* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 16 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MICHAEL JEFFREY MORRIS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 97-5188 (N. District of Oklahoma) (D.C. No. 92-CR-60-B)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

BeforeTACHA , McKAY, and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he court, therefore, honors the parties’ requests and orders the case submitted without oral argument.-2-

Michael J. Morris appeals the district court’s impo sition of a special condition of supervised release prohibiting Morris from acting as a mortgage broker and limiting Morris’ involvement in the financing of automobile sales. The case is before the court on counsel’s special b rief and motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Morris has not filed a response to the Andersbrief. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 2742, affirms the imposition of the special condition, and grants counsels motion to withdraw. Morris pleaded guilty in 1992 to use of a false soc ial security number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B). The guilty plea arose out of an attempt on the part of Morris to obtain credit with confidenti al information he had obtained in the course of his job as a mortgage broker. Aft er numerous violations of the conditions of his supervised release, which violati ons led to a prior modification and prior revocation of supervised release, the dis trict court entered an order revoking Morris’ supervised release on August 11, 1 997. As part of that order, the district court sentenced Morris to a six-month term of incarceration, followed by an additional thirty-month term of supervised re lease. In light of Morris’ repeated violations involving the access to and use of confidential financial information, the district court imposed the followi ng special condition of supervised release:-3-

You are prohibited from engaging in any type of emp loyment which involves the processing of credit applications, or the solicitation of investors or lenders for yourself or others. Speci fically, you are prohibited from being involved in any capacity in the field of mortgage brokering. If you are involved in the sal e of automobiles, you can process applications, but they must be appr oved by a supervisor or someone in the chain of command withi n the automobile agency. It is from this restriction that Morris appeals. A special condition of supervised release prohibiti ng a defendant from engaging in a specified occupation or profession mu st satisfy the following general requirements: (1) the condition must be rea sonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history an d characteristics of the defendant; and (2) the condition must involve no gr eater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5; see also United States v. Edgin , 92 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10 thCir. 1996) (interpreting § 3583(d) and § 5F1.5). As aptly conceded by Morris’ counsel, both of these conditions are clearly satisfied in this case. As to the first condition, the district court specifically found that Morris’ mortgage brok ering activities, with its attendant easy access to others’ financial informat ion, and Morris’ conviction for attempting to gain credit with falsified social sec urity information were reasonably related. As to whether absent the restr iction Morris would continue to violate the law, the district court found as follow s:-4- What we can’t get away from is this defendant commi tted new crimes. He has already been to prison for, I belie ve, 42 months. He has been prosecuted in 1988, 1992, revoked in 1993, and then he comes up last year and commits the same kind of cri me. And then he’s worried why we don’t want him to be a F & I man where he would have access to people’s credit reports and So cial Security numbers when the very crime he commits he’s using o ther peoples Social Security numbers to get credit. In addition to this criminal history, a psychologis t opined at the revocation hearing that Morris may suffer from a mental condit ion which causes compulsive criminal behavior in the area of illegally using others social security numbers and credit histories. In light of this background and testimony, it is clear that the occupational restriction imposed by the district co urt bore a direct relationship to Morris’ past criminal acts as well as the danger th at Morris’ unrestrained access to financial information would hold for the future. The occupations restriction imposed here also satis fies the second general condition in that it is the least restrictive possi ble while still preventing future criminal behavior on the part of Morris. As pointe d out by the United States and conceded by Morris’s counsel, the occupational restriction was not a blanket one. The district court did not prevent Morris from work ing in any capacity in which he might come into contact with financial informati on, only those situations most fraught with the potential for future criminal acts . In particular, the district court allowed Morris to process credit applications in a family automobile business, as long as Morris was supervised. Accordingly, the oc cupational restriction did not-5-

foreclose all potential employment avenues, only th ose where Morris had unfettered access and control over confidential fin ancial information. Having satisfied both of the general requirements f or imposition of an occupational restriction, the district court’s spec ial condition of supervised release is hereby AFFIRMED . Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge