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## RECORD OF EX PARTE CONTACT

AD DOCKET NUMBER: 2010-NM-156-AD

FAA EMPLOYEE CONTACTED: Mr. Jeff Gardlin, Aerospace Engineer (Cabin Safety), FAA Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100 Mr. Larry Armia, Supervisory Civil Aviation Speci alist, FAA Representative, Tokyo, Japan, APC-TYO Ms. Dianna Lee, Civil Aviation Specialist, FAA Asia-Pacific Area Of fice, Singapore, APC-001

DATE AND TIME OF CONTACT: 21 October 2010, 0830 - 1700

TYPE OF CONTACT: Briefing, Regent Hotel, Singapore.

NAMES OF ALL PERSONS INVOLVED IN CONT ACT, INCLUDING TITLES AND AFFILIATION:

See Attached list at end of this record

TOPIC(S) DISCUSSED (Be specific):

Presenters: Mr. Jeff Gardlin, Aerospace Engineer (Cabin Safety), FAA Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100 Mr. Peter Chittenden, Cabin Safety Engineer, European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) Mr. Steven Higgins, EASA

Summary: Mr. Jeff Gardlin chaired the information-shar ing session relating to th e non-compliance issues associated with aircraft seats manufactured by Koito Indus tries Co. Ltd. of Japan. A similar meeting was held at the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) Headqua rters in Cologne the prior week, and this meeting provided an opportunity for aut horities and air carriers in the Asia-Pacific region to come togeth er to discuss the next steps in coping with the sa fety and non-compliance issues. Both FAA and EASA have published a proposed Airworthiness Directive (AD) to address Koito seats and the unsafe condition affecting the operators. Over 100 representatives from various Asia-Pacific air carr iers, airworthiness authorities, modifiers, and others (see attached list) participated in the meeting. In addition, Koito Pr esident and CEO Takashi Kakegawa expressed his apologies and regrets to the audience during the meeting.

FAA/EASA Presentation: Same presentation that was presented in Koln, Germany was presented at this briefing. Towards the end of 2009, FAA and EASA became in creasingly aware of allegatio ns that the Koito seat company had been falsifying certification test results, and had not controlled production conformity for an appreciable period. TC holders (A irbus, Boeing) and JCAB progressive ly added confirmation to these allegations in the first Quarter of 2010. It became cl ear that unsafe conditions existed, and thus mandatory action was needed. FAA and EASA coordinated thoughts and close agreement result ed on an Airworthiness Directive framework. The level of safety performance c oncerned is in three basic areas: structural integrity, flammability, and injury. These proposed criteria include:

Structure – Seats must meet most basic structural requirements at their certification basis, either 6G, 9G, or 16G.

16G for current models.

Flammability – Most seat parts have to meet the Bunsen burner test. Seat cushions have to meet a much more stringent oil burner test. A three ye ar retrofit for cushion requirements is proposed as the only remedial flammability criteria.

Injury – Evolved from qualitative to add quantitative requirements. Not all injury criteria addressed in the FAA proposal and have not been retrofit. Therefore, minimum level of safety is determined based on historicalPage 2 of 7

Revision 1.16.2009 criteria prohibiting sharp edges.

Non-compliance could affect seat performance in turbulence.

Proposed AD: FAA and EASA addressed a proposed AD with four phases spanning a 2 to 6 year time period:

1. Determine basic static strength and injury.

2. Show seat cushion flammability.

3. Show “dynamic seats” meet 16G requirements.

4. EASA Proposed AD (PAD) only requirements (longer fi nal phase-out timescale for seats that meet

above AD minimum conditions but don’t m eet full certification requirements).

The proposed AD would require determining if affected seats and seating systems and their components are compliant with certain FAA and EASA regulations to es tablish a minimum level of safety, and removing those seats and seating systems in the affected fleet that are shown to be unsafe. If they are modified, rather than removed, modifications must meet Pa rt 21 requirements. Modifications that leave non-compliance cannot be approved. The only exception is the replacement of seat cushions. Removal and replacement of wear-out parts such as foodtrays and armrest cove rs are not considered modifications . Proposed ADs anticipate compliance data equivalent to certification data.

EASA and FAA have direct responsibility for only a limited portion of the affected fleet (European and U.S. air carriers). Data to show compliance for other countries are the responsib ility of the foreign authorities.

This meeting does not substitute for the formal commen t process against FAA Notice of Proposed Rule-Making (NPRM) and EASA Proposed AD (PAD). Participants are encouraged to provide comments online.

JCAB Presentation: The JCAB representatives reported that the noncompliance issues affect 1,000 aircraft that are in operation worldwide and equipped with appr oximately 150,000 Koito seats. Most seats have an FAA TSO Design Approval based on JCAB Specification Appr oval. JCAB listed several wrongdoings by Koito as addressed by the whistleblower. JCAB reported on its ongoing investigations of Ko ito including review of drawings for the production, conformity , and design analyses. Based on the results of the investigation, JCAB instructed Koito to conduct tests that confirm compliance status of in-service seat mo dels. Dynamic, static, and conformity tests of the seats and s eat cushions have been conducted by Koito and witnessed by the JCAB.

JCAB believes that all data obtained from Phase 1 and 2 te sts could be used for in-service seat models to show compliance with ADs proposed by FAA and EASA. Use of t hose test data will alleviate burden on operators in compliance finding and taking necessary co rrective actions, if any. JCAB urged FAA and EASA to accept their test results and apply them to in-s ervice seats. JCAB also asked c ooperation from Boeing and Airbus in utilizing Koito data to show compliance with the proposed ADs.

JCAB has no plans to issue its own version of AD now. In the future, the JCAB AD ( called TCD) will be issued and be based on the FAA and European AD. ( Note: JCAB mentioned that they have issued an AD to Japan Airlines (JAL) on flammability. This came as a surprise to the audience. However, this AD is not related to the Koito issue.)

Comments from Mr. Takashi Kakegawa, Pr esident and CEO, Koito Industries: Mr. Kakegawa expressed his deepest apologies and regrets to the meeting participants for the confusion caused by his staff of his company on this particular issue. As far as the aerosp ace sector is concerned, Koito ha s been in contact with the JCAB, Boeing, and Airbus, and conducting va lidation tests to ensure safety of seats in service. Koito has been working diligently to resolve this issue. Koito will con tinue to work with all parties concerned and ensure the safety of its products. He asked the audience for c ontinued support, cooperation, and understanding in thisPage 3 of 7

Revision 1.16.2009 regard.

Some Questions and/or Comments:

1. Various Operators: Two year plan and proposed timeline fo r airlines to meet AD requirements are

unrealistic.

2. Taiwan CAA: FAA and EASA should accept JCAB’s latest conformity test results.

3. Continental (COL) : Can FAA and EASA review JCAB’s Phase 1 and 2 test data now?

Ans. Yes, JCAB is translating the data into E nglish now. It will be available in one month.

4. EVA Airways (Taiwan): Limited information coming from JCAB, FAA, and EASA. Should communicate more among themselves, before rushing to issue an AD.

5. Operators: We are not questioning the AD. We would lik e to ask for an extension regarding the twoyear compliance.

6. AAPA Rep. – Issuing an AD does not help this certification issue. The ball should be in the court of the regulators, without bur dening the operators.

7. Japan Airlines (JAL) Rep. – Concerned that operators may rush to Boeing and Airbus, seek validation through tests, and attempt to resolve the issue.

Ans. By Boeing: Boeing is looking to narrow down the “family” of seats (i.e. Generation 1, 2, or 3 seats). By serial numbers, Boeing can determine what dynamic tests were run at that particular time. Economy seats can be validated; however, for first cl ass seats, it will be th e operators’ responsibility.

JAL Rep. – Can Boeing assign a POC on this issue?

Ans. By Boeing: Boeing has not assigned anyone yet. Boeing will select the highest number of seats of a “family” that are affected in economy class (e.g. outer, inner, ce nter, forward, or rear seats) and conduct 16G tests for compliance.

8. Operator: How can Boeing conduct seat tests when air lines don’t have any spare seats? Will the aircraft have an empt y “hole” in the cabin?

Ans. : Possibilities are to install a non- Koito seat, or to re-pitch the seats.

9. Boeing Rep. Can airlines go from one s easonal configuration to anothe r (summer/winter) after the AD

is released?

Ans. FAA/EASA: Existing approved configurations are still approved. Once and AD is promulgated, that may affect reconfigurations.

10. Operator: Can’t you just accept the JCAB drawings and validate? This removal of seats is going to

kill us.

Ans. FAA/EASA: There is a statement in the NPRM for alternative methods of compliance. Please review this language.

11. Thai Air: Will Koito replacement or spare parts be considered a modification?

Ans. FAA/EASA: Replacement parts must meet requirements specific to them, but for the FAA, the proposed AD does not consider a one for one replacement a modification.Page 4 of 7

Revision 1.16.2009 12. Singapore Airlines: Let’s look at JCAB’s presentation. Ther e seems to be no problem for the metallic parts produced by Koito. Second, there seems to be no problem by latest data provided and verified by the JCAB. We can apply them to the in-service seat s. So, what is the issue? Can’t FAA and EASA work with JCAB and come up with something that will work for the airlines? We should not be retesting and revalidating, as well as removing seats from the aircraft. I urge the aut horities to work together as we think the JCAB report is very significant.

13. AAPA Rep: This region is very conscientious and follo ws the AD. There should be more work done by the regulators before issuance of an AD, especi ally after listening to the JCAB’s presentation.

14. Taiwan CAA: Boeing and JCAB have witnessed each valida tion test. They should share the data and present them to us so that we can come up with our own determination.

15. JAL Rep. : Why do we need to remove the seat cushion fo r testing and compliance? Used seat cushion adheres to its original design.

Ans. FAA/EASA: Seat cushion is part of the seat and mu st meet original type de sign. Select a sample that is representative of the seats in the cabin.

16. EVA Rep: Ask JCAB and Koito to supply spare parts read ily. Urge FAA and JCAB to talk some more

before the issuance of an AD. We do not believe there are direct safety or risk concerns with the current

seats. It is unusual for an air line to receive an AD without first r eceiving a Service Bulletin from Boeing

or Airbus.

Ans. FAA/EASA: This is an unusual situation. Please ask your question as a formal comment.

17. AAPA Rep: The Koito seats that are in-s ervice are viable products. We ha ve not had a safety incident during turbulence involving a Koito seat . We must look forward to how we can efficiently install spare parts to existing seats to overcome the problem.

Statistics – Approximate Number of Seats Affected: Continental Airlines: 40,000 seats. All Nippon Airways: 24,000 seats. Japan Airlines: 9,000 seats. EVA Airways: 5,000 seats. China Airlines: 3,000 seats. Singapore Airlines: 1,600 seats.

Breakup Session: In the afternoon, the operators and airframe manufacturers met separately for an hour to gather their thoughts and reported out. Th ey emphasized that the 2-year time period is impractical, that three to five years may be more appropriate. They believe d the issuance of the AD should be re-examined, pending JCAB’s latest data. They asked JCAB for more flex ibility in obtaining design da ta from Koito on the spare parts and sharing them with other manufacturers so that they can meet compliance requirements. They believe Koito is unable to conduct conformity te sting for all operators within a short span of tim e. The lack of a “level playing field” makes it difficult for operators to meet the requirements of EASA, FAA, and their own foreign authority.

Conclusion: A healthy exchange of opinions and comment s took place between th e authorities and the operators. The proposed timeline offered by FAA and EASA to replace the seats with new seats or spare parts seems unrealistic to the operators, given the economic impact and workload involved. However, FAA and EASA have determined that unsafe conditions currently exist. It is not known whether FAA and EASA will agree to accept JCAB’s proposal to apply new test data to in-servi ce seat models. All pa rticipants believe thatPage 5 of 7

Revision 1.16.2009 this situation is unique, and they are anxious to learn the next steps in th e proposed AD process, especially if

and when the AD is issued.

COMMITMENTS MADE BY FAA/DOT PERSONNEL: FAA will consider comments made through the NPRM proce ss as identified on the Federal Register web site for the NPRM and via the NPRM guidance for submittal of comments.

Were any documents discussed? ( X ) YES (attach copies or re ference) ( ) No

Included Attachments: 101021 JCAB Presentation.pdf

PREPARED BY : Patrick T. Farina DATE: 06 November 2010Page 6 of 7

Revision 1.16.2009 Oct. 21, 2010 Koito Meeting (Singapore) Attendees List:

Name Company/Agency

Tadaki Sasaki Koito - Director
Noriyuki Ono Koito - Executive Managing Director Tsuneo Yamaguchi Koito - Senior Executive Managing Director
Takashi Kakegawa Koito- President Michael Dunican Boeing- Fl eet Support Engineering
Terry Wagstaff Boeing- Seats Engineering
Ben Oani The Boeing Company - Field Service
Hong Wee Jett8 Airlines
Lynn Yao Jett8 Airlines
Kok Wee Yong Jett8 Airlines
John Tubbesing The Boeing Company- Engineering

Hsien-Lun Chou EVA AIR

Basak Oz Turkish Airlines Technic Inc.

Koichi Yabuki ANA

Saskia Freriksen KLM

Maurice Laarakker KLM

Jan van de Maat KLM
Satoshi Okuyama Japan Airlines International Co., Ltd.
Yuthasit Suwamloy Thai Airways International
Hiroshi Ogawa All Nippon Airways
Susumu Sato All Nippon Airways (ANA)

Andrew Thie V australia
Patrick Schirmer The Boeing Company -Fleet Support

Brian Porter V australia
Kenji Ohashi ALL NIPPON AIRWAYS
Chiratthitikorn Maleekaew Thai Airways International PCL
Yew Kwang Tan Singapore Airlines
Abel Li Singapore Airlines
Frank Bindels The Boeing Company

Brian Wood Continental Airlines

Jeff Gardlin FAA
Larry Arima FAA - Tokyo
Diana Lee FAA – Singapore
Steven Higgins EASA
Jean-Philippe Tarres Airbus

Suwedh Sundarakul Thai Airways International PCL
Hans-Jürgen Lohmann Airbus Operations GmbH

Martin Eran-Tasker Association of Asia Pacific Airlines
Surakit Rattanachan Thai Airways International PCL
Hiroshi Ueda Nippon Cargo Airlines
Nonito Cedro Qatar Civil Aviation Authority
Samsudin Ab. Majid Dept Of Civil Aviation Malaysia
Yiu Wah Kam Singapore Airlines
Du-Sheng Yao CHINA AIRLINES
Jiann-Shin Tseng CHINA AIRLINES
Noboru Yanagisawa Nippon Cargo Airlines
Huey-Ling Mau CHINA AIRLINES

Peter Chittenden EASA
Yoshihiro Fujimaki Japan Civil Aviation BureauPage 7 of 7

Revision 1.16.2009 Takayuki Sakai Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
Ching-Far Yeh EVA AIRWAYS
Tzuu-Jiann Chyi EVA AIRWAYS
Kess Chiang Singapore Airlines
Mervyn Sirisena Singapore Airlines
Shun Liang Kwok Singapore Airlines
Kazunori Kato Japan Transocean Air Co., Ltd.
Wee Hong Tang Jamco Aero Design & Engineering
Masamichi Kato Tamco Aero Design & Engineering Pte Ltd
Rahimah Othman Singapore Airlines
Wai Seng Sito Singapore Airlines
Teck Chyang Chin Singapore Airlines
Weng Khoon Lim SIA Engineering Company
Riaz Akram Qureshi Jamco Aero Design and Engineering

David Wei-Min Lin CAA/Taiwan
Eric Yu-Cheng Chen CAA/Taiwan
Leonard Tan Jamco Aero Design and Engineering
Andrey Froltsov Transaero
Lesley Yip Singapore Airlines
Wee Cheong Lian Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Weng Khin Fong Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
George Foo Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Kian Ann Soh Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Jonathan Tan Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Kok Choo Tan Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Mun Cheok Ng Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Vincent Ng Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Chun Kwok Lau Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Choong Cheng Chew Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
Kah Han Tan Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore

Frederic Louis WilmerHale
Eiji Kobayashi Nishimura & Asahi
Jennifer Trock Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
Kenneth Quinn Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
David Lefrancq Airbus
Marc Makil Singapore Airlines
Lim Yen Yang AWAS
J.T. Sarungallo DGCA- Indonesia
Mulyanto DGCA- Indonesia
Christopher Hartman Continental Airlines
Arnold Juan Cathay Pacific Abdullah Al-Sharhan Kuwait Airways
Sze Kang Tan Singapore Airlines Peng Yoeng Koh Singapore Airlines
Sim Chen Liang Singapore Airlines Stanley Yeo Singapore Airlines
Tran Chi Dung Vietnam Airlines

Tran Minh Hai Vietnam Airlines

THIS FORM IS TO BE PL ACED IN THE PUBLIC DOCKET

FOR THE SUBJECT RULEMAKING ACTION

.