Defense Science Board

Task Force

On

Training for Future Conflicts

Final Report

June 2003

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for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

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Training for Future Conflicts 

Table of Contents

Letters of Transmittal i 

Report 1

Appendices: 

 Terms of Reference 83 

 

 Membership 87 

 Briefings and Visits 91 

 Acronyms 97 

v
Training for Future Conflicts 

vi

Left Intentionally Blank
Training for Future Conflicts 

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Report

1 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Defense Science Board Task Force

Training For Future Conflicts

Final Report 

2003

Dr. Ralph Chatham

Dr. Joe Braddock

Co-Chairmen

TIME

UNIT 

P

ROFICIENC

Y

TRAINING GOAL

CURRENT PRACTICE

This report can be read on three levels: viewgraph, caption (of which this is one), and amplifying text. The 

sketch notionally depicts the readiness “bathtub” curve, where peak performance is maintained for only a 

short time. Future conflicts may not permit us to accept this kind of readiness cycle.

THIS IS THE SECOND 21st century Defense 

Science Board report on military training. The report itself has a training goal: 

instruct and convince the acquisition and 

personnel communities to recognize 

instinctively that (1) military proficiency 

is as dependent on the warriors who operate weapon systems as it is on the 

weapon system technology, and (2) a 

superb way to waste personnel or system

acquisition money is to ignore training, 

or to tacitly allow training to pay the 

bills for acquisition or personnel system

flaws in those more measurable arenas. 

Achieving this goal may take some

time. Our first report, Training Superiority and Training Surprise, was published 

in 2001.*

 Some of our recommendations 

have been implemented. Most have not. 

We will present a report card on their

implementation in the executive summary. Nevertheless, either because of or 

in spite of our first report, there seems to 

be an increase in general awareness of 

the importance of training to warfare 

proficiency within the training communities. Less awareness exists outside

them. 

The task force work described in this 

report is aimed at determining how our 

forces must prepare for conflicts in the 

future, 10 to 20 years from now. We first 

asked what a future conflict might be 

 

*

 The report is available, at the time of this writing, at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports.htm. 

2 
Training for Future Conflicts 

like and how our forces planned to prevail in one. 

We then considered what future 

training for future wars might require, 

but we, like the rest of the nation, were 

interrupted by the atrocities of 11 September 2001. In the following months 

we watched the unfolding of a bona fide

future conflict. The special forces units 

employed were superbly trained for the 

Afghan campaign. However, the integration of all of our forces into that war 

leaves us with training lessons, especially for preparation for “no-plan” contingencies. The rest of our forces need to 

train in the continuous ways that our 

special units often can. In this report we 

suggest some technological and bureaucratic changes that might lead in that 

direction. Nevertheless, the unimplemented structural changes to the defense 

and intelligence systems that we recommended in our previous report are still 

needed if our forces are to be given a 

chance to learn before they get to the 

war how to fight, jointly, in the new 

combinations that will be required to 

succeed in planned or unexpected future 

conflicts.

3 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Report Roadmap

 Executive Summary

 Searching for Future Conflicts

 Impediments to Training Transformation

 Something New Is Needed

 Recommendations

 Return to the Summary

 Appendices

Welcome to Training for Future Conflicts. Our report starts with a summary of this work, a summary of our

last training report, and a report card on implementation of its recommendations. We then take the standard approach of defining some problems, identifying interesting developments, and then offering recommendations. We end with the same summary chart we started with, but add new supporting words. 

4 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Summary Charts

If your time is limited, read only the next 5 charts. If it is really limited, just read the next one.

5 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Summary of This Task Force

 Key Finding: Transformed forces need transformed training—NOW

3⁄4 Unintended human consequence of transformation: everybody must think

 Schoolhouse training, ADL, OJT, simulation, high-level exercises won’t fix this

3⁄4 OSD training transformation thrust & USN training emphasis are encouraging

3⁄4 Structural changes recommended by last TF not implemented

 Personnel & acquisition systems let training pay their bills without fear of being called into account

 Key Recommendations

3⁄4 SecDef require a high-level training report card at least annually

 Blue Training: Acquisition and Personnel executives must participate as well

 Red Training: SecDef/JCS require report on Training Surprise

3⁄4 USD(AT&L) establish & test co-equal training subsystem for acquisition programs

3⁄4 USD(P&R) report on how to convert to unit-managed personnel system

3⁄4 USD(P&R) sponsor a Virtual Training Environments ACTD

3⁄4 USD(P&R) encourage technology for home station training

3⁄4 DARPA expand DARWARS Training Superiority Initiative

3⁄4 USD(P&R) establish $40M/yr 6.3/4 training budget line for low-hanging fruit

3⁄4 CJCS and combatant commanders establish Deployed Combat Training Teams

3⁄4 DSB continue with new TF on Joint National CTC

Transformed forces require transformed training. Training technology development is needed, but the 

training revolution can not proceed within its traditional military stovepipe alone. Training must be excused from paying warfare proficiency bills that are better paid by the acquisition or personnel systems. 

OUR MILITARY IS TRANSFORMING itself

for the future. The emphasis so far has 

been upon new weapons systems and 

new operational doctrine. This emphasis 

is a natural result of hardware’s visibility. Largely unexplored, however, are 

the human consequences of this emerging transformation. 

The process will demand from everyone: initiative, cooperation, decentralized decision-making, and an ability to 

exploit fleeting opportunities. The future 

will require that more of our people do 

new and much more complicated cognitive tasks more rapidly and for longer 

continuous periods than ever before. Our 

warriors must also be able to fight in the 

old ways when the new technology degrades during combat. This amounts to a 

qualitative change in the demands upon 

our people that can not be supported by 

traditional kinds of training. Transforming training to support the warfare transformation will be a difficult undertaking: 

roadblocks must be removed and research performed, but, as our Training 

Superiority and Training Surprise task 

force pointed out, a training transformation could pay for itself. Unfortunately, 

the current bureaucratic structure won’t 

let this happen. 

Within the traditional training domain there has been encouraging progress, but the military’s goal should not 

be just training superiority; it should be 

warfare performance. To create warfare 

competence, the military services have 

been charged by law to “man, equip, and 

train” forces for Combatant Commanders to employ. Large organizations need 

6 
Training for Future Conflicts 

to subdivide in order to function and, by 

and large, the current military bureaucratic divisions match the Title 10 

charge: personnel, weapon system acquisition, and training. However, we 

only measure a subdivision’s performance against something like warfare 

competence in one of these three areas 

(acquisition). There are few war games, 

for example, that explore the effect of 

personnel policies or training practice 

upon campaign outcome. Hardware gets 

visibility and money, the personnel system runs open-loop, but the focus of this 

task force—training—although the chief 

concern of forces not actually fighting, 

takes a back seat in the bureaucracy. 

Training’s achievements, its failures, and 

its costs are not routinely visible to those 

with authority over discretionary funding 

in the Department of Defense (DoD). 

Moreover, the interactions among the 

three “stovepipes” and a fourth—force 

employment practices—are seldom explored. This results in training paying 

bills that would have been better paid by 

the personnel or acquisition systems. 

Good management pays attention to 

the interfaces among its administrative 

stovepipes. It can do so, however, only if 

it is thoroughly aware of those interfaces 

and of the contributions of each division 

to the entire organization’s goals. 

We will discuss specific recommendations in a few pages, but our key recommendations deal with ways to: 

(1) make visible the influence of training on warfare competence, and 

(2) force assessment of where the costs

of warfare competence would be 

best borne. 

We recommend continued DSB involvement in the short term and structural changes over the longer term. Both 

will help insure that the lesson of training value is not lost at the top. 

We conclude with a bumper-sticker: 

if you wish to increase military proficiency now, the best place for your marginal dollar is training.

7 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

The Core Issue and the Goal

TIME (τ is ~2-3 years)

UNI

T PROFICIEN

C

Y

This is a bad time for a war to start

Current practice Future training goal

TRAINING COSTS OR TIME

MILITARY PROFICIENCY

TIME AFTER TRAINING (τ is ~3 months)

MILITARY PROFICIENCY

FIRST TASK FORCE: Training Superiority and Training Surprise - HOW WE CAN GET SUPERIORITY

THIS TASK FORCE - HOW WE CAN KEEP IT

Learning decay

+

Personnel & unit

rotations

• Personnel Policies

• Acquisition accountable to training

• DARpaWARS: CTC-in-a-Seabag

• Deployed Combat Training Teams

• Instrumentation for home unit

training

A HIERARCHY 

OF LEARNING

CURVES

FORGETTING CURVE:

LEARNING DECAY

The training curves: hierarchies of learning curves and forgetting curves are discussed in our previous 

report, Training Superiority and Training Surprise. The “inter-deployment readiness bathtub curve” 

(above) represents the real world where proficiency decay is even more rapid because of personnel rotation policies. Filling the bathtub is key to preparing for future no-plan, come-as-you-are wars. 

IN OUR PREVIOUS DSB REPORT we discussed a revolution in training that gives 

many of our military forces a rapid and 

measurable order-of-magnitude boost in 

warfare competence. The key elements 

in this Combat Training Center (CTC) 

revolution are: 

• Create a realistic war situation, 

• Fight units and individuals 

within in it, 

• Measure everything that happens, 

• Conduct no-holds-barred collaborative after action reviews to 

explore critical feedback, and 

• Repeat for a few weeks. 

This CTC process works for a number of reasons, not the least of which is 

that it builds upon previously learned 

competencies to create competence in 

complex tasks. We created a notional 

chart of stacked learning curves to describe this. (See the upper left figure in 

this chart.) 

The figure in the upper right, however, illustrates that such a high degree 

of competence can decay if the task is

not practiced frequently. Unfortunately, 

CTC training is now performed only 

within a few specialized instrumented

ranges, only for some units every few 

years. Skill decay over time is just one 

source of warfare proficiency decay; 

other sources include rapid changes in 

the technology of warfare, changes in 

the kind of war to be fought, and personnel turbulence within units (which in 

the Army unless a war is imminent is 

8 
Training for Future Conflicts 

often at its maximum just after a unit 

completes its training at a CTC). 

Although we had hoped to find a 

way to bottle CTC training and export it 

electronically, our first task force spent 

more time considering how to maintain 

the achievements of the current training 

revolution. We were less specific about 

how we might foster a second revolution 

using new technology. 

In the current task force, we have reflected on ways to advance from the 

current state by preventing large readiness drops between applications of the 

first (CTC) training revolution to individuals and units. We offer several recommendations to keep our personnel and 

our units out of the inter-deployment 

readiness bathtub, illustrated by the 

lower figure in the chart. 

First among these are structural 

changes in the personnel and weapon 

system acquisition systems. Units, not 

individuals, are the basis of warfare 

competence, but evidence suggests that 

the existing individual-centered personnel system creates performancedegrading turbulence within units. This 

will not be easy to change. 

Second, if we were to insist that 

costs of future training be considered 

during the design and procurement of 

hardware, much of future warriors’ 

added cognitive load and training burden 

might be eliminated. 

Other structural changes include establishing Deployed Combat Training 

Teams that could—before a war is imminent—search out unique training requirements for future conflicts 

throughout the world. These would include not only what we might need to 

train ourselves, but how we might need 

to train new allies and how they might 

train us. 

Finally, we must enhance the ability 

to train units and individuals anytime 

and anywhere through local instrumentation of home stations and training projects like DARPA’s persistent, ondemand, universal training wars 

(DARWARS) program, which aims to 

create CTC-like cognitive training for 

everybody using common computer 

hardware and network facilities.

9 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Summary of the 2001 Task Force

 Uniquely American training superiority is eroding

 JV2010/2020 future requires more training, not less

 Training failure negates hardware promise

 2nd revolution in training is needed and can pay for itself

 But, DoD incentive structure won’t foster the revolution without help

 because training performance is not measured

 Training must take its Title 10 seat with “man and equip”

3⁄4 Restore and expand crown jewels of first training revolution (CTCs)

3⁄4 Each acquisition program establish, test co-equal training subsystem 

3⁄4 Services and combatant commanders deliver annual training report card to

DepSecDef

3⁄4 Designate ASD/DUSD to be accountable for training performance

3⁄4 Foster second training revolution by establishing: 

 ACTD-like pilot programs in computerized self-paced and unit-based training

 An advanced training research program element

 DARPA office for high payoff training/human performance technology

 DoD and intelligence community: detect and avoid training surprise

This is a summary of our last task force’s findings and recommendations: The right kind of training can

have electrifying effects upon performance. Unfortunately, we do it right only in parts of the Services and

even that capability is eroding. We must do more if we want to fight the new Joint Vision kind of warfare. 

We won’t get there on the present course. Worse, there is no single hand at the helm. 

The text below is the summary lifted

straight out of our previous report. In 

the last 2 years we have learned nothing 

to change our minds. The next chart is a 

report-card on the implementation of 

our recommendations. 

Our [first] task force’s principle finding is that the United States military enjoys a huge training superiority over our 

potential adversaries. This second superiority is at least as important to warfare 

performance as is America’s, better advertised, technological superiority. We 

should not rely on technological superiority alone. It could not bring victory in 

Viet Nam, nor is technology alone likely 

to be sufficient for future victories. During and since Viet Nam, actions by a few 

foresightful individuals caused our air 

forces and Army ground forces to adopt 

a new form of warfare training that has 

created a training competence complementary to our technological competence and, in part, supported by it. This 

was a revolution in training. 

We can not rest on our laurels. We

would need to reduce the cost of training 

even if nothing in warfare were to 

change. Warfare will change and training must change with it or we will be 

unable to fight our Future Combat Systems, our JV-2010/2020 forces, or even 

maintain logistics systems that sustain 

our new agile and flexible forces. 

Without a second revolution in training affairs, the revolution in military

affairs will not be supportable. That new 

training revolution is ripe for the pluck10 
Training for Future Conflicts 

ing; there is an emerging quantitative 

understanding of how to develop effective training approaches, and the electronic revolution now makes affordable 

its wide-spread application. These factors include individualized instruction, 

direct feedback on performance, beating 

the forgetting curve by delivering training at the time and point of need, and 

collaborative & self-paced learning. 

However, unless we make structural 

changes to the DoD, the new training

revolution won’t occur until long after it 

is needed. If we fail to make those 

changes, training will remain an afterthought, something slapped together ad 

hoc to address failures like those that 

occurred in the I-HAWK or ARCI programs. Such a failure will be paid for by 

the Service members we send into 

harm’s way and will waste much of the 

hard-won resources spent on acquisition 

of new (and old) weapon systems. 

The structural changes we recommend hinge upon making training issues 

routinely visible to those who write 

checks in the Pentagon. There is no 

COTS source for advanced military 

training nor is there a large industrial 

lobby to remind decision makers about 

the importance of training. This lack of 

external reminders makes structural 

change all the more important both to 

preserve our training superiority and to 

prevent training surprise from our adversaries. 

The key recommendation for fixing 

the present is to devote more resources 

to the crown jewels of the U.S.’s first 

training revolution: the CTCs, to permit 

JV2020 kinds of training against new 

threats. The keys to fixing the future are 

high-level training report cards. It 

doesn’t matter in what format the Services or the intelligence community tells 

the SecDef about the state of training, 

what matters is that the reports are delivered. The attention arising from these 

reports should aid implementation of our 

other recommendations and sustain recognition of the extraordinary value of 

training to winning wars.

11 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Report Card on 2001 DSB Training Superiority/Surprise Task Force

3 Restore CTCs and create a National Training Capability

Ç Considerable attention being paid to this now

Ç Contractor Red Force concept being tried out for air CTCs

Æ We recommend a third DSB task force to explore Joint National Training

Capability

Training OUTPUT Report Card to, at least, DepSecDef: not accepted

Annual Red Training Surprise Report

Æ Only delivered to this DSB task force, not requested by DoD

 Designate ASD/DUSD to be held accountable for training

Ç P&R has been given a seat on DAB.

Ê USD(P&R) has chosen to be advocate but process not institutionalized

Initiate ACTD-like pilot programs in training: no progress

Minimal effort to move training out of schoolhouses and into forces

Create an advanced training R&D program element: nothing

 Establish DARPA office for high payoff training/human performance 

technology development: Office (room 573) starting one program

Task Force results not briefed at highest DoD levels in this admin

μ

μ

μ

μ

μ

μ

We advocate regular reports on training to bring the subject to the attention of those who control money in

the DoD. In keeping with policy, here is our own report card on implementation of our last task force’s 

recommendations. Green checks and arrows represent encouraging results. A red X represents a recommendation that has been rejected or ignored. 

SINCE OUR FIRST task force began, much 

progress has been made to increase 

awareness at high levels in the Pentagon 

of the value of training. Whether or not 

we influenced it, we note that an initiative to create a Joint National Training 

Capability is underway. There has also 

been progress in using commercial 

sources to provide CTC’s opposing air 

forces. 

Our recommendation that DepSecDef require a yearly training report 

card was not accepted; the Under Secretary of Defense for Personal and Readiness [USD(P&R)], who has taken 

substantial responsibility for training 

upon himself, stated that too many reports burden the system already. 

In the area of training surprise, our 

task force received a report from the 

intelligence community, but this report 

was only delivered to us and went no 

further into the DoD. 

In our recommendations we failed to 

identify any action official to initiate 

ACTD-like projects in training or to 

establish an advanced training R&D 

program element. These recommendations received the customary fate of passive voice advice so crafted: they were 

ignored. In this report’s recommendations (next page) we remedy that omission. 

Although DARPA did not, as we 

recommended, establish an entire office 

for training and human effectiveness 

research, we are pleased to report that 

12 
Training for Future Conflicts 

one training research program has been 

created within DARPA. To make this 

happen, however, one of the co-chairs of 

this task force (Chatham) left his position in private industry to build and 

manage the program in DARPA. 

Finally, we note that the previous 

task force co-chairmen (who also cochaired this task force and are principle 

authors of this report) have not briefed 

their message to the highest levels of the 

Defense Department. This is, in part, due 

to the interruption caused by the atrocities of 11 September 2001. Our message 

did, however, reach the Under Secretary 

of Defence, Personnel and Readiness, 

USD(P&R), and his staff. They have 

taken positive action on many of our 

recommendations. We would like to see 

steps taken to institutionalize this interest and attention so it does not disappear 

when the current USD leaves office.

13 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

This Task Force’s Recommendations

 Structural changes to bring “train” to the table with “man and equip”

3⁄4 SecDef require an effective, realistic training report card yearly

 From Services, JCS, and acquisition establishment—in their own formats

3⁄4 SecDef request annual Training Surprise report card

3⁄4 USD(AT&L) establish and test co-equal training subsystem for acquisition programs

 Training experiments and research at levels commensurate with the influence of

training upon proficiency & readiness

3⁄4 USD(P&R) sponsor an ACTD for Joint Virtual Training Environments

 Expand USMC’s DVTE & Navy VAST to create joint environment

3⁄4 DARPA expand Training Superiority (DARWARS) initiative

3⁄4 Services provide units with ability to train at home with instrumented systems—

USD(P&R) include this in training transformation plan

3⁄4 USD(P&R) create, JFCOM advise ~ $40m/yr 6.3 training budget line

 CJCS and combatant commanders establish Deployed Combat Training Teams

 USD(P&R) report on how to move to Unit Managed Personnel System

 DSB maintain focus on training with new TF on Joint National Training

Capability

The structural recommendations have not changed since our last report. The training research ones have 

become more specific. We have added to our list an approach to identify future war’s training needs, and a

look at how to hold the personnel system accountable to warfare proficiency. We also recommend that the 

DSB not stop here but address how to create a true national training capability. 

“TRAINING” FIRST APPEARS in an OSD 

job title four levels down in the hierarchy. In large part this is because training 

funding is diffuse; there is no equivalent 

in training to a major system acquisition 

program office. Given its effect on warfare proficiency, however, training deserves more visibility. 

The first and last recommendations 

on this chart deal with methods to create 

this visibility. Reports that are critically 

reviewed force out issues and deficiencies that will otherwise be ignored. Reports from the Services, Joint Forces and 

acquisition establishment will not only 

highlight issues within the current training structure, they will force analyses of 

trades across stovepipes and identify 

when training is paying bills that would 

be better paid by the acquisition or personnel communities. 

The recommended Training Surprise 

Report should achieve a similar effect by 

encouraging the intelligence community 

to search for indicators of innovative 

training practices among potential adversaries that could lead to rapid proficiency changes. Finally, in the area of 

increasing training visibility in the Pentagon, we recommend that the DSB continue to highlight these issues by 

initiating a third training task force. 

Aside from visibility, there is the 

matter of funding for training research, 

which has been dropping for a decade 

even as new training approaches have

become more necessary. Virtual training 

environments based upon common com14 
Training for Future Conflicts 

puters have now shown that they can 

provide ways for our forces to practice 

cognitive and mission skills outside of

large CTCs (for example, on shipboard 

and at remote sites). Follow-ons to successful initial effectiveness demonstrations, however, are not funded. They 

should be; the technology level is just 

right for their expansion into a multiService Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration (ACTD). 

DARPA has initiated a Training Superiority project, nicknamed 

DARWARS, to create new kinds of 

training systems and then to link them 

and other training systems together to 

provide a set of universal, on-demand, 

persistent training wars for anyone, any 

echelon, at any time. Success will be 

determined by whether the Services and 

joint training programs join the process. 

This requires that a sufficient number of 

training systems be created and displayed to the Services to draw them into 

the process. The current program may be 

too small to achieve this. It should be 

expanded. 

While DARWARS aims to collapse 

CTC training into a seabag, the next

recommendation deals with creating 

sufficient instrumentation capability to 

allow units to train in the field at their 

home stations. This can be done today in 

part by paying attention to the issue during the design of emerging communications systems. We ask USD(P&R) to 

include this goal in his training transformation plans. P&R should also create 

a funding line to support low-hanging 

fruit that, with an additional infusion of 

cash, could deliver training value 

quickly. 

We should prepare for future comeas-you-are wars by identifying in advance what kinds of training we and our 

new pick-up allies may need. The joint 

warfare organizations should establish a 

few permanent deployed teams—

designated here as Deployed Combat 

Training Teams—dedicated to this task. 

Finally, we recommend investigating 

how we might reform the personnel system so that it becomes more responsive 

to the impact it has on training and on 

warfare proficiency. 

15 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Left Intentionally Blank

16 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Searching for Future Conflicts:

We Have Met the Future and It Is Now

With a nod to Walt Kelly’s phrasing, we note that, as this task force searched to define the character of

future conflicts, a future conflict found all of us on 11 September 2001. The goals of our task force changed 

as a result, as did the goals of much of the rest of the nation. 

17 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Terms of Reference

 Identify training approaches and technologies that will bring

our forces into a new warfighting era

 Characterize training and education needs to support JV2010/ 

JV2020 expectations 

3⁄4 Capabilities-based force

3⁄4 Combat dominance

 Identify time-phased developments over the next two decades

3⁄4 Training for both U.S. and allied forces to support transformation of 

concepts, technology, and forces

 Continue examination of Training Surprise 

3⁄4 Through evolution

3⁄4 Through transfer of training techniques from U.S. or our allies

3⁄4 Through the effects of globalization of innovation

Here are the major components of our charter, which asked us to describe the training changes necessary

to support a transformed military. We put the icon in the corner to represent that this chart deals with

changes required to support DoD’s warfare transformation. In future charts we will use other icons: 

stacked learning curves to indicate unfinished business left over from our last task force, or the readiness

bathtub curve without the green arrow to indicate we are discussing problems, but not yet offering solutions.

THE TERMS OF REFERENCE that initiated 

this task force are quoted in full in an

appendix. Here we summarize. 

The central theme of our charter is to 

explore what kinds of transformation in 

training may be required to support the 

broader transformation of our military. A 

combination of both these transformations is needed to achieve a future U.S. 

force characterized by Joint Vision

2010/2020 in which new warfare capabilities will emerge. These capabilities 

will be based on jointness, collaboration, 

and the leveraging of information within 

and across echelons. 

The U.S. transformed training starting in the 1970s and 1980s. The major 

innovation involved using combat training centers (CTCs) having competent 

opposing forces (OPFORs), and realtime instrumentation to determine force 

locations and state, and event pairing. 

When integrated with after action reviews (AARs) conducted by mentors 

and the trained forces themselves, these 

factors underwrote a revolution in learning and training methodology. This 

large-scale training capability was bolstered by smaller forces using live virtual and constructive simulation 

(sometimes combined and distributed) 

and metrics developed from tasks, conditions, and standards. 

18 
Training for Future Conflicts 

For almost 20 years no other forces 

of any nations employed these innovative methods. This first training transformation improved combat capabilities 

by factors of 5 to 35, rivaling and often 

exceeding improvements that could be 

made with new (and costly) generations 

of hardware. Our first study explored 

how this was done and the cracks we 

saw in the process. We predicted that a 

second training revolution was possible. 

The terms of reference for this task 

force asked us to characterize the elements of a second training revolution 

that could lead to fully transformed Joint 

Vision 2010/2020 capabilities-based 

forces. In addition, it asked for programmatic suggestions, recognizing that 

the underpinning for training and education transformation cannot be satisfied 

by simply improving what exists. New 

methodologies, elements and technologies will be needed. 

We were also asked to continue our 

inquiry into training surprise. As indicated, we were charged to examine revolutionary improvements: those that are 

the results of direct export of U.S. technologies and capabilities; those that flow 

from the globalization of goods, services 

and technologies; and finally, those that 

are truly independent surprises. 

As often happens, when reviewing 

our work we found that we did not accomplish our entire tasking. A major gap 

exists in the area of foreign training, 

both our training of new and unexpected 

allies and how they might train us. We 

do, however, make recommendations on 

how the needed review might be 

achieved and institutionalized without 

further DSB action. 

19 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Training Isn’t:

 Military training should be neither “just in time” nor “just in 

case”

 Simulation is not training 

 Networks are not training 

 Virtual environments are not training

 Games, including massive multiplayer on-line games, are not 

training

 Process measures do not assess training success

3⁄4Training is: relevant practice with feedback

This chart lists several common training fallacies. Many myths about training are sustained by commonsense, but not by research. For example, the notion that people learn better when the training process

matches their “learning style” is quite appealing but not borne out by quantitative research. 

WE START WITH A FEW definitions and 

observations. 

We concern ourselves with training, 

not education. The object of military 

training is not to create better-rounded 

citizens, it is to deliver warfare competence available where and when it is 

needed. We don’t advocate delivering 

training “just in time.” Warfare is a chaotic endeavor and plans to deliver anything just in time are certain to be 

disrupted in the fog of conflict. Nor do 

we advocate “just in case training,” 

packing individuals with every bit of 

knowledge we can force into them. Our 

new technology has given us far too 

many facts and options for the brain to 

work with. We must find a middle 

ground that delivers competence close 

enough to use so that it is fresh when 

required, but does not deliver so much 

that the user is overwhelmed with so 

many facts that s/he can’t choose what 

course of action to employ. 

We find that there are many commonly held misconceptions that we may 

as well dispel at the start. First, simulation may help training, but it is not by 

itself training. Improvements in resolution or simulation fidelity are often 

pleasing to the senses, but they do not 

necessarily signify improvements in 

training. At times they can even decrease 

the training value if expectations, raised 

by the beauty of the simulation, are not 

met—better a line drawing that moves 

correctly than a million-triangle visualization that doesn’t. 

Neither are networking, virtual environments, or are games, by themselves, 

20 
Training for Future Conflicts 

training. Training comes when these 

tools are combined with scenarios that 

force learning, with practice of relevant 

tasks within the scenarios, and with 

feedback during and after the experience. Games can teach, but it is important to ask what they teach. It is possible 

to wander around for many hours in a 

wonderful simulation learning few new 

(or the wrong) lessons. To convert a 

game or a simulation into training, one 

must make sure relevant lessons, tailored 

to the learner’s needs, arise from the 

situation and are practiced, identified, 

and reinforced. 

The notion of using computer games 

as trainers is currently quite popular, but 

how, why, and what they teach is a matter of hand-waving, not science. Nor is 

there understanding in the commercial 

game world or the psychology community of what makes games compelling 

and keeps users engaged so that lessons 

can be taught. 

There should be a catalog of sound, 

motion, color, visual effects, orienting 

response, levels, pacing, etc., and an 

understanding how each of these affects 

learning and user focus. There should be, 

but there isn’t. Given the current incentive structure, nothing is likely to 

change: game developers can’t afford 

the research and academics can’t get 

grants for frivolous things like game

dynamics and game assessment. Since 

neither the industry nor the academic 

community is likely to pursue research 

into the science of what makes games 

work without an external source of motivation, this area of study is an ideal 

subject for a DoD Multidisciplinary 

University Research Initiative (MURI) 

project. We recommend that OSD initiate such a project. 

Games will play a part, even a large 

part, in future training, given that they 

can provide practice with feedback that 

previously touted teaching revolutions 

could not, as well as provide strong motivation to practice. Nevertheless, without some research into how games 

actually work, the games-for-training fad 

may end up as peripheral to real training 

as did the education revolution once 

claimed for training films and for television. 

21 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Searching for Future Conflict Descriptions

 Services and JCS are espousing transformation

 New concepts being formulated; none tested

 Mostly disconnected efforts with different names: Joint Vision 2010/2020, Net 

Centric Warfare, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, Transformed Army,

Expeditionary Air Force ... 

3⁄4 We heard few concrete examples of future conflicts

 Mostly generic uses justifying existing or planned systems and staff structures

 Nothing like Afghanistan, Somalia, or Yugoslavia

 Mixed transformation picture from intelligence, infrastructure, and 

support communities

 Little thought given to training as ingredient of transformation

3⁄4 Army recognized a training revolution as necessary for their transformation.

USN trying to transform Navy education and training

 Briefings to us missed jointness, interoperability, and combined and 

coalition operations; the training-acquisition connection; and roles and 

value of unmanned systems

In the spring of 2001, we asked a number of organizations for their view of future conflicts. They told us

instead about their own progress, leaving out a view of the future that should have, perhaps, motivated the 

proposed changes. We may not have posed our question well, but an old hand at DSB studies once said, 

“believe them the first time.” Above is what we heard first. 

TO DETERMINE FUTURE training needs, 

we needed a view of the nature of future 

conflicts. In the hope of avoiding arguments about the validity of our choice of 

context, we set out to aggregate a vision 

of the future from those given to us by 

the Services and the Joint Forces. We

asked each Service, the JCS, and a number of support communities to tell us 

what future conflicts might look like. 

As we had feared, the vision was 

cloudy. All the briefers discussed 

changes underway or contemplated, but 

we got more information about proposed 

changes than we did about the character 

of future warfare needs that a transformed force might experience. 

Moreover, we found mention of 

other Services was conspicuous by its 

absence. There were also no references 

to the use of unmanned systems. Subsequent to these briefings, the Afghan 

campaign showed the need for and value 

of both. We also asked for informal 

speculations on what changes might be 

needed in training to help achieve the 

transformation they envisioned. The 

Army listed a dozen or so accomplishments needed to achieve their goals. 

When asked which were most important, 

the briefer considered and then stated

that if flawless communication and 

transformed training could be achieved, 

they would bring about the other 10. He 

was unsure how to achieve transformed 

training, however, and looked to us for 

ideas. We hope that what we offer here 

will be of some use. 

22 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Also commendable are the Navy’s 

far-reaching efforts to transform education and training for everyone in that 

Service. We were pleased to note that 

our first task force’s work had some influence on their effort, or at least was 

used to motivate the process. We hope 

that this initiative will grow to include 

the need to aid transformation for future 

wars was as well as correct current ills. 

None of those we asked noted the 

large impact that the personnel or acquisition communities had on training. 

Training appears to remain in a separate 

compartment of our military thinking.

The substantial savings that can be 

achieved by trading it off against the 

man and equip sides of our military establishment remain neglected even as we 

attempt to transform.

23 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Our Cloudy View of Future Conflicts

 All different

3⁄4 “No plan” contingencies likely

 Can arise with little warning

3⁄4 Minimal planning, rehearsal, or staging time

 Will be fought in unexpected places

3⁄4 Remote from continental U.S. and existing basing

 Will have elements of joint small unit operations and 

dispersed operations

 We will have to deal intimately with local forces and 

civilians, and with their culture, politics, and institutions

 Our response to this future appears to be to create new kinds 

of forces and new hardware full of complicated technical 

detail to allow us to operate continuously and at a far faster 

pace than any adversary

It was not clear to us that the changes being undertaken are a response to the brave new world of conflicts 

or are being made instead for the sake of transformation. Nevertheless, here are a few characteristics we 

expect from future conflicts. We will expand upon them in subsequent charts. 

THERE IS NO DEARTH of future visions 

despite our inability to get them directly 

from Service and warfare-support 

briefers. The intelligence community, for 

example, gave us a comprehensive vision of contentious problems that are 

likely to arise over the next several decades. These ranged from changing 

demographics to a newly emerging real 

global shortage of fresh water. (Shortages of water have been until now 

mostly ones of distribution, not a worldwide lack. Food and energy shortages 

will continue to be distribution issues not 

a global lack.) 

Without useable Service and Joint 

inputs, we resorted to creating our own 

list of characteristics of future conflicts. 

Chief among them is that they will arise 

unexpectedly, and unlike our Cold War 

experience, there is a fair chance that 

existing war plans will not cover them. 

A second major theme appears to be 

that, at least in conflicts like our 

2001/2002 Afghan campaign, the actions 

of a very small number of our warriors 

can have a large effect upon the success 

or failure of the war. 

The expected warfare environment 

may become even more complicated

than in the past. The Army Science 

Board’s 2000 Summer Study found, for 

example, that “In the dynamic battlefield 

environment of the future, C4ISR 

(command, control, communications, 

computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance) functions will be 

critical to the Future Combat System

24 
Training for Future Conflicts 

(FCS) success. The blinding speed and 

sheer volume of information will overwhelm and inundate the FCS operators 

and decision-makers.” 

Whether this is a necessary consequence of the future conflict environment or whether it results from our 

choice of how to meet it, we are moving 

headlong into a future that is full of 

technical and procedural detail and, although we swear on stacks of future system proposals that the cognitive 

demands made by our new hardware and 

procedures will be less onerous than

those of the past, we know in our hearts 

that they won’t be. 

The special forces teams that supported indigenous Afghan forces were 

superbly trained for that work, partly by 

accident and partly by intent. We can not 

afford the time, resources, and facilities 

to train all our fighters in that way. 

Something else will be needed. 

25 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Unintended Human Consequences:

 Cognitive demands will grow despite requirements to the 

contrary

3⁄4 Technology will confuse as often as it will support the warrior

 Transformed services will force everybody—even the most 

junior—to think

3⁄4 Receive, triage, assess, decide, and act on masses of incoming data

3⁄4 Transformation will replace human functions with machines

3⁄4 Transformation will replace the sight of your buddy with icons on a

screen

 Current training does not prepare our individuals or units for 

the new dynamic cognitive demands

 Current individual replacement system will not deliver 

needed higher levels of cohesion that transformation will

demand

The power per person in future wars will increase at the same time that each warrior becomes separated

from the direct human contact that has motivated people in close combat since well before Alexander the 

Great. Add in technology confusion and you have a training problem that may be qualitatively different

from any that we have seen before. 

The electronic domain has created a 

class of problems that not only are complicated, detailed, and have no intuitive 

connection with our non-digital senses, 

but the domain itself changes so rapidly 

that we need to learn whole new generations of software commands on an almost yearly basis. If a new kind of 

training isn’t created to help, the warriors will be overwhelmed. 

THE INCREASED COGNITIVE demands 

discussed in the previous chart result in a 

number of unintended human consequences. Chief among them is that our 

warriors and support personnel will have 

to thrive in a world that places more 

cognitive demands upon them than ever 

before. 

The future warriors may find themselves on a battlefield with no sense of 

the presence of their comrades except as 

icons on a computer screen. As they try 

to fight and to keep track of masses of 

digital information at the same time, 

their only help may come from the military equivalent of the paper-clip icon

that pops up occasionally in current office software. 

This amounts to addressing the supply side of training: how to get it to the 

users so that they are competent to perform their tasks as needed. The other 

way to extricate ourselves from the hole 

technology transformation is digging for 

us is to address the demand side of training and create systems that obviate the 

need to train. In our last report we rec26 
Training for Future Conflicts 

ommended structural changes in the acquisition system such that the value of 

demand-side changes would be obvious 

and there would be motivation to address 

them. 

We so recommend again. We also 

add in this report new recommendations 

for structural changes in the third part of

the Title 10 charge to the military services (man, equip, and train military 

forces for the Combatant Commanders): 

the personnel system. 

27 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Some New Afghanistan Campaign Demands

 Deploying to a landlocked country

3⁄4 No initial bases or nearby prepositioned forces and supplies

3⁄4 Air insertion of supply from sea and distant basing

 Combining U.S. and local forces

3⁄4 Amplify local forces with fires, situational awareness, supply, & support

3⁄4 Initial employment of local draft animals and pickup trucks along with U.S.

fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and

3⁄4 Transitioning up to larger, traditional U.S. and allied campaign forces

 Joint and combined arms operations

3⁄4 Preplanned and flexible attacks combining air and ground forces with 

loitering aircraft for precision weapon delivery and AC-130 direct fires

3⁄4 Employment of national standoff and close-in robotic (air + ground) ISR

3⁄4 Information reachback

 Unfamiliar culture, geography, language, and warfare approaches

Here are some of the characteristics of the Afghan war and new technology that enabled it. Our forces, for 

example, could call in precision air support from aircraft out of sight miles above them. The same technology, however, also allowed one soldier to call down an air strike on himself and allies because of a failure 

to understand which coordinates appeared on a GPS display after changing the unit’s batteries. 

IN THE LAST FEW CHARTS, we made a 

general case about the character of future 

conflicts and described some of the human implications arising therefrom.

Having set the context, in the next few 

pages we will expand upon the changing 

nature of warfare. 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

placed new demands on our forces and 

those of our allies who participated. It 

also provided the circumstances to apply, in a modest but meaningful manner, 

the tenets of JV2010/2020 at both operational and tactical levels. Innovation was 

an important aspect of campaign planning, preparation, and execution. Transformation was demonstrated by networkenabled collaborative activities to bring 

precision fires to bear, enable precision 

logistics executed from the air, and permit rapid deployment and sustainment 

from the sea and from distant land bases. 

This is to be contrasted with the traditional in-theater APODs, SPODs, and 

RSOI process. (See the appendix for a 

list of acronyms.) 

Ground forces included those from

Special Operations Command and Army

and Marine components of Central 

Command. These forces employed both 

traditional and non-traditional means to 

both deploy and carry out operations. 

Insertion by air directly from ships at sea 

provided real-world examples of what 

has been posited as counters to the use of 

anti-access strategies and tactics. 

Later in the campaign, robotic capabilities were brought to bear. Hellfire28 
Training for Future Conflicts 

armed Predator UAVs operated and 

commanded using distributed collaboration techniques and achieved the desired 

engagement performance within the 

boundaries of the rules of engagement 

(ROEs). Similarly, ground robots were 

employed to explore buildings and caves 

in support of manned air-land operations 

which also involved ground troops and 

organic firepower augmentation by attack helicopters and AC-130 gun ships. 

Fixed-wing aircraft delivered bombs 

with unprecedented precision. 

In all of the aforementioned circumstances, there are lessons to be learned, 

not only for training for ongoing and 

near-term operations but also for the 

transformation of training and education. 

For the moment, the lessons learned 

provide mostly insight that has not yet 

been converted into direct design guidance. Operation Enduring Freedom

should be regarded as the “tip of the 

iceberg” of the possibilities for enhanced 

and transformed joint operations. Much 

more can be done to define and explore 

the possibilities. We need to solidify the 

easily lost capabilities that resulted from

clever “ad hocery.” We also need to institutionalize inter-operability collaboration across force components and 

echelons. The requisite planning and 

preparation could be accomplished by 

overlaying available networking and 

communications on existing training 

ranges at home stations or CTCs. 

There are serious implications for the 

GIG, WIN-T, JTRS, and related communication systems now in early development and fielding stages. These new 

systems must not only support operations but also the training for them. 

They must, therefore, have (1) an 

embedded position location capability 

(where GPS does not function), possibly 

through multilateration; and (2) bandwidth to carry status and event data. At a 

minimum, they must also provide information for engagement pairing of real 

and virtual entities, whether these be 

manned or unmanned. 

29 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Homeland Security Considerations

 We reviewed some activities where DoD training and

training technology contributed to initial Homeland Security 

efforts

3⁄4 Adaptation of air team-training instrumentation pods (ACMI) to 

provide tracking, C2 for warplanes patrolling inside our outwardlooking military radar coverage and below FAA coverage.

3⁄4 Use of existing simulation tools to assist first responder planning and

training

3⁄4 Precision mapping of World Trade Center site to assist search, 

recovery, and clean up 

3⁄4 Activities by various crisis and support teams and the DoD 

Department of military support

 Northern Command and the Dept. of Homeland Security

were formed after our information-gathering efforts ended

 We do, however, observe that in the near term, improvements 

will depend upon organization, planning, and training. DoD 

should provide major assistance in these areas.

If you want rapid improvements, you should emphasize the people who perform the work. Improvements

through hardware take more time and are often more expensive. On the other hand, training improvements 

can be more ephemeral than hardware. This applies to the homeland security area as well as the military. 

IN THE COURSE of our activities, we devoted one of our sessions to examining 

circumstances where existing DoD capabilities were adapted to homeland security needs. These are cited in the 

accompanying graphic as useful examples of both thoughtful preparation by 

the DoD (implemented totally by the

Services) and successful “ad hocery.” 

The greatest insight to be gained from 

reviewing these circumstances has to do 

with assessment, planning, preparation, 

training, and exercising. It is the same 

insight and conclusion reached by other 

studies of homeland security challenges, 

particularly the DSB study: Homelend 

Defense Against Bioterrorism. 

In the near term (3 to 5 years) almost 

all improvements in homeland security 

will be derived from the process (planning, training, etc.) cited above, because, 

with a few exceptions, even important 

technological improvements will take 

more time to reach the field. It is as true 

here as it is for the military: if you want 

to spend a marginal dollar to improve 

capability or performance now, that dollar should go to the people side of the 

equation, rather than to fascinating 

hardware. We therefore recommend that 

great emphasis be placed on improvements through planning and training. 

Fortunately, the DoD is the world 

class planning and training organization. 

Its capabilities should be brought to bear 

to the benefit of the first responders: 

firefighters, police, and emergency, 

health care and infrastructure control,

maintenance and repair personnel. 

30 
Training for Future Conflicts 

As the Homeland Security Department is formed and starts functioning, 

DoD should assist not only with its formidable technology capabilities for the 

mid- and long-term but also with its 

planning and training expertise. The 

National Guard with responsibilities in 

both DoD and the States appears to be 

uniquely positioned to accomplish this. 

Finally, we note that in a major 

homeland security crisis the DoD will be 

called upon in multiple ways. This 

represents another kind of future conflict 

situation for which DoD training will be 

vital. 

31 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Emerging Transformational Developments  Armed, unmanned ground

vehicles

 Robotic follower supply 

vehicles

 UAV-carried

3⁄4 Communications relays

3⁄4 GPS pseudolite jam-resistant

transmitters

 Next generation of military

wireless capabilities

3⁄4 Will underwrite 

joint/collaborative operations

down to lower echelons

 JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio 

System)

 WIN-T (Warfighter Information

Network - Tactical)

 GIG (Global Information Grid)

 Enhanced Service and joint data

links

3⁄4 Bandwidth to support training

in these systems and other 

training issues have received

little emphasis to date

 Improved, low latency,

organic ISR

3⁄4 For smaller combat units,

organically and new 

information delivered from

higher levels

3⁄4 Examples

 A-160 robotic, mediumaltitude, long-endurance (40 

hr) helo as an ISR platform

with MTI and SAR radar

 Predator ISR and combat

payloads

 Global hawk ISR and

communications improvements

 Organic Air Vehicle (OAV)

with an ISR payload

 Jigsaw: processing software to

identify targets in cluttered 

terrain (adapted to OAV sensor

suite)

 Foliage penetrating radars for 

A-160, Predator, and Global 

Hawk

 Shadow UAV and its ISR

payloads for small[-unit use

3⁄4 Organic, networked ELINT

and acoustic systems to 

localize targets

3⁄4 Improved man-portable 

target ranging, locating, 

designating devices

3⁄4 Improved passive and active

combat ID systems

 Robotic underwater 

obstacle & mine clearing

systems

 First generation of robotic 

combat vehicles

3⁄4 UCAV (uninhabited combat air vehicle)

3⁄4 UCAR (uninhabited combat rotocraft)

3⁄4 Ground robotic weapon 

platforms

 Including Netfires with 

precision and loitering

missiles

 New high-performance 

clothing that must be used

as a system (it fails if you use

the wrong underwear)

This “eye chart” is meant to overwhelm the reader. The contents overwhelm us. This, unfortunately, represents only a small fraction of the new technology on its way to overwhelm our warriors who will be engaged in future conflicts. They will need new training to deal with all this and more. 

THE COMPANION GRAPHIC lists mixed 

examples of transformational technologies, subsystems, systems, platforms, 

and networks. Most importantly it indicates technical circumstances that permit 

employing such systems effectively, 

efficiently, reliably, and controllably. 

The examples are mixed because they 

range from technology in development 

(for example, the A-160 long-endurance 

robotic helicopter, probable fielding in 

2008) to robotic underwater mine clearing systems being fielded now. 

This listing, which is representative, 

not all-inclusive, gives special emphasis 

both to technologies that provide much 

improved situation understanding and to 

those technologies that enable swift and 

precise collaborative integration of the 

very things sought in JV2010/ 

2020—e.g., precision fires, precision 

logistics, and dominant maneuver. 

Also included in this representative 

set are the means to organize mannedunmanned action teams (humans plus 

robots) as well as unmanned-unmanned 

action teams (robots alone). The presence of both provides greater functional 

persistence (e.g., for ISR) beyond that 

which can be accomplished with humans. It also can obviate the need for 

extended time periods where human

manning would be onerous, sometimes 

risky, or both. Of course, the unmanned 

systems can at best perform only to the 

extent that their human designers have 

built in (and trained) the ability to deal 

with complexity. It is unreasonable to 

expect that computer-based reasoning on 

a par with human capabilities will be a 

32 
Training for Future Conflicts 

feature for these now-in-development 

items. Therefore, the training of humans 

to employ individual or integrated sets of 

unmanned devices will be crucial to 

overall success. The bumper sticker is 

this: there will be no unmanned systems. 

There may be no person onboard, but 

people will have to be trained to operate 

all the systems for the foreseeable future. 

Again we see the need for new 

methodologies to meet transformational 

goals. The message remains that a transformation of force capability demands 

transformation of training.

33 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Left Intentionally Blank

34 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Impediments to the Training Transformation

We have discussed a number of reasons why DoD training must be transformed. We will now explore the 

base upon which we propose to build the new transformation: our first training revolution, which instituted

engagement simulation in Combat Training Centers. We will then list impediments that stand in the way of

a second training revolution, one to be fully grounded in the digital age. 

35 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Our Training Superiority Conundrum

 Combat Training Center (CTC) delivers superiority:

3⁄4 We create wars

 With better-than-real enemy

3⁄4 Fight in them

3⁄4 Soul-search about our failures and successes

3⁄4 Try again

3⁄4 Documented, consistent order of magnitude improvements in weeks

 But we often waste this powerful advantage

3⁄4 We don’t have enough wars, real or simulated

 To train everyone in every skill, especially joint warfare skills

3⁄4 Only used by some of our forces, some of the time

 Process is episodic - not continuous

 Not used non-air Navy, USMC, some USAF and USA forces, or by any

support or intelligence organizations

 Virtual wars not often used below combatant commander staff level

 Personnel system plays musical chairs with unit manning 

afterwards

CTC training works extraordinarily well when it can be used. However, it is currently conducted only at a 

limited number of fixed sites for specific classes of warfare. Therefore, it can’t be used often enough or by

enough of our forces on enough of the many tasks our forces will be asked to perform in future conflicts. 

Worse, because training is thought of as independent of other Title 10 requirements, the personnel and

acquisition systems often squander the gains made from this process. 

AS DISCUSSED in our previous report, the 

U.S. training revolution of the 1970s and 

1980s involved creating artificial but 

realistic wars, fighting in them, objectively and self-critically measuring our 

performance in the war, and then trying 

again. The results have been spectacular: 

measured order-of-magnitude proficiency increases achieved in only a few 

weeks. 

Units emerging from this training are 

the most proficient warfighters in the 

world. Our 100-hour land-warfare victory in Desert Storm is a testament to 

this kind of training. 

Unfortunately, when a war is not 

imminent, only one month after a unit 

completes land warfare CTC training it 

often has become one of our least ready 

units. The personnel system plays musical chairs with the people therein, sending the commander and others off to new 

jobs. This destroys the interpersonal 

relationships that were so painfully developed in the process of engagement 

simulation. If war is imminent the personnel system can be held at bay. Units 

remain stable after a visit to a CTC and 

their peak proficiency decays much less 

rapidly. 

If a conflict arises with little warning, however, many of our units will be 

at the bottom of the inter-deployment 

readiness bathtub. Moreover, the CTC 

paradigm is not universal. It is used only 

by some of our forces every few years. 

36 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Major warfare exercises are often 

cited as providing training, but they do 

not include the key elements of a CTC 

experience. The training experience is 

limited to a few units and to high level 

staffs, neither of which get a chance to 

replay and repair their mistakes.

37 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

“Schoolhouse Training Won’t Hack It”

 Must train junior personnel to succeed in cognitive tasks

 Rapid changes

3⁄4 Technology refresh rate

3⁄4 Changing character of the conflicts

3⁄4 Personnel turnover and transfer to units with different versions of technology

 Skill decay

 Must be trained both for when the system works and when it degrades

 Residential instruction can be highly disruptive to units and personnel 

rotations

 Apprentice-Journeyman-Master OJT training may not hack it either

3⁄4 Not enough experts to do and to teach, too

 Expertise drains out of military with 5-10 year time constant

 In some new wars, perhaps, nobody is an expert

 Distributed learning may be necessary but is not sufficient

 Emerging phenomena of training systems growing into job performance 

aids

 Overwhelming insertion of overwhelming technology

Residential instruction has a long historical precedent. For some kinds of training it is still appropriate, 

but lectures are a poor way to instil complex skills. Moreover, moving people in and out of schoolhouses is 

costly and incredibly disruptive to unit cohesion. Personal computers, networking, and new training technology now make it possible to move knowledge to the student instead of moving the student to the classroom. 

“SCHOOLHOUSE TRAINING won’t hack 

it”∗ to deliver competence in the new 

world of future conflicts. This includes 

the technical changes, complexities, and 

bewildering variety of new and unplanned operational tasks that seem to be 

demanded every time our military turns 

around. We must train our forces not 

only to competence in straightforward 

tasks, we must train even the most junior 

levels of our hierarchies to analyze and 

to think. This can’t be done by residentbased training alone. 

Nor can schoolhouse training capitalize on the phenomena that we began to 

see as a pattern: the very best training 

systems are being modified to become

job performance aids. The Interactive 

Multi-Analysis Trainer (IMAT) discussed briefly in our last report illustrates this. Not only has it revolutionized 

the way sonarmen can view the environment through which sound passes, 

but when used as an operational tool it 

has created a brand new competence: a 

junior petty officer can now create onboard ship an acoustic search plan that 

has the potential to actually be useful (a 

thing that no one could have done even 5 

 

∗

 The quote is from General Paul Gorman (USA,

Retired) in reference to how an electronicallydelivered course could e-mail former students 

when the course matter changed, in opposition to

how a conventional course ends when the students leave the classroom. 

38 
Training for Future Conflicts 

years ago). Another example is the application of an aircraft training system 

locator now used to track operational 

warplanes in their new homeland defense role—inside our borders where 

there are no military radars. 

We pay a penalty for trying to keep 

our military technology up to the level of 

commercial and consumer electronic 

technology; what a soldier learned a few 

years ago may no longer be valid today. 

Traditional residential instruction 

doesn’t cope well with this issue. Nor

can master-apprentice training. It is hard 

for an apprentice to learn if there are no 

masters. 

Advanced Distributed Learning is a 

necessary ingredient for fixing this, but, 

at the moment, ADL supports the delivery of information to a computer near 

you. The “last meter,” from the computer to understanding inside the head of 

a student, is not yet well covered by 

ADL. Even without the desire to remain 

compatible with Microsoft, rapid introduction of new technology can overwhelm our warriors. We note with 

concern, for example, that the Army’s 

Objective Force Warrior program intends to deliver each new warfare capability to the troops as soon as each 

subsystem is ready. The training chaos 

this approach implies does not seem to 

have been considered by the hardware 

acquisition organizations. 

We can not resist repeating the following unverified anecdote. A soldier 

suit, created to keep the user warm in the 

cold and cool in hot weather, was carefully tested and found good. When it was 

tried out in the field by a regular unit, it 

failed. The problem was that soldiers 

were using their own underwear, 

whereas the suit’s design required a special kind of underwear material be used 

that worked as a system with the rest of

the suit so the dew-point was not inside. 

Technology is forcing us even to teach 

warriors how to dress. Nothing remains 

intuitive.

39 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Personnel Turbulence Limits Unit Performance

 Units, not individuals, are the “atom” of combat power, yet we move

people with little regard to effects on unit performance

3⁄4 Personnel rotations not coupled to unit readiness

 Individual replacement personnel system plays musical chairs with units after 

they have achieved high readiness

 Creates the current 30-plus percent per year turnover that won’t permit future units to be

prepared for come-as-you-are wars.

3⁄4 A dominantly residential education system constantly rotates individuals out 

of units for technical & leadership schoolhouse training 

 (Effective distributed learning could deliver such training inside the unit)

 A unit-based personnel system could

 Hold the personnel system accountable for the training and readiness havoc it can 

create

 Obviate much re-training and unnecessary training

 Slow the learning decay after major training events

 Create stabilized units that achieve new higher standards of readiness

 As well as improve cohesion, morale, family stability, and REDUCE COST

Personnel turbulence disrupts military units, not only directly by sending individuals to residential instruction, but indirectly by rotating people in and out of units with less regard for the unit’s needs than for the 

individual’s. Balance is needed, but balance can’t come until the issue is raised openly and the effects of 

personnel rotation upon unit proficiency are measured, reported, and assessed. 

COMBAT POWER ARISES from aggregates 

of people and systems, not directly from

individuals, yet the military personnel 

systems often move people around with 

little real regard to the effect on unit 

performance. This might have been unavoidable a century ago, when Army

Secretary Elihu Root created the current 

Army personnel system, but the electronic age now permits changes. 

The Army’s adoption of the CTC 

approach to training had the following 

unintended consequence, touched upon 

in a previous chart: the importance of a 

rotation to the National Training Center 

or its equivalent is so great that the personnel system will “stabilize” the unit 

until the unit finishes training there. 

Then the lid comes off and many individual transfers occur. This contributes, 

in large part, to the readiness bathtub

represented by the icon for this report. 

This may be acceptable if we have a 

large force and unexpected wars are not 

the norm. In the future these conditions 

are unlikely to obtain. 

There are Service differences, however. The Navy has similar rapid readiness drops to which the same kind of 

personnel actions contribute, but the 

personnel turbulence contribution occurs 

after an overseas deployment is completed (see the next slide). This probably 

results in a longer period of high readiness than is the case for the current 

peacetime Army practice, but it still 

leaves a large number of naval units in a 

low state of readiness for substantial 

40 
Training for Future Conflicts 

It is possible that units might be 

stood up for, say, 3 years at a time and 

all people within the unit stay with it for 

the duration. The Navy’s recent experiment of rotating an entire surface ship’s 

crew out to a deployed ship is another 

possible approach. Other options and 

hybrids are possible. This task force is in 

no position to recommend how those 

trades should be made, only to recommend that they actually be explored. The 

end result would be to hold the personnel system accountable for the training 

and readiness damage or benefits it can 

induce. 

periods of time. In a world of come-asyou-are wars and strained resources, we 

don’t have the luxury of having many of 

our units at the bottom of the readiness 

bathtub. 

It won’t be a simple task to alter the 

military personnel system such that it 

will not contribute so severely to creating long periods of low readiness for 

every unit. We are a nation that cares 

about individuals and their individual 

well being beyond just the pragmatic 

aspect of desiring our soldiers to stay

and grow in an all-volunteer force. Nevertheless, new kinds of conflicts and our 

technical and operational responses to 

them have created a situation where the 

personnel system can not remain detached from its effect upon readiness. 

The Army Science Board considered

some of these issues in their 2002 Summer Study. Details of their findings and 

recommendations were not available at 

The effects and tradeoffs of moving the time of this writing. 

from the current individual-based personnel system to one that is more unitbased need to be explored and measured 

by those who must worry about both 

readiness and retention. 

Finally, we note that there are other 

causes for the loss of readiness described 

by the bathtub curves. Principal among 

them is knowledge decay as time passes 

after training. We will take this up later. 

41 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

A Naval Readiness Bathtub Curve

C1

C2

C3

C4

INTER-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING CYCLE (IDTC)

+M4 +M5 +M6 -M16 -M15 -M14 -M13 -M12 -M11 -M10 -M9 -M8 -M7 -M6 -M5 -M4 -M3 -M2 -M1 +M1 +M2 +M3

DEPLOYED DEPLOYED

FY 98 Battlegroup Deployers

We discussed and displayed stylized readiness bathtub curves in the last chart and in the executive summary. We include this chart both to show an actual curve and to point out that the Navy times its readiness 

to match expected deployments. Unexpected deployments are a different matter. The colored bar to the 

right represents the four levels of readiness designated by a “C” rating. C1 is fully ready. A unit in the C4 

category is unable to perform its mission. The horizontal scale measure is months relative to the deployment date.

ON THE LAST PAGE we noted the Navy’s 

recent transfer of a whole crew to a ship 

that was already deployed overseas. In 

addition to saving maintenance costs, 

fuel, and wear and tear on the ship by 

making it unnecessary to sail across a 

broad ocean twice, there are also personnel benefits. Properly done, the crew 

will be better trained upon arrival at the 

deployed ship than they would have 

been had they spent weeks and weeks of 

steaming time to make the ocean transit. 

While this is a revolutionary experiment for the surface forces, the ballistic 

missile submarine force has used this 

kind of multiple crewing since about 

1960. Approximately every 3 months the 

crew changes with one crew manning 

the submarine and the other taking time

off and then training for their next deployment. This results in a 6 month cycle. Despite all this, however, each time

a crew takes charge of a boat, about a 

quarter of the people are new to that 

submarine.∗

 

∗

 The target tour length for an individual is mandated as 3 years. Few stay beyond that length of

time because the personnel system declares this 

would be bad for their careers. Some individuals 

must move on sooner for medical, humanitarian, 

or other reasons. Thus the average tour comes 

closer to being 2 years and the turnover rate per 

6 month cycle is 25 percent.

42 
Training for Future Conflicts 

The response to this situation has 

been massive amounts of conventional 

training, both schoolhouse and on-thejob. It is an expensive solution. 

The point of the foregoing is this: a 

Service may be reluctant to alter its personnel system for more reasons than 

tradition. Merely calling for a change 

won’t make it do what we hope it will. 

Unintended consequences will result 

from any changes. Those consequences 

and the desired benefits must be explored carefully. We do not recommend 

instant change; we don’t yet know what 

that change should be. Rather we recommend that USD (P&R), with advice

from the Services, take time to consider 

the alternatives and tradeoffs, then take 

action and finally monitor the results 

closely. 

43 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

The Acquisition System

 Training pays all the bills for design and production failures

3⁄4 The sins of the acquisition process will be visited on training systems 

unto the last generation

 See Training Superiority and Surprise report for old examples

3⁄4 We can give you new examples upon request

 E.g., Army acquisition executive Memo of 2 Oct. 2002: Army continues 

to field new equipment to soldiers without adequate training

 Conversion to new OSD acquisition guidance gives program 

managers new opportunities to ignore training in system 

development

 Each acquisition system needs a training subsystem that is 

co-equal (funding, testing, performance) to other subsystems

3⁄4 Not just to create operators who bring a system through operational

testing, but provide trained operators for the life of the system

3⁄4 Training subsystem must be key performance parameter (KPP)

3⁄4 DoD Directives support this goal but are ignored

This chart comes under the heading of old business. It is, however, unfinished business. These issues will 

only get better piecemeal, unless structural changes are instituted. Designating a training subsystem into 

each acquisition program to be co-equal to, say, a propulsion system is a key element. Establishing a highlevel training performance report card is the other key. 

The memo from the Army Acquisition Executive, identified in the chart , 

states: “The Army continues to field new 

equipment to soldiers without adequate 

training.... Systems are being fielded: 

without necessary training aids, devices, 

simulators, and simulations needed for 

sustainment training... [and] to training 

installations (1) late, (2) in the wrong 

quantity, or (3) in a different configuration than that fielded to units.” 

READERS FAMILIAR with our previous 

report—Training Superiority and Training Surprise—will find nothing new in 

this chart, and that is, of course, the issue. It still remains the case that the best 

place to put a marginal dollar to improve 

military performance is in training, and 

the best way to squander our hardware 

investments is to ignore training during 

the development of hardware systems. 

Systems continue to be created and 

then fielded with little consideration for 

the costs that must be incurred during 

the life cycle to train the weapon’s users. 

More subtle, but equally wasteful, is a 

failure to calculate whether an ordinary 

user is likely to be able to operate the 

weapon system to deliver the performance planned by the hardware designers. 

This happens regardless of such 

regulations as DoD Directive 1430.13: 

“the training system that supports a new 

defense system ... shall be assigned the 

same priority as that of the parent system

... should be available in time for the 

fielding of the parent system.” 

44 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Since the requirements unambiguously exist, we need something more 

than directives to get the acquisition 

process to recognize the havoc it plays 

with training and the savings it could 

achieve if training were considered during design and production. Thus we renew our recommendation that the 

Secretary of Defense require an annual 

training report card. This should lead to 

making visible the interfaces between 

training systems and the processes of 

acquisition, logistics, personnel, military 

education, and command and control. 

Only if the connections among all these 

to readiness are routinely exposed at a 

high level, will there be a chance that 

someone with authority will force these 

factions to integrate.

45 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

More Obstacles That Delay Training Transformation

 Complexity and cost of large-scale joint force training

 Lack of properly instrumented and equipped experimentation 

capability to examine and develop new Service and joint 

concepts

 Inability of units to train and rehearse with instrumentation 

and objective after action reviews at their home station, en 

route to the theater, and when deployed in theater

3⁄4 Particularly to address combatant commander-developed rules of

engagement (ROE)

 ROE can vary widely and rapidly with changing warfare situations. 

Practice under many different ROE is needed

 Lack of incentives for innovative joint training. 

3⁄4 Joint circumstances were the norm in recent conflicts

Our wars are joint; our incentive structure isn’t. For training, as elsewhere, this leads to many words of

support and few actions. 

THERE ARE OTHER obstacles that impede 

a training transformation. The first 

(CTC) training transformation in the 

1970s grew out of multiple needs. The 

first was the desire to achieve better performance than that demonstrated in 

Vietnam. The second was the realization 

garnered from experimentation on a 

small scale that large-scale instrumented, 

OPFOR, AAR, and Observer-Controller 

(OC) based training was feasible and, 

although somewhat expensive, affordable. While none of the Services would 

abandon such training, they are acutely 

aware of such training’s limitations and 

burdens. 

Unfortunately, we are not getting the 

full benefit of these fixed training sites. 

Often units go to CTCs and conduct 

learning and training that should have 

and could have preceded the visit. Embedded and local home-station instrumentation is a needed ingredient to 

prevent this waste. All of the Services

have attempted to use local and netted 

virtual means to improve matters, but 

they have achieved limited success because the instrumentation is available in 

small numbers and is not configured to 

cover support functions such as logistics, 

intelligence, or force protection. (We 

applaud, however, the recent change at 

the National Training Center that introduces force protection issues into its 

training.) 

This puts a clamp on how much a 

unit can grow in a CTC. Without homestation instrumented training and experimentation capability, much better

rehearsal at the remote training site is

inhibited. In particular it defers until the 

very end examination and refinement of 

training for specific rules of engagement 

(ROE). This is important because ROEs 

change with the character of each war. 

They often change within a conflict. 

Unless units practice with different types 

46 
Training for Future Conflicts 

of ROE, their responses in a real conflict 

may be inappropriate. 

In the not too distant past, affordability could be cited as something of a 

show-stopper. This matter is discussed 

with specifics at the end of this report, 

but suffice it to say that it is no longer a 

show-stopper. 

Finally, we note that, as with the personnel and acquisition systems, the goal 

of joint training is not supported by the 

current incentive structure. Existing personnel systems are unable to track joint 

training in all but its joint assignment 

context. This circumstance is being 

changed with the advent of the OSD-led 

Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program 

now in adoption and transition. Such 

tracking is possible within the basic 

software, Peoplesoft, which provides a 

substantial number of the building 

blocks for DIMHRS. 

The larger challenge is cultural and 

adjudicative. Much useful joint training 

could be accomplished through networking existing facilities, bases, and CTCs. 

The obstacles are related to training interruption and control priorities. Perhaps 

Combatant Commander priorities could 

be employed to focus integration, eliminating the need to learn only in true 

combat settings. 

47 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Fungibility and Low-Hanging Fruit

 Good ideas that could provide almost instant benefits fall into the cracks 

for lack of mechanism to fund them

3⁄4 Rules of engagement (ROE) analysis to determine simulation requirements

3⁄4 Deployable Virtual Training Environment

3⁄4 Virtual At-Sea Training

3⁄4 Proven ways to reduce time-to-train exist but are ignored

3⁄4 Spectrum of linked mounted combat training systems from PCs to dedicated

high fidelity simulators/trainers

 To, e.g., prepare Guard and Reserve best to use CCTT and multiple platforms

3⁄4 Intelligent course capture might reduce courseware costs - soon

 Potential to convert a one week course to PC-based computer tutor that teaches better

than the best teachers and pays for itself in two sessions of the course

3⁄4 A deployable DMT-like capability was created in 1990s as a network of 

commercial games but is unknown to the military training community

 Many more

 No mechanism to scrape up near-term cash to help

We found many relatively low-cost projects that could have near-term payoffs, but because training authority is diffuse, there was no champion who could reprogram money to make them happen. There should be a

funding mechanism available to allow us to pluck low-hanging training research fruit. 

FUNGIBLE: adj. returnable or negotiable 

in kind or by substitution. 

Although you may be tired of reading it, we continue to assert that training 

can have as large an impact upon warfare performance as can hardware. 

Training research budgets, however, are 

a minuscule fraction of hardware research budgets. Highly promising opportunities are left out in the cold in 

consequence. We saw a number of these. 

We will discuss the Deployable Virtual Training Environment and Virtual 

At-Sea Training in separate charts. 

These and others are listed here. 

We found that the software that 

drives some sophisticated mountedcombat trainers can now be ported to 

personal computers. With a small investment to make the porting, a substantial portion of the training value 

provided by the higher fidelity trainers 

could be made available to organizations 

like the National Guard whose units, on 

the average, experience Close Combat 

Tactical Trainer (CCTT) training only 

30 minutes per year. The lower fidelity 

systems could prepare units to get the 

most out of higher-level trainers as well 

as teach lessons that those users would 

never have a chance to learn otherwise. 

Large training device suppliers resist 

this process and some customers are 

afraid that they will miss something with 

the lower fidelity approach. As a result, 

good training that could be delivered is 

not delivered. 

One of our interim recommendations 

shortly after the atrocities of 11 September 2001 was that air distributed mission 

48 
Training for Future Conflicts 

training (DMT), like that being slowly 

introduced into the Air Force (and now 

the Navy), should be available on aircraft carriers and remote air bases. DMT 

currently is installed in hanger-sized 

facilities on land. We suggested that 

some form of that capability be shrunk

down to shipboard size. We subsequently found that a former Navy pilot 

had created, for a series of game centers, 

a multiple aircraft simulation capability 

that had many of the desired features. 

Unfortunately, his third round of venture 

capital funding fell through when the 

dotcom bubble burst. The hardware is 

now in mothballs and the knowledge of 

how to do the networking with commercial components is drying up. There is 

no one with money and authority to rescue this. 

49 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Left Intentionally Blank

50 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Findings: Something New Is Needed

If schoolhouse training won’t hack it,” something new is needed. In this section we offer some suggestions

about what the new somethings might be. In the past, the film industry and then television were held out as

the key to a revolution in education or training. They failed, in part, because the best training requires 

practice with feedback. We hope, with some justification, that the electronic revolution will fare better. 

51 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Something New Is Needed:

 To replace one-time schoolhouse training with continuous 

training at the user’s location: home station or deployed

3⁄4 Bridge last meter from data in computers, to understanding in a head

 Individual and collective training

 Training devices that also migrate into being operational decision aids

3⁄4 Distributed virtual training environments

3⁄4 Universal, persistent on-demand training wars

 To force the cottage military training industry to grow up

 To determine, before we encounter a “no plan” conflict: 

3⁄4 What and how we will need to train ourselves and our new allies

3⁄4 What and how they will need to train us

 To make acquisition and personnel systems accountable for 

the training burdens they create

 To create a true Joint National Training Capability through 

networking

Here we list some general themes framing the changes needed for future training. In the next few charts we 

will offer specific examples of new approaches that could improve the delivery of competence, the cost of

delivery, and the acquisition of the knowledge that must be transferred. There are more approaches; our 

observations are representative, not comprehensive.

LECTURE-BASED, resident training has 

such a long history it is hard to recognize 

that this process can be part of the problem. It is hard to modify a large, diffusely administered system that all of us 

have partaken of for a substantial fraction of our lives. In such a case, to get 

beyond the status quo one needs to create a new motivation structure that fosters change. The DoD will have to attack 

this from the areas of both performance 

and cost. This issue has also been addressed by the Army Science Board 

2002 Summer Study (in draft). 

Lectures have been shown to be a 

very poor method of transferring information and skills. In many classroom

settings a student has an average of three 

direct interactions with the instructor and 

the subject per hour. A tutored student 

has over 100. 

If, as we claim, training is relevant 

practice with feedback, then we must 

find ways to get the practice. Computers 

can be made to support many interactions to cover much of the “practice” 

part of training over a wide range of 

militaril tasks. Making the practice relevant to the students’ level of knowledge 

and their needs is harder. 

If the “last mile” communication 

problem is ever solved, the data to support computer training can be resident in 

a local personal computing device, but 

52 
Training for Future Conflicts 

we still need to bridge the “last meter” 

from the bits and bytes in the computer 

to understanding in the head of a student 

or user. 

“Intelligent” tutoring systems and 

networked wargaming have the potential 

to bridge this last meter for individuals 

and units and make practice relevant. 

However, the current state of the art appears too expensive to convince the residential instruction community of its

value either as a major supplement to 

schoolhouse training or in lieu of it. Research is needed to decrease costs. 

Local computer-based training systems have the potential to become job 

performance enhancers. We note that the 

IMAT acoustic trainer, which we mentioned in our last report, continues to 

move in that direction. Others will follow. 

We will touch elsewhere on each of 

the other major bullets in this chart, but 

the comment on training as a cottage 

industry needs a sentence or two here. 

Currently innovations in training come

piecemeal and are not transferred from

one system to another. Standards and 

methods of sharing innovation will be 

needed if “intelligent” (i.e., computerbased) training is to succeed.

53 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Virtual Training Environments

 USMC one-time appropriation 

for set of experiments 

 Deployable Virtual Training 

Environment (DVTE) 

3⁄4 Multiple PCs linked together aboard

an amphibious assault ship

 A place where mission skills can not be trained today but

where Marines spend months waiting to perform missions 24 

PCs in a ready room

 Creates environments such that mission skills 

can be refreshed for:

 Infantry squads

 Helicopter operations

 Land vehicle operations

3⁄4 But created with one-time funding with no follow-on

 No long-term assessment of warfighting value could be made

This is the Marine Corps’ land warfare equivalent of our recommended air warfare trainer-in-a-seabag. 

Marines can do many pushups while waiting on an amphibious assault ship, but until DVTE they could do

no coordinated mission training. DVTE gave one pick-up team of Marines a chance to do it—once. The

process must be continued and expanded. 

WHILE WE NOTED that experience of a 

virtual environment, by itself, is not 

training, it can permit kinds of training 

to be conducted when and where it has 

never been possible before. A Marine 

Corps project, the result of one-time 

funding, is a case in point. 

Marines on shipboard have the same 

problem as carrier-based and remotely 

deployed pilots have; they can perform 

some kinds of training, but there is no 

place where they can conduct coordinated mission-level practice. The Deployable Virtual Training Environment 

(DVTE) project attempted to see if they 

could remedy this situation by linking a 

number of standard laptop computers 

into a single warfare environment and 

trying it out on a large amphibious assault ship, U.S.S. Iwo Jima (LHD 7). 

We recognize that DVTE won’t help 

refresh how to shoot a rifle or exercise 

one’s running muscles, but it can be used 

quite effectively to teach lessons about 

reconnaissance, use of smoke, how not 

to get shot, what to do when a weapon 

system is degraded by hardware failures, 

inter and intra squad coordination, etc. 

In this one-time demonstration, with 

the help of many people creating training 

situations and facilitating after action 

reviews, DVTE appears to have worked 

quite well. Long-term assessment of how 

the lessons learned translate to success 

on a battlefield, however, was precluded 

by the one-time nature of the funding. 

54 
Training for Future Conflicts 

This work should be continued and 

expanded.∗

 

 

∗

 To avoid possible confusion, we note that the 

DARPA program, to be discussed in the following few pages, will attempt to create or incorporate environments like DVTE and then

autonomously insert the training, currently mediated by real people, at the front, middle, and 

back end of the virtual war experience. Creating 

an acceptable virtual environment is necessary 

before the training can be inserted. The DARPA 

program hopes to move beyond the environment

and into training that will require a minimum of

external human intervention.

55 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Hydrophone Array

Recording

Fall of Shot

Virtual Island

Remotely Located

Forward Observer

Actual Splash Point

Virtual target and

Impact point

Virtual At Sea Training (VAST) concept for 

Naval Surface Fire Support Training and Mission Rehearsal

 Real naval guns fire real ammunition into the sea but hit virtual targets

• Experiment a success

• Long-term prognosis uncertain

Virtual At-Sea Training

A real naval gun shoots. A real shell lands in the ocean. Where it would have fallen on a virtual target is 

calculated and inserted into the view of a real forward gunfire observer. The parts that require training are 

real; much of the rest is simulated but can be exercised separately. We could wish that future funding were 

as real as the gunfire and the communication networks. 

ANOTHER FORWARD-LOOKING but underfunded effort we encountered was the 

Navy’s Virtual At-Sea Training (VAST) 

project. Initiated in late 2001, when the 

availability of land targets for naval gunfire became in doubt, the Navy developed an approach to allow practice with 

real ammunition fired by real naval 

guns, but the shot falls innocently far out 

to sea. The first test occurred within 30 

days of the go-ahead order. 

GPS-equipped buoys were deployed 

that recorded impact sounds as the shells 

hit the sea surface. From this information the trajectory of the shell was calculated. The trajectory was used to 

determine where on a virtual landscape 

the shell would have hit. 

Damage effects were calculated and 

imposed upon a picture of the virtual 

scene as a forward observer would have 

viewed them using, for example, an unmanned air vehicle’s camera. The human 

observers reported the fall of shot back 

to the ship using the real communications networks. The gunners made adjustments and the process was repeated. 

Note that every part of the actual fire 

support process was exercised for real 

except the impact and explosive behavior of the weapon, the observation sensing, and the telemetry of sensed data to 

the forward observer. The only unique 

components of this system are buoy sets 

and software. 

56 
Training for Future Conflicts 

The intent to supply three deploying 

ships with this system in the fall of 2002 

has been delayed to spring of 2003. 

Continued concern about land firing 

ranges make it likely that this concept 

will be developed further. Concepts for 

expanding this approach into air warfare 

and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are 

also being explored at the $1.1 million 

level in FY 04, but only $250,000 is 

currently budgeted beyond that. 

57 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

New project, two goals

–Invent new ways to deliver cognitive

skills cheaply on demand

• 2σ last meter training goal based on:

– What works best in human training: tutors 

and student state monitoring; games;

interaction with human experts/peers when

artificial intelligence fails; after action 

reviews 

– Ubiquitous availability of PC/Mac/Palm 

computing and networking

–Create architecture so anyone, any unit (+ Guard and Reserve), can train anytime, anywhere—and wants to

•Following example of massive 

multiplayer games

– Scoring based on training value, not

monsters killed

– Strong buy-in by users

– Connect people/units who don’t talk to each

other now

•Auto scenario and AAR generation

• Implications for acquisition and training

development time/costs

DARPA’s Training Superiority Program:

One co-chair of this task force left the commercial world to create a training superiority program in 

DARPA. The probability of success is uncertain; this is outside DARPA’s usual technical inclinations. The 

goal is to create an environment where every echelon can, and will, train continuously in a virtual war. 

DARPA IS STARTING a project to create a 

technical environment that may foster 

solutions to issues raised in this report

and its predecessor. This is not accidental: one of the co-chairs of these task 

forces (Chatham) jumped ship from the 

contractor world shortly after the atrocities of 11 September 2001 to create the 

program in DARPA. Money is just beginning to flow as we complete this report, so we can offer only the usual rosecolored hype surrounding the initiation 

of a project. 

The program, nicknamed 

DARWARS, is based upon two observations already discussed: (1) an unintended consequence of transformation is 

that new warfare tasks will require substantial cognitive skill, and although 

“school-house training won’t hack it,” 

the ubiquity of personal computers and 

network connections might help; and (2) 

we don’t have enough opportunities to 

train in all the ways we might need to be 

trained for future conflicts. 

Some things that do work for training are human-human interactions (the 

average student of a good tutor is better 

than 98 percent of classroom students); 

putting emotional context into training

with, for example games; repetition of 

tasks where performance is measured; 

and the use of after-action reviews, mediated, in part, by the trainees themselves. Using these approaches, DARPA 

intends to create training development 

tools that will allow (mostly) automated 

and inexpensive devices to teach cognitive skills to everybody quickly. 

58 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DARPA chose several high-impact 

training areas to focus the work of the 

tool developers: deployable distributed 

air mission training, rapid tactical language training (to put a limited vocabulary and knowledge of culture and 

gestures into the brain behind the trigger 

finger), and aid for the information technician on ships or bases. These have 

been dubbed “last meter” training devices because they are designed to 

bridge the last meter between data on a 

computer and understanding in the heads 

of our warriors. 

The second observation, that we 

don’t have enough wars to train all our 

forces in all the warfare skills they need, 

leads to a new training architecture. One 

way of describing America’s existing 

CTC training is that it creates an artificial war in which our forces practice. It 

had been one of our task force’s goals to 

see if that kind of training could be bottled and exported electronically to all 

echelons all the time. We didn’t know 

how to do this when we wrote our first 

report. There is a chance that we do now, 

and this CTC-in-a-box goal is the chief 

focus of the DARWARS project. 

At a lower level, the focus is to tie 

the initial last meter training devices

together with a multitude of other training systems. We take our cue from the 

massive multiplayer game world, where 

tens of thousands of participants at a 

time enter into a virtual world. Some

games have 400,000 subscribers who 

exhibit a fierce sense of ownership in 

their world, a world in which the average 

user spends over 20 hours per week. 

Players create joint warplans. Some develop secure communication sites. Others write software that they contribute 

gratis to “their” world. DARPA hopes to 

create that kind of passion for participation in a set of universal training wars 

that will be available to anyone, any 

echelon, any time. Training development 

costs may be reduced by user inputs. 

DARWARS may also help the acquisition/training problem by providing an 

environment where new concepts can be 

tested.

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Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Create Deployed Combat Training Teams

 Designate small deployed/deployable teams

 Deploy them around the world continuously 

 In each geographic/geopolitical area they should determine,

before unplanned conflicts arise:

3⁄4 What kinds of training which parts of our forces will need

3⁄4 What the new training requirements are given new cultures, new

conditions, new languages, new warfare practices

 Find this out across the globe before new conflicts arise

3⁄4 Determine how and what to teach the pick-up allies we may find in

each region

3⁄4 Determine what our new allies must teach us

 They will be a resource when future conflicts do arise

3⁄4 Aid in the delivery of that training before and during future conflicts

This chart actually comes under the category of a recommendation. We know of nothing like this today. 

There are other special teams that prepare our forces to go into unexpected parts of the world—medical

units, for example. There should be deployed teams to do the same thing for training.

WE NOTED that our Afghan campaign 

required us to conduct war in new and 

unexpected ways. We heard from the 

first special forces team that entered the 

war zone that they had unique training 

experiences that suited them for a war 

they never expected to fight. For example, they had exercised with Uzbekistan 

special forces the year before. Despite 

this experience, however, even this team

had much to learn on the ground. Other 

special forces teams did not have the 

same kinds of experiences. Moreover, 

these kinds of opportunities are limited 

to special forces training and are not 

commonly available to other forces and 

their supporting units. 

We believe that steps should be 

taken to identify these kinds of lessons 

(before a conflict becomes imminent), 

catalog them, and prepare them for delivery on short notice to the forces that 

would soon enter a future conflict. To

accomplish this we recommend that several small, permanent teams be created 

to search out what kinds of training 

would be required were we to be drawn 

into conflict in unexpected parts of the 

world. This approach is not unknown in 

other areas of military preparation. The 

Navy, for example, has three permanently forward-deployed medical units 

that roam the world identifying the 

medical problems that our forces might 

encounter were they to be sent to unexpected and new theaters of conflict. 

The teams should represent all the 

possible forces that might enter a conflict; thus they should probably be chartered by several of the Combatant 

60 
Training for Future Conflicts 

Commanders (formerly CINCs) or by 

the JCS. They would determine what 

specific kinds of training we would need 

to apply to our forces and to our newly 

acquired allies. The methods for delivering this training will probably differ depending upon the technical 

sophistication of those who will be fighting and the local infrastructure and culture. Moreover, these teams should 

determine what kinds of training our 

allies would need to give to our forces. 

Finally, when a conflict starts these Deployed Combat Training Teams could 

assist in delivering the training to all 

concerned.

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Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

Joint National Training Capability

 Current Combat Training Centers

3⁄4 Key to our existing training superiority

3⁄4 BUT

 They are not interoperable

 They have a Service-only training focus

 Hard to reproduce a new enemy quickly for no-plan contingencies

 New weapons hard to represent with existing facilities

 Serve only some forces some of the time

 We applaud the recent change from focus on a “Center” toward a Joint

National Training “Capability” 

3⁄4 Link existing centers

3⁄4 Create links elsewhere (e.g., units at sea, units elsewhere)

3⁄4 Create links to virtual (DMT, CCTT, BFTT) and constructive training 

environments (high and low fidelity, including Guard and Reserve)

3⁄4 Create capability to train continuously rather than episodically

 Issue and approach is important enough to be subject of another DSB task

force

Any good study group recommends more things to be done, and so it is with us. One way of improving upon

the crown jewels of our first training revolution is to connect the existing CTCs together such that they 

serve as joint, not Service-only, training centers. We recommend DSB involvement in this effort. 

GIVEN THE KEY ROLE that CTCs play in 

our training superiority it is reasonable 

to ask how this process might be enhanced for the future. Our recommendations in Training Superiority and 

Training Surprise dealt mostly with how 

to restore the existing CTCs to their ~ 

1990 level of performance. Progress has 

been made on that front. 

An issue not addressed directly by 

our last task force, however, was how to 

use this base to create a real national

training capability, one that is not as 

exclusively single-Service oriented as 

the existing Navy air, Air Force air, and 

Army ground centers. Such a capability 

should also bring in other forces not yet 

served by such a center. For example, 

there are no Navy (non-air) or Marine 

Corps CTCs. The Marine Corps live-fire 

training, while a vital part of making a 

Marine, does not include an instrumented range, an opposing force, or the 

after action review process—all of 

which are key to the CTC success in the 

Army and both tactical air forces. Additionally, a JNTC should include logistics, intelligence support, and command 

and staff training. 

Linking the existing centers is 

probably a good starting point, but there 

are enormous issues about how such a 

linked facility should be configured, 

utilized, and paid for. Scheduling the use 

of the individual centers is already hard; 

insuring optimum use of a combined 

training capability will be harder. Moreover, the more participants we add, the 

62 
Training for Future Conflicts 

harder it will be to ensure that every 

person and unit experiences this kind of 

training often enough. Anytime something joint is created, funding issues 

loom. Funds planned for the joint project 

that do not directly support the parent 

Service are always in jeopardy. 

There are also the technical tasks attendant to connecting systems that were 

not originally designed to work together. 

We can hope that in the process of working out these issues the even harder issues of actually fighting in a joint 

environment may get highlighted as 

well. 

For these and a host of other reasons, 

including the request of the USD (P&R), 

we recommend that the next DSB training effort explore these issues.

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Left Intentionally Blank

64 
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DSB Task Force on Training for Future Conflicts

rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Training Surprise

We were charged to follow-up our last report’s observation that a potential adversary could improve its

warfare competence dramatically without our knowing it by using advanced training approaches. The next

chart is an unclassified summary of our latest findings in this area. 

65 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

 A second high-level intelligence community conclave on 

training surprise was held and reported to this task force

 Process was a fruitful endeavor with specific regional 

findings beyond the scope of this report

 As far as we know the complete training surprise briefing 

was given only to us, not the military customers 

3⁄4 But individual findings will have made their way into the user 

community

 The U.S. continues to export training technology, expertise, 

and methodology, mostly by private-sector firms

3⁄4 Training transfer successes:

 Croatia, Kosovo, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain ...

3⁄4 Failure

 Croatia has lost its training superiority since 1994 success

Training Surprise

Training surprise has occurred. Fortunately, we have yet to be on the receiving end of the surprise. To

prevent that from happening, the DoD and the intelligence community should cooperate in searching for 

indications that it might be happening. Top-level involvement is needed to sustain such an effort. 

OUR PREVIOUS TASK FORCE raised the 

issue of training surprise. Technology 

surprise is a serious worry throughout 

our technologically oriented Defense 

management. As this task force attempts 

to raise the importance of training superiority, we are obliged to consider the 

flip side of that coin: Can we be surprised by a new competence created by 

an adversary applying the training principles that have done so well for us? We, 

therefore, have continued the search for 

examples and patterns of training surprise. In addition, the task force also 

continued to assess the circumstances 

and effect of the export of training technology, methodologies, and expertise. 

In the first instance, partly at our request and partly on their own initiative 

(led very capably by MG John Landry, 

USA Retired) the intelligence community has continued the search and has 

found interesting examples of both improvements and losses in capability. 

There are continuing examples of “unusual” ongoing training. These ought to 

be brought to the attention of OSD (at 

least to P&R), the Combatant Commanders, the Service intelligence and 

training elements, and to the Deployed 

Combat Training Teams which we recommend in this report. While we have 

not made a complete audit, we have not 

seen this occurring, and certainly not on 

a regular and institutionalized basis. 

The situation on the export side of 

the equation is equally unsettling. We 

continue to apply only light control to 

the export of training technology, methods and expertise. In one case, a U.S. 

66 
Training for Future Conflicts 

firm is providing OPFOR services for air 

combat training to the UAE. One reason 

for this stems from the resource limitation in the Air Force to provide these 

services—an understandable circumstance in today’s environment. There are 

examples of our allies incorporating all 

the elements of our first training transformation (including those in the AAR 

process), although this can be culturally 

challenging. Germany, for example, appears to be moving toward establishing a 

large CTC in its eastern region. It is uncertain how joint or combined this will 

be and how it will relate our CTC at 

Hoenfels. 

On the other side of training surprise, 

it is equally important that we not overestimate readiness by failing to understand how ephemeral human competence 

can be. Our new review of training surprise uncovered the circumstances that 

now exist in Croatia. Earlier, in the 

1990s, Croatian forces were assisted by 

U.S.-directed training expertise to create 

a new military organization. This training had a high payoff in the very near 

term as the Croatians quite capably 

drove Serbian forces out of their territory 

in 1994 (as contrasted with their failure 

to stem invasion a year earlier). 

The latest estimate of their capability 

has, however, been downgraded. Their 

forces have lost competence due to a 

lack of continuing commitment to training. Training inferiority can quickly 

supplant superiority if the training process is not continued or if it is misapplied. 

This is a lesson that should not be 

lost on us: what we have today can disappear in only a few years. 

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Left Intentionally Blank

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rec/DTI - DSB training tf/ 04/16/03/page 1

Recommendations

We offer technical, structural bureaucratic, and funding recommendations. Learning from an omission in

our last report, this time around for each recommendation we have identified a “stuckee,” a specific individual or office that should be responsible for its implementation.

69 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Recommendations (1)

 Training report cards

3⁄4 SecDef require effective, realistic training report card

 From Services, acquisition executive, JCS—in their own format

 Acceptable if is part of a practical, reliable readiness reporting system

3⁄4 SecDef and JCS request annual Training Surprise report from intelligence

community

 USD(AT&L) require & test co-equal training subsystem for all 

acquisition programs

 USD(P&R) sponsor Joint Virtual Training Environments ACTD

3⁄4 Broaden USMC Distributed Virtual Training Environment concept to

include:

 Deployable, distributed air combat trainers for remote bases, aircraft carriers

 USN Virtual At-Sea Training

 Tie into CTCs, new National Training Capability, logistic, intelligence[,] and 

other support functions

3⁄4 ACTD provides the environment; training content provided by the units

Report cards force us to pay attention to areas that we might otherwise ignore. Despite their pain and

bother they provide visibility. We need to institutionalize this visibility for training, both ours and that of 

potential adversaries. The training subsystem in acquisition is unfinished old business from our last task 

force. A training ACTD is also old business, but here we make the recommendation much more specific: 

create a large-scale set of joint virtual training environments. 

OUR FIRST RECOMMENDATION aims to 

raise the visibility of training by requiring report cards on our training and that 

of our potential adversaries. We acknowledge that reports are burdensome 

to write and often tiresome to receive, 

but the process of creating and reviewing 

them forces us to think critically. It also 

brings out issues that we might otherwise ignore, given the multiple demands 

upon everyone’s time.The current Under 

Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness has chosen to champion training. The next holder of that office might 

not, unless structural changes are made 

to insure that training issues are visible. 

Moreover, there are others at high levels 

who need to hear the message that their 

efforts can be all for naught if they don’t 

pay attention to human competence, not 

just hardware performance. Thus, we 

again recommend that the Services, the 

JCS and the Intelligence Community 

deliver a training report card (in whatever format they choose) to the Secretary 

of Defense at least annually. 

The acquisition community must 

participate. We recommend here that 

they create a part of the training report 

card. We would be satisfied if, instead, 

they were forced to read and review, at 

the highest level, the training status reports of the Services, JCS, and Intelligence Community. Either way, it would 

bring the people versus hardware tradeoffs to the attention of those in the DoD 

70 
Training for Future Conflicts 

who spend the most discretionary 

money. Further, the acquisition executive should insist that a key performance 

parameter for every system be the creation and testing of a training subsystem—co-equal to all other subsystems—

that will insure trained operators 

throughout the system’s life-cycle. Failure of that subsystem should be viewed 

as equally disastrous as a failure of a 

propulsion system or warhead. We noted 

the progress in virtual training environments with the Marine Corps’ Distributed Virtual Training Environment and 

the Navy’s Virtual At Sea Training. The 

technologies are mature enough now to 

expand them into an Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration.We recommend the USD(P&R) sponsor such an 

effort. It would contribute to the recommended Joint National Training Capability and make inroads toward filling up 

the readiness bathtub. 

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Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Recommendations (2)

 Services provide units the ability to train at home with instrumented 

systems and after action reviews by adapting joint tactical

communications systems (JTRSA, WIN-T, etc.)

3⁄4 USD(P&R) include implementation plan in Training Transformation

planning

3⁄4 USD(P&R) require Service responses in one year

 Expand training research to level appropriate for training’s influence on

proficiency and readiness

3⁄4 USD(P&R) create $40M/year 6.3/6.4 training budget line to fund lowhanging fruit

 Fungible source of money for advanced training research and development

 Advise and consent from JFCOM

3⁄4 DARPA expand DARWARS initiative

 Provide sufficient mass to encourage self-sustaining universal, on-demand

cognitive training for everyone, everywhere in a persistent virtual war.

(1) Readiness would not fall off as quickly for land and air forces if they could practice on an instrumented 

range at home. New communication systems could fill this need if we get to the acquisition community 

early. (2) Training research funding does not match the value that training has on military performance. 

We recommend a start toward fixing this.

NEW FLEXIBLE HARDWARE and systems 

are being developed that are intended to 

make significant inroads into unifying 

the communication process across the 

Services. These systems, which include 

digital radios, could be capable also of 

automatically providing position and 

timing information equivalent to that 

provided by expensive instrumentation 

installed at major training center ranges. 

That capability could be used to allow 

units to train at their home station in 

ways that can only be done now during 

an expensive and rare deployment to a 

CTC. 

If we get this inserted into the acquisition process early enough, the incremental cost of delivering this capability 

will be small. If we wait, the backfit 

costs may become prohibitive. There is 

another aspect to this. Whether or not the 

home-station instrumentation is developed, bandwidth for training must be 

reserved and planned for in the design of 

the communication systems. 

If, as we assert, training has as large 

an impact upon warfare performance as 

does hardware, and it can be gained or 

lost more rapidly than hardware capabilities, then it is important to understand 

how the training process works. As we 

noted in our last report, however, funding for training research, which could 

give us this understanding, is miniscule 

in comparison to its impact, as well as 

miniscule in comparison to other kinds 

of defence research spending. 

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Training for Future Conflicts 

One example of our lack of knowledge was noted at the beginning: games 

for training are a hot subject, but the fad 

is not supported by a real understanding 

of when and how they teach or why they 

are compelling. If we are to use them

effectively, we must understand them, 

and it won’t come unless the DoD pays; 

there is little incentive among game developers or academics to do so. We recommend that USD (A&T) institute a

DoD Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) project in this 

area. We should also study how to capitalize on the over $9B/year investment 

made by the digital gaming industry 

each year in creating new games and 

gaming systems. 

We also pointed out that a substantial 

number of training developments that 

could have near-term payoff fail to get 

funding because there is no source of

fungible money to finish the job. We

therefore recommend that a large and

visible program element be created to 

support training research. 

DARPA’s DARWARS initiative is 

based upon an assumption that if new 

training technologies and on-demand 

training wars for everyone can be demonstrated to enough Service and Joint 

users, then the users will join in the 

process. The ARPANET and SIMNET 

are examples of the success of this kind 

of approach. At the moment, however, 

the project is probably too small to 

achieve a critical mass of support to 

make it self sustaining. We therefore 

recommend that the project be expanded 

to include more “last meter” training 

systems, persistent-world training networking, research on what compels and 

teaches in games, and what makes people become aces in military tasks. 

73 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Recommendations (3)

 JFCOM and combatant commanders establish deployed 

combat training teams

3⁄4 Determine what training would be needed for contingencies

 Before the contingency arises

 Training for our forces and of potential allies

 USD(P&R) investigate a DoD-wide movement toward unitmanaged personnel systems

3⁄4 Report to SecDef in one year on payoffs, drawbacks, and

impediments

 DSB continue bureaucratic water torture process 

3⁄4 Force training potential and failures to be visible at the top

3⁄4 Charter DSB Task Force on Joint National Training Capability 

 Extend physical CTCs

 Carve out high resolution instrumented experimentation areas within 

existing facilities

 Transform training for joint forces, instead of only some Service forces

We should create a structure that helps us plan in advance for the training needs of unexpected come-asyou-are wars. We should explore how to hold the personnel system accountable for the readiness consequences of its systems. Finally, the DSB should continue make training superiority visible to those who sign

checks in the Pentagon. 

IF, AS WE PREDICT, a fair portion of the 

future conflicts our military will encounter will take place in unexpected areas 

where the language and culture is unfamiliar, then we should seek to identify 

the new training needs that will arise. 

We recommend that a few standing 

teams be established and charged with 

the task of determining what we will 

need to train ourselves, what we will 

need to train our new allies, and what 

they can teach us. The teams should also 

prepare to distribute the initial training

as a conflict develops. 

Making changes to the military personnel system will not be easy. Each

service process is steeped in tradition 

and even minor alterations could have a 

substantial impact in individuals’ careers. We do not claim to know how to 

reform the Services’ personnel systems, 

or if the unintended consequences of 

such reforms would be worse than the 

status quo, but we would be remiss not 

to emphasize that personnel policies 

have a huge influence on both the instantaneous and average readiness of our 

forces. Our training systems pay for the 

damage that the personnel systems inflict. The bother to benefit ratio should 

be explored. We recommend that 

USD(P&R) explore the trades and report 

their conclusions to the Secretary of Defence within a year. 

Lastly, we recommend that the DSB 

continue the process, begun 4 years ago, 

to raise training awareness to the level 

enjoyed by its Title 10 companions, 

74 
Training for Future Conflicts 

“man and equip.” USD(P&R)’s current 

interest is in how to create and sustain a 

Joint National Training Capability and 

he believes that DSB involvement will 

help in the process. We agree. Our military needs to create a true national training capability and our recommendations 

on a Virtual Training Environments 

ACTD and on home-station training 

would support such a capability. 

Finally, we believe that any continued DSB efforts in training will have the 

salubrious effect of keeping high-level 

focus on how training can improve warfare readiness, or how failure to consider 

training can materially degrade proficiency. 

75 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Other Areas Ripe for DSB Review

 Interoperability problems of future warfare

 Multiple intelligence issues from last report

 Human performance enhancements

 Training of our allies

In the process of poking into training deficiencies and potentials, we found several other areas that require 

top-level review. 

Making systems that were designed 

and deployed in isolation work together 

within a Service is almost impossible. 

Cross-Service or cross-nation interoperability is a huge and growing problem, 

and technology advances have, at least 

up to today, made things not easier, but 

more complicated and fragile. The problems would benefit from a global review. 

A PROMINENT FEATURE of the Afghan 

campaign of 2001/2002 was how dependent forces of one Service were upon 

services provided by the others. Army

special forces on the ground used Army 

systems to call in air strikes from Navy 

aircraft which were refueled by Air 

Force tankers. Our allies on the ground 

used commercial satellite telephones to 

talk among themselves and commercial 

hand-held radios to interfere with enemy 

communications. Donkeys and John 

Deere mini-tractors were used to haul

material dropped in under Army parachutes from Air Force aircraft. The 

Army, which defines position by grid 

squares, must call in air strikes from the 

Air Force, which uses degrees and decimals of degrees, or the Navy which uses 

degrees, minutes, and seconds. 

In our last report we pointed out that 

dependence upon IQ-based selection 

tests wastes a great deal of human capital. Other reliable, repeatable measures 

have been shown to correlate to human 

success as well as or better than IQ. In 

one theory, developed by Sternberg, 

three measures were defined: analytic, 

practical, and creative “intelligence.” 

Use of these independent measures 

76 
Training for Future Conflicts 

could help us select individuals for military service and for specialty training 

within the services far better than our

current analytic-intelligence-only approach. The potential benefits of such a 

selection process within and across the 

Services needs review. 

Also largely unexplored are other 

kinds of human performance enhancements that don’t come under the umbrella of training. This involves not just 

teaching better than the best teachers, 

but looking at what might be done to 

make our forces, not just all we think 

that they can be, but better. 

Finally, the area of our charter that 

we slighted, only touching upon it with 

our combat training team recommendation, is the training of our allies and how 

they might train us. We missed this area 

and recommend that this oversight be 

remedied by further DSB work. 

77 
Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Good Things ARE Happening

 OSD Training Transformation Plan

 USD(P&R) has exercised authority on DAB to pressure some

acquisition programs to pay attention to training

 USN’s emerging EXCEL program, where continuing military 

education and human performance get high priority

 OPFOR changes in National Training Center to stress forceprotection issues, and to provide real-time coaching

 Cognitive science is slowly becoming cognitive engineering 

 Cost to support training per individual entity in a CTC 

context is now 1/20 of what it was 30 years ago

 Our forces still enjoy a substantial training superiority

We still enjoy the training superiority that won our first war in Iraq in only 100 hours of ground operations. In 2001 we sent a handful of superbly trained forces into a completely different kind of war and succeeded there as well. The success in the 2003 Iraq war is becoming apparent as we complete this report. 

We offer these words in the hope that they may help contribute to making our warriors as well prepared to

win future conflicts. 

OUR MILITARY has a training superiority 

that is just as powerful as our technological superiority. Moreover, some recent changes raise hope that we will 

continue to enjoy it. We list a few of 

those in this chart. 

An increased emphasis on training at 

the top levels may be opening the policy 

path to a real training transformation. 

Equally encouraging is USD(P&R)’s use 

of his new position on the Defense Acquisition Board to pressure for fielding 

training subsystems synchronously with 

hardware and also for reducing the practice of using training resources to pay for 

acquisition errors. 

The Navy emphasis on continuing 

professional education and human performance is also exciting. Like most 

revolutions it will be hard to implement 

in a large organization. We look forward 

to its success. 

We also commend changes at the 

National Training Center to create a contemporary operational environment. 

In the last year some of us have 

noted, particularly in creating DARPA’s 

DARWARS program, that cognitive 

science, which used to be primarily an 

area of research, is beginning to be applied to practical problems. We are at the 

early stages of this transformation, and 

may be deluding ourselves in the hubris 

of the start of a new endeavor. We hope 

not. 

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Training for Future Conflicts 

We proudly present some actual 

numbers in this chart’s bullet about 

costs. We dwell on them here because 

they go directly to the heart of the affordability challenge. 

In achieving the first training transformation—the creation of fixed combat 

training centers in the 1970s—three 

hardware items were particularly costly: 

(1) position location, timing, and event 

instrumentation; (2) data control and 

safety networks; and (3) the information 

management and display capabilities to 

support the AAR process. The highest 

cost items, however, were the people 

that stood behind the hardware. These 

included government, military, and civilians support (usually technical and software) personnel.Today improvements in 

cost-performance of hardware and software have dramatically reduced people 

support costs. In the 1970s, instrumentation was expensive. Position location 

was accomplished with many towers and 

radio multi-lateration. Processing and 

system-unique network hardware and 

systems to keep everything synchronized 

cost even more. In 1975 the Army hardware and software costs per instrumented entity approached $500,000. In 

mid-1990s constant dollars, this would 

amount to about $1.5 million. 

Today GPS can provide positive location and timing. Cellular phones and 

their transceiver-on-a-chip technology

have driven down communications and 

data link costs by more than an order of 

magnitude. Processing costs have 

dropped by five orders of magnitude. 

Moreover, these items are now embedded into the platforms vice appliquéd, 

and their reliability drastically reduces

support and support-manpower costs. 

By the end of the 1980s, a complete 

instrumentation package cost $50,000 

per entity. This in turn reduced the support and personnel costs by a factor of 

two or more. The late 1990s, ACMI 

pods took us further. 

Costs for CTC-like training are a 

much less significant issue today than in 

the past, but beware: the benefits may 

accrue both to our forces and to those of 

potential enemies. 

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Training for Future Conflicts 

DSB Task Force on Training for Future 

Conflicts

Return to the Summary of This Task Force

Key Finding: Transformed forces need transformed training—NOW 

3⁄4Unintended human consequence of transformation: everybody must think

Schoolhouse training, ADL, OJT, simulation, high-level exercises won’t fix this

3⁄4OSD training transformation thrust & USN training emphasis are encouraging 

3⁄4Structural changes recommended by last TF not implemented

Personnel & acquisition systems let training pay their bills without fear of being called into account

Key Recommendations

3⁄4SecDef require a high-level training report card at least annually

Blue Training: Acquisition and Personnel executives must participate as well

 Def/JCS require report on Training Surprise 

3⁄4USD(AT&L) establish & test co-equal training subsystem for acquisition programs

3⁄4USD(P&R) report on how to convert to unit-managed personnel system

3⁄4USD(P&R) sponsor a Virtual Training Environments ACTD

3⁄4USD(P&R) encourage technology for home station training

3⁄4DARPA expand DARWARS Training Superiority Initiative

3⁄4USD(P&R) establish $40M/yr 6.3/4 training budget line for low-hanging fruit

3⁄4CJCS and combatant commanders establish Deployed Combat Training Teams 

3⁄4DSB continue bureaucratic water torture with new TF on Joint National CTC

Red Training: Sec

Success in conflict is the goal. Training contributes substantially to this goal. It is approached mostly in 

isolation from the other contributing factors: hardware performance, personnel policies, and operational

procedures. As the nature of the conflicts we will fight changes, we can not afford to let each area transform without reference to the others.

THIS CHART IS THE SAME summary we

used at the beginning. The following 

words are different. 

Training superiority, created by the 

Combat Training Center process, was a 

revolution in creating warfare proficiency. It remains a uniquely American 

phenomenon. It is ours to lose and for 

others, at our peril, to gain. We currently 

only use it for some of our forces and 

only some of the time. 

Our task force’s principal finding is 

that there may be ways to maintain 

CTC-level proficiency continuously. 

This may be accomplished by making 

changes to the personnel system, by 

electronically exporting the cognitive 

aspects of the CTC experience as envisioned in the DARPA initiative, and by 

moving training toward the unit and 

away from residential sites. The funded 

initiative to create a Joint National 

Training Capability will also help, but a 

number of problems will have to be addressed to prevent it from creating the 

same uneven readiness over time that 

current fixed CTCs create. 

We also find that the nature of future 

conflicts, or at least our current operational and technological answer to future 

conflicts, will require continuous high 

cognitive proficiency from our warriors. 

To develop ways to achieve this we must 

fund and support training research and 

development at higher levels than we do 

now. The results are likely to pay for 

themselves quickly, not only in hard-tomeasure proficiency gains, but in re80 
Training for Future Conflicts 

duced training and training support 

costs. 

Changes within the traditional (diffuse) boundaries of military training 

establishments will not be enough. The 

transformation of tactics and hardware 

must no longer be made with minimal 

consideration of their effect upon the 

humans who will have to deal with them. 

The same applies to personnel policies. Key to making this happen is institutionalizing some form of top-level 

attention. The recommended training 

report cards should help. We hope that a 

continued DSB focus on training will 

help, too.

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Appendix 1

TOR

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Appendix 2

Membership

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Training for Future Conflict 

Membership

Co-Chairmen: 

Dr. Joseph Braddock 

Dr. Ralph Chatham

Members: 

Mr. Paul Chatelier 

Dr. John Christie 

Mr. Neale Cosby 

LTG William Etnyre, USMC (Ret) 

Dr. Dexter Fletcher 

LTG Paul Funk, USA (Ret) 

VADM Lee Gunn, USN (Ret) 

LTG William Hilsman, USA (Ret) 

GEN Paul Gorman, USA (Ret) 

Dr. Sung Lee 

RADM Fred Lewis, USN (Ret) 

Mr. Richard Lindhiem

GEN John Loh, USAF (Ret) 

Dr. Joe Markowitz 

Dr. Warren Morrison 

Dr. Harry O’Neil 

MG. George Steiner, USA (Ret) 

GEN John W. Vessey, USA (Ret) 

Dr. Gershon Weltman

Government Advisors: 

Mr. Clyde Owan, NIC 

Dr. Jerome Smith 

Dr. Sandra Wetzel-Smith 

Capt Art Gallo, USN 

Executive Secretary: 

Mr. Daniel Gardner, USD(P&R)

Mr. Michael Parmentier, USD(P&R) 

Defense Science Board Secretariat: 

LtCol Roger Basl, USAF 

 

SAIC Support: 

Richard Balzano 

Mark Mateski 

Cara Sievers 

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Appendix 3

Briefings and Visits

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Training for Future Conflict 

Briefings and Visits

JCS

• JV2020 BG Bundy, Deputy J-7 

Col Rankin, J-7 

Air Force

• Expeditionary Air Force MG Buchanan 

• Distributed Mission Training BG Morehouse 

• Air Operation Center as a Weapon System BG Morehouse 

Army

• Army Battle Command System Training LTG (Ret) Hilsman

• Army Transformation Foundation & Col (P) Combest, TRADOC 

Objective Force Concepts

• Transforming Professional Military Training BG Brown, TRADOC-DCST 

 

Navy and Marine Corps

• Review of Navy Training VADM (Ret) Gunn 

• Future Naval Operations VADM Cebrowski 

• Future USMC Concepts Lt.Col. Hibbert, MCCDC 

• Future Training & Education Concepts Lt.Col.Brandl, TECOM 

• Future Training Technologies Dr. Bailey, TECOM 

National Guard

• Programs & Issues LTG (Ret) Hilsman 

• New York Nattional Guard Civil Support Teams LTC Domenici, New York Nat’l Guard 

• JANUS-Based Collective Training Scenarios Maj. Minchin, New Jersey Nat’l Guard 

 

OSD

• Perspectives on Readiness & Training Dr. Mayberry, DUSD(Readiness) 

• Advanced Distributed Learning and Mr. Parmentier, ODUSD/R&T,PP 

 QDR Implications 

• DMSO Initiatives Capt. Lilienthal 

Operation Enduring Freedom MG (Ret) Jenkins 

Afghanistan Operations Capt. Nutschu 

JFCOM

• Perspectives on Future Training Mr. Moore, JFCOM 

• Transforming Joint Training Mr. Woods, JFCOM, J-7 

Logistics Community 

• Future Concepts MG Kelly, J-4 R&D Division

• DLA Past, Present and Future Christine Gallo, DLA

Transportation Community

• Future Concepts LTG Brown, USA, TRANSCOM 

 DCINC

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Training for Future Conflict 

Future Operations and Training

• Future Operations and Training Dr. Krepinevich, CSBA 

• Future Training GEN (Ret) Hartzog 

• Training (T2) Strategic Plan Mr. Parmentier, ODUSD/R&T,PP 

Intelligence Community

• Intel Community Training and Initiatives Mr. Wagner, CIA 

• Global Trends MG (Ret) Landry, NIO 

• Training Surprise Mr. Neary, DIA 

• China’s Aviation LCDR Overbaugh, USN (NMIC) 

• Update on China and “Training Surprise” MG (Ret) Landry, NIO 

Mission Capable Readiness System 

• Capability Based Readiness and Mr. Christie, IDA 

PERSTEMPO Research Mr. Tilson, IDA 

 

Wargaming Mr. Willis, DARPA 

Interoperability RADM (Ret) Walsh

Distributed Mission Training Update Mr. Gardner, ODUSD(R)R&T,PP 

DARPA

• Propose Training - Superiority PGM Dr. Chatham, DARPA 

Technology Innovations

• Joint Cognitive Ability and Readiness Management LTC Morris 

 & Analysis 

• Leadership Research Issues LTG (Ret) Miller, Oracle Defense 

 Operations

• ICT Initiatives Mr. Lindheim, Institute for Creative 

 Technology

• Recent Findings on Distance Learning Dr. Wisher, Army Research Institute 

• Manprint Dr. Keesee, Army Research Laboratory

• Virtual At Sea Training Mr. Scherr, ONR 

• JTRS, FCS, WIN-T and GUARD Net LTG (Ret) Hilsman 

• Army Transformation Initiatives COL (Ret) Reddy

• Intelligent Tutoring Dr. Van Lehn, University of Pittsburgh 

• Adaptive Behavior Systems Mr. Horvitz, Microsoft Research 

• JSIMS Status BG Seay

• Homeland Security Training MG Cortright (Oklahoma TAG) 

• JFCOM Homeland Security Civil Support COL Sick, JFCOM 

• Rules of Engagement Study Dr. Knarr, IDA 

Mr. Cosby, IDA 

Mr. Johnson, IDA 

 Capt. Nutsch

• Precision Targeting “2001 DSB Summer Study” Capt. McNarg , OSD 

 Mr. Kuhn, DTI 

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Training for Future Conflict 

Visits

• ADL Co-Lab Tour (Alexandria, VA) 

• Iowa NG Tech Center (Camp Dodge, IA) 

• Institute for Creative Technology (L.A. CA) 

• Air Force Research Laboratory, Warfighter Training Research Division (Williams AFB 

Mesa, AZ) 

- AF Distributed Mission Trainer 

- AH-64 and RPA Distributed Mission Trainer 

 

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Appendix 4

Acronyms

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Training for Future Conflict 

Acronyms

AAR After Action Review 

ACMI Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

ADL Advanced Distributed Learning 

AF Air Force

AH-64 Apache twin-engine, four bladed, multi-mission attack 

helicopter 

APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation 

ARCI Acoustic Rapid COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) 

Insertion 

ARPANET Advanced Research Projects Agency Network 

ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense 

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

CCTT Close Combat Tactical Trainer 

CDR Commander

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Commander in Chief 

CJCS Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 

COTS Commercial Off the Shelf 

CSBA Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment 

CTC Combat Training Center 

DAB Defense Acquisition Board 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 

DARWARS DARPA's Universal Persistent On-Demand Training 

Project 

DEPSECDEF Deputy Secretary of Defense 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System

DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DMSO Defense Modeling and Simulation Office 

DMT Distributed Mission Training

DOD Department of Defense 

DTI Directed Technologies Inc. 

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DUSD Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

DVTE Distributed Virtual Training Environment 

ELINT Electronic Intelligence

EXCEL Naval Task Force for Excellence through Commitment to 

Education and Learning 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FCS Future Combat System

GIG Global Information Grid 

GPS Global Positioning System 

ICT Institute for Creative Technology 

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses 

IMAT Interactive Multi-Analysis Trainer

IQ Intelligence Quotient (Analytical Intelligence) 

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JANUS Joint Army Navy Uniform Simulation 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JSIMS Joint Simulation System

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System

JV2020 Joint Vision 2020

KPP Key Performance Parameter 

LHD 7 USS Iwo Jima; WASP-class Amphibious Assault Ship 

MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command

MTI Moving Target Identification 

NIO National Intel Office

NMIC National Military Intelligence Center

OAV Organic Air Vehicle

OC Operational Capability

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OJT On-the-Job Training

ONR Office of Naval Research 

OPFOR Opposing Force

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PERSTEMPO Personnel Tempo (time an individual spends away from

home station) 

QDR Quality Deficiency Report 

R&D Research and Development 

ROE Rules of Engagement 

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101

RPA Reserve Personnel, Army 

RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration 

SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 

SECDEF Secretary of Defense 

SIMNET Large Scale Interactive Simulator Networking; Simulation 

Network 

SPOD Seaport of Debarkation 

TF Task Force 

TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 

UAE United Arab Emirates 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UCAR Uninhabited Combat Rotocraft 

UCAV Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle 

US United States 

USA United States Army 

USAF United States Air Force 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics 

USD (P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

VAST Virtual At Sea Training 

WIN-T Warrior Information Network-Tactical