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ISBN 1-930831-00-5
Europe’s New Defense

Ambitions: 

Implications for NATO, the US, 

and Russia

By Peter van Ham

Dr. Peter van Ham is a professor of West European Politics at the George C.

Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch–Partenkirchen,

Germany. He recently published A Critical Approach to European Security

(London: Pinter, 1999). A new book on European integration theory

(European Integration and the Postmodern Condition) is forthcoming from

Routledge (2001). 
Foreword

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is proud to issue

this inaugural edition of the Marshall Center Papers. Dr. Peter van Ham’s paper,

“Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia,”

sets the tone for our new monograph series. The Marshall Center Papers are

specifically created to disseminate scholarly monographs that explore and influence

the resolution of Atlantic-European-Eurasian security issues. Dr. van Ham’s paper

provides an articulate analysis of the most vital of current international defense

issues: the future of cooperative security in Europe.

The search for a European security identity periodically opens major debates

that push policy makers in new, sometimes revolutionary directions. The war in

Kosovo and the American-dominated air campaign have rekindled an old debate on

the future of European defense capabilities. At issue is how to resolve the potential

contradictions between a “Common European Security and Defense Policy” and

the maintenance of a strong transatlantic alliance. 

At the same time, the European Union has set itself the remarkable task of

rapidly absorbing the Western European Union and creating a European rapid

reaction corps. Both the speed and the scope of these reforms are impressive. They

may alter the strategic landscape quite fundamentally. The United States has

officially endorsed the European goals, although warning against the three “D”s—

Duplication, Decoupling, and Discrimination. 

Peter van Ham has devoted this study to exploring the impact of the Common

European Security and Defense Policy upon NATO, the United States, and Russia.

He laments the lack of frankness in recent debates and poses a number of sensitive

questions. Will Russia turn hostile to European ambitions, as the European Union

acquires military muscle? Will the United States have to accept the duplication of

some NATO assets? Will the Central Europeans first suffer from discrimination

(because few of them will soon join the European Union) and then worry about the

decoupling of the Atlantic Alliance? His answers are provocative but scholarly, and

his prediction of growing tensions in the Atlantic Alliance deserves a wide

readership.

Robert Kennedy, PhD

Director

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

iii
Executive Summary

At the European Union’s Helsinki summit of December

1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the

development of a new Common European Security and

Defense Policy (CESDP) aimed at giving the European Union

(EU) a stronger role in international affairs backed by a

credible military force. At Helsinki, EU Member States

committed themselves to a number of military “headline

goals”: by the year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up

to 60,000 troops for so–called “Petersberg” (i.e., humanitarian,

rescue, and peacekeeping) missions. This new EU–led rapid

reaction force should be deployable within 60 days and be able

to sustain deployment for at least one year.

This Marshall Center Paper analyzes the processes

leading to Helsinki by examining why and how this new

European consensus on defense issues came about. It takes the

pulse of the EU’s emerging defense policy and touches upon

the main controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What

are the national interests and driving forces behind it, and what

steps still need to be taken to realize Europe’s ambitions to

achieve a workable European crisis management capability?

Particular attention is paid to the implications of an emerging

European defense capability for the future of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the transatlantic

relationship, and the role of Russia in Europe.

The paper argues that the political and strategic

consequences of injecting defense issues into the structures of

the EU remain unclear. Although Europe’s defense ambitions

are not designed to undermine NATO, they do place into

question NATO’s future role in the management of European

security. Transatlantic tensions over the relationship between

v
vi

the “New EU” (i.e., an EU with its own military capabilities)

and NATO are already evident. The Kosovo air war of Spring

1999 was a turning point for Europeans, in that the war

highlighted the superiority of American military resources and

infrastructures. The war demonstrated that, despite years of

talk and paperwork, Europeans were still unable to back up

their economic and diplomatic prowess with military means.

“Kosovo” made it painfully clear that Europe depends upon

American military capabilities. It also accentuated the fact that

US leadership in Europe is problematic and that Washington is

unwilling to incur casualties in European conflicts where US

national interests are not clearly at stake.

The paper looks at three policy issues that remain

unresolved and that are bound to cause transatlantic problems

over the next few years. The first is how closely should the

EU’s CESDP duplicate NATO’s existing capabilities and

institutional structures? The second concerns how to

“sequence” the decision making processes in case of wars or

crises and in the real military challenges the EU is likely to

face in the decade ahead. The third involves the impact of a

new strategic balance within the Atlantic Alliance on Europe’s

defense industrial base, and vice versa.

However, the EU’s recent foray into things military has

wider implications. For example, how will Moscow come to

see the prospective enlargement of the EU in the direction of

Central Europe— possibly including the Baltic states— when

such an expansion would extend Europe’s “sphere of

influence” toward the territory of the former Soviet Union?

Will Russia alter its now rather positive attitude toward EU

enlargement and adopt a more hostile approach when the EU

takes on a more military guise? The general trend in

governmental circles in Moscow is to welcome the EU’s
vii

military plans as a step to rid Europe of American hegemony

and NATO–centrism. From this perspective, a European

CESDP is looked upon as a means to preclude a unipolar

world led by the United States. 

Not very surprisingly, this may also be one of the main

reasons why many Central European countries are cautious

about dealing with defense issues outside the well–known and

tested NATO framework. Countries like the Czech Republic,

Hungary, and Poland fear that Europe’s defense plans may

undermine the relevance of NATO. The EU’s new defense

ambitions are also of concern to western allies outside the EU

who are anxious to keep NATO as the ultimate center for the

organization of European security. Although neither Russia

nor Central Europe is part of the EU, their worries and

concerns are going to have an impact on how Europe’s defense

plans develop. Although Russia’s reactions to the EU’s new

defense ambitions remain ambivalent, it is unlikely that its

position will pose serious difficulties for the EU’s overall

strategy to integrate Russia into Europe.

The paper concludes that the EU’s new defense moves

illustrate that EU Member States now consider the risk that a

new European military force might undermine NATO is less

significant than the threat posed by the status quo. Without a

rebalanced transatlantic relationship, NATO would certainly

fall into decay. However, if Europe’s CESDP is injudiciously

managed, Europe may end up with the worst of both worlds: a

weak EU and a weakened NATO. n
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions:

Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia

Introduction1

At the European Union’s Helsinki summit on December

10–11, 1999, European leaders took a decisive step toward the

development of a new Common European Security and

Defense Policy (CESDP) aimed at giving the European Union

(EU) a stronger role in international affairs backed by credible

military force. After many years of talking about a possible

European Common Defense Policy (CDP), European

governments finally defined the military dimension of their

economic and political union. This remarkable expression of

collective political will to build a European defense capability

is a defining moment in the process of European integration,

giving the EU for the first time since 1954— when the attempt

to set up a European Defense Community (EDC) failed— a

distinct military component.

This paper analyzes the processes that led to Helsinki by

examining why and how this new European consensus on

defense issues came about. What are the national interests and

driving forces behind it, and what steps still need to be taken

to realize Europe’s ambitions to achieve a workable European

crisis management capability? Obviously a lot needs to be

done to provide the EU with a powerful military force capable

of acting autonomously in and around Europe. Particular

attention will be paid to the implications of an emerging

European defense capability for the futures of both the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the transatlantic

relationship, as well as its impact on the role of Russia in

Europe. 

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

1
Peter van Ham

2

Although Europe’s defense ambitions are not designed to

undermine NATO, the EU’s new plans do raise questions

about the role NATO is to play in the management of European

security in the decade to come. Transatlantic tensions over the

relationship between the “New EU” (i.e., an EU with its own

military capabilities) and NATO are already evident. NATO’s

Secretary General Lord Robertson captured this unease well,

by arguing that “[t]here has always been a bit of schizophrenia

about America, on the one hand saying ‘You Europeans have

got to carry more of the burden,’ and then when the Europeans

say ‘OK, we’ll carry more of the burden,’ they say ‘Well, wait

a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?’”2 The

transatlantic strain over the organization of European defense

also testifies to significant differences in strategic vision, as

well as in the practicalities of force planning and military

capabilities. Whereas the United States has a global vision, the

EU’s emerging defense strategy and military planning will

focus almost entirely on the European region. This

global/regional dichotomy is bound to increase US–EU

tensions over security strategy. This, in turn, may exacerbate

American concern over Europe’s latest defense ambitions.

What is more, given the process of European integration, a

distinct military character will alter the EU’s relationship with

Russia. The EU has now initiated accession negotiations with

the majority of Central European countries who want to join

the European integration process primarily for economic and

political reasons, and who still look to NATO as the principal

source of their “hard” (i.e., military) security. But, how will

Moscow come to see the prospective enlargement of the EU in

the direction of Central Europe, possibly including the Baltic

states, when such an expansion would extend Europe’s “sphere

of influence” toward the territory of the former Soviet Union?

Perhaps Russia will alter its now rather positive attitude
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

3

toward EU enlargement and adopt a more hostile approach

when the EU takes on a more military guise? Europe’s recent

foray into things military is also of concern to western allies

outside the EU who are anxious to keep NATO as the ultimate

center for the organization of European security. Although

neither Russia nor Central Europe is part of the EU, their

worries and concerns are going to have an impact on the

further development of Europe’s new defense plans.

This Marshall Center Paper takes the pulse of the EU’s

emerging defense policy and touches upon the main

controversies and challenges that still exist between good

intentions and the creation of rapidly deployable expeditionary

forces that would give Europe’s diplomacy a military

backbone. The paper will argue that the implications of

injecting defense issues into the structures of the EU remain

unclear and that the practical organization of the CESDP will

pose a serious challenge to both Europe and the United States

to maintain NATO’s leading role in European security.

Although Russia’s reactions remain ambivalent to the EU’s

new defense ambitions, it is unlikely that its position will pose

serious difficulties in the EU’s overall strategy to integrate

Russia into Europe.

The Road Toward a Common European Defense Policy

Two events have stimulated European governments to

rethink their commitment to define a common European

defense policy and capability. The first took place in 1997

when the Labour government of Prime Minister Tony Blair,

determined to demonstrate the United Kingdom’s central role

in Europe, took the initiative on the restructuring of European

defense cooperation. This was done in part to compensate for

the United Kingdom’s self–chosen exclusion from other
Peter van Ham

4

Membership

Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway,

Poland, Turkey, United States

Denmark

Belgium, France, Germany, 

Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 

Netherlands, 

Portugal, Spain, 

United Kingdom

Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland

*WEU:

Associate Members: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey

Associate Partners: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia

Observers: Denmark, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden
European projects— most notably the European Monetary

Union (EMU). 

The other turning point for the Europeans was the Kosovo

air war. The war made it clear that the United States had better

resources for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;

more accurate precision–guided munitions; as well as superior

air and sealift resources, logistics, and communications. The

Kosovo experience highlighted, in dramatic relief, NATO’s

internal capability gap. It demonstrated that, despite years of

talk and paperwork, Europeans could still not back up their

economic and diplomatic prowess with military means. Most

EU Member States— particularly France and the United

Kingdom— were also deeply concerned about the complex and

inept EU/Western European Union (WEU) and NATO

decision making processes for European military crisis

management. The Kosovo crisis has, therefore, done more for

the development of Europe’s defense identity than the decade

of post–Maastricht deliberations on the EU’s Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its ensuing CDP.

At the informal European Council meeting in the Austrian

town of Pörtschach, October 24–25, 1998, Britain for the first

time publicly referred to its altered position on European

defense cooperation, stating that Europe’s Bosnia and Kosovo

policies were “unacceptable” and marked by “weakness and

confusion.” Pörtschach, therefore, symbolizes the first,

explicit step by EU Member States toward establishing a

European crisis management capability backed by a more

effective military infrastructure. 

The European defense debate received additional

momentum with the “Joint Declaration on European Defence,”

the joint communiqué generated by the Franco–British summit

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

5
Peter van Ham

6

in St. Malo, France, on December 3–4, 1998. St. Malo was

hailed by officials and the media alike as a true “watershed” in

the EU’s security approach. St. Malo was seen as opening the

door to the possibility of a genuine Europeanization of defense

in the decade to come. For the first time, Europe’s defense

ambitions dealt with military substance rather than with

institutional niceties. St. Malo accepted the French position

that the “Union must have the capability for autonomous

action” on defense matters; whereas Britain was keen to stress

the organic link between the EU and NATO. Both countries

declared that “the Union must be given appropriate structures

and a capacity for analysis of situation, sources of intelligence

and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without

unnecessary duplication” of what already exists within NATO.

Although much remained undefined at St. Malo (the EU’s

ties with WEU, for example), it is difficult to overstate the

historic significance of the intensification of Franco–British

security cooperation that took place. Without the combined

political and military weight of both countries it would be

impossible to envision a credible common European defense

policy. Under Tony Blair, Downing Street adopted the French

view that a more robust European defense capability would

not undermine the transatlantic

relationship, but would, quite to the

contrary, be an essential element that

would keep the Atlantic Alliance

relevant and the United States

involved in the management of

European security. By crossing the

European Rubicon on defense

issues, Britain opened a new chapter

in European integration, permitting

a new security and defense dialogue

Britain opened a

new chapter in

European

integration by

crossing the

European Rubicon

on defense issues 
between “Brussels” and Washington. Initially, Paris seemed to

be both puzzled and irritated by the sudden change in Britain’s

position on European defense. French officials, therefore,

accentuated the continued relevance of WEU and the necessity

to keep European resources and decision making structures

independent of NATO and the United States. France further

argued for a strong EU–based military committee; for the EU

to have the capacity for autonomous action without recourse to

NATO assets; for the urgent development of European

strategic transport and intelligence capabilities; and, as well,

for the preservation of an Article V (collective defense)

commitment among the full members of WEU.

Kosovo: A Watershed in European Defense. The

combined German presidencies of the EU and WEU during the

first half of 1999 gave Berlin an opportunity to develop the

new impetus to give the CFSP credible operational capabilities

and to prepare the ground for the required institutional changes

in the EU’s infrastructure. At the same time as the debate

ensued concerning a new EU defense role, developments in

Kosovo confronted European governments with the fact that

they were militarily impotent to support regional crisis

management, even in a situation that was in immediate

geographic proximity.

The war over Kosovo quickly became a turning point. It

was because of Kosovo that Europe was forced to reconsider

what the EU/WEU and NATO could, and should, be able to do

in the complex fields of crisis prevention, crisis management,

peacekeeping, and warfare.3 From the onset of the war,

Washington determined the tone and policies of the

“international community.” During the war the United States

quite literally called most of the shots, while the European

allies played a more modest and low–key role. Although

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

7
Peter van Ham

8

NATO policy guided the war and was agreed upon in the North

Atlantic Council (NAC), among no less than 19 countries,

almost all of the intelligence information upon which

decisions were made (i.e., where, when, and what to bomb)

came from American sources. The missions were then mainly

executed by American aircrews, mainly using the American

military infrastructure.

“Kosovo” made it painfully

clear that Europe depends upon

American military capabilities.

However, it also underlined the

reality that US leadership in Europe

is tenuous and that most Americans

are unwilling to risk their lives in

messy European conflicts in which

their national interests are hardly at

stake. The lesson for Europeans is

evident: the United States remains

crucial for the maintenance of the

peace and security of the continent as long as Europe lacks the

willingness to assume more responsibility for its own defense.

This main “lesson of Kosovo” has, therefore, stimulated a

rethinking of European defense cooperation, not in order to

undermine NATO, but to provide the EU with the military

means to support its available diplomatic means. No European

country today calls for a European army, but most call for

Europe to embrace the necessity of establishing a partnership

with the United States based on more balanced military

capabilities and shared political leadership. In March 1999,

Prime Minister Blair noted that “[w]e Europeans should not

expect the United States to have to play a part in every disorder

in our own back yard. The European Union should be able to

take on some security tasks on our own, and we will do better

Kosovo made it

painfully clear 

that Europe

depends upon

American military

capabilities, yet 

US leadership in

Europe is tenuous
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

9

through a common European effort than we can by individual

countries acting on their own.”4

NATO’s Washington summit on April 24, 1999, basically

supported the trend toward a more pronounced and forceful

European defense capability. The summit communiqué

acknowledged “the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for

autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve

military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.”

It was stated that NATO was prepared to make “the necessary

arrangements” to give the EU access to the collective assets

and capabilities of the Alliance, as well as to ensure the EU

access to NATO’s planning capabilities. However, despite the

rhetoric of transatlantic cooperation, considerable controversy

remained after the summit over the exact meaning of

“autonomous action,” “ready access,” and the “presumption of

availability” of NATO assets.

At the EU’s subsequent summit in Cologne, Germany,

June 3–4, 1999, European governments committed themselves

for the first time unequivocally to a common European

defense policy. They declared that “the Union must have the

capability for autonomous action, backed up by credible

military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a

readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises

without prejudice to actions by NATO.” In order to achieve

this goal, EU leaders saw the need to strengthen European

capabilities in the fields of intelligence; strategic transport;

command and control— which implies efforts to adapt,

exercise, and bring together national and multinational

European forces; as well as to strengthen the industrial and

technological defense base. At Cologne, EU Member States

also prepared the political ground to put into place the

appropriate decision making mechanisms for crisis
Peter van Ham

10

management and to secure political

control and strategic direction of

future EU–led military operations.5

Modalities of Europe’s

Common Defense. The decisions

reached at Cologne were formalized

at the EU’s Helsinki summit of

December 1999. Many important

questions were left unresolved, but

decisions were made in Helsinki that

allowed Europe’s future defense

structure to be formulated. EU

leaders decided to add military

muscle to Europe’s already

significant economic and financial

clout by establishing new permanent

political and military bodies within

the EU Council:

• A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), to deal

with all aspects of the CFSP, including the CESDP. During a

military crisis, this PSC will exercise political and strategic

direction of the operation— under the authority of the Council;

• A Military Committee (MC), composed of EU Member

States’ Chiefs of Defense, or their military representatives. The

MC will give military advice and make recommendations to

the PSC; and

• A Military Staff (MS) to provide the Council with military

expertise and support to the CESDP. The MS will perform

early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for

the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management

(“Petersberg”) tasks.

EU leaders 

added military

muscle to

Europe’s already

significant

economic and

financial clout by

establishing new

permanent political

and military bodies

within the 

EU Council
At Helsinki, EU Member States further committed

themselves to a number of military “headline goals”: by the

year 2003, the EU should be able to deploy up to 15 brigades

(or 50,000–60,000 troops) for Petersberg missions. The

brigades should be militarily self–sustaining and be comprised

of the necessary command, control, and intelligence

capabilities; logistics; and other infrastructures, to include

about 500 aircraft and 15 ships. These new EU troops should

be rapidly deployable— within 60 days— and be able to sustain

such a deployment for at least 1 year. Around 150,000 troops

will be required for rotation purposes. The main aim would,

therefore, be for EU states to have enough forces at hand to

form the equivalent of an army corps of anywhere from 40,000

to 60,000 men. Such a corps would out of necessity be

self–sufficient in terms of logistics, intelligence, and

communications, and be ready for use in time of need for tasks

in which the United States and/or NATO decide not to become

engaged.

In order to prepare for these huge changes within the EU,

the Union’s General Affairs Council will work with the 15 EU

national Defense Ministers to expand on the headline and

capability goals. These EU Defense Ministers decided at an

informal meeting in Sintra, Portugal, in February 2000, that

the EU’s temporary structures, the Political and Security

Committee (PSC), Military Committee (MC), and Military

Staff (MS), would prepare to start their operations in March

2000. A so–called Force Generation Conference is to be held

at the end of 2000. At that conference each Member State will

earmark the resources it can contribute to the EU’s rapid

reaction force. The EU also intends to increase its efforts to

encourage the restructuring of the European defense industry

to make sure that the CESDP will have a solid basis for

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

11
autonomous action and not be dependent upon external—

mostly US— military infrastructures and equipment. France

and the United Kingdom have made their joint service

headquarters available for commanding EU–led military

operations.6

Although the dimensions of the CESDP are now becoming

clear, much remains vague and undecided. It is, for example,

questionable that the EU can set up a credible and effective

military infrastructure without de facto setting up a “general

staff” and creating its own military chain–of–command. For

the time being, many EU Member States seem reluctant to go

that far, mainly because this would acknowledge the need for

further duplication of NATO functions. The Helsinki

declaration is also elusive on how working relations with

NATO should be developed over the months to come. Starting

with the statement that “[t]he European Union should have the

autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a

whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU–led

military operations,” it also affirms a willingness to conduct

“the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with

NATO and its non–EU members.” However, because this

should be done only “with full respect for the decision–making

autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of

the Union,” it remains unclear what impact non–EU states can

have on Europe’s CESDP. (See below for a more in–depth

debate of this issue.) The more exact and concrete modalities

for consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the

EU and NATO— and especially with the United States— are

still to be developed. In the meantime much will, therefore,

depend upon the informal contacts between the EU’s High

Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, and NATO’s new

Secretary General, Lord Robertson.

Peter van Ham

12
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

13

Finding a New Transatlantic Military Balance

Ever since NATO’s Brussels summit of 1994, the United

States has, at least rhetorically, supported the development of

a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and

expressed its readiness to make Alliance assets and capabilities

available for WEU operations. Although American media were

somewhat dumbfounded by what was generally seen as an

overly ambitious European attempt to go it alone and establish

a European military union (akin to the other EMU), US

officials have aired their agreement with Europe’s military

push. At first, however, Washington was concerned with the

message of the EU’s Cologne summit of June 1999, where the

Europeans proposed to give the EU a defense character

without committing themselves concretely to a commensurate

increase in Europe’s military capabilities. In this respect, the

subsequent Helsinki summit was reassuring to the United

States, because it embedded the CESDP within the Atlantic

security framework and followed through with concrete

military headline goals.

In December 1999, following the Helsinki summit, US

Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott argued that “[t]here

should be no confusion about America’s position on the need

for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not

ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see

a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if

NATO is not engaged, on its own. Period, end of debate.”7

But, of course, the transatlantic debate over the reorganization

of European security and defense has just started in earnest,

with many a serious quarrel and argument lying ahead. One of

the main questions will be why, or perhaps even whether, the

United States has given up its resistance to the organization of

European defense within the EU. (Of course, answering this
question depends to a large extent on the outcome of the US

presidential elections of November 2000. An Al Gore

administration may be more supportive of Europe’s new

defense ambitions than a George W. Bush administration.)

One classical American argument against an EU–based

security system is that this would provide a backdoor security

guarantee to EU members, both present and future, who are

not covered by NATO’s Article 5. Because EU Member States

like Finland and Austria, who are not members of NATO, will

participate fully in the EU’s CESDP, they will indirectly affect

the European input into NATO and may in crisis situations call

upon the United States for military assistance. Other crucial

questions remain outstanding: Are policy makers in

Washington no longer concerned about the possible emergence

of an “EU caucus” within NATO which may present the

United States with inflexible European policy positions and

faits accomplis? Is America now

ready to give up its influence over

European security and hand over its

position of benign hegemonic

leadership to the EU?

Clearly, the British change of

heart on European defense urges the

United States to rethink its attitude

toward the EU’s budding defense

ambitions. Now that Washington has

“lost” its staunchest ally with an

undiluted Atlanticist security

orientation, the United States feels

that the vitality of the Alliance may

well be renewed by supporting the

CESDP. What is more, the Kosovo

Peter van Ham

14

The Kosovo

experience taught

Europeans some

embarrassing

lessons and

convinced many in

the United States

that crises in the

EU's backyard

should be solved

by the Europeans

themselves
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

15

experience not only offered Europeans some embarrassing

lessons, but it convinced many in the United States that crises

in the EU’s backyard should preferably be solved by the

Europeans themselves. However, the timing and the vague

modalities of Europe’s defense adolescence still trigger ample

American Angst. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s

famous “three D”s illustrate these concerns. Washington does

not want: a decoupling of Europe’s security from that of

America’s; a duplication of effort and capabilities; or

discrimination against those allies outside the EU. Although

Lord Robertson formulated a looser, and less negative, “three

I”s (i.e., the indivisibility of the transatlantic link; the

improvement of European capabilities; and the inclusiveness of

all allies in Europe’s defense policy), working out the difficult

practicalities of the CESDP is bound to become a source of

strain in US–EU relations.

America’s Ambiguous Enthusiasm. Apart from good

intentions on both sides of the Atlantic, little is clear in the

emerging new balance of power between the EU and NATO

and, hence, between “Europe” and the United States. Whereas

WEU has always been an unequal partner of NATO in the

defense field, the EU is bound to play a much more assertive

and forceful role in shaping Europe’s institutional security

landscape. Unlike NATO, the “New EU” will not only have a

sturdy military capability at its disposal, but also a broad

arsenal of economic, financial, and political instruments of

statecraft. Given that most of Europe’s regional problems and

conflicts may not be truly resolved by military means— at least

not in the long run— the EU is bound to become the actor of

choice to address European security challenges. 

To all but a few Atlanticist purists, it is obvious that the

strategic balance within NATO is in need of urgent change.
Although the Kosovo experience has exposed this unhealthy

imbalance within the Atlantic Alliance, the lack of frankness in

the debate remains worrisome.8 Europeans and Americans

alike know that NATO and the transatlantic relationship have

to be recast and that this will be a painful and problematic

exercise. It seems fair to say that if the EU is serious about its

intent to establish a common European defense policy, the

ultimate objective is to lessen Europe’s military dependency

on America. Meanwhile, the EU now wants to have the

possibility of fighting a Kosovo–like war without the consent

and military support of the United States. This is, one would

assume, nothing to be ashamed of and should be considered a

normal ambition for an economic and political

superpower–in–the–making like the EU. However, underneath

the varnish of the Clinton administration’s cautious support

lingers the concern that a more self–reliant Europe will

undermine the old NATO tradition of US hegemony and,

therefore, risk a transatlantic decoupling. Both Europeans and

Americans also fear that an increasingly isolationist and

unilateralist US Congress might react to a stronger European

defense by arguing that it is now time to leave European

security to the EU and bring home American troops.9 On the

other hand, it is understood that the US Congress may well be

more likely to continue its support for NATO if the Europeans

are serious defense partners. Based on the EU’s new defense

moves, EU Member States have decided that the risk that a

new European military force might undermine NATO is less

significant than the threat posed by the status quo. Given these

political imponderables, much attention is being paid to the

managing and packaging of a rebalanced EU–US/NATO

relationship.

There are three questions that remain unresolved that are

bound to cause transatlantic problems over the next few years.

Peter van Ham

16
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

17

The first is how closely should the EU’s CESDP duplicate

NATO’s existing capabilities and institutional structures? The

second concerns how to “sequence” the decision making

processes in case of wars or crises and in the real military

challenges the EU is likely to face in the decade ahead. The

third involves the impact of the new strategic balance within

the Alliance on Europe’s defense industrial base— and vice

versa.

The Duplication Dilemma. French Defense Minister

Alain Richard argued that “[w]hat fear of duplication really

conceals is worry [in the United States] about the appearance

of a new political partner, the European Union.”10 Although

the Helsinki decisions look impressive on paper, it is clear that

the EU’s military infrastructure will remain rather modest and

nowhere near the size of the NATO military staff. A European

military secretariat, reporting to Solana, will decide how many

military planners the EU needs in its defense organization. The

EU’s defense organization will, in any case, draw heavily on

planning done in the EU’s Member States. The EU’s plans

certainly do not involve, or imply, setting up standing

European armed forces with a permanent multinational

command, at least not for the near future. But, it will be

difficult to foresee a serious CESDP that does not acquire

better defense technology, better trained and deployable

troops, as well as at least some parallel military structure.

It is on this point that Europe’s harsh political reality could

start to overtake the strategy laid out at Helsinki, because it

seems evident that EU Member States at present do not wish

to allocate sufficient money to buy first–class, home–grown

defense systems— ranging from intelligence gathering

equipment, precision–guided weapons, and electronic warfare

capabilities, to search and rescue forces. Although Europe
spends 60 per cent of what the

United States does on defense, the

Kosovo war exposed Europe’s

weaknesses. Despite having two

million people in uniform, NATO’s

European members were hardly able

to place 40,000 troops in position in

time to fight a regional war. Most

European troops are still designed to

repel a Soviet ground attack, rather than to rapidly deploy

troops to nearby crisis situations. Because there is hardly any

public support to increase defense spending, much is being

made of trying to spend money more wisely and operating

more efficiently by cooperating more closely on the European

level. Lord Robertson argued perceptively that “[i]f you’ve got

a budget that is 60 per cent of the American budget and is

probably turning out 10 per cent of the capability then that is

your first big problem . . . You can actually spend more money

quite easily and get zero increase in capability.”11

But, is it really realistic to assume that Europe is spending

enough on defense and all it needs to do is create more synergy

and achieve more efficient defense cooperation? Money may

be better spent to get “more bang for the Euro,” but, as John

Chipman has argued: “Unless defense expenditure is allowed

substantially to increase, the build–up of a serious [European]

defense capacity will remain the stuff of communiqués.”12

According to NATO figures, the United States spends about

3.2 per cent of its GDP on defense (down from 6 per cent

during the Cold War), with France and the United Kingdom

spending 2.8 and 2.6 per cent, respectively; Germany (1.5) and

Spain (1.4) find themselves at the low end of the spectrum. On

average, defense spending by NATO’s European members has

dropped by 22 per cent since 1992. It is of no surprise,

Peter van Ham

18

NATO's European

members had two

million soldiers,

yet had difficulty

providing 40,000

troops for Kosovo
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

19

therefore, that the United States is calling upon its European

allies to take on a bigger share of the defense burden within

NATO. In December 1999, US Secretary of Defense William

Cohen criticized Germany for spending too little on defense,

arguing that this has a “profound and lasting impact on the

capabilities, not only of [Germany], but of the alliance as a

whole.”13

It is in this context that EU Member States may well decide

to set spending targets for buying new satellite–based

navigation and guidance systems, fighter airplanes and

transport aircraft, and the other defense equipment needed to

make European forces deployable within the 60–day target. In

the run up to Helsinki, several proposals were aired, ranging

from clear–cut defense convergence criteria (by François

Heisbourg), which would include a 2 per cent minimum of

GDP for defense and a 30–40 per cent minimum of the defense

budget for procurement and R&D, to suggestions for a

so–called European System of Force Elements (by Tim

Garden and John Roper) for financing, military planning, and

command arrangements.14 However, for those countries that

still have to reach the Maastricht government debt criteria

(which include Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands,

and Spain), it will be problematic to spend significantly more

on defense without breaching EMU commitments. Politically,

it will also be difficult to assure that no EU Member State

drags its feet on defense spending in order to take a free ride

on Europe’s CESDP. A Europe based on political solidarity can

not accept the silent NATO rule “who pays, plays.” However,

even if the Europeans were willing to spend more on defense

and set up defense benchmarks, the political momentum of the

EU’s CESDP implies that they will “buy European.” This will

receive a very cool reception in Washington and is likely to

increase tensions within the Alliance.
Although the EU’s Helsinki communiqué stresses the need

to avoid “unnecessary duplication” of the EU’s defense

organization with that of NATO, it is clear that some

duplication of capabilities and infrastructure is inevitable and,

probably, even beneficial. It should not be overlooked that

most of WEU already duplicates, in one way or another,

NATO structures. The EU has, therefore, accepted that some

duplication of effort and organization is foreseeable. If

Europe’s new defense ambitions were to provide Europeans

with more military capabilities (i.e., more strategic transport

and intelligence capabilities), thereby duplicating what the

United States already has available, this would be the type of

replication all NATO allies could happily live with.

NATO’s Fading Centrality. Another issue which will

have to be thrashed out is the future relationship between the

“New EU” and NATO. Non–EU NATO members have made

it clear that they want to be involved in the decision shaping

process on European defense. The United States has tried to

formalize the EU–NATO relationship on these issues, but

France has blocked these efforts and claims that the Europeans

first have to clarify their military ambitions among themselves.

Paris also argues that, for the time being, WEU should be the

institution of choice for debating defense issues with other

European countries, as well as with Turkey and the United

States. The EU has, however, decided to embark upon

strengthening ties between the European Parliament (to

include its working groups and committees) and NATO’s

North Atlantic Assembly.

Another part of this debate is the vital question of whether

NATO has to be consulted first, before any independent

European military action will be undertaken. In the lead up to

the Helsinki summit, Washington made it clear that before the

Peter van Ham

20
EU decides to act on its own in a crisis situation— with or

without the use of NATO assets— NATO should be given a

first option, or a right of first refusal, to intervene. This

problem of the order in which decisions are to be made, in

short “sequencing,” is important, because at NATO’s

Washington summit in April 1999 it was agreed that the EU

would have a “presumed access” to Alliance assets should US

troops not become involved in a specific military operation.

American officials also made it clear that “[e]ven if

Washington decides not to send troops, we still want to be

involved in the decision–making process from the

beginning.”15

In this respect, the Helsinki

declaration is a cause for some

concern for the United States, as it

continues to stress the need for EU

autonomy over the involvement of

non–EU states in decision making.

Although it argues that “NATO

remains the foundation of the

collective defense of its members

and will continue to have an

important role in crisis management,” this does not imply that

NATO will endure as Europe’s pivotal security organization.

In the future, Europe may well be capable of taking

autonomous military action without recourse to NATO and

even without first asking the United States to become

involved. This is the scenario which Washington fears may

provoke a transatlantic decoupling and, thus, spell the end of

NATO as we know it— i.e., a NATO based on American

supremacy. Although this would not necessarily be a serious

disadvantage to Washington, in that a self–reliant EU would

take some of the military weight off America’s shoulders, the

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

21

Two goals 

are at odds— EU

autonomy vs.

letting non–EU

states influence

decisions
long–term implications could be huge. The EU’s combined

economic, political, and military influence would transform

Europe into a serious rival to the United States on the world

stage. EU foreign policy objectives would overlap, but would

certainly not be identical to those of the United States.

Europeans, for example, remain less fixated on China and on

issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD). They are more concerned with legitimizing their

policies by international law and a UN Security Council

mandate and less hostile to “rogue states” like Iran and Cuba.

This implies that a stronger EU would not always have to be

in full agreement with the United States on many important

global political issues.

For the time being, however, the

likelihood of autonomous, EU–led

military operations is remote.

Although path–breaking, the

Helsinki summit plans for a new

Euro–force remain modest and

would accomplish little more than to

enable the EU to take military action

if the United States does not want to

be involved. For many years to

come any European–led military

operation will remain highly

dependent upon NATO command

structures as well as on US

intelligence and logistics, if not more. It is, therefore, difficult

to foresee how the EU would mount any serious operation

without at least the consent of the United States. But, it is the

continuing uncertainty and vagueness of the operational

details of the EU’s military structure and its future missions

that cause concern across the Atlantic. In an effort to assuage

Peter van Ham

22

Plans for a new

Euro-force remain

modest and

accomplish little

more than

enabling the EU to

take military action

without the United

States
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

23

American concerns, the EU has proposed to offer key NATO

military representatives permanent seats, or observer status, in

the EU’s PSC and MC. Another EU proposal offers NATO’s

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to

participate, “as appropriate,” in the EU’s MC. In any case, of

the 15 EU Member States, 11 plan to send the same

representatives to the EU and NATO military committees,

which should ensure both transparency and relatively smooth

cooperation.

However, the higher mathematics of consultation

mechanisms do not inform us what the “New EU” actually

plans to do with its fresh military power. This remains unclear.

For the time being, Europe’s CESDP is bound to have limited,

regional ambitions. The EU debate focuses on Petersberg

missions and not on territorial or collective defense and,

therefore, does not touch upon Article V of WEU’s founding

treaty (which offers a mutual assistance guarantee). Europe’s

military strategic planning will, therefore, focus on regional

concerns and will not, at least not yet, adopt a global scope.

However, whereas London has coined the phrase that the EU

will operate “in and around Europe,” Mr. Solana is already

talking about an EU which might want to act in Africa as well

as in East Timor,16 and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder

has argued that “[t]he Europe of the future must be able to

defend its interests and values effectively worldwide.”17 The

European Commission’s Strategic Objectives report of

February 2000 also argues that the EU should aim at a “Europe

which can show genuine leadership on the world stage.”18

However, although retaining a regional focus might

acquiesce to American demands, it also complicates an already

grim transatlantic debate on NATO’s role in preventing the

proliferation of WMD. In addition to the US Senate’s rejection
Peter van Ham

24

of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the Clinton

administration also wants to tinker with the existing

Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, proposing that the

United States set up its own national missile shield. Many

European states worry that this will not only set off another

global arms race, but may also decouple the strategic interests

within the Alliance, when the United States becomes less

vulnerable to missile attacks. In any case, this global/regional

dichotomy is bound to increase transatlantic tensions and to

exacerbate US concern over Europe’s defense ambitions.

Some of America’s doubt and unease over Europe’s new

defense initiatives do not spring from political worries

concerning NATO’s future centrality, but rather are a result of

the realization that European countries will buy fewer

American weapons in the future. Since the war in Kosovo, the

United States has called upon its European allies to spend

more on defense, implying that Europe should reequip itself

with advanced American technology. The recent series of

pan–European defense–industrial mergers has upset American

policy makers and analysts, because the EU’s CESDP is now

likely to be built upon a solid, European defense–industrial

base in which the United States only plays a marginal role.

Until Autumn 1999, Washington expected that its own defense

giants would absorb European firms or set up US–led

transatlantic defense groupings. However, since October 1999,

the process of European defense consolidation has acquired

momentum with the merger of France’s Aerospatiale Matra SA

and Germany’s DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA). The

newly–created European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co.

(EADS) is bound to seriously rival America’s hegemony in the

defense–industrial field, although it is still far from reaching

commercial and technological parity with the United States.19
Europe’s drive to consolidate its defense industry comes at

a time when American defense companies are exploring their

business opportunities in Europe and elsewhere with even

more vigor. This is why many in Washington grumble about an

emerging “Fortress Europe” and are calling for the revival of a

transatlantic concept of defense–industrial cooperation. It is

possible that defense alliances on opposite sides of the Atlantic

will bitterly compete. The conflict experienced here may well

spill over into the political arena and add to the transatlantic

strain.20 But, unless Washington changes its attitude toward

the transfer of technology to its NATO allies— technology

transfer remains strictly controlled— it is difficult to foresee an

expansion of transatlantic defense partnerships.

Russian Reactions, Central European Concerns

Europe’s new defense ambitions not only demand a

rethinking of NATO’s role and the future of the transatlantic

relationship, but also have a serious impact on the strategic

environment of all Central and East European countries,

including Russia. The general trend in Moscow’s

governmental circles is to welcome the EU’s military plans as

a step toward ridding Europe of American hegemony and

NATO–centrism. From this perspective, a European CESDP is

seen as a means to block the creation of a unipolar world led

by the United States.21 Not very surprisingly, this may also be

one of the main reasons why many Central European countries

are cautious about dealing with defense issues outside the

well–known and tested NATO framework. Countries like the

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland fear that Europe’s

defense plans may undermine the relevance of NATO— and its

Article V collective defense guarantee in particular. These new

NATO allies are also not assured that the United States will

draw the right conclusions from these recent EU initiatives.

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

25
They understand that the United States might, on the contrary,

decide to leave the management of European security to the

Europeans themselves.

Since most Central European countries lack institutional

ties to the EU to make a serious impact on the CESDP, this

next section will mainly address the fundamental reasons for

Central Europe’s concerns regarding recent developments.

Moscow’s more positive reactions also merit discussion,

because Russia’s strategic weight in Europe’s security

framework remains considerable. 

Moscow’s Perspective on European Defense. Most

Russian official statements and publications on West European

defense and politico–military cooperation are set in a positive

tone, quite unlike the Russian debate over NATO and its

enlargement process. In–depth knowledge and analysis of the

Byzantine workings of the EU and its activities are, however,

rare and limited to a small circle of experts and specialists. The

general public in Russia has practically no knowledge of the

EU and WEU. This also implies that— again, unlike NATO—

the EU/WEU are not perceived as an antagonistic military

bloc. Even though WEU offers a mutual military commitment

quite similar to that of NATO, it did not acquire an inimical

image in the USSR and was never perceived as a primary

instrument of western policy toward communism. It is indeed

significant that, contrary to what has happened with NATO,

the intensive development of WEU’s military dimension and

its process of enlargement have not provoked a negative

reaction in Russia. When WEU decided in May 1994 to offer

Central European countries (including the three Baltic states)

the status of Associate Partner, Russian Foreign Minister

Andrei Kozyrev stated that Russia had no objections to this

move. Quite to the contrary, European initiatives to strengthen

Peter van Ham

26
the political independence and military capabilities of WEU

have generally met with tacit or explicit Russian approval. For

example, when the North Atlantic Council endorsed, at the

Berlin ministerial meeting in June 1996, the concept of WEU

using NATO assets for WEU–led operations, Russian Minister

of Defense Pavel Grachev officially welcomed “the increased

role of WEU in solving West European problems,” and noted

that the “increased independence of WEU from NATO” should

be considered a “very positive fact.”22

During the Cold War, it was widely assumed that the USSR

actively encouraged West European military cooperation in an

effort to weaken the transatlantic link and to “decouple” the

United States from its European allies. Although there was

certainly an element of divide et impere in the Soviet approach

to the institutional management of European security, this

should, nevertheless, be considered to have been a minor

ingredient in an overwhelmingly Atlanticist policy based on

the assumption that the United States dominated NATO and its

decision making. The Russians may have tried to encourage

Europe to assume more autonomy in the military field, but

during the Cold War they realized that European room for

maneuver was very limited.

A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall this has all

changed, and Russia now has a heightened interest in the

EU/WEU and the European integration process.23 The EU and

Russia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

(PCA) in June 1994 which, apart from dealing with trade

issues, institutionalizes a broad political dialogue between two

“partners.” The EU has placed Russia in a pivotal position in

the debate on European security and has emphasized the fact

that the EU is interested in the “full involvement of Russia in

the development of a comprehensive European security

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

27
Peter van Ham

28

architecture in which Russia has its

due place.”24 Although Moscow

does not yet take the EU/WEU too

seriously as a partner in the area of

security and defense, Russia realizes

that Europe’s new military

ambitions have a broader and more

comprehensive character than the classic defense alliance of

NATO. It appears that Russia is prepared to adopt a more

unbiased and even positive approach to the EU’s defense

plans, especially in comparison to Moscow’s unveiled hostility

vis–à–vis NATO enlargement.

Related to this issue is the fact that the EU is now Russia’s

main trading partner (with whom Russia had an export surplus

of almost 10 billion euro in 1999), its main investor, as well as

its largest donor of assistance and grants (under the so–called

Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent

States [TACIS] program). The PCA formalizes the

EU–Russian relationship and includes a security dimension.

The EU adopted its Common Strategy on Russia at the

Cologne summit of June 1999. The Common Strategy has

done much to consolidate and galvanize a more general and

comprehensive EU approach toward Russia. Although WEU

regards developments in Russia to be a vital security interest,

it has been reluctant to institutionalize its relationship with

Moscow. Russia and WEU, however, do engage in a number

of practical cooperative projects. In November 1995, for

example, a commercial contract was signed between the WEU

Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain, and the Russian state

armaments company Rosvoorouzhenie.

25 Since 1997, WEU

and Moscow have also been discussing the possibilities of

making Russian long–haul air transport assets available to

WEU for certain Petersberg missions.26 In addition, in terms

Russia is prepared

to be positive

about the EU’s

defense plans
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

29

of building political contacts, the relationship is clearly

moving into a higher gear, without yet becoming

institutionalized.

In their analysis of the Russian approach toward WEU,

Dmitryi Danilov and Stephan De Spiegeleire note a number of

other reasons why Russia seems to be comfortable with the

EU’s defense plans. First, West European military–political

cooperation and integration do not pose a direct threat to

Russian security as long as WEU’s collective defense

functions have de facto been delegated to NATO. Second, the

EU’s and WEU’s focus on Petersberg missions seems to create

a benign psychological climate in Russia which makes

cooperation with the EU/WEU easier and politically less

sensitive. Third, Europe’s efforts to set up a CESDP clearly

point in the direction of a strengthening and rapprochement of

Western Europe’s security institutions (WEU and the EU’s

CFSP), which will inevitably increase Europe’s roles and

responsibilities. These developments are perceived positively

within Russia, mainly because they strengthen Western

Europe’s voice within NATO, which may give Russia more

political incentives and possibilities for cooperation with the

Alliance. All in all, Danilov and De Spiegeleire argue, a

stronger institutional embodiment of the European Security

and Defense Identity (ESDI) will contribute to the

establishment of a new “triangle” around which a European

security equilibrium will be structured: the United

States/Western Europe/Russia.

Clearly the “weakest chain” in this emerging security

triangle is the relatively underdeveloped link between the

EU/WEU and Russia. Following the EU’s Common Strategy

on Russia of 1999, Moscow has worked out its own official

policy vis–à–vis the EU and the European integration process
Peter van Ham

30

in general. This document, called Medium–Term Strategy for

Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation

and the European Union, was officially approved by the

Russian government in October 1999. The strategy starts by

claiming that Russia’s aim is to make use of the EU’s

economic potential and managerial experience in order to

assist Russia’s goals of achieving a socially oriented market

economy and a law–ruled democratic state. For the first time,

Moscow acknowledges that it is not in its interest to join the

EU as a full member. The strategy then proceeds to call for

cooperation with the EU to “ensure pan–European security by

the Europeans themselves without both isolation of the United

States and NATO and their dominance on the continent.” The

strategy also envisions “practical cooperation [between Russia

and the EU] in the area of security (peacemaking, crisis

management, various aspects of arms limitation and reduction,

etc.) which could counterbalance, inter alia, the

NATO–centrism in Europe.” It is telling that of the 20–page

document, a mere single paragraph is devoted to the security

aspects of EU–Russian cooperation; the remainder is devoted

to trade, financial cooperation, the impact of EU enlargement,

etc. 

This may again illustrate that, for the time being, the EU’s

defense ambitions do not register prominently on the strategic

radar screen of policy makers and analysts in Moscow.

However, given the scheduled enlargement of the EU, Russia

will no doubt come to see the “New EU” not only as a mainly

economic partner, but also as a possible challenger to Russia’s

traditional sphere of interest in Central Europe. EU

enlargement is likely to include the Baltic states as well as

most other former Warsaw Pact countries. If not managed

properly, this will no doubt add to the traditional Russian

trauma of isolation and seclusion from the core of Europe.
Most likely, Russia will only really take serious notice of the

EU’s increasing defense capabilities when confronted with

them during a crisis or conflict. When EU–led peacekeeping

troops start to operate closer to Russia’s traditional sphere of

interest, Moscow may easily change its mind on the assumed

positive aspects of Europe’s defense consolidation. At the

same time, a complete reversal of Moscow’s current

constructive attitude is equally unlikely, because its economic

and trade ties with the EU region are too valuable for Russia

to forgo.

Central Europe’s Fear of Decoupling. It used to be rather

straightforward: NATO was in the business of “hard security,”

dealing with defense issues, whereas the EU took care of

economics and trade, preparing the groundwork for political

and cultural cooperation and dealing with other “soft security”

matters. WEU essentially remained, at most, a sleeping beauty

that nobody wanted— or dared— to kiss awake. Given the

decisions made at the EU’s Helsinki summit, this seemingly

clear–cut division of labor has become a thing of the past.

Of course, such a tidy division

of tasks never really existed, and the

European integration process has

always had marked political and

security implications. But,

particularly for Central European

countries, this institutional order

was attractive because it firmly

embedded the United States in all

important security calculations in Europe, especially those of a

military nature. What is more, because NATO has proven to be

easier to join than the EU, Central European countries do not,

in general, look forward to a new division of tasks where the

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

31

Few Central

European

countries want 

the EU to take

more responsibility

for defense
EU takes more responsibility for defense matters. Contrary to

their counterparts in Western Europe, Central European policy

makers and analysts tend to emphasize the continued

importance of a credible and robust collective defense

commitment (à la NATO’s Article 5). For many Central

Europeans it is only the defense commitment of NATO, and of

the United States in particular, that offers them a credible

security guarantee. Because the EU lacks military clout and

practical experience, it is not considered the organization of

choice to handle defense issues. For the time being, the EU’s

defense ambitions do not exceed Petersberg missions and

exclude territorial defense (which remain entrusted to NATO).

But, Central Europeans seem more concerned than anyone else

that this may only be the beginning of a long and uncertain

process of transferring more and more defense tasks from

NATO to the EU. Were this to occur, the management of

European security would become only tangentially linked to

NATO, and this would result in the dreaded scenario of a

decoupling of the United States from Europe.

However, for the moment, Central Europe’s greatest

concern is that major decisions concerning Europe’s defense

policy are made by current EU Member States.27 Although

most Central European countries are engaged in accession

negotiations and have established multiple channels for

consultation and the exchange of ideas and information (most

notably through European agreements and the EU’s reinforced

pre–accession strategy vis–à–vis Central Europe), they are not

really involved in the debate over the shape of European

defense within the EU. The Helsinki communiqué argues that

it is the EU’s responsibility to ensure that the “necessary

dialogue” concerning the EU’s new defense role takes place

with EU accession candidates. The communiqué fails,

however, to specify how the dialogue is to take place and

Peter van Ham

32
whether it is to go beyond consultation. Hungary’s President

Arpad Goencz argued in January 2000 that his country, “as an

associate member of the Western European Union, intends to

take an active part in the formulation of the European security

and defense identity.”28 However, Goencz’s statement glosses

over the fact that Hungary (as all other Central European

countries) is not a member of the EU yet, which makes all the

difference. Polish diplomats have expressed their concern,

noting that by establishing a politico–military committee

within the EU, Europe is de facto mimicking NATO’s North

Atlantic Council and Military Committee, thereby

strengthening the EU’s “natural tendencies” for independent

military action without full agreement of the United States.29

For Central European countries this is an especially sensitive

point, because the general feeling is that, as Poland’s Foreign

Affairs Minister Bronislaw Geremek argued, “[e]xperience of

history indicates that it is better when the United States are

engaged in European affairs.”30

As Associate Members of WEU, the Czech Republic,

Hungary, and Poland call upon the EU to maintain their

current close involvement in the development of the ESDI.

WEU Associate Members (i.e., those European NATO

members that are not EU Member States),31 are fully engaged

in the discussions within WEU and can fully participate in its

activities and military operations. These Central European

countries, therefore, highlight the importance of transferring

the rights they enjoy as WEU Associate Members to the new

structures to be developed inside the EU. This, they argue,

would allow them to participate fully in the possible

formulation of the EU’s defense convergence criteria as well

as in the preparation and execution of the EU’s future military

operations. Most importantly, however, it would assure that

they have a voice in the decision shaping process within the

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

33
EU. This would allow them to be involved in substantive,

day–to–day consultations on issues related to Europe’s

military future and to participate in shaping the organizational

structure of the complex EU–WEU–NATO relationship. It

would also provide them with assured equal rights with EU

members in future EU–led military operations.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban has, therefore,

called upon his Central European colleagues to coordinate

their approach to the EU’s defense plans, because “[t]hese are

not the exclusive issues of Western European states; these are

Central European questions as well. We are aware of a Slovak,

a Hungarian, a Polish, and a Czech position on this question,

but we have never coordinated our positions on these strategic

issues and we have no real joint Central European strategic

planning.”32 A coordinated position will be all the more

necessary since the three front running EU candidates (the

Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) are expected to join the

EU sometime between 2003 and 2007. This is also the time

frame for the establishment of the Euro–force, to which the

current applicant countries are likely to make military

contributions. It remains uncertain as to whether countries like

Bulgaria and Romania will join the EU or NATO first, or how

they could contribute to EU–led military operations. The three

Baltic countries are in a strategically delicate position as

former Soviet republics, in that Russia’s firm opposition to

their NATO membership may well extend to the preclusion of

any future Baltic participation in the EU’s military structures.

Moscow has always been moderately positive in regard to

Baltic plans to join the EU. However, it is hard to predict

whether Russia will adopt a more hostile attitude toward the

Baltic when the Baltic states join the EU, once a more robust

and vigorous European CESDP manifests itself. 

Peter van Ham

34
In Conclusion

Helsinki testifies to a sea change in attitudes among

Europeans on the still sensitive issue of a common European

defense policy. One should not forget that a decade ago the

debate over Europe’s single currency was about “whether” it

could ever become reality, whereas in 2000, we are talking

about “how” to make it a success. A similar shift from

“whether” to “how” has occurred in the debate on European

defense, now that “Kosovo” has broken down many old

shibboleths against joint Europe–led military operations. In

addition to political reasons, defense cooperation is driven by

the potential to eliminate costly redundancies among European

armed forces. All this implies that many European states are

willing to pool the core of their national sovereignty and are

prepared to take one more step toward a qualitatively new

Euro–polity.33

No doubt, this will take getting used to by Americans and

Europeans alike. It will also require a change of mind and

intellectual flexibility on the parts of Russia and Central

European countries in their approach to the future organization

of European security. Although the transatlantic relationship

may have reached another of its (in)famous “crossroads,” there

is no reason to assume the dawn of an era of “transatlantic

troubles.” Washington tends to support European cooperation

as long as it takes weight off American shoulders, but not if it

challenges America’s own political primacy and economic

interests. On its part, Europe will have to get used to thinking

about European, instead of narrow national interests which

may well have to be defended with European military means.

The last time British troops fought under a German operational

command was in 1813, at the Battle of Leipzig. Yet, in October

1999, General Klaus Reinhardt of Germany took over as

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

35
commander of the Kosovo peacekeeping force, and overall

command of KFOR was taken by the Eurocorps in April

2000.34 All European countries will have to get used to these

historic novelties. There is little doubt that European countries

have sufficient military experience and leadership qualities to

take on these challenges. However, like the EMU and the euro,

much will depend upon the willingness of Europeans to trust

their own strength and capabilities. Will Europeans, and

others, be prepared to put their faith in an organization that has

brought them such bureaucratic nightmares as the Common

Agricultural Policy (CAP), and which is tarnished by a

reputation for sluggish and ineffectual decision making (albeit

not really justified)?

In the event of a serious crisis,

“Europe” finally has a relevant

telephone number, which many

Americans have called for; just dial

00–32–2–285–500–00 and one will

reach the EU’s new situation and

crisis center, headed by Solana.

Whether this will improve the

quality of the transatlantic dialogue remains to be seen. For the

time being, the underlying forces within NATO are more

competitive than cooperative. Because the scope and form of

Europe’s CESDP will remain undecided for quite some time,

the United States should have ample opportunity to affect the

shape of a more balanced transatlantic relationship in which

NATO will no longer play the central role. Anyone who

expects that the strategic arrangement of NATO, shaped by the

Cold War, could remain frozen a decade beyond its thaw is not

a realist. Without a rebalanced transatlantic relationship,

NATO will certainly fall into decay. On the other hand, if

Europe’s CESDP is injudiciously managed, Europe may end

Peter van Ham

36

Just dial 

00-32-2-285-500-00

to reach the EU's

new situation and

crisis center
up with the worst of both worlds: a weak EU and a weakened

NATO.35 One thing is therefore certain: If Europeans continue

to depend upon the United States for their long–term military

security, NATO will not survive, at least not as the pivotal

point for European defense. n

Endnotes

1. A shorter version of this paper was published as “Europe’s Common

Defense Policy: Implications for the Trans Atlantic Relationship,” Security

Dialogue, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 219–232.

2. Financial Times, September 15, 1999. 

3. Margarita Mathiopoulos and Istvan Gyarmati, “Saint Malo and Beyond:

Toward European Defense,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4,

Autumn 1999, pp. 65–76.

4. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, “NATO, Europe, and Our Future

Security,” speech at the NATO 50th Anniversary conference, Royal United

Services Institute, London, March 8, 1999.

5. Paul J. Teunissen, “Strengthening the Defence Dimension of the EU: An

Evaluation of Concepts, Recent Initiatives and Development,” European

Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 327–352.

6. Ian Kemp, “Pressure for EU Rapid Reaction Force Gains New

Momentum,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 1, 1999. 

7. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, speech to the North

Atlantic Council, Brussels, December 15, 1999.

8. For a few exceptions see Charles A. Kupchan, “Life After Pax

Americana,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1999, pp. 20–27;

Benjamin Schwarz and Christopher Layne, “NATO: At 50, It’s Time to

Quit,” The Nation, May 10, 1999, pp. 15–19; and Stephen M. Walt, “The

Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America are Drifting Apart,” The

National Interest, No. 54, Winter 1998/99, pp. 3–11.

9. International Herald Tribune, March 6, 2000. 

10. Quoted in the New York Times, December 13, 1999.

11. Quoted in Defense Daily, December 8, 1999.

12. Quoted in the Financial Times, October 22, 1999.

13. Quoted in the New York Times, December 2, 1999.

14. Mathias Jopp, European Defence Policy: The Debate on the

Institutional Aspects, Bonn: Institut für Europäische Politik, June/July

1999, pp. 26–29. See also Alyson Bailes, “European Defence: What Are the

‘Convergence Criteria’?” RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 3, June 1999, pp.

60–65.

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

37
15. Quoted in The Times, November 23, 1999.

16. Siegesmund von Ilsemann, Dirk Koch, and Alexander Szandar, “Europa

Baut eigene Armee” (“Europe Builds Its Own Army”), Der Spiegel,

November 29, 1999, pp.188–91. 

17. Quoted in the New York Times, December 13, 1999.

18. Commission of the European Communities, “Strategic Objectives

2000–2005— Shaping the New Europe,” Brussels, February 9, 2000, p. 4.

19. The Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas S. A. (CASA) aerospace

group joined the EADS in December 1999. EADS now controls 80 per cent

of the Airbus consortium, 43 per cent of Eurofighter and has almost all of

Europe’s military transport aircraft, missiles, spacecraft, and helicopters

within its portfolio. See Paul Baever, “European Giant is Born,” Jane’s

Defence Weekly, December 8, 1999. 

20. For a balanced American view, see John Deutsch, Arnold Kanter, and

Brent Scowcroft, “Saving NATO’s Foundation,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78,

No. 6, November/December 1999, pp. 54–67.

21. Medium–Term Strategy for Development of Relations Between the

Russian Federation and the European Union, Moscow: October 1999,

para. 1.5.2.

22. Quoted in Dmitriy Danilov and Stephan De Spiegeleire, From

Decoupling to Recoupling. Russia and Western Europe: A New Security

Relationship, Chaillot Paper No. 31, Paris: WEU–ISS, April 1998, p. 7.

23. For a few historical notes, see John Roper and Peter van Ham, “Russia

and the West,” in Vladimir Baranovski, ed., Russia in Europe: The

Emerging Security Agenda, London/Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1997; and Heinz Timmerman, “Relations Between the EU and Russia: The

Agreement on Partnership and Co–operation,” Journal of Communist

Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 1996, pp. 196–223.

24. This declaration was made by the EU during the “Security Working

Group” troika–meetings with Russia on October 10, 1996, preparing the

OSCE’s “Security Model for the Twenty–First Century.” For a good

overview and analysis of the EU’s policy toward Russia, see

Marie–Elisabeth de Vel and Hannes Adomeit, “The European Union’s

Long–Term Strategy Towards Russia,” CPN Briefing Paper from the

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2000.

25. Richard Tibbels, “WEU’s Dialogues With Russia and Ukraine,” NATO’s

Sixteen Nations & Partners for Peace, February 1998, pp. 43–46.

26. It is worth noting that WEU has agreed on similar arrangements with

Ukraine. In June 1999, WEU stated in a press release that “[t]he areas of

practical cooperation relate primarily to the preparation for crisis

management operations and include Ukraine’s observation of exercises at

WEU, the availability to WEU nations of Ukrainian training facilities as

well as the fields of long–haul transport and satellite imagery.” 

Peter van Ham

38
27. Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 23, 2000. 

28. BBC Monitoring European–Political, January 17, 2000. 

29. Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, December 20, 1999. 

30. Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw, December 16, 1999. 

31. Only Denmark does not fit this description. Denmark is only involved in

WEU as an Observer, but is, of course, also a full member of NATO and

the EU.

32. BBC Monitoring European–Political, August 30, 1999. 

33. Peter van Ham and Przemyslaw Grudzinski, “Affluence and Influence:

The Conceptual Basis of Europe’s New Politics,” The National Interest,

No. 58, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 81–87.

34. The suggestion to take this step was made by France and Germany on

December 2, 1999.

35. For a general discussion of the problem of rising expectations and

moderate adaptations of capabilities see: Christopher Hill, “The

Capability–Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International

Role,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, September

1993, pp. 305–328.

Europe’s New Defense Ambitions

39
Acronyms

ABM - Anti-Ballistic Missile

CDP - Common Defence Policy (EU)

CESDP - Common European Security and Defence Policy (EU)

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU)

CAP - Common Agricultural Policy (EU)

DASA - DaimlerChrysler Aerospace 

EADS - European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co.

EDC - European Defence Community (EU)

EMU - European Monetary Union

ESDI - European Security and Defense Identity (EU)

EU - European Union

MC - Military Committee (EU)

MS - Military Staff (EU)

NAC - North Atlantic Council (NATO)

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU-Russia)

PSC - Political and Security Committee (EU)

TACIS - Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 

States (EU)

WEU - Western European Union

WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction

Peter van Ham

40
The George C. Marshall 

European Center for Security Studies

Dr. Robert Kennedy

Director

MG (Ret.) Franz Werner

German Deputy Director

Ambassador Victor Jackovich

Associate Director for International Affairs

College of International and Security Studies

Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Dean

Dr. Peter van Ham (Author)

Professor of West European Politics

Ms. Sara C. Holman

Editor

Mr. Michael J. McNulty

Distribution
Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: 

Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia

by Peter van Ham, Professor of West European Politics at the

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,

Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

At the European Union’s Helsinki summit of December 1999,

European leaders took a decisive step toward the development of

a new Common European Security and Defense Policy aimed at

giving the EU a stronger role in international affairs backed by a

credible military force.

This Marshall Center Paper analyzes the processes leading to

Helsinki by examining why and how this new European

consensus on defense issues came about. It takes the pulse 

of the EU's emerging defense policy and touches upon the main

controversies and challenges that still lie ahead. What are the

national interests and driving forces behind it, and what steps 

still need to be taken to realize Europe's ambitions to achieve a

workable European crisis management capability? Particular

attention is paid to the implications of an emerging European

defense capability for the future of NATO, the transatlantic

relationship, and the role of Russia in Europe.

The Marshall Center Web Site:

http://www.marshallcenter.org

Designed and produced by VIB

April 30, 2000