THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER

IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

Norman Cigar

April 2010

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ISBN 1-58487-434-1
iii

FOREWORD

Pressure for the future spread of nuclear power for 

both peaceful and military purposes has been recently 

noticeable expecially in the Middle East. Virtually all 

countries in the region have expressed an interest in 

utilizing at least some aspect of atomic power, and 

in this monograph Dr. Norman Cigar examines the 

status of such thinking in post-Saddam Iraq. Public 

discussions in Iraq are surprisingly free, and one can 

find a willingness to express a range of views, even 

on a sensitive topic such as nuclear power, that would 

have been unthinkable a few years ago. 

Dr. Cigar has sampled opinions from all key sectors 

in Iraq—government officials, politicians, religious 

figures, scientists, academics, and news media 

pundits—largely the informed public, or those who 

are likely to have influence on future decisions in this 

arena. Dr. Cigar highlights the consensus for the 

rebuilding of a nuclear establishment at least for 

peaceful purposes, but also the divergent views in 

the country on the utility of nuclear weapons, and 

the fragmented and evolving political environment in 

which such decisions will be made. He also evaluates 

the concrete steps being taken by the new Iraqi 

government to play a role in the peaceful nuclear 

sector and the very real obstacles which it will have 

to overcome. Dr. Cigar highlights the difficulty of 

isolating Iraq from regional trends and the need to 

manage and control the process through international 

and bilateral safeguards, requiring some U.S. policy 

decisions. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this study as a contribution to identifying and analyzing this significant emerging policy issue, hoping it 

will be of relevance and interest to military and civilian 
iv

analysts, planners, scientists, and national and allied 

policymakers. It is also anticipated that the results of 

this analysis will provide a useful data baseline to help 

policymakers in their efforts to control proliferation 

and minimize the risk of nuclear accidents in order to 

ensure a safe Middle East.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

NORMAN CIGAR is a Research Fellow at the Marine 

Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. Before retiring, 

he taught military theory, strategy, and policy, 

operational case studies, nuclear war theory, and 

regional studies at the Marine Corps Command and 

Staff College and the School of Advanced Warfighting. 

Previous assignments include service as a senior 

political-military analyst in the Pentagon, where he 

was responsible for the Middle East in the Office of 

the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. During the Gulf War, he was the Army’s senior politicalmilitary intelligence staff officer on the Desert Shield/

Desert Storm Task Force. Dr. Cigar is the author of 

Why Did Iraq Want Nuclear Weapons? Perspectives 

of a Would-be Nuclear Power (forthcoming) and of 

Iraq’s Vision of the Nuclear Battlefield. He has written 

numerous works on politics and security issues dealing 

with the Middle East and the Balkans, and has been 

a consultant at the International Criminal Tribunal 

for the former Yugoslavia at the Hague. Dr. Cigar 

was also a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Conflict 

Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University. He 

has studied and traveled widely in the Middle East. 

Dr. Cigar holds a D. Phil. from Oxford (St. Antony’s 

College) in Middle East History and Arabic; an M.I.A. 

from the School of International and Public Affairs and 

a Certificate from the Middle East Institute, Columbia 

University; and an M.S.S.I. from the National Defense 

Intelligence College. 

vii

SUMMARY

This monograph provides an overview and analysis 

of thinking in Iraq on the issue of nuclear power. Nuclear power has long held a special fascination for Iraq, 

and despite past controversies, this issue continues to 

draw the attention of numerous influential Iraqis in 

the post-Saddam era. Informed public opinion in Iraq 

today is clearly a more important factor for understanding the background of decisionmaking than it was 

during the Saddam era, so that this monograph addresses the views of all the sectors of Iraqi society likely 

to have an input into decisionmaking in this arena. 

There is an emerging Iraqi consensus on the desirability of a peaceful nuclear program, with arguments 

supported by the expected benefits for electric power 

generation, agriculture, and medicine, as well as an 

eventual transition from oil. National pride is also a 

motivating factor, as nuclear power is viewed as an 

indicator of modernity and as proof of being able to 

keep up with regional neighbors. As for a military 

application of nuclear power, those expressing a 

positive view—all outside the current government—

see nuclear weapons as an effective political and 

military instrument and as necessary to balance 

Israel’s nuclear arsenal, although their support is 

voiced on behalf of “the Arabs” in general rather 

than using the more sensitive term, Iraq. The belief 

in the effectiveness of a balance of terror in ensuring 

security and stability is widespread. Perceptions about 

a prospective Iranian nuclear weapon, however, most 

often break down along confessional lines, with most 

Shi’a welcoming the prospect as a boost to the Shi’a 

community’s security, while Sunnis continue earlier 

views of a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat. There is little 
viii

concern over potential environmental implications or 

potential accidents, or attention to ethical issues.

One should expect in Iraq the same movement 

toward nuclear power as in the rest of the Middle 

East, at least in the civilian sector. However, 

daunting obstacles remain to rebuilding the country’s 

eviscerated nuclear infrastructure, which resulted 

from the dismantling of many facilities, the removal 

of fissionable material, and the emigration or death 

of former nuclear scientists. However, Baghdad has 

taken steps to reintegrate the country into the nuclear 

research structure of the Arab world and to end existing restrictive international controls. For example, 

it has requested that France build a new reactor, and 

has made an effort to regenerate its domestic scientific 

community. There is no indication of any intention to 

reestablish a military program; any decision to do so in 

the future would be impossible to predict, given Iraq’s 

evolving domestic political dynamics.

It will be difficult for the United States or the 

international community to ignore or reject outright 

Iraq’s expectations for a nuclear program, given the 

deeply-felt entitlement throughout Iraq’s informed 

public and in light of the almost universal regional 

trends. But the United States can help to manage 

the process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclear 

reintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector. At the 

same time, the United States and the international 

community should ensure that any return to a nuclear 

program be accompanied by Iraq’s acceptance of strict 

international monitoring and controls to prevent any 

diversion to the military field or terrorist use. U.S. 

policymakers and military leaders should also focus 

on ensuring that any peaceful nuclear program in Iraq

be as secure from accidents as possible through training and assistance. 
ix

Once stability increases in Iraq, U.S. military and 

civilian government agencies should launch an effort

to educate the Iraqi military, government officials, and 

the general population on the benefits and risks of 

nuclear power. Intelligence analysts should continue 

to monitor Iraqi public opinion on the nuclear issue, 

as well as any Iraqi actions which could lead to 

undesired results, including support from other 

countries. More broadly, U.S. and international leaders 

can work to modify the overall Middle East regional 

threat environment so as to alleviate the domestic 

pressures for nuclear proliferation both in the civilian 

and in the military sphere, especially by encouraging 

genuine progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, 

U.S. policymakers can support and reassure the 

Iraqi government and public, with regard to an 

incipient Iranian nuclear threat, although the inclusion of an "umbrella" for Israel or requests for a 

permanent U.S. military presence in the region would 

likely derail such an initiative. Awareness of and 

sensitivity to Iraqi thinking on the nuclear issue, in 

general, will facilitate the crafting of more effective U.S. 

policies which can in turn contribute to the security of 

the Middle East region and beyond.

1

THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER

IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

INTRODUCTION

The Terms of Reference.

Nuclear power has long held a special fascination 

for Iraq, as it has for many other countries, not only as 

a source of energy and as an engine of technological 

progress, but also as a potent weapon in a country’s 

arsenal and as a tangible achievement which could 

serve to legitimize a regime in the eyes of national, 

regional, and world opinion.1 Although Saddam 

Hussein’s well-documented effort to acquire nuclear 

weapons ultimately came to naught, it nevertheless 

has weighed heavily on the country’s recent history.

The persistent issue of nuclear power has 

continued to draw the attention of Iraqis in the postSaddam era. Discussions in the news media, despite 

their understandably subdued tone given the sensitive 

political environment of the past few years, reveal a 

continuing interest in a nuclear future for the country. 

In fact, it appears that discussions about nuclear 

power have been increasing in frequency as a new 

status quo took form and as the U. S. presence was 

expected to recede. Public opinion in Iraq indicates an 

enduring interest in reestablishing a nuclear capability 

at least for peaceful purposes, although Iraqis also 

still seek to grapple intellectually with the concepts 

of the utility and consequences of nuclear power in 

geostrategic and military terms. 

Nuclear issues were pivotal in U.S. policymakers’ 

focus and argumentation—if perhaps grossly misused 

and mistaken—in the period preceding the launching 
2

of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.2 However, 

such concerns have now largely disappeared from 

the policy horizon. The absence of any weaponsrelated nuclear facilities, a fact emerging after the 

invasion, and the pressing immediate concerns 

stemming from efforts to rebuild the Iraqi nation have 

overshadowed the continuing significance of such 

issues. Nevertheless, any developments in the nuclear 

arena will unavoidably require decisions by the United 

States and the international community on how to 

manage the situation so that Iraq’s interests can be 

addressed while ensuring a secure local and regional 

environment.

How Iraq will decide to proceed in the nuclear 

sphere in the future is still unclear. This monograph 

analyzes the public discussions by Iraqis in the news 

media about nuclear power in the post-Saddam era 

in order to gauge prevailing views about the utility 

and feasibility of all aspects of nuclear power. The 

thesis here is that there is a mounting consensus and 

pressure for establishing a nuclear capability, at least 

in the nonmilitary sector, a prospect that is perhaps not 

surprising in light of a similar trajectory throughout 

the Middle East. As for support for a military nuclear 

capability, the situation is more ambiguous—not 

surprising perhaps, given the sensitivity of that issue 

and the delicate current political balance in Iraq—but 

present indications are that while many Iraqis do view 

even a military application as positive, unpredictable 

domestic political considerations will be crucial in 

whether Iraq pursues such a path in the future. 

Informed public opinion in Iraq today is clearly 

a more important factor for understanding the 

background of decisionmaking than it was during the 

Saddam era, when it was essentially mute. This factor 
3

is even more salient given the fragmented nature of 

the country’s present-day political establishment and 

the lack, at least for now, of a hegemonic center. This 

public dialogue among Iraqis extends to the issue of 

nuclear power, although discussions in this area may 

still not be completely unfettered, given the continuing 

sensitivity of the topic, and especially given the 

possibility of an adverse American reaction. One can 

presume that present discourse is thus affected by at 

least some self-censorship, as well as by the normal 

prudence in the case of public figures, who must be 

careful to avoid treading in controversial areas because 

of their official status. Nevertheless, there are enough 

Iraqis sufficiently open with their views that one can 

delineate the general lines of thinking about options 

for the future of nuclear power in the country.

Research Sources and Methods.

The research for this monograph focuses on the 

views of Iraqi participants in the discussion about 

nuclear power both in Iraq and in the diaspora. The 

latter’s opinions are easily available to the public back 

home in Iraq via the internet. Thus there is now largely 

a single discussion arena, at least for the informed 

public. In fact, those Iraqis based abroad may feel less 

constrained about expressing their views than those 

in Iraq, given the still substantial, albeit diminishing, 

U.S. presence and scrutiny.

The commentators considered here range across 

the spectrum of politics and society, including nuclear 

scientists, government officials, political and religious 

figures, and intellectuals. It is these actors who are 

involved in the discussions on nuclear power and who 

bring expertise or influence to the table. Any decisions 
4

in this area are not likely to be the result of popular 

involvement, although opinion makers do seek to 

generate public support for their ideas. The views of 

Iraqi nuclear scientists are especially important, given 

their status as subject matter experts and celebrities. 

Their role in shaping the perceptions of rising generations of Iraqi scientists and political leaders may be 

significant. Religious figures who take a public stand 

also provide a degree of moral approval, a factor which 

is considerably more significant now then it was during 

the Saddam era. Notably missing from the discussions 

are any active duty military voices, although that 

may be understandable, given the immediate security 

concerns which preoccupy the Iraqi military and the 

continuing sensitivity of its status in today’s evolving 

political environment. 

One cannot always determine these days whose 

views a commentator may be reflecting publicly, 

whether his own or those of more influential backers—

domestic or foreign—who for politic reasons have 

thus far chosen to remain silent. The significance of the 

opinions of various individuals, of course, will be of 

unequal weight in these discussions—depending on 

their level of expertise, political ties, present job, or 

access to particular news media. Surveying all such 

views is nevertheless useful, as it provides a sense of 

the parameters of Iraqi thinking and insights into how 

the issues are framed with regard to the desirability and 

utility of nuclear power in the country’s future. When 

there are discordant views, these are always noted in 

the study. Thus, in the absence of such indications, the 

assumption is that there is a consensus.

Scott Sagan has provided a useful approach to 

understanding why states acquire nuclear weapons, 

and one can extend at least part of that framework to 
5

the issue of nuclear power in general, whether civilian 

or military. He identifies three main national motivations, namely, the need to respond to foreign threats, 

the product of domestic political and bureaucratic 

dynamics, and the desire to project an identity of 

modernity and technological prowess. Elements of all 

three can be glimpsed in the case of Iraq.3

LOBBYING FOR ATOMIC POWER

The Economic Argument.

Discreet lobbying by Iraqis in favor of reviving 

the country’s nuclear program—at least for peaceful 

purposes—began soon after the downfall of Saddam. 

As early as the fall of 2003, Iraqi nuclear scientists 

were urging a resumption of a peaceful nuclear program, touting the tangible benefits that would accrue 

to the country. 

Take for example, Hamid Al-Bahili—originally 

the director of the Osirak/Tammuz reactor complex, 

a professor of nuclear engineering, and at present 

Adviser in the Office of the Prime Minister and an 

Iraqi government representative on nuclear issues 

abroad. His upcoming book, serialized in the newspaper of one of the main Shi’a parties, charts his 

vision for a nuclear future in the post-Saddam era. 

Al-Bahili stresses the importance of nuclear power 

for Iraq and highlights its peaceful roles, such as the

generation of electricity and uses in medicine, industry, and agriculture.4

 Iraqi scientists abroad also 

expressed support for nuclear power, and in fact 

Asad Al-Khafaji, then working in Canada, argued 

that the absence of the peaceful use of nuclear 

power would be considered “backwardness in the 

cultural, economic, and technological arenas.”5
6

Acknowledging the concern of some about the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons, at the same 

time he dismissed arguments that oil and natural gas 

would be available forever, and severely criticized 

those who saw “any activity with nuclear energy as 

simply futile and playing with fire.”6 The editor of an

Iraqi scientific journal likewise concluded that “simply 

put, we cannot do without nuclear power . . . as a 

fundamental substitute for the generation of electric 

power. When oil and gas supplies run out, nuclear 

power will be the inexhaustible stand-by for the generation of future energy.”7

Such testimonials on behalf of the benefits of nuclear 

power have continued in subsequent years, including 

those by government officials. Al-Bahili has since 

lauded Iraq’s “very, very great achievements” in the 

nuclear arena during the Saddam era, and proposed a 

comprehensive plan to rebuild Iraq’s scientific system.8

Then there is Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf, Chief of the 

Plant Breeding Department of Iraq’s Ministry of 

Science and Technology, who has laid out in detail the 

potential uses of nuclear technology in agriculture—

as an alternative to chemical pesticides, a counter to 

livestock diseases, a multiplier of soil fertility, a tool for 

genetically engineering plants, and a food preserver 

via irradiation. He concludes that “nuclear technology 

can be an efficient, effective, and cost-effective solution 

to many of the problems which agriculture faces 

around the world,” then adding that “Iraq was one 

of the countries which initiated its nuclear program 

for peaceful uses beginning in the 1960s of the last 

century, and whose scientists are trying to maintain 

the momentum of that work to this day.”9 An Iraqi 

energy expert, pointing to the current problems in 

generating power in Iraq, maintains that the country 
7

should begin shifting from its diminishing oil reserves 

to renewable sources of energy, stressing that it had 

uranium deposits that would last one million years, 

that each square foot of uranium was equal to seven 

million barrels of oil, and that nuclear fusion could 

provide energy for “billions and trillions of years.”10

Al-Khafaji, too, has continued his efforts on behalf of 

nuclear power, suggesting that a concerted effort be 

made to convince Iraqi decisionmakers of the benefits 

of rebuilding that capability.11

Not surprisingly, Iraq’s Minister of Science and 

Technology, Ra’id Fahmi, has been a strong supporter 

of nuclear power, equating its establishment to a basic 

prerequisite for Iraq’s social and economic rebirth, 

while giving assurances that Iraq would comply fully 

with all international guidelines.12 One of the most 

eloquent spokesmen in favor of resuming a nuclear 

program has been Hussein Al-Shahristani, currently 

Iraq’s Minister of Oil, and himself one of the country’s 

most experienced nuclear scientists. He has argued, for 

example, that “it is vital for Iraq to have a developed 

nuclear research program for the peaceful use of 

nuclear power in the fields of medicine, agriculture, 

and industry,” but admitted that Iraq’s abundant 

reserves of oil and gas were already sufficient for 

the production of energy.13 Al-Shahristani was also 

careful to stress that civilian reactors could not be 

used to produce material for nuclear weapons and 

that there was little likelihood of a diversion of nuclear 

materials.14

Perhaps sensing that the case for nuclear materials 

pertaining to medicine might be the least controversial 

application, discussants have surfaced it most frequently. One Iraqi scientist, for example, noted that 

when the country’s nuclear program had been can-
8

celed, “the first victim [was] our hospitals.”15 Significantly, in 2008 the Baghdad municipal authorities 

announced their intention to establish a 50-bed nuclear 

medicine hospital.16

National Pride.

Many Iraqis view nuclear power for their country 

as a basic national right or, as Minister Fahmi called it, 

Iraq’s “sovereign right.”17 Some politicians have been 

more reserved, with the key factor for them being not 

the desirability of nuclear power but the timing. As 

one member of the Iraqi National Assembly stated on 

United Arab Emirates (UAE) television, “The time is 

not appropriate at present to build a nuclear reactor, 

[we prefer] new oil refineries for the short term instead, 

since even though the nuclear option would address a 

real problem, Iraq for now did not have the necessary 

possibilities.”18 However, another participant on the 

same television program, while admitting that the 

internal situation and state of the infrastructure were 

inadequate at present, countered that Iraq as a state 

had the right to acquire a nuclear capability, that now 

was simply “a short pause (tawaqqufat shwayya) with 

regard to nuclear power,” and that nuclear power was 

a form of “fantastic energy.” He proposed at least small 

research reactors for the present.19

Nuclear power is seen in Iraq by virtually everyone 

in the informed public—equally true in much of the 

region—as quintessentially emblematic of scientific 

and intellectual progress, a sort of litmus test for 

a country’s standing in relation to its peers, and 

something to which a government can point as a 

concrete achievement to boost its national pride and 

legitimacy. Supporters of nuclear power in Iraq have 
9

argued that this has been the “most important field of 

scientific-technological research bar none in Iraq.”20

An Iraqi government scientist even concluded that 

“no country can progress and develop culturally and 

scientifically without [nuclear technology].”21 In the 

same vein, Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf accepted as a given 

that “one of the benchmarks of progress for states and 

peoples is the possession of nuclear technology.”22 For 

one nuclear scientist, an Iraqi nuclear capability was 

even essential as a guarantee against Iraq returning 

to “the wasteland of backwardness and poverty.”23

Not surprisingly, Iraq’s Ministry of Science and 

Technology now has an atom symbol as the most 

prominent element of its logo, while the homepage of 

the Ministry’s official website is dominated by a large 

animated atomic emblem.24

Iraqis naturally compare their country to their 

neighbors in the region and must now find it 

distressing to see themselves falling behind countries 

they had often looked down upon in the past as 

having a lower level of progress. Baghdad certainly 

feels itself regressing as other countries in the region 

take steps to develop nuclear power capabilities—

not to speak of nuclear weaponization in Iran and 

Syria.25 For example, one Iraqi university professor 

was proud that Iraq had been “at the forefront of the 

Arab and Middle East countries in terms of having the 

solid advanced scientific brains and capabilities in all 

disciplines and fields,” but now fretted that the recent 

brain drain would remove Iraq from “the caravan of 

scientific progress and to its significant regression in 

comparison with the past period when we were far 

in the lead.”26 A former senior Iraqi military officer 

likewise urged public support for convincing the Iraqi 
10

government to build nuclear power plants, stressing 

that this was already being done in Egypt, Saudi 

Arabia, and the UAE.27 The Iraqi news media routinely 

highlight the nuclear plans of neighboring countries 

with an implicit sense of envy and resentment. As 

noted above, Iraqis must find it particularly galling for 

countries that in the past they considered backward 

and insignificant—such as Kuwait—to be passing them 

by in nuclearization. In fact, for Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf, 

one reason for reenergizing the nuclear program is 

to raise Iraq’s status above “the ranks of the other 

countries.”28

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN IRAQ’S FUTURE? 

Understandably, the greatest concern for the 

United States and the international community 

should be any Iraqi thinking about reviving a nuclear 

weapons program, however unlikely and unrealistic 

that might be in the near term. Here, as one might 

expect, discussions are often more discreet or indirect 

than is the case when dealing with nuclear power for 

peaceful purposes. The issue, if talked about openly 

at all, is often done by Iraqis living outside of Iraq. 

Usually, arguments by Iraqis in favor of nuclear 

weapons are softened by speaking about and on 

behalf of “the Arabs” rather than specifically about 

Iraq, or by focusing on the utility of nuclear weapons 

possessed or being developed by Iraq’s neighbors or 

by countries further afield. This indirect approach is 

expected to be less controversial in the eyes of outside 

observers. Iraqi commentators of all affiliations—apart 

from unreconstructed Ba’athists—are sensitive about 

potential accusations of promoting policies linked to 

the Saddam regime, especially with the predominant 

American presence in Iraq since 2003. Addressing the 
11

issue in regional terms may also be a way to garner 

broader support among neighbors. 

Not surprisingly, the remaining Iraqi Ba’athi 

opposition has been the most outspoken in supporting 

nuclear weapons for Iraq, praising Saddam for his 

nuclearization efforts while he was in power, and 

acknowledging for the first time that that effort had 

begun as early as the Osirak/Tammuz reactor project, 

the principal motivation having been to confront 

Israel.29

However, there is also a broad feeling among 

many other Iraqis engaged in these discussions that 

nuclear weapons in general provide a country with 

a unique military capability and that such weapons 

have a beneficial impact on any country’s security and 

geopolitical influence. For example, one Iraqi nuclear 

scientist concluded that “nuclear weapons have played 

an enormous and pivotal role in determining the shape 

of the balance of international relations whereby the 

strong exploit the weak.”30 Often, Iraqis nowadays 

address the issue by emphasizing the importance of 

nuclear weapons for other countries’ strategy and, in 

particular, for what many perceive as Israel’s or Iran’s 

ambitions for regional hegemony. 

Assessing Nuclear Threats to Iraq.

The perspective that Iraqi discussants have on a 

nuclear threat to their country not only reveals their 

assessment of the potential utility of nuclear weapons, 

but may also influence their readiness to support a 

similar Iraqi path one day. In the past, insofar as an 

actual or potential nuclear threat was concerned, 

Baghdad considered Israel, the United States, and 

eventually Iran to be most potentially threatening. In 

some ways, the Iraqis’ view of threats has remained 
12

constant, but in other ways it has evolved since the 

collapse of the Saddam regime. 

The Israeli Threat. As far as Israel is concerned, there 

remains in Iraq (and elsewhere in the Arab world) a 

deep-seated concern about the perceived threat from 

that country—including the nuclear aspect—and such 

concern is advanced frequently as motivation and 

justification for further proliferation in the region. 

For example, an op-ed piece in a Shi’a publication in 

Iraq held that “Israel threatens the Arab countries . . . 

with its nuclear monopoly and its aggressive policies 

against the Arab states and also threatens international 

stability.”31 According to this source, Israel was 

said to have achieved “geo-political victories” in the 

form of unequal political agreements with the Arabs 

specifically because of “the imbalance of power in 

the region in which Israel is the hegemonic actor who 

raises the nuclear, military, and economic stick over 

the heads of everyone else.”32

 An Iraqi nuclear scientist was likewise critical 

of Israel’s nuclear monopoly, asserting that “when 

only one side has nuclear weapons, that leads to an 

unjust hegemony in the geo-political situation in the 

region.”33 Yet another commentator stressed that it was 

the Israeli nuclear threat which prompted neighboring 

countries to also embark on nuclear proliferation.34 For 

his part, the Shi’a Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Al-Hasani 

Al-Baghdadi of Najaf saw as unfair that “Israel has the 

right to possess 200 nuclear warheads, while no other 

state in the region has the right to have even a single 

nuclear bomb,” attributing such an imbalance to the 

U.S. desire to maintain Israel as the strongest power in 

the region.35

The Ambivalence Toward an Iranian Nuclear Threat. 

On the other hand, perhaps no single aspect of Iraqi 
13

thinking on nuclear weapons has evolved as much as 

perceptions of a nuclear threat from Iran. In the past, 

the Iraqi argument in favor of nuclear weapons was 

often cast in terms of the need to counter an incipient 

Iranian nuclear capability, as well as the existing Israeli 

one. However, in today’s context, Iraqi concerns about 

a future Iranian bomb have become considerably more 

nuanced, with views frequently—but not exclusively—

dividing along sectarian/communal lines. 

The Iraqi Shi’a Viewpoint. Many in Iraq’s Shi’a 

community, while not wishing to subordinate their 

country to Iran, nevertheless may consider the latter 

as a guarantor against what they see as threats 

from neighboring Sunni countries, Israel, or the 

United States, and view Iran’s acquisition of nuclear 

weapons with relative equanimity. As one Iraqi Shi’a 

commentator put it, “Nowadays, Islamic Iran is the 

strong rear area [al-dhahr al-qawi] for Iraq.”36 In a similar 

argument, Iraq’s activist Shi’a Grand Ayatollah AlBaghdadi noted that “we look at the Islamic Republic 

[of Iran] as a regional power, and as the Islamic 

strategic depth for the Arab and Islamic peoples.”37 At 

the same time, Iraqi Shi’a observers frequently parrot 

Iran’s argument that its nuclear program is intended 

solely for peaceful purposes.38 An Iraqi Shi’a academic 

typically downplayed any Iranian nuclear threat to 

Iraq, arguing during a lecture in the United States that 

“Iran is a sovereign state and has the right to express 

its point of view on what concerns it; it is their decision 

to make and it is none of our business.”39 Similarly, a 

Shi’a Parliamentarian, Falih Al-Fayyadh, claimed that 

Iraq “is not frightened by Iran’s possession of nuclear 

weapons . . . because that will not affect Iraq in the 

least,” since relations between the two countries “do 

not permit either to threaten the other.” Instead, he 

added, it is Israel’s nuclear arsenal about which Iraq 
14

ought to be concerned, since Israel has “aggressive 

plans” in the region.40

Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi, predictably, disapproved the “American-Israeli plans for opposing “the 

peaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic [of 

Iran].”41 Another writer on an Iraqi Shi’a website, 

purporting to express “the point of view of many 

sons of Iraq,” likewise reacted harshly to those Arab 

commentators who urged the United States to strike 

Iran before it acquired nuclear weapons. He dismissed 

the views of those in the region who were fearful that 

“Iran and the Safavid Shi’a would acquire nuclear 

weapons” as stemming from hatred of Iran and of 

the Shi’a in general and from jealousy of the latter’s 

success.42 Indeed, he suggested that “the important 

question now thrown out on the table is . . . what if 

Iran or any other Shi’a . . . could liberate Palestine and 

Jerusalem?” He surmised that even then the Sunnis 

would be implacable enemies of the Shi’a and hostile 

to Iran.43 Instead of being concerned about Iran, a proMuqtada al-Sadr writer most feared that the United 

States would use the excuse of an Iranian threat to 

Israel to deploy a missile shield in Iraq in order to 

defend Israel.44

Some Iraqi Shi’a even went so far as to see Iranian 

nuclear weapons as a positive development, with 

Mundhir al-Kawthar claiming it would be “for the 

good of humanity.” In this observer’s view, the Iranian 

nuclear program—and clearly what is alluded to by 

this term are nuclear weapons—would provide a 

balance to “Israel’s arrogance” and pressure the United 

States to solve the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestinian 

issues. According to the same source, Iran’s nuclear 

program “does not represent any danger whatsoever.” 

On the contrary, he assured readers that a nuclear 
15

capability “would ensure peace in the broader Middle 

East region,” and credited nuclear deterrence as the 

reason for a reduced likelihood of war between India 

and Pakistan. Arguing that it was unfair to accept that 

Israel and North Korea could be nuclear powers but 

not Iran, the author attributed Iran’s desire for nuclear 

weapons as defensive, stemming from its fear of Israel 

and the United States, and contending that the Western 

countries were opposed because they “do not like a 

state with an independent will” in an oil-rich region, 

and that the Arab leaders were simply alarmed about 

the threat to their own positions. 45 Another Iraqi writer 

concluded that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it 

would mean “the collapse of classical American 

military superiority over the latter,” and predicted that 

the United States would therefore try to prevent Iran 

from achieving that decisive capability.46

On the other hand, one Shi’a nuclear scientist living in Algeria, Abd Al-Kadhim Al-Abboudi, diverged 

from the general Shi’a consensus, weaving instead a 

complex web of nuclear conspiracies that accuse the 

United States, Israel, and Iran of all plotting to use 

nuclear weapons against the Arabs. His leftist secular 

political leanings apparently trumped his communal 

ties.47

Given the prevailing public opinion in Iraq, the 

Nuri Al-Maliki government categorically rejected the 

use of Iraqi airspace for any Israeli strike against Iran.48

On the U.S.-financed Radio Sawa, even the country’s 

Sunni Vice President, Tariq Al-Hashimi, perhaps out 

of concern about an Iranian backlash and resulting 

instability in the region in case of a U.S. attack, advised 

against an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, going 

so far as to claim that Iran had a right to its peaceful 

nuclear program.49
16

The Iraqi Sunni Viewpoint. Other Iraqis, however, 

have been much more critical of Iran’s potential 

acquisition of nuclear weapons. Some have expressed 

skepticism of the need for Iran to go nuclear even 

for peaceful purposes, citing other better sources for 

generating electricity, such as solar power, and have 

also raised doubts about Iran’s stated intent not to use 

nuclear power for military purposes.50

One secular leftist observer interpreted Iran’s 

quest for nuclear weapons as revealing its “aggressive 

objectives.”51 A Sunni commentator concluded that 

if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, that would 

“put the region under Iranian control.”52 Another 

Sunni writer opined that the balance of power 

between Iran and Iraq had already been broken and 

that having nuclear weapons could help Iran spread 

its Shi’a propaganda. He worried that no neighbor 

could match Iran’s “pretensions of hegemony.”53 Still 

another writer expressed indignation at what he saw as 

Iran’s demeaning treatment of Iraq and equated Iran’s 

current leadership with Saddam in its willingness 

to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against 

others as well as for blackmail. Thus he saw a need for 

the West to block Tehran.54 An Iraqi intellectual living 

abroad even inquired rhetorically as to who would be 

more merciful with its nuclear weapons toward Iraq—

Iran or Israel. He posited that the Iranian regime was 

more dangerous, since it was similar to that of Saddam 

and would not be deterred by the thought of mass 

casualties. What is more, he concluded, “The Islamic 

religion will not serve as a deterrent to leaders such 

as the present rulers of Iran in their using all banned 

[weapons] in pursuit of their national interests at the 

expense of all the Arabs and Muslims.”55

Lieutenant General Wafiq Al-Samarra’i, at one time 

chief of military intelligence under Saddam, dismis-
17

sed the idea of a nuclear threat to Iraq from Israel, 

claiming that the latter would use that capability only 

for deterrence. Asked if he thought that Iran instead 

had already become the greater threat, Al-Samarra’i 

replied: “Yes, no doubt about it.”56 Others also 

dismissed an Iranian nuclear threat to Israel, believing 

instead that it was Iran’s Arab neighbors who would 

be the first victims, given Tehran’s hostility toward 

the latter.57 Another commentator—a former leader 

of the Iraqi Communist Party—expressed the view 

that Iran would use its nuclear capability for military 

purposes, but not against Israel. Rather, it would use 

it to blackmail and threaten Iraq and the Gulf states, 

and urged the European Union (EU) to bring the 

matter up in the United Nations Security Council.58

Indeed, one commentator claimed that once Iran had 

nuclear weapons, its resulting swagger would lead “to 

a renewal in the export of the Revolution again after 

it had been stopped by the First Gulf War.”59 A Sunni 

candidate for Speaker of Parliament, Taha Al-Lahibi, 

downplayed an Iranian nuclear threat to Iraq but only 

because he claimed, sarcastically, that Iran already had 

a dominant presence in Iraq and did not need to use 

nuclear weapons to get its way with Baghdad, and 

that it should be the other neighbors instead who must 

worry.60

A U.S.-financed Baghdad newspaper, on the other 

hand, counseled Iran not to threaten its neighbors with 

its nuclear program, but the reason given was that 

such a threat would drive other regional states to seek 

protection from foreign forces.61

Commentators in Iraqi Ba’athi circles, predictably, 

have been especially alarmist about an Iranian bomb, 

and one Ba’athi spokesman claimed that Iran would 

“exploit its nuclear project as a tool for pressure to 

increase its share of Iraq’s remains,” in competition 
18

with the United States.62 Another commentator on 

the official Ba’ath website concluded that, thanks to 

nuclear weapons, Iran will have taken “a great step 

toward imposing its hegemony over all the countries 

of the oil region.”63 Another spokesman for the Ba’ath 

made a universal plea for help in preventing “the rise 

of a nuclear Iran by whatever means.”64 In fact, another 

Iraqi Ba’athi went so far as to claim that the United 

States planned to maintain the Ba’ath Party “in reserve” 

if it struck at Iran because of the latter’s nuclear program, due to the Ba’ath’s implacable enmity toward 

Iran.65

Assessing Other Nuclear Threats.

In contrast, there seems to be limited public concern 

in Iraq about Syria’s potential for acquiring nuclear 

weapons. Perhaps this relative indifference may be 

because Syria’s success is not viewed as imminent, 

that Syria is not seen as a direct threat, or that less 

information is available about Syria than about Iran 

or Israel. After the Israeli air strike in September 2007 

against what Iraqis believed were Syrian nuclear 

facilities, for example, the principal concern seems 

to have been that Iraq might be affected by nuclear 

fallout, given the proximity of the targeted area to the 

Iraqi border.66 Iraq’s Association of Muslim Scholars, 

a grouping of Sunni ulama, accused the United States 

of repeating the same policy against Syria as it had 

against Iraq in the “nuclear weapons farce,” i.e., by 

falsely claiming that Syria was developing nuclear 

weapons.67 Some Iraqis remain vocally critical of Iran, 

such as one newspaper editor who termed the Iranians’ 

pursuit of nuclear weapons “a threat not only to the 

security of the region but specifically to the security 

of the Arab Gulf”—and implicitly therefore also to 
19

Iraq. Syria’s greatest fault, in his view, was its support 

for Iran’s nuclear program rather than any activity by 

Syria in the same field.68

Viewing matters from a Shi’a position, on the other 

hand, one Iraqi observer even posited a future nuclear 

threat to Iraq from Jordan, given the latter’s hostility 

to the Shi’a community in both Iraq and Iran. His 

conclusion was that for Iraq to achieve a “balance of 

terror” vis-à-vis Jordan, it would have to build its own 

nuclear reactors, although use of the latter on behalf of 

a weapons program was only implicit.69

As for any future American nuclear threat—which 

had played at least a supporting role in spurring Iraq’s 

pursuit of nuclear weapons during the Saddam era—

that is not seen as a pressing likelihood nowadays, and 

even if there were any such concern it is unlikely it 

would be revealed publicly, given the sensitivity of the 

local political situation as the United States continues 

its pullout. 

The Kurdish Viewpoint.

Iraqi Kurds, less deeply involved in the national 

and regional debate on nuclear power for Iraq, appear 

more concerned about any potential negative effects 

of nuclear power on their own area and may still feel 

a latent concern about the potential military use of 

nuclear weapons against their community in the future, a fear born of past experience with Saddam’s use 

of chemical weapons against them. For example, 

Masoud Al-Barzani, President of the Kurdistan region, 

when asked about the Iranian nuclear program, 

responded blandly: “We hope that the region will be 

free of all destructive nuclear weapons, because we 

suffered in the past from such banned weapons, and 
20

the Kurdish people paid a great price because of that 

at the hands of the former regime.”70

At the same time, some Kurds do voice concern 

about Iran’s impending acquisition of nuclear 

weapons. Intellectual Jawdat Hushiyar, for example, 

stated: “There is no doubt that an Iran with nuclear 

weapons will upset the existing military balance in the 

region dangerously, and particularly between Iraq and 

Iran,” a situation that could prove dangerous if some 

dispute were to erupt between the two countries. He 

then excoriated Iraq’s religious-based Shi’a parties for 

ignoring the threat.71 Other Kurds, like Parliamentarian 

Abd Al-Bari Zibari, have more typically been prone to 

temporize, noting that “it is way too early to consider 

Iran a nuclear state.” He expressed the belief that 

international pressure would very likely convince Iran 

to desist and that the United States would not permit 

Iran to acquire nuclear weapons in any event.72

Religiously motivated Kurds, on the other hand, 

seem to take a more nuanced position, based on a 

greater sensitivity to the Israeli threat. One Kurdish 

writer on a religious website, for example, held that 

a nuclear Iran would provide a balance against Israel, 

but would also prove threatening to non-nuclear 

neighbors, especially in the Gulf. He noted that nuclear 

proliferation would be difficult to halt unless the 

double standard favoring Israel was terminated.73

The Utility of Nuclear Weapons.

Whatever the partisan and confessional coloring of 

the debate, virtually all Iraqi commentators agree that 

nuclear weapons are effective in bestowing greater 

power to a country. Most Iraqis involved in such 

discussions seem to be in the “optimist” camp of nuc-
21

lear partisans, who see proliferation as a means to

achieve balance and stability through mutual 

deterrence. They take comfort in the analogy—however 

analytically tenuous—of the relationship between the 

superpowers during the Cold War. Asad Al-Khafaji, 

for example, held that “destructive nuclear weapons 

were used to kill millions of innocent civilians at a time 

when one side had a monopoly. When the monopoly 

was broken and that weapon spread to the reaches of 

the East and West, surprise, surprise, the situation then 

became secure! . . . In sum, I support the proliferation 

of nuclear weapons to all the parties involved in a 

conflict.”74

Even an Iraqi who counseled Iran to end its nuclear 

program so as to avoid a confrontation with the 

United States and Europe nevertheless acknowledged 

that “the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state 

results in a relative psychological reassurance (istiqrar 

nafsi) and confidence for that state in relation to foreign 

military threats and attacks against it by others.”75

At the same time, others have acknowledged 

the potential for an upsurge of instability, as a state 

acquiring such weapons is also said to “experience 

an increase in its might and an expansion of its power 

and influence.”76 One observer concluded that “if Iran 

acquires a nuclear bomb, the White House will no 

longer be able to block any Iranian attempt to expand 

eastward or westward, as it was able to do with the 

Iraqi Ba’athi regime when it attempted to swallow 

up Kuwait.”77 And still another Iraqi writer, although 

dismissing widespread charges that Iran had aggressive intentions against its neighbors, and praising it

instead for its challenge to Israeli expansionism, 

concluded that if Iran did acquire nuclear weapons 

“that will mean opening the terrible gates of hell for 

the Americans.”78
22

As noted earlier, when Iraqis verbalize their 

support for a nuclear sector within the military realm, 

they often broach the topic using the more ambiguous 

term of “the Arabs,” seeking to avoid any politicallycharged allusions to Iraq itself. For example, Iraqi 

nuclear scientist Asad Al-Khafaji argued that it was 

the balance of nuclear terror which had kept the peace 

between the superpowers during the Cold War, as 

well as between India and Pakistan. He then asked 

rhetorically: “Must the Arabs continue to cater to the 

feelings of their Western allies and not disturb the 

situation of a lack of strategic nuclear balance of power 

in the region?”79 Al-Khafaji, perhaps sensing that talk 

of a renewed unilateral nuclear program in Iraq might 

be premature, urged the Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) countries instead to use their money to finance 

a joint nuclear development effort with other unnamed 

Arab countries, arguing that this would allow the GCC 

states to dispense with large conventional forces for 

defense.80 Elsewhere, he has used the more vaguely 

amorphous term “the countries of the Gulf.” This term 

could be interpreted to include Iraq as the actor who 

could establish a nuclear “balance of terror with the 

Jewish state or with the Shi’a state [i.e., Iran],” a scenario 

he viewed as “a legal international right which no one 

can dispute.”81

Another nuclear scientist, Numan Al-Naimi, 

openly opined that Iraq, too, should have that right, 

insisting that “possession of a nuclear [capability] is a 

legitimate right in order to have technology, science, 

and the power to defend onself. Depriving Iraq of this 

technology only achieves the West’s strategic goal,” 

and he went on to rue the fact that the post-Saddam 

government did not protect the country’s scientists 

and that many had even been imprisoned.82 To be sure, 
23

even those supporting nuclear weapons for Iraq have 

been careful to emphasize that such a capability would 

be used only for deterrence by creating a “balance 

of nuclear terror” with Israel and Iran, thereby 

contributing to regional stability and security. As AlKhafaji put it, “The principle of ‘the balance of nuclear 

terror’ is the only practical solution to putting an end 

to the arrogance of just one party which has nuclear 

weapons in a conflict.”83

Bogus claims in the news media by Iraqis to the 

effect that Western forces have already used nuclear 

weapons against Iraq may also make the environment 

more congenial to an Iraqi nuclear option in the 

future. For example, the former Commander of the 

Republican Guards, Lieutenant-General Sayf Al-Din 

Al-Rawi, maintained that U.S. forces had used neutron 

weapons in the attack on Baghdad Airport, while an 

unnamed Iraqi physicist accused the British of using 

air-launched nuclear-tipped missiles against Southern 

Iraq.84 There are claims by other Iraqis that the 

international atmosphere is not conducive to nuclear 

disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons 

being unrealistic. They point to the U.S. retention and 

modernization of its own nuclear arsenal, with one 

Iraqi commentator labeling nonproliferation talk as 

“no more than sophistry” and asserting that peaceful 

coexistence is “just a myth.”85

Making a Case for Nuclear Weapons. An Iraqi Shi’a 

pundit, Hamid Al-Shakir, has made perhaps the most 

straightforward and extended argument in the Iraqi 

news media in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons.86

He develops his basic premise by asking whether, 

given that some states have nuclear weapons, others 

should seek a symmetrical capability or whether 

they should accept the “status quo so as to ensure the 
24

superiority of some states over others in order to create 

a peace of the strong over the weak.” Al-Shakir views 

international relations from a realpolitik perspective, 

emphasizing the primacy of power, and noting that 

“international law is nothing but the other face of 

power.” For him, it is technological, military, and 

strategic power which give states a “seat at the table” 

where the right and the wrong of law are determined. 

Only power can lead to authentic peace rather than 

peace imposed by the enemy—neither good intentions 

nor an imbalance of power can produce peace. 

Moreover, he specifically equates the possession of 

nuclear weapons with having a seat at the table. 

Al-Shakir accuses the West of promoting peace 

in the Middle East while opposing the buildup of 

military power by local states, again asking whether 

the “Islamic Arab states” can accept peace with Israel 

and the world while they are “completely empty 

and bereft of all power.” In particular, he focuses on 

whether peace can be crafted between a weak state 

and a great nuclear state, noting that no one wants to 

negotiate from a position of weakness, and that if one 

side lacks nuclear weapons it is automatically weak. 

He continues to stress the need for peace through 

strength. He even warns that one could wake up one 

day and find an Arab or Islamic country “wiped off 

the human map by devastating nuclear bombs. . . at 

the hands of Israel or the United States of America.” In 

his view, Israel would be willing to undertake such an 

attack so long as it knew that there was no equivalent 

retaliatory capability. 

He concludes in no uncertain terms that “nuclear 

war cannot be deterred except by possessing one’s 

own nuclear weapons!” His solution to this precarious 

situation is for the Arab or Islamic states to also acquire 
25

nuclear weapons, whereupon these states’ “standing 

among the nations and peoples [would] change 

genuinely.” In his view, having nuclear weapons will 

bring about real peace, security, and stability. However, displaying obvious confessional partiality, AlShakir concludes that “this realistic strategic perspective is what induces us to demand the development 

of an Islamic Shi’a nuclear arsenal which will revive 

the spirit of genuine balance in the Middle East region, 

and thus make possible the establishment of a different 

balance between the Arabs and Muslims, on the one 

hand, and Israel and the West, on the other.”

He concludes his analysis with a warning to the 

effect that “if our Arab and Islamic states do not 

hasten to acquire standing nuclear deterrent forces, 

they unavoidably will confront real extermination 

in the form of a total war which will force them to 

surrender so that the master-slave relationship can be 

consolidated.” While it is not clear whether the author 

favors nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran, of a Shi’adominated Iraq, or both, what is unambiguous is his 

conclusion that nuclear weapons are required in order 

to achieve a balance with Israel and the United States. 

In key aspects, this perspective is a carryover of earlier 

thinking in Iraq on the utility of nuclear weapons, 

and one that today is widely shared in the region as a 

whole.

Marginal Dissonant Views.

The only apparent dissonant element in this overview of Iraqi thinking would seem to be the prevailing 

opinion in one online forum session run by the BBC 

Arabic service. Asked whether the Arabs should have 

the right to acquire nuclear weapons, the majority of 47 
26

replies by Iraqi respondents were negative. However, 

such surveys should be approached with caution. 

Quite apart from the impossibility of determining 

the identity of participants in an anonymous online 

forum (Kurds, Christians, émigrés, those declaring 

false data, etc.), the BBC site was likely to attract 

younger, Western-oriented, contributors, with little

political clout. What is more, the often critical assessments expressed in this forum about the “Arabs” 

may reflect Iraqi views of their neighbors’ capabilities 

and trustworthiness more than views about their own 

country.87 Ultimately, the impact of a small number of 

anonymous bloggers on the national debate is likely to 

be insignificant.

Ethical Perspectives. 

One does not find discussions in Iraqi circles about 

the moral/ethical implications of nuclear weapons, 

even by religious figures, such as emerged in the 

West especially in the early years of the nuclear era. 

On the contrary, those Iraqi Shi’a ulama who have 

broached the subject have used a religious argument 

to support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For 

example, Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi told Syrian 

TV that “this Islamic Arab Umma [Arab world] must 

acquire nuclear weapons.” Otherwise, he concluded, 

the United States would continue to oppress and 

attack the Arabs, making them the latest victims of 

American colonialism.88 While Iraqi Sunni clerics have 

not openly made religious arguments in support of 

nuclear weapons, those Iraqi Sunnis seeking moral 

support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons can 

rely on the existing widespread explicit approval 

among mainstream Sunni religious clerics throughout 
27

the region on the legitimacy of WMD, the acquisition 

of which is often declared to be a duty for the Umma.

Environmental Considerations. 

Unlike in the past, today there is scope in Iraq for 

expressing publicly concerns about the safety and 

environmental impact of nuclear power. Whatever 

unease Iraqi experts have expressed on this subject, 

however, has been largely oriented on the effects 

stemming from the past. Although commentators 

have painted a grim picture of the current radiological 

contamination in Iraq, they most often blame the 

situation on U.S. actions, particularly on U.S. neglect in 

the wake of the collapse of security after the invasion 

in 2003, when nuclear waste materials were looted 

or otherwise disposed of improperly. For example, 

scientists such as Anis Al-Rawi, Dean of the College of 

Science at Baghdad University, and Hamid Al-Bahili 

have described in graphic terms how—after U.S. forces 

left the Osirak/Tammuz nuclear complex unguarded—the locals took barrels containing nuclear waste 

materials, emptied the contents into the river, and then 

used the barrels for their own storage purposes or to 

deliver milk from dairies. They speak of the likelihood 

of severe long-term health consequences for the average Iraqi from the contamination that resulted—

including sterility, birth defects, and cancer—suggesting that the United States should be responsible 

for providing medical care for anyone thus afflicted.89

The country’s embryonic environmental movement 

has also addressed the contamination of Iraq’s soil 

and water stemming from the U.S. use of depleted 

uranium munitions.90 In fact, one report concluded 

that the existing contamination was an “environmental 
28

and health disaster,” listing all the horrendous 

resulting medical problems.91 One Iraqi scientist also 

worried that the United States might pressure Iraq 

into allowing it to accept nuclear waste, and warned 

the Iraqi government not to do so.92 This same Iraqi 

scientist, in fact, proposed a postponement of any new 

nuclear initiatives until the current nuclear sites were 

cleaned up, noting that “the present time is not at all 

appropriate for such a [new nuclear] initiative until the 

appropriate authorities address this [contamination] 

issue and decontaminate all the land completely.”93

However, in Iraq the focus on safety or environmental issues does not seem to be linked to the future 

or to be intertwined with considerations about the 

basic desirability of nuclear power. Although such allegations released in the public domain may give 

second thoughts to some about the safety of nuclear 

power, no one in Iraq has critically addressed the 

long-term environmental concerns in discussions 

about new nuclear facilities. On the contrary, an Iraqi 

scientific journal made the case that whatever the 

negative aspects in terms of the environment, nuclear 

power was still the best long-term option.94

An unnamed Iraqi government scientist, in fact, 

assured the public that nuclear energy “cannot cause 

pollution to the environment.”95 Other Iraqis, such as 

nuclear scientist Asad Al-Khafaji, have minimized the 

risks of radiation in general, with the latter declaring 

his belief “that the risk of being struck by a speeding 

car, or drowning at sea, or falling from the tenth story, 

or having a cup full of sulfuric acid spilled on one’s 

head is [no] less dangerous than being exposed to 

radiation!”96 In fact, Al-Khafaji imputed such concerns 

to a foreign campaign to turn Iraqis against nuclear 

power contrary to the country’s national interest.97
29

Joining the debate, an Iraqi cinematographer even 

suggested that there was ample space in the deserts in 

the Middle East to dispose of nuclear waste safely.98 As 

in the case of civilian nuclear reactors, even for those 

tied to weaponization, most Iraqis involved in discussions of nuclear power do not voice concern about 

potential dangers. When one Iraqi did voice reservations about the environmental dangers of nuclear 

power, it was confined to Iranian reactors, but that 

may have been more politically motivated than based 

on environmental criteria.99

To be sure, Iraqis have been sensitive to the presence, in Iraq, of any U.S. WMD. For example, Article 

7 of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement adopted 

in December 2008, only allows the United States to 

introduce military equipment into the country “on condition that it has no direct or indirect connection to 

weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons, 

nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological 

weapons, and the wastes related to such weapons).”100

However, in this case, sovereignty issues were probably 

more important than environmental ones.

Again, the Kurds have had a different point of view 

than other Iraqis, with one of their leaders, Masoud 

Al-Barzani, reiterating his general opposition to any 

nuclear activity whatsoever in Iraq: “Actually, I am 

simply against nuclear weapons. I am even against 

building a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes,” 

citing the risk of a catastrophic nuclear accident.101

PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS

Although the nuclear power situation in Iraq is still 

evolving, with the opinions surveyed here indicating a 

variety of views on some issues, the positions expressed 
30

by those Iraqis who are knowledgeable, involved, and 

influential as to policy do help clarify some trends for 

the future. 

The Near-Term Trajectory.

In Iraq, one should expect the same movement 

toward nuclear power as in the rest of the Middle 

East. Iraq is an integral part of what has long been 

recognized as a regional system in terms of security, 

politics, and culture and cannot be insulated from 

broader regional dynamics.102 As an Iraqi academic 

argued at a conference, Iraq, because of its geographic 

location, is part of the Arab world, and one cannot 

simply separate or isolate it from its Arab neighbors.103

Moreover, as another academic emphasized, “Arab, 

Islamic, and regional” forces cannot escape having an 

impact on Iraq’s policies.104

Even with the still tenuous domestic situation, 

most Iraqis feel that their country by right ought 

to play a—or the—leading role in the Arab world. 

Despite the domestic fragmentation in Iraq, there 

seems to be an emerging academic consensus, at least 

among those able to overcome confessional loyalties, 

that Iraq should again play a major regional role, and 

that what is holding Iraq back from “influencing the 

regional system” is only “the lack of consensus among 

the patriotic Iraqi forces.” Moving from analysis to 

prescription, a conference participant concluded that 

“Iraq must regain its place in the world and in the 

Arab world in general, and vis-à-vis the neighboring 

countries in particular.”105 As the Deputy Chair of 

Iraq’s National Assembly reminded his colleagues at 

the 15th Conference of Arab Parliaments held in Oman 

in 2009, “Iraq is still an important factor in the Arab 
31

world [Umma],” and he assured them that Iraq would 

be “returning to the Arab arena in full force.”106

As noted, Iraq is part of a regional geostrategic 

and political system, and what its neighbors do with 

respect to nuclear power is likely to have a significant 

impact on Baghdad’s own decisionmaking process. 

Even more than Iran’s actions with regard to nuclear 

weapons, what Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Turkey do may 

be even more salient for Iraq. Some Iraqi observers take 

it for granted that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons 

then the Arab states in the Gulf, for their part, will 

be impelled to undertake “an arms race, including a 

nuclear one,” adding an additional unsettling factor to 

the Iraqi calculus.107

For many Iraqis, being a regional leader, as noted 

above, also means being a leader in the field of nuclear 

power. It should not be surprising that Iraqis would 

want to participate in the same trends emerging 

around them in the region. At the moment, and for the 

foreseeable future, the tendency among virtually all of 

Iraq’s neighbors is to consider or actually embark on 

some type of nuclear power development, including 

some oil-rich states such as the UAE and Kuwait. Any 

Iraqi government will likely seek to avoid opening 

itself to criticism for its lack of support of scientific 

progress, whether in comparison to Iraq’s neighbors 

or to the previous regime. Scientific achievements, and 

especially in the glamorous and high-profile field of 

atomic power, may well be the chosen vehicle to bolster 

the new regime’s domestic and regional legitimacy.108

Rebuilding an Infrastructure.

There have been discreet initiatives by the Iraqi 

government to help reestablish a nuclear program. 

Of course, in the recent past, the development of 
32

civilian and military nuclear programs in Iraq were 

intertwined, serving as a catalyst for conflict with the 

West, particularly the United States, one could have 

expected that after Saddam’s fall and the end of the 

occupation, measures would be taken to reorganize 

the country’s nuclear establishment. 

In August 2003, the Provisional Government formed the Ministry of Science and Technology, absorbing 

the formerly independent Atomic Energy Organization and the Military Industrialization Corporation. 

Some Iraqis voiced this as an attempt to downgrade 

the country’s nuclear potential, with an editorial in an 

Iraqi scientific journal criticizing the move and calling 

for “a review of the hasty decision.” The editorial 

suggested that at least a separate nuclear directorate 

be retained in the new ministry, arguing that all 

“developed countries” have nuclear power agencies.109

A distinct National Nuclear Power Committee was 

established within the new Ministry. In 2009, the 

Baghdad government also announced its intention to 

establish an official independent oversight body, the 

National Committee for Atomic Energy, to not only 

coordinate with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) and other relevant foreign entities, but 

also “to energize the Iraqi nuclear installations” and 

“to prepare high-quality specialists [for overseeing] 

the national program in order to prepare such cadres 

of [the appropriate] quality and number.”110

Over time, Iraq has taken concrete steps to rebuild 

at least some aspects of its nuclear capabilities. Iraq’s 

Minister of Science and Technology, Ra’id Fahmi, 

for example, requested formally that his country’s 

outstanding “nuclear file” dating from the Saddam 

regime be “closed . . . completely . . . officially, and for 

good,” and cast his case against the lingering obstacles 
33

in terms of “the right of states” to use nuclear power 

for peaceful purposes.111 One can sense an underlying 

resentment, even within government circles, of what 

is perceived as an unjustified suppression of Iraq’s 

legitimate right to atomic power. For example, when 

announcing that Iraq would adhere to the IAEA’s 

additional protocols on nuclear assurances, the 

government spokesman, Ali Al-Dabbagh, added that 

this would help strengthen Iraq’s ongoing efforts to 

end the oversight of the IAEA’s Iraqi task force by 

eliminating the “excuses” (mubarrirat) on which some 

Security Council countries rely to have that team 

continue its oversight work.112

In practical terms, the Iraqi government has also 

worked to reintegrate the country into the Arab world’s 

official nuclear research mainstream and to highlight 

the country’s expertise after years of isolation. The Arab 

world, for its part—perhaps anxious for additional 

balance between Iran and Israel—has indicated that 

it would welcome Iraq back in the nuclear fold. For 

example, Iraq has been able to resume cooperation 

with the Arab League’s Atomic Energy Agency. The 

Secretary General of the Arab League, Egypt’s Amr 

Moussa, reiterated in August 2008 to a visiting Iraqi 

delegation dealing with nuclear power that “the Arab 

countries must absolutely enter the field of the peaceful 

uses of atomic energy.”113 Iraq also served as the Chair 

for the Arab League’s 3-day conference monitoring 

Israeli nuclear activity “in violation of the Treaty on the 

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” held in Cairo 

in 2008, and helped work on the joint Arab position in 

response to “the threat of Israel’s nuclear weapons.”114

Later that same year, the Director General of the 

Arab Atomic Energy Organization invited a highlevel Iraqi delegation to participate in the agency’s 
34

21st conference in Beirut, Lebanon, where plans were 

discussed for Arab cooperation on the peaceful uses of 

nuclear power to 2020. Iraq’s Minister of Science and 

Technology stressed at the conference his country’s 

eagerness to become involved again, stating that 

Iraq was “fully prepared to offer the experience of its 

scientists and specialists” to develop a joint strategy. 

Moreover, he was gratified that a recommendation 

was to be made to the Arab League to support the lifting of United Nations (UN) Resolution 707, passed in 

1991, which had mandated intrusive inspections in 

Iraq and prohibited activity in the nuclear field.115

Iraq has also been showing greater assertiveness 

on other aspects of this issue, with its National 

Assembly, for example, in 2009, resurfacing an earlier 

claim against Israel for compensation for the damage 

the latter caused by its 1981 air strike against Iraq’s 

Osirak/Tammuz reactor.116 This issue has continued 

to remain active, with complaints that since Iraq was 

obliged to continue paying reparations for the 1990 

invasion of Kuwait and since it still owed money to 

France for the reactor, a 1981 UN Resolution calling for 

reparations for the reactor should be enforced.117

During his visit to France in February 2009, Iraq’s 

Minister for Electricity, Karim Wahid, requested that 

France help build a nuclear reactor in Iraq “because . . .

the future is in nuclear power.”118 Also indicative of 

Iraq’s interest in foreign assistance in the nuclear area 

was the apparent gaffe by an Iraqi government official 

in announcing that Italy’s partially state-owned Eni 

energy conglomerate would invest in nuclear power in 

Iraq. Eni, perhaps embarrassed by the public disclosure, 

was quick to stress that its investment would be only in 

the oil sector.119 By late 2009, an Iraqi diplomat, Ali AlBayati, Counselor at the Embassy in London, told Abu 
35

Dhabi’s Al-Arabiyya TV that his country had “begun to 

study a plan to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful 

purposes,” which he declared was “Iraq’s right.”120

Objective Obstacles. There are, to be sure, 

significant practical obstacles that militate against a

rapid resumption of nuclear-related activity—civilian

and, even more so, military—to include the country’s physical infrastructure (still incompletely reconstituted), marginal fuel resources, and depleted human 

capital.

Nuclear Materials and Facilities. Iraq’s nuclear 

facilities were damaged by U.S. air strikes in 1991 

and again in 2003, with decontamination and 

decommissioning beginning with international help 

after Saddam’s fall.121 Iraq’s recent disposal of its 

nuclear fuel material also presents a serious obstacle 

to a rapid reestablishment of its nuclear program. In 

an operation shrouded in secrecy in 2008, Iraq sold its 

stock of 550 metric tons (in 3,500 barrels) of apparently 

commercial-grade yellow cake (milled uranium oxide), 

to the Canadian company Cameco.122

The Iraqi government appeared to be sensitive to 

domestic criticism, insisting that the entire operation 

had been Iraq’s alone and that the United States had 

only provided technical advice (although the U.S. 

military had transported the materials, reportedly at 

only 10 percent of the actual shipping cost).123 An Iraqi 

government spokesman cited the reasons why Iraq had 

divested itself of the material as being environmental 

concerns and the expense of providing security, as well 

as “the impossibility of using it locally anyhow.”124

As Iraq’s Minister for Science and Technology, Ra’id 

Fahmi, later clarified, however, there were also 

political motives, namely, a desire to meet the terms of 

UNSC 1991 Resolution 687, so as to bring Iraq into full 
36

compliance with the provisions of the cease-fire of that 

year.125 At the same time, the Minister saw this as an 

important step toward acquiring assistance “for Iraq to 

reestablish its right to engage in nuclear activities for 

peaceful purposes.”126

Some in Iraq were incensed by the transfer of 

the nuclear materials. Iraq’s Association of Muslim 

Scholars, for example, fulminated against what it 

called “the theft, . . . of a great national treasure” in 

its Communique 568 of July 8, 2008. Calling for a 

condemnation of the action, the communique reiterated 

that the uranium oxide remained Iraqi property and 

that “soon Iraq’s rights would return to the people.”127

Another Iraqi observer living in Sweden cast doubt on 

the Iraqi government’s assertion that it had agreed to 

the initiative, dismissing the rationale that it had been 

done for the safety of the Iraqi population and labeling 

the U. S. operation “banditry . . . more like the action 

of a cowboy.”128 A former senior Iraqi military officer 

likewise called those who claimed that the uranium 

was sold out of fear that terrorists would gain access 

“ignorant, gullible, and lacking a conscience.”129 He 

insisted that the uranium had been locally mined and 

should have been used locally rather than sold for “a 

trifling price.”130

Iraq’s Scientific Community. Iraq’s scientific human 

capital is also far from being reconstituted. To be sure, 

the knowledge base gained with the breakthroughs 

achieved in the last phases of Iraq’s program before 

its sudden termination during the Gulf War is still 

extant in the minds of the country’s former scientists. 

However, they are now scattered and far removed. 

With most now approaching retirement age and with 

no sustained program in place to train and organize 

their successors, reconstituting the old programs 
37

will become difficult and complicated unless present 

personnel trends are reversed.

Nuclear scientists—as well as other Iraqi academics—have often felt threatened in the aftermath 

of Saddam‘s fall. Many were pursued by the U.S. 

occupation force for arrest in connection with their 

previous activity. Moreover, it appears that many 

intellectuals have also been targeted for assassination 

or kidnapping, and many have fled abroad—including 

to other Arab countries and Iran—because they felt 

vulnerable.131 Reports of murdered Iraqi scientists 

have been frequent in the Iraqi media and on the 

Web, with one journalist claiming that “if one wants 

to destroy this country, it can be accomplished by 

killing its scientists,” since that would scuttle Iraq’s 

“development, progress, and rebirth.”132 A leading 

Iraqi nuclear scientist, Nur Al-Din Al-Rabi, estimated 

that Iraq lost some 5,500 scientists through emigration 

or assassination.133 Another source estimated that 

of those killed, 350 were nuclear scientists.134 As a 

baseline, an Iraqi nuclear scientist estimated that at 

one time some 2,000 scientists and researchers, and 

10,000 engineers and technicians, had worked on 

Iraq’s nuclear program.135

While those responsible have seldom been identified and may include financially-motivated criminals, 

Iranian intelligence, and sectarian killers, Iraqi 

sources frequently have blamed unnamed “foreign 

intelligence” or have alleged the Mossad, Israel’s 

secret service, implicating at times U.S. acquiescence.136

The attribution to Mossad may be plausible, given 

the latter’s track record of reported assassinations in 

earlier years of individuals connected with Iraq’s arms 

programs, allegedly including the developer of Iraq’s 

“super gun,” Gerald Bull, and the then-director of its 

nuclear program, Yahya Al-Mashadd.137
38

The Iraqi government has more recently begun 

to make efforts to reconstitute the country’s scientific 

community by significantly raising salaries for 

professors and announcing plans to send 10,000 

graduate students and faculty in the sciences abroad 

over the next 4 years for study and research.138 The 

Iraqi government is also seeking to repatriate scientists in the diaspora.139 In 2009, Iraq’s Prime Minister, 

Nuri Al-Maliki, specifically stressed the need to 

invite nuclear scientists to return home.140 However, 

due to continuing security concerns, this process of 

reintegrating academics may be slow. As of October 

2008, for example, of 6,700 professors who had left 

after 2003, only 150 had returned.141 The United States, 

for its part, developed a pilot program to recruit Iraqi 

scientists formerly involved in the country’s military 

research programs for new civilian jobs.142 Despite such 

efforts, it is unlikely that the damage suffered by Iraq’s 

scientific establishment can be undone quickly, and 

there are indications that returning academics are often 

disappointed by the lack of immediate employment 

opportunities.143

Nuclear Security Concerns. Security related to a 

nuclear program, both from accidents and the diversion 

of nuclear materials, will remain a valid concern. 

First, as with any nuclear program, and especially a 

fledgling one, there is the possibility of mechanical or 

human error, leading to an accident which could have 

disastrous implications for the entire region.144 The 

current reduced complement of experts in the field 

available in Iraq and the still rebuilding government 

structures may heighten the risk and complicate a 

rapid and effective disaster response and damage 

control capability. 
39

Moreover, radioactive materials inherent in even a 

peaceful nuclear program could be misappropriated 

by terrorists for use in a radiological dispersal device 

(the so-called “dirty bomb”). The still unstable security 

situation in Iraq and the continuing disruptive activity 

by al-Qaeda, even if at a substantially reduced level, 

are legitimate reasons for concern in this area. The 

fact that three employees of the Ministry of Science 

and Technology were arrested in 2008 on charges 

of al-Qaeda membership highlights the continuing 

potential risks of compromise by terrorists of sensitive 

technology, information, or materials.145 The high 

degree of corruption at all levels of Iraq’s political 

system and society poses a real security vulnerability 

in this respect.146 The dire economic straits under which 

so many Iraqis live only magnify the risk for corruption 

potentially leading to such a diversion.147

Although unlikely, the possibility of reestablishing 

a covert Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the future 

cannot be dismissed categorically. Despite the progress 

made over time, there are still questions today about 

the effectiveness of international monitoring of 

civilian nuclear programs to ensure against diversion 

of resources to a military program. A report of the 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which 

evaluated the efficacy of the IAEA in detecting and 

ensuring against such an eventuality, stated that the 

inspection agency continues to have serious deficiencies in this regard.148 The willingness of other 

governments to transfer nuclear technology in 

return for money adds to the peril of covert nuclear 

proliferation.149 Iraqis, however, seldom voice such 

concerns. A rare exception was a leftist writer in Iraq 

who did worry about the widespread trend in the 

Middle East to seek nuclear reactors for allegedly 
40

peaceful purposes, noting that such technologies 

could be diverted for military purposes.150

Iraq’s Decisionmaking Parameters on Nuclear Weapons. 

Whether Iraq ever decides to seek to reestablish a 

military nuclear program will depend on complex 

domestic and regional dynamics.

The Factors in Decisionmaking. The preceding 

analysis suggests that, despite the upheaval accompanying the U. S. invasion and the elimination of the

Saddam regime, the idea of the utility of nuclear 

weapons may still be present in certain circles, and 

may one day be revived in Iraq. Andrew Flibbert, 

in particular, has made a cogent inferential case that 

Iraq’s historical experience, geography, and regional 

security situation will predispose it to renew its quest 

for nuclear and other WMD even in the absence of 

Saddam. He stresses enduring conditions as driving a 

future return to proliferation in Iraq, while criticizing 

what he terms the overemphasis on personality in our 

analytical perspective, that is, a focus on the role an 

individual such as Saddam played in such a process.151

As Flibbert puts it: 

Without a fundamental transformation of the regional security environment, too many incentives will 

drive any future sovereign Iraqi state to seek nuclear 

and other WMD. Most of the underlying causes of 

Iraq’s pursuit of WMD remain in place today, and 

nothing is likely to change the continuing reality. The 

war launched by the United States could generate the 

greatest proliferation pressure of all.152

Some, on the other hand, have made convincing 

arguments for the continuing importance and impact 

of leaders and personalities in making key decisions 

in world affairs, all the more so for the individualoriented regimes common in the Middle East.153
41

Perhaps the most fruitful framework for understanding the developing decisionmaking situation on

nuclear power in Iraq is a combination of both approaches. However important they may be, even 

enduring historical or geographic factors do not 

foreordain a country’s policies or security choices. As 

an analogy, although naval theorist Alfred Thayer 

Mahan isolated various long-term geographic, historical, economic, and social factors as predisposing a 

nation to become a sea power, he nevertheless capped 

his taxonomy with a final factor: “The Character 

of the Government, including therein the national 

institutions.” This human factor in Mahan’s judgment, 

could balance the preceding natural conditions: 

“Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular forms 

of government with their accompanying institutions, 

and the character of rulers at one time or another, 

have exercised a very marked influence upon the 

development of sea power.” He thus recognized that 

governments have a free will, exercising what he calls 

“intelligent will-power.”154 For example, countries 

with a geographic configuration such as a long coastline or location near key waterways could still be 

oriented on being continental powers rather than sea 

powers—such as the United States until at least 1898, 

or Japan until World War II—because of conscious 

policy choices. 

In that vein, what this survey of Iraqi opinion 

within the informed public does indicate is the 

existence of a domestic intellectual and political 

environment that is receptive to the notion of nuclear 

weapons as a useful and legitimate instrument of 

national power. However, there is no direct linear 

correlation between such opinions and the eventual 

acquisition of nuclear weapons. In particular, there 

would still be a requirement for a viable leadership to 
42

mobilize domestic opinion and resources, deal with 

the international consequences, and then formulate 

and implement concrete policies. As an Iraqi academic 

argued, the geographic factor in and of itself is not the 

sole determinant of Iraqi policy. As or more important 

will be how decisionmakers utilize and maximize the 

potential of geography to promote specific policies.155

The Domestic Political Dynamic. Iraq’s political 

establishment at present is visibly fragmented, and 

the political situation is likely to remain unstable for 

some time to come, with Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish 

blocs assessing threats and remedies from markedly 

different perspectives, not to speak of the splintering 

and shifting alliances within the confessional/ethnic 

communities and political blocs themselves.156 Iraqi 

intellectuals recognize that the role of their country in 

regional and international affairs is still evolving and 

anything but clear, a consensus conclusion reached at 

a roundtable of academics in Baghdad recently.157 The 

country’s political leaders will likely be distracted for 

the foreseeable future by far more pressing domestic 

challenges, and Iraq may be entering a long bout of 

instability not unlike that of the 1950s-60s. 

Whether certain attitudes are translated into 

concrete policies in the near future or ever—especially 

insofar as a renewed attempt to acquire nuclear 

weapons is concerned—depends on numerous 

unpredictable events. No one can forecast what the 

final constellation of forces within Iraq will look like, 

and internal dynamics will play a pivotal role in 

determining Iraq’s security orientation and priorities 

and its practical approach to WMD. Paradoxically, 

if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a Shi’a-dominated 

government in Baghdad might welcome from Iran 

a nuclear umbrella against Israel or hostile Sunni 
43

neighbors and perhaps forgo developing its own 

nuclear arsenal. Such an eventuality would obviously 

provide Tehran with continuing leverage over Iraq. 

Or a nuclear Iran might help a Shi’a-controlled Iraq 

by selling to it or otherwise providing nuclear knowhow and materials, perhaps as a way to help finance 

Iran’s own nuclear program. Conversely, a Sunnidominated or secular government in Baghdad might 

be encouraged by other Sunni neighbors to develop 

nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to Iran if the 

latter becomes a nuclear power.

It is reassuring that a recent Iraqi Minister of 

Science and Technology, Rashad Mandan Omar, 

categorically affirmed that Iraq would never acquire 

WMD in the future, describing the reason as follows: 

“Our country and our people are tired of all those 

stupid policies which the former regime adopted, 

and which cost us in material and moral terms.”158

Indeed, the new Iraqi Constitution, adopted in 2005, 

bars the acquisition of all WMD. Article 9 states that 

“the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement 

Iraq’s international obligations regarding the nonproliferation, non-development, non-production, and 

non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, 

and shall prohibit associated equipment, materiel, 

technologies, and delivery systems for use in the 

development, manufacture, production, and use of 

such weapons.”159 On August 19, 2008, Iraq signed the 

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In addition, 

in September 2009, the Iraqi Council of Ministers 

approved a bill to establish a government agency to 

monitor a ban on all WMD in Iraq, and forwarded the 

legislation to the Parliament for discussion.160 Such 

initiatives, however, may be insufficient in the long 

term unless the present perceived threat environment 

and domestic intellectual attitudes in Iraq change.
44

The Limits of U.S. Guidance. U. S. moral suasion on 

the nuclear issue may be undercut by what some Iraqis 

perceive as an American double standard, in regard 

to both its acceptance of Israel’s continuing nuclear 

monopoly and its divergent approach to its own nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis those of Iraq and other 

countries. For example, the late Isam Al-Baghdadi, then 

editor of The Iraqi Scientific Review, surfaced the issue 

in 2003, albeit somewhat elliptically. Having echoed 

former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s questions 

about the U.S. failure to ratify the Nuclear Test-Ban 

Treaty and its development of a new generation of 

nuclear weapons, Al-Baghdadi wondered whether 

the United States considered only its own interests in 

dealing with the proliferation issue: “Why does the 

[U.S.] prohibit other countries from looking after their 

own security priorities?”161

Another observer likewise noted a double standard, taxing the IAEA for having been harsh with 

Iraq’s nuclear program while being soft on Iran’s.162

Still another frustrated Iraqi commentator charged 

that “America was silent and is still silent, along with 

the other countries which have nuclear weapons, 

about the Israeli nuclear program.”163 This perception 

of a double standard by the United States with regard 

to Israeli nuclear weapons has also led to Iraqi skepticism of U.S. proposals for a nuclear security umbrella in 

the region, given Iraqi perceptions of Israel as a potential threat. One commentator pointedly inquired: “If 

the United States defends Israel from Iran, who will 

defend the Arabs from Israel?” He then recommended 

that the Arabs create their own strategic counter, 

balance to Israel.164

Ba’athi sources have been predictably vocal to the 

effect that the United States was not preventing Iran’s 

march toward nuclear weapons, with one commen-
45

tator even arguing that the United States was secretly 

favoring “its old Iranian ally,” and that the United 

States did not mind the latter’s acquiring nuclear 

weapons with which it could threaten the Arabs.165

An Iraqi Shi’a writer, on the other hand, also criticized 

what he saw as the U.S. double standard, but focused 

on the fact that Washington was “pursuing Iran day 

and night” while exempting India from controls over 

its nuclear activity.166

CONCLUSIONS

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this 

analysis. 

1. In the near term, one can expect increasing Iraqi 

calls for a revival of the country’s nuclear capability, 

at least in the civilian sector, which reflects a general 

consensus within key sectors of Iraqi public opinion as 

well as a growing regional trend. 

2. The Iraqi government will continue to reestablish 

its legitimacy by its support of a nuclear program. 

3. Significant practical obstacles will hamper rapid 

Iraqi development in the nuclear field without foreign 

support.

4. Despite a continuing widespread perception of 

the utility of nuclear weapons, at least within some 

sectors of Iraqi opinion, a near-term resumption of 

a military nuclear program is not likely, although 

volatile conditions in the region and within Iraq itself 

could change that likelihood at some time in the future. 

The nature of the government in Baghdad will be key 

to any such decision.
46

RECOMMENDATIONS

Several policy recommendations can be made based on the preceding study. While some ways to help 

manage the future are applicable specifically to Iraq, 

others may require a regional approach that subsumes 

Iraq.

First, U. S. and international policymakers should 

start thinking about helping to manage the process of 

an orderly, safe, and peaceful reintegration of Iraq in 

the civilian nuclear sector. It will be difficult for the 

United States or the international community to ignore 

or to outright reject Iraq’s expectations on the nuclear 

issue. Given the deeply-felt entitlement throughout 

Iraq’s informed public and in light of the almost 

universal regional trends, to seek to hamper Baghdad’s 

parallel efforts may well be counterproductive, causing 

significant resentment without succeeding in any case. 

Joint projects and technical cooperation with 

the international community could encourage the 

establishment and application of robust environmental 

safeguards and facilitate an effective verification 

regime and strict accountability for Iraqi civilian 

programs and facilities, while helping Baghdad 

achieve its stated objectives. An ancillary benefit of 

encouraging and guiding an Iraqi nuclear program for 

peaceful purposes is that it could employ many of the 

country’s nuclear scientists, including many of those 

now in the diaspora, thereby reducing the likelihood 

that they might put their talents to work for other state 

or nonstate entities for nonpeaceful purposes.

Second, policymakers in the United States and 

the international community should ensure that any 

return to a nuclear program be accompanied by Iraq’s 

acceptance of strict international monitoring and 
47

controls to prevent any diversion to the military field 

or terrorist use. It remains to be seen whether Iraqis 

would be happy with tight controls, such as using 

imported already-enriched fuel, and ensuring that any 

bomb-potential by-products are exported. However, 

we should insist on such precautions. While a regional 

regime of guidelines would likely be more effective 

and more palatable to Iraq and other countries, such 

an option is likely to stumble on the issue of exceptions 

made for Israel. 

Third, U.S. policymakers and military leaders 

should focus on ensuring that any peaceful nuclear 

program in Iraq is as secure from accidents as possible 

which, as noted, remain a continuing challenge even 

in technologically advanced countries. The United 

States can help in this area by providing sound technical advice, as well as training in operational safety 

and disposal of nuclear waste, and assistance with 

the development of emergency response capabilities 

to deal with the aftermath of any accidents. 

Fourth, once stability in Iraq increases, U.S. 

military and civilian government agencies should 

launch an effort to educate the Iraqi military, 

government officials, and the general population on 

nuclear power. The focus should be on the realistic 

benefits and costs of nuclear power, and in particular, 

on the risks and undesirability of nuclear weapons. 

Traditionally, the Iraqi military has viewed the use 

of nuclear weapons as a viable warfighting tool, and 

greater familiarity with the dangers of such a capability 

might help dampen future desires to proceed in that 

direction.167 This education can be accomplished as 

part of broader existing security courses or specialized 

instruction in the United States for key Iraqi personnel, 

as well as through public diplomacy directed toward a 

more general public. 
48

Fifth, intelligence analysts should continue to 

monitor public opinion in Iraq on the nuclear issue, 

as well as any covert activities which could lead to 

undesirable results, including support from other 

countries. At least for now, opinions can be expressed 

fairly openly in Iraq, reflecting attitudes both inside 

and outside the government. Developments in Iraq 

are dynamic so that changes need to be recognized, 

understood, and addressed in a timely manner.

Sixth, U.S. and international leaders can work to 

modify the Middle East regional threat environment 

so as to alleviate the domestic pressures for nuclear 

proliferation both in the civilian and in the military 

sphere. Unlike the realist assumption that states act 

as monolithic entities, the Iraqi case reminds us that 

frequently there is an interplay of fractious domestic 

forces and opinions, and that the international 

community can have an influence on outcomes by its 

advice and even more so by its actions. 

Specifically, a reduction in regional tensions 

by defusing perceived threats resulting from longstanding conflicts, in particular the Arab-Israeli 

conflict, could have a positive effect. A continuing fear 

of Israel’s nuclear intentions, as well as the embedded 

perception of a double standard by the international 

community when dealing with Israel’s nuclear 

weapons as opposed to those of other regional states, 

spurs and justifies calls for the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons as a counterweight. At the very least, genuine 

progress toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli issue 

would create an environment that is less conducive to 

consensus for the need of nuclear weapons. A parallel 

effort affecting the regional environment in this 

respect should aim to avoid threatening regimes such 

as Iran’s with forcible change. Such threats can be 
49

expected to make regional rulers defensive, putting a 

premium on acquiring a nuclear deterrent as a buttress 

to regime security, thus sparking a cascade effect.168

Seventh, U.S. policymakers can reassure governments and publics in Iraq and elsewhere in the region by providing a protective umbrella against the 

incipient Iranian nuclear threat they fear. Such a 

step has been already broached in principle by U.S. 

officials.169 An umbrella arrangement could play a key 

deterrent role against an Iranian threat and could also 

have a constructive impact on Iraqi decisionmaking, 

since Iraq might be less prone to look for the same 

capability in order to keep up with the rest of the region 

if its neighbors were also deflected from pursuing 

the nuclear weapons path. However, the inclusion of 

Israel in such a pact or requests for a permanent U.S. 

military presence in the region would likely derail it, 

as Egypt has already made clear.170 Moreover, there 

may be substantial doubts among Iraqis that have to 

be overcome. Lieutenant General Wafiq Al-Samarra’i 

dismissed outright any reliance on U.S. protection 

against regional nuclear threats, arguing that “talk of 

a U.S. nuclear umbrella for the region is misplaced 

[qasir] . . . since there is no guarantee that the present 

international balances and interests will continue over 

the long term as they are now. Who can guarantee that 

American power will continue as it is now?”171

Despite the complex challenges involved, this 

concept—if properly refined in concert with genuine 

progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process—could 

provide at least a measure of security that might 

slow down a regional arms race. Of course, it must be 

approached in a less formal and less public manner, 

perhaps as a private understanding of which all players are aware. In any event, any such U.S. assurances 

need to be crafted in a way that eschews publicly 
50

highlighting the inability of local regimes to provide 

for their own self-defense. Such a muted approach 

would preserve their domestic legitimacy while at the 

same time holding to a minimum the risk of the U.S. 

being dragged into a local conflict. 

ENDNOTES

1. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s 

WMD, Washington, DC: CIA, September 30, 2004, available from 

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/

index.html; and Norman Cigar, Why Did Iraq Want Nuclear 

Weapons? Perspectives of a Would-Be Nuclear Power, Maxwell AFB, 

AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, forthcoming.

2. Perhaps the most dramatic device used to mobilize public 

opinion for the war, and repeated often in the media, was the 

nuclear image crafted by National Security Adviser Condoleezza 

Rice, who warned that “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a 

mushroom cloud,” CNN Late Edition With Wolf Blitzer, September 

8, 2002.

3. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? 

Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, 

No. 3, Winter 1996-97, pp. 54-86.

4. Hamid Al-Bahili, “Al-Taqa al-dharriyya al-iraqiyya ila 

ayn?” (Where Is Iraq’s Nuclear Energy Headed?), Parts 1 and 2, 

Al-Adala, Baghdad, Iraq, August 18, 2003, p. 5; and September 8, 

2003, p. 5; and Hamid Al-Bahili, “Al-Bawwaba al-nawawiyya lil-istikhdamat al-silmiyya li-l-taqa al-dharriyya fi al-Iraq tuftah” 

(The Nuclear Portal to the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in Iraq 

Is Opening Up), Al-Adala, September 15, 2003, p. 5.

5. Asad Al-Khafaji, “Al-Taqa al-nawawiyya sayf dhu 

haddayn: Bayn bashaat al-istikhdam al-askari wa-hatmiyyat altatbiqat al-silmiyya” (Nuclear Energy Is a Two-edged Sword: 

Between the Ugliness of Military Use and the Inevitability of 

Peaceful Applications), Al-Majalla al-ilmiyya al-iraqiyya, Kuala 

Lumpur, Malaysia, December 17, 2003, available from www.
51

alhalem.net/derasat/qonbelanowawea.htm. Al-Khafaji has been based 

outside Iraq recently, in Canada and the UAE. 

6. Ibid.

7. Isam Al-Baghdadi, “Qarar hall al-taqa al-dharriyya 

khutwa li-l-wara’” (The Decision to Eliminate the Atomic Energy 

[Organization] Is a Step Backward), Al-Majalla al-ilmiyya aliraqiyya, August 16, 2003, available from www.ahewar.org/dbat/

show.art.asp?aid=10827.

8. Hamid Al-Bahili, “Al-kafa’at al-iraqiyya wa-dharurat alihtimam biha” (Iraqi Capabilities and the Obligation to Nurture 

Them), posted on the website of Shaykh Humam Hammudi, a 

member of Iraq’s National Assembly, September 2006, available 

from hamoudi.org/arabic/dialogue-of-intellect/06/09.htm.

9. Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf, “Istikhdam al-tiqniyya al-nawawiyya 

fi al-ulum al-ziraiyya: Madha? Wa-ila ayn?” (The Uses of Nuclear 

Technology in Agricultural Science: What? Where Is It Headed?), 

Majallat al-muzari, Kuwait, December 2008, reproduced on AlNakhil al-iraqi forum, available from www.iraqi-datepalms.net.

10. Ahmed Ali participating in a television program “Aswaq 

Al-Iraq” (Iraqi Markets) hosted by Hamdan Al-Jerjawi, AlArabiyya TV, Abu Dhabi, UAE, February 16, 2008, transcript 

available from www.alarabiya.net. 

11. Interview with Asad Al-Khafaji by Ahmad Yusuf, “AlAlim al-nawawi al-iraqi Asad Al-Khafaji: ‘Al-Khalij mulawwath 

nawawiyyan’” (Iraqi Nuclear Scientist Asad Al-Khafaji: ‘The Gulf 

Is Contaminated with Nuclear Material’), Al-Qabas, Kuwait, January 10, 2008, www.alqabas.com.

12. Interview with Ra’id Fahmi, “Li-l-Iraq haqq siyadi 

fi al-istikhdam al-silmi li-l-taqa al-dharriyya” (Iraq Has the 

Sovereign Right to the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power), Tariq alshab, Baghdad, Iraq, April 13, 2009, p. 2. Tariq al-shab is the Iraqi 

Communist Party’s official organ. 

13. Reported in “Hussein Al-Shahristani yadu ila ta’sis barnamij nawawi iraqi yustakhdam li-l-aghradh al-silmiyya” (Hussein Al-Shahristani Calls for the Establishment of an Iraqi Nuclear 
52

Program to Be Used for Peaceful Purposes), Al-Ahali, Baghdad, Iraq, 

March 3, 2008, www.ahali-iraq.net/detail.aspx?c=report&id=4710.

14. Interview with Hussein Al-Shahristani by Nidhal AlLaythi, “Tarikh tahwil al-barnamaj al-nawawi al-iraqi ila ahdaf 

askariyya” (The History of Diverting the Iraqi Nuclear Program 

to Military Ends), Al-Zaman al-jadid, London, UK, November 23, 

2006, available from www.alzaman.com.

15. Quoted in Karima Farhan, “Rafadh ismhu khawfan min 

tasfiyatihi min qibal quwa al-irhab al-alamiyya” (He Declined 

to Give His Name out of Fear That He Would Be Liquidated by 

the Forces of Global Terrorism), Al-Mada, Baghdad, Iraq, May 30, 

2004, available from www.almadapaper.com.

16. “Mustashfa jadid li-l-tibb al-nawawi fi Baghdad bi80 milyar” (A New Hospital for Nuclear Medicine in Baghdad 

Costing 80 Billion), Buratha News Agency, September 16, 2008, 

www.buratha.news.com/news_print_49497.html.

17. Interview with Fahmi, Tariq al-shab.

18. Salim al-Jabburi, participating in the television program 

“Aswaq Al-Iraq,” hosted by Hamdan Al-Jarjewi, Al-Arabiya TV, 

February 16, 2008, transcript at www.alarabiya.net. Emphasis 

added.

19. Ahmad Ali, ibid. 

20. Isam Al-Baghdadi, “Qarar hall al-taqa al-dharriyya.”

21. Farhan, “Rafadh ismhu.” 

22. Yusuf, “Istikhdam al-tiqniyya al-nawawiyya.” 

23. Asad Al-Khafaji, “Aidu li-l-Iraq haybathu al-nawawiyya” (Return to Iraq Its Nuclear Dignity), Al-Katib al-iraqi, 

June 13, 2009, iraqiwriter.com.

24. Available from www.most.gov.iq.
53

25. For a brief overview of countries with nuclear plans, see 

Joby Warrick, “Spread of Nuclear Capability Is Feared; Global 

Interest in Energy May Presage a New Arms Race,” Washington 

Post, May 12, 2008, p. A1.

26. Hamid Al-Mansuri, “Mata yastarji Al-Iraq uqulahu 

al-muhajira?” (When Will Iraq Retrieve Its Brains That Have 

Emigrated?), Al-Mada, June 9, 2007, www.almadapaper.com. The 

country’s Minister of Science and Technology likewise longed 

for earlier times, when Iraq had been “in the ranks of the advanced 

countries in the region showing promise in scientific research.” 

Interview with Ra’id Fahmi by Omar Sattar, “Al-Iraq arsa 

haykaliyyat al-hukuma al-iliktruniyya wa-yasa li-iadat al-uqul 

al-muhajira” (Iraq Has Solidified the Government’s Electronic 

Architecture and Is Striving to Repatriate the Brains Which 

Emigrated), Al-Hayat, London, UK, July 21, 2009, available from 

international.daralhayat.com/internationalarticle/39921.

27. Staff Major General Nuri Ghafil Al-Dulaymi, “Ayyuha 

al-mughaffalun annahu laysa yuraniyum al-nidham al-sabiq!” 

(You Gullible Ones, That Is Not the Previous Regime’s Uranium!) 

Akhbar Al-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq, July 8, 2008, available from www.

aliraqnews.com.

28. Yusuf, “Istikhdam al-tiqniyya al-nawawiyya.” 

29. See “Saddam wa-l-yahud” (Saddam and the Jews), 

undated, on the self-proclaimed Ba’athi website available from 

saddam.awardspace.com/index.php?ch=1&cho=2. Previously, Iraqi 

officials had always denied that Osirak/Tammuz had been 

intended for military purposes.

30. Khalil Ibrahim Al Issa, “Ma alladhi yadfa Isra’il taghryir 

istratijiyyat al-ghumudh al-nawawi al-radia wa-l-arab yaishun 

al-suqut al-hadhari wa-l-hazima al-shamila” (What Is It That 

Is Driving Israel toward Changing Its Strategy of Ambivalent 

Nuclear Deterrence While the Arabs Are Living through Cultural 

Collapse and Utter Defeat?), Sawt Al-Iraq, July 18, 2004, available 

from www.sotaliraq.com.
54

31. Majid Kayyali, “Al-Tahdid al-isra’ili ala akthar min said” 

(The Israeli Threat Exists on More Than One Level), Al-Furat, 

Baghdad, Iraq, May 12, 2005, p. 5.

32. Al Issa, “Ma alladhi yadfa Isra’il.” 

33. Interview with Asad Al-Khafaji by Ahmad Yusuf, “D 

Asad Al-Khafaji: al-mashruat al-nawawiyya laysat ‘makiyazhan’ 

siyasiyan li-l-hukkam” (Dr. Asad Al-Khafaji: The Nuclear 

Programs Are Not Just Political ‘Cosmetics’ for the Rulers), AlHiwar al-mutamaddin, Copenhagen, Denmark, October 16, 2006, 

available from www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=78306.

34. Latif Al-Wakil, “Ma’sat istratijiyyat al-umam almuttahida 

wa-silah al-jamia al-arabiyya” (The Tragedy of the United Nations’ Strategy and the Arab League’s Weapon), Buratha News 

Agency, August 10, 2006, available from www.burathanews.com/

news_print_5785.html.

35. Interview with Ahmad Al-Hasani Al-Baghdadi on Syrian 

TV, April 25, 2006, transcript on Al-Baghdadi’s website online 

available from www.alsaed-albaghdadi.com/all%20page/mq%2037.

htm.

36. Kadhim Shaltagh, “Hakadha yanbaghi an tufham alaqat 

shabna al-iraqi bi-Iran al-islamiyya” (This Is How the Relationship between Our Iraqi People and Islamic Iran Must Be 

Understood), Bint Al-Rafidayn, Baghdad, Iraq, November 2008, 

available from www.bentalrafedain.com/contact/200811/n11056.htm.

37. Sermon by Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Al-Hasani AlBaghdadi, carried by AlBasrah.net, February 28, 2008, available 

from www.albasrah.net/ar_articles_2008/0208/bqdadi_280208.htm.

38. For example, “Hawl barnamijha al-nawawi: hal yastami 

al-gharb ila al-muqtarahat al-iraniyya?” (On the Subject of Its Nuclear Program: Will the West Listen to the Iranian Suggestions?), 

Al-Sawt al-akhar, Baghdad, Iraq, April 7, 2008, available from 

www.sotakhr.com. 

39. Reported by Munir Al-Mawari, “Bahith shii iraqi: ‘AlNufudh al-irani fi Al-Iraq la yutaq’” (An Iraqi Shi’a Researcher: 

“Iranian Influence Will Not Be Tolerated in Iraq“), Al-Sharq Al-
55

Awsat, London, UK, April 12, 2006, available from alsharqalawsat.

com.

40. Falih Al-Fayyadh, quoted by the Aswat Al-Iraq news 

agency, Baghdad, Iraq, “Murashshah li-ri’asat al-barlaman qaliq 

min ’Iran nawawiyya’ wa-na’iban yuqallilan min al-makhawif” 

(A Candidate for Speaker of the Parliament Is Concerned about 

a “Nuclear Iran” While Two Parliamentarians Downplay Any 

Fears), February 6, 2009, available from ar.aswataliraq.info/index.ph

p?s+%D9%86%D9%88%D9%88%D9%8A&paged=2.

41. Communiqué number 22 by Grand Ayatollah Ahmad 

Al-Hasani Al-Baghdadi, “Man hum al-irhabiyyun nahnu am 

antum?” (Who Are the Terrorists? We or You?), March 16, 2007, 

available from www.alsaed-albaghdadi.com/all%20page/b%2022.

html. 

42. Ahmad Mahdi Al-Yasiri, “Hatta law harrartum Al-Quds 

satabqawn fi nadharhim safawiyyun wa-majus kafara” (Even 

If You Liberated Jerusalem You Would Remain in Their Eyes 

Safavids and Infidel Majus), Buratha News Agency, April 29, 

2006, available from www.burathanews.com/news_print_1288.html.

43. Ibid.

44. Hamid Al-Atiyya, “Tukhawwil al-ittifaqiyya al-amniyya 

Amrika nashr al-dar al-sarukhi fi Al-Iraq” (The Security 

Agreement Grants to America the Right to Deploy a Missile 

Shield in Iraq), Bint al-Rafidayn, November 2008, available from 

www.bentalrafedayn.com/contact/200811/n11100.htm.

45. The foregoing quoted material is from Mundhir AlKawthar , “Al-Mashru al-nawawi al-irani wa-l-arab wa-Isra’il 

wa-khalfiyyat al-mubadara” (The Iranian Nuclear Program, the 

Arabs, Israel, and the Background to the Initiative), Al-Iraq aljadid, London, UK, April 4, 2007, available from www.thenewiraq.

com/tni/view_printer.asp?ID=2478.

46. Muhammad Muslim Al-Husseini, “Tiqniyyat Iran alnawawiyya wa-hatmiyyat al-niza al-askari” (Iran’s Nuclear 

Technology and the Inevitability of a Military Confrontation), 

Babil, Baghdad, Iraq, September 19, 2007, www.babil.info/

printVersion.php?mid=9408.
56

47. Abd Al-Kadhim Al-Abboudi, “Al-Hulukust al-nawawi alirani-al-amriki al-qadim la yahriq Al-Iraq wahdahu” (The Coming 

Iranian-American Nuclear Holocaust Will Not Destroy Just 

Iraq), Al-Basra, July 23, 2009, available from www.albasrah.net.

ar_articles_2009/0709/3abdkadem_230709.htm. Al-Abboudi is a

prominent writer for the Iraqi Communist Party’s publication 

Al-Kadir.

48. “Al-Iraq yarfudh bi-quwwa istikhdam ajwa’hu li-shann 

hujum isra’ili ala Iran” (Iraq Categorically Rejects the Use of Its 

Airspace for Any Attack against Iran), Al-Rafidayn, Baghdad, Iraq, 

July 8, 2009, available from www.alrafidayn.com/index.php?view=ar

ticle&catid=1%3Anews&kid=10963%3A20.

49. Interview with Tariq Al-Hashimi, “Hukumat Nuri AlMaliki tatamid al-izdiwajiyya fi mawdhu al-malaff al-amni” 

(The Nuri Al-Maliki Government Uses Split Responsibilities for 

the Security Portfolio), Radio Sawa, September 4, 2007, available 

from www.radiosawa.com.

50. Muhammad Al-Musawi, “Al-Tiqniyya wa-l-qudra alnawawiyyatayn . . . mafahim dhat taarif wa-ru’an ahadiyya” 

(Nuclear Technology and Power . . . Concepts with Multiple 

Definitions But the Same Visions), Bint Al-Rafidayn, September 

2008, available from www.brob.org/contact/200809/n10402.htm.

51. Mustafa Muhammad Gharib, “Al-Siyasa al-iraniyya wa-alsilah al-nawawi” (Iranian Policy and Nuclear Weapons), Ilaf, March 

15, 2005, available from www.elaph.com/ElaphWriter/2005/3/48230.

htm.

52. Khalid Al-Hamud, “Hal al-taghayyur qadim? Li-man? 

Wa-ma huwa dawr al-quwa al-wataniyya al-iraqiyya?” (Is 

Change Coming? For Whom? And What Is the Role for Patriotic 

Iraqi Forces?), Shabab Al-Iraq, February 6, 2009, available from 

iraqshabab.net.

53. Mustafa Ismail, “Iran al-nawawiyya akhtar am Iran alqamiyya?” (Is a Nuclear Or a Repressive Iran More Dangerous?), 

Sawt Al-Iraq, January 26, 2006, available from www.sotaliraq.com. 
57

54. Mahdi Qasim, “Layakun wujud Najad ghayr marghub bih 

fi Al-Iraq” (Let (Ahmadi) Najad’s Presence in Iraq Be Unwelcome), 

Sawt Al-Iraq, February 28, 2008, available from www.sotaliraq.com.

55. Riyadh Al-Amir, “Hal umma bayn mitraqa wa-sindan” 

(The Situation of the Ummah between the Hammer and the 

Anvil), part 2, Iraq al-ghad, Malmo, Sweden, August 26, 2004, 

available from www.iraqoftomorrow.org/articles/61429.html?print.

56. Interview with Lieutenant General Wafiq Al-Samarra’i 

by Usama Mahdi, “Al-Samarra’i li-Ilaf: tafkik Hamas wa-tahjim 

dawr Iran al-muzayid filastiniyyan” (Al-Samarra’i to Ilaf: Dissolve 

Hamas and Limit Iran’s Role of Outbidding on Palestine), Ilaf, 

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 18, 2009, available from www.elaph.

com.

57. Ali Al-Kash, “Dawa iraniyya kharqa’ li-l-intisab li-l-nadi 

al-nawawi al-iqlimi” (A Clumsy Iranian Call to Join the Regional 

Nuclear Club), Shabakat akhbar Al-Iraq, May 15, 2008, available 

from www.aliraqnews.com. 

58. Aziz Al-Hajj, “Iran al-nawawiyya ala tariq Saddam!” 

(A Nuclear Iran Following in Saddam’s Path), Bint Al-Rafidayn, 

August 2005, available from www.bentalrafedain.com/contact/

200508/n746.htm.

59. Ismail, “Iran al-nawawiyya akhtar.” 

60. Taha Al-Lahibi to Aswat Al-Iraq, February 6, 2009.

61. Hussein Hafidh, “Al-Silah al-nawawi fi mintaqat Al-Khalij 

wa-mustaqbal al-amn al-qawmi” (Nuclear Weapons in the Gulf 

Region and the Future of National Security), Al-Sabah, Baghdad, 

Iraq, March 18, 2008, available from www.alsabaah.com/paper.php?s

ource=akbar&mlf=copy&sid=19862.

62. Office of Culture and Media, National Command, Arab 

Socialist Ba’ath Party, “Qadisiyyat Saddam malhamat al-uruba 

al-khalida” (Saddam’s Qadisiyya: Unforgettable Epic Battle of 

Arabdom), September 21, 2008, available from www.hcjl.org.
58

63. Shakir Al-Jawhari, “Asbab hirs Bush ala hayat Najad fi 

Al-Iraq” (The Motives for Bush’s Protecting Najad’s Life in Iraq), 

Shabakat Al-Rafidayn al-akhbariyya, February 2008, available from 

alrafdean.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=94236.

64. Safi Al-Yasiri, “Imnau Iran nawawiyya” (Prevent a 

Nuclear Iran), Shabakat Al-Rafidayn al-akhbariyya, November 24, 

2008, available from www.alrafdean.com.

65. Abd Al-Jabbar Al-Mulla Salih, “Musalaha wataniyya 

am musalaha ma hizb Al-Ba’ath?” (National Reconciliation 

Or Reconciliation with the Ba’ath?), Al-Ahali, Baghdad, Iraq, 

January 29, 2008, available from www.ahali-iraq.net/detail.

aspx?c=articles&id=4864.

66. Jamil Muhsin, “Mansha’at nawawiyya suriyya qurb alhudud al-iraqiyya?” (Syrian Nuclear Facilities Near the Iraqi 

Border?), Babil, October 20, 2007, available from www.babil.info/

printVersion.php?mid=10110.

67. Hay’at ulama‘ al-muslimin fi Al-Iraq, “Istikhdam al-diaya 

wa-l-tadhlil fi harb Bush ala Al-Iraq” (The Use of Propaganda 

and Deception in Bush’s War against Iraq), May 16, 2008, available from www.iraq-amsi.org.

68. Riyadh Al-Amir, editor of Iraq al-ghad, “Taqyim al-ra’is 

Bashshar Al-Asad li-dawr Iran fi Al-Iraq!” (President Bashshar 

Al-Asad Appreciates Iran’s Role in Iraq), Babil, March 26, 2009, 

available from www.babil.info/printVersion.php?mid=18762.

69. Fa’iz Al-Tamimi, “Al-Urdun yuhaddid janub Al-Iraq bidharba nawawiyya!!” (Jordan Threatens Southern Iraq with a 

Nuclear Strike), Buratha News Agency, May 4, 2009, available 

from www.burathanews.com/index_lite/php?show=news&action=prin

t&id=65084.

70. Interview with Masud Al-Barazani, “Al-ra’is AlBarazani: Natamanna hall mushkilat al-malaff al-nawawi alirani bi-diblumasiya wa-yahumm shabna al-kurdi” (President 

Al-Barazani: We Hope for a Solution to the Iranian Nuclear 

Issue through Diplomacy and It Worries Our Kurdish People), 

Al-Qabas, Kuwait, May 16, 2006, reprinted in Sawt Al-Iraq, May 
59

18, 2006, available from www.sotaliraq.com/articles-iraq/nieuws.

php?id=31581.

71. Jawdat Hushiyar, “Al-Tasalluh al-nawawi al-irani—tahdid 

mubashir li-amn Al-Iraq” (Iran’s Nuclear Arming—A Direct 

Threat to Iraq’s Security), Al-Badil al-dimuqrati, no place given, 

October 30-31, 2005, available from albadeal.com/albadeal-2005-1/

oct-1-1/29-29-29/jwdat-11-.htm.

72. Abd Al-Bari Zibari to Aswat Al-Iraq, February 6, 2009.

73. Zirwan Sulayman Al-Barwari, “Al-Tasalluh alirani, tahdid aw tawazun?” (Iranian Armament: Threat or 

Balance?), Qudwa website, no date, available from www.qudwal.

com/?page=articles/13/13-008; and “Al-Alam al-thalith. . . wa-lintishar al-nawawi” (The Third World and Nuclear Proliferation), 

Qudwa website, November 4, 2006, available from www.qudwal.

com/?page=articles/13/13-021.

74. Interview with Al-Khafaji, “D Asad Al-Khafaji: almashruat al-nawawiyya.” 

75. Al-Husseini, “Tiqniyyat Iran al-nawawiyya.” 

76. Ibid. 

77. Sami Kilawi, “Infijar al-qunbula al-iraniyya” (The 

Explosion of the Iranian Bomb), Sawt Al-Iraq, June 1, 2006, 

available from www.sotaliraq.com. 

78. Nidhal Naisa, “Lima al-ihraj ya siyadat al-ra’is Najad?” 

(Why the Embarrassment, President (Ahmadi) Najad?), Sawt AlIraq, December 10, 2005, available from www.sotaliraq.com. 

79. Asad Al-Khafaji, “Tawazun al-rub al-nawawi dhamana 

li-l-taawun al-silmi” (A Balance of Nuclear Terror Is a Guarantee 

for Peaceful Cooperation), Iraq al-kalima, no place given, February 

17, 2007, available from www.iraqalkalema.com/article.php?id=2975; 

and Asad Al-Khafaji, “Aidu li-l-Iraq haybathu al-nawawiyya.” 

Physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer had been the director of the 

U. S. Manhattan Project which developed the United States’ first 

nuclear weapons.
60

80. Interview with Al-Khafaji, “D Asad Al-Khafaji: almashruat al-nawawiyya.” 

81. Al-Khafaji, Al-Katib al-iraqi, “Aidu li-l-Iraq haybathu alnawawiyya.” 

82. Interview with Numan Al-Naimi, “’Al-Iraq al-nawawi’ 

asrar wa-khafaya yakshifuha li-l-Riyadh al-alim al-iraqi 

Numan Al-Naimi” (“A Nuclear Iraq:” Secrets and Mysteries 

Which the Iraqi Scientist Nucman Al-Naimi Reveals to Al-Riyadh), Al-Riyadh, January 24, 2006, available from www.alriyadh.

com/2006/01/24/article125215.print.

83. Ibid.

84. Anis Al-Rawi interview on Al-Jazeera TV, “Qa’id al-haras 

al-jumhuri qal inn al-kull qatal hatta al-mawt” (The Commander 

of the Republican Guard Says Everyone Fought to the Death), 

April 8, 2007, transcript available from www.aljazeera.net/news/

archive/archive?ArchiveId=1038032; and “Fizya’i iraqi: Ta’irat 

baritaniyya istakhdamat qanabil nawawiyya fi Al-Iraq” (Iraqi 

Physicist: British Aircraft Used Nuclear Bombs in Iraq), Al-Arab, 

Doha, Qatar, June 6, 2009, available from www.alarab.com.qa/

printarticle.php?docId=84944.

85. Sadiq Bakhan, “Al-Taayush al-silmi: amam gharizat almawt” (Peaceful Coexistence: In the Presence of the Instinct 

of Death), Al-Sabah al-jadid, Baghdad, Iraq, November 7, 2008, 

available from www.newsabah.com.

86. Hamid Al-Shakir, “Al-Qunbula al-nawawiyya alislamiyya al-shiiyya dharura li-tawazun al-salam fi al-alam!” 

(A Shi’a Islami Nuclear Bomb Is Vital for a Balance of Peace in 

the World!), Bint Al-Rafidayn, December 2008, available from 

www.brob.org/contact/200812/n11285.htm. Al-Shakir’s views as 

expressed here and in the following three paragraphs are derived 

from this source.

87. For an analysis by the further unidentified “Mohammed 

and Omar,” who seem intent on showing that Iraqis are more 

moderate than their fellow Arabs, see “Do Iraqis Want an Arab 
61

Nuclear Bomb?” on the blog Iraq the Model, May 4, 2008, available 

from iraqthemodel.blogspot.com.

88. Interview on the Nawafidh program, Syrian TV, May 5, 

2006, on YouTube, available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=cip_

opNNTbY&feature=related. 

89. Anis Al-Rawi interviewed by Al-Habib Al-Gharibi, “AlTalawwuth yuhasir Al-Iraq” (Pollution Grips Iraq) Al-Jazeera 

TV, May 23, 2004, available from www.aljazeera.net; and Hamid 

Al-Bahili interviewed by Mahir Abd Allah, “Wadh munadhdhammat al-taqa al-dharriyya al-iraqiyya bad al-harb” (The Status 

of the Iraqi Nuclear Agency after the War), Al-Jazeera TV, April 26, 

2004, available from www.aljazeera.net.

90. Khalil Ibrahim Al Issa, “Maalim islah al-turba aliraqiyya” (The Milestones in Cleaning Up Iraq’s Soil) Shabakat 

Al-Iraq al-akhdhar, December 27, 2003, available from www.

iraqgreen.net/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=83. Also see

“Tahdhirat min talawwuth bi’i fi Al-Basra wa-matalib bi-ltaharruk al-ajil” (Warnings of Environmental Pollution in Basra 

and Demands for Quick Action), Al-Sabah al-jadid, October 22, 

2008, www.newsabah.com.

91. Ahmad Abd Al-Hamza Al-Shaybani, “Al-Talawwuth albi’i fi Al-Iraq al-karitha al-khafiyya” (Environmental Pollution in 

Iraq: The Hidden Disaster), Al-Najaf al-ashraf, Najaf, Dhu al-hijja 

1426/January 2006, available from www.alnajafalshraf.net.

92. Mu’ayyad Al-Husseini Al-Abid, “Min mushkilat alnafayat al-nawawiyya fi mintaqatna” (The Problems of Nuclear 

Waste in Our Region), Bint Al-Rafidayn, September 2008, available 

from www.brob.org/contact/2000809/n10421.htm.

93. Ibid. 

94. Isam Al-Baghdadi, “Qarar hall al-taqa al-dharriyya 

khutwa li-l-wara’.” 

95. Farhan, "Rafadh Ismhu."

96. Al-Khafaji, “Al-Taqa al-nawawiyya sayf dhu haddayn.“ 
62

97. Al-Khafaji, “Aidu li-l-Iraq haybathu al-nawawiyya.” 

98. Jawad Bashara, “Law kunt waziran li-l-kahraba‘” (If I 

Were Minister of Electricity), Babil, June 9, 2008, available from 

www.babil.info/printVersion.php?mid=13689.

99. Riyadh Al-Amir, “Hal mintaqat al-khalij mustaidda liChernobyl iraniyya?” (Is the Gulf Region Prepared for an Iranian 

Chernobyl?), Al-Sabah al-jadid, June 21, 2009, available from www.

newsabah.com.

100. Sahar Issa, Jenan Hussein, and Hussein Kadhim, 

“Unofficial Translation of U.S.-Iraq Troop Agreement from the 

Arabic Text,” available from www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/

story/56116.html.

101. Interview with Masud Al-Barazani, “Al-Hilal al-shii 

ghayr mumkin, wa atibun ala al-arab” (The Shi’a Crescent Is 

Not Possible, and We Blame the Arabs), Ilaf, February 28, 2007, 

available from www.elaph.com.

102. On the analytical concept of a “system” for the Middle 

East, see Leonard Binder, “The Middle East as a Subordinate 

International System,” World Politics, April 1958, Vol. 10, No. 3, 

pp. 408-29; and F. Gregory Gause III, “Systemic Approaches to 

Middle East International Relations,” International Studies Review,

Spring 1999, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 11-31.

103. Abd Al-Jabbar Ahmad, “Ru’ya istishrafiyya li-alaqat 

Al-Iraq bi-muhitihi al-arabi” (An Overview of Iraq’s 

Relations with Its Arab Neighborhood), Al-Sabah, July 4, 2008, 

www.alsabah.com. 

104. As reported by Radhi Muhsin Da’ud, “Asatidhat al-ulum 

al-siyasiyya . . . stratijiyyat Al-Iraq al-iqlimiyya wa-dawrha fi altawazun al-duwali” (Political Science Professors: Iraq’s Regional 

Strategy and Its Role in the International Balance), Al-Sabah, 

October 18, 2008, available from www.alsabah.com.

105. Ibid.
63

106. Khalid Al-Atiyya quoted in Majid Al-Jamii, “Al-Atiyya: 

Al-Iraq yaud ila al-saha al-arabiyya li-annuh juz’ min al-hall lijami qadhaya al-umma” (Al-Atiyya: Iraq Is Returning to the Arab 

Arena Because It Is a Player in Resolving All the Umma’s Issues), 

Al-Dawa, Baghdad, Iraq, March 10, 2009, available from www.

adawaanews.net/newspaper/2009/727/02.Siasia.html.

107. See the editorial “Saddamiyyun akharun” (More 

Saddamists), Al-Sabah al-jadid, April 15, 2009, available from www.

newsabah.com.

108. Likewise, one can argue that the quest for regime 

legitimacy is also at least one source of motivation for Iran’s 

pursuit of nuclear weapons, Thomas Erdbrink, “Iran Makes the 

Sciences a Part of Its Revolution,” Washington Post, June 6, 2008, p. 

A1.

109. Isam Al-Baghdadi, “Qarar hall al-taqa al-dharriyya 

khutwa li-l-wara.” 

110. The Iraqi government spokesman, Ali Dabbagh, to the 

Aswat Al-Iraq news agency, “Al-Hukuma tatazim tashkil lajna 

wataniyya li-l-taqa al-dharriyya ” (The Government Plans to 

Form a National Committee for Atomic Power), Aswat Al-Iraq, 

April 9, 2009, available from ar.aswatiliraq.info/index.php?s=%D9%

86%D9%88%D9%88%D9%8A&paged=2. 

111. “Al-Iraq: Wazir al-taknulujia yutalib bi-ighlaq malaff 

al-barnamaj al-nawawi al-iraqi al-sabiq” (Iraq: The Minister of 

Technology Requests That the Previous File of the Iraqi Nuclear 

Program Be Closed), Maktub, Riyadh, September 26, 2006, 

available from news.maktoob.com/article.php/604690.

112. Ali Al-Dabbagh in “Al-Hukuma tuwafiq ala alindhimam li-nidham al-dhamanat li-l-wikala al-dawliyya li-ltaqa al-dharriyya” (The Government Agrees to Accept the IAEA’s 

Security Regime), Aswat Al-Iraq, August 30, 2009, available from 

ar.aswataliraq.info/index.php?s=%D8%B0%D8%B1%D9%8A.
64

113. KUNA, the Kuwaiti News Agency, “Musa yabhath albarnamaj al-nawawi al-silmi fi Al-Iraq” (Musa Discusses the 

Peaceful Nuclear Program in Iraq), Ilaf, August 30, 2008, available 

from www.elaph.com/Web/Politics/2008/8/361341.htm.

114. “Al-Iraq yatara’’as amal al-ijtima al-rabi li-mutabaat 

al-nashat al-nawawi al-isra’ili” (Iraq Chairs the Work of the 

Fourth Conference Monitoring Israeli Nuclear Activity), Al-Mada, 

June 23, 2008, available from www.alamadapaper.com.

115. “Al-Iraq yusharik bi-ijtima al-hay’a al-arabiyya li-ltaqa al-dharriyya” (Iraq Participates in the Arab Atomic Energy 

Organization’s Conference), August 14, 2008, Iraqi Ministry of 

Science and Technology website, available from most.gov.iq.

116. “Al-Iraq yutalib Isra’il bi-daf milyarat al-dularat katawidhat an hujum 1981” (Iraq Demands Billions of Dollars from 

Israel as Compensation for the 1981 Attack), Al-Sabah, February 

12, 2009, p. 1.

117. According to Parliamentarian Muhammad Naji to 

the Aswat Al-Iraq news agency, “Barlamani yujaddid dawathu 

al-hukuma li-mutalabat Isra’il bi-l-tawidh an tadmirha 

mufail Tammuz” (A Parliamentarian Renews His Call on 

the Government to Demand That Israel Pay Reparations 

for Its Destruction of the Tammuz Reactor), Aswat Al-Iraq, 

September 6, 2009, available from ar.aswatilraq.info/index.

php?s=%D9%86%D9%88%D9%88%D9%8A.

118. Haru Shakmakjikan, “Al-Iraq yadu Faransa li-bina’ 

mufail nawawi” (Iraq Asks France to Build a Nuclear Reactor), 

Al-Sabah al-jadid, February 23, 2009, available from www.newsabah.

com.

119. “Eni tatawaqqa istithmarat bi-qimat 10 milyar dular bihaql iraqi” (Eni Expects Investments Worth 10 Billion Dollars in 

an Iraqi Oil Field), Al-Rafidayn, October 14, 2009, www.alrafidayn.

com.

120. Interview with Ali Al-Bayati by Ramadhan Al-Saidi, 

“Mustashar sifarat Al-Iraq bi-Lundun: Namal ala isti’naf 

nashatna al-nawawi” (A Counselor in The Iraqi Embassy in 
65

London: We Are Working on Resuming Our Nuclear Activity), 

Al-Arabiya TV, Abu Dhabi), 5 November 2009, available from 

www.alarabiyya.net/save_print.php?print=1&cont_id=90360.

121. IAEA, “Decommissioning of the Iraq Former Nuclear 

Complex,” February 24, 2009, available from www-ns.iaea.org/

projects/iraq/default.asp; and John Cochran et al., “Iraq Nuclear 

Facility Dismantlement and Disposal Project,” paper presented at 

Waste Management Conference 2007, Tucson, AZ, available from 

www.ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/projects/iraq/documentation/wm07

paper.PDF.

122. Omar El Akkad and Andy Hoffman, “Iraqi Fuel Stash 

Quietly Shipped to Quebec,” Globe and Mail, Toronto, Canada, 

July 7, 2008, available from www.globeandmail.com.

123. According to the Iraqi government spokesman, Ali AlDabbagh, quoted in Usama Mahdi, “Baghdad: Bina al-mawadd 

al-nawawiyya li-khatarha al-amni wa-l-bi’i alayna” (Baghdad: 

We Sold the Nuclear Material Because of Its Security and 

Environmental Risk to Us), Ilaf, Jeddah, July 8, 2008, available 

from www.elaph.com. The actual operation was conducted over 

a 2-month period, and the material was transported by air from 

Baghdad Airport rather than by land, out of fear that it might 

otherwise be diverted to Iran or to terrorists while crossing Shi’a 

areas. Once it arrived on Diego Garcia, the uranium continued its 

journey by ship to Montreal, Canada.

124. Ibid.

125. Ra’id Fahmi quoted in the Ministry of Science and 

Technology communiqué of July 18, 2008, on the Ministry’s 

official website, available from most.gov.iq . The specific provision 

envisioned was apparently “4. Determines that Iraq retains no 

ownership interest in items to be destroyed, removed or rendered 

harmless pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 687, 1991.” 

126. Ibid.

127. The communiqué is available from www.yaqen.

net/?p=9390. 
66

128. Kadhim Al-Muqdadi, “Amaliyya muriba wa-akadhib 

amrikiyya mafdhuha” (A Suspicious Operation and Scandalous 

American Lies), Ilaf, July 14, 2004, available from www.elaph.com. 

129. Staff Major General Nuri Ghafil Al-Dulaymi, “Ayyuha 

al-mughaffalun annahu laysa yuraniyum al-nidham al-sabiq!” 

(You Gullible Ones, That Is Not the Previous Regime’s Uranium!), 

Akhbar Al-Iraq, July 8, 2008, available from www.aliraqnews.com.

130. Ibid.

131. See Richard Stone, “Targeted for Murder, Iraqi Scientists 

Named on a Hit List,” Science, Vol. 312, No. 5782, June 30, 2006, 

pp. 1857-58; and Sammy Salama and Cameron Hunter, WMD 

Scientists in the Crossfire; Issue Brief, Monterey, CA: Center for 

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International 

Studies, May 2006, available from www.nti.org/e_research/e3_77.

html#fnB6.

132. Ali Al-Kash, “Wa-min al-ilm ma qutil! Istihdaf ulama’ 

wa-mufakkiri Al-Iraq” (It Is Known What Was Killed! Targeting 

Iraq’s Scientists and Thinkers), Babil, April 23, 2008, available 

from www.babil.info/printVersion.php?mid=12580.

133. Quoted in “Al-Iraq faqad 5500 alim mundh al-ghazw 

al-anglu-amriki” (Iraq Has Lost 5500 Scientists since the AngloAmerican Invasion), Babil, March 17, 2008, available from www.

babil.info/printVersion.php?mid=12072.

134. Abd Allah Al-Hasan, “Al-Uqul al-iraqiyya bayn alkhiyar al-almani wa-l-salvadori” (Iraqi Minds Face a German or 

a Salvadorian Choice), Al-Jazeera TV, Doha, Qatar, April 16, 2008, 

transcript available from www.aljazeera.net.

135. Khalil Ibrahim Al Issa, “Ala al-dustur al-iraqi dhabt albahth al-ilmi” (The Iraqi Constitution Must Regulate Scientific 

Research), Sawt Al-Iraq, July 25, 2007, available from www.sotaliraq.

com/articles-ira/nieuw.php?id=12704.

136. For example, Imad Al-Akhras, “Man yaqif wara’ karithat 

wa’d al-uqul al-iraqiyya?” (Who Is Behind the Tragedy of Burying 

the Iraqi Minds?), Babil, April 5, 2008, available from www.babil.

info/printversion.php?mid=12283; and Abd Al-Rahman Inad, 
67

“Qadhiyya tashghal al-ra’y al-amm ila janib al-amn wa-l-iqtisad 

wa-l-siyasa . . . istihdaf al-kafa’at al-iraqiyya. . . Man yuqif nazf alwatan wa-awjahu?” (An Issue Which Concerns Public Opinion in 

Addition to Security, the Economy, and Politics . . . The Targeting 

of Iraqi Capabilities . . . Who Will Put a Stop to the Country’s 

Bleeding and Pain?), Al-Mada, December 26, 2007, available from 

www.almadapaper.com. Also see “Saddam wa-l-yahud.” 

137. On Gerald Bull, assassinated in Belgium in 1990, see 

Gordon Thomas, Gideon’s Spies; The Secret History of the Mossad, 

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, pp. 105-08; and Victor 

Ostrovsky, The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the 

Mossad‘s Secret Agenda, New York: HarperCollins, 1994, pp. 252-

54. On Yahya Al-Mashadd’s assassination, see Rodger W. Claire, 

Raid on the Sun; Inside Israel’s Secret Campaign That Denied Saddam 

the Bomb, New York: Broadway Books, 2004, pp. 58-64.

138. Brendan O’Malley, “Rebuilding Science in Iraq,” Cosmos, 

January 27, 2009, available from www.cosmosmagazine.com/

node/2495/full.

139. According to the Iraqi Minister of Science and Technology, “Malaff aslihat al-damar ughliq li-ann shabna mutab” 

(The Weapons File Is Closed Because Our People Are Tired), Ilaf, 

July 23, 2004, available from www.elaph.com.

140. Amir Taheri, “The Mideast Nuclear-Arms Scramble,” 

New York Post, May 14, 2009, available from www.nypost.com.

141. Tim Susman, “Iraq Remains Too Perilous for Many 

Professionals,” Los Angeles Times, October 5, 2008, available from 

www.latimes.com. 

142. Joseph B. Verrengia, “Ecologist Tries to Plant Seeds of 

Peace with Iraqi Scientists,” Los Angeles Times, January 9, 2005, p. 

1.

143. “Tarhib fatir bi-awdat al-akadimiyyin ila Al-Iraq” 

(Tepid Welcome for Academics Returning to Iraq), Al-Rafidayn, 

March 26, 2009, available from www.alrafidayn.com.
68

144. See Helen Caldicott, Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer, 

New York: The New Press, 2006, pp. 81-130; “Two Die at Pakistan 

Nuclear Plant,” BBC News, April 8, 2009, available from newsvote.

bbc.co.uk; “Krümmel Accident Puts Question Mark over Germany’s 

Nuclear Future,” Der Spiegel, Hamburg, July 23, 2009, available 

from www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-635788,00.

html; and James Rosen, “Inspectors Find Safety Problems at 

Nuclear Weapons Complex,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 3, 

2009, available from news.yahoo.com.

145. Kuwait News Agency, “Itiqal thalathat muwadhdhafin 

fi wizarat al-ulum wa-l-tiknulujiyya al-iraqiyya bi-tuhmat alintima’ li-l-qaida’ (The Arrest of Three Employees of the Ministry 

of Science and Technology on Charges of Belonging to al-Qaeda), 

July 8, 2008, available from www.kuna.net.kw.

146. See, for example, Damien Cave, “Nonstop Theft and 

Bribery Stagger Iraq,” New York Times, December 2, 2007, available 

from www.nytimes.com ; and Patrick Cockburn, “Iraq Faces the 

Mother of All Corruption Scandals,” The Independent, London, 

UK, May 29, 2009, available from www.independent.co.uk. In fact, 

the Berlin-based Transparency International NGO recently rated 

Iraq as one of the three most corrupt countries in the world. 

See Global Corruption Report 2009, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 

University Press, 2009, p. 402.

147. The Iraqi government’s official estimate of the country’s 

population living below the poverty line in 2009 was 25 percent, 

while some economists in the country placed that figure as high 

as 50 percent and hidden unemployment as high as 30-50 percent. 

See Muhammad Abd Allah, “Rub al-iraqiyyin dun mustawa 

khatt al-faqr!” (One-fourth of Iraqis Are below the Poverty Line), 

Babil, May 21, 2009, available from www.babil.info/printVersion.

php?mid=20001; “Nisbat khatt al-faqr fi Al-Iraq tablugh 50 bi-lmi’a” (The Proportion [of Those under] the Poverty Line in Iraq 

Reaches 50 Per Cent), Al-Rafidayn, May 26, 2009, www.alrafidayn.

com; and Kadhim Habib, “Niqash iqtisadi maftuh wa-sarih ma 

al-sayyid al-duktur Barham Salih na’ib ra’is al-wuzara’ Al-Iraqi” 

(An Open and Honest Discussion with Dr. Barham Salih, Iraq’s 

Deputy Prime Minister), Babil, May 29, 2009, available from www.

babil.info/printVersion.php?mid=20817.
69

148. See James L. Ford and C. Richard Schuller, Controlling 

the Threat to Nuclear Security: A Holistic Model, Washington, DC: 

National Defense University, 1997; Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

February 2008. See, in particular, Jack Edlow, “Can We Track 

Source Materials Better—Do We Need To?” pp. 65-70; Thomas B. 

Cochran, “Adequacy of IAEA’s Safeguards for Achieving Timely 

Detection,” pp. 121-58; and Robert Zarate, “The NPT, IAEA Safeguards and Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An ‘Inalienable Right,’ But 

Precisely to What?” pp. 221-290.

149. See Bruno Tertrais, “Khan’s Nuclear Exports: Was There 

a State Strategy?” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear 

Future: Worries Beyond War, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2008, pp. 13-57. 

150. Gharib, “Al-Hajis al-amni wara’.” 

151. Andrew Flibbert, “After Saddam: Regional Insecurity, 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Proliferation Pressures in 

Postwar Iraq,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 118, No. 4, Winter 

2003-04, p. 548.

152. Ibid.

153. For example, Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, 

“Let Us Now Praise Great Men; Bringing the Statesman Back 

In,” International Security, Spring 2001, pp. 107–46; and Jerrold 

M. Post and Amatzia Baram, “’Saddam Is Iraq, Iraq Is Saddam’ 

(Until Operation Iraqi Freedom),” in Barry R. Schneider and 

Jerrold M. Post, eds., Know Thy Enemy; Profiles of Adversary Leaders 

and Their Strategic Culture, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: USAF 

Counterproliferation Center, July 2003, pp. 163-220.

154. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Mahan on Naval Warfare; Selections 

from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, Alan Westcott, 

ed., Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1918, pp. 47-48.

155. Ahmad, “Ru’ya istishrafiyya.” 
70

156. This fragmentation includes the field of science where, 

for example, there were no links between Baghdad and Kurdistan; 

interview with Ra’id Famhi by Rushna Ali Tawfiq, “Hiwar ma 

al-sayyid wazir al-ulum wa-tiknulujiya al-duktur Ra’id Fahmi” 

(Interview with Minister of Science and Technology Dr. Ra’id 

Fahmi), Al-Sawt al-akhar, January 30, 2008, available from www.

sotakhr.com.

157. As reported by Radhi Muhsin Da’ud, “Jadal ala tawlat 

Al-Sabah al-mustadira . . . shurut wa-afaq al-dawr al-iqlimi li-lIraq” (Discussions at the Al-Sabah Roundtable: Conditions and 

Perspectives for Iraq‘s Regional Role), Al-Sabah, June 28, 2008, 

available from www.alsabah.com.

158. Quoted in “Malaff aslihat al-damar ughliq li-ann shabna 

mutab.” 

159. Iraqi Constitution, available from www.uniraq.org/

documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf.

160. “Al-Dabbagh: Majlis al-wuzara’ yuwafiq ala mashru 

qanun li-man intishar aslihat al-dimar al-shamil” (Al-Dabbagh: 

The Council of Ministers Agrees to the Law Proposal to Forbid 

the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction), Aswat Al-Iraq

news agency, September 14, 2009, available from ar.aswataliraq.

info/index.php?s=%D9%86%D%88%D9%88%D9%8A. 

161. Isam Al-Baghdadi, “Bina’ al-shariyya al-mustaqbiliyya” 

(Building Future Legitimacy), Al-Hiwar al-mutamaddin, November 13, 2003, available from www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.

asp?aid=11637.

162. Nizar Al-Samarra’i, “Qum al-nawawiyya” (A Nuclear 

Qom), Al-Zaman al-jadid, October 9, 2009, available from www.

azzaman.com.

163. Mustafa Muhammad Gharib, “Al-Hajis al-amni wara’ 

al-say li-l-husul ala al-silah al-nawawi” (The Security Concern 

behind the Effort to Acquire Nuclear Weapons), Al-Nas, Baghdad, 

Iraq, April 26, 2008, available from www.al-nnas.com/ARTICLE/

MKhareb/26auto.htm.
71

164. Mutasim Al-Sanawi, “Man yahmi al-arab min Isra’il?” 

(Who Will Defend the Arabs from Israel?), Al-Zaman al-jadid, 

September 13, 2009, available from www.azzaman.com.

165. Jumard Haqqi Ismail, “Al-Muthallath al-khabith” (The 

Vicious Triangle), Part 1, November 3, 2008. online on the Ba’ath 

website available from alrafdean.org/modules.php?name=News&file

=print&sid=101355.

166. Abd Al-Hussein Shaban, “Al-Nawawi al-salih wa-lnawawi al-talih” (Good Nukes and Bad Nukes), Al-Tajdid al-arabi, 

September 28, 2008, available from www.arabrenewal.org.

167. See Norman Cigar, Iraq’s Vision of the Nuclear Battlefield, 

Contributions to War Studies, No. 3, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps 

University Foundation, 2003. 

168. The resolution of regional disputes as a way to counter 

nuclear proliferation is a key theme in Joseph Cirincione, Bomb 

Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

169. Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “Clinton Speaks of 

Shielding Mideast from a Nuclear Iran,“ New York Times, July 23, 

2009, p. A1; and Mike Shuster, “Iran Prompts Debate over Mideast 

Defense Umbrella,” NPR News, August 26, 2009, available from 

www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=112222260. 

170. See Usama Saraya’s interview with President Husni 

Mubarak, “Ziyarat Washington li-tarh ru’yat Misr li-tahqiq alsalam” (Visit to Washington to Present Egypt’s View on Achieving 

Peace), Al-Ahram, Cairo, August 17, 2009, available from www.

ahram.org.eg/archive/Index.asp?CurFN=fon1.htm&DID=10042.

171. Wafiq Al-Samarra’i, “Al-Tasalluh al-irani . . . wa-kayfiyyat 

mualajatihi” (Iran’s Arming. . . and the Way to Deal with It), 

Babil, March 7, 2009, available from www.babil.info/printVersion.

php?mid=18334.
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