Report of the 

Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Future Strategic Strike Skills 

March 2006 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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____________________________________________________________________TABLE OF CONTENTS

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS________________________________________________________i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary........................................................................................................................ 1 

Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 7 

Terms of Reference/Tasking........................................................................................................... 9 

Background................................................................................................................................... 13 

ICBMs/Basing............................................................................................................................... 21 

SLBMs/SSBNs/SSGNs................................................................................................................. 29 

Bombers and Cruise Missiles........................................................................................................ 35 

Payloads ........................................................................................................................................ 39 

C4ISR............................................................................................................................................ 41 

Future Alternatives........................................................................................................................ 47 

Human Capital Management ........................................................................................................ 49 

Requirements for Strategic Skill Retention .................................................................................. 55 

Findings and Recommendations................................................................................................... 57 

Appendices 

A. Terms of Reference................................................................................................................ A-1 

B. Task Force Membership......................................................................................................... B-1 

C. Draft Action Plan ................................................................................................................... C-1 

D. Task Force Request for Data.................................................................................................. D-1 

E. List of Briefings.......................................................................................................................E-1 

F. Acronym List...........................................................................................................................F-1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________________ 

ii_________________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Programs......................................................................................................................... 11 

Table 2: Skill Areas for Future Strategic Strike Capability.......................................................... 12 

Table 3: SLBM Industrial Base .................................................................................................... 31 

Table 5: Skills Assessment ........................................................................................................... 61 

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: U.S. Employed Engineers ............................................................................................. 13 

Figure 2: U.S. Engineering University Graduates ........................................................................ 13 

Figure 3: U.S. University Trends in Defense-Related S&E ......................................................... 14 

Figure 4: Time to Obtain Clearances............................................................................................ 14 

Figure 6: R&D Scientists & Engineers Employment ................................................................... 15 

Figure 7: Leading Innovators........................................................................................................ 15 

Figure 8: ICBM Industrial Base.................................................................................................... 23 

Figure 9: ICBM Infrastructure – Critical Skills............................................................................ 24 

Figure 10: Guidance – Critical Skills............................................................................................ 25 

Figure 11: Re-entry Systems – Critical Skills............................................................................... 25 

Figure 12: Propulsion – Critical Skills.......................................................................................... 26 

Figure 13: SLBM Critical Skills Mix ........................................................................................... 29 

Figure 14: SLBM Facilities and Major Contractors ..................................................................... 30 

Figure 15: SWF Core Competencies ............................................................................................ 32 

Figure 16: Typical Ballistic Missile Industrial Base Employee Age Distribution ....................... 33 

Figure 17: DTRA S&T Demographics 2004................................................................................ 53 

Figure 18: Summary of Findings .................................................................................................. 60 

Figure 19: Summary of Recommendations .................................................................................. 62 
___________________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Tasking 

The Task Force was asked by the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)) to examine the current and future 

capabilities of the specialized skills necessary to maintain, upgrade, and design replacement 

strategic nuclear and non-nuclear strike systems. Recently, there has been considerable concern 

that the majority of the personnel involved with critical engineering skills may soon be retiring, 

thus endangering future capabilities to maintain current systems and to design replacement 

systems. The availability of strategic skills among military personnel, civil service personnel and 

industrial personnel were to be examined. The Chiles Commission (prescribed by the National 

Defense Authorization Act of FY 1997) examined the capabilities for the design and testing of 

nuclear warheads, therefore the topic was not included in this study. 

The Task Force was asked to provide remedial recommendations if their findings concluded that 

the availability of strategic strike system skills was in danger. 

Membership 

The Task Force included experienced individuals with backgrounds in strategic strike systems, 

listed in Appendix B. 

Approach 

Several approaches were used to gather pertinent information: 

 Meetings were held with the past and current heads of STRATCOM, including a site visit 

to STRATCOM Headquarters. 

 Briefings were heard from military, civil service, and industrial organizations involved 

with current operations and support of U.S. strategic strike systems. 

 Data were requested of the current age distributions of critical strategic strike personnel 

in relevant organizations. 

BACKGROUND

Policy Directions 

With the end of the Cold War, further development of the nation’s nuclear strike systems was 

terminated. Operational manning of those systems was continued along with maintenance and 

sustainment efforts. Plans were made to maintain these systems, but no specific actions were 

taken for replacing them with next-generation systems. 

 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY___________________________________________________________________ 

2_________________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

In 2002, Congress mandated a second Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concerning the future of 

U.S. strategic strike forces. This review directed a continuation of reduced-size nuclear forces; 

development of strategic defense systems including ballistic missile defenses; and maintenance 

of a responsive defense infrastructure capable of responding to any new strategic system needs. 

To-date, the Department of Defense (DoD) has not acted upon the NPR Implementer in its 

entirety. The Department’s focus has instead been on improving upon conventional forces, and 

specifically on addressing insurgency warfare challenges. Additionally, the Department is 

currently conducting a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) with an assessment of the needs 

identified by specific scenarios that may, in some cases, utilize strategic strike. 

Trends in Availability of Engineering Personnel to the DoD 

In the early days of the Cold War, urgent national defense problems drew on the services of a 

significant percentage of U.S. professional engineers. Today most of the country’s engineering 

talent is concerned with civilian developments, and only a small fraction is devoted to DoD 

problems. Currently, work related to strategic strike systems is not considered to be a desirable 

career path by engineering personnel, particularly when exciting and potentially lucrative careers 

are available in new technological areas such as computer/internet systems, quantum 

communications and computation, nanotechnology, etc. 

The result has been that in many strategic strike critical skill areas, experienced personnel are 

nearing retirement with few replacements. This situation could lead to the potential loss of 

critical strategic strike systems knowledge. 

STRATEGIC SKILLS SURVEY RESULTS

The Task Force heard briefings on strategic strike personnel management practices in the various 

military services, relevant industrial organizations, as well as in the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA). It also requested personnel age distributions from these organizations. 

Unfortunately, few of these organizations were able to provide such numerical data. A summary 

of the results obtained from the briefings and the limited survey data follows. 

Navy 

The Navy has a systematic Human Capital Management Plan focused on the retention of 

strategic strike skills over the long term. This was especially evident in the area of operations 

and sustainment of current systems, where the normal officer personnel system ensures a steady 

flow of new talent. Current Navy plans are to maintain current Submarine-Launched Ballistic 

Missile (SLBM) capability until approximately 2040. However, there is reason for concern in 

certain areas with respect to the ability of the industry to design replacement SLBM components 

and especially new SLBM systems, should they be needed to replace current systems. A 

strategic skills staff age distribution provided by one industry source, for example, showed that a 

serious loss of expertise would occur within 10 years, by which time almost half of the critical 

personnel will have left the company. 

Army 

Although the Army has no currently identified strategic strike mission, it must maintain a 

capability to understand nuclear effects, particularly on the battlefield. Toward that end, it has a 
___________________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________3

well-managed officer career process to ensure that this capability is maintained by a continual 

flow of officers into this specialty. 

Air Force 

The Air Force has recently integrated its strategic ballistic missile personnel into its Space Corps. 

The Service has also instituted a supervisory organization to ensure a maintained presence of 

strategic nuclear strike personnel, including capable strategic operational and maintenance 

officers, as well as civilian engineering personnel. The age structure of the operational personnel 

and maintenance personnel appears to be well under control. It is too early to tell if this 

management system will be able to maintain the necessary engineering skills in the civil service 

and in industry. Specifically, there is some question as to whether the industrial capability to 

design replacement Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) systems is being maintained, 

particularly when business opportunities for industry lie in different directions, such as 

conventional warfare and space systems. Data provided by the Air Force indicated that a serious 

decline in ICBM design capability would occur within 5 years and, with sustainment efforts, 

within 10 years. 

On the other hand, prospects for long-term maintenance of bomber design capability appears 

assured, because of the sizeable design capabilities being employed for new tactical military 

aircraft and for civil air transport aircraft. 

Application Programs 

Due to concerns over the potential loss of strategic strike industrial expertise, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) has recommended for the past decade that the Air Force and Navy 

fund “Application” programs to retain certain industrial strategic skills. These programs involve 

the redesign of replacement components for current systems. The funding by the Services and 

Congress for these efforts has never equaled the original recommendation of the United States 

Strategic Command’s Strategic Advisory Group (STRATCOM SAG). Moreover, this set of 

programs does not address retention of the skills necessary for the development of new 

replacement systems, should they be needed. 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

This DoD agency is charged with, among other things, understanding nuclear weapons effects. 

Government civil service personnel, military officers, and contractors are used to carry out this 

DTRA mission area. While military officers are involved with DTRA, a significant percentage 

of the civil service and contractor personnel is approaching retirement, according to an agency 

survey. As far as could be determined by the Task Force, DTRA does not have a Human Capital 

Management system directed to solve this problem. 

C4ISR 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities are provided by a variety of service organizations and 

government agencies. Because these capabilities are needed for modern precision conventional 

warfare, they should also be available for current and future strategic forces. Therefore, the 

skills needed for support of strategic forces could be available in the future with providing 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY___________________________________________________________________ 

4_________________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for detecting low level nuclear 

programs. 

New Strategic Strike Concepts 

A Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study of 2003 addressed the future of U.S. strategic 

strike systems, including non-nuclear systems. It appears that relatively little additional action 

has taken place on this subject over the past 2 years, either with regard to next-generation 

(evolutionary) systems or in connection with new types of systems (revolutionary) for future 

objectives. The personnel required for the development of such systems should be highly 

innovative; attracting such individuals may be difficult due to the lack of financial incentives 

associated with civilian industry’s efforts. 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the information received by the Task Force from a wide variety of briefings and 

surveys, it appears that a serious loss of certain critical strategic strike skills may occur within 

the next decade. More detailed findings and associated recommendations follow. 

FINDING #1 

 The DoD has not provided specific direction regarding next-generation strategic strike 

systems. Consequently, the industry and government talent base: 

 Are already marginally thin in many of today’s current systems, and 

 May not be available for potential next-generation systems. 

Recommendation 

 The Secretary of Defense should, taking account of the NPR Implementer and the Task 

Force on Future Strategic Strike recommendations, give direction for next-generation 

strategic strike systems. 

FINDING #2 

 The exploration of new concepts and technologies for strategic strike of challenging 

targets in the long-term is inadequate and will require access to a new talent base with 

different skills. 

Recommendation 

 The Secretary of Defense should establish a DARPA office charged with defining and 

funding the exploratory development of future strategic strike concepts, to include the 

application of new technologies. Output would include: 

 Concepts for strategic attack that can be transitioned to the Services; 

 Conceiving and maturing technologies required by the concepts; and 

 Annual reports to the Secretary of Defense on progress in developing strategic strike 

technologies. 
___________________________________________________________________EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________5

FINDING #3 

 The strategic strike area most at risk today is ballistic missiles: 

 Current skills may not be able to cope with unanticipated failures requiring analysis, 

testing, and redesign; 

 A large number of skilled military, civil service, and contractor personnel are nearing 

retirement; 

 Design skills are rapidly disappearing, both for major redesigns of current systems 

and for the design of new strategic systems; and 

 Applications programs are necessary, but not sufficient to maintain skills; moreover, 

they have never been funded at the required levels. 

Recommendation 

 Ballistic missile program offices should devote resources to the transfer of critical 

knowledge and skills to early career personnel in industry. 

 The Secretary of Defense should direct the Navy and the Air Force – absent near-term 

systems development – to fund advanced development (subsystem design, system 

prototype development, and testing) to support next-generation system development 

(which will also restore and maintain the skills base). 

 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Navy and Air Force Applications 

Programs are fully funded at the STRATCOM SAG’s originally-recommended levels to 

address critical areas not supported fully by advanced development. 

FINDING #4 

 DoD and industry have difficulty attracting and retaining the best and brightest students 

to the science and engineering disciplines relevant to maintaining current and future 

strategic strike capabilities. 

 The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) program has the potential for attracting 

personnel to government; however, it currently does not have strategic strike element. 

Recommendation 

 Strategic strike program offices should encourage and fund supporting industries to 

develop combined undergraduate scholarship and co-op programs for U.S. citizens in 

relevant science and engineering disciplines that would: 

 Include the requirement to work for a period of time in DoD or the Defense industry; 

and 

 Encourage future graduate studies. 

 Take advantage of the NDEA program. 

FINDING #5 

 Human capital management systems and strategies for identifying, tracking, and retaining 

critical skills are not being implemented effectively across all of the strategic strike 

constituent organizations. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY___________________________________________________________________ 

6_________________________________________________DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Recommendation 

 The USD (AT&L) should ensure that strategic strike constituent organizations institute a 

skill and domain-knowledge management system, and include active duty, civil service, 

and industry personnel. 
_________________________________________________________________________INTRODUCTION

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________7

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, concerns have arisen in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that skills 

necessary to maintain and modernize the country’s strategic nuclear strike systems are 

endangered due to the imminent retirement of critical personnel. 

The problem of retaining skills in the nuclear weapons area within the Department of Energy 

was earlier examined by the Chiles Commission Study. 

Nuclear payloads represent only a portion of the current strategic strike weapon systems 

employing nuclear devices; i.e., C4ISR, delivery systems, operations, maintenance and a broad 

supporting infrastructure constitute the “weapon system.” In addition, the reliance upon nonnuclear payloads in the future may change the way strategic strike systems are viewed. Thus, for 

current, near-term, and future strategic strike systems, all elements which comprise the weapon 

system need to be considered so that the skills necessary to develop, operate, and support all 

phases of the weapon system life cycle can be assessed. 

As a result, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 

requested the Defense Science Board to form a Task Force to study the adequacy and 

sustainability of skilled personnel needed to ensure the continued capability of United States 

strategic strike forces, both nuclear and non-nuclear. 

If serious problems were discovered in the adequacy and sustainability of current or future 

strategic strike skills, the Task Force was asked to generate recommendations for maintaining 

such skills into the future. 
INTRODUCTION ________________________________________________________________________

8 _________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
____________________________________________________________TERMS OF REFERENCE/TASKING

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________9

TERMS OF REFERENCE/TASKING

The Under Secretary requested that the Task Force: 

 Assess the current skills and their future viability to sustain U.S. nuclear and 

non-nuclear long-range strike forces. 

 Identify new skill sets necessary to develop new long-range non-nuclear strategic strike 

concepts 

 Recommend a strategy for successful evolution of current skills to those needed for 

future strategic strike forces. 

A copy of the Terms of Reference is in Appendix A. 

MEMBERSHIP

The Task Force membership was drawn primarily from individuals who had had an extensive 

career in the acquisition, operations, and maintenance of U.S. strategic systems. A number of 

members had also participated in the 2003 DSB Summer Study on Future U.S. Strategic Strike 

Systems. A complete list of participants is found in Appendix B. 

METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The Task Force held meetings over approximately a one-year period. The members heard a wide 

range of requested briefings on strategic strike personnel skills. In addition, the members 

discussed how best to assure sufficient future strategic skills given the current imbalance in the 

age distribution of those individuals. The classes of skills that were reviewed include: 

 Military personnel charged with operating the weapons platforms or systems; 

 Military and civilian personnel charged with strike planning; 

 Individuals involved with the innovation of new classes of long-range strike capabilities, 

particularly non-nuclear; 

 Military, civil service, and contractor personnel charged with maintenance of weapons 

platforms and weapons components, including guidance, rocket engines, fuzes, reentry 

bodies, etc.; 

 Civil service and contractor personnel charged with the modernization of outmoded 

components such as guidance systems, flight control equipment, fuzes, etc.; and 

 Government and industry personnel responsible for the planning and subsequent 

development of strategic strike systems for both the near-term and the future. 

A complete list of all briefings received is found in Appendix E. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE/TASKING ___________________________________________________________

10 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

The Task Force also visited the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, NE, including a meeting 

with Admiral James Ellis, USN, STRATCOM Commander-in-Chief; and later met in the 

Pentagon with his successor, General James Cartwright, USMC. 

DEFINITIONS

Strategic Strike. The DSB report on “Future Strategic Strike Forces,” dated February 2004, 

defined strategic strike as “a military operation to decisively alter an adversary’s basic course of 

action within a relatively compact period of time and can be either an isolated event or part of a 

military campaign.” The above definition applies as written. However, for the purposes of this 

Task Force, the definition of military operations is limited to nuclear and non-nuclear long-range 

strike systems, consistent with the Terms of Reference. 

Strategic Skills. For the purposes of this Task Force, strategic skills are “the critical skills and 

domain knowledge needed to design, develop, produce, test, operate, and maintain nuclear and 

non-nuclear long-range strategic strike systems.” This includes the targeting skills and 

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) functions required to effectively use these 

systems. 

TIMEFRAMES FOR FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCES

The DSB report on “Future Strategic Strike Forces” described three time periods for 

consideration. The present Task Force has continued to use these timeframes as follows: 

 Current systems sustainment (routine maintenance and remedying unanticipated 

problems) 

 Next-generation (near-term) systems (deployed within the next 10-20 years) 

[evolutionary] 

 Future systems (beyond 2025) [revolutionary] 

ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC STRIKE SYSTEMS

The Task Force divided the components of future strategic strike systems into the following 

elements: 

C4ISR 

 Intelligence to provide assessment and analysis of emerging threats 

 Surveillance and Reconnaissance to monitor the threat and provide timely (persistent and 

responsive) information to the responsible command 

 Battle Management to ensure that the responsible command has full and positive control 

of the weapon system in all phases of execution 

Delivery Systems 

 Bombers 

 Cruise Missiles 

 ICBMs 

 SLBMs 
____________________________________________________________TERMS OF REFERENCE/TASKING

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________11

Payloads 

 Nuclear 

 Non-nuclear 

Platforms 

 Bases for delivery systems 

Future Alternatives 

 Revolutionary concepts 

The current programs that comprise the strategic force structure are shown in Table 1. In 

addition, the near-term activities that may lead to next-generation systems are also summarized. 

Some of these initiatives may lead to implementation of the recommendations for future systems 

that the 2003 DSB Summer Study provided in its February 2004 report. 

Each of the elements relies upon a set of skills to assure efficient system development and 

effective operational performance. These skills are summarized in Table 2 for the evolution of 

current system capabilities to the next generation and, when applicable, for future systems. The 

latter, however, may be revolutionary in nature and require different skill sets (e.g., directed 

energy weapons, intrusive information operations, etc.) than those currently resident in the 

strategic strike force. 

Elements of Strategic Strike Forces 

Elements Current Programs Near-Term Activities DSB Summer Study 

Recommendations 

C4ISR Global Grid 

National Intelligence 

programs 

DARPA robotics 

DARPA UAVs 

Close-in, intrusive, persistent ISR; 

C4ISRTestbed 

Aircraft B-52, B-1, B-2 Global Strike Studies 

UCAV 

Prompt Strike Analysis of 

Alternatives 

CMs ALCM, ACM, TLAM, 

TACTOM 

Hypersonic S&T 

Global Strike Studies Prompt Strike Analysis of 

Alternatives 

ICBM MM-3, MM-3 Life Extension 

Applications Programs 

LBSD Analysis of 

Alternatives 

Applications Programs 

Prompt Strike Analysis of 

Alternatives 

Conventional Peacekeeper 

Payloads – 

ICBM 

SLBM 

Aircraft 

W62, W78, W87 

W76, W88 

B61, B83, W80-1 

“Reliable Replacement 

Warhead” 

Low-yield nuclear, earth 

penetrating, energetic materials, 

agent defeat 

SLBM D5, D5 Life Extension, 

Applications Programs 

SLIRBM Concept 

studies 

Applications Programs 

SLIRBM 

Prompt Strike Analysis of 

Alternatives Advanced payload 

integration 

Platforms SSBNs, SSGNs, SSN, 

ICBM basing, Aircraft 

 

Future 

Alternatives 

Information Operations, Directed 

Energy Weapons, Space Basing 

Table 1: Programs 
TERMS OF REFERENCE/TASKING ___________________________________________________________

12 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Skill Areas for Future Strategic Strike Capability

C4ISR Bombers Cruise Missiles

 National Systems 

 Robotics 

 Tags 

 Multi-cultural linguists 

 Communications (Global Grid) 

 UAVs 

 Battle management modeling 

and simulation

 Aerodynamics 

 Structures 

 Stealth 

 Manufacturing 

 Mission Systems 

 Propulsion 

 Flight Controls 

 Vehicle Systems 

 Hypersonics

 Aerodynamics 

 Stealth 

 Manufacturing 

 Propulsion–small, inexpensive 

turbine engines; ram jets 

 Guidance–GPS, terminal 

homing 

 Hypersonics

ICBMs/SLBMs Payloads Platforms

 Reentry Vehicles–homing, 

thermal protection, defense 

penetration, special purpose 

(EP, mobile targets) 

 Propulsion–large rocket motors, 

attitude control 

 Guidance–inertial, GPS 

 Rad-Hard Electronics–Dose rate 

 Low-yield nuclear 

 Earth penetrating 

 Agent defeat 

 Energetic Materials 

 Weapon effects 

 SSBN/SSGN 

 z Security 

 z Fire Control 

 z Modifications for 

 IRBMs/CMs 

 z Next Generation 

 Aircraft 

z Forward location support 

 (hangars) 

z UAVs/UCAVs 

 Conventional space-based (Future 

Concepts) 

Table 2: Skill Areas for Future Strategic Strike Capability 
_________________________________________________________________________BACKGROUND

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________13

BACKGROUND

Historically, the U.S. long-range strategic strike skill base benefited from the national priority 

and funding associated with supporting the Cold War mission. Moreover, for decades, 

concurrent Science and Technology (S&T), acquisition, and sustainment activity continuously 

exercised the critical skills necessary to support the full weapons systems life cycle. This 

resulted in a robust, motivated, and technically agile workforce that naturally maintained and 

transferred critical skills and domain knowledge through continuous application to real and 

important work. 

However, since the division of the USSR in the early 1990s, significant changes have occurred in 

the numbers of engineering personnel in the U.S. Figure 1 shows that a 10% decrease has 

occurred since 2001. Moreover, Figure 2 depicts a decline in the number of Bachelor degrees 

awarded in the field of engineering since 1990. While graduations of engineering masters and 

doctorates have not declined since 1990, the percent of U.S. citizens graduating with advanced 

degrees has significantly declined since 1994, as shown in Figure 3. 

Figure 1: U.S. Employed Engineers 

Figure 2: U.S. Engineering University Graduates 
BACKGROUND _________________________________________________________________________

14 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Figure 3: U.S. University Trends in Defense-Related S&E 

A further impediment to hiring such talent for DoD programs is the prolonged waiting period 

associated with obtaining security clearances, as shown in Figure 4. 

Figure 4: Time to Obtain Clearances 
_________________________________________________________________________BACKGROUND

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________15

The reduction of funding for DoD military systems, together with reduction in the supply of 

engineering personnel, have resulted in a decline of more than a factor of two in the numbers of 

aerospace scientists and engineers employed in U.S. industries, as shown in Figure 5. 

Figure 5: R&D Scientists & Engineers Employment 

Finally, surveys of a group of 400 leading U.S. technology innovators show that only a very 

small percentage are interested in positions within defense industries and DoD (see Figure 6). 

Thus, the talent available for conceiving new classes of strategic strike systems is only a very 

small percentage of the critically important class of innovating technologists. 

Figure 6: Leading Innovators 

The end of the Cold War also profoundly affected the long-range strategic strike militaryindustrial complex. The continuous development cycle that started in the 1950s ended with 

deployment of the Peacekeeper and Trident II (D5) systems in the early 1990s. The rest of the 

1990s saw a continuous erosion of national priority, clarity of mission, and funding levels. 

Science and Technology spending was also reduced as production programs ended or were 

reduced to minimum levels, leaving sustainment as the only area routinely exercising strategic 
BACKGROUND _________________________________________________________________________

16 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

strike skills. The current focus on the Global War on Terrorism has pushed the role(s) of future 

strategic strike systems further to “backburner” status. 

As a direct result of these trends, the strategic strike skill base of the DoD is currently at risk due 

to an aging workforce and lack of apparent long-term career viability, as well as competition for 

scientific and technical personnel in the marketplace. Sustainment and maintenance activity will 

slow the loss of these skills, but cannot preserve them over time.

The critical skills and domain knowledge needed to design, develop, produce, and maintain 

nuclear and conventional long-range strategic forces cannot be hired from the mainstream 

workforce. The increased use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)-based upgrades in current 

service life-extension programs have increased the commercial skills being leveraged in some 

areas. However, there are many areas, such as existing system and subsystem domain 

knowledge, nuclear safety and security disciplines, reentry systems, and radiation hardness, 

where skills providers have no commercial base from which to draw. These skills can be 

maintained only by the Department of the Defense. If lost, the general view of industry is that it 

would take five to seven years to reconstitute an adequately skilled workforce, and even then, 

expectations for error and cost overrun resulting from inexperience would likely be high. 

The findings and recommendations from the “Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear 

Weapons Expertise” (the Chiles Commission), dated March 1, 1999, and the DSB report on 

“Future Strategic Strike Forces,” dated February 2004, are relevant to this study. 

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was mandated by Congress in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. The NPR contains the results of a comprehensive 

Department of Defense review of the U.S. nuclear posture, as well as a long-range plan to sustain 

and modernize U.S. strategic nuclear and non-nuclear forces. 

The NPR reinforces the four primary defense policy goals that were defined in the September 

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): 

 Assure allies and friends of U.S. steadiness of purpose and our capability to fulfill our 

security requirements. 

 Dissuade adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten U.S. 

interests or the interests of U.S. Allies and friends. 

 Deter aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat 

attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversary’s military capability 

and supporting infrastructure. 

 Defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. 

The NPR states that Cold War-style strategic planning, including a U.S.-Russia relationship 

based on Mutually Assured Destruction, is no longer appropriate. Instead, the NPR encourages 
_________________________________________________________________________BACKGROUND

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________17

building a new framework with Russia that is based on mutual cooperation, common 

responsibilities, and common interests, rather than distrust and hostility. 

Following the direction outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the NPR shifts 

planning for America’s strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a 

capabilities-based approach. The capabilities-based approach provides a credible deterrent with 

the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and Allied security. 

The NPR directs a shift to a “New Triad” of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities that 

include: nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities; active and passive defenses; and a robust 

research, development, and industrial infrastructure. 

The first leg of the New Triad incorporates conventional capabilities together with the 

traditional Nuclear Triad, which is composed of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. 

The second leg of the New Triad requires the development and deployment of active and 

passive defenses because, in the new security environment, offensive capabilities alone may not 

deter aggression. These defenses include the development of a missile defense system. 

The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense infrastructure. Since the end of the Cold 

War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has been downsized, and the nuclear infrastructure, the U.S. 

industrial base, and the government labs previously focused on strategic systems have 

significantly deteriorated. New approaches to the development and procurement of new 

capabilities are being designed. In addition, the U.S. nuclear infrastructure needs to be repaired 

to increase confidence in deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of 

technological surprise. A critical element of the strategic strike infrastructure is the skills 

necessary to sustain existing capabilities and to be ready to create any new capability needed to 

counter changes in required capabilities. 

At the center of the New Triad is the needed capability for rapid, responsive planning that 

requires agile command and control woven seamlessly together with persistent and intrusive 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

The NPR calls for U.S. nuclear forces to be reduced to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally 

deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. This is a level that will provide a credible 

deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with national security 

requirements and Alliance obligations. The planned reductions will be completed in phases. 

While operationally deployed strategic nuclear forces are being reduced in number, the U.S. will 

continue to maintain a responsive force to remain prepared for any immediate or unexpected 

contingencies. 

CURRENT STATUS

In addition to the shift of the Defense Department from strategic nuclear systems to conventional 

warfare, and more recently to insurgency warfare, there has been a shift in the interests of 

technology experts in the United States. 
BACKGROUND _________________________________________________________________________

18 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

This has been driven in part by the consistently decreasing portion of the total U.S. technology 

development funding that is provided by the Defense Department. During the early days of the 

Cold War, a majority of total technology funding was devoted to defense problems, whereas 

today it is only a small percentage of the total. 

Independently, this shift should still result in adequate numbers of defense technology staff, 

because the total development funding of the country is comparatively larger today. However, 

the most important factor pulling capable technology staff away from defense-related work as 

compared to 50 years ago is the possibility of substantial financial rewards by participation in 

high-technology start-ups. 

Recent surveys by both Fortune1

 and Technology Review2 show that over 90% of those judged 

to be the most innovative individuals in the U.S. are either associated with technology start-ups 

or hold positions with university offering research opportunities that could later lead to a start-up 

(See Figure 6, “Leading Innovators”). 

Most of the remaining 10% are associated with technology developments in large commercial 

organizations, with only three to four percent having positions within the Defense Department or 

with defense contractors. Presently most of the technical positions supporting current U.S. 

strategic forces are focused on maintenance or the re-engineering of systems developed in the 

past. Such positions do not require the most innovative of the U.S. technology personnel. With 

the proper incentives, however, it should be possible to recruit sufficient numbers of qualified 

personnel for maintaining U.S. strategic forces. 

Conversely, in recent years interest has grown in the possibility of developing a non-nuclear 

strategic capability for the U.S. This will require the recruitment of creative individuals of the 

highest technical capability. To obtain the services of such individuals will require innovative 

recruitment incentives, both financial and professional. 

Approximately 70,000 engineers and scientists graduate in the United States each year. China 

and India, on the other hand, graduate approximately 200,000. While many of the latter have 

pursued education in the U.S., these nations have established their own sets of educational 

programs, and have developed a trend of educating an increasing number of students in their 

native countries (See Figure 3, “U.S. University Trends in Defense-Related Science and 

Engineering”). 

Engineers and scientists over the years have been attracted to fields that they perceive to be “the 

next big thing.” While no one knows what the future holds, many believe that nanoscale science, 

molecular biology (life sciences), and information science represent the technology “waves” 

(Toffler, 1980) of the future. Each in itself could be “the next big thing”; however, it is possible 

that there may be an intersection of all three fields that will provide a significant foundation and 

launching pad for the global future economically, and perhaps, even militarily. China is 

perceived to be in a position to take a lead in nanoscale technology, and India is now viewed to 

 

1 Top 10 innovators, Vol. 148 Issue 5, 2003, and What drives America's great innovators?, Vol. 150 Issue 8, 2004. 2

 October 1999, June 2002, October 2003 and October 2004.
_________________________________________________________________________BACKGROUND

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________19

be postured to be a leader in information sciences (not simply the low-cost provider of software 

coding on demand). 

Strategic strike skills may well be in competition for the individuals pursuing the “next big 

thing(s).” In addition, future strategic strike initiatives may well depend upon nanoscale 

technology, information sciences, and perhaps even life sciences in ways not currently foreseen. 

While the future evolves as noted above, the defense industry that brought us to where we are 

today continues to change in ways (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) that may well preclude 

drawing accurate conclusions from the past. For example, Douglas-Santa Monica was a leader 

in the development of maneuvering reentry vehicle (MARV) technology. That team was moved 

to Douglas-Huntington Beach, acquired by McDonnell-St. Louis, and then acquired by BoeingSeattle followed by relocation to Boeing-Seal Beach. It is doubtful that anyone on the original 

MARV team remains. This is a common theme across the industry that emerged after WW II, 

and is now “transformed” again after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Are the necessary skills 

resident in the U.S. to provide operations and sustainment to the current systems and, perhaps 

more importantly, to assure that unforeseen problems can be addressed? And are the innovative 

design, test, and development skills represented in a way that permits the fielding of future 

strategic strike systems potentially required in the years to come? 

STRATEGIC STRIKE CONSTITUENTS

For the U.S. to have the skill sets necessary in the 21st century to define, develop, operate, and 

maintain the strategic programs of the future, attention to those needs must be recognized and 

nurtured by the following constituents: 

 Strategic Policy 

 DoD Commands or Program Offices 

 Supporting DoD Agencies 

 National Nuclear Security Agency 

 U.S. Industrial Base (Contractors) 

 DoD Labs 

 Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) 

 Others in support of the above; e.g., multi-tasked agencies such as National Security 

Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA), Defense Information Security Agency (DISA); second-tier contractors and their 

supply chains, etc. 

Constituents also include organizations involved with: strategic policy; intelligence; weaponseffects assessments; kill-chain architectures for desired effects, targeting, etc.; the training and 

preparation for operations such as modeling and simulation; war games and responsive and 

adaptive planning for execution using “real time” communications, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; offense/defense integration; and the “best available” staff support to cognizant 

Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs), independent of geography. 
BACKGROUND _________________________________________________________________________

20 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
________________________________________________________________________ICBMS/BASING

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________21

ICBMS/BASING

BACKGROUND

ICBM development in the U.S. has had a rich history, beginning with the logical evolution of the 

German V-2 liquid rocket system into longer-range versions that were capable of military 

operation. Thor was deployed in mid-1959, followed by the significantly larger Atlas a year 

later. Titan I and Titan II, both large liquid rockets capable of global reach with high-yield 

nuclear weapons, were deployed in the early 1960s. In the late 1950s the Air Force became 

interested in the notion of using smaller solid propulsion boosters for ICBMs to decrease 

handling operations and improve survivability through hardened silos. Minuteman I (MM I) was 

fielded in early 1962, MM II followed in 1965, and the multiple independently targeted reentry 

vehicle (MIRVed) MM III entered the force in 1970. Each had three propulsion stages and 

shared many components. The Peacekeeper, which followed in 1986, had the same “template” 

despite its increased size and improvements in accuracy. 

Minuteman missiles were deployed in hardened silos located in missile bases throughout the 

Great Plains. The liquid Titan systems were based in Arkansas, Kansas and Arizona. Silo 

hardness technology was developed in the 1960s. The Peacekeeper was to have been deployed 

in a mode that relied upon Preservation of Location Uncertainty (PLU), so a considerable 

development effort took place in the 1970s to demonstrate the effectiveness of multiple 

protective shelters and deceptive basing concepts. Cancellation of the Missile X Multiple 

Protective Shelter (MX MPS) deployment in early 1981 turned attention to other basing systems: 

deep underground, rail mobile, air launched, and a number of camouflage/concealment/deception 

(CCD) systems, etc., which were developed to various degrees of maturity. Ultimately, the 

Peacekeeper (nee MX) program was significantly reduced in scope and a limited number of the 

missiles were deployed in existing Minuteman silos. 

Finally, development of a three-stage Small ICBM was undertaken in the early 1980s to utilize 

its inherent mobility for CCD applications. A road-mobile (and off-road) version was initiated. 

However, the program was terminated early in its development. Thus, the last ICBM basing 

design team terminated development activity in the mid 1980s. 

Beginning in 1963, the Air Force led the tri-Service ABRES (Advanced Ballistic Reentry 

Systems) technology development for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This program 

successfully developed ballistic reentry vehicles which could be deployed as MIRVs, maneuver 

to evade interceptors or attack targets using on-board sensors, and control observables so that 

defenses could be negated. In addition, countermeasures were developed for the U.S. offensive 

forces and signature data was provided to the Army’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) team. 

The ABRES program was strongly supported by OSD and historically received approximately 

$125-150 million per year (in then-year funding) for advanced development activities through 

Congressional appropriations to the Air Force. ABRES was terminated as a tri-Service program 

in 1984 and replaced by the Advanced Strategic Missile Systems (ASMS) program. 
ICBMS/BASING ________________________________________________________________________

22 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

ABRES and then ASMS developed new missile designs (e.g., Small ICBM) and basing concepts 

(e.g., Deep Underground) as well as new guidance systems, fuzes, and advanced 

countermeasures for future strategic systems. ASMS was terminated by the Air Force in 1991, 

leaving a void in ballistic missile technology development. 

As the Cold War began to wind down and as missile/basing development efforts in the U.S. were 

terminated, the Defense Science Board conducted a summer study in 1990, “Research & 

Development Strategy for the 1990s,” to determine what course of action should be 

recommended to ensure these technologies (and skills) that might be needed for systems over the 

long-term could be preserved. The DSB recommended that “pre-prototype” or “prototype” 

development be conducted in 13 areas, four of which had ICBM implications: reentry systems, 

propulsion, guidance, and hardened electronics. The thought was that these efforts were unique 

to strategic applications, would not likely be addressed by tactical forces, and certainly would not 

be supported by the commercial sector. Candidates for prototype development were to be 

selected after considering the threat and the mission to be accomplished, with work proceeding 

on the selected candidate throughout the relevant (and selected) industrial base until the concept 

was ready for production and deployment. If the threat changed or the mission demanded 

another alternative, the prototype development was to change accordingly. Strategic Air 

Command recognized the need for the maintenance of technologies and for the skills that 

addressed future needs, and endorsed the program in the early 1990s. Both the Air Force and the 

Navy were requested to provide $25M/yr for each of reentry systems, guidance, and hardened 

electronics development, and $40M/yr for propulsion development (the larger amount was 

judged to be necessary because of the significant costs associated with large-scale rocket motor 

facilities). Collectively, these efforts became known as “Application Programs” and have 

continued to receive endorsement from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and approval 

from OSD. However, these programs have not been fully funded over the years by the Services. 

Several attempts were made in the 1990s to identify systematically the envisioned threats and 

future missions that could necessitate future strategic systems development. The thought was 

that a national study, (i.e., a “STRAT Y,”3) could bring focus to the process, including the 

Applications programs, so that pre-prototype and prototype development could be targeted at 

those areas of recognized importance for future systems. No OSD or DoD sponsor emerged to 

cause a STRAT Y to occur. 

In the early 1990s, as a result of Base Closure and Realignment Committee (BRAC) activities, 

nearing the end of the Cold War, and Air Force interest in other missions, the ICBM Program 

Office was moved from Norton Air Force Base (AFB) to Hill AFB, where the ICBM logistics 

support had been headquartered. This move resulted in the decimation of what had been a strong 

and unique acquisition staff prepared to deliver significant milestones “on or ahead of schedule, 

within budget, which meet or exceed the users’ requirements.” Few, if any, Air Force personnel 

associated with today’s ICBM program have participated in a system or subsystem design. Arms 

 

3 STRAT X was an intense, nine-month “national study” (staffed by key government officials and leaders from the 

industrial base assembled in the Washington area) in the late 1960s that was charged with identifying the set of 

strategic systems and subsystems necessary to meet the expanding Soviet threat. Trident submarines, for example, 

as well as aircraft launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), small/mobile ICBMs, and other concepts that were eventually 

deployed have a STRAT X legacy. 
________________________________________________________________________ICBMS/BASING

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________23

control and policy decisions since the mid-1990s have resulted in deactivating the MM II force 

and withdrawing Peacekeeper from the silo fields (an ongoing process nearing completion). 

In the late 1990s, a series of “life extension” (LE) programs were initiated to prolong the life of 

Minuteman III. These programs, including guidance replacement, propulsion replacement 

(stages 1, 2, and 3), and post-boost vehicle propulsion, were charged with assuring that the 

operational availability and reliability of the deployed weapon systems were maintained at levels 

acceptable to STRATCOM. However, enhancing or improving the performance of the weapon 

system components was not permitted. In addition, the launch control system was modernized, 

replacing early 1970s control panels and electrical systems with current electronics and a 

modernized control panel approach. The goal is that the MM III in the field today and tomorrow 

will look and perform exactly as the 1970s version, but continue to do so with certainty over the 

years ahead. 

CURRENT PROGRAMS

With modest funding, the ICBM Program Office and the supporting industrial base have done an 

outstanding job in maintaining the availability, reliability, accuracy, and survivability of the 

weapon systems to the satisfaction of STRATCOM. Northrop Grumman serves as the prime 

integrator for the Air Force, with first-tier contractor support from Boeing (guidance and ground 

systems), Lockheed Martin (reentry and ground systems), and ATK (propulsion). This team and 

their second-tier contractors (e.g., Aerojet, Allied Signal, Draper Labs, General Dynamics, 

Honeywell, Raytheon, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and Textron) 

comprise the ICBM industrial base. The demographics of a typical industrial base contractor are 

shown in Figure 7. 

Figure 7: ICBM Industrial Base 

Life-extension programs for Minuteman components have been a key element in maintaining 

systems-level performance of the deployed weapon systems. Importantly, lessons learned in 

deactivation of MM I and MM II, rigorous aging and surveillance, selection (“cherry picking”) 

of stage components for Reentry Systems Launch Program (RSLP) missions conducted for the 
ICBMS/BASING ________________________________________________________________________

24 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Services, and an exemplary risk management approach have all served to provide a strategic 

deterrent that is available to STRATCOM for action whenever needed. 

The skills base needed to assure the success of the current systems over the long term, however, 

is thin. The ICBM Program Office has conducted an assessment of the skills viewed to be 

critical for success in implementing the current program (see Figure 8) and concluded that 

guidance skills (see Figure 9), reentry systems critical skills (see Figure 10), and propulsion 

critical skills (see Figure 11) are, in the aggregate, “marginal” at present and moving toward an 

untenable “below critical mass” workforce within 5 years. Because the program management 

team has not participated in an ICBM design, and only a handful of those who comprise the 

current industrial base were involved in MM, Peacekeeper, or Small ICBM design and 

development, the situation could become even more dire than portrayed if an unexplained failure 

developed on one of the few remaining flight tests of the operational system. No one who 

designed the original MM III components in the late 1960s is actively engaged in the program, 

so root causes of design failure, should one occur, could be difficult to determine and correct. 

Figure 8: ICBM Infrastructure – Critical Skills 
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FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________25

Figure 9: Guidance – Critical Skills 

Figure 10: Re-entry Systems – Critical Skills 
ICBMS/BASING ________________________________________________________________________

26 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Figure 11: Propulsion – Critical Skills 

The critical skills to support radiation-hardened parts are viewed by the ICBM Program Office to 

be available in the industrial base through funding by other Air Force programs. Because of this, 

the radiation- hardened electronics Application Program is managed elsewhere. Because of the 

differences in the threat level, however, the spectra of interest to ICBM technologists may not be 

addressed by satellite programs and other projects. The attention placed on weapons effects has 

decidedly been reduced since the early 1990s with the number of radiation-hardened electronics 

suppliers declining from 16 to only one or two in key areas. Few members of the current 

industrial team have participated in an underground nuclear test (the last one was conducted in 

September 1992) or modeled effects with above-ground X-ray or other test techniques. Few, if 

any, participants on the program have designed and developed hardened systems or subsystems, 

or developed survivable basing designs. Prior to the early 1990s, the ICBM Program Office 

conducted underground nuclear tests on components slated for operational use, routinely 

assessed the damage effectiveness of payload warheads against a broad spectrum of targets, 

recommended design and operational options to assure mitigation of fratricide environments, and 

actively engaged with the warhead developers in acquisition and implementation of a fully 

integrated weapon system. 

NEAR-TERM SYSTEMS (2015 TO 2025) 

Plans for ICBM systems in the near-term are focused on continuing and completing the lifeextension programs and assessing means to extend the operational life of MM III through an 

enhanced aging and surveillance program. 
________________________________________________________________________ICBMS/BASING

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________27

The history of the ICBM Program Office suggests that developing another three-stage solid 

missile (e.g., a MM IV) should be easily addressable by the management team and the industrial 

base. It has, however, been 25 years since a new system was designed, and over 20 years since a 

missile system was developed and tested by an acquisition team. In these previous times, the 

ICBM Program Office was responsible for the technology development (propulsion, guidance, 

etc.), and did not rely upon laboratory support as the fast-paced schedule and the importance of 

immediate program integration drove the modus operandi to be one of a vertically integrated 

team. Similarly, the ICBM Program Office conducted its own weapons-effects testing and 

assessment and did not rely upon Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) or other agencies for support. 

Consequently, the expertise that was assembled in the late 1950s through the early 1990s to 

implement the ICBM acquisition programs (development and deployment) no longer exists as an 

integrated enterprise.

Should another approach (an ICBM significantly different from MM III) be selected for a nearterm development, the ICBM Program Office would need additional (and other) expertise in its 

management chain. In addition, the industrial base would need to draw on expertise now 

residing in other programs and projects (C4ISR, MDA, etc.). The expertise that created 

maneuvering vehicles, terminal-fix sensors, buried target kill capabilities, etc., is, for the most 

part, outside of the ICBM industrial base. 

Peacekeeper is the most accurate U.S. long-range ballistic missile and has by far the largest 

throw weight. As such, it would seem to be a logical candidate to carry non-nuclear payloads on 

precision, surgical extraction missions, but the missile is being deactivated. As it is the most 

recent ICBM to be deployed, Peacekeeper represents the “latest” developments in ICBM 

technology. Some of the individuals who worked on the design in the late 1970s and who 

participated in its development during the 1980s are still available, should the need arise to 

retrofit Peacekeeper for conventional strike missions through off-board and/or on-board guidance 

updates. 

 

FUTURE SYSTEMS (2025 AND BEYOND) 

Because there has been no “STRAT Y” initiative and few of the recommendations relating to 

ICBMs of the 2003 DSB Summer Study on Future Strategic Strike Systems have been 

implemented, there has been little thinking about the future of ICBMs. C4ISR represents the 

future for (newly configured) payloads that could be delivered from land bases to global targets. 

The expertise and skills required to make this transformation currently exist in the community 

and could be assembled by the ICBM Program Office if the vision and mission were clear. 

Future emphasis, therefore, is likely to focus on the payloads, guidance systems, and responsive 

command and control (including off-board updates) rather than booster technology. 

Basing skills (CCD, PLU, hardness, etc.) have been neglected for 20 years and are not exercised 

by the ICBM programs or projects. The sophisticated Air Force countermeasures programs have 

been abandoned and those skills are now supporting MDA initiatives. The ability to develop 

maneuvering vehicles, control observables, and negate defenses has been lost in the ICBM 

program and would require significant growing pains to reconstruct. 
ICBMS/BASING ________________________________________________________________________

28 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

The future of ICBMs rests upon defining a vision of what is needed. This worked in the 1960s 

with STRAT X, when the appropriate expertise was assembled to do what needed to be done. 

That could happen again, but absent that clear direction, the ICBM skills base is, at best, 

prepared only to take on an evolutionary MM IV, and not to create truly new concepts. 
___________________________________________________________________SLBMS/SSBNS/SSGNS

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________29

SLBMS/SSBNS/SSGNS

BACKGROUND 

From the late 1950s to the deployment of the Trident II (D5) in 1990, concurrent science and 

technology, development, production, and sustainment activity exercised the critical skills 

necessary to support the full SLBM life cycle. This resulted in a robust, motivated, and 

technically agile workforce that naturally maintained and transferred critical skills and domain 

knowledge through continuous application to real and important work. 

The critical skills and domain knowledge needed to design, develop, produce, and maintain 

SLBM systems cannot be hired from the mainstream workforce (Figure 12). The increased use 

of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products for obsolescence and Service life extension 

programs has increased the Navy’s ability to leverage their skill base in some areas. However, 

there are many areas, e.g., existing system and subsystem domain knowledge, nuclear safety and 

surety disciplines, reentry systems, and radiation hardness, where there is little or no commercial 

base to draw upon. These skills can be maintained only by the Department of the Defense. 

The following assessment will focus on the state of the SLBM military, civil service, and 

industrial skills base. Near-term and future strategic systems include the Virginia-class 

submarine and the SL-IRBM currently under study by SSP. The Trident I (C4) force is being 

retired and is therefore excluded. The need for SLBMs is planned beyond 2040. The discussion 

will address current, near-term (10 to 20 years), and future programs (beyond 2025). 

Figure 12: SLBM Critical Skills Mix 

CURRENT PROGRAMS

The SLBM force structure consists of 14 Ohio-class SSBNs deployed in two oceans and outfitted 

with Trident II (D5) missiles. The four oldest of the original 18 Ohio-class hulls are being 

converted to SSGNs and are scheduled to be completed by 2009. The SSBN and SSGN force is 
SLBMS/SSBNS/SSGNS __________________________________________________________________

30 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

supported at and deployed from two Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWFs) – on the east coast at 

SWFLANT, Kingsbay, Georgia, and on the west coast at SWFPAC, Bangor, Washington. The 

industrial base consists of an eclectic group of ship construction, aerospace, guidance, rocket 

motor, ordnance, ballistic reentry, system assessment and test, and submarine navigation 

contractors. Prime and major subcontractors supporting the SLBM force are shown in Figure 13. 

Figure 13: SLBM Facilities and Major Contractors 

The SLBM program has benefited since its inception from the Navy’s centralized management 

of the total life cycle by a single program office, Strategic Systems Programs (SSP). Centralized, 

total program planning and management of the military, civil service, and industrial workforce 

have been and continue to be exemplary. The SSP human capital management strategy is one of 

the basic tenets of their long-term mission assurance strategy. 

Military 

Warfare-qualified Engineering Duty Officers (EDOs) are brought into the program early in their 

careers and, after a training and qualification tour, are assigned positions of increasing 

responsibility that can ultimately lead to senior acquisition assignments and/or major command 

of strategic facilities at the 06 level. This is complemented by the Navy’s rigorous management 

of the nuclear-trained officers and Petty Officers who man the SSBNs. Nuclear-trained 

submariner officers and Petty Officers serve as Weapons Officers on SSBNs and in fleet liaison, 

fleet certification, and other acquisition billets, to further close the loop between the system 

developer and the war-fighter. Continuation of this approach will sustain a qualified military 

skills base for current systems. 

Civil Service 

SSP has historically enjoyed low turnover in its civil service workforce. The workforce is 

dominated by baby boomers who have dedicated themselves to strategic careers based on the 
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FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________31

national priority associated with the Cold War. The civil service workforce is managed similarly 

to the military, with the majority of individuals spending their entire careers in SSP acquisition 

and management positions. However, the civil service workforce that developed the Trident I 

(C4) and Trident II (D5) systems has been retiring since Trident II (D5) was deployed in the 

early 1990s. SSP has an excellent mentoring program in place to transfer knowledge and 

develop future leaders. However, the entry-level and mid-career workforce are getting little or no 

substantive hands-on S&T, R&D, or major system development experience, because of limited 

opportunities to work on real programs. 

The civil service workforce of today, therefore, is adequate for the current programs, but will be 

at increasing risk due to the lack of programs that support the maintenance of unique critical 

skills. Long-term career viability concerns, lack of a perceived national priority, marketplace 

dynamics, and future mission uncertainty add to the problem. Many young professionals are 

often looking for the “next big thing,” which makes recruitment and retention in the current 

environment difficult. The current cadre of civil servants, supplemented with experienced staff 

from the retired military community and the SSP mentoring program, should maintain a qualified 

workforce for the rest of this decade. 

Industrial Base 

The SLBM industrial workforce is diverse, highly educated, and often isolated from the nation’s 

mainstream military-industrial complex. The work is usually classified, is performed in 

dedicated facilities, and must be executed in compliance with unique safety and security 

disciplines. Technologies such as radiation hardness and ablative reentry heat shields, for 

example, have no commercial equivalents. 

SLBM Industrial Base 

Subsystem Prime Contractor(s) Major Subcontractor(s) 

System Integration & 

Assessment Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) BAE, JHU/APL 

D5 Missile Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space 

(LMMSC) ATK 

Missile Guidance Charles Stark Draper Laboratory Raytheon, DRC, Honeywell, 

GD 

Reentry LMMSC, Sandia Textron 

SSBN Navigation Lockheed Martin Boeing 

Fire Control General Dynamics (AIS) 

Missile Launcher Northrop Grumman 

Ship Systems General Dynamics (EB) 

Targeting & Assessment JHU/APL, NSWC Dahlgren 

Table 3: SLBM Industrial Base 

The Trident II (D5) system is currently undergoing a life-extension (LE) program to extend the 

service life of the weapon system until 2042, to match the hull life of the Ohio-class submarine. 

The life-extension strategy uses a mix of continuing production of the existing design, as well as 

redesign based on component criticality, expected life, and future supportability and 

affordability. The D5 Life Extension program will be sufficient for training and transferring 

domain knowledge to the next generation of inertial guidance and electronics engineers. COTs-
SLBMS/SSBNS/SSGNS __________________________________________________________________

32 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

based shipboard systems, such as fire control and submarine navigation, have periodic refresh 

cycles to exercise skills. However, propulsion activity is limited to production and sustainment; 

and reentry, except for a MK4 fuse upgrade for the W76, has only sustainment activity planned. 

 

Based on the above considerations, industry inputs, and SSP assessments considered by the Task 

Force, the SLBM industrial skills base is adequate for the current system through the completion 

of the D5 production and Life Extension development programs planned for completion in the 

2010-2013 timeframe. 

 

Depots and Facilities 

The Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWFs) at Kingsbay, GA, and Bangor, WA, are in continuous 

operation supporting the fleet. As such, the skills shown in Figure 14 are exercised with 

sufficient regularity that there is no significant concern. Both facilities and their major 

supporting contractors have workforce capital management plans that maintain the right mix of 

skills, experience, and knowledge transfer. Even in the absence of development and production, 

fleet returns for cause, service life assessment, and surveillance activity exercise core skills on a 

regular basis. As long as the SLBM force structure and current operational tempo remain at or 

near the current levels, there should not be a concern in this area. 

Figure 14: SWF Core Competencies 

NEAR-TERM SYSTEMS (2015 TO 2025) 

As discussed in the current systems assessment, the skills necessary to sustain currently deployed 

systems, i.e., configuration control, testing, assessing performance, identifying and developing 

solutions to technical problems, etc., have been in decline due to loss of budget and program 
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FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________33

scope for the last decade, but are generally adequate for sustaining today’s force structure. 

However, there is no clear long-term strategy beyond the end of this decade. The combined 

impact of no clear national strategy, workforce demographics, and no planned development 

activity beyond circa 2015 will, in the absence of corrective action, put the workforce in serious 

jeopardy. 

Modernization programs such as the LE and Application Programs have been effective in 

preserving DoD-unique technologies and capabilities as well as critical skills since the early 

1990s. The currently planned, post-life-extension environment involves only the incorporation 

of life-extension alterations into the deployed fleet and sustainment activities. These activities 

are necessary but not sufficient for long-term maintenance of the S&T, prototype, design, and 

test skills needed for new development, complex failure investigations, and major technology 

insertions. 

Figure 15: Typical Ballistic Missile Industrial Base Employee Age Distribution 

In addition, current demographics do not favor long-term maintenance of skills, as shown in 

Figure 15. In the next 10 years, a serious loss from the workforce of personnel with SLBM 

domain knowledge and critical skills can be expected. S&T and development of non-nuclear 

strategic capability, such as that recommended by the 2003 DSB Summer Study, would attract 

innovative individuals with the strongest technical capabilities. Continuation of the SLBM 

Applications Programs will help with DoD-unique critical skills. If these areas are not 

supported, long-term sustainment of SLBM critical skills and support of future systems will be at 

serious risk. 
SLBMS/SSBNS/SSGNS __________________________________________________________________

34 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

FUTURE SYSTEMS (2025 AND BEYOND) 

If the issues summarized under near-term systems are not addressed, then there will be a serious 

loss of the critical skills needed to support SLBM systems over the long term. Recruitment and 

retention of a workforce willing to make the long-term commitment necessary to become the 

leaders and skilled workers who can execute the development challenge for the next-generation 

SLBM will be difficult. Today, new-hire civil service and industry professionals have difficult 

career choices to make. Young people want to use the modern skills they have acquired in 

college, frequently at considerable cost to themselves and their families, in viable careers that 

provide long-term personal growth and financial opportunity. 

This will become increasingly problematic as a significant portion of the current workforce will 

have to be replaced over the next 10 years. Subsequent to recruiting these replacement workers, 

their skills will need to be developed so they can be in position to execute the design and 

development of the next-generation SLBM system. 
___________________________________________________________BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________35

BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES

BACKGROUND

Long-range bombers were the first long-range strike assets of the U.S. military forces. They 

played a major role in World War II, and the B-29 Super Fortress became the first nuclear 

delivery vehicle. Later generations of heavy bombers were fielded over the years, and they 

became increasingly capable in their ability to penetrate enemy air defenses. 

The ever-increasing capabilities of air defenses prompted the U.S. to augment its bomber forces 

with long-range, air-launched cruise missiles, first with nuclear payloads and later with nonnuclear payloads. Cruise missiles could better penetrate air defenses, and they permitted the 

launching bombers to stand off from those defenses. At about the same time, the U.S. also 

developed and fielded long-range cruise missiles (nuclear and non-nuclear) to be carried on and 

launched from ships. 

CURRENT SYSTEMS

The current U.S. strategic strike forces include three operational bomber aircraft: the B-52, the 

B-1, and the B-2. All of these are used to deliver conventional payloads. The B-52 and the B-2 

are also part of the U.S. nuclear force structure. The B-1 has also served in a nuclear role, but is 

now used only for non-nuclear missions. All of these aircraft are undergoing modifications, 

including modernizing and improving avionics and integrating additional types of weapons. 

The U.S. also has underway a Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS) program. This 

demonstration program is exploring technology and system concepts for the use of unmanned 

vehicles for various missions now conducted by manned tactical aircraft. Many aspects of these 

developments would also be applicable to unmanned, long-range strike aircraft. 

The current U.S. strategic strike forces include both air-launched and sea-launched cruise 

missiles: 

ALCM – Air-Launched Cruise Missile. Has nuclear and conventional 

variants. 

ACM – Advanced Cruise Missile. Air-launched, nuclear only. 

TLAM – Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile. Submarine- and surfacelaunched, nuclear (not currently deployed) and conventional. 

TACTOM – Tactical Tomahawk. Submarine- and surface-launched, 

conventional. This is the only operational long-range cruise missile currently 

in production. 

JASSM – Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. Air-launched, 

conventional. This is a shorter-range cruise missile, in early production. This 

and the preceding cruise missiles are subsonic. 
BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES ___________________________________________________________

36 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

SSST – Supersonic Sea-Skimming Target. This ground-launched target 

vehicle is in development. Conceivably, air-launched and strike variants of it 

could be developed, most likely with conventional warheads. 

ASSESSMENT

In general, strategic strike skills associated with air-breathing aircraft and missiles are healthy. 

To a large extent, this is because of the similarity in the skills needed for bombers and cruise 

missiles to those skills that are currently being exercised in the development and production of 

tactical military aircraft (both manned and unmanned), commercial aircraft, and tactical cruise 

missiles. 

On the other hand, the absence of clear Department of Defense direction regarding future 

strategic strike systems makes it difficult, particularly for industry, to take the steps necessary to 

ensure an adequate skills base in the future. The Task Force heard this concern expressed by 

almost all of the industry representatives. They cited the need for a consistent government vision 

and roadmap, and investment in concept studies, technology demonstrations, and, finally, 

development and production programs. They are frustrated with what appears to them to be 

“constant” changes. 

Many of the skill sets needed for bombers and cruise missiles are common: aerodynamics, 

structures, stealth, manufacturing, mission systems (avionics, including guidance, navigation, 

and control), propulsion, propulsion integration, vehicle systems, and overall vehicle 

configuration design. Some of these skills are unique to bombers, e.g., life-support for manned 

systems, crew-machine interfaces, large structures, large engines, complex sensor and weapon 

system integration. Some are unique to cruise missiles, e.g., small, inexpensive turbine engines 

and terminal homing. 

Military 

The military has the skills necessary to plan, develop, deploy, operate, maintain, and sustain 

current bombers and cruise missiles. They are doing so adequately at this time, and they have 

the necessary personnel processes in place to continue this into the future. 

Government Civilian 

The same is generally true for the government civilian force. However, these areas, like many 

others, are at some risk due to the aging of the civil service workforce and the shortage of 

younger personnel, caused by the combination of the 1980s strategic forces build-up and the 

relatively low rates of hiring over the past decade or so. 

Industry 

The Task Force heard a mixed story on the demographic situation in industry. In some areas, the 

situation appeared quite healthy. For example, one company indicated that about 30% of their 

engineers had been with their program for less than 10 years, only about 20% were within 10 

years of retirement, and about 50% were in between. This is a good situation, and they appeared 

comfortable that they could handle this into the future. Comparatively, another company 

indicated that only about 10% had been with their program for 10 years and about 40% were 
___________________________________________________________BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________37

within 10 years of retirement – a situation prompting considerably more concern. Yet another 

had about 15% in their first 10 years, 70% in the middle group, and only 15% within 10 years of 

retirement. 

Not mentioned explicitly in the above list of skills are two areas which are of increasing 

importance and in which nearly all companies are experiencing shortages: systems engineering 

and software engineering. The increasing complexity of weapons systems, as well as the 

increased emphasis on “systems of systems,” makes systems engineering ever-more critical. In 

fact, the term “systems of systems engineering” has become a familiar part of the vernacular. 

Similarly, such complexity, as well as the incorporation of computers into essentially all aspects 

of system and subsystem design, creates great demand for software engineers. 

Industry, especially the larger companies, has considerable interactions with the academic 

community: they have intern, scholarship, and cooperative programs; they give research and 

development grants; they interact with the faculty to influence what is being taught and to 

involve the faculty in their programs; and they develop “strategic partnerships” with universities. 

Industry representatives cited a number of challenges in addition to those caused by 

demographics and shortages of systems engineering and software engineers. There are fewer 

engineering graduates available. An increasing number are foreign and ineligible for security 

clearances. The mathematics and analytic skills of American-educated graduates are not as 

strong as those of India- or Far East-trained students. Much of the necessary training, in areas 

such as hypersonic propulsion (ramjets and particularly scramjets), have unique problems in 

thermal protection and management, engine-vehicle integration, fuels, and shapes, which must 

be provided on-the-job. However, the relatively small number of ongoing aircraft and missile 

programs provides few opportunities to train young engineers. Finally, the current graduates are, 

as a community, more mobile, which results in increased competition from non-defense firms. 

NEAR-TERM SYSTEMS (2015 TO 2025) 

The U.S. has a number of science and technology programs underway as part of the National 

Aerospace Initiative, including the development of hypersonic (> Mach 5) technologies for use 

on potential future missiles and aircraft. The Air Force is exploring options for Long-Range 

Strike which include as possibilities next-generation aircraft and cruise missiles. Candidate 

concepts include penetrating bombers (manned and unmanned, subsonic and supersonic), and 

stand-off aerial platforms that launch supersonic or hypersonic cruise missiles. Higher-speed 

concepts would be consistent with the U.S. strategy for more-survivable, more-responsive forces. 

ASSESSMENT

Military and Government Civilian 

The basic skills required for the military will change relatively little as Near-Term systems are 

developed and come into the force, although those overseeing the technical aspects of these 

programs may need education in new areas, such as hypersonics. 
BOMBERS AND CRUISE MISSILES ___________________________________________________________

38 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Industry 

The points made above regarding the industry workforce apply for the ability to support NearTerm systems as well. The ability to support next-generation systems of the same general class 

as current systems will depend strongly on the health of the civilian aircraft and tactical military 

aircraft industries. The ability to support the development and production of aircraft and cruise 

missiles with hypersonic speeds will depend crucially on not only the continuation of science and 

technology programs in that area, but also programs that transition the relevant technologies into 

full-scale demonstrations, prototypes, and engineering demonstration models. 

FUTURE SYSTEMS (2025 AND BEYOND) 

In addition to the Near-Term systems described above, possibilities for the long-term include 

hypersonic bombers (manned or unmanned) as well as missiles. 

ASSESSMENT

Military and Government Civilian 

Again, the basic skills required for the military will change relatively little as future systems are 

developed and come into the force. 

Industry 

The points made above regarding the industry workforce apply for the ability to 

support future systems as well. 
____________________________________________________________________________PAYLOADS

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________39

PAYLOADS

The strategic strike skills necessary to sustain the current strategic strike payloads, and to 

develop new ones, can be separated into those relevant to nuclear and non-nuclear munitions. 

NUCLEAR

With regard to current nuclear strike systems, the status of the DoD skills relevant to the 

sustained operation of payload components that are the responsibility of DoD has been discussed 

extensively above. Briefly, skills are adequate for routine sustainment operations, and less 

certain in the face of unforeseen problems arising due to the increasing lack of development 

experience on the part of DoD personnel. 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for the nuclear explosive 

package in missile payloads and for the entirety of nuclear bombs. The status of strategic strike 

skills within the NNSA was outside the purview of this Task Force. 

NON-NUCLEAR

With regard to non-nuclear strategic strike payloads, currently only aircraft and cruise missiles 

fall into this category. The skills in this area are sound because they have been routinely 

exercised in the refurbishment of current capabilities as well as in the periodic development and 

deployment of new payloads. 

The status of relevant strategic strike skills for future non-nuclear ballistic missile payloads is not 

good. Reentry and impact pose very different environments for non-nuclear munitions than 

those imposed on existing “conventional payloads.” There are no funded programs, or even 

exploratory development programs, that would enable the skills necessary to deal with the 

challenges posed by these environments to be developed. 
PAYLOADS____________________________________________________________________________

40 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
_______________________________________________________________________________C4ISR 

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________41

C4ISR 

BACKGROUND

C4ISR represents not only the foundation, but perhaps more importantly, the backbone for future 

strategic strike systems. Utilization of solid-state chip technology, application of rapidly 

evolving electronics, and expansion of an increasingly sophisticated global communications 

network grid have opened new avenues for weapon systems performance. Future strategic strike 

systems are not limited by historic mechanical (linear) or evolutionary development. Weapon 

systems of the future can achieve effective, reliable, and assured performance through emerging 

electronic, optical, computational, and software technologies that offer responsiveness, 

persistence, interactive command and control, and real-time mission success assessment. 

The components of C4ISR for strategic strike systems, however, are diverse and individually 

rooted in development, deployment, and operational histories (or legacies) that do not necessarily 

share a common skills base or easily identifiable breadth and scope of expertise. For example, 

for over 40 years, developments in intelligence and the resultant assessments focused on 

exploiting those technologies that would permit the U.S. to peek over the Iron Curtain. The bulk 

of today’s intelligence budget is still directed at systems and their supporting technologies that 

can provide optical and/or electronic glimpses from a distance at what may be happening at 

periodic intervals in “targeted” portions of the globe. The objective was and is to provide 

sufficient information so that political, military, and economic threats facing the U.S. in the nearterm could be assessed. 

Surveillance and reconnaissance (SR) development has been aimed at supporting those 

systems which can provide warning that a threat: has reached a state of military readiness and 

operation; is directed at the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, and/or friends and allies; and is “on 

the move.” The SR supporting technologies have addressed quantification of the threat using 

visual, radar, optical, and/or electronic means. Thus, most of the SR development since the end 

of WWII has supported the notion of monitoring the status of the opposing bi-polar threat in 

areas of specific concern as they became accessible to our assets. 

Command and control of strategic systems has been built upon the premise of establishing a 

regimen for tightly controlling the authorization to release nuclear weapons. Thus, the 

dependency upon quality ISR and assured secure communication channels has been central to 

strategic systems command and control architectures. Ballistic missiles have rigorous 

procedures for maintaining control over launch that require release authorization from the 

National Command Authority. Targets are pre-selected and unknown to the crews implementing 

the command direction. Bombers or aircraft carrying nuclear cruise missiles also have rigid, 

predetermined plans for targeting, but do have the flexibility for obtaining directed updates 

during the operation. This pre-planned responsive targeting operation has been the basis for 

strategic command and control since the early 1950s, and, as a consequence, technology has 

focused on “surety” of control, survivable and secure communication links, and strict adherence 

to pre-planned options with decision-makers responsible for selecting the option that meets the 

threat determined from necessarily time-urgent ISR assessments. 
C4ISR_______________________________________________________________________________

42 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Communication links for strategic strike systems have necessarily relied upon multiple or 

parallel approaches to limit vulnerabilities to dedicated physical threats, jamming, or 

eavesdropping (tapping). Accordingly, there has historically been a desire to minimize the 

traffic and the content, thus leading to concise messages that can be used to implement the 

preplanned options, rather than dialog all of the perceived details of a situation. Consequently, 

sensors used for ISR have relied upon significant signal processing on-board, to reduce data to 

the bare essentials that need to be transmitted. 

Computer technology has moved so fast since the late 1950s that it has now firmly become the 

fourth “C” in C4ISR and influences directly the breadth and scope of the mission that can be 

tackled by today’s weapon systems. Computers on-board weapons systems digest the SR data, 

provide navigation and guidance updates, offer the possibility of steering a payload to the target, 

and can assist in assessing the effects of the attack for commands located elsewhere. 

CURRENT SYSTEMS

The skills to support today’s C4ISR systems have been nurtured over the years of the Cold War 

and remain committed to development and operational performance of assets that have been 

acquired by the intelligence community, related DoD agencies, and the Services. This National 

System has had the benefit of funding priorities and fast-track procurements leading to an 

environment that is regarded to be filled with technical challenge and one that offers professional 

satisfaction when success is achieved. Consequently, those with the appropriate skills are more 

easily attracted to the set of programs and projects that represent the National System and its 

supporting C4 and SR infrastructure. However, security clearances at the highest levels are 

requisite (see Figure 4 - Time to Obtain Clearances) and thus the trends of declining graduation 

rates (BS, MS, and PhD) of U.S. citizens who may qualify for employment should be a major 

concern for the C4ISR skills base in the years ahead (see Figure 3 – University Trends in 

Defense Related S&E). C4ISR and other skill sets must now draw upon a steadily decreasing 

pool size that can provide the needed talent (see Figure 1 – U.S. Employed Engineers; Figure 2 – 

U.S. Engineering University Graduates; and Figure 5 - R&D Scientists and Engineers 

Employment). 

The companies comprising the U.S. industrial base that supports the National System, related 

surveillance and reconnaissance programs, command and control initiatives, and the supporting 

communications infrastructure are currently able to attract personnel needed to replace those that 

are reaching retirement. Approximately 30% of the workforce has been with the programs for 

less than 10 years, whereas approximately 18% appear to be within 10 years of retirement. 

However, increasing compensation competition from the commercial sector and a perceived lack 

of C4ISR vision (i.e., program stability) could well alter the positive demographics currently 

enjoyed by the industrial base, through movement of the recent hires to other programs or 

careers. 

Despite the success in recruiting and the strong budget endorsements that the industrial base has 

enjoyed, there remain two causes for concern with the skills available for the current systems: 
_______________________________________________________________________________C4ISR 

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________43

Access to Space 

Today’s C4ISR systems that support strategic strike rely upon assured, timely access to space. 

The discipline for successful launch was developed in the ICBM and SLBM programs in the late 

1950s. The development of the liquid ICBM logically evolved into the “truck” necessary to 

carry space assets for C4ISR purposes into orbit (for example, the “1999 Air Force Assessment 

of the Titan IV Space Launch Failures”) and carried over to the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) for space launches later in the 1960s. Both military and NASA space 

operations adopted policies, procedures, and supporting infrastructure skill sets to assure mission 

success. However, the numbers of ICBM and SLBM test firings have been dramatically reduced 

following the Cold War, and the NASA space launch program has encountered significant 

setbacks. Many commercial satellite providers now rely upon foreign boosters for access to 

space. The innumerable “-ilities” and strict pre-launch regimen, which represent the necessary 

checklists for a successful space launch, are perhaps viewed as “dull stuff” compared with the 

more exciting technical challenges of electro-optical eavesdropping and sophisticated signal 

processor development. The skills necessary for access to space are resident in those individuals 

reaching retirement and are not easily mentored or transferred in an environment with a 

shrinking launch schedule. Further, a steadily decreasing number of individuals have 

participated in a successful launch operation. 

Weapons Effects 

In addition to the problem of access to space, the skills associated with weapons effects are also 

necessary to ensure continued progress in C4ISR. Today, the number of individuals working on 

the various C4ISR programs who have worried about system or subsystem vulnerabilities to 

EMP—including black-out, red-out, or other nuclear weapon-induced effects—continues to 

decline, and the people with these skill sets are not being replaced. The view that the Cold War 

is over has caused many of the “requirements” for radiation hardening or survivability protection 

to be ignored or moved below the funding line. C4ISR for strategic strike may well have 

vulnerabilities that an adversary could seek to exploit, and the skill sets available today in the 

C4ISR community to address those concerns are not being replenished with the exception of 

some efforts at the NNSA laboratories. Both the EMP Commission and the DSB Task Force on 

Nuclear Weapons Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation have addressed this issue in greater 

detail. Unfortunately, their recommendations have yet to be seriously acted upon. 

NEAR-TERM SYSTEMS (2015 TO 2025) 

In the near-term, C4ISR for strategic strike systems will build upon the success that tactical and 

theater forces have enjoyed in developing sensors, rapidly deployable communication links, 

robust command and control (e.g., the Army’s digitized battlefield), and the emerging stable of 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The realization of a global grid that is not bandwidthlimited will make possible the development of sensor systems that are capable of “ISRing” 

information without selective signal processing or restrictive communication links. This will 

allow the potential for transforming information into data that can be the basis for knowledge 

that drives subsequent action. 

Skills to implement near-term C4ISR systems for strategic strike are available in the commercial 

marketplace (computers, communication, and networking) and throughout other DoD programs 
C4ISR_______________________________________________________________________________

44 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

(sensors and platforms) used for tactical or theater operations. The challenge will be to define 

the evolutionary steps that C4ISR must take to move beyond the Cold War National Systems to a 

capability that is persistent, intrusive, and truly global with rapid deployment timelines. Once 

the systems are defined, the skill sets will follow to the industrial base and the government 

program offices. But that vision has not been provided. 

FUTURE SYSTEMS (2025 AND BEYOND) 

C4ISR to support future strategic strike systems will have to rely upon agents and analysts 

trained in the languages and cultures of potential global adversaries. These skills are not 

available to meet current embryonic demands and certainly not in the pipeline to support the 

intrusive, on-site intelligence operations envisioned for the future. 

Development of robotics (or “critters”) to serve as potentially expendable on-site collectors or 

sensors is in its infancy and requires a combination of mechanical and electro-optical skills not 

currently resident in the C4ISR community. These applications will likely depend upon MicroElectro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) and potentially even nanotechnology development skills. 

The utilization of computer tags or embedded software that can be exploited by ISR analyses and 

assessments depends upon skill sets well-recognized by the commercial community (e.g., global 

financial networks) and the current defensive security structure. The transformation to 

information operations and exploitation of an adversary’s assets will necessitate bringing in skill 

sets not present in significant numbers in the C4ISR industrial base or the government program 

offices. 

Persistence and global reach of ISR are likely to become as dependent upon UAVs and the 

cooperative utilization of other assets (e.g., fighters, tankers, and commercial aircraft) as much of 

the current systems are on satellites. Thus, the skill sets available for the “primary mission” can 

be used to advantage or leveraged for global ISR capabilities. However, the magnitude of the 

challenge leading to a truly global deployment of UAVs with ISR capabilities suggests that those 

skills are currently not available in any significant number and will have to be developed to meet 

the demand. 

Development of a truly net-centric command and control operation for strategic strike requires, 

at the outset, the skill of seeking change, which may not be a trivial obstacle. Given the will to 

have the capability to share information, appropriately protected, with all who have a need to 

access and participate, the skills will exist (commercial communications, entertainment modeling 

and simulation, etc.) to bring a collaborative command and control structure to strategic strike. 

This means that reach-back is real, responsive real-time retargeting is possible, offense-defense 

force elements can be integrated by the Combatant Commands, bomb damage assessments can 

be carried out as a timely part of the operation, and “battle management” is achievable. 

In all likelihood, the greatest challenge facing the development of C4ISR skills to support future 

strategic strike systems is the definition of the strategic strike architectures and concepts of 

operation necessary to achieve long-term U.S. objectives. The movement from the Cold War 

systems will be slow and, indeed, some of them are needed for the long-term to support 
_______________________________________________________________________________C4ISR 

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________45

continuing deterrence objectives. However, the ability to dissuade, deter, or defeat others, 

whether they be emerging peers, ambitious nation-states seeking to establish a place at the table, 

or terrorist groups lurking for an opportunity, will depend upon many skill sets not currently 

resident in the C4ISR community that supports strategic strike. Fortunately, the U.S. has the 

educational system that can provide a pool of talent that will be needed, and it already is doing so 

in the commercial sector and in emerging technologies being developed to support Homeland 

Security, Special Operations Forces, the Missile Defense Agency, and others. 
C4ISR_______________________________________________________________________________

46 ________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
__________________________________________________________________FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________47

FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

An assumption of the Task Force’s Terms of Reference is that many of the strategic strike skills 

required in the future will be different from those required for current strategic strike capabilities. 

Indeed, most of the future strategic strike options recommended by the 2003 DSB Summer Study 

have not been funded. However, efforts on directed-energy weapons, information operations, 

and space platforms for other applications provide a base upon which to build. 

One of the exceptions, where a different skill set will be required, is in the area of hypersonic 

propulsion. While ramjet and scramjet propulsion concepts have been pursued from time to time 

over several decades, the activity has been in fits and starts, resulting in a lack of a critical mass 

of expertise anywhere in government or industry. The Task Force was informed that the recent 

Mach 10 flight of the ATK X-43A would not have been possible without the major contributions 

of recalled retirees who had been part of a decades-old program. 

As defenses against air-breathing strategic strike systems continue to improve, hypersonic speed 

is a natural step for aircraft and/or stand-off missiles. The current absence of a funded, 

sustained program is delaying the day when the necessary skills will be developed that would 

ultimately allow hypersonic propulsion to play a part in strategic strike. The skills necessary to 

develop the advanced materials that will be required to handle the unique thermal and shock 

environments created during hypersonic flight are also not currently available, again due to a 

lack of coherent and sustained development activity. 

Non-nuclear munitions, with the ability to survive intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry and 

then to operate effectively thereafter, is another area where current skills are inadequate. The 

expectations laid out in the Nuclear Posture Review for strategic strike are that non-nuclear 

capabilities will replace as many of the historic nuclear missions as possible. Today, there is 

inadequate development work on non-nuclear munitions for strategic strike re-entry systems to 

create the skilled cadre needed to reliably build and deploy such systems. 
__________________________________________________________________ FUTURE ALTERNATIVES

48________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
____________________________________________________________HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________49

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

“Human capital management,” is a term currently in vogue that simultaneously recognizes that 

personnel are as critical as capital facilities and equipment to the ability of an organization to 

perform its mission, and that an organization is unlikely to recruit and retain competent 

personnel without an active management plan to do so. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

and the Army, Navy, and Air Force have, to different degrees, acknowledged this challenge with 

regard to the personnel whose skills are critical to the successful accomplishment of their 

responsibilities contributing to the success of strategic strike missions. 

The Task Force is convinced that the success of human capital management plans will ultimately 

depend upon adequate funding of challenging work and, most importantly, on real development 

programs that progress to production in selected cases. The routine sustainment of existing 

systems may be interesting enough for the retention of older personnel loyal to the programs they 

created and reluctant to change jobs at this point in their careers. Life-extension programs, with 

the introduction of some new capabilities, will be somewhat more attractive for new personnel 

and the retention of mid-career personnel. 

However, neither of these activities will provide the challenges that new-design work offers for 

the recruitment and retention of the “best and the brightest.” The best approach for knowledge 

transfer of the esoteric skills unique to strategic strike is for inexperienced personnel to work side 

by side with experienced mentors on new-design work, or on exploratory development programs 

when new systems are not programmed. The existing Applications Programs in the areas of 

guidance, re-entry, propulsion, and radiation-hardened electronics have provided some help in 

skill retention and knowledge transfer, but these programs are not sufficient by themselves and 

have been inadequately funded in the past. Recent funding decisions for these programs will 

make matters worse. 

NAVY

The Navy’s Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) is the only DoD strategic strike organization to 

specifically label their effort a “Human Capital Management Plan.” It recognizes the aging of its 

current workforce and acknowledges that the lack of new development and production programs 

is a disincentive for the recruitment and retention of a skilled workforce. 

SSP has developed a Strategic Plan to define management and performance requirements for 

their business lines and the human capital (military, civilians, and industrial partners) needed for 

the successful execution of each business element. Key to this success is the comprehensive 

human capital management plan currently being developed. 

The SSP Human Capital Management Plan has defined the current status of their workforce 

(military and civilians) by education, technical and critical skills, program expertise, years of 

experience, and years to retirement. The Plan also provides a knowledge management and 

knowledge transfer process to ensure critical skills and program expertise will be captured and 

transferred from retiring/departing personnel. The plan will baseline the critical skills and 
HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT____________________________________________________________

50________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

program expertise needed for new business lines and the process for acquiring, training, and 

retaining the required personnel. 

SSP has also mandated that their industrial partners (private industry and laboratories) provide an 

equivalent strategic plan for how they will support SSP in the near- and far-term (using SSPprojected budget resources) and manage their required human capital. Preliminary plans have 

been received from SSP industrial partners and, upon SSP concurrence, will be living documents 

for assessing changes in program requirements and budget resources. 

The stated objective of SSP is: “Through these Strategic and Human Capital Management Plans, 

SSP will assure continued and future success of their programs.” The Task Force is convinced 

that SSP is committed to their Human Capital Management Plan. We are equally convinced that 

such a plan is necessary. The data make clear that while military billets continue to be filled, and 

training programs are excellent, a large percentage the SSP civilian workforce is less than 10 

years from retirement (for example, up to 50% at the Special Weapons Facility Pacific and 35% 

overall) . 

Among its contractors, SSP initially directed implementation of a human capital management 

plan at the General Dynamics (GD) Pittsfield facility. The most impressive plan developed there 

has defined the critical skills required for SSP missions, assessed the relevant skills and risks of 

departure of GD personnel, developed Individual Knowledge Transfer Plans, including the use of 

mentors, and institutionalized the monitoring of knowledge management. SSP has recognized 

that mentoring does add additional cost, but has accepted these increased costs as necessary to 

retain the skills needed for current and future work within its contractor industrial base. Other 

contractors working with SSP are now designing similar plans for SSP approval. 

ARMY

While having no strategic strike delivery mission, the Army has recognized that it may have to 

operate in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) environments created by hostile forces or even 

as a result of the use of U.S. strategic strike systems in support of Army missions. In recognition 

of this need to understand the consequences of nuclear and other WMD use, the Army has 

established a career path for officers who specialize in the understanding of WMD, including 

nuclear weapons effects. While not explicitly labeled “human capital management,” the Army’s 

program includes all the elements for the successful recruiting, training, and retention of 

personnel with the necessary WMD-related skills. 

The Army’s stated purpose for the Nuclear and Counterproliferation Functional Area (Functional 

Area (FA) 52) is that officers will: “... apply knowledge and expertise of weapons of mass 

destruction in developing national and theater strategy, plans and policy. In addition, these 

experienced officers conduct weapons effects research and analysis, formulate and verify 

international treaties, and plan the employment of nuclear weapons to support theater and 

strategic operations.” 

Officers enter the program as Captains between years 5 and 6, with career designation following 

promotion to Major with the possibility of continuing in this specialization through the rank of 
____________________________________________________________HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

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Colonel. All FA52 officers are afforded an opportunity to obtain an advanced degree(s) in a 

relevant technical or strategic area, as well as specialized on-the-job training. The skills of this 

cadre are highly sought after, with officers serving tours with, among other assignments: OSD, 

OJCS, HQDA, STRATCOM, SHAPE, NORTHCOM, PACOM, EUCOM, USFK, JFCOM, 

DTRA, DIA, USANCA, USMA, DOE/NNSA.(see Appendix F for a full list of acronyms). 

The Task Force was impressed with the professionalism and relevant WMD-related expertise of 

this cadre. The career path, as designed, has ensured strong interest in being a part of this 

program. The expertise developed is critical to the appreciation of nuclear effects within the 

Combatant Commands and offices throughout the Pentagon. We commend the Army on its 

recent decision to leave management of this program with the United States Army Nuclear and 

Chemical Agency rather than transferring it elsewhere. 

AIR FORCE 

The Air Force in 2003 articulated a Space Professional Strategy to, “Build a team skilled and 

knowledgeable in the development, employment, and integration of space systems, concepts, and 

doctrine to achieve national security objectives.” The Commander, Air Force Space Command 

(AFSPC/CC) is the Space Professional Functional Authority (SPFA) responsible for the overall 

health and development of the community of Air Force Credentialed Space Professionals 

(CSPs). The CSP community is a subset of the larger category of “Space Professionals,” who 

have a thorough understanding of the space medium and its effective application to joint 

warfighting. The CSP community uniquely falls under the Space Professional Certification 

Program and includes scientists, engineers, program managers, and operators (officers, enlisted 

and civilian) whose careers and experience are tracked by the Space Professional Management 

Office (SPMO) within AFSPC. The SPMO also manages the CSP community’s Space 

Professionals education and certification. Over 7,000 active duty officers and enlisted personnel 

are included in the CSP Community, and their experience is tracked in nine key mission areas: 

Satellite Systems, Nuclear, Spacelift, ISR, Kinetic Effects, Space Warfare C2, Warning, Space 

Control, and Space Other. For example, more than 3,000 officers and enlisted personnel in the 

CSP Community are identified as having “Nuclear” experience, with about 900 of them having 

more than 5 years experience in the nuclear mission area. The civilian Guard and Reserve 

components have not been fully identified, but are expected to add another 2,500 members to the 

Air Force CSP Community. 

In addition, in recognition of the gradual erosion of nuclear expertise within the Air Force, an Air 

Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group (AFNGOSG) was created in 2002. This 21-

member group, chaired by AF/XOS, is tasked to provide a single, cross-functional forum to 

identify, manage, and resolve issues of concern to ensure the USAF is organized, trained, and 

equipped to carry out its nuclear responsibilities. With respect to nuclear skills, the AFNGOSG 

established a program to develop and sustain a pool of officers and non-commissioned officers 

(NCOs) with appropriate expertise to support the Air Force nuclear mission by ensuring 

sufficient training, education, and experience. This program has identified over 22,000 

personnel with nuclear experience. The Air Force identified 747 key nuclear billets that “...are 

so critical to the execution of the nuclear mission that if the person filling the position lacks the 

requisite experience, it will present an unacceptable risk to nuclear surety or mission execution.” 
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The Task Force finds that the responsibilities of the Space Professional Functional Authority and 

the Air Force Nuclear General Office Steering Group should be very important to the 

maintenance of strategic strike skills within the Air Force. Both functions are relatively new, 

and it is therefore not surprising that the Task Force was provided no metrics by which to judge 

if the missions were being accomplished or whether there has been any positive impact on skills 

as a result of SPFA or AFNGOSG actions. 

We recommend the Space Professional Management Office and the AFNGOSG work together to 

define requirements, metrics, and an implementation plan to ensure complementary actions in 

meeting U.S. needs for nuclear expertise as they relate to ICBMs. Equivalent agencies should 

also work with the AFNGOSG to define non-space-related nuclear requirements and metrics. 

ICBM skills are at risk within the industrial base that supports the Air Force strategic strike 

missions. The ICBM SPO has taken the step of requiring the ICBM industrial base to identify 

the status and trends of strategic strike-relevant skills. The charts generated for skills critical to 

propulsion, guidance, and re-entry generally show green/yellow going rapidly to yellow/red (see 

Figures 9, 10, and 11). 

Current ICBM-related industry personnel distributions show substantial fractions nearing 

retirement. Recruitment in most strategic-strike-unique areas is not taking place at a rate that 

will allow adequate training to replace the skills of retiring workers before they have left. 

While industries are well aware of human capital management strategies, they must be guided by 

business realities, and they see no firm commitment to a next-generation system, or to an Air 

Force commitment to exploratory systems. In addition, unlike the Navy SSP, the ICBM SPO has 

not worked with its industrial base to identify and then fund incremental sub-system 

developments that would specifically retain critical skills. 

The Applications Programs were created to fund strategic strike skills with no counterpart in 

commercial or other defense missions. They have contributed to sustaining these skills over the 

last decade. Applications Program funding by the Air Force and the Navy never reached the 

amounts recommended by advisory groups, amounts that would support the systems work that 

could demonstrate the necessary proficiency in strategic strike skills. Recent Navy and Air 

Force budget decisions have further cut funding for these programs. 

These skills will disappear from the industrial base without meaningful defense work, as they 

have no counterpart in commercial industry. Industry uniformly asserts that it will take 5 to 7 

years to reestablish critical personnel expertise if it is lost. The Task Force notes that 

redevelopment of expertise would be accompanied by technical and budgetary program failures, 

as new practitioners learned by their mistakes. 

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA) 

DTRA is the only Defense Agency with strategic strike responsibility examined by the Task 

Force. The assessment of strategic strike skills in DTRA is alarming. The only good news is 

that the billets occupied by military personnel show a healthy age distribution, and the relevant 

experience of these personnel seems commensurate with their responsibilities (see Army 
____________________________________________________________HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________53

discussion above). Comparatively, civilian personnel, once the strength of the scientific 

excellence of DTRA and its predecessor agencies, show a very high average age, a dearth of less 

experienced PhDs, and severe shortages in 124 of 163 critical skill areas important to strategic 

strike. Within the Nuclear Technology Division (TDN) organization alone, 14 of its 29 members 

are over 60, including five (of a total of seven) with doctorates. 

DTRA presented the Task Force with no plan for the management of human capital in the 

strategic strike area. Similar to industry, DTRA cited lack of a clear national plan for the future 

of strategic systems and the lack of Congressional support for exploratory strategic strike 

programs as hampering recruitment and diminishing the motivation of early- and mid-career 

personnel. 

These same factors were cited by DTRA as affecting their unique industrial base personnel, 

which suffer from the same demographic trend (see Figure 16). 

Figure 16: DTRA S&T Demographics 2004 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

U.S. Strategic Command was the only combatant command visited by the Task Force. The 

STRATCOM briefings were helpful to understanding the spectrum of strategic strike 

responsibilities within that command. STRATCOM had no problems filling its military billets, 

with the exception of Information Operations (they are currently working on this issue), and they 

identified no problems with the strategic strike skills of the military personnel available to them. 
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Regarding the civilian staff, the Task Force found there to be no human capital management 

plan. The Command could not provide the information sought about civilian personnel 

experience levels and went so far as to suggest that the Defense Science Board could pay for any 

effort to obtain the information requested. The Command clearly does not manage its human 

capital, a situation that can only lead to poor performance in the long-term. Senior civilian 

billets have remained open for an extended period, and the Command faces the retirement of 

additional senior personnel in the near future. 

FY06 NATIONAL DEFENSE EDUCATION ACT (NDEA) 

This Act has the potential for providing important support and resources for DoD long-range 

strategic strike skill retention. The Act focuses on future DoD critical science, engineering, and 

foreign language skills for people who are able to obtain clearance once their education is 

complete. The Act will include technical, undergraduate, graduate, doctoral, and post-doctoral 

levels. 

The program scope under consideration might include up to 1,800 students through FY14. A 

possible mix would be 861 technical, 344 undergrads, 258 graduates, 129 doctoral candidates, 

and 207 post-doctoral positions. Two funding levels are being considered: $155 million over 6 

years, equating to 1,800 students supported, and $950 million over 7 years, equating to 11,000 

students. It is not clear if long-range strategic strike skills will be specifically addressed by this 

Act. DoD should engage with the Congress now to ensure this Act will acknowledge and support 

strategic skills. 
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FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________55

REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGIC SKILL RETENTION

There are three fundamental questions with respect to obtaining and maintaining strategic strike 

skills within the United States into the future: 

 What kind of workers do we need to perform our mission? 

 How do we attract, develop, and retain them? 

 How do we transfer critical knowledge to the next generation of workers? 

The answers to these questions are best addressed by the use of a Skills and Domain Knowledge 

Management Process. Minimum elements are: 

 Strategic and operating plans that include knowledge management; 

 Definition of critical skills required; 

 Assessments of Critical Skills, Risk of Departure, and Technical Agility development 

needs of personnel; 

 Tools to manage/facilitate the process (HR database, etc.); 

 Development of Individual Knowledge Transfer Plans, execution of plans, and 

monitoring of status; and 

 Baseline Knowledge Management in company operation plans and processes on an 

ongoing basis to manage knowledge and critical skills. 

The strategic strike workforce is diverse, highly educated, and often isolated from the nation’s 

mainstream military-industrial complex. The work is usually classified, is performed in 

dedicated facilities, and must be executed in compliance with unique safety and surety 

disciplines. Technologies such as radiation hardness and ablative reentry heat shields, for 

example, have no commercial equivalents. However, the basic tenants of workforce stewardship 

apply: 

Skills must be exercised. Even the most experienced engineers and scientists cannot maintain 

their skills over time unless those skills are used. Recruiting, training, mentoring, and domain 

knowledge transfer are not purely academic endeavors, and they can happen only in the presence 

of real and relevant work. 

The strategic strike workforce must exercise the entire life cycle. Day-to-day sustainment 

does not exercise all of the skills required to support S&T and new development. Such activities 

must include: planning, concept definition, systems analyses, defining system requirements, and 

design for major modifications; responding to new threat-driven missions; determining how 

changes affect overall system performance; and making system cost/performance trade-offs 

through design and subsequent test and evaluation. These skills can be maintained over time 

only by engaging in real planning, S&T, and design activity. 
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People with strategic skills must be valued. A viable career path with reasonable promotion 

expectations is essential if DoD expects talented people to choose nuclear and conventional longrange strike as a career field in the twenty-first century. A valued workforce is a managed 

workforce. All skill providers must have an active skill and domain knowledge management 

system to ensure strategic skills professionals perceive their value and benefit from their 

“valued” status. 

Strategic strike skills must be competitive with the “next big thing.” Military, civil service, 

and industry professionals have difficult career choices to make. Young people want to use the 

modern skills they learned in college at considerable cost to themselves and their families. 

Challenging and relevant work should involve a mix of legacy and modern technology to ensure 

that assimilation of critical skills, knowledge transfer, and professional growth are realized. 

Military careers require “management.” The Military Services currently have some excellent 

processes and programs to identify, train, and manage the active duty community supporting 

nuclear and conventional long-range strike S&T, engineering, and operations. A continuation of 

this activity is vital if officers and enlisted personnel are to be recruited and retained. Careers in 

this area must be valued, and the opportunity for promotion must be predictable and real. 
_________________________________________________________FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________57

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Nothing is possible without a national commitment and sense of mission. Clarity about the 

nation’s policy and a firm, long-term commitment is the bedrock of any effective recruitment 

and retention strategy. People will respond to a well-communicated mission that is vital to the 

security of the nation. This was clearly validated by the Cold War experience. The Services’ 

operational components and acquisition program offices, the defense agencies, and the 

supporting industrial base must have a supportive policy. 

The DoD and STRATCOM should work with the Congress to develop a comprehensive policy 

on nuclear and conventional long-range strategic strike. There must be a sense that there is a 

future in this area or retention of the current workforce will be questionable and recruitment for 

the future of the best and brightest will be impossible... 

DoD and STRATCOM should develop a 10-year strategic strike integrated transformation plan 

based on DoD policy, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the DSB Summer Study report on Future 

Strategic Strike Forces. The plan must be coordinated and integrated with DOE/NNSA 

planning. A path to the future would provide the vision and spectrum of capabilities from which 

the Services, agencies, program offices, and industrial base can plan and budget programs and 

make C4ISR, delivery system, and payload decisions. With a vision and supporting program 

baseline in place, the Services, agencies, and industrial base would then be able to assess the 

skills needs. This, in turn, would provide the basis for a sensible and credible strategy for 

recruiting, training, and retaining skilled personnel and allow for domain knowledge preservation 

and workforce career management. 

In the absence of a clear national mandate, efforts to recruit military, civil service, and industry 

professionals into strategic strike programs will be a challenge. Today’s graduates have difficult 

career choices to make; an effective win-win strategy could be to recruit talented professionals 

into an organization’s leading-edge technology areas. This will be an attractive initial work 

assignment for those wishing to use their modern skills immediately. Over time, they can be 

exposed to the strategic strike area, which they will soon discover has real, relevant, and 

challenging technical work. A mix of legacy and modern technology benefits the organization, 

and ensures assimilation of legacy critical skills, knowledge transfer, and professional growth. 

Specifically, the Task Force offers the following Findings and associated Recommendations: 

FINDING #1 

 The DoD has not provided specific direction regarding next-generation strategic strike 

systems. Consequently, the industry and civilian government talent base: 

 Is already marginally thin in many of today’s current systems, and 

 May not be available for some potential next-generation systems. 
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58________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

Recommendation 

 The Secretary of Defense should, taking account of the NPR Implementer and the DSB 

Future Strategic Strike recommendations, set direction and priorities for next-generation 

strategic strike systems. 

FINDING #2 

 The exploration of new concepts and technologies for strategic strike of challenging 

targets in the far-term is inadequate and will require access to a new talent base with 

different skills. 

Recommendation 

 The Secretary of Defense should establish a DARPA office charged with defining and 

funding the exploratory development of long-term strategic strike concepts, which should 

include the application of new technologies. Output would include: 

 Concepts for strategic attack that can be transitioned to the Services; 

 Conceiving and maturing technologies required by the concepts; and 

 Annual reports to the Secretary of Defense on the progress of strategic strike 

technology development. 

FINDING #3 

 The strategic strike area most at risk today is ballistic missiles: 

 Current skills may not be able to cope with unanticipated failures requiring analysis, 

testing, and redesign; 

 A large number of skilled military, civil service, and contractor personnel are nearing 

retirement; 

 Design skills are rapidly disappearing, both for major redesigns of current systems 

and for the design of new strategic systems; and 

 Applications Programs are necessary but not sufficient to maintain skills; they have 

never been funded at the required levels. 

Recommendation 

 Ballistic missile program offices should devote resources to the transfer of critical 

knowledge and skills to younger personnel in industry. 

 The Secretary of Defense should direct the Navy and the Air Force—absent near-term 

systems development—to fund advanced development (subsystem design, system 

prototype development, and testing) to support next-generation system development 

(which will also restore and maintain the skills base). 

 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Navy and the Air Force Applications 

Programs are funded at the STRATCOM SAG’s originally-recommended levels to 

address critical areas not addressed by advanced development. 
_________________________________________________________FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________59

FINDING #4 

 DoD and industry have difficulty attracting and retaining the best and brightest students 

to the science and engineering disciplines relevant to maintaining current and future 

strategic strike capabilities. 

 The NDEA program has the potential for attracting personnel to government; however, it 

currently does not have a strategic strike focus. 

Recommendation 

 Strategic strike program offices should encourage and fund supporting industries to 

develop combined undergraduate scholarship and co-op programs for U.S. citizens in 

relevant science and engineering disciplines that would: 

 Include the requirement to work in DoD or the Defense industry; and 

 Encourage future graduate studies. 

 Strategic strike program offices should also take advantage of the NDEA program. 

FINDING #5 

 Human capital management systems and strategies for identifying, tracking, and retaining 

critical skills are not being implemented effectively across all of the strategic strike 

constituent organizations. 

Recommendation 

 The USD(AT&L) should ensure that strategic strike constituent organizations institute a 

skill and domain-knowledge management system; and 

 Include active duty, civil service, and industry personnel. 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_________________________________________________________

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 

Finding # 1 

 The DoD has not provided specific direction regarding next-generation strategic strike 

systems. As a consequence, the industry and government talent base: 

 Is already marginally thin in many of today’s current systems, and 

 May not be available for some potential next-generation systems. 

Finding # 2

 The exploration of new concepts and technologies for strategic strike of challenging targets in 

the long-term is inadequate and will require access to a new talent base with different skills. 

Finding # 3

 The strategic strike area most at risk today is ballistic missiles: 

 Current skills may not be able to cope with unanticipated failures requiring analysis, 

testing, and redesign; 

 A large number of skilled military, civil service, and contractor personnel are nearing 

retirement; 

 Design skills are rapidly disappearing, both for major redesigns of current systems and 

for the design of new strategic systems; and 

 Applications Programs are necessary but not sufficient to maintain skills; they have 

never been funded at the required levels. 

Finding # 4

 DoD and industry have difficulty attracting and retaining the best and brightest students to the 

science and engineering disciplines relevant to maintaining current and future strategic strike 

capabilities. 

 The NDEA program has the potential for attracting personnel to government; however, it 

currently does not have a strategic strike focus. 

Finding # 5

 Human capital management systems and strategies for identifying, tracking, and retaining 

critical skills are not being implemented effectively across all of the strategic strike 

constituent organizations. 

Figure 17: Summary of Findings 
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FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS___________________________________________________61

Table 4 provides the Task Force’s best estimate of the adequacy of current and future strategic 

skills necessary to support the nation’s strategic systems. 

Table 4: Skills Assessment
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS_________________________________________________________

62________________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

 The Secretary of Defense should, taking account of the NPR Implementer and the DSB 

Future Strategic Strike recommendations, give direction for next-generation strategic strike 

systems. 

 The Secretary of Defense should establish a DARPA office charged with defining and 

funding the exploratory development of long-term strategic strike concepts, which should 

include the application of new technologies. Output would include: 

 Concepts for strategic attack that can be transitioned to the Services; 

 Conceiving and maturing technologies required by the concepts; and 

 Annual reports to the Secretary of Defense on the progress of strategic strike technology 

development. 

 Ballistic missile program offices should devote resources to the transfer of critical knowledge 

and skills to younger personnel in industry. 

 The Secretary of Defense should direct the Navy and the Air Force—absent near-term 

systems development—to fund advanced development (subsystem design, system prototype 

development, and testing) to support next-generation system development (which will also 

restore and maintain the skills base). 

 The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Navy and the Air Force Applications 

Programs are funded at the STRATCOM SAG’s originally-recommended levels to address 

critical areas not addressed by advanced development. 

 Strategic strike program offices should encourage and fund supporting industries to develop 

combined undergraduate scholarship and co-op programs for U.S. citizens in relevant science 

and engineering disciplines that would: 

 Include the requirement to work in DoD or the Defense industry; and 

 Encourage future graduate studies. 

 Strategic strike program offices should also take advantage of the NDEA program. 

 The USD(AT&L) should ensure that strategic strike constituent organizations institute a skill 

and domain-knowledge management system; and 

 Include active duty, civil service, and industry personnel. 

Figure 18: Summary of Recommendations
 

APPENDICES

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FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS__________________________________________________A-1

A. TERMS OF REFERENCE
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B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

Members

Mr. Walter Morrow, Chairman 

Dr. Robert Barker 

Dr. George Schneiter 

Mr. John Stillwell 

Dr. Robert Strickler 

Executive Secretary

Col Danny Wilmoth, USAF 

DSB Representative

CDR Dave Waugh,USN 

Government Advisors

Mr. Stan Gooch, USSTRATCOM 

Mr. Richard Gullickson, DTRA 

Col James Hyatt, USAF XOS/NO 

Mr. Robert Krum, Navy SSP 

Mr. Elliott Lehman, DIA 

Dr. Don Linger, DTRA 

Mr. Sean Nolan, OUSD(I) 

Mr. Thomas Scheber, OUSD(P) 

Mr. James Thompson, OUSD(AT&L) 

Support

Mr. Robert Genkinger, SAIC 

Ms. Anne Marvin, SAIC 
APPENDICES __________________________________________________________________________

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C. DRAFT ACTION PLAN

FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The strategic strike mission remains a critical component of United States national 

security capability. It is now evident that our ability to execute the full spectrum of 

strategic strike will be in danger as a result of the imminent loss of many of the skills 

necessary to effectively carry out strategic strike, from research, through development, 

testing, production, and sustainment. Our skilled strategic strike work force—in 

industry and government—is retiring at a rate faster than new personnel are being 

hired and trained. I have become convinced that recruitment into relevant industries 

and government agencies has been hampered as a result of absence of a clear roadmap 

for the future of strategic strike systems and, as a consequence, lack of relevant 

programs. To remedy this serious problem faced by the nation, I am directing the 

implementation of a series of actions designed to make the future of strategic strike 

systems clear, to initiate exploratory development programs for strategic strike, to 

ensure that strategic strike skills are actively tracked, and to make careers in the skills 

important to strategic strike attractive to the brightest and the best. 

To that end I direct the following actions: 

1. USSTRATCOM shall define the capabilities need for future strategic strike (15 

years and beyond) in accordance with the policies developed by OSD (Policy) as a 

result of the QDR and the NPR Implementer. These evolutionary capabilities shall 

include definition of the C4ISR architecture essential to support future strategic strike, 

missile defense, and offense/defense integration. In addition, USSTRATCOM shall 

identify the payloads necessary to support future mission objectives and determine the 

launch systems required to provide delivery of those payloads to meet strategic 

mission needs. USSTRATCOM shall also identify the elements of transformation for 

future strategic forces; e.g., information operations, directed energy weapons, 

unconventional basing, etc., that may be required to meet evolving mission needs. The 

USSTRATCOM assessment of capabilities needed to support my direction should be 

completed within one year of this action plan. 

2. The Director of DARPA shall establish a Strategic Strike Systems Technology 

office charged with defining and funding the exploratory development of far-term 

(revolutionary) strategic strike concepts, which shall include the application of new 

technologies including directed energy weapons, information operations, persistent 

and intrusive ISR, revolutionary payload, delivery system and basing concepts as well 

as hypersonic propulsion concepts needed for strategic attack. These concepts can be 

transitioned to the Services for development and maturation of technologies required 

for eventual deployment. The Director, DARPA, shall provide the first annual report 

describing the activities and accomplishments of this new office to me within one year 

of the date of this action plan. 
APPENDICES __________________________________________________________________________

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3. The Services shall devote resources to the transfer of knowledge and skills critical 

to the sustainment of the future strategic strike mission to younger personnel in 

industry. The Services shall direct and fund industry contractors to continue or 

establish mentor and training programs to transfer critical knowledge and skills and 

require the demonstration of such programs as a condition of contract award. The first 

review and update of these practices and activities shall be provided to me within 180 

days of the date of this action plan. 

4. The Secretary of the Navy and the Air Force with guidance from STRATCOM 

shall develop a strategic plan for the appropriate funding of advanced development 

programs (subsystem design, system prototype development, and testing) to support 

next-generation system development. These plans shall be provided to me within 180 

days of the date of this action plan. 

5. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force after planning, programming, and 

implementing the advanced development programs shall fully fund the Navy and the 

Air Force Applications Programs at the levels originally recommended by the 

USSTRATCOM SAG ($20 million a year for each program, except the Propulsion 

Application Program, which should be funded at $40 million a year) so that skills in 

areas critical to the current or planned force, but not addressed by the advanced 

development initiatives are maintained. Both the advanced development programs and 

the application programs shall be planned and programmed within 180 days of the date 

of this action plan. 

6. The Services, defense agencies and combatant commands that support the strategic 

strike mission shall encourage and fund supporting industries to develop combined 

undergraduate scholarship and co-op programs for U.S. citizens in relevant science 

and engineering disciplines (including physics, chemistry, engineering, computer 

science, etc.) that would include the requirement to work in DoD or the Defense 

industry (specifically areas related to strategic strike) and encourage future graduate 

studies. The first review and update shall be provided to me within one year of the 

date of this action plan. 

7. The Services shall participate fully in the NDEA program by providing input to the 

DDR&E on required disciplines and requesting that NDEA service agreements and 

government payback be served in strategic strike-related offices and organizations. 

This action shall be initiated within 180 days of the date of this action plan and the 

status reported on an annual basis to me. 

8. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, in coordination with the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall encourage the existence or direct the establishment, 

within all strategic strike constituents, of a skill and domain-knowledge management 

system that includes active duty, civil service, and industry personnel. The first review 

and update from each Service shall be provided to me within one year of the date of 

this action plan. 
___________________________________________________________________________APPENDICES

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS__________________________________________________C-3

9. The USD (AT&L) shall track the completion of this action plan and shall be 

included as an informational addressee on all correspondence, reports and documents 

related to completion of this plan and future strategic strike skills.
APPENDICES __________________________________________________________________________

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D. TASK FORCE REQUEST FOR DATA

JFCOM DATA REQUEST
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STRATCOM DATA REQUEST
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E. LIST OF BRIEFINGS

April 14, 2004 

Mr. Steve Henry, DATSD 

Mr. Mike Novak, OUSD (AT&L) 

May 14, 2004 

Lt Col Barry Leiher, USAF

Mr. Robert Beimler, US Army 

CAPT Patrick Hopfinger, USN 

CDR John Wolfe, USN 

June 24, 2004 

ADM James Ellis, USAF 

Mr. Tom Scheber, OSD 

LTC Anne Winkler, USSTRATCOM 

COL David Ifflander, OP30 

CAPT Rick Holdcroft, ST11 

Col David Solomon, IO12 

Lt Col Furgini, USSTRATCOM 

September 15, 2004 

Maj Mark Clark, USAF 

Lt Col Christopher Poock, AF/ILM 

Col Cal Hutto, AFSPC/DPA 

Col Allan Netzer, OO-ALC 

September 16, 2004 

COL Edward Schmidt, NNSA 

Ms. Kathleen McInnis, CSIS 

Dr. Don Linger, DTRA 

Maj John Zabel, US Army 

Mr. Jim Howard, SSP 

October 6, 2004 

Mr. Jim Howard, SSP 

Mr. Mike Eagan, GDAIS 

Ms. Lisa Finneran, GDAIS 

Ms. Erin Moore, LMMSC 

Mr. Bert Cole, Strategic Weapons Facility, 

Pacific 

October 7, 2004 

Mr. Frank Moore, Northrop Grumman 

Mr. Kevin Cummings, ATK 

Ms. Kathy Robinson, AeroJet 

Mr. Lou Spina, Boeing 

Mr. Daniel Swallom, Textron 

November 16, 2004 

Mr. Mark Locher, USD (I)

Mr. Jim Detjen, DIA 

Mr. Mark Director, AeroJet 

November 17, 2004 

Mr. Mark Jefferson, Lockheed Martin Corp. 

Dr. Don Linger, DTRA 

Mr. Ted Harshberger, RAND

December 14, 2004 

Dr. Ron Sega, DDR&E 

Mr. Don Diggs, ASD(NII) 

Gen Cartwright, USSTRATCOM 

December 15, 2004 

Mr. Robert Bakos, ATK Thiokol 

Incorporated

Dr. Charles Henkin, Lockheed Martin Corp. 

Mr. Mark Jefferson, Lockheed Martin Corp. 

Mr. Stuart Wildman, Lockheed Martin Corp. 

Mr. Rex Agler, Lockheed Martin Corp.

Mr. Ned Newman, Boeing 

December 16, 2004 

Capt Tom Boyce, USNR

January 12, 2005 

Mr. Jim Howard, USN 

Mr. Bob Shaw, DDR&E 

Mr. Neil Kacena, Lockheed Martin Corp. 

February 16, 2005 

Mr. Jim Howard, USN 
APPENDICES __________________________________________________________________________

E-2 _______________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON
___________________________________________________________________________APPENDICES

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS__________________________________________________F-1

F. ACRONYM LIST

ABRES Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems 

ACM Advanced Cruise Missile 

AFNGOSG Air Force Nuclear General Officer Steering Group 

ALCC Airborne launch Control Center 

ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile 

AMCC Air Mobility Command Center 

AoA Analysis of Alternatives 

ASMS Advanced Strategic Missile Systems 

BRAC Base Closure and Realignment Commission 

CCD camouflage/concealment/deception 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

COTS Commercial off the Shelf 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DOE Department of Energy 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSP Defense Support Program 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DoD Department of Defense 

EDO Engineering Duty Officers 

EMD Electro-mechanical Device 

EMI Electro-magnetic Interference 

EMP Electromagnetic Pulse 

EUCOM European Command 

FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Center 

GD General Dynamics 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HR Human Resources 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
APPENDICES __________________________________________________________________________

F-2 _______________________________________________ DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

IO Information Operations 

JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

J-UCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air System 

LE Life Extension 

LEP Life Extension Program 

LMMSC Lockheed Martin Missiles & Space 

MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems 

NDEA National Defense Education Act 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NORTHCOM Northern Command 

NPR Nuclear Posture Review 

NRO National Reconnaissance Office 

NSA National Security Agency 

OJCS Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OUSD(AT&L) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

 Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

OUSD(I) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

OUSD(P) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

PACOM Pacific Command 

PLU Preservation of Location Uncertainty 

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review 

RCC Regional Combatant Command 

RSLP Reentry Systems Launch Program 

SATCOM Satellite Command 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe 

SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 

SLIRBM Submarine-Launched Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile 

SPO Systems Program Office 

SR Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
___________________________________________________________________________APPENDICES

FUTURE STRATEGIC STRIKE SKILLS__________________________________________________F-3

SSBN Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 

SSGN Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Submarine 

SSN Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine 

SSP Strategic Systems Programs 

SSST Supersonic Sea-Skimming Target 

S&T Science and Technology 

STRATCOM Strategic Command 

STRATCOM SAG Strategic Command’s Strategic Advisory Group 

SWF Strategic Weapons Facility 

SWFLANT Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic 

TACAMO C2

 Communications Relay Squadron 

TACTOM Tactical Tomahawk 

TLAM Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile 

UAV Unmanned Air Vehicle 

UCAV Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 

UGT Underground Nuclear Test 

USAF U.S. Air Force 

USANCA U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency 

USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

 Technology and Logistics 

USFK U.S. Forces Korea 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction