UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

: v. : : Case No. 1:17-cr-00225-TSC MICHAEL ZEWDNEH AREGA, :

: Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant’s Emergency Motion for a Stay and Reevaluation was r eferred to the undersigned. [Dkt. 8]. At issue here is whether there is reas onable cause to believe that a mental competency evaluation of Defendant is warranted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). This is a nondispositive matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 5 9(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Local Criminal Rule 59.1. Defendant was arrested on November 6, 2017, and charged with tr ansmitting in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the pers on of another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). He made his initial appearance on November 7, 2017, at which time the government moved to detain Defendant pending trial and for a me ntal competency evaluation. The undersigned ordered Defendant to undergo a preliminary comp etency evaluation by a psychologist associated with the District of Columbia Departmen t of Behavioral Health, Pretrial and Assessment Branch, and, in light of that decision, deferred addressing the detention motion until the question of Defendant’s competency could be resolved. On November 21, 2017, the undersigned found, based on the competency screening report pre pared by the psychologist, thatthere was reasonable cause to believe that a mental competency evaluation of Defendant was warranted. Accordingly, the Court ordered that Defendant be co mmitted to the custody of the Attorney General for a period not to exceed 30 days for placeme nt in a suitable facility for a competency evaluation. [Dkt . 6 (the “November 21 Order”)]. On December 19, 2017, Defendant filed this emergency motion see king a stay of the

November 21 Order and a re-evaluation of Def endant’s competency . [Dkt. 8]. The motion noted that, although the original ord er regarding Defendant’s compete ncy evaluation was issued almost one month prior, Defendant had still not been transported to th e designated Bureau of Prisons facility in Colorado for his evaluation. In the meantime, Defe ndant had been receiving mental health treatment at the D.C. Jail and had begun taking medicati on to address the symptoms of his mental illness. Also on December 19, the government filed a pr ogress report noting that Defendant had been designated to the Col orado facility on December 7, 201 7, but had not yet been transported. The government raised an issue under the Speedy T rial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. , noting that, pursuant to the statute, a period of delay of more than 10 days in transporting a defendant to or from a place of examination is presumptively, b ut not conclusively, unreasonable (and therefore not excluded from Speedy Trial Act calculations) , and that the court should allow the parties to present evidence that any delay in excess of 10 days was reasonable here. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F). A hearing was held on December 21, 2017, at which the undersign ed granted Def endant’s motion for a stay of the November 21 Order and further ordered a re-evaluation of Defendant’s competency, again through a screening by the District of Columb ia Department of Behavioral Health. [Dkt. 12]. A hearing was scheduled for January 11, 20 18, to determine whether Defendant

should be committed to the cust ody of the Attorney General for a full competency evaluation andto take evidence and hear argumen t regarding the Speedy Trial A ct issue that the government had raised in its progress report. Id. Defendant was again screened on January 9, 2018. In her report , the Department of Behavioral Health psychologist n oted that Defendant was much ch anged since his original screening. Having been placed on a regimen of medications, inc luding antipsychotics, Defendant was alert, lucid, and his conversation was goal-directed. He n o longer suffered from the irrational and delusional ideation that he had previously exhibited. The psychologist opined that Defendant was competent to stand trial. A hearing to determine whether Defendant should be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for a full competency evaluation was held on J anuary 11, 2018. Neither party challenged the conclusions of the competency screening report. In addition, counsel for Defendant represented, based on her intera ctions with Defendant, that he was competent to stand trial. On the basis of the preliminary competency report and the represen tations of counsel, the undersigned finds that there is no longer a reasonable basis to believe tha t a mental competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b) or further competency hearing under 1 8 U.S.C. § 4241(c) is warranted

at this time. 1 As to the Speedy Trial Act issue, the government declined to pr esent evidence at the hearing as to the reasonableness of any delay in transporting D efendant to the Colorado facility exceeding 10 days, taking the pos ition that the pendency of the detention motion from November 7, 2017, functioned to exclude time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 316 1(h)(1)(D). The government further noted that it was unnecessary to resolve any Speedy Tri al issues immediately, because they

1 At the hearing, the undersigned denied the government’s motion to detain Defendant prior t o trial and released him under the Pretrial Services Depar tment’s High Intensity Supervi sion Program, with additional conditions prohibiting Internet use and requiring Defendant comply with his mental hea lth treatment, including his medication regimen.might ultimately be mooted by a pre-trial resolution of the cas e and because they were not presently ripe as no trial date had been set. The undersigned finds that only the Emergency Motion for a Stay and Reevaluation, which did not itself address any issue as to the exclusion of time, h as been referred for resolution and therefore declines to address the Speedy Trial Act issues. Min ute Order dated Dec. 20, 2017. Should the district judge choose to refer any Speedy Trial Act disputes, the undersigned will address them expeditiously. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Local Criminal Rule 59.1, the Order dat ed November 21, 2017, is

VACATED

. SO ORDERED.

____________________________________ January 17, 2018 G. MICHAEL HARVEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE J UDGE