IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2014-KA-00643-COA DONALD ALLEN CAVES A/K/A DONALD CAVES A/K/A DONALD A. CAVES APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/17/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ANTHONY ALAN MOZINGO COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: PEARL RIVER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES MOLLIE MARIE MCMILLIN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: MELANIE DOTSON THOMAS DISTRICT ATTORNEY: HALDON J. KITTRELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED OF FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER AND SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS W I THOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR PROBATION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 06/09/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., CARLTON AND MAX WELL, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Donald A

. Caves appeals the conviction entered against him o n April 9, 2014, by the Pearl R i v e r C o unty Circuit Court f or f ailure t o register as a sex of f ender pursuant toMississippi Code Annotated se c t i o n 4 5

- 3 3

- 3 3 ( Supp. 2 014). 1 The trial court sentenced Caves

as a h abitua l o ffe n d e r p ursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated s e ction 99-19-83 (Supp. 2014)

to lif e in t he custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections without the possibility of parole. 2 On appeal, Caves argues: ( 1) the trial court erred in excluding the testim ony o f a def ense witness, and ( 2 ) the verdict is against the overwhelm ing weight of the e vidence. Finding no error, we af

f irm Caves’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS ¶2. In May

2012, Caves; his live-in girlf r iend, Am

b er Thom a s; and his children m oved
f rom the hom e Caves had lived in f or twenty y e ars to a nother hom e two blocks a w ay . Caves

a n d T h o m as b oth testif

ied that the previous h om e w as u nsanitary

. Caves testif ied tha t a Departm ent of Hum an S ervices social worker visited h is f am ily and inf

orm ed t hem that their hom e h ad m old a nd that they could not continue to live there. Caves testif ied that based on this inf o rm ation, he m o ved his f am ily to the new hom e. ¶3. In 1990, C aves was convicted of touching of a c h i l d f o r l u s t f ul purposes and is required by section 45-33

- 3 3 t o r e g i ster as a sex o f f ender and to notif

y the Departm ent of Public Saf

ety (DPS) of any changes to his residency

. In 2 012, Caves f ailed to personally
appear at the DPS and register ten day s bef o re m oving his f

am ily to the new residence.

1 S ectio n 4 5 -3 3 -3 3 ( 2 )(a) p ro v id es a m ax im u m sen ten ce o f “ i m

p riso n m en t in th e cu sto d y o f th e D ep artm en t o f

C o r rectio n s f o r n o t m o re th a n f

iv e ( 5 ) y ears[ .] ”

2 T h e p ro ced u ral h isto ry r ef lects th at a P earl R iv er C o u n ty g ran d j u ry in d icted C av es f o r sex u al b attery an d f

ailu re to reg ister as a sex o f f en d er u n d er s ectio n 4 5 -3 3 -3 3

. B o th th e S tate an d C av es’s ap p o i n t e d c o u n sel a g reed to p r o ceed to trial o n th e f ailu re-to -reg ister ch arg e, sav in g th e sex u al-b attery ch arg e f o r a later d ate. 2Consequently , Caves was arrested.

¶4. O n June 6, 2013, a Pearl River County grand jury i ndicted Caves f or sexual battery and f a i lure to register as a sex o f f ender under section 45-33-33. The indictm ent was l a t er

am ended t o charge Caves as a habitual of f ender u nder Mississippi C ode Annotated section
99-19-83. Bo t h the State and Caves’s appointed counsel agreed to proceed to trial on the
f ailure-to-register charge, saving the sexual-battery charge f or a later date. ¶5. Caves testif

ied in his own def

e nse at trial, stating that he lacked t he ability to read or write, and thus p ossessed no a ctual knowledge that he had a d uty to a p p e ar at the DPS ten day s bef ore he planned to m o ve. The j ury heard testim ony f rom the f o llowin g : C hris Robbins , a

n i n v e s t i gator with the Pearl River County Sherif f ’s D epartm ent; Thom as, Caves’s f orm er girlf

riend; Kristin Thibodeaux, the records clerk f or the Pearl River County Sherif f ’s Departm ent; and Charlie Hill, acting director of the sex-of

f e n der registry

f o r the State. ¶6. Thom as testif

ied that she and Caves dated f o r about two and a half y ears, and that she knew t hat the sex-of

f ender statute required Caves to re-register as a sex of f ender every ninety day s and to notif

y the registration of

f ice of any change of address. Thom as stated that Caves did not attem

pt t o re-register as a s ex of f ender w hen they m oved. Thom as testif i ed that she had accom

panied C aves i n the past w hen he would go to register as a sex of f ender. Regarding Caves’s a

bility t o read and write, Thom as testif ied, “He can read, but not like high school level,” and “I’ve seen him write.” Thom as f

urther specif

ied that to her knowledge, Caves “[ doesn’t] have dif f iculty ” reading and writing. ¶7. Thibodeaux testif

i ed that as the records c lerk of the s herif f ’s departm e nt, she f

ills out

3the initial and re-registrati o n p a p e r w o r k f or sex of f e n ders. T hibodeaux t estif ied that she personally went over the registration paperwork with Caves, and she also read the f orm s to him

. Thibodeaux af

f irm e d that she read the f

orm t o Caves, inf

orm i ng h im that he possessed the duty to record a ny change of address by personally appearing at the DPS driver’s license station not less than ten day s bef ore changing a ddresses. Caves adm itted that som eone read the f o rm s to him , but testif

ied that the person read them too f ast, and he could not understand the substance of

the f orm s. ¶8. Af ter the State rested, Caves’s a ttorney inf orm ed the trial court that Caves would like

to i ntroduce Erica Fraught a s a def ense witness. C aves stated that Fraught’s testim ony would conf irm t hat he was unable t o read and write, and that she had to read and explain things to him r egularly

. The t rial court e xcluded Fraught’s testim ony , ruling t hat the i ssue of whether
Caves could read o r w rite was n o t a p i v otal issue in the c ase. The trial court f urther explained that “it’s p otentially conf using to the issue when y ou’ve had both [ Thibodeaux and Investigator Chris Robbins] testif y they actually read f rom the docum ents to him

. ” ¶9. Af ter the trial, t he jury f

ound Caves guilty of f

ailing to r egister as a s e x of f ender.
Because Caves was i ndicted as a habitual of f ender under section 9 9-19-83, he was sentenced,

u p o n conviction, to lif

e without the possibility of parole. Upon denial of h is post-tria l

m otions, Caves f

iled his notice of

appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶10. “The s t a n d a r d o f r e view regarding adm i ssion or exclusion o f e vidence is abuse of discretion. W here error involves the adm ission or exclusion of evidence, this C ourt will not

4reverse unless the error adversely af f ects a s ubstantial right of a party .” W hitten v
. Cox , 799
So. 2d 1 , 13 (¶27) (Miss. 2000) (citation and internal q uotation m arks om itted). “ Unless the trial court has so abused this discretion as to prejudice the def endant' s case, we wil l not

reverse the r

uling of the trial court.” T idwell v. State , 806 So. 2d 1146, 1148 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citation om itted). ¶11. In Daniels v. State , 107 S o. 3d 961, 963 ( ¶ ¶ 1 0

- 1 2 ) ( Miss. 2013), the suprem e court explained: [ A] de novo standard of review [ applies] to a trial court’s d enial of a j udgm ent notwithstanding the verdict [ (JNOV)]. A m o tion f o r [ a JNOV] is a challenge to the legal suf

f i c i ency of t he evidence, and this Court will af f irm the denial of a m otion f

or [ a] JNOV if there is substantial evidence t o s upport the verdict. “Substantial evidence” is inf orm a t ion o f such q

uality and weight t hat reasonable and f

air-m inded jurors in the exercise of im partial judgm ent m ight have reached dif

f e rent conclusions. The evidence is viewed in the light m ost f avorable to the verdict.
A m otion f

or a new trial f

alls within a lower standard of review than does t hat of a [ JNOV] or a directed verdict. A m otion f or a new trial sim

ply challenges the weight of the e vidence. The [ s]upre m e [ c]ourt will reverse the lower court’s denial o f a m otion f or a new t rial only if

, by doing so, the court abused its discretion. (Internal citations and quotation m arks om itted).
DISCUSSION
I. Ex c lusion of Witness Testim o ny ¶12. Caves asserts that he was “essentially sentenced to serve lif

e without the possibility of parole f

or f ailure to m eet a deadline.” I n his app e l l a t e b r i e f , Caves m aintains that he is illiterate and was f

ound by a circuit court judge in 1990 t o be m entally retarded. However,

5nothing in the record substantiates this assertion. Caves claim s that because o f his inability

to read t he registration requ i r e m ents, h e lacked actual k nowledge of h is duty to appear in person ten day s bef

ore he intended to m ove. 3 ¶13. Upon review of this assignm e nt of error, the r e c o r d r e f l e c t s t h a t t h e t r i al judge excluded the witness testim ony of Fraught because

a subjective observation by some one that k nows [ Caves] is not a c onclusive determ ination of what h i s abilities are t o read or n o t o r h i s inability to read. And it’s potentially conf

u sing to the issue when y ou’ve had both [ Thibodeaux and Investigator Robbins] te s t i f y t hey actually read f

rom the docum ents t o him

. As stated previously , the r ecord s hows that Fraught was expected to testif y that she had known Caves f

or m any y ears and that he could not read or w r i t e . S i n c e the ability to read and w rite provides n o def

ense to com

pliance w ith the statutory r equirem e nt f or sex-of f ender registration, the trial court excluded the testim ony due to its lack of relevancy and potential

to conf use the issues and m islead the jury

. See M.R.E. 4 02 ( s t a ting that relevant evidence is usually a dm issible); M.R.E. 403 (stating t hat relevant evidence m ay be excluded if it would cause conf

usion or m islead the jury ). ¶14. Caves argues t h a t t h e t r i a l court erred in e x cluding F raught’s testim ony regarding
Caves’s a bility to read and write, thus depriving Caves of the ability to present a d ef ense at

3 M ississip p i C o d e A n n o t ated sectio n 4 5- 33- 29( 1) ( Re v. 2011) s tates th at “[ u ] p o n an y ch an g e o f ad d ress, in c lu d in g t em p o rary lo d g in g , an o f

f e n d er req u ired to reg ister u n d er th is ch ap ter i s req u ired to p e rso n ally ap p e ar at a D ep artm en t o f P u b lic S af ety [ d ] riv e r ’s [ l] icen se [ s] tatio n n o t less th an ten (1 0 ) d ay s b ef o re h e in ten d s to f

irs t r e s i d e a t th e n ew ad d ress.” “T h e f ailu re o f an o f

f en d er to p erso n ally ap p e a r at a D ep artm en t o f P u b lic S af ety [ d ] riv er’s [ l] icen se [ s] tatio n o r to p ro v id e an y reg istratio n o r o t h er in f o r m atio n , in clu d in g . . . rereg i stratio n [ o r ] ch an g e o f ad d ress in f o rm atio n . . . req u i red b y th is ch ap ter[ ,] is a v io latio n o f th is ch ap t er.” M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 5 -3 3 -3 3 (1 )(a). 6trial. Caves claim s that Fraught’s testim ony w as central to his def ense that he lacked actual knowledge of h is duty t o re-register under section 45-33-29(1) due t o his inability to read and write. Caves m aintains that if Fraught had been allowed to testif y , she w ould have testif

ied that Caves was unable to read and write, and that she h ad to read and explain things to h im regularly

. Caves argues that his def ense centered a r ound his intellectual d isabilities and his lack of actual knowledge of his d u t y t o inf orm the Departm ent of Public Saf ety (DPS) ten day s prior to changing residences. Caves asserts that Fraught’s t estim o ny would show that
Caves lacked actual knowledge of his duty to i nf orm the D PS because h e was unable to read and und e r s t a n d the r egistration requirem ents. At trial, the S tate objected to Fraught’s testim o ny because she was n ot disclosed to the S tate during d iscovery as a potential witness
f or the def

e nse. See URCCC 9 .04 (requ i r i n g the def endant to disclose p otential trial witnesses). ¶15. As previously acknowledged, at t r i a l , t h e judge excluded Fraught’s t estim ony on dif f erent grounds, stating: [ T]he witness w ill be excluded, but not f or the reason that it’s unf

air surprise or the State hasn’t had notice. . . . The reason the witness will be excluded i s t h e c o u r t f inds that

. . . both the investigator a nd [ Thibodeaux] testif ied that they read to [ Caves] u nder sworn testim ony the contents of docum e nts. And the court f inds that a subjective observation by som eone that knows [ C aves] is not a c o nclusive determ ination of w h at his abilities are to read or not or his i nability to r ead. And it’s potentially conf

using to the issue when y ou’ve had both w itnesses testif y they actually r ead f

rom the docum e nt s t o h i m. S o the ability to read is not — or inability to read is not the pivotal issue in the court’s view. ¶16. Caves m aintains that the issue a t trial was not sim ply whether he knew he possessed

7a d

uty to register, but whether he had a ctual knowledge t hat he was “required to personally
appear at a Departm ent of Public Saf ety [ d]river’s [ l]icense [ s]tation n o t l ess than ten (10) day s bef ore he intends to f

irst reside at the n ew address.” Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-29(1). As a result, he argues that Fraught’s testim ony constituted relevant evidence. ¶17. The M is s i s s i p pi Rules of Evidence def ine “relevant evidence” a s “evidence having
any tendency to m ake the existence of any f act that is of

consequence to the determ ination of the action m ore probable or less probable than i t would be w ithout t he evidence.” M.R.E.
401. Caves also relies on Rule 402, which states that “[ a]ll relevant evidence i s adm issible, except as otherwise provided b y the Constitution of the United States, t he C onstitution of the State of Mississippi, or by these rules.” M.R.E. 402. Caves also asserts that the trial court erred in not adhering to the procedure set out in Rule 9.04(I) 4 of the Unif orm Rules of Circuit

4 R u l e 9 .0 4 (I) o f t h e M ississip p i R u l es o f C ircu i t an d C o u n ty C o u rt p r o v id es a p ro ced u re f

o r in stan ces w h ere a p a rty h as f ailed t o co m

p ly w ith th e d isco v e r

y ru les. T h e ru le states, in p art: If d u rin g th e c o u rse o f t r i a l , th e p ro s ecu tio n attem p ts to in t ro d u ce e v i d en ce w h ich h as n o t b e en tim ely d isclo sed to t h e d ef en s e as req u ired b y th ese ru les, an d th e d ef

en s e o b j e cts to th e in tro d u ctio n f o r t h at reaso n , th e co u rt sh all act as f o l lo w s: 1

. G ran t th e d ef

en s e a reaso n ab le o p p o rtu n ity to in terv iew th e n ew ly d i sco v ered w itn ess, to ex am in e th e n ew ly p ro d u ced d o cu m e n ts, p h o t o g rap h s o r o th er ev id en ce; an d
2

. If , a f ter s u ch o p p o rtu n ity , th e d ef e n se claim s u n f

air su r p rise o r u n d u e p rej u d ice an d seek s a c o n tin u a n ce o r m istrial, th e co u r t s h a l l , i n th e in terest o f j u s tice a n d ab sen t u n u su al circu m stan ces, ex clu d e th e ev id en ce o r g ran t a co n t in u an c e f o r a p e rio d o f tim e r easo n a

b ly n ecessary f

o r th e d ef en se to m eet th e n o n -d isclo sed ev id en ce o r g r an t a m istrial.

8and County Court, which requires that the t rial court gra n t c o n t i n u ances and only exclude

evidence as a last resort f

or discovery violations. Caves argues that although the t rial court did not exclude Fraught’s testim ony b ased on the State’s a s sertion that the def e n se f ailed to disclose F raught as a potential witness in discovery , any discovery violation could have been easily cured by granting a short continuance in order f or the State to investigate. ¶18. As previously stated, Thom as, Caves’s ex-girlf riend, p rovided testim ony that she had witnessed Caves read and write. Thom as also testif ied that Caves possessed awareness that the sex-of

f ende r s t a t u t e required Caves to notif y the DPS of any change of address. See Miss. Code Ann. § 45-33-29(1). Thibodeaux, the records c lerk f or t he s herif

f ’s departm ent, testif i ed that she personally reviewed and explained the sex-of f e n der r egistration p aperwork with Caves and personally read the f o r ms t o h i m. Investigator R obbins of the Pearl River
Cou n t y S h e r i f

f ’ s Departm ent t estif

ied that when he arrested Caves, he read C aves his Miranda 5 rights and also verbally explained these rights t o Cav e s , a s w ell as the charge
aga i n s t h i m . In h is decision to exclude Fraught’s testim ony , t he trial judge ref erred to Thibodeaux and I n v e s tigator Robbins’s testim ony providing that they both read the f o rm s aloud to Caves, and explained that “it’s potentially conf using to the i ssue [ to a llow Fraught’s testim o ny ] when y ou’ve had bot h [T h i b o d e a

u x a n d I n v e s t i g ator Robbins] testif

y they actually read f rom the docum ents to him .”

3

. T h e co u rt sh all n o t b e req u ired to g ran t eith e r a co n t in u an ce o r m istrial f

o r su ch a d isco v ery v i o l atio n i f th e p ro secu tio n w ith d raw s its ef

f o rts to in tro d u ce su ch ev id en ce.

5 M ira n d a v. A rizo n a , 3 8 4 U

. S . 4 3 6 (1 9 6 6 ). 9¶19. In Gribble v. State , 760 So. 2d 790, 79 1 ( ¶ 1 ) ( M i s s . C t

. App. 2000), Quancidine

Gribble was charged with sim ple assault against her husband, R obert Gribble. At trial, the
State sought t o introduce Robert’s divorce c om plaint into evidence to show that he was claim ing c ruel and inhum an treatm ent. Id

. at 792 (¶4). T he trial judge ref used t o adm it the

com plaint into evidence, explaining that the jury already heard testim ony that a divorce was pending a n d that the grounds were cruel and inhum an treatm ent. Id

. Upon review, t his Court f ound no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the divorce com plaint, stating t hat “adm itting the actual divorce com

plaint in conjunction with the testim ony about the g rounds f or divorce would u nnecessarily conf use t he jury as to the issue in question in the pen d i n g c a s e rather than benef

it the jury .” Id. at 793 (¶9). ¶20. “The a dm i s s i b i l i t y o f e v i d e n c e rests w ithin the discretion of the trial court, and reversal w ill be appropr i a t e o n ly when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs.” Palmer v
. S t a t e , 9 3 9 So. 2d 792, 794-95 ( ¶7) (Miss. 2006). A f ter our review of the record bef

o re u s, we f

ind that the trial court did not err i n excluding Fraught’s testim o ny . II. Weight of the Evidence ¶21. Caves claim s that the verdict is against the overwhelm ing weight o f the evidence, and

as a result, the trial court e rred i n not granting C aves a JNOV o r, in the a l t e r n a tive, a new trial. Caves states t hat the evidence at t rial s howed that he “lacked actual k nowledge of the intricacies of t he duty t o notif y the DPS” o f his i ntent to change his residence. Caves asserts that because he c annot r e a d a n d h a s been f ound to be m e ntally retarded, allowing a

1 0conviction and sentence of l i f e w i t h o ut the possibility of parole to stand based on a technicality

would sanction an unconscionable injustice. ¶22. Caves m a intains that the overwhelm ing w eight of the evidence shows t hat he lacked actual knowledge of

his duty to appear in person a t a DPS driver’s license station ten day s bef ore he intended to f

i rst reside in a n ew hom e. Caves argues that since he had never lived
any where other than h i s f

irst residence on Lee Street in Carriere, M ississippi, he had never dealt with any of t he requirem ents of the statute o t h e r t han the re-registration every ninety day s. Caves argues that he did not understand t hat he was r equired t o n o t i f y t h e DPS in person ten day s bef

ore m oving. ¶23. The Mississippi Suprem e Court has held that “ [ t ]he issue o f whether [ the def endant], bey ond a r easonable doubt, had actual or probable knowledge of the duty to register as a sex of f ender is a f

actual issue f

or a jury to decide.” Garrison v. State , 9 50 So. 2d 9 90, 994 (¶11) (Miss. 2006). In G arrison , the def endant claim ed that h e lacked notice tha t s t a t e law required h i m to register as a sex of f ender. The G a rrison court r elied on Lambert v. California , 355 U.S. 225 (1957), wherein the United States Suprem e Court established: In cases where c ircum stances are com pletely lacking which m ight m ove one to i nquire as to the necess i t y o f registration a nd the def endant' s conduct is m erely passive, the State m ust prove actual knowledge o f the duty to register or proof of the probability of such knowledge and a subseque n t f a i l u r e to com ply with the duty

to register.
Garrison , 950 So. 2d at 994 (¶12) (citing Lambert , 355 U.S. at 228-29). ¶24. Our review o f

the record ref

lects that d

uring the trial, the jury heard testim ony f rom Thom a s, who stated that Caves could indeed read and write. Thom as also testif ied that she

1 1had previously accom panied Caves when he re-registered as a s ex of f ender. Thibodeaux, the records clerk f

or the sherif

f ’s departm ent, a lso testif i ed that she personally read the s e xof f ender registration f

orm s to C aves, including the f orm l isting his duty to record any change of address by personally appearing at the DPS d river’s license station not less than ten day s bef ore changing addresses. ¶25. The trial court adm itted the sex-of f ender registration f

orm s into evidence. The f orm s ref lected that Caves initialed the f o rm s as acknowledging that he received them

. Caves also provided testim ony during trial a dm itting that som eone told him what his duties would entail
if he e v er m oved, but stated, “they read [ the duties] so f ast I couldn’t understand t hem

. Just

m e being in a h u rry to get out of t here, I j ust s igned [ the f orm ] and t old them I understood it. I really didn’t.” Charlie Hill, acting director of the sex-of f ender regist r y f

o r the State, testif i ed that the sex-of

f ender registration of

f ice possessed no docum entation showing that
Caves had updated his registration since January 10, 2011. The evidence also showed that

on July 12, 2012, Caves com pleted the personal inf

orm a t ion on the Miranda -warning f orm where he identif

ied his address as 47 Cam ellia Street, Carriere, Mississippi. ¶26. Af ter the trial, the jury received a jury i nstruction regarding notice, which provided:
In general, m istake or ignorance of the law is no d ef ense. However, m istake or ignorance of the law can be a def ense when the def

endant has a duty to act but is unaware of t he duty

. Theref o r e , y o u m

ust f ind the State has proven bey ond a reasonable doubt that [ C a ves] h ad actual k nowledge o r the probab i l i t y o f such knowledge of the duty to appear at a [ DPS] [ d]river’s [ l]icense [ s]tation n ot l ess than ten (10) day s b ef ore he intends to f

irst reside at a new address. If the State has proven this bey ond a reasonable d oubt, t hen y ou m ust f ind [ Caves] “Guilty .” ¶27. Af ter our review of the record, we f ind that substantial evidence exists t o support the

1 2jury ’s verdict f inding Caves guilty of f

ailing to r egister as a sex of f ender. See Daniels , 107
So. 3d a t 963 (¶¶10-12). This Court will not disturb the jury verdict. Furtherm o re, the trial
court’s denial o f C a v e s ’ s m otion f or a JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial, is hereby af f irm ed. ¶28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE PEARL RIVER C OUNTY C I RCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION OF FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A S E X O F FENDER AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF COR R E C T I O N S W I T H O U T T H E POSSIBILITY OF P AROLE O R PROBATION IS AFFIRMED . A LL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO PEARL RIVER COUNTY. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., B ARNES, ISHEE, ROBERTS AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. MAX WELL, J., C O NCURS IN PART AND IN T HE RESULT W I T H O U T SEPARATE W RITTEN OPINION. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN PAR T WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.

1 3