Defense Science Board 

Report 

on 

Corrosion Control 

October 2004 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 

 
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_________________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................... III

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................13

CHAPTER 2. LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT AND POLICY ..................................23

CHAPTER 3. DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING PRACTICES .............................31

CHAPTER 4. MAINTENANCE PRACTICES.........................................................43

CHAPTER 5. FUNDING AND MANAGEMENT ...................................................55

CHAPTER 6. SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF

CORROSION........................................................................................................59

CHAPTER 7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.................................71

APPENDIX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE.................................................................75

APPENDIX II. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ........................................................79

APPENDIX III. BRIEFINGS..................................................................................81

APPENDIX IV. GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS, AND 

ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................85

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_________________________________________________________________ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Weapons system readiness and safety are among the highest priority 

challenges for the Department of Defense (DoD). As it continues to receive 

a large number of mission taskings, it is imperative that DoD equipment be 

maintained at an acceptable level of material condition so that it may be 

employed safely and effectively when required, often in harsh and 

physically demanding environments. However, both the material condition 

and safety of DoD equipment are routinely being undermined by the effects 

of corrosion. The dollar cost of corrosion to DoD has been estimated by the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) to be $10-20 billion per year. 

Aggressive action is needed at every stage in the life cycle of this equipment 

— during design, materials selection, construction, operation, and 

maintenance — to reduce the negative effects of corrosion. 

At the request of the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, the Defense Science Board 

(DSB) formed a task force to address corrosion control efforts within the 

DoD. There are two major areas of concern with respect to corrosion for 

DoD — the Services’ weapon systems, including platforms, electronics and 

munitions, and the supporting infrastructure, including facilities, bases, and 

ports. Due to the direct impact of weapon system corrosion on combat 

readiness, the Task Force focused its attention on the former, although both 

areas are critical to DoD, and much of the subsequent discussion applies to 

both. 

The magnitude of DoD’s corrosion problem is uncertain. There have 

been a number of efforts within the Department to estimate the costs of 

corrosion; however, for a variety of reasons, these estimates are highly 

suspect and probably significantly understated. One thing is clear — 

without aggressive action now, corrosion will almost certainly become a 

bigger problem, with even higher costs, in the future. 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY _________________________________________________________________

This report divides the findings and recommendations of the Task Force 

into five areas: 

 Leadership commitment and policy 

 Design and manufacturing practices 

 Maintenance practices 

 Funding and management 

 Scientific basis for prevention/mitigation of 

corrosion 

LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT AND POLICY

Corrosion prevention has not been a priority within the DoD. As a 

result, DoD does not have accurate costs of corrosion prevention, mitigation, 

and remediation, nor does it know what the costs should be. Since 

corrosion costs are unclear, reform advocates lack compelling arguments for 

the resources required to reduce corrosion life-cycle cost (LCC). Without a 

life-cycle perspective and disciplined adherence to comprehensive corrosion 

reduction plans, significant performance improvement will be impossible. 

The Task Force found that most new systems continue to be built with a 

disparity of outlook between Program Managers who control corrosion 

prevention decisions and operational commanders who incur the actual 

corrosion costs. The problem is not the Program Manager, it is the system 

that incentivizes minimum acquisition cost rather than minimum life-cycle 

cost. In order to make any improvement in this respect, it is essential that 

there be two policy changes: (1) the collection and use of comprehensive, 

fact-based information about the extent and cost of corrosion within the 

Services must be mandated and supported, and (2) Service Acquisition 

Executives must introduce an effective incentive system in the design and 

acquisition phase that rewards minimization of LCC . 

A key element in any improvement is providing a sound basis for 

decisions and judgments. The current body of subjective, disjointed, and 

anecdotal information about weapon system corrosion must be replaced 

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with credible information based on metrics and data. Quantitative 

measures of life-cycle corrosion effects are essential to assure responsible 

investment decisions and effective improvement incentives. These same 

data are needed to model and predict the utility of alternative corrosion 

strategies. For the immediate future, absent comprehensive data and good 

LCC models, prediction of corrosion effects and the corresponding future 

operation and support (O&S) cost of corrosion will necessarily remain 

subjective. However, even subjective decisions can be significantly 

improved by (1) capitalizing on the judgment of independent corrosion 

control experts, (2) increasing accelerated testing of weapon system 

prototypes and early production products, with improved correlation 

between accelerated test results and actual equipment service life, and (3) 

increasing the use of detailed modeling of high-risk suspect “corrosion 

prone” areas. 

DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING PRACTICES

Decisions made during equipment design establish in-service corrosion 

properties and consequent life-cycle corrosion costs. If care is taken to focus 

on corrosion prevention by appropriate choice of materials, fabrication and 

assembly processes, coatings and coating application, et cetera, in-service 

problems can be minimized. It follows that incentives for corrosion cost 

reduction need to be focused on design and manufacturing. 

The most obvious problems in achieving this are (1) that corrosion issues 

generally require spending funds now for a payoff at some point in the 

future, perhaps as far out as twenty years, (2) Program Managers of today 

will be gone in a few years, and (3) estimates of costs and savings have 

substantial uncertainty. 

The current system provides the wrong incentives with insufficient 

emphasis on longer term savings. The Task Force recommends that an 

incentive system be put in place that rewards life-cycle corrosion cost 

avoidance. While the Task Force discussed the attributes of an 

incentivization plan, including the nature of incentive rewards for Services, 

Program Managers and contractors, the preparation of a formal plan was 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY _________________________________________________________________

believed to be beyond the scope of the Task Force capabilities. Any useful 

incentive system must be based on credible predictions of LCC and what it 

“should cost,” and be supported in execution by a disciplined DoD 

maintenance data collection system — to include maintenance cost. 

Without a “meter” on planned versus actual corrosion performance, even 

the best incentive system will surely fail. 

Both policy reforms — accurate and objective corrosion data collection 

and new incentives to reward life-cycle cost reduction efforts — must be 

implemented; neither by itself will result in improved equipment material 

condition, safety and readiness, and reduced cost-of-corrosion. It is critical 

that data be collected and used not only to understand the depth of the 

problem, but to enable a quantitative corrosion mitigation strategy, which is 

founded on fact. It is equally critical that Program Managers be incentivized

to make the data-driven design trade-off decisions that will result in 

minimum corrosion and minimum corrosion cost. 

MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

The life-cycle cost of weapon system corrosion is almost entirely 

represented by the cost of maintaining or replacing in-service assets. 

Although equipment re-design may occasionally be required due to 

uncontrollable corrosion, the most practical way to generally reduce the 

current cost of corrosion is to do more and/or better preventive 

maintenance. The Task Force found that industry achieved major savings in 

corrosion costs by implementing “best practice” maintenance and in-service 

engineering strategies designed to anticipate, detect, and treat minor 

corrosion before it progresses to the point where equipment function or 

structural integrity are placed at risk. 

”Best practice” maintenance strategies demand, as a precondition, that 

the current material condition of supported equipment be well understood 

and quantified. Achieving a quantitative understanding of the extent of 

corrosion requires on-site assessments by well-trained, knowledgeable 

corrosion experts. Some Service maintenance organizations have a robust 

organic corrosion control capability already in place (e.g., naval aviation 

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Squadron Maintenance Departments), but most operational units need 

assistance from outside experts. Capitalizing on such expertise, a small 

sample assessment for the Marine Corps collected data on 352 equipment 

items in the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit. These data were used to make 

fact-based repair/replace decisions which would have been impossible 

without the field team’s help. The Task Force is persuaded that adopting 

this approach across DoD would provide a solid basis for improvement. It 

would quantify the corrosion problem and enable the relative value of 

alternate corrosion strategies to be objectively evaluated. 

FUNDING AND MANAGEMENT

Further confirming the relatively low priority assigned to weapon 

system corrosion reduction, the Task Force notes that corrosion science and 

technology (S&T) funding is small, fragmented, and generally comes from

unrelated research and development (R&D) accounts such as Small Business 

Innovative Research (SBIR) and Strategic Environmental Research and 

Development Program (SERDP). Dollars devoted to corrosion prevention 

during weapon system RDT&E have historically proved insufficient. There 

is no specific corrosion remediation budget in Service O&S accounts. 

 The Task Force concluded that effective Service-level corrosion 

executive authority, able to advocate on behalf of corrosion-related issues 

and funding, is currently lacking, and is badly needed. A model that may 

be appropriate to this challenge is the Service S&T Executive. 

SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR PREVENTION/MITIGATION OF CORROSION

The major S&T objectives with respect to DoD weapon system corrosion 

should be (1) achieving a science-based understanding of corrosion 

initiation, propagation, and termination, (2) development of integrated 

predictive tools for system design and management, and (3) gaining 

understanding of evolving materials and environmental issues. In each of 

these areas, important gaps exist. 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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On the management and funding side of S&T, the Task Force concluded 

that there was adequate communication across the corrosion S&T 

community and that duplication of efforts was not a problem. After 

reviewing ongoing projects, the Task Force found that corrosion S&T 

funding is largely comprised of either environmentally-driven efforts or 

Congressional additions; these are beneficial, but totally insufficient to drive 

down the cost of corrosion. The Task Force also believes that current S&T 

portfolios are very technological, but appear to be short on research to gain 

detailed understanding of the underlying corrosion science. Such detailed 

understanding will be essential for development of the predictive models 

needed for future cost-benefit judgments. Steady, long-term corrosion S&T 

funding necessary to achieve a higher probability of successful research 

application is lacking; the S&T portfolio should contain a mix of long and 

short term efforts. Additional funding will improve corrosion research at 

the various DoD laboratories, as well as within the supporting academic 

community. Increased research needs to be carefully managed to ensure 

that corrosion science evolves to assist Program Managers with the design 

of future weapon systems resistant to corrosion, and to assist equipment 

maintainers to protect and preserve the material condition of fielded 

systems at the lowest possible life-cycle cost. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Task Force offers five recommendations which are summarized on 

the following pages. For each, a series of comments is given related to 

implementation of the broader recommendation. The FY05 funding needed 

to implement all of these recommendations is estimated as approximately 

$50 million. 

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Recommendation Implementation

1 Promulgate and enforce 

policy emphasizing lifecycle costs over acquisition 

costs in procurement and 

provide the incentives and 

training to assure that 

corrosion costs are fully

considered in design, 

manufacturing, and 

maintenance 

– Create independent team of corrosion experts to review all 

programs coming to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 

and all maintenance plans to provide the expertise 

necessary to decision makers (<$1M) 

– Develop incentive structures to assure corrosion/life-cycle 

cost (LCC) considerations in all designs and manufacturing 

• Motivate PMs with program flexibility

• Motivate contractors with “carrot/stick” fee incentive

contracts 

– Mandate corrosion testing & reporting at all stages of 

development (see Recommendation 2) 

– Issue directive to require that all major weapon system 

Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team (CPAT) members 

complete a Defense Acquisition University (DAU) developed 

course on corrosion control 

– Accelerate the introduction of activity based cost accounting 

to ensure future visibility into actual LCC including the cost 

of corrosion

Recommendation Implementation

2 Mandate and implement 

comprehensive and 

accurate corrosion data 

reporting systems across 

DoD, using standard 

metrics and definitions 

– Contract for support in developing standard definitions, 

metrics, etc to be completed and promulgated within one 

year ($5M) 

– Direct Services to conform to these standards and to enable 

capture of complete and accurate operator, intermediate, 

and depot level corrosion man-hour, material, and cost data 

– Use these data to make fact-based decisions regarding 

corrosion and corrosion cost and to track progress of 

platform material condition improvement efforts (ROI). (Cost 

for analysis included in contract above) 

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Recommendation Implementation

3 

Fund contract for 

comprehensive assessment 

of all DoD weapon system 

equipment with 

approximately 30 fiveperson teams of corrosion 

experts and use the results 

to develop and implement a 

corrosion strategy 

– Provide a separate funding line to support annual 

assessment teams, to provide the means and expertise to 

manage ongoing maintenance efforts, and to support 

organizational level training and maintenance ($25M) 

– Implement well-defined maintenance programs that include 

continuous corrosion performance improvement and 

continuing assessment and reporting 

– Require each Service to contract and execute its part 

– All results to be reported to common data base for analysis 

and to support the development of a joint strategy for 

corrosion maintenance that accommodates the unique 

factors associated with each Service (and system) 

– Extend assessment database to capture existing aircraft and 

ship corrosion data 

– Direct that Services establish best practices maintenance 

plans, benchmarking and providing adequate training to all 

involved personnel at operator, intermediate, and depot 

levels and across the Services

Recommendation Implementation

4 

Establish Corrosion 

Executive for each Service 

with responsibility for 

oversight and reporting, full 

authority over corrosionspecific funding, and a 

strong voice in corrosionrelated funding 

– Fund new corrosion mitigation and control initiatives by

requiring each Service to: 

• Establish PE in POM06 of $15M for each service 

as a starting point 

• Submit and fund plan, concurrent with PR07, to 

invest and realize 10% savings (or $300M/yr) in 

corrosion costs by 2012, well into “self financing” 

• In absence of credible plan, include $100M for each 

Service in PR07 and each of the out years

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Recommendation Implementation

5 

Refocus and reinvigorate 

corrosion S&T portfolio; 

triple the effective funding 

in this area (+$20M) 

Particular emphasis on: 

• Development of a materials-corrosion toolset that emphasizes 

science-based modeling & simulation 

• Fundamental mechanistic understandings of corrosion 

phenomena as well as accelerated testing 

• Substitutes for effective corrosion prevention materials that are 

being withdrawn due to environmental and safety considerations 

• Newly developed materials 

• Non-destructive corrosion sensing/measurement in the field as 

feedback to prognostic and condition-based maintenance tools

POLICY OVERSIGHT

The Task Force debated alternative organizational locations for corrosion 

policy oversight within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and 

concluded that separate, dedicated policy sponsorship for defense weapons 

systems and for defense infrastructure was desirable. Within the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology & Logistics (USDAT&L), 

the Installations and Engineering Office is the only logical location for issues 

dealing with the cost and safety implications of infrastructure corrosion. 

The weapons systems responsibility is more complex because there are 

two major and equally important areas, the ”here and now” corrosion 

challenge represented by weapon system maintenance and repair, and the 

”corrosion of the future” represented by weapon system design and 

manufacture. Assigning the responsibility to Defense Systems (DS) is 

appropriate for the longer term aspects of corrosion cost reduction since that 

office leads the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), but DS has little focus on 

current readiness and operating and support (O&S) costs. On the other 

hand, Logistics, Materiel, and Readiness (LMR) is completely focused on 

current readiness and cost, but has little influence in weapon system 

research and development (R&D) or design. 

The Task Force reached no conclusion on the details for policy oversight. 

One option is to separate the responsibility into the logical three 

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY _________________________________________________________________

components that line up with the USD(AT&L) organization and maintain 

the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (PDUSD) as OSD focal 

point. This could be satisfactory if that official can afford the time necessary 

to give the subject adequate attention through his Office of Corrosion Policy. 

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_____________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 

Weapons system readiness and safety are among the highest 

priority challenges for the Department of Defense. As DoD continues 

to receive a large number of mission taskings, it is imperative that 

DoD equipment be maintained at an acceptable level of material 

condition so that it may be employed safely and effectively when 

required. However, the material condition and readiness of DoD 

equipment are routinely being undermined by the effects of 

corrosion. This threat must be addressed. Aggressive action is 

needed throughout the life cycle of these combat and support 

systems — during design, construction, operation, and maintenance. 

SCOPE

At the request of the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) and the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness , the 

Defense Science Board (DSB) formed a Task Force to address 

corrosion control efforts within the Department of Defense (DoD). 

Specifically, the Task Force was asked to:1

 Assess current on-going corrosion control efforts 

with particular attention to: 

− Duplication of research efforts 

− Application of current and future technology 

which currently exists in one area to other 

areas 

 

1 The complete terms of reference for the Defense Science Board Task Force Report on 

Corrosion Control is in Appendix I. Appendix II lists the Task Force members. 

Appendix III provides a list of briefings provided to the Task Force. 

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− Current state of operator and maintenance 

personnel training 

− Current state of maintenance processes 

− Incorporation of corrosion control and 

maintainability in current acquisition 

programs 

− Identification of unique environments 

important to National Security but with little 

commercial application 

 Determine which areas would provide the most 

significant advances in combat readiness if adequate 

resources were applied 

 Assess best commercial practices and their 

applicability 

STUDY APPROACH

Corrosion is a problem throughout the Department of Defense. 

Both the Department’s infrastructure and its inventory of hardware 

suffer the ravages of time and the elements. The Department does 

not have an accurate estimate of the cost of infrastructure corrosion, 

nor of equipment corrosion, but the prevailing belief is that the two 

problems are about equal in dollar terms. There is much more mass 

on the infrastructure side, but it tends to be cheaper by the pound. 

Weapon systems are less massive than buildings and runways, but 

they cost more by the pound to purchase and maintain. 

Both sectors need immediate attention, but only the hardware side 

is directly involved in operational readiness and combat capability. 

Therefore, consistent with the Terms of Reference, the Task Force 

directed most of its attention to problems associated with DoD 

weapon system and equipment corrosion as indicated in Figure 1. 

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_____________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

Figure 1. Task Force Emphasis 

6

Task Force Emphasis

DoD Infrastructure

•Buildings

•Roads

•Piers

•Pipelines

•Etc.

DoD Hardware

•Weapon systems

•Training systems

•Capital equipment

•Etc.

•GAO estimates DoD corrosion costs at $10B - $20B/year

•Current impacts and costs of corrosion are highly suspect and probably 

understated

•Corrosion is likely to be a bigger problem in the future than present

Early in the study, the Task Force discovered that “corrosion” 

means different things to different people. A number of different 

definitions were encountered, including: 

1. “The chemical or electrochemical reaction between a material, 

usually a metal, and its environment that produces a 

deterioration of the material and its properties”2 

2. “The chemical or electrochemical reaction between a material 

and its environment that produces a deterioration of the 

material and its properties”3

3. “The deterioration of a material, usually a metal, that results 

from a reaction with its environment”4

4. “The degradation of a material by its environment”5 

 

2 ASTM Book of Standards, G15, in Vol. 03.02, ASTM International.

3 ASM Handbook, Vol. 13A, p.1014, ASM International. 

4 NACE Glossary of Terms, NACE International. 

5 Ulig’s Corrosion Handbook, Second Edition, P.1254, The Electrochemical Society. 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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5. “The deterioration of a material or its properties due to a 

reaction of that material with its chemical environment”6

Any of these definitions would have sufficed, but for the sake of 

standardization, the Task Force selected the one used by DoD in its 

Report to Congress, but added the “physical” environment. 

Figure 2. What is Corrosion 

4

What is “Corrosion”?

“The deterioration of a material or its properties due to a

reaction of that material with its chemical [and physical] environment”*

• Aircraft

• Ships

• Ground vehicles

• Weapon systems

• Electronics

• Munitions

• Infrastructure

• Nuclear

Each has different

corrosion problems and

approaches to 

prevention, mitigation 

and remediation

• Large fraction of maintenance and replacement costs are due 

to corrosion, wear and fatigue which are strongly interactive

• Research

• Design

• Manufacture

• Testing

• Deployment

• Maintenance

• Refurbishment

• Disposal

*DoD Report to Congress, Dec 2003

A common definition, however, does not necessarily mean 

common problems and common solutions. The Task Force observed 

many different materials being used within the different Services, 

and, of course, different operating environments. The result is a 

broad range of deterioration characteristics, consequences, and costs 

across the Department. As well, there is a broad range of 

opportunities for improvement. See Figure 2. 

Most people in the Department of Defense have seen corroded 

DoD hardware. Most observers, whether laymen or corrosion 

 

6 Department of Defense, Report to Congress, December, 2003. 

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_____________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

experts, recognize that corroded material is different than 

uncorroded material. Furthermore, most observers equate corrosion 

with deterioration. 

Physical deterioration is properly associated with reduced safety 

margins and reduced functionality. Corrosion results in reduced 

structural integrity and, in extreme cases, loss of life. Assuming the 

damage is repaired rather than ignored, deterioration due to 

corrosion is also associated with increased operating and support 

(O&S) cost. 

In addition to the cost of repairing corrosion, equipment out-ofservice for corrosion repair is not available for use; operational 

availability and readiness suffer accordingly. The readiness impact 

and cost associated with corrosion are generally correlated with the 

amount of corrosion present. Badly corroded equipment — which 

may reflect poor design, poor manufacturing processes, and/or poor 

maintenance — affects cost and readiness far more than lightly 

corroded equipment. However, untreated corrosion always gets 

worse. Figure 3 summarizes the impact of corrosion and the gains 

that can be anticipated from serious corrosion management. 

Absent accurate corrosion cost data, it is impossible to quantify 

potential benefit in real dollars, but there seems to be general 

consensus, both within the Task Force and among many of the DoD 

and industry experts who briefed the Task Force, that as much as 30% 

of current costs could be avoided by preventing more and repairing 

less. This is not a near-term target because it is heavily dependent on 

reforms in the DoD weapon system design and acquisition process. 

Better materials selections, corrosion-resistant designs, higher quality 

plating and coatings, carefully controlled manufacturing processes, 

and more disciplined corrosion testing are all required. No 

reasonable amount of preventive action in the field will keep poorly 

designed, poorly constructed hardware from suffering corrosion 

damage. But a well-designed item, given reasonable preventive 

maintenance, will be much less expensive to operate and support 

over its full service life. 

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Figure 3. Why Address Corrosion 

7

Why Address Corrosion? Cost

Estimate 30% of current DoD corrosion cost could be avoided

through investment in sustainment, design, and manufacture

Now

$ REPAIR/

REPLACE

$ PREVENTION

$ TREATMENT

Readiness

(Ao) clearly improves with

reduction of corrosion

Safety

e.g. 9 fatalities in 10 

years in Army Aviation

were specifically related

to corrosion

Future

$ REPAIR/

REPLACE

$ TREATMENT

$ PREVENTION

One might expect that something so obvious and so deleterious to 

material condition would have been thoroughly quantified. The Task 

Force discovered, however, that DoD does not know how much 

corrosion it is dealing with, nor how much cost is being incurred. 

This lack of situational awareness impacts many of the specific 

problems discovered by the Task Force because it deprives problem 

solvers of the credibility needed to get leadership attention and 

commitment. A laissez faire culture has emerged within which 

overwhelming corrosion is taken for granted, and the cost of 

corrosion is just another cost of doing business. 

Regardless of what the real cost is, corrosion damage is generally 

treated as a “must pay” bill because every alternative, at least in the

short-term, is unacceptable. Weapons and other equipment 

purchased by DoD are needed in the field, and they cannot be used if 

they are unsafe or non-functional. 

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Equipment availability can be sustained either by preventing 

failures from occurring or by repairing failures that do occur. In 

terms of labor and material, it is relatively less expensive to prevent 

corrosion or treat minor corrosion. It is relatively more expensive to 

treat major corrosion or repair corrosion damage after it has occurred. 

And, of course, it can be extremely expensive to replace an asset that 

is so badly corroded that it is beyond economic repair. 

The Task Force asked itself, “Could readiness and safety goals be 

sustained at required levels with fewer corrosion dollars if DoD 

managed corrosion differently?” Or, conversely, “Could readiness 

and safety be improved with the dollars being spent today if DoD 

managed corrosion differently?” 

A small sampling by an expert field team of actual equipment in a 

Marine Corps Unit with 352 reportable items revealed a high 

proportion of assets that, although not in “like new” material 

condition, were in good condition requiring only continued operator 

attention to prevent further deterioration due to corrosion. The 

results are shown in Figure 4. This level of organizational 

maintenance is relatively inexpensive. The on-site evaluations also 

reveal a small proportion of assets that are corroded to the point of 

destruction. Replacement of these assets can be extremely expensive. 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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Figure 4. Sampling and Strategy Option 

8

Strategy Option

CC-1: No Repair

CC2: Operator

Maintenance

CC-3: Surface repair

& paint at

Intermediate level

CC-4: Structural 

repair & paint at

Intermediate level

CC-5: Must Replace

Item

Material Condition

0

222

99

25

6 0

50

100

150

200

250

CC-1 CC-2 CC-3 CC-4 CC-5

Number of Units

Total Repair/Replacement Cost

USMC Data: Inspection team review of 352 vehicles of 11th MEU

Push

to

CC-1

Give

up; save

resources

USMC definitions

Action Required Potential

Strategy

No piece of equipment reaches the point where it has been 

destroyed by corrosion, CC-5 on Figure 4 (Beyond Economical 

Repair), without passing through increasingly unsatisfactory levels of 

material condition, e.g., CC-4 and CC-3. The total cost of dealing 

with each level clearly is significantly higher as the item moves to the 

right on the graph. Figure 5 illustrates a USMC truck assessed at CC4, “item requires repair at the intermediate level before painting,” 

and provides anecdotal evidence of the current tolerance of the 

problem. 

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Figure 5. USMC Truck Ranked CC-4 

A management strategy that dealt with all corrosion at the CC-2 and 

CC-3 levels, routinely restoring these items to CC-1, would almost 

certainly avoid the most serious CC-4 and CC-5 cases. Without real 

cost data, which is not readily available, one can only speculate on 

the cost advantage of doing this. However, it is likely that a great 

deal of corrosion prevention and treatment could be funded with the 

dollars currently required to rework or replace the most badly 

damaged items. A logical approach may well be to focus available 

resources on restoring CC-2 and CC-3, and immediately replace the 

10% in CC-4 and CC-5 condition. Replacement items would not be 

allowed to degrade below CC-2. Aside from the cost, the readiness 

and safety implications of such a strategy are obvious. 

Whether or not this particular strategy is embraced, information 

presented to the Task Force suggests that the cost and readiness 

impact of corrosion can be reduced if the DoD manages the corrosion 

challenge differently. Significant improvement, however, requires 

that certain institutional barriers be removed. 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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CHAPTER 1 ________________________________________________________________________

The Task Force’s examination of DoD’s corrosion program 

revealed numerous opportunities for both short-term (tactical) and 

long-term (strategic) improvement. As might be expected, many of 

these opportunities remain unrealized because of the barriers 

encountered. Five fundamental barriers were identified: 

 Leadership commitment and education 

 Hardware design and manufacturing processes 

 DoD weapon system maintenance practices 

 Availability of corrosion control resources 

 Gaps in the scientific basis for corrosion control 

Not all of these barriers are equal, but improvements will be 

required in each area if DoD corrosion costs are truly to come down 

and if DoD weapon system readiness is to improve significantly. 

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____________________________________________________ LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT AND POLICY

CHAPTER 2. LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT AND POLICY

To put current and on-going DoD corrosion control efforts in 

context, it is necessary to understand how senior leadership within 

the Department views corrosion. This view is inevitably shaped by 

the personal experiences of the decision maker, and colored by the 

professional culture within which he operates. 

Based on the data presented, the Task Force believes that, at the 

senior level, familiarity with weapon system corrosion is largely 

anecdotal, and the prevailing corrosion culture is, essentially, laissez 

faire. The lack of any priority for serious attention reflects the 

leadership’s ignorance of the problem, an ignorance based not on 

incompetence, but rather on a lack of accurate and meaningful data. 

Absent a genuine, fact-based appreciation of the effects that 

corrosion has on material and equipment, it is not at all surprising 

that the scarce time and resources available to the leadership are 

expended elsewhere, such as on better-defined requirements with 

metrics that support confident investment in improved performance. 

Standards of performance with respect to DoD life-cycle corrosion 

cost do not exist. Data systems for documenting, collecting, and 

compiling the amount and cost of corrosion labor and material 

consumed annually are highly variable. In general, DoD does not 

know how big or how expensive its corrosion problem really is. 

Consequently, it has no strategy for systemic improvement. 

There are exceptions of course and the Navy’s nuclear power 

program is a good example. Overall, however, leadership awareness 

and commitment must be raised to a significantly higher level if 

comprehensive, sustained improvement of corrosion performance is 

to be achieved. Responsibility for raising leadership awareness, and 

motivating commitment rests primarily with the corrosion 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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CHAPTER 2 ________________________________________________________________________

community — those who do understand the problem and who do feel 

a sense of urgency. 

Among the leaders most in need of education are those in the 

DoD acquisition community. Acquisition community members 

control the purse strings that fund the decisions which determine 

75% or more of weapon system life-cycle corrosion cost. New 

systems continue to be built with a disparity of outlook between 

Program Managers (PM) who control corrosion costs and operational 

commanders who incur the O&S costs. This disparity leads to a 

mentality of “build it cheap and fix it later.” Improved PM 

awareness, while necessary, is not sufficient to change the culture. 

Incentives must also be changed so that PMs are routinely rewarded

for making decisions that will reduce the life-cycle cost (LCC) of 

corrosion. The problem is not the PM, it is the system that 

incentivizes minimum acquisition cost rather than LCC. 

Figure 6. Policies 

11

Incentive system that

subordinates life-cycle

cost to “fly-away” cost

Policy Must

Change

Comprehensive, factbased information

about the labor and

material cost of DoD

corrosion

Incentive system that

rewards PMs for

minimizing life-cycle

corrosion cost

Incomplete, anecdotal

information about the

cost of DoD corrosion

CURRENT POLICY PRESSURE

STRATEGY & VISION for the

FUTURE of DOD CORROSION CONTROL

Data Incentives

Change Change

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In addition, policy guidance is also needed to mandate effective 

maintenance data collection and reporting systems — specifically 

including maintenance cost data. Neither of these culture changes 

will be easy, but only when both reforms have taken root can a 

strategy and a vision for continuous corrosion performance 

improvement be created and implemented. See Figure 6. 

Absent hard data, the basis for making judgment decisions 

regarding corrosion control alternatives is currently highly subjective. 

Decisions need to become objective. As discussed previously, the data 

upon which corrosion control decisions are made is currently highly 

anecdotal. Data need to become fact-based. 

Additionally, the distinction between “acceptable corrosion cost” 

and “unacceptable corrosion cost” is nonexistent. Leadership must 

define and quantify the “should cost” in order that standards and 

metrics may be created and used to track performance improvement. 

Currently, performance standards are ambiguous and substandard 

performance is not defined. 

The current basis for making decisions about corrosion and 

corrosion control is dominated by expert opinion, generally not 

independent of the program. While it would be unfair to categorize 

these decisions as consistently lacking objectivity, the amount of 

subjectivity present tends to foster debate that, if left unresolved, 

compromises consensus. Without consensus, senior DoD leadership 

will seldom commit significant resources. 

The difference between “educated guesses” and “informed 

decisions” is hard data. One source of hard data about DoD 

corrosion is weapon system testing. While there is some ongoing 

testing, particularly in the S&T arena, this effort needs to be 

substantially extended into Development Testing/ Operational 

Testing (DT/OT) to generate the quantity of hard data needed to 

ensure fielded systems perform as intended. Accelerated Corrosion 

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CHAPTER 2 ________________________________________________________________________

Testing should be comprehensive at every stage of development as 

illustrated in Figure 7. 

Weapon system designers and DoD Program Managers routinely 

test their hardware to evaluate hundreds of performance parameters. 

Corrosion may or may not be among these parameters, but even 

when it is included, there is often a question about what to do with 

unfavorable test results. 

Failure to meet corrosion performance standards should be 

treated no differently than failure to meet any other performance 

standard —it should require a redesign and re-test. The cost and 

schedule implications of such an eventuality may be enormous, but 

they must not be deemed unacceptable. In any case, the cost at later 

stages of not redesigning and retesting now will almost always be 

greater. 

Figure 7. Corrosion Modeling and Testing 

18

Corrosion Modeling & 

Testing

RESEARCH

DESIGN

DT&E

DISPOSE

OT&E

DEPLOY

MANUFACTURE

OPERATE

SUCCESSFUL DT&E?

SUCCESSFUL OT&E?

N

N

Y

Y

Test data and

in-service 

experience

needs to

be iterated 

back to lifecycle model

and design

process.

In-Service Experience

High fidelity life

cycle corrosion 

model unique to

each system

Corrosion S&T

Model Predictions

Realistic

 to

be included in hardware design 

tests and operational/acceptance

tests

Operational Test

Experience

DT Experience

tests for satisfactory

corrosion performance need

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____________________________________________________ LEADERSHIP COMMITMENT AND POLICY

Corrosion testing discipline is one of the first policies that would 

help incentivize changes in the Program Management culture. 

The final challenge requiring heightened leadership awareness 

and commitment is standards and metrics for corrosion performance. 

Absent the context provided by corrosion performance standards, 

even the most accurate corrosion data is meaningless. The Task Force 

examined a number of areas that had the potential to provide 

significant advances in combat readiness if adequate resources were 

applied. As initiatives were discussed and as returns on investment 

(ROIs) were contemplated, the Task Force frequently found itself 

asking “how would we know?” 

Decision makers need to know what the data are telling them. 

Knowledge is not created until measured values (data) are compared 

with required or predicted values (standards). The quality of DoD’s 

corrosion program only has relevance in relation to what it “should 

be,” and its cost only has relevance in relation to what it “should 

cost.” The Task Force was unable to find evidence that either of these 

concepts was well thought out within the Department. 

The vision end-state for corrosion decision-making is a reasonably 

accurate life-cycle corrosion model formed from inputs from 

independent expert opinion, test and field data reports, and detailed 

computer modeling of suspect areas selected by the experts for indepth analysis. While the accuracy of such models will likely not be 

perfect, it is realistic to believe that acceptable accuracy can be

achieved, perhaps within the next decade, if corrosion data collection 

systems and in-service information feedback loops are put in place 

today. Predictions based on the model would be credible. This 

credibility, taken to the budget table, would generate hardware 

design strategies and O&S resource levels sufficient to ensure that 

corrosion performance targets will be met. 

The data collection systems and data feedback loops needed to 

populate and support a corrosion simulation model 10 years from 

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CHAPTER 2 ________________________________________________________________________

now are the same collection systems and feedback loops needed today

to wean DoD away from “educated guesses” and toward “informed 

decision making.” Even without significant modeling, near-term cost 

and readiness improvements can be expected to derive simply from 

improved corrosion data collection and management. 

When users in the field are capable of presenting credible, factbased information to the acquisition community, and when Program 

Managers are incentivized to pay attention to O&S concerns, true 

culture change can begin. 

In a perfect world, all of the variables associated with corrosion 

could be modeled in a high fidelity computer simulation. Reduced 

levels of periodic testing would be used, not to evaluate hardware 

designs and manufacturing techniques, but, rather, to validate the 

model and its predictions. It is unlikely that the degree of detail 

necessary for modeling to dominate the assessment of LCC can ever be 

achieved or that doing so could be economically practical, so a mix of 

decision support systems is pragmatically the best goal. For the 

foreseeable future, prediction of corrosion effects must rely on an 

integration of three components: judgment of independent experts; 

accelerated testing of prototypes; and detailed modeling of limited 

numbers of suspect area, as identified by the experts. All three 

components are important and should see significantly increased use 

and capability improvement, where possible. These capabilities need 

to be directed in support of a well defined, widely understood 

prediction of the impact(s) of corrosion on weapon system LCC. 

FINDINGS

 Corrosion prevention has not been a priority across 

DoD 

 DoD does not have accurate direct and indirect costs 

of corrosion prevention, mitigation & remediation, 

nor does it know what the costs should be 

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 Since corrosion costs are unclear, Service decisionmakers lack compelling arguments for resources to 

reduce life-cycle costs 

 At the platform level, decision-makers also lack 

effective corrosion standards and test methods to 

assess corrosion performance 

 Few decision-makers in a position to reduce lifecycle corrosion costs are incentivized to do so 

The issues of leadership commitment and policy are closely 

related to the other aspects of corrosion prevention and control. 

Therefore, Task Force recommendations in this area are included in 

the subsequent sections: design and manufacturing practices, 

maintenance practices, funding and management, and scientific basis 

for corrosion prevention and mitigation. 

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CHAPTER 3. DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING 

PRACTICES

ANECDOTAL CASE FOR PROBLEMATIC DESIGN & MANUFACTURE

The Family of Medium-Size Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) prototype 

acquisition provides an instructive case study of the failure of the current 

system to properly incentivize the design and manufacture of corrosionresistant weapons. In the early vehicle specification, corrosion engineers 

recommended that the acceptable level of corrosion in accelerated vehicle 

testing be limited to “stage 1” corrosion — defined as “corrosion deposit on 

the surface accompanied by minor etching and pitting; base metal is sound.” 

In the programmatic tradeoff with other competing factors, the Program 

Manager’s vehicle procurement contract was written to allow up to “stage 

3” corrosion — defined as “corrosion resulting in erosion of material from 

the surface; base metal in the corroded areas is unsound and small pinholes 

may be present.” This decision allowed the contractor to use cheaper nongalvanized steel to fabricate the vehicle; galvanized steel would have cost 

approximately $200 more per vehicle. 

When the vehicle was built and tested, it, not surprisingly, showed 

substantial stage-3 corrosion, as depicted in Figure 8. This poor level of 

corrosion resistance was not acceptable to the users. The result was a very 

large expenditure ($10s of millions) to redesign the vehicle to correct the 

problem, and major delay in the FMTV production deliveries. Since both 

the PM and contractor initially did what they thought was expected of them, 

this suggests that the current system by which weapons are designed and 

manufactured often provides the wrong incentives to key decision-makers. 

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Figure 8. FMTV After Accelerated Tests

SYSTEM INCENTIVES

Incentives for corrosion prevention during the design, 

manufacture, and acquisition process must be based upon a 

reduction of the total life-cycle cost (LCC), instead of the acquisition 

cost. A consistent and defensible method for calculating the returnon-investment (ROI) for corrosion prevention investments made 

during the design and manufacturing process must therefore be 

developed. 

There are barriers to success even with a well designed incentive

process. Corrosion prevention will almost always require spending 

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__________________________________________________DESIGN AND MANUFACTURING PRACTICES

funds now for payoff 5-20 years later. Program Managers of today 

are usually gone in a few years. Costs and savings can only be 

estimated, making them vulnerable during inevitable budget drills. 

Successful incentives require unambiguous, objective 

performance standards and credible LCC performance metrics. Since 

the results of the PM’s corrosion control decisions will typically 

manifest themselves over 20 years or more, the metrics must be based 

on predictions, which need to be made by corrosion experts. The 

importance of a well-defined, rigorous and consistent process is 

obvious, and the availability of a panel of independent corrosion 

experts is essential. 

The nature of LCC reduction incentives will necessarily differ 

within the targeted population. The commercial sector typically 

responds to a variation in profits and/or risk in the contract; 

conventional procurement approaches can provide both positive and 

negative incentives. Program Managers (PM) are also critical players 

and are motivated differently; returning some percentage of expected 

LCC savings to allow the PM the flexibility and resources to fund 

other aspects of the program is one potential approach. Service 

Comptrollers also need to be motivated; assuring that program LCC 

savings are retained within the accounts that generated the savings.

Such an incentive system is essential for motivating improved 

corrosion performance and genuine reductions in LCC. Credible 

estimates of ROI demand a large and accurate database for all 

procured weapon systems. Traceable and quantitative corrosion data 

for deployed weapons systems is essential. Detailed cost accounting 

linked to weapon system maintenance is required. 

Improved incentives, while necessary, are not, by themselves 

sufficient to ensure improved corrosion performance. The 

consequence of the incentivized behavior must be evaluated to 

confirm that the incentives are having the desired effect. Unless 

weapon system prototypes are put through some form of rigorous, 

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CHAPTER 3 ________________________________________________________________________

accelerated corrosion testing, there is no good way to assess longterm corrosion performance. The complexity of the environment and 

its effect on the materials is too great to use anything less than 

empirical field tests. In the distant future, this should not be the case, 

but the current and foreseeable state of science and technology 

cannot yet model the vast range of environments, materials, and 

structural configurations that influence corrosion behavior. Actual 

testing is the only way to demonstrate that corrosion performance is

acceptable.

Demonstration Tests must be programmed into every weapon 

acquisition program early enough and with enough resources to 

allow for the identification and correction of corrosion design 

problems. The Test and Evaluation (T&E) rules and metrics must be

clearly spelled out by directive. Accelerated corrosion testing should 

be included at every stage of development. 

MATERIALS SELECTION AND DESIGN

The key to lowering the life-cycle cost of military equipment due 

to corrosion is to design and manufacture new systems for enhanced 

corrosion resistance. Weapons systems should be designed with 

corrosion prevention in mind. Investment in the design phase to 

prevent corrosion will certainly pay off well in reduction of LCC.

The OSD policy established by a Memorandum of 12 November 

2003 on corrosion prevention and control mandated evaluation of 

corrosion planning during the acquisition process. To meet this 

requirement Program Managers will require the availability of 

trained materials engineers to evaluate corrosion reduction measures 

in new designs. There may not be enough DoD employees with the 

requisite education and experience to meet this need. For example, in 

Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) alone there are currently 

twenty-six design teams and six new construction ship programs that 

all require corrosion professionals. 

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Training in corrosion materials and design measures should be 

made available for acquisition personnel at the Defense Acquisition 

University (DAU). This training should be a prerequisite for 

participation in and leadership of the Corrosion Control Integrated 

Product Teams. 

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

Performance standards for military material and hardware are 

almost always tiered, flowing down from the highest and most 

general description of the required functionality, to the most specific 

descriptions of the chemical and mechanical properties of individual 

pieces, parts, connectors, and coatings. 

Ideally there is an auditable “if-then” relationship between the 

corrosion resistant properties of a higher assembly and the corrosion 

resistant properties of its constituent parts. A properly defined 

weapon system corrosion performance specification is met by using 

materials and manufacturing processes that individually meet 

applicable sub-tier corrosion performance specifications. Said 

another way, the top-tier standard is not likely to be met if one or 

more sub-tier standards is not met. 

DoD’s corrosion program suffers from a lack of performance 

standards. Top tier corrosion standards seldom exist. When they do 

exist, they are often “advisory” — subject to being ignored. Sub-tier 

and process standards, once robust under the umbrella of detailed 

military specifications (MILSPEC) policy, have also become 

discretionary guidelines. 

Users in the field seldom have difficulty knowing when their 

weapons are not performing, operationally, the way they were 

designed to perform. This visibility extends down to the component, 

sub-component, and even piece-part level (e.g., a microcircuit on a 

printed circuit card). These same users do not know whether their 

weapons are corroding the way they were designed to corrode. 

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Without a standard of performance, there is absolutely no way to identify

sub-standard performance. Nor is there a way to determine 

accountability for safety and readiness problems that may be 

obviously and directly related to corrosion. 

Without an unambiguous standard of corrosion “goodness,” and 

a way to measure and quantify it (metrics), DoD’s corrosion program 

will forever be reactive. Costs will, by definition, always be out of control 

because it is impossible to know if they are in control. How much should

DoD be spending to control corrosion on the Bradley Fighting 

Vehicle? On the DDG Class of warships? On the F-15 fighter? 

If it does nothing else to manage corrosion differently, DoD 

leaders need to fill the standards vacuum. Standards and metrics are 

the most basic tools of management. DoD will never manage to solve 

its corrosion problem without them. 

Incentives for corrosion prevention during the design, 

manufacture, and acquisition process must be based upon a 

reduction of the total life-cycle cost, instead of the acquisition, or 

initial procurement, cost. As discussed earlier, this requires that a 

consistent and defensible method for calculating the return-oninvestment (ROI) for corrosion prevention investments made during 

design and manufacture be developed. Credible estimates of ROI 

demand a large and accurate database for all procured weapons 

systems. Traceable and quantitative corrosion data for deployed 

weapons systems is essential as is detailed cost accounting linked to 

maintenance. 

METRICS AND STANDARDS

Implementation of incentives requires metrics and standards and 

rigorous, defensible prediction of LCC using a well-defined, widely 

understood process. Such metrics and standards must also have a 

clear “cause-and-effect” relationship to mission readiness, personnel 

safety, and reduced LCC. 

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A standard method for probabilistic predictions of mission 

readiness, personnel safety, and LCC from accelerated test data 

should be established, documented, and uniformly applied across 

DoD. Accelerated testing should be based on well-established 

standards to the extent possible. DoD must participate in 

organizations such as the American Society for Testing and Materials 

involved in standards preparation. 

A rigorous mathematical formulation of ROI for corrosion 

reduction must be documented and consistently used by all Service 

Program Managers and equipment operators. This formulation 

needs to be transparent, easy-to-interpret, and universally accepted 

by Service Comptrollers. 

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY FOR DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE

 “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” As DoD 

moves into the twenty-first century, high-performance materials 

must be found and incorporated during design and manufacturing to 

eliminate potential corrosion problems before they occur. The 

computational design of materials, based upon desired performance 

targets, will soon be within grasp, and should be exploited. Other 

advanced approaches for the exploration of materials options, 

including combinatorial synthesis should also be explored. “The 

synthesis of compounds as ensembles (libraries) and the screening of 

those libraries for compounds with desirable properties continues to 

evolve as a potentially speedy route to new compounds and 

materials... combinatorial chemistry is now firmly established as an 

important tool in (material) discovery – not so much for synthesizing 

and screening huge libraries, but for all the combinatorial tools that 

have been developed. The field does not have to demonstrate its 

value any more, and expectations for it are now at a realistic level.”7 

 

7 Chemistry and Engineering News, October 27th, 2003, pp. 45-45. 

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PREDICTIVE CAPABILITY NEEDED FOR DESIGN

As discussed in the section on the needed scientific research, a 

well-coordinated research and development program could enable 

the development of an integrated corrosion model for predicting 

equipment failure and mission readiness at the component or 

subsystem level. A comprehensive corrosion performanceassessment family of codes will include a deterministic sub-model for 

time evolution of surface environments, and for predicting the 

initiation, propagation, and cessation (stifling, arrest) of each mode of 

corrosion-related failure (pits, crevices, cracks). Formal and 

controlled model abstraction is needed to facilitate probabilistic risk 

assessment. The uncertainty and variability of all parameters and 

inputs are also needed. The application of neural networks, expert 

systems, and the development of computer aided design or computer 

aided manufacture (CAD/CAM) systems to guide the creation of 

corrosion resistant designs needs to be explored. 

Carefully designed experiments should be used for calibration 

and validation of corrosion models. The associated experimental 

program will have to address: aging and phase stability; the 

evolution of deliquescence brines, biofilms, and other surface 

environments; general and localized corrosion in those environments; 

microbial-influenced corrosion; stress-corrosion and hydrogeninduced cracking; corrosion fatigue; and the stress distributions that 

drive environmental fracture. 

INTEGRATION OF HIGH PERFORMANCE MATERIALS & SENSORS

Many advanced materials solutions have already attained a 

reasonably high degree of maturity, and could be applied to some of 

the corrosion and wear problems that are being encountered within 

the DoD. While incomplete, a list of such materials and fabrication 

innovations that could be considered during the design and 

procurement of new weapons systems include: 

 Electro-coatings and wear-resistant thermal sprays 

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 Substrates designed for coating application 

 Smart materials with sensing and self-healing 

capabilities 

 Better joining technology 

 Welding processes with minimal heat affected 

zones, such as reduced-pressure electron-beam 

welding 

 Stress mitigation with advanced processes such as 

laser peening 

New weapons systems should be designed and built with 

integrated sensors to provide the warfighter and other decision 

makers early warning of potentially catastrophic failures in weapons 

systems that are due to corrosion and other materials degradation 

phenomena. Such integrated diagnostics, if reliable and robust, will 

build confidence on the battlefield. A variety of methodologies for 

the potential integration of sensor technology into new weapons 

systems have been identified, such as: 

 Smart coating technology that also serves as 

indicator of underlying corrosion 

 Advanced non-destructive evaluation methods, such 

as laser-based methods for stand-off non-contact 

detection of corrosion and environmental fracture 

Caution must be exercised in adopting new materials for 

incorporation into weapons designs—specifically in regards to 

“green” (environmentally friendly) coating technology. All chromate 

replacements should be subjected to toxicology studies comparable to 

those used for chromate coatings. Many of the chromate 

replacements also involve oxidizing species (such as cerium) that 

may pose a long-term cancer risk. Substantially more emphasis 

should be placed on non-cerium chromate conversion coatings. All 

funded research should include tests aimed at the early identification 

of barriers to transition. 

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CHAPTER 3 ________________________________________________________________________

FINDINGS

After reviewing a large number of presentations from the various 

Services, as well as presentations from industry, a number of findings 

pertaining to design and manufacture of weapons systems with 

enhanced corrosion resistance emerged. 

 The design phase largely establishes future 

corrosion and life-cycle costs 

− Material, coatings selection and structural 

aspects are critical 

− Corrosion specialists must participate 

− The most advanced technologies from 

commercial world must be considered 

 Predictive corrosion models adequate for guiding 

the design of weapons systems do not exist 

 Maintenance cost accounting systems adequate for 

estimating return on investment (ROI) do not exist 

 Acquisition and design personnel are not 

empowered with the training necessary to minimize 

the impact of corrosion on life-cycle costs 

 Independent expert panels are not used to review 

the selection of corrosion resistant materials, 

coatings, etc. used in new systems 

 Existing DoD corrosion standards and metrics vary 

widely in quality and are often “advisory” in nature 

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Implementation

1 Promulgate and enforce 

policy emphasizing lifecycle costs over acquisition 

costs in procurement and 

provide the incentives and 

training to assure that 

corrosion costs are fully

considered in design, 

manufacturing, and 

maintenance 

– Create independent team of corrosion experts to review all 

programs coming to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 

and all maintenance plans to provide the expertise 

necessary to decision makers (<$1M) 

– Develop incentive structures to assure corrosion/life-cycle 

cost considerations in all designs and manufacturing 

• Motivate PMs with program flexibility

• Motivate contractors with “carrot/stick” fee incentive

contracts 

– Mandate corrosion testing & reporting at all stages of 

development (see Recommendation 2) 

– Issue directive to require that all major weapon system 

Corrosion Prevention Assessment Team (CPAT) members 

complete a Defense Acquisition University (DAU) developed 

course on corrosion control 

– Accelerate the introduction of activity based cost accounting 

to ensure future visibility into actual life-cycle cost and cost 

of corrosion

Recommendation #1 is to promulgate and enforce a policy 

emphasizing LCC over acquisition costs in weapon system 

procurement and provide the incentives and training to assure that 

corrosion costs are fully considered in design, manufacturing, and 

maintenance. Five elements of implementation are listed with a total 

near-term investment cost on the order of $1 million, primarily to 

assemble a standing team of corrosion experts to advise decision 

makers. 

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CHAPTER 3 ________________________________________________________________________

Recommendation Implementation

2 Mandate and implement 

comprehensive and 

accurate corrosion data 

reporting systems across 

DoD, using standard 

metrics and definitions 

– Contract for support in developing standard definitions, 

metrics, etc. to be completed and promulgated within one 

year ($5M) 

– Direct Services to conform to these standards and to enable 

capture of complete and accurate operator, intermediate, 

and depot level corrosion man-hour, material, and cost data 

– Use these data to make fact-based decisions regarding 

corrosion and corrosion cost and to track progress of 

platform material condition improvement efforts (return on 

investment). (Cost for analysis included in contract above) 

Recommendation #2 is to mandate and implement 

comprehensive and accurate corrosion data reporting systems across 

DoD, using standard metrics and definitions that will be developed. 

In this case, three specific implementation actions are shown with a 

cost estimated at about $5 million, largely for contract support in the 

development of standards and metrics.

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CHAPTER 4. MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

DOD WEAPON SYSTEM MAINTENANCE PRACTICES

The services pay for corrosion repairs mostly out of operating 

funds as a “cost of doing business.” When a corrosion condition 

results in material degradation, the owner must pay to have it fixed. 

The longer he waits, the worse the problem. Separating the cost of 

corrosion from other maintenance costs is difficult if not impossible 

with existing Service Maintenance Data Collection Systems (MDCS), 

as corrosion is almost always a factor in the overall material condition 

of any weapons system. The cost of corrosion is often buried within 

the current cost of maintaining or replacing existing assets. 

Lacking an overarching DoD strategy for addressing the problem 

of weapon system corrosion, the Task Force found that most current 

improvement initiatives are the result of isolated instances of the 

application of a new technology or due to a transient military leader

who makes corrosion reduction a personal priority. These singlepoint solutions, although commendable, will not solve the systemic 

problem. 

In order to address the global challenge of current, in-service 

corrosion, there must be a clear understanding of the extent of the

corrosion problem and a link between the corrosion problems in the 

field and the alternative maintenance strategies available to address 

them. The Task Force was briefed on several private sector strategies 

for addressing equipment corrosion in their respective industries 

(heavy equipment, airline, etc.). In benchmarking commercial 

equipment operators, the Task Force found a common thread often 

summarized as “Best Practice Maintenance.” This approach, which 

generally translates into “least cost (life-cycle cost!) maintenance,” 

has direct applicability to the DoD. Corrosion preventive methods 

and practices, and continued process improvements that make up a 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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“best practice maintenance” program are always “top-down” driven 

with a real commitment by those at the highest level of authority. 

“Best Practice Maintenance” is also data-driven maintenance. 

Once the major corrosion cost drivers are identified and the cause 

and extent of corrosion are understood for a specific system or 

component, a strategy and program to fix the problem is devised. 

Corrosion monitoring and inspection is closely tied to maintenance 

practices. Maintenance is most effective when problems are 

identified at the earliest possible date before damage becomes severe. 

Therefore, a comprehensive inspection and evaluation program is 

performed to identify a problem and assess/classify its severity to 

insure effective maintenance practices are implemented early. Proper 

training of personnel at the different levels of maintenance is critical 

to insure the effectiveness of a “best practice maintenance” program. 

When properly implemented, lessons learned from the corrosion 

program will drive future design, acquisition, and performance 

specifications. Therefore, the implementation of a “best practice 

maintenance” program must include a means of returning equipment 

corrosion performance data back to the cognizant engineering and 

design agency. Only in this manner, can the full benefit and cost 

savings associated from a “best practice maintenance” program be 

realized. Figure 9 shows schematically the interaction of the 

components of a “best practice maintenance” program. 

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Figure 9. Best Maintenance Practices 

Best Maintenance

Practices

OEM

DESIGN

IDENTIFICATION

AND

INSPECTION

EVALUATION

AND

ASSESSMENT

REMEDIATION

RECOMMENDATION

-PROCESS

- PRODUCT

IMPLEMENTATION

CERTIFICATION

DATA

BASE

RETURN

TO

Okay SERVICE

Monitor

Detection

Okay for Service

Service

Required

Dispose/replace

Fail

Okay for Service

• Corrosion Monitoring / Inspection / Maintenance

PERIODIC INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT STRATEGY

Many of the principles of commercial “Best Practice Maintenance”

are found in DoD’s Condition Based Maintenance. Condition based 

maintenance is an efficient means of establishing the need for 

periodic maintenance during the life of a component. This requires 

monitoring and inspecting the component at regular intervals, or 

better yet, some means of continuous monitoring. Several methods 

of monitoring are under development through field trials and R&D. 

Regular routine inspections for the purpose of condition based 

maintenance requires the training of personnel at the user level. Both 

of these will require time to implement and probably will result in 

very basic inspections without the assessment/evaluation of severity 

of the corrosion problem, which requires a more significant level of 

training than the identification of the problem. In addition, it is very 

difficult to establish program needs and requirements when there is 

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presently no means of knowing the extent of the problem throughout 

the Services. 

While some segments of the DoD already employ relatively 

mature and robust corrosion mitigation strategies (e.g, naval nuclear 

reactors, naval aviation), the majority of DoD weapons and 

equipment are operated and maintained with only relatively casual 

regard for corrosion reduction. Consequently, much of the inventory 

is corroded. Unfortunately, as discussed previously, no one knows 

how much or how badly. There is a significant need to assess 

corrosion for all DoD assets (weapon systems and facilities). This 

comprehensive assessment should have the following purposes: 

1. To establish the corrosion condition of DoD assets at the 

beginning of DoD’s implementation of a Services-wide 

corrosion reduction program. Subsequent assessments will 

permit the effectiveness of DoD’s corrosion strategy to be

evaluated. 

2. The assessment will characterize the types of problems 

identified and permit comprehensive maintenance 

strategies and solutions to be established. 

3. The initial assessment will lead to the establishment of best 

practice procedures for data collection, for assessing large 

numbers of assets, and for the establishment of measures 

and metrics for assessing corrosion for a particular system 

or facility component.

4. The initial assessment will serve to populate the data base 

on the corrosion condition of DoD assets. 

5. The assessment teams can simultaneously train local teams 

for the purpose of routine condition assessments and 

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identification of problems to be used in a condition based 

maintenance program. 

The best method to accomplish the above goals is to send out 

small teams of independent corrosion experts to conduct an 

assessment of DoD assets. This should start with an assessment team 

visiting one or a few sample sites to develop a repeatable process for 

all. 

An example of a model program is the USMC corrosion 

assessment effort at the 11th MEU (see Figure 10). However, while 

the USMC effort ranks maintenance requirements, it does not 

evaluate and characterize the extent and type of corrosion damage, 

which would also need to be included in the field team assessments 

to accomplish the described goals. 

This assessment would provide a sound basis for establishing 

DoD-wide corrosion reduction strategies. The results of the surveys 

would also provide a baseline for a prioritized list of corrosion 

problems for use in building remediation budgets. The cost of 

corrosion repairs would be identified and rolled up for use in 

assessment of new weapon system designs. 

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Figure 10. Periodic Assessment 

Strategy Option

CC-1: No Repair

CC2: Operator 

Maintenance

CC-3: Surface repair & 

paint at Intermediate level

CC-4: Structural repair & 

paint at Intermediate level

CC-5: Must Replace Item

Material Condition

0

222

99

25

6

0

50

100

150

200

250

CC-1 CC-2 CC-3 CC-4 CC-5

Nu

m

ber of Units

Total Repair/Replace

ment Cost

USMC Data: Inspection team review of 352 vehicles of 11th MEU

Push

to

CC-1

Give

up; save

resources

USMC definitions

Action Required

BENCHMARKING 

An initial step in establishing a “best practice maintenance” 

program requires knowledge about other programs with similar 

problems. Benchmarking other programs can be conducted 

simultaneously with the initial corrosion assessments. For ground 

vehicles and equipment, a detailed review of the USMC model for 

characterizing maintenance and how and where the maintenance will 

be performed would be a reasonable starting point. Benchmarking 

within the DoD is important, but benchmarking industry practices is 

also critical. Although it is clear that there are significant differences 

in drivers between a for-profit-industry-leader (Delta, UPS, etc.) and 

DoD, reviewing the maintenance practices and incorporating critical 

aspects of an overall best practice maintenance program is important. 

An area to look at for facilities including pipelines, roads, bridges, 

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and substructures is Department of Transportation (DoT). For 

instance, the Office of Pipeline Safety of the DoT provides regulations 

for the operation and integrity management for buried pipelines. 

In our look at industry practices, it seems clear that the more 

successful efforts repair corrosion effects as soon as detected (i.e. CC1 or CC-2 in the model illustrated in Figure 4) and thus prevent more 

severe impacts. This is a likely starting point in defining DoD 

strategies and policies.

It would be very inefficient for each Service to perform 

independent benchmarking studies. These studies should be 

coordinated at a high level. Each best-practice-maintenance-program 

for a system or component should have the same basic framework 

and reflect the overall philosophy established and promoted by the 

DoD. This will require a strong, centralized effort. 

TRAINING

Maintenance training in general, and corrosion control training 

specifically, is highly variable within and among the Services. 

Additionally, the various warfare communities have different 

maintenance cultures. At a high level, there are two basic approaches 

to weapon system maintenance: maintenance performed by those 

who operate the equipment, and maintenance performed by 

dedicated, professional maintainers (who are not operators). Typical 

of the former are Army and Marine Corps ground combat units and 

Navy ships. Typical of the latter are aviation Squadrons (all 

Services). Additionally, most warfare communities are supported by 

Intermediate Maintenance Activities (IMAs) staffed by maintenance 

professionals (who are not operators). All Services also operate large 

depot industrial facilities also populated by maintenance 

professionals —usually civilian — who are not operators. Within this 

large and diverse operator/maintainer population are many with 

significant corrosion control training and many more with none. 

Because of the hostile operating environment and the safety 

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implications of a corrosion-induced structural failure, all naval 

aviation Squadrons, for example, have very capable Corrosion 

Control Workcenters staffed by well-trained professionals. Naval 

aviation IMAs and naval aircraft depots are likewise staffed with 

corrosion experts. Professional maintainers, in all Services and at all 

maintenance levels, expect to be tasked to fix things —this is their 

chosen career field. On the other hand, the weapon system 

operators, who generally do not have journeyman level maintenance 

skills, do not expect to be required to fix things. They expect their 

equipment to work when they need it and to be provided what they 

need to do their war-fighting job. They generally do not enlist to 

paint their ships and vehicles. 

As might be expected, much of DoD’s current “corrosion crisis” 

seems to be centered in the warfare communities which do not have

routine access to trained maintenance professionals. This does not to 

imply that the Air Force, Army aviation, or Naval aviation are 

without significant corrosion problems, but it does suggest that, from 

the standpoint of corrosion control training, aviation seems to have a 

leg up. 

Corrosion is a complex process that can manifest itself in many 

forms, some of which are easy to recognize (large amounts of 

corrosion products on bare or poorly coated surfaces, deep pitting 

that may go through a wall, and severe blistering of a coating due to 

corrosion beneath the coating); while other forms may be difficult to 

detect and assess (crevice corrosion, corrosion at joints, stress 

corrosion cracking, corrosion fatigue, small pits, or even deep pits

that are very small but penetrate deep into the metal). It is not 

reasonable to expect all military personnel to be corrosion experts. 

Therefore, training must match both the individual’s expertise and 

the job function he/she is expected to perform. Training programs 

must be developed and taught at the different levels of maintenance 

and responsibility (operator, intermediate, depot, and program 

manager office). 

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The corrosion training that the operator gets should therefore only 

be to recognize what causes corrosion and the consequences of not 

taking reasonable preventive measures. Training is primarily on-thejob training. 

At the intermediate and depot level, corrosion training and 

expertise is important. This is particularly true in the aviation 

communities, where aircraft maintainers are trained to correct 

corrosion problems on aircraft as a vital part of safety. The 

requirements of this training, at the different levels, are outlined in 

Figure 11. 

At the Program Manager level, basic decisions are made with 

respect to the implementation of corrosion control strategies. It is 

important that at this level, benefits of different preventive methods 

be appreciated and that savings as identified by life-cycle costing be 

understood. 

 Figure 11. Training Requirements 

• Operator Level (Soldier, Sailor, Marine)

– Knowledge/awareness of importance of corrosion

– Primarily On the Job (OJT)

• Intermediate Level (military and civilian)

– Knowledge of corrosion prevention measures

– Technical training for corrosion prevention

– Basic corrosion maintenance assessment methodologies

• Depot Level (Private and Public)

– Knowledge of long term corrosion measures

– Inspector training for coating application and QA

– Detail corrosion assessment methodologies

• Program Manager Office Level

– LCC for maintenance/repair/replace decisions

– Detailed implementation of corrosion control methods

Training Requirements

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FINDINGS

 Extent of maintenance needs and current state of 

corrosion is not well characterized for most nonaviation assets 

 Quantitative understanding of the corrosion 

problem requires comprehensive, on-site 

assessments 

 It has been shown in industry that major savings in 

corrosion cost can be achieved through instituting 

“best practice” engineering and maintenance 

strategies 

 Appreciation and implementation of corrosion 

control practices varies significantly throughout the 

services 

 Systematic corrosion control training and awareness 

among operator-maintainers is lacking 

 Consistent and comprehensive corrosion control and 

maintenance strategies throughout all Services and 

for all systems including infrastructure does not 

exist 

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Implementation

3 

Fund contract for 

comprehensive assessment 

of all DoD weapon system 

equipment with 

approximately 30 fiveperson teams of corrosion 

experts and use the results 

to develop and implement a 

comprehensive corrosion 

maintenance strategy 

– Provide a separate funding line to support annual 

assessment teams, to provide the means and expertise to 

manage ongoing maintenance efforts and to support 

organizational level training and maintenance ($25M) 

– Implement well-defined maintenance programs that includes 

continuous corrosion performance improvement and 

continuing assessment and reporting 

– Require each Service to contract and execute its part 

– Report all results to common data base for analysis and to 

support the development of a joint strategy for corrosion 

maintenance that accommodates the unique factors

associated with each Service (and system) 

– Extend assessment database to capture existing aircraft, 

ship, and facility corrosion data 

– Direct that Services establish best practices maintenance 

plans, benchmarking and providing adequate training to all 

involved personnel at operator, intermediate, and depot 

levels

Recommendation #3 is to fund a contract for comprehensive 

assessment of all DoD weapon system equipment with 

approximately 30 five-person teams of corrosion experts and use the 

results to develop and implement a comprehensive corrosion 

maintenance strategy. This set of assessment teams is estimated to 

cost approximately $25 million per year and should be continued 

indefinitely. In addition to the initial DoD-wide assessment 

including both weapon systems and infrastructure, which should be 

completed in about 2 years, these groups can and should help in 

maintenance in high-corrosion areas as well as periodically revisiting 

all DoD systems and facilities. 

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CHAPTER 5. FUNDING AND MANAGEMENT

The importance of corrosion in terms of cost and operational 

readiness has been well established. How to deal with it has not. 

Corrosion prevention and control affects the entire life-cycle of a 

weapons system. Responsibility for corrosion therefore crosses over

existing organizational boundaries of S&T, acquisition, and 

operation. Centralized funding and management is needed to cross 

these boundaries, integrate corrosion control efforts, assemble and

distribute corrosion data, set overall policy, and reduce the cost of 

corrosion. 

FINDINGS

 Effective corrosion executive authority to advocate 

corrosion-related issues/funding is lacking at the 

Service level 

 Corrosion S&T funding is small and fragmented 

− Funded out of unrelated R&D accounts within 

DoD (SBIR, SERDP, etc.) 

 Dollars devoted to corrosion prevention during 

weapon system acquisition have historically proved 

insufficient 

 O&M corrosion remediation budget does not exist 

 The Task Force assumed an annual DoD weapon 

system/hardware corrosion cost of $10B/yr, a 

potential reduction of 15% (~$1.5B) by 2015 and an 

average ROI of 10:1 to estimate required funding. 

To the extent these estimates are valid, an annual 

investment of $58M/yr per Service is required 

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When a need for improved corrosion control coordination 

between Services was recognized at many levels, including Congress, 

a DoD office of corrosion policy and oversight was established. This 

office provided the focus to make significant progress in addressing 

corrosion control issues. Although this is recognized as a positive 

step by the Task Force and a continued requirement for establishment 

of centralized DoD corrosion control policy, there is an additional 

need for a direct Service-led approach. 

Corrosion funding decisions are often made at a level that does 

not produce optimum results. 

 Funding for corrosion S&T competes with other S&T 

areas with no priority given to the corrosion needs 

of each Service 

 During the design phase of new weapon systems, 

selection of materials and designs are made based 

on short term considerations. This often results in 

increased maintenance after deployment and 

increased life-cycle costs 

 Deployed weapon systems are maintained from 

operating accounts without provision for corrosion 

prevention expenditures 

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Implementation

4 

Establish Corrosion 

Executive for each Service 

with responsibility for 

oversight and reporting, full 

authority over corrosionspecific funding, and a 

strong voice in corrosionrelated funding 

– Fund new corrosion mitigation and control initiatives by

requiring each Service to: 

• Establish PE in POM06 of $15M for each service 

as a starting point 

• Submit and fund plan, concurrent with PR07, to 

invest and realize 10% savings (or $300M/yr) in 

corrosion costs by 2012, well into “self financing” 

• In absence of credible plan, include $100M for each 

Service in PR07 and each of the out years

Recommendation #4 is to establish a Corrosion Executive for each 

Service with responsibility for oversight and reporting, full authority 

over corrosion-specific funding, and a strong voice in corrosionrelated funding 

It is recommended that a memorandum be issued by USD(ATL) 

to each of the military services to establish a Corrosion Executive 

(possibly modeled after the existing S&T Executive). This senior 

leadership position would provide a focal point for the DoD 

corrosion executive in the coordination of inter-service initiatives and 

as an advocate for corrosion prevention funding requests and 

allocations. 

In order to provide the same focal point for corrosion issues as 

was found necessary in DoD, each Service needs to establish a 

Corrosion Executive to enforce Service corrosion policy. As a starting 

point, each Service needs to set aside resources for the Corrosion 

Executive to function. Assuming an annual DoD corrosion cost of 

$10B and a conservative potential reduction of 15%, or about $1.5B 

with a 10 to 1 ROI, an investment of $60M per Service is reasonable. 

In addition, a separate funding line is needed to support the 

continuation of assessment team visits. Based on the findings of the 

assessment teams, well-defined corrosion maintenance programs 

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(such as Marine Corps Corrosion Service Teams and Navy Paint 

Teams) need to be implemented to ensure continuous performance 

improvement. 

It is recommended that DoD acquisition regulations be changed to 

require that all personnel assigned to Corrosion Control Integrated 

Product Teams (CCIPT) be graduates of a comprehensive acquisition 

related corrosion training course. 

It is recommended that, to the extent possible, field corrosion 

prevention and control maintenance efforts be done by contracted 

civilian teams of highly trained professionals to implement corrosion 

prevention measures on vehicles and ships using the best available 

technologies. It is further recommended that the specific corrosion 

repairs made by the teams be based on a periodic detailed corrosion 

survey. 

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CHAPTER 6. SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR PREVENTION AND 

MITIGATION OF CORROSION

Corrosion S&T can favorably impact all aspects of the design, 

acquisition, deployment, and sustainment of DoD weapons and 

equipment to help achieve the goal of decreased corrosion control 

costs. The Task Force is optimistic that an invigorated S&T 

investment could enable accelerated development of new cost saving 

strategies for corrosion control. Without such an effort, it is believed 

that corrosion control costs will rise in the future due to several 

challenges that cannot be solved with off-the-shelf corrosion control 

technology.

The DoD program in Science and Technology for corrosion should 

be focused on establishing an improved scientific basis for prevention 

and mitigation of corrosion in DoD systems. Toward that end, the 

major S&T objectives should be: 

(1) Achieving science-based understanding of corrosion initiation, 

propagation and termination, including the basic science of 

accelerated corrosion testing so that there is a sound basis for use 

of acceleration factors and confidence in the applicability of 

accelerated tests. 

(2) Development of integrated predictive tools for equipment 

design and support, and improved sensing of the evolution of the

deterioration process to provide input data for life prediction 

models. 

(3) Gaining understanding of the corrosion properties of evolving 

materials and the effects of emerging environmental issues on 

DoD corrosion control efforts. 

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These are discussed in the following sections. 

NEED FOR SCIENCE-BASED UNDERSTANDING

Much of the data that are available concerning corrosion are 

empirical and, therefore, generally unsuitable for extrapolation to 

different materials or environmental circumstances. The quantity of 

these data is impressive, but the utility questionable. 

A classic example is the study of galvanic corrosion. When 

bimetallic couples are exposed, the information obtained applies 

directly to those two materials in the environment tested. It cannot 

be used beyond that situation. Relevant empirical bimetal couple 

data were not available when a new bimetal couple was built into 

artillery equipment and galvanic corrosion became a problem. An 

alternative approach would be to construct a library of 

electrochemical polarization data on a large variety of alloys in 

pertinent environments and then model galvanic current and 

potential distributions for any geometry using mixed potential theory 

and finite element analysis. The result of such a fundamental S&T 

effort would lead to a portable, long lasting tool and database that 

could predict galvanic corrosion behavior for a much broader range 

of alloy/environment combinations. More fundamental research in 

corrosion metallurgy and defect sensing is generally of greater 

intrinsic value if it is conducted at the appropriate investigativescience-level. The most useful research would engage the crossroads 

of corrosion, electrochemistry, metallurgy, and surface science. If we 

fail to move in this direction, there is Task Force consensus that 

corrosion costs are likely to rise in the future due to limitations in 

existing fundamental knowledge and the lack of materials/corrosion 

tool sets. 

Another example was a Navy laboratory test of dozens of 

different coatings candidates for a new marine amphibious vehicle to 

be constructed of high strength aluminum alloys. Since each coating 

was of different thickness, inhibitor content, and adhesion capability, 

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it would be difficult to ascertain which of these factors was 

responsible for good coating performance. These tests and 

evaluations could arguably produce very practical results that 

directly determine the best coating for the exact system under study, 

but the results would be empirical and create very little long lasting 

fundamental knowledge that extended beyond the design at hand. 

The shortcomings pointed out here are exacerbated by other 

pressing issues such as increased use of legacy weapons and 

equipment beyond design lifetimes as well as restricted usage of 

proven corrosion control strategies due to worker safety and 

environmental compliance requirements. For instance, the 

Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is currently 

under court order to propose a change to the personal exposure limit 

for hexavalent chromium no later than October 2004. The new limit 

for hexavalent Cr could be up to 100 times lower than the current 

limit. In addition to OSHA regulations, the EPA has a mandate to

perform health based risk assessments that are likely to force 

additional restrictions on chromate use. Alternatives to chromium 

need to be aggressively investigated at the level of basic 

understanding required to confidently make choices for substitution. 

The Task Force urges increased support of basic science (6.1) and 

advanced technology (6.2) efforts to assure understanding of 

corrosion phenomenology. The Task Force recommends 

identification and funding of critical R&D gaps as well as nontraditional corrosion areas with unfulfilled needs such as better 

understanding of corrosion phenomena involving corrosion mode

transitions (e.g., pits-to-cracks, paint failure-to-underpaint corrosion 

to exfoliation, etc.), understanding of the stochastic versus 

deterministic nature of corrosion, and improved utilization of 

distributed sensors. Accelerated laboratory and proving ground type 

testing should also be accompanied by increased funding for basic 

mechanistic understandings of accelerated testing results; for 

example, determination of what controls acceleration factors and 

establishment of the “portability of accelerated tests” from one 

corroding system to the next. 

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Other basic areas that should be addressed include development 

of an improved material science/corrosion prevention “tool set” to 

enable rapid material/coating design. These should include (a) 

computational design of next generation materials, treatments and 

coatings, (b) high throughput synthesis and testing of new materials, 

coatings, treatments, etc. using combinatorial methods, and (c) multiscale modeling of corrosion processes to replace trial and error 

approaches to design of new prevention strategies. Effort should also 

be invested in developing smart, multi-functional materials to enable 

sensing and self-healing. 

NEED FOR INTEGRATED/PREDICTIVE ENGINEERING TOOLS FOR 

SYSTEM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT

The overall challenge is to understand and predict system 

performance including corrosion mode transitions, statistical 

distributions in damage evolution, complex materials and 

environmental issues as well as linking damage evolution with the

full spectrum of chemical, mechanical, and electrochemical driving 

forces for a variety of corroding subsystems. These include paint 

failure and loss of coating function, etc., and should not be limited to 

effects of corrosion on fatigue of structural materials (focus of a 

current DARPA program). Currently, reliable probabilistic and 

deterministic assessment methods are not available to enable 

condition based maintenance, prognostics, or life prediction of a 

variety of subsystems common to DoD assets. The Task Force 

recommends the development of macroscopic models for evolution 

of corrosion damage for a variety of cases. Ideally these models will 

link subsystem level responses that affect structural integrity or 

functionality, to materials level (i.e., microstructure) conditions, 

defects, chemistries, and structures. A well-coordinated S&T program 

should enable the development of integrated corrosion model(s) for 

predicting failure and mission readiness. In conjunction with the 

development of predictive model, the DSB Task Force urges 

continued and expanded support of basic S&T into the forms and 

phenomenology of corrosion modes. This is needed in order to 

provide high quality inputs for such predictive capabilities; emerging 

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models will only be as good as the rate laws, damage evolution 

scenarios, as well as the initiation and arrest criteria that they contain. 

A comprehensive performance-assessment capability will include 

deterministic sub-models for time evolution of surface environments, 

and for predicting the initiation, propagation, and cessation (stifling, 

arrest) of each mode of corrosion failure (pits, crevices, cracks). For 

coatings, traditional metal corrosion protection systems are made up 

of individual processes with little S&T understanding of the whole 

system or its parts. Each step in the protection scheme has 

performance requirements, usually expressed in terms of some metric 

like a salt spray test with less focus on total system performance 

assessment or prediction. Formal and controlled model abstraction is 

needed to facilitate probabilistic risk assessment. Knowledge about 

the underlying causes and degree of uncertainty and variability of all 

parameters and inputs is also needed. 

There is a strong need to develop sensor technology for early 

warning, for data collection to improve understanding of corrosion 

processes as they occur in the field, and for performance 

confirmation. Included among the needs are methods for 

widespread detection and quantitative characterization of corrosion 

such as that leading to fatigue and/or environmental fracture. These 

methods should be based on a combination of external sensors 

(ideally non-contact and able to operate at a stand-off) and 

distributed sensors integral to the material or structure. The 

development should lead to sensors whose output can be 

quantitatively related to the extent of damage and for which physicsbased models are available for accurately predicting performance 

during design and assessing performance during operational life. 

“Smart coating” technology that also serves as an indicator of 

underlying corrosion could provide an inexpensive means of 

monitoring corrosion and model feedback. Relevant issues include 

prognosis, probabilistic risk assessment, multi-scale modeling and 

simulation, and data management and fusion. The Task Force also 

recommends development of mathematical tools to enable simulation 

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and prediction of corrosion processes that accept feedback and 

midcourse correction of predicted damage states from such sensors. 

In a practical sense, the use of such models will likely always be 

limited to analysis of equipment components or sub systems selected

as suspect, rather than an entire weapon system. While the accuracy 

of such models is seldom perfect, it is realistic to believe that 

acceptable accuracy can be achieved, perhaps within the next decade, 

if corrosion data collection systems and feedback loops are put in 

place today. Predictions based on such models would be credible. 

This credibility, taken to the budget table, would support hardware 

design strategies and O&S resource levels sufficient to ensure that 

corrosion performance targets can be met. 

The data collection systems and data feedback loops needed to 

populate a corrosion simulation model ten years from now are the 

same as discussed in Chapter 3. While it may take some time to 

digitally replicate today’s human experts in an “expert system,” nearterm cost and readiness improvements can be expected to derive 

from improved corrosion data management. 

NEED FOR UNDERSTANDING OF EVOLVING MATERIALS AND 

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 

The S&T role in hazardous material alternatives is crucial to 

preventing an escalation of corrosion control costs as chromates and 

heavy metals are phased out due to worker safety and environmental 

pressures. Many proposed protection strategies are unproven over 

the long run and lack fundamental and, in some cases, a practical 

basis for acceptance. Unlike chromates, many current generation 

non-chromate inhibitors have not shown consistent performance 

among the various aluminum alloys used on a single weapon system. 

Performance measures often lack scientific basis (e.g., salt spray tests) 

or correlation with long-term real world performance. Traditional 

evaluations of corrosion control systems are not sufficient for rapid 

discovery, verification, and acceptance of replacement materials. 

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Hence, trial and error approaches prevail. Traditional lab testing and 

lessons learned from field evaluations provide value but require 

years to assess performance. Thorough understanding of corrosion 

protection mechanisms for non-toxic corrosion inhibitors is needed if 

useful evaluations of alternative materials are to be completed 

quickly. Mathematical tools that could help engineers assess the long 

term protection properties at a defect site, including chemical and 

electrochemical throwing power, should be advanced. Coordination 

among DoD, industry and academia is needed to avoid fragmented 

solutions. In many cases, commonality of platforms across DoD 

suggest multi-Service solutions should be cost effective, such as for 

chromate replacement on high strength aluminum alloys. 

The continued use of legacy equipment beyond original design 

boundaries (lifetime, operating environment, etc.) implies the need 

for fundamental corrosion studies that address corrosion at various 

advanced stages of development and at conditions equivalent to long 

term exposure. In other words, testing of corrosion initiation and 

propagation are insufficient, since extended use of legacy materials in 

conditions of advanced damage evolution requires that issues such as 

corrosion stifling/re-initiation and corrosion site coalescence and 

interaction be confronted as well. These issues may escape attention 

in new systems when corrosion damage is typically less extensive. 

Also, emerging/evolving new materials, such as ceramics and 

metallic glass, while providing performance enhancing benefits will 

have their own corrosion problems that are not yet known or 

understood. 

The Task Force recommends a significantly increased S&T effort 

to develop the scientific basis and materials/corrosion toolsets 

needed for: 

 Selection and reliability of toxic materials 

replacement 

 Green technologies needed for corrosion control for 

environmental compliance 

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CHAPTER 6 ________________________________________________________________________

 Incorporation and use of emerging materials with 

corrosion problems that may not be understood 

 Extension of legacy equipment beyond original 

design life 

STATE OF S&T 

Corrosion S&T is currently a small fraction of 1% of the S&T 

budget and is largely a hodge-podge of scattered efforts funded to a 

large degree by either environmentally driven requirements (e.g., 

EPA, OSHA) or by Congressional adds. A major fraction of this 

could be properly categorized within budget area 6.3, if in S&T at all. 

As outlined in the preceding sections, there is a real need for more 

work that fits the basic research definitions applicable to budget areas 

6.1 and 6.2. 

A healthy research program exists in a few areas such as the Navy 

nuclear reactors program, but other S&T areas generally have no 

dedicated, consistent S&T program in corrosion. There are certainly 

exceptions and examples of visionary S&T. Examples include: 

 The DARPA funded prognostics programs aimed at 

structural material corrosion/fatigue 

 The Air Force funded KC-135 corrosion control 

program aimed at understanding the effects of 

corrosion on structural integrity and factoring such 

corrosion into aircraft structural integrity programs 

(ASIP) 

 The two Air Force Office of Scientific Research-led 

MultiService University Research Initiative (MURIs) 

(Ohio State – Understanding of Chromate Inhibitors 

and University of Virginia directed MURI on system 

understanding of novel multi-functional coatings) 

Similarly, commercial (Delta Airlines) and DoE (Sandia National 

Laboratories) risk assessment methodologies provided examples of 

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 SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR PREVENTION

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visionary approaches to achieve combinations of high equipment 

reliability, low life-cycle cost, and high operational availability for 

their respective assets. 

Individual research projects of intensely scientific nature, funded 

by individual agencies, also have been of great value. One example 

was an ONR program to understand environmental fracture in high 

strength alloys and the fundamental strategies and attributes of both 

the alloys themselves and cadmium replacement coatings that could 

mitigate fracture susceptibility if carefully designed. By studying the 

fundamental attributes of high strength alloys and coatings that 

govern fracture instead of trial and error empirical approaches to 

solving cracking susceptibility, generic long lasting information will 

be developed whereby a variety of future coatings could be tailored 

to fit the desired attributes and characteristic properties identified to 

help control environmental embrittlement of a variety of structural 

alloys. This generic basic science would apply to many coatings and 

many high strength alloys and thus long lasting generic benefit will 

be created by this relatively small S&T investment. 

However, there were also many examples given of mature 

technology development or RDT&E work that could yield only 

empirical findings. Some of this was termed S&T and consumed 

scarce S&T resources. 

S&T FINDINGS

The following are the overall findings of the Task Force in regard 

to the current DoD S&T program in corrosion control: 

 S&T investment is fragmented and inconsistently 

funded for achievement of long term gains 

 Current funding levels are too low by about a factor 

of three 

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CHAPTER 6 ________________________________________________________________________

 There is little or no redundancy in corrosion S&T 

portfolios observed given the diversity of issues and 

platforms in the various Services, and no reason to 

suspect redundancy given the small size of the total 

funding. S&T resources are not being squandered by 

research overlap 

 The current S&T emphasis is on technology 

applications with inadequate investment in basic 

scientific understanding 

 Several areas of corrosion technology research have 

unfulfilled funding needs that, if resourced, could 

produce high impact 

 There is adequate communication across the 

corrosion S&T community, among the Services and 

across warfare communities, providing ample 

means for applying technology developed in one 

area to another 

OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

In general, there appears to be an under investment in corrosioncontrol science and technology that is directed towards the existing 

challenges as well as directed at furthering the understanding of basic 

mechanisms. This is one of the barriers to achieving a reduction in 

corrosion control costs. DoD should strive to establish steady and 

consistent funding levels for corrosion control research, since a 

consistent approach will save money in the long run. 

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 SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR PREVENTION

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Recommendation Implementation

5 

Refocus and reinvigorate 

corrosion S&T portfolio; 

triple the effective funding 

in this area (+$20M) 

Particular emphasis on: 

• Development of a materials-corrosion 

toolset that emphasizes science-based 

modeling & simulation 

• Fundamental mechanistic 

understandings of corrosion phenomena 

as well as accelerated testing 

• Substitutes for effective corrosion 

prevention materials that are being 

withdrawn due to environmental and 

safety considerations 

• Newly developed materials 

• Non-destructive corrosion 

sensing/measurement in the field as 

feedback to prognostic and conditionbased maintenance tools

Recommendation #5 is to refocus and reinvigorate the corrosion 

S&T portfolio and, in order to affect this, tripling the effective 

funding in this area. Although the level of S&T funding directly 

related to corrosion effects is uncertain, it is estimated that an 

additional $20 million per year would be required. 

The increased S&T funding should have particular emphasis on: 

 Fundamental mechanistic understandings of

corrosion phenomena as well as accelerated testing 

 Substitutes for effective corrosion prevention 

materials which are being withdrawn due to 

environmental and safety considerations 

 Development of a materials-corrosion toolset(s) that 

emphasize science-based modeling & simulation 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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CHAPTER 6 ________________________________________________________________________

 Newly developed structural and non-structural 

materials 

 Corrosion sensing/measurement in the field as 

feedback to prognostic and condition based 

maintenance tools 

 

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__________________________________________________ RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 7. RECOMMENDATIONS AND 

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have discussed the findings and needs 

and have offered five major recommendations that are summarized 

below. In these chapters, each of these recommendations is 

accompanied by a series of near-term implementation steps that are 

recommended to effect the changes called for in the major 

recommendation. 

37

Summary of

Recommendations

1. Promulgate and enforce policy emphasizing LCC over acquisition costs in 

procurement and provide the incentives and training to assure that 

corrosion costs are fully considered in design, manufacturing, and

maintenance.

2. Mandate and implement comprehensive and accurate corrosion data

reporting systems across DoD using standard metrics & definitions

3. Fund contract for comprehensive assessment of all DoD weapon system 

equipment with ~30 five-person teams of corrosion experts and use the 

results to develop and implement a corrosion strategy

4. Establish Corrosion Executive for each Service with responsibility for

oversight and reporting and full authority over corrosion-specific funding

and a strong voice in corrosion-related funding

5. Refocus and reinvigorate corrosion S&T portfolio; triple the effective 

funding in this area (+$20M)

 

The estimated cost for implementing all of these 

recommendations is approximately $50 million in the first year, 

assumed to be FY05. Once the foundations are laid in this first year, 

additional investment in preventive design in future years should be 

$100-150 million per year but this will quickly (within 1-2 years) be 

offset by corresponding and larger reductions in O&S. 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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CHAPTER 7 ________________________________________________________________________

Figure 12. 

38

USD/ATL,

PDUSD

DS LMR I&E

Corrosion Policy for

Weapon Systems

Corrosion Policy for

Infrastructure Maintenance

Support Design

Acquisition

• Separate, dedicated policy sponsorship for weapons systems and infrastructure

desirable

• Alternatives for weapon systems corrosion leadership – choice of:

- DS (DAB leadership) – not focused on O&S (maintenance)

- LMR – limited influence in R&D (design)

The Task Force debated alternative organizational locations for 

corrosion policy oversight within the Department, and concluded 

that separate, dedicated policy sponsorship for defense weapons 

systems and for defense infrastructure was desirable. Within ATL, 

the Installations and Engineering Office is the only logical location for 

issues dealing with the cost and safety implications of infrastructure 

corrosion. See Figure 12. 

The weapons systems responsibility is more complex because 

there are two major and equally important areas, the near term 

represented by weapon system maintenance and repair, and the 

longer term represented by weapon system design and manufacture. 

Assigning the responsibility to DS is appropriate for the longer term

aspects of corrosion cost reduction since that office leads the Defense 

Acquisition Board (DAB), but Defense Systems (DS) has little focus 

on current readiness and O&S costs. On the other hand, Logistics, 

Materiel, and Readiness (LMR) is completely focused on current 

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__________________________________________________ RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

readiness and cost, but has little influence in weapon system R&D or 

design. 

The Task Force reached no conclusion on the details of policy 

oversight. One option is to separate the responsibility into the logical 

three components that line up with the ATL organization and 

maintain the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (PDUSD) 

as OSD focal point. This could be satisfactory if that official can afford 

the time necessary to give the subject adequate attention. However, it 

is important to maintain a centralized focal point for corrosion at the 

staff level, reporting to the DoD Corrosion Executive. This group, as 

it does now, is responsible for pulling together the diverse efforts and 

assuring that the DoD Corrosion Executive is kept fully informed on 

issues and problems in the area. 

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CHAPTER 7 ________________________________________________________________________

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_________________________________________________________________________APPENDIX I 

APPENDIX I. TERMS OF REFERENCE

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TERMS OF REFERENCE _________________________________________________________________

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76

The study will be sponsored by me as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

(Logistics and Materiel Readiness). Mr. Larry Lynn will serve as the Task Force

Chairman. Colonel Sarah Smith, USAF will serve as the Executive Secretary.

Lieutenant Colonel Roger BasI, USAF will serve as the Defense Science Board

Secretariat representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P .L. 92-463, the

"Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DOD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal

Advisory Committee Management Program," It is not anticipated that this Task Force

will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title

18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a

procurement official.

~,,~ Michael W. Wynne

Acting
 

________________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

RADM Steve Heilman, USN (Ret.) LMI 

Mr. Larry Lynn Private Consultant 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Dr. Robert Baboian Private Consultant 

Mr. Aubrey Carter Delta 

Dr. Michael Cieslak Sandia National Laboratories 

Dr. David Diehl PPG Industries 

Dr. Joseph Farmer Lawrence Livermore National Lab 

Dr. Robert Green Johns Hopkins University

Dr. Arthur Heuer Case Western Reserve University 

Mr. Brian Manty MB-TSI 

CAPT William Needham, USN(Ret.) Naval Surface Warfare Center 

Dr. Richard Pinckert Boeing 

Dr. Rick Ricker NIST 

Dr. John Scully University of Virginia 

Dr. Bruce Thompson Iowa State University 

Dr. Neil Thompson CC Technologies, NACE 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Col Sarah Smith, USAF 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

LtCol David Robertson, USAF 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Maj Dan Bullock, USAF AFRL 

Mr. Roger Griswold AFRL 

Maj Claxton Johnson, USMC 

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ______________________________________________________________

CAPT Philip Johnson, USN 

CW5 Theodore Walker, USA 

 

 

STAFF

Ms. Grace Johnson Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Stacie Smith Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

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________________________________________________________________________APPENDIX III 

APPENDIX III. BRIEFINGS

December 9-10, 2003: Arlington, VA 

BRIEFER TOPIC

Mr. Allen Westheimer, GAO Review of GAO Report: Opportunities 

to Reduce Corrosion Costs and Increase 

Readiness 

Mr. Dan Dunmire, OSD 

Col Larry Lee, OSD 

Dr. Lew Sloter, OSD 

Review of Report to Congress: LongTerm Strategy to Reduce Corrosion and 

The Effects of Corrosion on the Military 

Equipment and Infrastructure of the 

Department of Defense 

Mr. Bob Stith, USMC Marine Corps Corrosion Program 

Overview 

Mr. Hilton Mills Army Corrosion Program Overview 

Mr. Beau Brinkerhoff 

Mr. Dale Moore 

Dr. Robert Pohanka 

Navy Corrosion Program Overview 

Maj Dan Bullock, AF Corrosion & 

PVtn Ofc, WR-ALC 

AF Corrosion Program Overview 

Mr. Dan Dunmire, OSD 

Col Larry Lee, OSD 

Dr. Lew Sloter, OSD 

DoD Corrosion Policy and Oversight 

Office Update, DoD Corrosion 

Prevention Control IPT, The Science 

and Technology of Corrosion 

Prevention and Control 

February 2-3, 2004: Arlington, VA 

ADM Don Pilling, USN (Ret) KC-135 Corrosion Discussion 

Mr. Dave Curtis Naval Reactors (Classified) 

CDR Jim Syring DDX 

Mr. Chris Bolkcom 

Mr. Bill Mullis 

Congressional Research Service Tanker 

FMTV Program and Corrosion Control 

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BRIEFINGS _________________________________________________________________________

Col Sarah Smith, USAF DoD Corrosion Control & Prevention 

Policies for Weapon Systems 

CAPT David Lewis DDG 51 Presentation 

Col Sarah Smith, USAF Military Training Programs for 

Corrosion Control 

Col Sarah Smith, USAF Royal Australian AF Corrosion 

Program on F-111 and F-18 

Mr. Ken Herd, GE Global 

Technology Leader, Inspection 

and Manufacturing Technologies 

General Electric Initiatives in Corrosion 

Control 

February 25-26, 2004: Arlington, VA 

Dr. Leo Christodoulou, DARPA DARPA Programs 

Mr. Greg Saunders 

Mr. Steve Lowell, Defense 

Standardization Program Office, 

DLA 

Standards and Specifications 

Dr. Dave Diehl Near Term Effects/Solutions 

Mr. Steve Finley, AFMC/LGPE Pollution Prevention Technologies and 

Corrosion Control 

Dr. John Beatty, ARL Army S&T 

March 15-16, 2004: Arlington, VA 

Mr. Roger Griswold 

Dr. John Scully 

Visit to KC-135 Depot Line at Tinker

AFB 

Dr. Neil Thompson Corrosion Costs 

Dr. Joe Farmer Corrosion-Resistant Materials for the 

Safe Long-Term Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel

Lt Col Paul Trulove AF Office of Scientific Research 

Corrosion Program 

Dr. Joe Gallagher Aircraft Structural Integrity Program 

Col Sarah Smith, USAF Condition Based Maintenance Plus in 

DoD 

Mr. David H. Rose, AMPTIAC Reducing Corrosion Costs Through 

Educational Improvements and 

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________________________________________________________________________APPENDIX III 

Improved Technology Transfer 

RADM Steve Heilman, USN (Ret.) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting 

System 101 

April 21-22, 2004: Arlington, VA 

Dr. Lew Sloter, OSD Corrosion 

Office 

Sensors and Detection 

Maj Dan Bullock, USAF

Mr. George Slenski, AFRL/MLSA 

Electronic/Avionic Corrosion 

Prevention and Control 

Mr. Jeff Braithwaite, Sandia 

National Laboratories 

Corrosion of Electronic Devices and 

Predictive Modeling 

Maj Timberlyn Harrington 

Mr. Bruce Fox, Aging Aircraft SPO 

Aging Aircraft 

Mr. M. Brad Beardsley 

Mr. Larry Seitzman 

Corrosion Prevention and Control at 

Caterpillar 

Mr. Paul Howdyshell 

Mr. Vince Hock, Army Corps of 

Engineers 

Infrastructure Corrosion

Col Sarah Smith, USAF Mr. Wynne’s Video on the Corrosion 

Prevention and Control Program 

Mr. Aubrey Carter Delta Airlines Corrosion Control and 

Prevention Program 

CAPT Phil Johnson, USN 

Maj Dan Bullock, USAF 

Military Services Corrosion Control 

Data Call Results 

Mr. Jim Moran, Alcoa 

Mr. Dave Williams, Alcoa 

Mr. Mike Skillingberg, The 

Aluminum Association, Inc. 

Corrosion Control and the Aluminum

Industry 

May 10-11, 2004: Arlington, VA 

Mr. Dave Ferris Marines Corps Corrosion Data 

Collection 

Mr. Dan Dunmire 

Col Larry Lee, USAF 

Update on Corrosion Prevention and 

Control IPT 

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BRIEFINGS _________________________________________________________________________

Dr. Dave Diehl Coatings 

Mr. Larry Craigie, American 

Composites Manufacturers 

Association 

Composites and Corrosion 

May 24-25, 2004: Arlington, VA 

Mr. Steve Carr Army Corrosion 

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________________________________________________________________________APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX IV. GLOSSARY OF DEFINITIONS,

ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFB Air Force Base 

AFOSR Air Force Office of Scientific Research 

AMPTIAC Advanced Materials and Processes Technology Information 

Analysis Center 

ASIP Aircraft structural integrity program

ATL Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

CAD/CAM Computer aided design/computer aided manufacture 

CCIPT Corrosion Control Integrated Product Team 

CPAT Corrosion Prevention Advisory Team

DAB Defense Acquisition Board 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Agency 

DAU Defense Acquisition University 

D&I Discovery and invention 

DMA Design, manufacture, and acquisition 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoE Department of Energy 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DS Defense Systems

DSB Defense Science Board 

DT Development testing

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

FMTV Family of Medium-Size Tactical Vehicles 

FNC Future Naval Capability 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

IMA Intermediate maintenance activities

CORROSION CONTROL ____________________________________________________________

 

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GLOSSARY _________________________________________________________________________

LCC Life-cycle cost

L&MR Logistics and Materiel Readiness 

MILSPEC Military specification

MURI MultiService University Research Initiative 

NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 

O&S Operation and support 

OSHA Occupation Safety and Health Administration 

OT Operational testing

OTJ On the job 

PDUSD Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

PE Program Element

PM Program Manager

O&S Operation and support 

R&D Research and development 

ROI Return on investment 

RDT&E Research, development, test and evaluation 

SBIR Small Business Innovative Research 

SERDP Strategic Environment Research and Development Program

S&T Science and technology 

T&E Test and evaluation

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

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________________________________________________________________________APPENDIX IV

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