United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

the Judiciary, House of Representatives

ELECTION REFORM

Nine States’ 

Experiences 

Implementing Federal 

Requirements for 

Computerized 

Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists 

January 2006 

 

GAO-06-247 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2006

ELECTION REFORM

Nine States' Experiences Implementing 

Federal Requirements for Computerized 

Statewide Voter Registration Lists 

Highlights of GAO-06-247, a report to the 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives

The Help America Vote Act of 2002

(HAVA) was enacted in part to help

ensure that only eligible persons 

are registered to vote. Under 

HAVA, as of January 1, 2004, states

were to create computerized 

statewide voter registration lists to

serve as official rosters of legally

registered voters for elections for 

federal office. States, however, 

were given the option to seek a

waiver to postpone implementation 

of HAVA provisions until 2006. All 

but nine states did so. 

This report discusses the 

experiences of the nine states that 

were subject to the original HAVA 

deadline—Alaska, Arizona, 

Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,

Minnesota, South Carolina, South 

Dakota, and West Virginia. The

report describes actions election 

officials in these states reported 

taking to meet specific HAVA 

requirements—as applicable to 

their states—for (1) establishing 

computerized statewide voter 

registration lists and (2) verifying 

the accuracy of information on

voter registration applications and

maintaining accurate computerized

voter lists. GAO is also reporting 

what states said about challenges

they faced and lessons learned

implementing the requirements. 

Draft sections of this report were 

reviewed by the nine states; the

Election Assistance Commission, 

which was responsible for 

coordinating HAVA waivers; and

the Department of Justice. GAO 

incorporated technical comments, 

as appropriate. 

To establish the HAVA-required registration lists, five states modified 

existing computerized statewide voter registration systems; one state 

replaced an older system with a new one; and two states created statewide

voter registration systems for the first time, according to election officials

(see below). Officials from the ninth state reported no actions were taken 

because the state had such a registration list in place prior to HAVA. 

State election officials reported they took steps to verify information 

provided on voter registration applications and maintain their voter lists as 

required by HAVA. States either completed or were in the process of 

completing the required matches of voter registration information with state 

motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration records. Officials

from all nine states reported conducting the list maintenance activities 

required by HAVA: eliminating duplicate registrations and coordinating the 

voter list with state agency records on felons and the deceased to identify 

and remove the names of ineligible registrants. According to officials from 

four states, implementing HAVA improved the accuracy of the voter lists, for 

example, by correcting errors in voter information before they were entered

into the statewide list. Officials from the other five states reported little to no 

improvements to the accuracy of their lists in part, some said, because they 

had established systems similar to those required by HAVA prior to the 

enactment of the law. 

State election officials reported they faced challenges and learned lessons 

while implementing the HAVA requirements. For example, officials from 

seven states reported their experiences taught them that collaborating with 

local officials to develop the computerized statewide systems later helped 

them successfully implement the systems. 

States GAO Contacted Regarding Implementation of Required Registration Lists 

No changes needed 

to existing computerized 

system

Modified existing 

computerized system 

by adding new data

fields and data

matching capabilities

Replaced existing 

statewide computerized 

system

Created a statewide 

computerized system 

for the first time

S. Dak.

Minn.

S.C.

Ga.

Alaska

Ariz.

Hawaii

Source: GAO interviews with state election officials.

W. Va.

Ky.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-247.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William O.

Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8777 or

jenkinswo@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Eight States Reported Taking Actions to Establish Computerized 

Statewide Voter Registration Lists, and the Ninth Reported 

Having Such a List Prior to HAVA 10 

States Reported Taking Steps to Verify Information on Registration 

Applications and Maintain Lists, Improving the Accuracy of 

Some Lists 14 

State Election Officials Reported Numerous Challenges and

Lessons Learned while Implementing HAVA Requirements for 

Their Statewide Voter Registration Lists 25 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 29 

Appendix II EAC and DOJ Roles in Implementing HAVA 

Statewide Voter Registration List Provisions 31 

Appendix III Reported Experiences of Alaska Election Officials 

Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List 

Provisions 33 

Appendix IV Reported Experiences of Arizona Election Officials 

Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List 

Provisions 35 

Appendix V Reported Experiences of Georgia Election Officials 

Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List 

Provisions 38 

Page i GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VI Reported Experiences of Hawaii Election 

Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration 

List Provisions 41 

Appendix VII Reported Experiences of Kentucky Election 

Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration 

List Provisions 44 

Appendix VIII Reported Experiences of Minnesota Election 

Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration 

List Provisions 47 

Appendix IX Reported Experiences of South Carolina Election 

Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration List 

Provisions 50 

Appendix X Reported Experiences of South Dakota Election 

Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration 

List Provisions 53 

Appendix XI Reported Experiences of West Virginia Election 

Officials Implementing HAVA Voter Registration 

List Provisions 55 

Appendix XII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58 

Page ii GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Tables 

Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or 

Assigned by States to Implement HAVA Requirements 15 

Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVARequired Verification of Information on Voter Registration 

Applications by Matching with MVA Records 16 

Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify 

Duplicate Registration 18 

Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify 

Names of Deceased Registrants 19 

Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify 

Ineligible Felons 20 

Figures 

Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That 

Could Be Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration System 9 

Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish 

Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists 11 

Page iii GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Abbreviations 

AAMVA American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators 

DOJ Department of Justice 

EAC Election Assistance Commission 

HAVA Help America Vote Act 

HAVV Help America Vote Verification 

MCD minor civil decision 

MVA motor vehicle agency 

NASED National Association of State Election Directors 

NASS National Association of Secretaries of State 

SSA Social Security Administration 

VRAZ Voter Registration Arizona 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iv GAO-06-247 Election Reform
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

February 7, 2006 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 

Chairman 

Committee on the Judiciary 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Confidence in the electoral process to produce free and fair elections is of 

the utmost importance to a legitimate democratic political system. The 

basic goal of an election system is simple to state but not simple to 

achieve—enable all eligible voters to register to vote, cast their votes, and 

have those votes counted accurately. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) was enacted, in part, to help ensure that only eligible persons are 

registered to vote.1

 This law provides that, among other things, as of 

January 1, 2004, states are to create computerized statewide voter 

registration lists that serve as official rosters of legally registered voters 

for elections for federal office.2

 Under this provision, most states are also 

to verify the accuracy of information provided on voter registration 

applications by matching it with information contained in the state motor 

vehicle agency’s (MVA) database or the Social Security Administration’s 

(SSA) records, as appropriate.3

 In addition, states are to perform list 

maintenance on statewide voter lists by coordinating them on a regular 

basis with state records on felony status and deaths, in order to identify 

and remove names of ineligible voters. 

 1

Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002). 

2

HAVA in general applies to elections for federal office in the 55 U.S. states and territories, 

including the District of Columbia, but for the purposes of this report, we refer only to the

states. North Dakota does not require voters to register to vote and is, therefore, not 

subject to the HAVA requirements to create and maintain a computerized statewide voter 

registration list. 

3

Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter registration application 

information by comparing or matching it with MVA or SSA records. In general, under 

HAVA, states requiring full Social Security numbers on voter registration applications prior 

to 1975 in order to verify the identity of a registrant are not subject to this HAVA 

requirement.

Page 1 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Under HAVA, states could apply to the Election Assistance Commission 

(EAC) by January 1, 2004, for a waiver, postponing the effective 

implementation date of the statewide voter registration list requirement 

for 2 years until January 1, 2006.4

 All but nine states exercised the waiver 

option. The nine states that were to implement the HAVA requirements 

described above, by the original 2004 deadline were Alaska, Arizona, 

Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 

West Virginia. This report discusses the experiences of these nine states as

they implemented these HAVA requirements, in particular, the actions that

state election officials reported taking to (1) establish computerized 

statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify the accuracy of information 

on voter registration applications and maintain accurate computerized 

voter lists. In addition, we report what states told us regarding (3) the 

challenges they faced and lessons they learned while implementing these 

requirements. 

In addition to this report, we have issued or plan to issue reports this year 

on other specific election issues. These reports, as did our earlier work 

issued in 2001,5

 in general focus on the people, processes, and technology 

associated with the preparation for and administration of elections. 

Specifically, in June 2005, we issued a report on the efforts of selected

state and local election officials in seven states to ensure that voter 

registration lists are accurate.6

 In September 2005, we issued two reports, 

one on the efforts of selected local election officials in these same seven 

states on managing voter registration and ensuring eligible citizens can 

vote7 and the other on significant security and reliability concerns that 

have been identified for electronic voting systems.8

 Later this year, we plan

 4

HAVA established the EAC to provide guidance and manage payments to the states for the 

implementation of HAVA’s requirements. 

5

GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across the Nation, GAO-02-3 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001). 

6

GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials

Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10,

2005). 

7

GAO, Elections: Views of Selected Local Election Officials on Managing Voter 

Registration and Ensuring Eligible Citizens Can Vote, GAO-05-997 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005). 

8

GAO, Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting 

Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed, GAO-05-956 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
to issue a report on the Department of Defense’s implementation of the 

Federal Voting Assistance Program to facilitate absentee voting by military 

personnel during the November 2004 election. These reports respond to 

congressional requests made prior to the November 2004 election. In 

addition, we are undertaking a broader, more comprehensive review of 

election administration processes related to the November 2004 general 

election. This comprehensive study, which we plan to issue in 2006, will 

address activities and challenges—people, processes, and technology—

associated with each major stage of election administration to include 

registration, absentee and early voting, election day preparation and 

activities, and vote counting and certification. 

To meet our objectives for this report, we conducted structured telephone 

interviews with state election officials in each of the nine states. We also

interviewed officials with and obtained documents from the EAC and the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, which is responsible for 

enforcing parts of HAVA. In addition, we reviewed relevant state and 

federal laws. 

We did not independently verify the responses to questions posed to state 

officials during our telephone interviews. However, state election officials

were provided the opportunity to verify the accuracy of their responses for 

this report. We also provided relevant sections of the report to EAC and 

DOJ officials to verify the accuracy of the information they provided. 

Appendix I provides a more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology. 

We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of actions 

in order to establish the HAVA-required computerized voter registration 

lists; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no actions were taken 

because, according to the official, prior to HAVA, the state had a system in 

place that met the HAVA requirements. With regard to the other states, 

officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South Carolina, and South Dakota 

reported they had computerized statewide voter registration systems in 

place prior to January 2004 that they modified in order to implement the 

HAVA requirements; officials from Minnesota said their state replaced 

rather than modified the computerized voter registration system it had in 

place prior to HAVA. Officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their 

states did not have computerized statewide voter registration lists in place

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
prior to HAVA and created them for the first time to implement the law. 

Additionally, election officials from all states except Alaska, where state 

officials are responsible for maintaining the statewide voter registration 

list, told us that their states provided some form of support to local 

election officials to ensure that they could operate the computerized 

statewide voter registration system to enter and update voter registration 

information. 

State election officials reported taking the steps required by HAVA to 

verify information provided on voter registration applications and 

maintain their voter lists, and some officials reported the accuracy of the

voter lists improved as a result. The steps states took depended on what 

HAVA provisions applied to them. Of the states we reviewed, Alaska, 

Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia were subject to the 

HAVA provision for verifying information provided on voter registration 

applications by matching it with SSA and MVA records. These states were 

in various stages of implementing the requirement, officials told us. At the 

time of our review, four of these five states were matching information 

with MVA databases, and two states—Arizona and South Dakota—were 

matching information with SSA records, according to officials. Alaska, 

Minnesota, and West Virginia officials said they were in the process of 

making arrangements with SSA to conduct matches. The requirement to 

verify information on voter registration applications by matching it with 

MVA and SSA records, in general, is optional for states that collect voters’ 

full Social Security numbers on these applications.9

 Of the states we 

reviewed, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina fall into this 

category; officials from Hawaii reported their state voluntarily matched 

information on registration applications with MVA records. Officials from 

all nine states also reported conducting the list maintenance activities 

required by HAVA; all of the state officials said their states eliminate 

duplicate registrations and coordinate the voter list with other state 

records to identify and remove names of deceased voters and persons 

ineligible under state law to register to vote because of their felony status. 

 9

HAVA provides that for those states using full Social Security numbers on voter 

registration applications in accordance with Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, HAVA’s 

voter registration verification requirements are optional. Of the states we reviewed, 

Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina collect the full Social Security number and,

therefore, have not been treated as subject to the HAVA registration information 

verification requirement. Georgia’s right to this Privacy Act exemption, however, was in 

litigation at the time of our review. A district court order (Schwier v. Cox, 

Civil No. 1:00-CV-2820, (N.D. Ga. January 31, 2005)) that Georgia does not qualify for this 

exemption was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 

Page 4 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West Virginia officials said that 

implementing the HAVA requirements led to some or great improvement in 

the accuracy of their voter lists by reducing duplicate registrations or 

improving the quality of voter information before it was entered into the

statewide voter list. Officials from the remaining states—Alaska, Georgia, 

Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina—reported that HAVA had little or 

no effect on the accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely occurred, 

some of these officials said, because their states had operated

computerized statewide lists for many years prior to HAVA. While HAVA 

contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter registration 

lists, even after such requirements are implemented, maintaining accurate

computerized lists will likely remain a challenging task for state and local

officials. In part this is because of the inherent risks of managing a 

dynamic body of information that is constantly changing as voters move, 

change names, come of age to vote, or become ineligible to vote. 

Creating statewide registration lists required by HAVA presented a number

of challenges and lessons learned, officials told us, as they developed their 

computerized statewide voter registration systems, made them

operational, and later managed them. Election officials from Minnesota 

and West Virginia said that, for example, they adopted project timelines as 

they developed their systems that they later found were too compressed. 

Officials from Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed that 

completing the time-consuming task of converting existing voter 

registration data, which often were inaccurate and needed to be corrected, 

from old voter registration systems to the new statewide systems was a 

challenge. Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Dakota, and West 

Virginia officials also told us that as they developed their computerized 

systems, they learned that collaborating with local officials to design and

develop the systems was important to the states’ ultimate successful 

implementation of the systems. Officials also shared challenges and 

lessons learned related to making their systems operational. For example, 

some officials also told us they learned that prior to putting their systems 

into service, it is important to train staff to use the new system, and 

officials from Minnesota suggested providing the training manual online to 

make the most recent information available to staff. State officials also 

shared challenges and learned lessons from managing the computerized 

systems. For example, Hawaii officials said one challenge they faced was 

updating voter information and using their computerized system at the 

same time. Hawaii and Kentucky officials suggested officials keep in mind

that selecting future upgrades to the system will likely involve negotiations 

with local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or administrative 

and technical constraints. 

Page 5 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Background As election officials manage voter registration processes and voter lists, 

they must balance two competing goals. On the one hand, officials seek to

minimize the burden on eligible people registering to vote. On the other 

hand, they also seek to ensure that the voter lists are accurate, a task that 

involves including the name of each eligible voter on the voter list, 

removing names of ineligible voters, and having safeguards in place so that

names of voters are not removed in error from the list. 

Congress has passed legislation relating to the administration of both 

federal and state elections, pursuant to its various constitutional powers, 

including processes related to maintaining voter lists. The constitutional 

framework for elections contemplates both state and federal roles. States 

are responsible for the administration of both their own elections and 

federal elections. States regulate various aspects of the election process, 

including, for example, ballot access, registration procedures, absentee 

voting requirements, establishment of polling places, provision of election

day workers, and counting and certifying the vote. The states in turn incur 

the costs associated with these activities. Although the states are 

responsible for running elections, Congress has authority to affect the 

administration of elections. Congress’ authority to regulate elections 

depends upon the type of election. With regard to federal elections, 

Congress has constitutional authority over both congressional and 

presidential elections. In addition, with respect to federal, state, and local 

elections, a number of constitutional amendments authorize Congress to 

enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory acts. 

Most recently, HAVA was enacted in 2002, and among other things, 

mandated that each state establish a computerized statewide voter 

registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for conducting 

elections for federal office in each state.10 The voter registration list is to 

serve as a secure, centralized, and interactive database that is coordinated

with other state agency databases and grants state and local election 

officials immediate electronic access to enter and update voter 

information. States and territories were to implement a computerized 

statewide voter registration database by January 1, 2004. States could 

apply to EAC by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until 

January 1, 2006. Nine states and one territory—Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,

 10In addition to states, the District of Columbia, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin 

Islands, and Puerto Rico are generally subject to HAVA requirements. 

Page 6 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West 

Virginia, and Guam—did not apply for a waiver. 

States subject to HAVA must also take steps to ensure that the statewide 

voter registration lists are accurate. Under HAVA, states are to perform list 

maintenance on a regular basis by removing ineligible voters from the 

statewide voter list. States are to coordinate the computerized list with 

their state agencies’ records on felony status and death to verify voters’ 

eligibility. For example, states must cross-reference the voter registration 

list with their state’s records on felons to remove the names of ineligible

voters and records on death to remove deceased registrants. States are 

also required to remove duplicate registrants, that is, names of voters that

appear more than once on the statewide voter list. HAVA, in general, 

leaves it to the states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of 

actions to implement this list maintenance requirement. 

In addition to undertaking list maintenance, states are required under 

HAVA to verify voter registration application information. For federal 

elections, a voter registration application may not be processed or 

accepted by a state unless it contains the applicant’s driver’s license 

number or the last four digits of the Social Security number.11 If the voter 

has neither of these numbers, the state must assign the voter a voter 

identification number. Voter registration information is to be matched 

with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records or Social Security

Administration (SSA) records, depending on the information provided by 

the applicant. Certain state laws require applicants to provide their full 

Social Security number on voter registration applications. HAVA provides 

that for those states requiring full Social Security numbers on such 

applications, in accordance with Section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the 

HAVA voter registration verification requirements are optional. Of the nine 

 11With respect to driver’s license related information, the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Pub. L. 

No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005)) establishes certain minimum standards, effective in May 

2008, for state issuance of driver’s licenses in order for such licenses to be recognized for 

any official purpose by federal agencies. For a state driver’s license to be recognized by a 

federal agency, the REAL ID Act provides, for example, that states require applicants to 

present certain types of information, such as documentation of a person’s name, address of 

principal residence, and evidence of a person’s U.S. citizenship or lawful immigration 

status prior to issuance. Federal recognition of state-issued driver’s licenses will also be 

conditioned upon, among other things, a requirement that documents presented by an

applicant be verified by the state, that states enter into a memorandum of understanding 

with the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the legal presence of noncitizen 

applicants, and that states provide all other states electronic access to state motor vehicle 

database information. 

Page 7 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
states that did not receive waivers, four—Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and 

South Carolina—collect the full Social Security number and, therefore, are 

not subject to this HAVA requirement, according to state officials. 

Under HAVA, the state MVA must enter into an agreement with SSA to 

verify the applicant information when applicants provide the last four 

digits of their Social Security number rather than a driver’s license number 

on voter registration applications. HAVA additionally requires SSA to 

develop methods to verify the accuracy of information on the voter 

registration applications by matching the name, date of birth, and the last 

four digits of the Social Security number provided on the voter registration 

application with SSA records. SSA is to determine whether SSA records 

indicate the individual is deceased. 

Figure 1 provides an example of how a computerized statewide voter 

registration list could verify voter eligibility through matching registration 

applications with MVA and SSA, matching the statewide list with state 

records on felons and death notices from the state courts and the state 

vital statistics agency, and identifying duplicate registrants in the 

statewide list.12

 12Under federal law, U.S. Attorneys are required to give written notice of felony convictions

in federal district courts to the chief state election official of the offender’s state of 

residence upon conviction of the offender. The law also requires the state election officials 

to notify the election officials of the local jurisdiction in which an offender resides of 

federal felony convictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g). This provision was enacted into law

in 1993 in section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), Pub. L. No. 

103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993). 

Page 8 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Figure 1: Overview of Verification and Maintenance Processes That Could Be Implemented Using a Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration System 

Source: GAO analysis; graphics by Art Explosion.

Statewide voter list

Verifying information on

voter registration applications

Maintaining list by 

coordinating it with state 

agency records

State courts

Motor vehicle agency (MVA)

Social Security

Administration (SSA)

State vital statistic 

office

Apply to register to vote

State or local election office

matches information on

applications with MVA records, 

such as

matches information on

applications with SSA records, 

such as

Name

Date of birth

Address

Driver’s license number

provide felony status

information to state

election office to identify

names of ineligible voters

provides information to 

state election office 

to identify names of

deceased registrants 

Name

Last four digits of Social 

Security number

Date of birth

Records of the deceased

Transmits applicant 

information to MVA or 

SSA for verification

Based on results of 

MVA and SSA matches, 

adds eligible registrants

to the list or clarifies

inaccurate information

Identifies duplicate and 

ineligibile registrants

To assist states with implementing these federal mandates, HAVA 

authorizes funding to states for the creation and maintenance of the 

computerized statewide voter lists. In turn, HAVA requires states to 

provide such support as may be required to local jurisdictions to enable 

them to use the computerized voter list. HAVA also established EAC and 

charged it with, among other things, providing voluntary technical 

guidance on the administration of federal elections, serving as a national

clearinghouse for information on election administration, and providing 

Page 9 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
federal funding to the states to implement the HAVA provisions. Also, DOJ 

has enforcement authority with respect to the uniform and 

nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA requirements such as 

those relating to the statewide voter registration list and verifying 

information on voter registration applications. According to DOJ officials, 

following the passage of HAVA, it was unnecessary to take enforcement 

actions against any of the nine nonwaiver states. DOJ officials also 

reported working with the states to address initial challenges and provide 

informal guidance while EAC awaited staff and resources. Appendix II 

discusses EAC’s and DOJ’s roles regarding computerized statewide voter 

registration lists in greater detail. 

Officials from eight of the nine states reported taking a variety of actions 

in order to implement the HAVA computerized voter registration list 

requirement; an official from one state, Kentucky, reported no actions 

were taken because the state had such a system in place prior to the 

enactment of HAVA. Officials from Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, South 

Carolina, and South Dakota reported modifying their existing 

computerized statewide voter registration systems; officials from 

Minnesota said the existing computerized voter registration system was 

replaced; and officials from Arizona and West Virginia said their states 

created computerized statewide voter registration systems for the first 

time. Although these eight states reported taking different steps to 

establish computerized statewide voter registration systems, election 

officials reported that all of these systems met the HAVA provisions that 

called for computerized statewide voter registration lists. According to 

officials, these computerized lists served as centralized and interactive 

databases containing the names of all legally registered voters in the state

and granted election officials immediate electronic access to query, 

update, and enter voter information. They also said these computerized 

lists were capable of generating official voter registration lists. Figure 2 

summarizes the actions that eight of the nine states reported taking to 

establish computerized voter registration lists. 

Eight States Reported 

Taking Actions to 

Establish 

Computerized 

Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists, and 

the Ninth Reported 

Having Such a List 

Prior to HAVA

Page 10 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Figure 2: Actions Nine States Reported Taking to Establish Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists 

No changes needed to existing computerized system

Modified existing computerized system by adding new data fields and data matching capabilities

Replaced existing statewide computerized system

Created a statewide computerized system for the first time

Ky.

W. Va .

S. Dak.

Minn.

S.C.

Ga.

Alaska

Ariz.

Hawaii

Source: GAO interviews with state election officials.

Election officials from six states, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, 

South Carolina, and South Dakota, said their states’ existing computerized 

statewide voter registration systems, in place in some cases for many 

Page 11 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
years prior to HAVA, allowed state and local election officials to share and 

maintain an interactive database of registered voters and generate official

voter registration lists. As a result, officials from Kentucky reported they 

were required to make no change to their existing system to implement the 

HAVA requirements. Officials from these other states reported that they 

were required to only modify their existing systems, in some cases making 

only minor changes, in order to implement HAVA. For example, in Hawaii, 

election officials reported their state has operated a computerized 

statewide voter registration system since 1982 and only made minor 

technical changes as a result of HAVA, such as adding the ability to flag 

inactive voters. In addition, since Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South 

Carolina collect voters’ full Social Security numbers on voter registration 

applications, they are not subject to the HAVA provisions for verifying 

information on voter registration applications by matching it with MVA 

and SSA records, officials reported. Accordingly, officials said they did not 

have to modify their existing systems to provide this matching capability. 

Alaska and South Dakota are subject to HAVA’s data matching provisions. 

These states also had computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to 

HAVA, and their election officials said they modified them as a result of 

HAVA. Alaska election officials reported that they added new data fields to 

the computerized statewide voter registration system to capture the last 

four digits of the voters’ Social Security numbers and to identify first-time 

voters who registered by mail, which required little or no effort.

13 South 

Dakota election officials reported making similar changes as well as 

adding the capability to match voter registration applications with MVA 

and SSA records, actions that required a moderate level of effort, they 

said. 

In the three remaining states, officials reported creating new systems in 

order to implement HAVA. Officials from Minnesota said their state 

operated a computerized statewide voter registration system prior to 

HAVA. Their state replaced rather than modified this system. Arizona and 

West Virginia election officials reported that their states did not have 

computerized statewide voter lists in place prior to HAVA and that they

expended a significant level of effort to create such systems. Prior to 

HAVA, some counties and local jurisdictions in these states had 

computerized voter registration systems in place. However, the systems 

 13Individuals who register by mail and have not previously voted in an election for federal 

office in the state are, in general, required to provide identification at the polls the first time 

they cast a ballot. 

Page 12 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
were not interconnected to create statewide databases of legally 

registered voters. Election officials in Arizona said that creating the 

computerized list was also complicated because state and county election 

officials lacked the legal authority to access state records they were to 

match with the statewide voter list. The state had to pass new statutes and 

amend others so that election officials could receive information from 

state agencies, such as felony records, according to a senior election 

official. 

Some officials told us that in addition to the capabilities required by HAVA 

their states’ computerized voter registration systems provide election 

management tools that help them prepare for and conduct elections. For 

example, West Virginia election officials told us their computerized voter

registration list is also able to identify voters who wished to serve as poll

workers and produce reports on absentee ballots, early voters, poll 

workers, and election data statistics. Minnesota state election officials said 

that their computerized voter registration list includes a module that 

centrally tracks absentee ballots provided to military personnel or other 

citizens residing overseas. 

Some state officials are planning to enhance their systems’ election 

management features. For example, Arizona plans to award a contract to 

implement an updated version of its current system, which is to include 

the ability to track out-of-state moves by voters and manage issues such as 

petitions, provisional ballots, poll workers, and poll locations. Kentucky 

election officials told us that they wish to upgrade their system to provide 

more election management tools to counties, including a new function to 

identify poll workers and complete absentee ballot forms. See appendixes

III through XI for more information on each state’s current computerized 

statewide voter registration system and future plans. 

Federal funds are available to states to assist them as they implement the 

HAVA provisions.14 In turn, HAVA requires states to provide such support 

as may be required to local jurisdictions to help them use the 

computerized voter lists. Officials from six states we interviewed—Alaska, 

Arizona, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia—

reported receiving federal funds to establish computerized voter lists; 

 14To be eligible to receive federal payments to implement this and other HAVA provisions, 

states must comply with certain requirements such as appropriating state funds equal to

5 percent of the total funding to be spent on implementing HAVA. 

Page 13 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
these states said they spent a combination of federal and state funds 

totaling about $8.4 million to establish their computerized lists. As 

required by HAVA, each of the nine states, except Alaska, where the state 

is solely responsible for entering and maintaining voter registration 

information, provided some type of support to local jurisdictions to help 

them operate the computerized statewide voter registration systems, 

according to officials. For example, South Carolina election officials told 

us that they provided personal computers and software to local 

jurisdictions, as well as training for staff. 

State election officials reported taking required steps to verify information 

provided on voter registration applications and to maintain accurate 

computerized voter lists. Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and 

West Virginia—the states subject to the HAVA provisions to verify 

information provided on voter registration applications—took steps to do 

so by collecting the required unique identifying information from voters, 

officials told us. As of November 2005, Arizona and South Dakota were 

matching information on the applications with state MVA or SSA records, 

according to election officials. The remaining states were in various stages 

of implementing the matching requirement. All nine states conducted 

regular voter list maintenance activities to purge duplicates and remove 

names of persons ineligible to vote, such as deceased registrants, as 

required by HAVA, officials also reported. Officials from four of the nine 

states we reviewed said that implementing the HAVA requirements led to 

some or great improvement in the accuracy of their voter lists. While 

HAVA contains requirements that should help states maintain accurate

voter registration lists, maintaining accurate voter lists will likely remain a 

challenge for election officials, in part because lists are dynamic and 

constantly changing as voters move, change names, or become ineligible

to vote. 

States Reported 

Taking Steps to Verify 

Information on 

Registration 

Applications and 

Maintain Lists, 

Improving the 

Accuracy of Some 

Lists 

States Reported Taking 

Steps to Verify Voter 

Registration Applications 

with MVAs and SSA 

Under HAVA, most states are to verify the accuracy of information on 

voter registration applications by matching information, such as the name

and date of birth, with MVA or SSA records, depending on the information 

provided by the applicant. As noted earlier, HAVA also requires that voter 

registration applicants for federal elections provide or be assigned one of

several types of unique identifying information that can be matched with 

other records for verification. For matching purposes, applicants are to be

asked for their state driver’s license number or, if an applicant has not 

been issued a driver’s license, the last four digits of the voter’s Social 

Security number. An eligible applicant who has not been issued a state

Page 14 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
driver’s license or a Social Security number can still register to vote. In 

those cases, election officials are required to assign the registrant an 

identification number. 

Not all states are subject to the HAVA requirement to verify voter 

registration application information by comparing or matching the 

information with MVA or SSA records. In general, under HAVA, states 

requiring full Social Security numbers on voter registration applications 

prior to 1975 in order to verify the identity of a registrant are not subject to

the HAVA requirement that application information be matched with MVA 

or SSA records. HAVA provides that for those states the voter registration 

verification requirement is optional. Four of the nine states we reviewed—

Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, and South Carolina—collect the full Social 

Security number on voter registration applications and, therefore, 

according to state officials, are not subject to this provision. Five of the

nine states we reviewed—Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and 

West Virginia—are subject to this HAVA provision to collect or assign a 

unique identifying numbers and then verify voter information by matching

it with MVA or SSA information. 

Officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA provision 

reported their systems collected or assigned the required unique 

identifying numbers for registered voters, as indicated in table 1. 

Table 1: Reported Type of Unique Identifying Number Collected or Assigned by States to Implement HAVA Requirements 

State Driver’s license number Last four digits of Social Security number Voter registration number

a

AlaskabX X X

Arizona X X X

Minnesota X X X

South Dakota X X X 

West Virginia X X X 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states. 

a

HAVA requires that for those applicants who have not been issued a driver’s license or a Social 

Security number, states shall assign them a voter registration number. 

b

In addition to this information, Alaska’s voter registration application allows voters to provide their full 

Social Security number or an Alaska state identification card number. 

Officials from four of the five states also reported taking steps to match 

information on voter registration applications with state MVA records and 

provided the date by which MVA matching became available, as indicated

in table 2. 

Page 15 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Table 2: Reported Actions Taken by States to Implement HAVA-Required Verification of Information on Voter Registration

Applications by Matching with MVA Records

State Match applications with MVA records Date matching capability became operational 

Alaska X January 2004 

Arizona X January 2004

Minnesota X January 2004

South Dakota X January 2004 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states. 

In West Virginia, officials said that their state was not yet conducting these 

required matches because they were still in the process of developing an 

agreement with the MVA to verify information on applications. They also 

reported difficulty conducting data matches because the MVA lacked the 

ability to interface with the statewide voter list. They expected this issue 

to be resolved by 2006. Although not required to do so, Hawaii voluntarily 

implemented this HAVA requirement, election officials said. 

In addition, officials from all five of these states subject to this HAVA 

provision reported taking steps to match information on voter registration 

applications with SSA records. As noted earlier, if voter registration 

applicants provide the last four digits of their Social Security number on 

the registration applications rather than their driver’s license numbers, 

states are to verify information on the application by matching it with SSA 

records. Officials from two states—Arizona and South Dakota—reported 

that their states were currently conducting the required matches. They 

were not able to conduct these matches by the January 1, 2004, deadline 

because SSA’s computer program to process these matches was not 

operational until 8 months after the deadline had passed, in August 2004.15

Election officials from three states—Alaska, Minnesota, and West 

Virginia—said their states were not yet conducting these required matches 

because they were still in the process of developing an agreement with 

SSA to verify information on applications. Minnesota officials also said 

they encountered technical difficulties electronically sharing data with 

SSA but anticipated the agreement and the technological issues would be 

resolved so that they could conduct matches by 2006. Alaska and West 

 15GAO, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials

Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists, GAO-05-478 (Washington, D.C.: June 10,

2005). 

Page 16 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Virginia officials could not provide an estimated date by which the 

agreement would be completed and the required matches conducted. 

All States Reported Taking 

Steps to Perform Required 

List Maintenance on a 

Regular Basis 

In addition to requiring most states to verify information on voter 

registration applications, HAVA provides that all states, including the nine

states discussed in this report, are to perform list maintenance on the 

HAVA-required statewide voter registration lists on a regular basis.16 In 

general, list maintenance activities include adding new voters to the voter 

list; updating voter information if a voter moves within the state; and

removing the names of ineligible voters from the voter list, such as 

persons who are deceased or convicted of a felony that, under state law, 

makes them ineligible to be registered to vote. HAVA requires that the 

computerized list be coordinated with state agency records on felony 

status and death to remove the names of ineligible voters. Duplicate 

registrations, that is, names of voters that appear more than once on the 

statewide voter list, are also to be eliminated. 

Election officials in all nine states reported taking the required actions to 

perform list maintenance on a regular basis to identify and remove 

duplicates and names of registrants ineligible to vote. The sections below 

identify the type and frequency of actions states reported taking to 

implement the HAVA-required list maintenance activities in accordance

with state and local procedures. These procedures for maintaining the

statewide voter list varied from state to state, as detailed in appendixes 

III-XI. 

Identifying duplicate voter registrations. HAVA requires that states are to

remove duplicate registrations, that is, names of voters that appear more 

than once, from the statewide voter list. Duplicate registrations may occur 

in the statewide lists when, for example, voters move within a state, 

reregister, and then fail to notify the county in which they were previously 

registered to vote. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to 

determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list 

maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported that their 

systems check for duplicate registrants to ensure that voters are not listed 

 16HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the administration of elections. The

National Voter Registration Act, for example, was enacted, in part to establish registration 

procedures designed to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in 

elections for Federal office,” “protect the integrity of the electoral process,” and “ensure

that accurate and current voter registration lists are maintained.” 

Page 17 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
in the statewide voter list more than once. When applications are entered 

into the statewide database of registered voters, some states’ systems 

automatically screen the applications on a real-time basis, that is, as the 

data are entered, to ensure that they do not duplicate an existing 

registration; other states screen the entire list on a regular basis. Table 3 

shows the variation by state in the reported type and frequency of actions 

taken to identify duplicate registrations. 

Table 3: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Duplicate Registration

State 

Applications screened

to identify duplicate 

registrations 

Frequency of 

application screening

Voter registration list 

checked for duplicate 

registrations

Frequency of list 

checks 

Alaska X Real time X Annual

Arizona X Daily X Periodic

Georgia X Real time X Monthly

Hawaii X Real time N/AaN/Aa

Kentucky X Real time X Periodic

Minnesota X Daily X Annual

South Carolina X Real time X Quarterly 

South Dakota N/AbN/AbX Annual

West Virginia X Real time X Periodic 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states. 

a

Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration applications, not the entire 

database of registered voters, are checked on a real-time basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the 

states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list maintenance 

requirement. 

b

Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter registration applications, is 

checked annually. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to determine the type and 

frequency of actions to implement this list maintenance requirement. 

Identifying names of deceased voters. HAVA requires that states are to 

coordinate the voter list with their state agencies’ death records to verify 

voters’ eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to 

determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list 

maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states reported that they 

or local officials regularly matched state agency death records with the 

statewide voter lists to ensure that names of deceased registrants do not 

remain on the rolls. Most of these matches were based on electronic or 

paper records. Table 4 shows the variation by state in the reported type 

and frequency of actions taken to identify deceased registrations. 

Page 18 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Table 4: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Names of Deceased Registrants 

State 

Applications screened

to identify names of

deceased registrants 

Frequency of 

application screening

Voter registration list 

checked for names of

deceased registrants 

Frequency of list 

checks 

Alaska X Real time X Monthly

Arizona N/AaN/AaX Monthly

Georgia X Real time X Monthly

Hawaii N/AaN/AaX Biweekly

Kentucky N/AaN/AaX Monthly

Minnesota N/AaN/AaX Monthly

South Carolina X N/AaX Monthly

South Dakota X Daily X Weekly 

West Virginia N/AaN/AaX Monthly

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states. 

a

Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter registration applications, is 

checked. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of 

actions to implement this list maintenance requirement. 

Identifying persons convicted of a disqualifying felony. HAVA requires 

states to coordinate the voter list with their state agencies’ records on 

felony status to verify voters’ eligibility. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the 

states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to 

implement this list maintenance requirement. Officials from all nine states

reported that their states matched state court records with the statewide 

lists to identify persons ineligible under state law to vote because of a

disqualifying felony conviction. These matches were based on electronic 

or paper records. Table 5 shows the variation by state in the reported type 

and frequency of actions taken to identify voters ineligible to register 

because of a felony conviction. 

Page 19 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Table 5: Reported Type and Frequency of Actions Taken to Identify Ineligible Felons

State 

Applications screened to

identify names of

ineligible felons 

Frequency of application

screening

Voter registration list 

checked for names of

ineligible felons Frequency of list checks 

Alaska X Real time X Monthly

Arizona N/AaN/AaX Periodic

Georgia X Real time X Monthly

Hawaii N/AaN/AaX Biweekly

Kentucky N/AaN/AaX Monthly

Minnesota N/AaN/AaX Monthly

South Carolina X Monthly X Monthly

South Dakota X Daily N/AbN/Ab

West Virginia N/AaN/AaX Periodic

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by states. 

a

Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, the entire list, not voter registration applications, is 

checked. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’ discretion to determine the type and frequency of 

actions to implement this list maintenance requirement. 

b

Not applicable. To meet the HAVA requirements, voter registration applications, not the entire 

database of registered voters, are checked a daily basis. HAVA, in general, leaves it to the states’

discretion to determine the type and frequency of actions to implement this list maintenance 

requirement. 

Identifying individuals ineligible to vote because of mental 

incompetence. The voter eligibility requirements in the nine states we 

reviewed provided that applicants declared mentally incompetent to vote

are not eligible to register to vote. Officials in eight states reported they 

have procedures in place to identify registrants ineligible to vote because 

of court orders of mental incompetence. All reported that removing 

registrants for this reason was a rare occurrence. The ninth state, West 

Virginia, did not report such procedures are in place.17

 17West Virginia election officials told us that while state law provides that a person found 

mentally incompetent is ineligible to register to vote, they have not received such 

information from courts. 

Page 20 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Officials from four states—Arizona, Minnesota, South Dakota, and West 

Virginia—reported that implementing the HAVA requirements improved 

the accuracy of their voter lists somewhat or to a great extent. South 

Dakota officials reported that verifying applications has helped identify 

inaccurate information on applications and that matching applications 

with the MVA helped reduce the number of duplicate registrations. 

Officials from Minnesota, which replaced its existing computerized voter

registration with a new one in order to implement HAVA, also reported 

that implementing the HAVA requirements reduced the incidence of 

duplicate registrations. And officials in the states of Arizona and West 

Virginia, which built entirely new systems to comply with HAVA, reported 

a great improvement in the accuracy of their voter rolls. 

Four States Reported That 

Voter List Accuracy 

Improved as a Result of 

HAVA, but Managing 

Inherent Risks to Voter 

List Accuracy Remains a 

Challenge 

Officials from the remaining states—Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, 

and South Carolina—reported that HAVA had little or no effect on the 

accuracy of their voter lists. This result likely occurred, some of these 

officials said, because their states have had well-established computerized 

statewide lists, similar to those required by HAVA, in place for many years 

prior to HAVA. Officials from Georgia, Hawaii, and Kentucky also 

attributed this result to their states’ ability to require the full Social 

Security number on voter registration applications. Having this unique 

identifier provided a means to identify and remove duplicate registrants 

from voter lists, they stated. 

While HAVA contains requirements directed at maintaining accurate voter 

registration lists, even after such requirements are implemented, 

maintaining accurate computerized lists will likely remain a challenging 

task for state and local officials. In part this is because of the inherent 

risks of managing a dynamic body of information that is constantly 

changing as voters move, change names, come of age to vote, or become 

ineligible to vote. Managing these risks has challenged election officials 

across the country for some time, as we have documented in a series of 

past reports. In October 2001 we issued a report that described the 

operations and challenges associated with each stage of the election 

process, including list maintenance. We reported that, judging from our 

national survey of local election officials, officials were challenged by

continually updating and deleting information from voter registration lists 

and had concerns related to obtaining accurate and timely information to 

keep voter lists accurate.18 In June 2005 we reported on the processes 

 18GAO-02-3. 

Page 21 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
14 local voting jurisdictions from seven states used to verify voter 

registration eligibility and the challenges officials faced in maintaining 

accurate voter lists.19 We reported that while some of these challenges, 

such as reducing duplicate registrations among jurisdictions within the 

state, may be resolved when HAVA is fully implemented, others may 

continue to be issues. Problems identifying voters who are registered 

concurrently in more than one state and problems using incomplete, 

untimely, or hard-to-decipher felony, death, and other information could 

also continue to hinder efforts to maintain accurate voter lists. In 

September 2005 we issued a report that described the experiences of 

selected local election officials in the same seven states as they processed 

voter registration applications.20 We reported that officials in these 

jurisdictions face a number of challenges, such as processing incomplete 

or inaccurate applications received from voter registration drives 

sponsored by nongovernmental organizations. 

Some of the concerns highlighted in our October 2001, June 2005, and 

September 2005 reports remain issues in states we discussed in this report, 

even after these nine states implemented the HAVA-required computerized 

lists. For example: 

Duplicate voter registrants. Echoing concerns reported in our previous 

work, the majority of state election officials interviewed for this report 

said that their states might not receive information about residents who 

leave the state and reregister to vote in another state.21 As a result, voters 

could be registered and vote in two states concurrently. One senior 

election official described this type of duplicate registration as a 

“universal” problem affecting all states. States are not required to share 

information that would allow them to identify persons registered in more 

than one state,22 although some states voluntarily notify other states when 

a voter relocates and reregisters in that state, officials said. Officials from 

Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Minnesota, South Carolina, South 

Dakota, and West Virginia told us they notify other states of voters who 

 19GAO-05-478. 

20GAO-05-997. 

21GAO-05-478. 

22As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005 federal recognition of state-issued 

driver’s licenses will be conditioned upon, among other things, a requirement that states 

provide all other states electronic access to state motor vehicle database information. 

Page 22 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
relocate and then reregister. However, such notifications are possible only 

if voters disclose on their voter registration application they have 

relocated from another state, officials also told us. This issue, caused in 

part by a lack of consistently available information, poses an inherent risk 

to the accuracy of voter lists and may not be resolved solely by 

implementing the HAVA-required computerized list requirement. 

Deceased registrants. We previously reported that concerns regarding 

timeliness and completeness of vital statistics data on deceased persons 

used to match against voter lists may continue to be an issue, even after 

the HAVA requirements for a computerized list are implemented.23

However, the election officials we interviewed in most of the states did not 

share concerns about the timeliness of information their offices receive on 

deceased persons from the vital statistics office. One official observed that 

the vital statistics office may not receive timely information from coroners 

or funeral home directors. Officials in a majority of the states we reviewed 

observed that data on deceased persons may not be complete because 

states are not able consistently to identify and remove names of deceased

registrants if the deaths occur out of state. According to an official in 

South Dakota, some states are prohibited by state laws from sharing 

information on deaths, a fact that has, in part, prevented this issue from 

being resolved. Even in states that share such information, unless officials 

are aware that the deceased was registered to vote in a certain state, 

officials are not able to pass the information to the appropriate election 

office. This issue, related in part to the unavailability of information, poses 

an inherent risk to the accuracy of voter lists and is not resolved by 

implementing the HAVA-required computerized list requirement. 

Felons. While HAVA requires coordinating the voter list with state 

information on persons convicted of a felony, election officials we 

interviewed in several of the states expressed concerns similar to those 

reported in our previous work that the criminal information they receive is

incomplete, not timely, or difficult to decipher.24 This issue, similar to 

concerns related to the availability, timeliness, and quality of other types 

of voter registration information, poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of

lists because it could limit the ability of officials to identify and remove 

names of felons ineligible to register to vote from the computerized voter 

lists. 

 23GAO-05-478. 

24GAO-05-478. 

Page 23 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
U.S. citizenship. In addition to having concerns regarding felony status, 

election officials from two states also expressed concerns regarding the

willingness of registrants to self-attest that they were U.S. citizens and 

therefore eligible to vote under state eligibility requirements, concerns that 

are consistent with those documented in our previous work.25 The HAVArequired unique identifying numbers, such as driver’s license numbers or 

Social Security numbers, are not useful for this purpose because neither is

generally accepted as evidence of U.S. citizenship. This lack of information 

poses an inherent risk to the accuracy of lists, as illustrated by an example 

from Minnesota.26 Officials told us that they discovered 30 noncitizens on 

the Minnesota voter list during the November 2004 general election despite 

having the HAVA-required computerized statewide voter list in place. 

Minnesota’s MVA has since added visa expiration dates to the driver’s 

licenses of noncitizens to indicate their citizenship status. South Dakota 

officials reported their MVA provides similar information on driver’s 

licenses. To address this concern, Arizona officials told us that their state 

no longer accepts the registration applicants’ self-attestation of 

citizenship; all voter registration applicants are now required to provide 

proof of citizenship. As we reported in our June 2005 report, federal jury 

administrators could identify possible noncitizens on the basis of 

information that potential jurors provide when identifying themselves as 

noncitizens on their jury service questionnaire.27 We recommended that

the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts determine the feasibility and 

steps necessary for U.S. district court jury administrators to provide notice 

to state election officials of potential jurors who identify themselves as 

noncitizens. Officials from Hawaii reported that their state periodically 

checks the voter list with this type of information and other citizenship 

indexes. 

Receiving voter registration applications. Officials from Georgia, South 

Carolina, and South Dakota said that their state received voter registration 

applications from registration drives that contained inaccuracies such as 

 25GAO-05-478. 

26As discussed earlier, under the REAL ID Act of 2005, federal recognition of state-issued 

driver’s licenses will be conditioned upon, among other things, a state requirement that

applicants provide certain information relating to their U.S. citizenship or lawful 

immigration status prior to issuance. Federal recognition is also to be conditioned upon, 

among other things, a requirement that states enter into a memorandum of understanding 

with the Secretary of Homeland Security to verify the legal presence of noncitizen 

applicants. 

27GAO-05-478. 

Page 24 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
fictitious names, a problem that we had identified in past reports.28 South 

Carolina officials also said that only a small number of such applications 

are generally received. Officials from a majority of the nine states we 

reviewed reported that they received a small number of complaints from 

voters who said that they had registered through a registration drive but 

that their names did not appear on the voter list on Election Day. 

Creating statewide computerized lists required by HAVA presented a 

number of challenges and resulted in lessons learned, officials told us, as 

they developed their computerized statewide voter registration systems, 

made them operational, and later managed them. The challenges and 

lessons learned they shared are consistent with those that our past 

research has shown to be important to effectively acquiring, developing, 

and implementing information systems in public and private sector 

organizations.

29 Officials shared their experiences as they developed their 

systems, for example: 

• Election officials from Minnesota and West Virginia reported that meeting 

the time frames they established for developing their computerized lists 

was challenging, in part because of limited staff available to complete the 

work. 

State Election 

Officials Reported 

Numerous Challenges 

and Lessons Learned 

while Implementing 

HAVA Requirements 

for Their Statewide 

Voter Registration 

Lists 

• Designing a system with the appropriate scope was an issue raised by 

Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Minnesota officials. This challenge 

involved determining the functional requirements of the system, for 

instance, the number of election management features the system should 

provide, if any, in addition to the capabilities required by HAVA. A senior 

Minnesota official reported Minnesota reduced the scope of its new 

system from what it had initially planned because of resource and time 

constraints, keeping the necessary elements but eliminating some election 

administration functions. Officials said this experience taught them that 

the functional requirements of the system should be prioritized as early as 

possible to differentiate features that are necessary from those that would 

be nice to have. Arizona officials addressed this design challenge by

 28We reported in the past that state election officials we interviewed expressed concerns

regarding (1) the receipt of inaccurate voter registration applications from voter 

registration drives sponsored by nongovernmental organizations and (2) failure of these

organizations to submit completed applications to election officials. See GAO-05-997. 

29For additional information on best practices associated with acquiring and implementing 

vote systems, see GAO-05-956. 

Page 25 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
initially implementing a system that performed only the basic tasks 

required under the HAVA provisions, they reported. In the near term, they

told us, local officials used the computerized statewide system to manage 

voter registration information while continuing to use their local 

computerized systems to manage elections. This decision minimized 

changes to the way counties historically managed elections, officials said. 

The state plans to expand the scope of its new statewide system in the 

future, providing counties with additional election management 

capabilities, an official told us. Their plan, officials said, is to draw upon 

local and state officials’ experiences with the statewide system to identify 

and prioritize what additional features to add to their system. The 

Kentucky official offered a lesson learned as well, suggesting that election

officials, as they define the capabilities the system is to offer, should be 

mindful of selecting a system that the state can afford now and in the 

future. 

• Converting data on registered voters from the old system to the new 

system was time-consuming and required processes to ensure that data 

were accurately entered into the new system, election officials from 

Arizona, Minnesota, and West Virginia observed. This work was 

complicated, in part, because of inaccurate information in existing records 

such as misspelled street addresses or duplicate registrations that needed 

to be resolved before inputting the corrected data into the new systems’ 

databases. Minnesota officials said that to help local officials with this 

work, they developed a tool that allowed them to compare old records of 

voter information with the new ones on a case-by-case basis. 

Officials from Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, South Carolina, South 

Dakota, and West Virginia also said that as states develop their 

computerized systems, they should adopt a collaborative approach, 

working with local officials to design, develop, or implement the systems 

in order to obtain local officials’ cooperation. The state officials provided

various reasons for emphasizing the importance of maintaining 

cooperative relationships with local officials. For example, West Virginia 

officials told us local officials resisted moving from their county-based 

systems to the statewide system, which made implementing the system 

more difficult. Local officials resisted in part because many of them 

viewed the new statewide system as an intrusion into a domain of election

administration that had been a local—not a state—responsibility, state 

officials told us. Involving county officials in designing and implementing 

the system, the state officials said, might have addressed this issue and 

simplified implementation of the new system. Arizona and South Carolina 

officials said they involved local officials by convening a working group 

composed of both local and state officials that was responsible for 

Page 26 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
developing the system. Hawaii state officials told us that frequent, regular 

communication helped their state maintain a cooperative relationship with 

local officials; for instance, this state holds quarterly meetings with county 

officials in order to coordinate activities such as completing list 

maintenance and data entry before poll books and voter lists are printed.

Kentucky officials said the key to their success was the cooperative 

working relationship they cultivated with local officials by keeping them 

involved. 

Officials also shared challenges and lessons learned while making their 

systems operational. For example, West Virginia officials said that their 

system became operational in every county on the same day. However, it 

may have been beneficial for their state, they stated, to introduce the 

system incrementally county by county rather than bringing every election 

jurisdiction online the same day. They reasoned that such a staggered

rollout schedule might have been easier on the state election officials, 

given their staffing constraints. Officials from some states also told us that 

prior to putting systems into service, it is important to train staff to use the 

new system. In order to provide local officials access to the most current 

information, Minnesota officials said they provide the user’s manual 

online. 

State election officials also shared their lessons learned from their 

experience managing computerized voter registration systems once they

were operational. Officials from Hawaii and Kentucky, two states that 

have managed computerized voter registrations systems for some years, 

observed that as technology develops, officials may decide to enhance 

their systems, as both of their states have done over the years. These 

officials offered lessons to keep in mind as states contemplate system 

upgrades: be mindful that selecting upgrades to the system may require

compromises among local jurisdictions that may have competing needs or

different administrative or technical constraints and that changes to the 

system affect all local jurisdictions equally. Hawaii officials shared another 

issue they encountered while managing their system; they could not use 

the computerized system while updating voter information. To address 

this issue, officials from Hawaii said their staff created a shadow system 

so that the system could be updated and available at the same time. Hawaii 

officials also recommended that states establish uniform processing 

procedures among their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions function as 

one. 

Page 27 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

report date. At that time we will make copies available to others on 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix XII. 

Sincerely yours, 

William O. Jenkins, Jr., 

Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 

Page 28 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

This report describes the experiences of election officials in Alaska, 

Arizona, Hawaii, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South 

Dakota, and West Virginia implementing the Help America Vote Act of 

2002 (HAVA) requirements pertaining to the establishment of 

computerized statewide voter registration lists and steps to verify and 

maintain the accuracy of those lists. Specifically, our objectives were to 

describe the actions election officials from nine states reported taking to 

(1) establish computerized statewide voter registration lists and (2) verify 

information provided on voter registration applications and maintain the 

statewide voter lists. In addition, we describe what these state officials 

told us regarding (3) the challenges they faced and lessons they learned 

while implementing these requirements. Most states obtained a waiver 

from the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to postpone 

implementation of this HAVA requirement until January 1, 2006. However, 

these nine states did not obtain a waiver and, therefore, were to implement 

these HAVA requirements by the original deadline, January 1, 2004. 

To meet our objectives, we reviewed HAVA provisions related to the 

establishment of statewide computerized voter registration list 

requirements. We then identified the proper points of contact within each

state and conducted telephone interviews using a structured interview 

format. Among other things, we asked election officials in the nine states 

to describe when their computerized systems had been developed; the 

capabilities of their systems; what actions, if any, their states took to 

implement the HAVA requirements for a computerized list; what level of 

effort was required to make any HAVA-related modifications; what effect 

implementing these changes, if any, might have had on the accuracy of 

their statewide voter lists; and what challenges they faced and lessons they 

learned while implementing these HAVA requirements. We did not 

independently verify the accuracy of state election officials’ responses. 

However, state election officials were provided the opportunity to verify 

the accuracy of their responses for this report, and on the basis of the 

comments we received, we made technical changes where appropriate. As 

part of our interviews, we also asked state officials how much federal and 

state money was spent on their computerized statewide systems in order 

to implement the HAVA requirements. We did not independently verify the 

amounts they reported to us. However, we attempted to compare the 

amounts of money the states reported that they spent with data reported 

by them to EAC on the implementation of all HAVA requirements. Because

of variations in the way these amounts were reported by the states, we 

could not identify the amounts spent solely on implementation of the 

computerized list requirement. 

Page 29 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Our work focused primarily on the states, since most of the 

responsibilities for implementing HAVA statewide computerized list 

provisions took place at the state level. We did, however, communicate 

with officials from the EAC and Department of Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights 

Division to obtain information about and documentation on their roles and 

responsibilities related to the HAVA statewide computerized list 

provisions. We also provided sections of the report discussing EAC and 

DOJ to officials with those organizations to verify the accuracy of the 

information they provided and, on the basis of their comments, made 

technical changes where appropriate. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO 

reports on elections, including voter registration issues. 

We conducted our work from January 2005 through December 2005 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 30 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in

Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in Registration List Provisions 

Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) provides that the Election Assistance 

Commission (EAC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are to have 

specific roles in states’ efforts to implement the Help America Vote Act’s 

statewide voter registration list provisions. HAVA established EAC to, 

among other things, serve as a national clearinghouse for information on 

election administration and provide information and guidance with 

respect to laws, procedures, and technologies affecting the administration

of federal elections. 

On August 4, 2005, EAC released its final version of the Voluntary 

Guidance on Implementation of Statewide Voter Registration Lists. The 

purpose of the voluntary guidance was to assist states in their efforts to 

develop and maintain a statewide voter registration list pursuant to HAVA 

Section 303(a). The guidance describes a set of specifications and 

requirements states may use to implement the HAVA provisions, such as 

establishing real-time access to all registration data, securing the 

registration list, synchronizing the statewide list with local databases at 

least every 24 hours, and coordinating with other databases for the 

purpose of performing voter registration verification and list maintenance. 

EAC’s guidance also contains recommendations on dealing with outcomes 

that may result from the verification process, the type of voting history 

information states should track, and the type of system that is most closely 

aligned with HAVA requirements. In addition to the voluntary guidance, 

EAC has also created and posted on its Web site two best practices 

documents—“Best Practices in Administration, Management, and Security 

in Voting Systems and Provisional Voting” and “Best Practices for 

Facilitating Voting by U.S. Citizens Covered by the Uniformed and 

Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act”—and other information on 

election administration. According to EAC officials, EAC expects that the 

clearinghouse will be fully operational during 2006. 

HAVA also provides enforcement authority to DOJ with respect to the 

uniform and nondiscriminatory implementation of certain HAVA 

requirements such as those relating to the statewide voter registration list 

and voter eligibility verification provisions. Officials with DOJ’s Civil 

Rights Division told us that in addition to monitoring states’ compliance 

with HAVA, DOJ has promoted pre-enforcement compliance, which 

includes working with states to identify what actions are reasonable to 

expect them to take, educating state and local officials, and responding to 

states’ inquiries. According to DOJ officials, at the time of our review, DOJ 

had not taken enforcement actions against any of the nine nonwaiver 

states. DOJ officials also said that they worked with the states following 

Page 31 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix II: EAC and DOJ Roles in

Implementing HAVA Statewide Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

the passage of HAVA to address initial challenges and provide informal 

guidance while EAC began operations and hired staff. 

Page 32 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix III: Reported Experienc

Elec

Reg

es of Alaska

tion Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

istration List Provisions 

Page 33 GAO-06-247

Appendix III: Reported Experiences of 

Alaska Election Officials Implementing HAVA

Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps Alaska election officials reported taking to 

implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews with Alaska election officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

Alaska had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system 

prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created a mainframe-based 

system in 1985. To implement the provisions of HAVA, minor 

modifications were made to the system to allow election officials to record

driver’s license numbers and the last four digits of the voter’s Social 

Security number. These modifications cost approximately $5,000 in state 

and federal funds to implement. Alaska state officials awarded a contract 

to upgrade its statewide voter registration system, in order to include 

additional election management capabilities, such as poll worker 

management and Internet voter registration, at a cost of $2.6 million. 

To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements, the 

state’s four regional election supervisors, who function as state 

employees,1

 verified application information by comparing voter eligibility 

information (full name; date of birth; and either a driver’s license number, 

full Social Security number, the last four digits of the Social Security 

number, or a unique identifier assigned by the state if the individual lacks 

a Social Security number and a driver’s license) with state motor vehicle

agency records to verify identity, age, and duplicate registrations. At the 

time of our review, Alaska was not comparing information with the Social

Security Administration (SSA) because the state did not have a signed

memorandum of understanding with SSA. 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Applications 

 1

Alaska does not have counties; instead, there are four election regions responsible for 

administering elections. The state director of elections appoints the regional election 

supervisors. 

Election Reform
Appendix III: Reported Experiences of Alaska

Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

To implement HAVA, Alaska has taken steps to maintain the accuracy of

its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other state agency

records, as described below. 

• Duplicate registrants. State officials perform an electronic check on the 

entire statewide voter registration list for duplicates once a year and on an 

as-needed basis. 

• Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly electronic updates 

of vital statistics death records by checking name, date of birth and either 

the full Social Security number or the last four digits. 

• Disqualified felons. State officials update court system records on a 

monthly basis. Specifically, court system records from the Department of 

Corrections and Bureau of Vital Statistics are checked against the voter 

registration list, comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security 

number. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the event of a 

court declaration of mental incompetence, the court would notify state 

officials of the judgment and the Division of Elections would inactivate the 

voter’s registration. Officials reported that disqualification because of 

mental incompetence does not occur often. 

To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from the state 

voter registration list, election officials send letters notifying individuals of 

their pending removal from the statewide voter registration list. These 

letters are sent to those who have not voted in the most recent two federal 

elections and those who have disqualifying felony convictions, as allowed 

under state law. Alaska officials reported that they removed the names of 

ineligible voters in 2004.

Election officials did not report any challenges or lessons learned while 

implementing these HAVA requirements. 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter Lists 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 34 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix IV: R

Ari

H

eported Experiences of 

zona Election Officials Implementing

AVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Page 35 GAO-06-247

Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Arizona Election Officials Implementing HAVA

Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps Arizona election officials reported taking to

implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews with Arizona election officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

Prior to HAVA, Arizona did not have a computerized statewide voter 

registration system in place, although several counties operated 

computerized voter registration systems. Arizona created an 

interconnected, statewide Web-based voter registration system called 

Voter Registration Arizona (VRAZ) to implement the requirements of 

HAVA. VRAZ became operational by the HAVA deadline of January 1, 

2004. VRAZ had an initial development cost of $1 million and was jointly 

funded by state and federal sources. The system took approximately 

6 months to develop. The state had to pass new statutes and amend others 

so that election officials could receive information from state agencies, 

such as felony records. In addition to carrying out the required functions 

of the voter registration system, election officials can query all state voter 

registration records on Election Day if their polling place has an Internet

connection.

A new version of VRAZ is under development and is expected to replace 

voter registration systems in 13 of 15 counties. The new version of VRAZ, 

called VRAZ II, is expected to reflect reciprocity agreements with other 

states whereby officials will be alerted when a voter moves from state to 

state and registers to vote in those states covered by the agreement. In 

addition, the new system is expected to contain additional election 

management capabilities beyond those required by HAVA, including the 

ability to retrieve data on election administration issues such as voter 

petitions, provisional ballots, training of poll workers, and polling 

locations. The estimated cost for VRAZ II is $10 million. At the time of our 

review, Arizona officials were anticipating that VRAZ II would go online in

2007. 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Election Reform
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Arizona Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

To implement the HAVA voter application verification requirements, 

Arizona compared the applicant’s name, date of birth, driver’s license 

number, or the last four digits of the Social Security number with motor 

vehicle agency (MVA) records to identify potentially inaccurate 

applications. In addition, Arizona’s Web-based voter registration software, 

EZ Voter—which allows Arizona citizens to register to vote via the 

Internet—electronically verified the accuracy of the voter registration 

applications filed online by matching the applicant’s name, date of birth, 

driver’s license number, or last four digits of the Social Security number 

with MVA records. EZ Voter registrations were then entered at the county 

level daily and submitted to the statewide voter registration list. 

At the time of our review, Arizona had completed a memorandum of 

understanding with the Social Security Administration (SSA) and was 

verifying information on voter registration applications by matching it with

SSA records as required by HAVA. 

As state officials developed the VRAZ system, they identified and 

corrected inaccurate voter registration data prior to entering the data into

the new system; through this process they were also able to eliminate 

duplicate registrants from the statewide list. Election officials also took

steps to maintain the accuracy of the voter registration list by coordinating 

the list with other state agency records, as described below. 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists 

• Duplicate registrants. State officials electronically identify duplicate 

matches by checking name, address, driver’s license number, and the last 

four digits of the Social Security number on voter registration applications 

on a daily basis. The entire list is screened once a month to identify 

duplicate registrants. 

• Deceased registrants. The Secretary of State’s office receives an electronic 

file of recent deaths from the Department of Health Services once a 

month. Officials identify any matches by checking name, date of birth, and

the last four digits of the Social Security number. 

• Disqualifying felons. State officials receive information on felony 

convictions from Arizona courts on a varying basis—weekly or monthly in 

the case of the state’s superior courts and on an ongoing basis from 

U.S. district courts. Once a felon’s sentence has been completed, voting

rights are reinstated and the individual may register to vote by submitting 

a new voter registration application. Officials identify any matches by 

checking name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the Social Security 

Page 36 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix IV: Reported Experiences of 

Arizona Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

number. This is a paper-based process in smaller courts and an electronic 

process in larger courts. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. As with 

information on felons, courts submit information in an electronic or paper 

format to state officials on individuals declared mentally incompetent at 

different times for comparison with the statewide voter registration list. 

To ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from voter 

registration lists, local officials send a letter to voters to notify them of 

their impending removal from the statewide voter registration list. For 

example, letters are sent to individuals with a disqualifying felony 

conviction. 

One challenge Arizona election officials faced was designing a system with 

the appropriate scope. Election officials said they addressed this design 

challenge by initially implementing a system that performed only the basic

tasks required under the HAVA provisions. To minimize changes to the 

way counties historically managed elections, local officials used the 

computerized statewide system to manage voter registration information 

while continuing to use their local computerized systems to manage 

elections. The state plans to expand the scope of its new statewide system 

in the future, providing counties with additional election management 

capabilities. Another challenge reported by Arizona election officials was 

the conversion of data on registered voters from the old system to the new 

system. Officials said it was time-consuming and required processes to 

ensure that data were accurately entered into the new system. 

Election officials also reported on the importance of collaboration among 

state and local officials. The state convened a working group composed of 

both local and state officials that was responsible for developing its 

statewide computerized system. Arizona officials stated that a 

communications plan that allows information about the voter list 

management process to be shared among state and county officials can 

help lessen political resistance and facilitate buy-in by state and county 

officials. The implementation of VRAZ in stages was another way state 

officials gained the trust of the counties. 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 37 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix V: Re

Elec

Reg

ported Experiences of Georgia

tion Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

istration List Provisions 

Page 38 GAO-06-247

Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia 

Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps Georgia election officials reported taking to

implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews with Georgia election officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

Georgia had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system 

prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based 

system in 1995. To implement HAVA, state officials made one minor 

modification to their voter registration system—adding the capability to 

identify whether a voter had registered for the first time by mail. Officials 

have plans to enhance the current system in order to provide election 

administration management capabilities, such as identifying potential poll 

workers and giving election officials on Election Day immediate electronic 

access to the voter list so they can verify where voters are registered to 

vote. At the time of our review, officials were planning to conduct a pilot 

program to test the enhanced system. 

In Georgia, voter registration applicants were required to provide their full 

Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique 

identifier. Since Georgia collected the full Social Security number, the 

state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique 

identifying number or to verify information on voter registration 

applications with motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration 

records. Georgia elected not to verify information with these agencies, as

HAVA allows. However, the state had processes in place to conduct realtime checks of voter registration applications to ensure they did not 

duplicate an existing registration and that the application information did 

not match the records of deceased persons. The state procedures also 

provide for verifying voter eligibility by comparing voter registration 

applications with state court records on felony lists to identify persons 

ineligible to vote because of a disqualifying felony conviction. 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Election Reform
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia

Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Georgia has maintained the

accuracy of its voter registration list by coordinating the list with other 

state agency records, as described below. 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists 

• Duplicate registrants. On a monthly basis, state officials check the 

statewide voter list to identify duplicate registrants and transmit the list of 

duplicates to the counties for updating. 

• Deceased registrants. Every month, county officials receive electronic 

files on deceased persons from the Department of Vital Statistics. Officials 

identify any matches with the statewide voter registration list by checking 

name, date of birth, full Social Security number, and address. On a 

quarterly basis, the state receives an electronic report from the 

Department of Vital Statistics and verifies that the counties have made the 

changes and checks for errors. The information is compiled into a 

quarterly report that verifies that the counties have made the necessary 

changes and that an error report is generated showing the records that did 

not match. 

• Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, the state receives a paper list of 

felony convictions from state courts. The felony list is then sent to 

counties for updating. County officials identify any matches with the 

statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of birth, full Social

Security number, and address. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the case of

mental incompetence, a court order must specify that a person is barred 

from voting; otherwise, the person may continue to vote. As with 

information on felons, on a monthly basis, the state receives from state 

courts a paper list of individuals declared mentally incompetent. The list is

then sent to counties for updating. County officials identify any matches 

with the statewide voter registration list by checking name, date of birth, 

full Social Security number, and address. 

To ensure that eligible voters’ names are not inadvertently removed from 

the statewide voter registration list, county officials send a letter to voters 

to notify them of their impending removal from the voter registration rolls. 

These letters are sent to individuals who have requested to be removed, 

those with a disqualifying felony conviction, and those who have been 

declared mentally incompetent. Georgia officials reported that they 

removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004. 

Page 39 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix V: Reported Experiences of Georgia

Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

Although Georgia has had a statewide computerized voter list in place for 

10 years, officials reported that a challenge they continue to face is 

training employees on how to use the system. Officials said that one lesson 

learned is that states need to get buy-in from county officials early on in 

the process of developing a statewide voter registration system. They 

suggested that one way to accomplish this may be to form a task force, 

composed of state and local officials, to review system development issues 

and design. 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 40 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VI: R

Elec

Reg

eported Experiences of Hawaii 

tion Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

istration List Provisions 

Page 41 GAO-06-247

Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of 

Hawaii Election Officials Implementing HAVA

Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps Hawaii election officials reported taking to 

implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews by Hawaii election officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

Hawaii has had a computerized voter registration system since the 1970s

and developed a statewide interactive system in 1982. Hawaii’s system 

provides election officials with immediate access to the computerized 

statewide voter list whereby they can enter new or update existing voter 

registration information and query all state voter registration records. To 

implement HAVA, election officials made minor technical changes to the

statewide voter registration system, such as adding the ability to flag 

inactive voters. At the time of our review, Hawaii was making additional 

arrangements to enhance its current computerized voter registration 

system by modifying the absentee voting component of the system. 

In Hawaii, voter registration applicants were required to provide their full

Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique 

identifier. Since Hawaii collected the full Social Security number, the state 

was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique identifying

number or to verify information on voter registration applications with 

motor vehicle agency (MVA) or Social Security Administration records. 

Hawaii voluntarily matched information on voter registration forms with

MVA records, comparing information such as the individual’s name, 

driver’s license number, and full Social Security number. The 

computerized voter registration system conducted real-time checks for 

duplicate registrations and age requirements prior to accepting the new 

application into the statewide voter registration system. 

Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, Hawaii officials have 

maintained the accuracy of Hawaii’s statewide voter registration list by 

coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described below.

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter Lists 

Election Reform
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii 

Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

• Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter registration 

system automatically checks for duplicate registrations as soon as an 

application is processed. 

• Deceased registrants. Twice a month, county officials check paper death

records from the Department of Vital Statistics to identify deceased

registrants by checking the name, date of birth, and the full Social Security 

number. 

• Disqualified felons. Twice a month, county clerks receive paper records 

from circuit court officials. These records are then checked against the 

information in the statewide voter registration list by comparing name, 

date of birth, and the full Social Security number. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. Officials 

reported that disqualification because of mental incompetence does not 

occur often in Hawaii. The courts are the only entity that can make a 

judgment regarding mental incompetence that would disqualify a person 

from being registered to vote. 

To ensure that eligible voters’ names are not inadvertently removed from 

the statewide voter registration list, local officials send a letter to every

voter prior to the general election before removing voters’ names from the 

list, in accordance with the National Voter Registration Act provisions for 

removing voters’ names from lists. 

Although Hawaii had a statewide voter registration system in place prior 

to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on implementing voter 

registration systems. Hawaii election officials said that one of the biggest 

challenges can be coordinating with counties and developing a rapport 

with county officials. To assist in coordination efforts, the state holds 

quarterly meetings with county officials. In these meetings, state and local

officials coordinate activities such as completing list maintenance and

data entry prior to the printing of poll books and voter lists. Another issue 

raised by Hawaii officials was designing a system with the appropriate 

scope. These officials also shared lessons learned about managing a 

computerized voter registration system. They stated that technological

developments will require compromise among local jurisdictions that have 

different administrative and technological constraints. Officials also 

recommended that states establish uniform processing procedures among 

their jurisdictions so that all jurisdictions function as one. Finally, Hawaii 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 42 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VI: Reported Experiences of Hawaii 

Election Officials Implementing HAVA Voter 

Registration List Provisions 

created a shadow system so that the system could be both updated and

available for use at the same time. 

Page 43 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VII: 

Ke

H

Reported Experiences of 

ntucky Election Officials Implementing

AVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Page 44 GAO-06-247

Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Kentucky Election Officials Implementing 

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps Kentucky election officials reported taking 

to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews by Kentucky election officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

Kentucky had in place a computerized statewide voter registration system 

prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based 

system in 1973. Kentucky’s current system allows all local election 

officials immediate access to enter new or update existing voter 

registration information in their jurisdiction, and immediate access to 

query all state voter registration records. In addition, election officials 

provided a toll-free number for precinct officers to access an interactive 

voice response phone system to check voter eligibility. As a result, 

Kentucky did not have to take any additional steps to implement HAVA 

statewide computerized list requirements. 

Election officials planned to upgrade their computerized statewide voter 

registration system in the future to provide more election management 

tools to counties, such as including a function to track poll workers and 

complete absentee ballot forms. The state has developed the absentee 

ballot application and expects it to be used by its counties in the 2006 

elections. 

In Kentucky, voter registration applicants were required to provide their 

full Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique 

identifier. Since Kentucky collected the full Social Security number, the 

state was not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique 

identifying number or to verify information on voter registration 

applications with motor vehicle agency or Social Security Administration 

records. Kentucky elected not to verify information with these agencies, as

HAVA allows. To verify information on voter registration applications, 

Kentucky’s computerized statewide voter registration automatically

checked for duplicate registrations before new registrants were added to 

the statewide list. 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Election Reform
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Kentucky Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter 

Registration Lists 

Kentucky currently has processes in place to maintain the accuracy of the 

statewide voter registration list by comparing the statewide voter 

registration list with state agency records, as described below. 

• Duplicate registrants. The computerized statewide voter registration 

system automatically checks for duplicate registrations as soon as a new 

application is entered into the system. 

• Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, election officials check the 

computerized statewide voter registration list against the records from the

Department of Vital Statistics to identify deceased registrants by 

comparing name, date of birth, and full Social Security number. 

• Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, court records are electronically

checked against the computerized statewide voter registration list to 

identify persons convicted of a disqualifying felony by comparing name, 

date of birth, and full Social Security number. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. Officials use 

court records to identify voters ineligible because of mental incompetence

by comparing applicant’s name, date of birth, and full Social Security 

number with the computerized statewide voter registration list. 

To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently removed 

from the statewide voter registration list, state officials match voters’ 

identifying information with U.S. Postal Service, felony, mental 

competency, and death records. State officials also send letters to voters 

to notify them of pending removal based on a disqualifying felony 

conviction. 

Since Kentucky had a computerized statewide voter registration system in 

place prior to HAVA, election officials did not report any challenges. 

However, Kentucky election officials provided examples of lessons 

learned while maintaining their current computerized statewide voter 

registration system. They said it is important to develop a computerized 

statewide voter registration system that will be sustainable now and in the 

future. Officials suggested that as states contemplate system upgrades, 

they be mindful that changes to the system affect all jurisdictions, despite 

their differing needs and constraints. A key to their success has been the 

cooperative working relationship they cultivated with local officials by 

keeping them involved. Election officials also recommended that states 

“think outside the box” when designing ways to use the voter registration 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 45 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VII: Reported Experiences of 

Kentucky Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

database. For example, they utilized their statewide computerized system 

to established voter information centers on Kentucky’s state Web site to 

assist applicants and staff in the voter registration process.

Page 46 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VIII: 

Minne

H

Reported Experiences of 

sota Election Officials Implementing

AVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Page 47 GAO-06-247

Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Minnesota Election Officials Implementing 

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps Minnesota election officials reported taking

to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 

(HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews by Minnesota election officials and were not 

independently verified by us. 

Minnesota is unique in the way election administration functions are 

structured and can vary by jurisdiction. In this state, the county auditor 

has certain election responsibilities and can choose to delegate other 

election responsibilities to minor civil division-level (MCD) government—

townships and cities. For example, while counties manage voter 

registration, county auditors may delegate other functions, such as 

absentee voting to MCDs. There are some functions that MCDs are 

responsible for handling, such as polling place matters. 

Minnesota had a computerized statewide voter registration system in place 

prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created this mainframe-based 

system in 1988. To comply with the provisions of HAVA, the state amended 

its election laws and replaced its existing computerized statewide voter 

registration system in 2004. The system included new election 

management capabilities, such as providing election officials with 

immediate access to enter and update applicant information and creating 

electronic matching capabilities with state agencies to verify voter 

eligibility. The system also centrally tracked absentee ballots provided to

military personnel or other citizens residing overseas. The project was 

completed in 11 months at a reported cost of about $5.3 million. 

To implement HAVA, Minnesota verifies voter registration application 

information by comparing name, date of birth, driver’s license number, or 

the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security number with motor 

vehicle agency records to identify potentially ineligible applications. Since 

Minnesota is a same-day registration state, checks for duplicates are 

automatically run on voter applications on a daily basis. In addition, the 

Department of Public Service tracks visas issued to ensure that 

noncitizens are unable to vote. 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Election Reform
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Minnesota Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

At the time of our review, Minnesota was in the process of completing a 

memorandum of understanding with the Social Security Administration 

(SSA) to allow verification of information on voter registration 

applications by comparing it with SSA records. Officials anticipated that 

they would begin conducting matches by 2006. 

To implement HAVA, Minnesota election officials took steps to maintain 

the accuracy of the voter registration list by coordinating with other state 

agency records, as described below.

• Duplicate registrants. The statewide voter registration system produces 

maintenance reports to identify potential duplicates. In addition, checks 

for duplicates are run on an annual basis. 

• Deceased registrants. On a monthly basis, county officials conduct manual 

checks of oral and paper death records from the Department of Vital 

Statistics by checking the name, date of birth, and the full Social Security

number. 

• Disqualified felons. On a monthly basis, officials receive paper records 

from the courts to check for those persons convicted of a disqualifying

felony. Once the court computer system is in place, this process will have 

the capability to provide electronic matching by comparing the applicant’s

name, date of birth, driver’s license, identification card, full Social Security 

number, and last four digits of the Social Security number. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. On a monthly 

basis, officials receive paper records from the courts to check for those 

declared mentally incompetent. 

To ensure that the names of eligible voters are not inadvertently removed 

from the statewide voter registration list, state officials send notices to 

voters prior to removing their names from the list. 

Minnesota election officials reported that one of the major challenges they

faced was replacing the existing voter registration system in an 11-month 

time frame. Also, officials told us that conducting elections while updating

their voter registration system further complicated their efforts. Another 

challenge that election officials reported was converting data on registered 

voters from the old system database to the new system. Minnesota 

officials said that to help local officials with this work they developed a 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter Lists 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 48 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix VIII: Reported Experiences of 

Minnesota Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

tool that allowed them to compare old records of voter information with 

the new ones on a case-by-case basis. 

In addition, Minnesota election officials discussed various lessons learned 

while implementing the HAVA requirements. The first lesson learned was 

the importance of identifying and prioritizing the functional requirements 

for the computerized statewide voter registration system. In order to 

manage the scope of replacing a computerized statewide voter registration 

system, election officials told us they had to separate the “nice to have” 

features from the features required by HAVA. This step assisted election 

officials in managing the scope and cost of their project. 

Second, Minnesota election officials reported using in-house resources to 

replace the existing computerized statewide voter registration system. 

According to election officials, it is best to use in-house resources to 

establish a computerized statewide voter registration system when there 

are sufficient in-house resources and staff expertise. 

Third, Minnesota election officials said that it was useful to create an 

online user’s manual for the computerized statewide voter registration 

system. Election officials reported that by having the user’s manual online, 

staff at all levels had immediate access to information on how to operate 

the computerized statewide voter registration system. 

Page 49 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix IX: R

C

H

eported Experiences of South

arolina Election Officials Implementing

AVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Page 50 GAO-06-247

Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South 

Carolina Election Officials Implementing 

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps South Carolina election officials reported 

taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 

2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews by South Carolina election officials and were 

not independently verified by us. 

South Carolina had an interactive computerized statewide voter 

registration system in place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state 

created this mainframe-based system in the late 1960s and modified it in 

1992. Election officials made minor modifications to its system by adding

additional data fields in order to implement the provisions of HAVA. The 

system also has election management capabilities beyond HAVA, including

the ability to track absentee voters and poll managers. The state reportedly 

spent about $67,000 in federal funds for the most current system 

modifications. 

Election officials began work on a new Web-based, menu-driven system in 

2000. The system is expected to be more flexible and is to allow election 

officials to perform election administration tasks such as signature 

verification. The new system is also expected to have the capability to run 

checks with the motor vehicle agency database. Officials reported that the

implementation of the new system will not take place until after the 2006 

elections. 

South Carolina required voter registration applicants to provide their full 

Social Security number on voter registration applications as a unique 

identifier. Since South Carolina collects the full Social Security number, 

the state is not subject to the HAVA requirements to collect a unique 

identifying number or to verify information on voter registration 

applications with the motor vehicle agency or Social Security

Administration. South Carolina elected not to verify information with 

these agencies, as HAVA allows. Prior to entering applicants into the 

statewide list, county officials check to ensure the application does not 

duplicate an existing registration. State officials compare voter 

registration applications with records on deceased persons and persons 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Applications 

Election Reform
Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South

Carolina Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

ineligible to register to vote because of a disqualifying felony conviction,

as allowed under state law. 

Prior to and since the enactment of HAVA, South Carolina officials 

maintain the accuracy of the state’s voter registration list by coordinating 

the list with other state agency records, as described below. 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter Lists 

• Duplicate registrants. South Carolina produces a report on duplicates 

quarterly. The voter registration system identifies duplicate registrants 

using the full Social Security number and date of birth. County officials 

make the necessary changes. 

• Deceased registrants. State officials conduct monthly electronic 

comparisons with state agency death records. Officials identify any 

matches by checking name, date of birth, and full Social Security number 

and remove names of ineligible registrants. 

• Disqualified felons. State officials conduct monthly electronic 

comparisons with state agency felony records. Officials identify any 

matches based on name, address, date of birth, and full Social Security 

number and remove names of ineligible registrants. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The counties 

maintain paper records on the mentally incompetent. Upon receipt of a 

written court order, county officials identify and remove ineligible voters. 

In order to ensure that eligible voters’ names are not inadvertently 

removed, state officials send a letter to voters to notify them of their 

impending removal from the statewide voter registration list. Letters are 

sent to individuals who have filed a change-of-address with the U.S. Postal 

Service, failed to appear in the most recent two federal elections, or have a 

disqualifying felony conviction. South Carolina officials reported that they 

removed the names of ineligible voters in 2004. 

Although South Carolina had a statewide voter registration system in place 

prior to HAVA, officials shared their general perspectives on implementing 

voter registration systems. Officials stated that forming a working group 

composed of state and local officials helped to ensure stakeholder buy-in. 

State officials also reported that the updated system that they are in the 

process of creating is proving challenging because they are developing it 

in-house instead of purchasing the system from a vendor. Officials 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 51 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix IX: Reported Experiences of South

Carolina Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

reported that states should assess their available resources and skills 

before deciding to develop a system on their own. 

Page 52 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix X: Re

Dakota E

Voter Reg

ported Experiences of South 

lection Officials Implementing HAVA 

istration List Provisions 

Page 53 GAO-06-247

Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South 

Dakota Election Officials Implementing 

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps South Dakota election officials reported 

taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 

2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews by South Dakota election officials and were 

not independently verified by us. 

South Dakota had a computerized statewide voter registration system in 

place prior to the enactment of HAVA. The state created the system in 

2002. Election officials added new data fields and data matching capability 

to the existing computerized list in order to implement the provisions of 

HAVA. The modifications cost $302,004, of which $103,598 came from 

federal funds and $198,406 from state funds. 

To implement HAVA, county election officials verified voter registration 

application information by comparing name, date of birth, and driver’s 

license number, or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security 

number, with state motor vehicle agency records to identify potentially 

inaccurate applications. These officials also compared applications with 

records on the deceased and persons convicted of a disqualifying felony 

prior to adding them to the statewide voter list. South Dakota local 

election officials verified voter registration information by comparing it 

with the Social Security Administration’s records beginning in August 

2005. 

As required to implement HAVA, election officials have taken steps to 

maintain the accuracy of South Dakota’s voter registration list by 

coordinating the list with other state agency records, as described below.

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter Lists 

• Duplicate registrants. State officials check the statewide list for 

duplicates at least annually and more often during an election cycle. State 

officials identify duplicate registrants by checking for voters with the same 

name, driver’s license number, and the last four digits of the Social 

Security number and forward the names of ineligible registrants to county 

officials for processing. 

Election Reform
Appendix X: Reported Experiences of South 

Dakota Election Officials Implementing HAVA 

Voter Registration List Provisions 

• Deceased registrants. Local officials match name, date of birth, and the 

last four digits of the Social Security number on voter registration 

applications with the state vital statistics agency’s death records through 

weekly electronic batch comparisons. 

• Disqualified felons. Local officials electronically compare voter 

registration applications with records of persons convicted of a 

disqualifying felony that makes them ineligible to register to vote. Officials

identify persons ineligible to register to vote based on name, date of birth,

driver’s license number, and last four digits of the Social Security number. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. In the event 

that a court issues a declaration of mental incompetence, the court 

provides the written declaration to the county election official who 

removes the ineligible registrant from the voter list. 

In South Dakota, local officials are responsible for updating voter 

information and removing names from the voter registration list. To 

ensure that eligible voters are not inadvertently removed from the state 

voter registration list, local election officials send letters notifying 

individuals of their pending removal from the statewide voter registration 

list. 

State officials reported that working as a team and maintaining a positive

working relationship with the counties enabled South Dakota to 

implement HAVA by the deadline. 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 54 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix XI: R

Virginia Ele

H

eported Experiences of West 

ction Officials Implementing

AVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Page 55 GAO-06-247

Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West 

Virginia Election Officials Implementing 

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

This appendix describes steps West Virginia election officials reported 

taking to implement selected provisions of the Help America Vote Act of 

2002 (HAVA) and manage the election process with regard to establishing 

computerized statewide voter registration lists, verifying the accuracy of 

information provided on voter applications, and maintaining accurate

statewide voter lists. In addition, this appendix summarizes challenges and

lessons learned election officials reported with respect to implementing 

HAVA requirements. The statements in this appendix reflect the responses 

to our telephone interviews by West Virginia election officials and were 

not independently verified by us. 

With regard to the HAVA statewide computerized list provisions, West 

Virginia created an interactive, computerized statewide voter registration 

system. According to state election officials, some counties had 

computerized voter registration systems prior to the enactment of HAVA, 

but they were not interconnected through a statewide computer system. 

Election officials hired a vendor to create the new statewide system, 

which went into service in January 2004 at a reported cost of 

approximately $1.9 million in federal funds. The new system also has 

election management capabilities beyond the requirements of HAVA, 

including the ability to produce reports on absentee ballots, early voters, 

poll workers, and election data statistics. It also provides a separate 

database to track poll workers. 

To implement HAVA, West Virginia developed the capability to verify voter 

registration application information by comparing name, date of birth, and 

driver’s license number or the last four digits of the voter’s Social Security 

number with motor vehicle agency (MVA) records. However, officials 

reported that the state had difficulty conducting data matches with MVA 

because MVA lacked the ability to interface with the statewide voter list. 

Officials said that they expected this problem to be resolved by 2006. Since 

the enactment of HAVA, the state system checks new applications for 

duplicates, automatically flags duplicates, and notifies county officials to 

eliminate them. 

West Virginia is in the process of finalizing the agreement with the Social 

Security Administration (SSA) to allow a comparison between voter 

eligibility information and SSA data as required by HAVA. This agreement 

will enable state officials to compare the last four digits of a voter’s Social

Security number with SSA records. Officials reported that they expected

the agreement to be completed by December 2005.

Steps Taken to Establish 

Computerized Statewide 

Voter Registration Lists 

Verifying Accuracy of 

Information Provided on 

Voter Registration 

Applications 

Election Reform
Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West 

Virginia Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

Maintenance of Accurate 

Statewide Voter Lists 

Prior to HAVA, county voter registration systems could only check for 

duplicates within the county, and local officials could only check felony

and death lists using paper records. Since the enactment of HAVA, election 

officials have taken steps to maintain the accuracy of the statewide voter

registration list by coordinating the list with other state agency records, as

described below. 

• Duplicate registrants. West Virginia checked the entire database for 

duplicates during the implementation of its new statewide system. The 

county clerks also periodically check the system for duplicate registrants. 

• Deceased registrants. County officials maintain the voter registration list 

through a monthly comparison of the list with state death records. At the 

time of this report, officials rely on oral and paper records to identify any 

matches by checking name, address, date of birth, and the last four digits 

of the Social Security number. Officials said they expected in the future to

conduct these comparisons electronically. 

• Disqualified felons. County officials receive paper records from federal 

and state courts on disqualifying felony convictions. 

• Disqualification of those declared mentally incompetent. The state does 

not conduct list maintenance based on this information. 

Local officials are responsible for updating voter information and for 

removing voter records; state officials said that they follow the National 

Voter Registration Act provisions for removing names from the list. In 

general, section 8 of NVRA provides that, in the administration of voter 

registration for federal elections, states may not remove names of 

registrants for non-voting and that names of registrants may be removed 

only for certain specified reasons. 

West Virginia officials also said that meeting the time frames they 

established for developing their computerized lists was challenging, in part 

because of limited staff available to complete the work. The officials 

stated that it might have been better to introduce the system 

incrementally. West Virginia officials also reported that the counties 

resisted moving from county-based systems to the statewide system in 

part because many of them viewed the new statewide system as an 

intrusion into a domain of election administration that had been a local—

not a state—responsibility. Involving county officials in designing and 

implementing the system, the state officials said, might have simplified 

Challenges and Lessons 

Learned 

Page 56 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix XI: Reported Experiences of West 

Virginia Election Officials Implementing

HAVA Voter Registration List Provisions 

implementation of the new system. Other challenges reported by West 

Virginia officials included data conversion, obtaining timely approvals for 

purchases, changing necessary provisions of state law, and overcoming 

technology problems.

Page 57 GAO-06-247 Election Reform
Appendix XII: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 58 GAO-06-247

Appendix XII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777, or jenkinswo@gao.gov

In addition to the contact person named above, John Mortin, Assistant 

Director; David Alexander; Leo Barbour; Amy Bernstein; Michelle Fejfar; 

Geoff Hamilton; E. Anne Laffoon; Jean Orland; Dan Rodriguez; 

Miquel Salas: Stephanie Sand; and Ashanta Williams made key 

contributions to this report. 

Election Reform

Acknowledgments 

(440369) 
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