Defense Science Board 

Task Force 

on 

SEA BASING 

August 2003 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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___________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS

________________________________________________________________________ 

 

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD.......................................................................................................... iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... vii

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1

GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY ENVIRONMENT....................................................3

A SEA BASING CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE ........................................................11

THE VALUE OF AN OPERATIONAL SEABASE.......................................................27

ENABLING SEA BASING CAPABILITIES ...............................................................33

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................................87

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE..................................................................99

APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP.........................................................103

APPENDIX C: PRESENTATION TO THE TASK FORCE..........................................107

APPENDIX D: THOUGHTS ON SEA BASING IN THE 

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.................................................................................111

APPENDIX E: OPERATIONAL ISSUES OF SEA BASING IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.................................................................................135

APPENDIX F: SEA STATE...................................................................................157

APPENDIX G: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS......................165
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________ 

ii _____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

__________________________________________________________________FOREWORD

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

iii

FOREWORD

Forcible entry from the sea has played an essential role in 

virtually every major U.S. military operation, from the “shores of 

Tripoli,” to the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish American 

War, World War II and the Korean War. Sea-based operations, 

practiced by both the Army and Marines, have undergone 

continuous evolution, culminating in the amphibious assaults that 

played a decisive role in the European and Pacific theaters in World 

War II and in Korea. The geography of the United States, as an island 

power with the need to project military power across two great 

oceans, has made amphibious warfare a core competence in the 

American way of war. 

With the end of the Cold War, the world has entered a period of 

uncertainty. The United States has national interests in many of the 

world’s potential areas of conflict. It must have the capability to 

project its military power to deal with a full range of military 

contingencies. 

Over the past eight years the Defense Science Board has 

conducted a series of studies on the tactics, logistics and technology 

of land warfare in the post Cold War era. Its recommendations have 

emphasized light, rapidly deployable, maneuver forces supported by 

remote fires—in other words, the replacement of mass by responsive, 

precision firepower and maneuver. Others have foreseen a similar 

future where brigades perform functions that once required corps or 

divisions.1 These scenarios of future war rest on having intermediate 

staging bases in or near the theater of operations to support troops, 

logistics and combat fire support. 

Recent events in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have underlined, 

however, that the availability of such bases is, more often than not, 

uncertain due to physical or political factors that delay, limit or 

prevent their use. Moreover, modern weaponry, such as precision 

 

1 Robert Scales, Yellow Smoke, The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military, Rowman and 

Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
 

FOREWORD __________________________________________________________________ 

iv ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

cruise and ballistic missiles which will become widely available in the 

future, threaten to make fixed bases vulnerable to attack. The 

assumption of readily available, secure land bases is now open to 

serious question. 

Seabases, while certainly not immune from attack, can provide the 

United States with a capability suited to future military needs: most 

likely areas of future conflict are within reach of the sea. Seabases are 

mobile, complicating adversary defense operations and providing 

options for U.S. military forces. Seabases are sovereign, not subject to 

alliance vagaries, and seabases can be scaled to support activities 

larger than brigade-sized operations. 

Forcible entry from modern seabases, however, represents a 

substantially greater challenge than the amphibious operations of 

World War II and Korea. Large-scale amphibious assaults across 

beaches will face increasingly difficult challenges in the future. 

Instead, forces will initially leapfrog beaches. They will employ air 

and precision surface assault to penetrate and drive far inland to 

secure a lodgment, and then move to directly attack military 

objectives. At present, naval surface fire support lacks the reach and 

precision to support such movement inland. Thus, combat fire 

support must come from organic artillery and aircraft. The weight 

and volume of logistics required to support such inland forces will 

require high volume, heavy lift air capabilities, at least until U.S. 

forces have made the shore safe for resupply. 

In any case, the seabase must represent a haven where operational 

forces can reconstitute for further action, as well as receive supplies. 

Perhaps most important, forces based at sea must have the staying 

power to persist until heavier forces can arrive—there must be no 

period of vulnerability following the initial assault. 

A seabase is not just a ship, not just prepositioned materiel, not 

just helicopter assault—it represents a complex capability. One must 

think of a seabase as a hybrid system of systems consisting of 

concepts of operations, ships, forces, offensive and defensive 

weapons, aircraft, communications and logistics, all of which involve 

careful planning, coordination and exercising to operate smoothly. 
 

__________________________________________________________________FOREWORD

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

v

The seabase must be robust enough to operate in a wide range of sea 

conditions and be able to receive supplies from the sea without the 

support of in-theater, land bases. 

Such a seabase capability does not now exist, although some 

precursor amphibious capabilities are presently in place. Full sea 

basing requires development of important new operations, defense, 

logistic, and force integration capabilities to enable forcible entry 

from the sea under a wide variety of conditions. This study identifies 

many of those capabilities. 

A central authority must orchestrate the development of sea 

basing concepts, systems and concepts of operations. History 

suggests that sea basing has never been exclusively limited to Navy 

and Marine operations. The Air Force and particularly the Army 

must participate in the development and use of this joint military 

operational capability which lies at the intersection of traditional 

special operations forces, Marine and Army operations. Sea basing 

represents a crucial option for future warfare by all the Services and 

an important element in the transition between early entry and 

follow-on operations. A joint program authority must lead the effort. 

Experience in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq has made clear the 

need for flexible, persistent, sovereign basing; the challenges that 

must be overcome are apparent. Land warfare will continue to 

depend on advanced bases—the sea is the most reliable, flexible 

environment from which to operate in the opening phases of combat. 

The current program of record for ship development can still be 

made consistent with a coherent sea basing architecture—the 

program has not progressed too far for this to be possible. Now is 

the time to develop sea basing capabilities that will continue this 

critical American competency. 
 

FOREWORD __________________________________________________________________ 

vi ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

___________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Sea basing is a critical capability for the United States in a world 

where flexible, quick-response military action will be required in 

areas far from fixed bases available or suitable for American military 

use. The seabase replaces or augments the fixed, in-theater airports 

and seaports, on which past military operations have focused and 

depended, with a maneuverable facility at sea—a mobile base of 

operations, command center, logistics node and transportation hub. 

A commander can place a seabase where and when he chooses to 

exploit enemy weaknesses and employ the element of surprise, 

confusing enemy defensive preparations. A seabase can be a center 

for reconstitution and redeployment of forces in succeeding stages of 

complex operations. 

As a base for maneuver forces, it represents a far more serious 

threat than that of precision fires only, whether delivered by aircraft 

or cruise missiles. The force at sea threatens adversaries with 

destruction, invasion and ultimately loss of power. 

The sustaining power of the seabase can maintain the pace of 

military operations so that operational pauses characteristic of past 

expeditionary forcible entries disappear. The need to pause for 

supply and regrouping following entry and before moving to 

operational objectives is no longer necessary. Thus, the period of 

vulnerability, during which enemy forces organize and mount 

defenses, disappears. 

Although this study focuses on independent, brigade-scale, full 

combat configuration and use of sea basing, the concept is flexible. 

Seabases can be scaled to fit the needs of specific operations, allowing 

their use in a spectrum of applications, from humanitarian relief and 

non combatant evacuation operations to employment in large, fullwar scenarios. Seabases could have defensive as well as offensive 

uses—they can augment or replace shipping facilities in the 

continental United States (CONUS) that have been damaged by 
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

viii ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

terrorist or military action. They are a tool readily adaptable to the 

operational needs of each Service. 

This report concentrates on the ship-to-objective-maneuver role of 

the seabase, since that is its most transformational application. 

However, the seabase will support other concepts of operations, 

including amphibious, over-the-shore assaults. 

A key aspect of the future seabase lies in its dynamic capabilities. 

The seabase is more than bringing forces to the fight on ships; it 

allows for movement, surprise, tactical flexibility and full-spectrum 

support. 

A seabase will be far more than a flotilla—it will consist of 

operational concepts, weapons systems, ships, aircraft, logistics, 

information systems, cargo handling and transportation networks 

that must be carefully managed to operate together as elements in a 

complex “system of systems.” Ships and aircraft must be designed to 

accommodate each other, lift capabilities must be sized to serve the 

needs of the operations supported by the seabase, cargo transfer 

methods must work in rough seas encountered in likely operational 

areas, and the flotilla forming the seabase must have defensive 

capabilities to deal with threats encountered in real world operations. 

Developing the seabase requires persistent, top-down leadership 

throughout a continuing evolution of concepts of operations, ships, 

aircraft, weapons and transportation systems. Logistics and 

operations must be merged into a single, flexible capability 

responsive to commanders’ needs. The complexity and difficulty of 

developing the “system of systems” that will enable robust sea basing 

necessitates a coordinated development effort to ensure a consistent 

set of goals, requirements and priorities. The Task Force sees this as a 

joint effort to produce a capability for joint use—a Department-level 

responsibility that involves all Services. Achieving both 

interoperability and intermodality transfer demands a seamless, 

rapid and efficient design that is fully joint. 

Sea basing discussions tend to focus on the base itself and the 

operations it supports. The seabase actually consists of a chain of 
 

___________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

ix

capabilities that extends from CONUS to advanced bases, the seabase 

and the battlefield. Success of sea-based operations depends on the 

integrity of activities in each link of the chain, a substantial part of 

which will be carried out by contractors and non-military personnel. 

CONUS, inter-theater and intra-theater links are critical to sea basing 

success, just as are force deployment and sustainment on the 

battlefield. Seabase development must encompass the operation of 

the entire system. 

Twelve issues, discussed in detail in this report, must be 

addressed to make future sea basing a reality. We refer to them as 

the “dirty dozen.” The twelve issues are: 

 Management 

1. Meaningful participation by the Army and Air 

Force in forming a joint capability 

 Planning 

2. Sustaining troops ashore 

3. Protecting the force ashore 

4. Countering threats to operations in littorals—

mines, sea-skimming missiles, submarines, 

small boats

5. Concepts of operation 

 New Capabilities 

6. Cargo transfer at sea 

7. A long-range heavy lift aircraft that can be based 

at sea with capability to support forces ashore 

and transport troops

8. Ships of appropriate design 

9. A shared data communication system with 

sufficient bandwidth, redundancy and 

robustness

10. A logistics support system that handles all 

Service materiel interchangeably
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

x _____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

11. Intra-theater lift operational at sea state 4 

 Resources 

12. Development speed and funding for construction 

of a modern sea basing capability

Among the issues on this list, three stand out as especially 

important needs that must be developed: 1) the capability to handle 

cargo in rough seas characteristic of many likely areas of operations, 2) 

a heavy-lift aircraft (>20 ton) with theater-wide range that can be based 

at sea, and 3) ships whose design incorporates all the requirements of 

the seabase system of systems. These developments are difficult, but 

not impossible to achieve. They will require a substantial research 

and development effort and investment to produce robust 

capabilities. They are necessary to “make sea basing happen.” 

This study addresses future sea basing capability. Starting points 

for many elements required to form the future seabase already exist. 

A development plan must account for evolution from current 

capabilities to the means to meet tomorrow’s needs. The 

development process must also incorporate experimentation to 

identify and correct problems as development proceeds and to train 

sea basing leaders. This “spiral development” process is critical to 

success in an effort as complex, enduring and far reaching as sea 

basing. Additionally, periodic forcible entry exercises will help 

develop the expertise in the changing needs of littoral warfare faced 

by each of the Services. 

Throughout this report, the terms “seabase” and “sea basing” 

refer to a future expeditionary concept of a base at sea with ability to 

enable and sustain operations up to Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 

equivalent size Army unit or larger—a substantial expansion of 

today’s amphibious operational capability. Similarly, other terms 

used in this study, and listed in the table below, connote future 

developments. This list forms a useful overview of the critical issues 

identified by the Task Force. 
 

___________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

xi

Abbreviation Expanded Form 

Airlift Heavy-lift, long-range airplanes 

Communications High-capacity hundreds of miles link 

Lighters High-speed, heavy-lift, SS-4 capable boats 

Load Transfer Ability to transfer loads between all surface ships at SS 4+ 

Warehousing Capability of selective access to shipboard cargo 

Mines & Missiles Capability of clearing mines, defending against missiles 

Sealift High-speed, heavy-lift, long-range ships 

Management An organizational structure to get the work done 

In summary, the task force concludes the following: 

 Sea basing represents a critical future national military 

capability for the United States. It will help to assure 

access to areas where U.S. military forces are denied 

access to support facilities. 

 Future sea basing needs are well beyond today’s 

Navy and Marine Corps operating capabilities. 

 The complexity and difficulty of sea basing requires 

a coordinated, spiral development effort to address 

identified issues and create a joint sea basing 

“system of systems.” 

 The United States should realistically test its sea 

basing capabilities to work out problems and 

develop leadership skills in all Services. 

The seabase epitomizes the shift in emphasis from blue water to 

littoral operations—the maneuver space of the future where likely 

adversaries will exercise their power to deny access and control 

commerce. The high seas are no longer the center of contention. The 

littoral regions offer a maneuver space of great utility to American 

forces of all Services. They are also increasingly dangerous areas as 

sophisticated, inexpensive, defensive weapons become widely 

available. The littorals have great military promise; great care is 

needed to plan and develop tools for successful operations in them. 
 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ___________________________________________________________ 

xii ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

1

INTRODUCTION

Changes in the global environment—to include new and 

distributed regional threats and an increased focus on the Pacific 

Ocean arena—have shifted attention from the open oceans to the 

littoral regions as an important battle and maneuver space of the 

future. This in turn draws attention to the warfighting capabilities 

and missions that can be performed by expeditionary forces, as 

having “boots on the ground” will certainly be required in some 

contingency situations. 

Yet despite the importance of expeditionary capabilities, it is 

likely that these missions will be increasingly difficult to accomplish, 

primarily because of concerns with access to overseas bases and the 

lethality of littoral defenses. Thus, the concept for sea basing as a 

core element for future expeditionary warfare is of great interest to 

the Department of Defense. 

At the request of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics, the Defense Science Board established a 

Task Force to assess how sea basing of expeditionary forces can best 

serve the nation’s defense needs.2 More specifically, the Task Force 

was asked to: 

 Consider the operational requirements, the assets 

required, the role(s) of new technologies, and the 

effects of “jointness” 

 Examine the future relationships of the Amphibious 

Ready Group, with embarked Marine Expeditionary 

Unit, Carrier Battle Group, Maritime Prepositioning 

Ship Squadron, Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 

Surface Action Group and the Combat Logistics 

Force in establishing the Enhanced Network Seabase 

 

2 The complete Terms of Reference is contained in Appendix A. A list of Task Force 

members, along with presentations received by the Task Force, are in Appendices B and 

C, respectively. 
 

INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________ 

2 _____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

 Examine implications for platform costs and 

capabilities 

The Task Force was also directed to consider the following 

questions as it examined the broadest range of sea basing 

alternatives: 

 What is the naval environment expected to be for 

the next 20-50 years? 

 What is the role of naval forces in enabling access for 

joint forces through the world’s littorals? 

 What assets and technologies are needed to establish 

a robust and capable Enhanced Networked Seabase? 

 How does the timing of the acquisition of the 

technologies, platforms and systems which replace 

legacy systems build up full capability from what it 

is now? 

 As new hardware is acquired, should the function 

each legacy platform performs remain the same or 

are there opportunities to relocate functionality to 

improve effectiveness, efficiency or economy? 

 Are there other doctrine, organizational, training, 

materiel, leadership, personnel or facilities aspects 

that affect the development of a robust sea basing 

capability? 

The following chapters document the results of the Task Force 

deliberations. The report begins with an overview of the geopolitical 

and military environment in which the future seabase would operate. 

It then presents a sea basing concept for the future and an assessment 

of the value of an operational seabase. With that as background, the 

report explores the key capabilities needed to realize an operational 

sea basing capability. The final section contains the conclusions and 

recommendations that emerged from the Task Force effort. 
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND

________________________________________________________ MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

ON SEA BASING _____________________________________________________________ 

 

3

GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

Today, America’s military power lies predominantly in North 

America. This poses a strategic problem quite similar to that which 

confronted U.S. military planners at the onset of America’s 

participation in World War II—how to project that immense military 

and economic power across the great oceanic distances of the Atlantic 

and Pacific that separate the nation from its strategic interests 

without many intervening bases.3 

The political reality of the post-Cold War era is that U.S. allies are 

less dependent on the United States for their security than during the 

days of the Soviet Union. In fact, in the current war on terrorism, the 

United States has become more dependent on allies and friends for 

 

3 This discussion of geopolitical and military imperatives underlying the need for a more 

robust sea basing capability is drawn from Appendix D, Thoughts on Sea Basing in the 

Twenty-First Century. 

Geopolitical and Military Imperatives

• The United States confronts increasing 

challenges to projection of its military power

– U.S. military increasingly based in North America 

(although Naval expeditionary forces remain forward 

deployed)

• Decreasing access to overseas fixed land bases for political 

and military reasons

– Political constraints

• The United States was denied use of some of its bases during 

the Cold War

• Increasingly so over the past decade

• The refusal of Turkey to grant access in return for $6 billion 

and loan guarantees a harbinger of the future
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND 

MILITARY ENVIRONMENT_________________________________________________________ 

4 _____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

intelligence and cooperation in addressing a global, distributed threat 

than it ever was during the Cold War. Nevertheless, even during the 

Cold War the United States found that its interests and those of its 

Allies did not necessarily coincide. As a result, there were occasions 

where the United States was denied use of bases, air space, and ports. 

The 1990s saw numerous refusals by Middle Eastern states to 

allow U.S. forces the use of land bases on their sovereign territory. 

More recently, the air campaign against the Taliban regime in 

Afghanistan underscored the problem of access. Despite the 

expenditure of vast resources in building up the infrastructure of 

land bases in the Middle East, the United States discovered that many 

of its Arab Allies refused the use of that infrastructure for combat 

aircraft participating in the campaign against Afghanistan. The 

reluctance of France and Germany to support U.S. policy over Iraq 

was a signal that the United States can no longer rely on European 

support for many of its policies. Such attitudes will inevitably 

translate at some time in the future to an unwillingness to provide 

access to America’s bases in Europe during the course of a major 

crisis. 
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND

________________________________________________________ MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

ON SEA BASING _____________________________________________________________ 

 

5

The strategic and political costs of basing too much of America’s 

military power on foreign bases can be significant. Those costs have 

to do with the negative political impact such bases have had in the 

past, and will likely have in the future, on local attitudes towards the 

policies of the United States. 

During the Cold War, U.S. bases on foreign soil did cause 

considerable friction, but such friction was, for the most part, 

bearable to Allied political leaders. However, since the Cold War the 

situation has changed dramatically. The existence of a substantial 

American presence on land bases in the Middle East has contributed 

to political unraveling in that region and provided a propaganda base 

for those opposing America’s presence. 

Moreover, the competition between missile developments and 

defensive systems will be a key operational challenge over the next 

several decades. Large-scale missile attacks will be able to 

overwhelm protective systems, despite considerable defense 

improvements. American bases abroad will become vulnerable to 

Geopolitical and Military Imperatives

• Political costs of land basing

– U.S. paid stiff political price for continued basing of 

its forces throughout the Middle East in the 1990s

• Military constraints on land basing

– Increasingly precise cruise and ballistic missiles 

available to adversaries

– Special forces, commando, and terrorist threats 

also increasing

– Large footprints ashore = large, immobile targets

• Bottom Line

– More capable seabases will provide means to 

project power with less political cost and reduced 

vulnerability 
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND 

MILITARY ENVIRONMENT_________________________________________________________ 

6 _____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

these weapons. 4 In the near future, potential enemies of the United 

States will possess capabilities, either developed by indigenous 

industries or purchased abroad, to attack stationary targets, 

particularly large ones like airfields and ports. Moreover, one cannot 

eliminate the possibility of attacks on air bases by Special Forces or 

guerrillas. 

U.S. forces based on land in areas like the Middle East are targets 

at all times. It is only a matter of time before terrorists strike again at 

high visibility targets similar to Khobar Towers or the Marine 

Barracks in Lebanon. American maritime forces are likely, at some 

time, to be the target of terrorist attacks as well—the suicide attack on 

the USS Cole is a case in point. Yet forces based at sea are less 

vulnerable overall than those based on land. Thus, more capable 

seabases will provide the means to project power with less political 

cost and reduced vulnerability. 

A new world of threats will surely evolve as our defenses 

improve. U.S. security will rest on having a full spectrum of 

strategies and capabilities at hand. Among these will be the ability to 

act unilaterally and rapidly. The broad seabasing concepts outlined 

here provide freedom of action and decisiveness when coupled with 

light, agile, lethal forces supported by synchronized fires, maneuver, 

sustainment and protection.

 

4 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in 

the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis, Washington, DC, 15 September 1999, p. 52. 
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND

________________________________________________________ MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

ON SEA BASING _____________________________________________________________ 

 

7

The emerging operational world is likely to see increasing 

numbers of cruise and ballistic missiles, perhaps with precision and 

stealth capabilities, that could present a significant challenge to U.S. 

forward operating land bases. This is a threat not just to air bases, 

but one that will confront all the Services over the coming decades. 

As a result, all the Services should have a vital interest in involving 

themselves in sea basing. 

Geopolitical and Military Imperatives

• The Strategic Imperatives

– The Hart-Rudman Commission

Even if we retain the necessary bases and port 

infrastructure to support forward deployed [landbased] forces, they will be vulnerable to strikes that 

could reduce or neutralize their utility. Precision 

strikes, weapons of mass destruction, and cruise and 

ballistic missiles all represent threats to our forward 

presence as stand-off ranges increase. So, too, do 

they threaten access to strategic geographic areas.
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND 

MILITARY ENVIRONMENT_________________________________________________________ 

8 _____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The emerging threats and vulnerabilities suggest that U.S. 

military forces should increasingly rely on sea basing in one form or 

another. New capabilities and technologies created by the revolution 

in communications, computers and other areas, offer considerable 

possibilities for the development of advanced concepts for sea basing. 

But new technologies alone do not drive the need for new thinking 

and approaches to sea basing. Rather, it is the strategic and political 

framework that underlies the need to project U.S. military power 

from the sea and suggests the need for sea basing to become 

something more than just the property of the Navy and Marine 

Corps. 

Three definitions of “joint” appear in joint publications: 

 “Joint (DoD) connotes activities, operations 

organizations, etc., in which elements of two or 

more departments participate” 

 “Joint Warfare is team warfare” 

Geopolitical and Military Imperatives

• Future seabases would possess flexible 

capabilities to enable a wide spectrum of 

operations from humanitarian activities to war

• Likely future operations will be within range of 

the sea, including the “Asian Crescent” from 

North Korea to the Middle East, South America 

and Africa

• Sea basing must enable joint operations

– Efforts toward jointness must not hold up Marine / 

Navy progress 

– Sea basing efforts should aim at integrating service 

capabilities 
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND

________________________________________________________ MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

ON SEA BASING _____________________________________________________________ 

 

9

 “Joint Matters means matters relating to the 

integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, 

including matters relating to – (1) national military 

strategy, (2) strategic planning and contingency 

planning, and (3) command and control of combat 

operations under unified command.”5 

In sea basing terms, jointness means four things: 

 The ability of the seabase to serve as the joint force 

commander’s location 

 Its ability to serve as a dynamic base of operations 

for forces of all Services 

 Its ability to handle the logistics of all four Services 

plus special operations forces 

 Its ability to support and sustain operations from the 

sea of all four Services 

In effect, sea basing must become a truly joint concept with 

capabilities that allow for the projection of the full panoply of 

American military power against the enemies of the United States. 

 

5 See Murray, Williamson, Lessons Learned: The Learning Part, draft paper. 
 

GEOPOLITICAL AND 

MILITARY ENVIRONMENT_________________________________________________________ 

10 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

11

A SEA BASING CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

Amphibious warfare, a traditional U.S. military competence, is the 

forerunner of future sea-based operations. The World War II Pacific 

Victory was based on assaults over the beaches of numerous islands 

and atolls. Future sea basing envisions a broader, more flexible 

operational capability to support major land operations, over-theshore or well inland. The future seabase enables forcible entry 

operations with sustained thrust, focused directly on inland 

objectives without the need to first reduce coastal defenses. 
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

12 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Sea basing, for the purposes of this report, represents a future 

capability with antecedents in amphibious operations. A seabase is a 

system of systems enabling personnel, materiel, fires, and command 

and control to come together rapidly, integrate, and be projected as a 

flexible force capable of undertaking a broad spectrum of over-theshore operations. Such operations could range from humanitarian 

relief, operations other than war, and conflict prevention to brigadesized or larger combat operations. Even larger operations could be 

enabled by the addition of more seabases or by the ability to flow 

additional forces through the seabase. A seabase may serve as an 

integration point for joint as well as coalition forces. 

Sea basing is more than simply traditional amphibious assault 

operations. It entails the projection of land forces substantially 

beyond the beachhead, independent of in-theater land bases. A 

seabase also needs to sustain such forces for prolonged periods. 

Sea basing can be defined as: The capacity and/or capability to 

project rapidly sustainable military power ashore from the sea. Such 

capabilities must be flexible and adaptable to a wide range of 

What’s Different about Sea Basing?

• The United States has historically conducted forcible 

entry expeditionary operations across the shore 

• In the future, in-theater land bases or traditional 

amphibious operations may no longer be feasible due to 

political considerations or enemy defensive capabilities

• A seabase represents a sovereign, maneuverable 

capability for rapidly projecting U.S. offensive and 

defensive power, as well as assembling, equipping, 

supporting and sustaining scalable forcible entry 

operations without the need for land bases in the joint 

area of operations

• Sea basing expands current amphibious capabilities

in both scale and scope to enable rapid-response, deep, 

joint, prolonged operations
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

13

contingencies. They must also be capable of meeting and overcoming 

an increasing number of threats. Sea basing is inherently joint: it 

includes the integration of new ISR capabilities as well as precision 

fires to enable ground forces to achieve operational objectives. The 

ability of seabases to project power ashore can be substantially 

extended by military power from land bases, but in the emerging 

future it must be capable of operating by itself against substantial 

enemy capabilities until those capabilities have been destroyed or 

rendered harmless. 

The elements of the future seabase concept that this report 

envisions encompass a broad range of operations. This report 

concentrates on the most difficult type of operations – brigade-scale 

forcible entry from the sea, as it is the most demanding use of 

seabases. In doing so, however, the Task Force does not intend to 

deny the use of seabase components for the accomplishment of other 

missions across the operational spectrum. 
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

14 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Today’s amphibious operations focus on assaults over the shore 

and into seaports, to establish footholds ashore permitting the buildup of sufficient combat power to conduct operations against inland 

objectives. This concept of operations (CONOPS) requires an 

operational pause for supply and reorganization, thereby losing 

momentum through a decrease in operational tempo. 

Today’s Amphibious Today’s Amphibious 

Operations Operations
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

15

Today’s amphibious capability provides the nation great utility 

across the spectrum of conflict. Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) 

execute forward-presence operations. Nine additional ARGs, in 

transit, refit or training, backup the forward-deployed force. An 

ARG normally consists of three ships: a large-deck amphibious 

assault ship and two smaller amphibious vessels. ARGs carry Marine 

Expeditionary Units Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) and 

deploy from the east and west coasts as well as the western Pacific. 

The MEUs are combined-arms task forces based on infantry 

battalions. Logistics groups and composite fixed- and rotary-wing 

aircraft squadrons round out the units. Commanded by a colonel, a 

MEU is capable of special operations such as emergency evacuations, 

but is not designed for sustained combat ashore. 

An amphibious Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), capable of 

a greater range of special and combat operations, embarks in the 

ships of an Amphibious Task Force (ATF). The current 36-ship 

amphibious force has the resources to embark two brigades of 

approximately 13,100 Marines each. Brigades are task-organized 

forces and can vary in size. The notional brigade is built around an 

Today’s Amphibious Operations Capability

• Worldwide USMC/USN forward presence with three 

Amphibious Ready Groups

– Responsive forces for MEU/SOC missions

– Little capability for sustained land combat

• 2-plus Brigade amphibious lift capability

– Limited stand-off from beaches

– Requires large logistical footprint ashore

– Little naval surface fire capability; heavy reliance on air

• 3 Brigade equipment sets on Maritime Prepositioning

Force

– Require unopposed environment

– In-stream offload at sea state 2
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

16 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

infantry regiment. The aviation combat element (ACE) is a Marine 

Air Group consisting of several fixed and rotary-wing squadrons. A 

robust combat service support element, a brigade service support 

group, accompanies the force. The brigade is capable of sustained 

land combat, but relies heavily on the early introduction of its 

expeditionary airpower for fire support. Current doctrine for 

amphibious operations requires a substantial logistics presence on 

the beach to support the brigade as it moves inland. 

The ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) represent 

an important addition to the amphibious force. These commercial 

ships, manned by civilian crews, are organized in three squadrons, 

each of which carries equipment and sustainment for a Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade. The squadrons are based in the Pacific, the 

Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean. Capable of offload in sea state 

2, these ships deliver equipment in-stream or pier-side to a Marine 

brigade arriving at a secure port or airfield. 

Today’s amphibious forces have great flexibility. They can land at 

places and times of their choosing and can achieve strategic and/or 

tactical surprise; but they have significant limitations as well. Some 

amphibious ships must remain close to the beach to discharge and 

support the assault, which makes them vulnerable to shore-based 

attack and shallow water mines. The assault echelon brings most of 

its logistical support ashore, which slows the pace of military 

operations, while creating tempting targets and limiting mobility. 

The MPF ships possess capabilities for in-stream or selective offload. 

In-stream offload is limited by sea state and other factors, but the 

entire ship may be offloaded in-stream in benign conditions. 
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

17

Operations from a future seabase focus on direct assault on inland 

objectives (with no operational pause) followed by moves to capture 

seaports or safe shore lodgments for heavier follow-on forces. This 

shift in tactics is made possible by the logistics support, airlift and 

maneuver capabilities of the seabase. This shift in CONOPS reflects 

across the entire range of military operations. 

Seabase Enabled Seabase Enabled 

Forcible Entry Forcible Entry
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

18 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Future sea-based expeditionary movements direct from the sea to 

objectives are supported by strike, close support and logistics from 

the seabase and elsewhere. Direct-to-objective operations mean 

forces bypass shore defenses and move immediately inland. 
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

19

As envisioned in the nominal plan, the ship component of a future 

seabase consists of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), a Carrier 

Strike Group (CSG) and a Maritime Prepositioning Group (MPG) 

supported by a Combat Logistics Force (CLF). The Carrier Strike 

Group’s primary responsibility is to provide deep strike, combat air 

support to forces ashore and protection from airborne threats such as 

enemy aircraft or sea-skimming missiles. The CSG also provides the 

airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) needs of 

the joint force. 

The ESG supplies the seabase land assault capability. It should 

allow for assembly of the assault force, the transshipment of logistics, 

lift (both sea and air), and a place to reconstitute and redeploy forces 

following combat. The Maritime Prepositioning Group provides the 

combat equipment for Marine Expeditionary Brigade that reinforces 

the Marine Expeditionary Unit based aboard the ESG. 

Special operations forces, soldiers, and Marines would assemble, 

together with their equipment, on the seabase to match the mission’s 

needs. This combination would enable rapid force projection over 

Future Sea-Based Capabilities

• Conceptually, a nominal seabase consists of 

– One Expeditionary Strike Group 

– A Carrier Strike Group 

– A Maritime Prepositioning Group, supported by a Combat Logistics Force

– Specialized supporting vessels

– Incorporated forces

– Numbers may vary depending on the size and complexity of operations

• Proposed seabasing CONOPS call for employing 

equipment and logistics capabilities from advanced 

bases outside the theater of operations, within 

approximately 2,000 miles

• Seabases would enable sizable, rapidly deployable 

forces to operate independent of in-theater seaports or 

airbases

• Over the next two decades, U.S. sea basing capabilities 

could evolve sea-based operations in littoral regions 

supported directly from CONUS
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

20 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

the shore, force protection, logistics, and command and control. 

Additional Strike Groups, Prepositioning Groups, lighters, 

countermine systems and other specialized systems for joint 

operations and logistics handling may be added as required to 

support specific operations depending on the political and military 

context. The concept is flexible, however; small efforts, such as 

humanitarian or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) 

operations, may require only a few, small ships, whereas large 

operations would entail additional vessels. 

While a seabase can operate with or without in-theater land-base 

support, current transport limitations require an advanced base 

within roughly 2,000 miles for support and sustainment. At present, 

Guam for the East Asian theater and Diego Garcia for the Middle 

Eastern theater could fulfill that role—though requiring considerable 

investment. Southeast Asia represents a problem—there is currently 

no advanced base. Singapore may be too vulnerable; northwest 

Australia may be the best possibility. 

As lift capabilities improve, a long term goal for sea basing may 

be the ability to operate independently in major littoral areas of 

strategic significance around the globe supported directly from 

CONUS. 
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

21

Future forcible entry operations may employ a variety of bases to 

support the forces engaged. In-theater seaports and airbases have 

traditionally provided logistics and other support to forces ashore—

those forces perhaps already established by amphibious and air 

assaults. However, as the political context grows more ambiguous 

and new weapon threats arise, fixed bases on land will become 

difficult to sustain and utilize. 

Seabases may also serve as stepping stones for expeditionary 

forcible entry operations. A seabase is the best way to support the 

early stages of combat and provide sustainment until, with the 

seizure of ports, heavier forces can arrive. 

Seabases composed of today’s ships, logistics and lift systems 

remain limited in their ability to operate independently of advanced 

bases. They lack the capacity to assemble sizeable forces for combat, 

carry sufficient materiel to support large-scale operations ashore, and 

sort and selectively offload logistics tailored to specific operations. 

Additionally, current ARGs and MPFs lack the airlift capacity 

necessary to sustain inshore forces for prolonged periods. 

Future Seabase Concept of Operations: 

Overview

S

P

O

D O

P

S

A

R

E

A

STRATEGIC SEA LIFT

STRATEGIC AIR LIFT

C

O

N

U

S

A

P

O

D

STRATEGIC 

SEA/AIR LIFT

Seabase Area

AIR

SURFACE

Advanced

Base

AIR AND SEA LINKS
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

22 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Because of these limitations, seabases will rely on advanced bases 

close enough to the conflict to provide assembly and timely 

transportation of forces to the base, a marshaling area for supplies 

brought by commercial vessels for re-supply, and a reconstitution 

refuge for troops spent after sustained exposure to combat. Troops 

and materiel destined for the seabase must transit from CONUS to 

the advanced base, next to the seabase and finally ashore. 

In the longer term, sea basing systems may allow for direct 

shipment from CONUS to the base without transshipment through 

an advanced base. This improvement will reduce force closure time 

and increase seabase flexibility. Additionally, eliminating the 

advanced base adds the ability of the seabase to operate in regions 

where advanced bases may not be available. 

The crucial point is that sea basing, with or without an advanced 

base, will allow more rapid movement of reinforcements and logistics 

through its various components to sustain the tempo and lethality of 

operations ashore. 
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

23

Phased At-Sea 

Arrival and Assembly

Sea 

Base Advanced Base

Advanced Base

Phased at-sea arrival and assembly is a critical aspect of the future sea 

basing concept. For a sea-based operation, as a crisis develops, the 

initial response ESGs and CSGs arrive and constitute the seabase. 

The Maritime Prepositioning Group is sortied and self-deploying 

forces flow forward to the seabase while non-self-deploying forces 

move to advanced bases via strategic lift. From these bases, forces 

move forward by inter-theater connectors (such as high speed 

vessels, or RW/TR aircraft) to marry up with their equipment aboard 

the MPG en route to the theater. Sea based lighterage ensures 

smooth transfers within the seabase. 

Implicit with this capability is the habitability that future MPF 

ships MPF(F) must provide for MPG personnel as well as the 

interface capability that all lighterage and intra-theater lift vessels 

must have with MPF(F). 
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

24 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The notional timeline for flow-in forces is: 

 Aviation units ready within 72 hours of arrival at the 

advance bases

 Units ready within 24 hours of arrival at the seabase 

 Flow-in echelon closed within seven days of initial 

movement 
 

A SEA BASING

_______________________________________________________ CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

25

Sea 

base

Obj A

Obj B

Sustainment

Reconstitution and Redeployment

Rapid Recovery and Re-Employment is Essential to Maintain Combat Tempo

Combat tempo and responsiveness is increased through sea 

basing and direct assault on the objective with the ability to rapidly 

recover and re-employ forces, either in the same operation at a 

different location or in an entirely different operation. After it seizes 

its initial objectives, some or all of the force can be recovered to the 

seabase, maneuvered with the seabase and rapidly re-employed 

elsewhere. 

In order to achieve this, minimum logistics must be held ashore—

a core capability of sea basing. 
 

A SEA BASING 

CONCEPT FOR THE FUTURE _______________________________________________________ 

26 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

THE VALUE OF AN

_________________________________________________________ OPERATIONAL SEABASE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

27

THE VALUE OF AN OPERATIONAL SEABASE

U.S. military forces have long recognized the advantages of 

striking from a seabase. The island-hopping campaigns of World War 

II would not have been possible, if naval forces had not learned to 

sustain themselves at sea and project and sustain power from the sea. 

The great fleet trains that supported Task Force 58 in World War II 

are the ancestors of the current and future seabase. 

With the coming of the Cold War, U.S. forces came to rely heavily 

on a world-wide network of bases created to contain the Soviet 

Union. The nation soon learned, however, that access to and over 

these bases was not always assured. From Lebanon in 1958 to Turkey 

in 2003, U.S. forces have had to change operational plans and 

strategies because of denial of access by allies, who see such access as 

inimical to their national interest. 

Why Seabase?

• Seabases would better enable rapid, substantial power 

projection from the sea

– A counter to some area denial and anti-access measures

– Expand the range of military options and complicate defense for 

potential adversaries

– Minimize local/regional political sensitivities

– Maneuver reduces vulnerability compared to large, fixed military

presence ashore

– Provides rapidly deployable, yet persistent capabilities

– Closes the “vulnerability gap”

– Less vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction

– Likely to be the lynchpin for unilateral preventative action with 

both fires and maneuver operations

• Sea basing provides complementary and supporting joint 

force capabilities
 

THE VALUE OF AN 

OPERATIONAL SEABASE __________________________________________________________ 

28 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

In recent years, the number of permanent overseas bases has 

dwindled, a trend likely to continue. As a nation with global 

interests, the United States cannot allow other nations to hold its 

forward presence and power projection requirements hostage. Sea 

basing provides a powerful alternative to land bases. It is likely to be 

the necessary lynchpin for unilateral preventive actions with both fire 

and maneuver operations. 

With additional seabase capabilities, the United States would 

solve much of its access problem. Moreover, a mobile seabase 

enhances force protection and reduces the effectiveness of various 

anti-access strategies. A seabase of the future would obviate the need 

for large and vulnerable logistic infrastructures ashore and provide a 

powerful deterrent to potential adversaries. 

What is crucial to moving the seabase beyond its Navy and 

Marine Corps antecedents is the need for the other services to tailor 

their seaborne prepositioning concepts to those of the maritime 

prepositioning force. Moreover, the tailoring of at least part of the 

101st to operate off a seabase, as it did during the Haiti crisis, would 

substantially increase the nation’s ability to project power from the 

sea. The sea basing concept, however, extends well beyond the static 

use of carriers to transport and disembark forces—it encompasses 

dynamic deployment of forces to a mobile base, which then positions 

and supports them for best military advantage. The joint capabilities 

of the seabase ensure its usefulness for the entire extent of conflict 

from early entry to follow-on operations. 
 

THE VALUE OF AN

_________________________________________________________ OPERATIONAL SEABASE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

29

Expeditionary Operations Profile

Time

Combat Power

Follow-On Forces

(exploitation phase)

Initial Landing Force

Vulnerability Gap

Combat 

Losses

Expeditionary operations can be characterized by this chart. 

Initial forces are placed into battle quickly to limit and shorten the 

conflict, to employ the element of surprise, and/or to support 

threatened allied forces. After the initial assault and before the 

arrival of heavier, larger forces, the combat effectiveness of the initial 

force degrades due to fatigue, enemy action or surprise. During this 

period the initial assault force is capturing and rendering useful intheater seaports and airports of disembarkation (SPODs and APODs) 

required by the follow-on force. This period following the peak of the 

initial assault can be termed a “vulnerability gap.”6 

 

6 See Murray, Williamson, The Implications of Access for Power Projection, draft paper. The 

vulnerability gap and the operational value of the sea base are also discussed in Appendix E, 

Operational Issues of Sea Basing in the Twenty-First Century. 
 

THE VALUE OF AN 

OPERATIONAL SEABASE __________________________________________________________ 

30 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The Vulnerability Gap Results

from a Net Force Deficit

Time

Combat Power

Follow-On Forces

Initial Landing 

Force

Enemy Response

Gap

Attrition

Re-supply, second wave forces

Over the past century, projection of military power from the sea, 

usually termed expeditionary operations, has followed a similar 

pattern, especially when attacking an opponent who possesses the 

ability to reinforce his troops. Even when there was every 

expectation that a landing might occur, the attacker has usually 

enjoyed the advantage of being able to choose the place and time of 

his amphibious operations. At Gallipoli, as at Salerno, Normandy 

and the Falklands, the defender knew amphibious operations were 

about to occur, but remained unsure as to the location and exact 

timing of the coming attack. Thus, even though strategic surprise 

might have been lacking, the attacking forces gained tactical and, in 

some instances, operational surprise at the onset of the battle. 

The initial advantage of tactical surprise, however, usually proved 

difficult to convert into an immediate operational or strategic success. 

There were several reasons for this. First, the lassitude induced in 

achieving a successful amphibious lodgment made it difficult for the 

attacking troops to push on to take full advantage of their operational 

advantages. This was clearly the case in the Anzac landings during 

the Gallipoli campaign and in the failure to seize Caen during the 
 

THE VALUE OF AN

_________________________________________________________ OPERATIONAL SEABASE

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

31

Normandy campaign. In other cases, cautious commanders have 

failed to take advantage of the opportunities that the initial landings 

offered; here Sulva Bay, during Gallipoli, and Anzio spring to mind. 

The Turks, in the former case, and the Germans in the latter, had 

virtually no troops in the immediate landing area. But because of the 

attackers’ failure to seize the advantage of initial successes, the 

defenders were able to limit the impact of the initial landings. They 

were able to bring up sufficient reinforcements to establish a 

defensive front that hemmed the attackers into a bridgehead. Only in 

the Inchon landings were attacking amphibious forces able to gain 

almost immediately an advantage that led to a great operational 

victory. 

Once lost, momentum can only be regained by the buildup of 

superior military forces and their sustainment. This usually involves 

a prolonged buildup period and the erosion of the enemy’s strength 

by major military operations. In the course of the Normandy 

Campaign, Caen, which was defended by minimal German forces, 

did not fall for over a month, while it took Anglo-American forces 

two full months to gain operational freedom and defeat the 

Wehrmacht. 
 

THE VALUE OF AN 

OPERATIONAL SEABASE __________________________________________________________ 

32 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Sea-Based Sustainment can Reduce or 

Eliminate Vulnerability Gap

Time

Combat Power

Adversary Force

Seabase-Enhanced

Projected Force

For initial forces, the seabase acts as a support base, both speeding 

initial deployment and sustaining the halt phase force so that its 

impact is prolonged, not transitory. Besides disrupting the enemy’s 

equilibrium, future sea-based operations could, if needed, clear the 

enemy’s beach defenses so that follow-on heavier forces could come 

ashore over the beach or through captured seaports or airports. 

The seabase can continue to sustain its forces ashore even after the 

arrival of the follow-on forces thus enhancing the total combat power 

available to the Task Force Commander. There is no build up phase 

ashore—air and ground operations can begin simultaneously. The 

aim of the future seabase will be to prevent the period where the 

enemy can react and limit the operational success of initial landings. 
 

ENABLING SEA

___________________________________________________________BASING CAPABILITIES

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

33

ENABLING SEA BASING CAPABILITIES

Forcible Entry from the Sea Requires

• All functions performed on the seabase

– Moving forces, materiel, and weapons from an advanced base 

(or CONUS) to the seabase

– At sea reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

– Getting the force to the objective and sustaining it 

– Sea, air and land platforms working in concert to project power 

to the objective (including ESG, CSG, MPG, CLF, air and sea 

links plus lighterage)

– Defense suppression

• A joint system extending across interoperable 

platforms, netted together and sustained from the sea

• Much more than logistics – it’s operations!

The maneuverable nature of future seabases, independent of 

APODs and SPODs, expands the range of attack options. It would 

allow entry at a time and place of U.S. choosing. However, sustained, 

sea-based, forcible entries against future adversaries will represent 

more complex undertakings. 

America’s enemies will be able easily to defend shallow waters 

with inexpensive, hard-to-clear, mines; easily transportable, effective 

anti-ship missiles will replace shore-based artillery defenses of the 

twentieth century. In one scenario, expeditionary assaults might 

begin with inland, vertical envelopment of airmobile ground forces 

as much as 150 to 200 miles from the sea, deep into the enemy’s 

territory. Portions of the land force have the option to fight their way 

back to the shore to clear the beach for heavier forces. Sea basing 

would allow positioning forces to best advantage. 
 

ENABLING SEA

BASING CAPABILITIES ___________________________________________________________ 

34 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The dynamic nature of the seabase allows as well for many other 

operational concepts, depending on the situation—a major advantage 

of the sea basing concept. 

Sea-based operations will require close coordination of offensive, 

defensive, logistics, command and control, and supply systems. 

Furthermore, sea conditions in many areas will require complex sea, 

air and land supply transfer activities even with rough seas and high 

winds. 

U.S. military doctrine requires that sea, land and air forces form 

joint task forces. Thus, the seabase must be designed with joint 

operations in mind. While the Army, Marines, and Navy may 

directly employ sea basing techniques, all services, including the Air 

Force, must operate in close cooperation. Land, air and joint 

command and control systems must all be integral to seabases. 

The sea basing concept aims at expanding existing Navy/Marine 

Corps capabilities to encompass joint operations. The seabases of the 

future will serve the functions of air- and seaports. In other words, it 

will be an in-theater base for prolonged warfare operations. Such 

operations can involve the Air Force and particularly the Army, in 

addition to the Navy and Marine Corps; the brigade-sized 

operational focus of the conceptual seabase is at the “sweet spot” 

between the expeditionary operations traditionally performed by the 

MEB and 101st Airborne and larger military operations that involve 

divisions or corps. 

Seabases are much more than logistical support bases—they will 

be mobile operational elements that enable rapid closure and forcible 

entry from the sea. 

Sea basing to support fully joint operations will become an 

antecedent capability to establishing secure bases ashore. As 

conditions degrade from diplomatic and benign entry to paramilitary 

and then military opposed entry, sea basing becomes a “sine qua 

non” to forcible entry operations. 
 

ENABLING SEA

___________________________________________________________BASING CAPABILITIES

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

35

Sea basing is not just logistics. 
 

ENABLING SEA

BASING CAPABILITIES ___________________________________________________________ 

36 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

To be effective, a seabase must possess the attributes listed above. 

A seabase must be capable of supporting joint and combined force 

operations. 

It must be mobile, both to allow speedy positioning at the best 

location to support land operations and to make the seabase difficult 

to attack. Since the seabase is comprised of many vessels, these 

elements of the base must have the ability to coalesce rapidly as 

needed in accordance with operational plans. 

Task forces comprising the seabase must be tightly integrated, 

allowing for seamless communications, logistics and offensive and 

defensive systems. 

The seabase must be able to transfer materiel as needed among 

ships comprising the base, air transport and commercial ships 

providing sustainment for the base and supported forces. The 

seabase will have to conduct materiel transfer operations under the 

adverse sea conditions likely to be found in the areas of operations. 

Critical Seabase Capabilities

– Fully joint capable

– Maneuverable, dispersed – able to coalesce rapidly 

as needed

– Integrated command and control

– At-sea arrival, assembly, and transfer of materiel and 

personnel

– Selective, robust offload

– Conduct and sustain forcible entry and subsequent 

operations

– Facilitate movement ashore

– Force protection

– Re-suppliable throughout the follow-on force build up 

period in adverse weather

– Ability to reconstitute and redeploy the force

– Robust in challenging seas
 

ENABLING SEA

___________________________________________________________BASING CAPABILITIES

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

37

Since much of the equipment required by assault troops must be 

prepositioned in the MPF well before a conflict, it is not possible to 

predict the mix required for specific operations. For this reason, 

future MPF ships must be able to selectively sort and offload the 

equipment and cargo needed by the task force. Such ships must be 

automated warehouses at sea, able to move standard containerized 

loads and equipment under realistic sea conditions. 

The seabase must support both air and over-the-beach operations 

required during various combat operations, accommodating both 

moderate and heavy loads. 

The seabase must provide protection, both for itself and forces 

ashore. Inasmuch as future CONOPS for forcible entry operations 

envision agile, logistically unencumbered troops fighting deep 

inland, the seabase must have the ability to project both air and naval 

fires for close support. 

There must be a way to resupply the seabase to allow sustained 

operations, either independently or as part of a larger task force. The 

seabase may represent a transition element to land-supported 

operations as U.S. forces capture and repair SPODs and APODs for 

later use. 

In addition, the seabase must be capable of operations in 

challenging seas—up to sea state 4. To provide context, the table 

below shows the percentage of sea state 3 conditions (relatively 

benign conditions) or less for various littoral areas.7

Western Central America 73 Korean Coast 71

NW South America 55 East Coast Philippines 62

Eastern South Pacific 40 East Coast of Japan 48

Western South Atlantic 43 NW Africa 48

NE South America 54 Gulf of Guinea 71

West. and So. Caribbean 53 Cape of Good Hope 21

Eastern Pacific 45 West Indian Ocean 52

North Sea / English Channel 52 North Arabian Sea 73

Eastern Atlantic 40 Persian Gulf 89

Western Atlantic 60 Mediterranean Sea 75

 

7 Further discussion of sea state conditions is in Appendix F, Sea States. 
 

ENABLING SEA

BASING CAPABILITIES ___________________________________________________________ 

38 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Traditional amphibious operations focus on massing materiel and 

forces ashore. The seabase is regarded largely as a logistics delivery 

capability. 

In future conflicts, large, fixed footprints ashore are liabilities—

they are vulnerable, restrict movement and slow the operational 

tempo. The modern seabase is a mobile, defendable, largely 

prepositioned asset that combines operational, command and control, 

and logistics activities. It is, at the same time, fort, airfield, depot, 

barracks, command center and maneuver element—all able to exploit 

the maneuver space of the sea. 

The seabase should provide a full range of base operations, 

starting with force assembly and projection, protection of both the 

Ground Combat Element (GCE) and seabase itself, support of 

operations for prolonged periods and joint command and control, as 

needed. To be effective, the seabase must be capable of operations in 

sea conditions that are likely to prevail in the area of operations. 
 

ENABLING SEA

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39

The conceptual design of a seabase is the result of a series of 

interrelated tradeoffs: 

 Operational requirements (force size, weaponry, the 

reach inland of its military power, and 

environmental conditions) 

 Logistical requirements to support the force, in the 

initial assault as well as long term 

 Ship and aircraft lift and speed capabilities 

 Threats the seabase is likely to confront that 

determine defensive measures (especially standoff 

distances from shore). 

For example, a hypothetical threat estimate of an adversary with 

Mach 3.5 sea-skimming missiles that can target ships 100 miles out to 

sea (a three minute flight time) would put a seabase that lacks 

adequate defensive systems so far out at sea that helicopter and 

landing craft transit time and lift limitations would make it difficult 

to support forces at distances inland. 

Seabase Design Tradeoffs

• Fundamental seabase requirements represent 

tradeoffs among operational concepts, logistical 

requirements, lift capacity and speed, and 

defense requirements

• Additional requirements stem from expected sea 

conditions, cargo packaging, and the need to 

flexibly integrate the force with its materiel at sea
 

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40 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The need to carry out force reception, staging, onward movement 

and integration (RSOI) as well as logistics support operations at sea 

means that ships comprising the seabase require the ability to handle 

heavy loads (TEU inter-modal shipping containers or more) in sea 

conditions typically found offshore (sea state 4). Using today’s 

geopolitical picture, this means the Northern Pacific, the Indian 

Ocean and the Arabian Sea. 
 

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41

Planning CONOPS call for seabase ships to move to a distance of 

twenty-five n. mi. offshore at the outset of conflict. 

The initial movement of troops and weapons inland could occur 

by vertical lift. The number of available aircraft, their range, lift and 

speed, the size and weight of the forces, and distance from the 

seabase to landing zones will determine the rate at which forces 

deploy. Using today’s helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft, only 

relatively light forces could deploy in this manner over the distances 

the future operations will require. 

At present, heavier forces must come over the beach on Landing 

Craft Air Cushions (LCACs) and in Advanced Amphibious Assault 

Vehicles (AAAVs). From 25 n. mi., the one-way transit time for such 

landing vessels is one hour, a factor that severely limits the rate of 

deployment. 

After the beach is secure, ships move closer to shore (three n. mi.) 

to accommodate the need to pump fuel and fresh water across the 

beach and the slow speed of lighter craft. At five to eight knots, 

Seabased Land Force Deployment Operations

• Projected CONOPS envision seabase ships operate at 

an over the horizon line of departure at least 25 n. mi. 

offshore

– Helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft deploy the airborne force inland

– 35 knot LCACs and 20+ knot AAAVs, provide transit times of 

approximately one hour to the beach

• When a beach/lodgment area is required and secured, 

ships can close to 3 n. mi. or less to support the force

– Dictated by current fuel and water pumping capability and slow 

transit speeds of LCUs and lighters (5 to 8 knots) necessary to 

move heavy equipment

– Envisioned LCU(R) is a 15 knot vessel able to carry three 

M1A1/2 tanks

• Heavy lift (TEU) air vehicles capable of operating from 

the seabase would have great utility

– Would extend operational possibilities enormously

• Ability to handle cargo up to sea state 4 is crucial
 

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42 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

lighters—Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) ships—can carry heavy loads, 

such as main battle tanks that augment the lift capabilities of aircraft 

and helicopters. Higher speed lighters, that will replace current 

LCUs (LCU(R)), are under development. They are being designed to 

carry three Abrams tanks. 

Heavy lift air vehicles (capable of lifting an inter-modal TEU 

container) that can operate directly from the seabase would provide a 

major improvement in the ability to deploy and sustain more robust 

forces ashore, especially in combat. 

To preserve seabase maneuver options in the challenging seas 

characteristic of some possible operations areas, seabase ships should 

be able to handle cargo within and between ships up to sea state 4. 
 

ENABLING SEA

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43

The Dirty Dozen

Twelve Issues the Department Must Address

• Management

1. A Joint Sea Base Program Office

– Re-task and reorganize existing offices

– Ensure meaningful participation by the Army and Air Force in 

forming a joint capability

• Planning

2. Sustaining Troops Ashore

3. Protecting the Force Ashore

4. Countering Threats

– Littoral operations an important area of operations

– Mines, sea-skimming missiles, subs, small boats 

5. Concepts of Operations

– At sea RSOI, deployment, force protection, sustainment

The Dirty Dozen (cont)

• New Capabilities

6. Cargo transfer at sea

– Inter-modal TEUs at SS4

7. Long-range, heavy lift aircraft

– Based at sea with capability to support forces ashore and transport troops

8. Ships

– The platforms of sea basing

9. Communication architecture

– A shared data architecture with sufficient bandwidth, redundancy and 

robustness

10. Logistic support system 

– Ability to handle all Service materiel interchangeably

11. Inter-theater lift 

– HSVs, lighterage, sea-going cargo cranes, skin-to-skin transfer capabilities 

that can operate at SS4

• Resources

12. Development speed and funding 

– Creative ways to develop and fund construction of a modern sea basing 

capability
 

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44 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Meeting the requirements and capabilities for a future sea basing 

capability will require the Department to address the major issues 

listed above. They range from management, to planning, to 

developing new capabilities, to resources. 

Most of the issues facing DoD involve developing new 

capabilities. Some require research and development, new concept 

formulation, analyses of alternatives, and system development before 

they can come to fruition in seabase applications. Heavy lift aircraft, 

heavy lift cranes, and semi-submersible platforms are among those 

concepts and are discussed in the slides to follow. 

Of this list, three stand out as especially important capabilities 

that need to be developed: 

 Improved cargo handling capabilities that can 

operate in rough seas, characteristic of many likely 

areas of operations 

 A long-range heavy lift aircraft that can be based at 

sea 

 Next-generation ships that support future sea basing 

requirements 

Each of these developments is difficult, but not impossible to 

achieve. They require substantial research and development effort 

and investment to produce robust capabilities. They are all necessary 

to “make sea basing happen.” 
 

ENABLING SEA

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45

A seabase is a complex system of capabilities which would serve 

to capture not only the power and flexibility of future CSGs and 

ESGs, but also the superb capabilities envisioned for MPF(F) 

squadrons. The combination of these capabilities would allow at-sea 

arrival and assembly, selective logistics offload and air operations for 

up to a full Marine Expeditionary Brigade or equivalent Army 

brigade. 

The challenge is to create an achievable and synchronized path 

from today’s Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), ARGs, and Maritime 

Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadrons to the capabilities of the 

seabase envisioned for the next decade. Each of the legacy 

upgrades—such as LHA(R) and MPF(F)—must be addressed in 

conjunction, together with airlift support needs. To do otherwise 

would optimize individual elements in stovepipes which would 

inevitably lead to considerations of affordability that would preclude 

the achievement of what the seabase of the future could offer the 

nation. 

The Seabase System of Systems

It’s not just a bunch of ships

• Consists of interacting platforms and capabilities

• Must conform to an overall architecture 

– Allows for progression from the present to the future 

– Allows for CONUS-to-seabase deployment and sustainment 

using military and commercial transport

• Self defense

– Capability for optimally pairing fires and force protection

• Can sustain operations for prolonged periods

– Until follow-on forces arrive

– Serve as a support base thereafter

• C2 systems

• Logistic systems

• Naval surface fire support
 

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46 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The seabase, as currently envisioned, will inevitably eliminate 

legacy concepts such as the in-theater Intermediate Support Base, as 

well as current distinctions between “deployment” and 

“employment.” 

The seabase of the future must be capable of receiving logistics 

support from commercial container ships, while MPF(F) ships must 

have surface and aircraft interfaces to allow operations in conjunction 

with the CSGs and ESGs. The presence of these latter groups in the 

seabase would provide the seabase with the ability to protect itself, 

project power ashore, and support ground forces. 

The ability of MPF(F) squadrons to carry the necessary equipment 

for a MEB-sized force and their ability to accept re-supply from 

commercial and military shuttle ships, would insure sustainment of 

operations ashore, while follow-on heavy forces move to contact. The 

seabase not only offers logistics support, but can also provide afloat 

command and control for the joint force commander, at-sea 

equipment maintenance, and medical care for ground forces. 
 

ENABLING SEA

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47

Developing a system of systems, as complex as a seabase, 

necessitates careful coordination among the myriad projects required 

for implementing the system. Seabase realization must be guided by 

an overall architecture which coordinates diverse developments, 

including concepts of operation, ships, aircraft, cargo handling 

systems, logistics and communications. All the Services must 

participate to ensure compatibility. 

Managing such a wide ranging, multi-Service program will 

require a leadership structure that spans diverse disciplines and that 

endures for the length of the seabase development activity. After 

discussing alternatives at length, the Task Force concludes that a Joint 

Program Office is the best choice to manage seabase development. 

Management

1. A Joint Sea Base Program Office

• Developing the seabase will be a complex effort

– Requires an overall system of system architecture that supports 

CONOPS for a wide range of operations in a wide spectrum of 

environments

– Involves the planning and development of ships, aircraft, cargo 

handling systems, communications and logistics

– Requires participation of each of the services to ensure 

compatibility 

• A Joint Program Office can handle the size, scope, 

complexity and duration of the sea basing development 

effort
 

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48 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Current concept of operations for ship-to-objective-maneuver 

envisions the line of departure for transit ashore from the seabase at a 

minimum of 25 n. mi. This range is driven by the nominal radar 

horizon, the 35 knot transit speed of LCACs and 20+ knot speed of 

AAAVs (which will ensure that troops being lifted only have to 

endure an hour of what can be a disorienting and uncomfortable 

trip). Such distances may be risky given the expected proliferation of 

sea skimming cruise missiles in the future. At 25 n. mi. with a Mach 

2 cruise missile fired from shore, the seabase’s protective systems, 

resident primarily in surface combatants, have less than a minute to 

observe, decide on counters, and make a kill before the missile would 

hit seabase platforms such as an MPF(F) ship. 

With a line of departure of 75 to 100 n. mi., only airborne insertion 

and support of the initial ground forces ashore is realistic, leading to 

reduced inland reach and could eliminate surface combatant naval 

surface fire support. This distance also makes surface transits more 

difficult for LCACs and AAAVs, with an LCAC round trip requiring 

six to eight hours. Current LCUs, with a top speed of about 8 knots, 

are essentially unusable, requiring 20-24 hour round trip times. The 

Planning

2. Sustaining Troops Ashore

• Current CONOP calls for troops to depart from 25 n. mi. offshore

• This departure distance results from the radar horizon and the 35 kt

speed of LCACs and 20+ knot speed of AAAVs and endurance of 

assault troops.

– 25 n. mi. is over the horizon – an important element of surprise

– At 25 n. mi., defense against sea-skimming missiles must detect, target, 

and kill threats in a minute or less

– Lines of departure 75 to 100 miles offshore decrease large ship 

vulnerability, but make lighters impractical

– Additional threats, such as mines, complicate over-the-beach logistics.

– Ships must eventually move close to the beach to deliver heavy 

weapons, such as tanks

• A sea-based, heavy lift aircraft, capable of transporting a TEU load 

300 miles is crucial for sea basing

– Avoids the vulnerability / transit time 

– Speeds delivery of supplies from ship to shore
 

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49

surface movement would be so fragile that it is not clear that any 

operation other than a small raid or a NEO could be executed. 

A surface movement, even if executed from 25 n. mi. offshore 

after suppression of hostile forces protecting the beachhead, could 

face two additional obstacles—mines which currently can only be 

cleared over several days and sea states at or below 2. These 

obstacles essentially shut down the lighterage capability required to 

move heavy equipment ashore. Even an improved joint logistics 

over-the-shore (JLOTS) capability of sea state 3 represents only a 

marginal improvement. These deficiencies argue for development of 

a heavy lift aircraft (capable of lifting 20 tons or more) which can 

operate from the seabase. Such an aircraft could over fly the 

minefield and operate in up to sea state 5. However, it would still be 

insufficient for getting Abrams tanks and AAAVs ashore. 

The distance to shore in any operation is always in the hands of 

the commander—the object of seabase design is to allow maximum 

flexibility. 

Additionally, there is a need to develop the capability of carrying 

out warehousing operations aboard ship, particularly the selective 

moving of containers in high sea states, in order to tailor supply 

deliveries to the real-time needs of the Ground Combat Element. 
 

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50 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Today’s lack of sea-based air lift capable of delivering 20 ton loads 

inland means that much of the Ground Combat Element’s materiel 

must move over the beach (such as the Light Armored Vehicle shown 

here) . Delays in reaching and clearing the beach of adversary 

defenses in the future suggest that forces projected from a seabase 

may have to fight using lighter equipment and whatever long-range, 

air-drop flights land based C-130s and C-17s can deliver. 

The American military in 2020 will continue to need the flexibility 

to project sufficient firepower and land power ashore to attack and 

deconstruct sophisticated command and control and defenses in 

order to enable follow-on forces to come ashore through a captured 

port or over beaches made safe from enemy attack. 
 

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51

A traditional role of the Navy has been to provide air and naval 

surface fire support (NSFS) to forces ashore. In the past it has 

accomplished this mission with fire from 5-inch guns, land-attack 

missiles and sorties from carriers and ships in the amphibious force. 

Supporting future joint forces ashore from the seabase will require 

expanding that traditional role. Current doctrine calls for the seabase 

to remain 25 miles or more offshore, while forces ashore strike up to 

200 miles inland from the coast. These distances are well beyond the 

reach of traditional naval gunfire. Ships of the seabase need surface 

weapons systems capable of responding to calls for fire from 

distances greater than 25 miles. While the Tomahawk cruise missile 

certainly has adequate range and lethality, its size limits the number 

ships can carry, while its expense remains prohibitive. A smaller 

precision weapon is needed either in the form of a long-range naval 

gun, a smaller land attack missile, or an unmanned aerial vehicle 

(UAV). 

The ships of the seabase will have a vital role in providing 

protection to ground forces from cruise missiles. To this end, 

Planning

3. Protecting Forces Ashore

• Traditionally, naval forces have protected forces ashore 

from the sea through a combination of fire support 

brought ashore, NSFS, missiles, and air support

– NSFS lacks the range and precision to protect forces 200 miles 

inland 

– Current cruise missiles (Tomahawks) are too large and 

expensive for close support of troops

• The seabase must be able to protect troops ashore 

against missile attack as well as provide ISR, strike and 

close air support

– Forces ashore and at sea must have a common picture of the 

battle space

– Cooperative engagement technologies, where sensors ashore 

(such as radars) link to systems at sea, are key
 

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52 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

cooperative engagement technologies are key to success. Radars 

ashore linked to radars and weapons systems at sea as well as 

reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and strike aircraft 

can provide protection to both forces operating ashore and ships in 

the seabase. 

The carrier battle group will continue to provide long-range 

reconnaissance, targeting, and strike capabilities in support of the 

ground force. In addition, large, persistent, aircraft missile platforms 

can provide rapid response to calls for fire. 
 

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53

The ship or ships that will constitute a future seabase will be large 

and are likely to have displacements exceeding 100,000 tons. 

Depending on the level of survivability incorporated in their design, 

such vessels are unlikely to be sunk by a single mine, missile or 

torpedo. However, hits with such weapons would be sufficiently 

damaging to force mission aborts. Thus, every effort needs to be 

made to counter such potential threats. While the large 

displacements of seabase ships limit the chances of their loss due to 

single torpedo hits, the small craft (lighterage) used to transfer men 

and materiel to the beach are vulnerable to outright loss, not just 

damage, caused by mines and, when close inshore, to shoulder-fired 

missiles. 

Counters for the Mine Threat. Few nations have effective deep 

water mining capabilities. Water deeper than 200 meters (100 

fathoms) can be assumed to be a sanctuary for the seabase. 

Unfortunately, in many parts of the world such water depths occur 

far from shore: most of the Persian Gulf is shallower than 100 

fathoms. For a seabase to be positioned inside the 100-fathom line, a 

very large area must be cleared, and it must be done to a high degree 

Planning

4. Countering Threats

• Many ships constituting the seabase will have large displacements 

(>100K tons). A number of threats could compromise the ability to 

perform their missions:

– Obstacles and Mines: Principally a shallow water threat (<100 

fathoms). Current and developing Navy mine clearing capability is slow 

and difficult to conceal. Best approach now is detection and avoidance. 

More effort is urgently needed on mine clearing technologies

– Sea Skimming Missiles: Short flight times make rapid detection, 

targeting, and kill a must. Persistent shipboard and airborne ISR is a 

must, as are rapid response antimissile defenses

– Submarines: Long a Navy strength, anti-submarine defenses, as 

presently constituted, appear adequate against identified threats

– Small Boats: The projected Littoral Combat Ship will be well prepared 

to deal with the small boat threat
 

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54 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

of certainty. Current mine clearing capability in water depths 

between 100 fathoms and 10 fathoms, although very sure, is slow. 

Clearing an area of sufficient size to provide adequate maneuver 

space for a seabase will take at least many days, perhaps weeks. 

While the likelihood of having to clear room for an entire seabase 

may be small, it is highly likely that lanes will have to be cleared for 

lighters to operate between the seabase and the high water mark. 

Clearing obstacles and mines in the surf zone is a difficult problem; 

the Navy’s capabilities in this area are limited. In the sea basing 

context, mine clearance will be urgent; lanes will have to be cleared in 

no more than one day. That will require new methods. Development 

of shallow water mine clearance methods must be supported; they 

can exploit the absence of any need for furtiveness in sea basing 

applications. Designs of both heavy-lift aircraft and lighters should 

incorporate mine countermeasure features. 

Counters for Sea Skimming Cruise Missiles. Sea skimming missiles 

have two outstanding features as defensive weapons: 

 They can be hidden in commercial buildings, 

mounted on flatbed trucks, or deployed aboard 

small ships; a 100-mile missile weighs one, or at 

most two, tons 

 The range at which they can be detected by their 

target is limited by the height of the target’s radar; 

the horizon of a masthead radar is 15 miles—45 

seconds warning for a Mach 2 incoming missile 

There is no acceptable solution to sea skimming missile detection 

except to employ search radar orbiting at high altitude (the horizon 

range at 25,000 feet is just under 200 miles) and to place ships beyond 

the range of the missiles.8 Moving ships well offshore also reduces 

the clutter background against which the search radars must operate. 

On the other hand, it compounds the difficulty of supporting the 

troops ashore. 

 

8 Several projects are underway to develop medium-attack, long-endurance (MALE) UAVs 

that can serve as platforms for early warning surveillance radars. 
 

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55

Counters for the Submarine Threat. If an enemy has a submarine 

capability, it constitutes a serious threat to a seabase; a well-trained 

crew operating a modern quiet submarine in their home shallow 

waters cannot be found easily. But maintaining a competent 

submarine force is beyond the reach of all but a few nations, and is 

therefore an exceptional problem. The surest countermeasure is to 

track submarine whereabouts and pre-emptively destroy them at 

their piers. 

Countering the High-Speed, Small Boat Threat. The high-speed 

small boat threat is deemed to be of minor importance because 

surveillance radar is needed for many purposes and weapon systems 

exist that can destroy these targets. One of the principal capabilities 

of the projected new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be to counter 

such threats. 
 

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56 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

The planning CONOPS is a sensitive balance between the 

requirement to defend the seabase and the ability to project forces 

inland. 

The destruction of an adversary’s seaborne platforms can be 

carried out in a conventional manner, but finding and destroying 

shore-based defenses will be difficult and might have to be 

accomplished on the ground. The advanced (light) force to do this 

will have to be delivered by air; it will have to be relieved quickly by 

a force the weight of which cannot be handled by air but only by sea, 

which means a need for high-speed lighters and rapid mine clearing. 

The force’s relief cannot be conditional on good weather; the 

Department must develop the capability to perform all aspects of 

lighterage work in rough seas—loading, transit and off-loading. 

If shore-based defenses force the seabase farther out to sea, the 

range and speed of both air and sea vehicles become major problems. 

For example, an LCAC making the trip from a ship 100 miles offshore 

takes six hours per round trip, not counting load and offload times, 

as opposed to an hour-and-a-half for a twenty-five mile distance. 

Planning

5. CONOPS

• Shore defenses threaten the movement of ships to the 25 n. mi. line 

of departure necessitated by the radar horizon and current lift 

capability

– Portable, easily concealed anti-ship missiles must be cleared early in 

the conflict 

• A task which may involve FOPEN sensors or special ground ops to complete

– Rapid, means for clearing mines not available at present

• The success of planning CONOPS is sensitive to a number of 

factors:

– If enemy defenses force seabase ships farther offshore, current 

deployment systems will not suffice

• From 100 n. mi., an LCAC round trip to shore requires 6 hours; an LCU 24 

hours

• At 100 n. mi. offshore, helicopter and tilt-rotor range is limited to ferrying 

troops and materiel 50 miles inland.

– If heavy lift, sea-based aircraft (MV-22s are medium lift vehicles) are not 

available, the range and payload of helicopters (CH-53E) are 

inadequate to reach deep inland objectives

– If mine and shore-based missile threats cannot be avoided or cleared 

quickly, heavy materiel (Abrams tanks, AAAVs, bulk POL) cannot move 

ashore quickly, thus limiting initial commitment to light forces
 

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57

Each round trip delivers the equivalent of one Abrams tank. An LCU 

takes even more time – one round trip would require twenty-four 

hours at 100 n. mi.. Similarly, the greater distance MPF(F) ships are 

from shore, the less distance inland vertical take-off and landing 

(VTOL) air lift can penetrate. 

Heavy, long range airlift is critical. Without sea-based medium 

lifters (such as the MV-22) the ability to move troops inland drops 

sharply. Helicopters (CH-53E) lack the range to transport meaningful 

loads over planned CONOPS distances. On the other hand, should a 

long-range, sea-based air lifter, able to carry TEUs, become available, 

the flexibility and striking power of the seabase significantly 

improves. 

On the sea side, the ability to clear beaches of mine and missile 

threats impacts the ability to deliver heavy combat equipment and 

supplies (main battle tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, fuel and 

water) ashore. Because of their weight, such systems cannot be easily 

delivered by air, but are crucial for the fighting capabilities of forces 

ashore. If the seabase cannot close to three n. mi. in a timely fashion, 

the delivery rate of heavy items would drop significantly. 

While current systems do not support sea basing as envisioned 

(AAV, CH-46, CH-53E, LCU), new systems are being planned or in 

development that are first steps in the right direction (MV-22, CH53X, 

MEFFV, ITV, LHA(R) dual tram and MPF(F)). It is critical that the 

requirements for these new developments fit within the seabase 

system of systems. 
 

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58 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Seabases require new capabilities to support forces ashore. Some 

of these require research and development, new concept formulation, 

analyses of alternatives and system development before they can 

come to fruition in seabase applications. Heavy lift aircraft, heavy lift 

cranes and semi-submersible platforms are discussed in the following 

slides. 

One problem is the lack of programs to provide means to 

transport troops to the seabase efficiently. Current thinking is that 

combat forces could fly from CONUS to an advanced base and then 

be shipped to the seabase over a distance of as much as 2,000 n. mi.. 

One concept that “solves” this transport problem is the Theater/High 

Speed Vessel fleet (TSV/HSV) which can lift hundreds of troops and 

their kit 2,000 n. mi. at 40 to 50 knots. The Department of the Navy 

has no TSV/HSV program at present, and, if Littoral Combat Ships 

(LCS) are pressed into this mission, their other missions in the littoral 

such as anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures will be 

uncovered. The Army has a modest six vessel TSV program in its 

embryonic stage, but its intention is to use TSVs to lift the objective 

force’s equipment and troops directly to an austere, but secure port in 

Critical Seabase Capabilities Needed

• Improved cargo handling

– High-tech sea cranes

– Skin-to-skin transfer

– Lighters capable of matching the motion of supply ships

– Not JLOTS

• Heavy lift air vehicles

– Quad tilt-rotor

– Large single rotor 

– Fixed-wing

– Lighter than air cargo movers (e.g., HULA)

• New ships

– LHA(R) and MPF(F) seabase platforms for heavy lift air vehicles

– Semi-submersible platforms

– Automated warehouse ships
 

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59

the theater, not to a seabase. Thus, the interface of these relatively 

small TSV/HSVs with 100K ton displacement MPF(F) platforms is a 

problem. This is the same problem as the transfer cargo to and from 

lighters for shipment to shore. There is no technology work 

underway that addresses this interface in any sea state greater than 

near-calm conditions. 

If these problems are not overcome—that is the lack of a robust 

TSV/HSV program and sea state interface —then the MPF(F) ships 

will have to remain at the advanced base in order to have the troops 

walk onboard. MPF(F) ships would have to remain within 200 n. mi. 

of the advanced base, to allow rotary winged aircraft to execute what 

would be a very demanding ferry problem. These situations 

dramatically diminish the timeliness of the MEB-sized reinforcement 

capability of a seabase operating in an enemy’s littoral. 

On the other hand, some programs now under development no 

longer serve a useful purpose for sea-based operations as envisioned 

by this task force. The Joint Logistics Over The Shore (JLOTS) 

program, for instance, lacks the capacity and robustness needed if the 

seabase concept of airlifted light forces followed by heavy forces 

supplied through a port or over the beach is realized. 

New ship designs are also required for seabase duty. Seabase 

ships of the future, LHA(R) and MPF(F) for instance, will require 

large decks for sorting and loading supplies and conducting flight 

operations, must have accommodations for 2,000 to 3,000 personnel, 

have the ability to stow and load munitions, be able to selectively sort 

and load cargo as needed for operations, and do all of these functions 

at sea under realistic sea conditions – sea state 4. None of these 

capabilities are currently part of existing Maritime Prepositioning 

Squadron vessels. 
 

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Container ships are generally unloaded in port by large gantries 

that routinely move loads from ship to shore. To be compatible with 

commercial practice, a seabase requires the ability to move TEU 

containers from the seabase 1) to internal lighters (e.g. to an LCAC in 

a well deck), 2) to external lighters (e.g. to LCUs or LCU(R)s), and 3) 

from black hull container ships re-supplying the seabase. 

At-sea transfer of heavy loads is different in each transfer process. 

At present, the most universal means of facilitating loading is the 

stabilized crane, although additional means (such as heavy ballasting, 

roll stabilization, heavy fending, and stable SWATH designs) can 

reduce the difficulties of using cranes in various sea states. 

Transfer to Lighters. Because of internal sloshing (called seiching), 

amplified by the coupling of long wave motions to resonant 

frequencies of ships in shallow water, the current transfer ability to 

lighters located in wet well decks remains limited to sea state 3 and 

below. Furthermore, entry to or exit from a well deck is also limited 

to sea state 3. Technology exists to mitigate these limitations. Large, 

deep draft or heavily ballasted vessels with internal roll stabilization 

New Capabilities

7. Moving Heavy Loads At Sea

• Future seabases will require four separable atsea cargo transfer processes:

– Selective cargo movement within ships

– At sea transfer from vessels to lighters inside well 

decks

– At sea transfer to and from lighters alongside 

seabase ships

– At sea transfer from black hull commercial vessels to 

seabase ships

• For heavy loads, these processes differ

• Stabilized cranes, together with means to 

stabilize ships, offer limited technological options 

for at-sea cargo transfer
 

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61

(e.g. such as is employed by large cruise ships) exhibit little roll up to 

sea state 4. Use of dynamic, laser-controlled internal gantries, 

augmented by laser-controlled guy wire tensioning winches on large 

roll stabilized ships would allow internal transfers of standard 

container size (and weight) loads up to sea state 4. 

Transfer to External Lighters. Given current technology, the 

development of a sea crane that will allow the safe transfer of heavy 

containers from a large seabase ship to relatively small external 

lighters in sea state 3 represents a seemingly intractable problem in 

control theory. Unless the equivalent of a small harbor, contiguous to 

a seabase ship, can be developed and deployed to reduce the relative 

motions of small displacement hull external lighters, off-loading of 

heavy loads will remain limited to times of benign sea states. 

Transfer Between Ships. Although wire line transfer technology 

and helicopter replenishment techniques permit the routine transfer 

of light loads between ships in up to sea state 4, or if necessary sea 

state 5, the current ability for crane-based transfer of heavy containers 

between ships remains limited to sea state 2. An R&D program is 

currently underway to develop a heavy lift crane with ability for safe 

operation up to sea state 3. This project presents a difficult problem in 

control theory for linear induction electric motors. Even if successful, 

the current prognosis for developing a sea crane that will provide 

safe ship-to-ship heavy load transfer capability in sea state 4 is not 

good. 

The seriousness of sea state limitations on lighterage operations 

will vary with the location of the proposed operation and time of 

year. 
 

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Transfer of personnel, supplies and equipment to, from and 

within the seabase in a variety of environmental conditions 

(including the open sea) is critical to projecting and sustaining seabased forces. Selected future sea platforms will have the ability to 

accept personnel loads from rotary wing, fixed-wing and tilt-rotor 

aircraft and HSVs, as well as to conduct ship-to-ship transfer of 

containerized cargo and outsized equipment in the open ocean. The 

seabase must be capable of conducting such operations in at least sea 

state 4. 

Seabases must be capable of re-supply from commercial ships. 

Seabase ships must have the ability to transfer heavy inter-modal 

packages, which can move easily through distribution chains 

(commercial, DoD and Naval) configured as containers—twenty-foot 

equivalent units (TEUs). Naval logistics must insure information 

from constant in-transit visibility (ITV) to support overall joint total 

asset visibility (JTAV). The focus for at-sea transfer of TEUs will be 

the future MPS squadron ships that form a portion of the seabase. 

Due to new inter-modal naval packaging, such re-supply units can 

quickly be broken down into smaller containers. Inter-modal 

At Sea Transfer of Personnel, Inter-modal 

Containers and Out-sized Equipment

• Transfer of personnel and materiel to, from and 

within the seabase is key to success

• Materiel packaged for shipment on black hull 

ships today arrives in standard containers 

(TEUs)

• Materiel carried by MPF(F) ships is loaded 

months, sometimes years before need 

– Optimum mix and order of cargo are impossible to 

predict 

– MPF(F) ships must have selective offloading 

capability

• Equipment to handle inter-modal containers at 

sea does not now exist
 

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63

packaging will also allow breakdown and transshipment from 

MPF(F) ships to other vessels within the seabase, thus reducing 

repeated handling and its associated manpower demands. The 

receiving platforms (CSG, ESG, and even CLF ships) will be 

supported by a minimum 12,000-pound inter-modal container 

(similar to present-day Quad-Cons) transfer capability. Until all 

legacy ships can be adapted to such capabilities, the current breakbulk/palletized transfer capabilities will continue to be needed. 
 

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Heavy air lift is an essential element for assault in depth as 

envisioned in both Army and Marine Corps CONOPS. The MV-22 

tilt-rotor aircraft has a lift capacity of 5 tons at a range of 

approximately 250 n. mi.. The CH-53E can lift sixteen tons, but only 

for short distances. 

The Marine Corps inventory of materiel needed to support a light 

brigade contains many items that weigh up to 20 tons (such as 

standard sea shipping containers). Many such items are designed to 

fit in a C-130. Unless the Department develops airlifters capable of 

moving heavier loads than the MV-22, such items can be brought 

ashore only over the beach, which in future operations will require 

lengthy mine and missile clearing. The only major items weighing 

more than 20 tons are M1A1 and AAAVs. 

New Capabilities

7. Heavy-Lift Air Vehicles
 

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65

Sea basing can never reach full potential to provide rapid, flexible 

force projection with current/programmed air vehicles. Analysis 

indicates that almost all the ACE’s MV-22 and CH-53 aircraft in a 

nominal brigade-sized task force would be required to support the 

logistical demands of the Ground Combat Element at a radius of 

approximately 100 nautical miles. This is not a satisfactory capability 

for many cases, because it leaves no aircraft available for tactical 

missions and would destroy the flexibility and operational maneuver 

advantage of the force—whether Marine or Army. 

Future airlift vehicles—quad tilt-rotor, larger single rotor, fixed 

wing, hybrid ultra large aircraft (HULA), or lighter than air cargo 

movers—are not alternatives to sea basing, but rather should 

represent the movement, mobility and maneuver assets, which 

would integrate into and augment the seabase.9

 

9 The Army Science Board has examined aerial support requirements for Army forces with similar 

conclusions. 

Heavy Lift Air Vehicles

• Current and programmed air vehicles limit 

seabase ability to provide rapid, flexible force 

projection

– In some planning scenarios, an entire brigade ACE 

(MV-22s and CH-53s) is necessary to provide the 

transport and supply demands of the GCE leaving no 

capability for subsequent tactical missions

• Heavy lift air vehicles are valuable maneuver and 

sustainment assets for

– Transport of personnel and materiel to the seabase 

from remote advanced bases

– Movement and supply of forces ashore

– Persistent platforms for ISR, tankage, look-down 

defense radar and weapons delivery
 

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Sea basing will depend upon mobility assets to assemble and 

close the force in the joint operations area (JOA). Given the 

capabilities of future air vehicles, the potential exists for lift to move 

the force from CONUS directly to the seabase or to the seabase via an 

advanced base. The bottom line: future heavy airlift must be capable 

of operating in austere environments and from the seabase. 

Projecting forces across the breadth of an adversary’s territory to 

distances heretofore not realized would provide the Joint Force 

Commander great operational flexibility and allow him to operate 

inside the adversary’s decision cycle and thus control the tempo of 

battle. Emerging high speed vessels, improved lighterage, MPF(F), 

sea-going cargo cranes, and future heavy lift air vehicles all represent 

important parts of the sea basing puzzle, but air transport capabilities 

and limitations are critical to defining the bounds of operational 

maneuver from the sea. 
 

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67

A new, sea basable, heavy-lift aircraft, capable of lifting TEU loads 

with a theater-wide range would make a substantial improvement in 

the flexibility and efficiency of seabases. Such an aircraft would 

enable all but the heaviest loads to be delivered directly to the battle 

area without having to transit beach or port areas – especially to areas 

of operations deep inland.10

Additionally, such a heavy lift asset could act as organic ISR 

platforms, long-loiter gun-ships, provide organic tankage support to 

the seabase, and facilitate the movement of troops and supplies from 

the advanced base to the seabase. 

The MV-22, currently anticipated as the workhorse for near-term 

expeditionary operations lacks the lift required to efficiently support 

the Ground Combat Element. 

 

10 The Army Science Board’s technology studies suggest that a heavy lift aircraft with 20-25 tons 

capacity and 500 kilometer radius has the right properties to: provide rapid, unpredictable entry; 

provide follow-on sustainment; transfer cargo, including TEUs; and transfer up to 32-35 tons shipto-shore at 103 degrees Fahrenheit at sea level. 

Heavy Lift Aircraft 

• A sea basable, long-range, heavy lift aircraft capable of 

supporting the force ashore, organic ISR, acting as a 

loitering weapons platform and tanker, and transporting 

troops to the seabase from the advanced base has a 

major effect on seabase flexibility

– Several options have been developed for such an aircraft, such 

as quad-tilt rotor, large blade helicopters, fixed wing aircraft and 

lighter than air lifting bodies

– The aircraft should be capable of lifting TEU loads for distances 

of 300 miles

• It should be resident on the seabase

• It should be capable of ferrying troops to the seabase and from the 

seabase to the land battle area
 

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Several options are available for the design of such a heavy-lifter, 

including advanced tilt-rotor, rotary wing, fixed wing and lighter 

than air (HULA) concepts. 
 

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69

Ships that make up the seabase must be designed with specific 

seabase requirements in mind. These requirements include support 

for air operations and at-sea cargo transfer mentioned earlier, as well 

as accommodations for forces while they are aboard and the ability to 

selectively handle cargo as needed to support operations. 

Two ship development challenges confront the seabase developer: 

 New designs for existing ship types, such as the 

LHA(R) and MPF(F), to replace the existing fleet 

with modern vessels adapted for future seabase 

needs 

 Examination of potential revolutionary vessel 

designs specifically aimed at seabase applications, 

such as the Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) and the 

semisubmersible structures based on oil drilling 

platform technology. Such vessels could be the 

semi-fixed core of the seabase fleet, or of a size and 

design to support a major airfield, substantial 

storage capacity and hotel functions for large forces. 

New Capabilities

8. Ships: The Platforms for Sea Basing

• Two ship development challenges

– New designs for existing ship-types that can 

adapt to future seabase needs

• LHA(R) 

• MPF(F)

– Examination of potential revolutionary vessel 

designs specifically aimed at seabase

applications

• Mobile Offshore Base (MOB)

• Semisubmersible structures
 

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Ship development decisions must be made in the context of the 

overall system of systems architecture to be compatible with the 

needs of other major systems that deploy with the seabase. 
 

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71

The LHA(R) concept is the redesign of today’s Landing Ship, 

Helicopter Assault (LHA). The current design falls short of future sea 

basing needs in the space available to support air operations, its 

capacity to house troops, its ability to transfer cargo to LCACs and 

other lighters in conditions worse than sea state 3, and its ability to 

sustain prolonged operations ashore. Further, existing LHA designs 

do not meet USMC requirements for combined MV-22 and Joint 

Strike Fighter operations. 

Analyses of alternatives for LHA(R) designs are now underway. 

The Task Force urges that the LHA(R) design remain flexible enough 

to adapt to the overall seabase architecture, incorporating all 

elements of the seabase system of systems and concepts of 

operations. 

The LHA(R) Design

• Current design falls short of future sea basing 

needs in the following areas

– Space to support air operations

– Capacity to house troops

– Ability to transfer cargo in heavy seas

– Ability to sustain prolonged operations

• New designs must be flexible enough to adapt to 

the overall sea base architecture
 

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The intensity of air operations needed to launch attacking forces 

and then supply them underlines the requirement for a large air 

combat element. That requirement then drives the need to design the 

MPF(F) ships with flight decks to support at a minimum MV-22 

operations, as well as heavy helicopters. Such ships will also require 

hangar decks sufficient to support the ACE in sustained combat and 

re-supply operations. MPF(F) ships must have surplus space to allow 

flexibility rather than the bare minimum to support requirements, as 

is the case today. 

Additionally, future sea-based, heavy lift aircraft (including fixed 

wing designs) could require even more space. Cargo handling 

requirements (particularly the ability to locate and selectively offload 

container-sized loads) are also major considerations in the MPF(F) 

design. 

MPF(F) Support for Air and Cargo 

Operations

• STOM CONOPS envision all 87 rotary wing aircraft in 

the ACE operating off six MPF(F) ships

– Includes 40 MV-22 tilt-rotor and 20 CH-53E helicopter aircraft

– Future options may include fixed wing aircraft

– Other CONOPS alternatives are under consideration

• A flight deck / hangar deck to accommodate 10 MV-22 

and 4 CH-53E requires 33 spots. Today’s LHA has 42 

spots: an LHD has 45 spots

• Stowage of significant numbers of 20-foot TEU 

containers at a 70% load factor would foul 25% of an 

LHD-sized flight deck, rendering the area unusable

• The total cargo stowage and aircraft requirements for the 

MPF(F) necessitates large deck areas suitable for 

flight operations
 

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73

Mobile offshore base is a term often used to describe a large, 

semisubmersible platform, much akin to offshore drilling platforms 

utilized by the petroleum industry. The MOB is most generally 

referenced as having multiple sections linked together to form a seabased runway capable of C-130 and perhaps even C-17 operations. A 

single section would be 1000 feet long with a beam of 500 feet and a 

cost of roughly $2B. The ability to link multiple sections together has 

yet to be proven in significant sea states. 

In concept, a single section MOB would provide a creditable afloat 

base. It is stable and would provide ample storage for stores and 

equipment. A single section would also be capable of rotary wing 

operations. 

There are two significant drawbacks: transit speed and cost. A 

transit speed of twelve kts is not in keeping with the speed (twentyfour kts) required or desired for other units comprising the structure 

of the future seabase. The cost of a single section would exceed the 

expected cost of an MPF(F) ship, while providing significantly less 

transit speed and flexibility for other circumstances—such as 

Mobile Offshore Bases

• The Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB) builds on oil 

industry experience with large, floating drilling platforms

– Consists of 1,000 foot section linked to form a runway capable of 

handling large aircraft

– Cost per section is approximately $2B

• JMOB advantages include

– Stability

– Large Storage Volume

– Flexibility to deploy single sections to support helicopter 

operations

• The JMOB, however, has important drawbacks

– Slow transit speeds and slower maneuvering speed once 

deployed compared to other seabase components

– High cost 

– Lack of flexibility in use

– Easier to target due to slow speed, once deployed
 

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proceeding to an open port for off load or replenishment. Dollar for 

dollar, a modern MPF(F) design would provide the operational 

commander greater freedom of movement and choices for 

operational employment. 
 

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75

This popular vision of a future seabase (a super MOB) is 

inconsistent with the current seabase concept, which must be more 

mobile than the large “floating island” pictured here. The sea basing 

concept this task force envisions consists of multiple ships that would 

form together under the joint operational commander depending on 

the mission, the extent of enemy defense and offense capabilities, and 

the concept of operations. The seabase would expand and contract in 

accordance with actual conditions. The ships forming the seabase 

would coalesce and disperse as needed to perform RSOI, supply, 

command and control, and transportation. In its initial combat 

operations, the seabase could remain as much as 300 n. mi. off a 

sophisticated opponent’s shore. As combat operations degrade 

enemy defenses—air as well as maritime—the seabase would move 

closer to shore and strike deeper inland with air and ground forces. 
 

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The large, semi-submersible platform, an alternative to the JMOB, 

is a result of the oil drilling industry’s deep sea search for oil. This 

500 by 1,000 foot platform is a triple hull structure, with the center 

hull serving as cargo space. The protected spaces between the outer 

hulls and the center cargo hull could serve as protected lighter 

loading and unloading areas. In transit, the platform de-ballasts for 

higher speeds; on station, the platform is lowered into the water for 

stability. 

The advantages of such a large, semi-submersible platform 

include its stability in high seas, its large cargo volume and handling 

potential, its high deployment speed and the artificial lees available 

for cargo transfer to lighters. Additionally, the semi-submersible 

platform ramps and cranes are capable of unloading large, intertheater transport ships. 

Large, Semi-Submersible Platforms

• Large-platform, built on oil industry experience with 

semi-submersible drilling platforms, is a possibility

– A 500 by 1000 foot or larger multi-deck structure possible

– Cost is estimated to be approximately $2-3 B

• Large platform advantages include

– Stable in high seas

– Large storage and cargo handling volume 

– Acceptable transit and deployment speeds

• De-ballasts for transit speed, re-ballasts for deployment stability

– Artificial lees for loading lighters

– Ramps and cranes for unloading inter-theater transport ships 

• Such large vessels make the seabase platform-centric, 

reducing flexibility and maneuverability

• Other semi-submersible vessel possibilities
 

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77

This notional design of a large platform seabase support vessel, 

based on commercial oil drilling experience, would have ample 

stowage and deck space. It would be stable, due to its SWATH 

outriggers, and could transit at reasonable speeds, once de-ballasted 

into the transport mode. Its interfaces with commercial and MPF(F) 

ships would include both cranes and ramps. Lighters could utilize 

the artificial lees created between the hulls for loading and offloading. A variety of deck configurations are possible, allowing both 

fixed and rotary wing operations. 

Other semi-submersible configurations, also based on commercial 

antecedents, could be useful: for instance, a vessel which picks up 

and transports barges to seabase locations. 

The semi-submersible support platform is not a replacement for 

the multi-ship seabase concept addressed in this report; it is a 

possible future adjunct. Additional work remains to be done on 

exploring the seabase utility of such large-platform options. 

One Example of a Large, SemiSubmersible Support Platform

Source: Kellogg Brown and Root
 

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Current ship-to-shore communication capabilities are inadequate 

to support the requirements of a sea-based force. If the seabase is to 

function as the “rear area at sea,” it must have secure, long-range, 

robust voice and data links to mobile forces ashore, as they maneuver 

and call for fires. Supporting forces afloat will need real-time 

operational, logistical and planning information if they are to 

anticipate the needs of combat forces ashore. 

The current sea basing concept of operations envisions ships 25 

miles or more off the coast, while forces ashore move up to 150 miles 

inland. Providing the necessary wide-band communication links over 

distances of 200 miles or more will require new equipment and 

communication support concepts. Airborne communications nodes 

provide one possible solution to this communication problem. 

Failure to meet this requirement will force commanders to bring 

supplies and support equipment ashore as “insurance stock” against 

communications failure, negating the seabase’s utility. 

Such communications requirements will increase dramatically 

when the seabase serves as the Joint Force Command Center. In 

addition to voice and data circuits, video teleconferencing and reachback to CONUS represent basic requirements.

New Capabilities

9. Communications

• Current ship-to-shore communications are inadequate to 

support fully integrated seabase command, operations, 

logistics and defense

– Operational and logistical communications are not integrated

– Robust voice and wideband data communication links of 200 

miles (OTH) are basic requirements in planning CONOPS

– Communications failures prompt commanders to maintain 

“safety stocks” of supplies to guard against the possibility of 

logistics failure, clogging distribution channels

– Reliable wideband communications over future areas of 

operations will require airborne or satellite repeaters

• Communications needs increase when the seabase 

serves as the command center for Joint Task Force

– Broadband video conferencing and satcom voice and data links 

to CONUS are basic requirements
 

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79

The current state of ship-to-shore supply is likewise inadequate to 

support the requirements of a sea-based force. To properly support a 

joint force ashore from the sea, the joint force must have a 

transshipment capability to receive equipment and supplies in 

theater aboard the ships of the seabase. This will require designs for 

new lighterage and systems to enable the transfer of materiel in high 

sea states. 

Once equipment and supplies are aboard, the seabase must be 

able to conduct break-bulk and selective offload operations to move 

equipment and supplies ashore in quantities that tactical units can 

handle. The distances over which the supplies and equipment will 

travel demand not only high-speed lighterage, but development of 

heavy-lift, sea basable aircraft. 

Logistical support will demand a constant flow of information. 

Supply support from the seabase will rely on an uninterrupted flow 

of data on all classes of supply from tactical units to and from the 

seabase back through the supply pipeline to CONUS. With virtually 

New Capabilities

10. Logistic Support System

• Existing logistics systems are inadequate for seabase 

missions

– Seabases will serve as transshipment points for materiel arriving on 

black-hull cargo vessels and MPF(F) ships—sorting, repackaging, and 

integrating areas where troops, equipment, and forwarding services are 

mated to deploy and supply forces ashore

– Such activities must occur under sea conditions likely to prevail 

• New lighterage and cargo handling systems basic requirements

• Heavy lift aircraft, capable of using the seabase, to allow forces ashore to 

rely on modest supply inventories

– Current information systems do not support the logistics-intense 

seabase activity

• Existing systems allow visibility into in-transit and inventoried supplies

• Do not yet work with other Services’ logistics systems

• “Demand pull,” the ability of task force commanders to tailor logistics needed 

from anywhere in the pipeline, is nonexistent
 

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no supply dumps ashore, sea-based tactical forces will critically 

depend on the supply system’s reliability. 

Current systems provide visibility into in-transit and inventoried 

supplies, but are unable to mix and match logistical needs easily from 

supply systems of the other services. Furthermore, there is no 

capability for task force commander to pull supplies through the 

system to support his operations. The failure of the logistics system 

to meet operational needs flexibly will inevitably result in a logistical 

chain clogged with unneeded inventory. A responsive system would 

significantly reduce the volume of supplies handled by the seabase 

and reduce the complexity of sorting and repackaging materiel for 

transshipment to forces engaged in combat. 
 

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81

The seabase will contain ships operating in the same general area 

in support of each other. Though specifics are scarce, the concept of 

operations includes the movement of troops and equipment among 

ships and from ship to shore. The tempo of operations will be fast (or 

very fast), so the movement of personnel and equipment must be fast, 

easy and flexible. While severe weather may be a constraint, it 

should be possible to maintain operations in sea state 4. The 

equipment may be packaged in pallets (perhaps up to 5 tons each) or 

standard 20 foot containers (TEUs) of up to 20 tons. 

These conditions present significant technical problems. 

Speed. Since the distances are relatively short, it may be possible 

to satisfy the speed requirements with 30-50 knot vehicles. Such 

vehicles can be designed today, but higher speed (and hence more 

fuel) means less payload, or more frequent refueling with attendant 

decrease in the pace of operations. Higher speeds would be desirable 

in the future if technology makes them available. In some cases ships 

need to approach the beach to offload, so shallow draft will be a 

valuable attribute. Note however that to assist in load transfer from 

seabase ships in heavy seas, a deeper draft may be desirable. 

New Capabilities

11. Intra-Theater Lift

• Multiple ships operating in the same area will 

form part of the seabase

– Fundamental need for rapid, flexible cargo and 

personnel movement among the ships and from sea 

to land under most sea conditions

• Several critical problems need addressing 

– Higher speed, shallow draft vessels with sea keeping 

properties to allow loading and unloading under 

challenging sea conditions

– Ship-to-ship load transfer at sea – deep draft vessels, 

SWATH configurations, or moon pools

– Cargo packaging that makes best use of existing 

capabilities until new, heavier load methods are in 

place
 

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Transfer of loads. Moving heavy loads in a seaway at present is 

only possible in sea states up to 2. Some work has been done to 

extend capabilities to sea state 3, but more capability is required. 

Packaging of loads, methods of transfer, and ship designs need to 

make this possible. 

Packaging into smaller weight units may be possible for some 

loads. However, this would call for a standardization of sorts to 

make off-loading and on-loading platform capabilities compatible 

with the load packages. This is being worked only in a limited 

fashion at present. 

Methods of transfer need to be investigated, including traditional 

under-way replenishment and vertical replenishment methods, but in 

higher sea states, as well as more direct, simpler methods, such as 

ramps and other connectors, and even possibly skin-to-skin contact 

methodologies. Ship designs may have to focus on these offloading 

techniques and new technologies to assist in load transfer. 

Ship-to-ship. Some hull forms are better suited to ship motions in a 

seaway. Since it is the relative motion of the platforms that causes 

much of the problem, the design of one or both platforms may 

simplify the problem, where actual load transfer techniques can 

handle the load in question. For moving platforms, active controls 

offer some options for improvement. Deeper draft, SWATH 

configuration, or moon pools may be viable options for load transfer 

between stationary ships. Finally, while the transfer of loads to a 

submerged vessel minimizes the motions of at least one of the 

participants, the approach seems too cumbersome to have practical 

application. 

Ship-to-shore. Shallow draft is a key attribute. Air-cushion 

vehicles provide amphibian characteristics (as well as speed), but 

remain limited in their carrying capacity. SWATH ships have 

excellent sea-keeping characteristics, but have deep draft. Therefore, 

ways to retract the deep pods need investigation, which will 

inevitably complicate ship design. 
 

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83

The LCAC (shown here entering a dry well of a mother ship) is a 

workhorse in transferring heavy loads from ship to shore. It is fast 

and carries loads up to approximately 80 tons (sufficient for main 

battle tanks). Yet, difficulties loading these boats at sea in sea states 

over 2 or 3 and a top speed of 35 knots make lighterage a weak link at 

the beginning of a sea-based conflict. 
 

ENABLING SEA

BASING CAPABILITIES ___________________________________________________________ 

84 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

A clear vision must precede the full-scale development of the 

seabase. The Task Force can identify several programs that that need 

startup or more robust funding to realize the concept. More 

developments will follow as the vision becomes clearer. Specific 

programs needing greater attention include: 

 A TSV/HSV program to produce a meaningful 

number of vessels by the middle of the next decade. 

Current USMC thinking is that approximately 7,100 

Marines need to be deployed initially to the seabase. 

Given a TSV/HSV that can accommodate 350 troops 

for transit to the seabase with an 85 percent 

availability rate, approximately 25 vessels could 

provide the entire lift simultaneously. Half that 

number would more than triple the lift time from 

approximately 50 hours at 2,000 n. mi. to 160 hours 

due to time committed to the round trip. 

 Technology to ameliorate the TSV/HSV interface 

problem with larger MPF(F) ships. 

Resources

12. Development Speed and Funding

• A clear vision for sea basing must precede development of systems 

needed to ensure mission and system compatibility

• The need for high priority development programs is clear

– A TSV/HSV program to develop capacity consistent with operational 

needs of seabases

– Develop an interface that allows fast ships and MPF(F) ships to 

exchange personnel and cargo at sea

– Dramatic improvements in countermine, missile defense, and high sea 

cargo handling capabilities

– A black-bottom to MPF(F) at sea cargo interface capable of SS4

– Systems to move large loads selectively within an MPF(F) in high seas

– A sea basable, heavy-lift (20 ton), aircraft with a 300 n. mi. range (100 

n. mi. at sea, 200 inland) together with supporting ships

• A multi-mission aircraft of this type would have a major operational and

logistic impact and provide a platform for organic ISR, air-to-air refueling, 

gun ships and, most important, persistent look-down, early warning of seaskimming missiles
 

ENABLING SEA

___________________________________________________________BASING CAPABILITIES

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

85

 Technology and tactics to dramatically improve 

mine countermeasure capability and the ability to 

operate in sea state 3-4 in the mid-term. 

 Development of heavy-lift aircraft capable of 

operating from the seabase to a range of 300 n. mi. to 

increase CONOPS flexibility. 

 Technology to accept containers from commercial 

ships to MPF(F) ships in up to sea state 4 needs 

development or seabase sustainment of forces 

ashore would dramatically fall off. 

If the concept of selective offload is to work, there is an urgent 

need to work on the technology to move large loads (up to 20 tons) 

around on the MPF(F) ships in high sea states (up to SS 4). 

The funding challenges presented by the above programs are 

significant. Note that this funding is over and above that needed to 

design and build the basic MPF(F) platform. For those ships, given 

that LHDs in today’s dollars cost approximately $1.2 billion, a black 

hull, LHD-like MPF(F) vessel could cost over $1 billion. With a 

proposed buy of 18 MPF(F) ships, that equates to more than $18 

billion above the Navy’s present projection for ship acquisition. 

Furthermore, since it is not clear that designers know the “art of the 

doable” on MPF(F) platforms, an interim, prototype vessel for spiral 

development of new MPF(F) concepts should be considered along the 

lines of the MSC-proposed conversion of a 6,000 TEU Maersk liner. 

Development of a heavy lift aircraft with range sufficient to 

support the deep insertion of troops from the farthest out point of 

departure would significantly improve seabase utility. The delicate 

distance/lift/defense tradeoff for operations and logistics would no 

longer be as sensitive to standoff distance, as in current plans. 

Additionally, such a heavy-lift would provide seabase elements 

(including the CSG) with new organic capabilities for ISR, in-flight 

refueling, and combat gunship support. Most importantly, such a 

heavy lifter would support persistent look-down, early warning of 

sea-skimming missile attacks. 
 

ENABLING SEA

BASING CAPABILITIES ___________________________________________________________ 

86 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

____________________________________________________________RECOMMENDATIONS

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

87

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

• Sea basing represents a critical national, joint 

military competence to project forces rapidly 

from the United States

• Future sea basing needs are beyond current 

operating capabilities of the maritime services

• Complexity and difficulty of sea basing requires 

coordinated, evolutionary development of joint 

sea basing systems of systems

• The United States should exercise its sea basing 

capabilities realistically to work out problems 

and develop expeditionary warfare skills 

The Task Force concludes that sea basing is a critical military 

capability for the United States. It will allow for rapid force 

projection into areas of likely future conflict; it will support 

operations on a scale likely to be needed in many combat and non 

combat operations; and it lessens reliance on land bases, whose use is 

subject to physical and political uncertainties. Sea basing represents 

an option useful for combined service forcible entry operations. Its 

flexibility allows its adaptation to a wide range of operations, from 

limited scope to brigade-sized actions. Seabase sustainment can 

reduce or eliminate the period of risk following an initial 

expeditionary assault. 

Sea basing will require capabilities beyond those now available. 

Existing ARG, CVBG and MPF systems are not sufficient or flexible 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 

88 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

enough to allow assembly of sizable forces at sea, nor can they 

sustain a force ashore for prolonged periods. They lack sufficient lift 

to supply inland forces and must operate too close to the shore to 

allow protection against mine and missile threats. Additionally, 

existing ships lack selective offload and supply marshaling abilities. 

The at-sea interface with commercial container ships does not exist in 

some sea states. 

The complexity and difficulty of developing the system of systems 

to enable robust sea basing necessitates a coordinated development 

effort to ensure a coherent set of goals, requirements, and priorities. 

The development must involve all the Services to guarantee joint 

capabilities. 

Sea basing should be exercised realistically on a consistent basis to 

develop competence and work out problems by the process of spiral 

development. Red teaming must be a major component of such 

exercises. An increase in forcible entry capabilities will require 

strong leadership in each of the services as well as direction from 

above. 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

____________________________________________________________RECOMMENDATIONS

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

89

Sea basing can be regarded as one element of a new expeditionary 

warfare triad consisting of the seabases, land-based forces, and air 

operations. Sea basing is a national military capability, not just the 

province of the Navy and Marine Corps. Future expeditionary 

missions may entail Army as well as Marine operations from the sea 

and require Air Force ISR, airlift and combat operations. Thus, it is 

critical that all Services participate in planning and managing seabase 

development to assure the interoperability of all relevant Service 

capabilities. 

Seabases ensure U.S. freedom of action, particularly unilateral 

action. Properly underwritten, joint seabases will be strong 

deterrents. 

Future Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs may choose 

to locate their headquarters on a seabase. Further, the seabase 

operations envisioned by this Task Force (MEB or equivalent) lie in a 

middle ground between Marine expeditionary operations and Army 

mid-sized combat—such as where the 101st and 82nd Airborne 

Recommendations

Ensure Sea Basing enables Joint Operations

• Exploit those Joint Force capabilities that enable competitive 

advantage when operated from the sea

• Insist on enthusiastic participation from all Services

• Getting sea basing right is crucial to future U.S. military strength 

and freedom of action with unilateral actions. Properly 

underwritten it will provide a strong deterrent

• Sea basing is the middle ground between SOF, Marine small 

and mid-scale operations, and larger Army operations. Joint 

forces must have this capability 

• The SECDEF should establish a joint management process to 

initiate and integrate development of the future joint sea basing 

system of systems
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 

90 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Divisions are engaged. The seabase can be regarded as a transition 

element as combat operations escalate in future conflicts. 

The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the seabase is truly a 

joint capability by investing management of seabase development in 

a Joint Program Office, staffed by personnel from all Services. 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

____________________________________________________________RECOMMENDATIONS

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

91

Each of the twelve issues listed earlier in this report are critical to 

the future success of the seabase. If the United States is to have the 

ability to conduct independent forcible entry operations from the sea 

in 2020, as envisioned in the sea basing concept, DoD must initiate an 

aggressive development effort, led by a unified management. 

Furthermore, the funding required for developing seabases is well 

beyond what is available simply by reprogramming current budget 

dollars. 

Sea basing is more than a logistical concern—it represents an 

operational concept suited to the future geopolitical environment. 

Serious planning and operational consideration must address the 

uses of seabases in the future and how the Services will benefit from 

their flexible capabilities. 

The sea basing development effort must be a progression of 

system designs that migrate from today’s ARGs, CVBGs, and MPSs 

to the full concept by the year 2020. R&D priorities must include a 

new heavy lift, sea-based aircraft with matching ship designs as well 

as advanced cargo handling capabilities.

Recommendations

Address the Dirty Dozen

• Establish R&D focus on sea basing technological 

needs, availability, and tradeoffs

• Prioritize, select options, and fund spiral seabase 

development. At current funding levels, the future 

seabase is a long way off (20 years +)

• Should be treated as an operational capability, not 

just logistics

• Integrate near, mid, and long-term needs and 

capabilities

• Realistic logistic support of large forces from a 

seabase requires

– At-sea cargo handling capabilities

– A new heavy lift, sea-based, aircraft

– Matching ship designs
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 

92 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

As stated earlier, ability to handle cargo under realistic sea 

conditions is one transformational capability of future seabases. This 

includes both selective cargo movement and at-sea transfer of heavy 

loads among seabase ships and between the seabase and commercial 

vessels. 

No solution to the at-sea cargo handling challenge now exists. 

Resources must be devoted to solve each cargo handling problem: 

selective handling, stabilized cranes, skin-to-skin transfer and 

transfers between ships and lighters. 

Recommendations

• Develop at-sea cargo handling capabilities that 

withstand sea state 4

– Selective, automated cargo movement within seabase 

warehouse ships

– At-sea transfer from vessels to lighters inside well decks

– At-sea cargo transfer to and from lighters alongside seabase 

ships

– At-sea transfer from black hull commercial vessels to seabase 

ships

• Stabilized cranes, ship stabilization and skin-to-skin 

transfer development provides part of the solution

– More to be done to ensure seabase robustness
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

____________________________________________________________RECOMMENDATIONS

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

93

Development and experimentation of future heavy lift air vehicles 

should continue and be integrated into the overall development of 

sea basing capabilities. 

The sea basing planning CONOPS is a delicate balance between 

the ability to project forces ashore (distance, weight, tempo versus 

lighter and airlift capabilities) and the vulnerability of the seabase to 

shore-based defenses and mines. The 25 n. mi. departure line 

represents a compromise on both accounts, and the 3 n. mi. standoff 

distance for over-the-shore supply relies on the ability to clear mines. 

An aircraft, able to be based at sea, capable of lifting 20 tons with a 

range in excess of 300 n. mi. would make a major difference in the 

sensitivity of this balance. 

Such a heavy lifter would simplify deployment, since it could 

carry inland virtually all combat loads with the exception of the 

M1A1 and AAAV (20 tons is the design cargo load for the C-130). 

TEU loads need to be delivered directly to the battlefield without 

breaking containerized loads into smaller form factors, such as quadcons. There is a need to simplify seabase handling of supplies. 

Recommendations

• Initiate planning and development of a 

sea basable, heavy lift aircraft with at 

least 20 ton capacity and theater-wide 

range

• Plan design of MPF(F) ships and other 

aviation-supporting ships in the seabase to 

accommodate heavy-lifter options

• A variety of concepts are candidates for 

such a platform
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 

94 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Finally, a heavy lift, sea basable aircraft would enable more rapid 

deployment of troops and materiel from an advanced staging base to 

the seabase. Additionally, such an aircraft would have many other 

uses—ISR platform, gun-ship, aerial refueling, and persistent look 

down early warning. There are several possible designs for such a 

heavy lifter, including fixed wing aircraft, quad tilt-rotor, seaplanes, 

and hybrid lighter than air lifting airships. 

For a heavy lifter to be usable, future ships must have the ability 

to base and support heavy lifter air operations. The Task Force 

recommends the Department initiate a heavy lifter aircraft 

development program, beginning with an analysis of design 

alternatives. Time is short for starting this program, since ships now 

being specified, such as the MPF(F) must have capabilities compatible 

with the heavy lifter aircraft. 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

____________________________________________________________RECOMMENDATIONS

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

95

The United States has not carried out a major forcible entry from 

the sea since Inchon, although such an entry from the sea is a strong 

likelihood in future conflicts. The Navy and Marine Corps consider 

expeditionary operations a strong competence. However it is not a 

capability shared with the other services. Furthermore, changes in 

adversary defensive systems have made amphibious assaults more 

dangerous than in the past. 

CONOPS have evolved to favor inserting troops deep inland from 

the sea in order to seize crucial military objectives quickly. Current 

U.S. capabilities, if centered on the Navy and Marine Corps, do not 

represent a joint capability. The United States has not conducted 

large scale tests of its forcible entry capabilities from the sea, although 

extensive thought has gone into how such operations might occur. 

There are untested concepts in the current plan. 

The Task Force recommends that forcible entry from the sea, 

supported by a seabase, should be periodically exercised on a scale 

sufficient to work out problems with CONOPS, systems and 

requirements in accordance with spiral development. This should be 

Recommendations

Periodically exercise sea basing capabilities

• We haven’t done a large forced entry operation 

against a hostile force since Inchon. Yet, it is likely to 

be the way the U.S. military must fight in the future 

• Find and correct the weaknesses in the CONOPS 

through experimentation

– Analogous to the Louisiana maneuvers prior to WW II – the 

way to get the serious bugs out of fighting capabilities before 

the war 

• Eliminate hand-waving solutions to real problems

– One experiment is worth a thousand opinions

• Require brigade-level seabase tests every three to 

five years against realistic red team opposition 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 

96 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

a responsibility of Joint Forces Command. Such exercises should 

present opportunities to develop leadership and understanding in all 

the services in sea-based operations in much the same fashion as the 

Louisiana maneuvers advanced the Army and Army Air Corps’ 

understanding of mobile operations prior to WWII. 
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

____________________________________________________________RECOMMENDATIONS

ON SEA BASING ____________________________________________________________ 

 

97

During the Cold War, upwardly mobile rear admirals aspired to 

command of carrier battle groups; command of amphibious groups 

was usually assigned to those admirals who came out of the 

amphibious world, to other admirals who did not quite make the cut 

for carrier battle groups, or to those whose timing for rotation to sea 

duty did not match the availability of a carrier battle group 

command. Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy’s focus has 

shifted to the littorals in contrast to the Cold War’s blue water 

missions. As the Navy realizes its vision for Seapower 21, conducting 

the large-scale operations envisioned for a seabase will emphasize 

even more the need to have leaders experienced in these littoral 

operations. 

The Task Force believes that part of the development and 

maturation for an unrestricted line officer should include service 

directly tied to sea basing. For a surface warfare officer, command of 

an Aegis cruiser which participates in Sea Shield and Sea Strike 

operations is not sufficient to assert that the officer possesses a 

seabase background. Similarly for a tactical aviator, command of a 

carrier wing or an aircraft carrier is not sufficient to ensure the 

Recommendations

Elevate the practice of littoral warfare in all the 

Services

• Stress that littoral warfare is the toughest, real-world 

challenge to continued U.S. military hegemony 

– Requires our best leaders 

– Must have incentives to undertake such assignments

• Make meaningful sea basing experience a strong 

plus for promotion to senior command rank

– Increase prospects for promotion to three and four star 

ranks for littoral warfare officers

• Littoral warfare demands realistic protection of forces 

afloat and ashore

– Mines, sea-skimmers, subs, fast response to calls for fire

– All Services must contribute
 

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS ____________________________________________________________ 

98 ____________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

individual’s familiarity with the operations and logistics of a seabase. 

Further, we believe that service in ships and squadrons which are 

integral parts of the seabase such as amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships should be seen as a potential necessity to ensure 

that the seabase experience is legitimate. 

One way to accomplish this would be to change the current 

“amphibious group” structure into a “seabase group” structure 

which would consist of ESG and MPF platforms. This command 

should be viewed as a premier assignment. There is evidence that 

experience in littoral operations is increasingly recognized (there is 

currently one active duty Navy four-star who has commanded an 

amphibious group rather than a carrier battle group), but the Task 

Force concludes that more emphasis is needed to reward experience 

and success for this critical future capability. 
 

APPENDIX A 

__________________________________________________________ TERMS OF REFERENCE

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

99

APPENDIX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE
 

APPENDIX A 

TERMS OF REFERENCE___________________________________________________________ 

100 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

APPENDIX A 

__________________________________________________________ TERMS OF REFERENCE

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

101
 

APPENDIX A 

TERMS OF REFERENCE___________________________________________________________ 

102 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX B 

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

103

APPENDIX B: TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

Dr. William Howard Private Consultant 

ADM Donald Pilling, USN (Ret) Logistics Management Institute 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

ADM Stan Arthur, USN (Ret) Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire 

Control – Orlando 

Dr. Alan Berman ARL Pennsylvania State 

University 

VADM Frank Donovan, USN 

(Ret) 

Jardon & Howard Technologies, 

Inc. 

Mr. Alan Ellinthorpe Private Consultant 

Gen Richard Hearney, 

USMC (Ret) 

Private Consultant 

Hon. Paul Kaminski Technovation, Inc. 

ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret) Kellogg Brown & Root 

Dr. Williamson Murray IDA, Joint Advanced Warfighting 

Program 

Hon. Whit Peters Williams & Connolly LLP 

MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret) Sylvan Learning Systems 

Mr. Frank Sullivan Frank Sullivan & Associates 

Gen Michael Williams, USMC 

(Ret) 

Logistics Management Institute 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Dr. Paris Genalis OSD, Naval Warfare 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

CDR David Waugh, USN 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

CAPT Don Babcock, USN DARPA 

Maj Gen James Battaglini, USMC HQ - Expeditionary Warfare 

Division N75 
 

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP _______________________________________________________ 

104 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

Ms. Sharon Beermann-Curtin ONR 

Mr. Stephen Benson N713/N81 

CDR Bud Bishop, USN OPNAV N81 

Col Arthur Corbett, USMC MCCDC 

Ms. Darlene Costello OSD Naval Warfare 

Col Chandler Crangle, USMC 

(Ret) 

MCCDC 

RADM Lou Crenshaw, USN N-8 

BrigGen Michael Ennis, USMC Intelligence, USMC 

Mr. Gary Gisolo Center for Emerging 

Threats/Opportunities, USMC 

BrigGen Kenneth Glueck, Jr., 

USMC 

MCCDC 

LtCol Anthony Greco, Jr. USMC HQMC, Department of Aviation 

(APP-4) 

LCDR Brian Grimm, USN OSD/PA&E/NFD 

LtGen Edward Hanlon, Jr. USMC MCCDC 

LtGen M.A. Hough, USMC DC AVN, HQMC 

CAPT Linda Lewandowski, USN OSD, Office of Force Transformation 

Mr. Nicholas Linkowitz HQMC-Logisitc Vision & Strategy 

Center 

LtGen Robert Magnus, USMC Deputy Commandant, Programs & 

Resources Department 

Col William Murray, USMC MCCDC 

BrigGen Robert Neller, USMC HQMC 

Mr. Patrick O'Bryan Amphibious Requirements Branch, 

EFDC, MCCDC 

Dr. Frank Shoup HQ Navy 

Mr. James Strock Expeditionary Force Development 

Center (EFDC), MCCDC 

LTC Tom Tyra, USA HQDA G-3 SSP 

Mr. J. Noel Williams Center for Emerging Threats/ 

Opportunities 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX B 

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

105

STAFF

Ms. Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
 

TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP _______________________________________________________ 

106 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX C 

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

107

APPENDIX C: PRESENTATION TO THE TASK FORCE

NOVEMBER 18-19, 2002 

Mr. Trip Barber, OPNAV N70 Seapower 21 

Col Art Corbett, USMC (MCCDC) and 

CAPT(Sel) Brian Barrington, USN 

(NWDC) 

Enhanced Network Seabasing Concept 

CAPT Steve Rowland, USN OPNAV 

N753 

Expeditionary Warfare for the 21st

Century 

Mr. Spike Souders (CAN) MPF(F) AoA 

Mr. Donald Wurzel (ARETE) Seabasing Wargame De-brief 

Mr. Bill Greer (IDA) Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB 

Mr. Stan Siegel Fast Logistics 

LTC Norbert Smith, USA Army Perspective 

DECEMBER 11-12, 2002 

General Mike Carns, USAF (Ret) An Air Force Perspective on Seabasing 

Pat Purtell High Speed Vessel 

capabilities/limitations 

Andrew R. Kondracki Strike Up / Down 

Alan Ellinthorpe Hard Spots 

RADM Crowder, USN OPNAV Blue Cell brief on AFSB 

VADM Brewer, USN Maersk/MSC brief on S-Class 

conversion 

John Combs Technology for At-Sea Transfer of 

Heavy Load 

VADM Jim Amerault, Bill Schulz, Bob 

Scher and Jim Albus 

Container transfer in the open sea 

LTC Mark Ulrich JLOTS -- Current capabilities and 

research efforts 
 

PRESENTATION TO THE TASK FORCE _________________________________________________ 

108 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

JANUARY 27-28, 2003 

CDR Bud Bishop, USN Navy I-War study 

Rick Hibbert, EFDC The MEB -2015 / STOM CONOPS 

Pat O’Bryan, EFDC MPF (F) 

Chan Crangle, HQMC Forcible Entry Study 

Maj Rudolf Webbers Lessons Learned 

LtCol Thomas Fritz J-8 Threat assessment 

Mark Gibson, Mr. Spivey, and Mr. 

Outlaw, Bell Helicopter 

Bell-Boeing Quad TiltRotor (QTR) 

vertical lift aircraft 

Norm Betaque Naval Studies Board 

George Leineweber Mine Countermeasures 

FEBRUARY 26-27, 2003 

Col Richard Witt, USAF, JL Welsh and 

Barry Pavel 

Discussion 

Lee Bishop Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPS), 

the Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) and the 

Ready Reserve Force (RRF) 

Col John Pross, USMC Naval Seabasing Draft CONOPS 

Mr. Tom Tesch Navy Expeditionary Forces 

MARCH 25-26, 2003 

Nick Overfield, Commander Mike 

Bullock, Chief Officer Martin Stone and 

Commander Roger Ireland 

British Perspective 

COL Genaro Dellarocco, USA Army TSV Program 

Mr. Chuck Myers and Mr. Steve Huett Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft (HULA) 

Gen Michael Hagee, USMC A Perspective on Seabasing 

APRIL 15-16, 2003 

ADM Vern Clark, USN A Perspective on Seabasing 

ADM Joe Lopez, USN (Ret) Seabasing: Industry Innovation and 

Technology 

CAPT Chuck Fortenberry , USN (Ret) Offshore cargo handling techniques 

Bob Merkel and Loraine Brincefield Anti ship cruise missile 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX C 

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

109

Josh Davis Army Advanced Mobility Study 

ADM Art Cebrowski, USN (Ret) A Perspective on Seabasing 

MAY 27, 2003 

VADM Al Herberger, USN (Ret) Sea Horse System 
 

PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE ________________________________________________ 

110 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX D 

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

111

APPENDIX D: THOUGHTS ON SEA BASING IN THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

PROFESSOR EMERITUS

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

The cornerstone of America’s continued military preeminence is 

our ability to project combat power rapidly and virtually unimpeded 

to widespread areas of the world. Much of our power projection 

capability depends on sustained access to regions of concern. Any 

number of circumstances might compromise our forward presence 

(both bases and forward operating forces) and therefore diminish our 

ability to apply military power, reducing our military and political 

influence in key regions of the world.1 

For a number of reasons the concept of seabasing has received 

increasing attention in the defense community and its analysts. 

However, most efforts aimed at developing new concepts for sea 

basing start with the premise that sea basing represents an obvious 

and accepted principle of American defense policy, particularly 

because access to land bases has become an increasingly serious 

problem.2 The basic line of argument simply boils down to a 

comment made by a senior naval official in 1996. “With an aircraft 

 

1 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century (Washington, 

DC, 1997), p. 12. 

2 A recent article by Vice Admiral Moore and Lt. General Edward Hanlon comments: “Sea basing is 

the core of `Sea Power 21.’ It is about placing at sea – to a greater extent than ever before – 

capabilities critical to joint and coalition operational success. By doing so, it minimizes the need to 

build up forces and supplies ashore, reduces their vulnerability, and enhances operational 

mobility.... It exploits the operational shift in warfare from mass to precision and information, 

employing the 70 percent of the earth’s surface that is covered with water as a vast maneuver area 

in support of the joint force.” And in all that, hardly a word about the political and strategic 

benefits of sea basing. Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, Jr. and Lieutenant General Edward 

Hanlon, Jr., “Sea Basing, Operational Independence for a New Century,” Proceedings, January 

2003. 
 

THOUGHTS ON SEA BASING

IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ___________________________________________________ 

112 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 

carrier, you get 4.5 acres of Americana with no diplomatic restrictions 

on when and what you can fly.”3 Such a point of view is certainly 

understandable from a Navy and Marine Corps perspective, given 

the missions and culture of those two services, but it is hardly 

sufficient in today’s political atmosphere. 

Moreover, that premise certainly does not reflect the Air Force’s 

perspective. As the current Chief of Staff of the Air Force noted in 

late 1998, “Access is an issue until you begin to involve the vital 

interests of the nation that you want and need as a host. Then access 

is rarely an issue.” Similarly, General Joseph Ralston, USAF, then 

Vice Chairman of the JCS, commented in 1999, “If we stay engaged 

with our allies, we will have access when we need it.”4 Along similar 

lines, many Army leaders remain solidly within the landlocked 

perspective of their more than a half-century commitment in Central 

Europe. Others in the Army appear to be merely trailing behind the 

Air Force in the hope the latter will somehow get them to the 

battlefields of the twenty-first century.5 

Nor is a belief that sea basing is central to American defense 

policy necessarily typical of the perspective of many Washington, 

DC, pundits.6 Simply put, the counter argument to sea basing is that 

 

3 Quoted in Christopher J. Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002, p. 3. 

4 Ibid., p. 2. These are astonishing comments given the consistent unwillingness of America’s allies 

to provide access for military operations, when they have taken a different view of the situation 

from the position of the United States. 

5 One of the ironies of the Army’s present cultural predilections is the fact that it is largely dominated 

by a Euro-centric culture despite the fact that the two major wars in which it has fought since 1945 

were in Asia and not Europe (but those wars were largely fought by Army generals whose 

experience had been largely in Europe). Nevertheless, since the aftermath of World War II, the 

Army leadership has burrowed comfortably within its barracks in Europe, while dismissing its 

experiences in the Pacific as being irrelevant to the Army’s mission. At present, there are over four 

times more army generals stationed in Europe than there are stationed in the Pacific. 

6 It is well to remember that the one of the basic intellectual lines that characterized the arguments of 

the military reform caucus in the mid-1980s in its attempts to change the American approach to war 

was a fervent belief that the American military had, since the days of World War II, devoted far too 

much attention to its support and logistical structure and too little attention to the sharp end of 

combat, which was what really mattered. What such arguments missed was the harsh geographic 

reality that, unlike the German military located in the heart of Europe which did not need to get to 

the wars that it started, throughout the twentieth century the American military has confronted the 

difficult and intractable problems involved in projecting military power across two great oceans 
 

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the United States and its military forces will always have access to or 

can seize land bases, from which the U.S. military can project 

sufficient combat power to defeat opponents and achieve national 

goals. Dan Gouré of CSIS has put the anti-sea basing position 

directly in the Naval War College Review: 

The land-versus-sea argument has been going on for a long time, 

with no resolution in sight. It is sufficient here to point out the fact 

that naval forward presence may be needed, if land bases are not 

available, does not make it the preferred solution. Indeed, when 

the stakes are sufficiently grave or the vital interests of allies are 

threatened, it is unlikely that U.S. political and military leaders will 

rely solely on naval forward presence. To put it bluntly, if land 

bases are necessary, they will be found or even seized. This is an 

often-overlooked lesson of the Gulf War or the Kosovo campaign.7

At present, current sea-basing capabilities are not under 

immediate threat of major cuts in the budgetary processes, but 

neither the maritime services, nor their supporters, have done a 

particularly good job of articulating the larger political and strategic 

framework, necessary to protect the current capabilities—not to 

mention the future possibilities of sea basing.8 The presence 

argument has some validity, but misses major aspects of the 

emerging strategic environment—aspects which are already 

suggesting some of the difficulties that an over reliance by the United 

States on land basing could cause in the twenty-first century. 

Thus, there is a considerable danger in neglecting the strategic 

rationale, which must undergird the concept of sea basing. In a 

world of pure number crunching, sea basing is vulnerable on two 

counts. First, even in its present form, it is expensive in terms of the 

manpower and resources it consumes in procurement and 

 

and then in waging war on the far side of those oceans. For the articulation of the reformers 

argument about the so-called inferiority of U.S. military forces in ground combat see: Martin van 

Creveld, Fighting Power, German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT, 1982). 

7 Daniel Gouré, “The Tyranny of Forward Presence,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2001, p. 

17. 

8 It is worth noting that in the first year of George W. Bush’s administration, there was considerable 

attention given to the possibility of reducing the number of carrier battle groups, while the 

construction of the next carrier is still under serious consideration for cancellation. 
 

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maintenance. It is certainly more expensive than land basing. With 

the probability that defense budgets will decline in the near future, 

the costs of sea basing will inevitably confront challenges from within 

the Department, as well as from critics of military spending on the 

outside. It may well become increasingly difficult not only to achieve 

higher levels of support for the research and development necessary 

to test and procure the technologies and equipment required by new 

and innovative concepts, but even to defend current levels of 

spending for sea-basing capabilities. 

The second challenge will come from those who argue for massive 

reliance on the technological revolution in communications and 

computing power that is so rapidly altering the face of the First 

World. Supposedly technology will alter the fundamental nature of 

war and do so at a far lower cost to the nation than present defense 

budgets.9 Some theorists are already arguing that position from 

within the maritime services themselves. Such arguments will 

become increasingly attractive, when the Department of Defense 

finally confronts the hard choices that it is going to have to make—

choices it should have begun making over a decade ago. With 

increasing budgetary constraints -- an inevitability given the ebb and 

flow of American politics – those choices are going to be painful.10 

But there is no guarantee that when confronted by hard choices, 

either the civilian or military leaders within the Department will 

make the right choices. 

Yet access at the strategic and political levels represents a 

daunting set of problems and challenges. As a recent RAND report, 

ironically done for the Air Force has noted: 

As it has been in the past, so in the future the idea of “assured 

access” – the guaranteed ability for the United states to do what it 

wants when it wants, where it wants, from and via foreign territory 

 

9 Along these lines see particularly Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War

(New York, 2000). 

10 One of the surprising aspects of the post-Cold War world has been the relatively small decline in 

U.S. defense budgets compared to what happened in the immediate aftermath of World War I, 

World War II, and even the Korean War. Yet much of the current service planning for the coming 

decade appears predicated on a belief that defense budgets will continue to rise. 
 

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– will remain a chimera. Except in the most extraordinary 

circumstances, nations simply do not cede so much control over 

fundamental things.... [M]any of the contingencies that crop up in 

the next decade or two are likely to occur in areas where the United 

States faces sizeable access uncertainties.11

Without access to land bases, sea basing becomes an absolute 

strategic necessity for the United States in the coming decades of the 

twenty-first century. 

THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK OF SEA BASING 

The war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan should 

have provided a wake up call for those who believe that sea basing 

represents a luxury that land bases and ground forces projected from 

such bases can replace. The political reality of the post-Cold War era 

is that U.S. allies are less dependent on the United States for their 

security than during the days of the Soviet Union. In fact, in the 

current war on terrorism the United States has become more 

dependent on allies and friends for intelligence and participation in 

addressing a global, distributed threat than it ever was in the Cold 

War. 

Nevertheless, even during the Cold War the United States found 

that its interests and the perceptions by its Allies of their interests did 

not necessarily coincide. In 1973 all of its European NATO allies, 

except Portugal, denied the United States basing and overflight rights 

in aerial efforts to resupply Israel in the midst of that nation’s 

desperate fight for survival during the Yom Kippur War.12 

Moreover, the American military was not even allowed to ship U.S. 

military equipment in Europe to the Israelis. Only the recent 

purchase of C-5s and bases in the Azores made the aerial bridge—

with its crucial equipment loads to Israel—possible. 

 

11 David A. Shiapak, John Stillion, Olger Oliker, and Tanya Charlik-Paley, A Global Access Strategy 

for the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica, 2002), pp. 10-11. 

12 The Dutch were more cooperative than the other NATO allies for a variety of reasons and would 

have allowed the use of their bases, but overflight restrictions made that impossibility. 
 

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Similarly in 1986, the United States launched air strikes at Libya to 

punish Momar Qadafi for his support of terrorists throughout 

Western Europe and Middle East. USAF F-111s, flying from bases in 

the United Kingdom, could only participate by flying entirely around 

French and Spanish air space to reach the Mediterranean. That 

round-about route required a major increase in tanker support and 

added immensely to the considerable strains on the crews flying a 

complex and difficult mission.13 As a recent RAND report has 

commented: 

By the time the F-111s made it to Libya, numerous aircraft had had 

difficulties with their sensitive targeting systems that either 

prevented them from dropping the bombs they had carried such a 

distance or resulted in the delivery of the weapons well off target. 

Tired crews also made errors that resulted in improperly aimed 

ordnance. Thus, while on a strategic level the attack can arguably 

be assessed as a success, tactically the strikes achieved significantly 

less than the planners had hoped. At least some of the blame for 

the disappointing performance must be assigned to the excruciating 

mission profile, which stressed aircrew and aircraft well past the 

bounds of their normal operation.14

Despite America’s success in the Gulf War, the 1990s saw 

numerous refusals by Middle Eastern states to allow U.S. forces the 

use of land bases on their sovereign territory. In September 1996 both 

Turkey and Saudi Arabia denied the United States the use of their 

bases to respond to Iraqi attacks on the Kurds. As a result, the United 

States could only respond to Saddam’s actions with cruise missiles 

attacks against targets in southern Iraq.15 A year later Saudi Arabia 

again denied the United States the use of its bases to respond to Iraq’s 

expulsion of six UN weapons inspectors.16 

 

13 One of the fallouts from the operation was that the unauthorized use of tankers out of Zaragoza to 

refuel the F-111s caused the Spanish government (it was not informed of their mission) to push 

the United States into moving its F-16 wing from Spain to Sicily. Shiapak, Stillion, Oliker, and 

Charlik-Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force, p. 21. 

14 Ibid., pp 8-9. 

15 Ibid., p. 6. 

16 Ibid, pp. 6-7. 
 

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117

Two months after that crisis, the Iraqis completely stonewalled 

UN Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) inspections. Again Riyadh 

denied use of its bases to strike Iraq. And again, one year later in 

November 1998 the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates refused use 

of their bases for U.S. aircraft to respond to Iraq’s bad behavior.17 As 

a result, half of the U.S. combat aircraft stationed on land bases in the 

area (approximately sixty) were not usable for the planned combat 

strikes. But it was not only in the Middle East that the United States 

ran into access problems. During the air campaign against the Serbs 

and their ethnic cleansing program in Kosovo in the late 1990s, the 

French government, as it had done during the raid on Libya in 1986, 

refused to allow B-52s, flying from bases in the United Kingdom, to 

pass through French air space.18

The air campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan again 

underlined the problem of access. Despite the expenditure of vast 

resources in building up the infrastructure of land bases in the 

Middle East, the United States discovered that many of its Arab 

Allies refused the use of that infrastructure for combat aircraft 

participating in the campaign against Afghanistan -- even though 

those being struck were not Arabs, with the exception of the Al 

Qaeda fighters, who ironically were the sworn enemies of the 

conservative regimes on the Arabian peninsula. Given this denial, 

the question then arises: If Middle Eastern regimes are unwilling to 

allow the United States use of their land bases to strike targets in a 

non-Arab nation, how likely would they be to allow usage, when a 

military effort was aimed at an Arab nation and when it was of real 

strategic significance to the strategic and political stability of the 

Middle East? Saudi Arabia provided the answer with a resounding, 

“No!”, over the course of the recent war against Saddam’s regime. 

There is another significant problem which goes well beyond the 

problem of direct access for military action. The denial of bases to 

launch air strikes at targets in a region where the United States 

military has established an extensive infrastructure to support the 

projection of military power is not necessarily the worst case. It is 

 

17 Ibid., p. 7. 

18 Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” p. 35. 
 

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equally possible that in the near future U.S. forces will be denied 

logistical or tanker use of European or Middle Eastern bases in cases 

where U.S. and Allied national interests diverge, as was the case 

during the Yom Kippur War. Such denials are an increasing 

possibility, as memories of the Cold War fade. Some European allies 

of the United States already regard their connections with America as 

a matter of convenience—connections, with which they can entirely 

dispense, if their national interests so dictate.19 To paraphrase 

DeGaulle, nations do not have obligations, they only have interests.20 

Equally important as the right to use foreign bases for military 

operations may be the access to and use of their infrastructure and 

support for the projection of U.S. forces. The denial of that 

infrastructure, whether directly, or by refusing to allow material and 

combat power to flow across borders, would make such bases 

entirely useless in a crisis. Thus, that base infrastructure could 

subtract from the net combat power available to the United States by 

the denial of the considerable investments made in the maintenance 

and logistical facilities to support the projection of U.S. forces. 

As dangerous as the risks of a continuing over emphasis on land 

basing to the projection of U.S. military power may be, the strategic 

and political costs of basing too much of America’s military power on 

foreign bases may be even greater. There are compelling political 

and strategic reasons why the United States should be wary of too 

great an emphasis on land bases on the territories of its allies. Those 

reasons have to do with the negative political impact such bases have 

had in the past, and will likely have in the future, on local attitudes 

towards the policies of the United States. 

 

19 Memories of America’s contributions to victory in the Second World War and the rebuilding of 

Western Europe and East Asia are rapidly disappearing with the death of the generations that grew 

up in the 1920s and 1930s. It will soon be the turn of the generation that grew up in the 1940s to 

die off, and then even memories of the early days of the Cold War will disappear into the mists of 

history. 

20 For an examination of the realities of the international arena see the brilliant examination by the 

ancient Greek historian and general, Thucydides, in the “Melian Dialogue.” Thucydides, A History 

of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (London, 1954), pp. 400-408. For a general 

examination of the processes involved in the making of strategy through the ages see Williamson 

Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, The Making of Strategy, Rulers, States and War

(Cambridge, 1992). 
 

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119

During the Cold War, U.S. bases on foreign soil not only deterred 

the Soviet Union by underlining America’s commitment, but 

represented a real political assurance of America’s commitment to its 

allies. Nevertheless, those bases did cause considerable friction, but 

such friction was, for the most part, bearable to Allied political 

leaders.21 In Europe, despite considerable differences in cultural and 

political attitudes, Americans and Europeans shared a common 

heritage.22 In the case of Japan and South Korea, where the common 

heritage was not present, political leaders willingly tolerated the 

inroads of “Yankee barbarians,” in return for the protection they 

provided against the Communist threats from the Soviet Union, 

North Korea, and China. In other words, as long as the threat was 

sufficiently obvious, frictions caused by the presence of U.S. forces on 

foreign territory were tolerable. 

However, since the Cold War, the situation has changed 

dramatically. The existence of a substantial American presence on 

land bases in the Middle East in the aftermath of the Gulf War 

represents an entirely new situation. It has been the author of 

frictions that have already contributed considerably to the political 

unraveling of a region that is under enormous pressure -- not only 

from globalization, but from the collapse of the sureties that marked 

Islam’s rise to world dominance in the seventh century.23 In effect, 

history has demanded that Islamic societies adjust to a world that 

took the West at least five centuries to create.24 There are large 

 

21 The massive political protests in the early 1980s throughout Europe against the deployment of the 

Pershing II missile and ground launched cruise missiles were weathered at considerable political 

cost by the political leaders of America’s European allies. 

22 This author remembers the BBC quip of the late 1980s that was said with some sharpness: “The 

United States is the first country to go straight from barbarism to degeneracy, skipping 

civilization.” 

23 For a short study of the results see Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong (New York, 2002), but see 

also particularly his general survey of the history of the Middle East: The Middle East, A Brief 

History of the Last 2,000 Years (New York, 1995). 

24 For a discussion of these issues see Annex I of the Defense Science Board’s “2002 Summer Study” 

on terrorism for an examination of the roots of that political and psychotic disease (authors: Major 

General Robert Scales, U.S. Army retired, Lieutenant General Brad Hosmer, USAF retired, and 

Williamson Murray). For the nature of the problems that confront the First World and the West in 

particular with the increasingly powerful influence of radical Islam on the course of events in the 

Middle East see among other commentaries Lew Harris, “Al-Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology,” Policy 

Review, August 2002; David Warren, “Wrestling with Islam,” DavidWarrenOnline, 3 December 
 

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enough pressures washing over that region without the presence of 

American troops, including substantial numbers of women in 

uniform. Thus, the presence of U.S. forces has had a direct impact on 

societies that are already in cultural and religious disarray. During 

the buildup to the Gulf War, the United States assured its Middle 

Eastern allies that, as soon as it had defeated Saddam’s forces, it 

would withdraw from the region. To a great extent, it has honored 

that pledge, leaving only residual ground forces in Kuwait as an 

insurance policy against renewed Iraqi aggression. 

But the presence of substantial numbers of U.S. and British 

aircraft throughout the region has provided a propaganda base for 

Al-Qaeda to argue that the West had occupied—and still occupies—

Islam’s holiest lands and shrines. That may not accord with how 

Americans view their presence in the Middle East, but that is not the 

point.25 It is the perceptions of the locals that matter. Moreover, the 

presence of American airmen in Saudi Arabia has provided local Al 

Qaeda operatives convenient targets, as the attack on the Kobar 

Towers underlined in the mid-1990s. But the larger issue has been 

the propaganda mileage that bin Laden and his ilk have gained 

throughout the Middle East and other Islamic lands from the mere 

presence of American military forces and power in Saudi Arabia. 

One should not be so naive as to believe American maritime 

forces will not be the target of terrorist attacks. The suicide attack on 

the USS Cole is a case in point. Nevertheless, U.S. forces based on 

land in areas like the Middle East are targets all the time, while those 

 

2002; James Woolsey, “World War IV,” address delivered at the National War College, 16 

November 2002; and a brilliant essay by Michael Vlahos, “Terror’s Mask: Insurgency within 

Islam,” Johns Hopkins University, Applied Physics Laboratory, 2002. 

25 Nothing better underlines the American misunderstanding of the depth of the Islamic 

fundamentalist tides and the implications of those tides for the continuing utilization of land bases 

throughout the Middle East than the comment in a recent RAND publication on how to deal with 

Islamic unhappiness over the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia near Islam’s holiest places: 

“Here again, maintaining clear lines of communication and upholding a reputation for honesty and 

plain dealing probably represent the best weapon the United States has against this impediment.” 

One wonders at such attitudes, given the current state of religion and politics in the Middle East, 

but American political scientists have almost as short a memory as do the American people. 

Shiapak, Stillion, Oliker, and Charlick-Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force, p. 

41. 
 

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at sea are rarely vulnerable to terrorists, at least in terms of the 

weapons available at present. The continuing attacks on Americans 

in Kuwait—one of the few areas in the Middle East where one would 

think they would be safe—suggests the tensions that U.S. presence on 

land cause throughout the Middle East. And it is only a matter of 

time before terrorists strike again at high visibility targets similar to 

Kobar Towers or the Marine Barracks in Lebanon. 

Finally, there is little prospect that the deeply held anger within so 

much of the Islamic world will be assuaged by anything less than the 

complete surrender of the West and its values that aim at testing the 

frontiers of human knowledge.26 That anger is a harsh reality that 

will remain part of the strategic landscape for the remainder of this 

and perhaps the next century. But there is no need to maximize those 

tensions and frictions by the addition of large land-based air and 

ground forces, whose mere presence is a reminder to the Islamic 

world of its decline and the rise of the West.27 In every sense many in 

the Islamic world are hearing a tune similar to that played by the 

British Army at Yorktown in 1781: “The World Turned Upside 

Down.” The United States does not need to exacerbate the tensions 

and frictions of globalization by presenting those living in the Middle 

East with the visual every-day presence of Western military forces. 

THE GEOGRAPHIC PROBLEM

The United States again confronts the realities of its geographical 

position and the impact of that geography not only on its grand 

 

26 The sharpest and most coherent depiction of the threat from the religious fanatics in the Islamic 

world is Harris, “Al-Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology.” His bottom line is that Athere is one decisive 

advantage to the `evildoer’ metaphor [President George Bush’s description of Al-Qaeda], and it is 

this: Combat with evildoers is not Clausewitzian War. You do not make treaties with evildoers or 

try to adjust your conduct to make them like you. You do not try to see the world from the 

evildoers’ point of view. You do not try to appease them, or reason with them. You try, on the 

contrary, to outwit them, to vanquish them, to kill them. You behave with them in the same 

manner that you would deal with a fatal epidemic – you try to wipe it out.” 

27 For the failure of the Arab world to adapt to the conditions of the modern competitive, and global 

world despite the enormous riches that oil has brought the region, see the UN report of summer 

2002 done by a group of Arab economists and political scientists. In every important category 

their world lags behind the First World with virtually no sign of change over the past four decades 

– a reality these honest critics of their own societies graphically depict. For a summary of their 

report see “Self-doomed to Failure,” The Economist, 14 August 2002. 
 

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strategy, but on its military strategy as well. To an extent that was 

not true during the Cold War, when an extensive web of army and air 

force bases girded the world, America’s power now lies in North 

America.28 The current strategic problem is quite similar to that 

which confronted U. S. military planners at the onset of America’s 

participation in World War II -- how to project the immense military 

and economic power of the United States across the great oceanic 

distances of the Atlantic and the Pacific that separate the nation from 

its strategic interests without many intervening bases. 

In the Cold War the existence of bases on foreign soil and their 

military infrastructure eased the logistical problems confronting 

American strategists. But even then the tyranny of distance forced 

the United States to rely on its maritime forces to a considerable 

extent. The major change in the post-Cold War world is that 

distances now exercise their tyranny to an even greater extent. 

Unfortunately, there are relatively few signs of a recognition of that 

reality throughout a defense establishment enthralled with 

procurement and technological change. 

In three of the four geographic areas that lie at the heart of 

America’s strategic interests (Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast 

Asia) there still exist, over a decade after the ending of the Cold War, 

substantial infrastructure: bases, prepositioned equipment, 

maintenance facilities, and political connections that promise some 

degree of cooperation.29 It seems unlikely that there will be a 

catastrophic explosion in Europe. At least for crises on that continent, 

it seems likely that the United States will have access to its bases 

throughout the NATO region, for the foreseeable future, as long as 

 

28 In 1965 the USAF possessed seventy bases scattered across twenty-five countries. By 1985 that 

total had declined to forty-six bases in seventeen countries, and by 1995 that number had fallen to 

fifteen air bases in only ten countries. There is no reason to believe that this process will not 

continue over the coming decade. Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” p. 31 

29 The most basic context in the making of strategy, and especially in the making of military strategy, 

lies in the geographic realities that confront nations. On this topic see Williamson Murray and 

Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in The Making of Strategy, pp. 3-23; for the 

influence of geography on military operations and culture see Williamson Murray, “Some 

Thoughts on War and Geography,” in Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, edited by Colin S. 

Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (London, 1999). 
 

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European troubles involve internecine quarrels in places like the 

Balkans. 

What is less likely is that those bases will be available for a crisis 

in the Middle East, particularly if some European nations view their 

interests as conflicting with the projection of military power into the 

Middle East. The general unwillingness of Europeans to support 

current U.S. policy in the Middle East—driven to a considerable 

extent by their dependence on Middle Eastern oil—is only going to 

get worse as memories of the Cold War fade. The reluctance of 

France and Germany to support U.S. policy over Iraq are a signal that 

the United States can no longer rely on European support for many of 

its policies. Such attitudes will inevitably translate at some time in 

the future to an unwillingness to provide access to America’s bases in 

Europe in the middle of a major crisis. 

If access is a political problem for land-based ground and air 

forces deploying to the Middle East, it is an even greater problem in 

the Pacific in an operational sense. While U.S. land bases in northeast 

Asia and Guam are well positioned to handle a military crisis with 

North Korea, they are not positioned to handle troubles in Southeast 

Asia.30 Australia and Singapore have certainly been forthcoming in 

providing access to U.S. naval forces, but the former is probably too 

far from potential trouble spots in Southeast Asia to represent more 

than a useful staging area.31 The use of the latter carries with it the 

baggage of considerable vulnerabilities, given Singapore’s very small 

size. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report underlined the difficulty 

of projecting U.S. military power across the Pacific int Southeast Asia 

in its report to the Congress: 

The distances are vast... [and] [t]he density of U.S. basing and en 

route infrastructure is lower than in other critical regions. The 

 

30 In East Asia American land bases in South Korea and Japan provide a political assurance of 

American commitment to the area, which may be more important in providing a sense of political 

stability to Japan, South Korea, and even China than for their deterrent effect on North Korea’s 

bizarre regime. 

31 This was the case in 1942 and much of 1943for the American military efforts against Imperial 

Japan’s naval, ground, and air forces in the New Guinea and Solomon campaigns, where 

intractable logistical and supply problems confronted U.S. forces—problems that represented as 

great a set of obstacles as those posed by a ferocious and fanatical opponent. 
 

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United States also has less assurance of access to facilities in the 

region. This places a premium on securing additional access and 

infrastructure agreements and developing systems capable of 

sustained operations at greater distances with minimal theaterbased support.32 

If Indonesia were to continue its down ward spiral into civil war 

or political collapse, or China were to become more than a political 

threat in the South China Sea, given its already extraordinary 

territorial claims in the area, the United States could project its 

military power through sea basing in order to defend U.S. interests in 

an area with critical sea lines of communication, on which so much of 

the world’s trade and prosperity depends. 

THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEM 

Even if we retain the necessary bases and port infrastructure to 

support forward deployed forces, they will be vulnerable to strikes 

that could reduce or neutralize their utility. Precision strikes, 

weapons of mass destruction, and cruise and ballistic missiles all 

present threats to our forward presence, particularly as stand-off 

ranges increase. So, too, do they threaten access to strategic 

geographic areas.33

Only those, who have read deeply into the history of American 

military operations in the Second World War, understand fully the 

difficulties that U.S. forces confronted in the early months of 

America’s participation in that war. Throughout 1942, American 

forward operating bases were under constant attack by the air, 

ground, and naval forces of the Axis. Such attacks took a severe toll 

of the defenders. In June 1942 the crucial naval base at Midway 

Island in the Central Pacific came under heavy air attack by aircraft 

launched from Japanese carriers that destroyed much of the island’s 

infrastructure. Only extraordinary miscalculations by the attacking 

Japanese commander and the luck that placed U.S. dive bombers 

over Japanese carriers at the exact moment Japanese Zero defenders 

 

32 Quoted from the Quadrennial Defense Review Report by Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and 

Theater Air Bases,” p. 24. 

33 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, pp. 12-13. 
 

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had descended to ocean level to attack American torpedo aircraft 

saved the island from falling to an immense Japanese armada. 

Two months later, at Savo Island in August 1942, Japanese heavy 

cruisers sank one Australian and three U.S. heavy cruisers in the 

anchorage immediately off the shores of Guadalcanal—the cost to the 

attacking Japanese: minor damage to one of the attacking cruisers. At 

that time the U.S. Marines were struggling to bring a modicum of 

supplies ashore to defend the airfield they had just captured. Over 

succeeding months, almost continuous air attacks, 16" shells from 

Japanese battleships, heavy shelling by Japanese cruisers and 

destroyers and, eventually, substantial numbers of Japanese ground 

forces assaulted the Marines and their forward operating base. To 

protect that naval base from Japanese forces attacking down the 

“Slot,” the U.S. Navy suffered a series of costly reverses in September 

and October 1942. Only desperate resistance by Marine and Navy 

aviators, the sacrifice of much of the U.S. Navy’s surface power then 

available in the Pacific and the tenacious resistance of Marine grunts 

on the ground prevented Guadalcanal’s fall and the destruction of the 

1st Marine Division. 

In the war against the European Axis, throughout the winter of 

1942/1943, American air bases and ports in North Africa received a 

constant diet of pounding from the Luftwaffe. In one case during the 

Battle of Kasserine Pass, panzers from Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s 

marauding Afrikakorps managed to overrun a major American air 

base. In early spring 1943 during the Tunisian campaign, George 

Patton, furious at the Luftwaffe attacks on his forces, proposed giving 

Luftwaffe pilots a medal, when they struck his headquarters while 

Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Field Marshal Harold Alexander 

were visiting to hear out his complaints about Luftwaffe attacks. 

Throughout the North African campaign the Germans were able to 

inflict substantial damage on Allied shipping unloading in Oran and 

Algiers.34 

 

34 For an operational view of the campaigns of World War II see Williamson Murray and Allan R. 

Millett, A War To Be Won, Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, MA, 2000). 
 

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By 1944 that situation had radically changed for the better in both 

the European and the Pacific theaters. U.S. forces moved across the 

Central Pacific with their base structure virtually invulnerable to 

attacks by the forces of Imperial Japan. On the other side of the 

world, American forces raced through France in great open columns, 

unafraid that the Luftwaffe might interfere with their movement. 

During the Battle of the Bulge Patton’s Third Army’s tank columns 

were able to drive with their lights on, as they raced to the relief of 

hard pressed U.S. forces in the Ardennes. Only on the 1st of January 

1945, did the Luftwaffe launch a strike that destroyed nearly 300 

Allied aircraft on the ground in Belgium, but only because Allied 

aircrews and air defenses were recovering from a vast number of 

New Year’s eve parties. But that attack cost the Luftwaffe so many 

aircraft and fighter pilots that turned out to be the German air force’s 

swan song. The Luftwaffe would never again launch a significant 

military operation. 

American experiences in the limited wars that accompanied the 

Cold War mirrored the experiences of the last years of the Second 

World War—at least as far as the relative invulnerability of American 

bases, infrastructure, and support facilities went. There were, of 

course, occasional rocketing of American bases and guerilla attacks 

during the Vietnam War, which at times caused considerable 

damage, but only over a period that lasted nearly a decade. 

Nevertheless, the American military has slowly, but steadily, become 

accustomed to a world in which its land-bases are seemingly 

invulnerable. Ironically, the very policy of deterrence only served to 

reinforce a sense of the invulnerability of American bases to attack 

among all too many U.S. military leaders. Admittedly there were 

considerable efforts in the late 1970s and 1980s to prepare U.S. and 

NATO air bases withstand a massive assault by Warsaw Pact air 

forces. 

But even these considerable efforts to prepare base infrastructures 

to withstand aerial assault did not seem sufficient to protect NATO 

and American air bases in case of war. In the mid 1980s a series of 

tests of U.S. capabilities suggested how difficult it would have been 

to be air bases operating, while under a sustained assault by Warsaw 
 

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Pact aircraft and missiles.35 Those experiments saw a major U.S. base 

reinforced significantly beyond the normal base engineering support 

structure (the so called “Salty Demo” tests). The results, however, 

were depressing in terms of the difficulties in reconstituting a landbase structures under heavy enemy attacks.36 As an article on the 

experiment notes: 

The results [of the simulated Warsaw Pact attacks] were a sobering 

demonstration of the synergistic chaos that ensues when everything 

goes wrong at the same time. Thirty-one percent of the base’s 

personnel were casualties, half of them killed and nearly a third of 

the wounded were unable to return to duty. There was 

considerable damage to aircraft, vehicles, buildings, 

communications, and power systems... [F]ires burned all over, and 

unexploded ordnance lay about everywhere. Repair teams were 

short-handed and in some cases did not have the equipment and 

supplies they needed.37

Ironically, despite these suggestive tests, the implications have 

had little impact on either the Air Force’s or Department’s thinking. 

Moreover, despite the apparent vulnerabilities of forward operating 

bases, the Air Force is increasingly emphasizing short-range tactical 

aircraft in its force structure. Part of the explanation for such a casual 

dismissal of the threat to forward operating bases was undoubtedly 

the experience of the Gulf War, when none of the numerous bases, off 

of which Coalition aircraft flew, were subject to attack by Iraqi 

aircraft or missiles. The other part of the explanation may be that the 

Air Force is caught in a budgetary squeeze between its desire to 

acquire the F-22 and its other requirements. In the squeeze, the need 

to reconstitute air bases after attack has simply fallen out of the 

budget. 

 

35 RAND simulations in the early 1980s suggested that Warsaw Pact strikes against U.S. air bases in 

Europe in the first week of hostilities would cut sortie generation rates by over 40 percent, while 

destroying upwards of 40 percent of deployed aircraft. Another RAND study commented that: 

“In Europe, main operating bases and support equipment previously thought survivable may 

become extremely vulnerable.” Quoted in Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air 

Bases,” p. 8. 

36 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 

37 John T. Correll, “Fighting under Attack,” Air Force Magazine, October 1998, pp. 50-52. 
 

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The official line seems to be that defending fighters can prevent an 

opponent from pushing through sufficient aircraft or cruise missiles 

to inflict serious damage on the forward operating bases of U.S. 

forces.38 The difficulty with such arguments is that the emerging 

operational world is likely to see increasing numbers of cruise and 

ballistic missiles, perhaps with precision and stealth capabilities, all 

likely to present a significant challenge to U.S. forward operating 

land bases. GPS is not just a technology available to U.S. forces and 

America’s future opponents will undoubtedly figure out to use such 

technological capabilities to their advantage. On the missile threat 

the Hart/Rudman commission commented four years ago: 

The competition between missile developments and defensive 

systems will be a key operational challenge over the next several 

decades. Large-scale missile attacks will be able to overwhelm 

defensive systems, despite considerable improvements to them. 

American bases abroad will become vulnerable to these weapons.39

In the near future potential enemies of the United States will 

possess capabilities, either developed by indigenous industries, or 

purchased abroad, to attack stationary targets, particularly large ones 

like airfields and ports. Those targets will be identified before a crisis 

occurs and U.S. military forces deploy. It is already obvious to any 

power with pretensions of becoming a regional competitor to the 

United States that it must target and attack the air bases in its region 

into which the Air Force’s expeditionary forces could flow and into 

which Army ground forces could begin to arrive. 

 

38 As one commentator has noted: “[A]s recent force structure decisions have increased reliance on 

forward bases, the USAF seems to have discounted concerns over air base vulnerability, primarily 

because no opponent currently appears capable of mounting a serious threat. The focus of debate 

now revolves around performance and survivability in the air against enemy aircraft and surfaceto-air missile systems, while ground performance and survivability appears to be largely ignored.” 

Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” p. 9. 

39 U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in 

the 21st Century, Supporting Research and Analysis, Washington, DC, 15 September 1999, p. 52. 

Dr. Andrew Krepinevich commented three years later: “...the growing proliferation of ballistic and 

cruise missiles, and of weapons of mass destruction, is likely to enable even third tier militaries to 

place American bases overseas in their cross hairs. Such bases... may become the 21st century’s 

Omaha Beaches; killing zones for massed, immobile soldiers and war supplies.” Quoted by 

Francis G. Hoffman, “In Sailing in a Fog of Peace: Future Anti-Access Threats,” presentation at 

National Defense University, Washington, DC, 9 July 2002. 
 

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Moreover, one cannot eliminate the possibility of special 

force/guerrilla attacks on air bases. In 1942, British SAS 

commandoes in North Africa destroyed almost as many Luftwaffe 

aircraft on the ground as the RAF shot down in the air over the 

course of the year. During the Vietnam War, North Vietnamese and 

Vietcong commandoes managed to destroy nearly 100 aircraft and 

damage over 1,000 with unsophisticated weapons like satchel charges 

and mortars despite the fact that many U.S. bases lay far beyond the 

reach of the North Vietnamese in Thailand.40 It is not likely that 

potential opponents of the United States will not notice and respond 

to the successes that First World Special Forces have achieved over 

the past several decades. 

The potential for anti-access by direct attacks is not just a threat 

that confronts the Air Force. To one extent or another, it will confront 

all the services over the coming decades. It has major implications 

for the Army which is devoting substantial resources to developing 

new capabilities and weapons systems to speed up deployment of its 

units. To a considerable extent, those capabilities are predicated on 

airlift being available and on access to land bases to which Army 

units can deploy in order to begin ground operations against the 

enemy. Anti-access capabilities obviously also have considerable 

implications for the use of ports and other fixed facilities by the Navy 

and the Marine Corps.41 

But while the latter two services are paying significant attention to 

the anti-access problem, the Air Force, at least in its budgetary 

choices, appears almost oblivious to the emerging threats that 

technological change is already offering America’s future enemies. 

This appears to be the case particularly with regards to its 

procurement policies. At present, the Air Force is targeting much of 

its procurement resources for tactical fighters, while at least, 

 

40 Alan Vick, Snakes in the Eagle’s Nest: A History of Ground Attacks on Air Bases (Santa Monica, 

CA, 1995). The author’s bottom line: “The centrality of airpower to modern warfare makes 

airfields even more tempting targets than they have been [in the past].... If the historical 

experience is any indication, standoff threats [from special forces or guerrillas] will continue to 

pose a particularly daunting challenge.” Ibid., pp. xx-xxi. 

41 Here the conceptual work in both of the maritime services is clearly focused on addressing the 

emerging anti-access problem, as it pertains to the projection of Marine forces ashore. 
 

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according to its white paper on the future bomber force, it will not 

begin work on a replacement long-range bomber for the B-2 until 

2013.42

Almost as much as the Marine Corps, the Army has a vital interest 

in involving itself in sea basing. Over the past six decades, it has 

found the seabase extraordinarily useful for the projection of ground 

power into areas of interest to the United States. From the Second 

World War through the Vietnam War, the sea provided virtually 

everything the Army took into combat or fired at the enemies of the 

United States. That has not changed; in any substantial conflict in the 

future, whatever the projection power of airlift, the army will in the 

end have to rely on the seabase for the movement of heavy units and 

supplies that enable it to fight. 

However, in a major shift in its approach to movement to contact 

with the enemy, the Army, on two separate occasions over the past 

decade, has used the seabase as the loci for that movement. In Haiti, 

an aircraft carrier provided the seabase for a brigade of the 101st

Airborne Division, while during the recent ENDURING FREEDOM 

operation the carrier Kitty Hawk provided a secure base for SOF units 

to move on into Afghanistan. 

Reinforcing the importance of sea basing are the logistical 

numbers that will, for the foreseeable future, make some form of sea 

basing essential during the conduct of U.S. military operations. 

Simply put, the deployment of one of the Air Force’s Expeditionary 

Air Forces represents an enormous logistical task. The deployment of 

thirty aircraft to Qatar in 1997 required the movement of 4,000 short 

tons of personnel, munitions, force protection, and other items 

(overall approximately ninety C-17 loads).43 And the base 

infrastructure at Qatar was hardly a bare-bones base. 

 

42 Department of the Air Force, “White Paper on the Bomber Force,” Washington, DC, 1998, p. 28. 

For the Air Force’s surprising approach to long-range strike see Williamson Murray, “The United 

States Should Begin Work on a New Bomber Now,” Policy Analysis, Number 368, The CATO 

Institute, March 16, 2000. 

43 Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” p. 27. 
 

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131

When one considers that most of the forward operating bases, 

from which U.S. forces will have to operate in the future, will not 

possess a sophisticated infrastructure, the difficulties involved in 

relying on land bases become even clearer.44 The problem of 

supplying fuel alone represents an intractable problem. A single 

squadron of F-15E (twenty-four aircraft) requires 400 tons of fuel per 

day; an Expeditionary Air Force no less the 2,500 tons.45 When one 

adds in the tonnages of weapons, sustenance for supporting troops, 

and maintenance supplies required to support such forces, a picture 

of the difficulties involved in deploying U.S. military power by air 

become readily apparent. 

It is hard to see, given the present size of U.S. airlift forces, how 

the United States could support Air Force and Army units on landbases that were subject to sustained attack by cruise or ballistic 

missiles, as well as special forces. In those circumstances sea basing 

should be an increasingly attractive option for the Army B and even 

in some respects to the Air Force. Does this mean that the United 

States should entirely abandon the idea of land basing? Obviously 

not. But the emerging threats and vulnerabilities suggest that U.S. 

military forces should increasingly rely on sea basing in one form or 

another. 

 

44 The difficulties that the Air Force will encounter in putting together a workable base structure 

where none exists were underlined by those encountered in the Stans during ENDURING 

FREEDOM, where it took an inordinate amount of time to begin operations because virtually 

everything had to be flown in. Had the Air Force had to deploy significant numbers of Army 

troops initially as well, those difficulties would only have been exacerbated. 

45 Bowie, “The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases,” p.27 
 

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CONCLUSION

There are no easy solutions to the strategic reality that confronts 

the United States at present. The projection of military power from 

North America has in the past, and will in the future, represent a 

number of intractable problems. That projection, even during the 

Cold War, when the United States had large numbers of bases 

scattered around the world, has never been an easy task. But the 

pullback of U.S. forces to bases in North America only exacerbates 

that strategic reality. And now the United States confronts the 

possibility its opponents will attempt to deny it access to bases on 

foreign soil, either through diplomacy, intimidation, or the actual use 

of military force. The dangers of the emerging world order to the 

projection of America’s military power were succinctly pointed out 

by the authors of the Hart-Rudman Commission four years ago: 

Clearly, there are new challenges in our future, especially for a U.S. 

military strategy that has relied on forward based and forwarddeployed forces as a key component of that strategy. The 

permanent stationing of U.S. forces abroad will become more 

difficult to sustain. The political costs of such bases will likely rise, 

as well as the vulnerability of such forces to attack [by] ballistic 

missiles, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Taken 

together, the pressures against the permanent forward basing of 

U.S. military forces have profound implications for U.S. strategy, 

power projection capabilities, and alliance relationships.46

What to do? It would seem that new capabilities and technologies 

created by the revolution in communications and computers—as well 

as in other areas—offers considerable possibilities for the 

development of advanced concepts for sea basing. But it is not the 

new technologies that drive the need for new thinking and 

approaches to sea basing. Rather it is the strategic and political 

framework that underlines the need to project U.S. military power 

from the sea. And that strategic and political framework also 

suggests the need for sea basing to become something more than just 

the property of the Navy and Marine Corps. In effect, sea basing 

 

46 U.S. Commission on National Security, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st

Century, pp. 56-57. 
 

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133

must become a truly joint concept with capabilities that allow for the 

projection of the full panoply of American military power against the 

enemies of the United States. 
 

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APPENDIX E: OPERATIONAL ISSUES OF SEA BASING

IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

WILLIAMSON MURRAY

PROFESSOR EMERITUS

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

INTRODUCTION

For political reasons as well as the increasing lethality and 

accuracy of cruise and ballistic missiles in the hands of potential 

opponents, the access to and use of land bases by America’s military 

forces has been and will become increasingly in question over coming 

decades.57 In a number of political cases during the Cold War, U.S. 

military forces found access even to their own bases on foreign soil 

severely limited or even denied by host nations.58 The political 

difficulties that have confronted U.S. forces in accessing bases since 

then have steadily increased. For the past decade and a half, U.S. 

forces have run into significant political difficulties in using bases in 

the Middle East to execute strikes against Saddam Hussein’s 

truculent regime.59 At various times not only Arab nations but the 

Turks as well have refused U.S. forces the use of their bases to launch 

air strikes against Iraq. Yet, the most telling indication of how 

difficult it is even at present to gain access to bases for the conduct 

military operations has come with the decision of the Turkish 

 

57 For a specific discussion of the difficulties in accessing bases on foreign soil see Williamson 

Murray, “Thoughts on Sea Basing in the Twenty-First Century,” unpublished paper, Defense 

Science Board Task Force on Sea Basing, February 2003. 

58 The most obvious case occurred during the Yom Kippur War when all of the European nations 

except the Portugese refused to allow U.S. resupply aircraft to utilize bases on their soil. Similarly 

during the 1986 raid on Libya, the French and Spanish refused to allow F-111s, flying out of bases 

in the United Kingdom, to use their airspace. The resulting lengthy flight around both nations 

placed great strain on the crews and impacted on the operational success of the mission, although 

the strategic results -- improved Libyan behavior—more than justified the mission. 

59 See among others David A. Shiapak, John Stillion, Olger Oliker, and Tanya Charlik-Paley, A 

Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica, 2002), pp. 6-9. 
 

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parliament earlier this year to turn down $6 billion in foreign aid and 

even larger amounts in loan guarantees from the United States in 

return for allowing the 4th Infantry Division to move across its 

territory in order to attack Iraq from the north. As a result, the 

United States has found itself without the ability to conduct major 

operations against northern Iraq at the outbreak of war against 

Saddam Hussein’s regime, while the 4th Infantry Division’s 

equipment was quite literally at sea and its troops in Texas. 

But it is not just a matter of America’s allies being unwilling to 

allow U.S. military forces to utilize the bases on their soil. The 

strategic reality is that even before the Cold War ended, U.S. forces 

had begun to come home. This process has only accelerated since 

1990. In effect for the first time since the early 1940s the United States 

directly confronts the problem of projecting its military power across 

two great oceans – with all the logistical and geographical 

implications that that strategic reality implies. 

This does not necessarily mean that in the future the United States 

will possess no land bases on territories beyond North America. 

Rather, it suggests that the number of those bases will be fewer and 

less able to support substantial deployments of U.S. air and ground 

forces in crisis situations. Moreover, the base infrastructure will be 

less able to support major deployments through to other areas of the 

world. Finally, the most likely places where the United States will 

continue to maintain bases, such as Europe – and perhaps Northeast 

Asia after North Korea implodes – are the least likely to require U.S. 

military support. On the other hand, those places most likely to 

require U.S. deployments – the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and 

South Asia -- to execute large-scale contingencies are the least likely 

to have either the bases or infrastructure to support U.S. military 

forces. 

Exacerbating the difficulties involved in accessing land bases is 

the fact that such bases are becoming increasingly vulnerable to 

relatively precise cruise and ballistic missiles, not to mention enemy 

special forces, guerrillas, and terrorists. The National Defense Panel 

commented on these growing threats to land-bases abroad in the 

following terms: 
 

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Even if we retain the necessary bases and port infrastructure to 

support forward deployed forces, they will be vulnerable to strikes 

that could reduce or neutralize their utility. Precision strikes, 

weapons of mass destruction, and cruise and ballistic missiles all 

represent threats to our forward presence, particularly as stand-off 

ranges increase. So, too, do they threaten access to strategic 

geographic areas [of importance to the United States].60 

It is not that sea basing is a more efficient or less costly alternative 

to land basing. In some cases land bases will be more attractive and 

useful; in others they will compliment the use of sea based forces. 

However, for the most part, sea basing will likely prove more 

politically and operationally useful in the emerging strategic 

environment than land bases. Moreover, sea basing may be the only 

possible avenue of approach to defend national interests and to attack 

and defeat the enemies of the United States. The importance of the 

seabase to the initial operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 

regime in Afghanistan, when access to land bases was either not 

available or required an extensive buildup, is a clear indication of the 

importance of sea basing to the projection of U.S. military forces in 

the coming decades of the twenty-first century.61

This paper aims to examine several aspects of sea basing: its 

historical utilization, the difficulties that amphibious operations have 

confronted, and how one might think about the utilization of future 

potential capabilities of sea basing to defend the interests of the 

United States. The past is important because it is the only way 

through which one can understand the operational challenges. The 

present offers up capabilities that will not only be available decades 

into the future, but which can support and extend the operational 

possibilities open to future forces. And finally, the United States 

needs to develop certain potential operational capabilities to extend 

 

60 National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century 

(Washington, DC, 1997), p. 12. 

61 In terms of the Middle East and bases in that region, one could wonder at the end of 1992, since 

the Saudis were unwilling to allow U.S. aircraft to bomb non-Arab Afghanistan, how likely would 

they be to allow U.S. access to bases when the target was a fellow Arab nation. We now have the 

clearest possible answer in terms of recent American military operations against Saddam 

Hussein’s regime. 
 

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present capabilities in significant ways against opponents, who also 

are evolving new and challenging options to defend themselves. 

To end this introductory section, one might usefully define exactly 

what sea basing is as a concept. This definition is not meant to be 

restrictive, but rather to suggest how the Joint community and the 

Services might best think about a future, in which the United States 

will rely on the sea to a significantly greater degree than it has over 

the past half century for the projection of its military forces against 

the nation’s enemies: 

Sea basing: The capacity and/or capability to project sustainable 

military power ashore from the sea. The operational and 

technological capabilities on which sea basing rests must be flexible 

and adaptable to a wide range of contingencies and capable of 

meeting and overcoming an increasing number of threats. Sea 

basing is inherently Joint: it must include the integration of new ISR 

capabilities as well as precision fires to enable ground forces to 

destroy an opponent’s will. The ability of sea basing to project U.S. 

power ashore can be substantially extended by military force based 

on land, but in the emerging strategic environment, it must be 

capable, with minimum support from land-based forces, to defeat 

enemies who possess substantial anti-access capabilities.62

THE PAST

As island nations, both Great Britain and the United States have 

relied on the sea to project their power and influence onto the 

continents of the world.63 The great world-wide empire the British 

assembled in the eighteenth century rested on the Royal Navy’s 

ability not only to control the world’s oceans, but to project and 

 

62 The above definition is the result of extensive conversation and debate that took place among the 

members of the Defense Science Board’s task force on what exactly constitutes a seabase in the 

present as well as the future. Included in these discussions were active members of the U.S. 

military as well as the members of the task force. 

63 In the context of defending its global national interests, the United States is to all intents and 

purposes an island nation that confronts great oceans lying between itself and potential opponents. 

That has conferred a great strategic advantage on it, in that it has been relatively invulnerable to 

attack by its opponents. Nevertheless, at the same time it has confronted the intractable problems 

involved in projecting its military power across great oceanic distances, a problem which with the 

return of U.S. military forces to the continental United states has resurrected the problem to a level 

of the challenge that the United States confronted in 1941. 
 

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support land forces at crucial strategic locations. In 1756, the Royal 

Navy landed and supported Major General John Wolfe’s 

expeditionary force at Quebec City; the ensuing battle on the Plains of 

Abraham won the British control of Lower Canada. In the spring of 

the following year, the arrival of a Royal Navy squadron provided 

the reinforcements and supplies that destroyed the French position in 

Upper Canada and ended forever the French threat to the American 

colonies.64 

At the same time these events were playing out in North America, 

British sepoy troops, supported by the sea control provided by the 

Royal Navy, broke French power in India. On that naval power and 

its ability to project and support ground forces ashore, the British 

achieved a dominant position in the world – one which has continued 

to reverberate down to the twenty-first century. Today, the world’s 

language of choice is English rather than French, a direct result of 

those victories won by Britain’s naval and ground forces in the 

middle of the eighteenth century.65

In the wars against the military forces of the French Revolution 

and Napoleon’s Empire, the projection of military force onto the 

European continent proved more difficult than campaigns against the 

French colonial empire. Before 1789 the British had been able to 

wage war against France’s colonies because their allies had contained 

French military power on the continent. After 1789 that was no 

longer the case, as French armies destroyed one coalition after 

another. The British did launch a number of raids against the French 

revolutionaries and Napoleonic France. However, those raids largely 

floundered on their inability to move with dispatch, once ground 

forces had come ashore. Invariably, the French reinforced threatened 

areas sufficiently quickly to contain the landing before British troops 

 

64 For a brilliant depiction of the war between the British (with some considerable help from the 

American colonists) and the French for the control of North America see Fred Anderson, Crucible 

of War, The Seven Year’s War and the Fate of Empire in British North America , 1754-1766 (New 

York, 2000). 

65 A fact which the French have not forgotten. 
 

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could do great damage.66 It was not until the British found a secure 

base in Portugal, from which their small professional army under the 

Duke of Wellington could support a massive guerrilla uprising in 

Spain, that they had a significant and direct impact on the course of 

the general European war.67 

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE WORLD WARS

For the century of peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars, the 

British found that the combination of superior technology and the 

ability to project relatively small, but well-trained forces from the sea 

allowed them to control a global empire without a prohibitively 

expensive defense budget. Their technological superiority over 

native forces in their colonial empire was simply too great for the 

locals to have much chance on the battlefield, as the Zulus found out 

in the 1880s. All that changed in 1914, when the British committed 

their army to the war on the European continent against the great 

conscript armies of Imperial Germany. That small, professional army 

had a disproportionate impact on the fighting in 1914, particularly in 

the Flanders battles in the fall, where the British Expeditionary Force 

slaughtered a German corps—largely drawn from the Reich’s 

university student—and probably saved France from defeat in the 

war.68 But when it was over, there were hardly any survivors from 

 

66 The Walerchen campaign of 1809, during which the British landed a force of approximately 

40,000 men, escorted by thirty-five ships of the line, on the Scheldt Estuary in an attempt to seize 

Antwerp, failed because British commanders failed to act quickly enough to encourage the Dutch 

to revolt against French rule despite their considerable unhappiness with the rapacity of the 

Napoleonic system. The landing force moldered in low ground, where a substantial number of 

British soldiers fell victim to disease. 

67 In fairness to the British, their naval blockade of France and its allies had a significant impact on 

the French economy, while their financial support was crucial to the support of the great coalitions 

that the European powers put together against the French Revolution and Napoleon. For the 

clearest account of the course of the Napoleonic Wars and the British contribution to the allied 

cause see David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London, 1966). For the impact that the 

Industrial Revolution had on these wars—in effect as important a revolutionary event in its 

military implications as the French Revolution—in providing the financial basis for Allied victory 

in the Napoleonic Wars see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of Military 

Revolution, 1300-2050 (Cambridge, 2001), chpt. 1. 

68 So intense and accurate was the aimed rifle fire of the British professionals that the Germans 

thought that the BEF was equipped with a far larger number of machine guns than was actually the 

case. 
 

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the initial force of “old contemptibles” who had landed in France that 

August .69

In 1915, the British launched their ill-fated attack on the Gallipoli 

Peninsula in an attempt to open up the sea lines of communications 

(slocs) to Czarist Russia. Here their failure to develop complex 

amphibious techniques and inter-service cooperation (joint) over the 

course of the nineteenth century resulted in the failure of a brilliant 

strategic idea, because of flawed execution at the tactical and 

operational levels.70 The British made two major landings, the first in 

April 1915 and the second in August. Each gained some measure of 

tactical surprise.71 But each failed, when British and Anzac 

(Australian and New Zealand) troops failed to take advantage of 

tactical surprise, because of a focus on building up follow-on forces 

and creating sufficient logistical support on land to meet Turkish 

attacks.72 

Despite their weaknesses, the Turks under the inspired military 

leadership and generalship of their future modernizer, Mustafa 

Kemal, responded quickly enough to prevent the British from gaining 

a clear operational success. The inevitable result, given the 

technological sophistication of weapons and the primitive state of 

tactical conceptions, was deadlock. By denying British and Anzac 

troops the high ground, the Turks prevented the British fleet from 

breaking through into the Sea of Mamara and attacking 

 

69 One of the foremost soldiers in the British Army has entitled his account of the fighting in 1914 

The Death of an Army. See Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Death of an Army (New York, 1968). 

70 Winston S. Churchill, Britain’s great war leader in the Second World War, found his reputation 

tarnished by the failure at Gallipoli for the next thirty-five years, although as one of his most 

recent biographers has pointed out, he had virtually no control over the operational planning and 

execution of the operation. See Geoffrey Best, Churchill, A Study in Greatness (London, 2001). 

71 The first landing did not gain any strategic surprise, because the Turks knew that the British were 

coming, but not where. In the end the Turks and their German advisers guessed wrong, but the 

British failed to take advantage of the situation. For the most recent study of Gallipoli see 

Timothy Travers, Gallipoli (London, 2002); see also Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (London, 1956). 

72 There was, it is worth noting, an extraordinary amount of military incompetence, but the point here 

is that the pattern of the amphibious operation would be repeated in a considerable number of 

cases throughout the twentieth-century, at least in those cases where the enemy could bring 

significant reinforcements to bear on the fighting. 
 

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Constantinople – which might well have resulted in Turkish 

collapse.73

The pattern of Gallipoli is worth paying particular attention to, 

because it suggests the difficulties involved in past amphibious 

operations in achieving a success against an opponent who could 

reinforce his defending forces as quickly, if not more quickly, than 

the landing force. In describing the problem involved in amphibious 

operations against defended coasts, one should refer to Figures 1 and 

2 below.74

The difficulty that the British encountered in the two amphibious 

attacks they made at Gallipoli was that their first wave in most cases 

gained a successful lodgement and a considerable measure of 

surprise, but the ensuing phase, during which British and Anzac 

forces were building up sufficient forces and supplies to push inland, 

also allowed the Turks to respond. Turkish reinforcements for the 

threatened sector arrived with sufficient dispatch to create defensive 

that contained attacking troops and defeated British efforts to seize 

the high ground, on which victory at the Dardanelles depended.75 In 

effect, a combination of exhaustion in achieving the initial lodgment, 

losses in achieving that beachhead, and failures in leadership allowed 

the Turks the time to build up enough combat power to stop any 

British exploitation that could have led to Allied operational success. 

 

73 This is, of course a contentious point, but the present state of the evidence does indicate that the 

Turks were on the brink of abandoning Constantinople, when it looked like the British were on the 

brink of success in March and April of 1915. 

74 I am indebted to Major General Robert Scales, U.S. Army retired, for the conception and design of 

the depiction in Figure 1. 

75 The British also ran into one of the greatest military and political geniuses of the twentieth century, 

Mustafa Kamal, the father of modern Turkey – the only Islamic nation to adapt successfully to the 

challenges posed by the West over the past two centuries. 
 

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143

Time

Combat Power

Follow-On Forces

(exploitation phase)

Initial Landing Force

Vulnerability Gap

Combat Losses

Figure 1: Expeditionary Operations Profile 

Time

Combat Power

Follow-On Forces

Initial Landing 

Force

Enemy Response

Gap

Attrition

Re-supply, second wave forces

Figure 2: The Vulnerability Gap Results from a Net Force Deficit 
 

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This same pattern came close to being repeated in the Pacific in 

the first American operations during the Second World War. In the 

Guadalcanal campaign, the Marine landing force was sufficiently 

strong to seize the airfield and create the basis for a successful 

lodgement.76 Thereafter for a considerable period of time, the 

Marines had to remain on the defensive around Henderson Field due 

to the difficulties involved in building up their fighting and logistical 

base. Fortunately for them, the Japanese initially underestimated the 

threat and only sent a reinforced regiment to confront what was in 

fact a divisional sized force. By the time the Japanese high command 

woke up, it was too late. American air and naval strength was 

sufficient—just—to place severe constraints on Japanese abilities to 

reinforce their forces on Guadalcanal. But it had been a terribly close 

call. Had the Japanese acted with dispatch, they could have thrown 

sufficient forces on the island to destroy the 1st Marine Division. 

For the rest of the Pacific campaign, U.S. landing forces only had 

to confront outnumbered Japanese garrisons on the islands of the 

Central Pacific. American air and maritime superiority was such that 

the Japanese had virtually no chance of reinforcing their hard pressed 

forces.77 It was a very different case in Europe, where Allied 

amphibious attacks occurred against a continental enemy in a 

position to reinforce his defending forces. At Salerno in September 

1943, the Germans not only had strong defenses along the beaches, 

but substantial reinforcements inland. British and American landing 

forces established the beachheads relatively quickly, but soon ran into 

the problems posed by building up and supplying sufficient forces to 

move inland. The British held their bridgehead without difficulty, 

but the Germans came perilously close to driving the Americans into 

the sea. For a time the joint and combined commander, General 

Mark Clark, considered pulling the U.S. 36th Infantry Division off the 

beach, but reconsidered after a major German counterattack ran out 

 

76 For the most thorough analysis of the Guadalcanal campaign and the accompanying fighting that 

took place in the waters surrounding the island, see Richard R. Frank, Guadalcanal, The Definitive 

Account of the Landmark Battle (New York, 1990). 

77 They were able to reinforce the defenders of Luzon in the Philippines in 1944, but that was only 

due to the close proximity of the other islands, which somewhat mitigated American maritime and 

air superiority. 
 

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145

of steam – partially as the result of running into a cul de sac, where 

concentrated American artillery fire butchered the attackers.78

Five months later a combined Anglo-American amphibious force 

hit the beaches at Anzio.79 It caught the Germans completely by 

surprise – so much so that the only Wehrmacht troops in the area 

were four drunken officers, who drove their Volkswagen into a 

landing craft. The invasion commander, however, driven largely by 

his fears that the Germans would launch a counterattack, chose to 

build up his forces before moving inland. The Germans, acting with 

speed and ruthlessness, prevented any immediate Allied exploitation 

of the landing. They then launched a series of ferocious 

counterattacks that came close to driving the Allies into the sea. As 

Churchill so aptly described the results, “instead of hurling a wild cat 

on to the shore all we got was a stranded whale and Sulva Bay [the 

second landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula] all over again.”80

In the Normandy landings in June 1944, the Allies confronted the 

same problem—how to cover that gap between the initial impetus of 

the landing and the point where the invading forces possessed 

sufficient strength to defeat the enemy’s main forces. Here the Allies 

made a number of crucial moves to cover the initial weaknesses of 

the buildup phase. Beginning on 1 April 1944, they launched a 

massive air campaign that included the entire strategic as well as the 

tactical air forces of both nations and aimed at destroying the 

Wehrmacht’s ability to reinforce Normandy.81 That air campaign 

was one of the most successful of the Second World War—virtually 

shutting down the transportation network of northern France (road 

as well as rail) by 5 June 1944.82 In addition, the Allies dropped three 

 

78 For a discussion of the Salerno landings see Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, A War To Be 

Won, Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, 2000), pp 379-381. 

79 Ibid., p. 380. 

80 Quoted in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, vol. 7, The Road to Victory, 1941-1945 (Boston, 

1986), p. 69. 

81 For a discussion of the arguments that led up to that decision as well as the impact of the campaign 

against the German transportation network in Northern France, see Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe

(Baltimore, MD, 1985), pp. 249-257. 

82 A report by the German railroad authorities in France reported as follows in early June 1944 as to 

the condition of the rail system in the period immediately before the Allied landing: “In [France 
 

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airborne divisions to cover their flanks and distract the Germans as to 

what was actually happening. 

The result of these measures was that the Allies largely prevented 

the Germans from bringing to bear sufficient forces to threaten the 

initial lodgements. Even at OMAHA beach, where well-sited and 

undamaged German defensive positions came close to stopping the 

landing, the Americans gained sufficient space for follow on forces 

and supplies to come in. The bridgeheads were thus deep enough to 

facilitate their expansion on succeeding days of the campaign83. On 

the other hand, of the German forces, only the 21st Panzer Division, 

located close to the British invasion beaches, was able to launch a 

counterattack late on the first day – one that failed dismally. The first 

major reinforcements, the murderous juveniles of the Waffen SS

Hitlerjügend Division, began arriving early in the morning hours of 7 

June, and German reinforcements came up on the invasion areas, 

thereafter, in higgledy piggledy fashion throughout the rest of June.84 

Nevertheless, the Germans were still able to contain the Allied 

bridgehead for all of June and July and prevent the Allies from 

turning the battle into a mobile contest until early August, when the 

dam finally broke. 

 

and Belgium], the systematic destruction that has been carried out since March of all the important 

junctions of the entire network – not just the main lines – has most seriously crippled the whole 

transport system.... As a result,... it is only by exerting the greatest efforts that purely military 

traffic and goods essential to the war effort... can be kept moving.... the rail network is completely 

wrecked.” Ibid., p. 256. In effect the Allied air forces created a logistical desert – one that 

ironically, besides giving the Germans enormous difficulties in reinforcing the Normandy Battle, 

had a serious impact on Allied military forces once they reached the German frontier in September 

1944. 

83 For a discussion of the reasons lying behind the near defeat at Omaha Beach see Williamson 

Murray, “The Needless D-Day Slaughter,” Military History Quarterly, Spring 2003. 

84 For example the SS Division Das Reich, at the time of the invasion located in southern France at 

Limoges, took over two weeks to arrive in Normandy instead of the expected two to three days 

that German plans had called for. 
 

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147

These historical examples suggest a number of important 

constraints that any enlarged sea basing concept for projecting 

military power at the operational level must address. Sea basing has 

consistently allowed attacking military forces to pick the time and the 

place of where their amphibious forces will come ashore.85 But no 

matter how successful the initial landing may have been, the pattern 

has remained consistent. Invariably attacking forces have confronted 

a period immediately after the landing, where the lassitude induced 

by success and the difficulties involved in building up supplies and 

follow-on-forces for exploitation of the initial success have invariably 

resulted in a lull in forward movement.86 

In cases such as the Central Pacific, where the enemy could not 

reinforce his forces, such dead periods had little effect. At Gallipoli in 

1915, however, the Turks had time to seal off the bridgehead and 

deny British forces the high ground, which would have allowed them 

to open up the Dardanelles and seize Constantinople. In Europe 

during the Second World War, amphibious operations at both 

Salerno and Anzio came dangerously close to failure during the dead 

period after the first wave had come ashore. Even at Normandy, 

where the Omaha Beach landings barely managed to achieve a 

lodgement, the 1st Infantry and 29th Divisions remained in a perilous 

position for the first twenty-four hours after they had captured 

heights overlooking the beaches.87 

 

85 As pointed out earlier in this article, even at Gallipoli the British gained a sufficient measure of 

tactical and strategic surprise over their Turkish opponent—not once but twice! 

86 The lassitude was sufficient to prevent the British forces from moving forward to seize Caen, even 

though they had a relatively open road to the Norman City. Their failure to move on Caen, which 

they were supposed to seize by the end of the first day, resulted in the Germans holding that 

crucial road and communications center for the next month and a half. 

87 The near disaster at Normandy was largely the result of General Omar Bradley’s general 

disinterest in naval gunfire support despite the direct evidence from Salerno and the Pacific of its 

importance to the success of landing operations, particularly in attacking fortified beach defenses. 

The Army and Marine assault on Kwajalein in the Pacific three months before Normandy had 

received the support of seven battleships; Omaha Beach had only one battleship supporting the 

landing. The British landings received one-and-a-half-hour’s preparatory bombardment from 

supporting ships; Omaha Beach only twenty minutes. As one observer reported, Bradley’s 

attitude toward the lessons of the Pacific could be summed up as “what do we have to learn from a 

bush-league theater.” For an examination of Bradley’s responsibility for the most costly 
 

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THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

British amphibious operations to retake the Falklands in the early 

1980s from General Galtieri’s fascist regime suggests a number of 

interesting points about how one might think about the problem of 

amphibious operations in the twenty-first century.88 Admittedly 

there are considerable differences between the amphibious 

capabilities the British possessed at the time and the capabilities 

American forces possess at present and are likely to possess in the 

future. But it is the pattern of amphibious and logistical operations 

that the context of the Falkland’s war forced the British to follow – 

namely that they had to project everything from the sea in terms of 

combat power. Those lessons the American military should ponder. 

To begin with, much of the British military establishment—not to 

mention those in the civilian bureaucracy and the politicians—had 

concluded Britain no longer needed amphibious capabilities, given 

their nation’s strategic commitments to Europe and the central 

front.89 Thus, the British movements that initiated the reply to the 

Argentinean seizure of the Falklands involved throwing a lot of kit, 

Royal Marines, soldiers, and assorted supplies on ships heading 

south. The inchoate initial response, then forced the British to halt at 

an interim seaborne base B the Ascension Islands – and resort ship 

loadings and troops in preparation to making an opposed landing in 

the Falklands. That effort also allowed them to bring into the airfield 

at Ascension many of the initial supplies and pieces of equipment 

forgotten in the rush south. The intensive diplomatic maneuvering 

occurring in the immediate aftermath of the Argentinean invasion 

provided the time for resorting and reloading. 

 

amphibious operation launched by U.S. forces during the Second World War (nearly double the 

casualties suffered by the U.S. Marines at Tarawa) see Murray, “The Needless D-Day Slaughter.” 

88 The best book on the Falkland Island’s campaign remains Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The 

Battle for the Falklands (London, 1983). For an outstanding examination of the logistical 

difficulties the British confronted and how they solved them see Michael Clapp and Ewen 

Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, The Battle of San Carlos Water (London, 

1997). 

89 In fact, if the Argentinians had waited another year to launch their invasion of the Falklands, the 

British would not have been able to reply. In April 1982 the British government was on the brink 

of selling its light carriers to the Indians and the Australians, doing away entirely with the Royal 

Marines, and breaking up the few amphibious ships that it still possessed. 
 

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149

As with amphibious operation in World War II and Korea, the 

British gained a considerable measure of surprise, as to the location of 

the landing and its timing. Thus, the initial assault in San Carlos Bay 

met virtually no opposition on land and only a light response from 

Argentinean aircraft. Despite that success, the British ran into the 

same lull required to build up forces, supplies, and fire power that 

had marked so many past amphibious operations. On the second 

day the Argentineans launched a series of ferocious and all too 

effective air attacks on British shipping in San Carlos waters.90 It took 

the British almost a week to overcome the dead period before 

paratroopers struck against Argentinean forces at the Goose Green 

settlement; that attack was followed almost immediately by a march 

under hideous early winter conditions across East Falkland Island for 

the attack on the main Argentinean positions at Port Stanley. The fact 

that British artillery was almost out of ammunition, when the 

Argentineans surrendered, suggests how close the eventual margin 

of victory. 

Meanwhile the British had shipped an addition brigade sized 

force south to help in the final portion of the campaign in the QE2 

(Queen Elizabeth 2). The Gurkas and the Guards battalions of that 

brigade transhipped into other shipping at the South Georgia Islands, 

where due to both the lack of facilities and foresight, much valuable 

equipment remained behind. The price paid by the ill-prepared 

brigade turned out to be excessively heavy, when attacking 

Argentinean Skyhawks and Mirages severely damaged two British 

amphibious ships with large numbers of troops still on board. In the 

end, the reinforcing brigade was probably not needed: Royal Marine 

Commandos and paratroopers had proven sufficient to overcome an 

Argentinean military force that was badly led, badly trained, and 

largely unprepared to handle the ferocious weather conditions of the 

Falklands. 

 

90 The British were considerably aided by the fact that the Argentineans confined their attacks almost 

exclusively to the Royal Navy’s warships rather than to the supply and personnel ships and by the 

fact that many of the bombs that the Argentinean aircraft carried had been improperly fused and so 

failed to explode. 
 

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British operations in the Falklands suggest a number of 

interesting points about amphibious operations. First, an interim 

land base (probably somewhere on the world’s oceans) will be of 

critical importance in sorting through the logistical and support 

problems that confront attacking forces. Second, surprise in terms of 

the location and timing of the attack will probably be achievable, 

except against all but the most sophisticated opponents. Third, forces 

attacking from the sea must use that initial period of surprise, not 

only to execute the build-up, but to launch significant military 

operations to break the enemy’s cohesion. In other words, the dead 

period, marking the Falklands and earlier amphibious operations is 

no longer acceptable, given the technological sophistication future 

opponents will likely possess. 

If the enemy is not immediately rocked back on his heels by 

military operations, he could attack the amphibious forces at sea and 

ashore with cruise and ballistic missiles that would be far more 

accurate and lethal than the Mirages and Skyhawks the Argentineans 

possessed. Fourth, transfer and movement of follow-on forces 

through the seabase to support continuing military operations may 

need an interim land base or island base. Nevertheless whether they 

occur from land or at sea they must occur in a faster and more 

seamless fashion than the reinforcing brigade that eventually arrived 

in the last stages of the Falkland’s campaign. 

THINKING ABOUT SEA-BASED OPERATIONS

IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

As with all things dealing with military operations, the context – 

political, strategic, operational, and tactical – is what will be crucial in 

determining who wins and who loses in the future. In the twentyfirst century, the United States will confront a number of challenges – 

some great, most small – requiring the projection of its military 

power. At present it relies on a combination of power projected from 

the sea, from land bases in the vicinity of the crisis, and from the 

continental United States. As suggested above, the political and 

strategic realities suggest that the second of those options, land bases, 

will become increasingly doubtful as a means for the United States to 

project military forces in pursuit of national objectives. With a 
 

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151

refocusing of priorities, the United States Air Force could be in the 

position to project significantly greater military power from bases in 

North America against America’s enemies for much of the remainder 

of the twenty-first century.91

What then will the United States require in terms of sea basing to 

meld with distant attack from North America. In a number of 

smaller contingencies, ranging from situations similar to the 

Bangladesh typhoon relief effort to intervention in Somalia, the 

United States will need forces that resemble the Marine expeditionary 

units that have done such yeoman service in the recent past. 

Admittedly, those capabilities, deeply embedded in the cultures of 

the Marine Corps and the Navy, will require new weapons of greater 

range, lethality, and precision. Clearly ISR, utilizing space-based 

sensors and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), will enable greater 

understanding of the enemy and his intentions. Given the increasing 

devolution of advanced capabilities from first world to second and 

third worlds, present amphibious forces and their descendants will 

require the ability to reinforce Marine expeditionary units more 

rapidly and seamlessly to achieve a more robust and sustainable 

force. The return to the concept of Marine expeditionary brigades 

undoubtedly represents recognition of this need, for the Marines will 

need the capabilities to begin operations against a prepared enemy 

with more than a Marine expeditionary unit. 

More robust and effective opponents will require substantial 

additions, changes, and new concepts of operations and logistics to 

the framework of sea based forces. To begin with, the conduct of 

operations against a major regional competitor will require island 

bases, from which the U.S. logistical system can function with greater 

efficiency, not only during buildup, but the operational phases. At 

present, the United States utilizes bases at two locations, Guam and 

Diego Garcia, which would seem ideal for such a role.92 A major 

basing facility on the northwest coast of Australia—a region far from 

 

91 On the need for a substantial buildup in the U.S. strategic bomber force beyond what the USAF 

has been recommending over the past decade see Williamson Murray, “The United States Should 

Begin Work on a New Bomber Now,” Policy Analysis, The CATO Institute, 16 March 2000. 

92 I am indebted to Admiral Dennis Blair, USN retired for this point. 
 

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the most populated regions of that continent—could provide the 

jumping off spot to deal with troubles in southeast Asia. 

Such oceanic bases will require a greater infrastructure than 

presently available. With a major buildup in infrastructure, these 

bases would provide the key logistical center through which 

reinforcing units, supplies, and equipment would arrive from North 

American bases. Those three great bases would represent the 

equivalent of the Ascension Islands in the Falklands Island campaign. 

Moreover, the United States could place a portion of its prepositioned 

assets at each of the three bases. The investment to allow for 

operational maneuver from the sea would be considerable; those 

investments need tailoring to provide the investments in air and sea 

lift to support the rapid deployment of forces from North America. 

Looking at possible military operations in the future, say 2025, the 

seabase, reinforced from and with slocs reaching back to Diego 

Garcia, Australia, or Guam—depending on the contingency—would 

form up off an enemy’s coast. At that future date, it would still 

consist of a number of platforms built in the first decade of the 

twenty-first century, and in some cases earlier.93 The overall combat 

projection capabilities of the force would, however, enable U.S. forces 

to reach deeper into enemy territory from further off shore, not only 

with air strikes, but ground forces as well. Clouds of relatively 

cheap, but combat effective UAVs, supported by space-based assets, 

would provide commanders an improved sense of the enemy’s 

movements and in some cases intentions.94 But no matter how great 

the advances in technology, much of the enemy’s intentions and 

plans will remain opaque, even after the beginning of operations. 

 

93 For example a number of Nimitz class carriers will still represent an integral portion of the Navy’s 

warships capable of projecting air power from the sea. 

94 Nevertheless, whatever the improvements in technology over the next two decades, U.S. forces 

will never gain the ability to predict the enemy’s intentions, nor will they ever entirely remove the 

uncertainty and ambiguities that have always characterized the nature of combat. For why this 

will remain so see particularly Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Future and Future War

(Washington, DC, 1996). 
 

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153

The largest difference with current amphibious operations will 

rest on the ability of the seabase and its various components to 

provide an off shore footprint of what has traditionally become the 

on shore footprint. In other words, many of the key functions that 

now command and support Marine forces fighting on shore will find 

themselves remaining at sea. Such portions of the seabase will 

include, but not exclusively, substantial portions of the logistic 

infrastructure, much of the Marine air wing and its support structure, 

intelligence functions, as well as those who manage and control 

UAVs and sensors. 

Perhaps even more important than a deeper reach from farther off 

shore and a smaller footprint on shore is that the seabase must serve 

as something more than the framework for projecting a Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) 

ashore. In particular, in major regional contingencies, the seabase 

must serve as the interim stopping point for follow on heavier Army 

forces. Those forces will move through the seabase, or even form 

part of the seabase before operations begin. At times Army forces 

would immediately follow in the wake of the first insertions of 

Marines by air deep into enemy territory. In some cases, insertion 

would also come across beaches, where air strikes and special 

operations forces have eliminated enemy defenses. At other times, 

the sea-based equivalent of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) 

would operate with the first strikes of the Marines to immobilize and 

paralyze the enemy’s sense for what is happening. In addition, Army 

airborne forces, perhaps flying directly into the theater of operations 

from North America, could seize airfields for later deployments. 

Once a path was open, Marine units, followed by heavy Army 

units, could open up corridors and avenues of approach into the 

interior. The initial efforts might also aim to gain a port into which 

the Army could bring heavy armor and from which it could begin 

rapid exploitation. Nevertheless, given the missile threat such a port 

would serve largely as an entry and disembarkation point; there 

would be no intention to build up large supply dumps of a logistical 

infrastructure the enemy could attack. Here, the Army of the future 

must have the potential to disembark forces with a speed that it can 
 

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not at present match. Not until U.S. ground and air operations had 

substantially eliminated the missile threat would airfields and ports 

begin to receive a portion of the logistic infrastructure from the sea. 

At that point, supplies could begin moving directly from the United 

States to ports. 

The crucial enabler for sea basing capabilities that could support 

both the projection of Marine and Army ground forces from the sea 

onto enemy territory and their sustainment in an extended campaign 

would depend on a radical improvement of America’s logistical 

capabilities. If there is to be a true revolution in military affairs 

involving U.S. military forces in the coming decades, it must come in 

the field of logistics and the ships and aircraft that support that 

logistic effort. The possibility exists that technology will offer the 

American military quad-tilt rotor aircraft or even hybrid aircraft – 

with their helium lift capable of landing anywhere on land as well as 

on the sea.95 Such logistic enablers could go a long way to improving 

the ability of the seabase to move logistical support ashore to support 

the ground forces in combat. 

With faster ships able to shuttle between the interim bases (Guam, 

Diego Garcia, and perhaps northwestern Australia) and the seabase, 

the possibility will exist for rapid movement of supplies, 

ammunition, and other requirements in a faster fashion that true 

today. But for such a logistic system to work sufficiently effectively 

to make the seabase and its power projection capabilities a reality, the 

Navy and the Department of Defense need to solve a number of 

intractable problems: selective cargo off loads, transfer and 

movement of cargo in stormy seas, the ability to integrate in-coming 

cargo with what already exists on the seabase, and the creation of 

logistical standards and commonality among the Marines, Army, and 

Navy. 

 

95 Chuck Meyers, “Briefing on Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft (HULA) Task,” 25 March 2003, Defense 

science Board Task Force on Sea Basing. 
 

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155

Since the basis of evolving American doctrine points towards 

rapid decisive operations with dispersed, swiftly moving units, the 

basic approach on which sea-based operations will have to rest will 

consist of operational exploitation, intensive tempo, and precise 

firepower: in other words maneuver warfare.96 The firepower to 

support rapidly maneuvering Army and Marine ground forces 

would come from a variety of sources: loitering UAVs, close air 

support aircraft on station, remote artillery fires, and other 

possibilities. 

CONCLUSION

The difficulties with which land basing is already confronting the 

American military in terms of projecting its military forces, 

underlines that the Department of Defense and the Joint world need 

to address in the immediate future how to expand the present 

capabilities of the seabase not only operationally, but in a logistic 

sense as well. The Joint concept of operation should aim at 

integrating Marine and Army capabilities to the extent that 

operations from the sea strike with such tempo and consistent 

application of force that the enemy never has the opportunity to 

recover his balance. Such Joint air, land, and sea efforts from the 

seabase should represent a devastating rapier-like thrust at the 

enemy’s heart. 

There is a larger issue here. Many of the experimental war games, 

played so far within the Department of Defense to examine concepts 

like rapid decisive operations, have emphasized the ability of future 

U.S. forces to destroy enemy units with which they come in contact. 

However lethal the combination of new doctrine and technologies on 

the battlefield may prove, the real aim of such U.S. operations should 

not be favorable exchange ratios, but rather paralyzing the enemy’s 

entire command and control system, not just in a military sense, but 

in a political sense as well. The success of German operations in 

 

96 For the future of ground war see Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., U.S. army retired, Yellow 

Smoke, The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military (Lanham, MD, 2003); and Colonel 

Douglas MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the Twenty-First 

Century (Westport, CT, 1997). 
 

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France in 1940 did not depend on the numbers of French soldiers 

Wehrmacht tactical units were able to kill, wound, or capture, but 

rather the paralysis that German operations were able to induce in 

the minds of French senior commanders. U.S. operations from the 

sea by the third decade of the twenty-first century should have a 

similar aim in mind. 
 

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157

APPENDIX F: SEA STATE

MARINE BEAUFORT SCALE

The Beaufort scale was originally developed in 1805 by Sir Francis 

Beaufort as a system for estimating wind strengths without the use of 

instruments. It is currently still in use for this same purpose as well as 

to tie together various components of weather (wind strength, sea 

state, observable effects) into a unified picture. 

Force Speed Marine Conditions 

 (knots) (mph) 

0 <1 <1 Calm, sea like a mirror. 

 

1 1-3 1-3 Light air, ripples only. 

 

2 4-6 4-7 Light breeze, small wavelets (0.2m). 

 Crests have a glassy appearance. 

 

3 7-10 8-12 Gentle breeze, large wavelets (0.6m), crests 

 begin to break. 

4 11-16 13-18 Moderate breeze, small waves (1m), some white horses. 

 

5 17-21 19-24 Fresh breeze, moderate waves (1.8m), many white horses. 

6 22-27 25-31 Strong breeze, large waves (3m), probably some spray. 

 

7 28-33 32-38 Near gale, mounting sea (4m) with foam blown in 

 streaks downwind. 

8 34-40 39-46 Gale, moderately high waves (5.5m), crests break into 

 spindrift. 

 

9 41-47 47-54 Strong gale, high waves (7m), dense foam, visibility 

 affected. 

 

10 48-55 55-63 Storm, very high waves (9m), heavy sea roll, visibility 

 impaired. Surface generally white. 

 

11 56-63 64-73 Violent storm, exceptionally high waves (11m), visibility 

 poor. 

 

12 64+ 74+ Hurricane, 14m waves, air filled with foam and spray, 

 visibility bad. 

ref: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ol/climate/conversion/beaufortsea.html (National Climatic Data Center, NOAA) 
 

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159
 

SEA STATE___________________________________________________________________ 

160 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

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161
 

SEA STATE___________________________________________________________________ 

162 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

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ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________

 

163
 

SEA STATE___________________________________________________________________ 

164 ___________________________________________________________DSB TASK FORCE

 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX G 

ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

165

APPENDIX G: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND 

ABBREVIATIONS

AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 

ACE Aviation Combat Element 

APOD Air Port of Disembarkation 

ARG Amphibious Ready Group 

ATF Amphibious Task Force 

 

CLF Combat Logistics Force 

CONOPS Concept of Operations 

CONUS Continental United States 

CSG Carrier Strike Group 

CVBG Carrier Battle Group 

 

ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 

 

GCE Ground Combat Element 

GPS Global Positioning System 

 

HULA Hybrid Ultra Large Aircraft 

 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

ITV In-Transit Visibility 

 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JLOTS Joint Logistics Over-The-Shore 
 

GLOSSARY ___________________________________________________________________ 

166 _______________________________________________________________________

JMOB Joint Mobile Offshore Base 

JOA Joint Operations Area 

JTAV Joint Total Asset Visibility 

 

LAV Light Amphibious Vehicle 

LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion 

LCS Littoral Combat Ship 

LCU Landing Craft Utility 

LCU(R) Landing Craft Utility (Redesign) 

LHA Landing Helicopter Amphibious 

LHA(R) Landing Helicopter Amphibious (Redesign) 

LHD Landing Helicopter Dock 

 

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade 

MEU(SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable 

MOB Mobile Offshore Base 

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force 

MPF(F) Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) 

MPG Maritime Prepositioning Group 

MPS Maritime Prepositioning Ship 

 

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations 

NSFR Naval Surface Fire Support 

 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

 

RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration 

 

SPOD Sea Port of Disembarkation 

STOM Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 

SWATH Small Water-Plane Area Twin-Hall 

 
 

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ON SEA BASING ___________________________________________________________ 

 

167

TEU Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit 

TSV/HSV Theater/High Speed Vessel 

 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

 

VTOL Vertical Take-off and Landing 

 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

 

 
 

GLOSSARY ___________________________________________________________________ 

168 _______________________________________________________________________