The Honorable William A. Norris, Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting

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by designation.

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

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District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-4219

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Donald P. Kolbow, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Honeywell, Inc., sued as “Honeywell, *

Incorporated”, * [PUBLISHED]

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

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Submitted: June 13, 1997

Filed: August 28, 1997

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Before MURPHY, LAY and NORRIS, Circuit Judges. 1

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PER CURIAM:

Donald P. Kolbow appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

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favor of Honeywell, Inc., his former employer, in an age discrimination suit brought

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), and
The record reveals that Kolbow received excellent performance evaluations

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during much of his time at Honeywell. In addition, Kolbow is credited as an inventor

on seven patents procured for Honeywell between 1972 and 1993. 

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the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2). We

affirm.

Kolbow began working for Honeywell in 1955 and worked there until he was

laid off in January of 1993. He served as an engineering aide. In 1992, Honeywell’s 3

Vice President of Engineering for the Home and Building Controls division, Manfred

Ahle, decided to upgrade quickly the technological skill base of the engineering

employees. This was to be achieved largely by changing the skill mix of employees

toward more degreed engineers and engineers with advanced degrees, and through

training of retained employees. Pursuant to this direction, Kolbow’s supervisor, James

Krueger, completed an assessment in the fall of 1992 of the employees in his

department to identify training needs. Kolbow received lower scores than the degreed

engineers in all three of the categories used in the assessment. In December of 1992,

Krueger was told that layoffs would be part of the skills enhancement plan. Krueger

then used the assessment to recommend that Kolbow and two other employees from

his department be laid off. Dale Mueller, Krueger’s supervisor, approved the layoffs.

Pursuant to Honeywell’s plan to upgrade quickly the technological skills of its

engineering employees, approximately 50 employees were selected for layoff status,

and 47 were ultimately discharged. Kolbow’s deposition reflects that he thought he

was laid off because he could not be trained in a short time.

The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that Kolbow failed to

offer sufficient evidence that Honeywell’s proffered reasons for his discharge were

pretext for discrimination. The law governing evidentiary burdens in age discrimination
The same standards govern the MHRA claims. See Rothmeier v. Investment 4

Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1338 (8th Cir. 1996); Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc.,

483 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Minn. 1992).

 Honeywell urges this court that Kolbow did not present a prima facie case

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because the higher standard for a prima facie case in a reduction-in-force (RIF) case

should apply here. See Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1994).

The district court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Kolbow and

assumed at the summary judgment stage that this was not a RIF case.

 Kolbow includes an affidavit from Richard Porter, a degreed engineer with

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whom Kolbow had worked closely for many years. Porter’s affidavit praises Kolbow’s

performance at Honeywell and disagrees with some of Krueger’s evaluations of

Kolbow. 

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cases is now well established in this circuit. See Ryther v. Kare 11, 108 F.3d 832, 836-

38 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2510 (1997). 4

Honeywell stated that Kolbow was laid off pursuant to its plan to upgrade quickly

the technological skills of its engineering employees both because Kolbow did not have

an engineering degree and because of his lack of training and experience with computer

technology . Kolbow asserts that the real reason for his discharge was that his

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supervisors thought he was too old. He argues that Honeywell’s explanations were

pretextual. First, he argues that Honeywell’s response in this litigation is inconsistent

with its response given to the Minnesota Department of Human Rights. He also suggests

that Honeywell has inconsistently described the skill in which he was allegedly deficient.

Second, Kolbow argues that Krueger was not qualified to assess his skills because he

had been his supervisor for only three to four months, and that the assessment was

performed in a hurried manner. In addition, Kolbow objects to the fact that Krueger did

not consult his past performance evaluations as part of the assessment. Third, he

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submits that the decision to discharge him was made prior to Krueger’s assessment,

based on his inclusion on a “surplus” employee list made by Mueller in the fall of 1992.
 Kolbow’s argument that Honeywell’s response to his MHRA charge was

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inconsistent with its position in this litigation is not supported by the record.

Honeywell’s letter to the Department of Human Rights explains that Honeywell’s

Home & Building Control Engineering department, the department in which Kolbow

was employed, was in the midst of a reorganization to expand the technological skills

of its employees, and that Kolbow was laid off because his skills did not meet the

requirements for this plan. That Krueger’s evaluation was not specifically referenced

in the letter does not establish that his assessment was not used by Honeywell in

deciding to lay off Kolbow.

 Kolbow apparently agrees. At his deposition, Kolbow admitted that he did not 8

think Krueger had any animus against older workers.

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The district court held that these arguments did not present a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Kolbow was the victim of intentional age discrimination. We

agree. As the district court explained, Honeywell’s reasons for the discharge are

consistent: Kolbow’s supervisors decided that his skills were not sufficient for

Honeywell’s plan to upgrade quickly the technological skills of its engineering

employees.7 We find nothing in Kolbow’s objections to Krueger’s evaluation from

which a jury could conclude that Honeywell’s proffered rationale for his discharge was

evidence of pretext. Finally, the “surplus” list shows that Mueller did not think

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Kolbow’s skills were an asset to the department. This fact in no way suggests that the

reasons given for Kolbow’s discharge were pretextual.

We hold that Kolbow failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine

issue of material fact regarding the charge that Honeywell’s decision to discharge him

was motivated by intentional age discrimination. 

Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
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A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.