[Cite as Schnippel Constr., Inc. v. Profitt, 2009-Ohio-5905.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

SHELBY COUNTY 

 

SCHNIPPEL CONSTRUCTION, INC., 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 17-09-12 

 v. 

JIM PROFITT, ET AL, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. 

 

Appeal from Shelby County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 07CV000437 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: November 9, 2009 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Timothy G. Pepper for Appellant 

Roger L. Sabo for Appellee 
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PRESTON, P.J. 

I. Facts & Procedural History 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Schnippel Construction, Inc. (“Schnippel”), 

appeals the Shelby County Court of Common Pleas’ grant of summary judgment 

in favor of defendant-appellees Jim Profitt (“Profitt”) and Service Contract 

Administrators, Inc. (“SCA”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} Schnippel is an Ohio corporation and non-union contractor for 

private and public commercial construction projects in the State of Ohio. 

(Complaint, Doc. No. 2, ¶¶1, 5). On or about October 4, 1996, Schnippel 

executed and adopted a welfare benefit plan sold by SCA through its trustee or 

fiduciary, Profitt, and administered by Prevailing Wage Contractors Association, 

Inc. (“PWCA”). (Id. at ¶10). Schnippel executed and adopted this benefit plan 

based upon Profitt’s representation that PWCA’s benefit plan complied with 

federal and state prevailing wage laws. (Id. at ¶7). The PWCA benefit plan was 

subsequently amended, and Schnippel adopted the amended plan in 2001. (May 5, 

2009 JE, Doc. No. 127); (Profitt Aff. ¶8, Ex. B). 

{¶3} In 2005, Schnippel entered into a contract with Montgomery County 

for construction on a solid waste treatment plant. On June 20, 2006, the 

International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental, and Reinforcing Iron 

Workers, Local Union 209 filed suit against Schnippel alleging violations of 
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Ohio’s prevailing wage laws. (Doc. No. 2, ¶¶11-12); (Doc. No. 9, attached). In 

August 2007, Schnippel entered into a settlement agreement with Local 290, 

wherein it agreed to: pay $60,000.00 in damages, penalties, and attorney’s fees; 

and abstain from bidding on projects within Local 290’s territorial jurisdiction for 

a period of three (3) years. (Sharon Schnippel Depo., Ex. C). 

{¶4} On December 19, 2007, Schnippel filed a complaint against SCA, 

Profitt, and PWCA, alleging negligent misrepresentation and fraud against 

defendants SCA and Profitt and breach of contract and tortious breach of duty 

arising via contract against defendant PWCA. (Doc. No. 2). 

{¶5} On February 9, 2009, SCA and Profitt filed motions for summary 

judgment. (Doc. Nos. 85-86). On March 18, 2009, Schnippel voluntarily 

dismissed defendant PWCA pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A). (Doc. No. 114). On March 

26, 2009, Schnippel filed its memorandum in opposition to the motion for 

summary judgment to which SCA replied on April 3, 2009. (Doc. Nos. 120, 126). 

Schnippel also dismissed its fraud claim against defendants SCA and Profitt. (May 

5, 2009 JE, Doc. No. 127). 

{¶6} On May 5, 2009, the trial court granted SCA and Profitt summary 

judgment on Schnippel’s remaining claim of negligent misrepresentation, finding 

that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (Id.). 
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{¶7} On June 2, 2009, Schnippel filed a notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 135). 

Schnippel now appeals raising two assignments of error for our review. 

II. Standard of Review 

{¶8} Before addressing the merits of Schnippel’s assignments of error, we 

must set forth the applicable standard of review. An appellate court reviews a 

grant or denial of summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C) de novo. Wampler 

v. Higgins (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 111, 127, 752 N.E.2d 962, citing Doe v. Shaffer

(2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390, 738 N.E.2d 1243, citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison 

Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. To prevail under Civ.R. 

56(C), a party must show: (1) there are no genuine issues of material fact; (2) it 

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion 

when viewing evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor, and that conclusion is 

adverse to the nonmoving party; and (3) the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C); Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 390; Grafton, 77 Ohio 

St.3d at 105. 

{¶9} Material facts have been identified as those facts “that might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Turner v. Turner (1993), 67 

Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 617 N.E.2d 1123, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

(1986), 477 U.S. 242, 248 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S.Ct. 2505. “Whether a genuine 

issue exists is answered by the following inquiry: [d]oes the evidence present “a 
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sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury” or is it “so one-sided that 

one party must prevail as a matter of law[?]” Id., citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. at 251-52. 

{¶10} Summary judgment should be granted with caution, resolving all 

doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Osborne v. Lyles (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 

326, 333, 587 N.E.2d 825. “The purpose of summary judgment is not to try issues 

of fact, but is rather to determine whether triable issues of fact exist.” Lakota Loc. 

Schools Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Brickner (1996), 108 Ohio App.3d 637, 643, 671 

N.E.2d 578. 

III. Analysis 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING WHEN 

APPELLANT’S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 

CLAIMS ACCRUED, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 

FAILED TO FOLLOW THE OHIO SUPREME COURT’S 

PRECEDENT OF UTILIZING THE ACTUAL INJURY RULE 

FOR NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING WHEN 

APPELLANT’S NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 

CLAIMS ACCRUED, BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 

FAILED TO DISTINGUISH THE DISCOVERY RULE FROM 

THE ACTUAL INJURY RULE. 

{¶11} In its first assignment of error, Schnippel argues that the tort of 

negligent misrepresentation accrued in September 2007 when it settled the lawsuit 
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with Local 209. Specifically, Schnippel argues that its negligence claim against 

Profitt and SCA was not actionable until September 2007 because until then it had 

suffered no injury or damages. As a corollary to this argument, Schnippel argues 

in its second assignment of error that the trial court erred in determining when his 

negligent misrepresentation claim accrued because the trial court failed to 

distinguish the actual injury/delayed damages rule1

 from the discovery rule. 

{¶12} Profitt and SCA, on the other hand, argue that the alleged negligent 

misrepresentations occurred in 1996 or 2001, at the latest, and, as such, are barred 

by R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of limitations. Appellees also point out 

that the discovery rule does not apply to negligent misrepresentation claims, and 

that the “actual injury rule” cited by appellant was for construction cases only. 

Since the alleged negligent misrepresentations occurred in 1996 or 2001, the 

complaint was filed in 2007, and the discovery rule is inapplicable, appellees 

argue that the trial court correctly determined the complaint was time-barred. 

{¶13} We will examine the trial court’s judgment entry, the relevant statute 

of limitations, and case law cited by the trial court in support of its decision. 

Ultimately, we conclude that the delayed damages rule is inapplicable herein since 

 

1

 The “delayed damages” rule is also referred to as the “actual injury” or “actual damage” rule. See, e.g., 

O’Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp. (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 84, 87, 447 N.E.2d 727 (actual injury rule); Shaker 

Courts Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Indus. Energy Sys., Inc., (Feb. 24, 2000), 8th Dist. No. 75378, 

*2 (“actual injury or damage” rule). 
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Schnippel was damaged when Profitt and SCA allegedly made the negligent 

misrepresentation. 

{¶14} The trial court sub judice found that the parties agreed that the 

applicable statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation is four years. (May 

5, 2009 JE, Doc. No. 127). The sole issue presented to the trial court was “* * * 

when did the cause of action accrue. Did the cause of action accrue in 1996 when 

the alleged negligent misrepresentation took place or did it accrue in 2006 or 2007 

when Schnippel was sued or settled that lawsuit?” (Id.). The trial court 

acknowledged the Fifth District’s decision in J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. 

Lanning—which found that a mortgagor’s cause of action against a title company 

for negligently altering his mortgage accrued when his property was wrongfully 

foreclosed upon, not when the negligent alteration occurred—but found the Ohio 

Supreme Court’s decision in Investors REIT One v. Jacobs and our decision in 

Reidel v. Houser controlling. (Id., citing (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 546 N.E.2d 

206; (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 546, 607 N.E.2d 894). The trial court also found 

persuasive that the Court of Appeals in other districts have rejected the delayed 

damages rule as a way to circumvent the unavailability of the discovery rule in 

negligence actions. (Id., citing Chandler v. Schriml (May 25, 2000), 10th Dist. No. 

99AP-1006. See, also, Dancar Properties, Ltd. v. O’Leary-Kientz, 1st Dist. No. C030936, 2004-Ohio-6998, ¶14; James v. Partin, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-11-086, 
Case No. 17-09-12 

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2002-Ohio-2602, ¶25). Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Schnippel’s 

negligent misrepresentation cause of action accrued in 1996 when the alleged 

misrepresentations were made, or, at the latest, in 2001 or 2002 when amendments 

to the benefit plan were made. (Id.). Since Schnippel’s claim accrued in 2002, at 

the latest, and its complaint was filed in December 2007, the trial court concluded 

that Schnippel’s claim was time-barred. (Id.). We agree. 

{¶15} As the trial court found, the parties do not dispute that R.C. 

2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of limitations governs negligent misrepresentation 

claims. The parties also are not disputing whether the discovery rule is applicable 

for negligent misrepresentation claims. (Appellant’s Brief at 14, “The discovery 

rule is irrelevant to Schnippel’s negligent misrepresentation claim.”). Rather, 

Schnippel claims that the trial court’s reliance upon Investors REIT One was in 

error since that case, unlike his case, dealt with the discovery rule and not claimaccrual. 

{¶16} In Investors REIT One, the Ohio Supreme Court specifically 

determined that: (1) claims of professional accountant negligence are governed by 

R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of limitations; and (2) that the discovery rule 

was unavailable for claims of professional accountant negligence. 46 Ohio St.3d 

176, at paragraphs 1 and 2a of the syllabus. The Ohio Supreme Court has since 

reaffirmed Investors REIT One. Grant Thornton v. Windsor House, Inc. (1991), 57 
Case No. 17-09-12 

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Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 566 N.E.2d 1220. Several Appellate Courts, relying upon 

Investors REIT One, have rejected the discovery rule for other negligence actions 

governed by R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of limitations. For example, the 

First District has held that “the Ohio Supreme Court’s rejection of the discovery 

rule in cases against accountants [Investors REIT One] applies generally to claims 

for professional negligence controlled by R.C. 2305.09.” Dancar Properties, Ltd., 

2004-Ohio-6998, at ¶25, citing Hater v. Gradison Div. of McDonald & Co. 

Securities, Inc. (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 99, 109, 655 N.E.2d 189. The Fifth and 

Seventh Districts have rejected the discovery rule for cases involving negligent 

investment advice generally. Kegg v. Mansfield (Apr. 30, 2001), 5th Dist. No. 

2000CA00311, at *4, citing Hater, 101 Ohio App.3d at 109; Hirschl v. Evans, 

(Mar. 27, 1996), 7th Dist. No. 94 C.A.43, at *3. The First and Tenth Districts 

have specifically rejected the discovery rule for negligent misrepresentation 

claims, like at issue herein. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 99AP-1006, at *2. See, also, 

Dancar Properties, Ltd. (1st Dist.), 2004-Ohio-6998, at ¶¶13-14. Therefore, the 

trial court’s conclusion that the discovery rule was inapplicable to negligent 

misrepresentation claims, relying upon Investors REIT One, was not in error. 

{¶17} With respect to Schnippel’s argument that the delayed damages rule 

is applicable and distinguishable from the discovery rule, this Court rejected that 

argument, at least implicitly, in Riedel v. Houser, 79 Ohio App.3d at 549-50. In 
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that case, Riedel filed a claim alleging that Houser negligently prepared his sales, 

use, and permissive tax returns for the years 1983 to 1986. Id. at 547. The trial 

court granted Houser summary judgment based upon R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year 

statute of limitations. Id. On appeal, Riedel, like Schnippel herein, argued that the 

trial court misinterpreted Investors REIT One and urged this Court to distinguish 

the discovery rule in Investors REIT One from the delayed damages rule in order 

to preserve his claim. Id. at 547-48. We, however, declined Riedel’s offer, 

followed Investors REIT One, and found that the discovery rule was unavailable 

for claims of professional accountant negligence. Id. at 549. This Court rejected 

Riedel’s attempt to distinguish the delayed damages rule from the discovery rule, 

stating “[w]e believe the distinction urged by appellant to be without difference 

where the discovery rule is applicable for determination of the accrual of a cause 

of action.” Id. at 549. We further found that, in light of Investors REIT One, 

“consideration of the discovery rule [was] irrelevant to application of R.C. 

2305.09(D) in cases of accountant’s professional negligence.” Id. Therefore, we 

also cannot conclude that the trial court’s reliance upon our decision in Houser to 

reject Schnippel’s delayed damages argument was in error. 

{¶18} Several appellate districts have agreed with our statement in Riedel 

v. Houser—that the distinction between the delayed damages rule and the 

discovery rule for accountant negligence claims was a distinction without a 
Case No. 17-09-12 

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difference—and have rejected attempts to use the delayed damages rule as a way 

to circumvent the unavailability of the discovery rule for similar claims. Hater, 

(1st Dist. 1995), 101 Ohio App.3d at 110; Rihm v. Wade (Dec. 10, 1999), 2nd 

Dist. No. 17802, at *4; Hirschl, 7th Dist. No. 94 C.A.43, at *3; Bell v. Holden 

Survey, Inc. (Sept. 29, 2000), 7th Dist. No. 729, at *5; Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 

99AP-1006, at *2; Partin, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-11-086, at *2. Several other 

appellate districts have rejected the delayed damages rule primarily relying upon 

Investors REIT One. Fronczak v. Arthur Anderson, L.L.P. (10th Dist. 1997), 124 

Ohio App.3d 240, 243, 705 N.E.2d 1283; Jim Brown Chevrolet, Inc. v. S.R. 

Snodgrass, A.C. (11th Dist. 2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 583, 587-88, 752 N.E.2d 335. 

See, also, Accelerated Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Hausser & Taylor, L.L.P., 8th Dist. 

No. 88207, 2007-Ohio-2113, ¶¶21-26. Although many of these cases involved 

professional accountant negligence claims, the Seventh and Twelfth Districts have 

rejected the delayed damages rule for professional negligence claims against 

surveyors as well. Bell v. Holden Survey, Inc. (Sept. 29, 2000), 7th Dist. No. 729, 

at *5; Partin, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-11-086, at *2. The Tenth District rejected 

the delayed damages rule for a negligent misrepresentation claim. Chandler, 10th 

Dist. No. 99AP-1006, at *2. 

{¶19} Despite the overwhelming authority rejecting the delayed damages 

rule, the Fifth and Sixth Districts have extended it in a few cases. In Gray v. 
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Estate of Barry, the Sixth District held that R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of 

limitations for accountant malpractice founded on negligent preparation or filing 

of tax returns did not begin to run until after the client was notified by the I.R.S. 

that a penalty had been assessed for such faulty preparation or failure to file. 

(1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 764, 768-69, 656 N.E.2d 729. In that case, accountant 

John E. Barry, deceased, had provided accounting and tax preparation services to 

Joseph W. Gray III, M.D., Inc. Id. at 766. On July 14, 1993, Gary filed suit 

against Barry’s estate alleging that Barry had negligently failed to file I.R.S. form 

5500R along with the remainder of his 1987 tax return at the close of the 1987 tax 

year. Id. As a result of Barry’s failure to file the appropriate forms, Gary alleged 

that he incurred a $9,000.00 I.R.S. tax penalty. Id. In response, Barry’s estate filed 

a motion to dismiss arguing that Gary’s action was time-barred under R.C. 

2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of limitations. Id. Barry’s estate argued that any 

wrongful act on Barry’s part had occurred, at the latest, in 1988, and since there 

was no discovery rule for accountant malpractice, Gary should have filed his suit 

no later than 1992. Id. The trial court agreed with Barry’s estate and granted the 

motion to dismiss, citing Philpott v. Ernst & Whinney (Nov. 25, 1992), 8th Dist. 

No. 61203. 

{¶20} On appeal, Gary argued that the discovery rule should apply and, 

alternatively, that the cause of action did not accrue until the I.R.S. assessed the 
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penalty in 1993. Id. The Sixth District rejected Gary’s argument for a discovery 

rule, citing Investors REIT One, but found his argument with respect to delayed 

damages persuasive. Id. at 767-68, citing Investors REIT One, 46 Ohio St.3d 176. 

The Court in Gray distinguished the case at bar from Investors REIT One and a 

line of appellate cases, on the basis that its case dealt with claim accrual, not 

discovery of an existing claim. Id. at 768. The Court in Gray acknowledged 

Philpott but, nonetheless, found Philpott’s dissent more persuasive. Id. at 767-78. 

The Court reasoned as follows: 

We agree with the dissent in Philpott and the court of appeals 

opinion in Sladky. Philpott, Sladky and the present case are not 

discovery cases. The issue in each is the time at which the cause 

of action accrued. In any negligence action, a claim for which 

relief may be granted cannot be maintained absent the presence 

of all essential elements. “To establish actionable negligence, one 

must show * * * the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty 

and injury resulting proximately therefrom.” Mussivand v. 

David (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270. Since 

there can be no negligence without injury, there can be no 

negligent conduct by which a cause accrues, pursuant to 

Holsman, until there is an injury to a legally protected interest. 

Kunz v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co., supra. In the case of a 

negligently prepared tax return or a tax form negligently 

omitted from a return, there is no injury until the I.R.S. 

determines to levy a penalty assessment. Until that time, no 

claim upon which relief can be granted exists. Similarly, it is not 

until such a claim may be maintained that the time for any 

statute of limitation begins to run. 
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Id. at 768. Utilizing the date when Gary received notice from the I.R.S. that it was 

imposing a penalty, the appellate court determined that Gary’s action was filed 

within R.C. 2305.09(D)’s four-year time limitation. Id. at 769. 

{¶21} The Fifth District subsequently adopted Gary v. Estate of Barry’s 

delayed damages rule with respect to actions against accountants for negligent 

preparation of tax returns. Fritz v. Brunner Cox, L.L.P. (2001), 142 Ohio App.3d 

664, 756 N.E.2d 740. In doing so, however, the Fifth District acknowledged: 

* * *that other courts, in interpreting and applying Investors 

REIT One, would find that appellants’ complaint against 

appellees for accountant negligence was time-barred, since it was 

not filed within four years after the alleged negligent act was 

committed, which, in this case, was the filing of appellants’ 1994 

federal income tax return on September 14, 1995. However, that 

interpretation of Investors REIT One would lead to an illogical 

and inequitable result, namely, that appellants’ claims against 

appellees would be time-barred before appellants’ damages even 

manifested themselves. 

Id. at 669. More recently, the Fifth District applied its reasoning in Fritz and held 

that a mortgagor’s cause of action against a title company for negligently altering 

his mortgage accrued when the bank filed a foreclosure complaint against the 

wrong property in reliance upon the incorrect legal description of the property 

provided by the title company, not when the title company negligently altered the 

mortgage. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Lanning, 5th Dist. No. 2007CA00223, 

2008-Ohio-893. 
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{¶22} Schnippel asks this Court to adopt the reasoning of these cases 

applying the delayed damages rule. While we acknowledge Gray, Fritz, and 

Lanning, we are not persuaded by them for several reasons. To begin with, in 

Houser we rejected the delayed damages rule adopted by the Courts in Gray and 

Fritz. 79 Ohio App.3d 546. Additionally, the holding in Sladky v. Lomax (9th 

Dist., 1988), 43 Ohio App.3d 4, 538 N.E.2d 1089, upon which the dissent in 

Philpott and the Courts in Gray and Fritz relied, has been questioned following 

Investors REIT One. Lord v. Ernst & Whinny (June 3, 1992), 9th Dist. No. 15361, 

at *2; Jodway Heating, L.L.C. v. Stevens, 9th Dist. No. 08 CA0089-M, 2009-Ohio5054, ¶10. Furthermore, a majority of Ohio’s appellate districts have rejected the 

delayed damages rule in similar cases. For its part, Lanning, 2008-Ohio-893, is 

distinguishable since it did not involve negligent misrepresentation, and 

furthermore, we reject it since it relies upon Gray and Fritz, which cases are 

contrary to our decision in Houser. 

{¶23} We also find the Tenth District’s decision in Chandler persuasive. 

10th Dist. No. 99AP-1006. In that case, the property owners and the real estate 

company represented to Chandler that the duplex he was purchasing was properly 

used as a two-family unit for zoning purposes. Id. at *1. Based upon that 

representation, Chandler closed on the duplex on April 26, 1994. Id. In April of 

1998, Chandler decided to sell the duplex and discovered that it, in fact, was not 
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zoned for two-family use but for single-family use, contrary to the owners’ and 

real estate company’s representations. Id. On August 7, 1998, Chandler filed a 

complaint alleging, in pertinent part, negligent misrepresentation against the real 

estate company and the owners. Id. The trial court, however, granted summary 

judgment against Chandler, finding that his negligent misrepresentation claim was 

time-barred under R.C. 2305.09. Id. 

{¶24} On appeal, Chandler argued that his claim was not time-barred since 

it did not accrue until he suffered damages, which was when he discovered the 

zoning defect. Id. at *2. Chandler, like Schnippel herein, attempted to distinguish 

the discovery rule from the delayed damages rule to avoid the unavailability of the 

latter. Id. The Tenth District, however, found Chandler’s argument irrelevant, 

because Chandler did not suffer delayed damages as he opined. Id. at *3. 

According to the Court, Chandler was injured at the time he purchased the duplex, 

and his cause of action accrued at the time of the negligent misrepresentation. Id. 

The Court reasoned as follows: 

Chandler alleged in his complaint that he would not have 

purchased the duplex for the amount paid had he known that 

the duplex was zoned for single-family use. From the time he 

closed on the property, Chandler owned less than he believed. 

Thus, Chandler’s injury occurred at the closing on April 26, 

1994. The fact that Chandler did not realize his injury until 

much later does not change the fact that the financial injury 

occurred at the closing. 
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Id. at *4. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision finding that 

Chandler’s negligent misrepresentation claim was time-barred under R.C. 

2305.09(D). Id. 

{¶25} As the Court found in Chandler, we find that Schnippel’s argument 

in support of delayed damages is irrelevant, because Schnippel did not suffer 

delayed damages. Id. at *3. Schnippel, like Chandler, alleged that he purchased 

the PWCA benefit plan based upon the negligent misrepresentations of Profitt and 

SCA that the plan complied with federal and state prevailing wage laws. 

(Complaint, Doc. No. 2, at ¶¶6-10). Accordingly, like the Court in Chandler

found, we find that Schnippel was damaged in 1996 when he purchased (or, at the 

latest, in 2001 when he renewed) the PWCA benefit plan. 10th Dist. No. 99AP1006, at *4. Assuming its allegations are true, Schnippel, like Chandler, 

purchased less than it received based upon Profitt and SCA’s misrepresentations. 

Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 99AP-1006, at *4. That Schnippel did not discover that 

he was damaged until 2006 when Local 290 filed suit does not change the fact that 

he suffered damages at the time he purchased (or renewed) the PWCA benefit 

plan. Id. Therefore, based upon Chandler, we reject Schnippel’s argument that he 

suffered delayed damages. 
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IV. Conclusion

{¶26} Since Schnippel’s negligent misrepresentation claim accrued, at the 

latest, in 2001 or 2002 when it renewed the PWCA benefit plan, and its complaint 

was filed in December 2007, Schnippel’s claim is time-barred under R.C. 

2305.09(D)’s four-year statute of limitations. 

{¶27} Schnippel’s first and second assignments of error are both overruled. 

{¶28} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jlr