THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Edited by

Thomas E. Copeland

August 2000
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ii
CONTENTS

Foreword ......................

Biographical Sketch of the Editor ........

Introduction.....................

Session 1

Opening Address .................

Session 2

Information and Decisionmaking ........

Session 3

Information and Institutional Adaption ....

Session 4

Signaling and Perception in the

 Information Age .................

Session 5

The Information Revolution and

 Threats to Security................

Session 6

 Responding to Security Threats ......... 

Noon Session

Video Teleconference ............... 

Session 7

The U.S. Military and Information Operations . 

iii
TABLES

1. Taxonomy of Problem Types .........

2. The Three Virus Domains ...........

3. The Ideational Tenets and Associated

 Principles ................... 

iv
FOREWORD

The current era has seen more rapid and exte

change than any time in human history. The profus

information and the explosion of information technol

the driver, reshaping all aspects of social, political, cul

and economic life. The effects of the information revo

are particularly profound in the realm of national se

strategy. They are creating new opportunities for thos

master them. The U.S. military, for instance, is exp

ways to seize information superiority during conflict

thus gain decisive advantages over its opponents. B

information revolution also creates new security th

and vulnerabilities. No nation has made more effectiv

of the information revolution than the United State

none is more dependent on information technolog

protect American security, then, military leader

defense policymakers must understand the inform

revolution.

The essays in this volume are intended to contrib

such an understanding. They grew from a December 

conference co-sponsored by the U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute and the University of Pitts

Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Se

Studies. The conference brought together some o

foremost members of the academic strategic st

community with representatives of the U.S. Govern

and U.S. military. As could be expected when examin

topic as complex as the relationship betwee

information revolution and national security

presentations and discussions were far-ranging, cov

such issues as the global implications of the inform

revolution, the need for a national information se

strategy, and the role of information in U.S. mi

operations. While many more questions than an

emerged, the conference did suggest some vital task

military leaders and defense policymakers must unde

v
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer the e

as part of the vital national debate over the changing n

of security in the information age.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE EDIT

THOMAS E. COPELAND is a Doctoral Research Fel

the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Se

Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. His pre

publications include papers on U.S. technology tra

policy and the effect of insubordination on civil-mi

relations, and he has researched and written on terro

transnational organized crime, and the misuse of hist

analogy in American foreign policy. Mr. Copelan

taught classes in international relations and p

administration at Geneva College and the Univers

Pittsburgh. His professional experience includes s

with the Office of the Chief of Naval Research

Washington Post Company, and the Institute of 

Politics. He is currently a research consultant to the Fe

Government with LEXIS-NEXIS, Inc.

vii
INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century, American

content with their lot in life. Unemployment is at a 30

low, incomes are rising, and inflation is minimal. The 

seems to be free of major conflict, and—just in cas

needed—the U.S. military is the most advanced and ca

in the world. These are the good old days.

However, the apparent calm hides a numb

crises—the future of democratic capitalism in tran

states in Europe, Asia, and Africa; ongoing interna

external debates over the proper role of America i

world; differing approaches to guaranteeing the stabi

world ecosystems; the radicalization of many religiou

ethno-nationalist causes; and the declining sovereignt

legitimacy of the nation-state as it struggles to respo

economic, social, and political challenges brought on 

information revolution. The Chinese symbols for “

mean both danger and opportunity. This might also b

of revolutions, including the information revolution.

The information revolution is a phenomenon that 

simple characterization. Its origins lie in the not-so-d

past—the British codebreakers at Bletchley Park d

World War II created “Colossus,” the world’s first wo

computer. That crude device is now outperformed 

hand-held calculator. Yet the origins of the inform

revolution really go further back to the inventions 

radio, the telephone, and even the telegraph. In many 

information has been making the world a smaller 

since the invention of the printing press.

But the information revolution, as it is comm

understood today, is heralded as the greatest g

transition since the Industrial Revolution. 

transforming the world’s most advanced nations 

industrial societies to information-based societies. Cit

firms, and governments in information societies 

1
increasingly on high-speed and high-quality informat

conduct their daily functions and operations. Pieces o

have become the building blocks of many modes of h

interaction and activity.

The revolution is perhaps best illustrated by its re

The speed and volume of computing power have incr

exponentially while costs have been dramatically red

bringing personal computers to half of all American h

The revolution has created the Internet, which fro

origins as a secure, nuclear-proof communications s

for the military has become a true global inform

system, home to more than 40 million web sites with 

than 800 million pages of information, accessed by 

than 165 million users. The information revolut

moving beyond computer networks; even small cou

like Finland have gone wireless—more than 80 te

service providers service the two-thirds of all Finns wh

mobile phones.

Opportunity.

The information revolution seems to hold a 

promise. The U.S. economy saw tremendous growth 

1990s, thanks to information technologies. In

expectations of future economic growth fueled b

information revolution have driven the New York 

NASDAQ stock exchanges to record levels. The prom

economic growth and development applies elsewhe

well; technological advances are allowing the 

developed countries to leapfrog ahead in time, cost

technology, from having no telephones to acquiring wi

telecommunications. Improved person-to-person co

and understanding—thanks to new communica

technologies resulting in the creation of a “g

village”—seem to offer hope that the use of military 

may become far less necessary in the future.

Advances in technology and communications ar

revolutionizing other areas of human interaction su

2
politics and medicine. Election candidates now 

significant time and money into building web sites int

to get their message out to voters, who are able to che

candidates’ records, read news stories, participate in 

make campaign donations, and register to vote, all 

on-line. The state of Oregon is the first to consider all

citizens to vote over the Internet. These same com

users are also able to access the latest research report

advice on medical issues, network with others suf

from similar diseases or conditions, and even s

appointments on-line. New information technologie

being used for distributed medicine, allowing doct

urban hospitals and research centers to work with m

professionals in remote areas to diagnose and 

patients. Changes in politics and medicine are match

developments in education, entertainment, travel

trade.

Danger.

At the same time, there is a dark side to the inform

revolution. The gap between the information “haves

the information “have-nots” is getting larger; perhap

20 percent of the world is being influenced by globaliz

and the information revolution. While the United Sta

the world’s superpower in information technology, d

primarily by the corporate sector, our dependence 

information systems creates enormous vulnerabi

Even though President Truman warned many year

that the critical infrastructure of the United State

vulnerable, it has taken the country a long time to be

realize its weaknesses in the face of new threats. Thos

threats are becoming more potent; advanc

telecommunications enable opportunists and indiv

with malign intentions—terrorists, political extre

and criminal groups—to organize themselves effec

and to conduct new kinds of activities counter to 

interests.

3
The U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Ins

and the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for Interna

Security Studies at the University of Pittsbur

December 1999 sponsored a conference on the inform

revolution and its impact on national security. The goa

to bring together the corporate, academic, and govern

communities to share lessons learned from their resp

efforts to conceptualize and deal with the new threat

opportunities presented by the information revol

Discussions at the conference suggested a numb

important implications.

Technological Threats Need to Be Carefully

Assessed.

The technological threats most often discuss

public—cyber-terrorists, hackers, and asymme

attacks—are not yet as significant as some of the dom

policy debates suggest. We have seen very little evide

cyber-terror attacks. Although the information revo

has created vulnerabilities and expanded the scop

criminal activity, most hackers are juveniles who th

have done little damage against relatively unimpo

targets, using fairly simple tactics like denial-of-servi

a type of asymmetrical threat, terrorism in the pas

benefited from technological advances like the jetline

television. But while terrorists certainly make use of 

of the latest technologies, they still rely primari

tried-and-true tactics and weapons. Terrorists face se

challenges in acquiring the technological tools, expe

and access needed to successfully attack cr

information systems. Thus the information revolutio

not yet brought new kinds of terrorist threats, but 

increased the power available to traditional terror g

and other opportunists.

4
Technological Opportunities Abound.

At the same time, technological solutions are 

pursued to exploit opportunities made possible b

information revolution. Access to open sources throug

information technologies (such as the Interne

commercial satellites) levels the playing field in intelli

collection between public and private entities. To

intelligence consumer has many new choices, even as 

institutions like the vaunted National Security Agenc

themselves falling behind the latest technolo

developments. The Information Dominance Center 

U.S. Army Land Information Warfare Center (LIWC) 

advantage of new software programs, wireless techn

and video teleconferencing to train for and coord

information operations in the complex physica

informational environment—such as peacekeepin

which today’s Army often operates. Private s

companies are producing new software programs that 

together databases with structured augment

processes to create a system of virtual collaboration a

intelligence analysts that is open and logical. 

technological advances such as data mining and autom

learning and discovery are being used by the Com

Emergency Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie M

University to create useful intelligence from informa

has collected on nearly 23,000 computer security incid

Organizational Adaptation is Problematic.

The U.S. military and most other tradit

institutions, including firms and governments

ill-prepared to meet new organizational challenges pos

nonhierarchical, amorphous, networked opponents. I

argued that at the international level we see a la

agreement among nation-states on how they s

regulate things like the Internet and e-commerce

growing empowerment of (and outright challenges 

nontraditional actors, and the inadequacy of tradi

5
intergovernmental forums for dealing with many 

issues. Further difficulties arise at lower levels.

Rigid bureaucratic hierarchies make it extre

difficult for national governments to prevent or respo

many new kinds of transnational threats. Both str

and temporary alliances among criminal organizatio

hard to track, as are emerging terrorist organization

are small or include only one individual. Hacker at

often carried out through a network of proxies or “zo

computers, are not typical investigative subjects fo

enforcement and intelligence agencies. This is n

suggest that the U.S. Government is neglecting to re

to these threats or to consider changes to organiza

structures. It is probably farther ahead than any 

government in understanding and responding to 

threats, but it is still ill-prepared and inadequ

organized to address these problems.

The U.S. military has adapted unevenly to the 

mation revolution. It has been relatively success

applying technology to the battlefield and in tacklin

roles and missions, but it has not addresse

disadvantages of its hierarchical and centralized s

when facing flexible, networked opponents in the 

information environment. This failure must be correc

Opportunities Exist to Make Organizational

Change.

The undisputed predominance that the U.S. m

enjoys over military forces anywhere in the world, an

relative lack of serious national security threats facin

country at the moment, have created a unique environ

wherein the military should be free to make organiza

changes. Some traditional roles and missions will stil

to be fulfilled in the future through traditional struc

but the military must adapt itself more fully 

decentralized, nonhierarchical system. The ki

networked, flexible organization that is called for is 

6
radical idea—40 years ago Morris Janowitz sugges

The Professional Soldier that technology had ch

warfare to such a degree that coordination, cooperatio

teamwork are more fundamental to operational su

than are authoritarian leadership and structure

military has pushed decisionmaking further and fu

down the chain of command, and is experimenting wit

technologies that link soldiers and commanders in 

time. However, the military’s willingness to make n

organizational changes—required by amorphous 

networked opponents of the future—will continue 

constrained by institutional inertia, service rivalries

conservative thinking.

The business community has been somewhat qu

than the military to respond to the organizat

adaptation imperative, particularly in regar

competitive intelligence. A handful of best-pra

companies are carefully establishing unique organiza

networks and practices that enable them to coord

strategic and tactical competitive intelligence in way

significantly enhance their successful adaptati

changes in the global market. Businesses are findin

ways to organize themselves to carry out risk assess

and management and to provide critical and t

services. There is much for the military to learn fro

business community about flexible organization, an

private sector can learn a great deal from the military 

things like the redundancy of critical systems.

New Concepts Are Needed.

Dr. John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate S

proposed that much of the normal discussion of inform

strategy is located only at the technologica

organizational levels, and therefore there is a need for 

new thinking at the level of ideational tenets. Memb

the academic, think tank, business, and mil

communities who participated in this conference pro

7
some unique and important contributions t

conceptualization of the information revolution an

impact on national security. Participants offered new 

more complex characterizations of the nature o

information revolution, new definitions and unders

ings of theoretical and operational elements of inform

operations and warfare, and components of a na

information security strategy. They also urged d

consideration of the implications of information fo

security dilemma, deterrence and coercion, perceptio

misperception, alliances, and conflict resolution.

Conclusion.

If indeed current technological threats are n

significant as they appear in the public debate, one 

question whether dramatic organizational change

ground-breaking new concepts are really neces

However, it is clear that technology is changing 

improving so rapidly that the dangers and opportu

created, exacerbated, or illuminated by the inform

revolution will only grow in importance. We hope th

following summaries of presentations and papers a

conference will be an important contribution to the d

over the information revolution and national security

8
SESSION 1:

OPENING ADDRESS

“The Information Revolution:

Both Powerful and Neutral”

James N. Rosenau

University Professor of International Relati

The George Washington University

Much of my presentation may prove to be controve

So let me start with an observation that I belie

incontrovertible, namely, that the information revol

by providing technologies that have continued to g

accelerate the collapse of time and space, has a

substantially to the complexities that mark our 

Perhaps most notably, the revolution has rendered 

once was remote close-at-hand; it has transforme

linear into the nonlinear, the sequential int

simultaneous; and in so doing, it has pervaded world a

with what I like to call “distant proximities.”

This label for the consequences of the inform

revolution is useful because it reeks of complexi

nuance, and the need to guard against simp

conclusions. For there can be no mistaking di

proximities for simple interrelationships, re

discernible and easily understood. Distant proxim

encompass the tensions between core and perip

between national and transnational systems, be

communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, between cu

and subcultures, between states and markets, be

decentralization and centralization, between univers

and particularism, between pace and space, betwee

global and the local—to note only the more conspi

links between opposites that have been accelerated b

information revolution. And each of these tensio

marked by numerous variants; they take different for

9
different parts of the world, in different countri

different markets, in different communities, in dif

professions, and in different cyberspaces, with the 

that there is enormous diversity in the way p

experience the simultaneity of the distant proximitie

the information revolution has intruded upon their li

Put differently, distance is not measured only in 

across land and sea; it can also involve less tangible, 

abstract conceptions in which distance is assessed a

organizational hierarchies, event sequences, social s

market relationships, migration patterns, and a h

other nonterritorial spaces. Thus to a large extent, d

proximities are subjective appraisals, what people f

think is remote and what they think or feel is close-at-

There is no self-evident line that divides the distant 

the proximate, no established criteria for different

between the more-remote or close-at-hand environm

In other words, nearness and farness connote scale a

as place. They are a context, a “habitat of meaning,”

1

 a 

set that may often correspond with spatial distance ev

there are other scalar contexts which can mak

close-at-hand feel very remote and the faraway 

immediately present.

The Neutrality of the Revolution.

In short, clearly we need to be sensitive to nuance 

are to begin to grasp the meaning and potentials 

information revolution. I have tried to highlight this n

the title of my presentation, in characterizin

information revolution as powerful but neutral. S

some would argue, anything that is powerful cannot a

neutral, that the word “revolution” suggests power

power suggests purpose, and that, by their very n

purposes are laden with values. Thus, such a l

reasoning would conclude, to speak of the inform

revolution as powerful but neutral is not to trace nua

is be profoundly erroneous!

10
No, I shall contend, it is nuance and not error 

treats the revolution in terms of the technologies 

facilitate the rapid spread of information an

simultaneity of distant proximities rather than in ter

the information itself. Information is anything but ne

It can be skewed and designed to distort; it reflec

repeat, subject appraisals. This is not the case, how

with information technologies. They are essentially n

because they do not in themselves tilt in the direction 

particular values—neither toward good or bad, nor 

right, nor open or closed systems. They are neutral, 

sense that their tilt is provided by people. People and 

collectivities infuse values into information. For bet

worse, individuals and organizations introduce inform

into political arenas and thereby render it good or bad

neutrality of information technologies enables the dem

as well as the authoritarian to use information in wha

way he or she sees fit.

There is, in other words, some utility in starting wi

premise that the technologies that generate and cir

information are neutral. It enables us to avoid determi

modes of thought in which people are seen as being dep

of choice by the dictates of information technologie

more positively, the neutrality premise compels us to 

on human agency and how it does or does not make 

information technologies.

This is not to imply, of course, that consequences 

follow from the power of information technologies an

degree to which information technologies are ava

Indeed, a prime reason why consequences follow is th

technologies have facilitated human choice. Throug

Internet people can now make choices in a vast 

market, in the political realm, in the types of entertain

they enjoy; and there are endless other ways in whic

Internet is disaggregating the power of choice down 

individual level. Clearly, then, the availabil

information technologies facilitates the exercise of h

agency. Yet, to posit choices as facilitated by inform

11
availability is not to refer to the impact of va

Information technologies are about the contexts w

which decisional alternatives are considered. They s

range within which ends and means are fra

alternatives pondered, and choices made.

If we view this matter in this way, it is mislead

analyze information technologies in causal terms. Tha

is misleading if one confines the meaning of causatio

do, to human agency. So viewed, causality accounts f

choices that are made, and why information is interp

in one way rather than another. But inform

technologies are not human agents. They are s

equipment, inanimate hardware, gadgetry. Yet, as 

they are both powerful and neutral.

By treating information technologies as neutral, w

them as background conditions and not as imme

stimuli to action—as second-order dynamics that influ

contextualize, facilitate, permit, or inhibit courses of a

but not as first-order dynamics that change, trans

foster, impose, or shape courses of action. The distin

between the two types of dynamics is importa

differentiates between the operation of structures and 

of agents. Put more forcefully, the distinction preven

analyst from mistaking second-order for first-

dynamics, for treating information technologies 

unseen hand that somehow gets people, group

communities to pursue goals and undertake actions w

awareness of why they do what they do and, accord

without taking responsibility for their conduct.

A good illustration of the dangers of positing inform

technologies as first-order causal dynamics is evident 

adaptation of vertical business organizations in the 19

the horizontal flexibility required by the globalizat

national economies. When diverse enterprises first s

upon the new technologies, they treated the

labor-saving devices and as means to control labor r

than as mechanisms for organizational adaptation

12
result was an aggravation of their vertical bureau

rigidities. It was only after they made the nece

organizational changes in order to keep abreast of 

operational environments that the inform

technologies “extraordinarily enhanced” the success o

enterprises.

2

 For all practical purposes, in other word

restructuring of businesses away from hierarchica

toward network forms of organization precede

considerable impact of information technologies, ev

the latter then facilitated eye-catching growth on the p

the former.

In the same way, the notion of information as n

does not ignore the convertibility of information 

knowledge and, thus, into power. More accur

information technologies facilitate the exercise of wha

been called “soft power,” a concept that differen

information from the conventional dimensions of ma

power such as oil production, troops in uniform, mi

hardware, and agricultural production.

3

 As c

demonstrated during the Gulf War and the Kosovo co

military capabilities today highly depend on adv

information technologies; the targeting of missile

distribution of ideas through short-wave broadcasts

the dropping of leaflets over cities exemplify the applic

of information to modern security strategies. Yet, d

the innumerable ways in which soft power can be use

nonetheless the case that the information technolog

which it is based are neutral. To repeat, what counts i

officials and governments generate and emplo

technologies, and how publics interpret the informatio

knowledge that comes their way.

Needless to say, as conditions with which humans 

cope, information technologies are crucial dimensions 

political scene. As they change, so do the contexts in 

choices are made. As new technologies are developed

the range of plausible choices altered. Among other t

for example, technological innovations pose the quest

how the range of choice is expanded by the availabi

13
information for those who are, so to speak, informatio

rich and how it is narrowed for those who are inf

tionally poor—and, indeed, how the discrepancies be

the rich and the poor configure the context within whi

two perceive each other and interact.

These contextual factors have been mostly neglec

political scientists who study world affairs, a neglect 

to highlight here by addressing four main ways in 

information technologies contribute to the context w

which world affairs unfold. More specifically, I undert

explore (1) how the technologies have made possib

alteration of the skills of individuals; (2) how they m

affecting the circumstances whereby the gap betwee

informationally rich and poor is undergoing transf

tion; (3) how they may be changing the conditions 

which individuals and groups interact; and, (4) how 

may be contributing to the evolution of new g

structures.

The Skill Revolution.

While the world’s present population may not be 

skillful than earlier generations, there are good reas

presume that the skills of today’s person-in-the-stre

different than was the case for his or her predecesso

latter may have been more skillful in building firepla

cathedrals, but today’s citizenries are more skill

linking themselves to world affairs, in tracing d

events through complex sequences back into their h

and pocketbooks. These changes seem so extensive 

warrant labeling them as a “skill revolution,” 

transformation that has three basic dimension

analytic dimension, an emotional dimension, an

imaginative dimension—all of which have been g

facilitated by the recent advent of technologies that 

ideas, information, and pictures into the lives of peo

ways that had not previously been possible. G

television, the Internet, the fax machine, fiber optic 

14
e-mail, the computer, and, most recently, a mobile 

that links one’s e-mail and computer, have all en

people to alter their skills in such a way as to adapt 

effectively to the demands of an ever more complex wor

Some have argued that people tend to adapt t

information age by turning away from the realm of 

and politics. However, quite the opposite proved to b

case in a systematic survey of Americans who 

extensive use of at least four of five information techno

and were classified as Connected or Superconnected 

digital world:

5

Despite the national lament that technology undermin

literacy, Connected Americans are... more likely to spend ti

reading books than any other segment of the populat

broken down in this survey. Seventy percent of the Connec

say they spend 1 to 10 hours reading a book during a typi

week; another 16 percent read for 11 to 20 hours a week. F

from being distracted by the technology, Digital Citize

appear startlingly close to the Jeffersonian ideal—they a

informed, outspoken, participatory, passionate abo

freedom, proud of their culture, and committed to the f

nation in which it has evolved.

6

Furthermore, the dynamics of change fueling the 

revolution are likely to accelerate as increasingly e-ma

computer-literate generations of children and adoles

move into adulthood. For example, it is portentous, 

least noteworthy, that a 1999 survey of young p

between the ages of 13 and 17 in the United States rev

that 63 percent used a computer at home (compared 

percent in 1994) and 42 percent had e-mail addre

These findings suggest that the ranks of Superconn

and the Connected are likely to swell with the pass

time and the advent of new generations, thus adding 

ways in which the skill revolution is a powerful sou

change in world affairs.

While the acceleration rate of the skill revo

elsewhere in the world may not match or exceed the r

15
the United States, it is important to stress that the cha

skills of people everywhere matter. As indicated i

ensuing analysis, the newly acquired analytic, emot

and imaginative skills have enabled individuals to joi

participate in organizations appropriate to their int

and thereby to know when, where, and how to enga

collective action. In addition, as will be seen, the enh

public affairs oriented skills of people have contribute

major transformation of the global structures that g

world affairs.

Bridging the Information Gap.

There is little question that the benefits o

information revolution have been enjoyed by only a 

proportion of the world’s population, and that th

between those who are rich and poor with respect to 

access to information is huge. For example, while 

America and Western Europe had, respectively, 43.

28.3 percent of the world information technology mar

1995, the comparable figures for Latin America on th

hand and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Afr

the other were 2.0 and 2.6 percent. Put even more st

while the number of personal computers per 1,000 peo

low-income and lower-middle-income economies in 

was 1.6 and 10.0, the comparable figures for those in 

industrialized economies (NIEs) and high-in

economies were 114.8 and 199.3. Or consider Internet 

per 1,000 people in 1996: for the former two typ

economies the number was 0.01 and 0.7, respect

whereas the number in the latter two types of econ

was 12.9 and 111.0.

8

Notwithstanding the importance of these huge 

between the informationally rich and poor—gaps 

provide the rich with advantages and opportunitie

available to the poor—such data tell only part of the 

Most notably, they do not depict the trend line that r

allows for the assertion that not only are the inf

16
tionally rich getting richer, but the informationally po

also getting richer. The gap remains huge, but 

nonetheless the case that in a variety of way

information revolution is also unfolding in the deve

world and that, along several dimensions, the g

narrowing and likely to continue to narrow in the 

ahead. This shrinking of the gap stems from se

sources. One is the enormous decline in the co

information technologies, a decline that is brill

suggested by the fact that, for diverse reasons, “comp

power per dollar invested has risen by a factor of 10,00

the past 20 years” and that the “cost of voice transm

circuits has fallen by a factor of 10,000 over those sa

years.”

9

 Another source of the narrowing gap involv

capacity of developing countries to “leapfrog the indu

countries by going straight from underdeveloped net

to fully digitized networks, bypassing the traditional a

technology that still forms the backbone of the syst

most industrial countries.”

10

 Likewise, while most 

developing world has yet to be wired, its peoples can 

cellular phone and do not have to wait for the installat

fixed lines. It is noteworthy, for instance, that the

number of cellular phones per fixed line is already as high 

some low- and middle-income economies as in so

industrialized countries; some developing countries with l

density in both traditional telephone service and cellu

phones have recently invested in cellular technology at a ve

fast rate . . . .The Philippines, a country with low telepho

density (only 2.5 main lines per 100 people), has a higher ra

of mobile phone subscribers to main lines than Japan, t

United Kingdom, the United States, or several oth

industrial countries with densities of more than 50 main lin

per 100 people.

11

Put differently, not long ago it was conventional to 

that development in Africa lagged because the con

was not wired. But now this lag is less portentous be

communications in and to Africa are on the ver

becoming wireless. In other words,

17
The wireless revolution is ending the dictatorship of place in 

profound way[s] . . . . In the past, one of the bigg

disadvantages of being born in the poor world was that you w

isolated from modern communications—and hence locked 

the local economy. But mobile phones are great level

spreading the latest tools of communication to areas w

traditional phone companies could not reach. The phone lad

of Bangladesh are going around with mobile phones that wo

turn heads in Hollywood restaurants, and enabling th

customers to plug themselves into the global economy.

12

Of course, the rise in the trend line in devel

countries is especially noticeable among their elit

educated populations. Once the Internet was intro

into Kuwait in 1992, for example, scientists, scholar

students came on-line in increasing numbers. Wit

years their ranks had increased to some 45,000, and m

these are younger people who hang out in any of 

Internet cafes in Kuwait City, where they escape the 

and at the same time use the Internet for chatting, d

or otherwise reinforcing their local culture.

1

information revolution has also reached the small vi

of the Middle East: in the case of Al Karaka, Egypt, 

was electricity but only one telephone in the 1

however, less than two decades later all its house

electricity, and “there are also 20 telephones and more 

55 television sets. . . .”

14

Nor are authoritarian countries able to hold bac

information revolution. China, for example, has som

million Internet accounts, many of which are shar

several users, and it would appear that the num

accounts and users grows continually.

15

 Likewise, Ira

an estimated 30,000 people with Internet accounts ev

it also seeks to control the flow of information to and a

them.

16

 Whether such controls can ever be adequ

established is, however, problematic.

In sum, while there are billions of persons who d

have access to the Internet, their numbers are dwindl

more and more people and organizations everywhe

18
coming on-line. Put differently, and to recast a com

place metaphor, to focus on those who lack access may 

see the glass as 19/20 empty, but the trend line is 

direction of it being increasingly more than 1/20 full.

Interactive Contexts.

Perhaps the single most important consequence 

newer information technologies—and probabl

consequence that justifies a continuing reference t

“information revolution”—concerns their impact o

modes through which individuals and organiza

interact. Until the advent of the most recent technol

and especially the Internet, the vast majority of 

interactions were hierarchical in nature, both w

organizations and across organizations engaged in s

pursuits. The former hierarchies tended to be for

established, with ranks and positions that allowe

top-down flows of authority and policy directives, wh

the across-organization hierarchies were also mark

top-down arrangements but were more in the nature 

to speak, pecking orders—informal but widely s

rankings of prestige, influence, and power. Both the f

and informal hierarchies, however, have 

supplemented by the horizontal networks that the 

technologies permit. As a consequence of the capacit

networking facilitated by the newer inform

technologies, the present era is marked by a ver

explosion of organizations and associations, an explos

vast that fully tracing and documenting it is vir

impossible. At every level of community in every part 

world, new organizations are continuously being fo

that are preponderantly sustained by network rather 

hierarchical structures.

17

Note that hierarchies are being supplemented an

replaced by networks. To stress that the networ

become a central form of human organization is not to 

that hierarchies are headed for extinction. Ther

19
always be a need for hierarchy, for authority to be arra

such a way that decisional conflicts can be resolve

policies adopted by higher authorities when conse

agreements prove unachievable in any type of organiz

The present period of dynamic transformations is lik

be one in which many hierarchies are flattened, pe

even disrupted, but such a pattern is not the equival

anticipating the demise of hierarchical structures.

18

This is not to imply that horizontal networks ar

forms of organization. The networks that flow 

horizontal communication have long been featur

human endeavor. Such interactions have always 

possible, say, by steamship and letters during most 

19th century and by wireless and telephone during th

half of the 20th century. But these earlier technologies 

available only to elites. Others could not afford them. 

is new today, however, is that horizontal exchanges a

only rendered virtually simultaneous by the inform

revolution, but their cost has been reduced to n

nothing. As a result, horizontal networking is no l

confined to the wealthy and the powerful; instead, it i

available to any ordinary folk who have access t

Internet. Stated in terms of the new technologies,

the growth of a vast new information infrastructure includ

not only the Internet, but also cable, cellular, and sate

systems, etc., [has shifted] the balance . . . from one-to-m

broadcast media (e.g., traditional radio and television) 

many-to-many interactive media. A huge increase in glo

interconnectivity is resulting from the ease of entry and acc

in many nations, and the growing interest of so many actor

using the new infrastructure for all manner of interactions

The networking potential that flows from the 

availability of information technologies is pe

especially conspicuous in the United States. For no

has Internet usage in the United States more than do

in the last 4 years,

20

 but 9 percent of those i

aforementioned survey of the usage of diverse inform

20
technologies were classified as either “Connecte

“Superconnected” to the course of events.

21

 Tha

high-usage stratum of the public is capable of exte

networking can be readily deduced from a central find

the survey:

The Internet, it turns out, is not a breeding ground 

disconnection, fragmentation, paranoia, and apathy. Digi

Citizens [the Connected and the Superconnected] are n

alienated, either from other people or from civic institutio

Nor are they ignorant of our system’s inner workings, 

indifferent to the social and political issues our society m

confront. Instead, the online world encompasses many of t

most informed and participatory citizens we have ever had 

are likely to have.

22

Clearly, then, the significance of virtually free acc

the Internet by ever greater numbers of people can h

be underestimated. Already it has facilitated the form

and sustenance of networks among like-minded peopl

in earlier, pre-Internet times could never have conve

The result has been the aforementioned organiza

explosion, a vast proliferation of associations—

environmental to human rights activists, from small g

of protesters to large social movements, from speci

interest associations to elite advocacy networks, 

business alliances to interagency governm

committees, and so on across all the realms of h

activity wherein mutuality of interests exists. This we

explosion of organizations has occurred in territorial 

as well as cyberspace, but the opening up of the latte

served as a major stimulus to the associational prolife

in the former. Indeed, the trend toward network for

organization,

is so strong that, projected into the future, it augurs ma

transformations in how societies are organized—if n

societies as a whole, then at least parts of their governmen

economies, and especially their civil societies.

23

21
A stunning measure of the shift from hierarchi

network organizations facilitated by the new inform

technologies can be seen in innovations adopted by th

Marine Corps. In a recent exercise called UR

WARRIOR, a unit of Marines comprised of all ranks 

generals to privates launched an “invasion”of the Cali

coast, with the lower ranked personnel that “h

beaches” all carrying hand-held computers that linked 

to all the others in the unit and collectively provid

concerned with a picture of how the “battle” was unfo

In effect, they operated as a network in which ran

hierarchy were irrelevant, an arrangement that the M

Corps plans to apply on a larger scale in the future.

2

While the large extent to which the Internet und

the trend toward networking in government, busines

military organizations cannot be overstated, its releva

the world of voluntary associations and nongovernm

organizations (NGOs) is even more profound. In eff

has facilitated a step-level change in what is called 

society,” that domain of the private sector where p

have not had the resources to widen their contact

solidify their collaborative efforts that have long 

available to governments, corporations, and armies. N

is possible to inform, coordinate, and mobilize like-m

individuals in all parts of the world who have common 

to which they are willing to devote time and energy. Eq

important, NGOs and the advocacy networks they su

are proliferating. In 1979, for example, only 

independent environmental organization was acti

Indonesia, whereas by 1999 the number of 

organizations had risen to more than 2,000 linked 

environmental network based in Jakarta. Like

registered nonprofit organizations in the Philippines 

from 18,000 to 58,000 between 1989 and 1996; in Slo

the figure went from a handful in the 1980s to more 

10,000 today; and in the United States, 70 percent 

nonprofit organizations—not counting religious group

private foundations—filing tax returns with the In

22
Revenue Service are less than 30 years old, and a thi

less than 15 years old.

25

Clearly, then, the proliferation of advocacy netwo

altering the landscape of world affairs and h

substantial consequences for the course of events. Wh

or not a global civil society will ever evolve, it is certain

case that transnational networks of private citizens 

become pervasive and central actors on the global stag

is not an exaggeration, in other words, to note tha

global stage is becoming ever more dense as a huge v

of NGOs acquire the new technologies and thereby e

their reach and coherence. Indeed, as I will elaborate b

is a density that has altered the structures through 

world politics are conducted. In sum,

our exploration of emergent social structures across doma

of human activity and experience leads to an overarch

conclusion: as a historical trend, dominant functions a

processes in the information age are increasingly organiz

around networks. Networks constitute the new soc

morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of network

logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes 

processes of production experience, power, and culture. Wh

the networking form of social organization has existed in oth

times and spaces, the new information technology paradi

provides the material basis for its pervasive expans

throughout the entire social structure.

27

New Global Structures.

With people in both developed and developing cou

becoming more skillful in relating to public affairs, and 

organizations proliferating at an eye-catching 

accelerating rate, it is hardly surprising that inform

technologies have contributed to transformatio

historical global structures. Stated most succinctly, a

global arena has become ever more dense with actor

networks, the traditional world of states has 

supplemented by a second world comprised of a wide v

of nongovernmental, transnational, and subnational a

23
from the multinational corporation to the ethnic min

from the professional society to the knowledge comm

from the advocacy network to the humanitarian o

zation, from the drug cartel to the terrorist group, fro

local government to the regional association, and 

across a vast range of collective endeavors. Despi

diversity and cross-purposes, this “multi-centric” wo

seen as having a modicum of coherence such that it co

with the state-centric world. In effect, global struc

have undergone a bifurcation in which the two world

conceived as sometimes cooperating and often confl

but at all times interacting.

Needless to say, this interaction between the world

been greatly facilitated by the information technol

thus collapsing time, deterritorializing space

rendering traditional boundaries increasingly obs

Indeed, the more the technologies advance, the more 

facilitate the opening up of both governments 

nongovernmental organizations to the influence of 

members, to bottom-up and horizontal processes that 

greatly complicated the tasks of governance on a 

scale.

28

 For national governments these changes—an

vast proliferation of interconnections they have foste

have confounded the traditional practices of diplomac

the long-standing premises of national security, th

necessitating a rethinking of how to pursue goals in re

to the demands of both other states and the innume

collectivities in the multi-centric world.

29

 For the latt

increased connectivity has provided opportunities as w

challenges as they seek to network and build coalition

like-minded actors and contest the coalitions that sta

the way of their goals.

In short, the bifurcation of global structures has le

vast decentralization of authority in which g

governance becomes less state-centric and more the s

crazy-quilt patterns among unalike, dispe

overlapping, and contradictory collectivities seeki

24
maintain their coherence and advance their goals. 

than that, the interconnection of these patterns

is likely to deepen and become the defining characteristic 

the 21st century. The information revolution is what mak

this possible; it provides the capability and opportunity 

circuitize the globe in ways and to degrees that have nev

been seen before. This is likely to be a messy, complica

process, rife with ambivalent, contradictory, and paradoxi

effects.

30

The information revolution may be neutral in the 

that it permits the application of diverse and comp

values, but clearly it underlies extensive consequen

every realm of global affairs. And since there is no e

sight to the development of new information technol

clearly the full ramifications of their impact are yet 

experienced as people and their collectivities seek to 

abreast of the complexities of the dynamic transforma

that are altering the human condition.

DISCUSSION

Discussion focused on three subjects: the idea 

technology is neutral; the relationship between th

worlds of global politics (state-centric vs. multi-centric

the implications of information quality for interpre

and learning.

Dr. Rosenau: There are consequences of technology

are just second order—and not necessarily all good. As 

neutrality, we should differentiate between h

consequences as against the gadgetry and technolog

lead to those consequences.

In Seattle at the meeting of the World T

Organization, we saw the two worlds of world p

converging in the streets. My notion of the 21st cent

that in the political world we will continue to se

disaggregation of authority, which will move upwa

supranational organizations like the European U

25
sidewards to social movements, and downwa

subnational groups. A lot of the shifts in authority wil

the detriment of the nation-state. I would never say 

states are on their way out or off the stage, but they a

as competent as they used to be. They cannot contr

flow of information, money, pollution, crime, dru

people across their boundaries. It seems that the wo

going to get messier.

Regarding the quality of information, with my stud

say that their task is to develop knowledge, 

self-conscious and aware of the context frames the

when looking at the world. The information revo

makes people more possessive of working knowledg

me give an example. Scientists took a sample of 

players and nonchess players, and asked each gro

recreate a chess board after a chart was flashed 

seconds. They divided the chess players into two group

which saw pieces in an ordered pattern, and the other 

saw a random alignment of pieces. Those facin

game-like scenario had no problem reconstructing it; 

faced with a random board had no idea what to do

notion of the skill revolution (as part of the inform

revolution) is that while all of the information some

gets misinterpreted or ignored, the net consequence 

flow is greater imagination and capacity for judgme

that people enlarge their working knowledge. Some 

say that the revolution is not happening, that govern

continues unabated; but the information revolution, d

all its faults and the problem of being inundated 

information, has led to dramatic changes and increa

peoples’ skills.

SESSION 1 - ENDNOTES

1. Ulf Hannerz,Transnational Connections: Culture, People

London: Routledge, 1966, pp. 22-23.

2. Manuel Castells, The Information Age: The Rise of the N

Society, Vol. I, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 169.

26
3. See, for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and William A. 

“America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, Marc

1996, pp. 20-36; Richard Rosencrance, “The Rise of the Virtual 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, Fall 1996, pp. 45-61; Ryan Henry 

Edward Peartree, eds., The Information Revolution and Intern

Security, Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 1998; and Martin C. 

“Information War, Information Peace,” Journal of International 

Vol. 51, Spring 1998, pp. 411-428.

4. An extensive discussion of the skill revolution can be f

James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of 

and Continuity, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, C

James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Ex

Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge: Cambridge Un

Press, 1997, Chaps. 14-15; and James N. Rosenau, “The Skill Rev

and Restless Publics in Globalized Space,” in Michel Girau

Individualism and World Politics, New York: St. Martin’s Pres

pp. 44-68. Newly generated empirical materials that affi

hypothesis that skills in the realm of public affairs have adva

recent decades are provided in James N. Rosenau and W. M

Fagen, “Increasingly Skillful Citizens: A New Dynamism in 

Politics?” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, December 1

655-686.

5. The Superconnected were those in the survey of 1,444 ra

selected Americans who exchange e-mail at least three days a w

use a laptop, a cell phone, a beeper, and a home computer, wher

Connected were those who exchange e-mail three days a week 

three of the four other technologies. Jon Katz, “The Digital C

Wired, December 1997, p. 71.

6. Katz, p. 72.

7. Carey Goldberg and Marjorie Connelly, “Fear and Violen

Declined Among Teen-Agers, Poll Shows,” New York Times, Oct

1999, p. A1.

8. World Development Report, Knowledge for Develo

1998/99, New York: Oxford University Press for the World Ban

p. 63.

9. Ibid., p. 57.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

27
12. “A Survey of Telecommunications: The World in Your P

The Economist, Vol. 353, October 9, 1999, p. 36.

13. Deborah L. Wheeler, “Global Culture or Culture Clas

Information Technologies in the Islamic World—A View from K

Communications Research, Vol. 25, August 1998, pp. 359-376.

14. William E. Schmidt, “The Villages of Egypt Relish the F

Peace,” New York Times, September 24, 1993, p. A4.

15. Erik Eckholm, “A Trial Will Test China’s Grip on the In

New York Times, November 16, 1998, p. A8.

16. Neil MacFarquhar, “With Mixed Feelings, Iran Tiptoe

Internet,” New York Times, October 8, 1996, p. A4.

17. Lester M. Salamon, “The Global Associational Revoluti

Rise of the Third Sector on the World Scene,” Foreign 

July/August 1994, pp. 109-122.

18. For an analysis that stresses the limits of networks a

necessity of hierarchies, see Francis Fukuyama, “Social Netwo

Digital Networks,” a paper presented at the Workshop on the F

the Internet, Palo Alto, May 6, 1996.

19. David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “What If The

Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs?” paper presented at the 

Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washingto

February 17, 1999, p. 4.

20. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Politics Finding a Home on th

The Washington Post, November 22, 1996, p. A4.

21. Katz, p. 71.

22. Ibid.

23. David Ronfeldt, “Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Netw

Framework About Societal Evolution, ” Santa Monica, CA: RAND

p. 1. For a skeptical view of the potential of networks, and especi

Internet, see Deborah C. Sawyer, “The Pied Piper Goes Electron

Futurist, February 1999, pp. 42-46.

24. Joel Garreau, “Point Men for a Revolution: Can the M

Survive a Shift from Hierarchies to Networks?” The Washingt

March 6, 1999, p. 1.

28
25. David Bornstein, “A Force Now in the World, Citize

Social Muscle,” New York Times, July 10, 1999, p. B7.

26. See, for example, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn S

Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

27. Castells, p. 469.

28. Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarniz

Transnationalism from Below, New Brunsick, NJ: Tran

Publishers, 1998.

29. See Richard H. Solomon, Walter B. Wriston, and Ge

Schultz, Keynote Addresses from the Virtual Diplomacy Conf

Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1997; also, by same a

Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, Washingto

Center for Strategic & International Affairs, 1998.

30. Ronfeldt and Arquilla, pp. 19-20.

29
SESSION 2:

INFORMATION AND DECISIONMAKIN

The second session assessed the impact o

information revolution on intelligence and decisionma

looking at issues related to “data overload” or “inform

smog,” as well as the abundance of open sources 

challenge traditional government monopoli

intelligence. In addition, it considered how inform

technology might be used to enhance intelligence ana

“Exploiting Open Source Information—

Abundance, Value, and Intelligence Commu

Credibility”

Dr. Davis Bobrow

University of Pittsburgh

We begin with two intelligence community equa

First, the quality of an intelligence product is equ

collection x exploitation/processing x analysis. Se

intelligent policy is equal to the quality of the intelli

product x awareness of U.S. behavior and options x 

user/consumer discipline. What this means is that one 

have a great intelligence product, zero uncertainty, p

timing, and still have a disaster. If one understands th

of “value at the margins,” it is not obviously or neces

the case that upgrading the first term of either equ

(collection and quality product, respectively) offers the 

leverage from an increment of improvement. We leave 

to the reader to decide which of the six yields the f

improvement for the contemporary United States.

Our premise is that the information revolution m

less credible the notion that official intellig

communities have a monopoly (if they ever did) on any 

elements of a quality intelligence product. Therefore

31
should understand that they are in an extraordi

competitive environment, with a complex gro

American and foreign processors, collectors, analyst

consumers. Whether or not this is accepted i

intelligence community, anyone interested in 

informed will understand that they have a menu of 

far greater than they have ever had before.

The Problem Context.

Even an oversimplified version of the global inform

environment will reveal millions of people producing “

some of which may be considered “information.” The

now many more producers and sources, a real prolife

of suppliers. The problem is sifting through all the ava

information to find the important nuggets. 

government providers and others, add comme

overhead imagery and some 8,000 online comm

databases, etc., and one finds simply a “supply gl

information.

In the post-Cold War period, there is a demand boo

intelligence products. There are more issues, 

government consumers, more cross-sectoral custo

(public, private, and nonprofit), more coalitions, and 

outside actors, all stimulated by the notion that in th

information environment, information carries a pre

for effective behavior.

At the same time, the intelligence community fa

resource problem, and the ratios are getting worse. 

are more requirements and more potential sources

might call this “more hay to the needle.” But there 

manpower available—there are fewer searchers fo

needles. The number of CIA analysts basically has bee

since the mid-1970s; in fact, there have been ra

workforce reductions across U.S. intelligence age

associated with the Department of Defense over th

decade and a half. What this means is fewer specialis

more generalists who issue-hop, depending on 

32
priorities. In the context of information overload, there 

increasing tendency to follow the maxim of Sandy Ber

worry about today’s problems today and tomor

problems tomorrow.” This means that intelligenc

matter how good, will be of little help because it will 

too late.

Open Source Generalities.

In this context, we turn to considering open so

Experts for many years have suggested that exotic so

are less important than open sources. George Ke

stated that “the need by our government for s

intelligence about affairs elsewhere in the world has 

vastly overrated.” He also noted:

I would say that something upward of 95 percent of what 

need to know could be very well obtained by the careful a

competent study of perfectly legitimate sources of informat

open and available to us in the rich library and archi

holdings of this country. Much of the remainder, if it could n

be found here (and there is very little that could not) cou

easily be non-secretively elicited from similar sources abroa

Allen Dulles, another man who knew about secrecy

Because of its glamour and mystery, overemphasis 

generally placed on what is called secret intelligence, nam

the intelligence that is obtained by secret means and sec

agents . . . . In time of peace the bulk of intelligence can 

obtained through overt channels, through our diplomatic a

consular missions, and our military, naval, and air attaches 

the normal and proper course of their work. It can also 

obtained through the world press, the radio, and through t

many thousands of Americans, business and professio

men, and American residents of foreign countries, who a

naturally and normally brought in touch with what is going 

in those countries.

Both of these experts stressed open source informatio

before the information revolution. The obvious que

are: What has happened to prove they are wrong, or 

33
has happened to make us realize they are right? The ob

answers are “not much” and “a great deal.”

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director

Intelligence review listed the contribution of open sour

35 percent—much higher than either human intellige

signals intelligence. The community’s open source pro

office found that over 80 percent of the information 

production managers had identified could have been 

by open sources. So the range is probably somew

between 35 and 80 percent. Open sources also hav

advantage of the “third party rule,” which is that on

disseminate information to people who do not have a 

clearances. If one believes in the multi-actor wor

outlined by James Rosenau, the need for disseminat

crucial for information to realize its full potential val

The Aspin-Brown Commission, which began early 

Clinton Administration, talked about creating an 

source gateway to the intelligence community, in 

screening intelligence requirements to sort out inform

that had to be produced from secret vs. outside sourc

1997, despite all these reasons, about 1 percent o

intelligence community funding went to open source

ambitious Aspin-Brown recommendations have never 

implemented, and perhaps the community is even s

backwards. Recently, another wave of reports foll

alleged intelligence failures triggered the post-mo

calling for more use of outside experts and ou

information to control for internal bias.

Why the disparity between the alleged value of 

sources and funding? There are several charges often 

against open sources.

• First, open sources and unclassified analysts, i

too much, let the enemy know about sources and me

But we should fall back on Edward Teller’s rule t

everything is open, it is hard for others to find the nee

our haystack.

34
• Second, there is a lack of analytic discipline in 

sources. However, most American collection agencie

foreign counterparts go around pitching their lates

take” which has never been subjected to collective disc

or competitive analysis.

• Third, it is easier to provide misinformation ins

into open sources. But this is not true if one is aware o

easy it is, and where no one has a vested inter

defending the purity of the source or collection technolo

• Fourth, nonintelligence community analysts are 

gullible and take a more benign view of human n

However, classic historians do not seem to have that 

and most students of American politics are some

cynical. 

• Fifth, it is argued that we need “hard facts” for mi

operations, so-called “expeditionary facts.” But in the 

American military endeavors have often been hinder

the lack of open source information which could 

provided missing facts.

An Ambiguous Case: The Chinese Embassy in

Belgrade.

The U.S. cruise missile attack in March 1999 

damaged the Chinese embassy in Belgrade has 

criticized as an intelligence failure which could have 

prevented through more reliance on open source

decided to check this out, but found that obvious 

sources—both on the Internet and even traditional t

guides like Fodor’s—provide no address for the Ch

embassy. But a little more digging reveals two officia

government web sites which have listings of wher

embassy is. So if there is an address, one only needs a m

get expeditionary facts. We went to Hillman Library h

the University of Pittsburgh to find a map which i

shows exactly where the current Chinese embassy 

Belgrade.

35
Does that make the case for open sou

Unfortunately, it is not that easy. An official 

Government map (made public by a disgruntled 

employee) shows the embassy clearly. So maybe w

know exactly where the embassy was. Later ar

indicated that NATO officers involved in operations 

where it was, and that it was taken off the “no-hi

because the Chinese were assisting the Serbs with mi

intelligence.

Looking at almost any individual case to argue abo

value of open sources and uncleared analysts, it is e

find ambiguity. Yet there is often valuable open s

information even on expeditionary facts. In the case 

Chinese embassy in Belgrade, however, there is no rea

conclude that the policy choice—bombing—would 

been different even if open sources had been consulte

Given the current information environment, we s

remember that the open source debate has been going 

50 years. The Intelligence community faces challenge

opportunities that are more than mere budgetary prob

yet there is a chronic resistance to open sources and 

analysts. It is past time to move beyond the unrewa

anecdotal debate between optimists and pessimists

run a systematic set of tests to see who does bet

producing one or another type of intelligence product

“Crisis Avoidance and Mitigation:

The Genoa Approach”

Scott Fisher

PSR/Meridian

One of the things we face in the intelligence world 

the information revolution is delivering products in tim

the conflict between depth of analysis and length of 

what usually ends up suffering is depth of analysis. We 

products in less time than before, and we only handle 

is happening today.

36
The information revolution has made situ

management much more difficult. The goal should 

develop a mitigating strategy before the crisis req

intervention, so that the use of military force is an opt

choice, not a necessity. But there are often proble

getting decisionmakers’ attention, and there is usu

disconnect between them and analysts. The G

approach—a mixture of information technology 

collaborative software—tries to bring the parties 

together to increase both depth and speed of analysis

There are three key concepts in the Genoa app

transparency, persistence of information, and a coh

environment. With transparency, whatever the intelli

analysts produce can be seen by decisionmakers, wh

take the product and recreate or get inside the proces

created it. Persistence is also important. We n

corporate memory not just to save information, but 

able to manipulate it later, that is, to be able to 

against databases of past experience. The coh

environment of Genoa is designed to make sure that 

the tools work together to provide transparency 

persistence. 

Genoa utilizes a powerful, web-based environmen

facilitates out-of-the-box thinking. The idea is to avoid 

the standard train of thought. To use a historical exa

although the United States considered Pearl Harbo

possible site of conflict, we determined that we would 

Japan in the Philippines first, and we were obviously w

The goal is to expand the possibilities of imagin

thinking, to look at more and different arguments, a

arrive at more clear and concise policy options, enab

the technology being developed for Genoa.

Genoa takes a three-pronged approach to tim

utilize corporate memory in the form of databases to de

current crisis paths, which are in turn leveraged to de

scenario-based planning about the future. The not

corporate memory may be controversial because it a

37
one to go back later and analyze who made the 

successful analysis. However, it is crucial to pre

information to use in the future. The idea of crisis pa

that instead of considering only the most likely sce

Genoa allows analysts and policymakers to consider 

plausible but high-impact and high-uncertainty optio

A key step in this process is the involveme

policymakers. For example, a policymaker may have 

something that focuses his attention, like a news

article about Aum Shinrikyo. With this system, the an

develops various scenarios, and the policymake

consider a number of options. But the policymaker m

involved for the process to be valid.

The logic behind crisis paths is struct

argumentation. Genoa provides a set of templates t

which can handle either a top-down hypothesis (t

model and collect intelligence to test it) or a botto

data-driven model (the information is present, b

applicability must be determined). An analyst can b

transparent argument for why something is a threat, 

a structured hierarchy of questions that can be edited t

the demands of the particular case. The system thus m

a transparent and direct connection between the evi

and the rationale for the argument, enabling analyst

policymakers to argue not about conclusions but abo

details, the intelligence data.

The next step is collaboration between analysts. G

creates what are called thematic argument groups (T

places for virtual collaboration. Little time is required 

up a TAG, and any member of a TAG can participate 

discussion through the software tools. The goal is to m

preferable to collaborate virtually rather than ove

phone. In this environment, there is a push and p

information. 

In the search for information, the question of s

versus noise is important. However, Genoa offers the a

to search for more focused information, using the

38
navigation and semantic regions to find subdocumen

stories. Any analyst or decisionmaker can take the 

information and go back and modify the argu

lessening the danger of rigid argumentation.

The final step is summarization and publicat

information, which can take place through typical p

publication or computer-based visualization and 

storage. 

In sum, the Genoa approach provides transparen

analysis and persistence of information in a coh

environment which aides decisionmakers and analy

handling the speed and volume of information in th

global information environment.

“Intelligence Analysis and Information

Overload”

Lisa Krizan

Defense Intelligence Agency

Being a parent has really colored my outlook on 

reduces life to the basics, like eating, sleeping, workin

playing. This way of thinking spills over into work life

beginning with some comments about intelligence sh

between national intelligence and business intellige

will share some thoughts on dealing with inform

overload by getting back to basics in terms of intelli

requirements and analysis.

Intelligence Sharing in a New Light.

Although “information sharing” traditionally has b

government-to-government transaction, the environm

now receptive to government-private sector intera

There has been a widespread trend toward incorpo

government intelligence methodology into commerc

education. As economic competition accelerates aroun

world, private businesses are initiating their own “bu

39
intelligence” (BI) or “competitive intelligence” servi

advise their decisionmakers. Educators in busines

academia are following suit, inserting BI concept

professional training and college curricula.

Whereas businesses in the past have concentrat

knowing the market and making the best product, th

shifting their focus to include knowing, and staying 

of, competitors. This emphasis on competitiveness req

the sophisticated production and use of carefully ana

information tailored to specific users; in other w

intelligence. But the use of intelligence as a str

planning tool, common in government, is a skill tha

companies have perfected.

1

Although BI practitioners refer to the national se

model of intelligence, they do not seek to conduct 

intelligence operations, which are limited by la

government authorities. Large corporations are cre

their own intelligence units, and a few are success

performing analysis in support of strategic decisionma

The majority of businesses having some familiarity w

are not able to conduct rigorous research and analys

value-added reporting, so they are hiring BI contra

“out-sourcing” this function, or establishing their 

intelligence units. The implication of this trend is th

professionals should be skilled in both intelligence an

business discipline of value to the company.

2

Demand in the private sector for intelligence skil

be met through the application of validated intelli

practices of the intelligence community. Conversel

business perspective on intelligence can be highly use

government intelligence professionals. As a BI practi

explains, every activity in the intelligence process m

related to a requirement, otherwise it is irrelev

Government personnel would benefit from this pra

reminder in every training course and every work cent

the private sector, straying from this principle m

wasting money and losing a competitive edge

40
consequences of inefficient national intelligence c

costly on an even larger scale, particularly 

environment of information proliferation.

Whereas government practitioners are 

acknowledged subject-matter experts in intelli

methodology, the private sector offers a wealth of exp

in particular areas such as business manage

technology, the global marketplace, and skills tra

Each has valuable knowledge to share with the othe

experience gaps to fill. On the basis of these unique 

and capabilities, the pubic and private sectors can fo

new partnership in understanding their com

responsibilities.

Defining the Intelligence Problem.

Customer demands or “needs,” particularly if the

complex and time-sensitive, require interpretati

analysis by the intelligence service before being expr

as intelligence requirements that drive the produ

process.

4

 This dialogue between intelligence produce

customer may begin with a simple set of questions 

What, When, Where, Why, and How), and, if approp

may then progress to a more sophisticated analysis 

intelligence problem being addressed. The Taxono

Problem Types shown in Table 1 illustrates the factor

customers and producers may take into accou

articulating the nature of the intelligence problem 

selecting a strategy for resolving it.

This model enables decisionmakers and analy

assess their needs and capabilities in relation to a part

intelligence scenario. This ability to establish a baselin

set in motion a collection and production strategy is c

to conducting a successful intelligence effort. Employ

structured approach as outlined above can help prod

and customers avoid inefficiencies of time 

effort—particularly in a situation of inform

overload—and take the first step toward generating 

41
intelligence requirements by defining both the intelli

problem and the components requisite for its solution

Evaluating and Selecting Evidence.

To prepare collected information for further use

must evaluate its relevance and value to the sp

problem at hand. When the sources and volum

information are proliferating, intelligence analysts fa

enormous challenge in determining the source 

applicability of collected information to the intelli

issue. Several aspects to consider in evaluatin

relevance of information sources are reliability, prox

appropriateness, plausibility, and support.

Reliability of a source is determined throug

evaluation of its past performance; if the source p

accurate in the past, then a reasonable estimate of its 

accuracy in a given case can be made. However, if the s

is completely untested, then evaluation of the inform

must be done solely on its own merits, independent 

origin.

5 Proximity refers to the source’s closeness 

information. The direct observer or participant in an 

42

Problem Types

Characteristics

Simplistic Deterministic

Moderately

Random

Severely

Random Indet

What is the

question?

Obtain

information

How much?

How Many?

Identify and rank

all outcomes

Identify outcomes

in unbounded

situation

Predic

event

situat

Role of facts Highest High Moderate Low Lowes

Role of judgment Lowest Low Moderate High Highe

Analytical task Find information

Find/create

formula

Generate all

outcomes

Define potential

outcomes

Defin

factor

Analytical method Search sources

Match data to

formula

Decision theory;

utility analysis

Role playing and

gaming

Analy

and sc

Analytical

instrument

Matching

Mathematical

formula

Influence diagram

utility, probability

Subjective

evaluation of

outcomes

Use o

Analytic output Fact

Specific value or

number

Weighted

alternative

outcomes

Plausible

outcomes

Elabo

expec

Probability of error Lowest Very low

Dependent on

data quality

High to very high Highe

Follow-up task None None

Monitor for

change

Repeated testing

to determine true

state

Exhau

learni

Table 1. Taxonomy of Problem Types.
may gather and present evidence directly, but i

absence of such firsthand information, the analyst 

rely on sources with varying degrees of proximity 

situation. Appropriateness of the source rests upon wh

the source speaks from a position of authority on the sp

issue in question. Plausibility, or expectability, is the d

to which, based on prior knowledge, the analyst 

expect the information to be true. Finally, support 

degree of confirmation for the information from 

sources or pieces of information.

All these factors of source and content contribute 

initial assessment of the value of a particular pi

information to the intelligence production process. 

pieces that are judged to be reliable and useful may 

undergo further scrutiny in light of customer needs, 

items of questionable value may be rejected or set asi

further processing and comparison with other informa

Conclusion.

The intention here has not been to be overly simp

but to focus on how, in a situation of information ove

focusing on basics may be beneficial. In particular, the 

sophisticated models of intelligence problem definitio

careful selection and evaluation of evidence, may he

analyst sift through the growing mountains of inform

to find the real gems.

Discussion.

The panelists were asked to comment on two r

issues: the political nature of intelligence gatherin

processing, and the notion of a market analog

intelligence consumers and producers.

The Political Nature of the Intelligence Proces

Dr. Krizan: The intelligence community, in ord

maintain continuity amidst political changes, must 

43
its assets against problem sets and use establ

procedures designed to be responsive to the customer. 

the customer changes or its needs change, the intelli

community may be organized enough but not fl

enough to respond quickly to those changes.

Dr. Bobrow: The problem of politics and hierarch

not go away, but the way to remedy it without cre

excessive autonomy among government intelli

agencies is through the market. The intelligence m

needs intensive competition and low barriers to 

multiple sellers and buyers, high transparency

mobility. The open source world makes it more likel

we will face that situation. For example, large firms 

some influence on American foreign policy in ter

shaping the agenda, issues, options, and so on; those 

do not rely just on the official intelligence community, 

they often try to shape what the community diges

create the market, and let’s go with it rather than res

Otherwise the problem will not go away. The probl

compounded by the fact that the customer often is 

community—not outside it. The Genoa and K

approaches are not inherently aimed at a hierar

system; it would be better if everyone had the techno

such as Genoa in order to conduct better intelli

analysis. That is the only way we can get close to rem

the inherent distortions in the market.

Dr. Fisher: The Genoa approach faces a tough po

battle—people do not want persistence and transpare

the intelligence community because it will become clea

is doing the best analysis. Clearly we understand the

hurdles to overcome, but we are just trying to develo

technology, and hope the politics will follow.

The Intelligence Customer and the Market Ana

Dr. Bobrow: We are skirting between the horn

dilemma—of the analyst being too close or too far fro

intelligence customer. Let me suggest three things. Fi

44
the market analogy, the consumers are not jus

government, but responsible agents such as the 

interest, the nation, an ethnic group, and so on. The 

transparent the market, the more consumers are 

accountable for having gone out to get the “taste 

answer rather than a more informative one. Second, w

create a utopian, perfect market? Not entirely, but i

new information environment there is a better cha

coming closer to it. Third, people already go shopping f

answer that will suit, and there are tremendous ince

to put forward “good” answers. To change these h

tendencies, we would have to change the subsequent 

and benefits, handled by getting multiple supplier

consumers and a greater chance of later evaluation.

With a market there is a better chance of the analy

being far out from everyone. Public agents m

interested in having a different “take” about the fut

the present, so there is a possibility of greater dive

Supply diversity is happening anyway, de

foot-dragging by the intelligence community. Tak

example of the business world, where firms looki

potential investment sites assess the target from l

angles. Obviously the U.S. Government is taking dif

angles on the same subject, environmentalists would 

third angle, and so on. But the notion that a c

community can reform itself enough to level the pl

field is utopian. It can try, but those activities will er

SESSION 2 - ENDNOTES

1. Richard D’Aveni, “Hypercompetition,” briefing to 

Conference, Alexandria, VA, March 28, 1996.

2. Jan Herring, “Strides in Institutionalizing BI in Busin

briefing to SCIP Conference, Alexandria, VA, March 28, 1996.

3. David Harkleroad, “Actionable Competitive Intelli

briefing to SCIP Conference, Alexandria, VA, March 28, 1996.

45
4. Douglas H. Dearth, “National Intelligence: Professi

Process,” in Douglas H. Dearth and R. Thomas Goodden, eds., S

Intelligence: Theory and Application, Washington, DC: Joint M

Intelligence Training Center, 1995, p. 18.

5. Adapted from Gary Harris, “Evaluating Intelligence Ev

in Ronald D. Garst, ed., A Handbook of Intelligence An

Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College, 1989, pp. 34-35

46
SESSION 3:

INFORMATION AND INSTITUTIONAL

ADAPTATION

The goal of the third session was to consider 

lessons the private sector and the armed forces might 

from one another in responding to the challenge

opportunities of the information revolution.

“Lessons from Business Intelligence:

Achieving Strategic and Tactical Coordina

in Organizations”

Dr. Cynthia Miree

Oakland University

and

Dr. John E. Prescott

Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Busine

University of Pittsburgh

The issues and instruments of the military and na

security intelligence communities are similar to th

business intelligence. There are four things that we b

are important to compare and contrast between 

communities. First, there is cost—business organiza

have more budgetary constraints and limitations than 

intelligence. Second are outcomes. Failures of milita

national security intelligence have far more signi

repercussions than do failures of business intellig

Third, there are ethical issues. Business intellige

much more concerned about ethics, and 

investigations have been toned down or stopped altog

for ethical reasons. Fourth is the sustainability o

competitive intelligence department itself. Whereas 

national security community one may worry about g

the decision-maker’s attention, on the business sid

have to be worried about whether the boss will shut 

47
the whole operation. So what do business organizatio

to mitigate or avoid some of these problems in compe

intelligence?

This report is based on our study of compe

intelligence by Best-Practice Companies (BPCs). The 

was sponsored by 17 corporations, and we did case stud

five BPCs. Most companies that engage in compe

intelligence have either a strategic focus or a tactical 

but not both. The overall purpose of this study w

examine how the competitive intelligence function 

assist the sales organization in being more effective, an

specific research goal was to determine how 

coordinate the strategic and tactical intelligence proc

the sales function.

We looked at the sales function because it h

interesting hierarchy of sales representatives out i

field passing information back to the high-level man

who are making strategic decisions about product line

marketing, the whole process being mediated by mid

managers. It is interesting to note that this hier

actually bears a resemblance to the organizati

intelligence agencies.

There were four main areas of focus in our stud

organizational structure—how the competitive intelli

departments are actually structured; (2) what ki

competitive intelligence knowledge they are creati

their sales and marketing functions; (3) how they coord

strategic and tactical competitive intelligence; and (4

they measure the results of the competitive intelli

against the demands of their “consumers.”

Our first key finding was that companies that bo

establish coordination of strategic and tactical intelli

as a priority, and (2) are able to articulate the forma

informal processes that are used to achieve coordin

are more likely to achieve coordination than those w

not establish coordination as a priority and are not a

articulate their formal and informal coordination proc

48
Our second key finding was that in most BPC

coordination of strategic and tactical intelligence i

sales function is facilitated through the sophisticated 

coordinating mechanisms we have labeled the TA

process: Teams and Technology, competitive intelli

human resource Allocation, the role of compe

intelligence in the strategic Planning process

Interaction between competitive intelligence an

management, and the use of human Networks.

There are several fundamental issues in TAP-IN:

• Consistency across TAP-IN mechanisms;

• Hierarchy of importance for TAP-IN mechanism

• Level of sophistication for each TAP-IN mechan

• Effect of hierarchy on presence and use of TA

mechanisms.

The first mechanism of TAP-IN is Teams 

Technology. Within BPCs, organizational processe

enabled and managed by teams and the use of inform

technology. The competitive intelligence group

represented on most important strategic and tactical 

within the organization. Either technology is used to 

individuals together geographically, or used as deposi

for information. BPCs tend to use technology for one 

other, but not both equally—usually a 80/20 split.

Second is the Allocation mechanism. Compe

intelligence human resources are explicitly designat

assignment to strategic and tactical activities throug

design. That is, human resources are carefully alloca

where they are most needed. One example we studie

the MetLife company, where one competitive intelli

expert is strategic and the other two are tactical, m

sure their sales representatives can win bids.

Planning is the third TAP-IN mechanism. Compe

intelligence input is embedded in the strategic pla

process. We looked at several organizational examp

49
this. At Boehringer, strategic planners solicit compe

intelligence inputs from business intelligence and 

their sales force, while at MetLife they use a compe

intelligence database and competitive landscap

strategic planning. At Dow Chemical, compe

intelligence input is represented both directly 

indirectly in the strategic planning process and 

value-based planning process, which evaluate

contribution of strategies to stock market value.

Interaction, in the form of dialogue, is the primar

preferred method of communication in BPCs; they are 

less interested in putting out certain types of intelli

products. For example, Amoco is trying to imple

common mental models across decisionmaking 

competitive intelligence. At their strategic pla

meetings, they do not bring in competitive intelli

products the first day, but debate issues and what 

mean in a face-to-face forum. Both MetLife and Boeh

emphasize frequent face-to-face conversations 

internal customers, particularly strategic int

customers.

The fifth TAP-IN mechanism is Networking. In 

the establishment and use of internal and ext

networks are expected and reinforced. The companie

do competitive intelligence best are able to coordinate 

internal and external human intelligence networks. 

companies, like Boehringer, evaluate and select compe

intelligence personnel based on an employee’s netwo

skills and the possession of viable internal and ex

networks. Dow is establishing and leveraging net

over time to enable speedy access to information in a 

company.

In conclusion, Best-Practice Companies, which d

have the budgetary or human resources of the govern

intelligence community, are creating unique organiza

methods and forms to bring together strategic and ta

intelligence in cost-effective ways—the TAP-IN proc

50
that improve the companies’ competitiveness 

capabilities in the rapidly changing and informatio

global market.

“Multilateral Institutions in the Globa

Information Economy”

Dr. William Drake

Director

Project on the Information Revolution

and World Politics

Carnegie Endowment for International Pea

I would like to begin with some comments o

information revolution (IR) and the new interest 

impact on international relations. I will add some comm

on multilateral institutions and the global inform

economy, and talk about some of the reasons why they 

had a particularly difficult time adapting to the IR. I 

that this has importance and relevance beyond the re

communications and information policy, because the n

of the global information infrastructure and how 

managed impact the kind of IR we have on a worl

scale. Changes in the governance of information 

communication at the multilateral level have had a 

impact on the structure of the global economy an

worldwide shift toward the IR. I will conclude with se

points on the IR and how it impacts internat

cooperation and global governance.

The IR and World Politics.

There has been a striking lack of interest by po

scientists in the IR and its impact on national sec

although this is finally beginning to change. James Ro

is one of the few who have actually studied this, a

Washington, DC, there are some folks in the think 

who are beginning to study these issues.

51
There are a number of significant impediments to 

analysis of the IR’s impact on world politics. First, cr

thinkers on the IR are widely scattered acros

disciplines. There is interesting work being do

business, communication studies, sociology, and 

though much less, in political science. But most of 

thinkers are not conscious of the international rel

consequences of the IR.

What is striking about this void in political scie

that almost every day in the nation’s leading newsp

there are front page articles about the Internet or 

aspect of globalization or the IR, and yet somehow whe

read the political science journals you do not see 

mention of this phenomenon. This is partly due to po

science’s concern with creating certain kinds of theor

constructs and with maintaining the methodol

discipline of the field. Problems which do not 

themselves to the traditional methodologies are no

received, even though much of the globalization 

communication phenomenon can be measured quite e

Political scientists dismiss the IR as a change i

“exogenous variables” that impact in some unspecifie

people’s political preferences, but which as a whole ha

changed the nature of world politics.

Second, there is a kind of “two cultures” problem—

is no shared language or vocabulary between technica

national security experts. Among those seriously stu

the issue there is a growing recognition of the impo

connections between these two fields. This tribali

mirrored in government circles. People in national se

like those in the Department of Defense and the intelli

community are thinking about the IR, but the 

Department is far behind—the culture of inform

management and dissemination in State is not go

understanding the IR.

Third, there are a lot of interesting questions 

international politics which are not being asked. The

52
systematic questions about the impact of the IR o

interstate system, on the global distribution of powe

wealth, on the vertical levels of sovereignty, on indiv

state units, and on democratization and globalization

largely unexplored area is the foreign policy dec

making implications of a hypermedia environment

government can’t control how issues are framed

generates information, etc. We really need a 

interdisciplinary debate on these kinds of questions.

Conceptualizing the IR.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the IR 

fundamentally or primarily about technology—it is 

human agency. Technology does not drive any

independently, or else similar technologies would 

meant similar socio-political outcomes in states 

similar technologies, but that is not what we have 

Technology provides us with sets of tools, it facil

certain types of transactions, and it changes some 

trade-offs between different paths of activity, but it do

ultimately do anything by itself.

If you look at the history of the IR, I think it is much 

important to focus on the actors and the dynamics of c

over the information environment. Over the past 50 

we have seen in the economic sphere an effort to pri

information in a way that changes who is able to 

decisions on economics. This is the beginning of 

fundamental transformations that we are just beginn

see more clearly.

The IR really evolved through three main stages

first phase was from 1837 to 1963, and was marked b

telegraph and radio. In that era, large supp

(communications monopolies) exercised great contro

how information sources were constructed and config

Systems tended to be large and centralized. The s

phase began in 1964 with the success of the IBM 

computer for commercial customers, and ended in 

53
This period saw the shift in authority and influence 

suppliers to large corporate users (such as bank

automobile manufacturers) who demanded speci

communications systems and services. The third 

began in 1991 and might be called the “distributed

initiated with the privatization of the Internet back

Technological tools in the hands of government

corporations are now diffused at low cost through 

players in economic and other spheres. This 

qualitatively important shift that people have not gra

Nongovernment organizations (NGOs), organized c

and terrorists have an unprecedented ability to creat

disseminate information on a worldwide scale 

challenges the state. In this new realm of world politics

of the old rules do not seem to apply any more.

The IR and Multilateral Institutions.

In terms of global communication, we have witness

evolution in how governments adapt multila

institutions. In the first period there were carte

intergovernmental, state-controlled systems w

essentially excluded the private sector from authori

decisionmaking. The markets for communic

technologies were largely regulated by governmen

their own purposes. In the second phase, there ca

demand for liberalization to include nongovernm

actors, open up markets to competition, and 

specialization for businesses in goods and services

produced a fundamental bifurcation between the statu

interests of government and monopolies, on one hand

the open-market interests of a newly emerging coaliti

the other. This, in turn, caused a significant shift out 

stable, consensual, bureaucratic approach in g

communications, which had ruled for a 100 years

conflictual, trade-driven and highly-politicized en

ment. 

54
In the third phase—the present—government

struggling to adapt existing multilateral institution

regimes to the information economy, while creating 

regimes for the Internet, e-commerce, and so on. Bu

are facing enormous difficulties in this because there 

agreement on how to manage these fundamental issue

global scale. The point is that with the distributed I

ability of governments to adapt to the new rules of the 

is deteriorating. There is a decoupling between tradi

forms of governmental authority at the internationa

and what’s actually happening in technology, market

social practices today. Traditional regimes are losing 

ability to control or shape what people do with inform

technologies on a global scale, and we are moving 

chaotic, heterogeneous, difficult-to-forecast environm

Conclusions.

There are other challenges for global governance 

by the IR. First, the United States is becoming the d

force in international politics, but it has less to do with 

power than with the power of the private sector, techn

and civil society. The American private sector is drivin

of global activities. There is always a tension be

systemic interests and particularistic interests i

United States, and we tend to advance particular (pr

ones of powerful organizations under the guise of sys

(public) interests, and others often do not buy in.

Second, the IR has created a growing empowerm

nontraditional actors and issues, such as human r

landmines, the environment, and women. NGO

becoming real players in international politics, 

information technology to give them far greater infl

than they otherwise might have; small organiza

without deep pockets are now able to be much 

aggressive and influential than traditional theor

international relations would have predicted. The pre

for transparency in multilateral and internat

55
organizations, for opening up to these kinds of acto

going to be a permanent feature of international poli

the future.

Third, in many cases, the traditional form

intergovernmentalism will be inadequate to deal 

future issues on a global scale. We need new efforts to 

cooperative bridges such as global public policy netwo

share activity and authority with nongovernm

entities.

The IR, not by itself but in conjunction with 

political, social, and technological factors, is going to 

global governance more difficult. Intergovernm

frameworks will not be able to adapt, the result 

turbulence in world politics.

“Lessons from the Military Experience

The U.S. Military and the IR: The Pitfal

of Uneven Adaptation”

Dr. Steven Metz

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

Like any large, complex organization, the U.S. mi

has been buffeted by the Information Revolution (IR

found adaptation difficult. In many ways, wha

happened to the U.S. military in responding to the 

similar to what has happened to business, to governm

and to nongovernmental organizations. But ther

crucial differences about military adaptation that we 

to keep in mind. If business gets it wrong in ter

understanding and adapting to the IR, some investor

money, managers lose their jobs, and the business fa

government gets it wrong, political appointees chan

new party gets elected, and so on. But if the milit

wrong, people die, national interests suffer, and pe

even nations will crumble. These high stak

understanding and adapting to the IR make attem

56
study the effect of the IR on the military all the 

important.

Looking at how the military during the past 10 yea

adapted to the IR, we find that the success of the mi

has been somewhat uneven. When it comes to takin

technologies and applying them to traditional mi

functions, the U.S. military has been quite successful. 

it comes to mastering new roles and missions that em

out of the IR, the military has been moderately succe

But when it comes to understanding the IR and the n

adapt or adopt new organizational structures, the mi

still has a long way to go.

We should begin with the least painful change

ways in which the military services have taken 

technology and applied it to their traditional missio

trying to understand the IR, the services an

Department of Defense (DoD) have largely focus

conventional warfighting. This is what they spend the 

time thinking about, so it makes sense that this is w

they have been most successful. On a conceptual leve

IR has forced the military to think futuristically. Th

probably no other large organization on earth which h

more resources and brainpower into thinking abou

future than the U.S. military. This began several yea

in all of the services and is seen in concepts such as the 

After Next. The Joint Forces Command, the M

Warfighting Lab, and other facilities are condu

experiments, wargames, seminars, and conferences t

at how the IR impacts warfighting. The official think

that the IR allows the U.S. military to do the same job 

always done, but to do it better.

The future battlefield is the second area wher

military sees the IR having an important influence

mainstream position (taken from Major General Rob

Scales, Jr., the former Commandant of the U.S. Arm

College) is that the future battlefield will be charact

by high speed, adaptability, and agility, and that 

57
accurate and timely information will lead to spee

precision of operations. The conceptual template for 

found in Joint Vision 2010, which is designed to cre

military with “full spectrum dominance”—the idea th

U.S. military will be better than any conceivable ene

any conceivable type of conflict.

This dominance begins with information super

The military’s goal is to create a near-perfect, seamles

between information collected on the battlefield

decisionmaker using it, and the action taken to imple

the decisions. Military commanders in the past have a

been looking through the fog of war, and if one con

Napoleon at Waterloo or any other battlefield comman

history, it is interesting to consider whether, with 

information, they might have made better deci

Through better technology and new concepts, the mi

wants to see through the fog of war. The goal is to pro

commander with a perfect picture of the battlefiel

thereby enable him to make nearly perfect decision

important and unanswered question, however, is wh

information superiority and full-spectrum dominanc

actually feasible.

The military has had moderate success in adaptin

roles and missions to the imperatives of the IR. The

two new areas which are particularly worthy of com

First is the broad category of information operation

military has been trying to adapt its institutions some

toward the goal of attaining information superiority

thing the military has done is to give joint responsibil

information operations to U.S. Space Command, and a

services are involved in information operations

argument that we need a fourth service to h

information operations will likely intensify in the f

Within information operations there are three impo

missions:

• Information-in-warfare, which addresses the r

information in conventional activities, such as intellig

58
surveillance, and reconnaissance. The military has a

done these things, the new technology just enhanc

capabilities.

• Offensive info war, which includes physical a

against the enemy’s information assets, electronic wa

jamming, psychological operations, information at

(cyberwar), and military deception. This is one of the 

controversial elements of information operations beca

the range of legal, political, and ethical questions asso

with it. There were several stories in the media on the 

information warfare in Kosovo, but there were confl

claims about the extensive use of offensive inform

warfare and claims that such operations were consi

but were not used. Because of the interconnectedn

global information systems, there is a significant prob

control over the effects of cyber-warfare. Both curren

future information technologies do not match well wi

legal, ethical, and political frameworks we currently 

govern armed conflict.

• Defensive information warfare, which inc

operational security, counterpsychological opera

electronic protection, information assurance

counterdeception.

The second new mission is critical inform

protection, where we face new vulnerabilities as w

empowerment. There is a great deal of concern over ho

United States can protect its critical inform

infrastructure. The military certainly has a role in th

it is not well-defined so far, particularly regarding the 

military capabilities to protect commercial informatio

clear that the reserve components will be importan

this mission is rife with potential problems. It raises 

serious issues of civil-military relations, incl

distinctions between the two sectors and the function

are appropriate for the military.

Organizational adaptation is the area wher

military has been least successful. The good news is th

59
IR facilitates internal communication, training 

leadership development, and planning. Ther

discussions now of creating virtual staffs; instead of ne

all of the planners to be in one place at one time, yo

have them linked electronically and hopefully includ

best possible information and analysis. New training e

include advanced simulations, distributed learning, a

on. In those areas the military has adapted well.

The bad news is that the IR challenges hierarchie

bureaucratic organizations—it erodes old notio

centralized control that are the bedrock of mi

organization and function. It is plain that flat net

have serious advantages in adaptability and flexibilit

rigid hierarchies in dealing with the new inform

environment. The U.S. military has not really dealt 

this problem, or tried to think about how it might re

the future to nonstate, networked enemies. Tak

example, the struggle against drug traffic

organizations, which are highly flexible and adap

networks, and the way in which the U.S. Govern

(including law enforcement) is trying to respond 

bureaucratic and hierarchical means. The military a

the need for hybrid organizations—part hierarchica

part networked—but it has not yet fleshed out the conc

Let me conclude with a couple of observations. 

today the U.S. military is far ahead of every other 

military in the world in understanding and integratin

IR. Other state militaries are way behind in all fac

technology, organization, tactics, and strategy. Secon

Air Force and Marine Corps have done the best 

understanding the IR and adapting to it. Why is th

Force so adaptable and quick to understand 

opportunities of the IR? In part because the Air F

guiding concept of strategic bombing is about defeatin

enemy but not necessarily its military forces in the 

Strategic information warfare could be conside

modification of the same idea, allowing you to atta

enemy’s infrastructure directly without having to defe

60
military. The Marines’ advantage is that sm

organizations are often more adaptable, and r

leadership has placed a premium on innovation 

creativity. Third, nontraditional, flexible enemies whi

networked will be the military’s biggest challenges 

future, not traditional enemies.

Finally, the IR is simply the first phase in the l

historic Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The 

stage will likely be marked by the merger of inform

technology with things like robotics, biotechnology

extreme miniaturization. Most revolutions have 

phases: a moderate step, a radical step, and consolid

We are right in the middle of the moderate phase, t

new technologies and grafting them onto old ideas

eventually the radical phase will emerge.

So while the U.S. military is likely to succeed again

other traditional state military in terms of adapting t

technologies, the future may belong to non-state actor

may be in the middle of a historic RMA, where the I

simply the spark. If so, everything we know abou

nature of war may be changing. Right now the U.S. mi

has elaborate programs to look at that possibility, b

implications of it still remain to be seen.

Comments

Dr. Paul Hammond

University of Pittsburgh

One of the questions of relevance in integrating s

panel is bringing together a panel’s presentations, 

would like to share some thoughts I have on the is

institutional adaptation.

First, the military has often been way ahead 

business world, in part because of the scale of their wor

the enormous amounts of money spen

information-related problems. There is an impo

61
historical point here. In 1961, Secretary of Defense R

McNamara hired a man to do a “program” budget f

Department of Defense (DoD). The critical thing fo

budget was that it separated the accounting sy

required by Congress from the information system tha

used. He didn’t follow Congress’s guidelines on how m

was to be spent; he got rid of input-oriented rules to foc

better output-oriented programs. The program b

model included new analytical techniques that allowe

consideration of budget alternatives, yet this also requ

great deal more information. This was a giant step tow

management-oriented information systems, which we

just systems safe for a steel company to see how produ

was going, but could tell you how the company was 

from the view of the top. This innovation did not re

gee-whiz information technology, but it was an impo

beginning.

Dr. Prescott spoke of information-oriented people, 

throughout an organization, networking internally 

externally. This is a profound step beyond McNam

approach, which was still directed toward interna

information. In the business world you also look ou

The missing step between the DoD model and Dr. Pres

Best-Practice Companies is that during the 1960s an

businesses had in-house research and development (

organizations. When they came up with innovatio

products and processes, the source usually was outs

the firm. Networking was the rationale for doing the 

even if it benefited others; networking enabled compan

find the innovations they wanted. What we see now 

more extensive networking system with costs that a

tied primarily to R&D itself.

Second, there is a question of how to get an advant

zero-sum games. There are two kinds of problems 

information distortion and manipulation in inform

systems. First, we should consider reliability. In the 1

the U.S. Air Force spent a lot of money on building com

and control systems, and they learned then that garb

62
equals garbage out. Unless these systems had bene

the information providers, the providers gave 

garbage. Low-level information sources knew more tha

top levels did, and the system did not run well. How d

get reliable information? One possibility would be a l

system in which providers benefit from the informati

they have an incentive to do better. We probably do no

this kind of system today. The second proble

information distortion can be seen in adaptatio

information technology. Surely we should expect to se

ways for distorting information, manipulating people

so on, where people will take advantage of inform

systems. One of the goals of our information systems s

be to ensure accurate information, whether it is at the 

stage, the analysis stage, or final usage.

Discussion.

The panelists were asked to reflect on several i

public perceptions and opportunities for asymme

attacks through media relations; reliable inform

versus perfect information; the appropriate public rela

role for the military; and the proactive or rea

tendencies of business and the military.

Public Perceptions.

Dr. Metz: The defining feature of war in the inform

age is that the political-perceptual element is as impo

as what actually happens—what you make your own p

think and other audiences, not just the enemy. Mayb

model for future symmetric warfare is not Iran-Ira

India-Pakistan proxy-conflict with air strikes, post

and perceptions management. The United States 

future is going to face enemies like Somalia, who 

understand our psyche and can be more effective in fig

us. Saddam did it badly, and Milosevic, though it l

early on like he understood, also failed. Future enemie

understand us better, and their future leaders are stu

63
in our colleges today who will have a savvy understand

the United States.

Dr. Drake: We now refer to “audiences” when discu

war, and we lose sight of metrics for measuring ass

tions. Now we are thinking about wars that involve 

audiences needing satisfaction, not just for na

security reasons but for politics. We struggle wit

problem of issue management, trying to find ways to 

issues in real time, but it usually takes a long ti

respond. Thanks to CNN, others get to shape the res

first, and the United States responds belatedly. We n

anticipate better.

Dr. Metz: This presents a broad-based challenge 

political utility of force. The military’s focus on precisio

consideration of nonlethal technologies are design

maintain the political utility of force.

Dr. Prescott: Businesses have been dealing with th

smaller scale but more frequently than the military, an

military needs to get over its arrogance of not learning 

the business community.

Dr. Hammond: Such arrogance may have been jus

at one point, but now the “off-the-shelf” that the m

should consider is not technology but organiza

practices as outlined by Dr. Prescott.

Reliable Information or Perfect Information?

Dr. Metz: The answer is both. The offense/de

question has now shifted to a tension over hiding v

finding. The military says we should plan for that mi

building redundant sensors, utilizing data fusion, e

the military thinks it will be able to get perfect inform

but I do not think it is going to be possible. Better fi

will lead to better hiding technology.

Dr. Prescott: In the business world, compe

intelligence and competitive intelligence organizatio

64
dynamic capabilities which allow firms to lear

reconfigure themselves, to combine with other func

Competitive intelligence gives decision-makers a 

way of using imperfect information.

A More Active Public Relations Role for the

Military?

Dr. Hammond: The military has good reason f

being out in front—it needs to preserve its nonpartisan

While we think the military wants, and is trying, to g

message across, the costs of trying to be the spoke

make leaders reticent about getting out in front. How

in the future that boundary may have to be shifted.

Who Is More Proactive: Business or the Militar

Dr. Prescott: The business community is not ah

government intelligence agencies in terms of disciplin

it is better in innovation and lack of departmentaliz

Business managers will not put up 

compartmentalization, and the speed and qual

decisionmaking are better in business than in the milit

Dr. Metz: The costs of failing in business are muc

than the military’s costs of failing, so it is easier for bus

to be flexible and adaptable.

65
SESSION 4:

SIGNALING AND PERCEPTION

IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Dr. Robert Jervis

Adlai E. Stevenson Professor

of International Politics

Columbia University

Dr. Williams invited me to speak about signalin

perception in the Information Age, and I would like to 

some remarks that I hope will contribute to to

discussion. In his introduction, Dr. Williams 

reference to several of my books, including my firs

Logic of Images. If you are familiar with it, you know 

is about how actors, mostly states but including anyon

to project desired images of themselves to get others 

what they want them to do. Those images can be tr

they can be deceptive. Then I did a later book, Perc

and Misperception, showing that in theory these tw

very much interrelated. They are two sides of the same 

because when I am perceiving, I am trying to make c

inferences about the sort of actor you are, your inten

your character; and when I am giving off behavior to 

project images, I am trying to influence you. When 

perceiving, I want to understand your projection str

and when I am projecting, I want to know how yo

perceiving. So the two should fit together. However, m

books do not fit together at all either in substance or in 

The one on images is quite inductive and partly u

rational choice theory (before it became a theory), an

perception book is much more social-psychological.

Now what makes this more than a personal anecd

that as the two subject areas have developed, they 

really maintained a zone of separation. One other no

the academic literature. In the last 15 years there has b

lot of work done in economics based on signaling m

67
and they are almost entirely deductive and descriptiv

quite often useless, because they are totally unemp

and unpsychological, and unfortunately do not get 

heart of the matter.

These two areas need to be brought together b

keeping in mind several things we tend to lose sig

First, actors almost always want to project desired ima

themselves. An important book in this regard is E

Goffman’s Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (19

sociological classic. Second, the possibility of decept

always present. Anyone who has been a unive

administrator is familiar with how much deception th

in the world. Now if we look at the U.S. Government

what we do know from declassified sources, there are 

number of deception operations. But if we ask how a

the United States and the intelligence commun

deception by others, particularly in peace time, I thin

answer is remarkably slight. Part of the problem is tha

very hard to deal with deception, when you are reall

trying to get a sense of what is going on in the world

there is so much noise in the system, so much overlo

much ambiguity. For intelligence analysts and p

makers, when you try to layer deception schemes on 

that, it may be that the only things you have to latch 

may be totally misleading. It tends to erode your abi

act. Third, which I will come back to, different people 

different theories through which they interpret the w

different mindsets. This tends to be lost sight of when p

send messages.

Let me give you one example based on the infamou

of December 7, 1941. As World War II buffs know, abo

hours before the Japanese attack on Pearl Ha

Washington sent a message to Pearl Harbor saying 

should be alert for a Japanese attack, even th

Washington was confident the attack was coming 

Philippines. The people in Pearl Harbor receive

message, they understood it, and they thought there 

very high chance of going to war, too. So they put the ba

68
full alert for sabotage, which meant among other t

putting all the airplanes together in the middle o

tarmac. What went wrong was that from the perspec

Pearl Harbor personnel, the pressing day-to-day d

was Japanese sabotage. There was a large Jap

community there, the Americans knew they were 

surveillance by the Japanese, and, if there was going t

war, the obvious thing for the Japanese to do was to co

sabotage. Washington was concerned with more 

issues like the Philippines, and sabotage was small po

to them. But note what is really important at the s

level. Pearl Harbor did not know what was the pre

information that caused Washington to be so worried

the people in Washington could not put themselves 

place of the military leaders at Pearl Harbor who, in 

their duty, had to be worried about things like sab

This is the story of a great deal of signaling and perce

certainly in the realm of international politics, and in 

realms as well.

For the moment, I will use the term “signals” gene

although there are distinctions among different ty

signals. The meaning of signals always comes in the 

and head of the perceiver. That is obvious, but it tends 

lost sight of. It also means that people think differ

perceive differently, and will have many interpretati

various actions that are familiar, but also ones tha

strange. Let me give an example that is too good for 

have made up. Several years ago, before Monica Lew

there was the Paula Jones suit, which President C

underplayed for a while. But then he hired Robert Be

as his lawyer. Two things happened as a result. On

that the case suddenly got much more publicity i

Washington Post. According to a Washington Post 

the question was: if Paula Jones had no case, how 

Clinton needed to get a hired-gun like Bennett? I d

think Clinton quite realized that was the message h

sending. The other thing that happened, and i

seemingly quite unrelated, was that the U.S. dolla

69
greatly strengthened in the currency markets. Accord

a currency trader, “Clinton’s hiring Bennett was re

boon for the dollar.” Why? “We were starting to lose fa

him, and that helped turn things around.”

What this is telling us, and this may be an extrem

(although the Pearl Harbor case may not be extrem

that signalers have two problems. One, which I will r

to, is knowing what is in the other person’s head. Tw

message conveys meaning at two different levels. 

there is the message that is being conveyed, and the s

is the fact that the sender feels that he or she needs to s

message. Let me give another example. In most resta

restrooms, there is a little sign over the wash basin s

“employees must wash their hands after using the t

What message does this send? To the customer, it ap

that the restaurant is hiring people too dumb to know 

this is what they are supposed to do, so the restaura

the sign up to tell them. This is probably not the me

they want to convey. Similarly, in some situations w

currency is weakened, or a bank is giving off 

disturbing signs, lenders or investors may come out w

statement that they have “confidence” in the solidity 

bank. Or, when university presidents get in tro

sometimes the board of trustees will issue a statemen

they have great confidence in the leadership o

president. On one hand, you might believe them, but o

other wonder why they need to say that.

How would we feel if the American and F

presidents issued a statement that there we

differences between their countries that could n

resolved by peaceful means? Universities have re

instituted teaching awards, not to impress students

know better, but to impress the trustees and donors 

how seriously they take teaching. If the university doe

teaching seriously, it should not have to have the aw

There are a great many messages which hav

problem. But there is even a second layer, because onc

70
issue a “reassuring” message, it becomes some

expected. Returning to the example of the univ

president, if it is expected that, when they get in troub

board will make a statement of confidence even if th

not have it, then if the board later decides tha

statements are meaningless or counterproductive 

declines to make them, then the interpretation is th

president really is in trouble. So there are a great 

difficulties arising from the fact that signals exist on 

two levels.

Let me turn to the crucial problem first of how the i

of signals by definition depends on how they are perc

and secondarily that this is often unrealized. Many 

the best movie for international politics is Rashomon (

and I absolutely agree. It is the story of four people inv

in a crime who all see it very differently. Recently there 

been a number of conferences between American

former Soviets, between Americans and Vietnamese, 

back over Cold War incidents and bringing togethe

different sides. Leaving aside the numerous problems 

these, they reveal the tremendous differences in wh

sides believed and how they interpreted the others’ mo

It really confirms a great deal of Rashomon. Take, 

example, how foreign diplomats have a meeting and th

away and write up separate memos about the 

meeting. Forty or fifty years later sometimes it is poss

get the documents from both sides to compare them

they are often just wildly different. They tend to report 

about what they said than what the other side said. 

tend to allege hesitancies on the other side, and frame 

in terms of the objectives they were trying to 

Sometimes you want to ask if this is even the same me

because the differences are so great.

Ernest May, a great historian, has done an inter

book on the Spanish-American War. He notes 

President McKinley’s speech to Congress was mea

convey a very strong message to Spain; there are se

paragraphs that are obviously the gist, and the rest 

71
packaging. May went to the archives in Madrid and g

cable from the Spanish ambassador, essentially a c

the speech, marked up by the Spanish foreign min

There were extensive markings in the paragraphs 

McKinley had meant as throw-away lines, there 

nothing in the margins next to the sections he had me

important. 

We find this phenomenon in domestic politics as 

Historian Richard Immerman and political scientist 

Greenstein, both experts on Eisenhower, had the marv

idea of going back to look at the conversation that Ke

and Eisenhower had the day before the inaugural. Ke

had been briefed by Eisenhower a couple of days before 

Eisenhower had touched on Southeast Asia, and Ke

was disturbed enough about it to ask Eisenhower 

second briefing just on Southeast Asia. The way in 

this meeting comes down to us in the Schlesinge

Sorensen books is that Eisenhower says it wou

unfortunate if we had to send ground troops into 

(although really more Laos than Vietnam), but if the 

is having to lose Laos or Vietnam or sending ground t

then we have to send ground troops. There was no 

recorder in the Oval Office, at least not one running 

day, but Immerman and Greenstein found four mem

the conversation: Clark Clifford’s, McNama

Eisenhower’s, and yet a fourth. None of them say wha

the Schlesinger and Sorensen books, not surprisingly

all say something quite different, they contradict each 

on many points, they focus on what the person taking 

is most concerned with, and the final twist is that be

Immerman and Greenstein know Eisenhower well

think they can reconstruct what he actually said. But t

after studying him for 10 years, something no one 

room could, and they all came away with very dif

impressions.

The second order problem is that people rarely r

this. Putting it most simply, empathy is extremely dif

To understand the other person’s mindset, the theorie

72
have, the way they see the world, is difficult, espe

when they view you—as an individual, a corporate ac

a country—very differently from how you view yoursel

couple of other examples. One of the biggest surpris

have found since the opening up of archives of S

documents is that they talked in private the way they t

in public. They actually addressed each other as “com

At the top of the page they would actually say, “Work

the world unite!” The same sloganeering we disco

really was the way they talked to a certain extent. 

talked about us as imperialists, not just telling that 

Third World. They meant it. It is not surprising, alth

disturbing, that in the many now-declassified Na

Intelligence Estimates which were written in an attem

understand the Soviet Union, it was very rare for an

to be tasked by policymakers to write a memo as if they 

Soviet intelligence officers writing to their bosses 

what the United States was doing and why it was do

They did not want to do that. It is difficult, and no one w

to do it—certainly no analyst wants to do it on his o

own. 

As a result, actors tend to think that their signa

through. They sometimes worry they will be discoun

deceptive, or their objectives rejected as being fals

they usually think that at least on the first level the 

side understands what it is they are trying to say. Ofte

simply is not true. The British ambassador to the Ott

Empire, in one of the perennial crises of the late 19t

early 20th centuries, attempted to give the Ottoma

ultimatum. To show them he was serious and would 

more bargaining, he got in his sailboat and sailed ou

the Bosporus in plain view of Turkish spies, and 

confident that this would be noticed. They did notice 

their reaction was that he could not be serious

ambassador was off sailing again, and nothing s

would happen.

Another example from one of the Vietnamese-Ame

conferences. President Lyndon Johnson launched a 

73
offensive in December 1965, with a bombing pause 

North Vietnam, dispatching emissaries to ove

countries, and so on. Johnson probably was serious, h

looking for a way out now, this was not just for 

relations. But the North Vietnamese totally discoun

and, in fact, they thought if he were serious, he would 

it this way—he would not send out so many emissari

would not be so public, so demonstrative. They did not 

Johnson; this was how he always behaved, he believ

overdoing things. The Vietnamese thought that m

there was a time the Americans would talk peace, bu

clearly was not it. On the other side, the North Vietna

had a four-point peace program, one point of whic

quite ambiguous (regarding the role of the Na

Liberation Forces). They thought we completely under

what they were trying to say, and it was discussed in se

secret meetings at the end of which the Vietnamese th

we understood clearly. We may have discounted som

as deception, but we did not understand what they 

trying to say at all. This happens a great deal.

Let me talk about some implications and 

conclusions. First, this is a problem not only betwee

within governments. As anyone who has be

Washington knows, the only thing worse than negot

with the enemy is negotiating with the folks in the bu

across the street. This reflects not only different inte

but people have different tasks and see the world 

differently. In the Kennedy Administration, in try

determine policy toward Vietnam, a team of 

Department and Department of Defense experts wa

out into the field. When they came back to the Na

Security Council (NSC) with wildly different re

Kennedy supposedly leaned back in his seat and as

they had visited the same country. Of course they ha

they had visited their own minds—they were s

closed-minded the way we all are. They had certain b

and views, and they were going to interpret what the

in that light.

74
Second, attempts at deception work best, and I su

will only work, if you are trying to convince the other s

what they already believe. You have to plan to do wha

do not expect you to do; you cannot change their m

Deception can only work well when you have a 

information. Remember the Ultra decrypts and the D

Cross system in World War II, which worked brill

together, but only because the Allies were reading H

mail.

Third, there are lots of cases where the other sid

read messages you have not sent. For example, a

meeting between Scowcroft, Schultz, and Gorba

Gorbachev was getting really upset, and the Ame

could not figure out why he was so irritated. When 

asked him what was wrong, he said that a Reagan spe

the week before had been really troublesome. Scowcro

Scultz had no idea what speech he was referring to, bu

the meeting they found out Reagan had given a spe

some small Republican group, and the public had not 

paid attention. It was written by a fundraiser, and it s

its purpose. But Gorbachev read it, and no one had exp

that.

Fourth, different countries have different historie

this is important because of the tendency to draw hist

analogies based on historical experiences. States oft

not understand how important that is to the other sid

North Vietnamese have indicated, and I think t

probably true, that they were very influenced by G

1954, where they felt they were betrayed not only b

Americans but by their friends. By way of hist

analogy, therefore, they vowed they would not rep

whole series of errors they associated with Genev

Almost no one in the Kennedy and Johnson Adm

trations knew what Geneva 1954 was, let alone t

perhaps might influence the Vietnamese later.

75
Finally, what is most self-evident to you is apt to 

most troublesome, because you assume it is self-evid

the other side and it rarely is.

My conclusions are implicit in what I have already 

First, Rashomon is the rule, not the exception. You h

plan on it, you cannot always defeat it. You have to 

the assumption that it is difficult to get your me

through, and that many of the inferences you make 

the other side are quite wrong and are different from 

the other side holds. Second, people rarely understand 

partly because it is harder to act when you try to dea

this. Third, and related to that, actors often think 

messages have been received and understood when 

have not been. Therefore, when the other side does not 

as expected, you assume the message has been rej

This may be true, but often the message simply ha

gotten through. Fourth, actors tend to think that o

understand the images they have of others and the im

they are drawing from the other side’s behaviors, an

often is not true. And finally, in the face of all this, p

still have to act, and there is a difficult balance 

maintained between being open to new informatio

realizing a degree of ambiguity, confusion

deception—and setting a strong course in the world.

A final anecdote on this. Richard Neustadt’s 

Presidential Power (1960) points out the importance o

the President gets his information. Dean Acheson ca

to Neustadt and told him, “You’re always trying to te

President that he should get all this information 

conflicts with each other; my job is to make sur

President makes up his mind and does something.” 

real tension between coming to grips with the difficu

have laid out and setting a course in the world.

But if I were to advocate a prescription, I do thin

without slighting the need for acting in the fa

uncertainty, that most important decisions in busines

government should not be made without competing p

76
explaining what information is likely to be conveyed b

decision to the other side and how the other side is lik

view what we are doing, what its interpretations will 

other words, without extremely strong efforts to put o

in the other side’s shoes, to exercise some empathy. I 

there are very few decisions that are taken on that 

Doing so might not be easy or solve all the problems, 

might be a step in the right direction.

Discussion.

Dr. Jervis was asked to comment on several i

American signals regarding democratization; signalin

perception in the Information Age; and simplicity 

subtlety in signaling.

American Signals Regarding Democratization.

We can be sure that the message of democratizat

received differently in different countries that 

different histories, mindsets, and ideologies. It proba

taken well in some areas by newly democratizing coun

the message being that we think those effort

important. It also might be taken by them as a s

hypocrisy if we are not putting our money where our m

is, particularly if they look at our foreign aid budg

would be interesting to find out what these cou

actually think about the message of democratization in 

of other U.S. policies. In other countries it is certainly 

as a sense of American hubris—“they’re trying to fo

into their mold”—that we think we have discovere

latest panacea, because it is a little suspicious that d

the Cold War, although we did as much for democra

any country, the record is not great. Kennedy faced 

possibilities in the Dominican Republic, one that it 

become a democracy, two a totalitarian state, and th

communist state; until we could guarantee the elimin

of the third option, we would have to settle for the seco

77
the message of democratization probably does not conv

that we would like it to.

Signaling and Perception in the Information A

The discussions during this conference abou

explosion of information and information overload su

that we need to spend more time thinking a

institutional and personal screening mechanisms. O

the psychological screening mechanisms would 

become more theory-driven, maybe not in terms of f

theories but in terms of beliefs and expectations. It ma

be that the greater volume of information leads 

increased role for what people believe in the first pla

Second, there are many more sources of informatio

there now. The role of private messengers through hist

very interesting. There were priests involved in p

diplomacy between the United States and Japan in 

and although they did not exactly bring on the Ame

entry into the war, they muddied the diplomatic w

There are a lot of examples where private actors trying 

good by bringing together two countries often end up d

great deal of harm. Today there are many 

opportunities for private diplomacy, with more acc

information. 

Third is the problem of knowing the other side’s de

cycle and timing. One reason the United States w

surprised in Vietnam was that we were interpr

messages and intercepts found in South Vietnam as i

reflected very recent decisions made in Hanoi. But w

the problems of command and control on Hanoi’s side, 

was actually a multi-month lag time, so what we 

picking up often reflected decisions made 6 months pri

sometimes you see the other side reacting to you w

really has not, because it has not had time to get 

response or message and digest it. Information ove

may make the problem worse, though not necessarily

when you’re working in real-time, the press will be on 

78
back, it is hard to keep a secret, and it is hard to get th

you need to think before replying. You all know how re

mail goes out at the end of the day, offering yo

opportunity to take something back on further reflec

e-mail doesn’t allow you to do this. E-mail should h

built-in 15-minute delay so you can call it back.

Simplicity and Subtlety in Signaling.

It may indeed be true that it helps to have a repu

for having difficulty responding quickly, rather than h

a reputation for being ready and able with clear li

command and control. A response should be thoughtf

negotiations deadlines are useful, but there are situa

where time is more important and needs to be slowed 

Regarding subtlety, when you look at the historical r

it is evident that when people have tried subtle mes

very few of them have gotten through. On the other 

some nonverbal signals do get picked up by tr

diplomats. Also, when you do not get a response, you c

assume your message has been heard and rejected

difficulty often in bargaining is that you want to 

something subtle because you do not want to appear 

so you are caught in that trap. But I think the chan

subtle signals getting through are not great. If you do n

a response, do not assume anything, and do what you 

make things clear.

79
SESSION 5:

THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

AND THREATS TO SECURITY

The aim of this session was to assess how some 

threats to U.S. national security might be exacerbat

various aspects of the Information Revolution, lo

specifically at asymmetrical warfare, cyber-threats

different kinds of viruses.

“Metaphors and Modern War:

Biological, Computer, and Cognitive Virus

Edmund M. Glabus

Aegis Research Corporation

My plan is to be controversial and creative in thi

about asymmetric warfare. What I am proposing is 

doctrine, not an operational concept, but more 

innovative but tentative idea, using a metaphor to tea

questions for further inquiry. The first thing people th

when considering war is tanks coming over the hill, bu

is not the first thing to think of in information warfa

effective way to think about other things is to 

metaphor which conveys quickly what you are try

communicate. The metaphor I will be using is that 

virus.

Let me begin with some of the common definition

virus: (1) archaic: venom; (2a): the causative agent 

infectious disease; (2b): any of a large group of infe

agents; (2c): a disease caused by a virus; (3): somethin

poisons the mind or soul. Now a layman’s definitio

virus would be any agent that takes external co

equipment and uses it to make copies of itself. The

three types of viruses I would like to talk about:

81
• Biological: any of a large group of submicro

infective agents . . . that cause various important dis

in man, animals, or plants [Webster’s].

• Computer: a computer program that can infect 

computer programs by modifying them to inclu

(possibly evolved) copy of itself [Cohen].

• Cognitive: an agent that infects people with a m

a unit of information in a mind whose existence influ

events such that more copies of itself get created in 

minds [Dawkins/Brodie].

The virus metaphor is a heuristic, sort of a cheat 

and is no substitute for good scholarly research—bu

soundbite world, you need to attract attention 

communicate quickly. Table 2 illustrates the three 

domains and the similarity of terms used within them

A quick note on memetic viruses. There have been 

articles in the last 180 days with “memetic” in the 

These viruses are inherently good at replicating 

82

Biological Computer Cognitive

Gene Machine instruction Meme

Cell Computer (paper) Mind

DAN Machine language Representation

Virus Computer virus Cognitive virus

Gene pool All software Meme pool

Spores/germs Electronic messages Broadcast/

 Publications

Species Operating system Cultural

 institutions

Genus/higher Machine architecture Culture

Organism Program Behavior

Genetic evolution Artificial life Cultural evolut

Genetic “Back door”/ “Hot button” or

 susceptibility security hole psychologica

Table 2. The Three Virus Domains.
selves, from deception campaigns to urban legends tha

not die, especially on the Internet.

Let me turn to a discussion of viruses in asymme

warfare. Of course the goal of asymmetry is tha

adversary force wants to avoid U.S. strengths and e

U.S. weaknesses. This is possible through the u

different virus domains.

First, biological viruses such as anthrax are 

powerful. Iraq declared that it had 2,245 gallons of an

enough to kill billions of people. To put that in perspe

the average swimming pool has 25,000 gallons of wa

it—lots more than the relatively small amount of an

when only a small amount of it is needed to be fatal. It i

hard to find anthrax even in the production phase; it i

to evade intelligence. In asymmetric warfare the e

may try to step aside of U.S. strengths—to avoi

best-trained military fighters—by using a virus. W

much better trained in other things than we are in biol

warfighting. A biological attack can hinder U.S. relian

speed and agility in combat, and exploit America’s perc

unwillingness to suffer many casualties. A pow

technique of virus use is a second strike against emer

responders, which makes it difficult to mobilize, asses

respond to the first incident; the second one makes po

significant death and disruption.

Second, opponents may use computer virus

asymmetric warfare. How does the virus metaphor ap

information warfare? The virus allows one to lea

across geography—it is easier to inject a computer 

across oceans than other kinds of viruses. The enemy

of such a virus may negate the moral high ground f

United States that we claim with non-lethal warfare

France and Russia sound positive about non-lethal wa

The user of viruses is able to claim some moral grou

certain forums by arguing that it is non-lethal. It is di

to coordinate responses to information warfare at

especially from viruses, and this may allow an ene

83
exploit the U.S. reliance on information superiorit

just-in-time logistics.

Third, an enemy may also use cognitive (mem

viruses. The use of memetic viruses offsets the physic

of force, moving off the high-tech battlefield and in

human realm. It also flies under the radar of U.S. wa

systems, although the United States is rejuvenati

efforts to deal with propaganda and to coordinate resp

to it. Memetic viruses inject ambiguity and complexit

conflict, and complicate American policymakers’ effo

achieve political consensus.

So should viruses be considered a sort of unconven

weapon of mass destruction? Maybe so for anthrax, be

it can cause such widespread destruction. The answ

computer viruses is no. Although they may produce 

disruption, they are temporary events that can be miti

once we learn how to combat individual viruses. O

cognitive side, viruses are perhaps weapons of 

deception but not destruction.

Let me conclude by pointing out some common s

and issues among these three virus domains. All three 

can be used by states, groups, or individuals, from 

internal and external sources, and remote delivery m

are available. All require heavy civil involvement—

local and state to the federal level—and raise jurisdic

questions. Most defensive assets for all three are i

Reserve and National Guard. The viruses are che

develop and produce, and can become antidote-resista

is difficult to train for combating viruses, and ha

conduct combat assessment. And in general, American

the use of all three to be repugnant.

The virus metaphor is powerful, and it is relevant 

different facets of warfare. It is important to have cr

thinking in all these areas, and I hope that the 

metaphor moves us in that direction.

84
“Terrorism as an Asymmetrical Threat

Dr. Stephen Sloan

University of Oklahoma

It is important to begin by emphasizing ambiguity

problem is that it is difficult in warfare to determine c

who the enemy is, where the battlefield is, and 

strategy is needed to achieve what goals. Many year

Admiral Watkins aptly said that warfare would take 

in an ambiguous environment. This has special releva

the changing roles and missions of the military. An art

Foreign Affairs several years ago was titled “The 

Military as International Social Worker,” and w

iterations of military operations other than war (MOO

and so on.

Clearly, the end of the Cold War broke the ou

coherence of the international system; there was a ba

of nuclear terror, and deterrence worked, although wi

Cuban missile crisis it was a close thing. The end of th

War released forces that were always there—e

national, etc. Today, beyond the arbitrary dimensions 

nation-state are forces geared to using violence in dif

forms. There are changes in the international sy

including an expansion of the technological univers

what Lucian Pye referred to as “diffusion of world cul

There are incredible transnational movements, the 

generation, the Internet. Visit Nepal, and you wi

sacred cows walking the street in front of Internet st

The response to the technological universe has b

reassertion of primordial loyalties, and although w

seeing perhaps a withering away of those loyalties, w

see self-determination alive and well. There is a reass

of community not just overseas but also in the U

States, people identifying themselves with their own 

and periphery.

85
The United States now certainly feels the difficu

addressing asymmetric warfare. It is the classic quest

martial arts, converting the strength of one’s opponen

weakness. The United States has liabilities of na

power. And this is still within an environme

ambiguity—there is no longer an agreed-upon definit

what constitutes national security. It used to be tradi

military forces and issues, but now it includes en

mental challenges and a wide variety of other things

clearly difficult to identify what is a national se

interest in this changing security environment.

Terrorism is, of course, nothing new in terms 

information revolution. In my earlier studies I 

emphasized the role of technology and nonterri

terrorism—not confined to particular areas. But long 

Internet, there were two profound revolutions cha

terror. First, the impact of jet aircraft—they became 

targets of opportunity, and threw out the window 

conceptualization of terrorism as insurgency. You 

deal with insurgency, but not when the conflict took 

far away from the disputed territory. Second, the imp

communication—the 1972 Munich incident wa

breakpoint, although Aum Shinrikyo crossed the Ru

into mass terrorism more recently. Before the Interne

CNNdrome provided the public with images but not co

Recall from Vietnam the images of a man shooting 

Cong sympathizer; now we see images of an Ame

soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. T

are not in context any longer.

This ties in with perception issues as addressed b

Jervis. We are now dealing with virtual insurgenc

virtual terrorism. The military talks about 

multipliers, but psychologically one can create thre

magnify them, leaving an increasing impact o

population. These situations have legs—the rumor 

TWA Flight 800 was downed by a missile was spread 

Pierre Salinger pulled the rumor off the Internet.

86
The situation is complicated by several issues. In r

to the impact of information warfare, a se

organizational debate will continue—organizat

doctrine is near and dear to the military heart becaus

is where the money goes. The classic works o

infrastructure of terrorism suggested a centrifugal m

where the leader was not the center of the organiz

This enabled the group to bond and carry out actions q

without depending on a larger organization. This was 

disadvantage, however, because the compartmentaliz

required by security concerns kept them from engag

concerted campaigns—they needed command and co

But through the impact of the Internet and tactic

“netwar” (see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt), 

groups can now use measures short of traditional 

attacking with network forms attuned to the inform

age. Disparate, small groups are now able to network 

groups and activities.

The problem we experience technologically is th

that we rely on ladder hierarchies which are not well-s

for dealing with centrifugal organizations now that the

coordinate their actions across the Internet

increasingly we are seeing not just Internet use

free-floating terrorist cells of two or three people, t

independent of society. They float within environme

anger and hatred, but are free, and they are a pro

future threat. There were tremendous security effor

the Atlanta Olympics, but one lone terrorist—a “

cell”—pulled off an attack. These cells are diffic

penetrate.

The greater danger, though, is the cell transition

netwar, because our response is still hierarchical. The 

agency” approach still puts State or the FBI in charg

increasingly we face seamless terrorism where one c

differentiate between overseas and domestic groups

roles and missions are being created beyond the mi

The FBI is going overseas, and its assets are incre

globally. The military is also deeply involved in cou

87
terrorism regarding weapons of mass destruction (W

although always emphasizing it as a part of hom

defense. 

Serious issues about civil-military relations are 

tested. We need to get the National Guard more inv

there will be new requirements for domestic intelli

collection. Related questions of civil liberties, clipper 

and concerns about the National Security Agency will 

I am particularly concerned with the bureau

responses to these issues. Despite an apparent apprec

of the words, in national preparedness we are see

bureaucratic cockfight, and we are throwing money 

the tubes.

Ultimately, we face a major problem, but not ju

WMD. The fact is with a biological attack we are de

with crisis management—sorting out the bodies. Th

issue is preemption and how we engage in it. We c

longer afford to be reactive, we need to have inform

cells to do offensive and defensive information warfa

matter how good the Federal Emergency Manage

Agency and the National Guard are, we will only be 

triage after an attack comes.

So let me suggest four things we need to do: demy

deglamorize, delegitimize, and deter asymmetric wa

We have not done well so far. We can see the bodies, b

never deal with the context in which a tragedy takes 

Sun Tzu was correct that we live in “infested times.”

“The Cyberterrorist Threat”

Lieutenant Colonel (Select) Gregory J. Rattr

U.S. Air Force

While working on my Ph.D., I have spent the pa

months working in the Pentagon on information w

(part of the 5 years I have been involved in infowar), 

see it as a huge challenge. Organizational responsib

88
flow from how you define the threat, and we face a pr

of broad definitions and descriptions of infowar. But d

national-level attention we do not have struc

responses. As an aside, I wonder why, if asymmetri

such a threat, we have not seen more cyber-terr

happening. We have not suffered much yet from d

disruption. We have been saying this is a problem

nobody has used it to come after us.

So who are we talking about? Cyber-terrorist

non-state actors with an objective—not states

individuals or criminals. They are not engaged in 

diplomacy, or cyber-espionage, or the use of web si

release information. Boundary setting efforts are dif

Many things we do would be appropriate to deal wi

levels of threat.

What is cyber-terrorism? It is the destructi

disruption of information and systems. The idea of 

disruption in particular is getting lots of play in pub

might be possible to cause train wrecks with unde

switching technology, but one would need lots of 

Crashing the stock market is the classic case of wha

would do to disrupt the United States, and we do see 

markets disrupted by information problems. It wou

difficult for us to recover from would-be data corrupt

stock market databases, such as the disruption of cle

and settlement of trades, which would raise questions 

every trade and create long-term complications. The

also some gray areas like attacks on the media, disru

CNN, and attacking computer portals; these kin

attacks highlight the capability of the terrorists. 

means are used depend on the objectives of the group

There are several possible motives for cyber-terro

• political coercion—These terrorists want ca

orchestration of actions, and do not wish to aliena

public;

89
• religion/millennial/anarchists—Disruption is the 

Terrorist groups may be networked with the goa

long-term jihad against West, having no specific po

goals but also not intended to be a short-term effort

may plan for long-term disruption and perhaps even th

of extreme WMD; and,

• hackers—Hackers themselves could be co-opt

groups trying to do any of these; however, ther

operational security problems with using hackers, and 

difficulty of orchestration with hackers actually will

commit violence.

There also is a range of means available for comm

cyber-terrorism. These may include digital attack

malicious code; denial of service through inform

overload (we see this most right now); tar

intrusion—hackers breaking in, mostly exploratory s

corrupted code—the Y2K remediation effort has creat

enormous opportunity to create new code insertion

U.S. software, and a lot of the code is from India, Israe

China; and radio-frequency weapons—things like jam

to disrupt transmission of data will become more impo

as Internet goes infrared and wireless. However, I 

question the traditional wisdom on whether terrorists 

the tools, expertise, and access needed to conduct 

attacks. Web tools are like hand grenades rather 

bullets—they cause problems in networks but cann

targeted that well. They are not atomic bombs, either—

are not that powerful. The bullet would need a conc

effort and strong tools, and require more expertise tha

are likely to obtain easily. However, insiders make it 

easier for them to get the access and expertise they n

The assumption is that cyber-terrorists are most 

to target our critical infrastructure, and most energ

money are spent on critical infrastructure prote

Luckily what sprung from the Oklahoma City and 

incidents were some new mitigative efforts that also l

at cyber threats. We have been focused on critical ph

90
nodes without looking out for internal interconnec

such as timing and synching computers; these are 

major part of our efforts now. Terrorists are also likely 

after high visibility organizations like corporation

media, or DOD; attacks against web pages are c

coming from groups that want to get their name ou

notoriety for their actions. We also need to watch o

hoaxes, and there credibility is the key. Until this 

when we got more real viruses, we had lots of virus h

and spent a lot of time and energy on them. We are d

better job at recognizing the problem, and PDD-63, th

for national critical infrastructure protection, calls for 

of organizations and information sharing centers to ad

various types of threats.

One other note on the possibilities of cyber-terro

Terrorists may run two types of campaigns: single inc

with a dramatic impact, forcing us to focus on planni

protracted guerrilla campaigns which are more diffic

deal with, allowing hit-and-run tactics and pos

significant long-term threat. The policy and inves

responses to these types of campaigns may differ s

cantly.

So what have we actually seen of cyber-terrorism? 

has been plenty of theoretical stuff, but we have no

much evidence. Information systems have been a targ

centuries. Cavalry units cut telegraph wires durin

Civil War; and there is a long history of infrastru

attacks by Luddites, the IRA, and others. We have 

cases of hackers as terrorists, using the denial of servic

political act, but terrorists as hackers have not 

demonstrated to be a threat. An example of hacke

terrorists may be the Zapatistas; related special g

announced and launched an attack on DoD web site

military’s response actually forced a crash of the atta

computers.

There are challenges for us in defending against 

attacks, and there are challenges for cyber-terrorists

91
challenges include systems and infrastructures, whe

need to get producers to build better systems; ta

warning and attack, which means we need better se

and network maps; and the fact that response req

cooperation and coordination, which are difficu

practice.

Challenges for cyber-terrorists include proble

developing expertise—the culture of existing groups 

technologically adaptive or adoptive; there are limits 

use of hackers for hire; targeting is more than hackin

mass disruption may engender resistance in infra

tures and publics over time.

Let me conclude with a couple of observations. We 

to avoid hype and try to understand the underlying 

which are making cyber-terrorism a threat. The mea

counter it are available, but employing them is tough

United States is being proactive but we need to do mor

that includes making some difficult policy choices—th

no silver bullet, so we must discern the risks to guid

efforts.

Comments

“An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely

David Isenberg

Arms Control Implementation Division

Dyn Meridian

I have some prepared remarks that I would like to s

and then some specific comments about the present

we have just heard.

Let me begin by summarizing the conventional wi

to wit: Some day soon, society as we know it is go

collapse. Why? Because our computer networks w

attacked by hostile states or terrorist groups, and

result, the nation’s critical infrastructure will go down

power grids, telephone lines, air traffic control

92
financial networks will collapse; panic will engu

nation, anarchy will reign in the streets, and life will b

continuous Y2K scenario. Life, as we know it, will ce

exist.

It does not take much effort to see warnings of this

cannot go a day without reading accounts of the pe

cyber-threats confronting the nation. Consider some 

recent headlines: “Telecom Links Provide Cyber-A

Route,”

1

 “Pakistani Hackers Tap Lackland,”

2

 “U.S. Sc

to Erect Cyber-Defenses,”

3

 “Cyberwarfare Break

Rules of Military Engagement,”

4

 “In Theory, Reality

Open to Cyber-Attack,”

5

 and “China Plots Winning R

Cyberspace,”

6

 to name a few.

Preparing for an eventual cyber attack has b

growing threat industry for years now. The Pentago

numerous other cabinet agencies have been settin

offices to deal with this latest addition to the panth

weapons of mass destruction. Think tanks have 

cranking out thick tomes,

7

 academic journals regular

articles on the subject,

8

 and the defense industry has 

holding conferences

9

 to solemnly announce the emer

of our newest threat.

There is just one thing wrong. As Gertrude Stein 

famously said of Oakland, “There is no there there.” S

to the way the media has gone overboard the past cou

years regarding the prospect of an attack against the U

States with biological weapons, the imminen

information warfare attacks has been, in the words of 

Twain, greatly exaggerated.

In fact, it is nothing short of amazing when you con

that there still is no definition of “information warfare

is accepted government-wide. Nevertheless w

spending billions of dollars a year on various inform

operations.

10

 This is not to say, of course, that fe

information warfare attacks are totally off base. Cert

we have seen many deliberate disruptions of web 

e-mail servers, and introductions of various viruses ov

93
years. But most of these have been merely garden v

bothersome incidents, not the work of a rogue sta

implacably hostile terrorist group.

The problem is that we have been so inundated by 

inaccurate, misleading reporting about the subject—

is usually characterized by the phrase “Electronic 

Harbor,” that we take as a given that which has yet 

shown a true threat. In fact, the reporting is so bad 

there are web sites out there devoted to debunkin

myths that have grown up about the threats pos

computer viruses.

11

 Of course, these sites are i

minority. The vast majority of the sites dealing wit

issue, like the media at large, hype and exaggerat

threat.

12

Consequently, we may do more injury to ourselves 

any enemy has done, by simply overreacting. Many 

stories are recycled versions of ones that circu

previously, and were wrong in the first place. For exa

there was an article in September 1999 about how th

Government is growing increasingly worried that fo

infiltrators are building secret trap doors into govern

and corporate networks with the help of foreign

programmers doing Y2K-related work.

13

 Anonymou

analysts were quoted about being worried over the t

The only problem, according to George Smith, editor 

Crypt Newsletter,

14

 is that the same story was 

circulated back in the late 1980s and has been period

recycled since.

15

Another classic myth which keeps being brought b

life and has assumed the status of the Holy Grail is th

War Virus. For example, in November 1998 the Cent

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) relea

report on the danger of hackers and terror from the In

entitled “Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, Cyberwa

Averting an Electronic Waterloo.” The CSIS study p

on a number of myths, including:

94
The United States has readied a powerful arsenal 

cyber-weapons . . . planting logic bombs in foreign compu

networks to paralyze a would-be opponent’s air defen

system. . . .

While interesting reading, it is yet another in a lon

of appearances by the equivalent of the Internet’s Pilt

Man: the Gulf War virus hoax. This was originally an 

Fool’s story in which the National Security Agency 

was claimed to have developed a computer virus to a

Iraq’s air defense computers during the Gulf War; th

in which the CSIS report presents this myth indicates 

taken from sources known to be contaminated by it.

1

To paraphrase Pogo, we have met the enemy an

mostly our media. The overwhelming tenor of the cov

has always been toward accentuation of the sensa

parts of it. So when people do “intelligence analysis” o

and go to their Lexis-Nexus database, they find hundr

cites of the same scare stories and minor variations on 

going back over the decade. The bad analysis comes 

this is used as “proof” that an “electronic Pearl Harbo

be implemented by any teenager or group of malcon

with Net connections.

In fact, most, if not all, of these articles have a dre

sameness about them. Again and again the same 

organizations recycle the same quotes and cl

uncomprehending or indifferent to the fact that they a

actually producing anything that is real news. 

characteristics of “electronic Pearl Harbor” stories ar

1. Obsession with hypotheses upon what might ha

not what has happened.

2. Rafts of generally insignificant computer se

incidents accumulated as anecdotal evidence and deli

in an out-of-context or exaggerated manner, insinu

that something awful is about to happen—today, tomo

a year from now, always in the not easily glimpsed fu

95
3. Abuse of anonymous sourcing and slavish devot

secrecy. Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH) s

usually contain a number of “anonymous” sources—

the Pentagon, the White House, Congressional 

computer security firms, intelligence agencies, think 

or unspecified consulting firms. Frequently the anony

will allude to even more secret and terrible things 

cannot be mentioned in print or the Republic will crum

4. Paranoid gossip, the equivalent of which is offer

as still further proof the nation is in electronic da

Russia, China, France, India, Israel—almost any coun

can be portrayed as taking electronic aim at the Ame

way of life. Programmers of foreign descent are tarr

potential cyber-saboteurs in a kind of modern te

McCarthyism. Teenagers are transformed into elec

bogeymen with more power at their fingertips tha

Strategic Command. The allegations tend to be delive

anonymous sources or “experts” not required to pr

substantive examples. I am not convinced at all that 

an expert on terrorism makes anyone an expert i

virtual world, so one goal might be to keep the talks fo

on what is real, rather than what might be rea

attempting to restrict any discussion to reality—not 

reality—you can put them on the defensive.

Keep in mind there have been no examples of terr

in the virtual world with any measurable impact at all 

real world. Computer viruses, for example, are not v

as the work of terrorists by anyone in computer sec

While we know viruses exist and a certain amount of m

is spent each year in attempts to control them, there a

metrics that exist to measure or even quantify their e

or numbers with any precision. Even the anti-virus ind

does not have any accounting standard that provides 

information outside of raw numbers of actual indiv

viruses created, which in itself is a completely meanin

figure with regard to the real world. The empirical evi

that exists shows only that computer viruses 

constitute much more than “annoyances” in netw

96
computing. Conversely, you cannot use that informat

infer that they could mean anything special in the ha

potential terrorists.

 Let me quote from James Dunnigan, a military a

writer:

What gets lost in all the fanfare and desperation ov

information war is that most of the damage to informat

systems is, and always has been, caused by human error. T

flubs are either by the users, or by the programmers, hardwa

designers, and the ‘integrators’ (who put the hardware a

software together). Often it is impossible to tell if a syst

failure is a result of some bad programming or sloppy ch

design or the consequence of someone’s information w

attack . . . . Information war makes good copy—nothing lik

frightening lead story to spice up a slow news day. B

information war is nothing more than the same old use 

deception against an enemy that has been with us since t

first recorded battle, 3,200 years ago.

17

In short, there is no smoking gun that proves any c

the administration or the Pentagon has made abou

potential for information warfare against the nation

there is a substantial body of empirical evidence 

suggests the welfare of the United States is not as t

coupled to networked computers as the futurists sugge

rather, that computer security problems, while rea

part of the noise of a technological society that eve

works through on a day-to-day basis.

For example, consider the Melissa virus. There w

impact on the stock market, no impact on the economy

so it has been with computer viruses in general. Alth

they are often bandied about as part of the info-war 

Harbor scenario, there are no convincing studies that 

computer viruses, despite widespread existen

corporate, government, and military computers ove

entire decade, have much of an impact on anything. 

likely, you can factor them in with the types of h

errors, accidental erasure of files, and network acc

97
caused by incompetent administration that eve

struggles with.

So how do we go from an unquantifiable grit i

economic machine to a software bomb that brings 

everything? No one has a compelling answer for that 

than science fiction scenarios and what-ifs, which 

dime-a-dozen. It is like saying the common cold virus 

mutate into something that causes cancer next year. N

would take the cold virus scenario seriously, but many 

to believe the software possibility.

Where were the cyber-warriors during the conflic

Kosovo? There was no impact, other than a minor med

when alleged Yugo-hackers (who could also have 

American teenagers) tried to mess with NATO’s web 

There was no impact, other than a media reacti

“Chinese hackers” messing with the U.S. Inform

Agency (USIA) web page, or whomever they m

with—and again we could be talking about Ame

teenagers.

Anyway, there are no studies that explain ho

defacing of web sites equates to a potential for lootin

electronic treasury and turning off the water or powe

only thing that can be said is that it appears that we

break-ins are common. But this cannot be explain

simply detecting more such attempts. In many cases

merely a reflection of better monitoring and awaren

that is, the Pentagon is seeing what, in all likelihood

always there. And there is some self-fulfillment, too

more it gets into the mainstream press, the more net 

are inspired to get a piece of the action. This is a well-k

hacker phenomenon.

There are precious little detailed technical descri

that demonstrate how an electronic Pearl Harbor wo

attempted. You simply cannot find any. You can find a 

technical description of security holes in softwar

hardware. But this is not the same thing. Because yo

overwrite the stack of various pieces of Internet sof

98
with malicious commands does not equate to turning o

power on the eastern seaboard. It only equates to ga

some access on one vulnerable machine. Does that ma

control everything of value in the United States? Pro

not. However, there is a lot of nebulous description, wh

reality can be done by anyone with a 15-minute educat

the topic.

The hyperbole surrounding the vulnerability o

information systems has degraded useful education o

topic and created an environment where it is ac

harder to get practical work done. There has also be

explosion in snake-oil salesmen seeking to line their po

by catering to the fears of the not so well-inform

mirrors what has happened with Y2K. Every 

statement by an administration or Pentagon official o

subject is always followed by press releases on the bu

and PR newswires issued by fly-by-night consultin

computer security firms trying to coat-tail on the pub

As a result, it has become very difficult for someon

highly trained in the area of computer secur

differentiate the con men from the legitimate. Yet, t

what management in government and corporate Am

must do everyday. One might conclude that the hyst

tone the government uses has actually harmed na

security by opening a portal through which con men, 

and the simply greedy gain access to systems they 

normally get nowhere near.

Furthermore, there are a number of very good re

why the national security preoccupation with an elec

doomsday has actually been a hindrance t

establishment of good computer security measures. F

creates the impression computer security is an end

designed to protect from catastrophic events that co

one lump. Nothing could be further from the t

Computer security is a day-to-day affair. Inform

technology professionals in a working environment h

deal with aspects of it as a daily part of their jobs

constant implication that security is only of interes

99
relates to theoretical catastrophes interferes with edu

on it. Good computer security practices come from 

grass-roots up. Fundamental education on 

issues—even as simple as being able to get tr

anti-virus software or password management—is 

important than the creation of yet more super agencie

analysts to mull over or handle the threat. Put even 

bluntly, computer security is everybody’s business. I

not do well in secret or in a hierarchical world.

Second, the overemphasis on theoretical threat

resulted in a true rube’s approach to the subject. An

can come up with the suggestion to create a new age

“cyber-corps,” an “electronic FEMA,” an arm o

military—to be a central coordinator for computer de

but this completely ignores how successful com

security practices evolve. For example, the anti

industry is a model of distributed computer security. 

true global network. There is no central overse

anti-virus effort. To be sure, the industry is aggressiv

often conducts business in a predatory manner, but in 

of itself it must be distributive in nature. There simply 

other way to combat computer viruses. No one can do 

No central location could possibly muster enough reso

and react fast enough to emerging infections.

Another example of the necessarily distributive n

of net policing is the Internet reaction to spam

emergence of spam as a growing nuisance really does 

the heart of computer security issues. Simply, spam

make unauthorized use of the computing resour

others. In response to this, an informal international 

of administrators who hate spam emerged to con

protocols and procedures for dealing with the 

offenders. Again, this is a distributed process—

centralized, pyramidal, bureaucratic effort. The In

itself, in other words, tends to work against 

attempting to damage it. This also has very impo

implications for those contemplating the use of it 

platform for information warfare operations.

100
The continued entertainment of the idea that an

safeguard of the infrastructure is just another super a

away is unwise and misinformed. The Departme

Defense (DoD) has a serious brain drain in com

security workers, partly because of this approach. 

communication security workers started working fo

but lit out for greener pastures because (1) DoD simp

not pay them what they are worth in the private secto

(2) they are stuck in a hierarchical, centralized sche

which they have to consult with many distant superi

perform basic functions necessary to computer securi

they quit and go where they can do what they have to d

get paid twice as much for it.

Moreover, the emphasis on central defense ag

theoretical threats thoroughly obscures the fact that 

is not much pressure anywhere to develop commerci

software that is robust from a computer security view

The focus on fixing “external” threats is a sympto

approach—it does not get at the real roots o

disease—which is that software and hardware 

heretofore been developed in an environment that 

secure computing as an afterthought, not a necessi

change that takes education at a basic level. For exa

computer scientists and programmers should be 

thoroughly schooled early with regard to taking sec

into account when developing software in future busin

To summarize, does this mean that there is no thr

computer networks? No. It just means that we have m

enemy, and it is our own lackadaisical computing habi

incompetent reporting that threaten us.

Now let me turn briefly to comments on one 

previous speakers. Mr. Glabus is correct that there 

doctrine for viral warfare, but there is no doctrine for 

possible threats like bioterrorism and nonlethal th

Metaphors are often greatly exaggerated or dist

because we have few actual examples from the pas

should not give much credence to them. Biological v

101
have a psychological impact, producing a visceral, ter

response. But, like computer viruses, they have pe

been ballyhooed excessively. Israel has dealt for year

the threat of terrorism, but people do not overre

possible attacks because it is a part of life, more so 

here. People eventually will have to get smarter 

passwords and computer protection, but that does not 

that hacker attacks will never succeed.

Discussion.

Discussion at the end of this session focused on 

topics: the possible legitimization of terrorist at

particularly because of the ill-defined yet strategic nat

terrorism and information warfare; asymmetric w

and the ability of the American public to filter out 

bias; and the problems of hoaxes and incorrect fram

understanding “virtual terrorism.”

Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare.

Dr. Sloan: There really is no agreement on the nat

terrorism. The Vice President’s report on terrorism po

out the difference between an act of war and a crimin

but terrorism can be clothed in legitimacy by calling i

Asymmetric warfare is a concern. Despite the g

military power of the United States, given our shak

paredness and the force drawdown, there are new que

about our ability to engage in the regional conting

which are still out there. Conventional war is still a re

and though asymmetric warfare will be important 

future, we may be focusing too much on it.

Asymmetric Warfare and Media Bias.

Mr. Glabus: If one looks at recent coverage in th

Jose Mercury about hacker operations, it was a rela

sincere effort, and it went back and apologized lat

102
some misreporting. Both spin doctors and the media h

go back and fix their reporting later if possible.

Dr. Isenberg: There is a bifurcation in society be

those who follow the mainstream press and those who 

alternative outlets or sources. People following mains

news in the future will not “get it.”

Virtual Terrorism, Hoaxes, and Framing.

Dr. Sloan: Of course the government is trying to 

order out of chaos, and often focuses on the threat d

Following the Oklahoma City bombing, people immed

blamed Middle Eastern terrorists because it was eas

demonize a foreign enemy. One of the issues in inform

warfare is that the American portrayal of what terr

look like is inaccurate and unhelpful. Incorrect fram

terrorism gets in the way of meaningful analysis. 

frames take on their own legs, and the dynamics ar

you do not get down to the truth. Consider the sou

silence about Pan Am 103—we do not blame the real c

of that attack, Libya.

SESSION 5 - ENDNOTES

1. David A. Fulghum, “Telecom Links Provide Cyber-Attack 

Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 8, 1999.

2. Sig Christenson, “Pakistani Hackers Tap Lackland,”San A

Express-News, November 3, 1999.

3. Bob Drogin, “U.S. Scurries to Erect Cyber-Defenses,” Los 

Times, October 31, 1999, p. 1.

4. John Markoff, “Cyberwarfare Breaks The Rules of M

Engagement,” New York Times, October 17, 1999.

5. Bob Drogin, “In Theory, Reality, U.S. Open to Cyber-Atta

Angeles Times, October 9, 1999, p. 16.

6. Bill Gertz, “China Plots Winning Role in Cyber

Washington Times, November 17, 1999, p. 1.

103
7. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s 

Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, RAND, 1997; A

Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R. Thomas Goodden, Cy

Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age, A

International Press, 1996; Stuart J. D. Schwartzstein, e

Information Revolution and National Security, Center for Strate

International Studies, 1996; Edward Waltz, Information W

Principles and Operations, Artech House Publishers, 1998; an

Guisnel, Cyberwars: Espionage on the Internet, Plenum Press, 

8. Peter De Feaver, “Blowback: Information Warfare a

Dynamic of Coercion,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4, Summer 1

88-120.

9. “CyberTerrorism: The Risks and Realities,” November 

1999, Washington, DC, Jane’s Conferences.

10. To quote a past U.S. Government Accounting Organ

(GAO) report, “Defense Information Superiority: Progress Ma

Significant Challenges Remain,” Letter Report, 08/

NSIAD/AIMD-98-257:

Achieving information superiority will be expensive 

complex. Based on its analysis of the fiscal year 1999 thro

2003 Future Years Defense Plan, DoD estimates it will bud

an average of $43 billion a year (nearly 17 percent of the $

billion budget request for fiscal year 1999) for C4ISR syste

and activities during the plan period.

Though information warfare spending (both for defensi

offensive information operations) is certainly likely to be a 

subset of this, it still is likely to be billions of dollars a year just 

DoD.

11. See http://kumite.com/myths/.

12. A few random examples are http://www.

~ptmakul/infowar/index.html; http://www.aracne

~gtr/archive/index.html; http://www.rand.org/publica

MR/MR661/MR661.html; http://www.psycom.net/iwar.1.ht

http://www.infowar.com/.

13. “Threat of ‘infowar’ brings CIA warnings” Network 

September 15, 1999.

14. See http://www.soci.niu.edu/~crypt/.

104
15. Personal e-mail, September 15, 1999: “Ahhh, the f

Schwartau, Inc. All the kooks always come out for it. The CIA

dude warning about Bulgaria and Cuba making viruses is a ho

only a decade late. Those stories stem from the late 80s.”

16. See http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~crypt/other/sped.htm.

17. James F. Dunnigan, Digital Soldiers: The Evolu

High-Tech Weaponry and Tomorrow’s Brave New Battlefield, Ne

St. Martin’s Press, 1996, pp. 278-279.

105
SESSION 6:

RESPONDING TO SECURITY THREAT

The goal of this session was to consider the U.S. res

to threats to the national information infrastructure

how those responses might be enhanced.

“From Incident Data to Intelligence Analy

Jon Ramsey

CERT Coordination Center

In 1988 the Morris Worm, developed at Carnegie-M

University, attacked the Internet. The Defense Adv

Research Projects Agency (DARPA) respo

immediately, and out of that incident was bor

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT). We 

provide 24-hour technical assistance to Internet 

assess their vulnerabilities, issue advisories, and 

guidance on flaws in information technology.

CERT operates on a number of principles. First, we 

provide valued services. The “response” in our title im

that we are reactive, but we are also proactive. We ed

vendors on what they should and should not do, work 

security administrators, and do evaluations for a var

constituents. Second, we ensure the confidentialit

impartiality of our services. We do not identify the vict

cyber-attacks, but can pass information on anonymou

warn others. We are also an unbiased source of tr

information. Third, we coordinate with other organiza

and experts in the community, government, and p

sector. We utilize a distributed model for Incident Res

Teams, emphasizing coordination and cooperation

control. The CERT Coordinating Center helps these 

teams coordinate their analysis—we provide intelli

that only aggregate information can produce.

107
Our constituency really includes everyone o

Internet. As of January 1999, there were 43 million 

computers around the world, including a diverse 

users: academic and research institutions, govern

corporate users, and home systems. Anyone can turn 

for assistance.

Regarding the collection of data for intelligence ana

we call our collection the Haystack. We collect the da

operations but not for analysis—how long did it ta

recover, what cost, what preventions? What are the 

mitigation strategies? We are working on an autom

process to handle the reports of 45-60 incidents we r

each day. The data is stored in e-mail messages and s

files, but there is a problem with solving syntax 

semantics problems in those reports and mess

Additionally, whereas in 1988 CERT handled six inci

in 1999 the number of incidents exceeded 9,000. S

overall Haystack includes 22,940 incidents, 25

e-mails, and 17,000 hotline calls.

Processing Data to Produce Information.

Our information is derived directly from the dat

from other open sources. We use these to find tren

discover classifications and categorizations of inci

and to create advisories and reports on intruder too

also use nontraditional information such as politica

social events. For example, we have found that viru

worm attacks seem to correspond to mid-semester b

for college students, and our advisories seem to increa

number of reports rather than reduce them.

One of the things we have done with the data is to c

a root cause taxonomy of the vulnerabilities we 

discovered. The taxonomy shows which root causes 

after (such as buffer stack overflows, and configuratio

authentication problems). We have also crea

Distributed-Systems Intruder Tools Report which ana

the newest sets of intruder tools being used. The rep

108
available online at: http//:www.cert.org/rep

dsit_workshop.pdf.

The next step for CERT is to turn information 

intelligence products. We hope to do this us

multi-disciplinary approach. This includes, for exa

trying to understand an intruder’s motive through th

of criminology, psychology, and sociology. We are also 

some recent advances in technology such as data m

and automated learning and discovery to assist i

analysis process. In fact, the mission of the CERT An

Center is to use a multi-disciplinary approach t

creation of intelligence based on computer sec

incidents, vulnerabilities, and related information.

Let me conclude by reemphasizing our main goal, 

is to use intelligence to protect our national inform

resources by capitalizing on data collected at the C

over the last decade.

“A Computer Crime Overview:

National Infrastructure Issues”

Dan Larkin

Supervisory Special Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation

National Infrastructure Protection Cente

I am a realist, and am somewhat skeptical abou

problem of computer crime. There is a problem, but I a

sure it is an international threat. Most cases we have s

the FBI are domestic, although there are some on

international elements.

How do computer crime issues at the federal 

translate down to the local level? There is signi

computer-related crime in the Pittsburgh area. This r

has 450 software firms and 800 high-tech companies, 

number of these facilities have been targeted by crim

What we are trying to do is focus on the real th

109
reaching out to the experts in the military and in indus

locate those threats, and there are some new efforts a

at the local level to find an approach to the problem.

The Internet and increasing interconnectivity ha

to vulnerability because of the need for speed and 

information. What has happened is that we have had 

juvenile Internet hackers, and the reality of the thr

vulnerability. I started working with CERT 5 years a

part of the first national computer crime squ

Washington, DC. One hacker got into the National Oc

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite sy

and the FBI started working with CERT; now there is 

time agent from the FBI at CERT. We are making mor

more efforts to get business on board to work wit

confidentially, to inform industry about information 

might be targeted.

The fact is that hackers are mostly juveniles, and 

really fear prosecution. There are other criminal 

involved, however—hackers, insiders, nationa

international industrial-commercial spies. The FBI ha

some success against economic espionage. For exam

celebrity came for treatment at the University of Pitts

Medical Center, and the hospital tried to protec

identity; a hospital employee hacked in to steal her m

records to sell them to a magazine. This event actually 

federal legislation to protect computer record

Pittsburgh Paint and Glass, people were caught try

peddle company secrets, and two were prosecuted.

The Internet provides criminals with a numb

advantages: it makes it easy to locate victims; it crea

environment where victims do not have to see or spe

the criminals; it is a persuasive vehicle for fraud; the

only minimal costs to setting up a web page; and techn

has exploded exponentially in the recent past. As a r

we have seen several particular types of Internet 

come to predominate: financial crimes such as m

110
laundering and on-line gambling, terrorism, extortion

pornography, and a wide variety of frauds.

Let me conclude by highlighting several o

government’s responses to these problems. F

Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) create

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastru

Protection, the goal of which being to network on th

issues and vulnerabilities in our critical infrastru

Second, there is a new Internet Fraud Center co

on-line soon in West Virginia. Third, the whole Y2K 

has been useful in forcing us to look more carefully 

vulnerabilities, and we are getting more feedba

vulnerabilities from industry than before. Finally, w

instituting a program called InfraGard, in which 

inside industry to work together on vulnerabilities, an

that information down to disseminate to others 

retaining confidentiality). So far local industry has 

quite responsive.

“Gaps in Response”

Frederick G. Tompkins

Information Security Principal

UNISYS Corporation

What we are concerned about in the business sec

that the government community (primarily intelligenc

law enforcement) is primarily looking at postulat

perceived threats. Our concern is that postulated/perc

is on the opposite end of the spectrum from where w

looking, which is what is real and what is probable.

Last February Dick Clark of the National Se

Council (NSC) came to a financial industry sessi

discuss private sector samples of attack signature

indicated that the government had a database of 1

attack signatures, and would make them availa

industry with no conditions and no charge, wi

expectation of return information. We were working 

111
vulnerability assessment methodology for the fin

services infrastructure, and told the government we w

a threat and indicator briefing, and that the dat

needed to be made available right away. However, soo

government told us that we needed clearances to get in

threat briefings, since they were not open after all. W

get a secret level briefing, and what we heard was bas

secret information sources that we were not allowed to 

about, and so on. So we are skeptical, to say the least. 

we are told that information will be made available to 

usually do not get it.

Let me put this issue in context. What is reality f

commercial sector? Our problem is now, not just dow

road.

• Commercial off-the-shelf technology

problem we face is that we no longer custom-d

software, so that every unique problem we face mu

dealt with using generic software. We cannot influen

design and development of the products we must purc

In terms of risk, this increases the degree of uncert

Now we are changing internal business processes to e

software that was made by someone else; technology 

driver, not the servant, and this is a dangerous tre

major Y2K risk concern is that 85 percent of the remed

code being written is from India.

• Rate of technology change. The half-l

technology is now 5 months. This shortens internal ind

planning time frames from years to months, even do

days/hours. The strategic planning time frame used 

3-5 years, now it is 8-10 months; tactical planning w

years, now it is 30 days; operational planning was 1 m

to 1 year, today it is 48-96 hours. We simply have to mo

to the next problem if we cannot fix the first one.

• Risk acceptability. How do we manag

synergistic effects of risk across the infrastruct

Typical government responses are all about sandboxe

turf; people are talking about threats and vulnerabi

112
but not risks, which is what we deal with. The arithm

the Cold War was easy; we could quantify the thre

counting. But we cannot do that now; we cann

quantitative risk management. It is not possib

eliminate all vulnerabilities; the best we can do is p

risk avoidance. For example, there is a trade-off 

multi-programmed operating systems, which are ac

serial, not simultaneous. Data is transferred be

programs during wait times—control can be taken 

from outside thanks to a flaw in how these ope

systems are designed; the only solution is single

operations, which are no longer feasible in the bu

environment. There is a trade-off between securit

speed/flexibility.

• Speed of business. Little academic work is 

done in this area. Just-in-time logistics in busin

everywhere. At the Chrysler plant in South America, 

arrive just two hours ahead of when they are ne

Wal-Mart has no stockroom; each store instead 

satellite dish which enables it to order resupply as need

National and International Security.

Let me make several observations on national sec

Essentially, a different model of national security is ne

Former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre ha

that what is at stake is security “pre-Eisenhower,” 

means economic security. This was recognized i

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastru

Protection (PCCIP) report, which stated that “our na

defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life hav

depended on the essential services that underpi

society.” The commercial sector actually own

infrastructure, and we control it within certain risk l

the commercial sector wants to enrich its stock-holder

arrest criminals. It needs a competitive edge to stay 

in the marketplace where the product cycle is no

months. 

113
The interim Hart-Rudman report (September 

emphasized the economic security impacts of techn

vulnerability. It concluded that “the national security 

advanced states will be increasingly affected by vu

bilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure

that “global forces, especially economic ones, will con

to batter the concepts of national sovereignty.” Wha

stake, then, is not only the nation’s security i

constitutional context, but also the nations’ sec

because of the interdependence of economic relation

the international operations of American companie

example, UNISYS does 60 percent of its business ove

it controls NASDAQ operations, manages over half 

check clearances, and is used by most large banks 

world.

In summary, I would suggest several things. First, 

are still significant cultural differences between ind

and government which are bigger than paradigm

language. We are in a Kuhnian revolution in know

and the current paradigm is in crisis; shifts are occu

and we do not know they are happening. The scie

community is at least 5 years behind in understandin

problems. Second, we all have a stake in the na

security. Third, risks must be managed, not av

Nobody is saying how to do it, but compliance is n

answer. Fourth, our predilection for the countermeasu

jour must be overcome. Finally, what we are witness

not an information revolution, but a relationship revol

with profound implications for how we do business.

Comments

Mac Fiddner

University of Pittsburgh

My challenge is to try to bring these presentation

perspective on the theme of the conference, but i

interest of time my comments will be brief. Respons

114
the most difficult aspect of the problem, not jus

technological complexities, but also the types of inform

being transmitted (public, private, and classified

problems of sources, all while maintaining confiden

and integrity. I would conclude that at the momen

government does not have a real policy in regar

information security. There is perhaps a de facto policy 

the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastru

Protection, but it is not a well-articulated policy.

Discussion.

Discussion revolved around the ide

cyber-mercenaries and the confidentiality of inform

provided by business to the government. The FBI has s

relatively small number of cases of hackers for hire, a

the three most recent cases, two had signif

international elements. The FBI’s response has be

improve networking within the intelligence commun

create early awareness, including broadening its netw

intelligence to include groups like CERT. CERT doe

investigate the origin of a threat; rather it reacts 

event itself. Mr. Ramsey believes that the majority o

incidents are international, raising important lega

jurisdictional questions.

Industry is concerned that the government may m

corporate proprietary information (e.g., turning it o

the Securities and Exchange Commission), wi

guarantee from the government that the informat

going to be held confidential, particularly in respon

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from bu

competitors. The FBI’s position is that while busines

not get satisfaction every time, the level of security fro

FBI is appropriate, and business is protected from FO

115
NOON SESSION:

Video Teleconference

This session built on the previous session on respon

security threats.

“Towards a National Information Securi

Strategy”

Dr. John Arquilla

Naval Postgraduate School of Monterey

and

David Ronfeldt

RAND Corporation

Let me begin with a definition of information strate

is the pursuit of policy through informational end

means, and it includes several components. 

supporting existing political, economic, and mi

domains of statecraft, and emergence as a distinc

domain itself. We want to conceptualize information 

distinct dimension of American power. Second, man

our own capabilities and resources, and interacting 

others in peacetime, crisis, and war. It is at lea

important that we learn how to manage our own reso

as it is that we determine how to attack the enemy. T

attending to both the contents and conduits—bot

structuring and the processing—of information. It a

to the message as well as the medium. And finally, rea

that “information strategy” corresponds, at the h

level, to “knowledge strategy.” What does one know 

the battle for Seattle? Black helicopters and 135 n

states were upended by nongovernmental actors.

As the information revolution alters the world, w

some crosscutting trends. First, the information revo

is resulting in a vast new technological infrastructur

117
have global access and interconnectivity, and the U

States is the primary beneficiary of this, but as we be

more dependent on it we also become more vulne

Second, the power of networked non-state acto

increasing. In civil society we are seeing nongovernm

organizations (NGOs) and activists, but we also se

emergence of “uncivil” society, such as criminal

terrorists. Third, the information revolution is enha

the effects of “soft power” and “information operat

giving people greater ability to influence events. This i

of the Zapatistas in Mexico, of radio station B92 in S

and Suu Kyl in Burma, for example. For states, this ca

have some positive effects, perhaps allowing us to 

lower cost and with less risk, and perhaps also to targ

actions better. We use economic sanctions quite frequ

but with many unintended consequences. Inform

operations might allow us to pursue our aims w

hurting a lot of people. Fourth, states are being alte

some ways, and perhaps diminished, but they will h

learn how to deal with these new actors.

David Ronfeldt and I are trying to articulate a fou

vision of where we should go with U.S. strategy. First, 

is an emerging set of strategic opportunities 

imperatives.

• On the defensive side, we need to maintain “gu

openness.” Our economic and political security depe

open relations with our allies, but we have to be gu

because almost all information technology is dual-u

nature.

• Integrate a “sensory apparatus” to warn and mo

In other words, we need to learn how to network b

something we do not do well in government.

• Develop the “noosphere” proactively. David and 

to coin a new term at least once a year, or else we a

doing our job, and this is taken from Des Jardin’s notio

“realm of the mind.” This subsumes both cyberspace an

media-driven infosphere, and our corollary is that a 

118
type of politics will emerge alongside it, “noopolitik” r

than “realpolitik.”

• Project the right “story” via soft power. Whose 

won during coverage of the demonstrations agains

World Trade Organization in Seattle? Clearly, the de

strators’ story prevailed.

• Use “strategic swarming” to mix hard and soft p

Swarming is a kind of tactical or doctrinal approach 

allows one to strike from all directions simultane

whether it is social activism in downtown Seattle o

Zapatistas in southern Mexico. An interesting exam

this was General Shelton’s actions in Haiti a few year

where a small number of Special Forces were able to s

out and maintain control of the island during a per

intense coercive diplomacy.

Second, there is some concern or sensitivity over th

of the United States in information sharing v

information domination. Even our allies are worried 

intelligence cooperation with us because they are afr

some kind of exploitation. And if you listen to the Iran

Vietnamese media’s depiction of world opinion, 

perceive that we are seeking domination over the 

through cultural exports like reruns of Baywatch, alth

I do think some of this is tongue-in-cheek.

National Information Strategy.

How do we move toward formulating a nat

information policy and strategy? We have to rethink h

are applying “information” in the current pol

economic, and military domains of our grand strategy. 

we need to identify the building blocks and measures f

development of a new information domain of gr

strategy. This idea first appears in President Rea

National Security Strategy in 1981, suggesting the not

information as a fourth dimension of national power. A

same time, we have to think about how this problem a

119
to the offense-defense dilemma and its implication

deterrence and coercion, as well as what it mean

alliances and conflict resolution.

Current grand strategy is already replete 

information-driven elements. On the political level, ou

of democratic enlargement is greatly aided by interco

tivity because it puts such pressure on authorit

regimes. But there are places where we need to apply 

prudence because we do not want to see change com

quickly. We do not want it in Saudi Arabia yet, and 

wants democracy in Algeria if the radicals take over?

In the economic domain, information crea

tremendous new profitability for the United State

expansion and growth we have seen in the 1990s 

product of the information revolution. But we are look

technology that is all dual-use, having both commercia

military applications, so we may inadvertent

endangering our information security and empowerin

rivals. One of the great problems in our relations with 

has to do with the ballistic missile and other techno

that they are acquiring.

On the military side, it is a fascinating time. It is di

to find another period in time where one power had 

predominance in military power over all others. Wh

information revolution is allowing us to do, in ter

information operations and the information used i

weapons systems to improve their accuracy, is t

extremely limited and discriminate force. But there is 

danger of information arms races, and the possible spr

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), if the U.S. ed

information technology is not shared. Opponents ma

the need to offset our capabilities with dirty, old-fash

WMD. Recent Russian military exercises called ZA

[WEST] 99 featured extensive use of tactical nu

weapons.

120
A Framework for the National Information

Strategy.

If we want to conceptualize a framework for inform

strategy as a distinct domain, we need to think no

about offense and defense, but also about a more ge

posture. We need to think about the ideational tenet

organizational and technological principles, but th

defining level is that of ideational concepts. (See Ta

below.)

We have a policy choice to make: are we going to 

narrowly or broadly? If narrowly, then our focus will 

cyberspace security and safety. This includes infrastru

protection and assurance, intrusion detection 

rapid-response strategic information warfare

public-private intelligence coordination. This is whe

are right now. If our focus is broad, then we need to 

additional emphasis on global “soft power.” We 

pursue this notion of “noopolitik,” which is an interna

system based on ethics, norms, and values. It is re

revolution in diplomatic affairs, and the next step b

constructivism. Such a strategy at a broad level 

include the right of communications and information f

and the deep coordination of government and NGO

example, why were none of the NGOs invited to the W

Trade Organization meeting in Seattle? In either cas

need to pursue guarded openness, strategic swar

organizational networking, and infrastructure expan

At the organizational design level, we recom

interagency networks and some new organizat

structures, as well as better public-private cooper

Half of all military communications traffic goes a

commercial systems, so we need to learn how to coop

better.

On the level of technological application

recommend wide diffusion of strong encryption techn

because the bad guys already have it, so we might a

121
use it. As to defensive measures, we need better 

defense—there is a kind of Maginot Line mentality 

information security with firewalls or orange book sy

that (supposedly) nobody can break into. However, 

day we find new evidence that this is not true. Wh

need is depth defense that may allow the bad guys in, b

of our information is protected by strong encryption so 

damage is done. Regarding offensive capabilities, we a

talking just about taking down somebody’s power gr

need to be considering how to use our great media how

to get the story across that will win.

David and I would recommend that we fill i

framework broadly as follows:

Across the ideational level, as I suggested earli

need to explore the noosphere, this realm of ethic

ideas. Defensively, we need not only guarded opennes

the United States might find some benefits in a no-fir

statement regarding strategic information warfare (S

order to reassure other countries. Offensively, we b

swarming will be the best doctrine.

122

General Posture Defensive Measures

Offensive

Capabilities

Ideational Tenets

Development of

noosphere,

noopolitik, plus a

RDA*

Guarded openness,

no first use of SIW**

Discriminate

swarming

Organizational

Design

Interagency

networks, hybrids

with hierarchies

Public-private

cooperation for

information security

Coalition

information-

and interope

Technological

Applications

Wide diffusion of

strong encryption;

connectivity

Preclusive and depth

defense architectures

SIW** meas

media broad

capabilities

*RDA = Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs

 **SIW = Strategic Information Warfare

Table 3. The Ideational Tenets and Associ

Principles.
Finally, we should consider some new and varied 

on the agenda. First, those that are defense-related:

• Defending the homeland against “cybotage.”

• Elaborating behavior-based arms control. W

talking about behavior because we simply cannot c

the technology any more with SIW.

• Operating in coalitions, projecting forces. 

problems are immense. Disruption of our deploy

schedules or air tasking orders could cause us a great d

trouble.

• Coping with non-state actors, both civil and unc

• Shaping a strategic information doctrine (SID). T

a change from the Single Integrated Operational 

(SIOP).

Second are those that are community- and cou

related:

• Constructing a globe-girdling noosphere, a globa

society that allows us to resolve many of our disputes 

more peaceful means.

• Fostering a revolution in diplomatic affairs (

This means building a diplomatic system that is not 

on embassy edifices and putting the President on the 

line of every diplomatic crisis.

• Developing a capacity for strategic swarming.

• Pressuring authoritarian rulers. The inform

revolution gives us quite a bit of leverage in place

Cuba.

• Settling high-risk conflicts such as Kosovo. Peac

come there not through a negotiated military settleme

through an agreement on some common future.

What we need for an information strategy then 

concept of operations for the 21st century. Lord Nelso

123
example, suggested new naval tactics that allowed his 

to concentrate on smaller parts of the enemy’s nav

achieve a striking advantage. At Trafalgar and a num

other battles, he did just this. In the German conc

blitzkrieg, the tank, airplane, and advanced comm

tions were conjoined to enable maneuver warfare. We 

to get to this point in our thinking.

At present, there are more questions than ans

What issues get priority or provide us with the 

leverage? Do the issues and the framework relate well

much can reorganization alone accomplish? At 

shifting the current direction of our thinking s

advisable. The prevailing concept of operation

emphasized the technical and defensive dimensions, k

on U.S. vulnerabilities. The focus of the next conc

operations should be on ideational and organiza

dimensions, and on opportunities to be proactive. 

requires a great strategic shift in thinking that we hop

be evidenced in the next Presidential Decision Dir

(PDD) on the subject.

To explain where we are today, let me return to Ta

We are already implementing most of the defe

measures recommended (except the no-firs

statement), and we are utilizing most of the technol

applications except for the diffusion of strong encry

What is not getting done is thinking about the ge

posture, including the need for new, hybrid hierarchie

the offensive side we are not doing well at figuring ou

to share information with our most trusted allies. W

also not really considering offensive doctrine; we are 

with the doctrine of Curtis LeMay, which was some

along the lines of “nuke them into glass.” What we 

introduce is something a bit more discriminate, 

strategic swarming allowing us to place our efforts w

we need them.

124
Discussion.

Dr. Arquilla was asked to comment on four issue

place of physical violence in this approach; the emp

ment of nongovernmental organizations; inform

warfare attacks against the economy; and the outlo

success in devising a national information strategy 

bureaucratic realities.

Violence and Strategic Information Warfare.

Violence does not go away. At the military leve

concepts that David and I have elaborated about cyb

and netwar suggest that you can achieve your aims w

lot less destruction than you used to. We think you can 

having to use annihilation or destruction to win, and 

you can win with disruption. Violence is a key to terro

always will be, and my great fear is not that the cyber-

threat will become real—though it is now a lot less tha

given credit for in official circles. My fear is that terr

are learning how to become “informatized,” and the

using information now openly available to guide and 

their violent operations. Recently I was able to go o

from my desktop computer and take virtual tours o

military bases; I briefed this to some base commander

partly as a result that information is now off the Web

the terrorists using information in a variety of ways

importantly as a tool for supporting their active co

operations because there is a lot of information out 

Secondly, I think terrorists are going to be increa

using the Internet for fundraising. The Tamil Tigers 

showed an ability to reach out to a large diaspo

material support. Those kinds of uses are what I am 

afraid of than cyber-terror itself. Today the notion of 

bits and bytes to bring whole systems down is very 

exaggerated.

125
Empowerment of Nongovernmental Organizat

Clearly in the case of the landmine issue, the Net w

the only resource out there. There was a lot of 

coverage, and there was a lot of use of classic activist ta

Aerial bombardment began with zeppelins dropping b

on English pubs, and it took another 25 years for airpo

come to fruition as the defining force of 20th ce

conflict. In much the same way, I think the inform

revolution is now just getting on its legs in terms o

activism. The case of the Zapatistas is interesting. It is 

that the Mexican government was influenced to e

military activities against them in part as a respon

their use of information operations. In Burma, govern

behavior has been somewhat restricted becau

Net-based activity. This is still at an early stage, and 

the Internet is not going to be effective every time. We 

to be careful not to hype the capability, much like we h

be careful not to hype the threat of cyber-terror, eith

Strategic Information Warfare against the

Economy. 

I do not think the threat exists today, and it is not 

when it will. What we saw with the rise of airpower wa

different viewpoints. One was that it would hav

important effect on the battlefield, and it took abo

years for that to happen. The other view of the 

theorists was that airpower changed everything—yo

not have to engage the enemy’s field army to strik

homeland. For 85 years people have been trying to r

the potential of an independent striking force. I am 

we are going to have a similar debate over inform

warfare that may last just as long. There are thos

think we can bring the enemy to his knees simply th

an information attack on his economic, political

transportation infrastructures. Yet we built infrastru

that could withstand nuclear war—that is why we bu

Internet. I think that information warfare is as doom

126
the early, grandiose expectations of airpower. Howe

think information warfare can have strategic effects i

against militaries. Disruption of American deploy

could make all the difference, especially if an opponen

limited goals and threatens the use of WMD after h

achieved his goals and before we can respond. Suc

accompli strategies may be enhanced by inform

warfare. I think that like airpower, information warf

going to have its main effects on the battlefield an

cause homeland disruption, but it will never be a

obtain a state’s political aims in a true Clausewitzian s

Strategy vs. Bureaucracy.

What we have is a dismal landscape of bureau

pulling and hauling. I see few opportunities to 

through it. I have been looking at this issue for 10 year

progress is only made slowly, and here and there. W

walk the halls of the Pentagon, the locus of world p

everyone I meet seems to think fatalistically that h

accomplish or influence nothing. So I think our gr

problem is sociological, in persuading people that the

make a difference in what they do. There are pocket

and there where people are trying to make a differenc

are beginning to get some interservice coordination, 

little bit of interdepartmental cooperation. The challe

the years ahead of us is organizational, not technolo

Unless we begin to develop some sense of loyalty to an 

greater than an individual service, or the 

Department, or one of the other governmental a

involved, we are not going to move ahead. Ten years 

now I do not know if we will yet have a real inform

strategy, although I am sure it will be an improveme

what we have now. We have enough of a cushion 

international arena right now that perhaps we can con

to muddle through for awhile.

127
SESSION 7:

THE U.S. MILITARY AND INFORMATIO

OPERATIONS

The aim of this session was to provide an o

assessment of the information revolution and its imp

the way U.S. military forces conceptualize, organize

train for information warfare.

“Seizing the High Ground:

Land Operations and Information Operati

Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Warsocki, U.S. A

Land Information Warfare Center

Imagine being a commander in ancient Greek wa

You could not see what was happening very well, so yo

to seize the high ground. For centuries we have though

we could win the battle if we were able to see b

Information has evolved into another dimension of wa

We have now gone to the limits of physical height (s

but the new “high ground” is information.

Information operations (IO) is an integrating strat

actions taken to affect an adversary’s decision 

information, and information systems while defending 

own information and information systems. Phy

security, psychological operations, decep

intelligence—IO encompasses all these things. The t

to manage behavior through perception managemen

want to modify the enemy’s perception of the situatio

change his behavior, to get into his decision cycl

influence it.

The older concept of command and control wa

(C2W) is the antecedent to IO. C2W was focused on th

two parts of Colonel John Boyd’s notion of the OODA 

(Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act). We figured that 

129
could impact the information that the enemy’s dec

maker was getting, he would make bad decisions or giv

orders to execute them. This was seizing the high grou

create an advantage. It was not always easy to execut

kind of warfare, but it had the advantage of using fo

kinetic energy, which we had plenty of. That does not 

when you are in a peacekeeping situation, where fo

impermissible, and we are doing that more and more

Offensive information operations are centere

attacking the enemy’s most vulnerable points. If w

create a situation where the enemy is giving order

counterorders to the point that he is completely con

and all we have to do is come onto the battlefield and 

up, that is effective information operations. Think of 

actions. A policeman can be dressed in a variety of 

from McGruff the crime dog to kinetic energy-SWAT 

guys that break down your door. The ultimate mea

behavior modification is a bullet in the head, and t

what the military is good at. But that is not the first 

any more. The military has to figure out how to get in

unobservables: the willpower, perceptions, and situa

awareness of the enemy’s decision cycle.

Defensive information operations occur not just 

cyber-world, but on television, and in places like Bosn

Somalia. By the way, the poor defenseless Albanians w

on TV were also running black market operations, a

were confused as to what to do with them. They 

successfully attacking our information systems.

The goal of information operations is to buy time. 

chased by a bear you only have to be faster than th

behind you. Strategically, I do not need to win the w

just buy time. Get a commander more time by conde

his decision cycle or disrupting the opponent’s, and h

has command of a new dimension of warfare. The battl

can be peacekeeping or anything, but time is the c

piece of the puzzle.

130
The threat is anything that counters my plan, whe

am a businessmen, politician, soldier, or what have 

have a plan, and defense is strong but offense is decis

someone has a plan countering mine, that has 

disrupted or delayed. An election campaign is an exam

information operations interfering with the other 

plan. When I am a peacekeeper, the opponent is anyon

opposes my plan; it could be an NGO, an ally, or the e

and you deal with each differently.

The threat is also likely to be asynchronous 

asymmetrical. The next time we go to fight we may no

6 months to prepare our logistics, and we may be att

asynchronously to disrupt our debarkation points

bases, our supply and logistics net. There was a jok

went around in Bosnia about how to stop a NATO air s

get five Canadians and handcuff them to the target. T

asymmetry. You do not need military power if you ca

into the enemy’s decision-making cycle by using the 

media, and that is getting easier all the time than

television. In Serbia, Dutch footage of a U.S. helic

going down with no bullets fired (it had clipped a high 

wire) forced us to waste a week having to respond to 

We are likely to face some changing threats, incl

the actors I would call “mugs, thugs, and wackos,” wh

getting more creative and adaptive. We are going 

dealing with social fabric issues with implications for p

such as black markets, multinational areas, and cri

elements. For example, the Kosovo Liberation Army 

was supposed to be protected by U.S. forces, but we d

know what to do with the Albanian black marke

cropped up. It was not our policy to fight it; the ru

engagement were not clear.

There may be larger threats, as well, like the Chin

Chinese military document from June of 1999 titled O

Warfare outlined new principles of war which mu

directed against the United States. It suggests the use 

means possible, including armed force and nonarmed 

131
and lays out eight laws for a secure strategy, incl

asymmetric, omni-directional, nontypical, flexible at

The Chinese are talking like they are at war, at le

reconnaissance war, and we need to do what we can t

the reconnaissance.

This is not new. As far back as 1959 it was argue

the point of war is not to kill the enemy but to make h

what you want. What has changed is that informat

now so ubiquitous that I can reach behind my oppo

front line and attack his systems through inform

operations. So how does the Army deal with this?

Information Operations.

The planning principles of information operation

knowledge and synchronization. We need to know the 

audience—at home, in allied countries, or in the opp

country. There are a number of principles, but the 

synchronization, getting people moving like a football 

where everyone is working together and doing 

individual jobs. This is easier said than done.

There are some processes in information operation

are worth exploring. We face a variety of crises, camp

and routine tasks, so we have coordination cells 

problems, to put together a plan and get down to the le

executable tasks. These include a whole seri

intelligence and civil affairs activities: comm

relations, working with nongovernmental organiza

(NGOs), giving instruction to local police forces

working with the media. The G-5 has to do the job of 

politician in working with the NGOs, but he has to 

that we need their cooperation because we are not just 

to protect the NGOs.

What does the Information Operations Working G

(IOWG) do? It assists the IO staff officer plan, coord

and implement the IO campaign. Sometimes ther

132
question of who it is working for—the commande

decisionmakers, or itself; it depends on the situation

The key is orchestration of all these things. A 

things are happening all at once, but they all have the

rhythms and cycles, and it is difficult to coordinate 

There is a lot of friction in this process. You have to get 

to the nitty gritty details, by day and by month—

releases, plans, etc. People’s perceptions are often shap

how well you manage the day-to-day implement

problems. 

Intelligence support in this process is crucial. The

lot of information coming in, and synchronization of 

becomes important because the enemy may exploit it 

do not. There are lots of data out there, but we ha

coordinate and share that knowledge. With some 

databases like Oracle we can dump in both structure

unstructured data and turn the computer to the ta

making sense of it. The trick is to take a lot of disp

databases and pull out of that haystack the needles th

truly useful.

One of the tools we are using to do this is 

Themescape—we take lots of data, put it on the web

bring out the themes. We take the information and us

create connections between concepts or individua

visualize these in three dimensions, and brin

similarities and relationships among databases whic

reveal to us a center of gravity that we should target

How does the Army put all of this together? 

recently, this was not possible. We have opened what w

the Information Dominance Center, which is a c

facility where teams from around the world can co

with us and work on coordinating information opera

Here we can bring together the entire execution 

including feedback and putting all the pieces togethe

In conclusion, we need to know what IO can rea

The main goal is seizing the high ground of time, t

133
information being so vital. Short-term IO modifies beh

mid-term IO changes attitudes, and long-term IO ch

deep-seated beliefs. The point is that we need to 

realistic expectations about what IO can do for us. IO is 

silver bullet, but it can be an enormous help in avoidin

need to use lots of bullets.

“New Approaches to Information Warfar

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ayala, U.S. Air Fo

I am not going to outline the ways in which the Air 

tries to do the kinds of things Colonel Warsocki ha

described, because there is a lot of commonality wit

Army approach. I spent a year as a National Defense F

at the University of Pittsburgh to encourage out-of-th

thinking about information warfare (IW), and I wa

share with you some of the ideas I encountered durin

year that I am bringing back to the Air Force in the h

shaping the debate further.

The rationale for studying information warfare i

information is the key to situational awareness fo

airman and to the command and control of airpower A

country comes to rely more and more on airpower, we 

to be looking at this from a variety of angles. Now with

Air Force, IW is very fragmented. All kinds of spec

have a piece of it, from the traditional computer geeks, 

intelligence people, communications and elect

equipment experts, the security folks, education 

training teams, and public affairs specialists. In th

Force, all the camps are contending for their slice 

budget, over what part of IW they can gain control.

Broadly, what I want to cover includes understa

the nature of IW, picking a definition of it, and finding 

alternative approaches to IW.

134
Understanding the Nature of IW.

IW is much more than just the interesting features 

Internet. There are 165 million users on-line, and more 

800 million pages on the web. But more than jus

statistics, the bottom line is that the Internet is 

money—e-commerce already generates more than 

billion a year. IW is also about changing technology. 

transfer rates and volume have grown exponentially, 

the number of soldiers needed to cover an area has sh

and there are all kinds of new tools available.

There are a variety of IW definitions outsid

Department of Defense, and most of these foc

asymmetry. The military service definitions are typ

action oriented.

Now we do face a significant threat from nation-s

but we also face substate threats: first, widesprea

validated (by the Defense Sciences Board)—incompe

and amateurs, hackers, disgruntled employees incl

military personnel, and crooks. Unhappy employee

really a big problem. The second type of substate threa

validated but limited, such as organized crime, fo

espionage agents, and enemy proxies. The last ty

substate threat includes those whose existence is de

likely but has not been validated, such as po

dissidents and terrorists. We have found actors like O

Bin Laden using laptops, but we are not sure what th

are. Again, these substate threats are dynamic and m

they are not static. When you group all of the th

together and consider the probabilities and consequ

the vectors are moving increasingly towards both.

Now IW can be carried out at all levels of understan

As suggested earlier, it is true that the next time we a

going to get 6 months to prepare. However, we also h

be concerned with others who will give us 10 years—

will take a more strategic approach.

135
Choosing a Definition of Information Warfare.

Existing approaches are oriented toward proces

concentric ring model, where we try to create s

paralysis in the enemy by hitting his centers of gravity 

once. The Air Force strategy is operational 

management—everything we do in the milita

inherently dangerous, but we do not stop because 

dangerous, rather we try to manage the risk. This conc

risk management has proven successful in f

operations, and it is being applied by the Air Fo

networks and to how we deal with the media.

I would propose a modified definition of inform

warfare, which is to take “war” out of “information war

Let me explain by breaking it down further. Informat

defined as text that answers the prerogatives of who, 

what, and where; knowledge is text that answer

questions of how and why. Text is a stimulus for those 

who have sight, but we need to modify the tradi

definition to include stimuli of all the senses, not just 

War is stimulating the senses in a violent way. What 

could create the reaction we desire while using nonv

stimuli?

In looking for a better definition of IW, I have 

across several new approaches that are worthy of me

First, the approach taken by academics at King’s Coll

London (what I call a “Scotland Yard” approach) is bas

crime. They emphasize understanding the organiz

capabilities, motive, and objectives of the opponent

taking a matrix and applying a network analysis. Thi

not require a lot of sophistication, but it is a discip

approach involving categorization and linkage that m

useful to the military for determining what we want 

with IW.

Second, the Bulgarian military’s general staff app

is OODA loop derived, the goal being to reduce uncert

Their notion is that information warfare is an oxymo

136
there is no war if you are doing the information 

correctly. This is truly out-of-the-box thinking for th

Force, and it is dicey because it throws responsibility f

down to the level of the individual soldier or ai

Ultimately this may push the issue into the civilian 

and away from the experts in violence management.

The third approach is the Massachusetts Instit

Technology “Oxygen System.” The idea here is 

information is like oxygen—we all need it, and even 

being used it recycles itself. This is a useful model beca

its ease of use, transparency, and criticality.

Finally, the People’s Republic of China has come u

the notion of setting up a fourth branch of its armed for

do information warfare. This reflects a different view

and more fundamental Chinese thought based on Su

and the idea of chi or wisdom—a different way of thi

about the whole process. It deals in the rea

chaos—creating order out of a disordered situation.

These new slants on information warfare have s

implications for how we organize, train, equip, operat

maintain our forces. Sometimes the Air Forc

undergone change for the sake of change, but thes

fundamental changes that we cannot avoid.

• We will need changes in how we organize, th

increased teaming. The Air Force tried a Total Q

Management (TQM) approach in the Air Co

Command, and took the sortie rates of poor team

brought them up dramatically.

• We will have to train differently, using thing

collaborative, computer-based training, video telec

encing, and distributed learning. We will train soldi

their task, to the language required, to the cultures the

need to know.

• We will equip soldiers in new ways, issuing techn

to the lowest echelons. We are just starting this pr

Every cadet at the Air Force Academy now receives a la

137
whereas they used to be given a slide rule or calculat

the future we will give everyone Palm Pilots or s

technology, so that soldiers and airmen will become fam

with the technology from the very beginning.

• How we operate will be changed. We will need to 

to a more relaxed structure, a so-called “skip echelon” w

the boss does not mind going around the sy

Communications will take on special value, and w

have to emphasize individual accountability a

back-to-basics approach.

• Finally, we will have to alter how we mainta

forces. We are already going to more modular designs 

can incorporate commercial, off-the-shelf technol

Eventually we will supplement most high-cost upgra

equipment with low-cost throwaway equipment.

Let me conclude with three ideas. The threat of IW 

but distorted. We are usually focused on the system

the medium, and we are not paying enough attention 

content. Alternative tools and models do exist outside 

military, and they need to be considered more fully

finally, the potential exists for decreased, instead of 

efficient, violence.

Discussion.

The panelists were asked to comment on two ideas. 

it was suggested that the concept of “chaorder,” a mixt

chaos and order, is reflected in the blurring of distin

among war, crime, terrorism, social protest, black ma

etc. This creates new policy dilemmas, yet the militar

seems to be training for the old paradigm. Second, 

offered that the military operates only where direct

civilian authorities, yet those authorities are more and 

removed from the reality of the military. The militar

have to take a more active role in informing the ci

authorities just what it is capable of doing.

138
Training for the Old Paradigm.

Colonel Warsocki: Training is indeed critical

Command and General Staff College at Fort Leaven

wants to talk about IO, but the reality is that this is not 

we train people to do. Now what they are getting is 

information with some kinetic energy—training peo

be police and handle situations first before resort

violence. The good news is that the new generat

leaders has been in Bosnia and learned how to deal wi

locals and the media. They are learning from the sch

hard knocks rather than formal training. The lea

curve was steep in Bosnia, and the learning wa

institutionalized, but for better or worse we are learni

hard way. This may not be happening doctrinally a

Joint Readiness Training Center, and the schools ar

not ready to teach it, but everyone is learning it.

Colonel Ayala: In the Air Force we are training f

future, but not enough. At the Air Command and 

College and the Air War College, information has 

taught as an instrument of power at least since the t

the Gulf War. So many officers are learning abo

although a lot of officers do not have the opportunity 

through these schools. Many on the enlisted side are g

it in their leadership schools. However, it is still n

enough. I would add that as the Air Force is standing u

Expeditionary Air Force with all its new package

coordination issues, the process has caused a good 

confusion, but I think we are moving in the right direct

Civilian Control of the Military.

Colonel Ayala: I think the civilian population m

getting out of touch, perhaps because people do not 

any more and we no longer have a draft. At the same 

we are an all-volunteer force, and what we 

instantaneously on TV. It is one thing to see it on T

another to serve. What could be done? We need to b

that gap somehow, maybe through the reinstitution 

139
draft or some kind of national service. What is import

that citizens be familiar with the forces that guard ou

of life. Second, politicians do have to point us in the 

direction, but the situation now is such that eve

regular airman or soldier is the contact point wher

military interacts with the media and the public. C

voice recordings are used to get a message across abo

honesty and truthfulness in admitting mistakes, and o

are sharing in that pilot’s hectic experience but judg

publicly after the fact. You cannot time it or manage i

not going to be as orchestrated as a press conference 

commander.

Colonel Warsocki: The fight is on today, and the m

has to get engaged early. There are questions 

overreaching the bounds of military structure, but we 

whether we like it or not. Now how do we fix this? 

policy-makers need to be intellectually honest. Tak

example of the Kosovo Liberation Army and how p

makers like Secretary of State Madeleine Albrigh

then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holb

became emotionally involved with the Kosovar Alba

There was a degree of disingenuousness abou

Albanians being our “friends.” The Albanians wante

world’s best air force to support them, so they engage

campaign that was orchestrated to bring the United S

into the fight. Factual intelligence on the ground ma

difference to the policy-makers. Intellectual honesty 

take over from emotional language.

Dr. Metz: The military realizes it needs speed, not j

mobility but in operations, before the enemy gets ther

problem is that we are moving toward a fast military b

still have a slow-moving political system. It is a good 

that politics takes a long time, because we need consen

a democracy. However, wargames we have conduct

Carlisle (at the Army War College) reveal the real te

between a quick military and the slower executive b

decisionmaking process. We are going to continue to 

tension between these speeds.

140
Colonel Warsocki: An example of that tension occ

when the Army crossed the Sava River into Bosnia

Army got calls from the National Security Council on 

asking what we could do about the situation in Sar

The answers went up and down the chain, but it ultim

came down to what was politically acceptable 

physically doable. We settled for taking the airfield

determining factor was what politics would accept, r

than what was needed, and this put soldiers’ lives at 

141
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Mr. Thomas E. Copeland

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler