U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL AS

Stephen J. Blank

June 2000
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ii
The United States has adapted a strategy of eng

and enlarging the democratic community of states. T

caucasia and Central Asia have become important t

grounds of this strategy, by virtue of their strategic loc

adjacent to Russia, the Middle East, and Europe’s p

ery, and their large-scale oil and natural gas deposits.

A U.S. goal of irrevocably integrating these state

the Western state system economically, politically

militarily can make them an intensifying foc

international rivalry with Russia. Moscow still per

these areas as part of its sphere of interest and d

resents U.S. engagement there. Furthermore, Mos

current war with the breakaway province of Che

demonstrates its willingness to contest expanding 

interests forcefully. Moreover, in this region many f

exist that could cause other conflicts. Accordingly, 

sensitive place to test the strategic rationale o

engagement strategy and its military corollary, a str

whose goal is to shape the emerging environme

directions that we wish to see. This monograph contr

to the debate that has just begun and which undoub

will last for a long time over what our strategy for th

states should be and how it should be carried out.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic St

Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-S

world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Profes

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doc

Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base

taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and 

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the ed

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in 

coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author 

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissar

Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many a

and conference papers on Russian, Commonwea

Independent States, and Eastern European security i

Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferatio

the revolution in military affairs, and energy and secu

Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History from the Univers

Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History fro

University of Chicago.

iv
 WITH TRANSCAUCASIA AND CENTRAL AS

None of the states that emerged from the wreckage 

Soviet Union had any experience as self-governing po

communities, or as independent states with their 

armed forces. The 12 republics that retained a form

link to Russia created a loose organizational umbrella 

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 

locations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia

significant possibilities of conflict emerging in and a

them; and the presence of major oil and gas depos

Azerbaijan and Central Asia, have caused their str

importance for U.S. policy to rise steadily. In large me

this is because access to energy is a vital U.S. interest

that substantially enhances these countries’ import

After all, the Commander-in-Chief United States C

Command (CINC USCENTCOM), General Anthony 

United States Marine Corps, recently told an interv

that access to energy drives our strategy.

2

 In th

increasingly important U.S. interests also confront 

Moscow has defined as vital Russian inter

Furthermore, Russia’s current war with the secess

province of Chechnya in the North Caucasus demons

Moscow’s resolve to contest the burgeoning U.S. pre

forcefully. Thus, if a new military encounter between 

and Russian armed forces (or their proxies) o

anywhere, this is a likely place, whether in joint 

operations or in hostile confrontations.

Therefore we must assess the U.S. strategic obje

vis-à-vis these states and our armed forces’ th

engagement strategy for them. That theater engage

strategy is not just a series of directed activities under

in peacetime to improve the coordination of our forces 

those states’ militaries, improve civilian democratic c

of the armed forces, and establish habits of cooperat

1
part of our military strategy as well, and its impor

becomes clearer with every passing day.

4

 Our engag

strategy is part of the U.S. global strategy, e.g., stron

efforts to institutionalize civilian democratic contro

the military in Latin America, or multilateral de

cooperation in Southeast Asia, key aspects o

multinational engagement of those regions with the U

States. Multilateral engagement serves to demonstra

power projection capabilities as well.

5 The Partnersh

Peace (PfP) program that includes all of these sta

participants has that same focus. As NATO Secr

General Javier Solana said:

What we are expanding is a European, indeed Atlantic, c

space. I deliberately include our military arrangements 

this definition of “civic space.” The postwar experience 

Western Europe suggests that political and economic progr

and security integration are closely linked. Once their secu

is taken care of, countries can devote themselves with m

confidence to their long-term evolution. And a respons

military, firmly embedded in our democratic societies and un

civil control, is part and parcel of that civic space, as are 

military structures that are transparent, defensive, 

multinational.

6

But the value of strategic engagement as a strategy do

end with democratization. It represents an attempt to 

with partner and/or allied armies to provide stable m

relations between the U.S. military and those forces a

enhance peacetime military professionalism

engagement strategy also serves to enhance both 

capability for successfully making the transition to wa

participating in initial stages of combat in any f

conflicts.

7

 Engagement is both a peacetime and a wa

strategy. Indeed, the rising strategic importance of 

countries has led the United States to formulate str

goals towards them and to develop the instrument

modalities for realizing those goals. Therefore we mus

examine potential challenges to security in the CIS.

2
integrate the key areas of the CIS fully into We

economic and military-political structures.

8

 

integration entails these governments’ gro

democratization and development of open m

economies.

9

 However, these objectives also call on 

break any Russian hope of monopolizing the econ

political-military life of these states. Such a Ru

domination necessarily would diminish regional secur

attempting to create, in the face of determined 

opposition, an exclusive Russian sphere of influ

perhaps even a restored union, albeit not a Soviet [re]u

The costs of imposing Russia’s strategy and the 

resistance to it that would inevitably ensue would sh

all the states involved, including, and especially, R

For this reason it is difficult to see what “victor

Chechnya will achieve other than to destroy that pro

and impose further burdens on the Russian treasur

armed forces which already cannot cope with ex

demands. But while those processes would ma

“victory” does allow Russia to forcefully contest the We

presence in the region and provide many opportunit

further destabilizing Transcaspian governments. The

this war to safeguard Russia’s integrity fully comport

the integration of the CIS into an economic-pol

military union which remains Moscow’s numbe

priority in foreign affairs after defense of Russia’s inte

In fact, one reason why reintegration enjoys such a pr

is precisely because the Russian elite fears that fail

achieve reintegration would encourage centrifuga

separatist trends within Russia itself.

Conversely Russia’s government also believes as 

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin told the Duma, that 

quest for integration should be accompanied b

strengthening of the Russian Federation. They (th

states−author) will come to us by themselves. T

obvious.”

10 This fear betrays the fact Russian elite

define the state and its overall political project in ter

3
precisely to prevent the emergence of a new Russian e

in Eurasia. That restoration would inevitably threate

regional balances of power in Europe, the Middle Eas

the Far East.

The same objective applies with equal force to 

another regional competitor in Central Asia an

Transcaucasia. As the 1998 National Security Str

says, “The United States will not allow a hostile pow

dominate any region of critical importance t

interests.”

11

 But because precisely such a domin

remains Moscow’s critical objective, the pursuit of 

objectives must entail a vigorous political confron

with Russia over the CIS. That confrontation need n

violent, but, as Chechnya shows, it could become a con

force. Therefore we would be deluding ourselves 

thought that internal conditions within these regions

their geopolitical contexts, make for smooth sailing f

next generation. We would also be deluding ourselves 

thought that Moscow will soon share the U.S. objectiv

it is only interested in a “win-win” situation in the 

Nevertheless many U.S. policymakers and elites con

or profess to believe that Russia shares our goals an

follow our agenda in world politics.

12

And apart from what Russia and the United S

might do, there are enough internal dangers througho

Transcaspian to trigger conflicts that could then 

outside states with major regional interests to inter

And those need not be only Russia and the United S

Turkey, Iran, and China all have substantial and gr

interests in the Transcaspian and could see the ne

intervene and defend them. Naturally those interven

could have an impact on our subsequent policie

actions.

Therefore our shaping strategy, to be effective, 

fully, successfully, and peacefully promote the obje

laid out in official U.S. documents and work to pr

4
military commands to execute the shaping strategy 

Transcaspian must also have a strategic focus in or

prevent or inhibit the appearance of the security chall

described below.

U.S. Strategic Objectives in the Transcaspian.

The 1998 National Security Strategy expressly 

why this region is important to the United States. 

estimated reserves of 160 billion barrels of oil, compa

large natural gas reserves, and will play an increa

important role in satisfying the world’s future e

demands.

13

 As General Zinni observed, although th

majority of proven oil reserves still lie in the Middle 

the fungibility of oil and the interdependence of the m

coupled with our own and our allies’ need for secure a

to energy, govern our strategy.

14

 U.S. officials pu

maintain that this region’s energy sources could be a b

to the unstable Persian Gulf and allow us and our al

reduce our dependence on its energy supplies.

15

In pursuit of this goal we have worked to est

governments with open markets, i.e., openness to U.S. 

(and not only those associated with energy) and demo

We have also moved to check any possibility of 

one-sided military dependence upon Russia

determination to prevent either Moscow or Tehran 

dominating the area, either in energy, or thr

penetration and control of their defense structures

back at least to 1994.

16

 U.S. goals with regard to the re

energy economy do not override our strategic go

helping to secure the military-political independenc

full sovereignty of the new states.

17

 Accordingly

military activities take the same point of departure a

our more general regional approach. And our o

political objectives dovetail with the military o

preventing a return to Russian or a new Iranian hege

5
resources.

Recent testimony from U.S. officials indicates th

policy embraces many objectives. The goals of Ame

policy are to enhance the new states’ independence, 

about peaceful settlements to the region’s con

particularly those in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh

diversify global energy supplies through mu

East-West pipelines. By achieving these objectiv

would increase our own and our allies’ energy sec

eliminate traditional energy monopolies, support T

and the new states of Central Asia and the Caucasu

invigorate their ability to defend their borders ag

transnational threats like arms, drug smuggling

ethnic conflict.

18

Almost all of these goals came into focus at the Ist

meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperat

Europe (OSCE) in November 1999. At that confe

President Clinton played an instrumental role in adva

the following American policies:

• He tried to further efforts to negotiate a settlem

the unresolved ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Kara

between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

• He tried to advance the negotiations between G

and Turkey over Cyprus.

• He pressed for the removal of Russian forces in Ge

in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional For

Europe.

• And he presided over the signature of the protoc

the agreement to open a Baku-Ceyhan (Azerbaijan-Tu

pipeline for Central Asian and Azeri oil and gas.

All these endeavors were materially devot

strengthening Turkey’s role in the area as well a

American influence over the Transcaspian and Ea

Mediterranean. Naturally our military aims go b

6
facilitating their military integration into the West.

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Deputy Assi

Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia 

1994-96, stated that a coherent U.S. Caucasus policy 

to emerge in 1994, earlier than had previously 

suspected. The Pentagon’s main concern was the r

regional armed forces, including Russia’s effor

subverting the new states and intervening militar

their territories. Therefore Washington sought to sup

the primacy of bilateral ties to Russia with other bil

(i.e., American and Turkish) and multilateral relation

Washington aimed to support democratization; li

market economies; and integration with the Eur

community of states. It also supported removal of we

of mass destruction and nuclear materials, and openin

area for U.S. business investment.

19

In practice, energy and security have dominate

agenda as the means to achieve this broader Westerniz

to the point that evidently little pressure is being di

towards democratization of local governments. Po

conditionality as a prerequisite of investment, trade

aid is fast receding in visibility throughout the area a

U.S. policy as well.

20

 To the extent that we lose foc

democratization, we could also be risking an affiliation 

forces and trends that, if unchecked, could later 

undermine internal and regional security and develop

in these states. For this reason, as the area’s salience 

policy grows, we must make sure that defense and mi

strategy do not overly dominate what should 

comprehensive, balanced, and strategic approach.

What enhances the need for such comprehensiven

the concurrence of rising U.S. interest in the Transca

with that area’s emergence onto Europe’s security ag

This concurrence has brought about a veritable str

revolution. An area that was essentially a stra

backwater for centuries has suddenly become a zone o

7
American, and Asian security.

21

 NATO Secretary-G

Javier Solana, too, has stated that Europe cannot be 

secure if the Caucasus remains outside European secu

More specifically, the Transcaspian has be

perhaps, the most important area of direct Wes

Russian contention today. Those areas of contention 

Russia embrace economic issues such as energy route

pipelines, as well as classical issues of security, terr

integrity of states, and defense. They also overlay the e

fractures and tendencies towards conflict throughou

region. A study by Terence Hopmann of Brown Unive

based on interviews with regional specialists in these 

and Russia, concluded that,

However, it is in the Caucasus, where ethno-polit

separatism reflecting in part the long history of collision

ancient civilizations, where the greatest threats to milit

security are likely to develop over the next ten years. If 

fractured identities within this region are reinforced by 

intervention of outside parties, such as Turkey, Iran, Rus

and Western Europe, the threats to security of the region 

even of the world could become quite serious. The grea

dangers are likely to be a consequence of conflicts of identity 

region where states are weak and national identities are be

rediscovered or even created. The continuing crises of 

economy, environment, and politics may exacerbate th

underlying conflicts, even if they are not the primary cau

Concerted diplomatic efforts within the region and by the en

international community may be necessary to avert suc

tragedy.

23

Furthermore, the U.S. attempt to induce demo

zation from above—through reliable clients—and 

outside by its own efforts may itself be a factor 

generates the ethnic tensions and economic polariz

that fuel such conflicts. Local and foreign scholars 

conclude that the forces associated with democratiz

have allowed or set conditions for the emergenc

intensification of the flood of ethno-nationalism that o

8
and the consequences from which we are trying to ave

gaze may actually be among the prime contribut

regional destabilization.

Indeed, as the oil producing states are now memb

the PfP, and Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, and Georgia o

seek NATO’s direct participation in the area, the U

Western contest with Russia and Iran has assumed a 

openly military aspect.

25 And that was true even befo

war in Chechnya. Turkey wants to play as an organize

inspirer of a regional peacekeeping force, and provi

military assistance to Baku and Tbilisi, and U.S. forc

increasingly involved in training and exercises. Georg

Azerbaijan want NATO to guard pipeline routes. 

stimulates an equal and opposing reaction. Arm

officials proclaim the vital importance of joint exercise

Russia to defend Armenia’s security and talk of an 

with Russia and Iran.

26 Consequently and due t

spiraling strategic stakes in the Transcaspian, NA

collective engagement, as well as the specifically 

engagement, with the region is likely to grow.

The U.S. Strategic Engagement

in the Transcaspian.

From seeking to supplant the primacy of Ru

affiliations with local defense establishments and e

producers, Washington is now trying to compel Rus

accept a very inferior position compared to its reg

ambitions. In September 1995, U.S. experts on Centra

met at NATO headquarters and cited the extensive 

interests in Caspian energy deposits as a reason 

Washington might have to extend its Persian Gulf se

guarantees to this region.

27

 U.S. involvement has only 

off since then. While U.S. officials intone visions 

win-win situation for everyone, where everyone has s

interests in developing these energy markets, they 

really aimed to deny and break Russia’s monopoly ov

9
reinforces the notion that this is the true objective. Ind

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that America’s Casp

policy is predicated on the illusion of a “unipolar moment” wh

Washington alone can orchestrate, and indefinitely mainta

congenial alignment of international forces. The implicatio

that it is possible to fashion relations in the Caspian region s

to constrain Russian decision-making with relatively li

Russian resistance.

29 

Naturally Russia resists this policy because it be

its vital interests are at stake here. Moscow increa

fears a new U.S.-led cordon sanitaire in the area. Ru

analysts write that were such a U.S. led system to deve

Forces potentially hostile to Russia would gain opportunitie

control the principal transport arteries used for Russ

imports and exports, something that, in view of the depende

of entire economic branches and regions of Russia on export

raw materials and imports of food and other goods, could pr

to be a very effective level of pressure on Russia’s leadership.

Russian analysts also view with particular alar

plethora of bilateral military agreements with her f

Soviet republics. They regard our shaping strategy w

military presence as a thinly veiled effort to unde

Russia’s regional influence and insert America’s a

NATO’s military presence throughout the region. Rec

many Russian elites, including Foreign Minister 

Ivanov and Defense Minister General Igor Sergeyev r

the alarm that U.S. policy even aims to force Russ

altogether.

31 These fears have gained renewed imme

and urgency in the wake of NATO’s Kosovo campaign 

Russian military-political elites interpreted it as a pr

to a similar future anti-Russian campaign i

Transcaspian.

32 Even though Russia has failed to ac

meaningful reintegration of the CIS, pursuing that a

essential to Moscow’s recovery of a sense of itself as a 

power, and to its actual security.

33

 Hence Moscow fee

United States should keep out of the region and s

10
Doctrine.

34

These contrasting views highlight the strategic q

of the Russo-American competition for leverage 

influence over regional energy. Adding to that compe

is the fact that as the region’s states depend on ener

capital and any future development, whoever controls 

lifeline controls their destiny, a regional stra

consideration of utmost importance. Therefore Washi

attaches ever more importance to this region as the str

for energy heats up and parallels the U.S. effo

construct a world order in Europe and the Middle Ea

U.S. policies are also closely tied to NATO’s enlarge

and the dual containment of Iran and Iraq. U.S. an

increasingly call this area, and the “greater Middle 

which it is deemed to be part of, the “strategic fulcrum 

future” or the “strategic high ground,” due to its e

resources.

35

 Prominent Western analysts and fo

officials in America and Germany, Robert Blackwi

Michael Stuermer, claim that “no Western power has 

safe without some measure of influence or control ov

southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.”

geographical area now includes the Transcaspian, sin

Southeastern Mediterranean is precisely w

Washington and Turkey want the terminus of Transca

oil and gas to be. Ultimately the purpose of mi

engagement then becomes helping these states d

themselves to the point that they can control their bo

and resist attacks or pressure connected with oil an

flows. 

U.S. officials are not shy about spelling out their gr

vistas of the future. Ambassador Matthew N

postulates the entire Mediterranean region’s r

importance. To maintain regional security, NATO mu

only integrate the whole region into the Western eco

and foster the development of “pluralistic institutio

must also grasp the military nettle.

11
the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant rol

the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansio

its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly 

Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert

course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukra

Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Pers

Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major rol

this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle 

implement this commitment for years to come, although th

something that might be reviewed some time down the roa

Supposedly Russia’s views either do not count, or R

will blithely accept this outcome.

The advancing encroachment of NATO and the U

States into what Russia considers its backyard can a

found in NATO’s strategic concept and expanded mi

out of area. They maintain that since the threats to N

originate in the new Middle East, NATO must be pre

to act against them.

38

 Nimetz’s remarks and the foll

statement by former Secretary of State Warren Christ

and former Secretary of Defense William Perry hig

the issues at stake.

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to tod

reality: the danger to the security of its members is 

primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, 

threats to their collective interests beyond their territ

Shifting the alliance’s emphasis from defense of memb

territory to defense of common interests is the strate

imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weap

of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrori

genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions t

threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with such thre

alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form milit

coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory.

Thus, in the future, the United States could be d

into local conflicts through peacemaking or peaceke

and find itself in a combatant role. President E

Shevarnadze of Georgia has frequently proclaime

12
the conflict with the Abkhaz nationalist movement a

take Georgia into NATO by 2005. Shevarnadze evid

seeks a commitment of U.S. military power in ord

impose peace and supplant the Russian forces who ar

maintaining a truce on the Abkhaz-Georgian bor

Similarly Azerbaijan is constantly urging NATO to pr

F-16 planes from Turkey and what it calls “opera

security” for pipelines going through its territory, alth

one can hardly see the utility of fighter aircraft i

conceivable Azeri military scenario.

41

 Georgia, too, re

approached NATO members for weapons systems.

42

For now Washington has wisely eschewed the 

commitment of U.S. troops to any of the many confl

the area, but that is not a commitment of prin

Washington reportedly is willing to send peaceke

troops should the OSCE Minsk process lead to a solut

the Armenian-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh. An

military involvement in the region is growing. Genera

Sheehan (USMC), former CINC of the U.S. At

Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Comm

Atlantic announced America’s willingness to take p

regional peace support operations involving Central 

forces under U.N. authorization, further extendin

willingness of the United States to offer sec

cooperation to those states.

43

 However, the region’s mu

security challenges and Russia’s alarm at our inten

make the strategic implications of such a mi

commitment extremely serious.

NATO’s and the European Union’s (EU) regional ro

also growing. NATO’s expanding interest in the r

reflects the broader process by which the entire are

entered into the European security agenda afte

collapse of the Soviet Union.

44 This is not just a ques

conducting PfP programs and exercises with local sta

the region. Turkey’s provision of military traini

Central Asian states and Azerbaijan, and its intent

organize a Caucasian peacekeeping force and to play a 

13
the most prominent of such examples. But Ge

Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova are now discu

forming their own peacekeeping force to reduce the ne

Russian forces.

45

 NATO’s and the EU’s increasing in

in a southern Mediterranean exposure can only lead th

assume a more prominent institutional role in the fie

conflict prevention, security assistance, and mil

political integration.

46

Accordingly, the increasing interest of the United S

in preserving the area as “a zone of free competition

denying Russian or Iranian influence in the region m

Washington the arbiter or leader on virtually 

interstate and international issue in the area. These in

everything from the Minsk process to nego

Nagorno-Karabakh, to the opening of a “new Silk 

and/or East-West trade corridor, apart from energ

pipeline routes for oil and gas. The consuming inter

pipeline routes has led the U.S. Government to take 

positions as well on vital regional security issues lik

international status of the Caspian Sea, to arbitra

mediate competing claims between Azerbaijan 

Turkmenistan, and to take the lead in organizi

guaranteeing regional investment projects.

47

 Contr

the U.S. stated intention that NATO enlargemen

associated trends would not lead it to become fu

embroiled in all kinds of local issues, the exact oppo

happening, placing Washington at the cent

international adjudication and influence for 

questions.

48

This deepening political-economic-military involve

can only raise the region’s stakes for key 

constituencies, perhaps including the armed forces. O

the Transcaspian’s heightened importance could lea

U.S. Government to determine that in the event 

challenge to security there, that critical or even 

interests are threatened.

14
and deepening U.S. regulation of the region’s se

agenda. This political-military presence enhance

ability to employ coercive diplomacy in support of the 

in the area and is a major cause for Russia’s ange

NATO enlargement.

49

 Accordingly, most observers

even some official U.S. statements, view the totality 

diverse forms of the U.S. regional engagement as int

to further the goal of breaking Russia’s mono

demonstrate the U.S. power projection capability, he

the region to the West through the PfP program, en

local military capabilities for self-defense, prev

military reliance upon Moscow and cement a local pre

to defend U.S. energy interests.

50

U.S. military analysts are quite frank in how the

the kinds of activities contained under the rub

engagement and PfP, not only in Europe or Central As

essential aspects of the U.S. strategy of “extraord

power projection.” Our engagement programs take the 

of joint exercises, staff visits, training, incre

interoperability, and so forth.

51 These are pre

activities that also facilitate transition to war a

necessary participation in its initial stages. For exa

Roger Barnett writes about the Navy’s perspective b

analysis actually could serve as a generic one for al

forces.

It is often the action and activities of these forces that prov

the dominant battlespace knowledge necessary to sha

regional security environments. Multinational exercises, p

visits, staff-to-staff coordination—all designed to increa

force interoperability and access to regional milita

facilities—along with intelligence and surveillan

operations, are but a few examples of how naval forces [and t

same undoubtedly applies to other services−author] enga

actively in an effort to set terms of engagement favorable 

the United States and its allies. These activities are conduc

at low political and economic costs, considering the tangi

evidence they provide of U.S. commitment to a region. A

they are designed to contribute to deterrence.

15
nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or other

whom it has provided security assurances, . . . deterrenc

other undesirable actions by adversaries or poten

adversaries is part and parcel of everything naval forces d

the course of their operations—before, during, and after 

actual application of combat force. . . .

That the United States has invested in keeping these re

forces forward and engaged delivers a signal, one that canno

transmitted as clearly and unequivocally in any other w

Forward-deployed forces are backed by those which can su

for rapid reinforcement and can be in place in seven to th

days. These, in turn, are backed by formidable, but slo

deployed, forces which can respond to a conflict over a perio

months.

52

Thus the United States and NATO use these oper

to prepare either for peace, or for short, or protr

military operations in crucial security zones, and po

the Transcaspian’s rising profile as one of these zone

here is where the ambivalence sets in. Because Washi

regards Russia as a potential, or even actual, s

democratic partner, it has also cautioned Geo

Azerbaijan, and presumably other regional states 

infringe on Russia’s interests.

53

Shevarnadze publicly stated that President C

advised him not to try and rush the withdrawal of Ru

troops from Abkhazia. Shevarnadze also has stated th

entire Caucasus, not just Abkhazia and Georgia, shou

become an area of international competition bet

Russia and the United States.

54

 Unfortunately the l

the evolving U.S. policy comes close to converting the 

Transcaspian into just such an arena. But as long a

Transcaspian basin is alleged to be larger than the Gh

field in Saudi Arabia, the largest oil field in the wo

stake of this magnitude justifies Washington’s comp

interest and growing military presence in 

Transcaspian.

55

 Thus U.S. policy is impaling itself u

contradictory logic. Moreover, U.S. military policy m

16
structural forces that can and probably will challenge 

security.

Challenges to Security in the Transcaspian.

The sources of threats to regional security and 

strategy lie in the region’s structural conditions

expanding interstate rivalry for influence, an

competing policies of local state and non-state entitie

the Chechen, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Abkhazian na

movements. Indeed, many events of 1999 underscore

fragility of regional security structures.

A second Russian war in Chechnya began 

protracted Chechen operations to destabilize all of Ru

North Caucasian provinces, especially Dagesta

Armenia gunmen shot dead much of the leadership 

legislative and executive branches in a coup attempt. 

aftermath the Armenian armed forces openly chall

the President’s attempt to appoint his choice for De

Minister and resisted civilian authority over them. N

the ethnopolitical wars in Georgia or in Nagorno-Kara

moved appreciably closer to political resolution. Gu

almost killed President Islam Karimov of Uzbekista

ethnic Russian coup against Kazakstan was uncover

the latter’s police. Islamic fundamentalist forces, supp

by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, wreaked hav

Kyrgyzstan over a period of several months. These ep

merely point to much deeper structural fault 

throughout the region.

They demonstrate that no regional state player 

Transcaspian or aspiring state is fully democratic or s

They are, at best, proto-democratic or poten

democratizing states who all depend on one man’s po

or physical health for their stability. It would not take 

to generate protracted instability and internal conflic

17
everything. It encourages disaffected mutineers, eth

otherwise, to plot with foreign elements who are a

willing to support these plots for their own g

Personalism also discourages political institutionaliz

and the rule of law. Thus it creates enormous opportu

for politicizing the armed forces or for devel

paramilitary forces outside of lawful authority. 

personalism by definition also generates in

government, massive state corruption, and econ

maldevelopment or under-development; a ge

lawlessness and violence, anomic or politically focus

nature, becomes a surrogate, often the only one, for eff

political action. In addition, since authoritarian 

generally reproduces or intensifies ethno-social cleav

the lack of control over the means of violence an

absence of both the rule of law and of socio-eco

protection for the population become the perfect p

and/or real cause for ethnic violence.

A second challenge to regional security is povert

dependence on energy as a source of income. Energ

notoriously unstable source for long-term income 

economic-political stability. It is a constant temptat

outsiders. There is a great danger that the oil prod

states will fall victim to the diseases of other oil states 

Gulf, Venezuela, Congo, Nigeria, etc., and become r

states who depend on a single cash crop whose pr

subject to external fluctuations. These states’ (notab

Gulf states, Nigeria, Congo, Indonesia, and Vene

development is corrupt, undemocratic, and econom

stagnant.

57

 This factor makes economic and po

instability interactive processes.

A third structural factor that reflects and c

instability is the limited political control these governm

have over their armed forces. Even where controls 

they are rarely democratic controls that foster long

stability. Moreover, many of these armies are in 

embryonic stages and cannot, on their own, fully d

18
largely been hijacked by Nagorno-Karabakh an

demands of that war, Azerbaijan is a family oligarchy 

by constant coups, and both Georgia’s and Russia’s tro

with control over various multiple armed force

well-known, even if Georgia’s situation has impro

However, this improvement probably depend

Shevarnadze staying in power—an example o

dependence on personalities—and is not likely 

untested once he is gone. Indeed, we see recu

manifestations of paramilitary activity in Georgia eve

against him or against Abkhazia. Armenia and R

provide other examples of problems with control o

military. And all these uprisings have very ha

effects.

60 Likewise, Central Asian armies are still in a 

early stage of formation and not well tested. Certainly 

ability to repulse internal wars or coups is suspect 

Kyrgyzstan. Or else they may foment such coups a

their neighbors. For example, Uzbek-based forces re

attempted a coup in Tajikistan.

The absence of effective control over armed forces 

abets and reflects the widespread regional ethnic con

the fourth structural factor of instability. The 

Caucasus and Transcaucasia are saturated with scho

pseudo-scholarly, crackpot, chauvinist, and ethnogr

theories masquerading as scholarship which 

consciously used for nationalistic incitement an

creation of nationalist “militias” as in Nagorno-Karab

Local media are also saturated by the mentality of zer

conflict, ethnic suspicion, and propaganda, an

universally regarded as state instruments for po

indoctrination. Not surprisingly, ethnic tensi

pervasive. The growing restiveness and rising incide

political violence in the North Caucasus which 

develop into full-fledged organized ethnic violence lik

is not surprising.

62

 In April 1997, renewed fightin

broke out in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. A

mid-1998 Georgian irregulars seeking to force thei

19
Abkhazian victories and more Georgian refugees. A 

months later there was a mutiny or coup attempt 

within the Georgian Army. In February 1998 the Kara

faction of the Armenian government launched a cou

unseated the government. The issue that prompted th

was the government’s willingness to accept a 

nationalistic negotiated solution to the Nagorno-Kara

war than the Karabakhites would have preferred.

These wars, conflicts, and energy holdings hav

made the Transcaspian a cockpit of a new great 

Russia’s hegemonic designs on the region are well k

Turkey, Russia’s regional rival, is the strongest imme

military power in the region and events since 1991 ha

or impelled it to pursue an ambitious and comprehe

policy to enhance its interests and stabilize the region 

preventing Russia’s recrudescence. It considers Azerb

a natural friend or ally and regards the Transcaspian 

area newly opened to its influence. As a result, Ankar

vastly expanded trade and investment in Azerb

attempted to route pipelines through Turkey, and s

security agreements and training protocols with 

whose content is deliberately left to others’ imagin

This policy aims to help Baku resist Moscow and has p

successful. 

Turkey sees an opportunity to rearrange the re

status quo against Russia and supports Azerbaijan as 

it can. However, its military, economic, and po

weaknesses restrict its ability to take a strong lead ag

Russia even though its policies incite Russian suspic

Ultimately Turkey depends on Washington for assis

with regard to oil pipelines, for pressure on Arme

settle the Nagorno-Karabakh war and for direct supp

Baku. Much of this assistance has been forthcoming, 

could lead to situations where we have to bail out T

lest it along with its clients suffer a major defeat.

20
influence from spreading and to prevent Azeri nation

from stirring up an irredentist movement in northern 

Iran also sees no profit in antagonizing Russia over an 

that could explode in both their faces, especially as Ru

eager to provide it with arms and technical know-how

provision of arms is also intended to keep Iran from st

up trouble for Russia.

Naturally Iran seeks to maximize its ability to capi

on the revenues that will accrue from the explor

refinement, and shipment of Caspian energy pro

Therefore, Iran and Russia generally have acted in co

in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia to prevent We

control or even influence over energy developments

has given extensive military-political-economic supp

Armenia and continues to forge a working partners

not alliance with Russia, to minimize Azerbaijan’s abi

exploit its energy holdings.

Until now Russian policy has been driven b

strategic nightmares of being excluded from 

troublesome region, or of being engulfed in local confli

of being denied an oil monopoly. Across Transcau

Moscow sought to dictate a solution or freeze these con

as part of its policy to establish exclusive reg

hegemony. That strategy has not only consisted in co

diplomacy, but also in the time-honored Tsarist and S

practices of divide and rule.

Russia has exploited ethnic conflicts. It has supp

irredentists against established states, Christian

ethnic minorities against Muslims and titular or ma

peoples in these republics, funneled large amoun

weapons to its clients, incited the side seeking to s

from the local Transcaucasian state to revolt, and then 

its power to come in under the guise of a peacemaking 

(not peacekeeping). Russia has coerced Georgia, threa

Azerbaijan with both internal coups and major suppo

Nagorno-Karabakh, negotiated a peace and a long

21
arbiter of their fates or security guarantor. Russia has 

to gain bases, lasting strategic footholds, overtur

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) t

monopolize the local energy business, and crea

exclusive sphere of influence.

64

 Yet it has only gar

meager returns and is visibly unable to sustain its po

and maintain its own internal stability and armed for

a satisfactory level.

Today Russian military and economic power is v

retreating as Moscow’s capability to control its ou

provinces and neighboring republics came into qu

even before the Chechen war and indeed provoked it

retreat of Russian power is another structural facto

plays an important role in shaping regional out

because it opens the door to numerous local and fo

actors. In Abkhazia and the North Caucasus, Russian 

now preside over a very fragile truce where no 

appears in sight. Increasingly, Shevarnadze’s govern

in Georgia seeks to internationalize the solution t

conflict with the Abkhazians and pressure Russia 

siding with Georgia lest Tbilisi refuse future permissi

them to stay. Thus Georgia seeks help from Washin

the U.N., and even NATO. And U.S. forces are now he

train Georgia’s coast guard as the first step in what wi

be a larger policy conducted under the rubr

engagement, to minimize the need for Russian m

presence there.

65

 If Russia’s retreat continues, M

could lose effective military control over the N

Caucasus, the strategic gateway for Russian influen

the Transcaucasus, and beyond that, to the Middle 

But it continues to attempt to limit this retreat by me

its connection to Armenia.

Armenia depends on Russia for support again

Azerbaijan supported by Turkey. As long as Arm

policy is haunted by the past vis-à-vis local Turkic 

and dominated by the exigencies of its “diaspor

Nagorno-Karabakh’s struggle to rejoin Armenia, it has 

22
itself with Moscow. Russia has obtained a long-term 

and treaty that governs relationships with Erevan

new treaty is extremely close to an outright mi

alliance against Azerbaijan and allows Russia and Arm

to press Baku and Turkey.

66

 The treaty reaffirms Ru

lasting military presence in Armenia, is a virtual bil

military alliance against Baku, commits Armenia not 

NATO, and could be used to justify perpetuation of th

in Nagorno-Karabakh or further military pressure ag

Azerbaijan that will impede any energy exploratio

transshipment.

67

 It also reconfirms Russia’s determin

to counter U.S. presence and remain the exclusive reg

hegemon as well as its greatest power. Because Arm

can still menace Baku, incite Kurdish attacks ag

Turkey and threaten pipelines in both countries, th

forcing outsiders to factor these threats into any pla

peacetime pipelines, both Ankara and Baku dis

Russian protestations of peaceful intention.

While this relationship certainly confers great be

upon Russia, Moscow’s other policy fiascoes show tha

no longer strong enough to exercise exclusive hege

over the area and may ultimately have to abandon Ere

exorbitant claims to Nagorno-Karabakh to stabili

overall regional position and limit the Western pre

Erevan, for its part, seems unwilling to consider any 

other than force and thus may continue to destabili

region. But this policy cannot achieve any positive or la

benefit other than to deny tranquility.

Russia’s drive for hegemony over the Transcaucasu

Central Asia therefore led those states and inter

foreign powers to an equal and opposing reaction tha

blunted the Russian drive. Baku, Erevan, Tash

Astana, and Tbilisi, to a greater or lesser degree, are se

a Western counterbalance to Moscow, which the 

especially Ankara and Washington, are all too hap

provide.

68

 Central Asia has also turned to China, the U

States, and Iran in energy and economics, is exploring 

23
national militaries to escape from Russia’s shadow. 

from expanded trade and commercial relations and su

for infrastructural projects beyond the energy and pi

business, Turkey trains Azerbaijani troops and pro

economic-political assistance to Georgia and Azerb

Other Western powers, especially France and 

Britain, also display a rising regional profile.

Washington’s burgeoning military-political-eco

involvement seeks, inter alia, to demonstrate the 

ability to project military power even into this region 

that matter, into Ukraine where NATO recently 

exercises that clearly originated as an anti-Ru

scenario. Secretary of Defense William Cohen has disc

strengthening U.S.-Azerbaijani military cooperatio

even training the Azerbaijani army, certainly ala

Armenia and Russia.

69

 And Washington is also tra

Georgia’s new Coast Guard.

70 However, Washin

well-known ambivalence about committing force to 

World ethnopolitical conflicts suggests that U.S. mi

power will not be easily committed to saving its eco

investment. But this ambivalence about committing 

and the dangerous situation, where Turkey is all

Azerbaijan and Armenia is bound to Russia, creat

potential for wider and more protracted regional con

among local forces. In that connection, Azerbaijan 

Georgia’s growing efforts to secure NATO’s la

involvement in the region, coupled with Ru

determination to exclude other rivals, foster a polariz

along very traditional lines.

71

In 1993 Moscow even threatened World War III to 

Turkish intervention on behalf of Azerbaijan. Yet th

Russo-Armenian Treaty and Azeri-Turkish treaty su

that Russia and Turkey could be dragged i

confrontation to rescue their allies from defeat.

72

 Thus 

of the conditions for conventional war or protracted e

conflict in which third parties intervene are present 

Transcaucasus. For example, many Third World con

24
for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obli

rescue their lesser proteges and proxies. One or anoth

power may fail to grasp the other side’s stakes 

interests here are not as clear as in Europe. H

commitments involving the use of nuclear weapo

prevent a client’s defeat are not as well establish

apparent. Clarity about the nature of the threat 

prevent the kind of rapid and almost uncontr

escalation we saw in 1993 when Turkish noises 

intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan led Russian lead

threaten a nuclear war in that case.

73

Precisely because Turkey is a NATO ally, Ru

nuclear threats could trigger a potential nuclear blow 

small possibility given the erratic nature of Ru

declared nuclear strategies). The real threat of a Ru

nuclear strike against Turkey to defend Moscow’s int

and forces in the Transcaucasus makes the danger of 

war there higher than almost everywhere else. As Ri

Betts has observed,

The greatest danger lies in areas where (1) the potential 

serious instability is high; (2) both superpowers perceive vi

interests; (3) neither recognizes that the other’s perceiv

interest or commitment is as great as its own; (4) both have t

capability to inject conventional forces; and, (5) neither h

willing proxies capable of settling the situation.

74

Russian perceptions of the Transcaspian’s critica

its interests is tied to its continuing efforts to perpe

and extend the vast disproportion in power it poss

relative to other CIS states. This power and res

disproportion between Russia and the smaller states 

Transcaspian region means that no natural equilibri

possible there. Russia neither can be restrained nor 

accept restraint by any local institution or power 

pursuit of unilateral advantage and reintegration.

75

The only restraints it now accepts are the objectiv

that limit its faltering economic and military powe

25
And even the perceptions of waning power are diffic

accept and translate into Russian policy. In many 

Russia still has not truly or fully accepted how limit

capabilities for securing its vital interests are.

76 Whi

hardly means that Russia can succeed at will regiona

does mean that for any regional balance, either on ene

other major security issues, to be realized, someon

must lend power to the smaller Caspian littoral sta

anchor that balance. Whoever effects that balance m

willing to play a protracted and potentially even mi

role in the region for a long time and risk the kind of co

which Betts described. There is little to suggest tha

United States can or will play this role, yet that is wh

are now attempting to do. This suggests that ultimat

bluff can be called. That is, Russia could sabotage m

not all of the forthcoming energy projects by rela

simple and tested means and there is not much we co

absent a strong and lasting regional commitment.

Therefore, for a win-win solution to come about, 

external factor must be permanently engaged and will

commit even military forces, if need be, to ensure sta

and peace. This does not necessarily mean a unil

commitment, but more likely a multilateral one, e.g., 

the U.N.’s auspices but actually under U.S. leade

Without such a permanent presence, and it is h

unlikely that the United States can afford o

choose to make such a presence felt, other 

through economic investment, Russia will be a

exclude all other rivals and regain hegemony 

the area. Therefore, Russia has little incenti

desist from efforts to monopolize the en

business, and subordinate the producers 

dictates apart from the limits of its own powe

the record to date of such efforts as the U.N. and OSCE 

undertaken give little grounds for hoping that a reg

balance can come about of its own accord or through 

activities.

26
reflects the fact that since 1995 all of Eurasia has en

into the agenda of all of Europe’s security organiza

NATO’s military engagement policies through th

throughout Eurasia reflect this trend. Thus this are

become a borderland of European security and a la

issue on Europe’s agenda.

77

 Europe’s involvement wi

grow as NATO and the EU expand and as Russian 

weakens. 

Meanwhile the local states themselves are 

expanding and diversifying their internat

relationships to elude Moscow’s suffocating embrac

that they have tangible foreign support. All o

Transcaspian governments have joined the PfP and be

open to the influence of Western militaries and to re

interactions with them and their governments. The

seek greater involvement with European states 

especially the United States.

78

 This process reduces ch

for a regional Russian military monopoly despit

Russian bases there.

This internationalization of regional security iss

vital for the long-term, even though the West does n

fully appreciate its significance. More generally, effo

internationalize regional security conform with the go

small states to import multiple and diverse sec

resources from outside to fend off exclusive reliance 

any one state. Thus the Transcaucasian states, C

Asian states, Ukraine and even Chechnya have all tr

create regional security mechanisms.

NATO reciprocates Caucasian interest in 

organization even if it is not ready to commit its

regional peacemaking.

79

 Baku and Tbilisi have form

loose association, if not bloc, with Ukraine, Mo

Uzbekistan, and even Kazakstan within the CIS. 

formation includes increased defense cooperation an

multiple objectives. It aims to alleviate Ukraine’s e

shortage, reduce Kyiv’s dependence upon Russia for en

27
pipeline, commercial routes, industrial goods, and po

support. 

In general this “bloc” aims to shield them from Ru

efforts to make the CIS a vehicle for reunification 

former Union, the fundamental objective of Russian fo

policy.

80

 This proliferation of security mechan

ultimately might enable local governments to create 

own indigenous mechanisms for preventive diplo

continual negotiation, and conflict resolution wi

depending on Moscow. They would then avoid or r

vulnerability to Russia’s imperial games and stra

based on exploiting their divisions. But the chances fo

an outcome depend heavily on whether or not ther

constant Western security presence or at least diplo

support for such non-Russian networks. In shor

emerging pattern or system of regional interna

relations is taking shape despite Moscow’s best effo

arrest or inhibit the process. This factor, too, will driv

United States and perhaps some of its NATO all

maintain a constant presence in these states or just ov

horizon. Thus the internationalization of the Transca

security agenda will also make engagement into a long

and protracted factor of U.S. strategy and deepe

implied commitment to these states, especiall

energy-producers, that is already taking shape.

If real peace, true independence, economic stabilit

the future prosperity that depends on those three f

are to endure, political stability must take 

Unfortunately, most factors here work against long

stability. The linkage between authoritarian, perso

government and violence is a profound structural cau

regional unrest and ethnic violence. Once that vio

begins, it is hard to stop for two reasons. First, ethnic 

where land, sovereignty, and the integrity of the state 

the government are at stake are intrinsically harder to 

even more so than civil wars.

81

 Second, foreign powe

28
it to their own advantage.

Russia, in particular, has identified its interests wi

perpetuation of interstate and inter-ethnic enmity an

repeatedly exploited every opportunity for conflict 

area. Russia’s regional escapades belie the pretense 

being an impartial peacemaker, and its operational m

of peace operations do not promote a political solutio

However, Russia is not the only regional actor wh

soon resort to force or to proxies. Essentially, in the 

Caucasus, the threat or actual deployment of force in 

another form lies behind every single ethnopolitical co

and efforts to prevent them from exploding. This has 

the case since 1991. It is hardly surprising, then, th

same mentality is carried into interstate conflicts. Po

resolution of any of the North Caucasus’ and T

caucasia’s many wars, therefore, appears to be far 

realization unless Russia’s role is minimized.

Notwithstanding recent trends, the real danger i

context remains that Moscow will exploit deficienc

regional conflict resolution mechanisms to preve

marginalization, obstruct peace, and preserve a mi

approach to local problems, even though its own abili

impose a just and/or lasting settlement are absent. In 

words, Moscow could easily do something stupid 

embark upon strategic adventurism that puts its 

integrity at risk. Or it might incite others to launch a co

whose ends are unforeseeable. The current Cheche

could easily develop into precisely the kind of re

adventure that risks Russia’s integrity and whose en

nowhere in sight. For example, at a time when there 

usable conventional force to speak of above the le

minor police actions, and the entire North Caucasus 

the brink of war, Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, CINC 

Black Sea Fleet, Russia’s local naval forces, announ

program to give Russia parity with Turkey in the Blac

by creating special missile-carrying hovercraf

29
deployments given the real threats at hand. But they s

that Moscow is still competing with NATO’s naval f

not local unrest. Thus in any potential regional co

Moscow is still fighting the wrong war, and doing so 

weapons and systems ill-suited to the threats at han

Because there is so much “dry timber” throughou

region and in Russia, adventurers may try to fo

military action through, seeing that otherwise all i

Indeed, many now intone despairing remarks abou

future precisely because of the West’s penetrati

Transcaucasia. Accordingly, gamblers and adventuri

the Caucasus could stimulate like-minded actors in R

who would have no sound concept of strategic reality 

the stakes involved. Internal instabilities and stru

defects in one state could easily reinforce those in 

states, drawing many actors into the fray. Thus

confluence of these structural defects makes this are

most dangerous one in the CIS and at the same time c

a target for sound domestic and foreign policies to sta

the area and prevent recurrent violence.

Presently it remains an open question whethe

forces of integration can defeat the forces of fragment

But continuing regional violence will undo the 

Transcaucasian states’ viability and possibly Russia

leaving the United States with not a moment to lo

seeking solutions for this unhappy region. If any region 

out for preventive diplomacy, it is this one.

Theater Military Engagement as an Aspect

of U.S. Strategy.

One may speak of the U.S. engagement strategy 

military branch of this necessary preventive diplom

that it strives to create democratic, professional, and 

armed forces that can maintain legitimate order, 

internal political participation and reliably defen

national interests of the various states. Howeve

30
adequate measurements to assess what engagem

accomplishing. Moreover, the basic challeng

Transcaspian security are not those that the 

Army is equipped or trained to overcome. Fur

more, the growing presence of all kinds of 

institutions in these societies has a profou

destabilizing effect upon them and could e

aggravate the processes by which these s

become Nigerias and not Norways. 

For example, USCENTCOM has Central Asia in it

of responsibility (AOR). While it has yet to pub

statement of its posture and strategy for this area, its 

has stated the Command’s goals. General Zinni obs

that we are getting started in Central Asia and hav

goal of creating a formal regional presence to help r

transnational threats: drugs, terrorism, and 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

the entire AOR, CENTCOM’s growing peace

engagement commitment includes “the full ran

activities designed to strengthen ties with reg

militaries.” These include bilateral military interac

interpersonal relationships, security assistance, ta

training, and humanitarian assistance operations.

problem is that in lieu of either a fully developed progr

criteria for measuring the effectiveness of our act

there, or with Central Asian militaries, it is difficult, 

impossible, to evaluate the impact of these prog

Moreover, Central Asian participation in PfP activitie

NATO is promoting, e.g., the airborne operati

September 1997 in Kazakstan, entail substantial se

risks in the political domain. Certainly they alarm 

antagonize Russia.

Furthermore, it is gratuitously provocative to pro

that the exercise proves or shows that “we can go anyw

anytime.” In fact were we to face a military contingenc

we deemed of sufficient value to cause our active mi

intervention in Central Asia, we could easily face 

31
is a landlocked area with no friendly port for hundr

miles; air corridors of neighboring countries 

Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Russia are unlikely 

friendly; the water supply in the region is declining

much of the region is environmentally at risk. Central 

physical infrastructure might charitably be called “

World” and the region is highly diverse ethnically 

politically. Thus we might quickly end up on the wron

of a Central Asian ethnic conflict. In such a case we 

also quite likely be opposed by one or more of th

neighboring states, China, Iran, or Russia, all of 

might find it easier to project and sustain power in

area (or use proxies for that purpose) than we could.

Therefore we must conclude that for now CENT

lacks an adequate engagement strategy for this r

which comes a poor third after the Middle East and th

in its official statements. There are good intentio

collection of activities, but no well-designed grand str

or deeply conceived analysis of the area’s strategic pot

for or against U.S. operations in the region. To be fa

problem lies not with CENTCOM but above it, becau

strategy for the Caucasus and Central Asia as a whol

fact, although perhaps we will not admit it, a 

provocative one.

Unfortunately, USEUCOM’s program for the Cau

does not appear to be qualitatively different even tho

is documented more extensively. General Wesley C

former CINC EUCOM, writes that “we use presen

actively mold the security environment in peacetime, 

what is meant by engagement.” Our aim is to redu

conditions that lead to conflict.

86

 Furthermore our pre

is based on bilateral or multilateral agreement

therefore is welcome. This makes our presence and en

ment the “agent of an effective international conse

Engagement materially contributes to the promot

regional stability and democratization, by devel

professionalism with our partners, showing them h

32
institutions, helping to create a “cadre of security man

with international experience,” who understand and c

to change contemporary security issues. Engagemen

our allies and partners also relates to the shaping elem

of the national security strategy because it helps prep

more democratic and peaceful international environm

EUCOM’s AOR and makes the outbreak of conflic

likely. As a major participant in PfP activities, EUCOM 

acts to upgrade standards of professional conduct, pr

interoperability, and enhance mutual security for me

states including those who are not yet members of NAT

However, nowhere in its posture statement or m

statement does EUCOM indicate specifically what i

and present any evidence as to whether it is enj

success and, if so, how much. In other words we stil

adequate criteria for measuring how much success w

achieving and whether we are actually contributi

much as we think to regional stability. This criticism 

not mean engagement should be scrapped. But it 

suggest that it still remains in fact, if not forma

programmatically, more a collection of important act

in military affairs that have a strategic intention, but 

strategic content.

It is not enough to list all the inter-staff talk

exercises we do with CIS, or other states. We need to d

better standards for measuring achievements and fa

in this field because without them we have no way of 

knowing to what degree we are achieving U.S. str

goals, improving the regional security system, and he

stabilize the host countries involved. Once again, 

CENTCOM, the problem lies outside of and above EU

Much of what engagement is appears to be repack

what friendly militaries do on a normal day-to-day 

with each other and giving it a fancy strategic rati

While these activities are indispensable to securit

good fighting order, they do not, in and of thems

constitute strategy or strategic operations. Rather, th

33
national security strategies of the governments invol

Conclusions and Recommendations.

Undoubtedly the United States must be engaged 

the new independent states of the former Soviet Unio

the extent that states like Ukraine are vital to Eur

security or the Transcaspian states are vital to unim

energy access; we need to be there to maintain a reg

security balance. But we have no way to gauge the 

tiveness of our military engagement. Thus, for engage

to represent a truly strategic program in fact, and not j

rhetoric, we need effective standards to measure progr

we can chart the improvement of the local armed f

capabilities and those forces’ democratization.

Above the level of the major commands whose task 

devise and implement those standards, we need a 

comprehensive review of what our strategy is in area

the Transcaspian. Are we making the same mista

have made earlier in the Third World in identifying 

men and regimes that are inherently unstable and w

pathologies are visible to unbiased observers? If w

doing so, the results will be like those of prior Ame

defeats in the Third World. We need to review to 

degree we are creating an implied commitment to d

these governments against both internal and ext

threats to their security and independence. Mi

engagement cannot become, as it has been, an uncont

version of mission creep by which training and provis

assistance becomes a policy that ties our hands and c

an atmosphere of moral commitment that ma

unjustified in some crises. (Of course, it may well be jus

in others.)

There is a great danger that in the Transcas

because of the importance of access to energy a

balancing the Russian presence, we are drifting in

unplanned but protracted military presence. Such a d

34
short-run opportunism and taking the easy way out r

than a critical examination of where our interests li

how we can, in fact, support them. If engagemen

strategy, or part of our overall national security strate

advertised in official statements, then it must be so

conceived. For now it appears that many preex

programs have been quickly extended, or improvised

On balance it does not appear that eithe

government or the executive agencies to implemen

strategy know exactly what it is supposed to ac

whether it is achieving some unspecified goal, or what 

it entails. Ultimately, our current regional engage

represents programs that address only a relatively 

but important part of the regional threats to security, 

so in an improvised fashion. However, inspired impr

tion is not sufficient as a policy or as a strategy.

ENDNOTES

1. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for 

Century, Washington, DC: The White House, May 1997, p. 18 (he

National Security Strategy, 1997); William J. Clinton, A N

Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: The 

House, October 1998, pp. 32-33 (hereafter National Security S

1998); William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for 

Century, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, De

1999, p. 32.

2. General Anthony Zinni: “Avoid A Military Showdown Wit

Middle East Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 3, Fall 1998, p. 64.

3. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 23

Foreign Broadcast Information Service Central Eurasia, (hen

FBIS-SOV-)95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22, is the 

governmental document laying this out as a priority for a

institutions.

4. Major General Kenneth R. Bowra and Colonel William H. 

Jr., “Regional Engagement: AN ARSOF Approach to Future T

Operations,” Special Warfare, Fall 1998, pp. 2-23.

35
Regional Organizations and Peace Operations, McNair Papers, 

Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense Uni

Washington, DC, 1998, pp. 105-107, 123.

6. Solana is quoted in Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of E

Security, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers, 1998, 

7. Bowra and Harris, pp. 2-23.

8. National Security Strategy, 1998, pp. 37-41.

9. Ibid.

10. FBIS-SOV-95-188, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22.

11. National Security Strategy, 1998, p. 5.

12. U.S. Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Deve

Report, Washington, DC, 1997; Deputy Secretary of State 

Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Cauca

Central Asia,” Address at the Johns Hopkins School of Ad

International Studies, Washington, DC, July 21, 1997.

13. National Security Strategy, 1998, pp. 32-33; National S

Strategy, 1997, p. 18.

14. Ibid.; Zinni, p. 64.

15. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Leads Peacekeeping Drill in Kaza

Washington Post, September 15, 1997, p. 17; Moscow, Nezav

Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, October 10-16, 1997, 

SOV-97-345, December 11, 1997.

16. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “US Policy and the Cau

Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter, Berkeley Program in Sov

Post-Soviet Studies, Berkeley, CA: University of California, Be

Issue 5, Spring 1998, pp. 3-4.

17. Ibid.

18. U. S. Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Deve

Report, 1997; Talbott, “A Farewell to Flashman”; “The End 

Beginning: The Emergence of a New Russia,” An Address by 

Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, Stanford University, Stanfo

September 19, 1997, from Johnson’s Russia List, davidjohnson@

No. 1220, September 23, 1997; Assistant Secretary of State

36
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and 

Promotion, July 8, 1998; Turkistan Newsletter, ISSN 1386-62

98, July 15, 1998, p. 113; Ambassador Joseph A. Pressel, “The Ca

Conflicts and the CIS,” Statement Before the House Intern

Relations Committee, July 30, 1996.

19. Sherwood-Randall, pp. 3-4.

20. Martha Brill Olcott, “The Caspian’s False Promise,” 

Policy, No. 112, Summer, 1998, pp. 101-102.

21. Ibid.; Stephen Blank, “Instability in the Caucasus: New 

Old Traits,” Part I, Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1998, pp

Part II, May 1998, pp. 18-21.

22. Solana is quoted in Glen E. Howard, “NATO and the Ca

The Caspian Axis,” Stephen Blank, ed., NATO After Enlargeme

Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, Carlisle Barracks, PA: S

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998, p. 152.

23. P. Terence Hopmann, “Integration and Disintegration 

the CIS: The Military Security Dimension,” paper presented t

Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nation

New York, April 24-27, 1997, pp. 21-22.

24. Alexander Rondeli, “Security Threats in the Cau

Georgia’s View,” Perceptions, Vol. III, No. 2, June-August 19

43-53; S. Neil MacFarlane, “Democratization, Nationalis

Regional Security in the Southern Caucasus,” Governme

Opposition, Vol. XXXII, No. 3, 1997, pp. 399-420.

25. Howard, “NATO and the Caucasus: The Caspian Ax

151-229; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No. 8, Fe

27-March 5, 1998, as cited in Johnson’s Russia List, No. 2095, M

1998, davidjohnson@erols.com.

26. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, December 23

27. “If We Clash It’ll Be On The Caspian,” Current Diges

Post-Soviet Press (henceforth CDPP), Vol. XVII, No. 21, June 2

p. 21; Dmitri Vertkin, “Kazakhstan Security and the New 

Landscape,” Bailrigg Paper No. 26, Centre for Defen

International Security Studies, Lancaster University, 1997, pp

Robin Morgan and David Ottaway, “Drilling for Influence in R

Back Yard,” The Washington Post, September 22, 1997, pp. A1

37
29. Douglas Blum, Sustainable Development and the New O

Comparative and Competitive Outcomes in the Caspian Sea, P

on New Approaches to Russian Security, Working Papers Series

Cambridge, MA: Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard Uni

1997, p. 21.

30. Quoted in Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads: Europe, 

and the Future of NATO, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1

117.

31. Sergo Mikoyan, “The US and Regional Conflict in E

Survival, Vol. XL, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 119; Moscow, Nezav

Voyennoye Obozreniye, in Russian, November 19 1999, FBI

December 6, 1999.

32. Conversations with Russian military officers and ana

Moscow and Helsinki, June 1999.

33. FBIS-SOV, September 28, 1995, pp. 19-22.

34. Mikoyan, pp. 112-126; Gennady I. Chufrin and Ha

Saunders, “The Politics of Conflict Prevention in Russia and th

Abroad,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 4, Autumn 19

40-43; Viktor Israelyan, “Russia at the Crossroads: Don’t T

Wounded Bear,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 1, Winte

pp. 55-58.

35. Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Harkavy, Strategic Geograp

the Changing Middle East, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowm

International Peace, 1997, p. xiii.

36. Robert D. Blackwill, Michael Stuermer, “Introduction,” 

D. Blackwill and Michael Stuermer, eds., Allies Divided: Trans

Policies for the Greater Middle East, Cambridge MA: MIT Un

Press, 1997, p. 2.

37. Ambassador Matthew Nimetz, “Mediterranean Securit

the Cold War,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No. 2, Sprin

p. 29.

38. Hans Binnendijk, “Next, NATO Needs to Give Itself a So

Strategy,” International Herald Tribune, March 17, 1998.

39. Warren Christopher and William J. Perry, “NATO

Mission,” New York Times, October 21, 1997, p. 25.

38
Caucasian Region,” and Dmitri Danilov, “Russia’s Search 

International Mandate in Transcaucasia,” both in Bruno Cop

ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels: VUB Un

Press, 1996, pp., 91-102, 137-152, respectively; Moscow, Inte

English, February 19, 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-033, February 19

Moscow, NTV, in Russian, September 22, 1997, Foreign Br

Information Service, Military Affairs, (henceforth FBIS-UMA)-

September 22, 1997.

41. Baku, Zerkalo, in Russian, April 11, 1998, FBIS-SOV-

May 7, 1998.

42. Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, December 24, 1998

SOV, December 24, 1998.

43. “The Fortnight in Review,” Prism, Vol. III, No. 15, 

October, 1997; Rachel Bronson, “NATO’s Expanding Presence 

Caucasus and Central Asia,” Blank, ed., NATO After Enlargeme

Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, pp. 229-254; and H

“NATO and the Caucasus: The Caspian Axis,” pp. 151-228, g

accounts of NATO’s deepening involvement in this region.

44. Stephen Blank, “Russia and Europe in the Caucasus,” Eu

Security, Vol. IV, No. 4, Winter 1995, pp. 622-645.

45. The Monitor, December 10, 1998; Umit Eginsoy, “Turkish 

in Caucasus, Balkans Irk Rivals in Region,” Defense News, Aug

1998, p. 12.

46. Howard, “NATO and the Caucasus: The Caspian Ax

151-228; Bronson, pp. 229-254; Blank, “Russia and Europe 

Caucasus,” pp. 622-645; Nimetz, p. 29; Binnendijk.

47. Howard, “NATO and the Caucasus: The Caspian Axis”; B

Moscow, ITAR-TASS, in English, April 16, 1998, FBIS-SOV-

April 21, 1998; Statement of Undersecretary of State Thomas Pi

to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 3, 1998, in Jo

Russia List, No. 2092, March 4, 1998, davidjohnson@erols.com

48. Howard, “NATO and the Caucasus: The Caspian Axis”; B

Glen E. Howard, “NATO Expansion and Azerbaijan’s Sea

Security,” unpublished paper, presented to the CSIS Project on 

and the CIS, Washington, DC, July 15, 1997.

49. Mikoyan, pp. 112-126.

39
Enhanced PfP: Addressing NATO Enlargement in the 21

st

 Ce

International Affairs Review, Vol. VII, No. 2, Summer/Autumn 1

48-50.

51. Roger W. Barnett, Extraordinary Power Projecti

Operational Concept for the U.S. Navy, Strategic Re

Development Report 5-96, U.S. Naval War College, Center fo

Warfare Studies, Occasional Papers, Newport, RI, 1996, pp. 7-8

52. Ibid.

53. Tbilisi, Radio Tbilisi Network, in Georgian, August 9

FBIS-SOV-97-230, August 19, 1997.

54. Ibid.

55. Charles Fenyvesi, “Caspian Sea: U.S. Experts Say Oil R

are Huge,” RFE/RL Newsline, May 5, 1998; Robert Ebel, 

Choices in the Near Abroad: The Haves and Have-Nots Face the 

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studie

pp. 11-12; International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic 

1997/98, London: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 22-29.

56. Personalist government is the most stubborn structural o

to lasting peace and freedom, because it makes local political po

inherently unstable enterprise, bound to one person or his entou

also inhibits democratization and breeds conditions favor

ethnopolitical agitation in place of democratic participation.

57. For the concept of the rentier state, see Jill Crystal, 

Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and 

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Giacomo Lucia

Oil Rent, the Fiscal Crisis of the State and Democratization”; G

Salame, ed., Democracy Without Democrats: The Renewal of Po

the Muslim World, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994, pp. 1

Jacques Delacroix, “The Distributive State in the World S

Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. XV, No

1980, pp. 3-21; Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., The 

State, Volume II, London: Croon Helm, 1990; H. Mahdaw

Problems and Patterns of Economic Development in Rentier Sta

Case of Iran,” M. A. Cook, ed., Studies in the Economic Histor

Middle East, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 428-4

58. Charles Fairbanks, “The Postcommunist Wars,” Jou

Democracy, Vol. VII, No. 4, October 1995, pp. 18-34.

40
66-73; Liz Fuller, “Is Georgia Heading for Catastrophe?,” Rad

Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, July 6, 1998; Dodge Billin

“Truce Means Nothing in Western Georgia,” Jane’s Intelligence 

June 1998, pp. 13-17; Army and Society in Georgia, Parts 1-4, 

19, 1998, cipdd@access.sanet.ge; and the forthcoming study from 

Feinberg for the Center for Defense Information in Washington

60. Ibid.

61. Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict 

After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame, Thousand Oaks, CA, L

and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996, pp. 7-21.

62. Thus, in July 1997, renewed fighting broke out among th

Ossetians and the Ingush, while the situation continues to dete

in Dagestan, and the Chechen negotiations are stalled. For a 

review of the North Caucasus, see Tatiana Mastyugina a

Perepelkin, “An Ethnic History of Russia: Pre-Revolutionary T

the Present,” Vitaly Naumkin and Irina Zviagelskaia eds., W

CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997; and Georgiy L. Mirs

Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Forme

Empire, Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997.

63. This Turkish weakness was already apparent in 1993-94

V. Mayall, Turkey: Thwarted Ambition, McNair Papers N

Washington, DC: Institute for National Security Studies, N

Defense University, 1997; William Hale, “Turkey, the Black S

Transcaucasia,” John F.R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, and R

Schofield, eds., Transcaucasian Boundaries, New York: St. M

Press, 1996, pp. 54-70.

64. Trenin, pp. 96-99; Chufrin and Saunders, pp. 40-43; R

Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. LXXV

September-October 1997, p. 75.

65. Feinberg, pp. 24-25.

66. Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, September 1

FBIS-SOV-97-258, September 15, 1997.

67. Ibid.

68. Stephen Blank, “Instability in the Caucasus: New Tren

Traits,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1998, pp. 18-21. Wherea

and Tbilisi’s efforts to maintain substantial contacts with the W

well-known, Armenia’s are not. But all three states are member

41
with Washington and Paris. Rouben Adalian, “Armenia’s 

Policies: Defining Priorities and Coping with Conflict,” Adeed D

and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign Policy in Rus

the New States of Eurasia, Volume 4 of the Russian Littoral Proj

International Politics of Russia, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe & C

1994, pp. 321-324.

69. Kinzer, p. A12.

70. Feinberg, pp. 24-25.

71. Howard, “A Farewell to Flashman”; Sanobar Sherma

Moskovskiye Novosti, July 20-27, 1997, from Johnson’s Russ

djohnson@cdi.org; Dmitry Volsky, “The Explosive Karabakh C

New Times, No. 16, 1993, p. 24; J.D. Crouch II, William Van Cl

al., “The Politics of Reform in Russia,” Global Affairs, Vol. III

Summer 1993, p. 197.

72. Ibid.

73. FBIS-SOV, September 15, 1997; Volsky, p. 24; Crou

Cleave, et al., p. 197; Richard Betts, “Nuclear Peace and Conve

War,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. XI, No. 1, March 19

90-91.

74. Betts.

75. Paul D’Anieri, “International Cooperation Among U

Partners: The Emergence of Bilateralism in the Former Soviet 

International Politics, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4, 1997, pp. 417-448.

76. Ibid.

77. Blank, “Russia and Europe in the Caucasus,” pp. 622-6

78. Ibid. “New Trends in Caucasian Security,” pp. 18-21

Kuzio, “NATO Enlargement: The View From the East,” Eu

Security, Vol. VI, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 57-58; Moscow, ITAR-T

English, February 11, 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-028, February 11, 1

79. Ibid.

80. Shermatova, Moscow, Novaya Gazeta-Ponedelnik in R

December 9, 1996, FBIS-SOV-97-041-S, March 4, 1997.

42
Civil Wars,” International Security, Vol. XX, No. 4, 1996, pp. 1

“Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One 

Done and the Other Can’t,” Security Studies, Vol. VI, No. 1, A

1996, pp. 62-103.

82. Istanbul, Milliyet, in Turkish, Internet Version, July 3

Foreign Broadcast Information Service Western Europe-97-212, J

1997.

83. Scott R. Gourley, “USCENTCOM Expands AOR,” 

Intelligence Review, Pointer, June 1998, p. 8.

84. Ibid.

85. Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, “The Myth 

Caspian ‘Great Game’: The Real Geopolitics of Energy,” Surviv

XL, No. 4, Winter 1998-99, p. 122.

86. General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army, CINC USE

“Strategy of Readiness and Engagement,” 1998, p. 1.

87. Ibid., pp. 18-19, 23-27.

43
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

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