FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCTOBER 2, 2007

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 05-16010

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 01-01430-CV-MHT-CSC

TONY LEE SMITH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

versus 

RICHARD F. ALLEN, et al., 

Defendants, 

STEVE WALKER, Chaplain, 

WILLIE WHITING, Chaplain, 

BILL LINDSEY, Chaplain, 

ANTHONY ASKEW, Chaplain, 

DONAL CAMPBELL, Commissioner, 

ALBERT MURRAY, Deputy Commissioner, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

_________________________

(October 2, 2007)
 For a thorough and helpful discussion of the tenets of Odinism / Asatru, see Rust v. 1

Clarke, 883 F. Supp. 1293, 1297-98 (D. Neb. 1995) and Borzych v. Frank, 340 F. Supp. 2d 955,

960 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (discussing additional aspects of Odinism). See also Odinic Rite,

Questions and Answers About the OR and Odinism, http://www.odinic-rite.org/qa.htm (last

2

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and BIRCH and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant Tony Lee Smith, a prison inmate, brought this action

against a number of members of the Religious Activities Review Committee of the

Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), contending that these members

had violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 through § 2000cc-5, as well as his

constitutional rights, by declining him permission to possess certain items in

connection with his practice of Odinism. Smith sought injunctive relief and

monetary damages. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendant-appellees, and Smith now appeals. For the reasons set forth in this

opinion, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

I. BACKGROUND

Smith is presently an inmate at the Kilby Correctional Facility in Mt. Meigs,

Alabama. At the time this action was commenced, Smith was an inmate at the

Limestone Correctional Facility in Capshaw, Alabama. Smith is a practitioner of

Odinism, an ancient pre-Christian faith also known as Asatru. Odinism’s theology 1
visited Aug. 1, 2007). 

3

is grounded in ancient Icelandic sagas and runic mysticism. Adherents to the

religion strive to attain the “Nine Noble Virtues,” which are described as courage,

truth, honor, fidelity, discipline, hospitality, industriousness, self-reliance, and

perseverance. To attain these virtues, members of the Odinist faith must

communicate with the ancient Norse gods and goddesses–by studying runes,

practicing rites on specified days of the week, and observing the major Odinist

holidays. See R1-8, Exh. B4; Rust, 883 F. Supp. at 1298.

During his incarceration, Smith submitted a series of requests to the

Religious Review Committee of the ADOC, seeking approval of certain practices

in connection with his practice of Odinism. In February 2001, Smith first

requested permission to light a small fire; permission to observe the Odinist rites

on specified days of the week; and permission for a designated area at the prison

site for him to conduct his worship. The ADOC granted Smith’s request to

practice his Odinist religion and to receive Odinist literature, but denied his request

to have a designated area for worship, based on its concern that doing so would

pose security concerns and “could easily result in violence against other inmates

and staff,” and the assertion that “[t]his religion also promotes racial superiority

and is a popular front for hate groups.” R1-8, Exh. D; see also id. Exh. C. Shortly
4

thereafter, in November 2001, Smith filed this lawsuit, alleging violations of

RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause.

While Smith’s lawsuit was pending, in June 2003 Smith submitted a

supplemental request to the ADOC Religious Activities Review Committee, this

time requesting the following: one small quartz crystal; one religious necklace in

the shape of “Thor’s hammer,” R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 3; permission from the ADOC

to light a pine wood fire in a “small fire pit, approximately 9'' in diameter and 9''

deep,” id. at 2; permission to observe Thursday (“Thor’s Day”) as a designated day

of worship, id.; and a formal recognition of Odinism by the ADOC. Id. at 1. 

Smith was advised by a Chaplain with the ADOC that the Chaplain would

personally review the request; the Chaplain later stated that, in a discussion with

Smith, he had told him that

after [Smith’s] filing the request, with authoritative sources,

validating the requests, [the request] would be reviewed by me

and then [the Warden], who were different reviewers at the

institutional level . . . Inmate Smith’s requests would then be

sent to the Religious Activities Review Committee with the

scholarly, authoritative sources validating his claims for these

requests. I stressed the importance of identifiable[,]

authoritative sources, which scholars and/or his specific faith

community collectively recognize.

Id., Exh. K at 3.
 Apparently, Nebraska’s prison system houses a large number of Odinists. See generally 2

Rust, 883 F. Supp. 1293. 

5

In connection with Smith’s pending request, Smith had a friend who was

outside of the prison system submit additional sources on Odinism–via mail–to the

ADOC Chaplain. The Chaplain, however, advised Smith that he found that the

sources “may be okay, but that they were incomplete and sketchy since they did

not give information on the basic [tenets] of the religion itself or reference further

sources that could be accessed by me.” Id. at 4. Consequently, the Chaplain

sought to “gather more informative sources on [his] own,” including having

discussions with a Chaplain in a prison in Nebraska about the doctrinal 2

underpinnings of Odinism, and locating additional background sources on the

religion. Id. After the Chaplain had “gather[ed] information” and “research[ed]

the [credibility]” of Smith’s requests, he submitted Smith’s case to the ADOC

Religious Activities Review Committee (“the Committee”) for a final decision. Id. 

After conducting a meeting to discuss Smith’s request, the Committee

rendered a decision in October 2003. The Committee’s decision was as follows. 

First, the Committee granted Smith’s request for a religious necklace in the shape

of Thor’s hammer. The Committee also granted Smith’s request to use a

ceremonial fire in connection with his practice of Odinism, albeit “in the form of a

candle in a private secure place.” R2-98, Exh. M at 2. The Committee granted
6

Smith’s request to have a special day of the week–Thursday / Thor’s Day–to

practice the Odinist rites. It also granted Smith’s requests to recognize a total of

four Odinist holidays; to possess runes to use in connection with his religious

study; and to use and possess a small, fern tree twig “in a manner that would not

jeopardize security.” Id. With respect to Smith’s request to have Odinism

recognized by the ADOC, the Committee stated that the request was granted,

insofar as the ADOC agreed to formally recognize Smith’s right to independently

practice Odinism, including his right to have “literature, space, and [] approved

paraphernalia.” Id. at 1. 

The Committee declined the following aspects of Smith’s request. First, it

declined Smith’s request to possess a small crystal, due to a “lack of supporting

materials validating a need for this item.” Id. Second, the Committee denied

Smith’s request for a “designated place of worship” to perform the Odinist rites. 

Id. at 2. With respect to this issue, the Committee expressed concern that

Odinism’s alleged connections with Neo-Nazism and white supremacist beliefs

would pose security problems in the prison, were Odinism to be granted a

designated area of worship in the open, common area of the prison. The

Committee, however, advised Smith that he would be granted a secure location to

practice his Odinist rites, stating: “[w]hen a secure place of worship is required,
 The defendant-appellees filed a number of “Special Reports” addressing Smith’s 3

arguments and his claims for relief. The magistrate judge subsequently chose to collectively

construe these “Special Reports” as a motion for summary judgment. The propriety of that

decision is not before us on appeal, and therefore, we do not address it. See AT&T Broadband v.

Tech Commc’ns Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1320 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised on appeal

are considered abandoned.”) (citation omitted). Rather, for purposes of this appeal, we will

assume that the magistrate judge acted properly in construing the “Special Reports”–and the

responses thereto–as motions for summary judgment. 

7

the Warden and the Chaplain may designate a suitable location for Smith to

conduct his rites.” Id. Finally, the Committee declined Smith’s request for a fire

pit, limiting him instead to a small candle. 

 Smith was released from imprisonment in January 2004. The ADOC

defendant-appellees subsequently moved for summary judgment in connection

with Smith’s pending lawsuit. After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the 3

magistrate judge made the following recommendations. 

First, the magistrate judge found that the ADOC had already granted a

number of Smith’s requests, including his request for a worship spot; for a Thor’s

hammer necklace; for a small fire; and for a formal recognition of Odinism as a

valid religion. Accordingly, the magistrate judge determined that these claims had

all been rendered moot. He found that the only claim still pending before the court

was Smith’s RLUIPA claim based upon the denial of his request for a small quartz

crystal. As to that remaining claim, the magistrate judge found that Smith had
 See, e.g., Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (stating 4

that a transfer or release from prison will moot the prisoner’s claims for injunctive relief).

8

been released from prison, thereby mooting the injunctive relief aspects of that

claim.4

As to Smith’s claim for monetary damages under RLUIPA–based only on

the denial of the requested crystal–the magistrate judge found that Smith had

lodged claims against the defendant-appellees in both their official and individual

capacities. With respect to Smith’s official capacity suit, however, the magistrate

judge stated that a suit against the defendant-appellees in their official capacities

for money damages would not lie, because “the proper defendant in the official

action claims is the governmental entity.” R3-146 at 9. Accordingly, to the extent

Smith’s action involved any official capacity claims against the defendantappellees, the magistrate judge recommended that they be granted summary

judgment.

With respect to Smith’s claim against the defendant-appellees in their

individual capacities–based, again, solely on the denial of the crystal–the

magistrate judge found that Smith had established a prima facie RLUIPA claim. 

Specifically, the magistrate judge found that Smith had demonstrated that

“ADOC’s curtailment of his use of a crystal during religious ceremonies

substantially burdened the exercise of his religion.” Id. at 20. Nor, the magistrate
9

judge found, had the ADOC defendant-appellees established that the denial of

Smith’s possession of a crystal was necessary to further a compelling

governmental interest and was the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.

Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended denying summary judgment in

favor of the defendant-appellees on Smith’s RLUIPA claim for money damages. 

The magistrate judge declined to entertain a defense of qualified immunity for the

defendant-appellees on Smith’s RLUIPA claim, due to his determination that the

law was “clearly established” when the ADOC defendant-appellees had first

received Smith’s request for a crystal, and, therefore, qualified immunity would not

apply. R3-151 at 4. 

 In December 2005 the district court reviewed the recommendations of the

magistrate judge. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge that a number

of Smith’s claims had been rendered moot by the ADOC’s decision to grant his

requests in 2003, and that Smith’s only surviving RLUIPA claim was based upon

the ADOC’s denial of a small quartz crystal. The court further agreed that the

injunctive aspect of this remaining claim had been rendered moot by Smith’s

release from prison in 2004. Thus, the court only addressed Smith’s claim for

monetary damages based on the denial of the crystal.
 The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees

5

on Smith’s Equal Protection Claim. See Smith, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. The dismissal of the

Equal Protection claim has not been appealed by Smith, see Br. of Appellant at 34, and,

accordingly, we do not address it. See AT&T, 381 F.3d at 1320 n.14.

The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees on

Smith’s First Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, Smith requests that

we address the merits of his First Amendment claim if we affirm the dismissal of his RLUIPA

10

Turning to that claim, the district court first found that no action would lie

against the defendant-appellees in their official capacities, because such a claim

was “barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Smith v. Haley, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1240,

1244 (N.D. Al. 2005). As to the claim against the defendant-appellees in their

individual capacities for damages, the district court first expressed skepticism as to

whether individual capacity claims for monetary damages were available under

RLUIPA. Moreover, even assuming that such a claim were viable, and that the

denial of a crystal constituted a “substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person” so as to constitute a RLUIPA violation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, the

district court concluded that the defendant-appellees would be entitled to qualified

immunity on Smith’s individual capacity claims, because, contrary to the

magistrate judge’s finding, “Smith’s right to possess a crystal as part of his practice

of Odinism was not clearly established.” Id. at 1250. Since the district court found

that the defendant-appellees were entitled to qualified immunity on Smith’s

individual capacity claims under RLUIPA, it granted summary judgment in favor

of the defendant-appellees. This appeal followed. 

5
claim. If a prison’s regulation passes muster under RLUIPA, however, it will perforce satisfy

the requirements of the First Amendment, since RLUIPA offers greater protection to religious

exercise than the First Amendment offers. See Charles v. Frank, 101 Fed. App’x 634, 635 (7th

Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Since, as explained below, we conclude that Smith failed to present

sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim, it follows that

summary judgment was also appropriate on his First Amendment claim under § 1983. We need

not address that aspect of the district court’s decision. 

11

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Smith contends that summary judgment should not have been

granted in favor of the defendant-appellees for a number of reasons. First, Smith

argues that the district court erred in treating his request for injunctive relief–based

on the denial of his crystal–as moot, in light of his release from prison in 2004. 

Smith asserts that because he was re-incarcerated after the district court entered its

summary judgment order, and because he is still subject to the ADOC’s 2003

decision preventing him from possessing a crystal, his claim for injunctive relief

based on the denial of a crystal is not moot, and should be considered on its merits. 

Second, he argues that the district court erred in finding that other aspects of his

claim–namely, his request for a designated worship area and his request that he be

allowed to light a small pine fire in a 9'' by 9'' fire pit–had been mooted by the

ADOC’s 2003 decision. Third, Smith contends that he is entitled to monetary

damages against the defendant-appellees (in both their official and their individual

capacities) based on their alleged violations of RLUIPA, and that, contrary to the

district court’s conclusion, the defendant-appellees are not shielded in their
12

individual capacities from monetary liability under the doctrine of qualified

immunity. Smith further asserts that because he presented sufficient evidence to

establish a prima facie violation of RLUIPA by the defendant-appellees, and

because the defendant-appellees failed to demonstrate that the substantial burdens

on his practice of Odinism were necessary to further a compelling governmental

interest, he is entitled to both injunctive relief and monetary damages under

RLUIPA. 

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same legal standard used by the district court. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents,

263 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). We draw all factual

inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party–in this case, Smith. 

Id. at 1243 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We have stated that “the plain

language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial.’” Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243 (quotations and citation omitted). 
13

“Additionally, we note that we may affirm the district court’s decision on any

adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually relied.” 

Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 613 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted). 

Our discussion of Smith’s appeal requires that we unravel a number of

separate legal issues. First, we review RLUIPA’s legislative history and the

standard of liability that the statute sets forth. We then turn to Smith’s claims for

injunctive relief under RLUIPA, and whether the district court erred in concluding

that those claims for injunctive relief were moot. Third, we address the question of

what additional relief, if any, is available under RLUIPA–specifically, whether the

phrase “appropriate relief” in RLUIPA’s remedies section, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc2(a), contemplates money damages. We then address whether an entitlement to

monetary damages for violations of RLUIPA includes the right to seek individual

liability against defendants under RLUIPA, and, if so, whether the qualified

immunity defense would apply to those actions. Having resolved those legal

questions, we then assess the merits of Smith’s RLUIPA claims against the

defendant-appellees. 

B. Background on RLUIPA
14

“RLUIPA is the latest of long-running congressional efforts to accord

religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens.” 

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005). The

statute’s origins stem from the Supreme Court’s decisions in two cases,

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494

U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117

S. Ct. 2157 (1997). Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court had employed a compelling

interest standard for testing the constitutional validity of laws of general

applicability that affected religious practices; government actions that burdened

religious practices had to be justified by a compelling government interest. See

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1792-94 (1963); Atkins

v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 566 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the pre-Smith landscape). 

In Smith, however, the Supreme Court held that laws of general applicability that

only incidentally burden religious conduct do not offend the Free Exercise Clause

of the First Amendment. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79, 110 S. Ct. at 1599-1600.

Congress responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom and

Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), in which it sought to reinstate the pre-Smith

“compelling interest” standard for laws of general applicability burdening a

person’s religious practices. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714-15, 125 at 2118. RFRA
15

had “universal” coverage, applying to all state and federal laws, and purportedly

was passed pursuant to Congress’ enforcement powers under section 5 of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17, 117 S. Ct. at

2162; see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715, 125 S. Ct. at 2118 (stating that RFRA

lacked a Commerce Clause or Spending Clause underpinning). In City of Boerne,

however, the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to the states, holding

that the statute exceeded Congress’ remedial powers under the Fourteenth

Amendment. 521 U.S. at 535-36, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.

Congress again responded, this time by enacting RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-2000cc-5. “Less sweeping than RFRA,” and “invoking federal authority

under the Spending and Commerce Clauses,” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715, 125 S. Ct. at

2118, RLUIPA targets only two narrow areas for protection: land use (section 2 of

the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) and the religious exercise of institutionalized persons

(section 3 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1). 

The latter section, which is at issue in the present appeal, states that “[n]o

government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person

residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability,” unless the government can demonstrate that the burden “is

in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive
16

means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(a). Section 3 of RLUIPA thereby affords to prison inmates a “heightened

protection from government-imposed burdens,” by requiring that the government

demonstrate that the substantial burden on the prisoner’s religious exercise is

justified by a compelling, rather than merely a legitimate, governmental interest. 

See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

In doing so, section 3 affords confined persons “greater protection of religious

exercise than what the Constitution itself affords.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174,

186 (4th Cir. 2006). Section 3 applies whenever “the substantial burden on

religious exercise is imposed in a program or activity that receives federal financial

assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). 

C. Smith’s Claims for Injunctive Relief Under RLUIPA

On appeal, Smith first argues that the district court erred in construing his

claims for injunctive relief under RLUIPA as being moot. Smith’s argument in this

regard is two-fold. First, he contends that the district court erred in treating his

request for injunctive relief based on his request for a small quartz crystal as moot,

due to his release from prison in 2004. Second, he argues that the district court

erred in assuming that his other requests for injunctive relief–namely, his petition
 A release from prison does not moot a claim for monetary damages, McKinnon, 387 6

F.3d at 1362, since a claim for monetary damages “looks back in time and is intended to redress

a past injury.” Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997).

17

for a designated worship area and his request for a fire pit–had been mooted by the

ADOC Committee’s 2003 decision. We address each argument in turn.

“Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to

the consideration of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Mingkid v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 468

F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “The doctrine of mootness

derives directly from the case-or-controversy limitation, because an action that is

moot cannot be characterized as an active case or controversy.” Id. (citation

omitted). Accordingly, we may not entertain an appeal unless there is a present

case or controversy, that is, “an actual dispute [that] continues to exist between the

parties.” Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004). On the other

hand, “[a] case is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect

to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Mingkid, 468 F.3d at 768 (citation,

alteration, and internal quotations omitted).

The general rule in our circuit is that a transfer or a release of a prisoner

from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. 

McKinnon, 745 F.2d at 1363; Zatler v. Wainright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir.

1986) (per curiam). The reason for this rule is that injunctive relief is “a 6
18

prospective remedy, intended to prevent future injuries,” Adler, 112 F.3d at 1477,

and, as a result, once the prisoner has been released, the court lacks the ability to

grant injunctive relief and correct the conditions of which the prisoner complained. 

See, e.g., Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)

(stating that a prisoner’s past exposure to sub-par conditions in a prison “does not

constitute a present case or controversy involving injunctive relief”).

The district court relied on this well-established rule, and concluded that

Smith’s claim for injunctive relief–requesting that the ADOC be ordered to grant

him a crystal for his practice of Odinism–had been rendered moot by his release

from prison in 2004. The court found that “[Smith’s] release constituted a change

in the facts that ended the controversy with respect to injunctive relief for this

alleged injury,” that is, the denial of the crystal. Smith, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. 

This determination was not erroneous at the time it was made–indeed, under the

law of our circuit, Smith’s release from the prison would have mooted his claim for

injunctive relief requesting that he be granted the future use of a crystal. 

In an interesting turn of events, however, after the district court rendered its

decision and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees on

Smith’s claim for injunctive relief, Smith was re-incarcerated. At present, Smith

remains incarcerated in the ADOC prison system. Moreover, as the defendant-
19

appellees concede, Smith is again subject to the ADOC’s 2003 decision denying

his request for a small, quartz crystal. Smith’s appellate brief includes a letter from

the ADOC, dated 14 September 2006, which indicates that the 2003 Committee

decision remains in full effect and is applicable to his earlier religious requests. 

See Reply Br. of Appellant, Exh. 1. Thus, if Smith were to again request the use of

a small quartz crystal in connection with his practice of Odinism, the ADOC would

presumably decline his request for the same reasons it did in its original 2003

decision, namely, that there was a “lack of supporting materials validating a need

for this item.” R2-98, Exh. M at 1.

In light of this evidence, we conclude that Smith’s claim for injunctive

relief, predicated on the prospective use of a quartz crystal, is not moot. The

fundamental question with respect to mootness is whether events have occurred

subsequent to the filing of an appeal that “deprive the court of the ability to give

the . . . appellant meaningful review.” Al Najar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336

(11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Here, were we to conclude that the denial of a

quartz crystal constituted a substantial burden on Smith’s religious practice and

that it was not justified by a compelling government interest, we would have the

ability to afford relief to Smith, by reversing the district court’s summary

judgement order and remanding the case so that Smith could obtain the injunctive
 Nor, despite the parties’ arguments, need we inquire into whether Smith’s case would 7

fall under the “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception to mootness. See Murphy v.

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982) (per curiam) (discussing this exception to

mootness). 

In this case, it is not a question of whether the denial of Smith’s crystal is reasonably

likely to occur in the future, such that this exception would apply. See id. Rather, the conduct at

issue is occurring at present, since Smith remains subject to the 2003 denial of his crystal. 

Because this is a live case or controversy, one to which we have the ability to presently afford

meaningful relief, Smith’s claim based on the denial of the crystal is not moot in the first place. 

An inquiry into whether an exception to mootness applies–such as whether the conduct is likely

to recur in the future–would thus be misplaced and unnecessary.

20

relief he seeks. Because we have the ability to effectuate a remedy in Smith’s case,

we conclude that this particular aspect of his case is not moot. See, e.g.,

7

SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th

Cir. 1996) (stating that “[t]he ability of the appellate court to effectuate a partial

remedy is sufficient to prevent mootness” and concluding that because “potential

relief remains available to [the plaintiff] . . . th[e] case is not moot and [] we have

jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal”) (quotations and internal citations

omitted). Therefore, in assessing the merits of Smith’s RLUIPA action, we will

consider Smith’s claim for injunctive relief, based on his request for a small, quartz

crystal. 

Smith further challenges the district court’s determination that other aspects

of his claim for injunctive relief had been mooted by the ADOC Religious

Activities Review Committee’s decision in 2003. Specifically, he challenges the

district court’s conclusion (based on the magistrate judge’s recommendation) that
21

his requests for a “designated place of worship” and for a pine wood fire in a

“small fire pit approximately 9'' in diameter and 9'' deep,” R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 1-2,

had been mooted–prior to the summary judgment stage–by the Committee’s 2003

decision. 

In assessing these claims, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

finding that Smith’s request for a designated place of worship had been mooted,

since the Committee had decided that Smith would be granted “a secure place of

worship” going forward. R2-98, Exh. M at 2. Notably, the Committee declined to

grant Smith’s request for a “designated place of worship to perform [the Odinist]

rites” within the larger prison area, id. (emphasis added); however, the district

court construed the Committee’s decision to grant Smith a “secure place of

worship,” id., as, effectively, a grant of his request, thereby rendering it moot. The

district court also concluded that the Committee decision granting Smith “a candle

[to be used] in a private secure place,” id., had effectively satisfied Smith’s request

for a ceremonial fire pit, and, therefore, that particular claim for injunctive relief

had been mooted.

 Smith contends that these conclusions were in error, and that, contrary to the

district court’s finding, the 2003 decision did not moot these two individual

requests for injunctive relief. He points out that his request for a designated place
22

of worship was actually denied by the Committee, and that this request for

injunctive relief remains pending at present, since he continues to petition the

ADOC for a designated worship area in the prison. In other words, Smith argues

that the Committee’s limiting of his request to a “secure place of worship,” R2-98,

Exh. M at 2, does not moot his (still extant) request for “a designated area of

worship” in the greater prison, R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 1, and that therefore, we may

consider it. Additionally, Smith contends that the Committee’s granting him a

small candle did not moot his claim for “a fire pit, approximately 9'' in diameter

and 9'' deep,” id. at 2, and, since this claim for injunctive relief remains pending,

we may consider that request as well.

We agree. As noted earlier, Smith is presently incarcerated, is subject to the

ADOC’s earlier decision, and is apparently continuing to press his request for a

designated place of worship in the general prison area and for a ceremonial fire pit. 

As discussed, injunctive relief is prospective in nature, “intended to prevent future

injuries,” including the ADOC’s continued denial of a designated worship spot and

a 9'' by 9'' fire pit. See Adler, 112 F.3d at 1477. While the district court found that

these two claims were no longer pending, because the Committee had “allow[ed]

Smith to possess certain religious objects, as well as an area in which to practice

his faith,” Smith, 401 F. Supp 2d at 1244, we agree that the Committee’s
23

decision–which was partial in nature–did not wholly nullify Smith’s requests, and

that, for purposes of mootness, we retain the ability to effectuate a partial remedy

in this case. See SunAmerica, 77 F.3d at 1333 (“The ability of the appellate court

to effectuate a partial remedy is sufficient to prevent mootness.”) (citation and

internal quotations omitted). 

Put simply, were we to find that the denial of a designated worship place in

the larger prison, and the denial of a 9'' by 9'' fire pit, did in fact violate RLUIPA,

Smith could obtain to “appropriate relief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), including, in

the court’s discretion, an injunction prospectively granting him these two requests,

in their entirety. Because some “potential relief remains available to [Smith],” we

hold that these two claims are “not moot and that we have jurisdiction to decide the

merits” of these claims. See SunAmerica, 77 F.3d at 1333. We agree that the

district court should not have labeled these two particular claims for injunctive

relief as being moot, based solely on the Committee’s 2003 decision, which only

partially granted Smith’s requests. As a result, we consider these two claims on the

merits in addressing Smith’s underlying RLUIPA action.

D. Viability of Smith’s Claims for Monetary Damages Under RLUIPA

Having resolved which claims for injunctive relief remain viable in Smith’s

appeal, we now must address whether Smith could obtain additional, monetary
24

relief in the event he were to establish a RLUIPA violation. This inquiry involves

the preliminary question of whether monetary damages are provided for under

RLUIPA’s statutory rubric, and, if so, whether Smith may allege either an

individual or an official capacity suit for damages–or both–under RLUIPA. 

1. Availability of Monetary Damages Under RLUIPA 

RLUIPA creates a private cause of action for a prison inmate if section 3 is

violated, and further provides that the complaining party, if successful, may

“obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-2(a). While

the parties do not dispute that the phrase “appropriate relief” would presumably

entitle a complaining inmate to injunctive and declaratory relief–such as, for

example, an order granting the inmate the right to a particular object for use in

religious worship–the question is whether that phrase also encompasses a right to

monetary relief. 

To put it mildly, “there is a division of authority” on this question. Madison

v. Va., 474 F.3d 118, 130 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006). Some district courts have concluded

that the phrase “appropriate relief” as used in RLUIPA does not encompass

monetary damages. See, e.g., Boles v. Neet, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1241 (D. Co.

2005) (“It would appear, therefore, that the ‘appropriate relief’ permitted under the

statute must be limited to injunctive or declaratory relief . . . .”); see also Daker v.
25

Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (finding RLUIPA to be

“ambiguous on the question of whether it authorizes a private right of action

seeking monetary damages,” but rejecting a recovery of monetary damages,

inasmuch as they are sought in an individual capacity lawsuit). A number of

district courts have concluded otherwise, and have found that RLUIPA’s phrase,

“appropriate relief,” is sufficiently broad to include some forms of monetary relief. 

See Shidler v. Moore, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Guru Nanak

Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1161-62 (E.D.

Cal. 2003); see also Chase v. City of Portsmouth, No. 2:05CV446, 2005 WL

3079065, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 16, 2005) (“Appropriate relief may include

injunctive and declaratory relief as well as nominal damages.”) (citation omitted). 

Still other courts have assumed that money damages are available, without actually

deciding the question. See Presley v. Edwards, No. 2:04-CV -729-WKW, 2007

WL 174153, at *13 (M.D. Al. Jan. 19, 2007); Gooden v. Crain, 405 F. Supp. 2d

714, 723-24 (E. D. Tex. 2005); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937, 938-39

(W.D. Wis. 2002). This was the approach taken by the district court in this case in

disposing of Smith’s action. See Smith, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. 

The Supreme Court has instructed that, where Congress had not given any

guidance or clear indication of its purpose with respect to remedies, federal courts
26

should presume the availability of all appropriate remedies. See Franklin v.

Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 68-69, 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1034

(1992) (citations omitted). In Franklin, the issue before the Court was what types

of remedies were available in a private right of action for sex discrimination under

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (“Title IX”). 

Although the statute was silent as to what remedies were available, the court stated

that it was appropriate for a court to “presume the availability of all appropriate

remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated otherwise.” 503 U.S. at 66, 112

S. Ct. at 1032. Thus, absent any intent to the contrary reflected in the statute, the

Court instructed that the presumption should be in favor of all available relief–both

injunctive and monetary. Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 1036.

After Franklin, courts–when faced with a statute lacking express guidance

on the question of remedies–have generally adhered to this presumption. In Reich

v. Cambridgeport Air Systems, Inc., for example, the First Circuit concluded that

the general phrase “all appropriate relief,” as used in section 11(c) of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act, 66 U.S.C. § 660(c), “embrace[d] monetary

damages as well as other relevant forms of relief normally available.” 26 F.3d

1187, 1191 (1st Cir. 1994). 
27

In light of Franklin and its progeny, we agree that the use of the phrase

“appropriate relief” in section 3 of RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), is broad

enough to encompass the right to monetary damages in the event a plaintiff

establishes a violation of the statute. Congress expressed no intent to the contrary

within RLUIPA, even though it could have, by, for example, explicitly limiting the

remedies set forth in § 2000cc(a) to injunctive relief only. Instead, Congress used

broad, general language in crafting the remedies section of RLUIPA, stating that a

prevailing party could obtain “appropriate relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). We

assume that, when Congress acted, it was aware of Franklin’s presumption in favor

of making all appropriate remedies available to the prevailing party. See Franklin,

503 U.S. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 1036. In light of that presumption, we conclude that,

absent an intent to the contrary, the phrase “appropriate relief” in RLUIPA

encompasses monetary as well as injunctive relief.

Having reached that general conclusion, however, it bears pointing out that 

a prisoner plaintiff’s right to monetary relief is severely circumscribed by the terms

of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). The PLRA

provides that a prisoner may not bring a federal civil action “for mental or

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical

injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e); see also Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th
28

Cir. 2002) (construing § 1997(e) as barring a prisoner from obtaining

compensatory damages for solely mental or emotional harm while he is in

custody).

Despite this limitation, nominal damages may sometimes be appropriate

under § 1997(e). See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98 S. Ct. 1042

(1978) (stating that nominal damages may be appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a

violation of a constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual physical injury

sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages). Indeed, in earlier cases this

court has suggested that § 1997(e) does not preclude a prisoner from seeking

nominal damages, if he can establish that he has suffered a constitutional injury. 

See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Boxer X v.

Donald, 169 Fed. App’x 555, 558 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that “the PLRA’s

limitation on compensatory relief does not necessarily limit other forms of

monetary relief,” namely, nominal damages).

Here, Smith has alleged violations of RLUIPA due to the burden placed

upon his religious exercise, but no physical harm. He seeks nominal,

compensatory, and punitive damages. It is clear from our case law, however, that

the latter two types of damages are precluded under the PLRA, Napier, 314 F.3d at

532, but that nominal damages may still be recoverable. Hughes, 350 F.3d at
29

1162. Thus, although we conclude, as a general matter, that RLUIPA’s phrase

“appropriate relief” contemplates monetary as well as injunctive relief, in this case

it is clear that Smith’s monetary award, if any, will be limited to a grant of nominal

damages, in light of the limiting language of § 1997(e).

Having concluded that Smith may seek nominal damages in his section 3

RLUIPA action against the ADOC, we now must address whether Smith is entitled

to bring either an individual capacity action, or an official capacity action, or both,

against these defendant-appellees.

2. Availability of an Individual Capacity Suit for Damages Under RLUIPA

The distinction between an individual capacity suit–also referred to as a

personal capacity suit–and an official capacity suit is a significant one. “When a

plaintiff sues a municipal officer in the officer’s individual capacity for alleged []

violations, the plaintiff seeks money damages directly from the individual officer.” 

Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 

In contrast, an official capacity suit is, essentially, “pleading an action against the

entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165,

105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985) (citation and quotations omitted). Moreover, in an

individual capacity suit, a defendant “may, depending on his position, be able to

assert personal immunity defenses,” such as qualified immunity. Id. at 166-67,
 For this reason, as the district court observed, “[a]bsent liability for damages in their 8

individual capacities, there is no need for government employees to raise, and thus for the court

to address, the qualified immunity defense.” See Smith, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. 

30

105 S. Ct. at 3105. In contrast, in an official capacity action, “the only immunities 8

that can be claimed . . . are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity,

may possess, such as the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. at 167, 105 S. Ct. at 3106. 

In this case, Smith’s RLUIPA action seeks damages from the defendantappellees both in their individual and official capacities. The case law on

RLUIPA, however, is not clear as to whether the statute permits a suit for monetary

damages against government employee defendants in their individual capacities. 

Indeed, the district courts have been split on this question. Compare Agrawal v.

Briley, No. 02 - C - 6807, 2006 WL 3523750, at *9-10 (N. D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006)

(permitting an individual capacity suit for monetary damages under RLUIPA) and

Orafan v. Goord, No. 00CU2022 (LEK/RFT), 2003 WL 21972735, at *9 (N.D.

N.Y. Aug. 11, 2003) (stating that “[c]learly [RLUIPA] contemplates individual

liability”) with Hammons v. Jones, No. 00-CV-0143-CVE-SAJ, 2006 WL 353448,

at *1 (N. D. Ok. Feb. 14, 2006) (RLUIPA only allows for official capacity actions)

and Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1067

(D. Haw. 2002) (stating that RLUIPA “does not appear to allow causes of action

against individuals”).
31

RLUIPA’s section 3 provides that “[a] person may assert a violation of this

chapter as a claim . . . in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against

a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). The term “government” is defined as:

(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity

created under the authority of a State; (ii) a branch, department,

agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause;

and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law.

Id. at § 2000cc-5. 

Smith cites to this language, especially the latter references to “[an] official

of an entity” and to “any other person acting under color of state law,” id., as

evidence that RLUIPA was designed to provide for monetary relief from individual

governmental employees, in addition to permitting a recovery from the

governmental entity itself. Smith contends that the phrase “under color of state

law” in RLUIPA is similar to the “under color of” language that appears in 42

U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a cause of action against any person who, while

acting “under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State,” causes “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

the Constitution.” Just as the latter provides for an action against individual

government employees for damages, argues Smith, so too should the former.
32

A flaw with this argument, however, is that section 3 of RLUIPA was

enacted pursuant to Congress’ Spending Power under Article I of the Constitution;

RLUIPA “[s]ection 3 applies when the substantial burden on religious exercise is

imposed in a program or activity that receives federal financial assistance.” Cutter,

544 U.S. at 716, 125 S. Ct at 2118 (alterations and internal quotations omitted). 

Our court, in addressing other federal statutes that emanate directly from Congress’

Spending Power–that is, federal statutes that condition a state’s receipt of federal

funding on the state’s adherence to certain conditions–has repeatedly held that

Congress cannot use its Spending Power to subject a non-recipient of federal

funds, including a state official acting his or her individual capacity, to private

liability for monetary damages. See, e.g., Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270

(11th Cir. 1999) (stating that individual school officials cannot be held liable under

Title IX, because a Title IX claim can only be brought against the grant recipient). 

As we discuss below, this fact strongly militates against a recognition of a private

action against an individual capacity defendant for monetary damages.

The Spending Clause of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that

“Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and

Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general

Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 1. Pursuant to this
33

authority, the Supreme Court has held that “Congress may attach conditions on the

receipt of federal funds” and may “further its broad policy objectives by

conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with

federal statutory and administrative directives.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.

203, 206, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2795-96 (1987) (citation and quotations omitted). 

Congress’ Spending legislation typically grants federal funds to state institutions in

exchange for the state’s compliance with certain conditions. Such legislation has

been described as creating a “contract” between the federal government and the

state that receives the federal funds. See Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th

Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, 119 S. Ct.

33, reinstated at 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999). As a result, “[t]he legitimacy of

Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power [] rests on whether the

State voluntarily and knowingly accept[ed] the terms of the ‘contract.’” Pennhurst

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540 (1981)

(citations omitted). Additionally, pursuant to this arrangement, Congress may

create a funding contract that conditions the award of federal monies to the state’s

waiver of sovereign immunity to private lawsuits seeking to enforce the legislation. 

See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75, 112 S. Ct. at 1037 (finding that the Spending
34

Power permitted Congress to create a private cause of action against a state

institution for a violation of Title IX). 

Congress has enacted a number of laws creating a private action in the event

the federal funds recipient fails to adhere to the conditions of the contract–most

notably Title IX, which allows for a private cause of action when an “education

program . . . receiving Federal financial assistance” subjects a person to

discrimination “on the basis of sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 1681(a). With Title IX,

Congress effectively “condition[ed] an offer of federal funding on a promise by the

recipient not to discriminate, in what amounts essentially to a contract between the

Government and the recipient of funds.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,

524 U.S. 274, 286, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997 (1998) (citations omitted).

Courts, however, in addressing Title IX, have placed limits on its scope,

holding that the statute does not go so far as to allow a private cause of action

against an defendant in his individual capacity, since an individual defendant is not

the “recipient” of the federal funds. See Floyd, 133 F.3d at 789 (“Because the

contracting party is the grant-receiving local school district, a Title IX claim can

only be brought against a grant recipient . . . and not an individual.”) (citation,

quotations, and alterations omitted). In other words, the courts have consistently

recognized the limited reach of Congress’ Spending Power legislation, concluding
35

that statutes passed under the Spending Clause may, as a condition of funding,

subject the grant recipient to liability in a private cause of action, but that the

Spending Power cannot be used to subject individual defendants, such as state

employees, to individual liability in a private cause of action. See, e.g., id.;

Hartley, 193 F.3d 1263, 1270 (same); Rosa H. V. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist.,

106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that “Title IX does not instruct courts to

impose liability based on anything other than the acts of the recipients of federal

funds” and finding that “[w]hen the school board accepted federal funds, it agreed

not to discriminate on the basis of sex,” but that it is “unlikely that it further agreed

to suffer liability whenever its employees discriminate on the basis of sex”); see

also Jennings v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 444 F.3d 255, 268 n.9 (4th Cir.

2006), rev’d on other grounds, 482 F.3d 686 (2007) (en banc), pet. for cert. filed,

(U.S. July 9, 2007) (No. 07-43) (“Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress’

spending power and prohibits discriminatory acts by funding recipients. Because

school officials are not funding recipients under Title IX, school officials may not

be sued in their individual capacities under Title IX.”). Put simply, the federal

circuits are in agreement that Title IX, because of its nature as Spending Power

legislation, does not authorize suits against public officials in their individual

capacities. 
 RLUIPA also purports to contain a Commerce Clause underpinning. See 42 U.S.C. § 9

2000cc-1(b) (stating that RLUIPA will also apply whenever “the substantial burden affects . . .

commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes”). However, the

majority of courts that have addressed the statutory section before us have construed it as

emanating from Congress’ Spending Power. See Benning v. Ga., 391 F.3d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir.

2004); see also Madison, 472 F.3d at 124 (stating that RLUIPA “fits comfortably within

Congress’ Spending Clause authority”); Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 607-610 (7th Cir.

2003) (same). This strikes us as an appropriate interpretation of the statute, especially since

there is no evidence that a state prison’s denial of a individual prisoner’s request for a religious

item would “affect[]” interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). Like the other courts that

have addressed this statutory provision, we agree that it hinges on Congress’ Spending Power,

rather than its Commerce Clause Power. 

36

Similar to Title IX, section 3 of RLUIPA derives from Congress’ power

under the Spending Clause. See 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(b) (stating that section 3

applies in any case where “the substantial burden is imposed in a program or

activity that receives Federal financial assistance”); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 716, 125 S.

Ct. at 2119. In Benning v. Georgia, in reviewing the constitutionality of section 3 9

of RLUIPA, we concluded that section 3 constituted a valid exercise of Congress’

Spending Power. See 391 F.3d at 1306. In light of this Spending Clause authority,

Congress may, under RLUIPA, award federal funds to state prison institutions

who, as a condition of receiving federal funds, agree not to impose “a substantial

burden on the religious exercise” of its prisoners. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).

It is much less clear, however, whether section 3 of RLUIPA should be

construed as further providing a cause of action against individual defendants, such

as the ADOC Committee members who have been sued in their individual
 At least one district court in our circuit has already concluded that allowing an 10

individual cause of action for damages against defendant-employees of a prison would be

inconsistent with Congress’ Spending Power. See Daker, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-42 (“By

imposing liability on non-recipients of federal funding– individuals who are in essence

involuntary and unknowing third parties to the funding contract–RLUIPA would become an

example of an unprecedented and untested exercise of Congress’ [S]pending power.”). 

 Moreover, because we conclude that section 3 of RLUIPA does not permit a claim 11

against the defendant-appellees in their individual capacities, we need not address the secondary

question of whether the defendant-appellees would be entitled to a defense of qualified

immunity. See, e.g., Busby, 931 F.2d at 772 (stating that the qualified immunity defense only

applies when the defendant is sued individually).

37

capacities in this case. In light of our jurisprudence construing Congress’

Spending Power in other settings, it is clear that the “contracting party” in the

RLUIPA context is the state prison institution that receives federal funds; put

another way, these institutions are the “grant recipients” that agree to be amenable

to suit as a condition to receiving funds–but their individual employees are not

“recipients” of federal funding as we have construed that term. See Floyd, 113

F.3d at 789.10

We agree that a construction of RLUIPA providing for individual liability

raises substantial constitutional concerns. Consequently, we conclude that section

3 of RLUIPA–a provision that derives from Congress’ Spending Power–cannot be

construed as creating a private action against individual defendants for monetary

damages. See id. Thus, Smith is not entitled to pursue a claim against these

defendant-appellees in their individual capacities under section 3 of RLUIPA.11
38

3. Availability of an Official Capacity Suit for Damages Under RLUIPA

Having concluded that RLUIPA does not provide for a suit for damages

against government officials in their individual capacities–since such an action

would be incongruent with the reach of Congress’ Spending Power–we now must

address whether the statute permits an action for damages against the defendantappellees in their official capacities. “A suit against a state official in his or her

official capacity is not a suit against the official but is rather a suit against the

official’s office.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993)

(citation, alteration, and quotations omitted). Such actions are not a suit against the

officer personally, since the real party in interest remains the state entity, and a

favorable monetary judgment ultimately imposes liability on the entity that state

officer represents. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S. Ct. at 3105. So long as

the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, however, the

official-capacity suit will “in all respects other than name, [] be treated as a suit

against the entity.” Id. at 166, 105 S. Ct. at 3105 (citation omitted). 

In this case, we conclude that Smith may pursue an official capacity suit

against the defendant-appellees for “appropriate relief.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc2. RLUIPA allows for a plaintiff to seek relief in the event there is a violation by a

“government,” which term is defined in the statute as including, inter alia, any
 The district court properly found that, based upon Graham, an action against the 12

defendant-appellees in their official capacities, was, in essence, a suit against the state itself,

since a favorable judgment would be satisfied from state coffers rather than the individual

officers. The district court then stated, however, that an official capacity claim for damages

under RLUIPA would be “barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Smith, 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.

This conclusion was in error. While it is true that “the Eleventh Amendment [will] bar

federal suits against state officials in their ‘official capacity,’ because such actions seek recovery

from state funds,” see Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted),

we have previously held that, by entering into a funding contract with the federal government

and accepting federal funding, state prison institutions voluntarily agreed to waive their

sovereign immunity and make themselves amenable to actions under RLUIPA. See Benning,

391 F.3d at 1305-06. Indeed, in Benning, we held that section 3 of RLUIPA effectuated a clear

waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 1306. We held

that RLUIPA’s statutory language, conditioning the receipt of federal funds on adherence to the

39

“person acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii). Having

already concluded that the phrase “appropriate relief” includes an award of

monetary damages–albeit, in Smith’s case, an award limited to nominal

damages–we find that nothing in the plain language of RLUIPA prohibits an action

for damages against these defendant-appellees in their official capacities, that is, as

officers “acting under color of state law.” See id. Although it is true that these

officers were sued in their official capacities in name only–as monetary liability in

the event of a successful suit will ultimately be imposed on the entity that they

represent, the ADOC–it is undisputed that the ADOC received notice of the action

and had ample opportunity to respond to it. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165, 105 S. Ct. at

3105. Accordingly, consistent with Graham, we hold that Smith may pursue a

RLUIPA action for “appropriate relief” against these defendant-appellees, in their

official capacities as officers of the ADOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2.12
statute and providing that a plaintiff may seek “appropriate relief” when the statute is violated,

made clear that “by accepting federal funds, [the state] waived its immunity under RLUIPA,”

and found that “Congress unambiguously required states to waive their sovereign immunity from

suits filed by prisoners to enforce RLUIPA.” Id. at 1305-06. In light of that holding, we

conclude that the Eleventh Amendment will not shield the state (and it agents) from an official

capacity action for damages under RLUIPA. 

40

Thus, in addressing Smith’s appeal, we must consider both Smith’s claims

for injunctive relief, and his official capacity claims for nominal damages, in

evaluating whether the ADOC defendant-appellees were entitled to summary

judgment. We now turn to the merits of those claims. 

E. Merits of Smith’s RLUIPA Claims

To establish a prima facie case under section 3 of RLUIPA, a plaintiff must

demonstrate 1) that he engaged in a religious exercise; and 2) that the religious

exercise was substantially burdened. See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567; 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-1(a). The plaintiff “bear[s] the burden of persuasion on whether the . . .

government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the

exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). If the plaintiff succeeds in

demonstrating a prima facie case, the government must then demonstrate that the

challenged government action is “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b). In contrast, if the

plaintiff fails to present evidence to support a prima facie case under RLUIPA, the
41

court need not inquire into whether the governmental interest at stake was

compelling. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1228

(11th Cir. 2004).

Thus, to withstand summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim, Smith bore the

burden of first presenting evidence to demonstrate that his observance of Odinism

constituted a “religious exercise” under the statute. See Adkins, 393 F.3d at 567. 

A “religious exercise” is broadly defined under RLUIPA as “any exercise of

religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). In light of that definition, we conclude that Smith’s

practice of Odinism constitutes a “religious exercise” for purposes of a RLUIPA

claim.

As to the second step–the issue of a “substantial burden” on that religious

practice–Smith claims that the following decisions of the Committee effectuated a

“substantial burden” on his observance of Odinism: (1) the Committee’s decision

to deny his request for a small quartz crystal; (2) the Committee’s decision to deny

Smith’s request for a designated area of worship in the open area of the prison; and

(3) the Committee’s decision to deny Smith’s request for a “small fire pit,

approximately 9'' in diameter and 9'' deep.” R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 2. We address

each of these allegations in turn. 
42

1. Denial of a Quartz Crystal

The Committee denied Smith the possession of a quartz crystal after

reviewing his written request, as well as a number of background materials on

Odinism, because there was a “lack of supporting materials validating a need for

this item.” R2-98, Exh. M at 1. Smith contends that this decision substantially

burdened his observance of Odinism. 

We have previously defined a “substantial burden” as being “significant

pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her

behavior accordingly.” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. More pertinent to the present

action, we have made clear that, in order to constitute a “substantial burden” on

religious practice, the government’s action must be “more than . . . incidental” and

“must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.” Id. (citation

omitted). That is, to constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA, the

governmental action must significantly hamper one’s religious practice. 

Here, Smith contends that the fact that the quartz crystal was denied outright

should be sufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate that his religious practice was

substantially burdened. The Committee’s denial alone, however, does not

necessarily establish a substantial burden. Rather, in reviewing the entirety of the

record evidence, we find that Smith has failed to present sufficient evidence to
 We also note that the Committee’s denial of the quartz crystal should be placed in the 13

larger context of its 2003 decision–a decision in which the Committee granted Smith’s requests

for, among other things, a Thor’s hammer necklace; a candle in his cell; a fern tree; a number of

religious “runes” to be used in practicing the Odinist faith; as well as permission to have a

designated day of the week to practice his Odinism; and permission to recognize four Odinist

holidays. Put simply, as the district court found, the Committee granted almost the entirety of

43

demonstrate how, if at all, the ADOC’s denial of a small quartz crystal constituted

a “substantial burden” on his practice of Odinism. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). 

The decision to ultimately deny Smith’s request for a quartz crystal was

reached after the Committee undertook a probing and thorough review of Smith’s

religious requests. The ADOC Chaplain personally met with Smith to discuss his

request, including the need for the crystal; reviewed documentation on Odinism

submitted by Smith’s non-incarcerated friend; conducted independent research on

the tenets of Odinism; held discussions with Chaplains in other prisons on the

religion’s doctrines; and encouraged Smith to submit as much evidence as he could

in support of his request. In conducting his review, the Chaplain found that the

evidence in support of Smith’s request for a small quartz crystal was “incomplete

and sketchy.” R2-63, Exh. K at 3. After “gather[ing] more informative sources

on [his] own” and “research[ing] the [credibility]” of each of Smith’s requested

items, id., the Chaplain found that there were no “supporting materials validating

[the] need” for a crystal in connection with Smith’s practice of Odinism, and,

accordingly, the Committee denied that item. R2-98, Exh. M at 1.13
Smith’s request, permitting him to have a number of religious items to practice his Odinism; the

one physical item it denied was the crystal.

44

In challenging that decision on appeal, Smith has presented no evidence to

demonstrate that a small quartz crystal was fundamental to his practice of Odinism,

such that the denial of the crystal effectuated any “more than an inconvenience on

[his] religious exercise.” See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. Indeed, Smith has failed

to establish the relevance of the crystal to his practice of Odinism, as he was

obligated to do in order to demonstrate that the denial of that item would

significantly hamper his religious observance. Smith’s request states only that the

crystal was “essential” because it “allows communication with the netherworld.” 

R1-20, Exh. K. Similarly, the sources on Odinsim that were submitted by Smith

stated, in rather general terms, that “[q]uartz crystals are used in shamanism around

the world,” that they are used in many prehistoric religions, such as “Old world

alchemy, witchcraft, and magic,” and that they are “still in use in many traditional

societies.” R2-61. There is no mention in these third party sources of Odinism,

nor is there any indication that a small, quartz crystal is necessary to observe the

rites of Odinism. 

In short, neither Smith’s request, nor the outside sources that he submitted in

connection with it, demonstrate the need for a quartz crystal in order to practice

Odinism. While it is true that courts are not to inquire into the centrality of a
45

particular religious tenet in undertaking the substantial burden analysis, Adkins,

393 F.3d at 559, at a minimum the substantial burden test requires that a RLUIPA

plaintiff demonstrate that the government’s denial of a particular religious item or

observance was more than an inconvenience to one’s religious practice. See

Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. 

On appeal, Smith argues that a substantial burden can be found based on the

simple fact that (1) he asked for the crystal to use in Odinism; (2) the request was

based on Smith’s “sincer[e]” religious beliefs; and (3) the Committee flatly denied

that request. Br. Of Appellant at 47. Smith contends that this evidence should be

enough, standing alone, to demonstrate that his religious exercise was substantially

burdened under RLUIPA. Such an expansive reading of section 3, however, would

require us to find a substantial burden whenever any request in connection with a

sincere religious belief was denied by a state prison. If the word “substantial” in

the statutory phrase “substantial burden,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), is to retain any

meaning, it must, at a minimum, be construed as requiring something more than

solely the denial of a request that is sincere. An alternate approach, like the one

advocated by Smith, would result in the word “substantial” in § 2000cc-1(a) as

being mere surplusage, since every governmental action denying a requested item
46

to be used in religious observance would give rise to a prima facie RLUIPA claim. 

We decline to adopt such an expansive reading of section 3 of RLUIPA. 

Put simply, we are not convinced–and there is no evidence, other than

Smith’s own assertion and his scant sources, to establish–that the Committee’s

decision denying Smith a small, quartz crystal “place[d] more than an

inconvenience on [his] religious exercise.” See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. If

anything, the denial of the crystal strikes us as an “incidental” burden on Smith’s

Odinism, which, we have held, is not sufficient to meet the threshold of a

substantial burden under RLUIPA. See id. 

Because Smith did not present evidence to demonstrate a substantial burden

on his Odinist observances by the denial of the crystal, he failed to establish a

prima facie case under RLUIPA, and the defendant-appellees are entitled to

summary judgment on Smith’s RLUIPA claim. See id. at 1228 (summary

judgment is appropriate if the RLUIPA plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie

case, and the court need not inquire into whether the government interest asserted

is compelling). See also Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1243 (summary judgment is

appropriate if the party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial”) (quotations and citation omitted).
47

2. Denial of a Designated Area of Worship

Smith also argues that the ADOC’s decision to deny his request to be

granted a designated area of worship in an open area of the prison effectuated a

substantial burden on his practice of Odinism. The Committee denied Smith’s

request for a designated area of worship, due to its concerns that permitting Odinist

rites to be performed in a public area of the prison, before all the inmates, could

pose security problems. The Committee’s decision stated that 

The Asatru / Odinism religion draws and embraces certain members

of the Aryan Nations and Neo-Nazis, which combined with a

potentially hostile inmate population and the prevalence of prison

gangs, would be detrimental to security and [pose] a strong potential

for harm.

R2-98, Exh. M at 2. The Committee did grant Smith a secure location to practice

his Odinist rites, stating that when a secure place of worship was required, the

Warden and Chaplain would designate a suitable location for Smith to engage in

his observances.

Upon review, we find that Smith has failed to establish that this decision–to

allow Smith to practice his religion freely in a secure location while declining to

allow his observances in the general prison area–significantly hampered his

religious exercise. As discussed in the previous section, a substantial burden must

“place more than an inconvenience on [one’s] religious exercise.” See Midrash,
48

366 F.3d at 1227. Here, there is no evidence that the ADOC’s decision to limit

Smith’s religious practices to a secure location placed “more than an incidental”

burden on his practice of the Odinist faith. See id. On the contrary, Smith

remained free to engage in his religious observances under the Committee’s 2003’s

decision, albeit limited to a secure, rather than an open, area of the prison. 

In addition, as with the quartz crystal, Smith has failed to demonstrate on

appeal how, if it all, the decision to deny Smith a designated worship area, in the

open area of the prison, effectuated a “substantial burden” on his individual

practice of Odinism. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). In fact, the outside sources that

Smith submitted in connection with his request did not make any mention of the

need for a “designated worship area” in connection with the practice of Odinism. 

See generally R2-61. Because Smith failed to submit evidence to establish his

prima facie case, the defendant-appellees were entitled to summary judgment on

Smith’s RLUIPA claim based on the denial of a designated worship spot. 

See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1228. 

3. Denial of a Small Fire

Finally, Smith challenges the ADOC Committee’s decision to deny his

request for a small fire pit. Smith’s original request sought a “small fire pit,

approximately 9'' in diameter and 9'' deep,” in which he would be able to light a
49

pine fire. R2-63, Exh. K-1 at 2. The Committee granted this request only in part,

allowing Smith possession of a small candle to be used in connection with his

Odinist exercises. Smith contends that this decision effectuated a substantial

burden on his religious exercise under section 3 of RLUIPA.

We disagree. As with Smith’s request for a crystal, Smith failed to present

record evidence to establish the need for, or relevance of, a 9'' by 9'' fire pit in

connection with his Odinist practices, such that the denial of this item would

effectuate a substantial burden his religious observance. As noted, the ADOC did

grant Smith a candle to use in his cell in his observance of Odinism. On appeal,

Smith has failed to demonstrate how, if at all, the decision to limit him to a candle,

rather than to a full-blown fire pit, significantly hampered his practice of Odinism. 

See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1227. As with the ADOC decision on a secure worship

spot, the record demonstrates that Smith remained free to engage in his religious

observance under the ADOC 2003 decision, albeit limited to a candle rather than a

pine fire. 

Moreover, like the first two requests, Smith has failed to demonstrate how

the ADOC’s decision to limit him to a small candle effectuated a substantial

burden on his religious practice. The sources that he submitted in connection with

this request alluded to the Kenaz rune being representative of “the pine fire of
50

purification.” R2-63, Exh. K-1, but there was no mention of the need for a pine fire

in connection with the practice of Odinism. See id.; see also R1-20, Exh. M

(discussing in general how the rune symbolizes a pine tree giving heat and light);

R2-61 (stating that the rune “refers to the sacredness of the hearth and ritual

cleansing by fire”). The Chaplain found, and we agree, that the sources that Smith

submitted did “not show[] the necessity of [a pine] fire” in connection with the

Odinist rites. See R1-20, Exh. C. Failing such evidence, we are unable to find

how, if at all, the denial of a pine fire pit effectuated a substantial burden on his

observance of Odinism. Because Smith failed to submit evidence to establish a

prima facie RLUIPA case based on the denial of the pine fire pit, the defendantappellees were entitled to summary judgment on Smith’s claim. See Midrash, 366

F.3d at 1228. 

In summary, having reviewed Smith’s claims for injunctive relief and

nominal damages under RLUIPA–based on the ADOC’s denial of a crystal, a

worship area, and a fire pit–we conclude that none of the three violations was

sufficient to establish a prima facie claim under RLUIPA. Nor can we conclude

that the Committee’s disposition of Smith’s three requests, taken collectively, was

sufficient to establish that Smith’s religious practice was significantly hampered,

so as to give rise to a prima facie RLUIPA case. Accordingly, we conclude that the
51

defendant-appellees were entitled to summary judgment. And although the district

court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the defendant may have been

reached on the basis of qualified immunity, “we may affirm the district court’s

decision on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court

actually relied.” Parks, 43 F.3d at 613 (citation omitted). Because we conclude

that summary judgment was properly entered for the defendant-appellees, we

affirm the district court’s summary judgment order on Smith’s RLUIPA claims.

III. CONCLUSION

Smith has challenged the district court’s disposition of his claims brought

pursuant to RLUIPA, raising a number of separate issues on appeal. After

reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, and having had the benefit of oral

argument, we conclude that RLUIPA’s remedies section, which generally allows

for “appropriate relief,” may, in some cases, allow for the recovery of monetary

damages, where appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2. We conclude, however, that

under section 3, such a recovery only extends to an action brought against state

officials in their official capacities; a RLUIPA claim for damages against a state

official in his individual capacity is not viable under section 3 of RLUIPA. 

Having resolved these broader legal questions, in Smith’s particular case we

conclude that he failed to establish a prima facie RLUIPA violation under section
52

3, and, accordingly, that the district court acted properly in granting summary

judgment in favor of the defendant-appellees. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the

judgment of the district court. 
53

EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, CONCURS in the result.