COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00349-CV

D.R. HORTON - TEXAS, LTD. AND 

DRHI, INC.

APPELLANTS

V.

SAVANNAH PROPERTIES 

ASSOCIATES, L.P.

APPELLEE 

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FROM THE 362ND DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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OPINION

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I. Introduction

Appellants D.R. Horton – Texas, Ltd. (D.R. Horton) and DRHI, Inc. (DRHI) 

appeal a summary judgment in favor of Appellee Savannah Properties 

Associates, L.P. (Savannah). In three sub-issues, D.R. Horton and DRHI 

contend the trial court erred by not granting their motion for continuance of the 

submission date of Savannah’s summary judgment motions, by granting 
2

Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on its affirmative defenses of release, 

res judicata, novation, and limitations, and by granting Savannah’s no-evidence 

motion for summary judgment on D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s breach of contract, 

breach of warranty, negligence, and fraudulent inducement claims. We affirm.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises out of the second lawsuit between the parties. 

Savannah was the developer of multiple phases of residential single-family lots 

and commercial tracts in the Savannah Addition, a suburban development in 

Denton County, Texas. In February 2003, Savannah entered into a Contract of 

Purchase and Sale with DRHI (the Horton Contract) under which DRHI agreed to 

purchase from Savannah 800 residential lots in the Savannah Addition for the 

purpose of constructing single-family homes. In March 2003, Savannah and 

DRHI entered into another Contract of Purchase and Sale (the Continental 

Contract) under which DRHI agreed to purchase from Savannah 800 additional 

lots in the Savannah Addition for the same purpose.

DRHI transferred and assigned its rights and obligations under the Horton 

Contract and the Continental Contract to D.R. Horton. Savannah sold its interest 

in the Savannah Addition to CHS Savannah, L.P. (CHS) and assigned its rights 

and obligations under the Horton Contract and the Continental Contract to CHS.1

 1

CHS Savannah, L.P. is not a party to this appeal.
3

In 2007, a dispute arose between D.R. Horton and CHS over the Horton 

Contract and the Continental Contract. Savannah and CHS filed suit against 

D.R. Horton and DRHI, asserting breach of contract, fraud, and negligent 

misrepresentation claims arising from D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s alleged failure to 

purchase and close on the number of lots required by the Horton Contract and 

Continental Contract. D.R. Horton and DRHI filed counterclaims against 

Savannah and CHS, claiming they breached the Horton Contract and the 

Continental Contract by giving preferential treatment to another homebuilder 

working in the Savannah Addition.

D.R. Horton, DRHI, Savannah, and CHS settled the first lawsuit and 

entered into a settlement agreement under which the parties merged the 

Continental Contract into the Horton Contract so the Horton Contract was the 

only contract between the parties. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement 

agreement, CHS and D.R. Horton also amended the Horton Contract by entering 

into a Reinstatement of and Twelfth Amendment to Contract of Purchase and 

Sale (the Amended Contract). Under the terms of the settlement agreement, 

D.R. Horton and DRHI released Savannah and CHS from any and all claims 

belonging to D.R. Horton and DRHI, known or unknown, asserted or unasserted 

in the first lawsuit with respect to, arising from, or related in any way to the 

Horton Contract, the Continental Contract, the Savannah Addition, or the 

Amended Contract. As set forth in the settlement agreement, the parties filed a 
4

joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The trial court granted the motion 

and signed an order dismissing the first lawsuit with prejudice in May 2008.

On April 20, 2009, D.R. Horton and DRHI filed the present lawsuit against 

Savannah and CHS, asserting breach of contract, breach of warranty, and 

negligence claims arising out of Savannah’s and CHS’s alleged failure to 

properly prepare the soil on the lots they sold to D.R. Horton and DRHI for 

residential construction. In its answer, Savannah asserted the affirmative 

defense of release. Savannah filed a motion for summary judgment on its 

release defense, claiming D.R. Horton and DRHI released all claims against 

Savannah related to the Amended Contract and the Savannah Addition in the 

settlement agreement. The motion was denied.

On August 11, 2011, Savannah amended its answer to assert additional 

affirmative defenses, including res judicata, novation, and limitations. Savannah 

filed a motion for summary judgment on August 17, 2011 seeking a traditional

summary judgment on its res judicata, novation, and limitations defenses and a 

no-evidence summary judgment on D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s breach of contract, 

breach of warranty, and negligence claims. Savannah’s motion was set for 

submission on October 14, 2011. On October 12, 2011, D.R. Horton and DRHI 

filed a motion for continuance, claiming they needed additional time for 

discovery. Savannah’s motion was re-set for submission on January 13, 2012. 

On December 11, 2011, Savannah filed a motion asking the trial court to 
5

reconsider its order denying Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on its 

release defense.

The motion to reconsider and motions for summary judgment were heard 

by submission on January 13, 2012. On March 5, 2012, D.R. Horton and DRHI 

filed a fourth amended petition, asserting additional claims of fraudulent 

inducement and alter ego against Savannah. D.R. Horton and DRHI filed a fifth 

amended petition on March 27, 2012, adding a joint enterprise claim against 

Savannah. On April 17, 2012, Savannah filed a motion to strike these pleadings.

On April 17, 2012, the trial court granted (1) Savannah’s motion to 

reconsider, (2) Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on its release defense, 

(3) Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on its res judicata, novation, and 

limitations defenses, and (4) Savannah’s no-evidence motion for summary 

judgment on D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s breach of contract, breach of warranty, 

and negligence claims. The trial court did not specify the grounds upon which it 

relied in granting the motions.

Savannah filed an amended motion to strike D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s 

fourth and fifth amended petitions. The trial court granted the amended motion, 

striking all new, amended, or supplemental allegations relating to Savannah 

made in D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fourth and fifth amended petitions. The trial 

court then severed D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s claims against Savannah, thus 
6

making the court’s order on the motion to reconsider and motions for summary 

judgment final and appealable.2 This appeal followed.

III. Motion for Continuance

In their first sub-issue, D.R. Horton and DRHI contend the trial court 

abused its discretion by not continuing the January 13, 2012 submission of

Savannah’s motions for summary judgment. D.R. Horton and DRHI allege they 

did not have adequate time prior to the submission date to conduct discovery on 

their claims and on Savannah’s res judicata, novation, and limitations defenses. 

In response, Savannah contends D.R. Horton and DRHI failed to preserve error 

on this sub-issue because they did not set the motion for continuance for hearing 

or bring it to the trial court’s attention. Savannah also contends that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s motion for 

continuance because D.R. Horton and DRHI did not describe the evidence 

sought, explain its materiality, and show they had used due diligence in trying to 

obtain the evidence.3

 2

D.R. Horton and DRHI do not challenge on appeal the trial court’s ruling 

on Savannah’s motion to reconsider.

3

Savannah also claims the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

denying D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s motion for continuance because D.R. Horton 

and DRHI did not file an affidavit in support of their motion as required by Texas 

Rule of Civil Procedure 251. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. A review of the record, 

however, reveals that D.R. Horton and DRHI did file an affidavit in support of 

their motion.
7

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance for an abuse of 

discretion. See BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 

(Tex. 2002). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. In re 

Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding). Instead, 

we must determine whether the trial court’s action was so arbitrary and 

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Joe v. Two 

Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004). The test is whether 

the trial court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles. Cire v. 

Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).

B. Applicable Law

Rule 166a(g) permits a trial court to deny a motion for summary judgment 

or grant a continuance to the party opposing summary judgment if the party 

opposing summary judgment files an affidavit setting forth the reasons the party 

cannot present the facts necessary to respond to the motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 

166a(g); Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 662 (Tex. 2009). A motion 

for continuance seeking time for discovery must be supported by an affidavit that 

describes the evidence sought, explains its materiality, and shows that the party 

requesting the continuance has used due diligence to timely obtain the evidence.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 251, 252; Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 747 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) However, a litigant who fails to 

diligently use the rules of civil procedure for discovery purposes is not entitled to 
8

a continuance. State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 

1988). In deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion 

for continuance seeking additional time to conduct discovery, we consider factors 

such as the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and purpose 

of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the continuance has 

exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought. Two Thirty Nine Joint 

Venture, 145 S.W.3d at 161.

Under rule 166a(i), there is no specific minimum amount of time that a 

case must be pending before a trial court may entertain a no-evidence motion for 

summary judgment; the rule only requires an “adequate time for discovery.” See 

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). In considering whether the trial court permitted an 

adequate time for discovery, we consider the following factors: (1) the nature of 

the case, (2) the nature of the evidence necessary to controvert the no-evidence 

motion, (3) the length of time the case was active, (4) the amount of time the noevidence motion was on file, (5) whether the movant had requested stricter 

deadlines for discovery, (6) the amount of discovery that already had taken 

place, and (7) whether the discovery deadlines in place were specific or vague. 

McInnis v. Mallia, 261 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, 

no pet.)

C. Analysis

The record does not show that the motion for continuance was heard by or 

ruled upon by the trial court. However, assuming the trial court impliedly denied 
9

the motion for continuance,4 we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion. D.R. 

Horton and DRHI argue they needed additional time to conduct discovery so they 

could depose four of Savannah’s experts whose deposition notices Savannah 

quashed and redepose witnesses whose depositions were taken before 

Savannah asserted its res judicata, novation, and limitations defenses. D.R. 

Horton and DRHI complain they did not have adequate time to conduct discovery 

on Savannah’s res judicata, novation, and limitations defenses because 

Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on those defenses was served on 

D.R. Horton and DRHI just five days after those defenses were first pled by 

Savannah.5

Submission of Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on its newly pled 

affirmative defenses and D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s claims was originally 

 4

Compare Hightower v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 251 S.W.3d 218, 224–25 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. struck) (holding that appellant did not preserve 

error because he failed to obtain ruling on motion for continuance), and Dart v. 

Balaam, 953 S.W.2d 478, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (holding 

same), with Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(A) (providing that, to preserve error, trial 

court must have expressly or implicitly ruled on request, objection, or motion), 

and Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 114–15 (Tex. App.—Waco 

1999, no pet.) (holding that trial court impliedly ruled on motion for continuance 

by granting motion for summary judgment when appellant filed motion for 

continuance two days before summary judgment hearing).

5

D.R. Horton and DRHI also complain on appeal that the complexity of the 

case and the number of parties and attorneys involved necessitated additional 

time to conduct discovery with respect to their claims. These reasons were not 

included in D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s motion for continuance or the affidavit 

accompanying the motion as required by rules 251 and 252. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 

251, 252. Therefore, we do not consider them on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 

33.1(a).
10

scheduled for October 14, 2011 and was rescheduled for January 13, 2012. 

When the motions for summary judgment were submitted on January 13, the 

lawsuit had been on file for well over two years, and the motion for summary 

judgment on Savannah’s newly pled affirmative defenses and on D.R. Horton’s 

and DRHI’s claims had been on file for over five months. In their motion for 

continuance, D.R. Horton and DRHI did not identify which witnesses they needed 

to redepose. Nor did they explain the nature and materiality of the testimony 

they expected to elicit from these witnesses or from Savannah’s four expert 

witnesses. D.R. Horton and DRHI claim they exercised due diligence in 

obtaining discovery because they noticed Savannah’s expert witnesses for 

deposition, but Savannah quashed the notices. D.R. Horton and DRHI did not 

show they made another attempt to obtain these depositions in the intervening 

five months between the filing of the motions for summary judgment and the date 

the motions were submitted. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its 

discretion by denying the motion for continuance. We overrule D.R. Horton’s and 

DRHI’s first sub-issue.

IV. D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s Fraudulent Inducement Claim

As part of their third sub-issue, D.R. Horton and DRHI contend the trial 

court erred by granting Savannah’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment 

because Savannah did not address D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fraudulent 

inducement claim in its motion. In response, Savannah argues the trial court did 

not err by granting Savannah’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment 
11

because D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fraudulent inducement claim was made in 

amended pleadings filed after the submission of the summary judgment that 

were struck by the trial court.6

A. Applicable Law

Rule 166a(c) provides that a trial court shall render summary judgment if 

the pleadings and summary judgment evidence “on file at the time of the hearing, 

or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court” show the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). After 

a summary judgment hearing but before a trial court renders judgment, a party 

must obtain leave of the court to amend a pleading. Tex. R. Civ. P. 63; Austin v. 

Countrywide Homes Loans, 261 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2008, pet. denied) (“Once the hearing date for a motion for summary judgment 

has passed, the movant must secure a written order granting leave in order to file 

an amended pleading.”). A pleading filed after the summary judgment hearing 

without leave of court cannot be considered by the trial court. See Taylor v. 

Sunbelt Mgmt., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

1995, no writ) (stating “we cannot consider appellants' pleadings which were 

admittedly filed after the motion for summary judgment hearing”); W. Tex. Gas, 

Inc. v. 297 Gas Co., 864 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ) 

 6

D.R. Horton and DRHI do not challenge on appeal the trial court’s order 

striking all new, amended, or supplemental allegations relating to Savannah 

made in D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fourth and fifth amended petitions.
12

(holding trial court did not err by failing to consider amended petition filed after 

hearing without leave of court). Because an amendment that is not timely and 

not allowed by the trial court does not supersede the prior petition, the summary 

judgment movant need not amend or supplement his motion to address those 

claims. See Taylor, 905 S.W.2d at 745 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) and 

holding trial court did not err by granting summary judgment when new, 

unaddressed claims were added by amended petition filed after hearing without 

leave of court); W. Tex. Gas, Inc., 864 S.W.2d at 685 (same).

B. Analysis

D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fraudulent inducement claim was not contained 

in D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s pleadings on file at the time Savannah’s motions for 

summary judgment were submitted on January 13, 2012. D.R. Horton and DRHI 

asserted this cause of action in their fourth and fifth amended petitions, both of 

which were filed after the summary judgment submission date without leave of 

court. We presume that leave to amend was not granted unless the record 

shows that the trial court granted leave. See Austin, 261 S.W.3d at 76. Nothing 

in the record indicates the trial court granted leave or that D.R. Horton and DRHI 

sought leave. See Taylor, 905 S.W.2d at 745; W. Tex. Gas, Inc., 864 S.W.2d at 

685.

We hold the trial court did not err by rendering summary judgment in favor 

of Savannah because D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fraudulent inducement claim 

was contained in amended petitions that were filed without the court’s permission 
13

after the summary judgment had been heard by submission. See Taylor, 905 

S.W.2d at 745; W. Tex. Gas, Inc., 864 S.W.2d at 685. Accordingly, we overrule 

the portion of D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s third sub-issue challenging the noevidence summary judgment on D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s fraudulent 

inducement claim.

V. Motions for Summary Judgment

In their second sub-issue, D.R. Horton and DRHI contend the trial court 

erred by granting Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on its affirmative 

defenses of release, res judicata, novation, and limitations. In the remaining 

portions of their third issue, D.R. Horton and DRHI complain the trial court erred 

by granting Savannah’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on D.R. 

Horton’s and DRHI’s breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligence 

claims. Because Savannah’s release defense is dispositive of this case, we 

consider it first.7

A. Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 

315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the 

light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the 

 7

Although we usually address the no-evidence motion first when both noevidence and traditional summary judgment motions are filed, see Ford Motor 

Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004), we will review the propriety of 

granting the traditional summary judgment on Savannah’s release affirmative 

defense first because it is dispositive. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
14

nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the 

nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp 

Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every 

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, 

Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A defendant is entitled to 

summary judgment on an affirmative defense if the defendant conclusively 

proves all the elements of the affirmative defense. Frost Nat’l Bank v. 

Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508–09 (Tex. 2010); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), 

(c). To accomplish this, the defendant-movant must present summary judgment 

evidence that conclusively establishes each element of the affirmative defense. 

See Chau v. Riddle, 254 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. 2008). When, as here, the trial 

court’s summary judgment order does not state the basis for the trial court’s 

decision, we must affirm the order if any of the theories presented to the trial 

court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. See Provident Life & 

Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003); Star-Telegram, Inc. 

v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995).

B. Applicable Law

A release is an agreement or contract in which one party agrees that a 

legal right or obligation owed by the other party is surrendered. Dresser Indus., 

Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993). It is subject to 

the normal rules of contract construction, including the rules of ambiguity. Nat'l 

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 955 S.W.2d 120, 127 
15

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997), aff'd, 20 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. 2000). A 

release extinguishes a claim or cause of action and is an absolute bar to any 

right of action on the released matter. Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 508.

To release a claim effectively, the releasing instrument must “mention” the 

claim to be released. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 

(Tex. 1991); see Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 

Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tex. 2000). Claims not clearly within the subject 

matter of the release are not discharged, even if those claims exist when the 

release is executed. Keck, 20 S.W.3d at 698. It is not necessary, however, for 

the parties to anticipate and explicitly identify every potential cause of action 

relating to the subject matter of the release. Id. Although releases include 

claims existing at the time of execution, they may also include unknown claims 

and damages that develop in the future. See id.

In construing a release, as with other contracts, the primary effort is to 

ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties to the release, considering 

the instrument as a whole. Stafford v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 175 S.W.3d 537, 541 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (reasoning that a contract must be read as 

a whole rather than isolating a certain phrase, sentence, or section of the 

agreement). The contract’s language is to be given its plain grammatical 

meaning unless doing so would defeat the parties’ intent. Id. In determining 

intent, we must look to the contract, not what the parties allegedly meant. Union 

Pacific R.R. v. Novus Int'l, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
16

Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). An unambiguous contract will be enforced as written. 

David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. 2008). Parol 

evidence may not be introduced to create an ambiguity or to alter the intent of the 

parties as expressed in the instrument. Id.

C. Analysis

D.R. Horton and DRHI argue that their claims in the second lawsuit were 

not released because the settlement agreement does not release Savannah from 

“any duties, obligations, covenants, agreements or warranties set forth in the 

Amended Contract.” Savannah contends that, by the settlement agreement in 

the first lawsuit, D.R. Horton and DRHI released all of their claims against 

Savannah related to the Savannah Addition and the Amended Contract.

Paragraph 6 of settlement agreement provides as follows:

DRHI and [D.R. Horton], for and on behalf of themselves and their 

respective affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, predecessors, partners, 

owners, officers, directors, employees, representatives, members, 

attorneys, successors and assigns, if any (collectively, the ‘Horton 

Releasors’), hereby fully, finally, completely, generally and forever 

RELEASE, DISCHARGE, ACQUIT and RELINQUISH [Savannah]

and [CHS] and all of their respective affiliates, parents, subsidiaries, 

predecessors, partners (including, but not limited to, CH MM Denton 

LLC and Suncrest Savannah, L.P.), owners, officers, directors, 

employees, representatives, members, attorneys, successors and 

assigns, if any (collectively, the ‘Savannah Releasees’), of and from 

any and all claims, actions, demands, and causes of action, of 

whatever kind or character, in law or in equity, known or unknown, 

asserted or unasserted in the Lawsuit, as of the Effective Date, for 

any and all injuries, harm, damages, penalties, costs, fees, losses, 

expenses, liability, remedies, or other detriment, of whatever kind or 

character, which any of the Horton Releasors, jointly or severally, 

has, had or may have against any of the Savannah Releasees with

respect to, arising from or related in any way to the Horton Contract, 
17

the Continental Contract, the Amended Contract, or the Savannah 

Addition, including, without limitation, any such claims or causes of 

action that were or could have been brought in the Lawsuit (the 

“Horton Released Claim(s)”).

The language of paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement is unambiguous, and it 

releases any and all past, present, or future claims, actions, demands, and 

causes of action, of whatever kind or character, known or unknown, asserted or 

unasserted “with respect to, arising from, or related in any way to the Horton 

Contract, the Continental Contract, the Amended Contract, or the Savannah 

Addition.” D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s breach of contract, breach of warranty, and 

negligence claims all arise from Savannah’s alleged failure to prepare the soil on 

the lots in the Savannah Addition that were sold to D.R. Horton and DRHI and 

from Savannah’s alleged breach of the Amended Contract. Accordingly, D.R. 

Horton’s and DRHI’s claims in this lawsuit fall within the scope of paragraph 6.

D.R. Horton and DRHI do not dispute that their claims fall within the scope 

of paragraph 6 of the settlement agreement. Instead, they claim the settlement 

agreement did not release its claims in this lawsuit because those claims were 

preserved by paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement, which provides as 

follows:

Notwithstanding anything else to the contrary set forth in this 

Agreement, this Agreement is not intended to release and shall not 

release any Party from any duties, obligations, covenants,

agreements or warranties set forth in the Amended Contract, set 

forth in this Agreement, or set forth in any document hereafter 

executed that survives the execution of the Amended Contract, the 

termination thereof, or the closing of lots under the Amended 

Contract, such as, but without limitation, the obligation of CHS 
18

Savannah under the Earnest Money Deed of Trust (as defined in the 

Amended Contract). Additionally, notwithstanding anything else to 

the contrary contained in this Agreement, with respect to lots 

previously purchased and sold under the Horton Contract or the 

Continental Contract, this Agreement is not intended to and shall not 

release any Party from any duties, obligations, covenants, 

agreements or warranties pertaining to title set forth in or arising 

from any deed related to the prior purchase and sale of such lots.

D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s claims against Savannah do not arise from the 

duties, obligations, covenants, agreements, or warranties set forth in the 

settlement agreement or any document executed after the settlement agreement. 

Nor do D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s claims pertain to title. D.R. Horton and DRHI 

assert that their claims in this suit are based upon the “duties, obligations, 

covenants, agreements or warranties set forth in the Amended Contract” and 

were therefore not released by the settlement agreement. Savannah, however, 

is not a party to the Amended Contract. Therefore, it has no duties or obligations 

under the Amended Contract and is not subject to any covenants, agreements, 

or warranties set forth therein. See, e.g., Beaumont v. Excavators & Constrs.,

870 S.W.2d 123, 129 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1993, writ denied) (“[A] contract 

between other parties cannot create an obligation or duty on a non-contracting 

party . . . .”).

In response to Savannah’s summary judgment motion, D.R. Horton and 

DRHI offered the affidavit of Les Brannon. Brannon was the Region Counsel for 

the South Region of D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s parent company at the time the 

settlement agreement and the Amended Contract were executed. In his capacity 
19

as Region Counsel, Brannon was involved in the drafting and negotiation of the 

settlement agreement and the Amended Contract on behalf of D.R. Horton and 

DRHI. According to Brannon, paragraph 7 of the settlement agreement was 

included to make clear that any references to releases in the settlement 

agreement were not intended to release any party from the surviving duties, 

obligations, covenants, agreements, or warranties set forth in the Amended 

Contract or any other documents referenced in paragraph 7 of the settlement 

agreement. Brannon further states that the phrase, “Notwithstanding anything 

else to the contrary set forth in this Agreement,” was added to paragraph 7 to 

expressly exclude those surviving duties, obligations, covenants, agreements, 

and warranties from the mutual releases set forth in the settlement agreement. 

Brannon claims D.R. Horton and DRHI would not have entered into the 

settlement agreement if the existing surviving duties, obligations, covenants, 

agreements, or warranties expressly set forth in the Amended Contract as not 

being subject to any release had not been excluded from the mutual releases in 

the Settlement Agreement. Brannon further states that the lots purchased under 

the Horton Contract and Continental Contract are the subject of the second 

lawsuit, and the subject matter of the second lawsuit is unrelated to the issues 

litigated in the first lawsuit. Brannon’s affidavit testimony, however, is parol 

evidence that cannot be properly considered to change the written terms of the 

release. See David J. Sacks, P.C., 266 S.W.3d at 451. And to the extent that 

this parol evidence contradicts the plain meaning of the settlement agreement, 
20

this evidence is incompetent to change the agreement’s unambiguous language. 

See White Oak Operating Co., LLC v. BLR Const. Cos., LLC, 362 S.W.3d 725, 

734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

We conclude that the settlement agreement releases all of D.R. Horton’s 

and DRHI’s claims against Savannah related to the Amended Contract and the 

Savannah Addition, which include D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s breach of contract, 

breach of warranty, and negligence claims in this lawsuit. Therefore, Savannah 

conclusively proved its affirmative defense of release as a matter of law, and the 

trial court did not err by granting summary judgment. We overrule the portion of 

sub-issue two challenging the summary judgment in favor of Savannah on its 

release affirmative defense. Because we have concluded the trial court properly 

granted Savannah’s motion for summary judgment on Savannah’s release 

defense, which is dispositive of this appeal, we need not address the remainder 

of sub-issues two and three. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

VI. Conclusion

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not continuing the 

submission date of Savannah’s summary judgment motions, and therefore, we

overrule D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s first sub-issue. We also hold the trial court 

did not err by rendering summary judgment in favor of Savannah on D.R. 

Horton’s and DRHI’s fraudulent inducement claim against Savannah, and we 

accordingly overrule that portion of D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s third sub-issue. 

We further hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor 
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of Savannah on its affirmative defense of release, and we overrule that portion of 

D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s second sub-issue. Therefore, we need not address 

the portions of D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s second sub-issue challenging the 

summary judgment in favor of Savannah on its res judicata, novation, and 

limitations defenses or the portions of D.R. Horton’s and DRHI’s third sub-issue

challenging the no-evidence summary judgment in favor of Savannah on D.R. 

Horton’s and DRHI’s claims for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and 

negligence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

ANNE GARDNER

JUSTICE

PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: November 7, 2013