The Evolution of 

the Global SOF 

Enterprise from a 

Partner 

Perspective

by

Lieutenant Colonel 

Asbjørn Lysgård, 

Norwegian Army

Joint Special

Operations

University

Center for Special

Operations Studies

and Research

JSOU Press

Occasional Paper

October 2016
On the cover: Norwegian Army Special Operations Command, training mission Afghanistan 

2013. Source: Forsvarets Spesialkommando.

JSOU Press Publications are available for download at:

http://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the United States Government, 

Department of Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the Joint 

Special Operations University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not disclose 

classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. 

policy. Such academic freedom empowers authors to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.
About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Asbjørn Lysgård

Chair for the study of Special Operations, Norwegian Defense University College

Lieutenant Colonel Asbjørn Lysgård enlisted in the Norwegian Army in 1995, where he joined the 

Telemark Battalion. In 1999, he completed selection and basic training at the Norwegian Army 

Special Operations Commando (NORASOC). He joined the Infantry Officer Candidate School, 

and was commissioned in 2005 after graduating from the Military Academy. Lieutenant Colonel

Lysgård’s notable assignments include: Platoon Leader in NORASOC; Special Operations 

Advisor to the Norwegian Ministry of Defense; Squadron Commander in NORASOC; Aide-de 

Camp to the Norwegian Chief of Defense: and the first Norwegian exchange Liaison Officer to 

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Currently, he serves in the Norwegian Defense 

University College on a joint assignment as the Chair for the study of Special Operations.

Lieutenant Colonel Lysgård completed several deployments to Afghanistan in support of 

both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force. 

Additionally, he participated in multiple operations in Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. 

Lieutenant Colonel Lysgård has a Bachelor’s of Military Studies from the Norwegian Military 

Academy with a minor in Crisis Management, Communication, and Joint Cooperation. He earned 

his Masters of Military Science from the U.S. Marine Corps University. His notable awards and 

decorations include the Medal of St. Olav (with oak leaf cluster) and the Navy Presidential Unit 

Citation for his contributions to Task Force K-bar during OEF. Lieutenant Colonel Lysgård is the 

Co-founder and Chairman of the Board for the Gunnar Sønsteby Foundation. The Foundation 

provides resources for persons supporting peace, democracy, and the strengthening of the 

Norwegian Armed Forces.

1

Military leaders of all branches and departments confront foreign policy on behalf of their 

governments, developing capacities and resilience to win the current fight against an adversary 

that in many cases is unknown or has a complex leadership structure. Knowing whom to trust and 

who is willing to support a nation’s efforts becomes important as leaders build a ‘coalition of the 

willing.’ Through the Global Special Operations Forces Network (GSN), Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) can execute integrated campaigning with partners to facilitate dialogue across 

borders, shortening lines of communication and continuing development of high technology 

solutions. As information is transmitted across the world in seconds, timely planning and 

coordination in support of an operation becomes more important than ever in order to protect 

soldiers and win the current fight. It has become apparent that the growing complexity of each 

mission demands an ever-increasing ability for situational awareness. The creation and 

implementation of the GSN by partner nations has created cost-effective coordination solutions 

and, through that, increased security for deployed personnel across the globe. Moreover, enhanced 

understanding by political leaders and senior military officials on how to exploit the vast 

opportunities the GSN provides in support of creating a coalition has yielded progress in the fight 

against Daesh.

Close Ties and Closed Communities

During the German invasion of Norway in 1940, Norwegian Defense Forces lacked everything 

from timely plans and defense preparations to strategic guidance on how to fight a war. On the 

other hand, diplomatic ties, specifically between Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United 

States, were steadfast and soon proved their importance. Throughout the German occupation of 

Norway, close ties between Norway and her allies developed, allowing the Norwegian royal family 

to settle both in London and Washington, D.C. King Haakon VII of Norway fled to London, as 

did the Norwegian government, thereby escaping the German invasion. Their freedom and survival 

became immensely important, as did the need for unconventional and Special Operations forces.

In 1940, an organization named the Special Operations Executive (SOE) was established 

in Great Britain with the support of Sir Winston Churchill and approval by the British Cabinet.

Through this organization, the first Norwegian SOF unit, the Norwegian Independent Company 

No. 1 (later known as Company Linge), was created.

1 Concurrently, the United States was setting 

up the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under the leadership of William J. Donovan, an effort 

 1 Gunnar Myklebust, Tungtvanns-Sabotøren (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2011), 50.

The Evolution of the Global SOF 

Enterprise from a Partner 

Perspective
2

that benefitted from the support of British Special Intelligence Services and the SOE.2 These 

establishments of small units with reach-back capabilities to Whitehall and Washington, D.C., are 

known to be the first official cooperation between SOF units, creating a network for agents across 

the globe.3 In 1945, the OSS sent Major William Colby, who would later become the first director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency, to lead the Norwegian Special Operations Group in Norway 

and to conduct sabotage and collaborate with organized Norwegian resistance and guerillas.

4 For 

a small nation like Norway, the connections and personal relations that were established with 

colleagues from the U.S. and United Kingdom during the Second World War set the foundation 

for the future development of SOF.

Norway, however, following the Second World War, disbanded all its SOF units to 

prioritize a larger conventional force structure to meet the Soviet threat. The legacy of OSS and 

SOE was still present though, especially in the reserves and the Norwegian Home Guard. Finally, 

almost a decade after the war, Norwegian Defense Forces started to reinvest in SOF. In 1953, the 

Navy established the first teams of Frogmen and, in 1962, the Army established Hærens 

Fallskjermjegerskole (HFJS), the Army’s Commando School, to train long-range reconnaissance 

units for parachute insertion behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, U.S. SOF worked closely 

with HFJS to shape the battlefield, fighting off a potential threat from the East. Throughout the

Balkan wars and the Kosovo crisis, Norwegian SOF became an expeditionary strategic deployable 

force, which later developed into Hærens Jegerskole/Forsvarets Spesialkommando, the 

predecessor of the current strategic command.5

The Norwegian Special Operations Command (NORSOCOM) was established on 1 

January 2014, when its first commander, Rear Admiral Nils Johan Holte, took command of the 

two tactical Norwegian SOF units, Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK), and the Navy SOF unit 

Marinejegerkommandoen.

6 Since that time, the NORSOCOM commander and his staff have 

strengthened the long-established relations between the different SOF units around the world. 

Within NORSOCOM, there are departments specifically tasked with handling international 

relations and interagency coordination and connecting the lines between various organizations and 

government entities. NORSOCOM is represented within the Norwegian National Command 

Authority, NATO command, and at U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM, commonly 

referred to as SOCOM) by a wide range of liaison officers (LNOs). This forward presence is a part 

of the global SOF community, representing the NORSOCOM commander in many SOF venues, 

organizations, and arenas. Many LNOs report directly to the Commander NORSOCOM or the 

Chief of Defense as needed or required.

 2 Douglas Waller, Disciples (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 93. 3 Ibid., 96. 4 Peter Forbath and William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 50. 5 Eirik Kristoffersen, “Small States–Smart Solutions: Investing in a National Joint Special Operations Command,” 

Master ́s thesis, United States Army War College, 2015, 3.

6 Forsvaret, “Forsvarets Spesialstyrker,” accessed 18 May 2016 at: 

https://forsvaret.no/fakta/organisasjon/Forsvarets-spesialstyrker.
3

The long-term 

relationships created 

during the interactions of 

agents and commandos 

during the Second World 

War never ceased to grow 

and develop. The 

networks continued to 

expand, culminating in the 

current fights in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, 

where this multi-faceted 

network of professionals 

has proven its value to 

military, civilian, and 

political leaders. The trust 

that has been built within 

the group of individuals that belong to the SOF community is immeasurably strong. However, new 

technology and the methods of modern, sophisticated warfare have made it clear that to win the 

current fight, SOF operations require non-SOF support.7 The importance of a broad coalition and 

mutual support has become more evident as international matters create important concerns for 

politicians. A GSN can accelerate development, create strategic options for policymakers, and 

provide the best military, and sometimes grass-roots political advice, in a timely manner to 

strategic leaders.

The GSN

SOF depend on continuous development to remain relevant, and one way to develop its relevance 

is through close interactions with other nations’ SOF. Thus, SOF networks aid in both tactical 

development and fostering strategic partnerships. A SOF network among friends and allies across 

the globe serves many interests.

8 It is in the interest of small states, as well as in the interest of 

regional security partners, to develop the GSN. In this context, partners in the GSN share an 

understanding of SOF-like organizations, operational support requirements, communication 

technology, techniques, and procedures.

 7 USSOCOM, “SOF Truths,” JSOU, (SOF Reference Manual1-1), available at: 

http://www.socom.mil/pages/softruths.aspx

8 Kristoffersen, “Small States-Smart Solutions,” 7.

Close quarters battle training, 2012, at the NORASOC training site,

Rena military base, Hedmark, Norway. Source: FSK
4

When Admiral William H. McRaven assumed command of SOCOM on 8 August 2011, 

he envisioned and initiated a formalization of the GSN.9 The idea was to establish a peacetime 

network of SOF throughout the globe to build on the experience gained from over a decade of war. 

Through a GSN, SOCOM would enable SOF allies around the world to establish and sustain 

partnerships, very similar to how NATO Special Operations Headquarters has organized SOF 

cooperation in Europe.

To further take advantage of these regional and global networks, small nations need a 

dedicated, strategic SOF element with the authority and resources to operationalize initiatives.10

The future of the GSN should therefore focus on the ability of individual states to establish strategic 

leadership of their SOF, best addressed through a dedicated SOF element, especially for small 

states.11 Smaller states with correspondingly smaller military staffs can only afford a single ‘node’

or organizational entity to coordinate across all of the military elements. A central organization 

creates a single, strategic SOF Enterprise with both efficiency (effective use of resources) and 

effectiveness (being able to quickly synthesize and coordinate from a central point). Tactical units, 

however, must be empowered to practice ‘mission command’ or make decisions based upon intent 

when they are confronted with changes in their environment. This suggests that centralizing at the 

strategic level and decentralizing—at least from a decision-making standpoint—at the tactical 

level provides a ‘best practices’ solution.12 In effect, this describes the U.S. mission-command 

philosophy in action. This is a subtle but extremely important point that must not be lost. Mission 

Command also requires the commander to be comfortable with risk and puts a priority on selecting 

excellent operators that are not only tactically superior but also have a strategic mindset.

The strategy of the NORSOCOM commander is investing in the development of junior and 

mid-level officers in order to expect better decisions in the field based upon his intent, thereby 

‘buying down this risk’ in advance through education, training, and development. This investment 

in junior officers’ strategic abilities aligns with Admiral McRaven’s 2011 initiation of rigorous 

process assessment for how to best position and sustain U.S. SOF to meet current and future 

challenges to U.S. national security. Guiding the assessments was an assumption that “there are 

no local problems;”13 solutions must therefore come through cooperation, collaboration, and 

building capacity with partner nations (PNs). Admiral McRaven referred to the product of that 

assessment as the “Global SOF Network strategy.”14 The future of SOF, in accordance with 

 9 U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Q&A with Admiral McRaven,” Special 

Warfare, vol. 25, No. 2, April–June 2012, available at: 

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/sw2502/sw2502qaadmiralwilliammcraven.html. 10 Colin S. Gray, “Handfuls of Heroes on Desperate Ventures: When Do Special Operations Succeed?” United 

States Army War College, 1999, 7.

11 Kristoffersen, “Small States–Smart Solutions,” 9. 12 Lt. Col. Alan Docauer, LTCOL, USAF, “Peeling the Onion: Why Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution 

Works,” Air & Space Power Journal, March–April 2014. 13 Admiral William H. McRaven, commander, USSOCOM, “Posture Statement Before the 113th Congress House 

Armed Services Committee,” 6 March 2013. 14 Keenan D. Yoho, Tess deBlanc-Knowles, and Randy Borum, “The Global SOF Network: Posturing Special 

Operations Forces to Ensure Global Security in the 21st Century,” Journal of Strategic Security 7, no. 2, 2014.
5

Presidential direction and as envisioned in the GSN initiative, lies in joint operations, with U.S. 

SOF operating by, with, and through its interagency and international partners as the GSN.

Building a Network

In 2006, Admiral McRaven was tapped to lead Special Operations Command Europe, based in 

Stuttgart, Germany. Under his initiative as commander, Admiral McRaven established the NATO 

SOF Coordination Center (NSCC), enhancing and integrating the efforts of all NATO SOF. In 

2010, the NSCC evolved to become the NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ). To support this NATO 

initiative, small states like Norway contributed personnel to the Headquarters from the very start.15

NSHQ was viewed as a mechanism to enhance SOF cooperation and coordination, and to give 

small states a common arena to address strategic SOF-specific issues within the NATO alliance. 

Today NSHQ is collocated with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and, among several 

other roles, has become the center for coordination among NATO allies in the development of 

SOF.16

When Admiral McRaven took over as commander of SOCOM, he drew on the success of 

NSHQ, along with his service as the 11th commander of Joint Special Operations Command. 

Admiral McRaven also spent much time in Afghanistan, where operations intensified on his watch. 

His experiences of relying on cooperation with interagency and coalition forces made it clear that 

a network similar to that formalized in NSHQ needed to be built between SOCOM and its 

international SOF partners to ease the future planning and coordination of U.S. operations with 

coalition support.

Operationalizing the GSN

A series of strategic meetings between McRaven and other countries’ SOF commanders and chiefs 

of defense resulted in the planning and formation of national strategic SOF commands like 

NORSOCOM in Norway.17 A SOCOM-like structure is necessary to take full advantage of the 

opportunities NSHQ and SOCOM provide in terms of regional SOF cooperation. Interoperability; 

common command and control structures; and operational-level, deployable, joint, and combined 

SOF headquarters are all examples of the issues that were considered in establishing the GSN. 

Knowing how to address lessons learned and integrating knowledge from previous operations are 

ideas that must be addressed through strategic commands. Coordinating unity of interest and 

community of action is a pillar of the GSN and a vast improvement on the complexity of fighting 

information sharing, intelligence, and foreign disclosure issues.

In spite of this, location, space, limitation of access, and distribution of classified 

documents turned out to be a long and painful process in the development of the GSN. It was not 

 15 Kristoffersen, “Small States–Smart Solutions,” 8. 16 NATO Home Page, “NATO Special Operation Headquarters Official Opening,” 12 December 2012, available at: 

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_93124.htm?selectedLocale=en. 17 Author’s observation as Aide De Camp (ADC) to the Norwegian Chief of Defense, 2011–2013.
6

until May 2014, when the transition of the global SOF operational planning team, led by U.S. 

Army Colonel Stuart Bradin, stood up the J3-International (J3-I) at SOCOM, that the GSN truly 

began to operationalize. It was during this time that the U.S., along with all of its equivalent 

international partners in the J3-I, came together to work directly alongside one another in a 

horizontal, agile, and cooperative organization inside the SOCOM headquarters. The new location 

provided an open workspace where PNs could communicate with national commands through both 

national and NATO communication systems. The flexible, open workspace community allowed 

information to flow quickly and easily, as opposed to the episodic and fractured manner consistent 

with assigning separate rooms or workspaces to each nation. Additional rooms were provided with 

the new arrangement to facilitate one-on-one discussion when needed, and large areas could be 

cleared for briefings of different classifications, pending attendance and content of the PN 

discussions.18

J3-I was tasked to integrate PNs within the GSN. Its goals and primary functions were to 

facilitate enhanced decision-making for U.S. and global SOF commanders, integrate PNs into 

SOCOM processes, increase interoperability, improve staff processes to better inform strategic 

planning and resourcing, and enhance and accelerate the development of multilateral courses of 

action and cooperation among global SOF partners.19

As Admiral McRaven prepared to transition command to his successor, the fifth 

International Special Operations Forces Conference took place in Tampa, Florida. The theme of 

the conference was “Strengthening the Global SOF Network,” and SOF representatives and 

commanders from more than 80 countries participated. The conference brought forth a new issue 

not explored in depth in previous conferences: SOCOM’s network strategy, which emphasized a 

comprehensive whole-of-government approach to coordinate agencies, departments, and PN SOF 

integration into SOCOM, did not fully explain how small PNs were expected to contribute to and 

benefit from the GSN.20

In 1996, RAND strategists John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt proposed the concept that “It 

takes a network to fight networks.”21 The idea got more attention in the aftermath of 11 September 

2001:

It takes networks to fight networks. Governments that want to defend against 

Netwar may have to adopt organizational designs and strategies like those of their 

adversaries. This does not mean mirroring the adversary, but rather learning to draw 

on the same design principles that he has already learned about the rise of network 

forms in the information age. These principles depend to some extent on 

technological innovation, but mainly on a willingness to innovate organizationally 

 18 Author’s own experience as Norwegian LNO to SOCOM, 2014–2015. 19 SOF Lessons Learned Network, Multinational SOF Planning Insights, Tampa, 23 April 2015, 2. 20 Jonas Carling and Tom-Erik Kihl, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network from a Partner-Nation 

Perspective,” Master’s thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, 2014, 7. 21 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” RAND Monograph Report, 1996.
7

and doctrinally, perhaps especially by building new mechanisms for interagency 

and multijurisdictional cooperation.22

Within the GSN, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and memoranda of agreement 

(MOAs) regulate the sharing of information between participating nations. The baseline that every 

participating nation needs to fulfill is an MOU or an MOA with the United States.23 When this is 

concluded, access is granted, and J3-I capabilities enable a broad range of PN collaboration to 

occur on a continuous basis (U.S.-to-PN Bilateral, PN-to-PN Bilateral, and Multilateral), so when 

coalitions are formed, knowledge is disseminated, and PNs understand the nature of the problem. 

PNs are at all times encouraged to be physically close in proximity to one another to facilitate 

information sharing and collaboration.24 Any nation can initiate contact with SOCOM to become 

a member. The nature of the GSN is of such flexibility that each PN itself decides how 

comprehensively it wants to take part in or use the network. Some PNs are members because they 

need and want support through the GSN membership, while others are because they have SOF 

capacity and a desire to share the burden within the network. Today the GSN consists of multiple 

sub-networks that together create the overall network. The main sub-networks are:

• The U.S. SOF network 

• The U.S. interagency network 

• The PN SOF network

• The geographic combatant command (GCC) and functional combatant command 

networks

• The theater special operations command (TSOC) network

• NATO SOF network

The list does not represent all the sub-networks of the GSN. However, these sub-networks 

are the most prominent at the interorganizational level.25

One of the most difficult challenges so far has been the information assurance coordination 

between the different agencies and military representatives from the PNs. Each country has a 

national agenda and legislative systems to follow and, on several occasions, there have been 

challenges as to how to implement and share information both to and from certain PNs due to legal 

restrictions in information management. To meet the level of information sharing needed within 

the GSN, the classified information sharing system BICES-X was leveraged. It was developed 

 22 Scott Morrison, “Redefining the Indirect Approach, Defining Special Operations Forces (SOF) Power, and the 

Global Networking of SOF,” Journal of Strategic Security, 7, no. 2, 2013, 48‒54. 23 Jonas Carling, “Swedish SOF in a GSN Challenge,” SOF/SF Antologi, Svenske Försvars Högskolen, Swedish 

War College, 2015. 24 SOF Lessons Learned Network, Multinational SOF Planning Insights, Appendix A-3 (JLLIS 302381 

Unclassified), Tampa, 23 April 2015. 25 Carling and Kihl, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network,” 40.
8

from the NATO battlefield information collection and exploitation system (BICES). This system 

offers potential solutions to information sharing; however, limitations in the distribution of the 

system exist, as it is a chain of command (top-down) distributed system. Regardless, the system 

and the network proved their value in July 2014, as will be discussed in the next section, when the 

first phases of what were to become Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) kicked off.
9

Figure 1: Global Special Operations Forces Communications Infrastructure26

 26 SOCOM, “Operationalizing the Global SOF Network,” (J3-I brief) 2011-2013
10

Figure 1 depicts the lines of communication in the system and clearly underlines the 

importance and functions of the GSN. In addition, the BICES system provides the ability to 

establish live video teleconferences (VTCs) between national headquarters and forward operating 

bases, as well as joint and NATO headquarters. This unique capability provides members of and 

commanders within the GSN to have live-feed, secure conversations in support of ongoing 

missions. On a regular basis, all LNOs need to communicate with national headquarters to get 

additional guidance. SOCOM has, on this matter, provided facilities for national reach-back, where 

every nation can install secure national communications systems. This opportunity reinforces and 

supplements the reach-back capabilities provided by the different nations in the ‘Coalition Village’

at United States Central Command (CENTCOM).

Based on the creation of the J3-I and the Global Mission Support Center (GMSC) at 

SOCOM, it appears that SOCOM has adopted a form of network administrative organization for 

the overall network. SOCOM facilitates and synchronizes the day-to-day management of global 

mission support through a focus on strategic/global involvement.27 The GMSC provides daily and 

weekly coordination, with the opportunity for deep-dive orientations for the commander of

SOCOM on a regular basis, all with PN presence. The process is managed and supported by the 

J3-I through the campaign synchronization process. Based on strategic inputs, a three-year 

operation cycle is developed. Complicating the process are the different timelines each PN subnetwork operates under, the challenge of coordination with each national headquarters, and 

conflicting governmental guidance.

Maintaining the Initiative

As command of SOCOM transitioned from Admiral McRaven to General Joseph L. Votel in 

August 2014, adjustments and changes to the structure of the command were implemented, with 

some impacting the GSN and PN representation at the headquarters. In his first opportunity to 

address the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, General Votel emphasized the following:

We are living in a hyper-connected world; the spread of technology into an 

increasing number of cultures and societies is driving change in the strategic 

environment. The Cold War suppressed political mobilization in a variety of ways. 

The removal of those constraints, coupled with technology, is creating both 

challenges and opportunities. Adversaries can now easily access tools that range 

from advanced weapons systems and cyber capabilities ... By increasing 

transparency, communication, and collaboration with our partners, we maximize 

the effectiveness of our collective action against shared problem sets. SOCOM will 

 27 Carling and Kihl, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network,” 52.
11

continue to invest in these relationships so that our network development outpaces 

that of threat networks.28

This statement, given on 18 March 2015, wrapped up the ongoing process and described 

the coalition now operating in OIR. Technology and the GSN paved the way for continued PN 

representation and integration at SOCOM. Lead planners and coordinating events were covered 

by PN LNOs/staff officers within J3-I. By using the existing representation at SOCOM, the 

leadership set an example of how integration should be done. Initial phases of OIR were Special 

Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) led; however, CENTCOM was soon to become the 

lead in what developed into a long-term fight against terrorist organizations in the Middle East. 

The future of OIR will depend on the new strategic guidance given by General Votel, now the 

commander of CENTCOM. His experience with SOF and knowledge of fighting a network will 

definitely be added value in fighting Daesh.

The Challenges of Creating a Coalition

A nation’s specific reason for participating in a specific operation or a mission can affect 

its commitment. It is therefore important to establish informal communities of interest and formal 

communities of action. In the GSN, these take the form of working groups facilitated by J3-I that 

can develop and foster PN contributions to mission-specific tasks. In the early stages of any 

operation, and in OIR specifically, knowledge and reporting of updated information to respective 

headquarters are essential; it is necessary to provide actionable information to national 

stakeholders and policy-making politicians.

The operational approach of Operation Inherent Resolve was launched on 10 September 

2014. President Obama announced the formation of a broad international coalition to defeat The 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), emphasizing: “Our objective is clear: We will degrade, 

and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.”29

The name Inherent Resolve is intended to reflect the unwavering resolve and deep commitment of 

the U.S. and PN in the region and around the globe to eliminate the terrorist group ISIL/Daesh and 

the threat they pose to Iraq, the region, and the wider international community. It also symbolizes 

the willingness and dedication of coalition members to work closely with our friends in the region 

and apply all available dimensions of national power necessary—diplomatic, informational, 

military, and economic—to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL.30 Active participation in OIR 

will make way for further PN representation in similar efforts in the region, as ISIL continues to 

spread and bolster its influence there. OIR aims to defeat ISIL as a military force on the battlefield 

 28 General Joseph L. Votel, commander USSOCOM, “Statement Before House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” 18 March 2015, 5, available at: 

http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20150318/103157/HMTG-114-AS26-Wstate-VotelUSAJ-20150318.pdf. 29 President Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on ISIL” (Washington, D.C., 10 September 2014), available 

at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1. 30 U.S. Central Command, “Operation Inherent Resolve: Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve,” 

available at: http://www.centcom.mil/uscentcom-operations-and-exercises/inherent-resolve.
12

in Iraq and Syria by working with and through regional partners in order to enable whole-ofcoalition governmental approach to increase regional stability.

A challenge in fulfilling this requirement, as previously mentioned, is interagency (IA) 

cooperation. Intel-related information sharing has proven to be a slow process in SOCOM, where 

only the U.S. has the capability to distribute information bilaterally or within closed communities 

such as the Five Eyes Alliance.31 For other PNs, information has, in many cases, been overclassified, and foreign disclosure officers, or the lack thereof, have severely slowed down the 

release process.32 There is an educational gap in classification guidance at the operational level, 

leaving staff not fully trained in the use of appropriate classification. The Middle East Stabilization 

Force (MESF) tetragraph was created to ensure inclusion of all PNs involved in OIR; however, 

the tetragraph was not always effectively used due to lack of will or skill.33 SOCCENT 

representatives commented on several occasions throughout the coalition building process that 

information sharing does not begin until the commander, the J3-I, and authors of plans, orders, and 

briefing products embrace the information-sharing mindset and begin classifying documents and 

products for release within the MESF and other offices.34

For PN LNOs in support of OIR, it has become hard to incorporate lessons learned about 

Daesh’s tactics, techniques, and procedures when classification issues prevent them from being 

shared. As one SOF senior leader stated to the entire combined joint interagency task force 

(CJIATF) during a VTC: “If you have included everyone on your email, CC in some more.”35

Until this issue of information sharing is resolved, it will be difficult to operate as a coalition.

A recurring issue identified by both U.S. and PN 

officers when creating a coalition is the strained 

integration between conventional forces (CF) and SOF. 

Barriers to communication materialized as conflicts over 

command and control (C2), rooted in lack of CF 

understanding of SOF capabilities.36 Another problem is 

when it appears that SOF developed relationships with PNs before CF had an opportunity to do 

so. This is due to pre-existing relationships with PN SOF; many PNs have experienced the same 

challenges working with their own CF. Since the space between SOF leaders and national 

leadership may be compressed, decisions for SOF can be made quicker, and that speed creates a 

perception that SOF were building their own coalition. These challenges in building a coalition 

can be addressed by educating CF in the capacities of SOF and how they are synchronized as a 

part of GCC’s efforts.

 31 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States. 32 Author’s own experience as Norwegian LNO to SOCOM, 2014–2015. 33 Author’s experience as NORSOCOM LNO J3-I in discussion with Brig Smethurst, 27 August 2014. 34 Author’s own experience as Norwegian LNO to SOCOM, 2014-2015. 35 J3-I VTC, September 2014. 36 SOF Lessons Learned Network, Multinational SOF Planning Insights, Tampa, 23 April 2015, 5.

A recurring issue ... when 

creating a coalition is the 

strained integration between 

conventional forces and SOF.
13

When establishing a coalition, there will always be jurisdictional challenges until the 

coalition is finalized. For example, the creation of the OIR coalition was different than the creation 

of the coalition for 

Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) in 

Afghanistan. Later, 

NATO developed 

the International 

Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) to 

work in tamdem with 

OEF, and which is 

governed by NATO 

directives. The OIR 

coalition was formed 

outside of a formal 

alliance construct, so 

PNs were not able to 

fit their contributions 

into a template or existing structure. When forming new coalitions, new structures must be created 

and supported. To increase effectiveness, planners must be proactive and define billets and 

roles concretely.

OIR was created with a non-doctrinal approach to C2 structure, resulting in confusion and 

difficulties explaining current OIR C2 to national military leaders. It is recommended that 

organizational structure be clearly articulated for operations at all levels, in accordance with Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations and JP 3-05, Special Operations when conducting joint 

missions or establishing a coalition. In addition, a structural framework for PN billets needs to be 

developed, such as the one that was initiated in Afghanistan in 2015.

Early deployment of PN SOF representatives to OIR created an opportunity for initial 

multinational engagements as new partners wanted to join. To work through the concept of troop 

contribution, the OIR joint planning group (JPG) addressed issues within J3-I to prevent problems 

and overlying capacities. The broad knowledge of the international personnel at J3-I prevented 

mistakes and solved ongoing challenges on the front end. Informal discussions among planners 

allowed them to develop best practices within the legal framework and advise their governments.

Preparations and coordination once deployed for OIR were done through the smart use of 

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). PN integration teams demonstrated 

success and led newer partners as the coalition began to build solid proof of the efficiency of the 

GSN in practice. RSOI was supported both by U.S. and coalition partners, making the transition 

of personnel and goods flexible and precise. One of the main contributing factors for the success 

of integration and the acceleration of the planning process was the collocation of the J3-I and OIR 

NORASOC TF-51 in urban training in Afghanistan, 2013. Source: FSK
14

JPG at SOCOM. As SOCCENT was the lead on OIR, but lacked the facilities for planning coalition 

operations, the purpose-built J3-I workspace became the hub for coalition SOF activity. By 

working out of existing infrastructure and utilizing the GSN, planning will have “a warm start for 

any contingency.”37

A living network, proactive rather than reactive, has proven the importance of developing 

the GSN. Access into the SOCOM building is granted for LNOs and is more manageable for PNs 

than engagements with CENTCOM, as it belongs to a different GCC. A major drawback is that 

PN presence at SOCCENT is not currently possible, as the building is a sensitive compartmented 

information facility—TSOCs are not built or equipped to host coalition planning efforts.38 It is 

likely that the U.S. facilities will continue to have a rating of ‘no foreign’ for the foreseeable future.

Coalitions must facilitate entry of new partners based on requirements, not based on 

convenience of previous partnerships or agreements. An example of this is the fight against Daesh. 

While the regional problem is based in Syria, many 

nations have focused on supporting efforts in fighting 

the adversary in Iraq. This is mostly out of political 

convenience, and also because in Iraq there were 

previously established status-of-forces agreements 

(SOFA). In the future, it is likely that several additional 

nations will join CJIATF-Syria in order to keep the pressure on Daesh. There must be a way to 

expand the partnership so that it is the most operationally effective rather than the most politically 

expedient.

Since SOCOM and CENTCOM belong to two different structures, with overlapping 

operational areas, participants have discovered challenges in the LNO structure within the two 

commands. Since many SOF LNOs are junior in rank to their respective countries’ senior national 

representatives (SNR), all communication and reach-back must be coordinated to avoid confusion 

that can arise from reports written and submitted by two different people. SOF lines of 

communication are often short, and representatives will in many cases report directly to strategic 

military and political leadership in PN countries. It is therefore important to know and clarify how 

SOF fits into the CENTCOM SNR network, and to clarify national caveats, political sensitivity, 

and limitations. CENTCOM was responsible for building a coalition during OIR; SOF forces on 

the other hand were already engaged in Iraq, causing uncertainty among planners about who was 

building the coalition. SNRs were, on several occasions, approached by CENTCOM without 

including SOF in the planning. CENTCOM needs to understand that SNRs are sometimes not 

connected to SOF, due to national defense structures.39

During OIR development, most nations needed a whole-of-government approach to the 

new line of operations, more than a CF-versus-SOF approach as the C2 structure represented in 

the initial phase. The lack of protocol and doctrine on how to establish a coalition has been 

 37 SOF Lessons Learned Network (JLLIS 302384 Unclassified Appendix A-3), 2015. 38 SOF Lessons Learned Network (JLLIS 302384 Unclassified Appendix A-3), 2015. 39 SOF Lessons Learned Network (JLLIS 302384 Unclassified Appendix A-11), 2015.

Coalitions must facilitate entry 

of new partners based on 

requirements, not ... previous 

partnerships or agreements.
15

immense. As stated by Commander NORSOCOM, Rear Admiral Holte, “Operational 

requirements often outpace established doctrine, relationships, and agreements. This can result in 

operations that require the establishment of a coalition that may not be properly resourced or 

planned—especially at the strategic level.”40 For future operations, integrated planners on both a 

permanent and case-by-case basis should be accommodated by SOCOM in order to handle the 

workload that creating a “coalition of the willing” requires. Having temporary planners present 

will lend long-term, big-picture values to the JPGs, as LNOs have to deal with several additional 

duties, both as LNOs and as exchange officers.

With PN SOF representatives in theater, the GSN began working on a new line of approach. 

Forces assigned to Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq (SOJTF-I), significantly provided 

new and timely information to national headquarters and the J3-I. This dramatically reduced the 

number of requests for information (RFI) previously fielded by SOCCENT teams. Additionally, 

partner LNO workload at SOCOM decreased significantly, as the partner HQ questions could be 

answered by those partners deployed on the ground. The PN deployment of planners and staff 

officers from national SOCOM structures forward provided new (PN-influenced) situational 

awareness with key figures for the JPG VTC meetings at SOCOM.

These opportunities adjusted PN expectations and provided more precise information on 

which capabilities were needed in OIR. The broadening of the GSN accelerated this process and 

resulted in greater efficiency and budget reductions. In an early stage of OIR, best practices 

resulted in SOJTF-I being granted permission to write reports for MESF release, and this 

information sharing ended the initial challenge of many reports being overclassified. While 

working in a coalition, many nations are accustomed to stamping every report with the 

SECRET/NOFORN classification, and breaking this habit will take time. However, the change 

has already enhanced information sharing, and reports from several countries have been provided 

to the OIR JPG. The main communication system in this effort was still the BICES system, 

reinforced by BICES professionals solving initial technical challenges. It is recommended for 

future operations that there be PN presences on SOF staff forward, with national and NATO 

communication systems, to improve planning prior to the deployment of the main body of any 

coalition partners.

Coalition of the Willing

In the aftermath of the deployment of both CF and SOF to OIR, SOCOM and PNs have achieved 

well-coordinated and combat-proven integrated campaigning with partners. Skeptics, like Foreign 

Policy reporter Paul McLeary, have seen the rise of the GSN as controversial, even though it 

provides a common basis for SOF in a new environment.41The GSN has proven its value in support 

of CF, preparing the battlefield and providing common knowledge through PN deployments and 

staff officers serving in joint staffs. The cultural differences between PNs and the U.S. in the GSN 

 40Nils Johan Holte, Rear Admiral Commander NORSOCOM, Tampa, 30 October 2014. 41 Paul McLeary, “Lawmakers Skeptical of Global Spec Ops Plan,” DefenceNews.com, 10 August 2013.
16

become more visible once members are deployed, rather than operating in an everyday situation 

at SOCOM. A joint recce was conducted by representatives from The Netherlands, Spain, and 

Norway. This clarified the different authorities and SOFAs the countries had with the government 

of Iraq.

The largest difference appears between the IA intelligence community and SOF. SOF 

operations require high-resolution intelligence, hence the importance of trust between the 

communities. Whereas SOF are deployed to conduct 

operations on the ground, intel analysts are provided safe 

and secure environments, focusing on doctrinal work and 

collection. Every SOF operator is willing to go above and 

beyond the call of duty to solve a mission. An 

intelligence analyst however, needs to prioritize among 

requirements and customers, and will in many cases resist revealing information without exchange 

and prior concurrence from higher headquarters.42 A continuation of cooperation between IA 

operators and SOF will leverage operational experience of new technology and collection assets.

It is needed and recommended that deployed forces view their role both within the GSN, 

and perhaps more importantly, the larger CF and IA environment. SOF and CF members are a part 

of the larger puzzle—the complex and evolving concept of war, which affects every soldier and 

nation participating in a conflict. Burden sharing and serving one’s nation for a common interest 

creates a network of trust larger than any single nation is capable of building.

OIR has demonstrated that small nations’ cooperation with the U.S. can be timely, efficient, 

and cost-effective. The GSN can enable quick reaction time and rely on the whole network for 

support in a crisis response situation. This can include a variety of options, such as strategic lift 

assets, intelligence sharing, operational support, and strategic surveillance capabilities. Several 

PNs have experienced new challenges during OIR, and it is important for SOF commanders to 

expand their audience and to continue to educate military and political leaders on how to best 

deploy and employ SOF power in a dynamic environment. Political decision-makers need to 

understand the importance of the GSN and how to efficiently use SOF.

Recommendations and Conclusion

The continued development of SOF partners within SOCOM is depicted below. A steadfast growth 

in the coming years is likely to establish a PN presence with more than 70 countries, though this 

could become somewhat unwieldy if not tailored for more efficient partnering.

 42 Carling and Kihl, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network,” 72.

A continuation of cooperation 

between IA operators and 

SOF will leverage operational 

experience ...
17

Figure 2: The Growth of SOF Partnerships within SOCOM43

 43 Carling and Kihl, “The Global Special Operations Forces Network,” 72.
18

The expansion of PN representation at SOCOM depicted in Figure 2 is likely to result in 

two significant challenges: The first will be a perception of free-riding by smaller nations on the 

backs of large, mature, SOF-capable states. The purpose of sending representatives to SOCOM is 

not to improve current operations, but to get out in front of current operations in order to be better 

positioned, networked, resourced, and postured to defeat adversaries before they have the 

initiative, or to confront them from a position of superiority. Since SOCOM does not conduct 

tactical operations, small nations should consider if an LNO position within a TSOC is of higher 

value, due to proximity and operational experience needed for the individual country. Limitations 

on access from the U.S. side may restrict this possibility. U.S. military decision-makers must not 

provide mixed signals to PNs when suggesting coalitions. Information sharing with PNs must be 

a primary consideration to avoid bottlenecks created by inability to share sensitive information 

critical to mission success.

Second, by expanding PN presence, the GSN might lose some of its value. If too many 

nations are included, what are the benefits to each individual nation? “The perception of being 

valued and treated as special is important for participation in any network.”44 These challenges 

should be considered by PNs in the GSN when enthusiastically contributing to the Global SOF 

Enterprise.

In view of these challenges, a beneficial step for the GSN to take would be to define the 

organizational structure and clearly articulate it for operations at all levels, in accordance with JP 

3-0, Joint Operations and JP 3-05, Special Operations when conducting integrated campaigning 

with partners. In addition, a structural framework for PN billets needs to be developed within 

SOCOM. Integration of PN LNOs in forward-deployed staff billets similar to OIR needs to 

continue and expand. Benefits of this will be seen as the OIR coalition develops situational 

awareness and achieves success in training the indigenous population, and when CJIATF- (Iraq &

Syria) exploits gaps and friction, creating a stronger coalition prepared to fight Daesh in both Iraq 

and Syria. The network connections that are established through the GSN will enhance such a 

development as military advisors and leaders give their advice to political leaders. Continuing 

development of the BICES system will enhance GSN and SOF capabilities and accommodate 

coordination between nations in support of the Global SOF Enterprise. The implementation of 

BICES as a supportive SOF system by NSCC/NSHQ has made way for technological development 

and built bridges over old-fashioned obstacles protected by the descendants of the men with 

‘cloaks and daggers.’

 44 General Harald Sunde, Chief of Defense Norway, Partnership for Peace assessments, Brussels, 2012.
Acronym List

BICES battlefield information collection and exploration system

BICES-X battlefield information collection and exploration system extended

CENTCOM United States Central Command

CF conventional forces

CJIATF combined joint interagency task force

C2 command and control

FSK Forsvarets Spesialkommando (NORASOC)

GCC geographic combatant command

GSN Global Special Operations Forces (SOF) Network

GMSC Global Mission Support Center

HFJS Hærens Fallskjermjegerskole

IA interagency

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

J3-I J3-International

JP joint publication

JPG joint planning group

LNO liaison officer

MESF Middle East Stabilization Force

MOA memorandum of agreement

MOU memorandum of understanding

NORASOC Norwegian Army Special Operations Command

NORSOCOM Norwegian Special Operations Command

NSCC NATO SOF Coordination Center

NSHQ NATO Special Operations Headquarters

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 

OIR Operation Inherent Resolve 

OSS Office of Strategic Services 

PN partner nation(s)

RFI request for information

RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

SNR senior national representative

SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central

SOE Special Operations Executive

SOF Special Operations Forces

SOFA status-of-forces agreement 

SOJTF-I Special Operations Joint Task Force-Iraq
TSOC theater special operations command

USSOCOM/SOCOM United States Special Operations Command

VTC video teleconference
Joint Special Operations University

Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

7701 Tampa Point Blvd.

MacDill AFB, FL 33621