NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 19-1055

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JOANNE SCANNO,

on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated,

Appellant

v.

F.H. CANN & ASSOCIATES, INC.

 

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-16-cv-05943)

District Judge: Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo

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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 21, 2019

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Before: CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: December 4, 2019)

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OPINION*

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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

This appeal arises out of Joanne Scanno’s efforts to recover $27,333 in attorney’s 

fees under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) for a putative class-action 

lawsuit that was resolved via settlement on an individual basis. Because we are satisfied 

that the District Court did not err in accepting the report and recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge and in granting in part and denying in part Scanno’s motion for 

attorney’s fees, we will affirm. 

I.

In September 2016, Scanno, on behalf of herself, and on behalf of a putative class 

of others similarly situated, sued F.H. Cann & Associates, Inc. (“F.H. Cann”) under the 

FDCPA for deceptive debt collection practices. After a scheduling conference in 

February 2017, F.H. Cann moved for leave to amend its answer and, without leave from 

the District Court, moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. Scanno opposed 

the motion to amend and the District Court stayed briefing on the motion to compel 

arbitration. 

In June 2017, F.H. Cann offered to settle the case for $2,500, inclusive of the 

maximum statutory award of $1,000, attorney’s fees, and costs. Scanno’s counsel

rejected the offer, stating that “counsel would have received only approximately $1,000, 

although the attorney’s fees alone were $9,250.00 at that time.”1

 Three months later, 

F.H. Cann offered Scanno $4,000 to settle, inclusive of the maximum statutory award, 

attorney’s fees, and costs. Scanno again rejected the offer, noting that “the attorney’s 

 1 App. 63.
3

fees alone were $17,100” because counsel had spent additional time opposing F.H. 

Cann’s motion to amend and researching issues related to the motion to compel 

arbitration.

2

 Days after, the parties settled the matter on an individual basis for the same, 

maximum statutory award of $1,000 and agreed that Scanno would submit a motion for 

reasonable attorney’s fees.

Thereafter, Scanno filed her motion, seeking attorney’s fees in the amount of 

$27,333. The District Court referred the motion to a Magistrate Judge, who issued a 

report recommending that the District Court grant in part and deny in part the motion, and 

reduce the fees award to $10,418. The District Court adopted the report and 

recommendation and awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,418. It found that

Scanno’s counsel rejected a settlement offer in June 2017, only to reach the same 

resolution months later, and that counsel’s “significant experience” litigating FDCPA 

cases rendered “certain billing entries . . . excessive.”3 This appeal followed.

II.4

“We review the District Court’s attorneys’ fees award for abuse of discretion 

‘which can occur if the judge fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper 

procedures in making the determination, or bases an award upon findings of fact that are 

clearly erroneous.’”5

 

 2 App. 64.

3 App. 15–16.

4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291.

5 In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting In re 

Cendant Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 727 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also Hensley v. 
4

III.

Under the FDCPA, a prevailing plaintiff may recover “the costs of the action, 

together with a reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court,”6 and “in a typical 

case . . . the court should determine what constitutes a reasonable fee in accordance with 

the substantial Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the calculation of reasonable 

attorney’s fees.”7

In arriving at a reasonable fee, courts “must start by taking the amount of time

reasonably expended by counsel for the prevailing party on the litigation, and compensate 

that time at a reasonable hourly rate to arrive at the lodestar.”8 Although “the lodestar 

amount ‘is presumed to be the reasonable fee’ to which counsel is entitled,”9 the District 

Court may reduce the fee award “to account for . . . limited success” on the merits of the 

claim or for other factors, such as the experience of counsel and the complexity of the 

legal issues involved.

10 In addition, the District Court should exclude hours that are 

“excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.”11

 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983) (noting that the “district court has discretion in 

determining the amount of a fee award”).

6 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). 

7 Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 114 (3d Cir. 1991). “In general, a reasonable fee 

is one which is ‘adequate to attract competent counsel, but which do[es] not produce 

windfalls to attorneys.’” Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 

1179, 1185 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Student Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. 

AT&T Bell Lab., 842 F.2d 1436, 1448 (3d Cir. 1988)).

8 Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2000).

9 Id. at 243 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 

U.S. 546, 564 (1986)). 

10 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3, 436–37.

11 Id. at 433–34.
5

Scanno first challenges the District Court’s conclusion that she had only limited 

success on the merits of her case, arguing that her total recovery, including attorney’s 

fees, increased from June 2017 to September 2017.

12

The reasonableness of the fee award on the merits of the case is clear from the 

District Court’s reasoning. The District Court observed that, in June 2017, Scanno 

rejected a settlement offer which allowed her to recover the maximum statutory award of 

$1,000, only to incur twenty-five hours of additional legal services and accept the very 

same offer three months later. Scanno’s rejection of the June 2017 settlement offer 

appears to have been driven primarily by counsel’s independent belief that the offer did 

not account for all attorney’s fees incurred since the commencement of the litigation.13 

Even considering that Scanno’s counsel brought this suit as a class action, the case was 

ultimately settled on an individual basis with no change in Scanno’s recovery from the 

June 2017 settlement offer. Therefore, we cannot say that the District Court abused its 

discretion in reducing the lodestar by fifty percent.

14

 12 The parties do not dispute that $500/hour is a reasonable hourly rate for Scanno’s 

attorney’s services. 

13 Indeed, counsel concedes that the $1,000 maximum statutory award “was likely the 

same amount that [Scanno] would have received had she accepted the June 15, 2017” 

offer. Appellant Br. 16. 

14 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37 (noting that district courts have the discretion to 

“reduce the award to account for . . . limited success”); see also Paz v. Portfolio Recovery 

Assocs., 924 F.3d 949, 955–56 (7th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in substantially reducing attorney’s fees in an FDCPA action where 

counsel rejected a settlement offer above the maximum statutory award, proceeded to 

trial despite a slim chance of success, and ultimately recovered only $1,000 in statutory 

damages). 
6

Scanno also challenges the District Court’s sixty percent reduction of the lodestar

regarding the preparation of the fee petition, arguing that time spent on the fee petition 

was not excessive and that she had more than limited success on the petition. We 

disagree.

This Court has held “that the fee reduction rationale of Hensley . . . applies by 

force of the Court’s reasoning to fees generated in the litigation of a fee petition, and 

compels us to treat the fee petition litigation as a separate entity subject to lodestar and 

Hensley reduction analysis.”15 Here, the District Court properly reduced the lodestar by 

sixty percent for time spent preparing the fee petition because the amount of time billed 

was excessive given counsel’s “significant experience in this field.”16

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s reduction of the 

fees sought in preparation of the fee petition.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting in 

part and denying in part Scanno’s motion for attorney’s fees, and awarding total 

attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $10,418. 

 15 Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec’y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 924 (3d Cir. 1985). 

16 App. 16; see Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d 181, 187–88 (3d Cir. 2001) (reducing 

number of hours claimed in preparing fee petition due to excessiveness). Further, 

although not explicitly relied upon by the District Court, we find no error in the 

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Scanno had limited success on the fee petition.