CONFERENCE REPORT

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:

LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Ms. Maria Alongi

Rapporteur

October 18, 1996
ii

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Founded in 1987 by Catherine McArdle Kelleher, now with the

Department of Defense, WIIS offers a comprehensive set of

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private enterprise, academia, and the mass media. Ongoing seminar

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(pronounced "wise") computerized databank includes over 4000

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development and substantive information, including directories on

fellowships and internships, and an anthology of case studies on

ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

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iii

PREFACE

On October 23-25, 1995, coinciding with the Bosnia peace

talks being held in Dayton, Ohio, Women in International Security

(WIIS), an international, nonpartisan educational program; The

Friedrich-Eberet Foundation; the U.S. Institute of Peace; and the

Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a

conference, "Ethnic Conflict and European Security: Lessons from

the Past and Implications for the Future." Among the participants

and attendees were scholars and policymakers from the United

States and Europe concerned with the crisis in the Balkans and

the larger ramifications of ethnic conflict for European

security.

This rapporteur’s summary, compiled by Ms. Maria Alongi,

captures the primary themes of the conference to include linkages

between ethnicity and instability in Europe, the role European

and transatlantic security institutions can play in mitigating

those tensions, and the various positive roles Russia and the

United States can play in resolving or lessening the impact of

ethnic conflict. Ms. Alongi concludes that the nature of the

threat posed by ethnic conflict to European security is bound

inexorably to a political manipulation; an ethnicization of

politics. And while the Balkan crisis held the potential for

catapulting Europe back to July 1914, the way the international

community reacted to head off a further deterioration in the

situation provides some basis for optimism.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present this

overview of the conference. The opinions summarized in the

following pages are those of the participants and do not

represent official positions of the U.S. Government, the

Department of Defense, or the U.S. Army.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

ABOUT THE RAPPORTEUR

MARIA ALONGI currently is Special Assistant to the Defense

Advisor at the U.S. Mission to NATO. She served as rapporteur and

consultant to Women in International Security (WIIS) for this

project prior to assuming her current position.
1

ETHNIC CONFLICT AND EUROPEAN SECURITY:

LESSONS FROM THE PAST AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Introduction.

With the outbreak and intensification of a number of

ethnically defined conflicts on the European continent since the

fall of communism, a conventional wisdom has formed that makes

ethnic tensions and instability in Europe almost synonymous. This

prevailing notion of an ethnic threat to European stability also

has affected the debate on European and transatlantic security

institutions. Indeed, the capacity to prevent and respond to

ethnic conflict has been a major consideration in the process of

institutional development undertaken by several key political and

security organizations, including the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and the

Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As

further proof of the centrality of ethnic questions in European

security, the effectiveness and continued relevance of these

organizations has often been linked to their responsiveness, or

lack thereof, to the most prominent ethnic conflict in Europe:

the Balkan crisis.1

Is this linkage between ethnicity and instability in Europe

in fact correct? And, does our evaluation of the European

security processes and organizations reflect their actual and

potential capacity to manage the problem? In order to evaluate

the impact of ethnicity on the tensions and conflicts affecting

European security and the role of security organizations in

mitigating that impact, Women In International Security, the

Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace,

and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College

convened a conference in Washington, DC, on October 24-25, 1995,

entitled "Ethnic Conflict and European Security: Lessons from the

Past and Implications for the Future." The two-day discussion,

which analyzed the sources of ethnic tensions in Europe as well

as the institutional developments in the European security

framework, yielded four principal conclusions:

• First, greater precision is required when discussing

ethnic conflict in the context of European security. The ethnic

problem in Europe is multifaceted: stemming from different

causes, involving a variety of issues, and thus requiring

different approaches. In addition, although ethnic tensions are a

prominent feature of the European security landscape, not all

present a threat to security and stability. In sum, not all

ethnic problems should be equated with ethnic conflict.

• The threat to security and stability in Europe arises not
2

from the presence of ethnic tensions in regional relationships,

but from the exploitation and manipulation of these tensions for

political ends--a process that can be termed the "ethnicization

of politics."

• The international community has not yet developed

appropriate mechanisms to respond to challenges of an ethnic

nature. Although certain effective tools to manage the

centrifugal forces that ethnic tensions have produced already

exist, prior to the implementation of the Dayton accords,

responses have been halting, ad hoc, and inconsistent. In

addition, in certain cases, international responses to ethnic

conflict have actually aggravated the problem.

• The inconsistent approach of the international community

to ethnic demands and grievances reflects to a large extent the

inadequacy of existing norms for international behavior in the

post-Cold War era. Indeed, there is an inherent dichotomy in the

current international approach to ethnic questions, which is

based on the potentially contradictory norms of the inviolability

of borders, ethnic and minority rights, and the right to selfdetermination. It is incumbent upon the international community

to reevaluate how these norms are to be applied in response to

ethnic questions.

Ethnicity and Security: Linkages and Tensions.

The optimism fueled by the end of the Cold War and rejection

of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet

Union was quickly muted by the emergence of tensions and

conflicts in the former communist states. As analysts struggled

to define the forces that would shape international relations and

affect security in Europe, nationalism linked to ethnic identity

emerged in the literature as a key defining factor.2

 Yet, as many

of these analysts also highlight, the relationship between

increased ethnic consciousness and instability is not clear-cut.3

Indeed, the relationship among ethnicity, nationalism, and

conflict generates vastly different analyses. While some experts

believe heightened ethnic consciousness fosters nationalism,

which in turn can lead to secessionist movements and conflict,

others assert that state failure itself will spur people to seek

different means to organize themselves, fomenting nationalism and

possibly national conflict.4

Recent experience in Europe also suggests that ethnic

questions are only one component of a number of factors and

dynamics that result in conflict between and within states.

Although the conflicts in the Balkans, Nagorno-Karabakh, and

Chechnya indicate that ethnicity plays a distinct role in the

breakdown of security, there are also a number of cases on the
3

European continent in which ethnic tensions between and within

states have been managed so far without resort to violence.

Poland, for example, has not reacted in a confrontational manner

to laws limiting the rights of Polish minorities living in

Lithuania and Belarus. The identification of the Russian

population in Crimea with Russia has also not led to

confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, despite the sometimes

elevated tension between the two countries. And, despite the 1990

clashes between Hungarians and Romanians in Romania, the two

governments also avoided confrontation over the status of the 2

million ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Indeed, Romania adopted a

series of measures designed to ensure some limited rights for the

Hungarian population within its borders.

The above cases also highlight the complexity of the ethnic

problem in Europe. Under the heading of "ethnicity" in Europe are

often subsumed questions relating to a state’s treatment of

minority populations of different nationality within its borders,

a state’s relations and aspirations towards its own minorities

living outside the borders, relations between different ethnic

groups that share national borders, and even, as demonstrated by

the identification of the Balkan war as an ethnic conflict,

relations among groups of similar ethnicity but with different

religious and cultural traits. As a result, as conference

participant Heather Hurlburt suggested, the conventional wisdom

surrounding the question of ethnicity in Europe suffers from

paradoxical and sometimes clearly contradictory notions. Ethnic

conflict is ascribed as often to historical regional enmities as

to systemic changes resulting from the end of authoritarian

regimes. It is thus described alternatively as an "old" and "new"

problem. Another paradox involves the international community’s

treatment of the problem, which so far has focused on the

recognition and preservation of the collective rights of a

minority group. Although designed to stabilize interethnic

relations, this approach, in the opinion of several conference

participants, may generate an adverse effect. First, it singles

out and therefore elevates ethnicity among the many factors--

linguistic, cultural, and religious--that make up the identity of

a population. Second, the emphasis of the international community

on minority rights may encourage groups who feel disenfranchised

to organize along ethnic lines so as to attract the attention and

assistance of the international community in pursuing their

goals. In developing appropriate responses to the ethnic problem

in Europe, it is therefore necessary to reexamine widely-held

beliefs about ethnicity and conflict in Europe and distinguish

the issues concerning ethnicity in the European security context.

Ethnic Issues in the European Security Context.

Conference participants identified three distinct issues and
4

problem areas in ethnic relations in Europe:

• power struggles among substate groups that identify

themselves along ethnic lines as a result of the collapse of

state authorities, exemplified by the Balkans;

• the potential that the status of an ethnic minority within

a state might provoke irredentist claims by another state, a

situation that might arise in regions of Central and Eastern

Europe and the Baltics; and,

• tensions that occur within a state as a result of the

state’s resistance to demands by minority or other groups for

special ethnopolitical status, examples of which abound on the

territory of the Russian Federation.

Conference participants debunked the idea, prevalent in the

public debate, that enduring ethnic differences fomented the

conflict in the Balkans. Indeed, as several experts highlighted,

the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia, was

ethnically mixed, with at least one seventh of the population of

mixed heritage. The conflict in the Balkans can be best

understood instead as stemming from the deterioration of existing

state power structures brought about by the discreditation of

communism. In her book, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution

After the Cold War, Susan Woodward takes the analysis of systemic

change even further, and argues that the deterioration of the

power structures in Yugoslavia predates even the end of

communism, and has deeper roots in the transformation of the

global economy that burdened the Yugoslavian state with a debt

crisis that undermined its authority. In Woodward’s opinion, the

subsequent change in the international order brought about by the

demise of the Soviet Union magnified a state crisis already in

progress.5 Conference participant Mjusa Sever, of the Slovenian

Libra Institute, also argued that the source of the crisis in

the Balkans lies in the decline of communism. In Sever’s opinion,

elites in Yugoslavia, confronting a challenge to their power

base, sought to create new support for themselves by rallying

people around the nationalist cause,6

 thus radicalizing the

political debate.

Effective manipulation of information contributed to making

ethnic differentiation and nationalism an integral part of the

post-communist politics in the former Yugoslavia. Panelist Ana

Husarska, a journalist who has covered the conflict in the former

Yugoslavia, found that public perceptions among Bosnian Serbs

were strongly influenced by nationalist propaganda, as well as

the efforts of Bosnian Serb authorities to limit the people’s

exposure to a variety of views on the developing crisis.7

Finally, the initial response of the international community to

the changes sweeping Eastern Europe in the aftermath of communism
5

may have affected the splintering and radicalization of politics

in the former Yugoslavia. Several speakers made the point that

the recognition by the West of claims of independence by the

Baltic countries encouraged those in the former Yugoslavia who

sought independence as a means of extracting themselves from a

system that did not work and, in some cases, from human rights

abuses. Mjusa Sever further argues that when the international

community at the outbreak of the crisis in the Balkans pressed

for maintaining the integrity of Yugoslavia, it dealt a setback

for moderate reformists, for it lent legitimacy to existing power

elites.

A second expression of the ethnic problem in Europe is the

presence of large minority populations within established states-

-a situation that occurs in Central and Eastern Europe and in the

Baltics. Here, a number of ethnically distinct groups reside

outside national borders, such as Hungarians in Romania,

Slovakia, and Vojvodina; Turks in Bulgaria; and Russians in

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Baltics. In addition, several

Central and East European countries have sizable populations of

the stateless Roma (gypsies). The demands of these minorities for

special status, and the treatment of these groups by the state,

constitute potential flashpoints for the degradation of interstate or intra-state relations. Indeed, several post-communist

governments in Central and Eastern Europe articulated claims

towards national minorities residing outside state borders,

raising fears that this expression of "ethnic nationalism" would

turn into irredentism and foment instability. Former Prime

Minister Antall of Hungary, for example, repeatedly stated that

he was president of the five million Hungarians residing outside

state borders, and, despite Hungary’s adoption of the OSCE (then

known as CSCE) pledge that borders cannot be changed by force,

the government repeatedly refused to explicitely recognize the

borders of neighboring states.8

Despite this situation, conference participants concurred

that the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europe

is greatly diminished by the yearning of the Central and East

European countries to become integrated into the Western

community of nations, symbolized by membership in the European

Union and NATO. Indeed, minority rights questions in the region

have been handled largely through negotiation and agreement. In

1993, Hungary and Ukraine ratified a 1991 treaty on friendship

and cooperation, which rejects territorial demands by either

party against the other and includes provisions for the treatment

of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. In addition, dialogue is

underway between Hungary and Slovakia, and Hungary and Romania--

belying earlier expectations of a potential escalation of

tensions.

Conference speaker Charles Gati argued that threat
6

perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe provide a powerful push

toward integration in Western security structures. Relative

economic deprivation--following the high expectations generated

by the end of communism-- have indeed created a backlash against

minority populations, which are often scapegoated for economic or

societal failures. Yet, a more potent dynamic in these countries

is created by the perception of a longer-term threat to their

territorial integrity by Russia. Gati pointed out the widely-held

belief in Central and Eastern Europe that a downcast Russia will

eventually seek to regain lost status through territorial

aggression. Thus, countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the

Baltic states actively seek entry into NATO as a hedge against

future insecurity. In the opinion of Gati, this aspiration has

contributed to keeping ethnic tensions in check, as regional

tensions have come to be perceived as incompatible with "entry

into the club."

Likewise, Ukrainian-Russian relations on the question of

minorities have remained stable, despite the 1994 efforts by

Crimean regional president Yuri Meshkov to hold a referendum on

whether Crimea should become an independent state "in union" with

members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and his

pronouncements about potential reunification with Russia.

Conference participant Elizabeth Pond argued this expression of

Crimean nationalism owes more to the aspirations of the Russian

population in Ukraine for economic well-being than to a desire to

rejoin Russia. As Pond pointed out, Russians in Ukraine largely

supported the 1991 vote on Ukrainian independence, primarily in

the expectation that the Ukranian economy would undergo reform

and grow faster than Russia’s. As the Ukranian economy languished

and these expectations were proven wrong, desire for change was

channelled into expressions of nationalism. According to Pond,

nationalism in Crimea is not likely to receive great support from

Russia, which has not demonstrated a great deal of solidarity

towards Meshkov, or the remainder of the Russian population in

Ukraine; yet this situation could change if the economy in

Ukraine deteriorates further. A hopeful sign is the movement

among certain Russian intellectuals in Ukraine to develop a

"western-oriented Slav identity" for Ukraine, which envisions

greater political and economic ties with Western Europe, even if

short of joining Western institutions such as the European Union

and NATO.

Thus, a consensus emerged at the conference that, as long as

irredentism is perceived as hindering economic development, in

the form of closer relations with the more stable and prosperous

part of Europe or regional cooperation for example between Russia

and Ukraine, tendencies toward excessive nationalism will be

moderated. In this context, efforts by security institutions to

develop standards for cooperation on political and security

issues among countries in the region--such as the emphasis on
7

"good neighborly relations" by the OSCE and NATO’s Partnership

for Peace (PfP) program--can provide additional moderating

influences.

A different dynamic is at work in Estonia, where a series of

factors contribute to making the status of the large Russian

minority a source of tension between this country and Russia.

First, the Russian population in Estonia constitutes a majority

in certain regions of the country--up to 82 percent in county

Ida-Virumaa, for example--and furthermore it has retained a

distinct Russian identity, as 62 percent of these people were

born outside of Estonia.9 Second, Estonia has articulated a very

restrictive definition of citizenship that excludes a great

number of its ethnically Russian residents. Third, Russian policy

towards its diaspora contributes to strengthening the ties of the

Russian population in Estonia to Moscow and therefore discourages

whatever integration could be initiated by those willing to do

so. As a result, avoiding the intensification of the ethnic

question in Estonia will owe as much to Estonian actions and

policy toward the Russian minority as to the treatment of the

issue of Russian minorities abroad in Russia.

Indeed, a key factor affecting relations between the ethnic

minority and the rest of the population in a state is, according

to panelist Leila Alyeva, the identification of the minority

group with the interests of the state in which it resides,

regardless of the ethnicity of the majority population. Alyeva

cited the case of Azerbaijan, where ethnic Russians have formed

political groupings that have supported the policies of the state

even when these did not coincide with those of Russia. Loyalty to

the state by minorities, cultivated in turn by policies of

integration on the part of the state, have contributed to

diminishing the potential for ethnic rivalry in Azerbaijan, in

the opinion of the speaker.

Loyalty by the minority to the state in which it resides is

also, however, affected by the policies of the state from which

the minority originates. Klara Hallik pointed out in her

presentation that Russia is engaging in an activist policy

towards its minorities abroad, and particularly in Estonia, which

discourages integration by ethnic Russians. She further argued

that influencing Russians abroad has become part of Russian

foreign policy. By this line of action, Russia hopes to

accomplish these goals: maintain some level of control over a

former territory, and allow the minority to retain a link to the

mother country short of repatriation, which would weigh heavily

on Russia’s currently strained resources.

Analyst Tatiana Shakleina suggested that Russia’s position

on ethnic issues is still taking shape and will largely depend on

the evolution of the country’s foreign policy, a question that is
8

in turn tied to the development of Russian politics. Shakleina

describes different positions by groups on the Russian political

spectrum that vary from isolationism, to support for Western

orientation by Russia, to an activist foreign policy that is

primarily oriented toward Russia’s eastern and south-eastern

borders. According to this perspective, which group prevails in

the coming elections, and which view of Russia’s place in the

world prevails, will affect the treatment of the ethnic

question.10

A third aspect of the ethnic problem in Europe is the status

of the Russian population within non-Russian regions of the

Russian Federation. Leokadia Drobizheva cites a study that counts

150 intergroup conflicts on the territory of the fomer Soviet

Union, of which 30 involved open confrontation, with the Chechen

crisis perhaps the most virulent.11 Yet, Drobizheva and several

other conference participants cautioned against viewing the

problem of nationalities in the Russian Federation as a harbinger

of widespread ethnic conflict. Although the Russian government

today confronts a number of challenges from non-Russian peoples

who seek different levels of autonomy, not all such demands will

result in conflicts of the magnitude of the Chechen crisis.

Indeed, as Marjorie Balzer pointed out, the Russian central

government has engaged in negotiations and concluded treaties

with several regional governments seeking greater autonomy, such

as Tatarstan and the Sakha Republic.

Ethnic issues in the Russian Federation are best understood

in the context of adaptation by the people that formed the Soviet

Union to the realities of a new political system that is still

taking form. One aspect of this political transformation that has

contributed to the ethnic problem in the Russian Federation is

the dissonance between the old, Soviet constitutional approach to

ethnic matters and that of the new Russian state. While the

Constitution of the Soviet Union included the right to selfdetermination, the Constitution of the Russian Federation does

not contain the right to secession, and the state has actively

inhibited the realization of self-determination.12 Yet, this very

different legal approach to minority questions also reflects the

altered ethnopolitical map of the Russian Federation. In the old

Soviet state, about 49 percent of the population was made up of

non-Russians holding different ethnopolitical status, with some

residing in union republics, others in autonomous republics, and

yet others in national administrative units, such as okrugs and

oblasts.13 Today, 18 percent of the total population is ethnically

non-Russian, although it occupies 53 percent of Federation

territory.14

Another aspect of the ethnic question in the Russian

Federation, in the analysis of Marjorie Balzer, is the

development of a new set of relationships between the central
9

Russian government and the regions in the periphery. Balzer

argued that at least two secessionist movements in the Russian

Federation, in Tuva and the Sakha Republic, lost momentum when

their claims to the right secession were articulated by

nationalist parties as part of their constitutions. Balzer

concluded that support for ethnic nationalism in these cases

reflected pride in national identity rather than a real desire

for severing economic and political ties with the Federation. The

resolution of questions surrounding the control of natural

resources and the fiscal responsibility of the regions toward the

central government will also alleviate sources of disagreement

between the center and periphery, and moderate centrifugal

tensions in these regions of the Russian Federation.

The picture in Russia is not all positive, however. Indeed,

the tensions in the Caucasus region provide the greatest

potential for the spread of ethnic conflict in Europe. The

inability of the Russian government to negotiate a resolution to

the Chechen crisis may, in the opinion of several conference

participants, highlight the weakness of the Yeltsin government

and spur other latent conflicts to reignite. In addition, the

failure to put down the rebellion quickly, and the resulting loss

of life, both Russian and Caucasian, have the potential for

creating political instability within the Federation. The

conflict, which has received extensive media coverage, has

highlighted for many the willingness of the Russian government to

use force against its own citizens, diminishing backing for the

Yeltsin government by democratic forces. The result,

unexpectedly, may be the marginalization of democratic elements

in Russian politics, as Yeltsin seeks other sources of political

support.

The Nature of the Problem: The Ethnicization of Politics.

Although the expression of the ethnic problem in Europe is

multifaceted, and its causes are diverse, it is possible to

distinguish several common factors that determine whether tense

ethnic relations will turn into a conflictual situation. The

range of ethnic issues in Europe and the limited examples of

armed confrontation that have resulted indicate that the simple

existence of ethnic grievances and nationalist claims does not,

in itself, produce conflict. The cases in which conflict has

erupted violently, in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, share a

mixture of ethnic grievances, highly unstable political systems,

and underdeveloped democratic institutions. In each case, the

exploitation of ethnic grievances by political leaders for

political ends--a process that can be termed the "ethnicization"

of politics--contributed to a highly-charged domestic environment

in which immature democratic processes and institutions could not

manage to adjudicate competing demands fairly. In each case as
10

well, mistargeted international intervention aggravated the

situation.

In the former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya, cultural and

ethnic divides formed along preexisting economic and political

cleavages. In the former Yugoslavia, the decentralized system of

economic and political power developed during the Tito years had

led to deep economic differences among the constituent republics.

As Susan Woodward argues, these economic and social differences

were largely at the individual, rather than national, level and

reflected the public-private sector divide in the economy rather

than ethnic identity. Yet, as a result of the economic

displacement created by the introduction of market reforms and

the coincidental economic crisis of the 1970s, internal migration

in search of employment or higher education resulted in living

patterns in which socio-economic status coincided with culturalethnic identity.15 Thus, perceptions of relative deprivation

became regional, as different groups were thought to be

relatively better off than others, and increasingly ethnic in

nature.

Economic powerlessness and perceptions of other groups’

behavior play powerfully in the intensification of relations

between Russia and the Caucasus, as well. The rapid deterioration

of the standard of living in the former Soviet Union that

accompanied political change and economic reform coincided with

the emergence of a black market economy widely perceived to be

controlled by Caucasian elements. The association of

criminalization with ethnicity in Russia led to a deterioration

in ethnic relations, exemplified by the campaign of expulsions of

citizens of Caucasian appearance from Moscow and other Russian

cities beginning in 1993.

Elite exploitation of these sentiments, coupled with

immature democratic processes, also contributes to the

deterioration of intra-state and inter-state ethnic relations.

Woodward argues that in the former Yugoslavia, primarily in

republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia, nationalism was

promoted by the inability of citizens to organize along political

lines. The process of political and economic decentralization was

not accompanied by political liberalization. Thus, unable to

organize along party lines that competed with the preeminence of

the communist party, people drifted toward nationalist

organizations. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, in turn,

tapped into the emerging nationalism to press for their political

cause. Mjusa Sever also places responsibility for the escalation

of ethnic tensions on political elites, arguing that many

proponents of ethnic nationalism in the former Yugoslavia were

former communist party leaders who seized upon a different

ideology in an attempt to find new bases of support.
11

As in the Balkans, the manipulation by elites of ethnic

tensions fed into the management of the conflict between the

Russian government and the break-away Chechens. As conference

participant Leokadia Drobizheva remarked, depiction in the media

of Caucasian involvement in criminal activity in Russia coincided

with developments in the Chechnya crisis, so that during periods

of negotiation between the Russian government and the Chechen

rebels, the number of Caucasians reportedly involved in crime

fell dramatically.

Another common thread in the intensification of ethnic

conflicts is the reaction of the international community.

International responses to conflicts of an ethnic nature have

largely been shaped by competing norms: the inviolability of

borders, a central aspect of the normative construct for European

security enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, and support for the

rights of minority groups, represented in Europe by the

establishment of an OSCE High Commissioner for National

Minorities. In the opinion of several conference participants,

the early attempts by the international community to shape its

responses to ethnic conflicts in Europe--primarily in the

Balkans--on the basis of respect of these norms complicated the

resolution of the crisis. Several conference participants, for

example, argued that the early efforts of the international

community to prevent the recognition of the claims of

independence of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia, while

also supporting claims of self-determination by particular

groups, facilitated an outcome in which self-determination was

perceived as possible only by force.

Conference panelist Paul Goble argued further that

institutionalizing international support for claims of minority

groups--through the creation of the office of the OSCE High

Commissioner for National Minorities--fosters demands for selfdetermination by aggrieved groups when other mechanisms for

addressing valid grievances by national groups on bases other

than ethnicity do not exist or are not given equal visibility.

Goble reflected that claims of an essentially economic nature

could find expression in ethnic demands if greater efforts are

not made to elevate the profile of other international

organizations that address grievances that cut across ethnic

lines.

The international community may also unwittingly aggravate a

crisis by engaging discredited leaders in diplomatic initiatives.

Mijusa Sever argued that the West failed in its response to the

Balkans because it communi- cated with the representatives of the

old regime, rather than the emerging democratic forces. The West

was not prepared to deal with a country undergoing a systemic

change. It sought to keep the country together, in keeping with

its policy of maintaining existing borders intact, and continued
12

to interact with state authorities, which were no longer

legitimate. In so doing, it imbued them with legitimacy and

bolstered their position.

Finally, panelist Warren Zimmerman argued that the

international community bears responsibility for the

intensification of the Balkan conflict for having refused to

intervene militarily at the early stages of the crisis. Zimmerman

argued that the inaction of outside powers in response to

military attacks on civilian targets emboldened the aggressors

and allowed the escalation of violence. This, in turn, further

impeded an international response by raising the risk inherent in

intervening in a more violent conflict.

The Role of International Security Institutions and Processes.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, European and

transatlantic organizations and mechanisms have undertaken a

process of adaptation to the new conditions on the European

continent that has produced a host of new acronyms--such as OSCE,

Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), and PfP. This process of

adaptation has sought to reflect the changing nature of the

challenges to European security from the Cold War bipolar

confrontation to the emergence of regional tensions and the

challenges inherent in the political and economic transformation

of entires societies.

Since 1991, NATO has undertaken a transformation designed to

increase its capacity to respond to contingencies other than

collective defense. At a ministerial meeting held in Oslo in

1992, NATO stated its intent to support the United Nations and

OSCE in peacekeeping with its military capabilities. The

significance of this statement was great for the Alliance, for it

was the first indication of its will to move beyond the function

of defense of member states to undertaking operations of a

regional nature--so-called non-Article V contingencies. Since

then, the Alliance has been engaged in a process of adaptation to

be able to respond to the new challenges of the European security

environ- ment. The process of adaptation is two-fold, and is in

response both to the desire for entry into the Alliance by new

members and to the demand that it be able to respond effectively

to regional contingencies that fall short of collective defense

but that affect security perceptions in Europe--such as the

Balkan conflict. NATO is thus currently engaged in a study

designed to suggest changes to its military and political

structures to take in new members and integrate militarily those

that have not been integrated, and to take on new tasks of a nonArticle V nature.

If the experience of post-World War II Europe is an
13

indication, NATO enlargement is promising for European security

because it could work to increase security cooperation among

neighbors. Of course, an important caveat for European security

is to simultaneously increase cooperation with those states which

will not become members, so as not to create security vacuums. In

this context, the PfP initiative is an important development both

to prepare potential new members for entry and to avoid security

vacuums. Preparation for membership is done by including Partners

in Alliance processes of consultation, through meetings in

expanded Partner format, and transparency, through the process of

sharing information on defense plans. NATO has indeed

institutionalized transparency in defense matters among its

members during the past 40 years through the routine exchange of

information regarding defense capabilities and plans. Partners

are now sharing similar information with each other and with the

alliance through the Planning and Review Process (PARP).

PfP also can work to avoid the perception of insecurity by

those who will not become members because it was established and

is viewed by NATO as a continuing program even after NATO

enlargement is concluded. PfP was set up by NATO to offer a

permanent relationship with the Alliance short of membership. PfP

could then be viewed as a means for crisis prevention. By

increasing transparency and opportunity for consultation, it can

diminish the potential for crisis and escalation of tensions.

PfP can also contribute to a potentially key factor to

avoiding ethnic conflict: democratization--even if in a limited

way. By signing on to PfP, partners commit to establishing

civilian and democratic control of the military and defense

establishment. NATO as an institution, and NATO members

individually, have undertaken a series of exchanges with partners

on the wide range of procedures and traditions among established

societies that contribute to embedding defense planning and the

military within democratic structures. This could be an important

factor in stabilizing areas of ethnic and nationalist tensions,

where there exists the potential for the politicization of the

military.

NATO’s involvement in Bosnia constitutes so far the most

successful case of crisis management in Europe. NATO organized

and forms the core of the Implementation Force (IFOR) that is

implementing the provisions of the Dayton peace settlement among

the parties in the Balkan conflict: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,

and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Although the IFOR mission

is so far the test case for conflict resolution in Europe, its

impact on the wider European security framework awaits completion

of the mission.

The OSCE has also undergone a great deal of change to adapt

to post-Cold War European security challenges. In 1992 the then-
14

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began its

evolution by establishing the office of CSCE Secretary General

and a permanent secretariat. These steps gave permanence to an

organization that had been influential in European security since

the early 1975, but that had been originally structured as a

"loose consultative process."16 In 1992, as well, the then-CSCE

added an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

(ODIHR), which had earlier begun as the Office of Free Elections,

set up in 1990 primarily to monitor polls in the emerging

European democracies. As discussed above, the OSCE has also

instituted a High Commissioner for National Minorities charged

with monitoring minority issues and troubleshooting in cases in

which ethnic tensions have flared up. Perhaps the most directly

relevant developments to prevention of ethnic conflict to emerge

from the OSCE evolution are the establishment of Conflict

Prevention Center (CPC) and the FSC. Among the CPC’s main tasks

is the monitoring of crises and the mediation of disputes, while

the FSC is charged with facilitating confidence-building and

military transparency among OSCE member states.

As many analysts have remarked before, the organization has

some inherent limitations in its all-inclusive membership and

cumbersome decision-making procedures, which make consensus

difficult to achieve. Yet, the organization has taken up tasks,

such as monitoring missions in areas of instability and regional

discussions on arms control and stabilizing measures that are

promising for crisis prevention. A test case for the

effectiveness of both these commitments is in the Balkans. OSCE

monitors have been deployed in Kosovo, and the OSCE serves as the

umbrella forum under which the disarmament and arms control

provisions included in the settlement agreement between the

parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Dayton

Accords, are being negotiated.

The adaptation of a nonsecurity European institution, the

EU, is equally significant to future European security. If the

prospect of becoming part of the prosperous part of Europe has

acted as a moderating force in tense regional relationships, the

organization has a great potential for improving stability on the

continent. Yet, as Catherine Kelleher, Jane Sharp, and Lawrence

Freedman remark, the capacity of the EU to continue to influence

security affairs is limited by its ability to take on new members

in a timely manner. If it proves incapable of doing so, its

credibility with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will

be damaged, and its moderating influence will disappear.17

Conclusion.

Close examination of the nature of the ethnic threat to

European security reveals the importance not simply of the ethnic
15

aspect of a crisis, but of the susceptibility of the crisis to

political manipulation--the ethnicization of politics. In the

most severe cases of ethnic conflict in Europe to date--the

Balkan crisis and Chechnya--the breakdown of political authority

and profound systemic change facilitated the exploitation by

political leaders of preexisting ethnic tensions, exacerbated by

political and economic cleavages, and elevated the crisis to

conflict. The Balkan crisis in particular suggests that the

nature of the response of the international community can have a

significant impact on development of the crisis. It also

highlights the importance of developing appropriate tools to

prevent or manage of the crisis.

The development of European security institutions so far

suggests that a great deal of progress has been made in

establishing mechanisms for conflict prevention, while crisis

management and resolution tools are less developed. A largely

untapped potential for crisis management rests in establishing

mechanisms for involving grass roots groups and non-elites in

preventive diplomacy. This approach may alleviate the problem,

cited as a key aspect in the denouement of the Balkan crisis, of

imparting undue legitimacy on political leaders who exploit

ethnic tensions by making them the only interlocutors of the

international community.

In addition, normative questions raised by ethnic conflicts,

such as the relative weight of national self-determination in

relation to the commitment to respect borders, and minority

rights vis-à-vis individual rights have not been addressed fully.

In order to establish better tools for institutions, such

questions will have to be resolved to provide guidance for third

parties in formulating policy responses to situations of ethnic

tensions and conflict. An equally important normative exercise

for the international community will be to reexamine assumptions

about the early use of force as a measure for conflict

resolution. Ultimately, as the end-game of the Bosnia conflict

may demonstrate, the influence of the international community in

conflict prevention and management may rest on the credibility of

its commitment to back its words with force.

ENDNOTES

1. Recall, for example, the statement by Senator Richard

Lugar (R-Indiana) that NATO should go "out of area or out of

business," ("NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business," speech to the

Overseas Writers Club, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993).

2. See, for example, Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe’s Wars:

The Continuing Search for Peace and Security, New York: Twentieth

Century Fund Press, 1994, pp. 113-116.
16

3. Jonathan Dean, for example, argues that conflict related

to ethnic minority questions is more likely to arise when a

combination of other factors exists, including the relative

development of democratic institutions, economic well-being, and

the size of the minority population. Ending Europe’s Wars, p.

116.

4. For two competing interpretations of the link among

ethnicity, nationalism, and conflict, see Anthony Smith, "The

Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," Survival, Spring 1993, pp. 48-49,

and Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet

State," Survival, Spring 1993, p.20.

5. Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution

After the Cold War, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,

1995, pp. 15-20.

6. Mjusa Sever, "Ethnicization in Politics: Lessons of the

Balkan Crisis and Implications for Other Potential Conflicts in

the Region," paper presented at the WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army War

College conference on Ethnic Conflict and European Security:

Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future, October

24-25, 1995.

7. Husarska described her first-hand experience with an

informal system of censorship on the part of Serb authorities in

Bosnia, who prevented the access of journalists who did not

depict the Serb cause sympathetically.

8. Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe’s Wars, p. 117.

9. Klara Hallik, "Russians in Estonia: A Minority of

Estonia or Russia?", paper presented at the WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army

War College conference, October 24-25, 1995, p. 1.

10. Tatiana Shakleina, "Russia and Post-Soviet States:

Ethnic Problems and Foreign Policy," paper presented at the WIIS,

USIP, U.S. Army War College conference, October 24-25, 1995.

11. Leokadia Drobizheva, "Ethnic Tensions: Sources and

Perspectives," paper presented at the WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army War

College conference, October 24-25, 1995, p. 10.

12. Drobizheva, p. 3.

13. Ibid., p. 2.

14. Figures cited by Paul Goble, in comments delivered at

the WIIS, USIP, U.S. Army War College conference, October 24-25,

1995.
17

15. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, pp. 42-45.

16. Jonathan Dean, Ending Europe's Wars, p. 204.

17. Catherine M. Kelleher, Lawrence Freedman, and Jane M.O.

Sharp, The Political Context of Conventional Arms Control, Nomos,

forthcoming.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

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Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

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