PLAN COLOMBIA

Some Differing Perspectives

Gabriel Marcella

Charles E. Wilhelm

Alvaro Valencia Tovar

Ricardo Arias Calderón

Chris Marquis

June 2001
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ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD ...................

PREFACE .....................

PLAN COLOMBIA: An Introduction

 Gabriel Marcella ................

A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

 Charles E. Wilhelm ..............

A VIEW FROM BOGOTÁ

 Alvaro Valencia Tovar .............

A VIEW FROM PANAMA

 Ricardo Arias Calderón ............

A VIEW FROM PEORIA

 Chris Marquis..................

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ............

iii
FOREWORD

This is one in the Special Series of monog

stemming from the February 2001 conference on 

Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Insti

the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. F

North-South Center of the University of Miami. 

monograph, with an introduction by Dr. Gabriel Ma

includes four short, but interesting and important p

presented at the conference. General Charles E. Wilh

former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Sou

Command; General Alvaro Valencia Tovar, a f

commander of the Colombian Army; Dr. Ricardo 

Calderon, a former Vice President of Panama; an

Chris Marquis, a correspondent for the New York T

present four distinctly differing views regarding 

Colombia.

Their perspectives reflect the uncertainty and con

expressed at the conference regarding U.S. pol

Colombia and the implementation of Plan Colomb

that connection, there appears to be no consensus on 

Plan Colombia is and what it is not. This disarray, a

as additional questions generated from it, demonstr

pressing need to pursue the debate. This is imp

because, one way or another, Plan Colombia affects 

The Strategic Studies Institute and the North-

Center are pleased to offer these four differing perspe

on Plan Colombia to help inform the ongoing nation

international debates concerning security issues that 

the vital interests of the United States, Colombia, a

entire global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
PREFACE

This volume in our “Plan Colombia” series contain

expert presentations which were made to the Feb

2001 Miami symposium. The writers are a high-ra

retired military commander from Colombia and one 

the United States, a leading Panamanian political f

and a U.S. journalist. As might be expected, they look 

complex dilemma of Colombia from somewhat dif

angles.

Yet, unlike the fable of the elephant and the blind 

the authors offer us more elements in common 

contrasting views. First, it is clear that none of them o

panacea or quick-fix solution or even believes tha

short-term solution is possible. That judgment is criti

the Bush administration as it faces the need to develo

explain its own approach to the Congress and 

American public, audiences who are inherently a

long-term involvements when they can be avoided.

Second, each writer, in his own way, gives at 

tentative or conditional support to Plan Colomb

designed by the Colombian Government and as sup

by the United States, with a Congressional commitm

$1.3 billion last year. No one states that the plan is p

But, as General Valencia points out, action is far bette

“theoretical arguments” at this point, and the plan s

be adjusted in the light of experience as time goes on. T

a sensible and pragmatic approach. All four agree, a

that international support is crucial; Colombia canno

alone.

Third, the authors acknowledge that the real heart 

plan is what General Wilhelm calls the “soft comp

consisting of “peace process, alternative development

participation, human development, economic assis

and fiscal and judicial reform.” Yet, as he states, th

vii
assistance package so far ($1.3 billion of the overall 

requirement of $7.5 billion) is focused on the milita

“hard” component.

Finally, the writers, especially Ricardo Arias Calde

Panama, are keenly aware of the inability to conta

Colombian problems to Colombia. There is alre

spill-over effect on Colombia’s neighbors, and it ca

increase. That understanding, plus an acknowledged 

to give more attention to the social and economic i

undoubtedly lies behind the Bush administration’

Andean Regional Initiative, announced May 17, 200

The Bush administration placed high priority, ea

its tenure, on the economic integration of the Am

That objective includes achievement of the Free 

Agreement of the Americas by the year 2005, and with

framework of democratic governance as agreed at the 

Summit of the Americas held February 2000 in Quebe

A worsening of the situation in Colombia can cast s

doubt on the attainment of these goals.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-So

 Center

University of Miami

viii
 PLAN COLOMBIA:

An Introduction

Gabriel Marcella

Colombia is the most compelling issue o

hemispheric agenda. The United States, the co-respo

party in consumption, is committed to support Colom

fighting illegal narcotics. The central question is w

this will be enough to restore peace, economic growth

functioning democratic order to a deeply troubled n

This monongraph will explore the fundamental eleme

the policy challenge for the United States and re

partners.

U.S. National Interests at Stake.

The national interests at stake for the United Stat

central to our well-being as a society, to regional se

and international order, and to the future of eco

integration (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) wi

democratic framework for the Americas. U.S. trade 

Colombia exceeds $10 billion annually. The in

violence of Colombia not only depresses economic g

but it also directly affects the sovereignty of Pa

Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil. Contraband

trafficking, money laundering, gun running, dis

people, the “balloon effect” of coca cultivation, corru

and violence know no international boundaries

Andean region, Central America, Mexico, the Carib

the United States, Canada, and Europe compris

theater of operations for international organized 

peddling cocaine and heroin, and enormous lev

institutional corruption. Estimates run as high 

percent for the amount of cocaine entering the U

States that comes from Colombia, with Peru and B

providing the balance. Drug related crime and vio

1
accidents, the medical costs of addiction, rehabilit

incarceration, and up to 52,000 deaths per year 

staggering cost to U.S. society.

Thus geopolitical calculus places the Colombian 

within a new threat analysis that defies precise defi

that relies on the weakness of a failing state rather th

strength of a military power hostile to the United Sta

the base of the new threat is an illegal internationa

economy supported within Colombia by a cri

enterprise abetted and in alliance with insurgent

paramilitary forces, and externally by drug users esti

to number between 3.5 million (addicted) to 12 million 

United States alone. The institutional capacity of Col

to deal with public security, to control its borders, 

protect the lives of its citizens has declined to such a d

that it’s become a Hobbesian hell.

1

 Its troubles are d

only to drugs, but also to the lack of state auth

legitimacy, and effective governance in major portio

national territory three times the size of Montana

enormous empty spaces absent government presenc

prospect of an autonomous Farclandia in eastern Col

is not far-fetched.

The U.S. Response.

The United States has been providing econom

military assistance to Colombia for many years

strategic imperative increased dramatically sinc

proclamation of Plan Colombia by President A

Pastrana in 2000. The strategic theory behind 

Colombia is stunningly simple. It links eco

development to a peace process with the insurgent

central premise is that drug money feeds the coffers 

insurgents, whose attacks give rise to the self-d

organizations known as the paramilitaries. If the mo

taken away, the insurgents cannot mount the attack

become less threatening, and the paramilitaries

2
originated to fill the security void left by the abse

public security, have less reason for being.

The prospects for bringing the insurgents an

paramilitaries to the peace table are enhanced becaus

have less justification to wage war against the sta

against each other. Plan Colombia endeavors to stren

the state, reenergize an economy with nearly 20 p

unemployment, generate the conditions necessary f

pursuit of peace, control the expansion of illegal crop

drug trafficking, and restore civil society. It is nothin

than a grand strategy for remaking Colombia 

dignified and secure democracy. It is not a military st

nor is it an American plan, contrary to press comment

the United States, Colombia, Latin America, and E

The United States will meet its obligation to Plan Col

with a package of $1.3 billion designed to provide m

support (61 percent of the package) to help wit

eradication of coca fields and dollars for alternative cr

wean away peasants from coca; bolster the eco

infrastructure; strengthen institution building

support the peace process. Some of the money will als

Ecuador and Bolivia. The total plan will cost $7.5 b

with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billio

the international community and the United States.

Plan Colombia is a carefully thought out set of mu

reinforcing initiatives that also recognizes the just

“shared responsibility” between producing and cons

countries. There is no alternative to it. Yet, it w

succeed unless there is a security shield. Unles

Colombian security forces (military and police

reestablish effective control over the national territo

economic support and the institution building are not 

to take deep root in such an environment of insecurity

Bogotá must establish sufficient military asymmetry 

battlefield to convince the Revolutionary Armed Fo

Colombia (FARC) and Ejercito de Liberacion Na

(ELN) to negotiate an end to the conflict and deal wi

paramilitaries in some effective fashion. There can

3
three competing systems of law and order within a 

aspiring to democracy. Neither the insurgents n

paramilitaries have any incentive at this mome

negotiate a true peace, rather than a tactical one desig

weaken the government. The peace process has no h

success until the battlefield situation is decidedly in fa

the government.

Can Plan Colombia Work?

There are critics of U.S. support to Plan Colomb

even of the plan itself. The more informed nonideo

critics argue that a policy based merely on counterna

support is ipso facto doomed to failure becaus

insurgents will find other sources of funding for 

military operations, such as the lucrative kidnappin

reputedly netted the FARC $250 million in 2000. The

the threat to the Colombian state will survive by s

readjusting its political-military strategy. They 

further that were Colombia to achieve the object

seriously reducing coca production in the high prod

areas of Putumayo, Caquetá, and Guaviare, the prod

would shift to other parts of Colombia, as is occurrin

Nariño and the northeast. With sufficient demand 

United States and elsewhere, the production may als

to Peru and Bolivia, if not Ecuador and Venezuela

recreating the problem of an illegal international eco

elsewhere in the Andes.

The concern about the “balloon effect” is well-fou

Until 1997 the main producers of coca were Boliv

Peru. By 1998 Colombia supplanted them with 

industrial size plantations in the southern departme

addition to smaller peasant-owned plots. The re

success of Peru and Bolivia is instructive for the 

debate on Colombia. Peru and Bolivia reduced “illega

production by close to 70 percent through a combina

voluntary and forced eradication, interdiction

alternative cropping. The April 2001 shooting down 

4
innocent American missionary flight in Peru bares th

of air interdiction (such as the concept of due process i

but the operations worked in seriously stemming the t

President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia promised to elim

illegal coca cultivation completely by 2002. Th

government in Peru will also face the challen

maintaining the regime of incentives and disincenti

place. Similarly, the long-term prospects in Colomb

depend upon the central government’s ability to m

enough resources, people, and programs for the long h

order to integrate the cocaleros as dignified citizens 

nation. Bogotá hammered out The Interagency Action 

in order to implement the 10-point Plan Colombia 

southern departments (mostly Putumayo). Yet, it 

clear that Colombia has the institutional capability a

political will to sustain a national program of the mag

engendered by Plan Colombia. There are a lot of ifs 

future of Plan Colombia, mainly because o

government’s manifest institutional weakness, as w

the reluctance of the European Community to fu

portion of “shared responsibility.”

Thus, the United States must continue to stiffe

back of its allies. It is the only nation with the capacit

so and to provide the full spectrum of support, fro

diplomatic to the economic, military, and technical a

Neither the Europeans nor the Latin American

aggregate the combination of political will and reso

and mobilize international support. An unwritten r

international burden-sharing in the Americas is the U

States will provide the leadership and most of the m

others may fall in line. Nothing of magnitude 

Hemisphere happens without U.S. leadership or su

That is partly the burden of history and the burde

reluctant superpower. The United States has drawn t

in the sand with the commitment of Blackhawk and 

helicopters to support the Colombian military and po

counternarcotics operations and with additional res

5
for economic development, the peace process, an

judicial system.

In the American political process there is bipa

support for Colombia, but there is no willingness to cro

line into counterinsurgency support. This is appro

and ultimately to the advantage of both Colombia a

United States. The history of counterinsurgency su

teaches that for the ally in the field to win, the United 

should not make the sacrifices for it. The sacrifices 

case must be borne by the people of Colombia. They 

undergo the frustration and the agony of learni

making fundamental changes in institutional perform

of resurrecting an expensive judicial system whic

permits close to 95 percent impunity for murders

finally, even of sharing the burden of war. Current

soldiers doing the fighting and the dying are from the 

elements of society. Those with high school diplom

higher are by law exempt from combat risk. The Colo

government and the armed forces must get serious 

winning the war. Once all elements of society are enga

the national cause, once the risk of combat is shared b

and poor, the military and police will have better reso

leadership, intelligence, logistics, morale, and ultim

better support from the people of the nation. Th

strengthen the Clausewitzian trinity of the peopl

government, and the armed forces. Without i

correlation of forces for the people and governm

Colombia will continue to be problematic.

The bottom line on the prospects of Plan Colomb

lot of ifs: if the government can sustain a national 

across the spectrum of policy instruments, est

decisive asymmetry on the battlefield, obtain fo

economic assistance, gain regional cooperation on 

control, reform and rebuild institutions while fighting 

fronts, and do all of this by respecting the humani

norms of armed conflict.

6
The following commentaries by former Comman

Chief of the United States Southern Command, G

Charles E. Wilhelm; former Commanding General 

Colombian Army, Alvaro Valencia Tovar; forme

President of Panama, Ricardo Arias Calderón; and 

Marquis of the New York Times, provide the fab

pluralism on the merits of Plan Colombia. The 

expressed by these distinguished authorities eviden

intense hopes, the cautious concerns, and the dif

perspectives of a respected voice in the interna

community, of seasoned military leaders who 

Colombia deeply, and of a journalist who brings for

uncomfortable metaphors of the American experience 

20th century.

ENDNOTE

1. For further background on the societal environme

strategic options in Colombia, see David Passage,The United Sta

Colombia: Untying the Gordian Knot, The Letort Papers, Carli

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000; 

Marcella and Donald Schulz, “Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Stra

the Crossroads,” Strategic Review, Winter 2000, pp. 3-22; 

Marcella, Plan Colombia: The Strategic and Operational Impe

Special Series, Implementing Plan Colombia, Carlisle, PA: S

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2001; Joseph R. 

Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy fo

Special Series, Implementing Plan Colombia, Carlisle, PA: S

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2001.

7
A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Charles E. Wilhelm

“Does Plan Colombia move us in the right direction

vez, el problema es la pregunta. . . . Perhaps the prob

the question.

Plan Colombia does not move Colombia forward 

single axis as the question above implies. On the con

the plan is a comprehensive and integrated str

intended to move Colombia forward on ten axes con

collectively to solve the complex and interwoven soci

security problems that have tormented the country fo

than 4 decades.

In my view, too much attention has been paid 

United States to the so-called “hard component” o

Colombia (counterdrug measures and military re

while not enough has been paid to the “soft comp

(peace process, alternative development, s

participation, human development, economic assis

and fiscal and judicial reform). Perhaps this is so be

the lion’s share of the $1.313 billion U.S. assistance pa

focuses on the hard component. But at the end of the 

is important to remember that Plan Colombia is 

$1.313 billion military strategy with a small 

component—it is a $7.513 billion peace strategy w

subordinate counterdrug component.

In an attempt to drive this point home, w

accompanied President Clinton on his trip to Cartag

August 2000 during which he announced approval 

U.S. assistance package, I urged members of the bipa

delegation to “remember 1882.” I was asked, “

happened in 1882?” I replied, “Nothing terribly imp

that I can recall, but 1882 is not a date. The 18 and 82 

respectively the percent budget split between the ha

soft components of Plan Colombia.”

9
President Andrés Pastrana is keenly mindful o

During mid-January 2001, I visited with him at 

Narino. We talked for 45 minutes. Even though I 

retired military officer, we spent only 10 minutes disc

military matters associated with the hard compon

Plan Colombia. The other 35 minutes were spent disc

technologies and capabilities that could be appl

advance the social, economic, and humanit

components of the strategy.

During my visit I met not once with Minister of D

Luis Ramirez, nor did I meet with my friends and f

professional colleagues Generals Tapias, Mora, or Ve

Rather, I met with Eduardo Pizano, Claudia de Fran

Olga Echeverri, Fernando Medellin, Juan Manuel S

and others whom President Pastrana has tapped to o

and implement the soft component.We did not talk 

helicopters and counterdrug battalions. We talked 

housing for displaced people, development of mun

complexes in the south, and support for agriculture.

My point is simply this: public statements and 

accounts have given Plan Colombia a distorted im

don’t know of a single official, either U.S. or Colombia

has suggested that Colombia’s problems are amenab

military solution. That is why Plan Colombia has 

embraced in both Washington and Bogotá. In my v

correctly identifies the range of actions, in the p

proportions, that are required to suppress the illega

industry and to restore peace, security, and stabi

Colombia.

Now I’d like to take a stab at answering anoth

question. Is Plan Colombia working? The right ans

that it’s too early to tell, but there are some promising 

indicators. While expanding on this point, I’d like t

leave of generalities and deal with hard facts and figu

my view, the Colombia debate begs for this k

treatment. Too many positions and too many accou

conditions in Colombia are built on frameworks of he

10
speculation, supposition, and conjecture. The salien

are as follows:

• Coca eradication operations were initiat

Putumayo Department on December 19, 2000. 

January 31, 2001, 24,123 hectares had been sprayed

represents 28 percent of the 90,000 hectares 

cultivation. Bear in mind, this was accomplished in 

weeks.

• Of this total, 22,332 hectares, or 92 percent, are 

AUC-dominated southwestern region of Putumayo.

• The eradication operations have not been uncont

Eight aircraft have been hit by groundfire since oper

began, but no aircraft or crew have been lost.

• The first and second battalions of the counte

brigade formed and trained under Plan Colombia 

taken the field and are providing security for eradi

operations.

• These units have engaged and destroyed 40 targ

Putumayo to include coca base labs, cocaine hydroch

labs, and weapons storage facilities.

• There have been no reported human rights viol

during these operations. Moreover, since the first bat

was formed in April 1999, no human rights complaint

been recorded against any members or units o

counterdrug brigade.

• The Colombian armed forces and National Polic

been criticized for failing to work together. First

operations in Putumayo under Plan Colombia 

witnessed unprecedented coordination and coope

between the military and police. Combined militar

police forces have shared U.S.-supplied helicopters 

moving in and out of the area of operations; joint bri

are being conducted and intelligence is being shared

• There is a civil dimension to these operations. W

together, the U.S. Agency for International Develo

11
(USAID) and the Colombia National Plan for Alter

Development (PLANTE) have secured agreements 

1,453 families in the Puerto Asis municipality. 

agreements provide for the voluntary eradication of a

3,000 hectares of coca. PLANTE and USAID were hop

conclude voluntary eradication agreements with a t

5,500 families by the end of March 2001. Achievem

this goal would result in elimination of more than 

hectares. By augmenting the “stick” of forcible 

eradication with the “carrot” of alternative developm

exchange for voluntary manual eradication, resista

local officials is lessening.

•Developments are looking up in other pa

Colombia as well. On April 21, 2001, in Vichada depar

of eastern Colombia, Colombian soldiers supported by 

U.S.-built Black Hawk helicopters captured the not

Brazilian outlaw Luis Fernando Da Costa, believed t

been trading guns and cash with the EARC in exchan

cocaine.

1

To resort to a football metaphor, we are in a sense 

Superbowl XXXV replayed . . . at least from the Bal

Ravens’ perspective. The Ravens put together a team 

game plan emphasizing a strong defense and a lo

offense. They stayed the course with their strategy 

through that agonizing stretch in October 2000 whe

went more than 20 quarters without scoring a touch

They followed their strategy and game plan to the 

They made it to the Super Bowl, and, once there, the

convincingly. I would be the last person to triviali

struggle in Colombia, but there are strategic parallel

the Ravens, and these parallels can be instructive

Colombia was carefully conceived. It is a balanced pla

soft and hard components. It emphasizes the soft ov

hard. It will not achieve success overnight, and pitfal

be encountered along the way. But at this very early 

the organizations created under the strategy are doing 

they were intended to do, desired results are being ach

12
and the strategy is being executed as it was conceive

written.

While it is entirely too early to declare victory, it i

time to stop prophesying defeat. In answer to the qu

posed at the beginning of this chapter, “Is Plan Col

moving us in the right direction?” I would answer ye

moving us in the right directions.

If the engagement of U.S. armed forces in Colom

not instructive to them, then perhaps they are not p

sufficient attention. Here is a short list of six issue

deserve consideration by our men and women in uni

• U.S. military-to-Colombian military engag

versus direct involvement. Colombia is not and w

become another Vietnam.

• The subordinate role of the military component 

social components of Plan Colombia. What lessons s

we draw from that in Colombia and, more important

other countries we contemplate assisting?

• Limits imposed by the U.S. Congress o

engagement. Are they wise or not? Was I out in lef

when I acceded in my congressional testimony 

500-soldier troop limit and 300-person contractor lim

• The regional, hemispheric, and global implica

They have always been considered, but have we 

sufficient attention to unintended and second

repercussions?

• The power of the Interagency when done right, a

impotence of the Interagency when done wrong. 

interagency approach in Colombia enhancing our po

rendering us impotent?

• The power of information and the penalties th

paid when it is not capitalized upon.

I would like to close with some elaboration on th

bullet. At the end of January 2001, I called Colo

13
Ambassador to the United States Luis Alberto Mor

the Colombian Embassy in Washington. He was not h

a good morning because of an article that appeared 

front page of The Washington Post that very day, d

with atrocities perpetrated by the United Self-D

Forces of Colombia (AUC) in Chengue.

2

 I had rea

article once, and now I went back and read it severa

times. A light went on. That article was a little over 

words long. By my count, only 500 of those words co

attributed to official sources of the Colombian govern

If we fail to present our version of events to the news m

thus capitulating in the information struggle, how w

fare in seeking to advance our strategy before the co

public opinion, a strategy that is controversial at bes

ENDNOTES

1. “Manhunt ends with arrest,” The Sentinel, Carlisle, PA, A

2001, p. A3.

2. Scott Wilson, “Chronicle of a Massacre Foretold,”The Was

Post, January 28, 2001, pp. A-1, A-24.

14
A VIEW FROM BOGOTA

Alvaro Valencia Tovar

Introduction.

Plan Colombia is in essence a joint effort 

Colombian and U.S. Governments to confront the pro

crisis of that South American country. It is focused o

dealing and its collateral activities, insurgent guer

and self-defense outlaw bands euphemistically la

“paramilitaries.”

The plan recognizes the fact that narcotrafficking a

impact on the Colombian nation are not simply one na

problems but rather an international issue that 

enormous implications for the entire region and elsew

The scope of the plan encompasses four major compo

social, economic, judicial, and military.

But even these four components give no true ink

the breadth of the total Colombian drug phenom

particularly as it relates to the assignment of blam

responsibility. Colombia must, of course, shoulder a 

deal of the blame for producing the raw materials

(used to make cocaine) and poppy flowers (used to 

opium). But the other five aspects of the total drug 

involve international participation:

• Manufacturing. The process of converting th

materials to finished drugs relies on chemicals produ

industrialized countries.

• Export. Delivery of drugs out of Colombia is a gi

enterprise carried out by the international mafia.

• Distribution. The smuggling of drugs into m

countries involves a chain of non-Colom

intermediaries.

15
• Money laundering. The conversion of drug mone

legitimate monetary instruments involves the 

international banking system.

• Consumption. Obviously if there were no de

there would be no production. The countries that com

the market for illegal drugs must shoulder a large sh

the total drug problem.

Options with Regard to Plan Colombia.

In view of the controversy that has arisen 

promulgation of the plan, two major options m

envisaged with regard to its disposition. The first 

involve full revision prior to implementation. Such re

would occur after a stage of debate in both cou

particularly at congressional levels. Input would a

solicited from neighboring Andean countrie

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with the 

given an opportunity to speak on human rights viol

and the military component of the plan. Criticism

recommendations emerging from such discussion wo

considered by the plan’s authors in any rev

undertaken prior to further implementation.

The second option, diametrically opposite to the 

would be simply to proceed with implementation a

time, though allowing for mid-course adjustment

modifications as accumulative experience confi

invalidated, or otherwise qualified continuance of e

selected courses of action.

In order to ascertain the better of the two optio

should consider that this is the first time an interna

effort has been mounted to cope with the drug 

Lacking a basis of concrete previous experience, the p

essentially theoretical. Modifying the plan b

application, therefore, risks transforming it simpl

another theoretical construct. Sooner or later, we mu

in and test the water, allowing ourselves flexibility th

16
feedback mechanisms to correct course as we learn 

works and what doesn’t. We cannot achieve perfect

this point, and any effort to do so will only occasion e

delay.

Plan Colombia is more of a broad catalogue of inte

than a detailed description of specified actions. I

regard, it is analogous to a future contingency plan 

than to an operational plan for implementation toda

real-world crisis against a real-world foe. Even if 

Colombia was fully agreed to by all affected partie

resources were fully forthcoming, we would still fa

task of drafting detailed operational plans under each 

plan’s component parts for implementation on the gro

sea, in the air or space, or at the negotiating table.

I thus conclude that the second option is more des

In sum, it will allow progressive refinement and corr

of courses of action that admittedly cannot be ce

perfect today. Any grand human endeavor faces obs

and difficulties. We know that at the start. What 

matters is having the resolve to meet and overcom

obstacle in turn so that in time we will achiev

designated objective. Plan Colombia is beset by 

contentious issues which will evoke intensified oppo

misunderstanding, and recrimination as the p

gradually applied in practice. We should do our b

identify and analyze these issues now, at least in 

terms, so that as they become salient we shall have re

hand the facts, arguments, and arrangements to meet 

Main Obstacles To Plan Colombia.

I shall discuss the most significant and foreseea

these issues under three categories: political, interna

and Colombia’s internal conflict.

Political. Internal factionalism in both Colombia a

United States could be a serious impediment to the 

With the recent change in administrations in the U

17
States, new policies could emerge, and the dynam

political party support could change. In Colombia, 

who like and support President Andrés Pastrana are 

plan, whereas his political opponents are again

frequently even those who lack familiarity with th

and thus are in no position to judge it.

Much of the opposition to the plan is expressed in 

of intentional disinformation, particularly regardi

military component. The weight of this compon

deliberately exaggerated in portrayals to the public, le

the impression that Plan Colombia is a unidimen

militaristic approach to what is acknowledged to 

essentially socioeconomic problem. The fact that les

20 percent of the assistance contemplated under th

goes to strengthen the military is purposely downpla

ignored by the plan’s opponents.

Unfortunately, Colombian authorities made a s

blunder in their unveiling of the plan. There was no st

or public relations campaign for winning public supp

need not have been that way because the enormous 

and economic benefits inherent in the plan could 

served as an excellent basis for appeals to public op

Instead, there was a sudden announcement that a bil

plan had been approved by the two governments

suddenness and lack of prior public dialogue startled 

and undermined prospects for acceptance. Moreove

people thereby became more susceptible to the unfo

charges that the plan would pave the way to 

intervention by the United States and eventually tran

Colombia into another Vietnam. The public dialogu

then followed was marred by the paucity of re

information, with the result that public suspicio

opposition had blossomed by the time the issue re

Congress.

Still another source of political opposition to th

arrived in the form of nongovernmental organiz

(NGOs) devoted to the cause of human rights. These N

18
often on the basis of disinformation, argue tha

strengthening of Colombia’s military forces will enco

even more human rights violations. NGOs in Colombi

allegations to their proxies in the United States and E

who accept them at face value without fu

investigation. Two Colombian NGOs are partic

notorious for their bias against military institutions

accusations rarely reflect the realities and complexi

the episodes they so glibly discuss. These NGOs vir

never approach accused military or police for com

before public accusations are leveled. Thus the accuse

opportunities to defend themselves or justify their beh

The Colombian administration and the Minis

Defense have disseminated a stern policy to protect h

rights and give full expression to internat

humanitarian law. The commanding general of the 

forces and the commanders of the three services hav

taken strong actions to implement the governing po

all echelons of command. Officers charged with super

and support of human rights measures are function

battalion level and above. According to a report pub

by the Office of the Attorney General, a drastic decre

human rights abuses has occurred. Specifically, a me

percent of such incidents reported in the year 2000 

committed by military personnel, though admittedly 

number of these are still under investigation.

It is significant that Colombian military instit

show the highest level of prestige among na

institutions, higher even than that of the Catholic C

according to a survey conducted by a private p

organization known for the accuracy of its repo

military misbehavior was prevalent, such public ap

ratings would be unattainable.

An army doesn’t need to increase its strength to v

human rights. But it does need increased strength t

with the military dimension of Colombia’s total 

problem. The army as a matter of military philo

19
believes that support by the civilian populat

fundamental to counteract domestic subversion and 

guerrilla movements. It thus recognizes that to c

human rights abuses among the very people whose su

it requires is counterproductive to accomplishi

mission.

Plan Colombia has as one of its basic planks ju

reform, which itself unfortunately is polit

controversial, for complex reasons. In Colombia, the

more lawyers than all the other professionals togeth

reach a consensus among them, even at the levels 

Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and Minis

Justice, is extraordinarily difficult. Despite this diff

the Military Code, one of the major sources of concern w

Colombian jurisprudence, has already been reforme

similar efforts are under way in other fields of justic

proportion of lawyers in Congress remains high, how

and their national inclination toward litigious dispu

has brought about endless delays and postponeme

projects submitted by the executive.

International. Turning now to internat

impediments to successful implementation of 

Colombia, we should first take note of the post

countries neighboring Colombia. The possibility of sp

of the Colombian narcotrafficking mess to the territ

adjacent countries has provoked strong negative rea

particularly in Venezuela and Ecuador. The same fai

exploit public dialogue as a means of gaining po

approval within Colombia has plagued efforts to secu

understanding, cooperation, and support of Colo

neighbors. Proper preparatory communication with f

governments and news media did not take place.

Obviously, the possibility of spillover exists; in fact

spillover has been occurring for a long time, cer

predating the emergence ofPlan Colombia. Displacem

workers from the drug plantations and processing pla

neighboring lands has taken place whenever Colo

20
authorities conducted police actions near Colom

borders. But this unavoidable peril could be containe

managed by international cooperation and survei

under combined accords and planning.

Another troubling factor on the international land

is the reservations of the European Union (EU). S

European governments are supporting the Colo

peace process and even extending loans and eco

assistance to support the improvement of social, eco

and quality-of-life conditions in Colombia. Yet, these 

governments are distinctly lukewarm toward 

Colombia itself, mainly because of its military prov

More specifically, they believe that the peace proces

not justify investments in the armed forces b

Colombian state, particularly when such forces are s

be an indirect agent of human rights abuses rather 

guardian against such abuses. However, this th

seems not to consider that the outcome of the peace p

is still uncertain, and that the insurgents have th

refused to accept a cease-fire and suspension of 

hostilities against the military and civilian commun

Colombia’s Internal Conflict. Finally, with reg

obstacles to a successful realization of Plan Colomb

turn to those growing out of the insurgency 

counterinsurgency within Colombia’s own borders

guerrillas’ strategy has turned toward intensifying a

against small villages garrisoned by small 

detachments wholly incapable of sustaining, let 

winning, armed clashes against far superior insu

forces. This change of strategy is due to the serious se

suffered by guerrilla units in 1999 and 2000 when the

to escalate the war from direct, elusive tactics to 

confrontation with large army units in pitched battle

Although harassment of the civilian population 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) oc

long before Plan Colombia was ever envisioned, the 

argues that its attacks against small villages are a re

21
against the plan. The obvious but still worrisome reas

this position is the need to block approval of 

Colombia’s military component, which will enhan

broad capabilities of the armed forces even thoug

assistance provided by the plan is narrowly directed t

narcotrafficking. This fact is additional proof that th

alliance between the FARC and narcotrafficking is the 

source of revenue for the FARC in conductin

insurrection.

Other internal impediments to Plan Colombia 

from difficulties inherent to the peace process 

Stagnating support for the peace process is often ba

the allegation that “the government is not making suf

progress in its campaign against the self-defense gr

This allegation is disingenuous, since it is being us

FARC and FARC sympathizers as an indirect arg

against the plan itself. Behind the urgings fo

government to take a more aggressive stance again

self-defense groups lie two self-serving goals: (1) to for

government to destroy the United Self-Defense For

Colombia (AUC), which is the main foe of the FARC; a

to discredit Plan Colombia as being responsible f

stagnation of the peace process.

The final internal impediment to Plan Colombia 

tendency to politicize what should remain purely m

and technical issues. Although partial provis

resources has been accomplished, and the 

counternarcotics brigade has been equipped and tr

the whole effect of the plan can make itself felt only a

considerable period of time. Meanwhile, howeve

arrival of U.S.-supplied helicopters is being delaye

result of lengthy discussions in the U.S. Congress abo

types of helicopters to be furnished. For the sake o

optimal effectiveness and timeliness, it is best to r

such technical issues on the basis of tech

considerations, that is to say, nonpolitical considerat

22
Major Strategic and Operational Issues in Plan

Colombia.

Let us turn now to the major strategic and opera

issues that present themselves with regard to 

Colombia in order to formulate some 

recommendations:

• Develop and Implement an Energetic Policy T

Neighboring Countries. Strong action is needed to min

the hostile attitude of Colombia’s neighbors towa

plan. Misconceptions and exaggerated estima

spillover must be clarified if regional opposition is 

neutralized. 

A presidential summit of countries contiguo

Colombia should be convened by President Pastran

the following goals: convey a clear understanding th

Colombia situation bears enormous implications no

for the immediate region itself but for the entire 

based on a candid and unblushing recitation of a

relevant facts, transform the present attitude of ho

and suspicion into one of cooperation, understandin

positive support; work out a combined strateg

counteracting the spillover that would tend to be gen

by Plan Colombia; create a combined body consist

members from each of the countries, chartered to 

direct, and supervise the actions growing out of the 

described above.

• Intensify Public Information and Diplo

Colombia’s best allies are the facts; thus a concerted 

should be made to disseminate these facts to all partie

directly or indirectly can ultimately exercise an effect 

success of Plan Colombia. 

Both through public information program

diplomatic channels, efforts should be made to pro

better understanding of the plan—aimed especia

disabusing world public opinion of the delib

disinformation that so frequently marred the plan’s p

23
reception. Also ripe for publicizing are the positive res

be expected from the dual Colombo-American 

Particular attention should be directed to the 

military component, justifying it on the grounds th

insurgency-narcotrafficking alliance is a threat agai

the world’s nations, not just against Colombia’s in

security.

• Build Programs for Drug Crop Farmers Based o

Sympathy and Understanding. Let’s face it, the farme

being asked to give up their livelihoods even as 

confront possible legal consequences. In all propose

eradication and substitution programs, not to m

family displacement programs, careful attention m

given to the psychological, legal, and economic pli

affected farmers.

To elaborate on the point preceding, dealing wi

human infrastructure of the narco business requir

attention of our best and most sensitive minds. The co

socio-economic entanglement of displaced persons, 

unemployment, endemic poverty, low quality of life, de

the coffee industry, and lucrative salaries paid by 

dealers has brought tens of thousands of campesino

the traffic. Returning them to a traditional but improv

will be an enormous task requiring understanding of 

circumstances that gradually drew them into cr

activity. 

Alternative cultivation is not possible in the A

jungle where the soil is poor and the consuming cente

distant for commercial purposes. The only pra

alternative employment of the manpower involved 

the eradication by hand of the cultivated zones tha

created from destroyed tropical woodland, thus res

the original fragile environment. Return of the culti

and their families to their original working areas sho

encouraged and facilitated by enlightened gover

policies along with this process. Plan Colombia wi

most valuable tool for the accomplishment of these e

24
Conclusion.

Plan Colombia is thus far the most audaciou

well-conceived venture ever undertaken to solve the 

problem of narcotrafficking. It merits strong suppor

all societies and states. Obstacles and difficulties m

confronted with strong leadership and political wil

plan’s weaknesses should be overcome during the gr

process of implementation as experience is ga

Skepticism and cynicism can be overcome by the gr

emergence of positive results. To retreat at this late 

into theoretical arguments will come to nothing. W

required now is a pragmatic approach marked by a

boldness, and resolve.

Much still remains in implementing the plan. St

agencies linked to certain aspects of the plan need 

established, and many of those that are established n

be enlarged to handle the developing tasks 

responsibilities. Operational leaders must avoid all

their emerging organizations to become bogged do

bureaucratic wheel-spinning, thus losing sight of 

urgent missions. More plans, more strategy, more 

will need to be conceived. All this will constitute a cha

of extraordinary magnitude, but it should be approac

our two countries with optimism, a creative spirit, a

iron will to be successful.

25
A VIEW FROM PANAMA

Ricardo Arias Calderón

As one with considerable experience in formulati

security doctrine of Panama, which shares a common 

with Colombia, I would like to discuss Plan Colombi

regard to its broad regional and even global implica

Decades ago, organized violence was unleash

Colombia, originally as a product of the traditional po

conflict between conservatives and liberals. It even

became enmeshed with common legal delinquency. 

the violence turned into insurgency and came to be 

guerrillas of diverse Marxist-Leninist persuasion

nationalistic expressions. At present, it is headed 

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (F

with approximately 26,000 soldiers, and the Ejérc

Liberación Nacional (ELN), with approximately 

soldiers. More recently, the organized violence ha

diverse ties with narcotic producers and traders an

this reason, has had at its disposal large sums of m

Furthermore, it has provoked the emergence of op

paramilitary organizations, especially the Autode

Unidas de Colombia (ACU), with approximately 

soldiers. The ACU has lately gained in strengt

developed tacit acceptability to many segments of s

despite or perhaps because of its brutal methodology

The insurgent organizations have faced one anoth

narcotic organizations, and the paramilitary 

complicated and changing network of confronta

alliances, and betrayals. But above all they have fac

armed forces (approximately 146,000 soldiers, of 

some 60,000 are combat available), and the national 

forces (120,000) of the Colombian state. For yea

government’s armed organizations have sacrificed th

of their members in seeking to safeguard the securi

majority of Colombian citizens, while at the same 

27
paradoxically maintaining different forms of com

with the paramilitary and even in some cases

suspected, with the narcotic organizations.

In the conflict between the irregular organization

the regular military and police organizations of Colo

the value of the military and police has often been su

particularly in terms of their respect for human rights

commitment to social justice, and their compliance w

norms of legality and decency. While acting in the na

the only authority which has a valid claim to legit

that is to say the government of the country, the m

and police have worked under conditions that rendere

legitimacy at times questionable due to the govern

own behavior. The civil violence in Colombia is n

provoked nor sustained by foreigners, but rat

indigenous. It grows out of Colombia’s own social, eco

political, and cultural conditions. While in earlier 

some of the insurgent organizations have had f

support from Castro’s Cuba, that no longer seems 

with the disintegration of the Soviet orbit. Nor h

United States heretofore been a primary actor 

conflict, though it has had a stake in it throu

opposition to all guerrillas connected to the comm

movement. This stake increased significantly in 

years because of the fight against narcotics productio

traffic.

Given the decades during which successive Colo

governments attempted unsuccessfully to elimina

insurgency with firepower, it seemed reasonable to con

with President Andrés Pastrana that the only roa

towards lasting peace is the road of negotiation. Clear

stalwart attempt to negotiate peace has been the 

decisive, systematic, and courageous of any previous e

moreso even than that of conservative former Pre

Belisario Betancur.

But unfortunately the negotiations have no

advanced on any substantive issues, probably because 

28
intransigence of the guerrillas. From the Report 

Institute for European and Latin-American Rel

(IRELA) dated September 16, 1999, a few sta

regarding the guerrillas are worth recalling: the gue

are thought to be present in some form or other 

percent of the municipalities of the country”; an

intake of the FARC in 1997 was approximately $463 m

as against expenses of $78 million and the intake of th

in the same year around $340 million as against expen

$39 million.” These factors distinguish the Colo

guerrillas from their Central American counterpa

sufficiently ample territorial base in their coun

provide support for recruitment and training, a launc

for attacks, a sanctuary for repose and security, an

substantial financial self-sufficiency.

The IRELA report concluded that neither the gue

nor the government could defeat each other militaril

that the negotiations were going to be difficult becaus

guerrilla has no motivation of sufficient weight to eng

serious negotiations, given the improbability of suffe

military defeat, the relative rural support they enjo

the juicy benefits from the activities which they cond

finance the war.”

In these circumstances, one can quetion wh

weariness with a life of fighting is sufficient motive f

guerrillas to conclude a good-faith peace negotiation

not possible, then, as Pastrana’s term comes to an en

so, too, his capacity to shape events, for the populat

become so frustrated with an apparently endles

fruitless negotiation that segments of Colombian s

begin in desperation to seek a solution to the crisis fro

brutality of the ACU? And, in a similar vein, could 

happen that, in the present mood of public opin

successful electoral alternative could emerge commi

an all-out war with all its dire human consequences

presidential pre-candidacy of Alvaro Uribe Vélez, f

governor of Antioquia, may well represent su

alternative. To representatives of the guerrillas with 

29
I have talked, I have communicated this concern: if th

to negotiate with a President who has had the cour

propose real negotiations, they may have to deal in

with a President disposed to wage all-out war and to fa

AUC rather than the armed forces. It would be tra

Colombia.

In the meanwhile, negotiations falter, the co

worsens, and the international community 

increasingly concerned. In the Internet web presentat

the Colombian government itself, one reads this appra

As far as the evolution of the armed conflict in particular, 

observes a clear intensification. While 90 municipali

registered FARC and ELN guerrilla presence on the natio

territory, this number had increased to 310 in 1991 and to 36

1998. [This presence] . . . has also grown . . . in organizatio

terms. In 1989 45 FARC fronts and 19 ELN fronts w

registered, while by 1995 16 and 14 new fronts had been crea

respectively in each of these organizations. In 1996, 

estimate is that the FARC has 66 fronts and the ELN 

distributed respectively in seven and five regional blo

throughout the country. . . . [I]nvaluable . . . lives . . . are 

[between 30 and 40,000 per year—Author]. . . . At the pres

time, one can say that in terms of the GDP [economic growt

substantially impaired] as a consequence of the armed confli

Moreover, according to a news cable from Reuters 

December 27, 2000, an army report establishes th

groups in conflict are causing an ecological disas

unsuspected proportions. Concurrently, in a publica

the American Forum for the Transition Teams of th

U.S. Administration entitled The Western Hemisphe

American Policy Priority, one finds among the early 

points with potential to consume administration res

the following assertion: Colombia and neighbo

confront the steadily deteriorating politico-se

situation in Colombia, a much firmer, more subst

political commitment will be necessary from Wash

and other capitals. Similarly, the 11th Inter-Am

Dialogue Report, entitled A Time of Decisions, U.S. 

30
in the Western Hemisphere, dated December 14, 

warns:

Colombia faces the most severe challenges. As the natio

democratic institutions are battered by a relentless guerr

war, horrendous human rights abuses, pervasive crimi

violence, and economic recession, the Colombian governme

is increasingly losing control over the country. The recen

approved U.S. aid package of $1.3 billion is intended to h

reverse this situation, but may not be adequate to address t

fundamental task of restoring authority and credibility to t

Pastrana government. It is difficult to imagine how t

government can successfully pursue the goals of peace a

reconciliation without a stronger, more professional army th

can respond effectively both to the guerrillas and paramilita

groups. But the government also needs to manage the pea

process better and make a more effective commitment 

protecting human rights. The continuing lukewarm supp

for Colombia’s struggle from Latin American and Europe

governments is troublesome was well. The danger is great th

the violence in Colombia will worsen and the country w

deteriorate further.

Both the American Forum and the Inter-Am

Dialogue Report, in pointing out the deteriorating situ

recognize a most important dimension of the viole

Colombia and of the attempted peace negotiation, na

its regional and even global dimension. In fact, a

conflict intensifies, its spillover potential increases b

terms of the organizations in conflict intruding 

frontier areas of neighboring countries and in term

growing number of inhabitants of Colombia seeking 

by moving within the country or fleeing to neigh

countries and even more distant countries (particula

United States). There are currently some 1.5 to 2 m

displaced persons within Colombia as a result of the co

Moreover, the flight of uncounted numbers to 

countries occurs either in clandestine, illegal fa

mostly persons from the humbler classes, or in forma

fashion, mostly persons of middle and upper 

extraction. 

31
The very concept of Plan Colombia, which was orig

somewhat ill-defined, has been transforme

international interaction. When first mention

President Pastrana in December 1998 in Puerto Wilc

was presented as a way for the guerrilla to participate 

development, design, and execution of the project

would be simultaneous with the negotiations. 

projects were expected to generate investment for the 

affected by violence, illegal crops, and environm

damages. Plan Colombia was even, it is said, part 

pre-agreements between the government and the F

But since its 3-year cost has been estimated at $7.5 b

the Pastrana government sought to obtain somewha

than half ($3.5 billion) from the international comm

while itself providing a little more than half ($4 billi

had recourse to the ideas of the U.S. government, w

given its own priorities and political realities

influenced the concept of the plan to emphasize the 

against drugs. The drug fight in turn led to inc

emphasis on the plan’s military aspects since it wo

impossible to thwart the guerrillas’ drug activities w

resort to armed force.

The plan includes a complex set of objective

programs on the basis of ten strategies: economic; 

peace; national defense; judicial and human r

anti-narcotics; alternative development; s

participation; human development; and internationa

of the $1.319 billion voted by the U.S. Congress to su

Plan Colombia, some 65 percent or $862.3 milli

reportedly for Colombia, 14 percent for neighb

countries, 17 percent for U.S. agencies, and 4 perce

other purposes. Of the funds for Colombia, 70 percen

the fight against production and commerce of 

Moreover, of those same funds for Colombia, 58 perc

for military assistance, and 14 percent for police assis

Among its key elements are establishment of thre

anti-narcotic battalions and provision to the military 

of 60 helicopters—42 Hueys and 18 Black Hawks—a

32
as electronic equipment for intelligence-gathering th

satellite information. Also a key element is the train

about 30,000 additional Colombian military person

U.S. advisers, in part through subcontracting this t

private companies.

Such percentages as those above reflect, of course

the U.S. contribution, not the whole cost of the plan. B

U.S. contribution is the only portion of the cost t

relatively assured. Thus these percentages are indica

the importance assigned to different components 

plan.

But to render the military anti-narcotic str

effective and, to the extent they are interconnecte

anti-guerrilla strategies as well, requires that neigh

countries actively support Plan Colombia, establishi

example, a tight security circle around Colombia. T

precisely what Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador

Panama have all indicated they are unwilling to do, so 

to be drawn into the internal Colombian conflict. An

have expressed their concern that as presently conc

Plan Colombia will intensify the conflict and will in

its spillover potential, thereby rendering each 

neighboring countries more insecure.

In speaking of the neighboring countries one s

distinguish between those countries that have a

forces, like Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador, 

which could actively support Colombia since the

effectively defend themselves if necessary. Neverthe

has not been possible to persuade these four countries 

jointly, although in all four cases there have 

preventive movements of military units to their fr

with Colombia. Peru, while President Fujimori w

charge, showed a willingness even to confront the gue

militarily, though Vladimir Montesinos, head 

intelligence office of Peru, was instrumental in selling 

to the guerrillas.

33
Now that Fujimori’s regime has come to an end, B

Peru, and Ecuador could come closer in their po

regarding Colombia. It it desirable that they assume a 

dynamic and effective shared role in support of the eff

the Colombian government to bring the guerril

genuine peace negotiations. Clearly the intensified vi

in Colombia cannot but be a seriously destabilizing fa

a sub-region which is already the least stable in 

America. The reluctance of Colombia’s neighbors 

supportively invites a more unilateral type of action 

part of the United States, which is hardly desira

would also seem that Brazil should have a leadership 

play in this respect, both because of its size and weig

because it is a much more stable democracy than the 

neighboring countries. If Latin America, now beginn

reach its maturity both politically and economically, w

for the United States to abstain from intervention, i

show greater initiative in tackling its own stabilit

security problems.

For the four neighboring countries that have 

forces, another impediment to adopting a common po

may be the present government of Venezuela. In cont

the position of former President Fujimori of Peru, Pre

Hugo Chavez of Venezuela has shown evident sympa

the Colombian guerrillas, a fact that has gene

manifest tensions with the Colombian government

sympathy, combined with Chavez’s tendency to act 

own, often counter to U.S. interests, and to express 

admiration for Castro, has been vaguely defin

“bolivarianism.” In a worst-case scenario, Chavez 

continue to act or at least speak counter to the U

States, draw closer to Castro’s view of independenc

sovereignty, while at the same time being helpful 

Colombia guerrillas. One would thus have in no

South America and the Caribbean a triangle of cou

with radical internal and external policies, unrespon

the influence of the American superpower, but resp

only to their own initiative and convergent develop

34
While this scenario is not a given (and there are s

reasons for this fact), nevertheless the possibility po

new forms of radicalism that can find expression w

certain countries, and to their clustering regionall

even more widely. (Chavez, for example, is acting th

the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O

beyond our hemisphere.)

Among the countries neighboring Colombia, Pa

presents a case apart for a couple of reasons. One, bec

chose the Costa Rican model of total demilitarizat

public security. Its Constitution forbids the existence 

military organization. Two, because it now own

administers fully the Canal, which leaves Panama ex

to international realities, both regional and global, 

can represent a danger for Panama’s and the C

security. The only way in which Panama can under 

conditions safeguard the Canal while rema

demilitarized is for it to practice a very demanding po

neutrality, not just on behalf of the Canal as establis

the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, but on behalf of the coun

a whole. This policy requires that Panama abstain 

taking part in both conflicts between states and w

states. But since the Colombian conflict is on Panama

frontier and is intruding onto its territory, Pana

required to integrate its frontier region fully into the 

the country, develop its frontier police, and consider, 

when necessary, requesting the presence of United N

or Organization of American States (OAS) observers o

peacekeepers. Agreeing to a new U.S. military prese

Panama, even in the province of Darien, is not an opt

the Panamanian people; it runs counter to the fundam

need of the country: to establish a new model of relatio

with the United States after nearly a centu

subordination to the U.S. military.

It should be made clear, however, that Pan

neutrality in no way implies nonrecognition o

government of Colombia as the legitimate authority 

country or that it does not recognize the right o

35
government to elaborate and implement Plan Col

with the financial help of whichever other country is w

to contribute to it. This authority carries with it, of c

the responsibility of the Colombian government to p

armed incursions as well as the displacement 

population from its territory into Panamanian territo

is unable to accomplish this task—given the fact 

agreed to negotiate peace formally with the gu

groups, inviting foreign observers as witnesses 

process—the government of Colombia should acce

right of the Panamanian government to keep li

communication open with whatever armed organiz

have it in their power to affect Panama’s borders

latitude would enable Panama simply to seek by w

persuasion and diplomacy respect for the integr

Panamanian territory and Panamanian neutral

would not be a license to intervene in the negotiati

such. Moreover, Colombia and Panama should j

request the United Nations High Commission

Refugees (UNHCR) to coordinate the reception of dis

persons coming from Colombia to Panama and their 

to Colombia under conditions of security and dignity

Mention should also be made of the larger global c

of Plan Colombia, specifically the role that the Eur

Union (EU) can and should play. Clearly for Spain the

role to play. Otherwise, its carefully cultivated s

relationship to Latin America through the y

Ibero-American Summits might reveal itself to be w

political substance. After all, it is this relationshi

underpins Spain’s growing flow of investments to

Latin America. For the rest of the EU, one shou

reminded of its effort to relate directly to Mercos

Mexico, and to the whole of Latin America in comm

competition with the United States. Were the EU 

effectively absent from the efforts to resolve the Colo

conflict, which presently constitutes the gravest cha

to the democratic stability of the region, its effo

36
maintain and develop its Latin American connection 

be seriously weakened.

In order to provide a means for a greater Latin Am

regional contribution to the peace negotiation and 

Colombia, as well as a greater European and 

contribution, it would be desirable to draw influential 

American and European countries more closel

effectively into the negotiation process through 

mechanism not unlike the Contadora Group. One 

conceive of such a pro-Colombia group consist

representattives from Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela

Spain, with the Foreign Affairs Commissioner of th

serving as a helpful go-between and, if necessary, a ga

make sure the negotiation process continues uninterr

and reaches early substantive even if not defi

agreements. Such agreements might include an 

cease-fire, which at first could be temporary, as well 

early end to acts of personal terrorism. These agree

would be effective tests of whether both sides 

negotiation are equally interested in retaining the 

responsibility for peace in Colombian hands

Panamanians know the cost in the latter 1980s of 

unable to resolve our conflicts amongst Panamanians

then, I hope we have learned our historical lesson. F

reason, we can speak frankly to our Colombian neig

and brothers.) Such a mechanism might take some 

pressure from the United States, which now 

somewhat imprudently to emphasize the gro

militarization of its aid, in part out of a sense of bei

alone in the role of support of the Colombian gover

and people.

After all, we need focus on one question. The Colo

population is forty million; it lives in a territory of 1,14

square kilometers and had in 1999 a Gross Do

Product of $71,462 million. Colombia is located at th

northern tip of South America, and is surrounded b

other nations, among them the largest in Latin Am

(Brazil), the one with most oil (Venezuela) and the on

37
the Canal between the oceans (Panama). Colom

endowed with some of our richest cultural traditions a

history was the major setting for our foremost hero, B

But unfortunately this country is being used as one 

world’s largest producers of narcotics and Colombia’s 

are still suffering from the continent’s longest l

experience of organized violence. Now we mus

ourselves: Is the future of such a people our col

concern or not? And if it is, What can each of our cou

do without denying our respective realities and w

being disrespectful to that people’s own identit

self-determination? What can we do which rende

solidarity effective for Colombia’s sake as well as f

own?

One thing is clear: the answer is not nothing, can

nothing.

38
A VIEW FROM PEORIA

Chris Marquis

My father is a “rock-ribbed” conservative—a b

loving, tennis-playing, home-owning, drug-hatin

Force vet and family man. He doesn’t like the w

Colombia. He worries that American is sliding into an

morass. He is skeptical and pessimistic, and that can’

because his son is a journalist. I mention my dad be

the American public is just beginning to tune in to 

Colombia, and not all the critics out there are tree-hu

navel-gazing, pot-smoking liberals. Whoever imple

Plan Colombia is going to have to persuade people li

father, and the lawmakers who represent h

Washington.

There is, however, a growing consensus in the U

States that something must be done about Colombi

stakes are simply too high to walk away. But what and 

Defenders of Plan Colombia emphasize that we’

barreling our way into another Vietnam. This is diff

they say: there are safeguards, personnel caps, and lim

the American mission. Others feel the more acc

analogy lies with the El Salvadorian model, whe

United States plunged into a civil war fueled by compe

with communism. Neither model seems very accurate

would submit that neither is very desirable. The peac

was eventually established in San Salvador came 

price of unimaginable carnage for a tiny country, and 

some extraordinarily bitter divisions in the U.S. Con

Lots of smart people studied these wars and pro

changes in the previous American strategy. Plan Colo

they decided, had to be first and foremost a Colombian 

or at least perceived as one. Even as it provided for m

aid, it had to emphasize economic developmen

negotiations as the ultimate solutions. Colom

39
neighbors had to bless the plan or at the very lea

oppose it. And perhaps most significantly, American 

were not to engage in combat. Their participation ha

dictated by the fight against drugs and not b

many-sided civil war.

What I just described is the war that Congress beli

is now preparing to fight. On Capitol Hill support fo

Colombia is like ice on a frozen lake—it’s broad bu

There are a handful of Republicans, Congressmen J

Mica and Danny L. Burton spring to mind, who are ad

in their support of Colombia. They have been shout

more combat helicopters for years. Their passion, how

is for supporting the national police, not the Colo

armed forces. That wrinkle is truly the new aspect 

plan. Many lawmakers in both parties have reserv

about entering into an alliance with a military with 

dismal human rights record. Here, there are shades 

Salvador, where at times we discovered the enemy w

In this regard, Congressman Benjamin Gilman’s deci

withdraw his support from Plan Colombia was a stu

blow. Gilman, then Chairman of the House Interna

Relations Committee, had fought harder than anyone 

support for the plan. Gilman’s defection should give 

to those taking congressional support for granted. 

when the fighting intensifies and U.S. casualties 

expect a lot of hand wringing and more changes of h

President George W. Bush has voiced support fo

Colombia, but it remains to be seen how deep 

commitment really is. Bush appears eager to reorie

Latin American policy toward Mexico in pursui

hemispheric free trade agreement. Also, anyone fa

with Secretary of State Colin Powell’s views on w

might wonder how he feels about a scenario in which t

no explicit exist strategy nor a clear definition of succe

should never forget the alarming fact that, for all our 

in the anti-narcotics crusade, they have done noth

stem or even reduce the flow of drugs into the United S

40
One of Secretary Powell’s tasks will be to mobili

support of Colombia’s neighbors, who are alarmed 

prospect of a spillover across their national borders. A

must attend as well to the Europeans, who appear a

gleeful that the United States is having difficulties w

military-led approach. And I argue that it is a milita

approach. Until you can show me the money allocate

spent in support of social development, we’ve got o

hands essentially a U.S.-backed military strategy. T

all of this adds up to a massive public relations challe

top of a chaotic war. I just hope my dad is wrong.

41
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RICARDO ARIAS CALDERÓN obtained a B.A. from 

University and his doctorate from the University of 

He has been a university professor in Panama, Vene

and Chile. In the United States, he was a prof

department chairman, dean, and academic vice presid

Florida International University from 1972-78

Calderón joined the Christian Democratic Party of Pa

in 1964 and was exiled by the military dictatorship 

1969 to 1978. He was president of the party from 198

1993 and ran for Second Vice President in 1968 and 

He ran for First Vice President in 1989 and won. As M

of Government and Justice from late 1989 until mid

he demilitarized Panama’s security. Dr. Calderó

president of the Christian Democratic Organization 

Americas from 1981-85 and president of the Chr

Democratic International both from 1995-98 and from 

to October of 2000. He has authored several book

numerous articles on philosophy, university life

politics and writes a political opinion page published 

Sunday in the Panamanian daily, El Panamá Améri

GABRIEL MARCELLA teaches strategy in the Depar

of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Arm

College. He previously served as International A

Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, United S

Southern Command. His recent publications in

Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democr

Latin America; “Colombia’s Three Wars: U.S. Strat

the Crossroads”; Security Cooperation in the W

Hemisphere: Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Co

(co-author); “The Presidential Advisory System an

Making of Latin American Policy,” and “The Intera

Process and National Security: Forward Into the 

Century.” His current research interests focus o

Colombian crisis, national security decisionmaking, a

43
strategic dimensions of civil-military relations in ti

crisis and war. He is a frequent commentator on 

American security issues and U.S. policy in the printe

electronic media.

CHRIS MARQUIS is a Washington correspondent f

New York Times. He graduated from the Univers

California at Berkeley and the Columbia University 

of Journalism. In 1985 Mr. Marquis won a fellowshi

the Inter-American Press Association to work at the B

Aires (Argentina) daily, La Nacion. In 1998 he was aw

a Nieman fellowship at Harvard. Mr. Marquis is a lon

student of Latin America and U.S. policy toward the r

In that connection, he spent nearly a decade writing 

such matters for the Miami Herald, including a st

Central America correspondent.

ALVARO VALENCIA TOVAR, a general in the Colo

Army, was commissioned as a second lieutenant, Inf

at the Colombian Cadet Academy as honor graduate 

1942 class. He has extensive experience in resolvin

disturbances and organized insurgencies as Battalio

Brigade Commander and Army G-3 (Planning, Opera

and Training). General Valencia Tovar is a former D

of the Military Cadet School, Armed Forces War C

and the Infantry School. He was promoted to the top r

general and commanded the Colombian army from 1

1975. He served in the Korean War (1951-52) an

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Egypt durin

Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. General Valencia Tovar wa

chief of the Colombian Delegation to the Inter-Am

Defense Board in Washington, DC. He has publishe

11 books, among them the six-volume History 

Colombian Armed Forces.

CHARLES E. WILHELM is a retired general in th

Marine Corps. During his 37-year military career, G

Wilhelm saw combat service in Vietnam, Lebanon, So

and the Persian Gulf. An airborne-qualified in

officer, he commanded units at every level. In 1988, h

44
promoted to Brigadier General and served as Dire

Operations at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; D

Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon; D

Commander of the Joint Task Force PROVEN F

during the Persian Gulf War; Commander of the 

Marine Division; Commander of Marine Forces in So

Commander of the Marine Corps Combat Develo

Command; and Commander of Marine Forces i

Atlantic, Europe, and South America. In Septembe

General Wilhelm became Commander in Chief of th

Southern Command and directed U.S. Military oper

in the Caribbean and Central and South America un

retirement in September 2000. General Wilhelm h

B.S. in journalism from Florida Southern College, an

in management from Salve Regina University, a

Honorary Doctorate in international relations from F

Southern University. He is an honor graduate of the 

Infantry Officer’s Advance Course and a Distingu

Graduate of the Naval War College.

45
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

** ***

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Authors

Ricardo Arias Calderón

Gabriel Marcella

Chris Marquis

Alvaro Valencia Tovar

Charles E. Wilhelm

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams