Testimony 

Before the Little Hoover Commission, 

State of California

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. PST 

Thursday, February 23, 2006 EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS AND 

RESPONSE 

Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major 

Emergency Incidents 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

GAO-06-467T 

On March 3, 2006, this testimony was reposted to the Web 

because of two corrections made to the electronic version. The 

first correction occurs on page 12, where the word “not” has 

been added. The sentence should say, “The PFO does not direct 

or replace the incident command system and structure...” The 

second correction occurs on page 13, where the word 

“Performance” has been replaced with the word 

“Preparedness” so that “National Performance Goal” becomes 

“National Preparedness Goal.” 
Page 1 GAO-06-467T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the challenges of 

effective emergency preparedness for, response to, and recovery from 

major emergencies, including catastrophic events. Effective emergency 

preparedness and response for major events requires the coordinated 

planning and actions of multiple players from multiple first responder 

disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as 

nongovernmental entities. Effective emergency preparedness and 

response requires putting aside parochialism and working together prior 

to and after an emergency event. As one participant in responding to 

Katrina put it, the aftermath of a major disaster is no time to be 

exchanging business cards. 

September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the context of emergency 

management preparedness in the United States, including federal 

involvement in preparedness and response. The biggest challenge in 

emergency preparedness is getting effective cooperation in planning, 

exercises, and capability assessment and building across first responder 

disciplines and intergovernmental lines. DHS has developed several policy 

documents designed to define the federal government’s role in supporting 

state and local first responders in emergencies, implement a uniform 

incident command structure across the nation, and identify performance 

standards that can be used in assessing state and local first responder 

capabilities. Realistic exercises are a key component of testing and 

assessing emergency plans and first responder capabilities, and the 

Hurricane PAM planning exercise demonstrated their value. With regard 

to the status of emergency preparedness across the nation, we know 

relatively little about how states and localities (1) finance their efforts in 

this area, (2) have used their federal funds, and (3) are assessing the 

effectiveness with which they spend those funds. Katrina has raised a host 

of questions about the nation’s readiness to respond effectively to 

catastrophic emergencies. Effective emergency preparedness is a task 

that is never done, but requires continuing commitment and leadership 

because circumstances change and continuing trade-offs because we will 

never have the funds to do everything we might like to do. 
Page 2 GAO-06-467T 

Prior to September 11, 2001, emergency preparedness and response had 

primarily been the responsibility of state and local governments and had 

focused principally on emergencies resulting from nature, such as fires, 

floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, or accidental acts of man, not acts of 

terrorism. The federal government’s role in supporting emergency 

preparedness and management prior to September 11 was limited 

primarily to providing resources before large-scale disasters like floods, 

hurricanes, and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after 

such disasters. However, after September 11 and the concern it 

engendered about the need to be prepared to prevent, mitigate, and 

respond to acts of terrorism, the extent of the federal government’s 

financial support for state and local government emergency preparedness 

and response grew enormously, with about $11 billion in grants distributed 

from fiscal years 2002 through 2005. At the same time the federal 

government has been developing guidance and standards for state and 

local first responders in the areas of incident management and capabilities 

and tying certain requirements to the award of grants. 

The nation’s emergency managers and first responders have lead 

responsibilities for carrying out emergency management efforts. First 

responders have traditionally been thought of as police, fire fighters, 

emergency medical personnel, and others who are among the first on the 

scene of an emergency. However, since September 11, 2001, the definition 

of first responder has been broadened to include those, such as public 

health and hospital personnel, who may not be on the scene, but are 

essential in supporting effective response and recovery operations.1

 The 

role of first responders is to prevent where possible, protect against, 

 1

First responders have traditionally been thought of as local fire, police, and emergency 

medical personnel who respond to events such as fires, floods, traffic or rail accidents, and 

hazardous materials spills. As a result of the increased concerns about bioterrorism and 

other potential terrorist attacks, the definition of first responders has been broadened. 

Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act defined emergency response providers as including 

“Federal, State, and local emergency public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, 

emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, 

agencies, and authorities.” Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296 § 2, 116. 

Stat.2135, 2140 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101(6). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 

defined the term “first responder” as “individuals who in the early stages of an incident are 

responsible for the protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the 

environment, including emergency response providers as defined in section 2 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101),as well as emergency management, public 

health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment 

operators) that provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and 

recovery operations.” 

September 11, 2001 

Changed the Context 

of Emergency 

Preparedness 
Page 3 GAO-06-467T 

respond to, and assist in the recovery from emergency events. First 

responders are trained and equipped to arrive at the scene of an 

emergency and take immediate action. Examples include entering the 

scene of the event and assessing the situation, setting up a command 

center, establishing safe and secure perimeters around the event site, 

evacuating those within or near the site, tending to the injured and dead, 

transporting them to medical care centers or morgues, rerouting traffic, 

helping to restore public utilities, and clearing debris. 

Last year, GAO issued a special report on 21st Century Challenges, 

examining the federal government’s long-term fiscal outlook, the nation’s 

ability to respond to emerging forces reshaping American Society, and the 

future role of the federal government. Among the issues discussed was 

homeland security.2

 In our report we identified the following illustrative 

challenges and questions for examining emergency preparedness and 

response in the nation: 

• Defining an acceptable, achievable (within budget constraints) level of 

risk. The nation can never be completely safe; total security is an 

unachievable goal. Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable 

level of risk to guide homeland security strategies and investments, 

particularly federal funding? What criteria should be used to target federal 

and state funding for homeland security in order to maximize results and 

mitigate risk within available resource levels? 

• What should be the role of federal, state, and local governments in 

identifying risks—from nature or man—in individual states and localities 

and establishing standards for the equipment, skills, and capacities that 

first responders need? 

• Are existing incentives sufficient to support private sector protection of 

critical infrastructure the private sector owns, and what changes might be 

necessary? 

• What is the most viable way to approach homeland security results 

management and accountability? What are the appropriate goals and who 

is accountable for the many components of homeland security when many 

partners and functions and disciplines are involved? How can these actors 

be held accountable and by whom? 

 2

GAO, 21st Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government, 

GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 
Page 4 GAO-06-467T 

• What costs should be borne by federal, state, and local governments or the 

private sector in preparing for, responding to, and recovery from disasters 

large and small—whether the acts of nature or the deliberate or accidental 

acts of man? 

• To what extent and how should the federal government encourage and 

foster a role for regional or multistate entities in emergency planning and 

response? 

These issues are enormously complex and represent a major challenge for 

all levels of government. But the experience of Hurricane Katrina 

illustrated why it is important to tackle these difficult issues. Katrina was 

a catastrophe of historic proportions in both its geographic scope—about 

90,000 square miles—and its destruction. Its impact on individuals and 

communities was horrific. Katrina highlighted the limitations of our 

current capacity to respond effectively to catastrophic events—those of 

unusual severity that almost immediately overwhelm state and local 

response capacities. 3

 Katrina gives us an opportunity to learn from what 

went well and what did not go so well and improve our ability to respond 

to future catastrophic disasters. 

It is generally accepted that emergency preparedness and response should 

be characterized by measurable goals and effective efforts to identify key 

gaps between those goals and current capabilities, with a clear plan for 

closing those gaps and, once achieved, sustaining desired levels of 

preparedness and response capabilities and performance. The basic goal 

of emergency preparedness for a major emergency is that first responders 

should be able to respond swiftly with well-planned, well-coordinated, and 

effective actions that save lives and property, mitigate the effects of the 

disaster, and set the stage for a quick, effective recovery. In a major event, 

coordinated, effective actions are required among responders from 

different local jurisdictions, levels of government, and nongovernmental 

entities, such as the Red Cross. 

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on 

the answers to four basic, but hardly simple, questions with regard to 

emergency preparedness and response: 

 3

 Events need not be catastrophic for the federal government to provide assistance under 

the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, or to provide 

coordination under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the National Response Plan. 
Page 5 GAO-06-467T 

1. What is important (that is, what are our priorities)? 

2. How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments, 

performance standards)? 

3. How do we measure, attain, and sustain success? 

4. On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources? 

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions, and the data 

available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have 

better information and a sense of what needs to be done for some types of 

major emergency events than others. For some natural disasters, such as 

regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore a 

better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and 

identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with 

earthquakes, and Florida has experience with hurricanes. However, no 

one in the nation has experience with such potential catastrophes as a 

dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Nor is there any recent experience 

with a pandemic that spreads to thousands of people rapidly across the 

nation, although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related 

experience. 

Planning and assistance has largely been focused on single jurisdictions 

and their immediately adjacent neighbors. However, well-documented 

problems with first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate 

at the site of an incident and the potential for large scale natural and 

terrorist disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first 

responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a 

regional and multi-governmental basis. 

The area of interoperable communications is illustrative of the general 

challenge of identifying requirements, current gaps in the ability to meet 

those requirements and assess success in closing those gaps, and doing 

this on a multi-jurisdictional basis. We identified three principal challenges 

to improving interoperable communications for first responders:4

• clearly identifying and defining the problem; 

 4

GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation 

Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications, GAO-04-470 

(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004). 
Page 6 GAO-06-467T 

• establishing national interoperability performance goals and standards 

that balance nationwide standards with the flexibility to address 

differences in state, regional, and local needs and conditions; and 

• defining the roles of federal, state, and local governments and other 

entities in addressing interoperable needs. 

The first, and most formidable, challenge in establishing effective 

interoperable communications is defining the problem and establishing 

interoperability requirements. This requires addressing the following 

questions: Who needs to communicate what (voice and/or data) with 

whom, when, for what purpose, under what conditions? Public safety 

officials generally recognize that effective interoperable communications 

is the ability to talk with whom you want, when you want, when 

authorized, but not the ability to talk with everyone all of the time. Various 

reports, including ours, have identified a number of barriers to achieving 

interoperable public safety wire communications, including incompatible 

and aging equipment, limited equipment standards, and fragmented 

planning and collaboration. However, perhaps the fundamental barrier has 

been and is the lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and 

intergovernmental planning. The needed technology flows from a clear 

statement of communications needs and plans that cross jurisdictional 

lines. No one first responder group or governmental agency can 

successfully “fix” the interoperable communications problems that face 

our nation. 

The capabilities needed vary with the severity and scope of the event. In a 

“normal” daily event, such as a freeway accident, the first responders who 

need to communicate may be limited to those in a single jurisdiction or 

immediately adjacent jurisdictions. However, in a catastrophic event, 

effective interoperable communications among responders is vastly more 

complicated because the response involves responders from the federal 

government—civilian and military—and, as happened after Katrina, 

responders from various state and local governments who arrived to 

provide help under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC) among states. These responders generally bring their own 

communications technology that may or may not be compatible with those 

of the responders in the affected area. Even if the technology were 

compatible, it may be difficult to know because responders from different 

jurisdictions may use different names for the same communications 

frequencies. To address this issue, we recommended that a nationwide 
Page 7 GAO-06-467T 

database of all interoperable communications frequencies, and a common 

nomenclature for those frequencies, be established. 

Katrina reminded us that in a catastrophic event, most forms of 

communication may be severely limited or simply destroyed—land lines, 

cell phone towers, satellite phone lines (which quickly became saturated). 

So even if all responders had had the technology to communicate with one 

another, they would have found it difficult to do so because transmission 

towers and other key supporting infrastructure were not functioning. The 

more comprehensive the interoperable communications capabilities we 

seek to build, the more difficult it is to reach agreement among the many 

players on how to do so and the more expensive it is to buy and deploy the 

needed technology. And an always contentious issue is who will pay for 

the technology—purchase, training, maintenance, and updating. 

Effective preparation and response requires clear planning, a clear 

understanding of expected roles and responsibilities, and performance 

standards that can be used to measure the gap between what is and what 

should be. It also requires identifying the essential capabilities whose 

development should be a priority, and capabilities that are useful, but not 

as critical to successful response and mitigation in a major emergency. 

What is critical may cut across different types of events (e.g., incident 

command and communications) or may be unique to a specific type of 

event (e.g., defusing an explosive device). 

DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives to promote the further 

development of the all-hazards emergency preparedness capabilities of 

first responders. These include the development of the (1) National 

Response Plan (what needs to be done to manage a nationally significant 

incident, focusing on the role of federal agencies); (2) National Incident 

Management System (NIMS), a command and management process to be 

used with the National Response Plan during an emergency event (how to 

do what needs to be done); and (3) National Preparedness Goal (NPG), 

which identifies critical tasks and capabilities (how well it should be 

done). 

The National Response Plan’s (NRP) stated purpose is to “establish a 

comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 

management across a spectrum of activities including prevention, 

preparedness, response, and recovery.” It is designed to provide the 

framework for federal interaction with state, local, and tribal governments; 

the private sector; and nongovernmental organizations. The Robert T. 

DHS Activities to 

Identify What Needs 

to Be Done to 

Promote Emergency 

Preparedness 

Capabilities of First 

Responders 
Page 8 GAO-06-467T 

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, 

established the process for states to request a presidential disaster 

declaration in order to respond to and recover from events that exceed state 

and local capabilities and resources. Under the NRP and the Stafford Act,5

 the 

role of the federal government is principally to support state and local 

response activities. A key organizational principle of the NRP is that 

“incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic, 

organizational, and jurisdictional level.” An “incident of national 

significance” triggers federal support under the NRP; a second “catastrophic 

incident” trigger allows for accelerated federal support. All catastrophic 

incidents are incidents of national significance, but not vice-versa. The 

basic assumption of the federal government as supplement to state and 

local first responders was challenged by Katrina, which (1) destroyed key 

communications infrastructure; (2) overwhelmed state and local response 

capacity, in many cases crippling their ability to perform their anticipated 

roles as initial on-site responders; and (3) destroyed the homes and 

affected the families of first responders, reducing their capacity to 

respond. Katrina almost completely destroyed the basic structure and 

operations of some local governments as well as their business and 

economic bases. 

The NRP defines a catastrophic incident as: 

“any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels 

of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, 

environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic 

incident could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost 

immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector 

authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and 

emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All 

catastrophic incidents are Incidents of National Significance. These factors drive the 

urgency for coordinated national planning to ensure accelerated Federal/national 

assistance.” 6

 5

 The Stafford Act is the short title for the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended. 

6

 The NRP includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which applies to a subset of incidents of 

national significance meeting the NRP’s definition of a “catastrophic incident:” The annex 

does not apply unless the Secretary of Homeland Security designates the incident as 

“catastrophic,” which did not occur during Hurricane Katrina. 
Page 9 GAO-06-467T 

Exactly what this means for federal, state, and local response has been the 

subject of recent congressional hearings on Katrina and the recently 

issued report by the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina.7

 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 required the adoption of NIMS 

by all federal departments and agencies and that federal preparedness 

grants be dependent upon NIMS compliance by the recipients. NIMS is 

designed as the nation’s incident management system. The intent of NIMS 

is to establish a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and 

organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative 

emergency event management at all levels. The idea is that if state and 

local firsts responders implement NIMS in their daily response activities, 

they will have a common terminology and understanding of incident 

management that will foster a swift and effective response when 

emergency responders from a variety of levels of government and 

locations must come together to respond to a major incident. As we noted 

in our report on interoperable communications, such communications are 

but one important component of an effective incident command planning 

and operations structure. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 required DHS to coordinate 

the development of a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal “to 

establish measurable readiness priorities and targets that appropriately 

balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks and largescale natural or accidental disasters with the resources required to 

prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The goal was also to include 

readiness metrics and standards for preparedness assessments and 

strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness to 

respond to major events. To implement the directive, DHS developed the 

National Preparedness Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios,8

 12 of 

 7

A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 

the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: February 15, 

2006). 

8

The 15 scenarios were: (1) improvised nuclear device attack, (2) aerosol anthrax attack, 

(3) pandemic influenza, (4) biological attack with plague, (5) chemical attack with blister 

agent, (6) chemical attack with toxic chemical agent, (7) chemical attack with nerve agent, 

(8) chemical attack resulting in chlorine tank explosion, (9) major earthquake, (10) major 

hurricane, (11) radiological attack with dispersal device, (12) improvised explosive device 

attack, (13) biological attack with food contamination, (14) biological attack with foreign 

animal disease (foot and mouth disease), and (15) cyber attack. 
Page 10 GAO-06-467T 

which were terrorist related,9 whose purpose was to form the basis for 

identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of 

emergency events. Some state and local officials and experts have 

questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for 

preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and the 

emphasis on terrorist scenarios (12 of 15). The scenarios focused on the 

consequences that first responders would have to address. According to 

DHS’s National Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are 

intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic 

emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared. Using the 

scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local emergency 

response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 discrete tasks, 

of which 300 were identified as critical tasks. DHS then identified 36 target 

capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and local first responders 

on the capabilities they need to develop and maintain. That list has since 

been refined, and DHS released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in 

December 2005 (see appendix I). Because no single jurisdiction or agency 

would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target capability 

could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access 

to regional and federal resources, or some combination of the two. 

However, DHS is still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and 

metrics for these capabilities; and DHS is reassessing both the National 

Response Plan and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the 

Hurricane Katrina experience. Prior to Katrina, DHS had established seven 

priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness: 

• implementation of NRP and NIMS; 

• implementation of the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan;10

• expanding regional cooperation; 

• strengthening capabilities in interoperable communications; 

• strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; 

• strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis; and 

• strengthening capabilities in detection and response for chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons. 

 9

According to DHS officials, there was less concern about planning for natural disasters 

because there is a tremendous amount of experience, actuarial data, geographical and 

seasonal patterns, and other information that is not available in the context of terrorism. 

10 The goal of the plan, issued in draft in November 2005, is to enhance protection of the 

nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate 

the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to “destroy, incapacitate, or exploit” them. 
Page 11 GAO-06-467T 

Those seven priorities are incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 

homeland security grant guidance. The guidance also adds an eighth 

priority that emphasizes emergency operations and catastrophic planning. 

With almost any skill and capability, experience and practice enhance 

proficiency. For first responders, exercises—particularly for the type or 

magnitude of events for which there is little actual experience—are 

essential for developing skills and identifying what works well and what 

needs further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly 

catastrophic incidents, by definition require the coordinated actions of 

personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of 

government, plus nonprofit organizations and the private sector. It is 

difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective interdisciplinary, 

intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in developing the 

coordination and skills needed for effective response. 

Following are some illustrative tasks needed to prepare for and respond to 

a major emergency incident that could be tested with realistic exercises: 

Preparation: 

• assessing potential needs, marshalling key resources, and moving property 

and people out of harm’s way prior to the actual event (where predictable 

or where there is forewarning), 

Response 

• obtaining and communicating accurate situational data for evaluating and 

coordinating appropriate response during and after the event; 

• leadership: effectively blending (1) active involvement of top leadership in 

unified incident command and control with (2) decentralized decision 

making authority that encourages innovative approaches to effective 

response; 

• clearly understood roles and responsibilities prior to and in response to 

the event; 

• effective communication and coordination; and 

• the ability to identify, draw on, and effectively deploy resources from 

other governmental, nonprofit, and private entities for effective response 

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas 

needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and 

stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved in 

The Critical 

Importance of 

Realistic Exercises 

and After-Action 

Reports 
Page 12 GAO-06-467T 

responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic 

assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition 

to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include, 

depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors, 

and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for 

such things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation 

or ask for federal assistance. The Hurricane PAM exercise of 2004 was 

essentially a detailed planning exercise that was highly realistic and 

involved a wide variety of federal, state, and local first responders and 

officials. Although action plans based on this exercise were still being 

developed and implemented when Katrina hit, the exercise proved to be 

remarkably prescient in identifying the challenges presented if a major 

hurricane hit New Orleans and resulted in flooding the city. 

The importance of post-exercise assessments is illustrated by a November 

2005 report by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector 

General on the April 2005 Top Officials 3 Exercise (TOPOFF3) which 

noted that the exercise highlighted at all levels of government a 

fundamental lack of understanding regarding the principles and protocols 

set forth in the NRP and NIMS.11 For example, the report cited confusion 

over the different roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal 

Federal Officer (PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The 

PFO is designated by the DHS Secretary to act as the Secretary’s local 

representative in overseeing and executing the incident management 

responsibilities under HSPD-5 for incidents of national significance. The 

PFO does not direct or replace the incident command system and 

structure, and does not have direct authority over the senior law 

enforcement officials, the FCO, or other federal and state officials. The 

FCO is designated by the President and manages federal resources and 

support activities in response to disasters and emergencies declared by the 

President. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of 

federal disaster assistance and programs to the affected state, the private 

sector, and individual victims. The FCO also has authority under the 

Stafford Act to request and direct federal departments and agencies to use 

their authorities and resources in support of state and local response and 

recovery efforts. 

 11DHS Office of Inspector General, A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise, OIG-06-07 

(Washington, D.C.: November 2005). 
Page 13 GAO-06-467T 

In addition to confusion over the respective roles and authority of the PFO 

and FCO, the report noted that the exercise highlighted problems 

regarding the designation of a PFO and the lack of guidance on training 

and certification standards for PFO support personnel. The report 

recommended that DHS continue to train and exercise the NRP and NIMS 

at all levels of government and develop operating procedures that clearly 

define individual and organizational roles and responsibilities under the 

NRP. 

In the last several years, the federal government has awarded some 

$11 billion in grants to federal, state, and local authorities to improve 

emergency preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. What is 

remarkable about the whole area of emergency preparedness and 

homeland security is how little we know about how states and localities 

(1) finance their efforts in this area, (2) have used their federal funds, and 

(3) are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds. 

The National Capital Region (NCR) is the only area in the nation that has a 

statutorily designated regional coordinator.12 In our review of emergency 

preparedness in the NCR, we noted that a coordinated, targeted, and 

complementary use of federal homeland security grant funds was 

important in the NCR—as it is in all areas of the nation. The findings from 

our work on the NCR are relevant to all multiagency, multijurisdictional 

efforts to assess and improve emergency preparedness and response 

capabilities. 

In May 2004, we reported that the NCR faced three interrelated challenges: 

the lack of (1) preparedness standards (which the National Preparedness 

Goal was designed to address); (2) a coordinated regionwide plan for 

establishing first responder performance goals, needs, and priorities, and 

assessing the benefits of expenditures in enhancing first responder 

capabilities; and (3) a readily available, reliable source of data on the 

funds available to first responders in the NCR and their use.13 Without the 

 12The NCR is composed of the District of Columbia and surrounding jurisdictions in the 

states of Maryland and Virginia. 

13GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National 

Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals, 

GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 2004); and Homeland Security: Managing First 

Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region, 

GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005). 

Our Knowledge of 

State and Local 

Efforts to Improve 

Their Capabilities Is 

Limited 
Page 14 GAO-06-467T 

standards, a regionwide plan, and data on spending, we noted, it is 

extremely difficult to determine whether NCR first responders have the 

ability to respond to threats and emergencies with well-planned, wellcoordinated, and effective efforts that involve a variety of first responder 

disciplines from NCR jurisdictions. To the extent that the NCR had 

coordinated the use of federal grant funds, it had focused on funds 

available through the Urban Area Security Initiative grants. We noted that 

it was important to have information on all grant funds available to NCR 

jurisdictions and their use if the NCR was to effectively leverage regional 

funds and avoid unnecessary duplication. As we observed, the fragmented 

nature of the multiple federal grants available to first responders—some 

awarded to states, some to localities, some directly to first responder 

agencies—may make it more difficult to collect and maintain regionwide 

data on the grant funds received and the use of those funds. Our previous 

work suggests that this fragmentation in federal grants may reinforce state 

and local fragmentation and can also make it more difficult to coordinate 

and use those multiple sources of funds to achieve specific objectives.14

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant 

guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants is that 

eligible recipients must provide an “investment justification” with their 

grant application. States must use this justification to outline the 

implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to 

achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability 

Enhancement Plan. These plans are multiyear global program 

management plans for the entire state homeland security program that 

look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The 

justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland 

security grant program, including all UASI funding, any base formula 

allocations for the State Homeland Security Program and the Law 

Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and all formula allocations 

under the Metropolitan Medical Response System and Citizen Corps 

Program. In the guidance DHS notes that it will use a peer review process 

to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the effectiveness of a state’s 

plan to address the priorities it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall 

risk. 

 14GAO, Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet Outstanding Needs, 

GAO-03-1146T (Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003). 
Page 15 GAO-06-467T 

On February 1, 206, GAO issued its preliminary observations regarding the 

preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.15 Catastrophic events 

are different in the severity of the damage, number of persons affected, 

and the scale of preparation and response required. They quickly 

overwhelm or incapacitate local and/or state response capabilities, thus 

requiring coordinated assistance from outside the affected area. Thus, the 

response and recovery capabilities needed during a catastrophic event 

differ significantly from those required to respond to and recover from a 

“normal disaster.” Key capabilities such as emergency communications, 

continuity of essential government services, and logistics and distribution 

systems underpin citizen safety and security and may be severely affected. 

Katrina basically destroyed state and local communications capabilities, 

severely affecting timely, accurate damage assessments in the wake of 

Katrina. 

Whether the catastrophic event comes without warning or there is some 

prior notice, such as a hurricane, it is essential that the leadership roles, 

responsibilities, and lines of authority for responding to such an event be 

clearly defined and effectively communicated in order to facilitate rapid 

and effective decision making, especially in preparing for and in the early 

hours and days after the event. Streamlining, simplifying, and expediting 

decision making must quickly replace “business as usual.” Yet at the same 

time, uncoordinated initiatives by well-meaning persons or groups can 

actually hinder effective response, as was the case following Katrina. 

Katrina raised a number of questions about the nation’s ability to respond 

effectively to catastrophic events—even one with several days warning. 

GAO has underway work on a number of issues related to the preparation, 

response, recovery, and reconstruction efforts related to Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. We are examining what went well and why and what did 

not go well and why, and what our findings suggest for any specific 

changes that may be needed. 

Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency 

preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that 

requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many 

 15 GAO, Statement of Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s Preliminary 

Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 

GAO-06-365R (Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006). 

Catastrophic Events 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 16 GAO-06-467T 

stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of 

government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no “silver bullet,” no 

easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing 

commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change 

and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do. 

The basic steps are easy to state but extremely difficult to complete: 

• develop a strategic plan with clear goals, objectives, and milestones; 

• develop performance goals that can be used to set desired performance 

baselines 

• collect and analyze relevant and reliable data; 

• assess the results of analyzing those data against performance goals to 

guide priority setting; 

• take action based on those results; and 

• monitor the effectiveness of actions taken to achieve the designated 

performance goals. 

It is important to identify the specific types of capabilities, such as 

incident command and control, with broad application across emergencies 

arising from “all-hazards,” and those that are unique to particular types of 

emergency events. The priority to be given to the development of specific, 

“unique” capabilities should be tied to an assessment of the risk that those 

capabilities will be needed. In California, for example, it is not a question 

of if, but when, a major earthquake will strike the state. There is general 

consensus that the nation is at risk of an infectious pandemic at some 

point, and California has just issued a draft plan for preparing and 

responding to such an event. On the other hand, assessing specific 

terrorist risks is more difficult. 

As the nation assesses the lessons of Katrina, we must incorporate those 

lessons in assessing state and local emergency management plans, amend 

those plans as appropriate, and reflect those changes in planned 

expenditures and exercises. This effort requires clear priorities, hard 

choices, and objective assessments of current plans and capabilities. 

Failure to address these difficult tasks directly and effectively will result in 

preparedness and response efforts that are less effective than they should 

and can be. 
Page 17 GAO-06-467T 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions the Commission Members may have. 
Page 18 GAO-06-467T 

Planning 

Communications 

Risk management 

Community preparedness and participation 

Information gathering and recognition of indicators and warnings 

Intelligence analysis and production 

Intelligence/information sharing and dissemination 

Law enforcement investigation and operations 

CBRNE detection 

Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 

Food and agriculture safety and defense 

Epidemiological surveillance and investigation 

Public health laboratory testing 

Onsite incident management 

Emergency operations center management 

Critical resource logistics and distribution 

Volunteer management and donations 

Responder safety and health 

Public safety and security response 

Animal health emergency support 

Environmental health 

Explosive device response operations 

Firefighting operations/support 

WMD/hazardous materials response and decontamination 

Citizen Protection: evacuation and/or in-place protection 

Isolation and quarantine 

Urban search and rescue 

Emergency public information and warning 

Triage and pre-hospital treatment 

Medical surge 

Medical supplies management and distribution 

Mass prophylaxis 

Mass prophylaxis appendix 

Mass care (sheltering, feeding, and related services) 

Fatality management 

Appendix I: DHS’s Target Capabilities List 2.0 

(Draft) as of December 2005 

Common Target 

Capabilities 

Prevent Mission Area 

Protect Mission Area 

Respond Mission Area 
Page 19 GAO-06-467T 

Structural damage and mitigation assessment 

Restoration of lifelines 

Economic and community recovery

Recover Mission Area 

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