NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 23a0178n.06

No. 21-5292

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v. 

JESSE ROBERT COOP,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

OPINION

Before: GRIFFIN, WHITE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. 

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant Jesse Coop of one 

count of aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery (Count 1), one count of aiding and abetting the 

brandishing of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 2), and five counts of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (Counts 3 through 7). We 

vacated Coop’s firearm conviction and remanded to the district court for resentencing. United 

States v. Coop, 807 F. App’x 442, 450 (6th Cir. 2020). Coop appeals his new sentence, asserting 

procedural and substantive errors. We AFFIRM. 

I.

We recounted the facts of this case in our decision addressing Coop’s appeal of his 

conviction, id. at 444-46, and repeat only the facts essential for our present review. On April 27, 

2018, Coop and Keith Harrington, his roommate, spent several hours before dawn “walking back 

and forth between their Memphis apartment and [Coop’s truck], and making at least two trips away 

from the apartment before returning around 5:40 a.m.” Id. at 444. Shortly thereafter, the men 
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drove away in the truck after laying a motorcycle flat in the truck’s bed. Id. Soon after, they 

arrived aboard the motorcycle at a CVS, where they parked in the back before entering the store

and walking around. Id. Coop soon returned to the motorcycle, while Harrington pulled a cap 

over his face and approached the store’s pharmacist with a revolver and ordered him to get 

oxycodone, hydrocodone, and suboxone from the store’s safe. Id. When Harrington left with the 

drugs, the pharmacist heard a motorcycle starting. Id. at 445. Police quickly found Coop and 

Harrington using a tracker in one of the pill bottles. Id. Security footage showed they returned to 

their apartment by truck, with the motorcycle in the back, and then hid the motorcycle and went 

inside. Id.

Coop and Harrington were indicted on eight counts. Id. Harrington pleaded guilty but 

Coop went to trial. Id. In his opening statement, Coop’s attorney argued that Coop did not know 

Harrington had robbed the CVS until Harrington ran out with the pills and a gun, at which point 

Coop gave Harrington a ride for fear of being shot. Id. The jury convicted Coop of aiding and 

abetting Hobbs Act robbery, aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. Id.

at 446. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 78 months’ imprisonment on 

Counts 1 and 3 through 7, and to a consecutive term of 84 months’ imprisonment on Count 2, 

which was the statutory minimum, totaling 162 months in prison. Id. 

Coop appealed the convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient; the district court 

erred in its jury instructions and in responding to a question from the jury; and that aiding and 

abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a violent crime. Id. at 446-47. We found the evidence 

insufficient to support the firearm conviction, explaining that the government needed to prove that 

Coop “actively participated in the underlying drug trafficking or violent crime with advance 
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knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Rosemond 

v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 67 (2014). Although a jury can “infer from [a defendant’s] failure 

to object or withdraw that he had such knowledge” where the “defendant continues to participate 

in a crime after a gun was displayed or used by a confederate,” id. at 78 n.9, we reasoned that the 

government did not show enough to establish “beyond a reasonable doubt that Coop knew that the 

robbery he was planning would involve a firearm” because “the government presented no evidence 

that Coop knew that Harrington was armed.” Coop, 807 F. App’x at 449. The government could

only point to evidence that Coop and Harrington had planned the robbery extensively. Id. We 

vacated the firearm conviction and remanded for resentencing. 

On remand, the government argued for the application of a five-level increase to Coop’s 

base offense level under § 2B3.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which applies “if a firearm 

was brandished or possessed” during the commission of a robbery. USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2). The 

five-level increase yielded a total offense level of 28, with a Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months 

imprisonment. The government asserted that the fact that a jury convicted Coop of aiding and 

abetting robbery was enough on its own to show that Coop had advance knowledge that Harrington 

would use a gun for the robbery. The government also provided statements from witnesses it had 

chosen not to call at trial. These statements, filed under seal, were provided to Coop. Notably, 

one statement said that Harrington “owned a .45 caliber gun,” which he “kept in a closet in his 

room unloaded,” and that both “[Harrington] and Mr. Coop handle[d] that firearm on an almost 

daily basis.” Appellant’s Br. 14. Coop challenged the application of the enhancement and argued 

for a total offense level of 27, with a Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months imprisonment.1

1 Although Coop asserted that a five-level increase to the base offense level for his firearm 

conviction was inappropriate, his position resulted in a total offense level only one level lower 
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Acknowledging our holding in the prior appeal that there was no evidence at all in the 

record that Coop knew Harrington had a gun, the district court observed that the government has 

a lower burden of proof for establishing relevant conduct at sentencing than in proving an element 

of a crime at trial—a preponderance of the evidence versus beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, 

three factors persuaded the district court to apply the five-level increase: the robbery conviction;

the extensive planning by Coop and Harrington; and the additional witness statement that Coop 

knew Harrington owned a gun and handled it with him frequently. The court resentenced Coop to 

97 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release.

II.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, we consider whether the district court committed a “significant 

procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, 

treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. Second, 

we “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard,” accounting for “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance 

from the Guidelines range.” Id. To find an abuse of discretion, we must be “left with a definite 

and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. 

Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 

than without the enhancement because he was also subject to the offense level for the group of 

drug convictions. Without the five-level increase, the firearm offense level would be 21, but the 

drug offense level would still be 26, and Coop would be subject to a one-level increase for the 

combined offense level, resulting in a total offense level of 27. See USSG § 3D1.4. 
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498, 505 (6th Cir. 2013)). We presume reasonableness if the sentence is within the Guidelines 

range. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

III. 

Before proceeding to the merits, we acknowledge and reject Coop’s request in his reply 

brief that we hold the case in abeyance pending a decision by the Supreme Court or action by 

Congress regarding the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing. The Supreme Court has denied 

certiorari in the case Coop raises, see Osby v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 97 (2021) (Mem), and we 

will not await hypothetical legislative action.

IV. 

The five-level increase applies “if a firearm was brandished or possessed” during the 

commission of a robbery. USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). For “jointly undertaken criminal activity,” 

relevant conduct for this increase includes “all acts and omissions of others that were (i) within the 

scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and 

(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). A

sentencing court may “consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the 

rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of 

reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Id. § 6A1.3(a). Coop argues that the district court 

applied the wrong standard for relevant conduct and incorrectly found that the use of a firearm was 

within the scope of the robbery and reasonably foreseeable. 

A.

Coop first contends, based on statements made by the government and the district court,

that the district court used the wrong standard for attributing relevant conduct to a defendant 

engaged in joint criminal activity. He asserts that the government argued that “he was liable for 
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all acts that occurred during the robbery,” and he points to statements by the district court that he 

contends show that the court accepted the government’s broad view. Appellant’s Br. 26. 

According to his paraphrasing, the court told him that “even though he was not the one who pointed 

the gun, and everyone agrees that he was not, he was still responsible for everything that happened 

during the robbery,” and also “that while no one could know what was in his mind, everyone, 

including the jury, could see and evaluate what he did.” Appellant’s Br. 28. 

This argument exaggerates the government’s contention. The government did not argue 

that everything that happened could be attributed to Coop; it argued that a firearm could always 

be attributed in a robbery case. Although, as the district court noted, the government is wrong

about this, Coop distorts the district court’s statements, and the court plainly applied the correct 

standard. The statements Coop relies on came well after the district court’s focused analysis of 

the firearm issue, during a broader discussion of the Guidelines. The court never used the word 

“everything” and certainly did not suggest that Coop being “responsible for what happened that 

day” was the root of its analysis; the court had already applied the correct standards in deciding to 

apply the five-level increase and was explaining that the law may hold people engaged in a joint 

criminal enterprise accountable for others’ actions. R.136, PID 975-76. And the reference to the 

jury was relevant because the court was explaining that it, like the jury, must evaluate the evidence 

and draw reasonable inferences, and that it rejected Coop’s narrative of the facts, just as the jury 

did for the robbery and drug convictions.

B.

Coop also argues that Harrington’s use of a firearm was not within the scope of the jointly 

undertaken criminal activity. A court must make “particularized findings,” United States v. 

Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2002), to “determine the scope of the criminal activity the 
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particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and 

objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement),” USSG § 1B1.3 cmt. n.3(B). “[T]he court 

may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the 

defendant and others.” Id. According to Coop, the district court made insufficient findings 

because its “entire analysis with regard to scope was that there was a robbery in which [he]

participated, and there was a video showing hours of planning.” Appellant’s Br. 31. In his view, 

a district court must find more than “simply . . . that there was a robbery that was planned and 

executed.” Id.

We first observe that Coop made no specific argument addressed to the scope factor at 

resentencing. His written objection was to the five-level enhancement as a whole and asserted that 

“there is no evidence that [he] possessed the firearm, saw the firearm, or even knew that Harrington 

was armed.” At the resentencing hearing, although Coop’s attorney repeatedly discussed whether 

the use of the firearm was reasonably foreseeable, he never specifically argued that the government 

had failed to show the use of the firearm was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal 

activity.

2

The district court’s findings were sufficient, particularly considering that Coop made no 

effort to undermine the government’s showing on this front. We consider several favors to 

determine the scope of a defendant’s jointly undertaken criminal activity: “(1) the existence of a 

single scheme; (2) similarities in modus operandi; (3) coordination of activities among schemers; 

(4) pooling of resources or profits; (5) knowledge of the scope of the scheme; and (6) length and 

degree of the defendant’s participation in the scheme.” United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886, 

2 The probation officer mentioned the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, but 

Coop’s lawyer pivoted back to whether the firearm would have been reasonably foreseeable.
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895 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). These factors support that Harrington’s use of the firearm 

was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity. This case involved a single 

robbery with two individuals, and the government produced footage of Coop and Harrington 

preparing together for hours at their apartment complex and “casing” the CVS together just before 

Harrington pulled the gun. Coop, 807 F. App’x at 444, 448. Coop’s only argument is that the 

government has not proved that he agreed to the use of a firearm, but the Guidelines instruct that

an agreement is not necessary. As explained in an application note for whether conduct was 

“reasonably foreseeable,” if “two defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the course of 

that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a victim,” the second defendant is held

“accountable for the assault and injury to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed 

to the assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt anyone) because the 

assaultive conduct was within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery).” 

USSG § 1B1.3, cmt. n.3(D). Here, the single, confined undertaken Hobbs Act robbery inherently 

involved some “actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury,” see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1951(b)(1), and Harrington applied a threat of force using a firearm within the scope of the jointly 

undertaken Hobbs Act robbery. So Coop’s argument on scope fails. 

C.

Coop next argues that the district court made insufficient findings regarding whether it was 

reasonably foreseeable that Harrington would possess or brandish a firearm in connection with the 

robbery. He asserts that “the district court’s only finding was that . . . Coop knew that Harrington 

had a firearm in his apartment and so it was reasonably foreseeable that Harrington would use it 
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during the robbery.” Appellant’s Br. 32. He also notes that “Hobbs Act robbery does not require 

the use of a firearm, much less actual force.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).

The district court’s findings were again sufficient. The court found the government met its 

burden based on three pieces of information: Coop’s robbery conviction, evidence of Coop’s 

extensive planning with Harrington, and the statement from the additional witness that Coop knew 

that Harrington had a gun in the apartment and the two frequently handled it together. We find no 

error. As the Guidelines explain, the government did not need to show that Coop and Harrington 

had the exact same plan in mind in order to conclude that Harrington’s use of the gun was

foreseeable. See USSG § 1B1.3, cmt. n.3(D). It was enough for the government to show that 

Coop knew Harrington owned a gun and had handled it frequently with him, combined with the 

robbery conviction and footage showing hours of planning. 

Coop’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, he notes that the additional witness

reported seeing Harrington and Coop handle a .45-caliber firearm on a regular basis but the gun 

found on the day of the robbery was a .38-caliber handgun. However, as the district court noted, 

the fact that Coop knew Harrington owned a gun and had handled it with him often was enough—

combined with the other facts—to suggest that Coop could foresee the use of a firearm, even if 

Harrington used a different firearm for the robbery. Second, Coop notes that, although the 

additional witness denied ever handling the .45-caliber firearm and said he did not play with guns, 

another witness told police there was a .38-caliber special Glock in the apartment and that he had 

seen Harrington and the additional witness in possession of this weapon. We agree with the district 

court that this discrepancy does not suggest the additional witness was being untruthful about Coop 

and Harrington handling the .45-caliber firearm together; rather, it suggests the witness sought to 

avoid implicating himself. Third, Coop notes that Harrington had a limited criminal history, falling 
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into criminal history category 1 under the Guidelines, and that the additional witness stated the 

.45-caliber firearm was kept unloaded in a closet, so Coop had little reason to expect a gun would 

be used even if he did know that Harrington owned one. Nevertheless, given evidence that Coop 

knew Harrington owned a gun and frequently handled it with him; their extensive planning 

together; and the robbery conviction, the court could still find that the possession and brandishing

of a firearm in connection with the robbery was foreseeable. 

As for the elements of Hobbs Act robbery, Coop misses the point. He again asserts that 

the district court reasoned that in every robbery an accomplice can foresee the use of a firearm. 

But the district court explicitly—and correctly—rejected that argument. Instead, as discussed, the 

court found based on the combination of the robbery conviction, the extensive planning, and the 

additional witness’s statement about Coop’s knowledge of Harrington’s firearm ownership that it 

was more likely than not foreseeable that Harrington would possess and brandish a firearm in 

connection with the robbery.

V.

Lastly, Coop argues the district court may have been influenced by the government’s 

argument that he acted improperly at trial, rendering his sentence substantively unreasonable. On 

remand, the government presented new evidence that it claimed had not been presented at trial 

because the government believed Coop would testify and waited to present the evidence in rebuttal. 

The government expressed frustration with Coop’s trial tactics, and Coop in turn expressed 

frustration with the government. The district court reminded Coop that the prosecutor was only 

doing his job and his feelings about the prosecutor were irrelevant to the proceedings. Coop asserts 

that these comments from the district court “chastis[ing]” him show it “may have been swayed by 

the prosecution’s arguments” about Coop’s conduct at trial. Appellant’s Br. 39. 
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Because the district court imposed a sentence within the Guidelines range, we presume 

reasonableness, and Coop has given us no reason to vary from that presumption beyond vague 

speculation. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389-90. Indeed, he concedes that the district court explicitly

noted that his trial strategy was “not the issue . . . for resentencing” and that the court “asked the 

government to focus upon use or possession of a firearm.” Appellant’s Br. 36-37. Further, the 

record reflects careful deliberation by the district court with no hint of bias. The court explained 

that, before the hearing, it had considered a sentence at the upper end of the Guidelines but that it 

imposed a midrange sentence because Coop’s attorney showed he had “progressed while . . . 

incarcerated.” R.136, PID 983. Indeed, Coop’s 97-month sentence is at the upper bound of the 

range that he argued should apply. We find no abuse of discretion.

VI.

For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM.