The Marshall Center Papers, No. 7

What Roles and

Missions for Europe’s

Military and Security

Forces in the 

21st Century?

By Dr. John L. Clarke

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

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ISBN 1-930831-12-9 August, 2005
What Roles and Missions for 

Europe’s Military and 

Security Forces

in the 21st Century?

By Dr. John L. Clarke

John L. Clarke is the Professor of Leadership, Management and Defense

Planning at the College of International Security Studies, George C.

Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
Dr. John L. Clarke

ii
What Roles and Missions?

iii

Table of Contents

Foreword..........................................................................................v

Executive Summary..................................................................vii

Introduction...................................................................................1

Part I. Key Realities of Europe’s Security..................5

Environment

Part II. The Legacy Force and Its Implications .......9

Part III. Which Roles and Missions?..............................13

Part IV. Mission Sets for the 21st Century.................15

Intervention/Offensive Combat.......................................15

International Stability and Support Operations..16

Civil Support.................................................................................18

National Defense ................................................................22

International Humanitarian Assistance ..................25

Unilateral Military Operations......................................27

Part V. Types of Armed Security Forces.....................29

Part VI. Assessments and Force Nominations .......35

Part VII. Conclusions and Recommendations.........43

Endnotes .........................................................................................46
Dr. John L. Clarke

iv
Foreword

Military and other armed security forces in the 21st

Century face an array of requirements quite unlike those of the

past. Traditional roles, such as defending national territorial

sovereignty, remain, but their importance will be attenuated, as

more nations realize that their defense begins beyond their

borders, and that security means more than just the military

defense of territory and sovereignty.

These forces will be called upon increasingly to plan for,

support and execute a broad range of new and non-traditional roles,

missions and functions—not all of which are well suited for

traditional military forces. New military and security tasks, such as

stabilization operations or counter-terrorism missions, coupled with

the increasing restraints on resources, will require that armies

develop organizations of extraordinary flexibility and capability.

Therefore, what kinds of forces should be developed? To

perform what missions? Should some armies be replaced by

other kinds of armed security forces, such as paramilitary

police forces? Do all countries require a full range of

capabilities, or are there opportunities for rationalization

among neighbors, who no longer threaten one another? 

In this Marshall Center Paper, Prof. John Clarke explores

the new requirements thrust upon military and other armed

security forces. He examines in detail the range of roles,

missions and functions for these forces over the next decade. 

In a new perspective on these tasks for military and

security forces for the 21st Century, Dr. Clarke develops six

What Roles and Missions?

v
categories, or mission sets, of requirements, including Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations; International Stability

and Support Operations; Civil Support Operations; National

Defense Operations; International Humanitarian Assistance

Support; and Unilateral Military Operations.

Against these requirements, Dr. Clarke takes a close look

at a dozen different kinds of military and armed security

forces, asking key questions about the utility of each of them

in carrying out the missions. These kinds of forces include not

only heavy and light military forces, but also paramilitary

police forces and other armed security services. 

Dr. Clarke then evaluates these forces, and provides us with

his recommendation on which forces demonstrate the greatest

utility across the range of new requirements. He plows new ground

in identifying what requirements are truly necessary and which

kinds of forces are best able to accomplish them.

In this era of declining defense and security budgets, and

with the pressing need for military and security force

transformation, his recommendations on force structure and

mission requirements should be of great utility to defense and

security decision makers. 

His conclusion—that light conventional infantry forces,

special operations forces and paramilitary police forces form a

versatile, essential core of forces that every state should

consider—is precisely the kind of analysis that decision

makers require for the difficult choices they face. 

John P. Rose, Ph. D.

Director

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Dr. John L. Clarke

vi
Executive Summary

Are armies the dinosaurs of the 21st Century, soon to

become extinct in the new security environment? What is the

function of an army? Is security and defense the same thing?

What must armies be able to do? And, equally important, what

should they not do?

Will armies remain armies? Will they be replaced by other

kinds of armed security forces, such as police forces? Should

only military forces perform some tasks? What military and

security forces are the most useful, given the novel range of

threats that we face?

This paper offers an analytical framework for examining

these questions. The principal focus is to reexamine the roles

and missions of military and security forces in the EuropeEurasia strategic region, with particular emphasis on how new

and emerging requirements challenge legacy concepts and

organizations.

The paper analyzes the kinds of missions that military and

other armed security forces may face; how these tasks can

differ between defense and security functions; and the

differences between the two functions. It also evaluates how

well a range of existing force structures are adapted to

handling these operations. 

In particular, this paper suggests a basis for a series of

policy proposals to reorient security policy and develop the

best range of military and security forces for the current and

What Roles and Missions?

vii
future strategic environment. These recommendations are

intended to form the basis for guiding transformation efforts in

the countries in the Central and Eastern European strategic

environment.

Despite much discussion and debate about the reform and

transformation of military forces, the military structures of

most of the states in this region remain much as they were a

decade ago. As was the case during the heyday of the Warsaw

Pact, most of the armies of the region still have extensive

holdings of heavy forces, with large stockpiles of obsolete

tanks and motorized infantry vehicles. While many of these

stockpiles have been allowed to rust, continued investment is

required to sustain the maintenance and training base. 

These traditional, or legacy, forces are poorly suited to the

emergent region’s new security requirements. While a residual

national defense capability must be maintained, it is

questionable whether these forces can even minimally meet

today’s security needs. To maintain mobilization capacity

centered on rapid reconstitution of these forces would be

relatively expensive. Given the region’s parlous state of

military spending, it is debatable whether further investment of

this kind makes sense.

Modern military forces face a bewildering array of roles,

missions and functions, some of them quite new to traditionbound militaries. These tasks have generated requirements that

demand a fresh look at the diverse range of military

operations, with a view towards developing a modern

taxonomy of military missions. 

This paper outlines six operational categories that

encompass this broad range of requirements. While not

Dr. John L. Clarke

viii
exhaustive or inclusive, these categories cover the great

majority of missions that armies will have to fulfill in the

coming decades. It further develops each category by listing

specific mission tasks. The categories are:

• Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations

• International Stability and Support Operations

• Civil Support Operations

• National Defense Operations

• International Humanitarian Assistance Support

• Unilateral Military Operations

This paper explores in detail the military and security

requirements associated with each of these categories, in an

effort to establish the basis for determining the best mix of

forces that could best execute those missions.

The paper then analyzes twelve types of military and other

armed security forces that exist in the security-oriented

ministries of the states included in this study: 

• Active conventional ground forces (heavy) 

• Active conventional ground forces (light) 

• Special operations forces 

• Reserve forces 

• Border security forces 

• Internal security forces 

• National guards 

• Paramilitary police forces

• Special police forces 

• National police forces 

• Private military companies 

• Commercial security providers 

What Roles and Missions?

ix
Dr. John L. Clarke

x

The capabilities and special attributes of each of these

force categories is evaluated against the requirements

established by the mission sets; this evaluation is then used to

determine which types of forces are best suited for each of the

mission sets.

The foregoing analysis reveals several conclusions about

optimal force mixes for the foreseeable future. While each

country will have specific requirements, some recommendations seem applicable across the region. Policy makers

must understand these conclusions in order to make the wisest

decisions on building the most effective mix of forces able to

maintain regional security. 

First, channeling money into legacy heavy forces is not an

efficient investment. These forces are more costly than other

forces examined in this study in terms of maintenance, training

and sustainability requirements; their utility is limited, due to

their constrained strategic mobility and major logistical needs.

Indeed, investments in legacy heavy forces may be

counterproductive, because other, more useful force types

could be deprived of much-needed support.

Secondly, this analysis demonstrates conclusively that

active conventional ground forces (light) and special

operations forces have the broadest range of utility for

military forces. They rank among the most versatile forces for

almost every mission set examined in this study. In addition,

the analysis demonstrates that these forces require only modest

changes, and more importantly, marginal additional

investment. These forces also seem to be best positioned to

take advantage of technological innovation as well as to meet

emerging future requirements.
With regard to other armed security forces, highly

versatile paramilitary police forces appear to be most useful

and are good candidates for additional investment. They are

able to make important contributions across the range of

requirements, particularly in the national defense, stability

operations and civil support. They are well adapted to bridging

the gap between military and law enforcement approaches to

using force. As a result, they appear more useful than internal

security forces, which are generally more limited in their scope

of operations and a frequently military approach to the use of

force. Moreover, paramilitary forces are more versatile than

many specialized police forces and thus, are able to meet a

much broader range of requirements.

This study is designed to provide a foundation for making

the hard choices about what we want armed security and

military forces to be able to accomplish in the future—and

which of those forces represent the best and most efficient

investment.

What Roles and Missions?

xi
Dr. John L. Clarke

xii
What Roles and Missions?

Introduction

In the 21st Century will we still need armies? To do what?

Are security and defense the same thing? What must armies be

capable of doing? And equally important, what should they not

do?

Will armies remain armies? Will they be replaced by other

kinds of armed security forces, such as police forces? Are there

tasks that only military forces can perform? What are the most

useful kinds of military and security forces, given the novel range

of threats that we face?

This paper provides an analytical framework for examining

these questions. The principal focus of the paper is to reexamine

the roles and missions of military and security forces in the

Europe-Eurasia strategic region, with particular emphasis on how

new and emerging requirements challenge legacy concepts and

organizations.

The paper analyzes the kinds of missions that military and

other armed security forces may face; how these tasks can differ

between defense and security functions; and the differences

between the two tasks. It also evaluates how well a range of

existing force structures are adapted to handling these operations. 

In particular, this paper suggests the basis for a series of policy

proposals to reorient security policy and develop the best range of

military and security forces for the current and future strategic

environment. These recommendations are intended to form the

basis for guiding transformation efforts in the countries in the

Central and Eastern European strategic environment.

1
• Methodology

The paper classifies potential future military and security

tasks and requirements and groups them into six categories.

Then, it examines the current state of twelve different kinds of

military and armed security forces using the well-established

DOTLMS (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership,

Material and Soldiers) analytical construct.1 Based on this

analysis, the paper draws conclusions about the state of these

forces over a cross-section of states in Europe, as well as their

utility against the set of mission tasks developed in this paper.

Lastly, the paper explores the appropriate mix of military and

other armed security forces in a series of policy recommendations for security planners in Europe.

• Scope

The paper focuses on Central and Eastern European

military forces, particularly traditional ground forces, and

other armed security forces, i.e., paramilitary police, national

guards and state police. Although it does not include an

analysis of traditional air forces and navies (their missions are

likely to remain unique in the emerging environment), it does

include other maritime security forces, such as coast guards,

because of their law enforcement functions.

This study focuses not only on the proper and appropriate

role for military forces, but also on other armed security

forces in the region. As many of the new requirements involve

domestic security missions, it is appropriate to include these

kinds of forces in the equation. These include an extremely

wide range of paramilitary and law enforcement

organizations, as well as border security forces and national

police forces.

2
Predictably, there is a plethora of armed security and

police forces to be found in this region, many with overlapping

functions and jurisdictions. Just as is the case with legacy

military organizations, new security requirements beg for a

reorganization of these forces. Given the security needs of the

post-9/11 world, it is probably best to consider both military

and other armed security forces in order to leverage the

greatest security and defense economies of scale.

What Roles and Missions?

3
Dr. John L. Clarke

4
What Roles and Missions?

5

PART I: Key Realities of Europe’s

Security Environment

The key and, indeed, extraordinary reality is the simple fact that

the external, conventional threat has, for the most part, disappeared;

the countries of Europe no longer find themselves militarily

threatened by their neighbors. The territorial sovereignty of most

nations in Europe is no longer in question; the defense of Europe is

now to be found, as many have noted, on the Hindu Kush.2

Moreover, despite the tendency to conflate the terms defense

and security, it is evident that while the defense of Europe is no

longer in question, the security of many countries in Europe is very

much threatened. Security, the broader, overarching term, involves

law enforcement, counterterrorism actions, anti-corruption measures

and economic measures as much as it involves the military functions

of defense. It is axiomatic that the security requirements are broader

than those of the defense subset of security.

This is compounded by the fact that, unlike external threats that

can be addressed by defense efforts, the great majority of the threats

facing Europe today are simultaneously internal and transnational,

involving a significant law enforcement response that, of necessity,

must transcend borders. 

The extraordinary changes in Europe’s geopolitical and strategic

environments have clearly outpaced the necessary intellectual and

institutional transformation process. This is particularly the case for

Europe’s military and security forces. For the most part, these forces

remain mired in their legacy configurations from the immediate postCold War period—large, heavy tank and armored infantry

formations, with much of their associated logistic support

requirements, which fall increasingly short in attempting to maintain

30- and 40-year old weapons systems.
Dr. John L. Clarke

6

For many reasons, Europe’s armed forces are in a long-term

period of decline, and this

trend is not likely to be

reversed in the near future.

The perception that there is no

real external threat, and the

resulting lack of a clear

political will to do anything

costly about it, has created a

situation in which stasis is

trump. Many European

military establishments find themselves in a vicious cycle, with

most funding supporting obsolete and obsolescent legacy forces.3

Moreover, many European economies, particularly those that

are the focus of this study, remain bogged down by an extended

period of economic difficulties. With no real increase in defense

investment, this is not likely to change. Thus, the real challenge for

these countries is to make intelligent investments in key and

complementary capabilities that reflect current and possible future

strategic requirements and which will provide a realistic response

to the potential threats.4

Afurther difficulty is that, for many Europeans, the use of force

is no longer a viable option in the course of international affairs.

This predilection for finding solutions within the law, preferably

within the framework of international institutions, colors much

European thinking on the utility of force in the future. As a

consequence, there is a clear reluctance to countenance additional

investments in any military program, particularly legacy programs.5

At the same time, many Europeans note their main concern is

physical security, which they relate to the incidence of crime; hence,

they are more likely to approve investments in law enforcementoriented security forces as opposed to strictly military ones.

Many European military

establishments find

themselves in a vicious

cycle, with most funding

supporting obsolete and

obsolescent legacy

forces.
What Roles and Missions?

7

Consequently, there is little evidence of serious investment in

reform efforts or in the development of new capabilities. Many

European countries would like to make important contributions to

international stability and support operations, but they lack

deployment and sustainment capability. In most instances, they

would have to rely on other countries to provide these key

capabilities.
Dr. John L. Clarke

8
What Roles and Missions?

9

PART II: The Legacy Force and Its

Implications

Despite much discussion and debate about the reform and

transformation of military forces, the military structures of most of

the states in the region remain much as they were a decade ago. As

was the case during the heyday of the Warsaw Pact, most of the

armies of the region still have extensive holdings of heavy forces,

with large stockpiles of obsolete tanks and motorized infantry

vehicles. While many of these stockpiles have been allowed to

rust, continued investment is required to sustain the maintenance

and training base. 

These traditional, or legacy, forces are poorly suited to the

emergent region’s new security requirements. While a residual

national defense capability must be maintained, it is debatable

whether that requirement can be even minimally met by these

kinds of forces. To maintain mobilization capacity centered on

rapid reconstitution of these forces would be relatively

expensive. Given the region’s parlous state of military

spending, it is questionable whether further investment of this

kind makes sense.

The acquisition of more modern equipment, even at minimal

costs through various “cascading” programs that redistribute

redundant equipment from NATO’s more modern armies to newer

members, does not appear to truly address this question. Even

more modern equipment requires substantial investment in order

to sustain and maintain a mobilization capability.6

As a result, the countries of this region are excessively

burdened by their legacy force structures. Significant changes are
difficult politically, because many careers are bound up with the

fate of these forces. But given the low likelihood of a national

defense contingency, it is at least worth asking whether this

investment should be made at all, or whether these requirements

can be met through other means.

One way to update military force is through

cooperative rationalization of defense capabilities. As is the

case with older NATO

countries, in Central and

Eastern Europe defense

capabilities appear to be

redundant nationally when

viewed in a regional

context. It should prove

possible to achieve some

level of rationalization

between and among

neighbors, particularly in

the areas of maintenance, sustainment and training. Initial

steps in this direction have already been taken in Western

Europe; the Belgian and Dutch navies share many

infrastructure assets, particularly in the training and

maintenance areas of their maritime forces.

Another legacy of the region’s rapid pace of change is the state

of the reserve forces. As with the active force component, the

numbers and readiness levels of the reserve force components

have already been significantly reduced in these countries. Reserve

forces have received comparatively less investment than active

forces, and in many cases exist in name only. Their actual strength,

organization and level of readiness cannot, in some instances, be

determined with any precision. 

Dr. John L. Clarke

10

It should prove

possible to achieve some

level of rationalization

between and among

neighbors, particularly in

the areas of maintenance,

sustainment and training.
The legacy force issue is one of the biggest hurdles that

military reform advocates must overcome in determining which

roles and missions are most appropriate for the future defense. The

inherent stasis and inertia can prove politically and economically

difficult to overcome in the effort to reorient these new missions.

What Roles and Missions?

11
Dr. John L. Clarke

12
PART III: Which Roles and Missions?

What are national military objectives and how do they differ

from roles for military and security forces, and how do these in

turn differ from missions and functions? According to the US Joint

Chiefs of Staff, national military objectives include promoting

peace and stability as well as deterrence.7

Broad and enduring roles for armed forces are established by

law. These include: supporting and defending the laws of the

country, ensuring the security of the country against external

enemies, and upholding the national policies and interests. Thus, a

typical role for military forces would include being the “guardians

of the nation.” Other examples might include phrases such as

“support and defend the nation;” “ensure the security of the state;”

or “uphold and advance the national policies and interests.”8

Missions are tasks assigned to the military forces by the

political leadership, such as “defending against air attack.”

Missions can be specific to the service, or they can be joint

missions, to be accomplished by more than one service acting

together. An example of this might be “carry out peace support

operations as part of a multinational alliance.”9

Functions include specific responsibilities assigned to the

service components. For example, a function of the army might be

to provide organized, trained and equipped ground forces to a

commander for employment. Note that the service does not do the

employing itself, but rather a designated commander. Other

functions might include maintaining mobile reserve forces in

readiness; providing timely intelligence; and conducting research

and developing doctrine.10

What Roles and Missions?

13
It seems clear that many traditional roles, missions and

functions of military forces are now in flux. Whereas armies were

once the repository of civic virtue and served as the “school of the

nation” in helping to engender a strong sense of patriotism and

civic pride, these roles now seem less important, particularly with

the elimination of conscript armies and the advent of professional

forces. Without a clear external threat, the public views armies

with less respect and often disdain, and as a drain on public

finances. 

In a similar fashion, as organizations that often demonstrated their

ability to get things done, armies are often asked by political leaders to

undertake new and non-traditional missions, such as assisting with law

enforcement, drug control or border security. Particularly in the

aftermath of September 11th, many armies are being asked to

undertake missions that support homeland security efforts. 

These kinds of missions bring into question the precise

role of an army in society. Although there is a well-understood

distinction between military operations and law enforcement,

armies in many countries are being asked to carry out the

functions of police officers. 

The manner in which a soldier employs force is fundamentally

different from the manner of a policeman. The soldier’s predilection is

to use force in the first instance,

while a law enforcement official

would use force as a last resort.

This essential difference distinguishes between those kinds of

security and defense missions

that are suitable for military

forces, and those more

appropriate for other kinds of security forces. Failure to make this key

distinction can have catastrophic implications.

Dr. John L. Clarke

14

The soldier’s predilection

is to use force in the first

instance, while a law

enforcement official would

use force as a last resort.
PART IV: Mission Sets for the 21st

Century

This section examines the variety of missions that military and

security forces are being tasked to perform. This paper develops six

categories that encompass this broad range of requirements. While not

exhaustive or inclusive, these categories cover the great majority of

missions that will confront armies in this century. It further develops

each category by listing specific mission tasks. The categories are:

• Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations

• International Stability and Support Operations

• Civil Support Operations

• National Defense Operations

• International Humanitarian Assistance Support

• Unilateral Military Operations

Each category may be best understood as consisting of a set of

tasks that either traditionally have been assigned to military forces

or may be assigned to military forces in the future. 

• Intervention/Offensive Combat 

Missions of intervention or offensive combat are usually

undertaken as part of a coalition. Participating in a military

expedition, such as the Gulf wars or the air operations over

Yugoslavia in 1999, would meet this criterion. Offensive

counterterrorist coalition operations in Afghanistan, as opposed to

the International Security Assistance Force operation, would also

qualify. These operations require the ability to deploy in a

reasonable period of time and on a high level of interoperability.

The capability of carrying out sophisticated operations with a high

operational tempo is usually also a criterion. 

What Roles and Missions?

15
Conventional offensive capabilities may require highly

mobile operations using combat vehicles, parachutes or helicopterborne capability. They include many classic military operations as

well as a range of more modern techniques, such as those

employed in the Afghan and Iraqi wars, which featured ground

terminal guidance of air-delivered munitions. Afeature common to

all of these operations is that they require a high level of

technological sophistication; their successful execution requires

commensurately high levels of training and education.

In some instances, a unique or niche capability may be

required, such as troops that can operate in a chemically or

biologically contaminated environment, or a specialized unit that

has been trained to operate in urban or mountainous environments.

These operations may include some kinds of stability operations,

usually in the aftermath of combat operations, but they are

subsidiary operations, not the focus. 

On the other hand, many of these highly sophisticated missions,

conducted by specialized organizations in hostile, denied or

politically sensitive areas, and often considered clandestine, covert

or low visibility may require a high level of special operations

capability. Many states maintain small numbers of special forces

capable of carrying out unconventional missions. Special operations

forces can represent an attractive option for many states, as the initial

material costs are relatively low and the training, while extensive,

can build upon that provided to special police officers.11

• International Stability and Support Operations

This category includes military operations that take place

before and after the cessation of hostilities. These operational tasks

include a broad array of peace operations and peace support

missions and are designed to support diplomatic efforts aimed at

long-term political settlement.12

Dr. John L. Clarke

16
This category includes the four kinds of peace operations: 

• Peacemaking, which are principally diplomatic efforts

designed to avert or contain a crisis;

• Peacekeeping, which are operations conducted with the 

consent of all parties and are designed to facilitate the 

implementation of a truce or cease fire agreement;

• Peace enforcement, which is the threat or use of force in 

order to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions 

designed to maintain or restore peace and order; and

• Peace building, which are post-conflict activities that 

strengthen and rebuild government infrastructure and 

institutions in a post-conflict environment.

Peace enforcement operations, which may range from

providing humanitarian assistance, restoring order and stability,

and enforcing sanctions to

establishing protected zones

and forcibly separating

belligerents, are evolving into

ever more complex missions.

They often combine elements

of several categories in a

single operational area;

increasingly require sophisticated technology and, above

all, a high level of training and preparation on the part of soldiers.

Peace enforcement represents the most challenging operation that

many armies of the region are able to undertake at the current time.

Many states in the region already have extensive

experience in these operations, particularly as part of

international peace operations such as IFOR and SFOR in

Bosnia, KFOR in Kosovo and ISAF in Afghanistan. States

often view participation in these operations as an opportunity

What Roles and Missions?

17

Peace enforcement

represents the most

challenging operation that

many armies of the region

are able to undertake at

the current time.
to make an international contribution and gain important

experience for their military forces. Moreover, the nature of

these operations, generally not excessively demanding from a

technology perspective but very intensive from a manpower

perspective, is well suited to the strengths of many of the

region’s military organizations, which frequently lack much

modern technology but have large pools of manpower. 

In particular, the requirements of these peace enforcement

operations make them candidates for the employment of some of

the paramilitary forces extant in the region. This is particularly true

of the peace enforcement and peace-building aspects of these

operations, in which police forces can play a particularly useful

role, as has been demonstrated by the use of these forces in both

Bosnia and Kosovo.13

• Civil Support

Governments may frequently call upon military forces to help

civilian authorities carry out a very wide range of tasks. These civil

support operations can be as diverse as the temporary

augmentation of key functions during labor strikes, the support of

key sporting events, or the restoration of law and order and the

protection of life and property in a riot or insurrection. Supporting

civil authorities is an important role and function of military forces,

but the range of tasks required for some missions approaches the

limit of what may be appropriate for military forces.14

Civil support consists of three distinct sub-categories:

• Defense assistance to civil authority (DACA)

• Defense support to civilian law enforcement authority 

(DSCLEA)

• Defense assistance to civil disturbances (DACDIS)

Dr. John L. Clarke

18
Across this range of operations, military civil support

operations are designed to provide temporary support to domestic

civil authorities when permitted by national law. The guiding

principles are that military forces should always support civil

authority and only render assistance when an emergency or other

requirement overwhelms the capabilities of the civil authorities.

Military forces should undertake civil support operations only

when they can bring a unique and indispensable capability to the

situation and not as a routine matter. It is worth repeating that

soldiers are not policemen; the approach that soldiers bring to the

use of force is fundamentally different from that of law

enforcement officers. 

DACAmissions may provide aid either after natural disasters and

emergencies, such as earthquakes, floods and other weather-related

crises, or following man-made disasters, such as oil spills and

transportation accidents. Included in this area are responses to largescale fire emergencies, such as forest fires. Military forces often manage

humanitarian aspects of these emergencies (such as providing shelter

and food) or repair damaged infrastructure, such as dikes and bridges. 

Military forces can play a decisive role in supporting civil

authorities in an event involving the use of weapons of mass

destruction. These incidents are referred to as CBRNE (Chemical,

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and high-yield Explosive)

incidents. In these incidents, the military often brings unique

qualifications and capabilities that can go far beyond those of first

responders such as firefighters and police. Even so, if at all

possible it is best that local authorities remain in command.

Military forces may also provide support to local and national

authorities before and during the conduct of major sports and

cultural events. Examples include logistic support during Olympic

games and other winter sports events, as well as support for

civilian officials during major government events, such as

What Roles and Missions?

19
inaugurations, and major cultural events such as world fairs and

other major exhibitions. 

Military augmentation of essential services is the last category

of possible DACA operations. These missions typically take place

during periods of labor unrest and might include providing

supplemental air traffic controllers or postal employees, as well as

replacing emergency workers, such as firefighters and critical

transportation workers.15

DSCLEA missions are those in which military forces provide

direct support to domestic law enforcement authorities. In most

countries, military forces are restricted or prohibited from actually

supplanting those law enforcement elements.16

These are several major tasks within the DSCLEA rubric.

These include augmenting border security, supporting

drug/contraband law enforcement, supporting domestic police

efforts to combat terrorism, supporting security at national special

events and generally supporting law enforcement authority.17

Border security, as distinguished from border defense, is first

and foremost a function that should be performed by law

enforcement personnel. In most instances, customs and

immigration officials assure secure borders, but paramilitary

troops stationed at the borders can also perform this function.

However, when soldiers act in a law enforcement role, it is

important to determine how force may be used. Even those states

that routinely use soldiers for these purposes must carefully train

them in the restricted use of force. 

Military forces may support national and local law

enforcement authorities in efforts to control illegal importation of

proscribed items, particularly illicit drugs. This support may

involve reinforcing border security units or providing intelligence,

Dr. John L. Clarke

20
command and control assistance. Typically, military forces may

provide electronic intelligence to law enforcement authorities or

may provide an offshore interception capability.

Another legitimate role for military forces is to support

domestic law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism, but this

requires carefully distinguishing between domestic and overseas

efforts. Domestic efforts should remain the responsibility of law

enforcement authorities, while military forces should take the lead

in conducting these operations overseas. Military forces may

provide backup support or logistical support to these domestic

operations, but should never assume full responsibility in a

domestic context. 

As with the DACA example of providing logistical support to

national special events, military forces may also provide security

support for these kinds of events as part of a DSCLEA task.

Special event security support may involve providing checkpoints,

roving patrols and entrance/exit security.

Lastly, under DSCLEA, military forces can provide

specialized support for civil law enforcement authority. This may

involve providing training support, including the use of firing

ranges, as well as more extensive support, such as assistance for

prison security and special prisoner transportation needs.

DACDIS events, which include a range of disturbances involving

violence in a domestic context, (such as riots, insurrections and other

mass civil disturbances), almost always exceed the capabilities of the

civilian authorities. Military support in these cases represents the most

serious level of assistance given to civilian authorities. 

While every effort should be made to retain control by

civil law enforcement authorities, disruption or violence may

rise to a level that requires the imposition of martial law. In

What Roles and Missions?

21
these instances, the military may assume local law

enforcement authority, but political responsibility remains in

civilian hands, with military commanders continuing to

report to civil authorities. DACDIS operations may involve a

significant use of force, even as its use remains consistent

with the principles of restraint. Every effort should be made

to return the situation to civilian control as soon as

circumstances permit. 

• National Defense

National defense missions encompass defensive actions

designed to deter, destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of

adversary attacks on sovereign territory, domestic populations and

critical infrastructure. Missions of this nature include most classic

defense operations that states have historically conducted on their

own territory. These tasks include:

• Air and missile defense

• Sovereignty protection 

• Critical infrastructure protection

• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) crisis and 

consequence management

• Continuity of government operations 

In the United States, these tasks may be referred to as

homeland defense missions.18

The first task of homeland defense is to protect the nation’s

territory, people and infrastructure from air-delivered weapons.

This requires an ability to detect, classify, track, intercept and

destroy aircraft, cruise missile and ballistic missile threats. Air and

missile defense may include passive measures, such as system

hardening and concealment and active measures, which include

acquisition and targeting measures.

Dr. John L. Clarke

22
Tasks within the air and missile defense category include

interception operations, area and point defense measures, as well

as combat air patrol over critical infrastructure and air escort of

commercial or military aircraft. 

Sovereignty protection involves the defense of population and

territory. Although an actual attack on national sovereignty

remains remote in most instances, defending territorial sovereignty

against an external hostile threat remains a core mission for

military force. While these operations are principally conducted on

home territory, some may require interdiction of hostile forces

outside the national territory. In addition to land defense, this

mission set also includes the maritime defense of the national

territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. 

Sovereignty protection also extends to national space-based

systems and defense-related computer systems, thus expanding the

concept of territorial sovereignty into outer space and cyber-space.

The United States, for example, considers an attack on its national

space system to be an attack on its national sovereignty.19

Similarly, terrorist or hacker attacks on defense-critical computer

systems are also considered infringements on national sovereignty.

Protecting defense computer systems is a key task for military

forces, and is likely to become even more critical as they rely more

heavily on computer systems to coordinate operations. 

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) focuses on protecting

systems deemed essential to the continued operation of

government, business and society. Critical infrastructure is often

divided into national critical infrastructure (NCI) and defense

critical infrastructure (DCI). NCI includes elements of society that

are essential to the economic security of a country as well as the

public safety and well being of its citizens. NCI includes energy,

water and other vital human and emergency services, as well as

information, communications, transportation, agriculture, banking

and finance systems. In most instances, NCI protection will be the

What Roles and Missions?

23
domain of law enforcement officials, reinforced as necessary in

emergencies by military forces.20

Defense critical infrastructure consists of two categories:

critical information assets and power projection capabilities

and assets. These include military command, control,

communications, computer and intelligence networks (C4I);

critical logistics assets and selected strategic sites; as well as

air and sea ports. Military forces retain principal responsibility

for the protection of DCI assets. 

WMD crisis and consequence management is another key

task in the national defense mission set. Normally, a WMD

event could be expected to considerably exceed the

capabilities of local and

national emergency services. Military forces are

uniquely suited to managing the extraordinary

range of tasks associated

with these devastating

events. Frequently, military

organizations may train

units specifically to conduct

operations in a biological, chemical or nuclear environment, or

to detect and neutralize these weapons.

Military forces can provide containment and

decontamination services as well as essential emergency

medical and logistic support. In these events, military forces

may, in fact, provide the majority of response services, and

thus may assume a lead role in the attenuation and mitigation

of these incidents. 

Dr. John L. Clarke

24

Military forces are

uniquely suited to

managing the extraordinary range of tasks

associated with these

devastating events.
The last mission in the national defense mission set is that of

maintaining continuity of government. In the event of a major

incident involving national leadership, the military may provide

essential services, such as communications and logistics, in order

to maintain the government’s ability to govern. Decapitation

strikes aimed at the national leadership may give rise to

widespread panic and may quickly exceed the ability of civil

organizations and officials. The ability of military forces to

respond quickly and to help maintain key government services can

be critical to the government’s survival and its citizens’ safety. 

• International Humanitarian Assistance

Military forces, with their extensive logistics capabilities, are often

called upon to render assistance abroad in instances of significant

human suffering. These operations may take place in the aftermath of a

major natural or man-made disaster. These efforts may be carried out in

an international environment, frequently as part of a coalition effort, or

on a bilateral basis, with one state assisting another.

International humanitarian assistance includes:

• Disaster relief

• Logistics support to international organizations/

non-governmental organizations

• Refugee support 

• Disaster consequence management

Disaster relief is the most prominent task in this mission set.

Military forces with large stockpiles of life-support essentials are

often in the forefront of those asked to contribute assistance. Food,

blankets, tents and medical supplies are feature items in this effort,

along with earth moving equipment and other construction

equipment items necessary in the event of earthquakes and other

natural disasters.

What Roles and Missions?

25
Equally important to the provision of emergency supplies are

the military’s transportation capabilities. These transportation

assets, particularly aviation assets, enable military forces to

respond quickly, which can often prove vital, particularly in the

case of major natural disasters. 

While the military often provides aid directly to those in need,

in other instances military forces may work closely with partners,

such as the Red Cross, to provide logistics support to international

organizations or to non-governmental and private voluntary

organizations, such as Oxfam, World Vision or the Catholic Relief

Agency. Military forces are often asked to support the transport of

relief supplies and workers or to assist with communications

support. 

As a consequence of this close cooperation, military and nongovernmental organizations may develop mutually advantageous

relations, with the military providing support and receiving

operational information in return. In tense situations, military

forces may be asked to protect humanitarian aid workers

threatened by clans, gangs or other criminal elements. Committing

forces to these tasks is a crucial decision, which may allow military

forces to step over the boundary of humanitarian operations into

the realm of peace enforcement missions, due to the possibility of

the use of force.

Athird mission task in this set is that of refugee support. Major

calamities may create large numbers of refugees and military

forces can be instrumental in managing the refugee flow. In

addition to logistical support, this mission may require a

substantial law enforcement element.

Disaster consequence management is the last mission in this

set. After the initial emergency, military forces may help to

reestablish order and security. Consequence management includes

Dr. John L. Clarke

26
many of the tasks outlined in the discussion of DACDIS missions

in a domestic context, with the added difficulty of being performed

in a foreign environment. These include measures to restore

essential government services, protect public health and safety and

provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses and

individuals. 

• Unilateral Military Operations

Although conducting military operations as part of a coalition

is usually preferable to acting alone, in the interest of national

security each national government must retain the ability to

undertake missions unilaterally when necessary. These missions

can cover the full range of offensive actions (as set forth in the

section on intervention actions), as well as the following

specialized operations:

• Shows of force

• Strikes and raids

• Counterinsurgency operations

• Evacuation of non-combatants

• Personnel recovery operations

• Offensive counter-terrorist operations

These operations usually require a high level of technological

sophistication as well as a robust deployment capability. Some

operations, such as evacuation and recovery, may have to be

conducted at some distance, thus requiring an air transportation

capability. Shows of force, strikes and raids will require an even

more complex level of capability, including a significant offensive

weapons capability, as well as a long-range deployment capability.

Counterinsurgency operations conducted within national

boundaries to suppress insurgent movements, domestic uprisings

and rebellions are perhaps the most demanding of these operations

What Roles and Missions?

27
and often require a full range of military capabilities. These

missions often use a special operations capability and very

frequently require close cooperation with law enforcement

authorities. Even though many insurgencies may utilize terrorist

methods and target civilian populations, these missions differ from

both domestic and overseas counter-terrorist operations in that they

may require large numbers of conventional military forces.

Overseas counter-terrorist operations refer to offensive

operations conducted outside the borders of a given state and

which are usually conducted by military forces, and thus differ

from domestic counter-terrorist operations, which are usually

conducted by law enforcement authorities. 

Dr. John L. Clarke

28
PART V: Types of Armed Security

Forces

This section analyzes twelve types of military and other armed

security forces that exist in the security-oriented ministries of the

states included in this study. 

• Active conventional ground forces (heavy) 

• Active conventional ground forces (light) 

• Special operations forces 

• Reserve forces 

• Border security forces 

• Internal security forces 

• National guards/Militias 

• Paramilitary police forces 

• Special police forces 

• National police forces 

• Private military companies 

• Commercial security providers 

Many of these forces are found throughout the focus region of

this paper. Each of them is associated with a particular set of

capabilities and costs; each may be particularly useful in a defined

contingency. This section briefly describes each type of force as it

relates to the mission sets already detailed in this paper. It should

be noted that not all of the states in this region possess the full

range of these forces; the intent here is to provide a survey of forces

that might be employed to accomplish the mission sets outlined in

the previous section.

Active Conventional Ground Forces (heavy) constitute the

bulk of the legacy forces in the region. These units, often still

What Roles and Missions?

29
organized along Soviet doctrinal lines, consist of tank and

motorized infantry units, along with their associated artillery and

engineer support. These forces form the core of the national

defense forces in most countries of the region and with their highly

restricted mobility have limited deployment capability. Moreover,

chronic under-funding has rendered obsolete force structures that

in some instances are not even capable of carrying out the primary

core defense tasks. 

Active Conventional Ground Forces (light) constitute the other

principal component of the core defense force. Light conventional

forces are often equipped with a wheeled transportation capability

and can exercise some mobility; due to their relative lightness, they

are also more adaptable to contingencies requiring air

transportation. These light forces also include many specialized

organizations, such as paratroop, airmobile and mountain infantry

forces, which can be useful in many contingencies. 

Special Operations Forces, while small in number, are

normally a state’s most highly trained and equipped active forces

and can carry out a wide range of conventional and unconventional

tasks, including counter-terrorist operations. These forces are also

capable of undertaking training and internal defense missions

outside state borders. Special operations forces require

considerable investment in personnel and training, but are highly

mobile and can deploy rapidly.

Reserve Forces constitute the principal backup force structure

for the active forces described above. As such, they may contain

elements of heavy, light and special operations force structures.

For reserve forces, the key issue is the level of readiness, which is

a function of manning level, training and equipment. Throughout

the region, readiness is quite low; indeed it is remarkable the extent

to which reserve forces throughout Europe have disappeared or

been rendered inconsequential through neglect.

Dr. John L. Clarke

30
Border Security Forces consist of a number of different types

of organizations, which include border guards organized along

military lines, as well as armed border security police forces. This

category also includes maritime forces with responsibility for

coastal security. These forces can be quite large, and in part as a

legacy of the Soviet era, are generally well trained and equipped.

In general, their function is to secure the external borders of a

country, not to defend them. Thus, their function is principally one

of law enforcement. Border security forces may have some highly

mobile units equipped with light wheeled armored vehicles.

The central issue is whether these forces view themselves as

military or law enforcement organizations. In many cases, they

will perform both missions, as is the case with the US Coast

Guard; but the key is the mentality of the individual border guard

and his approach to the use of force. Many will view themselves

as soldiers, drawing on the traditional orientation of most border

troops; more modern ones will recognize the primacy of this

mission’s law enforcement aspect, and will identify themselves

principally as law enforcement officers.

Internal Security Forces, often referred to as interior ministry

troops, may be organized along military lines. These forces

generally support domestic security: they may guard critical

infrastructure, protect senior officials or provide a strategic reserve

to deal with unrest and calamities. In many instances, these

Ministry of Interior troops may be called upon to deal with

insurgencies, as has been the case with Russian troops in

Chechnya. The absence of law enforcement and investigative

functions in internal security forces distinguishes them from

paramilitary police forces, also often controlled by ministries of the

interior. 

Internal security forces may also include riot police, national

police reserves and, in some instances, highly trained counterWhat Roles and Missions?

31
terrorist forces charged with carrying out internal and overseas

missions. 

National Guards/Militias, also called home guards or militias,

represent another kind of reserve force. They are often regionally

organized, with specific operational areas. In contrast to the reserve

forces described above, national guards are not intended to act as

a reserve for the active forces, but rather to provide for territorial

defense. They have much simplified tables of organization, and

they generally have far less equipment, relying mostly on small

arms and simple crew-served weapons. Generally, they lack any

kind of combat vehicles, but may possess trucks for local mobility. 

National guards tend to have even lower levels of training and

readiness than reserves. Many do not meet regularly to conduct

training. They may be filled by men with a residual reserve service

requirement, who may be age 50 and beyond. Nevertheless, they

may constitute an important capability commensurate with the

level of threat to territorial integrity.

Paramilitary Police Forces are common in European

countries and are capable of executing a wide range of missions.

These forces, sometimes part of the Ministry of Defense but

normally under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, have a

variety of organizations and capabilities. They generally consist of

two elements: a territorial element, principally concerned with law

enforcement activities in non-metropolitan areas; and a mobile

element, capable of rapid deployment throughout the state, which

may have wheeled armored vehicles and aviation assets. 

Paramilitary police forces generally understand their primary

role to be that of law enforcement, with a territorial defense role as

secondary. Nevertheless, these organizations are flexible and can

be employed for many tasks set forth in this paper. Indeed, as

evidence of this utility, these police forces are now being employed

Dr. John L. Clarke

32
internationally in a number of peace operations, such as in Bosnia,

Kosovo and Iraq. 

Special Police Forces include agencies that carry out specific

police functions, including aviation police, railway troops, and

finance police. These police forces may also include ceremonial

and protective formations, organized along military lines, such as

presidential guards. In every instance, the purpose of these police

forces is limited to a specific function; they do not engage in the

general law enforcement activities. 

National Police Forces include the majority of regular police

forces in a given state. They may be organized nationally or

regionally, but generally always report to national authorities. They

are charged with general law enforcement functions, which may

include some national defense tasks as set forth in this paper,

particularly in the area of critical infrastructure protection and

crisis management. Moreover, these forces may be required to

work closely with military forces in the event of DSCLEA and

DACDIS events.

Private Military Companies are civilian-owned and operated

firms that carry out military and security functions. Sometimes

referred to as mercenary firms, they are usually staffed by former

military and police officers and are capable of carrying out a wide

range of military tasks. Because of the flexibility that these

companies demonstrate, they are often employed in lieu of regular

military forces for training missions or other special tasks.

Commercial Security Providers supply guards and security

officials for special events or at critical installations. These

organizations provide training, equipment, and organization for

these guards. In comparison to private military companies, their

range of services is much more restricted. 

What Roles and Missions?

33
Dr. John L. Clarke

34
PART VI: Assessments and Force

Nominations

This part provides assessments and force nominations for each

of the six mission sets discussed in Part IV. The assessments

consider each of these mission sets and evaluate each of the twelve

force types based on their ability to accomplish each of the tasks.

These evaluations form the basis for the recommended force

solution to each set. These recommendations constitute the

nominations for the force mix best suited for accomplishing the

mission set. For each mission set the types of forces best suited to

the particular mission requirement are indicated in bold italics and

those that can make a contribution at a lower, but still important

level are indicated in italics.

Intervention/Offensive Combat Operations

These operations, which will most likely occur outside the

state’s boundaries and be conducted as part of a coalition or

alliance, require the ability to manage technology as well as to

deploy rapidly and to sustain operations over time. In addition,

participating forces must be able to contribute effective combat

power in a contingency.

Accordingly, states participating in these operations must have

forces that can meet these requirements. Because heavy

conventional forces can meet some (combat power), but not all

(deployability and sustainability) of these requirements, they are

judged to be of lesser value for these contingencies. Moreover, the

status of many heavy force structures in the region is such that the

costs required to put them in a satisfactory state of readiness is

simply too great in relation to their potential for employment.

Thus, even though this mission set requires a high degree of

What Roles and Missions?

35
combat power, the heavy forces of states in the region should not

channel more resources into this area.

The best choices for meeting the requirements of this mission

set are active conventional

ground forces (light) and

special operations forces.

These forces are able to

harness newer technology and

generally have higher rates of

readiness at investment levels

that remain acceptable. Combined with probable coalition

air assets, the ability of robust,

light forces equipped with light vehicles, can be particularly

effective in these contingencies.

Special operations forces are particularly well adapted to these

requirements, and have high levels of deployability and readiness.

Many of the region’s special operations forces are well acquainted

with coalition special operations, having participated in numerous

international exercises and actual operations. 

International Stability and Support Operations

The basic requirements of peace operations are now well

known, given the experience of the international community over

the past decade. These operations are generally manpower

intensive, but are not necessarily ones that demand high levels of

technological sophistication. With certain exceptions, particularly

in the high-intensity peace enforcement operations, active

conventional ground forces (light) are able to accomplish many

of the tasks called for in this mission set. They are particularly

useful in peacekeeping missions, where there is less emphasis on

the use of force other than for self-protection.

Dr. John L. Clarke

36

These forces are able to

harness newer technology

and generally have higher

rates of readiness at

investment levels that

remain acceptable.
Paramilitary police forces are another good choice for

meeting the requirements of the mission set. Based on doctrine,

organization, equipment and training, these police forces are well

suited to carry out many stability operations tasks. They are

particularly useful during post-conflict peace building tasks, as

well as lower-end peace enforcement tasks that require a capability

for re-establishing order and stability during a transitional phase. 

Special operations forces, the third option, are very capable in

carrying out these tasks. They are particularly useful in supporting

peace enforcement tasks and can provide an excellent tool for

meeting coalition operations coordination requirements by

providing language-qualified liaison teams. Special operations

forces are also useful during pre-conflict peacemaking operations,

where long established military-to-military contact programs can

bear fruit, as well as in peace building operations, due to their

inherent ability to conduct training operations for newly

established security forces. 

Other forces that can be of some utility include certain types

of reserve forces, which can be activated to provide a sustainment

ability, and private military companies, which are now developing

some level of capability suited to low-end peace operations.

Civil Support

This section is divided according to the three mission subsets

of DACA, DSCLEA and DACDIS. This section considers only

military and paramilitary forces because the essential nature of

civil support is to provide support to civilian authority.

Defense Assistance to Civil Authority (DACA) 

Because the need for military support to civil authority is

unpredictable, active conventional ground forces, both heavy and

What Roles and Missions?

37
light, are likely to be called upon in the early stages of these

contingencies. Conventional forces, depending on their state of

readiness, can quickly react to a contingency. They have the

logistical support and self-deployment capability that allow them

to respond quickly and to sustain themselves during the operation.

In particular, these forces are well equipped to respond to incidents

involving chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

Additionally, both paramilitary police forces and internal

security forces are particularly well adapted to law enforcement

aspects of these operations. Paramilitary police forces are perhaps

best suited, given their equipment, doctrine and training. However,

police forces’ capabilities can be quickly overwhelmed by major

calamities and may require substantial reinforcement by military

forces.

National guards and reserve forces may also be useful,

although generally low levels of readiness delay their ability to

respond quickly to emergencies. National guards and reserve

forces are, however, useful to augment large public activities

planned well in advance, such as national sporting events.

Defense Support to Civil Law Enforcement Authority

(DSCLEA)

To support law enforcement authority, the best-suited forces

include active conventional ground forces (light), internal

security forces and special operations forces. Reserve forces and

national guards generally lack the capabilities, particularly

specialized capabilities and the ability to sustain operations over

time, to make a realistic contribution. Active forces can augment

border security forces over the long-term and have access to an

array of technology, such as ground surveillance radars, that can be

used effectively. Special operations forces can provide training

support to law enforcement authority, as well as assist in efforts to

Dr. John L. Clarke

38
combat domestic terrorism; however, civilian law enforcement

agencies should take the lead in this mission. It is assumed that

paramilitary police forces, if available, will always be involved in

these operations as a matter of policy. To the extent that they are

controlled by the ministry of defense and are focused on the

military aspects of their duties, they would be a natural source of

augmentation for the DSCLEA mission. 

Defense Assistance to Civil Disturbances (DACDIS)

As with DACArequirements, military assistance during major

disturbances or calamities generally requires a rapid response

capability. Thus, active conventional ground forces (light) and

internal security forces are the most likely candidates for

missions. Reserve forces and national guards, depending on the

amount of time available, can also contribute to carrying out these

tasks. As with DSCLEA events, paramilitary police forces, if not

otherwise already engaged, are likely to be called upon to manage

these contingencies.

National Defense

The most important forces available to defend the national

territory are the active conventional ground forces (light and

heavy). This is particularly true in the case of protecting the

nation’s sovereignty. Heavy forces are obviously more capable in

this mission, but because of the heavy yoke of legacy forces, they

are often found at a lower level of readiness than light

organizations. However, given the relatively low threat to

territorial sovereignty, it may be more prudent to rely on a mix of

active forces, reserve forces and national guards. The latter are

particularly capable in providing area territorial defense at

relatively low cost. Indeed, it is worth considering whether the

bulk of the territorial sovereignty mission can be shifted to reserve

and national guard forces. This would result in substantial savings.

What Roles and Missions?

39
For much the same reason, reserve and guard forces may be

best suited to protect critical infrastructure, particularly in those

instances where the infrastructure does not require a high level of

technical sophistication in order to achieve an acceptable level of

protection. These reserve elements are able to provide the large

numbers of static guard personnel often required for this mission.

Paramilitary police forces and internal security forces can also

provide this support, but at a cost to their other duties. A costefficient solution to the challenge of protecting critical

infrastructure is to employ commercial security providers in this

role.

International Humanitarian Assistance

As was the case for DACA in a national context, providing

assistance to international or foreign civil authority in the event of

a major catastrophe requires forces able to respond quickly and to

supply their own logistic support. These operations may also

require a capability for self-defense, so it’s likely to be useful if the

forces are armed. 

Many of the requirements of providing humanitarian

assistance can be met by combat troops, but some tasks go

considerably beyond their capabilities. Many of these operations

require highly specialized capabilities, such as water purification

units and military police, as well as civil affairs specialists,

particularly for dealing with the consequences of major calamities

and upheavals. The refugee support mission may entail providing

basic services such as sanitation and emergency medical services.

In addition, logistical support troops are generally very useful

during these contingencies, which frequently require substantial

movement of supplies and equipment.

Many states would find it difficult to develop, train and sustain

low-density specialized troops for these missions; consequently,

Dr. John L. Clarke

40
active conventional ground forces (light) could be tasked to

manage most of these missions. To a lesser extent, paramilitary

police forces may be deployed to support these missions. In

exceptional circumstances, some internal security forces may also

be deployed, particularly for those missions where protection of

humanitarian assistance and its providers is required, though

employment of these state security forces outside a nation’s own

borders may pose legal difficulties. 

Unilateral Military Operations

By definition, these operations rely only on national assets and

resources; international assistance is not a factor. These operations

rely primarily on conventional military capabilities, but they may

also draw upon special operations capabilities. In addition to land

forces, air and sea assets (as appropriate) may be useful in carrying

out some of these missions, particularly if they occur some

distance from the home territory.

As previously noted, these operations often combine military

and law enforcement operations; it is thus not uncommon for both

military and police forces to cooperate in executing them.

However, divided lines of command may occur, resulting in an

uncoordinated response.

For counterinsurgency operations, active conventional

ground forces (light) and paramilitary police forces are generally

the forces of choice. Heavy forces are generally not adaptable to

fighting counterinsurgency attacks, particularly in urban areas.

Internal security forces may also play an important role, but it is

critical to distinguish between their law enforcement and military

roles. Too frequently, internal security forces may be employed in

an essentially military role for which they are neither trained nor

equipped.

What Roles and Missions?

41
Active conventional light forces are also well suited for

employment in the show-of-force role, as are active conventional

ground forces (heavy), particularly if these actions take place on or

near the state borders. They are less useful should it be necessary

to undertake a show of force at some distance from the state, as

they can be difficult to deploy.

Special operations forces are uniquely suited to the

requirements of strikes and raids outside the state’s territory, as

well as recovery operations and the evacuation of non-combatants.

They are often able to function independently, a unique match for

the requirements of unilateral military operations. Coordinated

with air and sea forces, they can conduct operations at long range,

as was the case with the Mogadishu (German) and Kampala

(Israeli) operations. 

Dr. John L. Clarke

42
PART VII: Conclusions and 

Recommendations

The foregoing analysis reveals several conclusions about

optimal force mixes for the likely challenges of the future. While

each country will have its own requirements, some

recommendations seem applicable across the region. Policy

makers must understand the limited, but real, window of

opportunity in which the necessary mission-force mix changes can

be made.

First, channeling money into legacy heavy forces is not an

efficient investment. These forces are more costly than other forces

examined in this study in terms of maintenance, training and

sustainability requirements and their utility is limited, due to their

constrained strategic mobility and major logistical needs. Indeed,

investing in legacy heavy forces may be counterproductive,

because it may deprive other, more useful force types of much

needed support.

Secondly, this analysis demonstrates conclusively that active

conventional ground forces (light) and special operations forces

have the broadest range of utility for military forces. They rank among

the most versatile forces for almost every mission set examined in this

study. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that these forces require

only modest change throughout these points of analysis, and more

importantly, marginal additional investment. These forces also seem to

be best positioned to take advantage of technological innovation, as

well as to meet emerging future requirements.

With regard to other armed security forces, highly versatile

paramilitary police forces appear to have the greatest utility and

What Roles and Missions?

43
are good candidates for additional investment. They are able to

make important contributions across the range of requirements,

particularly in national defense, stability operations and civil

support. They are well adapted to bridging the gap between

military and law enforcement approaches to using force. In this

respect, they appear to be more useful than internal security forces,

with their generally more limited scope of operations and often

military approach to the use of force. Moreover, they are more

versatile than many specialized police forces and thus, are able to

meet a much broader range of requirements.

The mission of border security invites additional scrutiny.

Given the importance and complexity of border security missions,

highly specialized enforcement organizations must be developed

for this purpose. While military forces are often employed in this

role, principally because they represent a low-cost alternative for

securing borders, this mission calls for a law enforcement-centered

approach, as well as highly specialized training; both are often

beyond the scope of military forces.

Given the reduced level of threats to national sovereignty, most

territorial security tasks should probably be relegated to reserve

forces. While many reserve

formations desperately need

invigoration, the investment

required to achieve a credible

level of capability would be, in

most instances, modest. Reassigning part of the territorial

defense task to a national

guard/militia structure is

worth considering, because

these forces cost less than reserve forces, which must maintain a

higher level of readiness and are more resource-intensive from the

analytical perspective employed in this study.

Dr. John L. Clarke

44

Given the reduced level of

threats to national

sovereignty, most

territorial security tasks

should probably be

relegated to reserve

forces.
This analysis makes clear that across the range of force

options, hardware issues, particularly those related to investments

in legacy forces, are not the most pressing. For the range of tasks

analyzed in this paper, many equipment needs can be met through

off-the-shelf purchases, or through limited purchase of

technologically advanced mission-specific equipment. Based on

this analysis, a progressive approach to upgrading legacy

equipment holdings should probably give way to a more

aggressive approach that may skip a generation of technology in

order to acquire more advanced and more capable equipment.

As important as hardware may be, states can invest more

intelligently in personnel: human resources are the key to

integrating new capabilities and novel technology. While in the

near future, it may seem that equipment acquisition may increase

readiness, the challenges of developing the necessary doctrine,

organizations and training may actually decrease short-term

readiness. In fact, the difficulties of integrating new technology

inevitably require additional expenditures in personnel and

training. Consequently, additional expenditures for personnel are

the sine qua non of modern readiness and increased capability.

This paper has demonstrated that the proper mix of forces

required for managing future change can be obtained by

concentrating on three kinds of forces: light, special operations

and paramilitary police forces. Focusing future efforts on this force

mix can result in much higher levels of readiness, expanded

capabilities and reduced costs, especially when existing

redundancies are eliminated. States would be well advised to

consider this force mix as they move forward with planning for

operations in this decade and beyond. 

What Roles and Missions?

45
Endnotes

1 The DOTLMS was developed by the US Army as a set of metrics

for determining, inter alia, the readiness of military forces for different

missions. In this analysis, a C has been added to analyze the utility of

additional marginal investment, referred to as Cost, to determine how

much investment may be required to achieve a measurable gain in

effectiveness. For an example of DOTLMS analysis, see

http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1251/MR1251.Chap9.pdf.

2 Emerging defense doctrine in Europe is beginning to reflect this reality.

The defense of national territory is no longer the first priority in some

doctrines. See, inter alia, Germany’s new Defence Policy Guidelines.

(Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Berlin, May 2003), p. 4.

3 With rare exceptions, Europe’s spending on defense continues to

decline precipitously. Spending on defense is overwhelmingly devoted to

personnel, with little left for new equipment purchases. This has forced many

defense ministries to curtail or eliminate many programs. See, for example,

Smith, Craig, “Germany to Overhaul Military and Reduce Defense

Spending,” The New York Times, January 14, 2004, p. 2.

4 In many countries the process of strategic assessment is not fully

embedded. As a result, strategic requirements are not always well thought

through, nor are they coordinated with neighbors and partners.

5 Europe’s reluctance to countenance the use of force has been much

debated recently. See, inter alia, Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power,

(New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003).

6 The cascading program makes available a broad range of surplus

equipment from the long-term NATO members to newer NATO members

and applicant states. This equipment is generally a generation or two

removed from current acquisition programs. Its acquisition by other

countries mandates the establishment of entirely new logistical support

systems, necessitating significant investment.

7 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the

United States (JP1), p. III-1.

Dr. John L. Clarke

46
8 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Direction Armed Forces (JP 0-2), p. I-6.

9 Ibid, p. I-6.

10 Ibid, p. II-1.

11 See www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel for additional information on special

operations doctrine.

12 Ibid. Peace operations also referred to as peace support operations,

have now been subsumed under the rubric of stability operations in US

usage.

13 In particular, Multinational Support Units (MSU), composed of

Italian Carabinieri units, have proven to be effective in operations in the

Balkans. See http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-07.htm.

14See www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel.

15 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security (JP

3-26), p. IV-3.

16 In particular, the employment of military forces in a domestic

context in the United States is severely restricted by the Posse Comitatus

Act of 1878. See http://www.dojgov.net/posse_comitatus_act.htm

17US JCS, JP 3-26, p. IV-7.

18 In the United States homeland defense is distinguished from

homeland security. Homeland security is focused on protecting against and

responding to terror attacks, while homeland defense is concerned with the

role military forces play in defending the nation. For a further elaboration

see Clarke, John, “Securing the European Homeland,” Journal of

Homeland Security, September 2003.

19See JP 3-26, p. III-8 for this statement of policy.

20See JP 3-26, p. III-1 for examples of NCI and DCI.

What Roles and Missions?

47
The George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies

Dr. John P. Rose

Director

MG (Ret.) Michael J. McCarthy, USAF

Deputy Director

MG (Ret.) Dr. Horst Schmalfeld, GEAF

Deputy Director

Ambassador Mary Ann Peters

Associate Director for International Liaison

College of International and Security Studies

Dr. John Reppert

Dean

Ms Margie Gibson

Editor

This paper is available on the Marshall Center Web Site at

www.marshallcenter.org

Designed and produced by VIB, August 2005
The Marshall Center Papers

No. 1 – Europe’s New Defense Ambitions:

Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia

by Peter van Ham

April 2000

No. 2 – The Transformation of Russian

Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned

from Kosovo and Chechnya

by Alexei G. Arbatov

July 2000

No. 3 – Cooperative Security:

New Horizons for International Order

by Richard Cohen and

Michael Mihalka

April 2001

No. 4 – Western Unity and the Transatlantic

Security Challenge

by Peter van Ham and

Richard L. Kugler

June 2002

No. 5 – Counter-Terrorism and the

Use of Force in International Law

by Michael N. Schmitt

November 2002

No. 6 – Rethinking the National Interest:

Putin’s Turn in Russian Foreign Policy

by Sergei Medvedev

August 2004
ISBN 1-930831-12-9

The Marshall Center Web

Site:

What Roles and Missions for Europe’s Military

and Security Forces in the 21st Century?

By Dr. John L. Clarke, Professor at the George C.

Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen,

Germany

What kinds of military and other armed security

forces should be developed for the 21st Century?

What missions will they be expected to perform?

Should other kinds of armed security forces, such as

paramilitary police, replace some of today’s armies?

Do all nations need a full range of capabilities, or are

there opportunities for rationalization among

neighbors, who no longer threaten one another? 

In this Marshall Center Paper, Prof. John Clarke

explores the new requirements thrust upon military

and other armed security forces. He examines the

range of roles, missions, and functions for these

forces over the next decade. 

His conclusion—that light conventional infantry

forces, special operations forces, and paramilitary

police forces form a versatile, essential core of

forces that every state should consider—is precisely

the kind of analysis that decision makers require for

the difficult choices they face.