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[House Report 109-392]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                                       
109th Congress                                            Rept. 109-392
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                      Part 1

======================================================================

 
              DARFUR PEACE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2006

                                _______
                                

                 March 14, 2006.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                        [To accompany H.R. 3127]

  The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 3127) to impose sanctions against 
individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity, to support measures for the protection of 
civilians and humanitarian operations, and to support peace 
efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
The Amendment....................................................     2
Purpose and Summary..............................................     8
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     9
Hearings.........................................................    13
Committee Consideration..........................................    14
Votes of the Committee...........................................    14
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................    14
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................    14
Committee Cost Estimate..........................................    14
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................    14
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................    15
Section-by-Section Analysis......................................    15
New Advisory Committees..........................................    19
Congressional Accountability Act.................................    19
Federal Mandates.................................................    19
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............    19

                             The Amendment

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Darfur Peace and 
Accountability Act of 2006'' .
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Sanctions in support of peace in Darfur.
Sec. 6. Additional authorities to deter and suppress genocide in 
Darfur.
Sec. 7. Multilateral efforts.
Sec. 8. Continuation of restrictions.
Sec. 9. Assistance efforts in Sudan.
Sec. 10. Reports.
Sec. 11. Rule of construction.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
        International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
          (2) Government of sudan.--
                  (A) In general.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
                means the National Congress Party, formerly known as 
                the National Islamic Front, led-government in Khartoum, 
                Sudan, or any successor government formed on or after 
                the date of the enactment of this Act (including the 
                coalition National Unity Government agreed upon in the 
                Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan), except that 
                such term does not include the regional Government of 
                Southern Sudan.
                  (B) Officials of the government of sudan.--The term 
                ``Government of Sudan'', when used with respect to an 
                official of the Government of Sudan, does not include 
                an individual--
                          (i) who was not a member of such government 
                        prior to July 1, 2005; or
                          (ii) who is a member of the regional 
                        Government of Southern Sudan.
          (3) Comprehensive peace agreement for sudan.--The term 
        ``Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan'' means the peace 
        agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
        People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Kenya, 
        on January 9, 2005.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

  Congress makes the following findings:
          (1) On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives and the 
        Senate declared that the atrocities occurring in the Darfur 
        region of Sudan are genocide.
          (2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell 
        stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 
        ``genocide has been committed in Darfur,'' and ``the Government 
        of Sudan and the [Janjaweed] bear responsibility--and genocide 
        may still be occurring''.
          (3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United 
        Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush affirmed the 
        Secretary of State's finding and stated,``[a]t this hour, the 
        world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in 
        the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded 
        are genocide''.
          (4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council 
        passed Security Council Resolution 1556, calling upon the 
        Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to 
        apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their 
        associates who have incited and carried out violations of human 
        rights and international humanitarian law, and establishing a 
        ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all 
        types, including the provision of related technical training or 
        assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and individuals, 
        including the Janjaweed.
          (5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security 
        Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564, determining 
        that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its obligations 
        under Security Council Resolution 1556, calling for a military 
        flight ban in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names 
        of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for verification, 
        establishing an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
        to investigate violations of international humanitarian and 
        human rights laws, and threatening sanctions should the 
        Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council 
        Resolutions 1556 and 1564, including such actions as to affect 
        Sudan's petroleum sector or individual members of the 
        Government of Sudan.
          (6) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
        Darfur, submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General on 
        January 25, 2005, established that the ``Government of the 
        Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations 
        of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to 
        crimes under international law,'' that ``these acts were 
        conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore 
        may amount to crimes against humanity,'' and that Sudanese 
        officials and other individuals may have acted with ``genocidal 
        intent''.
          (7) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
        Darfur further notes that, pursuant to its mandate and in the 
        course of its work, the Commission had collected information 
        relating to individual perpetrators of acts constituting 
        ``violations of international human rights law and 
        international humanitarian law, including crimes against 
        humanity and war crimes'' and that a sealed file containing the 
        names of those individual perpetrators had been delivered to 
        the United Nations Secretary-General.
          (8) On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Security Council 
        passed Security Council Resolution 1590, establishing the 
        United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), consisting of up to 
        10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police tasked with 
        supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
        for Sudan and ``closely and continuously liais[ing] and 
        coordinat[ing] at all levels with the African Union Mission in 
        Sudan (AMIS) with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the 
        effort to foster peace in Darfur''.
          (9) On March 29, 2005, the United Nations Security Council 
        passed Security Council Resolution 1591, extending the military 
        embargo established by Security Council Resolution 1556 to all 
        the parties to the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 
        2004, and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, 
        South Darfur, and West Darfur, calling for an asset freeze and 
        travel ban against those individuals who impede the peace 
        process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the 
        region, commit violations of international humanitarian or 
        human rights law or other atrocities, are responsible for 
        offensive military overflights, or violate the military 
        embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security Council 
        and a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring compliance with 
        Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591.
          (10) On March 31, 2005, the United Nations Security Council 
        passed Security Council Resolution 1593, referring the 
        situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the prosecutor of 
        the International Criminal Court and calling on the Government 
        of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully 
        with the Court.
          (11) In remarks before the G-8 Summit on June 30, 2005, 
        President Bush reconfirmed that ``the violence in Darfur is 
        clearly genocide'' and ``the human cost is beyond 
        calculation''.
          (12) On July 30, 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the newly 
        appointed Vice President of Sudan and the leader of the Sudan 
        People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) for the past 21 
        years, was killed in a tragic helicopter crash in southern 
        Sudan, sparking riots in Khartoum and challenging the 
        commitment of all Sudanese to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
        for Sudan.
          (13) Since 1993, the Secretary of State has determined that 
        the Republic of Sudan is a country which has repeatedly 
        provided support for acts of international terrorism and, 
        pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section 
        620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, designated Sudan as 
        a State Sponsor of Terrorism, thereby restricting United States 
        assistance, defense exports and sales, and financial and other 
        transactions with the Government of Sudan.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

  It is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan is 
        characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed 
        against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual 
        violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias 
        with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-
        led faction of the Government of Sudan;
          (2) the Secretary of State should designate the Janjaweed 
        militia as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 
        219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act;
          (3) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have 
        continued to violate the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 
        8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, and 
        violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and 
        personnel of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is 
        increasing;
          (4) the African Union should rapidly expand the size and 
        amend the mandate of the African Union Mission in Sudan to 
        authorize such action as may be necessary to protect civilians 
        and humanitarian operations, and deter violence in the Darfur 
        region without delay;
          (5) the international community, including the United 
        Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
        European Union, and the United States, should immediately act 
        to mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial 
        resources to support the expansion of the African Union Mission 
        in Sudan so that it achieves the size, strength, and capacity 
        necessary for protecting civilians and humanitarian operations, 
        and ending the continued violence in the Darfur region;
          (6) if an expanded and reinforced African Union Mission in 
        Sudan fails to stop genocide in the Darfur region, the 
        international community should take additional, dispositive 
        measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in the Darfur 
        region;
          (7) acting under Article 5 of the Charter of the United 
        Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for 
        suspension of the Government of Sudan's rights and privileges 
        of membership by the General Assembly until such time as the 
        Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon 
        civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and 
        associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for 
        deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region;
          (8) the President should use all necessary and appropriate 
        diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the 
        responsibilities of the Committee of the United Nations 
        Security Council and the Panel of Experts established pursuant 
        to section 3(a) of Security Council Resolution 1591 (March 29, 
        2005);
          (9) the United States should not provide assistance to the 
        Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the 
        implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, 
        the support of the regional Government of Southern Sudan and 
        marginalized areas in northern Sudan (including the Nuba 
        Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja), 
        Darfur, and Nubia), as well as marginalized peoples in and 
        around Khartoum, or for humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until 
        such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to 
        cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the 
        Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered 
        access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur 
        region, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees 
        and internally displaced persons;
          (10) the President should seek to assist members of the 
        Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a 
        student loan forgiveness program for those individuals who 
        commit to return to southern Sudan for a period of not less 
        than five years for the purpose of contributing professional 
        skills needed for the reconstruction of southern Sudan;
          (11) the President should appoint a Presidential Envoy for 
        Sudan with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to provide 
        stewardship of efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace 
        Agreement for Sudan, seek ways to bring stability and peace to 
        the Darfur region, address instability elsewhere in Sudan and 
        northern Uganda, and pursue a truly comprehensive peace 
        throughout the region;
          (12) to achieve the goals specified in paragraph (10) and to 
        further promote human rights and civil liberties, build 
        democracy, and strengthen civil society, the Presidential Envoy 
        for Sudan should be empowered to promote and encourage the 
        exchange of individuals pursuant to educational and cultural 
        programs, including programs funded by the Government of the 
        United States;
          (13) the international community should strongly condemn 
        attacks against humanitarian workers and demand that all armed 
        groups in the Darfur region, including the forces of the 
        Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, the 
        Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and 
        Equality Movement (JEM), and all other armed groups refrain 
        from such attacks;
          (14) the United States should fully support the Comprehensive 
        Peace Agreement for Sudan and urge rapid implementation of its 
        terms; and
          (15) the new leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation 
        Movement (SPLM) should--
                  (A) seek to transform the SPLM into an inclusive, 
                transparent, and democratic body;
                  (B) reaffirm the commitment of the SPLM to bringing 
                peace not only to southern Sudan, but also to the 
                Darfur region, eastern Sudan, and northern Uganda; and
                  (C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine 
                the SPLM.

SEC. 5. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.

  (a) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas.--Section 6 of the 
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-497; 50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is amended--
          (1) in the heading of subsection (b), by inserting ``of 
        Appropriate Senior Officials of the Sudanese Government'' after 
        ``Assets'';
          (2) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as 
        subsections (d) through (f), respectively; and
          (3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(c) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas of Certain 
Individuals Identified by the President.--
          ``(1) Blocking of assets.--Beginning on the date that is 30 
        days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace and 
        Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contributing 
        to peace in Sudan, the President shall, consistent with the 
        authorities granted in the International Emergency Economic 
        Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets of any 
        individual who the President determines is complicit in, or 
        responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
        against humanity in Darfur, including the family members or any 
        associates of such individual to whom assets or property of 
        such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002.
          ``(2) Restriction on visas.--Beginning on the date that is 30 
        days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace and 
        Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contributing 
        to peace in Sudan, the President shall deny visas and entry to 
        any individual who the President determines is complicit in, or 
        responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
        against humanity in Darfur, including the family members or any 
        associates of such individual to whom assets or property of 
        such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002.''.
  (b) Waiver.--Section 6(d) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 
2004 (as redesignated by subsection (a)) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new sentence: ``The President may waive the 
application of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) with respect to 
an individual if the President determines that such a waiver is in the 
national interests of the United States and, prior to exercising the 
waiver, transmits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
notification which includes the name of the individual and the reasons 
for the waiver.''.
  (c) Sanctions Against Certain Janjaweed Commanders and 
Coordinators.--The President should immediately consider imposing the 
sanctions described in section 6(c) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan 
Act of 2004 (as added by subsection (a)) against the Janjaweed 
commanders and coordinators identified by the former United States 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes before the Subcommittee on Africa of 
the House International Relations Committee on June 24, 2004.

SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO DETER AND SUPPRESS GENOCIDE IN 
                    DARFUR.

  (a) United States Assistance to Support AMIS.--Section 7 of the 
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-497; 50 U.S.C. 
1701 note) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting ``(a) 
        General Assistance.--Notwithstanding''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
  ``(b) Assistance to Support AMIS.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the President is authorized to provide assistance, on 
such terms and conditions as the President may determine and in 
consultation with the appropriate congressional committees, to 
reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with the mandate, size, strength, and capacity 
to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, stabilize the Darfur 
region of Sudan and dissuade and deter air attacks directed against 
civilians and humanitarian workers, including but not limited to 
providing assistance in the areas of logistics, transport, 
communications, materiel support, technical assistance, training, 
command and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence.''.
  (b) NATO Assistance to Support AMIS.--The President should instruct 
the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States at NATO to advocate NATO reinforcement of the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), upon the request of the African Union, 
including but not limited to the provision of assets to dissuade and 
deter offensive air strikes directed against civilians and humanitarian 
workers in the Darfur region of Sudan and other logistical, 
transportation, communications, training, technical assistance, command 
and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence support.
  (c) Denial of Entry at United States Ports to Certain Cargo Ships or 
Oil Tankers.--
          (1) In general.--The President should take all necessary and 
        appropriate steps to deny the Government of Sudan access to oil 
        revenues, including by prohibiting entry at United States ports 
        to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or trade 
        activities in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the 
        shipment of goods for use by the armed forces of Sudan until 
        such time as the Government of Sudan has honored its 
        commitments to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize and 
        demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free 
        and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian 
        assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of 
        refugees and internally displaced persons.
          (2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to 
        cargo ships or oil tankers involved in an internationally-
        recognized demobilization program or the shipment of non-lethal 
        assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive 
        Peace Agreement for Sudan.
  (d) Prohibition on Assistance to Countries in Violation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591.--
          (1) Prohibition.--Amounts made available to carry out the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) may not 
        be used to provide assistance (other than humanitarian 
        assistance) to the government of a country that is in violation 
        of the embargo on military assistance with respect to Sudan 
        imposed pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
        1556 (July 30, 2004) and 1591 (March 29, 2005).
          (2) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
        paragraph (1) if the President determines and certifies to the 
        appropriate congressional committees that it is in the national 
        interests of the United States to do so.

SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS.

   The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the 
United States to urge the adoption of a resolution by the United 
Nations Security Council that--
          (1) supports the expansion of the African Union Mission in 
        Sudan (AMIS) so that it achieves the mandate, size, strength, 
        and capacity needed to protect civilians and humanitarian 
        operations, and dissuade and deter fighting and violence in the 
        Darfur region of Sudan, and urges Member States of the United 
        Nations to accelerate political, material, financial, and other 
        assistance to the African Union toward this end;
          (2) reinforces efforts of the African Union to negotiate 
        peace talks between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan 
        Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and Equality 
        Movement (JEM), and associated armed groups in the Darfur 
        region, calls on the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the 
        JEM to abide by their obligations under the N'Djamena Ceasefire 
        Agreement of April 8, 2004 and subsequent agreements, urges all 
        parties to engage in peace talks without preconditions and seek 
        to resolve the conflict, and strongly condemns all attacks 
        against humanitarian workers and African Union personnel in the 
        Darfur region;
          (3) imposes sanctions against the Government of Sudan, 
        including sanctions against individual members of the 
        Government of Sudan, and entities controlled or owned by 
        officials of the Government of Sudan or the National Congress 
        Party in Sudan until such time as the Government of Sudan has 
        honored its commitments to cease attacks on civilians, 
        demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated 
        militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of 
        humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary 
        return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
          (4) extends the military embargo established by United 
        Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (July 30, 2004) and 
        1591 (March 29, 2005) to include a total prohibition on the 
        sale or supply of offensive military equipment to the 
        Government of Sudan, except for use in an internationally-
        recognized demobilization program or for non-lethal assistance 
        necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace 
        Agreement for Sudan; and
          (5) calls upon those Member States of the United Nations that 
        continue to undermine efforts to foster peace in Sudan by 
        providing military assistance and equipment to the Government 
        of Sudan, the SLM/A, the JEM, and associated armed groups in 
        the Darfur region in violation of the embargo on such 
        assistance and equipment, as called for in United Nations 
        Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591, to immediately 
        cease and desist.

SEC. 8. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS.

  (a) Continuation of Restrictions.--Restrictions against the 
Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13067 
of November 3, 1997 (62 Federal Register 59989), title III and sections 
508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, or any other similar 
provision of law, shall remain in effect and shall not be lifted 
pursuant to such provisions of law until the President transmits to the 
appropriate congressional committees a certification that the 
Government of Sudan is acting in good faith to--
          (1) peacefully resolve the crisis in the Darfur region of 
        Sudan;
          (2) disarm, demobilize, and demilitarize the Janjaweed and 
        all government-allied militias;
          (3) adhere to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
        1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1591 (2005), and 1593 (2005);
          (4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern 
        Sudan;
          (5) fully cooperate with efforts to disarm, demobilize, and 
        deny safe haven to members of the Lords Resistance Army; and
          (6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for 
        Sudan without manipulation or delay, including by--
                  (A) implementing the recommendations of the Abyei 
                Commission Report;
                  (B) establishing other appropriate commissions and 
                implementing and adhering to the recommendations of 
                such commissions consistent with the terms of the 
                Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan;
                  (C) adhering to the terms of the Wealth Sharing 
                Agreement; and
                  (D) withdrawing government forces from southern Sudan 
                consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace 
                Agreement for Sudan.
  (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of subsection 
(a) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
congressional committees that it is in the national interests of the 
United States to do so.

SEC. 9. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.

  (a) Additional Authorities.--Section 501(a) of the Assistance for 
International Malaria Control Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law'' and inserting the following:
          ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
        law'';
          (2) by inserting ``civil administrations,'' after 
        ``indigenous groups,'';
          (3) by striking ``areas outside of control of the Government 
        of Sudan'' and inserting ``southern Sudan, southern Kordofan/
        Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei'';
          (4) by inserting at the end before the period the following: 
        ``, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan''; 
        and
          (5) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
          ``(2) Congressional notification.--
                  ``(A) In general.--Assistance may not be obligated 
                under this subsection until 15 days after the date on 
                which the President has provided notice thereof to the 
                congressional committees specified in section 634A of 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1) 
                in accordance with the procedures applicable to 
                reprogramming notifications under such section.
                  ``(B) Rule of construction.--The notification 
                requirement of subparagraph (A) shall not apply in the 
                case of assistance subject to notification in 
                accordance with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance 
                Act of 1961 pursuant to any provision of an Act making 
                appropriations for foreign operations, export 
                financing, and related programs.''.
  (b) Exception to Prohibitions in Executive Order No. 13067.--Section 
501(b) of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act (50 
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``Export Prohibitions'' and 
        inserting ``Prohibitions in Executive Order No. 13067'';
          (2) by striking ``any export from an area in Sudan outside of 
        control of the Government of Sudan, or to any necessary 
        transaction directly related to that export'' and inserting 
        ``activities or related transactions with respect to southern 
        Sudan, southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, 
        or Abyei''; and
          (3) by striking ``the export or related transaction'' and all 
        that follows and inserting ``such activities or related 
        transactions would directly benefit the economic recovery and 
        development of those areas and people.''.

SEC. 10. REPORTS.

  (a) Report on African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).--Section 8 of 
the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107-245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(c) Report on African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).--In 
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report, to be prepared in conjunction with 
the Secretary of Defense, on--
          ``(1) efforts to fully deploy the African Union Mission in 
        Sudan (AMIS) with the size, strength, and capacity necessary to 
        stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and protect civilians and 
        humanitarian operations;
          ``(2) the needs of AMIS to ensure success, including in the 
        areas of housing, transport, communications, equipment, 
        technical assistance, training, command and control, 
        intelligence, and such assistance as is necessary to dissuade 
        and deter attacks, including by air, directed against civilians 
        and humanitarian operations;
          ``(3) the current level of United States assistance and other 
        assistance provided to AMIS, and a request for additional 
        United States assistance, if necessary;
          ``(4) the status of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
        plans and assistance to support AMIS; and
          ``(5) the performance of AMIS in carrying out its mission in 
        the Darfur region.''.
  (b) Report on Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.--Section 8 of 
the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107-245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as 
amended by subsection (a), is further amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(d) Report on Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.--In 
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a), (b), and (c) 
of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report regarding sanctions imposed under 
subsections (a) through (d) of section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in 
Sudan Act of 2004, including--
          ``(1) a description of each sanction imposed under such 
        provisions of law; and
          ``(2) the name of the individual or entity subject to the 
        sanction, if applicable.''.

SEC. 11. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

  Nothing in this Act (or any amendment made by this Act) or any other 
provision of law shall be construed to preempt any State law that 
prohibits investment of State funds, including State pension funds, in 
or relating to the Republic of the Sudan.

                          Purpose and Summary

    The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 (H.R. 
3127), as ordered favorably reported out of the House Committee 
on International Relations with an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute, expresses the Sense of Congress with respect to the 
situation in the Darfur region of western Sudan and amends the 
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 to promote peace and 
accountability in Darfur. Inter alia, the bill:

         LAmends the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act 
        of 2004 to confer upon the President, notwithstanding 
        any other provision of law, the authority to provide 
        assistance to reinforce the deployment and operations 
        of an expanded African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 
        with the mandate, size, strength and capacity to 
        protect civilians and humanitarian operations, 
        stabilize Darfur, and, as necessary, dissuade and deter 
        air attacks directed against civilians and humanitarian 
        operations;
         LCalls on the international community, 
        including the UN, the European Union (EU), and the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to 
        immediately mobilize political, military and financial 
        resources to support the expansion of AMIS;
         LImposes targeted sanctions against 
        individuals determined by the President to be 
        responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
        against humanity in Darfur;
         LProhibits the provision of non-humanitarian 
        U.S. assistance to nations violating the military and 
        arms embargo imposed pursuant to UN Security Council 
        resolutions 1556 and 1591;
         LCalls for the suspension of Sudan's 
        membership in the United Nations;
         LEncourages the President to deny entry at 
        U.S. ports to certain Sudanese cargo ships or oil 
        tankers if the Government of Sudan fails to take 
        specified measures in Darfur;
         LAmends the International Malaria Control Act 
        to authorize the President to provide assistance to 
        Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, 
        Blue Nile State, and Abyei, provided that Congress is 
        notified pursuant to Section 634A of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961, and to expand existing 
        exceptions to prohibitions on imports to and exports 
        from Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas;
         LAmends the reporting requirements in the 
        Sudan Peace Act of 2002 to include sections on U.S. and 
        NATO efforts to support the deployment of an expanded 
        AU mission in Darfur, the performance of AMIS in 
        Darfur, and the status of the imposition of sanctions 
        pursuant to the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act; 
        and
         LProvides that nothing in this Act shall be 
        construed to preempt State laws which prohibit 
        investment of State pension funds in Sudan.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    The Darfur region of western Sudan is home to at least 36 
tribes identified within two major groups: Arabs and non-Arabs 
(the latter known as ``Zurga'' or indigenous Africans).\1\ Both 
groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim, and years of 
intermarriage have made racial distinction difficult. Over the 
years, desertification and competition over scarce resources 
has triggered sporadic armed conflict between the largely 
nomadic Arab herders and sedentary African pastoralists. 
Successive governments in Khartoum exacerbated these tensions 
by manipulating ethnic divisions and arming tribes of Arab 
descent to act as proxy forces in the region. This strategy is 
markedly similar to that which has been pursued by the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) in Southern Sudan, where over 21 
years of war left two million dead and nearly four million 
displaced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ International Crisis Group (ICG), ``Darfur Rising: Sudan's New 
Crisis,'' 25 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Citing ethnic, political, and economic marginalization of 
non-Arabs in Darfur, two rebel groups emerged in February 2003: 
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM). The SLA is composed mainly by the non-Arab Fur, 
Zaghawa, and Masaalit tribes. It is speculated that the SLA has 
received support from fellow Zaghawa in Chad and Libya, 
Darfurian businessmen in the Persian Gulf, and from the 
Government of Eritrea. The SLA also received early support from 
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan.\2\ 
The JEM is dominated by the Zaghawa and is alleged to have 
links to Dr. Hassan al Turabi, founder of the National Islamic 
Front (NIF), former Speaker of Sudan's National Assembly, and 
potential threat to President Omar Bashir.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Ibid, page 20.
    \3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The GoS has dismissed the SLA and JEM as terrorists and 
claims the conflict is tribal in nature. However, observers 
consistently assert that the conflict has far more to do with 
political and economic marginalization--and a war between the 
center of power and the periphery--than it does with 
traditional tribal rivalries. Khartoum's concerns over threats 
emanating from the West reportedly were exacerbated in March 
2003, when the SLA joined the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA), an umbrella group of southern rebels and northern 
opponents of the regime in Khartoum.
    With the NIF regime in Khartoum weakened by internal 
turmoil and distracted by mounting international pressure to 
resolve the North-South conflict, which already had lasted over 
two decades and claimed more than two million lives, the SLA 
and JEM exacted a string of victories throughout the spring of 
2003. By mid-2003, the GoS had significantly increased its 
presence in Darfur by arming government-supported militias, 
collectively known as Janjaweed, and by deploying the Popular 
Defense Forces (PDF). The Janjaweed, under the direction of 
regular government forces, unleashed a campaign of terror 
against civilians reportedly in an effort to forcefully expel 
non-Arab ethnic groups.\4\ In mid-February 2004, President 
Bashir declared that the security forces had crushed the SLA 
and JEM. Despite this claim, the conflict continues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHO). Report of 
UNCHO Mission to Chad, April 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to officials from the United States Government 
and the United Nations (UN), the situation in the Darfur region 
of western Sudan continues to be one of the greatest 
humanitarian crises in the world. Out of an estimated pre-
conflict population of seven million in Darfur, anywhere 
between 180,000 and 400,000 already have died and over two 
million have been displaced.\5\ Reports by refugees and 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) detail a systematic pattern 
of attacks against civilians by the Janjaweed, who have 
employed scorched earth tactics backed by air and land strikes 
by GoS forces. Entire villages have been razed, crops burned, 
and wells and irrigation systems destroyed. There are 
widespread reports of arbitrary killings, abductions, looting, 
torture, and rape.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Reports on the numbers of deaths resulting both directly by 
violence and indirectly by disease and malnutrition vary widely. The 
United Nations reports 180,000 deaths, while groups such as the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Coalition for International 
Justice (CIJ) place the figure between 300,000 and 400,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 2, 2004, UN Under Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan 
Egeland characterized the situation in Darfur as ``ethnic 
cleansing.'' \6\ On April 7, 2004, during a speech reflecting 
upon the Rwandan genocide before the UN Commission on Human 
Rights, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that reports 
from the region had left him with ``a deep sense of 
foreboding,'' and asserted, ``The international community must 
be prepared to take swift and appropriate action.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See UN, ``Press Briefing on Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur, 
Sudan,'' 2 April 2004.
    \7\ See UN, ``Secretary-General's Address to the Commission on 
Human Rights (As Delivered),'' 7 April 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States Congress declared that the atrocities in 
Darfur constitute genocide with the passage of H. Con. Res. 467 
and S. Con. Res. 133 on July 22, 2004. In testimony before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 2004, former 
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell affirmed the position of 
Congress and publicly acknowledged that genocide had occurred 
in Darfur and may still be occurring. On September 9, 2004, the 
State Department released a report which concluded that the GoS 
``promoted systematic killings based on race and ethnic 
origin,'' and that these acts constitute genocide. The report, 
and the Administration's subsequent determination of genocide, 
drew upon information collected by an ``Atrocities 
Documentation Team,'' which conducted 1,136 interviews of 
Sudanese refugees in August of 2004.
    Initially, the African Union (AU) was slow to respond to 
the crisis in Darfur. In late March 2004, the AU sent a team to 
participate in ceasefire negotiations between the GoS, the SLA, 
and the JEM in Chad. Under the terms of the April 2004 
N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement, the AU was tasked with creating 
a Ceasefire Commission and subsequently deployed ceasefire 
monitors under the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The 
deployment of AMIS, albeit small, took more than four months 
after the signing of the agreement. In late September 2004, the 
GoS and the AU finally agreed to expand AMIS, several weeks 
after the UN Security Council endorsed such an expansion and 
threatened sanctions if the GoS failed to cooperate. In May 
2005, the AU announced that AMIS would expand to 7,700 
personnel. With assistance provided by the United States, the 
European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
deployment of these additional troops began in July 2005. 
Currently, there are over 6,000 African Union forces and 
monitors on the ground in Darfur.
    Though forces and observers deployed under AMIS have 
performed well to date, the limited size and mandate of the AU 
mission, as well as logistical and financial troubles of the 
organization, have severely hampered the work of AMIS in 
Darfur. The mission is dependent upon funding and logistical 
support from donors--particularly the United States and the 
European Union--who have given generously but now face 
difficulty in sustaining contributions. Further, the mandate 
does not provide for civilian protection and contains no 
enforcement mechanisms, aside from reporting the violations to 
a Joint Commission. Since the signing of the ceasefire 
agreement and the deployment of AMIS, there have been countless 
violations by all parties with no apparent consequences.
    These constraints have prompted discussion of a United 
Nations takeover of AMIS. The United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador John Bolton, 
used the occasion of the United States' presidency of the 
Security Council during February 2006 to press for a resolution 
formally authorizing the ``re-hatting'' of AMIS. On February 3, 
2005, a Statement by the President of the Security Council was 
issued which authorized the Secretary-General ``to initiate 
contingency planning without delay . . . on a range of options 
for a possible transition from AMIS to a United Nations 
operation.'' A draft resolution then was circulated by the 
United States delegation to formalize the proposed UN takeover 
of AMIS, but was stalled by other Council Members who insisted 
that the African Union must first make a formal request for 
AMIS to be taken over by a UN mission, and that the Sudanese 
Government would have to agree to any such proposal in advance.
    To date, the United Nations has approved six United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to the situation 
in Darfur. Pursuant to UNSCR 1564 of September 18, 2004, an 
International Commission of Inquiry was created to investigate 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws 
in Darfur. While the report of the Commission of Inquiry, which 
was submitted to the UN Secretary General on January 25, 2005, 
effectively dodged the question of genocide, it did assert, 
``the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible 
for serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law,'' 
and that Sudanese officials and other individuals may have 
acted with ``genocidal intent.'' The report also noted that a 
sealed file containing information on individuals responsible 
for war crimes and crimes against humanity had been delivered 
to the Secretary-General for the purposes of possible future 
prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). By UNSCR 
1593 (March 31, 2005), the UN formally referred the situation 
in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC.
    On March 29, 2005, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1591, 
extending the military embargo established pursuant to UNSCR 
1556 (July 30, 2004) to all the parties to the N'Djamena 
Ceasefire Agreement, calling for an asset freeze and travel ban 
against those who impede the peace process, constitute a threat 
to stability in Darfur, commit violations of international 
humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are 
responsible for offensive military over-flights or violate the 
military embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security 
Council and a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring 
compliance with UNSCRs 1556 and 1591. Though a list of names of 
such violators has been submitted to the Security Council, the 
UN has yet to impose any sanctions.
    The inability of the United Nations to enforce resolutions 
of the Security Council calling for sanctions against Sudan, 
and the apparent inability to get a resolution passed which 
would immediately enable the United Nations to take over the 
AMIS mission in Darfur, largely is attributed to China and 
Russia--two permanent Members of the Security Council with veto 
power which have significant interests at stake in Sudan. The 
GoS also reportedly has begun a diplomatic campaign to persuade 
other nations to oppose any peacekeeping mission in Sudan other 
than AMIS.
    On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya, 
ostensibly ending 21 years of civil war between the government 
in the North and rebels in the South. Pursuant to the CPA, a 
Government of National Unity (GONU) has been formed in Khartoum 
which includes both members of the former National Congress 
Party-controlled government and members of the SPLM. 
Simultaneously, a regional government was formed in Southern 
Sudan which has been tasked with preparing the region for a 
referendum on the question of independence.
    Though it was hoped that the conclusion of the CPA would 
contribute to a political settlement in Darfur, such a 
resolution remains elusive and the crisis continues. Thus, the 
United States Government currently faces at least two critical 
challenges in Sudan: the confrontation of genocide in Darfur 
and the consolidation of peace in Southern Sudan. Already, the 
formation of this new Government of National Unity has prompted 
Sudan watchers to reconsider the appropriateness of imposing 
new sanctions against the Government of Sudan in general, 
versus imposing sanctions against individual perpetrators of 
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. In addition, 
the United States Government now must consider lifting, 
modifying, or waiving existing sanctions against Sudan in an 
effort to contribute to reconstruction and recovery efforts in 
Southern Sudan without inadvertently rewarding members of a 
genocidal government in Khartoum. Thus, while H.R. 3127 
specifically is intended to promote peace and accountability in 
Darfur, it also attempts to address several of the challenges 
presented by conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
and formation of the Government of National Unity.
    The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the House 
Committee on International Relations, accompanied by Reps. 
Payne, Smith of New Jersey, Lantos, Royce, Tancredo, Wolf, 
Jackson-Lee and Capuano, introduced H.R. 3127 on June 30, 2005. 
The substitute amendment, which was ordered adopted and 
favorably reported by the Committee on March 8, 2006, 
represents the product of eight months of bipartisan 
negotiations among Members from the House and Senate, with 
significant input from the Administration, academics, non-
governmental organizations, advocacy groups, and other 
concerned groups. The United States Senate passed a similar 
bill, S. 1462, on November 18, 2005.

                                Hearings

    The Committee's Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights 
and International Operations held four hearing on issues 
relating to Darfur and H.R. 3127 (March 11, 2004, April 22, 
2004, June 24, 2004, and November 1, 2005). During the March 
11, 2004, hearing, testimony was received from five witnesses, 
representing the U.S. Department of State, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, Smith College, and Safe 
Harbor International Relief. During the April 22, 2004, 
hearing, testimony was received from four witnesses, with one 
former UN official testifying in a private capacity and others 
representing Harvard University, Remembering Rwanda, and Human 
Rights Watch. During the June 24, 2004, hearing, testimony was 
received from three witnesses, representing the U.S. Department 
of State, Good Works International, and Human Rights Watch. 
During the November 1, 2005, hearing, testimony was received 
from a witness representing the U.S. Department of State.
    The Committee on International Relations held two hearings 
on issues relating to Darfur and H.R. 3127 on March 6, 2004, 
and June 22, 2005, respectively. During the March 2, 2004 
hearing, testimony was received from five witnesses, 
representing the U.S. Department of State, USAID, the 
International Crisis Group, Save the Children, and Darfur Peace 
and Development, with additional materials submitted by one 
Member of Congress and the United States Conference of Catholic 
Bishops. During the June 22, 2005, hearing, testimony was 
received from a witness representing the U.S. Department of 
State, with additional material submitted by Survivors United 
to Save the Women of Darfur.

                        Committee Consideration

    On July 21, 2005, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human 
Rights and International Operations met in open session and 
ordered favorably reported to the Full Committee the bill H.R. 
3127, as amended, by voice vote, a quorum being present. On 
February 8, 2006, the Committee met in open session and ordered 
favorably reported the bill H.R. 3127 with an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute by voice vote, a quorum being present.

                         Votes of the Committee

    Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote 
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of 
those voting for or against, be printed in the Committee 
Report.

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules 
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the 
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on 
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                        Committee Cost Estimate

    The Committee estimates there will be no cost.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The goals and objectives of H.R. 3127 are to promote peace 
and accountability in the Darfur region of western Sudan by 
authorizing expanded support for the African Union Mission in 
Sudan and imposing targeted sanctions against those determined 
to be responsible for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this legislation in article 1, section 8, clause 18 of the 
Constitution.

               Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion

Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.
    Section 1 contains a short title and a table of contents.
Section 2. Definitions.
    Section 2 updates the definition of the Government of Sudan 
(GoS), while clarifying that sanctions previously imposed 
against ``officials of the Government of Sudan'' will not apply 
to individuals who were not party to the government prior to 
July 1, 2005, or to the regional Government of Southern Sudan.
    Unlike the Sudan Peace Act of 2002 or the Comprehensive 
Peace Act of 2004, the focus of sanctions in this bill is not 
on the Government of Sudan in general, but on individuals who 
are responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes 
against humanity, regardless of their affiliation. This shift 
was necessitated by the fact that since the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, the Government 
of Sudan now includes members of the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM) and other opposition groups who are not 
necessarily associated with the former government's genocidal 
acts. Thus, the Committee sought to avoid punishing the new 
coalition government across the board, and alternatively 
focused on individual accountability.
Section 3. Findings.
    Section 3 provides updates on developments in the country 
and actions taken by the United Nations with regard to the 
crisis in Darfur, including the passage of six Security Council 
Resolutions, the submission of the Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the referral of the situation 
in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court, the death of Dr. John Garang, Vice President of Sudan 
and leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A), and the 1993 determination by the Secretary of State 
that Sudan is a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Section 4. Sense of Congress.
    Section 4 expresses the sense of Congress that:

         LThe Secretary of State should designate the 
        Janjaweed militia as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
         LAll parties to the conflict in Darfur 
        continue to violate the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement 
        of April 8, 2004, and attacks against aid workers and 
        AU personnel are increasing;
         LThe African Union (AU) should rapidly expand 
        the size and amend the mandate of the AU Mission in 
        Sudan (AMIS), to authorize such action as may be 
        necessary to protect civilians and deter violence in 
        Darfur;
         LThe international community, including the 
        UN, EU, and NATO, should immediately mobilize 
        sufficient political, military, and financial resources 
        to support an expanded AU mission and consider 
        additional measures should the expanded AU mission fail 
        to stop genocide in Darfur;
         LThe GoS's membership in the UN should be 
        suspended until such time as the GoS has honored 
        pledges to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize the 
        Janjaweed and associated militias, grant unfettered 
        access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and 
        allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and 
        IDPs;
         LThe United States should not provide any 
        assistance to the GoS, other than for implementation of 
        the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, for marginalized 
        areas, or for humanitarian purposes, until the GoS has 
        honored the pledges described above;
         LThe UN should impose sanctions against Sudan 
        pursuant to UNSCR 1591;
         LThe President should establish a student loan 
        forgiveness program for members of the Sudanese 
        Diaspora in the United States who commit to return to 
        Southern Sudan for at least five years so they may 
        contribute to reconstruction efforts;
         LThe President should appoint a Special Envoy 
        for Sudan and northern Uganda;
         LThe international community should strongly 
        condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and AU 
        monitors in Sudan;
         LThe United States should support and urge 
        rapid implementation of the Comprehensive Peace 
        Agreement for Sudan;
         LThe SPLM should transform itself into an 
        inclusive, transparent, and democratic political body 
        and reconfirm its commitment to seek peace in Southern 
        Sudan, Darfur, eastern Sudan, and northern Uganda.
Section 5. Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.
    Section 5(a) amends Section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in 
Sudan Act of 2004 to block the assets and restrict the travel 
of any individual whom the President has determined is 
responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity in the Darfur region. As the Comprehensive Peace in 
Sudan Act currently only imposes sanctions against senior 
officials in the government, this section reflects the 
Committee's resolve to hold individuals accountable for 
genocidal acts rather than punishing the new coalition 
government in general.
    Section 5(b) provides a national interest waiver for the 
imposition of sanctions against such individuals, provided that 
the President notifies Congress in advance.
    Section 5(c) calls on the President to immediately consider 
imposing sanctions against Janjaweed commanders and 
coordinators identified by the former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large 
for War Crimes during an Africa Subcommittee hearing on June 
24, 2004.
Section 6. Additional Authorities to Deter and Suppress Genocide in 
        Darfur.
    Section 6(a) amends the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act to 
authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, to provide assistance, in consultation with Congress, to 
reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded AU 
mission in Darfur with the mandate, size, strength, and 
capacity to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, 
stabilize Darfur, and deter air attacks directed against 
civilians and humanitarian operations. The Committee notes that 
the President already has committed significant resources 
toward this end, including by providing more than $190 million 
to date to support AMIS (not including the costs associated 
with air transport of AMIS personnel from Rwanda and Nigeria or 
additional funds which shall be made available following 
Congressional approval of an emergency supplemental budget 
request for Fiscal Year 2006) and pressing for greater UN and 
NATO involvement. Therefore, the Committee asserts that this 
language is consistent with current United States policy and 
only strengthens the President's ability to take quick and 
decisive action to support AMIS, particularly in preparation 
for an eventual takeover of the mission by the United Nations.
    Section 6(b) recommends that the US Permanent 
Representative to NATO use the voice, vote, and influence of 
the United States at NATO to advocate for NATO reinforcement of 
the AU mission, upon the request of the AU. Again, the 
Committee notes that the President and the US Permanent 
Representative to NATO already have undertaken to encourage 
greater NATO support for AMIS, but notes that much more could 
be done to help bridge the gap in capabilities while the United 
Nations prepares for an eventual takeover of the AMIS mission.
    Section 6(c) asserts that the President should take all 
necessary and appropriate steps to deny the GoS access to oil 
revenues, including by prohibiting access to United States 
ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or 
trade activities in Sudan's oil sector or arms industry, until 
such time as the GoS honors commitments to cease attacks on 
civilians, disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed and associated 
militias, grant unfettered access for deliveries of 
humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary 
return of refuges and IDPs. This language is consistent with 
long-standing efforts to prevent the Government of Sudan from 
financing genocide with oil revenues. However, the Committee 
does not intend to punish the regional government of Sudan--
which is entitled to a 50% share of oil revenues generated in 
the region--or to inadvertently undermine implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thus, an exemption specifically 
has been provided for cargo ships or oil tankers involved in 
internationally-recognized demobilization programs or 
deliveries of non-lethal assistance necessary to carry out 
elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
    Section 6(d) prohibits the provision of non-humanitarian 
U.S. assistance to countries which violate the military and 
arms embargo imposed pursuant to UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1556 and 1591. This language is intended to 
encourage governments, particularly those of neighboring 
countries which have a stake in the conflict, to behave 
responsibly, adhere to UN resolutions, and cut off the 
seemingly endless supply of weapons being provided to both to 
the Government of Sudan and to the rebel movements in Darfur.
Section 7. Multilateral Efforts.
    Section 7 directs the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
UN to use the voice, vote and influence of the United States at 
the UN to urge the adoption of a resolution which supports the 
expansion of AMIS, reinforces efforts to negotiate peace talks, 
calls upon all parties to honor obligations under the N'Djamena 
Ceasefire Agreement, demands an end to attacks against 
civilians and humanitarian operations; imposes sanctions 
against the GoS; and expands the military embargo imposed 
pursuant to UNSCRs 1556 and 1591 to include all arms 
transactions other that for use in an internationally 
recognized demobilization program or for non-lethal assistance 
necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.
    The Committee recognizes that the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Bolton, has pressed 
for greater UN action with regard to Darfur but has been met 
with strong opposition from other Member States. Such 
resistance became particularly evident during February 2006, as 
Ambassador Bolton attempted to use the occasion of the United 
States' presidency of the Security Council to push for a 
resolution which would authorize a United Nations peacekeeping 
mission to take over for AMIS in Darfur. The Committee 
encourages the U.S. Permanent Representative to continue to 
pursue these efforts, particularly with regard to the 
imposition of sanctions and the introduction of UN 
peacekeepers, despite opposition from other Members of the 
Security Council.
Section 8. Continuation of Restrictions.
    Section 8 prohibits the lifting of restrictions against the 
GoS imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13067, title III and 
sections 508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing and Related Programs Act of 2006, or any 
similar provision of law, until the President can certify that 
the GoS is acting in good faith to: (1) peacefully resolve the 
crisis in Darfur; (2) disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed and 
associated militias; (3) adhere to UN Security Council 
Resolutions; (4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis 
in eastern Sudan; (5) cooperate with efforts to disarm, 
demobilize and deny safe haven the Lord's Resistance Army; and 
(6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan 
without manipulation or delay. This section includes a national 
interest waiver.
    While sympathetic to the challenges which the existing 
sanctions regime against Sudan presents to the Administration, 
particularly as the United States seeks to provide greater 
support for reconstruction and recovery efforts in Southern 
Sudan, there is a strong, bipartisan consensus among Committee 
Members that it would be inappropriate to lift sanctions across 
the board and thereby ``reward'' a genocidal government and a 
state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, while legislative relief from 
existing sanctions may be forthcoming, the Committee asserts 
that such relief would be carefully considered and targeted in 
nature.
Section 9. Assistance Efforts in Sudan.
    Section 9 amends the International Malaria Control Act to 
authorize the President to provide assistance to Southern 
Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, 
and Abyei, provided that Congress is notified pursuant to 
Section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This 
section further amends the Malaria Act to expand existing 
exceptions to prohibitions imposed against Sudan pursuant to 
Executive or 13067 to include ``such activities or related 
transactions'' that would directly benefit the economic 
recovery and development of Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/
Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei.
    The Malaria Act currently authorizes the President to 
provide certain forms of assistance to areas of Sudan ``outside 
the control of the Government of Sudan.'' However, with the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and subsequent 
formation of the Government of National Unity, all parts of 
Sudan presumably are ``under the control of the Government.'' 
Thus, this language provides a specific exemption from the 
sanctions for Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas. 
Further, it expands the existing exemption for exports from 
areas formerly defined as being ``outside the control of the 
Government'' to include both imports to and exports from 
Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas.
Section 10. Reports.
    Section 10 amends the reporting requirements in the Sudan 
Peace Act of 2002 to include sections on U.S. and NATO efforts 
to support the deployment of an expanded AU mission in Darfur, 
the performance of AMIS in Darfur, and the status of the 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Darfur Peace and 
Accountability Act. Cognizant of the fact that the U.S. 
Department of State already is overburdened with onerous and 
often overlapping reporting requirements, the Committee has 
opted to incorporate these new requirements within existing 
annual reports, rather than mandating the issuance of entirely 
new reports.
Section 11. Rule of Construction.
    Section 11 provides that nothing in this Act shall be 
construed to preempt State laws which prohibit investment of 
State pension funds in Sudan.

                        New Advisory Committees

    H.R. 3127 does not establish or authorize any new advisory 
committees.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H.R. 3127 does not apply to the legislative branch.

                            Federal Mandates

    H.R. 3127 provides no Federal mandates.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN ACT OF 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
SEC. 6. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Blocking of Assets of Appropriate Senior Officials of the 
Sudanese Government.--Beginning on the date that is 30 days 
after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall, 
consistent with the authorities granted in the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block 
the assets of appropriate senior officials of the Government of 
Sudan.
  (c) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas of Certain 
Individuals Identified by the President.--
          (1) Blocking of assets.--Beginning on the date that 
        is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the 
        Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the 
        interest of contributing to peace in Sudan, the 
        President shall, consistent with the authorities 
        granted in the International Emergency Economic Powers 
        Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets of any 
        individual who the President determines is complicit 
        in, or responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, 
        or crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the 
        family members or any associates of such individual to 
        whom assets or property of such individual was 
        transferred on or after July 1, 2002.
          (2) Restriction on visas.--Beginning on the date that 
        is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the 
        Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the 
        interest of contributing to peace in Sudan, the 
        President shall deny visas and entry to any individual 
        who the President determines is complicit in, or 
        responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or 
        crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the family 
        members or any associates of such individual to whom 
        assets or property of such individual was transferred 
        on or after July 1, 2002.
  [(c)] (d) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of 
subsection (a) or (b) if the President determines and certifies 
to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver 
is in the national interest of the United States. The President 
may waive the application of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection 
(c) with respect to an individual if the President determines 
that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United 
States and, prior to exercising the waiver, transmits to the 
appropriate congressional committees a notification which 
includes the name of the individual and the reasons for the 
waiver.
  [(d)] (e) Continuation of Restrictions.--Restrictions against 
the Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to title III 
and sections 508, 512, and 527 of the Foreign Operations, 
Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 2004 (division D of 
Public Law 108-199; 118 Stat. 143), or any other similar 
provision of law, shall remain in effect against the Government 
of Sudan and may not be lifted pursuant to such provisions of 
law unless the President transmits a certification to the 
appropriate congressional committees in accordance with 
paragraph (2) of section 12(a) of the Sudan Peace Act (as added 
by section 5(a)(1) of this Act).
  [(e)] (f) Determination.--Notwithstanding subsection (a) of 
this section, the President shall continue to transmit the 
determination required under section 6(b)(1)(A) of the Sudan 
Peace Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).

SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.

  [Notwithstanding] (a) General Assistance.--Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the President is authorized to 
provide assistance, other than military assistance, to areas 
that were outside of the control of the Government of Sudan on 
April 8, 2004, including to provide assistance for emergency 
relief, development and governance, or to implement any program 
in support of any viable peace agreement at the local, 
regional, or national level in Sudan.
  (b) Assistance to Support AMIS.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, the President is authorized to provide 
assistance, on such terms and conditions as the President may 
determine and in consultation with the appropriate 
congressional committees, to reinforce the deployment and 
operations of an expanded African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
with the mandate, size, strength, and capacity to protect 
civilians and humanitarian operations, stabilize the Darfur 
region of Sudan and dissuade and deter air attacks directed 
against civilians and humanitarian workers, including but not 
limited to providing assistance in the areas of logistics, 
transport, communications, materiel support, technical 
assistance, training, command and control, aerial surveillance, 
and intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

  SECTION 501 OF THE ASSISTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL MALARIA CONTROL ACT

SEC. 501. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.

  (a) Additional Authorities.--[Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law]
          (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
        of law, the President is authorized to undertake 
        appropriate programs using Federal agencies, 
        contractual arrangements, or direct support of 
        indigenous groups, civil administrations, agencies, or 
        organizations in [areas outside of control of the 
        Government of Sudan] southern Sudan, southern Kordofan/
        Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei in an 
        effort to provide emergency relief, promote economic 
        self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide 
        education, enhance rule of law and the development of 
        judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people 
        reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in 
        support of any viable peace agreement at the local, 
        regional, or national level in Sudan, including the 
        Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.
          (2) Congressional notification.--
                  (A) In general.--Assistance may not be 
                obligated under this subsection until 15 days 
                after the date on which the President has 
                provided notice thereof to the congressional 
                committees specified in section 634A of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-
                1) in accordance with the procedures applicable 
                to reprogramming notifications under such 
                section.
                  (B) Rule of construction.--The notification 
                requirement of subparagraph (A) shall not apply 
                in the case of assistance subject to 
                notification in accordance with section 634A of 
                the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 pursuant to 
                any provision of an Act making appropriations 
                for foreign operations, export financing, and 
                related programs.
  (b) Exception to [Export Prohibitions] Prohibitions in 
Executive Order No. 13067.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, the prohibitions set forth with respect to Sudan in 
Executive Order No. 13067 of November 3, 1997 (62 Fed. Register 
59989) shall not apply to [any export from an area in Sudan 
outside of control of the Government of Sudan, or to any 
necessary transaction directly related to that export] 
activities or related transactions with respect to southern 
Sudan, southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, 
or Abyei, if the President determines that [the export or 
related transaction, as the case may be, would directly benefit 
the economic development of that area and its people.] such 
activities or related transactions would directly benefit the 
economic recovery and development of those areas and people.
                              ----------                              

                    SECTION 8 OF THE SUDAN PEACE ACT

SEC. 8. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Report on African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).--In 
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a) and (b) 
of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report, to be prepared 
in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, on--
          (1) efforts to fully deploy the African Union Mission 
        in Sudan (AMIS) with the size, strength, and capacity 
        necessary to stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and 
        protect civilians and humanitarian operations;
          (2) the needs of AMIS to ensure success, including in 
        the areas of housing, transport, communications, 
        equipment, technical assistance, training, command and 
        control, intelligence, and such assistance as is 
        necessary to dissuade and deter attacks, including by 
        air, directed against civilians and humanitarian 
        operations;
          (3) the current level of United States assistance and 
        other assistance provided to AMIS, and a request for 
        additional United States assistance, if necessary;
          (4) the status of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
        (NATO) plans and assistance to support AMIS; and
          (5) the performance of AMIS in carrying out its 
        mission in the Darfur region.
  (d) Report on Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.--In 
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a), (b), 
and (c) of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to 
the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding 
sanctions imposed under subsections (a) through (d) of section 
6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, including--
          (1) a description of each sanction imposed under such 
        provisions of law; and
          (2) the name of the individual or entity subject to 
        the sanction, if applicable.
  [(c)] (e) Disclosure to the Public.--The Secretary of State 
shall publish or otherwise make available to the public each 
unclassified report, or portion of a report that is 
unclassified, submitted under subsection (a) or (b).

                                  
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