* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-20379

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JEFF HENRY WILLIAMSON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:08-CR-539-1

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jeff Henry Williamson was indicted on August 13, 2008 for sending

threatening communications through interstate commerce. The indictment

alleged that Williamson sent an e-mail to the United States Attorney for the

Southern District of Texas stating that he was going to blow up the J. Edgar

Hoover Building. Williamson was arraigned on September 3, 2008. On April 21,

2009, the district court entered an order finding that Williamson was suffering

from a mental disease or defect rendering him incompetent to stand trial.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 28, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 10-20379

2

Williamson was committed to the custody ofthe Attorney General for treatment

and evaluation. On January 4, 2010, the district court found Williamson

competent to stand trial. Williamson went to trial on March 5, 2010. The jury

found Williamson guilty. The district court sentenced him to 42 months in

prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. 

Williamson argues that his statutory right to a speedy trial was denied

because his trial took place beyond the time permitted by the Speedy Trial Act.

The Speedy Trial Act requires that a federal defendant be tried within 70

nonexcludable days of the filing of his indictment or his appearance before a

judicial officer, whichever comes later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). We review the

district court’s factual findings in support of its Speedy Trial Act ruling for clear

error and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v.

McNealy, 625F.3d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 2010). Although Williamson challenges the

general use of the pendency of his motions to toll the running of the 70 days, he

has not shown that any of the facts as found by the district court are erroneous.

Williamson has not shown that the indictment should have been dismissed

based on the Speedy Trial Act

The district court did not err in denying Williamson’s motions to dismiss

indictment on constitutional grounds. To determine whether a defendant’s

constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, the court must balance

four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether

the defendant asserted his rightto a speedy trial, and (4) whether the defendant

was prejudiced by the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). The

Barker factors do not weigh heavily in Williamson’s favor, and therefore he is not

entitled to a presumption of prejudice. Williamson was tried within 60 days of

the district court finding him competent to stand trial he has failed to make a

showing of actual prejudice. 

Williamson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction because the Government did not show that he sent the threatening
No. 10-20379

3

e-mail. Williamson preserved this issue and review is de novo. See United

States v. Williams, 507 F.3d 905, 908 (5th Cir. 2007). We will uphold the jury’s

verdict if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the

elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903, 910

(5th Cir. 2008). Under 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c), the Government is required to prove

that the defendant transmitted a communication in interstate commence that

threatened to kidnap or injure another. United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284,

287 (5th Cir. 2001). Williamson’s only argument is that the evidence did not

show that he sent the e-mail. Given the evidence regarding Williamson’s

computer use, it would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude that

Williamson had sent the threatening e-mail.

The district court did not err in denying Williamson’s motion for a jury

instruction on entrapment. “Entrapment is an affirmative defense that requires

a defendant to show he was induced to commit a criminal act by a government

agent and that he was not predisposed to commit the act without the

inducement.” United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 689 (5th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Williamson’s argument is

frivolous because he confuses provocation with entrapment. He has not alleged

that the Government induced him to make the threat. 

The remainder of Williamson’s claims have not been briefed adequately.

Although pro se briefs are liberally construed, pro se parties must still brief the

issues and reasonably comply with the standard for appellate briefs set forth in

Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d

523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 requires, inter

alia, that the argument contain the appellant’s contentions and the reasons for

them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the

appellant relies. Rule 28(a)(9)(A). Rule 28 also requires the appellant’s brief to

contain “a statement of facts relevant to the issues submitted for review with
No. 10-20379

4

appropriate references to the record.” Rule 28(a)(7). Pro se litigants must brief

arguments to preserve them. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.

1993). All issues not discussed above are deemed abandoned. See Hughes v.

Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.