S. HRG. 111–701, PT. 7 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 7 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

MARCH 10, 17; APRIL 14, 21, 2010 

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

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62–160 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–701 PT. 7 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 7 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

MARCH 10, 17; APRIL 14, 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

MARCH 10, 2010

Page 

Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs ..................................................................................................................... 2 

Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Space Command .......... 7 

James, Lt. Gen. Larry D., USAF, Commander, 14th Air Force, Air Force 

Space Command, and Commander, Joint Functional Component Command 

for Space, U.S. Strategic Command ................................................................... 15 

Federici, Gary A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, and Space ...................... 20 

Dorsett, VADM David J., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2/N6), and Director of Naval Intelligence ..................... 21 

Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office ............................................................................. 25 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS

MARCH 17, 2010

Roberts, Bradley H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy ......................................................................... 82 

Klotz, Lt. Gen. Frank G., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command ..................................................................................................................... 84 

Shackelford, Lt. Gen. Mark D., USAF, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition ................................................... 88 

Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force .................................................. 90 

Scott, Maj. Gen. David J., USAF, Director, Operational Capability Requirements, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, 

U.S. Air Force ....................................................................................................... 91 

Johnson, RADM Stephen E., USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs, 

U.S. Navy .............................................................................................................. 93 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION

APRIL 14, 2010

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy .................................................................. 122 

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FUNDING AND FUNDING UNDER THE AMERICAN

RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT

APRIL 21, 2010

Triay, Hon. Ine`s R., Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, 

Department of Energy ......................................................................................... 270 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin 

Nelson (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Udall, and 

Vitter. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J. Hubbard. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; 

Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Rob Soofer, assistant 

to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; and 

Michael T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator BEN NELSON. Good afternoon, and welcome to our witnesses this afternoon. 

I apologize for the delay in the start. Votes always seem to get 

in the way of our regular business, and so we suffer through that, 

as we must. 

We have with us this afternoon: Gary Payton, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space; General Robert Kehler, Commander of Air Force Space Command; Lieutenant General Larry 

James, Commander of the 14th Air Force and the Strategic Command Joint Functional Component Command for Space; Vice Admiral David Dorsett, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance; Gary Federici, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Command, Control, Computers, Intelligence and Space; 

and Christina Chaplain, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, from the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

Welcome to all of you. We appreciate your being here. 

2 

Space is an essential element of almost every military operation. 

As various exercises and studies have demonstrated, including the 

Shriever series of war games, space provides a distinct and unique 

advantage to U.S. forces, one that they won’t operate and can’t operate without. But, as that advantage is becoming more well understood, more attention and leadership must be paid to protect space 

and the assets on orbit and on ground. 

Improving Space Situational Awareness (SSA), and thus, improving the ability to protect space systems, is a major and welcome 

focus of the Air Force budget request for fiscal year 2011, and so, 

we look forward to working with you to sustain this much-needed 

focus. 

After many years of discussing broken space acquisition programs that were years behind schedule and significantly over budget, it appears as if these programs have finally turned a corner. 

The Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system now has three satellites on orbit, with more to come; the first of the IIF Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites, which should launch in the next 

few weeks; the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency communications satellite should launch this summer; and there is a possibility that the Space-Based Infrared Satellite-Geosynchronous 

Orbit (SBIRS–GEO) system will launch in late 2010 or early 2011. 

This is all excellent news. 

There are still issues. The Navy Mobile User Objective System 

(MUOS) is about 2 years late, and the ultra-high frequency (UHF) 

Constellation that it will replace is increasingly fragile. 

On the other hand, this week’s decision to give serious consideration to an interim augmentation capability is positive. Launch 

costs have continued to increase, the space ranges need to be modernized, and there are growing concerns about the space industrial 

base. The operationally responsive space effort continues to wrestle 

with the challenges of establishing a responsive space capability, 

and small businesses still have difficulty bringing their innovative 

ideas to the table. Finally, the management coordination of space 

is fractured; some might even suggest, broken. 

I look forward to hearing some of the ideas on how to improve 

that situation, as both the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) are actively studying this problem, as well as on 

all the many facets of operating in, from, and through space. 

We have quite a large panel this afternoon, a lot to cover. So, if 

we can, let’s begin. 

My ranking member, Senator Vitter, will be with us shortly, but 

all of our witnesses have prepared written statements, and those 

will be included in the record, without objection. 

We’re ready to go. Because we have this large panel, if we could 

highlight just the major issues, rather than giving a long, formal, 

oral presentation, and then we’ll move straight to questions. 

We’ll start first with Secretary Payton. 

STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator. 

3 

As you mentioned, for the record, I submitted my opening statement, and so, I will forego a verbal opening statement, in the interest of time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GARY E. PAYTON

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the committee, 

it is an honor to appear before this committee as the Deputy Under Secretary of 

the Air Force for Space Programs, and to discuss our military space activities. I support the Secretary of the Air Force with his responsibilities as the Service Acquisition Executive for Space Programs. 

I believe the overall soundness of our Air Force space program is best illustrated 

by our consecutive string of 64 successful national security space launches over the 

past 10 years, most recently demonstrated with the December 2009 launch of the 

third Wideband Global Satellite Communications (SATCOM) satellite aboard a 

Delta IV launch vehicle. This record is the result of a world-class team of space professionals across our government and industry, all dedicated to the single purpose 

of providing essential capabilities to our joint warfighters and allies around the 

world. With superior space systems we provide our leadership with intelligence and 

situational awareness that otherwise would be impossible to collect. Space enables 

us to employ military force in both irregular warfare and conventional situations— 

we see the battlefield more clearly and destroy targets with greater precision. While 

acknowledging the ever increasing advantages that these space capabilities provide, 

we acknowledge that many of the satellites and associated infrastructure have outlived their intended design lives. 

To ensure the availability of these systems, the military space portion of the 

President’s fiscal year 2011 budget submission is focused on the continuity of key 

mission areas including worldwide communication; global positioning, navigation 

and timing; global missile warning; weather; and launch. Simultaneously, we are 

enhancing the protection of our space capabilities through improved Space Situational Awareness (SSA), defensive counterspace, and reconstitution efforts. This calendar year we will bear the fruit of investments from previous years with the 

planned launches of four ‘‘first of’’ operational satellites. The four ‘‘first of’’ satellites 

are the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) protected communications satellite, Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) satellite, Global Positioning System 

(GPS) II–F satellite, and Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 1 satellite. 

Worldwide communication is enabled through a ubiquitous space-based system 

with government and commercial platforms. Our users stretch from the Oval Office 

to the mountains of Afghanistan. Using protected, wideband, or narrowband communications, the President can command the Nation’s nuclear forces, our UAV pilots can fly Predators over Iraq and Afghanistan from the United States, and Special Forces teams can call for exfiltration or tactical air support. 

Global positioning, navigation and timing is a free worldwide service. It provides 

position accuracy down to the centimeter and time accuracy to the nanosecond over 

the entire planet, 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, and in any weather. The Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community depend on our GPS to support a 

myriad of missions and capabilities including weapon system guidance, precise navigation, satellite positioning, and communication network timing. The civil and commercial communities are equally reliant on GPS as the underpinning for a vast infrastructure of services and products including search and rescue, banking, map surveying, farming, and even sports and leisure activities. 

Global missile warning through Overhead Persistent Infra-Red sensors is our 

unblinking eye ensuring that we know whenever a rocket launches from anywhere 

on Earth. Our missile warning system is fast, persistent, and accurate in determining missile launch directions. At the strategic level, it informs leadership as they 

determine courses of action to defend America and our allies, and at the tactical 

level our real-time warning provides theater commanders with superior battlespace 

awareness. 

Weather observation and forecasting has greatly improved over the last 4 decades 

primarily due to space-based environmental sensing. Global, high resolution measurements of atmospheric temperature, density, and humidity populate mathematic 

models for weather prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive weather data as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons employment, and intelligence collection. 

4 

Our on-orbit assets continue to face greater threats that could deny, damage, or 

destroy our access to space capabilities. We must anticipate potential disruptions, 

either accidental or intentional, to our space operations or risk losing continuity of 

service. As such, we are expanding our ability to detect, identify, characterize, and 

attribute threats, as well as clearly discriminate between a hostile act and one that 

occurs naturally. In parallel, we are developing the organizational, operational, and 

technical enablers, including command and control systems, which will allow us to 

react swiftly and decisively when threats materialize. 

Congress’ support has been a vital component in improving our acquisition of 

space systems, maintaining continuity of service, and charting a course for the next 

generation of space capabilities that will enhance American security, freedom, and 

prosperity. 

UPDATE ON SPACE PROGRAMS

I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we have had over the 

last year and the progress we are making with regard to the mission areas I described earlier. 

Missile Warning 

For over 35 years, our legacy Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites, in conjunction with ground based radars, have unfailingly met the Nation’s missile warning needs. This legacy constellation, however, continues to age, while threats such 

as the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles and advanced technologies continue 

to grow. These threats are driving the need for increased coverage and resolution 

provided by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS). 

SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and is comprised of both geosynchronous 

earth orbit (GEO) satellites and highly elliptical orbit (HEO) payloads. Two HEO 

payloads are fully operational and, along with the DSP constellation, continue to 

perform the missile warning mission while providing increased support to the other 

three mission areas. Completion of the first SBIRS GEO satellite is planned for the 

end of 2010. 

Our fiscal year 2011 funding request continues development and procurement of 

the GEO satellites, HEO payloads, and the necessary ground elements. This budget 

requests full procurement for a fourth GEO satellite, and contains future year requests for procurement of the fifth and sixth GEO satellites. The first GEO satellite 

completed environmental testing, and we continue to work the final qualification of 

flight software prior to a final integration test and delivery by the end of this year. 

Our budget request also continues the commercially hosted on-orbit Wide Field-ofView (WFOV) technology demonstration effort. By partnering with the commercial 

space industry, we will have the opportunity to conduct an early on-orbit scientific 

experiment of WFOV infrared data phenomenology using a Commercially Hosted IR 

Payload. 

Communications 

The U.S. military is a highly mobile and dispersed force that relies heavily on 

wideband, protected, and narrowband satellite communications (SATCOM) for command, control, and coordination of forces. SATCOM enables forces to receive realtime images and video of the battlefield, thereby accelerating decision-making from 

the strategic to the tactical levels. These images and video often come from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled via SATCOM links, allowing the UAVs 

to fly far beyond the line of sight and to collect information without endangering 

U.S. forces. 

On December 5, 2009 we successfully launched the third Wideband Global 

SATCOM (WGS) satellite as part of the Department’s constellation of wideband satellites providing increased capability for effective command and control of U.S. 

forces around the globe. Each individual WGS satellite provides greater wideband 

capacity than the entire legacy Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) 

III constellation. Our funding request continues on-orbit support for WGS 1–3, continues production of WGS 4–6, contains full procurement for WGS 7, and advance 

procurement for WGS 8. 

In the protected SATCOM portfolio, we are conducting final confidence testing of 

the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite with a projected 

launch in the third quarter of 2010. This initial AEHF launch will complete the 

worldwide Medium Data Rate (MDR) ring, increasing the data-rate for low probability of intercept/detection and anti-jam communications from tens-of-kilobytes per 

second to approximately a megabyte per second. Our funding request supports the 

launch and on-orbit support of AEHF 1; assembly, integration, and test of AEHF 

5 

2–3 and the AEHF Mission Control Segment; and the production of AEHF 4. This 

budget requests advance procurement for AEHF 5, and contains a future year request for procurement of AEHF 6. 

While near-term satellite communication needs will be met with a combination of 

military systems (WGS and AEHF) and leased commercial SATCOM, the Air Force 

continues to work closely with the other Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands to meet the Department of Defense’s future protected and wideband communication needs. To this end, the Air 

Force will investigate options to harvest technologies matured by previous Transformational Satellite Communications System (TSAT) efforts, and evolve the next 

generation MILSATCOM architecture to provide connectivity across the spectrum of 

missions, to include land, air and naval warfare; special operations; strategic nuclear operations; strategic defense; homeland security; theater operations; and space 

operations and intelligence. 

Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 

The U.S. GPS continues to be the world standard for positioning, navigation, and 

timing (PNT). As a result, GPS has been incorporated into military, commercial, and 

civilian applications, to include navigation, agriculture, banking, cartography, telecommunications, and transportation. The current GPS constellation is robust and 

healthy, consisting of 30 operational satellites. 

Last year, we launched the final of 20 GPS IIR satellites, the last 8 of which were 

upgraded GPS IIR–M satellites with military code (M-code) for additional anti-jam 

capability, and a second ‘‘L2C’’ civil signal for increased accuracy. The GPS IIR program was started over 20 years ago, and represents one of our most successful, enduring space acquisition programs. This year, we will launch the first GPS IIF satellite, and 12 GPS IIF satellites will sustain the constellation over the next 6 years. 

GPS IIF will continue to populate the GPS constellation with military capability 

and introduce a third ‘‘L5’’ civil signal. 

Moving beyond GPS IIF, GPS III will offer significant improvements in navigation 

capabilities by improving interoperability and jam resistance. The procurement of 

the GPS III system will occur in multiple blocks, with the initial GPS IIIA contract 

awarded in May 2008. GPS IIIA includes all of the GPS IIF capability plus a 10- 

fold increase in signal power, a new civil signal compatible with the European 

Union’s Galileo system, and a new spacecraft bus that will support a graceful 

growth path to future blocks. The next generation control segment (OCX) for GPS 

III contract was awarded on February 25, 2010, and is on-track to be in place to 

support the first GPS IIIA launch, as well as continue to support the legacy GPS 

satellites. Finally, development of Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) continues 

with technology maturation of modernized receiver cards that will take advantage 

of the increased capability of GPS IIIA including a stronger and more secure M-code 

signal. 

Weather 

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) continues to be the Nation’s workhorse for terrestrial forecasting and space environmental sensing. DMSP 

Flight 18 was successfully launched in October 2009. We have two DMSP satellites 

remaining with Flight 19 and 20, and they are currently undergoing a Service Life 

Extension Program (SLEP) to repair, replace, and test components that have exceeded their shelf life. Flight 19 will launch in October 2012 and Flight 20 will 

launch in May 2014 or October 2016, depending on operational requirements. 

On February 1, 2010, the Executive Office of the President restructured the National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program to assign responsibility for each of the three planned orbits to the agency holding the majority of the interest in that orbit. Accordingly, the Department of Commerce will populate the afternoon orbit, the Department of Defense (DOD) will populate the early morning orbit, and the U.S. Government will continue to rely on capabilities from our European partners for the mid-morning orbit. For the morning 

orbit, DMSP satellites will continue to ensure weather observation capability. The 

DOD, in cooperation with partner agencies, will conduct a short requirements analysis for the morning orbit to serve as the basis to restructure the program in fiscal 

year 2011. While this analysis is conducted, DOD will work closely with the civil 

agency partners to ensure efforts to ensure continuity of the afternoon orbit continue productively and efficiently. 

Operationally Responsive Space 

ORS is focused on meeting the urgent needs of the Joint Force Commanders using 

a combination of existing, ready to field, and emergent systems. This program builds 

on the ‘‘back to basics’’ approach we have cultivated over the past several years by 

6 

providing enhanced mission capability through incremental blocks of small satellites 

and integration of other responsive space capabilities. Key tenets of the ORS program are to keep costs low, react rapidly to urgent warfighter needs, and reconstitute capability in contested environments. A clear example of these tenets is exemplified in the first ORS operational satellite (ORS–1), scheduled to launch at the end 

of 2010. It is being built for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to monitor denied 

areas and will be taskable like other CENTCOM organic airborne ISR assets. 

In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, ORS will continue to develop the enabling 

infrastructure of on-demand space support with Rapid Response Space Capability, 

whereby plug-and-play spacecraft will be assembled, integrated, and tested with 

Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) payloads, spacelift, satellite control, 

and data dissemination capabilities. Tactical Satellite 3 (TacSat-3), launched in May 

2009, demonstrated this ‘‘plug and play’’ modular, low cost spacecraft with a hyperspectral imaging payload. TacSat-3 provides a new capability for strategic and tactical reconnaissance from space, and continues to successfully provide military utility as a technology and test asset. 

Launch 

National Space policy requires assured access to space. Currently this requirement is satisfied by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program consisting of the Delta IV and Atlas V launch vehicles. The first 30 EELV launches 

have all been successful, and are part of our consecutive string of 64 successful national security space launches. Efficiencies are achieved through combined engineering, production, and launch operations while maintaining the separate Delta IV and 

Atlas V families of launch vehicles for assured access. The fiscal year 2011 budget 

request funds EELV launch capability (ELC), or infrastructure activities and ongoing support for over eight launch services planned for 2011. In addition, we request 

funding for three EELV launch vehicles which will launch in 2013. We combined 

the two launch vehicle families into the United Launch Alliance (ULA), resulting 

in some cost savings due to labor reductions and facility consolidations; however, 

launch costs are still rising. Factors contributing to rising launch costs are the depletion of inventory purchased in prior years, reduced number of annual buys increasing unit costs, and a deteriorating subcontractor business base without commercial customers. These industrial base factors will also be affected by the decision 

to replace NASA’s Constellation program with a new, more technology-focused approach to space exploration, which will likely reduce the customer base for solid 

rocket motors and potentially increase demand for liquid engines and strengthen the 

liquid-fuel rocket industrial base. We have initiated several efforts to examine the 

severity of these business base issues and identify potential mitigation steps. 

Space Protection 

The need for increased space protection of our space assets is paramount, and requires enhanced Space Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities and a legitimate 

battle management system. We need improved accuracy, responsiveness, timeliness, 

and data integration to support the warfighter. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request 

continues development of the Joint Space Operation Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS) to provide this capability and replace our aging mission systems. The 

JMS program will provide a single, theater-integrated, command and control, information technology system to allow informed and rapid decisions with real-time, actionable SSA. An operational utility evaluation effort will deliver the foundational 

infrastructure and mission applications to deploy a services-oriented architecture 

(SOA) with user defined applications 

The JSpOC is our single focal point for monitoring space activity. Over the last 

year, the JSpOC has transitioned the Air Force’s commercial and foreign entities 

(CFE) pilot effort into U.S. Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) SSA sharing program. This involved growing the capability to monitor and conduct conjunction assessments for all U.S. Government, commercial, and foreign active satellites, over 

1,000 systems. As a result, the SSA sharing program screens for collisions daily, and 

has a formalized information sharing process that reports potential conjunctions to 

commercial and foreign satellite owners and operators. 

The Space Fence and Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) are two programs 

critical to providing increased SSA data. The Space Fence is a three station, worldwide, radar system to detect and track smaller sized space objects, while the SBSS 

satellite is an optical system to search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit, particularly those in geosynchronous orbit. The Space Fence replaces the Air Force 

Space Surveillance System (AFSSS), and SBSS builds upon our success with the 

Space Based Visible (SBV) technology demonstration. In the fiscal year 2011 budget, 

the industry teams working on the Space Fence program will complete a PrelimiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
7 

nary Design Review, and the SBSS program will conduct on-orbit operations of the 

SBSS Block 10 satellite, planned to launch this summer. Additionally, we will continue efforts toward a SBSS follow-on by completing the acquisition strategy and 

conducting a full and open competition. 

Air Force Management of Space 

The Secretary of the Air Force recently directed a review on Headquarters Air 

Force management of space responsibilities. Since the Air Force’s last reorganization of space management following the 2001 Space Commission, events and new 

authorities have changed how responsibilities were assigned. This study will assess 

the impact of those changes for planning and programming, acquisition, oversight, 

and coordination with other DOD components and agencies. 

The Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan serves as the strategic framework 

for re-instilling excellence in space systems acquisition. This plan focuses on workforce, requirements generation, budget discipline, source selections, and clear lines 

of authority. Additionally, the plan builds on our ‘‘Back to Basics’’ philosophy, and 

leverages enduring principles from over 50 years of space acquisition experience. 

The Air Force is committed to providing the best possible education, training, and 

career development to these professionals who operate, acquire, and enable our systems. Institutions like the Air Force Institute of Technology, Defense Acquisition 

University, and the National Security Space Institute are at the forefront of our efforts to educate and train these warriors. These organizations continue to provide 

the education and training necessary to sustain the space workforce, our most vital 

asset. 

CONCLUSION

Our space systems are the envy of the world. Our infrared surveillance satellites 

are able to detect missile launches anywhere in the world; no other nation can do 

that. Our strategic communications systems allow the President precise and assured 

control over nuclear forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband SATCOM systems rapidly transmit critical information between the continental United States to 

our front-line forces; no one else has global, secure, anti-jam communications. Our 

weather satellites allow us to accurately predict future conditions half a world away 

as well as in space. Our GPS constellation enables position knowledge down to centimeters and timing down to nanoseconds; no one else has deployed such a capability. These sophisticated systems make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine, and 

airman safer and more capable. 

In the fiscal year 2011 budget, continuity of service across our space portfolio and 

improved space protection is paramount. Our ‘back to basics’ strategy over the recent years is demonstrating results, as we continue toward securing the world’s best 

space capabilities today and ensuring the same for our Nation’s future. 

The space constellations and space professionals that deliver these capabilities are 

our critical asymmetric advantage. We must ensure the recapitalization and health 

of these constellations and continue the professional development of our future 

space leaders. Delivering space capabilities is complex, challenging, costly, yet rewarding. Although we have faced significant challenges, we are also making significant progress. I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and thank 

you for your continued support of military space programs. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

General Kehler. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 

General KEHLER. Sir, thank you for inviting us. 

I will just make a couple of quick remarks. 

First of all, as an airman, I have to note that, earlier today, over 

in the Capitol Visitor Center, the Congressional Gold Medal was 

awarded to the Women Air Force Service Pilots (WASPs) from 

World War II fame. I would just note that at the beginning of the 

hearing here. I’ll paraphase, our Secretary of the Air Force, Michael Donley, by saying that ‘‘we have a better Air Force today, because of the service that the WASPs gave, and the groundbreaking 

work that they did for all of us.’’ 

8 

Regarding space, it’s a real pleasure for me to be representing 

the 46,000 men and women of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). 

It’s a mixed group of Active Duty folks, it’s Air National guardsmen, it is Air Force reservists, it is government civilians, and it is 

a key contractor team. Without that entire team, we would not be 

able to do the job that we are doing. 

Everything that we do in our command begins and ends with the 

needs of the Joint Force commanders or the needs of the civil population or, in the case of GPS, that’s really now a set of needs that 

we see from all over the world, and we take that responsibility 

very, very seriously. 

We like to say, around our command, that space and cyberspace 

capabilities provide something important for our Joint Forces; they 

provide them with the ability to see with clarity, communicate with 

certainty, navigate with accuracy, strike with precision, and operate with assurance. That’s a tall order for us. It’s one that we take 

seriously and that we are proud to provide on behalf of the Joint 

Force. 

The capabilities that we provide today are woven through the 

fabric of the Joint Force, and they’re woven through our daily lifes. 

Farmers in Nebraska, of course, are, today, navigating their fields 

using GPS and other space products that they receive. This has become a way of doing business, certainly in the United States and 

elsewhere around the world. 

So, that means that as space is becoming more congested and 

contested, we have to be more mindful of ensuring that those capabilities are available when they’re needed. 

That leads us to a space protection program that we’ve been very 

aggressive with over the last couple of years, along with our partners at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). I think we’re 

making good progress there, and I’d be happy to talk about that 

further as we go along. 

Then, finally, I would just offer, sir, I would agree with you completely, that we have turned some very important corners, but 

there is also no question that we have some very tough challenges 

ahead. I would offer my thanks to the committee, the leadership of 

the committee, the members of the committee, who have spent 

quite a bit of time, over the last several years, number one, being 

patient with us, and number two, doing your own homework in understanding these issues and being very helpful as we worked our 

way through some tough issues. 

I look forward to your questions, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I have to say, General Kehler, before we 

go to General James, you’ll have to decide whether they were patient or acquired the appearance of patience. [Laughter.] 

[The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

it is an honor to appear before you today as an airman and as the Commander of 

Air Force Space Command (AFSPC). 

I am proud to lead and represent over 46,000 Active Duty, Air National Guard 

(ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (ARC) airmen, government civilians, and 

contractors who deliver space and cyberspace capabilities to U.S. Strategic ComVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mand (USSTRATCOM), Joint Force Commanders, and myriad other users every 

minute of every day. The men and women of AFSPC accomplish their mission from 

‘‘deployed in place’’ locations across all 50 States, 3 territories, and Washington DC, 

while simultaneously serving from forward and deployed locations around the globe. 

We have completed an exciting and historic transitional year in AFSPC. In May 

2009, we became the Air Force’s (AF) lead Major Command (MAJCOM) for cyberspace, and in August, we established a new Numbered Air Force, 24th Air Force, 

as the AF cyberspace operational component to USSTRATCOM. In response to direction from the Secretary of Defense, 24th Air Force has been designated Air Force 

Cyber (AFCYBER) to become the AF Component to U.S. Cyber Command, when approved. As we assumed responsibility for cyberspace, we transferred responsibility 

for the Nation’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force to the new Air Force Global 

Strike Command (AFGSC) in December. The Air Force’s top priority of reinvigorating our nuclear enterprise remains the number one goal of AFSPC. 

Space and cyberspace capabilities shape the American approach to warfare, are 

embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of modern weaponry, and are threaded 

throughout the fabric of joint operations. Our integrated space and cyberspace capabilities provide access, persistence and awareness. Through networks, we put the 

power of a large force in the hands of smaller forces that operate on a distributed 

battlespace, across all domains and sometimes across different continents. Space 

and cyberspace capabilities also enable vital civil and commercial activities, including financial transactions, the electrical grid, mass transit operations, personal navigation, cellular communications, emergency services and better farming and fishing 

operations. 

At AFSPC, everything we do begins and ends with the Joint Force Commanders’ 

needs, and our measure of merit is how well we contribute to joint operations. Our 

mission is to provide an integrated constellation of space and cyberspace capabilities 

at the speed of need, and our vision is to be the leading source of those capabilities 

in the years to come. 

THE WAY FORWARD

Joint Force Commanders today increasingly rely on space and cyberspace capabilities to enable vital effects across the spectrum of operational needs: irregular warfare, near peer competition, global assessment, and crisis management. Whether 

conducting combat operations or humanitarian relief efforts, they are facing security 

challenges that are diverse and dispersed, and an operational environment that is 

uncertain, contested, and changing. Emerging threats can be fleeting, anonymous, 

and distributed globally; they may strike anywhere at any time, increasingly taking 

advantage of the space and cyberspace domains. 

In response, AFSPC is pursuing five primary goals: reliable and safe nuclear 

forces; assured combat power for the joint fight; professionalism and expertise; modernization and sustainment; and better acquisition. 

AFSPC Goal: Guarantee a Safe, Credible, Ready Nuclear Deterrent Force with Perfection as the Standard 

The Air Force moved aggressively to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise by consolidating all strategic nuclear forces under the AFGSC Commander, by aligning all 

nuclear weapons sustainment and support under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons 

Center, and by working to expand our nuclear experience and expertise. The transfer of 20th Air Force’s three nuclear capable missile wings to AFGSC marked a new 

chapter in the long, proud history of our nuclear deterrent force. We remain committed to ensuring a safe, credible, ready deterrent force with perfection as the 

standard. AFSPC will continue to provide personnel, logistics, operations and fiscal 

support to AFGSC through fiscal year 2010. 

AFSPC Goal: Deliver Assured Combat Power to the Joint Fight 

AFSPC delivers combat power that allows joint forces to navigate with accuracy, 

see with clarity, communicate with certainty, strike with precision, and operate with 

assurance. To do this, our airmen acquire, launch, operate, and protect U.S. and allied spacecraft, keep watch on adversary activity, and assure the cyberspace mission. As Joint Force Commanders rely on AFSPC-provided capabilities, the Air 

Force has requested approximately $11 billion in the Space Virtual Major Force Program, through the fiscal year 2011 PB to field and sustain leading-edge space capabilities. In addition, approximately $3 billion will transfer to AFSPC in fiscal year 

2011 to grow cyberspace professionals and provide integrated cyberspace capabilities 

to Joint Force Commanders. 

10 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) 

In 2009, we forward-deployed more than 2,500 AFSPC Airmen to various locations 

around the globe in support of combat operations. Approximately 2,100 deployed to 

the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) in support 

of Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. During these operations, 45 AFSPC airmen were awarded Bronze Stars and two 

received Combat Action Medals. 

Our humanitarian operations are also continuing. AFSPC is supporting disaster 

relief efforts during Operation Unified Response in Haiti. Precise GPS position and 

timing data, satellite communications, and real-time weather services, for example, 

help the Joint and multi-national disaster relief team with command and control, 

search, rescue, and mobility operations, and they distribute sharable situational 

awareness. Airmen from the 689th Combat Communications Wing, Robins AFB, GA, 

established critical network and communications infrastructure supporting thousands of humanitarian aid flights. In addition, airmen of the 67th Network Warfare 

Wing from Lackland AFB, TX, are integrating the mission critical networks of U.S. 

Government agencies in support of relief efforts. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request will allow us to continue this legacy of service 

by enhancing the protection of our space systems and cyberspace networks; improving Space Situational Awareness (SSA); assuring availability of launch; preparing 

to exploit new Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities; increasing GPS 

navigational accuracy, availability, and signal security; modernizing military satellite communications (MILSATCOM); and enhancing our cyberspace posture and 

operations. 

Space Protection 

In its first full year of existence, the Space Protection Program (SPP) delivered 

a comprehensive compilation of space system capabilities and interdependencies to 

our Nation’s key operations centers. This history-making ‘‘first’’ moved us closer to 

our goal of integrated space system protection for military, intelligence, civil, commercial, and allied space systems vital to our national security. Through SPP, we 

have developed a future vision to assure our space capabilities and are evaluating 

the architecture’s effectiveness through the Schriever War Game Series. On the 

strategic policy front, SPP personnel delivered the first Space Protection Strategy, 

supported the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and are contributing to the development of the new National Space Policy and Space Posture Review (SPR). 

Space Situational Awareness 

In concert with the SPP initiative, we continued to improve our SSA capability 

as the space domain becomes an increasingly contested, congested and competitive 

environment. The collision between an Iridium communications satellite and a Russian Cosmos communications satellite a year ago highlights the critical need for improved SSA. To posture our Nation for the future, AFSPC is filling critical SSA gaps 

with complementary programs to enhance our capability to detect, track, and identify smaller objects from low Earth orbit out to the geosynchronous belt. Modernizing and sustaining existing sensors greatly contribute to SSA capability. Complementary systems like the Space Based Space Surveillance system, Space Fence 

and the Space Surveillance Telescope (in cooperation with DARPA), will give us additional capacity to search and track more on-orbit objects, improve our ability to 

predict potential collisions, provide safety of flight, and rapidly track and catalogue 

new foreign space launches. 

Additionally, we are making sure that the USSTRATCOM Commander will have 

better C2 and SSA capabilities by combining three programs for the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC): Integrated Space Situational Awareness (ISSA), Rapid Attack Identification and Reporting System (RAIDRS) and Space C2. The effort, 

named ‘‘JSpOC Mission System (JMS),’’ is under development using a streamlined 

requirements and acquisition approach. 

Along with implementing capability solutions, we refined our tactics, techniques 

and procedures to reduce the possibility of future collisions. Through JSpOC SSA 

efforts, our ability to predict collisions increased 100 fold to include all active satellites, and now we conduct over 1,000 assessments per day. As a result, there have 

already been 56 instances where owner-operators maneuvered their satellites to 

avoid possible collisions. 

In addition, on 22 December 2009, we transferred the Commercial and Foreign 

Entities (CFE) pilot program to USSTRATCOM, with operational responsibility continuing at the JSpOC. Not only do we provide conjunction analysis for capabilities 

critical to national security and homeland defense, but also we expanded our services to provide positional data to over 40,000 users and a number of partner nations. 

11 

Launch and Range Enterprise Transformation (LET) 

It is our job to deliver assured space and cyberspace capabilities, and we can only 

do that if we have assured access to space. We now mark a full decade of successful 

national security space launches and over 7 years of successful Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle (EELV) launches. We must maintain that perfect record: launch 

failures are too expensive, in money and lost capability. LET is our effort to make 

sure that success will continue, and it involves four major efforts: (1) transforming 

launch services acquisition, (2) upgrading range capability, (3) fully leveraging ARC 

and the ANG, (4) improving business practices to better support commercial providers. 

As part of the launch services acquisition effort, we continue to look for ways to 

make EELV more cost-effective by working with the NRO and NASA for block buy 

opportunities. We are also defining ‘‘new entrant’’ criteria as part of our overall approach to space launch. We cannot neglect technology development; we are preparing a new reusable first stage demonstration and are pursuing technology for a 

new reusable rocket engine. 

Launch services will also be affected by the recent announcement cancelling 

NASA’s Constellation program. Our initial steps will ensure that the industrial base 

interdependencies between EELV and other launch systems are considered to support a viable national launch industrial base. 

The effort to upgrade range capability has been long in coming; our range infrastructure has been increasingly unsustainable and, unless addressed, will impose 

costly delays on national security, civil, and commercial launches alike. Our national space launch and weapon system test and evaluation capabilities demand a 

flexible range architecture. To address these demands, we are divesting redundant 

instrumentation while modernizing and increasing the reliability and availability of 

essential range assets. In addition, our future range design incorporates a telemetry-based architecture with an integrated GPS metric tracking capability. 

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) 

The Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to provide highly accurate position and timing signals that enable highly precise Joint combat operations worldwide. GPS is also a free utility serving as an enabler for economic transactions and 

influencing the global economy by more than $110 billion annually. We at AFSPC, 

the Air Force, and the Department of Defense do recognize and embrace our special 

responsibility to maintain GPS as the ‘‘gold standard’’ for space-based PNT. 

We continue to modernize the system and are developing and fielding a more robust, taskable, third-generation GPS satellite which will provide improved operational capabilities to military and civil users. In 2009, we launched the last two 

GPS Block IIR–M satellites, and for 2010 we continue preparations to launch, deploy, and operate the first GPS Block IIF satellites. For civil users, these new Block 

IIF satellites will broadcast the first operational signals in the L5 frequency band, 

which is protected by internationally recognized spectrum rules to ensure robust 

service quality for safety-of-life applications, such as aircraft all-weather approach 

and landing. In addition, we are building the first increment of eight GPS III satellites and a new Next Generation Control Segment (OCX). Together, GPS III and 

OCX will improve user collaboration, incorporate an effects-based approach to operations, and establish a net-centric architecture accelerating the mission application 

of position and timing information. 

Recognizing the joint team’s constant demand for enhanced GPS capabilities in 

geographically challenging areas where terrain can degrade GPS signal coverage, we 

partnered with USSTRATCOM and developed a plan called ‘‘Expandable 24.’’ This 

approach not only benefits military operations in places like Afghanistan, but all 

GPS users around the world, by taking advantage of the largest on-orbit GPS constellation in history. Over the next 2 years, we will gradually reposition GPS satellites to increase the number of satellites in view, thereby improving availability 

and accuracy worldwide. 

We continue to develop Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) to exploit the features of our new GPS satellites and control segment features. A key aspect of 

MGUE is the development of a common GPS module facilitating easy integration 

of GPS solutions into multiple platforms. Overall, our GPS enterprise efforts maintain the highest service performance levels to the civil community while transforming and modernizing GPS into a robust, taskable system tailored to meet 

unique military needs in today’s operational environments. 

Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 

The Joint Force Commanders rely on military and commercial SATCOM (especially in austere environments) to communicate securely and receive data, imagery, 

12 

and full motion video from Remotely Piloted Aircraft. Those services will depend 

heavily on our Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) system. Mission operations began 

last August with the second WGS (WGS–2) satellite, positioned over the Southwest 

Asia AOR, and it is now delivering ten times the capability that we had with the 

legacy Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). Last December we 

launched the third WGS (WGS–3) which is being positioned over the EUCOM and 

AFRICOM AORs. 

The demand for wideband MILSATCOM capability never slows, and so we have requested $595 million to continue production of WGS–4 & 5 and procurement of 

WGS–7. Later this year we expect to accept and launch the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite, a new system that will increase the protected communications data rate more than 5-fold and provide more coverage opportunities than Milstar. The end result will be enhanced national command and control satellite networks for the President, Secretary of Defense, and combatant commanders. Meanwhile, we are evaluating the right strategies to evolve future 

MILSATCOM capabilities to support COCOM requirements. 

Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) 

Only from space can we be assured of comprehensive missile warning and missile 

defense information. The first two Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit-1 (HEO–1) and HEO–2 payloads provide our Nation with comprehensive missile warning and missile defense data. This critical information in the hands 

of warfighters, particularly in contested areas and where no other assets are available, is invaluable. Furthermore, Congress added $13.8 million in fiscal year 2010 

for exploitation initiatives providing Joint Force Commanders with advanced 

Battlespace Awareness and Technical Intelligence. 

While the Joint Force Commanders benefit from the advanced SBIRS HEO detection and data exploitation efforts, we requested $530 million for the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) development program. As part of our OPIR portfolio, the SBIRS GEO payload will provide enhanced detection and data processing 

capabilities to the warfighter and the Intelligence Community. Recognizing a significant achievement, the first SBIRS GEO (GEO–1) space vehicle successfully completed Thermal Vacuum (TVAC) testing and is undergoing subsequent flight hardware replacement and software qualification. We look forward to final launch readiness and delivery to meet GEO–1 launch in 2011. 

Space Control 

As we enter the 19th year of continuous combat operations in the Persian Gulf, 

AFSPC continues to provide sustained defensive counterspace capability to 

USCENTCOM. We are in our sixth year of continuous presence in theater with Silent Sentry which provides critical electromagnetic interference detection and 

geolocation tools and highlights the need for a global capability. 

As part of evolving our support to the Joint fight, we are developing and fielding 

a follow-on system, RAIDRS Block 10 (RB–10). RB–10 is integrated as part of JMS 

and will provide transportable ground systems located around the world. In addition, the RB–10 capability will route SATCOM interference detection and 

geolocation data to the JSpOC thereby helping us protect military communication 

channels. 

Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 

The ORS program is exploring ways in which the urgent needs of Joint Force 

Commanders might usefully be addressed, and AFSPC works with the ORS office 

on projects involving communications, SSA, surveillance and reconnaissance. For example, TacSat-3 was launched on 19 May 2009, as an experimental system designed 

to demonstrate the military utility of a small satellite, taskable by a tactical user 

in the field to search and collect specific hyper spectral images and downlink the 

results directly to deployed ground units. We are assessing the utility of 

transitioning TacSat-3 to a residual DOD-operated reconnaissance system upon 

completion of its experimental period in May 2010. 

Later this year another ORS satellite, the ORS–1, should begin providing multispectral imagery of regions selected by ground force commanders. Existing ground 

systems will process and distribute the resulting images, and this development 

should also help inform a multi-mission modular approach that might prove useful 

in the future. 

Space Weather—National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) 

On 1 February 2010, the Executive Office of the President directed a major restructuring of the NPOESS program, whereby procurement of the system will no 

13 

longer be joint. NOAA and NASA will take primary responsibility for the afternoon 

orbit, and the Air Force will take primary responsibility for the morning orbit. As 

we work through this transition, we will continue to foster our longstanding productive partnerships with NOAA and NASA, by sharing data, coordinating user needs 

and operating satellites. 

AFSPC Goal: Forge a Battle-Ready Team by Attracting, Developing and Retaining 

America’s Best 

AFSPC will continue to be a leader in attracting, developing and retaining Airmen 

and civilians with the professional skills needed to succeed. Recognizing the critical 

roles of our families, we continue to extend the wingman culture to help nurture 

success on the home front. During 2010–2011, we will improve training and professional development programs; refine career paths and take necessary steps to care 

for our Airmen and their families. 

Developing Airmen 

Over the past year, we integrated space education and training into mainstream 

Air Force processes to enhance professional development and ensure continued 

sustainment. This construct equips our space professionals with a sound foundation 

at Undergraduate and Initial Qualification Training, expands their operational and 

strategic perspective of space through Space 200 and 300 continuing education and 

adds tailored advanced operational training at subsequent career milestones. Our 

programs have now developed over 13,000 space professionals who are experienced 

in today’s real-world and combat operations. 

Since my last appearance before your subcommittee, we worked with Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to restructure the National Security Space 

Institute (NSSI). In essence we created two complementary space academic organizations. The new NSSI is focused on ‘‘graduate level’’ continuing education and is 

now aligned under Air University, charged with specific responsibility for Air Forcewide Professional Continuing Education (PCE). AFSPC retained responsibility for 

advanced operational system training, fundamentals courses and pre-deployment 

training, now provided by the Advanced Space Operations School (ASOpS). Together 

the NSSI and ASOpS are the premier focal points for advanced space education and 

training, providing instruction to 1,728 students in 2009 including students from the 

Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, civil service and allied partners. This year, 

we will begin construction on a $19.9 million facility housing both schools on Peterson AFB, CO. 

We are carefully crafting a similar force development approach for our cyberspace 

professionals. Equipped with the vision outlined in ‘‘The Air Force Roadmap for the 

Development of Cyberspace Professionals,’’ and the experience gained by our Space 

Professional Development Program, we are building a parallel career development 

model for cyberspace. The goal is to ensure that cyberspace professionals have the 

proper academic credentials, the right training and education and requisite experience to establish, protect and leverage this critical domain. This year AETC will 

open the doors to Undergraduate Cyber Training (UCT) courses for the newly established Cyberspace Operations officer specialty and the Cyberspace Defense Operations and Cyberspace Support enlisted specialties. 

Missions conducted in and through the cyberspace domain will require Airmen 

with specific technical education and network-savvy aptitude. Working with academia and industry partners, we have defined academic prerequisites for cyberspace 

accessions, and are addressing the challenge in identifying and recruiting such people. To do this right, we need effective, innovative recruiting strategies and meaningful incentives to attract and retain cyberspace professionals. 

In addition to UCT, we are working with Air University and the Air Force Cyberspace Technical Center of Excellence to establish Cyber 200 and 300 courses along 

with advanced operations courses for cyberspace professionals. Course curricula are 

under development and we expect to teach classes on an interim basis in October 

2010 with a permanent approach in place in fiscal year 2012. 

Families and Quality of Life 

The year 2010 is the ‘‘Year of the Air Force Family.’’ In AFSPC, we recognize the 

sacrifices and contributions of our families by extending our wingman culture and 

emphasizing suicide prevention, safety and family support. In addition, we are 

working to attract and retain our Airmen and their families by providing quality 

housing and enhancing the sense of community on our installations. 

AFSPC significantly improved mission capabilities and the quality of life for its 

Airmen and their families in 2009 by investing $453 million on over 700 projects 

to sustain and modernize facilities, infrastructure and housing. We also executed 

$149 million of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds on another 280 

14 

projects to improve our working, living, and recreational environments. The combined $602 million was invested in areas to include housing, dormitories, a new 

child development center, fitness centers, community activity centers, launch and 

nuclear mission facilities; and electrical, heating/air conditioning, water and road infrastructure. For 2010, we will invest $118 million in MILCON projects for a child 

development center, facilities construction, and key projects across AFSPC. 

AFSPC Goal: Modernize and Sustain AFSPC’s Enduring Missions and Mature 

Emerging Missions 

As the Air Force lead for cyberspace, AFSPC will provide cyberspace capabilities 

that, when integrated with air and space capabilities, enable combat effects in a 

new way. As we have done with our space capabilities, we will establish a path to 

grow cyberspace operations, education, training, and development. We will also 

identify specific areas to draw on the combined resources of the ANG, ARC, and government civilians. Our plan is laid out in the ‘‘The United States Air Force Blueprint for Cyberspace,’’ which we will use in working closely with our Joint fight 

partners to provide complementary capabilities. The blueprint describes how we will 

align cyberspace activities and functions, evolve and integrate these unique capabilities, and build operational capacity. We must ensure that we can both defend 

against attacks and ‘‘fight through’’ and respond to attacks, in order to assure mission accomplishment. 

The newly activated 24th Air Force serves as the Air Force’s operational cyberspace component to USSTRATCOM and is charged to integrate, employ and present 

Air Force cyberspace capabilities. Structured pursuant to direction from the Secretary of the Air Force and Air Force Chief of Staff, the 24th Air Force achieved 

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) a few weeks ago (22 January 2010). 

Total Force 

In 2009, AFSPC continued to leverage ARC support to AFSPC missions. Our 

Total Force Integration (TFI) Strategy capitalizes on existing ARC presence and inherent strengths of the Reserve and Guard components. As we stood up 24th Air 

Force, our TFI partnerships played a key role in our success. Across AFSPC, our 

ARC partnerships in satellite and launch range operations, SSA, and battlespace 

awareness provide critical continuity and surge capacity. We are also preparing to 

increase ARC presence in missile warning, space control, and cyberspace operations. 

Schriever War Game Series 

The recurring Schriever War Game series has proven insightful in identifying key 

strategic and policy issues. At the end of our fifth Schriever War Game in March 

2009, we addressed key issues involving space deterrence, capability employment, 

and policy implementation and planning with senior leaders throughout the national security community. This war game also identified areas requiring additional 

emphasis and highlighted the close relationships between space and cyberspace capabilities, and informed our strategic development efforts in both the QDR and SPR. 

We are now preparing for this year’s wargame and look forward to increased international and industry participation. 

AFSPC Goal: Reengineer Acquisition to Deliver Capability at the Speed of Need 

No one doubts that we need to push relentlessly to improve acquisition. Our vision is to provide what the Joint Force Commander needs, when he needs it—capability at the speed of need. We have far to go, but recent successes show that we 

are on the right track. As mentioned earlier, in the past year we increased on-orbit 

capability with GPS IIR–20M and 21M, DMSP–18, WGS–2, and WGS–3. We are on 

track to deliver new capabilities as we have completed a GPS III Preliminary Design Review as well as GEO–1 and AEHF SV–1 TVAC testing. 

We will continue to pursue our ‘‘back to basics’’ philosophy and block-build approach, fund to the most probable cost, increase our acquisition workforce and expertise, improve relations with industry, and implement strict requirements control. 

Our Space and Missile Systems Center will deliver five major systems in the next 

24 months for SBIRS, AEHF, GPS IIF, ORS–1 and SBSS. The GPS III, OCX and 

Space Fence development programs are on the right track. 

As we reengineer acquisition processes, we are focusing efforts to rebuild the acquisition workforce and strengthen relationships across Industry and DOD. In an 

effort to recapture acquisition excellence, the USAF implemented an Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) to revitalize the acquisition workforce; improve requirements 

generation processes; instill budget and financial discipline; improve major systems 

source selections; and establish clear lines of authority and accountability within organizations. Overall, the AIP increases accountability at higher leadership levels, inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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creases communication between MAJCOMs and between product centers and 

MAJCOMs. 

Furthermore, we implemented a Human Capital Strategic Plan to recruit, develop 

and retain acquisition expertise. As part of the recruitment effort, we are developing 

and marketing a recruitment strategy that targets individuals with the desired education, experience, and skill sets. Taking advantage of favorable job market conditions and expedited hiring authorities, we hired over 300 recent college graduates. 

CONCLUSION

Space and cyberspace capabilities allow warfighting commands to meet the challenge of protecting the American people, their livelihoods and interests with precision at the moment of need. At AFSPC, our vision, our mission, our job, and our 

dedication is to make sure those commanders have the very best capabilities that 

we can humanly provide. With the continued support of Congress, we will be able 

to assure that our country will have the space and cyberspace forces it needs tomorrow and in years to come. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you very much. 

General James. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF, COMMANDER, 14TH AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, 

AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General JAMES. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to be here again this year. 

As the Commander of Joint Functional Component Command 

(JFCC) Space and 14th Air Force, I represent over 20,000 men and 

women around the world who really are responsible for conducting 

operations for all of our Department of Defense (DOD) space systems. Whether that’s satellite systems, whether that’s our missile 

warning systems, whether that’s space surveillance systems, or our 

launch systems, these are the men and women that actually execute those operations and make sure that we get the job done, day 

in and day out—as General Kehler said, both for the military, the 

Joint Forces commander, and all the civil users and other users 

around the world that rely on the products we provide. 

Sir, we have a great task in front of us, but these men and 

women execute that mission every day, and they provide the support that the world needs from a space perspective. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General James follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here once again to appear before you as U.S. Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM) Commander of the Joint Functional Component 

Command for Space (CDR JFCC SPACE) and 14th Air Force. 

It’s an honor for me to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of 

JFCC SPACE who operate and protect some of our Nation’s most critical systems 

for global communications, navigation, strategic warning, and situational awareness. These men and women are a tireless and innovative joint force, working hard 

to ensure critical space capabilities are available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, 

for our global forces. We operate in an increasingly congested and contested environment and ensuring access to all our Department of Defense (DOD) space capabilities 

for worldwide users is an absolute priority. 

Today I will focus my discussion on the space operational environment and how 

it.s changed over the last year. I’ll describe our priorities of Warfighter Support, 

Command and Control, Integration, and Readiness and then close with a look at 

new challenges we see in the months and years to come. 

16 

FRAMING THE OVERALL ENVIRONMENT

Space continues to be the ultimate ‘‘high ground’’ from which to operate. Every 

military operation utilizes space capabilities in some way. Whether it.s the Global 

Positioning System (GPS), overhead imagery, secure communications, or meteorological reports, ground and air commanders rely upon space capabilities constantly. 

However, space is becoming an increasingly congested and contested environment. 

As of 1 February 2010, the operators at the 

Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) track approximately 21,500 objects on 

orbit. That is an increase of 1,700 from just last year. There are nearly 10,000 

pieces of debris, 3,700 dead satellites and rocket pieces, and 6,800 unknown objects 

orbiting the Earth. Included in these objects are over 1,100 active satellites owned 

by more than 60 different countries and corporations. As the environment continues 

to grow in its complexity, our need for real-time space situational awareness (SSA) 

is becoming more obvious. Our ground sensors are critical elements of our Space 

Surveillance Network (SSN) dedicated to watching the skies and keeping track of 

all space objects. Across the globe, we have dedicated radar and optical sensors. 

These sensors track thousands of objects every day and automatically upload their 

observations to a computer database. These sensors cannot cover all of the sky all 

the time, so to enhance coverage, we have more collateral and contributing sensors. 

These sensors are used for space tracking when not supporting in their primary 

mission. All orbital observations come together in the JSpOC at Vandenberg AFB, 

CA, for analysis and computational predictions. 

Sensors and computers cannot discriminate between active satellites and debris 

among the thousands of objects on orbit. That’s where our most crucial component 

of JFCC SPACE comes in—its people. There are more than 29,000 military, civilians, and contractors conducting operations day to day for both JFCC SPACE and 

14th Air Force. Our missions demand a continuous 24–7 focus. Members of JFCC 

SPACE and 14th Air Force live and work in places such as Greenland, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein Atoll, Guam, and Alaska. Such commitment takes the dedication of 

a Total Force. JFCC SPACE is built of a cadre of marines, sailors, soldiers, and airmen. Of the 7,500 military men and women, more than 1,100 are Air National 

Guard, Air Force Reserves, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees from all Services. Of these, a relatively small number of people, only about 300, at the JSpOC 

are the single DOD focal point for monitoring all space activity. 

The JSpOC maintains our SSA, provides command and control of assigned forces, 

and supports all theater forces with space capabilities as needed. SSA is the cornerstone of JSpOC activities. The SSN central mission system is maintained and analyzed at the JSpOC by a collection of military and civilian analysts. These individuals keep track of what satellites are active, predict when pieces of debris or satellites will re-enter the atmosphere, recommend when a payload can be safely 

launched, and prevent potential satellite collisions. Over the last year, we have 

grown our JSpOC capabilities to not only monitor and protect DOD satellites, but 

monitor and conduct collision assessments for all commercial and foreign active satellites as well. After the COSMOS/IRIDIUM collision of 2009, we began increasing 

our personnel and computing power to allow for collision screening for all active satellites. I am proud to report that we achieved that goal ahead of schedule and now 

screen for collisions daily and report potential conjunctions to satellite owner/operators through USSTRATCOM’s SSA Sharing Program. To date, we have reported 

hundreds of potential conjunctions, with more than 50 resulting in the owner maneuvering a satellite. 

While SSA is the cornerstone of our capability, our number one priority is supporting our deployed U.S. and coalition forces. We’ve provided more than 20,000 

GPS accuracy predictions in the last year, supporting resupply air drops and personnel recovery actions. Space capabilities have aided in the recovery of 128 service 

men since 2003. We’ve covered more than 12 air and ground missions with tailored 

coverage by overhead sensors watching for hostile or insurgent activity within a specific area of concern. 

The criticality of space effects to the warfighter will continue to be vital to our 

Nation’s success in ongoing operations. We must protect our space assets against 

intentional and unintentional acts in order to preserve our essential space capabilities to ensure USSTRATCOM’s ability to execute and integrate operations across all 

lines of operations and provide real-time, actionable data to our joint warfighters, 

the combatant commanders. 

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JFCC SPACE PRIORITIES

To set a clear and unambiguous vision, we established four priorities for JFCC 

SPACE in late 2008: Warfighter Support, Command and Control, Integration, and 

Readiness. These priorities set the vector for all our efforts. 

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

Warfighter Support is our core focus and key factor in determining manpower requirements, technology needs, and operational processes. From launch through operational employment to re-entry disposal, our space capabilities are built around 

warfighter needs. Launch capabilities remain the foundation of our space program. 

Over the last year, we’ve seen a total of 27 successful launches from both Eastern 

and Western Ranges. Although our launch safety record is exemplary, we are transforming our launch operations to modernize our range safety equipment and streamline our range footprints. Sixty percent of the Western Range systems are being replaced or upgraded over the next 2 years and the Eastern Range command system 

will receive upgrades during the next fiscal year. 

JFCC SPACE directly supports warfighter requests through the JSpOC. Recent 

direct support for deployed forces includes GPS accuracy, overhead infrared, and 

Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) support. GPS is the most widely 

used space capability on the planet. Our forces use GPS for everything from urban 

foot patrols to Predator flights. We receive requests for GPS accuracy predictions 

daily through the JSpOC. On average, we send 400 GPS accuracy predictions to forward-deployed forces each week. To enhance coverage to all GPS users, we are repositioning three of our GPS satellites to assist users in terrain-challenged ground environments. The first of our new GPS IIF satellites will launch this Spring and add 

new capabilities for civilian and military users. GPS IIF will bring a civilian safetyof-life signal and provide a more robust signal availability for military users. To ensure warfighters understand the full capabilities and vulnerabilities of the GPS system, the Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC), a component of JFCC SPACE, 

maintains an active outreach program with the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), 

Services, and agencies. The JNWC ensures that Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) 

considerations are included across the spectrum of operations, to include COCOM 

planning, exercises, disaster response, to full conflict. 

Overhead Persistent non-Imaging Infrared (OPIR) capabilities have grown beyond 

providing strategic ballistic missile warning only. Today’s OPIR can provide battlefield commanders a wider range of situational awareness of the ground and air environments. We have provided support to ground troops during base exfiltrations to 

ensure demolition activities were successful. Overwatch of high-priority missions 

can ensure threats in the area are detected and reported before they cause a problem for the aircraft or ground commander. Consequently, OPIR’s traditional mission 

of ballistic missile detection and warning has seen remarkable increases in integration with intelligence systems. Launch information from multiple agencies flowed 

into the JSpOC, where operators had direct contact with higher headquarters. However, this operational picture is manually created by JSpOC operators. We need a 

system that automatically provides this to our operators and leaders. 

Technology advancements in overhead detection continue to advance and we are 

constantly finding new ways to provide better technical intelligence to the ground 

commanders. The Space-Based Infra-red System (SBIRS) in its Highly Elliptical 

Orbit (HEO) gives significant coverage over the northern hemisphere for infrared 

detection and technical intelligence gathering. We can now detect and report, in 

near real-time, natural, and man-made infrared events. The quality of data provided 

by SBIRS HEO is a key part in our operators. ability to characterize launches and 

predict threatened areas within minutes. SBIRS Geosynchronous (GEO) satellites 

will give us the ability to stare and collect for days and weeks worldwide. We will 

be able to characterize events that paint a picture for national leadership of new 

foreign technology development and proliferation information. We will be able to expand our warfighter support beyond the ballistic missile threat to include enemy air 

defenses, surface to air missiles, and even personnel recovery actions. 

Information technologies have truly revolutionized our capability to operate globally. From combat operations to humanitarian assistance, we use MILSATCOM 

every day. Secure communications allows survivable, joint communications for diplomatic travels through orders dissemination such as Nuclear Force Command and 

Control. Our Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) dissemination relies heavily on our MILSTAR constellation that is exceeding design life 

expectations. The new Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) is performing superbly 

and is an outstanding replacement to our aging Defense Satellite Communications 

System (DSCS) fleet. Our WGS system will have over 10 times the capacity of our 

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DSCS system and provides enhanced information security. WGS gives us automatic 

Digital Network/automatic Secure Voice Communications, Secret Internet Protocol 

Router Network and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System access 

from space. It can also carry Defense Message System, Defense Switched Network, 

Diplomatic Telecommunication Service Communications, and real-time Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicle (UAV) video for ground mobile forces. WGS–1 and WGS–2 will be 

joined by WGS–3 in spring 2010 after operational checkout and acceptance. 

Our priority of warfighter support stretches into the theater itself. For each theater’s Director of Space Forces (DS4), we maintain a close and dedicated relationship 

to ensure they have the most relevant information and current operational view of 

our space capabilities. Quarterly DS4 conferences bring all theater DS4s together 

to share tactics and insight, as well as allow them to identify new requirements in 

front of the JFCC SPACE staff firsthand. Our Silent Sentry capability has developed into a premier interference detection tool for satellite communications. The Silent Sentry team monitors all friendly SATCOM for unintentional interference or 

hostile denial attempts. Additionally, JFCC SPACE maintains in-theater capabilities for counter space activities directly supporting forces in harm’s way. Requested 

support from ground troops flows through the theater Air and Space Operations 

Center to the JSpOC and execution can occur within minutes of a request. 

JFCC SPACE is forging ahead in our efforts to provide new, operationally responsive space effects to the warfighter. We are actively engaged with Air Force Space 

Command and U.S. Strategic Command in developing the concepts and command 

relationships that may allow us to transition experimental capabilities to operational use. For example, TACSAT–3 is an experimental, hyperspectral imagery satellite that has shown great promise in areas such as which can be used to support 

ground troops. At the same time, we are supporting DOD’s Operationally Responsive Space concept development with the goal of providing rapid replenishment of 

space capabilities on the order of days to weeks, not months to years, using deployon-need assets. We are working with our Service partners to finalize and field the 

command and control architecture for Operationally Responsive Space-1, a purposebuilt, small spacecraft that will supply urgently-needed imagery to USCENTCOM 

and other theater operators. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL

JSpOC Mission System (JMS) is planned to replace our aging mission systems 

with a command and control information technology system consisting of infrastructure and mission applications. It will be a service-oriented architecture with the capability of user-defined applications. It will be much more than just a positional 

catalog. We envision a single, theater-integrated system with intelligence feeds, 

communications status, integrated missile warning, and status of forces all displayed on one operational picture. We expect it to automate much of what we do 

by hand today. Instead of the human analysis required in determining that a conjunction may occur, the system will automatically receive updates from sensors and 

alert operators to potential conjunctions. The operator will only need to confirm the 

conjunction and alert the owner of the satellite. JMS will be delivered in multiple 

releases, with Release 0 consisting of the initial Service-Oriented-Architecture infrastructure, due this summer. 

SSA has seen the greatest advance in operational utility in its history over the 

past year. We have increased daily conjunction screening at the JSpOC from 110 

primary satellites to over 1,000. With that increase, we have seen conjunction warning notifications increase from 5 to up to 35 per day and our interaction with commercial and foreign space agencies has increased likewise. Information sharing with 

commercial and foreign entities is now a formalized process within JFCC SPACE. 

We currently have data-sharing agreements with 16 commercial and foreign partners. However, we still suffer from an aged and limited sensor network to gather 

our most basic resource, orbital observations. Observations from the SSN are the 

foundational base of all SSA. Many of our SSN sensors operate on a one-object-ata-time system and none of them are networked with one another. The CONUSbased space fence can detect and observe multiple objects at one time and contributes more to our network than any other sensor. Additionally, we have considerable 

gaps in coverage in the southern hemisphere. Objects can be un-observed for a significant period of time while over areas such as Antarctica, Australia, Africa, and 

South America. Placement of a space fence in the southern hemisphere will improve 

our coverage considerably. The Space-Based Surveillance System (SBSS) will provide additional sensing capabilities. This sensor will operate from space, free of 

boundaries, borders, or atmospheric effects to distort or obscure viewing. The first 

SBSS satellite is scheduled to launch this summer and will be operated by the 1st 

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Space Operations Squadron in Colorado. SBSS will revolutionize how we observe 

satellites. With a potential capability to track objects much smaller in size, we will 

detect more objects in orbit, re-enforcing the need for a replacement SSA analysis 

system such as JMS. 

INTEGRATION

As space becomes even more critical to global operations and the access to space 

expands, it will be more critical than ever to work closely with friends, allies, the 

commercial space sector, and perhaps all space faring nations. Integration amongst 

all space agencies within the U.S. Government is essential to safe and effective operations. We continue to improve our linkages with intelligence community partners 

and build long-lasting, permanent relationships between our organizations. We continue to strengthen an already strong relationship with the National Reconnaissance Office through sharing facilities and permanent liaison positions and 

partnering during exercises and real-world events. We are working to create a wider 

relationship between the space and intelligence communities through a data sharing 

and collaborative information systems. The Joint Exploitation Fusion Cell will fully 

integrate multiple intelligence sources into one database for operators. This will 

allow for efficient integration of intelligence data into our assessments and 

verification of operational successes. 

Coalition and commercial integration have taken significant leaps forward over 

the last year. Cross-Atlantic visits to and from the United Kingdom and France 

have forged significant relationships and continue the dialog to improve coalition 

space operations. Australia, Germany, and Japan have all sent delegations to tour 

the JSpOC and witnessed how we accomplish our missions. Our experiences in coalition exercises have taught us valuable lessons; most notably that threats can come 

from multiple venues, so it is prudent to act together with our allied and commercial 

partners. Schriever 5 Wargame impressed upon U.S., Allied, and commercial partners on the importance of relationships with threats in this type of integrated global 

domain. We will continue to develop partnership processes in Schriever 10 this year. 

Since the COSMOS/IRIDIUM collision, commercial space operators have realized 

how much capability JFCC SPACE has to offer protection for their systems. Likewise, commercial users in space maintain some of the most accurate positional information of their own systems. It benefits both sides to share relevant information. 

JFCC Network Warfare (NW) is tasked with operating and defending DOD networks under the command and control of U.S. Strategic Command. Cyber and space 

are inherently linked as effective force multipliers and share similarities in the nonkinetic warfare environment. Our staffs have established continuous linkages as we 

operate common and complementary capabilities supporting each other as well as 

global joint forces. We fully recognize the benefits and are sharing tactics, intelligence, and procedures. In many scenarios, capabilities JFCC SPACE lacks, cyber 

forces can fulfill, and vice versa. Our intelligence, plans, and operations divisions 

share information and processes to determine where capabilities overlap and they 

diverge. We have begun collaborative work on new tactics that will deliver new capabilities to theater commanders and will continue to develop linkages between the 

two components. 

Integration across domains, borders, and industries requires a significant investment by those involved. Critical to effective integration are systems and facilities. 

Today the JSpOC performs its operational mission using a converted missile assembly building. Over 50 years old and designed for an entirely different purpose, the 

building presents significant challenges towards meeting our integrated space operations mission. Successful integration with U.S. and coalition forces, as well as commercial partners will depend upon facilities designed specifically for space command 

and control. 

READINESS

‘‘Perfection is our Standard.’’ This is our motto within JFCC SPACE and 14th Air 

Force. The readiness of our forces is a key priority. Without adequate and ready 

forces, we will fall short of achieving our goals as a joint force. Readiness includes 

health of the force, training, preparedness, and compliance. Our forces must be 

healthy and able to fight, trained for the fight, equipped to fight, and compliant 

with the law of armed conflict and other legal and policy constraints. Within JFCC 

SPACE and 14th Air Force, readiness issues exist in training and personnel numbers. Our Operational Readiness Inspections and Unit Compliance Inspections are 

the tools we use to evaluate unit readiness and compliance levels. Within the last 

2 years, all 14th Air Force wings have been found compliant and ready, but are still 

lacking in resources and training to commit to a full-time, warfighting posture for 

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extended periods. Every new satellite system brings new mission requirements. Acquisition of new missions, while continuing to maintain legacy missions, places more 

and more requirements on our personnel and hardware systems. Continued modernization of our systems and efficient use of our personnel are absolutely essential 

to the success of our future operations. 

CHALLENGES

We will face operational challenges in the space domain as capabilities expand 

and more nations utilize space systems. Improvement in data management will become increasingly important with the increase in the amount of observations from 

SBSS. Any future sensors will create even more additional data sources that we will 

have to integrate into our mission systems. We will continue to be challenged by 

the acquisition speed of new command and control systems and space capabilities. 

Off-the-shelf technologies have caught, if not surpassed, some of our own technology. 

We must acquire new systems, as General Kehler has put, ‘‘At the speed of the 

need’’. As long as forces are dispersed across the globe, we will have challenges with 

integrating with the joint warfighter. Multiple information systems across multiple 

theaters hurt efficiency and delay generation of desired effects for forces. Common 

information systems and a complete, integrated operational picture will allow commanders in direct and supporting roles to share common battlespace awareness. Advances in space technologies will not slow or end. Our operational environment will 

continue to grow in complexity as more nations, corporations, and even individuals 

place smaller and more capable satellites on orbit. Satellites will continue to get 

smaller and more capable. Our sensor network and mission systems are challenged 

to keep pace with the expanding orbital environment. Finally, as we venture into 

discussions with cyber forces, mission requirements will grow and our environment 

will expand to include the virtual as well. In our fixed-personnel and resource-restrained reality, we will have to find ways to operate more efficiently and effectively. 

CONCLUSION

Space operations and needs will continue to rapidly evolve. We must continue to 

search out ways to better support our forces around the globe, especially those in 

harm’s way. We will continue to coordinate with other government agencies to enhance overall support, ensuring the right effect is delivered at the right place at the 

right time. We will strive to strengthen our relationships with allied space partners, 

ensuring our global capabilities remain available for those requiring them. Perfection is our standard, and you can be proud of your soldiers, sailors, marines, and 

airmen that I am honored to lead. I thank the committee for your continued support 

as we work to preserve our critical space capabilities for our Nation. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Dr. Federici. 

STATEMENT OF GARY A. FEDERICI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, AND SPACE 

Dr. FEDERICI. Chairman Nelson, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today with Vice Admiral Jack Dorsett to discuss 

our space programs and space-related activities. 

The MUOS is clearly our most critical space program. We have 

had some challenges, and I think we are looking for a way ahead. 

We were pleased to submit a report to you last week with some options that may help mitigate gaps in the future and support the onorbit fragile Constellation. 

So, thank you very much. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Admiral? 

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STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID J. DORSETT, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE (N2/N6), AND DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 

Admiral DORSETT. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity 

to be here, especially on behalf of the men and women of the U.S. 

Navy. It’s a privilege for me to be able to testify before you today. 

I want to reiterate one point for you, that I believe you’re already 

aware of, and that’s that the U.S. Navy is critically dependent upon 

space. Our ships, submarines, aircraft operate across the farflung 

reaches of the globe, often operating independently. The one thing 

that keeps them tied together, I think, is space-based capabilities, 

whether that’s communications, the networks that support them, 

whether it’s the navigation and precision geolocation data that 

comes from space, weather and environmental sensing information 

is absolutely vital to the U.S. Navy. 

Truly, when it comes down to precision weapons, we need that 

detailed precision geolocation information that can only come from 

space. 

Our intelligence resources, also, from space, provide a critical 

component of what the U.S. Navy’s intelligence organization needs. 

Then, ultimately, I think the need for space to support our missile 

defense capabilities is on the rise. 

I have two points to make. One is regarding MUOS. Dr. Federici 

has mentioned it, and you have, as well. MUOS is in the midst of 

another delay. Last year, you were informed that MUOS was going 

to be delayed by about 11 months. Our estimate at this point is 

that the first MUOS satellite is expected to be launched in September 2011, with an on-orbit capability of December 2011. That’s 

about a 10-month delay from what you were briefed previously. We 

can go into details regarding what the purpose or the reason for 

that delay is, if you’d like. 

The other point that I’d like to make is to inform you that we 

do have a mitigation plan. You’ve received the report from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy this past week. We do vigorously 

fund the mitigation plan. We are vigorously funding the MUOS capability itself to ensure that we deliver the entire capability. We 

are looking and working with our partners to mitigate the challenges that we face. It has our full attention, sir. 

With that, I’m certainly prepared to take any of your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Frederici and Admiral 

Dorsett follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED BY VADM DAVID J. DORSETT, USN, AND DR. GARY A. FEDERICI

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are honored to appear before you today to address your Navy’s space activities. Navy Leadership expects to be prominent in the fields of intelligence, cyber warfare, command and control, knowledge management and space. By fusing these capabilities, he expects to 

attain command and control overmatch against any adversary. To achieve this important goal, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has restructured the Navy staff to 

bring all Navy information-related capabilities and systems under a single resource 

sponsor—Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Information Dominance). In the information and cyberspace domain, the CNO has also established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet as the global operator for many of Navy’s critical mission 

areas, including space operations. 

22 

Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure global communications capability to support the command and control requirements of highly 

mobile, geographically dispersed U.S. and coalition forces. Our satellite communications capabilities confer to our deployed forces a decisive advantage across the spectrum of military operations from peacetime engagements to humanitarian relief efforts to major combat. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), which is the next 

generation Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication system, is a critical element of our space architecture and will provide more capable tactical communications to meet the growing demands of our joint, mobile warfighters. 

NAVY SPACE REQUIREMENTS

The Navy’s interests in space, however, are not limited solely to communications. 

Intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, position, navigation, timing, missile warning, meteorology and oceanography each have significant space components. We 

must ensure that all of the Navy’s space equities and interests are well understood 

throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) and by our interagency partners so 

that our combatant commanders and Navy’s operating forces have the space capabilities they need to succeed in their missions. 

The Navy is critically dependent on space to conduct not only our wartime mission 

but also our core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. A wide 

array of national, joint, and commercial satellites currently provides Navy commanders with essential worldwide support. Space capabilities are vital to our Nation’s maritime operations and are foundational to our ability to operate in a 

networked and dispersed manner. These seminal space capabilities support tactical 

strike, expeditionary warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine 

warfare, special operations, undersea warfare, ballistic missile defense, maritime domain awareness, and information dominance missions. 

The Navy’s mission of ensuring the security of our citizens at home and abroad 

requires a global reach and persistent presence. We must constantly be ready to deliver on a mission of mercy or rapidly deploy decisive combat power, while supporting a myriad of complex maritime operations that fall between these extremes. 

Our ability to respond, in concert with the other Services and coalition partners, depends on assured space capabilities with inherent flexibility and responsiveness to 

support our worldwide responsibilities. 

The Navy is one of the largest ‘users’ of space in DOD, yet we rely on our partnership with the Air Force and the Intelligence Community (IC) to develop and field 

the majority of our space systems. Future U.S. satellite programs are now being developed that promise additional benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Due 

to the long lead times involved in complex space programs, it is essential that naval 

requirements and maritime missions are factored into the pre-launch design and 

planned on-orbit operation of future satellite acquisitions. Your Navy is actively engaged with key national and joint space-related organizations to ensure current and 

future Navy needs in space are identified and incorporated. Venues for this engagement include the DOD Space Posture Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the 

National Security Space Program plans and assessments, and the Operationally Responsive Space Executive Committee. 

NAVY SPACE INVESTMENTS

Of Navy’s current fiscal contributions to space, nearly 50 percent is dedicated to 

the acquisition, development and management of the UHF Follow-On and MUOS 

communications satellite systems. The remainder is predominantly apportioned to 

acquisition of the various satellite receiver terminals and equipment for Navy units, 

and space based navigation, oceanography, and meteorology. All these acquisitions 

are consistent with DOD’s High Priority Performance Goals in the President’s Fiscal 

Year 2011 Budget’s Analytic Perspectives volume (page 77–8). 

Navy’s investment in space-related Science and Technology Research and Development has been modest—roughly 4 percent of our total space-related funding. In 

this fiscally-constrained environment, investment in projects and studies that address maritime-related capability gaps is critical to the successful execution of our 

Nation’s maritime strategy. The innovations produced by the Office of Naval Research, Naval Research Laboratory, and the OPNAV N2/N6 Technology Insertion 

Branch (Navy’s Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) entity) are 

vital to this effort. Our active involvement and influence with non-Navy space-related research activities, centers and agencies are necessary to leverage ongoing efforts that complement and support our unique maritime challenges and requirements. 

23 

The Navy depends on space capabilities now and expects the demand for space 

capabilities to grow in the future, especially for satellite communications 

(SATCOM). The Navy’s major space segment responsibility to the joint community 

is the UHF narrowband satellite communications constellation. Today this constellation consists of eight UHF Follow-On satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites 

(FLTSAT), one Leased Satellite (LEASAT 5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. 

MUOS will begin to replace these systems in 2011. Based on evolving warfighting 

concepts, UHF satellite communications requirements are expected to grow, and 

MUOS, as designed, will be able to support those requirements. 

MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM

MUOS, the next generation UHF satellite constellation, will consist of four operational satellites with one on-orbit spare. MUOS will support Unified Commands 

and Joint Task Force Components, DOD and non-DOD agencies, and our allies by 

providing worldwide tactical narrowband netted, point-to-point, and broadcast voice 

and data services in challenging environments including double canopy foliage, 

urban environments, high sea states, and all weather conditions. MUOS will carry 

two distinct payloads. The legacy UHF payload will provide the capability of a UHF 

Follow-On satellite, while a new UHF waveform payload will significantly increase 

the number of accesses while also increasing available throughput to the 

Warfighter. The dual-payload design will allow backward compatibility with legacy 

UHF terminals while providing a next generation waveform to support ‘‘communications on the move’’ capabilities and provide disadvantaged platforms (hand held terminals, aircraft, missiles, UAVs, remote sensors) higher data rates per access (up 

to 64 kbps/access). 

MUOS will be the common denominator for future command and control, by enhancing the capability to communicate from the tactical edge to theater headquarters. MUOS will allow more comprehensive and coordinated support to regional 

engagement efforts, providing the capability to synchronize actions with other Services and agencies. This capability will be realized through the fielding of MUOS capable Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) terminals and by upgrading existing legacy UHF software programmable terminals. 

DELIVERING MOBILE USER OBJECTIVE SYSTEM

The timely delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy, and we recognize both 

our responsibility and commitment to providing this vital warfighting capability to 

all our DOD and IC partners. The delay in delivery of the MUOS, coupled with the 

age and fragility of the current UHF satellite constellation, has our full attention 

and focus. The program has been reviewed by an ASN (RDA) directed National Review Team, and the program has subsequently been re-baselined following the 

team’s recommendations. 

If gaps in UHF satellite availability occur, a series of mitigation options have been 

developed and can be incrementally implemented to minimize the operational impact. One mitigation initiative that has already been employed is a payload reconfiguration to UFO satellite Flight 11, which increased the number of available channels. This action was completed at no cost and with very low risk to the spacecraft. 

The Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources from two commercial satellites, LEASAT and SKYNET. If necessary, we are also positioned to lease an additional channel on an Italian space-based communications system (SICRAL). 

We are also pursuing options to make more efficient use of available satellite resources. The Integrated Waveform (IW), a software upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical terminals and Control System, is in development and will optimize UHF satellite channels by doubling the number of accesses that can be supported by a single 

25 kHz channel. DOD is also coordinating a Memorandum of Understanding with 

the Australian Ministry of Defense to procure/use channels on an Australian-hosted 

payload covering the Indian Ocean region, in exchange for future use (commencing 

2018) of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses in the Pacific Ocean Region. Finally, 

we are exploring the use of TACSAT–4, an Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory led development that supports Operationally Responsive Space 

Office efforts. TACSAT–4 may provide a very limited operational capability when it 

reaches on-orbit capability later this year. 

ENVIRONMENTAL REMOTE SENSING

The Navy continues to address vital interests in environmental remote sensing. 

In support of Undersea Warfare, we are procuring the Geosat Follow-On (GFO) II 

satellite altimeter to maintain continuity in mapping global ocean temperature profiles which provides critical input to our global and regional ocean models. The Navy 

24 

relies upon partnerships with the Air Force and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for its general meteorological and oceanographic remote sensing capabilities and is involved in defining the requirements for the DOD portion 

of the restructure of the National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System. 

The imagery and data collected by these satellites are essential to our ability both 

to characterize the environment and assemble vital maritime information that provides an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. In support of the Navy’s 

unique responsibility to provide precise positioning and navigation data, we are embarking on a new program, the Joint Milli-Arcsecond Pathfinder Survey (JMAPS), 

which will enable necessary upgrades to the master star position catalogs to meet 

the DOD positioning accuracy requirements into the next decade. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

The Navy applauds the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the National 

Security Agency’s exploitation and dissemination of both geospatial and signals intelligence data, as well as the National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO) operation of 

the space-based sensors. A robust architecture of SIGINT and GEOINT systems to 

meet current and emerging requirements remains crucial to successful maritime operations. While much progress has been made in improving the planning and programming of space-based sensors, it is imperative that replacements for older systems be funded and fielded in sufficient quantity and capacity to sustain continuity 

of space-based intelligence data throughout the maritime domain. Accordingly, we 

fully support the Office of the Director of National Intelligence collaboration with 

combatant commands and Services to ensure emerging requirements are adequately 

supported by IC-funded future collection systems. 

COMMERCIAL SPACE SYSTEMS

For Navy, commercially provided systems have the ability to augment, but not replace, national systems. These commercial capabilities have become increasingly 

useful in bridging the gap between requirements and capabilities. The Navy has utilized commercial communication satellites since the early 1990s to augment bandwidth requirements not satisfied by military communication satellites. Technical advances in the commercial sector can provide opportunities for rapid capability implementation, and are potential ‘‘game-changers’’ in the National Security Space Strategy. The Navy continues to work with the commercial sector to explore options to 

address multiple maritime mission requirements, and we continue to field systems, 

such as Commercial Broadband Satellite Program terminals, to fully leverage available commercial capability. 

SPACE CADRE

Our Navy equities, requirements, operations and management of space resources 

are the responsibility of a small but agile corps of space professionals that make the 

Navy’s use of space possible. The Navy’s Space Cadre is comprised of approximately 

1,350 Active Duty, Reserve, and civil service personnel from all warfighter designators and communities, and is a key component of the DOD’s 15,000 military and 

civilian space professionals. Part of our Total Workforce strategy is to ensure that 

fully qualified Navy Space Cadre personnel are consistently assigned to our most 

critical and consequential space billets. This strategy requires the Navy to continue 

to recruit and retain a talented and highly skilled workforce to fill vital space leadership positions now and into the future. We are committed to providing active career management and continued opportunities for Navy Space Cadre professionals 

to ensure that Navy and Joint space-related assignments complement and enhance 

career progression paths and promotion opportunities while infusing naval operational expertise back into the space community. 

Approximately one third of active duty space billets and a number of our civil 

service personnel are acquisition billets located throughout the Space and Naval 

Warfare Systems Enterprise and at the NRO. The Navy is fortunate to hold a key 

Flag-level billet within the NRO. Rear Admiral Liz Young, who is ‘‘triple-hatted’’ as 

PEO Space Systems and Commander, SPAWAR Space Field Activity, oversees the 

largest concentration of Navy Space Cadre members, and provides space systems 

engineering and acquisition expertise to OPNAV N2/N6 as well as to all Navy systems commands and research centers. It is essential that we continue to assign talented personnel to represent unique Navy requirements for space systems in the 

joint acquisition processes at the NRO and at the Air Force Space and Missile Center. As the newly established Fleet Cyber Command and U.S. 10th Fleet reaches 

full organizational maturity, they will assume a leading role in Navy’s space planning and operations. 

25 

CONCLUSION

In closing, we would like to reiterate that space capabilities have and will continue to be critical to our Nation’s success in the maritime domain. We now operate 

in a dynamic and challenging global environment that demands increased capability 

and capacity to operate in a networked but geographically dispersed fashion. Space 

capabilities are no longer nice to have; they are essential. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today. The continued 

support from Congress in general, and this subcommittee in particular, is deeply appreciated. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Ms. Chaplain. 

STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m focused on the acquisition side of space, and your opening 

statement covered a great deal of what I was going to say, so I’m 

just going to emphasize a couple of points about the efforts that 

DOD is making to improve space, and what we see are the remaining challenges. 

I think a lot of credit goes to DOD for the wide range of actions 

they’ve been taking to improve their acquisitions. They include 

such things as strengthening cost estimating, strengthening testing 

oversight, contractor oversight, strengthening the requirements 

process, strengthening their acquisition policy. Many of these 

began before the most recent Weapons Systems Reform Act 

(WSRA). 

But, we’re not really out of the woods yet; there are still a lot 

of challenges. I think reform itself will take a long time to produce 

results, just because space programs take a long time themselves. 

We have very few new programs on the horizon. 

Reform will also be difficult to achieve if the right bench strength 

isn’t there to execute space programs. This includes technical and 

program experts. It has been very challenging for DOD to address 

gaps in the space workforce. 

Likewise, reform will be difficult if there are gaps in the industrial base expertise, if there’s lax contract management and oversight, if there are insufficient resources for testing new technologies, and, as you mentioned, if we can’t get innovation in the 

form of our small businesses into the programs. All of these issues, 

we’ve identified before as needing attention. 

Moreover, there are still a lot of questions that need to be resolved about how space should be best organized, led, and supported. Studies concur that there’s a need for stronger centralized 

authority for space, and our own studies consistently show space 

programs have difficulty coordinating their ground, user, and space 

components, as well as getting agreements on requirements that 

cross boundaries. Moreover, without a central point of accountability, it may be difficult to sustain reform efforts underway. 

With that, I would like to just conclude and say, I look forward 

to the questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:] 

26 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) space 

acquisitions. Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities to support current military and other government operations, as well as to 

enable DOD to transform the way it collects and disseminates information. Despite 

the significant investment in space, the majority of large-scale acquisition programs 

in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced problems during the past two decades 

that have driven up costs by hundreds of millions and even billions of dollars and 

stretched schedules by years and increased technical risks. To address the cost increases, DOD altered its acquisitions by reducing the number of satellites it intended to buy, reducing the capabilities of the satellites, or terminating major space 

systems acquisitions. Moreover, along with the cost increases, many space acquisitions have experienced significant schedule delays—of as much as 8 years—resulting in potential capability gaps in areas such as missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring. These problems persist. 

My testimony today will focus on: (1) the status of space acquisitions, (2) the efforts DOD is taking to address causes of problems and increase credibility and success in its space systems acquisitions, and (3) what remains to be done. Notably, 

DOD has taken the important step of acknowledging the acquisition problems of the 

past and is taking action to address them, including better management of the acquisition process and oversight of its contractors. Moreover, several high-risk space 

programs have finally resolved technical and other obstacles and are close to begin 

delivering capability. However, other space acquisition programs continue to face 

challenges in meeting their cost and schedule targets and aligning the delivery of 

space assets with the ground and user systems needed to support and take advantage of new capability. Additionally, it may take years for acquisition improvements 

to take root and produce benefits that will enable DOD to realize a better return 

on its investment in space. Lastly, DOD still needs to decide how to best organize, 

lead, and support space activities. If it does not do so, its commitment to reforms 

may not be sustainable. 

SPACE ACQUISITION CHALLENGES PERSIST

A longstanding problem in DOD space acquisitions is that program and unit costs 

tend to go up significantly from initial cost estimates, while in some cases, the capability that was to be produced goes down. Figures 1 and 2 reflect differences in total 

program and unit costs for satellites from the time the programs officially began to 

their most recent cost estimates. As figure 1 shows, in several cases, DOD has had 

to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. For example, 

two satellites and four instruments were deleted from the National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer capabilities. This will reduce some planned capabilities for 

NPOESS as well as planned coverage. The figures below reflect the total program 

costs developed in fiscal year 2009. (Last year, we also compared original cost estimates to current cost estimates for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions 

for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. However, we were unable to perform this analysis this year because, for most of its major weapon system programs, DOD in fiscal 

year 2009 did not issue complete Selected Acquisition Reports, which contain updated yearly program funding estimates needed to conduct the analysis.) 

27 


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Several space acquisition programs are years behind schedule. Figure 3 highlights 

the additional estimated months needed for programs to deliver initial operational 

capabilities (IOC). These additional months represent time not anticipated at the 

programs’ start dates. Generally, the further schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk 

of not sustaining current capabilities. For example, according to Air Force officials, 

they have requested information from the space community on how best to address 

a potential gap in missile warning capabilities. 


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Some Acquisition Programs Have Overcome Problems and Have Satellites Ready for 

Launch 

DOD has made progress on several of its high-risk space programs and is expecting significant advances in capability as a result. In 2009, DOD launched the third 

Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite, broadening communications capability 

available to warfighters—and a fourth WGS satellite is slated for launch in 2011. 

DOD also launched two Global Positioning System (GPS) IIR–M satellites, although 

one has still not been declared operational because of radio signal transmission 

problems. Lastly, DOD supported the launch of a pair of Space Tracking and Surveillance System satellites, designed to test the tracking of ballistic missiles in support of missile defense early missile warning missions—these suffered many delays 

as well. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program had its 31st consecutive successful operational launch last week. 

Moreover, though it has had longstanding difficulties on nearly every space acquisition program, DOD now finds itself in a position to possibly launch the first new 

satellite from four different major space acquisition programs over the next 12 

months that are expected to significantly contribute to missions and capabilities. 

These include the GPS IIF satellites, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF) communications satellites, and the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) 

satellite—all of which struggled for years with cost and schedule growth, technical 

or design problems, as well as oversight and management weaknesses. Table 1 further describes the status of these efforts. 


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One program that appears to be overcoming remaining technical problems, but for 

which we are still uncertain whether it can meet its current launch date, is the 

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellite program. The first of four geosynchronous earth-orbiting (GEO) satellites (two sensors have already been 

launched on a highly elliptical orbit) is expected to launch in December 2010 and 

is expected to continue the missile warning mission with sensors that are more capable than the satellites currently on orbit. Total cost for the SBIRS program is currently estimated at over $13.6 billion for four GEO satellites (and two sensors that 

have already been delivered and are operational), representing an increase of about 

$9.2 billion over the program’s original cost, which included five GEO satellites. The 

most recent program estimate developed in 2008 set December 2009 as the launch 

goal for the first GEO satellite, but program officials indicate that the first GEO 

launch will be delayed at least another year, bringing the total delay to approximately 8 years. The reasons for the delay include poor government oversight of the 

contractor, technical complexities, and rework. The program continues to struggle 

with flight software development, and during testing last year, officials discovered 

hardware defects on the first GEO satellite, though the program reports that they 

have been resolved. The launches of subsequent GEO satellites have also slipped as 

a result of flight software design issues. Program officials indicate that they again 

intend to re-baseline the program to more realistic cost and schedule estimates by 

mid- to late-2010. Because of the problems on SBIRS, DOD began a follow-on system effort, now known as Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS), to run 

in parallel with the SBIRS program. For fiscal year 2011, DOD plans to cancel the 

3GIRS effort, but also plans to provide funds under the SBIRS program for one of 

the 3GIRS infrared demonstrations nearing completion. 

Other Programs Still Susceptible to Cost and Schedule Overruns 

While DOD is having success in readying some satellites for launch, other space 

acquisition programs face challenges that could further increase cost and delay targeted delivery dates. The programs that may be susceptible to cost and schedule 

challenges include NPOESS, Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), and GPS IIIA. 

Delays in both the NPOESS and MUOS programs have resulted in critical potential 

capability gaps for military and other government users. The GPS IIIA program was 

planned with an eye toward avoiding problems that plagued the GPS IIF program, 

but the schedule leaves little room for potential problems and there is a risk that 

the ground system needed to operate the satellites will not be ready when the first 

satellite is launched. Table 2 describes the status of these efforts in more detail. 


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1GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components, GAO–10–55 

(Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2009). 

Challenges in Aligning Space System Components 

This past year we also assessed the levels at which DOD’s satellites, ground control, and user terminals were synchronized to provide maximum benefit to the 

warfighter.1 Most space systems consist of satellites, ground control systems, and 

user terminals, though some space systems only require ground control systems to 

provide capability to users. Ground control systems are generally used to: (1) 

download and process data from satellite sensors and disseminate this information 

to warfighters and other users; and (2) maintain the health and status of the satellites, including steering the satellites and ensuring that they stay in assigned orbits. 

User terminals, typically procured by the military services and managed separately from associated satellites and ground control systems, can range from equipment hosted on backpacks to terminals mounted on Humvees, airborne assets, or 

ships. Terminals can be used to help the warfighter determine longitude, latitude, 

and altitude via GPS satellites, or securely communicate with others via AEHF satellites. Some user terminals are not solely dedicated to delivering capability from 

a specific satellite system. For example, the Joint Tactical Radio System is the primary user terminal associated with the MUOS program, but the system is also designed to be the next generation of tactical radios, allowing extensive ground-toground communication as well. 

Overall, we found the alignment of space system components proved to be challenging to DOD. Specifically, we found that for six of DOD’s eight major space system acquisitions, DOD has not been able to align delivery of satellites with ground 

control systems, user terminals, or both. Of the eight major space system acquisitions, five systems’ ground control system efforts are optimally aligned to deliver caVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB

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2 In making determinations about whether space system acquisitions were aligned, we examined whether there were gaps between fielding dates of satellite capabilities compared to ground 

system capabilities and whether lower percentages of user terminal types were planned to be 

fielded by the space system acquisitions’ planned initial capability. Generally we considered aspects of a space acquisition unaligned if there was a gap of years, rather than months, between 

the fielding dates of significant capabilities. Regarding user terminals, we only considered these 

unaligned compared to satellite capabilities when user terminals did not meet DOD’s measure 

of synchronization for military satellite communications space acquisitions. This measure, established by the U.S. Strategic Command, a primary user of DOD space systems, asserts that 20 

percent of any type of user terminal should be fielded by a space system acquisition’s initial 

capability date and 85 percent should be fielded by its full capability date. 3 It should be noted that while there are criteria for communications satellites, there are no 

criteria available in DOD that determine the optimum alignment or synchronization for the 

broader portfolio of satellite programs. This is principally because of inherent differences in satellite missions and their associated ground and user assets, according to officials involved in 

space system development as well as acquisition oversight. 

pability with their companion satellites, while three are not. For the five space systems requiring user terminals, none was aligned. In some cases, capability gaps of 

4 or more years have resulted from delays in the fielding of ground control systems 

or user terminals. When space system acquisitions are not aligned, satellite capability is available but underutilized, though in some cases, work-around efforts can 

help compensate for the loss or delay of capability. Moreover, when ground systems, 

user terminals, or both are not aligned with satellites, there are significant limitations in the extent to which the system as a whole can be independently tested and 

verified.2,3

Launch Manifest Issues 

Another risk facing DOD space programs for the next few years is the potential 

for increased demand for certain launch vehicles. DOD is positioned to launch a 

handful of satellites across missions over the next 2 years that were originally 

scheduled for launch years ago. Until recently, DOD had four launch pads on the 

east coast from which to launch military satellites. In 2009, DOD launched the final 

two GPS IIR–M satellites using the Delta II launch vehicle, thereby discontinuing 

its use of the Delta II line and its associated launch infrastructure. DOD now plans 

to launch most of its remaining satellites using one of DOD’s EELV types—Atlas 

V or Delta IV—from one of two east coast launch pads. At the same time, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) plans to use the Delta II to 

launch at least three major missions before that launch vehicle is retired. In addition, NASA is already manifesting other major missions on the Atlas V. Given the 

expected increased demand for launches—many of which are considered high priority—and the tempo of launches DOD has achieved with EELV, it appears that the 

launch manifest is crowded. As a result, if programs still struggling with technical, 

design, or production issues miss their launch dates, the consequences could be significant, as it may take many months to secure new dates. Some of DOD’s satellites 

are dual integrated, which means they can be launched on either type of EELV. The 

Air Force deserves credit for designing the satellites this way because it offers more 

flexibility in terms of launch vehicle usage, but there are also cost and schedule implications associated with rescheduling from one EELV type to the other. Moreover, 

DOD can request its launch provider to speed up the transition time between 

launches, although this would also increase costs. Nevertheless, Air Force officials 

stated that they were confident that the higher launch rates could be achieved, especially if a particular satellite’s priority increased. According to Air Force officials, 

they have already begun to implement means to address these issues. 

DOD IS TAKING ACTIONS TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROBLEMS

DOD has been working to ensure that its space programs are more executable and 

produce a better return on investment. Many of the actions it is taking address root 

causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are 

successful and they need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and support space activities. 

Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad scale, DOD 

starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding 

that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify 

and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Second, DOD has tended to 

start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time conVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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straints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition 

programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large amounts of 

time and money to fix. Moreover, there is no way to accurately estimate how long 

it would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and 

invention. Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements 

in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer 

but heavier, larger, and more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that gradually increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to maximize capability on individual satellites because it 

is expensive to launch. 

In addition, problematic implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, 

known as Total System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in 

problems on a number of programs because it was implemented in a manner that 

enabled requirements creep and poor contractor performance—the effects of which 

space programs are still addressing. We have also reported on shortfalls in resources 

for testing new technologies, which coupled with less expertise and fewer contractors available to lead development efforts, have magnified the challenge of developing complex and intricate space systems. 

Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial sector—has 

recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery 

from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified 

practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, 

technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit space programs. These practices are detailed in appendix 

I. 

DOD is implementing an array of actions to reform how weapons and space systems are acquired. For space in particular, DOD is working to ensure critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition programs begin; requirements 

are defined early in the process and are stable throughout; and that system design 

remains stable, according to the Director of Space and Intelligence under DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. DOD also 

intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus pursuing 

significant leaps in capabilities involving technology risk. The Director of Space and 

Intelligence also told us that DOD is revisiting the use of military standards in its 

acquisitions and providing more program and contractor oversight. The approach described to us by the Director of Space and Intelligence mirrors best practices identified in our reports. Moreover, some actions—described in the table below—have already been taken to ensure acquisitions are more knowledge-based. 

34 

4Pub. L. No. 111–23, 123 Stat. 1704 (2009). 

5Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 

2010). 

Congress has also acted on a broader scale through the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act, which was signed into law on May 22, 2009.4 The goal of this new 

statute is to improve acquisition outcomes in DOD, with specific emphasis on major 

defense acquisition programs (MDAP) and major automated information systems. 

According to the President of the United States this legislation is designed to limit 

cost overruns before they spiral out of control and will strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing officials who will be charged with closely monitoring the 

weapons systems being purchased to ensure that costs are controlled. DOD states 

in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 5 that the law also will substantially improve the oversight of major weapons acquisition programs, while helping to put 

MDAPs on a sound footing from the outset by addressing program shortcomings in 

the early phases of the acquisition process. DOD also states that it is undertaking 

a far-reaching set of reforms to achieve these goals and to improve how DOD acquires and fields critical capabilities for current and future wars and conflicts. 

ADDITIONAL DECISIONS ON LEADERSHIP, ORGANIZATION, AND SUPPORT ARE STILL

NEEDED

The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense have been 

taking to address acquisition problems are good steps. However, there are still more 

significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed to ensure that reforms 

can take hold. Recent studies and reviews examining the leadership, organization, 

and management of national security space have all found that there is no single 

authority responsible below the President and that authorities and responsibilities 

are spread across the department. In fact, the national security space enterprise 

comprises a wide range of government and nongovernment organizations responsible for providing and operating space-based capabilities serving both military and 

intelligence needs. 


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35 

6 Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and 

Management of National Security Space (Alexandria, VA, July 2008). 7 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture (Washington, DC, October 2008). 8Department of Defense, Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space 

Management and Organization (Washington, DC, Jan. 11, 2001). 9GAO, Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program 

Pose Management and Oversight Challenges, GAO–08–1039 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008). 

In 2008, for example, a congressionally chartered commission (known as the Allard Commission) 6 reported that responsibilities for military space and intelligence 

programs were scattered across the staffs of DOD organizations and the intelligence 

community and that it appeared that ‘‘no one is in charge’’ of national security 

space. The same year, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reported similar concerns, focusing specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions that would involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary 

of Defense.7 Prior studies, including those conducted by the Defense Science Board 

and the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission),8 have identified similar problems, both for space as 

a whole and for specific programs. While these studies have made recommendations 

for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no major changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years. In fact, an executive agent position 

within the Air Force that was designated in 2001 in response to a Space Commission recommendation to provide leadership has not been filled since the last executive resigned in 2007. 

Diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition process, primarily 

because it makes it difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for 

balancing needs against wants, for resolving conflicts among the many organizations 

involved with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need 

to be dedicated. Many of the cost and schedule problems we identified for the GPS 

IIF program, for instance, were tied in part to diffuse leadership and organizational 

stovepipes, particularly with respect to DOD’s ability to coordinate delivery of space, 

ground, and user assets. In fact, DOD is now facing a situation where satellites with 

advances in capability will be residing for years in space without users being able 

to take full advantage of them because investments and planning for ground, user, 

and space components were not well-coordinated. 

Congressional and DOD studies have also called for changes in the national security space organizational structure to remove cultural barriers to coordinating development efforts and to better incorporate analytical and technical support from an 

organization that is augmented with military and intelligence community expertise. 

Finally, studies have identified insufficient numbers of experienced space acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of personnel in project management positions as problems needing to be addressed in the space community. Our own studies 

have identified gaps in key technical positions, which we believed increased acquisition risks. For instance, in a 2008 review of the EELV program, we found that personnel shortages at the EELV program office occurred particularly in highly specialized areas, such as avionics and launch vehicle groups.9 These engineers work on 

issues such as reviewing components responsible for navigation and control of the 

rocket. Moreover, only half the government jobs in some key areas were projected 

to be filled. These and other shortages in the EELV program office heightened concerns about DOD’s ability to effectively manage the program using a contracting 

strategy for EELV that required greater government attention to the contractor’s 

technical, cost, and schedule performance information. In a recent discussion with 

GAO, the Director of Space and Intelligence under DOD’s Office of the Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics stated that the primary obstacle 

to implementing reforms in space is the lack of ‘‘bench strength,’’ primarily technical 

and systems engineering expertise. 

Concluding Remarks 

In conclusion, DOD space is at a critical juncture. After more than a decade of 

acquisition difficulties, which have created potential gaps in capability, diminished 

DOD’s ability to invest in new space systems, and lessened DOD’s credibility to deliver high-performing systems within budget and on time, DOD is finally positioned 

to launch new generations of satellites that promise vast enhancements in capability. Moreover, recent program cancellations have alleviated competition for funding and may have allowed DOD to focus on fixing problems and implementing reforms rather than taking on new, complex, and potentially higher-risk efforts. But 

these changes raise new questions. Specifically, when can investments in new proVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
36 

grams be made? How can reforms really take hold when leadership is diffuse? How 

can reforms take hold when there are still organizational barriers that prevent effective coordination? Lastly, how can acquisitions be successful if the right technical 

and programmatic expertise is not in place? Clearly, there are many challenges 

ahead for space. We look forward to working with the DOD to help ensure that 

these and other questions are addressed. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina Chaplain at 

(202) 512–4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Pubic Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Greg Campbell; Rich Horiuchi; Alyssa Weir; and Peter Zwanzig. 

APPENDIX II: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of individual space programs, 

common problems affecting space system acquisitions, and DOD’s acquisition policies. We relied on our best practices studies, which comment on the persistent problems affecting space acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to address these 

problems, and what remains to be done, as well as Air Force documents addressing 

these problems and actions. We also relied on work performed in support of our annual weapons system assessments, and analyzed DOD funding estimates to assess 

cost increases and investment trends for selected major space acquisition programs. 

The GAO work used in preparing this statement was conducted in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 


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Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

This really goes to Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and Admiral 

Dorsett. In 2001, the Space Commission, established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, to review 

the management and organization of space, concluded that a number of ‘‘disparate space activities should be promptly merged, 

chains of commands adjusted, lines of communication opened, and 

policies modified to achieve greater responsibility and accountability.’’ 

Here we are, 9 years later. Has the situation changed since the 

Commission made this finding? If so, is it better or is it worse? 

I guess we start first with you, Secretary Payton. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. A lot has changed since 2000 and 2001: establishment of the Director for National Intelligence (DNI) and the 

assignment of the NRO to that Director; the acquisition rules that 

were established as a result of that 2001 legislation have been 

changed again, and now space programs are back under the standard, routine acquisition policies that the rest of the Pentagon 

abides by. 

There has been a myriad of changes since that 2001 era. Recognizing that, Secretary Donley, back in December, asked Mr. Rich 

McKinney, an experienced Air Force employee, to look at how Air 

Force Headquarters should be organized, in light of all these 

changes since 2001. The results of Mr. McKinney’s analysis will go 

to Secretary Donley in late March, early April. Mr. McKinney has 

surveyed 56 people, to include Congress and the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force, all across the country. So, he has collected a wealth of 

data and is distilling that into some recommendations for Secretary 

Donley to consider. 

We are responding to all the changes that have occurred since 

2000 and 2001, and Secretary Donley will have that to digest here, 

within a few weeks. 

Some of the potential suggestions do include help from Congress, 

and so, we will be fully open and transparent with Congress if we 

decide to move down certain paths. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler? 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would offer that, in the management of 

space activities, there are two major and complementary segments 

that we have to look at. One is the operational segment, and the 

other is the acquisition segment. 

For operations, I would say, unequivocally, we are far better 

today than we were in 2001. It is clear who is in charge of our 

space operations, and that begins with the President giving the 

mission responsibilities to the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) whose predecessors have established the functional component for space. It’s a joint activity, where we have now 

pulled together the operational pieces of what used to be a fragmented activity. I think that now 6, 7, or more years of combat experience have helped hone how we do space operations. My take on 

this is that, in the operational side of this equation, we have made 

great strides, and we are far better for it today. 

On the acquisitions side, I think I would give us a mixed review. 

In my own command, for example, AFSPC, as a result of that committee’s work in 2001, I now have a hybrid major command in the 

38 

Air Force. I have a command that has responsibility to organize, 

train, and equip space forces to give to General Chilton at 

STRATCOM, but I also have an acquisition arm inside AFSPC; I’m 

the only one of the Air Force major commands like that. That was 

done specifically so we could pull operations and acquisition and requirements, from a four-star perspective, all together, and to make 

clear where the accountability and authorities were in all of that. 

So, in that regard, I think that we have also come a long way inside the Air Force. 

The question now is, in light of the changes that Secretary 

Payton mentioned, whether we are where we need to be. I think 

that’s where this review that Secretary Donley has begun is good 

and it’s timely. We’ll look forward to discussing this with the Secretary as we go forward. 

Certainly, there are some places where we still have work to do 

in the management area. The question is, in light of the changes 

that occurred since 2001, how best to go forward. We are participating in that study. It’s focused inside the Air Force, but, of 

course, it has implications for other things, as well, and we’re looking forward to that being completed. 

Senator BEN NELSON. How would that relate to policy? I understand operations. I understand acquisition. But, what about policy, 

to make sure that the overall picture is complete and all the pieces 

are in place, or what it takes to put all the pieces in place? Somebody has to truly be in charge to make all those decisions and see 

how each and every one of these pieces fits together to make the 

picture. What would you say to that? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir, I would offer, that is part of the charter 

that Secretary Donley laid out for this comparatively short study. 

How we relate to the rest of the Pentagon, to OSD, and how we 

relate to the other Services is part of the scope of that study. 

Senator BEN NELSON. All right. 

Admiral Dorsett? 

Admiral DORSETT. Mr. Chairman, I agree with General Kehler, 

that, on the operations side, there is great progress and improvement that’s been made, in terms of operational management and 

oversight of space activities. But, I also share, I think, your concern 

that it’s not just policy, it’s not just acquisition, but it’s the resources and how they are managed across DOD. While I’m probably a little bit out of my lane here, from my vantage point, there 

are a fair number of different players, with different roles and responsibilities across OSD, and it is not as clear to me that this is, 

perhaps, necessarily, the perfect organizational alignment. Whether it’s within the secretariat of OSD itself or whether it’s within the 

Joint Staff, there are different players and different organizations 

that have responsibilities, and it could probably be tuned up a bit. 

In terms of the Navy, I do want to bring to your attention, within 

the last year, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Gary 

Roughead, made a couple of significant changes that have streamlined the Navy’s focus on space and its management of space. 

In my office, the Deputy CNO for Information Dominance has assigned one individual responsibility for space. We had multiple flag 

officers on the Navy staff, previously, that had responsibility for 

space. 

39 

In the fleet, he stood up the 10th fleet. The commander of the 

10th fleet, a three-star admiral, is now the one individual who’s responsible for space, operationally, for the Navy. In the secretariat, 

my compatriot, Dr. Federici, has that responsibility. So, we’ve 

streamlined our organizational alignment, and we’re already seeing 

the benefits of that in the dialogue. 

We have some actions to take to actually make some additional 

progress. But, the alignment, organizationally, I think, has been 

very positive for us. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for your testimony and service. 

I apologize I was late because of other meetings. 

General Kehler and Mr. Payton, I want to focus on space and the 

potential impacts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) budget changes to what you do. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) certainly assures our access to 

space, has a remarkable success record, and is a real workhorse. 

But, as we all know, assured access to space is not cheap, and the 

cost is trending up. In that context, I want to understand what you 

think of the decisions, just announced with regard to NASA, to retire the Shuttle very quickly and, even more significantly, cancel 

the Constellation program. How will that affect future launch costs 

that you deal with? If you all could offer your thoughts on that. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. In fact, on February 1st, I called a dear 

friend of mine, Bill Gerstenmaier, over in NASA headquarters, and 

he was very open to work with the Air Force and the entire DOD 

as NASA puts together their plan for the future. 

Clearly, we share an industrial base with NASA. We share an industry workforce with NASA. That industrial base is, in many 

places, not healthy. Concentrating more flights per year in the 

EELV program would possibly help us in acquiring the components 

of a launch vehicle. But, we have to be very careful and understand 

and manage that relationship very closely, because it would not be 

beneficial for either organization to have a unique EELV for NASA 

applications and a unique EELV for DOD applications. That would 

aid neither agency. 

If EELV does become part of NASA’s future, either through government flights or commercial flights, we would have to watch very 

closely any design changes, as well as any production line changes 

of that sort of detail, and work very closely with NASA to understand and make sure we both end up with a better product. 

Senator VITTER. Let me back up, because I was really focused on 

something a little different. 

Mr. PAYTON. Okay. 

Senator VITTER. Maybe the more direct way to ask my question 

is this. This administration wants to cancel the Constellation program. Does that have an impact on you all, and, if so, what is it? 

Mr. PAYTON. Tomorrow, I have a session with several NASA 

folks, and NRO folks, to understand their immediate and longerterm future for the cancellation of Constellation and so that we can 

learn what the ramifications and the ripple effect could be. But, 

40 

again, that’s a relationship we intend to manage and understand 

very closely, and NASA has been very cooperative with us. 

Senator VITTER. General? 

General KEHLER. Sir, in looking at the NASA decision, first of 

all, we were asked, by the Augustine panel, to provide some input 

prior to the decisions, which we did. In that assessment that we 

provided before the decisions were made, we listed almost two columns. Column one was a set of what we saw as opportunities. As 

you look at the NASA decision today, the investment that is 

planned there, in terms of research and development for a new liquid engine, is a good opportunity that we would like to collaborate 

with them on. We see that as a good opportunity for the country, 

going forward. We see their desire to improve the launch infrastructure—especially on the east coast, related to the Kennedy 

Space Center, where we and the Air Force join at Cape Canaveral 

Air Force Station—as a benefit. 

We also see an opportunity, here, with the increased demand on 

commercial activities. We have said for a very long time, that part 

of our ‘‘assured access to space’’ plan includes commercial launch 

vendors that are viable. This pulling on commercial, we also think 

is a positive thing. 

There is a challenge, here, regarding solid rocket motors, and 

that’s the most immediate challenge that we see. The largest demand today, on the solid rocket motor industrial base, comes from 

NASA, although DOD, the Air Force, and the Navy, as well, rely 

on that same industrial base for both the land-based and the seabased strategic deterrent, for other launch-vehicle solid-rocket 

strap-ons, for example, that we need for EELV and other things. 

Part of the review that’s now going on, that Mr. Payton is heading, 

is, in fact, drilling down into that area of concern that we have, to 

find out whether that’s a real concern, or whether it is not. I can’t 

give you the details of that today, because what we recommended 

prior to the decision was, if this is the decision that’s made, we will 

then have to go off and sit down and take a hard look at what the 

implications will be for the industrial base. That is where we stand 

today. 

We don’t have answers yet. What we do have is a potential concern. Perhaps it will turn out not to be a concern, but we don’t 

know that yet. 

Senator VITTER. Let me explore that a little bit, because I don’t 

understand how it wouldn’t be a concern, at the end of the day. As 

I understand it, for solid-rockets, there’s a set industrial base. The 

majority of support comes from NASA. The minority of support 

comes from DOD. If that majority support from NASA goes away, 

and you still need to have and depend on that industrial base, I 

assume your costs go way up, absent some other help or some other 

factor. Am I missing something? 

Mr. PAYTON. I don’t know, and that’s the issue. That would be 

an obvious concern, but I don’t have facts that say that is, in fact, 

what will happen. I don’t know what will happen. I think that we 

need to pursue the course that we are on here, which is, we have 

people off studying this, working with NASA, working with the rest 

of the partners that we have, to make sure that we understand it. 

41 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Some initial estimates are that the booster cost, because of what I’m describing, could go up as much as 100 

percent. Is that within the realm of possibility, based on what you 

know now? 

Mr. PAYTON. The information we’ve seen is that the propulsion 

systems for our EELVs might double in price, not the whole launch 

vehicle, but the propulsion which is both solid propellant and liquid 

propellant rocket engines. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. So, in fact, your admittedly early estimates would confirm a 100 percent figure for that category. 

Mr. PAYTON. For that specific part of the EELV equation. We’re 

also looking at different ways to buy EELVs. That could perhaps 

save costs. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Mr. PAYTON. There’s a wealth of studies that we’re doing right 

now to look at what an EELV should cost; a should-cost study. 

Senator VITTER. That look includes this block-buy approach? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

If I can switch gears, quickly—and you may have covered this already, to some extent; I apologize, if you did. There is concern 

about not having a designated executive agent for space or Space 

Posture Review (SPR), even as we make major investments—nearly $11 billion in fiscal year 2011. Who, within DOD, is ultimately 

responsible for developing and coordinating that sort of departmentwide space strategy? 

Mr. PAYTON. The SPR was conducted with all elements of the 

Department. It was led by the OSD that handles policy for the 

SPR. 

Senator VITTER. So, the entity responsible for leading it is that 

office? 

Mr. PAYTON. For the SPR, yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. When will the Secretary designate an executive 

agent for space? 

Mr. PAYTON. Secretary Donley has asked Rich McKinney, a very 

experienced Air Force individual, to look at how the Air Force 

should be organized, in light of many changes that have occurred 

in the past decade, relative to the authorities and responsibilities 

of the executive agent for space. Mr. McKinney’s report, again, will 

be delivered to Secretary Donley in late March. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Compared to that timing, what’s the current status of the SPR? 

Mr. PAYTON. There will be an interim report that comes to Congress that, I understand, has been signed by the DOD representative, as of today. Then the Office of the DNI also has to sign that 

interim report, and then it can come over to Congress. 

Senator VITTER. Will that final version be done in time to inform 

the fiscal year 2012 budget within the Department? 

Mr. PAYTON. The interim report clearly will be. The final summation of the SPR will not be available until after the White House 

finishes a national space policy update. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

42 

Ms. Chaplain, your testimony ties diffuse leadership to acquisition problems. What, exactly, do you mean by ‘‘diffuse leadership,’’ 

and how do you think it’s affecting programs? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. In some of the programs we review, it becomes 

unclear if there’s a real person in charge or a single point of authority to resolve conflicts and gaps in coordinating assets. 

When we looked at the GPS program, for example, we found disconnects between the ground segment, the space segment, and the 

user terminal. Sometimes these gaps added up to years. So, our 

question is, who is the person in charge to resolve these gaps and 

make sure resources are dedicated to where they need to be? We 

never really found that single point of accountability. We’re looking 

at SSA now, and some of those questions come up again, like, who’s 

really the point person for SSA? It’s so broad, and it covers so 

many organizations. 

That is just what tends to happen in space, because there are so 

many players. Even outside of DOD, there’s an Intelligence Community, there’s NASA, there’s the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—any number of players involved in 

any one project. Who’s the one that brings it all together and has 

a strong say in what’s going on in these programs? 

I think it’s echoed, in a large sense, in some of these studies that 

have been done per various congressional mandates. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, if I could just hit one final topic, which is the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS). 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. 

Senator VITTER. If I can turn to the Air Force leadership. Did the 

Air Force help initiate the decision to divorce NPOESS? What was 

your input into the process that led to that decision? 

Mr. PAYTON. The Air Force participated, along with the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and NOAA and NASA and 

the National Security Council (NSC), to put together the White 

House decision on NPOESS. 

Senator VITTER. What was that input? Was the route that was 

taken—did it, in part, come from you, or was it enforced on the Air 

Force? 

Mr. PAYTON. It was a decision that OSTP made and the NSC 

made, but with multiple inputs from the Air Force on alternative 

future programs. If the programs stayed together, what would the 

future look like? So, our job was to offer technical advice and 

warfighter needs, and to offer the potential ramifications of certain 

decision paths. 

Senator VITTER. Did the Air Force have a fundamental opinion 

whether its interests would best be served with a divorce, or not? 

Mr. PAYTON. We deferred that to the NSC. 

Senator VITTER. What steps are being taken to ensure that Defense recoups the technologies it has already funded? 

Mr. PAYTON. In fact, the OSTP and the NSC sent all the participants a letter defining the near-term immediate steps. We helped 

put that letter together, and it includes harvesting the sensor technologies and gaining access to all the intellectual property that is 

necessary for future designs. So, we will have access to all of that. 

43 

Our initial step, though, is to work with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS) and do a military user requirements scrub to determine what 

the best requirements are for the warfighter that the Air Force 

would then design into a successor spacecraft for our part of the 

weather picture that we are responsible for, which is one of the 

three orbits; the Air Force will field the systems necessary to satisfy one of the three orbits that everybody needs. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Final question, jumping back to NASA-related issues. Obviously, 

canceling the recommendation, which is not law yet, of canceling 

Constellation is a major departure from the past. Was the Air 

Force explicitly asked the impact on you of canceling Constellation 

before the decision was made? 

Mr. PAYTON. No, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General KEHLER. Sir, may I clarify—on the executive agent question that you asked, just one other point? 

Senator VITTER. Sure. 

General KEHLER. I sensed, in the question, that maybe there is 

a view that there is not an executive agent today. That is not so. 

The directive that implemented the Space Commission’s recommendation about an executive agent says that the Secretary of 

the Air Force will be the executive agent. Then the Secretary can 

delegate that to the Under Secretary. Without an Under Secretary, 

we haven’t delegated that authority anywhere, but the Secretary 

himself is still the executive agent for space for DOD. 

He has three primary responsibilities in that job: plan, program, 

and acquire. Space policy has always been under the purview of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Just for clarification. 

Senator VITTER. General, my reaction to that would be, you can 

have a piece of paper that says the President of the United States 

is the executive agent, but that obviously wouldn’t be meaningful, 

given his other responsibilities. Admittedly, to a lesser extent, my 

response to that would be, it’s the same problem with the Secretary 

of the Air Force. Do you have a response to that? 

General KEHLER. No, sir. I understand exactly what you’re saying. I thought that what you were saying was that there was not 

an executive agent. Technically, there is. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

Ms. Chaplain, last year the GAO issued a report that resulted in 

some significant and very negative press coverage about the health 

and reliability of the GPS system. Could you update us on the 

GAO’s assessment, now, of the GPS system? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes. We’re currently conducting a follow-on review. The two programs we looked at, on the satellite side last 

year, were the IIF program and the IIIA program. The IIF program 

has made some progress, and it’s getting ready for a launch fairly 

soon. 

The IIIA program is meeting its schedule currently. We still have 

concerns about the compressed nature of the schedule, and all of 

the very difficult activities ahead for GPS IIIA, but it is not encountering any severe problems at this point. 

44 

When we look at the health of the constellation, our findings are 

pretty similar to last year’s. One thing we weren’t discussing in 

last year’s report, that should probably brought out more when we 

talk about it this year, is some of the options the Air Force has 

available to it to manage GPS if they experience some dips in the 

constellation availability. There are options that they have to get 

through those periods. 

Our concern is, you don’t want to find yourself in a state where 

you’re looking at those kinds of options; you want to make sure you 

do everything you can to keep the program healthy, resourced, and 

on track. 

Senator BEN NELSON. One of the key impacts to the Air Force 

looks to be the EELV upper-stage engine. The infrastructure cost 

may double, as we understand it, for the Air Force, because NASA 

has stopped buying these engines. Dr. Payton, General Kehler, 

could you enlighten us on this? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, Senator. That’s part of the propulsion doubling 

end cost that we have seen. We haven’t experienced it yet. It has 

been predicted. It’s both the upper-stage engine, called an RL–10, 

and the first-stage engine, called and RS–68, on one of the EELVs. 

The company that makes those two rocket engines has shrunk its 

overhead, facility-wise, by 50 percent in the past few years, but 

with the drawdown of the Space Shuttle main engine, which that 

company also works on; and the cancellation of a rocket engine 

called the J2X, which is part of the Ares launch vehicle. If that 

does come about, even though they’ve already reduced their overhead dramatically in the past few years, they will still have more 

overhead, more facility space than they need to produce the firststage engine and the second-stage engine. That’s, again, part of the 

industrial-base ramifications that we have to manage very tightly. 

Additionally, the flight rates for the EELVs have not materialized, due to a drawdown in commercial launch sales. That has been 

part of the problem, too; just not enough rocket engines being built 

compared to what the original plans were. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That puts us at a disadvantage of some 

sort. Is it just economic, or is it the potential of not being able to 

have parts or replacement or anything that would relate to continuity? 

Mr. PAYTON. The first word out of my mouth, when I talk to either the Air Force folks or the industry folks, when it comes to 

launch, is reliability. We cannot afford a failure in a launch. So, we 

will not do anything that sacrifices reliability. We have, again, six 

studies ongoing right now, all the way from mission assurance to 

detailed should-cost studies, to look at how much manpower the industry is charging to the EELV program. So, we have a series of 

six studies going on right now to look at how we can maintain the 

mission assurance, maintain the reliability, and reduce these costs 

that we’re seeing on the horizon. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Payton, the Air Force 

reconfigures and uses excess strategic assets for space launch. I understand there may be some issues arising, from a competition perspective, with regard to the use of these assets. Is there a way to 

save money, with respect to the assets, and avoid destruction costs? 

Does the Air Force have a view on this? 

45 

Mr. PAYTON. These rockets, that use excess Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) stages, are called Minotaurs. There are four 

different sizes of Minotaur. Every time we use one, we get Secretary of Defense approval to do that, for that very reason. But, 

these launchers launch satellites that are much smaller than what 

EELV rockets can launch. So, it’s a different class, a different, almost, market space, a different market for these class of launchers, 

compared to EELVs. 

Senator BEN NELSON. All right. 

Ms. Chaplain, you mentioned in your testimony that one of the 

problems facing DOD in the future is a lack of adequate engineers 

and technicians with space experience. Is this a problem not only 

with DOD, but is it also just a general problem in the industry, as 

a whole? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Yes, I think it is a general problem. The one thing 

to note is that NASA has some special flexibilities, in terms of hiring people and retaining them and recruiting them, that the DOD 

may not have on the space side, but, generally, in aerospace, I 

think there’s an increasing shortage in key technical expertise, that 

everybody is dealing with. 

Senator BEN NELSON. From the standpoint of the Air Force—and 

perhaps from the Navy, as well—Secretary Payton and Dr. 

Federici, could you give us some idea of your experience in being 

able to field technically competent engineers? While we may have 

it under control at the moment, or getting it under control, what 

does the future hold? 

Dr. FEDERICI. Within the Navy, we have the Naval Research Lab 

(NRL), and they have been in the space engineering, space science 

and technology, for well over 50 years. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Does that mean you’re growing your own, 

in effect? 

Dr. FEDERICI. We use the NRL as pretty much a pipeline to grow 

engineers on the civilian side. We also have a military cadre there, 

as well, that augments it. 

We also have a very strong Navy element at the NRO, and we 

have had that element for a long time. I believe we have about 240- 

plus people out there, all participating in acquisition programs. We 

also hold leadership positions out there. Admiral Liz Young is the 

systems engineer for the NRO. We also have Andrew Cox, who 

runs their Communications Directorate. Those are the key areas 

where we try to grow our people, and especially the people in the 

NRO—mostly military—and a civilian segment, as well. We try to 

take the military and try to move them back to the fleet, when we 

can, bring them back into space, as well, so that we always are 

bringing the fleet views of space support within this technology 

arm of the National Security Space Office. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Payton? 

Mr. PAYTON. The Air Force has something called an Acquisition 

Improvement Program for not just space, but across the board—air 

and space and cyber. Part of that is hiring 900 new acquisition personnel for space itself. We’ve already brought on over 50 of those 

900. That 900 will spread over the course of a few years. So, that’s 

on one end of the spectrum, where we’re attracting into Air Force 

46 

space folks who are already skilled in space acquisition engineering. 

On the other end of the spectrum, there are brand new lieutenants. The Air Force Academy has a superb astrodynamics department, where the cadets actually design, build, and fly satellites. So, 

we’re working the problem on both ends of the career spectrum. 

General KEHLER. Since the Space and Missile Systems Center 

(SMSC) is in AFSPC—over the last year, or a little bit more now, 

we have seen a sharp increase in the number of young people coming out of college who are interested in coming to work at SMC, 

to the tune of almost 300. Now, there are reasons for why they are 

there. It has to do with the economy and some other issues, of 

course. But, nevertheless, that’s about 300 young people that we 

would not have had otherwise. We believe that—given the nature 

of the work that they will do there, and the fact that many of them 

were interested in interning with us before they actually came to 

work for us, we think that we will retain a sufficient number of 

them, or a high percentage of them. That’s good news for us, and 

that’s one of the brightest spots that we’ve had in a number of 

years. So, that piece is good. 

I think the experience level of our program managers is going up. 

We have committed to keeping some of our program managers in 

place longer, for example, than we had in the past, and I think 

that’s paying some dividends, as well. So, working through this Acquisition Improvement Program, I think that we have seen some 

strides here. The question is whether we can sustain that. When 

the Air Force presence at the NRO, as well, which has been a very 

large presence over the years—we also see more experience there, 

and, in fact, some additional program management opportunities 

and other things out at the NRO, as well. 

The two places where we procure most of the Nation’s national 

security space devices—AFSPC and the NRO—have seen some improvements over the last year or 2. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Secretary, over 80 percent of the satellite communications in Iraq and Afghanistan are handled by commercial satellites, and most of this capacity is purchased on an annual basis and funded through the supplemental or contingency operations funding. In your view, should there be a more strategic approach to buying commercial communications? What’s the right 

mix of commercial and military capacity? 

Perhaps, General Kehler, I would begin with you. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, there should be a more strategic view about how to go forward. There is no question that satellite communications is one of those places where we rely very 

heavily on what commercial can provide; and, as you say, we essentially buy it by the pound. 

As we look to the future, of course, we have tended to provide 

the very high-end protected communications. The Navy does UHF 

for tactical and operational purposes; we’ve now been launching the 

wideband global service satellite. But, we still see room in the future for commercial, and one of the issues that has been taken on 

in the SPR is, what that mixture should look like as we go forward. 

At the same time, we are also looking at what the architecture 

should be, with the cancellation of the Transformational Satellite 

47 

System. What does that mean for the future of protected satellite 

communications and this mixture? We are back looking, again, to 

revalidate our requirements, so that we can understand what that 

mixture should be as we look at the future. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. Thank you. I think that will suffice 

there. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Panelists, thanks for taking time to join us today. 

Welcome, General Kehler. I know you took the medium-length 

journey from Colorado to join us today; and I understand that you, 

in part, came to be a part of the wonderful ceremony we had in 

Emancipation Hall, with the WASP pilots. It was moving and inspirational. 

My mother was a pilot. She was inspired to become a pilot both 

by the example of Amelia Earhart and the WASPs. I remember, 

fondly, her throwing three or four of her children, including me, 

into the airplane, and off we went, in Arizona. 

I’m reminded, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter, when 

we want to come together, it seems to be the American women that 

bring us together. It was very, very inspirational to be there today. 

Let me, if I might—and, Secretary Payton, turn to you, as well— 

to talk about NPOESS. I now understand we’re calling it the Joint 

Polar Satellite System, and that seems to be an important step, as 

we move to reconfigure what we do, rename it, as well. I’ve 

watched its progress, or lack thereof, in some cases, both in the 

House of Representatives and now in the Senate. The budget has 

ballooned, and the schedule was slipped. But, I was encouraged by 

the President’s decision to separate the acquisition responsibilities 

and move away from that tri-agency management structure that a 

lot of reviewers, independent and internal, said was, in part, why 

we had some troubles. 

I think we have the beginnings of a workable program. I’m going 

to continue to follow its progress and look to you all for leadership 

in the Air Force. I’ll give the Navy a pass for the time being. But, 

this is so important to have this continuity of weather and climate 

data. 

We haven’t heard a lot of detail about the direction that we’re 

going to take, so I’d appreciate if you’d share what you know of the 

timeline, the expected requirements for the morning orbit, and how 

you plan to determine them. In other words, will the legacy capabilities of the Defense Meteorological Satellites Program (DMSP) 

satellites be sufficient, or do you need capability along the lines of 

the NPOESS satellites? 

A lot of questions, but I’ll yield time to you all to share your 

thoughts. 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. Part of the stress and strain inside the 

NPOESS program was a desire for both Earth science climate data 

and operational weather observations to come off of the same platform. That’s difficult to do from an engineering perspective, as well 

as from a sensor resolution perspective. That’s a difficult design 

systems engineering task. That’s really why the program was delayed as long as it was. I think, fundamentally, that difference lies 

at the split of the program. For Earth sciences, that afternoon orbit 

48 

is the best orbit for observing for Earth sciences purposes. For military operational weather observations, the early morning orbit is 

the best orbit. So that logic played into that division of responsibilities. 

We are still going through the details of what sort of military requirements would be necessary for that morning orbit. The JCS are 

doing that for us. The good news is that we have a large workforce, 

both in industry and the government; operators and acquirers that 

are familiar with this mission area. We don’t have a learning curve 

with the people who are doing this, and so everything should be accelerated in that regard. 

Again, we’re going to confirm military requirements for the 

morning orbit and fold in any other Earth science requirements 

that may be satisfied in that orbit. But, predominantly, the requirements scrub will be followed by acquisition decisions about 

which sensors we need, on what size platform, and then we can do 

the appropriate budgeting for the fiscal year 2012 Future Years 

Defense Program. 

General KEHLER. Sir, I would just add, we have two DMSP satellites left, and so, we have a little bit of flexibility here. We are 

faced with decisions that we have to make, but we don’t have to 

make them today. We have to be deliberate about how we make 

those decisions. I think that’s what Secretary Payton is suggesting, 

that we are on a pathway to make some deliberate decisions here. 

Every review panel that looked at our acquisition programs over 

the last, maybe, 10 years that I’ve been paying really close attention to this in leadership positions has cautioned us against trying 

to do too much on any one given platform. I think that’s what Secretary Payton was just saying, as well; these are very difficult integration issues when it comes to that. 

At this point, the thinking is that we will still have a shared 

operational structure that will surround these various weather satellites, but that the acquisition will be placed in the right places 

for the right tasks. Now, it’s important for us to figure out what 

those ‘‘right tasks’’ are, to put in the acquisition houses that are 

best set up to do those, and make sure that we can do that in a 

timely way, harvesting the technologies that have already been 

paid for, essentially, through the development of the NPOESS program. 

We now have to go do our homework and make sure that we understand what best way to go forward here so that we’re not repeating any mistakes that have been laid out for us very capably 

and very painfully by a lot of the acquisition reviews. 

Senator UDALL. Can and should we continue to ask you some 

hard questions about all of this as you reconfigure and make these 

decisions? 

General KEHLER. Absolutely, sir, absolutely. [Laughter.] 

Yes, sir. 

Senator UDALL. I know I have the support of the chairman in 

that regard. 

If I might, Mr. Chairman—cut me off if my time expires—but I 

had two other questions. 

I’m excited about the restructuring of the National Security 

Space Institute (NSSI) and the construction that will begin to 

49 

house it and the Advanced Space Operations School at Peterson. 

I’m a homer in that regard, just like Senator Nelson is for his 

State. 

You talked, I know, in your testimony about the synergy between 

space and cyber, and I know that was a part of why the 24th was 

located under Space Command. I’d like you to expound a little bit 

more about those lessons and how you’re gaining from the 

synergies that are in front of us. 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. First let me offer that, again, almost 

9 years ago, when the Space Commission reported that we needed 

to do a better job preparing our space professionals, one of the outputs of that was to construct what is now known as the NSSI to 

do continuing education, if you will; postgraduate-level education 

for our space operations people, for our space acquisition people, for 

our space intelligence people, space weather people, and others who 

are all now part of that cadre of space professionals. It’s a joint activity; Navy folks come, Army folks, a handful of marines, et cetera. 

We have now taken that NSSI and its continuing education, and 

we’ve aligned that under the Air University, so that it’s going to 

get mature faster, we think, with a university structure over top 

of it. So far, it’s going well. We will, in fact, break ground on a new 

building for them here in the not-too-distant future. 

The second piece, though, is advanced operational training; and 

that we’ve aligned with the Air Force Warfare Center. That will be 

done in Colorado Springs, because that’s where the expertise is. 

But, this is advanced operational training that prepares our people 

to go forward, that prepares people for General James and his 

operational activities. I’d be willing certainly to listen to his comments on this, as well. 

I think we have that aligned the right way now. I think we have 

it aligned for our future. As I look over my shoulder at the young 

space professionals that are coming behind us, I think they are far 

better than we have ever seen before for a lot of reasons. These are 

some of those reasons. 

Regarding the Air Force’s decision to move out on the Secretary 

of Defense’s direction to prepare for cyberspace activities, yes, the 

Air Force has done a couple of important things. 

First is, we have decided that the major command responsibility 

for cyber will be in AFSPC. We think there’s a natural relationship 

there, engineeringwise, technologywise, and networkwise, where 

space is largely about networks. Cyber is largely about networks, 

and its operational business, in our view. So, putting it under a 

command like AFSPC made sense; standing up an operational organization—24th Air Force, which parallels General James’ 14th 

Air Force for Space. Second is, training the people, essentially paralleling the way we are training space people, I think, has us on 

the right track for the future. 

So, all those pieces together we did based upon many of the 

things that we have done for space and the success that we have 

seen in doing those. 

Senator UDALL. General James, do you care to comment? 

General JAMES. Yes, sir. On the training aspect, as General 

Kehler said, really, there are two key areas. Number one is looking 

at how you grow up a space professional, and how you get them 

50 

the depth that they need to execute the mission. I think over the 

last 10 years, as we’ve frankly been executing combat operations 

around the world, we’ve gained a lot of experience to know what 

do those space professionals have to know in order to support those 

combat operations around the globe. So, we’ve tailored our training 

to that. 

The second piece, as General Kehler mentioned, is the Air Warfare Center. We’ve really put into the curriculum there a lot more 

thinking about how you operate in an environment where space is 

absolutely essential, but it will be contested. We are also making 

sure our operators understand: How do we operate in those particular environments? What sort of experiments do we need to do 

at the Warfare Center so that all of this is relevant to the combat 

operation around the globe? 

We’re really ramping up quite quickly with the Air Warfare Center to understand all of those implications as we send people to Red 

Flags and the Warfare School and those sorts of things. We’re making a lot of progress in both of those areas. 

Senator UDALL. Congratulations. 

I see my time has expired. 

Mr. Chairman, I have another question. We can go another 

round, if that works for you. 

What I hear you saying is, you have outer space, you have inner 

space, and the two of them are definitely linked, and there are lessons that apply to both realms. 

Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

General Kehler and Secretary Payton, has there been a decision 

as to how the fiscal year 2010 NPOESS funds and the fiscal year 

2011 funds will be spent? I heard you say fiscal year 2012 is where 

you’re beginning to look, but what about 2010 and 2011? 

Mr. PAYTON. Senator, we would suggest continuing the industry 

work on the sensors and the spacecraft design and, of course, the 

continuing realtime operations and algorithm development that are 

going on, so that when the sensor information comes down, the 

computers on the ground can digest it. We need to continue that 

work for both NASA’s utility and the Air Force’s utility, because 

the sensors that the Air Force will need will probably be very similar to the sensors that are under construction right now. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler, do you have anything that 

you would like to add? 

General KEHLER. No, sir. In light of the decisions, some of it is 

still being worked out, and it’s being spent the way Secretary 

Payton says. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Dorsett and General Kehler, for 

years the committee has challenged the Department to pull together an integrated and funded satellite communications architecture. This follows up on the Afghan and Iraq question. To date, we 

really don’t have any architecture. Given the significant increase in 

the use of manned and unmanned air systems, as publicly discussed by Secretary Gates and Secretary Donley, does a strategic 

plan exist to address the associated significant increase in satellite 

communications support for these systems? Perhaps equally important, is that plan fully funded? 

51 

Admiral DORSETT. Mr. Chairman, I’m not aware that there’s a 

plan, nor am I aware that it’s fully funded. As I look at just the 

Navy’s portion of satellite-based communications, I would say that 

my observation is that there’s clearly a need for an integrated 

DOD-wide approach to space-based communications. 

As I discussed earlier about our MUOS challenges, we in the 

Navy have not even necessarily taken a completely integrated approach. The one thing that I can offer, though, is that our CNO 

focus on networks, on information, and on space, is at such a high 

pitch at this point that in our next budget deliberations, he’s putting great pressure on us to focus on the networks, the communications, the flow of information. So, we are basically ramping up our 

focus on this. 

Across the Department, I certainly would applaud a more integrated approach. The Navy has gone it alone, with the communications satellite systems and programs that we’ve managed previously, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Federici, I see you nodding approval. 

Dr. FEDERICI. I agree. To answer your question from my perspective, there is no integrated communications architect. A lot of architecture work is ongoing in different pockets of DOD and the 

NRO and elsewhere. 

A lot of these architecture studies though, in my view, are being 

done separate from the planning and programming and budgeting 

process. Somehow, we need to develop mechanisms and appropriate 

structures to bring those together, and there needs to be somebody 

that’s held accountable for this at a top level. That has not been 

done yet. 

Architecture work has been ongoing, but it’s more architecture on 

paper, and it doesn’t translate into budget and programs or impact 

programs. It doesn’t necessarily have to be a program in itself, but 

we really need to impact programs. It could turn to a policy, but 

we can’t have policies that are unfunded mandates. We need to 

make sure the policy, if it’s being derived from an architecture, is 

then linked to programs appropriately, and appropriately funded, 

as well. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler? 

General KEHLER. I couldn’t agree more. We have done a series 

of individual architectures over the years for space. What we have 

not done is an integrated communications architecture, which is 

really what needs to be done, which is an air, space, and terrestrial 

architecture that would really pull all the pieces together. Work is 

underway to do such an architecture. That’s a very difficult architecture to construct. 

I can tell you that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has looked 

at me recently and said—much like the CNO has looked at his 

staff—and he has said: ‘‘I want you to come back to me with a single air, space, and terrestrial Air Force network for one Air Force 

network that becomes part of the bigger architecture.’’ But, in 

terms of across the Department, this is something that we know 

is a missing link, and something that we need to go get after. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Payton, will that study that the 

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52 

ments to getting the architecture across the board for all the elements of air, terrestrial, and otherwise? 

Mr. PAYTON. Truthfully, the first step on air, terrestrial, and 

space communication requirements is being led by NII within 

OSD—NII and the Joint Chiefs—J–8. They’re putting together 

something called a bandwidth study that looks at the total requirements—air, space, and terrestrial. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In the process of doing that, that could be 

the group that puts it together, but ultimately, there has to be 

somebody that will have responsibility for it. Could we have that 

as a result of the Secretary’s study—if I understand what you’re 

explaining in Secretary Donley’s study? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You get both. I understand. You have to 

have the architecture, then you have to have somebody that’s responsible for the policy, of seeing it through? 

Mr. PAYTON. To execute the programs and deliver the architecture. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Execute it? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, sir. 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think there’s any lack of 

desire on the part of the Services or others to have such an architecture. This is really hard. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Even if we get somebody in place, it 

doesn’t mean it’s going to be a chip shot. Is that fair? 

General KEHLER. It depends on how you shoot, sir. [Laughter.] 

Senator BEN NELSON. Some days, it’s good golf. [Laughter.] 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Going back to the Air Force. Currently, 

there is no funding in the Air Force budget for a technology maturation line for overhead infrared capability. At the same time, the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has included in its budget funds for 

a new infrared satellite capability for missile tracking. The age-old 

question: Have the Air Force and the MDA coordinated on the requirements and technology for the program, to your knowledge? 

Mr. PAYTON. No, sir. When he first got on the job, General 

O’Reilly came to talk to the Air Force about his ideas about this 

program called the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS). We 

have to remember, though, that that program is for what they call 

midcourse tracking, where the rocket has already burned out and 

is now coasting through space. That is a different sort of infrared, 

different mission than overhead persistent infrared, which is looking for hot things, and globally. The PTSS will be more geographically constrained than what we can tolerate for the overhead persistent infrared sensor systems. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

Senator Udall, would you like to finish up with your questions? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just start out by thanking Dr. Federici and Admiral 

Dorsett for being here. 

The United States has been, is today, and will always need to be 

a maritime power, so my questions to the Air Force are not meant 

with any disrespect for the important roles that you play and the 

way in which you let us project force. 

53 

General Kehler, you noted that approximately $3 billion will 

transfer to AFSPC in fiscal year 2011 to grow cyberspace professionals and provide integrated cyberspace capabilities to Joint 

Force commanders. Could you outline how that $3 billion breaks 

down? 

General KEHLER. Yes, sir. It’s existing money, first of all. It 

transferred as we pulled together cyberpieces from around the Air 

Force. It’s not new money that we’ve put in the direction of cyber. 

So, first of all, it is largely to do those things that we have been 

doing for quite some time. Just as the Navy did, when they pulled 

together pieces of the Navy into their new organization, we pulled, 

largely, our communications and computer activities into my command and inside 24th Air Force. 

Much of what we are doing is continuing to provide those basic 

network communications, computer sorts of services that we had 

been doing in a scattered way throughout the Air Force, but now 

we’ve brought focus to all of that. 

The other thing that we are doing is, we’re revising our training 

activities to make sure that we are now building cyberprofessionals 

from the beginning who have certain academic prerequisites, who 

enter our training pipeline, who go through a deliberate preparation time, much like we do with pilots or space operations people. 

We are putting all of those pieces together inside air education and 

training command. 

We are also continuing to provide expeditionary cyberforces, combat communications people, who go forward—some of them are in 

Haiti, for example, still as we speak; others are forward deployed 

in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, et cetera. 

Then, of course, we are working on a new operations center, 

which will be part of 24th Air Force, which will be our Service component to the joint cyberspace organization—STRATCOM today. If 

and when we get to U.S. Cyber Command, 24th Air Force will be 

part of that. That $3 billion a year does everything from purchasing long-haul communications that we have to purchase—and, 

by the way, the demand continues to go up—through doing our 

normal communications functions—deployable air traffic control 

systems, all of the pieces that go with that—that we’ve inherited 

as part of the new cyberbusiness. 

Then, the new things that we’re doing to be able to do the primary responsibility, which we have for our service in cyber, which 

is protecting ourselves and making sure that these intrusions that 

go on, while we may not be able to prevent them all or stop them 

all, that they don’t impact our missions. So, our focus has become 

a mission-assurance-under-duress kind of a focus, so that we can 

continue to operate, even in the face of these intrusions that go on. 

Senator UDALL. Two comments on those points before I turn to 

General James for my last question. I would anticipate that, much 

like other areas of endeavor in the civilian arenas, that soon we 

will be competing—the military, that is—Federal Government—for 

personnel with those who have needs to protect their own assets 

in cyberspace, whether it be the banking system or our electricity 

grid and a number of other areas in which we see those sorts of 

threats. 

54 

I would also imagine that the ideal cyberprofessional would be an 

additional asset if they spoke Russian, Chinese, Hebrew, or French, 

given where some of the challenges are arising right now. 

General James, let me turn to you and talk a little bit about 

SSA. SSA is obviously crucial for keeping our assets safe. We’re relying more and more on commercial capabilities to satisfy our requirements. At the same time, those commercial providers, I understand, need to be given access to accurate SSA, as well. This was 

being done through the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) 

pilot program, I think, right? I understand that has been made permanent, transferred to STRATCOM. Can you update us on your efforts to make sure that we have the capacity to share that information between government and commercial satellite operators? 

General JAMES. Yes, sir. The folks that do that are out at the 

Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base, and 

that’s where all the data comes in from our worldwide sensors to 

make sure that we can track all the objects on orbit and then do, 

essentially, what we call conjunction assessments, which determine 

if one satellite is about to be hit by another piece of debris or another satellite. Over the last year, we’ve ramped up that capability. 

We were looking at about 110 satellites at the beginning of 2009, 

and now, at the end of 2009, we are really assessing over 1,100 

operational satellites to determine if there is going to be a possible 

collision between that particular satellite and another satellite or 

a piece of debris. 

We’ve ramped up our capability, and that’s primarily in support 

of what was the CFE program, now called SSA Sharing. So, we 

provide on the order of hundreds of assessments a week to various 

owner-operators around the globe to determine whether or not 

there is going to be a close approach. 

To date, over 50 satellites—owner-operators—have elected to maneuver their spacecraft, based on the data that we are providing 

to them. That’s commercial entities, that’s foreign entities—it really cuts across the gamut. That’s what we have implemented with 

this Space Situational Awareness Sharing program. 

We’re still in the middle of determining the level of accuracy of 

data we can provide, because there are certain capacities that we 

want to protect. But, that’s all ongoing, to determine how we do 

that. But, the owner-operators around the globe have been relying 

on our Joint Space Operations Center to get them that information, 

and it has worked very well over the last year. 

Senator UDALL. How much of that debris is from the Chinese 

weather bird that they unnecessarily destroyed? Was that over a 

year ago, now? 

General JAMES. It’s over 2 years ago. 

Senator UDALL. Is it 2 years ago? 

Mr. PAYTON. January 2007. 

Senator UDALL. I don’t mean to sound whimsical, but I know 

that was—in retrospect. 

General JAMES. The debris creation there was significant. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, please. 

General JAMES. I don’t remember the exact numbers, but several-percentage-point increase in the overall total of space debris in 

55 

the low Earth orbit area. So, yes, sir, we manage that quite closely, 

to make sure that none of that’s going to impact our systems. 

Senator UDALL. Maybe that was a lesson to the world, as unfortunate as maybe it was, that that’s not necessary in the future to 

show a capability. Hopefully, there are other ways to communicate 

with each other. 

General JAMES. Yes, sir. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler, the Air Force has increased the budget for SSA programs. Why is this important? What 

happens if this request isn’t fully supported? I’d like to know for 

the record how important this is so that we can consider that. 

General KEHLER. Sir, as General James just said, today we are 

tracking over 21,000 manmade objects in Earth orbit—debris, active pieces, or those that have outlived their usefulness or become 

dormant in some way. 

While there’s a great volume of space there in which they can 

move, they’re all traveling at a very high rate of speed, and as 

space becomes more congested, it’s even more important that we 

understand where these objects are and what they’re doing. First, 

we have a responsibility to help NASA understand for human 

spaceflight where this debris is and whether people are at risk. 

General James’ people draw an imaginary bubble, if you will, 

around the International Space Station and around the Shuttle and 

other human-occupied vehicles when they’re flying, to make sure 

that we can be very precise about what potential threats may be, 

because even relatively small objects traveling at those speeds— 

spacecraft, typically, are fairly fragile devices so, it’s important that 

we understand where these objects are. First, for safety of flight. 

Second, to preserve capability and investment. This an issue not 

only for national security purposes, but for economic purposes, as 

well. Where we saw the unintended collision between the Iridium 

satellite and the dead Russian Cosmos satellite, we caught a 

glimpse of what can happen here if space becomes more congested 

and we’re not able to keep pace. 

Much of the SSA investment is to move us from just being able 

to maintain a catalog to this term that we use, called situational 

awareness, which is a dynamic understanding of what is actually 

happening. Because the final reason that we need to make sure 

that we understand what’s happening on orbit is so that we detect, 

if you will, acts that would be malicious in some way, whether they 

would be done as part of a conflict in the future or whether they 

would be done as part of an unintended consequences, even from 

a maneuver that might go on. 

With our investment, with the importance of what we do there, 

with the way not only our warfighters but our economy and others 

rely on what comes from space, it’s very, very important for us to 

have a better and better and better awareness of what is happening in space. 

Sir, I would add one more point. That also extends to cyberspace, 

because there is a relationship between cyberspace and space, and 

our situational awareness in cyberspace needs to improve, as well. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Federici, the Navy’s recent report on 

UHF augmentation is a shift from the previous approaches, and inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
56 

cludes a revisit of commercial UHF options. This committee has 

supported a more aggressive approach to mitigation so this is a 

welcome development. What implications, if any, will this decision 

have for the Navy’s fiscal year 2011 budget? When will you be able 

to provide details of the commercial options? 

Dr. FEDERICI. We have looked at several options in the past. 

We’re going to revisit those options. We’re going to look at some 

other offerings in the next few weeks. I believe we’ll want to begin 

something soon. We’ll need to be working with your staffs, in coordinating some of our thoughts. We really have to work with Admiral Dorsett’s staff as well on any funding in fiscal year 2011 that 

may be needed once the bill is passed. So, that’s something we’ll 

need to work with your staffs on as well. 

But, it is an option that we have on the table now. We’re going 

to press forward. We need to take a look at what those options all 

are. We need to do the best business-case analysis that’s available, 

but we need to do it quickly; we need to get something underway. 

We have identified, as the report mentions, a number of mitigation options, but, when you take all the options together, they don’t 

really give you a full capability of a single UHF. We really want 

to now explore that option. It could be a hosted payload, leased, or 

it could be a purchase. We want to take a look at that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Dorsett, from an operational perspective, what are your major concerns about not having adequate 

UHF capability and plans to develop mitigation and augmentation 

capacity? If you didn’t have it, what does that do to your operations? 

Admiral DORSETT. First of all, the approach that we are taking 

now, by looking at a commercially hosted payload, is the right approach. It reduces the risk that we otherwise would have. Last 

year, we made a decision that we could afford more risk, with the 

additional delay on the MUOS. We made a decision that we no 

longer could afford that risk. 

It does come down to an issue of risk and how much capability 

you’re going to be able to provide to the warfighters. We’re looking 

at this from a joint perspective, since we’re providing this UHF capability across DOD. We’re at the point right now where we need 

to do additional mitigations. 

I think today we’re okay, but if there were to be any other delay 

in MUOS, or any delays in the entire MUOS constellation, we’d be 

placing the Joint Force at a level of risk that, frankly, would not 

be appropriate. 

So, I’m concerned about that from a warfighter’s point of view. 

I’m also concerned about it from the provider-of-the-capabilities’ 

point of view. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, what are your thoughts on 

making the DOD UHF spectrum available to encourage commercial 

investment in meeting the long-term government communications 

requirements, as well? Do you have some thoughts about how that 

might work? 

Admiral DORSETT. I have not delved into it. I think Dr. Federici 

would be better to answer that. I’d only make one comment, and 

I’d say that that is part of what we’re looking at when we’re looking at mitigation. You have to put that into the calculation. 

57 

Dr. FEDERICI. That is an area we’ll need to work with ASD NII 

on. I believe there’s been precedent set in the past that that has 

been done; I believe, with VSAT. That is something I’ll need to 

check, and I’ll take for the record. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

[The information referred to follows] 

We will continue to work with ASD NII on spectrum policies to encourage commercial firms to invest in solutions to meet our growing UHF spectrum warfighter 

communications requirements. In 1997, OSD did allow Hughes Corporation to use 

our LEASAT–5 spacecraft to support a contract with the Australian Defence Forces. 

We are exploring any good ideas that the commercial sector brings forward to fulfill 

our UHF communications needs. The Department will keep working with OSD to 

support existing commercial use of UHF government spectrum, as demonstrated in 

the attached 1997 memorandum (attached). 

58 


310str8.eps
59 

Dr. FEDERICI. So, that is an issue. It’s government spectrum. 

We’ll need to share that, subject to a number of conditions. So, 

we’ll look at that. We’ll take that for action. 

Senator BEN NELSON. All right. Thank you. 

The final question is for each of you. What one thing keeps you 

awake at night or disturbs you most when you look back over all 

the things we have to deal with? 

Secretary Payton? 

Mr. PAYTON. One of the things that’s most frustrating to me is 

the space industrial base. Our costs are going up, because the number of second- and third-tier players are getting out of the space 

business. They are getting out because they cannot compete effectively with overseas competitors for worldwide market. So, that is 

increasing our costs. 


310FUL9.eps
60 

I worry that eventually it may even lead to reductions in reliability. This goes all the way from the satellite solar arrays to batteries on satellites to propulsion systems on satellites and on 

launch vehicles. 

The thing that worries me routinely, constantly, is the extra 

costs that we have to put out to redesign our systems for suppliers 

who are no longer there, to requalify new suppliers. That’s a pervasive, difficult problem and our own export controls are hampering 

our industry. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler? 

General KEHLER. Mr. Chairman, there is not a single operational 

or mission-related item that keeps me awake at night. That’s because, in the hands of the young folks that we have operating these 

systems, they get the mission done. I think once the mission is in 

their hands and the hardware is in their hands, I don’t worry about 

anything that is going on operationally. 

I share Secretary Payton’s concern about the space industrial 

base. I’m not sure that it keeps me awake at night, but I do share 

his concern about the space industrial base. 

What does keep me awake at night is making sure that we can 

retain these marvelous young people that we have, and especially 

given that this is an All-Volunteer Force. Being able to retain the 

quality of people that we need is something that I will occasionally 

muse about so that I can satisfy myself that we’re doing everything 

we possibly can to retain them. We do largely but they are in high 

demand in many places. 

I would add that one of the ways that we are addressing that is 

by increasing the use of our Air Guard and our Air Force reservists. Even when people decide to move on, we pat them on the 

back, tell them, ‘‘thanks for your service,’’ and we offer to hand 

them over to the Guard or the Reserves. We’ll have to do that with 

cyberprofessionals, as well. We’re having some success with that. 

But, I spend a fair amount of time being concerned about retention. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General James? 

General JAMES. Yes, sir. From an operational perspective, again, 

as General Kehler said, I don’t know if it keeps me up at night, 

but it’s certainly at the top of my list, and that’s understanding the 

expanding capabilities of all the nation states and actors around 

the globe with respect to space. That gets into the SSA component 

of not only tracking objects and so on, but truly knowing what is 

going on in that environment. What are these objects? What is the 

intent of the owner? What are their capabilities? You have smaller 

satellites that are difficult to understand what they are doing. 

Getting not just tracking information, but situational awareness, 

so that, ultimately, decisionmakers can make the right decisions, 

should actions be required to protect our systems or to operate our 

systems, is really the thing that we need to continue to improve 

upon. That is not only just sensors, like the Space Fence or the 

Space-Base Space Surveillance System, but it’s also the melding of 

the intelligence component, because all of those things need to play 

together in order to give, ultimately, that knowledge to the decisionmakers to allow them to have that situational awareness and 

make the right decisions at the right time for the Nation. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Federici? 

61 

Dr. FEDERICI. Senator, at the beginning of the session, we talked 

a lot about an executive agent for space and the Commission report, almost 9 years ago. Living in acquisition for the almost 6 

years that I have, and looking at a number of different acquisition 

programs—of course the Navy has—MUOS is, pretty much, a capital program, and a couple of small acquisition programs. I think 

the organization and management across DOD is a key issue, still. 

I know it’s being worked; it’s on the table again. I think clarity and 

more transparency would be really good things, especially for the 

Navy. We know all the right offices to go to, but there are several 

offices you need to work with, and it leads back to that question 

on architecture that was asked earlier. The Navy really welcomes 

the opportunities to participate in some of the Air Force space programs, as well as the NRO, to participate in acquisition programs 

so we can continue to grow our cadre, as well. Because just having 

one small program office called MUOS is not enough to continue 

to grow a large cadre. So, we welcome that opportunity, and we 

would like to keep it. 

Admiral DORSETT. Mr. Chairman, I’m concerned about the rising 

costs of our people and our systems, especially in the current fiscal 

environment and the projected fiscal environment. In the future, 

when we no longer receive Oversease Contingency Operations supplemental funds, I am concerned. I do lose sleep over this. I lose 

sleep over the potential that the Nation will not be able to afford 

the military that our taxpayers expect from us. These costs are 

pretty tremendous, and we’re already seeing the stress as we’re 

moving towards our POM–12 program development, and I expect 

to see that pressure increase in the future. It is a big concern of 

mine. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. At GAO, of course, we’re paying—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. I was so worried you’d say it’s these gentlemen that keep you awake at night. [Laughter.] 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Right. [Laughter.] 

Yes, they keep me awake. Of course, I’m paid to worry about 

costs. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Watching over us. [Laughter.] 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I’m paid to worry about costs and schedule for 

space programs, which is more on the boring side of things, but I 

think these days we’re worried about the outcomes of some of these 

acquisition problems, and all the capability gaps that we face, and 

canceled programs. Where does that leave us going forward? How 

do we get from this position of being a little behind in some areas 

to getting back to being ahead and making sure we can be ahead? 

Do we have the right strategy and resources to get there? When 

we have that discussion, I’d personally like to see it cut across government, cut across industry, and be very strategic. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you all. I appreciate it. 

Once again, thank you for your service, and those that work with 

you, day in and day out, who wear the uniform or who are civilian, 

who keep us safe. 

Thank you. We appreciate it. 

We’re adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

62 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM

1. Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy has determined that the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) meteorological satellite program should be 

dissolved and a new approach to weather and climate satellites adopted. As part of 

that program dissolution National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) 

and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) will take the afternoon 

orbit and the Air Force will take the early morning orbit. We understand that 

NOAA and NASA have set up transition teams to begin work on their part of this 

split program. What is the Air Force doing? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Department of Defense (DOD), to include 

the Air Force, NASA, and NOAA have formed a transition team to outline the transfer of efforts from the NPOESS contract to DOD, NASA, and NOAA management. 

The Air Force will conduct a requirements review, an analysis of alternatives 

(AoA), and then proceed in accordance with DOD 5200-series guidance and the 

Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). The results of the requirements 

review and AoA will inform the acquisition strategy and follow-on program content. 

Air Force Space Command will partner with SAF/US(D), OSD, NOAA, and NASA 

to ensure U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) requirements are met. 

2. Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Payton, has there been a decision as to how the fiscal year 2010 and the fiscal year 2011 NPOESS funds will be spent? 

Mr. PAYTON. The fiscal year 2010 funds are to ensure the continuity in each orbit. 

Second flight unit copies of the instruments slated to fly on the afternoon orbit platform following the NPOESS Preparatory Project mission are the core focus of the 

NPOESS program’s fiscal year 2010 effort. The current plan is to continue executing 

the major efforts under the prime contract, carefully pace continued Microwave 

Imager Sounder and Space Environmental Monitor-NPOESS developments, and actively support the transition of the follow-on efforts supporting the Joint Polar Satellite System program. 

The plan for fiscal year 2011 is contingent on the transition activities in fiscal 

year 2010 as well as the path forward chosen to maintain continuity for the early 

morning orbit. 

3. Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Payton, when there is such a decision, could you 

please provide the committee with a detailed breakdown for these funds, including 

any termination funds? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, once the agencies finalize their plans, we will be happy to provide a detailed cost breakout. 

SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

4. Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler, the Air Force has increased the budget 

for space situational awareness (SSA) programs. Why is this important and what 

happens if this request is not fully supported? 

General KEHLER. Awareness of space is vital to preserving safety of life for 

manned missions and safeguarding our national security and commercial interest in 

space missions. The space domain is becoming increasingly contested, congested, 

and competitive. Our need to operate and maintain awareness in the space environment is vital to our national security. SSA depends on being able to detect, track, 

and identify objects in space. Today we track over 21,000 active space systems; but 

of graver concern is the increasing number of small objects that we are unable to 

detect, track, assess, and determine intent because of the limitations of our existing 

capabilities. 

If Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) requests for funding of the SSA improvement plans are not supported, we unnecessarily put enormous investments in national security, civil, commercial and international space capabilities and services at 

risk. Our warfighters, our economy, and our way of life depend on space-based services, and we expect the dependence to grow into the future. 

5. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Dorsett, from the Navy’s perspective as both a 

space operator and user of space assets, how important in your mind is this increased emphasis on SSA? 

Admiral DORSETT. The Navy is critically dependent on space assets for our 

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erations and is essential to maintaining the advantage we enjoy in space. In today’s 

contested and congested environment it is paramount that we are able to attribute 

malicious or hostile acts, to fully understand the space environment and the operational effects of spectrum interference, and to ensure safety of flight for space missions. The Navy relies on the Air Force for these capabilities and supports all the 

efforts to further enhance SSA to protect the Nation’s and international community’s space capabilities. 

ULTRA-HIGH FREQUENCY MITIGATION OPTIONS

6. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Dorsett, from an operational perspective, what 

are your major concerns about not having adequate ultra-high frequency (UHF) capability and the plans to develop mitigation and augmentation capacity? 

Admiral DORSETT. The Navy recognizes that tactical narrowband communications 

are critical to the joint warfighter. We are committed to maintaining the current 

UHF constellation and delivering Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) as quickly 

as possible. We are meeting current acquisition requirements, but not demand. Demand for UHF services is growing every year. Acquisition programs are planned 

and funded to meet requirements, not necessarily demand. 

The Navy has prepared a series of mitigation options that can be incrementally 

implemented to minimize the operational impact of a loss or degradation to the current on-orbit UHF constellation. We have already implemented a payload reconfiguration to UFO satellite Flight 11 which increased the number of available channels. This action was completed at no cost and with very low risk to the spacecraft. 

Additionally, the Navy continues to lease supplemental UHF resources from two 

commercial satellites, LEASAT and SKYNET, and is leasing an additional channel 

on an Italian space-based communications system (SICRAL). We are also pursuing 

options to make more efficient use of available satellite resources. The Integrated 

Waveform (IW), a software upgrade to UHF SATCOM tactical terminals and control 

system, is in development and will optimize UHF satellite channels by doubling the 

number of accesses that can be supported by a single 25 kHz channel. DOD is also 

in the process of finalizing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Australian 

Ministry of Defense to procure/use channels on an Australian-hosted payload in exchange for future use (commencing 2018) of equivalent UHF SATCOM accesses. Finally, we plan to assess the operational feasibility of TACSAT–4, an Office of Naval 

Research, Naval Research Laboratory, and Operationally Responsive Space Office 

initiative. 

7. Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Federici and Admiral Dorsett, for many years, the 

Navy has used the commercial LEASAT satellites to provide the critical UHF satellite services. What are your thoughts on making DOD UHF spectrum available to 

encourage commercial investment in meeting long-term government communications 

requirements? 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. Navy has had success with the LEASAT program by allowing a commercial vendor to provide UHF SATCOM services in DOD 

spectrum. Due to the delay to MUOS, Navy is investigating options for a UHF 

hosted payload; this approach would also result in Navy/DOD permitting a commercial vendor to operate a satellite that employs DOD spectrum. We are supportive 

of allowing commercial investment in systems that use the DOD spectrum if it enables DOD to satisfy military communications requirements. 

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

8. Senator BEN NELSON. General Kehler and General James, the new Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) office is working on responding to an urgent need of 

the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) for additional Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability through the ORS–1 satellite. This is important 

but the ORS fundamental work on the plug and play bus and sensor development 

work is also important. I am concerned that the basic work of the ORS office may 

be taking a back seat to the urgent need. In addition, the out-year budgets for ORS 

go down substantially. Can you explain how you will support ORS in the future? 

General KEHLER. The President’s budget includes significant funding to develop 

the technologies to enable ORS. $78 million of the fiscal year 2011 funding is dedicated to the basic work of the ORS office to develop enabling capabilities. In fiscal 

year 2011, the capability development funding includes Studies and Analysis, Systems Engineering and Enabling Technologies, Radio Frequency Modular Missions 

#1, Rapid Response Space Works, TacSat Planning and Launch Vehicles. The rest 

64 

of the fiscal year 2011 funding for ORS, $15.7 million, is ORS–1 funding in response 

to the COCOM urgent need. 

General JAMES. We do not believe that the basic work of the ORS office is taking 

a back seat to the CENTCOM urgent need. ORS essential tasks are to: (1) develop 

end-to-end enabling capabilities, and (2) respond to Joint Force Commander needs 

validated by TRANSCOM. AFSPC and JFCC SPACE strongly support this parallel 

approach to capability delivery for the Nation. From our perspective meeting, the 

CENTCOM need is an operational priority as is balancing enabler development. 

JFCC SPACE and AFSPC continue to work with the ORS Office, TRANSCOM, 

Services and our coalition partners to rapidly operationalize and balance the development of cost-effective, responsive technologies. 

9. Senator BEN NELSON. General James, are you involved in the operational military utility study for the sensor on the Tac-Sat 3 satellite, and if so, what are the 

early conclusions? 

General JAMES. Currently JFCC Space and AFSPC are not direct involved in the 

sensor aspects of the TacSat-3 Joint Military Utility Assessment (JMUA). We continue to maintain a close awareness of the JMUA technical progress. The full JMUA 

is not complete. Current observations are: (1) JMUA is in the data collection phase. 

(2) The operations in ‘‘routine’’ modes are progressing. (3) The ‘‘tactical’’ modes allow 

users to task/retask, process and downlink on Space Ground Link System and Ultra 

High Frequencies is ongoing. (4) The current data is statistically insufficient for 

JMUA determination. 

10. Senator BEN NELSON. General James, the ORS program gets the bulk of its 

requirements from the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Do you see this as 

still the correct approach or would you recommend any changes? 

General JAMES. The process by which the ORS Office receives requirements from 

STRATCOM is currently working. Urgent need requirements are submitted by Joint 

Force Commanders, Combatant Commands and Services. As the UCP assigned lead 

for DOD space mission and advocacy, STRATCOM validates the need and directs 

the ORS Office Director to lead an interagency group to develop potential solutions 

to address the need. These solutions are presented to the Commander of 

STRATCOM in approximately 90 days and based on the Commander’s recommendations are then presented to the Executive Agent for Space in his oversight and Service Acquisition Executive role. So far there have been four needs submitted to the 

ORS office to investigate. 

11. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Dorsett, the Navy has also been very involved 

with the ORS program. The Naval Research Lab built the Tac-Sat 4 satellite, which 

will launch later this spring, and the Navy has representatives in the ORS program 

office. In your view, how is this new program doing and what should it keep doing 

or do differently? 

Admiral DORSETT. Navy recognizes the potential of ORS to rapidly augment, reconstitute, or replenish mission critical space capabilities needed by the fleet. Additionally, we see value in the ORS concept to rapidly infuse space technological innovations into operational use—whether to support on-demand surge capabilities or 

reconstitute critical existing capabilities that are degraded or lost. 

I applaud the efforts of the ORS Office and its efforts to develop a multi-tiered 

approach to providing warfighting capability more rapidly at reduced costs. However, I do not support Service funding to build and store future ‘‘enabling capabilities’’ in advance of validated requirements. Additionally, it is difficult to fully assess 

and prioritize investment strategies before the prototype ‘‘enabling capabilities’’ are 

launched and operational. As the Navy’s Resource Sponsor for Space, I would desire 

to see a concrete demonstration of operational value and performance of ORS ventures prior to committing service-specific funding. 

Further, while enabling capabilities ready for development and/or rapid launch 

are key to ORS success, I would recommend that equal focus and priority be placed 

on evaluating new and innovative approaches to using existing, on-orbit resources 

to address urgent Joint Force Commander requirements. 

COMMERCIAL AND FOREIGN ENTITIES

12. Senator BEN NELSON. General James, with the increased challenging of tracking more and more space objects, and to avoid collisions in space, the pilot commercial and foreign entities program has become a permanent program under your 

65 

STRATCOM responsibilities. Why is this program important and what, if any, challenges have you seen in transitioning to a permanent program? 

General JAMES. This program continues to grow in importance, and, thanks to establishing this as a pilot program years ago, DOD and STRATCOM are now moving 

the program forward to a more operational posture. The Iridium-Cosmos collision 

of February 2009 revealed that no one space-faring nation or organization is immune to the risks and dangers of a congested space environment. Within our space 

surveillance resource capabilities, proactively coordinate with both U.S. Government 

and non-U.S. Government entities to take appropriate actions to avoid conjunctions 

since space debris is a danger to all. Fundamentally, SSA data sharing by 

TRANSCOM helps promote safety in space and confidence building. Our SSA data 

sharing is an excellent example of responsible and international cooperation. We 

have established a firm foundation of responsible behavior in space. The program 

enables TRANSCOM to establish sharing relationships with other owner/operators 

in order to share information to support safe and responsible space operations by 

all entities. 

Balancing information sharing with our national security responsibilities is a 

challenge. Keeping pace with, or ahead of the international demand for SSA has 

proven to be one on the most significant challenges. We have security concerns making sharing difficult, as well as challenges of contacting various satellite owners/operators. Currently, SSA sharing legislation requires formal agreements. Under 

emergency situations, such as predicted close approaches between satellites, we are 

authorized to provide notifications and share information without agreements. We 

are waiting for the delegation of authority to quickly enter into agreement with nonU.S. Governments. 

Finally, gathering, analyzing, and disseminating SSA places significant demands 

on our materiel and human resources. We have managed by updating and expanding some techniques, procedures, and increasing resources. As we provide SSA services to entities, we are finding that many new entities approach us for support, 

which will increasingly stress our resources and we will have to manage expectations and develop more efficient processes. 

13. Senator BEN NELSON. General James, are there any changes needed in the 

statutory authority for this program? 

General JAMES. The language contained in the current legislation adequately addresses to whom the Department may provide SSA data and services, and the restrictions that are attached. This allows the Department to build a SSA sharing program meeting the constraints and limitations of the U.S. Government and the needs 

of the entity supported. 

While a statutory change is not necessary at this time, the requirement for a written agreement to be in place before sharing SSA information has provided significant challenges to our ability to share information. We have an interest in providing 

SSA services that support safety of flight, yet unless it is an emergency situation, 

we cannot provide such services without an agreement in place. The lack of an 

agreement has precluded us from providing some requested services directly to a 

customer, such as early orbit determination support. Early orbit support provides 

the launch agency with information to enable insertion of the satellite into its correct orbit, an activity we have an interest in supporting in hopes of preventing conjunctions between the new satellite and other objects, and for improving our own 

SSA regarding the new object. We are currently reviewing internal procedures to 

determine whether we can expedite requests for information by modifying internal 

processes to make this data exchange more timely and efficient. We are optimistic 

we can address this issue without a need for statutory change at this time. 

COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES

14. Senator BEN NELSON. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, and Admiral 

Dorsett, over 80 percent of the satellite communications (SATCOM) in Iraq and Afghanistan are handled by commercial satellites. Most of this capacity is purchased 

on an annual basis and funded through the supplemental or contingency operations 

funding. In your view, should there be a more strategic approach to buying commercial communications and what is the right mix of commercial and military capability? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. Assured access to SATCOM under all conditions remains a critical capability for any warfighter. Wideband Global SATCOM 

(WGS) and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) will greatly improve our 

capabilities, but commercial SATCOM are still needed to satisfy the entire demand. 

66 

While supplemental or contingency funding is primarily used today to fund commercial leases on an annual basis, this short-term contractual model does not necessarily deliver the best fees and terms to the DOD. We are assessing many different commercial models, including different contractual models such as long-term 

leases that would require Services to budget for commercial services instead of relying on yearly supplemental funding. This same study will also deliver a recommendation on the right balance between commercial and military capabilities. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. We agree with the Air Force that an integrated, DOD-wide approach to building a communications architecture is needed. A 

holistic Joint Space Communications Layer (JSCL) architecture, developed and assessed against current and future space capabilities, gaps, and vulnerabilities, will 

be critical in determining the right mix of commercial and military SATCOM for our 

warfighters. It will be important to conduct a risk, cost, and feasibility analysis to 

ensure sustainment of our MILSATCOM capability while exploring future partnerships with industry. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK UDALL

DELTA II

15. Senator UDALL. Secretary Payton, the Delta II rocket has been one of the most 

successful launch vehicles in history for putting commercial medium class satellites 

into orbit. However, the last Delta II government launch at Vandenberg Air Force 

Base (AFB) is scheduled for 2011. The current lease arrangement between the Air 

Force and NASA has allowed for numerous launches of commercial satellites performing national security missions. I am concerned that commercial space companies may lose access to launch capabilities after the last government Delta II launch 

at Vandenberg AFB. What assurances can you provide that commercial companies 

will continue to have access to the necessary infrastructure to put their satellites 

into orbit so as to avoid being forced to launch on foreign providers? 

Mr. PAYTON. The Air Force has responsibility for national assured access to space. 

Not only is the Air Force in compliance with the Commercial Space Launch Act, it 

is in the Air Force’s interest to accommodate commercial companies with access to 

the launch infrastructure. As such, SpaceX has exclusive use of Space Launch Complex-40 at Cape Canaveral AFS to support both their government and commercial 

customers and the Air Force will continue to work with United Launch Alliance to 

support their commercial Atlas V and Delta IV customers at both the east and west 

coast launch ranges. 

SATELLITE IMAGERY

16. Senator UDALL. General Kehler, leveraging commercial satellite imagery provides unique advantages over traditional sources. Our military can share unclassified commercial imagery with coalition partners, enabling maximum information 

awareness without compromising security. Can you tell how your command has utilized commercial satellite imagery to accomplish your mission? 

General KEHLER. Commercial imagery is ideal for coalition sharing and in a humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) context. While AFSPC maintains 

close contacts with commercial imagery consortia, the joint force commanders are 

the true end-users of commercial imagery services and gain access through DOD’s 

lead at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. As you may be aware, Unified 

Commanders used commercial imagery for HA/DR following the 2004 tsunami in 

South Asia, recently in Haiti and Chile with the earthquakes, and domestically during the California wildfires. In short, the burgeoning commercial satellite imagery 

market can be a significant advantage for our warfighters. 

17. Senator UDALL. General Kehler, do you envision mission areas where your 

command will more heavily rely on space and near-space commercial ISR capabilities? 

General KEHLER. AFSPC, while not a direct consumer of commercial ISR, has a 

responsibility for leveraging any and all resources in an effort to provide integrated 

space forces and capabilities for STRATCOM missions. Commercial ISR capabilities 

are considered a viable option to meet many of the joint and coalition imagery 

needs; especially since the capabilities, timeliness, and accuracy of commercial services have improved over the past decade. 

67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

SPACE STRATEGY AND ACQUISITION DIFFICULTIES

18. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, this committee has long been concerned with the 

troubling space acquisition trend of schedule delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and 

the increasing risk of capability gaps. What is being done to resolve the poor conditions of space acquisitions? 

Mr. PAYTON. Over the past decade and a half the Air Force has attempted to 

adapt the changing landscape of the industrial base, the force structure, and the increasing requirement needs of the warfighter, resulting in increased complexity and 

the pursuit, in several cases, of not yet mature technologies. To address these challenges, the Air Force is rigorously pursuing an Acquisition Improvement Plan (May 

2009) which serves as the strategic framework for reinstilling excellence in space 

systems acquisition. The Acquisition Improvement Plan focuses on increasing the 

workforce; senior level certification of warfighter requirements; using Acquisition 

Decision Memorandum Cost Estimate Mean for costing; and multifunctional independent review teams for source selections. In addition, the Air Force is increasing 

accountability by establishing clear lines of authority. This plan postures the Air 

Force for success in space acquisition. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. We agree with the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) assessment that DOD has taken numerous actions to improve 

the acquisition process, including strengthening the requirements process, cost estimating, testing oversight, and acquisition policy. Additional improvements will result from development of a DOD-wide space architecture and close and continual 

partnership and communication between related program offices. 

General KEHLER. We understand the past problems, have learned valuable lessons, and have a way forward. To address acquisition, we are guided by the Air 

Force’s Acquisition Improvement Plan, which aims to recapture acquisition excellence through improving the requirements generation processes, instilling budget 

and financial discipline, improving major systems source selections, and establishing 

clear lines of authority and accountability within organizations. The plan also calls 

for revitalization of the acquisition workforce, which we are addressing through improved recruiting, training, and mentoring programs for military, civilian, Federally 

Funded Research and Development Centers, and System Engineering and Technical 

Assistance workforce. We are also continuing our efforts to retain skilled and experienced acquisition professionals to serve as mentors to transition their vast knowledge and skills to their successors. 

General JAMES. I defer this question to Mr. Payton and General Kehler. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We have not performed a comprehensive review of DOD’s reforms 

but it is clear that DOD has been working to ensure that its space programs are 

more executable and produce a better return on investment. For example, DOD is 

working to ensure critical technologies are matured before large-scale acquisition 

programs begin; requirements are defined early in the process and are stable 

throughout; and that system design remains stable. DOD also intends to follow incremental or evolutionary acquisition processes versus pursuing significant leaps in 

capabilities involving technology risk. DOD is also revisiting the use of military 

standards in its acquisitions and providing more program and contractor oversight. 

These and other actions identified in our testimony address the root causes of problems, though it will take time to determine whether these actions are successful and 

they need to be complemented by decisions on how best to lead, organize, and support space activities. 

19. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, do you believe the condition is getting better? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, the Air Force Acquisition Improvement Plan will certainly improve space acquisition. Despite past problems that have plagued space acquisition, 

the Air Force is on track to deliver on several highly anticipated programs in the 

next year: Space Based Infrared System GEO–1, AEHF SV–1, Global Positioning 

Systems (GPSs) IIF, ORS SV–1, and Space-Based Space Surveillance Block 10. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. Yes, I believe space acquisition processes, 

program milestone reviews, and recurring schedule assessments are adding rigor, 

visibility, and improved oversight to critical space programs. The MUOS program 

is an excellent example, where improved oversight allowed Navy to identify the need 

for a National Review Team assessment to independently evaluate program 

‘‘health.’’ Our reviews and oversight mechanisms have reinforced the need to incorporate an ‘‘end-to-end’’ focus on program requirements, which directly led to imVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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proved efforts at synchronizing programs (i.e. MUOS, JTRS, and Teleport) to better 

provide comprehensive mission capability. While it will take time to fully realize the 

effects of changes we have made to date, the Navy is effectively moving forward in 

improving our space acquisition processes. 

General KEHLER. The condition is definitely getting better. While the ultimate 

test will be in future results, we have taken significant steps toward addressing the 

acquisition issues, and we believe that our newest efforts in accordance with the Acquisition Improvement Plan and the WSARA will prove effective. In particular, our 

efforts are providing all stakeholders, from the program manager through the PEO, 

SAF, and ultimately up through DOD and Congress, with greater visibility into 

technology challenges. We have also improved our ability to balance performance requirements with the cost and schedule risks inherent in developing and fielding new 

technologies. 

General JAMES. I defer this question to Mr. Payton and General Kehler. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. It will take more time before we will know with greater certainty 

whether conditions are improving. The GPS IIIA program is DOD’s current forerunner in moving away from past practices and getting ‘‘back to basics.’’ The GAO 

was buoyed by DOD’s efforts not to overreach in deciding to evolve the capabilities 

on GPS IIIA. Further, DOD has continued to work to ensure that requirements remain stable. However, these positive efforts are tempered by our concern that DOD 

has developed a deployment schedule that is optimistic. 

20. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what more needs to be done? 

Mr. PAYTON. The Air Force will continue to follow through on bolstering the acquisition workforce and ensuring the Acquisition Improvement Plan is a success. Once 

these initiatives are fully implemented, I believe the Air Force will be on a better 

path to executing space acquisition programs and will assess what additional actions need to be taken. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. I agree with Ms. Chaplain of the GAO that 

acquisition reform will be difficult to achieve with growing gaps in space industrial 

base expertise, undisciplined contract management and oversight, insufficient 

resourcing for testing new technologies, and loss of innovation due to migration of 

small businesses out of the space industrial base. Our space industrial base must 

be protected and sustained. Additionally, we must ensure that the development of 

ground systems and terminals is synchronized with the development and on-orbit 

availability of our space systems, both to fully optimize end-to-end capability to the 

COCOMs, and to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. 

General KEHLER. Due to the long timelines for space acquisition, we need to remain committed to the Air Force’s Acquisition Improvement Plan principles over 

many years to reap dividends. Stability of requirements, funding, and personnel are 

key in delivering programs as planned. We will continue to improve processes so 

that stakeholders have the necessary information to make the hard trade-offs in 

planning and executing our investment portfolio to improve our warfighter capabilities. 

General JAMES. I defer this question to Mr. Payton and General Kehler. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense have been taking to address acquisition problems are good steps. However, 

there are still more significant changes to processes, policies, and support needed 

to ensure that reforms can take hold. Recent studies and reviews examining the 

leadership, organization, and management of national security space have all found 

that there is no single authority responsible below the President and that authorities and responsibilities are spread across the Department. In fact, the national security space enterprise comprises a wide range of government and nongovernment 

organizations responsible for providing and operating space-based capabilities serving both military and intelligence needs. 

Diffuse leadership has a direct impact on the space acquisition process, primarily 

because it makes it difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for 

balancing needs against wants, for resolving conflicts among the many organizations 

involved with space, and for ensuring that resources are dedicated where they need 

to be dedicated. Many of the cost and schedule problems we identified for the GPS 

IIF program, for instance, were tied in part to diffuse leadership and organizational 

stovepipes, particularly with respect to DOD’s ability to coordinate delivery of space, 

ground, and user assets. In fact, DOD is now facing a situation where satellites with 

advances in capability will be residing for years in space without users being able 

to take full advantage of them because investments and planning for ground, user, 

and space components were not well-coordinated. 

69 

Congressional and DOD studies have also called for changes in the national security space organizational structure to remove cultural barriers to coordinating development efforts and to better incorporate analytical and technical support from an 

organization that is augmented with military and Intelligence Community expertise. 

Finally, studies have identified insufficient numbers of experienced space acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of personnel in project management positions as problems needing to be addressed in the space community. Our own studies 

have identified gaps in key technical positions, which we believed increased acquisition risks. 

21. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, do you agree with the GAO assertion that we are 

facing potential capability gaps in critical areas? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. Yes, I agree with the GAO. The Navy is critically dependent upon space to conduct our wartime mission as well as our core capabilities of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. As one of the largest users of 

space, we are concerned about capability gaps in communications, remote sensing, 

ISR, Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), missile warning, and weather. To 

address potential capability gaps in the UHF SATCOM mission area, the Navy has 

developed a multi-layer mitigation strategy that includes commercial space augmentation options and optimization of existing UHF ground and space-based resources. General KEHLER. The GAO has asserted in recent testimony and reports that we 

are facing potential capability gaps in areas of missile warning, military communications, and weather monitoring and GPS. 

AFSPC is focused on continuing to deliver modernized MILSATCOM capabilities 

to warfighters. Our third generation MILSATCOM systems, DSCS and Milstar, are 

exceeding their design life and are continuing to provide substantial capability. We 

are delivering our fourth generation systems, WGS and AEHF, which will provide 

an order of magnitude improvement over existing capability. Even with our recent 

successes, the growing demand for MILSATCOM requires us to rely on commercial 

satellite capability into the foreseeable future. 

The GPS satellite constellation is extremely healthy. It is the largest constellation 

providing the greatest capability in GPS history. Since 1995, the Air Force has met 

or exceeded GPS performance requirements while providing worldwide users with 

24/7/365 PNT service. In addition, STRATCOM and AFSPC recently initiated the 

GPS Expanded 24 deployment configuration that will further improve GPS global 

coverage. While we face challenges in constellation sustainment, we have operational measures and modernization efforts that will allow us to maintain the required availability of 24 satellites with .95 probabilities for the foreseeable future. 

General JAMES. [Deleted.] 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Generally, the further a satellite acquisition delivery schedules 

slips, the more likely DOD is at risk of not sustaining current capabilities. In determining whether a gap could exist, we relied on DOD reports and testimonies, as 

well as our own understanding of individual satellite constellations, launch manifests, and requirements documents. Delays in both the NPOESS and MUOS programs have resulted in critical potential capability gaps for military and other government users. In addition, according to Air Force officials, they have requested information from the space community on how best to address a potential gap in missile warning capabilities. 

22. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what capabilities are at the highest of facing a 

potential capability gap? 

Mr. PAYTON. Specific capability gaps and risks of capability gaps in the on-orbit, 

operational space portfolio are classified. The Air Force is available to provide these 

details in the appropriate setting upon request. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. In our view, the space capabilities facing the 

highest probability of a gap are with several classified, noncommunication programs. Additional detail can be provided in a classified venue. The UHF constellation has a lower probability of capability gap than those classified programs. Current analysis projects 70 percent predicted availability of the UFO constellation by 

March 2011. We have developed and funded a mitigation plan, including investigating the feasibility of a commercially hosted payload approach, to minimize any 

operational impact to the warfighter. 

70 

General KEHLER. [Deleted.] 

General JAMES. SATCOM - Military SATCOM has the greatest potential for a capability gap. We are currently suffering an 80 percent lack of required capability 

and rely on commercial SATCOM to fill the shortfall. 

[Deleted.] 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. See answer to question 21. 

23. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what are we doing and what more can be done 

to prevent them? 

Mr. PAYTON. Specific capability gaps and risk of capability gaps in the on-orbit, 

operational space portfolio are classified. The Air Force is available to provide these 

details in the appropriate setting upon request. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. Numerous actions have been taken to improve the acquisition process, including strengthening the requirements process, 

cost estimating, testing oversight, and acquisition policy. Greater improvement 

would result from development of a DOD-wide space architecture, a central authority to implement it, and ongoing organizational alignments. Acquisition reform will 

be challenging with growing gaps in space industrial base expertise and loss of innovation due to migration of small businesses out of the space industrial base. Additionally, development of ground systems and terminals must be synchronized with 

the development of our space systems in order to fully optimize end-to-end capabilities for the warfighter. 

General KEHLER. [Deleted.] 

General JAMES. DMSP - A new DOD program will be constructed to address the 

morning orbit requirement, leveraging existing work by Northrop-Grumman and 

their subcontractors. To avoid a potential capability gap the program is exploring 

a plan to optimize service life of the remaining DMSP space vehicles and employ 

a Northrop-Grumman Aerospace System (NGAS) gapfiller, with a limited sensor 

suite if needed. 

SATCOM - We are analyzing current operations, identifying tactics, techniques, 

and procedures (TTPs), and implementing improvements to maximize satellite mission life. We are continuing to maximize our commercial SATCOM leases in addition 

to launching Wideband Global SATCOM satellites to prevent any significant 

SATCOM gaps. 

GPS - Although the GPS constellation can operate with 32 operational satellites, 

the 14 AF/CC directed satellite operators at 2 SOPS to maintain all satellites on 

orbit with residual operational value. These residual satellites do not provide operational capability day-to-day but hedge against risk of satellite failures. 2 SOPS operators are also employing tactics, techniques, and procedures that extend the life 

of our satellites well beyond their design life. A recently disposed GPS satellite was 

operated for 17 years or 240 percent longer than its 7.5 year design life. 

[Deleted.] 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. In the short-term, DOD can stretch out legacy system capabilities, 

develop gap filler satellites, or buy commercial services to prevent capability gaps, 

or even employ a combination of these solutions. For instance, managing power onboard legacy GPS satellites can alleviate potential gaps in coverage. Regarding 

NPOESS, the NOAA and NASA are to procure environmental satellites to meet 

NOAA requirements, and the Air Force is to procure its own satellites to follow the 

current satellites built under the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). 

According to an Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) statement, DOD’s 

plan for deploying DMSP satellites ensures continued weather observation capability in the short-term, but DOD would have to start a DMSP follow-on program 

in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011. At this juncture, many questions surround 

DOD’s strategy for moving forward. The MUOS program office is addressing the potential capability gap by activating dual digital receiver unit operations on a legacy 

satellite, leasing commercial ultra-high-frequency SATCOM services, and examining 

the feasibility of expanded digital receiver unit operations on the legacy payloads 

of the MUOS satellites. Regarding early missile warning, DOD is currently assessing proposed solutions from the space community on how best to quickly field a missile launch detection sensor as a gap-filling measure. In the long-term, more realistic estimations of delivery dates and knowledge-based acquisition practices, such 

as proving critical technologies before initiating large-scale programs, can prevent 

the kinds of delays that have led to risks of capability gaps. A strategic investment 

strategy can also ensure that programs needed to sustain critical capabilities begin 

at the right time and are not cut back or delayed in order to fund other programs. 

71 

24. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, given the Department is currently undergoing 

the development of the fiscal year 2012 budget, will the space posture review be 

completed in time to inform the fiscal year 2012 budget? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, the final Space Posture Review will be completed summer 2010. 

EVOLVED EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE

25. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle (EELV) assures our access to space. This heavy launch vehicle has 

a remarkable success record and is the true workhorse for delivering our systems 

to space. As we all know, assured access to space is not cheap and the cost is 

trending up. In addition, I understand that decisions made within NASA to retire 

the shuttle and cancel the Constellation program will significantly affect future 

launch costs within DOD. Please elaborate on how NASA’s change in mission has 

affected the cost of EELV. If not yet determined, when will you be able to fully assess the impact? Specifically, please explain the potential for cost increases and the 

affect on the industrial base. 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. We are still examining the potential effects of 

NASA’s decision on launch costs and the industrial base. Several efforts are underway within Air Force and AFSPC channels to make and internal assessment. We 

expect to have a sense of the way ahead in the summer. 

26. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, given assured access to space 

is a national interest, do you believe NASA should be partially responsible for addressing the cost increases? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Air Force and other government agencies 

must work together on current and future space programs to ensure this vital national capability. The Air Force, NASA, and NRO are in collaboration in the areas 

of range revitalization, propulsion strategy, and policy reform. We are also working 

to foster commercial participation at our launch ranges as part of our overall approach to space launch. 

27. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, would a change in EELV acquisition strategy, such as a block buy approach, help alleviate some of these cost 

increases? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. Predictable demand and stability in our buying 

process are the keys to implementing an effective acquisition strategy. As part of 

the launch services acquisition effort, we continue to look for ways to make EELV 

most cost-effective by working with the NRO and NASA for block buy opportunities. 

28. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, what are the benefits and 

costs to DOD in adopting such a block buy strategy? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. The Air Force anticipates a block buy approach 

would address industrial base stability issues, improve component/part reliability, 

enhance cost saving opportunities on recurring hardware through economies of 

scale, and reduce the significant contract administrative burden on both the government and the contractor. The current practice of procuring each launch service as 

a discrete and servable contract action forces the prime contractor to order single 

mission sets of hardware, or buy larger quantities at their own risk. Internal Air 

Force program office reviews and external reviews of the EELV acquisition approach 

suggest that it would be beneficial to acquire launch services in a block buy manner 

that enables the prime contractor to subcontract for economic order quantities. 

The Air Force does not anticipate any additional costs to launch services of a 

block buy approach; however, when the funds would be required may change. The 

Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office are currently conducting a joint 

evaluation of various acquisition models to implement a block buy approach. 

NATIONAL POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE SYSTEM

29. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, as I mentioned in my opening statement, the administration took dramatic steps in restructuring NPOESS. I have some significant concerns with respect to the tri-agency divorce and have yet to hear from the Air Force how they intend to cover their share 

of the orbits or the overall cost implications for doing so. Does the Air Force fully 

support the decision to divorce NPOESS? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

72 

General KEHLER. The Air Force fully supports the Executive Office of the President decision and is working with the NOAA and NASA to implement this decision. 

The decision to proceed with separately managed acquisitions was made after a full 

range of ramifications was discussed and risk mitigations identified. The Air Force 

will be responsible for the early morning orbit and we are assessing options to ensure an effective acquisition strategy. 

General JAMES. The current administration did take significant steps in restructuring the NPOESS. However, we will continue to partner with NASA and NOAA 

in those areas that have been successful in the past as directed by the President. 

In particular, a shared ground system has been highlighted as an area where our 

tri-agency relationship allowed for mission success. 

We are committed to the process of developing, testing, and launching a DMSP 

successor as directed by the President in his fiscal year 2011 budget. As you’ll recall, 

the 2011 budget places sole responsibility for DMSP’s early morning orbit with 

DOD. 

The Air Force intends to cover our share of orbits by smartly leveraging remaining DMSP satellites (F–19/F–20) and extend the constellation’s useful life as long 

as possible. Vehicles F–19 and F–20 are also a part of the service life extension program (SLEP) and were designed for extended life. Our current degradation rates for 

on-orbit DMSP satellites (both SLEP and non-SLEP) provide a high confidence that 

DMSP performance will exceed original design specifications. 

There are some significant cost implications for the Air Force due to NPOESS restructuring. These costs will be associated with the development and launch of a 

new program to replace DMSP. 

30. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, what is the 

current path forward for the Air Force? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

General KEHLER. The Air Force, working closely with OSD, has been an active 

participant on the triagency (DOD, NOAA, NASA) transition team activities. 

Specifically, the Air Force is currently examining the best way to provide for the 

early morning orbit. We are taking inputs from the warfighting community via 

STRATCOM, the requirements community via the Joint Staff, and our acquisition 

component via Air Force Space Command’s Space and Missile Systems Center. Finally, we will take these inputs and synchronize them with the rest of Air Force’s 

capability needs to arrive at a final recommendation to Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

The Air Force has options to consider for ensuring continuity of the morning orbit. 

Instrumental to our plan is the existence of two DMSP satellites currently scheduled for launch in 2012 and 2014. The Air Force may decide to rely on DMSP for 

the near future and start a new program in the fiscal year 2013–fiscal year 2014 

timeframe. This would produce a satellite ready for launch in the early 2020s. A 

second option under Air Force consideration is whether or not to continue the Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems effort to provide an NPOESS-like satellite in 

the 2018 timeframe. 

General JAMES. We are committed to the process of developing, testing, and 

launching a DMSP successor as directed by the President in his fiscal year 2011 

budget. As you’ll recall, the 2011 budget places sole responsibility for DMSP’s early 

morning orbit with DOD and afternoon orbit responsibilities to NOAA and NASA. 

We will smartly employ remaining DMSP satellites (F–19/F–20) in an effort to extend the constellation’s useful life as long as possible. Placing these remaining vehicles in the appropriate orbit will aid our extension efforts while also avoiding coverage gaps. Vehicles F–19 and F–20 are also part of the SLEP and were designed 

for extended life. Our current degradation rates for on-orbit DMSP satellites (both 

SLEP and non-SLEP) provide a high confidence in the likelihood of DMSP performance beyond original design specifications. Ultimately, this will allow the DOD to 

meet presidentially-mandated responsibilities and avoid coverage gaps as we develop a DMSP-successor in the early morning orbit. 

31. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, what steps 

are being taken to ensure that DOD recoups the technologies it has already funded? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

General KEHLER. Reuse or harvesting of the NOPESS investments is paramount 

to DOD and NOAA follow-on programs. There are three categories of major developments on NPOESS; the suite of sensors, the spacecraft system, and the ground system (downlink receipt, transmission, algorithms, and product generation). 

73 

Of these major elements, NOAA will use the Visible Infrared Imager/Radiometer 

Suits, Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite, Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS), and Microwave Imager/Sounder 

(MIS). The analyses planned by DOD will drive the extent to which elements DOD 

applies in its follow-on effort. The solution set is broad, and DOD has not determined its needs for the Northrop-Grumman space system or the appropriate 

NPOESS sensors. The Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center is performing 

a technical evaluation of the currently designed NPOESS system to inform the upcoming AoA to determine the optimum material solution(s) for the validated need. 

General JAMES. We are committed to being good stewards of taxpayer funds in 

developing the DMSP successor as directed in the 2011 presidential budget. The 

DOD is performing a comprehensive review of meteorological requirements. This review will build on existing requirements and technologies resulting in an AoA. 

32. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, what are 

the potential legal implications for negating the NPOESS contract? 

Mr. PAYTON, General KEHLER, and General JAMES. A determination to negate and 

terminate the contract has not been made. In the event that a decision is made, the 

Government has well-known and established procedures already included in the 

contract and previously agreed upon by both parties. We have exercised these provisions in many cases in the past, most recently with TSAT. 

If the contract termination will involve a reduction in employment of 100 or more 

contractor employees, congressional notification will be made in accordance with the 

DOD Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Obviously, if any claims are filed by 

the contactor during this period, these also will be dealt with in accordance with 

the FAR. 

The Air Force is committed to ensure that if a determination is made to terminate 

the contract, the dissolution process is managed as efficiently and effectively as allowed by law; we understand the process and have done it before. 

BANDWIDTH

33. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what is the current status of the comprehensive 

bandwidth study? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. The comprehensive bandwidth study has 

been delivered to Congress. 

General KEHLER. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration is leading the comprehensive bandwidth study. This study 

is in the final stages and we anticipate its completion and submission in May. 

General JAMES. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration is leading the comprehensive bandwidth study. I understand that the study is nearing completion and in the final stages. I anticipate its 

completion and submission will be in the late April-May timeframe. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We do not know the current status of the comprehensive study, 

as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. At 

this time, GAO does not have work underway in the communications bandwidth 

area. 

34. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, is it safe to assume that our bandwidth needs 

show no sign of decreasing in the future? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. The Navy depends on space capabilities now 

and expects the demand for space capabilities to grow, especially for SATCOM and 

the bandwidth it provides. The UHF narrowband SATCOM constellation today consists of eight UHF Follow-On satellites, two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one 

Leased Satellite (LEASAT 5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. MUOS will begin 

to replace these systems in 2011. Based on evolving warfighting concepts, UHF 

SATCOM requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as designed, will be able 

to support those requirements. Commercially provided systems have the ability to 

augment, but not replace, national systems. Commercial capabilities continue to 

bridge the gap between requirements (demands) and capabilities (available resources). The Navy has utilized commercial communication satellites since the early 

74 

1970s to augment bandwidth requirements not fully satisfied by military communication satellites. 

General KEHLER. The demand for SATCOM bandwidth is continuing to grow. One 

example of this growth is in the increased utilization of unmanned aircraft systems 

for ISR. This increase in operational platforms will require significantly more bandwidth to operate than is available today. Furthermore, as the threat continues to 

grow in the future, possessing enough protected communications capabilities to 

counter a hostile environment becomes increasingly crucial. The exact demand for 

SATCOM bandwidth necessary to operate in hostile and non-hostile environments 

is identified as part of the JSCL effort. 

General JAMES. Yes, the demand for SATCOM bandwidth is continuing to grow. 

For example, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review identified the need to expand 

manned and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) for ISR. This increase in operational platforms requires significantly more bandwidth to operate than is available 

today. Furthermore, as the threat continues to grow in the future, possessing 

enough protected communications capabilities to counter a hostile environment becomes increasingly crucial. The exact demand for SATCOM bandwidth necessary to 

operate in hostile and non-hostile environments is identified as part of the JSCL 

effort, which Air Force Space Command is a contributor. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. GAO does not have specific work underway in the communications 

bandwidth area. However, based on our work in Iraq, upcoming efforts in Afghanistan, as well as new wide area sensors and hyper-spectral imaging coming on line, 

the demand for bandwidth is on the increase, and not declining. The new technologies do not seem to consider their load on bandwidth capacity. 

35. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, what is the appropriate mix between DOD-provided and commercially-provided bandwidth? 

Mr. PAYTON, General KEHLER, and General JAMES. The mix of commercial-provided and DOD-provided bandwidth is a function of the specific capabilities required 

by the warfighter. Some capabilities, such as nuclear survivability and signal protection, are currently only provided by DOD systems. However, a significant portion 

of the warfighters’ demand for unprotected SATCOM can and is being provided by 

commercial systems. The proper mix of capabilities versus capacity is currently 

being looked at as part of the JSCL effort. We are nearing completion with the requirements identification and validation portion of this effort. Once the requirements are clearly defined, an AoA will be completed that will address specific solutions, to include commercial and DOD options, identifying the correct mix to meet 

the warfighters’ missions. It is expected that certain capabilities will continue to require DOD-provided SATCOM, but a significant portion of the overall capacity will 

be met commercially-provided SATCOM. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. An integrated, DOD-wide approach to building a communications architecture will help determine what the right mix of commercial and military SATCOM should be for our warfighters. Bandwidth requirements continue to increase, whether in support of humanitarian assistance/disaster 

relief operations, regional engagement, or major combat operations. The appropriate 

mixture between DOD and commercially-provided capacity will also be determined 

by the nature of the operating environment (benign, congested, contested, or denied). 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. The GAO has not been requested to do work in this area and 

therefore we do not know what the mix of DOD and commercially-provided bandwidth should be. 

PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SENSOR

36. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton and General Kehler, as you are aware, this subcommittee is also responsible for oversight of ballistic missile defense. The Missile 

Defense Agency’s (MDA) fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for a new space 

program called the Precision Tracking Space Sensor (PTSS). This proposed multibillion dollar program must be thoughtfully planned across the Department and 

every effort should be taken to ensure that the appropriate acquisition management 

assessments take place for program execution. I understand that MDA has proposed 

a hybrid program office model for developing and acquiring this system and I am 

interested to hear if you have been briefed on the plan. Do you support this approach? 

Mr. PAYTON and General KEHLER. We believe the PTSS hybrid program office is 

a sound approach whereby MDA and the lead Service could work side-by-side to adVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
75 

dress issues such as doctrine, training, and manning early within the design phase. 

This office would address PTSS Service-related issues early in the acquisition process, thus minimizing costs. Incorporating Service-related issues early in the acquisition process will also reduce sustainment costs; and once PTSS is fielded this office 

will facilitate the transition and transfer of PTSS from MDA to the lead Service. 

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

37. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, as you are 

all well aware, this committee has been a strong proponent of ORS. In addition, 

General Chilton, the Commander of STRATCOM, has been quite vocal in increasing 

the responsiveness of our space recapitalization abilities. Yet, I was surprised to see 

that the fiscal year 2011 budget cuts funding for ORS by almost 25 percent. Is the 

Air Force committed to the ORS model? 

Mr. PAYTON, General KEHLER, and General JAMES. Yes, the Air Force is committed to the ORS concept of responsively launching small satellites. 

The budget has been relatively stable for ORS funding. It is approximately $100 

million per fiscal year from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2011 with some exceptions 

for launch vehicle expenditures, ORS–1 and congressional adds. The fiscal year 2009 

funding is $135 million higher than fiscal year 2011 due to three reasons. The Air 

Force reprogrammed $39 million into ORS when ORS–1 was initiated as an urgent 

need in fiscal year 2009. The fiscal year 2009 funding line contains $9 million for 

TacSat launch vehicle expenditures while fiscal year 2011 doesn’t require any 

TacSat launch vehicle funding. Additionally, the original fiscal year 2009 request 

was increased by $87 million for congressional adds (Infrared Sensor Payload Development, Micro-Satellite Serial Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, Chip Scale Atomic 

Clock, and Missile Range Safety Technology). 

38. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, does the Air 

Force believe that the development of an ORS infrastructure that facilitates rapid 

reconstitution and reduces the fragility of space capabilities would greatly benefit 

the needs of the warfighter? 

Mr. PAYTON. Yes, the Air Force is continuing the development of capabilities and 

Concept of Operations for rapid assembly, integration, and test of modular spacecraft buses and payloads through the Rapid Response Space Works. This short-notice call-up and launch will greatly benefit the needs of the warfighter. Should onorbit capabilities require augmentation or replenishment, the ORS infrastructure 

will deliver ‘‘good enough to win’’ solutions to the warfighter. 

General KEHLER. Effects provided today through space-based platforms are no 

longer ‘‘nice to have’’ but a ‘‘must have’’ for the joint warfighter. The ability to ensure these effects will be available through phases of conflict is imperative. A responsive infrastructure is key to delivering responsive space capabilities. The Air 

Force is improving the responsiveness of the space infrastructure capability with organic initiatives and through the ORS program. The fiscal year 2011 budget request 

for ORS includes funds for the development of the Rapid Response Space Works. 

This facility is expected to provide the opportunity for the Air Force to assemble, 

integrate, and test small spacecraft. The capability to do so may prove useful in 

meeting reconstitution and augmentation mission needs. 

Outside of ORS, the Air Force is investing in the future Satellite Operation Architecture and in the Launch Enterprise Transformation. Both of these investments 

show promise of improving the responsiveness of the entire space enterprise. Responsive infrastructure is key to the ability to rapidly provide space capabilities to 

the warfighter and improving the responsiveness of the space infrastructure will significantly offset the inherent fragility of space systems. 

General JAMES. We believe the development of an ORS infrastructure would benefit the needs of the warfighter. Rapid reconstitution requires standardized plug and 

play technologies, availability of long-lead, high demand/low density parts at the 

ready, boosters at the ready with trained crews, and a range infrastructure that is 

responsive to immediate launch demands. 

ORS solutions are designed to be complementary to the large, exquisite space systems that meet the bulk of our national military space needs, and to the increasing 

use of purchased commercial space products and services. ORS has a mix of attributes—responsiveness, flexibility, affordability, and assuredness—that is unique, 

relative to these other two approaches (U.S. Government systems and commercial 

space). 

To be successful at rapid reconstitution, the ORS infrastructure must continue to 

exercise innovative acquisition models, concepts, and incentives versus attempting 

76 

to condense and adjust those of the mainstream space acquisition establishment. 

This is essential to ensuring rapid delivery of space capabilities to the warfighter. 

39. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, General Kehler, and General James, why the reduction? 

Mr. PAYTON. I defer this question to General Kehler and Lieutenant General 

James. 

General KEHLER. In fiscal year 2010, $124.3 million was appropriated for ORS. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget requests $94 million for ORS. The $30.3 million difference is not due to a reduction in the level of effort. The fiscal year 2010 

appropriation included $12.3 million in congressionally directed projects and $18 

million for the purchase of launch vehicles. The launch vehicle expense is not required in fiscal year 2011. 

General JAMES. The reduction in ORS funding from fiscal year 2010 and fiscal 

year 2011 of roughly $30 million is for two primary reasons. The fiscal year 2010 

funding line contains approximately $18 million for launch vehicle expenditures not 

required in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, the original fiscal year 2010 request was 

increased by $12 million for congressional adds (Micro-Satellite Serial Manufacturing, LEONIDAS, Rapid Small Satellite Development Test Facilities, and Space 

Sensor Data Link Technology). 

QUALITY CONTROL

40. Senator VITTER. Mr. Payton, Dr. Federici, General Kehler, General James, Admiral Dorsett, and Ms. Chaplain, contractor quality issues have had significant impacts on major defense space programs over the years. In your opinion, what more 

can be done to address quality control? 

Mr. PAYTON. All of our industry partners are improving their attention to assembly procedures, workforce training, and subcontractor management. However, this 

improvement is after several disconcerting incidents have occurred across the board. 

The rework and repetitive integration and test cycles required to overcome these errors create reliability risks by undoing work that had already been validated as successful. As a result, I would like to see better adherence to the processes and procedures our industry partners have already developed, published, and trained against. 

Following published procedures would have prevented a number of quality incidents 

from occurring. 

Dr. FEDERICI and Admiral DORSETT. The UHF Constellation is comprised of systems that typically last well beyond their design lives. The satellites and their subsystems are of very good quality, so the Navy can’t comment on negative impacts 

from major defense space program quality control problems. The Navy Space Systems Program Office along with our contractors is fully engaged in utilizing numerous quality control mechanisms that conform to industry standards. With these efforts the Navy expects high quality systems to be built for its UHF Constellation 

for years to come. 

General KEHLER. There are four key things we can do to address quality control 

on our major defense space programs. They are: (1) Reinvigorating government expertise in manufacturing, quality, and software, (2) Placing upfront emphasis on 

quality control, (3) Holding contractors financially accountable for their quality control errors, and (4) Implement specifications and standards judiciously and regain 

the configuration control of the system by revitalizing the Configuration Management (CM) career field. 

Good quality in our major space programs is the result of strong and sustained 

emphasis and teamwork by both the government and contractors. 

General JAMES. From my warfighter perspective, I remain concerned with space 

program quality control. JFGCC SPACE is tasked to employ space forces and we 

must have reliable systems to execute the mission. We exercise risk management 

and use survivability and redundancy as control measures to account for shortfalls. 

It is important we involve warfighters in establishing requirements to meet specific 

operational needs. 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. Our work has emphasized the benefits of gaining knowledge about 

technologies, design, requirements, and other resources, e.g. people and suppliers, 

before embarking on major acquisitions. In my opinion, following a knowledge-based 

approach can help reduce quality problems that we have seen on DOD space programs because it would entail gaining more knowledge about potential suppliers 

and their strengths and weaknesses. In addition to more knowledge, DOD needs to 

obtain and analyze more comprehensive data regarding prime contractors and their 

key suppliers which could be used to improve quality. Further, DOD space officials 

77 

have commented that they recognize that today’s workforce is smaller and less experienced than previous workforces and the parts and the process quality issues are 

a major detriment. 

41. Senator VITTER. Ms. Chaplain, I understand that GAO is conducting a comprehensive quality review on contractor quality. Could you please share some of 

your preliminary thoughts? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. I can share a few. First, contractor quality issues are not just affecting DOD space programs. Some of the NASA and MDA programs we have reviewed have experienced similar problems. Second, parts quality problems can have 

devastating effects. The ones experienced by GPS and AEHF satellite program 

added months to the schedule and increased cost. Quality problems have also contributed to failures in flight tests at MDA. Third, there are mechanisms in place 

to address these problems and agencies are working together. The question GAO is 

focused on is whether and how these can be more effective and what additional 

steps government agencies involved in space and missile defense can take to increase interagency collaboration. 

GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM

42. Senator VITTER. Ms. Chaplain, our hearing last year occurred shortly after 

GAO issued a report about a potential gap in the GPS constellation. During that 

hearing you explained that that if both the GPS IIF and the GPS IIIA programs 

are executed on schedule, there is only a 80 to 90 percent probability that the constellation will stay above 24 satellites. You further explained that such a probability 

should not be a significant cause for alarm because there are measures that can be 

taken in managing the life of our current satellites. What is the current assessment 

on the potential gap in GPS? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. As I testified in front of your subcommittee in March 2010, the 

results of our assessment of the GPS constellation appear to be similar to what we 

reported last year. Final results of this analysis will be available this summer. Since 

we last reported, the GPS IIF program has been further delayed, and we remain 

concerned about the Air Force’s ability to deliver GPS IIIA satellites as promised, 

given that the Air Force aims to deliver them 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. 

43. Senator VITTER. Ms. Chaplain, how is the GPS IIIA program structured in 

comparison to the IIF program? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. The GPS IIIA program has been structured by the Air Force to 

prevent the mistakes made on the IIF program. According to the GPS wing, the 

GPS IIIA program is using an approach that emphasizes requirements stability, upfront systems engineering, adherence to stringent parts/materials standards, active 

risk management, and full program funding. The intent of this ‘‘back to basics’’ approach is to address the development challenges which have affected numerous recent space acquisition programs. Furthermore, according to Air Force officials, the 

IIIA contractor retained some of its workforce from the IIR–M program and plans 

to incorporate a previously developed satellite bus—efforts that reduce program 

risk. Table 1 identifies the key differences in program framework for IIF and IIIA. 

GPS IIF GPS III 

Requirements Addition of requirements after contract award .......... Not allowing an adjustment to the program to meet 

increased or accelerated requirements. 

Development Immature technologies ................................................ Incremental development, while ensuring technologies are mature. 

Oversight ..... Limited oversight of contractor, relaxed specifications and inspections, and limited design reviews.More contractor oversight with government presence 

at contractor facility; use of military standards; 

and multiple levels of preliminary design reviews, 

with the contractor being held to military standards and deliverables during each review. 

Source: GAO analysis based on discussion with the GPS program office and program documentation. 

44. Senator VITTER. Ms. Chaplain, if it’s better positioned for success, why do you 

have a concern about the schedule goals for GPS IIIA? 

Ms. CHAPLAIN. We continue to believe the IIIA schedule is optimistic given the 

program’s late start, past trends in space acquisitions, and challenges facing the 

new contractor. With respect to satellite development, for example, DOD has taken 

significant steps to reduce schedule risks and these should better position DOD for 

78 

success than in the past. But the delivery date is 3.5 years less than the GPS IIF 

program and we have not yet seen a major satellite program in the past decade or 

so that has met its original delivery date, let alone one with an ambitious schedule. 

Our concerns also extend to the ground and user components for GPS—which have 

a history of significant schedule delays. To increase confidence in the schedule for 

delivering the ground control system for IIIA (the next generation operational control segment known as OCX), the GPS wing added 16 months of development time 

to the effort. This means that OCX is now scheduled to be fielded after the May 

2014 launch of the first GPS IIIA satellite. 

MINOTAUR SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

45. Senator VITTER. General Kehler, I want to ask you about the Orbital/Suborbital Program (OSP), which allows the Air Force to use decommissioned ballistic 

missile assets to build Minotaur space launch vehicles. Minotaur has been a lowcost and reliable launch option for the Air Force, with 16 of 16 successful missions 

to date. In a memo dated October 19, 2009, you expressed a desire to use Minotaur 

rocket for launching small defense payloads, saying: ‘‘The Minotaur family of launch 

vehicles provides a moderately responsive and more cost effective small launch capability.’’ Can you elaborate on the utility of the OSP? 

General KEHLER. The OSP leverages our inventory of decommissioned ballistic 

missiles to provide effective and low-cost small launch capability through the 

Minotaur family of launch vehicles. Sustaining OSP assures some of our emerging 

small launch needs can be met. OSP does not exclude other launch vehicle providers 

from competing for small launch opportunities. 

46. Senator VITTER. General Kehler, for what types of applications are Minotaurs 

currently used, and how does the Air Force plan to employ them in the future? 

General KEHLER. The Minotaur family of launch vehicles use decommissioned ballistic missile assets to provide an effective, low-cost small launch capability. 

Minotaur launch vehicles are currently used as targets for missile defense testing 

and to launch scientific and research payloads. This year, Minotaur will launch the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Hypersonic Test Vehicle, the Space 

Based Space Surveillance spacecraft, TacSat-4, a Space Test Program spacecraft, 

and ORS–1. We expect to continue using Minotaur, as well as other small launch 

vehicles, to deliver small spacecraft to orbit and perform suborbital research missions in the future. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(79) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in room 

SR–232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin 

Nelson (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators E. Benjamin Nelson, 

Begich, Sessions, and Vitter. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; 

Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator 

Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator BEN NELSON. I call this subcommittee hearing to order. 

The Strategic Forces Subcommittee is meeting today. Good afternoon. Before we begin, I have one administrative announcement. 

The open portion of this hearing will continue until approximately 

3:45 p.m., at which point we will recess and immediately move to 

SVC 217, the Capitol Visitor Center, where we will reconvene at 

4 p.m. for a closed briefing. This briefing will be for members and 

designated staff only. 

We welcome all of our witnesses today to discuss strategic and 

nuclear forces of the Air Force and the Navy. Appearing before the 

subcommittee are: Dr. Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy; Lieutenant General Frank Klotz, Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command 

(GSC); Lieutenant General Mark Shackelford, Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; 

80 

Major General Donald Alston, Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force; Major General 

David J. Scott, Director, Operational Capability Requirements, and 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements, 

U.S. Air Force; and Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of 

Strategic Systems Programs, U.S. Navy. 

The new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirms that the 

United States must prevent and deter conflict by maintaining both 

strong conventional and nuclear forces. Until such time as the administration’s goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, 

nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the 

Department of Defense (DOD). It will maintain a safe, secure, and 

effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States and 

on our allies and partners. 

Today’s hearing will discuss issues associated with maintaining 

the nuclear deterrent and the conventional operations of the longrange bomber force. When we scheduled this hearing, we had assumed that the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was supposed to be submitted with the QDR and budget request, would 

have been submitted as well. Unfortunately, that’s not the case, so 

some of the policy and nuclear force structure decisions have not 

yet been announced. Dr. Roberts, I will ask you later in this hearing to provide an update on the NPR and when we might expect 

to receive it. 

General Klotz, this is your first opportunity as the Commander 

of the new GSC to testify before this committee, so we look forward 

to hearing your plans for the new command and how this will improve the Air Force nuclear enterprise. While the new command 

has all of the Air Force nuclear-capable assets assigned to it, I also 

understand that this is not exclusively a nuclear command or an 

effort to recreate the old Strategic Air Command. I’d like to understand in more detail how the operational control of bomber aircraft 

will be managed, the relationship to Air Combat Command, including how the B–1 fits into this picture, and how the new command 

will influence the requirements process for the next generation 

long-range strike capability. 

Keeping the bomber force flying and fully capable to serve in its 

demanding conventional role is essential. All of these aircraft are 

old, the B–52 being the oldest, and all need to be modernized and 

maintained well into the future. The B–52s will have been flying 

for 80 years when they retire around 2040 under the current plan. 

These aircraft have a unique capability to sustain long loiter times 

to provide a broad variety of ordnance when and where needed. 

General Shackelford and General Scott, we look forward to hearing from you how all of the bomber aircraft are performing and the 

plans and funding needed to meet the mission-capable rate goals. 

Over the last 21⁄2 years, the Air Force has taken many actions 

to correct the problems that were uncovered after Labor Day weekend 2007, when a B–52 bomber unknowingly carried nuclear weapons across the country. General Alston, you’ve been working on fixing these problems for a while. We’d like to hear from you how you 

think we’re doing, what the successes are, and what you still worry 

about. 

81 

Admiral Johnson, the Navy has embarked on an ambitious replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarines. 

This will be a costly program that’s going forward without the benefit of an NPR. We look forward to hearing from you about this 

major undertaking, including the plans, the schedule, and the funding that will be needed. 

Last week the subcommittee held a hearing on space systems. In 

that hearing we had a good discussion about solid rocket motors 

and other aspects of the space launch industrial base. General 

Klotz and Admiral Johnson, I would like to hear your thoughts on 

this industrial base, as it is the same one that supports the ballistic missiles, and what each of you are doing to address those concerns. 

Again, welcome to all our witnesses. I’d like to note that each of 

the prepared statements that we’ve received will be included in the 

record without objection. Let me say also that I hear there may be 

another vote coming, so we’ll try to work around that schedule. 

Senator Vitter, would you like to give an opening statement at 

this time? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I’ll submit 

my written statement for the record and just focus on some highlights of that. 

First of all, I certainly also look forward to the administration’s 

NPR as soon as possible. Obviously, this discussion is a little bit 

partial and incomplete without it, so we await that and await filling in major blanks as we get that. I do believe we’re at a particularly critical time and a turning point for the DOD nuclear enterprise and we all need to be focused on making sure that happens 

properly. 

In that vein, I would quote the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States, which said that as the number of warheads decreases, the importance of our triad of strategic 

delivery systems dramatically increases. They rightly noted that 

each leg of the triad provides ‘‘unique contributions to stability.’’ As 

‘‘the overall force shrinks, their unique values become more prominent.’’ I think this is very important to keep our eye on. 

Lastly, I would simply underscore the chairman’s comments 

about the position of our industrial base, particularly with regard 

to solid rockets. I am very concerned, as I mentioned here previously, about the dramatic change in course proposed at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and what it 

would do to our solid rocket industrial base, which would have, in 

my opinion, a major negative impact on a lot of your capability and 

the costs of keeping that capability up. I look forward to General 

Klotz and others’ discussion of that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the Department’s fiscal year 2011 request for the Department of Defense (DOD)-wide strategic forces programs. The fiscal year 2011 request signifies a critical turning point for the DOD nuclear enterprise. 

82 

With the exception of the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN(X)), many of these 

funding requests are unfortunately designated by the Department as placeholders 

awaiting the delayed release of the administration’s Nuclear Posture Review. Nonetheless, as noted by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, as the number of warheads decreases, the importance of 

our triad of strategic delivery systems dramatically increases. The commission rightly notes that each leg of the triad provides ‘‘unique contributions to stability’’ and 

as the ‘‘overall force shrinks, their unique values become more prominent.’’ In this 

context, I look forward to hearing how DOD views the future of the triad, and in 

light of possible future reductions in warheads, how the Department views the continued and heightened importance of maintaining and modernizing a capable triad. 

One of the most significant and substantial investments in delivery vehicle modernization is the Ohio class SSBN replacement. At more than $6 billion budgeted 

over the next 5 years for research and development and an estimated 12 ships at 

$6–$7 billion each, the SSBN(X) is an extraordinary yet necessary investment. 

Nonetheless, development and eventual procurement cost as well as schedule must 

be a critical consideration before going forward. I look forward to discussing what 

steps are being taken early to ensure that requirements are established, capabilities 

are affordable, and that the follow-on is delivered both on time and within budget. 

Another vital area of the nuclear enterprise supported by the Quadrennial Defense Review and the budget request is the Next Generation Bomber (NGB). The 

budget includes $200 million for the NGB in fiscal year 2011 and a total of $1.7 

billion over the next 5 years. I fully support the administration’s efforts in this area. 

As for other Air Force related programs, the fiscal year 2011 budget continues 

funding to conduct an Analysis of Alternatives study for a follow-on Long-Range 

Standoff capability and dedicates significant resources, more than $800 million in 

the out-years to being research, development, test, and evaluation for that effort. I 

understand that a decision regarding the inclusion of a nuclear capability awaits 

further direction from the President, and I look forward to hearing more from our 

witnesses on the contributing benefit of our current Long Range Stand-off nuclear 

capability, and what the lack of a nuclear air launched cruise missile could mean 

for the nuclear triad. For the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the fiscal year 2011 budget requests more than $320 million to continue the commitment 

of sustaining the Minuteman. This continued reinvigoration is an essential investment to ensure the sustainment of the ICBM force through 2030. 

The Strategic Posture Commission expressed significant concern with the dwindling solid rocket motor infrastructure, responsible for supporting the majority of 

the strategic triad. Simply stated, the commission maintains that the submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and ICBMs are not being sustained: ‘‘There are 

no new missile production programs planned for more than a decade and decisions 

on follow-on ICBMs and SLBMs have not been made.’’ In the meantime, we have 

no other missile development programs utilizing solid fuels, all exacerbated by the 

administration’s decision to retire the Shuttle and cancel the Constellation Program. 

As we learned during our space posture hearing last week, the cancelation of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs has ramifications 

that go far beyond NASA itself and I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses. Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witnesses, thank them for their service, and anticipate a fruitful discussion. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

The panel is fairly large today, as we can see, so I would hope 

that each of you would highlight your comments as best you can, 

having already taken your written statements into the record. We 

would begin with you, Dr. Roberts. 

STATEMENT OF BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE 

DEFENSE POLICY 

Dr. ROBERTS. Thank you, sir, and thank you for the opportunity 

to be here today. 

Let me address directly your question about the state of the NPR 

and the report of the review. The review has been under way for 

11 months following the legislative mandate and a presidential 

study directive. It is wrapping up. The report itself is nearing comVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
83 

pletion and we expect completion and delivery here to Congress 

within the next few weeks at the most. We’re very much in the end 

game. 

We do recognize the delay. We apologize for the delay, and we 

regret it. But there was the need to be thorough in the review and 

the need to ensure that we had official agreement at the highest 

level on how to approach a balanced strategy for reducing nuclear 

dangers in the 21st century. 

I can report that the report itself will be organized around five 

key policy objectives. The first of those is to prevent nuclear performance and nuclear terrorism. The second is to reduce the role 

of nuclear weapons in U.S. military strategy. The third is to maintain effective strategic deterrence at lower force levels. The fourth 

is to strengthen regional deterrence, and assure U.S. allies and 

partners. The fifth objective is to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

Let me highlight two of the main themes that bear on the discussion today, two of the main findings of the review. The first is that 

under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) the 

United States should retain the triad. This is reflected in the fiscal 

year 2011 budget submission, which reflects commitments to sustain the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the manner directed by Congress, to begin the development of the follow-on class 

for the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) force, to sustain the 

bomber force, and to upgrade the B–2s over the coming 5-year period. 

You will also hear discussion today of a study that the Department has underway which will bring forward results in the next 

budget. It is a study of the requirements of a long-term mix of nonnuclear strike capabilities, nonnuclear ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and bombers, and how those are integrated in the emerging 

strategic environment. This is a study that’s underway and will be 

concluded in time to impact the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

I said that there are two themes from the NPR bearing on today’s discussion. The first is sustaining the triad under New 

START. The second is to recommend a plan for sustaining the 

stockpile, a plan that’s consistent with the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the stockpile 

management plan described therein. In support of this commitment, we’ve requested a 13 percent increase in the National Nuclear Security Administration’s fiscal year 2011 budget in order to 

modernize the complex, in order to strengthen surveillance of the 

stockpile, and in order to strengthen the science, technology, and 

engineering base in the nuclear complex. 

This budget also supports the life extension programs (LEP) for 

the 76 and 61, and it allows for a follow-on LEP study for the W– 

78. 

I hope that in setting out these two themes from the NPR we’re 

helping to inform today’s discussion. I look forward to the opportunity to answer any questions you might have, but also to come 

back and discuss the NPR in its entirety within a relatively short 

period of time. 

Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

84 

General Klotz. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF, 

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND 

General KLOTZ. Chairman Nelson and Ranking Member Vitter: 

It’s an honor to appear before you today for the first time as the 

Commander of Air Force GSC. I thank you for the opportunity to 

talk a little bit about the Air Force’s newest major command. 

GSC has now assumed responsibility for both the ICBM and the 

long-range nuclear-capable bomber force. In 16 months we’ve gone 

from a provisional headquarters here at Bolling Air Force Base in 

Washington, DC, of about 100 people, to a command comprising 

over 23,000 Air Force professionals at 5 different operational bases 

across the United States. 

The fundamental mission of Air Force GSC is to provide for safe, 

secure, and effective forces for nuclear deterrence and for global 

strike, both to deter aggression against the United States and to 

provide assurance to our allies. We perform this mission with a 

very elite and highly professional, disciplined team of American 

airmen who have a special trust and responsibility for the most 

powerful weapons in our Nation’s arsenal. 

The Minuteman III ICBM and the nuclear-capable B–52 and B– 

2 bombers have been and, most importantly, remain very important elements and components of the U.S. Armed Forces. The 

ICBM with its unmatched responsiveness and the bomber with its 

tremendous flexibility provide unique and complementary capabilities to the Nation’s strategic nuclear triad. 

As you rightly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the bombers of GSC 

also offer critically important conventional capabilities to the combatant commanders. Even though it’s a truism that the creation of 

GSC resulted largely from concerns about the state of the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise, this command takes the conventional role of the 

B–52 and the B–2 very, very seriously. To that end, GSC will continue to work very closely with Air Combat Command and the 

other major commands that are part of the combat air forces to 

continuously develop and refine weapons and tactics for employment of the bombers in conventional operations. 

I look forward to the opportunity to discuss these and other 

issues this afternoon. 

[The prepared statement of General Klotz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before the Senate today for the first time as 

the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Air Force’s newest major command. 

Today, I would like to provide a brief update the establishment of Global Strike 

Command; the enduring importance of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 

and long-range, nuclear-capable bomber to our national security; and the steps necessary to sustain and modernize these forces to ensure they remain safe, secure, and 

effective. 

COMMAND UPDATE

Upon assuming office in summer 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley 

and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz launched a comprehensive, 

85 

multi-faceted roadmap designed to restore a culture of compliance and rebuild the 

nuclear enterprise. Air Force Global Strike Command was established as a key part 

of this roadmap. This command is a visible commitment to the nuclear enterprise, 

clearly aligning the ICBM and long-range, nuclear-capable bomber forces under a 

single chain of command, providing focused oversight and advocacy of the Air 

Force’s nuclear forces. 

The command was founded on the premise that as important as other defense priorities may be, none are more important than the responsibility for operating, maintaining, securing and supporting nuclear weapons. For if there is one unchanging, 

immutable truth about this awesome capability, it is that it demands constant and 

undivided attention. This was true in the past, it is true now, and it will be true 

in the future, regardless of the size or composition of the Nation’s nuclear deterrence and global strike forces. 

Last year, in a speech in Prague, Czech Republic, President Obama made this 

point perfectly clear. ‘‘Make no mistake,’’ he said, ‘‘as long as these weapons exist, 

the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any 

adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.’’ The critical importance of this 

undertaking was again underscored in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which states, ‘‘Until such time as the administration’s goal of a world free of 

nuclear weapons is achieved . . . [w]e will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.’’ 

This then is the fundamental mission of Air Force Global Strike Command—to 

develop and provide safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrence and global strike 

forces both to deter attacks and assure our allies. It performs this mission with an 

elite, highly disciplined team of American airmen with special trust and responsibility for the most powerful weapons in our Nation’s arsenal. 

Global Strike Command is being established in a methodical, step-by-step fashion. 

The first step was to stand-up a provisional command in January 2009, at Bolling 

Air Force Base (AFB), in Washington DC, under the leadership of then Brigadier 

General Jim Kowalski, now a two-star and the Vice Commander of Air Force Global 

Strike Command. 

The next step took place on August 7, when General Schwartz formally activated 

Air Force Global Strike Command in a ceremony at Barksdale AFB, LA, the site 

of the command’s permanent headquarters. 

The first actual transfer of forces occurred on December 1, when Air Force Global 

Strike Command assumed responsibility for the intercontinental ballistic missile 

mission from Air Force Space Command. 

Under the new command arrangements, 20th Air Force, headquartered at F.E. 

Warren AFB, WY and its three missile wings—at F.E. Warren AFB, at Malmstrom 

AFB, MT, and at Minot AFB, ND—now fall under Air Force Global Strike Command. On the same day, the command also took charge of the ICBM test mission 

of the 576th Flight Test Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, CA and the targeting analysis mission of the 625th Strategic Operations Squadron at Offutt AFB, NE. 

Just 6 weeks ago, on February 1, the transfer of forces to Air Force Global Strike 

Command was completed as responsibility for 8th Air Force and the long-range, nuclear-capable bomber mission was assumed from Air Combat Command. The 8th Air 

Force is headquartered at Barksdale and exercises command over the two B–52 

wings, one at Barksdale, the other at Minot, as well as the B–2 wing at Whiteman 

AFB, MO. 

Since last year, significant changes have also taken place within these organizations as well. In August, 8th Air Force’s assets for cyberspace operations moved to 

the newly-established 24th Air Force, headquartered in San Antonio, TX. Then in 

October, the remaining ‘‘non-bomber’’ units of 8th Air Force were transferred to 9th 

and 12th Air Forces. The end-result is a leaner 8th Air Force focused exclusively 

on the long-range, nuclear capable bomber force. 

Additionally, in September, the Air Force reactivated the 69th Bomb Squadron to 

become the second operational B–52 squadron at Minot, thus mirroring Barksdale, 

which already had two operational B–52 squadrons. This move will help balance the 

workload between nuclear deterrence and conventional missions—not only at Minot, 

but across the entire B–52 force. The new operational squadron will ultimately 

bring ten additional B–52s and over 800 additional operations, maintenance, and 

support personnel to Minot. The new people and jets have already begun to arrive 

in a phased deployment that will be complete by this spring. 

Finally, Air Force Global Strike Command will achieve full operational capability 

in late summer 2010 with about 1,000 personnel on board at the headquarters and 

approximately 23,000 people in the entire command. Of special note, the command 

will be a fully integrated, ‘‘Total Force’’ team—composed of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, Government civilians, and contractors. 

86 

AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND FORCES

The Minuteman III ICBMs as well as the nuclear-capable B–52 and B–2 bombers 

have been, and most importantly remain, essential components of the U.S. Armed 

Forces. Each makes important and unique contributions to the security of the Nation, as well as the security of the Nation’s allies and friends. 

Of the three legs of the strategic nuclear triad, the ICBMs are the most responsive to national leadership. Continuously on alert and deployed in 450 widely dispersed locations, the size and characteristics of the overall Minuteman III force presents any potential adversary with an almost insurmountable challenge should they 

contemplate attacking the United States. Because an adversary cannot disarm the 

ICBM force without nearly exhausting their own forces in the process, and at the 

same time, leaving themselves vulnerable to sea-launched ballistic missiles and 

bombers, they have no incentive to strike in the first place. In this case, numbers 

do matter. The ICBM contributes immeasurably to both deterrence and stability in 

a crisis. 

While the ICBM possesses unmatched responsiveness, both in terms of time-tolaunch and time-to-target, the B–52 and B–2 bombers likewise possess significant 

and complementary capabilities and remain critically important components of the 

strategic nuclear triad. Their readiness levels can be visibly ratcheted up or down 

to demonstrate national intent. They can be dispersed to enhance their survivability. If ever launched toward their targets, they can be recalled should fast-breaking developments so dictate. They can also carry a comparatively large number of 

weapons with different capabilities. Bombers can avoid flying over sensitive areas 

in ways ballistic missiles may not be able to do. Just as the various components of 

the triad provide mutually reinforcing, complementary capabilities, so too do the two 

different bombers, with the B–52 providing unique, unmatched stand-off capabilities 

and the B–2 providing the capability to attack heavily defended targets. 

Finally, both of these bombers possess vitally important conventional, or nonnuclear, capabilities, as they convincingly demonstrated in the opening phases of 

both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. With ever-increasing capabilities to deliver highly precise and more effective munitions from bases in the 

United States or at forward deployed locations, the bomber offers important and 

unique capabilities to the combatant commander. While the creation of Global 

Strike Command clearly resulted from concerns related to the overall strength of 

the Air Force nuclear enterprise, the command nevertheless takes the conventional 

role of the B–52 and the B–2 very seriously. To that end, Global Strike Command 

will continue to work very closely with Air Combat Command and the other members of the Combat Air Forces to continuously develop and refine weapons and tactics for employing the bombers in conventional operations. 

SUSTAINMENT AND MODERNIZATION

As important as the ICBM and long-range, nuclear-capable bomber are to national 

security, they are aging weapon systems. The Minuteman III, first deployed in the 

1970s, is now nearly 40 years old. Moreover, much of the infrastructure—for example, missile silos, launch control centers, missile alert facilities, underground cables—were fielded even earlier with previous generations of the Minuteman. The 

last B–52H left the factory in 1962. The newest B–52 is older than the pilots who 

fly it, and in some cases twice their age. The B–2, the Nation’s most advanced 

bomber, is considerably newer; but, even it is now over 20 years old. 

Nevertheless, the Minuteman III and both bombers still have significant life left 

in them and will be a part of the Air Force inventory for many years to come. But, 

as with any aging system, each weapon system faces chronic problems ranging from 

vanishing vendors for spare parts to worn-out handling and test equipment. Additionally, original design specifications in some cases limit the integration of modern 

communications and data processing capabilities. Accordingly, the Air Force fiscal 

year 2011 budget request calls for increased funding to address sustainment and 

modernization, for both the missile and the bomber force. 

With respect to the Minuteman III ICBM, the Air Force is currently in a multiyear program to refurbish or modernize practically every inch of the Minuteman 

III—from the top of the nose cone to the bottom of the first stage nozzles. All three 

rocket motors have been overhauled with new propellant, the guidance system has 

been updated with new electronics, the propulsion system rocket engine (or post 

boost vehicle) is undergoing life extension, and the newer Peacekeeper ICBM reentry vehicles are being deployed on a portion of the Minuteman fleet. Meanwhile, 

other aspects of the weapon system have benefitted from substantial investment. To 

ensure connectivity with national command authorities, very low frequency communications equipment has been updated and new equipment has been added to reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ceive MILSTAR transmissions. Communications capabilities will be further expanded to take advantage of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite upgrades. To enhance the survivability of the weapon system, the missile alert and 

launch facilities are being equipped with new environmental control systems, new 

diesel generators, new electrical panels, and new batteries. These measures will not 

only extend the service life of the missile system, but will also enhance its maintainability and reduce the cost of ownership. 

Equally important, significant steps are being taken to enhance security in every 

facet of the ICBM system. Work was recently completed on reinforcing the concrete 

headworks at every launch facility, and progress continues on deploying a modified 

personnel access hatch designed to ‘‘button-up’’ a missile silo faster in case of emergency. Programs are underway to install security surveillance cameras at all the remote launch facility sites as well as all of the alert facilities. 

However, significant work remains, particularly in the realm of nuclear support 

equipment. For example, every weapon deployed to the missile field requires a thorough checkout from the Reentry System Test Set, which is overdue for replacement. 

Without it, not a single missile can be placed on alert. Associated cabling, junction 

boxes, and replacement parts are equally critical to keeping missiles on alert. As 

such, it is a reminder that sustainment of test equipment, handling equipment, and 

transportation equipment are very important to the effectiveness of a weapon system. Hard work is being done to improve in this area, and through a concerted effort with the system program office, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, and the 

ICBM contractor team, this challenge will be overcome just as many others have 

been overcome over the years. 

All these measures are designed to sustain the Minuteman III force through 2020. 

In response to congressional direction, the Air Force is currently exploring the steps 

necessary to sustain the Minuteman III until 2030. Projections can and have been 

made about the potential service life of the motors and other hardware after undergoing the current upgrade programs; but, it’s still too early to say with confidence 

just how long the Minuteman weapon system will be serviceable. The Air Force will 

continue to conduct a comprehensive program to inspect missile and reentry system 

components for signs of aging, and to perform periodic operational tests—both in the 

missile field as well as unarmed test flights from Vandenberg AFB, CA. 

The B–52 is also undergoing several programs in order to maintain its viability 

through 2040. Current initiatives include incorporating the 1760 data bus into the 

bomb bay to provide the capability to carry precision weapons internally. This upgrade will provide greater flexibility to the warfighter by practically doubling the 

smart weapon carriage onboard the B–52. The Combat Network Communications 

Technology acquisition program will support both nuclear and conventional operations by upgrading the B–52 fleet with tactical data link and voice communications 

capabilities. Efforts are also underway to enhance the aircraft’s capability to communicate in a secure, protected mode as the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency Satellite comes on line. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has allocated $3.3 million to conduct an Analysis of Alternative to replace the air-launched 

cruise missile (ALCM). This effort began last summer when the Air Force identified 

initial requirements to ensure the B–52 standoff weapons are viable beyond 2020. 

This is not the entire list, but it illustrates the range of B–52 programs underway. 

As for the B–2, a new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar is currently being fielded, and the B–2 is also beginning a modernization effort to improve 

the Defensive Management System on the aircraft. This will allow the B–2 to continue operations around the world in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. Funding will also be increased for the Weapon System Support Center Software Integration Laboratory, 

which enables testing of current as well as developmental aircraft systems. New terminals will need to be installed on the aircraft to enable it to communicate in secure, protected modes via the Air Force’s new Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

satellites—a task made more challenging by its unique low observable (LO) requirements. Efforts are also underway to address the sustainability of aft decks and to 

improve the process for maintaining the aircraft’s LO capability. 

It is also worth noting that Air Force Global Strike Command has lead command 

responsibilities for the venerable UH–1N Huey helicopter that currently supports 

field operations and security at all three missile bases. While this helicopter remains a serviceable aircraft, and has been an undeniably reliable workhorse for the 

Air Force, thanks to the expertise and efforts of the Air Force’s helicopter squadron 

leaders and contractor logistics support, the UH–1N fleet is aging and its ability to 

meet post-September 11 security requirements is constrained by cargo capacity, 

range and speed. It also lacks the necessary all-weather capability to support nuclear security response and convoy missions today. 

88 

The Air Force has initiated the acquisition process for replacement of aging UH– 

1N aircraft. On February 16, General Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, approved the Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) capabilities 

document stating the Joint Requirement Oversight Committee’s priority is the rapid 

fielding of the CVLSP to meet immediate warfighter needs. The next major milestone is for the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Global Strike Command, 

and the Air Force Materiel Command’s Aeronautical Systems Center to present the 

acquisition strategy to senior Defense Department leadership for review as part of 

the Material Development Decision. This effort is driving toward a projected initial 

operation capability of six aircraft to missile wings in fiscal year 2015. With this 

acquisition, the Air Force will be increasing both crew force and the number of aircraft that can successfully execute the mission anytime they are called upon. 

CONCLUSION

The nuclear deterrence and global strike forces of the Air Force remain vitally important to the Nation, as well as to the United States’ friends and allies around the 

world. For the men and women of Air Force Global Strike Command that means 

we have an extraordinarily important mission; noble and worthy work to perform; 

work that demands the utmost in professionalism, discipline, excellence, pride and 

esprit. 

Everyone across America—and the world—should know and never doubt that the 

senior leadership of the Air Force is extremely proud of the airmen who currently 

serve in Eighth and Twentieth Air Forces, and what they do every day. Indeed, our 

airmen are doing truly magnificent work—flying sorties and performing alert duties; 

keeping our bombers flying and our missiles ready; defending our flight lines and 

launch facilities; deploying to Southwest Asia and Guam; supporting our airmen, 

their families and retirees; and caring for our wounded warriors. With every sortie, 

every alert tour, every shift, every post and every support activity—they demonstrate over and over that they rank among the best and brightest airmen who 

have ever served in the U.S. Air Force. 

As Secretary of Defense Gates noted in his remarks to the bomber and missile 

personnel at Minot AFB 15 months ago, ‘‘Handling nuclear weapons—the most powerful and destructive instruments in the arsenal of freedom—is a tremendous responsibility. We owe you the attention, the people, and the resources you need to 

do the job right . . . .Yours is the most sensitive mission in the entire U.S. military.’’ 

This new command reflects the Air Force’s firm and unshakable conviction that 

strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operations require a special trust and 

responsibility—one that we take very seriously. Air Force Global Strike Command 

will serve as a single voice to maintain the high standards necessary in the stewardship of our Air Force’s strategic deterrent forces. 

Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

General Shackelford. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF, MILITARY DEPUTY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

General SHACKELFORD. Mr. Chairman and Senator Vitter: Thank 

you very much for offering me the opportunity to speak with your 

committee today. 

Air Force Acquisition has a number of modernization programs 

applicable to each of the three bombers to support our commitment 

to long-term support for those bombers out into the future. At the 

same time, we’re doing the appropriate risk reduction and requirements refinement for a future bomber or long-range strike capability. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Shackelford follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. MARK D. SHACKELFORD, USAF 

The Air Force continues to modernize and support its bomber fleet with over $5.5 

billion planned over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) in modernization 

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and sustainment investments. The B–2, B–52 and B–1 bombers each have programs 

to ensure their viability into the future. 

B–1

The B–1B Lancer has maintained an unflagging deployed presence since September 11, 2001 in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. 

During that time, the B–1 fleet and its crews have flown more than 6,900 missions 

and amassed more than 70,000 combat hours. In Operation Enduring Freedom 

alone, the B–1 has employed nearly 40 percent of all munitions while flying only 

5 percent of all sorties. 

Given the B–1’s critical contributions to today’s fight and its corresponding high 

operations tempo, the Air Force places great emphasis on sustaining the B–1 fleet. 

B–1 sustainment efforts currently address several issues which, if left unchecked, 

could critically limit aircraft availability and leave a gap in our power projection capability. Although these modifications represent a significant investment, they are 

critical to supporting our deployed combat forces by ensuring continued B–1 availability. 

The Air Force’s primary B–1 modernization effort is the Fully Integrated Data 

Link (FIDL). FIDL gives aircrew enhanced situational awareness and combat effectiveness by incorporating Link-16 data link and Joint Range Extension Beyond 

Line-of-Sight capabilities. FIDL also provides the backbone infrastructure for a substantial upgrade to the existing cockpit including modern multi-function color displays that provide aircrew with a new level of fused data. 

The Air Force continues to develop the highly successful Laptop Controlled Targeting Pod (LCTP) modification for the B–1. Begun in 2007 as a response to a U.S. 

Air Forces, U.S. Central Command Urgent Need Request and operational since 

2008, LCTP provides the B–1 with targeting pod capabilities via the Sniper Advanced Targeting Pod (ATP). The B–1 combined with the Sniper ATP delivers an 

unprecedented level of payload precision to the fight. Efforts continue to outfit the 

entire B–1 fleet for Sniper operations and provide a Moving Target Kill capability 

via employment of laser-guided weapons. 

B–2

The B–2 Spirit Advanced Technology Bomber provides a lethal combination of 

range, payload, and stealth, and remains the world’s sole long-range, low observable 

bomber. It is the only platform capable of delivering 80 independently targeted 500- 

lb Joint Direct Attack Munitions (GBU–38). While B–2 availability has steadily increased over the past 5 years, in part due to enhancements in low observable maintenance such as the highly successful Alternate High Frequency Material program, 

it faces increasing pressures to upgrade avionics originally designed over 20 years 

ago. The three increment Extremely High Frequency Satellite Communications and 

Computer Upgrade program (EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade) seeks first, in 

Increment 1, to upgrade the Spirit’s flight management computers as an enabler for 

future avionics efforts. Increment 2 integrates the Family of Beyond-line-of-sight 

Terminals (FAB–T) along with a low observable antenna to provide secure, survivable strategic communication, while Increment 3 will connect the B–2 into the Global Information Grid. Increment 1 of EHF SATCOM and Computer Upgrade is currently in Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) and on track to begin 

procurement in fiscal year 2011 for fleet installations beginning at the end of fiscal 

year 13. The Department is also investing in the B–2’s Defensive Management System to ensure continued survivability. This will allow the B–2 to continue operations in more advanced threat environments while decreasing the maintenance required to operate the system. 

We will also replace the B–2’s original radar antenna, upgrade selected radar avionics and change the radar operating frequency as part of the Radar Modernization 

Program (RMP). The Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract for the first six 

production radar kits was awarded in December 2008, with the second and final 

full-rate buy for the remaining seven ship sets awarded in November 2009. Seven 

radar ship sets were previously procured during development and are currently 

being installed in fleet aircraft. Upon delivery and installation of the radar ship 

sets, the twenty aircraft 

B–2 fleet will have completed its radar modernization efforts. The developmental 

units will be retrofitted to the final production configuration. Thanks in large part 

to congressional support, the RMP acquisition strategy was modified to include lifeof-type component buys to avoid diminishing manufacturing source issues during 

the production run. 

90 

B–52

The B–52 Stratofortress is our Nation’s oldest frontline long-range strategic bomber with the last airframe entering service in 1962. The Air Force has invested in 

modernization programs to keep the platform viable and operationally relevant. 

Major B–52 modernizations include the Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT), EHF SATCOM, Strategic Radar Replacement (SR2), and 1760 

Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade programs. CONECT provides an integrated communication and mission management system with machine to machine datalink interfaces for weapons delivery. The digital infrastructure provided in CONECT is the 

backbone for EHF SATCOM and SR2. The EHF SATCOM program integrates the 

FAB–T providing assured, survivable two-way strategic command and control communications. The SR2 program, starting in fiscal year 2010, integrates a modern 

non-developmental radar to address systemic sustainment issues, replacing the legacy APN–166 radar. Finally, 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade provides internal 

J-series weapons capability through modification of Common Strategic Rotary 

Launchers and an upgrade of stores management and offensive avionics software. 

Updated with modern technology the B–52 will be capable of delivering the full complement of jointly developed weapons and will continue into the 21st century as an 

important element of our Nation’s defenses. 

The fiscal year 2011 PB began funding for technology industrial base sustainment 

in anticipation of a future long range strike (LRS) platform program. This effort develops and demonstrates LRS technologies and concepts in support of Air Force 

Global Strike and Global Persistent Attack Concepts of Operations. This effort will 

provide capability improvements in the areas of strike responsiveness, survivability, 

lethality, connectivity, and affordability. The Quadrennial Defense Review-directed 

LRS study will help inform and shape the requirements for LRS. 

The sustainment and modernization efforts briefly outlined above will ensure our 

bomber fleet’s continued ability to project global power through enhanced combat capability and lethality, survivability, and supportability. I wish to thank the committee for it’s continued support of the Air Force’s global strike mission. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Alston. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General ALSTON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter: Thank 

you very much for the privilege to testify before you this afternoon. 

I have been in my position as the Assistant Chief of Staff of Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration for just the last 15 

months that the organization stood up. We stood it up in November 

2008. But actually I arrived in the position to be working the challenges the Air Force has just a couple of days after our event that 

you mentioned in your opening remarks. So I look forward to discussing and answering your questions with regard to the variety of 

initiatives that we’ve undertaken with regard to process, structure, 

and culture in order to have the positive impacts that are required 

for us to perform at the level demanded by nuclear weapons. 

I look forward to your additional questions on this. 

[The prepared statement of General Alston follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force strategic programs. 

Twenty months ago, the Air Force began taking comprehensive action to strengthen performance in the nuclear mission area and to determine the long-term actions 

necessary to build a culture of excellence within the Air Force nuclear enterprise. 

Credible and reliable nuclear deterrence is essential for our security and that our 

allies and friends, and the Air Force have a pivotal role in this vital mission area. 

Air Force senior leadership continually emphasizes that there is no mission more 

91 

sensitive than safeguarding nuclear capabilities and maintaining nuclear deterrence, and that the Air Force has a sacred trust with the American people to safely 

operate, maintain and secure nuclear weapons. The strategic plan we developed 

nearly a year and a half ago provided the initial direction and framework to begin 

addressing the findings and recommendations from a variety of internal and external reports. I intend to use the six strategic objective of our roadmap to update the 

committee on the initiatives underway to support the Secretary of the Air Force and 

Chief of Staff’s number 1 priority, which is to continue to strengthen the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise. 

REBUILD A CULTURE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND RIGOUROUS SELF-ASSESSMENT DEDICATED TO HIGH STANDARDS OF EXCELLECE IN THE AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Regardless of the size or structure of our nuclear force, every action by every Airman must be executed with precision and reliability. Perfection is the standard each 

and every time and a robust self-assessment and inspection process to effectively 

uncover, analyze, and address systemic nuclear weaknesses is an important tool in 

our effort to rebuild a nuclear-aware and focused culture. 

The Air Force Inspector General (IG) has implemented centralized, independent 

oversight of Air Force nuclear inspections and assessments, while preserving major 

command (MAJCOM) authorities and responsibilities for training and readiness of 

their assigned forces. 

To robust our inspection process, we have developed standardized/centralized 

training for all IG team members with nuclear inspection duties, and a MAJCOM 

certification program for nuclear inspection teams. We also formed a core team of 

inspectors that accompany major command inspection teams to ensure consistent 

application of standards. We have also mandated an increase in no-notice inspections. 

Inspection policy changes include increasing the frequency and intensity of inspections while limiting or eliminating advanced notice. Other changes include: 

• Ensuring 100 percent oversight by the Air Force Inspection Agency of all nuclear inspections 

• Re-emphasizing no- and limited-notice inspections 

• Mandating a no-notice Limited Nuclear Survey Inspection be executed between each full-scale Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI) 

Increased depth and rigor of nuclear inspection activities have enhances our ability to identify and document discrepancies as a means to improve processes and procedures. 

In the exacting world of nuclear weapons, a perfect pass rate would not be realistic or desirable. A unit must have 750 items in 100 percent compliance with established standards in order to receive a ‘‘satisfactory’’ rating, therefore an ‘‘unsatisfactory’’ rating does not directly translate to an inability of a unit to accomplish its 

mission nor does it indicate a compromise of the safety, security and reliability of 

nuclear-responsible forces. Instead, it indicates a deviation from the extremely high 

standards we demand and expect in this mission area and we are committed to finding those deviations, determining what caused them, and correcting the deviations 

as a means of enhancing our stewardship of the nuclear deterrence mission. 

REBUILD NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE AND CODIFY CAREER PATHS

Credible deterrence requires capable systems and competent people. To overcome 

the erosion of nuclear expertise, the Air Force set forth a path to examine education 

and training across the enterprise, improve identification and tracking of nuclear 

experience and expertise, and establish a force development governance construct to 

ensure continual, formalized senior leadership involvement in the development of 

future nuclear leaders. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

General Scott. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. DAVID J. SCOTT, USAF, DIRECTOR, 

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, AND DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS, AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member: As the Director of Requirements for the Air Force, I work hand-in-hand with 

92 

the major commands on the requirements throughout, whether it’s 

from a bomber force or the fighter force, but all those requirements. 

I will work directly with General Klotz on the requirements that 

he has, or hand-in-hand with General Shackelford to hand off the 

requirements for the acquisition. 

Many of the things that you see in the beginning of the phase 

of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

(JCIDS) and the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council are the 

things that we’ll be working, and work the conventional side of 

that. Sir, I’m looking forward to your questions also. 

[The prepared statement of General Scott follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MAJ. GEN. DAVID SCOTT, USAF 

Good morning Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee regarding Air Force Strategic Forces and the current conventional operations 

for B–52, B–1, and B–2. All three of our long range strike platforms remain engaged 

in today’s fight while retaining an ability to meet future challenges. Air Force bombers have been on rotating deployment to SWA since September 11. 

The B–52 amplifies the consistent message of long range U.S. airpower in a theater such as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) where distance drives decisions. 

Equipped with advanced targeting pods, the B–52s can also provide real-time ISR 

with full motion video, enhanced situational awareness, a demonstrable over watch 

presence, and precision joint fires in support of Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 

objectives. While our B–52 fleet remains heavily tasked and is currently supporting 

the deployed operations on a 1-to-3 dwell, it continues to meet a constant nuclear 

commitment with the nondeployed forces. 

The B–52 brings some unique maritime support capabilities to the Pacific theater, 

a theater defined by the immensity of the Pacific Ocean. In a broad ocean area surveillance or in an anti-shipping role, the B–52 provides an important force multiplier to the fleet and Joint Forces Air Component Commander. B–52s equipped with 

advanced targeting pods and armed with joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) provide persistence over the battle field or the fleet which significantly contributes to 

the effectiveness of the joint force’s ability to respond to critical land, sea, or air 

threats. 

The B–1 is in the ongoing fight in Afghanistan and provides long range persistent 

airpower in direct support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, U.S., and Afghan troops. The B–1 provides real-time ISR with full motion video, enhanced situational awareness, a demonstrable over watch presence, and precision joint fires in 

support of coalition objectives. B–1s added SNIPER Advanced Targeting Pod capability in summer 2009, to provide air crew with positive ID capability and the ability 

to share video with forces on the ground. The Air Force developed this capability— 

in response to a Central Command tasking—on an accelerated 18 month timeline. 

This allows the ability to combine precision targeting, precision weapons, and persistence to the joint commander. 

Demonstrating a worldwide deterrence capability with our nuclear forces is vital 

to protecting both the United States and our allies. The B–2 and B–52 are tasked 

to provide dedicated support to U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). This is done 

via the Global Deterrence Force; our recent reorganization of the B–52 fleet to add 

a fourth active duty squadron, the 69th bomb squadron, at Minot which is designed 

to optimize support for the STRATCOM mission. While deployed, the units meet Air 

Tasking Order mission requirements for both ground alert and scheduled sorties to 

support STRATCOM’s objectives. 

Air Force bombers are also currently supporting U.S. PACOM’s Continuous Bomber Presence to assure allies and support U.S. interests in the Pacific region. Air 

Force bombers have been deployed to U.S. PACOM (Andersen Air Force Base) since 

2003—currently, the B–2 and B–52 cover this tasking. Each B–52 deployment 

brings aviators, maintainers and support forces for what is growing from a 120-day 

to a 179-day period. B–2s rotate in behind every two B–52 rotations. 

U.S. PACOM deployed bombers support a variety of exercises, often in conjunction 

with other Combat Air Force assets. Training missions include local sorties, exercises, and 24-hour global power missions to ranges in Hawaii, Alaska, and Australia. Significant exercises include Northern Edge in the Alaskan ranges and Valiant Shield in the vicinity of Guam. Northern Edge is an annual Air Force exercise 

93 

where bombers integrate with F–22, F–15, and F–16 fighters as wells as E–3 Airborne Warning and Control System to conduct simulated composite force integrated 

strikes against ground and air defenses. Valiant Shield was a joint exercise with the 

U.S. Navy where B–2s and F–15Es exercised with naval aviation assets from two 

Carrier Strike Groups simultaneously, marking the largest mass of U.S. naval 

forces since the Vietnam War. 

The Air Force continues our commitment to future long-range strike capabilities, 

as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to modernize and sustain our bomber force. 

We will continue planned legacy bomber sustainment and modernization to increase 

the conventional capabilities of the bomber fleet. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this subcommittee. I look forward to 

your questions. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Admiral Johnson. 

STATEMENT OF RADM STEPHEN E. JOHNSON, USN, DIRECTOR, 

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Strategic Systems are impeccably supported by the Secretary of the Navy, the 

Chief of Naval Operations, and by your committee in all aspects of 

our program. 

We have returned three SSBNs to strategic patrol in the past 12 

months. USS Alabama, Her Majesty’s Ship Victorious, and USS 

Alaska have all completed their demonstration and shakedown operations and all are ready or already on strategic patrol. 

Last December, it was the USS Alaska, the third of those three 

SSBNs to return to strategic operations, that conducted the 130th 

consecutive successful flight of the Trident II D5 missile. This 

record of successful flight tests is unmatched by any other missile 

system in the world. 

I would also like to thank the committee for its strong support 

of the Ohio Replacement Program and I look forward to our discussion today in that area. 

The men and women of the Strategic Systems Program are committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and reliability for 

our systems. We sincerely appreciate the committee’s support. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM STEPHEN JOHNSON, USN 

Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, distinguished members of the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss our 

Navy’s nuclear enterprise, today’s force and the efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our submarine strategic forces, and the Ohio Class Replacement to maintain continuous strategic deterrence. 

NAVY NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

Strategic Systems Programs is impeccably supported by the Secretary of the 

Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and by your committee in all aspects of our 

program. We appreciate this strong support and remain vigilant in executing our 

strategic deterrent mission. Strategic Systems Programs continues to maintain a 

safe, reliable, and secure environment for our strategic assets. We continue to focus 

on the custody and accountability of the nuclear assets you have entrusted to the 

Navy. 

Earlier this year, the Navy took a significant step to better define the roles and 

responsibilities associated with the safety and security of our strategic weapons. The 

Secretary of the Navy signed an instruction strengthening Strategic Systems Programs’ role as the program manager and technical authority for technical operations, safety, security, and maintenance of the Navy’s nuclear weapons and nuclear 

weapons systems. 

94 

Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) will continue to sustain our high standards 

and focus on two major areas which include; (1) fully meeting operational and fleet 

support requirements and (2) recruiting and retaining the highest quality personnel 

to execute our strategic mission. I established senior executive level management 

for field operations and am implementing continuous on-site evaluation. These actions have improved the rigor applied to daily operations, increased the level of accountability, created an environment of self-assessment, and placed priority on implementing corrective actions. SSP has also placed a high priority on the recruitment, development and retention of a highly-skilled workforce. These two focus 

areas shape the way in which we manage our day-to-day operations and set the culture to sustain our strategic deterrent for the long-term. The men and women of 

Strategic Systems Programs and our industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our Sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines and 

sailors who are standing the watch to ensure the security of the weapons we are 

entrusted with by this Nation. I would like to take a moment to address a few of 

the major initiatives underway within the Navy that address the sustainment of our 

sea-based deterrent and ensure its future viability. 

TODAY’S FORCE

We have returned three SSBNs to strategic patrol in the past 12 months. USS 

Alabama (SSBN 731), HMS Victorious and USS Alaska (SSBN 732) have all completed Demonstration and Shakedown Operations and are ready for or already on 

strategic patrol. Our 14 U.S. Navy SSBNs, 8 of which are homeported in the Pacific 

and 6 in the Atlantic Fleet, continue to provide a credible, survivable, and reliable 

sea-based strategic deterrent for our national leadership. 

In December, the USS Alaska (SSBN 732), the third of the three SSBNs to return 

to strategic operations, conducted the 130th consecutive successful flight test of the 

Trident II (D5) missile as part of her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. 

This record of successful flight tests is unmatched by any other missile launch system. Therefore, I am pleased to report to you that the Trident Strategic Weapons 

System continues to demonstrate itself as a credible deterrent and meet the operational requirements established for the system almost 30 years ago. 

USS Nevada (SSBN 733) will soon complete her Engineering Refueling Overhaul, 

enter post availability testing, prepare for her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation and return to the operational cycle in spring 2011. Two more of our submarines, USS Tennesse (SSBN 734) and USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) are undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls which will maintain the viability of these 

platforms through the service life of the Ohio class. 

The Trident II (D5) weapons system is nearing its 20th year of deployment. We 

must continue to be vigilant of age-related issues to ensure the high reliability needed for a strategic weapons system. With the Trident II (D5) missile planned for 

operational deployment through 2042 to match the Ohio class hull life extension, 

D5 hardware will age beyond our previous experience base and will be operational 

almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic deterrent. Therefore SSP 

has adjusted our testing to focus on older missiles in order to best predict aging 

characteristics. For example, the missile successfully fired by the USS Alaska 

(SSBN 732) was approximately 17 years old. 

D5 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

The Trident II (D5) missile service life is being extended to 2042 to match the 

Ohio class submarine service life. This is being accomplished through an update to 

missile electronics and guidance packages to address obsolescence and continuous 

production of critical components such as rocket motors. 

SSP has restructured our D5 life extension program to ensure sufficient time for 

additional missile electronics design evolutions. The flight test schedule has been realigned by a few months to allow for data analysis and to incorporate any test 

changes. The initial introduction of the D5 life extended missiles to the Fleet has 

shifted from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. This shift, which is cost neutral 

until fiscal year 2013, will provide more time to ensure the successful deployment 

of the life extension program, while allowing us to continue to meet our ship-fill requirements. This modest schedule shift will also allow SSP to better accommodate 

the any potential outcomes of the Nuclear Posture Review and the New Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty. Ninety percent of the Trident II (D5) life extension component procurement remains on track to support missile production. 

One area of concern for the Trident II (D5) life extension program is the decline 

in the Solid Rocket Motor Industrial Base. The Navy is maintaining a continuous 

production of solid rocket motors and should be in production through 2023. HowVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ever, we have faced significant cost challenges as both the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration and Air Force demand have declined and will continue to experience those cost increases as demand continues to shrink further in future years. 

Another key to the success of the Trident II, D5 life extension program is the life 

extension of the W76, Mk4 warhead refurbishment known as the W76–1, which we 

are executing in partnership with the Department of Energy. The W76–1 refurbishment maintains the military capability of the original W76 for approximately an additional 30 years. This program will provide the Navy with the weapons we need 

to meet operational requirements throughout the Ohio service life and the planned 

follow-on platform. 

OHIO REPLACEMENT

Congress approved the first significant funding request for the Ohio Replacement 

program in the fiscal year 2010 budget. Thank you for your strong support. The 

Ohio Replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose endurance and stealth 

will enable the Navy to provide continuous, uninterrupted survivable strategic deterrence into the 2080s. 

The Ohio Replacement Analysis of Alternatives study was completed and is being 

reviewed within the Navy. It will support the Milestone A review, which is planned 

for the spring 2010. The Navy’s fiscal year 2011 budget provides the required research, development, test, and evaluation investment to support the lead ship construction beginning in fiscal year 2019. 

The United States and the United Kingdom (U.K.) have maintained a shared commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement since April 

1963. The U.S. will continue to maintain its strong strategic relationship with the 

U.K. for our respective follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement. 

The Ohio Replacement program includes the development of a common missile compartment that will support both the Ohio Class Replacement and the successor to 

the U.K. Vanguard Class. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

Our Marines and Navy Masters-at-Arms are providing an effective and integrated 

elite security force at both of our Strategic Weapons Facilities. The U.S. Coast 

Guard, Maritime Protection Force Units have been commissioned at Kings Bay, GA 

and Bangor, WA. These coastguardsmen and the Navy vessels they man provide a 

security umbrella for our Ohio class submarines as they deploy and return from 

their deterrent patrols. They form the basis of our Trident Transit Protection System. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I sincerely appreciate your continued support of the Navy’s nuclear enterprise. Your efforts will 

ensure the continued credibility, reliability, and safety of our Trident II (D5) Weapons System and its remarkable Trident II (D5) Missile, maintaining a record of success unmatched by any missile system. The men and women of Strategic Systems 

Programs are committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and reliability 

of this remarkable system. I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before 

you today and am prepared to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Begich has joined us. Do you have any opening comments you might like to make? 

Senator BEGICH. No, I will pass, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You’ll pass? We just mentioned the SSBN 

Alaska. Senator BEGICH. We like that. [Laughter.] 

Senator BEN NELSON. Dr. Roberts, is there any particular reason 

that this report is late? Is it just taking too much time to develop 

it? Because the questions that come about then are, is everything 

in the report in the budget or are there things that are going to 

be outside the budget that will come about as a result of this report? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The budget that was submitted reflects the results 

of the NPR and we don’t expect subsequent changes. The following 

years’ budgets may reflect some additional initiatives. 

96 

The delay is essentially a reflection of the fact that this third 

NPR since the Cold War is more comprehensive and complex than 

the prior two. The first, the 1994 NPR, was a strictly internal DOD 

planning activity and set out the key theme, lead but hedge: lead 

to reduce nuclear risks, but hedge against the possibility of a Russian turn to the worse by maintaining current force structure capability. 

There was an unclassified summary of that report made available in Powerpoint form a year or 2 after the fact, but it was very 

much an internal DOD force planning exercise. 

The 2001 NPR received slightly broader interagency review, but 

was still essentially an internal planning DOD activity. This NPR 

reflects the fact of the legislation that required a comprehensive review of arms control strategy and an integrated look at nonproliferation and other emerging 21st century threats, to include 

nuclear terrorism. This, of course, dovetailed with the instinct of 

the administration to take a very broad look. 

The legislation also mandated that this would be a DOD-led, but 

interagency, review of policy, strategy, and capabilities. So as we 

have moved through our work we have found a very complex landscape. Additionally, we were given the framework of the Prague 

speech and the desire to both take concrete steps to reduce nuclear 

roles while at the same time maintaining not just deterrence, but 

strategic stability and assurance of our allies. Accomplishing this 

very broad set of objectives in a balanced and comprehensive way 

has required a lot of analytical work and a lot of debate at every 

level in the executive branch. 

We’ve learned, moreover, that our leadership wishes to be very 

deliberative in moving through these discussions. We had set two 

deadlines, the original deadline and a fallback deadline, and we 

learned that we simply need to allow the leadership to work its 

way through the issues to the point where it’s satisfied with the result. We think we’re just about at that point right now. 

Senator BEN NELSON. General Klotz, you recently assumed this 

command, as you indicated. How has the transition of bombers and 

ICBMs gone so far and what’s left to be accomplished in that regard? 

General KLOTZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My sense 

is it has gone very well and the feedback I get from the airmen at 

each of our bases reinforces that opinion. We have started this 

whole process in a very systematic, methodical way, beginning with 

a program plan that was developed by General Alston and others 

in the Air Force headquarters that had literally hundreds of action 

items to be completed as part of the transfer of forces to GSC. 

As soon as we stood up our headquarters on the 7th of August, 

we set about as a command working through each and every one 

of those steps. We established working groups with both Air Force 

Space Command, from which we assumed the ICBM mission, and 

with Air Combat Command, from whom we assumed the B–52 and 

B–2 missions. We had working groups. We had weekly videoteleconferences. We had periodic meetings at the two-star level, 

then ultimately a meeting between myself and the commanders of 

both those organizations to ensure that we had crossed every t and 

dotted every i in terms of assuming those forces. 

97 

So we did, in fact, assume the ICBMs on the 1st of December of 

last year and the long-range bomber force on the 1st of February 

this year. We continue to have a relationship with both Space Command and Air Combat Command. I anticipate that those relationships will be very intense through the end of this fiscal year as 

they continue to discharge some of the responsibilities they have 

from a financial point of view, and also well into the future, particularly with Air Combat Command, since they have the responsibility as the lead major command for developing conventional 

weapons and tactics which will apply to not only the aircraft which 

they have responsibility for, but for both the B–52 and the B–2. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland 

Air Force Base, of course, is responsible for maintaining nuclear 

weapons and systems, but it’s not under GSC. Is this a good decision for it not to be under GSC? 

General KLOTZ. I think it’s a good decision, but I will caveat that 

by saying we need to constantly check how we’re doing and assess 

the strong points of that change as well as ways we can improve 

it. 

Let me tell you why I think it’s a good decision. To some extent— 

and Admiral Johnson can talk to this in greater detail—we’ve 

taken a page from the Navy’s playbook in the sense that they have, 

as I understand it, a single entity which has responsibility for what 

happens inside a weapons storage area. The technical operations 

that take place there are all managed by a single group. 

In many respects, it was fragmented in the Air Force enterprise 

by having each wing commander or each base responsible for the 

actions and activities that took place inside the weapons storage 

area. We thought, given the critical self-assessment we went 

through after the Minot incident, which you mentioned, that we 

ought to adopt a process by which we had a single organization responsible for activities that went on in the weapons storage area 

regardless of where they were, whether they were on a bomber 

base or whether they were on a missile base, and whether they 

were in a missile base in North Dakota or a missile base in Montana or Wyoming. 

So, having said that, I have gone out and I visited weapons storage areas at all of our bases. I’ve been very impressed with the enthusiasm, the energy, and the sense of purpose and seriousness on 

the part of the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center personnel that 

are operating inside the weapons storage areas. I’m very optimistic 

about that, but I will caveat that by saying we need to constantly 

go back and make sure that we have it right. 

Senator BEN NELSON. A final question in that area. There was 

a concern that getting personnel to transfer to the new command 

might be a challenge for recruiting and retention. How has that 

gone thus far? 

General KLOTZ. Quite the opposite, Mr. Chairman. I have been 

very pleased that people have been signing up in large numbers to 

come to Air Force GSC, both Active Duty military as well as government civilians and contractors. I think there are a couple of reasons for that. Many of the people who come are those who served 

in Strategic Air Command or in the nuclear enterprise for a number of years. They understand the seriousness which the Secretary 

98 

of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force have placed on continuing to strengthen the nuclear enterprise. They think that it is important, worthy, and noble 

work to do, and they want to participate. So it’s an opportunity for 

them to come back and do that. 

The other reason I think is probably a little more esoteric, in the 

sense that people are motivated by the fact that they’re coming and 

standing up a brand new organization. So rather than going into 

an organization which already exists and fitting in and perhaps 

maybe improving it, they have an opportunity to create an organization essentially from whole cloth. A lot of people find that a very 

exciting prospect and they want to be in on the ground floor and, 

as I said, we’ve had no lack of people signing up to come and work 

in the headquarters and in our units. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Let’s hope that continues. Thank you. 

Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. 

Thank you, General Klotz. You didn’t even mention the two other 

key factors. The food and the Saints’ Superbowl win helps, too. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. Roberts, I was happy to hear your comments about the nuclear triad. Given that, when will the Department make a decision 

with respect to the design of the next generation bomber and its 

nuclear capabilities? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I believe that will be a consequence of the study 

that’s under way on this future look at conventional strike, the future role of the bomber, and the follow-on cruise missile. These are 

meant to be part and parcel of an integrated look at strike. 

Senator VITTER. How would you lay that out in terms of a timetable with regard to the bomber after the NPR? 

Dr. ROBERTS. For the study and the budget result? We would expect to put forward the results of this study in the fiscal year 2012 

budget. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

General SCOTT. Sir, I don’t want to jump in, but I’m part of the 

Under Secretary of Defense study team and I can give you 

timelines. We’ve just kicked off that particular study team. The 

family of systems that they’re looking at are what they call longrange strike. Within that family of systems will be the long-range 

persistent strike aircraft, the conventional prompt global strike, 

and then the standoff weapons and the standoff platforms. 

In about the May timeframe, we’ll start talking about it, but it’s 

a 1-year study that we’re working with RAND on. 

Senator VITTER. Okay, thank you. 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. General Klotz, how important do you believe the 

ICBM force is in the triad, and specifically how critical do you 

think a 450-single warhead ICBM force is? 

General KLOTZ. The ICBM, in my view, is extraordinarily important to the triad and to our overall defense posture. Without saying 

a specific number, I think the numbers really do matter. By presenting a potential adversary with a fairly large, complex target set 

that he would have to deal with should he contemplate attacking 

the United States, having a large number of ICBMs literally forces 

99 

any adversary to exhaust his entire force in an attempt to defeat 

it or to disarm it. In the process, if he does that, then he’s still 

faced with the other two elements or components of the triad, the 

manned bomber and the submarine-launched ballistic missile 

(SLBM), which will provide for continuing deterrence after that attempt. So I think that’s extraordinarily important. 

The other point is that the ICBM is perhaps the most responsive 

of all elements of the triad because it is land-based. It’s located in 

the continental United States, and there are multiple and redundant communication paths to the launch control centers, so a very 

responsive system. 

By touting the strengths of the ICBM, I continue to be a champion for the manned bomber, as you would expect the Commander 

of Air Force GSC to be, but also for the SLBM because of its tremendous survivability and power that it also brings to the deterrent and assurance equation. 

Senator VITTER. General, going back to your comments about the 

ICBM, I assume you think whatever the number is, there’s a big 

difference between that number in a single-warhead force versus 

multiple warheads, the same number of warheads. Can you comment on the difference and what that means strategically? 

General KLOTZ. Again, I think the key and critical point from not 

only a deterrence point of view, but also from the stability point of 

view, is the number of silos or delivery systems you have, not so 

much the warheads. Indeed, as we were going through the negotiations for the START II Treaty, a treaty which, by the way, was 

never ratified, the assumption, which I think continues to hold 

true, is that as both sides go to lower numbers of warheads on delivery vehicles, it creates an inherently more stable situation in a 

crisis. 

So again, I think keeping the numbers of ICBMs at a robust 

number gives you the option to reduce the number of warheads and 

still provide for the stability in a crisis that we seek through the 

ICBM leg of the triad. 

Senator VITTER. Okay, thank you. 

Admiral Johnson, last week the Air Force confirmed during our 

space posture hearings that the cost of some components of the 

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle are likely to rise significantly, 

maybe as much as 100 percent, as a result of the administration’s 

decision to retire the Shuttle and cancel Constellation. How will 

this proposed NASA change in mission affect the cost of Trident D5 

life extension rocket motors and what sort of gap in the industrial 

base does this raise the prospect of? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Senator, we are in low rate initial production 

(LRIP) and intend to remain in LRIP for at least the next 10 years. 

The change in the industrial base and the national orders for largediameter rocket motors cause more of the fixed costs to fall upon 

the Navy’s production cost. We expect to see a rise, not of the order 

that you referred to in your question, but we do expect to see a rise 

of 10 to 20 percent. We are working with DOD and with the two 

companies involved to control those costs. But they will increase. 

We have seen increases and they will continue. 

On the other side of that equation, because we intend to remain 

in production for the next 10 years or so, that provides a warm inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
100 

dustrial base for the work that comes. So I would describe the industry as fragile. The government plays an important role in managing that industrial base and I think that it is manageable. The 

costs will go up. 

Senator VITTER. For that solid rocket industrial base, right now 

doesn’t NASA business represent the majority for them and DOD 

business represent the minority? So I guess my question is, if in 

fact—and this isn’t decided by Congress, that 70 percent majority 

business, whatever it is from NASA, just goes away, it strikes me 

as a layperson that that is going to probably cause you more than 

a 10 or 20 percent cost problem. What am I missing? 

Admiral JOHNSON. At the surface level, were we to not take action that would exactly be the result. The difference in the manufacturing requirement for the NASA is so much larger—even as big 

as the Trident missile is, it is so much larger than ours, I think 

we can control those costs by closing down portions of the facilities 

and removing those costs from the Trident program. But we cannot 

completely eliminate that. We don’t know exactly what those costs 

are going to be. 

So I think there’s a very valid concern. There’s no doubt our costs 

are going to go up. I don’t think they’ll double, but there’s absolutely no doubt it’s going to be significant and it’s going to be a difficult cost for the Navy to absorb. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I’m going to actually follow up on what Senator Vitter just talked 

about. I want to, if I can, just probe a little bit on the costing factor, and I’m not sure who would be the best, but I’ll look to you, 

Rear Admiral Johnson. The estimate you give is 10 to 20 percent. 

Give me an assurance in how you come to that number? I’m new 

to all this, about a year and a half in now, but I have come to the 

conclusion estimates aren’t the most accurate any more. No disrespect to any of the military folks, but it seems like every meeting 

I go to there is an estimate, and then I go to another meeting and 

the estimate’s just a little off. A little off in the military is millions 

and billions. 

So help me understand why you think it’s only 10 to 20 percent 

when those fixed costs are going to be spread no matter what? Help 

me understand that. 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. They’ve already gone up once. 

Senator BEGICH. How much did it go up last time? 

Admiral JOHNSON. On an individual rocket motor set price, it 

went up about $1.8 million per set, so that’s about an 18 percent 

change already. I’ll take that for the record and give you an exact 

number so you can have it. 

Senator BEGICH. That would be great. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The cost of an individual rocket motor set has increased $1.667 million from fiscal 

year 2008 to fiscal year 2010, a change of 20.48 percent. This increase was formulated using the expected negotiated unit cost of the fiscal year 2010 Rocket Motor 

contract. 

Admiral JOHNSON. So it’s already gone up as I testify before you 

today. Then of course, I said ‘‘at least,’’ as a minimum, not less 

101 

than 10 or 20 percent. We don’t really know the full extent at this 

moment. We’re working on that. I don’t expect it will double yet 

again, but it’s going to be a sizable cost for the Navy. 

Senator BEGICH. When you say you’re working on it, is that an 

internal process with the contractors to come to an understanding 

or is it just an internal process that you’re coming to with your 

team to guesstimate what it might be? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Strategic Systems Programs is part of an 

interagency task force headed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Industrial Policy, that has members from all the parties involved, and are examining that together. Congress has requested a plan, not a study but a plan, by June. It’s that team, that 

interagency team that I referred to, that will bring, I think, a credible solution forward to the committee on time in June. That’s my 

expectation. 

My position was based on an increase already seen. 

Senator BEGICH. That’s fair. 

Admiral JOHNSON. So I don’t think I’m too far off from you when 

the dust settles. 

Senator BEGICH. To make sure I understand—and I apologize, I 

wasn’t here for all your folks’ opening; I was still down on the 

floor—are the industry folks part of that discussion or not? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. Yes. For this June plan that’s coming forward, 

that’s been requested? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes. There’s an industry role. This team was 

at one of the manufacturers, ATK, in February with a group of 16. 

So this is very credible work, this interagency task force, and that 

lies behind some of the unwavering position, even though I wiggled 

a little bit. 

Senator BEGICH. I want to echo what I know the chair and the 

ranking member talked about with the industrial base when it 

comes to the rockets, that it is a concern to me also in how we 

manage it. It sounds like, obviously, you see it as not only a shortterm, but a long-term concern, and how to maintain that. The cost 

component is becoming a bigger issue. 

You anticipate the June plan will be on time? 

Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Do you think the plan will be detailed enough 

for us to understand the next stages, short-term and long-term, to 

ensure that we have the industrial base there, and also the resources to meet those needs? 

Admiral JOHNSON. That level of question is really an OSD question. Of course, it’s their study and their responsibility. But I have 

great confidence in this group and I don’t think they will let you 

down, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Great. Thank you very much. Again, I just want 

to echo the chair. I appreciate your comments. 

Let me, if I can, just ask a couple more quick questions. I’m not 

sure who the right person will be to answer it, so whoever jumps 

in first will be the right person. Actually, this one’s easy. This one’s 

for, I’ll specify it to General Shackelford, if I could. That is, you 

talk about the Future Years Defense Program and modernization 

and sustainment for the bomber fleet, I think it’s about $5 billion 

102 

and some. Can you just give me a little bit on how that investment 

will work to maintain the bombers? How will that be used, if you 

can help me there a little bit? 

General SHACKELFORD. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator BEGICH. Did I pick the right person to ask? 

General SHACKELFORD. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay, good. 

General SHACKELFORD. We have investments going to all three 

bombers with the intent on not just sustaining the capability, but 

modernizing where it’s appropriate. For instance, in the B–1 we 

have computer issues that we need to deal with, so we’re putting 

in a fully integrated data link that includes a backbone with communications technology for a Link 16 data link as well as the beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) capability. 

This has as part of it new displays, which provide additional information to both cockpits of the B–1, the internal diagnostic computer that provides status of health information to the crew, some 

modernization of components within the radar, as well as in terms 

of a major capability improvement the laptop-controlled targeting 

pod, which has been very well received in Southwest Asia in the 

war, which allows us to collect nontraditional intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance data, as well as target our Joint Direct 

Attack Munition, and our Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided 

weapons from the bomber itself. 

Moving over to the B–2, we have the combat network communications technology which now also provides a digital backbone to 

what was a very dated infrastructure within the aircraft itself, and 

allows us to do things like BLOS retasking of the aircraft. 

Similarly, as we look to the future, for now what is a strategic 

nuclear-capable bomber, the extremely high frequency (EHF) radio 

communication and computer mod starts out with a new computer, 

because all of our bombers are common in being maxed out on computer capacity. It starts out with that computer mod, then moves 

into the integration of terminals to talk to the newer satellite systems as they come on line over the next several years. 

We’re looking at a strategic radar replacement to upgrade what 

is also a fairly dated radar with the B–52. At the same time, we’re 

bringing on capability to use the GPS weapons out of the internal 

bomb bay. We can carry them externally, but putting them on internally and then integrating that into the aircraft is a very, very 

important upgrade. 

Then in the case of the B–2, the same EHF radio mod. This one 

brings on a computer, it brings on a new antenna to give us capability to talk to those satellites as they get on orbit and we get the 

receivers into the bomber itself. We’re also updating the radar with 

a modernization program that just 2 days ago reached required assets available for four aircraft in terms of its ability to be used by 

the warfighter in a contemporary sense. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me ask you another, to tee off of that. I appreciate that. It gives me a little sense of what the upgrades are. 

Do you think, for either one of you, the 2011 budget requests are 

sufficient, not only for what you’re planning here, but other needs 

within the bomber fleet? 

103 

General SHACKELFORD. With respect to the modernization program? 

Senator BEGICH. Yes, and sustainment. 

General SHACKELFORD. I believe we’re in good shape there. There 

is a shortfall we’re working on the B–1 side, on the vertical situation display unit. That is fallout of previous execution issues which 

have now been corrected. 

Senator BEGICH. What’s the size of that shortfall? I’ve run out of 

time here. 

General SHACKELFORD. I’ll have to get you that dollar figure. 

Senator BEGICH. Could you do that for the record, just so I understand what that gap is there? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The current B–1 shortfall in fiscal year 2011 3600 is $33.2 million. If not fixed 

before the end of April, B–1 will be at risk to complete VSDU and FIDL flight test 

in fiscal year 2011. 

Senator BEGICH. Generally you feel good, but you’re examining 

now to figure out how to resolve; is that a fair statement? 

General SHACKELFORD. As we were working to keep the fully integrated data link in that diagnostic computer on track, the piece 

that we had to tap to give the funds to those was the vertical situation display unit. 

Senator BEGICH. It came from one to the other. 

General SHACKELFORD. Right. We didn’t have sufficient funds in 

the program line to cover that over the last year. We’re working on 

reprogramming and asking for more there. 

Senator BEGICH. If you could show me what that is at some 

point, that would be great, and just get it to us. 

Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. We do have a vote that’s being called at 3:30 

p.m. 

I’ll be brief, Mr. Chairman. I will submit some questions for the 

record. 

Last year, I think, General Alston and Admiral Johnson, you testified about Air Force test flights and that the Air Force conducts 

three flight tests each year of the Minuteman III ICBM and the 

Navy conducts four test flights of the Trident to determine weapon 

reliability as required to meet your estimation of the strategic command requirements. Would you explain why that testing is necessary? 

General ALSTON. Let me take it from the Air Force side since 

that’s a responsibility that now falls under Air Force GSC. We do 

a lot of different tests, Senator Sessions, with the ICBM, not just 

flight testing. It’s part of a broad family of testing that takes place 

every month at a missile wing, which goes through annual tests of 

the electronic launch capabilities associated with it. 

But at the end of the day we feel we need to fly at least three 

actual flights from Vandenberg and launch them out into the Pacific Range to Kwajalein to see if it all comes together—the command and control, the equipment, and the missile silo, as well as 

the booster itself and elements of the reentry system—to make 

sure that this whole system of systems comes together. 

104 

We derive important data from the process of actually configuring these missiles for launch, as well as data from telemetry as 

the missile flies through the boost phase and through the trajectory 

phase, all the way down to the reentry phase. 

We’d like to do more. I know the Department of Energy (DOE) 

would clearly like us to do more tests. We talked earlier in a response to a question from the chairman or the ranking member 

that as we drive toward lower numbers of warheads that means 

every time we test an ICBM we test less reentry systems. So there 

is less data available for DOE. 

But I don’t see any substitute for actually doing a very robust 

flight test program. We do not have the great advantage of our flying Air Force in the sense that every time an airplane takes off and 

goes for a flight and lands to a certain extent you’re doing an operational test of that aircraft, not a formal test, but you’re making 

sure all the systems work. So for the ICBM there’s no other way 

we can do it. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that makes sense to me as a layperson 

looking at it, because there are so many complexities, so many 

thousands of components and computer capabilities, systems, and 

other things that go into this system. 

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to highlight these facts with respect 

to the annual ICBM flight testing because I want to bring our attention to the fact that similar flight testing for the ground-based 

interceptor (GBI), which is a long-range interceptor that will be 

part of the National Missile Defense system. According to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), it plans to acquire only 22 GBIs for the 

purpose of flight testing. This will be the 30 in Alaska plus the 

ones in California. According to their test plans to date, 19 of the 

22 are expected to be consumed through 2019, which isn’t a robust 

testing system, but it’s a couple of years maybe or maybe a little 

less. 

That leaves only three GBIs in the inventory then over the 12 

years from 2020 through 2032. It means I guess one flight test 

every 4 years as the system has aged some. General Klotz, while 

we have an assembly line up and running, might it not be smarter 

to go on and add to our inventory more GBIs so that we could 

maintain at least a minimum level of testing through the next decade? 

General KLOTZ. Senator, with respect, that’s a question really for 

the MDA to answer. I can tell you how the Air Force would approach it and how the Air Force GSC approaches it. We need sufficient assets in our Minuteman III inventory, as well as the equipment that goes with it, to conduct a minimum of three tests per 

year. 

We face a particular challenge that perhaps the MDA does not, 

and that is our Minuteman IIIs were first deployed in the 1970s, 

so one of the things that’s important for us in the testing program 

is not just to make sure things work, but to see how the system 

ages and whether it ages gracefully or whether there are other defects in the system, either at the design or as a result of longevity, 

that we’re not aware of through ground testing. 

Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, I guess you have the responsible 

oversight of this. Do I have your assurance and can we be assured 

105 

that you will examine what appears to me to be a gap in our capability for the kind of minimal testing that looks to be required? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Certainly. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’ve reduced the number of GBIs being produced dramatically, more than I think we should. But we’ve done 

that. I guess that’s a firm decision that is not likely to be reversed. 

But that does suggest to me that, with fewer systems in the ground 

ready to launch, we ought to be sure that they’re safe and reliable, 

and I hope that you will look at that. It would be cheaper to me 

to complete that inventory now than having to reconstitute an entire assembly line a decade away. 

Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

The vote has been called. I have a question, then we’ll reconvene 

at the Capitol Visitor Center. 

General Alston, in the Air Force nuclear roadmap, which is the 

strategy document for fixing the Air Force nuclear enterprise, 10 

key actions were identified. We’ve talked about some of these, but 

I have a question about two more. The first is to create strategic 

plans that address long-term nuclear requirements—cruise missile, 

bomber, dual capable aircraft, ICBM. Has that plan been developed, and would it be available to be provided to Congress? 

The second is to charge the Under Secretary of the Air Force 

with ongoing broad policy and oversight responsibility for nuclear 

matters. Now, we’ve just confirmed a new Under Secretary here. 

The statutory requirement for the Under Secretary of the Air Force 

and for all Service Under Secretaries is that they shall be the chief 

business management officer for their respective Services. With 

this change, will the roadmap action designate the Under Secretary 

with oversight and policy for nuclear matters? Will it be implemented or not, and if it isn’t, what kind of implementation might 

be required? 

It’s a long question. I’m going to have to run in a minute. 

General ALSTON. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I think I can be brief 

with these. I may have to turn and depend on Lieutenant General 

Shackelford a bit. But we have, particularly over the last year, examined through our stewardship responsibilities what actions are 

appropriate with the air-launched cruise missile, how do we get the 

Minuteman III to 2030, which Congress has directed us to do, our 

partnership with DOE for the LEP for the B61. We don’t have responsibility for that weapon end to end, but we do have great equities in that particular process. 

We looked at all of our platforms and our capabilities and we 

found that we did not have the kind of content that good stewardship would require. So we have begun a process that will put a follow-on standup capability. It’s now entering the JCIDS process, the 

DOD requirements process, this spring, with analysis of alternatives to commence in the fall. 

We have a roadmap to get the Minuteman to 2030, which continues to be refined. The acquisition community actually has structured plans across the systems in order for us to understand and 

more thoroughly add content as the resourcing requirements mature. 

106 

So I would say that right now we have taken the appropriate action that we set out to do and we’ve set ourselves on a course for 

more improved stewardship of our strategic delivery capabilities 

than where we were a year ago. I believe that’s on course. 

With regard to the Under Secretary, the Under Secretary has authority to stand in for the Secretary for all the responsibilities that 

the Secretary of the Air Force has. But we felt that for a point of 

emphasis in our roadmap, without any compelling authoritative 

power behind it other than it being the Air Force strategic vision 

for our nuclear enterprise, and it being an expression of the Chief 

of Staff and the Secretary on the courses of action and the course 

they set for our Air Force with regard to the nuclear enterprise, it 

was important to us to designate the Under Secretary to emphasize 

the value that was seen in that position having a specifically articulated responsibility to support the development and stewardship of the nuclear enterprise. 

That was the motivation by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary 

to put that content in the roadmap, and we are delighted that our 

Under Secretary is on board and able to help us do the heavy lifting that’s still required. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That was short. Thank you. 

We’ll reconvene downstairs at the Office of Senate Security after 

the vote. We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

SSBN(X)

1. Senator VITTER. Admiral Johnson, during the recent full committee Navy posture hearing, both Admiral Roughead and Secretary Mabus stressed the importance 

of getting the design of the Ohio class follow-on done properly, thoroughly, and 

thoughtfully. Please explain the design process going forward, how you will prevent 

requirements creep once a production decision is made, and ultimately what is being 

done to ensure that the program is affordable, delivered on time, and delivered 

within budget. 

Admiral JOHNSON. The Ohio Replacement Program plans to employ a design process similar to the successful design/build process employed on the Virginia class 

SSN. This process combines the expertise of designers, system experts, component 

developers, production personnel, and operators to develop a producible design meeting system requirements. Properly phased design efforts are essential to limit 

changes during construction and to support a planned 84-month construction period. 

Detailed requirements will be refined during development and review of the Capability Development Document. The single mission of the Ohio replacement platform 

is strategic deterrence. Once the requirements for the platform are established, any 

potential changes will be vetted through the Configuration Steering Board (CSB) 

process. CSB reviews of proposed requirements changes will be conducted annually, 

consistent with the guidance in Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 5000.2 

and Section 814 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

for Fiscal Year 2009. During construction, changes will be implemented only if funds 

are identified and schedule impacts are mitigated. 

Affordability will be an integral part of the design process. Use of parts common 

with the Virginia, Seawolf, and Ohio submarines will reduce component development costs. Where practical, the Ohio Replacement Program will leverage known 

successful systems, components, and construction processes from the Virginia submarine program as well as incorporating the SONAR Acoustic Rapid Commercial 

Off-The-Shelf Insertion and the Common Submarine Radio Room philosophy currently used fleet wide in the submarine force. 

In addition, the Ohio Replacement Program benefits from investment by the 

United Kingdom (U.K.) in the Common Missile Compartment (CMC). The United 

States and the U.K. have agreed to share the Nonrecurring Engineering (NRE) costs 

of designing a CMC. The U.K. will pay 12.5 percent of the total design NRE for the 

107 

common compartment. To date, the U.K. has invested over $280 million. Each nation will fund 100 percent of any design costs associated with country-unique requirements. 

2. Senator VITTER. Admiral Johnson, given the missile compartment of the 

SSBN(X) is a co-development effort between the United States and the U.K., to 

what extent would a British decision to only construct three instead of four submarines have on the United States in terms of overall cost? 

Admiral JOHNSON. The U.S.-U.K. have agreed to share the costs associated with 

NRE to design a CMC for both nations’ replacement SSBN programs. This cost 

share arrangement for NRE is unaffected by any future procurement decision by the 

U.K. with respect to the number of successor SSBNs they produce. 

The United States has the opportunity to explore cooperative arrangements for 

production in order to reduce costs for both nations. Larger numbers of submarines, 

or in this case, missile compartments, will lower costs on a per item basis. This effect is most significant in the first few units produced. While there is a cost advantage to the United States if the U.K. were to build four missile compartments, savings to the United States are dominated by the first three U.K. missile compartments built. Therefore the impact is minimal. 

NEXT GENERATION AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE

3. Senator VITTER. General Shackelford, a key component to the flexibility and 

credibility of the bomber force is the mix of effective penetrating and stand-off missiles. In the past, the Air Force has asserted that this mix is essential to the viability of this leg of the triad and the fiscal year 2011 budget includes funding to continue the study of the next generation air launched cruise missile (ALCOM). Nonetheless, I understand that the decision on whether this next generation missile will 

be convention or nuclear has yet to be made and is pending the Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR). Does the Air Force still maintain that the bomber leg of the triad 

can be maintained without a new or modernized long-range stand-off capability? 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Alston, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. The Air Force recognizes that a robust long-range strike capability is essential to strategic deterrence and that modernizing the legacy bomber 

fleet, while pursuing new long-range strike technologies, ensures a viable airborne 

strategic deterrent over the long-term. Per the NPR, an Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) for a follow-on ALCM will begin in the fall of 2010. The AoA results, expected 

by mid-2012, will better inform the Air Force and DOD on the best options for the 

long-range stand-off capability as part of the airborne leg of the traditional nuclear 

triad. 

NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

4. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made the decision to develop a follow-on bomber, and you have made it clear that you support the development of a new bomber. However, last April, Secretary of Defense Gates opted not 

to pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until there was 

a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology. As part 

of this effort to better understand the requirements for a new bomber, Secretary 

Gates stood up a Tiger Team to do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the 

new QDR. However, on reading the new QDR, on page 33, it looks like there still 

has not been a decision to move forward with a new bomber program, but instead, 

the Department has commissioned yet another study. What conclusions were drawn 

by the Tiger Team regarding the development of a new bomber? 

General KLOTZ. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. The Tiger Team identified a mix of capabilities that would be 

required of a family of systems to create the desired deterrent effects, or successfully 

strike, if required. The ongoing study is examining what mix of legacy and future 

platforms will be required to present the needed capabilities. 

General SCOTT. The Department has determined that additional analysis is needed to fully understand how all potential long-range strike options could contribute 

to the country’s National Defense and National Military Strategies and Objectives 

108 

before large amounts of funding are committed to an acquisition program. During 

the 2010 QDR, a Secretary of Defense-directed Tiger Team was established to complete an in-depth study of long-range strike—including the Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP) need, requirement, and technology. The team’s conclusions were supportive of pursuing a new LRSP but identified the need for additional analysis to 

explore options for reducing costs and accelerating fielding timelines. Based upon 

the need for additional analysis, the Secretary of Defense chartered a subsequent 

study to examine a broader array of long-range strike issues and options including 

the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades to legacy bombers; 

manned and unmanned force structure numbers; stand-off and penetrating platform 

ratios; stand-off cruise missile requirements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) demands; airborne electronic attack requirements; and conventional 

Prompt Global Strike needs. The study results will be available in the fall of 2010. 

5. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, what progress has been made in conducting the new long-range strike 

study required by the 2010 QDR? 

General KLOTZ. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. The RAND project for the Long-Range Strike study identified a 

series of tasks to be examined in order to inform decisions on the future size, character, and composition of U.S. forces for detecting, locating, identifying, tracking, engaging, disrupting, destroying, and assessing targets in adversary countries. The Air 

Force is scheduled to receive a series of midterm briefs on these tasks throughout 

the summer and a final brief in early fall. The study is on track to be completed 

by February of next year. 

General SCOTT. A summary of the RAND, IDA, and APL project description for 

the Long-Range Strike (LRS) study directed by 2010 QDR is listed below: 

Objectives 

• Inform decisions bearing on future size, character, and composition of U.S. 

forces for detecting, locating, identifying, tracking, engaging, disrupting, destroying, and assessing targets in adversary countries 

• Consider future adversaries with both modest and sophisticated anti-access 

capabilities 

• Evaluate alternative future capabilities and architectures including supporting infrastructure 

• Use a range of scenarios depicting theater-level conflict in the 2020–2030 

timeframe 

Approach 

• Task 1: ID scenarios and operational objectives using at least two MCOs in 

2020–2030 with Joint Country Force Assessment (JCOFA) threat projections 

and Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD) scenarios 

• Task 2: Assess LRS system capabilities and limitations including survivability 

and weapon effectiveness and considering off-board ISR, EA, C3, MILDEC, 

cyber, forward basing, AR, and PED support 

• Task 3: Develop at least three affordable LRS portfolios characterized by the 

absence of a new bomber, procurement of a new stand-off bomber, and the fielding of a penetrating bomber (manned or unmanned) 

• Task 4: Assess the effectiveness of each LRS portfolio with 1v1, mission, and 

campaign level analyses 

• Task 5: Examine robustness of each alternative force structure in the face of 

potential threat counters to include cost imposition of low observable (LO) 

versus counter LO competition 

• Task 6: Examine the flexibility of each LRS portfolio to adapt to multiple conflicts and operations across the threat spectrum with qualitative implications of 

each force on future U.S. nuclear posture 

Schedule 

• Analytical Approach Briefing: March 2010 

• Midterm Brief on Tasks 1–2: May 2010 

• Midterm Brief on Task 3: June 2010 

• Midterm Brief on Task 4: July 2010 

• Final Briefing: September 2010 

• Final Report Delivered: February 2011 

109 

Conclusion 

The study is on pace as described above. The scenarios, threats, and target sets 

have been approved. The LRS Working Group is in the process of defining the LRS 

portfolios described in Task 3. 

6. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, what will the three contractors (RAND, IDA, and Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory) reportedly hired to do analysis for this study be 

expected to produce? 

General KLOTZ. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. OSD has established the scope and parameters of this study and 

is using interim progress checks to ensure the study remains relevant, focused, and 

provides analysis necessary for answering how to best meet the Nation’s future 

Long-Range Strike requirements through the optimum mix of platforms and capabilities. 

General SCOTT. A summary of the RAND, IDA, and APL project description for 

the LRS study directed by 2010 QDR is listed below: 

Objectives 

• Inform decisions bearing on future size, character, and composition of U.S. 

forces for detecting, locating, identifying, tracking, engaging, disrupting, destroying, and assessing targets in adversary countries 

• Consider future adversaries with both modest and sophisticated anti-access 

capabilities 

• Evaluate alternative future capabilities and architectures including supporting infrastructure 

• Use a range of scenarios depicting theater-level conflict in the 2020–2030 

timeframe 

Approach 

• Task 1: ID scenarios and operational objectives using at least two MCOs in 

2020–2030 with JCOFA threat projections and MSFD scenarios 

• Task 2: Assess LRS system capabilities and limitations including survivability 

and weapon effectiveness and considering off-board ISR, EA, C3, MILDEC, 

cyber, forward basing, AR, and PED support 

• Task 3: Develop at least three affordable LRS portfolios characterized by the 

absence of a new bomber, procurement of a new stand-off bomber, and the fielding of a penetrating bomber (manned or unmanned) 

• Task 4: Assess the effectiveness of each LRS portfolio with 1v1, mission, and 

campaign level analyses 

• Task 5: Examine robustness of each alternative force structure in the face of 

potential threat counters to include cost imposition of LO versus counter LO 

competition 

• Task 6: Examine the flexibility of each LRS portfolio to adapt to multiple conflicts and operations across the threat spectrum with qualitative implications of 

each force on future U.S. nuclear posture 

Excursions 

IDA with the support of the Johns Hopkins APL are on task to provide analysis 

for excursions which RAND is not equipped to handle. For example, IDA will address the LO/counter LO capabilities with respect to a penetrating bomber versus 

advanced air defenses. 

Schedule 

• Analytical Approach Briefing: March 2010 • Midterm Brief on Tasks 1–2: May 2010 • Midterm Brief on Task 3: June 2010 • Midterm Brief on Task 4: July 2010 • Final Briefing: September 2010 • Final Report Delivered: February 2011 

7. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, can you certify that all the participants will not have a potential conflict 

of interest with regards to their work? 

General KLOTZ. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

110 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. Yes. Evaluation of the initial investigation of conventional longrange strike options, prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) 

dated February 2010, has determined RAND to be uniquely positioned to conduct 

this study in a short time. The study will be conducted in an unbiased manner that 

will achieve transparent results that are accessible to policymakers making resource 

allocation decisions. RAND has a long history of providing objective, independent 

analysis of complex problems for OSD, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, 

and all of the Services and has recently published work detailing the development 

of the anti-access threat. 

General SCOTT. All participants bring an unquestioned desire to ensure we deliver 

to the Nation the best possible Long-Range Strike solution in order to defend our 

country’s strategic interests. The agencies involved in this work are primarily ‘‘think 

tanks’’, and were selected precisely for their work on previous studies covering all 

aspects of our national defense. 

8. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, when do you expect this study to draw to a close? 

General KLOTZ. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. The Secretary of Defense has tasked his study directors to report 

results in September 2010. 

General SCOTT. The Secretary of Defense has tasked his study directors to report 

their results by September 2010. The entire LRS study schedule is shown below: 

Schedule 

• Analytical Approach Briefing: March 2010 

• Midterm Brief on Tasks 1–2: May 2010 

• Midterm Brief on Task 3: June 2010 

• Midterm Brief on Task 4: July 2010 

• Final Briefing: September 2010 

• Final Report Delivered: February 2011 

NUMBER OF BOMBERS IN FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015 FORCE STRUCTURE

9. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, with regard to the Future Years Defense Program force structure set out 

in the new QDR for the Air Force, the QDR proposes five long-range strike wings 

with up to 96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest Air Force Almanac, 

the Air Force has 153 bomber aircraft. I understand some of these aircraft are dedicated to testing, but over 50 aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you plan on 

retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? 

General KLOTZ. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) has responsibility for 

two types of long-range, nuclear-capable bombers: the B–2 Spirit and the B–52H 

Stratofortress. 

Total Aircraft Inventory (TAI) for the B–2 is 20, of which all 20 are combat-coded. 

All B–2 training and test activities employ combat-coded aircraft. 

TAI for the B–52H is 76, of which 54 are combat-coded, 18 are training, and 4 

are test. 

As stated in the unclassified Fact Sheet on the 1251 Report released by the White 

House Press Office on 13 April 2010, some of the Air Force’s deployable nuclearcapable bombers will be converted to conventional-only bombers (not accountable 

under the treaty), and up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers will be retained. AFGSC 

has not recommended retiring any B–2 or B–52 aircraft. 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. The Air Force has no plans to retire any bomber aircraft, currently retaining 96 combat-coded aircraft in its Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory 

(PMAI): 36 B–1s (nonnuclear), 16 B–2s and 44 B–52s. Overall, the Air Force fields 

162 TAI bombers with the additional jets required to meet fleet training, maintenance, attrition reserve, and testing needs. These are vital support functions for 

keeping our operational edge (96 PMAI) in the highest state of readiness. 

111 

TAI PMAI 

B–1 .......................................................................................................... 66 36 

B–2 .......................................................................................................... 20 16 

B–52 ........................................................................................................ 76 44 

162 96 

General SCOTT. The total number of bombers in the Air Force inventory is 162 

(66 B–1, 20 B–2, and 76 B–52 aircraft). 96 represents the total number of combat 

coded aircraft with the difference being made up from training, backup, attrition reserve, and test airframes. The table below shows the breakdown by aircraft type and 

coding. The attached slides show the geographic location, coding, and correct number for each bomber in the Air Force inventory. At this time, the Air Force has no 

plans to retire any of the 162 bombers currently in the inventory. 

Airframe Total Combat Coded (CC) Training (TF) Backup (BAI) Attrition Reserve (AR) Test (CB) 

B–1 ..................... 66 36 16 9 1 4 

B–2 ..................... 20 16 0 4 0 0 

B–52 ................... 76 44 16 11 2 3 

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317str1.eps
113 

10. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, what are the assumptions underlying what appears to be a substantial 

reduction in the number of bombers? 

General KLOTZ. See answer to question #9. 

General SHACKELFORD. See answer to question #9. 

General ALSTON. The Air Force has no plans to reduce the number of bombers. 

The life of the airframe, combined with operational relevancy, is continually balanced against current and future Long-Range Strike requirements to determine the 

proper force size. Additionally, we continually evaluate the legacy and future fleet 

size to meet national security priorities in a resource constrained environment. 

General SCOTT. See answer to question #9. 

QDR RED TEAM

11. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, I understand Secretary Gates appointed a so-called Red Team of retired 

senior officers and outside defense experts to provide an outside assessment of the 

QDR. I also understand that the Red Team reviewed the QDR’s assessments and 

conclusions through the summer of 2009, and submitted a memo to Secretary Gates 

in the fall of 2009. What did the QDR Red Team have to say about long-range strike 

and the development of a next generation bomber aircraft? 

General KLOTZ. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General SHACKELFORD. I defer to my colleague, Major General Scott, to address 

the question in that he is more familiar with the details of this matter. 

General ALSTON. A10 was not involved with the QDR’s Red Team assessment and 

was not briefed on the results of the study. 

General SCOTT. The QDR Red Team, led by General Mattis, Commander, U.S. 

Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), and Dr. Marshall, Director, Net Assessment, was 

established at the request of the Secretary of Defense to provide alternative viewpoints on recommendations generated during the QDR. These included such areas 

as risk assumptions related to future security environment challenges, force mix options, and the force planning construct. When the Secretary of Defense appointed 

the QDR Red Team, we understand he assured the panel members that their insights would help inform his decision-making and would not be subject to outside 

review, with a final memorandum going directly to him. The Air Force was not privy 


317str2.eps
114 

to the QDR Red Team memorandum or any of the specific recommendations put forward by the panel. 

12. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, General Shackelford, General Alston, and General Scott, what was the Red Team’s assessment of the QDR’s long-range strike pronouncements? 

General KLOTZ. AFGSC is a field command focused on the day-to-day operations, 

maintenance, security, and support of its subordinate bomber and missile units. It 

does not directly participate in the OSD-led LRS Working Group for the 2010 QDR 

LRS Study. 

General SHACKELFORD. See answer to question #11. 

General ALSTON. See answer to question #10. 

General SCOTT. See answer to question #10. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

13. Senator VITTER. Dr. Roberts, forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe 

represent a longstanding military and political commitment to the defense of Europe 

and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. However, counter to the 

interests of all NATO allies, a small coalition of European nations has called for the 

removal of U.S. weapons from Europe. Will the NPR address the important role the 

extended U.S. nuclear umbrella plays on nonproliferation? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Yes. The NPR report articulates five objectives, of which one is 

strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners. In that 

context, the NPR report outlines the elements of a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella 

comprised of the strategic forces of the U.S. triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. It also states that the United 

States will continue to assure allies and partners of the U.S. commitment to their 

security and to demonstrate this commitment through various initiatives designed 

to enhance regional security architectures. 

The NPR report acknowledges that U.S. security relationships are important not 

only in deterring potential threats, but also to serve our non-proliferation goals. 

These relationships demonstrate to neighboring states that their pursuit of nuclear 

weapons will only undermine military or political advantages. They also reassure 

nonnuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security interests can be protected 

without their own nuclear deterrent capabilities. 

NUCLEAR SURETY INSPECTIONS

14. Senator VITTER. General Alston, over the past year, we have been informed 

of a number of nuclear surety inspection (NSI) failures at a variety of units across 

the country. These no-notice investigations are a critical component of the Air 

Force’s renewed emphasis on nuclear oversight and assess all aspects associated 

with security of our nuclear forces. Noting the rigor of the standards have increased 

since the incident in 2007, how do you assess the effectiveness of the new testing 

regime in identifying problems? 

General ALSTON. The extensively overhauled NSI process is resulting in consistent and vigorous application of appropriately high standards. The increased inspection proficiency of individual inspectors, the volume of inspectors involved, and 

the increased number of no-notice or limited notice inspection is providing for higher 

quality refined assessments of performance. The level of detail derived from the NSI 

is enabling better trend analysis and better targeted improvements by our units. 

Major commands use discrepancies found during inspections, combined with other 

assessment tools, to continually improve processes and procedures. 

15. Senator VITTER. General Alston, as you are aware, the Strategic Posture Commission asserted that leadership was an essential element in inspiring people to 

‘‘feel they are doing important work and are valued for it.’’ Without a dramatic 

change in culture, such leadership and organizational changes are bound to fail. Is 

the culture changing? 

General ALSTON. Yes, culture change is vital. We have been taking deliberate 

steps to achieve the shift we’re seeking. 

By concentrating all our operational strategic forces under a single commander responsible for establishing and enforcing standards and holding leadership at all levels accountable, we set conditions for culture change. We took equivalent action with 

regard to all nuclear sustainment. 

115 

In addition to increased focus on inspections and the inspection process, we have 

also taken action across the Air Force to change the way every airman perceives 

the nuclear mission. We baselined every professional military education course—officer and enlisted—and modified or added nuclear elements to curricula as appropriate. 

We updated Air Force doctrine to include a greater focus on deterrence. 

Culture change is difficult and takes time. Consistent application of exacting 

standards, setting common expectations, performing every day with precision and 

reliability—and validating that performance with engaged leadership—are some of 

the conditions we have set to achieve the sustained excellent results we are after. 

WEAPONS STORAGE AREA

16. Senator VITTER. General Alston and General Klotz, I was extremely pleased 

to learn that the Air Force made a budget request in fiscal year 2010 to recertify 

the Barksdale weapons storage area (WSA), and Congress ultimately appropriated 

$77 million for the project. What are your thoughts regarding the WSA at Barksdale 

Air Force Base which was decertified for nuclear storage a number of years ago? 

General ALSTON. The Air Force is reviewing the implications of the NPR, the New 

START, and the 2010 NDAA mandated 1251 Report which suggests a range of Air 

Force nuclear force structure associated with New START limits. The Air Force will 

continue to ensure it has sufficient infrastructure to meet all current and future nuclear mission requirements, to include a Barksdale WSA. 

General KLOTZ. The WSA at Barksdale stood down in December 2007. This action 

was taken as a result of planned reductions in the number of deployed Advanced 

Cruise Missiles (ACMs) and ALCMs and, at the same time as a means of avoiding 

the costs associated with bringing the Barksdale WSA up to revised DOD security 

standards. 

In an ideal world, reestablishing the WSA at Barksdale would benefit the nuclear 

enterprise by eliminating the risks inherent in relying upon a single WSA at Minot 

to support B–52H ALCM operations. Additionally, having two WSAs would aid in 

maintaining a knowledgeable and experienced WSA workforce within the larger Air 

Force nuclear enterprise. 

We’ve taken initial steps to identify needed upgrades to security and control systems and current storage facilities to meet DOD requirements for weapon storage. 

Our current estimate for a full and complete recertification totals $108.5 million. To 

the best of our knowledge, the proposal in Congress for $77 million to be appropriated for the Barksdale WSA in fiscal year 2010 never made it into the final bill. 

Reestablishing a WSA at Barksdale must of course compete at the Air Staff 

against other Air Force priorities for limited resources and manpower. 

17. Senator VITTER. General Alston, can you give me some insight as to what scenarios and outcomes might preclude the Air Force from moving forward with the 

recertification of the Barksdale WSA? 

General ALSTON. Overall required force levels, combatant commander requirements, and operational considerations are a few of the considerations that will help 

inform a decision on taking further action to recertify the Barksdale WSA. 

18. Senator VITTER. General Klotz, how important is the recertification of the 

Barksdale WSA for your mission? 

General KLOTZ. See answer to question #16. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

NUCLEAR ARMS LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAMS

19. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, with respect to the W78 Life Extension Program (LEP), can you tell me if the NPR will take any option—i.e., refurbishment, 

reuse, replacement, or a combination of these—off the table? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The NPR report outlines a strategy for sustaining a safe, secure, 

and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist. Although the 

NPR report expresses a policy preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions 

to proceed from study to engineering development, the laboratory directors will provide findings associated with the full range of LEP approaches and to make a set 

of recommendations based solely on their best technical assessments of the ability 

of each LEP approach to meet critical stockpile management goals. 

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20. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, what are the factors to consider when establishing these guidelines for future LEP work? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Several key principles will guide future U.S. decisions on stockpile 

management. The United States: 

• Will not conduct nuclear tests, and will seek ratification and entry into 

force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

• Will not develop new nuclear warheads. LEPs will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. 

• Will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally 

mandated Stockpile Management Program. 

The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing 

warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement 

of nuclear components. 

In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the 

United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile 

Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress. 

21. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, under what conditions would you not consider 

reuse or replacement options? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment 

of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components. 

22. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, last fall, with respect to LEPs, Secretary Gates 

said at an Air Force Association meeting that we needed ‘‘in one or two cases probably new designs that will be safer and more reliable.’’ Will the NPR support the 

Secretary’s view that in one or two cases, new designs may be necessary? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Secretary Gates’ concern has been that the deterrent remains safe, 

secure, and effective. He explicitly said that his focus was ‘‘not about new capabilities, it is about safety, security, and reliability.’’ The NPR concludes that the United 

States can meet its requirements without developing new nuclear weapons. As Secretary Gates states in the preface to the NPR, ‘‘The NPR calls for making muchneeded investments to rebuild America’s aging nuclear infrastructure. These investments, and the NPR’s strategy for warhead life extension, represent a credible modernization plan necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our Nation’s deterrent.’’ 

23. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, will this include a new design that will make 

current warheads, such as the W78 safer and more reliable—and which will exercise 

the skills of our nuclear scientists? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The NPR report outlines the following principles to guide future 

U.S. stockpile management decisions: 

• The United States will not conduct nuclear testing, and will pursue ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

• The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. LEPs will use 

only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not 

support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. 

• The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, 

and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with 

the congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full 

range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components. 

Changes made to the stockpile would be in line with these principles and would 

remain consistent with basic design parameters by including components that are 

well understood and certifiable without underground nuclear testing. 

This approach to stockpile management will enable us to protect the human capital base—including the expertise to design, develop, engineer, and manufacture nuclear warheads—by fostering a stockpile management program that fully exercises 

these capabilities. 

These principles and the stockpile sustainment strategy articulated in the NPR 

support the goals of the NDAA on stockpile management related to increasing the 

safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear warheads. 

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The nuclear weapons laboratories have been directed to explore the full spectrum 

of options and in doing so will exercise the skills of our nuclear scientists. This position is strongly supported by National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 

leadership. 

B61 LEP

24. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, the Fiscal Year 2010 Energy and Water Conference Report did not provide the full request for the nonnuclear study of the proposed B61–12. How important is it that the NNSA be able to expeditiously proceed 

with a nuclear and nonnuclear LEP on the B61? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The B61 bomb is the cornerstone of the U.S. extended deterrence 

commitment to NATO and a key component of air-delivered strategic deterrence. It 

is also one of the oldest warheads in the stockpile and has components dating from 

the 1960s. DOD is committed to a full (nuclear/nonnuclear) life extension of the B61 

bomb and to the provision of a nuclear capability for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 

The B61 LEP study will address options to enhance surety, sustain effectiveness, 

optimize the use of limited NNSA production capacity, and reduce costs over the 

long-term. Life-extended B61 bombs must be introduced into the stockpile by 2017 

to avoid gaps in capability for both B–2-delivered strategic and Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA)-delivered non-strategic nuclear missions. 

The 2017 timeline is driven by two factors: 

• Critical components in the B61 will reach end-of-life starting in 2017; if 

not updated, aging weapons will need to be removed from service. 

• U.S. F–16 DCA begin to reach end-of-life starting in 2016; a nuclear-capable JSF will replace these aircraft beginning in 2017. 

Although JSF initial operating capability has experienced a 13-month slip, we still 

plan to implement JSF nuclear capability by 2017. 

25. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, in an unclassified response, what are some of 

the considerations that are involved with the urgency of the LEP of the B61? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Life-extended B61 bombs must be introduced into the stockpile by 

2017 to avoid gaps in capability for both B–2-delivered strategic and dual-capable 

aircraft (DCA)-delivered non-strategic nuclear missions. 

The 2017 timeline is driven by two factors: 

• Critical components in the B61 will reach end-of-life starting in 2017; if 

not updated, aging weapons will need to be removed from service. 

• U.S. F–16 DCA begin to reach end-of-life starting in 2016; a nuclear-capable JSF will replace these aircraft beginning in 2017. 

B61 JASON REVIEW

26. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, the conferees last year required a JASON review of the ‘‘national security and extended deterrence value of the B61 for both 

strategic and tactical purposes in light of nuclear terrorism risks and military 

threats.’’ Are you concerned that the mandate for this JASON study is beyond the 

technical capacity of JASON? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The committee’s mandate for the proposed JASON study delves into 

matters of policy and strategy which are beyond the scope of traditional JASON 

studies. Past JASON studies have customarily focused on technical, not policy, 

issues. The JASON advisory group, however, has the capacity for drawing in various 

subject matter experts including technical and policy experts. 

27. Senator SESSIONS. Dr. Roberts, won’t the NPR speak to these issues and isn’t 

that the more appropriate venue for a review of the value of the B61? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The B61 bomb is the cornerstone of our extended deterrence commitment to NATO and a key component of air-delivered strategic deterrence. It is 

also one of the oldest warheads in the stockpile and has components dating from 

the 1960s. 

To provide options to continue the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe, the Department is committed to a full (nuclear/nonnuclear) life extension of the B61 bomb and 

to the provision of a nuclear capability for the JSF. The B61 LEP study will address 

options to enhance surety, sustain effectiveness, optimize the use of limited NNSA 

production capacity, and reduce costs over the long-term. 

[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

(119) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Ben Nelson, Reed, Bingaman, Sessions, and Vitter. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Paul J. Hubbard. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Rob Soofer, 

assistant to Senator Inhofe; and Lenwood Landrum and Sandra 

Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator BEN NELSON. The hearing will come to order. 

Good afternoon and welcome. Our witness this afternoon, flying 

solo, is Tom D’Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA). 

Today, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee will discuss the defense programs at NNSA, which is responsible for maintaining the 

safety, security, and reliability of the Nation’s stockpile of nuclear 

weapons. The NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) work 

closely together to ensure that the delivery systems and the nuclear warheads present a reliable deterrent for the United States. 

Previously, this subcommittee heard testimony from the Military 

Services on the delivery systems that carry nuclear warheads and 

weapons. Today, the subcommittee will focus on the NNSA activiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00125 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ties to maintain those nuclear warheads and weapons without testing. 

Maintaining nuclear warheads and weapons that are more than 

20 years old without testing is a challenging task. Over the years, 

however, NNSA has made significant investments in people and experimental facilities, including the world’s most advanced computational capability, to maintain and sustain the nuclear stockpile. 

Today, I think many would be surprised to know that NNSA and 

its scientists would tell you that they know more about the technical physics of these weapons than their predecessors did during 

the heyday of underground nuclear testing. 

The challenge, however, is to use, maintain, and to pass on to future generations the skills necessary to maintain the nuclear weapons into the future and for as long as they’re needed. After years 

of surveillance work, NNSA has discovered and repaired previously 

unknown manufacturing defects, and is now focused on issues that 

will continue to occur with aging warheads. 

For the most part, the signs of aging are understood. High explosives crack, wires become brittle, rubber and plastics degrade, metals corrode, and obsolete parts must be replaced with newer parts. 

Since 1992 and the development of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), the NNSA has discovered and repaired problems that 

previously would have required a nuclear test to resolve. This expanded knowledge of the stockpile has allowed the NNSA to discover problems and develop, implement, and verify a fix, all without testing. 

All of the experimental facilities planned in the early days of SSP 

are now in place. As a result, the attention is turned to the plants 

and facilities that do the work to maintain the stockpile. These facilities and plants are where the people who make the parts, and 

assemble and disassemble, work. NNSA and Congress have an obligation to make certain that these people have a safe working environment and the tools to efficiently carryout their mission. 

New tritium facilities are in place at Savannah River Site (SRS), 

and the new Uranium Storage Facility just opened at the Y–12 site 

at Oak Ridge. The Kansas City plant is on track to move to its new 

facility in the near future. But, there is more work to be done. The 

last major facilities that are needed are the Uranium Processing 

Facility (UPF) at Oak Ridge, and the Chemical and Metallurgical 

Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL). 

With these multibillion-dollar facilities in place, and the new 

high-explosive facility at Pantex, the NNSA will be fully capable of 

maintaining the nuclear weapons for as long as they’re needed. 

President Obama is committed to making sure, while reducing the 

number of nuclear weapons, that there is a long-term effort to 

build new facilities and continue the SSP so that the deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective. 

Next week, the full committee will hold a hearing on the new 

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Mr. D’Agostino, you will be a witness, as we just discussed, at that hearing. But, today we’ll focus 

on the work and the budget of the NNSA as it fulfills its ongoing 

mission and the new missions outlined for it in the NPR. 

Your prepared statement, sir, will be included in the record. 

121 

Senator Vitter, the ranking member, would you have some opening remarks you’d like to make? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER 

Senator VITTER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ll submit my full opening statement for the record, but I just 

want to highlight four points. 

First of all, welcome, Mr. Administrator. Thank you for your very 

important ongoing work. 

This request clearly is just the first payment on what has to be 

a sustained period of investment. I’m very glad that we’re finally 

on this course of increased investment. I think the key is that we 

start it immediately, that we make sure we start with a significant 

enough investment, and, most importantly, that we make sure we 

stay the course, because 1 or 2 years of this investment clearly isn’t 

going to get the job done. 

This investment is important for the safety and security of nuclear weapons, what we have now. It’s even more important if we 

want to reduce the numbers of our nuclear weapons, as is proposed 

in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). We absolutely have to have this sustained period of investment for that to 

be even under consideration, and I look forward to this starting. 

Mr. Administrator, I’d love for you to address if this START is 

good enough? The national lab directors had argued for much more, 

to begin with, about a billion dollars a year; and so, I’m very curious about what is lost between that billion and this $624 million, 

and how we’ll deal with that over a full 10-year plan, or longer. 

Mr. Chairman, I also want to use the opportunity to state that 

I think the new NPR inappropriately limits the ability of our complex to ensure the highest level of safety, security, and reliability. 

That will be a part of the ongoing discussion, as well. In constraining the ability to design new weapons and exercise our full 

new scientific capabilities, I think we’re limiting safety. I think 

that limits intellectual growth; limits new concepts, design work; 

and limits our ability, therefore, to achieve maximum safety. 

Finally, I want to underscore that, clearly, the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) is among the most significant and time-critical 

funding elements of this fiscal year 2011 request. Technology maturation for many components should have begun, really, at least 2 

years ago. The longer we wait, the tougher that is, as a 2017 deadline continues to mount. 

I look forward to hearing if any additional policy roadblocks remain to prevent that work from moving forward on that critical 

B61 LEP. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement by Senator Vitter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

Today’s hearing focuses on the fiscal year 2011 request for the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA). The administration’s request takes a concerted 

and long overdue step forward in starting to address the long-term needs of the nuclear weapons complex. This request, the first payment on what must be a sustained 

period of investment, should be assessed carefully to determine over the course of 

this investment if enough of the near-term needs are being adequately funded. Prior 

to having this request trimmed down by almost half by the White House, the National Lab Directors originally argued for almost a billion dollar increase and I look 

122 

forward to hearing from our witness why this budget, an increase of $624 million, 

more adequately address our complex needs than the higher level of funding requested by the laboratories. 

With the recent release of the delayed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) we now 

have a blueprint to assess this administrations path forward for the nuclear weapons complex. Unfortunately the NPR constrains our the ability to design new weapons and exercise the scientific capabilities necessary for the development of even 

safer and more secure weapons, the NPR dangerously limits intellectual growth by 

prohibiting new concept design work and establishing a restrictively high bar for the 

replacement of antiquated and in many cases 60-plus year old technology existing 

in current weapons systems. 

The physical and intellectual infrastructure, as highlighted a year ago by the 

Strategic Posture Commission, is in dire shape. The fiscal year 2011 budget dedicates significant resources to continue the design and construction of the Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility (CMRR) at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility at Y–12. Both projects are critical pillars of the future 

weapons complex, but CMRR is undoubtedly a priority and I question why the budget intends to fund both on parallel paths rather than expedite the infrastructure 

necessary to the pit manufacturing mission. As for the intellectual infrastructure, 

the budget allocates funding to help stabilize the lab workforce at 2010 levels; however, given the large downward trend of scientists over the past decade, I question 

if stabilization is enough, especially given the imminent workload increases of the 

B–61 Life Extension program. 

The B–61 Life Extension program is arguably among the most significant and 

time critical funding elements of the fiscal year 2011 request. However, I understand that the full scope of B–61 work won’t be fully defined until the completion 

of the 6.2A study in 2011. At the same time, technology maturation for many components should have began more than 2 years ago and the longer we wait to define 

the scope, pressure on meeting the 2017 deadline will continue to mount. With the 

release of the NPR and the affirmation by the President on the need for a B–61 

in the future, I look forward to hearing if any additional policy roadblocks remain 

preventing work from moving forward on this critical life extension program. 

Section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires a report on the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms. The report requires a plan and estimated budgetary 

requirements over a 10-year period for enhancing the safety, security, and reliability 

of the stockpile; modernizing the nuclear weapons complex; and maintaining the delivery platforms for nuclear weapons. This bipartisan requirement is eagerly anticipated by Congress and I look forward to hearing more from our witness on NNSA’s 

long-term requirements as well as when we should receive this congressionally-mandated report. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget represents a welcome and long overdue recapitalization of the nuclear weapons complex. It is the first installment and must be sustained at increased levels far past the 5 years outlined in the request. I thank you 

Mr. D’Agostino for your leadership and your service and I look forward to a fruitful 

discussion. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Do you have some opening remarks that you’d like to make, Mr. 

D’Agostino? 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If I could, I also have a 

written statement to submit for the record. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. 

I’m pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Department 

of Energy’s (DOE) fiscal year 2011 budget request for the NNSA. 

When I last appeared before the subcommittee, the focus of my 

testimony was the continued transformation of an outdated Cold 

War nuclear weapons complex, and moving it towards a 21st-cenVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tury nuclear security enterprise, and our initial efforts in implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda. 

Since that time, we’ve defined a portfolio of programs to carry 

out the President’s nuclear security agenda. Our fiscal year 2011 

request for these programs is $11.2 billion, an increase of over 13 

percent from last year. In developing this portfolio, Secretary Chu 

and I worked very closely with Secretary Gates to ensure that we 

remain focused on meeting DOD requirements. This request fully 

supports, and is entirely consistent with, the new nuclear strategy 

outlined last week in the administration’s NPR. 

The NPR lays out the nuclear deterrence policies for the next 

decade. For the NNSA, the impacts are significant. The NPR documents the President’s commitment to provide the NNSA the resources required to support his nuclear security agenda and maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent 

without underground testing. 

I understand there’ll be a separate full committee hearing later 

this month to discuss the details of the NPR. I look forward to that 

hearing next week. 

To summarize, the NPR provides the direction for the NNSA to 

maintain the stockpile through enhanced surveillance with an appropriate LEP for the weapons remaining in the stockpile. It renews our commitment in human capital, the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering experts who underpin our stockpile management work; our support for nuclear nonproliferation 

and counterterrorism missions; and recapitalizes the aging infrastructure used to support the stockpile and conduct a full range of 

nuclear security missions. Our budget request for the NNSA supports this direction completely. 

Within our overall request, weapons activities increases nearly 10 percent, to a level of $7 billion; defense nonproliferation increases nearly 26 percent, to a level of $2.7 billion; and naval reactors increases more than 13 percent, to a level of $1.1 billion. 

Our request can be summarized in four components that, collectively, ensure that we implement the President’s direction: First, 

our request describes the NNSA’s crucial role in implementing the 

President’s nuclear security agenda, including his call to secure all 

vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. The $2.7 

billion request for nuclear nonproliferation programs includes several efforts that are directly linked to the President’s agenda, including nearly $560 million for Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

to secure vulnerable materials; over $1 billion for our Fissile Material Disposition Program to permanently eliminate 68 metric tons 

of surplus weapons-grade plutonium and more than 200 metric 

tons of surplus highly-enriched uranium; and over $350 million for 

nuclear nonproliferation verification research and development programs to provide technical support for arms control and nonproliferation. 

The second component of our investment is in the tools and capabilities required to effectively manage our nuclear weapons stockpile. Because the NNSA, DOD, and the White House were all intimately involved in the formulation of the NPR from the start, 

much of the early analysis enabled NNSA to formulate a budget request that already responds to many of the recommendations in the 

124 

recently released NPR. We concluded very early on that maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the enduring deterrent 

would require increased investments to strengthen an aging physical infrastructure and to help sustain a depleting technical human 

capital base. Our request includes more than $7 billion to ensure 

the capabilities required to complete ongoing life extension work; to 

strengthen the science, technology, engineering base; and to reinvest in the scientists, technicians, and engineers who carry out the 

entire NNSA mission. 

These activities are consistent with the new Stockpile Management Program (SMP) responsibilities, outlined in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and are consistent with 

the path forward, outlined in the NPR. As Vice President Biden 

highlighted in a recent speech, ‘‘We need to continue to invest in 

a modern, sustainable infrastructure that supports the full range 

of NNSA’s mission, not just stockpile stewardship.’’ He stated, 

‘‘This investment is not only consistent with our nonproliferation 

agenda, but essential to it.’’ There is a bipartisan consensus that 

now is the time to make these investments to provide the foundation for future U.S. security, as noted by Senator Sam Nunn and 

Secretaries George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, and William Perry last 

January. 

This leads me to the third component: our investment in recapitalizing our infrastructure and deterrent capability into a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise. As the Vice President also said 

last month, ‘‘Some of the facilities we use to handle uranium and 

plutonium date back to the days when the world’s great powers 

were led by Truman, Churchill, and Stalin. The signs of age and 

decay are becoming more apparent every day.’’ 

So, our request includes specific funds to continue the design of 

the UPF at the Y–12 facility, and the construction of the Chemistry 

and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Facility at Los Alamos. The naval reactors request includes funds to address the 

Ohio-class replacement, including a new reactor plant, and our 

need to refuel one of our land-based prototypes to provide a platform to demonstrate the manufacturability of the Ohio replacement 

core, and to realistically test systems and components. 

Mr. Chairman, investing now in a modern, sustainable nuclear 

security enterprise is the right thing to do. The investment will 

support the full range of nuclear security missions, including stockpile stewardship, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, treaty 

verification, counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, and emergency 

management, along with naval nuclear propulsion. 

Finally, the fourth component, and one that ties all our missions 

together, is our commitment to aggressive management reform 

across the NNSA. With increased resources provided by Congress 

comes increased responsibility on our part to be effective stewards 

of the taxpayers’ money and to ensure that the NNSA is an efficient and cost-effective enterprise. We take this responsibility very 

seriously. We initiated a zero-based security review to implement 

greater security efficiencies and drive down costs, while sustaining 

and even improving our security capabilities. Our supply-chain 

management center has already saved taxpayers more than $130 

125 

million, largely through eSourcing and combining purchasing 

across our enterprise. 

Last month, I announced the new contracting and acquisition 

strategy that includes, among other items, an initiative to consolidate site operations at Y–12 National Security Complex and the 

Pantex Plant into a single contract, with the option for the phasein of the SRS tritium operations. The proposed single-contract 

award will further strengthen our ability to achieve the ambitious 

goals set by the President in his budget request, and is consistent 

with my vision to move forward to a fully integrated and interdependent enterprise that will enhance mission performance, reduce cost, and strengthen private-sector partnerships. While many 

of the details still need to be worked out, we believe these efforts 

can save the taxpayers more than $895 million over the next decade. 

Finally, NNSA’s leadership team stresses performance and financial accountability at all levels of our organization. In 2009, our 

program met or exceeded 95 percent of the performance objectives. 

We continue to reduce the percentage of carryover, uncosted, uncommitted balances in several of our nonproliferation programs. 

Mr. Chairman, these investments made to date in the nuclear security enterprise provide the tools to address a broad array of nuclear security challenges. However, we must continue to cultivate 

the talents of our people to use these tools effectively, because our 

dedicated workforce is ultimately, in the end, the key to our success. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. D’Agostino follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO

Thank you for the opportunity to present the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget 

request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This budget request will allow the NNSA to meet its commitments to the American people to provide for nuclear deterrence, to reduce nuclear dangers around the world, and to provide the capabilities to address the broader national security challenges of the 21st 

century. 

At this time last year, the focus of NNSA efforts was the continuing transformation of the Cold War-era weapons complex to a 21st century Nuclear Security 

Enterprise, and transformation of the composition and size of the U.S. nuclear 

weapons stockpile. Simultaneously, we were in the very early stages of defining the 

efforts necessary to address the President’s policy statements on securing the most 

vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide. 

During the first 15 months of the Obama administration, we have been fully engaged with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Interagency on the Nuclear 

Posture Review, and with the Department of State on a New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Agreement and a broad menu of nonproliferation agreements 

with our international partners. 

NNSA efforts this past year defined a portfolio of programs to meet the President’s nuclear security agenda for the future. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request for this portfolio is $11.2 billion, an increase of more than 13 percent 

from last year. In the development of this portfolio, Secretary of Energy Chu and 

NNSA Administrator D’Agostino worked closely with Secretary of Defense Gates 

and other DOD officials to ensure that we remain focused on meeting the DOD’s 

requirements. As a result, the budget request for Weapons Activities increases nearly 10 percent to a level of $7 billion; Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation increases 

nearly 26 percent to a level of $2.7 billion; Naval Reactors increases more than 13 

percent to a level of $1.1 billion; and, the request for Federal oversight and staff 

included in the Office of the Administrator account increases by 6.5 percent to a 

level of nearly $450 million. NNSA’s budget request also includes associated outyear 

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sources needed to meet the continuing requirements for significant long term investments in the Nuclear Security Enterprise deliverables, capabilities, and infrastructure. 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request for the NNSA can be summarized 

in four core components that, collectively, ensure that the NNSA implements the 

President’s overall nuclear security agenda, introduced in his April 2009 Prague 

speech, re-enforced during the State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, and 

embodied in the Nuclear Posture Review. 

IMPLEMENTING THE PRESIDENT’S NUCLEAR SECURITY VISION

The budget request highlights NNSA’s crucial role in implementing President 

Obama’s nuclear security vision, including his call for an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years. The request 

for these efforts is $2.7 billion (an increase of 25.8 percent over the current year). 

Key nonproliferation programs reflect significant increases from last year, including; 

• Nearly $560 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (an increase of 68 percent over the current year) to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within 4 years, and to provide a comprehensive approach to deny terrorist access to nuclear and radiological materials at civilian sites worldwide; 

• Over $1 billion for our Fissile Materials Disposition program (an increase 

of 47 percent over the current year) for construction of the Mixed Oxide 

(MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and the Waste Solidification Building, design of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility, and meeting our commitment to support Russian plutonium disposition activities; 

• More than $590 million for Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 

and Second Line of Defense activities to accelerate securing nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union and other Asian states, as well as worldwide efforts to deter, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling events; and, 

• Over $350 million for the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and 

Development programs (an increase of 10 percent over the current year) to 

provide the key technical support for the President’s arms control and nonproliferation agenda. 

MANAGING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

Based on a preliminary analysis of the draft Nuclear Posture Review, the Department concluded that maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing—especially at lower stockpile numbers—requires increased investments to strengthen an aging physical infrastructure and to 

sustain a depleting technical human capital base across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. As such, we are requesting more than $7 billion (an increase of 9.8 percent 

over the current year) in the Weapons Activities appropriation to: 

• Ensure the capabilities required for stockpile management and for the 

completion of ongoing Life Extension Programs are available; 

• Strengthen the Science, Technology, and Engineering base capabilities 

that underpin stockpile stewardship, without nuclear testing, as well as all 

other NNSA nuclear security activities; and, 

• Reinvest in the scientists, technicians, and engineers who perform the 

mission across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

The President’s budget request is consistent with the principles of the Stockpile 

Management Program outlined by Congress in the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

RECAPITALIZING OUR NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE AND DETERRENT CAPABILITY

These increases represent an investment in transforming our outdated nuclear 

weapons complex into a 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise. This request includes funds to continue the design of the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y– 

12 facility; the design and construction of the replacement for the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory; and, conceptual design for the recapitalization of Naval Reactor’s Expended Core Facility at the 

Idaho National Laboratory. Investing in a modern, sustainable nuclear security infrastructure supports the full range of NNSA’s nuclear security missions, including: 

• Stockpile stewardship; 

• Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament; 

• Arms control treaty monitoring; 

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• Nuclear forensics; • Counterterrorism and emergency response; and, • the nuclear Navy. 

Additionally, the request supports the recent Department of Defense decision to 

recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-class ballistic submarines, 

the most survivable leg of the Nation’s strategic deterrent, are reaching the end of 

their operational life. The request will enable Naval Reactors to continue reactor 

plant design and development efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of long-lead reactor plant components in 2017, in support of Navy procurement of the first Ohio- class submarine replacement in 2019. Providing the Ohio-class replacement a lifeof-the-ship reactor core will require substantial advances in manufacturing technology to provide a new cladding and a new fuel system. The request also supports 

the refueling of a land based prototype reactor, providing a cost effective test platform for these new technologies. 

Continuing NNSA Management Reforms. With the increased resources provided 

by Congress comes an increased responsibility to be effective stewards of the taxpayer’s money. NNSA will continue to promote proactive, sound management reforms that save money, improve the way we do business, and increase efficiency. 

Following are a few of the efforts already underway: 

• A Zero-Based Security Review initiative has led to efficiencies in our site security programs, helping drive down those costs while sustaining core physical 

security capabilities. 

• An Enterprise Re-engineering Team is implementing ideas for improving the 

way NNSA does business, such as: 

• A Supply Chain Management Center has already saved the taxpayers more 

than $130 million since its inception in 2007 and is expanding its focus. Two 

key elements of the Center are: 

• eSourcing—an electronic sealed-bidding and reverse auction function; 

and, 

• Strategic Sourcing—where our Management and Operating contractors 

use their combined purchasing power to negotiate multi-site commodity 

contracts with vendors. 

• A moratorium on new, NNSA-initiated Reviews and re-direction of those resources to improve Contractor Management Systems and operations and oversight across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

• Issuing new NNSA Operating Principles to guide the priorities and decision 

processes of entities that perform NNSA work consistently across the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise. 

• Applying a new performance-based model, best business practices, and lessons-learned across the Nuclear Security Enterprise. The model, pioneered at 

our Kansas City Plant, provides greater contractor flexibility and accountability; 

better focused, risk-based oversight; eliminates redundant and non-value-added 

reviews; and, improves efficiencies and availability of Federal and contractor resources to support the full scope of NNSA missions. 

• Reducing contractor expenses through renegotiation of health and dental 

plans, using common contracts for administration and supplies, and converting plant shifts for five 8-hour days to four 10-hour day shifts. 

• Retaining the critical Federal workforce 

• Piloting for the Department a 5-year Office of Personnel Management 

Demonstration Project on Pay-for-Performance and Pay Banding to test 

new Human Resource concepts to recruit and retain a high caliber staff by 

providing faster pay progression for high-performing employees, and to 

build on the workforce planning system to better identify competency needs 

and gaps. 

• Conducting a Future Leaders Program and sponsoring Historically Black 

Colleges and Universities, Hispanic Serving Institutions, Native American 

Serving Institutions, and other intern and fellowship programs to bring into 

government the best and brightest talent in science, engineering, business, 

and other technical positions to ensure that when our aging workforce retires, it is replaced with competent, well-trained, and experienced professionals to carry on the mission work of the NNSA. 

Finally, NNSA continues to emphasize performance and financial accountability 

at all levels of our operations. NNSA needs to assure the committee and the taxpayers that the we are an excellent steward of the programs and funds Congress 

entrusts to us to carry out the President’s nuclear security vision. In 2009, NNSA 

met 95 percent of its stated program performance objectives, and, over the past 2 

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years, NNSA successfully executed consecutive, large annual funding increases in 

several of our nonproliferation programs while reducing uncosted, uncomitted balances. We are ready to meet the challenge of executing the additional program increases supported by the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request. Our Federal 

and contractor staff and our contracting processes are in place to initiate immediately the increased mission work both in the U.S. and abroad. The NNSA will be 

a leader in successful program and financial execution for the Department of Energy 

and for the U.S. Government. 

The NNSA is not operating on a ‘‘business-as-usual’’ basis. The budget request 

represents a comprehensive approach to ensuring the nuclear security of our Nation. 

NNSA will ensure that our strategic posture, our nuclear weapons stockpile, and 

our infrastructure, along with our nonproliferation, arms control, emergency response, counterterrorism, and naval propulsion programs, are melded into one comprehensive, forward-looking strategy that protects America and its allies. 

Maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile is the core work in the NNSA. However, the science, technology, and engineering capabilities, which enable the core 

work, must also continue to focus on providing a sound foundation for ongoing nonproliferation and other threat reduction programs. The investment in nuclear security is providing the tools that can tackle a broad array of national security and energy challenges and in other realms. NNSA now has the tools, but must continue 

to cultivate the talents of the people to use them effectively. 

The NNSA is developing the next generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians required to meet our enduring deterrence requirements as well as the critical 

work in nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, and forensics. People are ultimately our most important resource. We are working closely with our national laboratories to develop and retain the necessary cadre of the best and the brightest to 

successfully carry out all of our technically challenging programs into the foreseeable future. 

Following are more detailed descriptions of each of the four specific NNSA appropriations. 

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Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Senator Bingaman, do you have some opening remarks you 

might want to make? 

Senator BINGAMAN. I’ll just wait for questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

You mentioned the NPR, and it supports the decision, in the New 

START, to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile to 1,500 deployed 

nuclear weapons. It’s a reduction from the maximum of 2,200 deployed nuclear weapons allowed under the Moscow Treaty, but this 

number doesn’t represent the size of the total stockpile, which is 

considerably larger than the number of deployed weapons. What is 

your understanding of the impact that the NPR and START will 

have on the total stockpile size? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The total stockpile size is a size that includes, 

as you described, sir, the operationally deployed warheads and a 

reserves stockpile—a classified number, at this point—to essentially backup the operationally deployed warheads. Because we do 

have to do maintenance, it requires a bit of movement back and 

forth. Also, as part of that, because we hadn’t been actively involved—and this is that phase we’re entering into, is this active 

LEP management—we hadn’t been as actively involved in that. 

Now that we have a defined and clear path forward, DOD will be 

looking at whether or not, and by how much, we ought to be looking at the reserve stockpile and changing the size of that. Decisions 


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on that point have not yet been made, because as we note, the NPR 

was just released last week. So we want to phase those in as we 

move forward. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, will you be able to, as far 

as you know right now, retire and disassemble more nuclear warheads than previously scheduled? Or will it have any impact on 

that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In addition to the operationally deployed and 

reserve stockpile, there are a set of warheads in a dismantlement 

queue. Our last report that we provided, about 2 years ago to Congress, laid out an accelerated dismantlement path for those warheads, and for that third queue to be taken apart. We’re proceeding 

on marching down that plan that we had laid out 2 years ago. It’s 

a fairly aggressive plan. 

The question that has to come to play, that we will be looking 

at as we develop our fiscal year 2012 budgets in the out-years, is 

whether it makes sense to take another bite and try to even go 

faster taking down that retired set of warheads, or are those resources better spent on taking care of the warheads that we have 

right now? That’s an ongoing discussion, right now, that I’m having 

with DOD. We’re looking at various options on that, but we remain 

committed to taking apart all those warheads in that retirement 

queue by 2022. Granted, that’s 12 years from now, but we are talking about a number of warheads, and they are nuclear warheads, 

so we want to make sure that we don’t rush. Safety’s the most important thing, from my standpoint. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Now, there are different categories of nondeployed warheads. Some are active, reserve, and some are inactive, while some are in line, waiting for dismantlement. Can you 

tell us the current categories of these nondeployed warheads? Will 

the category or will the situation change under NPR? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think the NPR allows us to look at changing 

the situation. I don’t have the details on how it would change, at 

this point. It’s important that there are a couple of things happening at the same time. One is extending the lives and actively 

getting into finishing the W76 warhead and doing the design work 

and costing studies needed for the B61 warhead. That’s incredibly 

important. As we move forward in that, we’ll be in the position to 

look at whether we should accelerate our retirement of the retired 

warheads and/or whether we should move those warheads that are 

in the active and inactive reserve into the retirement category. 

Those are decisions made by DOD, they’re advised upon by my organization, particularly since we look very closely at which warhead systems are reaching their end of life, and in what manner, 

and what sequence we ought to be taking these apart. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Now, in terms of the categories, can you 

outline the nature of each category? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The categories, right now, are operationally deployed strategic warheads; an active and inactive reserve set of 

warheads to back up the operationally deployed warheads; and the 

third queue are the retired warheads, warheads that are being retired, but they’re awaiting dismantlement. There’s a significant 

number of warheads there, and we have to balance our resources 

between taking care of the stockpile and retiring warheads. 

171 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, even though you can’t talk 

about the classified total number of these nondeployed warheads, 

will we be able to handle the maintenance requirements of each of 

those warheads? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, very much so. What the NPR allows us to 

do is provide certainty in the work plan. Where we are right now 

is translating the broad NPR requirements into very specific 20- 

year plans. We have a document called the Requirements Planning 

Document (RPD) and the Program and Planning Document (PPD). 

These are the detailed documents that say what warhead gets 

worked on at what time sequence. So, the fact that we have this 

type of certainty, that we are going to work on the W76, finish the 

production of the W76; we are proposing to actively engage in the 

full B61 LEP, including the nuclear life extension; and that we are 

going to start studying—this is more from a laboratory side—what 

we might and what are the best approaches to dealing with the 

W78 warhead—that certainty allows us to allocate resources at the 

Pantex plant and the Y–12 plant, which are the hands-on people 

on the warhead components, with some degree of certainty. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In connection with the Pantex operation, 

the budgets for those operations are down from fiscal year 2010 

levels, at a time when Pantex will be conducting full-rate production of the W76 life extension and will be increasing the dismantlement rate, even though you say that perhaps things will be delayed 

on some dismantlement. Why is the budget down? It looks to me 

like maybe the operation tempo is up, but the budget’s down. It’s 

not that I want budgets up, but I want to make certain that they’re 

correlated. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. The budget we asked for, for the NNSA 

overall, allows us to do the work at the Pantex plant. There’s an 

element in the President’s budget request where we take, early on, 

and we allocate resources to each of the sites. Because of final 

questions on how much goes through what particular site, there is 

an element of the President’s request called the headquarters account. Essentially, it’s the Defense Program’s General Harencak, 

who’s sitting behind me—as the requirements become better defined, we allocate those resources out to the sites. 

Since we’re talking about next year’s budget, there are still resources to be allocated out to take care of any reductions or perceived reductions at the site. Obviously we don’t spend the money 

in headquarters so that money gets spent at our laboratories and 

production plants. 

I wanted also to clarify my comment on the accelerated dismantlement rate. We submitted a plan to Congress, in a classified 

report, that we accelerated our dismantlement rates from the 2006 

levels. So, now we are currently operating on the plan we submitted to you, sir, 2 years ago. We aren’t going to accelerate on top 

of that plan, unless we have the freed-up resource at our plants to 

do that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In terms of Pantex and the operations, are 

you satisfied that you have enough financial resources in the budget to be able to do what the plan is? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. I’m satisfied. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. Thank you. 

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Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Administrator, thanks again for your service. 

As I noted briefly in my opening statement, the center directors 

seem to have suggested a level above what we’re looking at for fiscal year 2011. We’re looking at an increase of $624 million. My understanding is, they suggested an increase of $1 to $1.2 billion. 

What’s the difference? What are we not doing in this request? How 

do you anticipate meeting those needs in the future? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. When we worked the internal budget process 

last year, I asked for input, broadly. Defense Programs runs that 

input process. About this time last year, we received feedback that 

said, ‘‘Yes, in order to do, broadly, the kind of work we think that 

might happen’’—this is before, by the way, we knew what the requirements actually were—‘‘we think, on the order of about a billion-plus is needed.’’ This is, again, just as a reminder, without any 

real requirements. As the year progressed last year, and the NPR 

was moving through its paces, the requirements became clearer. 

My staff and I were very aware that the requirements were happening, but because the NPR is drafted within the Federal Government and doesn’t involve a broad range of people outside of our laboratories, our labs and plants don’t become aware of all of those requirements. So, I can take their input and work it down. 

Additionally, early on what we had were what I would call 

power-point level of quality, with respect to budget input. But, 

what we had, as the year progressed last year, was a greater level 

of clarity on what it actually takes to do maintenance, build buildings, do work on the stockpile and as the stockpile requirements 

came through. So, I took a look at that request against the powerpoint-quality level of request, and applied their actual requirements to that. That brought that number down into our internal 

budget process. The resources we have, and the increases we have 

in the President’s budget, are exactly what I feel is needed in order 

to satisfy the requirements. 

I’ve talked to our folks at the labs and plants. They understand 

that. They agree with me, that what we have right now is what 

we need. Will folks always want more money? I think, early on, it’s 

hard to find a program manager that doesn’t want increased resources. 

A final and very important filter, frankly, from my standpoint, 

is our ability to appropriately execute the resources to get the job 

done. The layout that we have before us here, is what I feel is a 

significant increase, and it’s what is required to get the job done. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Certainly, Mr. Administrator, I assume 

you agree that this project has to be sustained over many years. 

We have asked for, in the authorization language, a 10-year plan 

about this. When do you expect that we’ll get that plan, in significant detail? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. This is the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program Plan? 

Senator VITTER. Right. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We are working on that plan. It’s going to be 

a 10-year plan. It will indicate, to the best of our ability, the 10- 

year program stream that we will need. We expect to get that plan 

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to the Hill in early May, if not by the 1st of May, which is what 

my target is. My internal target is to get that up by the first, but 

it’s certainly within the next few weeks, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. I know it’s not finalized yet, but can you 

describe, roughly, what you think the funding line over time of that 

plan will look like? Obviously, we have a significant increase proposed here. Over those next 10 years, what would you expect that 

proposal to look like, in terms of dollars? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. As you said, sir, the plan is not final, and I actually haven’t seen the tables. But, I will point out that the program we have in front of the committee today takes the—just the 

weapons activities account—I’m setting aside nuclear nonproliferation, for the time being—but, just the weapons activities grows, as 

you pointed out—it starts at $7 billion in fiscal year 2011, and it 

grows to $7.6 billion in fiscal year 2015. From that standpoint 

alone, I expect—because the out-years will be deep into the actual 

construction of these large facilities at Los Alamos and Y–12, and 

we’ll be into the work on the actual stockpile, the B61 warhead— 

will be in the production of that—that the increase will continue 

on into the out-years, years 6 through 10. 

But, I want to caveat, I haven’t seen the budget tables yet. It’s 

my best expectation, at this point, that we’ll see that increase continue. But, we will also, in parallel, continue to drive down and 

look at cost efficiencies, as I described in my oral opening remarks. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. In my statement, I highlighted the B61 

life extension. I know the fiscal year 2010 Appropriations bill did 

not fully fund your request for that. In unclassified terms, could 

you please share why that project is urgently needed, and the complexities associated with the plan, and why future delays imposed 

by Congress would be particularly detrimental? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. The B61 warhead is one of our oldest 

warheads in the stockpile, from a design standpoint and actual 

warheads in the stockpile. As General Chilton has pointed out in 

the past, as I’ve pointed out in the past, we have components in 

that warhead that have vacuum tubes. They are pretty hard to 

make these days. It could be hard to find somebody that actually 

has them. We can’t continue to operate in this manner, where we’re 

replacing things with vacuum tubes. 

Neutron generators and power supplies and the radar, essentially, are components that have to be addressed in this warhead. 

Also, I think, importantly, the work on this warhead will provide 

our first real opportunity to actually increase the safety and security of that warhead, and put 21st century safety and security into 

that warhead. So, when we work on warheads from now on, I’d like 

to be in the position of saying, ‘‘We made it safer. We made it more 

secure. We increased the reliability to ensure that we would stay 

very far away from ever having to conduct an underground test.’’ 

Senator VITTER. Okay. Once we are beyond the B61 scope of 

work, do you anticipate a significant sort of recalculation of necessary fiscal year 2012-and-beyond funding? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think it’s important to note that the work that 

we are proposing in the fiscal year 2011 request—whether we’re 

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ally about work on the stockpile itself—a good part of this work is 

work in the design phase or in the, what we call, defining the cost, 

scope, and schedule, because these are defined activities; they have 

a beginning, a middle, and an end. For these types of projects, we 

will be establishing performance baselines. In other words, the 

Government’s commitment, or the executive branch’s commitment, 

to saying, ‘‘I’m going to deliver such-and-such, by a certain date, for 

a certain dollar amount, on a certain dollar stream.’’ We expect for 

our two large facilities and the B61 warhead to be in that performance baseline decision point in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 

2013. At that point, those are the numbers that I want to lock in 

and commit to from a multiple-year standpoint, and will lock in 

and commit to getting the job done for those projects. 

We have to expect increases and decreases and adjustments in 

our program as we have a better understanding of what it takes 

to do a design. 

If I could just add a little bit more to that. We know that there 

have been some important changes in DOE lately, with Secretary 

Chu and with Deputy Secretary Poneman on approaches to large 

projects. In particular, one I want to point out for large capital 

projects is making sure that we know what we’re going to build before we start building it. It’s this idea of getting very close to finishing the design work before committing to a performance baseline. On these large facilities, particularly the capital projects, our 

goal is to get to 90 percent of design prior to construction, pouring 

concrete in the ground, and then finding out. Because that way 

we’re assured, we have a much greater confidence that we know 

what a project costs and how long it will take. 

Senator VITTER. Okay. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Bingaman? 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. 

Tom, thank you for your service. 

You testified to this subcommittee, last year, that the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSC) was an important tool to 

help maintain the stockpile. I wanted to be sure that’s still your 

view. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It’s absolutely my view that the LANSC provides the important experimental data that we need to help validate our codes, as well as help our scientists. It helps us in the 

basic science area as it well helps us in the energy area as we look 

at nuclear energy and being able to have materials that can handle 

neutron flux environments well. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you. Let me ask about the CMRR Facility. The budget you’ve given us doesn’t have in it any cost estimates. I guess your statement, just a few minutes ago, related to 

this. When would we expect to have firm cost estimates and completion dates for that project? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I expect, in calendar year 2012—whether it 

bridges into fiscal year 2012 or 2013—I’d have to double check. It’s 

going to take us a good year and a half more of design work to be 

confident. I think the most important thing is our desire to get 

DOE’s reputation back on track, with respect to large facilities. We 

do have programs in DOE that do well in this, and what we’ve 

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learned is that getting the design work largely completed, or getting it to around the 80 to 90 percent level is what it takes in order 

to do that. So, we’re going to work on that approach here for these 

two facilities. My expectation is about the 2012 timeframe to get 

that done. If it takes longer though, sir, I’m willing to push back 

the performance baseline by a year in order to make sure I know 

what we’re asking for. I think, in the long run, that will be the 

right thing to do. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Has the decision been made as to whether 

that CMRR Facility will manufacture plutonium pits? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I don’t think there’s any decision needed, sir. 

Here’s how I would describe that. The plutonium pits are manufactured in a building called PF4. It’s a building at Los Alamos that 

was brought up in the 1980s. It’s 20, 25 years old. We’re in the 

midst of upgrading that facility, working on the ventilation systems 

and the power systems and the like. The CMRR Facility will do a 

couple of things for us. It will do the materials characterization 

work that we need to characterize plutonium material for nuclear 

forensics work and for the stockpile. It will do the analytical chemistry that’s needed to do the surveillance work on the stockpile, 

which means if we take a stockpile pit, we take a little sample of 

that, and we send it over to the CMRR facility so that analysis can 

be done, so we can understand the aging of that warhead. Finally, 

there will be a component of this facility that will include storage. 

One of the things that we found that we’re having problems with 

is making sure that we have the adequate and appropriate storage 

for all of our material. So, it will provide those three functions. We 

will not make pits in the CMRR Facility. We’ll make them in the 

existing older facility. 

Senator BINGAMAN. As I understand it, the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) has criticized the PF4 facility for its 

safety envelope under a worst-case accident scenario. Does NNSA 

have a campaign to reduce or remove plutonium from that facility 

to deal with that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Senator, we absolutely have a campaign to do 

that. We have a campaign to do a couple of things. One, the concern of the DNFSB is a concern of mine in that the analysis was 

an unbounded analysis. That said, if the facility was completely full 

of plutonium, and all the worst things happened, then we would 

have a release. What we have done since then is taken a look at 

how much material is actually in the building, versus the building 

filled up to the rafters with plutonium. That reduced the risk to the 

public by a factor of 15, so that’s a significant reduction. We’re still 

not satisfied with that reduction. 

What we’re doing, even though the risk has been reduced by a 

factor of 15, is packaging and taking material out, and we’ve 

incentivized the laboratory to accelerate its packaging. Item two is, 

we’ve reduced the amount of—what we call fire loading, material 

in the building that could catch fire, because the accident was a 

fire accident. The building breaks open, there’s a fire, and then the 

wind carries everything out. If we reduce the amount of fire-loaded 

material and add fire upgrades, that also causes the risk to the 

public to go down. 

176 

We’re moving material out; we’ve reduced the fire loading; and 

we’re also putting in some—not ventilation adjustments, but, in essence, doors that will close automatically, to reduce the risk even 

further. I’m confident that the right steps are being taken. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask about the scientific and engineering complex that has been considered there at Los Alamos. I believe your budget proposes to cancel that. This was intended to 

house many of the scientists at the lab in a single facility. What 

is the plan for a facility of this sort? Is there an alternative course 

that you plan to follow? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. I would characterize it slightly differently, if I could, sir. We canceled the approach that the lab was 

proposing to the Federal Government, which was a third-party-financed approach which we felt did not meet the requirements. 

First of all, it did not meet the requirements that we had laid out, 

with the administration, and it did not meet the Office of Management and Budget requirements for third-party financing. So, we’re 

working with the laboratory, right now, on a different approach. 

We do need, frankly, a place to put our scientists at the laboratory. 

We don’t have the solution yet. The Defense Programs organization 

hasn’t closed on that particular approach yet. I don’t have anything 

I can say right now to you, sir. But, I’ll be glad, once we close on 

that approach, to communicate back to you, once we close on what 

that may be. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I may have some questions to submit in writing, 

but thank you very much. 

Senator BEN NELSON. They will be received. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Mr. D’Agostino, we appreciate your being with us today. 

One of the things that is really crucial to the START ratification 

process is the commitment, that we believe is there, to modernize 

the nuclear weapons program. It’s part of our 2010 Defense bill, 

and it says, ‘‘Must have a plan to modernize U.S. nuclear deterrent 

and estimated budget requirements over 10 years.’’ 

I was just going to tell you that there are a lot of concerns about 

this treaty. I don’t think it’s critical to our national defense, and 

I will try to be cooperative so people can celebrate all these meetings and signing all these documents. It makes them feel good. 

But, we need to know whether or not you have the money and the 

plan in place to modernize the arsenal. If it’s not there, I think 

Senator Lieberman was quoted as saying that he didn’t think the 

treaty could be ratified. I guess I see there is $5 billion for the first 

5 years, but what kind of plan is there for the second? Are we 

backloading the funding here to sometime when some new administration would have to come up with the money, not the one that’s 

signing this treaty? To put it all bluntly. [Laughter.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Senator, the fiscal year 2011 budget is not just 

a budget for 1 year. Within the program that we’ve submitted, we 

have a 5-year lookahead. The program does go up significantly 

from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015. We do owe you a 

10-year plan to describe what years 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 look like, as 

well. Our commitment is to get that plan to you. I believe that 

177 

what’s not needed is a 1-year step-up, which, frankly, we do have 

a significant increase from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011, but 

it has to be a long-term commitment that crosses administrations 

and crosses Congresses and the like. That’s our approach, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. I understand that. But you testified last summer that, ‘‘We anticipate that identified funding levels for the outyears may not be sufficient to meet the post-NPR stockpile requirements, including science-based stewardship, recapitalization of the 

aging plutonium and highly-enriched uranium facilities.’’ Do you 

still stand by that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No, I stand by the President’s budget. Last 

summer, I didn’t know where we were going to end up with the 

year. What we have here is a plan that does what the NPR asked 

for. The NPR lays out broad requirements, we’ve submitted a program and budget that has a very significant set of well-understood 

work for the next decade on working on the nuclear weapons themselves. 

Senator SESSIONS. But, you haven’t identified, yet, the funding 

for the out-years, that’s correct. Yes or no? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. I’ve identified funding for the next 5 years, 

but I haven’t—— 

Senator SESSIONS. The next 5 years. Excuse me. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. For the years 6 through 10, I have that plan 

in place. I haven’t gotten it out in public yet. 

Senator SESSIONS. Will it call for more spending per year, in 

years 6 through 10 than 1 through 5? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I haven’t seen the details of the plan yet, or the 

tables. We don’t have approval on the tables. My expectation is 

that, because we will be entering into the construction phase of 

some of these facilities, that the $7.6 billion that we have in year 

5 will continue, appropriately, to increase to reflect that. 

Senator SESSIONS. Where does $7.6 billion come from? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s the amount of money in our weapons activities account in fiscal year 2015. Right now, our weapons account 

has $7 billion in fiscal year 2011, that $7 billion increases to $7.6 

over a 5-year period. 

Senator SESSIONS. But, you have a new responsibility, a big new responsibility. I thought you were getting $1 billion a year from the 

Secretary of Defense to do the New START plan to modernize? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I gave you the total number, sir, which is an 

element of that, is the resources provided by DOD. 

Senator SESSIONS. You’re cutting other expenditures within the 

account? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’m trying to drive efficiencies, because this is 

not just a matter of getting more money, it’s making sure the resources we have in our base account are spent well. 

Senator SESSIONS. I couldn’t agree more about that. But this $5 

billion for this project in the first 5 years, as I understand it, is 

that about $1 billion a year you plan to apply? Or does it ramp up 

over the 5 years? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Since, I haven’t seen my years 6, 7, 8, 9, and 

10, I can’t give you a solid answer to that. But very shortly, you’ll 

be getting the 10-year plan and we will have that level of detail 

for you. 

178 

Senator SESSIONS. I just want to say, I learned something here, 

when I first came to the Senate, President Clinton had a lot of increases in the defense budget in the out-years, and I realized he’s 

going to be out of office, but he wasn’t spending his money this 

year to get it started. So, I’m trying to make the point that this 

is not going to be a pleasant process if you don’t have us really 

good numbers that we can believe in, and with credibility, and a 

real commitment is there to improve our stockpile. 

With regard to the W78 and W88, it seems that the NPR raises 

the bar to make it more difficult to recommend improvements or 

replacement options. Why would we constrict ourselves in the options that we would have to make the arsenal safer and more reliable? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Senator, I don’t believe we are constricting ourselves. After taking a look at the NPR, the lab directors feel that 

the NPR provides them the flexibility they need in order to maintain the stockpile, including the W78 and the W88. 

Senator SESSIONS. They work for you guys, and they pretty much 

follow orders. But, I’m going to ask you again, do the restrictions 

that are included in any way weaken the options that might be 

available in the future as we work to replace and modernize these 

weapons systems? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I believe the NPR does not provide any restrictions to modernize. So, there’s no impact, there’s flexibility for the 

lab directors to study all types of approaches to do life extensions 

on the warheads. The NPR is real clear on that, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. We’ll review that. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would just note, if you want to save some 

money, you have $6 billion in cleanup money, is that correct, in 

your budget? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In the DOE budget, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Another $6 billion of stimulus money for cleanups, that’s $12 billion. That right? Counting the money that 

was in the stimulus bill? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I’m more confident on the environment management work money. I don’t keep track of the stimulus money. 

Senator SESSIONS. If you want to look for a place to save money, I suggest that $12 billion would be a good place to start and that 

you have plenty of money to modernize our nuclear arsenal. Otherwise, we may not have a treaty to sign. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Director. 

Just in a general question—we have a challenge of modernizing 

our nuclear stockpile in both deployed and stockpile weapons, et 

cetera. Is there any significant difference, in terms of the status of 

ground-based, air-launched, or sea-launched systems, in terms of 

their modernization or their status? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I can answer part of that. 

Senator REED. Yes. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It’s probably better addressed to DOD. 

Senator REED. Right. 

179 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. General Chilton and Mr. Miller will be here, I 

think, next week. 

Senator REED. Yes, sir. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. My sense is, from the sea-launch standpoint, for 

example, I—because I’m a former submarine officer, I keep track 

of the trends—— 

Senator REED. I know there was something I liked about you. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We do have work that we have in our program 

request to do the design work on the follow-on Ohio-class submarine core. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. An element of that, obviously, is the replacement of the Ohio-class submarine. There is significant work and 

discussions underway within Strategic Systems Program organization on how we best move forward on that Trident replacement 

submarine. There’s a general understanding that this is the most 

survivable leg of our deterrent, and there’s a commitment to work 

with the Navy on getting this piece done. My element of the budget, as I described earlier, is over a $100-million increase in the 

naval propulsion program just to do that work on the Ohio-class 

submarine replacement, as well as refuel the reactor core on the 

prototype facility. 

From a submarine standpoint, I’m confident. But, I’ll have to 

leave it to my colleagues in DOD to deal with the other part of your 

question, sir. 

Senator REED. Very good. You are already beginning to undertake the work for the design of the new reactor system for the follow-on to Ohio. Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely, sir. This budget gets this going in 

high gear. 

Senator REED. One of the other aspects of the naval system is 

that their spent fuel is currently stored in the water basin up at 

naval reactors facilities in Idaho Falls, and the facility is 50 years 

old. It’s been described to me as a design that is not the most modern. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Senator REED. I don’t want to denigrate it, but it’s a swimming 

pool with—am I getting too far off the point here? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Getting pretty close, sir. 

Senator REED. Swimming pool with material in it. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Senator REED. So, what are we going to do to recapitalize that, 

in terms of the disposition of the fuel? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The facility you’re referring to is the Expended 

Core Facility, ECF, for short. This is a facility that’s done great 

work for the Nation. It’s a facility that is in need of upgrading. Just 

like our plutonium and uranium facilities, which were there in the 

1950s, and were designed to 1950s standards and the like, as we 

take a look at the work that we anticipate out into the future, with 

cores coming out, we know this facility is not going to be able to 

cut it. So we have $40 million requested in the fiscal year 2011 

budget on the ECF. We’re going to be working with the Office of 

Management and Budget. Once we establish the performance baseVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00185 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
180 

line again—is to make sure that those out-year funds are there to 

support this activity. 

Senator REED. You might have covered this already. But, what 

opportunity did you have to participate and observe this week’s 

summit meetings? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I was intimately involved with it. Because it 

was a nuclear security summit, our folks in the NNSA were actively involved in the workups to this. 

Senator REED. Yes. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. It’s taken almost a year, frankly, worth of effort 

in securing commitments from other nations to protect their material, to repatriate highly-enriched uranium or plutonium that either United States or Russia had provided; and to convert research 

reactor cores from highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium. Starting on Sunday, it culminated with a set of bilateral 

meetings, and Monday, with our counterparts from other nations, 

and then the summit yesterday, where we actually secured commitments and received agreement on a integrated work plan. My organization was actively involved. I was there for the last 3 days. 

We’re quite excited about this many countries that are interested 

in dealing with this global problem, and addressing it in a very systematic way. Being an engineer, I like to see things follow a certain 

work plan, with requirements and our goal is to have an agreed 

work plan and meet regularly and report back up to our presidents 

regularly on how we’re doing. Two years from now, we’ll have another opportunity to ask the world, ‘‘Did we do what we said we 

were going to do?’’ I think that’s very important, that followup. 

Senator REED. This integrated work plan encompasses all of the 

nations that participated? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. All of the nations, and possibly more. Some nations have a lot less to do than others. Obviously the United States 

and Russia have a fair burden and moral obligation as well as programmatic obligation to do this work. But, you’ve probably heard 

the announcements about Ukraine agreeing to give up the material 

they have and allowing us to bring that back to Russia; and agreements with Canada, as well, on bringing back U.S. material. We 

have secured agreements from various nations to allow us to put 

security upgrades in their facilities, put radiation detectors in their 

seaports, and have them take over that responsibility, and agree to 

sustain that. It was, frankly, remarkable. 

The last piece of it, which is something that many on the committee know about, is an agreement by Russia and the United 

States to sign the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement. 

This, unfortunately, had been in negotiation, I’m afraid to say, for 

10 years. We finally got it signed, and it’s an important part—that 

way, what we’ll do is get the International Atomic Energy Agency 

to verify that both nations, the United States and Russia, will be 

eliminating 68 metric tons of plutonium, plus a couple of hundred 

metric tons of highly-enriched uranium to go with that. So, it’s 

quite a set of days. We’re quite happy with that. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thanks. 

Senator REED. Thanks for your testimony. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you sir. 

181 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

You heard my colleagues from the other side raising questions 

about adequate financing and funding for the job that is going to 

be required as part of the New START. Based on what you now 

know, certainly with the current budget, years 1 through 5, do you 

believe that there’s adequate funding for the United States to fulfill 

our obligations under the Treaty as it relates to the nuclear arsenal? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do believe that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is it your opinion on years 6 through 10, 

based on what you know at the present time and what you will be 

submitting as part of the 10-year plan, that there will be plans for 

adequate funding in those out-years, as well? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Our goal is to put together 

that 10-year plan to describe the work, as we understand it today. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In recognizing that, as our project baselines are 

established, my goal is that those project baselines—as this plan is 

dynamic, change from year to year, and those project plan numbers 

get inserted into this plan. 

Senator BEN NELSON. There is no effort, as far as you’re concerned, that the front-end funding is light, inadequate, or is a 

smaller number than it should be, in anticipation that the outyears would be funded at a higher level. In other words, so that 

the funding should be adequate for each and every one of those 

years, based on the budgeting process that we have as part of Congress. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s right, sir. We put forward a program 

that meets the requirements and is executable. It doesn’t make 

sense for the executive branch to put together a political budget, 

because, in the end, what we’re trying to do is get the job done, and 

get it done in a way that best uses the taxpayers’ dollars and meets 

the requirements. That’s what we have in our budget submission, 

sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You don’t believe that partisanship or any 

kind of political pressure is being placed on this budgeting process, 

as far as you’re concerned? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Not as far as I’m concerned. I was intimately 

involved in putting this budget together, and received great support in doing so. In understanding that we needed to recapitalize 

our infrastructure, we needed to increase our resources in the 

science area, and that we needed to work on the stockpile. Sir, 

that’s what we have before us. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay, thank you. In connection with some 

facilities modernization efforts, there’ve always been people saying 

that the current facilities, in many instances, are in shambles; that 

they’re not current, they’re not up-to-date, they’re not state-of-theart, but that does not seem to be borne out by the facts, because 

you have, over the last several years, increased the level of facilities management during these recent years. Maybe you can tell us 

a little bit about some of the things that you’ve done so far on some 

of the facilities, recognizing that I think there are two major faciliVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
182 

ties that are going to have to have more than some work done on 

them. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right, certainly, absolutely, sir. We’ve done a 

significant amount, as you pointed out. I’ll give you some quick examples. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. At Sandia, for example, we’ve done work on a 

facility called the Microsystems Engineering Science Application facility. This is a facility that was critically important. It added on 

to an older facility, called the Microelectronics Development Laboratory. But, this facility, we knew we needed it, because, as components were getting smaller, we knew that we could pack more capability into a smaller size. When we’re talking about nuclear warhead designs, size and weight are huge factors in the equation. So, 

that facility was up and running, supported by and authorized by 

Congress within the last 10 years. 

Additionally, within the last 10 years, we built a facility called 

the Tritium Extraction Facility. This facility was vitally important 

to reestablishing the Nation’s capability to produce and extract tritium for use in the deterrent, also vitally important, something that 

could get done. 

We’ve saved the hardest for last, if I could put it one way. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The hard work is the uranium and plutonium 

work. These are the last two big facilities that have to get done. 

They are multibillion-dollar facilities. I won’t kid you, sir, these are 

expensive. But, at the same time, we were trying to get as much 

out of what we had. Now we’re at the point where we have to recapitalize those. But, just as with any large operation, any organization needs a recapitalization budget to replace buildings as they 

get old. We expect that to continue on, at the couple-of-hundredmillion-dollar-per-year level. 

Finally, one last point, if I could. Up at LANL, which had a very 

old administration building, it was the center building. It was one 

of the very first structures that went up in the early days of the 

Cold War. That facility was torn down and replaced with a new 

modern structure at LANL. 

We are turning the enterprise around. But, we are now left with 

our big jobs, and that’s what we have to get done over the next 10 

years. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In connection with the two new facilities, 

what portion of the design would be complete before construction 

starts? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. My goal is to get design as close to 90 percent 

as possible before construction starts. The reason why I can’t give 

you an exact number now is, it’s hard for me to look out in the future and find out, ‘‘Should I wait another year and spend another 

X-million dollars to get that last 5 percent? Or do I have enough 

now to go on? Does that last 5 percent really matter with respect 

to performing a baseline?’’ But, our goal is to get into this 80- to 

95-percent range on complete design before we start asking for increased resources from you, sir, and other committees, on the actual construction itself. 

183 

Senator BEN NELSON. Are you planning to get any kind of an 

independent cost estimate (ICE) of these facilities before you start 

making budget requests for significant amounts of money? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. DOE recently—I would say, within 

the last 2 months, put out a new policy on project management. 

The new policy had a couple of key elements to it. One, I’ve just 

alluded to, which is this idea of doing as much design work before 

you commit to the construction. The second one is ICEs at each of 

the critical decision points. In the past, we would only do this ICE 

at one of the major critical decision points. We’re going to do them 

at each of the four critical decision points. The third element is 

making sure that we have qualified project managers, and the 

right number of them on each of the projects. There’s an algorithm 

that’s been developed, and an approach and a desire to make sure 

we have enough project managers on the project. 

There are a couple of others, but for the sake of brevity, we could 

submit those details for the record, if you’d like. Or I could provide 

a copy of that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I think that would be helpful. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

As a result of the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) residing on the GAO’s High Risk List for Project Management 

Execution, the Department conducted a Root Cause Analysis (RCA) with resultant 

Corrective Action Plan (CAP–July 2008). The participants in this RCA were all experienced, senior members of the Department. The second most significant root 

cause of project failures was determined to be the lack of Federal staff (both contract professionals and project professionals) assigned to the project management 

team. The corrective action for this particular item resulted in the development of 

an algorithm by the Office of Engineering and Construction Management (OECM) 

that when used would predict the necessary Federal staffing levels. This model was 

based upon a similar model utilized by NavFac. Although the Federal project staff 

can be supplemented with contractor personnel, there remain certain ‘‘inherently 

Federal’’ functions that must be executed by Federal staff and cannot be allocated 

to contractors. 

After conducting a review of this model, NNSA adopted additional criteria into the 

algorithm that more closely reflected the actual staffing methodologies used within 

NNSA and the complexities of NNSA projects, as compared to a linear $/FTE concept suggested by the original OECM model. NNSA then utilized the model to predict the necessary staffing levels of the five largest NNSA projects. The model’s predictions were closely aligned to the Federal Project Director’s staffing plans. The results indicated that NNSA had a staffing deficit on these five projects in fiscal year 

2012. Further decisions regarding the funds to support the Federal Project staffing 

have been deferred until the fiscal year 2013 budget formulation. 

To address the immediate needs of Chemical Metallurgy Research building Replacement project and Uranium Processing Facility project, NA–10 has assigned a 

senior Federal Project Director to establish a HQ Project Support Office which will 

provide oversight of all activities for these critical projects. Additional NA–10 staff 

have been assigned to work under this FPD’s direction. 

NNSA is committed to the overall improvement of project management within 

NNSA and the eventual, near-term removal of NNSA from the GAO’s High Risk 

List. As such, NNSA will continue development of the logistics necessary to obtain 

the additional required staff to support these critical NNSA projects. 

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Senator BEN NELSON. One of the concerns about the treaty is 

whether we are going to be in a position to be able to do everything 

we need to do, as well as everything else that’s required as part 

of the overall operations of the facilities? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Right. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is there any concern on your part about 

your ability to build these two facilities simultaneously? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No. They’re in two different geographic locations. The key will be sticking to our principles, our project management principles; making sure we spend more time up front on 

the design; working with the DNFSB; ensuring that we have the 

safety built into these designs; and the thinking is done upfront, 

instead of trying to backfit features in after the design is starting 

to lock itself down. So, I think we have—the DNFSB and the 

NNSA go back and forth on these things, and appropriately so. 

But, the good news is, we’re having fairly significant amount of dialogue on these facilities with the DNFSB. I wouldn’t have it any 

other way. I think it’s very important to get that independent 

input. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Congress has required your agency to have 

a net reduction in square feet at each site. Now, in tearing down 

some of the old excess facilities and to budget for the decommissioning and demolition (D&D) for each old building that a new one 

would replace, are you in a position to where you think that you’re 

going to have a net reduction in square footage, but at the same 

time be able to handle the ongoing operations? Apparently you’ve 

not funded the D&D processes in recent budgets. 

So, two questions. One, are you going to be able to get there with 

the reduction in square feet, but still have enough to do what needs 

to be done? How are you going to be able to fund the D&D costs? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Okay. Yes, we will be able to have square-foot 

reductions. Early on, when we looked about the shift from going 

from an old Cold War nuclear weapons complex to a 21st century 

national security enterprise, we felt that we could take 9 million 

square feet out of the enterprise. That number probably doesn’t 

mean anything, except if I put it into context. We have 36 million 

square feet of space, and we believe we can take 9 million square 

feet down as we consolidate our functions, which we want to do 

with this plutonium and uranium, as we get into smaller more 

modern facilities. We believe we can take it down to 9 million 

square feet. 

Another element, which is not a matter of taking square—saying 

you’ve moved out of the old buildings, or the old buildings have to 

come down. We’re working with Dr. Triay. At Y–12, for example, 

we’re doing a consolidation of highly-enriched uranium, and we’ve 

completed the movement of all the highly-enriched uranium that 

was spread out in that Y–12 valley into this new facility that we’ve 

just built, this highly-enriched uranium materials facility. That will 

allow us, ultimately, to take that 150 acres of highly secure space, 

shift the fence to—only have 75 acres of space that we’re protecting, and all that work that’s outside now is available for the 

Environmental Management (EM) organization. Senator Sessions 

talked about this AARA money, that $6 billion. That money will be 

used to take down those facilities. 

260 

Senator BEN NELSON. I see. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We don’t have, at this point, every single 

square foot being taken down. We don’t have the details of that 

plan yet. But, for the most part, we’re working the EM organization to help us out on that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As the new facilities are being built, is 

your budget adequate for facilities maintenance? In other words, so 

we don’t end up with significant deferred maintenance that’s not 

covered within a budget, but obviously it’s a cost that will come due 

at some point in the future, and usually when there’s no money 

available to take care of it. Are you planning for that, budgetwise, 

as well? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In an ideal world, you’d always want to do more 

maintenance. What we’re trying to do is balance the tradeoff between taking facilities down and stopping maintenance; anticipating which facilities, and stopping maintenance on those facilities, and reallocating the resources to the fewer sets of facilities 

that we have right now. 

I have a separate office that looks into this. The numbers vary 

from site to site. I’m comfortable with fiscal year 2011. This is a 

challenge that General Harencak is working on at the Pantex 

plant, for example, right now. We’re trying to solve a small facilities maintenance problem there. But, at the same time, we feel 

that overall in fiscal year 2011, we’re okay. I’ll have to get back to 

you with an answer on the out years. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

During the construction of replacement facilities, National Nuclear Security Administration balances the amount of maintenance and operational funding it provides for an existing capability until the replacement becomes available. This balance considers the inherent risks of meeting the mission requirements as well as 

the safety of continued operations in existing facilities, while attempting to minimize unnecessary expenses. 

The Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program provides the 

funding necessary to maintain the operations, and to reduce the risk of their continued operations. This RTBF funding is provided to the weapon sites in three categories; namely, operations, risk reduction, and transformation. All sites are provided RTBF funding in each of these categories, however the risk reduction category 

continues to be a priority at Y–12 and Los Alamos National Laboratory in order to 

provide for safe and compliant operations of the existing facilities, while Uranium 

Processing Facility (UPF) and Chemical and Metallurgical Research Replacement 

(CMRR) are constructed. RTBF support is critical to the sites’ ability to manage risk 

in the hazardous Uranium and Plutonium facilities. 

Support for risk reduction is included in the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan 

targets and in the case of HEU and Pu facilities, additional funding through line 

item projects is also provided to further reduce the risk, namely 9212 NFRR and 

TA–55 Risk Reduction. It is vital that support for RTBF operations, risk reduction, 

and line item projects continues until the startup and operation of UPF and CMRR 

is complete. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The NPR states that the United States 

will ‘‘study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability 

of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis.’’ Have you established 

criteria that will be used to evaluate each warhead, on a case-bycase basis, to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of those 

nuclear warheads? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sir, we’ll take each warhead one at a time. The 

criteria we use is our surveillance data that we get out of taking 

the warheads apart and looking at them and finding out what comVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00266 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
261 

ponents need to be replaced. When there’s the right subset of work 

that has to be done, the decision gets made. We have pretty good 

sense about how the next 10 years look in this area. It’s not like 

there are go/no-go points on each of these particular points, but, essentially, it’s a conglomeration of, ‘‘We know when you’re going to 

need to work on the organic materials in this warhead, and we’re 

going to have to replace the neutron generator by this date. How 

about if we combine these two together and work on that as a joint 

life extension.’’ So, it’s a little dynamic from that standpoint, but 

the next 10 years worth of work is fairly well clear. Finish the W76 

production; work on the B61, the neutron generators, the power 

supplies, and the like; work on the radar; work on the nuclear explosive package to get the safety and security in it; and then we 

know we’re going to have to touch the W78, for reasons that are 

better off discussed in either a closed session or in a classified report for the record. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In that regard, some warheads, as I understand it, don’t have all the safety features that were identified by 

the Drell panel back in the 1990s. Is there a plan to incorporate, 

let’s say, all of the safety features in each warhead and weapon? 

Will this require any new pit designs or existing pits to be remanufactured or reused? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Let me start with saying that our warheads are 

safe and secure now. As you accurately said, depending on which 

warhead we’re talking about, if it’s one of our newer warhead designs and we’ve had the opportunity to put more modern safety and 

security in it, we’ve done so. 

What we hope to do, particularly with the B61 warhead, is make 

adjustments that will allow us to make sure we continue to use insensitive high explosives, and make sure that we put the right kind 

of 21st century security into those warheads. Some of them may require a modification to a pit; because we have a number of pits 

available, some of them may allow us to reuse pits that we’ve had 

before. 

What the NPR allows us to do, which is very important for our 

lab directors and our scientific workforce, is, it allows us to study 

the full range of options, whether it’s refurbish the existing one, 

reuse something that we’ve used before, or replace a component, 

because we think that’s the best way to get 21st century safety and 

security—we have the flexibility to study all of those and present 

to the President and Congress, and get authorization from the 

President and Congress, to move down any one of those particular 

tracks. 

Senator BEN NELSON. There’s always the question of having adequately trained and skilled staff. Can you give us some idea of how 

that is working for DOE? Are you encountering difficulties? If so, 

are you able to overcome those difficulties so that we keep adequate skilled staff? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. We’ve come a long way in a year, Mr. Chairman. A year ago, there was a lot of uncertainty within my organization as to what the future held. In fact, you can go back further 

than a year, because there was a general view that we did not have 

a bipartisan consensus on the deterrent. We, of course, have a lot 

262 

of very smart, capable folks that had plenty of options. In many 

cases, they took those options and left the organization. 

But, there is a solid group of dedicated people left. They’re very 

excited about the plan that the President has laid out, because they 

believe that it’s not only the right plan, but they believe that’s a 

plan that can be sustained over time. That’s the most important 

thing, is clarity in the work that’s laid out before us. Frankly, I believe America is safer now, with clarity in the NPR, than we were 

before, because our workforce believes that the country cares about 

this. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Not just the stockpile, sir, but also the nonproliferation and counterterrorism work and the like. 

Senator BEN NELSON. There is something about clarity, isn’t 

there? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is there any question I haven’t asked you 

that I should? [Laughter.] 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I felt I’ve answered a lot of questions, but—— 

[Laughter.] 

—I’ll be glad to take some more for the record, if that would help. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Let me check and see if we—— 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Oh, this is the toughest one, I guess. 

[Laughter.] 

The NPR states that the United States will not develop new nuclear warheads, and that the LEPs will not support new military 

missions. In this context, what is your understanding of the word 

‘‘new’’? How does this fit with the statutory definition of ‘‘new′′? 

There are some differences there, so perhaps you can help us understand that. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In my view, new nuclear warheads are warheads that are not based on previously-tested designs, or are warheads that provide a new military capability; for example, an enhanced electromagnetic pulse warhead, or a neutron bomb, or what 

has been euphemistically thrown around, the term ‘‘bunker-buster,’’ 

or a warhead that’s designed to defeat chemical or biological 

agents. Those are new military capabilities. Our approach is to be 

very consistent with the NDAA 2010, which talked about the SMP, 

which said, ‘‘Extend the life of existing warheads; ensure their safety, security, and reliability; to ensure that the stockpile can be extended without underground testing; to ensure that it provides an 

opportunity to reduce the size of the stockpile or reduce the numbers of different types of warheads; and to ensure that we prevent 

an accidental detonation or deliberate unauthorized use of a warhead,’’ all within the current mission functions of the existing 

stockpile. 

This is very consistent, frankly, I believe, with the language of 

the 2003 NDAA, and what we looked at is to be new military capabilities to come to the front. It’s my view that there was a desire 

on the part of Congress that you wanted to be aware of any work 

that was going on to enhance military capabilities. But, the language is very clear; it did not apply to life extensions. 

263 

So, the approach we’ve laid out is a life extension approach, consistent with the SMP, which does not bring in new military capabilities, and it ensures us confidence of using the underground test 

data. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So, it’s really tied to additional missions, 

or something that changes significantly what the prior mission 

would have been with existing weapons, is that fair to say? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. That’s right. I would add from a technical 

standpoint, that I have the underground test bar that I want to 

make sure I cross over each time. It also includes designs that are 

not based on previously tested designs. So, it would be both for me, 

but, at the bare minimum, for sure, the mission piece. 

Senator BEN NELSON. ‘‘New’’ is more tied to change than mission 

or design or capabilities, is that accurate, as well? If you expand 

a capability, would that create something new? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. For example, taking a warhead that we have, 

that might currently be at X kilotons, and now making it 2X or 3X. 

I don’t want to put words in General Chilton’s mouth, but he and 

I testified earlier this morning, and he described it from that 

standpoint, that the stockpile he has right now is what he needs 

to meet the current and expected future mission requirements. I 

believe, of course, he would be in a position next week to be able 

to describe that in a little bit more detail. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. That would be an appropriate place 

for us to bring it up again. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I thank you very much for your patience 

and your testimony and responding to the questions. Obviously, the 

whole area of the treaty will be discussed even in more detail, and 

there may be different ideas, it appears, about how to pursue this. 

I thank you for enlightening us with your answers today, and I 

look forward to seeing you next week. 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF BINGAMAN

B–61

1. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, in response to the Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is proposing to undertake a life extension of the B–61 gravity bomb. My understanding is that for this 

year the effort will examine principally the non-nuclear components. Do you anticipate looking at the nuclear warhead and are the cost estimates reflective of that? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the B61 addresses 

the necessary funding to develop and assess nuclear and non-nuclear life extension 

options and pursue technology maturation initiatives that enable a first production 

unit date in fiscal year 2017. The nuclear warhead scope is a critical element of the 

fiscal year 2011 study effort because it allows the development of life extension options to meet military requirements including extending the service life, implementation of enhanced safety features, and consolidation of four B61 weapon-types 

(B61–3, –4, –7, and –10) into a single weapon-type. 

While the fiscal year 2010 B61 study scope is currently limited to non-nuclear options, we have requested funding authorization to expand the study to include nuclear life extension options. This request is consistent with the planning and requirements contained in the fiscal year 2011 B61 budget request. 

264 

2. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, you list out-year cost estimates of the B– 

61 gravity bomb totaling approximately $1.68 billion. Does that estimate include 

only the weapons labs or the cost to assemble the refurbished weapon? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The B61 funding profile contained in the budget request includes 

only engineering and production development activities through fiscal year 2015 at 

the national laboratories and production plants. War reserve production activities 

at the plants will not begin until fiscal year 2016 and will continue through fiscal 

year 2021. Total program costs are being developed as part of the B61 Phase 6.2/ 

2A Study and will be reported to Congress as part of the Nuclear Weapon Council 

authorization of Phase 6.3 in fiscal year 2012. 

W–78

3. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, for fiscal year 2011 you are proposing to 

initiate a study on the Minuteman III W–78 warhead. Will it be a life extension 

program (LEP) of the existing warhead or will it consider different designs within 

the same military performance envelope? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In fiscal year 2011, the NNSA and the Department of Defense 

(DOD) will initiate a W78 Life Extension Phase 6.1 Concept Assessment Study. This 

study will carefully consider all options and will identify safety, security, and use 

control requirements as well as military priorities. As recommended in the NPR, 

this study will consider the possibility of using the resulting warhead on multiple 

platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead types in the nuclear weapons 

stockpile. 

AGING FACILITIES

4. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, do you support replacing the aging facilities for the NNSA service center at Kirtland Air Force Base that houses over 1,000 

NNSA employees? If so, how? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Requirements for the NNSA service center and other DOE staff 

located in Albuquerque have been under consideration for several years. At present, 

NNSA is working to finalize requirements and assess options for best meeting them. 

These requirements encompass, for example, the number of potential occupants for 

the space, and any special capabilities or requirements needed for the space. Acquisition approaches may be considered, and these may include line item construction 

by NNSA, construction by GSA and lease by NNSA, or construction by a third party 

and lease by NNSA. 

For fiscal year 2011, you will note on page 34 of the fiscal year 2011 budget request, Office of the Administrator—under the Other Related Expenses bullet, we 

highlight the increase for maintenance funding and additional local leased space to 

maintain the viability of the current NNSA service center complex. 

5. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, the budget for the nonproliferation 

verification research and development account is flat if not declining from fiscal year 

2011 to fiscal year 2015. This is a critical program to develop new nuclear material 

sensors and satellites to detect detonations. Can you explain why this is? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The increase in funding from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011 

supports and focuses this programmatic activity on key administration nonproliferation and arms control priorities. For example, a new capability will be created at 

the Nevada Test Site for testing and evaluation of new technologies that will ultimately support U.S. capabilities to monitor international treaties and cooperative 

agreements, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. 

Funding requirements for fiscal years 2012–2015 are being reevaluated as part 

of the fiscal years 2012–2016 budget process, which will consider the requirements 

for the new NTS capability. Any necessary revisions to the out-year budget requirements will be included in the fiscal year 2012 President’s budget. Using the unique 

facilities and scientific skills of NNSA and the DOE national laboratories and 

plants, in partnership with industry and academia, the research and development 

program conducts research and development that supports nonproliferation mission 

requirements necessary to close technology gaps identified through close interaction 

with NNSA and other U.S. Government agencies and programs. This program meets 

unique challenges and plays an important role in the Federal Government by developing new technologies applicable to nonproliferation, homeland security, and national security needs. 

265 

The research and development program’s contribution is two-fold. First, it includes research, development, production, and delivery of space- and ground-based 

sensors to detect nuclear detonations. Second, the program leads the nonproliferation community’s long-term research and development efforts in advancing next generation detection capabilities to detect foreign nuclear materials and weapons production facilities and processes. 

6. Senator BINGAMAN. Mr. D’Agostino, can you provide a total cost estimate for 

the construction of the three mixed oxide (MOX) facilities under the elimination of 

weapons grade plutonium program? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Fissile Materials Disposition program is responsible for the 

construction of the facilities that will be used to dispose of surplus U.S. plutonium: 

(1) the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF); (2) the Waste Solidification Building 

(WSB); and (3) the Pit Disassembly and Conversion (PDC) Project. The MFFF and 

the WSB are baselined projects, with the MFFF scheduled to begin operations in 

October 2016 and the WSB scheduled to begin operations in September 2013 to support MFFF cold start-up. The PDC Project is not yet baselined and the out-year 

funding associated with PDC should be regarded as a planning estimate that will 

be refined and validated when the Project Performance Baseline is approved (Critical Decision-2). 

Through fiscal year 2010, the total appropriated funding for all three construction 

projects is $3.5 billion. The approved MFFF total project cost (TPC) through fiscal 

year 2016 is $4.8 billion and the approved WSB TPC through fiscal year 2013 is 

$344 million. The funding profile in the table below corresponds to the funding profile given in the fiscal year 2011 request for the three projects. 

Through 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Fiscal Year Future 

Funding Total 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 

MOX OPC .................. 179,298 30,000 97,035 246,669 230,697 91,603 5,999 881,301 

WSB OPC .................. 29,481 21,500 28,000 21,143 100,124 

PDC OPC ................... 335,586 112,999 30,141 44,992 41,143 35,441 TBD TBD 

Total, OPC ............ 544,365 164,499 155,176 312,804 271,840 127,044 TBD TBD 

MOX TEC ................... 2,518,827 475,788 385,172 322,802 109,661 125,773 37,805 3,975,828 

WSB TEC ................... 169,749 57,000 12,927 4,655 244,331 

PDC TEC ................... 302,491 80,000 158,000 200,000 200,000 157,000 TBD TBD 

Total, TEC ............ 2,991,067 612,788 556,099 527,457 309,661 282,773 TBD TBD 

MOX TPC ................... 2,698,125 505,788 482,207 569,471 340,358 217,376 43,804 4,857,129 

WSB TPC ................... 199,230 78,500 40,927 25,798 344,455 

PDC TPC ................... 63,8077 192,999 188,141 244,992 241,143 192,441 TBD TBD 

Total, TPC ............ 3,535,432 777,287 711,275 840,261 581,501 409,817 TBD TBD 

OPC - Other Project Cost; TEC - Total Estimated Cost; TPC - Total Project Cost (OPC + TEC) 

MOX and WSB funding profiles support their approved baselines; PDC are preliminary estimates in the out-years since the project is not 

baselined. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

EXERCISING THE WORKFORCE WITH NEW DESIGNS

7. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, Secretary of Defense Gates told the Air 

Force Association on September 16, 2009, that larger investments in modernizing 

our nuclear infrastructure are necessary, including LEPs for our nuclear warheads, 

‘‘and in one or two cases probably new designs that will be safer and more reliable.’’ 

New designs were deemed necessary by the Strategic Posture Commission not only 

to improve safety, security, and reliability of our warheads, but also to exercise the 

scientific workforce. Why are new designs important? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The laboratory directors and I agree that our nuclear arsenal 

can be maintained into the indefinite future through LEPs. To improve the safety, 

security, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal, the NNSA plans to upgrade limited 

life components (LLC) and materials, and incorporate more surety—safety, security, 

and use control—technology, whenever possible, through LEPs. LLC reaching their 

end-of-life will be upgraded with, hopefully, LLC that have longer expected lifetimes 

266 

to reduce the number of times someone needs to touch a weapon. Certain materials 

will be upgraded with more attainable materials. The full range of LEP approaches 

will be considered on a weapon-by-weapon basis. The NPR states, ‘‘In any decision 

to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will 

give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear 

components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program 

goals could not be otherwise met, and if specifically authorized by the President and 

[funding is] approved by Congress.’’ In addition, active LEPs, such as the B61 LEP, 

further exercise the full spectrum of development work, from advanced and exploratory concepts through product realization, and develop the critical intuition, judgment, and confidence present only in experienced scientists and engineers who have 

applied their skills to real nuclear weapons design and development work. This 

work is essential to attracting and retaining the scientists and engineers necessary 

to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

8. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, do new designs imply new military capabilities or new warheads which must be tested? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. No. As stated in the NPR, LEPs will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. 

9. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, is the replacement approach necessary for 

new designs, or can this be done through reuse? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NPR directs that the full range of approaches be considered 

when studying weapon system life extension options. First, while we may develop 

a modification or alteration for an existing weapon, there will be no new nuclear 

component designs. If we retain a weapon’s nuclear component designs, we consider 

that refurbishment. If we replace a weapon’s current nuclear components with those 

originally designed for a different weapon system, we consider that reuse. If we replace a weapon’s current nuclear components with nuclear components based on 

tested, but never fielded, designs, we consider that replacement. The full range of 

options will be considered during weapon LEPs. The intent of all life extension options is to maintain the current military characteristics while making the weapon 

safer, more secure, and more reliable. 

RISKS OF AN AGING NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

10. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, in June 2009, in response to a question for 

the record, you told this committee that: ‘‘We incur more risk each year as the stockpile ages, crucial skills erode, and historic underground test data becomes less relevant. The recent Perry-Schlesinger Report indicates that in order to keep a vital 

skills base we will need to evolve the legacy stockpile by demonstrating the capability to field modern warheads that have no new military capabilities. We have not 

fielded a modern warhead in 2 decades, and critical skills are deteriorating.’’ Are 

you still of the view that we incur more risk each year as the stockpile ages? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The NPR and the President’s budget for fiscal year 2011, which 

was formulated to begin executing against the NPR policy direction, address the 

concern to which I spoke last year. The NNSA Science, Technology, and Engineering 

(ST&E) capabilities must be strong to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. As the 

stockpile decreases in size, the role of ST&E in deterrence increases in importance. 

Our capabilities enable us to annually assess the stockpile, to resolve significant 

finding investigations (discovered departures from design and/or manufacturing 

specifications), to extend nuclear weapon lifetimes, to assess other nations’ nuclear 

capabilities, and to dismantle retired weapons. The renewed sense of urgency created by this administration, combined with the very challenging technical program, 

create an environment that attracts highly-trained and motivated personnel. The rejuvenation of our scientists and engineers can be achieved through vigorous engagement of ST&E capabilities with sustainable programs, including LEPs, and an increased level of investment. The NNSA path forward will serve to attract, maintain, 

and manage the necessary Federal and contractor workforce to sustain nuclear deterrence, as well as other nuclear and energy security missions. This path sustains 

capabilities that also contribute to broader energy and security concerns and supporting U.S. leadership in ST&E. 

11. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, how does the administration ameliorate 

this situation in its fiscal year 2011 budget request? 

267 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The Defense Programs fiscal year 2011 budget request increased 

investments in the nuclear infrastructure and a highly skilled workforce to ensure 

the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. Specifically, 

the request includes an additional investment of $320 million for stockpile activities 

such as LEPs, advanced certification and plutonium sustainment, and $241 million 

for construction activities for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

Facility, the Uranium Processing Facility, and High Explosive Pressing Facility. 

These amounts are in addition to funding that is traditionally considered to be within the base program. These additional funds will support skilled scientific, technical, 

and engineering workers who will work on the various stockpile and construction 

programs and who will enable Defense Programs to accomplish its mission and meet 

its deliverables to DOD. 

12. Senator SESSIONS. Mr. D’Agostino, will the administration evolve the legacy 

stockpile by demonstrating the capability to field modern warheads that have no 

new military capabilities? 

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, the United States will sustain a safe, secure, and effective 

nuclear stockpile through LEPs, a process that will provide no new military characteristics and will not require underground nuclear testing. The administration is 

fully committed to funding this stockpile sustainment effort. NNSA and their laboratories work with DOD to develop a preferred life extension approach which is 

then presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council. A full range of technical approaches will be considered for each warhead undergoing life extension, including 

incorporating safety and security enhancements. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FUNDING AND FUNDING UNDER THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:42 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E. Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators E. Benjamin Nelson and 

Bingaman. 

Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel. 

Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner, professional 

staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Ann Premer, assistant 

to Senator Ben Nelson; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator 

Bingaman; and Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, 

CHAIRMAN 

Senator BEN NELSON. This subcommittee hearing will come to 

order. I apologize for the delay. Votes seem to get in the way of the 

rest of our work. But we’re starting nevertheless. 

I’m sorry my ranking member, Senator Vitter, is not going to be 

able to join us today. So I will fly solo here. 

Good afternoon, Dr. Triay, and welcome. We’re pleased to have 

you here. This afternoon the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

meets to discuss the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Environmental 

Management (EM) program budget request for fiscal year 2011 and 

the progress that has been made in implementing the $6 billion received under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. 

With us we have Dr. Ine`z Triay, the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management. 

Cleaning up the vast quantities of radioactive and hazardous 

waste and contamination which are the result of the Cold War nuclear weapons and materials production programs is an expensive 

270 

and daunting task. This cleanup effort has been ongoing for 20 

years and will most probably require another 40 years to complete, 

ironically about the same length as the Cold War itself. This effort 

is hugely expensive and technically challenging, with over $110 billion spent to date and approximately another $250 billion or so left 

to go. 

With President Obama’s decision in the Nuclear Posture Review 

(NPR) to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, more facilities 

will fall to the Office of Environmental Management to clean up 

and tear down. 

Dr. Triay, you have a difficult job with many complex challenges 

facing you, not the least of which is the management, treatment, 

and disposition of the highly radioactive waste in the tanks at the 

DOE’s Hanford, Savannah River, and Idaho facilities. Construction 

of the waste treatment plant at Hanford to deal with the 55 million 

gallons of waste stored at that site continues to be difficult as there 

are many unresolved technical and safety issues associated with 

the construction of the facility. 

The additional funds in the budget request dedicated to accelerating the design of the plant are certainly needed. But this committee wants to ensure that the technical and operational safety 

issues are resolved so that additional redesign is not needed again 

at some time in the future. This plan has been plagued by repeated 

changes in requirements and design, which has resulted in high 

concurrency in design and construction, all of which is factored into 

the increased cost of the project over the years. 

I recognize that the problems with this facility long predate your 

tenure as Assistant Secretary, Dr. Triay. But as you know all too 

well, you get to fix them. Last year, shortly after your confirmation 

this subcommittee held a hearing on your plans to implement the 

$6 billion in Recovery Act funding. According to the DOE Inspector 

General, implementation of this effort is now behind schedule. 

On the other hand, it’s more important that these funds be spent 

wisely rather than quickly to really accelerate the cleanup efforts 

and to reduce overall program costs. If these funds help to substantially reduce the projected $250 billion or more necessary in future 

cleanup costs, then this money is being well spent. 

We look forward to your report on the projects and the progress 

of this effort as well. Obviously, there’s a lot to discuss, so I want 

to keep my opening remarks short. 

Dr. Triay, your prepared statement will be included in the record 

and you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. INE` S R. TRIAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Dr. TRIAY. Thank you very much, Chairman Nelson. Good afternoon to you and the members of the subcommittee, Senator Bingaman. I am pleased to be here today and to address your questions 

regarding the Office of EM’s fiscal year 2011 budget request. 

EM’s mission is to complete the legacy environmental cleanup 

left by the Cold War in a safe, secure, and compliant manner. I am 

very pleased that we are able to present to Congress a budget that 

positions the program to be fully compliant with our regulatory 

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commitments and supports reducing the risks associated with one 

of our highest environmental risk activities, tank waste, as well as 

achieve footprint reduction across the legacy cleanup complex. My 

goal remains to complete quality cleanup work safely, on schedule, 

and within cost, in order to deliver demonstrated value to the 

American taxpayer. 

EM cleanup objectives will continue to be advanced in fiscal year 

2011 by the infusion of $6 billion from the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009. Through April 2010, the Office of Environmental Management has obligated $5.6 billion and spent $1.7 

billion respectively leading to thousands of jobs created and/or 

saved at our sites. 

In fiscal year 2011, EM will continue to draw on the $6 billion 

of Recovery Act funds to advance key cleanup goals. Recovery Act 

funds allow EM to meet all of our regulatory compliance requirements in fiscal year 2011. This funding has also allowed EM to leverage base program dollars, enabling the reduction of our operating footprint from 900 square miles to approximately 540 square 

miles by the end of fiscal year 2011. This is a 40 percent reduction 

which will position the program to advance forward the ultimate 

goal of a 90 percent reduction by the end of fiscal year 2015. 

We are also able to accelerate the legacy cleanup at Brookhaven 

National Laboratory and the Separations Process Research Unit in 

New York, and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California into fiscal year 2011 with Recovery Act funding. 

This budget request strikes a balance between maintaining support for EM’s core commitments and programs, while strengthening 

investments in activities needed to ensure the long-term success of 

our cleanup mission. This budget request significantly increases 

EM’s investments in science and technology areas that are critical 

to our long-term success. 

Specifically, this request targets $60 million in funding to Hanford’s Office of River Protection to use in developing and deploying 

new technologies for treating tank waste. This funding is needed 

to address near-term technical risks that have been identified, but 

is also needed to leverage and bring forward new technologies that 

could help us mitigate the life cycle cleanup of these wastes. 

EM will also continue to strengthen and deploy groundwater and 

decontamination and decommissioning cleanup technologies. Specifically, we will continue the development of an integrated highperformance computer modeling capability for waste degradation 

and contaminant release. This state-of-the-art scientific tool will 

enable robust and standardized assessments of performance and 

risk for cleanup and closure activities. This tool will also help us 

better estimate cleanup time and cost and reduce uncertainties. 

The request also provides an additional $50 million to accelerate 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at Hanford, boosting the budget for the plant to $740 million in fiscal year 2011. The 

additional funding will be used to accelerate completion of the design for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. Prior to 

design completion, it is critical that technical issues are addressed 

and incorporated in a timely manner. Our intent is to mitigate 

these risks early and get the design matured to 90 or 100 percent. 

272 

The fiscal year 2011 request makes a significant investment in 

the decontamination and the decommissioning of the Portsmouth 

Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in Ohio. This investment enables 

EM to accelerate the cleanup of the Portsmouth site by 15 to 20 

years, leading to a significant reduction in the duration and cost 

of the cleanup. 

Now that I have given an overview of our fiscal year budget request, I would like to take a few moments to discuss some of the 

areas I will be focusing on as the program moves forward. EM continues to adhere to a Safety First culture that integrates environment, safety, and health requirements and controls into all work 

activities. Our first priority continues to be the health and safety 

of our employees and the communities surrounding our cleanup 

sites. It is my duty to ensure that our workers go home as healthy 

as they came to work. 

Under my leadership, the program has embarked upon a Journey 

to Excellence. We have developed a new business model which provides a solid management base for EM to become an excellent highperforming organization. This implementation is key to performing 

our cleanup mission effectively and efficiently. A key component in 

this process is the alignment and understanding of headquarters 

and field operational roles and responsibilities. Toward that end, 

our management’s attention will continue to focus on improving 

project performance, aligning project and contract management, 

streamlining the acquisition process, and continuing our very 

strong performance in awarding cleanup work to small businesses. 

We will continue to conduct construction project reviews. These 

reviews examine all aspects of a construction project, including 

project management, technology, and engineering. These reviews 

assess the progress of each of our major projects and determine 

their overall health and ability to meet cost and schedule goals. 

These reviews are scheduled approximately every 6 to 9 months 

and are conducted to provide EM leadership the ability to 

proactively reduce project risk so that issues and solutions can be 

identified early, rather than react once problems are realized. 

With these improvements, we are confident that the EM program 

can succeed in its mission. Chairman Nelson and members of the 

subcommittee, I look forward to addressing your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Triay follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. INE ́S TRIAY

Good afternoon, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and members of the 

subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to answer your questions on the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office 

of Environmental Management (EM). 

PROGRAM STATUS

In fiscal year 2011, EM will continue to build on over 20 years of cleanup progress 

and will focus on investments to sustain risk reduction and strengthen technology. 

EM has made substantial progress in nearly every area of nuclear waste cleanup, 

including stabilizing and consolidating high-risk material such as tank waste and 

surplus special nuclear material (SNM). Progress also includes the near completion 

of transferring spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from wet to dry storage and disposing of 

large quantities of transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), and mixed lowlevel waste (MLLW). Much work remains but demonstrable progress has been made. 

EM will continue to seek ways to maximize reduction of environmental, safety, 

and health risks in a safe, secure, compliant, and cost-effective manner. The current 

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EM life-cycle cost (LCC) estimate range, which covers the period of 1997 through 

completion, is $275 to $329 billion. This includes $82 billion in actual costs from 

1997 through 2009, and an additional estimate of $193 to $247 billion to complete 

EM’s remaining mission. 

EM is analyzing its project plans to further optimize the program. This strategic 

planning effort will concentrate on the technical, programmatic, and performance 

challenges facing the cleanup projects. It is focused on footprint reduction and nearterm completions to reduce monitoring and maintenance costs and on alternative 

approaches to disposition tank waste and surplus SNM and SNF. 

EM cleanup objectives will continue to be advanced in fiscal year 2011 by the in- fusion of $6 billion from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Through April 2010, EM has obligated $5.6 billion and spent $1.7 billion, respectively leading to thousands of jobs created and/or saved at the EM sites. 

The Recovery Act funding is being used to further drive the EM footprint reduction 

of 40 percent by September 2011, removal of 2 million tons of mill tailings at the 

Moab site, accelerate by 7 years the disposition of legacy TRU waste inventories at 

11 sites, and build out the infrastructure needed to support high-level waste processing operations. EM will use Recovery Act funding to accelerate legacy cleanup 

completion at three small sites: the Brookhaven National Laboratory and Separations Process Research Unit in New York; and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California. EM will continue to build on its success in utilizing small businesses to advance its cleanup objectives. In fiscal year 2009, EM obligated $697 million of Recovery Act funding and $1.6 billion of base program funding for a total 

of $2.3 billion awarded to small businesses. 

PROGRAM STRATEGIES

EM continues to adhere to a ‘‘Safety First’’ culture that integrates environment, 

safety, and health requirements and controls into all work activities. EM’s goal is 

to keep our employees, the public, our stakeholders, and the States where cleanup 

sites are located safe from radioactive and hazardous materials contamination. EM 

plans to continue improving safety performance by further integrating safety into 

all work activities and by incorporating requirements and controls into every 

project, with the goal of achieving zero accidents or incidents. 

EM’s vision is to complete quality work safely, on schedule, and within cost in 

order to deliver demonstrated value to the American taxpayer. EM is introducing 

a new Business Model/Approach to achieve this vision. In addition to the safety performance goal, mentioned above, EM’s new approach includes improving Project 

Management through restructuring the project portfolio, adapting the Office of 

Science construction project review model to EM projects, establishing performance 

metrics for EM operating projects, aligning project and contract management, and 

streamlining the acquisition process. EM is aligning Headquarters and Field Operations in order to streamline decisionmaking and improve efficiency. We plan to utilize science and technology to optimize the efficiency of tank waste, surplus SNM, 

SNF, and groundwater treatment and disposition. Through these changes, EM plans 

to achieve excellence in management and leadership with the objective of making 

EM the employer of choice in the Federal Government. 

EM will continue to conduct construction project reviews. These reviews examine 

all aspects of a construction project, including project management, technology, design, engineering, safety, environment, security, and quality assurance. The process 

relies on expert knowledge and experience of world-class engineers, scientists, and 

managers sourced from Federal staff, DOE contractors, engineering firms, national 

laboratories, and the academic community. These reviews assess the progress of 

each of its major projects and determine their overall health and ability to meet cost 

and schedule goals. Scheduled approximately every 6 to 9 months, these reviews are 

intended to reduce the risk of project failure by identifying existing and potential 

concerns in a timely manner. In fiscal year 2009, all five major construction projects 

were reviewed with the findings ranging from technical to financial. In fiscal year 

2010, EM plans to conduct up to 10 reviews of its major projects and other capital 

asset projects, as needed, to follow up on previous findings and continue to assess 

the ability of the project to meet its scope, schedule, and cost objectives. As such, 

these reviews will provide EM leadership an ‘‘early warning’’ of possible problems 

so that corrections can be made. 

HIGHLIGHTS OF FISCAL YEAR 2011 REQUEST

EM’s overarching goal is to complete the cleanup of the legacy of the Cold War 

in a safe, secure, and compliant manner, on schedule and within budget. EM will 

continue to pursue its cleanup objectives and regulatory commitments, overlaying 

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risk reduction and best business practices. In fiscal year 2011, EM is well positioned 

to meet its regulatory compliance milestones. 

In fiscal year 2011, EM intends to reduce its operation footprint from 900 square 

miles to approximately 540 square miles, a 40 percent reduction, with the goal of 

achieving a 90 percent reduction by 2015. In fiscal year 2011, EM will also complete 

the legacy cleanup at Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Separations Process 

Research Unit in New York, and at the General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center 

and Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California. 

EM’s cleanup priorities have not changed and we remain committed to: 

• Activities to maintain safe, secure, and compliant operations within the 

EM complex 

• Radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and disposal 

• SNF storage, receipt, and disposition 

• SNM consolidation, processing, and disposition 

• High priority groundwater remediation 

• TRU waste and MLLW/LLW disposition 

• Soil and groundwater remediation 

• Excess facilities decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) 

EM’s fiscal year 2011 budget request funds radioactive liquid tank waste activities 

that are a large part of the cleanup challenge EM faces at its Hanford, Savannah 

River, and Idaho sites allowing the program to progress on its tank waste retrieval 

commitments and fund construction on tank waste treatment facilities. The request 

also targets $60 million in funding for Hanford’s Office of River Protection to invest 

in developing technology that can be inserted into the project’s schedule that can 

yield significant cost savings and reduce the period of execution. Specifically, this 

funding will be utilized to solve near-term technical risks that have been identified 

and used to leverage and bring forth new technologies by focusing on such critical 

areas as: waste chemistry issues associated with characterization and separation; 

and advanced retrieval technologies. EM will continue to coordinate with the DOE 

Office of Science, national laboratories, and other Federal and private organizations 

to address technology gaps in tank waste processing technologies. 

The request also provides an additional $50 million to accelerate completion of the 

design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at Hanford—boosting the budget for the plant in fiscal year 2011 to $740 million. This funding will 

enable the acceleration of design and focus on mitigating project risks early and getting the design matured to 90 or 100 percent as quickly as possible. 

EM will also continue to strengthen and deploy groundwater and D&D cleanup 

technologies as they are vital to the long-term success of our mission. Specifically, 

EM will continue the development of an integrated, high-performance computer 

modeling capability for waste degradation and contaminant release. This state-ofthe-art scientific tool will enable robust and standardized assessments of performance and risk for EM cleanup and closure activities. This tool will also help EM better estimate cleanup time and costs, and reduce uncertainties and risks associated 

with subsurface contaminant behavior and transport processes. 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST

The Department’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for EM is $6.05 billion, of which 

$5.59 billion is for defense environmental cleanup activities. Examples of planned 

activities and milestones for fiscal year 2011 by site-specific categories are: 

IDAHO 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Request 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 

Request 

$489,239 $467,875 $411,168 $469,168 $412,000 

• Complete construction and readiness testing in preparation for startup of 

operations of the Sodium Bearing WasteFacility. 

The Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project supports DOE’s EM mission of 

safely storing and treating liquid radioactive wastes. This project will treat approximately 900,000 gallons of sodium bearing waste stored in tanks that are 35 to 45 

years old. The treatment of this waste will enable EM to meet the Notice of Noncompliance-Consent Order Modification to cease use of the Tank Farm Facility by 

275 

December 31, 2012. In fiscal year 2011, the Sodium Bearing Waste facility construction and readiness testing will be complete. 

• Ship CH–TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and dispose of MLLW and LLW, as required in the 1995Idaho Settlement Agreement. 

During fiscal year 2011, 5,700 cubic meters of CH–TRU waste will be shipped to 

WIPP for disposal. In addition, 2,050 cubic meters of MLLW/LLW will be shipped 

for disposal by September 2011. 

LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Request 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 

Request 

$226,082 $211,775 $191,938 $199,438 $200,000 

• Continue characterization and certification of TRU waste for shipment to 

WIPP. 

The Solid Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project is comprised of the treatment, storage, and disposal of legacy TRU waste and MLLW generated between 

1970 and 1999 at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The end-state of this 

project is the safe disposal of legacy waste at LANL. In fiscal year 2011, LANL 

plans to package 2,000 drum equivalents of TRU waste for disposition, support of 

up to 3 shipments a week to WIPP, and disposition up to 300 cubic meters of LLW. 

• Maintain soil and water remediation. 

The LANL Soil and Water Remediation Project scope includes identification, investigation, and remediation of chemical and/or radiological contamination attributable to past Laboratory operations and practices. The remaining scope of the 

project includes characterization, monitoring, and protection of the surface and 

ground water at the Laboratory and approximately 860 Potential Release Sites left 

to be investigated, remediated or closed by evaluation and assessment of human 

health and ecological risks. In fiscal year 2011, activities include completion of characterization activities for Upper Canada del Buey, Two Mile, and Canyon de Valle 

Aggregate Areas. 

OAK RIDGE 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 Request Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 Request 

$498,688 $755,110 $411,168 $436,168 $450,000 

• Continue design for construction of annex and Building 3019 modifications for the Uranium-233 (U–233) down-blending process. 

The Oak Ridge National Laboratory maintains the Department’s inventory of U– 

233 which is currently stored in Building 3019. The fiscal year 2011 funding request 

will support the completion of 90 percent design for construction of annex and building 3019 modifications in preparation for future disposal. Benefits include reducing 

safeguards and security requirements and eliminating long-term worker safety and 

criticality concerns. 

RICHLAND 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 Request Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 Request 

$1,057,496 $1,634,500 $993,503 $1,080,503 $1,041,822 

• Continue remediation and facility D&D within the River Corridor. 

In fiscal year 2011, cleanup activities in the River Corridor include: complete excavation of 3 of 5 100–H burial grounds; complete 22 interim remedial actions at 

the 100 B/C Area; complete disposition of 8 facilities; and initiate interim safe storVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00281 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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age of the 105–KE Reactor and D4 100K Area facilities. These efforts will assist in 

reducing the Richland site footprint by up to 40 percent in 2011. 

• Maintain base operations to treat and dispose of LLW, MLLW, and TRU 

waste, as well as, ship CH–TRU waste to WIPP for disposal. 

In fiscal year 2011, activities include: provide core management and base operations to store, treat, and disposition LLW, MLLW, and TRU waste at the Central 

Waste Complex and manage off-site commercial MLLW waste treatment/disposal 

contracts; provide base operations of disposal trenches for Hanford’s MLLW; provide 

the base operations necessary to store and treat MLLW and TRU waste at the T 

Plant Complex; and to ship up to 1,825 cubic meters of CH–TRU waste. 

RIVER PROTECTION 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Request 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 

Request 

$1,009,043 $326,035 $1,098,000 $1,098,000 $1,158,178 

• Manage the tank farms in a safe and compliant manner until closure. 

The radioactive waste stored in the Hanford tanks was produced as part of the 

Nation’s defense program. In order to protect the Columbia River, the waste must 

be removed and processed to a form suitable for disposal and the tanks stabilized. 

To accomplish these goals, in fiscal year 2011, activities include: complete two 242– 

A Evaporator Campaigns for space management; complete retrieval of two C–Farm 

Single-Shell Tanks; complete removal of six hose-in-hose transfer lines; initiate C– 

200 Closure Demonstration Project; and continue to perform single-shell tank integrity evaluations. 

• Continue construction of the WTP complex. 

WTP is critical to the completion of the Hanford tank waste program by providing 

the primary treatment capability to immobilize (vitrify) the radioactive tank waste 

at the Hanford Site. The WTP complex includes five major facilities: Pretreatment 

Facility, High-Level Waste Facility, Low-Activity Waste Facility, Analytical Laboratory, and the Balance of Facilities. In fiscal year 2011, activities include: complete 

vessel upgrades for three spent resin collection and dewatering vessels to incorporate revised seismic assessment criteria at the Pretreatment Facility; complete 

civil engineering design (Title II) and Architectural design at the High-Level Waste 

Facility; complete 80 percent of bulk process piping installation and 65 percent of 

bulk conduit installation at the Low-Activity Waste Facility; complete 90 percent of 

bulk piping installation at the Analytical Laboratory; and accept delivery of the Anhydrous Ammonia System at the Balance of Facilities. 

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Request 

Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 

Request 

$1,361,479 $1,615,400 $1,342,013 $1,342,013 $1,349,863 

• Continue consolidation and disposition of SNM. 

The receipt, storage, and disposition of materials at SRS allows for de-inventory 

and shutdown of facilities at other DOE complex sites, providing substantial risk 

reduction and significant mortgage reduction savings to the Department. In fiscal 

year 2011, activities include: SRS continue to receive weapons grade surplus nonpit plutonium from LANL and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; develop a 

program to reduce the risk to personnel and the environment by reducing the residual plutonium-238 contamination in the F Area Materials Storage Facility (235–F); 

continue processing nuclear materials as well as purchase of cold chemicals and 

other materials for operations of H Canyon and HB Line; support L to H shipments 

to H Canyon; and perform H Canyon/HB Line infrastructure upgrades. 

• Reduce radioactive liquid waste. 

The mission of the tank waste program at SRS is to safely and efficiently treat, 

stabilize, and dispose of approximately 37 million gallons of legacy radioactive waste 

currently stored in 49 underground storage tanks. In fiscal year 2011, activities inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:53 Mar 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00282 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62160.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
277 

clude: continue operation of interim salt processing facilities; support H Canyon receipts of newly generated waste; continue operation of the Defense Waste Processing 

Facility and complete 297 canisters of glass waste; continue construction of the Salt 

Waste Processing Facility; continue saltstone production and disposal operations as 

well as vault construction; and support Tank 48 Return to Service Project. 

WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 

[Dollars in thousands] 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2009 

Recovery Act 

Fiscal Year 2010 Request Fiscal Year 2010 

Appropriation 

Fiscal Year 2011 Request 

$236,785 $172,375 $224,981 $234,981 $225,000 

• Operate WIPP in a safe and compliant manner and dispose of CH and 

remote-handled (RH) TRU waste from 27 DOE sites. 

WIPP in Carlsbad, NM, is the Nation’s only mined geologic repository for the permanent disposal of defense-generated TRU waste. In fiscal year 2011, the budget 

request supports maintaining an average shipping capability of 21 CH and 5 RH– 

TRU waste shipments per week. In addition WIPP will increase characterization efforts at TRU waste generator sites to increase inventory of shippable waste and increase WIPP’s efficiency. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and members of the subcommittee, I 

am honored to be here today representing the Office of Environmental Management. 

My program continues to pursue its cleanup objectives within the overall framework 

of achieving the greatest risk reduction benefit per radioactive content and overlaying regulatory compliance commitments and best business practices to maximize 

cleanup progress. We do that by continuing to address our highest priority cleanup 

activities in fiscal year 2011 while using Recovery Act funding to continue making 

progress on the twin goals of life-cycle cost management and footprint reduction. We 

are also integrating other equally important strategies into the cleanup activities so 

that we may complete quality work safely, on schedule and within cost thereby delivering demonstrated value to the American taxpayer. 

I am pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

I apologize for overlooking my colleague Senator Bingaman and 

giving him an opportunity to make an opening statement. 

Senator BINGAMAN. I was just here to ask questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BEN NELSON. As a matter of seeking forgiveness, let me 

ask you to start with the questions. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you. I’m glad to be here and I welcome Dr. Ine`z Triay. She’s someone we claim in New Mexico. She 

got started at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) as a scientist and then worked as field director for DOE down at Carlsbad 

at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) there. So she has a lot 

of friends and strong admirers in New Mexico. 

Let me just ask a few questions, first about Los Alamos and then 

about the WIPP project, if I could. We have this consent order 

that’s resulted from litigation with the State of New Mexico there 

in Los Alamos with regard to environmental cleanup. What is the 

annual budget that’s needed in your view to meet the milestones 

that are set out in that consent order? Is what we have in this 

budget adequate to do that? Do we need to add additional money? 

What’s your thought on that? 

Dr. TRIAY. The LANL cleanup program obtained about $211 million of Recovery Act funds, and in addition the President has requested about $200 million for 2011. We are poised to meet all of 

278 

our compliance milestones in 2011, and in addition Secretary Chu 

has called for a 45-day review, Senator Bingaman, of how we are 

delivering the cleanup work at Los Alamos. The National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) Act mandates that we essentially 

have no one from DOE directing NNSA officials or contractors. So 

we believe that there are opportunities for becoming more efficient 

and more effective when we do this 45-day review. 

We intend to brief you, your office, thoroughly on this. We know 

that you’re extremely interested in finding those efficiencies and at 

the same time making sure that we have all the resources that are 

needed at Los Alamos in order to meet those compliance milestones. So we will be looking forward to that interaction in about 

45 days from now. 

Senator BINGAMAN. On this issue of NNSA’s authority and your 

efforts to accomplish the requirements that you have for EM there, 

would it make more sense to have a separate EM contract for the 

cleanup work at Los Alamos, instead of having to go through the 

NNSA to try to get them to get this done? 

Dr. TRIAY. In this 45-day review that Secretary Chu has called 

for, one of the things that is going to be looked at is exactly that 

type of question. So we are going to be looking at all options when 

it comes to how to effectively streamline the operation. 

I offer, however, that for the Recovery Act we are performing 

cleanup with the construct that we have now, with the NNSA contractor in charge of the cleanup, and we have been able to within 

the Recovery Act construct be very efficient when it comes to the 

cleanup of Technical Area-21, the old plutonium facility at Los Alamos that is right there at the center of the main town of Los Alamos. 

So we are going to take those lessons learned. We are going to 

take the lessons that we have learned over the many years that we 

have been working between NNSA and EM as fully partnered and 

we are going to come up with recommendations to the Secretary 

that are shared between EM and NNSA and fully brief you on the 

deliberations, as well as the recommendations. 

Senator BINGAMAN. There has been a lot of interest and concern 

there in northern New Mexico about this issue of possible contamination of water. I gather your office has been working with the 

Buckman Diversion that the City of Santa Fe is part of to put proper monitoring in place on that issue. Could you describe that briefly? 

Dr. TRIAY. Yes. The NNSA is crafting a memo of agreement and 

the EM Office is fully participating. We believe that the early detection of contaminants is essential with respect to this particular 

diversion project. We are very committed to working hand in glove 

with NNSA and with the State of New Mexico. We understand the 

huge importance of this effort and we believe that early detection 

is the way to press forward. So we’re very committed to finishing 

that memo of agreement and moving forward with the funding necessary for that early detection. 

Senator BINGAMAN. I had a few questions on the WIPP project. 

Should I do those now as well? 

Senator BEN NELSON. Sure. 

279 

Senator BINGAMAN. My understanding is that the WIPP oper- ations in fiscal year 2011 have asked for an additional $7 million 

to maintain current disposal operations. That’s a figure I was 

given. Do you have any estimates as to what is required in order 

to maintain current operations there? I know they’re proceeding 

with the disposal of waste at WIPP at a faster rate than was originally thought or planned for. I’d just be interested in any thoughts 

you have as to whether they’re able to maintain that rate under 

the budget you’ve proposed? 

Dr. TRIAY. The WIPP project obtained Recovery Act funds, I be- lieve $172 million, in addition to the President’s request for fiscal 

year 2011. I think that, with respect to the throughput of waste, 

we are going to be able to meet all of the needs of the complex and 

be able to meet our compliance milestones, which are not for the 

WIPP, but that plant allows places like Idaho National Laboratory, 

like Savannah River Site, to meet the compliance milestones that 

they have. 

As always, we work very closely with our WIPP to try to integrate all of the needs of the complex and what are the throughputs 

that we can actually achieve. Because you are so knowledgeable on 

the WIPP operation, by increasing the throughput we get to economies of scale at the WIPP site. The more throughput of waste we 

have into the WIPP, the less the cost per unit per cubic meters disposed of becomes. So we are always coming up with strategic initiatives to try to increase that throughput. But between the Recovery 

Act and the President’s request, we believe that all of the compliance milestones in the complex can be appropriately addressed in 

the area of transuranic wastes. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask one other question on WIPP. I 

understand that there’s been some detection of rising levels of carbon tetra chloride from the waste drums that are disposed of at 

WIPP. I was wondering if you’ve reached a determination as to 

whether that poses any hazard, if there are measures being taken 

to compensate for that or deal with that problem? 

Dr. TRIAY. I’m happy to discuss this. We have been working with 

the New Mexico Environment Department and some of the levels 

of the organics, which are carbon tetrachloride, are elevated as a 

result of the waste that comes from Idaho. What we have done is 

we have instituted three measures. One of them is exactly as you 

described, which is to take measurements before the workers enter 

the different areas in the repository where there could be elevated 

organic levels. 

The other two measures involve mitigation. One of them deals 

with filtering of the actual waste, installing filters in the containers 

that have the actual waste that comes from Idaho, to ensure that 

in moving forward we don’t continue to increase the levels of 

organics in the repository. 

The third one is that we have actually installed a filtration unit 

in the repository itself. We have been working with the New Mexico Environment Department because recently the Environmental 

Protection Agency changed some of the risk factors associated with 

carbon tetrachloride. Having said that, we are completely committed, Senator Bingaman, to make sure that these levels of 

organics do not pose any threat to our workers or to the public or 

280 

the environment. So we are working very closely with the New 

Mexico Environment Department and we expect that these mitigations that we have put in place will actually address any potential 

issues. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you very much. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator. EM received $6 billion from the Recovery Act funding, as I mentioned in my opening remarks. As you indicate in your testimony, 

$1.7 billion has been spent. My understanding is that you’ll have 

until the end of 2011 to spend these funds. I assume there’s a plan. 

Will you tell us what the plan is and will all the funds be necessary 

in the cleanup, or is it possible some of them might be returned to 

the Treasury? 

Dr. TRIAY. We have a substantial amount of work that has been 

designated for the Recovery Act. We believe that we are on track 

for our internal goal of spending the Recovery Act dollars by the 

end of 2011. We funded all of our projects to 80 percent confidence. 

We intend to reduce the footprint of the entire EM complex by 

40 percent by 2011. At the end of the day, the EM program that 

essentially involves the cleanup of 50 years of nuclear weapons production is a huge liability to the Federal Government and to your 

efforts. We believe that the investment of the Recovery Act is going 

to reduce that ultimate liability. 

For instance, with the Recovery Act we have identified $4 billion 

of reductions in life-cycle costs. In addition to that, we have identified over $3 billion of cost avoidance moving forward. So the return 

on investment of the Recovery Act if you look at the amount of 

money that has been invested versus the amount of money that 

could be saved and avoided in terms of expenditures moving forward is on the order of 120 percent return on investment. 

We have been able to train workers and get them to work fast. 

We have 5,600 workers that are direct contractors. We have subcontractors from those prime contractors to DOE, and overall we 

have 9,200 workers. In the Recovery Act, we are going to be able 

to dramatically reduce the decontamination and decommissioning 

activities moving forward in this program, clean up soils and 

groundwaters, be able to dispose of transuranic and low-level 

waste, and ultimately reduce the contaminated areas of the EM 

cleanup dramatically by 2011. 

So I would submit that, based on the rate of expenditure, based 

on the amount of jobs that have been created and the amount of 

progress that we have already made and intend to make, this is a 

very good investment for the taxpayer. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

The goal of the stimulus funding was to accelerate the cleanup 

by dealing with the so-called shovel-ready projects that had not already been funded. In addition, it was to provide for jobs, and what 

I hear you saying is 9,200 workers. Last year I think the testimony 

was that you expected that there might be in the order of 13,000 

contractors’ jobs. Is that 9,200 the top number or is there still a 

possibility that there might be more with the expenditures in 2011? 

Dr. TRIAY. The way these jobs are counted, we count the actual 

employees that are working directly in prime contracts to DOE. 

281 

Those in turn hire other subcontractors, and if you add those 2, 

that’s the 9,200. 

In addition to that, the EM program utilizes a lot of materials, 

for instance the containers that we use for shipping waste to the 

WIPP that are manufactured in Carlsbad, NM. When you actually 

look at all of the individuals that have benefited from being part 

of the Recovery Act, our count is 16,000 employees that have been 

part of these efforts, which then would include vendors such as the 

individuals that are manufacturing the containers that we use to 

ship the waste to WIPP, individuals that are providing the cement 

for some of the activities that are going on in South Carolina in 

terms of decontaminating, decommissioning, and dealing with reactors in South Carolina. 

When you count all of that, we have been able to substantiate 

16,000 individuals actually benefiting from the Recovery Act. I 

would like to point out, if you allow me, that when we talk about 

subcontractors or vendors, the Recovery Act in the EM program 

truly has been a success story when it comes to small business. In 

2009, between the base program and the Recovery Act, as well as 

the small businesses, the small business awards that came from 

our prime contractors, we awarded $2.5 billion to small businesses 

in fiscal year 2009. 

We counted what that meant. It’s that over 20 percent of the dollars spent in 2009 went indeed to small businesses and were spent 

by small businesses. So I just point out that in terms of economic 

stimulus, I believe that we have good facts to show for the $1.7 billion that we have spent. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Very good. 

The original estimate was that about 60 percent of the funding 

would go to the Savannah River and Hanford sites. Is this still the 

plan? 

Dr. TRIAY. Yes. Hanford receives $1.9 billion and Savannah River 

$1.6 billion, respectively. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Are there any issues, technical or otherwise, that might interfere with Hanford or Savannah? 

Dr. TRIAY. The work at Hanford and Savannah River overall is 

going extremely well. At Hanford we have committed to a goal of 

40 percent reduction and a dramatic reduction of the facilities that 

are contaminated with radioactivity, waste disposal, as well as soils 

and groundwater decontamination. If anything, our internal goals 

now surpass that 40 percent footprint reduction. 

At Savannah River, there is the same type of commitment to 

footprint reduction. Actually, at the beginning, we had some problems with the Savannah River Site, but the Recovery Act portfolio 

has been turned around and right now our internal goal for Savannah River footprint reduction is well over 60 percent, even though 

the official commitment is 40 percent footprint reduction by 2011. 

We think that we can do better than that. 

At Savannah River, as a matter of fact, one of the main activities 

that we think that we can accomplish is the reduction of the 

amount of transuranic wastes that we have stored at the facility. 

We are going to be able to dispose of most of the transuranic waste 

from this large site, Savannah River, at the WIPP by the end of 

2011. 

282 

Senator BEN NELSON. The National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) to report periodically on the Recovery Act cleanup efforts. 

These briefings will be provided every 120 days, with the next one 

due at the end of April. The last one was at the end of December 

2009. Each site was to have a Recovery Act coordinator to monitor 

execution of the projects. In December, according to the GAO, Savannah River did not have one of these site coordinators. Do you 

know whether they do now? 

Dr. TRIAY. Yes, they do. What was done at Savannah River Site, 

instead of having a site coordinator, was that Headquarters deployed one of our senior executives to the Savannah River Site in 

order to address the project management issues that were encountered in the Savannah River Site Recovery Act portfolio at the beginning of the program. Now those project management issues 

have been addressed. We have implemented all of the corrective actions that the Office of Engineering and Construction Management 

oversees with respect to project management in the Recovery Act 

projects. One of the Federal project directors at the site, certified 

at the highest level of certification, has taken over the Recovery 

Act projects, and in addition to that we have been able to deploy 

a site coordinator to the Savannah River Site. 

Senator BEN NELSON. GAO also reported that these Recovery Act 

projects were going to be defined as either capital or non-capital assets. What’s the definition for each type of project, beyond a capital 

asset being a project above $20 million? 

Dr. TRIAY. What we noticed in the EM program was that we had 

whole entire programs, projects, and that we needed to restructure 

the portfolio, which in fact was something that Deputy Secretary 

Poneman encouraged in his last memo on project management to 

all of the departmental elements. 

The capital projects are essentially construction projects when we 

actually are building a particular facility. Cleanup projects are 

projects where we are not building a particular facility, but instead 

we’re performing cleanup operations that then in turn modify the 

status of a particular facility. For instance, removing fixtures from 

a facility that is contaminated and sending that contaminated material to a landfill, as well as ultimately demolishing the facility. 

Essentially, it goes to the amount of assets that DOE has. For that 

reason, even though we’re not building anything, we actually still 

count that as part of the project management portfolio that is part 

of DOE Order 413. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In their December review, GAO identified 

some potential issues that could impact success. I’d like to go 

through each of these issues and see if any of these have been in 

fact a problem. Number one, do sites have sufficient personnel to 

manage and oversee contracts for Recovery Act projects? I guess 

part of the answer would be when you’re ahead of schedule, doing 

better than you thought, that would be the case. But overall do the 

sites have adequate personnel? 

Dr. TRIAY. We always struggle with the amount of Federal staff 

and to achieve that right balance when it comes to the amount of 

staffing. Some years ago, as a result of a National Academy of Public Administration report, the EM Office increased the Federal staff 

283 

significantly, by about 300 Federal employees. So we think that we 

are poised to move forward with the Recovery Act as well as the 

base activities. Like you point out, our Recovery Act work is going 

very well, but we have added coordinators to all of the sites and 

those coordinators are trying to streamline the decisionmaking, the 

communications, between the site and headquarters. We think that 

that is probably a model that allows us to operate with less Federal 

staff moving forward. 

Senator BEN NELSON. With the influx of newly hired workers 

there, is it possible to sufficiently train them to work safely in hazardous environments? 

Dr. TRIAY. We have chosen the portfolio of the Recovery Act carefully to choose the type of activities where we have proven technologies with an established regulatory framework and a track 

record of training workers that come from construction, the construction field, training workers that come from different trades, 

into being able to work in the field of nuclear activities and in facilities that are heavily contaminated with radioactivity. 

Our safety record continues to be extremely solid and very robust. We have been actually encouraged by the interest that the existing workers have taken to train the new workers that are coming in to work on Recovery Act. So we have proven that the training, the work control, the integrated safety management approaches that we use in the EM program allow for an influx of 

workers and to maintain our safety record. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Now, can the existing disposal sites accommodate the newly created waste from Recovery Act projects, such 

as the demolitions and what have you? 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely. We have one Federal facility for low-level 

waste and that is the Nevada Test Site, and we have two commercial facilities for low-level waste. We heavily use Energy Solutions 

in Utah and what Energy Solutions tells me is that they can get 

better economies of scale if we actually send even more waste than 

what we’re sending now. 

So I believe that the commercial facilities as well as the Federal 

facilities are adequate, and have adequate capacity to deal with the 

amount of waste that we have identified for disposal. 

With respect to the WIPP, I think that you heard Senator Bingaman asking me whether we even needed more resources to try to 

maintain the amount of throughput that we have achieved in 2010 

with the Recovery Act. So this is not a matter of lack of capability 

at the WIPP, which is for transuranic wastes, or for the facilities 

that are utilized for disposal of low-level waste. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Are you encountering any challenges with 

local or State environmental regulatory agreements that might 

delay complete projects? I heard Senator Bingaman ask about the 

lawsuit. Will this involve delay or in some way impede your 

progress? 

Dr. TRIAY. The case that Senator Bingaman was referring to actually was resolved. There was potential litigation, and we resolved 

that lawsuit with the fence-to-fence cleanup compliance order at 

LANL. We actually have worked collaboratively with the regulators. Our regulators meet with us often, not only at the site level, 

but also at the headquarters level. They have been cooperative. 

284 

They are extremely interested in facilitating our Recovery Act activities. 

The portfolio itself was chosen for activities that have a well-established regulatory framework under the compliance agreements 

that were already part of the EM program and that have been negotiated and that had clear milestones. So I believe that the regulatory framework for the Recovery Act activities allows us to complete all the work in the portfolio, and we even have projects if 

some of the projects that we are moving forward with have some 

of the contingencies associated with them available for further effort. Even those projects also have a well-established regulatory 

framework that we can use to move forward. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In the January 2009 report to Congress, 

the cost to complete the balance of DOE’s cleanup program based 

on projects that had been identified by that time was somewhere 

between $250 to $300 billion. Since that time, President Obama 

has issued the NPR, wherein he’s committed to modernizing the 

nuclear weapons complex, the last two and the hardest, most expensive and complicated of the old facilities, and building some new 

facilities as well. 

In addition, we note that the fiscal year 2010 budget request 

doesn’t include any out-years funding. So really the question I have 

is, is that $250 billion number inclusive of what has been proposed 

in the latest budget, or are we looking at $250 to $300 billion for 

what was known in 2009 and everything being discussed in 2010 

or in the President’s comments about replacement, was that on top 

of the number? 

Dr. TRIAY. About a year and a half ago, the EM program sent 

a report to Congress on excess facilities that had already been identified that were not currently part of the EM portfolio. The Recovery Act has allowed us to move forward with the decontamination 

and decommissioning of some of those excess facilities. But the 

price tag associated with those excess facilities was on the order of 

$5 to $9 billion, and that was not fully included in the life-cycle 

costs of the EM program because those were not facilities that were 

officially part of the EM portfolio. 

The Recovery Act has allowed a lot of the work that needs to 

occur on those excess facilities, and maybe some of the work at

Y–12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, at LANL, and other 

places to move forward. But the bottom line is that the excess facilities as a result of the future needs of the complex is indeed a 

number that always appears to be in some amount of flux, because 

the weapons complex moves forward identifying different facilities 

that now need to be part of the EM portfolio. That happens in a 

very interactive manner. 

But I think we have a good handle on the amount of effort that 

those excess facilities will require moving forward, and we have 

shared that with Congress in our report. In addition to that, we’ve 

worked very closely with NNSA to try to identify what else they 

might need in terms of excess facilities as we move forward with 

our portfolio in EM. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But at the end of the day, is it still going to be in the range of $250 billion or $300 billion, with all the adjustments? I realize this is dynamic, but obviously I’m concerned 

285 

about what the moving parts and the changes can mean to the 

total projected figure. 

Dr. TRIAY. I hate to commit that it’s going to be less, but I would 

like to offer the following. We have been extremely concerned about 

that life-cycle cost and we have been looking at investments that 

can actually significantly lower that life-cycle cost. So like I was 

saying, for the Recovery Act investments we see return on investment that is on the order of 120 percent. What that means is that 

the life-cycle cost will be reduced next year when we send our lifecycle cost to Congress as a result of the investment in the Recovery 

Act. 

So even if some of the additional facilities that were not in the 

life-cycle costs come in, my intent is for the life-cycle cost to still 

be less than the life-cycle costs that you have delineated, even with 

the additional efforts of the excess facilities coming in. Not only the 

investments of Recovery Act, but in addition I talked about the investment in technology development and in particular in the area 

of tank wastes at the Savannah River Site and at the Hanford Site. 

We believe that with some of those investments that we have made 

and are making in the technology development portfolio, we can actually significantly reduce the life-cycle costs of the tank wastes by 

tens of billions of dollars and reduce the period of execution by decades. 

My intent is to not only accept those excess facilities as they 

need to come into the EM cleanup program, but work on the portfolio that I do have now so that that life-cycle cost decreases as a 

result of these investments that we’re making now in Recovery Act 

as well as in technology development for the tank waste. That is 

my objective. I know that that is the objective of DOE. We know 

that this liability weighs large in your defense portfolio. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I know you’ll do your best, and I suspect 

you know I’ll be asking you the same question next year. 

Dr. TRIAY. I’m counting on it. 

Senator BEN NELSON. To see if there have been any changes that 

would modify that number. 

Dr. TRIAY. Very good, absolutely. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

The January 2009 report identified a number of enforceable milestones at several sites that were at risk of not being met. Will the 

recovery funds and the rest of the funds allow any of these milestones to be met that probably weren’t going to be achieved according to that 2009 report? 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely. The Recovery Act has been instrumental 

in changing those facts. In fiscal year 2009, we completed successfully 72 out of 74 major milestones. Essentially, over 95 percent of 

the milestones were met. In fiscal years 2010 and 2011, we have 

on the order of the same amount of milestones and we intend to 

meet and complete successfully 100 percent of them. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Then can you, for the record, provide a list 

of those that have been achieved, as well as those that have yet 

to be accomplished? 

Dr. TRIAY. I would be happy to. As a matter of fact, the EM program decided to publish the milestones, the upcoming milestones, 

and the success that we have in meeting them on the web site, so 

286 

that we can have meaningful dialogue with our colleagues that 

were concerned about exactly how many milestones are we meeting, how are we completing our efforts. So we would be happy to 

provide that for the record. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Very good. 

The statute that required that January 2009 report also directed 

the GAO to review the report. GAO completed its review and submitted its report in June. The GAO had several issues with respect 

to the report, but I’d like to just highlight a couple of them. 

The report was supposed to include an assessment of whether 

legislative changes or clarifications would improve or accelerate 

cleanup. The report did not address this requirement, as the report 

was submitted shortly before President Obama took office and this 

section was deferred to the new administration. 

In the year that you’ve been the Assistant Secretary, have you 

had an opportunity to make such an assessment, and if you did 

what are your results? 

Dr. TRIAY. We have made assessments in terms of what could be 

changed moving forward, and during the current tenure of the administration we actually have been sharing that within the EM 

program and we would be ready to start vetting that through the 

entire DOE. The situation was at that time, for the reasons that 

you describe, we felt that to get ahead of the new administration 

was something that was not useful for the EM program to do in 

this particular report. 

But we always complete analysis of the things that could be improved, things that could be considered, deliberations that we could 

make in a very, very complex regulatory framework, and we are always ready and prepared for those kinds of deliberations within 

the Department and ultimately within the administration. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The report was also supposed to list the 

major mandatory milestones and if those milestones were not going 

to be met to identify the reason. For example, was it a technical 

or a financial reason. This element wasn’t addressed. Do you have 

some information for the record on that that you would submit? 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely, I’d be happy to do so. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Most of Environmental Management’s (EM) cleanup is performed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act through Federal Facility Agreements and under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

through various consent and compliance orders. EM’s overall record of meeting regulatory milestones exceeds 90 percent. EM is committed to meeting its regulatory 

obligations and is taking a number of steps to expand and improve the tools used 

to monitor and track regulatory compliance. The enforceable milestones at risk 

table, below, was produced in January 2009. Our more recent analysis of the 24 

milestones in the table with commitment dates through September 30, 2011, shows 

that 4 have been met, one was partially met, and 19 have been renegotiated since 

the table was developed. One of the four milestones that was met and the partially 

met milestone were accomplished due to the availability of American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act funding. The 19 that were renegotiated were at the Hanford site 

and were changed in consultation with our regulators to reflect mutual understandings of alterations in cleanup priorities, and the technical and sequencing complexities inherent in our environmental cleanup work. 

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The web address for our compliance performance as measured by environmental 

agreement milestones met is: http://www.em.doe.gov/Pages/CompliancePerformance.aspx. 

At that location, we post the past five quarters of Environmental Management’s 

(EM) ‘‘Environmental Compliance Scorecard.’’ Those scorecards show that, for fiscal 

year 2010, EM met 95 percent of its 141 major enforceable agreement milestones 

due. 


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Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

There’s a significant quantity of uranium-233 stored at Oak 

Ridge. The material has special security and safety requirements 

for storage, but it’s also potentially useful for medical isotopes to 

treat cancer. In May 2008 a DOE Inspector General report recommended that the material be retained. Nevertheless, EM is now 

tasked with disposing of the material. The budget request seeks 

funding for design in 2011, with the assumption that construction 

on the disposition facility will begin in 2012 and will cost between 

$400 and $500 million to build. 

Is there any effort in DOE to revisit the decision on disposition 

of the uranium-233? 


421str77.eps
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Dr. TRIAY. We’re always poised to revisit that decision. This is 

an area that, with my work at Los Alamos, I’ve always understood 

the concerns of the Inspector General. At the time of the report of 

the Inspector General, we encouraged our colleagues in the Office 

of Science, in the Office of Nuclear Energy, to ask again from their 

cadre of experts, as well as private industry, to see whether there 

was need for this particular material and to see whether our plans 

were appropriate. 

Even after that last Inspector General report, we were informed 

by our colleagues in the Office of Science, the Office of Nuclear Energy, that normally have under their purview the radioisotopes 

that need to be utilized not only in the Department, but also in private industry, that there was no interest in retaining this material 

and that we should move forward expeditiously to disposition of it. 

They pointed out to us that the security costs associated with the 

facility where these materials were, actually adds a liability to the 

portfolio of the Office of Science. 

So I understand the value of radioisotopes, having worked so 

many years in the Isotope and Nuclear Chemistry Division of 

LANL. But from what we can ascertain as a result of this particular last analysis that was performed when that Inspector General report was issued, there is no value to this material at this 

moment, and we were asked to move forward with the disposition 

of this material. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board (DNFSB) has raised a number of nuclear safety concerns 

about the efforts to redesign the waste treatment plant at Hanford. 

I understand that the basis of the concern is the need to technically 

understand the operational safety ramifications of the proposed 

changes. I also understand that there is progress between EM and 

DNFSB in resolving the changes, including the safety of the pulsejet mixers. 

What’s the schedule to resolve these issues and does the DNFSB 

have all the documentation that it has requested? 

Dr. TRIAY. There are two main areas, the pulse-jet mixers as well 

as the hydrogen generated in pipes and ancillary vessels. With respect to the pulse-jet mixers, we have a commitment for finishing 

addressing all the remaining issues by June 30. What we have 

done in that area is come up with a path forward that addresses 

some of the concerns that the DNFSB has had in terms of accumulation of waste in some of the vessels of the waste treatment plant 

by, in addition to completing the testing that we committed to completing, also making sure that we have the capability at the waste 

treatment plant to look into the vessels and make sure that accumulation is not occurring and, when it is occurring, a capability to 

move the waste out of those vessels and into smaller vessels, where 

it has been proven that effective mixing can indeed occur. 

So we believe that we can work effectively with the DNFSB to 

address the remaining issues associated with mixing of the waste 

at the waste treatment plant. 

With respect to the hydrogen generation pipes and ancillary vessels, the DNFSB and the Department have discussed the chartering of a group of experts, that actually has been chartered, to 

look at exactly how we are applying the code dealing with potential 

365 

hydrogen behavior in these pipes and vessels. The group of experts’ 

work is coming to resolution and we expect to be able to sit down 

with the DNFSB and make absolutely certain that they have all of 

their questions answered. 

We are confident that we’re going to be able to do just that and 

that we’re going to be able to assure the DNFSB that indeed this 

fast forward results in safe operations of the waste treatment plant 

after it starts treating waste. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The DNFSB also was worried that the 

process to assess hazards at the Hanford tank farm and the operating procedures are too complex or unexecutable, which can result 

in ad hoc changes. Do we have a schedule in place to resolve these 

issues? 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely. The field manager of the Office of River 

Protection is an expert herself on nuclear safety and she has taken 

an extremely active interest in addressing the issues that the 

DNFSB has laid out. We have a contractor at the tank farm at 

Hanford that is the same contractor that has operated the tank 

farms at the Savannah River Site for many years. So this gives us 

a unique opportunity to have the same type of procedures and protocols that were used at the tank farms at the Savannah River Site 

now adapted to the Hanford tank farms. The Savannah River Site 

tank farms have been operated safely for many, many years, even 

when we are actually encapsulating the waste already in glass 

form and we have vitrified a lot of the waste in the tank farms. 

So based on that, I am confident that we’re going to be able to 

address the issues presented by the DNFSB. Both the contractor 

as well as the Federal staff are very committed to effective, efficient, and prompt attention to these issues pointed out by the 

DNFSB. 

Senator BEN NELSON. The EM program as well as other parts of 

DOE has had to supplement some underfunded pension funds. It’s 

been particularly true at Savannah River Site. Do you see a need 

to add more money to these funds in fiscal years 2010 or 2011? 

Dr. TRIAY. I’m sorry? 

Senator BEN NELSON. It’s a matter of underfunding. In the past 

the EM program has had to supplement underfunded pension 

plans, in other words put more money in to bring them up to the 

required level. 

Dr. TRIAY. We actually, in the Department, have looked at the 

policy that was promulgated in order to fund pensions, and in 2010 

and 2011, we intend to fund the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) minimum as long as the fund doesn’t fall below 

60 percent. I believe that right now, both in 2010 and 2011, we 

have an appropriate amount of funding delineated in our budget in 

order to meet the policy of the Department to fund to the ERISA 

minimum. So the funding request of 2011 is sufficient. The pension 

plan will be funded to the requirements mandated by law, and in 

2010 we actually intend to look at exactly how much funding was 

designated for pensions, and we are going to be looking at that 

within the Department to make sure that we put all of the funding 

that we have to optimal use in 2010. No underfunding in 2011. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I urge you to be sure and do that, because 

any pattern of underfunding only mortgages the future further. So 

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we’d rather have current requirements currently met and not have 

to make up underfunding at a later date. It’s a budgetary nightmare, because it will come due. 

Dr. TRIAY. Absolutely. 

Senator BEN NELSON. You mentioned vitrified high-level waste. 

That’s the question of what to do without Yucca Mountain. While 

the question is being studied for location, in the interim will additional storage facilities have to be constructed at any of the current 

sites? 

Dr. TRIAY. In our portfolio for the EM program, we considered 

that the waste was going to be stored, after it was encapsulated, 

in glass for decades. So far, we see minimal impact as a result of 

a potential delay for moving forward with an ultimate disposal for 

the high-level waste that is going to be generated as a result of vitrification. 

Also, borosilicate glass is an international standard for extreme 

protection of human health and the environment. So we think that 

continuing to encapsulate our high-level waste in glass is a robust 

path forward within the deliberations that the Blue Ribbon Commission will entertain. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That concludes my questions. Is there anything that you would like to add to what you’ve already said in 

your statement and the answers to the questions? 

Dr. TRIAY. Thank you for the opportunity. What I would like to 

add, sometimes it’s not as clear the type of work that the EM program does to facilitate, to allow some of the critical activities of the 

NNSA portfolio. For instance, when it comes to nonproliferation activities both domestic and international, it is the work of the EM 

program that in great measure allows the work of the NNSA for 

things that need to happen in order to secure nuclear materials. 

We in the EM program are responsible for the consolidation of 

all of the plutonium from NNSA sites, as well as EM sites. We in 

the EM program are responsible for the consolidation of highly-enriched uranium fuel that comes from international efforts to reduce 

the nuclear proliferation issues. Recently we celebrated the fuel 

that came from Chile, and indeed that fuel is stored at the Savannah River Site under the purview of the EM program activities. 

All of the highly-enriched uranium, all of the uranium disposition 

as well as plutonium disposition activities are funded by the EM 

efforts working on the defense portfolio for the country. Our WIPP 

is the only deep geologic repository that is operational and that 

takes all of the waste associated with the activities related to anything that we do in the NNSA portfolio associated with plutonium. 

So thank you for the opportunity to point out that our work really facilitates in great measure important work of the NNSA sites. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, doctor. We appreciate your testimony. 

Thank you so much. With that, we’re adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF BINGAMAN

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP

1. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, Los Alamos is a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) site and the NNSA directs the cleanup operations there. Does 

this pose a difficulty for you? 

Dr. TRIAY. The budgeting for and accountability of legacy environmental cleanup 

activities at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) resides within the Office of 

Environmental Management (EM). However, section 3220 of the NNSA Act, 50 

U.S.C. Section 2410, prohibits NNSA employees from being directed by Department 

of Energy (DOE) officers or employees. As a result, the EM program has the accountability for cleanup activities at LANL without the authority to direct the work. 

This arrangement has presented management challenges, and EM and NNSA are 

currently collaborating in the development of recommendations to improve cleanup 

performance at LANL. The EM program has demonstrated the benefits of clear lines 

of authority and accountability for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

(ARRA) cleanup activities at LANL and could be used as a model for the other 

cleanup work at the laboratory. 

2. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, would having a separate EM contract for cleanup 

at Los Alamos be desirable? 

Dr. TRIAY. Yes. 

3. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, I understand that most of the stimulus funds 

will be used to clean up the old plutonium operations facility at Los Alamos

or TA–21. Will you need additional funds in the Los Alamos cleanup budget to continue this effort? 

Dr. TRIAY. TA–21 is a Los Alamos Recovery Act project and is currently scheduled 

to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

4. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, the NNSA fiscal year 2011 budget request lists 

the demolition and decontamination of the old Chemistry and Metallurgy Research 

(CMR) Replacement facility between $200 to $350 million. Do you think this is accurate and will you be directly responsible for it? 

Dr. TRIAY. My understanding of the NNSA fiscal year 2011 request for the old 

CMR facility is based upon the initial preconceptual cost estimate range. No, the 

Office of EM will not be responsible for this portion of the work at CMR, instead 

it will be the NNSA’s responsibility. 

5. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, are you aware of any analyses or experiments 

being conducted by DOE EM at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) that are directed to high level waste disposition in salt formations? 

Dr. TRIAY. No, there are no analyses or experiments being conducted by the Office 

of EM at the WIPP that are directed to high level waste disposition in salt formations. 

6. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, what activities does the EM program conduct 

that support the mission of the NNSA? 

Dr. TRIAY. The Office of EM supports critical nonproliferation consistent with the 

NNSA mission. Specifically EM activities in support of the NNSA mission include 

operations of: 

• Savannah River Site’s L-Basin, which stores highly-enriched uranium, including most recently fresh fuel received from Chile by the NNSA and 

transported to Savannah River for disposition by EM; 

• K-Area at Savannah River Site, which stores plutonium from around the 

NNSA complex; 

• H-Canyon at Savannah River Site, the only facility in the United States 

capable of processing plutonium and uranium for disposition; and 

• The WIPP, the world’s only deep geologic repository, for disposal of sealed 

sources and plutonium 

7. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, how many EM sites has EM cleaned up? 

Dr. TRIAY. The Office of EM has completed 88 of 107 sites at the end of fiscal 

year 2009. We project that we will complete 5 more sites; 1 in fiscal year 2010 and 

4 by the end of fiscal year 2011, bringing the total to 93 of 107 sites. 

8. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, how many sites remain? 

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Dr. TRIAY. The Office of EM had 19 sites remaining as of the end of fiscal year 

2009. We project that we will complete 5 more sites, bringing the remaining total 

down to 14 sites by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

9. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, will EM meet its milestones at WIPP and Los 

Alamos? 

Dr. TRIAY. The State of New Mexico is proposed to receive a total of $417 million 

in fiscal year 2011 funding for defense environmental cleanup, not including safeguards and security or program direction funding. With these funding levels, the 

WIPP and NNSA’s site at LANL will be able to complete all milestones. 

AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT

10. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, what additional work is taking place at Los Alamos as a result of ARRA funding? 

Dr. TRIAY. The Office of EM is spending more than $210 million on additional 

cleanup work at Los Alamos, much of it for soil and groundwater remediation as 

well as for deactivation and decommissioning of radioactive facilities. Cleanup of 

TA–21 is a Los Alamos Recovery Act project and is currently scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

11. Senator BINGAMAN. Dr. Triay, how many jobs have been created as a result 

of ARRA funding? 

Dr. TRIAY. As of June 30, 2010, the Office of EM has created or saved more than 

10,495 jobs directly funded by the Recovery Act. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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