UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_______________________________________ ) THOMAS TRAN ex rel. ) ESTATE OF TUYET THI LE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-2119 (RBW) ) ANTHONY CARR, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _______________________________________) MEMORANDUM OPINION The plaintiff, Thomas Tran, the personal re presentative of the es tate of Tuyet Thi Le (“Ms. Le”), filed this action in th e Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“Superior Court”) against Anthony Carr (“Mr. Carr”), the Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (the “Pa. Insurance Co.”), and the American Intern ational Group (the “AI Group”), seeking damages and insurance policy benefits arising from an automobile accident that occurred in November 2007. See generally Notice of Removal (Plaintiff’s Comp laint for Negligence and Declaratory Judgment (“Compl.”)). The case wa s removed to this Court, id. , and thereafter the plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of Mr. Carr. Do cket Entry Number 20 (Stipulation of Partial Dismissal). Currently before the Court are the plaintiff’s motion for pa rtial summary judgment, and the Pa. Insurance Co.’s and the AI Group’s (c ollectively, the “defendants”) cross-motion for summary judgment. 1 After considering the parties’ writte n submissions and the record before it,

1 The Court also considered the following papers in reso lving the parties’ motions: (1) Plaintiff Thomas Tran’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Mem.”) (this Memorandum contains a statement of undisputed f acts); (2) Plaintiff Thomas Tran’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Opposition to Defendants’ Insurance Company of the Stat e of Pennsylvania and American International Group Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Opp’n”); (3) Pl aintiff Thomas Tran’s Reply to Defendants Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania and American Interna tional Group, Inc.’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for (continued...)2 for the reasons set forth below the Court must deny the plaintiff’s motion and grant summary judgment to the defendants.

I. BACKGROUND The facts giving rise to this lawsuit are not in dispute. On November 15, 2007, an automobile driven by Mr. Carr struck and killed Ms. Le as she was crossing the street as a pedestrian at the intersection of Connecticut Avenue and Ellico t Street in the District of

Columbia. Pl.’s Mem. at 1-2. Mr. Carr had automobile insurance with another insurance company, and that company eventually paid th e plaintiff the full policy limit of $25,000. Id. at 3. At the time of the accident, Ms. Le was liv ing with her daughter, Khanh Mai Do (“Ms. Do”), who was employed as the deputy defens e attaché at the Embassy of Vietnam (the “Embassy”). Id. at 2. The defendants provided automob ile insurance to the Embassy. Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 1. See generally Defs.’ Mem., Exhibit (“Ex.”) A (Certif icate of Liability Insurance) (the “Policy”). 2 The Policy covered two automobiles, a 2003 Mercury Grand Marquis and a 2006 Toyota Sienna, Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 1, which Ms. Do ha d access to as part of her employment, Pl.’s Mem. at 2. Significantly, neither car was involved in the accident. Defs.’ Stmt. ¶ 7; Notice of Removal (Compl. ¶ 7).

(. . . continued) Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Reply”); (4) Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute in Support of Defendants’ Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania and American International Group, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’ Stmt.”); (5) Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants’ Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania and Amer ican International Group, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judg[]ment (“Defs.’ Mem.”); and (6) Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants’ Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania and American Internatio nal Group, Inc.’s Oppos ition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judg[]ment (“Defs.’ Opp’n”). The defendant has not numbered the pages of his briefs, see Defs.’ Mem.; Defs.’ Opp’n, and the Court will therefore cite to these documents as if the pages were numbered in sequential order.

2 Both parties have submitted copies of the Policy as attachments to their filings. See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A; Pl.’s Mem., Ex. 1. Neither party, however, has numbered the pages of the Policy. The Court notes that the Policy is sixteen pages long, and when citing to the Policy in this Me morandum Opinion the Court will refer to the pages as if they had been numbered in sequential order.3 In relevant part, the Policy provides for $100,000 in uninsured motorist benefits. Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A, at 1. According to the Policy, The [Pa. Insurance Co.] will pay al l sums which the insured or his legal representative shall be lega lly entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury or property damage sustained by the insured, caused by accident and arising out of ow nership, maintenance or use of such uninsured automobiles. [ 3 ]

Id. at 13. The term “insured” is not define d in the uninsured motorist provision, see id. however, it is defined elsewhere in the Policy, in part, as “the named insured and resident relatives legally responsible for the use thereof, provided the actua l use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission. The insurance with resp ect to any person or orga nization other than the named insured does not apply.” Id. at 7. On the page of the Policy entitled “Certificat e of Liability Insurance,” the entity listed as the “insured” is the “Embassy of Vietnam Defense Office.” Id. at 1. Several pages later, on the renewal declarations page for the “Diplomat Auto Program,” the “Named Insured” is designated

as the “Vietnam Defense Attache.” 4 Id. at 4. Ms. Do’s name appears in the Policy in two places: she is named as one of the four “Primary Driver[s]” of the 2 003 Grand Marquis, id. at 5, and she is listed under the heading “D river Information,” which include s “drivers who frequently use

3 The term “uninsured automobile” is defined as follows: an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of which there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally garaged, no bodily injury and property damage liability bond, or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile, or with respect to which there is a bodily injury or property damage liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing the sa me denies coverage thereunder. Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 13.

4 According to the plaintiff, the defe nse attaché for the Embassy at the time of the accident was Toan Nguyen. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.4 [their] own vehicles.” Id. at 2. Ms. Le’s name does not appear anywhere in the Policy. See id.

at 1-16. As noted earlier, the plaintiff commenced th is lawsuit in the S uperior Court seeking damages of one million dollars from Mr. Carr, Notice of Removal (Compl. ¶¶ 8-12), 5 and a declaratory judgment that the defendants ow e him $100,000 pursuant to the uninsured motorist provision in the Policy. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-19). The defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court, invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1364 (2006), a direct action statute gr anting federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction in any civil action, regardless of th e amount in controversy, filed by any person against an insurer who by contract in sures a member of a diplomatic mission. Notice of Removal ¶ 5; see 28 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (“The district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction, without rega rd to the amount in controversy, of any civil action commenced by any person against an insurer who by contract has insure d an individual, who is, or was at the time of the tortious act or omission, a member of a missi on (within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Diplomatic Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 254a(3))) or a member of the family of such a member of a mission . . . .”). 6 The defendants admit issuing the Policy to the Embassy, but deny that Ms. Do was a named insured and further deny that the in surance coverage extended to Ms. Le. See Notice of Removal (Answer of Defendants Insura nce Company of the State of Pennsylvania and American International Group, Inc. ¶ 14). Both parties now seek summary judgment.

5 On August 31, 2009, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case against Mr. Carr . Docket Entry Number 20 (Stipulation of Partial Dismissal).

6 22 U.S.C.§ 254a(3), the provision of the Diplomatic Relations Act referenced in 28 U.S.C. § 1364(a), explains that “the term ‘mission’ includes missions within the meaning of the Vienna Convention and any missions representing foreign governments, individually or coll ectively, which are extended the same privileges and immunities, pursuant to law, as are enjoyed by missions under the Vienna Convention.” See 22 U.S.C. § 254a(3). In turn, Article 1 of the Vienna Convention defines “members of a mission” as “the head of the mission and the members of the staff of the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes art. 1, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 1972 WL 122692.5 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Courts will grant a motion for summary j udgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) if “the pleadings, depositions, the discove ry and disclosure mate rials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, courts must view the eviden ce in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving party. Bayer v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury , 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The nonmoving party, however, cannot rely on “mere allegations or de nials . . . , but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] genuine issue[ s] for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (citation and internal quotati on marks omitted). Under Rule 56, “if a party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” summ ary judgment is warranted. Hazward v. Runyon , 14 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the absence of evidence that supports the non-moving party’s case. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, “the court must draw all reasonable in ferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determ inations or weigh the evidence. ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Prods. Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (citations om itted). Finally, “when ruling on crossmotions for summary judgment, the court sha ll grant summary judgment only if one of the moving parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law upon material facts that are not genuinely in dispute.” Teva Ph arm. Indus. Ltd. v. Food & Drug Admin. , 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 116 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting Barr Labs., Inc. v. Thompson , 238 F. Supp. 2d, 236, 244 (D.D.C. 2002).6 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The central issue for the Court is wh ether Ms. Le qualifies as an insured under the Policy. The plaintiff argues that because the Policy lists Ms. Do as a driver in two places, and because a column adjacent to one of those listings “has a category for ‘Additional Insured [and] Loss Payee,” Ms. Do therefore qualifies as a na med insured. Pl.’s Mem. at 5; see also Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 5. The plaintiff then claims that because the Policy defines the term “insured” in part as

“the insured and resident relativ es,” Ms. Do’s status as an in sured therefore extends to her mother, Ms. Le. Pl.’s Mem. at 5-6. According to the plaintiff, interpreting the Policy in this

fashion would be “consistent with the reasonab le expectations of th e Defense Attaché, the purchaser of the . . . [P]olicy,” id. at 7, and fulfill “the importa nt [public] policy function of protecting innocent victims . . . ag ainst uninsured motorists.” Id. at 8. For their part, the defendants emphasize that “the only named ‘insured’” under the unambiguous language of the Policy is the Embassy. Defs.’ Mem. at 2 (emphasis in original). More specifically, the defendants as sert that Ms. Do is not an “i nsured,” that Ms. Le was not a resident of the “insured’s” household, and that neither of the two cars covered by the Policy had any involvement in the underlying automobile accident. 7 Id. Thus, the defendants maintain that

Ms. Le “has no contact ” to the Policy and therefore they do no t owe benefits to the plaintiff. Id. (emphasis in original). Upon re viewing the Policy and the appli cable legal authority, the Court finds the defendants’ position more convincing.

7 The defendants even claim that if Ms. Do was the pedestrian struck by Mr. Carr, the uninsured motorist coverage would still not extend to her because she is not an insured and was not operating either of th e insured vehicles at the time of the accident. Defs.’ Mem. at 6 n.1.7 Under District of Columbia law, 8 an “insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer, and in construing it [the court] must first look to the language of the contract.”

Travelers Indem. Co. of Ill. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union , 770 A.2d 978, 986 (D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitte d) (quoting Cameron v. USAA Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co. , 733 A.2d 965, 968 (D.C. 1999)). “[U]nless it is obvious that words which appear in an

insurance contract are intended to be used in a technical connotation, they will be given the meaning which common speech imports.” Chase v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 780 A.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pa. Indem. Fire Corp. v. Aldridge , 117 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1941)). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the Court.

Dist. No. 1-Pac. Coast Dist. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. , 782 A.2d 269, 274 (D.C. 2001) (citation omitted). “A contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties dispute its meaning”

or could have drafted clearer terms. Id. (citations omitted); see Byrd v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 622 A.2d 691, 693-94 (D.C. 1993) (“We need not deem a contract ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on the interpre tation of the contract provisi on in question.”). Similarly, a contract “is not ambiguous where the court can determine its m eaning without any other guide than a knowledge of the simple facts on which, fr om the nature of language in general, its meaning depends.” Wash. Props., Inc., v. Chin, Inc. , 760 A.2d 546, 548 (D.C. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holland v. Hannan , 456 A.2d 807, 815 (D.C. 1983)).

8 District of Columbia law applies in this case because the Policy does not contain a choice of law provision, see Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 1-16, and neither party discusses choice of law in their briefs and both rely only on District of Columbia cases for the applicable legal standards governing contract interpretation. See generally Pl.’s Mem.; Pl.’s Opp’n; Pl.’s Reply; Defs.’ Mem.; Defs.’ Opp’n. Both parties therefore assume that District of Columbia law applies, and “[t]he Court need not and does not question [t heir] assumptions on that point.” Davis v. Grant Park Nursing Home LP , 639 F. Supp. 2d. 60, 65 (D.D.C. 2009); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. , 82 F.3d 478, 482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (indicating that parties may waive choice of law arguments); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983 , 932 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Unlike jurisdictional issues, courts need not address choice of law questions sua sponte .”).8 On the other hand, a “contract is ambiguous wh en it is, or the provisions in controversy are, reasonably or fairly suscepti ble of different constructions or interpretations or of two or more different meanings.” Holland , 456 A.2d at 815 (internal quota tion marks omitted) (quoting Burbridge v. Howard Univ. , 305 A.2d 245, 247 (D.C. 1973)). “If there is more than one interpretation that a reasonable pe rson could ascribe to the contract , while viewing the contract in context of the circumstances surrounding its making, the contract is ambiguous.” Gryce v.

Lavine , 675 A.2d 67, 69 (D.C. 1996) (citation omitted). With respect to ambiguous insurance policies, “if its language is reasonably open to tw o constructions, the one most favorable to the insured will be adopted[, and a]ny fair doubt as to the meaning of its own words should be resolved against the insurer.” Chase , 780 A.2d at 1127 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aldridge , 117 F.2d at 775); see also Smalls v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co , 678 A.2d 32, 35 (D.C. 1996) (“[C]ourts gene rally interpret any ambiguous provisions [in an insurance contract] in a manner consistent with the reasonable expectati ons of the purchaser of the policy.”) (citations omitted). With these principles in mind, the Court turns to the facts in this

case. As noted earlier, in the section of the Policy that defines the term “[i]nsured,” the Policy provides that the “unqualified wo rd ‘insured’ includes the named insured and resident relatives legally responsible for the use thereof, provided th e actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with his permission. The insurance w ith respect to any person or organization other than the named insured does not apply.” Defs.’ Me m., Ex. A at 7. As an initial point, the Court observes that by its plain terms, the scope of insurance coverage encompassed under the definition of the term “insured” applies only to the defendants’ obliga tion to “indemnify the insured for all sums which he [or she] shall beco me legally obligated to pay as damages because9 of bodily injury . . . [or] injury to or destruction of property . . . .” Id. Therefore, because the accident was caused by Mr. Carr and not the “insured” or any of the authorized drivers listed in the Policy, the definition of insured is simply not applicable under the facts in this case. See Pl.’s Mem. at 1-2. As a result, it follows that the Policy does not apply ei ther, and for that reason the plaintiff’s claim must fail. See Travelers Idem. Co. of Ill. , 770 A.2d at 986 (“[W]hen . . . contracts are clear and unambiguous, they will be enforced by the courts as written . . . .” (quoting Smalls , 678 A.2d at 35)). And even if the Court accepte d the plaintiff’s contention that the Policy applies in this case, Pl.’s Mem. at 5-6, the outcome would stil l be the same. As discussed earlier, the

“Certificate of Liab ility Insurance” specifically designate s the “Embassy of Vietnam Defense Office” as the “insured,” Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 1, and similarly, on the renewal declaration page of the Policy, the “Vietnam Defense Attache” is identified as the “Nam ed Insured[.]” Id. at 4. In contrast, both references to Ms. Do identify her on ly as either a frequent or one of the primary

drivers of the two vehicles covered by the Policy, and neither reference to her uses the word

“insured.” See Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 2, 5. Consequent ly, while Ms. Do would be insured while operating one of the two covered vehicles, it do es not make her the named “insured” under the Policy. See, e.g. , Lester v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 586 F. Supp. 2d 559, 572 (D.S.C. 2008) (“To the extent [p]laintiff argues he is entitled to [uninsured motorist] bene fits simply because he was listed on the Policy as an ‘insured driver,’ the court disagrees.”). The fact Ms. Do’s name appears in a column adjacent to another column where the word “insured” appears, Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 5, does not change this result. Accepting the plaintiff’s interp retation would lead to some peculiar consequences. For example, under the plaintiff’s theory, benefits would be payable under th e Policy to any relative10 residing with a driver listed on the Policy who ha ppened to be involved in an accident with an uninsured motorist, whether or not any of the car s covered by the Policy were involved. As the defendants correctly point out, Defs.’ Mem. at 6, acco rding to the plaintiff’s logic, if Ms. Do had a daughter residing with her and she was hit by an uninsured motorist wh ile crossing the street on a school trip to Utah, the child would be entitled to recover under the Policy. And remarkably, the plaintiff opines that such a resu lt would be legally appropriate, stating that coverage of the daughter in that situation “would be nothing more than would be included in a standard personal automobile po licy.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6-7. But the plaintiff is mistaken, the major flaw with her supposition being that it conveniently omits key language from the Policy’ s definition of “insured .” Specifically, the

definition of insured refers to the “actual use of the automobile . . . by the named insured or with his [or her] permission.” Defs.’ Mem., Ex. A at 7 (emphasis added). The definition of “insured”

is therefore linked to the “actua l use” of one of the two automo biles covered by the Policy, and the plaintiff’s reasoning overlooks the critical fact that neither vehicle had any involvement in

the accident in this case. See Pl.’s Mem. at 1-2. Indeed, by the plaintiff’s own admission, the only vehicle involved here was driven by Mr. Carr. Id. at 1; Notice of Removal (Compl. ¶ 7). Accordingly, the Court can not draw a connect ion between the accident and the scope of the coverage provided by the Policy, an d may not rewrite the Policy in order to create one. See

Chase 780 A.2d at 1127 (“[The Court] may not ‘indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insu rer.’” (quoting Cameron , 733 A.2d at 968)); see also Unfoldment, Inc. v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd. , 909 A.2d 204, 209 (D.C. 2006) (“A court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflec ted in the settled usag e of the terms they accepted in the contract . . . and will not torture words to import ambigu ity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room11 for ambiguity.”) (citations and internal quot ation marks omitted); 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. , 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C. 1984) (“The wr iting must be interpreted as a whole, giving a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all of its terms .”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Do is not an “insured” under the Policy, and therefore, it follows that her mother , Ms. Le, is not an “insured” either. Although there does not appear to be a District of Columbia case directly on point, the defendants point to a Maryland ca se, Schuler v. Erie Ins. Exch. , 568 A.2d 873 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied , 572 A.2d 183 (Md. 1990), which they conte nd is factually analogous to the

one here. 9 See Defs.’ Mem. at 6-7. In that case, the plaintiff was standing next to his car, a 1983 Camaro, when he was struck and injured by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist.

Schuler , 568 A.2d at 874. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff’s wife had automobile insurance providing for uninsured motorist cove rage through a policy issued by her employer, Rainbow Hair Designers. Id. Rainbow Hair Designers was the named insured under the wife’s policy, id. , and that policy covered five cars, including her 1980 BMW, an automobile which had

no involvement in the accident with the plaintiff. Id. at 874, 875 n.2. After the accident, the plaintiff sought benefits under his wife’s po licy, because her policy had a higher limit for

uninsured motorist covera ge than his policy. Id. at 875. In reviewing the language of the policy, th e Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover da mages under his wife’s policy because he was “not

covered as either the subscriber or as the named insured.” Id. at 877. The court noted that “if [the employer] had intended to include the owners of the five cars as named insureds it could have done so simply by including the named indi viduals under the named insured portion of the

9 The plaintiff argues Schuler is inapplicable because the language of th e policy in that case is different and also because it deals with a commerci al automobile policy rather than a diplomatic automobile policy. Pl.’s Reply at 1.12 declaration sheet in the policy.” Id. at 878. In addition, the court observed that even if the wife had “been struck while standing beside the [pla intiff’s] Camaro . . . the [insurance] policy” would still not provide coverage for her. Id. at 877.

To the extent Schuler is deserving of “special attention,” Dennis v. Walker , 284 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D.D.C. 1968), the Court generally agrees with its conclusion. See Walker v. Independence Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 555 A.2d 1019, 1022 (D.C. 1989) (“In the absence of appellate or other authority in [the District of Columbia], th e Court may be guided by Maryland common law.”); Napoleon v. Heard , 455 A.2d 901, 903 (D.C. 1983) (ind icating that Maryland is

“the source of the District’s common law and an especially persuasive authority when the District’s common law is silent”). Indeed, in this case, if the Embassy intended to make the drivers of the covered vehicles the “insureds,” it could have done so by designating them as such on the Policy, and that was not done. In any event, there is legal authority fr om other jurisdictions supporting the Court’s determination concerning Ms. Do, namely that “one listed in the policy, but only in the status of a driver of the vehicle, is not a named insure d despite the fact that such person’s name was physically in the policy.” 7A Lee R. Ru ss & Tomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 110:1 (3d ed. 2005); see Lester , 586 F. Supp. 2d at 572; Kitmirides v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co. , 783 A.2d 1079, 1084 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (“[W]e conclude that a person who is a listed driver on the declarations page of an automobile insuran ce policy, and who is nowhere else listed as an insured, is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage.”); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Wilkerson , 549 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“A lthough [son of named insured] may be [covered under policy] because he is an authorized driver of the insured vehicle, he is not the named insured.”); Little v. Progressive Ins. , 783 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“‘Named13 insured’ is . . . not synonymous with ‘drive r.’”); Eldridge v. Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. , 270 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (citi ng cases showing car insuran ce policies are not ambiguous if they do not define the term “dri ver”)); Hodges v. Pa. Nat. Ins. Co. , 615 A.2d 1259, 1261 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“[A]lthough [the ] plaintiff is insured under her mother’s policy, as would be any driver op erating the car with the mother’s permission, only the mother is the titled ‘insured’ on the policy.”) ; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams , 472 S.E.2d 220, 222 (N.C. App. 1996) (“[W]e reject the . . . contenti on that the term ‘driver’ is synonymous with ‘named insured.’”). IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the disputed te rms of the insurance Policy at issue in this case are unambiguous and that Ms. Le does not qualify for uninsured motorist benefits under the Policy that is the su bject of this litigati on. Accordingly, summary judgment is awarded to the defendants. SO ORDERED this 21st day of April, 2010. 10

/s/ REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Court Judge

10 This Memorandum Opinion accompanies the Order that was issued on March 31, 2010, and the Final Order issued on April 21, 2010.