Defense Science Board Task Force 

on 

Munitions System Reliability 

September 2005 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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II ____________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent 

advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and 

recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the 

Department of Defense. 

This report is UNCLASSIFIED. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary..................................................................................................................... 1 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 7

Legal Issues Regarding Munitions System Reliability ........................................................... 8

Report Organization .................................................................................................................. 12

Chapter 1. Assessing Reliability .............................................................................................. 13

 Munitions System Reliability Factors .............................................................................. 13

 Determining Failure Rates of U.S. Munitions in Conflict ............................................. 16

 Munition Life Cycle Data Sharing.................................................................................... 18

Chapter 2. Technology and Design Issues ............................................................................. 21

 Critical Technology Areas Related to Munitions Reliability ........................................ 22

 Target Sensing ..................................................................................................................... 25

 Electronic, MEMS, and Integrated Fuzing ...................................................................... 29

 Munitions Tagging.............................................................................................................. 34

 Precision Guidance and Munitions Reliability Impacts................................................ 36

 Operational Performance Assessment of Munitions Reliability.................................. 38

Chapter 3. Acquisition, Logistics, and Industrial Base......................................................... 43

 Legacy Munitions................................................................................................................ 44

 Optimizing the Fuze and Battery Industry ..................................................................... 46

Chapter 4. Transforming DoD ERW Abatement Efforts...................................................... 55

Appendix I. Terms of Reference ..............................................................................................I-1

Appendix II. Task Force Membership .................................................................................. II-1

Appendix III. DoD Policy Memo on Submunition Reliability .........................................III-1

Appendix IV. Briefings Received By the Task Force .........................................................IV-1

Appendix V. Acronym Index................................................................................................. V-1
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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Effect Tempo on Munitions Effectiveness Assessment........................................ 16 

Figure 2. Basic Fuze System Functions ................................................................................... 26 

Figure 3. Precision Guidance Input to Fuzing ....................................................................... 28 

Figure 4. Sensor-Based Fuzing: Target-Based Identification and Homing ...................... 29 

Figure 5. Guided Integrated Fuze and MOFA....................................................................... 31 

Figure 6. MEMS Safe and Arm Device for a 20mm Projectile............................................. 32 

Figure 7. Munitions RF tag lifecycle should be expanded to include deployment and 

UXO recovery. ............................................................................................................................ 36 

Figure 8. BLU-97 Munitions in orchard near Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2001..................... 39 

Figure 9. Bomb production drives fuze requirements.......................................................... 47 

Figure 10. Current and future funding for area attack is focused almost exclusively on 

Smart and Precision munitions................................................................................................ 49

Figure 11. Current OSD Structure for Addressing Explosive Remnants of War and 

Related Issues ............................................................................................................................. 57 

Figure 12. Humanitarian Demining ........................................................................................ 58 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Tagging Technologies................................................................................................. 34 

Table 2. Comparison of Commercial and Military Tagging Performance ........................ 35 

Table 3. General RF Tag Capabilities Comparison ............................................................... 35 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Munitions System Reliability met from 

June 2004 to May 2005. The Task Force’s charter focused on three principal areas of 

interest: 

• Conducting a methodologically sound assessment of the failure rates of US 

munitions in actual combat use; 

• Reviewing ongoing efforts to reduce the amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 

resulting from munition failures, and evaluate ways to improve or accelerate 

these efforts; and 

• Identifying other feasible measures the United States can take to reduce the 

threat that failed munitions pose to friendly forces and civilians. 

It was not within the purview of this Task Force to examine weapon requirements, 

but to examine the issue of munition reliability and identify ways to reduce the amount 

of UXO resulting from failed munitions. Reducing the amount of UXO will lower the 

risk of casualties among ground forces and enhance their freedom of maneuver in 

operations following munition use. It will provide greater flexibility for operational 

commanders who now must consider the risks to friendly forces and potential for 

collateral damage associated with a particular munition. It will significantly reduce the 

risks of post-conflict civilian casualties and the challenges that UXO poses to 

stabilization and reconstruction activities, including winning the “hearts and minds” of 

local populations. As US global commitments grow, our global responsibilities to 

ensure safe, reliable and effective expenditure of munitions must continue to grow as 

well. 

Munitions system reliability is a vital area that justifiably requires immediate 

attention and resources. Senator Patrick Leahy, in a June 24, 2003 letter to Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, voiced concerns about the apparent lack 

of progress in reducing US cluster munition failure rates and the impact of munitions 

on the lives of Iraqi civilians during Operation Iraqi Freedom. While acknowledging the 

prohibitive cost of retrofitting the entire stockpile of these munitions, the Senator 

observed that “the cost of removing duds littering Iraq and Afghanistan may not be 

appreciably less than it would have cost to retrofit the number of cluster munitions that 

were used in those conflicts.” 

A key focus of this study was area attack munitions (often referred to as 

submunitions or cluster munitions). Owing to the sheer numbers in which these 

munitions are employed, there is the potential for UXO left on the battlefield to hinder 

the movement of friendly forces, cause unintended casualties among military and 

civilians, and deny civilian use of territory and buildings long after a conflict is finished. 
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Maneuver warfare implies the ability to maneuver unimpeded in time and space to 

control the entire tempo of an operation by exploiting or attacking critical enemy 

vulnerabilities. This inextricable link among UXO, munitions system reliability and 

dominant maneuver must be managed if we are to maximize the potential of joint 

warfare on tomorrow’s battlefield. More precise munitions will help reduce collateral 

damage while improving lethality. Greater precision systems will, however, 

complement area attack munitions rather than replace them for the foreseeable future. 

The Task Force could identify no comprehensive approach—empirical observation 

or otherwise—to determine and document operational combat failure rates of US 

munitions. The available data is inconsistent, largely anecdotal, and often from 

questionable sources. Area attack munitions in particular—designed to produce 

dispersed battlefield effects—can be highly effective in combat but difficult to analyze 

afterward. There is no method in place that can systematically determine and document 

the reliability rates of a broad range of munitions during combat. 

The largest contributors to the UXO problem are legacy munitions, operational 

factors and fuze technologies. There is an enormous stockpile of aging munitions that 

will have to be used “as is,” retrofitted or demilitarized, but the Department of Defense 

(DoD) has no comprehensive approach in place to address these legacy munitions. 

Retrofitting the existing stockpile could easily run into the billions of dollars. 

Retrofitting is not without other challenges as well, namely meeting revised safety 

standards and risking the introduction of new failure points in legacy systems never 

designed for upgrades. The operational question then becomes one of priorities and the 

cost-benefit analysis of retrofitting older munitions at the expense of developing and 

fielding more capable, reliable, safe and effective munitions. 

Improving the functioning rate of area attack munitions is not the only way to 

reduce the amount of UXO and the risk it poses for friendly forces and civilians. 

Incorporating or improving the guidance capabilities of these munitions reduces the 

amount of UXO (because fewer munitions are needed to service a particular target) and 

the area potentially affected by UXO (because the guidance capability reduces the 

radius of error). It is also a less intrusive means of upgrading existing area attack 

munitions than retrofitting. The Army is currently incorporating a guidance system on 

its Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the Air Force is adapting its CBU-87 and CBU97 munitions by adding the Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser. While these efforts 

do not increase the reliability of the systems in question, they provide an immediate 

and practical way to reduce the amount and distribution of UXO resulting from the use 

of these munitions, because incorporating guidance results both in fewer munitions 

used per target and more accurate delivery (i.e., fewer failed munitions and a smaller 

affected area). 

New and emerging technologies offer additional approaches toward improving 

munition reliability and/or lessening the impact of UXO. Fuzes based on integrated 

circuits, Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) and integrated fuzing, targeting 
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and guidance systems can provide greater reliability. The use of radio frequency (RF) 

tags can be expanded beyond logistics tracking to facilitate UXO remediation for new 

systems. 

If there is one theme, however, that characterizes the challenges facing DoD with 

respect to the issue of munition reliability and UXO, it is “lack of focus.” There is no 

comprehensive approach to the issue of legacy munitions. Funding for munitions 

research and development is chronically inadequate, and there is no program in place 

to develop a new generation of area attack munitions that are affordable and highly 

reliable. Current acquisition practices have the unintended effect of squeezing fuze and 

battery manufacturers by relegating them to lower-tier subcontractor status and 

subjecting them to volatile production rates. A fragmented organizational approach 

hinders DoD’s post-conflict efforts to mitigate the impact of UXO. These challenges 

impede DoD’s immediate and long-term ability to reduce the risks that UXO poses to 

friendly forces and civilians. These challenges are not insurmountable, but solving them 

will require a previously unseen focus on the factors that lead to munition failures and 

UXO. At present, no one is positioned to take leadership and overall responsibility for 

fixing this growing and operationally constraining problem. 

The Task Force has researched the status of munitions system reliability efforts and 

considered other measures to reduce the risks posed by UXO. It identified eleven 

primary or “key” recommendations and five secondary recommendations. The primary 

recommendations are outlined below and addressed more extensively in the body of 

this report. Secondary recommendations are included in the relevant chapters. A 

classified annex in CD-ROM format provides additional information supporting the 

conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force. The classified annex is on file at 

the Defense Science Board Secretariat Office. 
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Assessing Reliability 

1. The Services, in coordination with the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation, should expand testing of munitions—to include legacy 

munitions—for the characterization of reliability in a broad range of 

operationally relevant environments that may cause degradation. 

Testing should validate any modeling or simulation. Munitions are 

expected to achieve effects, independent of the diverse employment 

environments (such as terrain, firing and launch conditions, weather 

conditions, etc.). Current testing is often performed in limited 

environments and does not provide comprehensive knowledge about 

how the munition will perform in actual environments. 

2. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop deliberate 

planning information-sharing tools for munitions system reliability 

information exchange. These tools will capture effectiveness data. 

Currently, usable information is either stovepiped or is not catalogued. 

3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should establish a munitions 

expenditure database accessible by all joint components during and 

immediately after combat operations. This database will identify the type, 

quantity, and location of munitions expended. The desired results are 

greater efficiency and effectiveness for ground combat maneuver planning 

and post-conflict clean-up efforts. 

TECHNOLOGY AND DESIGN

4. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) should fund 

new research investments into inexpensive, ultra-reliable fuze 

development based on integrated circuits, Micro-Electro-Mechanical 

Systems technologies, and integrated fuze, guidance and targeting 

systems. The DDR&E should establish pilot science and technology 

programs to achieve safety-certified, integrated fuzing, targeting and 

guidance systems. A reasonable goal would be to have at least two 

certified IC/MEMS-based fuzes available for introduction by 2008. 

5. The DDR&E needs to drive more joint weapons development efforts 

with the associated multi-Service research efforts to achieve a critical 
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mass of scarce development resources. Organizations such as the Defense 

Ordnance Technology Consortium are a good start, but are limited 

because of their voluntary nature; a forcing function and authorities need 

to be put in place. Further weapon acquisition and weapon research 

consolidation is necessary in order to maintain a governmental skill base. 

Joint research targeted at larger joint weapons programs will allow both 

industry and the Services to maintain a workforce capable of developing 

and producing state-of-the-art, highly effective and highly reliable 

munitions. 

6. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics should expand efforts to develop radio frequency tags for 

munitions beyond logistics tracking to facilitate UXO remediation for 

new systems. A DoD goal should be a single common tagging system for 

munitions of all types. DoD should develop a low cost, integrated RF tag. 

Economically, it does not make sense to retrofit all area attack munitions 

currently in storage, since the cost of installing the tags significantly 

exceeds the cost of the tags and outweighs the effective benefits. However, 

tagging existing area attack munition dispensers may be a viable method 

for identifying potential UXO sites.

7. The Services should explore methods to provide operational test and 

combat operations performance feedback to the acquisition community 

and the suppliers. This feedback should be used to optimize production 

methods, ensuring increased reliability through improvements in design 

and production control methods and documentation. 

Acquisition, Logistics and Industrial Base 

8. The Services should support a new, joint family of area attack 

munitions and upgrade a fraction of the current legacy inventory. The 

Services should assess their current operational plans to determine a 

reasonable number of legacy area attack munitions needed to address 

future conflict scenarios and develop a plan to reduce UXO in those 

munitions. This latter step will help ensure that the Services retain a 

needed capability and sustain industrial capability until a more modern 

area attack munition matures.

9. The Services should continue to field munition/dispenser guidance 

accuracy improvements. Improvement in munition guidance will reduce 

both the aggregate quantities of UXO and the areas in which it may be 

located. 
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10. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics should host a fuze and battery industry executive meeting (a 

“Last Brunch”) to discuss future procurement and acquisition policies 

in order to preserve and optimize our national capability. The munitions 

battery and fuze industries are strategic national resources with 

capabilities that need to be preserved. Without OSD initiative, the 

industry runs the risk of downsizing “overshoot.” 

Transforming DoD ERW Abatement Efforts 

11. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should transform all 

functions within his organization related to explosive remnants of war 

abatement efforts into one single office charged with the responsibility 

to execute the DoD program and empowered with the commensurate 

authority. This will achieve unity of command, unity of effort, and 

accountability. Sufficient funding already exists, but the current 

organizational structure prevents effective implementation of DoD ERW 

abatement efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION

This report summarizes the deliberations and conclusions of the Defense Science 

Board Task Force on Munitions System Reliability. The Defense Science Board was 

asked to assess DoD efforts to improve the reliability of its munitions and to identify 

whether there are additional steps DoD could take to further reduce the amount of UXO 

created when these munitions fail to explode. UXO poses a threat to both friendly forces 

and civilians. It can hinder the movement of friendly forces, cause casualties among 

military personnel and civilians alike, and deny use of territory and buildings long after 

a conflict is finished. 

Area attack munitions were a key focus of this study, although the Task Force did 

not limit its review to this class of munitions. Specifically, the Task Force undertook the 

following assignments: 

• Conduct a methodologically sound assessment of the failure rates of US 

munitions in actual combat use. The available data is inconsistent, largely 

anecdotal and often from questionable sources. For area attack munitions, there 

is no system in place to determine reliability rates during combat. DoD tracks 

information on failure rates as determined by lot acceptance and surveillance 

testing, but there are additional factors that can further degrade the performance 

of munitions below the levels revealed by testing. These include the age of the 

munition, conditions under which it was stored, angle and speed of release, 

range, and the terrain on which the munition lands. There are numerous claims 

from sources other than DoD allegedly based on observed failure rates in postconflict environments; however, these are generally based on questionable 

methodologies. Anecdotal evidence does indicate, however, that failed US 

munitions create quantities of UXO. 

• Review ongoing efforts to reduce the amount of UXO resulting from munition 

failures, and evaluate ways to improve or accelerate these efforts. A few 

Service efforts are already underway either directly aimed at reducing failure 

rates or incorporating other improvements to the munition that result in less 

UXO. The Army is retrofitting a limited number of Dual Purpose Improved 

Conventional Munitions with a self-destruct fuze. The Army is also moving to a 

guided version of its Multiple Launch Rocket System, and the Air Force has 

been adding Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) kits to existing area 

attack munitions systems.1 Incorporating guidance systems results in fewer 

munitions used per target and more accurate delivery, which means less UXO 

 

1 The Task Force notes with regret, however, that Program Budget Decision 753 eliminated funding 

for WCMD and WCMD-Extended Range procurement. 
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and a smaller affected area. 

• Identify other feasible measures the United States can take to reduce the 

threat that failed munitions pose to friendly forces and civilians. This last 

assignment was deliberately broad in scope. New and emerging technologies 

offer the opportunity to demand and obtain greater performance from 

munitions as well as ways to reduce the risk of collateral damage, and the Task 

Force considered a number of additional approaches to reduce the risk posed by 

UXO.

The focus of the Task Force was on improving munitions performance and 

mitigating the impacts of UXO. The Task Force did not perform a detailed analysis of 

the military effectiveness of area attack munitions (or any other munition system) and 

did not attempt to determine whether other munitions can achieve the same effects. 

Area attack munitions remain highly effective against a variety of targets, especially 

against dispersed enemy personnel, armor and other vehicles. They can be used to 

counter mortar and artillery fire, to suppress enemy defenses, and to seal breaches and 

gaps in defenses during combat operations. Area attack munitions also serve as a force 

multiplier, enabling a small force to defend itself against a larger force or over a large 

area. Against these types of targets, area attack munitions offer a number of advantages 

in comparison to unitary munitions. They require fewer rounds, which both reduces the 

logistics burden and decreases the tonnage of high explosive needed to attack these 

targets. They also enable more rapid and effective engagement of mobile targets than 

unitary munitions. For US ground forces, area attack munitions require fewer shots and 

permit faster movement. For US pilots, these munitions require fewer sorties, resulting 

in less exposure to enemy air defenses. 

Legal Issues Regarding Munitions System Reliability 

The idea of regulating the means and methods of warfare has existed for centuries, 

whether contained in treaty law, such as the Hague Conventions and the Geneva 

Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, or as customary 

international law. There are four basic principals of the law of armed conflict: 

• Military necessity/military objective; 

• Distinction/discrimination; 

• Proportionality; and 

• Humanity/unnecessary suffering. 
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These four principles must be applied when determining the method of warfare 

that is chosen, such as the tactics used in the conflict, and the means of warfare, such as 

the types of weapons used. 

The first principle, military necessity, allows those measures not forbidden by 

international law that are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the 

enemy as soon as possible. There are two elements to military necessity. First, there 

must be a military requirement to take the action. Second, the law of armed conflict 

must not forbid it. Therefore, even if there is a military necessity for taking an action, 

the target selected must have a military objective. Military objectives are defined as 

“those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 

contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or 

neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military 

advantage.” 

The second principle, the principle of discrimination or distinction, forms the basis 

for many of the Geneva Convention principles of the law of armed conflict. This 

principle provides that attacks should be directed at combatants and military targets, 

not at civilians or civilian property. Weapons used should not be employed in a 

manner that is considered indiscriminate. 

The third principle, the principle of proportionality, recognizes that civilian 

casualties may take place during a conflict. Where an attack is expected to cause loss of 

civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of damage 

and injury, the test is whether this loss or damage would be excessive in relation to the 

military advantage to be gained. This principle is only applicable when such an attack 

has the possibility of affecting civilians. If the target is purely military, with no known 

civilians or civilian property in the area, no proportionality analysis is required. 

The final principle is the principle of unnecessary suffering or humanity. The right 

of combatants to adopt means of injuring the enemy is certainly not unlimited. Under 

the Hague Conventions, it is especially forbidden to employ arms, projectiles or 

material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. Weapons to which this prohibition 

relates fall into two categories. First, certain types of weapons that are calculated to 

cause unnecessary suffering, such as projectiles filled with glass, irregular shaped 

bullets, and expanding bullet rounds, are illegal. The second are those weapons that are 

lawful, but are improperly used in a manner that would cause unnecessary suffering. 

One specific weapon system type that some have alleged to have indiscriminate 

effects, and thus to violate the second principle described above, is area attack 

munitions. This is the principal argument made by various non-governmental 

organizations and certain members of the international community in arguing that that 

area attack munitions are illegal, or should at least be regulated. It is alleged that these 

munitions cannot be accurately employed because of high failure rates, which are 

claimed to be as high as 20 percent or more. The resulting failed munitions, which 
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become UXO (also referred to as explosive remnants of war or ERW2), cannot 

distinguish between combatants and civilians. Civilians and individuals working for 

humanitarian groups have been injured, killed, or prevented from providing necessary 

relief supplies as a result of ERW. 

At present, no specific treaties regulate the use of area attack munitions. However, 

the four basic principles of the law of war do govern their use; they remain lawful 

weapons under the law of armed conflict. In 2003, the Convention on Conventional 

Weapons adopted its most recent Protocol on explosive remnants of war.3 This Protocol 

is the first multilateral agreement to deal with the problem of unexploded ordnance. Its 

purpose is to minimize the risks and effects of explosive remnants of war, mainly in 

post-conflict situations. Explosive remnants of war include ordnance that has been 

fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but failed to do so. 

Under the Protocol, it is the responsibility of the party that fired the ordnance either to 

clean it up, if it exercises control over the territory where the ordnance is found or, if it 

does not control the territory, to provide, where feasible, technical, financial, material or 

human resources assistance to facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or 

destruction of such explosive remnants. Parties to the Protocol are also required to take 

precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects 

from the risks and effects of ERW. 

The (non-legally binding) Technical Annex to the ERW Protocol contains several 

suggested “best practices” modeled after US and other States Parties’ practices that 

address pre-conflict situations. The purpose of this Annex is to offer practices that could 

increase the overall reliability of the munitions, thereby decreasing the chance that they 

will become ERW. For example, Section 3 provides, in part, that States should, to the 

extent possible, ensure the following measures are implemented and respected during 

the munitions manufacturing management: (1) production processes should be 

designed to achieve the greatest reliability of munitions; (2) high reliability standards 

should be required in the course of explosive ordnance transactions and transfers. 

Other than customary international law principles, which, among other things, 

require a State specifically to ensure that any weapon is not used in an indiscriminate 

method, there are no restrictions on the use of area attack munitions. There have been 

calls by non-governmental organizations in various international fora – specifically in 

the meetings of States Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons – either to 

ban or restrict the use of area attack munitions, especially in populated areas. The US 

 

2 The term “explosive remnants of war” is more inclusive than “unexploded ordnance” since the 

former refers to unexpended ordnance (such as that found in abandoned arms caches) as well as the 

latter. 

3 The United States played a significant role in drafting this protocol. The protocol is under review at 

this time; the United States has not ratified it. 
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Government has opposed these calls because these munitions, when properly 

employed, do not cause unnecessary suffering nor are they per se indiscriminate. Area 

attack munitions serve legitimate military purposes, and in many instances may cause 

less collateral damage than other munitions. 

As noted above, weapons cannot be used in a manner that would cause 

unnecessary suffering. Armed forces must balance the degree of suffering by the 

victims that is likely to occur if a particular weapon is used against the military 

necessity of using that weapon before a weapon is deemed to cause unnecessary 

suffering. While area attack munitions, as with any weapon, will inflict a degree of 

suffering on its intended victims, to be unlawful, the suffering must outweigh the 

legitimate military necessity in their use. It cannot be said as a blanket statement that 

area attack munitions cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering—that can only 

be determined on a case-by-case basis in the targeting process by military planners, 

including legal advisors. 

Another popular argument against area attack munitions is that they cannot be 

accurately deployed because the bomblets do not always detonate and the failed 

munitions create minefields incapable of distinguishing between combatants and 

civilians. It is important to remember that no weapon will work or be accurate 100 

percent of the time. In January 2001, DoD directed that in future acquisition of area 

attack munitions, the desired goal is to attain a reliable functioning rate of 99 percent. 

(This policy— see Appendix 3—was developed with future munition systems in mind; 

it does not compel any changes to legacy systems.) Area attack munitions certainly are 

not designed to be an indiscriminate weapon, as is attested to by the efforts put into 

increasing the reliability rates for these systems. Efforts are also made to ensure these 

munitions are not used in an indiscriminate manner. The evaluation of a target to 

determine whether an area attack munition is appropriate and whether it will cause 

collateral damage is done on a case-by-case basis. Technical experts analyze the target, 

with input from military attorneys, to ensure collateral damage is minimized. The 

targeting experts not only consider the direct impacts, but also factor in known failure 

rates to minimize additional collateral damage that may be caused by UXO. 
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Report Organization 

The main body of this report is divided into four chapters: (1) Assessing Reliability, 

(2) Technology and Design Issues, (3) Acquisition, Logistics and Industrial Base, and (4) 

Transforming DoD ERW Abatement Efforts. The Terms of Reference establishing the 

Task Force can be found in Appendix 1. Major General Kenneth R. Israel, USAF 

(retired), chaired the Task Force; a full listing of Task Force members is given in 

Appendix 2. The DoD policy memo on submunition reliability, signed by former 

Secretary of Defense Cohen in January 2001, is provided in Appendix 3. Finally, a 

classified annex, which provides amplifying detail to the report’s conclusions and 

recommendations, is available separately in CD-ROM format. 
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Chapter 1. Assessing Reliability

This section will address issues regarding design and observed munitions 

reliability, specifically focusing on factors affecting reliability, considerations in 

determining failure rates, and munition life cycle data sharing. 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Services, in coordination with the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation, should expand testing of munitions—to include legacy 

munitions—for the characterization of reliability in a broad range of 

operationally relevant environments that may cause degradation. Testing 

should validate any modeling or simulation. Munitions are expected to achieve 

effects, independent of the diverse employment environments (such as terrain, 

firing and launch conditions, weather conditions, etc.). Current testing is often 

performed in limited environments and does not provide comprehensive 

knowledge about how the munition will perform in actual environment. 

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should develop deliberate planning 

information-sharing tools for munitions system reliability information 

exchange. These tools will capture effectiveness data. Currently, usable 

information is either stovepiped or is not catalogued. 

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should establish a munitions 

expenditure database accessible by all joint components during and 

immediately after combat operations. This database will identify the type, 

quantity, and location of munitions expended. The desired results are greater 

efficiency and effectiveness for ground combat maneuver planning and postconflict clean-up efforts. 

Munitions System Reliability Factors 

Reliability means different things to different groups. To the warfighter, a reliable 

munition is one that consistently achieves desired effects in a predictable manner under 

a wide range of tactical situations with a minimum number of failures. The munition 

should do so without undue hazard or risk to friendly forces and civilians. Ideally, it 

presents the minimum possibility of unintended consequences. A reliable munition 

should also leave a “clean” battlefield, to avoid hindering the maneuver of friendly 
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forces. It can achieve this through a low failure rate, self-neutralization, or selfdestruction. 

To others, the most significant factor in determining a munition’s reliability is its 

effect on civilians. Like the warfighter, other groups desire a clean battlefield, but 

“clean” in terms of safety to civilians. Unlike the warfighter, these groups are not 

necessarily interested in how effective a munition is in achieving combat effects. The 

common ground between the two groups is a shared interest in a munition that 

performs its intended function, but only in the prescribed manner against the intended 

target. 

The Joint Munition Effectiveness Manuals (JMEM) define a munition’s reliability as 

“a measure of the probability of successful detonation.” Webster’s dictionary defines 

“reliable” as suitable or fit to be relied on, or giving the same result on successive trials. 

However, for purposes of discussion, this Task Force recommends: “Reliability 

describes the expectation of a munition’s ability to perform its intended function over 

successive trials.” The intended function should occur in the prescribed manner, which 

includes the desired time, place, and effect. Reliability is expressed as a ratio of the 

number of successful expenditures to the total number of expenditures. An equation 

can accurately portray the mathematical reliability of a single munition round. Such an 

evaluation may be useful for determining the failure rates of specific munition types. 

However, the resultant figure will provide only part of the story. In fact, the most 

complete evaluation of a munition’s reliability is on the scale of an entire conflict, either 

modeled or actual. 

The munition system includes a warhead and fuze, and may include a guidance 

and control section. The warhead consists of the explosive material and a casing that 

contains the material and provides a source of lethal fragments. The fuze is designed 

both to initiate the detonation when required and, for safety, to prevent detonation 

before it is desired. The guidance and control section may include movable fins, a 

battery, a generator, and electronics to ensure the munition is delivered to the desired 

location prior to detonation. 

Estimates of campaign-based reliability must take into account the total number of 

munitions expended and whether these munitions achieved the joint warfighting 

commander's objectives. The reliability of a munition can be expressed as: 

Reliabilityaggregate = Reliabilityplatform x Reliabilitydispense vehicle x Reliabilitymunition

Platform reliability is a function of how accurately the launching vehicle can place a 

munition on the desired target or achieve the required launch acceptability region. The 

platform’s accuracy subsequently affects the post-release accuracy of unguided 

munitions; once fired or released, unguided munitions must accept the original 

unguided solution all the way to impact. Guided munitions can overcome this 

limitation by adjusting the flight solution continually until impact. For the purposes of 

this report, the reliability of the platform (aircraft, artillery piece, etc.) is considered 

constant. The dispensing vehicle’s reliability is affected by the reliabilities of its 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 15

structure, accuracy, and dispense fuze. The vehicle must travel to the desired location, 

sense the desired dispense conditions, and activate the dispensing mechanism. 

The reliability requirement of a munition is the product of the effectiveness needed. 

Effectiveness is governed by the technology available and the cost to develop, field, and 

maintain the munition. Typical reliabilities for conventional munitions fall in the 95 to 

99 percent range. Reliability is subject to statistical confidence bounds. If improperly 

defined, these bounds either provide too much latitude for performance error or drive 

acquisition costs prohibitively high. Munition reliability can be significantly affected by 

such factors as the age of the munition, storage conditions, environmental conditions 

during employment, and terrain conditions. Reliability is also affected by 

manufacturing differences both within groups and between groups of the same 

munitions. Minimizing manufacturing variations reduces reliability variation and 

makes the effects of age, storage and deployment conditions more predictable. 

Potential UXO sources include munitions designed to detonate either upon contact 

with another object, in proximity to another object, at a set height of burst above 

ground, or at a predetermined delay set time. Munitions considered in this study are 

unitary or cluster, guided or unguided. They include both air-to-surface and surface-tosurface systems. This study did not address air-to-air systems, small arms, depleted 

uranium, and other weapons not specifically designed to explode when employed. 

Reliability is ultimately the relationship between munitions expended and the 

effects created on the battlefield. Until the advent of effects-based operations, 

assessments of munition effectiveness were based on physical target attrition. 

Campaign objectives were driven by attrition of a broad target list. Physical damage 

criteria, such as “catastrophic kill” and “mobility kill,” drove campaign planning. 

Assessment consisted of how well the munition physically damaged the intended 

aimpoints. Performance measures were driven by accuracy and size of a munition’s 

blast or fragmentation field. These basic criteria remain valuable tools at the tactical 

level. However, the effects-based operations methodology changes operational- and 

strategic-level warfare planning. Campaign planning focuses on discovering causal 

linkages in the enemy’s ability to wage war. Detailed pre-strike analysis of the enemy 

reveals weak nodes and determines the desired effect on those nodes. Systematic attack 

of those targets disables the enemy. Effects-based operations are military operations 

deliberately focused on achieving specific strategic, operational, or tactical effects, rather 

than against a particular target set. In effects-based operations, munitions reliability will 

be judged on the munition’s ability to achieve the desired effect on the assigned target. 

This is munitions effectiveness assessment. It includes both the functional as well as the 

physical effects of a munition. 

Munitions effectiveness assessment is currently limited by several factors. Modern 

warfare’s operational tempo stresses it. The mindset and culture of munitions 

effectiveness assessment remain based largely on Cold War-era thought, with poorly 

managed information flow and integration. Figure 1.1 illustrates how high levels of 
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16 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

effort early in a campaign stress the assessment process. The targeting cycle continues 

to compress, but analysis processes are not aligned for the same transformation. The 

flow of munitions expenditure and reliability data from the theater of operations (for 

assessment) to rear-located agencies is limited. The flow of ensuing analysis back to the 

theater is likewise restricted, aggravating real-time incorporation of assessment data 

back into the targeting cycle.4

Although the Services have an impressive array of modernized munitions, the 

Army has the largest legacy system challenge. The Army’s primary use of area attack 

munitions is in its indirect fire support artillery systems. Munition reliability issues, 

however, are not confined to one Service. Data sharing between the Services can help to 

identify ways to reduce the amount of UXO resulting from failed munitions and 

mitigate the effects of UXO. 

Determining Failure Rates of U.S. Munitions in Conflict 

Just as the nature of assessment and its related tasks has changed with the character 

of war, the concept of “munitions reliability” is evolving. The result is increasing 

difficulty in clearly defining and determining the failure rate of munitions in combat. 

Reliability in combat once referred simply to a munition’s ability to function repeatedly 

as designed. Civilian expectations of the military establishment’s abilities in target 

attack, however, have grown. The public expects the military to sense, locate, and attack 

targets quickly to win wars swiftly and with minimal collateral damage. The 

introduction of “smart” munitions into the inventory has changed the military’s own 

expectations. Reliability is no longer simply a matter of battle damage assessment. Each 

of the Find, Fix, Track, Target, and Engage steps in the kill chain are considered in 

munitions reliability assessment. As fuzing and guidance capabilities become more 

integrated, the reliability of target acquisition must be measured and assessed. If the 

 

4 A more thorough discussion of the challenges facing munitions effectiveness assessment can be 

found in a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) study (“Weapons Effects Assessment 

Study”) completed in April 2004 under the leadership of Brig Gen (ret) Buck Adams, USAF. 

Figure 1. Effect Tempo on Munitions Effectiveness Assessment 
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wrong target is selected because of faulty automated target recognition algorithms, 

erroneous Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates, poor analysis or a misaligned 

sensor, the overall mission impact may be roughly analogous to a malfunctioning fuze 

sequence. In terms of effects-based operations, planning to strike the wrong aimpoint 

not only fails to produce the desired chain of effect—it may also yield potentially 

undesirable secondary and tertiary effects for the warfighting commander. 

Battlefield collateral damage will always exist. No class of munition will be faultless 

in generating undesired battlefield effects. If a munition reaches the intended location, 

the intended target may no longer be there, but other objects not intended to be targets 

may remain within the effects field of the munition. The warfighter accepts this 

situation as normal course of the continual risk analysis process. Imperfections in 

intelligence gathering systems and methods, actions of the enemy, actions of civilians, 

and other uncontrollable factors will prevent military forces from having perfect 

intelligence or awareness of their environment. 

There is currently no comprehensive approach—empirical observation or 

otherwise—to determine and document operational combat failure rates of US 

munitions. The available data is inconsistent, largely anecdotal, and often from 

questionable sources. The lack of a rigorous method to determine munition reliability in 

combat leads to other attendant problems and a considerable amount of misperception 

concerning their effectiveness. Small quantities of UXO located in a populated area can 

create the impression of a reliability problem regardless of the actual failure rates. In 

contrast, significant quantities of UXO in relatively unpopulated areas can go 

unnoticed, even if they are the result of high failure rates. Area attack munitions, 

designed for dispersed battlefield effects, can be highly effective in combat yet difficult 

to analyze afterward. There is no method in place to determine and document 

systematically the reliability rates of a broad range of munitions during combat. 

During non-combat expenditures, DoD tracks information on failure rates as 

determined by lot acceptance and surveillance testing. These test methods provide 

accurate munition reliability snapshots at those times and under those conditions. 

Notably, surveillance testing is normally conducted under conditions ideal for munition 

to function, such as on desert hardpan soil. Additional factors can degrade the 

performance of munition below the reliability levels revealed by testing. These include: 

the age of the munition, conditions under which it was stored, angle, speed and altitude 

of release; range to target; angle and speed of impact; and type of terrain on which it 

impacts. The result is an incomplete statistical image of a given munition’s reliability. 

There are numerous claims from sources outside DoD based on observed failures in 

post-conflict environments. However, these are generally based on unscientific 

methodologies and cannot be substantiated. Anecdotal evidence does indicate, 

however, that some munitions can create quantities of UXO. These failures appear to be 

related to operational factors that are not assessed as part of developmental, acceptance 

and surveillance testing. 
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18 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

The lack of information regarding actual combat reliability rates reaches beyond 

munition employment issues. It also impacts operational and logistical planning and 

execution. The accuracy of munitions reliability statistics directly impacts DoD’s ability 

to plan efficient, munitions-related logistics operations. Munition consumption rates 

have a significant impact on theater mobility operations. The fewer munitions required 

for a mission, the less the logistics burden. As indicated above, munition lot acceptance 

and surveillance testing may establish a statistical baseline, but the factors affecting 

combat failure rates are broad and vary significantly. 

A note of caution regarding reliability and safety—by attempting to ensure a 

munition will function reliably under all conditions, it is possible to sacrifice safety. As 

a result, a munition could become less safe to handle, store and load. A munition that 

never detonates might be perfectly safe, while a munition that functions under 

unintended conditions may be considered mathematically reliable. 

Munition Life Cycle Data Sharing 

Munition reliability estimates are generally based on two types of data. The first set 

of data is the “as-built” reliability developed from testing of serial lot production. As 

munitions are built, they are grouped into lots that are periodically tested and 

compared to their requirements. Reliability is one of the qualities tested. If the results of 

the lot tests demonstrate that the lot satisfies its requirements, the lot is accepted into 

inventory and is eventually issued to the warfighter. As these accepted lots accumulate, 

the test data accumulate and provide information on the entire inventory. This 

information provides an assessment of the readiness of the inventory and includes 

reliability numbers. 

The second type of data is storage or surveillance test data. These data serve as an extension 

of lot acceptance data described above. Periodically, representative munitions are removed from 

inventory to assess any degradation in performance resulting from age or storage conditions. 

This information is extremely important because it assesses the readiness of the munitions, and 

thus the readiness of the military using it to engage the enemy in combat. It also permits the 

remediation, elimination and possible replacement of munitions that no longer meet Service 

requirements. The accumulation of this readiness data provides an assessment of the current 

state of the inventory of munitions. 

Data sharing efforts may be categorized into one of three time-based categories: 

pre-combat, combat operations, and post-combat. Activities in each phase are linked 

over time. Through component- and Service-specific processes, warfighting 

commanders determine current and future munitions capability requirements. Service 

staffs vet newly identified requirements through the Joint Capabilities Integration and 

Development System, leading to procurement and fielding. Service munition 

sufficiency requirements are annually vetted through the Munitions Requirements 

Process. Munitions are tested and evaluated on a recurring basis through various 

means, as discussed above. 
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The data drawn from post-production operational testing are distributed from the 

evaluating agency into various specialized systems. Though this system transmits data 

to agencies most directly connected to specific munitions and systems, it lends itself to 

data stovepiping. Furthermore, the data are not consistently updated in joint manuals. 

This results in the lack of comprehensive understanding of the expected munitions 

combat performance. For example, the Air Force’s Weapon System Evaluation Program 

reports contain valuable information, yet are not broadly distributed. The reports are 

available through a classified website, but no method is in place to notify agencies 

(outside of the regular distribution list) when new reports are published. Today, each 

Service has its own weapons index file. An integrated, digital-based system, once put in 

place, would help ensure a truly joint approach to munitions system issues. The Joint 

Munitions Effectiveness Manuals and attendant weaponeering software are updated 

approximately every sixteen months. Updates are accomplished periodically, as often as 

two to three times between major version publishing cycles. The Joint Logistics 

Commanders should ensure updates include appropriate munition effectiveness data 

based on data made available since the previous update. 

Combat operations are typically characterized by high-tempo munitions 

employment. Doctrinally and practically, the Services conduct battle damage 

assessment and munitions effectiveness assessment in the course of normal combat 

operations. These are normally focused on target damage and effects against the enemy. 

Documenting the specific locations and quantities of battlefield UXO is not a standard 

activity. Although air, land, maritime, and special operations components share data, 

they do not do so in an automated, centralized and coordinated fashion. Established 

methods do not lend themselves to real-time data call and interpretation. 

As noted in the discussion of munition effectiveness, feedback from real-time 

munitions employment is poorly managed and not integrated. This is the result of a 

high operational tempo, which stresses the ability to process, interpret and catalog this 

information. While the impact of this feedback on legacy systems—no longer in 

production—may be negligible, the feedback on systems still in production, or for 

which there are planned upgrades, could mitigate design and manufacturing problems 

during subsequent production. This Task Force’s survey revealed that fuze 

manufacturers have no direct interaction with field commands, nor do they have access 

to any central theater munitions effectiveness database documenting reliability trends. 

The inclusion of acquisition-trained officers on theater munitions evaluation teams 

(both during and after conflicts) will lead to the development of proper feedback 

mechanisms. Online Joint Munition Effectiveness Manual-based “lessons learned” 

would be one method for timely distribution of new observations on munitions system 

reliability performance. These observations could be included as updates to computerbased weaponeering systems, and thus rapidly distributed back to the field as 

automated “lessons learned.” 

Post-combat actions consist of data verification and selective clean-up of UXO. Joint 

commands and the Services develop lessons learned during this phase. This phase may 
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partially overlap in time with combat operations, such as when ground units report 

observations of air- or surface-based strikes with evaluations of specific munitions 

effects. 

Munitions reliability should be a formal part of munitions effectiveness assessment. 

As mentioned earlier, there is no real-time methodology in place or in practice that 

expeditiously and accurately tracks the failure rates of US munitions in combat use. 

Munitions expenditure assessments are inadequately linked with target-selection 

processes. Target selection processes are further complicated by the high-tempo 

targeting cycle preferred by US forces. Post-combat battlefield data collection teams 

need to include acquisition-trained personnel. These personnel will be able to determine 

the information manufacturers require during munitions design and production. To the 

extent declassification allows, manufacturers will be able to use this feedback to 

improve munitions and munition components. 

On the whole, the DoD has a significant opportunity to improve data sharing. This 

includes inter-Service and military-industry contacts. 
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Chapter 2. Technology and Design Issues

This section will address the scope of the technology areas associated with overall 

munition operational reliability. In particular, it will expand the discussion to include 

target identification and guidance systems, the potential for applying RF tagging to 

UXO remediation, monitoring operational performance of munitions for design and 

employment feedback, and the factors associated with the development of electronic 

and integrated fuzing, targeting and guidance systems. 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) should fund new 

research investments into inexpensive, ultra-reliable fuze development based on 

integrated circuits, Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems technologies, and 

integrated fuze, guidance and targeting systems. The DDR&E should establish 

pilot science and technology programs to achieve safety-certified, integrated fuzing, 

targeting and guidance systems. A reasonable goal would be to have at least two 

certified IC/MEMS-based fuzes available for introduction by 2008. 

• The DDR&E needs to drive more joint weapons development efforts with the 

associated multi-Service research efforts to achieve a critical mass of scarce 

development resources. Organizations such as the Defense Ordnance Technology 

Consortium are a good start, but are limited because of their voluntary nature; a 

forcing function and authorities need to be put in place. Further weapon acquisition 

and weapon research consolidation is necessary in order to maintain a governmental 

skill base. Joint research targeted at larger joint weapons programs will allow both 

industry and the Services to maintain a workforce capable of developing and 

producing state-of-the-art, highly effective and highly reliable munitions. 

• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should 

expand efforts to develop radio frequency tags for munitions beyond logistics 

tracking to facilitate UXO remediation for new systems. A DoD goal should be a 

single common tagging system for munitions of all types. DoD should develop a 

low cost, integrated RF tag. Economically, it does not make sense to retrofit all area 

attack munitions currently in storage, since the cost of installing the tags 

significantly exceeds the cost of the tags and outweighs the effective benefits. 

However, tagging existing area attack munition dispensers may be a viable method 

for identifying potential UXO sites. 

• The Services should explore methods to provide operational test and combat 

operations performance feedback to the acquisition community and the supplier. 
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22 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

This feedback should be used to optimize production methods, ensuring increased 

reliability through improvements in design and production control methods and 

documentation. 

The Task Force has reviewed the technology activities of the Service weapon labs, 

the ongoing munitions development programs and the various industry internal 

research and development activities. It has also looked at related technology areas in 

energy storage and remote sensing. It reviewed munition reliability performance data 

from monitoring/testing and tried to compare it to operational performance results. 

The Task Force’s general conclusion is that there is excellent work being performed 

throughout the munitions community to improve performance and reliability. 

However, the size of US arsenals and the relatively low level of area attack munition 

research and development now ongoing means that more reliable munitions will make 

up a very small percentage of the stockpile available to our warfighters for many years 

to come. 

The Task Force considered several related areas for improvement that reduce 

collateral damage, fratricide risks and UXO challenges without directly addressing perunit munitions reliability. Specifically, it looked at improved targeting and target 

identification, guidance and navigation improvements, theater munitions operations 

tracking and feedback for munitions design and operational weaponeering, and RF 

tagging of munitions for improved logistics operations and UXO remediation. None of 

these related areas contains any “silver bullets” that would transform the need for 

munition reliability improvement. However, these broader areas of the munitions 

operational profile can be applied to reduce significantly the unintended consequences 

of munitions use, and should be considered in a more complete DoD response to 

munitions reliability. 

Critical Technology Areas Related to Munitions Reliability 

Precision-guided munitions (which fly to a designated point) and smart munitions 

(which search for, identify and home on specified targets) incorporate their guidance 

and navigation functions with the fuzing function. Owing to the overall expense of 

these munitions, it is economically feasible to employ more sophisticated and expensive 

fuzes, increasing the reliability of the explosive payload initiation. However, an 

additional reliability factor will be of concern in achieving the overall battlefield goals of 

munitions reliability (maximum survivability of US and friendly forces, minimized 

logistics load, and minimum collateral damage and risk to civilians). This additional 

concern is that the functions of precision guidance and smart munitions target 

recognition and acquisition themselves provide input to the fuze. An incorrect target 

location insertion into the precision-guided munitions, or an incorrect target recognition 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 23

and homing acquisition may result in the same effect as a direct fuze (explosive charge) 

initiation failure or other improper function. Friendly forces or civilians might be 

mistakenly identified as the enemy target, or misdirection or false target indications 

may defeat the high lethality intent of the munitions. 

Munitions reliability in the sense of two important measures—lethality, and risk to 

friendly forces and civilians—is generally seen as a question of fuzing reliability with 

associated implications for failure rate and UXO risk. The overall question of munitions 

systems reliability, however, extends across the entire functional scope of munitions 

operation. The Task Force focused primarily on reliability issues related to the two 

important measures of lethality and risk, which are a critical part of the present (and 

probably continuing) new paradigm for warfighting by US forces, which we suggest 

may be stated in three parts: 

• Very high single-shot kill probability to minimize logistics and time to win; 

• Very low to zero US and friendly force casualties; and 

• Very low to zero collateral damage to civilians and civil assets. 

In this context, the critical technical issues are those of: 

• Reliable fuzing (the munitions must go off); 

• A high degree of control of the munitions’ lethal effects area; 

• A very high probability of correct target identification; and 

• A very low probability of friendly or civilian targets being incorrectly 

identified as valid (i.e., enemy) targets. 

These issues relate to: 

• Reliable fuzing (inexpensive but highly reliable fuze technology); 

• Correct target identification (sensor and processing technology); and 

• Accurate guidance to the target (both guidance and navigation technology). 

The current state of technology in each of these areas will be addressed in the 

following sections. 

Reliable Fuzing

Modern US conventional munitions of the larger calibers (105mm, 155mm artillery 

and tactical missiles)—both with unitary warheads and NATO standard fuzing—have 

on the order of 99 percent reliability. Smart munitions and precision-guided munitions 

also have very high reliability numbers. Both can afford relatively expensive fuzes since 

the overall cost per munitions unit is high, and the fuze represents only a minimal 

incremental cost within the overall per-round cost of the system. 
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Current stocks of area attack munitions and smaller caliber automatic cannon do 

not have comparably high reliable fuzes. Failure rates are reportedly as high as ten 

percent and—under some impact conditions (such as sandy or snowy terrain)—may be 

considerably higher. The low-cost-per-round requirement for these systems means that 

these fuzes must be very low-cost fuzes. Modern technology provides a basis for the 

development of low-cost reliable fuzes for these systems. There is a great reluctance, 

however, to destroy the stockpiles: (1) the United States may need to use a significant 

number of these systems in the event of a major contingency; (2) replacement systems 

might not provide the same needed capabilities that the existing systems do; (3) there 

are insufficient funds to cover demilitarization requirements; and (4) the replacement 

cost for current stockpiles would be enormous. 

Correct Target Identification

Although military forces have been identifying targets for centuries, it has recently 

become possible to achieve this function from significant distances with very high 

accuracy. As this ability has become more available and better measured, US forces are 

beginning to discover the risks and implications of accurate target identification. For 

direct fire from a weapons platform, target identification is addressed by Identification 

Friend or Foe systems and man-in-the-loop control. These methods are by no means 

foolproof, but in recent conflicts (Bosnia, Afghanistan and the two Iraq engagements) 

direct friendly fire casualties have been low. Improved fire-control systems will result in 

even lower friendly force risk. 

In the case of indirect fires, for which the smart munitions have been specifically 

designed, the objective is to assure very high single-shot lethality while reducing the 

exposure of US troops in the process of target acquisition. Unmanned aerial vehicles 

and other remotely operated target-acquisition assets help in this regard. The smart 

munitions themselves also incorporate terminal seekers designed to provide final 

identification of the target and highly accurate homing of a limited-warhead (reduced 

kill radius) guided munition in order to assure high lethality through a direct or neardirect hit. At the same time, this same accuracy and smaller kill radius reduces the risk 

of collateral damage. 

In the context of the new warfighting paradigm of little or no friendly force risk or 

collateral damage, the reliability of correct target identification may be expected to 

become an increasingly important issue, potentially limiting the use of some smart 

munitions under certain conditions in a similar way to that now experienced with the 

use of area attack munitions. The Task Force has seen that even single errors, such as 

the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy during Operation Allied Force, can 

greatly impact overall collateral damage effects in terms of lives and political impact. 

The critical technology required to achieve a very high reliability in target 

identification and homing for these smart munitions is more complex than that required 

for reliable fuzing. The specific nature of the sensor operation, the observable qualities 

of target and background for the sensor, and the algorithms used to make target 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 25

identification decisions (with consequent errors of the first and second kind) will be 

more difficult to handle and may require significant improvement in sensor dataprocessing systems. 

In any event, following the first priority of obtaining an affordable and reliable fuze, 

this second reliability risk area may be expected to predominate over the next 

generation of smart munitions. 

Precision Guidance to Target

This is a third and developing area of munitions reliability risk in the context of the 

desire for little or no friendly force risk and collateral damage. In this case, the indirect 

fire problem is one of identifying a correct target and a correct target location for attack 

by remote indirect fires. To do this, remotely operated forward observation means will 

be increasingly employed. Inaccurate guidance or incorrect target identification will 

again detract from the desired outcome of killing only the enemy assets. In a denser 

target environment, problems of this type will grow. 

Technologies of importance in this area relate not only to highly robust guidance 

and navigation systems—particularly to resist GPS jamming—but also to the question 

of battlefield awareness and target intelligence processing and dissemination. The use 

of "layered navigation systems" (using sensors, in addition to GPS, to provide positional 

information to the guidance and navigation system) will assist in achieving such 

robustness. The technologies of interest to the "Family of Integrated Operational 

Pictures" system (Single Integrated Air Picture, Single Integrated Ground Picture, etc., 

functions to be incorporated in the Global Information Grid under the Net-Centric 

battlefield) will be important, but outside of the scope of specific munitions design. 

Target Sensing 

This section briefly considers the role of target sensors in munitions reliability—

how they may be considered as a part of the fuzing function—and the particular 

importance of the reliable functioning of target sensors in reducing the risks of fratricide 

(friendly force risk) and collateral damage (risk to civilians). 

For this report, the fuze system is assumed to include the following functions: 

• Safeing assures that the fuzed munitions are safe to use (very low risk of 

premature detonation), blocking initiation functions. 

• Arming assures that the fuze is ready to operate based on arming input from 

appropriate sensors within the fuze system. Arming input may also include 

signals received from active communication with outside control means. 

• Target sensing provides appropriate interaction with the target (not necessarily 

direct contact) which will cause the initiation (see below) of the munition. 
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26 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

• Initiation (of the explosive payload) sets off a train of energetic materials 

leading to the booster ignition of the main energetic payload, which may either 

be the explosive charge or an expulsion charge for the ejection and distribution 

of munitions. 

Self-destruction, although not a core function of a fuze, causes the complete 

detonation of munitions or a complete failure (fire train to booster destroyed). Any 

remaining explosives cannot be easily set off. Neutralization, in similar fashion, causes 

the energetic elements of the fuze to become totally inert. 

These fuze functions, as applied to conventional munitions, are illustrated in Figure 

2. 

Conventional Munitions

All munitions fuze systems sense the target in some manner, the simplest by direct 

impact with whatever object is struck by the munition. Certain smart fuze systems 

sense the environment during penetration to initiate the fuze at the appropriate depth 

or distance. These sensors are largely inertial in character. Such smart fuzes are 

generally combined with precision-guided munitions or smart munitions (see below). 

Non-impact fuze initiation can be determined by various timing techniques, electronic, 

pyrotechnic or mechanical. Height-of-burst fuzing (e.g., the Multi-Option Fuze for 

Artillery, or MOFA, system) can also be initiated by a simple radar or radio-altimeter 

system. Finally, air target proximity fuzes are initiated by an active (usually RF) 

detection system that is part of the fuze system. Command-guided munitions systems 

can also be initiated by direct command to the munitions. 

For this class of munitions, the risks to friendly forces and civilians are primarily 

those associated with the failure rates of the specific fuzing systems and the reliability 

of back-up self-destruct systems. Owing to the relatively low delivery accuracy of 

conventional munitions, their use in populated areas carries significant collateral 

damage risk, both from normally functioning fuzes and from residual UXO. 

Figure 2. Basic Fuze System Functions 
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Precision-Guided Munitions

Precision-guided munitions employ active and passive technologies to increase the 

accuracy with which munitions may be directed to a particular impact point or fuze 

function point (air burst, height of burst, etc.). These munitions are capable of controlled 

flight. Coordinate-seeking munitions rely on receiving target position information from 

the GPS constellation and combining this information with an on-board inertial 

reference to arrive at a point in earth coordinates defined by the GPS reference system. 

Designated-homing, precision-guided munitions rely on sensing a homing reference 

(laser designation, for example) placed on the target by external means to achieve a 

high-accuracy hit on the illuminated spot. The relationship between the designated 

point (defined by the earth coordinates or the illuminated spot) and the target itself is a 

function of—and directly related to—the lethality desired against the selected target. 

The precision-guided munition fuzing system itself may be no different than those in 

conventional standard unguided munitions. In some cases, the precision-guidance 

system itself may be used to supply arming and fuze initiation information to the fuze 

system. 

For precision-guided munitions, the primary risks to friendly forces and civilians 

remain those associated with the failure rates of conventional munitions fuzing systems 

and the reliability of back-up self-destruct systems, since these systems are essentially 

identical to conventional systems, but delivered more accurately. Note, however, that 

very precise delivery to the wrong spot will significantly reduce the overall lethality of a 

precision-guided munition fire mission against that target. In other words, the increased 

battlefield lethality of these munitions will only be realized if the target location is 

known accurately. 
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28 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

The potential insertion of precision guided munition input to the fuze is illustrated 

in Figure 3. 

Smart Munitions

Smart munitions are generally categorized as those employing a terminal homing 

means that can both sense and recognize the target. In this case, the general target 

location is known (GPS coordinates or otherwise) and the smart munitions are directed 

to that area. Arriving at an "acquisition basket" which encompasses the general target 

location, the homing sensors on these smart munitions then search for, identify and 

home on the desired target. Fuzing against the target may rely on a combination of the 

target homing sensor and other standard fuzing methods. 

In smart munitions systems, there is an additional reliability factor associated with 

risk to friendly forces and to civilians—the risk of mistaken identification. The target 

acquisition and homing sensors must apply certain built-in tests (computer image 

processor, for example) for "true target" and, if these tests are "passed" (i.e., the system 

produces a "true target" indication), the munition then homes and fuzes on that target. 

As in any formalized decision process, there are potential errors of two kinds: real 

targets that are not detected, and non-targets that are identified as real targets. It is this 

latter class that constitutes the additional risk associated with smart munitions. The 

selected non-targets may in fact be friendly forces or civilians or civilian assets; 

therefore, a rational set of general considerations of munitions systems reliability may 

also include the risk of target sensor error and the consequent high-lethality 

engagement of friendly or civilian assets. The insertion of smart munitions input to the 

fuzing functions is illustrated in Figure 4. 

Figure 3. Precision Guidance Input to Fuzing 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 29

Electronic, MEMS, and Integrated Fuzing 

This section will address a trend in munitions system design that the Task Force 

believes will have a significant effect on future fuzing systems and the industry that 

develops them. The Task Force believes that pressure for increasingly sophisticated 

munitions systems has created, and will continue to create, pressure for integrating the 

fuzing function with other parts of the munition, particularly with the guidance and 

targeting systems. This is likely to change the markets for fuzes of any type, impacting 

plans for improving fuze reliability and industry production availability. 

Traditional fuzes integrate several complex functions while maintaining the 

primary objectives of providing safety and arming. The more modern fuzes in US 

inventories typically contain fuze components which include: the target sensor 

(mechanical or electrical), a reserve power source, a safeing and arming device, and an 

explosive train. 

Current and future warfighting scenarios are driving the need for smarter 

munitions that have longer range capability, can be placed more accurately on target, 

and reduce collateral damage. This need for smart munitions is subsequently driving 

the need to develop more complex munitions that integrate more complex technologies. 

With the push to integrate more complex functions (such as course correction, GPS, 

inertial guidance, electronic safeing and arming, and multi-mode initiation) into fuzing 

systems, there is an increasing need to miniaturize these new technologies as well as the 

Figure 4. Sensor-Based Fuzing: Target-Based Identification and Homing 
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30 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

traditional fuze components so that all of these can be packaged into the same space 

and volume of a conventional fuze. Integrating these technologies should have a 

significant effect on cost and logistics. Technology integration also affects the fuze 

industrial base. 

Advances in MEMS technology seem to offer the opportunity to achieve reliability 

through multiple parallel path redundancy, mechanical fire chain interruption, and the 

general state of IC reliability, with the low cost of such systems, once developed and 

engineered through the IC/MEMS foundry process. Many current fuze makers 

recognize this potential line of development, but the "new paradigm" is such that the 

most capable producers have the best potential of utilizing this new technology. A 

newly emerging MEMS-based fuze technology may well find its base in firms other 

than today’s fuze suppliers. The implications of such a shift for the fuze industrial base 

may be profound. 

The transition to electronic designs greatly enables integration of the fuzing 

functions with other munition functions. The technologies for more integrated guidance 

and fuzing are available but have not been applied fully. This transition promises lower 

operational costs and improved logistics but requires up front investment for the 

unique application to munitions systems. 

Given the potential for improved performance, lower cost and better reliability, 

there does not appear to be adequate investment in IC/MEMS fuzing and integrated 

designs either within munition programs or at the weapon labs. 

There are several reasons for the relatively slow pace of change in this area: 

• Munition affordability and risk to market drive acquisition executives to use 

established technology; 

• With fuzes near the bottom of the funding “food chain,” less technology 

investment has gone into the fuze and its integration; 

• There is a perception that munition unit cost will grow with improved 

integration, leading to un-affordability; 

• There is a concern that newer “integrated designs” or IC/MEMS-based systems 

will not be accepted by safety review boards; and 

• The effects of earlier munitions development and stockpiling have suppressed 

demand for new munitions that could more easily incorporate these approaches. 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 31

In terms of affordability the Task Force recognizes that adding more complexity 

will also increase the unit cost of any end item. One might argue that the cost of smart 

munitions is not affordable but the entire picture must be analyzed. If one smart 

munition can produce the same effects as 20 traditional munitions—plus reduce the 

effects of collateral damage and the logistics train to track, transport and carry—then 

the cost of the system would be justified. For example, the projected cost of a Guidance 

Integrated Fuze (see Figure 5) is in the $3000 range. It is anticipated that using one of 

these fuzes may eliminate the need to fire on the order of 20 projectiles with multioption fuzes. These fuzes currently cost approximately $220 each. The cost savings 

alone is approximately $1200 (and this does not include the cost of the projectile), plus 

the additional savings from reduced logistics of carrying 20 fuzes and projectiles. 

Smarter munitions can actually reduce the number of soldiers and platforms required to 

gain the same effects. 

The Task Force has seen some programs that have chosen to avoid integrated or 

electronic fuzes to reduce the risk of passing the weapon safety review. Weapons safety 

review boards have traditionally made use of certification through comparative design 

and visual inspections. Both of these proven approaches are challenging to apply to 

new IC/MEMS or highly integrated designs. Board members have in-depth 

understanding of traditional separate designs and far less experience with the new 

approaches. Some examples of successful certification exist (electronic safe-arm devices 

are now accepted and MEMS safe-arm devices are starting the review process), and 

others will follow that will provide an experience base in the area and reduce this 

programmatic risk. 

The intensity of munition programs development is clearly well down from the 

peak of the cold war. This reduced need has led, in turn, to fewer munition programs 

and smaller numbers in production for each program. This will suppress the broad 

adoption of electronic or integrated fuzes in two ways. First, the economic case for the 

change is reduced with smaller production runs. Secondly, there will simply be fewer 

new munitions relative to our large arsenals for some time to come. 

Figure 5. Guided Integrated Fuze and MOFA 
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32 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

Of course one must consider the effects of reliability on a system when adding more 

complexity. While added functions will generally cause a system to be less reliable, 

there are several reasons to believe this can be avoided with integrated fuzing. First, the 

electronic, MEMS and IC approaches used in integrated fuzes have demonstrated 

extremely high reliabilities in other applications and are inherently resistant to most 

environmental extremes and contaminates. More importantly, the cost and size of this 

technology easily enables 

redundant functions to 

improve reliability. 

Technologies such as MEMS 

are being considered as a 

vehicle to integrate traditional 

safeing and arming functions 

with electronic fuze functions. 

The Army and Navy are both 

developing fuze systems that 

will integrate multiple fuze 

functions within a single 

integrated circuit (Figure 6). It 

is likely that any new program 

would consider this option for development, and that many will follow this path. 

Advances in smart munitions have shaped, and will reshape, the industrial base. As 

discussed above, more effective smart munitions should reduce the need for the 

traditional quantities of munitions. This reduction in purchases will most likely affect 

the shape of the industrial base because manufacturers have to make adjustments to 

account for a reduced labor force and operational capability. In some instances, out-year 

purchases of more traditional munitions systems have been cancelled because of the 

emergence of smart munitions. For example, the Army has significantly reduced its 

requirement for MOFA fuzes by almost 800,000 from just two years ago because outyear production money was shifted toward guidance-integrated fuzing. This drastic 

change in requirement has driven the current producer of this fuze to consolidate 

operations. A sister division is now in jeopardy. The result may be the loss of the only 

qualified liquid-reserve power source supplier in the US industrial base. 

The smart munitions that will be procured will be more sophisticated and produced 

in much lower numbers. Current suppliers may not be able to transition to a business 

model that supports higher-end, lower-volume units. They will also have to convert 

from an electromechanical base to full electronics or integrated hybrids. It is expected 

that this transition will further erode the industry. The Task Force believes that the end 

state may be traditional fuze production only for small arms, if at all, and a different 

mix of contractors building a smaller number of integrated fuze, targeting and guidance 

systems. DoD’s effort should be focused on achieving this transition swiftly because of 

Figure 6. MEMS Safe and Arm Device for a 20mm Projectile 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 33

the improvements in reliability and performance it will bring, but with minimal 

disruption to necessary munitions maintenance and continued production. 

The Task Force therefore recommends that DoD undertake the following actions: 

• Fund new research investments into inexpensive, ultra-reliable fuze 

development based on integrated circuits, MEMS technologies, and 

integrated fuze, guidance and targeting systems. This will require an 

overarching investment at DARPA or across the weapons labs in addition to 

the individual munitions system targeted programs. Specifically, the labs 

should concentrate on safety-certified, IC/MEMS fuzing while DARPA 

develops integrated electronic fuze, guidance, targeting devices (a “single 

chip” munition control). DARPA’s efforts should also address safety 

certification. 

• Establish pilot programs in each Service to achieve safety-certified, fully 

IC/MEMS approaches to integrated fuzing, targeting and guidance systems. 

OSD should advocate these pilot programs, given the impact that proven, 

certifiable safety design can have on accelerating the technology transition. A 

reasonable goal would be to have at least two certified IC/MEMS-based fuzes 

available for introduction by 2008. 

• Consider logistical system modification to support technology-refresh 

lifecycle strategy. The trends toward integrated fuzing will tax energy storage 

systems that supported earlier dedicated fuze designs and further undermine 

production capabilities as numbers needed drop. Consideration should be 

given to adopting commercial, replaceable energy storage devices (i.e., 

alkaline or lithium batteries) or the equivalent. While this allows the 

munitions community to take advantage of improvements in the vastly larger 

commercial battery industry, it has impacts at every stage of logistics and 

munition operations. 

• Drive more joint weapons development efforts with the associated multiService research efforts to achieve a critical mass of scarce development 

resources. All the trends are for fewer weapons types procured in smaller 

numbers. Creating efficiencies may require more joint-Service acquisitions of 

similar if not fully common weapons. Research efforts should also be 

considered for consolidation, as the same pressure for a smaller workforce 

drives experience and corporate memory out of the weapon labs. 

Organizations such as the Defense Ordnance Technology Consortium are a 

good start, but are limited because of their voluntary nature; a forcing 

function and authorities need to be put in place. Joint research targeted at 

larger joint weapons programs will allow both industry and the Services to 

maintain a workforce capable of developing and producing state-of-the-art, 

highly effective and highly reliable munitions. 
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34 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

 Munitions Tagging 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

Michael W. Wynne, in his capacity as the Defense Logistics Executive, issued a tagging 

mandate in July 2004 intended to address the logistical aspects of tagging. This was in 

recognition of the benefits of tagging demonstrated by commercial tagging initiatives. 

Tagging technology has advanced rapidly in the past few years, leading to a wide 

assortment of tag technologies. In particular, advances in RF, optical, spectral imaging, 

and nanotechnology-based tags promise to revolutionize monitoring and tracking. 

Table 1 provides a summary of some of the current and emerging tagging technologies 

available in both the commercial and military sectors. In addition, it presents some of 

the relevant research being conducted by DARPA and others. 

Table 1. Tagging Technologies 

Tag Type Sector Current Applications Programs 

Commercial RFID, Theft Protection Express Pass, E-Z Pass, Railways.... Passive Military Logistics DARPA Digital Dog Tags, DoD Assets 

Commercial Container Tracking Alien Technologies Backscatter Tags Semi-Passive Military Combat ID, Asset Location PNNL Programs, VESTA/PARD 

Commercial GPS Locators GPS Locators Active Military Radar Responsive Tags RF STORM, DRaFT, Army RATE 

Passive Radar 

Reflectors Military Tracking and Targeting 

Tracking Secure Documents — 

GPS Data Commercial Asset Tracking Fleet Management, Rental Cars 

Loggers Government Vehicle and Item Tracking Law Enforcement, etc. 

Commercial Location Reporting Garmin Rhino 

RF Tags 

GPS Beacons Military Personnel Location Grenadier Brat, CSEL 

Barcodes Commercial Product Marketing Consumer Producets 

Beacons — — IR & UV 

Medical Cancer Research Fluorescent Military Tracking & Targeting DARPA/SRI 

Retro-Reflective Military Location & Covert COM Dynamic Optical Tags (DOTS) 

Commercial — — 

Optical 

Spectral Imaging Military Tracking & Targeting — 

Isotopic & 

Chemical Markers Commercial Product Tampering Oil & Gas Industry 

As the purpose of this discussion is to focus on technologies suitable to the tagging 

of munitions, it will focus on those technologies that are suitable to the operational and 

environmental constraints likely to be encountered by munitions handling. 

It would be a mistake to assume that the advances made in the commercial world 

are directly applicable to tagging munitions. While Wal-Mart seeks to automate 

inventory control and minimize theft through the use of simple, low-cost tagging 

technologies, these are largely inappropriate for munitions. Table 2 below provides a 

generalized comparison between low-cost, commercial tagging technology and the 

military requirements for munitions tagging. Note that the cost estimates do not include 

the cost of “installing” the tag. This cost will vary widely depending on the application. 

For instance, self-adhesive tags can have minimal installation costs, but an active RF tag 

could require significant effort to install. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Commercial and Military Tagging Performance 

Performance Commercial Military 

Shelf Life Days to Weeks 20 Years 

Maximum Detection Distance < 10 Meters 200+ Meters 

Security Little or None Medium to High 

Technology Optical and Near-Field RF Optical and Far-Field RF 

Environmental Industrial Extreme 

Cost per Tag ~ $.01 to $2 $.50 to $25 est. 

It should also be noted that there is no single solution that will satisfy all the diverse 

munitions tagging requirements. For instance, optical tags, such as barcodes and 

beacons, are well suited for many logistical control applications. However, optical tags 

require line-of-sight access; they are not well-suited to applications such as inventory 

analysis, theft protection, and UXO detection. For these applications, RF tags provide 

the best flexibility and performance. Therefore, the remainder of this discussion will 

focus on the use of RF tags for munitions. 

Table 3 provides a perspective of the RF tag capabilities and allocations. In general, 

RF tags can be grouped into three major categories: passive, semi-passive, and active. 

Munitions-related applications for RF tags include theft detection, logistics and 

inventory control, and localization. A side benefit of localization is the ability to locate 

UXO. Performance characteristics depend on a number of factors, including frequency 

range, transmit power, waveform and antenna size. 

The distinction between the various categories of RF tags can be gray. This Task 

Force has been shown how energy scavenging could be used in place of a battery to 

power active RF tags for detection ranges in excess of 100 meters. This eliminates the 

need for lifetime-limiting batteries. 

Table 3. General RF Tag Capabilities Comparison 

Type Effective 

Range Battery Life Security Programability Data Range 

Passive 10 m None Indefinite Medium None Low 

Semi-Passive 150 m Small 10 Years High Medium Low-Medium 

Active 100 km+ Medium-Large <1 Year (typically) High High High 

Research in RF tagging for military applications has been carried out by DARPA 

and other research facilities such as Sandia National Labs and Pacific Northwest 

National Labs. These efforts have been largely aimed at Blue Force tracking and highvalue asset tracking. DoD has recently committed to tagging all weapons for logistic 

tracking purposes. This will foster subsequent developments aimed at low-cost 

munitions tracking that addresses the development, storage and transportation phases 

of the lifecycle. It does not appear that this effort will extend to operations and UXO 

recovery phases (see Figure 7). This is of considerable concern and should be addressed 

before fielding any system. 
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36 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

DoD should expand its efforts to develop RF tags for munitions beyond logistics 

tracking to include UXO remediation for new systems. RF tags offer the best 

performance for tagging munitions, primarily because they do not require a clear line of 

sight from the reader to the tag. It is highly desirable to have the minimum number of 

solutions for all classes of tagged munitions in order to minimize the ultimate cost and 

improve flexibility. A DoD goal should be a single common tagging system for 

munitions of all types. This requires an operational view that extends across numerous 

weapons platforms. 

In order to achieve low production costs for such a tagging system, DoD should 

develop a low-cost, RF-integrated chip (RFIC) tag. The system development must 

include all aspects of the munitions life cycle—in particular the UXO recovery phase. 

The benefits of tagging could be extrapolated to encompass the entire munitions life 

cycle. This is consistent with the DoD tagging mandate view of tagging individual, 

higher-value munitions to enhance force protection. Tagging larger, higher-value 

munitions makes sense. In addition to the logistical benefits, the tags could be used to 

ascertain munition effectiveness after deployment. 

Economically, it does not make sense to retrofit all munitions currently in storage. 

The tag and installation costs can greatly exceed the effective benefits. For instance, it 

can be shown that the cost of tagging individual BLU-97 munitions clearly outweighs 

the benefits. However, it would make sense to tag the dispensers that contain the area 

attack munitions. In addition to the logistical benefits, the dispensers can be used to 

locate the area that might contain UXO after employment. 

Precision Guidance and Munitions Reliability Impacts 

The justification for acquiring improved fuze performance, as well as the general 

development of precision-guided and smart munitions, is that of significantly improved 

Figure 7. Munitions RF tag lifecycle should be expanded to include deployment and UXO 

recovery. 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 37

lethality per shot or sortie and the attendant savings in the logistics chain and sortie 

generation. Three areas of particular savings will have a positive effect on combat 

efficiencies: logistics chain impact, U.S. and friendly force combat survivability, and 

collateral damage. The fewer munitions required to achieve a particular effect, the less 

the logistics pre-load and continued munitions flow in battle preparation and 

engagement. Further, fewer munitions on target to achieve desired battle damage 

probability will generally result in a higher lethality (less attack-time opportunity for a 

mobile target to achieve protective cover, for example). Highly reliable and accurate 

munitions also contribute to a significant reduction in friendly force risk (fratricide) and 

residual (UXO) impediment to friendly force maneuver. Finally, especially in current 

and potential future combat scenarios, a critical issue is the avoidance of collateral 

damage and risk to civilian populations that place in jeopardy the objective of "winning 

the hearts and minds" of the peoples involved. Smart and precision-guided munitions 

reduce the chances of collateral damage, especially in confined and urban 

environments. The added expense per round of the precision or smart munition may 

well be more than offset by the advantage values gained in these confined areas. 

U.S. Forces are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs. GPS and numerous 

inexpensive and accurate sensors have enabled a broad transition to precision targeting 

and a substantial drop in the number of munitions needed to prosecute military 

operations. While the addition of precision targeting and guidance does not in and of 

itself improve munitions reliability, it provides several tangible related advantages. 

• By reducing the number of munitions expended, the quantity of UXO is 

correspondingly reduced. Air operations have moved from the era of ten or 

more sorties per target to ten or more targets per sortie in a very few years. 

Operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated air 

operations effectiveness in excess of any earlier approaches and with vastly 

less ordnance. Similar improvements will be brought to ground operations 

with the next generation of missile and artillery systems. 

• The use of precision munitions has reduced the area in which UXO may be 

located. The guidance systems used have proven to be reliable enough that 

very small amount of ordnance will be deposited outside of tight boundaries 

around the target area. Even for area attack munitions, this means predictable 

and smaller areas for potential UXO consideration. While not directly 

affecting the “percentage failure” of the munitions used, this effort will 

greatly reduce the number of area attack munitions needed to achieve the 

desired effect, thereby reducing the amount of UXO. 

• The economics of targeting prosecution have been substantially changed by 

these new guidance and targeting technologies. In addition to vastly reducing 

the numbers of munitions needed, the new guidance and targeting 

technologies have reduced the cost of logistic support, training, and 
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38 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

operations (e.g., fueling, repairs). These munitions also provide the capability 

to handle many targets per sortie, rather than many sorties per target to 

assure target kill, thus significantly reducing the cost of overall tactical 

operations and cost-per-target kill. 

• Certain potential future combat scenarios, however, may require the massed 

use of conventional munitions for force protection and ultimate defeat of 

enemy forces. DoD will need to maintain a balance of highly efficient, precise 

munitions and less precise but very low-cost munitions that are efficient 

against massed area-wide attacks. 

It is the combination of the first two effects that has led to the most substantial 

recent improvements in reducing collateral damage and the risks posed by UXO in 

recent US military operations. DoD should consider policy changes that compare the 

effects of precision guidance on operational UXO issues when assessing compliance 

with direct munitions reliability performance. If the intention of DoD’s submunitions 

reliability policy is saving the lives of civilians and US forces, it should consider indirect 

effects (such as guidance) as well as the directly measured munitions reliability. 

It is not clear that any further effort needs to be applied to take advantage of these 

effects. The value of precision munitions is well understood, as is the need to achieve 

precision or near precision in each new munitions system. It is also clear that the 

lethality of these accurate munitions has enabled greater use of unitary warheads, 

which makes it economically and technically much easier to achieve higher levels of 

reliability. 

Recently, many programs facing acquisition milestones have chosen unitary 

munitions to replace area attack munitions. The Task Force considered a 

recommendation mandating this transition, but has come to believe that this step is 

premature because (1) following the recommendations in this report can lead to 

technically acceptable highly reliable munitions and (2) area attack munitions provide a 

valuable tactical capability that cannot at present be replicated by other munitions. 

Operational Performance Assessment of Munitions Reliability 

During this review, the Task Force repeatedly tried to review operational 

performance data for the munitions of interest. It was clear that there is no structured 

mechanism for tracking munition reliability in combat operations. Some munitions 

reliability data can be inferred from strike assessment reporting, but this can only 

bound the failure rate. 

Modern production techniques, especially flexible precision manufacturing, can be 

set up to maximize the effectiveness with which feedback information on reliability (test 

and field performance) may be inserted into the production and quality control process 

to improve product reliability. The Task Force has, however, found that there is no 

effective mechanism in place to provide this feedback to the munition or fuze 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 39

manufacturer, and that the manufacturers do not receive timely or useful information 

about the types and nature of operational failures experienced in use. 

It should also be possible to provide improved munition performance predictions 

with this type of data. It is understood that many of the most problematic munitions 

have higher failure rates when used during or after precipitation, or when targeted at 

areas that may not trigger their contact fuzing as designed (such as trees, marshes and 

areas with heavy underbrush). However, no specific guidelines for taking into account 

the reduced effectiveness of these systems under these conditions have been developed 

or offered to mission planners. Although anecdotes abound, there is no statistically 

significant data on munitions reliability outside of proving ground conditions, and no 

efforts ongoing to generate any. 

Unfortunately, former Secretary Cohen’s guidance on munitions reliability may be 

having an unintended negative effect in this area. By targeting munitions reliability as 

measured in performance lot tests, all efforts are concentrated on high-reliability 

measures. Consequently, this makes capturing data on non-pristine operational 

scenarios risky, as the expected lower reliability could be misinterpreted as noncompliance with the guidelines. 

Figure 8. BLU-97 Munitions in orchard near Kandahar, Afghanistan, 2001. (Photo courtesy of William 

M. Arkin, Matthew McKinzie and Sarah Sewall) 
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40 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

Steps necessary to quantify reduced performance effects owing to target conditions 

will require some combination of more representative operational testing and better 

maintenance of area attack munition performance data in combat operations. This 

information will help mission planners determine when to use or to avoid using these 

munitions. Therefore, these scope-determining tests should not be excluded from any 

identification of anticipated munition reliability. 

Note that the type of data required for munitions effectiveness assessment is not 

necessarily the same type of data needed for production feedback leading to improved 

reliability. In the case of the former, information is sought to improve the accuracy of 

JMEMs. In the case of the latter, information on causes of failures will be essential in 

order to relate reliability to the production and lot acceptance process. It is the latter 

type of information that the fuze producers said they were not getting and that would 

be useful to a responsive production system. 

The overall point for the JMEMs is that the insertion of actually achieved target 

effects provides a much higher confidence in the guidelines for future munitions 

allocation and operational use. 

The overall point for industry feedback is that the producer needs to understand 

the relationship between production process/lot testing and failure mechanisms 

actually experienced in the field, if improved production processes and testing are to be 

identified and inserted into the production and acceptance line to improve reliability. 

The Services should explore methods to provide operational test and combat 

operations performance feedback to the acquisition community and the suppliers. This 

feedback should be used to optimize production methods, ensuring increased reliability 

through improvements in design and production control methods and documentation. 

SECONDARY RECOMMENDATION

• Consideration should be given to (1) whichever target characteristics could 

yield unacceptably high failure rates and (2) mechanisms for monitoring and 

anticipating those conditions in operations. Given the dependency on such 

factors as foliage, soil types, and recent weather, this is likely to be a complex 

undertaking. However, it is just these environmentally related failures that lead 

to a substantial portion of the misinformation about these munitions. 

Addressing these failures directly through anticipation and an alternative 

weaponeering could greatly reduce their contribution to UXO and any negative 

connotation attached to their use. This data should be made available as quickly 

as it can be generated and validated to weaponeering operations through direct 

contact with the affected mission planning operations. By directly and rapidly 

responding to munition performance limitations in certain scenarios, DoD will 

improve operational effectiveness while avoiding pockets of UXO that could 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________________ 41

lead to collateral damage or fratricide and be misrepresented as indicative or 

broader operational use of that munition. 
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Chapter 3. Acquisition, Logistics, and Industrial Base

This section will address the areas of acquisition, logistics and the industrial base, 

focusing in particular on the issues of legacy inventory area attack munitions, the 

deteriorating fuze and battery industrial base, and the acquisition policies that impact 

our national security. 

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Services should support a new, joint family of area attack munitions and 

upgrade a fraction of the current legacy inventory. The Services should assess 

their current operational plans to determine a reasonable number of legacy area 

attack munitions needed to address future conflict scenarios and develop a plan 

to reduce UXO in those munitions. This latter step will help ensure that the 

Services retain a needed capability and sustain industrial capability until a more 

modern area attack munition matures. 

• The Services should continue to field munition/dispenser guidance accuracy 

improvements. Improvement in munition guidance will reduce both the 

aggregate quantities of UXO and the areas in which it may be located. 

• The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

should host a fuze and battery industry executive meeting (a “Last Brunch”) 

to discuss future procurement and acquisition policies in order to preserve 

and optimize our national capability. The munitions battery and fuze 

industries are strategic national resources with capabilities that need to be 

preserved. Without OSD initiative, the industry runs the risk of downsizing 

“overshoot.”

There is nothing more certain than change, and change has been rampant in the 

world of fuzes and related fire train requirements. 

There is an increased emphasis on dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 

small-unit operations, focused logistics and force protection in US combat operations. 

At the same time, there are heightened public expectations that US forces will be able to 

conduct clean and precise operations that pose minimal risk of collateral damage. The 

result is an increased cost associated with UXO both in terms of effects on military 

operations and on growing sensitivity to humanitarian risks. Reaction to these changes 

has been throttled by lack of recognition at the highest levels and a severe shortage of 
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44 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

funding for those solutions that have been identified. This is not meant to be an 

indictment, but rather a critical review of what has evolved since the paradigm shifts 

evidenced by the fall of the Berlin Wall, Bosnia, Desert Storm, Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well as the defense industry consolidation 

initiated by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1993 and the follow-on 

assignment of overall Total System Performance Responsibility to system or prime 

contractors (“primes”) that has followed. 

Not to be forgotten is that the current preferred munitions are precise and smart. 

These munitions have redefined acceptable performance as well as drastically improved 

warfighter survivability with their accuracy, stand-off capability, lethality, and reduced 

failure rates. The new measure of effectiveness is “targets per sortie” rather than 

“sorties per target,” coupled with minimal collateral damage. This trend favorably 

reduces the number of munitions that need to be stockpiled, pre-positioned and 

supported. However, this reduced demand magnifies the problems of excess 

production capacity and lagging manufacturing technologies in the fuze sector of the 

munitions industrial base. 

The discrete fire train elements— batteries, fuzes, etc.—have been challenged to 

meet their technical requirements and retain their identity owing to the need for 

miniaturization and the high levels of integration, as well as the reduced quantity of 

munitions being procured. This is further exacerbated by the inherent safety concerns of 

such integration. No relevant or comparable commercial standards for safe-arm devices 

exist. 

The end result is that the dominant fuze manufacturers (L3, Kaman and ATK) have 

been forced to downsize even after consolidation. The risk to national security is that 

the entire industry could implode. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the reduced 

involvement of—and funding support to—the government in-house laboratories 

(Picatinny, China Lake, Eglin, Indian Head, etc.). It appears that recognition of the fuze 

industry’s plight has been shrouded by the success of new munitions systems. 

Before detailing the issues and programs underway and recommended, it should be 

noted that there is a massive inventory of munitions that were designed, developed and 

produced using decades-old technology. 

Legacy Munitions 

The largest contributors to the UXO problem are legacy munitions, operational 

factors and fuze technologies. With regard to legacy munitions, current munitions 

employment procedures emphasize using our best munitions systems first, then 

systematically expending less modernized munitions as the conflict progresses (i.e., last 

in—first out). Accordingly, there is an ever increasing stockpile of dated munitions that 

will either have to be used “as is,” retrofitted or demilitarized. A large percentage of 

area attack munitions are past their respective design life. Retrofitting the existing 

stockpile could run into the hundreds of millions of dollars or more for the BLU-97 
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alone. Retrofitting is not without other challenges as well, namely the question of 

meeting revised safety standards and the risk of introducing new failure points in 

legacy systems never designed for upgrades. The operational question then becomes 

one of priorities and the cost-benefit analysis of retrofitting older munitions at the 

expense of fielding more capable, reliable, safe and effective munitions systems. 

Retrofitting is not the only option for addressing the issue of legacy munitions and 

UXO. Incorporating or improving the guidance capabilities of these munitions—

through the application of GPS or Inertial Navigation System guidance to the delivery 

vehicle—can also help reduce the quantity of UXO and its impact on friendly forces and 

civilians. Adding accuracy improvements results in less UXO because fewer munitions 

are needed to achieve the same effect against a given target. It reduces the area 

subsequently affected by UXO because reducing the guidance capability reduces the 

radius of error. It also provides a less intrusive method of upgrading existing munitions 

than retrofitting, thus avoiding the expense and risk of the latter. The end results are a 

smaller logistics load, greater freedom of maneuver, reduced risk for both friendly 

forces and civilians, and less UXO. 

The Services have unanimously stated the need for area attack munitions. That said, 

there appears to be no plan addressing the future of these munitions, particularly as 

legacy systems age. It is clear that legacy munitions in the Service’s inventory have 

caused the UXO issues leading to the initiation of this Task Force. The ongoing 

Quadrennial Defense Review is an excellent opportunity to address the issue. 

The Services should assess their current operational plans to determine a reasonable 

number of legacy area attack munitions to address future conflict scenarios and develop 

a plan to reduce UXO. This will help ensure the Services retain a needed capability and 

sustain industrial capacity until more modern area attack munitions are developed and 

fielded. 

This should be accomplished through a measured technology update program. The 

first and least invasive step is to increase the guidance accuracy of the munition 

canister. With the increased accuracy of the dispenser, dispersion of UXO will be 

reduced. Given the requirement and resources available for upgrade, some portion of 

the munitions (e.g., BLU-97s) could also be upgraded to further reduce UXO. This 

hybrid action will address both the potential for further loss of industry capability and 

the employment of the legacy inventory of area attack munitions. 

The Task Force focused its research on US munitions. With the growing emphasis 

on coalition operations and multi-national acquisitions, munitions reliability 

considerations will need to include foreign-produced munitions and components as 

well as those produced in the United States. 
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46 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

SECONDARY RECOMMENDATION

• The Services should establish a sunset plan to phase out non-retrofitted, 

grandfathered munitions by 2020, consistent with Joint Vision 2020 and 

long-range Service planning. The sunset plan will make allowance for the 

Services’ ability to replace legacy munition capabilities. 

Optimizing the Fuze and Battery Industry 

The Addressable Market

There is a handful of struggling fuze manufacturers today, and in interviews with 

the top four, they all expressed concern about the long-term economic ability to 

produce fuzes for military purposes. Three corporations account for over 80 percent of 

2003 fuze sales, with the remaining sales spread among half a dozen other suppliers. 

There are significant issues with the munitions fuze and battery production base. 

Munitions fuzes and reserve batteries are a niche market exclusively dependent on 

military demand. They are also critical elements with respect to munitions reliability. 

The fuze and power source industries have significant excess capacity; volatile 

production rates have an almost crippling effect. 

Using joint-Service production requirements for tactical general-purpose bombs as 

a benchmark, Figure 9 depicts a chronic instability in production requirements. Each 

bomb produced requires at least one fuze when employed. The timespan of 1990 

through 2010 shows that there were huge surges in demand coinciding with both Gulf 

Wars, followed by rapidly declining requirements with “get-well” production forecasts 

in the out years. Such cycles are highly destabilizing for ammunition manufacturers and 

their component suppliers. They inhibit the achievement of a financially healthy, robust 

and modernized fuze supplier base to support warfighter needs. 

The risk of not achieving an acceptable return on investment (because of an 

unpredictable market) discourages fuze and battery suppliers from investing to 

modernize manufacturing processes or to improve designs to enhance reliability. 

During production valleys, line shutdowns are likely and result in the loss of critical 

skills and manufacturing know-how. The need to replace critical suppliers—forced to 

exit the market because of low volume—adds schedule risks, quality concerns and 

component requalification costs. Nevertheless, fuze suppliers historically have met the 

needs of the warfighter, including surge requirements. This has made it difficult for 

warnings of a growing systemic weakness in the fuze and battery sectors to receive 
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adequate top-level attention within DoD. The changing operational environment makes 

it essential that these warnings be heard. 

The emerging dominance of precision-guided munitions in air ordnance is driving 

a paradigm shift in what is needed from the fuze industrial base. During the Operation 

Desert Storm, over 220,000 general-purpose bombs were employed from about 1,300 US 

combat aircraft. Approximately 9,000 bombs or 4 percent of the total were precisionguided. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, about 24,000 general-purpose bombs were 

employed from about 700 combat aircraft. In this latter conflict, 63 percent, or about 

15,000 bombs, were precision-guided. That is nearly twice the number of precisionguided munitions and one-tenth the total number of bombs than in Desert Storm. While 

the air campaign requirements for the two wars were different, the dominance of 

precision-guided munitions is unmistakable and irreversible as the number of combat 

platforms decrease over the long term. 

The continuing use of precision-guided, general-purpose bombs will sustain a need 

for bomb fuzes, but not in the massive quantities previously required. However, the 

need for high-reliability fuzing is increasingly important when only one bomb is being 

dropped per target. This evolution in war fighting, combined with reduced production 

demands in the post-Operation Iraqi Freedom surge environment, enhances the 

likelihood of a major restructuring of the fuze and battery industrial base sectors. 

Recent studies confirm that a shakeout is impending. 

A multi-Service DoD panel participated in a study led by the Department of 

Commerce on the munitions battery industry. The study, published in February 2004, 

determined that the reserve battery industrial base should be part of the mobilization 

Figure 9. Bomb production drives fuze requirements. 
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48 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

base, and that the industry was economically stressed and needed to be strengthened. A 

study of the fuze industry, led by the Defense Contract Management Agency, was 

completed in December 2003. The study generally found that these manufacturers were 

suffering from marginal business, severe competition and significant overcapacity. The 

Task Force is concerned by the lack of positive action to resolve these critical findings. 

Some level of government interest and guidance is needed to maintain this critical 

capability until the next-generation integrated fuze—guidance, targeting, etc.—has 

matured. 

It is clear that defense acquisition strategies not tailored to shaping the desired 

industrial base end state have brought about significant challenges for the suppliers of 

munitions batteries and fuzes. These challenges include: company consolidation; 

reduced research and development spending, resulting in loss of workforce expertise; 

lack of technology for new designs; inefficient procurement practices, resulting in 

volatile production rates; and acquisition policies focusing on systems and relegating 

battery and fuze suppliers to a subcontractor status to the prime contractors. The likely 

result for essential batteries and fuzes will be delayed production, production of suspect 

quality, or no production at all. This will adversely affect DoD’s ability to meet future 

mission requirements, including minimizing UXO. 

Acquisition Policy Impact

Acquisition strategies and procurements will drive the future state of the fuze and 

battery industrial base sectors. All the studies and best intentions cannot supplant the 

fact that the fuzes and batteries DoD actually buys, and the contracting techniques it 

employs, will determine the future of these industrial base sectors. These strategies and 

contracts must be incentive-based in order to motivate industry to invest in the capital 

equipment and processes to create efficient, flexible and responsive manufacturing 

capabilities. Modernized, financially healthy fuze and battery suppliers are critical to 

achieving highly reliable munitions. 

Fuzes are sophisticated devices that must meet high safety standards using 

components and techniques with few (if any) commercial analogies. A systems 

approach, rather than a commodity approach, is required to assure delivery of a reliable 

product. Unfortunately, acquisition strategies for fuzes frequently do not recognize this 

fact. 

To meet small and disadvantaged business goals, for example, acquisition 

officials—both government and contractor—have often broken fuze procurements 

down to the component level to ensure these businesses could qualify. The unintended 

result is that fuze components were produced without a complete understanding of 

how they would be assembled or what functions they performed, and without the 

appropriate quality control. The consequence is poor fuzing reliability. 
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As previously discussed, feast-or-famine procurement requirements also have a 

deleterious effect on the fuze and battery industrial base sectors. This situation is 

exacerbated by annual fiscal-year contracts. There is little motivation for contractors to 

invest in modernization when the return on investment is unpredictable. Part of the 

reason government acquisition planners have not addressed this situation may be 

attributable to different perceptions of risk. Government personnel primarily view risk 

in terms of cost, schedule and product performance. While these factors are all 

important to industry, an additional factor for contractors is achieving financial 

objectives and meeting their fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders. To be successful 

in transforming the industrial base, government acquisition strategies must recognize 

how both prime and subcontractors perceive risk. 

Current government acquisition strategies (Total-System Performance 

Responsibility) emphasize the use of systems contracts managed by prime contractors. 

The objective is to provide well-integrated solutions to government requirements, with 

the prime contractor assuming the risk of developing and providing the total system. In 

recognition of this risk, prime contractors are often awarded cost-plus-fixed-fee 

contracts. However, to control their risks, prime contractors frequently require fixedFigure 10. Current and future funding for area attack is focused almost exclusively on Smart and 

Precision munitions. 
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50 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

price development contracts from their subcontractors, including fuze manufacturers. 

With few new programs offering production opportunities, and with excess production 

capacity, fuze suppliers have little choice but to acquiesce to the prime contractors. This 

situation creates significant risk for fuze manufacturers in the area they consider most 

important—achieving their financial objectives. As currently implemented, wellintentioned total-system contract strategies are not effectively addressing the unique 

needs of the financially stressed fuze and battery industrial base, and will not facilitate 

the needed transformation of these sectors. 

Assessing the Outlook for Industry

It is not a secret to anyone that the industry has suffered. Consolidation has taken 

place, and some companies are still facing a bleak outlook that dictates further 

consolidation and downsizing. 

With acquisition strategies tending to treat fuzes as a commodity, there is no toplevel recognition that munitions battery and fuze industries are strategic national 

resources with capabilities that need to be preserved. The current emphasis on systems 

contracting does not help the situation. Prime contractors are interested in making 

progress on their programs with minimal risk and cost. This results in more 

economically stressed fuze and munition battery suppliers and little emphasis on 

advancing technology. 

The Darwinian influence of the marketplace cannot be avoided, and a virtual safety 

net needs to be established through enlightened policy. Without OSD initiative, the 

industry runs the risk of downsizing “overshoot.” 

Current acquisition strategies are not effectively addressing the unique needs of the 

fuze and battery industrial base, despite the warnings of knowledgeable study groups 

and experts in the field that there are systemic problems in both areas. The long-term 

health of these at-risk sectors is crucial to producing reliable munitions. While studies 

and experts can sound the alarm, suppliers will only respond to what DoD customers 

actually buy and the contracting methods used for the purchase. Therefore, acquisition 

strategies and contracts are the primary tools for transforming these sectors into a 

financially healthy and responsive national asset. 

Because of their stringent performance requirements in a demanding operational 

environment, fuzes must be managed from a systems perspective, whether that be as 

end items procured by the government or as a part of a larger total system managed by 

a prime contractor. Government and prime contractor acquisition strategies must be 

tailored to support this reality. 

Currently, fuze and battery manufacturers are not motivated to invest in upgrading 

manufacturing capabilities or developing innovative new approaches to improve 

reliability because the financial rewards are too uncertain. This situation is a major 

contributor to the systemic weakness of the industrial base and is driven by a volatile 
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market, single-year contracts, excess capacity, too many producers, and contracts not 

tailored to address the supplier financial risks. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics needs to 

arrange a meeting with the fuze and battery industry executives to provide guidance on 

the future government requirements so they can make the necessary business decisions. 

This would be similar in nature to the “Last Supper” hosted by then-Deputy Secretary 

of Defense William Perry in 1993. As part of this process, DoD should identify required 

in-house and industrial base capabilities and develop acquisition policies and strategies 

to maintain them. 

Subsequent to this, DoD must increase its support of fuze and battery technologies. 

A forthcoming DoD Fuze Integrated Product Team Technology Plan is expected to 

identify approximately $120 million needed by both industry and government labs over 

the next ten years—above the current baseline—in order to support fuze technology. 

While the Task Force does not endorse a specific investment level, it is critical that DoD 

maintain complementary in-house and industrial base capabilities. 

SECONDARY RECOMMENDATIONS

• The Defense Systems Management College should immediately form a 

Red Team to develop policy recommendations for OSD to provide to 

program executive officers and program managers. The recommendations 

should focus on improving acquisition strategies and guiding the 

transformation of the fuze and battery industrial base. 

• The implications of advanced precision-guided and smart munitions 

system designs for safety design approval, design certification, and lot 

acceptance testing must be examined in order for these systems to move 

forward into their System Development and Demonstration and initial 

production phases in a timely manner. This is particularly important 

because such advanced munition designs provide close integration of 

guidance and target sensing with the fuzing function. Because of this, the 

design balance between munitions safety and munitions reliability is likely to 

be shifted away from current safety board concerns based on mechanical and 

electromechanical safety designs. In any event, the design and per-unit cost of 

these precision and smart munitions will assure high fuzing reliability. The 

critical performance criterion for these sensor-integrated fuzed munitions will 

be the effectiveness of these systems in achieving per-round lethality 

objectives against the mission target set. 
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52 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

The section below provides a number of options addressing fuze and battery 

community procurement issues. 

An Acquisition Policy “Tool Box”

Suppliers need to be rewarded for managing the risks inherent in the fuze and 

munitions battery industrial base sectors. These rewards can be a combination of 

economic and non-economic incentives. When fuzes are part of a larger total-system 

contract, primes should be rewarded for employing similar incentives for their fuze and 

battery suppliers. There are numerous possibilities including: 

a. Contract Length. Long-term contractual relationships are very beneficial in 

strengthening the industrial base. Five years should be the norm. While multi-year 

contracts are coveted by industry, base-year contracts with multiple priced options 

are viable alternatives. The key point is that long-term contracts reduce risks in 

achieving adequate returns on investment for projects that improve munitions 

system reliability. They also: 

• Reduce the likelihood of production breaks, which can contribute to the loss 

of skilled workers and the costly need to re-qualify processes or suppliers; 

• Reduce costs through long-term purchase agreements and economic-order 

quantity savings; 

• Allow time for supply chain streamlining efforts to take hold; 

• Secure contractor commitments to remain in the industry; and 

• Reduce contracting administrative workloads, allowing government 

acquisition personnel to concentrate on other mission tasks. 

b. Price-Quantity Curves or Tables. An important element of long-term contracts is a 

commitment by government and contractor to pricing for varying quantities. This 

provides the government with needed flexibility to handle changes in requirements 

while assuring the contractor a favorable price as quantities fluctuate. Minimum and 

maximum quantities and delivery rates should be identified. Agreeing to long-term 

pricing versus various quantities also facilitates stability in Service budgeting, since 

the cost impact of quantity fluctuations is visible to planners up front in the budget 

process. 

c. Economic Price Adjustments. When fixed-price contracts are employed, the 

government should recognize and allow price adjustments when there are 

components or materials for which there is significant market risk or cost volatility. 

Such adjustments are important in managing financial risks arising from long-term 

contracts. 
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d. Performance Incentives. Fuze and battery suppliers should be rewarded for both 

demonstrated and sustained improvements in reliability. 

e. Schedule Incentives. Fuze and battery suppliers who exceed delivery expectations 

should be rewarded. This includes both long-term, sustained, on-time delivery and 

demonstrated responsiveness and flexibility in responding to new government 

requirements. 

f. Robust Manufacturing Award Fees. Fuze and battery suppliers should be rewarded 

for their modernization efforts that balance current requirements with responsive 

surge capabilities and disaster-recovery planning. Rewards for effective programs in 

areas such as Lean Manufacturing and Six Sigma are also appropriate in that these 

programs contribute directly to improved product reliability.

g. Supply Chain Management Award Fees. Reliance on small and disadvantaged 

businesses is one of the hallmarks of federal acquisition policy. While acquisition 

strategies to procure fuzes must take a systems perspective, contractors should be 

rewarded for effective utilization of these important sources of innovative solutions. 

This includes mentoring small and disadvantaged businesses to improve their 

manufacturing capabilities using tools such as Lean Manufacturing and Six Sigma 

teams. 

h. Partnering Initiatives. Establishing a partnering environment promotes teamwork, 

cooperation and good-faith performance. Partnering involves bringing stakeholders 

together from across industry and government in a structured framework to share 

information and establish common goals and objectives. For example, partnering 

can be used to provide a forum for fuze and battery suppliers to receive direct 

feedback from warfighters on the reliability of their products. In an effective 

partnering environment there are no surprises for government or industry, 

especially regarding product reliability. 
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Chapter 4. Transforming DoD ERW Abatement Efforts

This section will address recommended changes to DoD’s organizational structure 

to improve its capability to address ERW issues. 

KEY RECOMMENDATION

• The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should transform all functions 

within his organization related to explosive remnants of war abatement 

efforts into one single office charged with the responsibility to execute the 

DoD program and empowered with the commensurate authority. This will 

achieve unity of command, unity of effort, and accountability. Sufficient 

funding already exists, but the current organizational structure prevents 

effective implementation of DoD ERW abatement efforts. 

The Terms of Reference directed the Task Force to identify other feasible 

measures—beyond improving the reliability rates of its munitions—that the United 

States could take to reduce the threat that failed munitions pose to friendly forces and 

civilians. Most recommendations in this report concern technical changes and 

improvements in targeting, fuzing, batteries, and the acquisition process itself. 

However, there is another category of “feasible measures” the United States can 

undertake—establishing a robust, well-synchronized and effective ERW abatement 

program. A DoD effort exists, in multiple entities, but it lacks unity of effort and unity 

of command, thereby limiting its potential contributions to establishing safe and secure 

environments in future stabilization, reconstruction, and counter-insurgency 

operations. 

Achieving 100 percent munition reliability is arguably neither economically feasible 

nor technically realistic; therefore, a prudent assumption is that there will always be USorigin UXO populating battlefields where American forces have engaged opponents. 

Furthermore, much of the UXO afflicting countries worldwide is not of US origin, and 

US efforts to reduce the amount of UXO resulting from its own operations will have no 

corresponding effect on foreign-origin UXO. Consequently, there will continue to be a 

demand for capabilities and resources to address these remnants of war. 

In addition, it is very significant to note that high reliability rates alone will not 

solve the UXO problem. For example, even a near-perfect 99 percent munitions 

reliability rate can yield nearly 80 pieces of UXO in less than a minute from just one 

volley of a multiple launch rocket system—an area attack munition system found in 
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dozens of countries world-wide.5 A more probable 95 percent reliability rate applied to 

a single tactical engagement—a battery of six launchers firing two volleys—would 

produce over 4600 pieces of UXO.6 Consequently, there will continue to be a demand 

for capabilities and resources to address these explosive remnants of war. The daunting 

time and costs associated with the clean up the UXO produced by these two volleys 

further illustrates the need for an aggressive effort to address ERW. The 4600 pieces of 

UXO would typically be scattered over three square kilometers, the area covered by a 

six-launcher strike.7 Assuming a clearance rate of two square meters per hour per man, 

it would require a 300-man demining unit approximately five years to clear the area to 

international standards.8 The cost could easily reach tens of millions of dollars. The 

time and costs could be further increased depending on the soil type, vegetation, slope, 

ground clutter, saturation level of ERW, and surrounding habitation and infrastructure. 

Fortunately, the resources, training base, facilities, and, for the most part, the 

personnel necessary to support abatement efforts currently exist, but responsibilities for 

these efforts within the Office of the Secretary of Defense are not organized in a 

coherent and streamlined manner. 

The US Government’s Humanitarian Mine Action Program is an interagency effort 

led by the Department of State. It is an active and vigorous program—and the largest in 

the world. US support for mine action since 1993 totals approximately $1 billion—

representing over 60 percent of mine action contributions worldwide during the past 

dozen years ($1.7 billion). 

Despite the title “Humanitarian Mine Action Program,” these interagency efforts 

necessarily address all explosive remnants of war—not just landmines. In reality, 

contaminated areas often contain a mix of landmines, mortar shells, artillery rounds, 

grenades, booby traps, bombs, weapons caches, improvised explosive devices, and area 

attack munitions. DoD recognized this reality and last year obtained a change to its 

legislative authority (Section 401 of Title 10, United States Code) broadening its 

humanitarian mine action efforts to include ERW. 

 

5 1 launcher x 12 rockets x 644 munitions per rocket x .01 failure rate = 77 pieces of UXO. 

6 6 launchers x 12 rockets x 2 volleys x 644 munitions per rocket x .05 failure rate = 4636 pieces of 

UXO. 

7 1 launcher firing 12 rockets attacks an area target covering 500m x 500m = .25 km2. At this rate of 

coverage, 6 launchers x 2 volleys x .25 km2 = 3 km2. 

8 One deminer can clear to international standards at an approximate rate of 1-3 m2 per hour. The 

costs range from $1-$80 per m2. The rate and costs are dependent upon many factors, including: soil type, 

extent of vegetation, slope, ground clutter, saturation level of ERW, extent of surrounding habitation and 

infrastructure, competency of deminers and demining program overall, and local labor rates. For the 

example cited: 3 million m2 ÷ (2 m2 cleared per hour x 30 hours per week effective clearance rate x 48 

weeks work per year x 200 deminers) = over 5 years. 200 deminers equates to an organization of at least 

300 personnel based on 1 supervisor per 2-3 deminers plus medical personnel and supervisory staff. 
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US ERW abatement efforts have supported programs in over forty countries and 

regions. DoD’s contribution to the effort totals nearly $270 million, of which 

approximately $120 million has been spent on research and development (mostly to 

develop mechanical demining technologies). DoD’s efforts focus on the following: 

“train-the-trainer” programs to establish indigenous demining and medical response 

capacities; mine-risk education efforts; underwater explosive ordnance disposal; 

technical assistance with ERW removal; establishing, training, and equipping national 

mine action authorities; provision of personal protective equipment for deminers; 

satellite imagery and map products; and mechanical demining technology, testing, 

training and equipment. 

Unfortunately, DoD efforts fall short of their potential because of organizational 

inefficiency. Figure 11 highlights the fragmented nature of DoD efforts. Component 

functions are assigned to multiple offices within the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy. This organizational structure lacks unity of effort and unity of 

command, and is consequently devoid of synergy. As a result, DoD is missing a 

significant opportunity to exploit a means of engagement and humanitarian assistance 

in support of present and future stabilization, reconstruction and counter-insurgency 

operations. 

Ironically, the Department of State has the very unity of effort and unity of 

command that DoD lacks. Its Weapons Removal and Abatement Office has 

Figure 11. Current OSD Structure for Addressing Explosive Remnants of War and 

Related Issues 
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58 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

responsibility for ERW abatement policy, program management, public outreach and 

decision-making authority, allowing it to achieve a level of consistency and focus that 

DoD at present cannot match. 

Therefore, in order to make effective use of its ERW resources, DoD should 

transform all functions related to ERW abatement efforts into one single office charged 

with the responsibility to execute the DoD program and empowered with the 

commensurate authority. This will achieve unity of command, unity of effort, and 

accountability, and will place DoD’s efforts on par with those of the State Department. 

Embracing this recommendation, DoD’s ERW abatement efforts could be poised to 

achieve the following: 

• Significantly increase the effectiveness of its interagency contributions 

resulting in reduced danger to US and allied military personnel and civilians 

alike from US- and foreign-origin ERW. 

• Demonstrate that, while area attack munitions remain militarily effective and 

continue to provide a needed capability, the United States is not indifferent to 

the potential dangers they can pose to civilians. 

• Lead future DoD efforts in the establishment of a safe and secure 

environment in stabilization, reconstruction, counter-insurgency, and 

humanitarian relief efforts, all of which will consume an increasing role of 

future military engagements. Stabilization operations are vastly improved 

when the hazards of mines, captured enemy ammunition, UXO and other 

remnants of war are controlled or eliminated. 

The United States maintains an aggressive interagency humanitarian program, as 

previously detailed, to assist other countries with 

their indigenous ERW—the vast majority of 

which is of neither US manufacture nor delivery. 

This stands as an impressive contribution 

and commitment to the eradication of threats 

posed by ERW—not equaled by any country or 

organization in the world. This point is often 

overlooked amid the periodic barrages of 

criticism that DoD receives for keeping 

landmines and area attack munitions in its 

inventory. 

Leadership in future DoD efforts in 

stabilization, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency efforts will depend on establishing 

and maintaining a safe and secure environment. 

Achieving this requires the safe removal of all 

Figure 12. Humanitarian Demining 
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ERW that threatens military operations or civilians. Therefore, once the recommended 

DoD organizational structure is in place, DoD should provide specific guidance—in the 

form of a Directive—focusing its ERW abatement efforts in support of broader 

stabilization, reconstruction and counter-insurgency efforts. At a minimum, this 

guidance should address the following: 

• Resourcing of training missions. The supply of US military personnel able to 

support these efforts evaporated in the face of War on Terrorism demands. A 

legislative initiative permitting DoD to use its civilian personnel for these missions 

is under review in Congress. 

• Combatant Command support of program. Currently, some Commands strongly 

support and embrace DoD’s ERW efforts and others don’t. The guidance should 

reiterate that ERW abatement efforts constitute an important security cooperation 

tool and need to be employed as such. From a functional point of view, 

Commands should adequately resource a small, dedicated ERW staff to facilitate 

operational support. This staff could be teamed with an Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal (EOD) cell to oversee doctrine development, joint tactics, techniques and 

procedures, EOD training, and employment on ERW abatement missions in 

support of the Command’s security cooperation goals. 

• Organization of DoD ERW abatement office, mission, resources, and linkage to the 

Security Cooperation Guidance. Currently, not all of DoD’s ERW efforts directly 

support this guidance. 

• Using the Secretary’s Transformation Planning Guidance as direction and the 

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel, and 

Facilities process as a structure for analysis, address EOD joint operations, training 

and realignment of the funding for joint EOD technology. There is currently no 

single organization responsible for developing EOD doctrine, training or tactics, 

techniques and procedures, and no single organization with the authority to make 

needed changes. This must change in order to support ERW abatement efforts. 

• Funding appropriated by Congress for mine action but susceptible to diversion to 

other humanitarian projects. Mine action and other ERW programs involve 

training people to do a dangerous task—a very perishable skill—and often involve 

significant lead times (working with the host nation government, interagency 

coordination, etc.) to plan and execute missions. Diverting funding away from 

planned ERW missions to address foreign disasters or other priorities creates 

significant disruptions and calls into question DoD’s long-term commitment to 

these efforts. Resources to support these missions cannot ebb and flow if they are 

to provide effective support to broader stabilization, reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts. 

DoD has made impressive contributions to ERW abatement. Nevertheless, the Task 

Force recommends a transformation of these efforts so that DoD can contribute 
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60 ___________________________________________________________ MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

effectively to the interagency humanitarian effort, thereby reducing the threat to 

military personnel and civilians alike, and helping establish safe and secure 

environments for US military operations. 

SECONDARY RECOMMENDATION

• DoD should provide specific guidance—in the form of a Directive—

focusing its ERW abatement efforts in support of broader stabilization, 

reconstruction and counter-insurgency efforts.
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________APPENDIX I - 1

Appendix I. Terms of Reference
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APPENDIX __________________________________________________ M II - 2 UNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY
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Appendix II. Task Force Membership

CHAIRMAN 

MG Kenneth Israel (Ret) Lockheed Martin Integrated Systems 

MEMBERS 

BG Buck Adams (Ret) Booz Allen Hamilton 

Col Paul Brandenburg, USAF (Ret) General Dynamics 

Mr. Danny Brunson EG&G 

Gen Chuck Horner (Ret) Private Consultant 

Mr. Kent Hutchinson Private Consultant 

Mr. Lanny Lancaster Private Consultant 

VADM Denny McGinn (Ret) Battelle 

Mr. Cliff McLain ARES Corporation 

Mr. Alan Moore The MITRE Corporation 

Dr. Spiros Pallas Private Consultant 

Dr. Allan Steinhardt Booz Allen Hamilton 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Mr. Scott Allred USMC 

MAJ Bruce Beyerly USAF 

LTC Jeffrey Brock Joint Staff 

Mr. Randy Cope USN 

COL John Croghan USAF 

Mr. Clayton Davis OSD (AT&L) 

Mr. Mike D’Onofrio OSD (AT&L) 

Mr. David Hodson OSD (Policy) 

COL John Jordan OSD (Policy) 

Mr. Rene Kiebler USA 

Mr. Brent Knoblett OSD (AT&L) 

Mr. Tony Kress OSD (AT&L) 

Maj Thomas Lennon USAF 

Mr. James Lingar NGA 

Mr. Sheldon Lu CIA 

LTC Michael Meier Joint Staff 

Mr. Tony Melita OSD (AT&L) 

Mr. Leon Springer USA 

COL Allan Vosburgh OSD (Policy) 

Mr. James Wangemann USN 

Dr. Jerry Ward OSD (AT&L) 

Ms. Diane Wright OSD (AT&L) 
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APPENDIX __________________________________________________ M III - 2 UNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

Mr. Marc Cheek OSD (Policy)

DSB SECRETARIAT

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA Defense Science Board 

CDR David Waugh, USN Defense Science Board 

SUPPORT 

Ms. Michelle Ashley SAIC 

Ms. Nicole Coene SAIC 

Ms. Cassandra Jastrow SAIC 
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MUNITIONS SYSTEM RELIABILITY ___________________________________________________APPENDIX III - 1

Appendix III. DoD Policy Memo on Submunition Reliability
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Appendix IV. Briefings Received By the Task Force

 

June 25, 2004 

Maj Darren Cochran, SAF/AQPW 

MGEN Ken Israel, Lockheed Martin 

Mr. Milo Serreyn, HQDA – G4, Munitions Division 

Mr. Anthony Kress, (OUSD)AT&L’s IDS/LW&M 

 

July 8 – July 9, 2004 

Mr. Rene Kiebler, Combat Ammunition Systems 

Mr. Leon Springer, US Army, Fuze Mgmt Office 

LTC Stephen Lee, US Army 

Dr. John Pletcher, US Air Force, Eglin AFB 

Mr. George Clessas, US Navy 

Mr. William Delaney, MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

Ms. Diane Wright, AT&L 

LTC Charles Kelly, J8 

Dr. Allan Steinhardt, Booz Allen Hamilton

 

August 19 – August 20, 2004 

Mr. Philip T. Gorman Jr., ARDEC/RDECOM 

LTC Kevin Jennings, PM Demilitarization 

Mr. Anthony Kress, (OUSD)AT&L’s IDS/LW&M 

Mr. Felix E. Cruz, PM CAS 

Mr. Lawrence Fan, Indian Head Division, NSWC 

Mr. Robert L. Lillard, US Army Artillary Center, Fort Sill 

COL Thomas Torrance, JCS J5 

LTC Keith Angles, USA (Ret), US Army Corp of Engineers 

Mr. Thomas McKimm, Fuze Division, FPAT, AETC, RDECOM-ARDEC 

 

September 21 – September 22, 2004 

Mr. Perry Hamlyn, Mitre 
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Dr. Allan Steinhardt, Booz Allen Hamilton 

Mr. Andrew Chester, DCMA 

Mr. Ed Cummings, Department of State 

COL John Jordan, OSD-Policy/SOLIC/Stability Operations 

COL Al Vosburgh, OSD – SOLIC 

 

October 28 – October 29, 2004 

Mr. Dave Cole, KDI 

Mr. Dave Fine, Alliant 

Mr. Steve Robillard, Alliant 

Mr. Harry Hutchins, Kaman Raymond Aerospace Corporation

Mr. Jerry Hawkins, Kaman Raymond Aerospace Corporation 

Mr. Joseph Homko, BT Fuze

Mr. Edward Cooper, BT Fuze 

Mr. Scott Pomeroy, NSWC DL 

Mr. Randy Cope, Fuze and Warhead Division 

Mr. Lawrence Fan, Indian Head Division, NSWC 

Mr. John Kunstmann, NSWC IH 

Mr. Roger I. Swanson, QE Program Manager, NOSSA 

 

November 22 – November 23, 2004 

Maj Gen Robert Chedister, AAC/CC 

BGen David Edgington, Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 

Dr. John Pletcher, US Air Force, Eglin AFB 

Mr. Brian Rutledge, Direct Attack Systems Group 

Mr. Russ Howard, Air-to-Ground Munitions Systems Wing 

Capt Steve Clark, Shaw AFB

Capt Kevin Halicki, Shaw AFB 

Col John Croghan, US Air Force, Eglin AFB

Mr. Anthony Kress, (OUSD)AT&L’s IDS/LW&M 

RADM Rondeau, NAVPERSDEVCOM 

Ms. Carolyn Holland, AAC/ENA 

Lt Col Raegan Echols, US Air Force, Eglin AFB 
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December 22, 2004 

LTC(P) Michael W. Meier, Joint Staff OCJCS-LC 

 

February 2 – February 3, 2005 

Mr. Dave Janiec, Naval Air (NAVAIR) Weapons Division 

Captain Dan Lee, US Navy, NAVAIR 

Mr. Roy Hageman, NAVAIR Weapons Engagement Office 

Mr. Mike Wirtz, NAVAIR Weapons Engagement Office 

Mr. Clint Housh, NAVAIR Joint Standoff Weapon Office 

 Mr. Forrest Lloyd, NAVAIR Weapons and Energetics Office 

Mr. Ken Hayes, NAVAIR Weapons Prototype Division 

Mr. Steven Fowler, NAVAIR Department for Energetics

Mr. George Hennings, NAVAIR Fuze Development Office 

Mr. Randy Cope, NAVAIR Ordnance System Division 

Mr. Dave Riggs, NAVAIR Safe Arm Development Branch 

 

March 30 – March 31, 2005 

Mr. William (Bill) Arkin, The Carr Center 

Mr. Matthew McKinzie, The Carr Center 

Ms. Sarah Sewall, The Carr Center 

Howard Russell, PEO for Weapons 

Keith Sanders, PEO for Tactical Aircraft and Strike Weapons & Unmanned Aviation 

Brent Pope, PEO for Missiles and Space

Jim Sutton, PEO for Ammo

Carl Campagnuolo, PEO for Special Programs (SOCOM)

Richard Bowen, PEO for Integrated Warfare Systems 

Scott Allred, US Marine Corps, Ammunition Program 

Gregory DuChane, US Marine Corps, Ammunition Program 
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Appendix V. Acronym Index

AGM air-to-ground Missile 

ATK Alliant Techsystems Inc. 

BLU bomb live unit, submunitions for cluster bombs or dispensers 

CALCM conventional air-launched cruise missile (US DoD) 

CBU cluster bomb unit 

CD-ROM Compact Disk - Read Only Memory 

CEM combined effects munitions 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DDR&E Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOTS Dynamic Optical Tags 

DPICM Dual Purpose, Improved Conventional Munition 

DRaFT Digital Radio Frequency Tag 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

EGBU Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit 

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

ERW Explosive Remnants of War 

GMLRS Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System 

GPS Global Positioning System 

IC integrated circuit 

J3 Joint Staff, Operations 

JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile 

JDAM joint direct attack munitions 

JMEMs Joint Munition Effectiveness Manuals 

JSOW Joint Service Stand-Off Weapon 

LGB Laser-Guided Bomb 

MEMS Micro-electro-mechanical system 

MLRS multiple launch rocket system 

MOFA Multi-Option Fuze for Artillery 

MSR Munitions Systems Reliability 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

RF radio frequency 

FRIC Radio Frequency integrated chip 
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RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

SDB small diameter bomb 

SFW sensor fused weapon 

SLAM-ER Standoff Land-Attack Missile – Expanded Response 

TacTom Tactical Tomahawk 

TSP & CP Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation 

US United States 

UXO Unexploded Ordinance 

VESTA Valuable Enterprise Services in Technology Achievement 

WCMD Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser 
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