i

CHINA AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Bates Gill

Lonnie Henley

May 20, 1996
ii

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These monographs were originally presented at the U.S. Army

War College Seventh Annual Strategy Conference held April 23-25,

1996, with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The

Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as

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iii

FOREWORD

The Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute held its

Seventh Annual Strategy Conference in April 1996. This year's

theme was "China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . .

. or Peer Competitor." One of the issues of this year's

conference was China's ability to participate in the Revolution

in Military Affairs (RMA). The two essays that follow address

that topic.

Dr. Bates Gill of the Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute (SIPRI), on a panel entitled, "Seizing the RMA: China's

Prospects," argued that there is more to participating in the RMA

than securing or producing high-tech weaponry. A revolution is an

all-encompassing phenomenon with socio-cultural as well as purely

technological aspects. China's prospects for seizing the RMA lie

not so much in the development of technology as in the

restructuring of concepts and organizations. History, culture,

and philosophical values will make it difficult for China to

participate in the RMA.

On the other hand, Dr. Gill believes that China may be able

to develop an "RMA with Chinese characteristics" much as it took

Marxism-Leninism, a Germanic-Russian innovation devised for

proletarian revolution, and modified its tenets to be relevant

within a peasant revolutionary context. Through sheer

determination and by optimizing technology and expertise

available from outside sources, China might approximate a less

sophisticated RMA entirely suited to its own needs.

Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley joined Dr. Gill on

this panel. His paper argues that, over the next 20 years, China

will deploy a dozen or so divisions possessing relatively

advanced systems, but that overall, the PLA will remain about a

generation behind the U.S. Army in terms of its ability to

participate in a fully-developed RMA. Furthermore, capabilities

within the air and sea forces of the PLA will be even more

limited with relatively small infusions of advanced aircraft like

the SU-27 and naval vessels such as the KILO class submarines.

These modern weapons will make up only a fraction of what will be

otherwise dated forces. According to Colonel Henley, by 2010 the

PLA may be able to achieve the kind of capabilities demonstrated

by U.S. forces in the Gulf War.

These papers paint a picture of China with limited potential

to become a peer competitor of the United States in the next two

decades. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that China's relative

power in Asia and globally will grow sharply in that period. Even

partial success in pursuing advanced military technology and

organizing concepts could enhance the speed and impact of that

rise in power.
iv

The exploration of the issues surrounding the RMA has only

just begun, and the essays that follow are worthy of

consideration by anyone interested in the role that China may

play in the strategic military balance early in the 21st century.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

BATES GILL heads the Project on Security and Arms Control in East

Asia at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI). Formerly he held the Fei Yiming Chair in Comparative

Politics at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Chinese and

American Studies in Nanjing, China. A specialist in East Asian

security affairs, Dr. Gill's research and publications focus on

China's arms trade, arms production, and arms control activities.

His latest book, co-authored with Taeho Kim, is China's Arms

Acquisition from Abroad, published by Oxford University Press.

LONNIE HENLEY, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, is a strategic

intelligence officer and China foreign area officer assigned to

the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,

Headquarters, Department of the Army. He is a graduate of the

United States Military Academy and holds masters' degrees in

Chinese language and history from Oxford and Columbia

Universities. He has served three tours in Korea and three years

as a China analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency.
1

CHINA AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:

ASSESSING ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS

Bates Gill

At present, a technological revolution in high and new

technologies is sweeping across the globe, and

increasingly becomes a critical factor in measuring a

country's national power and military strength. . . .

The next ten years are of critical importance for

China's vitalization.

Marshal Nie Rongzhen,

Founding father of PRC's

 military-technical base, 19911

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

This paper is organized into four principal sections. The

first section will introduce a framework for analysis by first

broadly sketching the meaning of a revolution in military affairs

(RMA) and offering general background points about China's

relationship to past and current RMAs. The body of the paper

consists of two principal sections which focus respectively on

economic and socio-cultural factors and which affect China's

capacity for change, innovation, and adaptability particularly in

areas of activity critical to grasping the current RMA. A

concluding section will assess how socio-cultural and economic

factors will affect China's progress in grasping the current RMA

in particular, and its military effectiveness overall.

Conceptualizing an RMA.

To define and describe an RMA is a complex and esoteric

undertaking, one which has consumed the time and intellectual

energies of numerous analysts who have in turn produced a

burgeoning body of analysis.2

 Rather than reinventing the wheel

on this subject, or developing a hard and fast definition, it

will be more useful for our purposes simply to sketch those broad

areas of agreement among analysts of past and contemporary RMAs.

Indeed, in terms of theory-building and policy prescription, the

study of RMAs remains in its nascent stages, barely out of the

definitional starting blocks.3

 At this early stage in the

development of our understanding of RMAs, offering a general

concept of what constitutes an RMA--rather than explicitly

linking the definition to the current RMA, or to present and

future capabilities and strategies of the U.S. military--seems to

be a more sensible approach if we are to usefully develop our

conceptual understanding of China and RMAs.
2

In broadly sketching the areas of apparent consensus on what

constitutes an RMA, and drawing from the literature just cited,

we can note the following general points:

• that RMAs are not simply technological in nature, but

concern significant progress and change in at least 4-5 important

military-related areas: technology, systems, operations,

organization, and strategy (see Figure 1 for a rough diagram of

how these components appear in the current RMA);

• that changes or progress in these areas in and of

themselves do not represent a true RMA, but rather it is the

synergistic combination of these developments which forms the

true RMA and alters the nature of warfare;

• that RMAs emerge from revolutionary changes of historic

magnitude within the broader social, economic, and political

environments of national and global societies, which in turn

offer the conditions for RMAs to be recognized, appreciated,

internalized, and exploited;

• that the smooth and successful process of recognition,

appreciation, internalization and exploitation requires

flexibility, adaptability, innovation, and openness to change.

China and RMAs.

Based on this broad conceptualization of RMAs, three general

points will serve as a background to the subsequent discussion of

economic and socio-political factors affecting Chinese approaches

to the current RMA.

Playing "catch-up." It was China's fate that at the

historical period of its confrontation with the West--in the

early to mid-19th century--another critical historical

development was taking place to form a watershed in the

development of military strategy and technology. On the far side

of that watershed, dating back to the earliest days of recorded

history, developments in military strategy and technology were

marked by their evolutionary and slow character. But since the

mid-19th century, change in military strategy and technology was

marked by its rapid and revolutionary character. Whereas prior to

this watershed, change in military strategy and technology was

measured in centuries, since the mid-19th century revolutionary

change in military affairs is measured in decades or less.4

 The

revolutionary and rapidly changing nature of military affairs is

unlikely to slow in the foreseeable future--and may accelerate in

what Alvin and Heidi Toffler have called the "Information Age" or

"Third Wave" of warfare.5 Metz and Kievit hypothesize that in the

future a series of "minor revolutions in military affairs will
3

occur closer together than in the past, almost to the point of

continuous revolution."6

As a result, since the mid-19th century, and throughout its

tortuous process of nation-building to the present day, China has

been playing "catch-up" with increasingly recurrent revolutions

in military affairs. Concomitant with its broader efforts to

modernize, a constant theme in the relationship between China and

military affairs since the mid-19th century has been its ability

or inability to adapt to rapid change and innovative military

developments even as the pace of change increases. To use the

Tofflers' typology, just as Agrarian Age China struggled to

confront the Industrial Age West from the mid-19th century

onward, so too today a (mostly) Agrarian Age and (nascent)

Industrial Age China now must confront the Third Wave of the

Information Age emergent in the Westernized world.7 This point

serves to give some historical background to the problem at hand,

allowing us to understand more of the contextual forest so as to

better analyze the trees immediately before us.
4

Avoiding the U.S. yardstick. Our understanding of RMAs is

dominated by what it means for the United States, and not for

other countries. In particular, the literature tends to focus on

defining the current RMA--with its emphasis on high-tech systems

such as stand-off precision strike weapons; command, control,

communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I) capabilities;

and information dominance--and suggesting policy options ahead,

all in relation to the United States. In short, our definitions,

frameworks, theories, and policy outputs on the RMA are

constructed and debated for the most part with reference to the

forces, threats, and missions of U.S. armed forces. Moreover,

because the United States already has highly sophisticated

battle-tested weaponry, its armed forces are far ahead on the

learning curve, having successfully tackled fundamentals in R&D

and production and moving toward refining both the technology and

strategy demanded by the rapid changes of the Information Age.

Applying this yardstick, the United States clearly dominates in

the four key areas of RMAs: technologies, systems, operations,

and organization, making it rather easy to conclude that the

Chinese do not have a grasp of the RMA, and are far from doing

so.

But, for a number of reasons, it would be unwise to blindly

apply this yardstick in our strategic analyses of other countries

such as China. First, it too easily falls prey to an overreliance on the technological superiority inherent in the United

States' grasp of the current RMA. Blind faith in the "silver

bullets" of technology too easily dismisses the possibility that

China can compete successfully with the United States and other

technologically advanced counterparts at some threshold below or

outside the RMA as defined by U.S. forces. Second, from a more

analytical point of view, this yardstick avoids answering why

China has not grasped the current RMA, and what factors will

determine its ability or inability to do so at some point in the

future.

This point emphasizes that we find ourselves treading in new

conceptual territory where we are likely to encounter conceptual

throughways and roadblocks not found on the RMA map as designed

in the United States. As we will see, factors entirely alien to

the American experience--such as communism and Confucianism--play

a critical role in the likely successes and failures in China's

progress toward current and future RMAs.

Comparing successes and failures. In reviewing China's

experience with RMAs over the past 150 to 200 years, its clearest

success is in the development of nuclear weapons and strategic

missiles in a relatively short span of time. In the integration

and operationalization of other RMAs, China has not exhibited

such clear success nor rapid development.8 Arguably, its strategy
5

and tactics in the Korean War were reminiscent of World War I,

while its efforts to stage a lightning strike against Vietnam in

1979 quickly bogged down and ended in miserable failure. A

discussion of Chinese efforts to more effectively make use of air

and naval assets in an integrated fashion is the subject of

another paper, but suffice it to say here that China is in the

very earliest stages of developing this capability commensurate

with capabilities demonstrated by other major powers in World War

II.

But the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic

missiles appears to be the exception to the trend for China and

RMAs, and offers interesting insights into China's ability to

grasp the current and future RMAs. First, China mobilized massive

intellectual and--at times equally or more important--political

resources in an all-out effort to build the bomb and missile

delivery systems in such a short period of time. So great was the

effort that it managed to meet with success in spite of the

disastrous economic and political maelstroms that swirled through

China from the late 1950s though the mid-1970s.9

But on the other hand, this effort also reveals insights for

what China has not accomplished. China is still behind in this

particular RMA, especially in terms of the survivability and

accuracy of its nuclear force. It continues to struggle with the

development of adequately powerful solid-fuel rocket engines, in

guidance systems, and in the development of multiple-warhead

weapons. While China can claim a nuclear "triad," it always

placed its greatest reliance on its land-based force, and its

strategic air and submarine forces are of questionable

reliability. Of the five declared nuclear powers, China maintains

its minimal deterrence posture--though it may be in the midst of

some modification10--which can only be roughly equated in force

and capability to that which was deployed by the superpowers more

than 35 years ago.

This point is raised to suggest that while China has shown

success in pursuing the nuclear weapon/ballistic missile RMA,

that success has thus far been limited to mastering fundamental

technologies and deployments, and has not moved far in terms of

operational capability and survivability nor doctrinal

developments.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Are economic and socio-cultural factors critical

determinants for the RMA, and, if so, how can their impact be

analyzed? As for economic influences, the Realist school has long

held the importance of economic factors for national power.

Realist critiques suggest that economic power, not military

power, will be the more critical determinant of national
6

strength. The Tofflers argue that the conduct of warfare is very

much a reflection of the economies that fight them, "not in

technological terms alone, but in organization, communication,

logistics, administration, reward structures, leadership styles

and cultural assumptions." Put another way, "smart tools in the

economy produce smart weapons for war."11

Looking ahead and beyond current economic factors, we should

recognize that the Information Age will redefine the critical

economic endowments for power. In addition to the traditional

three economic factors for national power as understood by

Realists--land, population, and resources--a fourth factor,

information, will be entered into the mix. How well an economy

adapts to this new reality will partially determine its

comprehensive national strength, and affect national power in

such fundamental areas as trade, business, education, technical

skills, propaganda and political control, as well as military

capability.

The following analysis will assess three critical economic

factors for their impact on China's ability to adapt to and

exploit capabilities inherent in the emergent RMA: autarchic

development; industrial policy and organization; and commitment

of financial resources.12

Autarchic Development.

China's traditional economic development policy of "selfreliance" is rooted in historic concerns and has important

implications for the country's ability to adapt to change in

general, and to see progress toward the current RMA in

particular. Like other countries, China's concern for selfreliance is security-related: the more a country can rely on

itself for its economic and military needs, the less likely it

can be held hostage in times of crisis.

But for China, the concern for self-reliance has deeper

roots than basic security concerns. Because of its recent

history, particularly what the Chinese term the "century of

shame"--from the onset of foreign encroachment onto Chinese

territory in the mid-1800s until the Communist consolidation of

its victory on the mainland in the mid-1900s--China remains

highly sensitive to dependent and semi-dependent relations with

foreigners. China's "betrayal" at the hands of Khrushchev and the

final collapse of massive Soviet economic and military assistance

in 1960 further strengthened a well-entrenched propensity toward

self-reliance and autarchy. The concern for over-reliance on and

even distrust of foreign economic sources and contacts is

reflected recently in Beijing's decision to regulate access to

financial data and information provided by foreign news vendors.13
7

In the especially sensitive area of military technology and

development, the concern over self-reliance is even greater.

China's singular aim in the development of its military

technology is to establish the means to produce the weapons and

technologies itself. As the official history of the Chinese

defense industry puts it:

In the process of developing its science and technology

for national defense, China has always stood firmly on

the foundation of self-reliance, correctly handling the

relationship between foreign goods and self-development

and overcoming an improper underestimation of our

capabilities and a tendency toward blind reliance on 

copying foreign imports. As to introducing foreign

assistance and technology: we need to, but cannot

simply depend on or blindly follow them. Study them,

but also know their fundamental nature so to put them

to our own use. . . . In this new era and for the

future, China will always adhere to the fundamental

guideline that the development of defence science and

technology must principally rely on its own strength.14

Today, as defense R&D and production "goes global," and the

costs and complexities of military technology increase, China's

military modernization efforts may not be able to so firmly

adhere to such traditional principles. Current Sino-Russian

cooperation may indicate a growing awareness in China of the need

to cooperate more closely with foreign suppliers in the

development of its military, but this relationship remains at an

early stage.

More broadly, the Tofflers note how countries such as China-

-which still seek and wilfully exhibit the trappings of selfreliance and nationhood--will resist what they view as the

intrusive influences of globalization which characterize the next

"wave" of development, the Information Age. Chinese efforts to

strictly monitor the Internet is just one of many manifestations

of this tendency.15 This has significant economic ramifications,

not only for China's ability to develop its military, but more

broadly for its ability to successfully reap the fruits of

participation in the global economy. Many analysts suggest that

the Soviet Union's inability to integrate with the global economy

was a decisive factor in its demise.

Industrial Policy and Organization.

Industrial policy and organizational methods have an

important influence on China's ability to absorb technologies,

exchange findings and ideas, and adapt to new circumstances in
8

order to more effectively grasp and exploit developments in the

current RMA.16 Moreover, in an apparent paradox, while the

economic reforms of the Deng era have done much to strengthen

China's comprehensive national strength, they have weakened its

defense industrial base in many ways. Of greatest interest to our

discussion at this point, three important factors arise: the

Soviet and Maoist legacy; commercialization; and

decentralization.

Soviet and Maoist Legacy. China's industrial base, and

particularly its defense industrial base, is still dominated by

the organizational model adopted from the Soviets in the early

1950s which has traditionally been characterized by overcentralization and bureaucratic formalism.17 Our discussion will

focus on several key aspects of this system. First, the

development of industry, and particularly the defense industry,

heavily relied on large scale output of what the Chinese call

"copy production." This characteristic feature of Chinese defense

production derives from the Soviet reluctance to part with

production technologies, the exigencies of the Sino-Soviet split

which compelled China to learn how to produce its own weapons,

and the Maoist proclivity to reward quantitative rather than

qualitative production targets. The current exhortations within

the defense R&D and production sector to "contract the front,

give priority to key projects" and "more research, less

production" acknowledge the need to restructure the sector's

approach to development.

Second, the Soviet legacy has left a vertically-organized

and highly redundant production system, with limited experience

in either "rationalization" or downsizing and few horizontal

linkages across production sectors or between research and

production facilities. This is especially true in the defense

production sector, which was traditionally isolated and

protected--geographically, organizationally, and politically--

from developments and innovations in other sectors of the

economy. Under these conditions, the problem of information

"scarcity" arises. In China, information and technology remain

highly scarce resources, which are tightly guarded mostly by

bureaucratic agents and institutions of the state.

This traditional separation of the commercial and military

sectors and lack of institutionalized horizontal informationsharing becomes especially problematic in an information-based

age when the diffusion of commercial technologies and

organizational principles are particularly important in making

progress in the current RMA. China has made significant strides

in recent years to "cross-fertilize" between the military and

commercial sectors and to decentralize decision-making (see

below), but this effort continues to meet with difficulties. An

indication of these difficulties is found in the China Daily
9

which reported in December 1995 that China's enormous research

establishment--2.4 million researchers at 5,860 research

institutes, 3,000 university research centers, and 10,000

business-related research units--produces some 30,000 patents a

year, of which about 5 percent end up in production.18 In other

words, while considerable research is conducted, little reaches

the point of application.

Third, the Soviet system of economic organization has left a

system which does not offer strong incentives to broad-based

science and technological innovation and achievement. The system

is run by bureaucrats and party officials whose interests lie not

in the development of scientific knowledge, but in meeting

production and political quotas. Moreover, in the formative years

of the People's Republic, enormous intellectual and financial

resources were poured into the military production sector and

especially to applied research for mass production, to the

detriment of more comprehensive and theoretical science and

technology expertise.

To be sure, the Soviet and Maoist models promoted mass

production, and, as noted above, resulted in certain key

breakthroughs, such as in ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.

But the price was the development of a stultified defense science

and technology sector which became accustomed to reverseengineering rather than technological innovation and lacked an

integrated and rational system of R&D development, production,

and procurement. But, this system offered little in the way of

"know-why" or "know-how," has not left a tradition of innovation

or "cross-fertilization" within and among relevant institutions

and individuals, nor led to the firm creation of the critical

link between research and production.

Commercialization. Now nearly 15 years into the ambitious

Chinese defense conversion effort, the program has a number of

success stories, but overall has proved extremely difficult, with

most defense enterprises continuing to lose money and facing

tough times ahead.19 Commenting on the looming socio-economic

crisis facing the Third Front defense industries in rural Sichuan

Province, a Chinese commentator noted that "most of the factories

are on the verge of bankruptcy" and concluded that in their turn

to the market "prospects for success are dubious."20 With 55 per

cent of China's defense industries in Third Front areas, the

conversion effort is both necessary and problematic.21

The move into commercial activities diverts resources and

expertise out of military production. Official statistics note

that on average 70 per cent of the output value of Chinese

defense enterprises under the State Council is for the civilian

market and the aim is to raise this figure to 80 per cent by

1999; some sectors already claim a much higher conversion rate.
10

According to some Western estimates, about 90 per cent of Chinese

defense production capacity sits idle.22 But these figures appear

to hide actual conditions on the ground, where the vast majority

of defense production enterprises have great difficulty in

converting to commercially viable production.23 Furthermore, it

appears that the commercialization effort invests financial and

intellectual resources in areas geographically and conceptually

outside the traditional centers of arms production with the

creation of "window enterprises" and PLA companies in the

prosperous coastal regions of China which are not engaged in

military R&D and production activities.24

On the other hand, the trend towards commercialization may

prove advantageous for the industry as a result of "spin-on"

synergies. The Chinese have begun to recognize that the

foundation for military technologies of the future will

increasingly be commercial technologies. The Vice-Minister of the

Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National

Defense (COSTIND), Huai Guomo, stated in 1993:

Because national defense high technology is by its

nature having multiple technologies, the differences

between defense and civilian technology is becoming

smaller and smaller. The trend of interchangeability

between the military and civilian is on the rise,

allowing the technical foundation for an accelerated

modernization of national defense and to realize the

steady improvement of weapons.25

General Liu Huaqing, China's highest-ranking active military

officer and Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission,

said in early 1995 that China "should pay attention to turning

advanced technology for civilian use into technology for military

use."26 Official Chinese policy appears to view conversion and the

commercialization of the industry in an optimistic light, but

moving from concept to realization will be no easy task with

little past experience upon which to found the effort. But it

will be critical for China to develop this capability in order to

grasp the current and future RMAs.

Decentralization. Overall economic trends in China today are

towards placing greater decisionmaking authority in the hands of

provincial, municipal and enterprise authorities, a trend which

is also taking place in the defense R&D and production sectors.27

However, tensions and contradictions exist between the center and

subordinate units as these developments unfold. As a result, the

picture on economic decentralization and its effect on China's

approach to the RMA is not clear. On the one hand, and over the

short term, the decentralization trends will pose difficulties to

the defense-related R&D and production units. On the other hand,

decentralization in principle can help China over a longer term
11

to develop the concepts, organizational structures, and

conditions needed within its economy to exploit the emergent RMA.

As part of the economic reform and modernization effort

since 1979, the main government units responsible for weapons

development and production have been periodically reorganized in

an effort to streamline and rationalize the system. Since 1979,

the defense industries under the State Council have undergone at

least three major reorganizations, and we now may be seeing the

advent of a fourth reorganization. First, in the early 1980s, the

formerly numbered machine-building industries were given names

and were streamlined somewhat, with the Eighth Machine Building

Industry (missiles) merged into the Seventh to make the Ministry

of Space Industry, and with the shipbuilding industry set up as a

ministry-level corporation. In 1988, these ministries were

regrouped under three ministry-level organizations--the Ministry

of Energy Resources (MER) (including nuclear industry), the

Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industry (MMBEI)

(included electronics, ordnance and land systems), and the

Ministry of Aerospace Industry (MAS) (including aircraft and

aviation products, missiles, and space launch vehicles and

satellites).

Most recently, over the period 1991 to 1993, the MER, MMBEI,

and MAS were shut down, and their subordinate industries were

reorganized under five ministerial level corporations ostensibly

subordinate to the State Council: China State Shipbuilding

Corporation (CSSC), China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), China

National Nuclear Industry Corporation (CNNC), China North

Industries (NORINCO), and Aviation Industries of China (AVIC).

The Ministry of Electronics Industry was set up as a regular

ministry, though parts of the industry were commercialized in the

form of China Electronic Industry Corporation (also know as

Chinatron). The trend toward decentralization is further

confirmed by the November 1995 Chinese White Paper on arms

control which notes "the government departments formerly in

charge of military production have already been changed into

general corporations [and] will step by step develop into

economic entities engaging in research, production, and

business."28

This gives a freer hand to hundreds of factories, companies

and research institutes which are ostensibly subordinate to the

ministry-level corporations. However, in the near term,

coordinating development and production of defense materiel--

hardly ever a well-coordinated effort in the Chinese experience29- -will only become more difficult under the market conditions

currently prevailing in China which favor the realization of

quick profits in the commercial sector over long-term planning.

In one example, managers at NORINCO apparently tried without

success to drastically cut back on the company's centrally-
12

mandated defense production quotas in order to free up resources

for more lucrative commercial production ventures. In discussions

with managers of defense production units in late 1995, it was

clear that many would like to get out of the defense production

business completely.

The picture is further muddied by the official line for the

defense science and technology enterprises. The official policy,

harkening back to the achievements of 35-40 years ago, offers

"strengthened centralized and unified leadership as the

fundamental assurance for defense science and technology

development" as the number one lesson of China's defense science

and technology experience.30 Maintaining the spirit or the letter

of such a policy will probably not be conducive to the kind of

open and innovative environment called for by the emergent RMA.

This political and economic tug-of-war--reminiscent of previous

critical development debates in contemporary Chinese history--is

likely to continue for some years to come to the detriment of

coordinated efforts aimed at getting a technological and

organizational handle on the emergent RMA.

Commitment of Financial Resources.

China has limited financial means to devote to science and

technology development over all, and defense-related R&D and

production in particular. Indeed, "science and technology" and

"defense" remain third and fourth priorities, respectively, in

the Dengist canon of the "Four Modernizations." However, as the

Chinese economy continues to thrive, new developments and

synergies in the commercial sector could overcome traditional

state-based sources of support to the science and technology and

defense R&D and production communities. But for China to make

significant advances in the emergent RMA will require not only

improved financial resources to relevant sectors, but also--more

difficult to accomplish--considerable improvement in the

development of human resources.

The four tables in this section present basic trends and 

indicators for certain potential financial resources to support

science and technology development and defense R&D and production

in China. Table 1 presents the most recent statistics available

from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

on Chinese military expenditure. The ACDA figures are "rough

estimates," and are some 7-8 times higher than the official

Chinese defense budget figures.31 In any event, working with

Chinese sources, Wang finds that the official Chinese defense

budget "does not cover the costs of research and development on

new weapons and equipment," the funding for which comes out of

other budgets.32 But the ACDA figures indicate that Chinese

military spending has remained relatively steady over time, when
13

factored for inflation and the devaluation of the yuan, between

approximately 50 and 55 billion U.S. dollars a year.

Unfortunately, these figures do not break down the totals into

spending categories such as R&D. Recent estimates for Chinese
14

--------------------------------------------------------------

Year Annual Spending % of GNP % of CGE

--------------------------------------------------------------

1983 53,050 6.8 30.4

1984 52,140 5.8 26.1

1985 52,160 5.1 23.8

1986 50,960 4.6 19.3

1987 51,400 4.2 19.5

1988 52,040 3.8 20.0

1989 51,320 3.6 19.1

1990 54,110 3.7 18.8

1991 52,000 3.3 17.3

1992 54,870 3.0 16.9

1993 56,170 2.7 16.2

--------------------------------------------------------------

Figures are in constant (1993) million U.S. dollars, and as a

share of gross national product (GNP) and central government

expenditure (CGE).

Table 1. Chinese Military Expenditure, 1983-93

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military

Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 58. The source

notes that these are "rough estimates."

spending on defense- and weapon-related R&D are in the range of

U.S.$1 billion to U.S.$5 billion a year.33 One researcher,

reaching the lower figure, also placed it in perspective to other

countries' military R&D spending in the period 1992-94 (Table 2).

It is similarly difficult to get good figures on the amount

China spends on science and technology R&D overall. According to

one recent source, China spent approximately 1 per cent of GNP,

or about U.S.$4.0 to 4.5 billion in 1992.34 The United Nations

estimates that in 1992, China expended approximately 16.9 billion

Chinese yuan, approximately 0.5 per cent of GNP, on R&D

expenditures (slightly less than U.S.$3.0 billion at 1992

exchange rates).35 In 1992, one researcher states the China

Natural Science Foundation (CNSF) was providing a total of 80,000

researchers with approximately 2.26 billion Chinese yuan.36

However, this appears to be an exaggeration, as official

statistics state that the CNSF was to receive only 1.5 billion
15

--------------------------------------------------------------

 Government Expenditure

Country Year on Military R&D

--------------------------------------------------------------

Canada 1993 210

China 1994 1,000

France 1992 4,700

Germany 1992 1,600

India 1994/95 320

Italy 1993 530

Japan 1992 660

Russia 1994 1,000

Spain 1993 290

Sweden 1992 450

United Kingdom 1993 3,900

United States 1994 42,000

--------------------------------------------------------------

Figures are in million U.S. dollars.

Table 2: Estimated Government Expenditure on Military R&D

in China and Democratic Countries

Which Spent Over $200 million U.S. Per Year, 1992-94.

Notes: Calendar years except for India, for which the fiscal

year is given; because of budget and conversion uncertainties

China and Russia figures are accurate to one significant digit. 

Others are accurate to two significant digits. Source: Eric

Arnett, "Military Technology: the Case of China," SIPRI Yearbook

1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 376.

Chinese yuan for the entire Eighth Five-Year Plan, 1991-1995, or

an average of 300 million Chinese yuan per year. The amount of

funding from the CNSF was to reach 500 million Chinese yuan per

year for 1995.37 Table 3 offers some comparative figures for

national R&D spending as a percentage of gross national product

for several countries. As another point of comparison, the

Pentagon recently reported that its requested 1997 budget for R&D

and procurement of "information technology," particularly in

communications and electronics, amounts to nearly U.S.$3

billion.38

Another potential revenue source for Chinese defense-related
16

R&D and production development is derived from the sale of
17

--------------------------------------------------------------

 R&D Expenditure

Country Year as Percentage of GNP

--------------------------------------------------------------

Canada 1992 1.6

China 1992 0.5

India 1990 0.8

Japan 1991 3.0

South Korea 1992 2.1

Soviet Union 1988 1.8

Sweden 1991 2.9

Taiwan 1993 1.9

United Kingdom 1992 2.1

United States 1988 2.9

--------------------------------------------------------------

Table 3: R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of

Gross National Product (GNP) for

Selected Economies in the Years Indicated (1988-93)

Sources: United Nations, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1995,

Lanham: Bernan Press, 1995, Table 5.1; Statistical Yearbook of

the Republic of China, Taipei: Directorate General of Budget

Accounting, and Statistics, 1995, Table 56.

weapons, both as exports and as domestic procurement. However,

this source of investment has come under pressure in recent years

as exports and domestic procurement have both declined

precipitously. Table 4 indicates that when measured in SIPRI

trend indicator values, the volume of Chinese arms exports has

dropped rapidly in recent years and particularly since the late

1980s. Similarly, domestic procurement has decreased as well, in

some cases quite considerably.39 Even as some defense procurement

continues, the financial resources available to the plants

remains relatively limited as a means to reinvest in improved

facilities and R&D. A leading Chinese defense economist writes

that the current pricing system for Chinese defense products

continues to limit profits for the manufacturer to around 5 per

cent of the cost of production, according to the formula of

"planned cost x (1+ 5 per cent)".40 It is unclear how much of this

profit is reinvested in R&D or plant development. A high-ranking

official in CAPUMIT states that profits from military enterprises

is reinvested according to the "5 + 3 + 2" formula: 50 per cent

is reinvested in upgrading the plant; 30 per cent is devoted to

plant and facilities maintenance; 20 per cent is used
18

--------------------------------------------------------------

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

--------------------------------------------------------------

1760 3214 2212 1414 1222 1103 1159 1284 744 868

--------------------------------------------------------------

SIPRI trend indicator values, expressed in constant 1990 U.S.

million dollars.

Table 4: Volume of Chinese Arms (Exports, 1986–95)

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, 1996. Note: SIPRI arms

transfer data are an index which indicate trends in deliveries 

of major conventional weapons. SIPRI arms trade statistics do

not reflect purchase prices and are not comparable with economic

statistics such as national accounts or foreign trade statistics.

 Sources and methods used in development of SIPRI arms trade

figures are explained in the SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford University

Press: Oxford, annual; and in Sources and Methods for SIPRI

Research on Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers and Arms

Production, SIPRI Fact Sheet, January 1995.

for personnel and administrative costs.41 This underlines that 50

percent is reinvested in upgrading the plant; 30 per cent is

devoted to plant and facilities maintenance; and 20 per cent is

used for personnel and administrative costs.41 This underlines the

point that production and R&D tend to be separated, not only

spatially and conceptually, but with regard to resource-access as

well.

Taken together, the potential sources of financial

commitment to the development of China's science, technology and

R&D strengths seems comparatively weak, at least in relation to

the types of technological and conceptual breakthroughs which

seem necessary for China to see progress with the current RMA.

While there is a clear understanding on the part of the Chinese

leadership of the necessity to devote more resources to R&D, to

integrate more fully with the international economy, and to

radically restructure its research and production communities,

this process will be slow and painful.

SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS

Socio-cultural factors and their influence on military
19

prowess and strategic thinking are less obvious and have not been

treated as amply in the literature as have the more obvious and

measurable economic factors. The notion of "national character,"

"national morale," and the "quality of society and government"

and their influence on national power were treated by Morgenthau

in his 1948 classic, Politics Among Nations.42 In efforts to

discern Soviet military thinking, studies on Moscow's "strategic

culture" appeared in the 1970s,43 and have since been supplemented

more recently by similar studies addressing other cultures.44 One

study in particular has sought to refine this approach, arguing

that "the nature of a society can affect the military power

generated by the society," suggesting that our analyses should

focus on "the dominant social structures of a country" and how

they influence "the amount of offensive and defensive national

military power that can be generated from a given quantity of

material resources."45

With regard to the RMA in particular, much scholarship and

the popular imagination have tended to stress the technological

factor as a driver of military change. But in the context of the

current debate on the RMA, the most careful observers emphasize

the multi-dimensional character of the RMA, and stress how it is

couched within a broader set of determinants. Cooper argues that:

creating a revolution is more . . . than pushing the

frontiers of science or the boundaries of military

systems; it must be a positivist process that requires

adaptation by the organism (or organization) for

exploitation to occur.46

Another analyst of the RMA notes the importance of behavioral

factors such as "new operational concepts, new tactics, and new

organizational structures," all of which derive from "the current

confluence of social, political, economic, and technological

forces."47

It is to this socio-cultural realm that we now turn to

analyze how established Chinese norms and values affect the

country's approach to RMAs. In particular, the following pages

will consider historical and contemporary Chinese socio-cultural

foundations and their impact--for better and for worse--on

China's ability to recognize, appreciate, adapt to, and exploit

revolutionary changes in military affairs.

Historical Context.

Confucianism. Confucianism is at its root a set of sociocultural norms which value and legitimize conservatism in

thought, and the maintenance of the status quo in political,

socio-economic, and cultural structures. Originally conceived as
20

a means to ensure the stability and prosperity of Chinese

agrarian society, Confucianism seeks precisely to avoid

revolutionary and disruptive change. As Lucien Pye argues:

The Confucian ideal was eminently appropriate for an

agrarian society but was detrimental to the development

of commerce and industry. Eventually, the Confucian

tradition . . . worked against the Chinese in their

confrontation with the modern industrial and

technologically oriented West.48<%0>

RMAs by their nature are "antithetical to existing cultural

norms and bureaucratic structures."49 It will be difficult enough

within a society and military which values technology and is

relatively accustomed to innovation and change--such as the

United States--to come to grips with the demands of the new era

in military affairs. For China, a society which is--by tradition

and by exigencies of contemporary socio-politcial realities--

conservative and resistant to foreign ideas, adapting to new

concepts and organizational structures will be difficult and

problematic.

Specifically, we can point to four key aspects of

Confucianism as important in relation to RMAs. First, the

pervasive influence of Confucianism is still felt today in its

segmentation of society, both horizontally and vertically.

Confucian norms look favorably on and promote a society so

regulated because it is understood that the system is stable and

conducive to prosperity and moral betterment when "everything is

in its proper place." From top to bottom, in rank order, society

was divided into the following: the emperor, the mandarin class

of scholar-bureaucrats, farmers, and artisans, with merchants and

soldiers occupying the bottom rungs. Cutting down vertically

across those horizontal divisions were other lines of division:

geographic, demographic (urban vs. rural) and familial. This

structure tended to restrict movement of ideas and labor, while

conserving the socio-cultural structure intact with little

change. In principle, the tenets of Confucianism allowed that

those with merit--as determined by the level of scholarly ability

to master the Chinese canon--were able to cross over these

societal divisions. In practice, only those with the time and

means to devote to the years of training and study necessary to

succeed in the examination system could hope to enjoy much

mobility.

Second, Confucianism teaches the centrality of government

not only as a dominant but (ideally) enlightened ruling force,

but also as purveyor of unifying socio-cultural values. It also

served for the ruling class as a "common code" of conduct and

moral virtue. In the wrong hands, however, this ideal could be

easily corrupted to a simple facade for perpetuating
21

authoritarianism and tyrannical political, social, and cultural

policies.

Third, Confucianism diminishes the role of the individual in

favor of the collective good. Confucians expect individuals to

perform certain duties and functions in accordance with their

determined place within society. In doing so, the individual is

assured to have done his part in contributing to the stability of

the entire society. Individualism, or acting outside one's

"role," was not considered socially acceptable behavior, and

contravened the interests of the whole.

Fourth, the Confucian system valued education to the degree

it accomplished two principal purposes. First, education was

intended to be the formal vehicle through which was conveyed a

narrow set of immutable and predetermined norms, values and

precepts. The process of scholarship entailed committing these

subjects to memory with little question or investigation.

Problems which subsequently arose were to be solved with strict

reference to the canon. Second, education was intended to broadly

prepare the scholar to assume functionally unspecialized duties

within the government. As a result, matters of study outside of

the canon--natural sciences, technology--were beyond the socially

acceptable pale or were scorned for their overly specialized and

impractical nature. Under this system the inventiveness and

innovation which marked early Chinese history bogged down from

the Ming dynasty onward into the 20th century--a span of nearly

500 years.

The Tiyong Concept. The tiyong concept is another

historically important influence on Chinese socio-cultural 

norms. It provides a transcendent normative basis for Chinese

approaches to socio-economic and technological development and

its relations with the outside world in general. The tiyong

concept--short for zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong (Chinese

learning for substance, Western learning for practical use)--

speaks to a belief in the inherent superiority of things Chinese.

This is the view which understands China as an inherently higher

culture and civilization, reluctant to accept and integrate the

ideas and learning of foreigners, particularly those of the West.

Moreover, as the notions of "science" and "technology" became

increasingly associated with the West, so too they were treated

with less respect within the tiyong framework. Time and time

again in Chinese history since the 1500s, the introduction of

Western learning and concepts--sometimes introduced peacefully,

other times rudely crashing onto Chinese shores--were rejected

with reference to arguments conceptually related to the tiyong

ideal.50

One example of this tendency is particularly illuminating

for our understanding of socio-cultural influences affecting the
22

exploitation of RMAs in China. Following its devastating defeat

at the hands of Japan in the 1895 (in which China was forced to

cede Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaodong peninsula to Japan),

China subsequently launched the ill-fated "Hundred Days of

Reform." With little planning or strategic vision, reform-minded

advisors to the Qing court attempted to drive through rapid

changes to the Chinese economic and scientific system similar to

what they perceived to be the accomplishments set in motion in

the late 1860s by the Meiji Revolution in Japan. The reformers

issued proclamations mandating the establishment of new academies

of learning, the development of railroads, the adoption of

Western scientific methods, and the translation of Western texts.

This movement was quashed almost as quickly as it began by the

Empress Dowager and her court of conservative supporters. The

reformers were hounded out of office, some were killed, and the

violently xenophobic Boxer Uprising erupted shortly thereafter in

1900.

These concepts underpinning Chinese socio-cultural norms are

not simply historical oddities, but continue to shape the way

modern-day Chinese leaders and citizens view their world. On the

one hand, this outlook helps to unify a disparate nation of more

than a billion persons, and provide some sense of Chinese

identity. The sense of "being Chinese" is a powerful emotional

and motivational force to Chinese on the mainland and around the

world. On the other hand, remnants of the Confucian sociocultural system, strengthened in ways by communist rule, stifle

innovation, promote rigidity in thinking, and tend to favor

paralysis over adaptability, all of which are not conducive to

recognizing, accepting, and exploiting the emergent RMA.

Contemporary Context.

Communist authoritarianism. Communism and Confucianism share

many socio-cultural similarities, but communist rule added new

dimensions of its own. In particular, through wielding modern

means of communication, propaganda, and political control, the

communist leadership has largely strengthened many of the

stultifying practices of Confucianism (while often condemning the

belief system in theory). On the other hand, the communist

leaders in their early years of rule were able to concentrate the

levers of power available to them in a way which resulted in

significant military-technical breakthroughs particularly with

regard to establishing a rudimentary but functional conventional

and nuclear deterrent.

The communist leadership is duly proud of its

accomplishments in restoring a semblance of order and stability

to China upon its victory in 1949, following the long "century of

shame" characterized by chaos, war, civil strife, and the often-
23

vicious intrusions of foreign powers. The communist system

quickly sought to impose its set of rules upon the Chinese

society to govern behavior, reward the good and punish the evil.

The system included its own understood hierarchy where--as in

Confucianism--the leaders were above the law but (ideally) benign

and with the society's greater interests in mind. Beneath the

leaders, the widening ranks of party members--properly imbued

with the communist canon--took control of the bureaucratic levers

of power, while beneath them China's vast numbers of peasants

were considered with special favor as were soldiers who fought

for the revolution. At the bottom of the ladder, merchants,

entrepreneurs, and landlords were eventually dispossessed of

their capital and relegated to second-class citizenship. Also

near the bottom of this hierarchy were persons with foreign

connections and learning, who were particularly suspect in the

new system. Geographic, demographic, and familial divisions

remained important, but the communists added a new dimension with

the introduction of huge bureaucratic socio-economic

organizations such as mass organizations, collectives and

communes, and the danwei, or work unit. The upwardly or

horizontally mobile knew the value of party membership--or at

least a strict adherence to the party's teachings--to their

ambitions.

As in Confucian practice, the centrality of the ruling

group--embodied under communism in the form of the Party--is

unquestioned. Moreover, through the massive socio-economic

organizations to which all belong, the party is able to socialize

the citizenry, unify thinking, and convey acceptable sociocultural norms and behaviors. The role of the individual is

subsumed to the will of the society--as defined by the party

orthodoxy. Moral models such as Lei Feng--a self-proclaimed

simple but devoted cog in the giant social machine--are extolled.

Individualism and unorthodox thinking are shunned and often

punished severely.

With Maoist disdain and suspicion of intellectuals, learning

is less revered than under Confucianism. "Merit" and moral

conduct (i.e., learning and practicing the communist canon) is

more often preferred to technical expertise. Experts and

specialists in science and technical fields, while often 

talented, are shabbily and at times brutally treated, and

considered suspect in difficult political times. The Cultural

Revolution destroyed a generation of possibilities in terms of

human capital. It may seem strange that the official line of the

defense science and technology sector is compelled to exhort its

people to "respect the knowledge and talent" of the intellectuals

and experts in their ranks, but such calls are apparently still

necessary.51 To this day, the arguments pitting "red" versus

"expert," the "open door" versus the "Four Cardinal Principles,"

and attacking the deleterious effects of (foreign) "bourgeois
24

liberalism" and "cultural pollution" provide a thin contemporary

veneer over the deep-seated nature of these debates.

These proclivities of the communist society reveal

themselves in the troubled way in which defense-related R&D and

production are conducted in China. These problems have been often

cited by Western and Chinese observers alike.52 In reviewing the

relevant Chinese and Western literature, and in discussions with

official researchers and experts concerned with the development

of China's defense R&D and production base, problems related to

the communist system consistently emerge: the persistence of

"leftist" and "ideological" thinking which has prevented the

establishment of a more rational and scientific approach to

decision-making; bureaucratic formalism and over-centralization;

poor coordination across the life cycle of a weapon system;

profligate and misdirected spending; an institutionalized lack of

horizontality between the defense R&D and production sectors and

to the outside commercial sector; and a continuing lack of esteem

and incentives for scientific expertise. In addition, the nature

of the Chinese socio-economic system requires a considerable

amount of political will to be directed from the top down before

change and innovation reform can be implemented from the bottom

up.

Attempts to break down this system and to introduce reform

and management techniques aimed at improving the defense

industrial base have had only mixed success, limited almost

entirely to the commercial sector. In the words of one Chinese

defense industry expert, a change for the better in the system

will require "efforts by a generation of people."53

Post-Mao modernization. In the two decades since Mao's

death, Chinese society and values have undergone tremendous

change. While deeply-rooted forms of social organization and

values under Confucian and Communist systems continue to be

predominant, the reforms and societal transformation of China

over the past 15 years--which can be expected to continue and

even accelerate in the years ahead--create change and tensions

that are both beneficial and detrimental to China's ability to

adapt to exploit the changes inherent in the emergent RMA. It is

still too early to know with certainty where these changes will

lead, if they can be sustained in a positive way, or if China

will stay true to its history and continue its rocky and

problematic relationship with change and foreign concepts.

At this early stage, however, it may be useful to consider

how post-Mao modernization has affected the social position and

status of Chinese human capital, which, perhaps more than any

other single factor, will determine China's ability to grasp the

emergent and future RMAs. As noted, the past record of Chinese

human capital development is mixed, and since 1949 and the advent
25

of the communist system has included long periods in which

scholarly and scientific training and intelligence were actively

scorned, and scientists and intellectuals actively punished and

even killed. In recent years, China has taken steps to invigorate

and heighten the social status of scientific and R&D communities,

which, if sustained, will no doubt contribute to improvements in

the development of RMA-related systems and organizational

constructs. As noted in relation to other aspects of the economy

elsewhere in this monograph, the present shake-out in the economy

as a result of reform will probably have short-term deleterious

effects on the development of China's human capital, but may pay

off over a longer term.

In the short term, the socio-cultural mantra defining the

rapid Deng-era changes could be summarized in the words of the

paramount leader himself: "It is good to be rich." This has

resulted in an increase in corruption, an entrepreneurial

preference for quick profits over long-term visions, an even more

covetous protection of information and technology by bureaucratscum-businessmen, and, of interest to our discussion, a slow drain

of expertise out of scholarly and research fields, and into

business. For the defense R&D and production sector, this trend

poses some difficult challenges. For example, the president of

Aviation Industries of China (AVIC) said in 1993 that in the face

of lucrative opportunities in the commercial sector, he has

problems keeping his staff of 10,000 engineers, technicians, and

designers "energized and committed to aerospace."54 Frieman argues

that the "open door policy has also made a career in non-defense

related science more attractive than it might have been in

earlier periods," adding that the "military sector might still

have some of the best, but it no longer has all of the best, of

China's scientists."55 The apparent employment of some Russian

scientists also suggests that China has difficulties meeting its

defense production R&D goals strictly through reliance on its own

expertise. Indeed, the official history of the Chinese defense

industry makes the case for improved technical training and

education, allowing that China "lacks personnel" who can "carry

forward the frontier of today's national defense science and

technology sector."56

Thus, while the modernization and reform effort will carry

forward and meet with a number of significant gains, it may do so

by taking socio-cultural directions not immediately beneficial to

long-term national health. This period of socio-cultural change

will be characterized by social disruption and decentralization,

restructuring of societal organization, the introduction of new

cultural norms and behaviors, the development of new conceptions

of "good" and "bad," "right" and "wrong," and the creation of a

novel approach to solve pressing problems. This process will take

time, will be resisted by entrenched interests, and in the near

term will slow China's efforts to fully exploit the emergent RMA.
26

CONCLUSIONS

Profound Changes, but to What Result?

A first conclusion we should draw from this brief analysis

is to acknowledge that profound changes are occurring in Chinese

economic and socio-cultural spheres which have important

implications for the country's approach to emergent RMAs. But

while this may be obvious, a more nuanced understanding of the

process requires analysts to recognize that while many of these

developments are conducive to China's approach to the RMA, others

are not.

For China's approach to RMAs, indeed to change generally, it

will no doubt benefit from those economic and socio-cultural

developments which favor greater flexibility, adaptability, and

innovation. Such changes underway in China are often remarkable

in their extent and pace. To take just one example, the official

Chinese press recently noted that about half of the enterprises

in a "pilot project"--607 out of 1,290--succeeded in

"transforming their corporate management from a planned-economy

type to one for a market economy." The enterprises established

supervisory boards and business-oriented meetings, abolishing

their former reliance on bureaucrats and party organization.57 But

the fact that the effort is in a pilot stage, involves a small

number of enterprises (of which only half were thus far

successful), and that such events should be news at all are

illustrative of the deeper obstacles that must be overcome in

spite of impressive gains thus far.

As to the RMA itself, it would seem that the PLA and defense

R&D community has begun the process of recognition and debate

beyond its immediate shock at the display of high-tech warfare

against Iraq in 1991. On October 26, 1995, the China Defense

Science Technology Information Center (CDSTIC), the information

clearing-house and think-tank connected to the ministry-level

commission in charge of China's defense industries (Commission

for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

(COSTIND)) held a seminar on the topic of "miliary technical

revolution." Bringing together persons from the Academy of

Military Sciences, the National Defense University, the armed

forces, and defense-related industries, the seminar addressed

"the intention, characteristics and development" of the military

technical revolution, and the "need to renew concepts and bring

about overall development in PLA military theory research."58 In

addition, efforts are underway to open up the defense R&D and

production system to outside influences, especially in the

context of increasingly friendly military-technical relations

between China and Russia.59
27

These changes and opportunities are impressive and hold 

great potential. On the other hand, in the grand scheme of

things, in these changes we are witnessing a China still

struggling--sometimes successfully, other times not--with the

economic and socio-cultural implications of the shift from

agrarian to industrial society. This struggle has been marked by

widespread social and political upheaval, tortured cultural

introspection, and economic turbulence that the current and

relative stability of Chinese society appears to belie. But

another great wave of change is likely to come to China, even as

it continues to grapple with its transition to the industrial

age. China's confrontation with this next wave is just beginning,

and the ultimate social, political, economic and military impact

of the information age for China is yet to come.

Technology-led or Behavior-led RMA?

As suggested by Figure 1, the component parts of the

emergent RMA can be divided into three categories. The first

category concerns the "tools of war" with an emphasis on

technology as their defining feature. The second category

concerns "behavior" and focuses on changes in organization and

ways of thinking as critical drivers. In studying China and the

RMA, this distinction is important. In particular, the work

presented here suggests that the greatest obstacles between China

and the emergent RMA does not rest in the development of

technology so much as in the restructuring of concepts and

organizations. It will be in this critical area--where the

attributes of innovation, integration, flexibility, adaptability

are all-important-- where China is likely to have the most

difficulty.

Three important points support this view. First, the

commercial nature and current diffusion of militarily-relevant

technology is such that it is probably only a matter of time

until China possesses and begins to see advances with critical

technologies for warfare in the information age. In the postindustrial age, the accoutrements of power are not as dependent

on classic factor endowments such as land, labor, and capital,

and are more related to information. This source of strength is

more transferable, meaning the diffusion of power as technology

is greater. For example, China is working on the development of

stand-off precision strike cruise missiles, on the development of

a GPS system, and on improving C4I capability. But the critical

test for China will not be simple possession of the technology

(it is said tongue-in-cheek that China can put together at least

one of almost anything), but rather applying to it the conceptual

and analytical tools necessary to understand the technology and

operate it effectively in the new conflict environment.

Second, China has met with relative success in those RMAs
28

which were primarily driven by technological breakthroughs. In

cases where the driver was a compelling need to address a

strategic problem (an operational and organizational driver) or

to respond to fundamental economic, political, and socio-cultural

changes, China has not fared as well.60 This point may be all the

more relevant in this period of rapid decentralization in China.

It seems difficult to conceive how China, under the economic,

social and political conditions prevailing today, can ever again

mount the kind of massive, highly-centralized, technology-driven

undertaking which accomplished its breakthrough to nuclear

weapons and ballistic missile technologies.

Third, in the past it was often the case that technology led

doctrine. But, on the other hand, in today's technology- and

information-rich environment, potential applications are

developing rapidly, and the opportunities for exploitation are

growing exponentially. Future success in grasping the revolution

in military affairs may well require the creation of wellconsidered frameworks and doctrinal approaches first, and then

choosing and integrating available technological choices to fit

the requirements. In other words, with a wide and seemingly

unlimited range of technological choice in front of strategists

and planners, it will be wise to carefully devise strategy and

doctrine best-suited to the future, before investing scarce

financial and intellectual resources pell-mell in areas that

ultimately are not suited to long-term national defense.

China, like others countries, is not experienced in this

approach, which demands a considerable degree of flexibility and

innovation. But unlike other countries, this problem seems

particularly acute in China. Many examples and analyses

illustrate the problem. Richard Latham, describing Chinese

military R&D and production policy, writes that "little thought

was previously given to linking threat and strategy to equipment

manufacture."61 John Lewis and Xue Litai, in their study of

China's nuclear missile submarine project, reveal that "China's

current strategic doctrines are the product, not the cause, of

the projects' political-technical evolution. . . . The strategic

doctrines did not shape the projects nor provide a coherent

context for them."62 A researcher at the China Defense Science and

Technology Information Center writes that "in our weapons system

acquisition process there are the following cases: though a

weapons system has already entered into the engineering

development state, its operational mode has not yet been

determined."63 The Chinese have gone forward with a major aircraft

development program (the K-8 jet trainer), even to the point of

having produced a number of operational models, but now have a

small purchase committment from Pakistan, and no orders

forthcoming from the PLA.64 A Chinese researcher who has spent

much of his career studying the procurement process in China sums

up the problem when he writes of the "segmentation phenomenon":
29

R&D evolves along the phases of basic research, applied

research, development, production and deployment. . . .

Should a problem arise in a certain link in the process

... productivity will be affected. Therefore it is very

important that they should be organically coordinated.

In this respect, China still has many problems.65

China's highest ranking active military officer and leading

advocate of military modernization, Liu Huaqing, has weighed in

on this subject as well: "[I]mprove coordination. When a new

project is launched, in the very beginning, we must consider from

an overall angle the related technological support, auxiliary

facilities, training of personnel, and other problems. . . ."66

Thus, for the future, China will need to focus on the

development of restructured conceptual approaches to problems,

while also making advances in the development of technology

itself. Referring to Figure 1, China will need to make the

linkage between "changes in tools" to "changes in behavior." That

step is difficult for any organization, and, as we have seen,

will be particulary difficult for China.

An RMA with Chinese Characteristics?

While China faces many obstacles to realizing the emergent

RMA, analysts should keep two caveats in mind.67 First, we know

that China has shown in the past its ability to focus resources

in a way which achieves RMA breakthroughs, as in the development

of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. This kind of

gargantuan and unified effort is idealized in current defense

science and technology sloganeering:

Together, the vast numbers of defense science

technology workers and all the Chinese people, under

the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and

adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles and to reform

and openness . . . will march on to realize strategic

targets and more magnificent and brilliant triumphs.68

It is possible that the concentrated effort of China's

greatest resource, its people, could result once again in

significant advances within the current RMA. This may be more

difficult than in previous efforts, but with the availability of

technology and expertise increasingly available from outside

sources, China could succeed in developing and deploying an "RMA

with Chinese characteristics": perhaps less sophisticated, but

sufficient for Chinese needs.

This brings up the second point. For the near- to mid-term

future it is likely that the kinds of conflicts China might face
30

will not require large-scale exploitation of emergent RMA

technologies and concepts. Rather, these conflict scenarios are

likely to be limited in time and space, and involve relatively

few military assets against foes who are also not well-advanced

within the current RMA. For China, a basic deterrent capability,

with an ability to exercise its military influence in ways it

deems conducive to its interests--incrementally larger presence

in the Spratlys, bluster and saber-rattling against Taiwan--may

be sufficient in the near- to medium-term to "buy time" as China

continues to modernize its armed forces. As the events of early

1996 starkly illustrated, even China's "junkyard army" can create

difficulties and draw the United States into areas of high

tension and potential conflict. The Chinese effort to master 

"high-tech warfare with Chinese characteristics" may be slow but

its potential threat cannot be entirely dismissed.

Concluding Words.

Is China within reach of the emergent RMA? In a few words,

not in the next 5-10 years. Clearly China is in a period of

profound change in the several areas discussed here. It would

appear that the Chinese have entered into a very early stage of

addressing the emergent RMA-- somewhere between the existence of

necessary conditions for revolution to occur and a recognition

that a revolution is in the making.69 A constellation of factors--

including developments in the economic and socio-cultural realm--

will determine where China goes from here.

ENDNOTES

1. Xie Guang, et al., eds. Dangdai Zhongguo de Guofang Keji

Shiye [Scientific and Technological Undertakings of National

Defense in Contemporary China], Vol. 1, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo

Chubanshe, 1992, p. 5 (author's translation).

2. Four of the more recent presentations on the subject are

Jeffrey Cooper, "War in the Information Age: The Changing

Technology of the Battlefield," paper presented at the conference

on Rethinking Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era, Wilton Park

Conference Centre, Sussex, England, December 8-10, 1995; Randall

G. Bowdish, "The Revolution in Military Affairs: The Sixth

Generation," Military Review, November-December 1995; Earl H.

Tilford Jr., The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and

Cautions, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, June 23, 1995; Stephen Metz and James Kievit,

Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Carlisle

Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

June 27, 1995. The latter work by Metz and Kievit provides an

excellent summary overview of the open literature on the subject,

and usefully links theory to prescriptive policy choices.
31

In addition, extensive treatments of the topic include

Michael J. Mazarr, Jeffrey Shaffer, and Benjamin Ederington, The

Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework,

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,

March 1993; Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War:

Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century, London: Little, Brown

and Company, 1994; Andrew F. Krepenevich, "Cavalry to Computer:

The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, Fall

1994. In April 1994, the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S.

Army War College held its Fifth Annual Conference on Strategy to

address the topic of the RMA which produced several valuable

studies: Jeffrey R. Cooper, Another View of the Revolution in

Military Affairs, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute,

U.S. Army War College, June 23, 1994; Michael J. Mazarr, The

Revolution in Military Affairs: A Framework for Defense Planning,

Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, June 10, 1994; Paul Bracken and Raoul Henri Alcala,

Whither the RMA: Two Perspectives on Tomorrow's Army, Carlisle

Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,

July 22, 1994. These citations offer only a small representative

portion of the writing on the subject.

3. After analyzing the vast literature on RMAs produced by

persons in the Department of Defense, the academic strategic

studies community, and defense-related think-tanks and consulting

firms, two military analysts concluded that while "this group

includes some brilliant thinkers, its output so far has not been

theoretically comprehensive and, as a result, has offered only

limited policy choices." Metz and Kievit, p. 2.

4. The themes of pre-Industrial Revolution militarytechnical continuity versus the more recent alacrity of militarytechnical change are expanded in Barry Buzan, An Introduction to

Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International

Relations, London: Macmillan Press, 1987, pp. 18-19.

5. Toffler and Toffler.

6. Metz and Kievit, p. 10.

7. Toffler and Toffler, pp. 18-25, 213-20.

8. Analysts differ over the precise number and type of RMAs

that have occurred since the beginning of the 19th century. A

representative list might include the following, in chronological

order: Napoleonic mass mobilization of conscript armies to

achieve theater-wide campaigns; advent of telegraph and trains

(as used in the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War);

mass production and mechanization of materiel (as used in World

War I); development of efficient internal combustion engines,
32

advancement in aircraft, and radio communications (as combined to

execute blitzkrieg warfare); joint development of nuclear weapons

and long-range ballistic missiles; development of informationbased technologies to allow for long-range precision strikes and

force synergies through radically improved C4I capability.

9. The seminal studies on China's efforts to overcome

enormous obstacles to develop its strategic forces are John Lewis

and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1988; John Lewis and Xue Litai, China's

Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the

Nuclear Age, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

10. See Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New ‘Old Thinking':

The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security,

Winter 1995/96, which argues that China may be moving toward a

more flexible warfighting doctrine of limited nuclear deterrence.

11. Toffler and Toffler, pp. 37 and 72; see generally their

chaps. 2, 3 and 9.

12. See "China's Capacity for Achieving a Revolution in

Military Affairs," which follows, for China's technological

prospects.

13. "State Council directive to control flow of information

in China sparks international criticism," China News DigestGlobal, January 22, 1996; Steven Mufson, "Beijing Imposes Strict

Controls on Economic News," International Herald Tribune, January

17, 1996, p. 1.

14. Xie Guang, et al., eds. Dangdai Zhongguo de Guofang Keji

Shiye [Scientific and Technological Undertakings of National

Defense in Contemporary China], Vol. 2, pp. 492-93 (author's

translation).

15. "Mainland China Internet users ordered to register with

police in 30 days," China News Digest-Global, February 15, 1996;

"Mainland surfers must promise not to ‘harm China'," China News

Digest-Global, February 19, 1996; Seth Faison, "For Internet fans

in Shanghai, the real line is wired to the Party," International

Herald Tribune, February 6, 1996, p. 4.

16. On the effect of economic reform on Chinese defense

industries, see Bates Gill, "The Impact of Economic Reform on

Chinese Defense Industries," in Mark Weisenbloom, et al., eds.,

Chinese Military Modernization, London: Kegan-Paul, forthcoming

in 1996.

17. On the continuing resemblance of China's defense

industrial base to that of the Soviet Union, see Erik Baark,
33

"China's policy response to the challenge of new technology," C.

Brundenius and B. Goransson, eds., New Technologies and Global

Restructuring: The Third World at the Crossroads, London: Taylor

Graham, 1993.

18. China Daily, December 23, 1995, cited in China News

Digest-Global, January 5, 1996.

19. The most comprehensive analysis of Chinese defense

conversion is Jorn Brommelhorster and John Frankenstein, eds.,

Mixed Motives, Uncertain Outcomes: Defense Conversion in China,

Boulder: Lynne Reinner, forthcoming 1996. Another excellent study

is Mel Gurtov, "Swords into Market Shares: China's Conversion of

Military Industry to Civilian Production," China Quarterly, June

1993.

20. Pei Jiansheng, "Market solution eludes remote militaryindustrial complex," China Daily Business Weekly, November 6--12,

1994, p. 7.

21. This figure was provided in communication with Jin

Zhude, President of the China Association for the Peaceful Use of

Military Industrial Technology (CAPUMIT, a research and public

relations organization attached to the Commission on Science,

Technology and Industry for National Defense), November 1995.

22. "Making a modern industry," Jane's Defence Weekly,

February 19, 1994, p. 28.

23. Based upon discussions the author held with Chinese and

foreign defense industry and military officials, Chongqing,

China, November 1995; see also Bates Gill, "Defensive Industry:

China's arms makers struggle with the marketplace," Far Eastern

Economic Review, November 30, 1995, p. 62.

24. See Jin Zhude, "Share-holding system: a new attempt at

conversion from military to civilian industry in China" and Lu

Yishan and Jiu Jichuan, "Strategic thinking on strengthening

international cooperation and promoting conversion from military

to civilian industry," in Haiyan Qian, ed., Restructuring the

Military Industry: Conversion for the Development of the Civilian

Economy, Beijing: Publishing House of the Electronic Industry,

1993, pp. 96, 236-41; Tai Ming Cheung, "Serve the people," Far

Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1993, p. 64.

25. Xiang Wang, "Xiandai junshi keji fazhan yu junzhuanmin:

guofang kegong wei Huai Guomo fuzhuren fangtanlu" ["Development

of modern defense technology and defense conversion: Interview

with Huai Guomo, Vice-Minister of the Commission of Science,

Technology and Industry for National Defense"] Xiandai Junshi

[Conmilit], no. 196, May 1993, p. 4 (author's translation).
34

26. Liberation Army Daily, January 15, 1995, translated in

"Liu Huaqing urges development of defense technology," Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, January 30,

1995, p. 30.

27. This point and the following section are based in part

on discussions and interviews with Chinese and Western defense

and defense industry officials in China in November 1994, January

1995, March 1995, and November 1995.

28. Information Office of the State Council of the People's

Republic of China, China: Arms Control and Disarmament, Beijing:

Information Office of the State Council, November 1995, pp. 14--

15.

29. Yan Xuetong, "China," in Ravinder Pal Singh, ed., Arms

Procurement Decision Making, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

forthcoming in 1996. This SIPRI study synthesizes written

contributions on Chinese arms procurement decision making from 12

Chinese defense industrial and defense research officials.

30. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, p. 488 (author's translation).

31. The actual figure for Chinese defense spending is widely

open to debate, and is probably not known with certainty to the

Chinese authorities themselves. Several in-depth studies are

available on the subject which discuss the methodological

difficulties involved and offer estimates on actual military

spending by China. Among the best are: Wang Shouguang, Demystify

China's Defense Expenditure, unpublished manuscript, May 9, 1995;

section on China by David Shambaugh in "World military

expenditures," SIPRI Yearbook 1994, Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1994, pp. 441-48; Arthur S. Ding, "China's Defence

Finance: Content, Process and Administration," China Quarterly,

June 1996. The ACDA figures represent a "middle ground" among

analysts, presumably are constructed in part from information not

openly available to the public, and are offered in a time series

with constant figures, which most analysts do not offer.

32. Wang, pp. 9-10.

33. Eric Arnett, "Military technology: the case of China,"

SIPRI Yearbook 1995, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995, 375-

76; Shambaugh, p. 446; Wang, pp. 12-13.

34. Ronald D. Humble, "Science, technology and China's

defence industrial base," Jane's Intelligence Review, January

1992, p. 4.

35. United Nations, UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1995,
35

Lanham: Bernan Press, 1995, Tables 5.1 and 5.6.

36. Hu Jian, "The role of the China National Science

Foundation," in Qian, p. 217. There is some confusion whether the

English name of the fund uses "Natural" or "National" in its

title. Official sources use the term "Natural."

37. Cui Lili, "Invigorating China through science and

education," Beijing Review, July 17-23, 1995, pp. 14-15.

38. Pat Cooper, "Information technology spending holds

steady," Defense News, March 11-17, 1996, p. 22. This amount is

broken down as follows: Milstar follow-on program, U.S.$700

million; Joint Strategic Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS),

U.S.$700 million; Army digitization program, U.S.$400 million;

space-based infrared system US$300 million; cooperative

engagement capability, U.S.$300 million; airborne warning and

control system (AWACS) aircraft, U.S.$300 million; global

broadcast system, U.S.$200 million.

39. John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, "Current and Future

Challenges Facing Chinese Defence Industries," China Quarterly,

June 1996.

40. Ku Guisheng, "National Defense Budgeting Procedure and

Price Reforms of Military Products," unpublished manuscript,

December 1994, p. 15.

41. Personal communication with the author, November 1995.

42. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed., New

York: Albert Knopf, 1966, pp. 122-35.

43. Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications

for Nuclear Options, Santa Monica: Rand, 1977.

44. See Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine:

France Between the Wars," International Security, Spring 1995;

Alastair I. Johnston, An Inquiry into Strategic Culture: Chinese

Strategic Thought, The Parabellum Paradigm and Grand Strategic

Choice in Ming China, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan,

1993. See also, Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic

Culture," International Security, Spring 1995.

45. Quotations drawn from Stephen Peter Rosen, "Military

Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," International Security, Spring 1995, p. 6.

46. Cooper, p. 21.

47. Tilford, p. 2.
36

48. Lucien Pye, China: An Introduction, 4th ed., New York:

Harper Collins, 1991, p. 34.

49. Cooper, p. 1.

50. On this point see the historical background offered by

Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks, The Organization and Support of

Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China, New York:

Praeger Publishers, 1970, pp. 11-40.

51. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, p. 495.

52. Richard J. Latham, "China's defense industrial policy:

looking toward the year 2000," in Richard H. Yang, ed., SCPS PLA

Yearbook 1988/89, Kaohsiung: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy

Studies, 1989, pp. 79-89; Yan Xuetong.

53. Interview, Beijing, March 1995.

54. Michael Mecham, "With many suitors, China seeks ‘equal

partnership"', Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 25,

1993, p. 23.

55. Wendy Frieman, "China's defence industries," Pacific

Review, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1993, p. 60.

56. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, p. 497.

57. China News Digest-Global, March 8, 1996.

58. Liberation Army Daily, October 29, 1995, cited in PLA

Activities Report, Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General, October

1995, pp. 26-27.

59. The content and impact of Chinese arms and technology

imports are documented and analyzed in Bates Gill and Taeho Kim,

China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Search for "Superb and

Secret Weapons," Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

60. Cooper, p. 20-22, develops the idea of different forces-

- technological, operational, strategic--are the primary drivers

of RMAs.

61. Latham, p. 86.

62. Lewis and Xue, China's Strategic Seapower, p. 20.

63. Qian Xuesen, "Military Systems Engineering," China

Defense Science and Technology Information Center Paper no. 2,

Beijing, 1989.
37

64. "K-8 ready for service but lacks PLA budget," Aviation

Week & Space Technology, February 12, 1996, p. 27.

65. Chai Benliang, "Retrospect and Prospect of Defence R&D

in China," unpublished manuscript, November 1994, p. 6.

66. Jiefang Ribao, August 6, 1993, cited in "Liu Huaqing

Writes on Military Modernization," Foreign Broadcast Information

Service, Daily Report: China, August 18, 1995, p. 21.

67. These points drawn from Richard Bitzinger and Bates

Gill, Gearing Up for High-Tech Warfare?: Chinese and Taiwanese

Defense Modernization and Implications for Military Confrontation

Across the Taiwan Strait, 1995-2005, Washington DC: Center for

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 1996, pp. 29-30.

 68. Xie Guang, Vol. 2, pp. 503-04. Interestingly, Liu

Huaqing, China's highest-ranking military officer and vicechairman of the Central Military Commission is more realistic:

"Without advanced science and technology and people armed with

advanced science and technology, modernization is empty talk."

Quoted in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World

Broadcasts: Far East, November 11, 1992, p. B2/4.

69. Cooper, p. 23. Cooper notes five steps in a

revolutionary process: (1) existence of necessary conditions; (2)

recognition of these conditions; (3) acceptance, adoption and

adaptation; (4) debate and specification on the new opportunities

and problems to be addressed and created; "institutionalization"

of the revolution; and (5) exploitation of the revolution. Id.,

pp. 23-24.
38

CHINA'S CAPACITY FOR ACHIEVING

A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Lonnie Henley

As China looks ahead to the next century, there is

remarkable agreement among its leaders and citizenry on the basic

interpretation of modern Chinese history--namely, that China was

for millennia one of the wealthiest and most powerful nations on

Earth, and that since the early 19th century it has been denied

its rightful place among the great powers through the concerted

effort of imperialist nations. There is equally widespread

agreement on the long-term objective of China's security policy:

to become the economic, diplomatic, and military equal of the

world's leading powers, meaning the United States. Chinese

leaders and analysts estimate that this will take 40 or 50 years.

There is also general agreement that the key to achieving this

goal is economic development, and that it is achievable on the

desired time line only if China is permitted to continue placing

highest priority on the economy rather than on accelerated

military spending.

In the past year, the perception has also solidified among

many Chinese leaders that the United States will try to obstruct

China's rise to its rightful place in the world. The United

States is the main beneficiary of the status quo, they argue, and

China the main challenger to the status quo. In a rather zero-sum

view of international relations, they conclude it is almost

inevitable that the United States will seek to contain China,

undermine its economic development, and prevent its becoming a

threat to America's privileged position as the world's only

superpower. Eventual conflict with the United States is therefore

seen as possible, but not likely for at least 20 years, and

ideally not until China has reached full superpower status in the

middle of the 21st century. Whether there will be such a conflict

is for another generation to determine; this generation's mission

is to put China firmly on the road to recovering its rightful

status among the world's leading powers.

Thus, as others will no doubt argue in more detail during 

this conference, China fully intends to build a military

capability equal to that of the United States, but only after it

has achieved a level of economic development sufficient to

underpin its superpower ambitions. In the meanwhile, the military

must improve its ability to defend China in the event of an

unforeseen conflict, to enforce China's territorial claims in the

South China Sea, and to carry out the forcible reunification of

Taiwan with the mainland if called upon to do so. Although these

are short-term goals in the grand scheme of Chinese strategic

objectives, they will still require considerable improvement over

a period of a decade or more. Once the People's Liberation Army
39

(PLA) achieves these objectives, in the second or third decade of

the next century, it will turn its attention to the broader goal

of matching the full range of American military capabilities,

particularly its advanced weaponry and long-range power

projection capabilities.

Components of a Revolution in Military Affairs.

The question before this panel is whether, in the course of

trying to develop a world-class military, China could achieve the

kind of unforeseen breakthrough in warfighting capabilities that

we have come to call a "revolution in military affairs," or RMA.

As a starting premise, we will take the following definition: an

RMA consists of the innovative application of military technology

to achieve new military capabilities not achievable by the

standard methods in use in other nations. "Revolution" in this

case consists of being the first to develop and implement a new

paradigm, a new concept of how to prosecute military operations.

It does not necessarily require cutting edge technology; in an

oft-cited example, the German blitzkrieg in the late 1930s

employed the same technological components available to the other

major powers, but applied according to a radically more effective

operational doctrine. Without denigrating the technological

sophistication of the German equipment, it was the doctrine, the

innovative application of available technology, that constituted

a revolutionary breakthrough. One could even argue that guerrilla

warfare as developed by Mao, Guevara, and Ho in the mid-20th

century represented an RMA based on a very low level of

technology.

More closely examined, the Chinese case involves two

different sub-questions. First, can China duplicate the

revolutionary advance that American forces made in the 1980s, and

then follow us into what we believe will be an equally

revolutionary information-based force structure of the 21st

century? In other words, can they close what is currently nearly

a two-generation gap in fielded military technology, operational

doctrine, logistical capabilities, and information processing,

and catch up while American forces move as rapidly as they can

into the information age? Second, and more importantly, is it

possible that China could achieve a revolutionary breakthrough in

military capabilities in some other direction, different from

what the United States has achieved or is seeking to achieve?

 It is debatable whether absorbing and implementing another

nation's conceptual breakthroughs constitutes a revolutionary

advance. If China follows us through the 1980s development of

AirLand Battle, precision deep strike, all-weather and 24-hour

mobile warfare, and then follows us into the 21st century

"digital battlefield" that we envision, does that constitute a
40

revolution in military affairs on China's part? The argument

against is that, eventually, many nations will be able to

duplicate the American success, as the technology and concepts

are disseminated and implemented throughout the world. On the

other hand, this is what many people are thinking when they ask

whether China can achieve an RMA, meaning can they achieve the

same RMA we are pursuing as we implement information technology

throughout our forces. Logically it would seem that this would

not constitute an RMA, but since the issue continues to arise, we

will examine both sub-questions outlined above.

Consequently, the place to start our discussion is with the

relevant aspects of China's current military modernization

efforts, both technological and doctrinal.

China's Efforts to Acquire Advanced Technology.

The possible counter-example of guerrilla warfare

notwithstanding, it would seem that achieving the kind of

breakthrough connoted by "RMA" requires at least fairly advanced

equipment for the era in question. Chinese industry has made

considerable effort to develop systems more advanced than the

early-1970s technology equipment that predominates in the PLA

inventory, but Beijing has not placed high priority on fielding

the improved systems in large numbers. In part this represents

priorities established by Deng Xiaoping in 1975 and reiterated

after his return to power in 1978. In a scathing speech to the

Central Military Commission in 1979, Deng asserted that

weaknesses in education, training, organization, doctrine,

tactics, and management procedures meant that the PLA could not

effectively maintain or employ advanced hardware even if the

nation could afford to supply it. The implicit corollary was that

once the PLA overcame these defects, probably in the mid-to-late

1980s, more modern equipment would be forthcoming. The hardware

payoff got further delayed, however, by the changes in the

international environment, notably glasnost and then the fall of

the Soviet Union, making it unlikely in Beijing's judgement that

China will face any serious threat to national security well into

the 21st century. Thus, ever since the early 1980s, the PLA has

been focused on the organizational, doctrinal, and human aspects

of military modernization, waiting in the meanwhile for Chinese

defense industries to catch up with their Western counterparts

and begin producing advanced systems at a price China can afford.

Over the past 3 years, this pattern has changed slightly.

Beijing has shown an increased willingness to purchase some

advanced weaponry, in numbers sufficient for operational 

deployment, from foreign suppliers. The most visible example is

the contract to purchase several hundred Su-27 fighters from

Russia over the next 15 years. This is the only purchase to date
41

that amounts to refitting a significant part of the force with

new systems. Other purchases, such as a few SA-10 SAMs and four

KILO submarines, serve to fill key weaknesses but leave the bulk

of the force with its older Chinese-built systems. In addition to

foreign purchases, the PLA continues to receive a modest flow of

new and relatively modern systems from Chinese manufacturers,

including short-range ballistic missiles, Luda destroyers,

Jianghu frigates, and improved models of the F-7 and F-8

fighters.

There are several reasons Beijing has loosened the purse

strings. To begin with, there is the persistent inability of

Chinese industry to catch up with Western or Russian state-ofthe-art. There has been success in some areas, such as solid-fuel

missiles and aviation metallurgy, but there remain intractable

weaknesses in key subsystems and in overall design. The aviation

industry in particular seems unlikely to overcome its

deficiencies in power plant, avionics, and system integration any

time soon. Regional developments, particularly the purchase of

advanced Western fighters by Southeast Asian countries and

Taiwan, require increased though limited power projection

capabilities sooner rather than later in order to protect Chinese

territorial claims. The sudden availability of Russian systems at

a reasonable price is also a factor. The biggest reason for

Beijing's willingness to spend hard currency on new systems,

however, is that the PLA has reached the stage where it needs the

advanced systems in order to continue its own development of

doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for large-scale

joint-service operations.

Doctrinal Development.

It seems clear that Beijing does not intend to refit the

entire PLA with modern weapons and equipment. The majority of the

PLA's 100-plus ground force divisions will remain low- to mediumtech forces dedicated to internal security, perimeter defense of

China's border, and various forms of economic activity. A much

smaller number, perhaps 12 to 18 divisions, are striving to

become modernized, mobile forces ready to fight what Chinese

planners call "modern local war under high tech conditions." The

explicit model for such warfare is the performance of the

Coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm. These elite divisions

have been engaged for the past several years in what the U.S.

Army would call warfighting experiments, developing the doctrine,

tactics, and operating procedures for multi-division, jointservice operations on a battlefield characterized by long-range

precision weapons, night vision devices, advanced reconnaissance,

surveillance, targeting and intelligence systems, and high

mobility and firepower. Over the next 5-10 years, the PLA will

disseminate and implement the operational concepts developed in
42

the past 3 years. As an aside, the recent multi-division exercise

near the Taiwan Strait is much better understood as part of the

long-term effort to improve PLA operational capabilities, than

as a short-term response to political developments in Taiwan.

Limiting the procurement of more modern weapons and

equipment to this subset of Chinese ground forces greatly reduces

the cost of modernization. Similarly, the Su-27s and the improved

F-7 and F-8 fighters will only make up a fraction of the entire

PLA Air Force inventory, and four KILOs only a fraction of the

diesel submarine fleet. Even so, the subset of the PLA receiving

more modern equipment constitutes a sizeable force, 12 or more

divisions and significant supporting elements. Keep in mind,

however, Chinese divisions are smaller than their American

counterparts, and have considerably fewer supporting assets at

the corps and theater army level. The bottom line is that over

the next 20 years, China will have a reasonable number of units

possessing relatively advanced systems, but will remain about a

generation behind the state-of-the-art in the most advanced

militaries.

The PLA's energetic efforts to develop and implement a more

effective operational doctrine are centered around understanding,

applying, and countering the warfighting concepts demonstrated in

the Gulf War. There is extensive discussion in military journals

about various aspects of high-technology warfare, both as

practiced by unnamed "advanced" militaries (whose characteristics

and capabilities are uniquely American), and as could be applied

in the defense of China against such an adversary. Chinese press

coverage of PLA exercises over the past several years shows that

some units are trying to work out how China would fight a hightech enemy invading China in the near future--for instance, how

Chinese forces should counter an enemy with much better night

vision capabilities--while others are developing tactics and

concepts that will be applicable in the longer run as the PLA

receives better equipment. Some exercises, such as the Taiwan

Strait exercise this spring, envision offensive operations

against Taiwan or the Spratlys, but the majority posture the Red

(friendly) Forces in a defensive role against Blue Force

invaders.

China's Capacity to Duplicate America's 1980s-1990s RMA.

The PLA's current preoccupation, as we have seen, is to

understand and duplicate the American advances of the last 15

years. Our first question is, can they do it, and, if so, how

long might it take? And, of course, does it constitute an RMA if

they succeed?

There are a great many weaknesses the PLA must overcome
43

before it can carry out the kind of operations the United States

did in the desert. Most obviously, the Chinese logistical system

is incapable of projecting and sustaining a large force at a

great distance outside China's border. This is not a capability

the Chinese presently desire, however, so let us recast the

logistical requirement to encompass rapid movement and

sustainment of large forces within China to counter a highlymobile adversary. The PLA recognizes that it has major

weaknesses even in relation to this limited requirement--severe

shortage of heavy airlift, inadequate rail transport, lack of

standardization across different military regions, excessive

reliance on fixed supply depots, shortage of organic

transportation to move supplies as a unit advances, and much

more. There is extensive discussion as to how to modernize the

logistical system, but the most that can be said at this point is

that the PLA is asking the right questions. Developing the right

answers, then retraining the entire force on more modern

logistical procedures, is a major task. It is likely to be a

decade or longer before there is significant improvement in the

PLA's ability to rapidly deploy and sustain forces to fight in a

demanding high-mobility, high-firepower conflict.

Learning to conduct large multiservice operations is an area

where the PLA is making more progress, but there is still a long

way to go. In the past few years, we have seen a number of multidivision exercises, and press reports have lauded commanders for

collocating air and ground force headquarters in the same command

post to improve inter-service coordination. Observers generally

do not consider these to be true joint operations in American

terms, however. While the air force may operate in proximity to

ground units, and air strikes be synchronized with ground

maneuvers, there seems to be little direct interaction between

the two. Certainly there is nothing like U.S.-style close air

support or air liaison officers with the maneuver brigades, much

less anything like Joint Air Attack Teams. U.S. Army commanders

are often frustrated that they must request air support many

hours in advance, rather than having it instantly responsive to

changing requirements, but it appears their Chinese counterparts

have no input to air force targeting below the Military Region

headquarters level. Nonetheless, the PLA is making significant

progress in the planning and execution of large joint operations.

It remains an open question how long it will take to reach the

level of competence U.S. forces demonstrated in the early 1990s.

There has been some effort to increase the realism of field

training, mainly through opposed-force exercise formats where a

Blue (enemy) Force contingent offers resistance as the Red Force

drives to its objective. Many of these still sound like

choreographed set-piece exercises, where the Blue Force offers

only token resistance, and actual Blue Force victories are rare;

but some units seem to be taking the concept more seriously,
44

injecting a greater note of realism into field training. The PLA

still has a great way to go in this respect, however. The U.S.

Army's approach to this problem was to create several training

centers where units face a highly-trained opposing force (OPFOR)

in a free-play exercise environment. Laser simulators, video and

audio recording, impartial umpires, and elaborate instrumentation

create a realistic combat environment and provide extensive

feedback to the exercising unit. Central to the National 

Training Center experience is the freedom to fail, in fact the

freedom to be thoroughly trounced by the OPFOR if the commander,

staff, and unit are not well prepared. Another tool of training

realism is computerized battlefield simulation for units which

cannot get to the training centers, and a mobile training team

that puts division- and corps-level staffs through realistic

command post exercises. The training centers, simulators, and

training programs took the U.S. Army over a decade to develop and

implement. It will take the PLA at least as long, and that only

after they embrace the concept of realism in training and the

freedom to fail that entails.

The PLA is also addressing some of the more technologyoriented aspects of 1990s-style high-tech warfare. It is

investing in modern command-and-control communications systems,

short-range ballistic missiles for the operational deep strike

mission, improved air defenses, and night vision systems. Chinese

publications also discuss the need for electronic warfare and

intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, but it is

not clear whether they have developed or begun fielding such

systems. There has been virtually no discussion of intelligence

processing and fusion systems such as the U.S. All-Source

Analysis System (ASAS), or of dedicated communications links for

intelligence dissemination. A central feature of current U.S.

doctrine is the effort to give the tactical commander the

clearest picture of the battlefield possible, down to the brigade

and even battalion level. This requires high-capacity, robust

communications links, standardization of data formats and

transmission protocols, interoperability of intelligence

communications among different systems and services, powerful

information processing systems at the lowest command levels, and

a commitment to the free flow of intelligence information to

tactical commanders. Obviously, we know less about Chinese

tactical intelligence than about many other subjects;

nonetheless, available sources do not indicate any effort by the

Chinese to implement such an elaborate and open intelligence

environment.

So the overall prognosis is that the PLA may achieve the

kind of capabilities demonstrated by U.S. forces in the Gulf War,

though it is likely to take at least 10 and probably 20 years for

it to do so. Clearly, this is the task the PLA has set for

itself, as evidenced by the nature of its field exercises and the
45

content of military journal articles for the past 4 years. If the

PLA achieves its goal, does that constitute a revolution in

military affairs? It depends on one's definitions, but I maintain

it would not. Many nations are trying to implement the new

approaches pioneered by the United States; following in the wake

of a successful revolution is not a revolutionary act.

China's Capacity to Achieve an Information-Based RMA.

It is widely perceived in U.S. military circles that if

there is another revolution in military affairs in the next few

decades, it is likely to be based on the exploitation of 

information technology. For our purposes, the question is

whether, if China caught up with U.S. 1990s-level capabilities

faster than anticipated, they could move with us or even ahead of

us into the age of the digital battlefield. This seems extremely

unlikely.

China lags far behind the Western world, and especially the

United States, in its use of information technology. Chinese

computer scientists are very competent, and have shown in the

past that they can assemble systems in a laboratory environment

that come close to the prevailing state of the art. Their copy of

the Cray supercomputer in the mid-1980s is an example. Mass

production of high-technology information systems is another

matter entirely; while China is making headway in the medium-tech

consumer electronics field, no one goes to China for mass

production of advanced integrated circuits. The Chinese lag even

further behind in circuit design, system integration, networking,

operating systems, and development of software applications.

Worst of all, from the Chinese perspective, the United States is

not only far ahead in these fields; it is also advancing much

more rapidly than anyone else in the world. And the greatest

creativity is taking place in the development of innovative uses

of the available technology. From the Internet to ASAS to on-line

banking to powerful database search tools, American society and

the American armed forces are moving rapidly along a path that

China is not prepared to follow.

It is not just a matter of available technology, or even of

creativity in the application of technology. The greatest

impediment to China achieving an information-based revolution is

its authoritarian political system. The dilemma that has

confounded Chinese leaders for over a century, since the SelfStrengthening Movement of the 1880s, is the desire to generate a

dynamic, technologically creative society without allowing a

permissive political and social environment, to arouse and

harness the energies of the Chinese people without giving up

governmental control. In America at least, it seems that the

creativity and initiative that fuel the information revolution
46

can only flourish in a permissive, free-market environment.

 China will, of course, obtain and apply information technology

developed elsewhere, to include some significant capability to

manufacture and modify systems for its own use. As long as the

free flow of information is perceived as a threat to the

political order, however, China is likely to lag far behind in

the application of information technology.

China's Capacity to Achieve Some Other RMA.

So China may duplicate the American breakthroughs of the

1980s and 1990s, though probably not for another decade or

longer; and it is unlikely to achieve an information-based RMA in

the foreseeable future. This does not necessarily mean the

Chinese cannot achieve a revolution in military affairs; it is

possible they will make significant breakthroughs in some other

direction entirely. In fact, this could do more to shift the

military balance in their favor than either of the more

conventional alternatives. We would be much more likely to

recognize, understand, and cope with a Chinese RMA if it followed

the same path we were already on; and less likely to deal

effectively with a revolutionary breakthrough based on concepts

and approaches that are unfamiliar to us. We dealt much better

with the Soviet conventional threat, for example, even when we

thought the Soviets were ahead in key technological areas, than

we did with the guerrilla warfare threat in the 1950s-1970s.

If China does achieve an RMA any time in the next quarter

century, it will necessarily be through the innovative

application of technology that lags somewhat behind the advancing

Western state of the art. Innovation is difficult to predict, but

we can make a reasonable effort based on known capabilities,

circumstances, and concerns.

Fusion of Conventional and Unconventional Warfare. One

avenue China is likely to pursue is the integration of high-tech

conventional forces with guerrilla, militia, and paramilitary

forces into a more effective form of defensive warfare. There is

already considerable discussion of this approach, generally under

the rubric of "people's war under high-tech conditions" (as

opposed to the standard formulation of "modern local war under

high-tech conditions"). For the most part, this discussion seems

to be coming from the bottom up; local militia units and military

districts publishing articles on how they can contribute to the

brave new world of high-tech warfare. The articles have a bit of

a "me too" tone about them, a rear-guard action by the local

districts trying not to get left behind as the PLA forges ahead

into the realm of large-scale conventional operations. Once the

PLA as a whole gets through the initial phase of defining and

implementing a more advanced conventional doctrine, the
47

leadership and doctrinal think-tanks may begin innovating and

modifying that doctrine to take advantage of Chinese strengths.

Chief among these strengths, at least for a battle taking place

on China's home turf, is the ability to mobilize and organize

huge militia and paramilitary forces to support the conventional

forces. If they can develop a comprehensive doctrine for

integrating guerrilla and paramilitary operations with the

conventional scheme of maneuver, they might achieve the kind of

beneficial synergy that constitutes a real breakthrough in

military capabilities--"AirLand Battle with Chinese

Characteristics," perhaps.

Precision Deep Strike. The area of military technology where

China seems closest to matching Western capabilities is in

building accurate, mobile, solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The

latest Chinese entries, such as the M-9 SRBM (aka DF-15, aka CSS6), seem to be achieving accuracy levels that make them useful

for precision deep strike missions with conventional or improved

conventional warheads. This will give the Chinese operational

commander the kind of capability that his American counterpart

achieves with cruise missiles, ATACMS SRBMs, precision-guided 

air-delivered munitions, and stealth aircraft. So far so good,

but not revolutionary. Some suggest that a breakthrough may come

if the Chinese give up on catching up with the West in

development of airpower, and decide to put much greater emphasis

on the use of surface-to-surface missiles. This would be

analogous to North Korea's shift to long-range artillery to

achieve capabilities the United States achieves with airpower

(battlefield interdiction, close air support, etc.). Whether that

would constitute a revolutionary breakthrough is open to debate;

my inclination would be to say no, but, as always, the issue is

whether they develop innovative doctrine for the employment of

this weapon, and innovation is hard to predict. At any rate, a

shift to heavy reliance on missiles would at least have

implications for U.S. force structure requirements, necessitating

heavier investment in anti-ballistic missile systems.

Will They Do It?

China could make a breakthrough in one of the areas outlined

above, or in some other area entirely, but on balance it does not

seem likely. The PLA and the defense industries are too heavily

devoted to following the technological and doctrinal paths

already blazed by the Western countries--stealth technology,

precision guided munitions, stand-off weapons, visualization of

the battlefield, improved C4

I and avionics, etc. It will take

the Chinese 10-20 years to work through these issues, before they

are likely to begin diverging from the prevailing Western

doctrinal themes. In the meanwhile, nothing is likely to occur

that will force them to change their general direction. Even the

worst-case possibilities, such as the extremely remote
48

possibility of direct large-scale conflict with the United

States, probably would not serve to make the PLA abandon its

current objectives of duplicating the kind of capabilities the

United States demonstrated in the Gulf War. The lesson the PLA

would draw from defeat in such a conflict would be that they had

to redouble their efforts to close the gap in technology and

operational capabilities--not that they had to abandon that

effort and strike out in some other direction entirely. In any

case, such a conflict seems extremely unlikely, and no other

foreseeable event seems likely to make them question their

current objectives.

On its current course, the PLA will achieve significant

improvements in its ability to execute large-scale joint

operations in defense of the Chinese homeland, and, to a lesser

extent, in its ability to project force against Taiwan or into

the Spratly Islands. Over the next two decades, it may even

achieve capabilities comparable to that of the U.S. armed forces

in the 1990s. It is unlikely, however, that China will achieve

any major breakthrough in the innovative application of

technology to military operations. China is not likely to achieve

a revolution in military affairs for at least the next quarter

century.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Dr. Bates Gill

Lieutenant Colonel Lonny Henley

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Devona A. Peck

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler