THE ATTOIWEY GENERAL 

OF TEXxU.4 

mty 24, 1988 

Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. Opinion No. (JM-909) 

Criminal District Attorney 

Smith County Courthouse Re: Whether a member of a 

Tyler, Texas 75702 board of directors of a water 

control and improvement district must reside in the district (RQ-1134) 

Dear Mr. Skeen: 

You have asked whether a person must reside within the 

territory encompassed by the Smith County Water Control and 

Improvement District No. 1 (the District) to be eligible for 

election as a district director. The District was created 

in 1961 pursuant to article XVI, section 59, of the Texas 

Constitution. Water control and improvement districts are 

general law districts governed by chapter 51 of the Water 

Code. Provisions regarding qualifications and election of 

district directors are found in subchapter C of chapter 51 

of the Water Code. 

In accordance with section 51.073 of the Water Code, 

the District elects five directors to serve staggered terms. 

Section 51.072 of the Water Code provides as follows: 

To be qualified for election as a director, a 

person must be a resident of the state, own 

land subject to taxation in the district, and 

be at least 21 years of age. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Thus, with respect to residency of directors, the Water Code 

requires only that they be residents of the state. 

You ask, however, whether the residency requirements 

P found in section 141.001(a)(5) of the Election Code apply to 

candidates for director of the District. Your question 

specifically concerns the applicability in this context of 

the requirement that a person reside in the territory from 

which the office is elected -- in this case, the water 

district. 

p. 4514 
Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 2 (J&909) 

Section 141.001 of the Election Code states in relevant 

part: 

(a) To be eligible to be a candidate for, 

or elected or appointed to, a public elective 

office in this state, a person must: 

(1) be a United States citizen; 

(2) be 18 years~ of age or older on the 

first day of the term to be filled at the 

election . . . ; 

(3) have not been determined mentally 

incompetent by a final judgment of a court: 

(4) have not been finally convicted of a 

felony from which the person has not been 

pardoned or otherwise released from the 

resulting disabilities; 

(5) have resided continuously in the state 

for 12 months and in the territory from which 

the office is elected for six months 

immediately preceding the [candidates' filing 

deadline]: 

. . . . 

(6) satisfy any other eligibility requirements prescribed by law for the office. 

(b) A statute outside this code supersedes Subsection (a) to the extent of any 

conflict. 

(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to an 

office for which the federal or state constitution or a statute outside this code 

prescribes exclusive eligibility reguirements. (Emphasis added.) 

Subsection (b) of section 141.001 provides that a 

statute outside the Election Code, such as the Water Code, 

supersedes subsection (a) to the extent of any conflict. 

Thus, the question we must decide is whether the Water 

Code's specific provision that to be qualified for election 

as a director of a water district a person must be a 

resident of the state, conflicts with the Election Code's 

general provision that to be elected to a public office a 

p. 4515 
Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 3 (JK-909) 

.- 

person must have resided continuously in the state for 

twelve months and in the territory from which the office is 

elected for six months. 

Under one view, the Election Code provision does not 

conflict with the Water Code, but merely supplements it. An 

example of such reasoning is found in Brown v. Patterson, 

609 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1980, no writ). In 

Brown the court reconciled the Election Code's general 

six-month durational residence requirement with a specific 

statute governing the election of school trustees. While 

the specific statute required residency in the school 

district, it had no durational requirement. The court found 

no conflict, harmonized the two provisions, and imposed the 

Election Code's durational residence requirement. If 

similar reasoning were applied to the question of residency 

requirements for water district directors, the result would 

be that in order to be a director, a person would not only 

have to be a resident of the state, as required by the Water 

Code, but he would also have to have been a resident of the 

state for twelve months prior to the candidates' filing 

deadline, as required by section 141.001(a)(5) of the 

Election Code. 

In our view, however, the reasoning of Brown is 

inapposite to the question of whether a person must be a 

resident of the district, as distinguished from how long he 

must have resided in the state. In establishing a district 

residency requirement, the Election Code does not merely 

supplement the Water Code, but instead conflicts with it. 

The express mention of one person, thing, consequence, or 

class is equivalent to an express exclusion of all others. 

State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 175 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1943). 

Put another way, a statute's inclusion of specific 

limitations excludes all other limitations of the same tvoe. 

Guinn v. State, 696 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tex. APP. - Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1985, no writ). 

When the legislature provides in a specific statute for 

a residency requirement and in a general statute for the 

duration of a residency requirement, as in Brown, the 

general statute can be read as supplementing the special 

statute. However, when the legislature addresses residency 

limitations by providing in a specific statute only that a 

person must be a resident of the state, then a general 

statute that requires residency in a district must be read 

as conflicting. Moreover, when the requirement that a 

director need only be a resident of the state is followed by 

a requirement that the director own land in the district, 

p. 4516 
I 

Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 4 (JM-909) 

that juxtaposition suggests that the legislature rejected a 

district residency requirement.1 

Having found that section 51.072 of the Water Code 

supersedes section 141.001(a) of the Election Code, we must 

determine whether section 51.072 violates article XVI, 

section 14, of the Texas Constitution, which requires that 

all district officers shall reside within their districts. 

The short and easy answer is no. Article XVI, section 14, 

i's not applicable to officers of districts created under the 

authority of article XVI, section 59, of the Texas 

Constitution. Walton v. Brownsville Naviaation District, 

181 S.W.2d 967, 969 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1944, writ 

ref'd); Kaufman Countv Levee Imnrovement District No. 10 v. 

Natiom1 Life Insurance Co 171 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. 

APP. - Dallas 1943, writ &la). 

SUMMARY 

The district residency requirement of 

section 141.001(a)(5) of the Election Code 

conflicts with section 51.072 of the Water 

Code. Pursuant to section 141.001(b) of the 

Election Code, the Water Code therefore 

supersedes the Election Code. A candidate 

for the office of director of the Smith 

County Water Control and Improvement District 

No. 1 need not be a resident of the district. 

1. One brief provided to us reviewed the acts of the 

69th legislature and the 70th legislature. Those two 

legislatures enacted laws authorizing creation of three 

general law districts and over seventy conservation and 

reclamation districts. In each instance specific director 

qualifications were provided, some in direct conflict with 

those of the Election Code. The variations in director 

qualifications suggest that the legislature sometimes 

tailors qualifications to different situations. In doing 

so, the legislature continues on occasion to use district 

property ownership as an alternative to district residency 

as a director qualification. See, e.s., Acts of 1987, ch. 

993, § 7(d). As a practical matter, some districts must 

have non-resident landowner directors at the outset because 

there are few or no residents living in the undeveloped 

district. 

p. 4517 
JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 5 (JM-909) 

MARY KELLER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

LOU MCCREARY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by F. Scott McCown 

Assistant Attorney General 

P 

p. 4518