Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

In a 2009 JSOU Press monograph reflecting on the education requirements for Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

personnel, Brigadier General Russ Howard (U.S. Army, 

retired) identified “cultural competency” as critical to SOF 

professional development. He returns to this theme with 

researchers Greta Hanson and Carly Laywell by answering 

this question: Why can some people act effectively in new 

cultures or among people with unfamiliar backgrounds 

while others, even highly respected people within their 

own group, stumble in those same situations? The research 

team asserts that cultural intelligence (CQ) makes the difference and describes a proficiency that goes beyond simply 

being intelligent, emotionally mature, or having good general social skills. Their message to SOF is that a person with 

high CQ, whether cultivated or innate, can understand and 

master situations, persevere, and do the right thing.

ISBN 978-1-941715-01-7

Cultural Intelligence for

Special Forces Personnel

Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell

JSOU Report 16-10

JSOU Report 16-10 Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel Howard, Hanson, and Laywell
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Education and 

Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics; Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 16-10

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

Cultural Intelligence for 

Special Forces Personnel

Brigadier General (Retired) 

Russell D. Howard, U.S. Army 

Greta Hanson 

Carly Laywell
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in November 2016.

ISBN 978-1-941715-01-7
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, 

Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq, August 2016, Patrick Paterson

Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, Region, and Culture Needs—

Leveraging Digital and LRC Learning to Reroute the “Roadmap” from Human 

Terrain to Human Domain, August 2016, Robert R. Greene Sands

The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, July 2016, Russell 

D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.

Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization. A Case Study of 

Task Force 714 in Iraq, July 2016, Richard Shultz

2017 Special Operations Research Topics, June 2016

Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in Unconventional Warfare, 

April 2016, Riley Post and Jeffrey D. Peterson

2016 Special Operations Essays, March 2016

The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing, February 2016, Jarret Brachman

Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments, January 2016, Robert Haddick

SOF Role in Combating Transnational Crime, January 2016

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, December 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion, 

November 2015, Colin S. Gray

On the cover. World map image used with permission from Shutterstock. 

Cover graphic by Clairvoyant Media Services.

Back cover. A team leader for a U.S. Special Operations Cultural Support 

Team hands out utensils during a women’s shura held at a local compound 

in the village of Oshay, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, 4 May 2011. Photo 

by Staff Sergeant Kaily Brown.
v

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................... vii

About the Authors .........................................................................ix

Introduction................................................................................... 1

1. The Technical Aspects of Cultural Intelligence ........................... 5

2. The Four CQ Components: Drive, Knowledge, Strategy, 

and Action .................................................................................. 11

3. Strategic Culture and Cultural Intelligence: Assets in 

a Dangerous World ..................................................................... 19

4. CQ and Operational Design: Complementary Acumen for 

Special Operations Campaign Planning....................................... 25

5. The Cultural Intelligence Assessment Process........................... 31

6. Making CQ Easy: 10 Cultural Clusters..................................... 35

7. Improving the CQ of Special Forces Personnel ........................ 45

8. Summing Up and Final Thoughts............................................. 51

Appendix A: Acronym List .......................................................... 59

Endnotes...................................................................................... 61

vii

Foreword

In a 2009 JSOU Press monograph reflecting on the education requirements 

for Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel, Brigadier General Russ 

Howard (U.S. Army, retired) identified “cultural competency” as critical 

to SOF professional development. He returns to this theme with researchers Greta Hanson and Carly Laywell by answering this question: Why can 

some people act effectively in new cultures or among people with unfamiliar 

backgrounds while others, even highly respected people within their own 

group, stumble in those same situations? 

The research team asserts that cultural intelligence (CQ) makes the difference and describes a proficiency that goes beyond simply being intelligent, 

emotionally mature, or having good general social skills. The empirical evidence offered in the research should resonate because SOF personnel will 

recognize operator attributes. These include bridging divides and knowledge 

gaps in an organization: transferring knowledge between otherwise disparate groups; and helping to build interpersonal connections and smooth the 

interpersonal processes in a multicultural team. 

The need for the SOF operator to effectively interact with interagency 

counterparts, indigenous peoples, and transnational, nongovernmental 

actors suggests that a predictive assessment of CQ potential and a toolkit 

of skills for professional development could be a key component of talent 

management and a source of competitive advantage. The authors argue that 

culturally intelligent personnel possess the potential to boost innovation and 

creativity due to their ability to help the team make best use of the multiple 

perspectives which are central to by, with, and through strategies. 

Howard, Hanson, and Laywell underscore the fact that successful people 

are not necessarily the multilingual, the executives, or socialites. They can 

be serious-minded quiet professionals. Their message to SOF is that a person 

with high CQ, whether cultivated or innate, can understand and master 

situations, persevere, and do the right thing.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

ix

About the Authors 

Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard is a senior fellow at the Joint 

Special Operations University (JSOU) and a senior advisor to Singapore’s Home Team Academy. General Howard was founding director of 

the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and head of the 

Department of Social Sciences at West Point, where 

he was also founding director of the Combating Terrorism Center. 

General Howard’s Army positions include chief 

of staff fellow at the Center for International Affairs, 

Harvard University, and commander of the 1st Special 

Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. 

Other assignments include assistant to the Special 

Representative to the Secretary General during UN 

Operations in Somalia II, deputy chief of staff for I Corps, and chief of staff 

and deputy commander for the Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian 

Advisory Group. He previously was commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special 

Warfare Training Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and 

served as administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner and as a 

special assistant to the commander of U.S. Southern Command. 

As a newly commissioned officer, Howard served as an “A” team commander in the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active 

component and served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During 

this period he served as an overseas manager of American International 

Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia, and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific Airlines. He was recalled to active duty in 1980 and served 

initially in Korea as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations 

Command at Fort Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 

1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 

General Howard has a B.S. in industrial management from San Jose State 

University and a B.A. in Asian studies from the University of Maryland. He 

also has an M.A. in international management from the Monterey Institute 
x

of International Studies and a master of public administration from Harvard University. He was an assistant professor of social sciences at the U.S. 

Military Academy and a senior service college fellow at The Fletcher School. 

His previous JSOU Press publications are Intelligence in Denied Spaces: New 

Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (2007), Educating Special 

Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment (2009), Cultural 

and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, 

and Potential Alternatives (2011), The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: 

Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? (2013), and The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces (2016). 

Greta Hanson grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota. She earned her B.A. 

in Russian Language and Political Science from St. Olaf College in 

Northfield, Minnesota. She is a graduate student at 

the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in 

Monterey, California, where she is working towards 

a Master of Arts in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. She works at the Monterey Terrorism 

Research and Education Program under the supervision of General Howard, leading research on cultural 

intelligence and its various applications. 

Carly Laywell is a researcher at the Monterey Terrorism Research and 

Education Program (MonTREP). She is a former Rotary Foundation 

Cultural Ambassadorial Scholar to France and a recent recipient of the State 

Department’s Critical Language Scholar for Arabic. A native Texan, she 

holds a B.A. from Southern Methodist University and an M.A. from the 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
1

Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

Introduction

Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel is the third culturerelated monograph the lead author has written for the Joint Special 

Operations University (JSOU). Published in 2011, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces Soldiers: Necessity, Acceleration, 

and Potential Alternatives was the first.1 It identified the need for Special 

Forces soldiers to gain competency in foreign languages in the post-Iraq and 

Afghanistan international security environment. It speculated that these 

soldiers will be deployed primarily in the so-called arc of instability, a swath 

of territory from the Caribbean to the Indonesian archipelago, which is home 

to hundreds, if not thousands, of different languages, dialects, and cultures. 

The monograph further speculated that these troops will need to be knowledgeable about the languages and cultures not only of their adversaries, but 

also, and as importantly, of the allies with whom they will work in this arc 

of instability. The monograph next explained that learning foreign languages 

and about foreign cultures are not mutually exclusive but mutually supporting, particularly when learned in tandem. Finally, and most important for 

this current work on cultural intelligence (CQ), the Cultural and Linguistic 

Skills monograph addressed the challenges of foreign language and cultural 

education and training, and determined that learning a foreign language is 

easier than learning about its related culture, for three main reasons. 

First, many countries in the arc of instability conduct everyday business and discourse in non-native second languages, such as English, French, 

Arabic, Spanish, and Russian. Therefore, it often is not necessary for Special 

Forces soldiers to learn the native tongue, as they can rely on one of these 

other languages, which they learn while in training and maintain throughout their careers. For example, the ability to converse in English, French, or 

Arabic will suffice in most parts of Africa. Second, technology will eventually produce software and lightweight hardware that will translate English 

into most languages, and vice versa, which will enable a Special Forces soldier, or, for that matter, any military person, diplomat, businessperson, etc., 

with a laptop and the right software to communicate in near real time with 

non-English speakers in most parts of the world. In fact, such technology is 

available now via Google and other search engines. Third, and most relevant 
2

JSOU Report 16-10

to this monograph, is the likelihood that future military personnel will be 

assessed for their ability to learn a foreign language, whereas no assessment 

vehicle has been available to measure their ability to learn about a foreign 

culture. This quote from the earlier monograph is instructive:

Unlike the case of foreign languages, where evidence exists that some 

have better aptitude for learning another language than others, there 

is no such reliable evidence regarding the learning of culture. Recent 

studies attempting to measure a person’s cultural intelligence (CQ) 

are interesting and informative, but inconclusive.2

However, this is no longer the case. There is now an assessment tool for 

measuring individuals’ cultural acumen, which is a central topic of this 

monograph. All Special Forces soldiers have taken the Defense Language 

Aptitude Battery (DLAB), which has been refined over the years to produce 

more definitive assessments of people’s ability to learn a foreign language. 

It is now sophisticated enough to predict fairly accurately what level of language difficulty a person can master. Few, however, know of the CQ assessment tool, which is better than the DLAB in at least one significant way: if the 

DLAB assessment determines that a Special Forces candidate does not have 

acumen in learning a foreign language, the soldier is dropped from consideration for Special Forces. Like the DLAB, the CQ assessment can also determine if a candidate lacks cultural education and training acumen. However, 

unlike the DLAB, the CQ assessment has a mechanism that suggests how the 

candidate can improve their CQ and thus improve their assessment score. 

The CQ assessment can also determine a person’s cultural orientation—that 

is, the culture(s) a person has a particular affinity for, which can accelerate 

their ability to work in that culture. At present there are 10 ‘cultural clusters’ 

that closely match the U.S. Special Forces Groups’ areas of operation. For 

example, a person with a cultural value orientation toward the ‘Confucian 

Asia Cluster’ and/or the ‘Southern Asia Cluster’ might be a better pick for 

1st Special Forces Group than a person with a ‘Latin America Cluster’ value 

orientation, who would likely do well in the 7th Special Forces Group.

Published in December 2013, the lead author’s second culture-related 

monograph for JSOU was titled simply, Strategic Culture.

3

 The monograph 

compared the strategic cultures of three nations and a non-state actor: Iran, 

China, North Korea, and al-Qaeda. Generally speaking, an analysis of strategic culture examines the motivators and conditions necessary for a nation 
3

Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

to use force. While several similarities and differences were noted among 

the four subjects, one cultural phenomenon stood out in all of them: mirror 

imaging. Mirror imaging is the incorrect assumption that, given similar 

circumstances and stimuli, an adversary of another culture will act in the 

same manner as one’s own. Unfortunately, the research found that U.S. leaders have all too frequently succumbed to mirror imaging when assessing 

the nation’s adversaries, which reflects poor cultural intelligence. This topic 

is covered in some depth in this third and final culture-related monograph 

for JSOU. 

Cultural Intelligence is the product of several months of interesting 

research and training for the lead author to qualify himself as a CQ practitioner and instructor, which included training sessions in Chicago and 

Kuala Lumpur. Although there is no magic formula for acquiring CQ, a person’s CQ ability can be measured and improved. This monograph addresses 

personal, strategic, and cultural situations in which high CQ capability is 

important. It also dives deeply into the CQ assessment process and explains 

why developing CQ skills is so important for Special Forces soldiers, particularly given the threatening environments these soldiers will face over the 

next several decades in the areas of the world where they will have to operate 

successfully. After describing the CQ assessment process, the monograph 

offers examples of what a personal CQ assessment looks like and explains 

how a person can increase his or her CQ.

A key benefit of having CQ acumen is that it enables a person to do a 

quick study of a particular culture. Studying the 10 culture clusters detailed 

in this monograph can enhance this ability. The clusters consist of groups of 

countries with broadly similar characteristics. These clusters can provide a 

quick study for Special Forces commanders required to go into unfamiliar 

cultural territory.

Finally, there is the ‘so what’ question: why CQ? Unlike the other culturerelated monographs for JSOU, which are primarily analytical and informative, this work advocates for the need to acquire CQ acumen, which is 

important for two main reasons. First, if a soldier who lacks CQ acumen 

is accepted into Special Forces, the authors believe it could have disastrous 

implications in the field. Second, and more importantly, the CQ assessment 

process gives prospective Special Forces soldiers the opportunity to increase 

their CQ if they come up short. Unlike IQ (intelligence quotient), which 
4

JSOU Report 16-10

according to most experts remains fairly constant throughout a person’s 

life, CQ can be improved. 

Cultural Intelligence has eight chapters. Chapter one describes the science behind the ability to assess the four components of CQ: drive, knowledge, strategy, and action. Chapter two continues the explanation of these 

four components, using vignettes and personal accounts to emphasize the 

importance of CQ. Chapter three puts CQ into a strategic context and 

notes how mirror imaging can have important international and strategic 

consequences—sometimes favorable and sometimes adverse. Chapter four 

provides an in-depth discussion of the CQ assessment process, using the 

lead author’s personal CQ assessment results as an exemplar. Chapter five 

discusses the relationship between CQ and operational design, which is 

a relatively new analytical procedure designed to help military planners 

address irregular warfare threats. Chapter six explains the 10 cultural clusters 

and describes how important having knowledge of the clusters can be to the 

geographically oriented Special Forces Groups. Chapter seven reviews how 

Special Forces soldiers can improve their CQ. 

The following CQ-related questions specific to Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) are answered in chapters two through eight:

1. Does the Special Forces community need a CQ assessment capability?

2. Is the CQ assessment process articulated in this monograph a functional cultural assessment tool for Special Forces soldiers?

3. Can good CQ acumen be beneficial to individual Special Forces soldiers 

as they carry out their duties?

4. Can senior Special Forces leaders benefit from CQ in the strategic 

planning process?

5. Can Special Forces Group commanders benefit from the cultural 

clusters CQ methodology?

6. Is the notion of improving CQ viable and important for the Special 

Forces community?

Chapter eight answers the ‘so what’ question by reviewing the importance 

of CQ to the Special Forces community. 
5

Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

1. The Technical Aspects of Cultural 

Intelligence 

Why do some people thrive in culturally diverse situations while others 

fail? The answer lies in a person’s cultural intelligence, or how successfully they function in diverse cultural settings.4

 Having good CQ does 

not imply that a person is well versed in all cultures, but that they are able 

to identify cultural patterns and have enough personal awareness to adjust 

their behavior as needed in an unfamiliar cultural situation. 

The history of CQ is surprisingly brief. In the past, cross-cultural interactions throughout the world were mostly limited to expatriate communities 

and transnational corporations conducting global business. However, in the 

last 50 years, the world has seen more than a 1,000 percent increase in the 

number of multinational companies.5 Most commonly referred to as globalization, this worldwide trend in interactive business operations has ushered 

in a tremendous increase in cross-cultural personal interactions, meetings, 

and business platforms; the strong influence of international business has 

made it nearly impossible for corporate entities to remain culturally isolated.

Today’s U.S. military forces—specifically Special Forces—also interact, 

collaborate, and work with their military counterparts around the world. 

While such interactions can be tremendously successful, getting the most 

out of collaborations with the militaries of other countries requires our soldiers to have solid CQ. The concept has been applied in the military for two 

decades, but it did not gain full recognition within the U.S. Department 

of Defense until the most recent counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.6

Despite its short history, the CQ field has undergone a rapid transformation from a theoretical construct to a scientific measure of intelligence. 

P. Christopher Earley of Purdue University’s Krannert School of Management and Dr. Soon Ang of Nanyang Technical University Business School 

in Singapore initially based the CQ model referenced in this monograph on 

the work of Robert Sternberg and Douglas Detterman, who claim that intelligence is a combination of mental capabilities and behaviors, and that every 

person has multiple loci of intelligence.7 Sternberg, a contemporary psychologist at Cornell University, is best known for his research on intelligence, love, 
6

JSOU Report 16-10

creativity, and cognitive styles. Detterman, a professor of psychology at Case 

Western Reserve University, has studied why some people are smarter than 

others since his career began in 1972.

Earley and Ang expanded on the Sternberg-Detterman premise by applying the multiple loci of intelligence theory to their own work with CQ, which 

they divided into four categories: motivation (drive), cognitive (knowledge), 

metacognitive (strategy), and behavior (action).8 The first three categories 

are brain-driven mental faculties, whereas the fourth—action—involves the 

entire body and relies on learned appropriate behaviors. While the sum of 

these four components represents an individual’s overall CQ score, each can 

be assessed and improved individually.

The first component of CQ is drive, which refers to an individual’s desire 

to learn, understand, and take part in culturally distinct practices.9 Individuals with a high level of CQ drive not only accept culturally diverse practices and situations, they actively seek them out and focus on participating 

successfully in such interactions. CQ drive consists of both intrinsic and 

extrinsic motivations, which relate to personal interests in foreign cultures 

and professional expectations, respectively. CQ drive is foundational to the 

rest of the CQ skill set and can be considered the most crucial component; 

aptitude is of little value if coupled with apathy, whereas inexperience can 

be overcome by the will to learn. 

The second CQ dimension is the cognitive, or knowledge, which signifies the cultural understanding learned through education and experience.10 

It thus refers to a person’s knowledge of the cultural practices, norms, and 

institutions of a given culture. This conception is different from previous 

approaches to cultural awareness, which focused almost exclusively on factual knowledge of other cultures, and success was contingent on the ability 

to memorize information rather than the ability to interact effectively with 

people from other cultures. 

Strategy comprises the metacognitive aspect of CQ—the ability to reflect 

on one’s own thought processes or the “processes individuals use to acquire 

and understand knowledge.”11 Strategy can be thought of as the ability to 

compare expectations with reality; CQ strategy involves checking one’s own 

cultural assumptions and contemplating those of others, and thus combats 

mirror imaging. Having a strong CQ strategy enables an individual to check 

stereotypes, anticipate differing points of view and social constructs, and 
7

Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

accurately interpret and appropriately respond to them in the moment of 

interaction.

While the other three pillars of CQ are crucial to successful cross-cultural 

experiences, they are limited to the mental faculties and are nothing without 

the ability to conduct oneself correctly. Aptly named, CQ action, or behavior, 

refers to one’s physical actions and demeanor. A high level of CQ indicates 

that an individual can use the appropriate gestures, words, tones, body language, etc., in diverse cultural situations.12 Advanced CQ action facilitates 

more positive interactions when traveling for business or pleasure, and helps 

individuals avoid offending the host culture. Behavioral CQ in turn leads to 

more productive interactions.

Increased research on cultural intelligence has coincided with increased 

attention to the subject and greater enthusiasm for its positive attributes. 

These developments have helped reinforce shifting attitudes when predicting 

a person’s professional potential. When accepting new students or hiring new 

employees, higher education institutions and corporations are now looking 

beyond academic performance and are paying increasing attention to the 

candidates as a whole. While grade-point averages and standardized test 

scores are important, a prospective hire’s demonstrated knack for establishing and maintaining human relationships, particularly in a multicultural 

environment, is at least equally important. The same is true of Special Forces 

soldiers, for whom standardized tests of their physical ability, psychological 

maturity, and the ability to learn a foreign language are important. So too 

is the ability to test for cultural intelligence acumen, which until recently 

had not been possible.

Business leaders are finding cultural intelligence an increasingly valuable 

asset, as employees with high CQ tend to have a stronger job performance 

than employees with low CQ. In business parlance, a person’s patience, 

leadership potential, negotiation abilities, and customer service and sales 

skills are just a few attributes positively correlated with high CQ.13 The same 

attributes benefit those in public service, particularly diplomatic and special 

operations careers. 

Moreover, CQ can predict how well an individual will adjust mentally 

and psychologically in a cross-cultural setting—an important factor in their 

professional success. For example, when thrown into new cross-cultural situations, those with high CQ will adjust more easily than those without. High 

CQ is similarly correlated with less mental fatigue and emotional exhaustion, 
8

JSOU Report 16-10

which in turn reinforces professional success. This facet of CQ will help those 

doing military service to remain mentally present while deployed and help 

limit the initial psychological shock of conflict. 

CQ is gaining recognition and importance in the private sector, and the 

same needs to happen in the public sector. CQ is especially relevant to military personnel serving in foreign cultures, as it can help soldiers and their 

commanding officers better understand their adversaries’ goals, motivations, 

and decision-making process.14

David Livermore has built on Earley and Ang’s research and continues 

to bridge the gap between the theoretical framework and practical application of CQ. Livermore, director of the Cultural Intelligence Center (CIC) in 

Holt, Michigan, divided the world into 10 cultural clusters: Anglo, Nordic 

Europe, Germanic Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin Europe, Latin America, 

Confucian Asia, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Arab.15 He then created 

a basic framework for CQ scholars that identifies the key characteristics of 

each group and provides basic advice for cultural adaptation. By using this 

cultural knowledge as a baseline, professionals and travelers alike can make 

informed predictions about what to expect when visiting or working with 

people from a given culture.

 It’s important to note, however, that Livermore’s 10 cultural clusters are 

just a starting point. Within the United States, for example, different cultures 

exist within the Northeast, the South, the Midwest, the West Coast, etc. The 

same is true, and highly relevant to military operations, of the Arab states, 

which do not all have the same culture. Rather, they share cultural characteristics that are unique to their region. 

The ability to recognize cultural nuances indicates that a person has 

strong CQ acumen, something they can build on once they have been 

assessed and know what their CQ capabilities are. Applying CQ is both 

strategic and practical, and Livermore’s work demonstrates that cultural 

intelligence is relevant not only to business professionals at transnational 

corporations, but also to public servants, military personnel, missionaries, 

tourists, educators, and others interested in expanding their cultural horizons. In an era with marked levels of cultural sensitivity, it is increasingly 

important for armed forces to display conscientious and respectful behavior 

in keeping with whatever culture they are embedded in. 

The benefits of CQ include increased understanding of adversaries’ goals, 

motivations, methods, and decision-making processes;16 the potential CQ 
9

Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

provides Special Forces personnel is unlimited. From a tactical standpoint, 

CQ can help “facilitate victory and potentially limit the duration and level 

of violence of modern warfare.”17 From a public relations standpoint, CQ can 

help win the hearts of the native populations the U.S. is serving. By respecting and working within foreign cultures, the U.S. military can create a model 

of mutual collaboration and respect, rather than conquest and occupation. 

This in turn will facilitate greater acceptance of a U.S. presence and a desire 

for further collaboration. Moreover, the leadership potential indicated by CQ 

is relevant to all who wish to display their abilities and advance their careers.

Some aspects of cultural intelligence overlap with other forms of intelligence, such as general, social, and emotional intelligence. Despite the similarities, CQ is distinct from these intelligence models, and from personality. 

CQ does not consist of innate characteristics and as such is not set in stone. 

Unlike IQ, which remains fairly constant throughout a person’s life, CQ is 

merely a snapshot of a person’s level of cultural intelligence at the time of 

the assessment. It reflects a combination of abilities that can vary from day 

to day, depending on the situation, and it can be developed and improved 

throughout a lifetime by traveling to foreign countries, working in a crosscultural setting, or actively studying other cultures.18 Moreover, while emotional, social, and cultural intelligence all help a person understand their 

own culture, only cultural intelligence suggests that a person has insights 

into other cultures.

This monograph will serve as a guide to CQ for those who need to operate 

in a multicultural environment, such as Special Forces soldiers. Case studies 

depicting CQ triumphs and blunders—some from a Special Forces perspective—will inform readers about the immense potential CQ offers, as well as 

the unwanted consequences that result when CQ is not adequately applied. 

Finally, assessment methods will provide relevant information for military 

personnel who decide to further their CQ training. 

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2. The Four CQ Components: Drive, 

Knowledge, Strategy, and Action 

As a construct, cultural intelligence incorporates multiple dimensions 

of mental and behavioral capabilities. Building on the multiple foci of 

intelligence theory, scholars Earley and Ang applied the psychological principles of motivation, cognition, metacognition, and behavior to the realm of 

cross-cultural interactions.19 The resulting schema of drive, knowledge, strategy, and action addresses four crucial components of successful interactions 

in cross-cultural situations. While the sum of these four components represents an individual’s overall CQ score, each can be assessed and improved 

individually. Individual component scores are not necessarily predictive of 

one another, meaning that a person who has a low score in one section will 

not necessarily have a low score in the other three, or vice versa. An individual’s drive, knowledge, strategy, and action collectively compose their 

CQ score, and each component represents a distinct and crucial element of 

their ability to succeed in multicultural settings. 

The Four Components of CQ

Drive. The first CQ component, drive, is foundational to the CQ skill set. 

In the words of CQ scholars Ang and Linn Van Dyne, drive is the ability to 

direct energy toward learning.20 Drive stems from both intrinsic motivation 

(such as a personal interest in other cultures) and extrinsic motivation (such 

as professional expectations), and it indicates an individual’s interest in and 

degree of confidence or self-efficacy in cross-cultural interactions. Aptitude is 

of little value if coupled with apathy, whereas inexperience can be overcome 

by the will to learn. In fact, all other aspects of CQ flow from an individual’s 

desire to learn and develop their cultural skills.21

Knowledge. The second CQ component is knowledge. Previous approaches 

to cultural awareness have focused almost exclusively on having factual 

knowledge of other cultures, and an individual’s success was contingent on 

their ability to memorize information rather than on their ability to interact 

effectively with people from other cultures. In contrast, the CQ model defines 

knowledge as a macro-level understanding of cultural systems.22 Rather than 
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rote memorization, CQ knowledge reflects an individual’s general awareness of cultural differences. In short, CQ knowledge is a mindset, not a list 

of facts. 

Strategy. Strategy is the metacognitive aspect of CQ; in essence, it’s the ability to reflect on one’s own thought processes. In the context of intercultural 

environments, strategy involves questioning one’s own cultural assumptions 

and contemplating those of others. It is a measure of an individual’s ability 

to compare their expectations with reality. As such, strategy combats the 

mirror imaging phenomenon—perhaps the most important point from an 

SOF perspective. Having strong CQ strategic ability enables an individual 

to anticipate differing points of view and social constructs, and to accurately 

interpret and respond to them in the moment of interaction. 

Action. While the previous three components of CQ are mental, action is 

behavioral. It refers to an individual’s ability to act appropriately in crosscultural environments.23 This includes the nuances of verbal interactions, 

as well as the subtleties of facial expressions and gestures. A person with 

well-developed action skills is able to intuit when to adapt to the norms of 

a new environment and, equally important, when not to. Action is thus the 

physical implementation of the three mental CQ capabilities. 

To place the four CQ components in context, consider the following 

vignettes. 

Vignette No. 1: Baffled in Brazil

John Q, a defense attaché at the U.S. embassy in Brasilia, plans to conduct a 

series of meetings with his counterparts at the Brazilian Ministry of Defense. 

This is his first assignment in Brazil, but he assumes that his previous experience elsewhere in Latin America is sufficient preparation. On the day of 

the meeting, he arrives at the scheduled time and is visibly frustrated when 

his Brazilian counterparts arrive nearly a half-hour later. His frustration 

mounts as the meeting is further delayed by small talk and several rounds 

of espresso. Mindful of his tightly packed schedule, John is anxious to get 

to the point, and by the time the meeting finally begins, he conveys his 

information directly and succinctly. His Brazilian counterparts, who all 

speak English, then update him on the status of several projects, although 

John is unclear about the details, due to the roundabout way they describe 
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their progress. As the meeting ends, John makes a hurried exit and rushes 

to his next appointment. 

Points to consider. Viewing this scenario through the lens of CQ reveals 

several areas for improvement. First, John appears to lack drive, as he shows 

little interest in learning about the Brazilian culture before his trip. In fact, 

John’s knowledge of broader cultural systems is also deficient. He expects his 

Brazilian colleagues to conform to American norms of punctuality, which 

differ greatly from those of other regions of the world. During the meeting, having more CQ knowledge would have equipped John to anticipate 

and bridge different styles of communication. Instead, to the Brazilians, 

John’s directness comes off as curt and his ‘strictly business’ approach cold 

and impersonal. With a better mastery of CQ strategy, John would have 

understood that cross-cultural communication is far more complicated than 

simply speaking a common language. Finally, John fails to adapt his behavior 

to the situation. His underdeveloped CQ action skills hamper his ability to 

communicate effectively with his Brazilian partners, and their relationship 

suffers as a result. 

A more thoughtful, CQ-informed approach to the situation might unfold 

as follows: John recognizes the importance of the strategic partnership with 

Brazil and wants to make a good impression on his counterparts. He also 

knows that his ambassador has high expectations, and any missteps may 

damage both his career and bilateral relations. The stakes are high, and 

he is driven to meet the demands of the situation. While he is unfamiliar 

with Brazilian culture, he has a cursory knowledge of how Latin America’s 

cultural values differ from his own, especially when it comes to time, and 

he adjusts his schedule accordingly. John also knows that Latin Americans 

often communicate in a more indirect, familiar manner, and he strategizes 

on how to convey his thoughts and engage his colleagues effectively. He joins 

in on the small talk before the meeting and thus finds his Brazilian counterparts receptive when they start to do business. John tailors his actions to 

the demands of this particular interaction and accomplishes his professional 

and personal goals for the meeting.

Vignette No. 2: Misguided in Mali

Jane Q, a psychological operations officer, was recently sent by U.S. Africa 

Command (AFRICOM) headquarters on temporary duty assignment to 
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Mali. Jane was chosen because she speaks fluent French and previously completed a complicated military information support operation in Haiti. Jane 

receives orders for a weeklong visit to the region, with arrival Sunday evening 

and departure the following Friday afternoon. At her first meeting with her 

Malian counterparts, Jane extends her hand to introduce herself, but the 

Malians keep their hands folded on their laps. What’s more, after what Jane 

considers an incredibly awkward introduction, her Malian counterparts 

pose several personal questions about her family. This occurs at every site 

visit. While she is able to communicate with her hosts in French, Jane feels 

they often do not fully understand one another, and she is frankly offended 

when several of them inquire as to when they will meet her boss. Jane is also 

frustrated to discover that the final site visit she has planned for Friday will 

be impossible because the site will be closed for the weekend. She is able 

to gather most of the information she needs to determine which sites will 

receive funding, but she returns to Stuttgart, Germany, feeling frustrated 

and confused by her interactions with her Malian colleagues. 

Points to consider. Based on her language skills and previous work experience, Jane appears to have the drive to understand other cultures. Unfortunately, her knowledge of cultural systems seems to be focused primarily 

on the Western Hemisphere and Christian cultures. Speaking French was 

insufficient to ensure clear communication with her hosts, and Jane had no 

discernable strategy for dealing with the major cultural differences between 

Mali and Western Europe. Consequently, her actions—such as attempting 

to shake hands with her Muslim male counterparts or balking at personal 

questions—were inappropriate. 

With the benefit of CQ assessment and training, Jane might have fared 

better on her trip. She could have used her CQ drive as an impetus to improve 

the other facets of CQ where she might be lacking. With just a bit of research, 

Jane would have learned that Mali is a predominantly Muslim country that 

operates on a Sunday through Thursday workweek. This also would have 

shed light on her interactions with the opposite sex and enabled Jane to 

strategize on how to assert herself while also putting her male colleagues at 

ease. While Jane may not feel comfortable divulging personal information 

to professional acquaintances, the fact that the questions arose at every site 

visit should have signaled to her that this is a Malian cultural norm. With a 

CQ strategy in place, she could have prepared stock answers that were vague 
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but polite, and reciprocated with similar questions as a show of respect to 

her Malian colleagues. A CQ-centered approach to these site visits would 

have honored both Jane’s unique identity and the culture of her local hosts. 

Therefore, perhaps a little CQ on the part of the AFRICOM HQ could have 

prevented this faux pas. 

Vignette No. 3: Blindsided in Beijing

A congressional delegation—composed of an influential senator, two ranking members of Congress, and high-ranking special operations advisors—is 

visiting China in an effort to promote bilateral counterterror operations. The 

American delegation invites a group of Chinese officials to a meeting at the 

U.S. embassy in Beijing, where they plan to discuss the finer points of the 

upcoming Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. The Chinese suggest meeting at their defense ministry, but the U.S. team (thinking of convenience) 

insists that it will be their privilege to host. On the day of the meeting, the 

Chinese officials, several of whom are in uniform, arrive at the appointed 

time. They shake hands and offer business cards to their American counterparts, who quickly tuck the cards away in their coat pockets. Once everyone 

is seated, a senator’s staffer formally welcomes the group and launches into a 

brief presentation that succinctly details America’s key regional counterterror policy points that should—in the staffer’s and the delegation’s opinion—

resonate with the Chinese. Afterward, she opens the floor for questions and 

is met with blank stares and silence. In the interest of encouraging dialogue, 

she singles out a young-looking Chinese official and elicits his opinion. When 

the time comes for the Chinese to make their presentation, a middle-aged 

man in uniform speaks at length in vague and sometimes confusing terms. 

On several occasions, he uses the phrase “drawing a snake with feet,” which 

prompts an American delegate to raise his hand and ask for an explanation. 

When the meeting concludes, all shake hands once again, and the Americans report to their superiors that the meeting was a success. Not long after, 

however, a counterterrorism portion of the RIMPAC exercise planning stalls, 

and the Americans are completely blindsided by the decidedly negative turn 

of events. 

Points to consider. At first glance, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what 

went wrong at this meeting. The Americans extended every courtesy to the 

Chinese officials, and their interactions were polite and professional. From 
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a CQ perspective, however, the Americans’ lack of knowledge about Chinese 

culture revealed a number of blind spots. The Americans were no doubt 

driven to bring about an agreeable outcome to their meeting, but their verbal 

and nonverbal communications appeared inconsiderate. The Chinese do 

not extend invitations lightly, and casually dismissing their offer to host the 

meeting was likely insulting. Moreover, while Westerners rarely examine a 

new acquaintance’s business card closely, the reverse is true in much of Asia, 

where name, rank, and title are matters of pride, and the chain of command 

is extremely important. Had the Americans examined the cards and taken 

note of their counterparts’ positions, they might not have made the mistake 

of acknowledging a younger, less experienced official over a senior colleague 

when asking a question. The Americans also did not adequately strategize 

ways to ensure clear communication with the Chinese. They were unaware 

of the indirect method of communication employed in China, and thus 

unprepared for the metaphor the Chinese official used. They could easily 

have sidestepped this problem by hiring an interpreter or by researching relevant terminology in Mandarin. In the end, the Americans’ actions reflected 

a great deal of room for CQ improvement. 

Vignette No. 4: A Katy Perry Faux Pas

The previous vignettes are composites of actual situations. However, one 

recent real-life incident demonstrates that even those with the wherewithal 

to develop CQ or hire people with CQ acumen fail to do so—at their own 

risk. Singer Katy Perry’s April 2015 concert tour is a case in point. Ms. Perry 

sparked controversy in China after a concert in Taipei, where she wore both 

a Taiwan flag and a sunflower-print dress during part of her performance. 

Many in the audience viewed her performance as a statement of solidarity 

with the 2014 pro-Taiwanese Sunflower Student Movement.24

Points to consider. Just over a year before, members of the Sunflower Student 

Movement occupied Taiwan’s parliament for 23 days, protesting a crossstrait trade agreement with mainland China. The students believed the pact 

would give mainland China too much economic and political power over 

Taiwan, and the sunflowers were used throughout the protest as a symbol 

of hope. Perry thus not only irritated Taiwan’s government, she also upset 

the leaders in Beijing who criticized her harshly, most likely believing that, 
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by draping herself in the Taiwan national flag, she supported the Taiwan 

independence movement. 

Perhaps Ms. Perry knew that the sunflower has special symbolism in 

Chinese culture and can be forgiven her faux pas, for in “Chinese symbolism, the sunflower represents long life, good luck and is considered very 

auspicious. Its yellow color signifies vitality and intelligence. It’s a symbol 

of happiness too.”25 She almost certainly did not know the student protest 

group had chosen the sunflower to symbolize the group’s anti-China cause 

for cultural reasons. However, that does not excuse her wearing the Taiwan 

flag, which anyone with a basic understanding of Asian politics and culture 

would know to be a rebuke of Mainland China, which considers Taiwan a 

breakaway province, not an independent state.

As these case studies illustrate, taking the time to prepare for, observe, 

and engage mindfully in multicultural interactions can pay long-term dividends. In all four of these stories, minor misunderstandings became major 

issues. Had the offending parties applied the four CQ components—drive, 

knowledge, strategy, and action—they could have avoided or at least corrected their mistakes. These examples demonstrate the ease and efficacy with 

which a person who has well-developed cultural intelligence can participate 

in intercultural exchanges, and with good results. 

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3. Strategic Culture and Cultural 

Intelligence: Assets in a Dangerous World26

Strategic culture—a nation’s set of beliefs, attitudes, and norms regarding 

the use of military force—is often molded by history and experience. 

While not a predictor of a state’s behavior per se, strategic culture in the 

hands of culturally attuned operators can do much to determine the triggers 

that might prompt a state to use military force. Strategic culture, like cultural 

intelligence, is a fairly recent phenomenon. Initially the product of a RAND 

study in 1947, strategic culture was first applied to the Soviet Union in an 

attempt to determine if, when, and how Moscow might use nuclear weapons. 

This chapter examines three historical examples where strong CQ could 

have been beneficial in a strategic culture context. These historical examples 

include the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the D-Day invasion, and Osama 

bin Laden’s attack on the United States on 11 September 2001.27

Where Were You When ... ?

Generally speaking, history is a slow process, but certain events—the attack 

on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944, the 

terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001—changed the course of 

history in an instant. The World War II generation could say exactly where 

they were when Pearl Harbor was attacked and when the first news of the 

D-Day invasion came over the radio. Those in more recent generations can 

say the same about 9/11. Much has been written about the successes and 

failures of these history-changing events, but what’s lacking or lost in most 

of the military and political research is the cultural component—the cultural 

factors that had a causal impact on all these events that altered, or in some 

cases set, the course of history.

Tora, Tora, Tora

Japan’s sneak attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was the deadliest foreign attack 

on U.S. soil up to that day, and remained so for half a century. “The assault, 

which lasted less than two hours, claimed the lives of more than 2,500 people, 

wounded 1,000 more, and damaged or destroyed 18 American ships and 
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nearly 300 airplanes.”28 Less known is the fact that 63 Japanese lost their lives 

in the assault—54 aviators and 9 submariners; the remains of 29 were never 

recovered.29 The Pearl Harbor attack was devastating for the U.S., but not the 

crushing blow Japanese leaders had predicted. “Remember Pearl Harbor!” 

became the rallying cry of an American public that until that day had been 

divided on whether or not to get involved in the war.

In the U.S., blame for the surprise of the attack centered on two military 

officers, Admiral Husband Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Navy Pacific 

Fleet, and General Walter Short, who was responsible for the defense of 

Hawaii. ‘Evidence’ of their failure included their underestimating a U.S. 

intelligence warning on 27 November of a possible Japanese attack. Kimmel 

was particularly criticized for having so many battleships at anchor—sitting 

ducks for the Japanese gunners. Short was criticized for a lack of defensive 

preparation, but even more for having all the island’s military aircraft lined 

up, wing to wing—hundreds more sitting ducks. Both Short and Kimmel 

were relieved of command for “dereliction of duty.”30

Pearl Harbor was the catalyst for the U.S. to join the allied war effort—the 

costliest American war in terms of treasure and blood, but also arguably 

the greatest victory. While much has been written about the U.S. failure to 

prevent the Pearl Harbor attack, little has been said about the cultural dimension, which holds important lessons relevant to the purpose of this narrative. 

Mutual cultural ignorance between the Americans and Japanese was in fact 

a major factor in the Pearl Harbor attack. American foreign policymakers 

knew little or nothing about Japan, and racial stereotypes of Japanese living 

in the U.S. were unflattering at best and often downright cruel. America 

tended to view Japan as a small island nation incapable of waging war against 

a modern Western power.31 When asked about his failure to heed intelligence 

warnings that the Japanese were preparing to attack, Admiral Kimmel is 

purported to have said, “I never thought those little yellow sons-of-bitches 

could pull off such an attack, so far from Japan.”32

Japan, in turn, had little understanding of the United States and her 

people. Other than Admiral Yamamoto, who had studied in the U.S., Japanese leaders responsible for international affairs prior to Pearl Harbor 

had little or no firsthand experience with Americans. The Japanese in fact 

regarded themselves as racially superior to their enemies and believed that 

“the Americans were too materialistic and individualistic to muster the 

national discipline necessary for a long and bloody war.”33 They also believed 
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that they were spiritually superior to the Americans, whom they regarded 

as an effete people devoted to their creature comforts and divided by political factionalism and racial and class strife. The Japanese were oblivious to 

the galvanizing effect their attack on Pearl Harbor was certain to have on 

American public opinion.34

While counterfactual history is not a well-accepted research method, 

one does have cause to wonder what might have happened if the U.S. and/

or Japanese government had had knowledgeable CQ analysts on staff prior 

to Pearl Harbor. Perhaps the “day that shall live in infamy” would have been 

just an ordinary day. 

The Allies Are Coming, but from Where?

The Allied invasion of Europe on 6 June 1944 was not exactly a secret. The 

Germans knew it was coming, but they did not know the date or the location. Keeping that information from the Germans was critical to the success 

of the landings in Normandy, and although their losses and mistakes were 

many, it could have been far worse for the Allies. It also could have gone 

much better for the Nazis—if the Germans had had better CQ.

Even before the D-Day landings, the Germans were the victims of Operation Quicksilver, one of the most successful military deception operations 

of all time. The Allies were able to pull it off, to a large extent, because 

German leaders had essentially no cultural intelligence. Operation Quicksilver was part of a much larger operation, Fortitude North and Fortitude 

South, which was implemented to convince the Germans that the allied 

forces had nine divisions poised to attack through Norway (Fortitude North) 

and nine through Calais (Fortitude South). But of course the 18 divisions 

didn’t really exist. Both operations had set up dummy headquarters that 

mimicked the communications patterns and procedures of the real thing, 

complete with dummy tanks, aircraft, and landing craft made out of plywood, and even some ‘blow-up’ tanks that looked real from the air. Double 

agents were used to plant stories about the fake divisions and the Germans 

were deceived, in part because the Nazis lacked air reconnaissance, and also 

due to their lack of CQ. 

In fact, the Germans’ lack of CQ was more than a contributing factor in 

the successful ruse. The Allies put General George S. Patton in charge of the 

fictitious organization. Patton was available because he had been relieved of 
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command of the 7th U.S. Army in Sicily for slapping two soldiers.35 General 

Eisenhower recalled Patton and reprimanded him for his actions. However, 

instead of returning him to the U.S., Eisenhower put him in charge of the 

fictitious operation. While not relishing the assignment, Patton played the 

part well, reporting to duty at the fictitious headquarters and even examining fictitious equipment. 

The Germans fell for the ruse and were convinced that Patton would lead 

the invasion of Europe across the channel at its shortest point, with a landing near Calais on the French coast. Patton was the Allies’ most daring and 

brilliant combat leader, thus the Germans could not imagine that he would 

not lead the attack. Their lack of CQ knowledge caused them to overlook 

the possibility that the U.S. Army would create a phantom operation and 

put Patton in charge of several nonexistent divisions. Moreover, due to the 

common CQ-related personality trap known as mirror imaging, the Germans most likely could not conceive that the most capable Allied combat 

commander could be relieved of command for “slapping privates,”36 and thus 

they were convinced that he was in charge of the expected invasion forces.37

The results are etched in history. The Germans, although they had enough 

strength at Normandy to make the Allied landing difficult, had earmarked 

some of their best forces for Calais to cover the anticipated landing site. If 

the Germans had better developed CQ that understood American war planning, strategy, and tactics rather than mirror imaging the Prussian way of 

war, the outcome of the Allied landing might have been completely different. 

9/11 in Retrospect: A Lack of CQ Results in Disaster

Much has been written about the failure of U.S. intelligence to ‘connect the 

dots’ prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Had the intelligence agencies done 

so, the attacks most likely would have been predicted and prevented, and 

thousands of lives saved. There was a good deal of evidence suggesting the 

attacks were coming, and the failure of U.S. communications and coordination among different federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies 

to pick up on the information and share it were the primary reason for the 

attackers’ success, as has been documented in the official “9/11 Commission 

Report.”38

However, the lack of CQ among policymakers was also a significant factor 

in the intelligence failure. To begin with, top military and policymaking 
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officials in the Bush administration did not take bin Laden’s 1996 fatwa

declaring a holy war against the U.S. seriously.39 One reason for this was the 

administration’s racial arrogance and cultural condescension that bears a 

striking resemblance to the cultural arrogance of the Roosevelt administration before Pearl Harbor. Disparaging terms such as ‘little yellow sonsof-bitches’ were used in the 1940s, whereas in the 1990s and early 2000s, 

al-Qaeda members were referred to as ‘towel heads.’ According to Michael 

Scheuer, who was fired from his job as head of the CIA’s “bin Laden unit” in 

1999, the Bush administration’s top personnel and policymakers were “so full 

of themselves” that they could not imagine that the rest of the world did not 

want to be like us. According to Scheuer, they believed America was invulnerable, particularly to the “unwashed, unlettered, unwhite, unshaved, and 

anti-feminist [Muslim] masses.” Scheuer noted the elites could not believe 

that “a polyglot bunch of Arabs wearing robes, sporting scraggly beards, 

and squatting around campfires in Afghan deserts and mountains could 

pose a mortal threat to the United States.”40 Americans are often blinded by 

what British strategist Ken Booth calls “strategic ethnocentrism, which is 

the inability to perceive other cultures or societies in an empathetic manner, 

or to understand them”—or, in the terminology of this monograph, a lack 

of cultural intelligence.41

However, bin Laden suffered from a similar lack of CQ vis-à-vis the 

United States. Indeed, cultural arrogance played a key role in al-Qaeda’s 

decision to attack the U.S. on 9/11.42 In fact, bin Laden made his decision 

to attack the Twin Towers based on two data points: the Marine barracks 

bombing in Lebanon in 1983, which was the deadliest terrorist attack on 

Americans at the time, and the Blackhawk Down disaster in Somalia in 1993. 

Both incidents convinced bin Laden that the U.S. was a “paper tiger” because 

of its rapid withdrawal of military forces from Lebanon and Somalia after 

suffering casualties.43 Bin Laden apparently assumed that, if the Americans 

would leave these two military outposts after experiencing fewer than 300 

casualties between them, Washington would do something similar if an 

attack caused more than 20,000 casualties. Like the Japanese before Pearl 

Harbor, bin Laden underestimated American resilience and ingenuity, and 

above all, the certainty that the U.S. would respond with force to any attack 

on the homeland. 
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Final Remarks

Many variables other than CQ certainly affected the war-related decisions 

presented in these three examples. While CQ should not be overemphasized 

in the decision to use force, warfare does have a CQ component. However, 

not all four CQ elements are always in play. Drive is assumed, in that a 

decision was made to go to war. One would expect knowledge of the enemy 

culture to be an important component of such a decision, but a lack of critical 

knowledge was a decisive factor in the three examples presented above. Had 

the Japanese, Americans, Germans, and bin Laden had a better appreciation 

and understanding of their adversaries’ cultures, they most likely would have 

applied different strategies and perhaps not have taken any action. Think of 

the lives and treasure that could have been saved if those deciding whether 

or not to go to war had well-developed CQ capabilities. It would have indeed 

changed the course of history. 
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4. CQ and Operational Design: 

Complementary Acumen for Special 

Operations Campaign Planning

Operational design, which refers to a broad analytical approach to 

achieving objectives and accomplishing missions, shares many inherent characteristics with cultural intelligence. Both are journeys of discovery 

with unclear goals, and both help to organize dynamic, nonlinear situations. More important to this discussion, however, is the possibility that CQ 

acumen can help to improve operational design. 

Operational design is defined as “a methodology for applying critical and 

creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them.”44 It was introduced 

into Army doctrine in 2008 as part of a program to help commanders and 

their staff understand the nature of complex military problems and improve 

their ability to use critical and creative thinking to resolve them.45 Perhaps 

most importantly, operational design helps people determine when and how 

to change the approach when confronting changing circumstances.46 Operational design is best used to address “ill-structured problems” characterized by unclear goals and an evolving strategy. A wealth of actors usually is 

involved, which means there will be a variety of opinions about the desired 

goals or whether a specific goal is attainable.47

Whereas operational design is a process intended to produce the most 

positive outcome for a challenging problem, cultural intelligence, as previously explained, is a person’s ability to function successfully in diverse 

cultural settings.48 Before discussing the relationship between CQ and operational design, however, it’s important to note that any definition of culture 

involves a wide set of parameters. For example, each branch of the armed 

forces has a unique culture, as do the various units within each branch. 

Government agencies also have unique cultures specific to their experiences, 

histories, and responsibilities. 

Operational design typically involves a wide range of actors, which may 

include military branches and units, government agencies, private-sector 

companies, international organizations, and even indigenous populations.49
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The different opinions, working styles, and attitudes toward teamwork these 

various cultures bring to the table can have a profound and sometimes negative effect on the strategies, approaches, and perspectives taken to operational 

design.50 Having well-developed CQ capabilities can help the actors involved 

navigate among the variety of cultures represented on an operational design 

team, and thereby increase the chances of success. 

Similarities

Practitioners of both cultural intelligence and operational design will find 

that the two share many theoretical characteristics. Like operational design, 

gaining CQ acumen is a journey of discovery, not a destination. The CQ 

score reflects a person’s current mindset, their personal experiences, and the 

level of cultural knowledge they have developed thus far. This score can be 

improved through academic study, cultural immersion, personal experience, 

and even by exercises designed to stretch a person’s confidence and comfort 

zone. In short, developing CQ is an ongoing process of improvement. 

Operational design is also a continuous and self-correcting process that 

must respond to an ever-changing environment: “Operational design adopts 

a skeptical posture regarding the finality of learning, or achievement of stasis 

in human situations. It assumes intervention in a situation by one party will 

elicit a variety of responses from other interested parties.”51

CQ and operational design both function in situations that lack a clearly 

defined end-state. The operational design process is intended to guide planners facing an environment that is nonlinear, dynamic, and requires flexibility—characteristics also applicable to the need for CQ. Strategies and action 

plans must continually interact with each other and readjust to changing 

situations. The cultural values and norms encountered can also change daily, 

as do individual opinions, preferences, habits, and personal experiences, all 

of which further complicate operations. With so many factors to consider, 

it’s impossible to achieve a 100 percent success rate—even in one’s native 

culture. In short, the constant adjustments needed to compensate for illdefined goals and changing strategies require tremendous flexibility. CQ and 

operational design, which both incorporate flexibility into their processes, 

can help SOF planners successfully navigate back and forth between changing strategies and actions.
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Differences

The differences between CQ and operational design highlight CQ’s ability to 

support and guide the operational design process. Developing a high level of 

CQ is an inherently personal journey, whereas operational design is largely 

a group effort. This difference complements the two and, to some degree, is 

what ties them together, as applying individual CQ is best when used to serve 

a group process and purpose, and to help achieve a successful end result. 

CQ’s Role in Operational Design

CQ can be of great benefit to operational design. When leaders execute plans 

without factoring in outside opinions and knowledge, greatly biased decisions can result, often with a negative impact. Adapting to outside opinions 

and knowledge is inherent in CQ, which makes it such a valid part of the 

thinking and planning involved in operational design. Not recognizing valuable cultural information in the context of operational design can be a fatal 

error, as cultural bias and assumptions may prevent critical information 

from being considered and understood. 

Leaders with considerable experience and success may inadvertently 

project egocentric tendencies, such as self-righteousness or shortsightedness. Egocentric tendencies can cause a person to feel superior due to their 

previous success, or to believe only they have the correct understanding of 

how the world works. This may cause them to overlook information that 

does not support their beliefs, values, goals, etc.52 In CQ parlance, egocentric 

characteristics are called mirror imaging, as noted earlier in this monograph. 

Well-developed CQ can help to combat mirror imaging in oneself and others, 

to identify gaps in understanding, and to develop an action plan to fix the 

problem.

Cultural intelligence can also aid operational design in terms of developing tactics and an action plan, particularly in balancing direct and indirect 

special operations actions. CQ could be seen as the yin to special operations’ 

yang, as it has been suggested that special operations seek to “push the line 

more to the right, where [action] is more indirect.”53 The effectiveness of an 

operation is directly related to commanders’ understanding of “the context 

of the complex issues facing the population,” and the CQ skill set will give 

operational designers a solid understanding of the culture in which an operation will take place, thus enabling them to factor in information needed to 
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design a successful operation.54 Familiarity with the cultural terrain will 

also allow operators to choose the best locations for various activities, drills, 

and missions. And, most importantly, in areas where accurate intelligence 

may be hard to come by, being able to converse with the local population 

may help operators obtain more accurate intelligence and thus to conduct a 

more successful campaign.

As noted in previous chapters, CQ strategy requires having enough personal awareness to evaluate one’s own cultural biases and potential points 

of friction, much as operational design can be considered an introspective 

part of special operations that “encourages continual reflection and discourse to develop inter-subjective (shared) meaning.”55 Reflecting on past 

experiences will allow practitioners of both CQ and operational design to 

examine what was successful or not, and to develop strategies that will help 

increase the chances of future success. Furthermore, CQ and operational 

design can complement each other in the details of planning an action, 

including a consideration of “all aspects of the human population in the 

operational environment and those of stakeholders, their institutions, and 

organizations,” which will enable them to come up with coherent strategies 

and plans.56

Reflecting on the operational design process, it is clear that multiple viewpoints can be beneficial in terms of innovation and collaboration, but they 

also can create divisions between groups in terms of the end goal and the 

steps needed to achieve those goals, which may cause disagreements and 

tension. A tactful CQ strategy can help the parties involved negotiate their 

various cultural biases and assumptions.

As noted, planning is the foundation of any operational design. When a 

situation changes and the execution must be readjusted, strategy and action 

intersect with each other. Such operations are often characterized by constant 

reframing and reevaluation in a short amount of time, and thus require a 

tremendous amount of flexibility and innovative thinking. CQ helps actors 

take stock of a situation and readjust their actions and behavior to the changing cultural landscape. It also can provide operational designers with tools 

to adapt to a changing theater quickly and effectively.
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Final Thoughts

In sum, cultural intelligence and operational design have many similar 

and mutually supporting characteristics, and CQ can significantly benefit 

the operational design process. CQ can provide a foundation for more successful operational design by helping designers and operators overcome 

common pitfalls, such as mirror imaging. Armed with greater knowledge 

of other cultures and understanding of the cultural inputs, designers will 

be better prepared to develop successful operations. Moreover, the skill sets 

that accompany strong CQ acumen will prove invaluable when navigating 

the space between expectations and actual outcomes. 

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5. The Cultural Intelligence Assessment 

Process

The cultural intelligence assessment provides an accurate measure of an 

individual’s cultural intelligence baseline within the four CQ pillars, 

revealing strengths and weaknesses and acting as a guide for improvement. 

As previously explained, the benefits of CQ are manifold and can help U.S. 

Special Forces achieve greater operational success. Assessing the CQ of Special Forces personnel is also an economical decision, as it facilitates the placement of personnel in the positions they are best suited for and eliminates 

those who lack CQ acumen. 

CQ assessment is a quick and painless process. Both self-assessments and 

a multi-rater assessment are available online through the CIC. The multirater assessment derives CQ results from a combination of a self-assessment and peer feedback from up to five individuals of the user’s choosing. 

Although this option is a bit more intensive and time-consuming, it provides 

the most comprehensive feedback and is applicable to a greater array of 

professions.57 Both options are processed by the CIC.58

Assessment can begin once the user has created an online account. The 

assessment is conducted survey style, and all questions are answered on 

a Likert scale, in which users mark whether they strongly, moderately, or 

slightly agree or disagree with, or feel neutral about, a given statement.59

The first section asks for the user’s demographic information and cultural 

experience, including the number of countries lived in, the number of languages spoken, and the amount of full-time work experience. Throughout 

the assessment, it’s important to think about culture in the broadest possible 

terms: interactions with people from different social classes and educational 

backgrounds, and with people of different ages and genders, are all considered cross-cultural interactions.

The remaining portion of the assessment asks the user about their behavior and preferences in cross-cultural situations, including the workplace. 

Questions ask whether behavior changes in multicultural settings, if volume 

or tone of voice changes, and how the user feels they compare to their peers 

and professional colleagues. The user is also asked to express a preference 

for working solo or in a group, and for operating within rigid guidelines or 
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with room for individualization. All of these questions contribute to the 

user’s CQ score and help them understand which type of culture they likely 

will work best in and which cultures they have the most in common with. 

Users of the multi-rater assessment ask a minimum of three (five or more 

is optimal) people to complete the survey on their behalf, which is combined 

with the user’s self-assessment to produce the results. This combination provides the most accurate overview of a person’s CQ, and as such is preferred 

in professional settings. When completed, the surveys are sent by e-mail to 

the CIC to be processed and interpreted by professionals. 

The results include detailed feedback on the four CQ pillars—drive, 

knowledge, strategy, and action—and also provide insight into the subdivisions of each category. For example, CQ drive is broken down into intrinsic 

interest, extrinsic interest, and self-efficacy, which refer respectively to the 

level of enjoyment derived from culturally diverse experiences, the benefits 

gained from such experiences, and the level of confidence one feels during 

such experiences.60

Knowledge is broken down into business, values and norms, sociolinguistics, and leadership. These subcategories relate to knowledge of economic and 

legal systems; values, social interaction norms, and religious beliefs; knowledge of a foreign language and its norms of communication; and knowledge 

about working and cultivating relationships with people of foreign cultures.61

CQ strategy includes three subcategories: planning, awareness, and 

checking. Planning refers to the strategy a person develops before a culturally diverse encounter, whereas awareness refers to how well an individual 

can perceive his behavior while in culturally diverse situations. Checking 

involves evaluating the assumptions one had going into a culturally diverse 

situation and readjusting them as necessary.62

Finally, CQ action is subdivided into speech acts—verbal, and nonverbal. 

Speech acts pertain to the manner and content of one’s communications, 

or how direct the communications are. For example, cultures within the 

Arab cluster tend to communicate directly and take things literally, whereas 

Anglo cultures tend to be indirect and are accustomed to looking for deeper 

meanings.

The assessment results will also enable users to see how they compare 

with worldwide norms in each of the four pillars and their subdivisions. 

The worldwide norms are derived from CQ assessments of over 35,000 individuals across the globe. Scores in the bottom 25 percent are considered 
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low range, moderate range scores are the middle 50 percent, and the top 25 

percent represent the high range. Users are able to compare their self-ratings 

with the observer averages.63

Users also are rated on their potential global effectiveness in four categories—cross-cultural adaptability, judgment and decision-making, negotiation, and strategic leadership—all of which are important components of 

cross-cultural success. The results will also inform users of their potential 

in these areas and provide strategies for improvement where necessary.64

This portion of the assessment is especially relevant to Army Special Forces 

selection. The assessment process acts as a screening tool so supervisors and 

officers can make the most practical decisions when making culturally sensitive assignments. CQ assessments provide the information needed to prevent 

soldiers from being assigned to units or positions where their intercultural 

acumen is not a good match. 

Perhaps the most interesting results inform users how their cultural preferences compare to cultures throughout the world. Individuals tend to have 

personal preferences and a strong orientation toward certain cultural values 

that sometimes, but not always, reflect their own national culture.65 The 10 

distinct cultural clusters will be discussed more in the next chapter. These 

clusters help Special Forces assessment personnel determine which cultural 

region a newly minted Green Beret is likely to serve in most effectively. 

Special Forces soldiers have a military presence throughout the world, and 

the CQ assessments help to ensure that each is assigned to a posting where 

they have the best chance of success, due to an affinity for a given culture. 

Moreover, the assessment results provide data that show which soldiers will 

adapt to new cultures most readily.

Most importantly, the assessment includes reflection questions in each 

category and a personalized action plan that an individual can use to 

improve their CQ. When interpreting the assessment results, it is important 

to remember that CQ is a malleable combination of abilities and capabilities. Moreover, unlike IQ, CQ can be improved through a combination of 

training, personal experience, and education.66 The CQ assessment is a fluid 

process that reflects the user’s frame of mind at the time of assessment and 

can be affected by such factors as mood and level of fatigue.67

While cultural intelligence is a new field, the CQ assessment has been 

academically validated.68 Three measurements have been conducted to ensure 

the experiments are sound and the results should be accepted. The first, 
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internal validity, is a measure of confidence that tells researchers the extent 

to which they can trust that no variables besides the one they are studying 

have caused or influenced the results.69 The higher the score, the more internal validity a project has. In the case of CQ research, the internal validity 

exceeds the standard cutoff of .70.70

Convergent validity measures the degree to which two variables are 

theoretically related.71 In the case of CQ, the self-assessment and observer 

scores are theoretically related, and the convergent validity supports this 

assumption.72

Discriminant validity is the opposite of convergent validity, as it measures how disconnected two theoretically unrelated factors actually are.73 In 

terms of CQ, discriminant validity relates how disconnected a person’s CQ 

is from their personality, general mental ability, or emotional intelligence. 

The statistical findings ensure that CQ is distinct from all three.74

One key thing to remember about assessment is its utility. The assessment takes little time and effort to complete, and the results offer valuable 

feedback to users from all backgrounds. Students, missionaries, international 

businesspeople, government officials, and travelers alike will find that this 

assessment provides an accurate reading of their cultural intelligence. Most 

importantly, the assessment will provide insight into how users can increase 

their CQ, and thereby improve their professional and personal performance 

in culturally diverse situations.
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6. Making CQ Easy: 10 Cultural Clusters

As discussed in previous chapters, CQ knowledge refers to an individual’s understanding of non-native cultures, and how their native culture 

informs their thoughts and actions. Such knowledge is crucial to CQ, but 

it can’t be achieved by memorizing a list of pleasantries and faux pas for 

every culture. In order to prioritize and simplify regionally specific cultural 

characteristics, CQ knowledge has been broken down into 10 cultural clusters that divide the globe into more manageable categories. The clusters are 

Anglo, Nordic Europe, Germanic Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin Europe, 

Latin America, Confucian Asia, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Arab.

First developed by scholars Simcha Ronen of Tel Aviv University and 

Oded Shenkar of The Ohio State University, these 10 clusters represent groups 

of cultures that share certain intellectual and behavioral patterns, typically 

due to a combination of shared history, religion, language, and/or geography.75 They are not meant to be exhaustive, and each cluster is widely diverse. 

The clusters also are not meant to prescribe how people of a given culture 

should behave, nor do they make any value judgment. However, cultural 

clusters do provide a foundation for cross-cultural interactions, which can 

be added to through personal observation and experience.

Before delving into detailed descriptions of the 10 clusters, there are a few 

guidelines for how to use them most effectively. Cultural clusters are primarily descriptive, thus they are most effective when used to compare multiple 

cultures rather than to define a single culture. They are meant to highlight 

the ways different cultures might approach the same situation, which often 

depends on overarching historical, religious, or social paradigms. One must 

beware of making generalizations based on these clusters, and on one’s own 

cultural biases and predispositions. These clusters do not reflect the full 

diversity of global behavior, but when used knowledgeably they can provide 

guidance without dictating every action—more like a compass than a GPS.

To enable comparisons between the cultural clusters, they have been 

assessed using a standard set of value dimensions. Also by no means 

exhaustive, the seven dimensions (see Table 1) identify major cultural differences and indicate which end of the spectrum a given culture falls on: 
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JSOU Report 16-10

Individualism-Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Cooperate-Competitive, Time Orientation, Context, and Being-Doing. 

Table 1. The Seven Cultural Value Dimensions76

Individualism-Collectivism Individualism: Individual goals and rights are more 

important than personal relationships 

Collectivism: Personal relationships and benefiting the 

group are more important than individual goals

Power Distance Low Power Distance: Status differences are of little 

importance; empowered decision-making is expected 

across all levels 

High Power Distance: Status differences should shape 

social interactions; those with authority should make 

decisions 

Uncertainty Avoidance Low Uncertainty Avoidance: Focus on flexibility and 

adaptability; tolerant of unstructured and unpredictable 

situations 

High Uncertainty Avoidance: Focus on planning and 

reliability; uncomfortable with unstructured or unpredictable situations 

Cooperative-Competitive Cooperative: Emphasis on cooperation and nurturing 

behavior; high value placed on relationships and family 

Competitive: Emphasis on assertive behavior and 

competition; high value placed on work, task accomplishment, and achievement 

Time Orientation Short Term: Values immediate outcomes more than 

long-term benefits (success now) 

Long Term: Values long-term planning; willing to sacrifice short-term outcomes for long-term benefits (success 

later) 

Context Low Context: Values direct communication; emphasis 

on explicit words 

High Context: Values indirect communication; emphasis 

on implicit understanding 

Being-Doing Being: Social commitments and task completion are 

equally important; diffuse boundaries between personal 

and work activities 

Doing: Task completion takes precedence over social 

commitments; clear separation of personal and work 

activities 
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The 10 clusters are described below, organized by the five Special Forces 

groups’ geographic areas of responsibility and summarized by their respective cultural value dimensions. The following reflects changes in group orientations, in that 3rd Group will be returning to Africa in the near future.

1st Group: Asia

Confucian Asia

China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.

The cultural value dimensions of the Confucian Asia cluster center on one 

single concept: promoting harmony. This tenet, called li in the Confucian 

tradition, is meant to bring about order and demonstrate respect and goodwill toward humankind. First-time visitors to this cluster region are often 

intimidated by the countless unwritten rules that govern everything, from 

personal greetings to table manners to business meetings, but these rules 

are simply the manifestation of li. This pursuit of harmony informs every 

facet of Confucian life, from birth to death, from the mundane to the sacred. 

Communication is also intended to promote harmony and preserve dignity 

(‘save face’). This cluster prefers indirect communication and draws from 

a wealth of nonverbal gestures and facial expressions. Many languages in 

Confucian Asia are rich with metaphors and proverbs that allow speakers 

to convey their thoughts without appearing impolite or overly harsh. Li also 

dictates a certain hierarchy of interpersonal relationships. Confucian Asia 

is the most collectivist culture in the world, and the commitment to family 

and other intimates is unparalleled in the other clusters. Divided into five 

archetypal relationships, li clearly identifies authority in every situation and 

defines specific roles for the leader and follower in each scenario. Memorizing the five relationships is less important than understanding the overall 

dynamic. When visiting a culture within this cluster, one must be aware of 

this paradigm and make every attempt to determine which role they are 

ascribed in each situation. Li is ultimately meant to bring about ren, or inner 

harmony and peace of mind. 

Confucian Asia Cultural Value Dimensions: Collectivist, Moderate Power 

Distance, Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Cooperative, LongTerm Time, High Context, Moderate Being-Doing
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South Asia

India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, etc.

The South Asia cluster is defined by its vibrant diversity, and the region 

provides a feast for the senses: the mouth-watering smells of a night market 

in Singapore, the soothing touch of a Thai massage, the awe-inspiring site 

of the Taj Mahal, the warming spice of Burmese curry, and the lively beat 

of Bollywood music. The most densely populated region in the world, South 

Asia embraces every major world religion, thousands of languages, and an 

abundance of cultural, artistic, and culinary traditions. Nevertheless, there 

are certain commonalities that unite the broader region and also distinguish 

it from Confucian Asia. While South Asia is highly collectivist, it is more 

accepting of individual self-expression and more forgiving of those who fall 

outside the social norm. However, South Asia still values social status. The 

Indian caste system is a prime example: each rung on the ladder is clearly 

defined, and people know which rung they occupy. Most of South Asia was 

subject to European colonization at one time, and certain vestiges of colonial 

influence remain. This can be observed in the enclaves of British, Portuguese, 

and Dutch expats, and in the value conferred on professional status over 

personal status. South Asians are consummate hosts and often go out of 

their way to make visitors feel welcome. When visiting cultures within this 

cluster, it is important to bear in mind the diversity of beliefs and expression 

throughout South Asia, and to follow the cues given by local colleagues and 

hosts to determine appropriate behavior.

South Asia Cultural Value Dimensions: Collectivist, High Power Distance, 

Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Cooperative, Moderate Time, 

High Context, Moderate Being-Doing

3rd Group: Afghanistan and Pakistan (Returning to Africa 

in the Near Future)

Afghanistan and Pakistan

These neighboring nations drive home the notion that the 10 cultural clusters 

need not be exhaustive to be effective. The cultures of Afghanistan and Pakistan do not fall neatly into one all-encompassing cluster, but examining them 
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through the lens of the cultural value dimensions and comparing them to 

nearby clusters sheds light on how to approach interactions with the Afghan 

and Pakistani cultures. Geographically speaking, Afghanistan and Pakistan 

belong to one of the clusters discussed above, South Asia. The British Indian 

Empire ruled Pakistan, along with India, Burma, and Bangladesh, until 1947. 

Despite the intense rivalry that persists between Pakistan and India, their 

cultural similarities are undeniable. Much like the South Asia cluster, most 

Pakistanis are highly aware of social status and adhere strictly to familial 

and societal expectations. Afghanistan was also subject to British invasion in 

the 19th century, and subsequently suffered at the hands of the Soviets in the 

20th century and the Taliban in the 21st. Lacking the political and economic 

stability that underpins civic society, Afghan culture is primarily a product 

of family and tribal structures. Afghanistan and Pakistan also have a great 

deal in common with the Arab cluster, discussed below. It is imperative to 

note, however, that although they are majority Muslim nations, neither is 

ethnically Arab, nor do they speak Arabic. 

Afghanistan Cultural Value Dimensions: Collectivist, High Power Distance, 

High Uncertainty Avoidance, High Cooperative, Short-Term Time, High 

Context, Being

Pakistan Cultural Value Dimensions: Collectivist, High Power Distance, 

Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Cooperative, Short-Term Time, 

Moderate High Context, Moderate Being-Doing

Sub-Saharan Africa

Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, etc.

Grouping the numerous countries of sub-Saharan Africa within a single 

cluster may appear to belie their diversity, but the same cultural undercurrents flow throughout the region. Chief among them is kinship, an idea best 

expressed by the Bantu term ubuntu, which is a philosophy of interconnectedness and codependence. This idea extends beyond the immediate family 

to include one’s clan, tribe, or ethnic group. Ubuntu teaches that life should 

not be lived in isolation and that personal success should not be sought at the 

expense of a brother’s failure. The importance of family within this cluster 

cannot be overstated, and it is common to inquire about family matters 

during introductions and greetings. Family and relationships, rather than 

time, are of the essence, and being personable is valued over being punctual. 
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Nevertheless, the evidence of European colonization in sub-Saharan Africa 

is plentiful, from the widespread use of French, English, and Portuguese to 

the prevalence of Christianity. Religion plays a critical role in daily life in this 

cluster, which perceives a great degree of unity and connection between the 

spiritual and physical worlds. Islam and Christianity are widely practiced, 

but they tend to have a distinctly local flavor and are frequently mixed with 

animism and tribal religions. 

Sub-Saharan Africa Cultural Value Dimensions: Collectivist, Moderate 

Power Distance, Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, Cooperative, Short-Term 

Time, High Context, Being

5th Group: Greater Arabia

Arab

Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, etc.

This cluster is one of the most important on the global stage today, yet it is 

widely misunderstood by outsiders. Within the region itself, ‘Arab’ implies 

a cultural and linguistic identity more than an ethnic identity. While Islam 

is the predominant religion of the Arab cluster, Christianity and Judaism are 

also scattered throughout. Moreover, there are widely varying interpretations 

of sacred texts and differing schools of thought even within Islam. This is 

evident in the various forms of dress for both men and women, as not all 

Arab women wear a headscarf, or hijab, nor do all men wear a tunic, or djellaba. Certain tendencies, however, are common throughout the region. The 

Arab cluster is extremely collectivist, and Arabs respect the patriarchal and 

hierarchical authority of the family. When faced with the unknown, Arabs 

frequently say Inshallah, meaning “God willing.”77 As a result, they tend to 

be more focused on the short term, leaving the future in the hands of God. 

Arab Cultural Value Dimensions: Collectivist, High Power Distance, Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Cooperative, Short-Term Time, High 

Context, Being
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7th Group: Latin America

Latin America

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, 

Venezuela, etc.

Due to the long history of European colonization in Latin America, the Latin 

American cluster exhibits many of the same traits as Latin Europe, although 

often in a more exaggerated form. For example, Latin America is particularly 

paternalistic, both politically and socially. The Catholic Church also has 

undeniable and palpable influence in many aspects of daily life. That said, 

a number of important differences distinguish Latin America from other 

clusters. Family is the arbiter of social power in Latin America, more so than 

in almost any other region. Latin Americans are devoted first to their families, and they deeply respect the family hierarchy. Latin Americans work to 

live rather than live to work, and they put their personal, family, and social 

lives ahead of their professional ambitions. They do not value punctuality 

or a devotion to schedules in the way their North American counterparts 

do. When faced with uncertainty, they seek to alleviate it through their 

relationships with God, family, and friends. 

Latin America Cultural Value Dimensions: Collective, High Power Distance, High Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Cooperative, Moderate Time, 

Moderate High Context, Being

10th Group: Europe

Anglo

Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, U.S., etc.

Covering every corner of the globe, the geographically dispersed Anglo cluster is united by a common language and a historical connection to Mother 

England. Over the centuries, this cluster has fused the Old World sensibilities 

of its European origins with a pioneering and entrepreneurial spirit. These 

cultures are often seen as ‘strictly business,’ whether in their preference for 

direct communication or their tit-for-tat view of human interactions.78 The 

common adage ‘there’s no such thing as a free lunch’ concisely conveys their 
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firmly held belief that everything comes at a price. This applies to their perceptions of time as well. The Anglo cluster runs like clockwork, especially in 

professional environments, and punctuality is essential; as is often said, ‘time 

is money.’ Cultures in the Anglo cluster value individualism and personal 

space, both literally and figuratively. The U.S. in particular is defined by its 

need for elbow room, and Anglos on the whole prefer a lot of personal space. 

They closely guard their privacy and typically avoid discussion of personal 

finances, religious beliefs, and politics. 

Anglo Cultural Value Dimensions: Individualist, Low Power Distance, Low 

Uncertainty Avoidance, Competitive, Short-Term Time, Low Context, Doing

Latin Europe 

France, French- and Romansh-speaking Switzerland, Italy, Portugal, 

Spain, etc.79

The powerful influences of the Catholic Church and the Roman Empire 

continue to define modern-day Latin Europe. In contrast to the Germanic 

and Eastern European clusters, Latin Europe is distinctly paternalistic in 

terms of both politics and, to a degree, gender relations. Politically, governments in this cluster expect the devotion of their citizens in exchange for 

stability and protection. Socially, while men and women enjoy equal rights, 

there are vastly different expectations around their societal roles and social 

norms. Despite this cluster’s general tendency toward secularism, the Roman 

Catholic Church wields significant power, which partially explains these cultures’ awareness of and deference to authority. Latin Europeans embody the 

aphorism ‘work hard, play hard’ and are motivated as much by professional 

status as personal contentment. They believe that one should not interfere 

with the other, and thus put equal energy into ensuring the quality of their 

personal and their professional lives. 

Latin Europe Cultural Value Dimensions: Moderate Collectivist, Moderate Power Distance, High Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Cooperative, 

Moderate Time, Moderate Context, Moderate Being-Doing
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Eastern Europe

Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, 

Russia, Serbia, etc.

Arguably the most diverse of the 10, the Eastern European cluster encompasses a vast array of religious, linguistic, and cultural groups. Nevertheless, 

they all have a history of frequent invasion and conquest. Eastern Europeans 

have been both colonizers and the colonized, and their recent history is 

marked by geopolitical upheaval. As a result, their loyalties lie more with 

ethnic groups and family clans than with the state.80 These cultures have a 

strong sense of hierarchy, and when it comes to decision making they defer 

to and respect authority figures. They are collectivists within the confines of 

their tightknit groups and are understandably wary of outsiders. Although 

they are often demonstrative and affectionate with one another, this rarely 

extends to foreigners. Harsh climates and unforgiving terrain dominate this 

cluster, and its people shoulder the burden with those closest to them. The 

threshold for earning their trust is high, but once earned it is not easily lost. 

Eastern Europe Cultural Value Dimensions: Moderate Collectivist, Moderate Power Distance, Low Uncertainty Avoidance, Moderate Competitive, 

Short-Term Time, Moderate Context, Moderate Being-Doing

Nordic Europe

Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, etc.

Nordic countries consistently top the world rankings in quality of life and 

human development. Although decidedly secular and at times even antireligion, they have an unwavering faith in work-life balance, and generous 

holiday and parental leave benefits are the regional standard. This egalitarian 

philosophy extends to nearly every facet of daily life in this cluster. Although 

the Nordics are individualists, they are equally committed to ensuring autonomy and personal freedom for all their citizens. Scandinavians go to great 

lengths to avoid standing out or calling attention to themselves, whether in 

their fashion choices or their professional lives. Scandinavian furniture and 

clothing designs echo this understated ethos, as they promote functionality, 

simplicity, and minimalism. These values extend to personal interactions 
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in the Nordic cluster, which favors direct communication, punctuality, and 

efficiency, traits that are often perceived as dry or impersonal.

Nordic Cultural Value Dimensions: Individualist, Low Power Distance, Low 

Uncertainty Avoidance, Cooperative, Short-Term Time, Low Context, Being

Germanic Europe

Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, German Switzerland, etc.

This small but economically mighty cluster includes most of the countries 

of Western Europe. Although this group shares some traits with the Anglo, 

Nordic, and Latin European clusters, its significantly unique differences 

merit a separate category. Like its neighbors, Germanic Europe is highly 

individualistic and characteristically blunt in terms of communication style. 

Unlike its neighbors, however, this cluster values order above almost all else. 

These cultures adhere strictly to rules and regulations and believe that proper 

planning and legislation mitigate risk. They tend to shy away from an ostentatious show of wealth or power and are markedly task and goal oriented. As 

such, a person’s status is generally less important than their ability.

Germanic Europe Cultural Value Dimension: Individualist, Low Power 

Distance, Moderate Uncertainty Avoidance, Competitive, Moderate Time, 

Low Context, Doing
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7. Improving the CQ of Special Forces 

Personnel 

Most anthropologists will say the most efficient way to learn about 

another culture is to immerse oneself in it: live there, learn the 

language(s), and experience daily life over an extended period of time. In 

short, the “best way to really get to know another society and its culture is 

to live in it as an active participant.”81 Joint exercises for training, military 

training teams, and joint exercises conducted by the five regionally aligned 

Special Forces groups ensure that members of the various groups have scheduled opportunities to be immersed in a foreign culture. Even so, most Special 

Forces soldiers do not have the opportunity to do so for any extended period 

of time.82 The following narrative describes alternative methods for improving CQ that are available to U.S. Special Forces.

Before improving CQ, one must first determine his or her CQ baseline. 

Although a formal assessment is the most reliable method, it is also possible 

to gauge CQ ability through self-assessment. An honest, objective self-assessment should enable an individual to identify their strengths and weaknesses 

across the four CQ components: drive, knowledge, strategy, and action. There 

are exercises people can do to correct their CQ deficiencies, and whatever 

a person’s level of CQ acumen, they will always benefit from improvement: 

those with superior CQ skills will gain an even greater advantage, and those 

with less than stellar CQ ability can take steps to improve. It’s important to 

note that improving one aspect of CQ will likely have a beneficial effect on 

the other aspects as well.

Drive is perhaps the most important CQ pillar, as it’s unlikely a person 

without drive will ever make an effort to improve their CQ. There are a few 

exercises that can help people increase their drive. One is to read case studies, as learning about the role CQ plays in successful operations can guide 

future efforts, and discovering how solid CQ helped lead to that success 

might spark a person’s interest in the field. Moreover, learning how CQ could 

have made a difference in failed operations might give a person a sense of 

urgency to increase their CQ.

Learning a foreign language can also help increase CQ drive, as having 

measurable benchmarks, such as being able to order a meal or ask for the 
46

JSOU Report 16-10

restroom, can motivate individuals to improve their language and cultural 

skills. In short, success breeds success. Furthermore, language consists of 

so much more than vocabulary and grammar rules; idioms, phrases, and 

even fables say a lot about the values and historical lessons of a particular 

culture. In this sense, learning a foreign language can provide the motivation 

to increase both drive and knowledge.

 For those with little time to invest in gaining foreign language proficiency, learning even a few simple phrases of greetings and thanks can have a 

similar effect. The ability to address someone in their own language, regardless of pronunciation or grammar, at the very least indicates one’s interest 

in that culture. This often elicits an enthusiastic response from the host and 

may pique the speaker’s personal interest and boost their confidence.

Military personnel—particularly Special Forces personnel—have several opportunities to learn foreign languages. Some Special Forces soldiers 

receive language training at the Defense Language Institute (DLI), which 

offers some of the best language instruction in the United States. DLI, which 

is part of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, offers instruction in 

24 languages. Qualified military personnel can gain basic competency in a 

foreign language in as little as 26 weeks.83

Most Special Forces soldiers receive language training as part of the 

Special Forces Qualification Course taught at the John F. Kennedy Special 

Warfare Center and School, which currently teaches 16 primary languages.84

Special Operations Forces Teletraining System Language Training, a new 

language instruction program facilitated by the Special Operations Forces 

Language Office, provides U.S. Special Operations Command students the 

opportunity to study languages remotely.85 Having the flexibility to study at 

any time of day in any location that has reliable Internet access will enable 

more service members to gain valuable language skills. Besides offering 

flexibility, the program teaches languages that are outside the usual core 

offering.86

Knowledge is perhaps the simplest CQ component to increase, and the 

Armed Forces have developed numerous methods to prepare military personnel for cross-cultural deployments. The DLI and the Special Forces Qualification Course offer state-of-the-art language training and education, which 

includes instruction in foreign cultures. Language classes at DLI are paired 

with courses that help give students a holistic education about the culture in 

which their foreign language is the native tongue. Current training exposes 
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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

service members to a wide variety of culture-related knowledge, such as local 

history, values, traditions, beliefs, geography, climate, and language. The 

in-house educational structure of DLI gives students an extended amount 

of time to become familiar with a foreign culture. 

To advance in their training during the Special Forces Qualification 

Course, students must become orally proficient in a target language. Students 

also study different military cultures throughout their training, with specific 

attention given to such topics as language and culture application, mediation 

and negotiation, and tactics.87 This educational structure is ideal, as military 

personnel need the classes, lectures, and workshops that provide critical cultural knowledge—such information cannot be communicated adequately in 

last-minute briefings before deployment. When military personnel arrive in 

a foreign culture, they must be comfortable with the situation and feel they 

are capable of carrying out their mission successfully. As such, it is crucial 

that their cultural preparation go beyond basic knowledge.

Strategy is a more contemplative aspect of cultural intelligence, and 

improving CQ strategy requires a great degree of self-awareness and empathy. To be successful CQ practitioners, Special Forces personnel must be 

able to take stock of their own cultural assumptions and those of others. 

Improving CQ strategy requires evaluating assumptions by envisioning 

encounters with other cultures, anticipating other cultures’ approaches to 

conflict, authority, uncertainty, etc., and being able to recall information 

learned about that culture’s language, religion, or history that might influence the interpretation of personal interactions. Most importantly, however, 

is that CQ strategy requires recognizing one’s personal expectations and 

comparing them with the assumptions of foreign cultures, which will help a 

person identify potential areas of friction or misunderstanding and suggest 

better strategies for addressing them.88

Information gained from lectures, workshops, and briefings, as well as 

through movies, books, and personal observation, can be beneficial when 

developing CQ strategy. Raw information about a new culture is crucial when 

developing a game plan for interacting in that setting. Before meeting with 

people in a new country and culture, a Special Forces soldier needs to know 

if it’s customary to shake hands, bow, or kiss cheeks in greeting. While it 

may sound simple and obvious, first impressions are lasting, thus knowing 

the basics can help one make a positive first impression, which can result in a 

successful operation and an enduring relationship between the two cultures. 
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JSOU Report 16-10

Developing a setting in which Special Forces personnel can be debriefed 

on cross-cultural interactions is also helpful in developing CQ strategy. 

The format of the meeting is unimportant, but it is crucial that the parties 

involved are able to talk about their trials, tribulations, and successes in a 

foreign culture. Having an open forum allows all parties to learn from one 

another’s mistakes and collectively improve the institution. 

The final CQ pillar is action. As important as the other three CQ components are, they will have little impact if they are never put into action. 

Nevertheless, a person must first have the drive to learn about a culture, 

knowledge of the customs, and a strategy to implement appropriate behavior 

before they can take action successfully in a foreign culture. 

One of the most effective ways to improve CQ action is to pay close attention to how people in different cultures interact and then replicate those 

behaviors. Culturally intelligent action requires constant mental engagement, as operating on ‘auto pilot’ in cross-cultural settings will exacerbate 

communication difficulties and lead one to fall back on native habits, which 

will not produce the desired results. Individuals must be aware of how their 

words and mannerisms are perceived and adjust them accordingly. It is also 

important to know which cultural norms an outsider should not adopt. For 

instance, while it may be customary to bow on certain occasions in Japan or 

Korea, if an outsider unknowingly overdoes it, the hosts may perceive it as 

patronizing or mocking. Similarly, while individuals from the Anglo cluster 

are typically more casual, being too informal with professional acquaintances 

may appear disrespectful or crude. A careful balance must be struck, and 

individuals who engage with other cultures mindfully are better equipped 

to recognize and respect that fine line.

Learning by example is another method for U.S. forces to improve their 

CQ. When on assignment in a foreign culture, military personnel must 

approach their work with the native population not as teachers but as equals. 

Learning from their hosts will allow U.S. forces to assimilate into the native 

culture more readily and work with its population most effectively. Full 

cross-cultural cooperation often requires first breaking language barriers. 

Although the U.S. conducted military training exercises in Thailand for 

over 20 years, participants did not get the full benefit of the training until 

the 353rd Special Operations Group started using language and cultural 

specialists, which improved the experience on both sides.89
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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

The U.S. military offers its personnel numerous programs that include 

participation in cross-cultural studies. While not specifically intended to 

do so, such programs help increase participants’ CQ. However, engaging 

in on-the-ground learning in a foreign setting is far more effective than a 

classroom setting for improving all four areas of CQ. Although not always 

feasible from a military standpoint, some immersion opportunities are available to military personnel. The Olmsted Scholarship, for example, offers U.S. 

military officers the opportunity to live in a foreign country for two years. 

This is the ideal immersion experience, as it gives them time to acclimate and 

assimilate culturally and socially.90 Although the officers living in a foreign 

country will undoubtedly make cultural blunders, by the end of the program 

they will feel comfortable in their surroundings, have intimate knowledge 

of the culture, and interact successfully with their foreign hosts. As such, 

immersion opportunities are one of the most effective ways to enhance CQ 

acumen.

Afghan Hands is a program that specifically helps military personnel 

increase their CQ capabilities. Participation lasts three to four years, during 

which participants spend several months learning either Pashto or Dari and 

studying the Afghan culture. This course of study is designed to prepare 

participants for a one-year deployment in Afghanistan, which gives them 

adequate time to adjust to living and working in that culture. An assignment 

stateside then follows, and the final year of the program involves a return 

to Afghanistan for one year.91 The intense training, coupled with long and 

repeated deployments, enables soldiers to gain expertise in the language and 

culture and build rapport with the native population. 

Those with high CQ tend to be more adept at adjusting to a different way 

of life, which supports the suggestion that testing soldiers’ CQ is beneficial. 

This model gives soldiers with less than exemplary CQ the time to adjust 

and thus to reach their full potential in an overseas assignment. In sum, 

programs like Afghan Hands allow military personnel to increase their CQ 

acumen while developing strong relationships with the indigenous populations, both of which add legitimacy and the potential for success to U.S. 

military operations. 

The CIC, among others, has developed a training program in the civilian 

sector to help participants increase their CQ. Two workshops, Developing 

Cultural Intelligence and Leading with Cultural Intelligence, are designed 

specifically for this purpose. Geared toward two different audiences, these 
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JSOU Report 16-10

workshops offer targeted sessions to help participants work effectively in 

whatever cross-cultural situations their professions require.92

The CIC is scheduled to launch a virtual CQ program in 2016 that will 

“bring the assessment, coaching, and training right to team members’ 

devices.”93 Participants first undergo a CQ assessment and then select two 

key intercultural skills they want to improve. They are then given personalized training based on their assessment results to improve the two chosen 

characteristics. The participants are assigned to training modules that guide 

them through the basics of CQ and provide useful instruction to help them 

improve their global effectiveness. 

Every new cross-cultural experience, whether a success or a failure, can be 

integrated into an individual’s existing CQ abilities. The desired results of a 

cross-cultural interaction are usually obvious: to reach a mutually beneficial 

agreement, increase profits, promote diplomatic cooperation, etc. Achieving 

these goals, however, is often obstructed by myriad cross-cultural differences. 

The four components of CQ shed light on these differences, and having solid 

ability in each area increases the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome 

without burning any bridges in the process. 
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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

8. Summing Up and Final Thoughts

This final chapter reviews several propositions about cultural intelligence 

that were articulated in this monograph by revisiting the six major 

questions asked in the introduction.

No. 1: Does the Special Forces community need a CQ 

assessment capability?

Not surprisingly, the answer may be yes. The Special Forces Assessment 

and Selection (SFAS) process was established to identify soldiers who have 

the mental, social, and physical skills to pass the Special Forces Qualification Course. SFAS candidates are assessed in a number of areas, including psychological, physical, and mental aptitude, land navigation skills, 

the ability to work individually and as part of a team, and endurance. The 

DLAB, mentioned earlier, “is designed to assess an individual’s potential 

for learning a foreign language. The test helps to select students for foreign 

language courses and identify appropriate languages for study.”94 All these 

assessment requirements help determine a Special Forces soldier’s potential 

to succeed as a member of a unit that will participate in global operations 

conducted primarily in unfamiliar and challenging cultural and physical 

environments.95 These operations are further complicated by considerable 

cross-cultural differences between U.S. Department of Defense personnel 

and their counterparts from local cultural groups in the host nation communities, and with their coalition partners. Some of these differences are 

significant in determining their influence in mission success.96

The extensive SFAS assessment menu does not include any testing for 

cultural intelligence aptitude. This seems a considerable oversight, given the 

importance of cultural sensitivity when conducting overseas missions, and 

the level of competence expected of Special Forces soldiers. Imagine that a 

Special Forces soldier is highly skilled in his occupational specialty, speaks 

a foreign language, and is physically fit—the ultimate ‘quiet professional’— 

but cannot operate effectively in a multicultural environment. What is his 

value to his team and the mission? An equally important question is: Was it 

worth the cost to train him if he can’t work effectively in the environment 

where he is most needed?
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JSOU Report 16-10

As mentioned in the introduction, this monograph differs from the 

lead author’s other JSOU publications because it advocates for a particular 

position—that Special Forces applicants have their CQ acumen assessed 

by the CIC. This recommendation is advocated for two reasons. First, the 

lead author is a certified Level 1 and Level 2 instructor in the CIC’s CQ program. Level 1 certification assessed understanding of CQ and CQ acumen, 

and granted certification to administer the assessment to others. Level 2 

certification involves design and delivery of cultural intelligence programs. 

Second, of 10 cultural assessment programs evaluated by the Journal of Cross 

Cultural-Psychology in July 2013, the CIC’s program was listed among the 

top three in the nation.97 Based on the journal’s evaluation, the Multicultural 

Personality Questionnaire and the Intercultural Adjustment Potential Scale 

would also be viable assessment mechanisms for Special Forces CQ testing; 

however, the lead author decided to advocate for a program the experts considered good and which he had personally experienced.98 Earning the Level 

1 and Level 2 certifications took approximately 40 hours, which included 

classroom instruction, outside reading, and practice teaching. None of the 

other cultural assessment programs offered such a convenient certification 

program.

No. 2: Is the CQ assessment process articulated in this 

monograph a functional cultural assessment tool for Special 

Forces soldiers?

The simple answer is yes. The CQ assessment process is quick and painless. A 

self-assessment and a multi-rater assessment are available through the CIC. 

The multi-rater assessment is considered the more accurate, as it determines 

CQ based on a combination of a self-assessment and peer feedback from 

individuals the soldier being assessed has chosen. Although the multi-rater 

option is a bit more intensive, time-consuming, and expensive, it provides the 

most comprehensive feedback and is applicable to a greater array of professions.99 Both are available online from, and are processed by, the CIC.100 CIC 

personnel provide the initial assessment scores and hard-copy feedback. A 

deeper interpretation of score results, particularly for those who show low 

CQ aptitude, can be done by CIC personnel for a fee or, more appropriately, 

by trained Special Forces personnel.
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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

No. 3: Can good CQ acumen be beneficial to individual 

Special Forces soldiers as they carry out their duties?

While the number of conventional U.S. military forces deployed around the 

globe has decreased markedly in the past two years, the number of SOF has 

increased slightly.101 In fact, President Obama and Pentagon leaders have 

increasingly made SOF—the primary U.S. force in terms of numbers and of 

missions requiring cultural competency—their military tool of choice.102 By 

definition, Special Forces unconventional warfare (UW) missions, such as 

leading insurgents against a hostile government, and foreign internal defense 

(FID) missions, which involve working with friendly governments to counter 

insurgencies, terrorism, and other threats and contingencies, are conducted 

in areas where the ability to work with other cultures is paramount. There 

are three main reasons for the cultural requirement: First, U.S. allies in FID 

operations are from other cultures.103 Second, U.S. enemies and allies in UW 

situations are from other cultures. Third, U.S. Army Special Forces’ allies in 

both UW and FID operations are from other cultures. 

Almost every operational deployment Special Forces soldiers undertake—

UW, FID, joint combined exchange training,104 military training team missions, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, counterterrorism, counter-drug, and 

counterinsurgency operations—requires some degree of cultural competency. Therefore, having CQ drive is a foregone conclusion, as all Special 

Forces soldiers are motivated to work in multicultural environments. However, it is impossible for each one to be competent in all cultures, which 

highlights three important reasons the CQ assessment is critical: First, CQ 

assessment indicates a person’s ability to understand and interact well in 

different cultures, although it does not teach how to master the nuances of 

any one culture. Second, CQ assessment indicates which cultures a person 

is likely to have the greatest affinity with. Third, CQ assessment provides a 

roadmap for improvement, as each person’s CQ assessment report identifies 

areas where improvement is needed and breaks these results down by region. 

The CQ report also provides a development plan, which often prompts the 

subject to request additional CQ training or to work individually to improve 

their CQ performance. 
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JSOU Report 16-10

No. 4: Can Special Forces senior leaders benefit from CQ in 

the strategic planning and operations process?

Absolutely. When the lead author entered the Special Forces in 1970, there 

was one Special Forces flag officer, a brigadier general; today there are more 

than two dozen Special Forces generals on active duty. Five have achieved 

four-star rank, one served as Army Chief of Staff, and another served as 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Given the nature of the threats the U.S. 

will face in the next two decades and its reliance on SOF, its leaders’ ability 

to understand other cultures’ motivations and actions and avoid mirror 

imaging will be critical in preventing strategic miscues—and thus more 

such tragedies as the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks. But this will require 

leaders who are both comfortable with their own culture and highly knowledgeable about other cultures. Of course, not all strategic decisions are as 

crucial as those made on D-Day, for example, but in the counterterrorism 

and asymmetric warfare engagements today’s military faces, decisions that 

fail to consider the cultural context can have serious implications. One need 

only look at the situation in Libya to understand that the lack of CQ has 

created a strategic nightmare for much of Africa. Toppling a tyrant in an 

operation that squandered neither American lives nor domestic political 

capital might have made good sense from a U.S. perspective.105 However, had 

decision-makers approached the decision to enter the conflict in Libya with 

solid CQ, they would have understood that Libya is a tribal nation and that 

removing Kaddafi would empower tribal leaders to assert power for profit 

and leave the door wide open for organized terrorist organizations such as 

al-Qaeda and ISIS. 

No. 5: Can Special Forces group commanders benefit from 

the cultural clusters CQ methodology?

Yes. As a quick study, the cultural clusters have great value for Special Forces 

groups that operate outside their traditional areas of responsibility, and for 

groups whose areas of responsibility include multiple cultural clusters. Using 

the clusters concept will not make a Special Forces leader or soldier an expert 

in any particular culture, but the clusters do serve as a quick reference guide 

that can help reduce the chance of missteps in the planning stages of an 

operation, limit the tendency toward mirror imaging, prompt the right 
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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

culture-related questions to ask, and fast-forward the ability to dive deeply 

into a particular culture, which can help promote mission success. 

No. 6: Is the notion of improving CQ viable and important for 

the Special Forces community? 

The lead author admits to bias, but strongly believes the answer is yes. In the 

past, cultural intelligence was not included in the Special Forces assessment 

and selection process. Almost every other competency was evaluated, but 

not CQ. This was not an oversight; the fact is that a viable CQ assessment 

mechanism was not available. It is now. For reasons already stated, this 

monograph advocates using the CIC’s multi-rater CQ assessment. The CIC 

program is preferred for several reasons: it is user friendly, it can be done 

online, it is relatively inexpensive, it shows an individual’s strengths and 

weaknesses in several technical (drive, knowledge, strategy, and action) and 

regional (the 10 clusters) areas, and, perhaps most importantly, it provides a 

roadmap for improving one’s score.

For the foreseeable future, U.S. Special Forces soldiers will need cultural 

intelligence to carry out most of their many missions, during which they will 

be working with, for, and against those from other cultures. A Special Forces 

soldier who lacks cultural intelligence is a liability to his team, to the mission, 

and to himself. We must begin now to identify those with and those without strong CQ and offer both groups the opportunity to hone their cultural 

skills, and thereby reduce the likelihood of mission—and personal—failure. 
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JSOU Report 16-10

Reference Tables

(Note: The following tables are derived from David Livermore’s Expand Your 

Borders: Discover 10 Cultural Clusters.)

Clusters Countries

Anglo Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.K., U.S., etc.

Arab Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi 

Arabia, United Arab Emirates, etc.

Confucian Asia China, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.

Eastern Europe Albania, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, 

Russia, etc.

Germanic Europe Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, etc.

Latin America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia.

Latin Europe France, French-speaking Canada, Italy, Portugal, Spain, etc.

Nordic Europe Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, etc.

Sub-Saharan Africa Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Zambia, Zimbabwe, etc.

Southern Asia India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, etc.

Table 2. Cultural Clusters

Characteristics Definitions

Individualism Emphasis on individual goals and rights.

Collectivism Emphasis on group goals and personal relationships.

Low Power Distance Emphasis on equality; shared decision-making.

High Power Distance Emphasis on differences in status; superiors make decisions.

Cooperative Emphasis on collaboration, nurturing, and family.

Competitive Emphasis on competition, assertiveness, and achievement.

Low Uncertainty Avoidance Emphasis on flexibility and adaptability.

High Uncertainty Avoidance Emphasis on planning and predictability.

Short Term Emphasis on immediate outcomes (success now).

Long Term Emphasis on long-term planning (success later).

Low Context Emphasis on explicit communication (words).

High Context Emphasis on indirect communication (tone, context).

Being Emphasis on quality of life.

Doing Emphasis on being busy and meeting goals.

Table 3. Cultural Values
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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

Individualism

Anglo

Germanic Europe

Nordic Europe

Eastern Europe

Latin Europe

Collectivism

Arab

Confucian Asia

Latin America

Southern Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Low Power Distance

Anglo

Germanic Europe

Nordic Europe

Confucian Asia

Eastern Europe

Latin Europe

Sub-Saharan Africa

High Power Distance

Arab

Latin America

Southern Asia

Low Uncertainty Avoidance

Anglo

Eastern Europe

Nordic Europe

Arab 

Confucian Asia

Germanic Europe

Southern Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

High Uncertainty Avoidance

Latin Europe

Latin America

Cooperative

Nordic Europe

Sub-Saharan Africa

Arab 

Confucian Asia

Eastern Europe

Latin America

Latin Europe

Southern Asia

Competitive

Anglo

Germanic Europe

Short Term

Anglo

Arab

Eastern Europe

Nordic Europe

Sub-Saharan Africa

Germanic Europe

Latin America

Latin Europe

Southern Asia

Long Term

Confucian Asia

Low Context

Anglo

Germanic Europe

Nordic Europe

Eastern Europe

Latin America

Latin Europe

High Context

Arab

Confucian Asia

Southern Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Being Orientation

Arab

Latin America

Nordic Europe

Sub-Saharan Africa

Confucian Asia

Eastern Europe

Latin Europe

Southern Asia

Doing Orientation

Anglo

Germanic Europe

Table 4. Cultural Value Continuum

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Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

Appendix A: Acronym List 

AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command 

CIC Cultural Intelligence Center

CQ cultural intelligence

DLAB Defense Language Aptitude Battery

DLI Defense Language Institute

FID foreign internal defense

IQ intelligence quotient

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific

SFAS Special Forces Assessment and Selection

SOF Special Operations Forces

UW unconventional warfare

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Endnotes

1. Russell D. Howard, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces 

Soldiers: Necessity, Acceleration, and Potential Alternatives (Tampa, FL: JSOU, 

2011), available at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/11-6_Final.PDF.

2. Ibid., 29.

3. Russell D. Howard, Strategic Culture (Tampa, FL: JSOU, 2013), available at: http://

jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-8_Howard_Strategic_Culture_FINAL.

pdf.

4. David Livermore, Expand Your Borders: Discover 10 Cultural Clusters (East 

Lansing, MI: Cultural Intelligence Center LLC, 2013), 7.

5. Pankaj Ghemawat and Niccolo Pisani, “Are Multinationals Becoming Less 

Global?” Harvard Business Review, 28 October 2013, available at www.hbr.

org/2013/10/are-multinationals-becoming-less-global/.

6. Juliana Pilon, Cultural Intelligence for Winning the Peace (Washington, DC: 

Institute of World Politics Press, 2009).

7. Kok-Yee Ng, Linn Van Dyne, and Soon Ang, “Cultural Intelligence: A Review, 

Reflections, and Recommendations for Future Research,” in Conducting Multinational Research, Applying Organizational Psychology in the Workplace, ed. 

A. M. Ryan, F. T. L. Leong, and F. L. Oswald, (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2012), 30, available at: http://soonang.com/wp-content/

uploads/2012/04/Ng_Van-Dyne-Ang-2012-CQ-review-reflections.pdf.

8. David Livermore, Linn Van Dyne, and Soo Ang, “Cultural Intelligence: Why 

Every Leader Needs It,” Intercultural Management Quarterly 13, no. 2 (2012): 

29–58.

9. Soon Ang, Linn Van Dyne, Christine Koh, K. Yee Ng, Klaus J. Templer, Cheryl 

Tay, and N. Anand Chandrasekar, “Cultural Intelligence: Its Measurement and 

Effects on Cultural Judgement and Decisionmaking, Cultural Adaption and Task 

Performance,” Management and Organization Review 3, no. 3 (2007): 335–371. 

10. Henry C. Triandis, “The Self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts,” 

Psychological Review 96, no. 3 (1989): 506–520.

11. Ang et al., “Cultural Intelligence.”

12. Ibid.

13. Livermore, Expand Your Borders, 26.

14. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Culture-Centric Warfare,” The Naval Institute: Proceedings 130, no. 10, 2004, available at: http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/ 

archive/story.asp?print=Y&STORY_ID=449.

15. Livermore, Expand Your Borders.

16. Scales, “Culture-Centric Warfare.”
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JSOU Report 16-10

17. Todd J. Clark, “Developing a Cultural Intelligence Capability,” Thesis, U.S. Army 

Command and Staff College, December 2008, 1–84.

18. Soon Ang and Linn Van Dyne, “Conceptualization of Cultural Intelligence: 

Definition, Distinctiveness, and Nomological Network,” in Handbook of Cultural 

Intelligence: Theory, Measurement and Applications, ed. Soon Ang and Linn Van 

Dyne. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp, 2008), 4.

19. P.C. Earley and S. Ang, Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across 

Cultures (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

20. S. Ang and L. Van Dyne, “Conceptualization of Cultural,” 4.

21. S. Chen, D. Lui, and R. Portnoy, “A Multilevel Investigation of Motivational 

Cultural Intelligence, Organizational Diversity Climate, and Cultural Sales: 

Evidence from U.S. Real Estate Firms,” Journal of Applied Psychology 97, no. 1 

(2012): 93–106.

22. David Livermore, “CQ: The Test of Your Potential for Cross-Cultural Success,” 

Forbes.com, 6 January 2010.

23. T. Rockstuhl, S. Seiler, S. Ang, L. Van Dyne, and H. Annen, “Beyond General 

Intelligence (IQ) and Emotional Intelligence (EQ): The Role of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) on Cross-Border Leadership Effectiveness in a Globalized World,” 

Journal of Social Issues 67 (2011): 825–840.

24. John Blistein, “Katy Perry Sunflower Dress Sparks Controversy in China,” Rolling Stone, 30 April 2015, available at: http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/

katy-perry-sunflower-dress-sparks-controversy-in-china-20150430.

25. “Symbolic Sunflower Meaning,” Dare to Discern, 2015, available at: http://www.

whats-your-sign.com/symbolic-sunflower-meaning.html.

26. This chapter was first presented as part of a two-day seminar in Singapore for 

the Terrorism & Extremism Futures Group, National Security Research Centre, 

16–17 March 2015.

27. Howard, Strategic Culture.

28. Barbara Maranzani, “5 Facts About Pearl Harbor and USS Arizona,” History.

com, 2011, available at: http://www.history.com/news/5-facts-about-pearlharbor-and-the-uss-arizona.

29. “Five Facts You Didn’t Know about Pearl Harbor,” Huffington Post, 6 December 

2013, available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/06/pearl-harborfacts_n_4395362.html.

30. Jonathan S. Landay, “Battle Over Who’s To Blame For Pearl Harbor Not Over,” 

Chicago Tribune, 25 November 1999, available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.

com/1999-11-25/news/9911250189_1_edward-ned-kimmel-husband-kimmelpearl-harbor.

31. Jeffrey Record, Japan’s Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 1991), viii, 54, available 

at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB905.pdf. 
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32. Gordon Prange, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (New York: Penguin, 1991), 

515.

33. Record, Japan’s Decision for War, 53.

34. Ibid., 55.

35. Finding Dulcinea, “On This Day: George S. Patton Slaps Hospitalized Soldier,” 

3 August 2011, available at: http://www.findingdulcinea.com/news/on-this-day/

July-August-08/On-this-Day--General-Patton-Shocks-Public-by-SlappingCrying-Soldier.html.

36. Barney Sneiderman, Warriors Seven: Seven American Commanders, Seven Wars, 

and the Irony of Battle (New York: Savas Beatie, 2006), 265.

37. Brian John Murphy, “Patton’s Ghost Army,” America in WWII, available at: 

http://www.americainwwii.com/articles/pattons-ghost-army/.

38. 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002). See, in particular, chapter 

13, available at: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.

39. CNN.com, “Timeline: Osama bin Laden, Over the Years,” 2 May 2011, available 

at: http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/osama.timeline/.

40. Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror 

(Lincoln, NE: Brassey’s Inc., 2004), 197–198.

41. Ahmed S. Hashim, “The World According to bin Laden,” Naval War College 

Review 54, no. 4 (2001): 25–27.

42. Ibid.

43. James Phillips, “The 1983 Marine Barracks Bombing: Connecting the Dots,” The 

Daily Signal, 23 October 2009, available at: http://dailysignal.com/2009/10/23/

the-1983-marine-barracks-bombing-connecting-the-dots/. 

44. Mike Santacroce, Planning for Planners: Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), 

(Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2013), VI–7.

45. United States Army, Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process (final approved 

draft) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Headquarters, 2010), 3-1; 

“USASOC SOF Campaign Planner’s Handbook,” Version 2.4, U.S. Army Special 

Operations Command, 2014, viii–1.

46. “Planners Handbook for Operational Design,” Joint Pub Version 1.0, 7 October 

2011, I-1, available at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/opdesign_hbk.

pdf. 

47. Adam Elkus and Crispin Burke, “Operational Design: Promise and Problems,” 

2010, 4, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/362-

elkus.pdf. 

48. Livermore, Expand Your Borders, 7.

49. Art of Design, Student Text Version 2.0 (Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced 

Military Studies), 5, available at: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/events/sams/

ArtofDesign_v2.pdf.

50. “Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design,” X-2. 
64

JSOU Report 16-10

51. Rick Swain, Fundamentals of Operational Design (Leavenworth, KS: Booz Allen 

Hamilton, 2009), iii. 

52. “Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design,” C-9.

53. Stew Magnuson, “Special Operations Mission to Require New Doctrine,” National 

Defense Magazine, May 2013. 

54. “USASOC SOF Campaign Planner’s Handbook,” viii-2.

55. Art of Design, 14. 

56. “USASOC SOF Campaign Planner’s Handbook,” viii-5.

57. Cultural Intelligence (CQ) assessment flyer, Cultural Intelligence Center LLC.

58. David Livermore, “Level 1 CQ Certification Manual,” Cultural Intelligence Center 

LLC, 2014, 15–26.

59. Likert (1932) developed the principle of measuring attitudes by asking people to 

respond to a series of statements about a topic, in terms of the extent to which 

they agree with them, thus tapping into the cognitive and affective components 

of attitudes. Available at: http://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale.html.

60. Livermore, “Level 1 CQ Certification.”

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Livermore, Expand Your Borders.

66. Ng, Van Dyne, and Ang, “Cultural Intelligence,” in Conducting Multinational 

Research, 29–58.

67. Livermore, “Level 1 CQ Certification.”

68. “Academic Construct Validity,” Cultural Intelligence Center LLC, 2012.

69. “Internal Validity,” Indiana University, 24 February 2015, available at: http://

www.indiana.edu/~p1013447/dictionary/int_val.htm.

70. “Academic Construct Validity.”

71. David Matsumoto and Hyisung C. Hwang, “Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence: A Review of Available Tests,” Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology 44, no. 

5, (2013): 671–837.

72. “Academic Construct Validity.”

73. William M. K. Trochim, “Convergent & Discriminant Validity,” Research Methods Knowledge Base, Web Center for Social Research Methods, 2006. 

74. “Academic Construct Validity.”

75. Simcha Ronen and Oded Shenkar, “Clustering Countries on Attitudinal Dimensions: A Review and Synthesis,” Academy of Management Review 10 (1985): 

435–447.

76. Livermore, Expand Your Borders.
65

Howard/Hanson/Laywell: Cultural Intelligence

77. Stephen Prothero, God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions that Run the World 

and Why Their Differences Matter (San Francisco: Harper One, 2010).

78. Neal M. Ashkanasy, Edwin Trevor-Roberts, and Louise Earnshaw, “The Anglo 

Cluster: Legacy of the British Empire,” Journal of World Business 37, no. 1 (2002): 

28–39. 

79. This cluster can also include French-speaking Canada.

80. Gyula Bakacsi, Takacs Sandor, Karacsonyi Andras, and Imrek Viktor, “Eastern 

European Cluster: Tradition and Transition,” Journal of World Business 37 (2002): 

1, 69–80.

81. Dennis O’Neil, “Methods for Learning About Culture,” Human Culture: An 

Introduction to the Characteristics of Culture and the Methods Used by Anthropologists to Study It, online tutorial, 22 May 2009, available at: http://anthro.

palomar.edu/culture/ Default.htm.

82. Howard, Cultural and Linguistic Skills Acquisition, 17.

83. Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, available at: http://new.

dliflc.edu.

84. According to Diane Rowlette, protocol officer at SFWC, SWEG is currently teaching 16 languages: Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Persian-Farsi, Dari, Russian, Tagalog, 

Urdu, Pashtu, French, Indonesian, Spanish, Portuguese, Thai, Arabic-Levantine, 

and Arabic-Egyptian. A Japanese curriculum has also been developed and the 

course is awaiting its first pilot.

85. Derrick Martin, “SOFTS Language Training,” Training Updates in Special 

Warfare, 27, no. 4, 7, available at: http://www.soc.mil/swcS/SWmag/archive/

SW2704/27-4_OCT_DEC_2014_web.pdf.

86. Ibid.

87. Special Forces Association, “Inside the SFQC,” available at: http://www.specialforcesassociation.org/inside-the-sfqc/.

88. Livermore, Van Dyne, and Ang, “Cultural Intelligence,” 29–58.

89. Kristine Dreyer, “LEAP participant helps SOG overcome language, culture barrier 

in Thailand,” 353rd Special Operations Group, available at: http://www.353sog.

af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/4611/Article/580138/leap-participant-helpssog-overcome-language-culture-barrier-in-thailand.aspx.

90. The Olmstead Foundation, “What We Do,” available at: http://www.olmstedfoundation.org.

91. Katherine Ellena and Rebecca Lorentz, “Cultural Intelligence: Archiving Lessons from Afghanistan,” CTX Journal, 3, no. 1, February 2013, 25-34, available 

at: https://globalecco.org/ctx-vol.-3-no.-1-article-5.

92. Sample Sessions, Presentations, Workshops & Virtual Learning Services, Cultural 

Intelligence Center LLC, available at: http://www.culturalq.com/tmpl/training/

sample.php.
66

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93. Virtual CQ, Presentations, Workshops & Virtual Learning Services, Cultural 

Intelligence Center LLC, 2015, available at: http://www.culturalq.com/tmpl/

virtualcq/index.php.

94. About.com, “Defense Language Aptitude Battery,” available at: http://usmilitary.

about.com/cs/joiningup/a/dlab.htm.

95. Robert Green Sands, “Assessing Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture 

(LREC) Performance: Not like threading a camel through the eye of a needle,” 

unpublished presentation. Copy available upon request. 

96. CNN.com, “Ebola Fast Facts,” 22 April 2016, available at: http://www.cnn.

com/2014/04/11/health/ebola-fast-facts/.

97. Matsumoto and Hwang, “Assessing Cross-Cultural Competence,” 867.

98. Ibid.

99. Cultural Intelligence (CQ) assessment flyer. 

100. Livermore, “Level 1 CQ Certification,” 15–26.

101. Nick Simeone, “Hagel Outlines Budget Reducing Troop Strength, Force Structure,” DOD News, 24 February 2014, available at: http://archive.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=121703.

102. Military.com, “Army Special Operations Command (USASOC),” available at: 

http://www.military.com/special-operations/army-special-forces.html; and 

Erik Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Thom Shanker, “Admiral Seeks Freer Hand 

in Deployment of Elite Forces,” New York Times, 12 February 2012, available 

at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/us/admiral-pushes-for-freer-hand-inspecial-forces.html.

103. Jack Murphy, “Foreign Internal Defense Tips, part 3: Building Rapport,” 

December 2014, available at: http://sofrep.com/39187/foreign-internal-defensetips-pt-3-rapport-building/.

104. Federation of American Scientists, “JCET: Joint Combined Exchange Training,” 

available at: http://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/JCET.html.

105. Russ Douthat, “Libya’s Unintended Consequences,” New York Times, 7 July 

2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/libyasunintended-consequences.html.