REVISING THE TWO MTW FORCE SHAPIN

PARADIGM

A “Strategic Alternatives Report”

From the Strategic Studies Institute

Edited by

Steven Metz

April 2001
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Governmen

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and sh

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Comments a

be conveyed directly to the editor. Dr. Metz can be contacted 

245-3822, fax (717) 245-3820, or email at Steven.

carlisle.army.mil. Copies of this report may be obtained fr

Publications and Production Office by calling commercia

245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Inter

Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institut

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for ele

dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisl

army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly 

newsletter to update the national security community on the res

our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and up

conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also pro

strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If y

interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e

outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-049-4

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword .....................

1. Introduction

 Steven Metz .................

2. Sizing the Force for the 21st Century

 John F. Troxell ...............

3. Replacing the 2 MTW Standard:

 Can a Better Approach Be Found?

 Richard L. Kugler ..............

4. A New Strategy and Military Logic

 for the 21st Century

 Huba Wass de Czege

 and Antulio J. Echevarria II ........

5. Rethinking Two-War Strategies

 Michael E. O’Hanlon.............

6. What Follows the 2 MTW

 Force Shaping Paradigm?

 Daniel Goure.................

7. Why the 2 MTW Must Go

 Michael Casey ................. 

8. Multi-Metric Force Sizing

 Ian Roxborough ............... 

9. Threats, Strategy, and Force Structure:

 An Alternative Paradigm

 for National Security in the 21st Century

 Robert David Steele ............. 

10. Comprehensive Security

 and a Core Military Capability

 Walter Neal Anderson ............ 

About the Editor and Authors........... 

iii
FOREWORD

U.S. military strategy is undergoing its most s

examination since the end of the Cold War. L

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, this proc

designed to assess every dimension of the str

including its most basic assumptions and concepts. F

first time in over a decade, everything about U.S. m

strategy is subject to question.

One of the most important elements of U.S. m

strategy for the past ten years has been the belief 

force able to fight two nearly simultaneous major t

wars (MTW) of the DESERT STORM type would be ca

of dealing with the full gamut of security challenges th

United States is likely to face. Now nearly every exp

U.S. military strategy agrees that this force sh

paradigm needs a relook.

Beyond that point of agreement, the experts div

Some contend that DESERT STORM-type wars 

unlikely that creating a military focused on them is a 

of money. But even this group does not agree on 

should replace the two MTW force shaping paradigm. 

experts are less willing to abandon the paradigm, ar

instead that it simply needs updating to reflect the na

the contemporary security environment. 

In the Strategic Alternatives Report that follow

Strategic Studies Institute has collected essays from 

of the leading thinkers on the question of a force sh

paradigm for the U.S. military. They represent a 

range of scholars, analysts, government officials

uniformed thinkers. While they share a belief 

importance of the issue, they vary widely on their as

tions, analytical parameters, and recommendation

airing this range of alternative perspectives, the Str

v
Studies Institute hopes to contribute to the buildin

new, 21

st

 century U.S. military strategy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vi
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Steven Metz

Since the early 1990s, U.S. military strategy has 

for a force able to fight and win two nearly-simulta

major theater wars (MTWs). An MTW was som

similar to Operation DESERT STORM—a large

conventional war in Eurasia against an aggressive re

power involving substantial American forces fro

services and, most likely, allies or coalition partners. 

policymakers and planners admitted that the outbr

two nearly simultaneous MTWs was unlikely, they fe

a military able to deal with such a challenge would a

sufficient for other likely missions and tasks.

The two MTW force shaping paradigm had a treme

effect on American strategy. National security st

always has both internal and external dimensions

external dimension specifies how a nation will dea

others, specifically how it will use power resources to p

or advance its interests. The internal dimension deal

building a consensus on strategic objectives and me

mobilizing support for the strategy, and developin

means to attain the objectives, including a military 

Many factors shape force development, incl

geography, wealth, strategic culture (including a na

tolerance for risk, its aggressiveness, and its world

level of technological development, strategic objectiv

shape and form of threat, domestic politics, commitm

partnerships, and expectations concerning the nat

current and future armed conflict. 

These factors made the two nearly-simultaneous 

force shaping paradigm the appropriate one in the 1

1
Geography dictated that any war involving the 

military would take place overseas. Only Eurasia com

a high enough level of U.S. national interest and of th

lead the United States into a large scale war. The we

the United States meant that the nation could sup

force that was large enough and advanced enough to p

decisive power to nearly every part of the globe. Ame

saw armed conflict as abnormal and episodic, arisin

aggression by dictators. Such dictators, in the Am

worldview, only understood force, and thus mu

deterred or defeated rather than accommodated. 

succeeded at armed aggression, others would be insp

attempt it. This meant that the United States sou

deter or reverse aggression in a wide band where 

interests were at stake, including Europe, Southwes

and Northeast Asia.

The best way to deter aggression, American str

thinkers held, was through military preponder

During the 1990s, the assumption was that the pr

threat to regional stability and U.S. interests came 

“rogue states” largely armed with Soviet or Sovie

equipment, and thus preferring to fight a Soviet-sty

based on armor-heavy conventional units. Such 

states wanted to expand their territory or augmen

national power by controlling vital resources and 

willing to use force to do so. Because the primary th

defined as one that was both possible and poten

dangerous—came from rogue states, the United 

could expect to fight with allies or coalition partners 

MTW.

Continuing a trend that began after World W

American military strategy in the 1990s was based 

qualitative superiority of U.S. forces, both in technolo

equipment, and in human factors like trainin

leadership. Qualitative superiority, along with all

and partnerships, allowed a relatively small U.S. mili

undertake global commitments. If war against a 

opponent did occur, qualitative superiority could 

2
compensate for numerical inferiority, particularly ear

war before all American and allied units had dep

America sought a quick resolution of armed conflict 

short wars would be more likely to be supported 

American people and their elected leaders. The two 

force shaping construct, in other words, had b

quantitative dimension and a temporal one. A m

built with it in mind could not only win two wars 

simultaneously, but could do so relatively quickly.

The nature of the global security environment 

1990s and of U.S. national security policy made th

MTW force shaping paradigm logical. But does th

hold? In some fundamental ways, the global se

environment of 2001 differs from earlier ones. For ins

while the degree of danger in the system ha

diminished, the nature of the threat has. Cross-

invasion by a rogue state with a Soviet-style milit

much less likely today than a decade ago. Humani

intervention and protracted peacekeeping are increa

important tasks for the militaries of many na

including the United States. Globalization an

information revolution have linked the world more c

than at any time in history, thus making it more diffi

ignore aggression or instability in less vital regions

the ongoing revolution in military affairs, in combi

with the accelerated pace of change which characteriz

21st century, has led American policymakers and pla

to conclude that they must undertake a fundam

transformation of the U.S. military. To build a militar

will remain dominant twenty years in the future 

same time that it is able to protect current regional st

is a daunting task.

These changes in the global security environmen

caused many American defense thinkers, both in and 

the government, to question the two MTW force sh

paradigm. That it needs reassessed is clear. But b

that, questions abound. Does the two MTW force sh

paradigm need updated or replaced? If Ame

3
strategists replaced it, what should the new paradigm 

revision is enough, what should be changed? Is it eno

simply redefine “major theater war” or should ther

different building block? Should conventional w

Southwest or Northeast Asia continue to serve as the 

for the concept of a major theater war? Is a force th

deal with two nearly simultaneous MTWs truly f

enough to also meet other security threats that ar

possible and potentially dangerous?

The time is right to ask these questions. This is li

be an extremely important year in the evolut

American national security and military strategy. As 

administration assumes power, the Pentag

undertaking a congressionally-mandated Quadre

Defense Review. The questions associated with th

MTW forcing shaping paradigm will be a vital part 

strategy formulation process of the new administratio

of the Quadrennial Defense Review. While the 

answers to them are not year clear, a range of po

answers has emerged. The essays in this coll

delineate a range of approaches to force shaping i

While they are unified by the strategic acumen of 

writers and by the fact that they all address the sam

questions, they do not all share assumptions or, 

importantly, conclusions. They recommend sol

ranging from a relatively modest updating of the two 

forcing shaping paradigm to its abandonment. 

The usefulness and validity of any force sh

paradigm must be assessed using a range of variables

of the simplest yet most powerful ways of doing thi

analyze the suitability, feasibility, and acceptability o

alternative or recommendation. The analysis of suit

asks whether an alternative is likely to attain its obje

The suitability of a force shaping paradigm mu

assessed in terms of acceptable risk, national interest

the nature of the threat or challenges that might be fa

suitable alternative is one with a good chance of prom

or protecting national interests and deterring or defe

4
against threats at an acceptable level of risk. In or

meet the suitability test, all of the force shaping para

discussed in this collection make certain assumptions 

future U.S. national interests, future threats or chall

and the level of acceptable risk. If these assumptions 

hold, the paradigm is not suitable. The feasibility of 

shaping paradigm is based on the existence of ade

resources. Each paradigm is based on assumptions 

future defense budgets; demographics; the ability 

U.S. military to recruit soldiers, sailors, airmen

Marines; the contribution of allies or partners

technology. Again, the validity of a paradigm is no g

than the validity of its assumptions. Finally

acceptability of a force shaping paradigm is conting

its being supported by the American people and 

elected leaders. A force shaping paradigm which 

generate a military or a military strategy that is unli

garner this support—for instance, one based o

preemptive use of weapons of mass destruction—wou

pass the acceptability test, and therefore has little v

As will become clear, the force shaping para

offered in this volume differ as to their assumptions a

the relative priority assigned to suitability, feasibilit

acceptability. Some are imminently suitable, but m

be adequately feasible and acceptable. Some are fe

but make not assure attainment of national objec

Strategy always entails difficult trade-offs and the set

priorities. That holds as much for the construction of 

shaping paradigm as for any other element of stra

Somewhere within the alternatives presented here, th

lies a force shaping paradigm that maximizes suita

feasibility, and acceptability. It may be one of 

proposed by the authors, or it may be a synthesis of s

of them. This can only become clear through an

debate, and consensus building. By illuminating th

components and assumptions of the force shaping pr

and providing a range of cogent and creative solutions

essays make a major contribution to this process.

5
CHAPTER 2

SIZING THE FORCE FOR THE 21st CENT

John F. Troxell

You cannot make decisions simply by asking yourself wheth

something might be nice to have. You have to make 

judgement on how much is enough.

Robert S. McNamara

April 20, 1963

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the United 

has been struggling to gain consensus on an appro

force planning methodology concerning the size 

military establishment and to answer the question 

much is enough?” The size and posture of the U.S. m

was the principal topic of the first Quadrennial D

Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel’s 

Alternative Force Structure Assessment, and rema

important task for the U.S. Commission on Na

Security/21st Century. The National Defense A

ization Act for fiscal year 2000, which made QD

permanent requirement, included under its firs

principal task to the Secretary of Defense a call 

comprehensive discussion of national defense strateg

the force structure best suited to implement that str

Consequently, the new administration, and all subse

“new administrations” must explicitly show their ha

the complex task of force planning. 

In designing forces to protect U.S. national inte

military planners must accomplish three tasks: dete

how much force is required to protect those interests 

certain degree of assured success or a minimum deg

acceptable risk; determine how to posture that forc

7
finally convince Congress and the public that the sol

for the first two tasks are reasonably correct.

1

 The is

creating well-reasoned force structure requirement

convincing cost conscious politicians is not an in

quential matter.

Most defense analysts claim that during the Col

the force planning task was relatively straightforward

threat posed by the Soviet Union required the field

forces capable of conducting a global war, with p

placed on defending Western Europe. This situation s

as the agreed scenario around which to design and d

forces and measure risks if specific force goals were no

Force modernization programs were also directly lin

maintaining a qualitative advantage over proj

improvements in Soviet capabilities. The resultan

War force was so large that all other military requirem

such as forces for forward presence, smaller

interventions, and humanitarian operations, could b

as lesser-included requirements. 

During the post-Cold War period, the sizing fu

that replaced the global war scenario against the 

Union has been the requirement to be able to pro

major theater war (MTW). This requirement ev

during the last years of the Bush administration 

rationale for the Base Force. The first act of the new C

administration was to reexamine the issue, resulting 

Bottom Up Review (BUR) Force. The Base Force a

BUR Force were both sized against the requirement t

two MTWs. This force-sizing requirement was reval

in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, but contin

generate a great deal of controversy. Depending o

point of view, the force structure associated wit

posture is attacked for being over-stuffed, unafforda

totally inadequate.

2

 During the past 15 months a w

group at the National Defense University has 

examining issues for the 2001 QDR and recently conc

that a severe strategy-resources gap exists and th

2001 QDR must confront the “iron triangle” of fundam

8
choices—spend more, cut costs, or do less.

3

 The two 

force-sizing construct is endemic to all of these choice

purpose of this chapter is to clarify the role of the two 

requirement within the current defense program 

propose an alternative force-sizing construct.

Force Planning Methodologies.

Since the advent of the Cold War, military planner

used two very different force-planning methodologies

easiest to conceptualize is threat-based planning

methodology is preeminent when threats to U.S. int

are easily recognized and identified. The task f

planner is to postulate a reasonable scenario, or a s

military contingency, then determine the amount o

needed to prevail in that scenario. This approach 

itself to dynamic and static modeling and prov

quantifiable rationale for the recommended force stru

and answers the question: Can the United States, 

unilaterally or as part of an alliance, defeat the oppon

prevail in the postulated contingencies? The logic 

approach is very compelling and greatly facil

accomplishing the planner’s third task—convincin

public and Congress.

The second major methodology is generally referre

capabilities-based planning. Somewhat hard

conceptualize, analysts have proposed several varia

the same basic theme. Capabilities-based planning i

in vogue when threats to U.S. interests are multifacet

uncertain, and do not lend themselves to single 

scenario-based analysis. Instead of focusing on one o

specific opponents, the planner applies a liberal d

military judgment to determine the appropriate m

required military capabilities. Capabilities-based pla

claim to focus on objectives rather than scenarios. A 

problem planners have with this approach is conv

Congress that military judgment has established the 

9
linkage between the recommended force and the unc

geostrategic environment.

POST-COLD WAR FORCE PLANNING

“Uncertainty is not a mere nuisance requiring a 

sensitivity analysis,” Paul Davis points out; “i

dominant characteristic of serious planning.”

5

 Th

military is well aware of this fact, but has had dif

during the current strategic transition in selling 

Congress and the public. The principal problem is th

of the all-consuming threat that focused the na

attention on the problem of containing the USSR fo

four decades. The global war force planning framewo

evaporated in the post-Cold War era, leaving 

agreement on appropriate threats, contingenci

required capabilities against which to focus the d

establishment.

The Base Force.

In an effort to demonstrate military responsiven

changes in the strategic and budgetary environmen

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin P

developed the Base Force in the early 1990s. This for

considered the minimum force that would still allo

armed forces to meet mission requirements with acce

risk. The Base Force straddled both the Soviet revol

of 1988 and 1991, causing the justification and rat

behind the chosen force levels to evolve over time

initial focus of the Base Force was on a capabilities

approach to defense planning, driven largely by re

constraints. 

The threat was very ill-defined at this point. 

running out of demons,” General Powell commented in 

1991, “ I’m running out of villains. . . . I’m down to Cast

Kim Il Sung.”

6

 In such an environment, Powell st

there were some very real limitations to threat-or

contingency analysis. The resource-constrained for

10
concluded, should instead focus on the combat capab

needed to ensure that a sufficient array of assets wo

present to perform the multiple missions demanded 

modern battlefield.

7

 The mission-focused aspect of th

Force was evident in the three conceptual conven

force packages that eventually became part of the 

National Military Strategy (NMS). Forces for the A

would include forward-based and forward deployed 

committed to Europe, and heavy reinforcing forc

Europe, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf based 

United States. The Pacific Forces differed from the A

package, reflecting the maritime character of the 

Finally, Contingency Forces would consist of U.S. 

ground, air, and naval forces capable of worl

deployment as needed.

8

Unfortunately, the advent of and ensuing foc

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT ST

precluded the Pentagon’s strategic planners 

completing the analytical construct behind the Base 

a task that Congressman Les Aspin was more than w

to undertake. In the first of two national security p

Aspin attacked capabilities-based force planning, ch

that decisions concerning what capabilities were requ

U.S. forces could not be done in a vacuum. Inste

concluded, “. . . it is critical to identify threats t

interests that are sufficiently important that Ame

would consider the use of force to secure them.”

9

 S

thereafter, Aspin outlined in a second paper his conc

the “Iraqi equivalent” as the generic threat measu

regional aggressors and the “Desert Storm equivale

the most robust building block for U.S. forces. The pu

was to establish a clear linkage between the force str

and the sorts of threats the forces could be expected t

with. Aspin also envisioned his “threat-dr

methodology to be flexible enough to include aspec

typical capabilities-based approach. The building blo

the methodology, he pointed out, were generic capabil

11
Although each is informed by a careful review of pertin

historical cases, I am not suggesting we acquire forces wh

would be suited only to a few places and precedents. 

suggesting instead generic military capabilities which sho

be effective against the full spectrum of categorical threat

the uncertain future.

10

Partly in response to this criticism the rationale f

Base Force evolved into a combined capabilities-base

threat-based approach and became more firmly ancho

the two MTW requirement. In late 1992, General P

began promoting the Base Force as both capab

oriented as well as threat oriented. In a few cases s

Korea and Southwest Asia, he pointed out, it was poss

identify particular threats with some degree of certa

These developments had no effect on the regional fo

the force. In 1992, Secretary of Defense Richard C

reported that, “the ability to respond to regional and 

crises is a key element of our new strategy.”

12

 The 

Force” National Military Strategy of 1992 conclude

U.S. “plans and resources are primarily focus

deterring and fighting regional rather than global w

Although neither of these documents specified a two 

requirement, the sizing function for this requir

continued to evolve behind the scenes. Both the 199

1992 Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNAs) focu

the warfighting analysis for Major Reg

Contingency-East (MRC-East)-Southwest Asia

MRC-West-Korea. According to Army force planne

principal focus of U.S. operational planning was “re

crisis response—to include a capability to respo

multiple concurrent major regional contingencies.”

14

 

autobiography General Powell clearly states wh

National Military Strategy did not: “The Base 

strategy called for armed forces capable of fightin

major regional conflicts ‘nearly simultaneously.’”

15

12
The Bottom Up Review Force.

With a new administration, the Base Force tit

jettisoned; but the underpinnings of U.S. force str

remained largely intact. Upon assuming office, Secre

Defense Les Aspin initiated a comprehensive review 

nation’s defense strategy and force structure and pub

the Report of the Bottom Up Review (BUR) in October 

The methodology for the BUR combined all threat

and capabilities-based aspects of the force-pla

methodologies. To begin with, there was the trad

assessment of threats and opportunities, the formula

a strategy to protect and advance U.S. interests, an

determination of the forces needed to implemen

strategy. At the same time, there was an evaluat

military missions that included fighting MTWs, cond

smaller-scale operations, maintaining overseas pre

and deterring attacks with weapons of mass destru

The ultimate force-sizing criterion was to “ma

sufficient military power to be able to win two 

regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously.

planning and assessment for these MTWs were bas

two illustrative scenarios viewed as represen

yardsticks with which to assess in “gross term

capabilities of U.S. forces.”

16

 From this perspectiv

BUR continued the dual focus on both threa

capabilities that had evolved in the Base Force. 

Clinton defense policy,” noted defense analyst Rich

Kugler points out,

represents continuity rather than a revolutionary departu

for the changes it makes are relatively small. . . . The ch

difference lies in the new policy’s call for a smal

conventional posture, but only 10-15 percent smaller than t

Bush administration’s Base Force.

17

13
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the

National Defense Panel (NDP).

Despite a degree of continuity and general agre

within the nation’s defense establishment concerni

overall framework for the size and posture of U.S. m

forces, planners continued to have difficulty with thei

task—convincing Congress and the public. The gr

difficulty was persuading Congress that the Pentago

sufficiently focused on the 21st century and prepari

military to execute the most likely conflicts. As a res

1996 Congress passed legislation directing the Secre

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of S

conduct a review of the U.S. defense program and pro

report in 1997. Their review was directed to inclu

comprehensive examination of the defense strategy

structure, force modernization plans, infrastru

budget plan and other elements of the defense program 

Congress also provided for an independent body of d

experts, designated the National Defense Panel, t

review and comment on the QDR, as well as look s

further into the future. 

The QDR was designed as a strategy-driven revie

upon its completion to serve as the overall str

planning document for the Defense Department. F

force planner’s perspective the key features of the QDR 

the newly articulated defense strategy of “shape, re

and prepare,” and several refinements to force sizin

planning considerations. However, the bottom

remained an overall requirement “that U.S. forces m

capable of fighting and winning two major theater 

nearly simultaneously.”

19

The shape-respond-prepare strategy recognize

requirements for U.S. military forces to operate in su

of U.S. interests across the entire spectrum of opera

from peacetime to wartime. Military forces ass

shaping the international environment through ov

presence, rotational deployments, and various mi

14
to-military programs. Shaping requirements 

normally been viewed as a lesser-included capa

provided by a larger war-time focused structure. The 

however, specifically indicated that the overseas pr

mission plays a significant role in determining the 

U.S. naval forces.

20

 Responding to the full spectr

crises, to include major theater wars, remained the 

stressing requirement. Although the QDR revalidat

centrality of a 2 MTW force structure, it also 

increased emphasis on capabilities needed for smaller

contingencies (SSC). These contingencies are viewed 

most likely challenge for U.S. forces, and the QDR n

requirement to be able to conduct multiple conc

smaller-scale contingency operations.

21

 One o

difficulties in using this approach as a force str

determinant, however, is that while the milit

relatively confident that it knows the types and quan

forces needed to fight an MTW, it is much less cert

what is needed for SSCs that have a wide vari

objectives and occur in diverse regions of the world.

2

Joint Staff sponsored a wargame series known as Dy

Commitment that attempted to identify and quantify 

of military capabilities for smaller-scale continge

These capabilities, however, are still viewed 

lesser-included subset of the MTW force. 

The QDR’s analysis continued to represent a bl

threat-based and capabilities-based planning. 

principal scenarios remain focused on the threat po

regional aggressors on the scale of Iraq or North Kor

slightly expanded scenario set was used to examine 

use of asymmetric strategies, differences in warning 

U.S. force size, and the degree of commitment to on

SSCs. The QDR also tested projected capabilities aga

range of more challenging threats—a postulated 

regional power in the 2014 timeframe. In addition, g

scenarios used a threat force based on the pro

capabilities of nations not currently allied with the U

States. As the report concludes, “this analysis enable

15
test our projected capabilities against a range of 

challenging threats.”

23

The report of the National Defense Panel highl

another dilemma faced by force planners—building 

for the present or focusing on future requirem

Concerning the present, the NDP acknowledged th

United States cannot afford to ignore near-term t

and that “the two-theater construct has been a 

mechanism for determining what forces to retain 

Cold War came to a close, [and] to some degree, it rem

useful mechanism today.”

24

 But the panel also argue

today’s threats are not necessarily the ones the U

States will face in the future, expressing concern th

two MTW construct is becoming an inhibitor to ach

the capabilities needed in the 2010-2020 time frame

panel suggested a fundamental change: “The U

States needs a transformation strategy that enable

meet a range of security challenges in 2010-2020 w

taking undue risk in the interim.”

25

Two MTW Rationale.

In examining the rationale for the two 

requirement, it is important to remember tha

requirement was never construed to be a strateg

represented the sizing function for the Cl

administration’s defense program—the prin

determinant of the size and composition of 

conventional forces. The nature of this sizing functio

clearly articulated by former Defense Secretary W

Perry in 1996:

Previously, our force structure was planned to deter a glo

war with the Soviet Union, which we considered a threat to 

very survival as a nation. All other threats, including regio

threats, were considered lesser-but-included cases . . . Tod

the threat of global conflict is greatly diminished, but 

danger of regional conflict is neither lesser nor included 

16
has therefore required us to take this danger explicitly in

account in structuring our forces.

26

The current version of the two MTW requirement 

that the principal determinant of the size and compo

of United States conventional forces is the capa

“preferably in concert with allies, . . . to deter a

deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggr

in two distant theaters in overlapping timefram

Inherent in the acceptance of the two MTW force-

requirement was the recognition that the United 

would not be able to conduct sizable contingency oper

at the same time it was fighting in two major theate

Three principal reasons for this sizing function em

during the post-Cold War period. First, as a nation 

global interests, the United States needed to field a m

capability to credibly deter opportunism—avoid

situation in which it lacked the forces to deter aggress

one region while fighting in another. “A one-theate

capacity,” the QDR points out, “would risk underm

both deterrence and the credibility of U.S. se

commitments in key regions of the world.”

29

 The vita

U.S. alliance relationships is critical to the nation’s se

Insufficient and thus incredible military capabil

respond and protect worldwide interests could se

undermine that vitality. The historical evidence in su

of the two MTW requirement is much stronger 

detractors are willing to acknowledge. There have be

instance, 22 nearly simultaneous crises requirin

deployment and use of military force from 1946 to 199

is argued that the likelihood of concurrent crise

increased in the absence of the Cold War super

restraints. 

A second reason was that a force capable of defeati

regional adversaries should provide the basic where

to support a defense against a larger-than-expected 

or respond to a regional crisis under circumstances 

difficult than expected.

31

 Although a peer competitor 

17
not envisioned in the near term, the possibil

confrontations with a larger than MTW threat m

guarded against. This hedge against uncertainty wa

required as a practical matter because of the time nee

reconstitute a larger force. “If we were to discard half 

two MTW capability or allow it to decay,” the f

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ge

Shalikashvili, concluded a few years back,

it would take many years to rebuild a force of compara

excellence. In today’s turbulent international environm

where the future posture of so many powerful nations rema

precarious, we could find ourselves with too little, too late.

3

Finally, the two MTW sizing function recognize

increased operational deployment of American force

provided adequate force to allow the United States to 

latent threats from regional adversaries when porti

the force were committed to important smaller

contingencies and engagement activities in 

theaters.

33

 Although U.S. participation in smaller

contingency operations should not be viewed as a gi

the National Command Authorities (NCA) decid

commit U.S. forces to such operations, the strateg

force structure, as sized by the two MTW requiremen

thought to adequately support that commitment. One 

current points of contention is the argument that th

MTW force lacks appropriate capabilities and possib

size to support rotational policies associated wit

increased scope of SSCs.

Components of the Two MTW Force-sizing

Construct.

In addition to the rationale discussed above, the c

defense program, unlike its Cold War predece

provides a great deal of specificity concerning imp

operational components of the 2 MTW sizing function

first component is the two illustrative planning sce

(IPS) developed to assist planning and assessment. T

18
depict aggression by a remilitarized Iraq against K

and Saudi Arabia, and by North Korea against the Re

of Korea. Each scenario examines the performa

projected U.S. forces in relation to critical param

including warning time, threat, terrain, regional allie

duration of hostilities.

34

 These scenarios were not de

to replicate the operational plans of the warfighting C

but rather to assess forces and support assets for a 

range of possible future operations.

35

 In addition 

MTW scenarios, the defense program has also exa

numerous smaller-scale operations in order to identi

unique force requirements not specified in the 2 

warfight.

A second component is a notional operational sche

the execution of an MTW. U.S. planning for fightin

winning MTWs envisions an operational strategy t

general unfolds as follows:

• halt the invasion;

• build-up U.S. and allied combat power in t

while reducing the enemy’s;

• decisively defeat the enemy;

• provide for post-war stability.

36

The final component is the MTW building 

According to the 1996 DOD Annual Report, “the fol

forces will be adequate, under most conditio

successfully fight and win a single MTW,” assu

continued progress on programmed force enhanceme

strategic lift, prepositioning, and other force capab

and their support assets:

• 5 Army divisions;

• 10 Air Force fighter wing equivalents;

• 1-2 Marine Expeditionary Forces;

19
• 4-5 Navy aircraft carrier battle groups;

• up to 100 bombers;

• Special Operations Forces.

37

Force Planning into the 21st Century.

Without an agreement on the mission or strategy

planning in the 21st century will continue to disap

Unfortunately, at the present juncture there is 

agreement concerning the mission of the armed force

on-going debate has two dimensions: shapin

peacekeeping versus warfighting; and current v

future focus. Numerous politicians, defense analyst

several senior military leaders have concluded that t

MTW requirement should be adjusted to specifically in

force-sizing for peace operations. This argument is ba

the experiences of the first decade of the post-Col

period. During that time the operational commitm

U.S. military forces has increased 300 percent, and th

majority of those deployments have been at the low 

the spectrum of conflict—shaping activities and sm

scale contingencies, not MTWs. Jeffrey Record argue

the 2 MTW force has little relevance in a world in w

“modern-day version of imperial policing is lik

consume much of U.S. military effort.”

38

 The most 

articulation of this position was contained in the Ph

report of the U.S. Commission on National Securit

Century, entitled Seeking a National Strategy: A C

for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom. The 

claims that “the ‘two major theater wars’ yardsti

sizing U.S. forces is not producing the capabilities n

for the varied and complex contingencies now occurrin

likely to increase in the years ahead.” It calls for a por

U.S. force structure to be specifically tailor

humanitarian relief and constabulary missions.

39

 

noted RAND analysts have proposed replacing th

MTW criteria with three simultaneous sizing criteria

20
needs for environment shaping; force needs for one 

MTW plus stability operations in other theaters; and 

needs for two “moderately difficult” MTWs.

40

 Eve

Defense Department has begun to waver on the 

slightly. The most recent edition of the DoD Annual R

in addressing the use of military force in supp

primarily humanitarian interests, has remove

previous qualifier that “the U.S. military is genera

the best means of addressing a crisis.”

41

 This sh

emphasis is further supported by a focus on peac

military engagement activities as the “best way” of red

the sources of conflict and shaping the interna

environment.

42

Strong voices, however, remain on the other side 

issue. General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff, indicated that the U.S. military should not carv

portion of its force structure exclusively to h

peacekeeping missions because those operations 

quickly escalate into situations that only tr

warfighters could handle.

43

 Chairman of the House A

Services Committee, Floyd Spence, in rejectin

Commission on National Security’s call to abandon t

MTW yardstick, indicated that he fundamentally disa

“with those who advocate shifting the composition 

armed forces toward peacekeeping and humani

operations at the expense of warfighting capabilit

The need for a versatile and flexible force capa

responding and executing a wide range of missions is c

recognized. The disagreement concerns where o

operational spectrum should risk be assumed—hig

(major theater war) or low end (peacekeepi

humanitarian operations)—or how to posture the fo

minimize risk. Force planners will have a hard 

developing an acceptable force structure in the abse

consensus on this issue.

Force planners also must resolve the issue of whet

focus their efforts on the current threat or future th

According to the NDP:

21
. . . we must anticipate that future adversaries will learn f

the past and confront us in very different ways. Thus we m

be willing to change as well or risk having forces ill-suite

protect our security twenty years in the future. The Un

States needs to launch a transformation strategy now that 

enable it to meet a range of security challenges in 2010 to 202

Proponents of this view contend that the “revolut

military affairs” (RMA) will have profound effects 

way wars are fought. This model would replace the 2 

force with a “silicon-based” superior force that wo

smaller and more flexible, emphasizing mobility, spee

agility. Warfighters would benefit from technol

achievements in stealth, precision weapons, survei

and dominant battlefield awareness. Most 

proponents also contend that at present the United 

has a threat deficit and therefore can afford to cu

structure and focus on research and development o

“sunrise systems,” experimentation and innova

Critics claim that both the QDR and NDP failed to p

innovative and long-term changes in the defense pro

General Shalikashvili’s response to such criticism 

the issue full circle back to risk assessment and how 

risk should be allocated over time:

My admonition was that we need to do what we need to d

remain capable of defending our country and winning 

nation’s wars. I didn’t want to get an award for innovati

sake. I didn’t want anyone gambling with our nation’s secu

just so we could be called great innovators.

47

Since the last QDR, the gamble that Ge

Shalikashvili wanted to avoid has only increas

intensity. Most of that tension is associated wit

strategy-resources gap mentioned in the introduct

this essay. Eliot Cohen, in a recent Foreign Affairs a

emphasizes the funding shortfall:

For a decade now the Pentagon has not had enough mone

replace aging hardware that it uses around the wor

Estimates of the shortfall range from $25 billion a year to th

22
times that figure (the latest assessment from t

Congressional Budget Office comes in at $50 billion a year).

4

The funding shortfall has translated into s

concerns about the readiness of the force to execu

strategy. In recent Congressional testimony, G

Shelton indicated that the risk associated with the 

demanding scenario has increased. At the 

Congressional hearing, Army Chief of Staff Genera

Shinseki stated that “. . . the increased frequency of m

requirements has had detrimental impacts on the 

especially in terms of operational tempo, personnel t

and turbulence.”

49

 The two MTW focus directly contr

to the undue strains on the force by not neces

generating the capabilities needed for the full ra

missions. Michael O’Hanlon notes the high opportuni

of over prioritizing the two MTW planning framewor

. . . keeping a high-priced insurance policy against regio

conflict would make it impossible to afford other key defen

investments . . . It would also leave us with a force structu

not well suited to smaller operations—meaning that ongo

no-fly-zone missions and peace operations will continue 

overwork our personnel.

50

BACK TO THE FUTURE

Force planning has been and always should be 

dynamic process. Consequently, as the stra

environment changes or as the understanding 

uncertainties matures, and as both threat and fr

military capabilities evolve, there should be adjustme

the defense program. It is time to adjust the two MTW 

sizing construct. The proposed adjustment that follow

not abandon the requirement for a two MTW capabil

articulates that requirement within a more appropri

of priorities. Because of a more mature understand

the post-Cold War security environment, the found

and principles originally associated with the Base 

may be more applicable today than when orig

23
proposed. The logic of the Base Force, combined wi

grammar of a force structure sized against a ra

missions may provide the “best suited” force pla

approach as the United States moves into the 21st cen

A return to the foundations of the Base Force 

bring more explicit visibility to the full range of d

requirements, correctly posture U.S. military for

uphold security commitments to alliance and coa

partners, and better posture forces to respond to the 

frequent challenge of SSC operations while preservi

core capability of concurrently deterring multiple M

The Base Force planning construct consisted o

foundations: strategic deterrence and defense, fo

presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.

51

Strategic deterrence and defense focused o

continued relevance of nuclear forces as the ult

deterrent, and the need for missile defense, at tha

referred to as Global Protection Against Limited S

(GPALS). Due to the spread of easier access to sophist

technology over the past decade, the U.S. homeland is 

susceptible to attack by hostile entities using a wide 

of capabilities from long-range ballistic missiles, to 

weapons, or even information attacks.

52

 The exp

range of national security issues that should be cons

within this planning category include National M

Defense, computer network attack and def

consequence management, and space control. The Na

Security Strategy recognizes the threat in these are

discussions about allocating appropriate resour

adjusting force structure are often drowned out b

debate about the readiness and modernization of th

MTW force. Returning to the Base Force construct pr

an immediate benefit of giving appropriate recognit

these vital aspects of U.S. security policy. 

The other three Base Force foundations co

conventional forces oriented to protecting U.S. 

interests. The first of these, forces for forward prese

24
based on the enduring principle that the presence o

forces in regions vital to U.S. national interests hav

key to averting crises and preventing war. In ad

forward-deployed forces are vital to the maintenance 

system of collective defense by which the United 

works with friends and allies to protect security inter

The reasons enunciated in support of forward pr

remain virtually the same today. The 2000 Annual D

Report highlights the imperative of engagement an

need for cooperative, multilateral approaches to sha

environment and create preferred international cond

A vital aspect of the military’s role in shapin

international security environment is achieved th

overseas presence.

54

 A brief review of the U.S. re

defense posture in Southwest Asia provides an exam

the ends-ways-means of forward presence. The en

enforcement of United Nations resolutions, ensurin

access to resources, and improving interoperabilit

regional nations’ self-defense capabilities. The way

means include limited long-term presence forces, a 

number of rotational forces, and prepositioned materi

equipment. The 2000 Annual Defense Report conclu

The close military relationships developed with frien

throughout the Middle East and South Asia, complemented 

U.S. security assistance programs, contribute to 

environment that allows regional states to more readily a

effectively support U.S. crisis response deployments. T

contribution is integral to U.S. deterrence efforts.

55

U.S. forward presence has changed very little in th

decade. Forces continue to be deployed in support o

American and allied interests in Europe, Northeast 

and the Pacific, and as mentioned above, in Southwes

What is missing from the two MTW force-sizing const

specific recognition of that requirement. The 

represents a qualified exception to this point in t

claims to primarily size its force against forward pr

requirements. The Air Force has also recently unvei

Aerospace Expeditionary Force concept that is desig

25
facilitate rotational deployments to meet ongoing fo

presence requirements. Both services, however, r

strong advocates of their respective “MTW building 

force structures. Concerning naval forces, “Fo

presence requirements, and peacetime and crisis res

operations . . . are major determinants of naval force n

Crisis response requirements link back to the two 

construct so the Navy seems to be hedging its bets on 

mission area is a more convincing case for force sizing. Lik

despite the AEF’s goal of reducing unpredictabi

forward presence type deployments, the Air Force con

to highlight its capability of deploying “seven to 

fighter-wing equivalents (FWEs) to a distant theate

matter of days as an initial response in a major t

war.”

56

 Two times seven or eight comes very close 

total conventional force structure of 19 active and r

FWEs. For the time being, the services remain wed

the two MTW force sizing paradigm.

Recall from the earlier discussion of the Base Fo

this essay, that forward presence forces were stru

and organized geographically—forces for the At

(including Southwest Asia) and the Pacific. Returnin

similar organizing principle would place the appro

priority on structuring the force to meet the requirem

forward presence and would also recognize u

capabilities needed in different regions. Nece

capabilities should be identified and resourced to resp

the potential threats to U.S. interests in each of thes

regions. Adequate forward presence forces will ma

and strengthen day-to-day alliance and coa

operations, provide the needed capabilities for sm

scale contingencies in those regions, and constitu

appropriate deterrence posture and enabling cap

should the need for a more significant crisis response 

If by definition the United States maintains fo

presence in only those regions of vital importance, th

prioritizing and resourcing these requirements the U

26
States will be contributing to deterrence and c

prevention where it counts most.

The third foundation of the Base Force was 

response, which articulated the need for capabilit

respond to regional crises. These capabilities were in

in the regional forward presence forces as well a

continental U.S. (CONUS) based contingency f

Characteristics of the contingency force included 

readiness and the full spectrum of joint capabilities

size of the force was very similar to the follow-on 

building block concept. The missions of the contin

force were to complement forward-deployed ass

provide an initial response capability in regions w

forward-deployed U.S. forces.

57

 In the present conte

contingency force would constitute a significant por

the nation’s major theater war capability. Note, how

that the contingency force would complement the ex

warfighting capability of the forward presence force

thus in combination they would represent the capab

respond to multiple MTW crises. In reality, this pos

little different than that practiced today. Ove

presence forces are counted within the two MTW 

requirement. However, by prioritizing the two MTW 

requirement, the forward presence mission is a 

included capability. It seems to be more appropri

recognize forward presence as the primary mission of 

forces and treat their contribution to the second 

requirement as the lesser-included capability. 

apparently prudent logic of the two-war strategy, M

O’Hanlon argues, “is excessively cautious, in light 

strong U.S. deterrent posture in key regions.”

58

 Reca

the principal arguments for the two MTW force str

are to credibly deter opportunistic aggressors and 

alliance commitments. A recent study on conven

deterrence found that “the most effective military det

is the capacity of the defender to repulse an attack an

the adversary its military objectives at the outset and 

stages of an armed confrontation.” This study goes 

27
conclude that effective conventional deterrence “

investing in forward-deployed forces and maintain

forward military presence.”

59

The final foundation of the Base Force 

reconstitution. Although the phrase “peer-competito

not popularized at the time of the original Base Forc

rationale for a reconstitution capability was targe

“forestall any potential adversary from competing mil

with the United States.”

60

 Defense capabilities asso

with reconstitution included cadre-type units and d

industrial base initiatives designed to facilitate g

mobilization in the face of a reemerged global thre

addition to the requirements for general mobiliz

investments in basic science and high-payoff techno

were also considered reconstitution activities—

defense related activities focusing on generating 

capabilities based on new technologies.

Returning to reconstitution as a strategic co

provides two advantages. First, it more appropr

characterizes selected reserve component formation

have limited utility within the two MTW const

Recognizing these forces as a far-term hedge, or str

reserve, should clearly reflect a lower priority for reso

The second advantage comes from replicating the c

concept of transformation. Transformation activities

as those associated with developing the Joint Vision 

force, should be explicitly recognized as a claimant on 

structure. Transformation activities should obv

receive a higher resource priority than other aspe

reconstitution, but it remains appropriate to group 

together as approaches to address uncertainties abo

future.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War era still lacks its own name, b

past decade has contributed greatly to a b

understanding of the uncertainties associated wit

28
resultant security environment. The logic of U.S. st

has remained relatively constant. It recognizes the ne

continued U.S. leadership and engagement in the 

coupled with the ability and willingness to respo

threats to U.S. and allied interests, along with appro

concern about developing future capabili

Unfortunately, the force-planning grammar asso

with this strategy and represented by the two 

one-size fits all force planning paradigm no longer ca

the full range of force requirements. A return 

foundations and force planning principles of the Base 

provides a better force-sizing framework with wh

enter into the 21st century. A comparison of the str

concepts and force-sizing paradigms associated wi

1997 QDR and a slightly adjusted Base Force 2000 ap

below. (Figure 1) Priorities should not be presumed d

from the figure, however it should be clear that Base 

2000 implies a much broader range of choices. Capab

to conduct two MTWs remain important but ar

necessarily the top priority.

Figure 1.

29

Sizing the Force for the 21st Century

Strategic Concepts Force Sizing

1997

QDR

Base Force

2000

• Shape

• Respond

• Prepare

• Homeland security

• Forward Presence

• Crisis Response

• Transformation/

Reconstitution

} 2 MTWs

Nuclear Forces and NMD

Space Control

Computer Network Attack and Defe

Anti/Counter-terrorism

Atlantic

Pacific

Southwest Asia

Contingency Force

Science &Technology

Selected Reserve formations

} 2 MT
There are several advantages to adopting the Base 

2000 concept. First and foremost, it clearly articulate

the requirements of a multi-faceted defense program 

goes far beyond the two MTW requirement. The two 

construct is too simplistic and thus fails to portra

convincing manner all defense requirements. The 

sizing requirements articulated in the Base Force 

construct should allow the defense establishment t

present a more coherent argument for adequate res

while at the same time more efficiently apply ava

resources to higher priority requirements. Decisionm

and planners will have a much better framework in w

recognize and make trade-offs between competing d

requirements.

61

Second, it returns the defense program to mor

capabilities-based force as opposed to the pr

threat-based force wedded to two specific M

Recognizing the full spectrum of military capab

needed to protect U.S. interests, to include providi

homeland security, forward presence, crisis respons

transformation and reconstitution, is the more pr

approach in an uncertain geostrategic environment

Base Force does not neglect the mantra of being a

“fight and win our nation’s wars,” nor abandon th

MTW capability. By focusing on an appropriate fo

presence posture, however, reinforced by a CONUS

contingency force, the United States is best positio

support critical alliances and coalitions and de

respond to crises that may threaten vital interes

insufficient resources necessitate a choice between fo

presence capability and the second MTW, a higher de

risk should be accepted in the MTW force. Cr

deterring opportunism is a complementary capa

achieved through forward presence and crisis respon

Threat-based planning using the two cano

scenarios of Iraq and Korea suppresses uncertainty a

longer satisfactorily measures the adequacy of U.S

posture. Furthermore, it is not clear why forces design

30
totally different regional scenarios have identical ope

(above-the-line) force requirements as expressed 

basic MTW building block.

62

 Finally, anchoring th

defense program to two atrophying threats may p

entire program at risk. The Base Force construct 

elements of both threat-based and capabilities-

planning to be applied, broadens the set of planning 

and emphasizes combinations of capabilities differen

those optimized against the two MTW force-

construct.

63

This chapter has presented an argument for 

force-sizing construct but has not attempted to pro

specific force structure. It should be clear, howeve

placing a higher priority on forward presence capab

does not necessarily portend a smaller force, but it cer

could be a different force. Such an approach should

minimum, address the issue of low density/high de

capabilities and thus relieve some of the operations 

(OPTEMPO) pressure. On the other hand, if res

remain limited, which is the likely scenario, the Base 

sizing framework can facilitate debate and pot

adoption of appropriate proposals to adjust the fo

otherwise address lower priority missions.

64

 The Base 

construct clearly articulates all of the requirements 

U.S. defense program and thus allows for a 

understanding of priorities, a more efficient allocat

resources across those priorities, and a more inf

debate about where to accept risk in the defense progr

The two MTW force planning paradigm has serv

United States well, but, as ironic as it may appear, it i

to return to its immediate predecessor and adopt a mo

Base Force construct. The Navy claims to be siz

overseas presence requirements and the Marines to

fact that they are a one-MTW force. It is time to ge

DOD on the same sheet of music. Force planner

strategists involved in the 2001 QDR must rely 

appropriate mix of threat and capability-based pla

and examine a broader set of requirements that will 

31
the United States to achieve its strategic objective

provide the U.S. political leadership with the appro

framework from which to judge “how much is enough

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Harlan Ullman, In Irons: U.S. Military Might in the New C

Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995, p. 111, id

three related “vital” questions for force planners:

What forces are needed strategically and operationally?; W

level of capability and what types of force structure 

politically and economically sustainable and justifiable . . .?; 

How do we safely, sensibly, and affordably get from today’s fo

structure and capability to that of tomorrow and prop

balance the threat strategy, force structure, budget, 

infrastructure relationships?

2. Certain proponents of the Revolution in Military Affair

that the current force is too large and should be cut to afford a 

emphasis on experimentation and modernization. See And

Krepinvich, Jr., “Keeping Pace with the Military-Techno

Revolution,” Science and Technology, Summer 1994, pp. 23-

James R. Blaker, “The American RMA Force: An Alternative 

QDR,” Strategic Review, Vol. 25, Summer 1997, pp. 21-30. For an 

argument on the unaffordability of the force, see Don M. Snide

Coming Defense Train Wreck . . .,” The Washington Quarterly, 

No. 1, Winter 1996. Michael O’Hanlon, in his book How to Be a 

Hawk: The 1999 and 2000 Defense Budgets, Washington, DC: Br

Institution Press, 1998, notes an annual shortfall in the defense 

of between $10 and $20 billion in the next decade. Most recently

Goure and Jeffrey Ranney argue that the defense department f

annual shortfall of $100 billion; in Averting the Defense Train W

the New Millennium, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 1999. 

see Harry G. Summers, Jr., The New World Strategy: A Militar

for America’s Future, New York: Touchstone Books, 1995, 

argument that the force is totally inadequate.

3. Michele A. Flournoy, Report of the National Defense Un

Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group, Washingt

Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense Uni

November 2000, p. 7.

4. The Rand Corporation happens to be the principal deposi

detailed exposition on force planning methodologies. Among th

32
recent works on this subject, refer to the following: James A. Win

The Post-Cold War Force-Sizing Debate: Paradigms, Metapho

Disconnects, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992; Richard L. Kugl

Military Strategy and Force Posture for the 21st Century: Capa

and Requirements, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994; and Paul K

ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How M

Enough, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1994. In this last wor

particularly to “Part Two: Principles for Defense Planning,” pp. 

Finally, Zalmay M. Khalilzad and David A. Ochmanek, eds., S

and Defense Planning for the 21st Century, Santa Monica, CA

1997.

5. Paul K. Davis, “Institutionalizing Planning for Adaptiv

New Challenges for Defense Planning, p. 81.

6. Quoted in William Kaufmann and John Steinbruner, Pr

for a New World Order: Decisions for Defense, Washington, D

Brookings Institution Press, 1991, p. 45.

7. Kugler, U.S. Military Strategy and Force Posture, p. 35. G

Powell defined those missions very broadly:

We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan f

What we plan for is that we’re a superpower. We are the ma

player on the world stage with responsibilities [and] intere

around the world.

Quoted in Kaufmann, Decisions for Defense, p. 47. 

8. Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President a

Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Goverment Printing Office, J

1991, p. 4; and National Military Strategy of the United 

Washington, DC: U.S. Goverment Printing Office, January 19

19-24, hereafter referred to as the NMS 92.

9. Les Aspin, National Security in the 1990s: Defining a Ne

for U.S. Military Forces, before the Atlantic Council of the 

States, January 6, 1992, pp. 5-6.

10. Les Aspin, An Approach to Sizing American Conventiona

For the Post-Soviet Era, February 25, 1992.

11. Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” 

Affairs, Winter 1992/93, Vol. 71, No. 5, p. 41. See also Colin L. 

My American Journey, New York: Ballentine Books, 1995, p. 4

33
12. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Co

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 19

13. NMS 92, p. 11.

14. “The Army Base Force - Not a Smaller Cold War 

Discussion Paper from the Department of the Army’s Wa

Division, dated February 1992. See also Kaufmann and Stein

Decisions for Defense, p. 27. The authors make the following p

How many contingencies might occur simultaneously, and 

how many separate theaters the United States should 

prepared to become engaged at any one time, was not m

clear. However, the assumption appears to be that 

Pentagon should have the capability to deal with at least 

major regional contingencies . . .

15. Powell, My American Journey, p. 564. Although the sup

analysis behind the Base Force included wargaming t

“canonical-scenarios”—MRC-East and MRC-West, the 1992 N

Military Strategy presented the force, as discussed abov

capabilities-based force. The closest the NMS comes to recogni

MTW requirement is the following from the Crisis Response se

Our strategy also recognizes that when the United State

responding to one substantial regional crisis, poten

aggressors in other areas may be tempted to take advantag

our preoccupation. Thus, we can not reduce forces to a le

which would leave us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere.

NMS 1992, p. 7. Using the same rationale, 1 year later w

publication of the BUR, the two MTW requirement was o

unveiled.

16. Les Aspin, Report of the Bottom Up Review, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993. (Hereafter ref

as the BUR.) BUR: methodology - p. 4; missions - p. 13; force sizin

No other administration has provided the degree of transparen

force planning deliberations as represented by the BUR. The d

wargaming analysis done by J8 is not presented for obvious rea

an unclassified publication. Nonetheless, contrast this with the 

of the Base Force, found in Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of t

Force 1989-1992, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Offic

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1993, which w

published until at least 2 years after the fact.

34
17. Richard Kugler, Toward a Dangerous World, Santa Mon

Rand, 1995, pp. 212-213. According to General Powell: “It took 

months to finish the BUR, and we ended up again with a defens

on the need to fight two regional wars, the Bush strategy, b

Clinton campaign cuts.” American Journey, p. 564.

18. George C. Wilson, This War Really Matters: Inside the F

Defense Dollars, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000, p. 15.

19. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Washingt

Department of Defense, May 1997, p. v. (Hereafter referred to 

QDR.) Although sticking with the same basic force requireme

QDR did provide a small degree of innovation in redefini

requirement from 2 MRCs to 2 MTWs. The MRC concept, 

defined in the Bush administration, referred to major r

contingencies. The BUR adjusted the term to major regional co

obviously retaining the same acronym. The QDR accept

requirement but changed the name to major theater war (MTW

20. Ibid., p. 23.

21. Ibid., p. 12.

22. Elaine M. Grossman, “Defense Officials Eye Small-Scale 

Organizing Yardstick,” Inside the Pentagon, March 30, 2000, p

23. QDR, p. 24.

24. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st C

Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p. 23.

25. Ibid., p. 1. 

26. William Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Co

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, pp. 

(Hereafter referred to as DOD Annual Report 96.) All of the arg

supporting a 2 MTW force posture were reiterated in the Q

12-13.

27. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Wash

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1999, p. 19. (He

referred to as NSS 99.)

28. QDR, p. 13; and NSS 99, p. 18.

29. Ibid., p. 12. This point is also made in NSS 99, p. 19. T

DOD Annual Report specifically addresses the need to prev

35
coercion of allied or friendly governments. William S. Cohen, 

Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 7. (Hereafter referred to 

Annual Report 2000.) 

30. Winnefeld, p. 18. The efficacy of concurrency as a force p

criteria was clearly demonstrated in 1994 when the United 

deployed military forces to South Korea and Kuwait in resp

threats against U.S. interests. See John F. Troxell, Force Plan

an Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Fram

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 15, 1997, p

31. QDR, p. 12. This point is also made in both the NSS 99

where it refers to the “two theater” force, and in the DOD Annua

2000, pp. 2-3. The 2000 Annual Report also recognizes the 

guard against wild card scenarios by maintaining “military capa

with sufficient flexibility to deal with such unexpected events,” 

32. General John M. Shalikashvili, CJCS Written State

Congress, March 1996, p. 18. 

33. QDR, p. 12.

34. The “use of plausible, illustrative scenarios against pos

threat forces enables comparisons and analyses to determ

relative values of different forces and capabilities across a r

circumstances.” The National Military Strategy of the United 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 17. 

the BUR, pp. 13-15, for a good discussion of the planning scenar

to develop the BUR force. This discussion addresses most 

common criticisms raised against using these particular sce

Robert Haffa, Jr., “A New Look at the Bottom-Up Review: Planni

General Purpose Forces for a New Century,” Strategic Review, 

No. 1, Winter 1996, p. 24, argues that the “work contained in th

was very much an extension of the scenario-driven methodolog

for the most part, has guided the planning of U.S. conventiona

since the 1960s. . . .” He goes on to state that the “most dan

near-term contingencies—Korea and the Gulf . . . are among th

stressful to plan against.” The 1997 NMS specifically ci

challenges faced in the Arabian Gulf region and in Northeast A

goes on to say that “even should these challenges dimini

capability [2 MTW] is critical to maintaining our global leadersh

The National Military Strategy of the United States, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997, p. 15. 

36
35. U.S. Government Accounting Office, Bottom-Up R

Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions, January 1995, pp. 61-64, 

that the scenarios differed from current warplanning assump

the CINCs. The DOD response pointed out the differences b

illustrative planning/programming scenarios and CINC warpla

major difference is that the commanders in chiefs (CINC

concerned with the present, while the illustrative planning sc

focus on the future.

36. DOD Annual Report 96, p. 5. For a more in depth discu

the operational phases, refer to BUR, pp. 15-17. The QDR 

particular attention on the need to halt an enemy invasion 

QDR, p. 13.

37. It is worth noting that the MTW building block has re

constant over the past several years, with the exception o

divisions. The original building block specified 4-5 Army div

That has since been adjusted to 5 Army divisions. The MTW b

block receives mixed coverage in the QDR. On the one hand th

claims that “the forces and capabilities required to upho

two-theater element of the strategy will differ from the Major R

Conflict building blocks developed in the 1993 Bottom-Up R

Later, however, concerning the requirements for major theater w

report concludes that a “force of the size and structure close 

current force was necessary.” The QDR goes on to claim that a 

force is needed in response to enemy use of chemical weapons or 

warning times. Finally, the recommended force structure is v

the same as the BUR force. QDR, Section III, p. 9; Section IV, p

Section V, p. 3. 

38. Jeffrey Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Pl

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 19, 1998, p. 1.

39. The United States Commission on National Secur

Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A Concept for Preserving S

and Promoting Freedom, April 15, 2000, pp. 14-15.

40. Paul K. Davis and Richard L. Kugler, “New Principles fo

Sizing,” in Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century, 

M. Khalilzad and David A. Ochmanek, eds., Santa Monica, CA

1997, pp. 103-104.

41. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President a

Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19

and Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 4. The 1999 version c

37
the qualifier quoted above as well as other potential constraint

use of force in support of humanitarian operations. The 2000 

has removed most, but not all of those constraints.

42. General Henry H. Shelton, Posture Statement before th

Congress, House Armed Services Committee, February 8, 

Available from http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/Posture00

Internet.

43. “Shelton Rejects Idea of Separate Peacekeeping 

European Stars and Stripes, April 27, 2000, p. 8.

44. Floyd D. Spence, “Statement of Chairman Spence on the 

of the Commission on National Security/21st Century Phase II R

Press Release, April 19, 2000.

45. NDP, p. i.

46. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Keeping Pace w

Military-Technological Revolution,” Science and Technology, S

1994, pp. 23-29.

47. Quoted in Wilson, p. 72.

48. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the Twen

Century,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 

43. The NDU QDR 2001 Working Group refers to a $30-50 bil

year mismatch, Flournoy, p. 7. See also U.S. Congressional 

Office, Budgeting for Defense: Maintaining Today’s Forces, Wash

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2000.

49. Quoted in Anthony H. Cordesman, Trends in US 

Spending: The Size of Funding, Procurement, and Readiness Pr

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International S

October 9, 2000, pp. 12-14.

50. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Rethinking Two War Strategies

Forces Quarterly, Washington, DC: National Defense Uni

Spring 2000, p. 12. See also, Flournoy, p. 16.

51. NMS 92, p. 6.

52. NSS 99, p. 16.

53. NMS 92, pg. 7.

54. DoD Annual Report 2000, pp. 3, 5.

38
55. Ibid., p. 12.

56. Ibid., pp. 42, 46. 

57. NMS 92, pp. 23-24.

58. O’Hanlon, How to be a Cheap Hawk, pp. 52-53.

59. Edward Rhodes, “Conventional Deterrence,” Comp

Strategy, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2000, pp. 246, 250.

60. NMS 92, p. 7.

61. The NDU 2001 QDR Working Group emphasized this cha

. . . the QDR presents two broad strategy developme

challenges. The first challenge is making a strategy-bas

case for the resources required to meet national objectives 

an acceptable level of risk; the second is determining the b

strategy possible, given the resources ultimately ma

available, while explicitly assessing the risks if availa

resources fall short of the ideal.

Flournoy, p. 18. 

62. Don M. Snider, “The Coming Defense Train Wreck . . 

Washington Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 1, Winter 1996, p. 94. S

Richard Haffa, “Planning U.S. Forces to Fight Two Wars

Number, Wrong Forces,” Strategic Review, Winter 1999, Vol. 27

pp. 15-21.

63. Flournoy, p. 11. This NDU report goes on to recommend t

the scenario set used for force planning be broadened 

include a wider variety of potential warfighting cas

endstate objectives, operational constraints, and jo

concepts of operations to ensure that the U.S. military 

prepared for the full range of challenges it may encounter 

the future.

64. Two detailed discussions of alternative force structu

found in O’Hanlon, How to be a Cheap Hawk, Chapter 3, “

Strategy and Force Structure”; and David A. Ochmanek, et. al., T

and Not to Yield, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1998. The NDU 200

Working Group discussed the concept of trade space-can

39
approaches to reduce costs while maintaining an acceptable 

risk. Flournoy, p. 8. 

40
CHAPTER 3

REPLACING THE 2 MTW STANDARD

CAN A BETTER APPROACH BE FOUND

Richard L. Kugler

The standard of sizing U.S. military forces to wa

Major Theater Wars (MTWs) has been a keystone o

defense planning since 1993. Critics are now chargin

because this standard allegedly has outlived its usefu

it should give way to a new approach that is suited 

demands of the coming years. Whether the 2 

standard is set aside will not be known until the upc

Department of Defense (DoD) Quadrennial Defense R

(QDR) is complete, and the new administration has f

its defense plans. But one thing already seems clear. 

the 2 MTW standard can be retired, a better replac

must be found, and it has not yet been identified, mu

agreed upon. 

This chapter offers one such candidate. Doubtless 

will appear in the coming months. All new appro

should be evaluated on their merits, in the context 

complex tradeoffs that must be addressed. Clearl

defense planning should not be a prisoner of the past

as clearly, change should not be pursued for its own 

but only when it yields genuine progress. Becau

stakes are high, this is a time for deep thinking and c

analysis of the issues and options. Doing so is th

guarantee that regardless of the choice ultimately m

will be the right one. 

My perspective is that of a defense planner wh

participated in the analysis of DoD strategic frame

and force-sizing standards since 1975. Having 

alternative approaches come and go, I grasp the advan

41
of the 2 MTW standard, but I also am troubled by draw

that may become more serious as the new global era un

My main concern is that because world affairs an

national security strategy are changing, the 2 

standard may no longer provide a reliable, stand

approach to guiding the preparation and use of m

forces. Something more comprehensive and inclus

other high-priority endeavors is needed. The centra

in my estimate, is to craft a new and broader appro

multiple standards that preserves the core strengths 

2 MTW standard yet also addresses new str

requirements and priorities. Although DoD has 

comfortable with the 2 MTW standard over the past d

it cannot afford to stand pat. The time has arrived fo

think and act creatively in this arena. The capac

innovate at key junctures is the reason why DoD perf

well in the past. This remains the case today.

Advantages of the 2 MTW Standard.

The 2 MTW standard is not the first formal appro

force-sizing employed by DoD, and doubtless it will 

the last. One of the toughest challenges facing d

planning is to translate decisions on strategic polic

concrete guidelines for determining exactly how m

forces are to be prepared. The role of a force-sizing sta

is to help perform this critical task. A force-sizing sta

helps determine the size of the U.S. force posture and 

explain the posture’s strategic and military ration

public. In less-visible ways, it also has a major impact 

myriad details of defense planning. It influences judg

about the U.S. defense budget, its subsidiary program

its priorities for spending money. It affects how forc

allocated among key missions and commands. It prov

framework for creating plans to deploy and emplo

forces in specific contingencies, and for analyzin

capacity of U.S. forces to win the wars they might be 

upon to fight. These important functions make 

force-sizing standard a matter of considerable signifi

42
They also greatly complicate the task of choosing a 

standard: never an easy matter in the past and arg

more difficult today because the Cold War’s clarity ha

replaced by a murky, confusing world. 

The 2 MTW standard was adopted in 199

reaffirmed in the QDR of 1996 because it was d

capable of meeting the emerging demands of the pos

War era, including deterrence of regional wars that 

break out as the old bipolar order unraveled. It perm

the Clinton Administration to trim about 10 percent 

“Base Force” inherited from the Bush era. The Pen

came away feeling that while the resulting posture o

less margin of safety, it likely would be large enough 

the job done. As the 1990s unfolded, the 2 MTW sta

endured as a serviceable doctrine that was neither w

admired nor hotly opposed. The fact that it has su

this long is testimony to its staying power and lin

appeal: attractive features at a time when consens

defense policy is hard to come by. Today’s criticisms o

being launched mostly by defense specialists, n

Congressmen, other political figures, or protesters 

streets. If it is to be retired, it will not go quietly in

night without a stiff debate. Any replacement for 

need to show not only superior substantive qualiti

also a similar capacity to command consensus insid

outside the Pentagon: a hard act to follow.

This standard was created in the aftermath 

Persian Gulf war, but before ethnic warfare had 

exploded in the Balkans. It postulated that U.S. m

forces should be large enough to wage two larg

regional wars that might erupt with little warnin

unfold in overlapping time frames. The two conting

most commonly cited were a renewed Iraqi atta

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, accompanied by a North K

assault on South Korea. Both were dangerous event

would menace U.S. vital interests, activate U.S. se

ties with close allies, and require major U.S. 

contributions. The 2 MTW standard calculated that 

43
forces are sufficiently large and capable of winning tw

wars, they will be able to deal with the biggest ex

threats on the world scene and be prepared to handle 

wars and crises that might unexpectedly occur. 

The 2 MTW standard thus was anchored in bi

warfighting. It did not mean that U.S. forces co

employed only to wage MTWs. During peacetime, it 

for U.S. forces to be used for other crises and continge

originally called “Lesser Regional Contingencies” (

and now dubbed Smaller-Scale Contingencies (SSCs). 

also made clear that forces employed for these pu

must remain on a tetherhook, primed to disengag

redeploy if MTW events necessitate their presence. 

MTW standard thus was meant to be flexible in determ

how U.S. forces might be used, but nonetheless, it wa

about the main purpose of the force posture: being pre

for MTWs and engaging in other operations only on 

exception” basis. In using MTW requirements to 

military adequacy for the 1990s, it declared that a 2 

posture would satisfactorily answer the perennial que

How much is enough?

1

The 2 MTW standard remains alive today, and con

to enjoy support in many quarters that valu

advantages. It provides the officially sanctioned rat

for virtually all U.S. active-duty combat forces and 

reserve component units as well. This is the case be

these forces would be needed to meet the weighty dem

posed by two MTWs erupting nearly at the same 

Basically, the standard postulates that about one-h

U.S. forces are needed for one MTW, and the other h

needed for the second MTW. The current U.S. p

includes the combat forces listed in Table 1. The only 

falling outside the 2 MTW standard are some 

National Guard units, which provide a low-cost, mobi

hedge against more demanding events. A typical 

commitment would include about 6.5 Army and M

divisions, 10 USAF fighter wings, and up to 4-5 c

battle groups (CVBGs). These combat forces wou

44
moved by sizable strategic mobility forces: air tran

and sealift ships. Accompanying the combat forces wo

command staffs, sizable logistic support units, an

reserve stocks. Total deployed manpower for a single 

posture would be about 400,000-450,000 troops fro

services. Clearly this is a large and powerful combat 

capable of major defensive and offensive operations.

Table 1. U.S. Defense Posture (2000).

The advantages of the 2 MTW standard are sever

It serves as a clear reminder that big wars similar to D

Storm can still occur because even though the United 

no longer faces a global threat akin to the Cold W

confronts strong regional enemies potentially will

commit aggression. This standard also signa

continuing U.S. willingness to defend its vital interes

protect its close allies. Its emphasis on warfighting c

compelling reasons for DoD to preserve the w

highest-quality military forces, with high read

modernization, and sustainment. The two 

contemplated by this standard require good mobility 

joint operations, and the mix of ground, air, naval 

45

Army Divisions 10 (2) 8 (

 (Separate Brigades)

Marine Divisions & Air 3 1

 Wings

Air Force Fighter Wings 12 8

 • Bombers 163 27

Navy Battle Force Ships 301 15

 • Carriers/ARGS 12/12 –

DoD Military Manpower 1.35 million 865,00

 Rese

 Active Compo
contained in the U.S. posture. The 2 MTW standar

provides support for the Revolution in Military A

(RMA), JV2010/2020, and DoD’s plan to begin a new 

procurement in a few years.

In addition to usefully linking U.S. forces to clear t

and plausible wars, the 2 MTW standard re

calculations of force requirements to a simple num

algorithm. By proclaiming the need for a two-war po

not one war or three wars, it has boiled defense pla

down to a single-point solution. It has helped build a 

political consensus for the current posture, establis

ceiling over the posture and a floor under it. The 2 

standard achieves this end with arithmetic procla

that more forces would be superfluous and fewer 

would be inadequate. Seasoned military officer

operations research analysts may recognize that rea

more complex than this formula. But the 2 MTW sta

thus far has gotten the job done in the public arena in 

that have helped insulate the Pentagon from Washin

political struggles. Meanwhile, it has allowed D

resolve its internal debates by focusing on two c

defined wars, whose postulated features have 

developed in satisfying detail to permit analysis of 

programs, and budgets.

Most important, the 2 MTW standard has bequea

force posture that thus far has adequately met U.S. se

requirements. While U.S. forces often have se

over-stretched when mounting peacekeeping mission

related operations in recent years, no enemy has 

opportunity to launch MTW-style aggression in the P

Gulf or Northeast Asia. Perhaps this situation ow

peaceful international conditions. But to an imp

degree, it may also owe to the fact that the U.S. mi

despite its problems and shortfalls, genuinely possess

capacity to work with allied forces to inflict decisive 

not just on one enemy, but on two enemies at once. 

sure, this capacity is not perfect. But even so

sufficiently strong to ensure eventual victory in both 

46
and crushing defeat for enemies. Because U.S. wa

operations in one theater do not open the door to unop

aggression in another theater, the 2 MTW sta

underscores deterrence to a significantly greater d

than could be achieved by a one-war standard. Mean

U.S. military forces generally have been available for 

lesser contingencies, including the Kosovo conflict

have occurred in recent years. While the Pen

sometimes has grumbled about such events, no major 

requirement has gone unmet. For these reasons, 

defense analysts agree that a 2 MTW force postur

cost-effective choice: it provides adequate mi

preparedness and safety, while not draining the f

treasury dry.

Criticisms of the 2 MTW Standard .

Despite its advantages, the 2 MTW standard ha

bombarded by mounting criticisms in recent months a

fault-finding on multiple grounds. Supporters of the 2 

standard assert that it has been misinterpreted and 

out of context. Perhaps so, but these misinterpret

have acquired a life of their own, to the point wher

standard now means something that may not orig

have been intended. Some critics have been calli

larger or smaller forces, but the main complaints 

focused not on force size, but instead on the stan

strategic rationale and priorities for preparing and 

forces. The following portrayal focuses on eight c

arguments being advanced, not the personalities m

them. In this chapter’s view, no force-sizing standard 

perfect, but most of these criticisms are valid to one d

or another. The looming question is: What should be 

of them? Are they mere chinks in the 2 MTW stan

armor, or are they strong enough to justify overturn

This question is for readers and the U.S. Governm

answer.

47
One criticism is that the 2 MTW standard alleged

to focus on the normal business of the Departm

Defense and U.S. military forces. It is totally preoc

with preparing U.S. forces to fight two major regiona

at the same time. To be sure, staying prepared fo

calamitous events is critically important. It provides 

compelling rationale to keep U.S. forces ready for 

time and to improve them as opportunities arise

regional wars—even one war at a single time, to say n

of two wars—occur infrequently. The vast majority 

time, U.S. forces are engaged in far-flung, dema

activities of a different sort: e.g., training, deve

collaborative practices with allies, reaching out t

partners, patrolling troubled areas, peacekeeping, st

at terrorists, and conducting minor crisis interven

The 2 MTW standard implicitly assumes that if U.S. 

are prepared to wage regional wars, they will be a

perform all these other missions. But is this truly the 

Because critics fret that it may not be true, they worr

an exclusive focus on MTWs can result in other vita

needs and program priorities being neglected.

A second, related criticism is that because the 2 

standard is preoccupied with fighting wars, it allegedl

nothing about the larger role played by U.S. for

carrying out the national security agenda abroad. 

sure, the U.S. national security strategy of sh

responding, and preparing calls attention to the imp

peacetime purposes of U.S. military forces. Bu

connection of these strategy precepts to the 2 

standard seems tenuous. This especially is the case be

the quite-important shaping function plays no role 

analytical process by which DoD gauges its 

requirements for the 2 MTW standard. The wrong-h

implication, critics allege, is that U.S. forces exist ma

wage war and only distantly to help achieve key po

and strategic goals in peacetime. 

This self-preoccupied focus on warfighting all

leaves DoD force planning curiously disengaged fro

48
central thrust of U.S. foreign policy in today’s 

keeping the peace and molding the future interna

system. Several observers, including the Secretary of 

have expressed mystification at this detached att

which was not the case during the Cold War, whe

Pentagon had a good reputation for grasping the po

purposes of military power. The ultimate effect, some 

fear, will be to weaken the U.S. military’s credibilit

importance in the public eye. They argue that the Co

and American people may not be willing to con

supporting a military capable of waging two hypoth

wars with the most vigorous war plans and hi

technology assets imaginable. But most fair-m

observers will be more-inclined to support a force pos

this size and strength if it powerfully contributes to ke

the peace and influencing how countries respec

interests. Unfortunately the 2 MTW standard does n

attention to this important role of U.S. military pow

Beyond this, the new administration will need to a

all-important strategic question: How many U.S. forc

needed to keep Europe stable, to dampen the Middle 

chaotic affairs, and to guide Asia toward a new se

architecture as China’s power grows? The 2 MTW sta

cannot address this question, much less answer i

allegedly lame response is that forces sized to figh

regional wars presumably will be big enough, and pr

configured, to achieve these core political goals. 

proves to be the case, it will be by accident, not design. 

if U.S. force needs for these goals prove to be greater th

different from, requirements for warfighting? In this 

the 2 MTW standard could leave U.S. national se

strategy flying blind or at least weakened. During th

War, U.S. forces were sized and publicly justified not m

to wage war, but also to contribute to such larger str

precepts as containment, deterrence, forward de

flexible response, and alliance preparedness. Critics 

that the time-honored value of this dual focus on peac

49
missions and warfighting has been lost in the 2 

standard.

A third criticism of the 2 MTW standard is t

anchors the U.S. defense rationale too single-minde

fleeting threats and too narrowly in an outdated fo

threat-based planning. Iraq and North Korea have s

as the principal threats of the past decade. But they a

necessarily permanent fixtures for the coming de

Indeed, they could fade from the scene quickly if Sa

Hussein’s government is overthrown and if the K

peninsula unifies. What would happen to DoD’s 

requirements then? Would a major disarmame

possible? Or will new threats appear on the scene? I

should the United States remain heavily armed eve

setting where no major wars loom on the immediate h

because new dangers could eventually appear, far 

than a disarmed United States could prepare for the

More fundamentally, this criticism alleges that 

MTW standard is trying to use two middling

adversaries, with backward economies and no allian

to each other, to create a replacement for the r

permanent, multi-theater enemy played by the 

Union during the Cold War. To be sure, permanent en

help make things simple, unchanging, and fr

controversy over such thorny issues as goals and prio

They allow defense planning to be reactive, sparing 

need to be proactive. The problem, critics allege, is th

type of threat-based planning has gone the way of th

War. In today’s fluid world, the primary task is to ad

U.S. interests, not to ward off ceaseless and gr

military threats. Permanent big-time enemies no 

exist. Whereas today’s enemies may be unthrea

tomorrow, countries that seem quiescent today may b

major trouble-makers a few years from now. Th

facing U.S. defense planning allegedly is to remain f

in ways that deal with this ever-shifting strategic 

rather than rigidly lock itself into a threat-based fram

50
that may bear little relationship to how the future ac

evolves.

Most critics likely would agree that threat-

planning should remain a contributing factor in 

defense planning. But they also argue that it should 

carried to the point of obscuring the need for the U

States to stay well-armed in a still-dangerous 

irrespective of the comings and goings of particular th

The United States is a global power with far-flung inte

security commitments, and involvements in tro

regions that are capable of unexpectedly explodin

conflict almost overnight. The two major wars of th

decade, in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo, both caug

United States by surprise: neither Iraq nor Serbia 

identified as full-fledged threats before they sud

invaded their neighbors. Given these realities, the c

U.S. defense posture of 13 active Army and M

divisions, 20 USAF fighter wings, and 12 Navy CVBG

ARGs is a sensible capability even in a setting wh

war-producing threats immediately exist. Over-relia

threat-based planning risks losing sight of this key str

judgment, thereby exposing the U.S. posture to dam

turbulence in a fluid setting where threats appea

disappear with regular frequency. U.S. defense pla

requires stable continuity: in today’s world, the old f

threat-based planning allegedly fails to provide it.

A fourth criticism is that the 2 MTW stand

too-beholden to the allegedly faulty premise tha

regional wars menacing U.S. interests may 

simultaneously. While the world remains a dang

place, the reality is that for the past 50 years, regiona

involving U.S. forces have occurred only one at a tim

two at once. The same pattern, this criticism alle

likely to hold true in the future. U.S. forces won the P

Gulf war and the Kosovo war so decisively that poli

isolated countries like Iraq and North Korea seem un

to be willing to risk major war with the United States a

allies. Even if one country or the other is tempted to c

51
aggression, they are unlikely to launch concurrent a

because they are not allies, are located far apar

respond to dissimilar situations. When the time is r

one country to attack, it likely will not be ripe for the 

Seasoned defense planners grasp the need to be pre

for two wars so that a strong response can be mounted 

region without fear that an enemy in another region w

given opportunity to attack. But to the man in the 

the expensive act of spending many billions of doll

being ready for two wars can come across as a wa

exercise in worst-case planning, if not bureau

self-indulgence. Possessing large forces as a ba

insurance policy against two wars makes sense pr

these forces are also needed for other high-pr

purposes. But possessing them solely or even primar

such insurance is something else again. 

A fifth criticism is that the 2 MTW standard all

creates blinders to theaters, missions, and conting

that lie outside its focus on regional wars in the Persia

and Northeast Asia. The strategic reality is that alt

this standard focuses on only two theaters, the U

States has major security involvements and m

commitments in three theaters, and occasionally carr

operations in others as well. When the 2 MTW sta

was initially adopted, it seemed to relegate Europ

NATO—previously a centerpiece of U.S. de

strategy—to the backwaters. Even so, the United 

chose to keep fully 100,000 or more troops in Euro

biggest overseas troop deployment) and to con

accepting major roles in NATO’s war plans for proj

large forces in and around Europe. But the forces all

to these war plans, including troops in Europ

reinforcements from the United States, were also as

major missions in the defense of other theaters. T

matters mildly, this perplexing behavior left Euro

confused. Their confusion grew when the United 

subsequently announced policies to enlarge NATO 

adapt alliance forces to new power-projection missi

52
which European units would be expected to car

modern doctrine with high-technology U.S. forces. O

the great ironies of the late 1990s is that when a maj

erupted in Kosovo, it occurred in the one theater appa

assumed by U.S. defense planning to be immune fro

threat of war. The United States responded effectiv

concentrating large air and naval forces for N

campaign, but the step required controversial decisi

deploy some units that were assigned to other re

commanders and war plans.

The problem of allegedly inflexible defense plan

can leave regional commanders in chief (CINCs) hig

dry goes beyond Europe. A few years ago, the United 

was required to deploy aircraft carriers toward Taiw

order to help dampen an impending crisis between 

and Taiwan. The carriers were sent, but they had 

temporarily extracted from forces earmarked fo

defense of South Korea. In the coming years, CINC-P

(CINCPAC) may face regular needs to deploy for

multiple spots in Asia and the Pacific for peacetime sh

missions and crisis response. If force commitments 

Korean contingency are treated inflexibly, in way

hamstring not only forces stationed in South Korea b

units based elsewhere in the Pacific and the United S

CINCPAC’s ability to respond could be impeded. Inde

three major regional commanders—Command

Chief-Europe (CINCEUR), CINCPAC, and Comman

Chief-Central (CINCCENT)—could face constrain

their ability to carry out missions and respond to crise

depart from the canonical scenarios of the 2 MTW stan

For all key regions, one concern is that future big 

may not take the shape of today’s MTW continge

which contemplate major ground attacks across the b

of U.S. allies. Because proliferation is accelerating

wars may involve use of weapons of mass destr

(WMD) systems and asymmetric strategies aim

clouding the political situation and slipping the 

military punch. Even some wars employing conven

53
forces in traditional ways may mostly take the fo

long-range air and naval operations, and they may 

waged over control of borders and territory. The impli

is that while the United States should remain prepa

big wars, its defense planning should examine th

spectrum of possible conflicts, not merely those 

replicate Desert Storm and occur only in the Persia

and Northeast Asia. A force posture optimized to 

today’s two MTW conflicts does not guarantee success 

big war that actually erupts is so different from 

conflicts that U.S. forces are unable to meet its dem

For example, current U.S. defense plans call for 

deployment of small forces capable of sending a det

signal and contesting enemy advances, followed by b

of much larger forces, over a period of several weeks, 

eventual counterattack. This response worked 

Persian Gulf war, but what if a future war re

deployment of medium-sized strike packages, 

counter-WMD assets, at a faster pace than now pla

Worrisome events of this sort are reason for th

beyond the narrow confines of today’s MTW contingen

An equal concern arises over the ability and freed

U.S. forces to react to wars and operations tha

significantly smaller than today’s MTW contingencie

controversies that have erupted in response to th

military performing peacekeeping missions make clea

the problem of constraints created by MTW commit

remains real, not merely theoretical. On the surface

commitments for such missions seem modest: norma

more than 2-3 percent of active U.S. military manp

Yet such missions disrupt some training for warfig

cause other forms of turbulence, and often result 

sustained deployment of units that have assignme

MTW war plans. Some observers complain abou

forces allegedly being run ragged by non-warfig

missions and express nervousness about the damag

to MTW preparedness, which is central to U.S. d

strategy. Skeptics counter by deriding the prospect 

54
entire U.S. military being kept of the shelf, standing 

against two regional wars that are unlikely to erup

being unavailable to deal with important event

missions that actually are occurring. Thus far, Do

always responded flexibly by making availabl

necessary forces for each operation. But to critic

debates that have accompanied these actions refl

inherent flaw in U.S. defense planning, one that can 

in an inability to see the forest through the trees. Aft

they say, military forces are created in order to be 

when they are needed, not treated as a precious asse

can be applied only in a few extreme cases that seld

ever, occur.

A sixth criticism is that the force calculations us

the 2 MTW standard seem questionable in ways th

result in the tail wagging the dog. Why is it that the 

number of forces—one-half of the U.S. posture in 

case—is needed to wage two wars that differ vas

enemy and allied forces, the terrain, and str

circumstances? The idea that U.S. forces of 6-7 divisio

USAF fighter wings, and 4-5 carriers are needed to d

the Persian Gulf seems reasonable. But the same jud

applies less clearly to Korea. During the Cold War, 

the situation was more precarious than now, the U

States planned to defend South Korea with smaller f

The idea was to rely on the South Koreans to meet th

of force requirements, with the United States providin

modest air and naval support. The South Koreans, b

by a booming economy and a population of 46 million

capable of performing this task today. In particular

army of about 25 divisions is amply large to po

densely a peninsula that is only 200 kilometers wid

marked by rugged terrain and prepared positions

notion that large U.S. ground forces might be nee

launch a powerful counterattack late in the battle se

stretch: it assumes that most South Korean units hav

destroyed but the North Korean army has suffere

lightly. Surface appearances suggest that a smalle

55
force allocation might suffice. This step could free 

units for missions other than the 2 MTWs, but it also 

mean that a sizing concept broader than 2 MTWs is 

used. Allocating this many forces to the Korea contin

maintains the simple clarity of the 2 MTW standar

perhaps at the cost of the flexibility needed to perform 

missions. If the U.S. force posture lacks adequate flex

owing to the rigidity of its own planning standard, t

seems to be genuinely wagging the dog.

A seventh criticism is that DoD allegedly does no

being fully prepared for two regional wars seriously 

own programming and budgeting, even though failur

so can come across as a major deficiency in U.S. d

preparedness. This criticism has its origins in the r

that at a time of fiscal constraints, DoD naturall

priorities in how it allocates funds. Programs of pr

importance normally receive full funding, but less-c

programs sometimes are short-changed to one deg

another. In the eyes of this criticism, DoD seems int

being highly prepared for one regional war while atte

to readiness and modernization, but is willing to 

some shortfalls in being able to mount a second 

response. Critics point to alleged shortfalls in strateg

war reserve stocks, and specialized assets, and 

practice of relying on reserve component forces to p

logistic support. Some critics decry the damage all

done to the top priority of U.S. defense strategy: 

prepared for two regional wars. Others question the n

be fully prepared for two wars. What unites both ca

that they are fingering an alleged disconnect be

strategy and budgets: the kind of disconnect that, if c

too far, can result in serious trouble for U.S. d

preparedness because of failure to establish clear prio

An eighth criticism, normally advanced less st

than the other seven, holds that the 2 MTW sta

misjudges the size of the U.S. defense posture that sho

maintained in the coming era. Some critics assert tha

MTW standard inflates U.S. force requirements. 

56
argue for smaller forces either to trim allegedly wa

defense spending or to focus additional money on m

pay, readiness, and procurement. Other critics alleg

the 2 MTW standard underestimates force needs. Th

for a bigger posture in order to carry out missions th

deemed likely to grow in the coming years. Their pr

goal is to assemble enough additional forces to safe

against MTWs while carrying out other missions, inc

peacekeeping and peacetime shaping. Critics from 

school thus agree that the 2 MTW falls short in it

function of accurately gauging force requirements, bu

disagree sharply on the remedial steps to be pursued

How seriously should these eight criticisms of 

MTW standard be taken? To those clamoring that 

MTW standard should be junked, they are a devas

indictment. To those who still see major advantages i

MTW standard, they are not sufficient to justify thr

out the baby with the bathwater. But even supporters 

2 MTW standard would be hard-pressed to deny th

problems should be fixed, if possible. The real issue 

whether the 2 MTW standard is fatally flawed o

serviceable, but whether a better replacement can be 

This is an issue that requires careful thought, for 

criticizing the 2 MTW standard is easy, desi

something better is harder.

Toward a New Approach to Force-Sizing: Asse

the Options.

A fair appraisal of the 2 MTW standard is that it 

sense in 1993 and for several years thereafter. But 

period since it was adopted nearly a decade ago, the 

has changed a great deal, and U.S. foreign polic

national security strategy have also changed. The 

21st century promises even greater changes. In the flu

ahead, DoD will need to gain maximum strategic m

from resources that may be less than ideal. A main pr

is not that the 2 MTW standard grossly misidentifie

57
force needs, but that it can give rise to a narrow, rigid 

on a single strategic purpose at a time when a fl

adaptable focus on multiple strategic purposes w

needed. The emerging situation requires an appro

force-sizing and the other dimensions of defense pla

that addresses the future, not the past.

Some of those who favor retaining the 2 MTW sta

argue that the United States can solve its defense dile

by focusing its military forces solely on being ready for 

wars while eschewing other burdensome mis

Presumably responsibility for these missions wou

assigned to allies and partners. While this approach s

appealing at first blush, it breaks down when its a

consequences are considered. The core problem is tha

military forces would not be available to support na

interests in many non-war situations that will have a 

impact on how the international system evolves. Too 

U.S. forces would be left standing on the sidelines, an

foreign policy would be denied one of its most imp

instruments. U.S. influence abroad would decline

sooner or later, U.S. forces might be compelled to figh

regional wars than otherwise will be the case.

Could allies and partners be relied upon to act in 

that protect American interests? Almost certainl

skeptics allege. These countries have their own inter

serve, their military forces are not adequate for s

power projection missions, and they rely upon 

leadership to mobilize their own capacity to act. The 

exercising restraint in the use of U.S. forces, dema

greater allied contributions, and forging a better divi

labor with them makes sense. But withholding U.S. 

from critical new-era missions that are here to stay 

ostrich approach to the coming era, one that seems d

to fail and backfire.

What can be done to keep U.S. forces properly focu

MTWs while still being available for other mission

DoD’s upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review deci

58
retain the 2 MTW standard, greater flexibility perha

be gained by trimming allocations to the Korea contin

and using the resulting forces to form a strategic rese

other missions. Essentially a new sizing standard wo

created: forces for two MTWs and one SSC. The c

force posture might be able to carry out this approach 

short term, but over the long haul, larger forces co

needed to make it viable. The reason is that a slim

down Korea commitment is a generic MTW posture 

cheap. In any event, this approach amounts to appl

bandage to one key problem, but it does not solve all 

problems arising from the 2 MTW standard. A 

fundamental change, aimed at replacing the 2 

standard with a new and innovative approach, m

needed. 

The act of contemplating how to carry out such a c

must begin with a clear-eyed appraisal of how the w

evolving in the early 21st century. In essence, world 

are being transformed by globalization. The growing 

of international activity in trade, finances, inform

technology, and values is drawing once-distant r

closer together in time and space, making them 

interdependent. As a consequence, the United States 

learn to think and act globally, for its interes

enlarging, and it is now becoming vulnerable to eve

the far corners of the world, including places that wer

deemed outside the perimeter of its defense planning

Global economics and security affairs now share 

stage, and they are interacting in complex ways to sha

future. While the ultimate outcome is impossible to 

new opportunities are being created, but so are new da

that are more serious than is often realized. A positive 

is that the U.S.-led democratic community, which 

covers nearly one-half of the world, is benefiting 

globalization, becoming wealthier, and drawing 

together in peaceful cooperation. But the tumu

regions comprising the rest of the world are a dif

matter. Already beset by troubled politics and econ

59
many of these regions are being both helped and harm

globalization. The consequence is growing chao

unstable security affairs that have the potential to pr

heightened military tensions, conflict, and war.

Especially menaced is the so-called “southern 

stretching from the Balkans in Europe, through the M

East and Persian Gulf, across South Asia, and alo

great Asian crescent from Southeast Asia to Japan

military forces will need to remain committed in 

traditional places as Europe and Northeast Asia, 

being capable of operations in Africa and Latin Am

when the need arises. But the stressful events of th

decade, including two wars, make clear that in the c

years, U.S. forces likely will be called upon to operate 

the southern belt more often than during the past. I

the southern belt could become a new main geogra

focus of U.S. military activity. If so, this situation wil

about major changes in how the United States thinks 

using military power in order to protect its interests, c

chaos, and foster stable security affairs so tha

progress-producing side of globalization can take hol

Owing to new geography and other trends, inc

WMD proliferation, future U.S. military strategy 

destined to be less positional and less continental t

the past. In the coming decade and beyond, it w

animated more by maritime concepts, flexible 

operations, and adaptive responses than before. It w

placing a growing premium on versatile peacetime str

shaping and on swiftly projecting military power in v

forms to ever-shifting places, some of them well-re

from existing bases and facilities, in crisis and war. 

be confronting new dangers, new threats, new conflict

new adversaries intent on frustrating U.S. str

designs. Meanwhile, it will be presiding over U.S. m

forces that themselves are being transformed in respo

the information era, the RMA, new doctrine, and c

procurement efforts. 

60
The core issue facing DoD is one of crafting 

approach to defense planning that reacts sensibly to 

major changes, accurately measures force need

priorities, and offers a credible strategic rationale th

endure—both inside the Pentagon and in the public a

The act of adopting a new approach is one that sho

pursued carefully, for many issues must be consid

Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to 

sizing: new contingency-based standards, capability

standards, and strategy-based standards. Contin

based standards would continue to size and design 

forces on the basis of wartime needs: e.g., enough for

1.5 MTWs or 2.5 MTWs instead of today’s 2.0 M

Capability-based standards would aspire to determi

force characteristics needed for a wide spectr

operations (e.g., sufficient land forces to provide a 

mixture of infantry, armored, mechanistic, and air a

units). The same applies to air and naval u

Strategy-based standards would look beyond wa

contingencies and combat capabilities to determin

forces needed to carry out the key precepts of na

security strategy. All three approaches have 

advantages and disadvantages. The tradeoffs need 

evaluated carefully before making a decision. The key 

is that today’s standard is not frozen in concrete. If a

approach is deemed better, the door can be open

adopting it.

Without pretending to settle this issue, this c

reasons that strategy-based standards, supplemen

analysis of contingencies and capabilities, may wor

This approach’s key advantage is that it would ancho

planning in a stronger strategic foundation than 

being prepared for hypothetical wars. This approac

used successfully during the Cold War, during whic

forces were sized to carry out national strategy thro

broad spectrum of capabilities, while also responding 

dictates of wartime contingency plans. Back then

defense strategy was often called “flexible respon

61
political and military term that said a great deal abo

virtues of not becoming too locked into single pre

scripts that overlooked something important or co

overturned at the drop of a hat. After all, D

Eisenhower once wisely said that “plans are nothin

planning is everything." In the old but new approa

forth here, U.S. forces would be sized to help carry o

three key precepts of national security strategy: sh

responding, and preparing—or their successors. On

key task is accomplished, forces can be fine-tun

perform specific contingency plans and provide a f

portfolio of assets.

Illustratively, a strategy-based approach can be br

to life by anchoring U.S. defense plans in a nested hie

of three new standards that together provide a r

measure of enduring military needs and a credible str

rationale for the resulting posture. The first two stan

are primary: chief mechanisms for determining force 

because they focus on the most common strategic mi

of U.S. forces and high probability events. The 

standard is complementary, ensuring effective for

more demanding, but less-probable events. The idea b

this strategy-based approach is to determine require

and priorities for each of these standards, and th

choose the kind of balanced, multifaceted force postur

does the best job of serving all three standards. 

Instead of replacing today’s single standard w

different single standard, this approach thus creates 

sensible standards, and calls upon DoD to anchor 

sizing and planning in a synthesis of all three of th

asks a simple question: Why have one standard when 

standards are needed to provide a reliable guide to str

planning? After all, if modern business corporation

grapple with the task of assessing multiple str

purposes, so can DoD. Countless books on the the

corporate decisionmaking have argued that sound str

plans are best made not by rigidly employing one 

reasoning but by employing several lines and blending 

62
together in sensible ways. Indeed, DoD regu

considered multiple standards during the Cold Wa

used them to make a steady stream of wise decisio

needs to recover this lost art. The three new standards 

Standard 1: Forces for Normal Global Mission

purpose is to ensure that during conditions short of 

war (i.e., 95 percent of the time), the principal U.S. re

military commands—especially EUCOM, CENTCOM

PACOM—always have enough forces available to th

perform their normal duties, such as training, workin

allies, outreach, peacekeeping, and respondi

small-to-medium crises and conflicts. Such forces 

include overseas-stationed assets plus units based 

United States that could be drawn upon when nece

Illustratively, this standard might assign or make r

available a posture of three divisions, five fighter wing

CVBGs, and an ARG to each of these three comm

Remaining forces would be withheld as a strategic r

under national command, for flexible use in other mi

and regions.

Standard 2: Forces for a Single MTW, while Perfo

Normal Missions Elsewhere. Its purpose is to ensur

U.S. forces swiftly can concentrate to win a sing

regional war in varying places, while not seriously den

the other major CINCs of forces needed to carry ou

normal missions. In event of a Persian Gulf wa

example, this standard would commit forces al

assigned to CENTCOM plus draw upon the str

reserve to create an adequate wartime posture. Mean

EUCOM and PACOM would retain control of most o

the forces normally assigned to them. Thus their n

operations would not be severely degraded. A s

calculus would apply to wars in other theaters.

Standard 3: Forces for More Wars, or Different W

Bigger Wars. Its purpose is to ensure that in event o

demanding wartime situations than Standard 2, U.S. 

will be adequate to the task if full use is made 

63
opportunity to concentrate them and employ 

adaptively. This standard would examine needs fo

MTWs in overlapping time frames. It also would ex

force needs should a different war or a bigger 

well-larger than today’s MTW conflicts, erupt. 

The main effect of these standards is to establish 

broader frame of reference for articulating and pursui

main strategic purposes and priorities of force plan

Above all, they place the need to be ready for two 

conflicts in a larger context and they devote sep

treatment to other concerns of equal or greater impor

Essentially, they say that U.S. forces should be 

capable of carrying out three strategic purposes: (1) n

peacetime missions and crisis-response duties, 

themselves are demanding; (2) fighting one big war, 

keeping other theaters stable; (3) in extremis, wagin

big wars or similarly demanding conflicts at the same 

Rather than assuming that Standard 3 preparation

produce adequate forces for Standards 1 and 2, they c

a careful examination of force needs and program pri

for all three standards on an individual basis. 

These standards also provide a more divers

potentially better way to think about how U.S. m

forces are combined together and used in the shifting 

of operational circumstances likely to confront them

current standard provides a single approach to 

employment: two large force packages for two MTW

contrast, the new standards provide a wide spectr

flexible packages. For normal conditions, they di

forces by creating four medium-sized packages: three 

major overseas CINCs and one held in strategic re

For dealing with a single MTW in any one of m

theaters, they concentrate forces to create a single b

properly tailored package, while maintainin

medium-sized packages for use elsewhere. For dealin

more, different, and bigger wars, they concentrate 

even more, to create two big packages or an even 

single package. Their common theme is that they fo

64
creating appropriate force packages for the full 

purposes and missions ahead, not just fo

low-probability event of waging two MTW conflicts 

same time.

Their intent is to help provide a fresh sen

perspective for judging ways to enhance the U.S. mil

flexibility, adaptiveness, and across-the-board perfor

in the coming era. They will help provide alternative 

for viewing the strategic priorities of U.S. national se

strategy, CINC requirements, service program dire

and force improvement opportunities. They will pro

framework for rewarding investment programs 

provide powerful strategic benefits in more ways tha

For example, they will cast a favorable light on measu

creating better infrastructure in new geographic re

where new bases and facilities might not be need

future MTWs, but might be essential for new peac

shaping missions and for responding to small crise

conflicts. They will also help call attention to 

attractive measures that may not be given full atten

service programs that today focus on two MTWs. 

Like all standards, they must be applied sensibly

their interplay in mind. Standard 1 should be employ

only for its own purposes, but also to help create ade

capabilities for Standards 2 and 3. Likewise, Stand

should be broadly targeted, in ways that have p

effects on the other two standards. Standard 2 ca

being prepared to fight a single regional war, but no

one war in one place. Rather, it means that U.S. 

should be able to wage different kinds of wars, vary

location, strategy, and operations in all three 

theaters. The flexible capacity to wage these different 

of wars will provide an inherent capacity to wage mor

one war at a time, should this step become neces

Standard 3 will no longer rule the roost, but it will sti

an important role. It can be used to identify cost-eff

measures that help U.S. forces fight not only two wa

also one war. Examples include strategic mobility, C

65
systems, war reserve munitions, and stocks: areas 

preparing for multiple wars still will make sense.

Together, these three standards will help impar

defense planning with a more comprehensive str

focus and a better sense of balance. They will pu

things first, yet devote proper attention to the full spe

of critical defense assets. They will help ensure th

still-important requirement of being able to fight tw

does not come at the expense of neglecting other c

measures, especially peacetime operations and str

shaping missions. Likewise, they will buffer again

reverse risk: that as DoD pays greater attent

Standards 1 and 2, it does not give short-shrift to retai

two-war capability as a credible insurance policy

prioritizing this way and allocating funds on the b

greatest marginal returns, DoD will be better able to 

forces that are fully capable of meeting Standards 1 

while still preserving a robust and credible capac

Standard 3. To be sure, these three standards c

fulfilled only if an adequate defense budget is funded

these three standards provide an improved str

formula for gauging force posture and budget requirem

and for determining how priorities can best be estab

and scare funds can best be spent, in the even

budgetary shortfalls occur. 

In using these three standards, this strategy

approach will be more complex and harder to explain 

the 2 MTW standard, which purchases simple clarity 

expense of strategic sophistication. But this new app

is no more complex than Cold War thinking, whic

readily grasped by the Congress and the American p

Within DoD, it would help ensure that defense prepar

are targeted not primarily at improbable events, but in

at enabling U.S. forces and CINCs to perform the peac

and wartime missions that most often must be carried 

today’s world. Yes, DoD’s Planning, Programming

Budget System (PPBS) process will be stretched, a

joint operational planning by the Joint Staff and the C

66
Preparing the Defense Planning Guidance, S

Program Objective Memoranda (POMs), and 

operation plans (OPlans) will be harder to accomplish

surely the Pentagon, in this information age, can car

defense planning on the basis of three standards, n

one standard—especially since considering all 

standards is a good way to determine how to pla

defense effort on the right track. 

A key payoff of this approach is that senior civilia

military leaders will have significantly better inform

at their disposal for making the tough decisions 

them. The bottom line is that this new approach wi

create a public rationale that rings true. In addition, 

contribute to creating a better-construed defense effo

supports the full strategic purposes of national se

policy and defense strategy. It offers the potential of m

the United States and its overseas interests more secu

still-dangerous and turbulent world where security m

at a premium.

Conclusion: Keeping Things in Perspective.

What are the implications of this new approach f

future size of U.S. military forces? This question will n

be addressed through careful analysis, but give

directions in which the world seems headed in the c

period, these three standards appear to point to a 

posture in the vicinity of today’s model, not appre

larger or smaller. If so, the challenge facing DoD will 

of using similar forces wisely, not building far larger 

or making do with far less. Clearly these three standa

not point toward major force drawdowns: althoug

standard might require fewer forces than now, the oth

standards likely will call for a larger number, sim

now. Indeed, the U.S. Government may ultimately con

that the act of keeping the peace and shaping the w

future requires more forces than fighting the nation’s 

67
In any event, these three standards crea

single-point requirement, below which the remaining 

will be clearly inadequate, and above which, added 

are transparently superfluous. But small differences 

margin can make a big difference in strategic perform

If a decision is made to enlarge the force posture some

it likely will focus on adding critical capabilities in ar

deficiency: e.g., “Low Density/High Demand” (LDHD) 

C4ISR assets, logistic support assets, peacekeeping a

ready reserve component units, and ships and airpla

force posture that is 10-15 percent larger than now m

needed, one supported by a defense budget that 

slowly but steadily. But much will depend upon s

assessments of requirements and affordability i

future. At the moment, the important task is to cr

sound approach to force-sizing and defense planni

that such decisions can be made with the best analys

information available.

The new approach put forth here, with its 

standards, is an illustration, not a fixed blueprint. W

helps illustrate is that the past need not be prologue

existing 2 MTW formula offers one option for navigati

future, but it is not the only viable option. Creative th

can produce other approaches with attractions of thei

They can be articulated in enough detail to provide co

guidance for sizing forces, allocating them among mis

and setting sound program priorities for improvem

The challenge is to develop a set of alternative appro

analyze them, and choose one not because it made se

the past, but because it offers promise of working best 

future.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. For a current portrayal of the 2 MTW standard and its 

defense planning, see Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, 

Report to the President and Congress, 2000, Washington DC

Government Printing Office, 2000, pp. 17-19.

68
2. For a textbook on planning by multiple objectives, see R

Keeney and Howard Raiffa, Decisions with Multiple Obj

Preferences and Value Tradeoffs, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 

69
CHAPTER 4

A NEW STRATEGY AND MILITARY LOG

FOR THE 21st CENTURY

Huba Wass de Czege

and

 Antulio J. Echevarria II

Few strategists would disagree that today’s 

dynamic strategic environment requires a reevalua

the ends, ways, and means of U.S. national securit

national military strategies. In fact, it has become a

commonplace to declare the Cold War—and its all

more stable security environment—at an end. In its p

“New World Order” has emerged that many argue is 

long on new and short on order. The current force

metric that underpins the national military strategy a

extension, the national security strategy has of late 

under special scrutiny. That metric calls for the 

military to maintain the capacity to deter, or if necess

defeat, large-scale aggression in two major theat

MTW) nearly simultaneously. The military logic fo

metric is threat-based and has obvious roots in the 

War—North Korean and Iraqi threats simply replac

Soviet one. Architects of the 2 MTW metric have 

great pains to point out that it provides forces to e

other national security missions as well, should eit

both of those conflicts fail to occur. Despite these c

however, experience has shown that the threat-

metric lacks the flexibility required by today’s dynam

uncertain strategic environment. Specifically, the 2 

metric does not account for the continuing and d

requirements of peacetime engagement—shapin

international environment—and it focuses primarily 

geographic regions for crisis response. This 

71
maintains that the current strategic environment re

a condition-based strategy and a flexible force-sizing 

based on general historical data and vali

political-military projections for each specific region.

2 MTW Shortcomings.

The 2 MTW metric does not acknowledge the va

peacetime engagement. Far from mere constab

duties, peacetime engagement involves actions 

facilitate agreements among states and quasi-states

as Ecuador and Peru, Israel and Egypt, East Timo

Indonesia, and the Kosovars and Serbs, that make 

less likely. It also includes deterring and containin

potential aggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and 

Sung in North Korea. In addition, it helps estab

regional balance of power in areas where the potent

trouble exists but the lines of conflict are less clearly d

as in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the T

Straits. It supports long-standing arrangements with 

national and international agencies to monitor arms c

arrangements, counterdrug trade, control the spr

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), monitor emba

and so on. It includes responding to humanitarian 

such as those in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda 

military forces can facilitate the work of nat

international, private and other nongovernm

agencies. It also helps to ensure that the United Stat

evacuate American citizens and other noncombatants 

hostilities break out unexpectedly. It helps build a ba

cooperative action with regional friends and neighbor

in the long run can reduce the expense of crisis respo

the American taxpayer and the burden on American f

Thus, although it indisputably detracts from some a

of warfighting preparations, peacetime engagement 

strategically valuable military skills and capabilitie

can enable and assist the U.S. military’s capacity to 

war.

72
Unfortunately, the logic underpinning the 2 

force-sizing metric wrongly assumes that forces comm

to peacetime engagement are available for crisis res

elsewhere. Hence, it tends to blur the distinction be

forces assigned to the daily work of shapin

international environment and those designated as a 

against strategic risk. Certain engagement activ

such as peacekeeping missions based on t

requirements—must continue even during a crisis. 

engaged in them cannot readily disengage. They b

the “sunk cost” of doing strategic business. Many of 

forces perform strategically vital functions that can r

the frequency and escalation potential of crises, 

overall resources required to resolve them. Indeed

forces in the region help set the conditions for succ

crisis response by providing first-hand intelligence, a

and liaison. Although the bulk of those forces 

probably remain committed in various locations wi

theater, they could still deliver vital deterren

condition-setting benefits to nearby regions.

Although small-scale contingencies are becoming 

frequent, it would be irresponsible to assume that a 

war, or large-scale crisis, will not occur. Nonetheless

MTW metric, associated with counter-aggression sce

in Southwest and Northeast Asia, fails to account f

unique requirements of other kinds of for

interventions. Historical and contemporary studies s

that crises tend to fall into two broad categories. In th

type, as in Panama (1989), immediate action 

necessary and escalation is not likely. Detailed pla

and preparations can occur and the response can ta

form of a coup d’ main, an overwhelming but very fo

surprise attack. In the second category, time availa

response is relatively short, as in Iraq’s invasion of K

(1990), and escalation is possible. Under this cat

decisive results might require significant coa

participation to avoid escalation and a rapid 

73
overwhelming military response to prevent the enem

seizing objectives and establishing integrated defens

Force requirements in any crisis have an imp

mass-velocity dimension that the 2 MTW metric do

capture. Forceful interventions should have an opera

momentum that offers U.S. forces a decisive advan

The rate of force flow often becomes as important as th

composition, and quality of the force that deploys

Army, recognizing this requirement, has posted a g

its Objective Force of being able to deploy five div

within 30 days as part of a balanced joint force. The p

of 2 MTW thinking and logic has produced a condit

which it would take about 75 days to reach this goa

45-day gap is a considerable difference, and is not ent

product of an Army designed to drive to battle from fo

deployed garrisons; it is also a function of inade

strategic transport.

Strategic Alternatives.

Broadly speaking, the United States has 

fundamental strategic options as it crosses the thr

into the 21st century. The first of these, which we m

preventive defense, aims at preventing problem

deterring, containing, isolating, and defeating s

threats. It requires strategists to array forces against 

threat and, thus, amounts to little more than a co

version of the containment strategy that characteriz

Cold War. This option pursues a negative end since it 

to preserve or restore the status quo ante. 

The second option, a brand of neo-isolationism, pu

a neutral end where security interests are strictly defi

terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness at 

The evolution of the international environment is l

left to itself. This approach expends less resources in 

of overseas engagement, but it accepts greater risks

would probably require a larger expenditure of resou

in order to respond to a crisis.

74
In contrast, the third option, positive engagement

at establishing a condition of stable peace and wides

prosperity as well as multilateral basis for crisis res

In other words, its ends are positive, rather than nega

neutral. A strategy of positive engagement accord

with a strategic environment in which vital interes

defined by conditions (peace, freedom, rule of law

growing prosperity) rather than by the containm

defeat of inimical state or non-state actors. Simply s

the basic aim of positive engagement is to maintai

shape the peace with allies and partners who share—

least are not opposed to—our interests and core valu

Like the other options, a strategy of positive engag

depends on the coordinated use of all forms of na

power. However, it differs from the other two, and w

current policy of Engagement, in one important resp

calls for proactive action—seizing the initiative—in 

security affairs to widen the circle of stakeholders in 

peace and prosperity and to set better terms when res

are required. It also differs in that positive aims gen

require more energy and resources than negative or n

ones. Not only would positive engagement redu

frequency of international crises, it would respond st

enough so that the post-crisis condition amounts to a 

stable peace than the status quo ante. Positive engag

would thus require a new approach to national m

strategy as well as a redress of the current imbalance i

military power. 

Accordingly, the national military strategy that 

from positive engagement would focus on establishin

expanding regional “zones of security” characteriz

multiple systems for facilitating crisis response and c

containment, as well as the entire range of stabilit

support operations. Military presence (both in and 

region) must signal a definite commitment to det

aggression and must demonstrate a bona fide capab

respond decisively to conditions that threaten the int

of the United States and its fellow stakeholders. I

75
without saying that under this strategy (and others

military forces would have to achieve and mainta

capacity for swift, decisive, and focused intervention

However, the underlying logic that separate

strategic approach from the others is that military 

must have the capability to take proactive action in 

not just react to crises. In other words, the entire d

establishment would have to think differently about 

military forces can or should do in peacetime. For exa

the U.S. military’s geographical Commanders in 

(CINCs) might conduct proactive regional engag

campaigns on a daily basis. These operations would r

a greater number of flexible and regionally “street-s

forward-presence conventional and special forces.

Positive engagement and its supporting mi

strategy would also require the defense establishm

change the way it approaches crisis response, contin

operations, and major theater wars. The best effo

prevent war will not necessarily preclude it. To be su

every crisis will require a military solution. How

maintaining global peace and prosperity will some

necessitate a military response. That response mus

from an understanding of the conditions and force

were at work during the peace and those necess

produce a more stable peace at the resolution of the 

More specifically, the defense establishment will h

alter its assumptions about the long and short

effectiveness of its demonstrated preference for sta

primarily technological military responses. As the w

Kosovo demonstrated, such one-dimensional resp

permit an adversary to prolong the fight, carry o

political objectives, and put stress on the “glue” that 

the opposing coalition together in the process. More 

point, military actions aimed at defeating and rem

adversarial regimes will require a more balanced

dimensional—U.S. force than current defense assum

acknowledge. Indeed, given the speed with which re

crises can unfold, and the strength an adversary can m

76
locally, a decisive force must respond as soon as it is e

that war will ensue. The length of the camp

decisiveness of the results, and degrees of collateral da

will be a function of the combined strength, balanc

tempo of the response.

A New Metric.

The force-sizing metric that supports po

engagement should, first of all, allow for a sign

resource investment in peacetime engagement. The 

a CINC’s baseline force, both stationed abroad a

CONUS, should reflect the “work load” history 

previous 5 years and expectations for the next 5 years

events of the last 5 years are any indication, 

requirements will probably increase rather than de

U.S. force requirements under a strategy of po

engagement might, for example, include cont

participation in the Balkans as part of a NATO task 

but augmented by a sub-regional engagement effort 

at building long-term cooperation under the Organi

for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the M

East, the United States might contribute element

standing United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping force a

as a larger subregional engagement effort involving k

and NATO allies. In the African subregion, U.S. 

might find themselves suddenly conducting noncomb

evacuations, disaster relief, and stability operations, 

unilaterally or in conjunction with other stakeh

nations. The point here is that historical data com

with validated political-military projections—with a 

against uncertainty—would serve as a basis for just

regional force requirements for upcoming program obj

memorandum (POM) years. 

As previously mentioned, peacetime engage

requirements do not disappear during a crisis and m

fact increase in importance. Hence, the new force

metric must include adequate forces for respondin

77
number of crises. The first step in determining wha

force is adequate for crisis response is to identi

potential number of crises that might erupt and how 

of them possess a real potential for escalation. Secon

metric must include sufficient resources to permi

forces to achieve and maintain a decisive opera

momentum. 

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer s

numbers of forces. For that, the defense community 

turn to historical data and regional political-m

projections and analytical organizations, such as the C

for Army Analysis, that can help quantify the 

requirements. For purposes of illustration, we sugge

the U.S. Army’s regional commitment to po

engagement consist of a baseline force consisting 

theater army, Army special operations forc

forward-presence corps, and a corps equivalent of r

component forces for rotational employment. This ba

force would consist of active and reserve component f

Active components, rounded out with reserve comp

elements, would conduct the daily work of peac

engagement. Concurrently, a corps equivalent of r

component forces would conduct long-range planni

full integration into the recurring work of peac

engagement. As a rule of thumb, then, reserve forces 

be allocated against the more predictable requireme

the future, and active forces against initial commit

and those most likely to change.

In a dynamic and unpredictable environment, a m

force capable of rapid and decisive response beco

prerequisite rather than an option. These forces sho

separate from those committed to peace engagemen

national command authorities should maintain a 

crisis response force with broad, tailorable capabili

intervene with full-dimensional force in cases inv

combinations of small states and the non-state 

associated with them. In addition, they should main

strategic response force capable of backing up 

78
deploying forces when the response involves m

powers and combinations of conventional 

unconventional forces.

The legacies of the Cold War continue to influenc

strategic thinking. The defense community contin

justify its strategic preferences with threat–

assessments, some of which are loosely labeled asymm

However, a threat-based strategy has serious liabili

an environment in which the next opponent or th

crisis is nearly impossible to identify. Today’s strat

might learn something from law enforcement agenci

fire fighters who do indeed attempt to track and appr

“America’s Most Wanted” criminals, but in fact 

primarily on enforcing the law and maintaining a con

of freedom and safety. Similarly, today’s strategists 

not to cease tracking specific threats entirely, but s

concentrate on how the United States can establis

maintain a long-term condition of global peac

prosperity. 

79
CHAPTER 5

RETHINKING TWO-WAR STRATEGIES

Michael E. O’Hanlon

As new administration officials focus on the 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in January 2001

should rethink the two-war construct. While some 

multi-war capability is needed, the notion of two DE

STORMs has outlived its usefulness.

It is not hard to find critics of the two-DESERT ST

approach which had its origins in efforts by Secret

Defense Richard Cheney and General Colin Pow

design a post-Cold War base force and gained 

popularity under the Clinton administration durin

Bottom-Up Review in 1993 and the last QDR in 

However, few have proposed an alternative app

Specificity is both needed and overdue. Replacin

two-DESERT STORM paradigm with a conce

force-sizing that could be called DESERT ST

plus-DESERT SHIELD-plus-Bosnia (IFOR) war

consideration. Though the term may be cumbersome; 

decade of the two-DESERT STORM jingle we 

oversimplified force planning long enough.

This new approach might allow further m

personnel reductions. But its main effects would be 

structure, not the size, of the Armed Forces. Specific

would permit a force posture more conducive to exe

the types of missions that have recently straine

military. The reasons why it would not jeopardiz

national interests are developed below.

81
Out with the Old.

The congressionally-mandated report released b

National Defense Panel (NDP), which was publis

months after the QDR report, concluded tha

two-theater war construct has been a useful mechani

determining what forces to retain as the Cold War cam

close. But it is fast becoming an inhibitor to reachi

capabilities we will need in the 2010-2020 time fram

panel regarded the two-DESERT STORM concept a

more than a bureaucratic device that was more relev

institutional requirements than to real world threat

However, the dismissive view of the NDP position 

too far. Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-Il contin

threaten U.S. interests. We cannot drop the tw

construct until convinced that any successor concep

afford adequate deterrent and defense capabilities. 

musings by the panel about the two-war framework, t

useful as cover for debating this subject, hardly for

basis of a new national military strategy.

The way in which the panel dismissed the tw

approach provided Secretary of Defense William 

with an easy comeback: which threat should be ig

Iraq or North Korea? And which national interest sho

abandoned, ensuring access to Persian Gulf 

maintaining the security of South Korea (not to m

general stability and nonproliferation in both theater

long as critics of the two-war framework propose repla

with a single war capability, they will lose the 

planning debate to such forthright rebuttals. The ab

handle overlapping crises in two or more locations is i

a sound strategic pillar on which to base U.S. forces.

In a broader sense, however, the NDP report was 

Positing two simultaneous replays of Operation DE

STORM, most likely in the Persian Gulf and Korea, s

of preparing to refight the last war. Moreov

presupposes that we would use virtually identical typ

82
numbers of forces—in each case six to seven activ

ground combat divisions including Army and Marine 

contributions, additional ground combat units fro

Reserve Components, ten wings of aircraft, four t

carrier battle groups, and other assets. Whether ope

on the open desert of Arabia or Bosnia-like terrain in 

and whether supported by relatively weak allies 

Persian Gulf or the capable forces of South Korea, pla

documents call for roughly the same cookie-cutter U.S

package: a slightly smaller version of that which 

Operation DESERT STORM.

If there were no opportunity costs to keepin

two-DESERT STORM planning framework, the Pen

would suffer little harm in retaining it. But given 

fiscal constraints in coming years, keeping a high-

insurance policy against regional conflict would m

impossible to afford other key defense investments an

would leave the Nation vulnerable on other fronts. It 

also leave us with a force structure not well suited to s

operations meaning that ongoing no-fly-zone mission

peace operations will continue to overwork our perso

The United States should change its warfig

strategy from the two-war concept to what can be ca

DESERT STORM-plus-DESERT SHIELD approa

force of 200,000 troops was sent to protect Saudi A

during Operation DESERT SHIELD in 1990. By co

Operation DESERT STORM employed 500,000 Am

troops to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Actually, it would be 

accurate, if more unwieldy, to term this appro

DESERT STORM-plus-DESERT SHIELD-plus-B

(IFOR) strategy. The latter two need not be se

simultaneous all-out conflicts because, at some point, 

case analysis must be plausible. But the requirem

maintain deterrence and presence, while wag

Operation DESERT STORM-like operation along 

something akin to Operation DESERT SHIELD, 

compelling. This type of construct would still be som

artificial, but it would encompass a fuller and broader 

83
of likely U.S. military missions than the current pla

framework.

The alternative would still require 90 to 95 perc

many active duty personnel as current plans. The Ope

DESERT STORM package would have to err on the 

caution, including a cushion of extra forces in the eve

United States and its allies encountered unexp

difficulties such as widespread enemy use of weap

mass destruction. For example, it might require a tota

Army divisions and twelve Air Force fighter wings as w

currently anticipated levels of Navy and Marine 

assets. Backup exists in the Army National Guard, 

retains almost as much of the combat force structure 

active Army but would have been expected to deplo

than 20 percent of its units into combat under the 

version of the two-DESERT STORM plan. Adding a di

for a major peace operation would leave an active duty 

perhaps 90 percent as big as current levels, with s

smaller cuts in other services.

Something Has To Give.

But in a period of fiscal surplus, why not kee

two-war capability while simply adding more for

needed? The budget situation is admittedly less star

it appeared at the time the last QDR even though rea

costs have also grown, laying claim to part o

Department of Defense (DoD) share of the budget su

Overall, rosy forecasts notwithstanding, it is doubtfu

the military will be able to retain current force str

and modernization programs. Large cuts will not be n

but trimming probably will be.

Budget plans substantially increase procureme

two reasons. First, the spending spree of the 1990s mu

because systems purchased during the Reagan e

wearing out quickly. Second, the Pentagon inten

replace existing weapons with more expensive one

F-22s, not to mention joint strike fighters and F/A-1

84
improved attack helicopters, and submarines. The 

appears to be that increasing procurement to $70 billi

year from the 2001 level of $60 billion will pay antic

bills. But neutral watchdogs like the Congressional B

Office tend to estimate steady-state price tags of $

billion for the future force in constant 2000 dollars.

2

Meanwhile, other budgetary demands are likely t

steady or rise under existing plans. Personnel spendin

no longer decline because real pay raises will more 

counter savings in personnel still to be made in th

stages of the post-Cold War drawdown. Though som

to realize large savings through privatizing and outso

as well as base closings, particularly in operation

maintenance, savings will be modest. Health 

maintenance, and base cleanup continue to exert u

pressure on the budget. Meanwhile reductions in res

development, test, and evaluation are being questio

unwise and would not save much.

The bottom line is that real defense spending will 

have to grow by at least $30 billion in the decade ah

sustain the current force and planned moderni

agenda. In other words, spending must increase fro

2000-2001 levels of around $290-320 billion or more

an available surplus nearing $2 trillion project

2001-2010 (not counting surpluses in Social Securit

Medicare), that may not seem to be an inordinate d

spending increase because it would probably tota

about 20 percent of available funds.

However, expecting the Pentagon to get $300-500 

in the next decade is highly optimistic. Out of a $1.8 t

projected surplus, $600 million would be needed to pr

existing levels of domestic services and allow spend

grow as fast as population rather than just keeping u

inflation. Because many discretionary spending pro

in transportation, education, immigration, prisons

environment are linked to the size of the populat

economy, that is a prudent assumption. Efforts to sh

85
entitlement programs in the long term, given high p

by both political parties and presidential candidate

likely to require at least $500 billion over the next d

according to the Center on Budget and Policy Prio

That leaves $700 billion for tax cuts as well as prescr

drug benefits for the elderly and education. After all 

and done, it is highly unlikely that anything close to 

trillion dollars in real funding will be added to the 

budget over the next decade.

3

The gap between planned outlays and likely re

levels for defense is likely to amount to $10-20 billi

year over the next 10 years. Part of the gap can be clo

reducing service modernization agendas. A

competitors and given advances in computers, electr

and robotics, less emphasis should be put on extr

expensive weapons platforms and more on a sy

of-systems approach. But even such a radical cha

acquisition may not solve all budgetary problems

means that a modification of the two-war strategy (a

as cutbacks in nuclear forces and a willingness to tr

ways to maintain forward presence in the Navy and M

Corps) is likely to be a budgetary imperative.

Even more important, altering the two-DE

STORM construct is necessary for the well-being 

Armed Forces. Adapting a less demanding tw

capability would allow the Army to shift personne

traditional combat roles to the types of low-densit

demand support activities that are typically overu

today’s non-warfighting missions.

A Rapidly Deployable Force.

A 200,000-strong DESERT SHIELD force wou

extremely effective. If deployed promptly, it could d

allied territory and infrastructure against virtuall

threat on the horizon today. U.S. commanders 

confident that they could defend Saudi Arabia w

DESERT SHIELD force in 1990. Today the high cal

86
personnel, combat equipment, and support capab

such as advanced reconnaissance systems would mak

a DESERT SHIELD capability significantly superior 

notional regional aggressor force specified in the Botto

Review, even though the latter force might be two to 

times larger.

The airpower component of a DESERT SHIEL

deployment, smaller but about as capable as t

DESERT STORM and larger than that deployed a

Serbia during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, 

devastate enemy forces and industrial infrastructur

ground component could conduct certain offensive 

operations. General Norman Schwarzkopf cons

evicting Iraq from Kuwait with a force of this size 

asking Washington to double the deployment (and th

before improvements made the military better arme

a decade ago).

4

The odds that such a force could deploy in time to p

significant loss of territory are reasonably good. Sin

Cold War, the Armed Forces have positioned 

equipment abroad and bought more fast sealift in th

of large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships. In addi

forces routinely deployed overseas, including 37,0

Korea, somewhat more in Japan, and half as many 

Persian Gulf, Army brigade sets of equipment are ba

Kuwait and Korea, another is afloat off Diego Garci

elements of a fourth are in Qatar. Marine br

equivalent sets are at sea at Diego Garcia and Guam 

the Mediterranean. These units could be married to 

from the United States in a week or so. Fu

improvements in both lift and prepositioning could sh

response time for other units too. Just as important, 

of precision guided munitions are now located ove

Stopping an enemy quickly and hitting it from the air 

make a major ground counteroffensive unnecessary

minimum, it should reduce its urgency.

87
Hollowing Threats.

The militaries of Iraq and North Korea re

dangerous but are markedly weaker than several yea

Moreover, neither power is likely to get much strong

time soon. This increases the odds that the United 

with a DESERT SHIELD force, and its regional par

could prevent significant loss of allied territory. 

conventional forces remain about half the size and str

of 1990. As opposed to a pre-DESERT STORM inven

5,500 tanks, Baghdad now has 2,200. Levels of light 

and armored personnel carriers are down from 7,

3,000; troop levels have declined from 1,000,000 to 400

The Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 199

although North Korean forces are poised near Seoul

capability to conduct large-scale combat opera

continues to deteriorate as worsening internal eco

conditions undermine training, readiness, and su

ment. And subsequent threat assessments reconfirm 

decline, notwithstanding some modest improve

reported in readiness levels over the last year.

To be sure, South Korea remains vulnerable to art

missiles, and special forces from the North, and Pyon

unquestionably possesses what amounts to ma

terrorist assets to target against Seoul. Any war o

peninsula would cause untold civilian deaths as w

large numbers of military casualties. But there 

difference between terrorism and an invasion.

Indeed, the Iraqi and North Korean threats 

declined enough that 200,000 to 300,000 U.S. troops 

even suffice for a counterattack. A single robust DE

STORM-like capability of closer to half a million 

should be retained out of prudence. But there is less an

reason to think such a large force would be needed eve

march on Baghdad or Pyongyang.

88
Allies Count.

Economic troubles notwithstanding, the South K

military is improving and, together with modest Am

forces in place on the peninsula, could probably with

an attack. South Korea, combined with U.S. forces 

Infantry Division and forward-based airpower could 

great damage to North Korean forces and could most 

stop an assault well short of Seoul. At a minimum

could buy enough time for U.S. reinforcements to arr

Most military casualties would be North Korea

military is more obsolescent than that of Iraq; an

invasion attempt would have to cross the most milit

swath of ground on the planet. The density of for

deployed allied forces near the demilitarized zone (D

greater than was the density of NATO troops alon

intra-German border during the Cold War. North 

would have to rely on roads and bridges that would su

destroyed in the first minutes of combat. If attackin

Seoul through the Chorwon or Munsan corridor

invaders would have to cross the Han or Imjin Rivers

freeze in the winter, but the ice might not be strong e

to support a large armored force. North Korean ch

weapons, commandos deploying through tunnels

forward-deployed dug-in artillery would complica

battle and cause many casualties. But armor would 

great difficulty breaking through allied lines and rea

Seoul.

Although the South possesses less armor tha

North, its technological edge evens the balance of 

artillery, planes, and other heavy equipment accord

some assessments. Its armor is nearly equal that o

models; for example, the K-1 tank is based on the M

uses some of its important components.

Given the higher state of military readiness of 

Korea, it is reasonable to conclude that its force

superior to those of the North. Looking at the outcom

89
range of past battles, one analyst estimated that 

readiness factors can at least double combat capa

Despite the fact that, as another analyst pointed ou

models appear to assume that South Koreans wou

fight as well as North Koreans, the former are com

soldiers and extremely well postured to stop an inva

An attacker attempting to directly penetrate de

prepared positions usually advances only a cou

kilometers a day even when not outclassed technolog

as the North Koreans certainly are. Given the letha

modern airpower and U.S. ability to quickly fly in com

reinforcements, such a slow pace of advance itself gen

to the North would be a recipe for disaster on the par

invasion force.

Pyongyang could not pull off a left hook or bypa

Korean equivalent of the Maginot Line because the de

extend across the peninsula. In addition, the allies 

overwhelming dominance in all-weather, day/night rec

sance that watches over all significant movement

chemical and biological weapons pose a special t

especially given the limited confines. U.S. forces 

increased attention to such threats, with the 

initiatives raised by former Secretary Cohen 

especially noteworthy. One could argue that Seoul s

do more as well. But it is more difficult to employ che

weapons than is commonly asserted, especially f

infantry force like North Korea’s. For example

extremely challenging for a foot soldier, suited up in 

and probably rather substandard protective gear, to 

many kilometers to take advantage of holes in enem

created by chemical attack. Nor should the North b

assume that such attack would not be countered b

nuclear retaliation. Airbursts in corridors north 

demilitarized zone would cause little harm to friendly 

while considerably affecting North Korean units. 

would also send a powerful message that America w

tolerate the employment of weapons of mass destr

against its troops or those of allies.

90
There is a final argument against the two-war cons

Just as the capabilities of South Korean forces must 

ignored, one should not overlook the likely role that B

forces would play in a conflict in the Persian Gul

United Kingdom deployed 30,000 troops during DE

STORM, was prepared to send 50,000 troops to fight a

Serbia, and tends to be aligned with the United Sta

issues of war and peace in Southwest Asia.

Without prejudging the prospects for an integ

European military force, or presuming full agre

between Washington and London in matters of defen

foreign policy, one can venture to say that Britain 

probably provide a division and several fighter squadr

any coalition led by the United States in a future con

the Persian Gulf. However, pessimistic American war 

do not now assume such contributions.

Some will see the similarity between this proposa

plan put forth as a trial balloon by Secretary of Defen

Aspin in 1993. Known as a win-hold-win strate

envisioned completing an all-out war in one theater 

simply holding the line in another. Once the first wa

won, forces would be redeployed for a counteroffens

meet the other challenge. But the caricature o

approach understated its capabilities and doomed 

rejection. Derided as win-hold-oops because of its a

risk to war plans, it never stood a chance bureaucratic

politically.

The important point is that a DESERT SHIELD 

with its overwhelming airpower and other long-range 

systems, can do more than hold a defensive line desp

limited capabilities of such a force.

The next QDR should weigh arguments like 

outlined above. The alternative is attempting to pre

simultaneous worst-case scenarios in the Persian Gu

Korea (something that the Armed Forces could no

handled even during the Cold War, given U.S. commit

in Europe) at the expense of readiness, research

91
preparing for the future. More dangerously, the m

could continue to overuse and wear out its most pr

assets and its people. That would be a far greater ris

the remote possibility of two nearly simultaneous, 

conflicts against both Iraq and North Korea.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. This chapter first appeared in Joint Force Quarterly, Sprin

pp. 11-17.It is reprinted with the permission of the author and 

Force Quarterly.

2. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that DOD 

required to spend $90 billion annually on procurement, given 

plans combined with the need to replace certain systems t

services have not yet incorporated into their formal acqu

programs. See testimony by Lane Pierrot, “Aging Military Equi

Subcommittee on Military Procurement, House Committee on 

Services, February 24, 1999.

3. Robert D. Reischauer, “The Dawning of a New Era,” in H

Aaron and Robert D. Reischauer, eds., Setting National Pr

Washington: Brookings Institution, 1999, pp. 1-12.

4. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The G

War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, Boston: Little, 

1995, pp. 123-41; Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S

in the Gulf War, Washington: Brassey’s, 1994, pp. 121-128.

5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The M

Balance 1990-1991, Oxford: Brassey’s, 1990, p. 105; The M

Balance 1997/98, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 1

Military Balance 1999/2000, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 

134.

6. Trevor N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualt

Equipment Losses in Modern War, Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 19

105-110, 148; Lawrence J. Korb, “Our Overstuffed Armed F

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 6, November/December 1995, p. 

92
CHAPTER 6

WHAT FOLLOWS THE 2 MTW FORCE

SHAPING PARADIGM?

Daniel Goure

It is fast becoming the conventional wisdom that t

Major Theater War (MTW) standard for the siz

character of U.S. Armed Forces is dead. The reasons 

for this judgment are various; there are not two enem

confront the United States; there are insufficient res

to support a force as large and complex as that requi

the standard; and, the standard does not reflect the c

realities of peacekeeping and small-scale contingenc

has been evident for several years now that U.S. m

forces are being over-stretched and over-used. It 

possible for the military to both maintain the capab

fight two nearly simultaneous MTWs and also su

contingencies from Somalia and Haiti to the Balkan

the Persian Gulf. The divisions supporting Ba

deployment have been rated as C4, or unready for wa

duty precisely because they are engaged in peaceke

duties. The present force structure lacks suff

low-density/high-demand assets to support adequate

current set of demands. The campaign in Kosovo, 

operations over northern Iraq were curtailed in or

reinforce forces conducting the air war, demonstrate

there are not enough of these units for more than one M

Despite the many criticisms of the two MTW stand

is good to remember that it was directly tied to Am

unique role and position in the world as well as to a na

security strategy which was one of managin

international system to prevent conflicts from arising

point was made rather well by Secretary of Defense W

Cohen: 

93
As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative t

the United States now and for the foreseeable future be abl

deter and defeat larger-scale, cross-border aggression in 

distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably 

concert with regional allies. Maintaining this core capabilit

central to credibly deterring opportunism—that is, to avo

situation in which an aggressor in one region might be temp

to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily commit

elsewhere—and to ensuring that the United States 

sufficient military capability to deter or defeat aggression by 

adversary that is larger, or under circumstances that are m

difficult, than expected. This is particularly important i

highly dynamic and uncertain security environment.

1

Abandoning the commitment to two MTWs do

mean rejecting the principle that the primary role o

military power is to fight and win this country’s war

what wars will these be? Some analysts have argue

the problem is not one of focusing the military on the n

fight wars but that the current standard is overly sp

focusing on a single type of conflict. One of the e

critics of the two MTW standard was the 1997 Na

Defense Panel (NDP). The NDP characterized th

MTW construct as “a force sizing function and 

strategy.” The NDP went on to warn that should one 

major contingencies disappear, particularly in the ab

of an alternative strategy, that “a strong demand wo

created for deep and unwise cuts in force structur

personnel.”

2

The simple solution, to trim the force structure 

edges, is one that would fall into the trap pointed out 

NDP. This would produce a “one and a half MTW” sta

or, perhaps, a “one MTW plus two or three smalle

contingencies.” Such an approach would not chan

basic strategic focus of U.S. national security strateg

force development, but could reduce the carrying co

what some critics view as an overly large, too exp

force posture. However, it would also reduce any cushi

U.S. military would have in the event that the one MT

larger or more difficult than expected. Military pla

94
would have a natural bias towards hedging on the cha

of the one MTW force. A single MTW against a more 

adversary could require nearly as large a force struct

has been deemed necessary at present to meet the can

two MTW threat.

In addition, the size and composition of the presen

is driven as much by peacetime demands as by war fi

requirements. Former Chief of Naval Operations Ad

Johnson testified recently that peacetime deplo

requirements were the true sizing metric for the Na

fact, a recent Navy force structure study argued tha

surface combatants were required to meet pro

operational tempo (OPTEMPO). The Air Force’s c

force structure problems, particularly for tan

transports, and low-density/high demand assets, is 

function of the increased peacetime OPTEMPO

possible to change from the two MTW standa

something ostensibly less stressing and not shave mu

the force.

But, if the two MTW standard is dead, what shou

replace it? The most likely solution, noted above, is fa

satisfying. Moreover, the “two MTWs Lite“ approach 

only addresses the question “How much is enough?” 

simple alternatives do not address the overriding que

“What strategy is the new force-sizing paradigm inten

support?” 

The majority of discussions of alternatives to th

MTW standard have focused on a very narrow set of po

assumptions. They would change the emphasis in 

planning, but few of the basic assumptions. They ten

threat-driven, or in some cases lack of threat d

Nevertheless, they provide no conceptual alternatives 

current paradigm, merely a different way of assessin

much is enough.

Perhaps it is would be more useful to defin

principles that should animate the search for an alter

formulation. There are a number of potential alter

95
approaches for defining both the size and quality of a 

force posture. They can be classified generally as 

top-down or bottom-up. The former consists of appro

that are derived from alternative strategic con

Different ways of defining national interests, the 

military force in security policy, and the relatio

between U.S. security and that of others, could res

distinct and different requirements for military force

latter group would be those approaches based less o

questions as what we might to fight about and a

whom and look instead to changes in the mean

methods of warfare to build alternative force str

paradigms.

Top-down Approaches.

The first alternative strategic paradigm shift, one 

would most significantly shift force planning away fro

current war fighting model, would be one focus

collective security. This approach would exten

argument that ours is a time without the threat of c

between the major powers. The source of the majo

significant wars of the last 500 years, European inter

politics, has been tamed by the twin forces of m

dependence on the United States and economic integr

War, according to this view, is no longer an option be

major powers. The forces for change in the 21st ce

world, catalogued in Thomas Friedman’s book, The 

and the Olive Tree, which include globalization, g

access to media, and improved education, to name 

important variables, will reduce the economic, politic

social incentives to engage in major conflicts. To these 

could be added the effect of changing demographics

first world is aging rapidly. Older populations are less 

to make war. The third world, where the bulk 

population growth is occurring, will be overwhelmed 

problems of modernization, and will have little in the 

resources, human or capital, to devote to se

war-making capabilities.

96
The uses for military force would be signifi

restricted under this paradigm. The role of force woul

create and maintain stability. Shaping missions 

become the first priority. Crisis response, incl

responding to humanitarian events, so-called failed s

and the possible rise of hostile non-state forces su

terrorist organizations would be the second pri

Monitoring would become the third priority role. 

There would be a role for traditional forces to suppo

crisis response mission. Such a force could refle

European Union’s concept for its own rapid re

capability. The United States would deploy a rapid-re

corps, plus supporting air and ground elements. The b

U.S. forces would focus on the shaping and moni

missions. They would be light forces, with an increase 

number, and even types, of so-called low-density/high

elements. 

A very different force alternative would be create

paradigm that emphasized continuing the curren

global preeminence. Some have characterized 

approach as “empire maintenance.”

3

 This concept 

view major inter-state conflict as unlikely. The U

States would be required to identify a security area in 

it would apply the principles of empire manageme

would be expected that other powers would do s

Overall stability would come through a concert of 

major powers. The principal sources of danger wo

from local conflicts that got out of hand and from 

threats to the “imperial order." However, conflicts o

the boundaries of the empire, would not be a U.S. conc

this paradigm. The United States would also have 

rather circumspect in its judgments of the ways other 

powers manage their imperial spaces. The United 

reaction to the Russian war in Chechnya suggest

elements of this model already are in place.

This model would differ from classic balance of p

however. It assumes that the goal of all the powers is s

97
stability. As a result, the role of military power would 

deterrence of other powers, but rather the prevent

control of local conflicts. Forces would need to be fo

deployed, perhaps on the model of the Roman le

serving both a constabulary role and as a deterr

would-be local aggressors. It could be argued that th

military presence in Europe is operating according 

model.

This paradigm could suggest a U.S. force str

oriented around a set of forward-deployed joint task 

each capable of addressing the threats in their own a

concern. There would be a small, strategically-depl

reserve capability. Greater reliance would be p

imperial auxiliaries—that is, allies. Local allies woul

supplement U.S. capabilities and undertake indepe

missions. U.S. forward-deployed forces might be or

around high-end military capabilities, while allies pr

other, unique capabilities.

A third model would be that of classic Realpolitik. 

the times and technology change, the nature of politic

not. Nations will still employ military power and eng

conflicts, in pursuit of their political goals. This model 

assume that the danger of major conflict betwee

powers continues to exist. It might be argued tha

danger is likely to grow as new power centers emerg

United States “unipolar” moment passes, and n

pursue their particular and individual interests. 

great and emerging powers, Russia, China, Japan, 

the EU, would be the principal focus of strategic con

Conflicts would be caused mainly by the efforts of 

nations either to increase or resist erosion of their re

power position vis-à-vis other powers. The sourc

particular conflict could be political, econom

geographic in character.

The Realpolitik paradigm would not assume a ret

a Cold War-like environment. Rather, it would be mu

the world between the last quarter of the 19th centu

98
the first decade of the 20th century. The focus of se

concerns in this paradigm would be the relative 

relationships of the major powers on the Eur

landmass. That is the region in which all the powers

the United States, reside. Alliance relationships 

clearly become of greater significance in this enviro

than has been the case since the end of the Cold 

Specifically, this environment could lead t

re-establishment of NATO as the essential coll

defense organization for the West. The power str

would occur along the margins, in the spaces between 

powers. Regions of concern would include the Cau

Central Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe

possibly the Koreas.

It is not clear that even a robust two MTW sta

would be sufficient in this environment. The purpose 

forces would be to deter major conventional war a

prevent escalation to nuclear use. Forces would be de

to fight and win large-scale conventional conflicts. Pla

would have to consider the idea of protracted con

Significant reserve capabilities would be required. 

The role of strategic forces would have to be reth

Their use could be restricted to limiting the scal

destructiveness of future conflicts. In effect, strategic 

would be designed to keep conflicts between the 

powers limited. Strategic defenses could well become 

investment. Reductions in strategic nuclear forces 

still proceed, although tactical nuclear weapons 

probably need to be reintroduced into the arsenal. 

The last strategic paradigm could be termed “Def

Independence.” The central assumptions of this par

are: that the United States faces no peer competit

significant regional adversaries, that the United 

continues to be primus inter pares in the global eco

and that domestic sentiment tends to move the U

States away from ideas of shaping environment

humanitarian responsibilities in areas not of vital in

99
Regional allies and coalitions take on the responsibili

manage local instabilities. The most significant se

problem for the United States is to deny any potential 

state the ability to upset the stability or threaten the U

States.

A paradigm based on “Defensive Independence” 

focus security policy on a limited number of regions or 

of vital interest. So long as they were not under thre

United States would remain essentially aloof from 

security issues. In addition, the United States 

require that the homeland be secured against t

Defensive, vice offensive, measures would be preferre

means of protecting national security. Defense policy 

seek to deny potential adversaries the means to th

access to regions and states of interest, or to threat

homeland. 

The critical defense policy concerns under this par

would be continuity of U.S. access to those region

states of interest, denial of direct attack options on 

regions and states by rogues, and ensuring the protec

the homeland. Naval forces and long-range 

capabilities would hold the dominant place in the 

structure to support this paradigm. The United 

could seek to rely more heavily than at present on n

weapons to deter threats to vital interests. A st

emphasis on strategic defenses would also be warran

Bottom-up Approaches.

The bottom-up approaches would take as give

current security environment and the present U.S. rol

Alternative paradigms would be based on the ways 

could be built to achieve essential core objectives, w

the need to define either future war waging requireme

conflict scenarios. As a result, bottom-up approache

relatively little to say about alternative force 

concepts. 

100
The first of the bottom-up paradigm might be t

“Technology-Driven.” A “Technology-Driven” par

would seek to make use of the so-called Revolut

Military Affairs (RMA). In its simplest incarnation

paradigm would assume that military superiority wo

conferred in that nation which most rapidly identifie

best exploited the technologies at the core of the RMA

military strategy, doctrine, and force shaping criteria 

be based on the exploitation of technologies in whi

United States holds an asymmetric advantage 

potential adversaries. The United States would seek t

the types of conflicts or in ways that reflecte

exploitation of technological advantages. In theory

approach would require a focus in force plannin

acquisition on the maintenance of high-end co

capabilities.

An example of an attempt to define a “Techn

Driven” paradigm is the Information Warfare (IW) d

of the early and mid 1990s. In these debates, propone

the IW school suggested that a new mode of warfar

emerging based on the ability to control and mani

information. So-called kinetic warfare, the use of bom

bullets, was viewed as an increasingly antiq

capability. The “Technology-Driven” paradigm loo

transcendent warfare models, technologies tha

revolutionary not simply at the level of military forc

doctrine, but at the operational and strategic level.

Arguably, a “Technology-Driven” paradigm woul

to an emphasis on aerospace and information capabili

force design. There is a clear U.S. military advant

these areas. Each of the Services is intensifyi

investments in advanced aerospace/IT capabilities

costs involved in pursuing such an option would be hig

require an “unbalancing” of the force structure rela

the current posture.

It must be admitted that a “Technology-D

paradigm based on an advantage in aerospace capab

101
would not be able to deal fully with the entire ra

security problems that currently confront defense pla

The choice of an aerospace-centered focus for d

planning and force shaping would require heavier re

on allies to fill capability gaps, specifically in ground 

created by the U.S. force shaping choice.

A second bottom-up approach could be c

“Capabilities-Driven.” This paradigm would not us

particular set of scenarios to determine force sizin

shaping goals, but define a set of overarching capab

that would be the basis for force design. Desired capab

could be defined relative to threat characteristics or 

basis of canonical objectives. For example, a d

capability might be to find and destroy a certain num

mobile targets in a given time period. Another migh

deploy to a point at a set distance from home base, a f

a definitive size and character.

An example of a “Capabilities-Driven" paradigm 

be ability to inflict “shock and awe” on any pot

adversary. The shock and awe concept proposes to 

U.S. military strategy and war fighting capabilities 

ability to disorient both physically and menta

adversary through the exploitation of advanced tech

and new operational concepts. In theory, ph

destruction and casualties could be minimized b

impact of shock. The awe inspired by such a cap

would be the basis for deterrence and dissuasion.

A capabilities-based approach to force planning 

lend itself to a resolution of long-standing role

missions issues. The future force would be designed t

specified requirements in capability categories (e.g., c

of airspace, deep strikes, battlefield interdiction, clo

support, etc.). Competing capabilities could be eva

against one another for that mission.

102
Concluding Thoughts.

Undoubtedly, there are innumerable, clever w

recast the current two MTW paradigm to something 

slightly smaller, not quite as old, and, hopefully

expensive. None of these constitutes a new paradigm

allow the Bush administration to continue on the c

path in force shaping. A different paradigm must star

a different strategic perspective on the nation’s na

security objectives and on the role of military pow

meeting them. Anything else amounts to rearrangi

deck chairs on the Titanic.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, The Repor

Quadrennial Defense Review,Washington, DC: Department of D

May 1997, p. 8.

2. Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming D

National Security in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Depart

Defense, December 1997, p. 23.

3. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “The Price of the Pax American

Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2000, p. 26.

103
CHAPTER 7

WHY THE 2 MTW MUST GO

1

Michael Casey

At the beginning of the 21st century, the United 

finds itself standing, almost by accident, in a preem

position in a world wracked with uncertainty, whe

only assurance is that the global situation will conti

change. America faces both a great opportunity and a 

danger: the opportunity that the world could be “shap

encouraged to become more democratic and peacefu

efforts to encourage such fail, the danger of a world 

with conflict, existentially-threatening transna

threats, and possibly the rise of a country or countries 

desire to challenge, eliminate, or replace the United S

In the hopes of encouraging the opportunity while av

the danger, the United States has adopted what can b

described as a hedge military strategy, usually refer

as “Shape, Respond, Prepare.” This strategy has, 

base, the intention of providing stability througho

world today while preparing for worst-case scenarios 

future.

There is a fundamental internal conflict to this st

which must constantly be reevaluated and balanced

is, how much emphasis should be focused on each 

various elements? Currently the U.S. defense esta

ment feels that it must maintain sufficient forces to 

and win two near-simultaneous major theater wars (

major regional contingencies). This chapter will argu

this, referred to as the “2 MRC” force-sizing paradigm

inappropriate model for the current U.S. strategy a

badly linked to real world threats, is largely unaffor

and short changes the future. 

105
With the collapse of the Soviet threat to Europe, de

of force planning constructs were suddenly obs

Casting about for a replacement by which to me

needed military forces, the Bush administratio

Congress, as described by Eliot Cohen,

2

 reduced m

forces by 30 percent while maintaining a high oper

tempo and research and development budgets, but 

reducing procurement rates. Intended as cautious po

tide the nation over until it was fully clear that the 

threat was truly gone, the Base Force was a rational h

Following the Gulf War, Secretary Les Aspin of th

Clinton administration formalized Pentagon think

evolving the capabilities-based force of the Base Forc

one capable of facing two, relatively well-defined thre

near-simultaneous major regional conflicts. I

envisioned that these conflicts would require rough

same forces as the just-fought Gulf War, only dou

Several years later, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense R

(QDR) accepted this two MRC model as the curren

sizing criteria.

It should be no surprise that the two MRC paradig

been heavily criticized for making insufficient chan

America’s military. Eliot Cohen has commented that

two MTW strategy requires almost the same force str

as did the Base Force; a dispassionate observer wo

hard pressed to see much difference between the 

Retired General Anthony Zinni, USMC referred 

current force structure as, “a mini-version of the Col

force.” Going further, he said, “Let’s admit it—

screwed up again.”

5

 Even Congress has gotten in on t

as stated by the House Appropriations Committee, 

now all too apparent that the military services are n

properly reconfigured from their old ‘Cold 

orientation.”

6

 From these criticisms, if nothing els

readily apparent that whatever the merits of the inte

behind the evolution to the two MRC force, the ch

simply have not gone far enough.

106
It may well have been true, as Department of D

(DoD) planners feared at the beginning of the decad

the United States could potentially face two countrie

simultaneously attempted to invade their neighbor

classic combined arms, armor heavy forces. Certai

the wake of the Gulf War when the doctrine wa

publicly outlined and the North Koreans were busy ra

sabers, this was a potential and real fear. However, 

year 2000, and for the likely foreseeable future

scenario has become less likely. U.S. forces have b

more advanced and capable, although stretche

overworked, while the adversaries against whom the 2 

has been judged have become increasingly weak and

least one case and possibly two, less politically motiv

Iraq’s forces have never been truly rebuilt after th

War, the embargo has had a severely detrimental eff

the attempts which they have made to build stocks 

materiel, and some observers have even commente

the Iraqi military is roughly half the size it was p

1990. North Korea for its part has suffered the loss 

prime military backer, the Soviet Union, at least a de

in overt support from China, a devastating famin

severe economic hardship. Its military, while l

opaque to the outside world, likely has been affected b

even if not as severely as civilian North Kor

Additionally, the South Korean forces have, for thei

increasingly become more capable and technolog

advanced. North Korean leaders have even begun m

noises about rapprochement with South Korea an

United States. While it is possible that this is sim

diplomatic ploy, if real it is not the kind of move a co

with overwhelming military superiority typically ma

third country, Iran, sometimes mentioned as a pot

MRC, has plenty of its own problems. Its militar

devastated by the Iran-Iraq war and has never 

rebuilt. It has a veritable cornucopia of old U.S

Russian military equipment that has reached the p

obsolescence where it would serve adequately onl

107
museum. Additionally, its revolutionary Isl

government has been defeated in election after electi

reformer president has made diplomatic outreaches 

West, and it has its own economic problems. While cer

still capable of doing damage to neighbors or oil shi

Iran looks to lack the military capability to seriously 

anyone but Iraq. 

All three of the countries mentioned above have

certainly true and will be brought up later, substa

increased their capability to carry out asymmetric at

but not one of them is truly as great a threat for a 

border invasion as they were 10 years ago. These fact

not gone unnoticed by military and political comment

John Troxell in Force Planning in an Era of Uncer

comments, “The Iraq and North Korean scenarios r

the most demanding, but in each case, threat capab

declining.”

7

 Secretary Cohen himself said, “Sa

Hussein is probably at half the strength he was prior 

Persian Gulf war.”

8

 Perhaps summing up the dis

between U.S. conventional forces and our pot

adversaries, Jeffrey Record says, “How dumb wou

enemy have to be to take on the United States 

conventional level of warfare?”

9

The 2 MRC assumptions, beyond the basic one th

enemies might simultaneously attempt to commit m

suicide by attacking U.S. allies with a classic com

arms force, are also certainly unrealistic. First, the 2 

defines both scenarios as requiring an approxim

DESERT STORM sized force—five divisions or so, s

air wings, three to six carriers, etc. Given the re

decline in potential adversaries’ military strengt

increases in U.S. allies military strength, not to m

U.S. military capability, this is unrealistic on the fac

Secondly, for some reason planners have chosen the 

border invasion scenario with combined arms as the 

stressing, even though it is easily apparent that this 

so. Far more stressing, for example, would be a 

Korean chemical and biological attack delivered 

108
missiles. Not only would this be devastating, but if 

and airfields were targeted too, U.S. forces wou

unlikely to even be able to make it in the theater q

without substantial losses. North Korea’s missile cap

is, after all, at least the public threat for which the U

States requires a national missile defense. An atta

Taiwan by China could be far more stressing for th

Navy than any Operation DESERT STORM scenario

a Kosovo II, if repeated using air-only forces, would 

stress the U.S. Air Force more than “Son of Desert St

The United States has, after all, been flying ove

bombing Iraq for 10 years without a loss, and it is un

that doing so en masse would be harder than a wa

unprepared bases a long way from the front aga

dispersed, light force using innovative tactics. Third

MRC force has, as too many commentators to list 

noted, not provided the organization and forces the U

States requires for the most common mission whi

military undertakes, that of the SSC—Small

Contingency, sometimes referred to as “nation-buil

Fourth, the 2 MRC force construct has not provid

United States with those forces which can truly def

and its allies against what are referred to as “asym

attacks”: terrorism, WMD, missile strikes, com

warfare, etc. Until the cross border invasion fo

removed, it is unlikely to do so.

Maintaining the 2 MRC force and keeping the re

forces at a high level of readiness, even without addr

the future threats mentioned above and dealt with 

below, is expensive and will likely require relatively 

investments in the future. The Congressional Budget 

has concluded that merely sustaining the current 

would cost about $50 billion more than the United 

currently spends on defense.

10

 Various other commen

have concluded that it would require between $25 

and $100 billion more per year. Commandant of the M

Corps General Jones has proposed that annual d

spending rise to above 4 percent of Gross Domestic P

109
per year, about a $100 billion increase.

11

 Air Force Sec

Whit Peters has also been quoted as calling for increa

$100 billion to the military budget.

12

Potentially worse than the amounts required to s

maintain the 2 MRC force, is the opportunity cost pre

of that force. There seems to be little doubt that the n

keep the force up to par to be able to “respond” is squ

out the investment needed to “prepare now.” Time 

time, planned increases in modernization accounts 

been pushed back due to shortages in readiness acc

Pay increases and military health care accounts 

attracted the healthiest share of recent defense b

increases. As General Jones puts it, “We are, in es

continuing to maintain our current status at the expe

future readiness.”

13

 The future readiness to which G

Jones was referring will only come about if the U.S.m

is modernized, to include procuring new platform

systems to replace those currently wearing out.

There is relatively little dispute, in addition, th

United States does, in fact, need to “prepare now.” 

same CBO publication which outlined the $50 

shortfall in defense spending, the authors note tha

military leaders have noted, however, the most worr

threats to U.S. interests may not be the conventional 

of foreign powers. Instead, so-called unconventional t

to the United States and to U.S. forces may pose g

dangers.” They further went on to note that, “Many 

same regional powers that the United States pla

worry about facing in conflicts with conventional we

also have NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] weap

The National Defense Panel has noted, “. . . our c

course is unlikely to produce the military capab

necessary to meet the range of challenges we fore

2010-2020.”

15

 The Center for Strategic and Bud

Assessments, as well as the Pentagon’s own Office 

Assessment, have both issued literally more stateme

this subject than can be mentioned. Suffice it to say, a

no observer of security affairs believes that the thre

110
2010 or 2020 will be those which are faced today o

faced when the 2 MRC force shaping paradigm was ad

And, as an almost equal number of observers have 

current readiness demands are squeezing out the eff

prepare for these future threats.

The lack of ability to keep up current forces 

addressing shortages in the capabilities presented 

two MRC force could probably be easily fixed if the U

States could resort to its traditional tactic of thr

money at a problem until it goes away. Unfortunatel

is probably not possible, and is certainly unlikely. The 

ballyhooed surplus is, at current rates of spendin

desired tax cuts, unlikely to ever materialize on an

approaching the scale mentioned in press report

seemingly accepted throughout Washington. For exa

the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities has conc

only about $400 billion of the surplus will likely be ava

for new tax and spending programs, not $1.9 trillion.

Brookings Institution, calculating the available s

slightly differently, concludes that only $350 billion w

available.

17

 And both of these estimates do not tak

account popular initiatives such as reducing the ma

tax penalty, a Medicare drug plan, education refo

pension reform, which would likely come before subst

increases to the military budget were considered.

It is also interesting to note that neither presid

candidate proposed increasing military spending b

about $10 billion per year. John Kreul commented, “. 

presidential candidates already have committed most 

budget surplus to other areas. . .”

18

 Similarly, Robert

said, “Boosting the Pentagon budget by that much 

billion a year] would require both candidates to re

domestic programs.”

19

 Congress too, is unlikely 

enthusiastic about huge military budget increase

threaten domestic priorities and tax cuts. The c

budget resolution shows the 050 Defense account g

$307.3 billion in FY01 and $332.5 billion in FY05.

20

 

inflation, this is not a huge increase, even accounting 

111
reality that the FY01 budget resolution has been vi

repeatedly. Over the past few years, Congress h

added huge amounts to the defense budget despite rep

pleas from military commanders, and that which ha

added has frequently gone to what many observers r

as “pork.” Kori Schake noted,

. . . the $30 billion that have been added since fiscal year 199

the defense budget are not predominantly helpful to 

national interest or to carrying out our defense policy. T

billion of that alone is military construction when we need t

shutting unused bases, not adding on.

21

Nor are huge increases likely in the future. John Lu

quotes Senator Pete Domenici, Chairman of the S

Budget Committee, referring to the CBO study 

concluded that $50 billion per year was requir

maintain current capabilities, “It doesn’t necessarily 

the military should simply get the extra money," he a

“Budget gaps such as this have been a reality sin

1970s,” he said.

22

The force in existence under the 2 MRC policy 

developing the capabilities the United States will n

meet future threats, is expensive and unlikely to r

much fiscal relief, and is designed around an uncerta

increasingly unrealistic threat. So, what should repl

The answers are, unfortunately, not as clear cut 

relatively simplistic 2 MRC paradigm and will r

substantial willingness to adapt to changing situati

the future. First, DoD needs to substantially expa

planning scenarios, particularly with an eye towar

“shape” and “respond” strategy elements and ada

current force to better, or at least more realistically

with them. There needs to be an admission that the

not all require cookie-cutter copies of the DESERT ST

force. In addition to the Iraq and North Korea threat

should look, for example, at a Chinese invasion of Ta

at an Iranian attempt to shut down shipping in the P

Gulf, at potential conflicts in the Balkans, at regiona

112
in the Caucasus regions, a breakdown, including low 

war and sniping at shipping in Indonesia, etc. All of 

would require not only different forces than the c

scenarios, but may well require realignment of c

basing for the shaping function. 

For example, in the Iraq scenario, the United 

currently keeps an armored brigade in Kuwait 9 mon

so out of the year, as well as composite air wings in 

Arabia and Turkey. It may be beneficial, to deter I

keep an armored brigade in theater year round, partic

one shaped for independent action if necessary. It 

also be beneficial to look at the possibility of statio

similar brigade in Eastern Turkey (which would 

present the opportunity to have some kind of land forc

to respond in the Caucasus if necessary), at least part 

year. This, combined with the air assets in theater, 

offer a substantial deterrent capability, particula

combined with a missile heavy component of some 

probably naval based. The Navy needs to admit that 

is relatively little role for carrier forces in a re

situation in this region. During the Gulf War, three ca

were present, none got closer than 300 miles or so to 

and naval air forces, for all their contributions, h

relied on Air Force refueling. Additionally, the trad

role of a carrier, responding to a threat where the U

States has no assets or cannot build up assets quic

moot in this context—a substantial land and air fo

already in theater. It would be better to save a carr

some other role and to supplement U.S. efforts in the 

with missile shooters.

Similarly, in Korea, if war breaks out there is 

likelihood of a fast reinforcement of U.S. forces 

excepting carrier-based air power and naval m

attacks. North Korea would simply have to be bl

insane to not take steps to stop the United States 

rapidly reinforcing South Korea. Their likely st

would be to try to end the war rapidly, and U.S. 

should be aligned to respond to this. The two Army br

113
in Korea would probably have to be able to operate on 

own for some time and should be reconfigure

independent action. These would present th

commanders with an offensive capability and would a

considerable North Korean attention and resources, 

presenting a substantial deterrent. Similarly, it m

beneficial to keep more carriers in the region—the one 

up from duty in the Persian Gulf would be ava

Repositioning a carrier to the Pacific to enable 

coverage would also allow for this force to be use

Chinese invasion of Taiwan if it was deemed necess

Washington.

Second, DoD needs to take a serious look at h

organizational structures are stressing the force. For 

the Navy and Marine Corps have had a rotationa

capable of keeping a substantial number of ships 

without breaking the remaining force. The Air For

recently moved to the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) 

to do much the same thing. Only the Army does not p

change to allow for forces designed for rotational duty

decision should be reexamined. Douglas MacGregor

famous book, Breaking the Phalanx, proposed m

towards smaller, brigade-sized units. The Army has c

to not do this, but it is a decision that should lik

revisited. Divisions may be fine for fighting Iraq 

desert or the Soviet Union in Germany, but stickin

the divisional structure has led to a high rate of deplo

for headquarters units in SSCs as well as high deman

density units like civil affairs. A combined arms b

type structure could solve many of these proble

essentially creating many more units capable of cond

a Kosovo or Bosnia type mission without augment

This would reduce the personnel tempo felt by 

soldiers. This is the kind of analysis that DoD an

services need to be exploring, even if it eventually do

pan out.

Third, DoD needs to look to the kind of f

capabilities, and efforts needed for the future and 

114
serious threats. Professor Ashton Carter of Ha

discusses what he calls “A-list” threats. These are th

Cold War scale, those which threaten the existence 

United States. None of the threats on Professor C

list, a Russian collapse similar to Weimar Germany, R

losing control over its arsenal of weapons of 

destruction, a truly hostile China, massive prolifera

weapons of mass destruction among many nation

catastrophic terrorism on U.S. territory,

23

 are trad

conventional military threats save possibly the h

China one. Yet the sheer scope and potential damage 

one of them demands that DoD pay much closer atten

them, and, where appropriate, augment capabilit

forces that can preclude such threats or, in the wors

scenarios, help mitigate them. It should be noted th

all the potential damage of a Iraqi takeover of Kuwa

North Korean conquest of South Korea, none of the c

threat scenarios for which the U.S. military is pre

would come anywhere close to the damage caused b

one of Professor Carter’s nightmares. Given this, it 

seem to make sense that if risk has to be taken, it be 

more among the “B-list” threats than the “A-list.”

Fourth, DoD must engage in a relatively large ef

experimentation. While any number of observers 

commented on the need for transformation, it is not 

clear what precisely the U.S. military shou

transforming into. There are threats and strategies 

the U.S. military must, in the future, be able to co

However, as another, smaller, group of writers 

mentioned, it is vastly important that the United Sta

transformation right, rather than simply transform 

own sake. It would, after all, do little good to transfor

the modern equivalent of the 1939 French Army. 

argues for a substantial effort of experimentation. 

through the new Joint Forces Command and servic

efforts, should be encouraged, or if necessary forced, 

new platforms, systems, organizations, tactics

doctrine. Most of these efforts will not work. All of the

115
teach some lesson and will be valuable for that. As par

ongoing experimentation effort, DoD needs to 

purchasing “lock-in systems,” those which, due to hig

large numbers, and/or long life spans, would essential

the United States into one organization structure, do

or platform. While some replacement is vital due t

equipment, a mid-term strategy for the rest might 

upgrade or extend service life where possible, rathe

replace wholesale. Similarly, an ongoing, high-int

effort in data links and communications would like

high dividends in the future by enabling more “lever

of various assets, sensors, etc. As part o

experimentation, DoD will have to acquire small batc

some systems with which to experiment and “play

example might be the converted Trident “SS

sometimes mentioned, which would give a shor

military capability as well as serve as surrogates for 

systems in experimentation efforts. Given the long

budget crunch facing DoD, it is also going to be necess

various programs to compete with one another

example, some outside DoD have suggested that the 

Special Forces (JSF) program be “shifted to the rig

delayed several years. This could be combined 

experimentation efforts in Unmanned Combat 

Vehicles (UCAVs) and the systems, possibly along 

other air power platforms such as long-range bom

could be placed in competition to see which has th

long-term benefit for the United States. DoD is 

unlikely to be able to afford all of its planned program

something will have to give. Competition w

experimentation seems likely to result in incr

capability to some extent while reducing procuremen

in the long term.

Finally, given the budget forecasts, DoD is going t

to resize the force, if only to save money. Howe

combined with the experimentation efforts listed abov

can also provide an opportunity to kick loose new 

within the military. In the Navy, for example, carrie

116
in some cases, as briefly mentioned above, declin

utility. Yet the Navy continues to keep carriers on sta

the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Pacific. 

three, only the Pacific makes sense. Bot

Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf host subst

U.S. Air Force and Army forces. Shifting some of 

carriers to the Pacific Ocean for better coverage there 

retiring two or so without replacing them would fr

substantial resources for the pursuit of other systems 

may be better suited for the future, such as the 

concept or the “Street Fighter” idea. The Army Na

Guard will also have to be rationalized. Currentl

Guard maintains eight divisions which have no wa

mission. Retiring two of these would allow the res

dollars to be put into increasing the readiness of the 

six, which would allow them to serve as h

reinforcements in time of war, particularly if the activ

Army trends more towards “medium weight” form

and/or experiments with brigade-based forces. It mi

worth examining why the Marines maintain 20,000 m

Okinawa, but only have three transport ships there. 

those numbers has to give; the occupation of Japan is 

While it is useful to station forces there, it is only usefu

so if they can respond to a threat, which is unlik

materialize on an outlying Japanese island. Eith

number of transport ships should be increased, or

likely, some or all of the Marines should be pulled 

Okinawa and put back into the fleet. Combined with 

likely slight increase, $10 billion or so, in the DoD b

and necessary efforts to close unneeded bases an

efficiencies in DoD’s support organizations, such resi

military forces may free up enough money to allevia

budget crunch while simultaneously offerin

opportunity to experiment to develop forces better sui

future threats.

In summation, DoD can no longer afford to main

force sizing model which short changes the futu

unaffordable, and is not clearly aligned with current 

117
to either shape or respond to current threats. The upc

Quadrennial Defense Review will offer a clear oppor

to eliminate the 2 MRC model and to move to one base

more diverse threat universe, a realistic budget en

ment, and which provides opportunities to experim

come up with solutions for future threats. While the 2 

may have served a useful purpose, that is over, and it 

to balance all the elements of U.S. national m

strategy—“Shape, Respond, Prepare”—not emphasiz

“Respond” at the expense of the other two.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. This chapter is the result of the author’s own thought proc

should not be taken to be representative of the views of his em

other Congressional staff, or the Congress as a whole.

2. Eliot A. Cohen, “Defending America in the Twenty-first Ce

Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, p. 42.

3. For more detail, see John. F. Troxell, Force Planning in a

Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework, Carlis

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Septem

1997, especially pp. 9-13.

4. Cohen, p. 43.

5. General Anthony A. Zinni, “A Commander’s Reflections,

2000, reprinted at http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Arti

prozinni.htm.

6. House Appropriations Committee, Department of 

Appropriations Bill, 2000: Report of the Committee on Appropr

H.Rpt. 106-244, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

1999, p. 11.

7. Troxell, p. 30.

8. Testimony before the House National Security Committ

21, 1997. House National Security Committee, The Quad

Defense Review, H.N.S.C. No. 105-14, Washington, DC

Government Printing Office, 1997, p. 70.

118
9. Jeffrey Record, “America’s Hollow Statecraft: Sourc

Consequences,” Strategic Review, Fall 2000, p. 50.

10. Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for D

Maintaining Today’s Forces, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Office, September 2000, p. XI.

11. From Michael O’Hanlon, “How Much Money is Eno

Defense?" Los Angeles Times, September 25, 2000. Found on Int

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2000/e20000926defense.htm.

12. Reuters News Service, “Official: Military Budget Need

$100 Billion,” Washington Times, October 27, 2000, p. 13.

13. General James L. Jones, Written Testimony before the 

Armed Services Committee, September 27, 2000, p. 5.

14. Congressional Budget Office, p. 3.

15. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: N

Security in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Department of D

1997, p. 21.

16. James Horney and Robert Greenstein, “How Much 

Enlarged Surplus is Available for Tax and Program Initia

Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 

p. 1.

17. Alan J. Auerbach and William G. Gale, “How Big 

Prospective Budget Surplus?,” Washington, DC: The Bro

Institution, September 2000, p. 1.

18. John Kreul, “Son of QDR: Prospects for the Army,” N

Security Watch, Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Ass

of the United States Army, July 15, 2000, p. 3.

19. Roberto Suro, “Shelton To Present Military Choic

Washington Post, September 27, 2000, p. 21.

20. Committee on the Budget, Concurrent Resolution 

Budget—Fiscal Year 2001, H.Rpt. 106-530, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 34.

21. Kori Schake, “Balancing Commitments and Capabilit

After Kosovo: Papers from a Capitol Hill Seminar, Lucy Webs

New York, NY: Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, 1999, p. 

119
22. John J. Lumpkin, “Military Doctrine Tackled,” Albuq

Journal, October 25, 2000, p. 1.

23. Ashton B. Carter, Written Testimony, “The Pe

Complacency: Adapting U.S. Defense to Future Needs,” subm

the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the 

States Senate, March 21, 2000, p. 4.

120
CHAPTER 8

MULTI-METRIC FORCE SIZING

Ian Roxborough

America’s armed forces are tasked to fight and w

nation’s wars. Warfighting is their core competency. 

is, moreover, a clear vision of what the current Am

way of war entails. It is embodied in Joint Vision 201

supporting documents, and in the canonical scena

halting cross-border aggression by armored forces

focus on the core competency provides a clear se

purpose and a clear metric for force sizing exercise

two-major theater war (MTW) standard. Unfortunate

tends to produce a one-size-fits-all approach wh

inappropriate for the current strategic situation

chapter argues that the United States should ident

basic tasks required of its armed forces in the c

strategic situation and design forces accordingly. The 

should be a set of organizations with differing 

competencies, and different metrics for force sizing.

Current U.S. defense planning treats most m

forces as all-purpose forces (capable of executing a 

range of missions) but basically designs those m

forces to fight a specific kind of war (cross-border ar

aggression.) Since the tasks of the military are broade

warfighting, and since wars vary greatly in their n

this type approach has serious drawbacks. (Some 

military forces are, of course, tailor-made for part

kinds of operations. Special Forces and nuclear det

forces are in this category. But most U.S. military forc

designed as general purpose forces.) This ch

recommends considerable increase in “tailoring” o

forces in order to meet the range of strategic tasks 

now confront the nation. Task-tailored forces (with s

121
core competencies) rather than all-purpose forces (wi

as the core competency) should be the prism through 

force-sizing exercises operate.

Current Arguments for a 2 MTW Force.

Several arguments have been put forward to just

MTW force. The most well-known is the argument abo

need to deter opportunism—“avoiding a situation in w

potential regional aggressor might be tempted to 

advantage when U.S. forces are heavily comm

elsewhere.”

1

 In principle, this is not unreasonabl

deterrence of opportunism requires only that the pot

regional aggressor be persuaded that he will not gai

aggression. For this purpose the United States needs 

the capability to slow down the aggression in the s

region until it can shift forces from the first theate

must convince the second potential aggressor that any 

that it might make will surely be rolled back at some p

time when the United States chooses. In either cas

metric for sizing forces for the second MTW wou

different, and probably smaller, than in the first 

Given the small number of potential regional aggress

the world, the probability that a second aggressor w

capable of, prepared for, and motivated to enga

cross-border attack at the same time the United St

heavily engaged in the first MTW is surely not very 

A second argument for a 2 MTW force is that it 

ensure that the United States will have sufficient m

capabilities to defend against a coalition of hostile pow

a larger, more capable adversary than is foreseen to

In other words, being able to fight two major wars wi

the United States to be able to fight one really larg

The truth of this is indisputable, but a careful assessm

this argument hinges on the word “help.” Of course 

forces would help prepare the United States for a 

large war. But simply to argue along the lines that m

better avoids the question of whether a really larg

122
might have different force requirements than two MT

a really large war were to occur in Asia, for examp

United States might want a greater proportion of its 

with longer reach, with more transportation asset

with greater capabilities for replacement 

reconstitution. It is not necessarily the case that 

designed for two MTWs are the best forces for one 

large war. Undoubtedly there are trade-offs here, and 

should be addressed explicitly.

A third argument for the 2 MTW standa

reassurance of allies and general promotion of 

interests. There are many ways that the United Stat

reassure allies and promote its interests. How do we 

whether an increment in military forces does this 

than the same amount of money spent on some 

activity, such as more diplomacy, payment of U.N. du

something else? This argument is a hang-over from th

War days when there was a large U.S. overseas pre

The forces stationed forward to meet the Communist 

could also be seen as promoters of more genera

interests. Given the forward presence of considerabl

forces, the marginal cost of using these forces f

promotion of a wide range of national interest

minimal. As this presence continues to decline, the 

by which allies are reassured and general U.S. int

promoted will need to be reassessed. It is now too exp

to undertake these tasks largely with military forces

A fourth argument—sometimes conflated wit

third—is that, as a global power the United States n

force that demonstrates its status as a superpower. Th

reputational argument. As such it tends to imply 

because reputation was enhanced in the past because 

size of America’s armed forces, in the future siz

continue to be the best way to maintain this reputatio

argument about reputation is inherently conservat

suggests that the United States should continue to do 

the way it has done in the past because any change mi

misunderstood and lead to a loss of reputation. Am

123
strategists need to resist this temptation, and need 

what other ways America’s reputation as a great pow

be maintained.

Strategic Context of Force Planning.

Decisions on force sizing follow logically from a 

assessment of the strategic situation. As we know, 

years since the end of the Cold War this has been a w

debated issue, and no consensus has been reached. A 

wide range of existing and potential threats have 

identified. There is no agreement over the re

importance of such threats. The result, in terms o

sizing, has been two-fold: on the one hand the United 

has experienced a great deal of inertia in restructur

forces. On the other, such innovation as has occurre

taken the form of a series of ad hoc and poorly assim

responses, particularly in organizational terms. Ther

been efforts at embracing the current revolution in m

affairs (RMA), at improving jointness, and at d

transformation of existing organizations. These effort

often been moves in the right direction. However, 

critics feel that these transformation efforts have fa

achieve the synergy and dynamism that is needed.

The forces that were in place at the end of the Col

have been reduced in size, but not fundamentally ch

in structure. They are smaller and more up-to-date ve

of the Cold War force. The trend has been evolutionar

the canonical scenarios around which post-Cold Wa

planning has revolved—the 2 MTW force based o

illustrative cases of Iraqi and North Korean cross-

attacks—are simply scaled-down versions of the Col

planning assumption of a massive Soviet attack throu

Fulda Gap. The great success in the Gulf War rein

this tendency to think of war in this way. Much curren

force planning continues to revolve around the im

halting and reversing an armored cross-border attac

strategic appraisal implied by this force structure is 

124
a series of regional threats plus a motley list of other t

to worry about. Implicitly, the items other than def

cross-border aggression on the constantly changing 

threats are usually treated as lesser-included cases 

can be managed by the forces designed to deal with 

theater wars.

There is a clear disconnect between the identifica

a wide range of diverse threats, and the force-

activities of the Department of Defense (DoD). Force

has focused primarily on the regional threat issue; 

kinds of threats, while duly noted (and some

highlighted) in the official reports, seem to play only 

roles in force-sizing exercises. Such issues as hom

defense and peace operations have considerable 

cations for the types of forces the United States needs, 

seems reasonable to assume that forces appropriate to 

missions will look rather different than forces desig

fight major theater wars. Basing force-sizing exe

primarily on the need to fight major theater wars can

a sound way to decide what forces the United States 

It is a case of the tail wagging the dog: because force

on the canonical scenarios of Korea and Iraq 

comfortable, so similar to Cold War assumption

regional threat has driven force planning to the v

exclusion of other threats and needs. Regional threa

but one factor among several that need to be conside

designing U.S. military forces. The full range of threa

have been identified needs to be considered, with 

explicit discussion of relative priorities. In addition, t

a need for the employment of military forces which 

independently of “threats.” Many peace operation

overseas presence, are only a response to “threats” 

term is stretched so far as to lose any real me

Strategic assessment cannot simply be threat-based

Although this chapter argues that the metric fo

sizing should derive from a strategic assessment, 

considerations preclude an extended discussion of str

Nevertheless, the strategic assumptions underlyin

125
chapter should be laid out explicitly. They are: (1) w

currently in a strategic pause; (2) there is a wide ra

diverse threats; (3) there is a need for a range of m

forces to engage in activities only indirectly rela

specific threats; (4) there is a need to prepare for a 

greater dimensions than the current notion of an M

only as a deterrent measure.

The Case for Experimentation.

The implication of a strategic pause is that now 

time to experiment with doctrine and force structu

course, from the perspective of policymaker

commanders in chief (CINCs), U.S. forces are cons

responding to one crisis after another. Stretched 

unable to accomplish pressing missions adequatel

notion of strategic pause appears like a figment 

imagination to the hard-pressed people in the thick 

action. To overcome the pressures of the present, we n

design organizational forms that enable commande

strategists to focus on the long term.

Experimentation, rather than acquisition or 

structure, ought to be the top priority for defense pla

Experimentation should not be equated simply 

furthering the RMA. The new American Way of W

embodied in Joint Vision 2010 and its successor docu

is fundamentally a preference for high-tech war. Whi

is clearly the right approach overall, the U.S. military 

to experiment with a lot of low-tech operations as we

experimentation should focus as much on organiza

design and warfighting concepts as on tactical issues

There are two important arguments why exper

tation should be a high priority. The first is the likelih

“getting it wrong.” When addressing innovation in a c

of rapid technological change, the natural trend is to e

effort in getting it right. Because the future 

unpredictable, and because enemies will be working e

hard to thwart U.S. innovations, the likelihood i

126
whatever innovation the United States designs no

turn out not to be quite right when the time comes to e

it in combat. The risk of not “getting it right” is high, a

only way to guard against the negative consequence

might follow is to create a military which is adaptab

flexible, ready to take failure in its stride. The les

America’s first battles is not (contrary to much c

thinking) that the United States should work har

prevent failure in the initial phases of a campaig

rather that the U.S. military needs to take a hard l

how it can respond to initial failure and go on to ada

ultimate success. It is more important to be adaptabl

to be right the first time.

The second argument is a logical corollary of thi

has to do with the need to nourish and sustain a subst

number of flexible thinkers in the military. The 

valuable resource in a time of rapid technological cha

a pool of innovative thinkers. Force design—partic

with regard to retention and reserve issues—s

explicitly aim to foster the existence of a large body of 

with the right attitudes. Many of the skills are emb

knowledge, learned from years of experimenting wit

concepts. They will exist at all levels of the military, n

among the ranks of those who have attended th

Colleges. Many sergeants and technicians will 

important aptitudes and skills which will be critic

rapid innovation and recovery from initial mis

Experimental forces should be nourished and the per

in them should be carefully tracked to maintain a c

experienced people who can pass on their ingr

knowledge to others.

Dealing with a Wide Range of Threats and Tas

As numerous analysts have argued, the end of th

War has meant a shift from one dominant threa

multitude of existing and potential threats, and 

increased the salience and frequency of some non

127
related military missions such as peace and humani

operations. The Department of Defense has had dif

defining a list of such threats: at times it seems as if 

produced a shopping list, with items added or d

without any underlying rationale being easily discer

Part of the problem is that status quo powers, such 

United States today, tend to regard any chan

“instability,” and see instability as a “threat.” 

temptation should be resisted.

Expansive definitions of national security have em

in recent years. It has been argued, for example, that 

are a threat to national security. Drug trafficking m

undesirable, and the amount of drug usage by th

population may be a cause of concern, but it is hard 

what is meant by defining this as a threat to na

security. There is no need to argue that an issue is a na

security issue in order to involve the military. Whet

not the military should be used should be decided enti

terms of whether they or some civilian agency are 

equipped for the task at hand. To argue that 

trafficking is a national security issue is to identif

issue that concerns the well-being of the Ame

population with national security. If we accept this, t

nothing that is not a national security threat, and th

becomes meaningless. To give another example, in the 

1990s it was argued that a failure to maintain a h

U.S. economy posed a risk to U.S. national security.

3

 

sense, this is absolutely correct. The links betwee

economy and defense strategy are many and intim

strong economy is a necessary precondition for an ef

defense. But a necessary precondition of something 

the same as the thing itself. To put “a healthy econom

list with other threats such as regional aggression is 

apples and oranges. We must not confuse what is a des

state of affairs for the United States (and the worl

whole) with threats to U.S. national security. We 

particularly at the War Colleges, that all eleme

national power should be coordinated, that wars i

128
economies and societies as well as militaries. But whi

is true, it does not follow logically that anything that 

the world a less desirable place to live in is a na

security issue. What is lacking here is a reasoned arg

about the long-term requirements for U.S. na

security, and the relationship between changes in the 

security environment and U.S. capabilities (includi

health of the economy) to respond to such cha

Shopping lists seldom promote careful considerat

matters such as the relationships between long-ter

immediate concerns, the relative importance of dif

issues, and trade-offs between responses to dif

concerns.

The United States has strategic goals which a

driven by immediate threats. They include such thi

showing the flag, humanitarian assistance, maintena

global peace, support of diplomacy, and prom

democracy, free markets, and human rights. 

activities require substantial military force. Some of 

tasks, such as showing the flag, can be done by 

designed to fight major theater wars. Naval ov

presence is a good example of this. With some other 

such as constabulary and nation-building operations, 

can be made that the forces designed for major theat

are not well-suited to these tasks. This chapter argue

tailored forces should be developed for such tasks, an

the warfighting components of the military shou

allowed to concentrate more on their core competenc

One of the major complaints today is that Am

armed forces are too busy. High PERSTEMPO is freq

cited as a reason for reduced morale and reenlistmen

costs of retraining units for warfighting after they 

from peace operations are high. Tailored forces will b

expensive and more effective. There will be the 

benefit of reducing the strain on the warfig

components of the armed forces. Tailored forces, of c

can only be justified if we foresee a long-term need fo

forces. This is why strategic assessment is so centra

129
Larger War.

It need not take a peer or near-peer competitor f

United States to find itself engaged in a massive war 

much larger than the current MTW scenarios. Jap

1941 was not a peer competitor of the United States 

stretch of the imagination, yet defeating Japan 

lengthy and costly affair. It is by no means beyon

bounds of possibility to imagine the United States bec

embroiled in a war against a powerful and resilient e

(or a coalition) that demanded resources far beyond 

needed for an MTW as currently envisaged. As I 

already suggested, the forces required for a large war 

be substantially different from those needed for two M

Especially if the war were to occur in Asia, the prob

immense distance would require considerable log

support. Anti-access and asymmetric strategies on th

of the adversary could well mean that the war bec

prolonged one, with periods of relative inactivity and 

of intense fighting. In such a war the United States wo

at a disadvantage.

Current thinking, based on the “lessons” of the Gul

focuses on the need to get to the theater rapidly an

quickly. While these are appropriate concepts for an 

they may prove counterproductive when confronted 

well-prepared enemy that intends to fight a protracte

In this scenario, the key issues for the United States w

sustainability and the rapid replacement of va

platforms. Key assets like satellites, Airborne Warnin

Control Systems (AWACS), joint surveillance, target 

radar system (JSTARS), and air refueling tankers m

targeted and may need to be replaced rapidly

munitions may be expended rapidly and stocks m

depleted. Replenishment of forces in the theater m

difficult. Current thinking about future warfighting 

to focus too much on rapid, decisive victory

underemphasizes the possibility of protracted 

Strategists and force planners need to spend some 

130
thinking about the kind of industrial base that w

required in such a war, the appropriate use of reserve

how to move away from reliance on complex machine

take many years to produce. The United States mi

better served by an ability to turn out large numb

standardized machines rapidly, as was the case wi

revolution in shipbuilding which produced the Liberty 

of the Second World War. Cheap barges filled with 

missiles may be preferable to complex destroyers 

elaborate defensive systems.

The United States might also be better served 

Reserve system that was able to rapidly integrate civ

into certain kinds of military operations (such as the m

white-collar jobs that a computer-reliant mi

generates) without necessarily putting them into un

or having them train on weekends. A “virtual Reser

computer-literate civilians might be a useful adjunct 

existing Reserve units. The experimental forces wo

crucial cadres for force expansion.

Organizational Implications.

The argument of this chapter is that the United 

should design a tailored force for each major str

mission. What might this look like?

One obvious route forward is further development 

unified command plan. Joint Forces Command (JFCO

a great example of the kind of new command that co

formed. JFCOM is tasked with training and exper

tation. It could also be tasked with preparing f

reserves and the industrial base for a very large war

sort of functional organization might be the way ahea

easier to make organization change through the u

command plan than through efforts to reform the se

Other new commands might be established, such 

Homeland Defense Command, an Expeditio

Command, and a Constabulary Command. Ex

functional commands like Space Command and S

131
Operations Command would round out the pi

Correlatively, the relationship between the geogra

commands and the functional commands would 

clarification. They perform different tasks, and it is 

means clear that they would be equal partners. The b

the forces would be assigned to the functional comm

and the geographic commands would be reduc

contingency and presence forces. Their main task wo

to provide regional intelligence and expertise.

The bulk of the regular general-purpose warfi

forces which are currently configured to fight two 

would be assigned to the Expeditionary Command. 

forces would be scaled to fight one MTW. JFCOM 

continue as trainer and experimenter, with the add

task of preparing for a large war. The forces assig

JFCOM would expand greatly.

The biggest change would be the creation o

Constabulary Command. This is perhaps one of the 

difficult areas to reorganize. Peace operations need 

range of skills, and the boundaries between militar

other governmental action, and between governmen

nongovernmental action are usually blurred. The is

international legitimation and the frequent ne

coalitions of one kind or another raise many iss

command and control of military forces.

Rather than use regular U.S. Army troops for 

missions, a dedicated force could be formed. It co

modeled on the Coast Guard: under civilian direction 

of the time, but militarized in time of war. It would c

large numbers of aid workers, engineers, medics

together with a strong core of area specialists. It 

contain its own organic firepower, but largely of a 

infantry and military police type. A good name for th

would be “Peace Corps,” were that name not already 

Perhaps it might be called the “Peace Army.” Unli

existing Peace Corps, the constabulary force would c

of organizations rather than individuals, and me

132
would be expected to serve for longer periods th

typically the case with the Peace Corps. To give an i

what the Peace Army might look like, imagine a patr

troubled region where the Peace Army was deploy

couple of light infantrymen and a Special Forces s

would provide most of the firepower, in addition to 

ability to call in air assets. The patrol would be le

political officer, probably a Colonel, with long experie

the region. There would be an anthropologist, a docto

civilian police officers, and an nongovernment organi

(NGO)-recruited liaison officer as the core compone

the patrol. Most of the members of the patrol wo

sergeants or officers. It would most definitely not look 

regular Army patrol.

It might be objected that recruiting and reta

personnel for this sort of mission would be very dif

They would be seen as second-class soldiers. It is pre

the fact that they would not be doing “normal” warfi

tasks that underpins the argument for a tailored 

Peace operations are often very rewarding to soldier

participate in them. By making it clear that they are d

very different kind of task than warfighting—not an in

task, just a different one—the role conflict between s

warrior and soldier/peacekeeper can be reduced, the c

retraining can be minimized, the current complaints 

perstempo can be addressed, and peace operations 

carried out more effectively with forces that are 

suited to the task.

Another innovation would be the Homeland D

Command. Defense of the United States is suffic

important that it should not be seen as a subsidiary m

or given to the Guard/Reserves to handle. Some asp

homeland defense require a recognizable mi

organization as the appropriate response. Defense a

air and missile attack is a good example. But other k

threat, such as cyberattack, or attacks by terrorists 

with weapons of mass destruction, require new for

hybrid organizations. They require close intermesh

133
military and civilian expertise. There is a need to ex

carefully things like horizontal accession and short-s

contracts as well as temporary secondment of civili

the Homeland Defense Command. The blurri

boundaries between civil and military in a domestic c

raises all sorts of thorny constitutional ques

Nevertheless, a clear case can be made for such a com

and hybrid civilian-military organizations may well 

wave of the future. 

Although the organizational changes recommen

this chapter may seem radical, it should also be b

mind that the Department of Defense is evolv

precisely this direction. Force planners should sim

more explicit and more experimental about organiza

design, and should attempt to introduce organiza

innovation much more rapidly.

Some Downside Risks.

Change carries with it certain risks. But so 

maintenance of the status quo in a changing environ

Keeping the two MTW metric carries risks. It only 

less risky because it is familiar. But if the strategic sit

is changing, then comforting continuities are 

dangerous than efforts at change. Some of the 

associated with the kind of approach to force-sizing 

advocated in this chapter can be foreseen. Others, of c

will come as a surprise. Let us briefly consider the 

obvious foreseeable risks.

With regard to the emphasis on experimentatio

central risks are (1) being caught unprepared strate

and losing the first battle because forces ready for c

have been slimmed down too much, (2) inadequate 

structure and acquisition, (3) run down of the d

industrial base, (4) loss of skilled labor force and of t

and ready soldiers, (5) the dreadnought effect of fi

weapons so advanced that all existing weaponry is ob

and all militaries start from a level playing fie

134
complacency, (7) doing R&D for the rest of the world, a

lack of organizational focus at the level of component 

of the military: organizations need a clear mission 

single, simple measure of effectiveness.

With regard to the proposal for organizational cha

produce more tailored forces, the principal foreseeabl

are: (1) lack of flexibility, (2) redundancy and unde

zation of forces, (3) difficulty of integration of one 

tailored forces with another, differently tailored, for

lack of unity of purpose and organizational focus at th

of DoD as a whole.

These are all risks. Some will exist if the curre

MTW force is maintained. Some can be guarded a

relatively easily. For example, the risk that a foc

experimentation will lead to insufficient acquisit

maintain a robust industrial base is not as serious a

seem at first sight. Experimentation will require 

acquisition; it is not possible to experiment in a mean

way with only one or two prototypes.

4

 What experim

tion will mean, however, is expensive unit costs be

production runs will be small. Maintaining an expa

defense industrial base in these conditions w

expensive. Let us take another example: there is th

that experiment in organizational design, together w

restructuring of the unified command plan proposed 

will lead to organizations without clear direction, pul

cross-purposes with each other. True, this may happe

this is already the existing reality. The cu

service-dominated organizations frequently p

cross-purposes. Why would we assume that things wo

worse with a different organizational design? They 

well be better. We won’t know until we try.

It might be said that a U.S. emphasis on experim

tion will mean that America does research and develo

for the rest of the world. Well, this is already the ca

large extent. What is important is not simply the tec

end result of experimentation, but the embodied know

135
and skills in the designers and operators. Experimen

produces smart, innovative people, and this is as m

resource as the tangible results of the experi

themselves. It will be vitally important to keep these 

intact, replenish them with new people, and pass alo

knowledge. This issue is not a new one: the need to ma

the embodied knowledge of a cadre of nuclear we

designers, for example, has long been recognized

proposal here is to extend this notion of husba

embodied knowledge to a much wider range of m

activities. 

It might seem as if I am trying to solve the inev

struggle over priorities and resource allocation by rew

the organizational chart. Of course no rewriting 

organizational chart will abolish conflicts over pri

and resources. They are what strategy is largely 

There will be budgetary struggles between the new u

commands. The central problem is one of how the po

system works to allocate resources among com

military demands. If the civilian political leadership c

adjust budgets to align forces to changing str

priorities, then whatever the organizational structure 

armed forces, there will be inevitable mismatches be

strategy, budget and force structure. We know that th

problem that exists today. It is largely a political prob

can only be solved by reform of the budget and str

process at the highest levels. But discussion o

America’s political process might be improved to fac

better strategy and force planning is beyond the scope 

chapter. The reorganization of America’s milita

produce tailored forces will not make the problem of 

redirect budgets to conform to strategic priorities (

than to historically accepted divisions between the v

services) go away. But to say that this chapter c

propose a solution to all organizational and po

problems facing the military does not mean th

organizational arrangements are equally effe

America’s strategic situation is complex; it requires a 

136
of measures of effectiveness, and several metrics fo

sizing. The United States is now in a time of strategic 

it can experiment with organizational structure in an 

to produce organizations tailored to the new tasks th

have to confront. It should do so.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Repor

President and Congress, 1998, p. 8.

2. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Repor

President and Congress, 1997, p. 6.

3. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Pr

and Congress, 1994, p. 3.

4. Eliot Cohen, “Defending America in the Twenty-first Ce

Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, pp. 47-49.

137
CHAPTER 9

THREATS, STRATEGY, AND FORCE

STRUCTURE:

AN ALTERNATIVE PARADIGM FOR

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CENT

Robert David Steele

While suffering substantial reductions in manp

and failing to modernize the conventional forc

American military claims to be ready so as to suppo

political claims of its current master in the White H

This claim does not stand up to scrutiny. The Am

military is not ready, either for two simultaneous t

conflicts, or for a range of Operations Other Than 

(OOTW). In fact, we have real culture shock with

military, where a serving Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff can be heard to say “Real men don’t do OOTW” 

same time that units are stretched to the breaking 

while they do exactly that: OOTW in every clime and 

The other elements of our national power—the diplo

economic, cultural, and justice elements o

government—are also not ready to make their contri

to national security in the 21st century. 

We require a comprehensive evaluation of the th

reconstitution of our national security strategy, 

deliberate but prompt investment in training, equi

and organizing the forces needed to protect our nation 

21st century. The “2+” strategy of structuring the fo

address two major theater war (MTW) scenarios at o

driving our military into severe degradation. 

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is not a substit

strategy and it is bankrupting our military by div

what disposable funds we have toward an overly tec

“system of systems” that is neither financially nor mil

139
sound. At the same time, RMA is creating an eno

interoperability gap—a strategic deficit—betwee

forces and those of allied nations, and betwee

commanders and the 98 percent of the relevant inform

they need that is in the private sector and not access

our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

systems. 

This review, after evaluating the real-world t

outlines a change in our national security strategy fr

to 1+iii—we need four forces after next, not one—a

increase in national security spending on the order 

billion a year for traditional military capabilities an

billion a year for nonmilitary capabilities in direct su

of our long-term national security strategy. Regard

funding, however, we need to restructure the force.

Arriving at the Bottom Line Figure.

Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate A

Forces Committee, said in the 1990s, with perfect cla

I am constantly being asked for a bottom-line defense numbe

don’t know of any logical way to arrive at such a figure with

analyzing the threat; without determining what changes in 

strategy should be made in light of the changes in the thr

and then determining what force structure and weap

programs we need to carry out this revised strategy.

This review follows Senator Nunn’s cogent task

first discussing the threat, then recommending a st

appropriate to the threat, and finally proposing s

force structure modifications as are necessary to execu

new national security strategy, a strategy I call the 

(One Plus Triple I) Strategy. This new strateg

reinforce our conventional military; substantially en

our expeditionary, constabulary, and special oper

forces; create a bold new program to achieve force prot

through global intelligence coverage that inspires eco

and cultural investments; and assure home front se

140
through a much expanded and better integ

combination of electronic security and econ

counterintelligence that extends the concept of na

security down to the state and local level th

revolutionary new uses of our National Guard and R

forces.

Analyzing the Threat.

The “threat” to the United States in the 21st ce

must be evaluated in the larger context of a world 

conflict is the norm, where major ethnic fault lin

across all major continents, where transnational crim

and local warlords are amassing fortunes through tr

women, diamonds, food, and medicine; and where w

our most precious resource—is approaching a “t

point” of nonrenewability. 

Let us begin with conflict. Each day, today, we 

on-going 26 severe low-intensity conflicts that kille

300,000 people in 1999 alone, and cumulatively, have 

roughly 8 million over time. There are 78 less 

low-intensity conflicts, and over 178 violent po

conflicts internal to specific nation-states. India, N

Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, China, Russia, Ug

Ethiopia, and Sudan, all populous countries, are enga

between 6 and 32 conflicts each!

Conflict trends are troubling. Severe low-int

conflicts (defined as conflicts with over 1000 casualti

year), have leveled off. However, lesser low-int

conflicts are increasing steadily in number each year

violent political conflict, often ethnically-based, has 

toward geometric increases year by year. Figure 1 

the actual number of conflicts per year from 1995 to 

In addition, relying on the aggregate data collecte

analyzed by centers of excellence such as the Stoc

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), we se

our world, today, endures 29 complex emergenc

141
declared by the United Nations; millions of refugee

internally-displaced persons across 67 countries

scarcity and related disease in 27 countries; m

plagues, from AIDS to the West Nile disease, cre

across 59 countries and rising; and child soldiers mur

one another in 42 countries. Peacekeeping forces are 

countries; landmines desecrate 62 countries; tort

common in 92 countries; corruption is common 

countries; and censorship is very high in 63 countrie

Those are simply the conflicts and the obstac

effective government management of scarce resour

behalf of their people. Let us turn to the special ca

ethnicity and water. Ethnicity, despite the popula

made for a “clash of civilizations,” is really most re

when it is combined with desperate shortfalls in the 

of life, such as water. Figure 2 combines a map 

142

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

HIC Levels Off

LIC Business is G

Internal Political &

Ethnic Violence Go

Through the Roof

High-Intensity Conflict Low-Intensity Conflict Internal War

Figure 1. Conflict Trends from 1995-200
current state of water for the world with genocida

lines corresponding to major ethnic divisions.

The coincidence of water scarcity and ethnic faul

in the Slavic-Islamic and Slavic-Chinese border region

special concern. Closer to home, we must be consci

both the increasing hyper-aridity and declining aqui

the American mid-west, and the substantial pol

characterizing all of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribb

The greatest threat to both national securit

national prosperity in the 21st century stems f

combination of water scarcity, failed states, ethnic 

lines, and opportunistic thugs thriving under condit

chaos. We are close to a “tipping point,” and it is we w

creating the ultimate crisis that results from a combi

143

Hyper-Arid & Arid

Semi-Arid

Genocidal Fault Lines

Extreme water pollution

Figure 2. Intersection of Water Scarcity a

Genocidal Fault Lines.
of global water pollution and the degradation of flood 

(no longer receiving nutrients because of dams blocki

silt) and the effects of irrigation (raising the salinity of 

a point where it cannot produce food) and van

aquifers (being mined into extinction); with genocida

lines and the attendant instability that gives rise to 

warriors.

Our national intelligence communities, while fo

primarily on strategic nuclear and conventional threa

those aspects of the threat that are secret, are fully aw

these dangers, but unable to make a compelling 

policy case for action. The Central Intelligence A

(CIA) did an excellent job of forecasting the spre

Anti-Immunal Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the 

but the policy community was not willing to make t

international issue nor to allocate resources for prev

measures. More recently, Dr. John Gannon, Ass

Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Prod

(ADCI/AandP), has rather carefully pointed out th

major threats facing us in 2015 are related to 

migrations, disease, and other nontraditional fa

Despite a major news story on the gap between intell

warning of AIDS in the 1970s and policy action on AI

a quarter century thereafter, Dr. Gannon’s accurat

timely warning about emerging nonmilitary thre

being ignored.

At the same time, selected experts and the occa

rare reporter have begun to focus on “modern plagu

well as water shortages, but they do so only within 

professional circles and fail to get a hearing at the 

level. Even those books that receive presidentia

broadcast television endorsements, such as L

Garrett’s Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global 

Health (Hyperion, 2000), fail to affect the national and 

state budgets for the simple reason that the voter

citizens—will not buy a 754-page book, much less r

and still less act upon its well-documented and u

144
message. The heart of Garrett’s message meri

attention.

In this context we must acknowledge the importa

the new definition adopted by the United Natio

Security Council Resolution 751 of April 24, 1992, whe

“magnitude of human suffering” in Somalia was recog

as constituting a threat to peace and security. We do t

two reasons: because such suffering creates wa

migration that carry disease, and because our 

defenses” against epidemics have been allowed to atro

the point that we are at serious risk in the developed 

and at the provincial, state, and local levels.

The threat in the 21st century is more complex tha

before and cannot be defined in strictly military t

Figure 3 provides a means of understanding this comp

while structuring the threat in a manner that leads lo

to both strategic and force structure equivalencies.

145

PHYSICAL

STEALTH,

PRECISION

TARGETING

NATUR

STEAL

RAND

TARGE

CYBER -

STEALTH,

DATABASE

TARGETING

IDEO -

STEAL

MASS

TARGE

GUERRILLA

WAR

CULTURAL

WAR

HIGH TECH

BRUTES

(HIC/MRC)

LOW TECH

BRUTES

(SOLIC/LEA)

HIGH TECH

SEERS

(C4I WAR)

LOW TECH

SEERS

(JIHAD)

MONEY--RUTHLESSNESS

POWER BASE

KNOWLEDGE--IDEOLOGY

TERRORISM

ECONOMIC

WAR

HIC High Intensity Conflict

MRC Major Regional Conflict

C4I Command, Control, Communications,

Computing and Intelligence

SOLIC Special Operations/Low

Intensity Conflict

LEA Law Enforcement Agencies

Jihad Religious conflict, also include

environmental, non-state “war”

Figure 3. Four Threat Classes Requirin

Strategic Consideration.
In fact we face four general kinds of threat

traditional nuclear and conventional forces sponsore

state; those that are violent but not necessarily asso

with a state, including both transnational crimina

terrorists or warlords able to acquire weapons of 

destruction; those that are nonviolent and often sta

including environmental conditions imposing a 

“magnitude of human suffering” as well as the refu

often gravely ill—from those conditions, the child so

bound into armed slavery, and the women and ch

traded for money and often laden with disease; and 

those threats to home defense, be they state-sponso

not, that surround our critical infrastructures, inc

our public health infrastructure, and the core 

economic well-being. At times, it is ourselves that w

to blame for the scope and imminence of our vulnera

as is the case with public health.

Seen another way, these four threat classes confr

with four distinct “ways of war”: Systemic War, Dirty 

Peacewar, and Cyberwar. Further complicatin

planning and programming, conflict between dif

forces takes differing forms, and we must evaluate how 

fight and how we might fight in the context of a worl

does not favor heavy armor formations—a world in 

only 50 percent of the ports are usable, where th

almost no cross-country mobility, bridge loading is l

to 30 tons and less in most Third World countries, a

aviation climate is hot and humid.

Changing the Strategy.

Fundamental strategic thinking should inclu

appreciation for the fact that a national security st

must be holistic—managing all sources of national 

including diplomacy, economic assistance, cu

outreach, and information operations, not jus

military—simultaneously. “War proper” is not just 

military force, but rather about imposing one’s wi

146
assuring one’s security in a complex world. Withi

larger context, power without purpose is wasted, t

priceless, technology is not a substitute for strate

thinking, asymmetric threats must receive co-

attention with symmetric threats, and strategic c

matters.

Determining our national security strategy for th

century therefore must be guided by two related prin

co-equal standing for asymmetric versus symm

threats; and co-equal structure and funding, or at 

some semblance of a rational balance, between m

forces designed for the traditional symmetric threa

largely unconventional or nonmilitary forces desig

deal with the asymmetric threat.

On this basis, “forward engagement” and “shapi

the theater environment make a great deal of sens

with two enormous caveats: there must be a force str

as well as funding for nonmilitary investments, and w

probably better off talking about “nurturing” pe

environments instead of the more imperial “shaping.

minimum, a strategy that is seriously committed to 

protection through economic, cultural, and inform

peacekeeping must recognize the vital role played 

nongovernmental organizations (NGO); the cr

importance of being able to communicate and coo

with indigenous organizations that are not part of a m

force; and the overwhelming influence on any situa

environmental conditions including the availability o

drinking water, sufficient food for the children, and 

medical provisions as might be needed to at least 

disease from spreading through epidemics.

Our new national security strategy must actually 

five elements that are in complete harmony wit

another: our global intelligence strategy, for ensurin

we can maintain global coverage and global warnin

interoperability strategy, for ensuring that what we 

and buy is interoperable with both military and c

147
coalition partners in a wide variety of “come as yo

circumstances; our force structure strategy for ensurin

we build to both the most likely as well as the wors

threats while balancing the relative roles of our mi

the rest of the Federal government, the reserve forc

private sector, and external allies or coalition partne

preventive diplomacy strategy for directly addre

conditions around the globe that spawn conflict and 

and finally, our home front strategy for fully developin

integrating the defensive capabilities of our state an

governments and the private sector.

A truly “transformative” defense strategy 

recognize that in this complex world with four threat c

we must adopt a “total mobilization” approach to na

security, and ensure that every element of governm

the federal, state, and local levels is empowere

integrated into an effective “total force” while w

ensure that the private sector is doing its part, partic

in relation to documenting supply-chain vulnerabil

high-technology forces and in applying new “due dili

electronic security measures to raise the over-all secu

our national financial, communications, power

transportation infrastructures. Figure 4 illustrat

kinds of trade-offs that must be made if we are to h

“transformative” force structure strategy.

Without spending too much time on these trade-o

us just note that there are three kinds of trade-offs sh

the figure: between the military and the rest of govern

between the active force and the reserve force; and be

the government as a whole and the private sector. W

leave the issue of U.S. versus allied or U.S. versus 

coalition levels of effort for another day.

“Real WAR” (HIC/MRC) forces must protect th

military and rely almost completely on active 

personnel “ready to go” without waiting for reservist

will draw on private sector capabilities to the m

extent possible. 

148
SOLIC/LEA forces, by contrast, will see the 

Government (USG) fielding an even mix of militar

diplomatic or justice or economic capabilities, whil

drawing equally on active and reserve forces, and di

the responsibility for dealing with terrorism 

transnational crime equally between U.S. Gover

endeavors and private sector security and intell

activities. 

In peace, the military continues to provide a 

logistics and communications infrastructure, but c

elements of the U.S. Government are in the majority 

Reservists skilled at foreign languages and 

occupations vital to civil affairs and the restructur

failed states come to the fore, while the overall ef

balanced between USG-funded and manned activitie

“overt action” by private sector elements including N

Finally, for IO/ECON, there remains a 20 p

commitment of military forces—largely in the Na

Security Agency (NSA) and related service inform

warfare centers—while the Justice, Treasury, and 

departments come to the fore; there is an even split be

active duty forces carrying out Information Oper

149

"WAR"

80% Military – 20% Other

75% Active – 25% Reserve

75% USG – 25% Private

HOME FRONT

20% Military – 80% Other

50% Active – 50% Reserve

25% USG – 75% Private

SOLIC/LEA

50% Military – 50% Other

50% Active – 50% Reserve

50% USG – 50% Private

PEACE

40% Military – 60% Other

25% Active – 75% Reserve

50% USG – 50% Private

Figure 4. Transformative Force Structu

Trade-Offs.
duties, and elements of the National Guard car

positioned across all critical infrastructure nodes, wi

funding—and the ultimate responsibility for day-

security—resting primarily with the private sector.

On the basis of this kind of approach, one can r

validate a need for four regional Commanders-in

(CINCs) (Pacific, Southern, European, and Central) 

conceptualizing four “threat-type” Commanders-in

(WAR, SOLIC, PEACE, and HOME). It would be 

eight CINCs that should comprise the working level 

new Joint Requirements Board under the direction 

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Such a force structure strategy would at a min

restructure the relationships between the Departme

Defense, Justice, and State; would establish mi

mandatory defense structure needs within 

Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Transpor

as well as the Federal Reserve; and would create se

new relationships—including secure interope

communications networks—with state and local age

the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the F

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and such 

civilian elements of government as must be 

integrated into our “total force” strategy. The pres

immediate staffs—the National Security Counc

National Economic Council and other odds 

ends—should also be restructured to conform to the ne

matrixed management of integrated operations a

each of the four threat classes. Such a force strategy 

also establish, in clear terms suitable for a news 

report as well as legislation, the minimal mand

responsibilities of the private sector in support 

national security strategy, with a special emphasis o

high standards for electronic security.

An integrated national security strategy, then, 

carefully develop, in tandem and with appropriate 

resources as well as force structure being assured fo

150
element of this holistic strategy, each of the follow

global intelligence strategy; an interoperability strat

force structure strategy; a preventive diplomacy st

(including economic assistance and cultural programs

a home front strategy. Those who would persist in lim

our national security strategy emphasis to conven

military forces are demeaning Clausewitz and underm

the security of the nation.

Determining the Force Structure.

A national security strategy that addresses all of 

factors, with all of the legal, financial, and po

implications that are associated with different ki

“engagement,” must inevitably find that we need four 

after next, not one. 

While it is certainly possible to have one “core force

includes the world-wide mobility, logistics

communications capabilities that we are justly proud 

fact our strategy must find that we need:

• a nuclear and conventional force that is small

very well equipped, fully modernized, and never comm

to OOTW—the WAR force;

• expanded and enhanced expeditionary, constab

and special operations forces able to put increasing 

packages anywhere in the world within 24 to 48 

hours—the SOLIC force including direct support to L

• a PEACE force, possibly combining subst

elements of the Civil Affairs, Army Engineers, an

Agency for International Development with new l

elements specially trained to interact with civilian 

units, as well as a new humanitarian assistance fleet w

the U.S. Navy and also new Air Force lift capab

relevant to peacekeeping; and finally,

• a fully developed HOME Defense force that give

and local authorities, not just federal autho

151
everything they need to legally carry out their du

preventing economic espionage and electronic a

against any of our critical infrastructures, while integ

the U.S. Coast Guard and appropriate national m

defense and other “continental” defense capabilities.

We cannot rely any longer on just the military, o

“one size fits all” military where our people and equi

are assigned to all kinds of missions for which they ha

been trained, equipped, and organized.

The “Core Force,” as opposed to General Colin Po

“Base Force” approach, draws a distinction betwee

functionalities and capabilities that are needed for a 

presence—communications, logistics, mobility, man

management—and very distinct and carefully focuse

structures and organizational arrangements tha

self-sustaining and are very deliberately trained, equ

and organized for optimal effectiveness in one of the 

“core competency” areas shown in Figure 5 below.

152

CORE

FORCE

Strategists

Advise Policy

Constabulary

Stabilize Failed States

Domestic Threats

Fires, Riots, Epidemics

Citizen Education

Bond Nation through Service

Force on Fo

Deliberate Viole

Electronic Security

Set Standards, Stand Watch

Small Wars

Random Violence

Ground Truth

Observe with Warrior’s Eyes

Figure 5. “Core Force” Visualization.
Eight Functionalities, Four “Type” CINCs.

Each of these eight functionalities should be actu

in corresponding force structure initiatives.

Strategists. Our national Net Assessment capa

and our national as well as our military str

formulation processes, have broken down. They 

become bureaucratic exercises of little value to long

force structure planning. They are weak in part beca

one has been willing to challenge the many 

assumptions and premises that guide our current 

structure decisionmaking process. We need, at a min

a dedicated National Security Strategic Center that h

even mix of representatives from each of the major sl

national power, as well as an even mix between long

strategic thinkers specializing in each of the four 

classes, and “top 5 percent” personnel from the mi

other elements of the civilian government, state and 

law enforcement and public health, and the private s

with special regard for selected nongovernmenta

nonprofit sectors. This element should report direct

new Presidential Council but be managed on a day-

basis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Domestic Threat. FEMA has improved increment

recent years, but needs a great deal more authorit

financial support. We need to redirect a substantial p

of the National Guard toward national, state, and 

emergency response duties, and to give them the tra

equipment, and organization that they require to b

extremely effective at dealing with fires, riots

epidemics, in direct support of the constituted 

authorities being assisted. From communicatio

medical to civil engineering to public relations t

services, there are valid requirements that demand a 

make-over” for those elements of the National 

fortunate enough to be selected for this very urgen

honorable aspect of national defense. This force, to i

new investments in active duty personnel as a cadre a

153
enforcement specialists as well, should be under a 

CINC for Home Front Defense who would al

responsible for Electronic Security and Citizen Edu

as discussed below, as well as for the national m

defense system as it develops over time.

Force on Force. This is the traditional mi

responsible for creating the maximum amount of viole

the smallest possible space—responsible for being a

execute “scorched earth” missions that obliterate 

cities if necessary, that can control significant ar

terrain in order to find and kill exactly the righ

personnel threatening the United States with any

from transcontinental missiles to bio-chemical car b

This force must receive all that the RMA can offer it, 

also being protected from OOTW missions and 

distractions. This force, under the leadership of a s

CINC responsible for the “total war” mission, shoul

over the bulk of the existing defense funding, and 

exclusively on maintaining its readiness while moder

aggressively. This force must have air-ground task 

dedicated to specific regions of the world and at lea

complete Corps specifically trained for each of th

major terrain types over which major wars might be f

desert, jungle, mountain, and urban. Selected eleme

all of the other forces (e.g. small wars, constabulary) 

pre-plan and train for specific contingency missio

support of a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) campaig

in the event of an MRC, would be chopped as required 

operational control of the regional CINC who woul

receive operational control of force on force elements

Small Wars. We keep forgetting our history. Bo

British and the Americans have learned the same 

more than once: forces designed for traditional confl

not do well in small wars until they have undergon

considerable adaptation as to render them unprepare

ineffective when required to return to traditional wa

Small wars require a much higher standard of foreig

knowledge and language competency, to name ju

154
significant difference, and are best fought by units tr

equipped, and organized specifically for small wars

Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is ideally sui

both its strategic culture and its tactical excellence, to 

as the parent of a force of three division-wing 

optimized for expeditionary operations. This force wo

especially skilled at joining international coal

engaged in peace enforcement operations, and in exe

violent complex forced entry missions.

Constabulary. The force that fights the small wars 

the force best able to maintain the peace, resto

functions of the failed state, and generally move as q

as possible toward an exit that has been planned 

original engagement strategy. Constabulary forces r

a combination of enormous numbers of civil a

personnel, very high percentages of military p

engineering, medical, and food service personne

considerable communications, intelligence, and l

personnel. This force must draw on and implement 

civilian programs related to water purificatio

desalination, food purity and distribution, and ep

conditions. This force must excel at working wit

sustaining long-term relations with NGOs—a 

challenge where our traditional intelligence and oper

leaders have failed completely. It has to fully int

indigenous personnel into every aspect of its reconstr

of society and the eventual turn-over of author

indigenous leaders. It has to provide considerable tr

in many skill areas, and at the same time needs to pla

deliberate abandonment of most of its equipment, inc

communications equipment, as part of “the deal.” Thi

would then return to the Continental United S

(CONUS) to reconstitute itself. It should be under 

SOLIC.

Ground Truth. The average Embassy officer 

trained, equipped, nor suited by nature to go in harm

on a daily basis. Most of what we need to know in the 

World is not published at all, much less in digital form 

155
English. Our increasingly complex world requires th

have a force for establishing “ground truth” through 

personal observation, in every clime and place. Such a 

created in the defense attaché mode but with much g

freedom of movement and much deeper mobilit

communications support, would integrate over

assigned liaison officers; “circuit riders” assigned to 

countries or regions and told to stay out of the Embas

off of the cocktail circuit; and very selective netwo

clandestine and covert observers using third 

passports or surreptitious entry to obtain their 

“ground truth” observations including sen

measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT)

force should be under CINC SOLIC, but in keeping w

recommendations for overall intelligence reform 

should be a major Clandestine Services Agency 

Station co-located with CINC SOLIC to ensure o

coordination between these “early warning” observati

warriors focused on rural areas, and the more trad

civilian clandestine espionage activities focused on 

political and economic and military targets.

Electronic Security. We have a very long way to go 

it is truly safe to live and work in cyberspace. Our fina

communications, power, and transportation infra

tures remain totally exposed and vulnerable for the s

reason that we will not be secure until there is a who

conversion of all existing electronic systems to a high l

security that must be embedded from the factories 

components on out. This will require three major na

initiatives that are not yet being properly discus

Washington: 1) the definition of minimal mand

standards for hardware, software, and personnel secu

relation to electronic systems and their contents; 

imposition of these standards via “due diligence” legis

that requires all enterprises to be compliant within 5 

with some systems to be secure within the year; and 

complete release of NSA-level encryption to the p

sector so that the Internet can be as secure as Presid

156
communications. This level of security on the Interne

fact a precursor to enabling the intelligence commun

well as corporations to have access to all rel

information while still being able to process secrets

minuscule effort being made today must be supplante

trained force responsive to CINC HOME, and elec

security brigades specializing respectively in fina

communications, power, and transportation systems

are in turn integrated within a nationally distr

“virtual network” of private sector employees, Na

Guard specialists, and Home Front Force active duty 

in new consolidated electronic operations centers focu

each of the major systems areas.

Citizen Education. “A Nation’s best defense 

educated citizenry.” As Senator Boren and David G

have noted so clearly, we are in fairly desperate c

stances in relation to both policymaker and voter know

about the hard realities of the world we live in. A 

investment must be made in the “internationalizat

education,” but even more so, we must find ways to 

integrate our increasingly diversified population so 

create a minimal level of social cohesion over time. It 

view that we must restore the draft and require ever

citizen to serve for 4 years, in any combination of year

2 + 2 or 1 x 4) between their 18th and 38th birthdays, w

least basic training and the first year being required 

entering college. I must go further and in recognition o

the middle-aged immigration increases as well a

longevity increases, and say that we must ha

additional draft requiring 2 years of service (at once 

stints of 3-6 months) from all those who are citizens in 

38th to 58th years and have not served previously. 

same time, we must substantially increase private 

sabbaticals by our field grade officers and selected 

non-commissioned officers. We must, in effect, giv

meaning to the concept of “total force” by ensurin

every single citizen has a common foundation of ser

the nation, and that we fully integrate every citizen—

157
extent of their capabilities—into our national defense

educational process does not require that every citize

arms—our new national defense force structure wil

many opportunities for those who do not wish to w

uniform or learn how to kill.

In summary, all but one of these eight functions wo

integrated under one of four “type” CINCs that wo

turn support the regional CINCs much as the servi

today but with a vastly improved focus of effort that a

both air-ground-sea interoperability as well as 

training and doctrine suited to the specific “type” of w

to be fought. Over time we should convert each of th

Services into one of the type CINCs, or disband them 

downsize administrative capabilities and improv

tooth-to-tail competency under this new force str

approach. 

Reordering the Government.

As Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., has noted, we n

do a much better job of organizing the rest o

government so that it is capable of “forward engage

using all of the sources of national power. This s

require, at a minimum, the establishment of Ambassa

level appointments to each regional CINC from Comm

Treasury, the Peace Corps, and the Agenc

International Development, and up-grading of the ex

Political Advisor positions from State to Ass

Secretary-equivalents. 

A new CINC PEACE, as a “type” CINC, shou

established with a small staff in the National Capita

close to the Department of State, and able to dr

military command and staff personnel as well as m

dollars to ease the transition toward the day when w

proper funding and structure for the nonmilitary ele

of national power. Someone like General Colin Pow

Admiral William Crowe, Jr., would be ideal candida

serve as CINC PEACE, with international educ

158
water, food, and public health as the mandated ar

interest, and the right to cut across bureau

boundaries, on behalf of the President, when it makes 

to do so. Eventually, once we have our national se

house in order, we will find that a similar restructu

government is necessary with respect to health, educ

interior, and other domestic elements of govern

responsible for the internal “commonwealth.”

CINC WAR CINC SOLIC

CINC

PEACE

CINC H

Force on

Force

Small Wars State/USIA

Dome

Thre

Constabulary Peace Corps

Electr

Secur

Ground Truth

Economic

Aid

Citiz

Educa

Figure 6. Reconstitution of Force Structu

Some of the features of each of the ten force str

components of a new national security “total forc

shown below.

CINCWAR

• Force on Force

• Existing strategic nuclear forces, drawn do

appropriate, but modernized

• Four Army-Air Force Corps of 3 division

teams each (12 and 12)

• Strategic mobility (black and gray) to mov

corps in 4 weeks

159
CINCSOC

• Small Wars

• Complete absorption of the U.S. Marine 

without dilution of its Congressionally-man

character or culture including uniforms

• Implementation of the 450-ship Navy 

response, littoral squadrons)

• Creation of two active/ four Reserve foreig

combat support brigades

• Constabulary

• Five active and five Reserve constabulary 

forces 

• Implementation of the 450-ship Navy (hu

tarian assistance slice)

• Ground Truth

• Ten Reserve foreign area specialist compan

• Ten Reserve ground sensor /relay comm

tions platoons (covert capable)

CINCPEACE

• State/USIA

• 1000 additional foreign service/foreign inf

tion officers

• 100 new consular/open source information 

• Peace Corps

160
• 10,000 new Peace Corps volunteers per yea

• Implementation of Peace Corps inform

assistance program

• Economic Aid

• 10 new water, food, and medicine project

year (2 within USA)

• Digital Marshall Plan for the Third World

CINCHOME

• Domestic Threat

• 50 National Guard Brigades, each with fir

engineer, and medical battalions that trai

state and local counterparts and al

international humanitarian assistanc

disaster relief

• National missile defense for New Yor

Washington as soon as possible

• Absorption of the U.S. Coast Guard, w

dilution of its character

• Electronic Security

• 50 National Guard Electronic Security Cen

• 50 National Guard Electronic Security B

ions, with specialist companies

• Citizen Education

• University of the Republic

161
• Universal Draft/National Defense Fello

Program

This approach to managing how we train, equi

organize our varying force structures to deal wit

distinct threat challenges wipes out, in one 

“Goldwater-Nichols”-style revolution, all of the negat

the existing Service “stovepipe” acquisition systems a

cultures that go with them. This should be the focus 

National Security Act of 2001.

Conclusion.

Both the RMA and the so-called defense transform

movements have failed. The 2+ MRC strategy has f

Our security environment demands a Home Front F

Peace Force; a Ground Truth, Small Wars and Co

ulary Force; and a dedicated strategic nuclea

conventional War Force that is not frittered aw

OOTW. 

We require a National Security Act of 2001. 

strategy, and the attendant force structure, are achi

within 6 years from where we are today, but will 

achievable as readily if we delay because the U.S. N

decommissioning ships as we speak—we must put a s

their dismantling of our submarine, destroyer, and f

capabilities because it is the U.S. Navy, as CINC PE

that will have the greatest burden to bear in supp

CINC SOLIC (U.S. Marine Corps) and CINC WAR 

Army). We must give CINC HOME (the U.S. Air For

financial resources—and culturally-powerful incent

with which to rapidly reconfigure itself into an eff

Home Front Defense that fully integrates and respec

needs and concerns of our state and local and private 

partners in our “total war” environment.

If we adopt a 1+iii strategy and implemen

recommendations of this review, America will beg

21st century with a national security archite

162
well-suited to our needs and agile—able to fight and 

any clime or place.

163
CHAPTER 10

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY

AND A CORE MILITARY CAPABILITY

Walter Neal Anderson

Despite the proliferation of highly sophisticated and rem

means of attack, the essence of war will remain the same . . 

will not be like a video game. What will change will be t

kinds of actors and weapons available to them. While so

societies attempt to limit violence and damage, others w

seek to maximize them, particularly against those with 

lower tolerance for casualties.

Hart-Rudman Commission

New World Coming, September 199

Introduction.

At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military move

a force focused on fighting the Soviet Union to a 

capable of and sized to perform a broad range of mi

against a backdrop of an uncertain future. America’s 

forces are now ostensibly structured to fight two 

Theater Wars (MTWs) nearly simultaneously. It 

surprising, however, that although reaffirmed by th

Bottom-Up Review and 1997 Quadrennial Defense R

(QDR), there has been much discussion recently abo

utility of the so-called “two MTW strategy.” Many, s

the Hart-Rudman Commission, see it as antiquated a

longer relevant. 

Despite a dearth of substantive intercourse o

national defense strategy during the recent presid

campaign, events have converged to make a thou

debate over America’s security particularly timely. 

there is no single threat on which we can or should focu

165
end of the Cold War, the beginning of a new millenn

new administration, and the mandated QDR process g

ample reason to take a fresh look at the issues affecti

security of our nation. At the end of this debat

strategic path we take will determine the well-being 

Americans for generations to come. Thus, it is impe

that the decisions we take be as well considered as po

However, we will do it wrong if we start the discussio

the “two MTW strategy,” for it is a misnomer of the h

order. 

America’s national security strategy is currently 

Engagement, and the military has put it into practice 

national military strategy of Shaping the interna

security environment and Responding to threats and 

while Preparing for an uncertain future. While the l

“Engagement” likely will be revised by the new a

istration, America’s security strategy is unlikely to c

drastically. The military will continue to perform Sh

Responding, and Preparing missions, even if the na

and relative emphasis on these three elements ch

Indeed, that, to date, the debate on our defense st

really has been over the balance between these 

strategic fundamentals is testimony to the continuin

they likely will play in our national security. A

reexamine this paradigm, we must consider our end

national interests and responsibilities, as well as the 

strategic and operational requirements and pot

challenges on the horizon.

Enduring Global Interests and Responsibilities

Our strategy debate must start with national inte

The Clinton administration classified our interests as 

important, humanitarian, and other. While some 

offer new categories, most agree that our interests sho

clearly articulated and prioritized. Although our na

strategy and the importance of various issues may 

166
changed over the years, America has always emb

three fundamental interests:

• Preserving the sovereignty of our nation, with v

institutions, and territory intact;

• Protecting our citizens at home and abroad; an

• Providing for the common welfare and eco

prosperity of our nation and citizens.

These enduring interests rightfully drive our na

security objectives and attendant military capabilitie

have led to a broad consensus that the United States 

remain actively engaged in the world. Isolationi

retrenchment is not an option. Globalization punc

the fact that our interests are undeniably tied to acto

forces beyond our borders.

Because we have entered the new century 

unprecedented national strength and extraord

economic health, the military’s role regarding the 

interest—common welfare and economic prosperi

worthy of particular note. While the military’s influe

physical security is obvious, many Americans d

appreciate the connection between our national pros

and our military excellence. Although physical se

may not be sufficient for prosperity, it is abso

necessary.

Surveying the past decade, we now see that th

peace dividend following our Cold War “victory” was f

the result of reduced military expenditures 

accelerated prosperity resulting from the diminished 

of global war, which allowed most countries to foc

economic development. The global contest be

capitalism and communism was swept away as demo

free market countries found themselves on the right 

history. Security was the oxygen that allowed the 

economy to breathe—peace, stability, and confidenc

essential for the sustained prosperity we have enjoye

167
the past several years. This will be even more true 

future, as the roots of global economic interdepen

broaden and deepen. 

America also has enduring global responsibil

Formal agreements and informal friendships aroun

world inextricably tie U.S. security and well-being to c

allies’ and partners.’ While these relationships do 

others’ interests, our motive is not beneficence

maintain and nurture these relationships because it 

America’s interests to do so. The United States wo

hard-pressed to “go it alone,” and has no desire to p

unilateral solutions for global issues. Thus, as backg

for our debate, we must keep in mind the pot

implications of any strategy shift that would signal to 

allies or potential adversaries that America is retren

There has been, for decades, some tension betwee

United States and its allies over mutually satisf

levels of security “burden sharing.” Often this tensio

had a negative effect on overall relations. For its pa

United States is seen by some as “wanting it both wa

wanting leadership of an alliance or internationa

without paying our full “dues” in terms of particip

sacrifice, and commitment. Clearly, each case m

judged on its own merit, but America must work closel

its international partners to strike an appropriate ba

Leadership comes with a cost. If we are willing to c

less and relinquish leadership in some cases, we m

prepared to accept the consequences of dimin

influence.

Taken together, advancing America’s enduring 

interests, fulfilling its worldwide responsibilities

sustaining its influence have a price tag. Any hope th

end of the Cold War meant the “end of history” re

unfulfilled. Instead, America’s armed forces, at one

their Cold War size, are more heavily committed gl

than ever. As the new administration begins to ke

promise to review America’s current global engag

posture, it must acknowledge the evolving str

168
landscape and the increasingly complex and d

challenges to America’s security and well-being. 

Strategic Challenges and Shifting Internationa

Sands.

Strategic challenges to U.S. interests have ev

dramatically in the last 10 years. Despite positive eco

and political trends since the end of the Cold War, 

states have benefited equally from these changes

world order is in transition. China, Russia, India

Indonesia, comprising more than a third of humankin

in the midst of major, uncertain political, economi

social change. Released from the grip of a bipolar stru

state and nonstate actors can more easily challen

global distribution of power, the concept of sovereignt

the character of warfare. Traditional friends and all

rethinking the global security environment and their 

in it. Even Europe is changing as it seeks ways to f

integrate, while protecting individual national iden

Real or invented notions of history, ethnicity, and re

are seemingly more evident. The Balkans and other r

remain frozen in a state of “no war, no peace.” We ha

to even name this era, and its ultimate directio

outcome are anything but certain.

As we negotiate shifting international sands, the

three enduring truths. First, the United States ha

would like to maintain, comprehensive preemin

politically, economically, and militarily—albei

arrogantly. Second, power remains relative, dynami

multidimensional. And third, armed conflict—rooted 

contest for power and control over people, territor

resources—remains a permanent feature of the 

landscape. These truths have direct implications f

security debate.

Even though general war with a global compet

hostile alliance appears unlikely for now, there are 

169
broad categories of threats that confront us. Chal

likely requiring a military response include:

• Humanitarian disasters, man-made or natura

• Transnational threats, including terrorist g

illegal drug trade, international organized crim

piracy;

• Failed states and intra-border conflicts, 

political, ethnic, religious, or economically 

violence threatens broader instability;

• Attacks on the United States homeland 

Americans abroad; and,

• War, including cross-border aggression, where 

threaten the sovereignty of others in regions c

to U.S. interests.

The character of these threats is also changing. Pot

adversaries have taken to heart the lessons of 20th ce

conflict, including Operation DESERT STORM. Th

selectively modernizing their militaries and deve

both traditional and asymmetric capabilities to av

counter our strengths. These changes have sign

implications for the environment in which the U

States and its partners might operate. State and no

adversaries likely will:

• Employ chemical, biological, nuclear, or radio

weapons;

• Exploit real or perceived U.S. political, eco

cyber, or psychological vulnerabilities;

• Operate in complex and urban terrain, hiding b

innocent civilians; and,

170
• Delay, disrupt, or deny U.S. military respons

access through conventional or unconven

tactics or capabilities.

An understanding of these emerging challenges 

inform our strategic debate by giving us insight in

defense strategy and the military capabilities we will 

require to implement it.

Enter the Debate.

Our current national security strategy serves as a 

point of departure for our debate. As mentioned prev

it is a strategy of “Engagement” and states we must 

the security environment, Respond to threats and 

and Prepare for an uncertain future.

Our current National Security Strategy (NSS

stipulates that:

[America’s armed forces] must have the capability to de

and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-bord

aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time fram

Maintaining a two major theater war capability reassures o

allies and friends . . . [and] deters opportunism . . .

1

From this portion of our current security strate

two MTW force-sizing standard—first established in 

and reaffirmed many times since—is articulated.

The NSS continues by noting that:

Fighting and winning major theater wars entails th

challenging requirements. First, we must maintain t

ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of t

enemy’s objectives in two theaters, in close succession. . 

Second, the United States must be prepared to fight and w

under conditions where an adversary may use asymmet

means against us. . . . Third, our military must also be able 

transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture 

global engagement—from substantial levels of peaceti

171
engagement overseas as well as multiple concurr

smaller-scale contingency operations.

2

Much of our current risk originates from the 

challenging requirements.” As we discuss any 

strategy, we must address these issues candidly.

Concerns over the Current Strategy—Termino

and More.

Our current definition of a Major Theater W

“large-scale, cross-border aggression” is too narr

address current and future strategic realities. Firs

scenarios for MTWs are typically linked to the K

Peninsula and Persian Gulf. Clearly the possibility 

that the United States will find itself involved in 

beyond these two contingencies. Second, it is poss

fight a war without “cross-border aggression” 

adversary. Operation ALLIED FORCE illustrates b

these points. This operation was, for U.S. Air and 

Forces, as well as critical enabling capabilities like C

and strategic lift, “MTW-like” in the resources require

Force officials repeatedly made this point. Had a 

entry into Kosovo been necessary, the ground 

required likely would also have reached MTW

proportions. Furthermore, operations over the F

Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were not a respon

“cross-border aggression” in the classic sense. 

large-scale, cross-border aggression remains a real th

our interests, it is not entirely useful as a meas

requirements. There is room in our strategic vernacu

the simple term “war,” to describe operations that r

significant levels of national resources and will.

Similarly, the phrase “Smaller-Scale Conting

(SSC) is equally unhelpful. The air war over the FRY 

by definition, an SSC. Yet it required all of the resourc

major war. In another case, the United States force

entered Bosnia in December 1995, at the time an 

consisted of more than 25,000 soldiers. Clearly “sm

172
relative. Also, the number of service members d

involved in an operation at any given point doe

adequately describe the full resource commitment, w

frequently 3-5 times those actually deployed. Exper

such as that in the Balkans, also tells us that SSC

evolve into long-term stability operations that increa

stress on our forces and affect our overall str

flexibility. In particular, there are significant chal

and limitations in our ability to redirect “committed” 

to other tasks around the globe.

This illuminates the risk, mentioned in the 

associated with fulfilling our two MTW requirement 

posture of engagement—shorthand for the requirem

withdraw from all contingency operations in the case 

wars. First, the political and strategic consequences m

too high to execute such a withdrawal when the time c

Second, there is no guarantee that the necessary po

decisions would be made in time. Most important

commander is willing to put America’s sons and dau

in harm’s way untrained. Thus, even with an early po

decision, the time required to withdraw, retrain

redeploy forces to war may well not meet our str

requirements. While some would argue for establ

specialized forces for peacekeeping, this would not sol

risk challenge, but exacerbate it. As units would h

rotate deployments for overseas peacekeeping, this 

require a dramatic increase in end strength, or se

overtax an already stretched force. In addition 

complexities of creating a two-tier force, there is comp

evidence that combat trained troops make the best 

for operations in ambiguous environments characteri

“no peace, no war.”

3

There are other sources of risk as well. The c

security strategy also makes no explicit provision of 

for Homeland Security (HLS). While many believe a 

attack on America, by any number of means, is 

matter of time, the military capabilities that wou

required to respond to such an attack—or perhaps 

173
multiple, simultaneous attacks—are not accounted 

our current strategy or force-sizing standard. Strateg

theater sea and airlift are also a concern. Recent s

have established that we have a two MTW requireme

only one MTW’s-worth of lift.

4

 Moreover, this shor

based only on a short-term assessment and does no

into account lift needed to meet the capabilities sou

future joint operational concepts and forces. Final

need to be prepared to fight two nearly simultaneous 

and meet current operational obligations, such as m

engagement and stability and support operations, 

significant strain on the Services’ ability to transform

transformation, which is defined as “a fundamental c

in our military capabilities,” will initially increase r

our security. Transforming forces are typically unava

for current operations. The Army is taking some ris

for example, with the transformation of its units at 

Hood and Lewis.

Taken together, the problems inherent in our c

strategy and force-sizing paradigm stem mainly fro

undeniable fact that we have allowed available reso

rather than strategic requirements, to determin

military capabilities. The corrosive effect of the c

strategy-capability mismatch has put the military on 

path to unacceptable risk. This risk derives from m

sources and is the difference between our stated str

and military ends, and the ways and means availa

achieve them. As we engage in this new security deba

must consider carefully the full range of capab

required for comprehensive security in an evolving str

and operational environment. 

A Strategy of “Comprehensive Security.”

. . . for years to come Americans will be increasingly less sec

and much less secure than they now believe themselves to 

Hart-Rudman Commission,

New World Coming, September 1999

174
One’s view of the world and America’s role in it 

most fundamental determinant of one’s beliefs ab

security strategy for the new century. A view tha

serves our nation’s interests would be balanced. It wo

neither excessively optimistic nor pessimistic. It wou

hold that America could any more fix all of the w

problems than it can turn its back on them. It would h

its core an equally balanced view of the natu

mankind—that, even in a changing world, the h

capacity for both good and evil continues. It 

acknowledge that, ultimately, intercourse between 

and other international actors is largely driven by the 

for power, where power is measured largely in ter

wealth, and the possession of which requires contro

people, land, and resources. It is the quest and strug

power that may lead to war, and in matters of confli

men, there are no easy, cheap, or high technology solu

The nature of war endures, even as the means with wh

wage it change. Despite the continuing likelihood 

and lesser conflict, however, America is well poi

continue to prosper, even thrive, in this world. There 

many opportunities as challenges.

While we would like to establish definitively ho

when we will employ our power, particularly m

power, this goal will remain elusive. Balance, 

judgment, and recognition of our enduring interes

values are required. Even though the line between str

overreach and lost opportunity is difficult to ma

appropriate national strategy would recognize our end

national interests and responsibilities, as well a

multiple, complex challenges to them. It w

acknowledge the fundamental role peace and stabilit

in both our own and global prosperity. It would acce

imperative of achieving new levels of synergy amo

diplomatic, economic, military, and informa

instruments of power. This strategy would recogniz

ultimately, the military instrument, while not suffici

necessary for prosperity. It would be informed by bo

175
successes and failures over the past decade and 

accordingly. Most importantly, it would be compreh

in its approach, recognizing the essential interrelatio

between Shaping, Responding, and Preparing

synthesizing these elements to achieve unity of purpo

a world of increasing knowledge and speed, a strat

Comprehensive Security would be increasingly p

flexible, and deft in its application. It would be fa

science and much more art—where Shape, Respond

Prepare would be better termed Engagem

Preeminence, and Transformation. 

Engagement entails remaining proactively invol

advancing our global interests and fulfilling our 

responsibilities. It is an approach to international rel

that, while best executed with an abiding sense of na

humility and acknowledging the important intere

others, provides unambiguously for our own most imp

interests. In contrast to its predecessor “Shapin

recognizes that even our closest allies do not take w

being “Shapees.” Moreover, explicitly establishing 

critical pillar of Comprehensive Security highlights 

unlike the Clinton administration’s national se

strategy, Engagement is not an end in itself. And, 

Engagement must be comprehensive, involvin

diplomatic, economic, military, and informa

instruments of power in ways that artfully reinfor

another, it must be based on a recognition that war w

soon cease to be a means to achieve ones objectives. A

conflict will remain an enduring feature of the str

landscape. As such, the United States must mainta

capabilities and capacity to perform the full ran

military operations.

Preeminence is required for both deterrence an

spectrum dominance. It is achieved through compreh

strength over time and across the full range of m

operations. It acknowledges the dynamic, rel

multidimensional nature of power, and recognize

neither diplomatic nor economic superiority can be ac

176
without military dominance. It holds that deterren

reassurance are the most fundamental measu

effectiveness of the military instrument of power—th

military need not necessarily be used in an ult

confrontation. The Cold War was not won, how

without the resolve and capabilities demonstrat

various theaters throughout the world over the cou

nearly five decades.

It should be clear that any strategy which provid

comprehensive security our nation requires will de

that the military deter and if necessary act as the 

arbiter of conflicts. We must be able to respond t

dominate in any mission scenario, protect the hom

and, without abdicating our concurrent g

responsibilities, perform critical shaping or engag

tasks. Simply put, we must be full spectrum capable

while dominance across the range of military operat

the goal, recent experience tells us that we 

quantitative and qualitative gaps in our cu

capabilities that have manifested themselves bo

day-to-day operations and, more importantly, in our 

to deter with conventional forces.

The Hart-Rudman Commission concluded 

“Deterrence will not work as it once did; in many ca

may not work at all.”

5

 Some might argue that, in pri

deterrence does still work the way it used to—that on

be deterred if the perceived risk of loss is greater th

potential for gain. The Commission’s conclusion 

however, point out that the United States lack

capabilities to deter certain adversaries and threats

example, our nuclear triad and high-tech conven

capabilities did not deter Slobodan Milosevic fro

campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo—the United 

had no “perceived,” politically acceptable capa

between diplomacy and bombs over Belgrade. 

transformation will narrow this gap between capab

and strategic requirements.

177
Transformation is far more than reorganization; 

fundamental, quantum improvement in capabi

Transformation in the ways U.S. national power int

with other states and with international and 

governmental organizations is essential. Eq

necessary, and of even higher priority, is transforma

the ways in which our own instruments of power inte

advance our enduring interests and prepare for po

contingencies both at home and abroad. The incr

complexity of the strategic environment mak

imperative that the political, economic, military

informational dimensions of power be applied holis

and with clear unity of purpose.

A myriad of transformation initiatives are cur

under way. The challenge remains to integrat

synchronize these initiatives into a coherent whole

minimum, the multidimensional challenges in the c

security environment require transformed, multid

sional capabilities. Moreover, to achieve transforma

a world where many technologies are obsolete in mont

must also change the way we change. We do now h

strategic window of opportunity to transform, but we 

get on with it. None of us knows with certainty how 

that window will be open.

Landpower’s Essential Contributions

to Comprehensive Security.

While the Marine Corps provides esse

complementary capabilities, the Army constitute

preponderance of America’s landpower capab

Furthermore, only the Army is capable of sustained 

dominance. As the nation’s decisive force, when em

as part of the joint, multinational, and interagency 

the Army ultimately determines the pace of victory a

character of peace. 

178
179

A simple crosswalk between the pilla

Comprehensive Security and Army capabilities to 

that strategy is illuminating.

The Army and Engagement. The Army has a u

ability to set conditions in an uncertain sec

environment by addressing the human dimens

international relations and potential conflict. Engag

is far more than presence, it is the day-to-day inter

with friends and potential adversaries that reassur

deters. While many countries do not have substant

or naval forces, virtually all countries have armies

Army is uniquely suited to engage these armies to pr

regional stability, encourage democratic institution

set the conditions for more effective crisis response. 

The Army and Preeminence. As part of a joint for

Army is uniquely capable of sustained, full spectrum 

dominance. Central to this contribution to Am

defense is the Army’s ability to conduct decisive c

operations. This credible, demonstrated capability 

foundation of conventional deterrence and underwrit

Army’s effectiveness in all other missions, as well 

effectiveness of other elements of national power s

diplomacy. From its ability to conduct precision fir

maneuver; command joint and multinational forma

conduct logistics operations for the joint force; expa

force in a protracted crisis; and, support civil authori

home and abroad, the Army’s contribution to our secu

indispensable. This role will only expand as require

for Homeland Security and missile defense m

missions in which the Army inevitably will play a c

part. 

The Army and Transformation. Americans expec

Army to prepare for future conflict, not the last wa

short, they expect their Army to have a vision. The 

does. That vision is to remain Persuasive in 

Invincible in War in the new century. The transition 

Army, from a Cold-War force to one optimize
comprehensive security requirements of a new cent

imperative, urgent, and under way. Througho

transformation, the Army must retain the capabili

fulfill its nonnegotiable contract with the Ame

people—to fight and win the nation’s wars. The 

between near- and long-term readiness is a false one

In particular, a transformed Army’s ability to 

combat-capable brigade on the ground anywhere 

world in 96 hours, followed by the balance of a division 

later, is a capability that begins to fill the current 

conventional deterrence and, if deterrence fails, offe

NCA the opportunity for strategic preclusion. The ab

deploy five divisions anywhere in the world in 30 

ensures that our nation will be able to achieve its po

and military objectives, rapidly and decisively.

Force Sizing for Comprehensive Security.

A strategy of Comprehensive Security would 

important implications for the armed forces that impl

it. In particular, the two MTW force-sizing paradigm 

be replaced by a Core Military Capability (CMC) f

operational forces which would have a minimum o

components.

First, the CMC would retain the requirement to 

and win two wars, worldwide, in overlapping timefr

As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted rece

As a global power, I submit that we cannot retreat from any 

activity to do another exclusively. And in this regard, a 

Major Theater War capability—and let me stress that this 

capability, not a strategy—has served us well. A two M

capability allows us to go in two directions at one time. It he

define us as a global power. And when we’re committed in 

area of the world, it deters opportunistic aggression in anot

it helps guard against being surprised. Moreover

strengthens our coalition relationships—so important to h

we will fight in future operations.

6

180
One reason for the shortcoming in the two 

force-sizing construct is that it was designed as a simp

to address one of several possible “Respond” continge

albeit the one perceived at the time as the most dang

Although fighting and winning wars is nonnego

Comprehensive Security also demands that Am

military continues to do far more than that. As th

decade reminds us, we may be called on to do ever

from fighting wars to fighting fires. While this is no

the Cold War may have obscured this fact. Theref

Comprehensive Security is to overcome the deficien

the current “Engagement” strategy and two 

force-sizing standard, it must also recognize that, w

two-war capability is imperative to sustain our statu

global power, it is not sufficient. 

This leads to the second component of America’

Military Capability. We can no longer treat all 

missions as “lesser included.” As mentioned above, 

than sizing our armed forces to meet current and 

tasks, today’s strategy addresses quantitative defici

by insisting unrealistically that our forces employ

long-term stability operations—such as in the Balkan

Sinai, Latin America, and other less well-k

locales—withdraw, retrain, and redeploy to a second 

America’s CMC must recognize and include the capab

to sustain essential engagement and stability and su

operations.

Third, we must have set-aside forces to ensu

security of the homeland. There is broad consensus 

growing threat array of ways and means by whi

adversary, state or nonstate, might directly attac

United States. Under current plans, the capabilitie

forces required to defend America are also programm

deploy to fight the nation’s wars, thereby exposin

homeland even further. Clearly, this is unacceptab

must be rectified under a strategy of Compreh

Security. America requires the ability to defend 

181
regardless of whatever other contingencies it mig

involved in around the world. 

Finally, America’s Core Military Capability mus

into account transformation. While “Transform

ultimately addresses qualitative shortcomings so th

military becomes a force optimally designed to dom

across the spectrum of operations, we cannot deny t

we transform, there are monetary, force-sizing

near-term readiness costs. This must be accounted f

strategy of Comprehensive Security.

The sum of these four “components” of America’

Military Capability—along with the institutional ca

necessary to field and train the world’s premier 

forces—is the minimum essential required to p

America the Comprehensive Security we require. Th

to maintain world-class institutional capabilities can

taken for granted—the tip of the spear is no sharpe

the forces that generate, project, and sustain it.

Conclusion.

Inevitably, the QDR will stimulate spirited deba

demand tough choices. Our nation has enduring 

interests and responsibilities, and the threats to 

interests are complex, uncertain, and expanding. 

nation requires a strategy of Comprehensive Se

supported by a Core Military Capability. 

The problems inherent in our current strateg

force-sizing paradigm derive largely from a ch

strategy-capability mismatch and have put the milit

a glide path to unacceptable risk. This trend can and 

be reversed. As we engage in this new security deba

must consider carefully the full range of capab

required for comprehensive security in an evolving str

and operational environment. Our global interest

responsibilities demand a two-war capability. Add

capabilities are required to carry out critical engage

182
stability and support missions, homeland security

essential transformation tasks. All of these str

requirements must be met to fulfill our Compreh

Security needs and mitigate operational, strategi

ultimately political risk over time. And, as we ma

tough resource decisions, the soundest investments 

those forces and systems that have full spe

effectiveness.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The 

House, December 1999, p. 19.

2. Ibid., p. 19.

3. The performance of U.N. troops in Bosnia prior to Day

compared to the performance of combat formations under NAT

is but one clear example of the need for combat capable forces i

peace operations.

4. Estimates of U.S. military airlift shortages vary from 1

percent of the capacity required to fight two major wars

discrepancy between these estimates, the former by 

USTRANCOM and the latter by the GAO, is due to differe

counting planes—TRANSCOM uses assigned strength, while t

decrements that number based on maintenance nonavailabil

other usage factors. In either case, both TRANSCOM and th

would agree that the result is increased risk, in terms of U.S. cas

in the event of two wars. For more, see Christian Lowe, “Milit

Able to Meet Requirement for War,” Defense Week, December 1

p.1. 

 5. New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Centu

United States Commission on National Security/21st C

September 15, 1999, p. 8.

6. General Henry H. Shelton, “The National Military Strat

Joint Vision 2020,” Army Magazine, January 2001, p. 7.

183
ABOUT THE EDITOR AND AUTHORS

STEVEN METZ became Acting Chairman, Strateg

Planning Department, in September 2000. He has 

Research Professor of National Security Affairs 

Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) since 1993. Dr. Me

has held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Stud

the U.S. Army War College. Prior to that, he served 

faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Comman

General Staff College, and several universities. He ha

served as an advisor to U.S. political organization

campaigns, testified in the U.S. Senate and Ho

Representatives, and spoken on military and se

issues around the world. Dr. Metz is author of more th

articles, essays, and book chapters on such topics as n

war, insurgency, U.S. policy in the Third World, m

strategy, South African security policy, and United N

peace operations. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and 

in International Studies from the University of 

Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the 

Hopkins University.

WALTER NEAL ANDERSON, a colonel in the U.S. Ar

Chief, Strategic Plans, Concepts, and Doctrine Div

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Office of the D

Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headqua

Department of the Army. Colonel Anderson 

commissioned as an Armor Officer in 1978 upon grad

from the United States Military Academy. He has ser

a variety of command and staff positions in the U

States, Asia, and Europe. From June 1995 to June 

Colonel Anderson commanded the 1st Battalion

Armored Regiment, which deployed to Bosnia for a y

part of NATO’s Implementation Force during Ope

Joint Endeavor. More recently, he was a Senior S

College Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United St

185
MICHAEL CASEY currently serves as U.S. Represen

Vic Snyder’s (D-AR) Legislative Director. He has work

Representative Snyder for the past 4 years. Prior to th

served on the staff of U.S. Representative Carrie 

(D-FL) for 2 years. He holds B.A.s in Political Scien

History from the University of Kentucky and an M

National Security Studies from Georgetown Univers

DANIEL GOURE is Deputy Director of the Interna

Security Program at the Center for Strategi

International Studies (CSIS). He joined CSIS in 

following 2 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defe

Director of the Office of Strategic Competitivenes

began his career with the U.S. Arms Contro

Disarmament Agency and specialized in regional 

control issues. He has been a defense analyst with S

Planning Corporation, R&D Associates, Sc

Applications International Corporation, and 

Technologies. Dr. Goure has published widely in 

journals as Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Mi

Technology, and NATO’s 16 Nations. He has be

adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University 

lecturer at the National War College, Air War C

Naval War College, and the Naval Postgraduate Scho

holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins Univ

and a B.A. from Pomona College.

ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II, a U.S. Army lieut

colonel, is currently assigned as the Director of Na

Security Affairs in the Strategic Studies Institut

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 198

commissioned as an armor officer, and has held a var

command and staff assignments in Germany 

Continental United States; he has also served 

assistant professor of European history at the U.S. M

Academy; as the Squadron S3 (Operations Officer) o

Cavalry; as Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at th

Army Armor Center at Fort Knox; as an action officer 

Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Fort Monro

and as a speechwriter for the U.S. Army Chief of 

186
Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria has published a book

Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the 

War, with the University Press of Kansas (2000

articles in a number of scholarly and professional m

journals to include The Journal of Strategic Studie

Journal of Military History, War in History, War & S

Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, Military Review

Airpower Journal. He is a graduate of the U.S. A

Command and General Staff College, and holds M.A

Ph.D. degrees in history from Princeton University.

RICHARD L. KUGLER is Distinguished Res

Professor at the Institute for National Strategic Stud

the National Defense University, where he advises 

DoD officials on national security policy, defense str

and force planning. Currently he is leading a 

research effort on globalization’s impact on na

security. Prior to joining INSS, he was a Research L

and Senior Social Scientist at RAND during 1988-

Before that, he was Director of DoD’s Strategic Co

Development Center and a Senior Executive in the O

Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evalua

Dr. Kugler is author of multiple books and many 

studies, and his articles have appeared in Foreign A

Survival, and other journals. He is coeditor of two bo

globalization and national security that will be publis

2001. He holds a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Insti

Technology, and is both a political scientist and oper

research analyst.

MICHAEL E. O’HANLON is a Senior Fellow in the f

policy studies program at the Brookings Institution 

he specializes in U.S. defense strategy and the d

budget, military technology, Northeast Asian securit

humanitarian intervention. He is also Adjunct Profes

the School of International and Public Affairs at Col

University, and a member of the International Instit

Strategic Studies as well as the Council on Fo

Relations. Dr. O’Hanlon’s most recent Brookings b

Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (cop

187
2000), which describes and assesses the hypothesis 

contemporary revolution in military affairs is within 

He has also recently completed a coauthored book w

Daalder on NATO’s recent crisis and conflict with Slo

Milosevic, entitled Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to 

Kosovo (also Brookings, 2000). Dr. O’Hanlon is pre

completing two Brookings books for publication in 200

on defense choices for the Bush administration and a s

with James Lindsay on the issue of national missile de

He holds an A.B., M.S.E., M.A. and Ph.D. from Prin

University.

IAN ROXBOROUGH is Professor of History and Soc

at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. H

previously employed at the London School of Economi

the University of Glasgow. During 1997-98 he was a 

Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Str

Studies at the National Defense University

Roxborough has published several books and num

articles on Latin America. His current research is a st

the post-Cold War debates about U.S. military strateg

doctrine. Dr. Roxborough has a B.A. from the Univer

York, England, and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisc

Madison. 

ROBERT D. STEELE is the author of On Intelligence

and Secrecy in an Open World (AFCEA International 

2000), and the founder and CEO of Open Source Sol

Inc. (OSS). He and his company are featured in The Y

Computers (2000), he has been twice named t

Microtimes 100 list of “industry leaders and unsung 

who . . . helped create the future," and is featured 

chapter on “The Future of the Spy” in Alvin and 

Toffler’s War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of th

Century, among other publications. He has written w

in the areas of information strategy, open s

intelligence, and asymmetric warfare inclu

information warfare. In the course of a 25-year na

security career, Mr. Steele has served as a Marine 

infantry officer and service-level plans officer; fu

188
clandestine, covert action, and technical collection d

programmed funds for overhead reconnais

capabilities; contributed to strategic signals intell

operations; managed an offensive counterintell

program; initiated an advanced information tech

project; and been the senior civilian responsib

founding a new national intelligence production fa

Mr. Steele holds graduate degrees in international rel

(Lehigh University) and public administration (Univ

of Oklahoma), and certificates in intelligence 

(Harvard University) and defense studies (Nava

College). 

JOHN F. TROXELL, a U.S. Army colonel, is cur

serving as the Director of National Security St

Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. 

War College. He has held assignments in the Departm

Army War Plans Division, as a force planner fo

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy 

Requirements, and was a former economics instruc

the U.S. Military Academy. Colonel Troxell’s opera

assignments have included service with the 1st In

Division, 293rd Engineer Battalion, and the 43rd En

Battalion. He also commanded the 3rd Engineer Bat

24th Infantry Division. His most recent assignment p

joining the faculty at the War College was as 

Engineer Plans Division, Combined Forces Com

Seoul, South Korea. Colonel Troxell has published a

in Parameters, Military Review, and his pre

publication from SSI was Force Planning in an E

Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framewor

earned a Bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Military Aca

and a Master’s degree from the Woodrow Wilson S

Princeton University. He is a 1997 graduate of th

Army War College. 

HUBA WASS DE CZEGE, a retired U.S. Army bri

general, was a career infantry officer with 2 years c

experience at the small unit level in Vietnam, and com

and staff at all levels up to assistant division comman

189
retirement in December 1993. He was one of the pri

developers of the U.S. Army’s Desert Storm and 

Cause-winning operational concept, AirLand B

Brigadier General Wass de Czege was the founder an

director of the U.S. Army’s premier graduate scho

military planners, the School of Advanced Military S

(SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. During NATO’s c

transformational years, from 1988-91, he was an adv

SACEUR, General “Jack” Galvin, and NATO Sec

General Manfred Woerner on military strategy relat

arms control and post Conventional Forces in Europe 

treaty strategy. From 1994 to 1996 he taught A

Military Strategy at SAMS. In 1994 he began studyi

effects of new technologies on the future practice 

military art. During the last 4 years, he has been 

engaged in the Army’s Army After Next studies projec

various other DoD consultancy assignments to in

service on a Defense Science Board summer study 

(1998) and on several Defense Advanced Res

Programs Agency (DARPA) advisory panels. Bri

General Wass de Czege was educated at West Point (U

1964) and Harvard (MPA, 1972).

190
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Steven Metz

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler