i

MANAGING STRAINS IN THE COALITION:

WHAT TO DO ABOUT SADDAM?

Stephen C. Pelletiere

November 15, 1996
ii

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iii

FOREWORD

Since 1991 the international community has imposed and

sustained an impressive constellation of measures to bottle up

the Iraqi regime--an oil embargo, other economic sanctions,

intrusive inspections, two "no-fly" zones, and the Kurdish "safehaven" in northern Iraq. For its part, Iraq has opted to "tough

it out" rather than fulfill the cease-fire conditions that ended

the Gulf War. The stalemate has devolved into a test of wills,

with Saddam Hussein betting that the discipline of his Ba'th

Party cadres will outlast the unity of the coalition arrayed

against him.

For 5 years U.S. policy has managed to steer a coalition of

states which share broad interests in regional stability and free

trade. Yet below these common interests, the United States has

walked a tightrope stretched between competing objectives vis-avis Iraq, e.g., undermining Saddam while preserving Iraq as a

counterweight to Iran; protecting the Kurds while not promoting

their independence. Time, however, has a habit of eroding

international coalitions and exposing seams in the details of

policy. Iraq's September 1996 actions in the Kurdish north found

such a seam in coalition objectives, or, to return to the

original metaphor, shook one anchor of the U.S. policy tightrope.

This study by Dr. Stephen Pelletiere examines how the

Kurdish crisis developed, why--most disturbingly--the key

coalition members divided in response to U.S. actions, and what

factors might guide future U.S. policy. He concludes that U.S.

policy needs reanchoring if we are to achieve our paramount

interests in this vital region.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in International

Politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the

early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign

correspondent during which time he was based in Beirut. Dr.

Pelletiere returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970, for a stay

at Shemlan, the Arabic language school of the British government.

In 1975, when the Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was

in Cairo, Egypt, conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship.

He interviewed refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many

United Nations professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the

University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in

Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until

1987 he was an intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the

Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in

1988, and became a full professor in 1992. He has written two

books on the Middle East: The Kurds--An Unstable Element in the

Gulf, and The Iran War--Chaos in a Vacuum.
1

MANAGING STRAINS IN THE COALITION:

WHAT TO DO ABOUT SADDAM?

America's Role.

Since before World War I, the West has been interested in

the Persian Gulf. Originally, Great Britain dominated the region.

The British regarded the area as part of their sphere of

interest. London particularly feared the penetration of some

foreign power into the Gulf, from which it would threaten India,

the crown jewel of Britain's empire.

In the 19th century, Britain's fears had focused on Russia.

But this soon shifted to fear of Germany, as the empire of Kaiser

Wilhelm built the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway, to terminate in the

northern Gulf. To neutralize the German advance, Britain

cultivated the petty sheikhs who lived along the Gulf littoral.1

It offered them subsidies if they, in turn, would agree not to

alienate any of their territory to a foreign power. In this way,

the British hoped to prevent the Germans from setting up a base

and bringing troops into the region.

Then, in the early 1900s, oil was discovered in Iran, and

Britain moved quickly to sew up concessions.2 For a time, Great

Britain seemed to be the predominant power in the area, until

American oil companies began to operate there.3 At that, Britain

was forced to share its influence with Washington. Nonetheless,

until the late 1960s Britain was the major power in this part of

the world. Washington acted as a silent partner, backing up the

British, but generally letting London take the lead in directing

affairs.

This condominium arrangement persisted until 1969, when the

British announced that they could no longer guard the Gulf. Their

economy was too weakened from having suffered through two World

Wars. Thus it was that the United States took over, effectively

becoming the Gulf's policeman. Western influence over the Gulf--

and, by extension, over the international oil industry--was

challenged immediately after Britain departed the Middle East.

This occurred with the outbreak of the Third Arab-Israeli War,

and the tremendous increase in oil prices that accompanied that

conflict.

The Arab Oil Embargo took power away from the oil-consuming

countries--mainly Great Britain and the United States--and

transferred it to the oil producing states, mainly the Arab oil

producers (and Iran), all of which were affiliated with the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Initially,

under OPEC's direction, oil prices pursued a trajectory steadily

upward. They went from less than $3 a barrel to more than $24 a
2

barrel immediately after the 1973 War, and they rose again with

the overthrow of the Iranian Shah in 1979. Then the market

steadied once more, largely due to intervention by the United

States.

The United States worked out a special relationship with

Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who have the greatest reserves of oil

in the world, agreed to cooperate with the West to ensure that

prices would be kept within reasonable limits (reasonable, that

is, by Western standards).4 The Saudis would endeavor to keep

prices low and that would keep inflation down, a boon to the

industrialized states. At the same time they would strive to

maintain prices at a high enough level so that the oil producers

could benefit.5

In return for cooperation with the West's financial markets,

the Saudis got protection. Originally, this was against alleged

menaces from the Soviet Union. But even before the fall of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the nature of the

protection had changed.

In the late 1970s, with the rise of Khomeini in Iran, the

lower Gulf trembled before the specter of militant Islam. Then

the Iraqis went to war with Tehran, and that seemed to check

Iran's growing power. However, Iraq's assault on Iran soon

faltered, and Arab and Western aid were required to sustain

Baghdad in a lengthy stalemate. Before the Iran-Iraq War had

ended, the United States was covertly assisting the Iraqis to

turn back the Iranian tide.

When Iraq defeated Iran, a new danger to stability in the

Gulf occurred, as in 1990 Iraqi forces overran neighboring

Kuwait. The United States then assembled one of the great

coalitions of all time, which ousted the Iraqi army from Kuwait,

and imposed military and economic sanctions on Baghdad which

continue to this day.

Why was the United States able to form such a powerful union

of states against Saddam Hussein? Because, in the eyes of most

the world's countries--and this was particularly true of the

industrialized nations--what the United States was doing was

necessary to fulfill its role as guardian of the Gulf. By

restoring the sovereignty of Kuwait, Washington sustained the

operation of the international oil trade, on which Western

economies depended.6

However, in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM, revolt

erupted in the Iraqi Kurdish regions. When the Iraqi army moved

to suppress this uprising, thousands of Kurds fled to the

mountains of neighboring Turkey, precipitating a humanitarian

crisis. Washington mounted Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which
3

subsequently was expanded to provide a safehaven for the Kurds.

At this point, formerly firm allies of the United States began

draw apart from it, distancing themselves from the U.S. effort to

help the Kurdish minority.

The former Soviet Union, for example, evidenced deep concern

over the U.S.-sponsored operation. Like Baghdad, Moscow is

bedeviled by fractious minorities, seeking to break free and form

their own states. Thus, the Russians were not in favor of

restricting a government's right to exercise authority within its

own borders.7

France, too, was not altogether pleased with Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT. On the one hand, the French strongly supported

the Kurds.8 But, during the Iran-Iraq War, Paris had been

Baghdad's primary weapons supplier. After the war, it expected to

be rewarded for this aid with oil concessions. To the extent that

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT prevented Iraq from rehabilitating

itself, it hurt French chances of obtaining economic rewards from

the Iraqis.

Turkey, too, was against Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. It

viewed the Kurds as a dangerous element. The Kurds are smugglers,

an occupation they have pursued for centuries. Once the safehaven

was set up, the Turks expected the Kurds to take advantage of it

to carry on--and expand--their illicit activities.9

Further, the Turks have a large Kurdish population of their

own, which, they feared, would fall in with the lawless element

in Iraq.10 The anarchy there would spread across the border into

Turkey, with nothing to stop the movement since Iraq's security

forces could not operate above the 36th parallel, a constraint

imposed by the Allies on Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan would become a

smugglers' paradise, the Turks felt.

Finally, many of the Arab states doubted the wisdom of

separating the north of Iraq from Baghdad's control. This would

weaken the regime, and dangerously skew the power balance in the

area toward Iran--something that no Arab government wished to

see.11

All of this is to say that the establishment of the

safehaven in northern Iraq did not enjoy the kind of support that

Operation DESERT STORM had engendered. It was not widely reported

in the West, but in many quarters the United States' newfound

policy of protecting the Kurds had few regional adherents.

Moving Toward Rupture.

In 1991 an incident occurred which buttressed the coalition
4

partners' misgivings about Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. The safe

haven had just been established under the direction of the two

principal Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.

Barzani was the spokesman for the northern Kurds, roughly all of

those around Zakho and Dohuk, and Talabani, the southern Kurds

from around Sulaimaniyah.12 (See Figure 1.)

In May 1991 Saddam Hussein made an offer of autonomy to the

Kurdish leaders.13 This was a renewal of a proposal the Iraqi

government had tendered to the Kurds in 1970.14 It was, in many

ways, an attractive plan. Indeed, the leader of the Kurdish

community in 1970, Mulla Mustafa Barzani (the father of Masoud),

nearly accepted the offer, but ultimately he rejected it,

choosing instead to return to war against Baghdad.15 Now, in 1991,

Masoud Barzani was tempted to enter into a compact with Saddam,

but his colleague, Talabani, balked at this. Ultimately Barzani

came around to Talabani's way of thinking. During the

negotiations with Baghdad, Washington and London behaved as if

they disapproved of the talks, and afterwards both appeared

relieved the deal was not consummated.16

Why did the United States and Britain--the principals

supporting Operation PROVIDE COMFORT--object to the Kurds' coming

to terms with Iraq? Was not the aim of the United Nations (U.N.)

resolution, under which the safe haven had been created, to

develop a modus vivendi between the Kurds and the central

government? If the United States did not want to see the parties

reconciled, what was the point of the exercise in the north?

Turkey feared that Washington policymakers had a secret

agenda; that undercover they were working towards the formation

of an independent Kurdish state.17 The Turks were appalled by this

prospect, since, as far as they were concerned, any such

development would be unworkable. That Washington could not

appreciate this fact was profoundly troubling to the Turks.

 Ankara sought and got assurances from the United States

that it would uphold the sovereignty of Iraq, and not permit the

Kurds to break away from the control of Baghdad.18 But that was

all it got. It could not, for example, discover where events in

the north were headed; and in particular, how long the safehaven

was likely to be kept in place.

Meanwhile, U.N. relief organizations had begun to enter the

north of Iraq, bringing much needed supplies.19 The two major

Kurdish factions--the Barzanis and Talabanis--began to organize

life in the north, and then in 1992 the Kurds elected a

Parliament.20 This development rekindled fear in Ankara of a move

toward statehood. The United States reassured the Turks that it

viewed Operation PROVIDE COMFORT as purely a humanitarian effort,

with no political overtones beyond precluding Iraqi military
5

predations in the north.
6
7

Aid for the Kurds came primarily from the United States, the

United Nations, and from some nongovernmental organizations.

There was not a lot of money available, but enough to support

Barzani and Talabani, and to pay their retainers, including the

so-called pesh mergas (selfless ones), who make up the leaders'

personal bodyguard.21 As for the rest of the Kurds, they had to

make do as best they could. This produced widespread

dissatisfaction, as the mass of Kurds had expected the Americansponsored operation to bring them some employment.

The Kurds had expected to see an extensive bureaucracy

develop in the north, to run the area. But, as long as Washington

ruled out a separate state for the Kurds, this was impossible.

The smuggler Kurds, those lawless elements, could survive without

a government; however, the city Kurds, who had no independent

means of support, suffered.22 For them, one of the few options

they had was to become pesh mergas, serving either Barzani or

Talabani.

It was perhaps the proliferation of retainers, who had to be

provided for, that led to a breakdown of Kurdish society. As the

demands upon the Kurdish leaders grew, they cast about for

additional sources of income. Barzani, for example, began

collecting a tax from Turkish truck drivers hauling contraband

across the northern Iraqi-Turkish border.23 This "customs"

operation was quite lucrative, and netted Barzani upwards of

$250,000 a day. When Barzani refused to share this revenue with

Talabani, the latter seized the Kurdish capital of Irbil, and

along with it the "state" treasury.24 With that, Kurdish society

exploded into civil war.

To try to compose this dissension, the United States called

a number of conferences among the Kurds, but none were

successful. The scenario always was the same--the Kurdish chiefs

would agree to mend their differences, but then would return to

their home bases and promptly resume their warfare. U.S.

policymakers seemed not to appreciate what was at the root of the

difficulty, namely that without some formal declaration of

status, Kurdish society was in limbo. The Kurdish leadership

could not raise funds from the international lending community;

it could not go to Baghdad for assistance, and the U.S. Congress

was unable-- or unwilling--to appropriate sufficient aid. There

needed to be a resolution of the situation, something that would

end the drift that was destroying Kurdish morale.

Meanwhile, conditions in the north continued to deteriorate.

The relief agencies began to pull out of the region, being unable

to guarantee the safety of their staffs. The Kurds wanted jobs

and expected the relief agencies to fire regular employees in

order to take them on the payroll. Some relief workers were

seized and held as hostages until ransoms were paid.25
8

Effectively, the Kurdish region was doubly oppressed because,

once the relief workers cut down their operations, available

assistance was inadequate. In Baghdad's view, the Kurds' action

in separating from the central government absolved it of any

obligation towards them.

It was probably inevitable that resentment towards the

United States would increase. To many Kurds, it was inexplicable

that Washington did not step in to at least end the civil war.

Bitter accusations against Washington and London, the upholders

of the safehaven, began to be expressed.26 I believe that the U.S.

failure to act was due to an incorrect assessment of conditions

inside Iraq. U.S. policymakers apparently believed that Saddam

could not last much longer. His people were suffering under the

most draconian sanctions imposed upon a nation since World War I.

His army was short of equipment. There had been one significant

defection from the ruling clique, and at least one serious tribal

disturbance.27

Therefore, despite appeals to act, Washington stood its

ground, believing that the trouble would soon be over. U.S.

policymakers had convinced themselves that Saddam's days were

numbered, and that, once he fell, a new pro-Western regime would

set things to rights. The problem with this strategy was that it

underestimated the Iraqi Ba'th Party.

The faction that represents Ba'thism in Iraq is the best

organized and disciplined party among the Arabs, if not in the

entire Middle East.28 Having sustained itself in power since 1968,

and survived what seemed at one time to be a ruinous war with

Iran, the party is used to handling crises. As this one deepened,

the Ba'thists tightened their control. The Iraqi people,

experiencing the pressure, went along with the party's dictates.

States in the area, who knew the Ba'th, did not find this

discipline surprising. But, in Washington the attitude of

watchful waiting persisted, as the conviction remained that

Saddam's days were surely numbered.29 In the meantime, a new, and

unexpected development--inside Turkey-- complicated the picture.

The Mystery of the PKK.

One of the abiding mysteries of Kurdish society involves the

activities of a group called the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).This

is made up of Turkish-Kurds who oppose the Ankara government. The

PKK advertises itself as a separatist organization, meaning that

it would like to detach the southeastern Kurdish region from the

rest of Turkey. At the same time, however, the PKK leaders are

vague as to what sort of society would be set up once the

separation was complete.30 The PKK was, at one time, a self-
9

proclaimed Marxist outfit.

What is puzzling about the PKK is the numbers of Kurds who

supposedly are adherents to its cause. Starting in 1991, after

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT came into existence, the media--here

and in Europe--began citing membership figures in the thousands.

This, despite the fact that--as late as 1988--the party could not

have claimed two hundred members, in toto. Indeed, among Kurdish

militant groups the PKK is a late bloomer, so to speak. It did

not become a group of consequence until 1984.31

I believe the PKK's phenomenal growth was not due to

ideological conversion on the part of a mass of Turkish Kurds,

but rather to something else. After the Kurdish rebellion in

northern Iraq--which accompanied the wind-down of Operation

DESERT STORM and the announcement by the United States that it

would mount Operation PROVIDE COMFORT--Syria and Iran became

alarmed over what they perceived to be NATO penetration of the

region.

Syria and Iran have always suspected the link between Turkey

and the United States through NATO.32 They view any move by

Washington and Ankara in the northern Gulf as a NATO-inspired

intrigue, and they try to resist such moves, however they can. In

particular, Damascus and Tehran condemned Turkey's agreement to

allow the allies to use Incirlik Air Base in southeastern Turkey

as a staging area for flights over northern Iraq.33 The Iranians,

in particular, were fearful that the Allies would fly

surveillance missions from there over Iranian territory.

I believe that Tehran and Damascus exploited what then was

an insignificant organization, the PKK, to counter Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT.34 The Syrians and Iranians distributed money

inside the safe haven, and this bought them mercenaries, or

rather pesh mergas. These individuals undertook operations

against the Turks. Shortly after Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

commenced, the PKK (or, at least, individuals claiming to be

adherents of the PKK) began attacking Turkish troop installations

in southeastern Turkey from bases the organization had set up

just over the border in Iraq.35

There was great deal of publicity over these attacks, and,

unfortunately for the Turks, this was instrumental in holding up

Ankara's bid to join the European Economic Community.36

Investigatory missions were dispatched from Brussels to examine

conditions among the Turkish Kurdish minority in southeastern

Anatolia. This seems to have provoked demonstrations on the part

of Kurdish militants, who sought to embarrass the Turkish

government.37

Turkey reacted in two ways. First, it cracked down hard on
10

the militants, and this, of course, created a renewed storm of

disapproval in Europe.38 But it also cited the existence of the

PKK, and the unrest that it was provoking in the southeast, as

proof that the safehaven was a destabilizing element in the

region.

This drew a declaration from Washington that it regarded the

PKK as a terrorist group, and that the United States sympathized

with Turkey's need to suppress the organization. Meanwhile,

Turkish commandos had begun conducting cross-border raids into

Iraq, to root out the PKK cadres.39 At least this was the

announced intent. In fact, I believe that Turkey used the PKK as

a pretext to intervene in the north, which under international

law it was prevented from doing.

I do not believe Turkey--despite its protestations about the

PKK--was seriously threatened by the organization, at least not

in 1992. But the Turks were convinced that the situation in

northern Iraq was fraught with peril, and that, unless checked,

it would soon get out of control. Specifically, the Turks feared

that the Iraqi Kurdish region was developing into a power vacuum,

since there was no authority capable of imposing order there.

Hence, the cross-border raids were a means the Turks

employed to impose their authority over the region. The tactic of

the raids was ingenious, because it enabled the Turks to satisfy

both the United States and themselves. They were able to go on

cooperating with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, which the United

States wanted, and yet they could simultaneously intervene in the

safehaven to curb the Kurds whenever they saw fit. It is also

likely that the Turks cleared the raids with the Iraqis in

advance. Iraq and Turkey had cooperated on a similar scheme

during the Iran-Iraq War.40 In the mid-1980s, the Iranians had

tried to create a second front against Iraq, using the Barzani

and Talabani Kurds. Ankara and Baghdad worked out an agreement

whereby Turkey was empowered to cross over into the Iraqi Kurdish

region to suppress the pro-Iranian guerrillas. This arrangement

probably spared Iraq defeat in the war.

Now, in the 1990s, the Turks were helping the Iraqis once

again. They were repressing the lawlessness of the Kurds, and

preventing the north from achieving de facto independence. The

raids did this by drawing attention to the unstable conditions

there, and underscoring the fact that the Kurdish leadership

could not control the area.

In any event, the cross-border raids are chiefly of interest

for the response they evoked from Iran. Iran never repudiated the

PKK as a client-organization, or stopped supporting that group,

but it began to branch out, as it were. Rafsanjani, Iran's

president, summoned the leaders of the two opposing Iraqi Kurdish
11

factions to Tehran. There, he announced that Iran would mediate

the leaders' dispute.41 Nothing of substance came out of the

conference, but it was shortly after this that Talabani began to

behave as a client of Tehran.42 At the same time, Barzani moved

over into the camp of the Turks.43 Thus, it seems likely that by

early 1995 America and Britain had lost control of their Iraqi

Kurdish clients, and things then began to move at a fast pace

toward the crisis of this past September.

The Crisis Erupts.

The incident which touched off the crisis occurred on July

29, 1996, when Iranian Revolutionary Guards crossed into Iraqi

Kurdistan, ostensibly hunting Iranian Kurdish guerrillas, who

(the Iranians claimed) use the area as a base against Iran.44 This

almost certainly was a deception. The Revolutionary Guards went

into northern Iraq to assist Talabani in his fight against

Barzani. They penetrated 50 kilometers into the interior and left

arms for Talabani as they departed. Why at this moment did the

Iranians decide to make such a potentially disruptive move?

My feeling is that they were upset by the U.N. decision to

allow Iraq to sell oil, for they saw in this concession the

beginning of the end of the economic embargo against Iraq.45 By

bringing aid to Talabani, the Iranians were positioning

themselves to strike at the oil pipeline through which Iraqi oil

was to move to the world markets. (See Figure 1.)

The Talabani guerrillas equipped with Iranian-supplied

weapons--and more than likely directed by Revolutionary Guards

left behind in Iraq--would interdict the flow of oil through the

pipeline, frustrating Iraq's hopes of getting out from under the

embargo to begin its recovery.

A number of points can be made about this raid. First, the

U.S. reaction was remarkably restrained.46 It is likely the U.S.

policymakers did not appreciate the seriousness of what Iran had

done. Indeed, it is probably the case that the Americans equated

the Iranian raid with the other earlier raids by the Turks, which

never seemed to come to anything--at least the Iraqi government

never felt provoked to retaliate.

The difference, however--as pointed out above--was that

Turkey conducted its raids almost certainly with Iraqi

acquiescence, and the raiding constituted, therefore, a form of

aid to Iraq, keeping the northern area under control, which the

Iraqi government was prevented from doing because of U.S.-imposed

restraints.

Another point is the effect of the raid on Turkey. Turkey
12

was eager to see the oil deal which Iraq had brokered with the

United Nations consummated, as Turkey stood to benefit

financially from it. It would gain revenue from transit fees--

since the oil moved to market through a pipeline which crossed

Turkish territory--and, in addition, Turkey had worked out

separate deals with Baghdad to sell it food and other

necessities.47

Turkey would not have been misled by Iranian protestations

that they were only going after anti-Tehran guerrillas. It would

have subjected the operation to keen scrutiny, and Turkey would

have seen that this was a threat to its interests.

Iraq would also have seen the operation for what it was--a

potentially lethal strike at its sovereignty, which-- unless

countered--could signal the breakup of the state.48

Finally, Barzani would have seen that his position was

undercut by his rival Talabani receiving arms and technical

assistance from Tehran.

It is my belief that this move of Iran into northern Iraq

was a blunder. The rapidity with which the anti-Tehran coalition

(Turkey, Barzani, and Iraq) responded indicates prior planning.

These three must have contemplated some such move on Iran's part

and been set to counter it.

One mystery is who initiated the prior planning: Turkey,

Iraq, or Barzani? Barzani is a likely candidate, since he had a

grudge against the West, in general, and the United States, in

particular. This dates back to the mid-1970s, when then-Secretary

of State Kissinger betrayed Barzani's father, Mulla Mustafa

Barzani--at least this is how Masoud Barzani views the matter.

Kissinger abruptly withdrew U.S. support for Mulla Mustafa's

anti-Baghdad revolt, prompting the Kurdish chief to flee to Iran

with the remnants of his movement.49

Mosoud Barzani also has the reputation of being a

strategist, someone who plots every move and then does what is

best for his interests. He does not act--as many Kurdish chiefs

are reputed to do--on impulse. Thus, once he had determined that

the Iranian move was harmful to him, he would have been receptive

to any means of countering it.

At the same time, however, Barzani would not have had the

temerity to devise anything so portentous as seizing Irbil. By

doing that, he and Saddam defied Washington in the most blatant

manner. There are penalties for such actions, which the Kurdish

leader would not have been anxious to incur. It seems likely

therefore that Barzani merely agreed to go along with the

seizure, but someone else conceived the idea. Saddam is capable
13

of such bold action. The Iraqi leader has a keen sense of Iraq's

national interest and, were he to perceive that Iraqi integrity

were threatened, would not hesitate to strike.

But, then, the Turks, too, are sensitive to such concerns,

particularly the Turkish general staff. The Turkish generals

consider themselves the guardians of the legacy of the founder of

modern Turkey, Kemal Ataturk.50 Ataturk decreed that Turkey must

consider itself a satisfied status quo power. This meant that

Ankara would uphold the state system in the region, renouncing

all claims on its neighbors' territory, but, at the same time,

expecting them to respect the balance of power.

Iran, by moving into northern Iraq, was maneuvering to

drastically shift the balance in its favor, and therefore it is

understandable that the generals would want to act. To be sure,

an operation such as this--one which harmed the United States--

could easily have backfired on Turkey. I do not believe this

would have stopped the generals.

The Turkish government has to worry about the reaction

Turkey's policies will have on Washington, but this not the case

with the generals. Moreover, the generals could claim--with some

justification--that the government's attempts to appease

Washington have not born fruit. Turkey has seen the U.S. Congress

slash its aid--it is all in the form of grants now, and the sum

is relatively insubstantial.51 Further, the Turks have been

outraged by what they perceive as the U.S. Congress' pandering to

the Greek and Armenian lobbies. And finally, Washington promised

to back Turkey's bid to enter the European Union, and so far that

has not materialized.

I am not suggesting that the generals acted on their own,

ignoring the civilian leadership. It is rather that the generals

would have--in my estimate--taken the lead on this. Recognizing

that Iran's penetration threatened the power balance, they would

have endorsed a counter-stroke, and I don't believe that worries

over how this would be received in Washington would have stopped

them.

Now that the Iraqis and Barzanis have recaptured Irbil,

Washington's position in the area is almost completely undercut.

Whereas in the past the United States controlled events, now it

is practically relegated to the sidelines. This was evident in

the most recent flare-up, where the Talabani forces--after having

been driven completely out of Iraq--returned, with Iran's aid, to

reconquer territory they had lost. For a time, it appeared that

Iraq would come to Barzani's aid again, provoking a possible

clash with the Iranians. American diplomats had to struggle

mightily to restrain Talabani from making a drive on Irbil, and

ultimately make him agree to a ceasefire. As of this writing,
14

whether the fighting actually would cease was up in the air.

This counter-stroke by the Talabani faction is particularly

worrisome, since it represents a significant escalation. All of

the parties--Iraq, the Kurdish factions, Turkey and Iran--must

now gauge how far they want to go with this. More than ever there

is the possibility of a runaway war.

Summing up, as a result of this affair, Turkey, Iraq and

Barzani have all been drawn into a coalition.52 Opposing them are

Iran, Syria and Talabani. Most unfortunate, for the interests of

the West, the influence of the United States and Britain has been

seriously weakened. We are too close to events to predict how the

affair will develop, but the situation seems certain to

deteriorate further.

The U.S. Position.

American policy on Iraq has gone through three shifts of

emphasis. First, the United States was in the Gulf to ensure the

flow of oil to the world market, and no one--or few, at any rate-

-objected to that. Then, it was there to guard the safehaven for

the Kurds, and support for this mission was thin at best. Most

recently, U.S. policy seems to have been directed towards

toppling Saddam Hussein, and--with the exception of Britain,

Israel and Kuwait--no one has supported this approach; even some

of the Gulf Cooperation Council states have opposed it.53

Setting aside the issue of how this anti-Saddam shift came

to be, a number of related issues should be taken into

consideration.

First, I do not believe that Iraq could survive the

disappearance of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'thists; it is far more

likely that the country would fall apart. To those who believe

the present regime could be dispensed with, I would propose the

following analogy--it is like saying that we will keep the flesh,

but abstract the skeleton out of the living form; the Ba'th is

the skeleton that holds Iraq upright.54

The reasons why the Iraqi people tolerate the Ba'th are many

and complex. However, I would like to cite one probable cause--

prior to the coming of the Ba'th, conditions in Iraq were almost

anarchical. Regimes succeeded each other in a revolving door

pattern, and each change of government was accompanied by

dreadful purges. Having lived through the pre-Ba'thist days, the

Iraqi people are not willing to see a government change, unless

they know what new form of rule--or disrule--is to be visited on

them.55
15

Moreover, if there is not some strong regime in power in

Baghdad, the country will become a prey to its neighbors-- two of

which have irredentist claims upon it.56 To prevent Iraq's

neighbors from exercising their claims, the United States would

have to permanently occupy the country; otherwise there would be

no defense against foreign takeovers.

We should not forget that, after Saudi Arabia, Iraq has the

largest reserves of oil in the world, and that one of its richest

fields is located on the edge of the Iraqi Kurdish region, in

Kirkuk. This is precisely the area Iran was attempting to

penetrate with its latest raid.

Without belaboring the point, it is important to keep in

mind that the main justification for the U.S. military presence

in the Gulf is to keep the oil flowing, and, to do that,

Washington must promote stability. Present policy has not been

conducive to this. In particular, efforts to overthrow the regime

in Iraq have worked against it. It could be argued that America's

present policy is undermining the very purpose for which it was

set up.

Most of America's allies seem to have drawn this conclusion,

and this is why they have been so chary about supporting

Washington in the latest crisis. It is not that the allies favor

the Ba'th, much less Saddam Hussein; rather they will not support

a change of government in Iraq, unless there is an equally

strong, well-organized, and disciplined regime available to take

over. Washington's present candidate to rule Iraq after the Ba'th

is the Iraqi National Congress. Few in the Middle East take this

organization seriously.57

The most disconcerting aspect of the recent crisis in Iraqi

Kurdistan was the behavior of America's allies. Washington found

it could not manage strains in the coalition. Suddenly, the

coalition partners resisted Washington-directed moves against

Baghdad. Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia all fought

shy of this. And, when Washington asked the Security Council to

condemn Iraq, Russia threatened a veto, if it were brought to a

vote. That so much opposition arose is an indication of how

strongly U.S. allies regard this issue.

 Now, the United States proposes to shift its emphasis on

Iraq once again--to Operation SOUTHERN WATCH from Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT. It wants to use American air power to, in

effect, deny Iraq control over almost half the country. There is

much to recommend against this new policy.

Public Goods.
16

The original no-fly zones set up over northern and southern

Iraq were never mandated by the United Nations. Rather this

security regime was something imposed on the Iraqis by the

victorious allies after the Gulf War.58

At the time the zones were established, many felt the allies

were taking matters too much into their own hands. Indeed,

Washington never consulted the members of the Security Council

before it took the step. Once the United States had the support

of Britain and France, it simply went ahead.

This means that for Operation SOUTHERN WATCH to continue

(and, indeed, to be expanded), there has to be a strong weight of

moral authority on the side of Washington. There is no such

consensus at the present time, and therefore Operation SOUTHERN

WATCH is virtually a two-man show (Britain and the United

States).59

There is a further problem with Operation SOUTHERN WATCH: it

is likely to result in an additional buildup of forces in the

southern Gulf. Pious Muslims reject the American presence that is

already there. They certainly will react adversely to the

introduction of more troops, and their anger is liable to be

translated into attacks on U.S. installations.60 Ultimately, this

could undermine the House of Saud.

However, the greatest danger is open defiance of the United

States, which could come about at any time. The possibility is

increasing that one of the major powers-- France, Russia, or

China--will turn against Washington, deciding unilaterally to

break the economic embargo. This would constitute a stunning

challenge to the U.S. world leadership role.

Effectively, then, the United States must have a new policy

on Iraq, and the only way to proceed on this is to recognize that

the Gulf constitutes a public good; that is to say, it is in the

interests of all the world's nations to guard the oil coming out

of the Gulf, and--recognizing this fact--it would be wise to

coordinate efforts for bringing this about.

Put another way, the Gulf is an asset in which all the

world's nations can claim a stake, and therefore whatever is done

about it must be of benefit to all involved. Washington cannot

unilaterally decide what is correct. In particular, it cannot

take up immutable positions, such as that Saddam Hussein must go.

Not all of our allies agree with the United States on this, and

the more the United States insists on the rightness of its stand,

the more coalition disharmony results.

And finally, the United States must confront the reality

that the present strategy of trying to control Iraq by using air
17

power and missiles alone is not working. If the United States

proceeds much farther on its present course, we will soon have to

confront the need for ground forces. These cannot be employed

without first having a great national debate, and that is

something for which, it does not appear, the nation is ready.

ENDNOTES

1. At this time, none of the states that exist in the Gulf

today were formed. Oil had not yet been discovered, and hence the

whole region was impoverished. Subsequently, Britain oversaw the

creation of all of the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council states

(GCC) but Oman and Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates (UAE),

for example, was cobbled together by Britain in the 1970s out of

six petty sheikhdoms.

2. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later BP) was the sole

concessionaire in Iran until the 1950s. The British Admiralty

owned 56 percent of this company. For details on how this

acquisition was arranged see Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters,

New York: Bantum Books, 1976.

3. After World War I, the United States retreated into a

stance of isolationism. However, concurrently a scare developed

that the country was running out of oil. This propelled American

oil companies on a worldwide hunt for additional supplies. At

this time, the Middle East had just begun to be developed as a

major oil producing area. To gain entry into this region, the

American companies sought the assistance of the federal

government, and it is from this period that Washington and London

set up the condominium arrangement for protecting Western

interests in that part of the world. For details see Harvey

O'Connor, The Empire of Oil, New York: The Monthly Review Press,

1955; Harvey O'Connor, The World Crisis In Oil, New York: Monthly

Review Press, 1962; Frank Hanighen, The Secret War, New York:

John Day Co., 1934; Pierre l'Espagnol de la Tramerye, The World

Struggle For Oil, New York: Alfred Knopf, 1924; Anton Mohr, The

Oil War, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1926; E. H. Davenport

and Sidney Russell Cooke, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American

Relations, London: The Macmillan Co., 1924; and Francis DeLaisi,

Oil, Its Influence on Politics, London: The Labor Publishing Co.,

1923.

4. Oil, because of the nature of the industry, tends towards

glut. In order to make it profitable, production has to be

regulated. Before World War II, this regulation was carried on by

the so-called Seven Sisters--Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf, Texaco,

Royal Dutch Shell, and BP--which together effectively operated as

a cartel. Under the agreement the Saudis struck with the United

States, the Saudis regulate their production to eliminate overproduction, which would drive the price down, or,
18

correspondingly, underproduction, which would send prices up. The

Saudis can do this because they, alone among all the oil

producing states, have the extensive reserves and modern

facilities which enable them to adjust their production rapidly.

5. For discussions of Saudi cooperation with Washington to

regulate oil prices, see "Saudi-U.S. Deal Suspected on Oil

Price," The Washington Post, July 20, 1992; and "U.S. Tries to

Influence Oil Prices, Papers Show," The Washington Post, July 21,

1992.

6. Two things would have happened had Baghdad held on to

Kuwait. First, Iraq would have become the most formidable member

of OPEC, and challenged Saudi dominance within that body. Second,

it is likely that the sheikhs would have lost heart and taken

their money to retire in Europe, which is effectively what the

Kuwaiti elite did in the early days of the Iraqi invasion.

7. See "U.N. Tells Iraq to Halt Repression," The Washington

Post, April 6, 1991; also "Soviets Reluctant to Back Wider U.N.

Role in Iraq," The Washington Post, May 14, 1991.

8. France had at the time a Socialist government under

Francoise Mitterand, and Mitterand's wife is one of the foremost

supporters of the Kurdish cause in Europe.

9. For the smuggling activities of the Kurds, see Brian

Sullivan, "International Organized Crime: A Growing National

Security Threat," Strategic Forum, No. 74, May 1996; "Turks' War

With the Kurds Reaches a New Ferocity," The New York Times,

October 18, 1993; David McDowell, "The Struggle for Kurdistan,"

Middle East International, April 28, 1995; "Turks find way round

sanctions on Baghdad," The Financial Times, December 8, 1994;

"Balkan War Victor: Heroin," The Washington Post, November 6,

1993; "Boom and Embargo: Iraqi Smugglers Prosper Despite Tough

U.N. Sanctions," The Washington Post, May 16, 1995; and "Heroin

Pouring Through Porous European Border, The New York Times,

February 9, 1993.

10. There are between 10 and 12 million Turkish Kurds, and

about 2 1/2 to 3 million Iraqi Kurds, and then there are Kurdish

communities in Iran and Syria as well.

11. See "Among the Arabs Little Enthusiasm," The New York

Times, August 17, 1992; "Arabs Are Uneasy On Plan For Iraq," The

New York Times, August 20, 1992; "Bush Faces Tricky Decisions in

Trying to Get Tougher With Saddam Hussein," The Wall Street

Journal, August 3, 1992; "Contrast in U.S. Policies Is Straining

Alliance," The Washington Post, September 19, 1992; "Moroccan

Warns U.S. About Iraq," The Washington Post, September 6, 1992;

"Behind the No-Fly-Zone Strategy; Dwindling Coalition Against
19

Iraq," The Christian Science Monitor, September 1, 1992; "U.S.

Has Trouble Maintaining Unity of Allies on Iraq," The New York

Times, July 28, 1991; "America's Allies in Gulf War Shy about

Bombing Iraq's Nuclear Facilities," The Christian Science

Monitor, July 31, 1991; and "Jordan Rejects U.S. Request," The

Washington Post, June 29, 1992. The Arabs regarded the Kurds as

tools of the Iranians and Israelis. Many Arabs have never

forgotten that the Kurds cooperated with attempts by the Shah of

Iran and the CIA to topple the Iraqi Ba'thists. The Israelis also

were active in this affair. For details on this, see Stephen

Pelletiere, The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf, Boulder:

Westview Press, 1984.

12. This is somewhat of a simplification. Barzani and

Talabani are, effectively, warlords who dominate their respective

regions, but this mainly came about because of their close ties

to Washington and London. In fact, within both areas there are a

number of powerful agas Kurdish chiefs, who acquiesced in

following Barzani and Talabani, only because they were handsomely

recompensed. See Stephen Pelletiere, The Kurds and Their Agas: An

Assessment of the Situation in Northern Iraq, Carlisle: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1991.

13. See "Why the Kurdish leaders went to Baghdad," Middle

East Insight, May 3, 1991; "Kurdish Leader Reports Accord With

Baghdad," The New York Times, May 19, 1991; and "Baghdad, Kurds

Near Agreement," The Washington Post, May 19, 1991.

14. For details of the autonomy scheme, see Stephen

Pelletiere, The Kurds and Unstable Element in the Gulf.

15. Mulla Mustafa Barzani gave as his reason for rejecting

the offer that the autonomy plan was deficient, inasmuch as it

did not include Kirkuk in the Kurdish region. However, Kirkuk is

not predominantly Kurdish; it also has a large Turkoman

population. Also, Kirkuk is the site of one of the world's

richest oil fields, and the nationalist Ba'th regime would not

concede that this might become a part of Kurdistan. It was also

suggested that what Barzani really feared was that, under the

plan, the Ba'thist imposed land reform would be extended into the

Kurdish area. Had he gone along with this, Mulla Mustafa would

have alienated all the tribal chiefs.

16. See "Barzani, Talabani Deny Differences," FBIS-NES-91-

128, July 3, 1991; also for the background to the 1970 autonomy

offer, see The Kurds and Their Agas. For apparent United States

and British relief that the Kurds did not reconcile with Iraq,

see "The US' failure in Iraq," Middle East International, October

4, 1996.

17. See "Key States Warn U.S. Over Kurds," The Washington
20

Post, November 15, 1992.

18. See "Turkey Says Bush Rejects Kurdistan," The New York

Times, September 4, 1992; "The Gulf Between Rhetoric and

Reality," Kurdish Life, No. 10, Spring 1994; and "Turkish Leader

to Press U.S. on Iraq Embargo," The New York Times, October 14.

1993.

19. The Kurds were already suffering, after having

participated in a mass exodus to Turkey at the tail end of the

Second Gulf War. Supposedly several hundred thousand participated

in this mass flight.

20. In the election for this parliament, Barzani won but

then "gave away" some of his votes so that the tally would be

split evenly between Talabani and himself. Barzani maintained

this was necessary, otherwise Talabani would not cooperate with

the Kurdish authority. This kind of dissension was an early

indication of trouble ahead.

21. The term pesh merga is an old one among the Kurds. It

traditionally was meant to signify a personal retainer of an aga,

a Kurdish chief. During Mulla Mustafa Barzani's revolt, the term

gained wide currency by being publicized in the Western press.

Today, the meaning is somewhat changed. Now it specifies anyone

who is part of the leader's militia, in whatever capacity he

serves. It has been estimated that today there are as many as

300,000 self-styled pesh mergas.

22. Under Ba'thist control of Iraq, the population was taken

care of by state-supplied welfare programs. This system worked

very well, even during the war, as the Ba'th maintained a policy

of providing "guns and butter." It was only after the Second Gulf

War, when the Ba'th had to relinquish control of the north, that

many Kurds, who formerly were provided for by the state, were

thrown on their own resources.

23. See "Kurdish hopes founder on warlords' rivalry," The

Financial Times, February 9, 1995.

24. Ibid.

25. See "U.N. Warns of End to Kurdish Relief," The New York

Times, May 23, 1993; and "Aid Workers in Kurdistan Fear Attacks,"

The Washington Post, July 8, 1993.

26. See "Desperate Kurds Consider Turning Once More to

Saddam," The Washington Post, June 23, 1993; also the commentary

in Kurdish Life, No. 13, 1995; "The State of the Kurds in the

State of the Union," also "Kurdish hopes founder on warlords'

rivalry," The Financial Times, February 9, 1995.
21

27. See "Iraq Reportedly Cracks Down on Clan That Tried a

Coup," The New York Times, June 20, 1995; "U.S. Officials Say

Evidence Confirms Reports of Fighting Between Iraqi Troops," The

Washington Post, June 16, 1995; "Anti-Regime Riots, 50 Deaths

Reported in Iraqi Province," The Washington Post, June 2, 1995;

"A Failed Plot to Overthrow Hussein Is Reported in Iraq," The New

York Times, March 14, 1995; "Senior Army Aides To Iraq President

Defect To Jordan," The New York Times, August 11, 1995; "Baghdad

'Coup': An Assassination Bid?," The New York Times, July 9, 1992;

"Saddam Said to Shuffle Military Command," The Washington Post,

August 15, 1992; and "For Possible Coup in Iraq, U.S. Plans," The

New York Times, December 11, 1991.

28. Ba'thism, as a political ideology, has manifested itself

in two distinct forms. Syria's present government is Ba'thist,

but it is vastly different from the Ba'thism that is present in

Iraq. For a discussion of the development of Ba'thism and of the

antagonism that exists between the two wings of the party, see

Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder: Westview Press,

1985; Christine Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World,

Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1984; and Marion FaroukSlugget and Peter Slugget, Iraq: Since 1958, London: I.B. Tauris

& Co., 1990. For a discussion of how the party managed to survive

the crisis, see "Iraq's War Defeat, Civil Strife Causing Crisis

in Baath Party," The Washington Post, July 16, 1992; and "Hussein

Rebuilds Iraq's Economy, Undeterred by the U.N. Sanctions," The

New York Times, June 23, 1993.

29. What certainly fed this optimistic outlook was the

defection of Saddam's son-in-law. See Op-Ed comments in The New

York Times and The Washington Post during this period.

30. The best treatment of the PKK, and of its ideological

claims, is Michael Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey, Boulder: Westview

Press, 1990.

31. For discussions of the status of the PKK in the period

immediately proceeding Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, see Stephen

Pelletiere, The Kurds and Their Agas; and "Turkey and the United

States in the Middle East: The Kurdish Connection," Turkey's

Strategic Position At the Crossroads of World Affairs," Carlisle:

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

32. Ibid.

33. This offer was also condemned by Turkey's general staff.

However, Turkey's then President Turgut Ozal was able to force it

through, largely because he was able to argue that, if Turkey did

not do this, it would not be able to influence events in northern

Iraq. This cost Ozal dearly, however. His party was repudiated at
22

the next election. He died soon after this.

34. Syria could be called the patron of the PKK. After the

Turkish Army seized power from Turkey's civilian leaders in the

mid-1970s, the PKK militants fled to Lebanon where Assad, in

effect, took them under his wing. For details, see "The United

States and Turkey: The Kurdish Connection," Turkey's Strategic

Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs. For specific

instances where Turkey has accused Syria and Iran of inciting the

Kurds, see "Turks Move to Crush Rebellion," The Washington Post,

October 5, 1992.

35. I am not implying, by any of this, that Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT caused the PKK to come into being. The PKK, as an

organization, goes back to the late 1960s. However, for most of

its career it was an inconsequential group. During the late 1960s

it was not much more than a street gang operating in Ankara and

Isranbul. After that it was transplanted (by Syria) to the Beka'a

Valley where its cadres were trained as terrorists. Then, during

the Iran-Iraq War, it operated from a safehaven in northern Iraq

controlled by the Barzani forces. It carried out some cross

border raids into Turkey. At no point was the PKK a popular

movement. If anything, it more closely resembled a cult, a Red

Brigade-type operation. Its modus operandi focused on

assassinations and bombings, mostly perpetrated in Europe and

around the world (its specialty was assassinating Turkish

diplomats). How was it able then to function as a guerrilla

organization in one of the most inhospitable areas of the world,

and how were the local Kurds persuaded to let it come among them?

In Iraqi Kurdistan, no one can even move through an area without

local permission, much less set up a guerrilla base and start

attacking the Turkish army. As to the membership figures, they

simply don't add up. Whereas before the creation of Operation

PROVIDE COMFORT the PKK could not have had more than a few

hundred members active in the area, after it the claim was made

that the PKK enrolled upwards of 2,000. I fail to see how the PKK

could have converted so many Turkish Kurds, when its professed

ideology is Marxism. The Turkish Kurds were instrumental in

ensuring victory for Turkey's Islamist Welfare Party in the last

elections. For claims--mostly by the Turkish authorities--of

Iranian backing for the PKK, see "Iran Implicated in Southeast

Attacks, Talks Held; Reaction to Iran Allegations; Ozal:

'Terrorists From Iran,'" FBIS-WEU-84-205, October 22, 1984;

"Turkey Warns Syria Over Aid to Armenians," FBIS-MEA-83-058,

March 24, 1983; "Syrian Agents Helped Iran," FBIS-MEA-83-151,

August 4, 1983; and "PKK Member Reveals Iranian Links With

Terrorist Activity," FBIS-WEU-93-140, July 23, 1993.

36. See William T. Johnsen, "Turkey and Europe: Expectations

and Complications," Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads

of World Affairs.
23

37. See "Turkey's Fight Against Kurds Embarrasses Ankara,"

The New York Times, September 5, 1992; "War on Kurds Hurts Turks

in U.S. Eyes," The New York Times, November 17, 1994; "Kurds in

Turkey Seem To Be Nearing Full-Scale Revolt," The New York Times,

March 30, 1992; "Christopher Gives Turks Plan to End Rights

Abuses," The New York Times, June 13, 1993; "Attacked in Turkey

and Iraq, Kurds Become Focus of Diplomacy," The Washington Post,

April 3, 1992; "Turkey's Efforts to Quell Rebel Kurds Raises

Alarm in Ankara and Europe," The New York Times, March 27, 1992;

"Defending Kurds, Bonn Cuts Arms Flow to Turkey," The New York

Times, March 28, 1992; "Turkey's Pursuit of Kurds Disturbs

Neighbors," The Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1995; and

"Jail deaths put Turkish rights record in spotlight," The

Financial Times, July 26, 1996. The Turkish Kurds represent one

fifth of Turkey's population, and therefore the threat from

revived Kurdish nationalism to Turkey is real.

38. See "Torture in Turkey," The New York Times, July 20,

1992.

39. See "Turkey Sets Up Buffer In North Iraq to Curb

Rebels," The Washington Post, August 8, 1992; and "Turks Attack

Separatist Kurds in North Iraq," The New York Times, August 7,

1992.

40. For background on this, see Stephen Pelletiere, The

Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, Greenwood: Praeger, 1992.

41. See "Iraq-Chronology," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 49,

No. 4, Autumn 1995.

 42. See Kurdish Life, No. 18, Spring 1996, for allegations

that Talabani conspired with Iranian agents to kill two antiTehran Kurdish guerrillas in northern Iraq. Also see "Talabani

Visits to Discuss Kurdish Peace," FBIS-NES-95-184, September 22,

1995.

43. This setup was only logical. Talabani's PUK, being based

in southern Kurdistan, is surrounded by enemies, and therefore it

must develop ties to Iran if it is to receive supplies.

Similarly, Barzani, in the north, is practically hostage to the

Turks.

44. See "Iran forces cross into Iraq to hit at Kurdish rebel

group," The Financial Times, July 30, 1996.

45. The United States had turned back several moves by

Russia and France to break the embargo, but at the same time U.S.

diplomats sensed that this resistance could not be kept up much

longer. These states were on the point of breaking the embargo
24

unilaterally. Hence, early this year, Washington agreed to let

Baghdad sell a specified amount of oil every two months and use

the proceeds to relieve suffering among its population and pay

war claims against the Iraqi state.

46. Washington did little more than warn Iran not to violate

Iraq's sovereignty.

47. See "Turkey signs oil-for-food deal with Iraq," The

Financial Times, August 16, 1996.

48. In fact, it does seem that that was what was on the

point of happening. Just after Tehran launched the raid, Turkey

announced that it was going to set up a security zone in northern

Iraq, to make sure that PKK militants could not cross over into

Turkey. I interpret this action as a shot across Iran's bow,

letting the Iranians know that they must not think that they

could take over in the north, that Turkey was prepared to contest

them should they go ahead with any such plan.

49. See "The House Select Committee on Intelligence Report,"

the Pike Report published in The Village Voice, February 23,

1976.

50. For background on this, see George Lenczowski, The

Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1980.

51. See "Turkey Rejects U.S. Aid Loan," The Washington Post,

June 7, 1996; "State Dept. Opposes Bill Cutting Turkish Aid," The

New York Times, June 8, 1996; and "Turkey Used U.S. Arms In

Suppression of Kurds," The Washington Post, June 2, 1995.

52. See "Article Views U.S. Initiative in Northern Iraq,"

FBIS-WEU- 95-149, August 3, 1995.

53. See "Dubai asks lifting of Iraq sanctions," The Boston

Globe, October 23, 1995.

54. Effectively, this is a condition of the omnipresence of

the Ba'th. The party is organized in every area of Iraq down to

the level of neighborhoods and villages. All of the military

leaders above the rank of colonel are Ba'thists. The provinces of

Iraq in every department are in the party's hands. To be sure,

the party is not the power it once was. But its apparatus

survives, and it is what runs the country.

55. For discussions of the ferocity that accompanied regime

changes in Iraq prior to the Ba'th, see Phebe Marr, The History

of Modern Iraq.
25

56. At the end of World War I, British troops seized Mosul

after the armistice was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the

victorious Allies. The Turks have always maintained that this was

improper and have frequently raised the prospect that, were the

area to disintegrate into anarchy, Turkey would repossess the

north of Iraq. Similarly, Iran maintained a virtual sphere of

interest over the predominantly Shia areas of southern Iraq until

the coming of the Ba'th. Moreover, the two holiest shrines of

Shiadom, Najaf and Karbala, are in southern Iraq.

57. See the interview with Barzani in "Die CIA kann Saddam

nicht sturzen," Der Spiegel, 39/1996.

58. The no-fly zones are so-called Chapter 6 actions of the

United Nations. Unlike Chapter 7 actions, they are not

enforceable. The economic embargo is a Chapter 7.

59. France has indicated that it is disinclined to

participate in an expanded overflight of southern Iraq.

60. On the order of the two attacks on bases in Saudi Arabia

which have already been perpetrated.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Stephen C. Pelletiere

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler