a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

February 2006 BORDER SECURITY

Key Unresolved Issues 

Justify Reevaluation of 

Border Surveillance 

Technology Program

GAO-06-295
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2006

BORDER SECURITY

Key Unresolved Issues Justify 

Reevaluation of Border Surveillance 

Technology Program 

Highlights of GAO-06-295, a report to the 

House and Senate Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, Committees on

Appropriations 

In September 2004, the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) 

established America’s Shield 

Initiative (ASI)—a program that

included a system of sensors, 

cameras, and databases formerly 

known as the Integrated 

Surveillance Intelligence System

(ISIS)—to detect, characterize, and 

deter illegal breaches to the

northern and southern U.S.

borders. The goals of the ASI 

program were to address ISIS 

capability limitations and support 

the department’s antiterrorism 

mission. In April 2005, department 

officials told GAO that ISIS was

subsumed within ASI. 

By congressional mandate, GAO 

reviewed the program to determine 

(1) the operational needs that ASI 

was intended to address and DHS’s

plans for ASI, (2) the steps that 

DHS had taken to ensure that ASI 

was aligned with the department’s 

enterprise architecture, and (3) the 

actions that DHS had taken to 

establish the capability to 

effectively manage ASI. 

In written comments, DHS agreed

with a draft of this report, stating 

that it was factually correct in 

virtually all aspects. DHS also 

commented that it has ceased work 

on ASI and redirected resources to 

its Secure Border Initiative. It also 

described program management

corrective actions that it plans to

implement. 

The ASI program defined the operational needs it expected ASI to meet, 

including addressing both known limitations in the ISIS and supporting 

counterterrorism efforts. The program also developed key planning 

documents for approval by the DHS Investment Review Board that were 

intended to meet these needs, including a program management plan, 

acquisition plan, and preliminary operational requirements document. 

However, these plans were not approved. 

The Review Board recently reviewed the ASI program and found, among 

other things, that it was aligned with the department’s enterprise 

architecture. However, the reviews also determined that the program had 

not adequately defined its relationships and dependencies with other 

department programs. Subsequently, the DHS Deputy Secretary directed that

the program be reevaluated within the department’s broader border and 

interior enforcement strategy, now referred to as the Secure Border 

Initiative. 

The ASI program had not established the people and process capabilities 

required for effective program management. As of August 2005, it had filled 

30 of its 47 program office positions, and it had defined roles and 

responsibilities for only 3 of them. In addition, while the program had 

defined and begun implementing a plan to manage program risks, it had not 

yet defined key acquisition management processes, such as effective project 

planning, and contract tracking and oversight. As a result, the program 

risked repeating the inadequate contract management oversight that led to a 

number of problems in deploying, and operating and maintaining ISIS 

technology. 

DHS’s decision to reevaluate ASI was justified by the existence of

unresolved key issues cited above (addressing its impact on other programs, 

and establishing people and process capabilities required for effective 

program management). These issues, if not addressed, would have 

introduced unnecessary risk. It is important that the department’s

reevaluation consider all such issues that could affect program success. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-295.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randolph C. 

Hite, (202) 512-3439, hiter@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-295 Border Security

Contents

Letter 1

Conclusions 3

Agency Comments 3

Appendixes

Appendix I: Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on Homeland Security, 

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations 5

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security 47

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 52

Abbreviations

ASI America’s Shield Initiative

CBP Customs and Border Protection

DHS Department of Homeland Security

EA Enterprise Architecture

EAB Enterprise Architecture Board

FTS Federal Technology Service

GSA General Services Administration

ICAD Intelligent Computer-Assisted Detection

IG Inspector General

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service

IRB Investment Review Board

ISIS Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System

PMO Program Management Office 

RVS Remote Video Surveillance

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Page 1 GAO-06-295 Border Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

February 22, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Judd Gregg

Chairman

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Harold Rogers

Chairman

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Homeland Security

Committee on Appropriations

The House of Representatives

In 1997, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deployed the 

Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS)—a system of sensors, 

cameras, and databases designed to prevent smugglers and illegal aliens 

from entering the United States along its northern and southern borders. 

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 INS was absorbed into the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the ISIS program was 

subsequently moved into the department’s Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) component. In September 2004, CBP established the America’s 

Shield Initiative (ASI) program. The goals of the program were to address 

ISIS capability limitations and support the department’s antiterrorism 

mission. In April 2005, DHS officials told us that ISIS was subsumed within 

ASI. In September 2005, we were told that the Deputy Secretary of 

Homeland Security directed that proposed plans for the program be 

reevaluated. 

The conference report for the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2005, directed us to review ISIS.2 Since ISIS was 

subsequently subsumed into ASI, we agreed to the following objectives: (1) 

determine the operational needs that ASI is intended to address and the 

1

Public Law 107-296 (November 2002).

2

H.R. Conf. Report 108-774 at 40 (2004).
Page 2 GAO-06-295 Border Security

department’s plans for ASI, (2) determine the steps that the department has 

taken to ensure that ASI is aligned with the department’s enterprise 

architecture, and (3) determine the actions that the department has taken 

to establish the capability to effectively manage ASI. 

On October 27, 2005, we briefed your staff on the results of our review. This 

report transmits these results. The full briefing, including our scope and 

methodology, is reprinted as appendix I. In summary, we made three major 

points:

• First, the program had defined ASI operational needs and developed 

planning documents for approval by DHS’s Investment Review Board. 

Operational needs included both addressing known limitations in ISIS 

capabilities and supporting CBP counterterrorism efforts through 

enhanced border surveillance capabilities. Planning documents 

included a program management plan, acquisition plan, and a 

preliminary operational requirements document. The review board did 

not approve these planning documents.

• Second, while DHS’s Investment Review Board found that the ASI 

program was aligned with the department’s enterprise architecture, it 

also found that the program had not adequately identified its 

dependencies and relationships with other department components. 

The board also determined that the program needed to be integrated 

into the department’s broader border and interior enforcement strategy. 

As a result, the Deputy Secretary directed that ASI be reevaluated within 

the context of this broader strategy, now called the Secure Border 

Initiative.

• Third, the program had not established key management capabilities 

(people and process controls). As of August 2005, it had filled 30 of 47 

program office positions and had defined roles and responsibilities for 

only 3 of the 47 positions. Further, the program had not defined key 

acquisition management processes, such as those for tracking and 

overseeing contractors and for developing and implementing project 

plans. Contract tracking and oversight is important because inadequate 

contract management oversight led to a number of problems in 

deploying, operating, and maintaining ISIS technology. Program officials 

told us they planned to develop key acquisition processes, however 

plans and timeframes for doing so had not been set. To its credit, the 

program office had defined and begun implementing a risk management 

process, which is one key acquisition process. 
Page 3 GAO-06-295 Border Security

Conclusions DHS’s decision to reevaluate the ASI program demonstrates that its 

investment review process is based on relevant considerations, such as 

dependencies with and impacts on related border security programs that 

the department’s enterprise architecture should explicitly define and the 

architecture alignment analysis should demonstrate. The limitations in the 

program office’s people and process capabilities are another issue 

supporting the department’s decision to reevaluate the program. 

Accordingly, the department’s decision to reevaluate the program was 

justified by the existence of unresolved key issues that, if not addressed, 

would have introduced unnecessary and unacceptable risk. It is thus 

important that this reevaluation include consideration of all issues that 

could affect program success. 

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director, 

Department GAO/OIG Liaison Office, DHS stated that it agreed with the 

overall thrust and that the report is factually correct in virtually all aspects. 

The department also stated that it had decided to cease work on ASI and 

that it has dismantled the ASI program office and a subset of its personnel 

has been assigned to the SBI program. Further, the department stated that 

in establishing SBI, it intends to implement corrective program 

management measures to address the problems that occurred on ISIS. The 

DHS comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chair and Ranking Minority 

Members of other Senate and House committees that have authorization 

and oversight responsibilities for homeland security. We are also sending a 

copy to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies of 

this report will also be available at no charge on our Web site at

www.gao.gov.
Page 4 GAO-06-295 Border Security

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Randolph C. Hite

Director, Information Technology Architecture

and Systems Issues
Page 5 GAO-06-295 Border Security

Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on Apendxies

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations ApendxiI

1

Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of

Border Surveillance Technology Program

Briefing to staffs of Subcommittees on Homeland Security, House and 

Senate Committees on Appropriations

October 27, 2005
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 6 GAO-06-295 Border Security

2

Briefing Overview

• Introduction

• Objectives

• Results in Brief 

• Background

• Observation 1: Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

• Observation 2: Enterprise Architecture Alignment Was Unclear

• Observation 3: Program Management Capability Was Lacking

• Conclusions

• Attachment 1: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 7 GAO-06-295 Border Security

3

Introduction

In 1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deployed the 

Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) to provide visibility and 

protection of the U.S. northern and southern borders. The goal of ISIS was to 

prevent the entry of smugglers, illegal aliens, contraband, and illegal narcotics into 

the country. 

In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 INS was absorbed 

into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). INS’s Border Patrol is now in 

DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) component. In September 2004, 

CBP established the America’s Shield Initiative (ASI) program. The goals of ASI 

were to address known ISIS capability limitations and to support DHS’s

antiterrorism mission, including its need to exchange information with state, local, 

and federal law enforcement organizations. In April 2005, DHS officials told us that 

ISIS was subsumed within ASI. By June 2004, the House Appropriations 

Committee had recommended that DHS use approximately $87 million of its CBP 

appropriations for ISIS and ASI in fiscal year 2005.2 In September 2005, we were 

told that the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security directed that ASI be 

reevaluated.

1 Public Law 107-296 (November 25, 2002).

2 H.R. Report 108-541 (2004).
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 8 GAO-06-295 Border Security

4

Objectives

The conference report for the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations 

Act, 2005,1 directed GAO to review DHS’s ISIS program.2 Since ISIS had 

subsequently been subsumed into ASI, we agreed to the following objectives:

1. determine the operational needs that ASI was intended to address and DHS’s 

plans for ASI,

2. determine the steps that DHS had taken to ensure that ASI was aligned with 

the DHS enterprise architecture, and 

3. determine the actions that DHS had taken to establish the capability to 

effectively manage ASI.

In September 2005, we were told that the DHS Deputy Secretary decided to 

reevaluate ASI in conjunction with development of its border and interior

enforcement strategy. This decision is reflected in the scope of our review and this 

briefing.

1 H.R. Conf. Report 108-774 (2004).

2 House Report 108-541.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 9 GAO-06-295 Border Security

5

Objectives

We performed our work at ASI offices in Washington, D.C., from April 2005 through 

September 2005, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. Details of our scope and methodology are described in attachment 1 of 

this briefing.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 10 GAO-06-295 Border Security

6

Results in Brief 

Consistent with its acquisition guidance, CBP defined the operational needs that it 

expects ASI to address in terms of both addressing known limitations in ISIS 

capabilities and supporting CBP counterterrorism efforts through enhanced border 

surveillance capabilities. During the last 6 months, CBP told us that it had been 

developing plans and documentation that DHS required for ASI to pass its next 

major acquisition milestone. CBP also told us that these plans and documentation 

would be made available to us after the program passed this milestone.

ASI was to be one of many DHS programs supporting its border and transportation

security mission, and thus it was critical that ASI be pursued within the context of a 

departmental enterprise architecture that defined the interrelationships and 

interdependencies among these border security programs and their supporting

systems environments. However, steps taken by DHS to ensure ASI’s alignment 

within this context raised questions that became more significant as the program 

moved beyond program initiation. Such questions were a critical factor in DHS’s 

recent decision to reevaluate ASI in conjunction with development of its border and 

interior enforcement strategy.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 11 GAO-06-295 Border Security

7

Results in Brief 

Further, CBP had yet to establish the kind of people- and process-related program 

management capabilities needed to effectively execute a program like ASI. For 

example, specific roles and responsibilities had not been defined for the program 

staff, beyond generic position descriptions. In addition, key acquisition processes, 

such as acquisition management and contractor tracking and oversight, had yet to 

be defined and implemented. Given CBP’s challenges in managing its ISIS 

contract, as reported by the General Services Administration’s Inspector General,1

the absence of such process controls was another key open issue at the time the 

decision was made to reevaluate the program.

1 General Services Administration, Compendium of Audits of the Federal Technology Service Regional Client Support Center (2004).
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 12 GAO-06-295 Border Security

8

Background

Within DHS, organizational responsibility for ISIS/ASI is within the Border Patrol, 

which is a component of CBP.

• The Border Patrol is responsible for preventing the entry of terrorists and their 

instruments of terror, illegal immigrants, and contraband, while facilitating the 

legitimate flow of people, goods, and services on which the economy depends.

• The Border Patrol is divided into 20 sectors: 17 of the sectors are along the 

northern and southern borders; the remaining 3 are along the coastal borders.

• During fiscal year 2005, CBP’s ASI Program Management Office (PMO) was 

responsible for the acquisition, deployment, and operations and maintenance of 

ISIS legacy technology, as well as ASI planning.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 13 GAO-06-295 Border Security

9

Background

Organizational Placement of ASI Program (partial DHS organization chart)
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 14 GAO-06-295 Border Security

10

Background

ISIS: A Brief Description

ISIS was initiated in 1997 to provide surveillance and protection of the U.S. 

northern and southern borders. The goal of ISIS was to help prevent the entry of 

smugglers, illegal aliens, contraband, and illegal narcotics into the country. During 

fiscal year 2005, ISIS deployment continued, and ISIS was subsumed into the ASI 

program.

System Components

ISIS is composed of three components: sensors, databases, and cameras:

• Ground sensors detect attempts by people or vehicles to illegally cross the U.S. 

borders.

• Several sensor technologies are used: radar (detect objects), motion, 

infrared (heat), seismic (vibration), and magnetic (metal). 

• As of August 2005, the Border Patrol reports that approximately 11,200 

sensors were deployed. As of October 2005, it reports that about 10,500

sensors were operational.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 15 GAO-06-295 Border Security

11

Background

• The Intelligent Computer-Assisted Detection (ICAD) databases record 

information from the sensors, document the results of investigations of border 

activities, and support analyses of border migration patterns.

• There is a separate ICAD database located in each sector at a Border Patrol 

control center, where officials monitor the ICAD information. 

• Each of the Border Patrol’s 20 sectors has at least one control center. 

According to ASI officials, the ICAD databases at the centers are not 

integrated, and therefore, information cannot be effectively and efficiently

shared between sectors.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 16 GAO-06-295 Border Security

12

Background

• Remote Video Surveillance (RVS) cameras are used to capture information on 

the number and description of individuals and vehicles attempting illegal entry. 

• The cameras are remotely manipulated; current capabilities do not enable 

cameras to focus automatically in response to sensor alarms. As of 

September 2005, the Border Patrol reports that 255 RVS camera sites are 

operational, with 2 to 4 cameras per site. 

• RVS images are communicated to the control centers by microwave, fiber

optic, or terrestrial cable.

• RVS cameras are mounted either on 60—to 80—foot poles or on mounting 

structures (e.g., buildings). Some mounting sites also have communications 

relays.

According to ASI officials, as of August 2005, ISIS technology covered about 4 

percent of the combined northern and southern borders. 
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 17 GAO-06-295 Border Security

13

Background

Overview of ISIS Role in Border Surveillance, Dispatch, and Reporting Process

When ISIS sensors detect movement (people or vehicles) crossing the border, 

alarms are triggered and transmitted to the ICAD database in the control center. 

Border Patrol officials are then to direct the RVS cameras at the alarm sites to 

assess the images shown on the ICAD monitor. 

Using the images, the Border Patrol officials are to provide information on the 

number of individuals and vehicles and the location of the incident to Border Patrol 

agents, who are dispatched to the site. The event is recorded in ICAD as a “ticket” 

for tracking purposes. 

The agents are to report back on the resolution of the ticket, including whether an 

apprehension took place. This information is then to be recorded in the ICAD 

database. ICAD information from each sector is to be transmitted to Border Patrol 

headquarters, where it is to be summarized and reported. The information is also to 

be analyzed to ascertain migration patterns in each sector. 
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 18 GAO-06-295 Border Security

14

Background

Simplified Diagram of ISIS Role in Border Process
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 19 GAO-06-295 Border Security

15

Background

ISIS Contracting Issues

In 1999, INS entered into an agreement with the General Services Administration’s 

(GSA) Federal Technology Service (FTS)1 to manage the acquisition and 

deployment of the RVS program, a major component of ISIS. In December 2004, 

GSA’s Inspector General (IG) found numerous problems with GSA’s administration 

of the RVS contract, including inadequate contractor oversight, insufficient 

competition, and improper contracting actions.2 More specifically, the GSA’s IG 

identified the following problems.

Inadequate contractor oversight:

• Of 30 task orders reviewed, 18 included construction or other work that was 

outside the scope of the contract.

• Costs of over $6 million were incurred for operations and maintenance when 

little or no work was actually performed.

1 FTS, among other things, assists federal agencies in acquiring, deploying, and managing information technology.

2 General Services Administration, Compendium of Audits of the Federal Technology Service Regional Client Support Center (Dec. 14, 2004).
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 20 GAO-06-295 Border Security

16

Background

Insufficient competition:

• Task orders were placed without benefit of competition.

• Documentation was inadequate for the original solicitation, evaluation, and 

selection.

• Costs were not reviewed for reasonableness.

Improper contracting actions:

• Modifications were made to contracts without adequate justification.

In June 2005, the GSA Deputy IG testified that many of the problems identified with 

the RVS contract were attributable, in part, to GSA’s and the Border Patrol’s 

chronic inattention to contract administration and project management.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 21 GAO-06-295 Border Security

17

Background

ASI: A Brief Description

ASI was intended to detect, characterize, and deter illegal breaches of the border, 

while providing necessary decision support information to assist Border Patrol 

agents.

According to the ASI Preliminary Operational Requirements document, ASI’s goals 

were to

• maintain legacy systems operations,

• provide surveillance of the entire land border between ports of entry,

• integrate surveillance capabilities with agent operations,

• provide decision support capabilities,

• support rapid and flexible deployment of surveillance assets,

• provide reliable, all-environment, 24-hour surveillance capability,
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 22 GAO-06-295 Border Security

18

Background

• improve collaboration and interoperability with mission partners and state, local, 

tribal, and federal enforcement officials,

• use state-of-the-market technology to create a cost-effective system, and

• provide open architecture solutions.

ISIS/ASI Costs

According to the ASI program manager, the budgeted amount for ISIS and ASI 

related efforts for fiscal years 1997 through 2005 was $452.4 million. As of 

September 2005, ASI officials report expended funds of $340.3 million1 for

• acquisition and deployment of ISIS equipment (RVS cameras, ICAD database, 

sensors, and agent support equipment),

• operations and maintenance of ISIS equipment, and

• planning for ASI.

1 ASI officials stated that about $51.6 million of the fiscal year 2005 appropriated funds was still available.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 23 GAO-06-295 Border Security

19

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

Observation 1: ASI operational needs were defined, and plans were being 

developed to justify ASI alternative solutions.

Effectively managing an acquisition generally includes, among other things, 

identifying a business need/opportunity or a missing capability required to satisfy 

an agency mission. Once a need or capability is identified and defined, effective 

planning is important to ensure that the need is adequately addressed and the 

project is effectively managed. This generally includes the development of plans 

and related documentation that, among other things, describe commitments to be 

met (e.g., cost, schedule, capabilities, and benefits) and how resources will be 

applied to meet them. These plans also serve as the basis for monitoring progress 

and taking corrective actions, as appropriate.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 24 GAO-06-295 Border Security

20

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

CBP’s acquisition guidance requires that mission needs be defined. CBP met this 

requirement in developing the ASI Mission Needs Statement, dated September 8, 

2004, which states that ASI is to support the Border Patrol’s operational functions, 

including its expanded mission of detecting and preventing the entry of terrorists 

and their associated means of terrorism, and to address the shortfalls of ISIS.

According to DHS documents, the Border Patrol’s operational functions are as 

follows:

1. Detect, prevent, and characterize illegal border breaches.

2. Respond to and apprehend individuals, groups, and items of interest.

3. Process individuals in custody and items as accurately, efficiently, and 

effectively as possible.

4. Transport individuals in custody and items of interest.

5. Deploy agents using effective decision support and rapid response systems.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 25 GAO-06-295 Border Security

21

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

6. Assess threats and determine likely illegal border crossing scenarios, methods, 

and locations.

7. Deter illegal entrance of individuals and items of interest.

8. Maintain continuity of operations.

9. Collaborate internally and with external organizations (international, federal, 

state, local, and tribal).
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 26 GAO-06-295 Border Security

22

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

The Mission Needs Statement also identified the following ISIS shortfalls that ASI 

was to address:

1. limited border coverage,

2. difficult and expensive maintenance,

3. inability to provide an all-weather, all-environment 24-hour capability,

4. inadequate mobile capability,

5. limited command, control, and situational awareness to ensure that all mission 

partners have access to required information,

6. lack of integration among system components (RVS cameras, sensors, and 

ICAD), and

7. lack of automated interoperability with other law enforcement entities.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 27 GAO-06-295 Border Security

23

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

DHS identified ASI’s key capabilities and mapped them to the Border Patrol’s 

operational functions. As can be seen in the following table, each of the capabilities 

maps to one or more of the operational functions.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 28 GAO-06-295 Border Security

24

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

Comparison of ASI’s Capabilities and Border Patrol’s Operational Functions

Border Patrol operational functions

ASI key capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

Expand the border area covered X X X X X X X 

Monitor the border with technologies for detecting breaches X X X X X X X

Characterize items of interest X X X X X X X

Provide notification for events X X X X X

Provide vectoring information X X X

Assist agents in event response X X X X X X

Support command and control and decision making X X X X X X X 

Enable agents to receive and send information in the field XXXXXXXXX

Provide interoperability with other agencies X X X X X X X X 

Report operational status and location of agents and assets X X X X X

Key to operational functions:

1. Detect, prevent, and characterize illegal border breaches.

2. Respond to and apprehend individuals, groups, and items of interest.

3. Process individuals in custody and items as accurately, efficiently, and effectively as possible.

4 Transport individuals in custody and items of interest.

5. Deploy agents using effective decision support systems and solutions facilitating rapid response.

6. Assess threats and determine likely illegal border crossing scenarios, methods, and locations.

7. Deter illegal entrance of individuals and items of interest.

8. Maintain continuity of operations.

9. Collaborate internally and with external organizations (international, federal, state, local, and tribal).

Source: DHS. 
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 29 GAO-06-295 Border Security

25

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

We compared the ASI planned capabilities to the ISIS shortfalls and found, as 

shown on the following slide, that the capabilities address all but one of the 

shortfalls. The capabilities do not explicitly address the ISIS shortfall pertaining to 

the difficulty and expense of maintaining ISIS. According to ASI officials, they plan 

to modify the ASI requirements document to address this omission.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 30 GAO-06-295 Border Security

26

Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

Comparison of ASI Capabilities and ISIS Shortfalls

 ISIS shortfalls

ASI key capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Expand the border area covered X X X

Monitor the border with technologies for detecting breaches X X X

Characterize items of interest X X

Provide notification for events X X X

Provide vectoring information X X X

Assist agents in event response X X X X X X

Support command and control and decision making X X X X X

Enable agents to receive and send information in the field X

Provide interoperability with other agencies X X

Report operational status and location of agents and assets X X

Key to ISIS shortfalls:

1. Limited border coverage.

2. Difficult and expensive maintenance.

3. Inability to provide an all-weather, all-environment 24-hour capability.

4 Inadequate mobile capability.

5. Limited command, control, and situational awareness that ensures that all mission partners have access

to required information.

6. Lack of integration among system components (RVS cameras, sensors, and ICAD).

7. Lack of automated interoperability with other law enforcement entities.

Source: GAO based on DHS data.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

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Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

ASI officials told us that, during the last 6 months, they were developing key 

planning documents for approval by the DHS Investment Review Board (IRB). 

Among others, these documents include the following:

• program management plan—documents the activities, tasks, and 

responsibilities for the program;

• acquisition plan—documents the technical, business, and management 

approach for acquiring the system;

• test and evaluation plan—documents the approach for verifying that the system 

meets the user’s needs and system specifications;

• risk management plan—documents formal processes for identifying, classifying, 

assessing, and mitigating risks; and 

• preliminary operational requirements document—describes the mission, 

capabilities, and operating condition that competing solutions must satisfy.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

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Observation 1

Needs Were Defined and Plans Were Developed

ASI program officials told us that their plans and related documentation would be 

made available to us after the program passed its next milestone. According to 

DHS officials, a milestone review for evaluating and selecting a system solution 

was held before the DHS Investment Review Board in June 2005; however, the 

board did not approve milestone passage, and thus we did not receive these plans 

and documents. In September 2005, the DHS Director of Program Analysis and 

Evaluation told us that the DHS Deputy Secretary directed that the ASI program be 

reevaluated. According to the Director, an investment decision memorandum 

directing and explaining the basis for this reevaluation has been drafted, but has 

yet to be approved. Further, he said that a plan for carrying out the reevaluation is 

being developed.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 33 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 2

Enterprise Architecture Alignment Was Unclear

Observation 2: Steps taken to ensure ASI’s alignment with DHS’s enterprise 

architecture raised questions that became more pressing as ASI moved beyond 

program initiation.

To effectively define, establish, and implement a program, it is essential that the 

program be aligned with a corporate blueprint, or enterprisewide frame of 

reference, that governs key aspects of the program’s operations. Such a frame of 

reference is referred to as an enterprise architecture (EA). An EA is an authoritative 

description of an entity’s operations, including how operations are performed, what 

information and technology are used to perform these operations, where the 

operations are performed, who performs them, and when and why they are 

performed. The architecture describes the entity in both logical terms (e.g., the 

business functions and information flows) and technical terms (e.g., hardware, 

software, communications, and security standards). Accordingly, an EA can help to 

clarify and optimize the interdependencies and relationships among an 

organization’s business operations and the underlying IT infrastructure and 

applications that support these operations. 
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

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Observation 2

Enterprise Architecture Alignment Was Unclear

As a program like ASI progresses through its life cycle, ensuring that it is explicitly 

aligned with an EA, and thus with other programs with which it must interact, 

becomes more demanding. Since its introduction in 2004, ASI’s relationship to 

other programs has continued to be an open issue.

• In August 2004, the DHS Enterprise Architecture Board (EAB)1 found that the 

ASI program was aligned with the DHS enterprise architecture. In August 2004, 

the Joint Requirements Council2 review found that it was likely that ASI would 

impact other programs, such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office 

of Detention and Removal,3 and that this impact should be considered in 

reviewing ASI. 

1 DHS’s Enterprise Architecture Board reviews programs for alignment with the DHS enterprise architecture.

2 The Joint Requirements Council supports DHS’s IRB process by identifying cross-cutting opportunities and common requirements among DHS organizational elements.

3 The Office of Detention and Removal is responsible for removing unauthorized aliens from the United States.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 35 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 2

Enterprise Architecture Alignment Was Unclear

• As a result, the IRB, in a memo dated October 5, 2004, approved the 

authorization of the ASI program, but noted several issues that the program was 

to address before passing the next milestone. For example, the program was to 

address its impact on other DHS components, such as US-VISIT1 and the 

Office of Detention and Removal.

• In July 2005, the DHS EAB again found that the ASI program was aligned with 

the DHS enterprise architecture and recommended program alignment approval 

for the alternative solution milestone. However, during its review, the EAB 

raised several issues about the ASI program, including whether the program 

had adequately identified other DHS components with which it may need to 

share information. ASI agreed with the EAB’s issues and planned to address 

them. As a result, the EAB stated that it considered the issues to be resolved.

1 The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) is a governmentwide program intended to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and visitors, facilitate

legitimate travel and trade, ensure the integrity of the U.S. immigration system, and protect the privacy of our visitors.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 36 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 2

Enterprise Architecture Alignment Was Unclear

• On September 8, 2005, the DHS’s Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation,

whose organization supports the DHS IRB, stated that the board found that ASI, 

as currently defined, did not adequately identify its dependencies and 

relationships within CBP and with other DHS components, such as the Office of 

Detention and Removal. Further, the Director stated that the board determined 

that CBP needs to integrate ASI into the department’s border and interior

enforcement strategy, and the broader departmental structure. The Director 

stated that as a result the DHS Deputy Secretary, who chairs the IRB, directed 

that ASI be reevaluated within the context of this broader border and interior 

enforcement strategy. As mentioned earlier, an investment decision 

memorandum directing the reevaluation has been drafted but has not yet been 

approved, and a plan for executing the reevaluation is being developed.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

Observation 3: ASI program management capability (people and processes) had 

not yet been established.

Our prior work and relevant guidance and leading practices show that for program 

acquisitions like ASI to be successful they need to, among other things, have 

(1) adequate staff to fill positions that have clearly defined roles and responsibilities

and (2) well-defined and implemented acquisition management processes.1

The ASI program office was established in September 2004. See next slide for the 

ASI program office structure.

1 GAO, Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to be Addressed, GAO-03-1083 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 38 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

ASI Program Office Structure
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 39 GAO-06-295 Border Security

35

Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

People

DHS had not fully staffed the ASI program office.

• According to the ASI Program Manager, the office’s staffing needs 

totaled 47 full-time positions (29 government and 18 contractor 

personnel).

• As of August, ASI had filled 30 of the 47 positions (see table).

Personnel Positions needed Positions staffed Positions not staffed

Government 29 15 14

Contractor 18 15 3

Total 47 30 17

Source: GAO based on ASI PMO data.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

ASI has defined roles and responsibilities for only 3 of the 47 staff positions. The 

roles and responsibilities for the program manager and deputy program managers 

are as follows: 

• ASI Program Manager—Responsibilities are to (1) manage the ASI program 

and serve as its sole spokesperson, (2) secure and approve funding, (3) obtain 

resources, (4) lead the program team, (5) provide strategic direction and 

decisions, (6) ensure that project and program plans are consistent, (7) ensure 

that solutions are defined and accepted, (8) manage and support contract 

management efforts, (9) review and approve program/project plans, 

(10) provide input on technical and cost proposals, and (11) participate in cost 

proposal negotiations with contractors.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

• Deputy Program Manager for Technology Management—Responsibilities are to 

(1) prepare documentation required to complete milestone for alternatives 

analysis (e.g., operational requirements document, analysis of alternatives), 

(2) develop program master schedule, and (3) oversee contract evaluation and 

source selection.

• Deputy Program Manager for Acquisition Management—Responsibilities are to 

(1) develop the acquisition plan, (2) develop source selection procedures in 

coordination with Program Management and Technology Management, and 

(3) oversee contract award and administration.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 42 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

The PMO had yet to clearly define roles and responsibilities for its other 44 staff 

positions. Specifically, the PMO provided us with six position descriptions, but none 

of these addressed specific ASI roles and responsibilities. For example, one 

position description (for a telecommunications manager) is a generic description 

designed to cover any such position within DHS. Also, a position description for a 

border patrol agent described the position as a staff advisor to the Chief, Border 

Patrol, and his or her assistants. 
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 43 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking

Processes

A suite of key acquisition process areas are necessary to effectively manage a 

system acquisition program.1 These process areas include, among others, 

acquisition planning, project management, requirements management, contract 

tracking and oversight, and risk management.

The PMO had not defined and implemented these key acquisition management 

processes. For example, a key practice in project management is developing and 

implementing a project plan. However, the program manager told us that ongoing 

ISIS acquisition and deployment activities, which were subsumed into ASI, were 

not being guided by a project plan. 

According to the Deputy Program Manager for Acquisition Management, the PMO 

planned to develop key acquisition processes, including processes for managing 

contractors, but time frames for doing so had not been set. As previously noted, 

inadequate contract management oversight processes led to a number of problems 

in deploying, operating, and maintaining ISIS technology.

1 Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model ® , version 1.03 (March 2002).
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 44 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Observation 3

Program Management Capability Was Lacking 

To the PMO’s credit, it had defined and begun implementing a risk management 

process.

• The ASI program office developed a draft risk management plan, dated May 10, 

2005. The plan addressed, among other things, a governance structure and 

process for identifying, analyzing, mitigating, tracking, and controlling risks. The 

governance structure included a risk owner, management team, and risk

database coordinator. As part of its process, ASI had also developed a risk 

database that included a description of each risk, its priority and severity, the 

individual responsible for mitigating the risk, and a strategy for mitigating the 

risk.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 45 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Conclusions

DHS’s decision to reevaluate the ASI program demonstrates that its investment 

review process is based on relevant considerations, such as dependencies with 

and impacts on related border security programs that the DHS enterprise 

architecture should explicitly define and the architecture alignment analysis should 

demonstrate. The limitations in the program office’s people and process capabilities 

are another issue supporting the department’s decision to reevaluate the program. 

Accordingly, DHS’s decision to reevaluate the program was justified by the 

existence of unresolved key issues that, if not addressed, would have introduced 

unnecessary and unacceptable risk. It is thus important that DHS’s reevaluation 

include consideration of all issues that could affect program success.
Appendix I

Briefing to Staffs of Subcommittees on 

Homeland Security, House and Senate 

Committees on Appropriations

Page 46 GAO-06-295 Border Security

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Attachment 1 

Scope and Methodology

To accomplish our objectives, we performed the following tasks:

• analyzed supporting documentation, including ASI’s mission needs statement;

interviewed program officials to identify the operational needs and DHS’s plans 

for ASI; and performed a comparative analysis of the plans and best practices; 

• analyzed supporting documentation and interviewed DHS and program officials 

to assess DHS’s actions to determine ASI’s alignment with the department’s 

enterprise architecture;

• assessed DHS’s plans and ongoing efforts to establish and implement the ASI 

program, including roles and responsibilities and such key management 

processes as risk, requirements, and acquisition management; and

• analyzed ASI’s risk management plan and interviewed program and contractor 

officials to determine ASI’s risk management process.

We performed our audit work from April to September 2005, in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 47 GAO-06-295 Border Security

Appendix II

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

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Appendix II

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

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Appendix II

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

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Appendix II

Comments from the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

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Page 52 GAO-06-295 Border Security

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Randolph C. HIte (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Deborah A. Davis, Assistant 

Director; Barbara S. Collier; Neil J. Doherty; Sairah R. Ijaz; B. Scott Pettis; 

Amos A. Tevelow; and Daniel K. Wexler made key contributions to this 

report.

(310611)
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