IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-70010

BEUNKA ADAMS, 

Petitioner–Appellee

v.

RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent–Appellant

________________________________________________________________________

No. 12-40436

In re: BEUNKA ADAMS, 

Petitioner

Consolidated with 12-70011

BEUNKA ADAMS, 

Petitioner–Appellant

v.

RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, 

Respondent–Appellee

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 25, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

Before KING, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Beunka Adams was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in

Texas state court. He is scheduled to be executed on April 26, 2012. On April

13, 2012, Adams filed a motion in the district court pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), seeking relief from the district court’s judgment

denying his initial federal habeas corpus petition. He also filed a motion for a

stay of execution. Adams v. Thaler, No. 5:07-cv-00180 (E.D. Tex.). That same

day, in a separate district court action, Adams filed a second-in-time federal

habeas petition and a motion for a stay of execution. Adams v. Thaler, No. 5:12-

cv-00036 (E.D. Tex.). 

On April 23, 2012, the district court granted Adams’s motion to stay his

execution pending the court’s disposition of Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In the

separate action related to Adams’s second-in-time federal habeas petition, the

district court transferred the case to this court, in order for us to determine in

the first instance whether Adams’s habeas petition is successive. On April 24,

2012, Rick Thaler filed a motion to vacate the stay of Adams’s execution. For the

following reasons, we VACATE the district court’s grant of a stay of execution;

we DISMISS Adams’s successive federal habeas petition; and we DENY his

motion for a stay of execution. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

1 The facts of this case are set forth in our previous opinion. See Adams v. Thaler, 421

F. App’x 322, 324-26 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming the judgment of the district court denying

Adams’s federal habeas corpus petition). 

2 Adams’s underlying claim is that the jury instructions in the punishment phase of his

trial were unconstitutional, because the second Texas special issue did not encompass the

constitutional level of intent required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison

v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), for the imposition ofthe death penalty. Adams contended that

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions and that his

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the constitutional issue on direct appeal.

3

Beunka Adams (“Adams”) was convicted of capital murder and sentenced

to death in Texas state court.1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”)

affirmed Adams’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and the Supreme

Court denied review. Adams v. State, No. AP-75023, 2007 WL 1839845 (Tex.

Crim. App. June 27, 2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1145 (2008). Adams filed a

state habeas application, in which he asserted various claims, including several

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. After an evidentiary hearing, the state

trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending the

denial of Adams’s habeas application. The TCCA adopted these findings of fact

and conclusions of law and denied Adams’s application. Ex parte Adams, No.

WR-68066-01, 2007 WL 4127008 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 21, 2007). 

Adams filed a second state habeas application in 2008, asserting two new

claims related to the jury instructions given during the sentencing phase of his

trial. Specifically, he asserted that he was deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s and

appellate counsel’s failure to ensure that the jury was properly instructed in the

punishment phase of his trial.2 While the subsequent state application was

pending, Adams filed a federal habeas petition asserting ten claims for relief,

including the two claims presented in his second state habeas application.

Adams simultaneously filed a motion to stay and abate the federal proceedings

until the TCCA ruled on the second application. The federal district court
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

4

granted the motion. A few months later, the TCCA found that the two claims in

his subsequent state habeas application were procedurally barred, specifically

that they did “not satisfy the requirements of Article 11.071, Section 5,” of the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the TCCA dismissed the

application as an “abuse of the writ.” Ex parte Adams, No. WR-68066-02, 2009

WL 1165001 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2009).

Thereafter, the district court denied Adams’s federal habeas petition,

dismissing the two claims that Adams presented in his second state habeas

application and denying the remaining claims. Adams v. Thaler, No. 5:07-cv180, 2010 WL 2990967 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2010). The district court determined

that Adams had procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel claims pursuant to Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750

(1991). Coleman held that “[i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted

his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state

procedural rule,federal habeas review ofthe claims is barred unless the prisoner

can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. Because the

TCCA dismissed these claims as an “abuse of the writ”—an independent and

adequate state procedural ground—the district courtfound thatthe claims were

procedurally defaulted. Furthermore, the court ruled that Adams could not

demonstrate “cause” to excuse the procedural default, because, pursuant to

Coleman, the ineffectiveness of state habeas counsel in failing to raise these

claims in Adams’s first state habeas application did not constitute “cause.” See

id. at 752-53. The court granted Adams a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on

eleven issues: on the ten claims he presented in his petition and on the issue of

whether his two claims were procedurally barred. We affirmed the district
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

3 The Court defined an “initial-review collateral proceeding” as “the first designated

proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 132 S.

Ct. at 1315, 1317.

5

court’s judgment denying Adams’s petition. Adams v. Thaler, 421 F. App’x 322

(5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 399 (2011).

Adams recently filed another subsequent habeas application in state court,

which the TCCA dismissed as an abuse of the writ. Ex parte Adams, No. WR68066-03, 2012 WL 476538 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2012). On March 13, 2012,

Adams petitioned the Supreme Court for review of that dismissal and also filed

a motion for a stay of execution. On February 27, 2012, Adams filed in our court

a motion for authorization to file a successive petition, but withdrew that motion

on March 23, 2012, several days after the Supreme Court issued its decision in

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).

In Martinez, the Supreme Court noted that Coleman held that “an

attorney’s negligence in a postconviction proceeding does not establish cause” to

excuse procedural default. Id. at 1319. The Court recognized that Coleman “left

open . . . a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right to

effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to

raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id. at 1315. However, the Court

did not resolve this constitutional question. Id. Instead, the Court in Martinez

“qualifie[d] Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception: Inadequate assistance

of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings3 may establish cause for a

prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Id.

The Court summarized its narrow holding as follows: 

Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a

procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing

a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the

initial-review collateral proceeding,there was no counsel or counsel

in that proceeding was ineffective. 
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

4 Although we need not, and do not, address the impact of Martinez on the Texas habeas

landscape, we note that Texas does not require a defendant to raise an ineffective assistance

oftrial counsel claim only in state habeas proceedings, seeLopez v. Texas, 343 S.W. 3d 137, 143

6

Id. at 1320. The Court characterized its decision as an “equitable ruling,” and

not a constitutional ruling. Id. at 1319. 

On April 13, 2012, Adams filed a motion in the federal district court

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), seeking relief from the

district court’s judgment denying his federal habeas petition. Adams v. Thaler,

No. 5:07-cv-00180 (E.D. Tex.). In his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Adams stated that

the district court relied on Coleman to conclude that Adams’s ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims were procedurally defaulted and

that ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel could not constitute

cause to excuse the default. Adams asserted that, since the district court’s

judgment,the Supreme Court had decided Martinez, which created an exception

to Coleman’s holding that ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel cannot

constitute cause to excuse procedural default. Adams argues that Martinez

constitutes “extraordinary circumstances” entitling him to Rule 60(b)(6) relief.

Adams also filed a motion for a stay of execution pending disposition of his Rule

60(b)(6) motion.

Also on April 13, 2012, Adams filed a second-in-time federal habeas

petition in the district court, a motion for a stay of execution, and a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis. Adams v. Thaler, No. 5:12-cv-00036 (E.D. Tex.).

Adams argued that his second-in-time federal habeas petition was not a

“successive” petition and therefore that the court had jurisdiction to entertain

it without our prior authorization. In his petition, Adams asserted that, given

Martinez, he could now demonstrate cause for his procedural default and was

therefore entitled to an adjudication of his ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel claims.4In his motion for a stay of execution, Adams argued
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011), and thatineffective assistance claims (particularly those, like Adams’s

claim, involving trial counsel’s failure to object to jury instructions) are often brought on direct

appeal, with mixed success.

7

that the district court “should stay the execution and set a briefing schedule so

the parties and the Court can meaningfully examine Martinez’s implications.”

On April 19, 2012, Rick Thaler (“Director”), Director of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice, filed a response in opposition to Adams’s

motions for relief from judgment and for stay of execution. The Director argued

that the district court should deny Adams’s Rule 60(b) motion because the

Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez was simply a “change in decisional law

after entry of judgment” and does not constitute “extraordinary circumstances.”

The Director also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Adams’s

second-in-time federal habeas petition. The Director contended that it was

“undoubtedly [a] successive” petition because his first federal habeas petition

“was dismissed with prejudice challenging the same conviction” and “it contained

the exact claims Adams now presents the [district court.]” The Director argued

that, because Adams did not receive prior authorization from the court of

appeals, the district court should dismiss Adams’s successive petition. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

On April 23, 2012, the district court granted Adams’s motion to stay his

execution pending the court’s disposition of Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In a

one-page order, the court stated, “Having considered the circumstances alleged

and authorities cited in the motion [for a stay of execution], the Court finds that

it is well-taken and it will be granted.” The court did not rule on Adams’s Rule

60(b)(6) motion. In the separate action regarding Adams’s second-in-time

habeas petition, the court issued an order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631

transferring the case to this court, for us to determine in the first instance

whether Adams’s petition is successive. The court explained that “[w]hether
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

8

Adams’s current application is a second or successive petition as those terms are

defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is a close case, and in light of that statute the most

efficient and economical approach to answering that question is to allow the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to make the initial

determination.” 

On April 24, 2012,the Director filed a motion to vacate the stay of Adams’s

execution. The Director argued that the district court improperly granted a stay

of execution because Adams’s underlying claims have no merit. Furthermore,

he argued that the district court improperly granted a stay of execution because

it is not “reasonably likely [that] Adams[’s] motion justifies relief from

judgment,” because the Martinez decision does not constitute extraordinary

circumstances. Therefore, the Director asserted that “Adams cannot prove that

his pending Rule 60(b)(6) motion would provide a sufficient basis for a stay.”

The Director also filed a response in opposition to the district court’s order

transferring Adams’s second-in-time habeas petition to this court. The Director

argued that the district court erroneously transferred the petition to us, as the

district court should have dismissed the petition as an unauthorized successive

petition. The Director asserted that we should dismiss Adams’s successive

petition, as it is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

Finally, on April 24, 2012, Adams appealed the district court’s transfer

order, and he followed that up with a motion, filed on April 25, 2012, asking this

courtto establish a briefing schedule on the question whether his second-in-time

habeas petition is successive. In the alternative, he asks this court to hold that

his petition is not successive and to remand it to the district court for

consideration. He also asks for a stay of execution. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Stay of Execution

1. Standard of Review
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

9

We review a district court’s grant of a stay of execution for abuse of

discretion. Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 322 (1990) (“The District Court abused

its discretion in granting a stay of execution.”); Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100

(5th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has stated that a “stay of execution is an

equitable remedy.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006). A stay of

execution “is not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to

the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue

inference from the federal courts.” Id. (citations omitted). “The party requesting

a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of

[judicial] discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2009) (citations

omitted). In deciding whether to grant a stay of execution, the district court was

required to consider four factors: 

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he

is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay

will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Id. at 434 (quoting Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)); see also

Buxton v. Collins, 925 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1991). 

2. The District Court Improperly Granted A Stay

In granting Adams’s motion for a stay of execution, the district court did

not rule on Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Nor did the court explicitly address

the merits of Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. However, as explained above, in

order to grant a stay of execution, the district court was required to consider four

factors, including that “the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is

likely to succeed on the merits.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. Therefore, in granting

the stay, the district court made an implicit determination that it was

reasonably likely that Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion justified relief from

judgment. Thus, in order to assess whether the district court properly exercised
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

10

its discretion in granting a stay, we determine whether Adams has shown a

likelihood of success on the merits of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

As a preliminary matter, we determine whether the district court had

jurisdiction to rule on Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545

U.S. 524 (2005), the Supreme Court stated that a Rule 60(b) motion does not

contain a habeas corpus “claim,” and thus should not be construed as a

successive petition, when the motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal

court’s resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the

federal habeas proceedings.” Id. at 532 (footnote omitted). Specifically, the

Court held that a petitioner does not make a “habeas corpus claim . . . when he

merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination

was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust,

procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar.” Id. at 532 n.4. In his Rule

60(b)(6) motion, Adams challenges the district court’s determination that his

claims were procedurally defaulted. Thus, Adams’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not

to be construed as an improper successive habeas petition and is properly before

the district court. See Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291, 305 (5th Cir. 2010)

(noting that the court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion

where petitioner challenged the district court’s ruling on procedural default);

Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 399 n.26 (5th Cir. 2010) (same). 

Next, in order to determine whether the district court properly entered a

stay of execution, we assess whether Adams has demonstrated a likelihood of

success on the merits of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a court may reopen a final judgment when a party

shows “any other reason that justifies relief.” “We have interpreted Rule

60(b)(6)’s ‘any other reason’ language to mean any other reason than those

contained in the preceding five enumerated grounds of Rule 60(b).” Rocha, 619

F.3d at 400. “While Rule 60(b)(6) is commonly referred to as a ‘grand reservoir
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

11

of equitable power to do justice,’ the rule is only invoked in ‘extraordinary

circumstances.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535 (“[O]ur

cases have required a movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to show

‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.”)

(quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950)). The Supreme

Court has stated that “[s]uch circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas

context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535.

In contending that “extraordinary circumstances” exist to warrant Rule

60(b)(6) relief, Adams first points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez,

which was issued after the district court’s judgment. He asserts that Martinez

represents a “jurisprudential sea change” in federal habeas corpus law,

recognizing an exception to Coleman’s holding thatineffective assistance of postconviction counsel cannot constitute cause for procedural default. Also, Adams

points to the “capital nature of the case and the equitable imperative that the

true merit of the cause be heard” as factors that, when combined with Martinez,

constitute “extraordinary circumstances” and warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief. 

Our precedents hold that “[a] change in decisional law after entry of

judgment does not constitute exceptional circumstances and is not alone grounds

for relief from a final judgment” under Rule 60(b)(6). Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring

Co., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Batts v. TowMotor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747-48 (5th Cir. 1995). We have held that “[t]his

rule applies with equalforce in habeas proceedings under”the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act(“AEDPA”). Hernandez v. Thaler, 630F.3d 420, 430

(5th Cir. 2011); see Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Under

our precedents, changes in decisional law . . . do not constitute the ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ required for granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. . . . The dicta in Batts

suggesting that the rule for changes in decisional law might be different in the
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

12

habeas corpus context because finality is not a concern is now flatly contradicted

by, among other things, AEDPA.”). 

Indeed, in Gonzalez, the Supreme Court concluded that a change in

decisional law, concerning the interpretation of AEDPA’s statute of limitations,

after the entry ofthe district court’s judgment dismissing the habeas petition did

not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” under Rule 60(b)(6). The Court

explained thatthe district court’s “interpretation was by all appearances correct

under the Eleventh Circuit’s then-prevailing interpretation of [AEDPA].” 545

U.S. at 536. The Court stated that “[i]t is hardly extraordinary” that,

subsequent to the district court’s judgment, the Supreme “Court arrived at a

differentinterpretation.” Id. The Court explained that “not every interpretation

of the federal statutes setting forth the requirements for habeas provides cause

for reopening cases long since final.” Id. In Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420

(5th Cir. 2011), we found that the district court properly dismissed, under thencontrolling precedent, petitioner’s habeas petition as barred under the AEDPA

statute of limitations. Id. at 429. We concluded that the Supreme Court’s later

change in law regarding the calculation of AEDPA’s limitations period—which

would have rendered petitioner’s habeas petition timely—did not constitute

“extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 430. We reasoned that “[w]ell-settled

precedent dictates that [petitioner] may not use Rule 60(b)(6) to claim the benefit

of the Supreme Court’s decision in Jimenez.” Id. 

Similarly, in the present case, in denying Adams’s initial federal habeas

petition, the district court correctly determined that Adams’s claims were

procedurally defaulted pursuant to the then-prevailing Supreme Court

precedent of Coleman. The Supreme Court’s later decision in Martinez, which

creates a narrow exception to Coleman’s holding regarding cause to excuse

procedural default, does not constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” under

Supreme Court and our precedentto warrant Rule 60(b)(6) relief. See Gonzalez,
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

13

545 U.S. at 536; Bailey, 894 F.2d at 160. The Martinez Court’s crafting of a

narrow, equitable exception to Coleman’s holding is “hardly extraordinary.”

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 536; see also Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (“The rule of

Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized here.”). 

Because the Martinez decision is simply a change in decisional law and is

“not the kind of extraordinary circumstance that warrants relief under Rule

60(b)(6),” Adams’s 60(b)(6) motion is without merit. Hernandez, 630F.3d at 429.

Because Adams has not made a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits

of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the district court abused its discretion in granting

a stay of his execution pending the resolution of this motion. We therefore

vacate the district court’s grant of a stay of Adams’s execution.

B. The District Court’s Transfer of Adams’s Successive Habeas Petition

The district court transferred Adams’s second-in-time federal habeas

petition and accompanying motion for a stay of execution to this court so that we

could determine in the first instance whether his petition is a “second or

successive” petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 

We first must consider whether we have jurisdiction over this case. See

Martin v. Halliburton, 618 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have jurisdiction

to determine our own jurisdiction.”) (citations omitted). A threshold question in

determining whether we have jurisdiction is whether the district court had the

authority to transfer the case to us. The district court transferred the case to us

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Under this statute, entitled “Transfer to cure

want of jurisdiction,” when a civil action is filed in a court and “that court finds

that there is a want of jurisdiction,” the court “shall, if it is in the interest of

justice,transfer such action or appealto any other such courtin which the action

or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1631

(emphasis added). Therefore, in order for the district court to have had the
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

14

authority to transfer the case to us pursuant to the statute, the district court

must have lacked jurisdiction over the action. 

The question of whether the district court lacked jurisdiction over Adams’s

second-in-time federal habeas petition depends on whether Adams’s petition is

a “second or successive” petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. If

Adams’s petition is successive, then the district court did not have jurisdiction

to consider the petition because Adams did not obtain our prior authorization

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). See Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152

(2007). Therefore, we examine Adams’s petition to determine whether it is

successive.

AEDPA does not define “second or successive.” The Supreme Court has

stated that the term “takes its full meaning from [the Court’s] case law,

including decisions predating the enactment of [AEDPA].” Panetti v.

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943-44 (2007). “The Court has declined to interpret

‘second or successive’ as referring to all § 2254 applications filed second or

successively in time, even when the later filings address a state-court judgment

already challenged in a prior § 2254 application.” Id. at 944. For instance, in

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), the Court concluded that “[a] habeas

petition filed in the district court after an initial habeas petition was

unadjudicated on its merits and dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies

is not a second or successive petition.” Id. at 485-86; see also Panetti, 551 U.S.

at 944-46 (holding that“a § 2254 application raising a Ford-based incompetency

claim filed as soon as that claim is ripe” is not a successive petition); Stewart v.

Martinez–Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (holding that a second-in-time

federal habeas petition is not “successive” when it only raises a Ford claim that

was previously dismissed as premature). 

Adams argues that his second-in-time habeas petition is not successive

because “the Supreme Court has consistently determined that a petition filed
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

15

after [a] technical procedural barrier is removed is not ‘second or successive.’”

Adams argues that his case is similar to the Court’s decisions in Panetti, Slack,

and Martinez–Villareal because his two ineffective assistance of counsel claims

in his initial federal habeas petition were dismissed on purely “technical”

grounds—for procedural default. Adams asserts that Martinez has removed this

technical barrier to federal habeas review of his claims, and therefore we should

not treat his petition as “second or successive.” 

We reject Adams’s argument and conclude that his habeas petition is

clearly successive. We have stated that “a later petition is successive when it:

1) raises a claim challenging the petitioner’s conviction or sentence that was or

could have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes an

abuse of the writ.” In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations

omitted); see United States v. Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d 862, 867 (5th Cir. 2000)

(finding the In re Cain standard “consistent with the Supreme Court’s views as

expressed in” Martinez-Villareal and Slack). 

In his second-in-time habeas petition, Adams raises two

claims—ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to ensure

the jury was properly instructed in the punishment phase of his trial—that are

identical to the two claims presented in his initial federal habeas petition, filed

with the district court in 2009. Thus, pursuant to In re Cain, because Adams

has raised claims that were already brought in a prior petition, we must

construe his second-in-time habeas petition as successive. 137 F.3d at 235; see

also Hernandez, 630 F.3d at 427; In re Flowers, 595 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2009)

(holding that “[b]ecause the claims [petitioner] raises in his proposed § 2254

application were or could have been raised in his first § 2254 application,
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

5 Our conclusion that Adams’s petition is successive is consistent with the pre-AEDPA

“abuse of the writ” doctrine. See Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2008)

(stating that we “look to pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles in determining whether [a]

petition is successive”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Bates v. Whitley,

19 F.3d 1066 (5th Cir. 1994), we stated that “Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254

Proceedings precludes federal review of a state prisoner’s second federal habeas petition if the

petition ‘fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on

the merits.’” Id. at 1067 (emphasis added). We reasoned that “[a] federal habeas court’s

rejection of a petitioner’s constitutional claim because of state procedural default and a failure

to show cause and prejudice must be regarded as a determination on the merits in examining

whether a subsequent petition is successive.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Adams’s second-intime petition constitutes an “abuse of the writ.”

6 Assuming without deciding that Adams may rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) as

authority to file this successive habeas petition, we nevertheless conclude that he is not

entitled to authorization. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A), if a claim was not presented

in a prior habeas corpus application, it “shall be dismissed unless . . . the applicant shows that

the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Martinez does not provide a

basis for authorization under § 2244(b)(2)(A), as the Court’s decision was an “equitable ruling”

that did not establish “a new rule of constitutional law.” 132 S. Ct. at 1319. 

16

which . . . was dismissed as time-barred[,] . . . the instant application is

successive.”) (citations omitted).5

Because we conclude that Adams’s petition is successive,the district court

did not have jurisdiction to consider the petition. Therefore, we conclude that,

to the extent that the petition is construed as an application for a successive

petition, the district court correctly transferred the case to us pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1631 and we have jurisdiction to consider that application. However,

in his April 25, 2012 motion, Adams disclaims seeking our authorization to file

a successive petition in the district court, correctly, as he cannot meet the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Because Adams brings the same two claims

in his successive habeas petition as he did in his initial federal habeas petition,

Adams’s petition is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (“A claim presented in

a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was

presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”).6 Therefore, the federal

courts lack jurisdiction over this petition, and we dismiss Adams’s successive
Nos. 12-70010, 12-40436, 12-70011

17

habeas petition. As there is no basis for a stay, we deny his motion for a stay of

execution. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s grant of a stay

of execution; we DISMISS Adams’s successive federal habeas petition; we DENY

his motion to set a briefing schedule or, in the alternative,to remand his petition

to the district court; and we DENY his motion for a stay of execution. The

mandate shall issue forthwith.