W(H)ITHER CORPS?

D. Robert Worley

August 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-061-3

ii
FOREWORD

In a March 2001 address to the Association of the U

States Army, General Eric Shinseki noted, “We ar

again an army between the wars, and once again, w

challenged to adjust to break old paradigms. So w

transforming to become strategically responsiv

remain dominant across the entire spectrum of m

operations.” 

Army transformation has many dimensions with c

in technology, operational methods, and organizatio

far, the focus of organizational transformation has b

the redesign of tactical units such as the interim b

combat teams. But corps—the Army’s operationa

organizations—must also be transformed.

In his monograph, Dr. D. Robert Worley of the Po

Institute for Policy Studies provides a history 

structure and function of Army corps and discusses 

they might be redesigned to play an effective role in th

century security environment. He concludes tha

different Army corps have such diverse functions that 

size fits all” approach is inappropriate. After conside

number of options, he provides a blueprint for an ar

corps structures that would fulfill missions 

peacekeeping to major wars.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publis

monograph as a contribution to the ongoing process of 

transformation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

D. ROBERT WORLEY recently joined the Po

Institute for Policy Studies where he serves as a 

research fellow in the Center for Emerging Threat

Opportunities. His defense analysis career began 

RAND Corporation in 1985 through 1992 and contin

the Institute for Defense Analyses from 1992 through 

Analytic activities have been concentrated in h

echelon command and control but include warga

training exercises, and experimentation at the na

command, Allied Command Europe, U.S. unified com

and joint task force levels as well as at Army corp

division level through the battle command tra

program. Prior to becoming a defense analyst, Dr. W

managed and directed research and development eff

the Hughes Aircraft Company, NASA, and the Univer

California at Los Angeles. He served in the United 

Marine Corps from 1967 to 1971, with one tour in Vie

Dr. Worley earned a Ph.D. in Engineering and an En

Degree from the University of California at Los Ang

1986 and 1985, respectively. He earned a Master of S

degree in Electrical Engineering from the Univers

Southern California in 1980 and a Bachelor of Arts 

major in Computer Science from the Univers

California at Berkeley in 1978. He earned a Mast

Government from Johns Hopkins University in 1995 

Master of Arts in National Security Studies 

Georgetown University in 2000. Dr. Worley formerly s

on the computer science faculty at the Univers

California at Los Angeles and is now a Fellow at 

Hopkins University’s Washington Center for the St

American Government and a member of the adjunct f

at George Washington University’s Elliot Sch

International Affairs.

v
W(H)ITHER CORPS?

INTRODUCTION

Army transformation should not be a “one size f

process. Each of the Army’s surviving corps has a u

origin. Relevance to present and future co

environments requires multiple destinations. Ultim

separate transformations are required to move 

distinct origins to diverse destinations.

Today’s U.S. Army corps have their roots in Napo

corps d’armée and the corps formed during the Am

Civil War. Corps and divisions vanished after the Civi

Divisions were resurrected on the eve of U.S. entry to 

War I, but corps returned later as large ta

headquarters during the preparation for World War I

Cold War, with its large standing Army, mature coal

extensive network of modern infrastructure in wha

expected to be the primary theater of war, and k

enemy with known doctrine and known order of 

made corps the U.S. Army’s principal warfig

command. 

Today these conditions no longer hold. Given 

should corps retain their preeminent role? Should 

survive at all? The answer is unequivocally “yes.” Bu

role should they play and what relationship should 

have with echelons above and below? There is no 

answer that applies across the Army. Whither corps

In the face of small budgets and high operating t

resistance to change is self-destructive. The Army 

remain relevant, or it will continue to lose in the b

competition. But relevance to what? Some argu

relevance to the many expected small wars at the expe

the ability to fight “big” wars. Others argue for maint

a “big war” capability for unexpected but high 

1
conflicts, at the risk of appearing irrelevant to the fre

small wars. Still others argue that relevance is deter

by the ability to fight America’s “big wars” 20 years 

Regardless of where relevance for ground forces is 

most agree that relevance will be determined in the c

of joint forces. In any case, organization will m

Refining the shape and function of corps will be a vita

of the broader process of Army transformation.

THE COLD WAR CORPS

Each of the Army’s corps is tailored for a specific ra

missions. But, regardless of its mission-sp

composition, all corps have certain common character

For instance, a corps remains active for the duratio

war, fights as part of a larger ground force, span

operational and tactical levels of war, and has a co

and dynamic composition. Corps sustain campaign

operations. While a division fights and then withdr

reconstitute, a corps remains active until the campa

operation is completed and then moves to the next, po

taking on new combat power to continue the figh

continuous operations of corps and the concomitant n

take on new divisions demand simple and sta

procedures between corps and lower echelon force

might come under its command.

One of the most significant assumptions embed

current organizational design is that corps—and, hen

lower echelon tactical commands—fight as part of a 

ground force. As such, corps translate operational obje

from a higher echelon command into tactical acti

execution by subordinate commands and elements

assumption is a dramatic symptom of the Army’s conc

of war—the Army fights America’s “big wars” and 

should be organized for them.

As part of a larger ground force, from whom will 

receive direction? General H. Norman Schwarzkopf ch

retain strong direct connections to his corps, leavi

2
army headquarters in more of a support than a com

role. But if it constitutes the largest ground elemen

theater of operations, a corps will take direction from 

task force and be responsible for all aspects of the g

war. In a smaller-scale contingency requiring o

division or brigade of ground forces, corps may p

ground capabilities to a joint task force rather than fo

a subordinate command.

What are the implications for organizing, trainin

equipping lower-echelon ground forces when they a

part of a larger ground force? The answer may n

immediately apparent, but the ability to field a 

integrated corps is less desirable than the abil

construct a force from flexible building blocks. A 

composition is neither static nor standardized. Div

were and are designed to be complete for tactical co

Division organization has long been standardized 

tables of organization and equipment. Corps, in con

have escaped such standardization. Corps h

headquarters, major subordinate commands, and 

subordinate elements. Cold War doctrine retaine

language of dynamic composition, but capstone alig

with subordinates created strong habitual relatio

leading to more complex bindings and procedures.

A corps’ major subordinate commands include div

(infantry, light infantry, armored, mechanized, air

air assault), separate maneuver brigades of infan

armor, armored cavalry regiment, aviation brigad

corps artillery. Divisions constitute the majority of a 

combat power. Each Cold War corps acquired it

armored cavalry regiment, the “eyes and ears of the 

commander,” for forward reconnaissance in force. 

may take on new combat power prior to battle and ma

combat power added and taken away during battle. Be

of this, Haislip argued that corps must use simple sta

operating procedures (SOPs).

1

3
Each corps has an extensive complement of 

subordinate elements for support. In World War II, a 

was both commanded by and supported by its sup

numbered army. During the Cold War, a corp

subordinate to a multinational army and supported 

U.S. Army component. As a result, each American 

acquired a large, division-sized support command. 

major subordinate elements include an intelli

brigade, engineer brigade, air defense artillery br

signal brigade, chemical brigade, military police br

civil affairs brigade, psychological operations bat

finance group, and personnel group.

Strong habitual relationships developed between 

headquarters, their major subordinate elements, and 

major subordinate commands. This was particularly 

the heavy corps with assigned forces, but was also t

the lighter corps with apportioned forces. A sound arg

can be made that habitual relationships lead to 

effective warfighting teams—if they fight the wa

planned on. However, habitual relationships pr

dependencies and limit the flexibility of a corps to pe

across a wider range of missions. SOPs become 

complicated as staffs of the many elements habitually 

in the same command structure. While written do

retained the language of temporary relationships, 

bonds developed through training and SOPs that 

developed for a very specific mission.

The question must be asked, when should the l

flexibility be sacrificed to the focused effectiveness o

by the habitual relationship? Given the focused threat 

Cold War, the answer was clearly to sacrifice flexibil

immediate effectiveness. In the post-Cold War perio

answer must be to favor flexibility to produce effectiv

for a wider spectrum of scenarios. Haislip argued th

dynamic composition of his World War II corps re

simple SOPs and simple interactions between corp

division. His admonition again takes on added signif

in the current security environment.

4
In addition to the accretion of major subord

commands and elements, corps became the doctrinal 

of intelligence in the U.S. Army. The most sophist

national intelligence assets could not be fed 

multinational (NATO) army headquarters, but they 

be fed to a U.S. corps. Planning and conducting dec

operations in consonance with the higher ech

deception plan is another corps responsibility. Integ

the capabilities of the other services is also doctr

centered in corps. A smaller-scale contingency base

division or smaller ground force requires parceling ou

assets to form ad hoc headquarters or doing without 

functions provided by corps.

The demands of Cold War coalition warfare transf

corps from an austere tactical headquarters into th

Army’s principal warfighting organization. In World W

armies were commonly provided by a single countr

army groups were allied commands even if dominate

single country. During the Cold War, armies were 

commands; corps and below were more likely to be 

country commands. The implications of the single v

multinational nature of a command were many. The U

States provided logistical support for its own forces. 

provided intelligence from national assets directly t

units, bypassing higher-echelon allied commands. 

was the highest echelon U.S. Army organization 

NATO warfighting command structure.

Corps Specific Characteristics.

During the Cold War two heavy corps, V and VII 

were forward deployed in Germany, while a third 

corps, III Corps, was prepared to deploy to Europe on 

notice. XVIII Airborne Corps, while it had a Cold 

mission, was largely focused on a variety of sm

contingencies. I Corps returned from Korea to Wash

with responsibilities across the Pacific to include Kor

the five corps, the three oriented on war in E

5
dominated doctrinal thinking and equipment require

in the Army.

V and VII Corps. U.S. Army V and VII Corps 

assembled under NATO’s Central Army Group (CEN

under command of a U.S. Army general. Not really an 

group, CENTAG was a combined army including tw

corps, a single German corps, and a separate G

brigade. V and VII Corps were based in Europe in def

postures against a possible threat from Eastern E

Both benefited from, and depended on, superb G

transportation and communication infrastructur

decades of intelligence preparation and familiarizatio

the terrain.

V and VII Corps were shaped by decades of prepa

for a massive ground attack from waves of Warsaw 

forces. They were assigned a relatively small a

responsibility along the inter-German border an

mission to defend in place. They repeated a deli

planning cycle each 2 years, updating their war 

incrementally improving it, and absorbing imp

weapon systems as they were fielded. The strategic a

operational levels of war were in the hands of pla

while commanders focused on the tactical. Both 

trained rigorously to execute the plan in the tactica

frame. Should the war have come, there would have b

time to mobilize so V and VII Corps maintained the h

possible level of readiness. The force was heavy 

armored and mechanized infantry divisions fo

deployed. Habitual relations between corps and as

subordinates were strong.

III Corps. Also a product of deliberate plannin

Mobile Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, was heavy and s

the “big war” as its driving force. Unlike V and VII Cor

Corps planned for strategic movement. The 

maintained a forward headquarters in Euro

complement the command headquarters in Texa

function was to maintain familiarity with the terra

6
infrastructure, including the prepositioned equi

maintained by German nationals, and to receive the 

The forward headquarters collaborated with the 

headquarters in the biennial planning process.

When the United States proclaimed to NATO t

would provide 10 divisions in 10 days, III Corps to

promise seriously and began the preparation fo

monumental undertaking. Upon III Corps’ departu

Europe, Army National Guard divisions would fall 

Fort Hood and the equipment left behind. When ready

too, would move forward to Europe. Deliberate pla

was central to III Corps’ mission. Habitual relatio

with assigned forces were strong.

After arriving in Europe and mating with preposi

equipment, III Corps would then conduct opera

movement across the continent to join either N

Northern or Central Army Group. Depending on cond

it would either counter attack or relieve another corps 

defense, demanding more flexibility in its opera

planning than in V and VII Corps. III Corps’ ca

training event, Roadrunner, as its name implies, or

on operational movement with headquarters and 

communications leapfrogging across the plains of Te

III Corps contributed its major subordinate comm

and elements to the Gulf War, but the Corps did not g

same is true of III Corps during Vietnam. In all likel

its subordinate commands would have been parcelled 

V and VII Corps as replacement units had it been ca

Europe. One has to wonder about the logic of buildi

not using such a capable warfighting organization.

XVIII Corps. XVIII Airborne Corps and its subor

units also had a “big war” mission and participated 

biennial deliberate planning process. One element o

War deliberate planning envisioned a Soviet invas

Iran in the north through the Caucasus Mountain

U.S. response would be not through the Eur

Command but through the Central Command with it

7
in the defunct Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 

XVIII Airborne Corps. The corps would deploy rapid

enter Iran in the south through the Zagros Mounta

defend the oil fields. The ability to deploy rapidly and d

was demonstrated in the early phases of Ope

DESERT SHIELD.

XVIII Airborne Corps was and is America’s contin

corps. Based in North Carolina, it prepared for a b

range of missions than did the heavy corps. In addi

one heavy division and one light infantry divis

includes the Army’s one of-a-kind airborne and air a

divisions. Each of these four divisions has dif

strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, as w

different combat power characteristics, making it d

to mount an integrated corps offense. Despite this, 

Corps demonstrated its offensive capability d

Operation DESERT STORM. A bolstered heavy VII 

transplanted from Europe was the main effort, howe

XVIII Airborne Corps stresses crisis action rathe

deliberate planning. Operation JUST CAUSE, the in

of Panama, typified its normal approach: crises 

planning, picking elements from across the force (inc

elements beyond its habitual relationships), and 

deployment. XVIII Airborne Corps makes no assum

about being part of a larger ground force, although 

demonstrated that ability. In operations like JUST CA

it expects to be the highest echelon ground compon

theater and is prepared to take on operat

responsibilities in addition to its tactical responsib

Given the changing threat, other corps may find them

with greater operational responsibilities in the futur

I Corps. I Corps in the Pacific Northwest was the li

of the five Cold War corps. It was light in the sense 

lacked heavy divisions of armor and mechanized infan

was also light in the sense that it was perennially 

resourced. It participated in deliberate planning 

context of a Korean War scenario and was advertise

8
Pacific contingency corps. For purposes of training, it 

as the parent corps for three light divisions in the P

Northwest, 6th ID(Light) in Alaska, 7th ID(Lig

northern California, and 9th ID(Motorized) in Washi

For purposes of war planning, I Corps was aligned 

heavy National Guard divisions. In the middle 19

Corps moved from Korea to Fort Lewis, Washington

of the 9th ID and its culture as an experimental test b

light forces.

Cold War Corps.

Planning strategic, operational, and tactical mov

produces a different corps than planning a tactical de

Perhaps this partially explains VII Corps’ performa

the Gulf War. VII Corps was responsible for a much 

area of operations in the Gulf than in Europe, and 

responsible for a long operational march rather 

defense in place. Its communications were inadequate 

larger area and movement requirements,

2

 and it cou

match the speed of the heavy division to its left.

3

 III 

had prepared extensively for strategic and opera

movement but was not used, just as it was not used d

Vietnam.

In their primary warfighting mission, III, V, an

Corps would conduct operations under command of a 

multinational ground force: NATO’s Northern or C

Army Group. This reality drove Army doc

organizational design, equipment acquisition, and tra

The relationship with a higher echelon gr

headquarters also produced a negligible joint culture 

corps echelon.

V and VII Corps were forward deployed, prepared 

close fight, and were well integrated into a specific co

structure. III Corps planned and trained for strateg

operational movement to enter the close fight as part 

larger ground force. The missions of these three 

dominated Army thinking. In this part of the Army

9
“big war” army—the culture included a heavy relia

deliberate planning and heavy forces, and poor integ

with air forces. The XVIII Airborne Corps shares str

and operational movement with III Corps, but i

prepared to be the largest ground component in th

contained a broad range of light and heavy forces, and 

on crisis action planning. The airborne corps main

good multi-service relations with the Air Force for mo

but not for integrated air-ground combat. It has lon

hard to characterize I Corps and therefore hard to jus

existence.

THE DIRECTION OF TRANSFORMATION

Transformation should produce greater releva

present and future needs. But the country’s need

complex, and we must ask relevance to what and 

Transformation should preserve the good in the ol

discard what is not justified by present and future 

Finally, the destination of transformation need not 

from whole cloth; history offers several archetyp

consideration. A corps must continually evolve 

relevant. 

Relevance to What War and When?

Within the services and the Department of Defen

concept of “transformation” has multiple, some

incompatible meanings. One of the most impo

determinants of the trajectory of transformation is th

of future war that the U.S. military must be prepa

fight. Identifying this is particularly difficult in th

long term—2020 and beyond.

4

 Because of this, str

thinkers have considered at least four typ

transformation: (1) transformation from the garrison 

built for the “big war” of the 1980s to an expeditionar

for small wars and contingencies; (2) transformation 

the industrial age force of the 1980s to an informati

force for 2020 and beyond—a dominant interpretation 

10
revolution in military affairs (RMA); (3) transform

from the “big war” force for the 1980s to a “big war” fo

2020 and beyond; and, (4) transformation 

service-focused warfare to seamless joint warfare.

Baby and the Bathwater.

Transformation must preserve some characteristi

which ones? One way to answer the question is to ex

the premises that underlay the Cold War corps a

compare them to the present reality and the unc

future that we must plan for.

One reality of the post-Cold War era is a reduct

“above the line forces,” e.g., divisions and separate bri

Not only are there fewer of them, but an incre

percentage of them are in the United States rathe

forward deployed. Forces once resident in Europ

therefore assigned to the European Command ar

either disbanded or stationed in the United S

Continental United States (CONUS)-based forces a

scarce resources to be shared—assigned to Joint 

Command (JFCOM) in CONUS, apportioned th

multiple plans to multiple unified commands, and all

as crises emerge. Transformation must elevate the sh

of scarce resources over the Cold War method of fo

deployed, assigned, and fenced forces.

The readiness model must also be challenged. D

the Cold War, the U.S. military focused on war in E

and thus maintained the highest level of readiness po

across the force. Tiered or staged, readiness was 

discussed but went against the grain of the “big war” f

Throughout the Cold War, however, naval forces and 

army units employed a rotational readiness model

only one-third of the force at the highest level of readin

any given time. Since the end of the Cold War, the Air 

has boldly adopted the rotational readiness model th

Army continues to resist. This has significant costs. F

11
the right readiness model or models thus must be p

transformation.

The “big war” culture within the Army should 

dismissed lightly. The Marine Corps will quickly rem

that it fights the country’s battles, but that only the 

can fight America’s “big wars.” Transforming the Ar

fight small wars will kill this critical culture and capa

The “big war” Army produces commanders and 

capable of prosecuting the strategic and operational 

of war. Deliberate planning to mobilize, deploy, and s

a large force is the lynch pin. It does not take place in t

units. Skill at higher echelon command and staff m

developed through career progression and training. 

these factors suggest that transformation must pr

the “big war” culture in some part of the force.

World War II offers evidence that the existence of a 

and the existence of a corps headquarters are se

issues. The inability to field a corps from head to toe do

preclude the existence of a corps headquarters. Pres

corps headquarters preserves career paths and e

preservation of the “big war” culture. Having 

positions is necessary but not sufficient. Conscious 

must be devoted to preparing commanders and staff 

higher levels of war. It is customary to train 

headquarters without troops in the field, relying inst

computer simulations and a variety of scen

appropriate for the training audience. The same is t

other higher-echelon headquarters, including Joint 

Force (JTF) headquarters. Therefore, it is possi

maintain the readiness of corps commands and staffs 

absence of its subordinate units. The higher-ec

commands can exist without assigned forces, but ha

relations must be considered in transforming the for

The transformed corps must be a combined 

headquarters, deal with joint issues, preserve the “bi

culture in the army, and be adept at the operational l

war. It must be effective at small wars, “big wars

12
conceivable future wars. This is a demanding ar

requirements.

One alternative is to have no corps headquarters o

at all, as was the case between the Civil War and Wor

I. In the case of major war, this would force the Ar

create a higher-echelon combined arms headquarters 

last minute. All evidence suggests this is a formu

disaster.

6

 Moreover, commanders and staffs would h

opportunity to develop the skills needed at corps lev

thus would effectively destroy the “big war” culture 

U.S. Army.

Another option is to keep only a small 

headquarters except during a major war. World W

offers evidence that the existence of a corps and a 

headquarters are separate issues. The inability to 

corps from head to toe does not preclude the existen

corps headquarters. The relatively low cost of small 

headquarters allows more of them to be maint

Preserving corps headquarters preserves career 

allows staff and commanders the opportunity to d

appropriate skills, and enables preservation of the “bi

culture. It is customary to train corps as a headqu

without troops. Therefore, it is possible to mainta

readiness of corps commands and staffs in the absenc

subordinate units.

The corps forward headquarters offers another mo

would consist of a modest headquarters, forward de

with a small footprint. Small headquarters hav

primary duties: to be knowledgeable of the local po

and military situation and the military capabilities 

region, and prepare to receive deploying forces and a 

headquarters. The Army, through its corps forward, a

Air Force, through many of its numbered air forces

long employed this model. Marines call the proces

larger force falling in on top of a smaller force compo

But should the forward element be an Army 

headquarters or a joint headquarters? The logic for 

13
headquarters forward is obvious and compelling. The 

forward model maximizes the efficient use of scarce 

provides local expertise in theater under the comman

regional Commander in Chief (CINC), provi

political-military engagement, high-level presence

offers training opportunities and career paths for h

echelon commanders and staffs.

The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) is another mode

based on a garrison construct with ground combat 

(division), air forces (air wing), and service support 

(force service support group), along with a hand

standing air-ground task force headquarters. The M

division maintains its subordinate units at various st

readiness—rotational readiness—and continu

provides infantry battalions to a small Marine Air-G

Task Force (MAGTF) for deployment at sea. The ai

and force service support group function simila

providers to MAGTFs. In garrison, the FMF’s div

wing, and support group units maintain sep

organizations for efficiency. The MAGTF is design

combined arms effectiveness and flexibili

expeditionary operations.

The Cold War-era corps with large headqua

support elements, and assigned forces is another opti

high cost and the few forces available for su

organization would limit the number that could be cr

perhaps to just a single one. This would offer only 

training opportunities and career paths, while threa

the capability to prosecute a “big war.” In that sense, i

worst of both worlds. While a major theater war may 

imminent, such a conflict would post a serious dange

retaining the ability to prosecute one seems pr

Having to form an ad hoc headquarters would not do 

Destinations for Transformation: Whither Corp

The Army cannot fight alone. It cannot get to a 

without the Navy or the Air Force, nor can it sustain it

14
theater without support from its sister services. Its ab

for forcible entry and deep strike are modest. It c

survive in the field against an enemy with com

tactical air power. Solutions must be joint; they mus

the context of ground forces’ relationship to the emp

joint force.

The history of the Army has followed a progress

combined arms warfare down to successively lower ec

and smaller formations;

7

 the same pattern is 

repeating with joint warfare. Joint warfare is com

arms warfare compounded by a clash of theorie

bureaucratic obstinence. The JTF is the next s

pushing jointness down. In the last decade, the JT

become the nation’s instrument of choice for comman

control of military operations at the operational level o

In the coming decade, a wide array of informatio

systems for command and control nominally are 

developed for the JTF. Yet JTFs are typically crea

response to an emerging contingency or crisis, seem

inviting “first battle” problems.

8

In transforming corps, the first objective is to im

the nation’s ability to respond to crises by staffin

training an organization that can effectively and effic

bring to bear the full range of capabilities provided by 

uniformed services—command and control of com

arms. The second objective is to improve effectiven

equipping an organization capable of exploitin

dramatic advances in information technology an

precision weapon systems they enable. This argue

national intelligence assets be piped to a JTF headqua

not to a corps headquarters. It also argues that the 

rather than the services, be the proponent for comman

control systems. Furthermore, the strategic and opera

levels of war are not single service environments, b

domain of the joint force commander. The JTF is respo

for the operational level of war, and corps tran

operational into tactical; therefore, transforming 

must be discussed in the context of the JTF. Transform

15
of today’s corps can lead to five forms: ad hoc JTFs

forward; expeditionary JTFs; strategic JTFs; 

experimental JTFs. These are not mutually exclusiv

each form has strengths and weaknesses.

Ad Hoc JTFs. Like the Cold War corps, JTF

designed for a specific mission or range of missions. U

Cold War corps, a JTF usually doesn’t exist until a 

demands it. Services believe that they can’t fo

single-service combined arms headquarters at th

minute but, for some reason, the U.S. military see

believe that joint force headquarters can. The c

practice is to predesignate unified command comp

commanders as potential JTF commanders. However

the exception of a brief period of training, the comman

firmly ensconced in a single service job with a single s

staff.

9

 When a JTF is formed, its staff is built ad ho

typical training event brings together a joint staff 

weeklong, 24-hour per day, real-time, plan exe

exercise. When the exercise is over, the staff disband

JTFs Forward. In addition to service resista

standing JTFs,

11

 the CINCs of the unified commands 

JTFs from outside their theater, i.e., from JFCOM. Re

CINCs will accept the JFCOM role as provider of s

forces, but not as provider of joint force comma

Therefore, it is important to establish multiple sta

JTF headquarters in the unified commands along the 

forward model. These must be capable of rece

MAGTFs, air expeditionary forces (AEFs), or 

air-ground task forces (JAGTFs) from CONUS. Th

forward headquarters may have staffs dominat

planners, logisticians, and special operations f

Training would focus on the operational and re

political levels and would provide career paths for 

echelon commands and staffs. JTFs forward would pla

train for compositing. They would not have assigned 

but should build strong relationships with rotating 

They must be prepared to conduct operations with wh

forces are allocated for a crisis. Strong hab

16
relationships must be built within the JTF forwar

between it and its parent unified command. The 

forward—commander and staff—must be distinct 

unified command service components.

VII Corps was disestablished after the Gulf Wa

much of its equipment was left behind in the 

prepositioned for future contingencies. A resurrect

Corps is a candidate to be a forward headquarters 

Persian Gulf region either as a JTF forward or as th

component of a JTF forward. V Corps remains the 

ground force presence in the U.S. European Com

(EUCOM). Since the end of the Cold War, EUCO

increasingly been responding to crises on the periph

its area of operations and in sub-Saharan Africa. It re

composed of forward deployed heavy forces not opti

for such missions, requiring resort to naval expedit

forces, special operations forces, and CONUS-based 

forces. Heavy armor may be useful in the Balkans 

Sierra Leone, but armored divisions are not

requirement is for military police, civil affairs, all fo

service support, and, in some cases, for infantry sup

by armor. The composition of the infantry division is 

appropriate to these missions and capable of form

wider range of combinations.

To say that V Corps with heavy divisions is no 

appropriate to the CINC’s needs is not to say that 

should not be a corps or Army presence in Europe. EU

was a creature of the Cold War, well integrated in

NATO command structure. In contrast, during the 

period the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM

almost exclusively political in nature, with only a brig

light forces to protect the canal. Which model best mee

needs of U.S. relationships with countries in Eu

Perhaps there remains a role for one or more corps fo

headquarters with a role similar to III Corps Forwar

Other forward-deployed JTFs are possible. A bou

shift removing sub-Saharan Africa from EUCOM a

17
“big war” army purview might also be appropria

separate JTF forward under U.S. Central Com

(CENTCOM) oriented on small wars and expedit

operations with apportioned forces from XVIII Co

more appropriate for operations in sub-Saharan Afri

maritime JTF in Korea is another candidate for 

forward. If trends continue, Oceania may warrant 

forward as well.

Expeditionary JTFs. The recent spate of smalle

contingencies did not see corps or divisions fighting a

of a larger ground force. Instead, a mix of smaller 

functioned as the JTF’s ground component. To be relev

the expected small wars of coming decades, ground 

must function as part of an expeditionary JTF.

The transformation from the “big war” to the 

wars” force would be most difficult and destructive if a

to III Corps. III Corps represents the heart of the A

ability to project heavy combat power half way arou

world, to conduct sustained land combat operations, 

close with and destroy the enemy. To transform III Co

an expeditionary force would represent a significant 

the country. An important deterrent would be lost, as 

a potent option for the national command authorities

a transformation is against III Corps’ deliberate pla

heavy forces, and “big war” culture.

XVIII Corps, on the other hand, embraces a contin

culture and holds light forces in high esteem

assumption that divisions fight as part of a corps an

corps fight as part of a larger ground force permeat

organization, doctrine, and training in the “big war” 

Nowhere are those assumptions less applicable th

XVIII Airborne Corps. It faces enduring problems acq

the level of close air support and battlefield air interd

that major war demands. It has not integrated wel

armored and mechanized forces. Nowhere is it 

important to match the high strategic mobility o

18
ground forces and air forces to produce a rapidly depl

air-land team with dominant combat power.

Much real change since the end of the Cold War ha

focused on the division. There are fewer of them, and e

lighter only because they are smaller. There are n

division types, nor have any old division types been r

There has been little change with respect to divisions 

the active and reserve components. Change at the di

level is about size, not shape. The degree of specializa

the division level was appropriate for the Cold War a

28 divisions but not for today’s army of 16 division

appropriateness of the division structure at III Corp

entirely different issue than the appropriateness 

division structure at XVIII Corps.

Nowhere in the Army is the inappropriateness 

division structure more obvious than in XVIII Air

Corps. Does the country need the forcible entry and 

strategic mobility provided by airborne forces? Do

country need the ability to move ground forces r

around a theater of operations as provided b

helicopter-borne air assault forces? Most certainly, o

counts. Should those capabilities be localized into s

division-sized structures? Probably not. Should 

capabilities instead be resident in other ground force

Marines excel at forming Marine Expeditionary 

(MEUs) built around an infantry battalion but can als

Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) and M

Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) at the regiment and di

level, respectively. The larger MAGTFs are problema

to the relatively small size of the Marine Corps

reasonable, then, to expect that the Army-Air Forc

air-ground task force should focus on forming at br

division, and corps levels.

To be relevant to the many small wars expected 

next two decades, the assets of XVIII Airborne Corp

those expected under a true numbered air force sho

combined, then their former headquarters gutt

19
warfighting commands. The freed assets shou

recombined into an organization capable of comma

joint air-ground task forces, principally deployed by a

new organization should be created in accordance 

FMF model, including several standing JTF headqu

analogous to the standing MEB and MEF headqua

Perhaps the resources of one or more MEF headqu

could be freed as a result.

Using the FMF model, the army corps would prim

be a provider of brigades and divisions to a joint task 

The Air Force would provide its pieces as well, perh

the form of composite wings. America’s contingenc

could provide complex combined arms teams of airbor

assault, light infantry, mechanized infantry, a

artillery, engineers, tactical aircraft, and airlift. These 

should provide larger air-ground task forces than ex

Navy-Marine Corps teams. They would be prepa

composite onto a JTF forward or onto an amphibious

group with MEU, and be prepared to be composited o

larger JTF. This option, of course, has serious force 

implications. It would be difficult to do with the c

force structure, much less a smaller one.

Training would include habitual relationships 

several JTFs forward for compositing and planning. U

the habitual relations between headquarters and 

subordinate commands and elements, habitual rel

should be within headquarters and between headqu

and headquarters forward. Rotational readin

appropriate for expeditionary JTFs. These ga

organizations would be powerful proponents for 

command, control, communications and comp

intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (C

strategic and theater lift, close air support, and batt

air interdiction. They would be the recipient

benefactors of training as opposed to the current m

They would retain a crisis action planning culture 

than a deliberate planning culture. They would be ca

20
of forcible entry. Standing command teams wou

organized, trained, and equipped prior to crisis emerg

Strategic JTF. III Corps is the keeper of the heav

war” culture born of World War II, criticized as irre

during Korea and Vietnam, risen again to ascendanc

in the Cold War, and vindicated in the Gulf War. 

relevant as a deterrent and blunt instrument fo

unexpected major theater war, III Corps, and its “bi

culture, must be preserved in the context of a 

Maintaining III Corps does not necessarily 

maintaining its internal structures, and it does not m

should evade transformation. Perhaps III Corps is 

transformation should take place without waiting fo

systems. This could take the shape of the organization

cultural changes described in Douglas Macgr

Breaking the Phalanx, rather than a technologically-

transformation.

13

 While greater strategic mobility wo

an objective, combat power and mobility would rema

primary objective.

To improve strategic mobility without sacrificing c

power and in-theater mobility, III Corps should bec

joint air-ground task force on a theater wide scale, a

in the Cold War model of separate air and ground for

must be organized, trained, and equipped to conduct t

coupled air-ground operations as practiced by Ge

George Patton and Pete Quesada in World War II E

and as practiced by the Marine Corps in small units.

strategic JTF must be capable of fighting in coalition 

its own. Coalition partners may provide their own JT

coalition ground forces and air forces may be combine

large ground and large air forces subordinate to co

command. In the latter case, the transformed corps m

prepared to integrate with a larger ground force, a com

army, as in the Cold War.

Resources devoted to improving strategic mobility 

be for naught if the force were not trained and rea

deployment. This JTF, standing from head to toe, s

21
employ a total force readiness model rather t

rotational readiness model. The geo-strategic enviro

and the availability of strategic lift assets should dete

the level of readiness maintained. It would provide 

paths, training, and experience to continue buildin

war” commanders and staffs. More than one of thes

headquarters could be maintained without requirin

underlying forces. Habitual relations between 

headquarters and assigned forces may be the pre

method of operations in garrison.

Perhaps another corps headquarters on this mode

be established as a strategic reserve. In the short ter

strategic reserve corps would be more of a training ha

functioning to provide replacement units to the de

strategic corps. Given longer lead times and the need

echelon forces mobilized from the Reserve componen

be allocated to the strategic reserve corps for 

deployment as a whole. This strategic reserve 

headquarters would complete the same training progr

the standing strategic corps. A tiered readiness 

would be appropriate for the strategic reserve corp

strategic reserve JTF.

Experimental JTF. If responsibility for transform

is assigned to a part of the force with current rea

requirements, it will always be a back burner 

Incrementalism will be the rule. Given the r

operational tempo within the U.S. military, transform

will continue to be modest indeed. With XVIII 

contingency responsibilities, transformation would a

be secondary to current readiness. If III Corps were 

the long-term transformation mission, its culture 

interpret the mission as, “Given a heavy corps, ho

information technology be applied productively?” A 

organization needs to be created that will ask the que

“Given all this information technology, what force w

build?”

15

22
The requirement for jointness is even stronger w

the context of long-term transformation. 

experimentation must seek solutions independe

current service roles and missions. A separate 

command, perhaps a JTF, must be created as the prop

for this transformation. To assure that experimenta

truly joint rather than multiservice, the JTF shou

have separate service components, as is the custom

separate funding stream and authority. The joint 

commander must be a true commander, not a coordin

service components.

Perhaps the obvious home for this function is JF

However, Army history offers an important lesson. 

the Army undertook the task of rebuilding itself 

Vietnam, it consciously decided that readiness for tod

readiness for the future were too different to be put u

single command. Army reforms in 1973 created the 

Command (FORSCOM) and the Training and Do

Command (TRADOC). Readiness for today—unit tr

and readiness—was assigned to FORSCOM. Respons

for individual training, doctrine development, and c

developments was assigned to TRADOC, which was c

above, and against the resistance of, the powerful b

schools. A long succession of the Army’s brightest 

through TRADOC. Most will ascribe credit for rebu

the Army to the success of TRADOC.

16

 If a single s

couldn’t transform itself in the face of current rea

requirements under a single command, why wou

expect joint transformation to be accomplished un

single command? The functions of today’s JFCOM n

be split into a JFCOM with current read

responsibilities and a Joint TRADOC with future rea

responsibilities.

Given the difficulty justifying I Corps’ existen

resources should be applied elsewhere. The resourc

Corps should be given over to the experimental JTF 

with similarly freed resources from the other service

23
CONCLUSION

Changing the entire army structure may not be 

for, but examination of the entire structure is. 

challenges should be made throughout the force

structure of all four services should be exam

individually and, more importantly, collectively. 

structure should be rationalized and justified in a top 

process beginning with the Joint Strategic Pla

process. Having the best air, land, and sea forces is n

objective—providing the CINC, and increasingly th

commander, with the best combined arms team is.

A great deal of the debate over transformation focu

equipment, either as an end in itself or as a step prereq

to transformation. Equipment modernization, a w

topic, consumes resources including time, and com

with or defers true transformation. Some transform

vary the equipment set while holding the com

hierarchy constant, for example, attempts to digi

heavy corps or to equip divisions with wheeled rathe

tracked armored vehicles. Transformation is a 

broader issue than modernization. In contrast, Mac

has challenged the division and brigade echelons—

organization and doctrine—while initially holdin

equipment set constant.

17

 This allows transformat

begin immediately without being held hostage 

lengthy acquisition and fielding process.

The country demands more of its Army than c

accomplished in a single transformation. Nonetheles

military forces must continually evolve to remain re

to the present and to the future. But there are many ty

relevance and separate transformations must be app

accomplish each.

• Relevance to the expected and frequent m

operations in support of national interests through 

forces designed for small wars.

24
• Relevance to the unexpected wars in support o

national interests through heavy deployable forces.

• Relevance to the uncertain future thr

experimentation.

The joint task force is the crux of the matter. By ig

it—e.g., corps headquarters masquerading as 

headquarters—the services have preserved their 

prestigious three-star commands, the status quo

service prerogatives. Single-service structures defy 

structures, and weak joint organizations perpe

separate service warfare. The three-star headquarter

the services should be challenged and, when appropri

dismantled; the freed resources combined to form tru

headquarters. Standing JTFs and standing 

headquarters would provide a focal point for acquisi

command and control information systems. Connect

national and other scarce intelligence and communic

assets must reside in the JTF, not in service headqua

Standing JTF headquarters would also e

experimentation with new methods of warfare as port

by advocates of an RMA and by the transition fro

industrial to the information age. Expectations are h

increased warfighting effectiveness enabled by inform

technology and precision weapons. Rea

experimentation with these systems and new metho

both expedite and hone emerging capabilities as w

protect us from an over-reliance on unproven concep

ENDNOTES

1. See Wayne H. Haislip, “Corps Command in World W

Military Review, Vol. 70, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 22-32. (This mon

draws extensively from his work.) Haislip reports that XV Corps 

different divisions rotate through his World War II command a

at any given time the corps had from one to six divisions. XVIII A

Corps took on forces from 7th ID(Light) immediately prior to Op

JUST CAUSE and in the early stages of Operation DESERT S

took on heavy divisions from III Corps.

25
2. New Mobile Subscriber Equipment was being fielded at th

compounding the communications shortfalls caused by the larg

and march distances and the lack of German infrastructure. 

transport truck shortages were endemic to the entire Army, not 

Corps.

3. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Genera

The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Boston, MA: Little

and Company, 1995.

4. The year 2020 is somewhat arbitrary, but is based on the 

held assumption that the United States will face no peer or ne

competitor for the next 20 years. Some may consider transform

and 3 to be the same and, indeed, they may turn out to be. Howe

former makes the assumption that the big wars of the future 

fought in a fundamentally different way, enabled predomina

information technology. The latter makes no such assumption.

5. Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, C

Consequences, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1

6. America’s First Battles, 1776-1965, Charles E. Heller and W

A. Stoft, eds., Manhattan, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986

Robert Worley, “Joint Task Forces: Options to Train, Organi

Equip,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Winter 1999, pp. 

7. Worley, 1999.

8. Ibid.

9. D. Robert Worley, Michael H. Vernon, and Robert E. D

Time and Command Operations: The Strategic Role of the 

Commands and the Implications for Training and Simu

Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1996.

10. Worley, 1999, pp. 31-48.

11. The Marine Corps attempted to create a true standing J

lacked support from the other services and the rest of the Depart

Defense. See Mark T. Goodman and Richard M. Scott, “Standin

Task Force: Opportunity Lost,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 82

September 1998, pp. 38-39.

12. In a similar idea, Steven Metz advocated forming a sub

command for Africa under the U.S. European Command, for

standing JTF to coordinate engagement activities on the part o

unified commands, and providing the foundation for a headqua

26
case of any U.S. military activity during humanitarian r

peacekeeping operations. See Steven Metz, Refining American S

in Africa, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 44

13. Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New De

Landpower in the 21st Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

14. Thomas Alexander Hughes, Over Lord: General Pete Q

and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II, New Yo

The Free Press, 1995.

15. I am indebted to General Larry Welch, USAF (Ret.), 

formulation.

16. James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, Ge

Right: American Military Reforms after Vietnam to the Gulf W

Beyond, New York, NY: William Morrow and Company, 1993.

17. Macgregor.

27
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. D. Robert Worley

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams