United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-11196

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Dameyon Antoine Newton, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CV-356

USDC No. 4:16-CR-60-1

Before Barksdale, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Dameyon Antoine Newton, federal prisoner # 11568-078 and 

proceeding pro se, contests the district court’s denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

motion challenging his conviction of conspiracy to possess, with intent to 

distribute, cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Our court granted a 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 9, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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certificate of appealability (COA) on two of the six issues raised in the § 2255 

motion: whether Newton’s former counsel was ineffective for failing to 

move to (1) suppress his post-arrest statements on the claim that Newton was 

twice denied requests to speak with counsel; and (2) suppress his post-arrest 

statements on the claim that law enforcement officers intimidated and 

coerced him. (The district court concluded: Newton waived these two 

claims by pleading guilty; and his plea was voluntary.) Additionally, Newton 

claims the court erred in denying his § 2255 motion without holding an 

evidentiary hearing. (As addressed in the order granting the COA, this claim 

does not require a COA. E.g., Norman v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 234 (5th 

Cir. 2016).) 

The decision to deny Newton’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary 

hearing is reviewed for abuse-of-discretion. E.g., United States v. Cavitt, 550 

F.3d 430, 442 (5th Cir. 2008). As discussed infra, the record was adequately 

developed, including Newton’s “solemn declarations in open court”; the 

record supported the determination his plea was voluntary; and Newton 

failed to show the likely merit of his claims. Therefore, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the motion without holding an evidentiary 

hearing. United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d 641, 649 (5th Cir. 2009) 

(citation omitted); e.g., Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 442 (record not sufficiently 

developed to overcome petitioner’s showing of indicia of likely merit of his 

action); United States v. Samaniego, 532 F. App’x 531, 535–36 (5th Cir. 2013) 

(record not sufficiently developed due to, inter alia, lack of statement by 

counsel for decision).

For the two claims permitted by the COA, our court reviews the 

district court’s factual findings for clear error; its legal conclusions, de novo. 

E.g., Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 435. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

(IAC) are reviewed de novo. E.g., United States v. Scott, 11 F.4th 364, 368 (5th 

Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 827 (2022). Generally, once a valid guilty 

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plea has been entered, “all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings are 

waived”, including IAC claims, unless, of course, the ineffectiveness relates 

to the voluntariness of the plea. E.g., Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 441 (citation 

omitted).

To prevail on his IAC claims, Newton must demonstrate: counsel’s 

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”; and he 

was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 

(1984). Regarding the first prong, there is a strong presumption that: counsel 

rendered adequate assistance; and the challenged action might be sound trial 

strategy. E.g., id. at 689. If Newton satisfies the first prong, he must establish 

prejudice by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty”. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 

1958, 1965 (2017) (citation omitted). Along that line, the Court has clarified 

“[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a 

defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s 

deficiencies”. Id. at 1967. Courts “should instead look to contemporaneous 

evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences”. Id.

Newton has not shown objectively unreasonable assistance or 

prejudice. Even without his post-arrest statements, the Government 

accumulated substantial evidence against him. And, his post hoc assertions he 

was denied counsel and his statements coerced are contradicted by the postarrest reports. Moreover, through correspondence he told counsel he gave 

officers false information following his arrest. By affidavit, counsel attested: 

he conducted an independent investigation and concluded Newton’s postarrest statements were voluntary; he discussed with Newton the possibility 

of a motion to suppress the statements; and Newton insisted on avoiding a 

trial. Cf. Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 441 (stating evidence did not support counsel’s 

guilty-plea recommendation was strategic and informed based, in part, on 

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absence of “sworn record testimony from counsel explaining the strategy 

behind his decision”).

By entering a guilty plea, Newton would: increase his chances for a 

more lenient sentence; and alleviate the risk of facing additional counts and 

charges. E.g., Young v. Spinner, 873 F.3d 282, 287–88 (5th Cir. 2017). The 

contemplated motion to suppress was unsupported by the record and would 

have relied principally on Newton’s credibility as a witness and attestation of 

the facts, which counsel had reason to doubt. Cf. Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 440 

(motion to suppress had an “appreciable chance of success”). Further, 

Newton fails to show exclusion of his statements would have a significant 

impact on the outcome at trial. Accordingly, he has failed to overcome the 

strong presumption counsel’s decision to recommend a guilty plea was 

strategic and reasonable.

Even assuming Newton could establish the first prong for his IAC

claims, he has failed to prove prejudice through showing a reasonable 

probability he would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel’s errors. E.g., 

Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1965. From the time of arrest throughout most of the 

criminal proceedings, his actions and correspondence overwhelmingly show 

his desire to cooperate in hopes of a lenient sentence. Prior to formally 

entering his plea, he admitted under oath: he was aware of, and understood,

the elements of the offense charged and possible sentence; he knowingly and 

voluntarily wished to plead guilty; he was satisfied with counsel’s 

representation; and his plea was not influenced by any deal, understanding, 

promise, or other agreement with the Government. These “solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity”. McKnight, 

570 F.3d at 649 (citation omitted). Only after seeing the Presentence 

Investigation Report did Newton develop reservations. 

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After moving to withdraw his plea, he admitted in court the allegations 

supporting his motion to withdraw were false. Consequently, his post hoc 

assertions he would have insisted on going to trial if properly advised about a 

possible motion to suppress lack “contemporaneous backing”. Young, 873 

F.3d at 287; e.g., Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967. As in Young, Newton “had only one 

major interest: minimizing his sentence”; and he cannot rely on hindsight to 

challenge his plea when unsatisfied with the resulting sentence. Young, 873 

F.3d at 288. Again, he fails to show a reasonable probability he would not 

have entered his plea but for the alleged error by counsel. 

AFFIRMED.

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