The Marshall Center Papers, No. 3 Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order

By Richard Cohen 

and Michael Mihalka

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES
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ISBN 1-930831-04-8
Cooperative Security: 

New Horizons for 

International Order

By Richard Cohen 

and Michael Mihalka

Mr. Richard Cohen is the Director of the Senior Executive Seminar

and a professor of NATO and European Security Studies at the

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies.

Dr. Michael Mihalka is a professor of Eastern Europe Studies at the

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 

Foreword

No single trend, over the past decade, deserves more careful analysis than the

remarkable growth of cooperation among the countries of Eurasia and North

America. Many new international organizations have been born, and a few of the

old ones have been successfully transformed. NATO Secretary General Robertson

remarked on September 28, 2000, in Tbilisi, that NATO has changed fundamentally

— indeed, “beyond recognition” — as shown by its cooperation with non–member

countries. So much has happened so quickly that we need new theories to explain

the recent past, let alone to shape the opportunities, challenges, and threats of the

era that lies ahead.

It is for that reason that the Marshall Center takes such pride in publishing this

edition of the Marshall Center Papers. Here we present two different approaches to

the topic of Cooperative Security. Both are controversial. They take exception to

traditional thinking, in many respects, and they do not entirely agree with each

other.

Richard Cohen presents a compelling and highly original model of Cooperative

Security — a term that once was applied almost exclusively to the Organization for

Security and Co–operation in Europe (OSCE). Cohen advocates concrete steps for

translating this idealistic but vague concept into reality, contending that NATO has

become the world’s best example of a Cooperative Security organization. He argues

that NATO remains a Collective Defense system, to the extent that it focuses on

external threats, but only in part. In addition, NATO has acted as a Collective

Security organization — restoring international stability first in

Bosnia–Herzegovina and then in Kosovo — on behalf of the United Nations, when

possible, but without United Nations approval, when necessary. Cohen explores all

of these diverse functions, presenting his own, normative vision of how NATO

should develop in the future, as a Cooperative Security institution, and urging closer

contact between NATO, the European Union, and Russia. Cohen notes, however,

that “the breadth of . . . Cooperative Security is probably limited” by a lack of “core

values and . . . common geo-strategic interests.”

Michael Mihalka both broadens the analysis of Cooperative Security and

deepens its theoretical underpinnings. He traces the history of Cooperative Security

organizations, arguing that they date from the early 19th century and extending the

concept beyond the Northern Hemisphere to include the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations (ASEAN).

iii
Mihalka points out that many members of OSCE and ASEAN are

quasi–authoritarian or transitional democracies, and not consolidated liberal

democracies. Even states that do not share common values can still cooperate, but

only if their ruling elites have confidence in their common future and believe that

working together is better than proceeding alone. However, Mihalka warns that

non-democratic countries are limited in their ability to pursue cooperation. They

may succeed in averting war with each other — as in the case of ASEAN — but

they are unlikely to develop a common position on regional threats to stability. Thus

Mihalka argues that the future success of Cooperative Security depends not only on

spreading liberal democracy, but also on intensifying economic ties with the nondemocratic countries and fostering their sense of a “security community” that

serves the interests of all its members. Mihalka, in contrast to Cohen, concludes that

“Even among states that lack common values, cooperative security is possible.”

These two, contrasting essays raise many questions about the future of the newly

independent countries and the new democracies. Are they entering a new era, in

which one state’s gain is not necessarily another state’s loss? What is the connection

between their rhetorical support for Cooperative Security abroad and their actual

progress toward liberal democracy at home? How much importance should they

assign to projecting stability beyond their borders? Can they pursue cooperation as

opposed to confrontation, reassurance instead of deterrence, and mutual benefit in

place of unilateral advantage? What concrete steps should they take to benefit from

the experience of previous centuries and other regions?

Richard Cohen and Michael Mihalka have performed a major service by

presenting their views in this single volume. Their disagreements testify to the

complexity and the importance of the issues that they raise.

Robert Kennedy, PhD

Director

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 

iv
Cooperative Security

From Individual Security to 

International Stability 

by Richard Cohen p. 1

From Theory to Practice

by Michael Mihalka p. 29

v
— Richard Cohen is the Director of the Senior Executive Seminar

and a professor of NATO and European Security Studies at the

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Prior to

his position at the Marshall Center, he was a British Army Officer

who served as Chief of the Military Cooperation Branch and was

the founder and Chairman of the Military Cooperation Working

Group at NATO Headquarters, Brussels. His Army career included

a wide variety of command and operational staff appointments in

Canada, Germany, Northern Ireland, Hong Kong, Borneo, the

Falkland Islands, Zimbabwe, and the United States.
Cooperative Security: From Individual

Security to International Stability

by Richard Cohen

Executive Summary

The term Cooperative Security has become a popular

catch–phrase since the end of the Cold War. It has been

generally used to describe a more peaceful, but rather idealistic,

approach to security through increased international harmony

and cooperation. This paper presents a more pragmatic and

concrete model of Cooperative Security. The Cooperative

Security model proposed is based on established institutions

and on two well–recognized forms of international security. To

these two concepts of security it adds two new dimensions.

The Cooperative Security model advanced here embraces

four concentric and mutually reinforcing “rings of security”:

Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense,

and Promoting Stability. Of these four rings, Collective

Security — a political and legal obligation of member states to

defend the integrity of individual states within a group of

treaty signatories — and Collective Defense — the

commitment of all states to defend each other from outside

aggression — are well–known and generally well–understood.

The new elements of this Cooperative Security model are a

common commitment to Individual Security and to Promoting

Stability.

This paper argues that although many international security

organizations, including the League of Nations, the United

Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Co–operation

in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), and the Warsaw Pact, were founded on the basis of

either Collective Security or Collective Defense, only NATO

can claim to effectively operate in all four rings of this

Cooperative Security model. 

Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

1
Richard Cohen

2

The idea that true security must be based, first and foremost,

on the security of the individual human being has gained

widespread popularity in recent years. Individual Security is

synonymous with Human Security and Human Rights. The

paper argues that Individual Security must form the core or

first, inner ring, of any long–lasting and robust cooperative

international security arrangement. For this reason, members

of a Cooperative Security system must share basic liberal

democratic values.

The Cooperative Security system must also be proactive. Its

members must be prepared to engage in collective diplomatic,

economic, and, if necessary, military action in areas outside

their common space which may threaten their welfare and

stability. This is the fourth and outer ring of Cooperative

Security, Promoting Stability. Non–member states that exist

“within” this fourth ring will also benefit from increased

security and from cooperation with states inside the system,

and indeed they may aspire to become part of its core

membership.

The paper argues that with its new interest in defense and

security, the European Union (EU) is moving toward

becoming a de facto Cooperative Security organization.

Together with NATO, it actively seeks to bring stability and

prosperity to the area around it. At the same time, like NATO,

it works closely with and holds out the prospect of

membership to countries not already part of the Union. As the

EU and NATO move closer together in the defense and

security field and as both organizations enlarge, the

Cooperative Security space will widen and deepen. The

ultimate goal, in the longer term, is that all the countries of the

OSCE, including Russia, are brought into a larger

Eurasian–Atlantic Cooperative Security organization that

could bring harmony and stability to much of the northern half

of our planet. 
Cooperative Security: From Individual

Security to International Stability

. . . to see established a peace which will afford all

nations the means of dwelling in safety within their

own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that

all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in

freedom from fear and want.1

– The Atlantic Charter

What is Cooperative Security?

The term Cooperative Security has become popular since

the end of the Cold War. Although it does not yet have a

generally accepted definition, it has been widely used to herald

a new approach to international relations. It appeared to offer

an escape from narrow Cold War “zero–sum” strategies into

the broad sunlit vistas of international peace and harmony.

However, as is often the case in life, events have demonstrated

that this early burst of optimism was, at best, premature. 

This paper proposes a model of Cooperative Security that

encompasses the traditional international security

arrangements of Collective Security and Collective Defense

and adds two new elements, Individual Security and

Promoting and Projecting Stability.

Rebirth of a Concept

The concept of Cooperative Security is not a post–Cold War

invention. Indeed, Immanuel Kant introduced the idea in the

Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

3
Richard Cohen

4

late 18th century in his “Second Definite Article of Perpetual

Peace.” Kant proclaimed that “The law of nations shall be

founded on a federation of free states.”2 Today, at the start of

the 21st century, the term Cooperative Security has become

much more fashionable as strategists and policy–makers

struggle to frame a new approach to security for a turbulent

present and an unpredictable future.

In the early 1990s, many strategic thinkers were caught up

in a tide of optimism generally hailed as the New World Order.

The term Cooperative Security became a catch phrase for a

rather idealistic approach to the swiftly changing international

climate. In 1992, three leading American strategists — Ashton

Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner — spoke of

Cooperative Security in terms of providing new avenues

toward world peace: “Organizing principles like deterrence,

nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of

the cold war . . . Cooperative Security is the corresponding

principle for international security in the post–cold war era.”3

In 1994, writing in Foreign Policy, former Australian Foreign

Minister Gareth Evans described Cooperative Security as

tending “. . . to connote consultation rather than confrontation,

reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than

secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and

interdependence rather than unilateralism.”4

These attempts to define and shape the concept of

Cooperative Security generally reflect a liberal/idealistic view

of the future of world security. Unfortunately, this vision has

been rudely jolted by an unwelcome “return of history” in the

Balkans, in parts of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere. 
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

5

It seems to me that a more pragmatic approach to

Cooperative Security is necessary if the concept is to be of real

use in an unstable and dangerous world. In other words, we

must seek a way of “operationalizing” the term. To achieve

this we must narrow our

expectations of what Cooperative

Security can achieve. We need to

build a system based upon

mechanisms and institutions

already in place, i.e., institutions

that have proven themselves

effective in providing relative

peace, stability, and prosperity to

nations and groups of nations in the last half of the 20th

century.

But before we look at how to construct a realistic and

effective approach to Cooperative Security, it might be helpful

to briefly examine two of the other major security concepts

that came into prominence in the 20th century.

Collective Security and Collective Defense

Though the concept of cooperation and alliances between

families, tribes, and states, in peace, but more generally in war,

has been a common feature of the history of mankind, the

terms Collective Security and Collective Defense are

inventions of the last century. Both concepts imply a

long–term, formal commitment between groups of states to

protect the security interests of individual members within

their common spheres.

A pragmatic

approach to

Cooperative

Security is

necessary in an

unstable and

dangerous world
Richard Cohen

6

Collective Security. Collective Security looks inward to

attempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states.

The first modern Collective Security organization was the

League of Nations founded in the aftermath of World War I.

Its members pledged to protect each other from attack by other

nations within that organization. The idea was simple: an act

of aggression by one or more members against another would

be opposed, if necessary by force, by the other member states

of the League. For a variety of reasons, the League of Nations

was ultimately not successful in achieving security and

stability. This was almost certainly due in large part to what

Marshall Center Professor Michael Mihalka has called the

“...fundamental incompatibility of liberal democracy, fascism

and communism...”5 that co–existed within its membership.

At the end of World War II, the newly formed United

Nations (UN) took up the mantle of Collective Security from

the League of Nations. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter

provide for action by member states to preserve and restore

international peace and security.6 In the 1970s, the Conference

on Co–operation and Security in Europe (CSCE), now the

Organization for Co–operation and Security in Europe

(OSCE), was formed to provide Collective Security to

virtually all of the states of the Eurasian–Atlantic region. At

best, however, both of these organizations have been only

partially effective. 

Collective Defense. A Collective Defense organization

looks outward to defend its members from external aggression.

Collective Defense organizations blossomed during the days

of the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

7

(NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Central

Treaty Organization (CENTO), the South East Asia Treaty

Organization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Pact were founded in

the aftermath of World War II. Collective Defense commits all

nations, bound by treaty, to come to each other’s defense in the

event any member is threatened by, or is actually subjected to,

military attack by a state or states outside the treaty area. The

Brussels Treaty of 1948, the founding document of the

Western Union (now the WEU), and the Washington Treaty of

1949, NATO’s founding document, both contain these

provisions as their central theme.

Cooperative Security: Two New Elements

To be both useful and effective, Cooperative Security must

look both ways, inward and outward. But, it also must

incorporate two further dimensions not covered explicitly by

either Collective Security or Collective Defense. The first of

these is the concept of Individual Security and the second is the

Active Promotion and Projection of Stability into areas

adjacent to the Cooperative Security space where instability

and conflict might adversely affect the security of its members. 

Individual Security. Individual Security, or what former

Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, has popularized

as “Human Security”7 stands at the center of any real

international security system built around liberal democratic

ideals. The furtherance and protection of the basic freedoms of

the individual is the nucleus from which all other forms of

security must radiate. Dr. Bill McSweeney, in his investigation

of the meaning of security, makes the telling point that
Richard Cohen

8

“Contrary to the orthodox view of

security studies, security must make

sense at the basic level of the

individual human being for it to

make sense at the international

level.”8

In an age of growing

interconnectivity between states and

peoples, concern about the human condition within a state has

become the direct and immediate interest of the world

community. Violations of human rights in one state become

very quickly known to the citizens of other states. Damage to

the security of individuals in one country, by external or more

often by internal forces, now means that other peoples and

their governments feel that their own security is diminished. 

Recent gross violations of the individual security of large

numbers of human beings in such widely flung countries as

Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor have had a dramatic impact

on the international community. These examples and others

are clear illustrations of what we might call the “globalization

of concern.” Individual Security is now at the heart of the

international agenda. The Westphalian concept of the absolute

right of states to act as they see fit within their own territories

is no longer accepted by liberal democratic states nor,

increasingly, by nations within international organizations

such as the United Nations. The concept of state sovereignty

cannot be a screen behind which mass violations of human

security can take place with impunity, even within otherwise

recognized international boundaries.

Damage to the

security of

individuals in one

country now means

that other

countries may find

their own security

diminished 
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

9

Promoting Stability. The second

new component of Cooperative

Security is the active promotion of

stability outside the boundaries of

the states forming the Cooperative

Security system. Instability in areas

adjacent to the territory of the

Cooperative Security system, or

further afield, that might threaten the security of its members,

will become a matter of serious concern. Stability may be

upset by the danger of conflict between states, but also by

mass violations of individual security within neighboring

states, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in 1998 and

early 1999. This provoked a strong reaction from NATO and

others. How stability can be developed, restored, and

preserved in the world around them should remain the active

concern of the states within the Cooperative Security system.

Here we must sound a word of caution. Promoting Stability

could be seen as a license for unwarranted intervention by

larger powers or international organizations in the legitimate

internal affairs of other, mainly smaller states. Active

intervention — diplomatic, economic, or military — must,

therefore, be very carefully sanctioned and monitored. I will

say more about this below.

The following model, Figure 1 — Cooperative Security:

The Four Rings, is built on a series of widening concentric

circles, or rings. It attempts to bring together the four elements

of Cooperative Security in a practical framework to form a real

and effective security system: 

The states within

the Cooperative

Security system

will remain actively

concerned with the

stability of the

world around them
Richard Cohen

10

Figure 1

Cooperative Security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus

of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or

informal alliances and institutions characterized by shared values and

practical and transparent economic, political, and defense cooperation. In

a Cooperative Security system, individual states’ national security

objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security:

Ring One: Promoting and protecting human rights within their own

boundaries and further afield (Individual Security)

Ring Two: Maintaining peace and stability within their common 

space (Collective Security)

Ring Three: Mutual protection against outside aggression 

(Collective Defense)

Ring Four: Actively promoting stability in other areas where conflict

could threaten their shared security, using political, informational, 

economic, and, if necessary, military means (Promoting Stability)

Promoting Stability

Collective Defense

Collective Security

Individual 

Security

Cooperative Security

The "Four Rings"
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

11

The Four Rings: Explaining the Concept

“Strategic System.” Cooperative Security is described as a

“strategic system,” as it does not easily fit the generally

accepted definition of a “strategy” which has been described as

“the integrated application of means to achieve desired ends.”

The word “system” implies that the concept cannot be fully

realized in the abstract. As we have seen, it must be manifested

in concrete form to achieve its complete potential. Thus, it will

be based on existing or newly created, strong and resilient

institutions.

“Nucleus of Liberal Democratic States.” Cooperative

Security must have at its core a nucleus of liberal democratic

states adhering to common values. There are two points to be

made here. First, there are those who argue that the state itself

has become a less relevant player in the realm of national and

international security and that sub–state and trans–state actors

now play the leading role on the modern security scene. It is

true that non–state organizations, trans–national corporations,

non–governmental organizations (NGOs), pressure groups,

and even international criminal and terrorist groups are

increasingly influential in the security area. There is, however,

in my opinion, no early prospect that a realistic alternative to

the system of sovereign states and the institutions they form

will be replaced as the dominant providers of security to the

citizens of this planet. 

Second, I believe that only liberal democratic states can be

trusted with the protection and

furtherance of human rights in their

widest sense, the core of the

Cooperative Security system. States

that UN Seceretary General Kofi Annan

Human rights are

best protected by

liberal democratic

states
has called “fig leaf democracies,” and clearly, non–democratic

states may work with the member states of the system for

short–term, specific purposes. Several of the countries that

provide contingents to SFOR, in Bosnia, and to KFOR, in

Kosovo, are certainly not liberal democracies. However, they

may make a helpful political and military contribution to the

Cooperative Security system in specific and limited ways. In

the longer term, their own values and perceptions may change

through contact and cooperation with the liberal democracies

within the system.

Because of the ultimate unreliability and fragility of

undemocratic states as allies — for example, Iran, Libya, and

Yugoslavia have all been, at one time or another, helpful to

western interests — it seems abundantly clear that only liberal

democratic states are capable of developing and sustaining the

common objectives, the spirit of compromise, and the

flexibility essential for the long–term maintenance of a

Cooperative Security system. As we have seen, the League of

Nations ultimately foundered on a lack of basic political

compatibility amongst its members.

“Practical and Transparent Cooperation.” Real

Cooperative Security should link states in many ways. They

must be committed to a dialogue amongst themselves,

spanning a whole range of activities and interests. If we accept

that the broader definition of security includes political,

economic, and human rights aspects, then the nations forming

the Cooperative Security system must be linked by all

elements of the web of security. These include: close and

continuing political consultations; free and open trade

relations; and closely aligned foreign and security policies,

including integrated or multi–national military formations.

Most importantly, they must develop mechanisms for

Richard Cohen

12
peacefully and amicably resolving differences between

individual states or groups of states within the system,

including perceived violations of individual security within

one or more of the member states. Recent European Union

(EU) members’ sanctions against Austria, whatever the actual

rights or wrongs of that particular case, were a demonstration

that even the most solid of liberal democracies can come under

close scrutiny and pressure from its peers when its

commitment to individual security and human rights is

brought into question.

“Individual States’ National Security Objectives.” Within

a system of Cooperative Security, individual nations must

sometimes forego or modify pursuit of their own individual

national interests for the sake of the longer–term common

good. They do so because they judge their shared interests to

be ultimately more important to them than their own

short–term concerns. This element is fundamental to the

success of a Cooperative Security system. During the 1999

Kosovo crisis, the Greek government reluctantly went along

with NATO’s decision to bomb the Serbs. It did so because it

rightly perceived the potential long–term damage to NATO

and ultimately to its own security and prosperity of blocking

consensus. Failure to reach agreement within NATO on such a

vital issue would ultimately have done more damage to

Greece’s own national interests than any benefit that might

have been gained in protecting traditional economic, cultural,

or political ties with Serbia.

Ring One: Promoting and Protecting Human Rights.

The essential basic value upon which a Cooperative Security

system rests is an unquestioned conviction by its members to

uphold and maintain the Individual Security of its own citizens

and those of their fellow members. This is the inner ring of the

Cooperative Security system, which will ultimately hold it

Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

13
Richard Cohen

14

together over time under inevitable pressures and stresses,

internal and external. Only the ideals and values of liberal

democracy can keep this vital nucleus together.

Ring Two: Maintaining Peace. This ring of Cooperative

Security embodies the concept of Collective Security, i.e.,

protection from threats and aggression by fellow members of

the Cooperative Security system. Collective Security will also

include close cooperation between members in countering

common threats such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal

immigration, drugs, pollution, and joint planning and actions

in the event of natural or man–made disasters, etc. 

Ring Three: Mutual Protection. An essential feature of a

Cooperative Security organization is that, unlike the UN or the

OSCE, it provides its members with “hard” security. That is, it

promises reliable and credible military protection against

aggression or the threat of aggression from outside the system.

This is the Collective Defense ring of Cooperative Security.

Ring Four: Actively Promoting Stability. Finally, a

Cooperative Security system attempts to prevent and preempt

instability, which will almost certainly include widespread abuse

of human rights, in the area around it. It does so by actively

Promoting Stability through a wide variety of means, including, as

a last resort, the use of force. This is the fourth and outer ring of

Cooperative Security, and arguably its most sensitive element. 

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, in 1999, was an example of

an attempt to restore and then to promote stability in an area

dangerously close to its borders. In Kosovo, massive

violations of individual security were an important factor in

swinging public opinion behind the NATO action. No less

important was the fact that the organized and widespread

persecution of ethnic Albanians by the Yugoslav government

risked destabilizing the region and threatened NATO members

Hungary, Greece, and Turkey, as well as NATO Partners
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

15

Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria. This fear of

destabilization and the spread of conflict were certainly the

determining factors in the decision to use military force once

political, diplomatic, and economic tools proved ineffective.

Institutionalizing Cooperative Security

As we have seen, Cooperative Security must be built around

a strong institutional framework. Figure 2 attempts to match

the current leading international security organizations with

the characteristics of the Cooperative Security system that we

have described above. This chart is based on the perceived

effectiveness of the institution in a particular role, rather than

on its formal organizational commitment to one security role

or another. “Yes?” indicates, at best, only partial effectiveness

in fulfilling a particular role: 

Institutionalizing Cooperative Security

Figure 2

Institution

Ring

One:

Individual

Security 

Ring 

Two:

Collective 

Security 

Ring

Three:

Collective

Defense

Ring

Four:

Promoting

Stability

UN Yes? Yes? No Yes?

OSCE Yes? Yes? No Yes?

EU Yes Yes No Yes?

NATO Yes Yes Yes Yes
Richard Cohen

16

If we agree with this description of

Cooperative Security, then NATO

is, for the moment, the world’s only

working model of a Cooperative

Security system.

NATO — A Practical Example of Cooperative Security

It can be reasonably argued that although the large majority

of NATO’s 19 member states qualify as liberal democracies

and upholders of Individual Security and human rights within

their own borders, the record is not perfect. Some would claim

that the use of the death penalty in the United States puts into

question America’s commitment to human rights. Others will

point to Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish minorities; to the

Czech Republic’s handling of its Roma community; or to

British actions in Northern Ireland. However, in an imperfect

world, most reasonable observers would agree that NATO

members come close to the championing of Individual Security,

which stands at the core of a Cooperative Security system. 

For many years NATO has been held up as a successful

example of a Collective Defense organization. Article 5 of the

Washington Treaty of 1949, NATO’s founding document, put

this role firmly at the center of the Alliance’s core functions.

However, even during the Cold War, the Alliance served as an

unofficial, yet de facto, guarantor of the security of its

individual member states against threats from fellow members. 

Greek–Turkish friction over a variety of issues would

almost certainly have resulted in at least one war between

these states, had they not been firmly embedded within the

North Atlantic Alliance. On more than one occasion, informal,

but intense, bilateral and multilateral consultations within the

NATO Alliance averted a Greek–Turkish conflict. Such a war

would have dealt a severe blow to NATO solidarity and would

certainly have put at risk the long–term future of the Alliance, a

fact not lost on the two protagonists. In a wider context, French,

NATO is currently

the only working

model of

Cooperative

Security
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

17

Danish, Belgian, Dutch, German, Italian, and British

membership of NATO has made armed conflict, historically a

not infrequent occurrence between these states, virtually

unthinkable. More recently, “fishing wars” between NATO

members (between Britain and Iceland, and Canada and Spain)

never risked escalating into armed conflict. In short, the Alliance

has functioned very effectively as a de facto Collective Security

organization throughout much of its 50–year history. 

In the years since the end of the Cold War, NATO has

vigorously pursued the fourth dimension of Cooperative

Security, Promoting Stability, in the states adjacent to the

territory of its members. The Alliance has sought to encourage

and to promote stability both institutionally and practically. The

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and its successor,

the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the

NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the

NATO–Ukraine Joint Commission, and the Mediterranean

Dialogue are examples of the institutional framework that

NATO has put in place to promote stability in the areas beyond

its boundaries.

Crisis Management has become NATO’s operational tool for the

promotion and maintenance of stability in areas on its periphery.

Crisis Management includes Conflict Prevention (active

diplomacy and preventive deployments) and Crisis Response

operations, like Bosnia and Kosovo. Crisis Management was

adopted as a “fundamental security task” in the new NATO

Strategic Concept approved at the Washington summit of April

1999.9 Crisis Management seeks to include NATO partner states

whenever possible. It, together with the NATO enlargement

process, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Weapons of Mass

Destruction (WMD) Initiative, have become major vehicles for

promoting stability outside the traditional NATO area as originally

defined by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. 

NATO, therefore, embodies the description of Cooperative

Security that we describe above. This model depicts the concept:
18Cooperative Security:

A NATO Model

OtherInstitutions

WMDInitiative

MeDi

NA

Enlargement

PfP

CrisisManagement

CrisisResponse

Promoting Stability

Collective Defense

Collective Security Individual

Security

Figure 3
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

19

The Balkans: Cooperative Security on the Firing Line

NATO operations in Southeast Europe are clearly an

important test of Cooperative Security in action. The air

attacks on Yugoslavia, the NATO–led humanitarian missions

in Albania and Macedonia, the KFOR mission in Kosovo, and

the SFOR mission in Bosnia, are part of a coordinated effort to

reestablish stability in this sensitive part of Europe. NATO and

other international institutions have made a long–term

commitment to Balkan stability. If the situations in Bosnia and

in Kosovo can be stabilized, then the NATO model of

Cooperative Security will be enormously strengthened.

Although they were not welcomed by everyone, NATO’s

Operation “Allied Force” in 1999 and the Alliance–led

security and nation–building tasks in Kosovo and Bosnia

might, in the longer term, point the way toward a more hopeful

era in Southeastern Europe and in the wider world.

It is possible, however, that the SFOR/KFOR international

operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and the EU–led Stability

Pact for Southeastern Europe will ultimately fail to bring a

measure of stability and reconciliation to the Balkans. Such a

failure would be the result of a loss of interest and

determination on the part of NATO, the EU, and the

international community to persevere despite the difficulties

and setbacks. If this does happen, the concept of Cooperative

Security will be dealt a severe blow. It will be seen to have

fallen short of the hopes and expectations of its creators. Such

a development would not necessarily invalidate the concept

altogether. But it would mean that the Cooperative Security

model we have discussed had failed to clear the obstacles of

indecisive political leadership, insufficient military

capabilities, and the inevitable compromises inherent in any

cooperative and consensual relationship between states. 
Richard Cohen

20

The European Union and Cooperative Security

As the European Union moves somewhat unsteadily toward

a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), prospects for

extending Cooperative Security in Europe beyond the NATO

space look hopeful. Still, despite the recently announced

“Headline Goals” and the subsequent promised commitment

of forces by EU and non–EU states, European determination to

develop a real defense capability remains to be tested. Are the

Europeans really ready to make the financial and political

sacrifices to give their armed forces the weapons, the

interoperability, the deployability, and the sustainability to

credibly conduct a Kosovo–style operation without

ultimate reliance on American political will and military

power? 

If EU declarations of intent are indeed turned into substance,

a true CFSP will herald, probably unannounced, a de facto

mutual defense arrangement between members of the Union,

including the so–called “neutral” nations of Sweden, Finland,

Austria, and Ireland. The eventual incorporation within the

EU of the Western European Union, along with Article 5 of its

founding document, the Brussels Treaty, would make this

commitment official and legally binding. The EU would then

move into the Third Ring of Cooperative Security, Collective

Defense.

If a capable European Rapid Reaction Force based on a

Common Foreign and Security Policy can be created within a

reasonable time frame, the EU will be able to join NATO in

occupying the Fourth Ring of the Cooperative Security model,
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

21

Promoting Stability outside its

territory. It would then effectively

operate in all four Rings of the

Cooperative Security system.

Assuming that NATO and the EU

can come to satisfactory operational

and institutional arrangements, this

would broaden and strengthen the

Cooperative Security space now occupied only by NATO. In

addition, the parallel enlargements of both the EU and NATO

will further expand the circle of states within the Cooperative

Security system.

The Fourth Ring States

What of the states which presently lie outside both the

NATO and EU areas? Many have expressed their wish to

become members of these organizations, either by taking an

active role as candidates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace as

Membership Action Plan (MAP) members and/or by being on

the EU’s official list of candidates for early accession? Are

these states and those who are not at present moving toward

membership of NATO or the EU excluded from the benefits of

the Cooperative Security system? It seems clear, by virtue of

their active candidacy and/or their increasingly close

cooperation with these institutions, that these states in the

“Fourth Ring” have gained implied, but not guaranteed,

security commitments from the states within the Cooperative

Security space. Even states such as Ukraine, Moldova,

Georgia, and Azerbaijan, that are not yet candidates for

membership of either NATO or the EU, may benefit in security

Parallel

enlargement 

of EU and NATO 

will further 

expand the

Cooperative

Security space
terms from their increasingly close arrangements with these

organizations. They already enjoy the advantages of

cooperation in the fields of joint planning and actions in the

event of natural or man–made disasters.

The Limits of Cooperative Security

. . . if a powerful and enlightened people should form a

republic. . . this would serve as a centre of federal

union for other states in accordance with the idea of

the law of nations. Gradually, through different

unions of this kind, the federation would extend

further and further. 10

– Immanuel Kant

In their 1992 work on Cooperative Security, Carter, Perry,

and Steinbruner foresaw that “The formation of a new security

order requires that cooperative security arrangements be extended

to other forces and potential theaters of military engagement.”11

But how much of the world can a practical and effective

Cooperative Security system cover? What should be the limits of

its ambitions and its interests? These are questions which are not

easy to answer. 

Given that the members of a Cooperative Security system

must be open and democratic with a close commonality of

values and interests, there is clearly a practical limit to the size

of a Cooperative Security organization. There is also the

important question of geography. For otherwise like–minded

Richard Cohen

22
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

23

nations living far apart, the absence of common, geo–strategic

concerns may also limit membership of the system. As an

example, Japan, an open and democratic society with a strong

economy and relatively powerful and well–equipped armed

forces, would not fit easily into a Eurasian–Atlantic

Cooperative Security system. Its core security concerns are too

remote from those of most European states. This, of course,

would not preclude close cooperation and possibly joint action

with such an organization.

It is conceivable, and certainly desirable, that in the longer

term Russia and the other independent states of the former

Soviet Union could become part

of a huge Eurasian–Atlantic

Cooperative Security system. This

vast region of strength, stability,

and harmony, stretching from

Vancouver to Vladivostok, could

result from a gradual drawing

together of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. However, many of

the states on the southern periphery of this area and, indeed,

further afield in Africa, the Middle East, and South and East

Asia, may not share the values and the interests of such a

“western” and “northern” oriented system, nor might they

have any desire to join it. 

In the longer term, the ultimate goal should be a stable and

strong Eurasian–Atlantic Cooperative Security system

incorporating Russia and the other states of the former Soviet

Union. Such an organization might look something like this:

Russia could

become part 

of a huge 

Eurasian–Atlantic

Cooperative

Security system
Richard Cohen

24

Figure 4
Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

25

Conclusion

Cooperative Security, as we have described it, can become

the basis for a more peaceful and harmonious future. It

combines four basic security arrangements: Individual

Security, Collective Security, Collective Defense, and

Promoting Stability in widening rings of security. A

Cooperative Security system requires from the democratic

states that form it a willingness to closely cooperate with each

other and to reach out, if necessary, to intervene in areas

outside their territories that might affect their common peace

and security. 

NATO provides a real–life model for such a Cooperative

Security system. It embodies all four of the basic functions.

The EU is in the process of enlarging this NATO core into a

wider and deeper Euro–Atlantic Cooperative Security space.

Ultimately, this space should be expanded to include other

parts of the Eurasian–Atlantic region, including Russia.

Beyond this region, the breadth of a Eurasian–Atlantic

Cooperative Security is probably limited by virtue of the

non–acceptability to other states of its core values and of its

common geo–strategic interests. 

In the final analysis, the success of any international security

system depends on strong and united leadership, a spirit of

compromise, and a determination of its members to persevere.

This is especially true for an institution as closely knit and

comprehensive as a Cooperative Security system. If these

elements are lacking, the system will fail. It will do so not

necessarily because the concept itself is faulty, but because its
practitioners lack the courage and the wisdom to surmount the

inevitable difficulties and disagreements to see it through to

long–term success. However, if prudent, far–sighted

leadership can overcome these obstacles, a real and practical

manifestation of Cooperative Security may yet bring new hope

to an unsettled world. 

Endnotes

1. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, The Atlantic Charter,

Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, July 14, 1941. The Atlantic Charter was

subsequently incorporated in the Declaration of the United Nations.

2. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 1795, quoted in Classics of Modern

Political Theory: Machiavelli to Mill, ed., Steven M. Cahn,

London/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

3. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New

Concept of Cooperative Security, Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institution Press, 1993.

4. Gareth Evans, “Cooperative Security and Intra–State Conflict,” Foreign

Policy, No. 96, Fall 1994.

5. Michael Mihalka, “Concepts of Cooperative Security,” paper prepared

for the Senior Executive Course, College of International and Security

Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,

Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany: July 1998.

6. Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945.

7. Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Human

Security: Safety for People in a Changing World, Ottawa: Canadian

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April, 1998. 

8. Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, A Sociology of

International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

9. North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington,

DC: April 24, 1999, para. 10.

10. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” 1795. 

Richard Cohen

26
11. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, A New

Concept of Cooperative Security.

Cooperative Security: Individual Security to International Stability

27
— Michael Mihalka is a professor of Eastern Europe Studies at the

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Prior to

his position at the Marshall Center, he was a senior analyst at the

Open Media Research Institute in Prague, Czech Republic. He has

also served as a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa

Monica, California. His teaching positions included the University

of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the University of Texas at Austin, the

RAND Graduate School, and the Private Institute for International

Business Studies (affiliated with Clemson University). In addition

to his work on international relations theory, his research also

covers internal violence and the democratic transition.

28
Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

29

Cooperative Security:

From Theory to Practice

by Michael Mihalka

Executive Summary

Almost all observers believe that cooperative security is

desirable, but few agree on exactly what it means or how best

to achieve it. Thus the goals of this paper are twofold: first, to

provide a theoretical analysis of cooperative security, and then,

to reflect upon the practical results, not merely in Europe and

Eurasia, but also in Southeast Asia. 

Cooperative security may be defined in the following way:

sustained efforts to reduce the risk of war that are not directed

against a specific state or coalition of states. Cooperative

security can only take place when countries develop a sense of

a common future. They begin to realize that unilateral attempts

to increase their security may be doomed to failure because

one state’s actions cause corresponding reactions by another

state, degrading the security of both. This is the so–called

“security dilemma.” The realization that this action–reaction

sequence cannot be avoided has led to the best example of

bilateral cooperative security — the series of arms control

agreements between the United States and Russia.

Early examples of multilateral cooperative security systems

include the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the

United Nations. Since World War II, more and more countries

have adopted cooperative security as a mechanism for

fostering international stability. Their governments believe

that they have much to gain from working with their neighbors
to decrease the likelihood of conflict, as opposed to acting

unilaterally or to forming military alliances. In Western

Europe, cooperative security has become the norm. Its citizens

assume that they will never again go to war against each other.

Consequently, such international organizations as the

European Union (EU) are characterized by increasingly dense

institutionalization of contacts and the continuing

denationalization of security policy. NATO has fostered this

process, adopting a wide range of entirely new missions that

can best be characterized as cooperative security. All of these

trends are bolstered by economic interaction within the region,

mutual respect for the rule of law, and the fact that all of the

West European countries are liberal democracies. 

Outside Western Europe, the nature of cooperative security

is quite different. Here we find two major groupings of states

associated with the term cooperative security: the

Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe

(OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). They differ sharply from the EU and NATO. They

are not bound together by a comparable body of laws, and the

economic relationships within each security community are

much less intense. Perhaps most importantly, many of their

members are not liberal democracies. Yet OSCE and ASEAN

have taken some notable steps to prevent conflict in the

absence of a specific threat. They demonstrate that cooperative

security can at least begin to take shape among states that have

little in common. 

NATO and the EU show that liberal democratic values and

a shared economic system permit much higher levels of

Michael Mihalka

30
cooperative security. The closer the interaction among states

and their citizens, the more they will find ways to further their

security cooperatively. Liberal democracy may not be

necessary for cooperative security to begin or to continue, but

it expands the range of options and benefits for all. 

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

31
32
Cooperative Security: 

From Theory to Practice

Introduction

Traditional concepts of security do not provide adequate

solutions to the current challenges

of intrastate conflict and regional

instability. The major schools of

thought in international relations —

realism and liberalism — reflect an

era when war was considered to be

a legitimate instrument of policy.

Today, many states, especially in

Western Europe, are less concerned

about deterring or defending

against aggression than about

preserving the overall stability of their region. Such countries

have much to gain by working together to decrease the

likelihood of conflict. Their goal has often been called

“cooperative security.”

Unfortunately, many states claim to engage in cooperative

security when, in fact, they mean simple cooperation. But,

their rhetoric does reflect this shift in the primary security

perception of states: a shift away from defending against a

major threat and toward promoting stability. Historically,

many groupings of states have tried to promote stability. Their

experiences foreshadowed current cooperative security efforts.

Today, three groupings of states view themselves as engaged

in cooperative security — the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and

Co–operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

33

Traditional security

concepts do not

provide adequate

solutions to the

current challenges

of intrastate

conflict and

regional instability
The first part of this paper defines cooperative security and

relies heavily on the concepts of the security dilemma and the

prisoner’s dilemma. The second part explains how states and

groupings of states have engaged in cooperative security

according to this definition. The final section addresses the

future of cooperative security.

Defining Security

Since the end of the cold war, there have been so many

definitions to the term security that some scholars have called

it an “essentially contested concept” — i.e., a concept so

value–laden that no amount of argument or evidence could

lead to agreement on its meaning.1 The confusion lies more

with the values and social units that need protecting, than with

the concept itself. Hence, security can be defined as the

freedom to exercise certain values, or, as Arnold Wolfers has

put it, security can be measured as “the absence of threat to

acquired values.”2 The conceptual problem then becomes one

of defining which social units (e.g., individuals, states,

international institutions, and state systems) and values (e.g.,

physical safety, political independence, and economic

well–being) apply.3 Answers to

these questions tend to vary with

respect, among other things, to when

the question is asked and to which

approach is taken to understand

international relations. Thus, after

the cold war, West Europeans turned

from concern about the continued

survival of the state (so–called

“hard” security) to an interest in

economic well–being (“soft”

security). This shift reflects the real

Michael Mihalka

34

After the cold war,

West Europeans

turned from

concern for the

survival of the

state — “hard

security” —

to an interest in

economic

well–being —

“soft security”
decline in the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and

its successor state, Russia.

In this paper, we will focus on the state as the major unit of

analysis and on freedom from coercion as the major value to

be protected. It is common for the literature to deal with

specific states, or groups of states, posing a threat to an

individual state’s security. Concerns about transnational or

environmental threats change that focus and require new

thinking about security. Much of what is written about

cooperative security attempts to address that void. Thus, this

paper’s definition of cooperative security deals with issues

other than traditional threats:

Cooperative security is activity among states to

lessen the likelihood of war, or its

consequences should it occur, that is not

directed at any specific state or group of states.

This definition separates two very distinct spheres of

international relations activity: 1) activity directed at specific

states, or groups of states, perceived to pose a threat to the

peace; and, 2) activity directed to improve the environment

within which states operate. Cooperative security attempts to

deal with the second definition, improving the broader security

environment.

Cooperative security can occur between two states, or

among many. The simplest, and traditionally the most

common, case is one consistent with the neo–realist model of

international relations. Few assumptions need be made about

state behavior. The state is the unit of analysis and tries to

improve its security, often at the expense of others. Under

these circumstances, cooperation is difficult. 

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

35
The Security Dilemma and the Prisoner's Dilemma. As

theorists have de–emphasized the struggle for power in favor

of the pursuit of security as the major motivating factor for

states, they have recognized the “security dilemma.”4 The

security dilemma, in which a state’s actions, meant to increase

the security of its citizens, result in responsive actions on the

part of an adversary — countervailing actions that may

ultimately diminish the security of all. Military preparations

by one country, regardless of its intentions, are perceived to

pose a threat to others. Robert Jervis has said that “the security

dilemma can not only create conflicts and tensions but also

provide the dynamics triggering war.”5 The concept of the

security dilemma is crucial for understanding the trend toward

cooperative and common security in the early 1990s. The

major state–level cause for conflict along the East–West axis

was ideologically defused with Gorbachev’s arrival in the

Soviet Union. The security dilemma, however, remains;

although it may be circumvented through arms control

agreements. 

The prisoner’s dilemma further illustrates the problems that

arise when a state unilaterally improves its own security, and

another state responds in kind, resulting in both states being

less secure than before. As an example, two countries face the

same choice: to arm or not to arm. If one side arms, and the

other does not, then one side gains a unilateral advantage. It is,

therefore, rational for both sides to arm. This logic, however,

leads to resources being diverted from civilian to military

purposes and a general escalation of arms. 

The Prisoner's Dilemma

Michael Mihalka

36

Russia arms Russia does not arm

US arms Arms race US unilateral 

advantage

US does not arm Russia unilateral Arms control

advantage
The prisoner’s dilemma is a recurring international problem. If

it is rational for both sides to arm, what would it take for them

to cooperate instead? The answer lies in the fact that the

prisoner’s dilemma is iterative. Once both sides recognize the

spiraling effect, they have an incentive to cooperate.6 By

negotiating, they can avoid increased military expenditures.

It is a sense of a common future

that leads them to cooperate. A

prime example of this form of

cooperative security is the nuclear

arms negotiations between the

United States and the Soviet Union

— once likened to two scorpions in

a bottle — during the cold war. The iterative prisoner’s

dilemma provides sufficient conceptual underpinnings to

explain cooperative security between pairs of states. We need

to look further to account for cooperative security among

several states.

The Security Community. The notion of a security

community, developed originally by Karl Deutsch, goes a long

way toward accounting for cooperative security among several

states. Deutsch and his colleagues sought to explain the

international community that developed in Western Europe

immediately following World War II (WW II).7 Here, he

identified the evolution of a “pluralistic security community,”

in which states had a shared “expectation of peaceful change.”

States in a pluralistic security community expect other states in

the community not to use or threaten to use military force as a

means of resolving disputes. Such a community develops

through extensive transaction and communication that aid and

abet the consolidation of shared norms and values. This

continued interaction is reinforced by cooperation, which

further develops shared norms, which then creates more

interaction, in a positive feedback loop. 

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

37

It is a sense of a

common future that

leads to

cooperation
Cooperative security is thus one

consequence of a security

community. States within a security

community work together to

address security threats in their

immediate environment. Some of

this action is cooperation in the

traditional sense, such as the formation of the NATO alliance.

But, much of this action, such as the deepening and widening

of the European Community (EC), is not directed at any

specific state threat and thus falls within the domain of

cooperative security.

The interaction inherent to a security community leads to

shared norms. Sustaining the security community also leads to

the development of a common identity. Shared norms and a

common identity increase trust among participating states and

make cooperative security a further norm regulating their

behavior. 

Practical Examples of Cooperative Security

Cooperation between adversaries and potential adversaries

has often occurred. Agreements and conventions not to use

chemical weapons and to limit the use of violence against

civilians have long existed.

However, conventions have sometimes been rudely ignored.

For example, a series of agreements prohibited the use of

chemical weapons. An agreement in Brussels in 1874,

followed by one at the Hague in 1899, outlawed the use of

projectiles filled with poison gases. Nevertheless, the use of

chemical weapons in World War I (WW I) resulted in over

1,300,000 casualties and approximately 100,000 fatalities.8

Michael Mihalka

38

Cooperative

security 

is a consequence

of a security

community
Given the experience of WW I, chemical weapons were

subsequently used largely against the defenseless — the

Italians against the Abyssinians (mustard gas, 1936), or more

recently the Iraqis against the Kurds (hydrogen cyanide and

mustard gas, 1987–88). However, there was a tacit agreement

not to use chemical weapons in WW II — no major WW II

combatants used them. And, the Iraqis did not use chemical

agents against the United Nations (UN) coalition in the 1991

Persian Gulf War, although they had previously used such

weapons against Iran. In both WW II and the Gulf War, the

combatants had a clear sense of a common future that kept

them from employing chemical weapons. Any temporary

advantage conveyed by an initial use would be wiped out by

subsequent retaliation.

Arms control generally provides

fruitful ground for cooperative

security, especially if both sides can

be made to see that the security

dilemma they face puts them into an

iterative prisoner’s dilemma.

Ashton Carter, William Perry, and

John Steinbrunner had the following to say about cooperative

security in a 1993 publication:

The central purpose of cooperative security

arrangements is to prevent war and to do so

primarily by preventing the means for successful

aggression from being assembled, thus also

obviating the need for states so threatened to

make their own counterpreparations. . . .

Cooperative security differs from the traditional

idea of collective security as preventive

medicine differs from acute care.

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

39

Arms control 

generally provides

fruitful ground for

cooperative

security
Focused on restraining the organized

preparations of established militaries,

cooperative security does not address itself

directly to sub–state violence.9 [emphasis added] 

Carter, et al., clearly address the security dilemma when they

argue that military forces must be configured so as not to pose

a threat to their neighbors, thus provoking a response. The

Brookings team thought that although no post–cold war state

was pursuing world domination, the security dilemma could

lead states into competition, when they might prefer

cooperation.

Indeed, virtually every arms control regime can be viewed

as an example of cooperative security. The successive efforts

between the United States and the Soviet Union (and its

successor state — Russia) to manage their common security

space through strategic arms control provides an important

bilateral example. The Nonproliferation Treaty, the

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, etc., illustrate

multilateral efforts. However, such unique, one–off

arrangements are limited and do not necessarily enhance

security in other areas. Therefore, we need to look at

institutionalized efforts at cooperative security.

Institutionalizing Cooperation

Cooperative security arrangements have repeatedly evolved

throughout the last two hundred years, whenever states have

become convinced that they need to improve the conditions

leading to security within their environment. These efforts

range from the Concert of Europe — set up after the end of the

Napoleonic Wars — to the Organization for Security and

Co–operation in Europe. 

Michael Mihalka

40
The Concert of Europe —

Early Cooperative Security.

What came to be called the Concert

of Europe emerged from the Vienna

treaties ending the wars against

Napoleonic France in 1815. The

quadruple alliance of the four victorious powers — Austria,

Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain — agreed to meet on a regular

basis to discuss matters concerning European security. France

joined in 1818. The Concert of Europe is most often referred

to as the mechanism whereby the balance of power was

adjudicated in the 19th century. 

In the decades immediately following the Napoleonic

settlement, the primary concern was countering the liberal

threat fomented by the French revolution. Revolution was seen

as the source of instability in Europe. Revolution infected

France and led to the Napoleonic wars. In the immediate

aftermath of those wars, revolution, and not any one state,

posed the major threat to order and was perceived as a future

threat to dynastic survival. Austrian Chancellor Metternich

believed that intervention and repression were necessary to

eliminate revolution and revolutionary ideas. The Concert

served as the main vehicle for intervention. 

However, the British found the continental enthusiasm for

dynastic intervention unacceptable. British diplomat

Castlereagh argued in the House of Commons that he “could

not recognize the principle that one state was entitle[d] to

interfere with another, because changes might be effected in its

government which the former state disapproved.”10 Only an

immediate threat to vital interests justified state intervention.

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

41

Cooperative

security has

evolved over the

last 200 years 
Disagreement over the Concert’s prevailing conservative

political objectives, as evidenced by the continental powers’

intervention in Spain in 1823, led Britain to withdraw from the

Concert. Britain did not share the conservative, indeed

reactionary, values of its erstwhile Continental allies, and

could not accept anti–liberal interventions as legitimate.

Even so, some British

authorities had kind words for the

Concert of Europe at the end of the

19th century. During the Armenian

and Cretan crises of 1897, Britain’s

Lord Salisbury recognized the

Concert of Europe as the “inchoate

federation of Europe” — a federation with the capability of

becoming an international organization.11 It was, in effect, the

first real effort at cooperative security.

The League of Nations — Failure to Achieve Collective

Security. The League of Nations is best remembered for

failing to prevent World War II, but deserves better press for its

actual accomplishments, especially its efforts to manage

conflicts among its members. The League accomplished

important innovations. Premier among them was the

agreement to consider an act of war against one member state

to be an act of war against all. The term “collective security”

derived from this form of security agreement. Members

consulted on military matters, but were required to

immediately engage in financial and economic sanctions.

Second among the League’s important innovations was the

institutionalization of agreements. They were accomplished in

an Assembly, consisting of the member states; a Council,

comprising the victorious powers at the Versailles Conference;

and four additional states, drawn from the Assembly. Third,

Michael Mihalka

42

The Concert of

Europe was the

first real effort at

cooperative

security
the League assumed responsibility for adjudicating disputes

among its members. Fourth, the League assumed

responsibility for overseeing the political development of

certain territories and colonies of the defeated countries.

The League’s ineffective handling of Germany in the 1930s

followed failures to act against Japan over its invasion of

Manchuria and against Italy over its invasion of Ethiopia.

Agreement was not possible. Failure to act effectively against

Italy merely confirmed the League’s inability to deal with

disputes raised by major powers. 

The League failed in part because it lacked sufficient

legitimacy among the major powers. After World War I, only

two of the six major powers — Britain and France —

supported League principles and practices, among them the

post–war territorial status quo. The United States Senate

prevented the United States from joining. Bolshevik Russia

and Germany were specifically excluded at first. Italy was

severely disaffected, not having gained the territories it

deemed it deserved due to its switch of allegiances during the

war. Italy continued to undermine League principles, first by

its intervention in Corfu in 1923, and then later by its invasion

of Ethiopia. Germany finally joined in 1926, but quickly

exited when the National Socialists came to power in 1933.

Russia joined in 1934. 

Clearly betraying his liberal instincts, Wilson rejected

membership of autocratic governments. Non–democratic

countries had to adopt democratic forms of government to gain

membership. Restricting membership ran counter to the idea

that the more universal a collective security system was, the

more effective it would be. Yet, if liberal theorists are right,

Wilson’s instincts were correct. Only liberal states would live

up to their obligations. 

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

43
In the final analysis, the League of Nations failed because it

was unable to develop a security community. Its members did

not share values. There was no agreement on how European

countries should organize themselves politically. France and

Britain wanted to retain their parliamentary democracies. Italy

quickly opted for fascism, and

Russia for Bolshevism. Germany

failed at parliamentary democracy

before finally following Italy into

fascism in the 1930s. Japan became

a military corporatist state.

Territorially, France and Britain

wanted to maintain the status quo.

Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan did not. The

League’s collective security system presumed a global security

community — a group of states with a clear common identity.

The League failed because it could not develop that identity.

The United Nations — Collective Security and

Cooperative Security. The United Nations, like the League

before it, is a collective security system, but was designed to

correct the perceived major shortcomings of its predecessors.

The United Nations, unlike the League, has universal

membership. The UN requires a consensus among the five

major powers that are permanent members of the Security

Council, with only majority consent from the entire council.

The League required unanimity. United Nations enforcement

actions are guaranteed if the permanent members agree. Not

surprisingly, UN collective security operations have only

occurred twice.

Michael Mihalka

44

The League’s

collective security

system failed 

when it did not

develop a

global security

community 
The United Nations has predictably, given the conflicting

values of member countries, been largely ineffective as a

collective security system. Agreement is rare when the

interests of Security Council permanent members’ conflict.

The two collective security operations that have been

“successful” illustrate the need for common interests and

values.

The United Nations effectively acted against North Korea in

1950, but only because the Soviet Union boycotted the

Council sessions. At that time the permanent members

included the United States, the United Kingdom, France,

Nationalist China, and the Soviet Union. The end of the cold

war made possible the second successful UN cooperative

security operation, against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

At this time, the Soviet Union, soon to be Russia, expressed a

desire to join the Western community of nations and did not

block action against Iraq, its former client.

There was no UN enforcement action against Serbia over

Kosovo in 1999. The inevitable vetoes of both Russia and

China kept the issue from even coming to a Security Council

vote. NATO proceeded, arguing the requirement for urgent

humanitarian intervention. Some felt that the UN Security

Council lacked the legitimacy to authorize humanitarian

intervention because it was not a coalition of liberal

democratic states. Russia and China opposed the action, in part

because an intervention in Serbian internal affairs would

establish a difficult precedent for their own domestic

situations — Chechnya in the case of Russia, Tibet for China.

Nevertheless, the United Nations has engaged in a number

of peacekeeping operations that many would consider

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

45
cooperative security efforts. The

UN authorized the peacekeeping

operations in Bosnia and Kosovo

(operations not funded by the

United Nations, and, therefore, not

strictly UN operations) and Russia

participates in both. Moreover,

many countries that take part in

these “UN peacekeeping

operations” do so for reasons other

than a simple commitment to the furthering of peace — they

participate for economic reasons, as they profit from renting

their troops to the UN. 

The League of Nations and the Concert of Europe suggest

that security communities and, hence, cooperative security are

indeed possible among states that are not liberal democracies,

but that such security communities may be unstable. The

Concert of Europe did achieve routinized cooperation and a

form of cooperative security. Its members shared the common

ideology and purpose of the suppression of liberalism. As

some of the states participating in the Concert saw the major

problems in international relations differently, the Concert

broke down.

The failure of the League of Nations revealed the need for

liberal democratic states as the basis for a security community.

It would appear that Wilson’s instinct that League members

should be liberal democratic states was essentially correct.

The League’s problems were with its non–democratic

members. The League was able to accommodate a fascist

Italy, but not a fascist Germany. Once Germany turned fascist

and left the League, the League was no longer viable.

Michael Mihalka

46

The United Nations

has engaged in a

number of

peacekeeping

operations that

many would

consider

cooperative

security efforts
The United Nations provides a different cooperative

security lesson. Much of what the United Nations does is

cooperative security, although the term is rarely used. The United

Nations does not comprise a security community — several wars

have occurred between its members. Nevertheless, many

member countries have participated in UN multilateral

peacekeeping operations. Most importantly, major collective

security enforcement actions have only occurred when the

non–democratic members of the UN Security Council were

either absent or willing to defer to their liberal democratic

counterparts.

Western Europe — The Prototypical Security Community.

The integration of Western Europe after World War II focused

on the creation of security communities, particularly on the

development of the European Community, now called the

European Union (EU). Karl Deutsch has pointed out that in

stark contrast to the interwar period, West European states no

longer planned for war against each other and, thus, had begun

to form a security community.12 Indeed, the founders of the

European Community made a conscious effort to build a

security community in Western Europe by furthering a

collective identity. Jean Monnet, one of the EC’s architects,

wrote in 1944:

There will be no peace in Europe if states

re–establish themselves on the basis of national

sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of

prestige policies and economic protectionism.

If the countries once more protect themselves

against each other, it will once more be

necessary to build up vast armies . . . Europe

will be reborn yet again under the shadow of

fear.13

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

47
The EC’s precursor, the European Coal and Steel Commission

(ECSC), was proposed by Robert Schuman in May 1950.

British Member of Parliament, and sometime Prime Minister,

Harold Macmillan said: 

To the great majority of Europeans, by far the

most significant aspect of M. Schuman’s

initiative is the political. It is not, in its

essentials, a purely economic or industrial

conception; it is a grand design for a new

Europe; it is not just a piece of convenient

machinery; it is a revolutionary, almost

mystical, conception.14

The Schuman Declaration setting up the European Coal and

Steel Community is worth quoting at length:

The solidarity in production thus established

will make it plain that any war between France

and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable,

but materially impossible. The setting up of this

powerful productive unit, open to all countries

willing to take part and bound ultimately to

provide all the member countries with the basic

elements of industrial production on the same

terms, will lay a true foundation for their

economic unification.

This production will be offered to the world as

a whole without distinction or exception, with

the aim of contributing to raising living

standards and to promoting peaceful

achievements. In this way, there will be

realized simply and speedily that fusion of

Michael Mihalka

48
interest which is indispensable to the

establishment of a common economic system;

it may be the leaven from which may grow a

wider and deeper community between

countries long opposed to one another by

sanguinary divisions.

By pooling basic production and by instituting

a new High Authority, whose decisions will

bind France, Germany and other member

countries, this proposal will lead to the

realization of the first concrete foundation of a

European federation indispensable to the

preservation of peace.15

In a speech given in 1999, Polish Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek

quoted Schuman: “Europe has to shape its own soul. Europe

again has to become a direction for mankind. Europe is not

against anything or anyone. United Europe is a symbol of

all–embracing solidarity for the future.”16 The ECSC provided

the material basis — cooperation in coal and steel — for a

security community to develop in Europe and thus

increasingly for more cooperative security among members of

the EC and later the European Union.

The end of the cold war proved to be one of the larger tests

for the European Union. Some feared that the United States

would withdraw from Europe and that West Europeans would

“renationalize” their security policies. Some Germans feared

that their now reunited country would set off again on its

Sonderweg, i.e., its special path. Some of Germany’s

neighbors, in turn, were slow to endorse reunification. Yet,

Germany remained on the European path.

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

49
In the waning years of the Bush presidency, the United

States did in fact lose interest in Europe and conceded to the

West Europeans the leading role in the 1991 Yugoslav conflict.

Flush with enthusiasm after embarking on the Maastricht

treaty negotiations, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Poos

proclaimed the “hour of Europe.” Wishful thinking led the EU

to believe that the Yugoslav conflict could not be resolved

through military means. They were wrong.

The European Union’s intention is to remain a liberal

democratic security community. Applicants must meet the

EU’s three major membership criteria: progress toward

becoming a liberal democracy; progress toward engaging a

market economy; and progress toward adopting the EU’s

common law, the acquis communitaire. Thus, a country needs

to be a relatively mature liberal democracy before it can join.

A “re–nationalization” of security policy has not occurred

and the European Union has made slow, but halting, progress

toward coordinating respective national security policies.

Several members of the European Union have participated in

the Eurocorps, which now has assumed responsibility for the

overall Kosovo mission. The European Union displays almost

all of the characteristics of a mature security community with

cooperative security as the norm.

NATO — From Collective Defense to Cooperative Security.

Many of the same analysts who thought that the European

Union would “renationalize” its security policy after the end of

the cold war, also believed that NATO would disappear once

its “main threat,” the Warsaw Pact, collapsed. These analysts

were entrenched in the realist tradition and did not reckon with

Michael Mihalka

50
the common transatlantic identity developed among the

Alliance members.

Robert De Wijk, a senior advisor to the Dutch government,

argues that “NATO’s task as a collective defense organization

has been completed, because the threat from the East no longer

exists. NATO must change into an ‘organization for

cooperative security’ that draws its right to exist above all from

carrying out military operations aimed at conflict management

and humanitarian aid.” De Wijk realizes that obtaining

political support among the member states for this new

orientation would be very difficult. But, he says: “If you regard

NATO as a classic defense alliance, then it can be closed

down. After all the objectives have been reached.” In fact, he

argues that NATO should be folded into the OSCE.17

NATO, of course, was never simply a classic defense

alliance, but its political component was obscured during the

cold war. After the cold war, NATO launched several

Partnership for Peace (PfP) program initiatives and throughout

the 1990s expanded on them. The PfP program is not simply a

waiting room for those countries wishing to join NATO. Many

of the former so–called neutrals — Ireland, Finland, Sweden,

Austria, and Switzerland — have used the PfP to promote their

own security cooperatively.

For example, Ireland, having participated in the

UN–mandated (but not operated) peacekeeping operations in

Bosnia and Kosovo, wanted to institutionalize its relationship

with NATO — the United Nations designee as the regional

organization responsible. The Irish government requested its

parliament’s approval to apply for PfP membership and in so

doing defined the PfP as: “a voluntary, non–binding and

cooperative security framework of cooperation between NATO

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

51
and non–members of NATO that has evolved into a major

framework for cooperation, training and preparation for UN

peacekeeping, humanitarian tasks and crisis management.”18

NATO has launched other efforts to promote cooperative

security, including its special relationship with Ukraine and the

Founding Act with Russia. Particularly notable is that even the

preamble to the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act connects

democracy, that is the promotion of internal liberal democratic

values, with cooperative security:

The Russian Federation, on the one hand, and

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its

member States, on the other, hereinafter

referred to as Russia and NATO, based on an

enduring political commitment undertaken at

the highest political level, will build together a

lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro–Atlantic

area on the principles of democracy and

cooperative security. [emphasis added]

NATO has also asserted its promotion of cooperative security

in Europe. The final communiqué from its December 1997

Brussels ministerial asserts:

As Foreign Ministers, we attach particular

importance to the far–reaching, positive

political developments, which have occurred

since 1991 in the security landscape in Europe

and to new cooperative security structures,

which are being built throughout the

Euro–Atlantic region.

We reaffirm our commitment to further

strengthening the OSCE as a primary

Michael Mihalka

52
instrument for early warning, conflict

prevention, crisis management and

post–conflict rehabilitation as well as for

enhancing cooperative security and advancing

democracy and human rights. NATO

enlargement is linked to and part of a

comprehensive process which comprises the

following elements: broad cooperation with

Partners within the Euro–Atlantic Partnership

Council and the enhanced Partnership for Peace

Programme; a strong, stable and enduring

partnership with Russia based on the Founding

Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and

Security between NATO and the Russian

Federation, signed in Paris on 27th May 1997;

a distinctive Partnership with Ukraine, which

was founded by means of the Charter, signed in

Madrid on 9th July 1997; and an enhanced

Mediterranean Dialogue. All these elements

contribute to establishing the foundation of a

Euro–Atlantic area characterized by

cooperative security and reliable stability, and

are supplemented by the work of the OSCE

(Organization for Security and Co–operation in

Europe), in particular on a ‘Common and

Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st

Century’ in accordance with the decision of the

OSCE Lisbon Summit in 1996. [emphasis added]

Expanding on the theme of cooperative security, NATO

Secretary–General Javier Solana identified the,

. . . various elements of a comprehensive

approach to cooperative security as a

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

53
wide–ranging and continually deepening

programme of military and defence–related

practical cooperation through the Partnership

for Peace; the establishment of a new forum —

the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council — to

provide for regular, intensified political

consultations with all Partners on a wide range

of security issues, from peace support to policy

planning; new and dynamic partnerships with

Russia and Ukraine; and the process of opening

NATO to new members.

Solana views the Partnership for Peace program as the

“flagship” of NATO’s program for cooperation. He also

stresses the importance of NATO enlargement in furthering

cooperative security:

An enlarged NATO gives us better means —

and, indeed, greater incentives — for Partners

wishing to join NATO to deepen their ties with

the Alliance as well as with other Partners. The

prospect of NATO membership has already

proven it to be an important instigator of

domestic reform and improved bilateral

relations among countries of Central and

Eastern Europe. And that cannot but contribute

to building cooperative security.

Solana argues that NATO has redefined itself based on a

definition of security that sharply contrasts with one used

during the cold war:

In broadening our concept of security, in taking

on new roles and missions, in carrying out wide

Michael Mihalka

54
adaptation, the NATO of today is no longer

about defending against large–scale attack. It is

about building security within societies,

creating the conditions of stability in which

respect for human rights, consolidation of

democratic reforms and economic patterns of

trade and investment can flourish. . . . In short,

it is about a new cooperative security order for

the Euro–Atlantic region.19

He is not alone in seeing a fundamental change in the

security basis for Europe. Jozef Sestak, State Secretary at the

Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foresees a Europe divided

into two security systems: one, a collective security system

based on a NATO core; and, the other, a cooperative security

system made up of broader NATO cooperative programs, such

as the Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the OSCE,

and the Western European Union (WEU).20 Solana and others

seem to be moving away from a state–centric view of security

to an individual–based definition of security favored by

liberals. NATO had become a cooperative security system long

before Solana used the term to describe NATO activities.

These efforts at promoting liberal order in Europe were a

necessary precursor for the

interventions in Bosnia and

Kosovo.

NATO’s humanitarian intervention

in Kosovo represents a cooperative

security enforcement action. NATO

acted without a UN mandate. This

occurred in part because the norm

for action did not exist at the UN Security Council, while it did

exist among NATO members. Another indication that NATO

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

55

NATO’s

humanitarian

intervention in

Kosovo represents

a cooperative

security

enforcement action
serves as a security community is the failure of repeated and

considerable tensions between Turkey and Greece to lead to

war. 

OSCE — A Venue for Cooperative Security? The

Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe differs

from NATO and the EU. OSCE members do not form a security

community and do not hold common values — despite the

official adherence to the Helsinki Principles. The OSCE region

extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok and is quite diverse,

providing little basis for a common identity. Nevertheless,

despite what appears to be infertile ground, many view the

OSCE as the quintessential cooperative security example. The

OSCE Handbook lists its priorities as follows:

– to consolidate the participating State’s common 

values and help in building fully democratic 

civil societies based on the rule of law;

– to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and 

bring peace to war torn areas;

– to overcome real and perceived security deficits 

and to avoid the creation of new political, 

economic, or social divisions by promoting 

a co–operative system of security.

The Handbook itself is rife with cooperative security

references: 

The comprehensive nature of security in the

OSCE context is closely related to the

Organization’s co–operative approach to

solving problems. Starting from the premise

that security is indivisible, participating States

have a common stake in the security of Europe

Michael Mihalka

56
and should therefore co–operate to prevent

crises from happening and/or to reduce the risk

of already existing crises getting worse. The

underlying assumption is that co–operation can

bring benefits to all participating States, while

insecurity in one State or region can affect the

well–being of all. The key is to work together,

achieving security together with others, not

against them.

‘We are determined to learn from the tragedies

of the past and to translate our vision of a

co–operative future into reality by creating a

common security space free of dividing lines in

which all States are equal partners. We face

serious challenges, but we face them together.’

— Lisbon Declaration on a Common and

Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for

the Twenty–first century, December 1996. 21

OSCE’s drive for cooperative security appears most clearly

in the efforts to further politico–military security. Guidelines

such as the OSCE’s Charter on European Security or the Code

of Conduct on politico–military aspects promote the notion

that security should be accomplished jointly without any one

state achieving an advantage. Some analysts suggest that these

agreements have no teeth, given that states would not be

sanctioned if they did not honor them.

All the OSCE does is cooperative security, in that it is a

consensus–based organization. However, the OSCE should

also be viewed as a norm–setting agency. States, and even

other international organizations, are free to participate as they

see fit. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999, a

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

57
“Platform for Co–operative

Security” was embedded within the

Charter for European Security. The

platform offers the OSCE as a

coordinating framework for

international organizations and for

states wishing to work in a

sub–regional context. The OSCE is

more like a bazaar than a factory —

states and international organizations can pick and choose how

they wish to cooperate.

Despite these strengths, the OSCE does not meet all of the

criteria for a security community. Some OSCE members have

recently been at war with each other and plan for such

contingencies in the future. The OSCE’s strength lies in

providing an opportunity for states to cooperate, if and when

they wish, setting regional benchmark norms. Nevertheless, it

is no accident that those states that most frequently exploit the

OSCE capabilities come from the western end of the Eurasian

land mass. European countries merely proceed to cooperate on

security matters based on existing memberships in institutions

that are a part of the OSCE.

ASEAN — Limited Cooperative Security Without

Democracy. The Association for South East Asian Nations

does not seem particularly fertile ground for developing a

security community or promoting cooperative security.

Arguably, none of its member countries is a mature liberal

democracy. ASEAN member states do not have common

forms of governments, and, in fact, have very little in common

with each other, prompting one observer to distinguish them as

a “chaos of cultures.”22 Nevertheless, no war has occurred

Michael Mihalka

58

OSCE is more like

a bazaar than a

factory — states

and international

organizations can

pick and choose

how they wish to

cooperate
between these states since 1964. The ability of the countries

within this region to deal with their security problems

constructively and cooperatively reflects the continued

commitment of their respective elites. 

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand formed ASEAN in 1967 as a forum for regional

cooperation, mindful of the recent regional conflict.

Indonesia’s failed policy of confrontation with Malaysia and

Singapore, resulting in Sukarno’s 1965 fall, allowed regional

politics to be put on a more cooperative footing. Its neighbors

conceivably wanted to lock Indonesia into the ASEAN

cooperative security structure, just as France wanted to bind

Germany into European cooperation after World War II. The

United States exit from the region in 1974, with the end of the

Vietnam War, raised fears of Vietnamese aggression. The first

ASEAN summit took place in 1976. Brunei joined ASEAN in

1984; Vietnam joined in 1995. Laos and Myanmar followed in

1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

The norms that bind countries in this region appeared in the

1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: 

a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, 

equality, territorial integrity and national identity 

of all nations;

b. The right of every State to lead its national 

existence free from external interference, 

subversion or coercion;

c. Non–interference in the internal affairs of one 

another;

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by 

peaceful means; 

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

f. Effective cooperation among themselves. 

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

59
One scholar, Amitav Acharya, argues that the original

members of ASEAN diverged considerably in their

perceptions of external threat. However, all agreed that

internal insurgency, in particular communist–backed internal

insurgency, posed the major threat.23 ASEAN members

realized that interstate war would only exacerbate the political,

ideological, and economic conditions feeding these internal

conflicts. Cross–border cooperation was required to contain, if

not defeat, insurgent groups. 

Archarya also argues that “the practice of multilateralism,

the ASEAN norms, the ‘ASEAN Way,’ and principle of

regional autonomy constitute the basis of ASEAN’s collective

identity.”24 The term “ASEAN Way” refers to the perception

that regional disputes should be solved by consensus, outside

of formal mechanisms. In essence, disputes should be solved

“among friends” and not by outsiders — an approach to

conflict management that promotes ASEAN’s regional

autonomy.

ASEAN’s sense of collective identity has been maintained

through its relatively exclusive membership. Remaining

largely within Southeast Asia,

ASEAN has deflected the desires of

countries such as Sri Lanka to join. 

ASEAN, thus, contrasts sharply

with Western Europe as a security

community. ASEAN governments

are either quasi–authoritarian or

transitional democracies, not

consolidated liberal democracies.

The economic material basis for

regional cooperation is quite small.

Michael Mihalka

60

ASEAN is a

security

community

because its

members, national

political elites,

have chosen

cooperation over

competition to

accomplish

regional security
Intraregional exports represent only a third of all exports, a

figure consistent with the export–driven growth strategy of

their economies. Institutionalism is quite limited — there are

no supranational organizations in ASEAN and nothing to

compare with the EU’s acquis communitaire. Nevertheless,

ASEAN has become a security community largely through its

national, political elites’ efforts to avoid competition and to

choose cooperation as a means for assuring regional security.

The ASEAN states have, in fact, made material steps toward

cementing their relationship. In 1992, ASEAN agreed to

establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) committed to

the gradual lowering of tariffs by 2008. This date was

subsequently moved forward to 2002. Trade between ASEAN

countries grew from $44.2 billion in 1993 to $73.4 billion in

1998.25 Before the 1997 financial crisis, intra–regional trade

had an annual growth rate of 30%, compared to 19% for

external trade. However, in the aftermath of the 1997 financial

crisis, intra–regional trade contracted much more sharply than

external trade. Attempts to extend AFTA to include New

Zealand and Australia have met strong resistance.

The lack of strong, underlying, common values sharply

limits ASEAN’s effectiveness. No war has broken out among

its members. It has brought into its fold former threats such as

Vietnam. Yet, ASEAN has not developed a common position

on such regional threats to stability as the situation in East

Timor. Indonesia invaded East Timor, a former Portuguese

colony, in 1975 and annexed it in 1976. The United Nations

never recognized this annexation. On August 30, 1999, East

Timor voted for independence. Anti–independence militias

perpetrated a blood bath, destroying East Timor’s

infrastructure, displacing 600,000 of its original 850,000

population, and convincing Australia to lead a multinational

peacekeeping mission into East Timor. The second largest

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

61
contingent, 1,500 troops (to Australia’s 4,500), came from an

ASEAN member, Thailand. The Philippines also sent troops.

ASEAN clearly failed to develop a coherent East Timor

policy, particularly because one of its founding members,

Indonesia, considered East Timor to be an internal matter.

ASEAN’s failure to form a cohesive policy contrasts sharply

with the readiness of NATO to act in Kosovo.

Nevertheless, several commentators see a growing

convergence of values among the ASEAN states. A

development of common values bodes well for future

cooperative security. In particular, ASEAN Secretary–General

Rodolfo Severino said in his keynote address at the ninth

annual conference of the Harvard Project for Asian and

International Relations in Beijing on August 29, 2000:

Political diversity is inevitable, necessary, and

even desirable. But in the light of globalization

and regional economic integration, in the face

of global competition for markets and

investments, some political convergence will

have to take place, within Southeast Asia and

elsewhere, and it will likely be in the direction

of greater openness, greater freedom, and

greater pluralism. It will proceed at different

paces, and political diversity will remain. But

the direction is emerging into view.

Globalization and the technological revolution

will also have a significant impact on the

diversity and convergence of cultures.26

The Future of Cooperative Security

The success of cooperative security hinges upon several

factors. Above all, it requires the belief that certain countries

Michael Mihalka

62
share a common future, and that

cooperation offers the best possible

means of achieving their national

interests. Historically, the

perception of a common threat was

the most frequent, as well as the most

effective, basis for establishing a

security system. This was surely the

case for the Concert of Europe,

NATO, the EC/EU, and ASEAN. 

Because national elites were willing to work together in the

face of a common threat, they developed a common identity

that transcended national borders and intensified their sense of

a common purpose. Once formed, that new identity can be

quite tenacious, permitting security arrangements to outlive

the threats that first brought them together. Just as the Concert

of Europe long outlasted the danger of another French

revolution, so NATO and the EU have transformed themselves

since the fall of communism and the full integration of

Germany into Europe. 

Today, the threats to Europe are increasingly transnational

phenomenas. They include corruption, organized crime,

migration, epidemic diseases, environmental catastrophes, and

terrorism. Such complex problems can only be overcome by

united action across national frontiers. To the extent that

threatened states work together, they gain a critical awareness

of their common future, and we can expect cooperative

security to become the norm.

In Western Europe and North America, cooperative security

has become a way of life that is steadily moving to the east and

the southeast. The security communities of these regions draw

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

63

Cooperative

security requires a

belief in a common

future and that

cooperation offers

the best possible

means of achieving

national interests
their unusual strength from one main factor: they consist of

consolidated, liberal democratic states. As security

communities, both NATO and — even more so — the EU have

developed dense networks of multilateral institutions that

foster the denationalization of security policy and serve the

needs of entire regions. It is no accident that NATO and the EU

both promote liberal democracy. They do so because they

believe, in part, that security is better assured cooperatively

among countries that have adopted the liberal democratic form

of government. 

Interdependence leads to a common identity — especially

economic interdependence. The fact that Central and Eastern

European countries seek validation of their European identity

through EU membership, while several countries find it

important to actively reject their Balkan identity, is indicative

of this strong need for an economically protective common

identity. 

At the same time, a need for multilateral approaches to

security builds toward cooperative security. This is especially

true among small countries that need to pool resources. The

Baltic countries provide a good example, and recent efforts

made in Southeastern Europe are promising. Consensual

decision practices often aid this multilateral security approach

to establishing a common identity, and hence the felt need for

cooperative security. ASEAN countries share only two

common factors: a geographical propinquity and a belief in a

common future, but it has succeeded as a cooperative security

unit.

Cooperative security has been increasingly adopted as a

mechanism for furthering national security. As the prisoner’s

dilemma illustrates, countries will behave individually in a

Michael Mihalka

64
rational manner, but in so doing will act against their own

long–term interests. Relying on self–help and old–style

balancing behavior has given way to cooperative efforts to

promote stability. Even among states that lack common values,

cooperative security is possible. ASEAN is an important

practical example. Cooperative security has been approached

on a case–by–case basis, but since the end of World War II

several security communities have developed — most notably

in Western Europe.

The EU in contrast with ASEAN, gives credence to the fact

that common values and a common economic destiny leads to

more cooperative security. The more dense the interaction

among states and their citizens, the more they will find ways

to further their security cooperatively. It is the EU members of

the OSCE who take the organization most seriously as a venue

for cooperative security. Should they wish, non–democratic

OSCE members can participate in the OSCE’s cooperative

opportunities. However, it is clear that those members of the

OSCE already united by the common values of liberal

democracy best use the organization. Liberal democracy may

not be necessary for cooperative security to begin or to

continue, but it expands the range of options and benefits for all.

Since military force used

unilaterally has become largely

discredited as an instrument of

policy, countries will band together

to use force collectively to further

security in their immediate

neighborhood. Moreover they will

take other steps, economic and

otherwise, to improve their security environment to lessen the

likelihood that new threats will arise. Older traditional

concepts of security have proved inadequate to deal with these

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

65

Modern security

challenges lead

inexorably to the

increasing use of

cooperative

security
issues. The nature of modern security challenges leads

inexorably to the increasing use of cooperative security. 

Endnotes

1. David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International

Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, January 1997, pp. 3-26. 

2. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol,”

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4, December 1952, p. 485.

3. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security.” 

4. Charles Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, 

Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1977, pp. 171–201.

5. As cited in Andrew Butfoy, Common Security and Strategic Reform: A

Critical Analysis, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

6. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books,

1984.

7. Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

8. The French first used gas in grenades in 1914. The Germans followed by

carrying out the first large–scale chemical attack on April 22, 1915 at

Ypres, Belgium. Chlorine gas was released from gas cylinders along six

kilometers of the front line. The Germans claimed that they did not violate

the 1899 agreement because they did not use projectiles.

9. Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D.Steinbrunner, A New

Concept of Cooperative Security, Washington, DC: The Brookings

Institution Press, 1993.

10. Carsten Holbrad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and British

International Theory, New York: Longman, 1970, p. 124.

11. Holbrad, The Concert of Europe, p. 7.

12. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.

13. Quoted in Ole Waever, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West

European Non–War Community,” in Emmanuel Adler and Michael

Barnett, eds., Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1998, p. 83.

14. Statement by Harold Macmillan, British MP, quoted at:

http://www.liv-coll.ac.uk/europetrip/Europe%20journey/schuman.htm;

accessed December 2000.

Michael Mihalka

66
15. The Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950; available online at

http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/declaration.html; accessed

December 2000.

16. Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Jerzy Buzek, “Priorities of the

Polish Foreign Policy,” speech at the Paaskivi Society, Helsinki, November 4,

1999; available online at http://polcon.tripod.com/buzek.html; accessed

December 2000.

17. Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad, June 26, 1997. Translation by Foreign

Broadcasting Information Service, FBIS–WEU–97–177.

18. Irish Department of Foreign Affairs Press Release, October 13, 1999;

available online at http://www.irelandemb.org/press/46.html; accessed

December 2000.

19. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, “NATO's Role in Building

Cooperative Security in Europe and Beyond,” speech at the Yomiuri

Symposium on International Economy, Tokyo, Japan, October 15, 1997.

20. Jozewf Sestak, State Secretary at the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

“Harbingers of Gloom Will Not Help,” interview by Leopold Moravcik,

Bratislava Pravda, July 18, 1997.

21. Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe

(OSCE) Handbook, Prague: 2000, p. 17–18; available online at

http://www.osce.org/publications/handbook/index.htm; accessed January

2001.

22. Amitav Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in

Southeast Asia,” in Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities, p. 203.

23. Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast

Asia,” p. 203.

24. Acharya, “Collective Identity and Conflict Management in Southeast

Asia,” p. 213.

25. ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA): An Update, November 1999; available

online at http://www.asean.or.id/general/publication/afta-upd.htm;

accessed September 2000.

26. ASEAN Web Site, http://www.asean.or.id/; accessed September 2000.

Cooperative Security: From Theory to Practice

67
Acronyms

ASEAN – Association for South East Asian Nations

CENTO – Central Treaty Organization

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)

CSCE – Conference on Co–operation and Security in Europe

EAPC – Euro–Atlantic Partnership Council

EC – European Community

ECSC – European Coal and Steel Commission

EU – European Union

MAP – Membership Action Plan (PfP)

NACC – North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – Non–governmental Organization

OSCE – Organization for Co–operation and Security in Europe

PJC – NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council

PfP – Partnership for Peace

SEATO – South East Asia Treaty Organization

UN – United Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WEU – Western European Union

WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTO – World Trade Organization
CThe George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies

Dr. Robert Kennedy

Director

MG (Ret.) Michael J. McCarthy, USAF

Deputy Director

MG (Ret.) Franz Werner, GE

Deputy Director

Ambassador Victor Jackovich

Associate Director for International Affairs

College of International and Security Studies

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Dean

Dr. G. Paul Holman, Contributing Editor

Professor of National Security Studies

Ms. Sara C. Holman

Editor, Marshall Center Papers

Mr. Michael J. McNulty

Distribution

Marshall Center Papers Editorial Board Reviewers

Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner

Dr. Jacob Kipp
The Marshall Center Papers

No. 1 - Europe’s New Defense Ambitions:

Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia 

by Peter van Ham

April 2000

No. 2 - The Transformation of Russian 

Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned 

from Kosovo and Chechnya 

by Alexei G. Arbatov

July 2000
The Marshall Center Papers

Editorial Advisory Board

Prof. Evgeniy Bazhanov

Vice-President, Russian Diplomatic Academy

Prof. Dr. Wilfried von Bredow

Institut für Politikwissenschaft,Universität Marburg

COL Joseph R. Cerami 

Chairman, Dept. of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

Dr. Paul Cornish

Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

Dr. Christopher Dandeker

Head, Department of War Studies, King’s College London

Dr. Robert H. Dorff

Department of National Security and Strategy, US Army War College

Prof. Dr. Heinz Gaertner

Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien

Prof. Dr. Ferenc Gazdag

Director, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Budapest

Dr. Thomas B. Grassey

Director, US Naval War College Press

Prof. Dr. Ali M. Karaosmanoglu

Chairman, Dept. of International Relations, Bilkent University

Dr. Jacob Kipp

Senior Analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office 

US Army Combined Arms Center

Dr. Charles A. Kupchan

Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington

Dr. Friedemann Müller

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin

Dr. Frances Pilch

Political Science Department., US Air Force Academy

Dr. Andrew L. Ross 

Strategic Research Department, US Naval War College

Dr. Dmitri Trenin

Deputy Director, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow Center

Dr. Thanos Veremis

Constantine Karamanlis Professor in Hellenic and Southeastern

European Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 

Tufts University

Prof. Dr. Peter M. E. Volten

Director, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen 

Dr. Stephen L. White

Department of Politics, University of Glasgow
Cooperative Security:

New Horizons for International Stability

by Richard Cohen, Professor of NATO & European Security

Architectures, and Michael Mihalka, Professor of Eastern

European Security Affairs, George C. Marshall European Center

for Security Studies

No single trend, over the past decade, deserves more careful

analysis than the remarkable growth of cooperation among the

countries of Eurasia and North America. This Marshall Center

Paper presents two different approaches to the topic of

Cooperative Security.

Richard Cohen presents a compelling and highly original model 

Cooperative Security. He offers a powerful vision of how NATO

should develop in the future and urges closer contact between

NATO, the European Union, and Russia. Michael Mihalka

broadens the analysis of Cooperative Security and traces its

history. He argues that the success of Cooperative Security

depends on spreading liberal democracy, intensifying economic

ties, and fostering multilateral security arrangements. These

contrasting essays explore the prospects for a new era of

international relations, characterized by reassurance instead of

deterrence, cooperation as opposed to confrontation, and mutua

benefit in place of unilateral advantage.

The Marshall Center Web Site:

http://www.marshallcenter.org

Designed and produced by VIB

April 2001