Filed 3/2/22 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION 1

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

BENJAMIN TZE

- MAN CHUI
, as Trustee, etc., et al.

Plaintiff s and Respondent s ,

v.

CHRISTINE CHUI
, Individually and as Personal Representative, etc., Defendant and Appellant ;

MICHAEL CHUI
, a Minor, et al., Appellants;

ESTHER SHOU MAY CHUI CHAO et al., Respondents. B306918

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP154245 )

1 Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part s A, B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.7, B.8, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5
, D, E .2
, and F of the Discussion.2 APPEAL from order s of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, David J. Cowan
, Judge. Affirmed. Bohm Wildish & Matsen and James G. Bohm for D efendant and Appellant Christine Chui. Ambrosi & Doerges, Mary E. Doerges ; Karcher Harmes and Kathryn Karcher for Appellant Michael Chui. Law Offices of Michael S. Overing, Michael S. Overing and Edward C. Wilde for Appellant Jacqueline Chui. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, Alex M. Weingarten
, Eric J. Bakewell and Sean P. Hanle for Plaintiff and Respondent Benjamin Chui. Glaser Weil Fink Howard Avchen & Shapiro
, Miriam J. Golbert and James T. Grant for Plaintiff and Respondent Margaret Tak

- Ying Chui Lee

. Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, Birnberg, Coleman & Gold and Justin B. Gold for Res pondent Esther Shou May Chui Chao

. Hinojosa & Forer
, Jeffrey Forer and Shannon H. Burns for Respondent Jackson Chen. McBride Law Group and Julia C. McBride for Respondents Helena Chang Chui and Ruth Chang.

________________________________

In proceedings u nder the Probate Code concerning the administration of a trust , the co

- trustees and a beneficiary of the

trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 2 alleging that Christine Chui misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor

. On the day set for trial on the petitions
,

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.3

t he litigants settle d and recited the terms before the court. The terms affecting Christine’s minor children

— Jacqueline and Michael 3

— who are beneficiaries under the trust, were subject to the approval of their guardian ad litem, Jackson Chen , and the

court

. Chen , on behalf of the Minors, subsequently entered into

an agreement with the co

- trustees and certain trust beneficiaries
, but no t Christine (the first GAL agreement). The first GAL agreement recited Chen’s approval of the oral settlement agreement and set forth additional terms

. Christine sought to cancel and repudiate the agreement s through a variety of procedural methods

. The court granted the

co

- trustees’ motion to enforce the oral settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, but denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement

. Chen
, the co

- trus tees, and certain trust beneficiaries

— but not Christine

— s ubsequently entered into a second agreement (the second GAL agreement)

. Over Christine’s objections, t he court granted Chen’s petition to approve that agreement . The court also denied Christine’s petition to remove Chen as the Minors’ guardian ad litem in the trust litigation and granted Chen’s petition to be appointed the Minors’ guardian ad litem in related probate cases. Christine and the Minors appeal ed , challenging the orders (1) e nforcing the oral settlement agreement ; (2) granting Chen ’s petition to approve the second GAL agreement ; ( 3 ) appointing Chen as the Minors’ guardian ad litem in certain probate cases;

3 Some of the parties have the same surname. To avoid confusion and to enhance the opinion’s readability , we will refer to the parties by their first names. We mean no disrespect. We will also refer to Jacqueline and Michael collectively at times as the Minors.4

and (4) denying Christine’s mot i on to remove Chen as the Minors’ guardi an ad litem. For the reasons set forth below, w e affirm the court’s orders

.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

A. The Trust King Wah Chui (King) and Chi May Chui (May) had three children: Robert, Margaret, and Esther. Robert married Helena Chui in 1974. They had one child, Benjamin. Robert and Helena divorced in 2002. Robert married Christine in March 2003. They had two children, Jacqueline (born March 2003) and Michael (born May 2004)

. In 1 988, King and May establis hed a revocable trust (the Trust)

. The assets of the Trust consist primarily of interests in residential apartment complexes and related business entitie s, other real property , and financial accounts. After May died in March 2004, the T rust was divided in to three subtrusts: T rust A, T rust B, and T rust C

. 4 T rust B and
T rust C were irrevocable. Among the assets of Trust C are interests in properties the parties refer to as Taylor, Paularino, Domingo, Derek (or Pepperwood), and Calle Cristina

. 5 According to the Trust document, t hese properties are to be distributed upon King’s death

4 We will refer to the T rust and the subtrusts collectively

as the Trust unless a more specific reference to a subtrust is appropriate.

5 Consistent with the terms of the Tr ust and the parties’ understandings, o ur references to properties includes the Trust’s interests in partnerships and limited liability companies that hold real property.5

to Robert or, if Robert is not then living, to Robert’s children

— Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Michael

— equally

. After May’s death , King amended T rust A several times. 6 Under an amendment made in June 2004, interests in properties the parties refer to as Three Lanterns and Sycamore are to be distributed upon King’s death to Robert or, if Robert is not then living, to Christine; but if Christine is not then living, these properties are distributed to Michael. Under an amendment made in January 2005, a certain residence in Monterey Park is to be given to Jacqueline. 7 Under an amendment made in November 2005, property the parties refer to as Atlantic Towers is to be distrib uted upon King’s death to Robert or , if Robert is not then living, to Christine. 8
In addition to the distributions described above
, the Trust document provides for distributions of real properties, business interests, and money to Robert, Margaret, Esthe r, Benjamin,

6 As a result of the amendments to Trust A , Robert’s share of the Trust assets allege dly increased from 36.6 percent to 69.7 percent

. Benjamin alleged that King made these amendments as a result of Christine ’s and Robert ’s “psychological, emotional, and financial elder abuse on an increasingly demented and incapacitated King.”

7 Certain b equests are made to the trustees of trusts established for the benefit of Esther, Benjamin, or Jacqueline. Our references to bequests to such individuals includes bequests to the trustee of such trusts unless the more specific reference is appropriate.

8 The Atlantic Towers property was sold in 2013. It appears from our record that proceeds of the sale have been held in a separate account of a limited partnership that remains a Trust
asset. The parties’ references to Atlantic Towers appears to refer
to the Trust’s interests in that limited partnership.6

Jacqueline, and Michael , among others. The T rust document includes other bequests that are not relevant for our purposes

. The T rust document further provides for the distribution of the Trust residue ; that is, t rust property for which there is

no specific bequest

. Under the residuary provisions, 30 percent of the residue goes to each of Robert, Margaret
, and Esther, and
10 percent goes to Benjamin ; if , however, Robert predeceases King, Robert’s 30 percent share of the re sidue is distributed in equal parts to each of Robert’s children

— Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Michael

. In February 2011
, King , whose cognitive abilities had allegedly been in decline for some time
, resigned as trustee of the
T rust and , pursuant to the Trust document, Robert and Margaret became co

- trustees. In January 2013, Robert became incapacitated and , in March 2013, t he s uperior c ourt appointed Benjamin (Robert’s son by his first wife , Helena ) to act as co

- trustee of the T rust together with Margaret. (We will sometimes refer to Benjamin and Margaret collectively as the co

- trustees.) Robert died in June 2013

. King died in June 2014.

B. Trust Litigation
In October 201 2 (prior to Robert’s and King’s deaths)

, Esther filed a petition in the Los Angeles Superior Court alleging that Robert and Margaret improperly delegated to Christine their fiduciary duties as trustees of the Trust. The petition was assigned case No. BP137413

. Esther sought an accounting and an order removing Robert and Marg aret as trustees. In March 2013, Esther requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the Minors in Los Angeles Superior Court
case No. BP137413. T he court
, over Christine’s objection, granted7

the request and appointed Chen as the M inors ’ guardian ad litem

. At that time, Jacqueline and Michael were ages 10 and 8, respectively.
In February 2014 (after Robert’s death and the appointment of Benjamin as co

- trustee of the Trust )
, Esther filed a n amended petition in case No. BP137413
, alleging t hat Christine converted

t rust assets for h er benefit. On the same day, Esther filed another amended petition under section 850 in the same case alleging that Benjamin and Margaret breached their fiduciary duties as

co

- trustees of the T rust. In August 2015, Benjamin and Margaret filed a petition
in case No. BP137413 for an order surcharging Robert’s estate based on allegations that Robert breached his fiduciary duties

as trustee “by making improper and unauthorized payments and disbursements o f [t] rust assets.” In July 2016
, Benjamin filed a petition under section 850 in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BP154245. Benjamin alleged, among other claims, that Robert and Christine committed elder financial abuse against King and, acting as trust ee and/or trustee de son tort , breached their fiduciary duties and misappropriated

t rust assets

— including money , jewelry, and antiques

— for their own benefit

. Benjamin sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, an order requiring Christine to disgorge assets wrongfully taken from the T rust, and a determination that Christine be deemed to have predeceased King for purposes of section 259. In October 2016, Christine filed petitions in L os Angeles Superior Court case No. BP 155345 to remove Benjami n and Margaret as trustees of the Trust based on alleged breaches of

trust

. Christine sought, among other relief, an order suspending and removing Benjamin and Margaret as trustees and surcharg ing them for losses to Trust A incurred as a result of their8

m ismanagement. Benjamin moved to dismiss the petition under the anti

- SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). The court denied the motion on February 20, 2018. 9
In August 2017 , Margaret filed a “ joinder ” to Benjamin ’s petition in case No. BP154245

. I n March 2018, Benjamin and Margaret filed a first amended petition that alleged claims similar to those Benjamin alleged in the original petition and sought similar relief. Esther filed another amended petition in January 2017 under case No. BP155345. She alleged that King suffered from dementia since 2004 and was susceptible to undue influence since that time. Christine and Robert allegedly took advantage of King’s vulnera bility to wrongfully transfer to themselves approximately $10 million of t rust assets. Esther sought, among other relief, an order that Christine return the property taken from the T rust and pay double damages pursuant to section 859. She also sought an order determining that Christine predeceased King for purposes of section 259. In addition to the T rust litigation in case Nos. BP137413, BP154245, and BP155345 described above , at least five other probate court proceedings have been deemed related to thes e

cases. Although the substance and status of these related cases

are not entirely apparent from our record, they have been identified ( and summarily described ) as L os Angeles Superior Court case No

. BP143884 (concerning Robert’s estate) ; case No. BP145642 (concerning Robert and Helena’s irrevocable life insurance trust

9 Benjamin appealed that order to this court, which we assigned case No. B288425. On January 29, 2020, we ordered the appeal stayed “ pending determination of the proceedings before the probate court .”9

( ILIT ) ) ; case No. BP145759 (concerning the guardianship of the
M inors) ; case No. BC544149 (concerning litigation regarding Robert’s estate) ; a nd case No. BP162717 (concerning the King Chui and Chi May Chui life insurance trust)

. 10 In 2014, the court appointed Christine as guardian of the

estate s of Jacqueline and Michael in case No. BP145759 and guardian ad litem for the M inors in case No. BP145642 (concerning the ILIT litigation )

. It does not appear that, prior to March 3, 2020, any guardian ad litem had been formally appointed for the Minors other than Chen in case No. BP137413 and Christine in the ILIT litigation
, case No. BP145759. 11

C. The S ettlement A greement
Trial in the T rust litigation was set to begin on May 14,
2018

. 12 That day, counsel for Christine, Benjamin
, Margaret , and Esther announced a settlement (the settlement agreement ) in court and orally set forth the terms on the record in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

. Guardian ad litem Chen was not present and the M inors were not represented in the proceeding

.

10 The parties also refer to L os Angeles Superior Court case No. BP16STP04524 , which is apparently concerned with Robert’s separate property trust , although it does not appear that a court has deemed that case related to the others.

11 In March 2020, the court expressed its view that the failure to appoint Chen in “several other cases” that had been deemed related was the result of the court’s “oversight” and an “administrative defect,” which it then “cur[ed]” by appointing Chen as guardian ad litem in several of the related cases.

12 It is not clear from our rec ord which cases were the subject of the trial that was scheduled to begin on May 14, 2018.10 Christine’s counsel recit ed the following settlement terms on the record : (1) Christine “ waives all rights to T rust A , including but not limited to claims regarding Three Lanterns
, Sycamore , and Atlantic
Towers

. Such interest goes to the residue. ” (2) Benjamin ’s interest in “Taylor, Derek, and Paularino are
disclaim ed to the Minor [ s ]
, ” and the Minors and Christine “disclaim their beneficial interest in Domingo” to Benjamin

. The p roperty known as “Calle Cristina will be sold, and

two

- thirds of the net proceeds will go to Ben [ jamin], and the remaining one

- third will go to the minor children’s trus ts. ”

“ The parties consent to the sale of [property known as] Hellman for f

air m arket value, and shall cooperate as needed.” 13 (3) Christine will deliver to Benjamin’s lawyers certain jew elry and other items of personalty within one week

. (4) Christine will pay $3 million to Benjamin’s counsel’s trust

account within one week

. (5) T he property to be distributed to Jacqueline and Michael under the T rust “will be distributed to their respective irrevocable

trusts th at were established by King, Rob ert [,] and Christine.” (6) “ Christine disclaims any rights as a beneficiary of King’s

trusts . The minor children’s claims, if any, can only b e brought by their guardian ad litem Jackson Chen, his designee, or his

court

- appointed s u cc essor, until such time as they reach the age of majority .” (7) Christine’s appeal in t he ILIT case and Benjamin’ s appeal from the order denying his anti

- SLAPP motion will be dismissed with prejudice, each side bear ing their own costs and attorney fees.

13 The Hellman property was not the subject of a specific bequest in the Trust and was considered part of the Trust residue.11 (8) Benjamin “ disclaims any further interest or rights or standing in Robert’s trust , with the exception of the Domingo property .” “ A ll litigation between the parties

. . . will be dismissed
, with each side to bear thei r own costs and attorney fees. ” No one admits liability and all parties “ agree to a waive r of Civil Code section 1542 .” (9) “ [ A ] ll provisions of this agreement affecting the M inors’ interests and rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem.” ( 10) “ [ T ] he parties shall work together to cause the T rust
to be amended to effectuate the settlement with the resulting tax treatment that is fair and equitable to all parties

. ” (11) “ [ A ] ll objections to any accountings are dismissed with prejudice
, and all parties waive rights to future accountings

. ” (12) The parties shall “ prepare a long form agreement , with all dispute s regarding the long form agreement to be resolved by”

a specified judge “via a binding arbitration.”
The court confirmed with counsel that the agreement would be enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. After Christine’s counsel recited the foregoing terms, counsel for Benjamin announced that “there are other terms that are not material to th e agreement with Christine that have been reached

as and among all the other parties. ” He p r oposed to read these additional terms into the record after the court has questioned the parties about the agreement. The court then asked Christine, Benjamin, Margaret, and Esth er if they heard and understood the terms of the agreement, if they had had enough time to speak

to their lawyers about the terms, and if they agree d to the terms. Each answered the questions affirmatively. The court concluded that, “subject to, with the exception of Mr. Chen on behalf of the two minor children, everybody appears12

to have agreed to these term s , and the court can, with that

one exception, assuming they agree, find that there’s a binding settlement of all issues
, and all petitions will be disposed of per the agreement.” Benjamin’s counsel then indicated he wanted to place the additional terms on the record. Christine’s c ounsel asked if they “need [ed] to stay.” The court suggested th at they “stay, just in case,” but told counsel, “ [Y] ou c an leave if you want.” Christine’s counsel responded, “Let’s leave

. ” Christine and her counsel then left the courtroom. Benjamin’s counsel then recited the following additional

terms : Esther will receive t he $3 million that Christine agreed

to deliver to Benjamin’s lawyers ; Helena Chui ( Robert’s first wife and Benjamin ’ s mother ) and Ruth Chang ( Helena’s mother ) will exercise a right to purchase the Sycamore property “at book value ”; Esther has a right of first refusal on any offer for the Three Lanterns property without commission; and Margaret will have the authority to assign family burial plots. Lastly, a time limit established in the T rust that bars Esther from full access to her t rust property shall be waived

. The court inquired of Esther, Margaret, Helena
, and Ruth

as to their understanding and acceptance of the terms and their opportunity to speak with counsel , and received affirmative

response s from each

. The court then found that “there’s another binding agreement between the parties enforceable under [Code of Civil Procedure section] 664.6 .” Within one week after the settlement agreement was placed on the record, Christine delivered to Benjamin’s counsel $3 million and certain jewelry , in accordance with the agreement

.13 D. T he F irst GAL A

greement On July 5, 2018, Christine filed a motion to set aside the settlement agreement , asserting that her consent to the settlement “was legally invalid because she was under the influence of codeine, as well as ill and sleep

- deprived.” She further asserted that the settlement agreement is “unconscionable.” The court denied Christine’s motion without prejudice as procedurally improper. 14 On July 23, 2018, Chen , pursuant to a request from the court, provided a report to the court in which he referred to a “ long

- form ” “draft ‘Settlement Agreement and M utual Release
, ’ ” which Benjamin’s counsel had circulated. Chen informed the court : “At the present time, with the long

- form agreement as drafted, I do not believe th at the proposed settlement is in the best interests of the Minors and I am unable to sign the agreement.” He made the following comments: (1) T he $3 million Christine pa id to Benjamin’s counsel’s trust account should be deposited in the
T rust to be applied to estate taxes and administration expenses; (2) H e could not agree to “broad releases, including a waiver of Civil Code [s] ection 1542”; (3) H e has “substantial concerns” regarding the distribution of property into the M inors ’ trusts ,

w hich “are not supervised by the [c] ourt ” and would extend the time the distributions are held in trust “to the detriment of the Minors”; (4) H e would not agree to the approval of trust accountings

or to waive the M inors’ rights to future accountings ; and ( 5) T he provision giving the guardian ad litem the power to bring claims

14 The court denied the motion to vacate t he settlement because “there was no such thing as a motion to vacate an agreement. You either file a complaint to vacate an agreement .

. . or perhaps you bring a petition in probate court parallel to a complaint to vacate an agreement.”14

on behalf of the M inor s should be limited to matters connected

to proceedings in which a guardian ad litem is appointed. Chen concluded that he “will insist on certain changes to the long

- form agreement before” he agrees to sign it. On August 10, 2018, Benjamin
, Margaret, Esther , and Chen entered into the f irst GAL agreement
, which recites that Chen “agree s to the terms of the S ettlement A greement subject to this A greement.” The f irst GAL agreement included, among other provisions, an agreement t hat the M inors will each receive $500,000 out of the $3 million Christine had delivered

to Benjamin’s counsel. The agreement further provides that the guardian ad litem ’s waiver of rights under Civil Code section 1542 is limited to matters pertaining to the T rust and that
, although Chen agrees to withdraw any objection to previously filed petitions for accountings, he “retains the right to request future accountings .” Christine is no t named as a party to the first GAL agreement, and she did not sign it

.
E. Motion to Enforce the S ettlement A greement On August 15, 2018, Benjamin and Margaret filed a motion

to enforce the settlement agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

. The motion was supported in part by Chen’s declaration in which he states that he believes the f irst GAL agreement “did not change the material t e rms of the settlement agreed to by the other parties

. ” The settlement agreement , he stated, “ is in the best interest of the [ M ] inors and the other beneficiaries of the

. . . T rust.” In a supplemental declaration, he stated that he “ never rejected the May 14, 2018 [s]ettlement ,” and he had “agreed to the settlement on behalf of the [M] inors on Aug ust 10, 2018.”15 Christine filed an opposition to the motion and argued,

among other arguments, that Chen’s July 23, 2018 report “amounted to a rejection of the offer set forth in the [settlement ] [ a ] greement,” and the first GAL agreement includes terms that differ from the settlement terms. On September 12, 2018
, the court held a hearing on the motion and took the matter under submission

. On September 17, the court issued a written ruling granting the motion

. The court rejected Christine’s argument that the terms of the oral settlement agreement were changed by the first GAL agreement . The first GAL agreement, the court exp lained
, “ explicitly states Chen’s agreement to the terms of the settlement agreed to by the other parties on the record before the [c] ourt on May 14, 2018 .” The

court also rejected the argument that Chen’s July 23, 2018 report

to the court constituted a rejection of the settlement agreement : “Chen never stated that he rejected the terms of the settle ment ” ; he “stated merely that he would not sign the proposed long form agreement as drafted .” The court concluded by stating that “[t] he [settlement] agreement still remains subject to [c] ourt approval of the [ M ] inors’ compromise. ” In its order, the court noted that although “Chen was appointed initially as [guardian ad litem] in just one case, thereafter t h e parties stipulated that the pending petitions in all these related cases were to be tried together. The [c] ourt understood th at [Chen] was [guardian ad litem] for all of these

cases

— as did Chen.” In that order, the court refers to the following cases as “related”: BP137413, BP143884, BP145642, BP145759, BP154245, BP155345, BP162717, and BC544149. On September 27, 2018, Christi ne filed a motion for reconsideration of the order enforcing the settlement agreement

.16

She argued that she had been denied an evidentiary hearing and that the court erred in concluding that the agreement among other parties that the $3 million she had pai d would be given to Esther was immaterial. She further argued that Chen’s July 23

, 2018 report constituted a rejection of the settlement “offer.” Before that motion was heard, Christine filed a motion

to vacate the order enforcing the agreement on the gro unds : (1) T wo pending appeals in related cases deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order enforcing the settlement agreement ; (2) Christine, in her capacity as guardian ad litem for the M inors in the ILIT case and as guardian o f the M inors’ estates, did not consent to the settlement agreement ; (3) There was no meeting of the minds because Christine was mistaken as to material terms of the settlement agreement ; (4) T he settlement agreement was the result of extrinsic fraud or mistake; (5) T he settlement agreement is unconscionable and contrary to public policy ; and (6) Christine’s mental condition at the time of the agreement was “impaired.” On December 14, 2018, t he court denied the motion for reconsiderati on and the mot ion to vacate the order enforcing the settlement agreement

. On December 17, 2018
, Christine filed a petition in case No. BP15 4245 to set aside the settlement agreement , appoint

an interim trustee to manage the Trust, and appoint herself as

gu ardian ad litem for the Minors in place of Chen , among other relief . The court subsequently granted Benjamin’s anti

- SLAPP motion and dismissed the petition

. 15

15 Christine has a ppealed the order granting Benjamin’s anti

- SLAPP motion to this court (case No. B301214). We stayed proceedings on appeal pending the outcome of the litigation regarding the settlement agreement.17 In January 2019, the court entered its order enforcing the settlement agreement

. 16

F. Chen’s P etition for A pproval of the F irst GAL A greement On November 12, 2018, Chen filed a petition for an order approving the first GAL agreement

. A t rial on Chen’s petition took place in April and May 2019. After Chen rested his case, Christine made a motion for nonsuit , which the court treated as a motion for judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8

. On July 18, 2019, the court granted Christine’s motion and denied Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement

. Chen, the court st ated, had not proven “that the agreement is in both or either of the [ M inors’] best interests.” The c o urt also issued an order to show cause (OSC) re removal of Benjamin and Margaret

as co

- trustees.

G. The S econd GAL A greement On July 29, 2019, Benjamin and Margaret moved for reconsideration of the court’s order granting Christine’s motion for judgment

. On August 2 2, Chen, Benjamin, and Margaret filed motions to reopen the trial. During the hearing on these motions
in October 2019, the parties agreed to participate in a mediation.

16 Christine filed a notice of appeal from this order on Mar ch 5, 2019, which we assigned case No. B296150. In June 2019, Benjamin filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeal

on the ground that the order was not an appealable order because the settlement agreement was subject to approval of the Minors’
comp romise. On July 3, 2019, we granted Benjamin’s motion and dismissed the appeal “as premature.”18 On December 5, 2019, Benjamin
, Margaret , Chen, and Christine p articipated in a mediation

. All parti cipants other than Christine reached an agreement (the second GAL agreement)

. At a status conference held on December 16, 2019, the court was informed of the second GAL agreement and ordered that the motions to reopen the trial and the motion for reconsideration of the order granting Christine’s motion for judgment were withdrawn

as moot

. The court explained that Chen’s petition for approval of the first GAL agreement was “ denied with prejudice as to that agreement” and without prejudice t o a motion for approval of “some revised [GAL] agreement.” The second GAL agreement was memoria lized in a writing dated January 16, 2020
, and signed by , among others, Benjamin and Margaret (in their individual capacities and as trustees of the
T rust) , Esther, Helena (Robert’s first wife)

, and Chen as the M inors’ guardian ad litem. Christine did not sign the document

. The second GAL agreement incorporates the terms of the settlement agreement and states that the parties “agree to and approve the terms of the S ettlement A greement that affect Jacqueline and Michael , and except as expressly provided herein, nothing in [the second GAL agreement] modifies or eliminates any term of the [settlement ].” According to the second GAL agreement : Benjamin shall give to the Minors his interests in the Taylor, Derek, and Paulari no properties and the Minors shall give to Benjamin their interest s in the Domingo property ; the Minors shall each receive $500,000 out of the $3 million Christine paid to Benjamin’s counsel under the settlement agreement and approximately $190,000 “from Insurance19

Trust #1”; 17 Helena and Ruth shall pay $740,000 to each of the Minors for the Minors’ interests in Sycamore; the Calle Cristina property will be sold and one

- third of the net proceeds “shall collectively be distributed” to the Minors “equa lly” ; the Hellman property shall be sold and 10 percent of the net proceeds “shall collectively be distributed” to the Minors “equally”; Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther shall pay any estate tax liability attributable to the interests the Minors receive from the T rust ; the Minors shall receive “a credit for their share of the [e] xpenses of [a] dministration [as defined] coupled with a complete and full distribution of their share of the Trust ” and, as a result, they shall “have no further interest in the Trust and/or in the future accountings of the Trust”;
the t rust ees shall pay any property taxes attributa b le to the Minors’ property interest s in the T rust until the properties are distributed to the m ; “ ‘ all objections to any accountings are dismissed wit h prejudice
, and all parties waive rights to future accountings ’ ”; the parties release the Minors from any liability for legal and administrative expenses attributable to the interests distributed under the second GAL agreement ; and the parties waive thei r rights under Civil Code section 1542 , provided that Chen’s waive r is limited to matters pertaining to the administration of and litigation relating to the T rust; the parties waive their right to object to approval of the second GAL agreement and to appeal from an order approving the agreement

.

17 The Trust document does not refer to an “Insurance Trust,” and it is not clear from our record to what the phrase “Insurance Trust #1 ” refers. Its nature and the amount due the Minors under this trust, however, does not appear to be in dispute.20 H. The Repudiations On December 3, 2018, Christine filed a notice of repudiation of the settlement agreement and the first GAL agreement. Three days later, she filed an amended and supplement al notice of repudiation of the settlement agreement and the first GAL agreement. Christine purported to repudiate the se agreement s in her capacity as parent and guardian of the M inors, g uardian ad litem of the M inors with respect to the ILIT case , “and a s a petitioner, respondent, and beneficiary of the

. . . Trust .” According to Christine, the terms other parties agreed to after she left the courtroom on May 14, 2018 “resulted in material prejudice to the Minors

. ” She also relied on a declaration by an account ant who opined that the settlement agreement resulted in a net loss

to the M inors of $25,251,430. In addition, “ she has reason to believe ” the s ettlement a greement may have caused “as much as $100,000,000.00” in economic harm to t he M inors. In February 2019, Jacqueline (then 15 years old) filed a n unverifi e d notice of her repudiation of the settlement agreement and the first GAL agreement

. She states that she is repudiating the settlement agreement “on her own” “because it is not in her best interests, ” it waives various rights and claims she holds, disclaims her interest in the Dom i ngo property, “and in m an y ways leav[e s] her in a worse position tha n if Christine

. . . had lost at trial.” On December 26, 2019

— after the parties to the second GAL agreement participated in the mediation that led to that agreement and before that agreement was memorialized in writing

— Christine filed a notice of repudiation of the second GAL agreement on the ground, among others, that the agreement was not in the best interest of the M inors. After the written second GAL agreement was executed, Christine filed a supplemental repudiation of the

ag reement. In each document, she stated she was acting as the21

parent and guardian ad litem for the M inors in the ILIT case, guardian of the M inors’ estates, trustee of Robert’s separate property trust, and the trustee of the M inors’ irrevocable trusts. Acc ording to Christine, the M inors “are far better off without” the second GAL agreement “by approximately $50 million” and, if the agreement is disapproved, the M inors “will reserve their rights and claims of $100 million against Esther,” Benjamin, and Marga ret, a s well as their “rights to account ings , and appeal.” On January 31, 2020, Jacqueline (then 17 years old) and Michael (then 15 years old) signed and filed declarations repudiating the second GAL agreement. The Minors stated that Chen “has never met o r spoken with [them]” during the preceding eight years and has assisted others in litigating against them and their interest. According to the M inors, the agreement also:

“ waives [their] substantial rights and claims including 8

- year past due and future trust accountings ”; “ waives [their] substantial rights, interests, [and] claims of over $100 million against [others]”; and “ waives [their] constitutional rights to appeal .” The M inors further stated that Chen has a conflict of interest by representing both of them. 18 On February 27, 2020, the co

- trustees filed a response to Christine’s purported repudiations. Among other points, they asserted that Christine does not have standing to repudiate the agreements in any capacity because Chen is the only person who can act for the M inors with respect to the Trust litigation
, Christine has a n irreconcilable conflict of interest with the M inors , and

18 T he court ultimately struck these declarations because they were not verified. The declarations were resubmitted in March 2020 with the Minors’ verifications.22

Christine waived any rights to represent the M inors when she agreed to the settlement agreement.

I. The March 3, 2020 Consolidated Ruling s The day after the second GAL agreement was signed , Chen filed a petition for its approval and a petition to remove Christine

as the Minors ’ guardian ad litem in all related cases and to appoint Chen in her place. In response, Christine filed demurrer s to each petition and a petition to remove Chen as guardian ad litem for the Minors

. 19 On March 3, 2020, the court heard oral argument from counsel for Christine, Benjamin, Margaret, Esther, and Chen regarding the pending petitions and demurrers. At the conclusion of the hearing, t he court issued a “consolidated ruling

, ” in which the court made the following rulings , among others : (1) The

court overruled Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition to remov e Christine as guardian ad litem of the Minors and granted Chen’s petition , appointing him guardian ad litem of the Minors in Christine’s place in all related cases except the case concerned with

19 On t he same day, Christine, in her individual capacity and in her capacity as a fiduciary of Jacqueline and Michael, filed a petition under section 850 alleging, among other claims, that Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther had misappropriated trust property and tortiously interfered with Christine’s and the Minors’ expected inheritance. Among other relief, Christine sought: the return of property “wrongfully taken”; punitive damages; an order disinheriting Esther, Margaret, and Benjamin; and the re moval of Benjamin and Margaret as co

- trustees of the T rust.23

the guardianship of the estate of the Minors (case No. BP145759) ; 20 (2) The court denied without prejudice Christine’s petition for removal of Chen as the Minors ’ guardian ad litem; and ( 3 ) The court overruled Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL a greement and granted the petition

. The court also discharged its OSC re garding removal of Benjamin and Margaret as

co

- trustees

. Initially, the court stated that the co

- trustees and Christine lacked standing to challenge Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL agreement. “Proceedings on a [guardian ad litem’s] [p] etition for [a] pproval ,” the court explained, “ are fundamentally between the [ M ] inors , the [guardian ad litem] , and the [c] ourt

— and nobody else.” The court also rejected the need for an evidentiary hearing because “proceedings on a [p] etition for [a] pproval are generally non

- adversarial in nature, as the proceeding is purely between the [c] ourt and its officer, the [guardian ad litem], to determine whether a proposed agreement is a good deal fo r the [ M ] inors

. ”
In evaluating the second GAL agreement, the court considered the Trust document and evidence of what the Minors would receive under the second GAL agreement. The court noted that the second GAL agreement provided “substantially better economic terms for the Minors than the [first] GAL agreement,” which the court had rejected eight months earlier

. In addition

to greater economic benefits, the second GAL agreement also “disentangles the Minors’ assets from Ben[jamin ] ’s assets, substantially mitigating the possibility of future disputes

. ”

20 The court subsequently corrected this order to the extent it appointed Chen as guardian ad litem in case No. BP145642, involving the ILIT.24

Although the Minors were waiving their right to future accou ntings, the court determined that this waiver had no “negative effect” on
the Minors because, as a result of the property exchanges between the Minors and Benjamin, and the co

- trustee s ’ agreement to cover the M inors ’ liabilities for estate taxes and trust expenses, the

co

- trustees “will no longer hold any of the Minors’ assets,” and “the Minors no longer had any financial interest in the Trust.” The court approved of the second GAL agreement’s handling of Three Lanter ns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers . The Minors would receive a total of $1,480,000 for the ir share, as residuary beneficiaries
, of the Trust’s interest in the Sycamore property

— an amount “corresponding to the Minors’ 20 [percent] i nterest in the [T] rust re sidue .” Three Lanterns will be sold to pay estate taxes in accordance with the terms of the Trust document
, 21 and the Minors’ share of that property’s value and the Atlantic Towers sale proceeds

— equal to approximately $1.75 million

— w ill, in effect, be exc hanged for a “waiver ” of the Minors’ $3.2 million share of

estate taxes , producing “a net improvement of $1.45 million” for the Minors

. The court expressly declined to consider “hypothetical
trial results

— where the evidence is unknown” and rejected “[u]nnecessary speculation as to the outcome of a highly contested, lengthy and expensive trial
, ” which “would not clarify the merits of the [a]greement.” In overruling Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s peti tion to remove Christine as guardian ad litem and her demurrer to Chen’s

21 Pursuant to the 2008 amendment to the Trust, estate
t axes attributable to the gifts made of Trust A property were to be paid from the residue of the Trust and from the Three Lanterns property. According to evidence submitted by the co

- trustees, there were insufficient assets in the residue to pay all the ta xes due. The sale of Three Lanterns was therefore necessary to pay the taxes.25

petition for approval of the second GAL agreement , the court rejected Christine’s reliance o n her and the Minors ’ repudiations of the second GAL agreement

. The repudiations filed by the Minors
, the court explained
, “are not legally operative documents, as they are unverified and not prepared by or with the Minors’ [guardian ad litem] .” Because the Minors “ have no legal authority to file repudiations without the representation of a gu ardian ad litem
, ” the repudiations are “ineffective and improper

. ” The court stated that a lthough Christine, as the Minors ’ parent, “would generally have a right to object or repudiate, she is precluded from doing so here because her objection is inconsistent with the Minors’ interest.” Moreover, “Christine has expressly waived her right to bring claims on the Minors’ behalf or object to the terms of the [second] GAL [a] greement ” under t he settlement agreement

. The court struck Christine’s repudiations “as improper and irrelevant.” In granting Chen’s petition to remove Christine as guardian ad litem and appointing Chen in her place i n certain cases, the court found that Christine “ waive d her right to repr e sent the
M inors as their guardian for purposes of the settlement agreement ” and that she has a conflict of interest arising “from her persistent opposition to any possibility of settlement ,” which precludes

“ her from acting on the M inors ’ behalf in this litigation

. ” The

court further explained that, although the court had previously deemed the other cases related to the case in which Chen had been appointed guardian ad litem and had in dicated to Chen that he should seek appointment in the related case s , Chen had not done so

“ until now.” By extending his appointment of Chen as guardian ad litem to the other cases , the court stated that it was “remedying an administrative defect” and “curing its own oversight

. ”26 In denying Christine’s petition to remove Chen as guardian ad litem , the court noted that Christine waived her right to seek Chen’s removal when she agreed that the M inor s ’ claim s “ ‘can only be brought by their guardian ad litem[,]

. . . Chen.’ ” Moreover, the

cour t found that “ there is no basis to remove Chen where he has successfully done his job by negotiating an approvable settlement for the Minors, leaving them far better off than they were under the [first] GAL [a] greement. ” On March 23, 2020, the court entered an order incorporating the March 3 rulings. Christine filed a motion for reconsideration of the consolidated rulings on March 13, 2020, and a motion for new trial on March 27, 2020

. On April 28, 2020, the court denied Christine’s motion for

a new t rial

. T he court rejected Christine’s reliance on the Minors ’ repudiations of the second GAL agreement because Christine lacked the authority to prepare and file the repudiations on the Minors ’ behalf without Chen. Chen, the court explained, “must be invo lved in any [r] epudiations by the M inors.” On June 24, 2020, the court granted Christine’s motion for
reconsideration of the court’s March 3, 3020 rulings w ith respect

to her removal as guardian ad litem in the ILIT case (case
No. BP145759 ) , and otherwise denied the motion

. On the same date, t he court entered an order : approving the second GAL agreement ; appointing Chen guardian ad litem of the Minors in case Nos. BP145642, BP 1 54245 , BP162717, 16STPB04524, BC544149; denying without prejudice Chr istine’s petition to

remove Chen as guardian ad litem ; and discharging the OSC

re garding removal of the co

- trustees

.27 On July 23, 2020, Christine
, Jacqueline, and Michael filed separate notices of appeal from the court’s orders issued on March 3, 2020
, April 28, 2020, and June 24, 2020

. Chen filed a motion in this court to dismiss the appeals filed by Jacqueline and Michael. We summarily denied that motion on March 22, 2021. Christine, Jacqueline, and Michael

— each represented by separate counsel

— ther eafter filed separate appellant’s briefs. The co

- trustees, Esther, and Chen filed respondent’s briefs.

DISCUSSION

A

. The E

ffect of P ending A

ppeals on the T

rial C ourt P roceedings
Christine and the Minors argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make the challenged orders enforcing the settlement and approving of the second GAL agreement because appeals

on other rulings were pending in this court. 22 We reject this argument.

1. Background: The P ending A

ppeals The pending appeals are case Nos. B286548, B288425, and
B301214. Case No. B286548 is an appeal from a judgment in the

22 Esther contends that we should not consider the appeals by Jacqueline and Michael because they were represented by

a guardian ad litem, Chen. Esther argues that the Minors ca n speak through only “[o]ne [v]oice”

— in this case, Chen’s

— and there cannot be a “second voice” speaking for the Minors on appeal,

even their own. As we explain below, even if we assume that the Minors may appeal , they have failed to establish prejudicial error. We do not, therefore, need to decide whether Chen’s trial court appointment as the Minors’ guardian ad litem precludes the Minors from challenging the court’s orders on appeal.28

ILIT litigation ( L.A. Superior Court case No. BP145642 ) (the ILIT appeal)

. In that case, the trial court determined that Benjamin is the sole remainder beneficiary under Robert’s life insurance trust “and is entitled to

. . . 100 [percent] distribution of the assets in the [trust ] .” The court entered a judgment in favor of Helena (Robert’s first wife) and Benjamin (Robert and Helena’s chi ld) and against Christine (Robert’s second wife)

, in her capacity as guardian of the estates of Jacqueline and Michael (Robert and Christine’s children )

. Christine filed her notice of appeal in November 2017. Under the settlement agreement reached in May 2018
, Christine agreed to dismiss the ILIT appeal. On February 21, 2019, we granted Benjamin’s m otion to stay proceedings in the ILIT appeal pending resolution of Christine’s challenges to the settlement agreem ent an d the second GAL agreement

. Case no. B288425 is an appeal by Benjamin from an order issued on February 20, 2018 (L.A. Superior Court case No. BP155345 ) denying his anti

- SLAPP motion to dismiss Christine’s petition to remove Benjamin as a trustee of the Trust. Benjamin filed his notice of appeal on February 23, 2018. Under the settlement agreement, Benjamin agreed to dismiss the appeal

. On January 29, 2020, we granted Benjamin’s motion to stay proceedings on appeal in case No. B288425 “pending determination of the proceedings before the probate court.” Case No. B301214 is an appeal by Christine of an order issued on March 29, 2019 (L.A. Superior Court case No. BP 154245 ) granting Benjamin’s anti

- SLAPP motion dismissing Christ ine’s petition to set aside the settlement agreement and for other relief

. On January 31, 2020, we granted Benjamin’s motion to stay29

proceedings on appeal in this case “pending determination of the proceedings before the probate court.” 23

2. Discussion
U nder section 1310, an appeal of a judgment or order in proceedings governed by the Probate Code generally “ stay s the operation and effect of the judgment or order .” (§ 1310, subd. (a).) The question is thus whether the statutory stay of the “ operation

an d effect ” of the judgment in the ILIT case and the anti

- SLAPP order s preclude d the court from ruling on the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and Chen’s petition to approve the second GAL agreement

. The purpose of the automatic stay under section 1310 , like the automatic stay imposed in civil actions generally, “ ‘ is to protect the appellate court ’ s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The [automatic stay] prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it. ’ ” ( Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 ( Varian ) [discussing Code of Civ il Proc edure section 916, subd ivision (a) ]

. ) In considering the analogous Code of Civil Procedure section that generally imposes a stay of proceedings “in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby” (Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd

. (a) ), our Supreme Court has explained that the “fact that [a] postjudgment or postorder proceeding may render the appeal moot is not, by itself,

23 We take judicial notice of the notices of appeal and our orders staying proceedings on appeal in case Nos. B286548, B288425, and B3012 1 4.30

enough to establish that the proceeding .

. . should be stayed

. ” ( Varian
, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 189 .) “ Rather, something more is needed. For example, the trial court proceeding must directly or indirectly seek to ‘ enforce, vacate or modify [the] appealed judgment or order. ’ [Citation.] Or the proceeding must substantially interfere with the appellat e court ’ s ability to conduct the appeal. ” ( Id. at p p. 189

− 190 , fn. omitted .) A stay of trial court proceedings may also be required when “ the possible outcomes on appeal and the actual or possible results of the proceeding are irreconcilable. ” ( Id. at p

. 190 .) Here, the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and petition to approve the second GAL agreement had two possible

outcomes with respect to the pending appeals : (1) the motion or petition (or both) would be denied, in which case the provisions in the settlement agreement requiring the dismissal of the ILIT and anti

- SLAPP appeals would be ineffective
, the ILIT judgment and anti

- SLAPP orders would be unaffected , and the appeals would proceed as if there had been no settlement agreement ; or (2) if the motion and petition were granted, the appeals would be dismissed pursuant to the settlement agreement

. Under the first possible outcome, there would be no impact on the eff ect or operation of the ILIT judgment and the anti

- SLAPP orders and no interference with our ability to conduct the appeal s from such judgment and orders

. Under the second possible outcome, although the dismissal of the appeals necessarily interferes with our ability to conduct those appeals, it is an interference that the law encourages. As our Supreme Court has explained, settlement and dismissal of cases

on appeal are favored “ because it will preclude the need for future expenditures of time and money by the parties and the judiciary. Requiring parties to continue to litigate a matter over which there is no longer a real dispute ‘ is wasteful of the resources of the31

judiciary. ’ ” ( Neary v. Regents of University of Califor nia (1992)
3 Cal.4th 273, 277 .) We therefore reject the argument that the pending ILIT and anti

- SLAPP appeals had the effect of stay ing the proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. Christine further argues that Chen was required to bring his petit ion for approval of the second GAL agreement in this

court. She relies on Anderson v. Latimer (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 667 ( Anderson ). In that case, a minor was injured in an auto accident and sued the drivers of the two cars involved. ( Id. at p. 670.) A jury found in his favor and against each defendant, and judgment was entered thereon. The defendants appealed. While the appeal was pending, one of the defendants settled with the minor’s guardian ad litem. ( Id. at p. 676.) The guardian ad lit em filed a petition
in the superior court for approval of the settlement. Based on the statutory requirement that a minors’ compromise be approv ed by

“ the court in which the action or proceeding is pending ” ( Code Civ

. Proc
., § 372 , subd. (a)(1) ) , t he Cour t of Appeal held that the superior

cour t “lacked jurisdiction to address the petition”; the Court of Appeal “ was the only court possessing jurisdiction to hear and determine whether to approve or disapprove the compromise .” ( Anderson , supra, 166 Cal.App.3 d at p. 676 .) The Anderson court’s analysis implies that the action or proceeding in that case was “ pending ” only in the Court of Appeal. A motion in a case in which an appeal is pending may go forward
in the trial court, however, so long as the motion is not precluded by a stay put in place by statute or a court order

. (See, e.g., Henry M. Lee Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1375,
1383 [trial court can proceed on matters not stayed by a ppeal ] .) As to such postappeal motions , the action or proceeding continues to be

“ pending” in the trial court even while the appeal is pending in the Court of Appeal. As set forth above, the related appeals did not32

stay Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL agreement in the trial court. Chen was not required, therefore, to file his petition in this court.

B

. The O rder G ranting M otion to E nforce the S ettlement A

greement
Christine and the M inor s contend that the court erred in granting the co

- trustee s ’ motion to enforc e the settlement agreement because: (1) T he court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion; (2) T he agreement the court enforced contains terms to which Christine did not agree; (3) Christine did not ag ree that the money she paid to Benjamin’s counsel would be delivered to Esther; (4) The court failed to make a finding as to the meaning of “residue”; ( 5 ) Chen rejected the settlement agreement; ( 6 ) T he agreement is unconscionable; ( 7 ) T he court failed to consider

“ inseverability ”; and (8) T he agreement was the result of extrinsic fraud

. We reject these arguments.

1. Failure to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing
In connection with the motion to enfo r ce the settlement , the

co

- trustees ( in support of the motion ) and Christine ( in opposition

to the motion ) submitted declaration s and document ary evidence in support of their positions. The court held a hearing at which counsel for Christine and the co

- trustees appeared and argued. Chen also appear ed as guardian ad litem for the M inors. Christine contend s that s he was denied due process because the court failed to hold a “ full evidentiary hearing
, ” where she could present witness testimony. W e agree with the trial court that , even if Christine had a right to present testimony at the hearing, she waived that right by failing to request a n evidentiary hearing or to seek to introduce evidence at the hearing on the motion

.33 Although Christine ’s counsel indicated at the hearing that he had sought to present testimony and other evidence in connection with Christine’s earlier motion to set aside the settlement, th at motion was not before the court when the motion to enforce the settlement was heard. The court had pr eviously denied Christine’s motion to set aside the settlement without prejudice on the ground that it was procedurally improper
, and Christine did not challenge that ruling

. Christine does not refer us to any point in the record where she requested an ev identiary hearing or the right to present testimony during the motion to enforce the settlement

. Therefore, even if she had a due process right to present evidence at th at hearing , she waived that right. Christine also relies on section 1022, which provides that “[a] n affidavit or verified petition shall be received as evidence when offered in an uncontested proceeding under this code. ” Under this rule, “ ‘ affidavits and verified petitions may not be cons idered as evidence at a contested probate hearing ’ ” “ ‘ when challenged in a lower court. ’ ” ( Estate of Bennett (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1303,
1309 .) When, however, “the parties did not object to the use of affidavits in evidence, and both parties adopted that means of supporting their positions ” and “ participated in such presentation of the evidence as a matter of convenience

. . . , they cannot question the propriety of the procedure on appeal. ” ( Estate of Fraysher (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131, 135 ; accord, Esta te of Nicholas (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1088 ; see McMillian v. Stroud (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 692, 704 [ trial court did not err in failing to hold evidentiary hearing where appellant s “ neither expressly requested an evidentiary hearing

. . . nor made an offer of proof establishing the necessity for a hearing ”] .) Here, both sides submitted and relied on declaration s and documentary evidence to support their views and, although34

Christine filed objections to the moving parties’ evidence, she
did not obj ect to the use of declarations generally or rely on section 1022. She has therefore forfeited the argument on appeal.

2. Alleged C hanges to the S ettlement A greement
Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 permits a court to

“ ‘ enter judgment pursuant to the terms of a settlement if the parties stipulate orally before the court or in writing to settle all or part of a case. [Citation.] ’ ” ( Leeman v. Adams Extract & Spice, LLC (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373

– 1374 ( Leeman ) .) A settlement is enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 if some parties stipulate orally in court while others agree in writing. (See Elyaoudayan v. Hoffman (2003)
104 Cal.App.4th 1421, 1432 [ Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 allows “ a ‘ mix and match ’ approach to the manner of agreement

as long as all parties agree to the same material terms ” ] ; accord
, Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1259 .)
In ruling on a motion to enforce a settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, “ the court may interpret the terms of the parties ’ settlement agreement ” and decide “ ‘ what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon
, ’ ” but may not

“ ‘ create the material terms of a settlement. ’ ” ( Leeman
, supra , 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 137 4 , qu oting Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810 ( Weddington Productions ) .) A new or altered term is material if “ it changes the rights or duties of the parties, or [any] of them. ” ( Consolidated Loan Co. v. Harman (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 488, 491 ; se e Humphreys v. Crane (1855)
5 Cal. 173, 175 [a change that “ does not vary the meaning, the nature, or subject matter, of the contract is immaterial ”] .) We review the court’s factual findings to determine if they

are supported by su bstantial evidence and review legal conclusions35

de novo. ( Weddington Productions
, supra , 60 Cal.App.4 th at p. 815 ; Connerly v. State Personnel Bd . (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175.) Christine contends that the “purported settlement” the court enforced “ ‘ was different from the terms of the parties ’ stipulated settlement agreement.’ ” She discusse s 10 terms of the settlement agreement , which she argues were change d
, and describe s 15 terms that appear only in the second GAL agreement. Michael makes a similar argument, asserting that the agreement the court enforced included “30 modified and new terms .” More specifically, Michael lists 10 terms of the settlement agreement that were allegedly changed and 20 “new terms” that were added in the second GAL agreement. Christine’s and Michael’s argument s improperly conflate the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement . Although the secon d GAL agreement relates to the settlement agreement and Chen’s approval of the settlement agreement is a condition to the effectiveness of th e agreement , Christine is not a party to the second GAL agreement and that agreement does not impose any obligation on her or de prive her of any right or interest she acquired in the settlement agreement

. Although the terms of the second GAL a greement are relevant to challenges to the court’s approval of the second GAL a greement (see Discussion part C
, post ) , t he purported 15 terms that Christine identifies and the 20 terms Michael identifies that were purportedly added in the second GAL agreement in January 2020 are irrelevant to the issue whether the court erred in granting the motion to enforc e the settlement

ag reement in September 2018

. As for the 10 terms that Christine and Michael contend the court had changed when it granted the motion to enforce the settlement agreement , a close examination reveals that the contentions are without merit.36 The first term of the settlement agreement is that Christine “waives all rights to T rust A, including but not limited to claims regarding Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers. Such interest goes to the residue.” A ccording to Christine, under th e agreement the court enforced
, “Michael gets only $740,000 of the ‘net fair market’ value of Sycamore ” and “Atlantic Tower and
Three Lanterns will be sold to pay for estate tax, and neither Minor receives anything from these properties.” The reference

to Michael’s receipt of $740,000 is to language in the second GAL

a greement and does not appear in the court’s order enforcing the settlement agreement

. Nor does that payment change or affect any of Christine’s rights or obligation s under the settlement agreement

. Michael contends that under the first term he “should receive S ycamore and Three Lanterns outright.” The first term, as recited by Christine’s counsel before the court, however, does n ot provide for Michael to receive any interest in Sycamore or Three Lanterns. Instead, Christine

— the devisee of Sycamore and Three Lanterns under the Trust document

— expressly waived her interest in these properties and agreed that they would go “to the re sidue.” Under the second term of the settlement agreement
, the “parties consent to the sale of Hellman for fair market value, and shall cooperate as needed.” According to Christine and Michael
, th ese terms were changed because Hellman is part of the Trust residue and the M inors are 10 percent residual beneficiaries , yet the M inors “would each receive only [five percent ] of the proceeds ” from the sale of Hellman. Christine and Michael again refer to the second GAL agreement for the allegedly changed term, not the order enforcing the agreement , which did not specify what, if anything, the M inors would receive from the sale of the Hellman property

. Moreover, Christine does not explain how the M inors’37

receipt of five percent of the sale of Hellman affec ts any of her rights or obligations under the settlement agreement

. Under the third term , certain jewelry and other items specified in discovery responses shall be provided to counsel for Benjamin within one week. According to Christine and Michael
, the enforced agreement differed because the M inors will not receive the specified items. The agreement as recited by Christine’s counsel in court, however, did not specify who would ultimately receive the items. There is thus no difference. The fourth term of the settlement agreement required Christine to pay $3 million to Benjamin’s lawyers ’ “trust account.” Contrary to Michael’s assertion, the parties did not agree that the “Minors will receive $3 million” ; i n fact, t he parties did not spe cify the ultimate recipients of the money. According to Christine, this provision was changed in the second GAL agreement by requiring that Jacqueline and Michael each receive $500,000 of the $3 million

. Even if th e provision for such payments in the seco nd GAL agreement is deemed a change to the settlement agreement , it does not change any right or obligation of Christine ’s ; it merely provides Michael with $500,000 he did not have a right to receive under the settlement agreement. Under the fifth term, t he M inors’ interests in the T rust will be distributed to their respective irrevocable trusts established by King, Robert, and Christine. Christine asserts that this was change d to provide for distribution “to those trusts that are under [c] ourt supervision.” She cites only to the second GAL agreement, and the citation does not support the assertion. Under the sixth term, Christine disclaims any rights as a beneficiary under the T ru st and the M inors’ “claims, if any, can only be brought by ” Chen, his designee, or his court

- appointed successor until they reach the age of majority. According to Christine and38

Michael
, this term was changed because Chen waived the M inors’ “claims of $10 0 million ” and the M inors do not “want to waive [their] claims.” Again, Christine cites only to the second GAL agreement, and the citation does not support the alleged change. Michael refers also to his and Jacqueline’s repudiations of the agreements

. T he repudiations (which are discussed below) , were not asserted until after the court ruled on the enforcement of the settlement agreement. Therefore, although they may bear upon the effectiveness of the second GAL agreement, they cannot be relied on to ch allenge the court’s September 2018 ruling enforcing the settlement agreement. (See Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency v. Dhaliwal (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1328 [ we review

a court’s ruling based on the record as it existed at the time of the ruling].) Under the ninth term, the provisions of the agreement affecting the M inors’ interests and rights are subject to approval by the guardian ad litem. Christine notes that Chen was appointed

“ in only one case of nine case s and had no power to bind t he Minors for the remaining case s .” Michael adds that he “did not want to dismiss his ILIT appeal.” The se points , however, do not indicate any change in the term in the settlement agreement . Indeed, in ruling on the motion to enforce the settlement, the court explained that the settlement agreement was “ subject to the condition precedent of Chen’s agreement.” The 10th term provides that “ the parties shall work together to cause the T rust to be amended to effectua te the settlement with the resulting tax treatment that is fair and equitable to all parties.” Christine argues that this “[n]ever occurred and is not part of the final judgment,” and that “ the tax treatment achieved by the final judgment is unfair and ineq uitable.” Michael makes a similar argument. The references to “final judgment” appear to be to the39

second GAL agreement or the court’s order approving the second GAL agreement
, not to the order enforcing the settlement agreement, which made no change to this provision. Moreover, Christine’s and Michael’s comments indicate an alleged breach of the agreement, which is irrelevant to the determination of whether the agreement was enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

. Under the 11th term, the parties dismissed with prejudice all objections to accountings and waived rights to future accountings. Christine and Michael assert that this was changed in the second GAL agreement where the minors “waived all rights to full and independent past due, current, and future trust accountings.” They do not refer to any change in the agreement as enforced by the court and, in any case, they do not explain how any change in the second GAL agreement has any e ffect on their rights or obligations. Lastly, under the 12th term, “ the parties are to prepare a long form agreement, with all disputes regarding the long form agreement to be resolved . . . via binding arbitration.” Christin e and Michael argue that this provision was changed because they

were excluded from any long form negotiation s, and refer to the second GAL agreement as a “ long form ” to which they never consented. As with the argument s regarding the 10th term, the alleged exclusion from negotiations suggests a possible breach of the settlement agreement , not a changed term. Christine makes a cursory assertion that the court “had

no power to enforce a settlement that, as the [t] rial [c] o urt found here, had been procured by fraud.” The undeveloped assertion is made without citation to the record. We therefore decline to consider it. (See Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8 [“ courts will declin e to consider any40

factual assertion unsupported by record citation at the point where it is asserted ”].) For the foregoing reasons, we reject Christine’s and Michael’s argument s that the court enforced an agreement with terms different from the agreement Christine made in May 2018.

3. Christine’s A lleged L ack of C onsent to Esther a s the R ecipient of $3 Million
Christine contends that she did not consent to the “ additional material terms ” recited by Benjamin’s counsel on May 14, 2018
, after Christine and her attorneys left the courtroom. 24 Because these terms were added in her absence, she argues, there was no meeting of the minds as to these terms and therefore no contract

. In particular, Christine points to the agreement re ached among Benjamin, Esther, Margaret , and Helena that the $3 million that Christine agreed to pay to Benjamin’s law firm’s trust fund “goes to Esther.” Christine asserts that she “would never have agreed to give a penny to Esther ” and “would have never consented to this term.” According to Christine, her $3 million payment should have been added to the T rust corpus , which would have benefited her children as residuary beneficiaries

. Christine, however, could have bargained for a provision requiri ng the money be added to the T rust or distributed to particular persons (such

as her children) or not distributed to particular persons (such as

24 Christine asserts that she “was precluded from all knowledge of the additional material terms added on May 14, 2018,” and that “ [r] espondent coerced [her] into leaving the [c] ourtroom to record Esther’s name.” The record, however, indicates that the cour t invited Christine and her counsel to remain in the courtroom “just in case,” but that Christine and her counsel left voluntarily.41

Esther) . Christine made no such bargain , however, and upon transferring the money as agreed, she had no right to direct what happens to the money there after.

4. The Court’s F

ailure to M

ake a F inding as to the M eaning of “

R esidue ”
Christine next contends that the court never made a factual finding concerning the meaning of the word, “residue,” as used in the settlement agreement

. Pursuant to term one of the agreement
, Christine agreed to waive “all rights to T rust A, including but not limited to claims regarding Three Lanterns, Sy camore, and Atlantic Towers. Such interest goes to the residue.” According to Christine, the word “residue” could mean the “ [r] emainder ” of the trust estate as defined in the Trust document or , as she understood it, “the corpus of T rust A , since the fami ly often referred to Trust A as the Residue Trust.” If residue means the remainder of the Trust, her interests in Trust A assets , including Three Lanterns and Sycamore
, would be distributed to the residua ry beneficiaries. According to Christine, however, she understood that she was relinquishing her interest s in Three Lanterns and Sycamore to Michael

. Christine did not, however, raise this point in her opposition to the motion to enforce the settlement

. She refers us to he r declaration in support of her motion to set aside the settlement agreement . But in that declaration, she states only that she learned “what it meant for [her] property to enter into the ‘residue’ of [ the ] . . . T rust” after her accounting expert evaluat ed the settlement

. She does not state what her understanding was of the T rust residue either before or after the accountant explained it to her. Thus, even if the court considered her declaration in connection with the motion to enforce the settlement, her declaration is insufficient to raise the issue she asserts on appeal.42 In any case, the meaning of “residue” in the context of trust and probate litigation has a readily understandable meaning

as the surplus of the estate rem aining after the payment of debts and the distribution of specific bequests and devises

. (See Estate of Lawrence (1941) 17 Cal.2d 1, 8 ; Blech v. Blech (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 989, 1003 ; Estate of Keller (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 232, 241 ; § 21117 , subd. (f).) Here, with respect to Trust A

— in which Three Lanterns and Sycamore were held and which was the subject of term 1 of the settlement agreement

— the reference

to the “ residue ” unambiguously refers to the provision of the Trust document that provides for the distribution of “[t] he remainder of Trust ‘ A, ’ after any payments and distributions by the [t] rustee [of specific bequests] pursuant to the provisions of [specified] subparagraphs ” of the Trust document. Although the treatment of such “remainder” under the Trust document is somewhat complex, there is no reasonable reading of the Trust document that supports Christine’s interpretation by which the Trust’s entire interest in Three Lanterns and Sycamore as part of the res idue, would be given to Michael.

5. Chen’s Alleged Rejection of the “Settlement Offer” Christine next contends that Chen rejected the “settlement offer” in his July 23 , 2018 report to the court on a proposed “long form” agreement , and that his rejection “ killed Christine’s offer.” She argues further that Chen could not “revive” “the offer” by his subsequent “purported acceptance

. ” The argument is fundamentally flawed because , as the trial court found, the settlement reached by the parties in court on May 14, 2018, was not an offer, but an agreement subject to a condition, namely , Chen’s approval. Specifically, Christine and the other parties present in court agreed that the terms “affecting the M inors’ interest s and43

right s are subject to a pproval by the guardian ad litem.” The phrase “ ‘[s] ubject to ’ is generally construed to impose a condition precedent. ” ( Rubin v. Fuchs (1969) 1 Cal.3d 50, 54 .) The court found that this condition of Chen’s approval was met when Chen entered into the fir st GAL agreement and stated that he “agrees to the terms of the S ettlement A greement” reached in court on May 14, 2018. Chen reiterated his approval of the settlement terms in his declaration filed in support of the motion

to enforce the settlement , in which he states his “agreement to the terms of the settlement agreed to by the other parties on the record before the [c] ourt on May 14, 2018.” The court’s finding is thus supported by subst antial evidence. Christine further argues that eve n if Chen approv ed of the settlement agreement , the additional terms in the first GAL agreement differed from the settlement agreement and constituted a rejection of the settlement terms. Christine, however, again erroneously conflates the settlement agre ement with Chen’s separate agreement with other parties in the first GAL agreement

. Christine was not a party to the first GAL agreement and nothing in that agreement alters any of Christine’s rights, interests, or duties under the settlement agreement

.

6. Alleged Unconscionability Christine contends that the trial court erred in rejecting her argument that the settlement agreement is unconscionable. “ ‘ The unconscionability doctrine ensures that contracts, particularly contracts of adhesion, do not impo se terms that have been variously described as “ ‘ “overly harsh ” ’ ” [citation]
, “ ‘unduly oppressive ’ ” [citation]
, “ ‘ so one

- sided as to “ shock the conscience ” ’ ” [citation], or

“ unfairly one

- sided ” [citation]. ’ ” ( Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 899, 910

– 911 .) The doctrine “ ‘ “ has both a44

procedural and a substantive element, the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter

on overly harsh or one

- sided results. ” ’ ” ( Id. at p. 910.) Both elements must “ ‘ “ be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause

. ” ’ ” ( Ibid. ) Christine contends that the settlement agreement “was procedurally unconscionable because it contained term s that were unknown to Christine prior to their announcement on the record .” Although she uses the plural, “terms,” she refers only to her lack of understanding of the word “residue.” She argues that the agreement “was substantively unconscionable becaus e its terms were drastically harmful to Christine and her children, and any bargain therein was illusory. ” The arguments are without merit. When the settlement was placed on the record, Christine

was present and represented by three attorneys from differe nt law firms. 25 After the terms were recited by her counsel, the court asked her if she heard and understood “all of the terms,” and she responded, “Yes.” She also answered affirmatively to the question whether she “had enough time to speak to [her] lawy er about [the terms],” and whether she agreed “to all of those terms.” Under these circumstances, Christine has failed to establish procedural unconscionability. Regarding substantive unconscionability, we note that Christine was facing claims by Benjamin, Margaret, and Esther that she had committed financial elder abuse against King and used her position as trustee de son tort to misappropriate more

25 One of Christine’s attorney s , Vikram Brar, was not present for the trial. When later asked why he was not there, he expla ined that being Christine’s attorney “doesn’t mean [he] would attend all hearings.”45

than $12 million in cash and $12.5 million in other property interests from the T rust. In addition to damages for these losses, the petitioners were seeking $14.4 million in statutory damages and attorney fees (§ 859), punitive damages, and a determination that Christine predeceased King pursuant to section 259. The trial court, which was familiar with the case, explained that, “ even assuming [the petitioners] have likely exaggerated their probability of prevailing at trial, proving unconscionability is still

a heavy burden for Christine: It is not enough to assert merely that she may have prevailed bu t rather that the settlement terms ‘shock the conscience.’ This they do not where it appears there

was at least some probability Benjamin and the others might have prevailed. Given their showing that Christine might not have prevailed, it is not inconcei vable to the [c] ourt that she might have elected to avoid potentially greater losses by entering into an agreement that may not be particularly favorable to her. ” On appeal, Christine does not attempt to show that she might have prevailed at trial. Instea d, she argues that the settlement left her and the children “over $35 million worse off than if she had lost the case on the merits.” She explains that if she had lost, she could have been deemed to have predeceased King under section 259.
In that case, she contends, Michael would have received her share of the Three Lanterns and Sycamore because the T rust document provides that Michael is to receive these properties if both Robert and Christine predecease King. Therefore, she argues, by preventing her f

rom losing at trial, the settlement “effectively disinherited .

. . Michael, thus leaving her family over $35 million worse off than if she had lost the case.” (Boldface omitted.) Christine’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of section 259. Under subdivision (a) of section 259, a person who, among other requirements, is liable for physical or financial46

abuse or neglect of a decedent, will be deemed to have predeceased the decedent “to the extent provided in subdivision (c).” (§ 259, subd. (a).) 26 Under subdivision (c), a person who is liable under subdivision (a) shall not “ receive any property, damages, or costs that are awarded to the decedent ’ s estate in an action described in subdivision (a).” (§ 259, subd. (c).) As one court has explained, a “ person found liable under subdivision (a) of section 259 is deemed to have predeceased the decedent only to the extent the person would have been entitled through a will, trust, or laws of intestacy to receive a distribution of the damages an d costs the person is found to be liable to pay to the estate as a result of the abuse. Section 259 does not necessarily eliminate the abuser ’ s entitlement to a share of the estate; it simply restricts the value of the estate to which the abuser ’ s percent age share is applied and prevents that person from benefiting from his or her own wrongful conduct. ” ( Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 803

− 8 04
, fn. omitted.) Thus, if the

co

- trustees established Christine’s liability under section 259, subdivis ion (a), and recovered property, damages, or costs from Christine as a result of such liability, Christine could not receive

26 Subdivision (a) of section 259 provides that a “ person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent [for certain purposes] where all of the following apply: [ ¶ ] (1) It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the person is liable for physical abuse, neglect, or financial abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult . [¶] (2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith. [¶] (3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious in the commission of any of these acts upon the decedent. [¶] (4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter until the time of his or her death, has been found to hav e been substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence. ”47

any share of the recovered property, damages, or costs. The

statute would not operate, as Christine suggests, to give Michael alon e property that is “awarded to the decedent ’ s estate .” (§ 259, subd. (c).) Christine and “her family,” therefore, could not win by losing, and her substantive unconscionability argument fails.

7. The Court’s A lleged Failure to Consider I nseverability
Christine next argues that “ the court failed to consider inseverabil ity by enforcing a modified agreement with terms

to which [she] did not consent. ” ( Boldface and c apitalization omitted.) She asserts that her “deal was inseparable from her children’s” and , until the court approved the “precise terms” affecting Jacqueline and Michael , “there was no settlement to enforce.” In placing the terms of the settlement on the record on May 14, 2018, however, the parties and their counsel made clear that they were setting forth the terms of a binding agreement, enforceable under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, subject only to Chen’s approval. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Christine was withholding her acceptance of the agreeme nt pending her review of other terms to which the Minors , through their guardian ad litem
, and others agree d

. We therefore reject the argument.

8. Michael’s C laim of E xtrinsic F

raud by the C

ourt Michael contends that the order enforcing the settlement agreement is unenforceable because the court did not inten d

to perform it. He discusses at some length the law th at permits

a contracting party to rescind a contract that was induced by extrinsic fr aud. He refers to orders made after his appeal in this case in which the court allegedly required the M inors to

pay $500,000 in Chen’s legal fees and to sell the Taylor propert y

.48

These orders, he argues, are contrary to the terms of the settlement

agreem ent and indicate that “[t]he trial [ c ] ourt enforced the settlement without any intention of performing it.” (Boldface omitted.) Aside from the fact that the trial court is not a party to the settlement agreement and has no duty to perform any of its terms
, Michael’s assertions are made without citation to the record and, in any case, are not encompassed within the scope of Michael’s notice of appeal. Therefore, we reject the argument

.
C

. The Court’s A

pproval of the S econd GAL A greement
Christine and the M inors challenge the court’s order granting Chen’s petition approving of the second GAL a greement on the following grounds: (1) Chen , as a guardian ad litem appointed in one case only, did not have capacity to make the second GAL agreement ; (2) the court f ailed to hold an evidentiary hearing

on the petition ; (3) the lack of notice to the Minors deprived them of due process ; (4) the agreement was not in the Minors’ best interest s ; (5) the court failed to approve Chen’s attorney fees;
and ( 6 ) Christine and the Minors repudiated or disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the s econd GAL agreement . We address each in turn.

1. Chen’s Capacity to Make the Second GAL Agreement Jacqueline contends that Chen lacked capacity to make a contract in Jac queline’s name because, prior to March 2020, Chen had been formally appointed the guardian ad litem in only one of the many cases involving or related to the Trust. We reject this argument.49 Initially, we note that in proceedings under the Probate Code,

t he court is not necessarily required to appoint a guardian ad litem for minors involved in the proceeding s . Under section 1003, the court “may , on its own motion or on request of a personal representative, guardian, conservator, trustee, or other interest ed

person, appoint a guardian ad litem ” for a minor “ if the court determines that representation of the interest otherwise would be inadequate .” (§ 1003, subd. (a).) 27 The word “may” implies discretionary decision

- making authority ( People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448 )
, and, as the statutory text indicates, such discretion is to be guided by the court’s determination regarding the adequacy of the representation of the minor’s interest in the absence of a guardian ad litem. In the absence of an appointment of a guardian ad litem, the
M inor s were not, as Jacqueline asserts, representing themselves “in pro [.] per.” Rather, the court is “ the guardian of the minor” ( Serway v. Galentine (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 86, 89 ( Serway ) )
, and the guardian ad litem is appointed , if at all, “ ‘ “ merely to aid and to enable the court to perform that duty of protection. ” ’ ” ( Williams v. Superior Court (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 36, 49

– 50 ( Williams ) ; see

27 Section 1003’s discretionary appointment power contrast with the requirement under section 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure that “[w] hen a minor

. . . is a party, that person shall appear either by a guardian or conservator of the estate or by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court in which the action or proceeding is pending .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) “ The general provisions for appointment of a guardian ad litem ” under Code of Civil Procedure section 372, however,

“ do not apply in probate proceedings. Instead, the matter is governed by [section] 1003

. ” ( Ross & Cohen, Cal. Practice Guide : Probate (The Ru tter Group 2021) ¶ 3:558

. )50

Cole v. Superior Court of City & County of San Francisco (1883) 63 Cal. 86, 89 ( Cole ) [ “ [t] he court is, in effect, the guardian

— the person named as guardian ad litem being but the agent to whom the court, in appointing him (thus exercising the power of the sovereign [s] tate as parens patriœ ) has delegated the execution of the trust ”] ). Therefore, the fact that a guardian ad litem had not been appointed for the minors in particular probate proceedings does not mean that the minors were representing themselves. In light of the discretionary authority provided b y section 1003, the absence of an appointment of a guardian ad litem would ordinarily imply that the court found that it could adequately protect a minor ’ s interest, if any, and that the aid of a guardian ad litem was not required. Here, however, the cour t indicated that its failure to appoint a guardian ad litem was an “oversight” on its part and a “clerical issue” and “administrative defect,” which
it “cur[ed]” when the court granted Chen’s request to be appointed guardian ad litem in the related cases. Whatever the reason for failing to appoint a guardian ad litem in particular related cases, there is no merit to Jacqueline’s assertion that she represented herself in pro . p er

. in those cases. Where a guardian ad litem was not appointed to act as the cou rt’s aid or agent in performing the court’s duty to protect the M inors’ rights, the court merely proceeded without the aid of a guardian ad litem in performing that duty. In this light, we see no legal significance in the fact that Chen had not been appoi nted guardian ad litem in the related cases when he negotiated the second GAL agreement. As guardian ad litem in at least one of the Trust litigation cases, he negotiated an agreement ostensibly to aid the court in its duty of protecting the M inors’ inter ests. The fact that the agreement encompasses claims the M inors may have in related

cases

— over which the court acted as the M inors’ guardian without51

the aid of a guardian ad litem

— means only that Chen arguably provided more aid to the court than his case

- specifi c appointment required. Although t he court had the power and duty to reject such aid if it determined that the agreement was not in the M inors’ best interest s , there is no bar to accepting such aid

. The refore, the fact that Chen had not been appointed guardian ad litem in all cases in which the second GAL agreement affected the Minors’ right s did not preclude the court from approving of the second GAL agreement

.

2. Christine’s S tanding to O ppose the P

etition for A pproval of the S econd GAL A gr eement Among other rulings made at the hearing held on March 3,
20 20 , the court denied standing of the co

- trustees and Christine to object to Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL agreement.

“ Proceedings on a [guardian ad litem’s] [p] etition for [a] pproval ,” the court explained, “ are fundamentally between the [M] inors, the [guardian ad litem] , and the [c] ourt

— a nd nobody else. ” Christine and the Minors challenge this ruling

. The approval of a petition or motion to approve a minor’s compromise is governed by section 3500, subdivision (b), sections 3600

− 3612, Code of Civil Procedure section 372
, and rules 7.9 5 0 through 7.9 5 2 of the California Rules of Court. 28 None of the se sta tute s or rules require s notice or an adversary hearing to

28 Although the appointment of a guardian ad litem in probate proceedings is governed by section 1003, the P robate C ode does not provide for a guardian ad litem to compromise a minor’s claim . Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which does permit

a guardian ad litem to compromise a minor’s claim with court approval, thus provides the applicable rule. (See § 1000 [except where Probate Code provides an applicable rule, the rules of practice in civil actions applies].)52

approve a minor’s compromise

. ( Pearson v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337 , fn. 2 ( Pearson ) ; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ il Proc edure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2021) ¶ 12:579 ; see Burge v. City and County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 614 [“ [a] lthough it would ordinarily be better practice to hold a hearing and take testimony, the [predecessor to section 3500] does not req uire it”] .) Thus, the Pearson court stated, albeit in dict um , “ it would appear that a petition to approve or disapprove a minor ’ s compromise may be decided by the superior court, ex parte, in chambers. ” ( Pearson , supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1337 , fn. 2 ; see 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2021) Pleading, § 80 [ application for approval of a minor’s compromise is made

ex parte and may be heard in chambers ] .) The question whether Christine had standing to oppose Chen’s position is complicated by that fa ct that she was the Minors’ parent and their guardian ad litem in one case

— the ILIT litigation

— d irectly affected by the settlement agreement

. A person in her position is arguably entitled to participate in the hearing

at which her children and wards have much at stake. The weight of such status, however, is arguably diminished by the fact that
, although Christine is a parent and guardian ad litem , the court found that she had a conflict of interest with the Minors and “appears to be using the Minors to pursue her own agen da”

—

an agenda that is “inconsistent with the Minors’ interest [s] .”
We need not decide whether the court erred in determin ing that Christine lacked standing with respect to the petition for approval

. Even if the court erred
, Christine ha s failed to establish prejudice. The record demonstrates that the court considered Christine’s demurrer to Chen’s petition for approval on the merits and addressed her arguments on the petition at the hearing. In her demurrer, Christine argued , among oth er arguments : (1) her53

repudiation of the second GAL agreement precluded the court’s approval; (2) Chen is not the guardian ad litem in all matters affected by the agreement; (3) the pending appeals bar consideration of Chen’s petition for approval ; and (4 ) Chen failed

to provide any basis to show that the second GAL agreement is better than the previously rejected agreement. The court was also aware of Christine’s and the Minors’ positions as expressed in their repudiations of the agreements

. In addition, after the court’s ruling, Christine filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for new trial , each supported by voluminous evidence, including the declaration of an accounting expert addressing the economic aspects of the second GAL agreement. The court addressed Christine’s argument s in these motion s on the merits and at length in written ruling s denying the motion for new trial and granting in part and denying in part the motion for reconsideration. 29 On appeal, Chri stine does not point to any evidence or argument that the trial court failed to consider and address at

one hearing or another
, and she does not explain how she has been prejudiced by the court’s ruling

. Prejudice is not presumed, and the appellant has the duty to show that an error is prejudicial. ( Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601 ; see Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“ the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error cau sed a miscarriage of justice ”] .) Christine has failed to make that showing

29 Due to the COVID

- 19 pandemic, the court did not hear oral argument on the motion for new trial, which was set for April 23, 2020. It did hold a hearing on Christine’s motion for reconsideration via remote video or audio conferencing on June 24, 2020. In addition to Christine’s counsel, Christine, Jacqueline
, and Michael were present by telephone.54

here. In any case, b ased on our review of the record, it is not reasonably probable that , in the absence of the alleged error, Christine would have obtained a more favorable resul t. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , 836.) We therefore conclude that, if the court erred by ruling that Christine lacked standing to oppose the petition, the error was harmless.

3. The C ourt’s A pproval of the S econd GAL Agreement In determining whether to grant a guardian ad litem’s petition to approve a settlement of the ward’s claims, a court

must determine whether it is reasonable and in the minor’s best interest. (See Pearson , supra, 202 Cal .App.4th at p. 1338 ; Scruton
v. Korean Air Lines Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1607 ( Scruton ) ; Espericueta v. Shewry (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 615, 626 ; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950 [petition for approval of a minor’s compromise “ must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing upon the reasonableness of the compromise ”].)
We review the probate court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. ( Breslin v. Breslin (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 801, 806 ; Estate of Green (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d 25, 28 .) Here, in approving the second GAL agreement , the court relied in part on its comparison of what the Minors would receive under the Trust document in the absence of a settlement and the second GAL agreement with what the Minors would re ceive under the second GAL agreement. According to evidence submitted in support of the petition , if the terms of the Trust document are applied without regard to the settlement or the second GAL agreement, Jacqueline and Michael would collectively receive $600,000 pursuant to the terms of Trust B and $351,024 pursuant to an “Insurance Trust.” These amounts55

do not appear to be in dispute. Because Robert predeceased King, Benjamin, Jacqueline
, and Michael would each receive one

- third of the Trust’s interes t in the Taylor, Derek, Paularino, Calle Cristina, and Domingo properties. Based on appraisals of the properties reported by Christine’s expert, t he value s of the M inors’ collective

two

- thirds interest in these properties , as of the date of the May 2018 settlement, wa s $2,880,000, $2,260,000, $5,405,860, $161,111, and $3,144,510, respectively, for a total of $13,851,481. As residuary beneficiaries, they would also receive interests, collectively valued at $91,736 , in the Hellman property

. Jacquelin e would also receive the Monterey Park residence valued at $840,000. In addition, pursuant to the provisions of Robert’s separate property trust, the M inors held remainder interests in the Paularino and Domingo properties with present values of $1,678,623 and $2,074,763, respectively. Their share of estimated estate taxes and unpaid trust administration fees would be $2,153,660, and $328,516, respectively. Therefore, b ased on these amounts , the

net value of the Minors’ collective beneficial interests in the Trust in the absence of the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement would be approximately $17 million. Under the settlement agreement and second GAL agreement, the M inors would receive the same amounts due them under Trust B ($600,000) and t he insurance trust ($351,024), and the same values attributed to the Hellman property ($91,736) and the Monterey Park residence ($840,000). The primary differences between the M inors’ entitlement under the Trust document and the second GAL agreement arise from (1) what Chen refers to as the “property swap”; (2) payments of cash to the M inors; (3) the absence of the Minors’ liability for estate taxes and the Trust’s litigation and administration expenses ; and (4) the mutual release s and the Minors’ waivers of past and future accountings

.56 Pursuant to the property swap, the M inors would receive Benjamin’s one

- third of the Trust’s interest in the Taylor, Derek, Paularino, and Calle Cristina properties . The M inors’ interest in these properties would thus increase by 50 percent and be valued

at $4,320,000, $3,390,839, $8,108,988, and $241,667, respectively. 30 The minors would swap, or disclaim to Benjamin, their combined

two

- thirds interest in the Domingo property (valued at $3,144,51 0), as well as their remainder interest in that property (valued at $2,153,660). The additional cash payments under the second GAL agreement include , collectively, $1 million (out of the $3 million Christine paid to Benjamin’s counsel’s trust account) 31 an d payments totaling $1,480,000 in exchange for the M inors’
20 percent interest in Sycamore

— an interest they gained as residuary beneficiaries after Christine waived her right to that property in the settlement agreement. 32

30 Under the second GAL agreement, the Calle Cristina property is to be “sold on the open market for fair market value.” Jacqueline and Michael will receive the ir share of the net proceeds as defined.

31 Arguably, the $3 million Christine paid to Benjamin’s counsel’s “trust account” should have been considered part of the Trust corpus and distributed to the residual beneficiaries . If so, the Minors , as residuary beneficiaries, were entitled to receive, collectively, 20 percent of the $3 million . Even if this argument is accepted , the amount they receive d from this source under the second GAL agreement

— $1 million

— is 66 percent more than the $600,000 they could hav e received as residua ry beneficiaries in the absence of the second GAL agreement.

32 Under the Trust, neither M inor had an interest in Three Lanterns, Sycamore, or Atlantic Towers ; because Robert had57 The provisions protecting the M inors from liability for estate taxes and unpaid litigation and Trust expenses are valued at $2,482,176. Based on these amounts, the M inors’ collective net value under the settlement agreement and second GAL agreement would thus be approximately $ 22 milli on

— approximately $5 million

more than what they were entitled to receive under the terms of the Trust

. In addition, Chen produced evidence that the additional income to the Minors resulting from the increased interest in the Taylor, Derek, and Paularino p roperties would more than offset, by approximately $100,000 per year , the loss of income that results from disclaiming the Domingo property to Benjamin

. Christine and the M inors contend , however
, that the second GAL agreement deprived the M inors of “real a nd unique properties” worth between $25 million and $35 million. The theory is based primarily on the ass umption that Michael had an interest in , or “stood to inherit,” Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers. The assumption, however, is unfounded, as the Trust document unambiguously provides for such properties to be given to

predeceased King and Christine had no t , these properties were to be distributed to Christine

. Under the settlement agreement, Christine agreed to waive her interest in these properties, which would then become part of the residue of the trust estate. The Minors, as 10 percent residua ry beneficiaries under the Trust, would thus be entitled to a sha re of these properties. According to Chen’s petition, Three Lanterns and Atlantic Towers are to be “liquidated and used to pay the [e] state [t] axes for the Trust.” As

a result, “[t]here is no portion of those assets that remain to be distributed to the M inors.”
Th e $1,480,000 payment is for the Minors ’ residuary share of Sycamore’s fair market value based upon the net fair market value as determined by “Christine’s designated expert appraiser.”58

Christine. Michael wa s a contingent beneficiary under the Trust who would have been entitled to Three Lanterns and Sycamore only if Christine predeceased King . Because that did not occur , Michael was not entitled to the se properties. The further assumption that “unique properties,” such as family heirlooms and jewelry, were bequeathed to the M inors is similarly without support

. Christine relied on a provisi on of the Trust document stating that the gifts of certain real properties includes “any personal property located on and used in connection with such real properties,” for the assertion that Jacqueline stands to inherit the antiques located in the Montere y Park residence, which King had bequeathed to her. The provision Christine relied on, however, relates only to real properties held in Trust C ; the Monterey Park residence is held in Trust A . The provision devising the Monterey Park residence to Jacquel ine expressly entitles Jacqueline to “ the real property and improvements ” only. Christine also contends that the M inors would be entitled

to undistributed income from the Taylor, Domingo, Derek, and Paularino properties
, and that the $500,000 that each M in or will receive out of the $3 million she paid to Benjamin’s counsel should be compared with “the accumulated income of $6 million from [the
M inors’] expected inheritance properties.” She does not, however, point to any provision of the Trust or other evidence to support the
M inors’ entitlement to any such income

. Christine and Michael also refer to claims the M inors have against the co

- trustees for “$100 million.” The purported claims appear to be based upon allegations in a petition Christine filed
in February 2020, six days before the hearing on Chen’s petition for approval of the second GAL agreement. Aside from their belatedness, they are unsubstantiated in our record and the cour t reasonably could, as it did, consider them speculative and decline to59

give them any weight in evaluating the benefits of the agreement to the Minors

. In addition to the economic benefits for the Minors obtained in the second GAL agreement, the court als o noted the benefit of terminating this costly litigation and its drain on t rust assets, 33
and considered favorably the fact that the property swap provisions would disentangle the interests of the Minors and Benjamin

. Instead of Benjamin, Jacqueline, and Mich a el holding undivided

one

- third interests in several properties
, Jacqueline and Michael will jointly hold interests in some properties while relinquishing their entire interest in one property

— Domingo

— to Benjamin

. The separation will p resumably avoid or reduce future litigation

amon g these individuals as well as avoid the need for future
Trust accountings to the Minors and the litigation that could arise therefrom. In light of the economic benefits the Minors obtained under the second GAL agreement , the extrication of the Minors from

a situation where they would jointly hold property interests with

a half sibling hostile to them, the end to costly litigation, and the peace that the settlement should provide for all sides, the court did not abuse its discretion in approving the s econd GAL agreement.

4. The Failure to Provide Notice of Chen’s Petition
to the Minors
Michael and Ja c queline contend that they were e ntitled to notice of Chen’s petition. They cite to section s 1460 and 1511. Section 1460 governs the manner and timing of notice to a “ward” (§ 1460, subd. (b)(2)), among others, “if notice of hearing is required

33 According to Chen, attorney fees and costs relating to Trus t administration and litigation
, for the period between June 1, 2016 and September 30, 2019, amounted to $14,693,290.60

under this division .” (§ 1460, subd. (a). ) The referenced division covers the Guardianship

- Conservatorship law (§ 1400 et seq.). Section 1511 is also concerned with proceedings under that law. Neither section 1460 nor section 1511 appl ies to a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to section 10 03, nor to petitions to approve a minor ’ s compromise, which are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 372. Although the Minors had a right to be present at the hearing on Chen’s petition (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.952(a)), that right can be “di spense[d] with” for good cause. Here, the court waived that requirement at the request of Christine’s counsel with respect to the hearing on the first GAL agreement. In response to Christine’s motion for new trial after the ruling on the second GAL

agree ment, the court noted that Christine did not seek “any update on that requirement and did not herself attempt to bring the Minors to the March 3, 2020 hearing.” Even if the absence of the Minors at the hearing was error, the Minors fail to establish that t he error was prejudicial. Although the court rejected the Minor s ’ repudiations of the second GAL agreement, the court acknowledged that the “[r]epudiations made
the [c] ourt and Chen aware of the Minors’ positions ” regarding the second GAL agreement and , i n response to Christine’s motion for new trial, stated that , even if the court had considered the repudiations, it is not “ ‘ reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [the Minors] would have been reached.’ ” Other than the repudiations, which are discussed below, and the arguments they assert on appeal , which we have rejected , the Minors do not point to any argument they would have asserted if they had been present. In light of the benefits to the Minors prov ided by the second GAL agreement, as discussed above, and our reject ion of the61

arguments asserted on appeal, they have not established that the Minors’ absence at the hearing was prejudicial. Michael further contends his right to due process was violated b ecause Chen had waived his rights under the Trust, his right to appeal, and his right to object to the second GAL agreement, and his “right to claims of $100 million against the [ co

- trustees and Chen ]

. ” His argument that Chen deprived him of his right to appeal is moot because we have permitted Michael and Jacqueline to appeal. Michael’s contention regarding the alleged loss of $100 million in claims is, like Christine’s similar contention, without support in the record. We reject the further claims that Chen and the court deprived them of other rights as beneficiaries under the Trust because they received countervailing benefits under the second GAL agreement. (See In re Christina B. (1993)
19 Cal.App.4th 1441, 145 4 [ guardian ad litem can compromise min or’s rights with “ some countervailing and significant benefit ”]

. )

5. Michael’s A rgument C oncerning the O mission of A pproval of Attorney F

ees Michael contends that the court erred “by omitting to

appr o ve that [c] o

- [t] rustees’ $20 million legal fees was funded by Michael’s expected inheritance.” The somewhat incoherent argument lack s apposite authority and pertinent citations to the record . It appears to be based on the assumption that Michael

was entitled to the Three Lanterns property and to “expected accumulated income from his various expected inheritance properties,” including Sycamore, and the co

- trustees breached a duty owed to him by encumber ing that property with a $6 million debt. Michael was not, however, entitled under the Trust document

or otherwise to acquire Three Lanterns or Sycamore

. We reject this argument.62 6. Christine’s Repudiations
Christine filed purported repudiations of the settlement agreement and the first and second GAL agreements. She purported to repudiate the agreements in her capacity as guardian ad litem for the M inors in the ILIT case, as guardian of the M inors’ estates, as the M inors’ parent, and as trustee of a trust established for Michael’s benefit. In its March 3, 2020 con solidated ruling, the court acknowledged that Christine would ordinarily have a right to object or repudiate agreements made by her children, but stated that “she is precluded from doing so here because her objection is inconsistent with the Minors’ intere sts.” Christine contends that this was error. We disagree. Christine relies on Scruton
, supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1606

. In that case
, a guardian ad litem of two minors settled the minors’ tort claims against an airline and petitioned the court for app roval of the settlement. ( Id. at p. 1600.) Prior to the hearing on the petition, the guardian ad litem repudiated the settlement and withdrew the petition. The defendant airline then filed a motion

to enforce the settlement, which the trial court grante d. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that the guardian ad litem could repudiate the settlement at any time prior to the court’s approval of it , and the guardian ad litem’s repudiation was entitled to “some deference.” ( Scruton
, supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 160 8 .) Notwithstanding such deference, the Scruton court further explained that the trial court had the power to enforce a settlement repudiated by a guardian ad litem if it finds that the63

repudiation is “adverse to th e best interests of the minors.” ( Ibid. ) 34
Because the trial court in Scruton failed to make such a finding, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. ( Ibid. ) Scruton reflects the general principle s discussed above that
, with respect to minors, the “ co urt is, in effect, the guardian ” and the guardian ad litem’s actions are subject to court supervision

. ( Cole
, supra , 63 Cal. at p. 89; accord, McClintock v. West (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 540, 549; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1311 ( County of Los Angeles ) ; Serway
, supra , 75 Cal.App.2d at p. 89

. ) Under such supervision, the court may “rescind” a guardian ad litem ’s actions that are “ inimical to the legitimate interests of the ward .” ( Regency Health Services, I nc. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1496, 1502; accord, Zapanta v. Universal Care, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1175.) Thus,

as Scruton indicated, the court could reject a guardian ad litem’s repudiation of an agreement if the court determines the repudiation is “adverse to the best interests of the minors.” ( Scruton
, supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) Although Scruton was concerned with guardian ad litem ’s repud iation of an agreement, the same principles apply to a parent of a minor. Because the “ court has the responsibility to protect the rights of a minor who is a litigant in court ,” it “ has the inherent authority to make decisions in the best interests of the child, even

34 According to Jacqueline, Scruton held that the trial court can consider whether the agreement is in the best interest of the minor only if the guardian endorses the agreement. This is incorrect. (See Scruton
, supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608 [“ we hold the trial court here could not unilaterally and summarily enforce the repudiated compromise without first determining whether
, in rejectin g the agreement, [the guardian ad litem] had acted contrary to the best interests of the minors ”].)64

if the parent objects

. ” ( Williams
, supra , 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 49
, italics added; accord, In re Marriage of Metzger (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1448 .) Here, Christine and the Minors analogize Christine to the guardian ad litem in Scruton
, who se repudiation was entitled

to some deference

. ( Scruton
, supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) Christine, however, is not in the same position as the guardian ad litem in Scruton

. There was only one guardian ad litem in Scruton ; here, there are two

— Che n and Christine

— each presumably entitled to some deference under Scruton , yet wi th diametrically opposing views as to the benefits of the agreements for the M inors

. As between these two, the scope of Chen’s appointment, which encompasses the Trust litigat ion that is the primary focus of the settlement and second GAL agreement
, would appear to warrant greater deference to his view than to Christine ’s. Although Christine is the guardian ad litem in the ILIT case and the guardian of the children’s estates, the relationship of these

case s to the settlement appears to be incidental

. More importantly, the court found that Christine has

a conflict of interest in purporting to represent the M inors in repudiat ing the agree ments

. We review that determination for

an abuse of discretion and any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. ( See Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008)
43 Cal.4th 706, 713 [ abuse of discretion standard applies where trial court is in better position to “ evaluate the consequences of a potential conflict [of interest] in light of the entirety of a case ” ].) Christin e’s interest i n defending the co

- trustees’ claims against her is in conflict with the M inors ’ interest s because what the co

- t rustees recover from Christine for her alleged misappropriat ion of Trust assets would be available to the residua ry Trust beneficiaries, including the M inors . I f , on the65

other hand, Christine successfully defend ed against such claims, she would retain what the co

- trustees were seeking in damages and there would be correspondingly less to distribute to the beneficiaries, including the M inors

. Christine’s conflict of interest is also apparent w ith respect

to the sett lement and second GAL agreements . I f Christine is successful in opposing the second GAL agreement ( thereby causing the settlement agreement to fail due to the failure of that condition ) , she would benefit by retaining her claims under the Trust document t o Three Lanterns, Sycamore, and Atlantic Towers
, while the M inors would be denied the benefit s of having such properties added to the T rust res idue
, as well as denied the receipt of Benjamin’s interests in the Taylor, Paularino, Der e k, and Calle Cristina properties and the additional income these properties would produce . They would also be denied the receipt of cash payments and favorable tax provisions that would be unavailable

to them without the settlement

. The M inors, along with other trust beneficiaries, would also hav e to endure further litigation at the expense of the Trust estate. The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in finding that Christine has a conflict of interest with the Minors. In light of these conflicts , any de ference s he would arguendo otherwise be due as a guardian ad litem under Scruton is negated or severely limit ed

. Christine contends , however, that she made an irrevocable assignment of her interest in Three Lanterns and Sycamore

to Michael and that her and Michael’s interests are therefore “completely aligned.” She has not developed t his point
, and Christine does not explain how such an assignment would avoid the conflict s between her and the M inors. In any case, the purported assignment was made in April 2019, almost one year after she66

waived her right s to Three Lanterns and Sycamore in the May
2018 settlement agreement

. B y that point, she had no interest
in these properties to assign. As the co

- trustees contend, the assignment “had no legal eff ect. ” Even if Christine has no conflict of interest with the Minors and her repudiations were entitled to some deference under Scruton
, the court could reject the repudiations if they are

“ adverse to the best interests of the [M] inors.” ( See Scruton
, supra , 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1608.) Although the court did not expressly rely on this rationale
, it is implicit in its determination that the second GAL agreement is in the Minors’ best interes t and its finding that Christine’s repudiations were intended to deny the Minors the benefits of that agreement. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the second GAL agreement was in the M inors’ best interest s , the court’s imp lied determination that Christine’s repudiations were adverse to the Minors’ best interest s is also not an abuse of discretion.

7. The Minors’ Repudiations
The Minors contend that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiation s of the agreements

. They rel y on the general principle that “ a contract of a minor may be disaffirmed by the minor before majority or within a reasonable t ime afterwards .” ( Fam. Code, § 6710 ; see, e.g., Berg v. Traylor (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 809, 820 ( Berg ) [ “ ‘[ a ] contract (or conveyance) of a minor may be avoided by any act or declaration disclosing an unequivocal intent to repudiate its binding force and effect ’ ”].) This rule exists to protect minors

“ against [their] own improvidence and the designs of others. The policy of the law is to discourage adults from contracting with an infant and they cannot complain if as a consequence of violating the67

rule they are injured by the exercise of the right of disaffirmance vested in the infant. ” ( Burnand v. Irigoyen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 861,
866 .) As the cases Jacqueline cites illustrate, the principle has been applied to permit minors to disaffirm a minor’s execution of a deed of trust ( Lee v. Hibernia Sav ings & Loan Soc iety (1918) 177 Cal. 656, 659 ), a minor’s contract for personal services ( Berg
, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 )
, a minor’s execution of a deed ( Sparks v. Sparks (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 129, 13 7 )
, a minor’s execution of a promissory note ( Niemann v. Deverich (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 787,
793 ), and a minor’s contract for the purchase of real property ( Maier v. Harbor Center Land Co. (1919) 41 Cal.App. 79, 80

− 81 ). The Minors , however, have not referred us to a case in which

a minor disaffirm ed an agreement entered into by the minor’s guardian ad litem subject to court approval. The general principle the Minors rely on

— that a minor

may disaffirm a contract before reaching maj ority

— is subject

to the provis o : “Except as otherwise provided by statute .” (Fam. Code , § 6710 .) Code of Civil Procedure section 372
, subdivision (a)(1) expressly provides that a court

- appointed guardian ad litem “shall have power, with the approval of the

court in which the action or proceeding is pending, to compromise the same, to agree to the order or judgment to be entered therein for or against the ward

. . . , and to satisfy any judgment or order in favor of the ward .

. . or release o r discharge any claim of the ward

. . . pursuant to that compromise. ” This statute thus authorizes a guardian ad litem to make settlement agreements in judicial proceedings subject only to the approval of the court. (See County of Los Angeles

, supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311; Safai v. Safai (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 233, 245 .) To allow a minor to disaffirm a contract negotiated by the guardian ad litem would68

negate this authority

. It thus falls squarely within the “otherwise provided by statute ” exception to the general rule under Family Code section 6710 allowing minors to disaffirm contracts. The exception is also supported by sound policy . T he policy of discouraging adults from contracting with a minor is outweighed by the policy that favors s ettlement of litigation ; i f a minor could disaffirm a settlement agreement negotiated by his or her guardian ad litem
, litigants opposing minors would have little incentive

to seek a settlement with the minor , resulting in a waste of the litigants’ and judicial resources. T he policy concern supporting the general rule of protecting minors against their own improvidence and the design of others is accommodated by the requirement that the court must approve the agreement reached by the guardian ad litem

. Jacqueline relies on a statement in Pearson , supra, 202 Cal.App.4th 1333
, that while a guardian ad litem’s “ petition for approval of [a minor’s settlement agreement] is pending [,] the settlement agreement is voi dable only at the election of the minor or his guardian .” ( Id. at p. 1339 .) Jacqueline points to the disjunctive “or” to argue that , prior to judicial confirmation of the settlement agreement , the agreement is voidable at the election of the minor. The statement in Pearson , however, is dict um that does not withstand scrutiny.
In Pearson , a minor, represented by a guardian ad litem, sued a defendant to recover damages for personal injuries. ( Pearson
, supra , 202 Cal.App .4th at p. 1336.) The parties settled and the guardian ad litem filed a petition to approve the settlement with the court. After the settlement was reached and before the court approved it, the minor died. If the litigation had not settled, the minor’s death would have extinguished his claim for damages for pain and suffering. ( Ibid. ) The settling defendant then opposed69

the petition for approval of the settlement. The trial court granted the motion because, as a result of the extinguishment of pain an d suffering damages, the settlement “would result in a ‘windfall’ for plaintiffs.” ( Id. at pp. 1336

− 1337.) The guardian ad litem in Pearson filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal to compel the trial court to grant the motion for app roval of the settlement. The court issued the writ, and explained that “while the motion for approval of the minor ’ s compromise is pending, the settlement agreement is voidable only at the election of the minor or his guardian. Neither the letter nor the spirit of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 372 confers any right on the defendant .

. . to object when the court approves or disapproves of a settlement agreement.” ( Pearson
, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1337.)
Pearson was thus concerned solely wit h the question whether a defendant who enters into a settlement agreement with

a guardian ad litem “ can object to court approval of the settlement. ” ( Pearson
, supra , 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 133 9.) The court had no occasion to consider whether a minor can “v oid” a settlement agreement entered into by his or her guardian ad litem

. The language Jacqueline relies on suggesting that the minor can do so

— that “ the settlement agreement is voidable

. . . at the election of the minor ” ( i d. at p. 1339 )

— even when the guardian ad litem continues to seek the court’s approval of the agreement, is thus dict um

. Because the statement in Pearson is unsupported by authority or sound policy, and contrary to our analysis of the interplay between Code of Civil Procedure sect ion 372 and Family Code section 6710, we decline to adopt such dictum or extend Pearson ’s holding to the facts in this case.70 D

. Christine’s A dditional A rguments At pages 102 to 108 of her opening brief, Christine asserts

a series of arguments that lack ci tations to the record and citations to pertinent legal authority, and are at times incoherent and conclusory . These include the following assertions: T he trial court “failed its duty to carry out the Trustors’ [i] ntent and Christine’s purpose of relinquishing assets of $35 million, to oversee [the guardian ad litem] and [c] o

- [t] rustees’ breach of fiduciary duty, and to protect the minors ”; “ The Trustors and Christine had expected that it should be the duty of the [ c] ourt, [the guardian ad litem] and the [t] rustees’ [ sic ] to carry out the Trustors ’ irrevocable and indisputable intent that these real properties relinquished by Christine should have gone to the [c] hildren, not Esther, Margaret, Benjamin, Benjamin’s mot her and wife (who

are not even the Trust beneficiaries) ” ; T he minors “were deprived by their expected inheritances, namely over $35 million in real and unique real properties, including Sycamore, Three Lanterns, Atlantic Towers , Taylor, family heirloom jew elries, and antique [ sic ] in the amount, which carry a sentimental value from the Trustors to the Minors and had generated substantial annual income of over $1 million for over 50 years ”; “ Christine would not agree to give Esther a penny (let alone $3 mill ion cash, family heirloom jewelry and antique [ sic ] , and Three Lanterns and Atlantic Tower), since Esther had sued Robert into an early [ sic ] and was the major

cause of Robert ’ s death ”; T he court “erroneously removed Christine from protecting her children when enforcing the settlement on
June 24, 2020” ; and “ T he [c]ourt erred in restricting Christine from advocating for her purpose [ sic ] of relinquishing $35 million, carrying out the Trustors’ intent and protecting her children, by enforcing the settlement with adding 25 material terms, which Christine has never consented to .” Because these points are71

undeveloped or incoherent and lack pertinent citations to the reco rd or legal authority, we decline to address them.

E. Order D enying Christine’s P etition to R emove Chen as G uardian A d L item

1. Chen’s Alleged Conflict of Interest
Christine and Michael contend that the court erred in denying Christine’s petition to remov e Chen as the M inors’ guardian ad litem because Chen’s representation of both allegedly created an unavoidable conflict of interest. The argument is based on the same misunderstanding of section 259 discussed in Discussion part B

. 6, ante

. Christine and Michael rel y on the provision of the Trust document that provides for the Three Lanterns and Sycamore properties to be given to Robert if Robert is living when the last trustor dies and, if Robert is not then living, to Christine and, if neit her Robert nor Christine is then living, to Michael. Christine argues that due to this provision, Michael and Jacqueline had divergent views as to whether Christine, if the case had gone

to trial, c ould have been deemed to have predeceased King for

purpos es of section 259. Under Christine’s view of section 259, if she is deemed to have predeceased King, Michael would receive the Trust’s entire interest s in Three Lanterns and Sycamore
, and Jacqueline would receive no interest in these properties . B ut if C hristine’s view of section 259 is incorrect, Three Lanterns and Sycamore would be distributed as part of the Trust residue of which Michael and Jacqueline are 10 percent beneficiaries. Christine therefore contends that Michael’s interests are aligned with her view of section 259, while Jacqueline ’s interests are aligned with the opposing view. Chen, Christine concludes, was thus conflicted by the opposing interests of his wards

.72 Christine’s view of section 259 , a s discussed above, is based

on a n un tenable construction of the statute. According to Christine, if she is deemed to have predeceased King under section 259, she has also pre deceased King for purposes of the Trust bequest that Michael shall receive Three Lanterns and Sycamore i f she predeceases King. T he scope of the determination that one has

“ predeceased a decedent ” under section 259 , however, is expressly limited “to the extent provided in sub division (c)” of that statute. S ubdivision (c) extends no further than to prevent a person found liable under subdivision (a) or convicted of a specified crime under subdivision (b) from receiving any of the property, damages, and costs awarded to the decedent’s estate in an action descr ibed in subdivision s (a) or (b) . T hat is, it limits what the abuser can receive; it does not expand the rights of others or create a rule for interpreting provisions of a trust document

. A determination that Christine has predeceased King for purposes of section 259
, therefore, does not mean that Christine has predeceased King for

purposes of the bequest of Three Lanterns and Sycamore

. In this light, Christine’s and Michael’s argument that Chen had a conflict of interest amounts to an argument that Chen had a duty to assert an untenable position on behalf of Michael. H e did

not. There was thus no conflict of interest and, therefore, no err or in denying Christine’s motion to remove Che n as guardian ad litem.

2. Chen’s Alleged M isconduct
Michael further contends that Chen should have been removed because he made false statements regarding the

co

- trustees’ legal fees in this litigation. Michael relies on alleged statements and actions fo r which he provides no citation to the record. He also relies on Chen’s involvement in certain post

- appeal orders, which Michael contends violate the terms of the settlement73

agreement and the second GAL agreement. These allegations

are also made without citation to the record and , in any case, are not encompassed within the scope of Michael’s notice of appeal. Michael further points to Christine’s experts’ declarations to the effect that the second GAL agreement deprived the M inors of more than $ 6 million in income from the Sycamore and Three Lanterns properties. Even if these statements are credited, they are expressly based on the assumption s that the settlement agreement is not enforceable and that Michael “ stood to inherit Christine Chui’s in terests in Sycamore

. ” These assumptions, however, are unsupported by the record. For all these reasons, we reject these contentions.

F

. The Court’s D ischarge of OSC Regarding R emoval of C o
- t rustees On July 18, 2019, w hen the court granted Christine’s motion for judgment as to the first GAL agreement, the court further ordered that the co

- trustees be suspended as trustees and issued

“ an OSC why they should not be removed.” The court did not, however, set a date for a h earing on the OSC

. The parties (other than Christine) thereafter entered into the second GAL agreement and Chen petitioned for its approval. Replacement trustees for Benjamin and Margaret were never appointed and t he OSC does not appear to have been addr essed again until the court issued its consolidated rulings on March 3, 2020. At that time, the court discharged the OSC because the settlement agreement had “been approved and [the] litigation [was] concluded.” The court thus found “it unnecessary to pr oceed on the OSC .” Christine and Michael argue that the court erred in discharging the OSC. Because we have affirmed the court’s ruling enforcing the settlement agreement and its approval of the second GAL agreement, which effectively terminate Christine’s and the74

Minors’ interest s in the Trust
, Christine and Micha el do not have standing to seek removal of the co

- trustees. Accordingly, we reject this argument on that basis.

DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY , J.

BENDIX, J.