IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2021 ND 27

Carrie Thompson-Widmer, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.

Kimberly Larson, Wells County,

Eddy County, and Foster County, Defendants and Appellees

No. 20200173

Appeal from the District Court of Eddy County, Southeast Judicial District, 

the Honorable Mark T. Blumer, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.

Christopher A. Wills, St. Cloud, MN, for plaintiff and appellant.

Brian Schmidt (argued), and Scott K. Porsborg (on brief), Bismarck, ND, for

defendant and appellee Kimberly Larson.

Lawrence E. King, Bismarck, ND, for defendants and appellees Wells County, 

Eddy County and Foster County.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

FEBRUARY 18, 2021 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
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Thompson-Widmer v. Larson

No. 20200173

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Carrie Thompson-Widmer appeals from a judgment dismissing her 

claims of defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship 

against Kimberly Larson, Wells County, Eddy County, and Foster County. We

affirm, concluding Larson’s communications were privileged and therefore not 

subject to liability for defamation.

I

[¶2] Thompson-Widmer was the director of Tri-County Social Services, which 

handled the social services for Wells, Eddy, and Foster Counties. Larson was 

also employed by Tri-County. Thompson-Widmer was Larson’s direct 

supervisor.

[¶3] In January 2017, Larson filed a formal complaint with the State Board 

of Social Work Examiners against Thompson-Widmer on the basis of 

Thompson-Widmer’s actions in two child protection services cases. Larson 

alleged Thompson-Widmer misrepresented information about a child’s home 

environment in one case, and altered a report about methamphetamine in an 

infant’s meconium in the other case. Larson also met with a state’s attorney 

about Thompson-Widmer’s actions. The attorney referred the matter to a 

special prosecutor for consideration of potential criminal charges.

[¶4] Tri-County placed Thompson-Widmer on paid administrative leave, and 

Larson became the interim director of Tri-County Social Services.

Approximately ten days later on January 24, 2017, Thompson-Widmer 

resigned. Because the complaint to the State Board was filed while ThompsonWidmer was a Tri-County employee, Larson placed the complaint and the 

supporting documents in Thompson-Widmer’s employee personnel file.

[¶5] On March 14, 2017, the special prosecutor sent an email stating the 

investigation into Thompson-Widmer’s conduct had ceased and “no criminal 

charges are to be filed at this time.” On June 16, 2017, the State Board of Social 
2

Work Examiners issued a letter of concern to Thompson-Widmer but did not 

take formal action against her social work license. The two documents were 

not placed in Thompson-Widmer’s personnel file.

[¶6] After the criminal investigation into Thompson-Widmer’s action was 

suspended, she became employed with Catholic Charities in April 2017. TriCounty worked with Catholic Charities on adoption placement cases. Larson’s 

staff informed her they did not feel comfortable working with ThompsonWidmer. Larson notified Catholic Charities that Tri-County would rather work

with someone other than Thompson-Widmer. Catholic Charities submitted an 

open records request for Thompson-Widmer’s personnel file, and Larson 

fulfilled the request on Tri-County’s behalf. In May 2017, after receiving the 

personnel file, which included Larson’s complaint against Thompson-Widmer, 

Thompson-Widmer was terminated because she was not forthcoming about her 

issues while employed by Tri-County.

[¶7] Following the State Board of Social Work Examiners’ June 2017 

decision, Thompson-Widmer became employed by Dunn County Social 

Services from January 2018 to March 2018. She worked at Candeska Cikana 

Community College from March 2018 to March 2019. Thompson-Widmer also 

applied for other positions. Larson fulfilled open records requests for the 

employers and potential employers.

[¶8] In November 2018, Thompson-Widmer sued Larson and the Counties, 

claiming Larson defamed her and interfered with potential business 

relationships by sending her personnel file to potential employers. ThompsonWidmer alleged Larson knew that providing the personnel file would harm her 

employment or potential employment. Thompson-Widmer also alleged the 

Counties were liable for Larson’s actions. In October 2019, Thompson-Widmer 

moved to amend her complaint to add a claim of punitive damages against 

Larson.

[¶9] Larson and the Counties moved for summary judgment, arguing they

were immune from suit. They also argued that sending Thompson-Widmer’s 

personnel file to potential employers were privileged communications. After a
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hearing, the district court granted the motions for summary judgment, denied 

Thompson-Widmer’s motion to add a punitive damages claim, and dismissed 

her claims against Larson and the Counties. The court concluded Larson’s 

fulfillment of an open records request was a privileged communication because 

it was made in the proper discharge of an official duty. The court also concluded 

Larson was immune from liability as a political subdivision employee. In 

dismissing Thompson-Widmer’s claim of tortious interference with a business 

relationship, the court concluded that since Larson was not liable for 

defamation, she could not be liable under a different theory of tort. The court 

concluded the Counties were not vicariously liable because Larson was not 

liable.

II

[¶10] Our standard of review for a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

is well established:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt 

resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there 

are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can 

reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to 

be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary 

judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues 

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was 

appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be 

given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably 

be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether 

the information available to the district court precluded the 

existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the 

moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district 

court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law 

which we review de novo on the entire record.

[¶11] THR Minerals, LLC v. Robinson, 2017 ND 78, ¶ 6, 892 N.W.2d 193 

(quoting Markgraf v. Welker, 2015 ND 303, ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d 26).
4

III

[¶12] Thompson-Widmer argues that Larson defamed her by implication by 

sending her personnel file to potential employers without the documents

resolving the criminal investigation and the ethics complaint. ThompsonWidmer asserts the March 2017 email which indicated the criminal 

investigation was suspended and the June 2017 letter of concern from the 

State Board of Social Work Examiners should have been included in her 

personnel file as she believes these documents demonstrate the investigations 

were resolved in her favor. Thompson-Widmer contends Larson’s 

communications to the potential employers defamed her by implication 

because Larson created the false and misleading impression that ThompsonWidmer was the subject of an open criminal investigation and ethics complaint.

[¶13] Defamation includes either libel or slander. N.D.C.C. § 14-02-02. “Libel 

is a false and unprivileged publication by writing . . . which has a tendency to 

injure the person in the person's occupation.” N.D.C.C. § 14-02-03.

[¶14] Slander is a false and unprivileged publication other than libel, which:

3. Tends directly to injure the person in respect to the person’s 

office, profession, trade, or business, either by imputing to the 

person general disqualifications in those respects which the 

office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing 

something with reference to the person’s office, profession, 

trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its 

profits;

. . . .

5. By natural consequence causes actual damage.

N.D.C.C. § 14-02-04.

[¶15] “A publication must be false to be defamatory.” Schmitt v. MeritCare 

Health Sys., 2013 ND 136, ¶ 11, 834 N.W.2d 627. “Statements that are 

‘technically true’ on their face, however, may constitute civil libel if they use 

innuendo, insinuation, or sarcasm to convey an untrue and defamatory 

meaning.” Id.
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[¶16] Under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05, certain communications are privileged:

A privileged communication is one made:

1. In the proper discharge of an official duty;

2. In any legislative or judicial proceeding or in any other 

proceeding authorized by law;

3. In a communication, without malice, to a person interested 

therein by one who also is interested, or by one who stands in such 

relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground 

for supposing the motive for the communication innocent, or who 

is requested by the person interested to give the information; and

4. By a fair and true report, without malice, of a judicial, 

legislative, or other public official proceeding, or of anything said 

in the course thereof.

In the cases provided for in subsections 3 and 4, malice is not 

inferred from the communication or publication.

[¶17] “Privilege is based upon the sound public policy that some 

communications are so socially important that the full and unrestricted 

exchange of information requires some latitude for mistake.” Krile v. Lawyer, 

2020 ND 176, ¶ 18, 947 N.W.2d 366. “There is no liability for defamatory 

statements that are privileged.” Id.

[¶18] The district court concluded that as the director of Tri-County Social 

Services, Larson was legally required to provide Thompson-Widmer’s 

personnel file on request because the file was a public record. The court 

concluded Larson’s “fulfillment of an open records request is a communication 

made in the proper discharge of an official duty and is a privileged 

communication under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1).” The court also concluded that 

because Larson was a political subdivision employee, she was “immune from 

liability for fulfilling open records requests for Thompson-Widmer’s personnel 

file.”

[¶19] We agree with the district court that Larson’s communications were

privileged and she was immune from liability. The records of a public entity 

are public records. N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18(1). “A personnel file maintained by a 

personnel director of a political subdivision is a public record open to public 

inspection.” City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572, 
6

578 (N.D. 1981). “Upon request for a copy of specific public records, any entity 

. . . shall furnish the requester one copy of the public records requested.” 

N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18(2). Larson’s fulfillment of open records requests was the 

exercise of an official duty; therefore, the communications were privileged

under N.D.C.C. § 14-02-05(1).

[¶20] Thompson-Widmer asserts Larson should have updated her Tri-County

personnel file with the documents stating criminal charges would not be filed 

against her and no action would be taken against her social work license.

Thompson-Widmer argues that by not including those documents in her file, 

Larson created the false and misleading impression that Thompson-Widmer 

was the subject of an open criminal investigation and ethics complaint.

[¶21] Under N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-03(3)(a), a political subdivision employee is 

immune from liability for “[a] claim based upon an act or omission of a political 

subdivision employee exercising due care in the execution of a valid or invalid 

statute or regulation.” Additionally, a political subdivision employee may not

be held personally liable “for acts or omissions of the employee occurring within 

the scope of the employee’s employment unless the acts or omissions constitute 

reckless or grossly negligent conduct, or willful or wanton misconduct.” 

N.D.C.C. § 32-12.1-04(3). The district court indicated Thompson-Widmer 

provided no authority establishing Larson had a duty to update ThompsonWidmer’s personnel file after she resigned. Thompson-Widmer has also not 

alleged that failing to update her personnel file after her resignation was a 

reckless or grossly negligent act.

[¶22] Larson fulfilled open records requests under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-18(2) on 

behalf of Tri-County. We decline to hold that Larson’s failing to supplement

Thompson-Widmer’s personnel file after she resigned created a genuine issue 

of material fact regarding Thompson-Widmer's claim of defamation by 

implication. See, e.g., Schmitt, 2013 ND 136, ¶ 19 (stating “It would be an odd 

use of the defamation doctrine to hold that silence constitutes actionable 

speech.”). We conclude Larson’s communications were privileged and she was

immune from liability. The district court did not err in granting summary 
7

judgment in favor of Larson and the Counties. The court did not err in 

dismissing Thompson-Widmer’s claims against Larson and the Counties.

IV

[¶23] We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude they 

are either without merit or not necessary to our decision. The judgment is 

affirmed.

[¶24] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte