S. HRG. 111–701, PT. 2 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 2 

SEAPOWER 

MAY 6, 2010 

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62–156 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–701 PT. 2 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 2 

SEAPOWER 

MAY 6, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS

MAY 6, 2010

Page 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; Accompanied by VADM John T. Blake, USN, 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources; Lt. Gen. George J. Flynn, USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat 

Development and Integration ............................................................................. 6 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

THURSDAY, MAY 6, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Reed, Webb, Hagan, Sessions, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins. 

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member; and Jason W. Maroney, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; and Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Hannah I. Lloyd, and 

Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; 

Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Juliet M. Beyler 

and Gordon I. Peterson, assistants to Senator Webb; Perrin Cooke 

and Roger Pena, assistants to Senator Hagan; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator 

Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Ryan 

Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED, CHAIRMAN 

Senator REED. Let me call the hearing to order and welcome our 

witnesses—Secretary Stackley, Vice Admiral John Blake, and Lieutenant General Flynn—to the subcommittee this morning. 

I want to also recognize my colleague and the ranking member, 

Senator Wicker, and my colleague and chairman and ranking member of so many committees, Senator Collins. 

Thank you all. 

We are obviously, gentlemen, grateful for your service to the Nation and to the Navy and the Marine Corps. We want you to convey 

our appreciation to the men and women of those Services, and their 

2 

families, who serve so valiantly today and across the globe. So, 

thank you, and thank them. 

This is the first hearing I’ve held as chairman of the Seapower 

Subcommittee, and I particularly want to welcome Senator Wicker; 

Roger and I serve together as chairman and ranking member. He 

and his staff have done extraordinarily good work. I appreciate and 

look forward to continuing our efforts together. 

Since the last time the subcommittee met, the Department of Defense (DOD) has completed the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR), and released an updated 30-year shipbuilding plan. We look 

forward to the witnesses’ assessment of the QDR and the 30-year 

shipbuilding plan. 

We’d like to hear how these documents have driven the Services’ 

fiscal year 2011 budget request, and how they support and describe 

this year’s budgets decisions. 

The Navy continues to be faced with a number of critical issues 

as it tries to balance its modernization needs and procurement 

needs against the cost of current operations. The shipbuilding 

budget remains at a level where it will be difficult, at best, to field 

the Navy we want and, indeed, even the Navy that we need. 

We were very pleased to see the Department’s decision to continue budgeting for two Virginia-class submarines per year. We believe that, when the Navy and contract team have been achieving 

effects like driving down costs and reducing construction-span 

times, it should be a model for other programs in the shipbuilding 

area. 

We support the Navy’s inclusion of the cost of the Ohio replacement SSBN in its budget documents. SSBNs will remain a vital leg 

of the nuclear triad for the foreseeable future. 

These two decisions, building two attack boats per year and 

starting the Ohio replacement program, will yield significant stability to the Nation’s submarine industrial base and provide the 

Navy with a more than capable submarine fleet for many years to 

come. 

Unfortunately, the picture isn’t as rosy everywhere. We continue 

to have significant concerns in the shipbuilding area. The most notable area of concern remains in surface combatant. The Navy has 

made strides in the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since 

last year, the Navy has decided upon a winner-take-all acquisition 

strategy to procure the two fiscal year 2010 vessels, with fixedprice options for two ships per year for the next 4 years. However, 

we remain concerned about the ability of the competing shipyards 

to produce these ships on time and under the cost cap. 

We look forward to receiving more analysis during the Navy’s 

decisionmaking on large surface combatants. The restart of the 

DDG–51 program, following the truncation of the DDG–1000 program, is now underway. Although the Navy has said that the primary reason for making this change is requirements, we know that 

the Navy was also concerned about the cost of the DDG–1000. We 

remain concerned about the cost of the DDG–51s, and intend to 

keep a close eye on this program, as well as DDG–1000. 

As the Navy firms up its requirements and its understanding of 

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3 

ants, we look forward to your testimony providing the strategic 

linkage of threats, requirements, and resources. 

The subcommittee notes the Navy’s desire to utilize the DDG–51 

hull form with the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) to fulfill 

these requirements. We are concerned with the amount of redesign 

for the DDG–51 that will be needed to accommodate the AMDR. 

We have even greater concern that the radar may not be fully developed and tested in time to meet the construction schedule for 

the first fiscal year 2016 ships. 

Since this ship appears to be significantly different from even the 

restarted DDG–51, we look forward to hearing how the Department plans to use full and open competition, to the maximum extent practicable, for both the ship and the major systems on the 

ship in order to keep costs down while maximizing capabilities. 

Specifically, we expect the Navy, per longstanding requirements 

of the subcommittee, to procure ships that utilize open architecture. 

These are significant challenges, and we fear they have the potential to add great deals of instability to the Navy shipbuilding 

budget, even in the near term. If the Department of the Navy is 

unable to control its acquisition programs and drive out cost 

growth, the Navy will not be able to afford the fleet it needs to 

meet the requirements of the QDR. 

The QDR heavily emphasized the need to overcome anti-access 

capabilities and strategies that might be employed by potential adversaries. It therefore approved continuing the Expeditionary 

Fighting Vehicle (EFV). The EFV attempts to fulfill the Marine 

Corps’ requirement to swim ashore from 20 to 30 miles at sea in 

armored vehicles and execute an amphibious landing. Unfortunately, the EFV program has been another poster child for troubled 

programs, with continuing cost, schedule, and performance issues. 

While we understand the requirement, we look forward to hearing 

how the Marine Corps plans to correct the problems in the program 

and deliver this needed capability. 

In concert with this testimony on the Marine Corps’ requirements for amphibious landing capabilities, we would like to hear 

from the witnesses this afternoon how the Department intends to 

meet the Marine Corps’ naval surface fire support needs, particularly given the truncation of the DDG–1000 program that was intended to meet those needs. 

We also welcome further information on our rate of production 

of big-deck amphibious ships. At our last hearing, Chairman Levin 

noted that the Department of the Navy has had trouble defining 

the requirements for the Maritime Prepositioning Force-Future 

(MPF(F)) program. Since that time, the Navy has shifted away 

from a MPF(F) optimize for forceful entry operations, towards a 

new Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) produced and procured to enhance maritime prepositioning squadron capability. 

We’d like to hear the witnesses discuss this change and its impact on the Navy’s ability to achieve its various missions, including 

humanitarian and disaster relief. 

Finally, I’d like to note Secretary Gates’ comments at the AirSea-Space Conference this week, that we must, in his words, ‘‘be 

willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions, in light of 

4 

evolving technologies, new threats, and budget realities.’’ This subcommittee will accept his challenge. The world and technology are 

changing rapidly, and the Navy must adapt to those challenges. 

We will continue to work with the Navy and Marine Corps to ensure that our sailors and marines have not only the best equipment, but also the right equipment to succeed in today’s challenging environments. As you can see, there are some bright spots, 

but there are significant areas of concern. 

We look forward to hearing your testimony today and dealing 

with the other issues that face the Department of the Navy. 

Now I’d like to recognize Senator Wicker. 

Roger? 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your 

kind words of welcome. I look forward to this hearing. 

We have an outstanding panel, and I think they are to be commended for their selfless service to the Nation. I think we’ll have 

a very interesting hearing. 

The chair has raised a number of issues, in his opening statement, that I agree need to be debated. The fiscal year 2011 shipbuilding budget funds nine ships, including two Virginia-class submarines, two DDG–51-class destroyers, two LCSs, one LHA amphibious assault ship, an MLP, and a third joint high-speed vessel 

(JHSV), at a total cost of $13.7 billion in new ship construction. 

Against the backdrop of the President’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2011, Secretary Gates’ speech, that the chair referred to, before the Navy League Symposium on Monday of this week, makes 

our hearing today on the Navy’s shipbuilding programs particularly 

timely. Secretary Gates’ public comments force us to review longstanding assumptions about how our Navy and Marine Corps will 

project power globally and whether our long-range shipbuilding 

plans and budget are consistent with these needs, and adequate to 

meet them. 

Given the President’s budget before us, I find some of Secretary 

Gates’ comments confusing. I hope our witnesses can help clarify 

some crucial issues. For example, Secretary Gates urged the Navy 

to revisit its plans to keep 11 carrier strike groups for the next 3 

decades. He questioned what kind of amphibious launch capability 

we really need to deal with the most likely threat scenarios. How 

do these comments square with the force structure requirements 

laid out in the QDR and the 30-year shipbuilding plan recently 

submitted to Congress, which call for 11 CVNs and about 33 amphibious ships? 

Some of Secretary Gates’ comments raise questions, in terms of 

the budget for the coming year, and even more so for out-years. In 

his speech, Secretary Gates cautioned that he doesn’t foresee any 

significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget, beyond 

current assumptions. But, here are the facts: right now, we spend 

$15.8 billion on ship construction. According to the Navy’s 30-year 

shipbuilding plan, we need to spend $17.9 billion per year to sustain current submarine and surface ship construction levels. So, 

what does this mean for the future of the Navy, if the Secretary 

5 

of Defense does not think additional funds will be available to meet 

the Navy’s own plans? 

For example, the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan calls for replacement of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines and the 

multiyear procurement of 2 Virginia-class attack submarines per year. Because the ballistic missile submarines cost over $6.5 billion 

each, and the Virginia-class submarines cost around $2 billion 

each, these expenditures, alone, consume over 75 percent of the 

current shipbuilding budget. So, unless the Navy intends to increase its shipbuilding top line during this period, overall surface 

ship production would decrease to only two surface ships per year. 

Taking this into consideration, is a 313-battleship force merely lipservice? 

On the LHA amphibious assault ship program, I remain concerned about the aviation and surface lift requirements. In my 

view, both the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter and the V–22 Osprey programs present unresolved questions, in terms of their operational 

suitability on L-class ships. 

For future LHA vessels, why didn’t the Navy invest in a more 

incremental acquisition strategy, which would have us integrate 

larger hangar space into that ship as the aircraft programs that require such space ripen, while we preserve a well-deck capability for 

surface assault? 

With the many modern advances incorporated into LHD–8, I 

hoped a common hull design and maturity would create stability in 

the big deck amphibs. However, LHA–6 and LHA–7 will both be 

radically different from LHD–8. I understand there are discussions 

about changing the design of the follow-on ship to the LHA–7. 

These changes impact our ability to be as efficient with every dollar as we possibly can. 

With DOD pursuing a 33-ship amphibious fleet, as blessed by the 

QDR, rather than the Marine Corps’ original requirement for 38 

amphibious ships, I understand that the Department of the Navy 

is accepting risks. So, we need to get this right. I hope our witnesses can help us with this issue, and identify the specifics of 

these acceptable risks. 

I would also like to hear from the Marine Corps on updates with 

the long-delayed and challenged EFV, which the chair mentioned, 

especially in light of Secretary Gates’ comments on Monday. 

From the Navy, I’d like to know how they intend to go forward 

with the third DDG–1000 destroyer, now that we’ve been notified 

of critical cost growth in that program. 

In addition, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about 

the LCS competition and the status of the electromagnetic aircraft 

launch system, which would be deployed on the USS Gerald Ford. 

So, we have many issues to discuss today, and I look forward to 

the testimony of our witnesses. 

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Sessions and Senator LeMieux. 

If someone wants to make a brief comment, I’ll entertain it, but 

I think the normal procedure is to go to the witnesses and accept 

their statements for the record. 

Thank you very much. 

6 

Secretary Stackley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 

ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY VADM JOHN T. BLAKE, 

USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES; LT. GEN. GEORGE 

J. FLYNN, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, distinguished members of the 

Seapower Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you today to discuss Navy shipbuilding. 

More importantly, thank you for the steadfast support for the 

Navy and Marine Corps program, and, of course, your constant 

support for our sailors and marines. 

With the permission of the committee, I’d like to provide a brief 

statement and submit the more formal statement for the record. 

Senator REED. You have unanimous consent. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Thank you. 

Today we are a battle force of 286 ships supporting global operations with, arguably, greater reach and greater command of the 

seas than any navy at any point in history. While we take pride 

in knowing that our ships, aircraft, and weapon systems are unmatched at sea, as formidable as our technology may be, it is the 

skill, dedication, and resourcefulness of our sailors and marines 

that gives us our greatest edge. It’s our responsibility to place in 

their hands the tools that they need to win the fight we’re in and 

to return home safe. It’s our responsibility to provide the capabilities and capacities to win the next fight. 

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps have outlined those capabilities in what has been 

referred to as the 313-ship Navy. To this end, the fiscal year 2011 

budget request includes funding for nine ships, a modest, but important, step towards meeting the CNO’s and Commandant’s requirements. 

This year, we increased Virginia-class submarine procurement to 

two boats per year. In 2005, then CNO Mullen challenged the Virginia program to put the Navy in a position to be able to buy two 

boats for $4 billion in 2012. This year, with Congress’s support, 

‘‘two for four in 2012’’ has become ‘‘two for four in 2011.’’ 

In 2011 we increased DDG–51 production to two ships, which, 

alongside the Aegis modernization program, adds both capability 

and capacity to our fleet’s sea-based missile defense. 

With the competitive down-select to a single design for the LCS 

program later this year, our 2011 budget request sustains an efficient build rate of two LCSs per year for the winning shipyard. 

Congress’s support for this revised acquisition strategy, which includes opening competition for a second builder in 2012, has been 

critical to the Navy’s efforts to bring much-needed stability and improved affordability for this program. 

With this year’s request, we increase our amphibious lift capability with procurement of an LHA–6 amphibious assault ship and 

our logistics lift capability with procurement of an MLP and a 

7 

JHSV. Additionally, a second JHSV is funded in Other Procurement Army, for a total of 10 ships in fiscal year 2011. 

As we look to the near term, the Navy shipbuilding plan averages 10 ships per year, while balancing requirements, affordability, 

and industrial-based considerations in the next decade. Specifically, 

we have placed aircraft carrier procurement on a 5-year cycle, 

which will ensure our ability to sustain an 11-carrier force from the 

delivery of Gerald R. Ford, in 2015, through 2040. We sustained 

submarine construction at two boats per year, average, for the next 

quarter century. We’ve canceled the CG(X) program, because of 

technical risk and affordability concerns, and we will continue 

DDG–51 construction, leveraging a stable and mature design and 

infrastructure, while increasing the ship’s air and missile defense 

capabilities through spiral upgrades to the weapons and ship sensor suites. We’ve restructured the maritime prepositioning force to 

provide enhanced yet affordable sea-basing capabilities. 

In the second half of this decade, we will need to proceed with 

recapitalization of three major ship programs. We plan to commence procurement of the replacement for the LSD–41-class amphibious ships, following the definition of lift requirements. 

We look to accelerate introduction of our next fleet oiler, the T– 

AOX. The T–AOX will bring greater efficiency and modern commercial design to our refueling-at-sea capabilities, while also providing 

critical stability to an important sector of our industrial base. 

Most significantly, we’ll procure the lead ship of the Ohio-class 

replacement, SSBN(X), in 2019. 

The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan fairly outlines the challenges we confront today. For the long term, in meeting our Navy’s 

force structure requirements, operational, technical, manufacturing, and fiscal challenges all come to bear as we impose upon 

the plan greater cost realism and budget realism. In the most pragmatic terms, in balancing requirements, risks, and realistic budgets, affordability controls our numbers. 

So, to this end, we’re focusing on bringing stability to the shipbuilding program, adjusting our sights to find the affordable 80 

percent solution, when 80 percent meets the need: working across 

our systems commands to improve the quality of our cost and 

schedule estimates that inform our requirements decisions; placing 

greater emphasis on competition and fixed-price contracts. We’re 

continuing to improve our ability to affordably deliver combat capability to the fleet through open architecture. We’re clamping down 

on contract design changes, and we have canceled high-risk programs. 

Our goals for mounting today’s force and recapitalizing the fleet 

affordably cannot be accomplished without strong performance by 

our industrial partners. So, it’s essential that we have a clear understanding of the issues affecting their performance. So, we’re 

building upon past studies this year, with assessment of our shipyards, the vendor base, and the design-industrial base, with an eye 

towards capability, capacity, and productivity requirements needed 

by our Navy, near-term and far-term. 

In the end, industry must perform. We’ll work to benchmark performance, to identify where improvements are necessary, to provide 

8 

the proper incentives, and to reward sustained strong performance 

with favorable terms and conditions. 

To meet our objectives, we must be smart buyers. We’ve gone far, 

in the course of the past year, to reverse the downsizing trend of 

the acquisition workforce. From supervisors of shipbuilding to the 

warfare centers, systems commands, and program executive offices, 

we’ve added professionals in the fields of systems engineering, 

manufacturing, program management, contracts, cost-estimating, 

and test and evaluation. Of course, we have much farther to go. 

The objective is not merely to increase the workforce, but to restore core competencies that have slipped loose in the course of the 

past decade and a half of downsizing. 

In sum, the Department is committed to building the fleet required to support the national defense strategy, to which the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request addresses near-term capabilities while 

also laying the foundation for long-term requirements. Ultimately, 

we recognize that, as we balance requirements, affordability, and 

industrial-base considerations, it is vital that we, the Navy and industry, improve affordability within our programs in order to 

achieve a balance that gives greater favor to requirements in the 

industrial base. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stackley, Admiral Blake, 

and General Flynn follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, VADM JOHN T. BLAKE, USN, AND LT. GEN. GEORGE J. FLYNN, USMC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Wicker, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address Navy shipbuilding. The Department is committed to the effort to build an affordable fleet tailored to support the National Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and the new 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The Department’s fiscal year 2011 budget 

will provide platforms that are multi-capable, agile, and able to respond to the dynamic nature of current and future threats. The fiscal year 2011 shipbuilding budget funds nine ships, including two Virginia-class fast attack submarines, two DDG– 

51 class destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) including economic order 

quantity for seven ships sets, an Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA), a Mobile Landing 

Platform and the third Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) for the Navy. Additionally, 

a second fiscal year 2011 JHSV is funded in Other Procurement, Army for a total 

of 10 ships in fiscal year 2011. 

As we continue to build our future force, we remain engaged in operations in Afghanistan and in the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. 

Since last year, the Marine Corps has transferred authority for Anbar Province 

to the U.S. Army. From 2003–2009, our force levels in Iraq averaged 25,000 marines. Our mission in Iraq is complete and your marines have redeployed. 

In Afghanistan, the mission has expanded. Since July, the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade has conducted Operation Khanjar, the most significant Marine 

Corps operation since the battle of Fallujah in 2004, and the largest helicopter insertion since the Vietnam War. As of September 22, 2009, there were more marines 

in Afghanistan than in Iraq. In December, they conducted Operation Cobra’s Anger 

in the vicinity of Now Zad and recently the First and Third Battalions, Sixth Marines conducted a major offensive to secure Marja. There is now a robust Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force of 19,400 personnel with equipment, commanded by a Marine two-star general in Afghanistan. Your marines and sailors have already had 

success and have made a difference in some of the toughest regions of Afghanistan, 

primarily Helmand Province in the south—the source of the highest volume of 

opium production in the world. However, more work remains to be done. 

For the second year in a row, the Navy has more sailors on the ground than at 

sea in CENTCOM. At sea, we have more than 9,000 sailors, including a U.S. Navy 

aircraft carrier and air wing dedicated to providing 24/7 air support to U.S. and coaVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:07 Feb 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62156.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
9 

lition forces on the ground and ships supporting counterterrorism, theater security 

and security force assistance operations. Navy riverine forces are on their sixth deployment to Iraq, conducting interdiction patrols and training their Iraqi counterparts. On the ground, we have more than 12,000 Active and Reserve sailors supporting Navy, Joint Force, and combatant commander requirements. Navy commanders lead 6 of the 12 U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. 

We have doubled the presence of our SEABEE construction battalions in Afghanistan, increasing our capacity to build forward bases for U.S. forces and critical infrastructure in that country. Our Naval Special Warfare forces continue to be heavily 

engaged in direct combat operations and our explosive ordnance disposal teams continue to conduct lifesaving counter-Improvised Explosive Device operations. As we 

shift our effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, demand for Navy individual augmentees 

(IAs) has increased. We have additional IAs supporting the surge of U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan while our IAs in Iraq remain at current levels to support the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, maintain detention facilities and critical infrastructure, and support coalition efforts until the operations and support they provide can 

be turned over to Iraqi forces. 

While Iraq and Afghanistan continue to be the primary focus of our Nation’s military efforts, our Navy remains globally present and engaged to protect our partners 

and advance our Nation’s interests around the world. Approximately 40 percent of 

our Fleet is currently underway, providing U.S. presence in every region of the 

world. Our Fleet is executing all the capabilities of our Maritime Strategy today. 

Our ballistic missile submarines are providing nuclear deterrence year-round, 

while our Aegis cruisers and destroyers are providing conventional deterrence in the 

form of ballistic missile defense (BMD) of our allies and partners in Europe, the 

Mediterranean, and the Western Pacific. Our carrier strike groups and amphibious 

ready groups continue to prevent conflict and deter aggression in the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf, and Indian Ocean, while their forward deployments afford the 

United States the ability to influence events abroad and the opportunity to rapidly 

respond to crisis. 

Our Navy continues to confront irregular challenges associated with regional instability, insurgency, crime, and violent extremism at sea, in the littorals, and on 

shore as we have done throughout our history. We are partnering with U.S. Coast 

Guard law enforcement teams in the Caribbean to conduct counter-narcotics and 

anti-trafficking operations and deny traffickers use of the sea for profit and exploitation. 

We continue to strengthen our relationships and build the capabilities of our 

international partners through maritime security activities, such as global maritime 

partnership stations in Africa, South America, and Southeast Asia, and high-end 

training and operations with partners in the Western Pacific. Our ships continue 

to conduct counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia with an international 

presence that includes traditional and nontraditional partners, such as China and 

Russia. 

We provided humanitarian assistance and disaster response to Haiti after a 7.0- 

magnitude earthquake devastated the Nation. Within hours of the earthquake, we 

mobilized the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN–70) with over a dozen helicopters, cargo aircraft, and extensive potable water-generating capability. The USS 

Bataan Amphibious Ready Group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, the 

USS Nassau Amphibious Ready Group with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, 

and the USS Gunston Hall immediately responded to stabilize the increasingly volatile environment. This force included over 4,300 marines and sailors, 7 amphibious 

ships, 28 tilt rotor/rotary wing aircraft, multiple ship-to-shore landing craft, and significant medical, engineering, construction, and sustainment capability. Additional 

naval assistance included complementary sustainment and command and control capabilities along with a SEABEE construction detachment, our hospital ship USNS 

Comfort with medical personnel and supplies, a Navy dive and salvage team, P–3 

surveillance aircraft; several surface ships with helicopters, Maritime Prepositioning 

Force ships with military and interagency supplies and equipment, and Military 

Sealift Command ships with fuel and cargo. Our disaster relief effort continues as 

part of a comprehensive U.S. Government and nongovernmental organization response. 

Global demand for Navy forces remains high and continues to rise because of the 

ability of our maritime forces to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military impediments to access while bringing the persistence, flexibility and agility to conduct 

operations from the sea. 

The Department has updated the Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan based upon the 

313-ship force originally set forth in the last Naval Force Structure Assessment, as 

amended by the Secretary of Defense decisions, and the 2010 QDR. As such, the 

10 

plan is designed to provide the global reach; persistent presence; and strategic, operational, and tactical effects expected of naval forces within reasonable levels of funding. The plan balances the demands for naval forces from the National Command 

Authority and combatant commanders with expected future resources. The plan 

takes into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding 

design and industrial base and uses realistic cost estimates for the ships. 

In the near-term from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2020, the Department of the 

Navy begins to ramp up production of ships necessary to support persistent presence, maritime security, irregular warfare, joint sealift, humanitarian assistance, 

disaster relief, and partnership building missions, namely the LCS and the JHSV. 

At the same time, the Department continues production of large surface combatants 

and attack submarines, as well as amphibious landing, combat logistics force, and 

support ships. Yearly shipbuilding spending during this period averages $14.5 billion (fiscal year 2010$), or about $1.5 billion less than the 30-year average. The 

overall size of the battle force begins a steady climb, reaching 315 ships by fiscal 

year 2020. 

In the mid-term planning period, from fiscal year 2021 to fiscal year 2030, the 

recapitalization plan for the current fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) inventory begins to fully manifest itself. Current plans call for 12 new Ohio-class replacement submarines (SSBN(X)) with life-of-the-hull nuclear reactor cores to replace the 

existing 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. Advance procurement funds for detail design for the 

first SSBN(X) begins in fiscal year 2015, and the first boat in the class must be procured in fiscal year 2019 to ensure that 12 operational ballistic missile submarines 

will be available to perform the vital strategic deterrent mission. Eight more SSBNs 

will be procured between fiscal year 2021 and fiscal year 2030 (with the final three 

coming in the next planning period, beyond fiscal year 2031). Because of the high 

expected costs for these important national assets, yearly shipbuilding expenditures 

during the mid-term planning period will average about $17.9 billion (CY 2010$) per 

year, or about $2 billion more than the steady-state 30-year average. Even at this 

elevated funding level, however, the total number of ships built per year will decline 

because of the percentage of the shipbuilding account which must be allocated for 

the procurement of the SSBN. Recognizing these impacts, we are looking at various 

ways to control the cost of these ships, including leveraging technology and lessons 

learned from the highly successful Virginia SSN shipbuilding program and by considering sustainment issues earlier in the design process than we have in the past. 

In the far-term, from fiscal year 2031 to fiscal year 2040, average shipbuilding ex- penditures fall back to an average level of about $15.3 billion (fiscal year 2010$) per 

year. Moreover, after the production run of Ohio replacement SSBNs comes to an 

end in fiscal year 2033, the average number of ships built per year begins to rebound. 

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

The Navy remains firmly committed to maintaining a force of 11 carriers for the 

next 3 decades. With last year’s commissioning of USS George H.W. Bush (CVN– 

77) and inactivation of the 48-year-old USS Kitty Hawk (CV–63), our last conventionally powered aircraft carrier, we have an all-nuclear-powered carrier force for 

the first time. Our carriers are best known for their unmistakable forward presence, 

ability to deter potential adversaries and assure our allies, and capacity to project 

power at sea and ashore; however, they are equally capable of providing our other 

core capabilities of sea control, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and 

disaster response. Our carriers provide our Nation the ability to rapidly and decisively respond globally to crises with a small footprint that does not impose unnecessary political or logistic burdens upon our allies or potential partners. 

Our 11-carrier force structure is based on world-wide presence requirements, 

surge availability, training and exercises, and maintenance. During the period between the November 2012 inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN–65) and the commissioning of Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78), the Navy will utilize the congressional 

waiver for a 10 carrier fleet. We will continue to meet operational commitments during this 33-month period by carefully managing carrier deployment and maintenance cycles. After the commissioning of CVN–78, we will maintain an 11 carrier 

force through the continued refueling program for Nimitz-class ships and the delivery of our Ford-class carriers at 5-year intervals starting in 2020. 

CVN–78 

The Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78) is the lead ship of our first new class of aircraft 

carrier in nearly 40 years. Ford-class carriers will be the premier forward deployed 

asset for crisis response and early decisive striking power in a major combat operation. They incorporate the latest technology, including an innovative new flight 

11 

deck design to provide greater operational flexibility, reduced manning requirements, and the ability to operate all current and future naval aircraft. Among the 

new technologies being integrated is the electromagnetic aircraft launch system 

(EMALS) which will support Ford’s increased sortie generation rates. EMALS is 

moving from having been a promising technology to a proven operational capability, 

which will deliver the warfighting enhancement needed in the future. Recently, the 

program successfully demonstrated a controlled launch sequence with the full-scale 

EMALS production representative unit and an aircraft launch demonstration is 

scheduled for later this summer. EMALS’ production schedule supports delivery of 

CVN–78 in September 2015. 

THE SUBMARINE FLEET

Our attack and guided missile submarines have a unique capability for stealth 

and persistent operation in an access-denied environment and to act as a force multiplier by providing high-quality intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

as well as indication and warning of potential hostile action. In addition, attack submarines are effective in anti-surface ship warfare and anti-submarine warfare in almost every environment, thus eliminating any safe-haven that an adversary might 

pursue with access-denial systems. As such, they represent a significant conventional deterrent. While our attack submarine fleet provides considerable strike capacity already, our guided missile submarines provide significantly more strike capacity and a more robust capability to covertly deploy Special Operations Force personnel. Today, the Navy requires 48 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines (SSGN) to sustain our capabilities in these areas. The Navy is studying alternatives to sustain the capability that our SSGNs bring to the battle force when 

these ships begin retirement in 2026. 

Virginia-Class SSN 

The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that dominates in the 

littorals and open oceans. Now in its 13th year of construction, the Virginia program 

is demonstrating that this critical undersea capability can be delivered affordably 

and on time. These ships will begin construction at a rate of two per year in 2011, 

with two ship deliveries per year beginning in 2017. The Navy will attempt to mitigate the impending attack submarine force structure gap in the 2020s through three 

parallel efforts: reducing the construction span of Virginia-class submarines, extending the service lives of selected attack submarines, and extending the length of selected attack submarine deployments. One of the critical aspects of this mitigation 

plan is achieving and sustaining a construction rate of two Virginia-class submarines per year. The Navy continues to realize a return from investments in the 

Virginia cost reduction program and construction process improvements through upgraded shipbuilder performance on each successive ship. Not only are these submarines coming in within budget and ahead of schedule, their performance is exceeding expectations and continues to improve with each ship delivered. Additionally, three of the five commissioned ships completed initial deployments prior to 

their post shakedown availabilities. 

Ballistic Missile Submarines 

Our ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable leg of the Nation’s strategic arsenal and provide the Nation’s only day-to-day assured nuclear response capability. They provide survivable nuclear strike capabilities to assure allies, deter 

potential adversaries, and, if needed, respond in kind. The number of these submarines was delineated by the Nuclear Posture Review 2001 which established the 

requirement of a force comprised of 12 operational SSBNs (with 2 additional in overhaul at any time). Because the Ohio SSBNs will begin retiring in fiscal year 2027, 

their recapitalization must start in fiscal year 2019 to ensure operational submarines will be available to replace these vital assets as they leave operational service. As a result, the procurement plan in this report supports a minimum inventory 

of 12 SSBNs for this force. 

Submarine Modernization 

As threats evolve, it is vital to continue to modernize existing submarines with 

updated capabilities. The submarine modernization program includes advances in 

weapons, integrated combat control systems, sensors, open architecture, and necessary hull, mechanical and electrical upgrades. These upgrades are necessary to retain credible capabilities for the future conflicts and current peacetime ISR and indication and warning missions and to continue them on the path of reaching their full 

service life. Maintaining the stability of the modernization program is critical to our 

future Navy capability and capacity. 

12 

SURFACE COMBATANTS

As in the past, cruisers and destroyers will continue to deploy with strike groups 

to fulfill their traditional roles. Many will be required to assume additional roles 

within the complex BMD arena. Ships that provide BMD will sometimes be stationed in remote locations, away from strike groups, in a role as theater BMD assets. The net result of these changes to meet demands for forward presence, strike 

group operations and BMD places additional pressure on the existing inventory of 

surface combatants, currently base-lined at 88. While a new force structure analysis 

may require the Navy to procure a greater number of these ships, we will also have 

to consider redistributing assets currently being employed for missions of lesser priority for these new missions as a result of the 2010 QDR and the President’s commitment to supporting the missile defense of our European allies. 

In the Navy’s fiscal year 2009 shipbuilding report, the lead CG(X) guided missile 

cruiser was planned to start in fiscal year 2011. This ship was to fulfill a critical 

role in integrated air and missile defenses (IAMD); but due to the ship’s projected 

high cost and immaturity of its combat systems technology and still evolving joint 

BMD architecture, the Navy has determined that it is not feasible to continue to 

pursue a new-design CG(X) procurement program. Instead, we intend to deliver 

highly capable, multi-mission ships tailored for IAMD by spiraling the DDG–51 program into the next future destroyer, DDG Flight III. This preferred approach will 

develop the Air and Missile Defense Radar and install it on a DDG–51 hull with 

the necessary hull, power, cooling, and combat systems upgrades. The installation 

of this ‘‘family of systems’’ upgrade to the existing DDG–51 class will define the 

third flight of these ships. The warfighting analysis completed for CG(X) directly 

supports requirements development for this upgraded DDG–51 which is envisioned 

to be procured in fiscal year 2016. 

DDG–51 

To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship missiles along with 

deep-water submarine threats, we have restarted production of the Arleigh Burke- class destroyer DDG–51 Flight IIA series. The first ship of the restart, DDG–113, 

was funded in fiscal year 2010 and the contract is expected to be awarded this summer. This budget procures an additional two ships in fiscal year 2011. These ships 

will incorporate integrated air and missile defense, providing much-needed BMD capacity to the Fleet. They will also leverage the maturity of the DDG modernization 

program and include all associated hull, mechanical and electrical alterations. We 

will continue production of the DDG–51 in order to leverage the hot production line 

to spiral the DDG–51 to address future IAMD capabilities. 

The DDG–51 class, starting with the Flight IIA restart, will continue to be upgraded in order to deliver the best combination of capability and capacity to meet 

future threats. This approach leverages the cost-savings of existing production lines; 

reduces total owner ship costs due to predictable designs; reduces cost overruns and 

delays through the incremental, or evolutionary, approach of developing new technologies; and it strengthens and stabilizes the industrial base to more efficiently and 

cost effectively produce ships to meet our national needs. 

Littoral Combat Ship 

The Navy remains committed to procuring 55 LCSs. LCS expands the battle space 

by complementing our inherent blue water capability. LCS fills warfighting gaps in 

support of maintaining dominance in the littorals and strategic choke points around 

the world. The LCS program capabilities address specific and validated capability 

gaps in mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. The 

concept of operations and design specifications for LCS were developed to meet 

these gaps with focused mission packages that deploy manned and unmanned vehicles to execute a variety of missions. LCS design characteristics (speed, agility, shallow draft, payload capacity, reconfigurable mission spaces, air/water craft capabilities) combined with its core command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, sensors, and weapons systems, make it an ideal platform for engaging in 

irregular warfare and maritime security operations. 

Affordability remains the key factor to acquiring the needed future capacity of 

this highly flexible and capable ship. To stay on path to deliver this ship in the 

quantities needed, we announced this past September that we will down select between the two LCS designs in fiscal year 2010. We have assessed the combat capabilities of both these ships and believe that either ship would meet all of the key 

performance parameters for this class. While each ship brings unique strengths and 

capabilities to the mission and each has been designed in accordance with overarching objectives for reducing total ownership cost. On balance, they produce essentially equivalent results across the broad spectrum of missions assigned. Therefore, 

13 

the down select will be based largely upon procurement cost considerations. The selected industry team will deliver a quality technical data package, allowing the 

Navy to open competition for a second shipyard to build the selected design beginning in fiscal year 2012. The winner of the down select will be awarded a contract 

for up to 10 ships from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014, and also provide 

combat systems for up to 5 additional ships built by the second shipyard. This decision was reached after careful review of previous fiscal year 2010 industry bids, consideration of total program costs, and discussions with Congress. In addition to the 

funding required for two seaframes in fiscal year 2011, our fiscal year 2011 budget 

includes an additional $280 million for economic order quantity for seven ships sets 

to continue the block buy which is essential to lowering the per unit costs of the 

seaframes. We request your continued support as we take the measures necessary 

to deliver this much needed capability at the capacity we need to meet future demands. 

DDG–1000 

The DDG–1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally crewed, 

multi-mission surface combatant designed to fulfill long-range, precision land attack 

requirements. The first DDG–1000 is under construction, with plans for three ships 

in the class. There is a validated operational requirements document which specifies 

that naval surface fires will be necessary to support combat operations across the 

beach. The DDG–1000 features two 155mm advanced gun systems capable of engaging targets with the long-range land attack projectile at a range of over 63nm. In 

addition to providing offensive, distributed and precision fires in support of forces 

ashore, it will provide valuable lessons in advanced technology such as signature reduction, active and passive self-defense systems, and enhanced survivability features. Overall, construction of DDG–1000 is approximately 20 percent complete and 

is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2013 with the initial operating capability in 

fiscal year 2015. 

Modernization 

As threats evolve it is vital to modernize existing ships with updated capabilities. 

Capable ships, supported by an effective industrial base, have been the decisive element during war, crisis response, and peace-time operations for more than two centuries. The destroyer and cruiser modernization program includes advances in 

standard missiles, integrated air and missile defense, open architecture, and necessary hull, mechanical and electrical upgrades. These upgrades are necessary to retain credible capabilities for future conflicts, including BMD, and to continue them 

on the path of reaching their full service life. Maintaining the stability of the cruiser 

and destroyer modernization program is critical to our future Navy capability and 

capacity. 

The DDG Modernization Program is planned to execute in two 6-month availabilities; hull mechanical and electrical first, followed by combat systems 2 years later. 

The program focuses on the Flight I and II ships (hulls 51–78), commencing in fiscal 

year 2010. However, all ships of the class will be modernized at midlife. Key tenets 

of the DDG Modernization program include: upgrade of the Aegis Weapons System 

to include an Open Architecture (OA) computing environment; upgrade of the SPY 

radar signal processor; addition of BMD capability; Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 

(ESSM); the upgraded SQQ–89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system; the SM–6 

Missile; and improved air dominance with processing upgrades with the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC–CA) capability. 

The Cruiser Modernization Program is designed to modernize all remaining cruisers. The first fully modernized cruiser, USS Bunker Hill (CG–52), was completed in 

June 2009. The key aspects of the Cruiser Modernization program include: upgrade 

of the Aegis weapons system to include an open architecture (OA) computing environment; addition of Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM); SPQ–9B radar; Close In 

Weapon System Block 1B; upgraded SQQ–89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system; 

and improved air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire 

Control-Counter Air. Six cruisers will receive an additional BMD upgrade. Our fiscal 

year 2011 budget includes funds to execute the modernization of three cruisers and 

three destroyers. 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS

These ships provide distributed forward presence to support a wide range of missions from theater security cooperation and humanitarian assistance to conventional 

deterrence and assuring access for the Joint Force. When necessary, our forward 

postured amphibious forces can aggregate with others surged from homeports or 

other global locations to conduct major combat operations. The number of amphibVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:07 Feb 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62156.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
14 

ious ships in the Department’s inventory is critically important for overcoming geographic, diplomatic, and military challenges to access in permission, uncertain, or 

hostile environments. 

The Navy and Marine Corps have determined a minimum force of 33 ships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship amphibious force requirement for the assault echelon in a 2 Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) forcible 

entry operation. A 33-ship force comprised of 11 LHA/D amphibious assault ships 

and a mix of 11 LPD–17 amphibious transport docks and 11 LSD(X) dock landing 

ships will be sufficient to support forcible entry operations with acceptable risk in 

the speed of arrival of combat support elements of the MEB. 

LPD–17 Class Amphibious Warfare Ship 

The LPD–17 San Antonio class of amphibious warfare ships represents the Navy’s 

commitment to an expeditionary, power projection and engagement fleet capable of 

operating across the full spectrum of warfare. The class has a 40-year expected service life and serves as the replacement for four classes of older ships: the LKA, LST, 

LSD–36, and the LPD–4. San Antonio class ships play a key role in supporting ongoing overseas operations by forward deploying marines and their equipment to respond to global crises. USS New York (LPD–21) commissioned last November and 

to date, two LPD–17 ships have completed initial deployments. The 11th LPD is 

planned for procurement in fiscal year 2012. 

LHA Replacement (LHA(R)) 

LHA(R) is the replacement for our Tarawa class ships that will reach the end of 

their already extended service life between 2011–2015. LHA(R) will provide flexible, 

multi-mission amphibious capabilities that span the range of military operations 

from forcible entry to humanitarian and disaster relief. LHA(R) will leverage the 

LHD–8 design while providing modifications that remove the well deck and increase 

aviation capacity to better accommodate aircraft in the future Marine Corps aviation combat element (ACE), such as the short take-off vertical landing Joint Strike 

Fighter and the MV–22. We laid the keel of the lead ship, USS America (LHA–6) 

in July 2009 and our fiscal year 2011 budget includes funds for one LHA(R) which 

is split-funded in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. 

MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (FUTURE)

The MPF(F) concept envisioned a forward-deployed squadron of ships to enable 

rapid closure to areas of interest, at-sea assembly, and tactical employment of forces 

to areas of interest in the event of crisis. Although useful in the lower end of the 

war-fighting spectrum, this squadron was primarily designed for use in major combat operations. Due to refocusing of priorities and cost, this program has been restructured and replaced with alternatives which enhance the existing capabilities of 

the Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadrons. While the MPF(F) program 

originally intended for this purpose has been truncated in this year’s program, the 

creation of a support program has been added to enable development of the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures required to fully exploit this mission area in the future. 

Ships previously discussed in the context of the MPF(F) are moved to the command 

and support section for battle force accounting. In addition, the Navy has determined the LHA–6 class amphibious assault ships previously designated for the 

MPF(F) would better serve the Navy and Marine Corps in the assault echelon force 

where they could be employed in joint forcible-entry operations. As such, the requirement for these ships has been moved to the amphibious warfare category. 

In support of this enhanced MPS concept of operations, three T–AKE auxiliary 

dry cargo ships have been shifted to provide logistic support to Marine Corps units 

ashore. Further, the Navy recognizes the need to provide for at-sea transfer of vehicles from a cargo ship and to provide an interface with landing craft air-cushioned 

vessels (both key capabilities the MPF(F) program was to provide). The Navy intends to procure three Mobile Landing Platforms (MLPs) to fulfill this capability. 

The planned MLPs, a lower cost variant of the MPF(F) MLP program, will be based 

on an Alaska-class crude oil carrier modified to be a float-on/float-off vessel. These 

ships will provide concept validation, operational testing and an incremental operational capability. Operationally, the three current MPS Squadrons will have an additional MLP and an additional T–AKE to supplement the current maritime 

prepositioning force in order to better provide in-theater capability to support resupplying a MEB. 

JOINT HIGH-SPEED VESSEL

The JHSV provides high-speed support vessels for the Army and the Navy. JHSV 

will be an effective alternative to move assets throughout marginally developed theVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:07 Feb 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62156.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
15 

aters of operation while also requiring a less well developed port facility than is the 

case for today’s principal lift assets. In addition, its relatively shallower draft permits operation in a greater number of port facilities around the globe. The combination of these attributes permits rapid transport of medium size payloads over intratheater distances to austere ports, and load/offload without reliance on well developed, heavy port infrastructure. Combatant commanders have made clear to the 

Navy their desire for this niche capability that can execute unique operations with 

partner nations throughout each of their areas of responsibility. 

SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRIAL BASE

Beyond balancing requirements and resources, the fiscal year 2011 President’s 

budget submission for shipbuilding also weighs the shipbuilding industrial base. 

The Navy’s plan leverages stable designs to minimize disruption experienced over 

past decade of ‘‘first of class’’ construction. The plan provides stable procurement 

rates within constraints of requirements and budget which allows industry to plan 

and invest in facilities and process improvements to drive learning and efficiencies 

into serial production. The fiscal year 2011 shipbuilding plan ensures that major 

suppliers have ‘‘base’’ workload and opportunity to compete for future ship construction. As an example, the revised LCS acquisition strategy creates opportunity for 

our major shipbuilders to compete for future workload that was previously limited 

to incumbents. The Navy intends to sustain dual sources for fast attack submarines, 

surface combatants, LCSs, and amphibious/auxiliary ships. 

The Navy continues to promote efficiency within the shipbuilding industry. The 

Navy has expanded use of competition and fixed-price contracts; incentivized shipyards to improve facilities through contract incentives, selective release of retentions, and Hurricane Katrina infrastructure funding; cracked down on contract 

changes; and judiciously employed multiyear authority, block buy authority and economic order quantity to show commitment to stable production. 

Finally the Navy has initiated a Shipbuilding Industrial Base Study to review capabilities/capacities of the shipyards including design and production; the health of 

the vendor base, and trends in rates and overhead, productivity, and investment 

strategies. This study will inform Navy’s fiscal year 2012 budget deliberations. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

The Department has embarked on a deliberate plan to increase the size of the 

DoN acquisition workforce by at least 5,000 employees over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), or about a 12 percent increase. We started last year and aggressively increased our acquisition workforce based upon bottoms-up requirements 

from our PEOs, systems commands, and warfare centers. In the last 15 months, for 

example, we have added 400 acquisition personnel (journeyman and high-grade) to 

support shipbuilding programs at the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, we 

have added over 900 acquisition personnel to our warfare centers across the country, that provide critical engineering, integration support, testing, and contracting 

oversight to all of our sea, air, land, space acquisition programs. These personnel 

are critical since they represent a part of the pipeline of future program managers 

and senior systems engineers. 

We have also taken advantage of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development 

Fund (DAWDF), initiated by Congress, and added nearly 300 acquisition interns 

this past year, and are on target to bring aboard an additional 500 this year and 

next. About 30 percent of our DAWDF acquisition workforce hires are now in shipbuilding organizations. We have also improved our education and training programs 

in two critical areas of need—shipbuilding program management and contracting. 

We have used DAWDF funds to pilot a shipbuilding program manager’s course that 

was successful enough that we are moving it permanently to our Defense Acquisition University program. In addition, because of the difficulty in hiring experienced 

contracting officers, we have implemented an intense accelerated contracting training program at the Naval Sea Systems Command to increase the number of qualified contracting officers as well as increase retention rates among this important 

group. It will take several years to rebuild and rebalance the DoN’s acquisition 

workforce, but these measures and continuing them with this budget is an important step. 

These acquisition workforce initiatives are supportive of DOD’s high priority performance goal to ‘‘Reform the DOD Acquisition Process’’ in the President’s Analytic 

Perspectives volume (page 78) of his fiscal year 2011 budget which includes these 

performance measures: 

16 

• By 2011, DOD will decrease reliance on contract services in acquisition 

functions by increasing the in-house civilian and/or military workforce by 

4,765 authorizations for personnel. 

• By 2011, DOD will increase the total number of DOD civilian and military personnel performing acquisition functions by 10,025 personnel (end 

strength). 

Navy’s other acquisition initiatives described in this testimony are supportive of 

the other performance measures in DOD’s high priority performance goal to ‘‘Reform 

the DOD Acquisition Process.’’ 

SUMMARY

The Navy’s Long Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels addresses the 

requirements in support the National Defense Strategy, the Maritime Strategy, and 

the new 2010 QDR. The plan sustains an 11-CVN force from 2015 through 2045; 

increases Virginia-class build rates to two submarines per year; increases air and 

missile defense capability with continued DDG–51 construction and Aegis modernization; increases amphibious lift capability with LHA–7 procurement in fiscal 

year 2011 and the 11th LPD in fiscal year 2012; increases intratheater lift capability with increased JHSV procurement; and continues Ohio-class replacement design and development by funding research and development efforts within the FYDP 

as well as advance procurement funds for detail design in fiscal year 2015. 

Through the Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels, the Navy has addressed affordability. The plan continues DDG–51 construction to leverage a stable design, mature 

infrastructure, and affordable capabilities. The Navy cancelled CG(X) and truncated 

DDG–1000 procurement at three ships and consolidated construction in a single 

shipyard. The Navy plans to transition DDG–1000 technologies and has aligned 

CG(X) Research and Development funding to the DDG–51 platform including development of the air and missile defense radar. The Navy intends to down select to 

a single LCS design which leverages competition, commonality, and efficient construction rates. The Navy has restructured the Maritime Prepositioning Force by 

continuing development of enhanced seabasing capabilities for the Maritime 

Prepositioning Squadrons. We have directed the LHA(R) ships to the amphibious 

force and intend to augment with MPS squadrons with a T–AKE, Mobile Landing 

Platform, and an existing large medium speed roll-on/roll-off ship. The Mobile Landing Platform will leverage an existing commercial design. The Navy has also increased the emphasis for meeting and extending service lives of in-service ships. We 

are sustaining the CG/DDG Modernization efforts and are targeting extension of the 

more capable DDG–51 Flight IIA ships to 40 year. We have deferred command ship 

replacement and intend to sustain the current command ships until 2029. 

The Navy has addressed realism in the Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels by incorporating realistic budget projections in the near- and mid-term and realistically 

estimating the long term. In addition, in this year’s plan the Navy has included the 

estimated funding for the Ohio-class replacement program during the mid-term period. 

Finally the Navy has addressed the industrial base in leveraging stable designs 

to minimize disruption experience with first of class constructions, provides stable 

production rates within the constraints of requirements and budget and ensures 

major shipbuilders have base workload and opportunities to compete for future ship 

construction. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Secretary Stackley. 

I presume that Admiral Blake’s and General Flynn’s statements 

that are included in the record are sufficient. 

Admiral BLAKE. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Fine. 

Let me just begin a 7-minute round, and I anticipate also having 

a second round. 

Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, the Navy’s surface ship 

plan is basically divided into three periods: near-term, mid-term, 

and long-term. It’s my understanding that, when in the near term, 

one of the driving forces is the Hull Radar Study, which some people have concluded suggests the approach is to buy a heavily modified DDG–51, and then add the yet-to-be-developed AMDR. 

17 

Just two questions. If the AMDR—which is currently being developed—is not ready for the fiscal year 2016 ship cycle, what are 

your plans? Mr. Secretary or Admiral Blake? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me start. 

Prior to the Hull Radar Study, we had initiated the AMDR, not 

a program at the time, but technology development, recognizing 

that this is the capability we believe we need to drive to, to be able 

to bring the ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability that the fleet 

needs in the back half of this decade. 

That technology development was initiated a year-plus ago. We 

made a conscious decision, at the front end, to leverage competition, to the extent practical. We have three very capable competitors for that systems development. So, we are sustaining competition on the front end as we go through, today, technology development, going to ultimate system delivery. 

As we did the Hull Radar Study in the course of 2009, we attacked this a couple of different ways. First, we put together a core 

team to do the study, which comprised our warfare centers, our 

program offices, and our systems commands. Then we wrapped 

that with outside experts, in the form of the Applied Physics Lab, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Labs to, one, identify the right technology for the threat; two, determine how much 

capability is required; and, three, look at the technical viability and 

feasibility of the schedules that we are driving to. 

The outcome of that study was that both the core team and the 

outside expert team that we brought to it concluded that 2016 was 

the feasible timeframe for AMDR. That means that between now 

and 2016 we need to continue to monitor progress in that development before we put the 2016 ship under contract, with the intent 

of ensuring we’re not tying ourselves down to concurrent development with ship construction. 

We have a path that we have to plow, between now and 2016, 

to monitor progress in the competition, in the technology development before 2106. If we determine, as we approach that, that we 

cannot get there on that timeline, then we’re going to have to revisit. 

What we’re not going to do is put immature technology into 2016. 

At that point in time, we would keep a viable path going forward, 

where the development of the technology would pace the incorporation of the capability. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral Blake, any comments? 

Admiral BLAKE. I would just add, sir, that when we looked at the 

Hull Radar Study, we looked at it from three perspectives: from the 

perspective of the hull; the combat systems; and the radars themselves. We determined in that study that either hull could support 

the systems. We determined that the SPY–3, as well as AMDR, 

was the correct approach; it was more capable, it was scalable, and 

we could do it that way. 

The third piece was, we looked at the lines of code that would 

be required as we looked at the DDG–51, and there was significantly less technical risk on the side of the DDG–51, as compared 

with any other hulls. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

18 

Just let me add a followup question, and that is, with this proposal of modified DDG–51, with the new radar for 2016, do you 

have a good understanding of the total cost of the ships, both the 

hull modifications and the new radar and fighting combat systems? 

Secretary Stackley? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me just start with the baseline ship. 

The last ship under construction and contract right now is DDG– 

112. We’re going into the restart with 113, 114, and 115 at the two 

building yards. We have a solid estimate for that baseline. When 

we look at the 2016 ship, first we deal with core capabilities. The 

core capabilities would be the upgrade to the AMDR, bring in SPY– 

3, and then it’s the support systems that go with the sensor suite 

upgrade. So, we’re talking power and cooling. 

The 30-year report does not lay in the costs for those upgrades, 

because we’re going through the 2012 timeframe to put together, 

in concert with a requirement from last year’s authorization bill, 

the technology roadmap that gets us there. 

We have rough estimates today. We’re refining the estimates as 

we look at the candidate technologies. That would lead to a POM– 

12 for a 2016 ship. 

Senator REED. Okay. 

Let me raise another question. This goes to continually looking 

back at alternative approaches. At some point, if the proposed 

modified DDG–51 plus the new radar gets so expensive, do you 

look back at going the other way; taking the DDG–1000, and modifying that ship to be more capable? Is there a point at which you 

begin to look at alternatives? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We took a hard look at that with the Hull Radar 

Study, and there are several factors that work against that approach. One is the core combat system itself, and what it would 

take to modify the DDG–1000 core combat system to match what 

we have today, out in the fleet, with the Aegis and the advancedcapability builds that we have associated with the Aegis program. 

The other is the basic platform itself. 

Senator REED. Admiral Blake, do you have any comments? 

Admiral BLAKE. I would go back to the point I mentioned earlier 

about the lines of code. It was such a significant difference, when 

you looked at the DDG–1000 versus the DDG–51, it was in the 

range of two to one, because of that, it was felt that it was significantly less technical risk, and therefore that would be the more 

prudent path to go down. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Let me ask one final question in this round before I recognize 

Senator Wicker. With respect to DDG–1000, Secretary Stackley, it 

has breached the Nunn-McCurdy line, so there’s a technical review 

underway. My understanding is, the principal cause of that is the 

truncation of the program from seven ships to three ships. Can you 

comment on that? 

Second, what effect will this have on the truncated program, as 

it exists today? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start with the baseline for the 

DDG–1000 program was struck at milestone B when it was, at that 

point in time, a 10-ship program. When you look at the criteria for 

determining the procurement acquisition unit cost, you have both 

19 

a research and development (R&D) component, as well as a procurement component. The program has a healthy R&D stream that 

preceded procurement. So, when you go from a 10-ship program to 

a 7- and then, ultimately, to the 3-ship program, that R&D front 

end basically gets divided into 3 ships and becomes a significant 

burden on the average unit cost. 

That became the mechanism that triggered the Nunn-McCurdy 

critical breach. We’re going through the process, right now, to meet 

the criteria for certifying continuation of the program, where we 

have five criteria that we need to certify. We are more than midstream through that process. June 4 is our requirement to certify, 

or other, back to the Hill. As you indicated in your remarks, the 

driver for this particular program has to deal with the quantity impact on the average unit cost. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Senator Wicker, please? 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, in your joint statement, the testimony reads, ‘‘The 

Navy remains firmly committed to maintaining a force of 11 carriers for the next 3 decades.’’ Firmly committed. The statement 

goes on to say that for a 33-month period, after the inactivation of 

the Enterprise and before the commissioning of the Gerald R. Ford, 

the Navy will utilize a congressional waiver for a 10-carrier fleet 

and then, after that, will maintain an 11-carrier force through the 

continued refueling program, et cetera. 

By contrast, I mentioned in my opening statement that I hoped 

that you would help overcome some confusion that I have with regard to the Secretary of Defense and his speech on Monday. He 

said, ‘‘Considering that the Department must continually adjust its 

future plans as the strategic environment involves.’’ He mentions 

two things, one of which is aircraft carriers. The Secretary said 

this: ‘‘Our current plan is to have 11 carrier strike groups through 

2040. To be sure, the need to project power across the oceans will 

never go away. But, consider the massive overmatch the United 

States already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing antiship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need 11 carrier strike groups for 

another 30 years, when no other country has more than 1?’’ 

The QDR came out in February, Secretary Stackley. What has 

changed in the strategic environment to cause DOD and the Secretary of Defense to seemingly make such a dramatic departure 

from the QDR in a very important speech on Monday? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, let me be careful not to reinterpret the Secretary of Defense’s speech, but try to address your question. 

As described, both in my opening remarks, and I think you have 

hit on it as well, we have some very significant challenges before 

us in the Department of the Navy’s shipbuilding program, regarding meeting our force structure requirements, for the 313-ship 

Navy, which includes 11 carriers, and doing it affordably, within 

the budgets that we have today within the Future Years Defense 

Program (FYDP) and, equally importantly, beyond the FYDP, when 

we project what it’s going to cost. 

The message that Secretary Gates has been very consistent with 

the Department of the Navy on is affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding program; that to achieve our 313-ship plan with realism 

20 

associated with future budgets, we have to come after affordability. 

We’re doing that across the board in each of the areas that he highlighted in his speech. It’s carriers, but it’s carrier strike groups, 

which include support ships. It’s the future Ohio-class replacement, 

and combatants, as well as amphibs. 

I view his remarks in the framework of budget realism. We have 

to improve affordability to hit our numbers, in terms of force structure. We have to find that balance. 

Senator WICKER. So, you’re making a distinction between carriers and strike groups? 

Mr. STACKLEY. He used the term carrier strike groups, which, 

when I hear carrier strike group, I hear the carrier and its escort 

ships. 

Senator REED. Can I intervene for 1 second? 

There’s a vote on. I would propose to run over and vote. 

Senator Webb will be recognized immediately after Senator 

Wicker. I will warn people that you’re on your way, Senator. 

Thank you. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator WICKER. We certainly need to be mindful of cost, Mr. 

Secretary. But, the Secretary of Defense said, ‘‘Do we really need 

11 carriers?’’ I’m just asking, have you had a conversation with the 

Secretary of Defense since he made these remarks on Monday? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Did you participate at all with the Secretary in 

formulating his remarks on Monday? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. 

Senator WICKER. I see. 

General Flynn, did you participate with the Secretary? Did he 

show you the speech before he made it? 

General FLYNN. No, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Admiral Blake? 

Admiral BLAKE. No, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. 

But, as far as the three of you are concerned, the Navy remains 

firmly committed to maintaining a force of 11 carriers for the next 

3 decades. 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, as you noted in our statement, the Navy 

does remain firmly committed to 11 carriers. As you also noted, it 

is the law. 

The second point I would make on that is, if you were to ask the 

CNO today, he would note for you that there has been no decrease 

in the demand signal for carriers from the combatant commanders 

(COCOMs), either now or as we look ahead to the foreseeable future. 

Senator WICKER. I see. 

Let me, then, move on to one other thing, and then I’ll turn it 

over to Senator Webb for the first round. 

The Secretary went on to say, on Monday, about how nice it was, 

and a real strategic asset, during the first Gulf war, to have a flotilla of marines waiting off Kuwait City, forcing Saddam’s army to 

keep one eye on the Saudi border and one eye on the coast. Then 

he goes on to say, ‘‘But, we have to take a hard look at where it 

would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious 

21 

landing again.’’ Further on, ‘‘On a more basic level, in the 21st century, what kind of amphibious capability do we really need to deal 

with the most likely scenarios?’’ Then, ‘‘How much?’’ 

General Flynn, I’m not trying to get this panel into a debate with 

the Secretary of Defense. But, as far as the question of asking ourselves these questions, I thought we asked the questions and then 

developed the QDR. In what scenarios, General, might it be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious landing 

again? 

General FLYNN. Senator, one of the key things, I think, that the 

Secretary said is, ‘‘We can’t define ourselves by the past.’’ I don’t 

believe we determine what our amphibious and power projection 

capabilities are by the events of the past. The heroic battles of Iwo 

Jima and Inchon and even what we did during Operation Desert 

Storm are in the past. As we look to the requirements of the future 

and what is demanded by the new security environment, I think 

we need to go to more recent history and take a look at the amphibious withdrawal from Somalia; the ability to project power into 

Afghanistan with Task Force 58; the noncombat evacuation of Lebanon, which was made possible by the fact that we had the ability 

to come ashore if we had to; the numerous partnership engagements that go on around the world right now; to the use of naval 

forces to prevent conflict; as well as the responses to humanitarian 

crisis and disasters around the world. That’s how we’re looking at 

defining the requirement. We believe that we need to take advantage of new operating concepts, which I believe we are in what you 

see, and the new plan now is to use the sea base as an operating 

base, and also to use the sea as maneuver space. 

So, we’re changing our operational concepts. We’re going beyond 

things of the past. Major assaults, as they were planned in the 

past, are not, probably, going to happen in the future. But, other 

operations are, and they’re going to be defined by using the sea as 

a base of operations and, also, the sea as maneuver space. 

Senator WICKER. No major assaults are likely. What about major 

amphibious landings? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I think those are still a possibility in the future. But, assaults, as they were envisioned in the past—what 

comes to mind most often are battles like Inchon and Iwo Jima— 

they’re probably not going to happen in the future. 

But, the ability to project power—and we believe the minimum 

requirement is to be able to project at least a two-brigade capability—is still a viable requirement, and one that we size the force 

to do, sir. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Let me just consult about how much time we have on this vote. 

[Pause.] 

I think what we’re going to have to do is recess. I think, probably, Chairman Reed will be back in just a moment, because there 

was only one vote. But, for now, we’ll recess, subject to the call of 

the chair. [Recess.] 

Senator REED. Let us reconvene. 

At this point, I’d like to recognize Senator Collins, if you’re ready, 

Susan. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

22 

Mr. Chairman, you know that I really should be right up there 

by you, given my seniority. But, I’m delighted to be a member of 

your subcommittee, and look forward to working very closely with 

you on these issues which we care a lot about. 

Senator REED. Likewise. 

Senator COLLINS. Secretary Stackley, I want to follow up on an 

issue that the chairman raised about the Nunn-McCurdy cost 

breach for the DDG–1000 program. I think it’s important, for the 

record, for all of us to reemphasize that this breach was caused by 

the reduction in quantity. It was not due to poor performance by 

the contractor. Is that correct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. To restate what I stated earlier, the 

R&D costs for the total program now get borne by three ships. That 

triggers a critical breach. There’s actually several major contractors 

involved. 

Senator COLLINS. True. 

You can imagine the one I am most interested in. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. But, when we evaluate, we take a 

look at total cost of the program. 

This program has gone to great lengths to ensure that the maturity of the design is high before we get into construction. When we 

looked at reducing the number of ships, we went to great lengths 

to try to align the construction effort to a single location to gain 

efficiencies for a three-ship build and to leverage all that you can 

in one location. So, the efforts for the three-ship construction programs, when you look at the procurement unit cost as opposed to 

the R&D piece of it, we’ve been keeping that contained. 

Senator COLLINS. I recognize that the process to recertify the 

DDG–1000, in light of this breach, requires significant analysis. 

You indicated to the chairman that you’re about halfway through 

that process. I am concerned, however, that these delays are going 

to have an impact on program schedule, on program cost, and on 

the maintenance of the workforce, unless it comes to a closure soon. 

Could you give us some better understanding of how soon you 

think the process will be completed, and when the second and third 

DDG–1000 ships could be put under contract? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. Let me start with the schedule. June 

4 is the hard-and-fast date that we need to meet for certification. 

That’s a pretty well-understood date for all the Nunn-McCurdys. 

We’re driving to that date, and we will have all the issues addressed to support that schedule. 

With regards to construction contracts, Bath Iron Works (BIW) 

has construction contracts for both DDG–1000 and –1001. Since 

the original program had production split over two shipyards, BIW 

had a piece of 1001 when that ship was contracted with Northrop 

Grumman. As the contract has moved north, they still have a core 

piece of their work share on 1001. We have a proposal in hand for 

the balance of the ship, under a fixed-price proposal, and we are 

negotiating those details so that when we come out of the NunnMcCurdy process, we can quickly conclude the contract actions that 

are necessary. 

In the interim, we have existing material procurement contracts, 

so that we can keep material orders on schedule, without causing 

23 

disruption for those ships’ construction schedules to keep the costs 

contained. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Stackley, in Secretary Gates’ speech on 

Monday, he talked about the need for the Navy and the industry 

to find ways to build ships more economically. One way to do that 

is for the Navy to make greater use of multiyear procurement contracts. As the Navy looks at the restart of the DDG–51 line, are 

you giving consideration to the use of multiyear procurement contracts? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Absolutely, we are. We’ve used two multiyears in 

the past, with the DDG–51 program, that provided great benefit. 

We are not ready yet—the initiation of the restart—to go right into 

a multiyear. 

We do owe Congress an acquisition strategy. In formulating that 

acquisition strategy, we will be addressing an approach that considers multiyear, perhaps in 2013. 

Senator COLLINS. Finally, I want to pick up on an issue that the 

ranking minority member raised, and that is about the adequacy 

of the shipbuilding budget. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 

has estimated that, in order to achieve the level of shipbuilding 

that is set out in the 30-year shipbuilding plan, you would need 

about $4 billion more a year than what the Navy is budgeting. The 

Navy, I believe, is assuming an annual investment of about $15.9 

billion to meet the long-term goals of the plan. But, CBO has testified that the shipbuilding plan would cost $20 billion a year. That 

was even based on a smaller plan than what the Navy ultimately 

embraced. 

What is your reaction to the CBO’s estimates of what it believes 

would be the true costs of carrying out the plan? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. A couple things. First, the Navy has 

great respect for CBO’s works. We spend time sharing data and information to understand our respective assumptions so that, where 

there are differences in our estimates, we can address them headon. 

In the CBO’s report, in looking at a 30-year plan, the numbers 

that you quoted stretch out across the full 30-year plan. If you 

break it down into near-term, mid-term, and far-term, I think CBO 

would agree that our differences in the near-term are not to the extent that you’ve described; they’re on the order of single digits of 

percent differences. In terms of the FYDP and the near-term, we’re 

not exact, but we are relatively close. Now what we have to do is 

understand our differences and attack those differences. 

Now, it grows in the longer term. We do have concerns with the 

projected costs and budgets in the longer term. That’s why we’re 

spending a great amount of effort today going after, not just requirements, but capabilities to meet the requirements to find more 

affordable solutions for our ship programs. 

What CBO has highlighted is a risk in our 30-year program that 

is pronounced in the far term. What we intend to do is use the time 

we have now to try to address those risks, as well as understand 

our differences. We have different assumptions on things like escalation that, when you compound an escalation assumption over 30 

years, it becomes pretty extreme on the back end. 

24 

We respect their analysis. We sit down, side by side, to understand the differences. We believe we’re fairly close in the nearterm, and we are tackling the issues in the near-term. We see the 

risk in the long-term, and we are working on that on the R&D side, 

in terms of defining requirements and capabilities. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, let me start off by pointing out that all three of you 

graduated from the Naval Academy. Is that correct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Admiral BLAKE. Yes, sir. 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Did you ever think there would be a time, when 

you were a midshipman, when you would be testifying before a 

chairman who graduated from West Point? [Laughter.] 

That’s a rhetorical question, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

When I ran the Guard and Reserve programs, I spent most of my 

time with the Army, so I guess turnabout is fair play here. 

I’d like to pick on a couple of points that Senator Wicker made. 

I think they are really important for us to get a clear idea of what 

this administration is doing, in terms of setting goals, on the one 

hand, and then hearing contrary information, on the other. 

It is the administration’s position that the Navy should grow to 

313 ships. Is that correct, Secretary Stackley? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Okay. I just want to make sure of that. 

I had some real concerns with Secretary Gates’ comments. I have 

great respect for him. I know that he, like you and all of us, is looking for efficiencies, in terms of shipbuilding programs and these 

sorts of things. But, this quote that Senator Wicker mentioned, it 

goes to a fundamental misunderstanding that I have seen repeated 

over and over again, through different cycles, about why we have 

a Navy. 

When someone says that there is a massive overmatch between 

our Navy and other navies around the world, I think it’s a 

misstatement of why we have navies or how different countries 

field military forces. You don’t field a navy to fight another navy. 

You field military forces to protect your essential national interests. 

Our Navy, as I believe all of you would agree, is vital to the strategic posture of the United States and to deterring malevolent behavior in a wide range of hotspots around the world that is an additional requirement, in terms of potentially fighting another navy, 

and it’s also a requirement that we cannot ignore as we periodically, including right now, become committed to long-term engagements on the ground. 

I think it would be a very serious mistake to cut back the defense 

budget or to alter the defense budget in order to fund ground forces 

that are in Iraq and Afghanistan, hopefully temporarily, in terms 

of the whole cycle of how our country operates, and, at the same 

time, do that at the expense of these vital shipbuilding programs 

that take years and years to put into place and are the envy of 

every other country. 

25 

Anytime a large emerging country decides that they want to become an international power, ask yourself what they do: they build 

up their navy; they try to build aircraft carriers. The Chinese are 

trying to build an aircraft carrier right now. So, let’s be very, very 

careful, in terms of what we do affecting our long-term viability. 

Admiral, I’d like you to, just for the record here, tell us how long 

it takes to design, build, test-run, and actually put to sea an aircraft carrier, from the inception of the concept. 

Admiral BLAKE. I would first start with the R&D piece, sir. But, 

I would tell you that we need dollars up front for at least 7 years. 

We’ve just shifted the carriers from 41⁄2- to 5-year cost centers. 

That means we need those cost centers there in order to be able 

to get the ship from design all the way to put it out in the fleet. 

The other concern I think you have to look at is the industrial 

base. Because when you design a carrier which is an extremely 

unique asset, you must make sure that when you put that out 

there you are supporting the industrial base, which, as we know, 

has many fragile points in it. 

From the beginning to the end, it is something that we have to 

definitely take into account. That was one of the things we took 

into account when we moved the cost centers from 41⁄2 to 5 years. 

Senator WEBB. So, from the beginning of a design concept to actually putting that ship out to sea in harm’s way, we’re talking how 

many years? 

Admiral BLAKE. I believe it’s 7, sir. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I can take that, sir. 

Senator WEBB. Secretary Stackley? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. For a clean-sheet design, you’re probably 

talking, from the start of the design to the ship operating it’s about 

a 17-year period, for something like a carrier. 

Senator WEBB. It’s a considerable amount of time. Anyone who’s 

visited one of these shipyards and seen, literally, the generations 

of expertise that go into how you lay down an aircraft carrier— 

where you put your wiring, all these sorts of things—can understand that this is something that has been passed down from generation to generation. It’s very difficult to recreate, once you lose 

the workforce or you get away from the concept. That’s why it’s so 

difficult for other countries to match what we have. 

My comment today, Mr. Chairman, is basically just a note of caution, in terms of how dangerous it would be for us to waver from 

this essential part of our strategic makeup. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on the comments of Senator Webb and Senator Wicker on the issue of the 313-ship plan, and ask when you 

expect the Navy will reach that plan. 

Mr. STACKLEY. The 30-year report lays out both the structure of 

the 313-ship Navy, in terms of numbers versus types of ships, 

where we stand today, at 286 ships, and both our procurement plan 

and our decommissioning plan; so, the puts and takes and what the 

total force structure looks like over the next 30 years. We hit a 

number of 320 at about 2020. 

26 

So, when do we actually hit 313? It’s the end of this decade. Then 

we’re challenged to stay at that number. We’re challenged to stay 

at that number because of the competition within the budget for 

the higher-class replacement program, and then to be able to sustain our force structure as the ships that we built in the 1980s and 

the 1990s, at high rates, meet their retirement age. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Is the Navy prepared to be flexible in the decommissioning of ships if the new ships that were required to get 

to 313 don’t come online, as expected? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We have to be careful that we do that well in advance. So, when we look ahead, at surface combatants in particular, and recognize that the Arleigh Burke-class, that we procured at three to five per year in the 1990s, will be decommissioning at a rapid rate in the 2020s and 2030s, we need to look at 

extending their service life in order to hold up our force structure, 

because we won’t be able to recapitalize at the same rate we 

bought those on. 

Right now, the DDG–51 program is entering a mid-life modernization program. At the front end of that, we’re taking a hard 

look at the material condition. We’re baselining those ships. We are 

emplacing sensors and putting a surveying program in place, so 

that when we get to the more capable Flight IIA 51s going through 

modernization, we can do the necessary things to extend their service lives. 

Senator LEMIEUX. That’s good to hear. No one wants our sailors 

to be operating on a ship that’s not safe or not up to par. But, at 

the same time, if the ship is still seaworthy and can still perform 

its mission, if we’re having challenges adding new ships to get to 

the 313 level, it makes sense to do the things you just spoke about. 

Let me ask you a question about the readiness level and our 313- 

ship plan, specifically to this administration’s announcement last 

year of its new plan for BMD in Europe and for it to be more reliant upon our Aegis-class ship force, with the cruisers and destroyers. Based upon that change, do we have a sufficient cruiser and 

destroyer fleet in order to meet that mission? 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, if I could take that question? 

Senator LEMIEUX. Yes, sir. 

Admiral BLAKE. What you see now is the Navy’s approach to the 

BMD challenge, which we are currently addressing. We currently 

have in the fleet 21 ships that are BMD-capable. By the end of the 

current FYDP, we will have 27 ships that will be BMD-capable and 

available for tasking. 

The Navy’s approach has been threefold. We’ve looked at it from 

the acquisition of BMD kits in order to make ships that are currently in the inventory capable of performing the BMD mission. 

The second approach we’ve taken is to build the BMD into the 

ships, from the keel up, which we have also put in the plan. But, 

the challenge there is, it takes us 5 years in order to go from the 

time we start the work until we deliver a ship. We have demand 

signal today that is out there that needs to be met in a quicker 

way. The third approach we are taking is, we are looking at what 

we call Aegis Ashore, in which we would put the BMD capability 

ashore. We are looking at beginning that in the 2015 timeframe. 

27 

So, it’s a three-pronged approach. We will go with kits, we will 

go with ships from the keel up, and we will go with a program 

we’re calling Aegis Ashore. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Along that three-pronged program is the number of ships that we have and the number of ships that are in that 

effort sufficient, in your mind? 

Admiral BLAKE. It is currently sufficient to meet the COCOM demand signal. The challenge we are facing is the rotation as we put 

those units out there, because we have to put them on station for 

a certain period of time. We have missions on both the east coast 

and west coast of the United States, where we have to put ships 

out for both. 

In fact, one of the west coast units did the mission in the Mediterranean, the USS Higgins. She had actually been over there on 

the BMD mission, and then as she was on her way home, she responded to the Haiti event, in which they had the earthquake, and 

then she went back through the Canal and went home. So, we are 

able to move ships from both coasts. 

But, yes, the short answer to your question is, we believe we 

have the levels. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We’re going to hear soon, I understand, about 

the announcement on the common hull for the 55-ship Littoralclass. Do you know when that announcement is due? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We received proposals in April. We are going 

through proposal evaluation. We have a series of internal reviews 

that will need to be conducted. We engage, as necessary, in discussions with the offerers. We’re targeting a down-select decision this 

summer. 

Senator LEMIEUX. This summer. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We’re scheduled to get those Littoral-class 

ships at Mayport, in Jacksonville. At the same time, we’re decommissioning the frigates. So, there’s a concern, which I’m sure you 

are aware, that we’re going to have a huge gap as those frigates 

come offline and Littoral ships come online. So, urgency in getting 

that done is important to my State. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Mr. Chairman, that’s all I have. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. 

Despite the shortage of amphibious operational capabilities, the 

Navy continues to decommission the aging amphibious fleet in 

order to reduce the operation and maintenance (O&M) expenses. 

Admiral Blake, what are the Navy’s plans to retire the vessels from 

the existing amphibious fleet within the next 10 years? 

Admiral BLAKE. When we developed the 30-year shipbuilding 

plan, we looked at two factors. The first was affordability; what we 

could afford. The second was a view toward the future; how we 

were going to be able to get capabilities out into the fleet. 

Specifically, the current large-deck amphibious ships, which we 

have in the budget for decommissioning, originally had service lives 

28 

of 20 years. They were subsequently extended, and they are coming 

to the end of those service lives. 

What we have seen is that, as those ships come to the end of 

their service lives, we have had a challenge in order to keep on 

maintaining those vessels. 

Recognizing the affordability issues we had, it was determined 

that, in order to be able to provide a capability in the future for 

the amphibious force, we were going to have to look at decommissioning those ships as they are currently listed in the 5-year defense plan. 

So, the overall approach was, if we were to not decommission 

those ships, then we would have to pressurize both our manpower 

and our O&M accounts. If we were to do that, because those accounts would be pressurized, we would have to look into our other 

accounts in order to be able to cover that, because we have already 

reallocated the manpower and the O&M dollars in order to meet 

other emerging issues. 

I’ll give you an example. Manpower that would come off those 

ships would then be reapplied to our increase in the 10th Fleet, the 

Cyber Fleet. It would also be used to meet additional COCOM demand from organizations such as U.S. Special Operations Command. We’ve gotten demand signals to put additional folks out 

there. 

What I would tell you is, while it was not easy to make that decision in order to be able to put those ships out within the current 

FYDP, we felt it prudent in order to be able to build the future 

force of the fleet, specifically on the NFP side, because if you pressurize both the manpower and O&M accounts, the only place we’re 

able to go at that point is our procurement accounts. Our procurement accounts are made up, principally, of the aircraft and shipbuilding accounts. 

Senator HAGAN. I think you said that the original life cycle was 

20 years, but you’ve extended it? 

Admiral BLAKE. That’s correct. 

Senator HAGAN. To what? 

Admiral BLAKE. I’ll have to take that one for the record. I’ll get 

you the exact number on the years. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The expected service life of the LHA 1 Class has been extended to 35 years. 

Senator HAGAN. Admiral Blake and General Flynn, if the requirement for amphibious capabilities is 38 ships, and the agreed 

level of acceptable risk dictates a need for 33 ships, will the Navy 

and Marine Corps have the ability to fully support the COCOM requirements, when, I believe, only 29 ships will be available in 

2011? 

Admiral BLAKE. As I was stating earlier, it was a matter of affordability. If you look at the shipbuilding plan within the FYDP, 

you’re absolutely correct. I believe in 2011, we get down to 29 

ships, and then we build back up. It was an issue, from the Navy 

perspective, of affordability, risk, and getting that future capability 

out there in our procurement accounts. 

General FLYNN. Senator, we agreed that the floor was 33 ships. 

One of the key issues is, when we put the plan together, there were 

29 

key assumptions and parameters about the availability of new 

ships. 

Cost is one thing, and I think we need to strike a balance between that and capability. When you get around 29 ships, you are 

challenged, not only in meeting your larger requirement, but you 

are challenged in meeting your day-to-day requirements. Since the 

plan was written, we continue with those decommissionings as an 

operational assessment of what that will mean to our capabilities, 

because some of the assumptions as to when new ships would come 

online may no longer be valid. 

Senator HAGAN. The 2011–2015 shipbuilding plan calls for procuring the 11th and the final San Antonio-class landing platform 

dock amphibious ship in 2012. In 2017, the 30-year shipbuilding 

plan calls for the start of procurement of a replacement for aging 

landing ship dock amphibious ships. Secretary Stackley, can the 

LPD–17 design be used as the basis for the LSD replacement? 

Would the procurement of a 12th LPD–17 in 2014 or 2015 support 

keeping the production line open while transitioning to the start of 

the LSD replacement? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. In general terms, the Navy would 

look for reuse of design and common hull forms to improve affordability of any new program. 

The timing for the LSD(X), as I mentioned in my opening remarks, is ahead of need. The LSD–41 and –49 class do not exit the 

service until the mid-2020s. We look at concerns with the industrial base. So, we have pulled that replacement program as early 

as we can without pushing some other requirement out that’s more 

urgent, on a schedule basis. So, we have the LSD(X) just outside 

of the FYDP. This year and next year, we are going through the 

definition of the requirements to determine exactly what the lift 

fingerprint is that the replacement ship has to provide. Does that 

line up with an LPD–17 hull form? If it turns out that the LPD– 

17 has more capability than what the LSD(X) has, then we have 

to do the affordability and trades review to balance off, what’s the 

cost of a new start versus the cost of reuse? Affordability, capability, requirements, and schedule are all going to be brought to the 

table in that review and that debate. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. Let me go to one more. 

The Navy originally estimated the cost of building the LCS sea frames at approximately $220 million per vessel. I understand that 

Secretary Mabus has been a champion for acquisition reform; however, the current LCS sea-frame procurement costs have more than 

doubled. Will the Navy be awarding this as a fixed-price contract? 

What risk would the Navy face in the event that the winning shipyard is unable to build the first 10 of these ships within the contracted cost? 

Mr. STACKLEY. It is a fixed-price contract that’s out for bid. 

Senator HAGAN. For 10 ships? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Specifically, it’s a fixed-price incentive contract. 

Two firm fiscal year 2010 ships, and then two-per-year options in 

2011 through 2014, for a total of 10 ships. 

There is a pricing portion as part of the review of the proposals, 

but there’s also a technical portion. Inside of the technical portion, 

there’s an evaluation of the bidder’s ability to meet their proposal, 

30 

in terms of management and production. So, we evaluate that exact 

issue prior to awarding to the winner. 

Senator HAGAN. What happens when their costs come in over? 

Mr. STACKLEY. On the fixed-price contract, it’s in accordance with 

the terms and conditions of the contract. So, they propose a target. 

We have what’s referred to as a ceiling, where the ceiling limits the 

government’s liability. Between the target that they propose and 

the ceiling, the cost is shared in accordance with what’s referred 

to as a share line. 

Senator HAGAN. I understand in the 1970s we had a serious situation where we had to do a substantial financial bailout. I was just 

curious we are looking into that when all these contracts with one 

bidder are signed. 

Mr. STACKLEY. There was a lot of learning that took place in the 

1970s. Our intent is not to repeat that experience, which is why 

cost realism is an important part of the evaluation process. We do 

not award based on what they bid. We award based on evaluated 

cost. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thank all of you for your work. 

Secretary Stackley, we appreciate the difficult choices all of you 

face in the Navy, with budgets that show not much growth from 

the President for defense when we’re increasing personnel in DOD. 

I believe, as Admiral Blake indicated, that puts pressure on procurement. That’s just the way it’s always been. But, sometimes, 

when we have good programs that need to be completed, it’s unthinkable to not complete them in a sound way. 

Secretary Stackley, yesterday, Defense News reported that Secretary Mabus, the Navy Secretary, in his remarks to the Navy 

League on May 5, stated that, ‘‘Energy efficiency, both in the manufacturing process and in the final product, would increasingly be 

a factor in judging program performance, as well as in the contract 

awards.’’ 

Earlier, he said, in October of last year at an energy forum, 

‘‘First, we’re going to change the way the Navy and Marine Corps 

award contracts. The lifetime energy cost of a building or a system 

and the fully-burdened cost of fuel in powering those will be a mandatory evaluation factor used when awarding contracts. We’re 

going to hold industry contractually accountable for meeting energy 

targets and system efficiency requirements.’’ He goes on to emphasize that more. 

In September 2009, he said, ‘‘One of the drivers, for me, is the 

affordability of being able to operate the force. We no longer have 

the luxury to say, ‘It’s a good deal on price,’ or, ‘Let’s buy it.’ We 

have to get our arms around lifecycle costs.’’ 

Do you agree that that’s the right way to purchase a ship, or any 

vehicle, but a ship, particularly? That you want to know not only 

how much it costs today, but how much fuel it will use and how 

much it will cost to operate that? Is that a factor that should be 

given weight in the process? 

31 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, the Secretary has outlined his goals for energy, and we are putting a lot of effort into not just meeting his 

goals, but building the path to get there. 

When we look at how we procure our ships, we bring total ownership cost into the equation, and we evaluate not just the procurement costs, but we look at the ownership costs throughout the life 

of the program, which includes energy, it includes manpower, it includes maintenance, and modernization considerations, in addition 

to the upfront procurement cost. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you said that you agree with the Secretary. Is that right? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I would always agree with the Secretary, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Especially when he’s correct, as he is in that 

statement. But, I didn’t hear you say, precisely, that you are at 

that level now. He said, ‘‘First thing we’re going to do is fix this 

energy matter.’’ 

So, I’m asking you, today, when you look at the LCS competition, 

is that effectively being evaluated in the bid process? It certainly 

seems that it should be. 

Mr. STACKLEY. We took a look at the larger category of ownership cost, we considered it as an evaluation factor, compared the 

two designs, and arrived at an evaluation inside the technical portion of the LCS award criteria that would address improvements 

to total ownership costs, which would include energy, as well as 

maintenance and modernization. 

Senator SESSIONS. The fact that that is a very long and complex 

answer makes me nervous, because my analysis of it is that it does 

not do just what the Secretary said. 

I would offer for the record, Mr. Chairman, a report from the 

CBO that’s analyzed this particular question. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

32 


506sea1.eps
33 


506sea2.eps
34 


506sea3.eps
35 


506sea4.eps
36 


506sea5.eps
37 


506sea6.eps
38 


506sea7.eps
39 

Senator SESSIONS. The way I read the report, it’s pretty clear to 

me that the Navy has not sufficiently calculated the comparative 

fuel costs of the two ships. 

That’s what you mean by those words you gave us, doesn’t it? 

You compare the cost of one ship, in its normal operating procedure, and you compare the cost of the other. Correct? Is that what 

you mean? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We look at total ownership cost, which includes 

all the factors, including energy. Yes, sir. 


506sea8.eps
40 

Senator SESSIONS. Let’s focus on the energy part of cost. Do you 

consider how much it costs to run one ship, and you consider the 

cost of the other one? That’s what it means, does it not? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Have you calculated and reduced to dollar 

amounts the estimated fuel cost of operating these ships, each one, 

through the life cycle? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We’ve looked at the different ways in which the 

Navy would operate the ship, because, clearly, fuel costs are dependent upon how you would operate the ship, and ran the respective analyses for the two different designs. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m well aware of that, but it would be part 

of how you would calculate it. Have you calculated it through to 

dollar-and-cent figure so you can compare actual cost? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. In accordance with the different ways in 

which we would operate the ship inside the total—— 

Senator SESSIONS. How much do you calculate LCS–1 and LCS– 

2? What are the figures for each? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I would not provide those in an open forum, because the respective figures that we have used are proprietary. 

However, we have provided that information, through other means, 

to CBO in forming their report. 

Senator SESSIONS. As I read the CBO report, it would conclude 

the Navy inadequately scored that. But, do I hear you saying that 

you have an actual dollar-and-cents figure that you’ve used in evaluating the lifecycle cost that now the Navy has and is applying to 

this ship? 

Mr. STACKLEY. To be exact, we took a look at the total ownership 

costs for the two competing designs. We looked at maintenance, 

modernization, manpower, and fuel consumption. 

When we look at fuel consumption, we have to consider the different ways in which the Navy would operate the ship. Then we 

looked at the total ownership cost, side-by-side, for the two different designs, considering different categories for the way the 

Navy would operate—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Surely, you would have to reduce this variable 

speed to some sort of factor that you could evaluate, in terms of 

dollars and cents. That’s what CBO said. 

It’s been done before, hasn’t it? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. As you read through the CBO report, 

what they point out is, there’s a range, in terms of the percent of 

the total ownership cost that’s made up by fuel. There’s also a 

range for how much of an impact the different mission type of operations have on that percent. Within that range, you could have one 

design being better than the other, and vice versa. So, the outcome 

of the analysis for total ownership cost is highly sensitive to the 

way that the Navy would operate the ships. 

Senator SESSIONS. I couldn’t agree more. But, have you calculated that? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. You would agree, would you not, that if you 

didn’t properly calculate that, then it could be unfair to one competitor or another? 

41 

Mr. STACKLEY. What I would definitely agree to is that there’s 

a degree of uncertainty around the estimates. When you say, ‘‘not 

properly calculating it,’’ I would say that the Navy’s estimate is not 

so much of a point estimate as it is a number plus or minus a certain percentage of uncertainty. I would not suggest that we’ve been 

unfair to one or the other, based on that calculation. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Stackley, I’m not able to follow those answers. It’s awfully complex to me. It would seem to me that if you 

were buying an automobile, and one got better gas mileage than 

another one, you would calculate, over the expected life of that car, 

how much you spend on fuel in each one. Are you saying that you 

have done that in this case, in this competition, and that you are 

prepared, at some point, to make that public? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Two things. One, you say, ‘‘within the competition.’’ The analysis that you are referring to is not a part of the 

award criteria. 

Senator SESSIONS. Then are you going to make it a part of the 

award evaluation, or not? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. What we have as a part of the award criteria is how to improve upon total ownership cost. When we do the 

analysis of total ownership cost, which includes fuel, and we put 

side-by-side comparisons between the two designs, then the outcome of that analysis is entirely dependent on the assumptions you 

make with regards to how the Navy would operate the ship, where 

the range of operations is entirely within what the LCS would be 

called to perform. 

Senator SESSIONS. CBO, faced with those circumstances, came up 

with a range, did they not? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. The range was something like 8 to 18. 

Mr. STACKLEY. It was 8 to 11 percent for a frigate type of combatant, which would include an LCS. 

Senator SESSIONS. They estimated a moderate range would be 

11. That was their estimate of what the fuel cost should be. Do you 

use that figure, or a different one? 

Mr. STACKLEY. We used the baseline figures that we have for the 

two designs. The other information that CBO pointed towards was 

the operating regime of the ships, where they would nominally 

spend 95 percent of their time at 16 knots or less; 5 percent of the 

time north of that speed. You have a range of variability of 5 percent inside of CBO’s numbers, driven by the way you operate the 

ships, for a cost factor that’s 11 percent of the total ownership cost. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would just say that this is a very serious matter. I’m not able 

to follow your answers. My concern is that you’re not adequately 

accounting for differences of fuel. I intend to follow it. I hope that 

you conduct this correctly. But, if not, I think we would not have 

had a fair competition. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

We’ll begin the second round. 

I want to commend Senator Wicker and my colleagues for raising 

the issue of Secretary Gates’s speech. He really challenged us to 

look very closely at the cost of procurement systems. But, I want 

42 

to make the further point that that doesn’t just apply to shipbuilding; that applies across the spectrum: aircraft, ground systems, et cetera. We’re in an age in which the operational environment includes the budget, and we have to be conscious of that. But, 

I thank you, Roger, for bringing it up. 

Senator SESSIONS. I join with you, Mr. Chairman, in sharing 

those comments and thanking Senator Wicker for his. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Let me just raise a few questions, then turn it over to Senator 

Wicker. 

The Ohio-class replacement program is underway; the first steps. 

I think it’s a very sensible program and that we have to follow 

through. But, Admiral Blake, in terms of what the Navy is doing, 

the tradeoffs, in terms of design, looking ahead at what this platform will look like, which will be reflected, first, in the R&D aspects and requests for funding, and then in procurement, how are 

you working to make this affordable, as well as effective? 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, what we started out with was, we took the 

original Ohio program, which we did many years ago, and we used 

that as the model in order to determine where we were going to 

go with the Ohio replacement. So, we used that as the framework 

in order to determine when we thought we needed to start the 

R&D process, which started in the 2010 budget. Then, we went forward from there. 

The second piece we determined was, based on the service lives 

of the ship, when would we be required to bring the Ohio replacement into service? That was then determined to be 2019. 

What we did was a two-step process. We started with the R&D 

piece, upfront, and then we determined when construction had to 

start. Then you had the advanced procurement that you would 

have to put in place. That was the idea, so that the first Ohio replacement would arrive, and we would meet the requirement to 

meet the mission. That was the entire process, as we drove towards 

it. 

Senator REED. I understand the timeline, let me rephrase the 

question. 

I think there’s a temptation, when you’re looking at a new platform, to make it capable of doing everything. That’s expensive, 

typically. There’s always this tradeoff between capability and expense. How are you dealing with those two issues? 

Admiral BLAKE. One of the ways we’re looking at it is, we’re 

looking to see, first of all, what capability you want to have in the 

vessel. 

Let me use the D5 program as an example. We determined that, 

based on the success of the D5 program, that we should take the 

D5 program and put an extension program in place so that we 

would be able to utilize that system and the reliability and security 

that it gave us out into the 2040 timeframe. We also felt that if 

you go back in history and you look, you’ll remember that the previous program, the C4 program, was a less capable system. The D5 

was then designed in the late 1970s, early 1980s. 

What we determined was, in order to minimize risk, we would 

go to the D5 program, as opposed to starting up, since we have not, 

since the early 1980s, done any missile design work, with respect 

43 

to an SSBN weapon system. Therefore, we would continue down 

the path of using the D5. 

The idea was to keep it affordable because if you go back in history, if we hadn’t gone down that path, then we were going to have 

to rebuild the infrastructure, the design, and everything else, because we have not done that in several decades. The idea was to 

make it affordable and to make it less risky. That’s one example. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Admiral. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Can I add to that? 

Senator REED. Secretary Stackley, just your comments, briefly, 

on my questions. But, to the tradeoff between capacity and affordability. Is there a normative price in your head for per-ship, now? 

Or is it too early? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. First, we have done an analysis of alternatives leading into the R&D ramp for the Ohio replacement. We 

looked at a large number of variations on a couple of concepts, 

where you start with the Ohio itself, you take a look at what we’ve 

learned from Virginia, and you look at variations on the Virginia, 

and then what you have left, beyond that, is a clean-sheet design. 

We take a look at, what are the core requirements that the replacement boat needs to provide? Then we look at opportunities, either from the standpoint of affordability or capability. 

Right now, we are going through tough discussions on capabilities versus requirements versus cost, leading up to a milestone decision this summer with acquisition, technology, and logistics. This 

process is absolutely key for the next decade, because we are going 

to build the Ohio-class replacement, it is going to be a very expensive platform, and it is going to meet our national security requirements. 

Once we head down a certain path, we have to ensure it’s the 

right path, because we won’t get a restart opportunity and we 

won’t have the ability to back out. So, we have to get it right, upfront. 

We’re muscling through this now. We have estimates that are on 

the table, in terms of both the R&D stream and the procurement 

stream. If you look at the 30-year report, it’s a $6- to $7-billion 

boat, and that’s simply taking the Ohio and escalating it out to the 

2019 timeframe, when we will procure the first replacement boat. 

That gives us great concern, because of the amount of pressure 

it puts on not just shipbuilding, but all procurement, as well as the 

R&D leading into it. We don’t want to cut ourselves short on R&D, 

because we want to get it right. We need to look at both affordability and capability in this effort. But, we have to take a look at 

the total program and see what we can do to, not just keep it under 

control within the budget, but, when we get out there to execute, 

make sure it doesn’t escape us. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Let me ask a question, then yield to Senator Wicker. I might 

have one more question. 

Going back to the decision about the DDG–51 versus the DDG– 

1000, the DDG–1000 was developed with the principal mission of 

close fire support for forceful entry, principally, the Marine Corps. 

Then the Navy made a decision that they could do that by other 

means, and the more pressing need was missile defense, and the 

44 

DDG–51 seemed to be more capable at that. Part of that decision, 

I understand, is the thought that the Navy could essentially adopt 

an Army system, the non-line-of-sight (NLOS) launch system. 

Now it appears that the Army is getting ready to abandon developing that system, forcing you to have no system, or to adopt the 

cost of that system, rather than bootstrapping on the Army. 

Admiral Blake, if NLOS is canceled, which it appears close to 

being, what’s your backup plan? I’d like everyone to comment on 

this general topic. What are you going to do to ensure close fire 

support for forceful entry of marines? 

Admiral BLAKE. First of all, for the NLOS program, the NLOS 

was looked at, from the Navy perspective, to go on the LCS. It was 

going to be part of the surface modular package that was going to 

go on there. One of the missions it was going to be used for was 

for the swarming boat issue. 

What we are doing right now is, because of the Army’s announcement that they are potentially looking at terminating the program, 

going back and evaluating for that particular module, if, in fact, 

that program is terminated, and it is decided that the Navy would 

not go down that path, what would we have to do in order to meet 

the key performance parameters for that particular module on the 

LCS? 

Senator REED. Thank you. That clarifies the situation a great 

deal. Secretary Stackley, might the close fire support be provided, 

not by destroyer, but by the LCS? Is that the operational concept, 

Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. Naval surface fire support capability, or 

requirement, is met by what’s referred to as a triad. First, there’s 

organic artillery, there is air, and then there’s naval surface fires. 

That triad is intended to meet the overarching, or capstone, requirement. We look at the contribution of the advanced gun system 

on the DDG–1000 to the overall requirement. We look at other surface ships—basically, 5-inch/54, which is common to the DDG–51 

and the cruiser. With the NLOS, we look at a capability that the 

LCS could further contribute to that campaign problem. 

Senator REED. General Flynn, since your marines are going to 

have to make the forcible entry, you have the last word on the 

whole topic and NLOS, too. 

General FLYNN. Sir, over a year ago—and this was at the same 

time that we were looking at the DDG–1000 program—we agreed 

to look to a joint analysis of alternatives (AOA), to determine a way 

ahead for naval surface fires. A key part of that, as Secretary 

Stackley said, is our belief in the triad that no single leg of the 

triad can meet all the demands of it. We see naval surface fires as 

providing both volume and accuracy as a key part of that triad. 

As part of the joint AOA, we looked at 71 alternatives, and we 

came down to the 6 most promising. One of them was the NLOS 

system. If it proved promising, it would have to have an extended 

range. But, that was one of the alternatives. That was one of the 

areas that we were also looking at to capitalize on the Navy’s 

building of the LCS platform. 

If NLOS proves not to be effective, then the only other option 

that’s available right now is the development of a 5-inch extendedrange round for use off the DDG–81 and higher-class hull forms. 

45 

That really needs to be a POM–12 issue, because right now there 

is no naval surface fire, with the exception of the DDG–1000, in the 

program or record. The next promising thing to look at, or the most 

viable, appears to be the extended range 5-inch. That would meet 

the requirement. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, General. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

General Flynn, with regard to this decommissioning of the LHA– 

4 in 2011 and LHA–5 in 2013, in advance of their expected service 

life, is it your understanding that that decision is still an open 

question? Let me put it is way. In your view, is there still an opportunity for that decision to be reversed? 

General FLYNN. Sir, the way I’d answer that is, I believe that it’s 

important that we have to balance what was in the 30-year shipbuilding plan. Has anything changed since the 30-year shipbuilding 

plan that would warrant going back and taking a look at that decommissioning of vessels? The key thing, I think, that needs to be 

done is, what is the operational impact, based on what was assumed or what was counted on in the plan? Has anything changed? 

If nothing’s changed, and deliveries will be met, and capabilities 

will be there, I don’t think that’s a reversible decision. 

But, the reality is that it’s not just the funding requirements. 

Maybe in the current budget year we’re across the line of departure. But, in the future budget year, I do think we need to take 

a look at the delivery of new ships and when they’re going to be 

operational-ready, because there was an assumption made in the 

plan that those ships would be ready and deployable at a certain 

period of time. 

We’ve had some challenges with the delivery of the new class of 

LPDs. It all comes together, when you take a look at the lift-carrying capacity of the fleet to do that. So, I’d be an advocate for an 

operational assessment, to see what impact that would have. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Where are we then, in the decision about 

making an operational assessment? How involved would such an 

assessment be? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I think that how involved that assessment 

would be is to take a look at what demands you have for day-today operations and to see if the inventory can meet those demands. 

Senator WICKER. Is it fair to say the Marine Corps was opposed 

to these two decommissionings? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I think it’d be fair to say that the Marine 

Corps would like to see an operational assessment of the impact of 

those decommissions. 

Senator WICKER. Where are we on that, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me describe that the decommissioning plan 

that you see in the report to Congress, that pulls the LHA–4 and 

-5 out, that was done in concert with the PB11 budget build and 

QDR. In terms of an operational assessment for changes, since that 

was put together, I’m not aware of one. 

Senator WICKER. Would you be vigorously opposed to such an 

idea? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I think we should always be reassessing our 

plans, based on changes that have occurred since the prior plan 

46 

was built. I think it’s our responsibility to be constantly reviewing 

changes. 

Senator WICKER. It would be possible to decommission the first 

one and make a different determination, with regard to the LHA– 

5, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. STACKLEY. It’s not supposed to occur until 2013. 

Mr. STACKLEY. General Flynn talked about passing a line of departure on the LHA–4. I think we have passed the line of departure, because you’re talking about manpower that simply is not in 

the budget for a big-deck amphibious. So, that one, I believe, is 

passed. 

Senator WICKER. We’ve not passed the line of departure for the 

LHA–5. Is that correct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The manpower accounts have been adjusted to assume decommissioning of the LHA–5 in 2013. That’s inside of the 

FYDP. To change that plan, you’d have to change those manpower 

assumptions in POM–12, and that would have its attendant impact. 

Senator WICKER. But, we’ve not passed the line of departure, 

have we? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. That’s a 2013 budget impact associated 

with, not just manpower, but also O&M associated with maintaining the ship past its current decommissioning date. 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, I would add one point to that. 

Senator WICKER. Please. 

Admiral BLAKE. If you look at the entire number of ships that 

are being decommissioned, when you decommission those largedeck amphibs, they are not being either scrapped or put for foreign 

military sale, they’re being put in an inactive status. So, should a 

national emergency require them being brought back out into the 

active fleet, that, of course, could be accomplished. 

The second thing I would point out, as Mr. Stackley pointed out, 

was that if you were to pressurize the accounts and in order to 

bring those ships back in, specifically with respect to manpower 

and the O&M accounts, we would likely have to go, in order to find 

the offsets to cover those costs, in our procurement accounts. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. That was helpful. 

General Flynn, how do we arrive at the 38 number on amphibious ships to really meet our needs? What risks do we take when 

we go down to 31 or fewer? 

General FLYNN. Sir, to give you an idea, the 38-ship requirement 

was based on what would it take to be able to conduct an amphibious assault with a 2-brigade-sized force, with each brigade needing 

17 ships in the assault echelon. So, that gives you a total of 34, 

with 4 somewhere in the maintenance cycle. 

That number pretty much would support the steady-state demand for day-to-day operations that we see from the COCOMs. 

To give you an example of the utility of 31 ships, over 70 percent 

of the amphibious fleet at the end of January, during the Haiti operation, was at sea. So, that gives you an idea of the utility of the 

ships. As you get lower, for example, if you did the same thing with 

29 ships, 80 percent of the amphibious fleet would be at sea, because we had 9 ships supporting 3 different expeditionary units, 

and you had 7 ships off the coast of Haiti, with 9 in maintenance 

47 

and 6 others available for deployment. So, that gives you an idea 

of the utility of the ships, as well as their use. 

Senator WICKER. For accomplishing your mission, any drop between 31 would be an unacceptable risk. Is that correct? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I believe, from some of the operational analysis that I’ve seen, we’d be challenged to meet some of our presence 

requirements. 

Senator WICKER. All right. 

I think people would be disappointed if I didn’t talk about the 

well deck issue. Mr. Secretary, we had a lengthy discussion last 

year. The idea of inserting well deck back in the LHA–7 has seemingly been put to rest. Is that correct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. I’m interested in the way ahead. I’ll tell you, 

it’s wonderful to have such access to General Conway and Admiral 

Roughead on a one-to-one basis. There seems to be an interest in 

adding the well deck back for future ships because of the increased 

weight of the equipment now. 

General Flynn, do you support putting well deck back in for future LHAs? 

Secretary Stackley, is the Navy considering adding a well deck 

back to the follow-on to the LHA–7? 

General? 

General FLYNN. Sir, a couple of points on that. When the LHAs 

were first designed without the well deck, they were part of a larger program. MPF(F) was still one of the considerations. When 

thinking about the requirement for amphibious ships, we also had 

to take into account what the program was at the time when that 

was first laid in. 

Without the well deck, MPF(F) was also a viable program. That 

is no longer affordable, and we’ve made some adjustments there. In 

order to keep with the number of amphibious ships that we’re likely to see in the future, it’s important that you have as much flexibility as you can in the ship designs. That is why we’ve been working with the Navy and with Mr. Stackley to take a look at the feasibility of adding the well deck back into the ship that is currently 

programmed for fiscal year 2016. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. We’re looking at the feasibility. Do you 

advocate that, at this point? 

General FLYNN. Yes, sir. We believe that we do need the well 

deck back in to provide the flexibility, not just because of the added 

weight of some of the equipment, but also for the utility of the ship. 

The size of the fleet is not going to get any bigger than 33, for sure, 

in the immediate future. So, the more flexibility you can have in 

the ships that you have, the better off you’re going to be. 

Senator WICKER. How close are we to a decision in that regard? 

General FLYNN. Sir, it’s a POM–12 issue that we’re working 

through right now, as to which design would be the most feasible. 

Admiral BLAKE. Sir, we had Navy and Marine Corps warfighter 

talks earlier in the year. As a result of those talks, it was determined that we would look at the feasibility of the well deck in the 

2016 ship. 

Senator WICKER. Fiscal year 2016? 

48 

Admiral BLAKE. Yes, sir. The fiscal year 2016 ship. That is the 

current discussion that is going on between the Navy and the Marine Corps. 

Senator WICKER. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Just to cap it off. As we talked about last year, 

the discussion emerged, before last year’s hearing, regarding the 

well deck; and the timing, in order to try to insert a well deck for 

a fiscal year 2011 ship, it just was not feasible, either in terms of 

cost or schedule. 

What we have been doing in the meantime is taking a look at 

alternative approaches to getting back to a well deck big deck for 

the next LHA, LHA–8, which is a 2016 ship. We’re looking at a 

mod-repeat to the LHD–8. We’re looking at a LHA–6-based design 

with a well deck. Then we’re looking at something a bit beyond 

that that provides a hybrid of capability between the LHA without 

a well deck and the well deck itself. 

So, we are active right now, looking at those types of alternatives, so that when we come forward with POM–12, we have 

both a baseline and a design approach, leading to a fiscal year 2016 

procurement. 

Senator WICKER. I think that will wrap it up for me, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. 

I have one question on the EFV. The Commandant has made this 

the centerpiece of his forcible-entry strategy. But, it seems, with 

the procurement rate being so low, this vehicle would only be available at the full operational capability in 2025, with about 573 vehicles. 

Mr. Secretary and General Flynn, can you comment on the role 

of the EFV and its importance? If it is important, how does this 

production rate match the importance? 

I don’t know who wants to go first. 

Mr. STACKLEY. I’ll have General Flynn address the role and I’ll 

talk about the procurement approach. 

General FLYNN. Senator, on the EFV, it’s part of a larger ground 

tactical vehicle strategy; it’s just one piece of that. The role that it 

performs is the ability to get us quickly ashore, to be able to use 

the sea as maneuver space, but, at the other time, it’s designed to 

be a fighting vehicle onshore. So, it performs multiple roles. 

It has been sized to what we believe is the minimum requirement, which is a two-brigade-size assault. 

The key part of the program right now is, in accordance with the 

program restructure, the seven test vehicles are being delivered, 

starting last week. We’re going to go through the test phase so that 

we can make a final decision on the viability of the program after 

we see how the seven test vehicles perform. 

Senator REED. So, you’re reserving judgment. 

General FLYNN. I think a key part of the restructuring of the program was the delivery of the seven test vehicles, and then to see 

how those test vehicles met the restructured knowledge points, to 

see how they perform. 

Senator REED. We want them to succeed. But, if they fail, then 

you’re on to a new delivery system. 

49 

General FLYNN. If they don’t meet their knowledge point, sir, 

then we’re not going to stick with the program. They have to meet 

their performance parameters at each of the knowledge points. 

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, your comments. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The only thing to add is the history on 

the program. It did see cost growth early, and it also saw a significant reduction in the quantity that was planned for procurement 

by the Marine Corps; we proceeded with development and ran into 

some problems with testing and reliability, it hit a Nunn-McCurdy 

wall and was restructured. That was about 2 years ago. 

Since the restructuring, the focus has been on, let’s get the development right, so that we have a good firm baseline for production, 

recognizing that the out-year procurement rates are not optimal. 

So, you hit on it, that when you procure it at a lower rate, you’re 

going to drive some cost, and you also delay when you get your full 

operational capability. 

We have not made any adjustments to the out-year procurement 

in that regard. However, procurement was delayed a year on the 

front end, so we can get greater assurance that we have it right 

in the development. The program office and industry have been 

working, and doing a pretty credible job, in terms of at least giving 

the design and proofing the components. We’re just now taking delivery of the test vehicles, where we can actually get into some substantive data to back up the analysis, to give us greater confidence. 

Senator REED. This is a somewhat unrelated question, but it goes 

to the current operational tempo of all of the forces. How often are 

you exercising forcible entries within the Marine Corps today, General Flynn? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I wouldn’t say it’s, ‘‘how often do you exercise forcible entry?’’ I’d say it’s, ‘‘how often do you exercise seabased operations?’’ 

Senator REED. Right. 

General FLYNN. I would say that we’re doing it quite often. 

Senator REED. Okay. 

General FLYNN. There was the Haiti operation. We put two expeditionary units down there, plus an additional ship; the noncombat 

evacuation from Lebanon; scores of partnership engagements that 

take place around the globe throughout the year; the humanitarian 

relief that occurred last year with the expeditionary unit on its way 

to the Gulf; and other sea-based operations in the Central Command areas of operation. So, there are quite a lot of operations that 

are ongoing from the sea right now. 

Senator REED. I recognize that. 

But, it just strikes me that this is a cost to our land forces who 

are engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, that some of the skills that 

they would need for non-counterinsurgency are not being exercised 

a lot. You’re right, going to Haiti, moving marines across the beach 

is good. But, it’s not the same thing as simulating a forcible entry 

with air support and live fire, et cetera. Is that done as much as 

it should be done? 

General FLYNN. No, sir. That’s one of the guidances we got from 

the Commandant, to start doing that. What you’re going to see this 

year is an amphibious exercise done out at Camp Pendleton this 

50 

summer. This fall, you’re going to see exercise Bald Alligator done 

on the East Coast in Camp Lejeune. 

Senator REED. With the 82nd Airborne? 

General FLYNN. Sir, I think they might be doing something else. 

Senator REED. I’m addressing that to the former Deputy Commander of the 18th Airborne Corps. 

General FLYNN. Right. 

Senator REED. So, he keeps up with these airborne units. 

General FLYNN. Whenever we can bring in the other corps into 

the Marine Corps, we will. 

Senator REED. Right. 

Thank you, gentlemen, not only for this excellent testimony, but 

for your service to the Navy, to the Marine Corps, and to the Nation. Thank you very much. 

We will take any additional comments or statements my colleagues would like to submit for the record in the next several 

days. There may be questions addressed to you by members who 

were here or not here. I would ask you to respond promptly back 

to the committee. 

If there’s no other information, then the hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

NAVY SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

1. Senator WEBB. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, how is the Navy addressing its requirements for surface naval fires? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral BLAKE. As discussed in the fiscal year 2010 

Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) Report to Congress, NSFS is one leg of a fires 

triad which also includes fires delivered by tactical aircraft and ground systems. The 

relative contribution of each leg of the triad varies with the tactical scenario. The 

Navy has invested in an array of capabilities to strengthen the fires triad including 

advanced networking capabilities, unmanned airborne systems, ships and shipbased systems, and tactical aircraft precision delivered munitions. 

Advanced Networking Capabilities 

• Naval Fire Control System (NFCS) is a shipboard naval fires planning 

and coordination system designed to automate all shipboard fire support 

battle management duties. It provides an interface to the Advanced Field 

Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the gun weapon system, and forward entry devices. NFCS is installed in DDG–51 class ships hull number 

81–108 and will be installed in all future DDG–51 class destroyers. 

• Supporting Arms Coordination Center (Automated) is installed on all 

LHAs and LHDs. It provides an integrated capability to conduct fire support planning, coordination, and execution of all supporting arms fires—including NSFS, tactical aviation, and ground artillery and mortars ashore. 

This system is capable of integrating multi-service command and control 

systems aboard ship, including AFATDS and NFCS, to provide maximum 

situational awareness and a common operating picture. 

Unmanned Airborne Systems 

• The fielding and wider use of unmanned systems such as Predator, Global Hawk, Scan Eagle, and other systems provide a range of capabilities and 

endurance options. Increasingly, ground spotters are using these systems to 

improve their targeting. 

Ships and Ship-Based Systems 

• Counter Fire Radar. The ability to rapidly detect and engage enemy indirect fire decreases friendly casualties. The radar system on DDG–1000 will 

provide an expanded capability to provide sea-based counter fire in the littoral. 

• Tactical Tomahawk provides a precision, all weather, deep land attack 

capability. Today, Tactical Tomahawk is fielded on all vertical launching 

51 

system-equipped cruisers and destroyers. A version of Tactical Tomahawk 

Weapon Control System will also be fielded on DDG–1000 platforms and 

new construction DDG–51s. Various fleet exercises and operational test 

launches have demonstrated Tactical Tomahawk’s utility and effectiveness 

in the NSFS role, including the ability for a ground spotter to derive Tomahawk quality targeting in the field and the capability to in-flight redirect 

Tomahawk to the new field-generated target. 

• Five inch/62 guns for DDG–51 destroyers. The MK 45 Mod 4, 5 in/62 gun 

was introduced into the fleet in 2001 aboard USS Winston Churchill (DDG– 

81) and has since been installed on all new construction destroyers. 

• DDG–1000 destroyers with 155mm advanced gun systems and long-range 

land attack projectiles. The DDG–1000 program of record consists of three 

ships. Its primary mission is to provide sustained precision and volume 

fires at long ranges to support distributed joint and coalition forces ashore 

and to conduct independent attacks against land targets. 

• The electromagnetic rail gun is a promising technology that may become 

a key future naval land attack weapon. It uses electricity to launch projectiles at Mach 7, potentially propelling them up to 250 miles in about 6 minutes. 

Tactical Aircraft Precision Delivered Munitions 

• Over the past 20 years, the ability of Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation 

to prosecute targets ashore has increased significantly. Current investments in 

additional capabilities include: 

• Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) 

• Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) 

• Low Collateral Damage Bomb (LCDB) 

• Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC) 

• Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) 

• Harvest Hawk Airborne Weapon Mission Kit 

All of these systems contribute to the fires triad and work together to provide effective fire support from the sea in support of troops ashore. 

2. Senator WEBB. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, the NSFS requirement 

was to be addressed, in part, by the DDG–1000, but now that there are only three 

ships being procured, what capabilities have been identified to meet NSFS needs, 

and what is the anticipated timeline for testing and fielding such capabilities? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral BLAKE. Analysis shows that when considering 

all Department of the Navy investments—including NSFS, tactical aircraft, and 

strike missiles—the Navy-Marine Corps team can provide sufficient fires from the 

sea to cover all anticipated scenarios. Additional future capabilities being procured 

include: 

• Low Collateral Damage Bomb (LCDB) - currently in production 

• Direct Attack Moving Target Capability (DAMTC) - IOC 2010 

• Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) - IOC 2011 

• Harvest Hawk Airborne Weapon Mission Kit - IOC 2011 

• Advanced Gun System (DDG–1000) - IOC 2015 

• Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) - IOC 2015 

• Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) - IOC 2016 

• Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB II) - IOC 2016 

3. Senator WEBB. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, is the Navy assessing 

modular systems that could be deployed on a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to help 

satisfy Marine Corps requirements for surface fire support? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral BLAKE. LCS is being built to cover Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated warfighting gaps in littoral antisubmarine warfare, surface warfare, and counter-mine operations. The 2009 NSFS 

Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) examined the possibility of a modular fire support 

system for LCS. However, there is no requirement for LCS to conduct the NSFS 

mission, as the current complement of surface and air weapons is capable of delivering sufficient supporting fires ashore to meet NSFS requirements. 

4. Senator WEBB. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, what is the status of the 

AoA for Joint Fires Capabilities? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral BLAKE. The NSFS AoA is complete and has 

been submitted to the Secretary of the Navy. 

52 

5. Senator WEBB. Secretary Stackley and Admiral Blake, has the Marine Corps 

been consulted in determining what programs should be funded/supported and how 

soon they need to begin testing? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Marine Corps was an active partner in the NSFS AoA 

and in developing the fiscal year 2010 NSFS Report to Congress. Additionally, the 

Marine Corps is an active participant in developing the Department of the Navy’s 

annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission. 

MARINE CORPS SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT

6. Senator WEBB. General Flynn, what are the Marine Corps’ specific needs regarding naval fire support? 

General FLYNN. Accurate, timely, lethal, persistent, all-weather, long-range fires 

from U.S. Navy surface ships are essential for naval littoral operations. The Marine 

Corps requires naval surface fires that range 41 nautical miles, accounting for the 

over the horizon (OTH) distance of 25 nautical miles plus 16 nautical miles of coverage afforded by organic, ground-based indirect fire systems once ashore. Large 

area targets and targets classified as suppression targets may require that constant 

pressure be maintained for an extended period of time during joint forcible entry 

operations. The tactical assignment of direct support and the anticipated fire mission requirements are often responsive and defensive in nature. Direct support assignment speeds response and simplifies command and control through decentralization in ways not generally available with air support. NSFS would provide 

this capability until land-based indirect fire assets are ashore. 

7. Senator WEBB. General Flynn, what is the Marine Corps’ portion of the NSFS 

requirement, and how has the reduction in DDG–1000 procurement affected this requirement? 

General FLYNN. DDG–1000 platforms will provide the sole long-range NSFS 

ashore during joint forcible entry operations; reductions in program scope limit the 

Navy’s ability to fulfill this important tactical mission. As identified in papers from 

the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC, CD&I), the 

Marine Corps requires a range of 41 nautical miles for NSFS. This distance will provide the OTH range of 25 nautical miles plus 16 nautical miles of coverage, replicating organic ground-based indirect fire systems. With only three DDG–1000s 

being produced, and all three being stationed on the west coast, the Navy may be 

limited in its ability to react to multiple LCO engagements simultaneously, or provide fires to all battalions ashore during an MCO. Additionally, if there is not a 

DDG–1000 on station when needed, the Navy would be unable to continuously meet 

the Marine Corps’ 41 nautical mile range, volume, and responsiveness requirements 

for NSFS. With normal Navy deployment and maintenance cycles, the triad of fires 

may be degraded to the point that the ground commander will not always have adequate fire support available when and where he needs it. The Navy’s NDAA Section 

125 Shipbuilding Acquisition Strategy is asking for an increase in DDG–51s. While 

the DDG–1000 and its Advanced Gun System are critical elements needed to close 

the NSFS gap, the Arleigh Burke class destroyers, outfitted with the MK–45 Mod 

4 5-inch/62 gun mount, have the potential to provide accurate and lethal fires at 

extended ranges when firing extended range munitions. This solution was one of the 

top performing alternatives in the NSFS AoA, and could augment the production of 

the DDG–1000s. 

8. Senator WEBB. General Flynn, what alternative capabilities are being pursued? 

General FLYNN. The Marine Corps concurred with the results of the draft NSFS 

AoA which identified several promising near-term NSFS technology options, to include the complementary development of an extended range 5-inch guided projectile 

and extended range precision attack missiles. These enhancements would augment 

the 155mm advanced gun system (AGS) and long-range land attack projectiles 

(LRLAP) of the DDG–1000 program, and help fulfill the Marine Corps 41 nautical 

mile range, volume, and responsiveness requirements for NSFS. The Marine Corps 

also endorses continued technology development of the electromagnetic rail gun 

(EMRG) as a future NSFS capability. 

9. Senator WEBB. General Flynn, how is the Marine Corps working with the Navy 

to develop NSFS capabilities? 

General FLYNN. Through the Naval Surface Fires Support AoA, the Marine Corps 

provided subject matter expert input for its NSFS requirements. The outcome of the 

draft analysis weighed the range, volume, and responsiveness requirements of the 

53 

Marine Corps before the final alternatives were selected for recommendation. We 

have also provided input to the Navy regarding the future development of the advanced gun system and long-range land attack projectile. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

SHIPBUILDING

10. Senator VITTER. Secretary Stackley, I’m very concerned about the impact of 

the shipbuilding budget on the shipbuilding industrial base, and in particular, the 

effect on the Avondale shipyard in Louisiana. With statements from the Department 

of Defense (DOD) that future shipbuilding funding will at least be stagnant if not 

reduced, I would like the Navy to really focus on that impact on jobs and the industrial base as well as our Armed Forces. When can we expect to see the Shipbuilding 

Industrial Base Study? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition) has chartered an independent entity to develop and provide 

a publicly available, comprehensive, and independent assessment of the Navy shipbuilding industrial base. The shipbuilding assessment aims to produce a publicly 

available report at the time the fiscal year 2012 budget and the fiscal year 2012– 

2016 FYDP are submitted to Congress, expected to be early February 2011. 

11. Senator VITTER. Secretary Stackley, when the Navy examines the capabilities 

and capacities as well as the health of the base, will that cause the Navy to make 

significant changes, such as moving ships to the left in order to support the industrial base? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request represents 

the best balance of resources, requirements, and industrial base. The Navy’s 30-year 

shipbuilding plan submitted with the fiscal year 2011 budget request takes into account the importance of level loading of ship procurement to help sustain minimum 

employment levels and skill retention in order to promote a healthy U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. 

12. Senator VITTER. Secretary Stackley, if the study finds that the budget is not 

enough to support a robust industrial base or sustain the existing base, what would 

you recommend for the existing shipyards that may not have enough work because 

of the budget? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s Long Range Plan for Ship Construction Report 

to Congress submitted with the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget plan balances 

needs against expected resources, and assesses the risks associated with DOD’s balancing efforts. Further, the plan aims to maintain the shipbuilding design and industrial base necessary to build and sustain tomorrow’s Navy, while providing opportunities for the industrial base to compete for future shipbuilding contracts. Ultimately, the Navy working with industry must stem the trends in cost growth in 

order to achieve our shipbuilding objective within projected budgets, and this will 

require increased efficiencies in the way we design, build, and buy our ships. Accordingly, to sustain their business base of Navy shipbuilding, U.S. shipyards must 

continue to strive for efficiencies to improve their competitive posture. 

To this end, the Navy fosters programs such as the National Shipbuilding Research Program and the Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) Program that provide recommendations on facility improvements and efficiency efforts. The Industrial Base Innovation Fund, in its third year, is administered by ManTech and has 

been funded through congressional plus-ups to the President’s defense budget. Further, U.S. shipyards can promote future growth by pursuing expansion of its commercial shipbuilding base through a Shipbuilding Capability Preservation Agreement application to the Secretary of the Navy. 

13. Senator VITTER. Secretary Stackley, do you think the current shipbuilding 

budget is enough to sustain the shipbuilding workforce? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s shipbuilding plan, in many instances, reflects recapitalizations based on projected ship retirements. The plan also includes competition opportunities for the shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy continues to work 

with the shipbuilding industry to reduce the cost of our platforms which may allow 

additional recapitalization. 

14. Senator VITTER. Secretary Stackley, Secretary of Defense Gates said this week 

that ‘‘I do not foresee any significant top-line increases in the shipbuilding budget 

54 

beyond current assumptions.’’ Do you agree with Secretary Gates that the Navy 

should make no plans for increasing the shipbuilding budget? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s Long Range Plan for ship construction Report to 

Congress submitted with the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request outlines 

the shipbuilding top line assumptions for the next 30 years. In this report, the Navy 

provides the plan for ship procurement to meet force structure requirements based 

on an average of $15.9 billion per year shipbuilding budget (constant dollar fiscal 

year 2010), which represents an approximate 20 percent increase in shipbuilding 

compared to the past decade. 

While the average shipbuilding budget has remained steady over the last few 

years, a significant change in the fiscal year 2011 report is the inclusion of the ballistic missile submarine recapitalization from within Navy’s anticipated total obligation authority. During the years in which the new submarine is being procured, the 

Navy’s shipbuilding plan projects an increase in the shipbuilding budget to approximately $18 billion per year (approximately 45 percent increase relative to the past 

decade). The risks and challenges associated with projecting this level increase in 

shipbuilding budgets in the outyears are self-evident and therefore we are assessing 

impacts and alternatives to ensure the future force and industrial base that will 

support it are best postured to meet the national maritime requirement. The Navy 

has looked more closely at where it would be willing to assume risk for the future 

and not procure those ships which are not absolutely necessary in executing the 

missions for which the Navy is solely responsible. In completing this review, the 

Navy has balanced the anticipated risk in the period with the uncertainties of the 

future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources, and requirements possible. 

The Navy recognizes that topline increases to the shipbuilding budget above this 

amount are unlikely. Therefore, the Navy will continue to drive for affordability initiatives into our shipbuilding programs while prioritizing our ship construction 

budget to best meet our warfighting requirements. 

15. Senator VITTER. Secretary Stackley, for the LCS, do you believe the competition is on track and when do you expect to finalize the process and select the final 

design? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The fiscal year 2010 LCS competition is on track. Proposals 

from the competitors were received on April 12, 2010. The Navy is evaluating these 

proposals and anticipates awarding a contract in summer 2010. 

[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

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