STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: SOUTH ASIA

Dr. Amit Gupta

March 2003
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ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq signals the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alters strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the

author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position

that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military

action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after

the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the

region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with

Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

AMIT GUPTA is a Visting Fellow in the Program in Arms

Control at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

He is the author of Building an Arsenal (Praeger), and

co-editor with Raju G. C. Thomas of India’s Nuclear Security

(Lynne Rienner). Dr. Gupta was educated at the University

of Delhi and the Australian National University, and has a

Ph.D. from the University of Illinois.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: SOUTH ASIA

Background.

India and Pakistan have shied away from President

Bush’s call for a military effort to change the regime in

Baghdad. India’s official position was given in a joint

statement during the official visit of Russian President

Vladimir Putin to New Delhi in December 2002. The two

governments agreed that:

Both sides strongly opposed the unilateral use or threat of use

of force in violation of the UN charter as well as interference in

internal affairs of other states . . . [Further,] it was stressed [in

their talks] that the comprehensive settlement of the situation

around Iraq is possible only through political and diplomatic

1

Conclusions:

India and Pakistan, the major countries of South Asia,

have distanced themselves from the proposed U.S.-led

military action in Iraq. Both countries remain concerned

that a prolonged war would affect their domestic security

situation and their economies adversely.

The war will not change either country’s long-term

relationship with the United States. They see the United

States as an important strategic and economic partner.

India and Pakistan will continue to provide strong

support in the war on terrorism. Increased security

cooperation is taking place with India.

India, especially, could be a partner in the post-war

reconstruction of Iraq’s economy, its civil society, and its

military.
efforts in strict conformity with the rules of international law

only under the aegis of the United Nations....1

For Pakistan, being an American ally in the war on

terror has placed some domestic pressure on the Musharraf

government. This makes Islamabad reluctant to participate

in another military operation that is viewed as being

anti-Muslim in its orientation.2 Leaders of the Islamic

fundamentalist party, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),

that has formed provincial governments in Balochistan and

the crucial, to the war on terror, North West Frontier

Province, made it clear that, if General Musharraf followed

the American policy line, they would not allow the

government to function. More importantly, MMA ministers

have begun to call for a revival of the Taliban and resistance

to the Karzai government in Kabul. The ministers have also

said that they will use force to oppose the operations of the

FBI and American forces on Pakistani soil.3

Added to the anger of the Islamic groups is a broad public

movement against U.S. policy in Iraq that could be used to

help launch an agitation against the Musharraf regime.

Pro-democracy forces in the country may use any potential

movement to further their own agenda. In such a situation,

Pakistani observers believe that it would be hard to

continue Pakistan’s policy to support the war on terrorism.

Further, a large Pakistani diaspora population lives in

the Middle East—although not in Iraq—and the Pakistani

government is concerned about the adverse impact of any

military operation on this community. Both Pakistan and

India, as net energy importers, are concerned about the

short-term spike in oil prices that any conflict will bring. A

protracted war would lead to an economic downturn in both

states, but Pakistan would face more severe economic

problems because of the fragile state of its economy.

India does not support military intervention because it

has approximately four million citizens working in the

Persian Gulf region, and it fears that a conflict would

endanger the lives and livelihood of this diaspora group.

2
Further, the Indian government traditionally has

maintained strong ties with the government in Baghdad:

Indian military personnel have trained Iraqi officers since

the early 1960s; hundreds of thousands of Indians have

worked in Iraq; and the Indian government has maintained

strong links with the Baathist government in Baghdad

because of its secular credentials.

There is also the concern that any military operation

would be viewed as being anti-Muslim rather than antiSaddam. Participating in the war effort could lead to

sectarian violence in India as sections of India’s Muslim

community (which is over 120 million people) may protest

the government’s decision to participate in the war.

A unilateral use of force by the United States would

cause concern in India since it believes that multilateralism

should be the bedrock of a post-Cold War international

system. A use of force against Baghdad which is not

sanctioned by the United Nations would, therefore, lead to a

formal Indian expression of concern. At the same time,

however, the long-range benefits of a U.S.-Indian strategic

relationship, coupled with the possible fallout of a war, will

see New Delhi continue to push for a closer relationship

with Washington.

Such a maturing of the relationship would be aimed at

strengthening the joint efforts against the war on terrorism,

enhancing India’s military capability, and, possibly,

reacting to the military lessons of an Iraq war.

Counterterrorism and South Asia.

Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, India remain important

allies in the war against terror. The recent arrest of Khalid

Sheikh Mohammed suggests that the war on terror is

succeeding, as Pakistan is permitting American law

enforcement and security agencies to assist in tracking

suspected al-Qaeda within the country.

3
The CIA and the FBI are providing training and

equipment to Pakistani police and agents as part of their

efforts to apprehend al-Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Justice

Department, for its part, has allocated $73 million to boost

Pakistan’s border security. The program will provide

all-terrain vehicles, Apache helicopters, and radio

communication equipment, in addition to training for

provincial and tribal police and army troops.4 Additionally,

Pakistan and the United States are expected to set up a

Joint Working Group on counterterrorism.

The United States-India Counterterrorism Joint

Working Group was established in January 2000. The group

reached the following agreements in counterterrorism

cooperation:

Broadened their exchange of information and

assessments on the international and regional

terrorist situation;

Strengthened intelligence and investigative

cooperation;

Qualitatively upgraded and expanded anti-terrorism

training programs for Indian law enforcement

officials;

Signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty;

Launched a bilateral Cyber Security Forum, with a

wide-ranging program of action to address challenges

of cyberterrorism and information security;

Introduced military-to-military cooperation on

counterterrorism to supplement the initiatives of the

U.S.-India Defense Policy Group in this area;

Worked together closely on multilateral initiatives on

terrorism, including on the implementation of UNSC

Resolution 1373;

4
Initiated dialogue and cooperation in homeland/

internal security, terrorist financing, forensic science,

transportation security and border management;

and,

Taken concrete steps to detect and counter the

activities of individual terrorists and terrorist

organizations of concern to the two countries.5

The joint anti-terrorism efforts with both India and

Pakistan are, therefore, getting increasingly comprehensive and, in the case of Pakistan, have started to yield

satisfactory results.

Impact of a Conflict.

The impact of a new Gulf War on South Asia, and on the

U.S. standing in the region, may well depend on the

duration of the war, its economic impact, and on the possible

use of the war by al-Qaeda to achieve its own objectives. The

prospective role offered to both South Asian countries in a

post-war environment also would determine the attitudes

about the conflict.

The duration of the war would be important because the

longer it continues, and the more bloody the confrontation

gets, the more likely it is to lead to adverse consequences

both for the South Asian countries and, in the short-term,

for the U.S. standing in the region. A short war, or perhaps

even a rapid regime change, would be the best solution for

both South Asian countries since it would mean minimal

disruption in the flow of energy supplies and only a short

term spike in energy prices. A short war would also most

likely prevent a downturn in the economies of the Persian

Gulf countries, thus ensuring that the Indian and Pakistani

diaspora populations would not face unemployment or be

forced to return to South Asia.

The economic impact of a longer duration conflict,

possibly one with higher levels of casualties, would be

5
traumatic for both Pakistan and India. Higher energy costs

would lead to spiraling inflation in both countries and to

demands for terminating further market reforms. The

United States views market reforms as being critical to

Pakistan’s efforts to become a stable economy and, in the

case of India, to develop a stronger economic relationship

with the United States. A longer duration conflict could

potentially force the expatriate communities of both

countries, which provide valuable remittances and hard

currency to India and Pakistan, to lose their jobs or, at the

very least, to see a sizable reduction in earnings as the

economies of the Gulf states weather the consequences of a

drawn out conflict.

The War on Terrorism.

As this is being written, the hunt for al-Qaeda and

Taliban forces continues in Afghanistan. With it comes the

real danger that these organizations could use U.S.

attention being focused on Iraq to wage new terror strikes in

the region. From an Iraqi perspective, terrorist incidents in

South Asia, especially against American troops would

complicate, but not effectively hinder, America’s war effort

against Baghdad. The rise of terrorist attacks must be

expected, therefore, if a war breaks out in the Persian Gulf.

Additionally, Kashmiri terrorist groups based in

Pakistan may use this opportunity to stage spectacular

strikes against Indian civilian and military installations,

thus reigniting the near nuclear conflict situation that

occurred between the two countries in May-June 2002.

Kashmir terrorist groups have been quite successful at

ratcheting up the level of violence in Indian Kashmir

whenever international attention has focused on the region.

Visits by senior administration officials, both from the

Clinton and Bush administrations, typically have been

marked by terrorist actions by Kashmiri groups. And the

Indian government has made it clear that a serious terrorist

attack, one that leads to high casualty levels or has symbolic

6
value like the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian

parliament, will lead to retaliation against Pakistan.

Pakistan, in turn, has signaled that it will not hesitate to

use nuclear weapons in a conflict with India. The longer the

conflict, therefore, the more likely the possibility of tensions

rising in South Asia due to terrorist activities.

India will continue to work with the United States on the

war against terror because the two countries’ interests are

complementary. Eradicating Al-Qaeda and Taliban, both of

whom the Indian government believes have provided

assistance to the Kashmiri insurgency, is in India’s

long-term interests. At the same time, clipping the wings of

both terrorist organizations constrains the efforts of

Pakistan’s InterServices Intelligence (ISI) to try to

destabilize the Indian political system. India will continue,

regardless of the outcome of the Iraq war, to provide the type

of assistance the United States needs to fulfill its objectives

in the war on terror.

Regional Complications?

A possible concern for U.S. military planners is that a

war in Iraq may trigger a war in South Asia with India,

possibly seeing the diversion of U.S. attention from South

Asia as an opportunity, launching a preemptive strike

against Pakistan to resolve the issue of crossborder

infiltration. India is unlikely to engage in a preemptive war

against Pakistan given the Indian understanding of U.S.

interests in Pakistan and the belief that coercive diplomacy

would better serve to fulfill New Delhi’s interests. India

recognizes that the United States will continue to work

against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan along the border areas

with Pakistan. New Delhi, somewhat reluctantly, will

restrain its actions against Pakistan.

This has to be qualified. If a serious terrorist incident

occurs, like the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian

parliament, then India would be under great domestic

pressure to take appropriate military action against

7
Pakistan. But if the current situation continues, India

would prefer to exercise coercive diplomacy—the threat of

going to war—to get the United States to rein in the

Pakistani government—just as the Bush administration

did in June 2002 when it pressured General Musharraf to

stop state supported infiltration into Indian Kashmir.

Participation in Coalition Efforts.

Both countries have adopted a neutral position on the

Iraq crisis, and the Indian government has gone as far as to

suggest that it supports a continuation of the UN sanctions

and weapons inspection approach to dealing with the

problem. Once a war breaks out, however, the attitude of the

both governments may change due to the events on the

ground. The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by

Iraq, particularly against the civilian populations of the

Gulf states, would see both countries provide humanitarian

assistance to the affected countries. It would also remove

the constraints placed by domestic constituencies on

intervention because co-religionists were being targeted

with such attacks.

Even then, however, it is unlikely that either country

would exercise the initiative to participate militarily in the

war. The fear of the military situation deteriorating along

the India-Pakistan border would remain in the calculations

of both countries. A more practical constraint would emerge

from the limited mobility of both armed forces. The Indian

Navy can stay at sea for less than a month. The Indian Air

Force does not have an aerial refueling capability. Thus, by

the time any forces were placed on the ground, the war could

well be over.

Post-War Reconstruction.

The most likely area where both countries would be

willing to participate would be in post-war reconstruction.

India’s role would be more significant than Pakistan’s

because of its large pool of educated personnel and its

8
long-standing ties to the Iraqi government. At the root of

any such analysis is the extent to which regime change will

take place in Iraq and the willingness of the United States to

commit time and resources to this endeavor. If the U.S. goal

is to bring about a total societal change, as was the case in

post-World War II Germany and Japan, then it will require

the de-Baathification of the country, a restructuring of

government machinery, and purging and retraining of the

military and police forces. India, particularly, could play a

role in the post-war reconstruction effort in the following

ways.

First, if there is a major health crisis in Iraq, Indian

medical teams could provide the type of assistance required

for the country to recover from a longer duration conflict.

UN estimates of a worst-case scenario health crisis are that

up to ten million people may be affected in a conflict.6 Even if

one places a conservative estimate and reduces this number

to a tenth of the figure cited, it will still be a significant

humanitarian crisis. The Indian government would not

view its position of neutrality as being compromised by

carrying out such an action.

Second, Indian military and police personnel could

assist in the retraining of the Iraqi armed forces and police.

If successful democratization is to take place in Iraq, the

armed forces and police will have to be made into

professional forces that respect the rule of law and recognize

constitutional limitations. The Indian armed forces, with

their long and strong tradition of honoring civilian

supremacy over the military, would serve as ideal trainers

of a new Iraqi army. They could also provide the peace

enforcement capability that post-war Iraq will require.

Indian assistance would be welcome since it would be more

acceptable to the general Iraqi populace than an American

force commitment to carry out these objectives. Indian

forces could also remain for a longer period in Iraq, thus

freeing American troops for operations elsewhere.

9
Implications for Long-Term U.S. Strategy and

Standing.

Both India and Pakistan view the United States as their

long-term partner in both security issues and economic

development. Of the two relationships, the one with India is

likely to be more significant since it will be based on a range

of economic, political, and military concerns.

The Indian government is carrying out market reforms,

pursuing a foreign policy complementary to American

interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and attempting

to develop a new military relationship with the United

States. The latter goal, if brought to fruition, will see greater

sales of armaments and weapons technology to India. There

is also a push to have joint operations particularly in the

maritime sphere. Additionally, the U.S. position in the war

on terror has had significant benefits for India. The Bush

administration, in May-June 2002, successfully pressured

the Pakistani government to halt cross-border infiltration of

militants into Indian Kashmir. Another strategic interest of

the two countries that coincides is preventing the

proliferation of WMD.

The Indian government views itself as a responsible

state and, consequently, refuses to transfer WMD

technology to other countries. India also believes that its

regional security environment has deteriorated because of

the transfer of WMD technology from China to Pakistan, as

well as the transfer of ballistic missiles to Islamabad from

both Pyongyang and Beijing. The Indian government

would, therefore, view with concern an overt development of

the Iraqi WMD program since it could mean illegal transfers

to state and nonstate actors. The banned Lashkar-e-Taiba,

which seeks a violent solution to the Kashmir issue, has, for

instance, claimed that the group allegedly had control over

two nuclear weapons.

The military lessons of the war, both offensive and

defensive, will also shape Indian thinking on how to direct

10
the emerging relationship with the United States. U.S.

offensive measures will lead to a demand from the Indian

military and government to get the types of technology that

made such efforts successful. Offensively, India is already

expecting to test a 3000-kilometer range ballistic missile by

the end of the year. The war would certainly provide an

incentive for India to develop its nuclear forces but would

not lead to a major, and rapid, push for conventional force

modernization. India’s concerns remain Pakistan and the

deterrence of a Chinese attack in the Himalaya. In both

cases, Indian force levels are sufficient to achieve its

military objectives.

Defensively, if the Iraqis use WMD, India will press the

Bush administration for assistance in getting the Arrow

ABM system, as well as any other civil defense and

countermeasures that the United States may employ to

protect troops and civilians. From the Indian perspective, a

use of WMD could be replicated by Pakistan supported

insurgents in India. While this may be an exaggerated fear

with respect to nuclear weapons, it may be more credible in

the case of biological or chemical weaponry—although the

Indians would point to Pakistan’s transfer of nuclear

technology to North Korea as an example of how even the

nuclear taboo is being broken by Islamabad.

For India, therefore, the Iraq conflict will not change

what is a serious move to consolidate and build upon the

goodwill generated by the Clinton and Bush administrations in making overtures toward that country.

Pakistan, similarly, will continue to welcome U.S.

interest. The short-term economic stabilization of Pakistan

that followed the September 11, 2001, attacks has been

implemented due to the help provided by the United States

and other western nations. Pakistan’s military rulers

recognize that any moves towards long-term stabilization of

the economy will require continued western assistance and

goodwill. Iraq, in that sense, will not impact significantly on

the relationship. Pakistan recognizes its limited leverage

11
with the United States comes from the ability to capture or

neutralize Taliban and al-Qaeda elements. It will not,

therefore, rock the boat on the issue of Middle East politics.

Pakistan’s economic problems, therefore, serve as an

incentive for Islamabad to toe the American line.

Moreover, some Pakistanis believe that Iraq provides an

opportunity for Pakistan to reap economic benefits. They

point out that if anti-western sentiments rise because of a

Gulf war, then Arab investors, out of a sense of anger, may

put money in Pakistani banks. This is an optimistic

assessment and unlikely to happen because of the

precarious state of the Pakistan economy.

An alternative scenario is one where the United States

has a diminishing interest in the region. This could be

caused by a downsizing of forces after an Iraq conflict as the

administration attempts to shift resources from military

expenditure to stimulate the economy. It could also happen

if a major victory in the war on terror—the capture of Osama

bin Laden or compelling evidence that he is dead—occurs.

But even if there is a lowering of interest, a change in the

U.S. perception of India and Pakistan is unlikely. The Bush

administration will push ahead with its plans to develop a

stronger relationship with India, and it will also remain

engaged, at the very least economically, with Pakistan.

In conclusion, the principal South Asian countries view

the conflict with Iraq as one that could hurt their economies

and complicate their domestic political situations. This has

led both India and Pakistan to oppose the use of force to

resolve the dispute with Iraq. Both countries, however,

believe that they can play a role in post-war democratization. They also view a stronger long-term relationship with

the United States as desirable and, therefore, will not

connect events in the Gulf to these bilateral relationships.

12
ENDNOTES

1. Available at http://meadev.nic.in/ind-ter/for-med/russiain

diaopp.htm.

2. It should be pointed out, however, that the Pakistan military,

which would be the major challenger to President Musharraf’s policies,

remains a disciplined and loyal organization that supports the current

leadership.

3. “Iraq’s Blowback and Pakistan,” The Daily Times, January 9,

2003.

4. Ryyko Huang, “South Asia and the United States: Assessing New

Policies and Old Problems,” Center for Defense Information Terrorism

Project Brief, May 24, 2002.

5. “U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group,” U.S.

Department of State Press Statement, July 18, 2002.

6. Colum Lynch, “Iraq War Could Put 10 Million In Need of Aid,

U.N. Reports,” The Washington Post, January 7, 2003.

13
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

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