a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Addressees

January 2006 DOD BUSINESS 

TRANSFORMATION

Defense Travel System 

Continues to Face 

Implementation 

Challenges

GAO-06-18
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2006

DOD BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

Defense Travel System Continues to Face 

Highlights of GAO-06-18, a report to Implementation Challenges 

congressional addressees

The Department of Defense (DOD)

has been working to develop and

implement a standard end-to-end 

travel system for the last 10 years. 

Over the past several years 

numerous GAO reports and

testimonies have highlighted 

problems with DOD’s travel 

practices that resulted in wasteful 

spending of millions of dollars. In 

response, the department has 

noted that the Defense Travel

System (DTS), in part, will help 

correct these problems. Because 

of the widespread congressional 

interest in DTS, GAO initiated the

audit under the statutory authority 

of the Comptroller General of the 

United States. The objectives of

the audit were to (1) determine if 

DOD effectively tested key DTS 

functionality, (2) ascertain if DTS 

will correct the weaknesses 

previously identified, (3) identify

the challenges that remain, and 

(4) identify opportunities to 

streamline DOD’s travel process. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making 10

recommendations to DOD,

including the following: 

(1) properly test new or modified 

system interfaces, (2) obtain data

on utilization of DTS, and 

(3) streamline DOD’s travel

management practices. DOD

concurred with all of the

recommendations and described its 

efforts to address them. 

DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in 

the area of testing key functionality to ensure that the system will perform as

intended. Consequently, critical flaws have been identified that resulted in 

significant schedule slippages between the planned and actual system 

deployment, as shown below. 

DTS Schedule Slippages 

GAO’s recent analysis of selected requirements related to DTS’s reservation 

module disclosed that system testing was ineffective in ensuring that the 

promised capability has been delivered as intended. For example, GAO 

found that DOD did not have reasonable assurance that DTS properly 

displayed flight and airfare information. This problem was not detected 

prior to deployment, since DOD failed to properly test system interfaces. 

While DTS has corrected some of the previously reported travel problems, 

others remain. Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to 

duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased with the centrally billed 

accounts. However, problems remain related to improper premium-class 

travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of travelers’ 

claims. These remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and

will take departmentwide action to address. 

GAO also identified two key challenges facing DTS in becoming DOD’s 

standard travel system: (1) developing needed interfaces and 

(2) underutilization of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. While DTS 

has developed 36 interfaces with various DOD business systems, it will have 

to develop interfaces with at least 18 additional systems—not a trivial task. 

Additionally, the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems results 

in underutilization of DTS and affects the savings that DTS was planned to 

achieve. Furthermore, GAO has identified concepts that the department can

adopt to streamline its travel management practices. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-18.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact McCoy 

Williams at (202) 512-6906 or Keith Rhodes 

at (202) 512-6412. 
Page i GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Ongoing DTS Testing Remains a Concern 11

DTS Has Corrected Some Previously Reported Travel Problems 17

DTS Faces Challenges in Making DTS a Standard DOD Travel 

System 24

Conclusions 40

Recommendations for Executive Action 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 46

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 49

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 54

Related GAO Products 55

Table Table 1: Summary of Premium-Class Travel Analysis 19

Figures Figure 1: Defense Travel System Processes 9

Figure 2: Delay in the Development and Implementation of DTS 12

Figure 3: Limitations of DTS Testing 14

Figure 4: Current DTS System Interfaces 26

Figure 5: DTS System Interfaces That Need to Be Developed 27

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Page 1 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

January 18, 2006 Leter

Congressional Addressees

Over 10 years ago, the Department of Defense (DOD) Task Force to 

Reengineer Travel issued a report that pinpointed three principal causes for 

DOD’s inefficient travel system: (1) travel policies and programs were 

focused on compliance with rigid rules rather than mission performance, 

(2) travel practices did not keep pace with travel management 

improvements implemented by industry, and (3) the travel systems were 

not integrated.1

 To address these concerns, DOD established the Project 

Management Office—Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS) to acquire travel 

services that would be used DOD-wide. The Defense Travel System (DTS) 

is envisioned as being the department’s standard end-to-end travel system.2

 

The department currently estimates that DTS will be fully deployed at all 

intended locations by the end of fiscal year 2006, with an estimated total 

development and production cost of approximately $474 million. Of this 

amount, the contract for the design, development, and deployment of DTS 

is worth approximately $264 million. The remaining costs are associated 

with areas such as the operation and maintenance of DTS, operation of the 

PMO-DTS, the voucher payment process, and management and oversight of 

the numerous commercial travel offices (CTO). 

Over the past several years, our reports and testimonies have highlighted 

problems with DOD’s travel practices that resulted in wasteful spending of 

millions of dollars.3

 In responses to some of our reports, the department

1

Department of Defense, Report of the Department of Defense Task Force to Reengineer 

Travel (Arlington, Va.: January 1995).

2

DOD expects DTS to perform all functions related to travel or ensure that other systems are 

provided with adequate information to provide this functionality. For example, obligating 

funds associated with travel is a necessary function, and DTS is expected to (1) make sure 

that adequate funds are available before authorizing travel either through information 

contained in its system or by obtaining the necessary information from another system, 

(2) obligate funds through issuance of approved travel orders, and (3) provide DOD’s 

financial management systems with the necessary information so that those systems can 

record the obligation. Since DTS is required to ensure that all travel-related functionality is 

properly performed, DOD commonly refers to DTS as an “end-to-end travel system.” 

3

See the Related GAO Products section at the end of this report.
Page 2 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

has noted that DTS, in part, will help correct these problems. In September 

2005, we testified on our preliminary results regarding this audit of DTS.4

 

Our audit objectives were to (1) determine if DOD effectively tested key 

DTS functionality related to flights and fare information, (2) ascertain if 

DTS will correct the internal control weaknesses and improper payments 

previously identified, (3) identify the challenges that remain in ensuring 

DTS achieves its goal as DOD’s standard travel system, and (4) identify 

opportunities for DOD to streamline the entire travel process. To address 

the first objective, we reviewed two key DTS flight-related requirements 

and the related testing to determine if the desired functionality was 

effectively implemented. To address the second objective, we analyzed 

(1) our prior reports and testimonies, (2) selected Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and (3) DOD congressional 

testimonies to identify the specific problems that DTS was intended to 

resolve. Further, we randomly selected for review travel vouchers drawn 

from the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 (October through December 2004) 

to determine if DTS calculation problems identified by DFAS had been 

resolved.5

 To address the third objective, we discussed with the PMO-DTS 

the deployment of DTS as it relates to the transmission of data, such as 

finance and accounting information, between DTS and the other systems 

belonging to DOD, as well as private sector businesses. We also analyzed 

DOD data related to the utilization of DTS. To address the fourth objective, 

we analyzed the department’s current travel processes, discussed them 

with the PMO-DTS, and reviewed our past reports that discussed federal 

agency travel practices. We determined that the DOD data we used as the 

basis for our evaluation in this report were sufficiently reliable by

(1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) reviewing 

existing information about the data and the system that produced them, 

and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. 

Because of the widespread congressional interest in DTS, this assignment 

was performed at our initiative under the statutory authority provided to 

the Comptroller General of the United States. Our work was performed 

from October 2004 through October 2005 in accordance with U.S. generally 

4

GAO, DOD Business Transformation: Preliminary Observations on the Defense Travel 

System, GAO-05-998T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005). 

5

Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Statistical Operations and Review Branch, 

Military and Civilian Pay Services Defense Travel System: Results of Post Payment 

Reviews, 1st Quarter, FY 2004 (Kansas City, Mo.: undated).
Page 3 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

accepted government auditing standards. Details on our scope and 

methodology are included in appendix I. We requested comments on a 

draft of this report from the Secretary of Defense or his designee. We 

received written comments from the Director, DFAS, which are reprinted in 

appendix II.

Results in Brief DTS’s development and implementation have been problematic, especially 

in the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that the 

system would perform as intended. Thus, it is not surprising that critical 

flaws have been identified, resulting in significant schedule slippages 

between the planned and actual deployment dates of the system. As 

originally envisioned, the initial deployment of DTS was to commence 

within 120 days after the effective date of contract award in September 

1998, with complete deployment to approximately 11,000 locations by April 

2002. However, that date has been changed to September 2006—a slippage 

of over 4 years. Our recent analysis of selected requirements for one key 

area disclosed that system testing was ineffective in ensuring that the 

promised capability was delivered as intended. For example, we found that 

DOD did not have reasonable assurance that flight information was 

properly displayed.6

 This problem was not detected prior to deployment 

since DOD failed to properly test the system interfaces through which the 

data are accessed for display. Accordingly, DOD travelers might not have 

received accurate information on available flights, which could have 

resulted in higher travel costs. PMO-DTS officials have acknowledged that 

the problem has existed since the initial deployment of DTS in February 

2002. PMO-DTS officials stated that the problem was corrected in an 

August 2005 release of the software. However, we found that the August 

2005 release did not fully address this problem. Our review found that as of 

the September 2005 release, the PMO-DTS had reasonable assurance that 

DTS was properly displaying the correct General Services Administration 

(GSA) city pair airfares, but DOD still lacks reasonable assurance that the 

flight information displayed was accurate.

DTS has corrected some of the previously reported internal control 

weaknesses, while others remain. We previously reported that as a result 

of a breakdown in internal controls and a weak control environment, DOD 

has (1) paid for improper premium-class travel, (2) failed to redeem unused 

6

Flight information includes items such as departure and arrival times, airports, and the cost 

of the airline ticket.
Page 4 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

airline tickets, and (3) paid twice for the same airline ticket when using the 

centrally billed accounts (CBA). In commenting on our reports and in 

congressional testimony, the department has stated that DTS, to varying 

degrees, will help resolve these problems. In addition to our prior reports, 

DFAS’s Kansas City Statistical Operations and Review Branch has 

previously reported inaccuracies with DTS’s travel payments of airfare, 

lodging, meals, and incidental expenses.7

 

First, although DOD has taken numerous actions to improve existing 

guidance and controls related to premium-class travel, including system 

changes in DTS, our results indicate that unauthorized premium-class 

travel continues. This continuing problem is not the fault of DTS but rather 

is caused by the lack of adherence to departmental policy. Second, as 

currently designed, DTS cannot determine whether a traveler has not used 

all or a portion of an airline ticket; rather, the traveler has to request that 

the CTO process a credit for the unused portion of the airline ticket. To 

address this unused airline ticket problem, the department now requires 

certain CTOs to run unused ticket reports that identify tickets that were not 

used within a specified time period, usually 30 days past the trip date. 

Third, in regard to duplicate payment for the same ticket, we have observed 

that DTS is designed to ensure that tickets purchased through the CBAs 

cannot be claimed on the individual’s travel voucher as a reimbursement to 

the traveler for airfare expenses, thus eliminating this problem of paying 

twice for the same ticket. 

Finally, we randomly sampled 170 travel vouchers8 for the period 

October 1, 2004, to December 31, 2004,9 to ascertain if the problems 

previously reported by DFAS had been resolved. For the attributes tested, 

we found that DTS calculated the lodging and meal reimbursements 

correctly based upon information provided by the traveler. However, we 

identified instances in which human error, either by the traveler or the 

authorizing officials (AO) resulted in questionable payments to the traveler. 

For example, our random sample identified a case where the traveler 

7

Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Military and Civilian Pay Services Defense 

Travel System.

8

We analyzed 170 travel vouchers, and at the time of our review 3 vouchers in our sample 

had not yet been completed and submitted.

9

The vouchers selected for review were those trips in DTS where (1) the trip started on or 

after October 1, 2004, and (2) the trip ended on or before December 31, 2004.
Page 5 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

claimed a travel advance received as a travel expense. Since travel 

advances are not eligible for reimbursement, the payment for this claim 

resulted in a duplicate payment to the traveler—for the advance and for the 

actual expenses paid for using the advance. On the other hand, we also 

identified an example where a traveler deducted a travel advance received 

on the traveler’s personal credit card from the travel claim. Since the 

traveler was responsible for repaying the advance received, this deduction 

should not have been made, and the traveler was underpaid. In all cases, 

the AOs did not detect these errors during review of the travel claims. 

To become the standard travel system within DOD, DTS has faced and will 

continue to face challenges—some of which are beyond the control of DTS. 

Two of those challenges are (1) developing needed interfaces and 

(2) underutilization of DTS at sites where it has been deployed. To date, 

DTS has developed 36 interfaces with various DOD business systems, and 

going forward, interfaces will have to be developed with at least 18 

additional business systems. According to the PMO-DTS, DOD has spent 

over $30 million on developing and testing the interfaces. Some of these 

systems, such as the Army’s General Fund System, are critical to DOD’s 

modernization of business systems and operations. According to the PMODTS, the availability of funding to develop the interfaces is uncertain. 

Unless these interfaces are successfully developed and implemented, it will 

be virtually impossible for DTS to be a truly end-to-end travel system. 

In addition, the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems at 

locations where DTS is already deployed results in the underutilization of 

DTS and reduces the savings that DTS was planned to achieve. For 

example, the Army has acknowledged that legacy systems are operating at 

locations where DTS has been deployed. As a result, DOD is spending 

funds on duplicative systems—legacy systems and DTS. Additionally, 

because of the continued operation of the legacy systems at locations 

where DTS has been fully deployed, DOD components may pay DFAS a 

higher fee for processing manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing 

the travel voucher electronically through DTS. For example, for the period 

October 1, 2004, to February 28, 2005, the Army paid DFAS over $6 million 

to process 177,000 travel vouchers manually—$34 per travel voucher, in 

contrast to about $186,000 to process 84,000 travel vouchers 

electronically—$2.22 per voucher. Overall, for this 5-month period, it cost 

the Army about $5.6 million more to process these travel vouchers 

manually as opposed to electronically using DTS. 
Page 6 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

In its 1995 report entitled Report of the Department of Defense Task Force 

to Reengineer Travel, the department noted that the existing process was a 

complex system that imposed exorbitant administrative costs on the 

traveler and DOD to ostensibly ensure that travel funds are not wasted. 

The report concluded that the process focused on (1) compliance with rigid 

rules rather than on mission performance, (2) outmoded travel practices, 

and (3) “stovepiped” administrative processes, and that the department 

needed to address these problems. While DTS has reduced some of the 

administrative burden, opportunities exist to further reduce the 

administrative burden and cost while supporting the DOD mission. While 

some of the opportunities could be implemented by DOD policy changes, 

others will require coordination with other organizations such as, the 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Examples of possible changes in DOD’s 

travel management practices include automating approval of changes to 

approved travel expenses and simplifying the display of airline flight 

information.

We are making ten recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at 

improving the department’s management and oversight of DTS and 

streamlining its administrative travel processes. In its written comments 

on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with all of our recommendations and 

briefly outlined its actions for addressing them. We have reprinted DOD’s 

written comments in appendix II.

Background Twelve years ago, in September 1993, the National Performance Review 

called for an overhaul of DOD’s temporary duty (TDY) travel system. In 

response, DOD created the DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel to 

examine the process. The task force’s January 1995 report pinpointed three 

principal causes for DOD’s inefficient travel system: (1) travel policies and 

programs were focused on compliance with rigid rules rather than mission 

performance, (2) travel practices did not keep pace with travel 

management improvements implemented by industry, and (3) the travel 

system was not integrated.

On December 13, 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 

Technology and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief 

Financial Officer issued a memorandum, “Reengineering Travel Initiative,” 

establishing the PMO-DTS to acquire travel services that would be used 

DOD-wide. Additionally, in a 1997 report to the Congress, the DOD 

Comptroller pointed out that the existing DOD TDY travel system was
Page 7 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

never designed to be an integrated system.10 The report stated that because 

there was no centralized focus on the department’s travel practices, the 

travel policies were issued by different offices and the process had become 

fragmented and “stovepiped.” The report further noted that there was no 

vehicle in the current structure to overcome these deficiencies, as no one 

individual within the department had specific responsibility for 

management control of DOD TDY travel. 

To address these concerns and after the use of competitive procedures, the 

department awarded a firm fixed-price, performance-based services 

contract to BDM International, Inc. (BDM) in May 1998. In September 

1998, GAO denied a bid protest challenging the department’s selection of 

BDM.11 Under the terms of the contract, the contractor was to start 

deploying a travel system and to begin providing travel services for 

approximately 11,000 sites worldwide within 120 days of the effective date 

of the contract, completing deployment approximately 38 months later. The 

contract specified that upon DTS achieving initial operational capability 

(IOC),12 BDM was to be paid a onetime deployment fee of $20 for each user 

and a transaction fee of $5.27 for each travel voucher processed. The 

estimated cost for the contract was approximately $264 million. Prior to 

commencing the work, BDM was acquired by TRW, Inc. (TRW), which 

became the contractor of record.

The operational assessment of DTS at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, 

from October through December 2000, disclosed serious failures. For 

example, the system’s response time was slower than anticipated, the 

result being that it took longer than expected to process a travel 

order/voucher. Because of the severity of the problems, in January 2001 a 

joint memorandum was issued by the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

10Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller): Department of Defense Travel 

Reengineering Pilot Report to Congress (Arlington, Va.: June 1997).

11The protestor, Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS), had alleged that the 

department improperly evaluated the two offers by (1) undervaluing the estimated savings 

to the department by EDS’s proposed accelerated DTS deployment schedule, (2) failing to 

hold “discussions” with EDS on the proposed accelerated deployment schedule, and 

(3) omitting from consideration certain department evaluation team members’ concerns 

about BDM’s staffing level for operation and maintenance of the DTS. Matter of Electronic 

Data Systems Corporation, B-280133; B-280133.2 (Sept. 3, 1998).

12IOC represents the first attainment of the minimum capability to effectively employ a 

system of approved specific characteristics. 
Page 8 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Technology and Logistics) directing a functional and technical assessment 

of DTS. The memorandum also directed that a determination be made of 

any future contract actions that would be necessary, based on the 

assessment results. In July 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics) approved proceeding with DTS and 

restructuring the contract with TRW. 

The TRW contract was restructured through a series of contract 

modifications, which were finalized on March 29, 2002. The government 

agreed to provide TRW consideration in the amount of about $44 million 

for the restructure of the contract. TRW agreed to release and discharge 

the government from liability and agreed to waive any and all liabilities, 

obligations, claims, and demands related to or arising from its early 

performance efforts under the original contract. Northrop Grumman 

subsequently acquired TRW in December 2002 and, as such, is now the 

contractor of record. 

The first deployment of DTS was at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South 

Dakota, in August 2001. As of September 2005, DTS has been deployed to 

approximately 5,600 locations. The department currently estimates that 

DTS will be fully deployed to all 11,000 locations by the end of fiscal year 

2006, with an estimated total development and production cost of 

approximately $474 million. Of this amount, the contract for the design, 

development, and deployment of DTS, as restructured, is worth 

approximately $264 million—the same amount as estimated in the original 

contract that was agreed to with BDM.13 The remaining costs are DOD 

internal costs associated with areas such as the operation and maintenance 

of DTS, the operation of the PMO-DTS, the voucher payment process, and 

management and oversight of the numerous CTO contractors. 

DOD Travel Process DTS automates and integrates the department’s three travel processes: 

authorization, reservations, and payment to the traveler. Figure 1 depicts 

the designated DOD travel process using DTS.

13According to the PMO-DTS, the $44 million associated with the restructuring of the 

contract is part of the overall contract amount of $264 million.
Page 9 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Figure 1: Defense Travel System Processes

The three essential players in the processing of a travel authorization and 

related payment are the traveler, the CTO, and the AO. The traveler 

generates a travel authorization and enters the appropriate information 

into DTS, such as travel dates, departure and arrival airports, and hotel and 

rental car arrangements. When the traveler is finished, DTS sends a 

prebuilt passenger name record to the CTO. If possible, requested 

arrangements will automatically book without CTO intervention. In cases 

where the travel arrangements do not automatically book, the CTO must 

intervene and take additional steps to book the requested arrangements. 

Next, the traveler’s AO receives an e-mail notification from DTS stating that 

there is a travel authorization awaiting review and approval. 

The AO is a key internal control point in the travel authorization process. 

AO responsibilities include reviewing the travel authorization for 

compliance with travel laws, regulations, and policies; determining if the 

Authorizing

official

Using DTS, books

travel arrangements

and inputs estimated

travel expenses to

prepare travel

authorization

Traveler

Using DTS, prepares travel

voucher for reimbursable

expenses of trip

Traveler CTO 

Verifies travel

arrangements have

been auto-booked,

book if not

Authorizing

official

Reviews and retains original

receipts substantiating

travel claims if they are not

stored electronically in DTS, and

approves vouchers for certification by

electronically signing the document

Reviews travel

authorization for consistency with

travel laws, regulations, and policies, 

and approves or rejects authorization

as appropriate (DTS sends

e-mail to traveler regarding

AO action)

Approved

Rejected

DFAS

Records accounting and

disbursing information and

sends EFT to bank,

government credit card vendor,

or both, as directed by traveler

Traveler

Takes trip and

incurs expenses

Authorization and travel

Voucher

Source: GAO.

Certifying

official

Reviews and

certifies approved

vouchers for

payment

H

O

T

E

L

H

O

T

E

L

S M T W T F S

1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

CTO 

Issues ticket

3 days

before trip

H

O

T

E

L

S M T W T F S

1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31
Page 10 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

trip is mission essential and funds are available; assigning the proper line of 

accounting prior to authorization; reviewing all policy exceptions, and 

approving or rejecting the travel authorization as appropriate. When the AO 

approves a travel authorization by electronically signing the document in 

DTS, DTS routes the approved travel authorization to the CTO for ticketing, 

sends an obligation transaction to the appropriate accounting system and 

notifies the traveler via e-mail that the travel authorization has been 

approved. 

When the trip is complete, the traveler creates a travel voucher for 

reimbursable travel-related expenses from the travel authorization data 

stored in DTS, and electronically signs the voucher. DTS electronically 

routes the travel voucher to the AO for approval.14 An AO is then 

responsible for certifying a travel voucher for payment by electronically 

signing the document.15 DTS submits the certified travel voucher to DFAS 

for payment through electronic interfaces, which records the information 

in the appropriate accounting and disbursing systems.

Previously Reported DOD 

Travel Issues 

Over the past several years, we have reported pervasive weaknesses in 

DOD’s travel program. These weaknesses have hindered the department’s 

operational efficiencies and have left it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and 

abuse. These weaknesses are highlighted below.

• On the basis of statistical sampling, we estimated that 72 percent of the 

over 68,000 premium-class airline tickets DOD purchased for fiscal 

years 2001 and 2002 were not properly authorized and that 73 percent 

were not properly justified. During fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD 

spent almost $124 million on airline tickets that included at least one leg 

of the trip in premium-class—usually business class. Because each 

premium-class ticket costs the government up to thousands of dollars

14AOs are appointed as accountable officers and shall be pecuniarily liable for erroneous 

payments from negligent performance of duties in accordance with DOD Financial 

Management Regulation 7000.14-R, vol. 5, ch. 33.

15DOD policy permits the AO to also serve as the certifying official, but PMO-DTS officials 

stated that by practice, AOs do not approve and certify the same vouchers. Certifying 

officials are also pecuniarily liable for erroneous payments, but may be relieved from 

liability if they were not negligent in the performance of their duties.
Page 11 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

more than a coach class ticket, unauthorized premium-class travel 

resulted in millions of dollars of unnecessary costs annually.16

• Because of control breakdowns, DOD paid for airline tickets that were 

neither used nor processed for refund—amounting to about 58,000 

tickets totaling more than $21 million for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. 

DOD was not aware of this problem before our audit and did not 

maintain any data on unused tickets. Based on limited data provided by 

the airlines, it is possible that the unused value of the fully and partially 

unused tickets that DOD purchased from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal 

year 2003 with its CBA could be at least $100 million.17

• We found that DOD sometimes paid twice for the same airline ticket—

first to Bank of America for the monthly DOD credit card bill, and 

second to the traveler, who was reimbursed for the same ticket. Based 

on our mining of limited data, the potential magnitude of the improper 

payments was 27,000 transactions for over $8 million. For example, 

DOD paid a Navy GS-15 civilian employee approximately $10,000 for 13 

airline tickets he had not purchased.18

Ongoing DTS Testing 

Remains a Concern

DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in 

the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that the 

system would perform as intended. Given the lack of adherence to such 

key practices, it is not surprising that critical flaws have been identified 

after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages. In July 2002, a 

DOD Inspector General’s report noted that in early 1999, it was evident that 

the commercial-off-the-shelf software would require extensive 

modification in order to meet DOD’s needs.19 Further, the report pointed 

16GAO, Travel Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to Improper Use of First 

and Business Class Travel, GAO-04-88 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2003), and Travel Cards: 

Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to Improper Use of First and Business Class 

Travel, GAO-04-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003).

17GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars Wasted on 

Unused Airline Tickets, GAO-04-398 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004).

18GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars of Improper 

Payments, GAO-04-576 (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004). 

19Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Allegations to the Defense Hotline 

on the Management of the Defense Travel System, D-2002-124 (Arlington, Va.: July 1, 2002).
Page 12 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

out that operational problems continued to arise during the third phase of 

the system testing in the fall of 2000. As originally envisioned, the initial 

deployment of DTS was to commence 120 days after the effective date of 

the contract award in September 1998, with complete deployment to 

approximately 11,000 locations by April 2002. However, that date has been 

changed to September 2006—a slippage of over 4 years. Figure 2 shows the 

schedule slippage between the planned and actual implementation of DTS.

Figure 2: Delay in the Development and Implementation of DTS

Our recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that the testing of 

DTS is not always adequate prior to updated software being released for 

use by DOD personnel. System testing is a critical process utilized by 

organizations to improve an entity’s confidence that the system will satisfy 

the requirements of the end user and will operate as intended. Additionally, 

an efficient and effective system testing program is one of the critical 

elements that needs to be in place in order to have reasonable assurance

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Phase I - Common User Interface 

(CUI) Computation Module Test 

Phase II - Full system test within 

a controlled environment 

Phase IIIa (part 1) - Full system 

test on an operational base using 

simulated data

Phase IIIa (part 2) - Full system 

test on an operational base using 

live data

Phase IIIb - Full system test of 

CUI interfaced with accounting 

and disbursing system of each 

military service and defense 

agency 

Sept

98

Jan 99

Oct

98

Sept

99

Oct

98

Sept

00

Nov

98

Dec

00

Jan

99

Ongoing testing continues until

all 35+ Defense Accounting

and Disbursing Systems have successfully completed testing

Source: GAO, based on information provided by DOD.

Original date

Actual date

Schedule delays
Page 13 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

that an organization has implemented the disciplined processes necessary 

to reduce software development project risks to acceptable levels. 20

In one key area, our review identified instances in which the testing of DTS 

was inadequate, which precluded DOD from having reasonable assurance 

that DTS displayed the proper flights and airfares. For example, DOD 

officials stated that prior to an August 2005 system update, DTS should 

have displayed 12 flights, if that many flights were available, within a flight 

window.21 DTS program officials and Northrop Grumman personnel 

acknowledged that this particular system requirement had never been 

tested because DOD failed to document the requirement until January 

2005. Because a system requirement covering this feature had never been 

defined and communicated to the contractor, there was no reasonable 

assurance that DTS would display the envisioned number of flights and 

related airfares within a given flight window.22 As we have noted in 

previous reports, requirements that are not defined are unlikely to be 

tested, with the resulting consequence that they are even less likely to be 

satisfied.23

We also noted that even when the requirements were properly defined, the 

DOD tests for determining whether DTS displayed the proper flights and 

airfares did not provide reasonable assurance that the (1) proper flights 

were displayed and (2) airfares for those flights were displayed. 

Specifically, DTS uses a commercial product to obtain information from the 

database that contains the applicable flight and airfare information—

20Disciplined processes for software development and implementation include a wide range 

of activities, including project planning and oversight, requirements management, risk 

management, and testing.

21Prior to the August 2005 system update, DTS used a 4-hour flight window for domestic 

flights and a 12-hour flight window for foreign flights. The current window is 12 hours for 

domestic flights and 24 hours for foreign destinations. The system is also now expected to 

display up to 25 flights for the flight window.

22A flight window is the amount of time before and after a specified time and is used for 

determining the flights that should be displayed. For example, if the flight window is 4 

hours and estimated departure time is 9:00 a.m., then the flight window that is used for 

displaying available flights is from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

23GAO, Indian Trust Funds: Challenges Facing Interior’s Implementation of New Trust 

Asset and Accounting Management System, GAO/T-AIMD-99-238 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 14, 1999).
Page 14 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

commonly referred to as a global distribution system (GDS).24 In testing 

whether DTS displayed the proper flights and airfares, the information 

returned from the commercial product was compared with the information 

displayed in DTS and was found to be in agreement. However, the 

commercial product did not provide all of the appropriate flights or airfares 

to DTS that were contained in the GDS. Since the PMO-DTS neither 

performed an end-to-end test nor made sure that the information returned 

from this commercial product was in agreement with the information 

contained in the GDS, it did not have reasonable assurance that DTS was 

displaying the proper flight and airfare information to the users.25

According to DOD officials, this system weakness was detected by users 

complaining that DTS did not display all relevant flights and airfares. 

Figure 3 illustrates the inadequacy of the DTS testing. 

Figure 3: Limitations of DTS Testing

24A system that is used to offer and purchase travel services and related products. For 

example, according to one GDS (SABRE), it now includes more than 400 airlines, 64,000 

hotels, 32 car rental companies, 9 cruise lines, 35 railroads, and 220 tour operators. In 2004, 

more than 900 travel providers displayed information about their products and services 

through the SABRE system, and an estimated $70 billion worth of travel-related products 

were sold. 

25The purpose of end-to-end testing is to verify that a defined set of interrelated systems, 

which collectively support an organizational core business area or function, interoperate as 

intended in an operational environment.

Source: GAO.

Provides flight

and fare

information

Interface between

DTS user interface

and GDS databases

Enables user to

access flight and

fare information

Provides flight

and fare

information

Interface between

DTS user interface

and GDS databases

Enables user to

access flight and

fare information

Commercial

product

DTS user

interface

GDS

databases

Commercial

product

DTS user

interface

GDS

databases

Testing performed Testing not performed

Sufficient testing performed

interface is successful

Insufficient testing performed,

“end-to-end” interface is unsuccessful
Page 15 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

PMO-DTS officials acknowledged that these two problems have been 

ongoing since the initial implementation of DTS. Accordingly, as a result of 

these two weaknesses, DOD travelers might not have received accurate 

information on available flights and airfares, which could have resulted in 

higher travel costs. Further, PMO-DTS officials have stated that the two 

problems were corrected as part of the August 2005 DTS system update. 

However, we found that the problems have not been entirely corrected as 

of the September 2005 release. In reviewing the documentation relating to 

the September 2005 release, we found that (1) the requirements generally 

described the functionality that was expected relating to the display of 

flights and airfares except that the specific flight order was not adequately 

documented and (2) testing was inadequate to provide reasonable 

assurance that the DTS system requirements associated with the 

reservation module were properly tested.

Our analysis found that the documentation relating to the testing for the 

September 2005 release provided reasonable assurance that the proper 

GSA city pair airfares were displayed for a given flight. However, this 

documentation did not provide reasonable assurance that the proper flights 

were displayed. Although we were told by PMO-DTS officials that the 

testing efforts had checked the number of flights displayed in the GDS to 

those that were displayed by DTS to ensure that DTS was properly 

displaying the available flights, adequate documentation was not retained 

to verify that this comparison had been made. In November 2005 we 

performed a limited test and found that the system did not properly display 

the GSA city pair flights between Chicago, Illinois and Dayton, Ohio. Our 

analysis also identified other problems in the display of flight information. 

More specifically, for the reservation module our analysis found that the 

flights actually displayed in DTS did not meet the stated DOD 

requirements. According to PMO-DTS officials, DTS is required to display 

up to 25 flights within a 12-hour flight window for domestic flights, with the 

GSA city pair flights shown first. When more than one flight is available 

within a category, the flights should then be sorted first by the elapsed 

flight time26 and then by the earliest departure time. Our review found that 

the testing performed for the September 2005 release did not provide 

reasonable assurance that these requirements were met. Our analysis of 

26Elapsed flight time is the amount of time the flight is scheduled to be in the air, rather than 

the total trip time. For example, one flight displayed in DTS showed an elapsed flight time 

of 3 hours and 20 minutes with a total trip time of about 9 hours.
Page 16 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

two frequently used city pairs DOD tested disclosed that DTS (1) displayed 

more than the 25 flights, (2) included flights that were outside the flight 

window, and (3) did not display the flights in the proper order. The 

following examples illustrate these problems.

• The testing documentation showed that 29 flights were displayed for the 

Chicago, Illinois, to Dayton, Ohio, flight and that 11 of these flights were 

outside the flight window. For example, the stated departure time was 

9:00 a.m. which means that flights from 3:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. should be 

considered for inclusion. Furthermore, 60 percent of the first 10 flights 

were outside of this window and leaving at such times as 3:45 p.m. 

(fourth item on the display) and 8:55 p.m. (eighth item on the display).

• Although the stated requirement was to show the flights with GSA city 

pairs first, sorted by elapsed flight and earliest departure times, the 

testing documentation showed for an October 18, 2005, departure time, 

that the first flight displayed in DTS left Washington, D.C., at 6:45 a.m. 

and arrived at Columbus, Ohio at 9:30 a.m. with an elapsed flight time of 

1 hour and 55 minutes when the user entered a 9:00 a.m. departure time. 

However, the documentation also showed that 6:55 a.m. (eleventh item 

on the display) and 1:35 p.m. (thirteenth item on the display) departing 

flights were also available with elapsed times of about 1 hour and 25 

minutes. Based on the stated requirement, these two flights should have 

been shown first and second on the display since they had shorter 

elapsed flight times and were also GSA city pair flights. Furthermore, 

the flights with the shortest elapsed flight times were direct flights while 

the first flight involved stopping at another airport before arriving at 

Columbus, Ohio. 

We believe that one factor contributing to the failure to detect the errors in 

displaying the flights in the proper order was that the stated requirements 

for the order had not been properly documented. Specifically, the 

requirements that were included in the testing documentation stated that 

the flights were to be displayed in the following order: GSA city pair flights 

with capacity limits, GSA city pair flights, and all other unrestricted flights. 

These requirements did not contain additional information to state that 

elapsed flight time and earliest departure time should also be considered in 

the display. As we noted in our September 2005 testimony, requirements 

that are not defined are unlikely to be tested.27

27GAO-05-998T.
Page 17 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

PMO-DTS officials stated that subsequent to the September 2005 release, 

they had identified the flight order display problem and that it had been 

corrected in a subsequent release. Our limited test in November 2005 

showed that the flights were now displayed in the proper order for the two 

city pairs for which we had identified problems in the September 2005 

testing. PMO-DTS officials stated that they would investigate the reasons 

(1) that more than 25 flights were displayed, (2) why flights that were 

outside the 12-hour flight window were displayed, and (3) why all GSA city 

pair fights were not included in the display.

DTS Has Corrected 

Some Previously 

Reported Travel 

Problems

DTS has corrected one of the previously reported travel problems, but 

others remain. We have previously reported that a breakdown in internal 

controls and a weak control environment have led to potential fraud, 

waste, and abuse of hundreds of millions of dollars being improperly spent 

on DOD travel.28 Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to 

duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased through CBAs. However, 

problems remain related to improper premium-class travel, unused tickets 

that are not refunded, and accuracy of travelers’ claims. The three 

remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and will take 

departmentwide action to address.

Duplicate Payments Related 

to CBA

Based upon our observations, we found that DTS was designed to ensure 

that a ticket purchased through CBAs cannot be claimed on the individual’s 

travel voucher as a reimbursement for airfare to the traveler. We have 

previously reported that the department sometimes paid for the same 

airline ticket twice when the CBAs were used.29 As part of our statistical 

sample discussed later, we found 14 travel vouchers for which an airline 

ticket purchased with a CBA was included on the voucher; however, the 

traveler did not receive reimbursement for the claim. 

Improper Premium-Class 

Travel

While DOD has taken actions to improve existing guidance and controls 

related to premium-class travel, including system changes in DTS, we 

identified instances in which unauthorized premium-class travel continues. 

28GAO-04-88, GAO-04-398, and GAO-04-576.

29GAO-04-576.
Page 18 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

In November 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness formed a task force to address our prior recommendations 30 that 

focused on three major areas: (1) policy and controls of travel 

authorization, (2) ticket issuance and reporting, and (3) internal control 

and oversight. Subsequently, several policy changes were made to improve 

the control and accountability over premium-class travel. For example, the 

approval level for first-class travel was elevated to a three-star general and 

for business-class travel to a two-star general or civilian equivalent. Other 

changes included strengthening the description of circumstances when 

premium-class travel may be used to more clearly show that it is an 

exceptional circumstance and not a common practice. In all cases, AOs 

must have their own premium-class travel approved at the next higher 

level. These changes also set a broad policy that CTOs are not to issue 

premium-class tickets without proper authorization. In September 2004, 

the PMO-DTS made system changes to DTS that blocked eight fare codes 

that were considered to be premium-class fare codes from being displayed 

or selected by the traveler through DTS. According to the PMO-DTS, the 

airline industry does not have standardized fare code indicators to identify 

first-class, business-class, and economy-class. Subsequently, DOD found 

that economy class fare codes were being blocked using the eight codes 

and, in May 2005, reduced the list to three codes. According to PMO-DTS 

officials, these three codes are consistently used among the various airlines 

to designate premium-class travel.

Despite these various changes in policy and to DTS, we continue to identify 

instances in which premium-class travel is occurring without the proper 

authorization. Our analysis disclosed at least 68 cases that involve 

improper premium-class travel.31 Table 1 presents a summary of our 

analysis.

30GAO-04-88.

31To assess the use of premium-class travel, we obtained databases from Bank of America 

and the PMO-DTS, which provided information on the actual travel transactions and 

traveler information for the period October through December 2004. The Bank of America 

database contained all DOD transactions for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, and the 

PMO-DTS database contained all vouchers processed by DTS for the same period. We 

eliminated all airfare transactions that were (1) less than $200, (2) not processed through 

DTS, and (3) determined to be economy class. As a result, we identified 419 cases that 

could involve premium-class travel.
Page 19 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Table 1: Summary of Premium-Class Travel Analysis 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

DOD regulations require that authorization for premium-class 

accommodations be made in advance of travel unless extenuating 

circumstances or emergency situations make advance authorization 

impossible. Further, consistent with the Federal Travel Regulation, DOD 

restricts premium-class travel to one of the following eight circumstances: 

(1) regularly scheduled flights between origin and destination provide only 

premium-class accommodations, and this is certified on the travel voucher; 

(2) coach class is not available in time to accomplish the purpose of the 

official travel, which is so urgent it cannot be postponed; (3) premium-class 

travel is necessary to accommodate the traveler’s disability or other 

physical impairment, and the condition is substantiated in writing by 

competent medical authority; (4) premium-class travel is needed for 

security purposes or because exceptional circumstances make its use 

essential to the successful performance of the mission; (5) coach-class 

accommodations on authorized/approved foreign carriers do not provide 

adequate sanitation or meet health standards; (6) premium-class 

accommodations would result in overall savings to the government 

because of subsistence costs, overtime, or lost productive time that would 

be incurred while awaiting coach-class accommodations; 

(7) transportation is paid in full by a nonfederal source; and (8) travel is to 

or from a destination outside the continental United States, and the 

scheduled flight time is in excess of 14 hours.32 However, a rest stop is 

prohibited when travel is authorized for premium-class accommodations. 

Based upon the documentation provided by DOD, we found that none of 

Defense component

Potential premiumclass travel 

Improperly 

approved

premium-class 

travel

Properly approved

premium-class travel

No documentation 

received

Documentation 

inconclusive

Army 93 46 4 4 39

Navy 40 13 9 0 18

Air Force 157 9 0 131 17

DOD agencies 118 0 6 110 2

Total 408 68 19 245 76

32Department of Defense Civilian Personnel Joint Travel Regulations, paras. C2000 and 

C2204 and Department of Defense Joint Federal Travel Regulations, paras. U3100 and 

U3125.
Page 20 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

the 68 cases meet the above criteria or were approved at the appropriate 

level.

Further, as shown in table 1, we were unable to ascertain if premium-class 

travel occurred for 321 travel legs. For 245 travel legs, no documentation 

was received, and for 76 travel legs, the documentation provided was 

inconclusive. On numerous occasions, we requested that the DOD 

components provide us with documentation, such as ticket stubs or travel 

itineraries, to substantiate whether the travel legs were premium- or 

economy-class travel. If the documentation indicated premium-class travel, 

we requested that the proper authorization and justification be provided.33

At the end of September 2005, the DOD components had not provided the 

requested documentation for 245 travel legs. Therefore, we could not 

ascertain and—more importantly—on the basis of the documentation 

provided, DOD is not in position to determine, if the airfare was for 

premium-class or economy-class travel.

Specific examples of the 68 instances of improperly approved premiumclass travel are highlighted below: 

• A Navy senior Chief Petty Officer (E-8) flew from Norfolk via Detroit to 

Seattle, Seattle to Los Angeles, drove from Los Angeles to San Diego, 

and flew first class from San Diego via Detroit to Norfolk. The traveler 

charged $1,578 on the government travel card for travel from Norfolk to 

Seattle and San Diego to Norfolk, whereas GSA city pair fare was only 

$359. Similarly, the traveler paid $298 to fly from Seattle to Los Angeles 

compared to the GSA city pair fare of $149. The CTO remarked on the 

travel authorization that it would not issue a first-class ticket without 

properly approved documentation and the lowest government fare was 

$414. The traveler submitted the travel voucher and the approving 

official (civilian GS-9) approved the premium-class travel costs without 

documentation of proper authorization from a premium-class approving 

official. According to a Navy official, the traveler purchased his own 

ticket at the airport. However, this has no bearing on the fact that 

reimbursement was made without the proper authorization.

• A Department of the Army civilian employee (GS-12) flew from 

Columbia, South Carolina, via Atlanta, Georgia, to Gulf Port, Mississippi, 

33Request for documentation was made on May 19, June 9, July 11, August 8, and August 22, 

2005. 
Page 21 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

to attend a conference. One leg of the return trip included a first-class 

flight. From our review and analysis of Bank of America data and the 

travel voucher, DOD paid $1,107 for the airfare. The cost of a GSA city 

pair round trip airfare was $770. According to information provided by 

the Army, the traveler informed the Army that he was meeting another 

traveler at the destination; they were going to share a rental car; and 

there were no seats available on the flight the other traveler had booked. 

Therefore, the individual selected a flight arriving as close as possible to 

the time of the traveler he was meeting. The justification provided by the 

traveler is not in accordance with DOD’s criteria. As a result, the 

premium-class fare was not properly approved. 

Fifty-eight of the 68 travel legs identified as premium-class travel were for 

international travel, mostly intra-European flights. For 31 of the 58 travel 

legs, the CTOs claimed that these flights were the lowest unrestricted fares 

available, and therefore it is not necessary to obtain permission for 

premium-class travel. However, effective August 16, 2004, paragraph 

U3125-B5.b of the Joint Federal Travel Regulations (JFTR) and paragraph 

C2204-B.5.b of the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR) require the approval of 

premium-class travel under these circumstances. More specifically, the 

JFTR and JTR state that “When regularly scheduled flights between the 

authorized origin and destination (including connection) points provide 

only premium-class accommodations, the member must certify these 

circumstances on the travel order attachment.” In the absence of specific 

authorization/approval from the designated authority, the member is 

financially responsible for all additional costs resulting from premium-class 

airline accommodations use. The 58 travel legs were identified as business 

class and therefore should have been approved in accordance with DOD’s 

policy. However, the CTOs failed to notify the traveler that these travel legs 

were coded business class, and therefore, approval by higher authority was 

required. Unless the CTOs adhere to the applicable policy, improperly 

approved premium-class travel will continue. It is incumbent upon DOD to 

ensure that the CTOs are knowledgeable about the department travel 

policies and that those policies are followed.

Unused Airline Tickets DTS still does not have the capability to determine whether a traveler does 

not use all or a portion of an airline ticket and obtain a refund as required. 

To address this problem, DOD directed that all new CTO contract 

solicitations require CTOs to prepare unused airline ticket reports which 

identify tickets that were not used within a specified period, usually 30 

days past the trip date, so that they can be canceled and processed for 
Page 22 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

refund. Additionally, the various DOD components were directed to modify 

existing CTO contracts to require the CTOs to process refunds for unused 

airline tickets. However, according to DOD officials, this requirement has 

not yet been implemented in all existing CTO contracts.

At the five locations we visited, 34 each CTO was preparing the unused 

airline ticket report; however, the frequency varied. The CTOs at the Army 

and Air Force locations prepared the required report on a daily and 

monthly basis, respectively. According to Army and Air Force officials, the 

reports are prepared for each location currently using DTS. For the third 

quarter of fiscal year 2005, the Army had unused airline tickets of 

approximately $14 million, and the Air Force had about $2 million of 

unused airline tickets submitted for refund. The Navy requires its CTO to 

produce the unused ticket report on a weekly basis. Our review of the 

Navy’s unused airline ticket report for the week ended July 17, 2005, 

indicated that the Navy was in the process of obtaining refunds of about 

$800,000. The Marine Corps prepared unused airline ticket reports on a 

monthly basis. For the third quarter of fiscal year 2005, the Marine Corps 

had approximately $1.4 million in unused airline tickets refunded. Army, 

Navy, and Marine Corps representatives stated that the reports prepared by 

their CTOs also included dollar amounts that are the result of travelers 

notifying the CTOs that all or a portion of their ticket was not used. They 

could not ascertain the amount that related directly to the work of the 

CTOs. According to Air Force personnel, the unused airline ticket report 

only includes tickets that were found by the CTO and then canceled and 

refunded.

Accuracy of Travel Voucher 

Reimbursements 

Questionable

DFAS has previously reported problems with the accuracy of DTS travel 

payments. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, DFAS reported a 14 

percent inaccuracy rate in the DTS travel payments of airfare, lodging and 

meals, and incidental expenses. Our analysis of 170 travel vouchers 

disclosed that for the two attributes that are directly related to the 

operation of the DTS system—computation of lodging reimbursement and 

meals and incidental expenses (per diem)—the DTS calculations were

34Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado; Defense Logistics 

Agency, Virginia; Headquarters Marine Corps, Virginia; and Naval Operations Headquarters, 

Virginia.
Page 23 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

correct in all instances on the basis of the information provided by the 

traveler.35

However, we continue to identify numerous instances in which employee 

errors led to inaccurate reimbursements. In some cases, errors occurred 

because incorrect data were entered into DTS by the traveler. In other 

cases, the reviews by the AO were inadequate. In regard to the AO reviews, 

on the basis of our sample, we estimated that 18 percent of the travel 

vouchers were paid even though there was not reasonable assurance that 

the amount of the reimbursement was accurate. 36 Further, we estimated 

that 29 percent of the travel vouchers lacked adequate receipts for the 

amounts claimed.37 Furthermore, for the 49 travel vouchers lacking 

receipts, we saw no evidence that the AOs were provided with the 

appropriate receipts by the traveler. 

The JFTR and JTR state that receipts are required for all lodging expenses 

regardless of amount and for all individual official travel expenses of $75 or 

more. The receipt must show when specific services were rendered, and 

the traveler must attach the required receipts to the travel voucher.

In one case, the traveler was reimbursed for expenses claimed in excess of 

$500, even though none of the required receipts were available for review 

and approval by the AOs. Additionally, we identified eight vouchers in 

which the claims for reimbursement of rental car expenses were not in 

accordance with DOD policy. The JFTR and JTR state that when rental car 

usage is authorized for official business by the AOs, reimbursement is 

authorized for rental car expenses, such as the rental costs, taxes and local 

assessments on rental car users, gasoline, parking, road/tunnel tolls, and 

any per-day administrative fee required by the rental car agreements. When 

a compact rental car (the “standard” for TDY travel) does not meet 

requirements, the AOs may authorize vehicles appropriate for the mission. 

In all eight cases, we found that the traveler did not provide justification for 

35We analyzed 170 travel vouchers, and at the time of our review, 3 vouchers in our sample 

had not yet been completed and submitted. The selected vouchers were drawn from the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2005 (October through December 2004).

36We are 95 percent confident that the total number of travel vouchers that were paid even 

though there was not reasonable assurance that the amount of the reimbursement was 

accurate was between 13 percent and 25 percent.

37We are 95 percent confident that the total number of travel vouchers that lacked adequate 

receipts for the amounts claimed was between 22 percent and 36 percent.
Page 24 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

the non-compact rental cars and the AOs did not require the justification to 

be documented in accordance with DOD policy.

The AO’s review and approval of the traveler’s voucher is intended to 

ensure that only authorized, properly supported travel charges are 

reimbursed and that the amounts are accurate and properly calculated. Our 

analysis clearly indicates that DOD reimbursed travelers for amounts 

claimed despite the lack of the required documentation. According to DOD 

regulations, “the AO (s’) signature on the expense report certifies that the 

travel was taken, that the charges are reasonable . . . and that the payment 

of the authorized expenses is approved.” While the AO’s signature indicates 

that the payment is approved, it falls short of ensuring that amounts 

claimed are reasonable in the cases in which receipts for airfare and 

lodging are not provided. Further, inadequate reviews by the AO’s resulted 

in some travelers being reimbursed more than entitled and other travelers 

having to pay for legitimate travel expenses out of their own pockets. 

DTS Faces Challenges 

in Making DTS a 

Standard DOD Travel 

System

DOD’s goal of making DTS the standard travel system within the 

department depends upon the development, testing, and implementation of 

system interfaces with the myriad of related DOD systems, as well as 

private-sector systems, such as the system used by the credit card company 

that provides DOD military and civilian employees with travel cards. While 

DOD has developed 31 system interfaces, the PMO-DTS is aware of at least 

18 additional DOD business systems for which interfaces must be 

developed. To date, DOD has reported that the development and testing of 

the system interfaces has cost over $30 million. Developing the interfaces 

is time consuming and costly. Additionally, the underutilization of DTS at 

the sites where it has been deployed is also hindering the department’s 

efforts to have a standard travel system. Furthermore, the underutilization 

affects the estimated savings that are to be derived from the use of DTS 

departmentwide. 

Interfaces Are Critical to 

Implementing an End-toEnd System 

One of DOD’s long-standing problems has been the lack of integrated 

systems. To address this issue and minimize the manual entry of data, 

interfaces between existing systems must be developed to provide the 

exchange of data that is critical for day-to-day operations. For example, 

DTS needs to know before permitting the authorization of travel that 

sufficient funds are available to pay for the travel—information that comes 

from system(s) other than DTS—and once the travel has been authorized, 
Page 25 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

another system needs to know this information so that it can record an 

obligation and provide management and other systems with information on 

the funds that remain available. Interfaces are also needed with privatesector systems, such as the system used by the credit card company that 

provides DOD personnel with travel cards. Figure 4 identifies the 36 DOD 

business systems for which the interfaces with DTS have already been 

developed and implemented.
Page 26 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Figure 4: Current DTS System Interfaces

Defense Travel System

Automated Disbursing

System

Centralized Disbursing

System

Computerized Accounts Payable

System for Windows

Defense-Business

Management System

Defense Cash

Accountability System

Defense Civilian

Pay System

Defense Industrial Financial

Management System

Defense Joint Military

Pay System

Defense National

Stockpile Center

Defense Working Capital

Accounting System

Departmental Cash

Management System

DFAS Corporate

Database

Distributed Data Archive

and Retrieval System

Document Automation and

Production Service

Electronic 

Business

Electronic Document

Access

Financial Reporting

System

Financial Accounting Management

Information System

General Accounting and

Finance System

General Accounting and Finance

System - Defense Travel

Marine Corps

Total Force System

Naval Reserve Order

Writing System

OnePay

Operational Data

Storage

Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Command - San Diego

Standard Accounting and Reporting

System - Field Level 

Standard Accounting and

Reporting System - Headquarters

Command Module

Standard Accounting, Budget

and Reporting System

Standard Finance

System 

Standard Finance System

Redesign 1

Standard Operation and

Maintenance Army Research

and Development System - NT

Standard Operation and

Maintenance Army Research

and Development System - TC

Temporary Duty

To School

Washington HeadquartersServices

Allotment AccountingSystem - Defense Finance and AccountingService

Washington HeadquartersServices

Allotment AccountingSystem

Washington HeadquartersServices Allotment AccountingSystem - Defense Information Systems Agency

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 27 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Figure 5 illustrates the additional 18 DOD business systems for which 

interfaces with DTS must be developed in the future.

Figure 5: DTS System Interfaces That Need to Be Developed 

While DOD was able to develop and implement interfaces with the 36 

systems, the development of each remaining interface will present the 

PMO-DTS with challenges. For example, the detailed requirements for 

each of the remaining interfaces have not yet been defined. Such 

requirements would define (1) what information will be exchanged and 

(2) how the data exchange will be conducted. This is understandable in 

some cases, such as for the Army General Fund Financial Enterprise

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

To be completed in future

Completion dependent on future funding

Defense Travel System

Army’s General Fund

Financial ERP Forward Compatible Pay

Army Reserve Personnel Command

Orders and Resource System

Logistics Modernization

Program

Automated Fund Control

Order System

Marine Corps Total

Force System

Business Systems ModernizationMilitary Sealift Command -

Financial Management System

Corps of Engineers Financial

Management System(s) NAVAIR ERP

Defense Civilian Personnel

Data System

Defense Enterprise Accounting,

Manangement System

Defense Integrated

Finance System

Defense Integrated Military

Human Resource System

Reserve Lifecycle

Automation Services

Navy ERP

Standard Industrial

Fund System

Transportation Financial Management

System - MTMC (Military Surface)
Page 28 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Resource Planning (ERP) system,38 which is a relatively new endeavor 

within the department, so it will be some time before DOD is in position to 

start development of the interface. Additionally, the development of the 

DTS interfaces depends on other system managers achieving their time 

frames for implementation. For example, the Navy ERP system is one of 

the DOD systems with which DTS is to interface and exchange data. Any 

difficulties with the Navy’s ERP implementation schedule could adversely 

affect DTS’s interface testing and, thereby, result in a schedule slippage for 

the interface’s implementation. The above two factors also affect DTS’s 

ability to develop reliable cost estimates for the future interfaces. 

Interfaces with PrivateSector Systems Are Critical 

Besides the DOD systems, DTS must also develop effective interfaces with 

several private-sector systems. For example, DTS must interface with the 

department’s credit card provider and the four GDSs used by the various 

CTOs that support DOD’s travel activities. The information from the credit 

card provider is used for such items as (1) supporting and automating the 

CBA reconciliation process for credit card charges and (2) providing the 

traveler with the credit card charges to assist in the preparation of the 

travel voucher and the payment process. The interfaces with the four GDSs 

are necessary since DTS must support the GDS that has been selected by a 

CTO servicing a given DOD location. For example, CTO A has selected 

SABRE as its GDS and services base A, while CTO B has selected Apollo as 

its GDS and services base B. In order for DTS to properly display the 

reservation information to personnel at base A, it must have a connection 

to SABRE, while in order to perform the same function at base B, it must 

have a connection to Apollo. 

Further complicating DTS’s operation is the fact that not all airlines use a 

GDS. Fees are charged by the GDS for displaying and booking reservations 

and to the CTO for making travel arrangements. Providing the travel 

services directly to the traveler could eliminate these costs and is one 

reason that some travel service providers have decided not to use a GDS. 

According to DTS officials, the ability to directly connect travel service 

suppliers and customers is being explored. For example, they are currently 

negotiating with an airline to bring its flight and airfare information into

38An ERP solution is an automated system consisting of multiple, integrated functional 

modules that perform a variety of business-related tasks, such as payroll, general ledger 

accounting, and supply chain management. 
Page 29 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

DTS, rather than going through a GDS, by using an existing internet 

technology commonly referred to as Web services.39

Underutilization of DTS 

Affects Estimated Savings 

Another challenge in establishing DTS as a standard travel system within 

DOD is the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems, which are 

controlled and operated by the various DOD components. Currently, at 

least 31 legacy travel systems are continuing to be operated within the 

department. As we have previously reported, because each DOD 

component receives its own funding for the operation, maintenance, and 

modernization of its own systems, there is no incentive for DOD 

components to eliminate duplicative travel systems.40 We recognize that 

some of the existing travel systems, such as the Integrated Automated 

Travel System version 6.0, cannot be completely eliminated because they 

perform functions, such as permanent change of station travel claims that 

DTS cannot. However, in other cases, the department is spending funds on 

duplicative systems that perform the same functions as DTS. The funding 

of multiple systems that perform the same functions is one of the reasons 

why the department has at least 4,150 business systems.41 Since these 

legacy systems are not controlled and operated by the PMO-DTS, it does 

not have the authority to discontinue their operation. 

Over the past several years, we have been critical of the department’s 

inability to effectively control its business systems investments.42 To 

address this issue, the statutory requirements of the Ronald W. Reagan

39As defined by the World Wide Web Consortium “Web services provide a standard means of 

interoperating between different software applications, running on a variety of platforms 

and/or frameworks. Web services are characterized by their great interoperability and 

extensibility thanks to the use of [the Extensible Markup Language (XML)], and they can 

then be combined in a loosely coupled way in order to achieve complex operations.” XML is 

a flexible, nonproprietary set of standards for annotating or “tagging” information so that it 

can be transmitted over a network such as the Internet and readily interpreted by disparate 

computer systems. 

40GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without Adequate 

Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).

41GAO-05-381.

42GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Continue to Be Invested with 

Inadequate Management Oversight and Accountability, GAO-04-615 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 27, 2004), and GAO-05-381.
Page 30 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 200543 are aimed at 

improving the department’s business systems management practices. The 

act directs DOD to put in place a definite management structure 

responsible for the control and accountability over business systems 

investments, by establishing a hierarchy of investment review boards from 

across the department, and directs that the boards use a standard set of 

investment review and decision-making criteria to ensure compliance and 

consistency with the department’s business enterprise architecture. The 

continuation of the status quo should not be tolerated. It is the investment 

review boards’ responsibility to ensure the funds are not being spent on the 

legacy systems at those locations where DTS has been fully deployed. 

Allowing such expenditures to occur will only perpetuate the current 

parochialism and cultural resistance to change that is prevalent throughout 

the department. We have previously reported that cultural resistance and 

stovepiped operations have all contributed significantly to the failure of 

previous attempts to implement broad-based management reforms at 

DOD.44 The department has acknowledged that it confronts decades-old 

problems deeply grounded in the bureaucratic history and operating 

practices of a complex, multifaceted organization and that many of these 

practices were developed piecemeal and evolved to accommodate different 

organizations, each with its own policies and procedures. 

Because of the continued operation of the legacy systems at locations 

where DTS has been fully deployed, DOD components pay DFAS higher 

processing fees for processing manual travel vouchers as opposed to 

processing the travel vouchers electronically through DTS. According to 

an April 13, 2005, memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Financial Management and Comptroller), DFAS was charging the Army 

$34 for each travel voucher processed manually and $2.22 for each travel 

voucher processed electronically—a difference of $31.78. The 

memorandum further noted that for the period October 1, 2004, to 

February 28, 2005, at locations where DTS had been deployed, the Army 

paid DFAS approximately $6 million to process 177,000 travel vouchers 

manually—$34 per travel voucher, versus about $186,000 to process 84,000 

travel vouchers electronically—$2.22 per voucher. Overall, for this 5-

43Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 

108-375, § 332, 118 Stat. 1811, 1851-56 (Oct. 28, 2004) (codified, in part, at 10 U.S.C. §§ 186, 

2222).

44GAO, Department of Defense: Long-standing Problems Continue to Impede Financial 

and Business Management Transformation, GAO-04-907T (Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2004).
Page 31 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

month period, the Army reported that it spent about $5.6 million more to 

process these travel vouchers manually as opposed to electronically using 

DTS. 

The military services have recognized the importance of utilizing DTS to 

the fullest extent possible. The Army issued a memorandum in September 

2004 directing each Army installation to fully disseminate DTS to all 

travelers within 90 to 180 days after IOC at each installation. The 

memorandum included a list of sites to which DTS should be fully 

disseminated and the types of vouchers that must be processed through 

DTS. Furthermore, the memorandum noted that travel vouchers that could 

be processed in DTS should not be sent to DFAS for processing. In a 

similar manner, in February 2005, the Marine Corps directed that upon 

declaration of DTS’s IOC at each location, commands will have DTS fully 

fielded within 90 days and will stop using other travel processes that DTS 

has the capability to process. The Air Force issued a memorandum in 

November 2004 that stressed the importance of using DTS when 

implemented at an installation. The Navy issued a similar directive in June 

2005.

Despite these messages, DTS remains underutilized by the military 

services. Some of the military services, and in particular, the Army, have 

taken steps to monitor DTS’s usage, but others, such as the Marine Corps, 

do not capture the data necessary to assess the extent to which DTS is 

being underutilized. The lack of pertinent data hinders management’s 

ability to monitor its progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the 

standard travel system. Until DOD develops and implements an effective 

strategy for overcoming resistance, parochialism, and stovepiped 

operations, transformation efforts, as envisioned by the 1995 task force 

report, will not be successful and the department will be faced with the 

continued proliferation of numerous business systems that are 

nonintegrated, duplicative, and waste limited resources.

Additional Actions Can Be 

Taken to Streamline DOD 

Travel Process

In its 1995 report, the DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel noted that the 

existing process was complex and imposed exorbitant administrative costs 

on DOD to ostensibly ensure that travel funds are not wasted. The task 

force concluded that the DOD travel system focused on (1) compliance 

with rigid rules rather than on performance of the mission, (2) outmoded 

travel practices, and (3) a nonintegrated travel system and that the 

department needed to address these problems. While DTS has reduced 

some of the administrative burden, other opportunities exist to further 
Page 32 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

achieve the vision of a travel system that reduces the administrative burden 

and cost while supporting DOD’s mission. While some of the opportunities 

could be implemented by DOD policy changes, others will require 

coordination with other organizations such as IRS. Examples of the 

possible changes in DOD’s travel management practices include the 

following:

• automating approval of changes to authorized travel expenses;

• utilizing commercial databases to identify unused airline tickets and 

obtain refunds;

• simplifying display of flights;

• utilizing airfares other than the GSA city pair fares, where cost effective; 

and

• using automated methods to reduce hard copy receipt requirements.

Automating Approval of 

Changes to Authorized 

Travel Expenses

The current business process used by DTS designates the traveler’s 

supervisor as the AO responsible for authorizing travel and then approving 

the travel voucher and making sure the charges are appropriate after the 

travel is complete. Furthermore, should the actual expenses claimed on the 

travel voucher differ from the authorized estimate of expenses, the AO is 

required to approve these deviations as well. For example, if the estimated 

costs associated with the travel authorization are $500 and the actual 

expenses are $495, then the AO must specifically approve the $5 difference. 

If the difference is caused by two different items, then each item must be 

approved. Similarly, if the actual expenses are $505, then the AO must 

specifically approve this $5 increase. This policy appears to perpetuate one 

of the problems noted in the 1995 DOD report—compliance with rigid rules 

rather than focusing on the performance of the mission. 

One practice that could be used to reduce the administrative burden on the 

traveler and the AO is to automatically make the adjustments to the travel 

claim when the adjustments do not introduce any risk or the cost of the 

internal control outweighs the risk. For example, processing a travel claim 

that is less than the amount authorized does not pose any more risk than 

processing a travel claim that equals the authorized amount since the key is 

whether the claim is valid rather than whether the amount equals the 

funding initially authorized and obligated in the financial management 
Page 33 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

system. The concept of using tolerances and making accounting entries is 

discussed in the Exposure Draft: Core Financial System Requirements

that was published by the Office of Federal Financial Management.45 These 

requirements were also contained in the previous document issued by the 

Joint Financial Management Improvement Program in November 2001.46

Using Commercial 

Databases to Identify 

Unused Airline Tickets

We have previously reported that DOD has not recovered millions of 

dollars in unused airline tickets.47 As discussed previously, one action that 

DOD is taking to address the problem is requiring the CTOs to prepare 

reports on the unused airline tickets. While this action is a positive step 

forward, it requires (1) the CTOs to have an effective system of performing 

this function and (2) DOD to have an effective program for monitoring 

compliance. 

A third party service, commonly referred to as the Airlines Reporting 

Corporation (ARC),48 may provide DOD with the necessary information to 

collect unused airline tickets in an automated manner. DTS officials have 

stated that they have had discussions with ARC, but were uncertain of the 

cost of obtaining and utilizing the data provided by ARC. If the information 

from ARC was utilized, DOD would not have to rely on the reports 

prepared by the CTOs and would be able to avoid the costs associated with 

preparing the unused airline ticket reports. According to DOD officials, 

this requirement has not yet been implemented in all the existing CTO 

contracts, and therefore, the total costs of preparing the unused airline 

ticket reports is not known. 

45Office of Management and Budget, Office of Federal Financial Management, Exposure 

Draft: Core Financial System Requirements, OFFM-NO-0105 (Washington, D.C.: February 

2005).

46Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, Federal Financial Management 

System Requirements: Core Financial System Requirements, JFMIP-SR-02-01 

(Washington, D.C.: November 2001).

47GAO-04-398.

48According to ARC, it was established by the travel industry to provide prompt, efficient, 

secure distribution and settlement of travel purchased in the United States. It also is a 

recognized travel industry data store and provider of travel industry knowledge and insight. 

According to DOD, ARC provides information on a subscription basis.
Page 34 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Besides using ARC for the unused airline tickets, DOD could use the 

information from ARC to provide assurances that the airfares claimed by 

travelers are correct. A case in point is an example we found in our review 

of premium-class travel. Since the ticket was obtained through a 

transaction outside of DTS, it was not included in the results previously 

discussed. We found that an Air Force senior executive purchased an 

airline ticket from Albuquerque, New Mexico to Europe with stopovers in 

France, Great Britain, Denmark, and Germany. He originally purchased a 

round-trip airline ticket using his government travel card for $3,159. The 

traveler then exchanged the ticket at an airport and received a $1,303 credit 

on the government travel card. We examined Bank of America data and 

confirmed that a refund of $1,303 was posted to the account. While in 

Munich, Germany, the traveler exchanged the ticket again and was charged 

an additional $515. The total airfare cost for this part of the trip was $2,371; 

however, the traveler submitted a voucher claiming the original estimated 

cost of $3,159 and included a handwritten receipt. The approving official 

approved the travel voucher, and the traveler was reimbursed $3,159, an 

overpayment of $788. Additionally, the traveler purchased an airfare ticket 

in Copenhagen to fly to Hamburg, and we found that the traveler submitted 

a receipt and requested a reimbursement of $628, even though Bank of 

America showed that ticket cost only $523—a potential overpayment of 

$105. As a result of these various transactions the traveler was potentially 

improperly reimbursed at least $893. 

Since ARC maintains ticketing data, such as passenger name, ticket 

number, flight information, and fees paid for over 3 years, access to ARC 

would allow DOD to obtain the entire history of refunds and exchanges 

associated with a given ticket number. This information would permit 

DOD to not only identify unused airline tickets, but also unreported 

refunds such as those in the previous example. Since ARC is the 

organization that assigns tickets numbers, DOD could easily query the trips 

of interest. Under this concept, DOD could take the ticket numbers and 

query ARC to validate that the (1) ticket had been used and (2) ultimate 

price paid for the ticket after any refunds. Any tickets associated with trips 

that had been completed but not yet used would be identified in this 

process, which would allow DOD to begin taking the necessary actions to 

ensure it received the reimbursement for the portion of the unused airline 

ticket. This information would also be useful in identifying refunds 

provided to travelers that were not shown on the travel vouchers.
Page 35 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Simplify the Display of 

Flights

The current DTS business rules require the system to display multiple 

airfares for the same flight. DTS displays airfares in the following order, if 

seats are available on a given flight:

• GSA city pair fares with capacity limits,49

• GSA city pair fares,50 and 

• other unrestricted fares—if GSA city pair fares are not available on that 

flight.

Following the above criteria, for a flight from Washington, D.C. (Ronald 

Reagan National Airport), to Dallas/Fort Worth, the GSA city pair fare with 

capacity limits, which is $188,51 would be shown along side the GSA city 

pair fare of $341, assuming that seats were available for both fares. We 

believe that the process could be simplified if only the lowest available 

airfare was displayed—in this case, $188. Using the above flight, DTS 

should only display the GSA city pair fare with capacity limits for the given 

flight, if seats are available, since it was the lowest-cost unrestricted 

airfare, rather than showing both fares. Furthermore, if a lower 

unrestricted fare was available, that fare, rather than the GSA city pair fare, 

should be shown. This approach would be in accordance with the GSA city 

pair program since it allows for other unrestricted fares to be accepted 

when the selected airfare is (1) lower than the GSA city pair fare and 

(2) available to the general public. Implementation of this change would 

require DTS to change its business process. Currently, if travelers have to 

change their flights and the fares are not the same, they have to go through 

49These fares are lower in cost and the terms and conditions are similar to GSA city pair 

fares except the airline limits the number of seats that can be sold. However, they are 

refundable, changeable, and have no advance ticketing requirements. These fares are not 

always available, especially for last-minute or peak-season travel.

50GSA awards contracts to the airlines to provide flight services. This is commonly referred 

to as the GSA city pair program. Under this program, (1) no advanced ticket purchases are 

required, (2) no minimum or maximum length of stay is required, (3) tickets are fully 

refundable and no charges are assessed for cancellations or changes, (4) seating is not 

capacity controlled (i.e., as long as there is a coach-class seat on the plane, the traveler may 

purchase it), (5) no blackout dates apply, (6) fare savings average 70 percent over regular 

walk-up fares, and (7) fares are priced on one-way routes permitting agencies to plan for 

multiple destinations.

51The $188 represents a one-way fare, which is how the GSA city pair fares are shown.
Page 36 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

the approval process because it necessitates change in the amount of funds 

obligated to pay for the flights. In reality, approving an airfare change from 

a GSA city pair fare with capacity limits to a GSA city pair fare should be 

“automatic” since a GSA city pair flight and airfare were being used and this 

airfare could have been selected by the traveler when the travel 

authorization was originated. Additionally, the automatic approval of such 

an increase would help alleviate concerns the travelers may have about 

amending travel authorization while in a travel status. 

Utilizing Restricted Airfares 

Where Cost Effective

DOD’s business rules and the design of DTS provide that only unrestricted 

airfares should be displayed. However, adopting a “one size fits all” policy 

does not provide an incentive to the traveler to make the best decision for 

the government, which was one of the stated changes documented in the 

1995 DOD report. Other airfares, generally referred to as restricted airfares, 

may be less expensive than a given GSA city pair fare and other 

unrestricted airfares. However, as the name implies, these fares come with 

restrictions. For example, within the GSA city pair fare program, changes 

can be made in the flight numerous times without any additional cost to the 

government. Generally, with restricted airfares there is a fee for changing 

flights.52

The Federal Travel Regulation and DOD’s JFTR and JTR allow travelers to 

take restricted airfares, including on those airlines not under the GSA city 

pair contract, if the restricted airfare costs less to the government. 

However, DOD’s regulations do not address reimbursement above the 

applicable unrestricted airfare if that charge was incurred for the 

convenience of the government. For example, assume that the GSA city 

pair rate between city A and city B was $300 and a traveler selected a 

restricted airfare for $250. If the traveler incurred a $35 change fee for 

personal reasons, then the traveler would be allowed to claim for 

reimbursement the $35 fee since the total price of the ticket ($285) was less 

than the GSA city pair fare. On the other hand, if the traveler incurred a $70 

fee and the change was for the convenience of the government, it is not 

clear under DOD’s regulations that the traveler would receive

52Other types of restrictions include purchasing the ticket in advance or staying over a 

specified number of days.
Page 37 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

reimbursement for the entire $320.53 Furthermore, even if the traveler felt 

certain that no changes would be required, DTS does not display restricted 

air fares. Additionally, at the present time, DOD does not have quantifiable 

information available that can be used to ascertain if the use of restricted 

airfares would be advantageous to the department.

Adopting a standard policy of using one type of airfare—unrestricted or 

restricted—is not the most appropriate approach for DOD to follow. A 

better approach would be to establish guidance on when unrestricted and 

restricted airfares should be used and then monitor how that policy is 

implemented. For example, travelers could be instructed to select 

restricted airfares when (1) the certainty of the trip occurring is highly 

probable, (2) the cost differential between unrestricted and restricted 

airfare would cover the costs of at least one change fee, and

(3) the restricted airfare meets mission requirements. Once these business 

rules were defined, DTS could be modified to incorporate them into its 

displays of available flights, which would assist the traveler in identifying 

restricted airfares that may be of interest and in compliance with DOD 

guidance. Although development of the guidance is an important first step, 

management also needs to determine (1) whether the policy was being 

followed and (2) what changes are needed to make it more effective. For 

example, a periodic review of the change fees associated with restricted 

airfares could be made to determine such items as (1) whether, after 

consideration of these fees, savings were accruing to the department and 

(2) if the change fees were significant, the reasons for those change fees. 

Since DTS could be modified to capture the change fees as a separate 

expense item, such quantifiable data would assist in this analysis.

Using Automated Methods 

to Reduce Hard Copy 

Receipt Requirements

While receipts provide valuable information that is necessary to validate 

claims, as noted in our sample results, the omission of receipts was a 

significant problem in our review of the travel vouchers. In some cases, 

DOD may be able to change its policy and reduce the number of receipts 

required and the associated administrative burden without adversely 

affecting its ability to ensure a claim is proper. However, in some cases, IRS 

regulations mandate that DOD obtain receipts. For example, IRS has 

prescribed certain guidelines relating to the requirement for receipts 

53Under the JFTR and JTR, if a DOD traveler arranges travel through a noncontract CTO, 

DOD will reimburse the cost of a restricted ticket only up to the cost of the least expensive 

unrestricted ticket.
Page 38 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

associated with travel expenses.54 In this regard, receipts are not required 

for expenses less than $75 (except for lodging) and transportation 

expenses where receipts are not readily available.55

Automated methods could be used to reduce the number of receipts that 

the traveler is currently required to provide without compromising internal 

controls. Currently, a DOD traveler is required to provide a copy of the 

receipt associated with the airline ticket, except when the ticket is 

purchased via the CBA. However, adequate information may be available 

from automated sources that would provide at least the same degree of 

assurance as the receipts. Specifically, when the airline ticket is acquired 

using a government credit card, the appropriate information is available 

from the credit card company in an automated form that can be used to 

validate the claim on the voucher. Besides the airline tickets, information 

on the government charge card could also be used to validate the claim for 

reimbursement for travel fees paid to the CTO and fuel charges. 

Furthermore, if DOD gained access to the information contained in ARC as 

discussed previously, then this information could be used to further 

support the costs associated with the travel claim.

Other automated methods that may be able to produce reasonable 

assurance of the claim may require consultation with IRS. For example, 

IRS requires that lodging expenses be supported by receipts showing 

(1) the name and location of the hotel; (2) the dates the employee stayed 

there; and (3) separate amounts for charges such as lodging, meals, and 

telephone calls.56 In the case of federal travel, such information is critical to 

determining whether the individual is receiving duplicate reimbursement. 

For example, if the employee was reimbursed $70 for lodging expenses, 

which included a $5 meal, then that employee could be compensated for 

the meal twice—once under the per diem allowance paid and then again 

under the lodging expenses. The information currently displayed by the 

government charge card vendor does not provide this level of detail. 

However, other automated techniques may provide reasonable assurance 

that the objective of not paying expenses twice is achieved. Conceptually, 

5426 C.F.R. § 1.62-2; see also, Revenue Ruling 2003-106, November 3, 2003; Revenue 

Procedure 97-45, October 14, 1997. 

55Internal Revenue Service, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses, Publication 463 

(Washington, D.C.: 2004).

56IRS Publication 463.
Page 39 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

using data-mining techniques,57 an entity could achieve reasonable 

assurance that the claims for lodging were reasonable and did not include 

duplicate charges. The following is one conceptual approach that could be 

used.

• DTS knows (1) the dates the employee claimed lodging expenses, 

(2) the amount of lodging expenses claimed each day, and (3) the 

location where those expenses should have been incurred.58 Also, 

assuming that the lodging was booked through DTS, it knows the rate 

that is expected to be paid.

• The government charge card system knows the (1) transaction date of 

the payment made to the lodging provider, (2) total amount paid, 

(3) name of lodging provider, and (4) location of lodging provider (city, 

state, and zip code).

• Comparison of data from DTS and the government charge card would 

indicate whether the claim for lodging costs was greater than or equal to 

the amount claimed on the travel voucher, which would provide 

reasonable assurance that the costs had been incurred. 

• Although the comparison of the DTS information to the charge card 

information would provide reasonable assurance that the charges 

claimed were actually incurred, it would not provide reasonable 

assurance that the costs claimed did not include duplicate charges. 

Reasonable assurance that the amounts actually claimed represented 

the actual charges for those items can be obtained by using the data 

already captured (or available) through two methods. First, since DTS 

knows the travel claims for a large number of individuals, it will have a 

high probability of knowing (1) the lodging expenses incurred by others 

at that facility and (2) the applicable tax rate for lodging associated with 

a given zip code. For example, if 10 travelers stay within a given zip 

code and the tax rate is 5 percent, then it is reasonable to expect that 

another claim in that zip code with a 5 percent tax rate is reasonable. 

Second, it may be possible to compare the rate claimed by multiple 

57Data mining applies a search process to a data set, analyzing for trends, relationships, and 

interesting associations. For instance, it can be used to efficiently query transaction data for 

characteristics that may indicate potentially improper activity.

58For example, the employee may have been authorized to travel to Washington, D.C., but 

stayed in Arlington, Virginia, which is located near Washington, D.C.
Page 40 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

individuals at a given facility even though those individuals may not 

have been associated with the trip or stayed at the facility on the same 

day. For example, if 5 travelers stayed at hotel A during a 6-month 

period and all of them claimed the same for lodging and taxes, then it 

would be reasonable to assume that this figure was the actual amount 

paid. Using these techniques, anomalies could be detected. 

The term “reasonable assurance” is important because no matter how well 

designed and operated, an internal control system cannot provide absolute 

assurance that agency objectives will be met. Furthermore, an important 

concept in internal control considerations is the relationship between costs 

and benefits.59 Because techniques and technology may allow DOD to 

achieve the reasonable assurances needed by IRS that, in effect, require 

DOD to obtain lodging and similar receipts, DOD could explore with IRS 

acceptable approaches for reducing the number of receipts required for the 

paper-based receipt process. Reducing the need for paper receipts would 

also reduce the administrative burden on the travelers and the AOs and the 

costs incurred by DOD for capturing and storing these receipts. 

Conclusions Overhauling DOD’s financial management and business operations—one of 

the largest and most complex organizations in the world—represents a 

daunting challenge. DTS, intended to be the department’s end-to-end travel 

management system, illustrates some of the obstacles that must be 

overcome by DOD’s array of transformation efforts. With over 3.3 million 

military and civilian personnel as potential travel system users, the sheer 

size and complexity of the undertaking overshadows any such project in 

the private sector. Nonetheless, standardized business systems across the 

department will be the key to achieving billions of dollars of annual savings 

through successful DOD transformation. As we have previously reported, 

because each DOD component receives its own funding for the operation, 

maintenance, and modernization of its own systems, nonintegrated, 

parochial business systems have proliferated—4,150 business systems 

throughout the department by a recent count. The elimination of 

stovepiped legacy travel systems and cheaper electronic processing, which 

could be achieved with the successful implementation of DTS, is critical to 

realizing the anticipated savings. Further, opportunities exist to streamline 

the department’s overall travel management practices thereby reducing the 

59GAO, Financial Management: Effective Internal Control Is Key to Accountability, GAO05-321T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2005).
Page 41 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

administrative burden and cost without affecting internal controls and, in 

some cases, improving internal controls over the department’s travel 

management practices. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve the department’s management and oversight of DTS and 

streamline its administrative process for travel, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following 10 actions:

• direct the PMO-DTS to effectively implement the disciplined processes 

necessary to provide reasonable assurance that (1) requirements are 

properly documented and (2) requirements are adequately tested; 

• direct the PMO-DTS to properly test new or modified system interfaces 

so that the intended functionality is properly operating prior to a 

software update being provided to DTS users;

• direct the PMO-DTS to require that all CTOs adhere to the department’s 

policy on the use of premium-class travel, even in those instances where 

it is listed as the only available airfare; 

• direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the 

heads of all DOD agencies, to reemphasize that travelers are to justify 

exceptions from department policy and the importance of the 

authorizing officials not approving any travel authorization in which 

exceptions are not properly justified;

• direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the 

heads of all DOD agencies, to routinely monitor, such as on a quarterly 

basis, information on the number and cost of processing travel vouchers 

outside of DTS and initiate action to eliminate funding for legacy 

systems, where applicable;

• direct the PMO-DTS to develop and implement the means to automate 

the approval of changes to authorized travel expenses where possible; 

• direct the PMO-DTS to consider the viability of using commercial 

databases to identify unused airline tickets, for which reimbursement 

should be obtained and help improve the assurance that the actual 

travel taken was consistent with the information shown on the travel 

voucher;
Page 42 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

• direct the PMO-DTS to consider simplifying the display of airfares in 

DTS; 

• direct the PMO-DTS to determine the feasibility of utilizing restricted 

airfares, where cost effective; and 

• direct the PMO-DTS to work with IRS to develop an approach that will 

permit the use of automated methods to reduce the need for hard copy 

receipts to satisfy requirements to substantiate travel expenses. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Director, 

DFAS, which are reprinted in appendix II. DOD concurred with all our 

recommendations and identified actions it plans to take to improve the 

department’s management and oversight of DTS and streamline its 

administrative travel process. For example, DOD stated that it will 

continuously monitor and adjust its processes to ensure requirements are 

properly documented and tested. Additionally, DOD noted that the PMODTS will incorporate system and travel review changes to ensure CTOs are 

following departmental policy by periodically reviewing premium-class 

travel authorizations. DOD’s comments also noted that the department will 

consider the use of commercial databases to identify unused airline tickets 

for which reimbursement should be obtained. DOD noted that this effort 

could be expanded governmentwide through ongoing collaborative efforts 

with GSA. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; Under 

Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics); and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. Copies of this report will be made available to 

others upon request. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions 

on matters discussed in this report, please contact McCoy Williams at (202) 

512-6906 or williamsm1@gao.gov or Keith A. Rhodes at (202) 512-6412 or 

rhodesk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Page 43 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

McCoy Williams

Director 

Financial Management and Assurance

Keith A. Rhodes

Chief Technologist

Applied Research and Methodology

Center for Engineering and Technology
Page 44 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

List of Congressional Addressees

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel Inouye

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate

The Honorable Susan Collins

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph Lieberman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Charles Grassley

Chairman

Committee on Finance 

United States Senate

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Chairman

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate
Page 45 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

The Honorable Tom Coburn

Chairman

The Honorable Thomas Carper 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government 

Information, and International Security

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Mark Dayton

United States Senate

The Honorable Duncan Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives

The Honorable Tom Davis

Chairman

The Honorable Henry Waxman

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable William Lacy Clay

House of Representatives

The Honorable Paul Kanjorski 

House of Representatives

The Honorable Edolphus Towns

House of Representatives 
Page 46 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To determine if the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively tested key 

Defense Travel System (DTS) functionality associated with flights and 

airfares, we reviewed two key DTS flight-related requirements and the 

related testing to determine if the desired functionality was effectively 

implemented.

To determine if DTS will correct the problems previously identified with 

DOD travel, we analyzed past GAO reports and testimonies, selected 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and DOD 

congressional testimonies. In this regard, we focused on how DTS 

addresses issues related to premium-class travel, unused tickets, and 

centrally billed accounts (CBA) and the accuracy of claims for travel 

reimbursement. More specifically, to determine if DTS will correct the 

weaknesses related to premium-class travel, we

• identified and tested all individually billed account (IBA) and CBA 

premium-class travel transactions processed by DTS for the first quarter 

of fiscal year 2005 (October through December 2004) for proper 

approval and justification and 

• obtained an understanding of the process to purchase properly 

approved and justified premium-class travel through DTS, and of the 

controls in DTS to prevent a traveler from purchasing premium-class 

travel without proper approval.

To assess the use of premium-class travel for IBA, we obtained from Bank 

of America a database of fiscal year 2005 first quarter (October through 

December 2004) air travel transactions charged to IBA accounts. The 

database contained transaction specific information, such as the price of 

the ticket, ticket number, name of passenger, date and destination of travel, 

and service code (first, business, or coach class seating accommodations). 

We also obtained from the Project Management Office—Defense Travel 

System (PMO-DTS) a database containing all vouchers processed by DTS 

for the same time period. We extracted all unique Social Security Numbers 

(SSN) from the PMO-DTS database and compared the information with the 

data from Bank of America. This comparison resulted in the identification 

of the IBA transactions that could be potential premium-class airline 

tickets. We eliminated all airfare charges that were less than $200, which 

created a listing of 380 potential premium-class travel IBA charges. In those 

instances in which there was insufficient information in DTS to ascertain if 

a premium-class airline ticket had been purchased, we requested additional 

information from the military services, such as travel itinerary or ticket 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 47 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

stub providing information on the class of service (economy, business, 

first) purchased. We reviewed the travel authorization and all supporting 

documentation to determine the class of service provided and determined 

if there was proper approval and justification for premium-class travel. 

To ascertain if the CBAs were being used for the purchase of premiumclass travel, we followed the same methodology used in reviewing IBAs. 

Our comparison resulted in the identification of 244 potential CBA 

premium-class travel transactions. The CBA listing only contained the 

travelers’ names and not their respective SSNs, therefore we requested 

additional information from the military services. In performing our 

analysis of the IBA and CBA, besides the $200 criteria mentioned above, we 

also eliminated all airfare transactions that were not processed through 

DTS or that we determined were economy-class airfare transactions. This 

process resulted in the identification of potentially 419 transactions in 

which a premium-class ticket could have been issued.

To address the issue of unused airline tickets, we discussed with the PMODTS specific actions that were being taken and visited five locations1

 to 

ascertain if the commercial travel offices were preparing the unused airline 

ticket reports. In regard to the duplicate payment for airline tickets 

purchased through the CBA, we reviewed DTS controls to ascertain if they 

were designed to ensure that tickets purchased through the CBA cannot be 

claimed on an individual’s travel voucher as a reimbursement to the 

traveler. 

To test for the accuracy of travel voucher reimbursements, we utilized the 

DTS database previously mentioned covering the first quarter of fiscal year 

2005. From this database, we extracted all temporary duty travel vouchers 

where the travel occurred from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004. We 

assumed a 10 percent rate of control violations, and we desired a precision 

of +/- 5 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level. These 

parameters, along with an assumed 80 percent response rate, led to a 

sample size of 173 travel vouchers.2

 Because we followed a probability 

procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large 

1

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado; Defense Logistics 

Agency, Virginia; Headquarters Marine Corps, Virginia; and Naval Operations Headquarters, 

Virginia.

2

We analyzed 170 travel vouchers, and at the time of our review 3 vouchers in our sample 

had not yet been completed and submitted. 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 48 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could 

have provided different estimates, we express the precision of our 

particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or 

minus 5 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the 

actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. 

As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence 

intervals in this report will include the true values in the study population.

To identify some of the challenges confronting DOD in making DTS the 

department’s standard travel system, we discussed with PMO-DTS officials 

their implementation strategy and reviewed past GAO reports and 

testimonies related to the department’s efforts to improve the accuracy and 

reliability of the information in its business systems. Additionally, we 

analyzed data on the number of systems interfaces that have been 

developed and implemented to date and those that need to be developed in 

the future. We also discussed with the PMO-DTS some of the specific 

actions that could be taken to further streamline the department’s travel 

management practices. In this regard, we reviewed past GAO reports that 

discuss specific actions agencies can take to streamline their respective 

travel management practices.

We assessed the reliability of the DOD data used for our audit by 

(1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) reviewing 

existing information about the data and the system that produced them, 

and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this 

audit. We performed our audit work from October 2004 through October 

2005 in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing 

standards. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 

Defense or his designee. We received written comments from the Director, 

DFAS, which are reprinted in appendix II.
Page 49 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 50 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 52 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 53 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System
Page 54 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contacts McCoy Williams, (202) 512-6906 or williamsm1@gao.gov

Keith A. Rhodes, (202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov 

Acknowledgments In addition to the above contacts, the following individuals made key 

contributions to this report: Darby Smith, Assistant Director; J. Christopher 

Martin, Senior Level Technologist; F. Abe Dymond, Assistant General 

Counsel; Beatrice Alff; Francine DelVecchio; Thomas Hackney; Gloria 

Hernandez-Saunders; Wilfred Holloway; Jason Kelly; Sheila Miller; Robert 

Sharpe; Patrick Tobo; and Adam Vodraska. 
Page 55 GAO-06-18 Defense Travel System

Related GAO Products

Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel 

Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers. GAO-05-400T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005.

Army National Guard: Inefficient, Error-Prone Process Results in Travel 

Reimbursement Problems for Mobilized Soldiers. GAO-05-79. Washington, 

D.C.: January 31, 2005.

DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars of 

Improper Payments. GAO-04-576. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004.

DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses Led to Millions in Fraud, Waste, 

and Improper Payments. GAO-04-825T. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004.

DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars Wasted 

on Unused Airline Tickets. GAO-04-398. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 

2004.

Travel Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to Improper Use of 

First and Business Class Travel. GAO-04-229T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 6, 2003.

Travel Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to Improper Use of 

First and Business Class Travel. GAO-04-88. Washington, D.C.: 

October 24, 2003.

(192146)
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