COUNTERFORCE AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE:

CAN THE ARMY USE AN ASW APPROACH TO THE SCUD HUNT?

James J. Wirtz

March 20, 1995
COUNTERFORCE AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE:

CAN THE ARMY USE AN ASW APPROACH TO THE SCUD HUNT?

James J. Wirtz

November 29, 1994

DRAFT REPORT
ii

*****

The author is Associate Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. A

somewhat different version of this report was originally prepared

for the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Washington, DC The

views expressed in this monograph are the author’s and do not

necessarily represent those of the Ballistic Missile Defense

Office, the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Government. The

author would like to thank John Arquilla and George Conner for

their comments on earlier drafts of this monograph.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also

may be conveyed to the Director of Research by calling commercial

(717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.
iii

FOREWORD

The Gulf War demonstrated that theater missile defense (TMD)

will be an important mission for the U.S. Army and its Patriot

defense system in the years ahead. The author suggests that Army

planners should view TMD not just as a simple tactical problem,

but as an exercise that has important political and strategic

ramifications that cut to the core of U.S. efforts to create and

maintain international coalitions.

A factor that will shape the political and military

effectiveness of TMD is the resolution of the strategic problem

of integrating counterforce options, active defenses and passive

defenses. He argues that instead of developing strategy on an ad

hoc basis, the philosophy that influences the U.S. Navy’s

approach to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) might serve as a guide

to counterforce operations against mobile missiles. Counterforce

attacks would reduce the tactical problem faced by Patriot crews,

improving the overall performance of TMD. He also notes that an

ASW approach to counterforce should help the United States

achieve its political objectives of alliance formation and

deterrence in the face of regional aggression.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

monograph to foster debate on this important subject.

WILLIAM W. ALLEN

Colonel, U.S. Army

Acting Director

Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JAMES J. WIRTZ is Associate Professor of National Security

Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA. He earned

his degrees in Political Science from Columbia University and the

University of Delaware. He was a John M. Olin Fellow at the

Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and he

joined the Naval Postgraduate School in 1990 after teaching at

Franklin & Marshall College. He is the author of The Tet

Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (Cornell University Press,

1991, pbk 1994). His work has been published in Defense

Analysis, Intelligence and National Security, International

Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, International

Security, Orbis, Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies,

Strategic Review, Studies in Intelligence, and The Journal of

Strategic Studies. He teaches courses on military innovation and

joint warfare, international relations theory and intelligence.
v

SUMMARY

To maximize effectiveness, theater missile defense (TMD)

should include counterforce options, active defenses and passive

defenses. During the Gulf War, however, the integration of these

three elements occurred on an ad hoc basis. To increase the

political, strategic and tactical effectiveness of existing

defensive systems in wartime, Army planners should integrate the

three elements of TMD into an overall strategy. This report

describes how the philosophy that influenced anti-submarine

warfare (ASW) operations can be used to guide counterforce

attacks against mobile missiles, thereby improving theater

missile defenses. It explains why an ASW approach to

counterforce is superior to just attacking an opponent’s missile

infrastructure. It also explains why this type of counterforce

strategy can be based on preemption not preventive war. The

impact of ASW counterforce operations are also evaluated in terms

of the stability-instability paradox, crisis stability, alliance

relations and deterrence.
1

COUNTERFORCE AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE:

CAN THE ARMY USE AN ASW APPROACH TO THE SCUD HUNT

Introduction.

As events during Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated,

theater missile defense (TMD) will be increasingly important to

the United States in the future. From a strictly operational

perspective, U.S. forces stationed overseas would greatly benefit

from a capability to defend themselves and their hosts against

ballistic missiles, especially if an opponent’s delivery systems

are armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But, from a

political or strategic perspective, TMD could be the sine qua non

of U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. If American forces

lack a credible TMD capability, U.S. allies might come to believe

that it is in their interest to reach an accommodation with

aggressive regional powers; they could decide to bandwagon

instead of balancing in the face of aggression.1 Indeed, this is

the primary concern that motivates U.S. counterproliferation

efforts: by obtaining a WMD capability, a state contemplating

even conventional aggression could reduce U.S. regional

influence.2 American policymakers might be willing to take the

chance that a carrier battle group on the move cannot be

targeted, but regional allies might not be willing to count

solely on deterrence to protect stationary countervalue targets

(population, resources or industry) from attack.

In a sense, TMD creates a sort of "chicken and egg" problem

for strategists. On the one hand, allies are probably necessary

for the construction of a credible theater missile defense,

especially if their propinquity to the threat increases the

usefulness of their territory in the construction of missile

defenses. On the other hand, TMD strategies that require allied

participation must find a way to secure this cooperation; they

must explain why the allies needed to stage an effective defense

will be available at the proper time. TMD plans that simply

assume allied cooperation in this most dangerous game are simply

"preferred strategy." In this case, architects of U.S. TMD

assume that allied powers will join U.S. initiatives despite the

best efforts of potential opponents to prevent this cooperation.

 After all, this was an important lesson of the Gulf War: Saddam

Hussein worked to destroy the political glue of the coalition
2

arrayed against him by attempting to draw Israel into the fray.3

 Policymakers should not assume that overwhelming U.S. military

superiority will again rescue the United States from a

politically difficult position.4 Clearly, there is a political

foundation to TMD that must be created prior to the eruption of a

regional crisis involving the potential use of theater missiles.

 To assume otherwise would only complicate a politically and

militarily dangerous situation.

Another lesson from the Gulf War is that effective TMD

requires both a counterforce capability and a counterforce

strategy. Despite the availability of the Patriot missile

system, U.S. planners seemed to give little thought to the

mobile-missile threat before the Gulf War. This lack of

attention could be explained by the fact that the SCUD threat

itself does not fit easily into the notion of the ideal strategic

air campaign.5 Most strategists would probably agree that

hunting individual SCUD launch teams in the field is an

inefficient use of scarce resources.6 Yet, as the war

demonstrated, ignoring this problem in peacetime only increases

the need for wartime innovation. Although they did not pose a

significant military threat, SCUD attacks during the war posed an

enormous political problem for the alliance. Despite the

protests of planners, SCUD attacks ultimately forced the alliance

to alter significantly the air campaign. Indeed, as General

Merrill McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff noted, "what surprised

us was we put three times the effort that we thought we would on

this job."7 Peacetime planners can concentrate on the rational

application of air power; but, in wartime, political concerns

will work to concentrate every available military asset to stop

missile attacks against countervalue targets.

Seen from this perspective, the decision to deploy Patriot

missiles represents more than a simple tactical counter to an

opponent’s theater missile capabilities. TMD deployment creates

important political and strategic consequences which should be

recognized by Army planners. Politically, the decision to place

the Patriots on foreign soil cuts to the core of alliance

formation, greatly influencing the likelihood that the United

States will be able to create the political foundations for

successful coalition warfare. In other words, political

calculations, not tactical considerations, are likely to

influence the decision to deploy Patriot. Strategically, Patriot
3

will be part of a larger effort against an opponent’s military

capabilities that probably will include counterforce. Army

planners should think about how Patriot will interact with U.S.

counterforce options to achieve overall U.S. military objectives.

 And, from a strictly battlefield perspective, Army officers have

an interest in making sure that counterforce options are

available to reduce the tactical problems involved in TMD. 

Patriot will be far more effective if an opponent is incapable of

barrage firing missiles. If Patriot is to succeed in battle,

plans have to be formulated in advance to reduce the threat it

faces to manageable levels. It makes no sense simply to concede

opponents the advantage of launching coordinated attacks at times

and places of their choosing.

Given the need for the United States to develop an effective

TMD strategy to bolster allies in the face of regional aggression

and to increase the effectiveness of existing defensive systems,

the purpose of this monograph is twofold. First, the analysis

will briefly describe an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) approach to

the counterforce mission inherent in any realistic effort to

defend U.S. allies and U.S. forces stationed overseas from

attacks from mobile missiles. This approach offers a new

philosophy about how to prosecute counterforce attacks against

mobile missiles, a philosophy based upon the Navy's many years of

experience hunting submarines operating at sea. Second, this

monograph will explain how TMD, especially a defensive strategy

that incorporates an ASW-based counterforce capability, can

bolster America's political and military position by

strengthening regional alliances. In other words, a counterforce

strategy that reflects ASW procedures is both politically and

militarily superior to other counterforce strategies because it

is based on preemption and not on preventive war or retaliation.

 An ASW-inspired counterforce strategy would serve to bolster

deterrent and denial strategies that require allied

participation; but, it probably would not further exacerbate

potential regional confrontations that are by definition crisis

unstable.

The analysis begins by describing the "ASW approach" to

counterforce. It describes the five-step method the Navy devised

to conduct undersea warfare and how this approach can be used to

guide a counterforce campaign directed against mobile missiles. 

It then states why counterforce is crucial to any TMD strategy. 
4

It describes how counterforce--the need to base TMD on a strategy

of preventive war or preemption--can complicate the use of TMD to

strengthen regional alliances. The monograph also explains why a

counterforce strategy governed by an ASW philosophy can overcome

many of the problems inherent in engaging in TMD counterforce

attacks. The analysis concludes by discussing how this proposed

counterforce strategy can help achieve U.S. political and

military objectives.

An ASW Approach to Counterforce.

The effort to target a weapons system that relies on

mobility and stealth to avoid destruction is a problem that has

long confronted the U.S. Navy. Submarines rely on their ability

to move quietly throughout the world's oceans as a defense

against attack. At first glance, it would seem far easier to

find a needle in a hay stack than to find a submarine in the

oceans' vast expanse. But, the U.S. Navy has developed a highly

sophisticated ASW capability that literally can detect, track,

target and destroy submarines as they operate in the open oceans.

 In theory, the same ASW philosophy used to organize and

prosecute attacks against submarines should prove to be equally

effective against mobile missiles that also rely on mobility and

stealth for protection.

The U.S. Navy's ASW procedures are often divided into five

categories: (1) the continuous collection and analysis of

intelligence on all known platforms; (2) continuous monitoring of

all probable launch areas; (3) generation of cueing (warning)

when specific platforms move to a launch status; (4) the

localization of specific systems; and (5) attack. Organized

sequentially, each of these categories represents a stage in the

ASW search and attack effort. As one moves from stage one to

stage five not only does the area searched become increasingly

restricted, but the time available to complete the task at hand

becomes increasingly limited. These five stages should be

replicated in the effort to destroy mobile missiles; they can

form the core elements of an ASW approach to counterforce strikes

against theater ballistic missiles.

A great deal of information, critical to the entire

counterforce effort, can be gained through sustained collection

and analysis of data about all known mobile missiles, the first
5

stage of the ASW process. In tracking submarines, the opponent's

entire inventory is followed by hull number; similar efforts

would have to be made to track individual missile TransporterErector-Launchers (TELs). Missile production, storage and repair

centers would have to be continuously monitored to generate this

fundamental order-of-battle intelligence. This should yield

information about the overall size, day-to-day readiness, and

surge (alert-generation) capability of the opponent's systems. 

Training cycles, exercises, support vehicle activity, base egress

and ingress and movement through "choke points" (well-maintained

roads, heavy duty bridges, rail heads) would also be continuously

monitored. Not only would these efforts yield a useful estimate

of the general location of the opponent's mobile missiles, but it

would also create a baseline to assess deviation in the

opponent's standard operating procedures. In effect, stage one

creates an indications and warning baseline, a critical

component of the overall military and political success of

counterforce TMD strategies.

Surveillance of all probable launch areas, the second step

in the ASW process, depends upon intelligence initially gathered

about the opponent's overall missile capability: indications of

when and where to look for mobile missiles are produced in stage

one analyses. In stage two operations, visual signatures of

areas of interest would be compared on a regular basis to look

for changes (damage to plants, tire tracks or the presence of the

weapons systems themselves). Similarly, acoustic, seismic, radar

and communication signatures could be used to develop records

that could be compared over time. Of special importance would be

"life-support events," the logistical tail that might lead

directly to a TEL in the field or evidence of human activity as

the TEL crew goes about its daily business. Special attention

would be paid to the most likely operating areas and negative

search information (indications that terrain features make

certain areas unsuitable for SCUD operations) would be used to

develop an operating history of the opponent's TELs. Armed with

this information, real-time "tracks" of fielded TELs could be

monitored as long as possible; thus, a working knowledge of the

location of all TELs in or near launch areas could be maintained.

Cueing, the third step in the ASW process, is characterized

by intensive efforts to develop a more accurate and detailed

track of a specific weapons system. It typically results when a
6

TEL is detected in a launch area or when changes in activities or

activity levels indicate that preparations are underway for an

actual missile launch. This intelligence could come from a

variety of sources. Stage one analyses might yield indications

of changes in activity patterns or the general location of a

specific system. Stage two surveillance efforts might also

detect communication, acoustic or radiation signatures as TELs

are made ready to fire. Cueing, however, is best viewed as a

transitional step in counterforce efforts against mobile

missiles: it is related to a decision by either U.S. authorities

or the opponent to begin to move to a war footing. Cueing is

intended to establish a detailed track of a potential target,

information that would allow for the quick prosecution of an

attack.

The decision to engage in the localization (identification

of the target's precise location) of cued TELs, the fourth stage

of the counterforce operation, will likely be made by the

National Command Authority. Although search activities related

to cueing might require overflights of an opponent’s territory,

localization will require armed aircraft or unmanned airborne

vehicles to enter an opponent's airspace, an act of war. 

Platforms working to localize an opponent's TELs should

themselves be armed with defense suppression weapons. 

Localization begins from a starting point identified by

intelligence collected and analyzed from the proceeding three

stages of the ASW process; because of the short ranges involved,

a wide variety of sensors can then be used to generate timely and

detailed tracks of the target. Obviously, coordination of the

platforms involved and fusion (receiving, analyzing and

displaying) of the data produced by a variety of sensors would

facilitate localization.

Over the years, the Navy also has discovered that practice

is the critical element in the success of localization efforts.

The Navy was fortunate, however, in the sense that the Soviets

had for years provided opportunities to localize real targets on

the open ocean. In other words, officers and policymakers cannot

expect that the skills, experience, hardware and communication

architectures (fusion) necessary to localize a target can be

improvised at a moment's notice.8

The final step in the ASW process is to attack the target. 
7

Ideally, the attacking weapons system would have its own

localization sensor. The Navy never carried out this final step

during the Cold War, but exercises revealed that coordination and

practice did increase the likelihood of successful attacks. It

would also be important during an attack to verify somehow that

the opponent's weapons system had been destroyed: crippled

systems could be repaired and fired at a later date. 

Counterforce places a premium on the availability of small ground

units that can be inserted quickly behind enemy lines to

guarantee that TELs and missile storage and servicing cites have

been destroyed.

In sum, several aspects of an ASW approach to counterforce

make it attractive as a framework for the destruction of TELs

before missile launch. An ASW approach calls for continuous

monitoring of the status and activities of an opponent's military

forces. This would not only build order-of-battle and

infrastructure intelligence, but it would also provide a basis

for indications and warning estimates. An ASW approach also

increases the defensive problem confronted by the opponent. 

Instead of counting on the ability to "shoot and scoot,"

opponents would have to base their operations on the assumption

that their forces are being continuously hunted. In a situation

when every stray electronic, seismic or acoustic emission might

be used to attack a TEL, missile crews might become preoccupied

with the defensive task of protecting their missiles. It might

become impossible for them to fire with the "hunters" on their

trail. Moreover, because it does not rely on "flaming datum," an

actual missile firing, to locate an opponent's weapon, an ASW

inspired strategy probably is the most effective approach to

counterforce. It is the only strategy that suggests that it is

possible to locate and to destroy missiles after they have moved

to the field but before they can be fired.

Still, one facet of the ASW approach makes it especially

attractive as an organizing framework for the counterforce

mission: an ASW approach to counterforce allows for the

possibility of preemption. In other words, the decision to

begin the final stages of the counterforce mission--localization

and attack--can be made after strategic warning has been

received. Because monitoring is continuous, the decision to

destroy an opponent's weapons can be based on indications that

the opponent is preparing its mobile missile systems for launch.
8

 As the following sections explain, this single characteristic of

the ASW approach to TMD increases its political attractiveness as

the basis of a counterforce strategy. Policymakers can wait very

late in the game, in fact, even after the initiation of

conventional hostilities, before acting to destroy an opponent’s

capability to use mobile missiles to launch weapons of mass

destruction.

Theater Missile Defense: A Simple Formula.

As one long-time student of strategy was fond of noting,

there is no secret to damage limitation. Three capabilities are

required. First, a good counterforce capability must be

available to destroy weapons on the ground before they can be

launched against U.S. allies or U.S. forces stationed overseas.

Second, active defenses must be used to engage the forces that

survive initial counterforce attacks. Third, passive defenses,

programs to reduce the vulnerability of likely targets to the

effects of the opponent's weapons, must be available.9

Technological, organizational and strategic shortcomings or even

the opponent’s own defensive efforts can limit the effectiveness

of damage limitation strategies.10 But, when combined, these

three capabilities can create a denial strategy, a plan to

prevent the opponent from obtaining his objectives.

Counterforce strategies--efforts to destroy delivery

systems, missile transporter-erector-launchers (TELs), storage

and maintenance facilities and operating bases--contribute

enormously to the overall effectiveness of theater missile

defenses. Compared to the active and passive defensive missions

embodied in TMD, counterforce strikes are particularly efficient.

 In other words, counterforce attacks make it possible to destroy

groups of weapons and delivery systems with individual weapons;

conversely, active defenses generally require the expenditure of

several weapons to stop or destroy individual warheads.

Two reasons can be offered for the relative effectiveness of

counterforce. First, it is often easier to locate and attack a

weapon before it is put into operation or is actually fired; and,

as just noted, counterforce is efficient at the margins. 

Compared to active defense, counterforce strikes pose a

relatively modest technological targeting problem. Not only are

the targets often stationary, but their whereabouts can usually
9

be determined in advance. In other words, it is easier to target

operating and storage facilities than it is to destroy missile

warheads traveling toward a target at thousands of miles per

hour. Because they are relatively large and may be located prior

to hostilities, fixed targets are more easily destroyed than

individual weapons on the move. Of course, surprise is probably

necessary to gain all of the advantages inherent in counterforce

attacks. It is likely that competent opponents faced with a

brewing crisis would use dispersal, active defenses or even the

shield provided by moving weapons into civilian population

centers to protect critical systems from attack.11

Counterforce attacks can be more efficient than active

defenses because they hold out the prospect of destroying dozens

of delivery systems or warheads with relatively few weapons:

weapons expenditure rates favor counterforce in most

circumstances. For instance, it is easier to destroy ten

warheads sitting on a missile in its silo than to destroy

individually ten warheads as they speed toward their targets. 

Indeed, as one follows a weapons system's infrastructure from

individual warhead to production facilities, counterforce's

"efficiency at the margins," becomes readily apparent. As the

Air Staff has noted: "[the] earliest response offers greatest

leverage at [the] lowest cost."12 By attacking a TEL and its

missile reloads, one could destroy 40 warheads (4 missiles

carrying 10 warheads) with as little as one weapon. Similarly, it

might be possible to destroy dozens of missiles by attacking

assembly-fueling-mating facilities or to destroy hundreds of

delivery vehicles by attacking storage facilities. By holding

out the prospect of destroying dozens, if not hundreds, of

individual weapons simultaneously, counterforce is the most

efficient component of a theater missile defense effort.

One factor, however, can limit the overall effectiveness of

counterforce strategies. To be successful, counterforce requires

a state to take the initiative; generally speaking, the earlier

in a conflict the decision is made to exercise the counterforce

option the greater its potential impact. Counterforce strategies

face diminishing returns as a war progresses. For example, an

opponent's forces can be dispersed, making them more difficult to

locate and destroy. Weapons can also be placed on alert; given

tactical warning, many can be used rather than face destruction

on the ground. Of course, some benefits can always be obtained
10

by destroying empty garrisons or a nation's general military and

industrial infrastructure, but once an opponent's forces move to

a war footing, counterforce strikes will produce diminishing

returns. To insure the greatest effectiveness, TMD requires the

initiation of counterforce strikes as early as possible in a

developing conflict. Clearly, the requirement to initiate

counterforce attacks before opponents launch their weapons could

undermine both deterrence and crisis stability, but it is

possible to mitigate the more provocative elements of TMD.

If policymakers consider realistically the fundamental

limitation of counterforce strategies--the need to fire first--

they are really left with two options: a state can initiate

hostilities either by launching preventive or preemptive attacks.

 The decision to launch a preventive war often rests on the

calculation that war is inevitable, and that conditions will

never be more favorable for the initiation of hostilities. In a

sense, leaders who adopt the logic of preventive war accept risk;

they are willing to jump through "windows of opportunity."13 They

tend to believe that since they must fight an opponent sooner or

later, they may as well fight now before changes in the military,

diplomatic, domestic-political or economic balance decrease the

chances for success on the battlefield. Although the eruption of

World War I and even Hitler's declaration of war on the United

States have been identified as cases of preventive war, the best

example of the phenomenon probably is the Japanese decision to

attack Pearl Harbor.14

By contrast, preemption occurs following indications that

the opponent is about to attack. A preemptive strategy implies

that a state is not willing to allow its opponent to inflict the

first blow; upon receipt of strategic warning, the goal is simply

to beat the opponent to the punch. Although preemption lacks the

onerous political and moral connotations that are inherent in

plans for preventive war, it still is a demanding military

mission. According to Lawrence Freedman, "the technical

requirements [of preemptive war] would be exacting: a reliable

intelligence system, to insure adequate warning of attack, and an

ability, including a capacity for quick movement, to abort this

attack."15 A preemptive attack would be prompted not by the

normal day-to-day operating procedures followed by an opponent,

but by clear indications that the opponent's forces are either

being placed on generated alert or are actually being readied for
11

firing. Some analysts believe that both Soviet and American

officers and policymakers were mesmerized by the effort to avoid

falling victim to the other’s preemptive nuclear attack, leading

both Superpowers to create nuclear employment doctrine and

command and control infrastructures that were inherently crisis

unstable.16 But, the best recent example of a preemptive attack

was the 1967 Israeli strike against both Egypt and Syria after

Israeli military and political leaders became convinced that the

Arabs were about to initiate hostilities.17

In sum, TMD would greatly benefit from the integration of

counterforce strikes into an overall strategy to defend against 

missile attack. To be most effective, however, a state

contemplating counterforce attacks must be willing to initiate

hostilities. Moral, political and practical considerations,

however, argue against the adoption of a preventive war strategy.

 Put succinctly, as a democracy, the United States cannot adopt a

strategy of preventive war, even though the strategy has been

considered in times of perceived great peril.18 Preemption is

demanding, but it is the only real form that U.S. counterforce

attacks can take. Indeed, those who advocate a preventive war

strategy for the United States must first explain why American

political leaders will behave differently in the future.

TMD and Regional Alliances.

Given the nature of potential conflicts, one could add a

fourth element to a new U.S. TMD strategy: strong alliances, or

at least extremely cooperative working relationships with newfound friends. Counterforce strikes would be facilitated by

access to bases close to an aggressive state. Similarly, active

defenses, especially point defenses, might be impossible to

construct without access to territory near or around likely

targets. The very existence of alliances themselves also

strengthens the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats: alliances

provide tangible evidence of a U.S. commitment to defend a state

or a region against aggression. But the role played by strong

alliances in a successful TMD strategy does not mean that they

will exist when the time comes. The cooperation and protection

of allies is both a means and an end of U.S. strategy. In other

words, allies might be necessary for the construction of TMD, but

the availability of an effective TMD might also be a necessary

condition for the creation of a strong regional alliance to
12

resist an aggressive state.

Because U.S. TMD strategy is linked to regional alliances,

planners must take into account the political and military

motivations of potential U.S. allies. For most regional actors,

the overriding goal of their foreign and defense policies will be

to avoid an opponent's missile attacks. Fundamentally, they have

two options to achieve this objective: (1) they can enter into an

alliance (balance) with the United States to prevent the attack

either through a denial strategy based on TMD or a deterrence

strategy based on retaliation; or (2) they can reach some

political accommodation (bandwagon) with the threatening state to

avoid attack. The challenge for U.S. planners is to devise a TMD

strategy that increases the likelihood that potential allies will

balance instead of bandwagon. Without this kind of strategy, the

proliferation of WMD could reduce U.S. regional influence:

potentially friendly states might become unwilling to support

U.S. policies generally or to assist U.S. efforts to stop

aggressive states.

A TMD strategy based on the notion of preventive war is

unlikely to deter bandwagoning behavior for several reasons.

Given the goal of avoiding missile attacks, preventive war could

be viewed as a way to bring about undesired conflict. All things

being equal, regional actors will probably be willing to desist

in the hope that continued diplomatic efforts or unanticipated

developments will remove a nascent threat. Almost by definition,

the real prospect of preventive war will appear far more

harrowing and undesirable than the seemingly remote possibility

of missile attacks. A preventive war strategy simply offers to

fight more efficiently a war that regional elites wish to avoid

in the first place. As a result, it is unlikely to elicit a

positive response from friendly regimes.

A strategy of preemption, however, is more likely to serve

as a rallying point for regional actors. Democratic allies would

be attracted to the prospect of avoiding hostilities until the

last possible moment by simply planning on beating the opponent

to the punch. In contrast to a preventive war strategy,

preemption offers the hope of winning or, at a minimum, greatly

reducing the consequences of a war that is already unfolding. A

preemptive strategy delays the onset of war until an opponent

begins to undertake activities identified as evidence of
13

immediate preparations for an actual attack. Diplomatic

initiatives intended to prevent war can thus be allowed to run

their course. Obviously, this would help the formation of a

coalition of democratic states; the case for engaging in

hostilities would develop naturally as diplomatic efforts

repeatedly fail to generate a positive response from the

opponent.19

Most importantly, if a U.S.-led coalition adopted a

preemptive TMD strategy, it still might not have to initiate

hostilities. The first shot in a war does not necessarily have

to be fired by the United States in a TMD counterforce attack.

Counterforce strikes against an opponent's missile infrastructure

and launch facilities could be withheld until indications were

received that the opponent was making actual preparations to

fire. Indeed, a finely tuned preemptive strategy would give the

United States and its allies an enormous advantage. For example,

everything from border skirmishes to large-scale conventional war

could take place without placing irresistible pressure on the

United States to escalate the conflict vertically by attacking

the opponent's missile systems and infrastructure. Even after

hostilities had erupted, counterforce attacks could await clear

indications that the opponent was preparing missile systems for

immediate firing. In effect, if U.S. policymakers believe that

the United States and its allies must obtain the political

benefits that accrue to clear-cut victims of aggression, then TMD

counterforce attacks would have to be based on preemptive

strategy that employs ASW techniques.

Similarly, TMD counterforce could also prevent the opponent

from benefiting from the stability-instability paradox.20 An

opponent might believe that the threat of missile attack,

especially if these missiles were armed with weapons of mass

destruction, could reduce the U.S. presence in a region or

prevent a vigorous U.S. or allied response to hostilities. An

opponent could be counting on the stability produced by the

possibility of missile attacks to pave the way for conventional

aggression (instability). Indeed, this is one way a state

contemplating aggression could attempt to take advantage of

either the honest efforts of most states to avoid war, or the

tendency of small states to bandwagon in the face of particularly

dangerous threats. The leadership of an aggressive state would

hope that the threat of missile attack would facilitate conquest,
14

not only without interference from extra-regional actors, but

maybe without any bloodshed at all.21

An ASW-inspired TMD defense, however, could help reduce some

of the more dangerous aspects of the stability-instability

paradox. Threatened states in a region could take measures to

improve their defenses, despite threats of missile attack,

because the option of TMD would be available. And since a TMD

based on an ASW philosophy does not require a preventive war

strategy, regional allies or new-found friends would not have to

view a decision to strengthen their defenses as a decision for

war. This is the most vicious aspect of the stabilityinstability paradox: leaders contemplating aggression will hope

that their intended victim will come to believe that any sort of

decision to resist aggression actually increases the likelihood

of bringing about the undesired outcome, war. A counterforce

strategy based on ASW techniques, however, separates the decision

to create a defense from the decision to engage in war. The

notion that the decision to construct a defense is not a prelude

to war will increase the likelihood that policymakers will work

to deploy theater defenses before a nascent crisis.

Even a preemptive strategy based on an ASW philosophy,

however, can never completely eliminate fears of "miscalculated

escalation," fears that lie at the heart of the stabilityinstability paradox. In other words, U.S. and allied

policymakers will always fear that actions taken to increase

their defensive capabilities might be seen by their opponents as

a sign of impending attack, leading the other side to preempt in

a crisis that otherwise might be solved peacefully.22 Indeed, the

fear of miscalculated escalation is what distinguished riskaverse policymakers, who hope to avoid war, from risk-acceptant

leaders, who are willing to generate "a few casualties" to

achieve their objectives. Ultimately, the decision to risk war

by increasing one's defenses is a political issue that lies

beyond the reach of strategy.

Still, one could argue that regardless of what philosophy

influences a TMD counterforce architecture, denial strategies are

inherently crisis unstable. Opponents will not stand idly by and

allow the United States to build an effective TMD that eliminates

their capability to launch either conventional or WMD warheads

against their opponents. In other words, a denial strategy
15

creates more than just a “use it or lose it situation” for an

opponent; it could also indicate to targeted states that the

United States and its allies are contemplating aggression or

preventive war. Under these circumstances, TMD counterforce will

simply accelerate and intensify the security dilemma (military

actions taken for even defensive purposes tend to decrease the

security of others), leading to a further deterioration in

regional politics or even war.23 Alternatively, a denial strategy

could make it clear to leaders contemplating aggression that the

costs of war could not be avoided and that they alone will not

dictate the tempo of escalation or the scope of the conflict;

these kinds of perceptions tend to strengthen deterrence.24

It is unlikely, however, that an ASW-inspired counterforce

strategy will have much impact on crisis stability in the most

probable regional contingencies because the nuclear and

conventional military balance in these regions is extremely

crisis unstable. Although American policymakers do not dwell on

the fact, the United States already possesses a splendid nuclear

first-strike capability against regional mobile missile threats.

 It might be apparent to Americans that it is unlikely in the

extreme that the United States would initiate nuclear

hostilities, but regional opponents must plan to meet U.S.

capabilities, not U.S. intentions. Until regional actors obtain

a significant secure second-strike WMD capability against the

United States, the nuclear and conventional military balance, in

a strict “technical” sense, will remain crisis unstable,

regardless of the refinements the United States makes to

counterforce strategies. And, in the political sense of the

term, underlying hostility, alternate views of history, and

competing political agendas will only serve to fuel regional

competition. Clearly, the states involved believe that war is a

real possibility; this perception alone greatly contributes to

crisis instability.25

Conclusion: TMD Counterforce and Alliances.

A preemptive counterforce strategy that is influenced by an

ASW philosophy offers important advantages over other approaches

to the counterforce mission that must be a part of any realistic

theater missile defense plan. An ASW approach to counterforce

makes a preemptive strategy possible. A preemptive strategy, in

turn, makes it more likely that U.S. efforts to defend against
16

regional missile attacks will generate regional support. Instead

of reducing U.S. influence in a region, theater missile defenses

based on an ASW philosophy are more likely to be supported by

allies. The preemptive strategy outlined in this monograph can

increase the probability that the political prerequisites of

military success will be in place when the United States

confronts aggressive states armed with ballistic missiles. In

other words, a counterforce strategy based on ASW principles can

increase the probability that regional actors will balance with

the United States against aggressive states. An ASW approach to

counterforce could strengthen deterrence by helping to create the

alliances needed to demonstrate an American commitment to resist

aggression.

To guarantee both the political (bolster U.S. regional

influence and allies) and military (destroy missiles before they

are launched) success of an ASW counterforce strategy, however,

three processes have to be set in motion well before the onset of

hostilities. First, weapons systems and intelligence collection

facilities must be either created or modified to meet the

requirements posed by the ASW counterforce mission. Second,

discussions must take place with potential allies about the

theater missile defenses as soon as possible. Not only would this

be taken as a sign of U.S. support, helping to achieve the

political goal of boosting U.S. influence in a region threatened

by missile attack, but it would also serve as the basis for

future military cooperation. Clearly, key issues related to

intelligence collaboration, and the sharing of military

facilities, would have to be solved before a simmering conflict

becomes a crisis. But, most importantly, political and military

judgments will have to be made in advance about what constitutes

strategic and tactical warning of impending missile attack. 

Sorting out these issues during a crisis is likely to produce

paralysis as allied policymakers and officers come to terms with

the demands of a preemptive strategy. During the Cold War, for

example, analysts called attention to the political problems the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would face in

responding to indications of impending attack.26 Analysts noted

that fears of miscalculated escalation, defections from the

Alliance, or just political indecision could impede NATO’s

response to Soviet mobilization. If one considers that NATO's

membership had years to contemplate how and when to generate its

defenses upon receipt of indications and warning of attack, the
17

severity of the problem facing a nascent alliance that has

adopted a preemptive strategy is clear. Extensive consultations

about when and how to respond to an opponent’s generation of its

mobile missiles must take place before the onset of a crisis;

consultations represent a necessary condition for the success of

any counterforce strategy based on preemption.

Since much of the political benefit of an ASW inspired

counterforce strategy is based on its requirement of sustained

and intensive political and military interaction with potential

allies, the need for these kinds of consultations should be

viewed as a positive development. Even though unilateral action

might offer a simpler way of dealing with nascent missile

threats, a multilateral response, by definition, would probably

be more politically productive from the American perspective. 

And, since a multilateral response is likely to serve as a strong

political signal of a coalition's willingness to resist attack,

political, military and intelligence consultations on the issue

of missile defense might serve to deter states contemplating

aggression.

Third, from a strictly practical standpoint ASW counterforce

operations cannot be improvised at the last minute. If the

Navy's experience is any guide to this type of operation, then

the hunt for mobile missiles will succeed only after much

practice.27 Indeed, over the years, the Navy discovered that ASW

operations required that a community of officers dedicate major

portions of their careers to this specialized form of warfare. 

In a time of shrinking resources, however, the challenge would be

to develop an interservice community dedicated to the task of

destroying mobile missiles on the ground. Indeed, each of the

services has something to contribute to an ASW counterforce

effort. Not only would a massive amount of air power be required

to complete these attacks successfully, but ground forces could

also participate in reconnaissance missions, especially by

guaranteeing that missiles once localized and attacked were

actually destroyed.

The U.S. Army already is prepared for two missions in an

ASW-inspired TMD architecture: conducting active defenses against

incoming weapons and launching ground operations behind enemy

lines to insure that sites targeted from the air have been

destroyed. But no service has offered to coordinate both the
18

counterforce and active defenses that constitute effective TMD. 

Army planners, however, are logical candidates to specify the

counterforce requirements to insure the effectiveness of Patriot.

 Reducing the number of incoming warheads to levels below the

number of available interceptor missiles or preventing barrage

attacks are reasonable requirements set by peacetime planners for

counterforce options.

Ultimately, technology might improve the effectiveness of

counterforce attacks, but it is impossible to predict when,

during a period of decreasing defense budgets, this new

technology will become available. Still, an ASW approach to

organizing a counterforce attack offers a cheap, and politically

and militarily effective way of destroying mobile missiles. The

solution to the SCUD problem, a solution likely to meet with the

approval of America's allies, is available today. Senior

political and military officials simply need to recognize the

potential inherent in an ASW approach to counterforce to make

this capability a reality for the United States, its allies, and

U.S. forces operating overseas.

ENDNOTES

1. In the literature on international relations, balancing

refers to the tendency of states to form alliances to defend

themselves against aggressive states. Bandwagoning is the

tendency to join with aggressive states in an effort to avoid

their depredations. For a discussion of these concepts see

Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1987; and Randall Schweller, "Bandwagoning for

Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International

Security, Vol. 19, No. 1, Summer 1994, pp. 72-107.

2. AF/XOXI Briefing Slides, "Countering Weapons of Mass

Destruction Proliferation: Developing the Tools," delivered

September 15, 1993, USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.

3. On this point see James J. Wirtz, "Miscalculation,

Surprise and American Intelligence After the Cold War,"

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,

Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1991, pp. 10-11.

4. Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh note, for instance,
19

that because the United States was at the head of a "disparate

coalition" during the Gulf War, it was on the political

defensive; only an extraordinarily successful military campaign

prevented political weakness from interfering with the liberation

of Kuwait. See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait

Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," International Security, Vol.

16, No. 2, Fall 1993, p. 41.

5. For a fine discussion of air doctrine see Michael E.

Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber

Program, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, pp. 29-67.

6. David E. Snodgrass provides a succinct description of how

campaign planners misapplied doctrine when confronted with a

difficult Scud problem: "US War planners were aware that Scud

attacks, particularly on Iranian cities, had a significant impact

on the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. However, General

Schwarzkopf viewed the Scud simply as a terror weapon. He did

not consider the Scud as militarily effective because it had a

small warhead with inaccurate guidance. Before Desert Storm,

officers at the Air Staff discussed the mobile missile problem

with SAC [Strategic Air Command] and learned of the difficulty in

trying to find individual launchers once they deployed to the

field. Air Staff officers therefore formulated a general attack

plan to disrupt Saddam Hussein's command and control system

rather than attack the separate launchers . . . . By interrupting

Saddam's operational and strategic scheme, US planners hoped to

prevent the Iraqis from using their Scuds at all." See David E.

Snodgress, "Attacking the Theater Mobile Ballistic Missile

Threat," MA Thesis, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 1993, p. 3.

 7. McPeak quoted in Snodgress, "Attacking the Theater Mobile

Ballistic Missile Threat," p. 3.

8. As Stephen Rosen has recently noted, many successful

wartime innovations, for instance, carrier aviation and the

development of a U.S. Marine Corps amphibious capability,

experienced a long peacetime gestation. Paradoxically, effective

wartime innovation is facilitated by prior planning. See Stephen

Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military,

Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 76-85.

9. Warner R. Schilling, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Concepts in
20

the 1970s: The Search for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing

Parity," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2, Fall 1981.

10. Robin Ranger, "Theater Missile Defenses: Lessons from

British Experiences with Air and Missile Defenses," Comparative

Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 4, October-December 1993, pp., 399-413.

11. Of course, officers have been known to take the wrong

steps when facing a nascent threat. For example, General Short's

decision to respond to warnings of potential hostilities with

Japan by increasing defenses against sabotage actually increased

the effectiveness of Japanese attacks on Oahu’s airfields. See

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of

Failure in War, New York: The Free Press, 1990, pp. 49-50.

12. "Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation:

Developing the Tools."

13. On "windows of opportunity," see Richard Ned Lebow,

"Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?"

International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer 1984, pp. 147-186.

 For a fine discussion of the concept of preventive war, see Jack

Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,"

World Politics, Vol. XL, No. 1, October 1987, pp. 82-107.

14. Jack Snyder, for example, describes how European Great

Powers and their military establishments on the eve of World War

I misperceived a situation of defensive dominance and adopted

offensive doctrines which approximated preventive war strategies.

 See Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military

Decision Making and the Disaster of 1914, Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 1984. For a discussion of Hitler's decision

for war against the United States, see Randall L. Schweller,

"Tripolarity and the Second World War," International Studies

Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 1, March 1993, pp. 73-103. On Japan's

decision to launch a preventive war against the United States,

see Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision,

Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, pp. 339-357.

15. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,

New York: St. Martin's, 1983, pp. 126-127.

16. Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War,
21

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993.

17. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, "The Six Day War," and

Michael I. Handel, "The Development of the Israeli PoliticalMilitary Doctrine," both contained in Frank Horton, Anthony

Rogerson and Edward Warner, eds., Comparative Defense Policy,

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

18. As Bernard Brodie wrote in the late 1950s, "Preventative

war seems today no longer a live issue, though it was that only a

few years ago among a small but important minority of American

citizens. The pressure in favor of it diminished as the Soviets

developed a nuclear capability, and especially as Americans

became acclimated to living with those nuclear bombs that had

provoked the idea in the first place." Bernard Brodie, Strategy

in the Missile Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959,

pp. 227-228. On the issue of preventative war in U.S. strategy,

see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, Princeton: Princeton

 University Press, 1991, pp. 21, 103-107; David Rosenberg, "The

Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-

1960," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, Spring 1983, p. 33;

and, Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance,

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 161-164.

19. Clearly, the scenario described here mirrors the U.S.

experience in the Gulf War: the Bush administration engaged in a

sustained diplomatic effort to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait

peacefully. See Freedman and Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won," pp.

38-39.

20. On the stability-instability paradox, see Glenn Snyder,

"The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul

Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power, San Francisco: Chandler,

1965, pp. 194-201.

21. It would be extraordinarily unwise to dismiss the

possibility that a gifted leader could manipulate the threat of

force to intimidate small states without provoking great power

intervention or even hostilities. After all, Hitler, apparently

following this strategy, did well enough until his last bloodless

victory, the occupation of the Lithuanian district of Memel on

March 23, 1939. See A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second

World War, New York: Atheneum, 1984, pp. 131-132; and William L.
22

Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1960, pp. 461-462.

22. Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South

Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," in Robert Jervis,

Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds., Psychology and

Deterrence, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p.

102.

23. On the security dilemma, see John Herz, "Idealist

Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol.

2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157-180; and Robert Jervis,

"Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol.

30, No. 2, January 1978, pp. 186-214.

24. John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 1983; and, James J. Wirtz, "Strategic

Conventional Deterrence: Lessons from the Maritime Strategy,"

Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, Autumn 1993, p. 121.

25. Purely "technical" assessments of the military balance

or imbalance between states are not sufficient to produce

instability in strategic relationships. The United States

possess a splendid first-strike capability against most nations,

yet people do not lay awake at night worrying, for example, about

what this implies about the future of U.S.-Canadian relations. 

For an elaboration of this logic see Colin Gray, Weapons Don’t

Make War, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1993.

26. Richard Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense

Planning, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982.

27. According to Cohen and Gooch, the Navy learned this

lesson the hard way during a highly successful U-boat campaign in

 1942. See Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, pp. 59-94.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Acting Director

Colonel William W. Allen

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. James W. Wirtz

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler