IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1984

Filed April 15, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF L.T. and L.T.,

Minor Children,

T.B., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb, District 

Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. 

AFFIRMED.

Bryan J. Tingle, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Kayla Stratton of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and 

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by May, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Mahan, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2020).
2

MAHAN, Senior Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children, born 

in 2013 and 2016.1 She contends (1) the State failed to prove the grounds for 

termination cited by the juvenile court; (2) termination was not in the children’s best 

interests; and (3) the children’s placement with the father should have precluded 

termination of her parental rights. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

This family most recently came to the attention of the department of human 

services in January 2018, upon reports of physical abuse of the children by the 

mother. The mother was intoxicated and caring for L.T., L.T., and J.T.2 while the 

father was at work when she started to “go crazy” and yell at the children. The 

mother shoved, kicked, and punched J.T., and she held J.T. down in bath water 

by his neck. J.T. had bruises and marks from the incident. There were 

unexplained marks on L.T. and L.T. as well. The father came home from work, 

called the police, and the mother was arrested. A child abuse assessment resulted 

in founded reports for physical abuse and failure to provide proper supervision. A 

no-contact order was entered prohibiting the mother from having contact with the 

children. A no-contact order that had already been in place for J.T. was extended.

 

1 The parental rights of children’s father were not terminated. The children were 

placed in a guardianship with the father. The parents were previously married. 

They are now divorced but continue to be in a relationship.

2 The mother was involved with the department beginning in 2009, due to mentalhealth concerns, violence toward the father, and adoption scams (“pretending to 

be pregnant to prospective adoptive parents”). In 2012, the mother’s parental 

rights were terminated to J.T., born in 2008, while she was in prison on charges 

for filing a false report and perjury. 
3

The mother reported she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, 

borderline personality disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. The mother stated that she discontinues her mentalhealth medication when she feels it is unnecessary, and that she self-medicates 

with alcohol when she goes off her medication. The mother admitted to “binge

drinking” when “things are wrong.” The father acknowledged the mother was not 

taking her medication and had been “getting unstable.”

The children were adjudicated in need of assistance. The no-contact order 

with regard to L.T. and L.T. was subsequently modified to allow the mother to have 

supervised contact with them at the department’s discretion. The mother began 

supervised visits with L.T. and L.T. in May when she was released on pretrial 

supervision. In July, the mother pled guilty to a charge of child endangerment 

stemming from the incident in January. Within a few months, in August 2018, the 

mother attempted suicide by overdosing on her medication, and she was 

hospitalized for several weeks. Upon her release from the hospital, the mother 

turned herself in on an outstanding warrant.3 Since then, the mother has had daily 

phone contact with L.T. and L.T.

The State filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights in 

December 2018. The termination hearing took place over two days in April and 

May 2019. The mother was incarcerated at the Iowa Correctional Institute for 

Women in Mitchellville, with a possible release date in July or August 2019. The 

 

3 The mother was charged with operating while intoxicated and two counts of false 

reporting. Upon her arrest, she was admitted to the hospital due to her high level 

of intoxication. 
4

mother testified her plan was to “parole to the House of Mercy,” where “they have 

a bed ready.” The mother had recently been cleared for in-person visits with the 

children at the prison, but no visits had taken place yet.4 She received medication 

management and felt her new medication was “working amazing.” She was 

engaging in individual therapy and had participated in several therapeutic 

programs in prison, which “teach[] you how to deal with your emotions, you know, 

your impulses” and “teach[] you to think before you act, what are your values.” She 

also took an alcohol-related class. The mother received work-related training, was 

certified to operate a forklift, and was to receive assistance in finding employment 

upon her release from prison. 

The mother requested additional time for reunification. She believed the 

children could spend time with her at House of Mercy “[t]hree months down the 

line, a couple months” after she established herself there. The mother 

acknowledged she “can’t go home right now” but stated she and the father had 

been together “for 18 years” and she believed the no-contact order on J.T. could 

be modified to allow her to live in the family home again. The father testified that 

he would allow the mother to see the children “if I think she is safe,” but he 

questioned her ability “to stay sober.” The department and guardian ad litem 

recommended termination of the mother’s parental rights. 

 

4 The department caseworker testified she had submitted the visitation form to 

family safety, risk, and permanency services and had asked the father to make an 

appointment for the older L.T. to see a victim-advocacy therapist, which were 

prerequisites to establishing visitation at the prison due to the mother’s childendangerment charge and the no-contact order in place between the mother and 

the children. 
5

Following the termination hearing, the court entered its order terminating 

the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d), (f), (g), 

and (h) (2018). The mother appeals. 

II. Standard of Review

Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo. 

In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019). Our primary consideration is the

best interests of the children, In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006), the

defining elements of which are the children’s safety and need for a permanent

home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

III. Discussion

The mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

grounds for termination cited by the juvenile court. We may affirm if we find clear 

and convincing evidence to support any of the statutory provisions. See In re A.B., 

815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We will focus on Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(d), which requires the State to show:

(1) The court has previously adjudicated the child to be a child 

in need of assistance after finding the child to have been physically 

or sexually abused or neglected as the result of the acts or omissions 

of one or both parents . . . .

(2) Subsequent to the child in need of assistance adjudication, 

the parents were offered or received services to correct the 

circumstance which led to the adjudication, and the circumstance 

continues to exist despite the offer or receipt of services.

With regard to this subsection, the mother contends, “Contrary to the 

Court’s findings [she] was in fact taking advantage of the services offered to her, 

although limited, to correct the circumstances which led to the adjudication and as 

such the State failed to prove this element 2.” Her argument focuses on her claim 
6

that she “took advantage of every service available” to her but the services were 

inadequate to allow her to demonstrate her parenting skills and “continue working 

on her areas of need.”

In order to determine what circumstances led to the adjudication and 

required correction, we look to the adjudication order. The juvenile court made 

findings of fact, including:

2. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the 

allegations of the petition(s) filed January 25, 2018 and the children 

are adjudicated in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code 

section(s) 232.2(6)(b) and (6)(c)(2) and the aid of the Court is 

required.

3. The Court makes the following specific findings of fact: 

there is a founded [child protective services assessment] against the

mother for physical abuse and denial of critical care regarding the 

children; counsel for mother takes no position as the children’s 

mother has decided not attend/be transported; mother remains in 

custody due to the criminal charges.

We have examined the child protective services assessment identified in 

the findings of fact. The report was founded as to both children for physical abuse 

and failure to provide proper supervision.5 The report stated:

[The mother] has mental health issues that are not adequately being 

addressed. She is using alcohol in place of medication. She was 

under the influence of alcohol as a sole caretaker and became 

physically aggressive with the children. All three child[ren] sustained 

injuries from [the mother]. [The mother] denied being able to recall 

what transpired with her children and how they sustained injuries. 

Following this incident, the mother was arrested and jailed on charges of 

child endangerment. As the mother acknowledges, she spent these proceedings 

in and out of jail and she was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. 

However, contrary to the mother’s assertion, she was offered many services to 

 

5 The report was also founded on these bases as to J.T.
7

correct the circumstances which led to the children’s adjudication, including, but 

not limited to, a psychological evaluation, therapy, mental-health treatment, 

medication management, an alcohol-related class, and supervised visitation. 

Despite those services, the circumstances which led to adjudication 

continued to exist at the time of termination. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d)(2). 

The mother’s therapist opined that, given her considerable mental-health needs, 

the mother should be closely monitored for an extended time prior to any possible 

reunification due to safety concerns for the children. The department caseworker 

opined that during the time since removal, the mother “has had minimal time of 

stability to where she showed that she was able to parent her children and to 

maintain a stable lifestyle,” and “[i]t is not fair for these children to continue to have 

to wait for their mother to get herself into a position where she would be able to 

parent them on a consistent basis.” We agree. Cf. In re T.C., No. 13-1023, 2013 

WL 4774049, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (“T.C. was adjudicated [child in 

need of assistance] due to drug abuse and violence by his parents. The father has 

made no progress to correct this situation. Termination under Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(d) is supported by clear and convincing evidence.”).

The juvenile court further observed, “The mother fails to understand the 

connection between her behaviors, her history, and her mental health. It is clear 

that, even with the appropriate, intensive therapy, she would not be safe to parent 

her children in six months.” Cf. In re T.C., 489 N.W.2d 53, 55–56 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1992) (noting a parent’s failure to admit and address her psychological and

substance-abuse problems constitutes a failure to cooperate in correcting the
8

circumstances that led to the adjudication). We concur in the court’s finding that 

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(d) was satisfied.

We turn to the children’s best interests. The mother contends termination 

of her parental rights is not in the best interests of the children because “[t]he 

children obviously know who [she] is, she apparently will be allowed to remain a 

part of the children’s lives by the father and by legally terminating her parental 

rights, this will only serve to confuse and possibly continually traumatize the 

children as they grow up.” Indeed, the father testified he would allow the mother 

to be around the children “if she is safe and sober,” but he also stated “[i]t depends 

on her mental state” and he “wouldn’t break any no-contact orders.” The parents 

have a lengthy history, and the juvenile court was aware the father had allowed 

the mother to be around J.T., to whom her parental rights had been terminated. 

When asked if the court should decline to terminate the mother’s parental rights 

and allow the department to stay involved with the family, the department 

caseworker responded:

No. . . . Because there’s a no-contact order. So DHS is not going to 

stay involved for the next four to five years to be able to monitor 

whether or not [the mother] and [the father]—if they’re able to do this.

I think that at some point in time these children deserve to have 

normal lives without DHS coming to see them, without [family safety, 

risk, and permanency workers] coming to see them. They have a

right to be able to be kids, and at some point in time [the father] is 

going to have to be able to protect them. And so, you know, if we 

were to terminate and she were to be allowed to come back into the 

house by [the father], it would then be on [the father]. And I think that 

having that responsibility, [the father] would be more likely to be a 

little more protective instead of knowing that if she were to come in, 

if this were to happen again, [the mother] would leave the home and 

we would go through all of this again.
9

The mother also contends termination of her parental rights will position the 

father as the children’s “sole provider” and “effectively cut off an avenue of financial 

support for the children as [she] is entitled to federal Social Security benefits due 

to disabilities.” But the mother testified that she believed “getting disability . . . led 

to my depression, which led to my drinking, which led to my downfall . . . because 

I didn’t have a life outside of my house.” The mother expressed her desire “to get 

out there and work.” We commend the mother’s goals and progress to being selfsufficient, and we cannot conclude financial interests preclude termination of 

parental rights. Stability and permanency are in the children’s best interests. 

Having given “primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best 

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and 

to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren],” Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2), we conclude termination is in the children’s best interests. 

The mother also argues that the court should have applied an exception to 

prevent termination because “the father maintained care and custody of the 

children throughout the proceedings.” See id. § 232.116(3)(a) (providing that the 

juvenile court need not terminate parental rights if “[a] relative has legal custody of 

the child[ren]”). The exceptions to termination of parental rights found under 

section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 45 

(Iowa 2018). “An appropriate determination to terminate a parent-child relationship 

is not to be countermanded by the ability and willingness of a family relative to take 

the child[ren].” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1997). The court considered 

the fact that the children were placed in the sole custody of the father but found it 

did not preclude termination “given the older children’s continued fears, and [the 
10

mother’s] continued lack of control of her behavior.” We concur in the court’s 

finding. We conclude termination is in the children’s best interests, and no 

permissive statutory exception should be applied to preclude termination. We 

affirm the decision of the juvenile court to terminate the mother’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.