1

Filed 6/26/15 In re L .L. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re L. L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C075958

SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R. L. , Defendant and Appellant ; A. S., Defendant and Respondent. (Super. Ct. No. JD233732 )

R. L., mother of the minor L. L. , appeals from the juvenile court ’ s jurisdictional and dispositional orders finding the minor a dependent of the court, removing him from

m other ’ s custody, awarding sole legal and physical custody to father, A. S., with2

visitation for mother, and terminatin g the dependency. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § § 300, 361.2, subd. (b)(1), 395

. )
Mother contends : ( 1) the disposition order removing the minor from her care is not supported by substantial evidence of danger to the minor; ( 2) the placement order is not supported by substantial evidence and lacks the necessary findings; ( 3) the visitation
order is not in the minor ’ s best interests; and ( 4) the juvenile court erred in failing to
ensure that the exit order was enforceable. We aff irm and direct the juvenile court to file the exit order with the family law division in Sacramento County Superior Court

. BACKGROUND On September 2, 2013, the five

- year

- old minor (born October 2007) and his two

month

- old half sibling N. L

. (born July 2013) were placed in protective custody after mother was admitted to the hospital for a mental health assessment and no one was
available to take care of them. Two days later , the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services ( depa rtment ) filed a dependency petition for the minor alleging jurisdiction based on mother ’ s current and prior mental health problems. The September 2013 detention report related that mother ’ s home was unkempt with soiled diapers, garbage, bags, and clothing strewn about and thre e

- foot

- high piles of clothing in the playroom/ laundry room area

. The children’s toys were pushed against the

w alls with other bags and boxes. N. L. ’s bassinet held folded laundry. The kitchen was disorganized and there did not ap pear to be any formula for N. L. The refrigerator h eld uncovered food and a significant amount of alcohol, which mother said belonged to her

roommate. Mother told the social worker she had gone to the emergency room to be asse ssed for postpartum depression. N. L. ’s father J. B. was supposed to meet her and pick up the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the W elfare and Institutions Code.3

c hildren but he never showed up. Mother felt she had no other option except to take the
chi ldren to the hospital with her. The children were placed in protective custody by the
po lice because there was no one to take care of them. At the emergency room, mother met with a psychiatrist, who advised her that her

men tal health issues required long

- term care to control. She confirmed a previous diagnos is of depression, panic disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. She was on Paxil for a significant time but stopped taking it after she felt better. In the past, she had been prescribed Wellbutrin and Xanax for depression and anxiety but r efused to continue taking them. S he admitted a depressive episode in January 2012 that led to her being admitted to the emergency room for suicidal ideation and to a Child Protective Services investigation after the minor was placed with the maternal grandmother (grandmother)

. Mother adm itted not complying with recommended mental health services.
N. L. was born at about 36 and a half weeks gestation

. When he was disch arged from the hospital on July 27, 2013, he weighed four pounds nine ounces. His first visi t after discharge was on A ugust 9, 2013. The doctor requested mother return with N. L. in five days for a weight check, but mother failed to return

. On September 3, 2013, the social worker met the foster parent, who said N. L. had no apparent fat layer on his body , and his skin w as hanging off his limbs.
The minor told the social worker that he was scared when mother “ gets sad ” like
she did when h e and his brother were removed. The minor was covered with insect bites,
which he said were from mother ’ s roommate ’ s dog that was covered with fleas. He also told the social worker that the roommate drinks a lot of alcohol and once got drunk and was “mean to my mommy. He yelled at my mommy and told her to do something with me, but I don’t remember what it was. ” The minor want ed to live with grandmother, but
she did not have a bed for him. On September 3, 2013, mother called the social worker and said she tried to get
treatment for her mental health issues, but she was referred to another doctor who could4

not treat her until September 17, 2013. Mother was sobbing; the social worker referred her to the Sacramento County Mental Health Treatment Center for evaluation.
The mino r ’ s father, A. S. , lived in the U nited Kingdom; notice of the dependency

was sent to him t hrough the B ritish Embassy in San Francisco.
The minor and N. L. were detained by the ju venile court in September 2013. The October 2013 jurisdiction and disposition report related another interview with mother in which she denied having suicidal iterations in the 2012 incident. She denied the allegation that her failure to treat her mental health pro blems put her children at risk. She realized she had a pattern of taking her medication after mental health episodes and then stop ping taking it over time as she felt better, which would eventually lead to another episode. She now realized that she must take her medic ation for the rest of her life. She had been taking her med ication for about thr ee weeks and her mental health wa s better. Mother said she did not know that it was mandatory for N. L. to go back to the doctor and have his weight checked. She called the doctor’s office after N. L. ’s initial appointment, and the y sa id not to come in until his two

- month check up. Mother had hoped to bring both children in at the same time, so she cancel ed on e appointment, and then forgot. Mother told the social worker that she believes she just becomes forgetful.
As J. B. was n ow fully committed to their relationship and parenting the c hildren, everything was better. She said they “will probably be together forever.”
N. L. ’ s father J. B. confirmed mother ’ s diagnosis of depression, panic disorder, and posttraumatic stress dis order

. G randmother t old the social worker that she believes
mother is depressed and needs counseling. She saw mother ’ s dirty home and its flea infestation, which did not concern mother. The minor had been covered in flea bites,
some of which were infected. G randmother told mother to take the minor to a doctor, but
mother seemed to be in d enial of the matter’s severity. G randmother eventually had to buy over

- the

- counter treatments for the minor ’ s flea bites. She also had concerns that
mother was not taking the minor to the doctor for the regular well

- child appointments.5

G randmother said she told mother she needed to take the minor to the doctor. I t did not seem that mother was following through. She also was not sure if mother was neglecting
th e minor’s diet and education. 2 Mother and the minor had lived with grandmother for about eight months until mother angrily left after being told she had three months to get a place to live and a job.
G randmother believed things went downhill for mother a fter that. It was her impression
that mother wants someone to take care of her. The report provided details regarding a January 2012 child welfare referral from a mandated reporter regarding mother’s prior depressive episode

. Mother had told her
healt h care provider that she wanted to jump off her balcony. Law enforcement placed
mother on a section 5150 hold and she was taken to the hospital. The reporte r stated mother’s house was “ disgusting. ” Garbage was piled up to the countertop in the kitchen, which also contained dirty dishes with rotten food on them. The bathroom had a fecal
smell. Asked what he had to eat that day, the minor said a chocolate cookie. He appeared to be shaking when he wa s playing. The allegation of general neglect was deemed inconclusive, but mother signed a safety plan, agreed to call or visit grandmother or great grandmother if she was too stressed or nervous, promised to clean the house, and agreed to seek counseling. Mother also agreed that if she had a severe or long lasting mental health episode, she would seek medical help and inform grandmother.
Mother told the social worker that although she was currently taking her
medication she ha d become very stressed and anxious, resulting in her becoming forgetful about her children’s medical appointments. Realizing that she might have to take her medication for the rest of her life, mother expressed her desire to have a social

2 Mother told the social worker in a September 20, 2013 interview, that she was teaching the minor how to read and write. She did n ot plan on enrolling the minor ( who would turn six in October 2013 ) in to kindergarten until m id

- October.6

worker continue monitoring her compliance so that she does not become stubborn and stop taking her medication again. Mother a nd J. B. were starting a family. She was

“ freaking out ” before because she had no help. In the future, she w ould take better care
of her mental health because she ha d J. B. and “ tons of support. ” The social worker recommended sustaining the petition and continuing out

- of

home placement with services for mother. In October 2013, father ( A. S. ) made his first appearance in juvenile court and was granted presumed father status. A November 2013 addendum report described a meeting with mother, J. B. , grandmother , and department social workers to look at returning the children to mother
and J. B. Mother and J. B. had agreed to comply with their case plans and provide the department with relevant information regarding mother’s mental health and the children’s

care

. A second addendum report indicated that m other and J. B. did not attend the
childre n’s medical appointments as directed. N. L. had been transported to the emergency room and diagnosed with an upper respiratory infection. He was prescribed an inhaler and steroids and given a follow

- up appointment. At a visit to mother ’ s home,
the socia l worker found it smelled of cigarette smoke. Mother said J. B. smoked in the bedroom, which concerned the social worker as N. L. ’ s doctor said N. L. could not be around any cigarette smoke. Mother had formula for N. L. and necessities for the
children. She showed the social worker her bottle of Paxil and said she was no longer taking Xanax as it made her sleepy and forgetful. The department recommended returning the children to mother

. It retained

concerns , but the y would mostly be mitigated by mother’s continu ed compliance with the case plan. A December 2013 addendum report reiterated the recommendation to return
the children to mother. In January 2014, the juvenile court sustained the petitions as to the minor and
N. L. and, at the department’s request, struck an allegation in N. L. ’ s petition that he7

failed to thrive in mother ’ s care. The court continued the case for a contested dispositional hearing

. A February 2014 addendum report related that J. B. told a social worker in January
2014 he had broke n up with mother a few days earlier. He told the social worker th e y fought a lot and it was not going to work . Although he denied any physical altercations
between them , t here were times when he tried to leave the home and mother would hold onto him to prevent him from leaving. During an argument in the car, mother opened the
d oor and took off her seat belt. She closed the door but it did not latch properly, causing
her t o be thrown out of the car when J. B. turned the corner to go on to a side street. The social worker briefly interviewed father in January 2014. He visited Sacramento in December 2013, staying with mother as she had separated from J. B.
Father said tha t mother and J. B. had a lengthy history of altercations and have separated multiple times. Later that month, the social worker received an e

- mail chain between
mother and father , in which mother described J. B. as having anger outbursts before he
moved o ut , writing that J. B. “got a little scary and got physical

. ” The department now recommended continued placement in foster care for the children.
A fifth addend um report issued in March 2014. The social worker interviewed
father at court in February 2 014. Father had one week of contact with the minor in 2007
and no further contact until the minor ’ s second birthday when he visited moth er and the minor for four days. His next contact with the minor was once in October 2013 and two
times in December 2013 when he came to Sa cramento for court appearances. Father said he paid mother at least $400 a month in child support since the minor ’ s birth even though
there is no formal child support order. He asked for the minor ’ s placement with him in England.
Father was born in Dewsbury, England , in 1 980. He met mother playing an online video game in 2003

. The y communicated via phone and I nternet through 2006 when8

mother went to Englan d to move in with him. She left England in 2007 during her pregnancy bec ause she was homesick

. Father has a bachelor ’ s and master ’ s degree. He earn ed about $30,000 a year as
an inf ormation technology technician. He live d with the paternal grandparents, who own
a five

- bedroom home and could provide daycare for the minor. The department recommended placing the minor with father and terminating the dependency. Continued foster care placement was recommended for N. L. Father was present at the contested disposition hearing

. Mot her arrived late. Mother objected to the proposed dispositional orders. Mother argued that placing the minor with father in England and terminating the dependency would deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction and leave her adrift, as the matter would be subject to the control of English autho rities.
The trial court awarded sole legal and physical custody to father , ordered weekly contact with mother via phone and Skype, and once annual physical contact with the parents sharing the cost s, and dismissed the dependency

. Additional visitation was allowed as the parents could arrange.
DISCUSSION
I
Removal Order
Mother contends the disposition order removing the minor from mother ’ s care must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence of substantial danger to the
minor. We disagree.

“ A dependent child may not be taken fr om the physical custody of his or her parents

. . . with whom the child resides at the time the petitio n was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence

. . . [that] [¶] [t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well

- being of the minor if the minor were ret urned home

. . . . ” ( § 361, subd. (c) , (c)(1) .)9

“ In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we look to the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court. We do not pass judgmen t on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence, or determine where the weight of the evidence lies. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record in the light most favorable to the ju venile court ’ s order, and affirm the order even if there is other evidence that would support a contrary finding. [Citation.] When the [juvenile] court makes findings by the elevated standard of clear and convincing evidence, the
substantial evidence tes t remains the standard of review on appeal. [Citation.] The appellant has the burden of showing that there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the order. [Citations.] ” ( In re Cole C . (2009) 174 Cal. App.4th 900,
915

- 916.)
Mot her claims the issue which put the minor at danger at the time of detention,
mother ’ s mental health, no longer existed at the time of disposition

. According to
mother , the two allegations in the dependency petition, that she was not compliant with her medications and had been hospitalized for a mental health evaluation in September 2013, had “ long been resolved ” by the date of the disposition. In support of her contentions, mother notes that the department recommended returni ng the minor to
mother ’ s care in the November 2013 and the December 2013 reports. Although the department changed this recommendation to out

- o f

- home placement in the February 201 4 report, mother argues that neither this report nor the March 2014 addendum assert ed a proper basis for this change. Mother has a history of mental health problems that manifest in breakdowns when
she does not take her medications. These breakdowns in turn placed the minor at risk of neglect manifested in various ways, includi ng neglecting to provide necessary medical
care to both the minor and N. L. , as we have described

. Mother admitted she forgot medical appointments , and claimed she would become forgetful when nervous and10

stressed , even while taking her medication

. Because her compliance with her medication requirements was sketchy, as we discuss in more detail below, t he juvenile court could reasonably infer that mother’s problems with taking medical care of her children would
be present to an even greater degree i n the future. F ailing to take a child to medical appointments presents a substantial risk of physical harm or illness to any child. Mother’s failure to consistently take her medication presented other threats to the
minor. Less than two years before th e incident leading to the dependency petition, mother was put on a section 5150 hold for suicidal iteration. The home presented as filthy and the minor had not been eating properly

. While the referral was ultimately deemed inconclusive, mother signed a s afety plan which she did not follow. Mother’s failure to abide by one of the terms of the safety plan, informing grandmother if she had a severe mental health episode, led to the children ’s removal from her when she was hospitalized

. Again in the curre nt dependency, mother had stopped tak ing her medication. T he
minor was covered with untreated flea bites , some of which were infected, and mother
had refused to take him to the doctor. A s before , the house was unkempt

. While an unkempt home is not groun ds for a child’s removal, in this context, it is additional
evidence of m other’s neglect of her children’s needs when she does not take h er medication. Mother admitted significant difficulty staying on her medication, at one point asking for extra superv ision from the social worker. Discontinuing her medication and the ensuing mental health episodes is associated with a lack of support from others. J. B. was her primary support during the dependency. J. B. ’s initial absence played a role in
the incident leading to the dependency. J. B. was not living with mother when N. L. was born. Mother subsequently told the social worker that her depression is a product of stress and anxiety, but J. B. starting to participate in raising her children relieve d her
stress. S he also said that everything was better when J. B. was fully participating in11

raising the children , with their subsequent breakup, she no longer had this necessary support. The juvenile court could reasonably infer that mother needed othe r people to help keep her on track and on her medication. G randmother ’s information that mother wanted (and needed) caretaking also supported this inference. The changed circumstance between the November 2013 report recommending the minor’s return and t he February 2014 report recommending his continued removal was the breakup between J. B. and mother. Not only did mother lose her support system, but

t he circumstances of the breakup also provided additional evidence of domestic violence
between mother an d J. B. Mother’s e

- mail t o father described an incident of domestic violence before the breakup , and adds to concerns raised by the minor’s prior statement
that J. B. was at times mean to his mother. In addition, father told the social worker that
mother and J. B. had a history of altercations and breakups. The incident in the car where
mother was thrown out of the c ar during an argument with J. B. , is additional evidence
that domestic violence between J. B. and mother is not limited to the one incident related
in her e

- mail

. This is substantial evidence allowing the trial court to conclude that the minor was at risk of witnessing further domestic violence if he was returned to mother.

“ ‘ [D]omestic violence in the same household where children are living

. . . is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious ph ysical harm or illness from it.’ [Citation.] Children can be ‘ put in a position of physical danger from [spousal] violence’ because, ‘ for example, they could wander into the room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg

. . . . ’ [Citation.]” ( In re E.B. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 568,
576. )12 II
Placement Order
Mother conten ds there is insufficient evidence that placement with A. S. in the United Kingdom and dismissing the dependency was not detrimental to the minor

. She also contends that the juvenile court failed to make statutorily required findings to place
the minor wit h father and terminate the court dependency.
Section 361.2 , states in pertinent part : “ (a) When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless i t finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child

. . . . [¶] (b) If the court places the child with that parent it may do any of the following: [¶] (1) Order that
th e parent become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child. The custody order shall continue unless modified by a subsequent order of the superior court. The order of the juvenile court shall be filed in any domestic relation proceeding between the parents. ” As with the findings addressed in subheading I, ante , we apply the deferential
substantial evidence standard of review to the juvenile court ’ s findings under

s ection 361.2. ( In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal. App.4th 1564, 1569

- 1570 ( John M .) .)
Mother likens this case to John M., where , according to her, the juvenile court remanded the case for a new dispositional hearing after the agency failed to conduct an adequate investigat ion of the nonoffending parent. She asserts that the department ’ s investigation of A. S. was inadequate, which in turn deprived the juvenile court of the
information needed to determine whet her placing the minor with him wou ld be13

detrimental to the minor. She accordingly concludes that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court ’ s finding of no detriment.
John M . addressed the opposite disposition from the one present here, a finding that placement with the nonoffending parent was detrimental to the minor. The Court of Appeal found that the minor had to be placed with the nonoffending parent unless there

was a “ detriment finding by clear and convincing evidence. ” ( John M., s upra , 141 Cal. App.4th at p. 1569.) T he juvenile court found detriment based on the 14

- year

old child ’ s stated wish not to live with his nonoffending father, the child ’ s relationship with his infant sister and members of his extended family, the child ’ s la ck of a relationship with his father, “ the paucity of information ” about his father, and the child ’ s reunification plan with his mother. ( Id. at p. 1570.) The appellate court found these factors insufficient to support a finding of detriment. ( Ibid .)
The C ourt of A ppe al also found that neither the a gency nor the juvenile court explored alternative means of investigating the father, who lived in Tennessee. ( John M.,

supra , 141 Cal. App.4th at p p. 1572

- 1573.) Because the father was “ a parent, the
approp riate investigation is a basic one, less rigorous than the investigation necessary for placement with a more distant relative such as a cousin. While [the father ’ s] geographical distance from San Diego necessitates a greater effort to garner information, it should not subject him to greater scrutiny. The depth of investigation should be determined by the fact that he is John ’ s parent, not that he lives in Tennessee. ” ( Id. at
p. 1573.) Contrary to mother ’ s contention, John M. actually supports the juvenile court ’ s finding. Here, t here is much more evidence about the nonoffending parent and even less
evidence of detriment than in John M

. A. S. was interviewed twice by the department , once briefly and a second time more extens ively. The department was able to learn that
A. S. had been committed to the minor since birth , supporting L. L. with regular voluntary support payments after mother took the minor and left the United Kingdom.14

A. S. ’ s lack of contact with the minor was a matter of geography rather than choice. He
had the means to s upport the minor, including day care through the paternal grandparents.
The minor in John M. was older than the minor in the present case, nearly 14 years old at the disposition hearing. ( John M., supra , 141 Cal. App.4th at p. 1570.) He was “ a troubled young man in need of services, ” having sustained physical abuse, not trusting adults, and with cognitive problems. ( Id. at p p. 1570

- 1571.) By contrast, the record
contains no evidence that the minor here has any special needs. Nothing in the report suggests the minor ’ s relation to mother is so close that he would be harmed by prolonged separation. Indeed, the minor express ed a preference for living with grandmother in his initial interview af ter detention. Likewise, the record does not support an inference that his relationship with his half sibling, who was less than a year old at disposition , was so close that separation would be detrimental to him. Given
the evidence of father ’ s fitness, and the lack of any evidence supporting detriment, substantial evidence supports the trial court ’ s finding. Mother also contends the juvenile court did not make the necessary findings on the record as required by section 361.2, subdivision (c).
Section 361.2 states in pertinent part : “ (b) If the court places the child with that parent it may do any of the following: [¶] (1) Order that the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child. The custody order shall continue unless modified by a subsequent order of the superior court. The order of the j uvenile court shall be filed in any domestic relation proceeding between the parents

. [¶]

. . . [¶] (c) The court shall make a finding either in writing or on the record of the basis for its determination under subdivisions (a) and (b). ” A juvenile co urt may therefore place the child with the nonoffending parent and terminate the dependency
if it makes a finding on the record that ongoing supervision is no longer necessary. ( In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal. App.4th 1124, 1135.)15

Mother notes the trial c ourt did not make a finding that ongoing supervision pursuant to section 361.2, subdi vision (b)(2) was not required. She claims this is a necessary finding , it should have been made on the record pursuant to subdivision (c), and the juvenile court ’ s failu re to make this finding was prejudicial error

. She also contends the juvenile court failed to state on the record or in writing the basis of its decision placing the minor with A. S. and terminating the dependency. At the disposition hearing, mother object ed to the department ’ s recommendation
of granting custody to A. S. and terminating the dependency. She argued that doing so would leave mother without options and leave the minor at the “ whim and control ” of the authorities in England, and moving th e minor to a foreign country and away from a
mother with whom he was bonded would be detrimental to him. The juvenile court , which read and considered the department ’ s reports, found that placement with father

“ would not be detrimental to the safety, prot ection or physical or emotional well being ” of the minor, and that awarding legal and physical custody to father was in the minor ’ s best interests. The se reports, as related elsewhere in this opinion, contained substantial information regarding father ’ s f itness as a parent for the minor.

“ In these circumstances, the fact that the juvenile court did not expressly state

‘ there is no need for continuing supervision ’ is no grounds for reversing its otherwise proper ruling. [Citation.] ” ( In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal. App.4th 525, 538 , fn. omitted .) Where, as here, mother ’ s counsel argued that granting s ole legal and physical custody o f
the minor was detrimental to him and left him at the “ whim ” of English authorities, it is no great leap to conclude that the j uvenile court considered whether ongoing custody supervision was necessary before deciding to award custody to father and terminate the dependency. Given the ample evidence supporting a finding that A. S. was loving, committed to parenthood, and able to p rovide a stable home for the minor, we will imply a finding that ongoing supervision was not necessary.16

Nor will we reverse for the juvenile court ’ s failure to put this finding or the factual basis for the disposition on the record, because m other did n ot object to th ese alleged

errors.

“ An appellate court ordinarily will not consider challenges based on procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been but was not made in the
trial court. [Citation.] Dependency cases are no t exempt from this forfeiture doctrine. [Citations.] The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the juvenile court so that they may be corrected. [Citation.] Although forfeiture is not automatic, and the appellate court has discretion to excuse a party ’ s failure to properly raise an issue in a timely fashion [citation], in dependency proceedings, where the well

- being of the child and stability of placement is of paramount importance, that discretion ‘ s hould be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue. ’ [Citation.] ” ( In re Wilford J . (2005) 131 Cal. App.4th 742, 754.) When a trial court is required to make a finding on the record, failure to object to the absence of such a finding forfeits the contention on appeal. ( People v. Tillman (2000)
22 Cal. 4th 300, 303.)
The issue of the minor ’ s placement and the termination of the dependency was

conte st ed at the disposition hearing. Mother ’ s failure to object to the lack of findings on whether there was a need for ongoing supervision forfeits the contention on appeal.
III
Visitation Order
Mother contends that the juvenile c ourt ’ s visitation order was not in the minor ’ s best interests. We disagree. When placing the minor with the nonoffending parent and terminating the dependency , a juvenile court “ may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. ” ( § 361. 2, subd. (b)(1).) The power to determine the right and extent of visitation by a noncustodial parent in a dependency case, including orders issued when the17

dependency case is terminated, resides with the juvenile court and may not be delegated to nonjudic ial officials or private parties. ( In re Donnovan J. (1997) 58 Cal. App.4th 1474, 1476.)
A visitation order “ necessarily involves a balancing of the interests of the parent in
visitation with the best interests of the child. In balancing these interests, the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion should determine whether there should be any right to visitation and, if so, the frequency and length of visitation. ” ( In re Jennifer G . (1990)
221 Cal. App.3d 752, 757.) If a juvenile court “ grants visitation, ‘ it must also ensure that at least some visitation at a minimum level determined by the co urt itself, will in fact

occur. ’ [Citation.] ” ( In re Hunter S. (2006 ) 142 Cal. App.4th 1497, 1505.) “ [B]y failing to mandate any minimum number of monitored visits [within a stated period of time], the

court ’ s abstract recognition of [a parent ’ s] right to visitation is illusory

. . . . ” ( In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal. App.4th 310, 319.)

“ We review an order setting visitation for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ” ( In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal. App.4th 1264, 1284.) “ ‘ The appropriate test for abuse of discretion
is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to
substitute its decisi on for that of the trial court. ’ [Citations.] ” ( In re Stephanie M . (1994)
7 Cal. 4th 295, 318

- 319.)
Mother claims there is no substantial evidence that the visitation order is in the
minor ’ s best interests. She notes that her ability to visit the minor is contingent on her coming up with half the cost of travel to the United Kingdom, as the juvenile court ’ s order specifies that the costs shall be split. She objects to the court ’ s failure to require
father t o bring the minor to the United States to see mother, where he could also see his18

half sibling, other relatives, or friends. She concludes that the “ extremely limited visitation plan ” is neither reasonable n or in the minor ’ s best interests. 3
The juvenile court ’ s ability to craft the visitation order was limited by the considerable physical distance between mother and father. Where one parent lives in the United Kingdom and the other in California, physical visitation is necessarily limited
absent highly unusual circumstances, like a parent with the time and resources to fly to the other country routinely. With no such circumstances present here, ordering more than one physical visit per year risked imposin g a severe financial burden on one or bot h parents. One annual visit with the parents sharing the costs, wi th more as they can work out, i s a reasonable response to this problem. The guaranteed annual visit ensures that visitation is neither illusory n or subject to the control of a party other than the juvenile

court. Allowing the parents to arrange visits therefore is not an improper delegation of control over visits to either parent. Splitting the cost of the mandated visit is the fairest
allocation of costs. Finally, mandatory weekly Skype and phone contact admirably increases contact between mother and the minor without incurring the burden of travel required for a physical visit. Given the very young age of N. L. and the lack of any
evidence of a close bond between the minor and his half sibling, there was no need for the juvenile court to make extra accommodations for visitation between them. Accordingly, we conclude that this fair

- minded, flexible visitation order was not an abuse
of discretion.

3 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred by failing to order an evidentiary he aring on the visitation issue. The authority mother cites for this proposition, In re Michael W

. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 190, addressed the juvenile court’s denial of the parent’s request for an evidentiary hearing before terminating the dependency, making visitation orders, and transferring the matter to family court. ( Id . at p. 19 2 .) The juvenile court here made the visitation order following a disposition hearing at which mother was allowed to present evidence. Nothing more was required.19 IV
Exit Order Finally, mother contends the juvenile court prejudicially erred by failing to ensure
that its exit order was enforceable. She asserts the juvenile court should have opened a family law case file and placed the exit order there. She also claims the juvenile court
relied on an inc orrect view that the California judiciary would retain jurisdiction after the
minor was transferred to anot her country. Asserting jurisdiction may in fact lie with the courts in the United Kingdom, mother asserts the custody and visitation orders must be
reversed. When a juvenile court orders custody with the nonoffending parent and terminates jurisdiction, the court must prepare and file an exit order ( Judicial Council Forms, form
JV

- 200) in accordance with r ule 5.700 of the California Rules of Court

. 4 ( Rule 5.695(a)(7)(A)

. ) “ The order of the juvenile court must be filed in an existing nullity, dissolution, legal guardianship, or paternity proceeding. If no custody proceeding is filed or pending, the order may be used as the sole basis to open a file. ” (R ule 5.700(a)(1).) The juvenile “ court may direct the parent, parent ’ s attorney, county counsel, or the clerk to: [¶] (A) Prepare the order for the court ’ s signature; and [¶] (B) Transmit the order within 10 calendar days after the order is signed to the superior court of the county where a custody proceeding has already been commenced or, if none, to the superior court of the county in which the parent who has been given custody
resides. [¶] (3) After receipt of the juvenile court custody order, the superior court clerk of the receiving county must immediately file the juvenile court order in the existing proceeding or immediately open a file, without a filing fee, and assign a case number. ” (Rule 5.700(a) (2), (3) .)

4 Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court.20

M other contends this framew ork requires the juvenile court to open a family law case file and place the exit o rder therein where none exists. We agree. The court erred in failing to do so because a termination order ends the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. ( In re John W . (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973.) “ The moment the juvenile court terminates the dependency proceedings, the child passes completely from the mandatory jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and the jurisdiction of the superior court, including the f amily law court, is available.” ( In re Sarah M . (1991) 233 Cal.App. 3d 1486, 1504 , disapproved on other grounds by In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196 .) Although rule 5.700 contains the permissive term “may,” we conclude that a juvenile court has a duty to use the exit

o rder to form the basis of a new family law file when there is no ongoing nullity, dissolution, legal guardianship, or paternity proceeding. This allows the noncustodial parent a means for enforcing the custody order while effecting the termination of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Because the parent with custody, father, lives in a foreign country , we shall direct the juvenile court to use the exit order to open a family law case file in Sacramento County Superior Court

. Mother contends that “withi n a matter of months” California is likely to lose subject matter jurisdiction over custody and visitation orders

. T his is not true because we are directing the opening of a family law file and t he Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act 5 ( the Uniform Act ) governs multi state child custody matters and it s policies apply to int ernational child custody disputes

. ( Ocegu e da v. Perreira (2015)
232 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1081, 1084; In re Stephanie M. , supra , 7 Cal. 4th at p. 310.)
Under the Uniform Act , the child ’ s home state has jurisdiction to make the initial custody
order (which happened here)

. (Fam. Code, § 3421, subd. (a)(1).)

5 Family Code sectio n 3400 et seq.21

So long as mother resides in California, the minor , who has other family in California and will have frequent phone contact with her under the visitation order, will have a significant connection with the state , and the family court retains jurisdiction over custody and visitation. ( Kumar v. Superior Cou rt (1982) 32 Cal.3d 689 , 696

- 698.)
Also there is a mechanism for enforcing the visitation order in a foreign country. The United States and the United Kingdom are signatories to the Hague Convention 6 ( Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal. App.4th 1154, 1158 , fn. 1 ) , which is intended “ to ensure that custody and visitation rights under the law of treaty signatories are respected by other parties to the Hague Convention. [Citations.] ” ( Guardianship of Ariana K . (2004)
120 Cal. App.4th 690 , 705 ( Ariana K .) .) State and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over actions pursuant to the Hague C onvention

. (22 U.S.C. § 9003 (a).)
Because California courts have retained jurisdiction over visitation and custody , mother has a means of enforcing her rights in a Cali fornia or federal court. 7

6 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 ( Hague Convention).

7 In her reply brief, m other asserts two reasons that the Hague Co nvention is inapplicable here. She claims that it applies only to cases w here the child was abd ucted from a parent’s custody. Citing Aria na K ., she also asserts the Hague Convention is inapplicable because the Uniform Act is the sol e means of recourse op en to her. She is wrong on both counts. The Hague Convention applies to children who are “wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention.” (2 2 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(A ).) “The Hague Convention seeks ‘ to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as secure protection for rights of access

. ’ ” ( Maxwell v. Maxwell (4t h Cir. 2009) 588 F.3d 245, 250, quoting Hague Conven tion, pmbl., 19 I.L.M. at 1501, italics added. ) Courts effectuate this intent by “preserv[ing] the status quo.” ( Miller v. Miller (4th Cir. 2001) 240 F.3d 392, 398.) Thus, the Hag ue Convention ensures a parent’s visitation rights. ( Aria na K., supra , 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 705.) Not recognizing mother’s visitation rights would therefore be unlawful retention22 DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed

. The juvenile court is directed to open a family law case file in Sacramento County Superior Court with the exit order in
accordance with rule 5. 700.

ROBIE , Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO , J.

DUARTE , J.

of the minor and would be subject to correction th r ough an action under th e Hague Convention. Ariana K. involved the father’s appeal from an order appointing the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt as the minor’s guardians. ( Ariana K., supra , 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 694.) The f ather here asserted the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the guardians did not invoke their rights under the Hague Convention. ( Id. at p. 704.) The Court of Appeal held that the convention did not deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the guardianship petition. ( Id. at p. 707.) In so ruling, the Ariana K. court noted that the Hague Convention “expressly allows other proce edings involving a child to proceed.” ( Ibid .) The Hague Convention is not a nullity. It is an alternate means of enforcing the juvenile court’s visitation order that also allows the family court to retain subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform A ct

.