PLAN COLOMBIA:

THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL

IMPERATIVES

Gabriel Marcella

April 2001
*****

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necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Departmen

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Government. This report is cleared for public release; distrib

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The author appreciates the thoughtful commentary on 

drafts of this paper by William Harris, Dennis Keller, Stuart Lip

Joseph Nuñéz. This paper was originally prepared for present

the Conference “Implementing Plan Colombia: Strateg

Operational Imperatives for the U.S. Military,” cosponsored 

Dante B. Fascell North-South Center, University of Miami, a

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, on Febru

2001.

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ISBN 1-58487-047-8

ii
FOREWORD

The crisis in Colombia is the most compelling challen

United States faces in the Western Hemisphere. The U

States is committed to helping Colombia fight its st

against the violence and corruption engendered by the 

in narcotics. This report examines the strategic theory 

Plan Colombia, the master plan which the governm

Colombia developed to strengthen democracy through 

security, and economic development. In this timely pap

Gabriel Marcella argues that the United States an

international community must support this beleag

nation. He cautions, however, that the main responsibi

success lies with the Colombians. They must mobili

national resources and make the sacrifices to win ba

country from the narco-traffickers, the insurgents, a

paramilitaries. To that end, Plan Colombia is a well-con

strategy that must be sustained for the long term.

This is the first of a series of monographs stemming 

major conference held in Miami, Florida, on Februa

2001. That conference, entitled “Implementing 

Colombia: Strategic and Operational Imperatives

cosponsored by The Dante B. Fascell North-South Cen

the University of Miami and the Strategic Studies Insti

the U.S. Army War College. The intent was to clarify 

focus the debate, and learn from it. We are pleased to p

this monograph in the hope that it may contribut

resolution of Colombia’s problems through greater di

and debate.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
FOREWORD

This monograph by Dr. Gabriel Marcella is elo

testimony to the immense stake which the United 

has in the outcome of Colombia’s multifaceted crisi

prolongation of Colombia’s troubles and their pot

deepening present a threat to the stability of an 

region. The problem goes well beyond the question of 

drug production and supply. It means the possible re

of major, positive developments in Central and 

America through the 1990s which include democratiz

growth through freer markets, and economic integ

through free trade agreements leading to an eventua

Trade Area of the Americas. Both the Clinton ad

tration and, now, the Bush administration have sh

commitment to help Colombia because it is in ou

national interest to do so. It is incumbent upon the pe

Colombia principally, but also the internat

community, to stay the course during a multi-year ef

grand proportions.

That part is not easy for Washington, given over, a

country often is, to short-term thinking. Plan Col

recognizes realistically the need for patienc

determination in pursuit of a broad range of initiativ

years to come. Leadership will be required to get tha

across to electorates and legislators who demand q

results than may be possible. The United States, th

the commitment of $1.3 billion, has become engaged 

program. But this moment is, as Winston Churchill sa

certain turning point in World War II, “not the end o

the beginning of the end, but possibly the end 

beginning.”

The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center is plea

collaborate with the U.S. Army War College. We 

through a recent conference and now through a se

studies such as this, an ongoing analysis of the policy 

v
which are of critical importance to this country and 

Western Hemisphere.

Ambler Moss

Director

Dante B. Fascell North-South C

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

GABRIEL MARCELLA teaches strategy in the Depar

of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Arm

College. He previously served as International A

Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, United S

Southern Command. His recent publications in

Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democr

Latin America, “Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strat

the Crossroads,” Security Cooperation in the W

Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Co

(coauthor); “The Presidential Advisory System an

Making of Latin American Policy,” and “The Intera

Process and National Security: Forward Into the 

Century.” His current research interests focus o

Colombian crisis, national security decisionmaking, a

strategic dimensions of civil-military relations in ti

crisis and war. He is a frequent commentator on 

American security issues and U.S. policy in the printe

electronic media.

vii
PLAN COLOMBIA:

THE STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL

IMPERATIVES

Colombia today would be a completely different country i

had not suffered for the last twenty years all the perve

effects of narco-trafficking . . . it would be more secure, m

governable, and more democratic.

1

Colombia’s Travails.

Colombia is the most difficult challenge facin

United States in the hemisphere. Washington’s prest

Inter-American Dialogue affirmed in late 2000: “ No co

in Latin America outside of Mexico will command g

U.S. policy attention than Colombia.”

2

 It has long 

besieged by internal conflict. But the appetite for c

and heroin in the United States (where 3.5 million 

are addicted to cocaine and up to 12 million use 

drugs), Europe, Canada, Asia, and Latin America f

veritable killing machine that annually takes the l

over 3,000 (over 40,000 in the last 10 years). Nearly 

kidnappings took place in Colombia in 2000, securin

again that country’s first rank in that dreadful busin

Violence has displaced over 1.5 million people cau

the crossfire of shooting, threats, and counter-threats

the insurgents and paramilitary vigilantes. Its de

tiveness intensifies poverty. The insecurity makes n

life practically impossible for Colombians of all class

Colombia’s problems also raise deep concer

Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, and Brazil 

spillover violence, corruption, ecological damage

criminal activity.

4

 There is fear of the “balloon effec

threat that coca cultivation could move across border

back into Peru and Bolivia) should Colombia drama

reduce cultivation.

5

 Moreover, the violence and uncer

1
about the future contribute to the steepest economic d

in two generations, with 20 percent unemployment f

year 2000.

Insecurity and contagious pessimism about the 

drive thousands of Colombians to seek opportunit

personal and family security abroad, especially 

United States. A leading intellectual expresses the c

grim national mood in Colombia:

. . . no idea, no ideology, no leader, no force, no institutio

national scale that might try to convince us, provo

admiration or moves the collective enthusiasm . . . A Congr

out of touch with reality . . . An opposition of beggars and act

. . . A criminal insurgency without ideas. A murderous right 

frightened intellectuals . . . Businessmen on the defensive an

“civil society” which no longer exists.

6

The institutional capacity of the state to deal wi

problems of governance and public security is man

weak. Colombia’s collective troubles are a pow

combination of the lack of authority, legitimacy

governance. The leading scholar on the violence, Ed

Pizarro of the National University of Colombia and res

professor at the University of Notre Dame, refers in Sp

to the partial collapse of the state and the om

emergence of the solution from the right as derechiz

which implies increasing popular support for the 

right-wing paramilitaries in a society lookin

alternatives. This is a common historical patte

societies riven by deep conflict. As the political 

weakens and public security declines, a societ

naturally look for security from the right.

7

Plan Colombia and the United States.

The United States has been assisting Colomb

decades, but the imperative changed dramatica

1997-98 as Colombia displaced Peru and Bolivia 

major source of coca production. Because thes

2
Colombian neighbors succeeded in sharply reducin

cultivation, the enterprise moved north into souther

eastern Colombia. These remote areas are lightly pop

and practically free of such manifestations of the Colo

state as the judicial system, police, military, roads, sc

medical service, markets, and credit facilities. Indeed

40 percent of the national territory is outside the con

the central government, thus posing a serious challe

national unity throughout the history of indepe

Colombia. In this area outside the government’s co

soil, temperature, and moisture conditions can produ

crops of coca in 12 months. Today close to 300,000 ac

various areas throughout Colombia annually produ

estimated 520 metric tons compared with 245 produ

Peru and Bolivia combined. The following table show

dramatic shift in production patterns. Until 1997 m

the coca was grown in Peru and Bolivia, while coca ba

shipped to Colombia for processing and distribution.

The Colombian production areas of Putumayo, Ca

Guaviare are, moreover, dominated by insurgents kno

the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucion

Colombianas) and the paramilitary vigilantes. The 

are 15,000-20,000 strong, of whom some 6,000 m

forcibly recruited children, according to the UN

representative in Colombia.

8

 The paramilitary g

(autodefensas) are some 6,000 in strength and growin

3

1995 1996 1997 1998 1

Peru 460 435 325 240 1

Bolivia 240 215 200 150 

Colombia 230 300 350 435 5

Totals 930 950 875 825 7

Table 1. Andean Potential Cocaine Produc

(Metric Tons).
tenacity with which the FARC fought to preserve its c

over the coca production areas in Putumayo departm

the fall of 2000 clearly demonstrates that the nar

guerrilla nexus is no longer a myth.

9

 Estimates run a

as $500 million per year for the amount of money tha

into insurgent coffers from the coca business th

extortion and war taxes. This amount, enough to f

formidable war machine, allowed FARC battallion

formations in 1997-98 to inflict serious defeats upo

Colombian army. The paramilitaries also depend upo

proceeds, with their leader, Carlos Castaño, asserting 

to be 70 percent of their war chest. Some analysts argu

the FARC will not be strategically defeated by elimi

the drug money going to the war chest. This is be

nearly 50 percent of their income (which does not com

coca) would be unaffected, allowing them to main

significant tempo of military operations.

10

In the United States each year illegal drug use kill

52,000 persons. The costs of health care, accidents, an

productivity reach $110 billion. The illegal drug 

generates violence and corrupts wherever it touches

Mexico, through Central America, Panama, an

Caribbean states, reaching even the highest circ

governments. A senior U.S. diplomat who serv

Colombia estimates that two-thirds to three-fourths 

members of the Colombian Congress are corrupt. T

stake for the international community are the 

principles of democratic community—the rule of la

inviolability of international borders, and the security 

individual and society. Illegal drugs contribute signifi

to the $600 billion global money-laundering economy

Colombia, three times the size of Montana w

population of 40 million, is important to the United St

far more positive terms. Overall bilateral trade is $10 

per year, and Colombia will play a key role i

anticipated economic integration of the hemispher

visionary Free Trade Area of the Americas, target

2005. Until its recent troubles, the country was cons

4
one of the leading democracies in Latin America. How

under the enormous strain of conflict, its deep flaw

democracy have become salient: corruption, a t

dysfunctional judicial system (despite having eight 

the number of judges the United States has for 

100,000 people), and an ineffective governmental 

across a vast territory.

11

A decisive turn in U.S. policy began when A

Pastrana assumed the presidency in 1998. H

campaigned on a promise to end the three decades of w

declared dramatically: “For peace I risk everythin

soon embarked on a risky peace process. In January 1

granted the FARC a 16,000 square-mile demilitarize

(the despeje, covering 4 percent of the national territo

area the size of Switzerland, but with a population o

96,000 (one-fourth of 1 percent of the national popul

A smaller insurgent group, the ELN (Ejército de Libe

Nacional) with 5,000 members, may also be given a v

of a demilitarized zone in 2001.

What motivated this unusual arrangement? Beca

failed efforts at peace making, especially the execu

thousands of members of the M-19 guerrillas who put 

their guns in the early 1990s expecting to be “reinteg

into society, it was decided that a peace process would 

only if the FARC could be assured security in a desp

area where the government would pull out its polic

military forces and allow the FARC local authority.

gesture would show goodwill and establish the ba

meaningful negotiations that would lead to demobiliz

eventual reinsertion of members into society, and a d

peace. But the process has achieved little but frust

and criticism, with the result that Pastrana has been 

show hardly anything for his efforts. In the meantim

FARC has used unfettered control of the despeje to r

reequip, train, and stage for operations against gover

forces, as well as promote cultivation of coca. Adopti

classical insurgent strategy of “fight and talk,” the 

continued aggressive military operations agains

5
military and police. Such conduct reinforced the accu

from many quarters at home and abroad tha

Colombian government had irresponsibly surren

sovereignty over Colombian territory to criminals, yi

an important instrument in the struggle for legitima

By the end of 2000, Pastrana had little to show 

gamble in the peace process, and his own stand

national polls plummeted. To preserve the faltering 

process, Pastrana announced in early December th

despeje would be maintained until the end of January 

and that a humanitarian agreement would free mor

500 Colombian police and army troops held captive 

zone. Ending the despeje would amount to ending the 

process, and the government found itself in the unte

position of not being able to retake the zone militar

well entrenched is the FARC. 14 Yet there appear

alternative but to maintain the peace process for 

domestic and international reasons. The question wa

Pastrana and Marulanda agreed to another extensi

the Los Pozos Accord of February 2001.

Bilaterally, Presidents Bill Clinton and Pastrana 

off well. Pastrana visited Washington four times

Clinton journeyed to Cartagena in August 2000 in or

launch Plan Colombia and reassure Colombia

bipartisan support. The presidential retinue inc

Democratic Senator Joseph Biden and Speaker of the 

of Representatives Dennis Hastert. Biden repo

advised Pastrana: “Mr. President, here are the 

powerful men and women in the United States. We b

in you . . . but if there are no results all this good c

could evaporate.”

For some time senior officials in Washington had 

thinking that Colombia needed a major boost o

support and a more comprehensive strategy that co

sustained beyond an administration. In November 

the U.S. Congress voted a $165 million supplement

package for Colombia, which, added to the $124 m

6
appropriated earlier, made Colombia the third-l

recipient (though far behind Israel and Egypt) of U.S. 

the world. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickeri

experienced hand in Latin American affairs, argued 

long-term national plan rather than fitful short-term 

that each year had to be repeated in the U.S. po

process. It was also imperative that the Colom

government become more proficient in linking a long

plan with operations in the field and that it m

resources and personnel across the ministries, th

engaging the creative talents of all Colombians 

rebuilding of the nation.

Thus Plan Colombia was born, which, contra

speculation in the media, was authored by a Colom

Jaime Ruiz, Chief of Staff for Pastrana, who h

doctorate from Louvain and an engineering degree fro

University of Kansas, has an American wife, and s

flawless English, wrote the plan in a week in Englis

From Strategic Theory to Implementation.

The strategic theory of Plan Colombia is very simp

links economic development and security to the 

process. The central premise is that drug money fee

coffers of the guerrillas, whose attacks give rise 

self-defense organizations otherwise known a

paramilitaries. If the money going to the narcos is 

away, the guerrillas cannot mount the attacks, they b

less threatening, and the paramilitaries have less rea

being. The prospects for bringing the guerrillas an

paramilitaries to the table for serious peace negotiatio

enhanced because they have less justification an

ability to wage war against the state and against each 

Plan Colombia endeavors to strengthen the 

reenergize an economy with deep unemployment, ge

the conditions necessary for the pursuit of peace, cont

expansion of illegal crops and drug trafficking, and r

civil society. In other words, Plan Colombia is nothin

7
than a grand strategy for the remaking of the nation 

secure democratic society freed of violence and corru

It is not a military strategy.

The concept of “shared responsibility” (number 

Plan Colombia) for the narcotics problem links 

international support. It is common wisdom that li

magnitude happens in this hemisphere without lead

from Washington. Accordingly, U.S. economic and m

support is critical in encouraging Colombians to sacrif

their survival and in prodding the international comm

to assist. The 5-year Plan Colombia will cost $7.5 b

with $4 billion to be provided by Colombia, and $3.5 

by the international community (read here Europe), 

includes the $1.3 billion committed by the United S

This division reflects the “shared responsibility” be

Colombia and the international community for the pr

of drug consumption and production, of demand and s

Nonetheless, by the end of 2000, European nations, 

understanding of Colombia’s complex problems is h

influenced by human rights-oriented nongovern

organizations, had offered a mere $750 mill

Europeans are also reluctant because of the misperc

of a heavy military component in the American assis

In fact, of the U.S. contribution, 61 percent is militar

The main elements of the U.S. aid package for 

Colombia are:

• Support for human rights and judicial reform — 

million.

• Expansion of counternarcotics operations in Sou

Colombia—$390.5 million (for helicop

humanitarian assistance, and develop

assistance).

• Alternative economic development—$81 milli

Colombia, $85 million for Bolivia, and $8 mill

Ecuador.

8
• Increased interdiction efforts — $129.4 million

• Assistance for the Colombian police — $115.6 m

(These dollars were an emergency supplement to the 

million earlier provided and $256 million committ

2001. See Appendix I for more details.)

To give impetus to Plan Colombia, officials from B

and the United States hammered out the Plan Colo

Interagency Action Plan, which is really Annex 1 o

Colombia. It is a Colombian project intended to jump

the first 2 years of the Plan, specifically targeting the 

threat area of Putumayo and Southern Colomb

immediate negative effect on coca production. Its act

will include social actions to promote dignified emplo

and sustainable development for peasants displaced 

imminent elimination of coca production, the strength

of the judicial system, the protection of human 

interdiction of coca shipments in order to isolate prod

and make legitimate agriculture competitive

eradication—both voluntary (manual) and aerial

hoped that these measures will reduce coca production 

percent in 2 years. A comprehensive publicity campaig

promote commitment by the population, gener

momentum and mutual confidence between the peop

the state agencies. All of the ministries of the na

government are involved, as are numerous multil

agencies such as the United Nations, banks, nong

mental organizations, as well as various entities of th

Government.

18

The Interagency Action Plan is carefully thought o

comprehensive, and demonstrates the impact o

strategic planning principles (it was a collaborative 

between Colombian officials and U.S. civilian and m

planners in summer 2000). It remains to be seen wh

the government can muster the political will, the reso

and the organizational skills to implement it. Moreov

9
entire country needs the equivalent of the Intera

Action Plan, not simply Putumayo and the South.

Linking Strategy to Operations.

Plan Colombia has not been an easy sell. First, th

confusion between the U.S. contribution of $1.3 billio

the $7.5 billion overall plan. Some critics, misreadin

Colombia and Vietnam, use what they mistakenly pe

as a similar U.S. experience in South East Asia 

warning. The experience in tiny El Salvador in the 19

far more appropriate and applicable to Colombia, t

selectively so.

The central component of the U.S. aid pac

counternarcotics support, has generated much heat i

intellectual and political circles. A principal po

contention is whether a policy based on counterna

will be enough to help Colombia turn the tide agai

multiple threats. Shouldn’t the United States do more 

form of counterinsurgency? The answer is a resoundi

based on the realities of domestic politics combined w

valuable lessons learned in El Salvador. First, th

Congress will not easily support a counterinsur

program fraught with controversy. It will more 

support a counternarcotics program. Thus the aid pa

is the best possible outcome, given the political avers

the United States to supporting ambiguous wars. Cr

the line into counterinsurgency is simply not an o

Second, unlike El Salvador, Colombia has the resour

not the political will, to mount and fund its 

counterinsurgency. Third, the Colombian governmen

the armed forces and police, even with all of 

inefficiencies, have a greater degree of legitimacy th

the institutions of El Salvador. Finally, counterinsur

support would be unpopular in Latin America and E

and would therefore diminish Colombia’s chan

obtaining international support.

10
The qualified success in El Salvador (which coi

with the twilight of the Cold War, signalling the end 

external Soviet bloc support to the insurgents) was 

due to the prudent decision that the United States 

provide only limited indirect support, including the f

55 advisors, equipment, and training. Salvadorans 

had to make the sacrifices for their own survival

putting out strong and more legitimate roots for demo

U.S. support to Colombia scrupulously avoids coun

surgency. U.S. trainers from the 7th Special Forces G

will not be with deployed Colombian units. They are 

ground imparting skills to Colombian Army and Navy 

This training will improve the Colombian military’s 

to help the Colombian National Police conduct oper

against the coca infrastructure.

19

 In a typical opera

Colombian army counternarcotics battalion, v

specifically for rectitude in human rights and outfitt

light infantry operations, will secure an area fro

guerrillas (on the ground as well as air) around 

facility in order to permit the police to enter safely to a

investigate, take evidence, and then destroy the coc

the production facility.

Helicopters provided by the United States (Black H

and Hueys) will give much-needed mobility to the 

counternarcotics battalions being formed and traine

battalions were deployed by December 2000). 

helicopters are not to be used for counterinsur

Because of the long lead time between manufa

technical modification, the normal pilot training req

and integration with the counternarcotics battalion

helicopters will not have a significant impact until aft

2001.

20

However, neither Colombia nor the United S

should be seduced by the promise of technology. 

additional helicopters will certainly provide mobil

troops and logistical support, the human elemen

counts as most important in combat. This verit

demonstrated once again in the FARC shootdown 

11
UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter at the battle of Dabe

October 2000. The military in this instance failed to co

adequate reconnaissance.

21

The 18 Black Hawks and 30 Huey IIs approved for 

Colombia by the U.S. Congress are to be used on

counternarcotics operations, such as force prote

eradication, and lab destruction. They may also be us

humanitarian purposes to prevent the loss of life. Mor

former Secretary of Defense William Cohen prohibi

Department of Defense “personnel from engaging in 

field operations or deploying to areas where h

confrontation is imminent.” 22

Whether the distinction between counternarcoti

counterinsurgency operations can be maintained in t

of the battlefield is another issue. U.S. officia

optimistic that the operational distinction can be 

Also, will counternarcotics operations have lasting re

For example, once a lab or coca field is destroye

expectation is that the government will follow-u

provide support (in Spanish, seguimiento) to the farm

that they have a dignified occupational alternative a

integrated into the legitimate economy. That is the obj

of the Inter-Agency Action Plan. Initial indications 

promising. In early December 2000, some 550 fa

signed up to stop growing coca and instead grow 

bananas, plantain, palm, yucca, rice, fish, and pou

Jaime Ruiz, top aide to President Pastrana, commen

the delicate task of convincing peasants:

If the United States would simply like to finish all the coca in 

most cost-effective way—spraying—they would dest

Colombia . . . we are going to tell these people we’re going to g

them something, not just take something away from them. T

have to feel they don’t want to grow coca.

24

Plan Colombia contemplates $88 million for we

peasants away from growing coca and poppies.

12
The State Department’s Agency for Interna

Development estimates that there are 18,000 small 

farms that cultivate about 90,000 acres of coca. How 

peasants will be persuaded is uncertain, but if they 

agree, their fields will be sprayed with glyphosate (kn

the United States as the weed-killer Roundup). Mor

the bulk of the coca-growing acreage is in the indu

plantations. The owners of these plantations ar

traditional farmers, but hardened entrepreneurs d

tied to the international cocaine networks. A to

approach, forced eradication, will be needed here. Of c

none of this will be permanent unless the governme

provide security and economic alternatives and ma

the legal regime in place so that growers do not slip ba

bad habits. There are a many “ifs” here, especial

government’s ability to sustain programs for the long t

Alternative development worked to a significant d

in Bolivia (55 percent reduction in 4 years, with even 

expected for 2000) and Peru (67 percent). It worked be

of a combination of interdiction, eradication

alternative development that received long-term su

from the government. Interdiction and eradication w

effective that the coca economy became unpredictabl

therefore, unattractive to investors. Alternative de

ment worked also because the United States fund

bulk of it. The European reluctance to fully fund 

expected contribution to Plan Colombia will set ba

alternative development strategy.

Peasants are shrewd capitalists. Amish farme

whom smoking is forbidden by their religion, always 

tobacco, a legal crop subsidized by the federal govern

in the breadbasket of Lancaster County, Pennsylvani

hedge against the weather or a bad market for cor

other crops. Similarly, in Bolivia, peasants tak

insurance by planting coca elsewhere. 25 Thus to wean 

the peasants permanently, the government nee

maintain both positive and negative incentives for 

time. Columnist George Will is not persuaded that “. . 

13
through herbicides . . . to neutralize the left-wing for

impoverishing them” will work.

26

Another criticism is that the U.S. support is too gen

to the military. Senator Paul Wellstone, after a v

Colombia (where he and the U.S. Ambassador just m

being bombed), said that giving nearly 75 percent of t

to the security forces is not a wise choice becaus

Colombian military is a deeply troubled institution

though it has recently taken steps to improve its h

rights record.”

27

Even though his percentage is off (the correct figur

percent), Wellstone’s critique has company,

28

 much li

concerns expressed by the European Parliament and 

opposed to the U.S. military assistance. However, thi

discounts an important strategic truth. Little w

achieved without security. As the English political th

John Dunn states, “There cannot be political c

without the capacity to coerce.”

29

 Experience shows th

United States and other donors would be simply thr

money away if the assistance is not secured.

The state’s capacity for legitimate coercion will r

significant expansion of the armed forces and polic

three counternarcotics battalions themselves will 

enough for that mission. While it won’t be total lev

U.S. policy has enough performance conditions and c

exact significant human rights compliance by Colo

security forces. This brings forth another key point

engagement with the government and security for

fundamental for the humanization of the conflict and 

ultimate success of the government. No other nation h

clout. Madeleine Albright’s notion that the United St

the “indispensable” nation, the agent of good, is on the 

for Colombia. Nonetheless, though we can im

accountability, we should not take on burdens that be

Colombians.

Another strategic reality is that no other nat

willing and able to provide Colombia with the full heli

14
package: equipment, training, and maintenanc

unstated principle of international affairs is that the U

States makes a political statement of magnitude w

decides through congressional approval to provide m

assistance to a beleaguered friend.

Another school of thought criticizes Plan Colom

the matter of scale. Though they believe that its ele

are the right ones, these advocates would support fa

international resources for Plan Colombia becau

currently configured the plan will only buy time. 

would urge the Bush administration to decide 

Colombia is the place to draw the line on interna

crime, adopting the diplomatic equivalent of Genera

Powell’s doctrine of “overwhelming force.” This 

require not only more resources, but even a paradigm 

on the proper use of military forces. None is likely to oc

Finally, there is the entire decriminalization of 

school of thought. It is totally opposed to the “war on 

at the source. This passionate grouping overlooks th

that 85 percent of the counternarcotics budget of the U

States focuses on demand reduction at home. But even 

pertinently, this alternative provides no assuranc

narcotics consumption would be reduced. Decriminali

may, in fact, increase it. By a curious coincidence, 

activists share ground with the FARC, which sta

March 2000:

Drug consumption is a lackey of imperialism. . . . We are go

to publicly defy North American imperialism so it becom

committed to the legalization of the consumption of drugs, a

in this way fight seriously for the elimination of dr

trafficking.

30

Whether this is typical FARC duplicity is a legit

question. The agreement struck at Los Pozos in Feb

2001 between Pastrana and 74-year-old Marulanda 

that the FARC would not oppose manual eradicat

illicit crops. This seems to have partially met Past

goal of having the FARC denarcotize itself, but it lef

15
the matter of forced eradication of the indu

plantations, a significant source of FARC income.

The bottom line is that Plan Colombia 

well-thought-out set of mutually reinforcing initiative

comprehensive and balanced. So is the U.S. su

package. Retired General Charles Wilhelm, who ov

the genesis of the Colombia commitment as Comman

Chief of the United States Southern Command in 

between 1997 and 2000, calls Plan Colombia a “socia

with a military support element” and not the othe

around. The problem lies not in the design but 

execution, less in Washington and much more in Colo

The Bush administration will continue the pol

confining support to counternarcotics, refusing to su

counterinsurgency. Sustaining the policy for the lon

will be the challenge, for which Colombia must demon

enough success to warrant continued U.S. support.

The Colombian government in a sense faces 

overload. It must simultaneously fight three interr

wars at home against traffickers, insurgents

paramilitaries. To do so it must generate resources at 

and abroad, fully engage the talents of its people, reb

totally dysfunctional judicial system, conduct deep re

of its institutions,

31

 sustain the peace process, expan

restructure its armed forces, obtain international su

and rebuild the nation. It must do all of this while subj

itself to performance conditions from Washingto

continued assistance. But that is the inescapable nat

an assistance relationship of mutual dependence. The

extraordinary burdens for a government and societ

deep defects. Accordingly, it is critical to answe

question of whether a weak state can function strate

in the Clausewitzian sense. Can Colombia make th

between national level strategy and the implementa

successful operations and tactics?

The crucial question for Colombia is not wheth

Interagency Social Action Plan is a brilliantly con

16
construct—it is—but whether as a nation Colomb

make a commitment to win. Bogotá must mobilize res

for the long term. The violence is not likely to go away 

administration or two. Accordingly, Pastrana and suc

leaders across the ministries and decisional elites n

sustain an integrated effort that must begin wit

professionalization and expansion of the military as w

the police.

32

 Colombia’s armed forces must become 

proficient in a number of areas: use of intelligen

operations, quick-reaction capability, mobility, log

close quarter and night combat, joint operations, m

evacuation, and relations with the civilian populatio

The military must also be democratized so that th

of combat is shared more equally. Until recently the a

bachilleres (soldiers with a high school diploma) corp

exempt by law from exposure to combat risk. The cor

been disbanded, but the exemption from combat for 

with a secondary education remains law. Thus, befo

planned expansion of 55,000 soldiers announced in 

nearly 35,000 soldiers were administrative drones in 

of about 135,000 that needed to provide static defense 

infrastructure and respond to simultaneous attacks 

an enormous territory. For example, one brigade 

cover the eastern part of Colombia, an area the s

France. The U.S. Army would need a minimum o

divisions for such an area.

Soldiers from the lower class do the fighting and dy

senior State Department official with int

on-the-ground knowledge of Colombia asserts t

universal conscription were adopted, the internal 

would be over in 5 years because the middle and 

classes would have a stake in the outcome. Sharing bu

and bounty makes the glue that holds a nation toge

The upper and middle classes would demand more 

for the military budget, better leadership, better trea

and training, the best equipment for soldiers, and ef

strategy and operations. Unfortunately, there is 

17
political support for such a proposal in Colombia. It m

symptomatic of a society in denial of the danger it fa

Because much of the army is tied down to static d

duty, more units will be needed to pressure the FAR

ELN, and the paramilitaries. It is unlikely tha

insurgents can be defeated militarily, but the balance 

battlefield matters mightily at the peace negotiation

insurgents have little incentive to negotiate seriousl

the paramilitaries have little rationale to lay down 

arms. Once the military establishes a decidedly fav

balance in the field, the other combatants will come t

senses and negotiate rather than await further destru

Building the peace will not be easy.

In 2000 the army performed very well, according 

commander, General Jorge Enrique Mora. It cond

3,215 offensive actions, 67 percent more than in 

capturing a significant number of guerrillas, param

members, and narco-traffickers.

35

 Better leadershi

one of the keys for improvements on the battlefield

was a marked improvement from the 1997-98 period

the army was losing the war.

Conclusion.

A military effort alone will not bring Colombia bac

the brink of total failure as a democracy, but fail

certain without it. History shows that all succ

counterinsurgencies in the modern world have had a 

social, economic, and political component to compleme

military. The military cannot save Colombia’s demo

institutions by itself. There is no alternative to 

Colombia at this time, and time is of the essence. Th

provides an excellent foundational strategy that m

further developed, applied to the entire country

sustained for many years to come. Striking at the sou

much of the violence—the narcotics business—is criti

overall success. Given the aversion to counterinsur

support in the United States, the best this nation can 

18
Colombia is reduce its appetite for cocaine and hero

provide Colombia the “means” and the “know how” t

its own struggle. The U.S. aversion to counterinsur

support may actually be in Colombia’s best national in

because Colombians will have to make their own sacri

ENDNOTES

1. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, El Narcotráfico, una A

para la Seguridad Nacional, Bogotá, November 2000, p. 1.

2. Inter-American Dialogue, “A Time for Decisions: U.S. P

the Western Hemisphere,” Washington, DC, 2000, p. 19.

3. For more information on Colombia’s complex problems 

U.S. policy dilemmas, see Gabriel Marcella and Donald 

“Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads,” C

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 5, 1999; 

Passage, “The United States and Colombia: Untying the Gordian 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2000. S

the report of the Inter-American Dialogue and the Council on 

Relations: “Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia: Fo

Constructive U.S. Policy,” New York: Council on Foreign Re

2000. See also Foreign Affairs en Español, Vol. 1, No. 1, Sprin

Note the articles by Ana Maria Salazar, Luis Alberto More

Michael Shifter.

4. The spillover effect is not a classical military th

neighboring countries. It is more a problem of international 

contraband, corruption, and associated violence. See, for ex

Patrice M. Jones, “Colombia’s Drug War Spills Into Ecuador,” C

Tribune, February 13, 2001 (http://ebird.dtic.mil/Feb

e20010214colombias.htm).

5. The balloon effect is more than cultivation. It inclu

displacement of trafficking, violence, and consumption into othe

and countries.

6. Hernando Gómez Buendía, “No futuro,” Semana.com, De

18, 2000 (http://semana.terra.com.co/972/ZZZT1C5DSGC.as

also the thoughtful commentary by El Tiempo’s Rafael Nieto 

“Las Hipocresias Nacionales,” published in El Tiempo and per

e-mailed to this author, December 21, 2000.

19
7. On the threat posed by the paramilitaries, see Min

National Defense, Illegal Self-Defense Groups in Colombia, 

December 2000. For a comprehensive treatment of the violen

strategic recommendations from a distinguished military intel

see Alvaro Valencia Tovar, Inseguridad y Violencia en Co

Bogotá: Universidad Sergio Arboleda, 1997.

8. “What this could mean,” said Carel De Rooy, “is the propo

children could be twice what we thought, or they’re throwing kid

front as cannon fodder.” Juan Forero, “A Child’s Vision of W

Guerrillas In Colombia,” New York Times, December 20

(http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2000/e20001220childs.htm).

9. Juan Forero, “Puerto Asis Journal: To Make a Point, the 

Are Strangling a Town,” New York Times, November 3

(nytimes,com/2000/11/03/world/03/COLO.html); Juan Forer

Roads Taken From Rebels, Colombia Says,” November 14

(nytimes.com/2000/11/14/world/14COLO.html).

10. Linda Robinson, Latin American Bureau Chief of US Ne

World Report, maintains that coca accounts for about 50 percen

FARC income. See Robinson’s interview with Warren Olney, N

Public Radio International, KCRW, Los Angeles, January 26, 2

11. The dysfunctional judicial system and recommended cor

are discussed in Steven Levitt and Mauricio Rubio, “Unders

Crime in Colombia and What Can Be Done About It,” Workin

No. 20, FEDESARROLLO, Bogotá, August 2000.

12. Given the government’s inability to control vast a

Colombia’s national territory, there have been de facto despejes, 

practical political autonomy for irregular forces, since independ

the 1820s.

13. See the strong criticism in the Washington Post e

“Crossroads in Colombia,” January 3, 2001, p. A16. The distin

national political leader Noemi Sanín urged a reevaluati

redesign of the peace process. See her letter to FARC leader 

Marulanda in “Hay que rediseñar el proceso de paz,” El T

January 7, 2001, http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/07-01-2001/paz

14. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering remarked, “

possible to defend the existence of the despeje when there 

negotiations.” Scott Wilson, “To Preserve Peace Talks, Co

Maintains DMZ,” Washington Post, December 7, 

(washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38377-2000Dec7). 

20
15. Source of this information is former Ambassador to Co

Curtis Kamman. Interview, U.S. Army War College, Carlis

December 8, 2000. Writing it in English may have been a 

blunder that helped fuel rumors that Washington wrote Plan Col

16. The full title of the plan is Plan Colombia: Plan for 

Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State. It is available in 

and Spanish from the Colombian Presidency: http://www.pres

gov.co/webpresi/plancolo/plancin2.htm.

17. Howard LaFranchi, “Briefing: Putumayo, The Newest F

the Latin Drug War,” Christian Science Monitor, December 12

(http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2000/e20001212newest.htm). The Eu

Parliament qualifies its support of Plan Colombia: “stepping up m

involvement in the fight against drugs risks sparking off an escal

the conflict in the region, and . . . military solutions cannot brin

lasting peace.” Its 22-point statement, “European Parl

Resolution on Plan Colombia and Support for the Peace Pro

Colombia,” available from ceudes@andinet.com. The Eu

Parliament in February voted 474 to 1 against supportin

Colombia because it was a bilateral agreement between Bog

Washington. The Parliament’s action was mainly a psych

gesture, lacking any policy authority.

18. More details can be found in Office of the Presiden

Colombia: Interagency Action Plan, Phase I, Bogotá, 2000.

19. The total number of U.S. military trainers fluctuates b

200 and 300, with a limit of 500. Civilian contract trainers 

about 300. Obviously some of the principles of instruction an

imparted via U.S. trainers apply to both counternarcoti

counterinsurgency. The expectation is that such training will 

professionalizing impact throughout the army.

20. On this, see United States General Accounting Office

Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to P

Results,” Report to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcom

on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Comm

Government Reform, House of Representatives, Washingto

October 2000. See also the testimony of Jess T. Ford before th

subcommittee, “Drug Control: Challenges in Implementin

Colombia,” October 12, 2000.

21. See Karen DeYoung, “Colombia Plan Faces ‘Crunch 

Washington Post, December 22, 2000; http://Washingtonpo

wp-dyn/articles/A38415-2000Dec21.html.

21
22. Information provided by LTC George Rhynedance, 

Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, August 31

23. The difficulties of crop eradication based on sprayin

substitution, and winning the hearts and minds of peasants wh

felt that they have been abandoned by the government should 

minimized. See Juan Forero, “Luring Colombian Farmers fro

Cash Crop,” New York Times, November 20, 

nytimes.com/2000/11/20/ world/20COCA; Juan Forero, “No 

Spared in Colombia’s Coca War,” New York Times, January 31

pp. A1, A8; David Adams, “Plan Colombia Gets Off to Rocky St

Petersburg Times, February 11, 2001; sptimes.com/News/0

Worldandnation/Plan Colombia gets of.shtml; David Adams an

Kotler, “In War On Coca, Colombia Enlists Farmers,” Phila

Inquirer, December 5, 2000; http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec20001205inw

The aggressive Bolivian coca eradication and crop substitution p

in the Chapare has caused widespread resentment among 

farmers, though the Hugo Banzer government promises to leave 

without drugs by 2002. See Clifford Krauss, “Bolivia Wiping Ou

at a Price,” New York Times, October 23, 2000; nytimes.com/2

/23/world/ 23BOLI.html. 

24. Karen DeYoung, “A Long Way from Coca to Coffee,” Was

Post, October 11, 2000, p. A18.

25. The success in Bolivia is far from complete. While mos

cultivation in the Chapare had been eliminated (all but a few h

hectares) by the end of 2000, the “legal” growth in the Yung

expanded to some 12,000 hectares. SeeThe Economist, January 

pp. 31-32.

26. George F. Will, “Colombia Illusions,” Washingto

September 10, 2000, p. B7.

27. Paul Wellstone, “Bush Should Start Over in Colombia

York Times, December 26, 2000 (nytimes.com/2000/12/26/o

For a scholarly analysis of the interplay between the military 

new threats, see Cynthia A. Watson, “Civil-Military Relat

Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Funda

Reform?” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2000, pp. 529-5

army’s improved human rights conduct can be seen in the Depa

of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practi

example, 1997, 1998, and 1999. The military’s ties to the parami

tacit and active, still are strongly criticized, even byU.S. officia

22
28. See, for example, Adam Isacson, “U.S. Military Aid to Co

The Human Rights Implications,” Washington: Cen

International Policy, 2000.

29. John Dunn, The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of P

London: Basic Books, 2000, p. 120.

30. Document of FARC Plenum, March 21-25, 2000, l

unknown. Decriminalization has other and more nuanced exp

For example, Clinton’s drug czar, retired General Barry McCaffr

Governor Gary E. Johnson of New Mexico advocate modifying 

reduce mandatory incarceration of some drug consumers, 

education, care and rehabilitation, thus refusing to “toler

needless casualties of drug prohibition.” See Gary E. Johnson, “A

Prohibition: Another Failure,” New York Times, http://www.n

com/2000/12/30/opinion/30John.html.

31. Among the reforms it must undertake is the overhaulin

entire apparatus of government and the constitution, and dece

administration. See the recommendations in Alberto Alesina, 

Carrasquilla, and Juan José Echavarría, “Decentraliza

Colombia,” FEDESARROLLO, Working Paper No. 15, Bogotá, 

2000; Alberto Alesina, “Institutional Reforms in Colo

FEDESARROLLO, Working Paper No. 21, Bogotá, November 2

32. According to former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo Rue

country needs a lot more policemen. As many as 200 municipalit

be without police. See Pardo’s “En vez de paramilitares más pol

Espectador, January 18, 2001; accessed via internet.

33. For more specific analysis on the needs of the Col

military, see Passage, “The United States and Colombia: Unty

Gordian Knot.”

34. On this concept, see the profound meditation by Deborah 

Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, New York: 

1997, p. 20.

35. See General Mora’s report in “Capturados 1,018 guerril

el año 2000,” El Tiempo, January 2, 2001, p. A1.

23
APPENDIX I

SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF U.S. SUPPORT 

COLOMBIA

A. Alternative Economic Development 

Resettlement: alternative crops, applied research on 

with identified markets, credit and land titling

productive infrastructure (such as packing sheds, st

and drainage), environmental programs, local gover

assistance to internally displaced people with infra

ture projects (schoolrooms, water systems, road

bridges, and market shelters).

B. Improving Governing Capacity: protection of h

rights workers, strengthening human rights institu

establishing human rights task forces, child s

rehabilitation, witness and judicial security in h

rights cases, support of the United Nations human 

office and U.S. Government monitoring.

C. Administration of Justice: reform of crimina

prosecutor training, judge training, judicial centers, 

defenders.

D. Law enforcement: asset forfeiture/money laun

task force, anti-corruption program, financial 

investigating units, anti-kidnapping strategy, ju

police training academy, custom police training, ma

enforcement and port security, multilatera

enforcement, prison security, banking superv

assistance, revenue enhancement assistance, cu

training assistance, investigation and prosecut

organized financial crime, military human rights and 

reform, the Army Judge Advocate General School.

E. Support for the Peace Process: seminars and an

of conflict management and comparative peace proce

25
APPENDIX II

THE TEN ELEMENTS OF PLAN COLOMB

1. An economic strategy that generates employ

supports the ability of the State to collect tax revenu

allows the country to have a viable counterbala

economic force to narco-trafficking. The expans

international trade, accompanied by enhanced acc

foreign markets and free trade agreements to a

foreign and domestic investment are key t

modernization of our economic base and to job cre

Such a strategy is crucial at a time when Colom

confronting its worst economic crisis in 70 years

unemployment running 20 percent, which in turn g

limits the government’s ability to confront drug traff

and the violence it generates.

2. A fiscal and financial strategy that includes 

austerity and adjustment in order to boost economic a

and recover the historically excellent prestige of Col

in international financial markets.

3. A peace strategy that aims at a negotiated 

agreement with the guerrillas on the basis of terr

integrity, democracy and human rights, which s

further strengthen the rule of law and the fight a

drugs.

4. A national defense strategy to restructur

modernize the armed forces and the police, so that th

be able to restore the rule of law and provide security 

country, to combat organized crime and armed group

to protect and promote human rights and interna

humanitarian law.

5. A judicial and human rights strategy to reaffir

rule of law and assure equal and impartial justice 

27
while pressing ahead with the reforms already initia

the forces of law and order to ensure that they play 

proper role in defending and respecting the right

dignity of all.

6. A counternarcotics strategy, in partnership with 

countries involved in some or all of the links of the 

chain: production, distribution, sale, consumption, 

laundering, precursor chemicals, and arms dealing. A

the national level, to stop the flow of drug money—the 

violence—to the insurgent and other armed organiza

7. An alternative development strategy that will pr

agricultural schemes and other profitable eco

activities for peasant farmers and their fam

Alternative development will also consider econom

feasible environmental protection activities, design

conserve the forest areas and end the dangerous expa

of illegal crops across the Amazon basin and Colombia

national parks—areas of immense bio-diversity o

environmental importance to the international comm

Within this framework the strategy includes sustai

integrated, and participatory productive projects com

with the required infrastructure. Particular attentio

regions which combine high levels of conflict with low 

of State presence, social capital, and serious environm

degradation, such as the Middle Magdalena valle

Macizo Colombiano, and the south-west.

8. A social participation strategy aimed at col

awareness. The strategy seeks to develop 

accountability in local government, comm

involvement in anticorruption efforts, and cont

pressure on the guerrillas and other armed groups 

kidnapping, violence and the internal displacem

individuals and communities. The strategy will also in

cooperation with local business and labor groups, in o

promote innovative and productive models in the fa

more globalized economy. In addition, this strategy se

strengthen institutions, both formal and informal, to 

28
changes in the cultural patterns through which vi

develops and reinforces itself. It includes the promo

mechanisms and educational programs to inc

tolerance, the essential values for peaceful coexistenc

participation in public affairs.

9. A human development strategy to promote effo

guarantee, within the next few years, adequate edu

and health, to provide opportunities to every 

Colombian and help vulnerable groups in our so

including not just those affected and displaced by vi

but also those in conditions of extreme poverty.

10. An international oriented strategy to confir

principles of shared responsibility, integrated actio

balanced treatment of the drug issue. The role and su

of the international community is also vital to the suc

the peace process provided that it conforms to the te

international law and is requested by the Colo

government.

29
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

Author

Dr. Gabriel Marcella

Department of National and Internationa

Security Studies

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler