COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Baker and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

LEON ANTHONY WILSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0962-97-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 APRIL 7, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Marc Jacobson, Judge 

 Robert L. Bohannon (Bohannon, Bohannon & 

Hancock, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Leon Anthony Wilson (appellant) appeals his bench trial 

conviction by the Norfolk Circuit Court (trial court) for 

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.1 The sole issue 

presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erroneously 

convicted appellant of possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon while simultaneously acquitting him of murder2

 and use of a 

firearm in the commission of murder3

 based on a finding of 

self-defense. On the facts contained in this record, we affirm 

the judgment of the trial court. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1Code § 18.2-308.2. 

 2Code § 18.2-32. 

 3Code § 18.2-53.1. 
- 2 - 

 Upon familiar principles, we state the facts in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). 

Stated in that light, the record discloses that on May 10, 1995, 

appellant shot and killed Wilfredo Velez. On that date, Velez 

confronted appellant concerning a drug sale and demanded that 

appellant return his money. Appellant told Velez he would "check 

it out" and left the scene. About ten minutes later, Velez 

confronted another person, apparently believing him to be 

appellant, and began waving a hatchet. When appellant heard what 

was taking place, he "stepped inside [a] house," "picked up a 

[gun]," put it in his pocket and walked out into the street to 

face Velez. He returned Velez' money, but Velez came at him 

swinging the hatchet. Appellant backed up and pulled out his 

gun. When Velez came at him again, appellant fired into the 

ground, but Velez kept swinging and backed appellant into a 

fence. Appellant warned Velez repeatedly that he "[didn't] want 

[any] trouble," but Velez would not leave him alone, and 

appellant shot him because he thought "Velez was going to kill 

[him]." Velez died from the gunshot wounds. 

 The trial court found the evidence insufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed murder and 

acquitted him of the charges of murder and the related use of a 

firearm. However, the trial court found the evidence sufficient 
- 3 - 

to support appellant's guilt for possession of a firearm after 

having previously been convicted of a felony. We agree. 

 It is clear that when Velez first was seen "waving a 

hatchet," he was not waving it at appellant. Appellant was not 

even present at that time. Appellant only "heard" that Velez 

intended to attack him with the hatchet. Upon hearing that 

intention, appellant stepped inside a house, picked up a gun, 

concealed it, returned to the street, and initiated a further 

confrontation with Velez. 

 Here, the evidence supported a finding that appellant, a 

convicted felon, possessed the firearm before becoming embroiled 

in the altercation which led to the shooting. Upon entering the 

house and taking possession of the gun, appellant was in 

violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, regardless of what he did with 

the gun thereafter. Therefore, the evidence supports a finding 

that the charges of murder and the related use of a firearm were 

separate in time from the charge of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon. Cf. Treu v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 996, 406 

S.E.2d 676 (1991). 

 We hold that appellant's acquittal on the independent 

charges did not prevent his conviction for the charge from which 

this appeal emanates. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.