THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA:

UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT

David Passage

March 2000
An earlier version of this monograph was written for the U.S

War College conference on Colombia, December 10-12, 1998. D

of the conference were Dr. Gabriel Marcella, Department of N

Security and Strategy; and Dr. Donald Schulz, Strategic 

Institute, of the War College. I am grateful to Dr. Marcella, Dr

(now of Cleveland State University), and to Ambassador Edwin 

the University of Oklahoma for their invaluable comments 

structure and content of this monograph.

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ISBN 1-58487-019-2

ii
Twenty-five years after the end of the Vietnam Wa

ghost of that war still haunts decisionmakers when it 

to making long-term commitments to situations 

remotely resemble anything like our Indochina exper

That is the case with Colombia, which is embroiled 

internecine struggle with two guerrilla movements, be

overthrowing the government, as well as with n

traffickers and paramilitary forces.

In this, SSI’s fourth Letort Paper since the series 

nearly 3 years ago, Ambassador David Passage detai

complicated but increasingly clear nexus betwee

political and social insurgencies and the drug traffi

This, he maintains, has obliged a highly reluctant U

States to reexamine whether its counternarcotics str

can succeed if it is not accompanied by a willingness to 

the Colombian government improve its ability to d

guerrillas and regain control of its national territory.

If the United States is to become even more involv

the internal struggles in Colombia, it is a good bet th

Army will play an important role. I therefore comme

you Ambassador Passage’s The United State

Colombia: Untying the Gordian Knot.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
AMBASSADOR DAVID PASSAGE is a 33-year vete

the U.S. Foreign Service who retired from the 

Department in September 1998. He has had exte

experience with both Latin America and gue

insurgencies in various parts of the world. Ambas

Passage was political officer at the American emba

Quito, Ecuador, during the mid-1970s and Deputy Ch

Mission/Charge d’Affaires at the American Embassy 

Salvador at the height of that country’s civil war, from 

to 1986. Coincidentally, he spent 6 years as a you

Colombia and was in Bogotá during the violent upris

May 1948 which sparked a decade-long civil war kno

La Violencia. At the beginning of his Foreign Service c

Ambassador Passage was a pacification program anal

the U.S. military assistance command in Vietnam. H

served as an American negotiator during the extensiv

diplomatic effort in the 1980s to secure the withdraw

Cuban forces from Africa, an end to Angola’s 

Mozambique’s civil wars which were fanned by in

insurgencies; independence for Namibia, which wa

being fought for by an internal insurgency; and the po

“constructive engagement” with South Africa (whic

under the threat of possible guerrilla warfare from 

nationalist movements). At the end of his ca

Ambassador Passage was Director of Andean Affairs 

State Department, with responsibility for the o

conduct of U.S. relations with Colombia, Venez

Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia.

v
vi
 UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT

Introduction.

A long time ago in a mythical kingdom, far, far way

Gordius of Phrygia tied an intricate and complex kno

decreed that anyone who could untie it would be

Master of all Asia. Legend has it that Alexander the 

averted an ill omen, which could have resulted fro

inability to untie the knot, by slashing through the 

with his sword.

Today, in Colombia, the United States is faced wit

such a conundrum. Fearful of finding itself committe

long-term struggle against Colombian guerrillas, 

counter-narcotics policy has been to help Colom

government in its efforts to halt cultivation, productio

trafficking in illicit narcotics while steering clear 

internal insurgencies, driven as they are by socio-pol

ideological, and economic causes.

Meanwhile, Colombian authorities have acknowl

the danger that drug trafficking poses to their society

the mortal threat that Colombia faces is from two gue

armies that are intent on violent revolution. What is 

more complicating is that the collusion between 

traffickers and the insurgents is growing. For the U

States, the menace of drugs is real and urgent. Bu

memories of Vietnam also linger, giving pause to thos

contemplate increasing commitments in faraway pla

circumstances that even remotely resemble those ext

Southeast Asia in the last half of the 20th century.

1
Democracies.”

When El Salvador’s and Guatemala’s civil wars en

negotiated settlements, U.S. policymakers bre

audible sighs of relief. Thus ended more than 40 ye

internal conflicts which convulsed a number of 

American states. Successive U.S. administra

portrayed much of this as part of the global str

between democracy and communism—between th

world and the “evil empire,” in Ronald Reagan’s memo

phrase.

Because defeating the Farabund Marti Nat

Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in El Salvado

been a cardinal objective of U.S. foreign policy in the 1

and, because the end of the civil wars in El Salvado

Guatemala roughly coincided with the collapse of the U

of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Ame

policymakers were quick to take credit and pointed 

collapse of the USSR as the inevitable result of a 

economic and political system lacking widespread po

support.

But Unrest Persists.

We may have breathed our sighs of relief too soon, 

seem to have persuaded ourselves that just be

governments come to power through the election pr

they are therefore democratic. Elections alone d

democracies make, a truth which we ignore at our 

Internal conflict is not yet over in this hemisphere be

many of the underlying causes of the turmoil of the 1

1970s, and 1980s remain with us.

Gross corruption still exists at virtually every le

government and society in most Latin American coun

The disparity between the rich (who, in Latin Americ

very rich) and the poor (who, in Latin America, are very 

is diminishing only slowly. And a widespread popular 

2
and economic elites who traditionally have held pow

incapable of distracting themselves from petty po

squabbling and personal aggrandizement to turn to th

needs of “the people.” Indeed, the traditional r

politicians do not even understand what those needs 

Despair over this chasm between popular aspir

and on-the-ground reality has led to the rise of so-

“democratic dictators” in some Latin American cou

(e.g., Peru’s President Alberto Fujimori, Venezuela’s 

Chávez, and Bolivia’s Hugo Banzer), to pop

rabble-rousers in others (such as former presidents A

Bucaram of Ecuador and Ríos Montt of Guatemala), a

reignited populist insurgencies in a third group of na

In three key Latin American states—Mexico, Colo

and Peru—guerrilla insurgencies challenge ex

political processes and institutions and in Mexic

Colombia deny governments control over parts of thei

national territory.

In Mexico, the small but annoyingly entrenched E

Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) and E

Popular Revolucionario (EPR) have an inviting and po

target in the corrupt and corpulent Partido Revoluci

Institucional (PRI), even though the latter is now a

trying to democratize itself. In Peru, the faintly M

Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”, or SL) and even 

autarchic Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac A

(MRTA) have conducted widespread and effective 

ultimately nihilistic) terrorist campaigns against P

government, society, and economic infrastructur

autocratic but fiercely determined technocrat, Pres

Alberto Fujimori has waged a relentless campaign ag

both SL and MRTA to good effect, but remnants o

organizations still exist and could revive to comp

Peru’s political scene.

And in Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucio

de Colombia (FARC), which traces its pedigree t

3
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) have pl

Colombian governments that are seeking to end gue

sabotage of the country’s economic infrastructure an

repeated humiliation of Colombia’s armed forces and p

The United States has an important stake i

outcome of these conflicts. While the primordial issue f

United States is no longer competition with a nu

tipped global arch-enemy with the capacity to “mak

rubble bounce,” stresses in our neighbors’ internal po

affairs have a direct effect on the United States includi

a negative impact on trade and commerce, (b) incr

movements of migrants seeking to remove themselve

their families from the crossfire, and (c) the northwar

of illegal narcotics to the rich and insistent Ame

market.

The U.S. Stake in Colombia.

Economically, Colombia ranks about 25th on the 

our most important trading partners. That means tha

Canada, Mexico, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, 

handful of other European and Asian coun

Colombia—with which the United States did almos

billion in legal two-way trade in 1998—is in the top h

the second tier of our most important trading partner

our fourth most important customer and supplier in 

America (after Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela); we d

again as much business with Colombia as we do with 

which aspires to be the next member of the North Ame

Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). More than 400 o

“Fortune 500" companies do business in Colombia eit

their own name or through wholly-owned subsidi

franchises, or licensing and marketing arrangements

than 25,000 American citizens live and work in Col

and, while some of them are dual-nationals, all have a 

expectation that the United States will look after 

4
right to admission into the United States.

The migration issue has enormous potentia

disrupting U.S. relations with Colombia. In num

Colombians may well comprise the second largest gr

illegal aliens in the United States, after Mex

Moreover, the impact of civil unrest is not confin

Colombia but spills across its borders creating refug

neighboring countries as well. The numbers of disp

persons have ebbed and flowed over the past decade, 

as a result of changing patterns of narcotics traffickin

other illegal activities, partly as a result of the percept

greater economic opportunity in the United States

partly as a result of the growing level of violence 

Colombia. The greatest threat of large-scale i

migration, however, comes from the latter. If dom

violence ever reaches the stage where significant num

of Colombians (of all classes) give up hope for an end t

conflict and simply try to get out of the crossfire, the U

States could experience a wave of illegal immigrants s

to what we have seen from Mexico over the past se

decades. We have already witnessed, over the past 3 

increasing numbers of middle and upper class Colom

moving assets and family members to safety outsid

country. The Colombian foreign ministry reports that 

than 565,000 Colombians left during 1996-98 and ha

returned, and more than 65,000 Colombians depart

one-way tickets during the first 6 months of 199

mid-1999, the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá reported that it

application workload had doubled, to 50,000 per mon

The third important negative result of turmoil in 

America—the production of and trafficking in i

narcotics—is sufficiently obvious not to require 

elaboration. The wrenching dislocations and distorti

Latin America’s “producer” economies by huge inflo

ill-gotten revenues have been amply documented. A

has to do is look at the gleaming and ostentat

overbuilt cities like Cali and Medellín, see the glit

5
and excessive financial resources, and consider the am

of arable land that has been bought up by narcotraff

and thus removed from agricultural developme

legitimate farmers, to see what drugs do to source co

economies.

A Sad Comparison to the Balkans.

Colombia is far more important to U.S. na

interests, overwhelmingly so in economic terms, 

anything going on in the Balkans. The United State

more business with Colombia each week than it do

year with all the countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosni

Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Federal Repub

Yugoslavia [Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina]) tha

to make up Yugoslavia, combined! The potential for 

flows of refugees to the United States from Colom

much greater than from the Balkans, if only bec

whereas refugees from the Balkans have other Eur

alternatives, the overwhelming majority of Colombia

only the United States as a possible safe-haven.

The United States may be dismayed and distract

events in the Balkans, but its interests are truly mena

what is happening in Colombia. Yet the United State

invested enormous amounts of diplomacy, prestige

military force in the Balkans despite far greater pot

there for long-term entrapment in a quagmire, a

remains timid and nervous about a much less risky, c

or hazardous effort to try to help bring peace to strif

Colombia. We have managed to terrify ourselves by 

ghosts from our own past in this hemisphere (c.f

Agency for International Development’s [AID] ill-beg

public safety program in the 1960s, most notor

depicted by Costa-Gavras’ film “State of Siege”) as w

paralyze ourselves by our domestic political and ideol

squabbling over what our national objectives ought to 

Colombia.

6
If the United States really believes what it say

should want to see a cohesive and democratic Colomb

by a freely-elected government. That government sho

able to exercise effective control over its national terr

safeguard the human rights and civil liberties of 

citizens, end human rights abuses by its police a

armed forces as well as by others such as paramilitarie

guerrillas, curb the production and trafficking of 

narcotics, and be supported by all its citizens as it ta

the country’s serious political, social and econ

problems.

For Colombia’s government to do that, its militar

police forces have to be sufficiently professionally tr

and equipped to be able to enforce laws and thwart a

challenges to government authority—be they from 

FARC, ELN, paramilitaries, narcotraffickers, or 

criminal elements.It is almost irrational to expect 

country fighting for national survival (and Colombia 

fact, fighting for its life, even though it is not yet anyw

near mortal peril) should be able to quickly or easily ac

the truly prodigious transformation necessary to live 

accepted norms for human rights and civil liberties

also exceedingly difficult for police and military for

transform themselves into professional and respe

guardians of democratic and constitutional law and 

while under hostile fire from guerrilla and param

forces which obey no human rights constraints and sh

respect for civil liberties.

Having said that, the human rights records of bo

police and military forces are clearly improving. Th

been recorded by virtually all of the groups which m

human rights performance in Colombia. It appears 

invisible only to the most determined nay-sayers a

those who so strongly oppose Colombia’s nat

government and that country’s military and police 

that they are willing to distort the truth for the sa

7
conundrum: Colombia’s overarching national priority 

reestablish sovereignty, regain control over its na

territory, end its domestic violence and resume eco

growth for all its people—but the professed U.S. objec

simply to end illicit drug trafficking to American consu

U.S. Policy: A Gordian Dilemma.

We have tied our policy toward Colombia in a kn

determinedly confining our objectives—and therefor

supporting assistance—to counternarcotics prog

repeatedly reaffirming that we would not be drawn int

country’s internal strife. But it should have been obvi

anyone not willfully obtuse that the Colombian govern

was slowly but steadily losing control over its na

territory to precisely those criminal elements

narcotraffickers and drug lords, the FARC and 

guerrillas, and the paramilitary groups opposin

latter—who were the source of both the drug traffickin

Colombia’s deteriorating internal stability.

In fairness to successive U.S. administrations 

found themselves trapped in this thicket, objective an

did not lead us here. Rather, U.S. policy was forced o

road and into the brambles by competing, h

carnivorous, pressure groups in the United States.

On the one hand, ideologically motivated 

determined partisans in Congress have noisily 

ferociously insisted that the only way to bring Ame

drug problem under control is to stamp out production 

source countries. These zealots have sought to comp

Clinton administration to implement programs and 

money on equipment and training for wha

self-evidently been a futile effort to eliminate the prod

and trafficking of drugs.

On the other hand, equally determined human 

activists in the private voluntary organization (PVO

8
Congress, and elsewhere, have insisted that the 

Government not train or otherwise assist Colom

military and police forces, whom they accuse, with 

justification, of having committed widespread and se

abuses of human rights.

To a historian, the arguments and their proponen

remarkably similar to those arrayed against the U.S. 

to help El Salvador defeat its internal insurgency a d

ago. The words of José Miguel Vivanco, director of H

Rights Watch-Americas, who has observed these proc

over the years, are perhaps revealing:

[Colombia] is so polarized as a result of this nightmar

internal conflict, and the issue of human rights is 

politicized, that there is a tendency to overlook atrocit

committed by the forces one may sympathize with.

2

So, dismayed by human rights abuses committ

Colombian police and military forces and u

considerable pressure from human rights group

elements in the Congress to forego assistance to Colom

military forces, the U.S. Government severely restrict

training and assistance programs. But alarmed b

unconstrained flow of illicit narcotics to Ame

consumers, it created exceptions to allow counternar

and limited counterterrorism training to Colom

counternarcotics police (DANTI). This was subsequ

expanded to include training and equipment for Na

Police units engaged in counternarcotics and cou

terrorist activities, which now have been further enlar

include limited training for three new batta

hand-picked from Colombian army units suppo

counternarcotics activities.

But the Clinton administration bent over backwa

avoid the possibility that U.S.-trained Colom

counternarcotics units might somehow end up fig

9
spokesman described U.S. policy thusly:

U.S. assistance is strictly for counternarcotics purposes. 

provide anti-drug assistance to the Colombian National Po

and to those elements of the military, and only those element

the military, which are directly involved in counternarco

operations.

3

U.S. Embassy personnel in Colombia (both civilia

military) were under strict orders to monitor the u

which U.S. training and equipment were put in or

ensure that there was no diversion to Colom

counterinsurgency effort. Helicopters and other equip

provided by the U.S. Government were to be used on

counternarcotics activities. Weapons, ammunition 

other lethal equipment were only for the war against d

Training was almost exclusively tied to the effort to 

up the narcotics trade, arrest and prosecute drug kin

and disrupt the production and transportation of 

destined for the U.S. market.

At one point during 1997-98, the administration 

went through an amusing, if surreal, pas de deux 

attempted to define a region (the “box”) in southea

Colombia where narcotraffickers, but presumabl

insurgents, were active. It was ultimately forced to aba

this fiction as it became increasingly clear that the 

and ELN were moving into areas where narcotraff

were active, and coca and opium poppy cultivation 

expanding into territory controlled by the FARC and E

Meantime, four realities gradually arose to domina

debate over policy. First, the FARC and ELN 

continuing to erode government control in rural area

step up pressure in urban areas with occasional d

forays into the hearts of Colombia’s cities. Second

human rights situation was deteriorating as polic

military lashed out against civilians suspected of aid

sympathizing with the guerrillas. Third, well-a

trained, and equipped paramilitary forces such a

10
(ACCU) and United Self-Defense [groups] of Colo

(AUC) emerged, arrogating unto themselves respons

for providing local community defense where govern

forces were unable to prevent guerrilla activity. And fo

there was an evident and growing symbiosis be

narcotraffickers and paramilitary units, the FARC an

ELN, as the latter three accepted payoffs from the 

lords in return for protecting airfields, crops, and proce

facilities.

As it became increasingly clear that the two-d

American effort to stamp out drug production i

producer countries was having no impact on su

reaching our market, the U.S. Government—u

pressure from those in Congress who simply refus

believe that if the United States threw enough resour

the problem we could not stamp it out—expa

counternarcotics cooperation with the Colom

government. First, we enlarged the number of Colom

entities eligible to receive training and equipment from 

the counternarcotics police to other units withi

Colombian National Police. Then we added trainin

prosecuting narcotics cases. Finally, we find our

tiptoeing up to providing training and equipme

Colombian military units exclusively devot

counternarcotics programs.

But the simple fact remains—back to the Go

Knot—that there has been no diminution at all o

cultivation of illicit drugs in Colombia, and will not 

long as the Colombian government does not exercise c

over its national territory. Despite significant increa

U.S. counternarcotics assistance over the past 6 

acreage under coca and opium poppy cultivatio

expanded every year, as has the volume of finished co

and heroin bound for the American market. The 

ballyhooed reductions in Bolivian and Peruvian 

cultivation should—if we are honest—be seen not 

triumph for our counternarcotics effort but, rather, 

11
have much larger and more efficient plantatio

southern and eastern Colombia, growing newer and 

potent varieties of coca, able to cut several thousand 

off transportation routes and to eliminate the expe

bribing, evading, or otherwise neutralizing Ecuad

Peruvian, and Bolivian law enforcement officials.

Where to Begin?

A number of studies of the Colombian mili

professional competence have recently been made by 

Colombians and foreigners, virtually all of them ident

serious shortcomings. Despite the fact that the Colom

military has had more experience over a longer per

time in dealing with guerrilla insurgents than any 

military force in this hemisphere, its track record ov

past two decades has not been impressive.

By the mid-1990s, the army was suffering repeate

humiliating defeats at the hands of the FARC and the 

One of the most devastating was in 1996 at Las Delic

the southern part of the country, when a sizeable arm

was overrun by the FARC, resulting in the capture of n

100 government soldiers. Their release was even

negotiated with assistance from humanita

organizations, but the FARC used the occasion to h

press conference and announce a political manife

demands and objectives. An increasing number of d

for the army in 1998 included a unit overrun at Cagu

Billar in Caquetá department in March, with 62 so

killed and 43 captured; an attack at Miraflores in Gua

department in August, with 40 soldiers killed an

captured; an attack on Iribe, south of Bogotá in August

34 soldiers killed; and the overrunning of Mitú

provincial capital of the Vaupés department, alon

eastern border with Brazil on November 1, with 70 so

killed and 45 captured.

12
army’s high command to conduct an after-action r

which discovered such appalling lapses as the fact th

officers in charge of the outpost had not even organized 

perimeter defenses! The report noted that the troops 

not call in air support because their radio batteries 

dead, and that a number of prostitutes frequented b

unit’s members were FARC guerrillas on intellig

gathering missions.

4

 In contrast, the army ha

intelligence on the massing of nearly 800 guerril

nearby areas for the attack.

Only since the latter part of 1998, after a num

changes in personnel at the top, has the army begun to 

some success in running guerrilla groups to ground

the FARC and ELN, on the other hand, continue to la

audacious operations in the army’s own backyard, 

within sight of Bogotá itself.

Professional critiques of the Colombian a

performance begin with examples of incompetenc

corruption at virtually every level of leadership, and 

the way down to ignorance and fear among ill-tr

inadequately-equipped, and poorly-led conscripts a

bottom.

A Role for the United States?

Many necessary changes can only be brought abou

result of a wholesale housecleaning of incompetents b

Colombian army itself, as it increasingly realize

seriousness of its predicament. At the very top, f

president Samper removed General Harold Bedo

commander of the armed forces, replacing him with Ge

Manuel José Bonett; President Pastrana continue

process by replacing General Bonett with Ge

Fernando Tapias, who removed more than a dozen 

officers and ordered other personnel changes such a

sacking of Major General Iván Ramirez, commander 

20th intelligence brigade—an important watersh

13
and dissemination process.

But other changes are also needed, some of 

Colombia’s friends could help with. At the very le

carefully designed and modest assistance program 

vastly increase the speed at which the mil

professionalizes itself and cleans up its past reco

human rights abuses. A partial list of the most impo

deficiencies and areas for improvement would ha

include:

• Development of strategy. The Colombian arm

not yet have a viable comprehensive strategy for de

with the guerrillas and paramilitaries to re

government control over its national territory.

• Training and doctrine for small unit opera

The Colombian army is woefully unprepared for sma

combat operations. Just before he retired to ru

president, then-armed forces chief General Bedoya 

that, if elected, he would create three new army divisi

help deal with the guerrillas. One hopes the Colom

army’s new leaders realize that divisions are not wha

uses to chase small bands of guerrillas throug

mountains of central Colombia.

• Training and doctrine for joint operation

Colombian military is only just now beginning to dev

doctrine for joint operations, which should includ

national police, and use army, air force, and navy ass

reinforce each others’ skills and strengths and compe

for weaknesses.

• Training and equipment for night co

operations. Until very recently, night combat oper

were virtually unheard of. At sundown the army repai

its cuarteles and hoped the guerrillas would not attac

night.

14
evaluation, and dissemination of usable operat

intelligence. To describe the Colombian mili

collection and evaluation of intelligence as “prim

would be charitable. Dissemination of usable, actio

intelligence is virtually nonexistent due to rivalrie

distrust between army units and their leaders.

• Development of quick reaction capabi

When four American birdwatchers were kidnapped 

guerrilla roadblock in Boyaca in 1998 (along with num

Colombian citizens), it took more than eight hours 

army unit to react—despite the fact that the roadbloc

less than 10 kilometers from the nearest army base.

• Creation of an airborne strike force to 

rapidly to developing tactical situations 

opportunities. In 1985, the United States helpe

Salvadoran military create a heliborne immediate rea

force named Relámpago (Lightning), designed to lau

reaction within 15 minutes of receiving actio

intelligence. One of its first operations captured Nidia 

a senior FMLN comandante, when she and a small 

stopped to rest after a raid. Colombia needs to creat

such a force to react immediately to intelligence 

high-value targets.

• Enhancement of the military’s aerial me

evacuation capability. El Salvador president 

Napoleón Duarte said that the creation of such capa

gave him the equivalent of a new division because 

positive impact on his soldiers’ morale and confidenc

late 1999 it was reported that the Colombian arm

three medevac helos.)

• Dramatic improvement in logistics suppl

repair capabilities. All three military services 

significant improvements in the way they maintain 

logistics and repair facilities. These are not unknown 

in Colombia. Avianca, the national airline, oldest i

15
maintenance and logistics services without which one 

never run a major international airline.

• Dramatic improvement in spare p

inventorying and anticipation of need. For exa

until very recently, the Colombian military had no 

helicopter rotor blades, and when the need for them 

helicopters were sidelined or cannibalized 

replacement blades could be ordered and shipped fro

manufacturer—a process which usually took several w

and sometimes months.

• Significant improvement in transport capa

and lift. Trucks and other vehicles on the ground

rotary and fixed wing aircraft in the air.

The Vietnam Analogy and Lessons Learned

in El Salvador.

Those who criticize proposals for U.S. mi

assistance to Colombia make three basic charges. Firs

United States would risk starting down a slippery slop

could ultimately lead to our being trapped in a Vie

type civil war with similarly disastrous conseque

Second, the Colombian military’s human rights per

ance is so bad that the United States should not 

anything to do with it until it cleans up its act. And thir

magnitude of the problem in Colombia is so great as to 

any viable U.S. training and equipment pro

unacceptably costly.

One of the saddest results of America’s involvem

Vietnam is how resistant we are to learning from it

traumatized we remain by it, and how paralyze

national decisionmaking process is by the specter, ho

implausible, that the United States might get involv

another such experience.

The anonymous and obviously hostile Congres

staffer who described U.S. military and police tra

16
in Vietnam in 1964”

5

 obviously knows nothing about 

Vietnam or Colombia. There are a number of valid less

be learned from our national experience in Vietnam

avoiding attempting to influence in a positive m

developments in foreign countries of importance t

United States should not be one of them.

Those of us who were involved in the U.S. effort to h

Salvador bring its civil war to a negotiated settle

without that country having to endure what Nica

went through under the Sandinistas applied lesso

learned in Vietnam. For the sake of brevity, let me con

these to three:

• The United States made clear that it was El Salv

war, not ours, to be won or lost by Salvadoran

Americans.

• The United States would help retrain El Salv

armed forces which, at the time we became involved, h

appalling human rights record, but we woul

participate in combat operations and would lim

involvement to 55 trainers (not, note, “advisers”).

• The United States used all the means at its dispo

compel the Salvadoran government to make signi

internal reforms: to end human rights abuses b

military, eliminate death squads, draw up a 

constitution, hold free and fair elections, end the oliga

monopolies over the major cash crops (e.g., sugar, c

cotton, rice, and shrimp), implement land reform

economic assistance to the campesinos, and sta

process of building a true democracy—none of whic

United States ever forced on the Saigon regime.

And the result in El Salvador was quite different 

that in Vietnam. Even after all other factors are take

account or discounted, the incontrovertible fact is tha

a modestly designed and simple U.S. assistance pro

using the three key lessons learned from Vietna

17
performance to the point that the guerrillas ultim

concluded that they needed to negotiate a peace o

being wiped out. The armed forces’ leadership forced 

to death squad activities, curbed abuses of civil and h

rights, and was able to win the active support of th

population. And the armed forces became the stro

defenders of the civilian government led by Pres

Duarte, who 20 years earlier had been driven into ex

the same military which now supported him.

Ditching the Myths.

In our national discussion about what, if anythin

should do to help Colombia, we need, first and forem

ditch—echar de la ventana—the notion that U.S. tra

programs and military equipment sales will start us 

the road to a Latin American version of Vietnam. T

nonsense and ignores the highly successful U.S. effor

Salvador only a dozen years ago and reversal 

disgraceful human rights situation in the proc

something the United States has every right to be prou

With respect to cost, the United States spent nea

billion to help turn the tide in El Salvador—but that w

impoverished country that had already been through 

of debilitating civil war. If the United States wanted 

the situation there reversed (and President Reagan 

clear that he did), we were going to have to provide m

the resources ourselves.

But that is not the case in Colombia—a wealthy cou

rich in resources and talent. Colombia’s problem 

paucity of resources. It is the misapplication of them 

still considerable degree of corruption within the mi

(in the procurement process, payroll, contracts, 

Colombia wastes too much money on things it does not 

and does not spend enough to buy things it does. Its air 

still wants F-16s to replace its aging Mirages and 

what it needs is ground attack and close air support air

18
maintain a “blue water” capability. What it needs is c

patrol and riverine craft to regain control of its terr

waters and rivers from smugglers and narcotraffickers

the Colombian army wants a lot of expensive high

equipment it does not need to chase small ban

guerrillas in the mountains; what it really nee

increased mobility and communications equip

training in small unit operations and night co

improved intelligence gathering, evaluation 

dissemination, and improvement in leadership capab

A viable U.S. assistance program to significantly 

Colombia reorganize and reorder its internal security 

need not be very costly. Although President Pastran

Defense Minister Luis Fernando Ramírez have v

Washington to discuss additional resources for 

Colombia (the Colombian government’s ambitious 5

$7 billion campaign to restore law and order and wip

the illegal narcotics trafficking), the defense budge

already provide most of what that country needs. It h

essentially adequate force structure, although it ne

redesign it to deal with small but highly mobile gue

bands instead of invading armies from outside its bord

also needs to take the threat it faces seriously enou

reexamine some of its practices, like exempting high s

graduates from combat. It needs help drawing up tab

organization and equipment tailored to counterinsur

warfare, not traditional maneuver warfare.

This year, U.S. assistance to Colombia may reach 

million—the third largest military assistance progr

the world—and in his State of the Union speech on Ja

27, 2000, President Clinton appealed to the Congr

support his 2-year $1.6 billion program to help stren

Colombia’s democracy as well as the counternarcotics 

But we should not be under any illusions about its 

impact or effectiveness. Virtually all these funds w

spent on the continuing effort to stamp out the produ

and export of drugs. Of fiscal year 1999’s $289 million

19
and most of the remaining $40 million will go to trai

equip hand-picked army units (two more battalio

support the police war on drugs.

Finally, how large would a military training pro

have to be to be viable? How many U.S. personnel wo

needed to have a significant impact on professiona

Colombia’s armed forces? If 55 trainers were requir

the United States to turn around the situation 

Salvador—which one very senior American policym

uncharitably described to me as a country barely the s

metropolitan Bogotá—how many U.S. military pers

would be needed in Colombia?

There is no reason why a viable military trainin

assistance program could not be accomplished w

relatively small number of uniformed personnel, pe

even fewer than the famous “55.” The United States h

help the Salvadoran armed forces develop skills in vir

every facet of their military operations—logistics, 

parts, uniforms, messing and rations, medical care, pa

payroll, motor vehicles, weapons and ammun

housing—the works. Colombia’s military, however po

performance until now, is nonetheless a good deal 

capable than the military force the United States w

assist in El Salvador in the early 1980s. And in El Salv

we sent trainers out to battalion level headquarters, 

would not necessarily be required in Colombia. There 

priori reason why a military assistance program s

have to be large to be effective, or why it should be cos

lead to a deeper American involvement in Colom

internal conflict.

As for risk, bear in mind that the United States al

has several hundred military personnel in Colo

including more than 100 at ground-based radar stati

exposed rural areas on Colombia’s southeastern 

(piedmont plains). American civilian contract pers

man the State Department’s air wing, eradicating coc

20
development personnel across the country. The 

exposure to FARC and ELN retribution is alread

exactly inconsequential.

Applying the Salvadoran Lesson to Colombia.

It is probably worth reiterating the criteria used f

U.S. training and assistance program in El Salv

changing what needs to be changed in order to appl

Colombia:

• This is Colombia’s conflict. The United States 

going to fight it for Colombia. Colombian government 

are going to have to fight it and win it—or they, not w

lose it. This happens to be consistent with Pres

Pastrana’s view, an added advantage.

6

• The United States can help Colombia’s armed 

evaluate shortcomings and overcome them organizatio

and through training—but only if they want our hel

are willing to apply lessons learned (both from our and 

own experience) to make the improvements necessa

turn the situation around on the battleground.

• Finally, Colombian military and police forces n

fundamentally change the way they deal with their ci

population. They need to end—definitively—the h

rights abuses which have marred their interaction wi

civilian populace, remove the violators from militar

civilian ranks, and prosecute in civilian courts thos

should be charged with civil crimes and abuses.

And the Peace Process?

There is, regrettably, little in the current situat

suggest that conditions exist for a viable negotiated 

between the Colombian government and the FARC a

ELN under any circumstances other than those 

would be regarded by most Colombians—and certain

the powerful elites whose acquiescence would be req

21
unacceptable surrender of sovereignty.

In fact, what should alarm those who seek a nego

peace is the gap between FARC and ELN demands an

reality of the situation. The reality is that Colom

guerrilla movements have never enjoyed signif

popular support (unlike, for example, the FSL

Nicaragua and FMLN in El Salvador, who at least had 

minimal level of popular standing), and may be 

whatever appeal they may once have had. According t

Ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman, in an 

Forum discussion at the State Department on Novem

1999, nationally respected and reputable po

institutions in Colombia have found popular support f

FARC and ELN to be no more than 3-5 percent of the v

age population. Although there have been impre

turnouts at massive rallies calling for an end to Colom

violence, low levels of public support for the guerrillas 

suggest a very great willingness on the part of Colom

people to see their government capitulate to gue

demands for the surrender of significant elemen

government responsibility.

What then are the prospects for a negotiated settle

If one reviews every similar situation over the past 50 

viable negotiations become possible only when one 

gains sufficient ground to convince its opponen

opponents) that it is in its (or their) best interest to neg

a settlement.

In Vietnam, the United States and Governme

Vietnam yielded to reality. The United States struc

best deal it could in Paris but the jig was up and we kn

Henry Kissinger was not under any illusion abou

eventual outcome. He did the best he could unde

circumstances with a very weak hand. In Malays

Robert Thompson’s forces fought well, gained a 

advantage and were on the verge of decimating the Ch

insurgents when the latter agreed to end the fightin

22
the reality that the Mau Mau were not going to be su

within any reasonable period of time or at any reaso

cost and began the process that led to that cou

independence. In the Philippines, Ramón Magsa

Philippine Constabulary whipped the Hukbalah

Cuba, Fidel Castro’s forces defeated Fulgencio Ba

armed forces; in Peru, President Fujimori has beaten 

both Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA (at least for th

being); in El Salvador and Guatemala, government 

gained sufficient strength to persuade the FMLN 

URNG to negotiate peace agreements rather than be 

out.

The point is that there is a necessary preconditi

viable peace negotiations: one side or the other nee

accept that it is losing and that its best opportunity to 

annihilation is to strike the most favorable barg

can—or for stasis to be reached between antagonists s

sides become willing to compromise for the sake of h

the fighting.

That is not the situation in Colombia. The govern

side is hurting, but it is nowhere near being def

Unlike El Salvador, which was genuinely on the rop

1982-83, Colombia is not in danger of imminent colla

defeat. Neither the FARC nor ELN is capable of sto

down out of the mountains to seize Bogotá; neith

capable of capturing any major town and holding it fo

long. It is not necessary to throw resources at Colom

problems in a panicked fashion. Neither the govern

nor the Colombian people are about to surrender 

elements of sovereignty just for the sake of bringi

ephemeral peace.

On the other hand, there is no evident incenti

either the FARC or ELN to make concessions. 

continue to slowly enlarge the territory under their co

their losses are sustainable at current rates; and they 

the ability to reduce losses by reducing their activit

23
would significantly reduce the fighting. Indeed, o

FARC statements into spring 2000 suggest no chan

their intention to defeat the government and bring ab

social, political, and economic revolution. Although the 

may be hurting somewhat more than the FARC from C

Castaño’s paramilitary forces and has hinted 

willingness to engage in peace talks, there is noth

suggest that this is anything other than a tactic to 

counter the paramilitaries and reduce whatever assis

they may be getting from Colombian security forces.

This is not to say that the United States should n

willing to encourage the parties to speak to each othe

even to speak to them ourselves if there were some 

role we might play. As a generalized propositi

diplomacy, dissenting U.S. congressional voices t

contrary notwithstanding, no country should ever ref

speak to those it disagrees with unless there is a 

compelling reason. So long as the Colombian governm

aware of and concurs in U.S. approaches to the FARC a

ELN, it would be foolish for the United States to pa

opportunities for at least informal communications wi

insurgents, and President Pastrana has confirmed th

was both aware of and concurred in U.S. conversation

FARC representation.

And so, the war of attrition continues with the FAR

the ELN slowly eroding Colombian government contro

its national territory, but not anywhere near beco

sufficiently strong to do more than increasingly emba

government forces and their civilian leaders. They cer

are not likely to become strong enough to be able to d

conditions for a negotiated peace for at least a num

years, and Colombia’s armed forces are slowly start

improve their ability to counter the guerrillas.

24
Although Colombians will have to make most 

decisions and fight most of the battles which will dete

the fate of their country, the United States, too, ne

decide what it would like to see happen and wha

prepared to do to influence the outcome.

If the United States is serious about wanting to 

reduction in the production and trafficking in i

narcotics, it needs to accept the fact that no reduct

likely until Colombia’s government regains control 

national territory and is able to deal with narcotraff

on the basis of law. That is an absolute sine qua non f

positive impact on cultivation in Colombia o

agricultural stock (coca and opium poppies) for i

narcotics, its transformation into usable raw materia

coca and poppy gum), conversion into cocaine and h

and packaging and shipment to consumer countries.

If the United States is serious about wanting to 

reduction in human rights abuses, it should offer tra

programs to help professionalize both Colombia’s polic

military forces so that neither of them believe they h

abuse human rights and deny civil liberties in ord

enforce laws and maintain public order. As was the c

El Salvador in the early 1980s, ties between govern

forces (either military or police) and paramilitary 

squads, when such occurs, reflect inadequate mi

training and inept leadership. The way to per

government forces to sever such links, in Colombia as 

Salvador, is to offer them an alternative—imp

training and equipment—so that they do not believe 

have to resort to extra-legal means to help them d

their country and its elected democratic government.

In fact, Colombia’s military forces have already beg

make significant progress in cleaning up their act. 

August 16, 1999, letter to The Washington Post

President Gustavo Bell Lemus noted that in the p

25
the armed forces dropped by more than 85 percent

roughly 2,000 in 1996 to 310 in 1999, and that, wher

1993 approximately half of all human rights violations 

attributed to the armed forces, by 1998 that numbe

fallen to only 4 percent. And although those are Colom

government figures, even the major international h

rights organizations, Amnesty International, H

Rights Watch Americas Division, and the Washi

Office on Latin America, acknowledge that progress is 

made on curbing human rights abuses by the se

forces.

For now, Congress still prohibits U.S. assistanc

training programs to Colombian police and military 

guilty of human rights violations in the past or with h

rights violators still in their ranks. A better and 

productive approach might be for the United States to 

on training precisely these units. Certainly the respo

human rights abuses committed by American police 

(Los Angeles, Chicago, New York City, Washington

has not been to cut off federal training programs and 

but, rather, to increase them.

Here, El Salvador can serve as a model: in the 

before the U.S. military assistance program began to s

changes in that country’s performance in the early 198

Salvador’s police and military forces routinely 

repeatedly perpetrated unspeakable abuses ag

innocent civilians. By the mid-1980s, with a ma

American military training program underway, the nu

of such violations went into a veritable free-fall. By 198

Amnesty International and other human rights g

reported a virtual cessation of death squad activit

other abuses that had characterized earlier phases 

Salvador’s civil war, and divided responsibility for th

that remained more or less equally between the gue

and the public security forces. That contrasts dramat

with the example of Guatemala, where the United S

engaged in no such training or assistance program

26
length of the civil war, at the cost of tens of thousa

lives.

Which would we rather see in Colombia—the Salva

example of reform in security forces comportment a

improvement in their performance to the point t

negotiated peace became possible—or the Guatem

example of fighting fire with fire which, to be 

ultimately led to a Carthaginian peace?

Narcotics.

Finally, although this is not a monograph o

counternarcotics policies, there has been enough discu

about the effectiveness of U.S. national drug co

strategy to warrant a couple of comments and observat

First, one would be hard-pressed to think of an

subject where we, as a nation, have engaged in 

self-deception than about the effectiveness, or even eff

of our “war on drugs” and the likely impact of even to

and more expensive, but likely equally fu

counternarcotics programs.

Despite the expenditure of in excess of $250 billio

the past 20 years in an effort to halt the productio

shipment of illicit narcotics to the U.S. market, it is acc

to say that there has been no impact at all—abso

none—on the street-corner price or availability of coca

heroin in the United States. As much of the stuff ente

United States as is necessary to maintain depen

supplies at stable and affordable prices. Every chan

patterns of usage thus far (i.e., cocaine to heroin, cr

crystal methamphetamines, etc.) can be easily 

convincingly shown to be the result of changing cons

preferences—not changes in availability or supply.

The test of the effectiveness of our effort to stamp o

production and transshipment of illegal narcotics t

United States is not how many hectares of the back s

27
opium poppies have been sprayed, how many labs have 

smashed, 55-gallon barrels of precursor chemicals p

into the headwaters of the Orinoco and Amazon, 

kingpins arrested, cartels broken up, small drug-car

aircraft forced or shot down, or “mules” arrested a

ports of entry. The only valid test of the effectiveness 

effort is its impact on street-corner availability of 

within a 5-block radius of the average American m

school. And by all accounts, drugs of choice have neve

more freely available, purer in quality, or cheaper in 

within that 5-block radius.

The result of our crack-down on coin-operated cig

vending machines and convenience store sales to se

graders is that it is now easier for the average se

grader to get the equivalent number of marijuana join

worse) than it is for him or her to buy a pack of cigar

And the result of raising the price of cigarettes in an ef

keep kids off them has been to make some illegal 

almost cost-competitive with tobacco. So long as there 

insistent market in a country like the United Stat

illegal narcotics and a sufficient profit to be made, the

probably be produced. And so long as they are illegal

production and distribution will be through orga

crime.

Bottom Line.

Let us conclude by returning to the theme o

monograph—untying the Gordian knot of counternar

versus counterinsurgency. If the United States is s

about either ending human rights abuses or curbin

production and trafficking of illegal narcotics, the firs

has to be to help a democratically-elected Colom

government regain control over its own national terr

If the United States is serious about wanting to 

reduction in human rights abuses in Colombia, it s

offer training programs to both Colombia’s civilian 

28
themselves to the point that they do not feel they h

abuse human rights and deny civil liberties in ord

enforce Colombia’s laws and maintain public order.

If the United States and human rights activists w

see an end to the paramilitary death squads, we ne

accept that the only way these forces will be brought 

control is by adequately trained and equipped Colom

military and police units. Who else do we expect to d

job? Do we really believe this can be accomplished 

easily and quickly if the United States refuses to help 

Colombian government forces to respect human right

defend democracy against outlaw vigilante thugs?

It is a continuing tragedy that the United States re

so paralyzed by the ghost of Dan Mitrione (the U

public safety official who was kidnapped and tortur

Uruguay’s Tupamaro guerrillas in the early 1

portrayed in the film “State of Siege”) that, as a mat

legislation (section 660a of the Foreign Assistance A

continues to refuse to train foreign police forces for any

but narrow exceptions such as counternarcotics opera

How odd that a country like the United States, 

believes so strongly in civil law enforcement conducte

led by civilian officials, should be unwilling to train ci

police officials, answerable to civilian authority 

enforcing civil laws, in countries trying to democ

themselves.

And if the United States is serious about wanting to 

halt to the production of illegal narcotics in Colombi

place to begin is by helping Colombia’s democrat

elected government regain control of its nat

territory—whether from drug lords, bandit ar

paramilitary forces, or armed insurgents. It will not, r

not, be possible to constrict the production or traffick

narcotics so long as Colombia’s government cannot e

Colombia’s laws over the whole of its national territo

29
interest in the fate and future of its inhabitants. Colom

one of our neighbors. Its house is on fire; it has asked fo

needs and deserves our help. The right U.S. reaction 

to wash our hands and walk away (on grounds that 

not want to get involved in a Spanish-speaking Vietn

that Colombia’s human rights record is not spotless)—

roll up our sleeves and get to work to help.

ENDNOTES

1. William Branigin, “Colombians Fleeing Homeland

Washington Post, July 28, 1999, p. A14.

2. José Miguel Vivanco, cited in Serge Kovaleski, “Rights 

Colombia Full of Risks,” The Washington Post, August 2, 1999, 

3. U.S. Department of State, Press Briefing, March 2, 1998

4. Douglas Farah, “Colombian Army Fighting Legacy of Abus

Washington Post, February 18, 1999, p. A15.

5. Joshua Hammer and Michael Isikoff, “Colombi

Narco-Guerrilla War,” Newsweek, August 9, 1999, p. 42.

6. Enrique Comellas, “Pastrana Rejects U.S. Intervention t

Guerrillas,” Interview with President Andrés Pastrana in La 

(Buenos Aires),Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Latin Am

July 15, 1999. accessed via Internet.

30
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Ambassador David Passage

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler