Aspects of Leadership

Edited by 

Carroll Connelley and Paolo Tripodi
Aspects of Leadership

Ethics, Law, and Spirituality

Edited by 

Carroll Connelley and Paolo Tripodi

Marine Corps University Press

Quantico, Virginia
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this book are solely those of the authors. They do not 

necessarily reflect the opinions of the organizations for which they work, Marine 

Corps University, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. 

Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, the 

U.S. government, the French Ministry of Defense, the French Air Force, or the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Published by

Marine Corps University Press

3078 Upshur Avenue

Quantico, VA

22134

www.tecom.usmc.mil/mcupress

1st Printing, 2012

PCN 10600008900

MARINE CORPS

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8-6

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ISBN 978-0-16-091368-6
—iii—

Foreword ........................................................................................... VII

Acknowledgments .............................................................................IX

Introduction ..........................................................................................1 

Carroll Connelley

Ethics

Leadership, Ethics, and Culture in COIN Operations: 

Case Examples from Marjeh, Afghanistan.....................................13 

Brian Christmas and Paula Holmes-Eber

Ethics and Irregular Warfare: The Role of the 

Stakeholder Theory and Care Ethics...............................................39 

Geoffroy Murat

A Pedagogy of Practical Military Ethics .........................................59 

Clinton A. Culp

Leadership in a World of Blurred Responsibilities .......................87 

Emmanuel R. Goffi

When Loyalty to Comrades Conflicts with Military Duty ........ 111

J. Peter Bradley

Contents
iv | Aspects of Leadership

Leadership and the Ethics of Dissent: 

Reflections from the Holocaust......................................................137 

Paolo Tripodi

Enacting a Culture of Ethical Leadership: Command 

and Control as Unifying Mind.......................................................161 

Clyde Croswell and Dan Yaroslaski

Law

Training the Rules of Engagement for the 

Counterinsurgency Fight................................................................201 

Winston Williams

Rules of Engagement: Law, Strategy, and Leadership................221 

Laurie R. Blank

Humanity in War: Leading by Example; 

The Role of the Commander in Modern Warfare........................259

Jamie A. Williamson

Agency of Risk: The Balance Between Protecting Military 

Forces and the Civilian Population ...............................................287 

Chris Jenks 

Accountability or Impunity: Rules and 

Limits of Command Responsibility...............................................309 

Kenneth Hobbs 
Spirituality

Spiritual Injuries: Wounds of the American Warrior 

on the Battlefield of the Soul ..........................................................343 

David Gibson and Judy Malana

Soldier Spirituality in a Combat Zone: Preliminary Findings...377 

Franklin Eric Wester

The Spiritual as the Nexus for the Ethical and the Legal...........413 

Jeffrey S. Wilson

The Religious Factor in Military Leadership ...............................435 

Pauletta Otis

Spiritual Leadership in the Battle Space: 

Who Is in Charge? A Personal Essay.............................................455 

Arnold Fields

Contributors......................................................................................471

Contents | v

—vii—

Aspects of Leadership is a new book edited by Lieutenant Colonel 

Carroll Connelley and Dr. Paolo Tripodi, the Ethics Branch head, 

and comprised of essays by a group of 20 leadership and ethics 

scholars and practitioners. The Lejeune Leadership Institute 

Ethics Branch, Marine Corps University, provides current and 

relevant scholarly research and instruction on ethics and moral 

leadership and the law of war.

This collection of essays provides timely and insightful views on 

current leadership behavior and ethical concerns that men and 

women of the armed forces face in the demanding, complex, and 

prolonged decade of armed conflict.

This book offers significant and relevant perspectives on the historical underpinnings as well as from recent deployments and operations that affect ethics and law of war on individual Marines, 

units, and the populations engaged in conflict. The various 

chapters are the result of thoughtful perspectives and exhaustive 

research by intelligent and committed scholars and practitioners 

who apply their knowledge and wisdom with the passion to 

make clear what right ethical behavior by service members should 

look like.

Foreword
viii | Aspects of Leadership

Dialogues addressing leadership from various aspects are captured and shared in this collection and should benefit not only 

the formal schools at Marine Corps University, but also fellow 

service professional military educational institutions. This book 

will also be relevant for those dedicated officer and enlisted personnel in the operating forces looking to broaden their understanding of leadership as they confront the difficult environments 

our Marines currently and will continue to face in the foreseeable 

future. It seems fairly settled within the Marine Corps that the 

study of leadership is something to be revered. Every commandant from the very earliest years of our founding emphasized 

education in leadership, understanding that leaders were made, 

not born. 

Dr. James van Zummeren

Director, Lejeune Leadership Institute

Quantico, VA
—ix—

You can hold this book in your hands today because of the hard 

work of many people, and even more than that, because of their 

infinite patience in dealing with me. Those I am about to mention 

have provided great professional contribution to this project, and 

at the same time have endured my stress. I am not sure whether 

I should thank them, or offer them apologies. Likely, I should do 

both!

Carroll Connelley provided the horsepower for the book. It has 

been a great experience working with him. Very likely on several 

occasions he might have regretted agreeing to work with me on 

this project. I am sure that, had he not been a Marine gifted with 

a unique work ethic, he might have quit and this project would 

not have been completed. I am confident that his beautiful family 

shared some of the Tripodi-induced stress, and they deserve much 

recognition; it makes me happy to be popular with his children 

and to have them know me as the “count.”

It is very likely that the contributors to this book had to deal with a 

process that might have appeared pedantic at times. Peer reviews, 

initial revisions, editorial revisions, manuscript editor’s revisions 

. . . I am sure that anytime they thought “ok, we are done” and 

saw my name in their inbox, they had to find special willpower to 

Acknowledgments
x | Aspects of Leadership

open the message. They have been outstanding at every moment 

of this process. Carroll and I will be indebted to them for a long 

time to come.

Nearly all chapters in the book have been read and copy edited 

several (no mistake, several!) times by Andrea Hamlen and Stase 

Rodebaugh. Megan Hennessey skillfully edited four chapters, 

and Dr. Patrice Scanlon served as a second reader. Andrea and 

Stase are two important “pillars” of Marine Corps University, 

where they are responsible for the Leadership Communication 

Skills Center. They have been extremely professional and provided great guidance. 

My final victims in this process were the MCU Press managing 

editor, Shawn Vreeland; manuscript editor, Andrea Connell; designer, Robert Kocher; and the MCU Press senior editor, Ken Williams. They have provided tremendous expertise to finalize the 

book. Carroll and I are particularly grateful to Ken Williams and 

Steve Evans, who believed in this project from the very beginning and responded in a positive and encouraging way to our 

proposal. 

It has been my wife, Jenny, who has had to cope with the greatest amount of my stress. I am sure that she is even happier than 

I am to see the book completed. When I felt overwhelmed by the 

process, I was comforted by my son, Antonio. I thought he was 

the one who best understood me—he listened to me, and after a 

short while looked at me and asked, “Can I watch a little Elmo 

now?” He and Jenny are the source of my strength and happiness. 

Paolo Tripodi, 

Richmond, VA
But if you are ferocious in battle remember to be magnanimous in 

victory . . . I know of men who have taken life needlessly in other 

conflicts, I can assure you they live with the mark of Cain upon 

them.

-Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins’ Address to the Royal 

Irish Guards, 22 March 20031

Lieutenant Colonel Collins’ entire address to his unit just prior 

to sending his forces into battle on the eve of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom has been cited2 as one of the most inspirational modernday-warrior speeches. In full, the guidance to his soldiers struck 

the perfect balance between encouraging the utter destruction of 

the opposing forces and inspiring his troops to accomplish the task 

in a manner that would allow them to return home with honor. 

1 Joseph J. Thomas, “We Go to Liberate: LtCol Tim Collins’ Address to the Royal 

Irish Guards” in Leadership Explored: Lessons in Leadership from Great Works of Literature, ed. Joseph J. Thomas (Virginia Beach, VA: Academx Publishing Services, 

2006), 332–33.

2 Ibid. Thomas adds, “Collins’ speech was reprinted in the London Times along 

with a photo of its author, cigar clenched in teeth. His words drew comparisons 

to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and Churchill’s towering war speeches.” See also 

John Keegan, The Iraq War (New York: Knopf, 2004), 167. Lieutenant-Colonel 

Tim Collins would become famous by making an inspiring eve-of-battle speech to 

his troops, which President George W. Bush had displayed on a wall in the Oval 

Office at the White House. 

Carroll Connelley

Introduction

—1—
2 | Aspects of Leadership

Without being strident, Lieutenant Colonel Collins appealed to 

his soldiers’ ethical, legal, and spiritual dimensions in his speech. 

While leadership has many aspects, this book focuses on the 

ethical, legal, and spiritual because of their foundational nature. 

As one of the course readings for the Marine Corps Command 

and Staff College states, “Leadership is the driving force of all war 

actions, and ethics is the foundation of leadership. Therefore, it is 

important for military leaders to become lifelong students of these 

two interwoven concepts.”3

 In order to support this precept, we 

compiled this collection to provide insight on how ethics, law, and 

spirituality can enhance a leader’s ability to create a command 

climate to accomplish the mission and support his or her Marines. 

A study of combat leadership conducted by the U.S. Army found 

that the “sine qua non of almost every successful commander 

was the unquestioned integrity concerning his duties, coupled 

with a solid ethical foundation in matters of dealing with combat 

or warfare.”4 Ethics, according to the military, appears to be the 

bedrock on which good leadership is built. But ethics is a broad 

field that has been considered throughout history and is studied 

in many different forms, beginning with the virtue ethics of the 

Greeks, moving through stoicism, onto consequentialism, then 

Kant, and more recently, applied ethics, to name but a few. For 

those of us in the military, while different approaches to ethics 

continue to be debated by scholars, at its core, ethics is the question of making the morally right decision at the most difficult 

time. However, to only reflect on the ethical dimension and ignore 

the legal and spiritual components that inform and help military 

3 U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Staff College Distance Education Program, 

MAGTF Expeditionary Operations, Course Book and Readings 8906, Volume I, 

AY12, 1–2.

4 The U.S. Military Academy History Department, “Leadership in Combat: An 

Historical Appraisal” in West Point’s Perspectives on Officership, ed. Timothy Spurlock (Dallas, TX: Alliance Press, 2001), 257.
Introduction | 3

members cope with difficult decisions would leave this work incomplete.

The study of leadership for warriors begins with the classics of 

the ancient world and runs through the accounts of our most 

recent conflicts. Vice Admiral James Stockdale was a student of 

that history and a modern heroic leader who, after deep study 

and careful reflection, was able to successfully employ his education under the most difficult circumstances. Admiral Stockdale’s extended time as a prisoner of war not only tried his ethical 

stamina, but also challenged the legal responsibilities he owed 

to his country and men, as well as tested his spiritual fortitude. 

Having been through such trials, Admiral Stockdale is an enormous repository of reflection on how the ethical, legal, and spiritual aspects of leadership help form a leader.

In his 13 July 1979 speech5

 to the cadets at the United States Military Academy concerning duty, keeping one’s word, and making 

right choices, Admiral Stockdale referred to the 17th-century 

philosopher John Locke’s book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

6

 Admiral Stockdale pointed to Locke’s conception of 

three different answers to the question of “why a man must keep 

his word” and proposed that the answers were “as applicable 

today as they were then.”7 Admiral Stockdale went on to describe 

the answers:

First, said Locke, a [spiritual] man will say, “Because God who 

has the power of eternal life and death requires it of me that I 

keep my word.” Secondly, said Locke, if one takes the Hobbesian view of life, he will say, “Because society requires it and the 

5 James B. Stockdale, “A Vietnam Experience, Duty,” in West Point’s Perspectives on 

Officership, 263.

6 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Charleston, SC: Nabu 

Press, 2010).

7 Stockdale, “A Vietnam Experience, Duty,” in West Point’s Perspectives on 

Officership, 263.
4 | Aspects of Leadership

state will punish you if you don’t.” (Hobbes was a very practical kind of hardnosed guy.) And thirdly, John Locke observed 

that had one of the old Greek philosophers been asked why a 

man should keep his word, the latter would say, “Because not 

to keep your word is dishonest, below the dignity of man, the 

opposite to virtue (arête).”8

Consequently, when asked to describe how to make morally right 

decisions, Admiral Stockdale referred to the spiritual, legal, and 

ethical foundations of making decisions and leading. All three 

aspects are taken into account when dealing with the most vexing 

moral dilemmas. Further, Admiral Stockdale insisted to the prospective officers that it would be their “duty to be moralists.”9

Defining a “moralist not as one who sententiously exhorts men 

to good, but one who elucidates what the good is,”10 Admiral Stockdale concluded his speech by appealing to a final duty he believed 

military officers have:

You must be able to act as philosophers in your careers in order 

to explain and understand the lack of moral economy in this 

universe. Many people have a great deal of difficulty with the 

fact that virtue is not always rewarded nor is evil always punished. To handle tragedy may indeed be the mark of an educated man, for one of the principal goals of education is to prepare 

us for failure. When it happens you have to stand up and cope 

with it, not lash out at scapegoats or go into your shell.11

While this speech was given over thirty years ago, it still rings true 

today. In the midst of an ongoing conflict with an enemy that is difficult to identify, does not adhere to the law of war, and appears to 

operate with a different set of moral standards, a leader must be able 

8 Ibid, 263.

9 Ibid, 265.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid, 266.
to intelligently explain to his subordinates why following the law 

and making the morally right decision at those most difficult times is 

essential. 

Where law is concerned, General James N. Mattis explains the essential connection to leadership and good decision making. In the 

foreword to the Marine Corps Reference Publication on War Crimes, 

General Mattis notes that “compliance with the Law of War is not 

only required under the UCMJ, but is also absolutely essential to 

mission accomplishment.”12 Despite the continuing consternation of the overlegalization of combat, one of the most respected and venerated warriors of our day has unmistakably posited 

that the law is in fact a force multiplier for leaders and not a constriction, as has so often been described. It is a matter of leaders 

understanding the law—not deferring to judge advocates—and 

making the link between law and mission accomplishment that is 

paramount. Simply put, the law is another support for assisting 

Marines in making those morally right decisions in the most difficult circumstances.

Spirituality, too, is an oft-misunderstood aspect of leadership. It 

is considered here because all indications identify the element 

of spirituality as being able to assist a command and its Marines 

to make measured decisions and promote a positive command 

climate that effectively deals with postcombat effects. In his 

seminal work, Marine Corps Vietnam veteran and Rhodes scholar 

Karl Marlantes describes the connection among spirituality, adherence to the law, and successful reintegration into society upon 

return from combat.

Warriors deal with death. They take life away from others. This 

is normally the role of God. Asking young warriors to take on 

that role without adequate psychological and spiritual prepa12 Department of the Navy, MCRP 4-11.8B, War Crimes (Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 2005), i., http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Pages/

MCRP%204-11.8B.aspx#.T3S47o5191A.

Introduction | 5
6 | Aspects of Leadership

ration can lead to damaging consequences. It can also lead to 

killing and infliction of pain in excess of what is required to 

accomplish the mission. If warriors are returned home having 

had better psychological and spiritual preparation, they will integrate into civilian life faster and they and their families will 

suffer less.13

The current combat environment is replete with demanding situations that perplex even the Corps’ most senior leaders. It is our 

belief that when the aspects of leadership discussed in these pages 

are used properly, they promote a positive command climate and 

ultimately nurture Marines both in combat and upon their return. 

Ultimately, this collection is presented in the earnest hope that it 

will spark discussions that will assist future leaders in reflecting 

on the ethical, legal, and spiritual challenges under the most difficult circumstances. Part I of this collection addresses the difficulty of ethical decision making in the current counterinsurgency environment. To begin the examination, Lieutenant Colonel 

Brian Christmas, USMC, and Dr. Paula Holmes Eber address the 

complex ethical challenges found in operating among foreign 

populations while trying to understand and work with diverse 

legal, religious, and moral systems. Using case examples from operations in Marjeh, Afghanistan, during 2010, the authors demonstrate how a clear understanding of Islamic practices and local 

leadership can assist in dealing with conflicts that affect the unit, 

Coalition partners, and the local populace. 

Geoffroy Murat, in his chapter, suggests a tool that leaders can 

rely on in order to be successful in operations: looking to “care 

ethics” or stakeholder theory—which states that personal development comes from being interdependent with others and 

encourages placing others at the center of one’s actions—to help 

guide decision making.

13 Karl Marlantes, What It Is Like To Go To War (New York: Atlantic Monthly 

Press, 2011), 1. 
Major Clinton Culp, USMC (Ret.) tackles the question of which 

pedagogical method is best suited to influence the ethical conduct 

of service members. The chapter primarily examines the current 

pedagogical methods that affect the majority of new officers who 

receive pre-commissioning ethics education, briefly touches on 

enlisted ethics education, and examines the institution’s role in 

facilitating moral conduct. 

Captain Emmanuel Goffi, French Air Force, addresses the difficult 

conflict that leaders must resolve in terms of their competing responsibilities toward their subordinates, their nations, and the international community. Used as an example is the French involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan, in which French troops have 

ostensibly been deployed with the primary purpose of defending 

French national interests; however, Paris’s declared justification 

for involvement has been premised primarily on humanitarian 

concerns. 

Dr. Peter Bradley explores what happens when loyalty to a fellow 

service member conflicts with a professional military obligation. 

This chapter examines the military duty-personal loyalty dilemma 

from a psychological perspective, drawing on research from the 

areas of decision making and military cohesion to illustrate how 

an individual’s internal forces interact with situational influences 

to affect the choices military personnel make in these cases. 

Dr. Paolo Tripodi draws on the historical account of the Holocaust 

to offer reflection for leaders on the issue of dissent. This chapter 

explores the motivations that led to disobedience and organizes 

them into two categories: subjective (the result of the individual’s 

inability to perform a certain task) and objective (result of an individual’s opposition to perform a certain task). 

The chapter by Dr. Clyde Croswell Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel 

Daniel L. Yaroslaski, USMC, concludes the ethical consideration 

Introduction | 7
8 | Aspects of Leadership

of leadership by positing that the need for global leadership and 

ethical mindfulness has never been more apparent. Their stated 

goals are ambitious as they attempt to arm the discerning reader 

with a new vocabulary; create an expanded understanding of the 

ethical nature of leadership complexity, sense making, and exercise of authority; and ground tactical, operational, and strategic thinking all within the biological, natural principles of living 

systems

Part II of this collection addresses various issues that have coalesced around the law of armed conflict and the responsibility 

leaders have for this issue that, at times, has been relegated to 

judge advocates. Major Winston Williams, USA, begins the conversation discussing training the rules of engagement (ROE) for 

the counterinsurgency fight, focusing on the delicate balance 

between exercising the inherent right of self-defense and winning 

the support of the local populace. 

Professor Laurie Blank, Esq., then examines and refocuses the 

debate about rules of engagement to analyze the critical intersection of law, strategy, and leadership that ROE represent in armed 

conflict. This chapter addresses the challenge of how civilian and 

military leaders can translate the important role that ROE contribute to mission accomplishment. 

Professor Jamie A. Williamson, Esq., then takes a broader perspective on the law of armed conflict as he discusses the importance 

of humanity in war and the critical role a commander plays in 

providing this perspective to his subordinates. 

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Jenks tackles the complicated topic of 

balancing the degree and manner by which risk is borne between 

Afghan civilians and U.S. military members as a result of the 

ongoing counterinsurgency operations. The author, by utilizing 

the evolving tactical directive on the use of force, explores the 
agency of risk between Coalition military and the civilian population in Afghanistan.

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Hobbs examines command responsibility when soldiers from multiple nations participate in coalition 

operations under a unified command structure. This chapter suggests that if a multinational commander is held criminally liable 

for the actions of subordinates from partner nations in the same 

manner as those from the commander’s own national forces, then 

a fundamental change should take place in the way coalitions are 

established. 

Part III of this collection considers the warrior’s spiritual dimension and how leadership can effectively support this. Commander 

David Gibson and Lieutenant Commander Judy Malana begin the 

conversation by examining the spiritual dimension of invisible injuries sustained on the battlefield. While spirituality may be individually practiced, and because it can affect the entire unit, they 

suggest a conceptual framework for intervention and healing on 

both the individual and unit level.

Colonel Franklin Eric Wester examines the results of a survey 

of U.S. land forces in the combat zone of Iraq collected in the 

summer of 2009. Named the Army’s Excellence in Character, 

Ethics, and Leadership (EXCEL) Survey, it measured spirituality 

as one of the individual variables among soldiers. Colonel Wester 

analyzes the data to identify statistically significant correlations 

between higher scores of spirituality and measures of ethics and 

resilience. 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Wilson discusses in detail the meaning 

and definition of the term “spirituality” within the military 

context. He argues that since spirituality is the philosophical underpinning of any logically coherent construction of ethics and 

law for both individuals and organizations, both legal and ethical 

Introduction | 9
10 | Aspects of Leadership

education must begin with an education in spiritual matters. 

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson draws upon philosophy, behavioral 

science, and military history to craft a narrative of a uniquely 

American sense of spirituality that serves as a nexus for ethics 

and law in the American armed forces. 

Dr. Pauletta Otis tackles the stimulating topic of the impact religion has on military leadership by considering questions such as 

if the personal morality of incoming personnel differ in any measurable way with regard to religious identity; if a service member’s faith system or belief in personal responsibility to a “higher 

authority” makes him or her a more ethical or moral professional; 

and if spiritual or religious commanders are more ethical in their 

decision making. In this essay, Dr. Otis focuses on the relationship between personal spirituality and ethical behavior, religious 

identity and ethical behavior, and how either individual faith or 

religious institutions relate to the mission and requirements of the 

military. 

Finally, Major General Arnold Fields concludes the discussion of 

spirituality by proposing that spiritual leadership is the amalgamation of natural, learned, and spiritual qualities necessary to 

influence ethical behaviors of self and others in the interest of 

morally acceptable objectives and outcomes. In this personal essay, 

Major General Fields reflects on his own experiences in combat 

and posits that fighting and killing in the name of freedom remain 

a moral dichotomy for the nation to ponder and the individual 

American warrior to resolve in his or her own spiritual realm.
Part I

Ethics

Many of the more complex challenges in operating among foreign 

populations stem from trying to understand and work with 

people who follow different religious, political, and legal systems. 

Around the world, notions of leadership and authority, methods 

for judging and resolving disputes, and concepts of morally 

and religiously acceptable behavior vary radically from country 

to country or even from region to region within a country. Misunderstandings and conflicts between the local population and 

outside military forces can quickly arise due to different religious 

or cultural interpretations of events and actions. When handled 

poorly, such misunderstandings may even escalate to serious hostilities on the part of the local population, resulting in violent conflict and a widening gap between the population and military or 

security forces in the area.

Tensions and hostilities from these misunderstandings are not inevitable, however. As this chapter demonstrates, military decision 

makers can often effectively resolve conflicts with local populations by partnering with religious, tribal, or other locally recognized leadership to leverage the community’s traditional dispute 

resolution mechanisms. We argue that by working with local 

leadership to apply culturally accepted processes for resolving 

Leadership, Ethics, and Culture 

in COIN Operations

Case Examples from Marjeh, Afghanistan

Brian Christmas and Paula Holmes-Eber

—13—
14 | Aspects of Leadership

conflict, tense situations can be resolved peacefully and successfully without the need for more kinetic approaches. Since these 

solutions have a “local face,” the community is more likely to 

accept the outcome, local leaders are empowered and legitimized, 

and U.S. and Coalition forces build stronger relationships with 

the community in the long run. 

Using three vignettes from 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine’s (3/6) operations in Marjeh, Afghanistan, in 2010, this chapter demonstrates 

how a clear understanding of local leadership patterns, Islamic 

beliefs, and culturally accepted methods for resolving disputes 

enabled the battalion to resolve local conflicts that affected the 

unit, Coalition partners, and the local populace. Our analysis 

combines in-depth case studies of actual operational events with 

cross-cultural research on conflict resolution. This synthesis of 

conflict resolution theory and operational experience allows us to 

expand our analysis beyond the specific case examples presented 

here to understand the larger cultural lessons learned from each 

vignette. 

The annals of recent Marine Corps engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan have many examples of unsuccessful cross-cultural 

interactions. This may teach us what to avoid in that specific 

culture, but failures are not particularly helpful in identifying the 

specific factors that lead to success. Because our goal is to identify 

positive lessons that can apply to military operations, not only 

in Afghanistan, but in many cultural contexts, we have selected 

three vignettes of conflicts that were resolved successfully. The 

theoretical literature on cross-cultural conflict resolution is then 

applied to explain the underlying cross-cultural principles that 

led to the successful outcomes.
Leadership, Ethics, and Culture | 15

Religion, Law, and Conflict Resolution in CrossCultural Perspective

In working in foreign cultural contexts, misunderstandings can 

often arise when a service member assumes that other cultures 

resolve conflict and evaluate behavior according to Western standards. In the United States and Europe, conflicts are officially resolved by using formal court systems based on Roman and British 

common law practices; applying secular rather than religious 

standards to behavior; and relying on state-funded political and 

security systems to enforce peace. 

Cross-cultural research, however, demonstrates that people in 

both Western and non-Western nations employ a large range 

of dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve conflict—many of 

which are not based on formal state institutions. Furthermore, in 

many regions—particularly those that have had an external leadership imposed upon them (through colonial rule or conquest, for 

example)—state-sanctified leadership may not have the power 

or legitimacy to enforce laws or motivate the local population to 

comply with these laws. Rather than viewing state leadership, 

law, and the courts as the only system for resolving conflicts, 

scholars note that people around the world rely upon a variety of 

mechanisms for resolving disputes. This legal pluralism1

 provides 

people with numerous avenues for resolving differences. In the 

United States, for example, many conflicts never reach the courts 

but are resolved through mediation, arbitration, or simply by 

pressure and intervention from family or community members.

Military leaders, therefore, need to be aware that in many countries there are parallel and even competing systems of justice and 

dispute resolution. This is particularly common in Muslim countries, in which secular European judicial systems operate side1 Olivia Harris, Inside and Outside the Law: Anthropological Studies of Authority and 

Ambiguity (London: Routledge, 1996).
16 | Aspects of Leadership

by-side with religious Islamic law. Typically in these countries, 

secular law governs business, international relations, and criminal law (all issues in which the state desires control), while religious law is relegated to family and domestic issues. 

Ideally, secular and Islamic legal systems do not overlap, but in 

most Muslim countries there are grey areas where cases could be 

tried in either court system. The decision as to where to bring a 

complaint often reflects local values, as well as a pragmatic assessment of which legal system is likely to be most favorable to 

the complainant. Frequently, local Muslim legal and religious 

scholars and leaders (such as a mullah, imam, qadi, etc.) hold a considerable amount of power, authority, and respect from the local 

population due to their influential roles in resolving conflict. This 

explains why, in most Muslim countries, there are two parallel 

(and sometimes competing) power systems: one based on state 

authority and the other on religious authority. Operationally, 

when working in such areas, military leaders will be most successful if they can work with leaders of both systems. 

Religious and secular legal systems are not the only forms of conflict resolution, however. Frequently, indigenous forms of leadership (such as tribal leaders, business leaders, and so on) exert 

much influence over the community; as a result, the population 

may turn to these leaders for intervention in and resolution of local 

conflicts. Military leaders may overlook these oftentimes powerful mechanisms for resolving disputes, since they do not have the 

familiar trappings of a Western-style political and judicial system. 

Alternative nonstate political-legal systems can be based on tribal 

precedent; other legal/moral philosophies (e.g., the Pashtun 

code of honor and revenge, Pashtunwali, in Afghanistan); or other 

historical traditions established long before the arrival of European or foreign legal systems.2

 The resulting indigenous dispute 

2 See Thomas Barfield, Afghan Customary Law and Its Relationship to Formal Judicial Institutions (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2003); and 

Louise Anderson, “The Law and the Desert: Alternative Methods of Delivering 

Justice,” Journal of Law and Society 30 (2003): 120–36.
resolution mechanisms can range from a formal council meeting 

of elders (e.g., the Iraqi tribal shuras and the Afghan jirgas) who 

listen to complaints and mete out judgment, to more individual 

forms of conflict resolution, such as the use of mediators hired 

to assist in guiding negotiation between the offended parties. In 

some cultures, a respected community leader, religious leader, or 

elder may adjudicate complaints, sitting on his front porch each 

morning and “holding court.” In others, members of the community may band together to form a vigilante group, hunting down 

and killing individuals they consider to be criminals or violators 

of an accepted cultural rule.

By understanding and recognizing the variety of avenues for resolving disputes in an area of operation, military leaders can select 

conflict resolution methods that are most likely to lead to successful outcomes. The following analysis applies cultural research on 

Afghanistan to analyze the vignettes from Marine Corps Battalion 

3/6’s operations in that area. The specific vignettes are then evaluated for the larger cross-cultural lessons, illustrating how military 

leaders can resolve crises through the use of local leadership and 

resolution methods.

Leadership and Conflict Resolution in 

Southern Afghanistan

Studies of Afghanistan reveal a two-tiered legal dispute resolution system, reflecting the difficult and often ineffective relationship between the state and regional areas. First, there is a stateregulated legal system composed of state-appointed courts and 

judges. Over the past 30 years, depending on the government in 

place at the time, this legal system has been more or less founded 

on a state-mandated interpretation of Islam, theoretically based 

on the Hanafi fiqh (jurisprudence).3

 Although loosely tied to Sunni 

3 See Barfield, Afghan Customary Law; and Nazif Shahrani, “Local Politics in 

Afghanistan: Dynamics of State-Society Relations in Perspective” (keynote address 

presented at the symposium on “Beyond the State-Local Politics in Afghanistan, 

Bonn, Germany, Center for Development Research, 26–28 February 2009). 

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sharia (Islamic law), as Barfield4 notes, this connection is more an 

ideal than a reality due to the inadequate religious and legal education of the majority of judges and lawyers in the country. 

In theory, the Afghan state legal system is the only recognized 

method for resolving disputes in the country. However, due to 

inadequate funding and lack of skilled personnel, the Afghan 

court system is effectively limited to the major urban centers of 

the country and a select set of higher-level courts in the outlying 

provinces. Furthermore, given the uneasy relationship between 

the state and outlying tribal and ethnic groups, even where state 

courts do exist, the local population is reluctant to use the state 

legal system, viewing it as a structure the state exploits to exert 

control in the region.5

Thus a second—parallel and informal—tier of conflict resolution 

exists in outlying provincial areas. This is particularly evident in 

the Pashtun-dominated region of southern Afghanistan. Today, as 

in the past, local Pashtun tribal groups tend to continue to follow 

their own system of justice based on a mixture of religious and 

cultural leadership and sanctions. The result is a syncretic mix of 

a local folk interpretation of Islam combined with community application of the tenets of Pashtunwali.

Recent research on Afghan village areas reveals a balanced system 

of conflict resolution and community leadership composed of the 

following elements: (a) tribal councils or jirgas; (b) the village religious/legal leader or mullah; and (c) the village representative 

or malik.

6

 Each of these three parallel systems works in conjunction, either simultaneously or sequentially, to resolve community 

disputes and issues. According to a survey conducted by Brick,7

4 Thomas Barfield, Afghan Customary Law.

5 Shahrani, “Local Politics in Afghanistan.” 

6 Jennifer Brick, “The Political Economy of Customary Village Organizations in 

Rural Afghanistan” (paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Central Eurasian Studies Society, Washington, DC, September 2008). 

7 Brick, “The Political Economy.” 
villagers were equally as likely to go to each of these different 

leaders to resolve an issue. This finding is critical, since it suggests 

that no one leadership system is dominant. Rather, a system of 

checks and balances is in place so that religious (mullah), community (jirga), and political (malik) leadership must work together 

effectively in order to maintain harmony in the village. 

This preference, particularly among rural Pashtuns, for an egalitarian approach to decision making and conflict resolution is 

evident throughout the literature on Afghanistan.8

 The egalitarian village leadership system is in clear contrast (and perhaps 

in response) to the top-down, state-centralized efforts to control 

local areas. As the three following vignettes illustrate, by understanding and working with all three parallel leadership systems 

in Marjeh, Afghanistan, under the leadership of Lieutent Colonel 

Brian S. Christmas, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines was able to successfully resolve local conflicts and build effective long-term positive 

relationships in the region. In order to emphasize the perspective 

of the leader in the cases, all three vignettes are narrated in the 

first person by Lieutenant Colonel Christmas. All case summaries 

and the lessons learned continue to be presented by both authors.

3rd Battalion, 6th Marines: Operations in 

Marjeh, Afghanistan, 2009–2010 

In December of 2009, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines was informed 

that they would be deploying to Afghanistan in January of 2010 

8 See David Edwards, “Learning from the Swat Pathans: Political Leadership in 

Afghanistan, 1978–97,” American Ethnologist 25 (1998): 721–28. Also see Brick, 

“The Political Economy”; Nazif Shahrani, “War, Factionalism, and the State in Afghanistan,” American Anthropologist 104 (2002): 715–22; Shahrani “Local Politics 

in Afghanistan”; Thomas Barfield, “Weapons of the Not So Weak in Afghanistan: 

Pashturn Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace” 

(paper presented at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series on “Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities and States: Transitions and Identities,” Yale University, 23 February 

2007); and Barfield, Afghan Customary Law.

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under the 2d MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade) and Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7).9, 10 They were assigned the mission 

of clearing the northern area of Marjeh in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. They partnered with an Afghan National Army (ANA) 

kandak (battalion) and, following the initial clearing, also partnered with various Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) 

and Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) units. The deployment 

lasted over seven months and consisted of both conventional and 

counterinsurgency operations.

9 The narration of three cases is provided in the first person by LtCol Christmas to 

illustrate his perspective. In contrast, all case summaries and analyses are provided 

by both authors.

10 In 2004, I (LtCol Christmas) served as the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 

operations officer during operations in the Oruzgon Province of Afghanistan. To 

the outsider looking in, our actions would seem to be purely kinetic and focused 

on the enemy. But a closer look reveals a BLT commander who had a clear understanding of the culture and the people that significantly influenced our successful 

day-to-day operations. From Jan Mohammed, the province governor and aggressive leader of the Afghan Militia Forces and his soldiers, to the local leaders in the 

countless villages that we fought in or traveled through, LtCol Asad Khan’s proactive, sincere, and knowledgeable approach to these individuals ensured our success. Never relinquishing his authority but understanding when to give and take 

strengthened our relationships and promulgated the confidence of those that he 

was trying to influence. My leadership education continued as the executive officer 

of a battalion deployed to Fallujah, Iraq, in 2005 following the initial clearing of 

the city. LtCol Bill Jurney was assigned the daunting task of piecing a large portion 

of the city and the outlying areas back together. This included the reintegration of 

the civilian populace, the re-establishment of the local government and authorities, 

and the rebuilding of the infrastructure that was damaged or destroyed during the 

initial fight. All of this was completed while engaging an insurgent enemy—a task 

that has become common on today’s battlefield and requires engaged and informed 

leadership. LtCol Jurney, like LtCol Khan, provided me the example of developing 

and maintaining relationships with all of the “players” involved in ensuring success. 

In this case, LtCol Jurney had a clear handle on relations with the leadership of the 

two Iraqi battalions that were operating in our AO, the political and religious leaders, and the local leaders, all of whom influenced the ability to repopulate, rebuild, 

and enhance what was previously a prosperous and viable community. My experience with these two sincere, informed, and proactive leaders provided me with 

strong role models to emulate. Coupled with the education provided at Command 

and Staff College, I was prepared to handle the challenges faced during operations 

in Marjeh, Afghanistan.
Northern Marjeh included a mixed terrain consisting of plush 

farms with canals formed in grids as well as desert with deep 

sand. There were both small and large villages and comparable 

markets and bazaars. The majority of the narrow roads throughout the area of operations (AO) required one-way traffic and very 

careful driving along the canals. Many areas were only accessible 

by foot traffic or helicopter. During the beginning of the deployment, the Marines and sailors endured freezing temperatures, 

volatile rain storms, and hail the size of golf balls; by the end 

of the deployment, the Marines and sailors were enduring 120 

degree temperatures.

In late January, elements of the battalion (partnered with the ANA 

down to the squad level) inserted via ground and air into the Bari 

Desert, where they began to conduct shaping operations. In the 

second week of February, in conjunction with adjacent units, 3/6 

Map 1. Map of 3/6 Area of Operations in Marjeh, Afghanistan.

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conducted a ground and heliborne assault on northern Marjeh in 

order to seize named objectives and ultimately clear their designated area of operation. 

As the Coalition forces continued to clear the enemy from Marjeh, 

the “government-in-a-box” was put in place. The “box” consisted 

of Haji Zahir, the appointed subgovernor, and a few administrative officials. Haji Zahir was a brave, proactive, and engaged individual who wanted to make a difference, but he was challenged 

by a shortage of resources and experience. The governor, along 

with many U.S. and ANA officials, did not seem to understand 

the complexity of the area that was now designated “Marjeh.” It 

included all of the areas to the north, up to the canal boundary 

with the British and Nadi-Ali, through portions of Trek-Nawa, 

to the west and northwest into the Bari Dessert inclusive of the 

Sistani Peninsula, and south out of Marjeh proper toward Camp 

Dwyer. The focus tended to be on the central area where the big 

bazaars were and where the “box” was placed. As a result, it took 

engaged and proactive leadership to court the governor and to 

ultimately help him to realize the importance of addressing this 

entire area. Without the Afghan government’s direct engagement, 

the mission, again at all levels of warfare, would not have been 

successful.

The importance of building and maintaining relationships with 

the political, religious, military, and community leaders in an area 

of operations cannot be overstated. Unfortunately, often these relationships are typically handled in an extreme manner. In some 

cases, military leaders approach the situation with apprehension and treat local leaders with “kid gloves.” At the other end 

of the spectrum are cases in which the situation is mishandled by 

a leader who does not understand its complexity or who is too 

arrogant to see the importance of local leadership. There is a fine 

line that a leader must walk so that he will not give too little or too 

much latitude and/or attention to the detriment of his mission as 

the following three vignettes illustrate. 
Vignette 1: Using a Mosque as an Insurgent Weapons 

Storage Facility 

During our initial push into northern Marjeh, following successful 

shaping operations in the Bari Dessert through January and into 

February of 2010, Captain Bill Hefty, along with the Marines and 

sailors of Company I and their ANA partners, cleared through an 

area that was heavily laden with improvised explosive devices 

(IEDs). In one instance, the Coalition force came to a mosque that 

contained a large depository of IEDs and manufacturing materials along with small arms and ammunition. This was discovered 

following a search conducted by the company’s ANA partners. 

The mosque and surrounding area were secured and the incident reported to the battalion. Understanding the importance 

and complexity of the issue, especially being early into our time 

in Marjeh, we informed the regiment, who then informed higher 

command. Ultimately, this resulted in delaying further actions in 

the area until the Afghan director of the Hajj, along with a council 

of mullahs and other officials, could see the weapons stash for 

themselves. 

My ANA counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Farouq, and I arrived 

on the scene shortly after the reports, followed by a CNN crew 

sent down from the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. A few hours 

later the director of the Hajj and officials from the Helmand Province government, including the subgovernor, Haji Zahir, flew in. 

They were accompanied by Afghan television and newspaper reporters.

Realizing the importance of this event and the effect of first impressions on likely future relations, I ensured that my role and 

Lieutenant Colonel Farouq’s roles were equal as we addressed the 

visiting religious and provincial government leaders. Throughout 

their time inspecting the mosque, these leaders were given full 

access to the area and were treated with the utmost respect. At 

times this was annoying, as the company was ready to push, as 

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was I, and the amount of time it was taking to prove that a mosque 

was being used in this manner seemed unnecessary. However, 

reflecting upon my previous experiences in Afghanistan in 2004, 

I recognized the importance of working with the director of the 

Hajj, so I initiated a conversation with him, acknowledging his 

value without demeaning my own position and authority. That 

night, the director of the Hajj denounced insurgents using local 

mosques as sanctuaries and IED manufacturing and storage facilities. His speech was covered by CNN and the Afghan networks. 

Lessons Learned 

This highly sensitive incident was not resolved by conventional 

military tactics but by allowing local and regional leadership to 

take the lead in condemning the illegal cache. By taking the time 

to let the local leaders conduct their inspection, we demonstrated 

our understanding of their culture and the importance of Islam’s 

role for them. The result was that a highly respected religious 

leader, the director of the Hajj, spoke out publicly on television 

against the insurgents. Because Afghan religious officials (and 

not U.S. Marines) publicly stated that the actions were contrary 

to Islam, the local population was more willing to accept the 

evidence. 

Equally important, this incident established a partnership 

between local leadership and Battalion 3/6, providing legitimacy 

to the actions of the battalion in the eyes of the populace. The 

efforts taken to work with the Afghan religious leaders, the ANA, 

and the press were valuable at all levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical). The newly established relationship with the 

director of the Hajj would prove beneficial throughout continued 

operations over the next five months, and our ANA counterparts 

experienced our dedication to our partnership. Ultimately, the 

time delay during the tactical execution resulted in an operational 

and strategic victory and would prove highly beneficial in the 

long term, as the next two vignettes will emphasize.
Vignette 2: False Accusations of Marines Desecrating a Quran

With the initial clear of “Marjeh proper” nearly completed, and 

Company I’s recent push into the Sistani Peninsula, we continued 

to capitalize on our success, the positive press (Afghan and U.S.), 

and the development of our relationships with local political 

and religious leaders. One of our first steps was to hold a shura 

with the tribal leaders to discuss our plans to position our forces 

throughout the Sistani Peninsula. Sistani is home to many tribes 

including the Norzai, Ichsokzi, and Alikozi, and this particular 

shura proved educational and improved our ability to handle the 

sensitive incidents that we would encounter in future operations. 

The shura was to be the first of many we held in the region, and 

I gained a true appreciation for the importance of the culture, 

knowledge of the local leadership, and the value of organizations like the Human Terrain Teams (HTT).11 Prior to the shura, 

while walking around and assessing the ground, I had my jump 

Marines and sailor pull out our “shura-in-a-bag”12 to supplement the company’s resources. During this time, John, the senior 

member of the HTT approached me with a small piece of paper 

in his hand. He asked if he could speak with me for a moment. 

My education began the minute John started to talk. He handed 

me the slip of paper and described the complexities of Sistani, the 

multiple tribes represented throughout, where they were situated, 

and where they stood on the totem pole. He provided me with the 

names of their leaders and then described what they were likely 

to discuss and what was most important to each. This information 

11 Human terrain teams are primarily an Army program designed to provide 

battalion and regimental commanders with a greater understanding of the culture 

and needs of the local population. The controversial program deploys a team of 

civilians (who are intended to have cultural, linguistic, or operational knowledge 

of the region) with battalions and regiments. Their role is to talk to the population 

and advise commanders on the sociocultural situation in the region.

12 “Shura-in-a-bag” consisted of a large pack that housed a tea set, with extra 

glasses; a teapot; Afghan serving dishes; cashews; and other assorted nuts, dried 

fruit, and candy. It also included large bottles of water, sugar, “good” tea, spoons, 

napkins, and a poncho line to sit on. In my vehicle, I also kept an Afghan rug.

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on local leadership was instrumental in our ability to execute the 

shura successfully. 

In order to provide sufficient forces to continue operations in 

“Marjeh proper,” we established an agreed-upon presence on the 

outskirts of Sistani. We agreed to conduct security patrols, provide 

an active civil affairs program, and rely on the local leaders and 

people to manage daily activities occurring within the peninsula. 

As a result of our continued relationships with the local population and their leaders, we were able to successfully achieve our 

limited goals in this part of our area of operations. 

Threatened by our successful operations, our enemy attempted 

to sway the positive local opinions of our Coalition force against 

us by creating disorder. After a few months into our operation, 

a very young and animated mullah told the locals that following a recent search of a home, a Coalition patrol had desecrated 

a Quran. The “mullah” gathered a small mob and headed across 

the Sistani Desert to the district center into Marine Corps Battalion 1/6’s area of operations to protest. Although the protest was 

not in my AO (Battalion 1/6 had to deal with this first mob), I 

departed for Sistani in order to investigate. 

When I arrived, I immediately stepped to the side, allowing the 

new ANA commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed,13 to take 

the lead as he questioned local people in the area. We found that 

the home where the desecration allegedly occurred was abandoned. All indications were that the accusations were false. We 

questioned several members of the mob who stated that ANA soldiers, with the help of Marines, had beaten them. They stated that 

there were many individuals with broken limbs, severe bruising, 

and other injuries. However, nobody with such injuries could be 

produced. The emotions tied to the alleged desecration of a Quran 

13 LtCol Farouq’s ANA Battalion rotated out following the main surge into Marjeh. His battalion was relieved by LtCol Mohammad’s battalion that would remain 

with 3/6 until its relief-in-place.
and word of mouth, especially from a religious leader, were very 

powerful and evoked a strong emotional reaction among the 

people. 

During the questioning, what struck us the most was that the 

mullah was not someone we had ever met or known. This was 

a place where we had established relations with local religious 

and community leaders, where we had agreed with the community about how we would operate in the area, and where we had 

already conducted various civil affairs-related efforts, including 

providing school supplies to the three local madrassas (religious 

schools). Frankly, it did not make sense. 

After we were informed of a second mob forming the following 

day, I called upon the subgovernor, Haji Zahir. I then picked him 

up at the district center, along with other religious officials and 

government personnel, and in a similar fashion to the mosque incident, provided them full access to the house and the local area. 

We walked around and spoke to some of the local population, 

and it became evident that the claims of a damaged Quran were 

unfounded. 

The incident came to a head when Haji Zahir asked the “mullah” 

to take a walk with him and to lead their group in prayer. As they 

returned from washing at the stream and praying, the subgovernor and his entourage were smiling and laughing. Having the 

relationship that I did with the governor, I inquired what was 

so amusing. He exclaimed, “That man is no mullah, he does not 

even know how to lead us in prayer.” Ultimately, we gathered 

as many locals as we could and Haji Zahir gave the floor to the 

mullah, who, with great emotion and detail, explained the supposed atrocity and condemned the efforts of our Coalition forces. 

The locals were visibly angry afterwards and wanted vindication.

Then, Haji Zahir and a Marjeh religious leader spoke to the people, 

describing what they had observed during their visit. The leaders 

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then dispersed all involved, providing Qurans to the local community and dispelling the accusations made. What was amazing 

about the whole situation is that the first mob was made up of 

individuals who did not even come from the area of the alleged 

desecration. Clearly, this was the enemy’s attempt to instigate 

problems as a result of our continued successful operations and 

relationship with the locals, the government, and the military. 

Lessons Learned

By taking a role as a Coalition partner supporting the governor 

and the religious leaders, I was able to show a presence without 

usurping the appropriate local authority for resolving disputes. 

As a result, the religious and political leadership in the area was 

able to use clear, culturally accepted evidence (that the mullah 

was a “fake mullah” who did not know how to pray) to challenge 

the false accusations. Furthermore, these leaders were able to 

provide the culturally appropriate solution to the problem: dispensing additional Qurans to the population. Equally important, 

however, by working as partners with the local leaders, our role 

as legitimate protectors of the peace was reinforced in the eyes of 

the community.

The relationships mentioned above include the trust and mutual 

respect required between a U.S. commander and his Coalition 

counterpart and with that partner’s subordinates. One’s Coalition 

partners need to be willing to listen, make informed decisions, 

and at times, be willing to follow one in the heat of battle. We had 

this relationship with our first ANA partners as was evidenced 

by our initial clearing operations in Marjah. We maintained a 

mutual trust and respect, capitalizing on each others’ strengths 

and providing support mechanisms to manage or overcome our 

weaknesses. 

As parts of our battle space began to transition from the clear to 

the hold phase, our ANA Battalion also transitioned, requiring 
our attention to ensure these types of relationships were fostered 

with our new partners. The need for this relationship transition 

was made evident upon our having to deal with the Marines’ unintended upsetting of a Quran during the search of a home.

Vignette 3: A Mishandled Quran

In the southeast corner of our area of operations, where “Marjeh 

proper” and Trek Nawa border each other, we established a platoon-sized position to address the infiltration lines of the insurgents. It was a volatile area that guaranteed contact with the insurgents multiple times throughout the day. The platoon assigned 

to this area was partnered with an ANA counterpart, which was 

the pattern throughout our operations. 

After some time, we began to receive reports of ANA soldiers possibly collaborating with the enemy, providing the numbers and 

likely route of outgoing patrols. To address this issue, I spoke with 

my new ANA counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed. At 

first, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed’s reaction was defensive, 

but once I explained that the information was gained through unquestionable intelligence collection sources, he became willing to 

find a solution. 

Having learned from my previous experiences that working 

through local leadership led to greater legitimacy in our efforts, 

my recommendation was that Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad 

should handle the situation. I provided him the identification of 

the suspects, emphasizing that since we were Coalition partners, 

our information and intelligence collection should also be partnered. I suggested that he explain to his subordinates that the 

knowledge of the actions by the perpetrators was gained through 

his own intelligence means.

This was acceptable to him and we made our first trip down to the 

small base. While he addressed the issue of collaboration with the 

enemy, I focused on inspecting the facility with the platoon comLeadership, Ethics, and Culture | 29
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mander and talking to the Marines, sailors, interpreters, and the 

ANA who were not directly involved with their commander. It 

was a good visit that accomplished a great deal, especially toward 

building our relationship at multiple levels. This would not be 

our last challenging visit to this post, as we soon discovered.

Within a few weeks, we were forced to return. Marines were again 

accused of upsetting and damaging a Quran during a search of 

a home. This time, however, the accusations were true. Yet what 

made this event different from the previous incident was that it 

was not the locals who were protesting the event, rather, it was our 

ANA partners on the Trek Nawa border. Tensions with their partnered Marines and sailors were literally on the verge of outright 

aggression. 

To set the stage, the Marines and sailors were aware of the disloyalty of some of the ANA as a result of our previous visit. Both 

Marine and ANA forces were led by strong platoon commanders; however, they were both frustrated by dealing with constant 

contact with the enemy, oppressive heat, and restricted terrain. So 

on this particular day, the ANA had decided that they were not 

going to participate in the patrols and required searches. 

That morning, the Marines and sailors went out on the search 

alone. They were disgruntled, but maintained as much composure as could be mustered throughout the execution of the patrols. 

While the Marines and sailors continued their search, an older 

Afghan man approached the ANA soldiers who had remained 

behind. He was carrying a Quran that appeared to have fallen 

apart. He was not overly emotional, but wanted to know why the 

ANA would mistreat the Quran during their search of his house. 

The ANA’s unexpected reaction was outrage, fits of anger and 

emotion, and the requirement to restrain and disarm some of their 
own soldiers. Everyone returned to the patrol base, where emotions remained high. These emotions ultimately incited the majority of the ANA soldiers to begin questioning their partnership 

with the Marines and to threaten to avenge the alleged desecration. The instigators within the group easily capitalized on this 

situation as tensions mounted exponentially. 

Upon hearing reports of the incident, I immediately called Haji 

Zahir and explained that a group of Marines allegedly desecrated 

the Quran. I stated that I was on my way to investigate the situation with Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed and that we would let 

him know the results. I wanted him to hear about the incident 

from me; I wanted him to know that we were addressing it immediately; and I wanted him to know that we understood its importance and his important role in the situation’s ultimate reconciliation. The drive was a short distance from the forward operating 

base (FOB); therefore, we arrived on the scene very quickly. 

Indeed, emotions were high. The Marine leadership and the 

ANA leadership had done a good job separating the two forces. 

Marines remained on the posts of the patrol base. Before arriving 

at the scene, the only information I had about the situation was 

that there was an alleged desecration. As I walked in, I cordially greeted an old man sitting calmly by the side entry point. As 

the conversation continued, he was whisked away by two ANA 

soldiers. I found this a bit odd, but knew that I had other things 

to worry about as the noise emitting from the inside of the compound was akin to wailing Iraqis at a funeral. Both Lieutenant 

Colonel Mohammed and I understood the value of not overreacting, and we both calmly approached our separated forces to investigate the circumstances. As he spoke to his leadership, I spoke 

to the Marine platoon commander and platoon sergeant. They explained that Marines were conducting searches, while their ANA 

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partners refused to participate. In one case, a Marine was looking 

at a book, when another walked in the room, knocking the book 

out of his hands out of frustration. The book separated and the 

pages were dispersed across the floor. Not realizing that the book 

was a Quran and not showing their usual respect for the owner 

and his property, the Marines moved on to the next house. 

As the lieutenant colonel went on, I realized who the old man was 

upon my arrival and that there was more going on than just the 

desecration of the Quran. Several issues needed to be addressed 

and the first started with my Marines and sailors. I spoke to them 

in full sight of the ANA. I spoke of the Bible and our general 

understanding and then I spoke of the Quran and their understanding. I explained that to Muslims, the type in the Quran is the 

words spoken by God to Mohammed and that there is only one 

version of the Quran that is sacred, spoken by God, and written 

by the illiterate prophet who neither wrote nor read until God 

gifted him. Most already knew this, but needed a reminder. They 

clearly understood the passion of their partners, as this passion 

is similar to that shown by our Marines and sailors for their own 

religion. 

I approached Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed, who clearly had 

the hardest task and was unable to restrain the emotions of his 

platoon. I asked if he would mind if I spoke with his men. Clearly 

frustrated and skeptical, he supported my request. Rather than 

using my interpreter, I asked one of the platoon’s two interpreters, 

a clear-headed man who had gained the respect of the ANA, to 

translate for me as I addressed the ANA soldiers. He obliged. As 

I began to address the soldiers, I was immediately attacked with 

harsh words and witnessed the uncontrolled emotions of others 

in the background. Remaining calm, I responded, acknowledging their claims of our mistake. I then explained our intent of addressing the situation by working with the local community and 
religious and governmental leaders to ensure appropriate steps 

would be taken to rectify the mistake.

There were three ANA soldiers who were especially vocal, one 

with an ability to articulate his thoughts coherently and with persuasion. This became a challenge, as he and his two assistants were 

clearly instigating and taking advantage of a highly sensitive situation. In speaking with Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed, I asked 

for his recommendation. He stated that we needed to remove the 

three individuals as well as the other interpreter. I happily concurred and my counterpart took actions to ensure removal of the 

instigators without causing additional conflict.

My task was not complete, however, as I followed up with Haji 

Zahir and explained all that happened. Ultimately, Lieutenant 

Colonel Mohammad and I drove down to the district center and 

spoke with the subgovernor. Haji Zahir called the director of the 

Hajj, explained the circumstances, and asked for guidance. We 

were told that we needed to replace the Quran as well as provide 

a cow to be slaughtered and given to the people of the town. 

Based on this guidance, Haji Zahir, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed, and I drove to the patrol base and had the ANA, partnered 

with Marines, lead the foot patrol back to the compound where 

the incident occurred. 

We were attacked by insurgents throughout the movement. 

Despite the constant firing and ultimate danger, the subgovernor 

understood the importance of his role, maintained his composure, 

and willingly continued on with the patrol. Upon our arrival, I 

asked Haji Zahir if it was best to give the cow to the community 

as a gift or to provide the community with the money to purchase the cow. Out of sight of others, I provided Haji Zahir the 

money for the cow and we proceeded to greet the owner of the 

compound. The old man was elated at the subgovernor’s willing 

visit, especially as shots ricocheted around us. He was even more 

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ecstatic when presented with two Qurans to replace his damaged 

one. Haji Zahir explained to him and to others standing within 

earshot that he had spoken to the director of the Hajj on our behalf 

and that he recommended replacing the Quran and providing a 

cow for a feast to be held in the village. He then handed the old 

man the money and expressed the importance of the work that 

the Coalition forces were conducting. He stated that the Americans do not understand everything about their culture, but have 

good hearts, have a willingness to learn, and want to help Afghanistan succeed. 

The cow supplement seemed to shock the recipient, who thanked 

the subgovernor with enthusiasm and thanked both me and Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed with equal respect and appreciation. A 

good portion of the ANA soldiers witnessed this exchange, which 

had its added benefits. The ANA platoon commander was given 

the responsibility of following up later with the village elders to 

ensure that the money actually went toward the feast, further integrating them into the community’s solution of the problem. 

Lessons Learned

By turning to the district religious and political leadership systems 

to help resolve the conflict, an extremely volatile situation was 

averted. The local leadership came up with a culturally appropriate solution requiring payment of a cow and a feast to the community. This solution, which is based on Pashtunwali notions of 

reinstating honor (nang), is a culturally accepted way of resolving conflict in Pashtun areas of Afghanistan. The Marines paid 

a social debt for dishonoring the elderly man, the religious community, and the ANA, thus absolving any hostilities between the 

parties. 

Equally important, both religious and political district leadership visited the home of the elderly man in person. Their presence not only added authority and validity to the Marines’ actions 
but also reinforced the support of the community leaders for the 

presence of the Marines and the ANA in the area. The parallel 

presence of both religious and political leaders during all three 

of the vignettes described here reflects the Afghan village preference for balanced leadership in which no single individual is 

given undue authority. By including all important leaders in these 

events, rather than working with only one, this balance was maintained and strengthened throughout the Marines’ deployment to 

the area.

Ultimately, a potentially disastrous event that could have soured 

the partnership between the ANA and the Marines actually had 

the reverse effect. The relationship between the Coalition partners 

was strengthened both at the platoon and the battalion levels; 

the local community gained confidence in the ANA and the local 

Afghan government; the ANA gained confidence in the local 

Afghan government; and the relationship between the Coalition 

partners and government, religious, local, and military leaders 

continued to grow.

The Rest of the Story

Operations in northern Marjeh continued to progress and over 

the seven months within the AO, all involved witnessed strengthened relationships and mission accomplishment. The subgovernor held office hours on Saturdays in the central portion of 

our northern AO and conducted shuras with local leaders in all 

corners of the AO. Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) officials had begun to show the necessary understanding of Marjeh and the need to expand governance to all 

parts of the area. Demonstrating his commitment to his role in the 

community, the director of the Hajj accepted an invitation to lead 

a shura of the local leaders and to meet with the local mullahs 

immediately afterwards. This balanced approach to community 

Leadership, Ethics, and Culture | 35
36 | Aspects of Leadership

leadership proved instrumental in our continued success, which 

was evidenced by a decrease in IED incidents and an increase in 

civilian-assisted IED finds and cell phone hotline tips. 

In addition, after an initial shura in the Camp Hill area, a local 

mullah declined assistance for his mosque, stating he would 

let me know when he was ready. His lack of support and trust 

was disappointing. However, several months into the operation, 

the mullah pulled me aside to tell me that he was ready. He had 

changed his mind and wanted to be part of the solution. 

We realized the extent of the affection and respect that we had 

earned in the area by the end of our tour. During clearing operations early in our mission, we had bestowed our battalion coin 

upon the director of the Hajj. Several months later, the director 

revealed the contents of his pocket and there was the battalion 

coin—a symbol of our friendship—carried as a daily reminder of 

the bond that existed between the Marines and the local community leaders. 

Conclusions

Through the example of these three vignettes, the military leader 

gains an appreciation for the importance of making a concerted 

effort to work with and through Coalition partners, host nation 

government, religious leaders, and local officials in order to build 

trust and a strong relationship. The vignettes reveal the operational value of employing culturally acceptable solutions to the 

potentially volatile issues that inevitably arise throughout a unit’s 

deployment. By including local leadership and using indigenous 

approaches to conflict resolution, these solutions are more likely 

to be accepted by the local population. Furthermore, host nation 

leadership is given ownership of the process, since solutions are 

generated by a unified effort of host nation entities with minimal 
involvement from the foreign Coalition partner. As a result, local 

leadership is strengthened; a solid foundation of trust and cooperation is built between Coalition partners and the host nation 

power brokers; and the local population gains confidence in the 

ability of Coalition and local leadership to provide stability in the 

area. 

Leadership, Ethics, and Culture | 37

For a long time, military ethics has been associated with protection 

ethics: service members’ main mission was to protect a territory 

and national security. However, protection ethics are more difficult to implement in modern conflicts in which Western armies 

are deployed to areas far from the national territory they are supposed to protect. In addition, the connection between national security and several interventions abroad, such as the deployment 

of French soldiers in Afghanistan or in Chad, is far from obvious. 

Therefore, it is important to consider whether applying care ethics 

over protection ethics would help troops to establish better and 

more effective connections with a broad range of local actors including inhabitants of the villages they come across; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are involved on the battlefield; 

or local, national, and international mass media. 

The evolution of war has made a significant impact on and 

transformed the scope of troops’ assignments. For these service 

members, the goal of these assignments is not only to be the most 

powerful, but also, and more importantly, to be able to understand a complex environment where politics and military affairs 

are interconnected. Military personnel should also understand 

and take into account the role all stakeholders play in the theater 

Ethics and Irregular Warfare

The Role of the Stakeholder Theory 

and Care Ethics

Geoffroy Murat

—39—
40 | Aspects of Leadership

of operations. In irregular wars, destroying the enemy is only one 

objective, but not the most important; in order to succeed, it is 

essential to convince the enemy to enter into a peaceful political 

process of conflict resolution.

In such an environment, one has to question the very training of 

troops. The culture of military institutions based on the ethics of 

virtue does not accurately prepare them for the conflicts of our 

time. In order to define a military culture that would be more 

appropriate for the new strategic environment, it is necessary to 

explore and analyze the features that are specific to a soldier or 

Marine’s job. These include spirit of comradeship and solidarity, 

which can go as far as sacrificing one’s life to protect fellow troops.

The underlying values of these specific behaviors are related to a 

moral theory called “the ethics of care.” This theory states that personal development comes from being interdependent with others 

and encourages placing others at the center of one’s actions. The 

objective of care ethics is to build confidence among individuals. 

Thus, care ethics stresses what we owe each other rather than how 

we should behave as individuals.1

 Such a culture suggests that 

individuals should try to fulfil the needs of those they are responsible for. This is what Marines and soldiers do when they try to 

help each other on the battlefield. It would therefore be possible 

to build military ethics based on the feeling of care that soldiers 

share among themselves and to extend it to all stakeholders involved in a conflict. Because a soldier’s mission today is to understand the expectations of all actors in a conflict, care ethics has 

great potential to be a powerful guide in these types of missions. 

1 For more details on this idea, see Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care (Oxford: 

Oxford University Press, 2004). For more detail on the ethics of care, see also 

Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 

1985); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 

1990); and Joan Tronto, “Beyond Gender Difference: To a Theory of Care,” Signs

12 (1987): 644–63.
A potent illustration of how service members may implement care 

ethics is provided by Colonel Benoît Royal when he referred to an 

incident that happened to a French unit in Somalia in 1993. As 

the unit engaged General Aideed’s violent militia, despite a very 

tense situation, French soldiers opted to clear buildings roomby-room and did not use artillery, which could have killed noncombatants. They advanced in enemy-held areas street-by-street, 

building-by-building and did not hesitate to put their lives at risk 

while they made sure that they would not harm noncombatants. 

When General Aideed later met international troops, he refused 

any negotiation with the international community but said he respected the French troops because they showed that they knew 

how soldiers should fight.2

 Often, fighting with honor means 

taking risks in order to save lives and accepting the risks that are 

inherent to irregular warfare. It is wrong to believe that insurgents 

do not have their own ethical values—though those values may 

differ from our own. 

In the confrontation with Aideed’s militia, French troops showed 

care for the local population. They accepted risks in order to save 

noncombatant lives, although it would have been much safer for 

them to just use artillery on the buildings. In a conflict situation 

where there is little certainty regarding who and where the enemy 

is and with the constant concern for local populations, troops 

have to make decisions that are likely to be influenced by the 

stress generated by the environment. To understand how soldiers 

and Marines react, it is important to consider the role played by 

emotions. Feelings—such as sympathy, empathy, or sensitivity—

could even help service members fulfil their missions. Indeed, 

these feelings allow troops deployed in a country they are not familiar with to care for local players in the conflict. 

2 Benoît Royal, L’éthique du soldat français (Paris: Economica, 2008), 35.

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 41
42 | Aspects of Leadership

Emotions play a key role in establishing vital connections in the 

fight against terrorism. They need to be taken into account to 

understand troops’ ethical behavior and how they think on the 

battlefield. Thus, care ethics is particularly relevant when analyzing military ethics. Care ethics can contribute to military ethics as 

the concept addresses irrationality, emotions, and feelings, all of 

which are overlooked in many other theories regarding morality 

that focus mainly on rationality. For instance, utilitarianism uses 

mathematical calculus to determine the amount of welfare from 

which each actor can benefit. Likewise, deontological approaches 

deny that emotions have any influence in the analysis of a situation.3

 Even Aristotle in his Nichomachean Ethics associates morality with rational behavior. According to Aristotle, the only way 

to find the good is to forget one’s feelings and follow only one’s 

own individual rationality.4 Yet if military ethics requires service 

members to rally all actors around them, it is important for them 

to understand their environment and the situation of other actors 

in the conflict. This is a condition to convince these actors to consider a political settlement of the conflict, as opposed to using 

military force. 

Among the many authors who have examined counterinsurgency 

operations, Pierre Chareyron offers a perspective that is particularly relevant for this chapter. Chareyron identifies three factors 

that are of great importance in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations: (1) “The more you protect yourself, the more you are 

in danger”; (2) “The bigger the military activities, the longer the 

war”; and (3) “Tactical irregularity, ethical regularity.”5

Believing that troops can take an overly protective approach in 

COIN operations and be successful could be misleading. Insur3 For more details, see in particular John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 

MA: Belknap Press, 1971).

4 Aristotle, Ethique à Nicomaque (Paris: Vrin, 2007).

5 Pierre Chareyron, “La contre-insurrection à l’épreuve du conflit afghan.” Politique étrangère 1 (2010).
gents often do not want to destroy the enemy army; they are 

aware that they are not strong enough to do so. However, by 

adopting a highly protective approach and engaging in other 

activities characteristic of conventional warfare, regular armies 

make their moves much easier to read. This tactic is dangerous 

because a highly protective approach makes it difficult for regular 

armies to connect with local populations.

As time goes by, foreign interventions conducted by regular 

armies might be seen as invasions. People who were neutral at 

the beginning of the occupation are more likely to get involved in 

the conflict and to turn against the foreign army, which will make 

it more difficult to initiate a reliable political process.

If the war is not fought according to just war rules, unethical behavior from the regular army can easily lead to failure. Unethical behavior compromises the legitimacy of the intervening force. 

This is problematic because COIN operations need legitimacy if 

they are to convince the parties involved in the conflict to negotiate with each other. Events such as Abu Ghraib lead local civilians to believe that the foreign army does not respect them or care 

about their traditions and history. 

One of the most significant weaknesses of modern insurgencies is 

that they do not hold the same legitimacy as did national liberation movements in the past. The cases of Vietnam and Algeria in 

the 1950s and 1960s are good examples. In Iraq, al-Qaeda was not 

supported by many local tribes, whereas Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam 

and the “Front de Libération Nationale” (FLN) in Algeria succeeded in winning the support of the majority of the population. 

If insurgents were to gain a similar legitimacy, armies conducting COIN operations probably would never reach a settlement 

of the conflict, no matter how many battles they won. Clearly the 

war for legitimacy is closely linked to the ethical behavior of the 

troops operating in a COIN campaign.

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 43
44 | Aspects of Leadership

Chareyron’s three assumptions shape the basic context of COIN 

operations. In many situations, their implementation is far from 

being complete as regular armies find it difficult to accept risks 

to gain the trust of the local populace. The idea that emerging 

technologies will help Western democracies prevent casualties in 

asymmetric conflicts is a dangerous illusion if one considers Chareyron’s reflections. While these new technologies may save lives 

in the short term, an overreliance on technology on the irregular battlefield can be counterproductive in the long term because 

it might prevent troops from understanding the way the insurgents and their local supporters perceive the conflict and their 

environment.

When Marines and soldiers operate in a COIN environment, they 

might have to play a humanitarian role. They may also need to 

act as a police force and establish connections with local tribes. 

Troops are central to a network of local actors with whom they 

have to build strong relations; the success of a COIN campaign 

will depend on the strength of the connections they are able to 

establish. 

Thus a key issue is to explore how troops can make sound decisions on the battlefield and ensure that such decisions successfully challenge the negative perceptions of the local actors. Care 

ethics and Edward Freeman’s stakeholder theory provide interesting reflections.

The stakeholder theory, developed in the 1980s in the field of business ethics, has significantly changed the way we look at corporate life. In the 1980s, the business world was based on a dominant paradigm that a business organization’s main goal was to 

make profits to be distributed to its shareholders. Freeman questioned this paradigm and introduced the idea that shareholders 

are of course to be considered, but they do not constitute the most 

important objective of a business. According to Freeman, share-
holders only represent a small component of all stakeholders. A 

company that intends to achieve sustainable profits should care 

about all stakeholders: clients, suppliers, its employees, and the 

overall environment. This approach is indeed a condition for sustainability and, ultimately, success.6

Freeman’s theory can find application beyond business ethics; 

indeed, military ethics can benefit from adopting some of Freeman’s reflections. The asymmetrical wars that are the military’s 

main focus of effort today involve numerous stakeholders acting 

as networks with different interests and rationales. Troops may 

achieve their goals by dealing efficiently with their stakeholders. 

Within this context, “stakeholders” are all persons or organizations affected by the troops’ presence and operations. 

In the past, many theorists have neglected the role of sound 

ethical decisions in relation to both military and business environments. For instance, Milton Friedman, an opponent of the 

shareholder theory, believed that the business world is amoral 

and that it should not bother with ethics.7 Clausewitz, echoing 

this sentiment, contended that morals and warfare would be an 

absurd mix since conflict is an outburst of violence that can resort 

to any means to achieve its goals.8 These theoretical approaches 

raised ethical concerns, as some practitioners tried to understand 

how morals may be of some importance in the business world or 

in warfare. 

Freeman’s stakeholder theory deals with two main factors: the 

purpose of a corporation and the reason the corporation exists. 

In the objective waging of wars, two similar questions should 

be answered: first, what is the object of war? And second, what 

6 Edward Freeman, J.S. Harrison, A.C. Wicks, B.L. Parmar, and S. de Colle, 

Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

2010).

7 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” The New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970. 

8 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1997).

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 45
46 | Aspects of Leadership

is its purpose? The aim of waging war is to convince or coerce 

the enemy to negotiate and, to this end, it is required that all 

stakeholders involved in the conflict be taken into consideration. 

Local populations, public opinions in countries at war, the media, 

NGOs, and many other parties are all stakeholders whose contributions must be dealt with to reach an agreement aiming at sustainable peace. 

Stakeholders are not only numerous, but differ significantly from 

each other. Knowing how to deal with such diversity is of primary 

importance. Stakeholder theorists have tried to determine analysis patterns that would enable one to understand how to properly deal with requests coming from each stakeholder. Such an 

approach provides guidelines as to how to meet the requirements 

of every stakeholder. In addition, such a categorization makes it 

possible to prioritize tasks and actions.

There have been many attempts to determine stakeholders’ interests and to prioritize ways of satisfying those interests. Mitchell, 

Agle, and Wood developed one of the most well-known models 

used to determine why one stakeholder is more visible than 

another in a decision-making process. This model takes three 

factors into account: power, legitimacy, and degree of urgency of 

a stakeholder’s needs. Power is defined as the ability to influence 

the decision-making process. Legitimacy is regarded as the status, 

function, or entitlement that enables a stakeholder to appear as 

legitimate in playing a role in the decision-making process. The 

degree of urgency of a stakeholder’s needs refers to the fact that 

a stakeholder will apply pressure on a decision-making process 

all the more when its requirements are in urgent need of being 

met.9

 These determinants are also relevant to military operations 

9 Ronald K. Mitchell, Bradley R. Agle, and Donna J. Wood, “Toward a Theory of 

Stakeholder Identification and Salience,” The Academy of Management Review 22 

(1997): 853–86.
in which various stakeholders will play on these three characteristics to draw the decision maker’s attention. For instance, A is 

ordered to bomb a building in Iraq, and if one attempts to determine the pattern of his stakeholders according to Mitchell’s methodology, the following dynamics should be considered:

In figure 1, A’s boss would indisputably be an important stakeholder from the perspective of A—he has an urgent need, i.e., 

making A execute his order; he is legitimate, as A is supposed to 

obey his orders; and he is powerful, as he is A’s boss. That is why 

A’s boss is placed at the center. If one looks at the people living in 

the building, they have an urgent need for the building to remain 

intact; however, they have little power over A. They do have a 

legitimate expectation that they will not be targeted, as they do 

not participate directly in the conflict.10 That is why, in figure 1, 

they are located in the circles labeled “urgency” and “legitimacy” 

10 The law of armed conflict gives them the legitimacy not to be targeted. 

Figure 1. Example of Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s Stakeholder Methodology.

POWER

Insurgents

Iraqi

People

Bosses of

A’s boss

A’s boss

People in

the

building

Iraqi

government

URGENCY LEGITIMACY

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 47
48 | Aspects of Leadership

but not in “power.” The insurgents have neither legitimacy nor 

needs from the perspective of A; however, they have power and 

leverage since they can take action to prevent or delay A from 

achieving his objectives.

Locating actors in figure 1 provides a tool for analyzing the situation and could help with decision making. Yet this type of categorization has a few shortcomings. To begin with, some stakeholders may easily be inadvertently neglected. For instance, in the 

case presented above, the influence from the media and Western 

public opinion can play a role in A’s decision-making process. It 

is equally difficult to determine the legitimacy, leverage, or even 

degree of urgency of the needs of all stakeholders. In practice, information is always incomplete, and it would be unreasonable to 

believe that all stakeholders around A could be mapped out and 

precisely assessed in terms of legitimacy, power, and degree of 

urgency of their needs. Furthermore, this assessment is done at 

one point in time and in a specific environment. Assuming that 

it should hold in the medium to long term is unreasonable. It is 

difficult to understand what dynamics are responsible for the 

way stakeholders will evolve. In Freeman’s view, categorizing the 

entire spectrum of stakeholders is impossible. Freeman suggested that it is unlikely, if not impossible, that a single pattern may 

apply to managing one’s stakeholders in any setting and under 

any circumstances.11

Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s classifications help to clarify this important discussion, but they are insufficient as far as enabling a 

decision maker to choose a certain course of action. In some cases, 

Mitchell, Agle, and Wood’s approach may help actors understand a given situation, but in others in which the distribution of 

power is not clearly defined, the theory may be less helpful. Much 

depends on the specific situation a stakeholder is dealing with. 

11 Freeman, Stakeholder Theory, 72–75.
In addition, Freeman argues that it does not fall within the duties 

of philosophers or theorists to tell practitioners how to act. Many 

officers have succeeded in leading their troops without consulting 

either with philosophers or ethicists. This is why a more relevant 

approach would be to bring practice and ethics closer together 

and to use descriptive and normative approaches in training and 

education programs. 

For Freeman and his proponents, the best way to manage a stakeholder is to adopt a pragmatic approach. Freeman suggests that 

the most effective way to do this is to develop a personal relationship with stakeholders, which Freeman and McVea call a “names 

and faces” approach.12 Behind each stakeholder is a person, 

whether the stakeholder is an individual, an association, an organization, or an institution. In order to grasp the stakeholder’s 

needs, it is important to learn and understand its character. Many 

individuals are mistaken if they strive to meet the needs of stakeholders immediately without spending time bonding with them 

in person. Failing to spend time with the stakeholders and to fully 

identify their needs increases the likelihood of misunderstanding and misinterpretation, resulting in their needs being incorrectly met. The needs of stakeholders may be very specific, clearly 

defined, and profoundly diverse, thus making it impossible to 

exhaustively itemize all the needs that stakeholders may express. 

When considering perception—and in particular the fact that a 

relationship of trust is often built on how people perceive each 

other—any decision or any use of technology should require a 

thorough analysis of its perception by local populations, regardless of the benefits it brings to the military campaign. What is truly 

important in the end is not whether troops did the right thing, but 

if the stakeholders of the conflict think that the troops indeed did 

the right thing. 

12 John F. McVea and R. Edward Freeman, “A Names and Faces Approach to 

Stakeholder Management,” Journal of Management Inquiry 14 (2005): 55–69.

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 49
50 | Aspects of Leadership

Care Ethics and Stakeholder Theory are 

Complementary Approaches

Care ethics and Freeman’s vision of “pragmatism” can be brought 

together. Both visions promote the idea that close links must be 

developed with the environment before individuals are in a position to make a sound decision. Both stress the importance of 

acquiring an understanding of the needs of others before acting. 

More specifically, care ethics rests on a paradigmatic change. It 

sets out that the individual is not really autonomous, but one is 

dependent on the relations that one is able to build with others. 

This is why care ethics implies that in a COIN operation, a soldier 

or Marine should pay constant attention to the expectations and 

needs of others. However, it is impossible to address all stakeholders’ needs, especially since some of their interests can be contradictory. In these cases, troops have to properly prioritize the way 

they will address stakeholders’ demands. This requires beginning 

the decision-making process with an analysis of the stakeholders’ 

needs. Troops should focus on how to most effectively help local 

actors. 

There are many examples of service members who show concern 

to the local stakeholders through their actions. Often such an approach is a condition for the success of any mission. Yet the way 

armies’ “values” are identified in many national militaries and 

the way ethics is taught in military academies13 tend to focus on 

individuals or groups of service members rather than on a holistic 

understanding of the entire range of stakeholders in a conflict. 

Therefore, a proper application of care ethics should go beyond 

military units and should apply to all stakeholders. This is where 

the stakeholder theory and care ethics interestingly complement 

each other. Care ethics provides a framework that allows troops 

13 Paul Robinson, Nigel de Lee, and Don Carrick, Ethics Education in the Military

(Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2008), 7.
to try to develop a feeling of regard, while stakeholder theory 

enables them to understand that they must consider all parties 

involved in their decision-making process if they want to obtain 

their goal, that is, to convince the enemy to join a political conflictresolution process.

Similarly, using troops in their home countries to help the local 

population in cases of natural disasters promotes behaviors based 

on a sense of care for stakeholders outside the military. This activity may allow troops to consider stakeholders other than those 

within military institutions, a skill they will need to exercise when 

participating in operations abroad. What is frequently described 

as a secondary task should be embedded in a service member’s 

mission statement, as he or she will subsequently have to perform 

humanitarian and law enforcement tasks in foreign countries.

Care Ethics Enables Us to Question Violence 

During Wartime

Discussing violence in relation to care might seem contradictory. 

Yet care ethics theorists have looked into the phenomenon of violence. For instance, Daniel Levine provides an enlightening analysis of the connection between care ethics and counterinsurgency 

methods.14

It would be a mistake to think of care ethics as being far or completely removed from the use of force and troops’ ability to coerce 

certain stakeholders. Indeed, it is possible to take care of people 

while forcing them to behave in a certain way. The case of the 

communist uprising in Malaysia after World War II provides a 

good example. British troops’ original strategy was to split the 

insurgents from the villagers by founding new villages where ci14 Daniel H. Levine, “Care and Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Military Ethics 9 

(2010): 139–59.

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 51
52 | Aspects of Leadership

vilians had to relocate. This action did not yield any results per 

se, as Levine shows in his article. Only when this act was perceived as one of British benevolence did the communist uprising 

begin to lose ground. The British successfully established a relationship based on trust by implementing humanitarian programs 

to care for and feed the local population while stressing that the 

newly founded villages would possibly strengthen their inhabitants’ safety. In addition, they promised independence to Malaysia 

once the risk of a communist regime taking power was addressed. 

As Gérard Chaliand explains, the British approach was probably 

only possible due to the very specific conditions of the communist 

uprising, which involved mainly Chinese segments of the population, whereas the majority of the population was Malaysian or 

indigenous.15

The origin of care ethics lies in an analysis of the parent-child relationship. Carol Gillingam studied the feeling of care that unites 

a mother and her child; she claims that in her relationship with 

her child, a mother is always tempted to use violence at one point 

or another.16 Children are indeed vulnerable creatures who like 

(and do not hesitate) to test their parents’ boundaries. The difference in physical strength between a mother and her child is such 

that she could easily kill her child by hitting him or her too hard. 

Furthermore, she often finds herself alone with her child, having 

complete control over the situation, and her child is fully vulnerable. Yet the sense of trust that mothers build with their children 

is strong enough that they may punish their children through 

means other than the use of force. Punishment is then accepted by 

children and regarded as legitimate. For instance, a mother may 

ground her child until authorizing him or her to be released from 

punishment. Using coercion and constraint is not unrelated to 

15 Gérard Chaliand, Les guerres irrégulières: XXème-XXIème siècles (Paris: Gallimard, 2008). 

16 Gilligan, In a Different Voice.
expressing a feeling of care. According to Levine, troops involved 

in counterinsurgencies are presented with the following type of 

situation: 

The counterinsurgent’s moral assignment is not to limit the use 

of violence appropriately but to understand why these civilians 

support these insurgents and how they can be made to trust this

government, which is supported by counterinsurgent troops.17

The main purpose of a counterinsurgency operation is to unite 

civilian populations behind the legitimate government. Most importantly, a major objective is to create the conditions for insurgents and the government to enter into a reliable conflict-resolution process. To this end, it is essential that civilian populations 

are taken care of and are paid attention to, as Levine emphasizes. 

Levine also stresses the importance of moderation when using 

force. Force should be used only if it will be perceived as legitimate or it will cause a breach of confidence between civilians 

and counterinsurgents. Levine agrees with Freeman’s theory that 

stakeholders have divergent interests and suggests that creativity 

is the key to solving conflicts while satisfying these different interest groups. A similar logic applies to insurgents and a regular 

army confronting them. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan, 

there is little chance that either side will prevail over the other 

in a decisive way. The idea is no longer to determine who must 

surrender to whom but to see whether there are courses of action 

that would allow both sides to move on together and resolve their 

differences. In Levine’s words,

If an analogy is required, then the relation between counterinsurgents and insurgents is probably closest to the one between 

members of a family on bad terms with each other. In such circumstances, a certain sense of trust has to develop for the well17 Levine, “Care and Counterinsurgency,” 140.

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 53
54 | Aspects of Leadership

being of people with whom these individuals on bad terms with 

each other are related (i.e., the other members of the family), 

even if they are faced with deep-rooted animosity, anger, or 

moral disagreement. Concurrently, most relations between 

members of a family on bad terms with one another do not 

exclude the possibility of reconciliation even if no one has been 

looking forward to this so far.18 

Insurgents and counterinsurgents are somehow compelled to understand each other. Since both counterinsurgents and insurgents 

are unable to destroy each other, the path to negotiation must 

always be left open. Care ethics and stakeholder theory, if brought 

together with the clear objective of convincing the enemy to negotiate rather than fight, provides an analytical tool that can be used 

to understand the role of troops in counterinsurgency campaigns. 

Troops can and should show concern and care for the local stakeholders in a conflict. The vignettes offered by Lieutenant Colonel 

Christmas in this book are an illustration of this concept. Care 

ethics and stakeholder theory provide service members with a 

framework that will enable them to better deal with ethical dilemmas that are typical of asymmetric warfare. Yet military ethics 

training and education programs make no reference to care ethics. 

Instead, ethics curricula often cover mainly lessons about the law 

of war and rules of engagement. Many in the military associate 

these deontological rules with ethics and neglect a care approach 

and its importance in asymmetric warfare.

In his vignette about a mosque that was a suspected weapons 

storage facility, Lieutenant Colonel Christmas was faced with a 

difficult dilemma: investigate the facility and risk upsetting the 

local population or risk losing service members by leaving a potential threat unchecked. Lieutenant Colonel Christmas chose to 

take the time to have religious leaders involved in the inspection 

18 Ibid., 157–58.
of the mosque. Had he only considered military necessity, he 

would have inspected the mosque himself right away. He might 

have consulted his rules of engagement, only to discover that 

these rules would not have been specific enough to guide him to 

a decision. Indeed, this scenario reveals the great limitations of a 

rules-based ethics approach, and this approach fails to predict the 

situations troops might face. Lieutenant Colonel Christmas made 

a critical, effective decision because he practiced two concepts: 

first, he placed himself in the local stakeholders’ situation and analyzed the possible consequences of having only Marines conduct 

an inspection of the mosque; and second, he recognized that such 

a course of action would most likely be perceived as a lack of 

respect for Islam. He decided that the claims of the local population were important. By taking the time to allow local leaders to 

conduct their inspection, he demonstrated his understanding of 

their culture and the important role of Islam for them.19

Lieutenant Colonel Christmas also considered all the stakeholders in his decision-making process. The decision to wait for the 

religious leaders to get involved in the inspection of the mosque 

allowed him to strengthen the relationship with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and with the local press. In the long term, 

the religious leaders could also become precious allies in other 

situations—there was a huge benefit in showing them that ISAF 

treated them with respect. He stated, “The newly established relationship with the director of the Hajj would prove beneficial 

throughout continued operations over the next five months. And 

our ANA counterparts experienced our dedication to our partnership. The result was that a highly respected leader, the director of 

the Hajj, spoke out publicly on television against the insurgents. 

Ultimately, the time delay during the tactical execution resulted in 

19 See the chapter in this book by Brian Christmas and Paula Holmes-Eber, 

“Leadership, Ethics, and Culture in COIN Operations: Case Examples from 

Marjeh, Afghanistan.” 

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 55
56 | Aspects of Leadership

an operational and strategic victory and would prove highly beneficial in the long term.” Indeed, the relationship the lieutenant 

colonel created with the religious leaders allowed him to navigate 

two other challenging situations he describes in his chapter. 

Two other examples illustrate the links between Lieutenant 

Colonel Christmas’s actions in Marjeh and stakeholder theory. 

First, he did not consider all the members of the ANA forces the 

same way. He took the time to build a close relationship with 

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammed. He acted on a “names and faces 

approach,” that is to say, he put a name and a face to a larger institution or organization. Thanks to the special connection with 

Lieutenant Colonel Muhammed, Lieutenant Colonel Christmas 

had an ally during some difficult moments in his mission, in particular, when there were doubts about the betrayal from several 

members of the ANA. Had he not taken the time to build this 

trust relationship with his ANA counterparts, Lieutenant Colonel 

Christmas would have had difficulty resolving the tense situation. 

Second, by keeping a broad view of the situation and identifying 

all the stakeholders involved, he was able to find an innovative 

solution to conflicts that seemed to have none. 

The theories presented in this article, as well as Lieutenant 

Colonel Christmas’s experience, provide a framework that may 

help troops deal more effectively with difficult dilemmas. Experience is the key to handling a large variety of situations, yet 

training and education programs should provide Marines and 

soldiers with the skills they need to operate successfully in asymmetric warfare environments. Learning the rules of engagement 

is important in order to understand the context and goals of the 

mission; however, it is not enough information with which to 

make a sound decision. In a complex environment, stakeholder 

theory is a tool that can help service members analyze the situation and assess the best, most effective course of action. Addi-
tionally, a care approach, through which positive relationships 

are created among as many stakeholders as possible, including 

military allies, religious leaders, and the media, is necessary to alleviate the many moments of tension that troops will face. When 

military leaders are deployed on a mission such as the one Lieutenant Colonel Christmas experienced in Marjeh, they will not 

think only about the rules of engagement, but above all, about 

their overall responsibility. This responsibility requires an ability 

to analyze and build long-term relationships with all the stakeholders around them. The stakeholders analysis and care approach may be natural for many military leaders, but Marines and 

soldiers should learn to apply these theories early in their careers 

before deploying into asymmetric warfare situations. 

Ethics and Irregular Warfare | 57

As iron sharpens iron, so a man sharpens the countenance of 

his friend.

-Proverbs 27:16

Given today’s fast-paced and chaotic battlefield where the enemy 

is not easily identifiable and the leaders are young, the need for 

moral military members has never been greater. This statement 

does not imply that there was not a need for an ethical military in 

the past, but merely states the obvious fact that in today’s world, 

the U.S. military requires young leaders to exercise more autonomy than they’ve had in the past. For this reason, a young military 

member’s conduct may have moral ramifications that affect not 

only those around him; his conduct may also have ethical implications that could affect an entire nation.1

 As a result, the U.S. 

Marine Corps, as well as the other branches of the armed services, 

1 Within the context of this paper, the term “morals” is defined as practices and 

customs of a group or person, while “ethics” is the principles and rules that are 

explicitly stated and held by that group or person. Richard M. Fox and Joseph P. 

DeMarco, Moral Reasoning: A Philosophic Approach To Applied Ethics, 2nd ed. (Fort 

Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000). This text will use both “ethics” 

and “morals” interchangeably and trust that the reader is able to distinguish between the two based on the context. The text will refer to “character education” as 

a holistic educational approach where one’s moral conduct advances in sophistication and is brought in line with the praiseworthy ethical standard of the organization, in this case, the U.S. Marine Corps. 

A Pedagogy of Practical 

Military Ethics

Clinton A. Culp

—59—
60 | Aspects of Leadership

has instituted precommissioning ethics education for about half 

of its officers.2 By and large, this ethics education instills U.S. military values in its members. 

This chapter investigates current ethics programs and evaluates 

which pedagogical method is best suited to influence the ethical 

conduct of the serviceperson. As such, the chapter will primarily 

examine the current pedagogical methods that affect the majority 

of new officers who receive precommissioning ethics education, 

briefly touching on enlisted ethics education, and will examine 

the institution’s role in facilitating moral conduct. Specifically, it 

will focus on some common barriers to the pedagogy of ethics 

(e.g., curriculum, use of ethical theories and case studies, conduct 

of the classroom, lack of horizontal integration) and will offer 

methods for minimizing barriers. Lastly, the chapter will examine 

what the junior officers in the operating forces can do to influence 

ethical conduct within their units.

Current Pedagogical Methods

Each branch of the U.S. military services has its own pedagogical method, and within each branch different methods are used 

for entry-level training and follow-on for professional development. To complicate matters, there are differences in pedagogical methods between enlisted and officer training and education. 

Because there is a wide variation in the moral sophistication of 

individuals, presumably, the appropriate method is used at the 

proper time to facilitate moral development. The variation of 

moral sophistication is seen at all levels within the military. For instance, two 18-year-old enlisted persons can be at different levels 

of moral reasoning, and the same can be said of 22-year-old newly 

2 DoD, “Table B-30. FY 2009 Active Component Officer Accessions By Source 

Of Commission, Service And Gender,” Department of Defense, http://prhome.defense.gov/MPP/ACCESSION%20POLICY/PopRep2009/appendixb/b_30.html. 
commissioned officers and seasoned veterans. However, it can be 

generally stated that the older (i.e., more life experience) one is 

and the more education one has (i.e., critical thinking and reasoning skills), the more sophisticated his moral reasoning will be.3

Enlisted Character Education

At the enlisted level the ethics education system is primarily a 

rules-based system of punishments and rewards; its intent is to 

instill habitual and immediate obedience to orders. While this 

method is a good initial start, one has to question whether 9 to 

13 weeks can have an effect after 18 years of life experience. U.S. 

Army Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Williams’ study of moral reasoning indicated that, at least for a nine-week initial entry training program, moral reasoning is in fact not affected and in some 

cases actually decreases.4

 After initial entry training and occupational specialty schools, there is no formal ethics training until the 

service member attends a noncommissioned officer’s course. In 

this respect, the military seems to take a pragmatic approach (i.e., 

caught, not taught) to teaching ethics to its enlisted members. 

Officer Character Education

The pedagogical methods used for teaching ethics to officers is also 

varied, and more so than in enlisted ethics training. In part, this 

variation is due to the multiple programs through which officer 

candidates can receive a commission. Each service academy has 

its own highly developed ethics education programs. There are 

hundreds of Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) programs, 

3 Thomas Lickona, Educating For Character: How Our Schools Can Teach Respect 

And Responsibility (New York: Bantam Books, 1991); Lawrence Kohlberg, The 

Philosophy Of Moral Development: Moral Stages And The Idea Of Justice: Essays On 

Moral Development, vol. 1 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981); James Rest, et 

al., “A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research,” Journal of Moral Education 29 (2000).

4 LtCol Kenneth Williams used the Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT2) as his measure 

of moral reasoning. Kenneth R. Williams, “An Assessment Of Moral And Character Education in Initial Entry Training (IET),” Journal of Military Ethics 9 (2010).

Practical Military Ethics| 61
62 | Aspects of Leadership

all of which base their ethics education on their respective service 

academy’s model. However, the ROTC programs also rely on the 

liberal education that cadets or midshipmen receive from their 

prospective university. The final major commissioning sources 

are Officer Candidate and Training Schools (OCS/OTC) and the 

Direct Appointment (DA) process where the prospective officer’s 

precommissioning ethics education is fully dependent on the particular degree program within his respective university.

Much has been said about the pedagogical methods used at the 

academies with regard to ethics education and how to improve 

an already successful system.5

 The academies arguably have an 

advantage in time, curriculum, and pedagogical methods over 

ROTC programs due to the lack of “undue” influences (e.g. fewer 

contact hours with the midshipman, fraternal organizations, and 

a general partying lifestyle that is prevalent on most college campuses) that the cadets and midshipmen are exposed to while at 

the academies.6 The academies are also able to take advantage 

of a multimodal pedagogical method, similar to the approach 

used in initial entry training for enlisted personnel. Typically, the 

methods used at these academies vary from the authoritative boot 

camp model to motivational speakers and role models to formal 

classes and case studies during the students’ junior and senior 

years. Formal classes in military ethics at the academies are taught 

mainly by civilian professors, most of whom have degrees in philosophy, some of whom have a military background. These classes 

are intended to provide a broad overview of several ethical theo5 J. Joseph Miller, “Squaring The Circle: Teaching Philosophical Ethics in the 

Military,” Journal of Military Ethics 3 (2004); Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, and 

Don Carrick, eds., Ethics Education in the Military (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2008); 

J. Carl Ficarrotta, Kantian Thinking About Military Ethics (Farnham UK: Ashgate, 

2010). 

6 An argument can be made that providing ROTC cadets and midshipmen with a 

liberal arts education exposes them to a broader spectrum of ethics that lends itself 

to experiences that are more practical.
ries in an environment that allows for an open dialogue on ethical 

issues. However, what occurs most often is a move from a dialectic to a didactic method in which the student seeks the approved 

solution to the problem at hand.

If this move occurs at the service academies, where educated philosophy professors teach formal classes, one has to wonder how 

ethics education is being conducted within the more prevalent 

ROTC programs, which 30 percent of new officers attend. To date, 

little research has been conducted on the effectiveness of these 

programs with regard to ethics training. 

ROTC Ethics Education

Senior military leaders assume that a senior company grade or 

a field grade officer who passes the requirements to be assigned 

to an ROTC program is capable of teaching ethics. Certainly, the 

officers have the capacity to lead by example, but character education requires much more. While certain individuals are more than 

capable of teaching ethics, few are able to do so without formal 

education. Just as not every rifle expert makes a good marksmanship coach, and not every engineer makes as a good engineering educator, not every good leader will be effective in teaching 

ethics. The military is accustomed to training, and many officers have been trainers prior to being assigned to an ROTC unit. 

However, rarely have officers been educators; this role requires a 

skill set that most officers do not acquire in the field or in training. 

Indeed, training does not equal education. J. Joseph Miller summarizes this dichotomy by contrasting “the technician’s method” 

(i.e., asking “how” questions) with the “philosopher’s method” 

(i.e., asking “why” questions)7

 when teaching military ethics. The 

military sends excellent trainers who are well versed in the technician’s method to ROTC units. The technician’s method pays off, 

7 Joseph Miller, “Squaring The Circle: Teaching Philosophical Ethics In The Military,” Journal of Military Ethics 3 (2004). 

Practical Military Ethics| 63
64 | Aspects of Leadership

to some degree, as the instructor trains young soon-to-be officers 

in the rules and how to use formulas for making ethical decisions within those rules. This method serves the novice well, as 

the method is easy to train and allows a young officer to arrive 

at an ethical decision with relative ease. However, most ethical 

issues are complex and cannot be neatly “plugged” into a technical formula. A few pitfalls, which often occur at ROTC programs, 

are classes in formal ethical theories, the tendency to apply an 

ethical theory to a particular “real world” problem, overreliance 

and improper use of case studies, overuse of the didactic method, 

and lack of horizontally integrating ethics education. I will now 

discuss each of these pitfalls in greater detail. 

Formal Classes

The military sends generally well-meaning and morally upright 

individuals to be instructors at ROTC programs; however, few, if 

any, are educated in teaching ethics or ethical theory. A typical syllabus for a leadership and ethics ROTC course includes readings 

on act and rule utilitarianism ethics, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, 

jus ad bellum and jus in bello and other ethical theories. Each of the 

theories requires more than a passing glance, and, often ROTC 

instructors are ill equipped to teach an in-depth study in ethical 

theory. As such, the theories presented are often misunderstood 

and misused. 

It is important to note that ROTC courses are taken in addition to 

courses that are required for the midshipmen’s or cadet’s degree. 

This means that midshipmen and cadets are required to participate in physical training courses and leadership billets in addition 

to their course work, which generally results in an ROTC student 

carrying a heavy course load, typically 15 to 18 hours per semester. If the student is pursuing a technical major, this course load 

can easily exceed 18 hours per semester, and often is as high as 21 

hours per semester. 
Given the amount of reading, reflection, writing, and discussion required to properly understand ethical theories, it is easy 

to see that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to cover all the 

ethical theories in the text during one semester. ROTC programs 

require leadership and ethics courses; however, they are not typically required for a diploma. Therefore, given the emphasis on 

graduating and receiving one’s commission from ROTC leadership, cadets and midshipmen tend to prioritize their assignments 

in required courses, which are needed for students to receive their 

college diploma, over courses that are treated as supplementary. 

This system may suggest to students that high GPAs and graduation (i.e. meet ROTC accession goals) are more important than 

having men and women of exemplary character in the operating 

forces.

Applying the Theory

A natural result of the formal classes is a misuse of the various 

ethical theories. This often manifests itself in questions such as 

“what would Mill say about “gundecking” maintenance records?” 

These types of questions often result in a misapplication of theory, 

which typically seeks ways to morally justify why one should 

(or presumably should not) falsify or cheat on the maintenance 

record. This line of questioning usually digresses into a “battle” 

between Mill and Kant (or another ethical theorist), with each one 

defending a side, when, in reality, both would agree that gundecking is wrong.

Case Studies

Case studies are “easy”; in fact, case studies tend to be the default 

method used to teach ethics courses in the ROTC curriculum. 

While case studies are an effective method for teaching about 

ethical decisions, typically one of two things happens when 

using case studies. First, the student often uses the “applying the 

Practical Military Ethics| 65
66 | Aspects of Leadership

theory” approach to the case, allowing the particular theorist to 

do the heavy lifting, resulting in a misplaced or shallow application of the particular theory. This approach often fails to tie “core 

values” with the particulars of the specific case. Second, when case 

studies are used in group discussions, the group usually arrives 

at an answer through consensus building. This particular method 

looks and sounds like moral reasoning is occurring; however, the 

answer often might depend on the dominant individual within a 

group and not on sound moral reasoning.

The Didactic Classroom

In most military situations, one often defers to authority, and 

the classroom is no exception. It takes special effort for both the 

student and the educator to overcome this phenomenon. As soon 

as the educator exerts his authority or indicates that he has the 

right answer, students quickly seek the approved answer over the 

reasoned answer. Worse yet, the educator “lectures” or “preaches” 

on the proper application of ethics, as if he were the gatekeeper of 

such knowledge.

Lack of Horizontal Integration 

Teaching ethics can, and often does, occur outside the classroom, 

yet instructors rarely take advantage of these opportunities. 

When an ROTC student does something right or wrong, his/her 

conduct is rarely linked to the organization’s values and principles. A pat on the back for a job well done, without mention that 

their conduct exemplified the organization’s values, often results 

in a missed opportunity to reinforce right conduct. Likewise, punishment is rarely linked to the values that are the foundation of 

the rule that was broken, again missing an opportunity to reinforce right conduct. 

The list in this section is by no means an all-inclusive list of potential pitfalls that occur during character education in ROTC 
programs, but the list helps identify key areas in which the U.S. 

military can improve character education.

Suggestions for Improvement

Formal Classes

 The military’s intent is to increase the practical moral reasoning 

skills and general character of its personnel. Perhaps a different 

curriculum for entry-level training, both officer and enlisted, 

would better serve this purpose. A curriculum that focuses on 

critical thinking skills and increasing moral sensitivity, moral 

empathy, and open mindedness, while linking the organizations’ 

values and principles to military rules and regulations, would 

better serve that purpose than a broad-brush class in metaethics 

and ethical theory. These skills are critical to moral reasoning and 

under the best of circumstances are difficult to master. To some, 

these skills may be viewed as “soft” and thought of as counterproductive to the military mission. However, without these “soft” 

skills, moral reasoning cannot occur. Leaders should welcome 

healthy debate over ethical issues, especially prior to the point of 

action.

Offering a process for evaluating a situation and determining its 

ethical implications can be problematic, as many individuals may 

treat the process as a formula, one of the very things I criticize 

about the current method for teaching ethics courses at ROTC 

programs. Yet a process-based method rather than a rules-based 

formula is often useful for both the novice educator and student.8

The intent of this process is to answer the “why” questions as 

opposed to the “how” questions. Most military personnel, even 

those in entry-level officer training and education, are familiar 

8 Reid Hastie and Robyn M. Dawes, Rational Coice In An Uncertain World: The 

Psychology Of Judgment And Decision Making (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2010).

Practical Military Ethics| 67
68 | Aspects of Leadership

with U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd’s decision-making cycle, 

the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop. While Colonel 

Boyd’s OODA Loop was originally intended for fighter pilots, it 

has been adapted for other decision-making domains including 

business, medical professions, and ground combat. Using such a 

familiar decision-making tool will aid the individual through the 

difficulties of moral decision making.

The OODA Loop is easily adaptable to practical moral reasoning 

skills. During the observation phase, one must be able to identify 

situations that are morally relevant, i.e., one must have moral sensitivity. This requires military personnel to identify the relevant 

social values, moral values, and principles involved; the organization’s values and principles must also be considered. What is 

the role of the individuals and the organization as a whole? Is 

there an existing code of ethics or rule governing the situation? 

Orienting oneself to the morally relevant situation requires critical thinking skills, moral empathy, and an open mind. During 

the next phase of the OODA Loop, decide, one has to determine 

whether or not social values take precedence over moral values. 

The individual should assess whether the values and principles 

being expressed in the situation are in conflict or congruent with 

those of the organization. If a conflict exists, does it constitute an 

exception? The decision requires moral reasoning skills. If one has 

evaluated the situation honestly and critically, he has completed 

the moral reasoning process; however, in the end, the decision 

must be implemented—that is, one must act. 

The Ethical OODA Loop

The following example of how to implement the OODA Loop in 

an ethical context is adapted from the conflicting loyalties scenario in Ethics for the Marine Lieutenant.

9

 This scenario was intention9 William T. Stooksbury, ed., Ethics For The Marine Lieutenant (Annapolis, MD: 

Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, 2002).
ally chosen to illustrate the application of the ethical OODA Loop 

to an all-too-common noncombat moral dilemma. This process 

is easily adaptable to any morally relevant situation, including 

combat situations. 

After a successful field operation at Camp Lejeune, the Battalion commander authorizes a 72-hour liberty. One of the platoon 

commanders in Alpha Company did particularly well, receiving 

an “attaboy” from the company and battalion commanders. The 

lieutenants of Alpha Company decide to have an “O” call over 

in Greenville. Being a new dad and wanting to go home, you try 

to beg off, but succumb to the pleas of your fellow officers, who 

remind you of the importance of being a “team player,” and the 

need for “unit cohesion.” 

After a few drinks, you switch to soda in preparation for your 

drive home; however, the company executive officer (XO) is 

not ready to leave. You offer him a ride home, but he says he is 

“feeling lucky and might hook up with an ECU gal and won’t 

have to drive back to camp swampy tonight.” Knowing the XO is 

a big boy, and senior to you, you decide to head home.

At 0200 the next morning, you receive a phone call from the XO 

and he certainly was not “lucky.” He was arrested for DWI and 

wants you to come and pick him up from the Greeneville police. 

Hesitantly, you head back to Greeneville to pick up the XO. After 

picking him up, you head back to Camp Lejeune, and, on the way 

back the distraught XO runs through his options: say nothing, i.e., 

cover it up; wait and see, plea-bargain down to reckless driving, 

and even then no one needs to know; or “come clean” and tell the 

company commander.

Before we delve into this issue, it is necessary to orient ourselves 

to the “core values” of the Marine Corps: honor, courage, and 

commitment. 

Practical Military Ethics| 69
70 | Aspects of Leadership

Honor is comprised of integrity, responsibility, honesty, and tradition. Being a Marine of integrity, one consistently demonstrates 

the highest standards of right conduct, both legal and ethical. Responsibility is accepting the consequences, both good and bad, 

for one’s decisions and actions. Honesty is summed up in that 

Marines do not lie, cheat, or steal and they seek fairness in all 

actions. Tradition is also an important aspect in that Marines 

respect the customs, courtesies, and traditions that bind Marines 

together. It also means having a respect for the traditions and heritage of others.

Courage is the moral, mental, and physical strength to endure 

hardship, resist opposition, and face danger. Courage is comprised 

of self-discipline, patriotism, loyalty, and valor. Self-discipline is 

the ability to police one’s conduct, maintaining moral, mental, 

and physical fitness. Patriotism is having devotion to defend the 

Constitution of the United States and to America herself. Loyalty 

is the strong feeling of allegiance to the United States of America, 

the U.S. Marine Corps, one’s command and fellow Marines, and 

to one’s family and self. Valor is having determination to face 

danger, both in and out of battle, with boldness.

Commitment is completing one’s pledge or promise, and being 

committed to a goal requires one to self-identify with the goal 

and act in a manner that supports that goal. Commitment is comprised of competence, teamwork, selflessness, concern for people, 

and spiritual heritage. Competence is maintaining and improving 

one’s skill level in order to achieve one’s goals—the goal of being 

a Marine. Teamwork is the understanding that, while on rare occasions individual effort achieves the goal, it is more often the 

case that the individual’s effort supports his or her team members 

in achieving the goal. Selflessness is placing the welfare and needs 

of the nation, the Corps, and others before one’s personal welfare. 

Concern for people is an understanding that all people (even our 
enemies) are of value, and as such, Marines treat all people with 

respect and dignity. Spiritual heritage is an understanding that 

our nation was founded on religious and spiritual principles, that 

all people are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights of 

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Maintaining spiritual 

health enables Marines and their families to endure the hardship 

that is the life of a Marine.

Now that we have briefly examined the core values of the Marine 

Corps, let us turn our attention back to the situation at hand. 

The ethical nature of the XO’s actions can be evaluated using the 

OODA Loop. This process first requires a person to observe the scenario, highlighting that there are several morally relevant issues: 

first is the DWI itself, second is the possible cover-up that the XO 

is contemplating, third is coming clean, and fourth is the possible 

action the platoon commander may need to take if the XO does 

not come clean. Although interconnected, this analysis of the situation will deal with each issue separately. This requires us to determine what the XO values. One can assume that the XO values 

his oath of office and the core values of the Marine Corps. The XO 

also values camaraderie, drinking, and chasing women, which are 

not inherently bad nor do they necessarily constitute an ethical 

issue. However, when taken to excess and conflict with the core 

values of the Marine Corps, there are ethical problems. For instance, honor, and specifically integrity and responsibility, means 

demonstrating the highest standard of consistent adherence to 

right, legal, and ethical conduct. Responsibility means personally accepting the consequences for one’s conduct and coaching 

subordinates to make moral and ethical decisions that follow the 

organization’s code of conduct. (In this context one must exhibit 

responsibility in order to coach it.)

Clearly, there is a conflict between what the XO personally values 

(having a good time, drinking, and chasing women) and the 

Practical Military Ethics| 71
72 | Aspects of Leadership

moral values of integrity and responsibility. Here the XO has at 

least two distinct roles: that of a leader of Marines and that of a 

driver. What effect will his conduct have in both roles? If the XO 

places precedence on his personal values (having a good time, 

drinking, and chasing women), which he did by turning down 

a ride and driving while intoxicated, he has violated the moral 

values of integrity and responsibility. By violating these values, 

the XO has also let down the Marines he leads and violated the 

core values of the Marine Corps. 

It’s also necessary to consider his role as a driver. By driving 

drunk, the XO jeopardized the lives of the drivers who shared 

the road with him, thereby violating the common trust that one 

will not drive while drunk. By employing moral empathy, we can 

speculate as to how the XO would feel if he were the one being 

violated. Arguably, he would not wish to be on the receiving end 

of his conduct. In this situation his personal values (having a 

good time, drinking, and chasing women,) do not constitute an 

exception to his moral values, integrity, and responsibility. The 

decision and action in this case should have been made prior to the 

XO getting in his car and driving while intoxicated. Because it is 

easy to apply hindsight, it’s necessary to briefly consider a future 

action: a possible cover-up. The XO provides several courses of 

action, two of which appear to be different but in fact are the 

same, namely not coming clean with the hope his problem will go 

unnoticed and waiting to tell his CO in hopes of pleading down 

to a lesser charge. Both options are a deliberate cover-up and the 

latter adds equivocation to the first. As such, these decisions will 

be treated as equivalent moral issues.

Moving to the second step of the OODA Loop, orient requires an 

evaluator to apply critical thinking skills, moral empathy, and an 

open mind to determine which courses of action could be considered ethical. First, it is clear that the XO values his role in the 
Marine Corps; if he did not value such a role, there would be no 

reason for him to be distraught. The XO also values loyalty, as 

seen by his organizing the “O” call and in his implicit and explicit 

communication to the platoon commander that “no one needs 

to know.” The XO’s self-preservation is not inherently immoral, 

nor is his valuing loyalty; however, when examining his actions, 

the XO’s priorities are called into question. The XO’s self-preservation is in conflict with the core value of commitment, namely 

selflessness, where selflessness is taking care of one’s subordinates and families before themselves. Loyalty is also in conflict. 

The XO’s view of loyalty—that the platoon commander should 

be loyal to him—is mistaken. The XO should know that loyalty 

is due to higher principles such as the Constitution of the United 

States and the Marine Corps, and not to an individual. The XO is 

also avoiding the consideration that loyalty (when not in conflict 

to one’s oath, the Constitution, and the Marine Corps) goes both 

ways. That is, the XO should show loyalty to the platoon commander as well. 

There is a clear conflict with the XO’s values of selfishness and 

selflessness, as well as that of misplaced loyalty (i.e., loyalty to 

the XO before the organization). In this situation, this misplaced 

loyalty also brings up a conflict between loyalty and honesty. If 

the platoon commander is to remain loyal to the XO, the platoon 

commander will necessarily violate the core value of honesty, 

either directly by having to lie about the XO’s conduct if asked or 

by not reporting the XO’s conduct if not asked, both of which are 

dishonest. Using moral empathy, would the XO want to be put in 

the platoon commander’s position (i.e., forced to choose between 

competing loyalties or having to be dishonest about what he 

knows)? What would the XO do if he were the company commander? If the XO was consistent, this would not constitute an exception; he could not justify his “cover-up” as taking precedence 

over core values (i.e., his choosing lying and misplaced loyalty 

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74 | Aspects of Leadership

over the core values of proper loyalty and honesty). Nor could he 

justify an exception to loyalty to the organization (i.e., not putting 

the platoon commander in this ethical position).

After evaluating the XO’s predicament, it is easy to see that the 

morally right decision is to “come clean” and tell the company 

commander as soon as possible what happened over the weekend. 

This decision places moral values over personal values and having 

a good time (i.e., the selfless act over the selfish act and honesty 

over misplaced loyalty). It also takes into account the moral position of others who are affected by the forthcoming moral action. 

Unfortunately, the OODA Loop process is rarely used; at best, 

moral decision making is linked to leadership (which indeed it 

is) with a matter-of-fact statement such as “this is poor leadership 

by example.” At worst, it is tritely summed up with the statement 

“if you drink and drive, you’ll get busted” (i.e., it is against the 

rules, and if you break the rules, you will be punished). The more 

important question of “why” is it poor leadership is rarely asked. 

In other words, the links to Marine Corps core values and why it 

is morally important to do the right thing does not receive enough 

attention. 

Applying the Theory

Ethical theories are not necessarily essential in practical ethics. A 

basic understanding of the classic ethical theories would certainly 

be helpful, but it is not necessary and could be potentially misleading if not understood fully. Those who are teaching formal classes 

in practical military ethics should have a solid background in 

ethical theories. However, they should be cautious when teaching 

ethical theories to entry-level personnel. If they are not formally 

educated in ethics, instructors should focus more on the practical 

application of ethics rather than on theoretical application.
Case Studies

Case studies should emphasize basic moral reasoning skills, such 

as the ability to think critically, develop moral sensitivity, moral 

empathy, and open mindedness to alternative possible courses of 

action. The focus of case studies should be to determine the values, 

principles, and potential rules used in making unethical decisions 

and then to identify those elements that should have been used to 

make the ethical decision. Positive cases should also be studied to 

identify sound reasoning that resulted in proper conduct. These 

positive case studies are often given in the form of positive role 

model stories of military legends. Nevertheless, a concerted effort 

should be made not only to tell the stories of military lore but also 

to link proper conduct to core values and principles. 

A proper focus on core values should eliminate the theoretical 

“battle royal.” A duty of the educator is to prevent groupthink 

from prevailing over sound moral reasoning. When a group easily 

agrees with one another and myopically seeks “how” to apply the 

rules to a particular case without asking the difficult “why” questions, the learning that occurs within the group is of little benefit. 

Therefore, the educator must guide the students, keeping them on 

task and focusing on the relevant issues, values, and principles. 

The Dialectic Classroom

Classroom conduct is perhaps where the most gains can be made 

with regard to the development of moral reasoning, but it is also 

the most challenging aspect to change. The dialectic classroom 

can be problematic, remembering the tendency not to challenge 

authority in the military, especially at the entry level, when the 

very purpose of the class is to have the students challenge belief 

systems. Typically, the senior member of the ROTC unit teaches 

the ethics courses, and this can be a distracting factor if not propPractical Military Ethics| 75
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erly managed. The teacher must make it clear that, barring extenuating circumstances, nothing within the dialogue will be used 

against the student. If students do not trust the educator, learning will not occur. Whether or not it is intentional—and I suspect 

most times it is not—the mere fact that the educator is a ranking 

officer can generate a barrier against open and honest dialogue. It 

is the educator’s responsibility to remove this barrier. 

If possible, the educator could have the class meet in civilian 

attire. While this may seem trivial, the fact is that being at ease 

in the learning setting does make a difference from a student’s 

point of view and may facilitate dialogue.10 If the class is held in a 

military setting (e.g., a typical military classroom with a podium 

and desks neatly covered and aligned), the educator may wish to 

consider moving the site of the class to a nonmilitary setting. If 

the number of students permits, circular or semicircular seating 

should be used. This allows for everyone to be engaged in the 

dialogue and also helps to reduce the “sage on the stage” effect.

Silence in the dialectic classroom is not “dead time.” Questions, 

if framed properly, should create thought, and thought takes 

time. This again can be an impediment for the military educator because military officers often take movement and talking 

as making progress, i.e., all the students are conversing on the 

subject matter, therefore, learning must be occurring. Unless the 

movement and discussion are purposeful, it is wasted time and 

effort. Most officers, having been trained as technical experts, 

are expected to quickly master skills and provide answers in a 

timely manner (where “timely manner” typically means as fast 

as one can). Finding the patience to wait for an answer is a skill 

that most military educators will have to learn. The educator also 

needs to be open to different points of view; this does not mean 

10 Jerry H. Gill, Learning To Learn: Toward A Philosophy Of Education (Atlantic 

Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993).
that the educator has to agree with those points of view, but he 

must respect the student. It is from this open-mindedness that 

the educator is able to provide meaningful feedback that facilitates dialogue and challenges the student to consider a different 

point of view. This feedback can be both verbal and nonverbal. 

In particular, educators should avoid closed-ended feedback and 

questions—that is, answering student questions with a simple yes 

or no, or asking yes or no question to students—as this does not 

facilitate dialogue. Educators should also be sensitive to the fact 

that nonverbal communication such as body language and eye 

contact speaks as loudly as verbal communication.

The educator should be aware that not all students will develop 

the same level of moral reasoning. Indeed, it is the educator’s job 

to identify a student’s level of personal moral reasoning skills, 

and then to ask questions that challenge the student at his level of 

moral reasoning. By asking a higher-level moral reasoning question to one who reasons at a lower level, the educator runs the risk 

of placing the student in distress. This moral distress is where the 

student perceives the dialogue as a threat and might resist further 

discussion. In order to be an effective educator and to properly 

assess a student’s level of moral reasoning, however, the educator 

must be familiar with the levels of moral reasoning.11

Lawrence Kohlberg developed three levels (each with two stages) 

of moral reasoning in 1981 in his seminal work Essays on Moral 

Development: Volume One: The Philosophy of Moral Development. 

Kohlberg’s six stages have been the signpost for the pedagogy of 

11 See seminal works on schema and levels of moral reasoning, including: Kohlberg, The Philosophy Of Moral Development: Thomas Lickona, Educating For Character: How Our Schools Can Teach Respect And Responsibility (New York: Bantam 

Books, 1991); James Rest, “Moral Judgment Research And The Cognitive-Developmental Approach To Moral Education,” The Personnel and Guidance Journal 58 

(1980); Stephen J. Thoma and James R. Rest, “The Relationship Between Moral 

Decision Making And Patterns Of Consolidation And Transition,” Developmental 

Psychology 35 (1999).

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moral development. The following is a brief overview of Kohlberg’s levels and stages of moral development:

Level one is the preconventional level and consists of two stages: 

stage one, punishment and obedience, and two, individual instrumental purpose and exchange. In stage one of the preconventional level, a person defines moral correctness as a literal obedience 

to rules and authority. Thus, a person who has a stage one understanding of morality does not consider the interests of others, 

nor does he recognize that he is separable from others. When an 

individual enters stage two, he defines what is morally right as 

serving one’s own or others and understands the reciprocity of 

concrete exchange.

Level two is the conventional level and has two stages: stage three, 

mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, and conformity; 

and stage four, social system and consciences maintenance. In 

stage three, being morally right requires playing a good role and 

maintaining loyalty and trust by being concerned about the feelings of others in the group. In stage four, morally correct actions 

are those that uphold social order and welfare of the society. 

Level three is the postconventional and principled level and consists of stage five, prior rights and social contract or utility, and six, 

universal ethical principles. In stage five an individual upholds 

the basic values, rights, and legal contracts of society, even when 

they differ from actual rules and laws of society. Stage six is where 

one is guided by universal ethical principles that everyone should 

follow. Justice is Kohlberg’s universal ethical principle: respect of 

the equal dignity of individual human beings requires treating 

people as an end in themselves and not as a means to an end.12

Stage six is the pinnacle of moral reasoning; as such, it should be 

everyone’s goal. However, this does not mean that if one’s moral 

12 Kohlberg’s stages, especially stage six, is a very Kantian notion. Kohlberg, The 

Philosophy Of Moral Development. 
reasoning is at a lower stage, he or she is an immoral person. It 

only means the individual’s moral reasoning is less sophisticated. 

In 2000, James Rest, Darcia Narvaez, Stephen Thoma, and Muriel 

Bebeau revised Kohlberg’s stages. Such a revision allowed for a 

more flexible interpretation of an individual’s level of moral reasoning and consolidated the levels into three schemas thereby 

bringing the theory in line with modern cognitive science theory. 

Rest’s moral schema theory includes the personal interest schema 

(Kohlberg’s stages two and three), maintaining norms schema 

(Kohlberg’s stage four), and postconventional schema (Kohlberg’s 

stages five and six). People within the personal interest schema 

justify a morally right decision by appealing to the personal stake 

they have in the consequences of their action. People within the 

maintaining norms schema (stage four) perceive a need for social 

norms to govern the group. These norms apply to the entire group 

and should be plain, consistent, and definite; there should be reciprocity of the norms within the group. The group must be organized into some hierarchical chain of command and one must 

obey authorities within the chain of command out of respect for 

the group. Within this schema, social norms define morality. The 

last schema is the postconventional schema, where people reason 

first from a moral criterion.13 There is an appeal to a moral ideal 

(e.g., beneficence, honesty, responsibility, justice)—these ideals 

are shared within the community, and there is full reciprocity of 

the ideal within the community.

Understanding the levels or schemas of moral reasoning allows 

the educator to formulate the appropriate “why” question, be it 

13 Rest’s moral schema theory allows for a more flexible moral criterion in which 

to form the foundations of one’s moral reasoning. Where the moral criterion for 

Kohlberg’s stage theory is justice, the criterion for Rest’s moral schema theory may 

be justice but it could also be care (beneficence), honesty, or responsibility. The 

moral criterion used is dependent on the individual and the situation; however, it 

is not to be confused with relativistic or situational ethics. Moral schema theory 

relies on a primary moral value such as justice, honesty, beneficence, or 

responsibility at the postconventional schema. 

Practical Military Ethics| 79
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a question designed to bring the student from a personal interest 

schema to a maintaining norms schema or from the maintaining 

norms schema to the postconventional schema. Educators should 

avoid saying what the “approved” answer is, and they should 

also avoid providing their own personal answer to a particular 

problem. The goal is to ask the appropriate “why” question that 

draws a reasoned answer from the student. This requires patience 

on the part of the educator, especially an educator with a military background who is accustomed to a quick answer. Once the 

student has articulated his answer, the educator should ask follow-up questions that relate the student’s answer to the values 

and principles of the organization. The educator’s purpose is to 

ask questions that create dissonance.

In summary, the dialectic classroom and process is nothing new; 

it is the maieutic method, more commonly known as the Socratic 

Method. Knowing at what level or schema a student is reasoning helps frame the line of questions. The crux of this method is 

the follow-up question; the goal is to “stress” the current belief, 

without putting the student in “distress.” Self-reflection, writing 

one’s thoughts down, and follow-up discussion challenge or 

strengthen the validity of the newly reasoned conclusion. This 

process is thought to reinforce, create, or rewire neural pathways and schemas within the brain, thereby increasing reasoning 

skills.14

Horizontal Integration

The connection between personal conduct and the core values of 

the Marine Corps should be made evident. This approach allows 

for positive reinforcement of conduct as opposed to negative reinforcement. Positive reinforcement acknowledges someone for 

exhibiting right conduct rather than only instructing someone on 

14 Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain (New York: Dana Press, 2005); 

Laurence Tancredi, Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals About Morality

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
what the rules are and telling them not to break them. In other 

words, it is important that the instructors value a service member’s honesty in a particular situation. Such an approach will reinforce the service member’s belief about honesty. Linking conduct 

to organizational values in this manner reinforces the importance 

of both the value and the individual’s right conduct. 

Intuitive Ethics

Evidence suggests that the majority of daily judgments and behaviors (including moral ones) are intuitive; they appear in one’s 

consciousness without their origin being known. Benjamin Libet’s 

1999 study developed theories of intuitive decision models of 

moral conduct. Libet found that increased brain activity occurred 

about 300 milliseconds before the subject became consciously 

aware of impending action, followed by 150 milliseconds of consciousness before the brain sent the signal to act, and another 

50 milliseconds for that signal to get to the muscle to initiate 

movement.15

Jonathan Haidt, in his social intuitionist model of moral conduct, 

suggested that most moral reasoning is a post hoc rationalization 

of intuitive behavior after one receives feedback from his or her 

social group. Haidt offers four reasons why his model provides 

a strong explanation for moral conduct. First, there are dual processes that drive our conduct, both conscious and unconscious. 

Second, the agent acts more like a defense lawyer than a judge; we 

seek to morally defend our actions. Third, often we cannot explain 

why we do the things we do; we manufacture reasons post hoc 

when pressed for answers. Fourth, several studies indicate moral 

action may be linked with moral emotion to a greater extent than 

it is linked with moral reasoning.16 Indeed, moral conduct is often 

15 Benjamin Libet, “Do We Have Free Will?,” Journal of Counciousness Studies 6 

(1999).

16 Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog And Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuistionist Approach To Moral Judgment,” Psychologcal Review 108 (2001).

Practical Military Ethics| 81
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a result of an intuitive emotional reaction as opposed to a rational reasoned action. The following are a few studies in cognitive 

neuroscience that seem to support a social intuitive link to moral 

conduct.

Anthony Greenwald and colleagues, using their Implicit Association Test (IAT), also seem to support an intuitive process for 

moral conduct.17 Greenwald and Farnham compare reaction times 

between congruent and noncongruent concepts and attributes to 

determine if there is an implicit association between the two when 

compared to an explicit measure of the concept and attribute. The 

classic example uses the concepts of a flower and an insect with 

attributes of pleasant and unpleasant. A congruent task links the 

concept of a flower with a pleasant word and the concept of an 

insect with an unpleasant word, while an incongruent task links 

the concept of a flower with an unpleasant word and the concept 

of an insect with a pleasant word. Reaction times for identifying 

a pair as congruent or incongruent are measured, and typically 

incongruent pairs take longer to identify, thereby indicating an 

implicit association with the congruent pair. Concepts used with 

the IAT have been religion, gender, race, and ethnicity, all of 

which have moral implications. When comparing explicit measures of stereotyping within those concepts, there is little correlation between the two; in other words, one might not stereotype a 

concept such as ethnicity on an explicit measure, but when given 

the IAT, there are implicit associations with certain ethnicities. The 

results of Greenwald’s IAT indicate that there is both an explicit 

17 Anthony G. Greenwald and Shelly D. Farnham, “Using the Implicit Association Test to Measure Self-Esteem and Self-Concept,” Journal of Personality and 

Social Psychology 79 (2000); Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee, and Jordan L. K. Schwartz, “Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 

Implicit Association Test,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1998); 

Anthony G. Greenwald, Colin T. Smith, N. Sriram, Yoav Baranan, and Brian A. 

Nosek, “Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 9 (2009).
and implicit mechanism at work when one makes judgments to 

include judgments with moral implications. 

One might conclude that there is something more going on in the 

gap (Libet’s 150 milliseconds) that allows “dishonest” subjects to 

override their propensity to cheat. Clearly, the growing evidence 

that there might be something going on “under the hood” needs 

to be taken seriously. Our intuitions play a greater role in our 

moral conduct than we previously thought.

As a result of the increasing evidence that much of our moral 

conduct is based on our intuition, an effort should be made to integrate intuitive ethics into military training and education. Military personnel need to be put into as many “real world” morally 

ambiguous situations as possible and be required to make intuitive judgments, decisions, and actions in order to resolve the situation. These situations or vignettes could easily be integrated into 

existing training scenarios. However, in order for ethics education 

to increase good intuitive ethics, there needs to be a link between 

the implicit and explicit. One way to make the implicit known, 

and thereby reinforce right conduct and correct wrong conduct, is 

by continuing the dialogue into the after action review for those 

vignettes that can be evaluated in terms of morality. There should 

be a determined effort to question the morally relevant conduct 

and to link this conduct to the core values of the Marine Corps. 

Educating the Educators

In addition to sound leadership and role modeling, educators 

need to be skilled in practical moral reasoning skills (e.g., critical thinking, moral empathy, open-mindedness, and the ability to 

link conduct with the values of the organization). Certainly, the 

educators who will be teaching entry-level ROTC classes need to 

be educated on how to conduct character education. Very little 

formal education on how to conduct character development is 

provided to ROTC instructors. Perhaps there should be a formal 

Practical Military Ethics| 83
84 | Aspects of Leadership

education process for those who instruct at ROTC programs. 

The U.S. Marine Corps can remedy such a shortcoming at The 

Basic School (TBS); however, other services do not have this 

opportunity. 

The military/DOD/USMC should also identify those responsible 

for character education in the operating force and educate them.

The captain, lieutenant, and staff noncommissioned officer are 

in the ideal positions to conduct character education in the operating forces. Yet as character education does not equal training, 

perhaps there should be a deliberate effort to equip these young 

service members to make the needed links between one’s conduct 

and the core values of the organization. If character development 

is important, and arguably it is as important as any technical skill 

such as firing a rifle, there should be a concerted effort to educate 

educators at TBS, Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS), and at 

the Staff Noncommissioned Officers Course (SNCOC) and other 

postcommissioning schools. 

Regardless of the method of educating the educator, the Marine 

Corps should invest time in discussing ethical issues prior to the 

point of action. War-gaming tactical situations are an expected 

and common practice in the troop-leading steps, as is the Marine 

Corps Planning Process (MCPP); incorporating ethical issues in 

this process will be beneficial to develop moral reasoning skills.

Conclusion

In order to achieve maximum effectiveness in character education, the Marine Corps should integrate both intuitive and maieutic methods in ethics education programs. More importantly, 

the Marine Corps should set the conditions for success within 

the classroom and integrate both reason and intuition outside 

the classroom. Unethical behavior should not necessarily be 
punished in training; rather, Marines who display unethical 

conduct should be remediated by spending time discussing the 

connection between core values and moral conduct. Those who 

educate Marines about making morally correct decisions must 

take advantage of proven pedagogical methods in order to 

enrich the conversation and facilitate greater moral development 

throughout the Corps. 

Practical Military Ethics| 85

The new international environment, new forms of conflict, new 

expectations from public opinion, the powerful role played by 

the media, and the conflicting agendas of great nations have put 

service members and, particularly, military leadership in situations in which exercising leadership is extremely difficult. The 

changing nature of the missions that military leaders are asked to 

execute and the increasing demands of their responsibilities have 

placed a heavy burden on them. Often these new responsibilities 

are confused and blurred, and as a result military leadership is 

more complex. The “fog” of responsibilities is part of the framework in which service members are asked to operate.

Leaders deal with at least three levels of responsibility: toward 

the profession, the nation, and the international community. Assuming that through comradeship and esprit de corps, the profession of arms is comparable to a family, these three levels can be 

compared to Emile Durkheim’s “three loyalties” consisting of the 

loyalty toward “the family in which one is born, the nation or the 

political group, and humanity.”1

Many thanks to Dr. Paolo Tripodi and Lieutenant Colonel Carroll Connelley 

(USMC) for the tremendous work they have done to carry this project to its 

end. I also acknowledge Ms. Stase Rodebaugh for her compelling and thoughtful 

comments which helped me make this paper clearer. I am grateful to Major James 

Gingras (USAF) and Heather Richards for the time they spent reading these lines 

and for their insightful feedback. All my thanks and love to my wife Christine and 

our son Thomas.

1 Emile Durkheim, Moral Education (Mineola, NY: Courier Dover Publication, 

2002), 74.

Leadership in a World of Blurred 

Responsibilities

Emmanuel R. Goffi

—87—
88 | Aspects of Leadership

Military leaders are asked to assume the responsibilities related 

not only to their rank and position, but also to their profession. Assuming responsibility is the path for leaders to build 

their legitimacy. In this paper, legitimacy is defined as the combination of three elements: tradition, charisma, and rationalitylegality.2

 Indeed, in the military, these three essential elements 

directly impact the trust leaders can expect from the profession 

and from their subordinates in particular.3

 The responsibility 

military leaders have toward the nation is rather complex since 

it involves respect for both the people with their expectations, 

and the state with its agendas. Finally, international responsibility is the outcome of the rise of cosmopolitanism in international relations and foreign policy. Cosmopolitanism stresses 

that all human beings are citizens of the world, and as Kwame 

Anthony Appiah explained, cosmopolitanism is thus made of 

“two strands that intertwine.” In Appiah’s view, “one is the idea 

that we have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond 

those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kin, or even 

the more formal ties of shared citizenship. The other is that we 

take seriously the value not just of human life but of particular 

human lives.”4 Thus, cosmopolitanism advocates a moral duty for 

every human being toward every other human being—not only 

toward fellow citizens, friends, family members, or a particular 

community.

The complexity of military leadership is determined by both 

the number of actors military leaders are responsible for and 

2 Maximilian Weber, Le savant et le politique, electronic version by Jean-Marie 

Tremblay made from the book, Le savant et le politique (Paris: Union Générale 

d’Éditions, 1963), 33–34, http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/Weber/savant_politique/Le_savant.html.

3 Emmanuel Goffi, Les armées françaises face à la morale: Une réflexion au cœur des 

conflits modernes (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011), 160–63.

4 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (New 

York: W.W. Norton, 2007), xv.
the interaction among those actors. The conflict in Afghanistan, 

where French troops, as many others, have been deployed with 

the primary purpose of defending French interests, is a perfect 

example of this complexity and interaction. Although troops have 

been deployed to protect French interests, the argument used by 

the government to explain and justify France’s involvement in Afghanistan has been mainly humanitarian. French military leaders 

in Afghanistan are not always clear regarding the real objective of 

their mission. Are they supposed to promote French interests, or 

are they supposed to protect the Afghan people? Or is the intervention in Afghanistan a multipurpose mission? 

Figure 2 illustrates the complexity of this situation and how different levels of responsibility interact: in the nation, military 

leaders are responsible toward fellow citizens; in the profession, 

they have a double responsibility toward their superiors and their 

subordinates; and in the world, military leaders are responsible 

The Profession

of Arms

 Military Leaders

Citizens

Coalitions

Multinational

Military

Operations

Statesmen

Peoples

The Nation The World

All Servicemen

Figure 2. The Circles of Responsibility.

Blurred Responsibilities | 89
90 | Aspects of Leadership

to all human beings. These responsibilities become particularly 

complex at the intersection of the three circles and particularly 

when military leaders are deployed in multinational military operations. In these operations responsibilities are blurred, and it is 

difficult, if not impossible, to determine clearly who is responsible 

for what. 

Before exploring these three levels of responsibility, it is important 

to explain the meaning of “responsibility.”

Responsibility: A Complex Concept

George Ambler, executive partner with Gartner Executive Programs, notes that “as leaders we can be given accountability and 

we can be given authority, but we cannot be given responsibility. 

We have to take responsibility. Leadership is a choice we make. 

The attitude of responsibility is a leadership mind-set. We do not 

become leaders because we have authority and are therefore accountable. We are leaders because of how we choose to respond. 

Leadership rests on our responsibility, not our authority.”5

 In Ambler’s view, responsibility is the pillar of leadership. Thus, military 

leaders should be aware that leadership is deeply rooted in the 

exercise of responsibility. Michael Walzer provides more clarity 

on this point. According to Walzer, “Officers take on immense responsibilities . . . for they have in their control the means of death 

and destruction. The higher their rank, the greater the reach of 

their command, the larger their responsibilities.”6

Indeed, responsibility is at the core of the profession of arms. As 

managers of violence, soldiers and their leaders bear the greatest responsibility. Therefore, they must be held accountable for 

5 George Ambler, “Responsibility and Its Role in Leadership,” The Practice of 

Leadership (blog), 31 August 2008, http://www.thepracticeofleadership.net/

responsibility-and-its-role-in-leadership.

6 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 316.
their actions. This accountability can be divided into two parts: 

on the one hand, they are responsible for following and applying 

the rules of law; on the other hand, they are responsible for doing 

what is morally right.

Currently there is a strong, but necessary, constraint on military 

actions, especially on the use of force, which is tightly disciplined 

by the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and the rules of engagement 

(ROE). Liability of military members can hardly be avoided when 

a violation of the LOAC has been committed. 

Personal liability at all levels of the hierarchy has been the cornerstone of international criminal justice since the Nuremberg trials. 

As a defendant at Nuremberg, one of the most prominent Nazi 

leaders, Hermann Göring, argued that he could not be held accountable for complying with orders issued by his superior, Adolf 

Hitler. He tried to evade his personal liability for the crimes Nazi 

Germany committed during the Second World War by deflecting 

the responsibility toward his superiors. 

Yet in 1945 the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 

Nuremberg determined that “[t]he fact that the Defendant acted 

pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not 

free him from responsibility.”7

 In 1950, the so-called Nuremberg 

Principles postulated that “[t]he fact that a person acted pursuant 

to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him 

from responsibility under international law, provided a moral 

choice was in fact possible to him.”8

This point was later included in the Rome Statute that established 

the International Criminal Court. Article 33 states,

7 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of 

the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, London, 8 

August 1945, Art 8, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350?OpenDocument.

8 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg 

Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle IV, http://untreaty.un.org/

ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_1_1950.pdf.

Blurred Responsibilities | 91
92 | Aspects of Leadership

The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 

committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government 

or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve 

that person of criminal responsibility unless (a) The person was 

under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or 

the superior in question; (b) The person did not know that the 

order was unlawful; and (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.9

Therefore, it is extremely difficult to evade one’s responsibilities toward international law. However, when dealing with national jurisdictions, things can be rather confusing. In France, for 

example, the penal code states that “a person is not criminally 

liable who performs an action commanded by a lawful authority, 

unless the action is manifestly unlawful.”10 This statement does 

not contradict international laws; however, it does not formally 

forbid the use of the “obedience to authority” argument. The 

main issue with this article and Article 33 of the Rome Statute is 

that they imply all military personnel must have a deep knowledge of what is lawful and what is not. However, this is something difficult to achieve. As a result military commanders on the 

battlefield normally rely on the advice of legal advisors (LEGAD) 

and on documents such as the rules of engagement. Yet, this is 

not enough and mistakes can be made. In some circumstances 

LEGAD might not be available. Often the ROE are complex and 

unclear. In some cases, there might be a perception that the interest at stake is so high that violating the rules might be a necessary and acceptable compromise. This point is at the center of the 

debate on torture. Abu Ghraib, al Habbaniyah, and several other 

detention centers were condemned by the International Commit9 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 33, http://untreaty.

un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.

10 French Penal Code, Art. 122.4 § 2, English version, http://195.83.177.9/upl/

pdf/code_33.pdf.
tee of the Red Cross for the abuses that took place. Resorting to 

torture, even if clearly unlawful, can be wrongly perceived as a 

necessary means of last resort. 

Liability for war crimes includes the perpetrators and also those 

who were in charge. As Stéphane Bourgon puts it, “[i]t is important, and it goes without saying, that commanders are vested with 

significant powers. It is necessary to allow them to fulfill the missions they are entrusted with. These powers are, notwithstanding, accompanied by heavy responsibilities based on commanders’ duty to control their subordinates and to ensure the respect 

of international humanitarian law.”11 Leaders’ responsibility 

is obviously not limited to legal considerations. The moral and 

social consequences caused by the violation of certain rules, such 

as the prohibition on torture, can weigh heavier than the legal 

ramifications. 

Stanley Milgram, in his famous study on obedience,12 provided 

evidence that a significant number of individuals will obey an 

immoral order issued by an authority perceived as legitimate.13 It 

is easy to give up one’s responsibility, as had been done by Nazi 

leaders in Nuremberg or as shown by the Stanford Prison experiment14 in 1971 and more recently by the French TV program, Le 

Jeu de la Mort, broadcast in March 2010.15 In this program, which 

11 Stéphane Bourgon, “Les tribunaux pénaux internationaux et le droit international humanitaire: La responsabilité du commandement” in, Les conflits et le droit, 

ed. Emmanuel Goffi and Grégory Boutherin (Paris: Choiseul, 2011).

12 In 1961 Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment aimed at measuring the 

willingness of individuals to obey orders given by an authority figure. A subject 

was ordered to ask questions to a “learner” and to deliver an electric shock to this 

“learner” each time he made a mistake. The shock was increased for each mistake 

to reach highly painful and, eventually, deadly levels. The so-called “learner” was 

an actor and shocks were not actually delivered.

13 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: Perennial Classics, 2004).

14 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: How Good People Turn Evil (London: 

Rider, 2009).

15 Le jeu de la mort (Jusqu’où va la télé?), broadcast on the French TV channel 

“France 2,” 17 March 2010.

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was based on Milgram’s experiment, 81 percent of the subjects 

pushed the lever to the ultimate 440-volt shock just because they 

were asked to.16 Leaders must be prepared to avoid the “Lucifer 

effect”17 and prevent their subordinates, or even their superiors, 

from perpetrating evil acts.

Lieutenant General Denis Mercier noted that “[n]o frame, whether 

legal or moral, will release the soldier—or all the more, the officer—

from his responsibility when it comes to the use of force, whatever 

the complexity of the situation in which he operates.”18 Indeed, as 

explained by Anthony Hartle, “To be prepared for his responsibility, a commander must be proficient in a variety of areas. He must 

be a ‘tactician, strategist, warrior, ethicist, leader, manager, and 

technician.’”19 Often leaders are expected to be knowledgeable 

about everything and to make good decisions always. Obviously 

this kind of expectation can be unrealistic, and military leaders 

can often just choose the “lesser of two evils”; this course of action 

is the outcome of limited knowledge of the environment where 

they operate and the interests at stake.

Responsibility toward the Profession

In his classic book, The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington 

wrote that military ethics “exalts obedience as the highest virtue 

of military men.”20 This point of view is widely shared among 

French field officers. Leaders have a duty to obey and to advise 

their superiors. Advising superiors, however, can be challenging, 

particularly when a disagreement might arise and the opinion 

16 In the Milgram experiment conducted in 1961, 65 percent of the subjects 

delivered the final massive shock of 440 volts.

17 Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect.

18 Lieutenant General Denis Mercier, préface in Goffi, Les armées françaises face à 

la morale.

19 Anthony Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 14.

20 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Belknap, 1957), 79.
offered could be perceived as adversarial. This is indeed an important responsibility for any leader, but even more so for military officers. 

In the case of obedience, leaders consider themselves merely 

professionals who have been given a mission they must execute 

without questioning.21 This mind-set is germane to the military 

culture of obedience and also to the traditional subordination of 

the military to the political power. In 44 BC, Cicero wrote “Cedant 

arma togæ” or “Let arms yield to the toga.”22 In this statement lies 

the idea that the military is always expected to submit to civilians’ rules. Yet this relation is not always easy. Decisions made by 

political leaders are sometimes difficult for military leaders to understand. The French-led military Opération Turquoise23 is a good 

example of the difficulty faced by leaders in fulfilling a political 

mission with serious consequences in the field, for which “the 

political responsibility of the French government remains a substantive issue which deserves close scrutiny.”24 It might be easier 

to blame the military rather than blame the political institution 

responsible for ordering the use of force.

The conflict in Afghanistan is an interesting and important case. 

In France the real motivation of the intervention remains unclear 

to both French military leaders and their troops deployed there. 

Three factors are useful to explain such a situation. First, officials’ 

21 Jean-Claude Barreau, Jean Dufourcq, and Frédéric Teulon, Paroles d’officiers

(Paris: Fayard, 2010), 172. 

22 Quintus Tullius Cicero, De officiis (On Duties), I, 77, Stoics.com, http://stoics.

com/cicero_book.html.

23 Opération Turquoise was a mission in Rwanda proposed and led by France in 

1994 under Resolution 929 of the UN aiming at “achieving the objectives of the 

United Nations in Rwanda through the establishment of a temporary operation 

under national command and control aimed at contributing, in an impartial way, 

to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in 

Rwanda.” France was highly criticized for its controversial role in the conflict. The 

French army was charged for “complicity of genocide and/or complicity of crimes 

against humanity.”

24 Barreau et al., Paroles d’officiers, 179.

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discourse, such as that from French political leaders, has stressed 

the humanitarian dimension of the intervention. Second, the political agendas of Coalition members differ significantly from one 

another. The reasons that have determined many countries’ decisions to intervene in Afghanistan have changed often along with 

the means used during the intervention. Third, these changes 

have made a significant impact on the overall environment on the 

ground and on the perception Afghan people and Coalition troops 

have of the intervention. As a result, military leaders have often 

struggled to understand and explain why they are fighting in Afghanistan. In France for instance, exploring why French troops 

are fighting in Afghanistan can lead to a wide range of explanations. The intervention is justified by humanitarian and strategic 

arguments, as well as an emphasis on the role France plays within 

NATO and its relationship with the United States. 

It should be noted that making decisions to deploy troops into 

combat zones and risk their lives for unclear reasons is dangerous. Colonel Eric Maïni, deputy commander of the French Air 

Force Academy, stated during an informal discussion, “It is a 

major responsibility to put the name of a subordinate on the list 

of those who will be sent into combat.”25 This must be taught to 

cadets and reminded to senior leaders.

Audrone Petrauskaite, at the General Jonas Zemaitis Military 

Academy of Lithuania, found that 69.1 percent of Lithuanian 

cadets considered responsibility as the most important quality of 

a professional officer (responsibility ranked higher than duty–60 

percent–and loyalty–50.9 percent). At the same time, 69.1 percent 

of the respondents agreed with the idea that “militaries should 

carry out all orders of their commander” and only 25 percent 

considered “that militaries should carry out only the order that is 

25 Quoted with the kind agreement of Colonel Eric Maïni.
in agreement with their consciousness.”26 Cadets overall should 

be taught that leadership is intrinsically linked to the exercise of 

responsibility, and a proper exercise of responsibility requires 

autonomous thinking. This means that they should develop the 

moral courage required to refuse the execution of illegal and/or 

immoral orders. According to Hannah Arendt, it is this thinking, 

considered as free will, that will allow the individual to develop 

the ability to apply sound judgment and then take responsibility, 

and if necessary to say “no.”27 Thus, responsibility toward superiors’ orders rests in the ability to refuse the execution of those 

orders that are clearly unlawful and/or immoral. Due to the subjective nature of the perception of morality, the act of refusing the 

execution of “immoral” orders poses serious challenges to the 

individual. 

On some occasions political and military agendas can collide. According to Robert McNamara, the question often is “how much 

evil must we do in order to do good? We have certain ideals, 

certain responsibilities. Recognize that at times you will have to 

engage in evil, but minimize it.”28 Thus, under what circumstances should military leaders oppose the execution of missions that 

would place the lives of their troops at risk? This question was 

raised in Afghanistan when a Dutch battalion refused to carry out 

a reconnaissance mission as they were not adequately equipped 

and troops’ lives could have been compromised.29 A similar case 

occurred in Iraq when U.S. soldiers refused to execute what they 

26 Audrone Petrauskaite, “Ethics in Lithuanian Professional Military Education” in Civil-Military Aspects of Military Ethics, vol 2, ed. Edwin R. Micewski 

and Dietmar Pfarr (Vienna: Publication Series of the National Defense Academy, 

2005), 90.

27 Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (New York: Schoken Books, 2005).

28 The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara, motion 

picture, Sony Pictures Classics, 2003.

29 “La fronde d’un bataillon néerlandais en Afghanistan,” Le Figaro (Paris), 1 October 2008, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/10/01/01003-20081001ARTFIG00433-la-fronde-d-un-bataillon-neerlandais-en-afghanistan-.php.

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called a “suicide mission” consisting of operating a fuel convoy in 

a dangerous area.30

In combat commanders are placed under a great deal of pressure generated by the responsibility to execute the orders they 

have received, while trying to minimize the loss of troops’ lives. 

Leaders deal with multiple responsibilities as subordinates and 

advisors to civilian authority and toward their subordinates. They 

are morally and legally accountable for the consequences of the 

decisions they make. Yet what does accountability mean when responsibility and its sharing are blurred?

One French example provides a good illustration of this concern. 

In August 2008, 10 troops were killed in an ambush in the Uzbin 

Valley in Afghanistan.31 This tragic event paved the way to a 

strong debate in France about whether France should continue 

its military commitment in Afghanistan. The most pressing issue 

was about identifying who was responsible for those deaths. The 

ambush was widely reported by the media. French public opinion 

blamed military leaders for the losses. In October 2009, the families of the soldiers killed in action decided to sue military leaders 

for “deliberately endangering the lives of others [i.e. soldiers].” 

The legal action was aimed against “individuals who . . . had not 

assumed their responsibility. . . “ Clearly, such a course of action 

generated a concern about whether military leaders will continue 

to accept their responsibility in future combat operations.

The French military found that the initiative taken by the families of those killed in action was unfair. The issue is whether 

military leaders on the battlefield are the only ones who should 

be held responsible for the casualties. French public opinion per30 Dan Glaister, “Doubts about U.S. Morale in Iraq as Troops Refuse ‘Suicide Mission’,” The Guardian, 16 October 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/

world/2004/oct/16/iraq.usa.

31 For further details about the ambush see Bill Roggio, “Taliban Kill 10 French 

Troops in Kabul Province Ambush,” The Long War Journal, 19 August 2008, 

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/taliban_kill_ten_fre.php.
ceives that French troops are not properly equipped to conduct 

counterinsurgency campaigns or humanitarian intervention in a 

highly hostile environment. Indeed, should this be the case, then 

identifying responsibilities is significantly more complex. Many 

among the French military stress that the intervention in Afghanistan has been launched without the French parliament’s approval 

as required by Article 35 of the constitution. Therefore, military 

leaders share no responsibility for such a political decision. 

In a situation lacking clarity, military leaders feel a strong responsibility toward their subordinates. This opinion is widely shared 

within the French military. In addition, before dedication to the 

nation or fellow citizens, French soldiers’ main motivation in 

combat is to risk their lives for their comrades-in-arms.32

When the motivation to enter a conflict is not clear, and as a result, 

military leaders might find it difficult to explain why troops 

should kill or might be killed, the very sense of military commitment may shift from the defense of the nation to the defense of 

comrades. Nonetheless, the defense of the nation remains the traditional—and a strong—responsibility of military leaders.

Responsibility toward the Nation

In the first century BC, Horace wrote, “Dulce et decorum est pro 

patria mori,” or “It is sweet and fitting to die for one’s country.” 

Today, to serve France with the “ultimate sacrifice” is, as stressed 

by former French President Jacques Chirac, the “raison d’être” 

and the “honor of the professional officer.”33 There is a close re32 Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, and Terrence M. 

Potter., Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2003), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/

display.cfm?pubID=179; and Kelly Kennedy, They Fought for Each Other: The 

Triumph and Tragedy of the Hardest Hit Unit in Iraq (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 

2010).

33 Jacques Chirac, Discours de M. Jacques Chirac, Président de la République, à 

l’occasion du bicentenaire de l’Ecole spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr, École Militaire, 

Paris, 25 January 2002, http://rpr.infos.27.pagesperso-orange.fr/00000003.

htm#ANCRE%2025/01/02.

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lationship between military personnel and the nation clearly 

captured by General Georgelin as he notes that “[t]he serviceman is the one who, today as yesterday, thinks about the values 

which founded the nation, because it is on their behalf that he 

will, if necessary, use the force he has been entrusted with by his 

fellow countrymen.”34 Emile Durkheim notes that there is always 

a tension between patriotism and cosmopolitanism at the moral 

level. However, he emphasizes the fact that “in contrast with the 

nation, mankind as source and object of morality suffers this deficiency: there is no constituted society.”35 In addition, the French 

Defense Code states that “[t]he Armed Forces of the Republic 

are dedicated to the nation. The mission of the armed forces is to 

prepare and to insure by force of arms the defense of the homeland and the higher interests of the nation.”36 The defense of the 

nation has long been the main, if not the only, reason worth dying 

for.37 Dying pro patria was, in the First and Second World Wars, a 

strong motivation for French soldiers.38

This seems to be the most important responsibility of any military 

member. In his study on the U.S. military, Roger H. Nye writes,

The true American soldier has always cherished a vision of 

himself as a servant of the nation, an identity that runs counter 

to the idea of professional isolation from the great politic body. 

In this sense, soldiers feel deeply about patriotism, a patriotism 

that extols the American nation as man’s best hope for guaran34 Général d’armée Jean-Louis Georgelin, former Joint Chief of Staff, “L’identité 

militaire vue par le général Georgelin,” http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/le-chef-detat-major/interventions/articles/12-10-07-l-identite-militaire-vue-par-le-generalgeorgelin.

35 Emile Durkheim, Moral Education, 76.

36 Code de la Défense, Article L3211-2, http://droit-finances.commentcamarche.

net/legifrance/50-code-de-la-defense.

37 Ernst Kantorowicz, Mourir pour la patrie et autres textes (Paris: PUF, 1984), 

105–41.

38 Guillaume Cuchet, “Mourir pour la patrie: le poilu entre gloire terrestre et 

gloire céleste” in Le sacrifice du soldat: Corps martyrisé, corps mythifié, Christian 

Benoit et al. (Paris: ECPAD/CNRS Editions, 2009),74–78
teeing the freedom and peace necessary to man’s achieving his 

great potential. Defense of the nation becomes a great calling. 

With it comes the duty of protecting the people, their value 

system, and their material well-being.39

Military leaders have significant responsibilities toward the 

nation and fellow citizens. Thus, they are placed in a difficult position when the political decision to use force is not supported or 

when it is even opposed by the “nation.” If one accepts Clausewitz’s point of view that the military is a tool of politics, and that 

politics in a democracy is the expression of the nation’s will, then 

military leaders are accountable to their fellow citizens or at least 

to their representatives. In the case of the French intervention in 

Afghanistan, the French parliament was excluded from the political decision-making process. More recently the French parlia39 Roger H. Nye, The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence

(New York: Perigee Trade, 2002), 14.

Government’s

Political

Object

War as an

instrument of policy

subject to reason

alone

Moral (consequentialism and

deontology), legal, and subordination

Moral, legal and

support

Army’s

Courage and 

Talents

War as the play of

chance and

probability

Media

War as a

mere topic

People’s

Passions

War as primordial

violence, hatred,

and enmity Support

Support

Moral (consequentialism) and

 legal 

Moral (deontology) and

 legal 

Democratic

interaction

Types of

expectations

Information Flow

Figure 3. The Remarkable Trinity +1.

Blurred Responsibilities | 101
102 | Aspects of Leadership

ment was also excluded from the decision to intervene in Libya. 

In these situations, military leaders deal with the Clausewitzian 

“remarkable trinity,”40 (see figure 3) trying to balance the people, 

the military, and the government, as well as the media.

In Clausewitz’s trinity, military leaders deal with conflicting and 

often confusing priorities. A balance should be found between 

the French government’s agenda to maintain, and indeed also 

strengthen, the number of troops in Afghanistan, and the French 

public opinion’s desire to withdraw. In such a blurred situation, 

military leaders are asked by the government to execute a mission 

that will risk the lives of their troops while French public opinion 

is opposed to such a mission. According to Hartle, “[i]n general, 

military forces and military leaders have always been an obedient 

arm of the state and strictly subordinate to civilian authority.”41

Therefore, the mission decided by the government must be accomplished even when public opinion is opposed to it. However, 

such a division will have a major impact on military leaders. 

Winning hearts and minds is not only about the people of 

the countries where troops are deployed, but it’s also about 

their respective public opinions. General Benoit Royal stresses that “today more than yesterday, a military force which 

does not benefit from the support of the public opinion loses 

its legitimacy.”42 The people no longer feel responsible for political decisions, and political leaders do not feel responsible 

since they consider themselves acting on behalf of the people. 

In this confusing situation military leaders should be able to 

balance obedience to orders with expectations from their fellow 

citizens. 

40 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Ware: Wordsworth Classics, 1997), 24.

41 Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, 16.

42 Benoît Royal, “La guerre se gagne avec l’opinion publique,” Le Figaro, 13 February 2009, http://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/ 2009/02/27/01005-20090227ARTFIG00001-la-guerre-se-gagne-avec-l-opinion-publique-.php. . 
Responsibility toward the International 

Community

Since the early 1990s, the international community and its most 

important actors have decided to play a more robust role to create 

a safer global environment. Western states have looked at their 

national security through the prism of international stability. A 

shift has occurred from a nationalist to a cosmopolitan approach 

to security, indeed, from a nationalist to a “nationalist-throughcosmopolitan” approach. The French national strategy policy also 

stresses that “in virtue of its international responsibilities and on 

the basis of a collective vision of its own security interests, France 

may occasionally have to take part in an intervention even though 

its own direct interests are not at stake.”43 French moral altruism 

comes together with a more pragmatic consideration of France’s 

“indirect interests.” 

Together with an increased use of force to deal with internal or international disputes in some parts of the world, such as in Africa, 

the need for justice has increased in a considerable way. This is 

true both at the national and international levels. 

The idea of being responsible for the well-being and the security 

of other peoples has been largely used by the United Nations to 

promote and justify humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. 

As Kwame Anthony Appiah writes,

Accepting the nation-state means accepting that we have a 

special responsibility for the life and justice of our own; but 

we still have to play our part in ensuring that all states respect 

the rights and meet the needs of their citizens. If they cannot, 

then all of us—through our nations, if they will do it, and in 

spite of them, if they won’t—share the collective obligation to 

change them, and if the reason they fail their citizens is that they 

43 French White Paper on Defence and National Security (Paris: Odile Jacob/La 

Documentation Française, 2008), 69, http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/France_

English2008.pdf.

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104 | Aspects of Leadership

lack resources, providing resources can be part of that collective obligation. That is an equally fundamental cosmopolitan 

commitment.44

Cosmopolitanism is now widely spread throughout the world in 

the name of a duty to aid others, or “the responsibility to protect.” 

According to Jeremy Bentham, “[e]very man is bound to assist 

those who have need of assistance, if he can do it without exposing himself to sensible inconvenience.”45 Therefore, military 

leaders’ responsibility has broadened beyond the profession 

and the nation to include also the international community. Are 

French soldiers and UN peacekeepers expected to risk their lives 

to protect other peoples? Should military leaders accept and risk 

their troops’ lives to protect foreign citizens when deployed in 

peace-support operations? The cosmopolitan answer to these 

questions is yes. However, it is not clear whether French public 

opinion would always support such a view. French public opinion 

might have a limited tolerance for casualties, and its resilience 

might decrease as French troops’ deployment drags on and there 

might be a perception of diminishing chances of success.46

In addition, it is reasonable to explore what cost French public 

opinion is ready to pay in support of these missions. Michael 

Gross argues that “[a] nation in a position to help must determine whether costs are reasonable and whether it is willing to 

sacrifice some of its members to rescue others.”47 It is important 

to determine what would be considered “reasonable.” According 

to Gross, “[o]nly national defense can obligate individuals to risk 

44 Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, 163–64.

45 Jeremy Bentham, “Specimen of a Penal Code” in Works vol I, ed. J. Bowring 

(Edinburg: Tait, 1843), 164, cited in Michael L. Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern 

War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 215.

46 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, Paying the Human Costs 

of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton: 

Princeton University Press, 2009), 13.

47 Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War, 223.
their lives.”48 Yet in Gross’ view, if the nation decides to engage 

troops in humanitarian interventions, it must provide the best 

conditions possible to succeed and thus minimize, as much as 

possible, risks for its service members. 

French military leaders involved in the Uzbin ambush were 

charged as “individuals who . . . had not assumed their responsibilities . . . “ by “deliberately endangering the lives of others.”49

The fact that the intervention in Afghanistan was presented to the 

French public as a humanitarian mission led them to believe that 

French troops would face a negligible amount of hostility and violence. Humanitarian interventions are not “real wars,” and thus 

there is a mistaken perception that they will be missions without 

casualties. Political leaders’ responsibility and credibility are at 

stake. Very likely they use a moral argument to justify the use of 

military force. The humanitarian argument was used by former 

French President Nicolas Sarkozy to justify the intervention in 

Afghanistan. A translation of his speech following the Uzbin 

ambush reads, 

Because fighting here, in the Uzbin Valley in Afghanistan, the 

French must know it, [we are] protecting our democracies from 

terrorism. You defend here human rights, and in particular 

women[‘s] rights. Thanks to you, millions of Afghan children 

are attending school. Thanks to you, infant mortality has been 

reduced by a factor of three. . . . Even if the death toll is very 

heavy, be proud of what you are doing here.50

48 Ibid., 228.

49 Eight complaints, based on article 223-1 of the French Penal Code, have been 

registered at the Tribunal aux Armées de Paris (Paris Military Tribunal). See Agence 

France Presse, “Embuscade d’Uzbin: 6 nouvelles pliantes,” Le Figaro, 30 November 2009; and Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Plaintes d’Uzbin: le point de vue d’un 

magistrat et d’un avocat,” Secret Défense (blog), 29 October 2009, http://secretdefense.blogs.liberation.fr/defense/2009/10/plaintes-duzbin-le-point-de-vue-dunmagistrat.html. 

50 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic (speech, Kabul, Afghanistan, 

20 August 2008, http://www.elysee.fr/president/root/bank/pdf/president-2073.

pdf. (Author’s translation.)

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106 | Aspects of Leadership

This approach emphasizes the moral responsibility that French 

people are supposed to have toward other nations. The so-called 

responsibility to protect (R2P) was “first articulated by the independent International Commission on Intervention and State 

Sovereignty (ICISS) and refined and adopted at the 2005 World 

Summit.”51 R2P aims at preventing and stopping crimes such as 

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.52 However, several commentators have noted that R2P 

can be used as an excuse for violating state sovereignty. Seuma 

Milne considered the intervention in Libya, launched to “protect 

civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack in the 

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,”53 as a strong evidence of R2P abuse.54

Despite the fact that “Western armed forces have historically 

focused on and attempted to instill, nationalist sentiments—

mainly the protection and self-defense of physical integrity and 

rights of family, friends, and fellow nationals—as ideological incentives to fight,”55 they must also be prepared to accept the shift 

to cosmopolitan interventions. Indeed, humanitarian operations 

are now part of European Union missions, as stated in the Petersberg Tasks.56 These missions will continue to play an important 

51 Edward C. Luck, “The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early 

Promise?” Ethics & International Affairs 24 (2010), http://www.carnegiecouncil.

org/resources/journal/24_4/response/001.html?sourceDoc=002023.

52 Ibid.

53 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011, 

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.

pdf?OpenElement.

54 See Seumas Milne, “There’s Nothing Moral about NATO’s Intervention in 

Libya,” Guardian.co.uk, 23 March 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/nothing-moral-nato-intervention-libya; and Hany Besada, 

“Libya and R2P,” Thedailynewsegypt.com, 26 May 2011, http://thedailynewsegypt.

com/global-views/libya-and-r2p.html.

55 Daniel Blocq, “Western Soldiers and the Protection of Local Civilians in UN 

Peacekeeping Operations: Is a Nationalist Orientation in the Armed Forces Hindering Our Preparedness to Fight?” in Armed Forces & Society 36 (2010): 291.

56 Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 

19 June 1992, http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf.
role in foreign and security policy and will very likely grow in 

number. As a result, the risk that service members might die to 

protect foreigners will be high. Military leaders should be aware 

of these tasks and their consequences, so that they can explain 

them to their subordinates and be better prepared to advise their 

political leaders. The French white paper (the national strategy) 

stresses that,

Apart from the legality of military intervention, the question of 

its legitimacy has already been raised by the Secretary General 

of the United Nations and by the Security Council itself. This 

development concerns not only cases of “genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other grave violations of international humanitarian law,” 

where the “responsibility to protect” falls in the last resort on 

the international community. It also applies to “threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”57

France, like the other countries, has a significant responsibility 

toward the international community. This is due to the fact that 

France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and 

other important international organizations. 

Conclusion

The role of leadership is multifaceted and complex particularly 

when responsibilities are confused and poorly defined. The new 

international environment, which leads to new expectations, 

modern conflicts, citizens’ lack of interest in politics, and the manipulation of moral arguments to justify the use of force, have 

made military leadership significantly more complex.

In addition, military leaders often take responsibilities that go 

beyond their traditional role of defending the nation and national 

57 French White Paper on Defence and National Security, 107, http://merln.ndu.

edu/whitepapers/France_English2008.pdf.

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108 | Aspects of Leadership

interests. The call for cosmopolitanism has generated confusion 

and doubts about the role the armed forces are supposed to play. 

Used to defending their nation’s interests, military leaders are 

now facing risks associated with the protection of people all over 

the world. Meanwhile, public opinion has expectations that lives 

will be saved, not only among their own country’s troops, but also 

among enemy troops and particularly among civilians.

Commanders and their troops are asked to fight ethically in wars 

that might be morally questionable. They are expected to save 

lives in violent conflicts presented as humanitarian, which erroneously implies a low level of violence, for the most part, to the 

population. In order to generate public opinion support, political leaders do not hesitate to resort to a rhetoric that might lead 

people to believe that casualties are just a minor occurrence in 

modern conflicts. Military leaders are thus supposed to wage and 

win wars without casualties.

The reality of war, however, is significantly different from this 

portrayal. Wars, even those conducted for humanitarian reasons, 

are uncertain and often costly for human life. Canadian Army 

Lieutenant Colonel Richard Walker notes that “within command 

responsibility resides the three-way command-harm dilemma: 

the mission vs. risk to our soldiers vs. risk to innocent civilians. 

The decision process may start with is it legal? And if legal, is it 

moral or ethical?”58

Military leaders are aware that in order to accomplish their missions they will often have to choose among risking their troops, 

the enemy troops, and in several cases innocent civilians. The 

choice they will face will rarely be an easy one. Then they will 

be held responsible, at least morally, for the casualties they might 

cause or suffer.

58 Richard J. Walker, Duty with Discernment: CLS Guidance on Ethics in Operations (Ottawa: National Defence Strategic Edition, 2009), http://www.army.forces.

gc.ca/land-terre/downloads-telechargements/aep-peat/duty-servrir/duty-servrireng.pdf.
Indeed, the political/strategic decision to use military force must 

remain under the exclusive control of the nation through its representatives, yet the outcomes—and thus the responsibility of 

commanders’ decisions to use force at the tactical and operational 

level—must be shared between military and political leaders. In 

France, the parliament is the legitimate authority to decide when 

to use military force. Citizens must then be reminded that through 

their participation in political life, they play a decisive role in the 

nation’s policy making; as a result, they hold a collective responsibility for the use of military force decided by their representatives. 

In addition, the objectives of military interventions must be clearly 

and honestly explained to citizens and to service members. This 

would reduce the moral gap between public opinion and the military and strengthen support for the troops that are often deployed 

in a hostile environment. Political leaders should be committed to 

properly informing people about the context, the stakes, and the 

risks associated with each intervention, especially when they are 

conducted for humanitarian purposes.

Political leaders will continue to defend their nation’s direct interests and their own population; however, this should not prevent 

them from assuming even greater responsibility. They might take 

a cosmopolitan approach to foreign policy. Yet cosmopolitanism 

should not be used to cover the pursuit of national interests. The 

real intent, when using force, should never be hidden behind 

moral arguments, such as humanitarian motives, as they blur the 

reason given to service members’ commitment and create strong 

and/or false expectations among the public. 

Political leaders’ responsibility toward the world should be 

seen as the outcome of two factors: the defense of indirect national interests and the protection of foreign peoples. These two 

factors must meet two requirements. First, they should not add 

Blurred Responsibilities | 109
110 | Aspects of Leadership

an unnecessary and heavy burden on the country’s military, and 

second, the nation’s public opinion must be supportive of such a 

commitment.

Indeed, the nation and its people must be placed at the core of any 

decision that might consider military action and the use of force. 

In France, this key element of a functioning democracy has been 

neglected, and today the parliament has no weight in the decision 

to deploy troops, which is exclusively under the control of the 

executive branch. 

In conclusion, responsibility is indeed a key element of military 

leadership. Military leaders must take responsibility toward the 

profession, the nation, and the world. However, their ability to do 

so might be seriously compromised if a significant distance exists 

between them, the country’s political leadership, and public 

opinion. Now, more than ever, it is necessary to move the three 

circles of the remarkable trinity closer to each other. 
On 19 October 2008, a Canadian army captain working with the 

Afghan National Army fired two rounds into a gravely wounded 

Taliban fighter. Although shooting the man was a violation of the 

law of armed conflict, Canadian criminal law, and the Canadian 

military’s code of conduct, the captain’s misconduct was not reported by the three Canadian soldiers who were present that day 

and only became public when an Afghan interpreter reported the 

incident weeks later.1 Like most modern militaries, the Canadian 

forces have regulations that require members to report unlawful 

behavior, but in this instance, the soldiers ignored these rules and 

kept quiet, perhaps to protect their captain, to protect themselves 

from reprisals, or for some other reason. This episode is similar to 

other incidents of military misconduct in which personnel witness 

transgressions but keep quiet. For example, a generation earlier, 

in 1992, soldiers of the Canadian airborne regiment set ablaze the 

personal vehicles of two unit leaders, a captain and a sergeant, 

and then formed a wall of silence when authorities tried to iden1 The captain was later convicted of “disgraceful conduct” by a military court 

and dismissed from the Canadian Forces. Michael Friscolanti, “A Soldier’s 

Choice,” Maclean’s Magazine 24 May 2010, 20–25, http://www2.macleans.

ca/2010/05/18/a-soldiers-choice/; Michael Friscolanti and John Geddes, “A Stern 

Message about Battlefield Ethics and the ‘Soldier’s Pact’,” Maclean’s Magazine, 2 

August 2010, 28–30, http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/07/26/a-stern-message/.

When Loyalty to Comrades 

Conflicts with Military Duty

J. Peter Bradley

—111—
112 | Aspects of Leadership

tify the culprits.2 More recently in 2003 and 2004, plenty of U.S. 

soldiers knew of the mistreatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, 

but only a few reported the abuse.3 Likewise, when soldiers of 

the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division raped a 14-year-old Iraqi 

girl in 2006 and then executed her and her family, several months 

passed before other unit members reported those responsible for 

the atrocities.4

Incidents like these are examples of “military duty-personal 

loyalty dilemmas,” situations in which the demands of military 

duty collide with personal loyalty to unit mates. In such cases, 

military personnel witness the misconduct of their comrades or 

learn about it later and are then faced with the problem of deciding whether to report the incident as required by their military 

duty or to protect their comrades by keeping quiet. Such dilemmas happen more often than we realize. Some cases become wellknown and can have vast implications, such as U.S. Army Specialist Joe Darby’s decision to report the abuse of Iraqi detainees 

at Abu Ghraib.5 Other cases are more banal, like a soldier who 

witnesses a comrade accidently fire his weapon and then must 

decide whether to report the misconduct or not. 

Given the significance the military places on good order and discipline, it is important that military men and women have the moral 

competence to intervene when wrongdoing is occurring or to 

report the misconduct if they are unable to intervene. When military personnel ignore the misdeeds of others, the abuses continue, 

cover-ups occur, and the military profession is diminished. Very 

little has been written on this issue, so the purpose of this chapter 

2 David Bercuson, Significant Incident: Canada’s Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), 212, 224.

3 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil

(New York: Random House, 2007), 330, 360.

4 Jim Frederick, Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle 

of Death (New York: Harmony Books, 2010), 323.

5 Seymour M. Hersh, “Torture at Abu Ghraib,” The New Yorker, 10 May 2004.
is to show how relevant elements of social science theory and research can help us understand why military personnel ignore the 

illegal, unprofessional, or immoral conduct of their unit mates. 

As much as possible, this analysis draws on published research to 

explain the forces involved in these duty-loyalty dilemmas. There 

is still much to be learned in this area, so suggestions for additional research are also included. The chapter has three objectives: (1) 

to highlight what is currently known about the factors involved 

in the decision to report (or not) the misconduct of military comrades; (2) to identify areas of further research so we can better 

understand the forces involved; and (3) to suggest actions that 

military forces can take to encourage more reporting of military 

misconduct. 

The Military Duty-Personal Loyalty Dilemma

The duty-loyalty dilemma can occur in an instant or unfold 

slowly over time. In the rapid version of the dilemma, service 

members witness a comrade doing something illegal, unprofessional, or immoral, and then find themselves with a difficult decision to make: What do I do? Do I intervene to stop this behavior 

from happening or do I keep quiet? Because the event occurs in a 

matter of minutes, or even seconds, the observer has little time to 

think or act. If the observer has not been prepared for such challenges, he or she may succumb to the influences of the moment 

and act on impulse without much thought. In the more protracted 

version of the dilemma, the witnessing military member either 

saw the violation and did not take action at the time or learned 

of the misconduct afterwards. Even though the observer did not, 

for one reason or another, intervene at the time of the misconduct, 

he or she is still faced with a dilemma after the fact—to report the 

violation or to keep quiet.

Loyalty and Military Duty | 113
114 | Aspects of Leadership

When viewed from a professional or a moral perspective, the 

dilemma does not seem very complicated. It basically involves 

two obligations that are in conflict. First, military personnel have 

a duty to stop illegal actions from happening or to report them if 

they did not stop them earlier. Second, the same military personnel may feel obliged to help their comrades—or at least to avoid 

harming them—and to report an infraction would likely lead to 

harm of some sort, perhaps in the form of disciplinary action or a 

reprimand from a supervisor. 

Some readers of this chapter might suggest that the question 

to report or not in such a situation does not qualify as a moral 

dilemma per se because a moral dilemma requires conflicting 

moral obligations; in this instance, there is only one moral obligation, the professional duty to report the unlawful activity. Strictly 

speaking, an individual has no moral obligation to protect a colleague who has committed a violation, so the military duty-personal loyalty dilemmas I have described here may not qualify as 

bona fide moral dilemmas. Instead, they may be closer to what 

Coleman calls “tests of integrity,” situations “where it is reasonably obvious, or even perfectly obvious, what the right thing to do 

is, but for whatever reason, it is difficult for the person involved to 

actually do the right thing.”6

Coleman’s distinction between tests of ethics (i.e., moral dilemmas) and tests of integrity provides a degree of conceptual clarity 

that is useful at a theoretical level (and is also valuable in the ethics 

classroom), but this distinction may be less helpful to individuals who have to make these choices in the heat of the moment. 

Indeed, some service members may believe that supporting their 

comrades is the right thing to do in these instances. The emotional and social pressures involved in tests of integrity can be so 

6 Stephen Coleman, “The Problems of Duty and Loyalty,” Journal of Military 

Ethics 8 (2009): 106.
overwhelming that an individual facing a duty-loyalty dilemma 

can easily misinterpret the situation as an ethical obligation, demanding that his or her unit mates be supported. Of course, this 

is speculation, but there is a vast body of research showing that 

individuals often think they are making sound decisions when 

they are actually making poor choices.7

Research shows that individuals employ two types of decision 

making to solve problems: (1) rapid, intuitive reasoning and (2) 

slower, more deliberate reasoning.8 Studies also show that the 

rapid approach is most often used in solving moral dilemmas 

because individuals typically respond to moral questions very 

quickly with the first idea that comes to their mind.9 Clearly, there 

is a role here for ethics training and education to ensure that an 

ethical response comes quickly to a service member’s mind. Ethics 

training that emphasizes professional obligations (so personnel 

will know what is expected of them) and decision-making procedures (so they will know how to reason through moral dilemmas) 

would be helpful not only with more deliberate decision-making 

tasks, but the same procedures can be trained to the point that 

they become almost instinctual in order for military personnel 

to respond quickly and correctly when unanticipated dilemmas 

occur.

The Police Code of Silence

The military is not the only institution in which individuals must 

wrestle with conflicts between professional duty and loyalty to 

7 Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not By Me): Why 

We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts (Orlando, FL: Harcourt 

Books, 2007).

8 Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 

xvi.

9 Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 

Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108 (2001): 814–34. 

Loyalty and Military Duty | 115
116 | Aspects of Leadership

comrades. Police officers have been known to look the other way, 

falsify police reports, and lie in court to cover the misconduct of 

other police officers.10 Of course, the military and police communities are not identical,11 but they are similar enough to warrant 

comparison: each has a clear chain of command, uniforms, rules 

for employing force, and members of each community operate 

in dangerous environments which, in turn, promote reliance on 

comrades and little mixing with outsiders. Therefore, research 

showing how and why police officers overlook collegial misconduct may provide some insights to the military. 

The practice of police officers protecting other police is so common 

that there are terms for it: “The Code,” “The Code of Silence,” 

“The Blue Curtain”12 and the “Blue Wall of Silence.”13 The code is 

not a myth; it “is well documented in court opinions, scholarly literature, news reports, and police investigatory mission reports.”14

Moreover, it is a worldwide problem.15 Within the United States, 

several large-scale investigations have confirmed that the code 

is a significant part of police corruption.16 The prevalence of the 

code is well illustrated in two surveys of American police officers. In the first, 52 percent of the respondents agreed that “it is 

not unusual for a police officer to turn a blind eye to improper 

conduct by other officers” and 61 percent disagreed with the state10 Gabriel Chin and Scott Wells, “The ‘Blue Wall of Silence’ as Evidence of Bias 

and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury,” University of Pittsburgh 

Law Review 59 (1997–98): 234.

11 Thomas J. Cowper, “The Myth of the ‘Military Model’ of Leadership in Law 

Enforcement,” Police Quarterly 3 (2000): 228–46.

12 Carl B. Klockers, Sanja K. Ivkovich, William E. Harver, and Maria R. Haberfeld., The Measurement of Police Integrity (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice 2000), 1, www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181465.pdf.

13 Chin and Wells, “Blue Wall of Silence,” 233.

14 Ibid, 238–40.

15 Rick Sarre, Dilip K. Das, and H.J. Albrecht, Policing Corruption: International 

Perspectives (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005).

16 Jerome H. Skolnick, “Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence,” in Policing 

Corruption: International Perspectives, 303.
ment “police officers always report serious criminal violations involving abuse of authority by fellow officers.”17 In another study 

of 1,116 full-time police officers in the United States, researchers 

found that 46 percent “had witnessed misconduct by another employee but took no action.”18

The code persists because of police loyalty and fear of retaliation.19

Police officers submit to the code of silence for many practical 

reasons such as to avoid “being shunned, losing friends, having 

no one to work with, losing backup support, harassment, physical threats, permanent stigmatization, and exposure of one’s own 

misconduct.”20 The code of silence is also promoted by a subculture of loyalty and protecting colleagues, which in turn, is created 

by the inherent danger of the job, the closed nature of the police 

community, prying media, and unsympathetic outsiders.21 Police 

officers are first exposed to this subculture at the beginning of 

their careers, in the academy. 

Not all police officers, however, live by the code all the time. Research shows that police officers are more likely to report the violations of other police if they are employed in supervisory roles 

or serve in larger organizations.22 These results may be due to 

the fact that senior personnel usually have more knowledge about 

what is required by the organization, more commitment to the or17 David Weisburd and Rosann Greenspan, “Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of 

Authority: Findings from a National Study,” The National Institute of Justice Research in Brief, May 2000, 5, www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181312.pdf.

18 Neal Trautman, “Police Code of Silence Facts Revealed” (paper presented at the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police: Legal Officers’ Section, 2000), http://

www.aele.org/loscode2000.html.

19 Gary R. Rothwell and J. Norman Baldwin, “Whistle-Blowing and the Code of 

Silence in Police Agencies: Policy and Structural Predictors,” Crime & Delinquency

53 (2007): 607–8.

20 J.H. Skolnick, “Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence,” in Contemporary 

Issues in Law Enforcement and Policing, eds. Andrew Millie and Dilip K. Das (Boca 

Raton FL: CRC Press, 2008), 306.

21 Rothwell and Baldwin, “Whistle-Blowing,” 612.

22 Chin and Wells, “The Blue Wall,” 250; Skolnik, “Corruption,” 46.

Loyalty and Military Duty | 117
118 | Aspects of Leadership

ganization, and more to lose if they don’t take correct action. Regardless, the research suggests that the issue of police silence may 

be more serious among less experienced officers in smaller units. 

Because smaller units may be more cohesive, they may also have 

stronger norms for not reporting the infractions of others. Moreover, smaller units provide fewer places for officers who might 

be contemplating reporting to find refuge from the retaliation of 

colleagues. 

While police officers have a reputation for remaining silent about 

the misconduct of colleagues, they are not alone in this regard. 

A study of 197 police officers and 168 public employees working 

in the state of Georgia revealed that the civilian employees were 

less likely to report violations of misconduct than the police officers surveyed in the same study.23 Unsatisfactory colleagues are 

also tolerated in other occupations. For example, “doctors often 

overlook the deadly faults of the most marginal members of their 

profession . . . and just about any teacher knows colleagues who 

should not be in a classroom, but have been, for years, without a 

meaningful professional objection raised.”24

Given the parallels between the military and police communities, it seems logical to find some military members behaving like 

police officers by keeping silent about the misconduct of comrades. What is perhaps more surprising is that so little is known 

about military silence in this area when so much is known about 

the police code of silence. Clearly, the military code of silence is 

an issue that merits further research. 

23 Gary R. Rothwell and J. Norman Baldwin, “Ethical Climates and Contextual 

Predictors of Whistleblowing,” Review of Public Personnel Administration 26 (September 2006): 216–44.

24 Patrick O’Hara, Why Law Enforcement Organizations Fail (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005), 141.
Whistle-Blowing in the Military

Individuals who report the misconduct of others are called whistleblowers,25 but sometimes they are given more disparaging labels 

like “snitch,” “squealer,” or “rat,” terms that convey the contempt 

others can have for whistle-blowers. Unfortunately, while there 

is very little empirical research on whistle-blowing in the military, one study—the only published study of its kind—showed 

shocking results. Employing a variety of research methods (e.g., 

surveys, interviews, focus groups), the Mental Health Advisory 

Team IV (MHAT IV) studied the attitudes of U.S. soldiers and 

Marines serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2006. Of primary 

interest is the reluctance of the soldiers and Marines in the study 

to report battlefield misconduct.26 Shown in figure 4, the results 

indicate that only 55 percent of the soldiers and 40 percent of the 

Marines would report a unit member for injuring or killing an 

innocent noncombatant. These results are startling when one considers that injuring and killing noncombatants are violations of 

the laws of war and contravene the moral codes of the U.S. armed 

forces.

When asked in the comfort and safety of the MHAT IV research 

setting, slightly less than half of the respondents said they would 

not report the wrongdoings of a unit comrade. But what would 

they actually do if faced with a situation in which a unit comrade 

had just injured a noncombatant or committed the other infractions listed in figure 4? Would they take the proper professional 

action of reporting the misconduct or would they keep silent? 

There is no way of knowing for certain, but one can expect, from 

25 An internal whistle-blower is someone who reports a violation through existing 

(i.e., internal) organizational channels, while an external whistle-blower reports the 

wrongdoing to authorities outside the organization, like the media, government, 

or police.

26 Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, 

Final Report, 17 November 2006, http://i.a.cnn.net/cnn/2007/images/05/04/

mhat.iv.report.pdf.

Loyalty and Military Duty | 119
120 | Aspects of Leadership

research mentioned earlier, that many of the respondents would 

make the choice very quickly, based on intuition, gut feeling, or 

first impression.27 When viewed this way, the MHAT IV results 

may be helpful in predicting what the respondents would actually do, for the answer that came to the minds of almost 50 percent 

of the respondents was not to report the incident. If not reporting is the default decision for almost half the respondents in a 

research setting, it is unlikely that larger numbers would report 

the wrongdoings when presented with the choice in real life. 

Another question that emerges from the MHAT IV study is 

whether these results are unique to U.S. military members. How 

would the military men and women of other countries respond to 

the same questions? Would British, French, or Canadian service 

members be more (or less) inclined than their American counterparts to report the misconduct of their comrades? Again, there 

is no way of knowing for certain without conducting the same 

study in these countries, but it is possible that the results would 

be similar. To the extent that military culture has common characteristics shared across different nations—conservatism, focus 

27 Haidt, “The Emotional Dog.”

I would report a unit member for

OIF 05-07

Soldiers

Marines

30

43

34

47

35

46

32

46

33

50

40

55

0 50 100

Injuring or killing an innocent non-combatant

Stealing from a non-combatant

Mistreatment of a non-combatant

Not following general orders

Violating ROEs

Unnecessarily destroying private property

Percent Agree or Strongly Agree

Figure 4. OIF 2005-07 Soldier and Marine Reporting of Battlefield Ethics 

Violations (from MHAT IV Final Report).
on order, discipline, and control come to mind—and to the extent 

that these factors influence the attitudes of military members, 

we could see similar results. However, there may be differences 

among the military cultures of nations as well, caused by factors 

such as the intensity of the operations the nation’s forces are currently involved in (i.e., military personnel who are fighting wars 

are likely to be more aggressive than those in peacekeeping operations), the leadership styles promoted within the nation’s forces, 

and the nation’s cultural tolerance for violence and diversity.

Perhaps the most important question posed by the results in 

figure 4 is why the respondents reported as they did. The ethical 

violations in figure 4 are listed in descending order of harm to 

others, and the rates of reporting are lower as we move down 

the list. This suggests that respondents were using some sort of 

internal scale for deciding whether an offence should be reported 

or not. If this is the case, where did this scale come from? Are the 

responses based on individuals’ own personal criteria or norms 

that are promoted within their section, platoon, or company? We 

see that the lowest rate of reporting, 43 percent of soldiers and 

30 percent of Marines, was obtained for unnecessarily destroying 

property, the least harmful act on the list. Clearly, most of the respondents felt that violations of private property were not serious 

enough to report. 

The MHAT IV research on attitudes about battlefield ethics is a 

novel and important study that reveals how little we understand 

about the perceptions and motivations of military personnel on 

the issue of reporting professional misconduct. 

What Happens to Whistle-Blowers?

The obvious reluctance to report the violations listed in figure 4 

might have less to do with the type of misconduct and more to 

Loyalty and Military Duty | 121
122 | Aspects of Leadership

do with the personal consequences of reporting. A perusal of the 

research on civilian whistle-blowers shows that the personal cost 

of reporting the misdeeds of others can be high. One study of 394 

civilian internal and external whistle-blowers found that approximately two-thirds of those surveyed “lost their job or were forced 

to retire (69 percent), received negative job performance evaluations (64 percent), had work more closely monitored by supervisors (68 percent), were criticized or avoided by coworkers (69 

percent), [or] were blacklisted from getting another job in their 

field (64 percent).”28 In addition to the retaliation they experienced on the job, many whistle-blowers in this study also suffered 

mental health problems like “severe depression or anxiety (84 

percent), feelings of isolation and powerlessness (84 percent), distrust of others (78 percent), declining physical health (69 percent), 

severe financial decline (66 percent), and problems with family relations (53 percent).”29 Although there are no equivalent studies in 

the military sector, one might expect that military whistle-blowers 

would suffer similar consequences. 

Like the respondents in the police research described earlier, some 

military personnel may keep quiet about misconduct in their 

units because they are afraid of possible retaliation. This was the 

case with U.S. Army Specialist Adam Winfield, a soldier in the 5th 

Stryker Brigade, who was reluctant to go along with his comrades 

and squad leader in their scheme to kill innocent Afghan noncombatants. Adam’s sergeant and a few squad members had already 

killed several innocent Afghan men and then fabricated evidence 

to make it appear as though the shootings were lawful killings 

of insurgents. When word spread through the platoon that he 

was thinking about reporting the killings to authorities, Winfield was ostracized by his fellow soldiers and threatened by the 

28 Joyce Rothschild and Terance Miethe, “Whistle-Blower Disclosures and 

Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information about Organization 

Corruption,” Work and Occupations 26 (1999): 120.

29 Ibid., 121.
squad leader. The atmosphere in the platoon became so bad that 

“he was hoping he’d get blown up and just end this mess.”30 In a 

similar case, Private Justin Watt was worried about the possibility of retaliation when he was thinking about turning in his 101st 

Airborne Division mates for the rape and murder of a 14-year-old 

Iraqi girl and her family. He was convinced that the misconduct 

should be reported, but he “was terrified for his safety. . . . If these 

dudes would kill a kid, he thought, why wouldn’t they kill the 

soldier who snitched?”31

Military Culture

There are a number of influences within military culture that may 

make military personnel reluctant to report the misconduct of 

their comrades. Many of these influences flow from the military’s 

need for members to cooperate with one another, a key component of unit efficiency. Unfortunately, some of the social processes 

employed to strengthen unit effectiveness also weaken individual 

responsibility.

Unit cohesion is a central element of military culture. It is built 

upon peer bonding that is actively encouraged in the military. A 

military member learns early in his or her career that success or 

failure—indeed life or death—depend in large measure on the 

willingness of comrades to come to his or her aid when needed. 

As a result, the intense bonding that occurs in military units can 

lead service members to value peer relations over most other considerations. In fact, the lateral bonds holding peers together can 

be stronger than the vertical bonds between military personnel 

and their leaders. This, in turn, can lead to problems, as the path 

for passing “the professional ethic” to junior personnel is from 

leader to follower, not peer to peer.

30 Luke Mogelson, “A Beast in the Heart of Every Fighting Man,” The New York 

Times Magazine, 1 May 2011, 41.

31 Frederick, Black Hearts, 322.

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124 | Aspects of Leadership

When comparing the responses in figure 4, there is an indication 

that social cohesion may have had some impact on the views of 

the respondents. It is impossible to know for certain why the U.S. 

Marines who completed the MHAT IV survey were less inclined 

than the soldiers to report violations committed by unit comrades, but it may have been due to the influence of unit cohesion. Members of cohesive units stick together more, both in their 

actions and attitudes, and the Marine Corps has a reputation as a 

particularly cohesive force.

The decision to report or not may also be influenced to some 

extent by careerism. Even though military culture emphasizes 

teamwork, it is individuals who are rewarded with promotions 

and medals, rarely teams, so a self-serving ethic is also fostered 

in the military. Most personnel want to advance in rank and they 

quickly learn that the way to progress is to do one’s work well, 

get along with everyone, and conform to unit norms. Few military 

personnel would view reporting on comrades, which might jeopardize their colleagues or their units, as the kind of behavior that 

leads to personal success.

Military life can have a transformative effect on the mind-set of 

the service member because of social processes like conformity, 

deindividuation, the bystander effect, and groupthink, which 

abound in the military environment. Service members who are 

susceptible to these group pressures are particularly vulnerable 

when presented with military duty-personal loyalty dilemmas 

because these processes can erode their personal agency to the 

point that they readily accept the norms and influences generated 

by their unit mates.

People are naturally inclined to conform to the actions of others 

when placed together in groups,32 and military socialization is 

32 Eliot Aronson, The Social Animal, 9th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2004), 

20.
particularly effective at getting service members to conform to 

unit norms.33 The strength of unit cohesion is well illustrated in 

the following quote from a Canadian soldier:

You have a bond. You have a bond that is so thick that it is unbelievable! It’s the pull, it’s the team, the work as a team, the team 

spirit! I don’t think that ever leaves a guy. . . . And that’s the 

whole motivation, that when somebody says we want you to do 

something, then you’ll do it. You’ll do it because of the team, for 

the team and because the team has the same focus.34

Through the process of deindividuation, some military members 

become so absorbed by their small unit that they cast aside their 

own sense of right and wrong for the norms embraced by the 

group. Some of the junior soldiers who participated in the abuses 

at Abu Ghraib, and were later prosecuted for their actions (e.g., 

Private Lynndie England), undoubtedly fall into this category.35

The bystander effect, a concept that accounts for how people can 

observe harmful events without intervening, helps explain the 

reluctance of service members to take proper action, particularly 

in novel situations for which they feel unprepared. Many individuals are unwilling to take action that deviates from the group, 

and military personnel, like most people, will observe others for 

cues as to how to act in ambiguous situations. If no one is taking 

action, they won’t either. The bystander effect has been invoked to 

explain the misconduct of soldiers of the elite Canadian Airborne 

Regiment during operations in Somalia in 1993. Two paratroopers 

of the regiment were in a bunker torturing and beating a Somali 

teenager to death while other members of the regiment, within 

earshot of the abuse, continued on with their daily activities. It is 

33 Gwynne Dyer, War: The New Edition (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2005), 

31–53.

34 D. Harrison and L. Laliberte, No Life Like It: Military Wives in Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1994), 28.

35 Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect, 367.

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estimated that up to 17 members of the unit entered the bunker 

and saw what was happening, but no one tried to stop it.36

Finally, “groupthink” emerges when members of a group are 

more concerned about maintaining harmonious relations within 

the group than doing the right thing.37 Groupthink is typically associated with the failures of higher-level leadership teams like the 

decision makers behind the failed Bay of Pigs operation38 and the 

Challenger space shuttle disaster,39 but it can operate in military 

squads and platoons as well. Groupthink thrives when people 

keep their dissenting views to themselves and go along with the 

prevailing mood of the group. Therefore, any service member 

who observes his teammates engaged in misconduct and does not 

speak up is contributing to groupthink. 

Taken together, the elements of military culture and social processes outlined above are potent forces that can induce military 

personnel to go along with their peers, for good or bad. What 

makes these influences even more powerful is their elusive nature, 

for many military personnel caught in their grasp are simply 

unaware that their attitudes and behavior are being shaped by 

these subtle forces. 

Is Military Loyalty Misplaced?

One way to view service members’ choices to protect comrades 

over fulfilling their military duty is to characterize these choices 

36 George Shorey, “Bystander Non-Intervention and the Somalia Incident,” Canadian Military Journal 1 (Winter 2000–01), 24, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/

vo1/no4/index-eng.asp.

37 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

38 Roderick M. Kramer, “Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 

Years Later: How Well Has the Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?” 

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73 (1998): 236–71.

39 James K. Esser and Joanne S. Lindoerfer, “Groupthink and the Space Shuttle 

Challenger Accident: Toward a Quantitative Case Analysis,” Journal of Behavioral 

Decision Making 2 (1989): 167–77.
as misplaced loyalty. But according to an insightful article by Peter 

Olsthoorn, this type of choice should be expected because it is 

consistent with the model of loyalty practiced within the military. 

Olsthoorn argues that military personnel tend to value loyalty to 

comrades and their military unit over allegiance to the professional ideals espoused in military manuals.40 Of course, this is an 

assertion that stands to be empirically validated, but those who 

have observed military affairs up close would likely endorse Olsthoorn’s hypothesis. It certainly explains behavior we see in some 

theaters of operation, such as the tendency of Western military 

personnel to place greater emphasis on the safety of their comrades (i.e., force protection) than the safety of indigenous noncombatants, even though the military profession espouses legal 

and ethical protections for noncombatants. This view of the military model of loyalty is apparent in an article by Thomas Smith 

showing how a unit of American soldiers interpreted their rules 

of engagement during checkpoint operations in order to maximize force protection at the expense of noncombatant immunity.41

It should come as no surprise that service members have more 

regard for their comrades than for outsiders. Both in the general 

population and in social science circles, it is well known that our 

self-esteem and sense of well-being are related to the quality of relationships we have with others we value.42 People naturally strive 

to get along with others and fear of social rejection motivates us 

to cooperate with our colleagues, friends, and other people who 

are important to us. This behavior has evolutionary origins, for it 

served our ancestors well in the past when the group’s survival 

depended on the collective effort of comrades. Because humans 

40 Peter Olsthoorn, “Loyalty and Professionalization in the Military,” in New Wars 

and New Soldiers: Military Ethics in the Contemporary World, ed. P. Tripodi and J. 

Wolfendale (Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2011), 262.

41 Thomas W. Smith, “Protecting Civilians . . . or Soldiers? Humanitarian Law 

and the Economy of Risk in Iraq,” International Studies Perspectives 9 (2008): 154.

42 Aronson, The Social Animal, see the chapter on conformity.

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128 | Aspects of Leadership

tend to favor the members of their own group over nonmembers, 

it is an easy transition for military recruits to cooperate with unit 

mates, and military personnel soon learn to value the lives of their 

comrades over the lives of others, even though (as pointed out by 

Olsthoorn) ethicists like Michael Walzer maintain that all people 

have equal worth.43 The result is that unit loyalty often trumps 

professional ideals in military matters. 

Group work has been hardwired into us over the millennia because 

of its social utility, but it now undermines our desire to be ethical 

toward outsiders. How do we then overcome our natural inclination to treat insiders better than outsiders? A possible remedy is to 

expand our notion of group identity to a broader, more inclusive 

group—call it humanity—but this is difficult to do, particularly 

when members of the out-group are shooting at us or supporting 

those who are shooting. We will return to this topic later. 

Research

So far we have seen that (1) there are some cases of military personnel not reporting the misconduct of their comrades; (2) the 

issue is a major problem in police culture; (3) civilians who report 

the misdeeds of their coworkers usually suffer harmful consequences; and (4) some aspects of military culture likely contribute 

to nonreporting. That said, the analysis in this chapter has been 

speculative, based on my personal impressions—formed over 33 

years of military service—one empirical study in the military, and 

findings from police research whose results may not apply entirely to the military environment. While there are indications that 

military personnel turn a blind eye to the misconduct of comrades 

on occasion, it is not clear how widespread this is, so we need 

to investigate further to see if there is indeed a problem before 

seeking potential solutions. Any actions the military institution 

takes on this issue should be based on evidence, not opinion, so I 

43 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 156–58.
suggest a program of empirical research that focuses on two levels 

of analysis: military members (e.g., attributes and perceptions) 

and the characteristics of the environments in which they work.

At the individual level, the research should investigate the extent 

to which nonreporting occurs in order to determine the extent of 

the problem, and, if there is a problem, to determine whether the 

issue is one of understanding (not knowing what should be reported or how to report) or will (lacking the motivation to report 

misconduct). This line of inquiry should be conducted with military personnel of different ranks from both the enlisted and officer 

corps. The research could employ surveys, interviews, focus 

groups, or experiments, but the results would be more conclusive 

if several of these methods were used. Here are some questions 

that could guide this research: 

• Have military personnel observed violations (of the law 

and military codes of conduct) in the past? Have they reported these violations? Why or why not? What were the 

consequences for those who reported? Do those who have 

reported (and those who did not) have any regrets about 

their decision?

• How do reporters of wrongdoing differ from nonreporters? 

What are the personal characteristics of those who report 

and those who do not (i.e., age, rank, education, training, 

etc.)?

• Do military personnel know which misconduct should be 

reported? For example, should x, y, z violations of your nation’s military code be reported up the chain of command? 

What types of misconduct do they think should be reported? Which misdeeds should not be reported? Why do some 

types of misconduct warrant reporting and others do not?

• How likely are military personnel to report misconduct?

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• Do military personnel know how to report (i.e., who to 

report to, when, and how)?

• Why would military personnel want (or not want) to report 

misconduct? What are the factors and influences that might 

lead them to report? Are there circumstances that might 

alter what or when they report? Are military personnel not 

reporting the violations of others because of fear of retaliation? Are other motivations involved?

• How do military personnel think their unit mates would 

view someone who reported misconduct? What actions 

might other military personnel take against someone who 

reported misconduct?

• Are military personnel more vulnerable to the bystander 

effect and groupthink than others?

• To what extent do unit characteristics like cohesion, climate, 

leadership, and such play a role? For example, (A) are military personnel in cohesive units more or less inclined to 

report misconduct?; (B) how does the ethical climate of a 

military unit affect whether its members will report misconduct?; (C) how do the impressions of military personnel about their unit leaders affect whether unit members 

are disposed to report misconduct?; and (D) how do other 

unit characteristics (unit type, size, mission, etc.) relate to a 

member’s likelihood to report misconduct?

• Is the code of silence encouraged by some aspects of military 

culture? What characteristics of military culture support 

nonreporting? What characteristics of military culture encourage reporting?

This list of research questions is not exhaustive. Other questions 

will surface as researchers think more about the issues and still 

others will emerge when researchers begin discussing the subject 
with military members (e.g., in focus groups and/or interview 

sessions).

At the environmental level, research should explore the impact 

that military units, training schools, and mission-specific factors 

have on the inclination of personnel to report misconduct. Studies 

should be conducted in different types of units (combat, support, 

administrative) to see what effect, if any, unit type has as well. 

Given the research evidence showing that the seeds of the police 

code of silence are planted in the academy, studies should also 

be conducted with candidates on recruit and occupation training courses to determine if attitudes about reporting (or not) are 

formed early in one’s exposure to military culture. It is also possible that attitudes about reporting may vary according to the type 

of operations service members are engaged in, therefore the effect 

of mission-specific factors (e.g., combat intensity, stressors, etc.) 

should be explored as well.

Interventions

A research program based on questions like those listed above 

will show if there is actually a problem within the military of personnel not reporting the misconduct of comrades. If a problem is 

identified at the individual level, the results will show if it is due 

to lack of knowledge (what to do and how to do it) or insufficient 

motivation (commitment to taking proper action). This information will help in the development of potential interventions. For 

example, gaps in knowledge can be addressed with further training on regulations and procedures, as well as training on how 

to analyze a duty-loyalty dilemma to select the correct course of 

action. Gaps in motivation can be treated with more emphasis 

on professional identity and obligations, as well as training on 

the social and situational influences that can prevent people from 

taking proper action. Similarly, if a problem is identified at the 

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132 | Aspects of Leadership

environmental level, special training and policies can be designed 

for those types of units that need it. While the research outlined 

above is critical for determining what needs to be done, we can 

be confident that instruction in three areas—professionalism, psychosocial influences, and military loyalty—will be helpful.

Professionalism 

Police research found that senior officers in supervisory roles were 

more likely to report misconduct, probably because it was part of 

their role and therefore expected of them. Enhancing the professional identity of junior military personnel could have a similar 

effect. Impressing on service members that they have a responsibility to intervene when their colleagues misbehave could make 

them less inclined to protect any transgressing comrades. While 

this responsibility departs from the traditional view of junior personnel, which has them attending more to following orders than 

making what are essentially leadership decisions, many of us 

now subscribe to General Krulak’s view of the “strategic corporal,” which recognizes that junior personnel have a broader role 

than that of passive follower.44 In order to become strategic corporals however, service members need training that emphasizes 

their professional obligations, and, as military manuals insist, the 

training must be realistic so as to prepare them for challenges they 

will actually face on the job.45 The training should convey what it 

means to be a professional military member in the nation’s forces, 

stress national values, and highlight international law that is relevant to the unit’s current mission. The utility of such training 

is illustrated in a recent evaluation of ethics training conducted 

44 Charles Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” 

Marines Magazine, January 1999, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/

strategic_corporal.htm.

45 Paul Robinson, “The Fall of the Warrior King: Situational Ethics in Iraq,” in 

Ethics Education for Irregular Warfare, ed. Don Carrick, James Connelly, and Paul 

Robinson (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 75–86.
within a U.S. Army brigade in the aftermath of the MHAT IV research mentioned earlier. Built around realistic battlefield scenarios and conducted by unit leaders, the training began with senior 

commanders leading their mid-level commanders in ethics discussions, who then did the same with their junior commanders, 

who in turn, guided their soldiers in discussions of the scenarios. 

Based on the responses of brigade members to pre- and posttraining surveys, the authors of the study noted that the training led to 

lower rates of unethical conduct and increased willingness on the 

part of soldiers to report the misconduct of fellow soldiers.46 This 

is an important study that illustrates how effective ethics training 

can be when it is conducted by a unit’s chain of command. In fact, 

training of this sort that highlights a unit’s ethical standards is 

an excellent opportunity for leaders to establish their professional 

and moral authority. 

Psychosocial Influences 

We saw in the research presented earlier that police officers are 

often reluctant to report the misconduct of colleagues because of 

cultural norms and peer pressure. These influences are difficult to 

resist, but unit leaders can help their personnel muster the moral 

motivation to report comrade misconduct through a mix of stiff 

penalties for not reporting, increased emphasis on the responsibility to report, and instruction on how social influences can pressure individuals to make unprofessional choices. Behavior that is 

illegal, unprofessional, or immoral does not happen by chance. It 

usually follows from earlier actions that weaken the individual’s 

resolve to withstand harmful influences. Accordingly, leaders 

must be constantly reminded that they can shape the climates of 

the units their subordinates work in. Leaders can be taught about 

46 Cristopher Warner, et al., “Effectiveness of Battlefield-Ethics Training During Combat Deployment: A Programme Assessment,” The Lancet 378 (2011): 

915–24.

Loyalty and Military Duty | 133
134 | Aspects of Leadership

the kinds of situational forces that encourage misconduct and can 

learn how to mitigate these corrosive influences. 

Military Loyalty 

One of the reasons for not reporting misconduct might be that the 

military places more value on group cohesion and unit loyalty 

than commitment to professional values. To the extent that this is 

an accurate assessment (another research question), Nicholas Rescher’s model of military obligations can provide some guidance 

on how the military community could expand its understanding of professional loyalty.47 The model consists of five broad 

targets of military loyalty: the chain of command, the service, the 

nation, civilization, and humanity at large. Most military personnel already grasp the concepts of loyalty to chain of command, 

service, and nation, as they are well established in the military 

model of institutional loyalty. However, the obligations to civilization and humanity might be novel ideas for some and would 

therefore require quality training to ensure that these concepts are 

accepted by junior personnel. Training on military loyalty could 

be incorporated into the professionalism training mentioned 

above, and, like professionalism, would be most effective if delivered by credible leaders from within the unit. 

Conclusion

Although the dilemma of choosing between protecting a comrade 

who has committed professional misconduct and reporting 

the violation as required by one’s military duty is not a moral 

dilemma, it is a very difficult decision, and one that some military personnel are not able to make correctly. As we saw with the 

47 Nicholas Rescher, “In the Line of Duty: The Complexity of Military Obligation,” in The Leader’s Imperative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility, ed. Carl Ficarrotta (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001), 245.
MHAT IV study, many military personnel are reluctant to report 

the violations of their unit mates. Research also shows that the 

problem of not reporting collegial misconduct is widespread in 

the police community. It endures at the individual level because 

police officers are afraid of reprisals and at the institutional level 

because police culture encourages the code of silence. Similar influences may operate in the military environment, but we will 

not definitively know unless studies like those conducted in the 

police community are replicated in military units. This is an important line of research that will tell the military institution if it 

needs to act and how.

Loyalty and Military Duty | 135

The Nazi extermination of European Jews is the most extreme instance of abhorrent immoral acts carried out by thousands of people 

in the name of obedience. Yet in lesser degree this type of thing is 

constantly recurring: ordinary citizens are ordered to destroy other 

people, and they do so because they consider it their duty to obey 

orders. Thus obedience to authority, long praised as a virtue, takes 

on a new aspect when it serves a malevolent cause; far from appearing as a virtue, it is transformed into a heinous sin. Or is it?

 -Stanley Milgram1

The victims were shot by the firing squad with carbines, mostly by 

shots in the back of the head, from a distance of one metre on my 

command. . . . Meanwhile Rottenführer Abraham shot the children 

with a pistol. . . . The way Abraham killed the children was brutal. 

He got hold of some of the children by the hair, lifted them up from 

the ground, shot them through the back of their heads and then 

threw them in the grave. After a while I just could not watch this 

any more and I told him to stop. What I meant was he should not lift 

the children up by the hair, he should kill them in a more decent way.

-SS-Mann Ernst Göbel2

1 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (New York: 

Perennial Classics, 2004), 2.

2 SS-Mann Ernst Göbel quoted in Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds., 

The Good Old Days (Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky & Konecky, 1991), 197. 

Leadership and the Ethics of Dissent

Reflections from the Holocaust

Paolo Tripodi

—137—
138 | Aspects of Leadership

There is a strong and distinctive sickening reaction generated 

by the description of such atrocities and by the many photos3 of 

the slaughters perpetrated during the days of the Holocaust. The 

piles of extremely malnourished bodies and the ashes of human 

beings who were gassed and incinerated by the thousands make 

us wonder how this could have happened. 

There were many photos taken before these slaughters took 

place; these photos often depicted women getting undressed in 

front of a crowd of German SS or army officers and soldiers, just 

seconds before being killed. On the way to their deaths, in the 

final moments of their lives, they had to suffer the humiliation of 

being stripped of their clothes and dignity. In some photos, there 

are children who are very likely five or six years old, their hands 

up walking toward the execution place. In the background, a few 

Germans in uniform watched to make sure that even these young 

children would be part of the “final solution.”

Another set of photographs gives us the same intense sickening 

feeling, yet the presence of individuals in uniform, the perpetrators or the bystanders, generate a different set of questions: Why 

did they do it? How could they do what they did? We struggle 

to make sense of how people who look like us managed to lose 

their sense of humanity and kill their next door neighbor’s children, wife, mother, and then the neighbor himself. According to 

Michael Geyer,

These soldiers are people quite unlike anything movies, television, and quite a few books would like to make us believe. 

They look in uniform much like what they would become in 

postwar life—your average Fritz, Franz, or Otto. They look perfectly normal but committed extraordinary atrocities. We would 

3 These photos can be seen on permanent exhibition at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington, DC. They can also be viewed on the 

USHMM website at http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/exhibit/.
not recognize them for what they did—were it not for the photographs that depict what they did, but did not see for themselves, until years later.4

How could these individuals simply “obey” and pull the trigger 

many times? At what point did they develop a mental callus that 

allowed them to view what they did as nothing more than a necessary “job”? 

The list of questions that are generated by reflecting upon the Holocaust is endless. In this chapter, I will address two: first, should 

those German officers, NCOs, and soldiers have disobeyed 

the orders they were given? Clearly, yes. The second question, 

however, is significantly more complicated and deserves much attention: could they have disobeyed? In this paper, I will deal with 

this difficult question and try to provide some tentative answers. 

The Individual’s Inability to Comply with Inhumane Orders: Subjective Disobedience

The killing of defenseless people began in the days that followed 

the German invasion of Poland. Hundreds of Polish POWs, Jewish 

people, and civilians were killed in the beginning of September 

1939. In the following months and years, the German approach 

on the Eastern Front was ruthless. Jürgen Förster noted that “the 

brutalization of the soldiers began in Poland; the barbarization of 

warfare itself would begin in Soviet territory.”5

 German soldiers 

did not hesitate to crush resistance or any form of opposition. The 

search and elimination of Jewish civilians was well organized 

and, regretfully, very effective.

4 Michael Geyer, introduction to The German Army and Genocide: Crimes Against 

War Prisoners, Jews, and Other Civilians in the East, 1939-1944, ed. Hamburg 

Institute for Social Research, (New York: The New Press, 1999), 9.

5 Jürgen Förster, “Complicity or Entanglement? Wermacht, War, and Holocaust,” 

in The Holocaust and History, ed. Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck 

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 271.

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By the time the Wehrmacht crossed the line of departure to invade 

the Soviet Union in June 1941, the army had become highly ideological. German soldiers no longer saw themselves as warriors, 

but rather as the executors of an ideological mission whose end 

was the elimination of Germany’s most deadly enemies. They believed that they were fighting a war for the supremacy and survival of German civilization in which annihilation of the enemy, 

both combatants and civilians, was a vital and necessary task.6

It is difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate with a strong degree 

of reliability the number of individuals who “happily” executed 

the orders of killing innocent civilians from those who executed 

the orders going against their inner nature and soul, and those 

who actually asked to be exempted from killing. Edward Westermann in Hitler’s Police Battalions noted that “the range of behavior 

exhibited by gendarmes in the East extended from direct opposition to the conduct of atrocity, to dutiful obedience, and into the 

realm of enthusiastic, if not sadistic, support for the most brutal 

treatment of the local population.”7

Oswald Rufeisen, a Jew who became an interpreter with a German 

police unit in Mir, Poland, which today is Belarus, had the unwelcome “opportunity” to get to know the members of the unit 

quite well. Rufeisen remembers that the second in command, Karl 

Schultz, seemed “a beast in the form of a man.” Nechama Tec, 

a biographer of Oswald Rufeisen wrote, “Schultz, a brutal man, 

a sadist, took great pleasure in torturing people in general, and 

Jews in particular. . . . [W]hen faced with two prospective victims, 

a mother and child, he would kill the child in front of the mother 

and only after a day or two execute the mother.”8

6 For an insightful portrayal of the German soldiers’ perception of the war in the 

East see Stephen Fritz, Frontsoldaten (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 

1995).

7 Edward B. Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East

(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 210.

8 Nechama Tec, In the Lion’s Den: The Life of Oswald Rufeisen (Oxford: Oxford 

University Press, 1990), 103.
Yet not all Germans “enjoyed” such a gruesome task. In Ordinary 

Men, Christopher Browning offered an enlightening portrayal of 

how the policemen of Reserve Battalion 101 dealt with the killing 

of hundreds of people in a small Polish city. Several of these men’s 

stories provide an opportunity to reflect about the terrible nature 

of what they were ordered to do. Many among them, however, 

tried to execute the orders even if they did not know whether they 

would be able to deal with the killing of harmless civilians in cold 

blood. The following are a few cases of policemen who struggled 

to perform such a task.

Georg Kageler realized what he was participating in after he assisted with the first round of killing. He then learned that many 

of the victims were from Kassell, Germany, the same place he was 

from. He labeled what was happening as “repugnant” and asked 

his platoon leader to be released, after which he was assigned to 

guard the marketplace.9

 August Zorn’s first victim was an old 

man who could not keep pace with the rest of the group headed to 

the execution site. Zorn and the old man arrived when everybody 

else had been killed already. The scene must have been devastating for both men, but surely for the old man who threw himself 

on the ground and refused to move. Zorn shot him on the spot 

“because I was already very upset from the cruel treatment of the 

Jews during the clearing of the town . . . I shot too high.” For Zorn 

the view of the damage caused by the bullet on the body of the 

old man was awful and he asked to be relieved of such a “duty.”10

Franz Kastenbaum hesitated and then missed the fourth man he 

was supposed to kill. It was so repugnant to him that it became impossible to shoot accurately. He then ran into the woods, vomited, 

and sat for a while against a tree.11 Even the battalion commander, 

Major Wilhelm Trapp, a member of the Nazi party since 1932, was 

9 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the 

Final Solution in Poland (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 67. 

10 Ibid., 66–67. 

11 Ibid., 67–68.

Ethics of Dissent | 141
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appalled by the terrible orders he and his battalion were asked to 

execute. Yet, with tears in his eyes, he just did what he was told 

to do.

In “Military Violence and the National Socialist Consensus: The 

Wehrmacht in Greece, 1941–44,” Mark Mazower provides an interesting insight on how some of the men of the 98th Regiment of 

the First Mountain Division (Gebirgs Division) reacted when they 

had to execute large numbers of civilians in the Greek village of 

Komino.12 In the middle of August 1943, soldiers from the 98th 

Regiment surrounded and assaulted the small village of Komino. 

In the attack against the defenseless population, they killed more 

than 300 people, about 50 percent of the entire village population. 

In executing the carnage, they made no distinction of age or sex. 

The division’s reputation was that of a unit that would engage in 

any operation that would help them defeat the enemy, even if this 

meant killing civilians and enemy POWs. Even so, several soldiers among those who participated in the punishing operation 

against the Greek civilians resented what they were asked to do.

Mark Mazower provides the reaction from a few soldiers. Karl D. 

recalls that the soldiers of 12th Company had much discussion 

about what they had done. According to Karl D., “few thought 

it [was] right.” He was so sickened by the massacre that it took 

him “weeks to recover my [his] peace of mind.” August S. remembers that after the shooting was over, several soldiers were “very 

depressed.”13 Otto G. was disgusted and determined to do something about it, yet “in the end we lacked the courage to desert. Not 

a single man deserted.”14 Mazower’s research provides strong ev12 Mark Mazower, “Military Violence and the National Socialist Consensus: The 

Wehrmacht in Greece, 1941–44” in War of Extermination: The German Military 

in World War II, 1941-1944, ed. Hannes Heer, Klaus Naumann (New York: 

Berghahn Books, 2004).

13 Ibid.,147.

14 Ibid.,148.
idence of a difficult situation for many of the soldiers in the division. The official report filed by the division chaplain stated, “The 

mass killing of women and children during operations against the 

bands is producing a difficult inner burden on the conscience of 

many men.”15

Both Browning and Mazower provide evidence that, in the execution of cold and calculated massacres, there were individuals who 

found it dreadful to murder another human being. Such inhumane 

behavior made a serious emotional and psychological impact on 

several of those policemen and soldiers. Yet, despite this inner 

resistance, they did as they were ordered. Several were able to 

step back from the very beginning and were assigned to different 

duties, while others could not continue and were allowed to stop. 

Yet another group executed the horrible task. 

Indeed, although those who objected to the execution of killing 

tasks technically disobeyed, they did so on the ground that the 

task was something they found difficult to perform. They provided several reasons for their refusal. Some did not want to kill 

women and children, as they had families back home; others felt 

very close to those civilians who came from the same place they 

came from; still others simply could not stand the gruesome consequences of killing at a close range, the stain of their victims’ 

blood mixed with grey brain matter on their uniforms, the screams 

of women and children, the implorations, the begging for mercy. 

They did not disobey on the ground that killing harmless civilians 

or enemy POWs was morally wrong and therefore unacceptable. 

In order to understand individual soldiers’ resistance to such terrible orders, it’s necessary to explain two forms of disobedience. 

The first form of disobedience, subjective, takes place when an individual is unable to perform or execute the orders. The second 

form, objective, occurs when an individual is in irreconcilable 

15 Ibid.

Ethics of Dissent | 143
144 | Aspects of Leadership

disagreement with the order. In the first case, had the individual 

been able to execute the order, he would probably have done so; 

in the second case, the individual’s decision is firm and probably 

unchangeable.

The two forms of disobedience can occasionally happen simultaneously; however, it should be noted that there is a significant 

difference between disobeying in the former case and in the latter. 

Indeed, it is questionable whether the action of those who objected 

to the orders of killing in the first case is real disobedience. They 

knew that the worst consequence they might have suffered was 

to be ridiculed by their colleagues; identified by their officers as 

wimps; or in the worst case, they might have compromised their 

careers. The testimony of an SS sergeant is helpful to illustrate this 

point. He said, “The reason I did not say to Leideritz [probably 

the sergeant’s immediate superior] that I could not take part in 

these things was that I was afraid that Leideritz and others would 

think that I was a coward. I was worried that I would be affected 

adversely in some way in the future.” He did not want to give the 

impression of being too weak, thus he explained, “I carried out 

the orders not because I was afraid I would be punished by death 

if I didn’t. I knew of no case and still know of no case today where 

one of us was sentenced to death because he did not want to take 

part in the execution of Jews. . . . I thought that I ought not to say 

anything to Leideritz because I did not want to be seen in a bad 

light, and I thought that if I asked him to release me from having 

to take part in the executions, it would be over for me as far as he 

was concerned and my chances of promotion would be spoilt or I 

would not be promoted at all.”16

Indeed, Oswald Rufeisen stressed the fact that there was a significant difference within the German small police unit regarding 

participation in actions against the Jews and the partisans:

16 SS-Scharführer Leideritz, quoted in Klee, The Good Old Days, 78.
A select few Germans, three out of thirteen, consistently abstained from becoming a part of all anti-Jewish expeditions. 

Conspicuously absent from such anti-Jewish expeditions was 

Meister Hein [the commander of the unit]. Neither he nor the 

other two were reprimanded for it. No one seemed to bother 

them. No one talked about their absence. It was as if they had a 

right to abstain.17

Helmut Langerbein in Hitler’s Death Squads provided an insightful account of how some of the executors dealt with the experience of killing and how some resisted or objected to the task 

of killing women and children. Harm Willms Harms, a police 

first lieutenant, is an interesting case. The police lieutenant had 

obeyed some execution orders and resisted carrying out others. 

Langerbein noted that “his case is important because it shows that 

his refusal to kill Jews had no negative repercussions. Harms was 

not an SS member, but he had already participated in the early 

massacres of Einsatzkommando Tilsit without hesitation.” When 

he was ordered to supervise the execution of women and children, however, Harms told his commander that he could not do it. 

Despite a short-lived negative reaction from his direct superior, he 

was allowed not to take part in the execution. Although Helmut 

Langerbein used Harms’s case to show that a refusal to obey 

orders to execute Jews had no consequences, he did not provide 

the right context and consideration. Harms did not refuse to kill 

Jews, indeed, he had already participated in the execution of Jews, 

but he could not bring himself to kill women and children. His 

was not an act of real disobedience; he did not have the “ability” 

to perform such a terrible task. His commander, after threatening 

him, told him, “That’s all right then. . . . You do not have to do 

that. You have a wife and children.”18

17 Tec, In the Lion’s Den, 102.

18 Helmut Langerbein, Hitler’s Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder (College 

Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 169.

Ethics of Dissent | 145
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The case of another police officer, Captain Hans Karl Schumacher, 

provides even better insight into what motivated certain individuals to obey terrible orders rather than overtly defy them. Captain 

Schumacher was a policeman who did not disguise his dislike 

for the Nazis’ policies. He was so determined in his objection to 

the Nazi regime that he had refused to join the Gestapo. In 1941, 

however, Schumacher was sent to Kiev to join Einsatzgruppe C. 

His immediate task in Ukraine was to organize a local detective 

force. However, in a few months, the German forces began a tough 

antipartisan campaign, which was clearly a pretext to exterminate 

the local Jewish community. Captain Schumacher, after an initial 

resistance to the methods used to kill, just accepted what “needed 

to be done.” He overcame his initial resistance and, although he 

continued to express his disagreement and repugnance for the 

implementation of the Nazi extermination policy, he participated in eight and maybe ten massacres. Langerbein explained that 

Captain Schumacher was a firm believer of the German officer’s 

honor code “to obey one’s superiors and to set an example for 

one’s men.” Therefore, to set an example to his men, he personally 

killed some of the victims.19

It is realistic to consider that those who could not “stomach” 

killing women and children in cold blood did not really disobey, 

as long as they knew that such an option was available to them. 

In a few cases, the most they had to do was to assess how much 

their refusal might have affected their professional future and 

the relations with their comrades. True disobedience is the act of 

challenging the ordering authority on the ground that what was 

asked was objectively wrong and morally unacceptable rather 

than subjectively difficult to perform. Clearly this course of action 

carried consequences much harsher than being assigned to different duties or compromising a possible promotion. Indeed, these 

acts of true disobedience were met in a rather different way.

19 Ibid., 172.
Some reflections offered by Stanley Milgram following his famous 

obedience experiment are important to this argument.20 Milgram 

provided evidence that a significant number of individuals are 

ready to inflict harm on another individual if they are ordered 

to do so by someone in a position of authority. In his experiment 

Milgram explored many key areas, an important one for the objective of this chapter being moral responsibility. He noted that 

when someone in a position of authority issues an order, he might 

relieve those who will execute the order of their moral responsibility. Soldiers who have been asked to perform a certain action 

might see themselves as instruments of a commander’s will. 

From their point of view, they share no moral responsibility for 

the action.

Thus, special attention should be placed on understanding moral 

confusion and its impact on soldiers. When a commander issues 

an order, soldiers’ initial moral concern might be about how well 

they perform that action and live up to the commander’s expectation. The confusion occurs when the order they have been asked 

to execute is illegal and/or immoral. Wolfram Wette noted that 

“in wartime conditions that imposed both physical and psychological burdens on soldiers, the military’s demand of absolute, 

unquestioning obedience—even to criminal orders—caused 

many of them to lose most of their sense of individual responsibility and personal guilt. Soldiers’ sense of humanity and justice 

became dramatically deformed.”21

This sense of “unquestioning obedience” becomes even stronger 

when the execution of immoral, criminal orders is perceived as a 

necessary part of the mission that must be accomplished both at 

the tactical and strategic level. A strong element of the military 

profession is to accomplish the assigned mission. Officers and 

20 See section in this essay titled “Could They Have Disobeyed?” for an explanation of Milgram’s experiment.

21 Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (Harvard: Harvard 

University Press, 2006), 158–59. 

Ethics of Dissent | 147
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their soldiers might be inclined to accept some bending of their 

sense of morality in order to accomplish their mission. They will 

be even more determined if they perceive that what they have 

been asked to do, although immoral, is in line with the country’s 

overall mission. Troops might develop a common sense of what is 

“right,” which in the case of the German military was completely 

immoral.

Applied Ethics: Objective Disobedience.

The form of disobedience that is probably more powerful is objective disobedience. Rather than stressing their inability to perform 

a terrible task, a few individuals made a point about how wrong it 

was to execute such inhumane and immoral orders. They actually 

challenged the authorities in charge and responsible for issuing 

the orders. For those individuals, it was not only subjectively 

impossible to kill another human being in cold blood, but also 

ethically unacceptable that the institution they belonged to was 

engaged in such an immoral project. Their refusal to execute the 

orders had a greater impact as their standing could potentially 

become an obstacle to the implementation of the Nazi policy. It 

appears that the number of individuals who took this course of 

action was even smaller than those who overall opposed, for personal reasons, the killing of defenseless individuals. In addition, I 

differ from other scholars in this field as I believe that those who 

objectively refused to execute the orders on legal and/or moral 

grounds indeed paid, or would have paid, a much higher price for 

their decision, much different from the first group, as happened in 

the cases of Feldwebell Schmid and Lieutenant Battell. Their motivations and beliefs—rather than a nauseating reaction to blood, 

the fragment of skull or human brain, or the sight of executed 

or about to be executed children—gave them enough strength to 

defy the orders.
It is important to recognize such a difference because it allows 

us to understand how distorted military training and discipline 

can compromise an individual’s moral autonomy and thus create 

the conditions for soldiers to execute inhumane orders. The motivations of those who did not comply because of their inability 

to execute the task were not at odds with what was happening. 

They understood these actions as elements of an overall vision 

in an ideological war against a deadly enemy. Those soldiers and 

officers had lost the ability to morally assess, in an autonomous 

way, right from wrong. Under normal conditions, a good number 

of them might have argued that killing women and children was 

wrong. However, when immersed in a strong military system, 

run by “corrupt” leadership with strong discipline, those same individuals probably pulled the trigger many times. Indeed, several 

individuals among them found a perverted pleasure in killing 

defenseless people. Yet, here, the purpose of this paper is to understand the motivation of those who might have defied such an 

order, rather than the motivation of those who received a sick satisfaction by committing these evil deeds. For those who had the 

potential to defy the orders and did not, it is important to understand moral autonomy and how it works in military institutions.

The coming pages will focus on individuals who defied the orders 

and decided to disobey in an objective way. This analysis explores 

their motivations and the consequences of their actions.

Sergeant Anton Schmid 

Anton Schmid was drafted in the Wehrmacht, although he was 

an Austrian who was born in 1900 in Vienna. In 1941, Schmid’s 

unit was stationed in Vilna (today the capital of Lithuania), supporting the frontline troops. Vilna was also the place that hosted 

one of the oldest Jewish communities in the region. Sergeant 

Schmid had many chances to interact with members of the Jewish 

community, as several among them worked in the same military 

Ethics of Dissent | 149
150 | Aspects of Leadership

camp. The Austrian sergeant not only became aware of the terrible conditions Jewish people were subjected to in Vilna, he also 

learned of mass killings and was severely shocked. He learned of 

the systematic killing of thousands of civilians in the beginning 

of 1941 in Ponar, just a few miles from Vilna. For Schmid, it was 

unacceptable to remain a passive bystander, and he took action to 

protect the lives of innocent and defenseless people. He secretly 

hosted several of them inside the building he was responsible for, 

hid many in military vehicles and took them out of Vilna, and 

distributed “yellow” permits that identified specialized workers 

deemed essential to the Wehrmacht. From October 1941 to February 1942, when he was arrested for his activity, he probably saved 

more than 300 people. It took the war court just a few days of 

trial to decide that Sergeant Schmid should receive the toughest 

punishment.

In April 1942, Schmid was executed. In one of the last letters to his 

wife, he wrote of the terrible atrocities he had learned about—the 

killing of thousands of people and the brutalization of women and 

children. He simply and powerfully wrote, “I acted as a human 

being.” Wolfram Wette noted that Schmid “was able to preserve 

the humane orientation he had acquired before his induction into 

the Wehrmacht and act on it.”22

Lieutenant Albert Battel

German army Lieutenant Albert Battel, a veteran of the First World 

War, was a mature man in his fifties and an old-time member of 

the Nazi party; he had joined the party as early as 1933. Yet the 

more he learned about the anti-Jewish Nazi policy and the killing 

of Jews, the more he became committed to protect as many as possible. In 1942, he successfully convinced his commander, Major 

Liedtke, to instruct the local commanders to protect all the Jews 

working for the German army in their areas of responsibility. He 

22 Wette, The Wehrmacht, 290.
clearly took an attitude that seriously defied the SS in the region. 

He went so far as to stop the SS from rounding up the Jews in the 

Przemysl ghetto in July 1942. The unusual confrontation between 

the SS and the army units stopped just short of escalating to a firefight. In the words of Modecai Paldiel, “It was an event unheard 

of [sic] in the annals of the Third Reich. A German military officer 

had dared to raise his weapon against the SS to prevent them from 

carrying out a fateful deportation action against Jews.”23 Yet, after 

the SS leaders complained to the army headquarters about the 

behavior of the two officers, the SS were able to force both Battel 

and Liedtke to give up the Jews they were protecting.

In the Gestapo report redacted after the incident, Lieutenant Battel 

was identified as the instigator of the army action against the SS in 

Przemysl. In October, the commander in chief of the SS, Heinrich 

Himmler, wrote to Martin Bormann, Hitler’s chief adjutant, that he 

intended to arrest Battel after the end of the war. In the meantime, 

Battel was reprimanded and sent to a unit on the Eastern Front. 

To be sent to a frontline unit in Russia at the end of 1942 meant a 

significant increase in the possibility of being killed compared to 

serving in the military administrative task Battel had behind the 

front. David Kitterman wrote that Battel, despite his action, “suffered no serious consequences.”24 Arguably, this only happened 

because he was lucky enough not to be killed on the Russian Front 

and because the end of the war did not allow Himmler to arrest 

Battel. Had Battel been arrested, Himmler likely would have done 

everything he could to have executed the lieutenant. 

Lieutenant Klaus Hornig 

Klaus Hornig began his career as a police officer in the early 

1930s. It was only because of a series of events over which he had 

23 Mordecai Paldiel, The Righteous Among the Nations (New York: Harper Collins, 

2007), 21.

24 David Kitterman, “Those Who Said ‘No!’: Germans Who Refused to Execute 

Civilians during World War II,” German Studies Review 11 (1988): 243. 

Ethics of Dissent | 151
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no control that he received command of a police company deployed in the Eastern Front. In the portrayal of Horning provided 

by David Kitterman, the German officer came across as a determined man, committed to the values he inherited from his family 

and critical of several initiatives adopted by the Nazi regime years 

before the beginning of the conflict. Hornig was an officer who 

clearly distinguished right from wrong and, as a lawyer, had a 

good knowledge of the German Military Code of Justice, specifically of Paragraph 47, which clearly established that a subordinate 

had the “right to refuse an order which he recognized as illegal.”

In the weeks after Lieutenant Hornig took command of his 

company, he was ordered by the battalion commander to eliminate 780 Russian POWs who had been labeled as “commissars.”25

The lieutenant made clear to his commander that he had no intention of executing an order he considered illegal and immoral. He 

then proceeded to instruct his troops about the German Military 

Code of Justice and the provisions of Paragraph 47.

None of Hornig’s troops participated in the execution. Yet for the 

Lieutenant it was the beginning of a series of major problems. He 

had overtly challenged an order and instructed his men on how 

to avoid executing such orders; it was a case of insubordination. 

In addition, over the course of the following days he overtly criticized what the SS were doing; his criticisms were categorized as 

insults. Hornig’s life soon became a nightmare. He was put on 

trial a number of times and jailed in different penitentiaries until 

he was sent to the infamous concentration camp of Buchenwald 

where he spent nearly ten months as a “political” prisoner. It was 

clear that the most senior SS leaders wanted Hornig sentenced to 

death. It was only the lack of witnesses and evidence that stopped 

25 Several weeks before the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, orders and directives were issued to provide the German military with guidelines for the behavior 

of troops in occupied territories. Among them was the “Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars,” better known as the Commissar Order. Troops 

were instructed to execute immediately any identified Soviet political commissar 

that might have been captured during military operations.
SS prosecutor Paulmann from sentencing Hornig to capital punishment.26 Hornig was indeed extremely lucky to survive the 

hardship of internment, months in a concentration camp, a few 

deadly marches during which thousands of his fellow inmates 

were killed, and the SS determination to execute him to set an 

example.

Captain Paul Grueninger

Perhaps the most significant case of objective disobedience based 

solely on moral grounds is that of Swiss Border Police Captain 

Paul Grueninger. In the late 1930s, the flux of Jews leaving 

Germany and Austria grew dramatically in response to the Nazis’ 

anti-Jewish policies and activities. Switzerland had become a destination for many German and Austrian Jews. Yet by August 1938 

the Swiss government decided to close the borders; only individuals with a valid visa were allowed in country. All border police 

officers were ordered to comply with the new policy. Clearly, this 

meant denying access to large numbers of Jews and abandoning 

them to a terrible fate. All police stations applied the new policy 

with the exception of the one in St. Gallen. For months, Captain 

Grueninger helped Jews in St. Gallen find shelter, either somewhere in Switzerland or in a hosting country through the Swiss 

Association of Jewish Refugees. Grueninger was then ordered 

to stop his activity and to ignore the cry for help coming from 

the refugees. The implementation of such a policy was in clear 

conflict with Grueninger’s beliefs. He told his family, “I [would] 

rather break the rules than send these poor, miserable people back 

to Germany.”27 The Swiss captain not only defied the order, but he 

also falsified the date of the entry visas on a number of passports.

26 David Kitterman, “Refusing to Kill in the Midst of the Holocaust: The Case of 

Klaus Horning,” in Remembrance, Repentance, Reconciliation, ed. Douglas Tobler

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 107–25.

27 Meir Wagner, Moshe Meisels, Andreas C. Fischer, and Graham Buik, The Righteous of Switzerland: Heroes of the Holocaust (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, 

2001), 37.

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In April 1939, Grueninger’s commitment to save the lives of defenseless people was exposed. The Swiss government took a tough 

approach: Grueninger was suspended, lost his salary and pension 

rights, and had to wait for a couple of years to be processed. The 

sentence he received was only monetary—he had to pay the cost 

of the investigation and an additional fine of 300 Swiss francs.

The following years and decades became extremely difficult for 

Grueninger. Without salary, he took whatever job was offered to 

him. Despite the hardship he had to face for the rest of his life, 

Grueninger never felt that he was a victim. Rochat and Modigliani stressed that he wished the Swiss authorities would acknowledge what he had done and give him “credit for having upheld 

one of his country’s finest traditions. What is striking about Grueninger’s deeds is that he never altered his values to suit the government. The refugees whose lives were in danger took priority 

over the legitimate orders of the administration.”28

Indeed, it is difficult to believe that even after the end of the war, 

the Swiss government refused to rehabilitate Grueninger when it 

became clear that individuals like him had acted out of humanitarian concerns and deserved great respect. Although his actions 

were morally sound, Grueninger had committed the sin of disobedience at a time when the government became morally blind 

to the cry for help. It was in November 1993 when Grueninger 

was finally rehabilitated by the Swiss government—21 years after 

he died. The message from the Swiss government was that clear 

obedience is significantly more important than morality.29

Could They Have Disobeyed?

Milgram’s obedience experiment is best known in its main 

28 Francois Rochat and Andre Modigliani, “Captain Paul Grueninger: The Chief 

of Police Who Saved Jewish Refugees by Refusing to Do His Duties,” in Obedience 

to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm, ed. Thomas Blass (Mahwah: LEA Associates, 2000), 100.

29 Wagner, The Righteous of Switzerland, 32–56. 
variant, the one in which the 40 subjects—“the teachers”—were 

placed in a situation in which they were “ordered” to punish a 

“learner” who they could not see. They could hear that the learner 

was suffering because of the electric shock they inflicted on him. 

In this situation, two-thirds (65 percent) of the teachers inflicted 

what they believed was a harsh punishment that caused significant harm and possible death to another individual, the learner. 

Among the other variants of the experiment, Milgram tested how 

the teacher would behave if the learner was extremely close to 

him and thus the teacher would be able to hear, but also and more 

importantly, to experience directly, the consequences of the punishment he inflicted. The outcome of this variant was significantly 

different. In what Milgram called the “touch-proximity” variation, 

the outcome was reversed, 70 percent of the teachers defied the 

order to punish the learner.30 Through this experiment, Milgram 

demonstrated that a significant number of individuals are willing 

to inflict significant pain to another individual, basically because 

they are ordered to do so. However, many among these individuals would resist if they had visual contact with the victim.

Milgram’s findings are extremely interesting; we should bear 

in mind, however, that in the Yale University laboratory where 

the initial experiment took place, the conditions under which the 

teachers were observed did not even come close to the conditions an average German soldier was placed in. It should also be 

noted that out of 40 individuals assembled from different social 

backgrounds, living in a free country without any specific training or indoctrination, a disturbing percentage of them decided to 

comply with what was clearly an immoral order. They were free 

to do as they wanted—just stand up and walk away—and a few 

did, but not the majority. Clearly in Milgram’s experiment there 

was not a fear of punishment, as there was not a fear of punishment among those who selectively decided not to kill women and 

children but went ahead and participated in other types of execu30 Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 36.

Ethics of Dissent | 155
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tions. Therefore, fear of punishment does not help to explain why 

thousands of individuals lost their sense of humanity and killed 

large numbers of defenseless civilians. 

Military organizations emphasize the importance of virtues.They 

need brave, dedicated soldiers who are ready to face the most 

difficult challenges: kill and being killed. Samuel Huntington in 

The Soldier and the State wrote that “loyalty and obedience are the 

highest military virtues.”31 Clearly, if these are the highest virtues, 

disloyalty and disobedience are the greatest vices or sins. Yet it 

is quite clear that in the case of the use of the military to achieve 

an evil objective, such as the extermination of a race, disobedience is the highest virtue. The issue for soldiers is the difficulty 

of defying orders, and this is not because they might fear punishment, since this would be a rather easy but reductive explanation.

Soldiers are placed in a system that compresses, or to use Peter 

Kilner’s definition, “by-passes” moral autonomy.32 I am not suggesting here that soldiers become automatons. What I am stressing is that the military system, with its training programs and 

values, tends to stress compliance rather than defiance. In a military operation, soldiers become part of an effort in which their 

behavior becomes nearly mechanical. Their ability to react to the 

orders they receive in a quick and efficient manner is fundamental 

to succeed. However, one wishes that when asked to do something as horrible as the German Armed Forces did during the 

Holocaust, they would seriously question the orders and actually 

defy them. That disobedience should not only be subjective, but 

more importantly, it should be objective. We would expect that 

soldiers asked to kill women and children would defy the order, 

not because they do not have the “callus” to execute it but because 

they disagree with the execution of the order.

31 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 

Civil-Military Relations (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1981), 73.

32 Peter Kilner, “Military Leaders’ Obligation to Justify Killing in War,” Military 

Review (2002): 24–31.
Yet the complexity of such a course of action, as rightly noted by 

Christopher Penny, is that although soldiers have a responsibility 

to disobey illegal orders, “ . . . the lower a soldier’s position in a 

military hierarchy, the less ability he or she will have to effectively 

question orders.”33 In addition, even if faced with manifest illegitimacy, soldiers will place great trust in their leaders regarding 

the legality and morality of what they have been asked to do. U.S. 

Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Smidt provided an excellent 

explanation of the relationship between leaders and soldiers and 

the important role leaders play in influencing soldiers’ behavior. 

Smidt stated that

It is through effective military leadership that a soldier can be 

influenced to perform acts that transcend the norms of human 

nature. Only a successful and skilled motivator of troops can 

inspire a combatant to charge a machine gun position, contrary 

to the most powerful of human instincts, that of self-preservation, in order to acquire a small and seemingly insignificant 

piece of turf. Powerful and persuasive leaders are required to 

build and maintain the degree of commitment necessary to successfully execute an armed conflict. 

Even more important for the objective of this paper is what Smidt 

stressed in relation to leadership and atrocities: 

Just as dynamic military commanders can induce their subordinates to accomplish heroic acts beyond the pale of traditional 

human limitations, they also, unfortunately, possess the power 

and means of ordering, encouraging, or acquiescing to acts that 

are inhumane in the extreme. Through an abuse of legitimate 

military leadership and authority, a commander may condone 

or even direct conduct that goes far beyond even the relaxed 

standard of acceptable violence associated with warfare. Under 

33 Christopher Penny, “Amoral Automatons: A Moral Critique of Superior Orders 

as a Defence to War Crimes Charges Before the International Criminal Court,” in 

The War on Terror: Ethical Considerations, ed. Daniel Lagacé-Roy and Bernd Horn 

(Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008), 17.

Ethics of Dissent | 157
158 | Aspects of Leadership

the direction of persuasive leadership, soldiers have committed 

acts so atrocious as to exceed any possible rational application 

of military force. . . . It is to the leader that a young soldier looks 

for guidance in terms of distinguishing appropriate and inappropriate uses of force during military operations.34

The German Armed Forces officers do indeed bear the greatest 

burden and responsibility for giving up the obligation of dissenting from accomplishing an evil and clearly immoral project. 

While soldiers’ ability to disobey in an objective way was greatly 

limited, military commanders, and particularly senior leaders, 

would have been in a much stronger position to oppose Hitler’s 

evil project and the conduct of a war that broke all fundamental 

rules of decency. Jürgen Förster noted that “the military leaders 

did not simply comply with Hitler’s dogmatic views, they were 

not mere victims of an all-exonerating principle of obedience. The 

military leaders, too, believed that the threats of Russia and Bolshevism should be completely eliminated.”35

 Indeed, it is difficult and rare to find cases of senior military leaders 

who opposed or resisted the execution of Hitler’s immoral orders. 

Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars uses General Erwin Rommel’s actions as an example of good leadership in war. Believing it 

was unacceptable to kill POWs, General Erwin Rommel decided 

to burn Hitler’s 1942 commando order, which required German 

soldiers to kill enemy soldiers found behind German lines, even 

after these soldiers had surrendered.36 General Siegfried Westphal, 

an operations officer in General Rommel’s staff, said that they destroyed such orders “as we did not want anything to do with such 

methods.”37 Other distinguished and charismatic leaders such as 

34 Michael Smidt, “Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in 

Contemporary Military Operations,” Military Law Review 164 (2000): 157–58.

35 Förster, “Complicity or Entanglement?,” 273.

36 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 38.

37 Siegfried Westphal quoted in Gerald Fleming, Hitler and the Final Solution

(Berkley: University of California Press, 1984), 38.
Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein tried, after the war, to 

present themselves as reputable leaders who had opposed Hitler’s brutal and criminal conduct of the war. The evidence proved 

that they were also accomplices in allowing the troops under their 

command to perpetrate the killing of civilians and POWs. Probably the most notable exception was General Johannes Blaskowitz. According to Richard Giziowski, Blaskowitz’s biographer, the 

German army general deeply despised the atrocities conducted 

by the SS and some army units since the invasion of Poland in 

1939.38

Yet none of the senior leaders directly defied Hitler’s criminal 

orders, even if this meant compromising the value and reputation of Germany. They gave up the responsibility to disobey in an 

objective way and to make clear to Hitler and senior Nazi leaders 

that Germany’s values could not be compromised by such an evil 

project. They would likely have faced a punishment much different from the one Anton Schmid faced.

What should be noted is that those individuals who decided to 

defy the authorities who ordered the execution of such an evil 

project had a clear understanding that the values they stood for 

were much greater than their own lives. They felt they had a moral 

responsibility, indeed an obligation, to stand for those values, 

even when everybody else headed in a different direction. These 

were individuals of strong character who did not allow the situation to overwhelm them. Schimd made a clear case for humanity, while Hornig, a religious man, made a compelling case not 

only for legality, but also for morality, and more importantly, for 

Germany itself. Grueninger felt that closing the border to the refugees was a betrayal of what Switzerland stood for, and he did not 

care if the authorities had taken a different approach. Indeed, he 

38 Richard Giziowski, The Enigma of General Blaskowitz (New York, Hippocrene 

Books, 1996).

Ethics of Dissent | 159
160 | Aspects of Leadership

felt that they were taking the country in a direction that negated 

Swiss history and tradition. Rochat and Modigliani wrote that

Grueninger believed that the refugees’ lives ought to be placed 

above federal decrees regarding who should or should not 

be allowed into Switzerland. . . . Grueninger fully believed in 

Switzerland’s long-standing humanitarian tradition—a tradition that called for taking care of people whose lives were in 

danger . . . . He seemed convinced that the Swiss people felt bad 

for the refugees—that they felt a sense of responsibility toward 

them, as they had previously when other persecuted peoples 

had needed assistance.39

In all these cases, these courageous individuals had an extremely 

clear understanding of what their real duty was and acted accordingly. The case of Grueninger, however, has one additional factor 

that differs from all others, making it an important case for both 

practitioners and ethicists. While Schmid, Battel, and Horning 

defied illegal and immoral orders, Grueninger’s orders were absolutely lawful, yet the consequences were immoral. He judged 

that, under the circumstances, the execution of lawful orders 

was unacceptable. It is still today an open discussion whether 

disobedience in a case similar to Grueninger would be praised 

or punished. A focus on subjective and objective disobedience, 

rather than on the strict parameters of legality and the abstract 

boundaries of morality, would pave the way to a more constructive discussion on dissent.

39 Rochat and Modigliani, “Captain Paul Grueninger,” 106.
I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield functions to create that “point of penetration,” 

and rapidly exploiting the initiative of that penetration to achieve 

a decisive maneuver against the armies that threatened the sovereignty of my country. . . . We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no 

longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes 

of thought. 

-Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army1

[A] few successful individual leaders in charge aren’t enough. They 

must build a culture of leadership that becomes the identity of the 

organization rather than just that of top leaders.

 -General Anthony C. Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps2

The topic of this article is derived from a presentation to the NATO Senior Officer Policy Course at NATO School made by Mr. Tom Randall, Legal Advisor to 

the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Operations. Thanks also to Mr. Sherrod 

Lewis Bumgardner for his generous contributions to this article.

1 Major General Peter Chiarelli and Major Patrick Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: 

The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (2005): 4.

2 Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, Leading the Charge: Leadership Lessons from the 

Battlefield to the Boardroom (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 58.

Enacting a Culture of 

Ethical Leadership

Command and Control as Unifying Mind

Clyde Croswell and Dan Yaroslaski

—161—
162 | Aspects of Leadership

“Enaction” is the new paradigm emerging in cognitive science 

about how the mind works. In the past, “cognition” was defined 

simply as the processing of information about the world “out 

there” as if it already existed. In contrast, “enaction” means that 

the way the human species thinks and behaves is actually cocreating the world in which we live. This chapter introduces this 

emerging, dynamic, multidisciplinary paradigm.

In living biological and organizational systems,3

 leadership 

emerges from many levels at the same time: the individual level 

that includes cells, organs, and organisms; the organizational 

level that includes teams, military units, and groups; and even at 

the community, society, and supranational/global levels. Leadership’s complexity changes the global and local environment dayby-day, moment-by-moment for each living self. While the term 

“global” means geographical to some, in the context of enaction, 

it pertains to a biologically adaptive, living process through which parts 

connect to create a meaningful whole. Global is a unifying principle 

of self-organizing minds, a comprehensive concept that explains 

the self-organizing process between global and local mind4 based 

on top-down and bottom-up dynamic coemergence or reciprocal causality. For the military, this process may be thought of as 

command and control where the commander (global/top down) 

provides commands and intent while subordinates (local/bottom 

up) provide control and specificity in the form of action and feedback. Global mindfulness is a comprehensive concept—a means 

for imagining how transformation actually works in collective 

human experience—a primal way of thinking about enacting a 

culture of ethical leadership and creating a globally unified mind.

3 James Grier Miller and Jessie Miller, “A Living Systems Analysis of Organizational Pathology,” Behavioral Science 36 (1991), 239–52. 

4 Francisco Varela and Natalie Depraz, “Imagining: Embodiment, Phenomenology, and Transformation,” in Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground, ed. B. 

Alan Wallace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 195–230.
The authors’ military service includes operations in Vietnam and 

the Middle East, and in both enlisted (bottom-up specifics) and 

field grade officer (top-down constraint) service. Drawing upon 

our enlisted experience, we quickly agreed that blind obedience 

from the bottom up is seldom ideal. Further, we now contend 

that a less mindful acceptance of the classic strategic mind, which 

focuses on simply attaining goals with little thought to the global 

impact, often generates complexities and emerging problems 

heretofore unimaginable. Focusing simply on ends without a 

global, unifying approach creates extremely complex problems, 

i.e., the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War, Abu Ghraib 

during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and countless other instances of 

civilian atrocities.5

This chapter is firmly grounded on two vital documents that 

serve as the philosophical foundation of the Marine Corps: 

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, and 

6, Command and Control. Within MCDP 1, the concept of viewing 

the adversary as a “complex system of individual parts” is balanced with the recognition that individual human will is a central 

component in war.6 MCDP 6 “sees command as the exercise of 

authority and control as feedback about the effects of the action 

taken” based on “an interactive process involving all the parts 

of the system and working in all directions.”7

 The goals of this 

chapter are threefold: arm the reader with a new vocabulary; 

create an expanded understanding of the ethical nature of leadership complexity, sense making, and exercise of authority; and 

ground tactical, operational, and strategic thinking all within the 

biological, natural principles of living systems.

5 Paolo Tripodi, “Understanding Atrocities: What Commanders Should Do to 

Prevent Them,” in Ethics, Law and Military Operations, ed. David Whetham (New 

York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 173–88.

6 U.S. Marine Corps, Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Navy, 1997), 12–13.

7 U.S. Marine Corps, Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1996), 40.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 163
164 | Aspects of Leadership

Our premise is that to succeed in future complex engagements, 

the U.S. military must create a culture of ethical leadership that 

enacts creative and ethical thinking at all organizational levels, 

both inside and outside the bonds of social or organizational 

culture. A culture of ethical leadership can be the major source 

of energy for a unifying mind. Moreover, ethical leadership by 

and in an organization sees people in other countries as legitimate 

parts of civilization, not as separate entities. Recognizing another’s legitimacy—even the enemy’s—is vital because of what can 

be learned from the other since any “other” can provide information, knowledge, or experience that can help create increased understanding of a complex problem and inform decision-making 

processes.

Recognizing “the other” as legitimate is not a new idea. General 

Alfred M. Gray, former Marine Corps Commandant, often said 

that Marines are not too proud to learn anything from anybody, 

since every person can be a source of legitimate information or a 

learning resource. Much can be learned from the civilian populace 

during combat, in complex political and social situations, and in 

rugged foreign terrain, particularly in order to generate peace after 

conflict. A unifying culture of ethical leadership must pervade 

every level of leadership, beginning with strategic guidance appropriate for complex engagements in both war and peace and 

including ethical conduct and moral autonomy for every member 

in the organization. The purpose of this chapter then is not only 

to describe “what” a culture of ethical leadership’s key values are, 

but also to explain “how” and “why” a culture of ethical leadership is created and required.

Principles of Adaptation: Mindfulness, Ethics, 

and Emotions

Nobel physicist Max Planck said when we change the way we 

look at things, the things we look at change. Fitness of mind is 
vital to success and effectiveness, as is fitness of body and spirit, 

and innovative behavior and action are closely related to creative 

living and the practice of mindfulness.8 “An innovation is an idea, 

practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or 

other unit of adoption.”9 Mindfulness can be simply seen as (1) 

creation of new categories; (2) openness to new information; and 

(3) awareness of more than one perspective.10

Enaction is “movement into context,”11 where the movements of 

mind and body are simultaneously prereflective, nonverbal reflective, or verbal reflective.12 The embodied mind operates prereflectively as mindfulness, and when developed and practiced can 

be, as anthropologist Gregory Bateson said,13 the difference that 

makes the difference.

Our new science of mind, ideas of ethics, and affective neuroscience are radically reconceptualizing leadership’s complexity and 

revealing why many conventional leadership strategies often fail. 

That is precisely why research on the practice of mindfulness in the 

military and Mindfulness-Based Mind Fitness Training (MMFT) 

is contributing to creating a culture of ethical leadership.14

Fitness of mind is just as vital to success as fitness of body, and it 

is increasingly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan that conventional 

twentieth-century models, linear leadership theories, and stra8 Jon Kabat-Zinn, Guided Mindfulness Meditation (Boulder, CO: Sounds True, 

2002), 1.

9 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 4th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 

1995), 11. 

10 Ellen Langer, Mindfulness (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 1989), 63–70.

11 Clyde Croswell and Scot Holliday, “Generating Organizational Awareness: The 

Primordial Nature of Language and Emotioning” (working paper, The Center for 

the Study of Learning, George Washington University, Washington, DC, 2004).

12 Daniel Stern, “Pre-Reflexive Experience and Its Passage to Reflexive Experience: 

A Developmental View,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2009): 307–31.

13 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2002), 

64–65.

14 Elizabeth Stanley and John Schaldach, “Resources,” Mindfulness-Based Mind 

Fitness Training (MMFT) Institute webpage, http://www.mind-fitness-training.

org/resources.html.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 165
166 | Aspects of Leadership

tegic minds often constrain effectiveness. Conventional strategy 

can become the cause of “wicked” problems in foreign cultures, 

ever-changing climates, and the rugged mental landscapes and 

terrains of twenty-first-century military action. 

Natural principles can guide, cultivate, and nourish an attitude 

of wisdom and creative living.15 Essentially, bio-adaptive principles generate organizational improvisation, innovation, and 

creativity,16 not unlike Meyers and Davis’ “improvisation-ready” 

Marines.17 Life-conserving principles provide a species ethic 

guided by global maxims and are the source of inter-enactive 

emergence,18 or enacting a culture of ethical leadership.

19 Principles of 

ethical leadership include

• Ethics is “a reflection on the legitimacy of the presence of 

others.”20

• Value is the expression of relationship between self and 

other (other may be a person, thing, innovative idea, organization, etc.).21 In living systems, value is seen as whatever 

an organism chooses [consciously or subconsciously] to be 

attracted by or self-propelled toward.22

15 Karl Weick, Making Sense of the Organization (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 

2001), 361. 

16 Karl Weick, Making Sense of the Organization: The Impermanent Organization

(West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 267. 

17 Christopher Meyer and Stan Davis, It’s Alive: The Coming Convergence of Information, Biology, and Buisness (New York: Crown Business, 2003), 151.

18 Giovanna Colombetti and Steve Torrance, “Emotion and Ethics: An Inter-(en)

active Approach,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2009): 505–26.

19 Douglas Griffin, The Emergence of Leadership: Linking Self-Organization and 

Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2002), 175 

20 Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding (Boston: Reidel, 1992), 247.

21 Tsunesaburo Makaguchi and Dayle Bethel, Education for Creative Living, trans. 

Alfred Birnbaum (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 70–74.

22 Elliot Jaques, The Life and Behavior of Living Organisms: A General Theory

(Westport, CT: Prager, 2002), 245.
• The process of structuring has two aspects: components (individuals) and organization (relationships).23

• Mindfulness is “the awareness that comes from systematically paying attention on purpose in the present moment, 

and nonjudgmentally, to what is closest to home in your experience: namely this very moment in which you are alive, 

however it is for you—pleasant, difficult, or not even on the 

radar screen—and to the body sensations, thoughts, and 

feelings that you may be experiencing in any moment.”24

• Learning is the transformation of behavior through experience.25

• Communication is the coordination of behavior,26 and communication (implicit or explicit) has no meaning except in 

the context of the receiving apparatus.

• We human beings are both constitutive of and constituted 

by our world. Constitution is the process of providing an 

ever-clearer meaning.27

• Enaction is movement into context (whether physical, 

verbal, mindful, intentional, or not).28 Any movement 

affects others and consequently evokes an affective response in others in the environment.

23 Humberto Maturana, “The Biology of Language: The Epistemology of Reality,” in Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought: Essays in Honor of Eric 

Lenneberg, ed. George Miller and Elizabeth Lenneberg (New York: Academic Press, 

1978), 27–63.

24 Jon Kabat-Zinn, Guided Mindfulness Meditation, 1.

25 Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 

Realization of Living (Boston, MA: Riedel, 1980), 35; Maturana and Varela, The 

Tree of Knowledge, 172.

26 Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge, 193.

27 Stephen Strasser, The Idea of Dialogal Phenomenology (Pittsburg, PA: Duquesne 

University Press, 1969), 69. 

28 Croswell and Holliday, “Generating Organizational Awareness,” 9.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 167
168 | Aspects of Leadership

• Emotions are “dynamic processes in the brain and body 

that prepare the body for future actions and enable it to 

carry them out,”29 which means “emotion is the energy of 

transformation.”30 It is not trivial that the source of time is 

the valence and constitutional dynamics of affect.31

• Violence is the imposition of a point of view with little or no 

understanding of the other’s point of view.32

Innovative Minds and Language

The mindful insights found in the opening quotes by Major General 

Chiarelli and General Zinni illuminate and confirm changes and 

shifts in both the global and local landscapes. General Chiarelli, 

who had just arrived in Baghdad as the commanding general of 

the U.S. Army 1st Armored Cavalry Division, realized something 

new was emerging simultaneously across all levels—strategic, 

operational, and tactical. We propose a new mental model (see 

figure 5) for enacting a culture of ethical leadership that comprehensively accounts for the complexity of global problems, local 

situations, sense making, living adaptation, and the diffusion of 

command (exercise of authority) and control (dynamic feedback 

from numerous sources). 

29 Walter Freeman, How Brains Make Up Their Minds (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 2000), 91–92.

30 Clyde Croswell and Krishna Gajjar, “Mindfulness, Laying Minds Open, and 

Leadership Development: An Enactive Approach to Leadership Complexity and 

Practical Wisdom” (joint paper to the Interdisciplinary Conference on Cognition, 

University of Central Florida Cognitive Science Program and International Association for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Orlando, Florida, 20–23 

October 2007, 25). 

31 Francisco Varela and Natalie Depraz, “At the Source of Time: Valence and the 

Constitutional Dynamics of Affect,” in Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Intersubjectivity, eds. Shaun Gallagher, Stephen Watson, Phillipe Brun, 

and Phillipe Romanski (Rouen, France: University of Rouen, 2004), 153–74.

32 William Isaacs, Dialogue: The Art of Thinking Together (New York: Random 

House, 1999), 132.
A new mental model is vital to replace outmoded thinking, otherwise one remains imprisoned by the “iron cage of memory,” 

with little to no creativity or possibility of change.33 By changing 

the language one uses, or the meaning of the language, one can 

change the way one thinks. However, innovative, adaptive thinking and solutions to complex problems often meet resistance, so 

brief descriptions of key components will provide subtle insights 

as we move through the process, flow, and meaning of the model. 

The starting point for creating a culture of ethical leadership is 

the recognition that individuals and organizations now and in the 

future face inherently complex problems (see figure 6). Complex 

problems are generated by the interaction between cultural, societal, paradoxically global (shared), yet locally specified realities. When the interactive nature of complex problems or interactive complexity requires political judgment rather than scientific 

reason or preconceived strategy alone to resolve, they are consid33 Croswell and Holliday, “Generating Organizational Awareness,” 1.

Diffusion Wicked Problem Sense Making

Initial Condition Set

Biological 

Adaptation

Prescriptive Training

Commanders Intent and

effort by individuals/small

groups

Global Problem

(Social/Cultural from all sides)

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process

Process helps

create next

“conditions set”

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process Organization and

(Local Solution)

Individual agency

System Wide Change

and Action

OR

System Wide Rejection

of Change and Action

Figure 5. Culture of Ethical Leadership.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 169
170 | Aspects of Leadership

ered “wicked problems.”34 General Chiarelli quickly realized that 

the situation in Baghdad was wicked, complex, and composed of 

enemy, friendly, and neutral cultures, each with unique goals, objectives, and desires. Further, he also realized he needed to change 

the mind-set and modus operandi of his own organization. 

To better understand how humans experience a phenomenon 

like complexity or wicked problems, two key terms require 

explanation:

• Phenomenon: Something perceived or experienced, especially an object as it is apprehended by the human senses 

as opposed to an object as it intrinsically is in itself. A phenomenon can be other selves, happenings, experiences, and 

ideas as they are perceived by human beings through the use 

of their senses and imagination.

• Phenomenology: The study of human experiences; understanding that the meaning of an object transcends the nature 

34 Hoirst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 160.

Diffusion Wicked Problem Sense Making

Initial Condition Set

Biological 

Adaptation

Prescriptive Training

Commanders Intent and

effort by individuals/small

groups

Global Problem

(Social/Cultural from all sides)

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process

Process helps

create next

“conditions set”

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process Organization and

(Local Solution)

Individual agency

System Wide Change

and Action

OR

System Wide Rejection

of Change and Action

Figure 6. Initial Condition Set.
of the object.35 When human beings experience a phenomenon, we immediately ascribe meaning, specific to self. 

When one person says to another “think about a dog,” the 

speaker might imagine one type of “dog” (poodle), while 

the listener might likely imagine a different “dog” (dachshund). Both images share common characteristics, but the 

specific meaning of each person’s image may be completely different. The implication is that when human beings 

gather and organize, a comprehensive unifying mind 

emerges as culture as images gain shared meaning. Consequently, culture is “an intersubjective system of meaningful 

experiences, institutions, activities, symbolic expressions 

of the ritual and art, together with their products, which 

are shared by the members of a given society”36 (i.e., local 

people inter-enacting cocreate their society, community, or 

culture).

35 David Bidney, “Phenomenological Method and the Anthropological Science 

of the Cultural Life-World,” in Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, ed. Maurice 

Natanson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 117–18.

36 David Bidney, “Phenomenological Method,” 133.

Diffusion Wicked Problem Sense Making

Initial Condition Set

Biological 

Adaptation

Prescriptive Training

Commanders Intent and

effort by individuals/small

groups

Global Problem

(Social/Cultural from all sides)

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process

Process helps

create next

“conditions set”

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process Organization and

(Local Solution)

Individual agency

System Wide Change

and Action

OR

System Wide Rejection

of Change and Action

Figure 7. Sense Making.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 171
172 | Aspects of Leadership

While experiencing a phenomenon, an individual autonomously 

begins the process of sense making in order to respond or determine appropriate actions (see figure 7). Making sense of situational (local) problems occurs at both an individual and organizational unit level, taking into account previous experience, plans, 

training, and education as well as cultural, societal, and personal 

biases. Yet sense making is far more than mere retrospection. 

“Mindfulness,” “participatory sense making,” and “global” are 

three concepts vital for effective sense making:

• Mindfulness: “The awareness that comes from systematically paying attention on purpose in the present moment, 

and nonjudgmentally, to what is closest to home in your experience; namely, this very moment in which you are alive, 

however it is for you—pleasant, difficult, or not even on the 

radar screen—and to the body sensations, thoughts, and 

feelings that you may be experiencing in any moment.”37

• Participatory Sense Making:

38A biologically self-grounded 

natural response to stimulus in the environment whose 

purpose is to conserve and sustain the life of a living organism (an adapting, autonomous agent). In this sense, 

self is more than a psychological or social/cultural construct; self is primarily a living, self-creating, self-conserving, 

self-organizing unity that adapts to preserve its autonomy/self.

Sense making is the autonomous agency and intentionality 

of a living system, whether individual, team, organization, 

community, society, or planet/globe.39 The self operates 

with biological autonomy to conserve its own life; biologists call this process autopoiesis, meaning self-creating or 

self-organizing.40

37 Kabat-Zinn, Guided Mindfulness Meditation, 1.

38 Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making: An 

Enactive Approach to Social Cognition,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

6 (2007): 485–507.

39 James Miller, Living Systems, 239.

40 Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 82.
• Global: The unifying principles of living, self-organizing 

systems; not global in the geographical sense, but the comprehensive mind that identifies and unifies the place and 

mental space of all persons, cultures, and ideas. Global is a 

species ethic41 or unified field of mind. Local is exclusively 

a simple unity point of view (bottom up); global is inclusively the composite unity view (top down). Thus, global 

mind creatively imagines42 relationships and potential 

connections that already exist between components or all 

peoples. In nature, these two points of view operate with 

complementarity and dynamic coemergence, not as polar 

opposites.

The next process in the model, biological adaptation, emerges 

when individuals and organizations attempt to create solutions 

to wicked problems after having made sense of both perceptible 

and cognitive phenomena (see figure 8). After achieving a shared 

sense, one moves into action (or context) based upon that sense. 

41 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Scribner, 1994), 206.

42 Varela and Depraz, “Imagining: Embodiment, Phenomenology, and Transformation,” 195–230.

Diffusion Wicked Problem Sense Making

Initial Condition Set

Biological 

Adaptation

Prescriptive Training

Commanders Intent and

effort by individuals/small

groups

Global Problem

(Social/Cultural from all sides)

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process

Process helps

create next

“conditions set”

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process Organization and

(Local Solution)

Individual agency

System Wide Change

and Action

OR

System Wide Rejection

of Change and Action

Figure 8. Biological Adaptation.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 173
174 | Aspects of Leadership

Key to this process is the idea that prior to and during the process 

of adapting, individuals and organizations are affected and therefore are experiencing the energy of transformation. Accordingly, 

affect is vital to understanding biological adaptation.

• Affect: A transitive verb essentially meaning “to move 

somebody emotionally” or to act upon something.43 Affect 

is a primordially adaptive impulse or natural form of 

energy that arises in living beings. The emergence of affective science, affective neuroscience, and neurobiology are 

revealing that cognition and emotion (mind and body) are 

inseparable and operate with complementarity, not as polarized opposites that can be excluded one from the other. 

They operate as parallel aspects of the embodied mind. 

Affect is manifested as six major phenomena in human experience: emotion, feelings, mood, attitude, affective style, 

and temperament.44 In this context, affect or emotion can 

be seen as the energy of transformation.45 Finally, affect has 

energic valence46—positive (productive), negative (destructive), or neutral (ambivalent/ambi-valent)—as it emerges.

The final process in enacting a culture of ethical leadership is 

diffusion and whether an idea (innovation) is either adopted or 

rejected by an individual or organization (see figure 9). Diffusion essentially means that the individuals within an organization have rejected or accepted a proposed innovation. Rejection 

or acceptance of the innovation includes specific feedback from 

the individual (local) level to the organizational (global) level 

about what will or will not work and what is or is not acceptable. In wicked problems, diffusion and implementation of an 

43 Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, s.v. “affect.” 

44 Richard Davidson, Klaus Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), xiii.

45 Croswell and Gajjar, “Mindfulness, Laying Minds Open, and Leadership 

Development,” 25.

46 Varela and Depraz, “At the Source of Time,” 153–74. 
innovation create the next condition set that must be resolved. The 

vital term for understanding diffusion is “enaction” or the “enactive 

approach.” 

• Enaction: The emerging paradigm of cognition that breaks 

with modern cognitive theory and the myths of mere information processing, computationalism, and representationalism. The enactive approach to cognition is more 

comprehensive than classic single-disciplined psychological or social approaches to cognitive science known as first 

generation Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Conventional cognitive theory conceptually reduces and represents 

the things, people, and events observed in a stable external 

world by seemingly independent consciousness. Enacted 

meanings are constituted both globally and locally within 

the embodied mind by an interpretation of the experience 

and physical history of a culture, organism, unit, organization, person, etc.47 In enaction, “knowledge depends 

on being in a world that is inseparable from our bodies, 

47 Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: 

Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 9.

Diffusion Wicked Problem Sense Making

Initial Condition Set

Biological 

Adaptation

Prescriptive Training

Commanders Intent and

effort by individuals/small

groups

Global Problem

(Social/Cultural from all sides)

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process

Process helps

create next

“conditions set”

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process Organization and

(Local Solution)

Individual agency

System Wide Change

and Action

OR

System Wide Rejection

of Change and Action

Figure 9. Diffusion.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 175
176 | Aspects of Leadership

our language, and our social history—in short, from our 

embodiment.”48

In the new paradigm, enaction is based on dynamic coemergence49

of self and other and the inseparability of a living organism from 

its environment. Enaction is “movement into context”50 by a 

living organism that is both verbal and nonverbal, prereflective 

and reflective.51 When the body of an individual speaks or moves, 

that enaction or embodied life and mind is a stimulus to which 

the environment reflexively responds, including the responses of 

other human beings, organizations, or nation states. What we say 

or do partly specifies the world we live in; we are our world. At 

the same time, how the global mind or world we live in responds 

to our movement often constrains our self or who we are. Thus, 

a living organism actually specifies or enacts the world it lives in, 

and with synchronicity, the world constrains or enacts its components or parts. The enactive approach constitutes both maturity52

and wisdom.53

The proposed mental model is designed to assist individuals and 

organizations in the process of becoming aware.54 Several operational narratives are debunked by both enaction and leading-edge 

neuroscience, as technological innovations like brain and positron 

emission tomography (PET) scans, functional magnetic resonance 

imaging (fMRIs), consciousness studies, and the emerging science 

of mind and life unmask these outdated myths. Still, innovative 

48 Ibid., 149.

49 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the 

Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 38.

50 Croswell and Holliday, “Generating Organizational Awareness,” 9. 

51 Stern, “Pre-Reflexive Experience and Its Passage to Reflexive Experience,” 

307–31. 

52 Norman Fischer, Taking Our Places: The Buddhist Path to Truly Growing Up

(New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 188.

53 Weick, Making Sense of the Organization, 361.

54 Natalie Depraz, Francisco Varela, and Pierre Vermersch, On Becoming Aware: A 

Pragmatics of Experiencing (Philadelphia: Jon Benjamins, 2001), 1.
conclusions and ideas from science meet resistance in the mind 

and body; and, as we all have learned through experience, resistance to change often creates wicked problems. To begin unifying 

mind for enacting a culture of ethical leadership, we first must 

understand the natural complexity of “wicked problems.” 

Wicked Problems

Success in complex problems, particularly wicked global problems, requires a combination of mindfulness, creativity, and 

wisdom, along with a culture of ethical leadership. Heretofore, 

military training and doctrine were highly focused on penetrating an enemy system and taking decisive action to terminate a 

local threat. General Chiarelli realized that classic modes of strategy alone and action directed toward linear threat termination are 

often obsolete. Military actions require a more global mindfulness, innovation, and organizational learning,55 not less mindfulness56 or mere routine performance. Mindfulness is particularly 

relevant since recent history shows that the military is the branch 

of the United States government normally called upon to lead and 

coordinate efforts to respond in the global environment. 

When contextualized by the two quotes at the beginning of this 

chapter, it becomes apparent that a new, more dynamic model of 

ethical leadership and mindfulness of the complexity of momentby-moment adaptation is vital. In complex adaptive systems,57

55 David Schwandt and Michael Marquardt, Organizational Learning: From 

World-Class Theories to Global Best Practices (Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie Press, 

2000), 61.

56 Daniel Levinthal and Claus Rerup, “Crossing an Apparent Chasm: Bridging 

Mindful and Less-Mindful Perspectives on Organizational Learning,” Organization 

Science 17 (2006): 502–13.

57 David Schwandt, “Individual and Collective Co-Evolution: Leadership as 

Emergent Social Structuring,” in Complexity Leadership: Part I: Conceptual Foundations, ed. M. Uhl-Bien and R. Marion (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2008), 102.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 177
178 | Aspects of Leadership

leadership emerges at all levels (local and global, individual and 

collective). As individuals take local action on behalf of the United 

States, they do so through immediate sense making of the situation, and then take the corresponding present moment behavior 

in response to the situation. This behavior then creates the conditions that specify the future action required to deal with a new, 

emerging situation. 

The perfect example of this is what took place at Abu Ghraib. In 

making sense of their situation and role as prison guards, the soldiers acted in a way they thought was appropriate for the situation. The consequence was a new strategic reality felt throughout 

the world, particularly in Muslim and Middle Eastern societies. 

The practice of mindfulness58 precisely cultivates wise creativity and creative wisdom59 because an autonomous agent “creates 

products through creative processes aimed to optimize its own 

life chances in surroundings of continuous livability.”60 Thus, 

solving locally emerging problems requires more than global, 

conventional military strategy, operations, and tactics. Effective 

problem solving requires a culture of ethical leadership.

Twenty-first-century conflicts and the complexity of wicked problems defy clear, simple, linear solutions, and they are often contextualized by societal norms embedded in cultural phenomena that 

require resolutions based solely on political judgment. Moreover, 

political stability is often fleeting in a rapidly evolving world, and 

these emerging wicked problems are open-ended and affected by 

factors often well beyond any one leader’s or individual’s understanding and span of influence. Problems are wicked when the 

58 Karl Weick and Ted Putnam, “Organizing for Mindfulness: Eastern Wisdom 

and Western Knowledge,” Journal of Management Inquiry 15 (2006): 275–87. 

59 Hans Knoop, “Wise Creativity and Creative Wisdom,” in Creativity, Wisdom 

and Trusteeship: Exploring the Role of Education, ed. Anna Craft, Howard Gardner, 

and Guy Claxton (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2008), 119.

60 Ibid., 126.
mission/situation is ambiguous and not likely to become apparent as to whether or not a problem has been resolved.61 For these 

reasons and in order to “create, connect, and evolve”—to adapt 

and overcome—Marine Corps doctrinal publications dispensed 

with conventional command and control and redefined the organization’s command structure.62 Marine Corps doctrine states that 

command and control is really “a system that provides the means 

to adapt to changing conditions . . . we can thus look at command 

and control as a process of continuous adaptation.”63 Whether 

manifested in the form of command and control or some other 

process, adaptation occurs primarily in self-organizing, living systems 

as the agency and intentionality of biological autonomy—not solely psychological, political, economic, societal, nor cultural constraints alone. 

This vital aphorism reveals the profound complexity of human 

systems and organizations and is a definitive point explained 

throughout the chapter. 

The profound complexity of wicked problems has 10 distinguishing features. Six of the proposed 10 features quickly rise to the 

level of greatest value to this chapter. The term “wicked” does 

not connote evil or cruel; Rittel and Weber used the term to mean 

extraordinarily complex, murky, and an overt challenge to reason. 

Thus, when facing a truly wicked problem, any leader must realize 

that first, the problem itself is a symptom of another problem and 

second, every actor is a potential leader precisely because every 

stakeholder enters the situation with a distinct and personal 

history and a unique causal narrative,64 affirming the value of the 

“enactive” approach to cognition.

Leadership is being reconceptualized and its ethical meaning is 

rapidly being reconstituted. Scholars, practitioners, nonprofit or61 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 160.

62 Meyer and Davis, It’s Alive, 152.

63 U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, 46.

64 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 165.

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ganizations, governments, businesses, and military units alike are 

finally beginning to realize that leadership is something generated dynamically and with complementarity. Generated leadership emerges at all levels of an organization from the top down 

and bottom up, globally and locally by the actions, participation, 

agency, and behaviors of traditionally conceived leaders and followers/informal leaders alike. Thus, leadership is a complex, collective phenomenon, not created solely by one person at the top of 

an organization in a single role or position of authority. 

Effective leadership emerges (or not) in the immediate space 

and time where tactics meet commander’s intent. In Meyers 

and Davis’ provocative text, It’s Alive, Lieutenant General Paul 

K. Van Riper argues effectively that “the power comes from the 

bottom up, not from the top down. Those involved have some 

awareness of both what’s happening around them [locally] and 

what’s happening on a larger scale [globally], and they will selforganize [locally] to achieve the commander’s intent.”65 Lieutenant General Van Riper’s use of the word “power” is not trivial in 

this case, as power is an analogue for force, energy, affect, and 

emotion as explained above, most literally, physical movement. 

Both power and emotion have valence that can produce, destroy, 

or become neutral. 

Since a wicked problem is symptomatic of another problem, 

leaders must face the third distinguishing feature of a wicked 

problem, which is that each wicked problem is truly unique.66 The 

problem may have varying levels of similarity to other problems, 

yet the problem itself cannot always be solved by doing exactly 

what worked for a previous problem or the last time a similar 

problem was encountered. Albert Einstein clarified this feature of 

wicked problems when he stated that “the significant problems 

65 Meyer and Davis, It’s Alive, 153.

66 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 164.
we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at 

when we created them.”67

Consequently, the uniqueness and causality of any problem leads 

to the fourth distinguishing feature that any proposed solution is 

a “one-shot operation.”68 Thus, dealing with wicked problems requires mindfulness and wisdom of organizational sense making.69

In a social/political situation, a single operation or action/tactic 

may now serve as another causal factor in the next uniquely problematic situation. As a result of the experimental, unpredictable, 

one-shot nature of a proposed solution, a wicked problem will not 

present an obvious end to an open-ended causal chain. Likewise, 

the fifth distinguishing feature, based on the nonlinearity and individual narrative associated with the problem, is that a proposed 

solution cannot be seen as either true or false, but rather as good 

or bad for each of the actors involved.70

Finally, the sixth and most significant feature of wicked problems 

for any leader, given the complexity and emerging, adaptive 

nature of self-organizing and the potential damage a bad solution 

can create, is that a leader “has no right to be wrong.”71 With all 

of these characteristics at work, any single leader facing a wicked 

67 Albert Einstein, “Quotes on Problem Solving,” LeadershipNow webpage, 

http://wwwleadershipnow.com/problemsolvingquotes.html. The authors would 

like to point out that many scholarly references are made to this quote as written 

but that there is some debate about the exact wording. Alice Calaprice, in The 

New Quotable Einstein (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) attributes 

the quote to a paraphrasing of a 1946 New York Times article (“Atomic Education 

Urged by Einstein,” New York Times, 25 May 1946, http://www.turnthetide.info/

id54.htm), where Einstein writes, “A new kind of thinking is essential if mankind 

is to survive and move toward higher levels.” Either version of the quote would 

prove the same point being made in this chapter, that a new thinking is necessary 

if we want to effectively deal with complex systems.

68 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 163.

69 Karl Weick, Kathleen Sutcliffe, and David Obstfeld, “Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking,” in Organization Science 16 (2005): 409–21.

70 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” 162.

71 Ibid., 166–67.

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problem has a very low probability of consistent success. Even 

when a proposed solution is acceptable and effective, there will be 

a voice of dissonance stating the solution was not good enough. 

That is why understanding leadership as the self-organizing 

process of dynamic coemergence is a more accurate conceptualization than are the previous simple, linear leadership theories.

Complex, wicked problems are all too often the exact types of 

problems military personnel are called on to solve. The proposed 

mental model begins with the wicked problem primarily because 

predeployment or preengagement training attempts to help individuals and units within a larger organization create the rules of 

engagement, command climate, and commander’s intent to help 

individuals understand what they are seeing, react properly, and 

report accordingly. These actions within the context of the wicked 

problem are all directed toward individual and organizational 

sense making. Participatory sense making is an important second 

step toward understanding command and control.

Participatory Sense Making and the Enactive 

Approach

Seven properties that have informed organizational decision 

making for over four decades have conceptually described sense 

making in organizations.72 Weick’s early publications describing 

sense making in organizations revealed seven characteristic properties. Sense making is (1) grounded in identity construction; (2) 

retrospective; (3) enactive of sensible environments; (4) social; (5) 

ongoing; (6) focused on and by extracted cues; and (7) driven by 

plausibility rather than accuracy.73 What has become clear over 

the past half-century is that organizations are far less stable than 

assumed; in fact, they are impermanent and structured in ways 

72 Synthesis of the evolution of sense making in Karl Weick’s published works in 

1969, 1979, 1995, 2001, and 2009.

73 Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 

82.
and relationships that are not always evident.74 Everything is connected and many organizational relationships change continuously, both internally and externally, which is not always evident 

to autonomous agents. 

Most recently, however, the classic approach to sense making is 

being expanded. Emerging sense-making research, along with 

calls for understanding the true nature of participatory sense 

making, has ushered in this expansion.75 Understanding participatory sense making may provide insights into why current strategic plans often do not create the intended results; why emerging 

operations often generate unanticipated responses, unintended 

consequences, and unintended outcomes; and why conventional 

military tactics often fail to achieve goals and objectives.

Recent literature from sense-making and affective neuroscience 

research is reconceptualizing the conventional notion of sense 

making. Both illuminate the adaptive nature of sense making 

that has not yet been explained. Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 

in dealing with high-reliability organizations (HROs) including 

those found in the military, have recently concluded that sense 

making occurs more in the present moment and is more futuredirected than was originally proposed.76 More importantly, they 

indicate that sense making is more behaviorally defined, emotiondriven, and action-oriented than previously thought. This means 

that sense making often operates without one’s awareness; it is 

an experience or sense that actually occurs biologically and psychologically within an individual—an “embodied phenomenon.” 

Furthermore, leading scholars of the sense-making concept recognize the important role of emotions and are calling for accounts 

and research of emotions during the act of sense making.77

74 Karl Weick, The Impermanent Organization, 3–4.

75 DeJaegher and DiPaolo, “Participatory Sense-Making,” 485–507.

76 Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, “Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking,” 

409.

77 Sally Maitlis and Scott Sonenshein, “Sensemaking in Crisis and Change: 

Inspiration and Insights from Weick,” Journal of Management Studies 47 (2010): 

551–80. 

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Concurrently, affective neuroscience and research from the National Institute of Health (NIH), the National Institute of Mental 

Health (NIMH), and other institutions around the world reveal 

that cognition and emotion are aspects of mind that operate interdependently with dynamic coemergence as inseparable processes.78 From twenty-first-century science of mind, the affective 

domain is vital for organizational learning, mindfulness, and critical thinking, as this new science reveals insights about how the 

mind transforms the brain and how mindfulness emerges as participatory sense making. This new understanding of the mind’s 

adaptive nature has significant implications for leadership, ethics, 

and self-organizing global systems.

These insights manifest themselves particularly in violent settings 

(i.e., war/combat), and sense making as adaptation is generated 

spontaneously in the form of affect or primary emotional systems.79 These autonomic responses take the form of forceful emotions like seeking, fear, lust, care, panic, play, and in particular, rage. 

In Achilles in Vietnam, Shay’s empirical portrayal of the traumatic 

effects of combat explain more long-lasting affective and behavioral forms in the mind and body than purely momentary rage.80

The root cause of such extreme reactions is the betrayal of “what’s 

right,” leading to the undoing of character. This betrayal creates a 

loss of social trust emanating from perceptions of injustice therefore producing effects far greater and longer lasting than a single 

act of situational rage. Stress-induced phenomena in the climate 

of a combat environment are a primary source of Posttraumatic 

Stress Disorder (PTSD), and a unified culture of ethical leadership 

may help reduce perceived betrayal and the wicked problems it 

creates.

78 Justin Storbeck and Gerald Clore, “On the Interdependence of Cognition and 

Emotion,” Cognition and Emotion 21 (2007): 1212–37.

79 Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal 

Emotions (Boston, MA: Oxford University Press, 2005), 51.

80 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam.
Adopting the enactive approach when making sense of wicked 

problems may lead to a better understanding of how participatory sense making emerges as the process of continuous adaptation. Essentially, within the dynamic relationship between subjective perception (specifically of the bodily senses) and objective 

conception (of socially constructed and culturally constrained 

realities) lies the space and source of timely meaning emergence. 

Finally, sense making’s emotional and affective natures are now 

understood as having affective valence—positive (productive), 

negative (destructive), or neutral (ambivalent).81 Earlier insights 

revealed that emotion/affect is the energy of transformation.82

Combined with research that reveals cognition does not occur 

without emotion, and vice versa, the myth that all emotions are 

always destructive and should always be avoided is debunked, 

and the oft-perceived negative emotion of fear may in reality 

produce life-saving behavior. 

Affect and emotions are natural adaptation, natural selection that 

often results in life-saving, life-producing, vital processes. For effective leaders, this means sense making is grounded in the understanding that emotions can no longer be ignored or excluded from 

sense making and decision making.83 Therefore, affect and emotions are vital to adaptation and ethics.84 Given this scenario and 

recent research across various disciplines and fields, particularly 

affective neuroscience, the unifying mind of ethical leaders and 

followers takes into account the affective nature and complexity of 

relationships between self and other. In the intersubjectivity and 

reciprocity of communications, the whole body (mutual incorpo81 Varela and Depraz, “At the Source of Time,” 159.

82 Croswell and Gajjar, “Mindfulness, Laying Minds Open, and Leadership 

Development,” 25.

83 Lesley Fellows, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Decision-Making: 

A Review and Conceptual Framework,” Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience 

Reviews 3 (2004): 159–72.

84 Colombetti and Torrance, “Emotion and Ethics: an Inter-(en)active Approach,” 

505–26.

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ration) is the source of mind, not the head or one brain alone85—

the mind is embodied, and emotions are “dynamic processes in 

the brain and body that prepare the body for future actions and 

enable it to carry them out.”86 The top down/bottom up reciprocity of communications and the prominent role of emotion in sense 

making echo the concept of “implicit communications” found in 

MCDP 6, when describing the relationship between individuals 

controlling local execution and the commander who is overall in 

charge of the mission.87 Thus mindfulness during sense making 

generates leadership as the outcome and complementarity of both 

local and global agents and actors (components) inter-acting in 

relationship. 

Dynamic coemergence then is equivalent to command and control 

in the military. A global and local approach is vital for overcoming the shortfalls, failures, and myopia of strategy, operational 

crises, and tactical misperceptions of the situation at hand. The 

bottom-up approach is analogous to Colonel John Boyd’s famous 

OODA Loop88—observe, orient, decide, act—which is why virtually every organizational member is a leader. Similarly, in the 

quantum realm, followers cannot be constrained to action as mere 

observers; we are all participating observers. This means that every 

individual component participates in enacting ethical leadership. 

Each is far more than a mere observer (follower) awaiting orders 

or instructions from the top down. Truly effective mindfulness 

and sense making are both participatory and adaptive, and this 

type of command and control (moment-by-moment reciprocal influence or relating) is clearly specified in MCDP 6.89 The classic 

85 Francisco Varela, “Steps to a Science of Inter-Being: Unfolding the Dharma 

Implicit in Modern Cognitive Science,” The Psychology of Awakening: Buddhism, 

Science, and our Day-to-Day Lives, ed. Gay Watson, Stephen Batchelor, and Guy 

Claxton (York Beach, ME: Samuel Weiser, 2000), 73–89.

86 Walter Freeman, How Brains Make Up Their Minds, 91–92.

87 U.S Marine Corps, Command and Control, 79.

88 Ibid., 63.

89 Ibid.
top-down-only approach to command and control was formally 

abandoned by the Marine Corps over 15 years ago. 

Although participatory sense making is necessary in creating 

knowledge, understanding the situation, and creating a proper 

response, knowledge and understanding alone are not enough to 

create viable solutions to complex problems. Wisdom and creativity are vital. Knowledge and understanding (of the commander’s 

intent and the situation studied during operational planning) 

must be expanded by adding specific meaning to data and information (local control or feedback from subordinate or outside 

sources). Without feedback and meaning, learning as the transformation of behavior through immediate experience can be severely 

limited and adaptation curtailed. Learning is far more than mere 

recall, memory alone, or knowledge acquisition; learning requires 

a change in behavior. Under these conditions and in the complexity of wicked problems in particular, mere routine memory or 

classic trained performance can often fail.

Ethical leadership means that global constraints (command) and local 

specifics (control) are both vital components for unifying mind. Failure 

by an organization to heed both components from the strategic 

to the tactical level will continue placing U.S. servicemen and 

women, allies, and U.S. and foreign civilian populations in unimaginably dangerous situations. A lack of this understanding 

can equate to a perceived betrayal of “what’s right,” often leading 

to a breakdown in social and cultural trust. This breakdown in 

trust further erodes or creates the undoing of moral character and 

may result in or at least contribute to long-term pathologies like 

chronic anger and PTSD in veterans and civilians alike.90

The enactive approach to participatory sense making and “implicit communications” are grounded in the embodied mind.91

90 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 165–81.

91 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, 72–77.

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This means adaptation in living systems occurs naturally as selfcreation or autopoiesis;92 and as a living system, the human body’s 

primordial nature is reflexively, subconsciously, and biologically structured for adaptivity, purposeful self-conservation, and 

agency.93 Participatory sense making is a naturally creative, generative process that occurs in the present moment, not from retrospective past experience alone, and with a different, innovative 

future in mind. So, paradoxically, sense making is both temporal 

and atemporal in nature. Sense making has double intentionality in that it is both immediate, as in the current situation, and 

longitudinal, as in oriented toward future goal achievement. As 

such, effective sense making is based on past, present, and future 

moments, not retrospective memory alone. Therefore, when seen 

as the transformation of intentional behavior through experience, 

learning includes cognition, is more behaviorally defined, and 

is infused with the transforming energy (+, -, o) of emotion. The 

immediate and longitudinal “time” dimensions of sense making, 

seen as urgency and participation respectively, are correlated to 

dialogic leadership and organizational learning.94

In sum, as participatory sense making occurs, we act on that 

sense. Our own enacted sense in turn effects or evokes a response 

from or enacts the environment, even though the environmental 

response cannot be predicted or assumed. So, in essence, enaction 

really is movement into context.95 Complex adaptive systems (i.e., 

humans in organizational relationships) experience participatory 

sense making, affectivity, mindfulness (more or less), and rationalized contexts (less than more) in ways unique to each individual. 

As one process for dealing with wicked problems and imagining 

92 Maturana and Varela, The Tree of Knowledge, 48.

93 Ezequiel DiPaolo, “Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency.” Phenomenology 

and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2005): 429–52.

94 Schwandt and Marquardt, Organizational Learning: From World-Class Theories 

to Global Best Practices, 179.

95 Croswell and Holliday, “Generating Organizational Awareness,” 9.
innovative solutions, sense making’s outcome is carried (embodied) into context mentally, physically, and spiritually. This movement into context enacts a response from the environment, and 

because the diffusion of innovations in the context of crises and 

change is often naturally resisted, the actual process of diffusion 

of innovation requires further exploration. 

The Diffusion of Innovation

[I]t was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought. 

-Major General Peter Chiarelli96

Major General Chiarelli’s recognition that the traditional way of 

thinking about problems was no longer acceptable demonstrates a 

mindfulness that ultimately allowed his organization to innovate. 

The general’s openness helped him recognize that a change was 

required for his unit to be successful and brought with it opportunities for innovation. According to the change model proposed 

by Everett Rogers in Diffusion of Innovation,97 an innovation occurs 

at and between the local/individual levels. Specifically, in order 

for a new idea to reach acceptance—or be valued by others—there 

are four key elements that must be in play: the innovation itself, 

communication, a social system, and time.98

First, the innovation itself must be recognized by the individual as 

new, and it is not all that important if the idea is objectively new 

or not.99 Second, communication refers to the method through 

which the innovation is spread. The specific method of communication or medium is not always essential, as long as some form of 

96 Chiarelli and Michaelis, 4.

97 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 1st ed. (New York: The Free Press, 

1962), 161, 168–71, 306.

98 Ibid., 12.

99 Ibid.

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effective communication occurs.100 Thus, communication does not 

happen in a vacuum; rather, it occurs in a social system defined as 

“a population of individuals who are functionally differentiated 

and engaged in collective problem-solving behavior.”101

Yet in living systems, communication is far more than the simple 

linear transfer or passing of information or knowledge. Instead, 

communication in complex adaptive systems is “the coordination 

of behavior”102 and value is defined as the expression of relationship between self and other (i.e., idea, person, thing, organization, 

etc.).103 The affective valuation, cognitive evaluation, and transformation of information into goal-referenced knowledge are vital 

processes of leadership in organizational learning.104

Third, a social system is composed of an entire population, yet 

the source of control arises within an individual because an innovation can only be considered truly diffused once individual 

members value and accept the idea. Rogers identified a continuum of adoption/action within his third element. Some innovations can be accepted (valued) quickly by an individual and then 

acted on, while other innovations may be accepted (valued) by 

the individual, but not translated into action until a large enough 

group of adopters has been formed. Conversely, some innovations require only a few but powerful adopter/decision makers 

before a change may be made.105

Finally, the fourth element—time—is vital to organizational 

learning. While time is not fixed, it does include the process that 

takes an individual from the point of exposure to the idea to full 

adoption. For the sake of clarity then, adoption of an idea is far 

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid., 13.

102 Behavior and autopoiesis as explored in Maturana and Varela’s two previously 

cited works, “Autopoiesis and Cognition” and Tree of Knowledge.

103 Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, Education for Creative Living, (Ames: Iowa State 

University Press, 1989), 70–75.

104 Schwandt and Marquardt, Organizational Learning, 43.

105 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 1st ed., 15–17.
more than a cognitive psychological process related to rational 

goal achievement and is clearly not the same thing as adaptation. 

Adaptation involves the reflexivity of affective valuation (e.g., an 

emotional value or response) and often prereflective behavioral 

intention as well (e.g., a feeling that something is either right or 

wrong).

A decision to adopt an innovation has societal influences, yet 

decisions are ultimately most effective when the local/individual level adopts the innovation and decides to implement it both 

internally and externally. A decision cycle to adopt or accept an 

innovation often excludes the plausibility of sense making to determine the feasibility and “how to” of implementing or applying the innovation. To that end, Rogers 5th edition of Diffusion 

of Innovations offers a model that describes the five-step process 

an individual utilizes to adopt or reject a particular innovation: 

knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation.106 Rogers is clear that his model frames, or contextualizes, 

the process of innovating as a rational-empirical cognitive model 

only and intentionally leaves out the affect of emotion and other 

nonrational elements. Rogers’ assumption of rational-empiricism 

ignores and possibly conceals affective valuation and adaptive behavioral intention otherwise denied by social and cultural taboos, 

false assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes.107 However, this chapter 

obviously expands on and complements his diffusion of innovation model rather than undermines the strength of his argument. 

Figure 10 graphically represents Roger’s five-step process:

Although the process appears causally linear, it does not always 

result in adoption or acceptance of a proposed innovation due to 

the nature of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). CAS have a mind 

of their own and cannot be controlled. Rejection or resistance or 

106 Everett Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, 5th ed. (New York: The Free Press, 

2003), 169.

107 Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith, Handbook of Affective Sciences, xiii.

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even ambivalence may emerge at any point in the process, and 

even an initial adopter may eventually reject the change. Thus, 

five significant criteria make any innovation persuasive: relative 

advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. Understandably, opinion leaders who demonstrate adoption 

of the innovation are vital for the organization (relationships) 

even within a formal and strict social structure like the military. 

Particularly in the case of the military, leadership is diffused and 

tasks are often executed with high levels of individual autonomy. 

Thus if the individual leader/actor/agent finds that the innovation does not provide an advantage over another solution, or is 

not compatible with an assigned mission and the individual’s 

mind-set, simple to understand, or proven to work, the individual 

will quickly revert to habits of preinnovation behavior when left 

unsupervised.

The elements of diffusion/adoption are an important first step 

to understanding the evaluation of an innovation, yet alone they 

don’t provide direct insight into how organizational change is 

finally made. To gain this insight, it is vital to understand Rogers’ 

five adopter categories and how each individually and collectively effect (enact) adoption: innovators, early adopters, early 

Knowledge Persuasion Decision Implementation Confirmation

Perceived

Characteristics of the

Innovation

1. Relative Advantage

2. Compatibility

3. Complexity

4. Trialability

5. Observability

Adoption

Rejection

Continued Adoption

Later Adoption

Discontinuance

Continued Rejection

Figure 10. Rogers’s Five-Step Process.
majority, late majority, and laggards.108 The innovator is generally 

described as someone who is venturesome. He or she does not 

have to be a formally recognized leader with official authority, 

position, or role. Generally, an innovator usually has a peer group 

of other innovators who encourage risk taking and help protect 

each other when a new idea falls short of expectations or completely fails.109 The real change agents in the adoption process are 

the early adopters. Early adopters are usually highly respected 

by their peers within the social system and quickly become “the 

embodiment of successful and discrete use of new ideas.”110 (italics 

added.)

Once an innovation has passed through the innovators and early 

adopters, it is diffused to the majority, which has two categories, 

early (classified as deliberators) and late (classified as skeptics), 

each with its own critical opinion leaders. Members of the early 

majority are rarely in leadership positions and deliberate before 

adopting the innovation, whereas members of the late majority, 

with their skeptical approach, hold out until the overwhelming 

opinion is that the innovation is necessary and the “right way to 

go.”111 Finally, laggards are the traditionalists with few opinion 

leaders and a general fear of innovation. Laggards’ values derive 

from what has been done in the past, and, if they do eventually 

adopt an innovation, it has most likely been superseded by the 

next innovation.112 One negative side of adoption is that if an innovation is adopted and then fails, it may be perceived as a betrayal of “what’s right.” This betrayal, as previously mentioned, 

could result in the undoing of character in combat, which is one 

antecedent of PTSD.113

108 Ibid., 168–71.

109 Ibid., 169.

110 Ibid., 169–70.

111 Ibid., 170–71.

112 Ibid., 171.

113 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 3.

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Rogers’ studies identified patterns of adoption within a normal 

population, demonstrated by figure 11 below:

In addition to rational-empiricism, there are several other false 

assumptions concealed by the Rogers model. These false assumptions do not negate the value of the model, but they do create 

possible variance when military personnel and units adopt innovations. The dynamics of combat action and fog of war are anything but general, nor are combatants the “normal” population. 

Diffusion of innovations in any crisis and emerging change to 

routines are often impeded by fear of the unknown; no one can 

fully predict future outcomes, particularly in twenty-first century 

military actions. 

Yet innovators as complex adaptive living systems are continuously learning in order to transform their behavior through immediate experience. The adaptive capacity of self-organizing 

systems often appears in the form of resistance to change and 

even adaptive resistance to stability. In nature, change and stability operate with complementarity and ambivalence rather than as 

opposing polarizations.114

Classic military strategy, theory, and models, innovative as they 

may be, are often cumbersome and met with resistance, even 

rendered obsolete by globalization and technology. In fact, many 

114 Carrie Leana and Bruce Barry, “Stability and Change as Simultaneous Experiences in Organizational Life,” Academy of Management Review 25 (2000): 753–59.

Late Laggard

Majority Early

Majority Early

Adopter

Innovator

2.5% 13.5% 34% 34% 16%

Figure 11. The Diffusion of Innovation.
strategies, operations, tactics, theories, and linear models actually 

cause wicked problems, albeit unintentionally. The human mind 

and experience naturally resist control, change, and innovations 

during the process of participatory sense making. Phenomenology, science of mind, and the biology of the enactive approach 

provide an alternative, more comprehensive, natural means for 

understanding and adapting to instability, complex changing 

conditions, and wicked problems often generated by flawed decision models or simple linear thinking. 

Enacting a Global Culture of 

Ethical Leadership

Evaluation and synthesis of the previous sections reveal two insights. First, any military unit, or individual, is a living, complex 

adaptive system composed of components and an organization 

(relationships between the components). In living systems, there 

are things, people, and ideas/ideals that are both creative and 

destructive. Value is expressed and created by relationships generated together with others and with self, both cognitively (conceptions) 

and affectively (perceptions). These values are created, reinforced, 

and realized by behaviors and actions in organizations through 

the learning that takes place in the daily interaction of the components/individuals. Without constant reflection, revitalization, 

evaluation, creativity, and mindfulness, the less mindful habits of 

blind routine performance can quickly imprison the minds of individuals and organizations in the “iron cage of memory” alone.115

Second, every member of an organization is naturally a leader 

able to coordinate and modify his/her own behavior in the organization moment-by-moment by practicing mindfulness of our 

own verbal and nonverbal communication.116 A leader embod115 Croswell and Holliday, “Generating Organizational Awareness,” 2.

116 Daniel Stern, “Pre-Reflexive Experience and Its Passage to Reflexive Experience,” 307–11.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 195
Diffusion Wicked Problem Sense Making

Initial Condition Set

Biological 

Adaptation

Prescriptive Training

Commanders Intent and

effort by individuals/small

groups

Global Problem

(Social/Cultural from all sides)

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process

Process helps

create next

“conditions set”

Ethic of Legitimacy -

affecting change/decision

process Organization and

(Local Solution)

Individual agency

System Wide Change

and Action

OR

System Wide Rejection

of Change and Action

Figure 12. Culture of Ethical Leadership.

196 | Aspects of Leadership

ies mindfulness, enacts policies, and generates emerging ethical 

know-how for a specific culture—both from bottom-up control 

and top-down command—by respecting the legitimate presence 

of all organizational members and other members in external 

organizations with whom he/she interacts. Each unit member 

models ethical behavior (or not) for those around them and even 

for those individuals outside the unit or immediate organization. 

The value of ethical leadership is that during times of crisis and 

change, each member of the unit is able to productively focus the 

energy of self-regulating emotion in order to cocreatively transform unit potential and its subsequent relationships with other 

components in the environment. Wholesome transformation is 

accomplished when each person mindfully discerns a more comprehensive (global) meaning, heeds one’s local perceptions and 

human experience, and includes the insightful sense of one’s own 

embodied mind (self) with the sense of others. Healthy transformation then is learning how to live together.

Mindfulness is self-organizing, or the space and time between 

perception and conception, where real meaningful living is re-
spected, created, and cultivated in the voice, energy, value, and 

ethics of learning to live together. When we practice mindfulness, 

local tactics emerge to meet, inform, and specify the commander’s 

global intent, thereby enacting a global culture of ethical leadership. Command and control is then a process of healthy living, 

unifying mind, and living to conserve the life of self and others. 

Every person, component, and relationship has leadership potential. Each leader, wherever in the organization, can act mindfully 

[more or less] with ethical awareness of others, not from the delusion of “I know and have all the answers.” 

Conclusion

The Nobel poet T. S. Eliot reminds us in The Four Quartets that 

every end is a beginning, every beginning an end.117 This chapter 

intended to move the reader’s mind beyond the confines of 

memory, linearity, and mere objectivity into the space, time, and 

complexity of command and control, enaction, and mindfulness. 

We also introduced an innovative approach for enacting a culture 

of ethical leadership. The bioadaptive principles were explained 

and expanded the traditional self-limiting conceptualization of 

leadership. We saw that enaction, the new paradigm of cognitive 

science,118 emerges naturally from the embodied mind,119 and the 

enactive approach to participatory sense making can be seen as 

vital for creative living, diffusing innovations, and realizing the 

infinite potential and value of human transformation during crisis 

and change. 

Reframing command and control as a dynamic, vital, life-giving 

process is the ultimate goal of this chapter. Command and control 

is not a top-down phenomenon only, it operates from the bottom 

up with complementarity and synchronicity. As members of the 

117 T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1943).

118 This subject is fully explored in John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, and Ezequiel 

DiPaolo, eds., Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science (Cambridge, 

MA: MIT Press, 2010), vii.

119 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, 177.

Command and Control as Unifying Mind | 197
198 | Aspects of Leadership

military, we can change the way we think by practicing mindfulness and by changing the language, or at least the meaning of the 

language, we use to think. We can transform the way individuals 

and organizations make sense of wicked problems, how we adapt 

to emerging situations in a timely manner, and subsequently 

create and diffuse human value. We cocreate and enact potential 

resolutions to wicked problems. There is no single road map to 

follow or guide to cultural transformation; rather, we believe we 

have provided a solid foundation for enacting a culture of ethical 

leadership. 
Part II

Law

Counterinsurgency is war, and war is inherently violent. Killing the 

enemy is, and always will be, a key part of guerilla warfare. . . . But 

successful counterinsurgents discriminate with extreme precision 

between . . . combatants and noncombatants.

-David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency1

The application of the Army’s Counterinsurgency Doctrine2 and 

the rules of engagement (ROE)3 in modern irregular warfare has 

become a controversial issue, given Marines’, soldiers’, military 

officers’, and lawmakers’ expressed frustration with the doctrine’s application in Afghanistan.4

 In particular, one commander 

stated his unit felt “they [had] their hands tied behind their backs” 

1David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.

2 Department of Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006)

3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, 13 June 2005.

4 See Colonel David M. Fee, “Rules of Engagement and the Obligations of the 

Strategic Commander” (unpublished Strategic Research Project, 16–17, 19 February 2010) (on file with author); and Wesley Morgan, “Weighing Threats and Rules 

of Engagement in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 23 August 2010, http://atwar.

blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/weighing-threats-and-rules-of-engagement-inafghanistan.

Training the Rules of Engagement 

for the Counterinsurgency Fight

Winston Williams

—201—
202 | Aspects of Leadership

because they complied with the rules of engagement.5 Furthermore, Congressman Walter Jones (R-NC) avowed that the rules 

of engagement “have proved too often to be fatal” to Marines and 

soldiers and “defies our [the American people’s] fundamental 

belief in the right of self-defense . . . ”6 Unfortunately, General 

Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, a former commander of the Joint 

Special Operations Command who ran all special operations in 

Iraq and then became the top commander of American forces in 

Afghanistan, ignited this frustration and criticism when he issued 

a tactical directive in July 2009.

Although General McChrystal’s directive sought to minimize civilian casualties,7

 many military and political officials saw the directive as a limitation on the right of self-defense.8

 In fact, General 

McChrystal acknowledged the limitation’s potential risks within 

the directive when he wrote, “I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment of force entails risks to our 

troops . . . [b]ut excessive use of force resulting in an alienated 

population will produce far greater risks.”9 Some soldiers and 

Marines, however, believe that these rules “give the advantage to 

the Taliban.”10

5 Sara A. Carter, “U.S. Troops Battle Both Taliban and Their Own Rules,” Washington Times, 16 November 2009.

6Dan Lamothe, “Rep.: Hold Rules of Engagement Hearing Now,” Army Times, 15 

April, 2010.

7 Memorandum from General Stanley McChrystal, Tactical Directive, Afghanistan, 

ISAF Headquarters, 6 July 2009, www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. This tactical directive is no longer in effect but General 

David Petraeus incorporated most of the principles into his Counterinsurgency 

Guidance.

8 Diana West, “Diana West: Afghan War Rules Endanger U. S. Troops,” Washington Examiner, 12 September 2009, http:// washingtonexaminer.com /op-eds 

/2009/09/ diana-west-afghan-war-rules-endanger-us-troops.

9 Memorandum from General Stanley McChrystal. 

10 “Soldiers Decry Military’s Use of Force Rules” CBSnews.com, 25 June 2010, 

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories /2010/06/25/world/main6618493.shtml. See 

also Ann Scott Tyson, “Less Peril for Civilians, But More for Troops,” Washington 

Post, 23 September 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/22/AR2009092204296.html. 
Nonetheless, General McChrystal’s guidance has high-level supporters, including General David H. Petreaus (former U.S. Central 

Command [CENTCOM] and International Security Assistance 

Forces [ISAF] commander). Specifically, General Petreaus disagrees with the proposition that the current rules of engagement 

give the advantage to the Taliban. In fact, Petreaus’s guidance to 

ISAF states that “if we kill civilians or damage their property . . . 

we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate. That’s 

exactly what the Taliban want.”11

Similarly, civilian casualties in Afghanistan have strained the relationship between ISAF and Afghan President Hamid Karzai,12

who demanded that ISAF “decrease the civilian casualties as long 

as they remain [in Afghanistan].”13 Thus, the challenge in this 

counterinsurgency, as with other counterinsurgency conflicts, is 

balancing between the inherent right of self-defense and winning 

the support of the local populace.

Though the objective of counterinsurgency is to garner the support 

of the local populace,14 the standing rules of engagement state that 

“[u]nit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or 

hostile intent.”15 The counterinsurgency objectives and the right 

of self-defense may force a commander to choose between protecting his soldiers or protecting the population. Thus, the crucial 

ethical issue is if units can garner populace support but not undermine their right of self-defense.

11 Memorandum from General David Petraeus, COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency 

Guidance, Afghanistan, ISAF Headquarters, 1 August 2010.

12 Eltaf Najafizada, “Karzai Says Afghan Army Woes Bring NATO Raids, Civilian 

Deaths,” Bloomberg.com, 23 November 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/

news/2010-11-23/karzai-says-afghan-army-woes-bring-nato-raids-civilian-deaths.

html.

13 Ibid. 

14 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. 1-159.

15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B, app. A.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 203
204 | Aspects of Leadership

Achieving the counterinsurgency objectives while effectively exercisng the right of self-defense requires persistent and deliberate training in the rules of engagement.16 This primer will show 

that the current ROE training methods do not sufficiently prepare 

leaders for the complexities of counterinsurgency. Adequate ROE 

training for the counterinsurgency fight can educate and prepare 

leaders of Marines and soldiers for the current operational environment, and leaders should tailor ROE training to meet the 

overall goal of winning the support of the local populace. Thus, 

to ease the friction between population-centric objectives and the 

right of self-defense, commanders, with the assistance of their 

judge advocates, must tailor ROE training to meet the mission requirements of the counterinsurgency fight.

To support this proposition, this chapter is divided into three 

parts. Part I will provide a brief overview of the counterinsurgency doctrine and the challenges associated with applying the 

current rules of engagement to counterinsurgency. Part II will 

provide proposed guidelines for ROE training directed at preparing units for the counterinsurgency fight. Finally, Part III will summarize the importance of ROE training to winning the support of 

the local populace.

Overview of Counterinsurgency Doctrine and 

the Rules of Engagement

Counterinsurgency doctrine and the rules of engagement are inseparable at the tactical level. Troops at this level face an indistinguishable enemy who attacks them from buildings or other 

areas populated with noncombatant civilians to provoke the use 

16 Mark S. Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, 

Not Lawyering,” Military Law Review 143 (1994). See also Department of the 

Army, FM 3-07-22, Command and Control in a Counterinsurgency Environment

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2004) para. 2-72. This 

manual expired on 1 October 2006.
of force in self-defense.17 Major General Robert B. Neller wrote, 

“[t]hough the inherent right of self-defense will always remain 

paramount in a COIN environment, the default reaction must 

always be to ‘not shoot.’”18 General Neller’s proposition is a harsh 

reality for Marines and soldiers at the tactical level. Surprisingly, 

the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, did 

not draw as much criticism as the application of this doctrine 

along with comparable rules of engagement in Afghanistan.19

Thus, the source of the friction is the application at the tactical 

level with seemingly incongruous rules of engagement. The first 

step to understanding the friction is to understand the foundation 

of the FM 3-24.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN 

is a struggle for the population’s support.

-FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency20

The Army published FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in December 

2006 “to fill a doctrinal gap.”21 Field Manual 3-24 defines counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 

insurgency.”22 This definition highlights the military as one of six 

components of counterinsurgency and shows that there is more 

to counterinsurgency than combat operations. David Galula was 

one of the first scholars to recognize the military and nonmilitary 

aspects of counterinsurgency, and FM 3-24 includes many of Galula’s theories.23

17 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “Lawfare: Decisive Elements of 21st-Century Conflicts?” 

Joint Forces Quarterly 54 (2009): 36.

18 Robert Neller, “Lessons Learned,” Marine Corps Gazette, February 2010, 2.

19 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 18. See also Colonel Gian Gentile, “Time for the 

Deconstruction of Field Manual 3-24,” Joint Forces Quarterly 58 (2010): 116. 

20 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. 1-159.

21 Ibid., “Foreword.”

22 Ibid., para. 1-2 

23 Ibid., para. 2-42.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 205
206 | Aspects of Leadership

Galula wrote extensively on counterinsurgency doctrine, drawing 

from his experiences in Algeria, Indochina, and China.24 The crux 

of his theory was that gaining the support of the population is the 

objective of a counterinsurgency.25 The insurgents seek the active 

or passive support of the local populace against the established 

government; the counterinsurgents need the active support of the 

local populace to maintain order and rule of law. Galula describes 

this conflict between insurgents and counterinsurgents as a “fight 

between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow 

and the lion cannot fly.”26 The population’s support is vital for the 

insurgent’s success.27 Thus, Galula’s population-centric approach 

is the logical method for defeating the insurgency—separating 

the insurgent from the support of the population.

The modern insurgency still thrives on the support of the population, which makes winning the population’s support fundamental to overall mission success.28 Although the objective is clear, the 

application of the counterinsurgency doctrine is not an easy task 

because the implementation of this doctrine is “counterintuitive 

to the traditional U.S. view of war.”29 In a traditional war, each 

side tries to defeat the other through attrition—killing the enemy 

through overwhelming force and firepower. This is not the case 

for counterinsurgency. For this reason, Field Manual 3-24 iden24 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger 

Security International, 1964), 2.

25 Ibid., 52. Galula’s “First Law” states that “the support of the population is as 

necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”

26 Ibid., xii. Galula focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent by 

showing that the insurgent cannot defeat the counterinsurgent in a conventional 

fight and the counterinsurgent cannot win the unconventional fight with its 

superior military might. See also Memorandum from General Stanley McChrystal, 

6 July 2010.

27 Ibid., 9.

28Memorandum from General David Petraeus, 1 August 2010. General Petraeus 

stated, “The decisive terrain is the human terrain. The people are the center of 

gravity. Only by providing them security and earning their trust and confidence 

can the Afghan government and ISAF prevail.”

29 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. 1-148.
tifies a number of paradoxes that are worth highlighting.30 One 

paradox is “[s]ometimes, the more force is used, the less effective 

it is.”31 Another paradox is “[s]ometimes doing nothing is the best 

reaction.”32 Also, “[s]ome of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.”33 Generals McChrystal and Petraeus incorporated many of these paradoxes in their directives in Afghanistan.34

In addition, based on United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan (UNAMA) data, the civilian deaths attributable to 

ISAF have decreased by 30 percent since the issuance of General 

McChrystal’s tactical directive.35 Thus, understanding and applying these contradictions may in fact contribute to decreasing civilian casualties.

These paradoxes show that counterinsurgency is different from 

conventional warfare. Counterinsurgency requires the minds of 

leaders and troops to be adaptive, which impacts not only battle 

drills and standard operating procedures but also the rules of engagement. Specifically, in counterinsurgency, commanders are 

required to simultaneously minimize civilian casualties and not 

limit the inherent right of self-defense.36 The standing rules of 

engagement (SROE) for U.S. forces define the inherent right of 

self-defense.37 Although there are multiple theater-specific ROE 

that are more relevant to the current counterinsurgency fight, the 

SROE are the proper starting point for analyzing the application 

of the ROE.

30 Ibid. 

31 Ibid., para. 1-150.

32 Ibid., para. 1-152.

33 Ibid., para. 1-153.

34 Memorandum from General David Petraeus, 1 August 2010.

35 United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan, “Afghan Civilian Casualties Rise 31 Percent in First Six Months of 2010,” press release, 10 August 2010, 

http://unama.unmissions.org/ Default.aspx?tabid= 1760&ctl=Details&mid=2002

&ItemID=9958.

36 Colonel Richard C. Gross (Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Central Command), 

telephone interview, 13 January 2011. Colonel Gross was the Staff Judge Advocate 

for ISAF during the implementation of General McChrystal’s tactical directive.

37 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B, 2.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 207
208 | Aspects of Leadership

The Application of the Rules of Engagement 

in a Counterinsurgency

A soldier fired upon in conventional war who does not fire back with 

every available weapon would be guilty of a dereliction of his duty; 

the reverse would be the case in counterinsurgency warfare, where 

the rule is to apply the minimum of fire.

-David Galula, Counterinsurgency 

Warfare Theory and Practice38

The current SROE for U.S. forces “establish fundamental policies 

and procedures governing the actions to be taken by U.S. commanders and their forces during all military operations.”39 These 

rules set the foundation for the development of theater-specific 

ROE in the form of mission-specific ROE or supplemental measures.40 In fact, because the SROE are fundamentally permissive, 

all commanders must notify the secretary of defense of any further 

restrictions placed on the SROE.41 The SROE provide definitions 

and procedures for the use of force in self-defense and encompass 

proportionality.42 These concepts of self-defense and proportionality are at the heart of the friction between counterinsurgency 

doctrine and the rules of engagement.

The SROE have included the inherent right of self-defense since 

the first draft over 10 years ago.43 The SROE describe the inherent 

right of defense by stating that

Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or 

demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by a unit 

38Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, 66.

39 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B , 1.

40 Ibid., 2.

41 Ibid., I-1. “SROE are fundamentally permissive in that a commander may use 

any lawful weapon or tactic available for mission accomplishment, unless specifically restricted by approved supplemental measures . . . ”

42 Ibid., A-2, A-3.

43 Ibid., A-2; see also Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instr. 3121.01A, 

Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, 13 

January 2000.
commander as detailed below, military members may exercise 

individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and acting 

as part of a unit, individual self-defense should be considered a 

subset of unit self-defense. As such, unit commanders may limit 

individual self-defense by members of their unit.44

Under the current SROE, individual self-defense is not without 

limits and the unit commander regulates this individual right, 

which differs from the 2000 SROE. The previous definition separated unit self-defense from individual self-defense and defined 

individual self-defense as

The inherent right to use all necessary means available and to 

take all appropriate actions to defend oneself and U.S. forces in 

one’s vicinity from a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent 

is a unit of self-defense. Commanders have the obligation to 

ensure that individuals within their respective units understand 

and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense.45

The difference between these definitions is important to the counterinsurgency fight for two reasons. First, this change allows 

the unit commander to control the use of force in self-defense 

situations. The commander has the discretion to respond, or 

not respond, to a hostile act by an insurgent that is designed to 

create civilian casualties. For example, a common tactic of insurgents in Afghanistan is to commit a hostile act “with the primary 

purpose of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact, or at least 

to react in a way that insurgents can exploit.”46 On one occasion, the Taliban “held a wedding party hostage” while engaging soldiers to provoke a violent response, which would create 

civilian casualties.47 Contrary to the Taliban’s intent, the on-scene 

commander in this instance had the discretion to limit the indi44 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01A, A-4.

45 Ibid., A-3.

46 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. 1-152. 

47 Dunlap, “Lawfare: Decisive Elements of 21st Century Conflicts?”

Training the Rules of Engagement | 209
210 | Aspects of Leadership

vidual right of self-defense to avoid civilian casualties, which is 

consistent with General Petraeus’ guidance and the SROE.48 The 

second difference is the persistent, dated belief that the right of 

individual self-defense is absolute.49 Thus, the 2005 SROE clarify 

the role and limits of individual self-defense as a subset of unit 

self-defense. Any use of force in self-defense, however, whether 

individual or unit self-defense, must comply with the principle of 

proportionality.50

The principle of proportionality is an indispensible part of the use 

of force in self-defense situations. The SROE’s definition of proportionality, however, is often confused with the law of war principle of proportionality, which mandates that the “loss of life and 

damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military 

advantage to be gained.”51 The practical application of this principle in counterinsurgency is a paradox in and of itself.52 While the 

law of war’s principle of proportionality universally applies in 

any targeting decision,53 the SROE’s principle of proportionality 

only applies in self-defense.54 The SROE stipulates that

The use of force in self-defense should be sufficient to respond 

decisively to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent. 

Such use of force may exceed the means and intensity of the 

48 Memorandum from General David Petraeus, 1 August 2010; Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B, A2.

49 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Petraeus Reviews Directive Meant to Limit Afghan Civilian Deaths,” Washington Post, 9 July 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content /article/ 2010/07 /08/ AR 2010070806219_2. 

html?sid=ST2010070905635; see also John J. Merriam, “Natural Law and Self 

Defense,” Military Law Review 206 (2010).

50 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B, A-3.

51 Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1956) para. 41 (15 July 1976) C1.

52 Matthew L. Beran, “The Proportionality Balancing Test Revisited: How Counterinsurgency Changes Military Advantage,” Army Lawyer, August 2010, 1, 4.

53 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 

annex I, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 

54 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B, A-3.
hostile act or hostile intent, but the nature, duration, and scope 

of force used should not exceed what is required.55

Although unit commanders have control over the proportional response in self-defense situations,56 higher-level commanders have 

directed de-escalation in areas where civilians may be present.57

One key component of the strategy in Afghanistan to reduce 

civilian casualties is the focus on an element of de-escalation, 

withdrawal,58 prior to employing airstrikes or other uses of force 

in residential compounds.59 Consequently, under this strategy, 

troops are required to consider other courses of action short of the 

use of force, including withdrawal, in response to a hostile act or 

demonstration of hostile intent. This type of de-escalation is consistent with General Petraeus’s statement that “[e]very Afghan 

civilian death diminishes our cause. If we use excessive force or 

operate contrary to our counterinsurgency principles, tactical victories may prove to be strategic setbacks.”60 Although this strategy has achieved some success in controlling the use of force to 

reduce civilian casualties, some legal scholars have debated the 

effectiveness of the current ROE and the law of war in a counterinsurgency.61 Hence, applying the rules of engagement in a popu55 Ibid., 2

56 Ibid., A-2.

57 Chandrasekaran, “Petraeus Reviews Directive.” 

58 The term “withdrawal” under the SROE’s principal of de-escalation allows the 

enemy, “when time and circumstance permit,” the “opportunity to withdraw or 

cease threatening actions.” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3121.01B,

A-3. For the purposes of this section, the term is used consistent with the directives 

in Afghanistan, which require ISAF to consider withdrawing to de-escalate rather 

than escalate force in residential areas.

59 Brendan Groves, “Civil-Military Cooperation in Civilian Casualty Investigations: Lessons Learned From the Azizabad Attacks,” Air Force Law Review 65 

(2010): 1–5.

60 International Security Assistance Force, “Updated Tactical Directive Emphasizes Disciplined Use of Force,” press release, 4 August 2010, http://www.isaf.nato.

int/article/isaf-releases/index.php. 

61 David E. Graham, “Counterinsurgency, The War on Terror, and the Law of 

War: A Response,” Virginia Law Review 95 (2009).

Training the Rules of Engagement | 211
212 | Aspects of Leadership

lation-centric operating environment is not an easy task. In order 

to prepare leaders, Marines, and soldiers for the challenging tasks 

associated with counterinsurgency, commanders have to use the 

existing rules of engagement concepts and develop training that 

complies with not only the rules of engagement but also the counterinsurgency doctrine. 

Counterinsurgency Rules of Engagement 

Training

Soldiers execute in the manner they train; they will carry out their 

tasks in compliance with the ROE when trained to do so.

-FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army62

The unique challenges of counterinsurgency require leaders to 

train soldiers and Marines for a decentralized fight in a complex 

environment.63 The general trends in Afghanistan “indicate the 

need for decentralized positions, distributed operations, effective small unit64 leaders, and well-trained small units that must 

bear the brunt of close combat.”65 Furthermore, the relative adaptability of the enemy compounds the challenges these small unit 

leaders face.66 With these challenges in mind, leaders and judge 

advocates should focus counterinsurgency ROE training toward 

empowering small unit leaders to make critical decisions on the 

application of force. In order to achieve this goal, the training 

must be rooted in principles67 and reinforced regularly.68

62 Department of the Army, FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), A-44.

63 Michael A. Vane and Robert M. Toguchi, “Achieving Excellence in Small-Unit 

Performance,” Military Review (May-June 2010): 73.

64 Ibid., 74. 

65 Ibid., 73. 

66 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. 1-155.

67 Mark S. Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,” 83.

68 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. D-8.
Training ROE Principles for the Decentralized 

Counterinsurgency Fight

You must train the squad leaders to act intelligently and independently without orders.

-David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency69

In counterinsurgency, as in most conflicts, leaders, Marines, and 

soldiers face situations where principle-based decisions are more 

effective than adherence to hard and fast rules.70 When these 

“principles conform both to tactical wisdom and to the relevant 

legal constraints on the use of force, then the larger system of ROE 

governing the ground component in a particular deployment will 

best serve military objectives and national interest.”71 The two relevant principles to the military objective in counterinsurgency are 

self-defense and proportionality. Judge advocates must develop 

training for small unit leaders to educate their troops on these two 

principles. To be effective, judge advocates should leverage Situational Training Exercise (STX) lanes72 as the primary forum for 

company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers to 

train their troops.

The Situational Training for Self-Defense and Proportionality

The best method for teaching the application of self-defense and 

proportionality to counterinsurgency is through situational training.73 This type of training “focuses on one or a small group of 

tasks—within a particular mission scenario—and requires that 

soldiers practice until they perform the task to standard.”74 Decentralized ROE training requires commanders and judge advo69 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 34. 

70 Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,” 6.

71 Ibid., 6. 

72 FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army, para. A-45. 

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 213
214 | Aspects of Leadership

cates to establish a “uniform standard.”75 Thus, judge advocates 

should work with the commanders to develop standards for ROE 

training far in advance of a deployment to a counterinsurgency 

fight.76 After establishing these standards, the judge advocate develops realistic ROE vignettes based on lessons learned in theater.

The most effective ROE vignettes are from the relevant theater of 

operation. Realistic ROE vignette training provides “a window 

into how [a] soldier thinks” and gives the leader an “opportunity 

to train the soldier and teach him a different way of looking at 

the situation.”77 Hence, ROE vignette training provides the proper 

forum for judge advocates to assist leaders with training soldiers 

on the application of self-defense and proportionality in a counterinsurgency. At the completion of vignette development, the judge 

advocate should identify the proper trainers at the company and 

platoon levels.

Empowering Small Unit Leaders for Counterinsurgency 

ROE Training

Training a brigade combat team on the ROE is a difficult task for 

judge advocates because of limited legal assets at the brigade 

and battalion level.78 A recent after action report (AAR) comment 

from Afghanistan shows that “[i]t is very hard for a brigade legal 

team to train and educate a 6,000-person BCT on . . . the rules of 

engagement on a regular basis.”79 To alleviate this burden, judge 

advocates should conduct ROE training that empowers senior 

noncommissioned officers and company commanders to train 

75 Howard H. Hoege III, “ROE . . . Also a Matter of Doctrine,” Army Lawyer, 

June 2002, 1, 5. 

76 Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,” 83. 

77 “Leading Our Soldiers to Fight with Honor,” Army, November 2006, 62, 

www3.ausa.org/pdfdocs/armymag/nov06/cc_nov.pdf.

78 Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal 

Center and School, After Action Report: 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry 

Division, 2009-2010, 10 August 2010, 18.

79 Ibid.
their subordinates on the ROE.80 Thus, the judge advocate is the 

primary trainer for the company commanders and the senior noncommissioned officers. These company-level leaders will be the 

primary trainers for their troops. The efficacy of this approach 

depends on timing; therefore, the training should start well in 

advance of a deployment.81

Many judge advocates in the field have insufficient time to conduct 

adequate ROE training for small unit leaders in advance of their 

deployment.82 Due to competing requirements, these judge advocates are unable to conduct STX lanes with the unit on the ROE 

prior to the combat training center rotation.83 Furthermore, at the 

combat training centers, ROE training by the units is typically 

limited to a vignette-driven briefing that is not integrated into 

STX lanes.84 These current ROE training trends show that units 

are not incorporating the ROE into their collective training events 

during their predeployment timeline.85

A unit’s timeline for deployment flows from its force generation 

cycle, which typically includes three distinct phases of training: 

individual, collective, and mission readiness training.86 The critical phases for ROE training are the first two phases where the 

80 Hoege, “ROE . . . also a Matter of Doctrine,” 4.

81 Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,” 82. 

82 Captain Matthew Lund (senior observer/controller, Joint Readiness Training 

Center, Charlottesville, VA), interview, 4 March 2011; Major William Johnson, 

e-mail message, 24 February 2011 (on file with author). Both of these officers 

conduct mission readiness exercises for units deploying to Afghanistan. International Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center 

and School, JA 422, Operational Law Handbook (2010). 

83 Captain Matthew Lund, interveiw.

84 Major William Johnson, e-mail message. All brigade combat teams deploying to Afghanistan execute a mission readiness exercise at one of the three combat 

training centers.

85 Marine Corps Order 3502.6, “Marine Corp Force Generation Process,” 26 

April 2010; Department of the Army, FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), para. 4-1. 

86 FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, para. 4-1.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 215
216 | Aspects of Leadership

units conduct individual and collective training.87 Judge advocates should endeavor to conduct all the ROE individual training 

during the first two phases. The audience for the initial individual 

and collective training should be the company commanders and 

senior noncommissioned officers.88

Early execution of the situational training for company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers will allow them to 

incorporate ROE vignettes into the squad-level collective training. 

The judge advocate plays a supervisory role in the latter phases of 

this process by getting feedback89 from the collective training and 

after action reviews during the combat training center rotation.90

The benefit of this approach to ROE training is that it produces 

more trainers at the company level and below, which enables frequent rules of engagement training.91 More ROE trainers in the 

small units are invaluable to providing the necessary feedback for 

the unit to conduct ROE refresher training in theater.

Periodic ROE Reinforcement Training in Theater

Training counterinsurgents in ROE should be 

reinforced regularly.

-FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency92

The complex counterinsurgency environment often requires units 

to update and/or change their initial plans to meet the demands 

of the dynamic operational environment.93 Furthermore, this environment entails a “cycle of adaptation . . . between insurgents 

and counterinsurgents; both sides continually adapt to neutralize 

87 Ibid., para. 4-3–4-4.

88 Ibid., para 4-20–4-23.

89 Hoege, “ROE . . . Also a Matter of Doctrine,” 5.

90 FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, para. 4-188.

91 Hoege, “ROE . . . also a Matter of Doctrine,” 5.

92 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. D-8. See also Department of the Army, FM 

3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 

para. A-24.

93 Ibid., para. 5-114.
existing adversary advantages and develop new (usually shortlived) advantages of their own. Victory is gained through a tempo 

or rhythm of adaptation that is beyond the other side’s ability 

to achieve or sustain.”94 In order to keep pace with this cycle of 

adaptation, ROE training should be continuous throughout the 

deployment.95 Judge advocates should leverage the unit’s update 

briefs and the small unit leadership to adjust ROE training to 

enemy tactics and distribute training resources to the lowest level. 

The small unit leaders, who understand ROE, will not only disseminate these training resources but also provide input on their 

relevance and effectiveness.

Most units in theater have some form of update brief on a daily 

or weekly basis, which provides the staff and the commanders 

with situational awareness.96 These update briefs will provide the 

requisite situational awareness97 to develop new ROE vignettes. 

The shift change briefing is a briefing conducted by the staff, 

which includes significant enemy activity over a 24-hour period.98

During this briefing, the intelligence section briefs “significant 

enemy actions” and “changes in the most likely enemy courses 

of action.”99 This portion of the brief gives the legal team a snapshot of enemy activity,100 which will enable the team to identify 

trends and update the vignettes for periodic ROE training. While 

judge advocates use these briefs to gain situational awareness, 

94 Ibid.

95 See Center for Law and Military Operations, The Judge Advocate General’s 

Legal Center and School, After Action Report, Special Forces Task Force-81, 2009-

2010, 5 October 2010, 8.

96 Department of the Army, FM-Interim 5-0.1, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), para. 2-76 (change 

1, 14 March 2008). Situational awareness is “knowledge of the immediate present 

environment including the knowledge of METT-TC.” (METT-TC is an acronym 

for Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civil Considerations.) Ibid. 

97 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. 4-22. 

98 FM-Interim 5-0.1, The Operations Process, para. 2-76.

99 Ibid., para. 2-77. 

100 Ibid.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 217
218 | Aspects of Leadership

they should also seek feedback from the results of mandatory 

investigations101 related to the ROE and their primary trainers—

company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers. 

These investigations often highlight deficiencies in a unit’s understanding or application of the ROE.

Since the company leaders “bear the brunt” of the combat operations in counterinsurgency, these leaders are the subject matter 

experts on enemy tactics and trends. The company commanders rely on their company intelligence support teams to provide 

them with the updated enemy situation, analysis, and trends.102

Consequently, prior to developing ROE refresher training in 

theater, judge advocates should seek input from company commanders and senior noncommissioned officers. The input from 

these leaders will enhance the relevance and effectiveness of the 

training. After gathering all the input from the shift change briefs, 

the investigations, and the company leaders, the judge advocate 

develops and disseminates updated ROE vignettes for refresher 

training.103

Small unit leaders have multiple methods of conducting refresher training and reinforcing the ROE at their level outside of the 

standard classroom briefing. These leaders can incorporate the 

101 Department of the Army, Reg. 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and 

Boards Officers (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 

para.1-6.

102 Rod Morgan, “Company Intelligence Support Teams,” Armor (July-August 

2008): 23–24, http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/site/dig/documents/COISTArmor%20Magazine-JUL-AUG08.pdf.

103 One method of disseminating the updated ROE vignettes is by fragmentary 

order (FRAGO). A FRAGO is an “abbreviated form of an operation order issued 

as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order . . . ” Department of the Army, FM 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), para. I-9.
updated ROE vignettes in the unit’s rehearsals.104 For the battalionlevel operations, company commanders can include the updated 

ROE vignettes in the unit’s combined arms rehearsal.105 For company-level operations and below, squad leaders can update their 

battle drills and standard operating procedures in accordance 

with the latest vignettes. The integration of the ROE into these 

rehearsals provides the leaders with the necessary knowledge to 

adapt and continue to achieve the counterinsurgency objectives 

while not undermining the right of self-defense.

Conclusion

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, 

worldwide irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of 

violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force 

will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists 

and other extremists.

- Robert M. Gates106

The counterinsurgency fight will likely persist for the near 

future,107 especially in Afghanistan with the uncompromising 

Taliban.108 As long as this type of warfare continues, leaders at 

104 Department of the Army, FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2010), para. 4-132. There 

are five types of rehearsals: “confirmation brief, the back brief, the combined arms 

rehearsal, the support rehearsal, and the battle drill or SOP rehearsal.” 

105 FM 5-0, The Operations Process, para. E-3. This type of rehearsal is a synchronization tool for subordinate units and occurs after these units receive an operation 

order.

106 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009, http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/

files/2009/01/20090201_20090101_ForeignAffairs_ABalancedStrategy.pdf.

107 Ibid.

108 Bobby Gosh, “Obama Afghanistan Plan Breaks Old Ground,” Time, 28 

March 2011, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888257,00.html.

Training the Rules of Engagement | 219
220 | Aspects of Leadership

all levels will struggle with the challenges of “winning the hearts 

and minds” of the local populace109 and exercising the right of 

unit self-defense. Unit predeployment ROE training and theater 

refresher training can assist leaders with clearing some of the “fog 

of war”110 related to applying the ROE in the counterinsurgency 

fight. Incorporating and co-opting leaders and noncommissioned 

officers into ROE training are vital to soldiers’ and Marines’ understanding of the application of the ROE in the counterinsurgency fight. These leaders will continually train their troops in theater 

to adapt to the changing enemy situation and garner the support 

of the local populace.

109 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para. A-26.

110 Ruth Wedgewood, “Law in the Fog of War,” Time.com, 13 May 2002, http://

www.time.com /time /magazine /article/0,9171,1002407-1,00.html.
—221—

We can’t win without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture 

our way to victory. Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their 

property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies 

than our operations eliminate. That’s exactly what the Taliban want. 

Don’t fall into their trap. We must continue our efforts to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.

-General David Petraeus, U.S. Army1

You can’t fight a war like this.

-Anonymous U.S. Marine officer2

Events of the past several years reinforce that United States and 

Coalition operations in Afghanistan are a constant testing ground 

for counterinsurgency doctrine. Less frequently discussed, 

however, until the past year, is the fact that conflict in AfghaniI would like to thank the participants in the Aspects of Leadership Symposium at 

Quantico, Virginia, and the participants in the 4th National Security Law Workshop at the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, 

Virginia, for their very helpful insights and comments on earlier drafts.

1 General David Petraeus, COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, Afghanistan, 

ISAF Headquarters, 1 August 2010.

2 U.S. Marine officer, cited in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “‘This Is Not How You 

Fight a War’: Military Reviews Directive that Restricts Troops in Effort to Limit 

Afghan Civilian Deaths,” Washington Post, 9 July 2010.

Rules of Engagement 

Law, Strategy, and Leadership

Laurie R. Blank
222 | Aspects of Leadership

stan is also a critical test for, and demonstration of, the role that 

rules of engagement (ROE) play during military operations and 

conflict. The quotes above—one from General Petraeus’ August 

2010 COMISAF (Commander of International Security Assistance 

Force) Guidance and the other from a junior officer on the ground 

in Afghanistan—highlight the essential role that leadership must 

play in the dissemination, training, and communication of ROE.

ROE distill law, strategy, and policy into tactical instructions for 

Marines, soldiers, airmen, and sailors regarding when and against 

whom they can use force.3

 The law of armed conflict governs 

conduct during wartime and provides the overarching parameters for the conduct of hostilities and the protection of persons 

and objects. Strategic policy determines the goals of the overall 

operation and of specific missions. ROE are then the most specific 

and direct manifestation of both law and policy on the ground. 

In effect, ROE tell Marines and soldiers how they can accomplish 

their mission—who they can kill and what they can destroy in the 

process of mission fulfillment.

In June 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, then-commander of 

the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), issued a tactical directive setting forth guidelines and rules for the use of force 

in Afghanistan, as well as the basic principles behind those rules. 

The tactical directive established guidelines for using air power 

and other munitions against enemy targets and for providing 

support to multinational forces engaged with the enemy on the 

ground. In the strategic and tactical environment of a counterinsurgency—mixed with counterterrorism operations as well—

these guidelines focus on the key overarching goal of minimizing civilian casualties, a critical component of counterinsurgency 

success.

3 This chapter will focus on Marines and soldiers, the primary military forces 

engaged in operations in Afghanistan.
Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 223

In the past year, however, some have framed the tactical directive and the ROE for U.S. and other multinational soldiers in Afghanistan as handcuffs that restrict the ability of troops to fight 

the enemy effectively and endanger service members by ostensibly denying the use of air power to protect troops engaged with 

the enemy. The mainstream media has frequently highlighted 

this portrayal, as have blogs and other communications from the 

frontlines.

However, these critiques show, above all else, a failure to understand the purpose and use of ROE. The current debate also—and 

more importantly—misses the mark. Readers of the news and 

the complaints believe that there is a fundamental debate about 

whether the ROE are correct and are left with the impression that 

perhaps the rules formulated at the top are problematic or even 

faulty. An examination of the key goals and principles of counterinsurgency strategy show that this is not the case, as will be 

discussed briefly below. 

This chapter will examine and refocus the debate about ROE to 

analyze the critical intersection of law, strategy, and leadership 

that ROE represent during armed conflict. When strategic counterinsurgency goals of minimizing civilian casualties are mistaken 

for legal rules that do not allow for civilian deaths in wartime, we 

need to delineate the differences between law and policy, between 

legal parameters governing the use of force and the targeting of 

persons and tactical considerations driven by strategic policy. 

Senior commanders see the value of the ROE in their everyday 

operations and relationships with local military and government 

officials, but some enlisted soldiers and Marines, as well as officers, complain about what they view as unreasonable restrictions 

on their ability to use force. As a result, we need to examine the 

role that leadership plays in communicating the direct relationship between the overall mission, the law of armed conflict, and 
224 | Aspects of Leadership

the tactical needs on the ground. Articulating the mission and 

the ROE in a manner that is tactically, operationally, and strategically logical is always central to effective mission success. In 

the complex counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan and 

other contemporary conflicts, doing so requires leaders to take an 

abstract concept—the broader strategic goal of protecting civilians and “winning hearts and minds”—and translate it into an 

operational concept.

ROE are a key leadership tool and a key leadership opportunity. 

ROE are also a critical component of military operations, one in 

which commanders must be proficient, just as they are proficient 

in weapons systems, tactics, and other aspects of military operations. And yet ROE are rarely, if ever, discussed as a component of 

leadership. Rather, ROE are generally referenced as instructions, 

as the manifestation of the legal framework and the mission at 

hand—which is, of course, wholly accurate. But it also unfortunately ignores the critical function ROE play as a facet of leadership in military operations, both at the level of the commander’s 

capabilities and expertise and the level of how the mission and 

the means to accomplish that mission are communicated from top 

to bottom.

This chapter will first provide foundational background about 

the law of armed conflict, strategic policy—namely counterinsurgency strategy—and ROE to set the stage for the discussion of 

leadership as a component of ROE and of ROE as a component of 

leadership. The second section will focus on ROE and leadership, 

examining the current debate about the ROE in Afghanistan and 

how leadership is a critical aspect of communicating the mission 

in Afghanistan to troops on the ground and the U.S. public. ROE 

form a critical component of everything the military does, and 

as such, it is essential to ensure that military leaders all along the 

chain of command understand, craft, and communicate the ROE 

properly to multiple audiences.
ROE, Strategy, and the Law of Armed Conflict

ROE are “directives issued by competent military authority that 

delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. 

[naval, ground, and air] forces will initiate and/or continue 

combat engagement with other forces encountered.”4 These circumstances and limitations stem from the three components that 

contribute to the ROE: law, strategy, and policy. 

U.S. rules of engagement are . . . based upon three pillars: national policy, operational requirements, and law. To be truly effective, the rules of engagement that govern the military forces 

of the United States must be fully consistent with the political 

objectives of our national policy, the dictates of the law, and the 

safety and survival of our forces during the prompt and effective accomplishment of their mission.5

As a result, a preliminary examination and understanding of the 

law governing military operations (the law of armed conflict) and 

military strategy (primarily counterinsurgency strategy) is useful 

and relevant as background to any discussion of ROE.

Law of Armed Conflict 

The law of armed conflict (LOAC)—otherwise known as the law 

of war or international humanitarian law—governs the conduct 

of both states and individuals during armed conflict and seeks 

to minimize suffering in war by protecting persons not partici4 Joint Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/

doctrine/dod_dictionary/; see also International and Operational Law Department, U.S. Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate 

General’s Legal Center and School, 2010), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/...Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2010.pdf.

5 Richard J. Grunawalt, “The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A Judge 

Advocate’s Primer,” Air Force Law Review 245 (1997): 246-47. See also International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement

(Sanremo, Italy: International Institute of Humanitarian Law, 2009), 1, 6 (“In 

addition to self-defence, ROE will therefore generally reflect multiple components, 

including political guidance from higher authorities, the tactical considerations of 

the specific mission, and LOAC.”).

Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 225
226 | Aspects of Leadership

pating in hostilities and by restricting the means and methods of 

warfare.6 LOAC applies during all situations of armed conflict, 

with the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary 

law applicable in international armed conflict and a more limited 

body of conventional and customary law applicable during noninternational armed conflict. It is U.S. policy, however, to apply 

the full body of the law of war whenever the U.S. military is 

deployed and in any military operations.7

 In all circumstances, 

therefore, LOAC provides the basic framework for all actions, obligations and privileges; it is, in essence, the outer parameters for 

all military conduct.

The law of armed conflict has multiple purposes that all stem 

from or contribute to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities 

and the protection of persons and objects affected by conflict. The 

most obvious, perhaps, is the humanitarian purpose, the focus 

on protecting persons who are caught up in the horrors of war. 

Equally important, however, is the regulation of the means and 

methods of warfare for the direct purpose of protecting those who 

are fighting—soldiers and others—from unnecessary suffering 

during conflict. Finally, it is crucial to recognize that the law of 

war does not exist to inhibit military operations or prevent war; 

rather, the goal of this body of law is to enable effective, moral, 

and lawful military operations within the parameters of the aforementioned two protective purposes. Each of these purposes plays 

a critical role in the development of both standing ROE and mission-specific ROE.

6 See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Humanitarian Law in Brief, ICRC.org, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/

section_ihl_in_brief. The law of armed conflict is set forth primarily in the four 

Geneva Conventions of 14 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols.

7 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 5810.01D, Implementation of the 

DOD Law of War Program, 30 April 2010: “Members of the DOD components 

comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are 

characterized, and in all other military operations.”
Four fundamental principles lie at the heart of the law of armed 

conflict: distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and humanity. Each of these principles helps to carry out the law’s goals 

of protecting civilians and regulating the conduct of hostilities, 

and together they create a framework that can guide examination 

of the obligations and actions of parties to conflicts and the rights 

and privileges of individuals in the conflict zone. When viewed 

as a whole, these four principles clearly underline the delicate 

balance the law strikes between military necessity and humanity.

The principle of distinction requires that any party to a conflict 

distinguish between those who are fighting and those who are 

not, and direct attacks solely at the former. Similarly, parties must 

distinguish between civilian objects and military objects and 

target only the latter. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets forth 

the basic rule: 

. . . [i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 

population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 

at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 

combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives 

and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.8

Distinction thus lies at the core of LOAC’s seminal goal of protecting innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat.

The principle of proportionality requires that parties refrain from 

attacks in which the expected civilian casualties will be excessive 

in relation to the anticipated military advantage gained.9

 This 

8 AP I, art. 48, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 48 is considered customary 

international law. See Jean Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 

2005), 1.

9 AP I, art 51(5)(b) (prohibiting any “attack which may be expected to cause 

incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 

combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 

direct military advantage anticipated”).

Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 227
228 | Aspects of Leadership

principle balances military necessity and humanity and is based 

on the confluence of two key ideas. First, the means and methods 

of attacking the enemy are not unlimited. Rather, the only legitimate objective of war is to weaken the military forces of the 

enemy. Second, the legal proscription on targeting civilians does 

not extend to a complete prohibition on all civilian deaths. The 

law has always tolerated “the incidence of some civilian casualties . . . as a consequence of military action,”10 although “even a 

legitimate target may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain from 

the attack.”11 That is, the law requires that military commanders 

and decision makers assess the advantage to be gained from an 

attack and assess it in light of the likely civilian casualties. Proportionality is not a mathematical concept, but rather a guideline 

to help ensure that military commanders weigh the consequences 

of a particular attack and refrain from launching attacks that will 

cause excessive civilian deaths. The principle of proportionality 

is well accepted as an element of customary international law applicable in all armed conflicts.

The principle of military necessity recognizes that a military has 

the right to use any measures not forbidden by the laws of war 

“that are indispensable for securing the complete submission of 

the enemy as soon as possible.”12 Critically, military necessity 

does not justify departures from the law of armed conflict. A doctrine popular among German theorists at the turn of the twentieth century, called kriegsraison, suggested that military necessity 

should override the law and that one could abandon the laws of 

10 Judith Gardham, “Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus 

in Bello,” in International Law, the International Court of Justice, and Nuclear 

Weapons, ed. Laurence Boisson De Chazournes and Philippe Sands (Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 1999), 283–84.

11 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory 

Opinion, 8 July 1996, 1996 I.C.J. Reports, 936. (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 

Higgins, dissenting on unrelated grounds.)

12 Department of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, 

DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army,1956), para 3(a). 
war in situations of extreme danger. Never accepted, this doctrine 

remains simply in the archives of legal history. Most important, 

military necessity is inherent in existing LOAC norms and incorporated into numerous provisions. It does not exist as a norm 

separate from existing black letter law that can be presented as an 

alternative approach. Indeed, in this way, military necessity exists 

in a delicate balance with the fourth and final core principle of 

LOAC, the principle of humanity.

The principle of humanity—also referred to as the principle of unnecessary suffering—aims to minimize suffering in armed conflict. To that end, the infliction of suffering or destruction that is 

not necessary for legitimate military purposes is forbidden. Once 

a military purpose has been achieved, the infliction of further suffering is unnecessary. For example, if an enemy soldier is “out of 

the fight” by dint of being wounded or captured, continuing to 

attack him serves no military purpose. Another facet of this core 

principle is that weapons causing unnecessary suffering, such as 

dum-dum bullets or asphyxiating gases, are outlawed. Similarly, 

direct attacks on civilians serve no military purpose; the principle of humanity affirms the immunity of civilians from attack. 

Originally set forth in the Martens clause,13 humanity provides a 

means to fill in potential gaps in LOAC stemming from an erroneous belief that anything not prohibited is permitted in conflict. It 

is thus “much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause, 

making the usages established among civilized nations, the laws 

of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience into the legal 

yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provisions of the 

Convention and the Regulations annexed to it do not cover spe13 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, preamble, 

July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2), 949. (“Until 

a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting 

Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 

adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 

established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of 

public conscience.”)

Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 229
230 | Aspects of Leadership

cific cases occurring in warfare, or concomitant to warfare.”14 The 

Martens clause also serves as a constant reminder that the principle of humanity remains relevant and retains its primacy even 

as new developments—whether in the types of conflicts, technology, or weapons—outpace codification. As the International 

Court of Justice stated in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 

“the Martens Clause . . . has proved to be an effective means of 

addressing the rapid evolution of military technology.”15

These four principles and the related concepts underlie LOAC as 

found in international conventions, such as the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, and, equally important, in U.S. 

codification of the law, particularly in the Law of Land Warfare 

and other U.S. law of war policy and manuals.16 They therefore 

form the backbone of the law informing ROE and the foundation 

of the specific legal principles that set the outer parameters for 

conduct during armed conflict and other military operations.

Counterinsurgency Strategy

Counterinsurgency (COIN) fits within the broader category of 

irregular warfare and includes “military, paramilitary, political, 

economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government 

to defeat insurgency.”17 Thousands of pages have been written 

about counterinsurgency and the appropriate strategy, tactics, 

and policy for battling insurgents. This chapter will not attempt to 

reinvent the wheel or even delve beneath the surface in discussing 

COIN strategy. Rather, this brief discussion of COIN strategy and 

mission goals will simply lay the foundation for understanding 

how they contribute to the development, implementation, and 

communication of ROE during irregular warfare and COIN, such 

as in Afghanistan.

14 United States v. Krupp, 9. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1341 (1950).

15 Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons, para 78.

16 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land.

17 Department of theArmy, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1.
COIN focuses primarily on enabling a legitimate government 

to create effective governance and therefore, “[t]he cornerstone 

of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can 

be implemented and disorder spreads.”18 Indeed, “[b]ecause insurgents gain strength from the acquiescence of the population, 

the focus of counterinsurgency is building the population’s trust, 

confidence, and cooperation with the government.”19 Just like 

any other central tenet of any military strategy, this fundamental goal drives the implementation of COIN strategy in the form 

of the ROE. In particular, unlike conventional warfare, in COIN, 

winning the trust of the civilian population and building the legitimate government’s capacity is equal—perhaps even greater—in 

importance than killing enemy fighters.

Like politics, all COIN operations are local, and the people are 

the prize—. . . not terrain, not a body count, not the number 

of patrols run or civil affairs projects completed. The security 

and well-being of the people are the only metrics that determine 

your success.20

The application of force becomes measurably more complicated 

in such operations. As the U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Manual states, therefore, “[i]n a COIN environment, it is 

vital for commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels 

of force and apply that force precisely so that it accomplishes the 

mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering.”21

In the current conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. and allied forces face 

a challenging task of battling Taliban militants, al Qaeda, and as18 Ibid, 1-23.

19 Ganesh Sitaraman, “Counterinsugency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of 

War,” Virginia Law Review 95 (2009): 1745, 1747.

20 Robert Neller, “Lessons Learned,” Marine Corps Gazette, 2 February 2010.

21 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-25. See also David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4, who notes that while killing the enemy is an essential part of guerilla warfare, “successful counterinsurgents discriminate with extreme precision between . . . combatants and noncombatants.”).

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sociated terrorist groups while building a secure environment 

for the government to develop its capacity, rule of law, and security operations. Minimizing civilian casualties has become a 

key feature of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in its effort to win “the 

hearts and minds” of the local population. As General Stanley 

McChrystal, former ISAF Commander in Afghanistan, stated in 

testimony before Congress,

I would emphasize that how we conduct operations is vital 

to success. . . . This is a struggle for the support of the Afghan 

people. Our willingness to operate in ways that minimize casualties or damage, even when doing so makes our task more 

difficult, is essential to our credibility.22 

Recent analysis of operations in Afghanistan, the incidence of civilian casualties, and the growth or decrease in insurgent operations in particular areas have confirmed the emphasis on minimizing civilian casualties as a key aspect of U.S. strategy. Thus, 

civilian casualties serve in many ways as the best recruitment tool 

the insurgents could have: “The data are consistent with the claim 

that civilian casualties are affecting future violence through increased recruitment into insurgent groups after a civilian casualty 

incident.”23

Rules of Engagement

As stated above, ROE are directives to military forces regarding 

the parameters of the use of force during military operations. 

One of the most famous examples of ROE is from the Battle of 

22 Hearing to Consider the Nominations of Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN for 

Reappointment to the Grade of Admiral and to be Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Lieutenant General Douglas M. 

Fraser, USAF to be General and Commander, U.S. Southern Command; and Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA to be General and Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan Before S. 

Comm. on Armed Services, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of LtGen Stanley A. 

McChrystal).

23 Luke N. Condra, Joseph H. Felter, Radha K. Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro, 

The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 16152), 3.
Bunker Hill in the Revolutionary War, when an American officer 

ordered, “Don’t one of you fire until you see the whites of their 

eyes.”24 ROE are based on three key components: law, strategy, 

and policy—the legal framework of the law of armed conflict, the 

military needs of strategy and operational goals, and the national 

command policy of the United States. Equally important, both the 

standing ROE (SROE) and mission-specific ROE provide for the 

right of all troops to use force in self-defense. In all military operations, therefore, 

. . . rules of engagement are designed to provide for the safety 

and survival of U.S. military forces that come into harm’s way 

and to ensure successful accomplishment of any mission that 

those forces may be tasked to undertake. Our rules of engagement are also the principal mechanism of ensuring that U.S. 

military forces are at all times in full compliance with our obligations under domestic as well as international law.25

The three purposes of ROE provide a useful foundation for exploring the interrelationship between ROE and leadership. As a 

political purpose, ROE imbue the actions of commanders with the 

goals and objectives of national policy. “For example, in reflecting 

national political and diplomatic purposes, ROE may restrict the 

engagement of certain targets, or the use of particular weapons 

systems, out of a desire to tilt world opinion in a particular direction, place a positive limit on the escalation of hostilities, or 

not antagonize the enemy.”26 An example of policy-based ROE 

24 Mark S. Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering,” Military Law Review 143 (1994): 34, citing John Bartlett, 

Familiar Quotations (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1968), 446 and note 

1 (attributing slight variations of the same statement to Prince Charles of Prussia, 

Israel Putnam, and Frederick the Great). 

25 Grunawalt, “The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement,” 246-7. See also International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo Handbook on Rules of Engagement, 

1. (“ROE appear in a variety of forms in national military doctrines, including 

execute orders, deployment orders, operational plans, or standing directives.

Whatever their form, they provide authorisation for and/or limits on, among other 

things, the use of force, the positioning and posturing of forces, and the employment of certain specific capabilities.”).

26 Operational Law Handbook, 73–74.

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can be seen in Executive Order 11850, which prohibits first use of 

herbicides and riot control agents without prior approval.27 Military purpose-based ROE give the commander parameters within 

which he or she should operate to fulfill the designated mission, 

such as “granting or withholding the authority to use particular 

weapons systems or tactics.”28 Finally, in fulfilling legal purposes, 

ROE ensure that commanders and troops act within the framework of the law of armed conflict and other applicable laws. An 

example of law-based ROE would be the mandate that “hospitals, 

churches, shrines, schools, museums, and any other historical 

or cultural sites will not be engaged except in self-defense.”29 In 

some circumstances, ROE provide greater restrictions than those 

the law requires, depending on the needs and objectives of the 

overall mission.

The SROE apply to all military operations and contingencies 

outside U.S. territory and to air and maritime defense missions 

within U.S. territory. “They provide implementation guidance on 

the inherent right of self-defense and the application of force for 

mission accomplishment [and] are designed to provide a common 

template for development and implementation of ROE for the full 

range of operations, from peace to war.”30 The SROE define individual and unit self-defense, distinguish between the use of force 

in self-defense and in furtherance of the mission, and provide 

guidance for understanding the concepts of hostile force, hostile 

act, and hostile intent. Each Combatant Command has specific 

ROE as well and every military operation, such as Operation Iraqi 

27 Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,” 25.

28 Operational Law Handbook, 74.

29 Headquarters, Joint Task Force South, Operations Order 90-2, ROE Card (Key 

West, FL: December 1990), para. L (summarizing ROE stated in annex R of the 

Corps-level operations order for Operation Just Cause in Panama) (on file with 

CLAMO). This rule fulfills multiple United States LOAC treaty obligations to 

protect religious and cultural objects, historic monuments, and hospitals, as long 

as they are not being used at the time for military purposes.

30 Operational Law Handbook, 74.
Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, has specific ROE tailored to meet the legal, policy, and military parameters and objectives of the particular operations. Furthermore, multinational 

operations have multinational and combined ROE. These ROE 

can often present multilayered challenges, as the U.S. Army JAG 

School’s Operational Law Handbook explains: 

Each nation’s understanding of what triggers the right to selfdefense is often different, and will be applied differently across 

the multinational force. Each nation will have different perspectives on the LOW [law of war], and will be party to different 

LOW obligations that will affect its ROE. And ultimately, each 

nation is bound by its own domestic law and policy that will 

significantly impact its use of force and ROE.31

In essence, therefore, ROE represent the intersection of law, policy, 

operational strategy, and even diplomacy or multinational coordination, the center of four interlocking frameworks.

The Role of Leadership

According to one Marine Corps definition, leadership “is the sum 

of those qualities of intellect, human understanding, and moral 

character that enables a person to inspire and to control a group 

of people successfully.”32 The Army’s definition of leadership is 

similar: “Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to 

accomplish the mission and improving the organization.”33 The 

Army’s leadership framework highlights three levels: direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership. All 

three are relevant to the instant discussion of ROE and leadership. 

31 Ibid, 77.

32 Lejeune Leadership Institute, Leadership Guide, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/usmc/leadership_guide.pdf. 

33 Department of the Army, FM 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-2.

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Direct leadership is “face-to-face or first-line leadership”34 and is 

about direct, in-person communication. Organizational leaders 

“influence, operate, and improve their outfits through programs, 

policies, and systems. They must concern themselves with the 

higher organization’s needs, as well as those of their subordinate 

units and leaders.”35 Strategic leaders are “responsible for large organizations and influence several thousand to hundreds of thousands of people. They establish force structure, allocate resources, 

communicate strategic vision, and prepare their commands and 

the Army as a whole for their future roles.”36

As one of the primary tools for communicating strategy, the legal 

framework, and other key considerations relevant to a particular 

mission or broader military operation, ROE are, in a fundamental 

way, about leadership. This leadership function has multiple audiences, however, which can be divided into two primary categories. The first, of course, is the military, with numerous audiences, 

from senior commanders to junior commanders to the Marines 

and soldiers on the ground. While ROE in the most immediate 

sense provide Marines and soldiers on the ground with the parameters for the use of force, making them in some sense the most 

direct audience, ROE are equally important at the higher levels of 

the military. The second category is policy makers and the general 

public. In today’s globally interconnected world of 24-hour news 

cycles and the Internet, the Marine or soldier on the ground in a 

faraway conflict has a much louder voice than in the past. The 

government also does not exercise the same measure of control 

over information about a conflict as it might have a century, or 

even several decades, ago. ROE thus play a role—whether intended or not from the beginning—in communicating the mission to 

34 Ibid., 3-7.

35 “Army Leadership: Doctrine and the New FM 22-100,” Army Study Guide 

website, http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/leadership/army-leadership-doctrine-.shtml.

36 FM 6-22, Army Leadership, 3-7.
the general public and policy makers. The manner in which military leaders convey the ROE and mission parameters to these audiences, and the effectiveness of that communication, is therefore 

another component of the way ROE and leadership interact in a 

critical manner. Finally, communicating with both sets of audiences in a consistent manner is thus at the heart of the essential 

interrelationship between ROE and leadership.

The nature of counterinsurgency in particular brings several important aspects of military leadership to the fore. The Marines, for 

example, highlight the leadership concept of “decentralization.” 

This concept emphasizes that subordinate commanders should 

make decisions based on their understanding of the commander’s intent37 using their own initiative, rather than passing questions up the chain of command and waiting for an answer. To do 

so, junior commanders must have a thorough understanding not 

just of the senior leadership’s intent and objectives, but also of 

how to apply that understanding to the facts on the ground and 

developments as they arise. As the Marine field manual, Leading 

Marines, states, “In order to generate the tempo of operations we 

desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity 

of combat, command and control must be decentralized.”38 Such 

decentralized operations inherently produce a greater need for 

increased understanding of ROE and shared vision. In the same 

way, the permissive structure of the SROE goes hand in hand with 

leadership considerations based on trusting those at the lowest 

level to use the tools and training they have received correctly 

in the heat of combat. The COIN manual highlights the need to 

“empower the lowest levels”:

37 A device designed to help subordinates understand the larger context of their 

actions. U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, June 1997), 88.

38 U.S. Marine Corps, MCWP 6-11, Leading Marines (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, November 2002), 77–78.

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Mission command is the conduct of military operations through 

decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective 

mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results 

from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined 

initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. . . . It is the Army’s and Marine Corps’ preferred method 

for commanding and controlling forces during all types of operations. Under mission command, commanders provide subordinates with a mission, their commander’s intent, a concept of 

operations, and resources adequate to accomplish the mission. 

Higher commanders empower subordinates to make decisions 

within the commander’s intent. They leave details of execution 

to their subordinates and expect them to use initiative and judgment to accomplish the mission.39

ROE are at the center of this system of decentralized command 

and individual initiative—the parameters and guidance that 

ROE provide to senior and junior commanders enable them to 

internalize the intent of the senior leadership and implement it 

on the ground. In counterinsurgency, these imperatives and challenges are magnified severalfold, both for operational and ethical 

reasons. 

The dynamic and ambiguous environment of modern counterinsurgency places a premium on leadership at every level, from 

sergeant to general. Combat in counterinsurgency is frequently a small-unit leader’s fight; however, commanders’ actions 

at brigade and division levels can be more significant. Senior 

leaders set the conditions and the tone for all actions by subordinates.40

39 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-145.

40 Ibid., 7-1. The COIN manual further emphasizes that “effective COIN operations are decentralized, and higher commanders owe it to their subordinates to 

push as many capabilities as possible down to their level.” Ibid., 1-146.
As this statement from the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual

explains, the current conflict in Afghanistan, a complex counterinsurgency operation, offers an excellent opportunity to explore 

how ROE and leadership interact and reinforce each other, in 

effect. To do so, this section will therefore explore the current 

debate over the ROE in Afghanistan and the interaction between 

ROE and LOAC in these situations. Using this discussion as the 

foundation, this section will then highlight how understanding 

leadership and its role in military operations and counterinsurgency in particular is essential to addressing this debate and the 

role of ROE. 

The Debate Over ROE in Afghanistan

Over the past few years, media coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan has exposed what appears to be a growing debate over 

the parameters of the ROE for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. U.S. operations against the Taliban, conducted in and among 

the civilian Afghan population, often led to unintended civilian 

casualties. As these incidents grew and the political and diplomatic ramifications increased in the face of anti-U.S. sentiment, 

the United States began to reconfigure the parameters on its use 

of force. In June 2009, then-ISAF Commanding General Stanley 

A. McChrystal issued a tactical directive setting out restrictions 

on the use of air power in order to hold civilian casualties to a 

minimum. The directive explained the new parameters as follows:

We must fight the insurgents, and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat the enemy and protect our forces. But we 

will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but instead 

on our ability to separate the insurgents from the center of 

gravity—the people. That means we must respect and protect 

the population from coercion and violence—and operate in a 

manner which will win their support.

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This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate 

will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like 

capture of terrain or attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid 

the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering strategic 

defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and 

thus alienating the people.

While this is a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching 

operational issue—clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular 

support will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The 

Taliban cannot militarily defeat us—but we can defeat 

ourselves.41

The directive thus highlights the policy and operational imperatives driving the restrictions on the use of force and illustrates the 

components of ROE: legal, operational, and policy.

Over the next year, reports spread about “soldiers frustrated 

about the increasingly restrictive rules of engagement under 

which they have to operate [and] troops explain[ing] that they 

are hamstrung, unable to protect themselves and use their superior firepower to fight the enemy.”42 According to media reports 

in the United States and other allied countries, there was great 

discontent among enlisted men and junior officers about the supposed inability to “fight back” in response to Taliban attacks. 

For example, one British noncommissioned officer was quoted 

saying, “I agree with [the restrictions] to the extent that previous41 Memorandum from General Stanley A. McChrystal, Tactical Directive, Afghanistan, ISAF Headquarters, 6 July 2009, www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/

Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf.

42 Celeste Ward Gventer, “Why U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan Are So Frustrated; 

Restrictive Rules of Engagement Reflect a Deeper Problem: It’s Not Altogether 

Clear Why U.S. Soldiers Are Trying to “Win Over” the Population,” Christian 

Science Monitor, 30 June 2010. See also Wesley Morgan, “Weighing Threats and 

Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan,” New York Times, 23 August 2010; and 

Diana West, “Afghan War Rules Endanger U.S. Troops,” Washington Examiner, 12 

September 2009.
ly too many civilians were killed but we have got people shooting 

us and we are not allowed to shoot back.”43 Soldiers complained 

about feeling prevented from responding to threats unless they 

were directly fired upon, and there were numerous allegations 

that the tight restrictions on air support meant that units had to 

fight back without this key weapon in the U.S. and allied arsenal 

against the Taliban. In other situations, some soldiers and Marines 

have said that they have heard—or been given—two or more conflicting interpretations of the ROE and the tactical directive. In 

situations where clarity of purpose and clear parameters are critical to efficient and effective military operations, such reports and 

complaints raise concern. Indeed, uncertainty and misinterpretations of the ROE and the basic parameters of the mission and the 

use of force seemed to grow amid claims that junior and senior 

commanders, unsure how to apply the rules, were tightening the 

restrictions further to avoid the risk of overstepping the bounds 

set in the tactical directive.

These developments offer a useful example of the dangers in 

viewing ROE as a restriction, leaving commanders looking for 

clearance from above or giving too much direction to their subordinates. Doing so can take away critical judgment from the triggerpuller and therefore create either unnecessary dangers (putting 

Marines or soldiers in harm’s way) or automatons blindly following instructions. At times, the result can be cascading problems 

of getting permission or seeking cover for decisions, particularly 

when this perception is created at the top and magnified as it goes 

down the chain of command. Ultimately, this pattern runs directly counter to the fundamental concept of ROE.

Although the concerns within the military remained contained, 

the media coverage fostered a much greater dissatisfaction with 

43 Thomas Harding, “Curbs on Firing at Taliban are Putting Us at Risk, Troops 

Warn,” Daily Telegraph, 7 July 2010, 14.

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the ROE among the general public—the second audience mentioned above. The American public, and even top civilian leaders 

and politicians, seemed to believe that U.S. troops in Afghanistan 

were unable to defend themselves and were forced to withstand 

attacks by the Taliban without the authority to shoot back.44 The 

parents of one U.S. service member killed in Afghanistan charged 

that “our soldiers are forced to fight with one hand tied behind 

their backs. They’re not allowed to take care of business.”45 In a 

modification of the actual ROE and the objectives of the tactical 

directive, such reports presented the parameters for the use of 

force as requiring U.S. troops to actually take enemy fire before 

engaging with kinetic force. Nonetheless, in the past few years 

there has been a growing perception that the United States is 

struggling in Afghanistan because of the rules we impose on ourselves, because we define the mission in a way that requires limits 

on the use of force and on the situations in which force is appropriate. This perception itself can be problematic, even if it is based 

on an inaccurate or partial understanding of the actual situation 

on the ground. In effect, “[a]s soldiers feel more restricted in using 

force and as friendly deaths mount, public support for a foreign 

deployment may fade quickly in a nation that abhors American 

casualties.”46 Even if tactical victories continue, this erosion of 

support can spell strategic victory for the opposing side, demonstrating the importance of the general public and the civilian leadership as an audience for the communication of the ROE.

At the same time that these concerns were spreading in the U.S. 

media and—at least as reported—among U.S. troops in Afghanistan, General David H. Petraeus took over command of ISAF 

44 One congressman has declared that the ROE “have proved too often to be fatal” and “def[y] our fundamental belief in the right of self-defense.” Dan Lamothe, 

“Rep: Hold Rules of Engagement Hearing Now,” Army Times, 15 April 2010; see 

also Chandrasekaran, “This is Not How You Fight a War.”

45 David Zucchino, “Military Families Fault Rules of War; Some Call Limits on 

Troops a Key Reason for the Growing U.S. Toll in Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, 

2 September 2010.

46 Martins, “Rules of Engagement for Land Forces,” 14–15.
forces in Afghanistan. In his confirmation hearing, General Petraeus promised to engage in a comprehensive and serious review 

of the ROE in Afghanistan in direct response to such reports. As 

the media reported widely at the time in the summer of 2010,

The controversy pits the desire of top military officers to limit 

civilian casualties, something they regard as an essential part of 

the overall counterinsurgency campaign, against a widespread 

feeling among rank-and-file troops that restrictions on air and 

mortar strikes are placing them at unnecessary risk and allowing Taliban fighters to operate with impunity.47

Statistics gathered and analyzed throughout the past few years 

have demonstrated that the U.S. focus on limiting air power, indirect fires, and minimizing civilian casualties has accomplished 

just that goal: civilian casualties caused by U.S. and other ISAF 

forces have decreased significantly.48 The question thus was not 

whether the U.S. strategy and ROE effectively achieved the stated 

goal of reducing casualties among the Afghan civilian population, 

but whether the parameters set forth to achieve that goal were 

appropriate for enabling the United States to achieve its overall 

mission in Afghanistan. 

After his review, General Petraeus issued a tactical directive in 

August 2010 that renewed the focus on limiting the use of force 

to protect civilians and reduce civilian casualties. Amid a broader 

discussion of strategic and operational goals in Afghanistan, the 

COMISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance maintains continuity in the 

area of use of force:

Fight hard and fight hard with discipline. Hunt the enemy aggressively, but use only the firepower needed to win a fight. We 

can’t win without fighting, but we also cannot kill or capture 

47 Chandrasekaran, “This is Not How You Fight a War.” 

48 Condra, The Effect of Civilian Casualties; Ken Dilanian, “Study: Military 

Efforts to Prevent Afghan Casualties Help U.S. Troops Too,” Los Angeles Times, 

2 August 2010; Jason Motlagh, “Petraeus’ Rules of Engagement: Tougher Than 

McChrystal’s,” Time.com, 6 August 2010.

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our way to victory. Moreover, if we kill civilians or damage their 

property in the course of our operations, we will create more 

enemies than our operations eliminate. That’s exactly what the 

Taliban want. Don’t fall into their trap. We must continue our 

efforts to reduce civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.49

This framework maintains the dual strategic imperatives of defeating the Taliban and reducing civilian casualties, and reinforces that the United States and ISAF cannot win and accomplish 

the mission simply by killing every Taliban militant they find. 

General Petraeus also issued clear instructions that prohibited 

junior and mid-level commanders from making the guidance any 

stricter without his approval, in an effort to address directly concerns about inconsistent application of the ROE and the tactical 

directive.50 This additional component to the August 2010 tactical 

directive highlights the key theme addressed here in this chapter: 

the role of leadership in the development, implementation, and 

communication of the ROE.

Understanding the Interplay Between 

LOAC and ROE

As the previous section explains, LOAC forms the basic parameters for the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons and 

objects during armed conflict. ROE operate within that framework to set the rules for the use of force in the circumstances of the 

particular military mission at hand, the operational imperatives, 

and national command policy. The inherent population-focused 

nature of counterinsurgency is an ideal venue to explore the interplay and distinction between LOAC and ROE.

At the most basic level, counterinsurgency is a strategy employed 

during armed conflict against one or more insurgent groups. Like 

other armed conflicts, counterinsurgency operates within the legal 

49 COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, 1 Aug 2010.

50 Motlagh, “Petraeus’ Rules of Engagement: Tougher Than McChrystal’s.”
framework of LOAC, which applies in all situations of armed conflict. One of the fundamental incidents of armed conflict is the 

authority to use force against enemy persons and property as a 

first resort. LOAC thus contemplates—and accepts—that parties 

will seek to destroy enemy personnel and capabilities and seek 

the complete submission of the enemy, in accordance with distinction, proportionality, and other key obligations under LOAC. 

In both international and noninternational armed conflict, enemy 

personnel can be—and are—targeted on the basis of their status 

as the enemy, as hostile forces.51 Although LOAC certainly allows 

status-based targeting in counterinsurgency, just like any other 

conflict, as long as parties adhere to the rules of LOAC, strategic and policy imperatives often lead to a narrower approach to 

fighting insurgents. It is here that we see the distinction between 

LOAC and ROE in counterinsurgency in particular. The law 

allows for the killing of enemy personnel, and accepts the incidental civilian casualties that occur as a result of such lawful 

attacks, but those casualties may well undermine the military’s 

ability to accomplish its broader mission. For this reason, “[s]ome 

military options, available under both international and national 

law, may not come within national policy intent, either generally 

or with respect to a specific operation.”52 Thus,

When NATO soldiers are doing their best to avoid civilian casualties, tribal elders are more likely to work with them. Intelligence flows over cups of green tea. When the environment is 

soured by civilian death, however, these elders retreat behind 

mud walls—brooding and aloof. Likewise, villagers become 

more likely to respond to insurgent requests to bed down with 

51 See Nils Melzer, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 

in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,” International Review of the 

Red Cross 90 (2008), 991 (adopted by ICRC Assembly, 26 February 2009), http://

www.cicr.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/review-872-p991; and Jimmy Gurulé and 

Geoffrey S. Corn, Principles of Counter-Terrorism Law (Eagan, MN: West Group, 

2011), 70–76.

52 International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo Handbook on Rules of 

Engagement, 2.

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new gun posts. A vicious cycle of killing ensues. This, in turn, 

creates a lockdown of development resources, which undermines the planned-for American exit.53

Or, as one U.S. soldier stated succinctly, “If we could exercise a 

great deal more violence of action, I think we would be more successful at killing. I don’t know how much more successful we’d 

be at winning the war.”54 The specific limitation on the violence of 

action here is not LOAC but the ROE, is not the legal framework 

governing the conduct of hostilities but the policy and strategic 

objective of protecting the civilian population in order to facilitate 

the safe and secure environment for the legitimate government to 

grow and consolidate authority.

In today’s conflicts, where one often hears complaints that LOACcompliant militaries are at a grave disadvantage when fighting 

enemies who do not abide by the laws of war, and in fact exploit 

them for tactical and strategic gain, this distinction between 

LOAC and ROE is often blurred. There is no doubt that fighting 

an enemy that deliberately intermingles with the civilian population, uses innocent civilians as human shields, and launches 

attacks from civilian and protected buildings is an extraordinarily 

difficult and dangerous task. Claims that LOAC is obsolete and 

cannot work in such conflicts are unfounded, however, and manifest a misunderstanding of the purposes of LOAC and the operational capabilities of the U.S. and other advanced militaries.55

53 Philip Smucker, “Don’t Take the Taliban’s Bait; It Would Be Tempting—and 

a Mistake—to Alter the U.S. Rules of Engagement in Afghanistan. Here’s Why,” 

USA Today, 18 August 2010.

54 C.M. Sennott, “Petraeus to Review ‘Rules of Engagement’; Video: In Afghanistan, US Soldiers Say Lives Are Put in Danger by Rules Intended to Save 

Civilians.” GlobalPost, 8 July 2010, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/100707/petraeus-review-rules-engagement.

55 See e.g., Laurie R. Blank and Amos N. Guiora, “Teaching an Old Dog New 

Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare,” Harvard 

National Security Journal 1 (2010), 45–85; Laurie R. Blank, “New Wars, New 

Rules? Not So Fast,” JURIST, 12 January 2010.
These claims also rest on a fundamentally incorrect interpretation of the LOAC principle of proportionality and strategic goals 

to limit civilian casualties and the relationship between the two. 

As explained above, proportionality requires that commanders refrain from launching attacks in which the expected civilian 

casualties will be excessive in relation to the military advantage 

gained. A disproportionate attack, therefore, is one in which civilian casualties are excessive, not one in which civilians are 

killed. LOAC thus accepts that there will be civilian casualties, 

even while requiring efforts to minimize—but not completely 

eliminate—such casualties. Strategic policy and mission imperatives, in contrast, may well seek to eliminate civilian casualties 

as much as possible, particularly in counterinsurgency. Although 

such ROE have a critical mission purpose, they do not mean that 

civilian deaths necessarily constitute violations of LOAC. And 

yet the debate surrounding the ROE in Afghanistan, both within 

the military and in the broader U.S. public, suggests that some 

military personnel and a large proportion of the general public 

believe exactly that. These beliefs, like recent claims that because 

of the ROE in Afghanistan, U.S. soldiers and Marines are handcuffed in fighting an enemy that does not adhere to the law, show 

a misunderstanding of the purpose of the ROE and how the ROE 

relate to LOAC. COIN and ROE are ultimately inseparable, and 

the relationship between ROE and LOAC is a major component of 

education regarding COIN.

Communicating the ROE and the Mission

The above discussion points out the components of the ROE and 

the misunderstandings and contradictions inherent in the current 

debate about the ROE in Afghanistan. Above all else, however, 

all of these factors point to leadership: to the fact that ROE are a 

key leadership tool—and opportunity—that enables an effective 

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commander to communicate the relationship between mission accomplishment, the law of armed conflict, and the tactical needs on 

the ground. For example, no member of the military would hesitate or complain about a highly risky mission to assault a hill if it 

accomplished a larger mission, even knowing the likelihood of 

survival would be low. And yet, when the tactical directives and 

the ROE create risks and dangers for an outcome that is harder to 

measure (“hearts and minds”), the connection between the two 

becomes attenuated. Acceptance of risk for mission accomplishment is a core military function; since counterinsurgency requires 

the assumption of short-term risk for longer-term benefit, that 

benefit must be articulated and operationalized more effectively.

The senior civilian and military leadership understand the 

value of ROE in their everyday operations, and how these rules 

improve relationships with local military and government officials. However, the fact that many complain about the rules as unreasonable restrictions on the ability to use force is clear evidence 

that the message is not being communicated effectively down the 

chain of command or out to the general public. In the current conflicts, when strategic counterinsurgency goals of minimizing civilian casualties are mistaken for legal rules that do not allow for 

civilian deaths in wartime, the differences between law and policy 

are not understood by either a significant portion of the military 

or the U.S. civilian population at large.

In the face of the apparent confusion and misinterpretations detailed above, viewing ROE as a leadership tool, as a critical component of military leadership at all levels, is a fundamental aspect 

of today’s military operations. It is established doctrine that 

“while ROE should never drive the mission, the political, military, and legal forces that may impact the mission and inhibit the 

use of force must be considered and planned for throughout the 
planning process.”56 This concept carries directly through to the 

communication, training, and implementation of ROE as well, 

especially in COIN, where the nature of individual Marines’ or 

soldiers’ interactions with the local population is significant. Although it is axiomatic that ROE must be clear and succinct to be effective, translating the above concepts from the planning process 

to the dissemination and implementation process becomes a key 

facet of effective leadership in COIN operations. 

A Commander When the Commander’s Not There

ROE are “commanders’ rules.”57 Judge advocates and others play 

an important role in the planning, development, drafting, and 

training of ROE, but commanders must retain control over and 

authority for ROE throughout the process and, critically, during 

training and military operations. From the senior leadership to 

the soldier or Marine on the ground, ROE do more than give 

guidance for specific uses of force and other actions during military operations. They provide the link to communicate the commander’s intent, a critical component of any effective mission and 

the key to effective operations in COIN. According to warfighting doctrine, commander’s intent is “a device designed to help 

subordinates understand the larger context of their actions. The 

purpose of providing intent is to allow subordinates to exercise 

judgment and initiative—to depart from the original plan when 

the unforeseen occurs—in a way that is consistent with higher 

commanders’ aims.”58 As the Marine Warfighting Manual explains, 

There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished 

and the reason or intent behind it. The intent is thus a part of 

56 Center for Law and Military Operations, Rules of Engagement (ROE) Handbook 

for Judge Advocates, (Charlottesville, VA: Center for Law and Military Operations, 

2000), 1-1.

57 Ibid., 1-2. See also Joint Pub 1-02, Operational Law Handbook, 73 (“ROE ultimately are the commander’s rules that must be implemented by the Soldier, Sailor, 

Airman, or Marine who executes the mission.”).

58 MCDP 1, Warfighting, 88.

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250 | Aspects of Leadership

every mission. The task describes the action to be taken while 

the intent describes the purpose of the action. The task denotes 

what is to be done, and sometimes when and where; the intent 

explains why. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While a 

situation may change, making the task obsolete, the intent is 

more lasting and continues to guide our actions. Understanding 

the intent of our commander allows us to exercise initiative in 

harmony with the commander’s desires.59

In COIN, the intent—or the why—is not limited to the reason for 

taking a particular hill or capturing a particular strategic objective. Rather, the purpose of specific missions will be linked directly to the broader purpose of the U.S. mission. Put another way, 

the nature of COIN means that individual events on the ground 

can have a significant impact on the broader mission—in effect, 

the strategic corporal writ large. ROE are thus overall a strategic 

issue.

In all missions, context is an important piece of ROE development 

and, in particular, ROE training and dissemination. Context includes understanding who the enemy is, whether there even is 

an enemy, the nature of the civilian population, and its relationship with hostile forces—all considerations that enable soldiers 

to take a set of rules and apply them in a given situation. Past 

analysis of ROE in both training exercises and actual operations 

has shown that “often the source of confusion in an eighteen-yearold private lies not in the rules of engagement themselves, but in a 

lack of understanding of the situation.”60 Although this statement 

is directed at ROE and the soldier or Marine on the ground, it is 

equally relevant along the chain of command, especially in COIN. 

If a company commander is not getting the necessary context and 

message from higher-ups along the chain of command, then we 

cannot expect that he or she will be able to provide that context 

59 Ibid., 88–89.

60 Center for Law and Military Operations, ROE Handbook for Judge Advocates, 

3-22.
to subordinates. As one Marine general explained, understanding 

how to apply the ROE is not sufficient.

More importantly, Marines must understand why the ROE 

exist. Marines need to be “educated” in the application of these 

rules and the consequences of their application, as well as the 

potentially disastrous consequences of improper application. . . 

. [Not] educat[ing] as to the reasoning and applicability of those 

rules may cause the force to inappropriately act.61

This is a two-part leadership issue: first, at the micro level, each 

level of leadership has an important role to play and contribution to make to ensure that the ROE are communicated effectively; 

and second, at the macro level, officers of every rank need to be 

trained in the culture of ROE and in the notion of ROE as critical component of every aspect of military operations, just like a 

weapons system.

On the micro, or mission-specific, level, the challenges in Afghanistan suggest a lack of sufficient internal communication 

and a failure to blend the broader mission imperatives with the 

specific ROE in disseminating the ROE. Like any other battle 

task, “ROE application is as important to a soldier’s success in 

today’s complex environment as the ability to fire and maintain 

a weapon.”62 All too often, unfortunately, commanders face multiple mission imperatives and delegate ROE training to the judge 

advocate, which undermines the ability to communicate the commander’s intent and to reinforce the essential contextual aspects 

from the commander’s perspective. Indeed, communicating ROE 

unrelated to self-defense has traditionally been difficult, both from 

the complexity of the issues and the lack of consistent approach 

from unit to unit and mission to mission.63 So how does com61 Neller, “Lessons Learned,” 14.

62 Center for Law and Military Operations, ROE Handbook for Judge Advocates, 

2-2.

63 Mark Martins, “Deadly Force Is Authorized, but Also Trained,” Army Lawyer, 

September/October 2001, 16.

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mander’s intent get communicated? The first step is to identify 

the intent at the highest level—that found in the tactical directive 

and other guidance. The natural tendency is to focus on the need 

for better ROE instruction and training at the unit level, which is 

important, but doing so fatally ignores the key prerequisite: the 

communication of the senior leadership’s intent to the battalion 

commander, junior commander, and senior enlisted soldiers and 

Marines. Here lies the first component in the notion of the ROE 

as the commander when the commander is not there.64 COIN 

demands seamless integration of mission and ROE, and depends 

on the ability of the junior commander to effectuate the intent of 

the top leaders and the overall strategic imperatives during daily 

interaction with the enemy and the local population.

That’s where it’s going to be won—corporal, sergeants, lieutenants. That’s where you have to focus on because that’s who is 

going to be way out there on the edge of the empire, the pointy 

end of the spear, like we say. Those are the Marines that are 

going to make those tough calls and if they’re not trained to 

deal with that type of decision making, if they don’t have the 

requisite excellence and their weapons handling and their small 

unit tactics, they’re not going to be able to do that job.65

Leadership in the ROE context cannot start at the junior commander level, therefore, but must come from the top. In order 

for subordinates to understand the intent of those at the top, i.e., 

those more than one level directly above them, the senior leadership needs to communicate intent clearly while still facilitating 

64 See e.g., “The Art of Battalion Command,” Counterinsurgency Leadership 

in Iraq, Afghanistan and Beyond, Marine Corps University Symposium, 23 July 

2009, 5 (“And you try to operationalize it because you want them to understand it 

so that when they’re in that point where they have to make a decision and no one’s 

around and it’s corporal so and so, he can do it. He knows what Furness would 

want him to do and that’s probably the only thing—if that’s the only thing he can 

remember, it’s something he can fall back on and hopefully it gets him through 

that difficult decision.”)

65 Ibid., 4.
the use of initiative at the individual level. “Combat in counterinsurgency is frequently a small-unit leader’s fight[, but] commanders’ actions at brigade and division levels can be more significant 

[because] senior leaders set the conditions and the tone for all 

actions by subordinates.”66 This includes not only communicating 

the mission and disseminating the ROE, but—and this is the critical step—clearly conveying and demonstrating how the mission, 

LOAC, and the ROE coalesce into a coherent whole rather than 

remain three separate imperatives with unclear coordination.

The senior military leadership has a second audience for communication about the ROE: the civilian leadership and the general 

public. Communicating consistently with both the military 

chain of command and the general public is a challenge, but in 

today’s interconnected world, it is essential. Further, although 

the general public is not traditionally a relevant audience regarding ROE, the 24/7 interconnected Internet culture has made it 

so. Current efforts to convey the imperatives of COIN and how 

they are carried out through and preserved in the ROE and the 

tactical directive have fallen short, as evidenced by the debates 

and misunderstandings over the parameters of the U.S. and ISAF 

mission in Afghanistan. Diminished public support for the war 

effort—for whatever reason—among both the general public and 

the civilian leadership is highly problematic. The fact that the 

ROE themselves are directly tied to COIN and based on LOAC 

demonstrates that the source of the debate over the ROE is not the 

foundations but the message, not the components but the com66 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 7-1. In some cases, the commander’s rejection 

of or disdain for the strategy can create the opposite climate, one of disrespect for 

the ROE and the mission and even one that enables criminal behavior, such as in 

the case of Colonel Harry Tunnell, commander of the Army’s 5th Stryker Combat 

Brigade in Afghanistan. . Five soldiers from the brigade have been charged with 

war crimes, accused of killing unarmed Afghan civilians for sport. . Many attribute 

the crimes in part to the culture of aggression and disregard for counterinsurgency 

strategy that Colonel Tunnell fostered. . Craig Whitlock, “Brigade’s Strategy: 

‘Strike and Destroy’,” Washington Post, 14 October 2010.

Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 253
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munication. That message and communication are the essence of 

leadership.

At the level of junior commanders and Marines and soldiers on the 

ground, ROE also play the role of the commander when the commander is not there. Because ROE provide the soldier or Marine 

with parameters for action, that individual will be operating in a 

vacuum without an effective understanding of the commander’s 

intent and the way the ROE operationalize the mission and the 

broader strategy. Simply knowing the rule that indirect fires are 

prohibited without direct observation is not sufficient. Understanding why and how this rule advances the overall mission 

and the unit’s local efforts creates the key link between the ROE 

and the soldier’s actions to carry them out, between knowing the 

rule and internalizing it.67 Eliminating unobserved indirect fires 

surely helps fulfill LOAC’s goal of minimizing civilian casualties 

and obligation to refrain from attacks that will result in excessive 

civilian deaths, but is not required to adhere to the law. The rule 

thus marries LOAC obligations with the COIN goals of putting 

the local population first and, even more important, plays a role 

in protecting our own troops. Studies have shown that when U.S. 

and ISAF attacks cause civilian casualties, insurgent groups gain 

members and attacks against U.S. and allied forces increase.68 All 

of these pieces come together and must be woven together into 

a complete message for troops on the ground. Those who question or complain about the ROE in Afghanistan argue that these 

parameters place the safety of Afghan civilians above the safety 

67 See e.g., FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2-14-15 (“2-72: Knowledge of the ROE 

itself is not sufficient to help Soldiers make informed decisions regarding the appropriate application of force. . . . Effective communication is equally essential. 

Leaders must ensure that every Soldier completely understands the mission and 

commander’s intent, and has comprehensive situational understanding at all times. 

The appropriate level of situational understanding, realistic training, and disciplined adherence to basic troop leading procedures equips Soldiers with the tools 

necessary to make informed decisions regarding the decision to use or refrain from 

the use of force.”).

68 Condra, et al, The Effect of Civilian Casualties, 3–4.
of U.S. troops. These claims show both a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the ROE, COIN, and LOAC, as explained 

above, but also an absence of effective leadership in communicating the role of the ROE. Still more, these claims demonstrate 

how ROE themselves can be an effective leadership tool to communicate the broader mission; the safety of Afghan civilians and 

the safety of U.S. troops often go hand in hand, as studies on the 

linkage between civilian casualties and insurgent attacks show. 

ROE make this case and as such, should not only be the subject of 

leadership efforts but also the venue for leadership, communication, and dissemination.

Leadership and ROE at the Macro Level 

Marrying ROE and leadership effectively at the micro level also 

requires comprehensive thinking and efforts at the macro level. In 

order to create a truly effective system in which ROE are seamlessly integrated with mission objectives and LOAC, ROE must take 

on a more central role in military education and training. Officers 

and NCOs must be trained in the culture of ROE itself, not just the 

planning, drafting, and dissemination process. In this way, teaching officers about the role of ROE in the broader system—particularly in today’s conflicts where COIN and ROE are nearly inseparable in many ways—is leadership at the macro level. Just as 

officers and NCOs must completely master a weapons system or 

other component of military operations, so must they fully master 

ROE as a critical component of everything the military does. One 

step is to explore the curriculum at the war colleges to see how 

ROE are currently taught and how to integrate the concept of 

ROE, and the interplay with COIN and LOAC, more deeply into 

the curriculum. Military exercises offer another rich opportunity 

for broader ROE training, beyond the training and instruction in 

the specific ROE for the exercise. It is often too easy for commanders and planners to turn ROE over to the judge advocates, both 

Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 255
256 | Aspects of Leadership

for drafting and training, but doing so can take ROE right out of 

the leadership equation. Exercises, which can be a key tool for 

learning beyond the training specific to the exercise, thus provide 

a venue for inculcating ownership over the ROE process from the 

earliest planning through the constant and repetitive instruction, 

training, and conversations that make ROE an effective tool in the 

hands of a commander.

Conclusion

Training, dissemination, and implementation of ROE implicate 

leadership at every level, particularly in a counterinsurgency environment like the current conflict in Afghanistan. The nature of 

the mission in Afghanistan and the debate over the ROE offer an 

ideal venue to examine the role that ROE can play as a leadership 

tool, as well as the opportunity ROE provide to enhance leadership across the spectrum of command, from the top strategic 

levels to the small unit level. Indeed, the leadership challenges 

are greater still in multinational operations, where the command 

structure and organizational resources are more diffuse and dispersed. In such situations, the top commanders must exert significant powers of persuasion and the ability to convince others in the 

coalition to focus on the same mission objectives and implement 

that mission in the same manner.

Recognizing the contribution that ROE make to leadership efforts 

as the critical intersection between law, strategy, and policy 

during armed conflict—and that leadership makes to the effective 

implementation of ROE—is an essential step. In keeping with the 

focus on decentralized leadership and the need to communicate 

the commander’s intent, ROE serve as a commander when the 

commander is not there, providing the link to the commander’s 

intent and enabling soldiers and Marines to exercise judgment 

and initiative in accordance with strategic mission imperatives. 
For these reasons, it is essential to highlight that ROE is a key 

aspect of leadership at both the micro and macro levels. First, ROE 

training, dissemination, and implementation must include clear 

and concrete explanations and demonstrations of how the commander’s intent, the ROE, and LOAC are thoroughly integrated. 

Second, on the macro level, officers must be trained, educated, 

and proficient in the culture of ROE as a central component of 

all military operations. Although the debates over the ROE in Afghanistan may not get it right on the relationship between LOAC, 

ROE, and COIN, they do reinforce the essential connection and 

interrelationship between ROE and leadership, one that demands 

further emphasis.

Law, Strategy, and Leadership | 257

—259—

Even war has its limits. In situations where the parties pitted 

against each other have resorted to armed force, there are restrictions to the extent and the type of violence that can and should 

be used, against whom, and what can be targeted. The exercise 

of humanity in armed conflicts is a thread which, as this chapter 

explores, needs to run through all aspects of planning and battlefield conduct, with military commanders having to make important and difficult decisions, and crucially, lead by example.1

At the outbreak of armed conflicts, international humanitarian 

law (IHL), also known as “the laws of war,” becomes the regulating legal framework for the parties to the conflict.2

 This body 

of law, termed jus in bello, includes the four Geneva Conventions 

of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005, the Law of 

The Hague, and customary international law.3

 It recognizes that in 

1 The terms “commander” and “superior” are used interchangeably in this paper. 

The paper focuses on military commanders, not civilian commanders, of all ranks 

who have members of armed forces under their command.

2 The terms “international humanitarian law” and “laws of war” are used interchangeably in this paper.

3 The United States has not signed either of the Additional Protocols. However, a 

large portion of Additional Protocol I—including those provisions and principles 

highlighted in this chapter—are considered to be customary international law by 

both the U.S. and other countries around the world. See Gary D. Solis, The Law 

of Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 138: “Having 

once accepted that 65 percent of the Protocol is customary international law, and 

necessarily forced to comply with the remaining portion . . . U.S. rejection of Additional Protocol I nears irrelevance.”

Humanity in War

Leading by Example: The Role of the 

Commander in Modern Warfare

Jamie A. Williamson
260 | Aspects of Leadership

armed conflicts there will be loss of life and damage to property—

incidents that have no place in times of peace. Yet it attempts to 

limit the suffering caused by conflict and hostilities by inserting 

certain basics of humanity and minimum standards of behavior, 

while allowing the parties to the conflict to achieve their military 

objectives. IHL is about compromise between humanitarian principles and military necessity. 4

In many regards, the military commander is left to decide how 

aggressively to engage the enemy. The law will, of course, set the 

outer framework and determine what actions are deemed lawful 

even if they result in widespread killing. Yet in exercising that 

right of action in hostilities, commanders and, by extension, their 

subordinates, are also to be guided by their own morals and personal standards to act with restraint. In the same way as the medieval Codes of Chivalry and the 19th-century Lieber Code, modern 

day IHL calls for combatants to behave in a civilized manner, not 

to cause unnecessary suffering and wanton destruction. In sum, 

one should act as an “officer and a gentleman,” affording humane 

treatment to all.5

In conflict, if the enemy is dehumanized and demonized, it 

becomes easier for combatants to justify acts of untoward vio4 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), xxxiv. Put more bluntly by a U.S. commander in 

Iraq in 2006, “I really had to work to convince them, ‘Dude, not everybody needs 

to get the crap kicked out of him. In fact, beating the crap out of people is wrong, 

you know? Geneva Conventions? Look it up. It’s a concept.’” Jim Frederick, Black 

Hearts (New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 2010), 189.

5 Codes of Chivalry, at their peak in the 12th and 13th centuries, were in essence 

codes of conduct for knights, and indirectly provided some protection to civilians. 

See http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/721819/law-of-war/52915/

Roots-of-the-international-law-of-war; Instructions for the Government of Armies 

of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code), 24 April 1863. The “Lieber 

Instructions” were prepared during the American Civil War by Francis Lieber, then 

a professor of Columbia College in New York, revised by a board of officers and 

promulgated by President Lincoln. They reflected in large part the then-prevailing 

laws and customs of war. See D. Schindler and J.Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (Dordrecht: Martinus Nihjoff, 1988), 3–23.
Humanity in War | 261

lence against the adversary. With research showing that moral 

disengagement of combatants is a gradual process, the threshold 

of acceptable levels will be constantly pushed. The challenge for 

commanders is to lead by example and prevent their troops from 

committing acts of heedless destruction, unnecessary violence, 

and acts of barbarity. 

This chapter recalls that military superiors at all levels have a clear 

legal obligation to respect and to ensure the respect of the tenets 

of IHL by their subordinates. Where they fail to do so, they leave 

themselves open to possible criminal liability. Today’s commanders also have to assume a particular role in contemporary irregular-driven conflicts; not only must they ensure compliance with 

the laws of war, but in addition to their traditional military role, 

they often must also act as diplomats and politicians in complex, 

culturally diverse environments to increase chances of achieving 

the overall mission objective of winning hearts and minds. In so 

doing, they work toward sustainable peace, which is best served 

by conducting a “clean war,” namely one within the boundaries 

of IHL.

Discretion of the Commander in Applying IHL

Conflict is a fickle beast, wreaking havoc, causing suffering, death, 

and destruction, yet allowing for acts of survival, courage, and 

humanity. International humanitarian law is its leash, seeking to 

place restraints on how this beast behaves, limiting the manner in 

which those engaged in the fighting conduct themselves vis-à-vis 

the enemy and seeking to ensure a minimum of protection will 

be afforded to specific categories of persons and property. Commanders are expected to hold the leash and to decide how tightly 

it needs to be gripped, all the time balancing military necessity 

and humanity.
262 | Aspects of Leadership

The 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 

1977 and 2005 provide the baselines that must be respected at all 

times. With over 600 provisions, the Conventions and their Protocols are detailed in many ways and specific to many issues. 

The Third Geneva Convention, which explains meticulously how 

prisoners of war are to be handled when they have fallen into the 

hands of the adversary, exemplifies how detailed IHL can be. Likewise, the Fourth Geneva Convention is extensive in its description of the treatment of civilians, with particular focus on more 

vulnerable groups, such as children and women. Read alongside 

the commentaries to the Conventions, military manuals, and doctrine, there seems little left to discretion. The parties to the conflict 

will struggle to argue against the common sense understanding of 

many of these provisions.

Yet, despite the best efforts of the drafters of the Conventions 

to provide clear and measurable rules, more significant areas of 

IHL, especially in the conduct of hostilities, continue to require 

a balancing act between, on the one hand, military necessity and 

operational requirements, and the other, the spirit of the law 

and humanitarian considerations. Some of the more important 

IHL concepts, seemingly obvious at face value, such as distinction, precaution, proportionality, and humane treatment, are also 

subject to this balancing act and the inevitable exercise of discretion by commanders.

The Principles

As noted in the Pictet Commentaries to the Additional Protocols 

of 1977, there were many differences of opinion during the drafting of these provisions “due to the heavy burden of responsibility 

imposed . . . on military commanders, particularly as the various 

provisions are relatively imprecise and open to a fairly broad 

margin of judgment.”6

 The commanders, being at the forefront of 

6 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June, 679. 
military operations, therefore translate the law into practice. They 

have to determine in the fog of war who, what, and how to target 

during military engagements, always evaluating myriad factors 

to ensure that their actions are compliant with IHL. A brief review 

of some of these concepts helps to illustrate this.

The principle of distinction is at the core of IHL, with the parties 

to a conflict having to direct their attacks only against military 

objectives and combatants, and not against civilians and civilian objects. Therefore, a party has to assess, before launching an 

attack, whether a potential target is a military objective, defined as 

“objects which, by their nature, location, purpose, or use make an 

effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial 

destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling 

at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”7

 Any decision 

about whether an object is protected against attack depends on 

the information available to the commander and the circumstances at the time.8

Once it has been determined that a potential target is a military 

objective, the party considering launching the attack must make 

a proportionality assessment, as well as review the pattern of life, 

so as to limit any collateral damage. Thus, if an attack is expected 

to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 

to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 

anticipated, it is to be cancelled or suspended.9

 Some have argued 

that proportionality is often “inexact in application” requiring 

7 Additional Protocol I, to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 52(2).

8 Referred to as the Rendulic rule by the U.S. JAG, “the circumstances justifying 

destruction of objects are those of military necessity, based upon information reasonably available to the commander at the time of his decision.” International and 

Operational Law Department, U.S. Operational Law Handbook (Charlottesville, 

VA: The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2010), www.loc.gov/

rr/frd/...Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2010.pdf

9 Additional Protocol I, to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 51(5)(b) and Art. 57(2)(b).

Humanity in War | 263
264 | Aspects of Leadership

combatants to make “estimates” of likely harm.10 Put another 

way, “it must be difficult for people who have not served in the 

military themselves to judge what is, or is not, ‘reasonable’ in confused and dangerous conditions.”11

Throughout the planning and execution phase of operations, the 

parties are required to exercise the appropriate level of precaution. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term, and severe damage;12 to 

spare civilians and civilian objects;13 and the parties are to exercise all “feasible precautions” in the choice of means or methods 

of attack in order to avoid and minimize collateral damage.14 As 

with the proportionality assessment, such exercises of “care” and 

“precaution” are left to commanders to appreciate.

Civilians shall enjoy protection unless and for such time as they 

take a direct part in hostilities.15 Determining at what point a civilian is said to be taking a direct part in hostilities is a difficult task, 

especially when one is in a “troops in contact” situation. As the 

International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) guidance on 

direct participation and related articles published in response to it 

have shown, consensus was difficult to reach on a number of key 

issues. Practitioners, military operators, and academics, for instance, expressed differing views on which acts are “preparatory,” 

when participation ends, if the person “regains” civilian status 

and the related protection after having participated in hostilities. 

Deciding on acceptable criteria as to who is a member of an organized group and of a declared hostile group was likewise a chal10 Bill Rhodes, An Introduction to Military Ethics: A Reference Handbook (Santa 

Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), 109. 

11 Mike Jackson, Soldier: The Autobiography (London: Bantam Press, 2007), 421.

12 Additional Protocol I, to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 55(1).

13 Ibid., Art. 57(1).

14 Ibid., Art. 57(2)(b), and also Art. 58, generally. 

15 Ibid., Art. 51(3).
lenging exercise for the experts.16 Whereas experts might disagree 

on the legal aspects, the hard decisions on whether or not a particular individual has lost his protection are left to the commanders 

and their troops in theater. Most cases are clear-cut, yet there are 

times when a line cannot easily be drawn, and an inkling of doubt 

subsists. For the superior, the choice may be between jeopardizing the success of a particular mission and other goals, such as 

winning hearts and minds, to benefit the overall campaign.

All persons who do not or who no longer take part in hostilities 

are to be treated humanely in all circumstances.17 Likewise, individuals who have been deprived of liberty are to be afforded 

humane treatment.18 Although a commander responsible for detainee operations will be guided by his society’s standards as to 

what constitutes “humane,” these may nonetheless contradict 

cultural and religious dictates of the detainee, as was amply demonstrated over the last decade. Again, apart from obvious acts of 

ill treatment or torture, the commander will have to assess a multitude of factors, including behavior and attitude of guards visà-vis the detainees, appropriate disciplinary measures, and force 

protection constraints and will have to take into account religious, 

cultural, and dietary considerations of detainees in ensuring that 

any detention regimen as laid out in the relevant operating procedures is humane.

The Commander’s Choice

The commander’s exercise of discretion in applying these principles not only impacts how operations are conducted but can 

also have a bearing on how the war is viewed, on swaying public 

16 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 

Hostilities under IHL (Geneva: ICRC, 2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/

documents/feature/direct-participation-ihl-feature-020609.htm.

17 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, Art. 4(1) and Common 

Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. 

18 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 

Humanity in War | 265
266 | Aspects of Leadership

opinion at home, on keeping troops’ morale high, and on gaining 

the support of the local population. The U.S. Army is very much 

of the view that compliance with the laws of war not only enhances public support of military missions but can also end conflict 

more quickly.19 Similarly, the Pictet Commentaries to the Additional Protocols have argued that the faithful application of IHL, 

by limiting the effects of hostilities, can contribute to reestablishing peace.

The amount of force and methods of warfare that are used on the 

adversary and the perception of the local population are central to 

counterinsurgency and can have major repercussions in winning 

hearts and minds. As the British army field manual underscores, 

“A society’s view of acceptable levels of coercion and force are 

often closely linked to its cultural norms. How a society or groups 

within it regard the use of coercion and force are likely to have a 

bearing on how military operations are perceived. It is therefore 

an important factor to take into account when planning and conducting operations and when reacting to events.”20 In addition to 

its obvious negativity, perception of an excessive use of force can 

markedly increase the risk of individuals deciding to retaliate by 

joining or actively supporting the insurgency, whether by becoming directly engaged or through provision of safe houses, information gathering, and hiding places for weapons caches:

Force may solve a tactical problem—a firing point neutralized, 

a fleeting target engaged, or a strongpoint destroyed—but if the 

use of force is perceived as excessive or ill targeted, the neutral 

segment of the population may be antagonized or alienated 

and it may leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. 

Worse still, active support for the insurgents by those suffering or observing the effects of force may be engendered. This is 

19 U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook, 37.

20 British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10, Countering Insurgency, Army 

Code 71876, October 2009, 3-15, news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_11_09_

army_manual.pdf.
particularly so in those tribal cultures where codes of personal 

and family honor, justice, and vengeance are strong. Here the 

killing or perceived ill treatment of a family member (especially 

females) could result in other members of the family joining the 

insurgency.21

Thus, how a commander conducts operations and exercises his 

discretion under IHL can either stoke or diminish an insurgency. 

As Whetham warns, “Allowing the gloves to be taken off anywhere in the chain of command is not only bad strategy, but it 

can also undermine the reasons for which you went to war in the 

first place.”22 In counterinsurgency situations, commanders are 

expected to show greater restraint than ever in how much force 

is used.

Commanders’ individual leadership styles and operational decisions may benefit the winning of hearts and minds in an operation, and for the most part troop morale and discipline may 

be positively enthused. Yet the reverse effect is also true, to the 

extent that soldiers may feel disempowered as to how force is 

used and lose confidence in their military might. The negative reactions of some military personnel to the concept of “courageous 

constraint” that NATO and U.S. commanders introduced in Afghanistan in 2010 reflects the tightrope that commanders must 

walk in finding the right level of force that needs to be used to 

achieve the objective of winning the war, especially in counterinsurgency situations. In revising the escalation of force standard 

operating procedures, the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) hoped to reduce collateral damage and civilian casualties. 

However, military personnel were reported to have been very 

21 Ibid., 3-28. 

22 David Whetham, “Taking the Gloves Off and the Illusions of Victory: How 

Not to Conduct a Counter-Insurgency,” in Warrior’s Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality 

and Torture in Modern Warfare, ed. George Kassimeris (Farnham UK: Ashgate, 

2006), 135.

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268 | Aspects of Leadership

critical of the new policy of courageous restraint, suggesting it 

was forcing them to fight with one hand tied behind their backs 

and that it was eroding troop confidence.23 One article quoted a 

junior officer saying, “It’s a major bugbear for the British army, it 

affects us massively. Thank God we have the ANA (Afghan National Army) here because they have different rules of engagement to us and can smash the enemy.”24

This illustrates that the evolving nature of the hostilities in irregular warfare regularly tests the application of IHL standards and 

principles in theater. Also, with counterinsurgency blending military, political, economic, and social objectives, the mission’s strategy and rules of engagement will be regularly modified to best 

meet these. As David Kennedy wrote, “In today’s asymmetric 

postcolonial wars, the terrain beneath a soldier’s interpretations 

of what is and is not appropriate is constantly shifting.”25 The 

British Army field manual explains, “Today’s hybrid threats—any 

adversaries that simultaneously and adaptively employ a fused 

mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism, and 

criminal behavior in the same battle space to obtain their political 

objectives—are constantly seeking to exploit what they perceive 

to be the vulnerabilities of regular forces.”26 How to best tackle 

these adversaries and win hearts and minds is complex and requires the military to be able to continually adapt and adjust its 

“line of attack.”

For commanders, the nature of threats is always evolving as nonstate actor insurgents modify their tactics and the means they use 

23 Thomas Harding, “‘Courageous Restraint’ Putting Troops Lives at Risk,”

Telegraph (London), 6 July 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/

asia/afghanistan/7874950/Courageous-restraint-putting-troops-lives-at-risk.html; 

Sean Naylor, “McChrystal: Civilian Deaths Endanger Mission,” Army Times, 30 

May 2010, http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_afghanistan_civilian_casualties_053010w/.

24 Ibid. 

25 David Kennedy, Of War and Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

2006), 132.

26 British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10, 1-1. 
to overcome the more powerful—in terms of capacity—regular 

armed forces. Left with a certain amount of discretion in applying 

IHL, the commander has an essential role to play in ensuring the 

norms of IHL are respected despite the shifting sands of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. 

To Prevent, Punish, or Be Punished

As witnessed over the centuries, participation in armed conflicts can bring out the best as well as the worst in individuals 

as they seek to defeat their respective adversary. Those who do 

not comply with IHL can and must be held accountable. Commanders can be held personally responsible for having ordered 

the commission of violations of the laws of war. They can also be 

held liable for having failed to either prevent or punish their subordinates (omission liability).

As discussed above, a large part of the commander’s responsibility is assumed through preventive action, with leadership style 

and exercise of authority central to creating an environment conducive to the constant respect of IHL. However, there may be situations where, despite all the best endeavors on the part of a commander to instill the appropriate behavior and discipline among 

the troops, combatants under their authority and control may 

transgress the laws of war. In these cases, the laws of war require 

superiors to punish the perpetrators accordingly. As General Sir 

Mike Jackson explains, “We do our best to screen out such individuals, but inevitably, some slip through the net. So abuses will 

occasionally happen—but they can never be tolerated.”27

27 Jackson, Soldier: The Autobiography, 421. General Sir Michael David “Mike” 

Jackson, GCB, CBE, DSO, DL served with the British military from 1963 to 

2006. In 1997, he was commander of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps 

(ARRC) in the Balkans; from 2000 to 2003, he was commander in chief, Land 

Command of the British Army; and was the chief of the General Staff (CGS), the 

professional head of the British Army, from 2003 to 2006. He retired from the 

army after serving for over 40 years.

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Punishment can occur through either disciplinary or penal action, 

though the latter is to be preferred where serious violations of 

IHL are at issue.28 An argument could be made that it is unfair 

to hold commanders responsible by way of omission liability for 

the actions of their subordinates; a stronger counterposition is 

that to allow a culture of acquiescence or impunity for acts of unnecessary violence by subordinates potentially encourages more 

violations and can undermine the overall mission: “How can we 

expect to win the support of the Iraqi people if they believe that 

we are abusing their compatriots?”29 The responsibility of commanders to control subordinates and to ensure that they respect 

IHL is now engrained in case law.

Even before the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 

U.S. Supreme Court in the Yamashita case strongly stated that 

commanders could be held accountable for failing to discharge 

their duties to control the operations of persons under their 

command who had violated the laws of war.30 This 1946 case concerned General Tomuyuki Yamashita, the commander of the Japanese forces in the Philippines in 1944–45. The majority judgment, 

delivered by Chief Justice Stone, enounced the principle that the 

laws of war impose upon an army commander a duty to take 

28 See Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic ́, IT-01-47-A, Appeal Judgement, 22 April 

2008, para. 33. “It cannot be excluded that, in the circumstances of a case, the 

use of disciplinary measures will be sufficient to discharge a superior of his duty to 

punish crimes under article 7(3) of the Statute. In other words, whether measures 

taken were solely of a disciplinary nature, criminal, or a combination of both, cannot in itself be determinative of whether a superior discharged his duty to prevent 

or punish under article 7(3) of the Statute.”

29 Jackson, Soldier: The Autobiography, 421.

30 In Re Yamashita No. 61, Misc. Supreme Court of the United States 327 US 1; 

66 S. Ct. 340; 90 L. Ed. 499; 1946 U.S. LEXIS 3090. The relevant charge held 

against General Yamashita was that “the law of war imposes on an army commander a duty to take such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the 

troops under his command for the prevention of acts which are violations of the 

law of war and which are likely to attend the occupation of hostile territory by an 

uncontrolled soldiery; and he may be charged with personal responsibility for his 

failure to take such measures when violations result.”
such appropriate measures as are within his power to control the 

troops under his command and prevent them from committing 

violations of the laws of war. In the view of the court, the absence 

of such an affirmative duty for commanders to prevent violations 

of the laws of war would defeat the very purpose of those laws: 

It is evident that the conduct of military operations by troops 

whose excesses are unrestrained by the orders or efforts of their 

commander would almost certainly result in violations which 

it is the purpose of the law of war to prevent. Its purpose to 

protect civilian populations and prisoners of war from brutality would largely be defeated if the commander of an invading 

army could with impunity neglect to take reasonable measures 

for their protection. Hence the law of war presupposes that its 

violation is to be avoided through the control of the operations 

of war by commanders who are to some extent responsible for 

their subordinates.31

Similarly in the case of the United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al. 

(High Command Case), it was underscored that “under basic 

principles of command authority and responsibility, an officer 

who merely stands by while his subordinates execute a criminal order of his superiors, which he knows is criminal, violates 

a moral obligation under international law. By doing nothing 

he cannot wash his hands of international responsibility.”32 The 

concept of command or superior responsibility is now firmly ingrained in the prosecution of war crimes and has been extended 

to other grave international crimes, notably genocide and crimes 

against humanity.

International criminal tribunals prioritize the prosecution of commanders over that of subordinates, and a perusal of relevant judg31 Ibid.

32 United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., Trials of War Criminals before the 

Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. XI 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), 1230, 1303.

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ments highlights that these courts are inclined to sanction commanders more harshly than the foot soldier who wielded the fatal 

blow. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has underscored that with rank comes responsibility, which can aggravate the sentence to be handed down. The tribunal emphasized that commanders, by virtue of their positions, 

set the example for their troops and that failure to act appropriately could have a negative effect on the how their subordinates 

behave. 

As the ICTY explained in Obrenovic, “When commanders, through 

their own actions or inactions, fail in the duty, which stems from 

their position, training, and leadership skills, to set an example 

for their troops that would promote the principles underlying the 

laws and customs of war and thereby—either tacitly or implicitly—promote or encourage the commission of crimes, this may be 

seen as an aggravating circumstance.”33 This reasoning has been 

followed by other international and hybrid tribunals in sentencing superiors, civilian or military. 

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda stipulated that 

“as a general principle, this Appeals Chamber agrees with the jurisprudence of ICTY that the most senior members of a command 

structure, that is, the leaders and planners of a particular conflict, should bear heavier criminal responsibility than those lower 

down the scale, such as the foot soldiers carrying out the orders.”34

The Special Court for Sierra Leone has followed suit “where the 

accused has actively abused his position of command or participated in the crimes of his subordinates, however, such conduct 

can be considered to be aggravating.”35

33 ICTY Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenovi, Case No.: IT02-60/2-S, 10 December 2003, 32.

34 ICTR Appeals Judgement, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR96-13-A, 16 November 200, 125. 

35 SCSL Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon, and 

Augustine Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, 8 April 2008, 17.
In terms of responsibility, the principle has been set in stone that 

commanders, because of their hierarchical positions, are to be held 

to higher standards than those of lower rank. This trend is very 

much influenced by the belief—in part based on common sense—

that leaders set the example for the actions of their subordinates 

and are specifically tasked under the laws of war to assume this 

responsibility. It is not strict liability as such, but as the courts 

argue, there is a strong presumption that commanders at all times 

should know or have known of the actions of their subordinates.

Of course, much of the case law has evolved in the context of 

conventional warfare, where clear lines of responsibility could 

be determined. With the development of such warfighting concepts such as “distributed operations,” the challenge will arguably be even greater on commanders at all levels to exercise and 

to be seen to exercise the required level of supervision over their 

subordinates.

A Better Peace by Waging a Cleaner War

In today’s complex asymmetrical situations involving one or a 

number of nonstate actor groups engaged against regular armed 

groups, insurgents may aim to overthrow their governments 

through violent means. Such groups can use a mélange of political, religious, and criminal methods and tools, seeking to weaken 

a government’s power as well as increase their own control over 

territory and the local population. Commanders have had to 

adapt to these new realities and the expectations of counterinsurgency warfare.

Fighting these belligerents and overcoming their adversity is no 

longer just a question of inflicting the greatest amount of death 

upon the enemy in the least possible time, as General Patton 

would argue, but is also significantly about winning hearts and 

minds, thus depriving the groups of potential support of the local 

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population.36 Conflict is more than the use of lethal force on the 

adversary, and more a blending of military, political, and economic means to achieve long-lasting peace. As General Sir Rupert 

Smith explained, 

In our new paradigm, which I call “war amongst the people,” 

you seek to change the intentions or capture the will of your opponent and the people amongst which you operate, to win the 

clash of wills and thereby win the trial of strength. The essential difference is that military force is no longer used to decide 

the political dispute but rather to create a condition in which a 

strategic result is achieved. . . . In large measure, the strategic 

objective is to win the hearts and minds of the people. In other 

words, this isn’t a supporting activity of your tactical battle. It 

is the purpose of what you are doing. So arriving afterwards 

to paint a school or deliver toothpaste isn’t helping if you’ve 

blown the school away in the first place.37

Modern-day thinking on counterinsurgency reflects this shift in 

attitude and strategy in dealing with new threats in multifaceted 

noninternational armed conflicts.38 Defeating the enemy is also 

gaining the support of the local population, and this cannot be 

achieved by the use of force alone. “Counterinsurgency is warfare; 

it is distinctly political, not primarily military; and it involves the 

people, the government, and the military. The strength of the relationship between these three groups generally determines the 

outcome of the campaign.”39 Commanders in the field are expected to juggle among “security,” “development,” and “sustainment” and to “always execute good judgment, tactical patience, 

and innovation to defeat an insurgency.”40 They must navigate 

36 See for instance General Patton’s speech to the Third Army, given in 1944. 

37 General Sir Rupert Smith, interview, International Review of the Red Cross 88 

(2006): 719, 724.

38 British Army Field Manual, Volume 1 Part 10, 1.1. 

39 Ibid. 

40 Department of the Army, FMI 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98), Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC,: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2009), ix, 

www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-24-2.pdf.
through various domestic political structures, sometimes based 

on complex tribal customs and allegiances. In such contexts, commanders often have to interact and cooperate with a plethora of 

different actors, including international, intergovernmental, and 

nongovernmental organizations; community representatives; 

coalition partners; traditional leaders; religious leaders; and the 

media.

Besides the capacity building and structural support that parties 

to a conflict can bring to affected communities, the success or 

failure of a counterinsurgency depends substantially on the 

ability to win the confidence of the local population in order to 

undermine the support for the insurgency. In counterinsurgency, 

ultimately, whoever gains the support of the local population has 

the better chance of defeating the enemy. 

To achieve such an objective, it is important that all appropriate 

steps are taken to ensure that the laws of war are fully respected. With the 24/7 media coverage of hostilities, the reputation of 

armed forces can be made or broken by a single image of an act 

of humiliation, of ill treatment, or of wanton disregard for life. 

These images may sway public opinion, can be used to undermine public support, and more dangerously can generate greater 

animosity toward a country and its armed forces. Locally, military commanders are not only expected to understand the local 

communication system, as it “influences local, regional, national, 

and international audiences,”41 but must also be aware that the 

insurgents can use media and propaganda to gain credibility 

and undermine the adversary. According to the U.S. COIN field 

manual, insurgents “will use all available means, including the 

media, nongovernmental organizations, and religious and civic 

leaders, to get their information out to all audiences. Successful 

insurgents strive to seize the moral high ground on any counterin41 Ibid., 1-38.

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surgent mistakes, both real and perceived. This includes political, 

military, economic, social, religious, cultural, or legal errors.”42 For 

any commander, finding the right mechanisms and tools, besides 

the use of force, to counter these means is crucial to ensure success 

of the mission.

Even though force used in an operation may be lawful and meet 

proportionality requirements, it may still be perceived as unacceptably violent in a given community, leading to a negative 

perception by the affected population.43 In counterinsurgencies, 

using restraint and culturally appropriate and accepted forms of 

violence can help more effectively combat and overcome the insurgency and achieve sustainable peace. At the same time though, 

not using the right amount of force can undermine the credibility 

of the campaign in the eyes of the local population and also encourage the insurgency to continue to act unchecked.

Counterinsurgencies evolve and change with peaks and troughs 

of violence. Certain situations, such as riots, may call for law enforcement action in support of local police, whereas others may 

require a more traditional resort to force in the military sense, 

where there is obvious hostile insurgent action. Ultimately, as recognized by the GB-COIN, the decision as to the level of force required is at the discretion of commanders, who have to weigh the 

prevailing circumstances at the time and associated risks within 

the overall objectives of the counterinsurgency operation.44 Deciding on the course of action is only part of the equation; ensur42 Ibid., 1-26.

43 British Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10, 3-15, 3-28 “Force may solve a 

tactical problem—a firing point neutralised, a fleeting target engaged, or a strongpoint destroyed—but if the use of force is perceived as excessive or ill targeted, 

the neutral segment of the population may be antagonised or alienated and it may 

leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness. Worse still, active support for 

the insurgents by those suffering or observing the effects of force may be engendered. This is particularly so in those tribal cultures where codes of personal and 

family honour, justice and vengeance are strong.”

44 Ibid., 3-29.
ing that the troops under their command act within the limits is 

another, especially when they are called to exercise substantial restraint in the use of force. The Aitken Report highlights this, noting 

that commanders, through Mission Command, will communicate 

their overall intent—what and why—but that it will be left to the 

subordinates to determine how to accomplish this: 

Those subordinates are not, of course, given completely free 

rein—the commander’s orders are to be obeyed, but he will 

stipulate the constraints under which his subordinates are to 

be bound, and he should personally supervise the execution of 

those tasks in an appropriate fashion, in order to satisfy himself 

that they are being carried out correctly. And whilst tasks can be 

delegated, responsibility for them can never be delegated; that 

responsibility remains with the commander.45

In very much the same way as the commanders, their subordinates should have a good understanding of the contexts in which 

they operate, possess situational awareness, and be cognizant of 

the “four corners” of their rules of engagement and of the consequences—including possibly criminal liability—of operating 

outside these. How much force each commander decides to use 

very much depends on the nature of the threat faced, and threats 

vary and evolve. Yet any engagement, even if spontaneous, needs 

to respect IHL, which again calls upon the superiors to exercise 

a certain amount of discretion in the conduct of hostilities, effectively control their subordinates, and call on them to use restraint 

where appropriate.

The Commander’s Influence

History is littered with examples of atrocities committed by armed 

45 British Army, The Aitken Report: An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse 

and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004, 25 January 2008, 8, mod.uk/NR/

rdonlyres/7AC894D3-1430-4AD1.../aitken_rep.pdf.

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individuals in conflict. In many contexts, the example set by commanders makes the difference between maintaining discipline 

and committing crimes. It has been documented that without the 

buy-in of the higher command, junior officers struggle to enforce 

discipline among their troops. 

In the context of the Soviet military advance into the East in 1945, 

mass rape was committed against German women. The failure 

by the hierarchy in Moscow to denounce these atrocities allowed 

for the offenders to continue in their offences and go unpunished. 

The combination of alcohol and lack of discipline made it virtually impossible for lower-ranked officers to put an end to the rapes. 

Once the leash has been removed, it can be very difficult, and at 

times virtually impossible, to bring offenders back in line:

The more intelligent junior officers were deeply disturbed, 

and they knew that they were virtually powerless to stop it. 

. . . Marshal Rokossovsky issued order No. 006 in an attempt 

to direct “the feelings of hatred at fighting the enemy on the 

battlefield.” It appears to have had little effect. There were also 

a few arbitrary attempts to exert authority. The commander of 

one rifle division is said to have “personally shot a lieutenant 

who was lining up a group of his men before a German woman 

spread-eagled on the ground.” But either officers were involved 

themselves, or the lack of discipline made it too dangerous to 

restore order over drunken soldiers armed with submachine 

guns.46

Reacting to many of the horrors seen during the Second World 

War, more efforts were undertaken to have states better assume 

their responsibilities to respect IHL and ensure its respect.47 States 

46 Antony Beevor, War and Rape: Germany 1945 (Lees-Knowles Lectures, Cambridge, England, 2002–03, http://www.culturahistorica.es/beevor/war_and_rape.

germany.pdf .

47 Article 1 Common to the Four Geneva Conventions and Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I.
are to disseminate the text of the Geneva Conventions in times 

of peace and war as widely as possible, particularly in military 

programs,48 and to adopt necessary legislation to effectively suppress violations of IHL.49 Additional Protocol I also requires states 

to ensure that legal advisers are available when necessary to 

advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol and on the appropriate instruction to give to the armed forces.50

The adoption of these articles was aimed at finding the appropriate mechanism to enable the states’ undertakings to be effectively 

enforced at the field level before and during actual military operations. As commanders were deemed to have the means at their 

disposal to ensure the respect of IHL, Article 87 of Additional Protocol I requires states and parties to the armed conflict to require 

military commanders to prevent as well as suppress breaches of 

IHL by members of the armed forces under their command and 

other persons under their control. It was recognized that in military environments, subordinates will be influenced by the actions 

or inactions of their commanders and that for a superior to allow 

a culture of acquiescence or impunity for acts of unnecessary violence has damaging consequences.

Placing this responsibility on superiors reflects the fact that “everything depends on commanders, and without their conscientious supervision, general legal requirements are unlikely to be 

effective.”51 Commanders are on “the spot and able to exercise 

control over the troops and the weapons which they use.”52 The 

commander is not expected in complex battlefield environments 

to be able to exercise control over his troops all of the time. Disci48 Articles 47 GCI, 48 GCII, 127 GCIII , 144 GCIV, and 83 API. 

49 Articles 49 GCI, 50 GCII, 129 GCIII, 146 GCIV and 85 API.

50 Article 82 API. 

51 ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 

Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1018.

52 Ibid.

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pline, though, must be imposed to a sufficient degree, to enable 

the enforcement of the Conventions and their Protocols “even 

when he may momentarily lose sight of his troops.”53 Commanders by virtue of their hierarchical responsibility over their subordinates “have the authority, and more than anyone else they 

can prevent breaches by creating the appropriate frame of mind, 

ensuring the rational use of the means of combat and by maintaining discipline.”54 The crucial role of commanders in creating 

the right environment has been underscored by the UK chief of 

General Staff, who wrote, 

When I took up my previous appointment as commander in 

chief of Land Command in April 2005, I reminded and required 

all commanders to set the example to their subordinates and, 

within the context of Mission Command, provide the leadership and supervision that will ensure the delivery of required 

outcomes as well as professional behavior. I underline again the 

responsibility of all leaders from chief of the General Staff down 

to the most junior lance corporal to both delegate, as necessary, 

but also to supervise, where appropriate, the execution of tasks. 

That is the responsibility of command.55

Conclusions in the Aitken Report make for similar reading, underscoring the importance of the army’s core values, which should 

not be seen as mere empty symbolism: 

The Army’s core values—selfless commitment, courage, discipline, integrity, loyalty, and respect for others—articulate the 

code of conduct within which the Army conducts its unique 

business. They reflect the moral virtues and ethical principles 

which underpin any decent society but which are particularly 

important for members of an institution with the responsibility 

53 Ibid., 1018.

54 Ibid., 1022.

55 UK chief of the General Staff, writing to the army in April 2007, as cited in the 

Aitken Report, 27.
of conducting military operations—including the use of lethal 

force—on behalf of the nation. The Army requires that all its 

people understand these values and live up to their associated 

standards. It does this in part by mandating annual training 

for all ranks but also by requiring its leaders to set a personal 

example to their subordinates.56

Coupled with creating an environment conducive to respecting 

IHL, Article 87(2) of Additional Protocol I requires states to ensure 

that commanders, commensurate with their level of responsibility, 

ensure that members of their armed forces under their command 

are aware of their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and 

Protocols.57 Article 87(3) goes on to stipulate that commanders 

have the duty to prevent and suppress violations by their subordinates as well as to initiate disciplinary or penal action as may 

be necessary. 58

In a study entitled “The Roots of Behaviour in War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations,” the ICRC sought to identify 

those factors that condition the behavior of combatants in armed 

conflicts.59 In the same vein as Article 87 of Additional Protocol I, 

the conclusions of the study serve to reinforce the relevance and 

importance of the role of the commander as outlined in ensuring 

the respect of IHL.

As a premise, the study suggested that in war there will be excesses, blunders, and acts of violence. Despite the privilege that 

combatants have to use lethal force in armed conflicts, the study 

noted that in general they are reluctant to kill another human 

being. To overcome this normal human response, soldiers have 

56 British Army, The Aitken Report, 24.

57 Article 87 (2) API. 

58 Article 87 (1) and (3) API.

59 Daniel Muñoz-Rojas and Jean-Jacques Frésard, “The Roots of Behaviour in 

War: Understanding and Preventing IHL Violations,” International Review of the 

Red Cross 86 (2004), www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_853_fd_fresard_eng.

pdf. 

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to be trained, prepared, and conditioned before in-contact situations when engaging the adversary. It is this training and preparation that can make the difference between acting within the law 

or outside it.

The challenge then is to be able to engrain the “right way” to act 

among the troops, limiting behavior that deviates from acceptable 

norms, while at the same time allowing combatants sufficient flexibility and aggression to fulfill their missions. In irregular warfare, 

finding this balance is an intricate challenge.

As the study explains, there may be individuals who will always 

pose a behavioral risk. Yet, in general, the conduct of most troops 

will be molded by the group ethos, the actions of their peers, and 

the example set by their superiors. Calling for the destruction 

of the adversary through his dehumanization must be balanced 

with the need to place limits on the means and methods used, and 

not causing unnecessary suffering. Failure to instill a sense of professional and personal responsibility and morality early on in the 

basic training and predeployment cycles could have serious negative implications for the conduct of hostilities in theater. The challenge of creating the appropriate mind-set among the combatants 

has taken on greater amplitude in the context of contemporary 

irregular warfare, which can blend peace operations, counterterrorism, and law enforcement.

One of the main conclusions of the ICRC study concerns the impact 

of authority and the obedience to orders in ensuring the respect 

of IHL. Basing itself on some of the results of Stanley Milgram’s 

experiments reported in Obedience to Authority, the study submitted that in a military setting, individuals will be less inclined to 

disobey orders than an ordinary citizen and will not allow external 

influences to come in the way of the relationship he has with his 

superiors.60

60 Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard, “The Roots of Behaviour in War,” 83. 
Interestingly, the study concluded that combatants have a tendency to shift responsibility for their actions to their superior chains of 

command. They would adapt their conduct to that which would 

be expected of them, even when contrary to their moral obligations. Through training and collective training, the sense of the 

individual is subordinated to the concern of showing one’s self 

as being worthy of expectations of the command. Thus, the foot 

soldier accepts the commander’s view of the situations and will 

conform willingly to what is expected of him.

The study found that violations of IHL were not for the most 

part committed as a result of direct orders but rather because of 

a lack of specific orders not to violate the law, or because of an 

implicit authorization to behave reprehensibly. The study added 

tentatively that prevention of IHL violations requires an explicit 

order not to violate the laws of war.61 The U.S. Army Operational 

Law Handbook makes a similar statement about clarity of orders: 

“Clear, unambiguous orders are the responsibility of good leadership. Soldiers who receive ambiguous orders or who receive 

orders that clearly violate [laws of war] must understand how to 

react to such orders. . . . Troops who receive unclear orders must 

insist on clarification.”62

Through dissemination, training, the presence of legal advisers, 

and underscoring responsibility on commanders, the Geneva 

Conventions and their Protocols have thus placed understanding 

of the law at the center of IHL. In so doing, the drafters of the 

Geneva Conventions aimed to generate the reflex among properly 

trained soldiers to fully respect IHL at all times in the conduct 

of hostilities. Training and good leadership are essential as junior 

soldiers are the ones on the frontline who will have to find the 

courage to uphold the law under extreme pressure.63 Creating the 

61 Ibid., 85.

62 U.S. Army Operational Law Handbook, 36.

63 Jessica Wolfendale, “What is the Point of Teaching Ethics in the Military,” in 

Ethics Education in the Military, ed. Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee, and Don Carrick (Farnham UK: Ashgate, 2008),168–69.

Humanity in War | 283
284 | Aspects of Leadership

appropriate mind-set is as much a matter of prevention before any 

hostile action as it is in combat where the decisions and actions 

taken by the commanders will have a bearing on the comportment of their subordinates.

Not only must the commander be the standard-bearer, but he will 

also need to be in a position to effectively influence his subordinates, even if they are out of sight. Finding the right mechanism, 

whether through training or the taking of disciplinary measures, 

for encouraging his troops to remain well-ordered even in the 

more testing and hostile of environments can be a challenge, but 

it is one that must be met. As has been shown in many contexts, 

losing moral influence and control of one’s subordinates can have 

unwanted and arguably, at times, serious repercussions.64

Conclusion

With the universal ratification of the Geneva Conventions, states 

have sent out the strong message that they intend to abide by their 

IHL obligations as they engage in hostilities. With today’s irregular warfare blending military power with political and economic 

development in complex counterinsurgency operations, winning 

hearts and minds is essential not only to emerge victorious but 

also to bring stability over the longer term. When winning the 

war and hearts and minds intertwine, respecting IHL is not only 

a legal obligation and a moral imperative, but it also becomes an 

operational requirement. Disobedience of the laws of war brings 

dishonor, and rather than weakening the enemy’s will to fight, it 

can often strengthen it. 

64 “If every time you go down to see your soldiers, you tell them that they’re 

fucked up, then guess what. They don’t want to see you anymore. And they will 

do just enough to not get your attention. But they aren’t going to trust in you as a 

commander, and as a leader you have no influence. And when the formal chain of 

command breaks down, the informal command steps up, and then you are entering dangerous territory, because nobody has any idea where the informal leaders 

will take the group.” Jim Frederick, Black Hearts, 199.
As British Army Lieutenant General John P. Kiszely noted, it has 

been recognized that “in the eyes of the warrior, counterinsurgency calls for some undecidedly unwarrior-like qualities, such as 

emotional intelligence, empathy, subtlety, sophistication, nuance, 

and political adroitness.”65 These are all traits that today’s commander must bring to the table and to the battlefield. Compliance with the law is one important element to ensure success and 

much will be left to commanders to lead their troops to success 

by example. 

65 John Kiszely, “Learning about Counter-Insurgency,” Royal United Services 

Institute Journal 151 (December 2006).

Humanity in War | 285

 —287—

Leaders prepare to indirectly inflict suffering on their soldiers 

and Marines by sending them into harm’s way to accomplish the 

mission. At the same time, leaders attempt to avoid, at great length, 

injury and death to innocents. This requirement gets to the very 

essence of what some describe as “the burden of command.”. . . Ultimate success in [Counterinsurgency Operations] is gained by protecting the populace, not the [military] force . . . [yet] combatants 

are not required to take so much risk that they fail in their mission 

or forfeit their lives.

- Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency1

In 2010, nine years into Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, casualties among both Afghan civilians and members of the 

U.S. military were at their highest levels to date. Taliban insurgents employing suicide and improvised explosive devices directly caused the vast majority of those casualties.2

 Yet attitudes 

1 Department of the Army, FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006) 7-14, 1-149, 7-23.

2 By the middle of 2010, Leon Panetta, then-head of the Central Intelligence 

Agency, estimated that there were only 50 to 100 al-Qaeda militants operating in 

Afghanistan while the Taliban were “engaged in greater violence,” including improvised explosive devices and “going after our troops. There’s no question about it.” 

“Fewer Than 100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan: CIA Chief,” ABCNews.net, 28 June 

2010, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/06/28/2938358.htm.

Agency of Risk

The Balance Between Protecting Military 

Forces and the Civilian Population

Chris Jenks
288 | Aspects of Leadership

and perceptions among both the Afghan population and the U.S. 

military reflect differing conceptions of blame and responsibility. 

Afghans blame the mere presence of the United States as the underlying cause for Taliban attacks and resulting civilian casualties, while members of the U.S. military question whether selfimposed limitations on employing force has led to increasing 

numbers of American service members wounded and killed. 

One of the origins of this angst is the degree and manner by which 

risk is borne by the two groups, Afghan civilian and U.S. military, 

as a result of the ongoing counterinsurgency operations. At the 

strategic level, military doctrine, including the language above 

from the U.S. military’s 2006 counterinsurgency manual, provides 

fundamental principles that govern the conduct of military operations and, in so doing, shapes the parameters of this risk. Moving 

from the strategic level through the chain of command to the tactical level—the soldier and Marine on the ground—the contours of 

risk are operationalized through the war-fighting command promulgating rules of engagement and, in Afghanistan, the tactical 

directive. 

The tactical directive “provides guidance and intent for the use of 

force by” U.S. and Coalition military forces operating in Afghanistan.3

 Beginning in 2008, three successive commanders of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan have 

made portions of the directive—previously classified to protect 

the force and still classified in parts—public. 

The 2008 tactical directive stressed minimizing death or injury of 

innocent civilians and reinforced the idea of proportionality, “requisite restraint, and the utmost discrimination in our application 

of firepower.”4 This iteration, however, didn’t place any specific 

3 International Security Assistance Force, Tactical Directive, 1 August 2010, 

http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/updated-tactical-directive-emphasizesdisciplined-use-of-force.html.

4 International Security Assistance Force, Tactical Directive, 2 December 2008, 

http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090114.pdf.
Agency of Risk | 289

limitations on certain types of force, relying instead on “[g]ood 

tactical judgment” to minimize civilian casualties.5 In contrast, 

the 2009 directive dictated that “use of air-ground munitions and 

indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized 

under very limited and prescribed conditions.”6

The 2009 tactical directive “de-emphasized airstrikes, artillery, 

and mortars. This transferred some of the risk in skirmishes 

from Afghan civilians to Western combatants. In the past, American patrols in contact often quickly called for and received fire 

support. Not anymore. Many firefights . . . are strictly rifle and 

machine gun fights.”7 In accordance with this perspective, in not 

providing the fire support that otherwise may be available, the 

tactical directive increased engagement times with the enemy, 

which in turn heightened the risk to troops on the ground. The 

resulting concern of some U.S. service members wasn’t so much 

that the tactical directive transferred risks away from the civilians to the U.S. military, but that it transferred risk away from 

the enemy.8 Yet a 2010 review of the tactical directive “found no 

evidence that the rules restricted the use of lifesaving firepower” 

or even “a single situation where a soldier has lost his life because 

he was not allowed to protect himself.”9

At first glance, the current iteration of the tactical directive, which 

General David H. Petraeus issued in 2010, differs only slightly 

from the 2009 version. And those differences seem little more than 

an alternatively worded means to the same conceptual end—the 

5 Ibid.

6 International Security Assistance Force, Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009, www.

nato.int/isaf/docu/official.../Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf.

7 C.J. Chivers, “What Marja Tells Us of Battles Yet to Come,” New York Times,

10 June 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/world/middleeast/11marja.

html?_r=1.

8 Ibid.

9 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Frustration Over War Rules of Engagement Grows: Petraeus Will Review Policy to Limit Civilian Deaths That Some Troops Say Hinders 

Military Activity,” Washington Post, 9 July 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/

wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/08/AR2010070806219.html.
290 | Aspects of Leadership

importance of protecting the Afghan population. But the 2010 tactical directive seemingly alters the risk relationship and balance 

between Afghan civilians and the U.S. military. The 2009 directive expressly acknowledged that “the carefully controlled and 

disciplined use of force entails risk to our troops,” recognizing 

that protecting the force must, on some level and at some times, 

be subordinate to protecting the civilian population. In partial 

yet profound contrast, the 2010 tactical directive lists protecting 

Afghan civilians and the men and women in uniform as coequal 

moral imperatives.

Utilizing both the tactical directive and doctrinal concepts from 

the counterinsurgency manual, this chapter will explore the allocation of risk between the military force and Afghan civilian 

population. The chapter first reviews civilian and military casualty figures and then uses those numbers as a touchstone against 

which to consider each group’s perception of the risk it faces. 

To set the conditions for that comparison, the chapter discusses 

the allocation of risk outlined in recent counterinsurgency doctrine and how that allocation translates from the conceptual or 

strategic level to the operational reality of soldiers and Marines 

in harm’s way at the tactical level. This chapter examines whether 

that translation is conceptually consistent and tactically viable.

While the concept of the U.S. military accepting increased risk 

in order to protect the civilian population is codified as doctrine, 

how well is the military translating, and training, that doctrine? 

As one commentator stated, “[n]o one wants to advocate loosening rules that might see more civilians killed. But no one wants 

to explain whether the restrictions are increasing the number 

of coffins arriving at Dover Air Force Base and seeding disillusionment among those sent to fight.”10 This chapter seeks not to 

provide that explanation but to prompt a discussion on whether 

10 C.J. Chivers, “General Faces Unease Among His Own Troops, Too,” New York 

Times, 22 June 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/asia/23troops.

html.
there is consistency in risk tolerance between U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine and the execution of that doctrine at the 

tactical level in Afghanistan. 

Civilian and Military Casualties and Their 

Causes

Civilian Casualties

According the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 

(UNAMA), 2,777 civilians were killed in 2010 as a result of the 

ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, a 15 percent increase from 2009.

11,12 This follows a four-year trend during which each year more 

civilians were killed in Afghanistan than the year prior.13 In terms 

of wounded civilians, UNAMA documented 4,343 conflict-related 

injuries in 2010, a 22 percent increase from 2009.14

While the total number of civilian casualties has been increasing, in both 2009 and 2010 the percentage of civilian casualties 

caused by progovernment forces (including the Afghan, U.S., and 

Coalition militaries) decreased.

15 In 2010, UNAMA claimed that 

progovernment forces were responsible for 440 civilian deaths or 

16 percent of the total, a 26 percent decrease from 2009.16 Progovernment forces were also purportedly responsible for 400 civilian 

11 This chapter relies on data from the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan (UNAMA). While the United States compiles its own statistics, 

certainly, for U.S. casualties, for Afghan casualties the U.S. refers to UNAMA for 

Afghan civilian casualties and to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction for Afghan National Army and police casualties. See Susan G. 

Chesser, “Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians,” Congressional 

Research Service R41084, 14 January 2011.

12 UNAMA Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan Annual Report 2010 on Protection 

of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA, 2010), i, http://

unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA./human%20rights/March%20PoC%20

Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.

13 Ibid, according to UNAMA, between 2007–10, 8,832 civilians have been 

killed in Afghanistan.

14 Ibid., ii.

15 Ibid., i. 

16 Ibid.

Agency of Risk | 291
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injuries or 9 percent of the total, a 13 percent decrease from 2009.17

In terms of the manner by which Afghans were wounded or killed 

by Coalition forces, UNAMA stated that “[a]erial attacks claimed 

the largest percentage of civilian deaths caused by progovernment forces in 2010, causing 171 deaths (39 percent of the total 

number of civilian deaths attributed to progovernment forces).”18

However, that figure represents a 52 percent decrease in Afghan 

civilian fatalities stemming from Coalition air strikes from 2009.19

Conversely, antigovernment elements, such as the Taliban, were 

responsible for 2,080 deaths in 2010 or 75 percent of the total civilian deaths, a 28 percent increase from 2009.20 This continues, and 

widens, the trend recognized by UNAMA in 2009, that “more civilians are being killed by AGEs [antigovernment elements] than 

by PGF [progovernment forces].”21 Antigovernment elements 

injured some 3,366 civilians or 78 percent of the total, a 21 percent 

increase from 2009. Antigovernment element suicide and improvised explosive device attacks caused the greatest overall number 

of killed and wounded Afghan civilians.22

U.S. Military Casualties

Not until 2008 did U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan exceed 

17 Ibid., ii.

18 Ibid., i.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 UNAMA, Human Rights Unit, Afghanistan Mid Year Bulletin on Protection 

of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 4 July 2009, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/

UNAMA/human%20rights/09july31-UNAMA-HUMAN-RIGHTS-CIVILIANCASUALTIES-Mid-Year-2009-Bulletin.pdf. According to UNAMA, “[i]n the 

first six months of 2009, 59 percent of civilians were killed by AGEs and 30.5 

percent by PGF. The UN characterized this as “a significant shift from 2007 when 

PGF were responsible for 41 percent and AGEs for 46 percent of civilian deaths.” 

(AGE: antigovernment elements; PGF: progovernment forces.)

22 UNAMA, Afghanistan Annual Report 2010, i. UNAMA claimed that the most 

alarming trend in 2010 was “the huge number of civilians assassinated” by AGEs. 

The 462 civilians AGE forces assassinated represent “an increase of more than 

105 percent from 2009.” The majority of the assassinations occurred in southern 

Afghanistan, with Helmand Province experiencing a 588 percent increase and 

Kandahar Province, a 248 percent increase compared to 2009.
30,000.23 But by November 2009, there were 68,000 troops in Afghanistan and roughly 100,000 by mid-2010. Such variance either 

skews quantitative comparison, or at a minimum, renders statistical analysis of U.S. casualty rates over time beyond the scope of 

this chapter. Accordingly, this section will refer to U.S. casualty 

data only from 2010 to provide a frame of reference and comparison and not as the basis for empirical analysis.

In 2010, 499 U.S. troops were killed in Afghanistan.24 Improvised 

explosive devices were responsible for 268 of those fatalities, 

or roughly 54 percent.25 In terms of injuries, 5,173 U.S. service 

members were wounded in Afghanistan in 2010.26

23 Brian Montopoli, “Chart: Troop Levels in Afghanistan Over the Years,” CBS 

News.com, 1 December 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-

5855314-503544.html. 

24 Coalition Military Fatalities by Year, iCasualties.org, http://icasualties.org/

OEF/Index.aspx.

25 In 2010, Afghan insurgents emplaced 14,661 IEDs, “a 62 percent increase 

over 2009 and more than three times as many as the year before.” Craig Whitlock, 

“IED Casualties in Afghanistan Spike: Big Increase From 2009 to 2010 Is Result 

of U.S. Troop Surge,” Washington Post, 25 

January 2011.

26 Operation Enduring Freedom: U.S. Wounded Totals, iCasualties.org, http://

icasualties.org/OEF/USCasualtiesByState.aspx. 

2010 Afghanistan Casualty Comparison

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

US Military

Afghan Civilian

Wounded Killed

Figure 13. Casualty Comparisons and Causes of Death and Wounds.

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Using 2010 for comparison purposes, and speaking only in total 

numbers and ratios, more U.S. forces were wounded (5,173) than 

the total number of Afghan civilians wounded (4,343). Within that 

total number, the UN claims that U.S. and Coalition forces were 

responsible for wounding 400 Afghan civilians. Thus, U.S. forces 

were wounded almost eleven times for every one instance when 

they wounded an Afghan civilian.

Anti Government

Forces

78%

Pro 

Government

Forces

22%

Anti Government

Forces

75%

Pro 

Government

Forces

25%

Figure 14. 2010 Causes of Death for Afghan Civilians.

Figure 15. 2010 Causes of Wounds to Afghan Civilians.
Compared to the numbers of wounded, the fatalities discussion 

is almost flipped. In 2010, 2,412 Afghan civilians were killed compared to 499 U.S. service members.27 Within that total number, the 

UN claims that U.S. and Coalition forces were responsible for the 

deaths of 440 Afghan civilians. Thus, U.S. forces were killed at 

roughly the same ratio by which they killed Afghan civilians.28

That comparison provides a reference point for a normative discussion on how the two sides, Afghan civilian and U.S. military, 

perceive the risk that the casualty rates depict, the extent to which 

those perceptions are consistent with the numerical indicia of risk, 

and ultimately how that impacts the overall counterinsurgency 

effort. From the perspective of the U.S. military, examining U.S. 

service member perceptions of risk requires first briefly reviewing the modern doctrine by which the U.S. purports to conduct 

counterinsurgency campaigns, filtered through the ISAF and actualized through the tactical directive.

U.S. Military Counterinsurgency Doctrine

In 2006, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps filled a doctrinal gap 

that spanned two decades or more by issuing a publication exclusively devoted to counterinsurgency operations, the type of 

armed conflict soldiers and Marines were—and are—fighting in 

27 Indeed, the number of Afghan civilians killed in 2010 considerably exceeds the 

sum total of all U.S. fatalities in Afghanistan to date:1476. iCasualty.org.

28 These figures seem incongruent with historical trends. In a story on the 60th 

anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the British Broadcasting Corporation claimed that “in World War I, the ratio of soldiers to civilians killed was ten to 

one. In World War II it became 50–50, and today the figures are almost reversed—

up to ten civilians for every one soldier.” Imogen Foulkes, “Geneva Conventions’ 

Struggle For Respect,” BBC News, 8 August 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

europe/8196166.stm. In Vietnam, the last major counterinsurgency operation the 

U.S. military conducted, the ratio of monthly combat fatalities per 100,000 U.S. 

service members was 667, or more than 15 times higher than the casualty rate in 

Afghanistan. Marcus Baram, “Overall, Afghanistan More Lethal for U.S. Soldiers 

Than Iraq (Chart),” Huffington Post.com, 18 March 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/15/overall-afghanistan-more_n_319194.html.

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296 | Aspects of Leadership

Iraq and Afghanistan.29 The publication provides principles and 

guidelines for counterinsurgency operations, including lessons 

learned thus far in Iraq and Afghanistan and those learned and to 

some extent forgotten, or at least neglected, from Vietnam.

The doctrine details a variety of guidance on the risk relationship 

between military forces and the civilian population, including the 

following: 

• “The military forces’ primary function in COIN is protecting the populace.”30

• “The importance of protecting the populace, gaining 

people’s support by assisting them, and using measured 

force when fighting insurgents should be reinforced and 

understood.”31

• “In conventional conflicts, balancing competing responsibilities of mission accomplishment with protection of noncombatants is difficult enough. Complex COIN operations 

place the toughest of ethical demands on soldiers, Marines, 

and their leaders.”32

• “Limiting the misery caused by war requires combatants 

to consider certain rules, principles, and consequences that 

restrain the amount of force they may apply. At the same 

time, combatants are not required to take so much risk that 

they fail in their mission or forfeit their lives. As long as 

their use of force is proportional to the gain to be achieved 

29 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para 7-14, 1-149. The U.S. military defines 

an insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or 

movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority” and 

counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat 

an insurgency and to address any core grievances.” U.S. Department of Defense, 

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms, 15 February 2012, 161, 77, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

30 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para 2-4.

31 Ibid., para 5-65.

32 Ibid., para 7-21.
and discriminates in distinguishing between combatants 

and noncombatants, soldiers and Marines may take actions 

where they knowingly risk, but do not intend, harm to 

noncombatants.”33

The doctrine also identifies paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations, including:

• “Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure 

you may be.”34

• “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.”35

• “The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less 

force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.”36

• “Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.”37

Suffice to say that doctrinal guidance on the use of force in a counterinsurgency is markedly different than in conventional armed 

conflicts where the focus is to “concentrate the effects of combat 

power at the decisive place and time.”38

The counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance is then filtered through 

the International Security Assistance Force mission: 

[i]n support of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce 

the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in 

capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces, and facilitate 

improvements in governance and socioeconomic development 

33 Ibid., para 7-23.

34 Ibid., para 1-149.

35 Ibid., para 1-150.

36 Ibid., para 1-151.

37 Ibid., para 1-152.

38 Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, w/change 1 (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, 2011), para A-6. This manual describes the principle of 

war of “mass” and how “[c]ommanders mass the effects of combat power in time 

and space to achieve both destructive and constructive results . . . ” in order to 

overwhelm an opponent or dominate a situation.

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298 | Aspects of Leadership

in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.39

The question then becomes how the United States should reduce 

the capability and will of the insurgency. The answer is both 

through offensive or kinetic operations as well as through denying 

the insurgency the ability to operate by improving governance 

and socioeconomic development. Protecting the civilian population is inextricably linked to both. The tactical directive provides 

the means, or parameters on force as a means, to accomplishing 

the mission, shaped by the counterinsurgency doctrine.

Tactical Directive

After revising the tactical directive in the summer of 2009, General 

Stanley A. McChrystal made portions public “to ensure a broader 

awareness of the intent and scope” of his guidance to the force.40

While there had always been limitations on the use of force by 

U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and at least one prior version 

of the tactical directive released to the media, General McChrystal’s modifications sparked discussion and controversy, much of 

which has continued and remained not just unresolved but unaddressed by the U.S. military.41

39 Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force, About ISAF, http://www.

isaf.nato.int/mission.html.

40 Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009, 7.

41 For example, in September 2011, President Obama awarded former Marine 

Sergeant Dakota Meyer the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions in Afghanistan in September 2009, in saving the lives of fellow Marines and Afghan army 

soldiers during a Taliban ambush. The award ceremony retriggered questions of 

whether the tactical directive and/or risk-averse commanders contributed to some 

of the deaths of U.S. Marines in the ambush. See Larua Rosen, “Medal of Honor 

Recipient Highlights Marine’s Valor as Well as Risks U.S. Troops Faced under 

Controversial Rules of Engagement,” The Envoy blog, 14 September 2011, http://

news.yahoo.com/blogs/envoy/medal-honor-recipient-highlights-marine-valor-wellrisks-220928608.html.
As discussed in the introduction, contrary to his predecessor, 

General McChrystal allowed the use of air-to-ground munitions 

and indirect fires under “very limited and prescribed conditions.” 

In his iteration of the directive, General McChrystal acknowledged the implicit trade-off inherent in limiting the use of force at 

the tactical level in support of the broader strategic goal of Afghan 

civilian support.

We must fight the insurgents and will use the tools at our disposal to both defeat the enemy and protect our forces. But 

we will not win based on the number of Taliban we kill, but 

instead on our ability to separate insurgents from the center of 

gravity—the people. That means we must respect and protect 

the population from coercion and violence—and operate in a 

manner which will win their support.

This is different from conventional combat, and how we operate 

will determine the outcome more than traditional measures, like 

capture of terrain or attrition of enemy forces. We must avoid 

the trap of winning tactical victories—but suffering strategic 

defeats—by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and 

thus alienating the people.

While this is also a legal and a moral issue, it is an overarching 

operational issue—clear-eyed recognition that loss of popular 

support will be decisive to either side in this struggle. The 

Taliban cannot military defeat us—but we can defeat ourselves.

I recognize that the carefully controlled and disciplined employment 

of force entails risk to our troops [emphasis added]—and we must 

work to mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use 

of force resulting in an alienated population will produce far 

greater risks. We must understand this reality at every level in 

our force.42

42 Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009.

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Some U.S. service members were critical of the 2009 tactical directive. As a junior U.S. Army officer in Afghanistan queried,

[m]inimizing civilian casualties is a fine goal, but should it be 

the be-all and end-all of the policy? If we allow soldiers to die in 

Afghanistan at the hands of a leader who says, “We’re going to 

protect civilians rather than soldiers,” what’s going to happen 

on the ground? The soldiers are not going to execute the mission 

to the best of their ability. They won’t put their hearts into the 

mission. That’s the kind of atmosphere we’re building.43

One noncommissioned officer sent an e-mail to a member of 

the U.S. Congress complaining that the rules of engagement 

(ROE) that flowed from the tactical directive were “too prohibitive for Coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical success.”44

Another noncommissioned officer commented to a reporter that 

he “wish[ed] we had generals who remembered what it was like 

when they were down in a platoon. . . . Either they have never 

been in real fighting, or they forgot what it’s like.”45 One news 

story quoted U.S. service members in Afghanistan as complaining 

that the tactical directive “handcuffed” them.

The directive’s limitations on the employment of indirect fire 

and close air support received much of the front-line criticism. 

One Marine infantry officer said he had stopped requesting air 

support during ground engagements as the approval process was 

too time consuming and tethered him to a radio. Moreover, the 

officer claimed that air support didn’t arrive, was late when it did 

arrive, or that pilots were hesitant to conduct the requested air 

strike of ground targets. Alternatively, some units describe “decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefly out 

into the open to draw fire once aircraft arrive, so the pilots might 

43 Chandrasekaran, “Frustration Over War Rules of Engagement.”

44 George Will, “An NCO Recognizes a Flawed Afghanistan Strategy,” Washington 

Post, 20 June 2010.

45 Chivers, “What Marja Tells Us of Battles Yet to Come.” 
be cleared to participate in the fight.”46 While those are perhaps 

anecdotal and isolated examples, they occurred within a time 

frame in which both U.S. military and Afghan civilian casualty 

rates increased. And while at the same time the percentage of 

Afghan casualties caused by the U.S. military significantly decreased, there doesn’t appear to have been a corresponding increase in Afghan civilian perceptions of safety, security, and the legitimacy and utility of the U.S. military presence in their country. 

From the Afghan civilian perspective, that the casualty-producing 

entity is predominantly the Taliban is little comfort and doesn’t 

constitute protection. From the U.S. service member perspective, 

if the Afghan civilians refuse to place blame for civilian casualties on the entity actually causing them, and the only real beneficiary of U.S. restraint is the enemy, then why should those service 

members accept more risk?

The criticism of the tactical directive seemed to reach its zenith 

in the spring and summer of 2010. In the spring came word of 

an ISAF proposal to award a medal to U.S. service members for 

“courageous restraint for holding fire to save civilian lives.”47 According to an ISAF statement: “[w]e routinely and systematically 

recognize valor, courage, and effectiveness during kinetic combat 

operations. . . . In a COIN campaign, however, it is critical to also 

recognize that sometimes the most effective bullet is the bullet not 

fired.”48 As one story noted, “[a] combat medal to recognize a conscious effort to avoid a combat action would be unique.”49 The 

courageous restraint effort, which would seemingly recognize the 

tactical application of some of the counterinsurgency doctrinal 

points listed above, was short lived.

46 Ibid.

47 William H. McMichael, “Hold Fire, Earn a Medal,” Navy Times, 11 May 2010, 

http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_restraint_medal_051110mar/.

48 Honoring Courageous Restraint, ISAF COIN Analysis News, ISAF website, 

http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/caat-anaysis-news/honoring-courageous-restraint.

html.

49 McMichael, “Hold Fire, Earn a Medal.”

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By the summer, one U.S. Army colonel claimed the troops “hated” 

the tactical directive and that “right now we’re losing the tacticallevel fight in the chase for a strategic victory.”50 At this point and 

unrelated to the tactical directive, General McChrystal resigned 

as the ISAF commander.51 But the tactical directive loomed large 

in the interim while General Petraeus was awaiting confirmation to succeed General McChrystal. At his confirmation hearing, 

General Petraeus submitted an opening statement acknowledging that some U.S. service members were concerned over the tactical directive:

Our efforts in Afghanistan have appropriately focused on protecting the population. This is, needless to say, of considerable 

importance, for in counterinsurgency operations, the human 

terrain is the decisive terrain. The results in recent months have 

been notable. Indeed, over the last 12 weeks, the number of innocent civilians killed in the course of military operations has 

been substantially lower than it was during the same period last 

year. And I will continue the emphasis on reducing the loss of 

innocent civilian life to an absolute minimum in the course of 

military operations.

Focusing on securing the people does not, however, mean that 

we don’t go after the enemy; in fact, protecting the population 

50 Chivers, “What Marja Tells Us of Battles Yet to Come.”

51 General McChrystal resigned following the release of a Rolling Stone story. 

Seemingly lost in the controversy over remarks made by members of his staff in the 

story which prompted the resignation, much of the article dealt with the tactical 

directive. See Michael Hastings, “The Runaway General,” Rolling Stone, 22 June 

2010, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-runaway-general-20100622. 

The article quoted one U.S. Special Forces operator as claiming, “I would love to 

kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even 

greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.” While the article 

quotes General McChrystal as acknowledging that “[w]inning hearts and minds in 

COIN is a coldblooded thing” the general also explains how ISAF can’t kill its way 

out of Afghanistan, that “[t]he Russians killed one million Afghans, and that didn’t 

work.” 
inevitably requires killing, capturing, or turning the insurgents. 

Our forces have been doing that, and we will continue to do 

that. In fact, our troopers and our Afghan partners have been 

very much taking the fight to the enemy. Since the beginning of 

April alone, more than 130 middle- and upper-level Taliban and 

other extremist element leaders have been killed or captured, 

and thousands of their rank and file have been taken off the 

battlefield. Together with our Afghan counterparts, we will continue to pursue relentlessly the enemies of the new Afghanistan 

in the months and years ahead.

On a related note, I want to assure the mothers and fathers of 

those fighting in Afghanistan that I see it as a moral imperative to bring all assets to bear to protect our men and women 

in uniform and the Afghan security forces with whom ISAF 

troopers are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder. Those on the 

ground must have all the support they need when they are in 

a tough situation. This is so important that I have discussed it 

with President Karzai, Afghan Defense Minister Wardak, and 

Afghan Interior Minister Bismullah Kahn since my nomination 

to be COMISAF, and they are in full agreement with me on it. I 

mention this because I am keenly aware of concerns by some of 

our troopers on the ground about the application of our rules of 

engagement and the tactical directive. They should know that I 

will look very hard at this issue.52

In early August 2010, General Petraeus issued an updated tactical directive. In the first paragraph of the revised directive, 

General Petraeus cautioned that “[s]ubordinate commanders 

are not authorized to further restrict this guidance without my 

approval.”53 This requirement sought to address concerns that 

52 U.S. Central Command, General Petraeus ISAF confirmation, 29 June 2010, 

http://www.centcom.mil/from-the-commander/gen-petraeus-isaf-confirmationhearing.

53 Tactical Directive, 1 August 2010. 

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the issue with the tactical directive under General McChrystal was not so much the limitations he imposed, but that 

those limitations were a floor, not a ceiling, and that several 

layers of command between ISAF and a U.S. Army or Marine 

Corps unit in contact were adding additional restrictions or 

requirements.

But contrary to General McChrstyal’s express acknowledgement 

of the limitations on the use of force equating to increased risk for 

U.S. service members, General Petraeus’ version placed protecting Afghan civilians and the force on the same level.

We must balance our pursuit of the enemy with our efforts to 

minimize loss of innocent civilian life, and with our obligation 

to protect our troops. Our forces have been striving to do that, 

and we will continue to do so.

In so doing, however, we must remember that it is a moral imperative both to protect Afghan civilians and to bring all assets to bear 

to protect our men and women in uniform and the Afghan security 

forces [emphasis added] with whom we are fighting shoulderto-shoulder when they are in a tough spot.54

This language seems if not inconsistent with counterinsurgency 

doctrine, an avoidance or obfuscation of the subordinate relationship between protecting the force and the civilian population 

which the doctrine emphasizes and the harsh consequences that 

flow from that subordination during use-of-force situations.

Yet the current tactical directive is not receiving as much open 

criticism as its predecessor, at least from U.S. service members. 

Its impact on the “hearts and minds” of the population is unclear 

though. Despite the report that in the third quarter of calendar 

year 2010, antigovernment elements caused 90 percent of Afghan 

civilian deaths and injuries, in the minds of many Afghans, the 

true cause of the casualties was ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan.55

54 Tactical Directive, 1 August 2010.

55 David Nakamura, “Afghans Reject Good Guy-Bad Guy Narrative,” Washington 

Post, 14 August 2010.
So to the extent, notwithstanding the changed wording, that the 

tactical directive is still implemented in a way to emphasize protecting civilians, those civilians don’t seem to agree. This seems 

due in part to continuing challenges ISAF faces in strategic communications—a 2010 poll revealed that 40 percent of those interviewed believed ISAF was in Afghanistan “to destroy Islam or 

to occupy or destroy the country.” Additionally, “only 8 percent 

of interviewees in the south knew the story of the 9/11 attacks 

and as a result had no understanding of the justification for the 

conflict with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”56 Further supporting an 

argument that Afghan perceptions of their safety and future in 

Afghanistan are not positive, beginning in 2008 and continuing 

through 2010, more Afghans are seeking asylum in foreign countries than at any point since the 2001 U.S. invasion.

As one commentator aptly noted, “[a]n American counterinsurgency campaign seeks support from at least two publics—the 

Afghan and the American. Efforts to satisfy one can undermine 

support in the other.”57 Overt, or at least publicized, U.S. military criticism of the current directive seems to have abated. But is 

that indicative of greater acceptance of the implicit risk trade-offs 

the directive represents? A lesser dislike of the current directives 

requirements than those in prior versions? Or is the absence of 

overt comment simply masking continued divergence between 

doctrinal counterinsurgency guidance and tactical realities on 

56 Norine MacDonald, “The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 16 December 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/16/

the_good_the_bad_and_the_ugly_in_afghanistan. Further supporting an 

argument that Afghan perceptions of their future in Afghanistan are not positive, beginning in 2008 and continuing through 2010, more Afghans are seeking 

asylum in foreign countries than at any point since the 2001 U.S. invasion. David 

Nakamura, “More Afghans Pursue Asylum Disillusioned by War and Instability, 

Many Have Become Economic Migrants,” Washington Post, 28 November 2011. 

From 2004 through 2007, fewer than 10,000 Afghans a year sought asylum, while 

from 2008 through 2010, the numbers are closer to, if not in excess of, 20,000. 

Nonetheless, even this recent spike of asylum applicants is significantly less than 

the 30,000 plus from 2000, the last full year of Taliban rule. 

57 Chivers, “What Marja Tells Us of Battles Yet to Come.” 

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the ground? General McCrystal subordinated the military to the 

civilian population in terms of risk allocation. General Petraeus 

seemed to consider them coequal. What then of the U.S. Army 

platoon leader who, prior to leading his soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan, told them “[w]e are going to go up there and take care 

of each other. That is going to be our number one priority.”58 Thus 

at the same point in time, the operational commander considered 

protecting the military and civilian population equally important, 

a tactical leader on the ground considered protecting the military 

more important, and the doctrine stating that protecting the civilian population was paramount. The first needed step is to recognize this cognitive dissonance. From there, the task becomes reassessing how the U.S. military operationalizes counterinsurgency 

doctrine.

Translating and Training Doctrine

The counterinsurgency doctrine lays out competing interests: protection of the force and the civilian population. On the one hand, 

the doctrine claims that “ultimate success in [counterinsurgency 

operations] is gained by protecting the populace, not the [military] force”59 while “[a]t the same time, combatants are not required to take so much risk that they fail in their mission or forfeit 

their lives.”60

The U.S. military acknowledges that “[e]thically speaking, COIN 

environments can be much more complex than conventional 

ones” and that “[t]he fortitude to see soldiers and Marines closing 

with the enemy and sustaining casualties day in and day out requires resolve and mental toughness in commanders and units. 

58 Greg Jaffe, “Combat Generation Elusive Victory: Fighting to Get Out of the 

Way: U.S. Troops Battle to Hand Off a Valley Strongly Resistant to Afghan Governance,” Washington Post, 27 December 2010, .

59 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, para 1-149.

60 Ibid., para 7-23.
Leaders must develop these characteristics in peacetime through 

study and hard training. They must maintain them in combat.”61

There have now been three iterations of how doctrinal concepts of 

risk allocation in counterinsurgency are implemented through the 

tactical directive and a wide range of service member responses. 

There are a few lingering questions regarding the evolution of this 

doctrine, primarily: Are the implications of this tactical directive 

conceptually consistent with doctrine and has the military discussed the ethics of risk allocation necessary to conduct counterinsurgency operations?

The service member complaints about the tactical directive and 

the short-lived nature of the courageous restraint medal, suggests a disconnect between doctrine and practice. What kind of 

discussions is the military fostering through its professional military education and other training? The U.S. Army’s Center for 

the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) provides one example.62

One of the CAPE training vignettes involves a new platoon leader 

who overhears one of his noncommissioned officers telling the 

soldiers in the platoon that protecting each other, that ensuring 

every member of the platoon returns home uninjured, is their 

mission. While the vignette sets the conditions for the very discussions this chapter suggests, CAPE training is relatively new, is 

not widespread and, more importantly, not required.

That U.S. service members are in harm’s way in Afghanistan and 

are trying to protect the civilian population is implicitly understood. But is there an explicit training component in place that 

will ensure all service members in the U.S. military have a shared 

understanding when doctrine espouses the dichotomy that “[u]

ltimate success in [counterinsurgency operations] is gained by 

61 Ibid., para 7-24, 7-149.

62 The U.S. Army chief of staff established the CAPE at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, to reinforce the Army profession and its ethic. See 

http://cape.army.mil/.

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protecting the populace, not the [military] force . . . [yet] combatants are not required to take so much risk that they fail in their 

mission or forfeit their lives.”63

The U.S. military inculcates its service members with the concepts 

of selfless service and duty, among other values.64 The military 

ethos at its core focuses on service members looking out for the 

safety and welfare of their fellow service member—the proverbial, but in combat, literal—soldier or Marine on your left and 

right. While that focus is understandable and even commendable, 

without frank and candid discussions on where and how risk is 

apportioned and accepted in counterinsurgency operations, is the 

military unintentionally sowing the seeds of that dissonance? 

63 Counterinsurgency, para 7-14, 1-149, 7-23.

64 See Army Values, http://www.army.mil/values/.
—309—

Discipline is the soul of an Army. It makes small numbers formidable, procures success to the weak, and esteem to all.

-George Washington1

The subject of command responsibility strikes familiar tones for 

commanders and legal advisors in their national military frameworks. However, for better or worse, the armed conflicts and 

other military operations that the United States currently engages 

in seldom happen solely within the context of a single nation’s 

force.2 Far more common today is the joint and multinational coalition force. For example, this may take the form of a NATO-led 

coalition force like the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) in Afghanistan.3

1 George Washington, Letter of Instructions to the Captains of the Virginia 

Regiments, 29 July 1759, http://www.revolutionary-war-and-beyond.com/georgewashington-quotes-1.html.

2 U.S. commitments in Afghanistan (both ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom), Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, off the coast of Somalia, and elsewhere 

are either under a multinational joint command as with the NATO operations, 

part of some other coalition or collaborative effort, or sometimes a mixture of both 

national and multinational commands.

3 ISAF currently includes the forces of 49 Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs), 

website of the International Security Assistance Force, Troop Numbers and Contributions, http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php.

Accountability or Impunity

Rules and Limits of Command Responsibility

Kenneth Hobbs
310 | Aspects of Leadership

This chapter will look at the general principles that apply in cases 

of national command, followed by some of the challenges inherent in multinational environments. Next, these paradigms and 

current developments in international law will be compared.4 The 

international community is justifiably interested in minimizing 

the effects of war, especially in the case of civilians.5

 The use of 

criminal prosecutions serves both to hold violators accountable 

and to deter future misconduct.6 However, there are indications 

that this desire to protect may lead to an expansion of the scope 

of liability for commanders that has only rarely been seen before. 

This nature and scope of command responsibility has significant 

effects not just on the individuals involved, but also on the organization of military operations and the degree and nature of 

communications and information flow up and down the chain of 

command. Expanding the scope of command responsibility has 

the potential to reduce criminal misconduct, but it could also substantially alter the nature of commands and the idea of leadership 

within the military.

In the context of multinational operations, expanding the criminal 

liability of commanders brings into sharp focus the differences 

between national and multinational command structures and 

the limitations of the control and authority of the multinational 

commanders over the members of their force. If the multinational 

4 The focus is primarily concerned with the law of armed conflict, also known as 

the law of war or international humanitarian law; however, these international law 

developments cannot be fully considered without at least some discussion of international law outside of armed conflict and international human rights law (IHRL).

5 The international community includes nations, acting individually and collectively through organizations like the United Nations, organizations including the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as educational and religious institutions, commentators, 

etc. The expressions of this concern include the development of international and 

domestic law, the investigations and reports of various organizations and the efforts 

of the international community as described above in areas of conflict to minimize 

the effects of armed conflict.

6 Guenael Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility (Oxford and New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2009), 15.
Command Responsibility | 311

commander is to be criminally liable for the actions of subordinates from partner nations in the same manner as for those from 

the commander’s own national forces, a fundamental change 

should also take place in the way coalitions are established to give 

the commander the ability to enforce compliance and demand 

accountability of subordinates to a degree that can be fairly described as exercising “effective control” over those subordinates. 7

As significant as the possibility of individual criminal liability is, 

however, other developing trends, from new technologies like live 

video feeds, Blue Force Tracker, and YouTube, in the development 

of international human rights law may also result in dramatic 

changes in the nature of command and the way leaders command 

in future military operations.

Command Responsibility, Defined

Before going further, one needs to understand the idea of command 

responsibility and what it means. In the legal context, command 

responsibility is the potential criminal liability commanders have 

for serious crimes committed by their subordinates resulting from 

their failure to prevent the crimes or to deal with the subordinates 

after the crimes have been committed. While commanders are responsible for other actions as well, including actions that are not 

crimes, the focus will be on this unique form of criminal liability 

for most of the discussion.

Criminal Responsibility, Generally

When we speak about commission of crimes, in most cases the 

crime involves two concepts: the actus reus (“guilty act”) and mens 

7 “Effective control” has been required by courts in order to hold commanders 

accountable for crimes committed by their subordinates. See, e.g., Celebici Appeal 

Decision, Case No.: IT-96-21-A , 20 February 2001, Paragraph 196. This term “effective authority and control” is used in Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the treaty 

creating the International Criminal Court (ICC). See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Art. 28, U.N.T.S., vol. 2187, No. 38544. 
312 | Aspects of Leadership

rea (“guilty mind”).8 Actus reus is the criminal act itself. In the case 

of a murder, the actus reus is the killing of a person by the accused. 

Mens rea is the mental state of the accused during the relevant 

time period, which is often at the time the actus reus takes place. 

For most criminal offenses, the completion of an act in and of itself 

does not constitute the commission of a crime.

The crime of murder is an appropriate example to use when 

looking at criminal acts in the context of the military and armed 

conflict. Killing the enemy is one of the things that service 

members are specifically trained to do from the earliest days of 

basic training. If all that was required to commit a crime was the 

act of killing a person, any life taken during an armed conflict or 

other military operation would be a crime. However, this is not 

the case since troops who kill the enemy in an armed conflict—

provided they comply with the law of armed conflict—are protected by combatant immunity.9

 So, we know that in certain cases 

the killing of a person is not a crime. The other component to the 

act of killing a person that makes killing a crime is the mental state 

of the actor, the actor’s mens rea.

For most crimes, there must be either a specific intent to commit 

the crime or knowledge that an action will lead to the commission 

of the crime. In some cases, a person’s recklessness or extreme 

disregard for the consequences of their actions will establish the 

necessary mental state. Also, the potential punishment for crimes 

is often more or less severe depending on the level of mens rea on 

the part of the actor committing the crime.

Murder is only one of several crimes that can be committed when 

someone kills another person.10 Murder generally requires a specific intention to kill. If the intent to kill was formed in advance 

8 Henry Black and Joseph Nolan, Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (St Paul, MN: 

West Publishing, 1990).

9 10 U.S.C, Section 914 (2011); see also, Manual For Courts-Martial (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), iv–63 

10 Ibid., Sections 918, 919.
of the killing, the murder might be considered premeditated, 

making the crime even more serious. If the actor did not specifically intend to kill, but knew that death was the likely result of his 

action, the killing would still be a crime, but not as egregious as 

a premeditated murder. Killing another person through recklessness can also be a crime.11 This is sometimes called negligent homicide, but requires recklessness, also called criminal negligence, 

rather than mere negligence. However, in each of these cases, the 

actor has acted in some way with a “guilty mind.”

Criminal Responsibility Applied to Commanders

Commanders intuitively understand that they are responsible for 

the consequences of the orders they give, just as they would be 

for the actions they take themselves. For example, a commander 

who orders a subordinate to shoot a group of unarmed civilians 

is as responsible for the multiple murders that result as the troop 

that pulled the trigger.12 This is the most basic level of responsibility for commanders, although this is not “command responsibility” as it is defined in international law. There is no real question 

about the commander’s intention; the evidence of mens rea is at 

its clearest. When a commander gives an order to attack an objective during an armed conflict, the commander can potentially 

be held accountable for the resulting damage. To avoid potential 

legal liability, the commander must have taken appropriate steps 

to ensure that the target met the requirements imposed by the law 

of armed conflict.

“Command responsibility” as described in international law 

generally does not stem from actions taken by a commander but 

rather by omissions on the part of the commander.13 These omis11 Ibid., Section 919.

12 See generally United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (C.M.A. 1973); Michael 

L. Smidt, “Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations,” Military Law Review 164 (2000): 155, 232, note 

289.

13 Website of the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia, 

http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf. , Art. 

7, Rome Statute, Art. 28

Command Responsibility | 313
314 | Aspects of Leadership

sions can involve failures by a commander to prevent crimes 

committed by subordinates or failures to properly investigate 

and punish crimes committed by subordinates. The commander 

either knows that the criminal acts of the subordinates are about 

to be committed or that they have been committed. We return to 

the case of a soldier or Marine murdering a group of unarmed 

civilians using his machine gun. In this case, however, there was 

no order from the commander to take this action. The commander 

has not taken any action that would have prompted the killing, 

which would indicate that the commander does not have the mens 

rea to kill. Now, suppose that the commander is informed that this 

is about to take place; for instance, by hearing the troop explaining his intentions on the radio. The commander at that moment 

has a responsibility to take action to stop the act and prevent the 

murder of the civilians. Failure to act not only violates the commander’s responsibility to exercise control over subordinates, it 

may also create the impression of tacit approval. The commander 

may be liable for the killings.14

Suppose the commander did not hear about the killings before 

they took place over the radio. Instead, the commander received 

an after action report and learned about the killings after the fact. 

The commander did not order the action and was unaware that 

it took place. At this point there is no mens rea to kill the civilians 

on the part of the commander. However, the commander still has 

a responsibility to exercise control and supervision over subordinates, so the commander is faced with a choice: to take action or 

to take no action. In this example, the action to be taken may be 

initiating an investigation potentially leading to a court-martial, 

along with the possibility of other additional remedial measures 

(which may include conducting training, issuing orders, or taking 

other actions to prevent further violations). Taking no action, 

14 Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility.
or taking action that would attempt to hide the misconduct or 

fail to address it adequately, would put the commander in legal 

jeopardy.15 It should not come as a surprise to a commander that 

there would be legal consequences for failure to investigate, prosecute, or otherwise address violations of the law of armed conflict 

because the commander has taken an affirmative step, by commission or by omission, to thwart the administration of justice. 

There is a “guilty mind,” a mens rea, in this case just as when the 

commander orders the illegal act directly.

Finally, imagine if the commander neither ordered the killings nor 

was even aware that the civilians were killed. Can the commander 

be held liable in this situation? If so, where is the mens rea on the 

part of the commander here? Although it may sound strange, the 

answer may be that commanders can be prosecuted for atrocities 

committed by subordinates even though they had no knowledge 

of the wrongdoing. To explore this idea, we will begin by going 

back to World War II.16

Development of Command Responsibility Doctrine since World War II

During the Second World War, atrocities were perpetrated upon 

civilians and soldiers on a large scale in both Europe and Asia.17 In 

the aftermath of the war, the victorious Allied powers prosecuted 

many alleged war criminals in both the European and Pacific theatres. We begin with one group of atrocities, which was committed during the final months of the war in the Pacific by Japanese 

15 Ibid.

16 There are other examples of the discipline of commanders for acts of subordinates prior to World War II, by the United States and others. W. Hays Parks, “A 

Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes,” Military Law Review (1995): 73–74; 

Smidt, “Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond,” 155.

17 Estimates of casualties in WWII range from 20 to 60 million, an extremely 

large percentage of whom were civilians (37,215,153), WWII Multimedia Database, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/frame5.html.

Command Responsibility | 315
316 | Aspects of Leadership

soldiers, largely against Filipino civilians. The soldiers were from 

units under the command of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. 

The Yamashita Precedent

In September 1944, General Yamashita was transferred from 

Manchuria to command the Japanese 14th Army, which was responsible for the Japanese defense of the Philippines, including 

the island of Luzon where the Philippine capital was located.18

Yamashita arrived at his new command at a particularly inopportune time: the Allied forces were 11 days away from beginning 

the campaign to retake the Philippines.19 Yamashita hastily developed plans for repelling the Allied forces even before he could 

assemble his general staff. 

The Allied advance was extremely successful, beginning with 

the retaking of the island of Leyte, which moved the battle to the 

island of Luzon. Yamashita’s troops were under the command of 

subordinate generals in the southern, central, and northern sections of the island. In the center of Luzon sat Manila, the capital. 

Approximately 20,000 Japanese military personnel, mostly sailors 

under the command of Admiral Soemu Toyoda, were located in 

Manila. In spite of Yamashita’s order to withdraw and abandon 

Manila, Admiral Toyoda chose to remain. The capital and the 

Japanese military located there were cut off from the remaining 

Japanese units, including General Yamashita. During the days 

and weeks that followed, the Japanese forces in Manila committed atrocities on a large scale, including thousands of rapes, indiscriminate property destruction, and the murder of an estimated 

25,000 civilians. Atrocities also took place in other parts of Luzon 

in smaller numbers. The Allies succeeded in their campaign to 

retake the Philippines and General Yamashita surrendered to the 

Allied forces on 2 September 1945. 

18 Richard L. Lael, The Yamashita Precedent: War Crimes and Command Responsibility (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1982), 6; Smidt, “Yamashita, 

Medina, and Beyond,” 155.

19 Ibid.
A U.S. military commission was presented with the allegation 

that General Yamashita “unlawfully disregarded and failed to 

discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of 

the members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal 

atrocities and other high crimes against people of the United States 

and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines.”20

Although Yamashita faced only a single charge, his prosecutors 

provided a list of 123 alleged war crimes perpetrated by Yamashita’s subordinates. The trial took place before the military 

commission and concluded on 5 December 1945. On 7 December, 

Yamashita was found guilty and sentenced to death by hanging.21

Yamashita filed a petition following his conviction for a writ of 

habeas corpus,22 requesting his release and contesting the propriety of the military commission proceeding.23 The U.S. Supreme 

Court ultimately decided the matter in one of many controversial 

decisions of the period involving the war and national security.24

The Supreme Court found that the commanders were required 

under the law of war to exercise control over their subordinates 

to prevent the commission of war crimes.25 Although the Court 

deferred almost completely to the military commission in its 

procedures and the determinations made concerning whether 

the evidence actually established Yamashita’s guilt, the decision 

has been widely cited for the proposition that commanders can 

be criminally liable for the crimes of subordinates even without 

actual knowledge of their wrongdoing. Some commentators call 

the Yamashita decision “absolute liability” for commanders, but 

20 In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1946), 13–14.

21 Ibid.

22 Black and Nolan, Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s.v. habeas corpus (literally, 

“you have the body”). Also known as the Great Writ, the ability to have one’s 

confinement questioned is one of the cornerstones ensuring our liberty. The right 

to habeas corpus is the only individual right found in the original Constitution 

before adoption of the Bill of Rights.

23 In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 

24 W. Hays Parks, “A Few Tools in the Prosecution of War Crimes,” 73–74.

25 In Re Yamashita, 327 US 1 (1946).

Command Responsibility | 317
318 | Aspects of Leadership

at the very least, it established one precedent for the imposition of 

liability when the commander “should have known” of the subordinate’s actions and taken steps to prevent them.26

Nuremberg

The trial of General Yamashita was merely one of the scores of 

prosecutions that took place following World War II. Many were 

conducted, as Yamashita’s was, by U.S. military tribunal; many 

also took place in international tribunals composed of judges, 

prosecutors, and defense counsel from multiple nations. The most 

famous war crimes trials of this period took place in Nuremburg, 

Germany. International tribunals conducted some of the Nuremburg trials, while others were conducted by the United States as 

military commissions under the provisions of the Control Council 

Law No. 10. While the Nuremberg trials are well-known for rejecting the defense of “just following orders,” command responsibility was also featured in the Nuremberg trials. Especially significant for this discussion is a case often referred to as the High 

Command trial.27

High Command involved the trial of 14 senior general officers who 

held positions at the highest levels of the German armed forces 

during the Second World War. These senior officers included 

commanders of the German army, air force, and navy who were 

accused of a range of crimes, including war crimes, crimes against 

the peace, and crimes against humanity.28

The tribunal in High Command described the concept of command 

responsibility, what it was and was not, and provided an alternative to the Yamashita decision that offered a much less controversial view of the doctrine, one that more closely reflected traditional notions of criminal justice:

26 Jennifer S. Martinez, “Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: 

From Yamashita to Blaaki and Beyond,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 

(2007): 638–64; see also Smidt, “Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond,”184–85.

27 United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol xii (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office,1948), 1, 76 

28 Ibid. (All accused were acquitted of crimes against peace.)
Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of 

command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the act is directly traceable to 

him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates 

constitutes criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case it 

must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, immoral 

disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence. Any other interpretation of international law would 

go far beyond the basic principles of criminal law as known to 

civilized nations.29

This is a significantly more restrictive view on command responsibility than Yamashita, especially as viewed by the decision’s detractors.30 There is a clear focus on the connection between the 

criminal acts of the subordinate and the omission on the part of 

the commander. Further, the level of culpability is much higher 

than mere negligence, rising instead to a wanton disregard more 

consistent with recklessness.

The High Command tribunal also made other significant findings 

concerning command responsibility. The tribunal determined 

that staff officers generally were not subject to conviction for the 

actions of subordinates since it was generally the commander that 

actually had the authority to take action and the commander was 

the individual who made decisions and issued orders.

In the case of areas under occupation by the German forces, the 

tribunal convicted commanders with responsibility for occupied 

territory for not only the actions of the crimes committed by 

troops in their own units, but also for the crimes committed by 

troops under other commands but operating within their areas 

of responsibility because of the enhanced obligations of forces in 

occupation.31

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid. The High Command decision made specific reference to Yamashita, stating 

that while the decision is entitled to deference, the latter situation was factually 

distinct from the cases against the German accused.

31 Ibid., 77.

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The “Ad Hoc” Tribunals: Tribunals Created by United Nations 

Security Council Resolutions

In the decades following World War II, the number and prominence of war crimes tribunals diminished until the 1990s. More recently, over the last 20 years, the United Nations Security Council 

created a series of special tribunals to investigate criminal allegations in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Congo, and 

elsewhere.32 The first and longest running of these special tribunals is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, generally referred to as the ICTY. Yugoslavia disintegrated 

with the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, torn 

apart by war and ethnic divisions. The conflicts were bitter and 

many atrocities were committed, but there was significant doubt 

within the international community that anyone would be prosecuted for war crimes and other crimes against humanity, including genocide. The United Nations Security Council, acting pursuant to its responsibility to maintain or restore international peace 

and security under Article 24 of the UN Charter, 33 established the 

ICTY to investigate and prosecute these types of crimes in the 

former Yugoslavia.

The governing document for the ICTY, called the ICTY Statute, 

directly addressed the question of command responsibility.

34 The 

ICTY Statute provides that commanders may be responsible for 

acts committed by subordinates if the commander “knew or had 

reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such 

32 The tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda are the most 

important for this article, as most of these courts’ decisions involved armed conflicts.

33 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 

June 1945, Art. 24, 59 Stat. 1031, TS No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.

34 (ICTY Statute, Article 7, paragraph 3: “The fact that any of the acts referred to 

in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not 

relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that 

the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior 

failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.”
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary 

and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 

perpetrators thereof.”35

There are three elements to this formulation. First, a superiorsubordinate relationship must be present. This is not simply a 

question of whether there is a relationship on paper, but rather 

requires “effective control” of the subordinate by the superior.36

Second, the commander must have known, or had reason to know, 

that the subordinate was about to commit or had committed the 

crimes in question. The ICTY and other ad hoc tribunals have interpreted this to mean that the commander was in possession of 

information that would put a reasonable commander on notice 

that crimes were about to be committed or had been committed. 

This is a more rigorous requirement for the prosecution than in 

the Yamashita case. The third and final requirement is the failure 

by the commander to take reasonable and necessary actions to 

either prevent the crimes from being committed or the failure to 

punish the perpetrators.

These failures are of a nature of a dereliction of duty, as described 

in the High Command case; however, command responsibility is 

not the same as dereliction of duty. While the omissions on the 

part of the commander are essentially derelictions of duty, the 

commander is actually held responsible for the acts committed 

by the subordinate, e.g., murder. Which actions would be reason35 The other authorities that should be mentioned at this point are the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These treaties also addressed 

the idea of command responsibility. The United States has signed but not ratified 

these treaties; however, commentators contend that the provisions dealing with 

command responsibility are customary international law. See Article 86, paragraph 

2, of Additional Protocol I:

“[t]he fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by 

a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal disciplinary responsibility, 

as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled 

them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was 

going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within 

their power to prevent or repress the breach.”

36 Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility, 156.

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able and necessary are, of course, situation dependent. Consider, 

for instance, what might be reasonable steps to punish subordinates for their crimes; in some cases the commander will have the 

authority to initiate criminal prosecutions, but in others the referral of the alleged crime to appropriate authorities could be adequate if that is the action reasonable and necessary under the 

circumstances.

Another significant aspect of the ICTY Statute is the way the ICTY 

related to national courts. Concerned that justice might not be 

served if national courts were responsible for prosecutions, the 

Security Council determined that the ICTY would have primacy 

over national courts.37

In the case of the conflict in Rwanda, a tribunal (known as the 

ICTR) was likewise formed to deal with the crimes involved in 

that situation. In Rwanda, an armed conflict erupted between the 

two major ethnic groups in the country, the Hutus and the Tutsis, 

for economic and political control over one of the poorest and most 

overcrowded nations within the African continent. Millions died 

in Rwanda during the armed conflict and a number of individuals in positions of leadership were prosecuted in the ICTR. One 

such person was Jean Paul Akayesu, who held some of the greatest power over the people in his prefecture. Akayesu was accused 

of a range of crimes, including superior responsibility for rape, 

murder, mutilation, and other atrocities. This was in significant 

part because of his status as the bourgmestre (similar to a mayor) 

of the villagers, as well as the unofficial authority he was able to 

exercise. Akayesu was determined to have been in control over 

his village and the persons who lived there, including the persons 

who killed, raped, tortured, and assaulted members of the village 

during Akayesu’s tenure. It did not matter that Akayesu was not 

the military commander of these persons under his authority. 

37 http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf. 
The statute for this criminal court did not require that the person 

accused of crimes be the commander of the persons conducting the activities. The statute for the special criminal tribunal in 

Rwanda determined that civilian as well as military leaders could 

be held accountable under the doctrine of command responsibility.38 This determination may have some significance as we look at 

the degree of authority exercised by multinational commanders. 

The idea of both military commanders and civilian leaders having 

liability under the rubric of command responsibility—also called 

superior responsibility to include those not acting as military 

commanders—was adopted by the treaty that created the International Criminal Court.

International Criminal Court

Unlike the ICTY and subsequent special tribunals, a UN Security 

Council resolution did not create the International Criminal Court, 

also known as the ICC. A treaty, called the Rome Statute, created 

this entity.39 The ICC was created to establish a standing tribunal for investigation and prosecution of war crimes and crimes 

against humanity.40 The jurisprudence of these international tribunals have added to the body of interpretive guidance in the area 

of international criminal law and the law of armed conflict and 

suggest potential trends in these areas that merit consideration. 

The section of the Rome Statute dealing with command responsibility is found in Article 28.41 For the first time, there are two 

38 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, case no. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment of 2 September 1998. 

39 The United States invested considerable effort in the negotiation of the Rome 

Statute. While the United States was unable to obtain all of the modifications it 

desired, it did sign the treaty. The treaty was not ratified by the Senate, and was 

subsequently “unsigned” by President George W. Bush. Following this denunciation, the United States entered into bilateral agreements with many of its allies 

and partner nations that provided that American personnel within their territories 

would not be turned over to the ICC. These agreements are known as Article 98 

agreements. To view the document itself, see http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm.

40 The Rome Statute undertakes to create offenses through the use of convention 

(treaty) law instead of customary international law.

41 Article 28, Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors. 

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324 | Aspects of Leadership

different standards of liability. One standard, set out in subsection 

(a) of Article 28, applies to military commanders and those acting 

like a military commander. The second standard, set out in subsection (b), applies to those superiors that still exercise “effective 

control” over the subordinate but do not fit within the category 

of commanders or those acting like commanders. In both cases, 

the requirement of “effective control” is made explicit. The two 

standards differ in the degree of awareness on the part of the commander of the actions of subordinates and on the nature of the 

authority exercised by the superior. In the case of commanders or 

effective commanders, the Rome Statute returns to the objective 

“should have known” standard, whereas for the other category of 

superior, the much less rigorous and more difficult to prove, standard of actual knowledge or conscious disregard, also described 

as “willful blindness,” is put into place.

The Rome Statute formulation also departs from the ad hoc tribunals in that it modifies the idea of “punishing perpetrators” to 

specifically also include “submitting the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.” These changes create 

a significant possibility that the International Criminal Court will 

interpret cases involving command responsibility differently than 

the ICTY and other ad hoc tribunals.

At this point, there has only been one decision by any of the chambers of the ICC dealing with command responsibility. In the case 

of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC 

issued a detailed opinion approving his case to go to trial, which 

included a significant discussion of command responsibility as 

defined in Article 28 of the Rome Statute.42 In its assessment of 

42 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05 -01/08, Pre-Trial Chamber, 

15 Jun 2009, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf. (Mr. Bemba is 

allegedly responsible, as military commander, of two counts of crimes against humanity: murder (article 7(1)(a) of the Statute) and rape (article 7(1)(g) of the Statute); and three counts of war crime: murder (article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Statute); rape 

(article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Statute); and pillaging (article 8(2)(e)(v) of the Statute).
Article 28 of the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber found that 

five elements were required to establish the responsibility of commanders for acts of their subordinates:

(1) The suspect must be either a military commander or a person 

effectively acting as such;

(2) The suspect must have effective command and control or effective authority and control over the forces (subordinates) who 

committed one or more of the crimes set out in Articles 6 to 8 of 

the Statute;

(3) The crimes committed by the forces (subordinates) resulted 

from the suspect’s failure to exercise control properly over them;

(4) The suspect either knew or, owing to the circumstances at 

the time, should have known that the forces (subordinates) 

were committing or about to commit one or more of the crimes 

set out in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute; and

 (5) The suspect failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress the commission of such crime(s) or failed to submit the matter to the 

competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.43

This decision, assuming that the trial and appeals chambers of the 

ICC adopt its conclusions, would provide a great deal of clarity in 

a number of areas that were unclear in the decisions of the ad hoc 

tribunals.44 Regarding the issue of who can be held responsible, 

the court determined that superiors must both be commanders 

(or acting as a commander, for example, in the case of irregular 

or militia groups that lack a legal command relationship) and the 

superior must exercise “effective control” over the subordinates. 

43 Ibid 141–42.

44 Ibid., 148–51. These areas of clarity include the requirement that “effective 

control” existed prior to the commission of the crimes of the subordinates and the 

unequivocal establishment of a causal connection between the failure on the part 

of the commander and the crimes committed by subordinates. 

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326 | Aspects of Leadership

In considering what establishes “effective control,” the court 

described a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis that considered 

whether the following indicia of control were present:

• Official position

• Power to issue or give orders

• Capacity to ensure compliance with orders issued

• Position within the military structure and actual tasks 

carried out

• Capacity to order forces to engage in hostilities

• Capacity to resubordinate units or make changes to 

command structure

• Power to promote, replace, remove, or discipline any 

member of the forces

• Authority to send forces where hostilities take place and 

withdraw them at any given moment

As one will see, the command responsibility framework established by the Rome Statute may have significant impacts in the 

multinational environment. 

Application of Command Responsibility to Multinational Commands

Case Study: NATO International Security Assistance Force, 

Afghanistan

As complex as the legal issues may be for national commands 

and their military commanders, for the multinational commander, the complexities are much greater. This is an important issue 

to consider since many recent military operations were and are 

organized as multinational commands. This is especially true 

in NATO operations. NATO’s military command structure is by 
nature multinational. Operational commands in NATO are routinely multinational as well. NATO’s largest current operational 

commitment is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

in Afghanistan. We will take a look at this command to illustrate 

some of these additional complexities.

The ISAF commander is an American four star general, and the 

vast majority of the military personnel supporting ISAF are from 

the United States.45 The day-to-day conduct of military operations 

is the responsibility of the ISAF Joint Command, commanded by 

an American three star general. However, as mentioned above, 49 

nations provide troops to ISAF.46 The area of operations includes 

the entirety of Afghanistan, divided into six Regional Commands, 

three of which are commanded by non-U.S. commanders. Many 

of the contributing nations have assigned senior commanders as 

part of their contributions. Some nations’ contingents are organized so that they fall under the command of one of their own 

commanders, but many nations have their personnel interspersed 

within multinational units.

International Security Assistance Force, 

Afghanistan: Key Facts and Figures47

A variety of other teams also operate within Afghanistan as part 

of ISAF. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are arrayed 

across Afghanistan to provide assistance with reconstruction, 

security, governance, and rule of law activities, operating with a 

significant level of autonomy.48 Operational Mentor and Liaison 

45 Troop Numbers and Concentration, website of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), http://www.isaf.nato.int/leadership.html; http://www.isaf.

nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php.

46 Ibid.

47 Key Facts and Figures, website of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF), http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/9%20September%202011%20ISAF%20Placemat%281%29.pdf.

48 About ISAF, website of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 

http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html.

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Teams (OMLTs) are located with Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF) units to provide assistance and training. Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs) fulfill a similar role in 

developing the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Regardless of the lower-level organizational structures, all personnel from all 48 nations fall under the command of the ISAF 

commander.49 The ISAF commander has all the apparent attributes of a national commander. He has the title and the associated 

command structure. He develops policies and procedures and 

issues orders and other guidance. He also receives direction from 

and reports to higher-level commanders in the NATO military 

command structure. But does he have “effective control” over 

his subordinates? In our national context, the commander issues 

orders and if the orders are violated, then the commander has the 

clear authority to take immediate action to deal with the violation. 

This authority may include prosecution and confinement or other 

disciplinary and administrative sanctions. This authority exists 

because the nation has enacted laws to create the authority and 

has given it to commanders.

NATO does not have the ability to enact laws. Like most international organizations, NATO is created by a treaty, in this case the 

North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 (also referred to as the Washington 

Treaty).50 The nations that are members of NATO each have a representative in Brussels at NATO headquarters and make up the 

North Atlantic Council (NAC). Although it serves as the decision49 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the effort that involved the initial 

Coalition campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda following the attacks of 11 

September 2001, also continues in Afghanistan, but is not a NATO operation. 

The same U.S. general in command of ISAF is also in command of the personnel 

supporting OEF. Many of the rules and procedures are the same for both ISAF 

and OEF. However, there are differences, some of them significant.

50 North Atlantic Treaty between the United States of America and other governments, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, (24 August 1949), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/

official_texts_17120.htm.
making body for NATO, the NAC does not operate as a congress 

or parliament. The NAC does not have the authority to make laws 

as nations do. NATO also lacks a judicial apparatus—there are no 

judges, no prosecutors, and no ability to punish misconduct in the 

same way that a nation can.

Therefore, the NATO commander in many ways lacks the ability 

to arrest, initiate prosecutions, and enforce discipline that a U.S. 

commander has. What tools does the NATO commander have? 

The NATO commander has the ability to prevent a soldier from 

participating in operations and has the ability to notify the soldier’s national authorities. The NATO commander cannot require 

that a soldier be disciplined or prosecuted—that is left to the discretion of the sending nation.

One might suggest that regardless of the particular authorities 

the multinational commander has, he or she still has the ability 

to issue orders that all must follow. But is that accurate? It is undeniably true that the members of the U.S. military have an obligation to follow lawful orders.51 Failure to follow a lawful order 

is a crime. Even without an express order, it is still a crime for a 

U.S. service member to fail to fulfill his or her military duties.52

American commanders have the force of law and the threat of 

potential prosecution to back up their orders. However, even with 

this authority, members of the military still violate orders and fail 

to comply with their duties. Only a small percentage of the force 

falls into this category; nevertheless, it shows that even where 

commanders have the force of law backing up their orders, it is 

not always enough to ensure compliance.

How are orders perceived when issued by a NATO commander? 

The answer may vary. For the personnel from that commander’s 

nation, for example, the order will likely be ethically and legally 

51 10 U.S.C., Sections 890, 892. 

52 Ibid., Section 892.

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330 | Aspects of Leadership

binding. But this is not always the case. Unlike in the national 

context, multinational commanders must cope with the influences and direction from the nations that provide their forces to the 

operation. As mentioned above, only national authorities have 

the ability to discipline and punish, even though authority over 

the forces is transferred to the multinational commander. This is 

not unique to NATO, but rather is part of the nature of multinational military operations.

Nations provide forces voluntarily and may attach conditions or 

restrictions to the employment of the forces they contribute. In 

some cases, these conditions, commonly referred to as “caveats,” 

may result from international or domestic legal requirements. For 

example, many NATO members and partners are parties to the 

treaties prohibiting the use of cluster munitions and antipersonnel land mines. They may stipulate that their forces will not be 

required to use these munitions, since to do so would violate their 

international legal obligations. Sometimes these caveats are based 

on policy or political concerns. Regardless, nations continue to 

exercise control over their forces in multinational operations. 

Considering this, and considering that the essentially all-national 

authorities have coercive tools at their disposal, the multinational 

commander appears to be in a position of authority. However, it 

is certainly arguable that the commander lacks the means to exercise “effective control” over the forces ostensibly subject to the 

commander’s orders.

One sees this in the way that investigations are carried out as 

well. In the U.S. military, commanders generally have the ability 

as part of their command authority to order investigations of any 

matter that takes place within their command. In a multinational 

command, the commander can still conduct investigations, but 

the nature of the multinational command requires additional 

considerations. The multinational commander does not have the 
ability to compel forces to cooperate with investigators because 

of the lack of disciplinary authority discussed above. In a similar 

vein, because national authorities must handle any potential prosecution for a violation of law, any investigation must be handled 

very carefully. 

Aspects of an investigation like the gathering of evidence and 

the questioning of potential suspects can be ruinous to a prosecution if handled incorrectly. Because the rules and procedures will 

vary depending on the nationality of the individual concerned, 

the multinational commander risks the possibility that an investigation undertaken by the command will taint evidence and may 

result in a crime going unpunished. In the case of ISAF, these concerns have resulted in a command policy that acknowledges the 

dangers of tainting evidence and jeopardizing prosecutions. Investigations conducted by ISAF are designed to identify problems 

in the organization, training, and direction of ISAF personnel and 

units but are not intended to serve as criminal investigations. In 

fact, ISAF policy states that if evidence suggests a crime may have 

been committed, the investigation is to cease and the national 

authorities of the individuals involved are to be notified. The intention is that national authorities will then conduct any criminal 

investigations in accordance with their own legal requirements.

Assessing the NATO Approach

Let us take a look at how the scenarios discussed above might play 

out in a multinational command like ISAF. If a U.S. commander 

orders the summary execution of civilians, regardless of the nationality of the subordinate that actually carried out the order, the 

commander would be subject to discipline, since the commander is still subject to U.S. jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice (UCMJ).53 If a U.S. commander engaged in any 

misconduct, American authorities would be able to investigate 

53 Ibid., Section 802.

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332 | Aspects of Leadership

and take any necessary actions. If a potential crime was uncovered concerning a commander of any other nation, the national 

authorities for that commander would be notified and that nation 

would take any actions it deemed appropriate for the situation.

Suppose that an ISAF commander heard over the radio that a subordinate from another nation was about to kill a group of unarmed 

civilians in his custody. If that commander does nothing, that inaction is a tacit approval of the killings, subjecting the commander 

to possible jeopardy even though the subordinate is from a different nation. But what if the commander objects immediately and 

orders the subordinate to stop? The commander lacks the means 

to arrest, prosecute, or punish the “subordinate” of another nationality. Does the commander exercise “effective control”? Based 

on the decisions of the ad hoc tribunals and the Bemba Pre-Trial 

Chamber decision, which makes the ability to punish only one 

of a series of factors to consider, the answer may be yes.54 If the 

commander does exercise “effective control,” has the commander 

taken “all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her 

power” to prevent the misconduct? Since the subordinate is from 

another nation, is the commander required to contact a superior 

of the subordinate’s nationality to ensure that the subordinate received the order to stop from an officer that has legal authority to 

do so?

In the event that the commander did not know the killings were 

taking place until afterward (and did not have reason to know 

under the circumstances at the time), what actions are required? Is 

notifying the subordinate’s national authorities sufficient to meet 

the commander’s legal responsibilities? Perhaps.55

54 As part of the legal courses conducted at the NATO School, the author has had 

several opportunities to present this type of scenario before groups of legal advisors 

from more than 20 nations. This unscientific anecdotal evidence reveals a general 

level of agreement with the proposition that in some cases, the relationship may be 

sufficient to rise to the level of “effective control” even in a multinational command.

55 Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility, 250, note 97.
Now consider a scenario where the multinational commander is 

completely unaware of the killings. The person who killed the civilians was from a subordinate command and of a different nationality than the commander. At what point does the commander “have reason to know” of the subordinate’s actions? This is one 

of the key points of contention in Yamashita and in subsequent 

cases. In the Philippines, more than 20,000 innocent lives were 

taken and the military commission concluded that the atrocities 

were so widespread that Yamashita must have known that they 

were occurring. The defense argued that Yamashita was unaware 

of the actions of his subordinates due chiefly to the success of the 

Allied forces in cutting off Yamashita’s command, control, and 

communications capabilities. 

The multinational commander, like the ISAF commander, has 

the traditional impediments to complete information: distance, 

limited communications, and the time pressure of operational 

commitments. In addition, the multinational commander has 

significantly diminished legal authority. Reliance on persuasion 

and cooperation is required, while in a traditional military hierarchy, the commander’s authority alone is generally sufficient to 

ensure compliance. The ISAF commander has issued policies and 

procedures for the reporting and investigation of potential violations of the law of armed conflict. In fact, ISAF procedures are 

in place requiring investigations of civilian casualties generally, 

regardless of how they are caused. Even though an investigation 

is initiated, the ISAF commander or commanders at lower echelons cannot conduct an investigation in the same fashion that 

a U.S. commander would for an incident involving subordinate 

U.S. persons. As described above, the multinational commander 

lacks authority to place witnesses under oath or to punish criminally witnesses that make false statements or attempt to conceal 

evidence.

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334 | Aspects of Leadership

As important to this discussion as the question of knowledge is 

the notion of what actions can reasonably be taken to prevent the 

commission of a criminal act. It is unrealistic to expect that a commander with significantly less authority than a commander in a 

national command will have the same menu of options as that of 

a national commander. In the context of ISAF, policies and procedures have been developed to ensure compliance with the law 

and rules governing the use of force. Some commentators have 

expressed discontent with these policies on the basis that they unnecessarily restrict the ability of subordinates to use force.56

The international precedents dealing with the idea of criminal liability for commanders range from the harshest interpretation of 

Yamashita as an imposition of “strict liability” for commanders, to 

simple negligence, to criminal negligence or recklessness, to something just short of actual knowledge or “willful blindness.” The 

jurisprudence of the ICC, which most of the NATO members are 

subject to, will likely continue to develop this concept. However, 

there are significant differences between a national command 

and a multinational command that deserve careful consideration 

should this concept, developed with a national command structure in mind, be applied to a multinational command structure, 

especially one as complex as ISAF.

Other Trends Impacting Commanders and How 

They Lead

Technological Developments

One of the considerations in modern warfare, and modern military operations generally, for the United States concerns the dra56 Dan Murphy, “Afghanistan War: Will the New Petraeus Rules of Engagement 

Make Troops Safer?,” Christian Science Monitor, 5 August 2010, http://www.

csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/0805/Afghanistan-war-Will-thenew-Petraeus-rules-of-engagement-make-troops-safer.
matic technological advances that have taken place in recent years. 

During WWII, commanders used short-range radios and runners 

to communicate. The nature of land warfare was such that maneuver units could be out of contact for hours or days at a time. 

This required subordinate commanders to exercise significant 

authority and initiative. In the case of air warfare, senior commanders would often have to wait for the return of their fighters 

and bombers to be able to conduct a debriefing and determine 

what took place during the day’s missions. Today, communications technologies have ushered in the age of the satellite phone, 

e-mail, internet chats, and other tools to ensure that commanders 

have constant communication with their subordinate commanders on a real-time or near real-time basis.

In the case of the modern Combined Air Operations Center 

(CAOC), the commander can, in many cases, obtain live video 

feeds from piloted or remotely piloted aircraft to inform decisions concerning whether or not to attack a potential target. This 

can allow the commander to make personal decisions and take 

responsibility directly for targeting. In a situation like modernday Afghanistan, where the number of combat sorties is small, 

this level of engagement by a senior commander may be feasible. 

However, we must remember that sooner or later another major 

theater war or potentially another world war may take place. In 

that environment, where the number of daily combat sorties will 

climb to the hundreds or thousands, execution of daily missions 

will be the responsibility of lower-level commanders.

This applies to the land and maritime components, as well. Advances in communications and other technologies, like the Blue 

Force Tracker system that allows real-time awareness of the location of friendly forces, make it possible for commanders to have 

greater visibility over the area of operations than ever before. In a 

situation like ISAF, where only a limited number of engagements 

Command Responsibility | 335
336 | Aspects of Leadership

with the enemy take place on a daily basis, there may be a tendency for higher-level commanders to have a heightened degree 

of knowledge. Just as with the air component, the outbreak of a 

new large-scale armed conflict would require a much greater delegation of the operational details of combat activities.

The law of armed conflict must be flexible enough to deal with the 

range of potential conflicts. It is tempting to view armed conflict 

narrowly through the lens of our recent experience, but that temptation should be resisted. 

Legal Developments in International Human Rights Law

Another developing area of the law is international human rights 

law. Soon after the negotiation of the UN Charter, the UN General 

Assembly approved a statement of principles called the Universal 

Declaration of Human Rights.57 Treaties of various types followed; 

some were centered on a particular aspect of human rights, and 

some were more all-encompassing. Regional human rights treaties were negotiated that contained mechanisms for enforcement. 

For example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 

created a court that has the ability to hear complaints directly from 

individuals throughout Europe and can require the state parties 

to the Convention to pay damages if the ECHR determines that 

the human rights enshrined in the Charter were violated.58

In the past, these human rights treaties were considered to have 

little impact on military operations because of the nature of the 

law of armed conflict (LOAC) as a special law, a lex specialis, 

which operated as a self-contained legal system that came into 

effect only during armed conflict and that displaced human rights 

law during this period.

57 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 

1948, 217 A (III), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3712c.html.

58 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 

Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/

docid/3ae6b3b04.html.
This understanding has been subjected to criticism over the 

decades, and there are now other conceptions of the relationship 

between LOAC and international human rights law.59 In some 

regions, the current favored formulation is that international 

human rights law applies at all times, including during armed 

conflict. If this perspective is taken to its logical conclusion, for 

instance, concerning the right to life under the ECHR, the ability 

of armies to use deadly force would essentially be eliminated and 

replaced with a law enforcement model. The other perspective 

is to view LOAC and international human rights law as complementary. Under this view, where there is a specific provision in 

LOAC, it will apply during armed conflict. On the other hand, 

where there is no specific rule under LOAC, human rights law 

will be applied to fill in this gap. This may seem like an academic 

discussion; however, this has become a significant issue in Afghanistan in the context of detainee operations. Some nations, 

based on decisions by the European Court of Human Rights, 

have concluded that the ECHR applies to detainee operations in 

Afghanistan and that the possibility of ill-treatment of detainees 

by Afghan authorities prohibits the release of detainees to Afghan 

police. In addition to the practical concerns to ongoing operations, the expanding influence of international human rights law 

during armed conflict could also impact the doctrine of command 

responsibility.60

Conclusion

As illustrated, the principle of command responsibility is well established in the law, but the contours of this principle are still a 

59 “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,” I.C.J. 

Reports (New York: United Nations, July 1996), 226, 240.

60 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 

Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston: Addendum: Mission to the United 

States of America, 28 May 2009, A/HRC/11/2/Add.5, http://www.unhcr.org/

refworld/docid/4a3f54cd2.html. 

Command Responsibility | 337
338 | Aspects of Leadership

work in progress. The development of international criminal law 

from the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court 

as well as developments in human rights law have the potential to dramatically expand the exposure that commanders face. 

In the multinational context, commanders could be obligated to 

exercise ever-greater oversight, with ever-increasing accountability, but without an increase in authority over their subordinates. 

Based on current legal rules, it is unlikely that the multinational 

commander in an organization like ISAF is able to exercise “effective control” over his or her subordinates, which makes the 

imposition of command responsibility impossible. Other than the 

course correction following the controversial Yamashita decision, 

the trend since has been in the direction of expanding the scope 

of command responsibility. Considering the development of the 

doctrine of command responsibility and other current trends like 

technological advances and the development of international 

human rights law, the potential exists for criminal liability for 

commanders to continue to expand. Examining these potential 

developments raises grave questions about the concept of military leadership, especially for multinational commands.

If commanders will be held accountable for the misconduct of 

subordinates that they neither ordered nor were aware of, but 

rather should have been aware of, the potential for criminal liability will serve as a powerful incentive for commanders to insist 

upon a constant flow of information from subordinates regarding 

all aspects of activities. Similarly, this potential for criminal prosecution for the unknown actions of subordinates will encourage, 

if not require, the personal intervention of commanders at all echelons into the smallest level of detail concerning operations.

Combine this incentive structure with modern communication 

technologies and you have the very real possibility that general 

officers will be monitoring and directing patrols at the company 
and perhaps the platoon level to avoid the potential of liability 

because of the actions of subordinates. While a level of oversight 

of this sort would almost certainly limit the use of force by subordinates, the impact on military organizations and on the concept 

of leadership should be apparent. When the superior at the operational or potentially strategic level exercises tactical control over 

a subordinate leader’s unit, the superior will dictate the actions 

taken by the subordinate. This invariably affects the subordinate’s 

ability to develop plans, employ initiative, and make decisions. 

This would unquestionably impact the development of future 

leaders.

These are issues that American military personnel must bear in 

mind. It may seem that these international law developments 

are something of little consequence—the United States is not a 

party to the Rome Statute and the ad hoc tribunals take place half 

a world away. But this could not be further from the truth. One 

needs look no further than the most recent U.S. National Security 

Strategy to see that international law has a prominent place in 

current U.S. policy:

From Nuremberg to Yugoslavia to Liberia, the United States has 

seen that the end of impunity and the promotion of justice are 

not just moral imperatives; they are stabilizing forces in international affairs. The United States is thus working to strengthen 

national justice systems and is maintaining our support for ad 

hoc international tribunals and hybrid courts. Those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held accountable, and 

we will continue to support institutions and prosecutions that 

advance this important interest. Although the United States is 

not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the International 

Criminal Court (ICC) and will always protect U.S. personnel, 

we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues 

of concern and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those 

Command Responsibility | 339
340 | Aspects of Leadership

cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the 

requirements of U.S. law. 61

The impacts of developing norms of international law will be felt 

in the United States, regardless of whether the nation is a party to 

particular treaties.62 Moreover, U.S. forces, including commanders 

who must work together with superiors and subordinates from 

nations that are parties to the ICC and recognize these international legal rules, will find themselves significantly handicapped 

without a basic awareness of these principles.

61 Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 

2010), 48.

62 For example, the ICTY stated that the Rome Statute, even in 1999 before the 

treaty came into force, had real legal significance because it reflected the opinio 

iuris of the large number of states that initially signed the treaty. Opinio iuris reflects a sense of legal obligation and is part of the requirement for a rule to acquire 

the status of customary international law, which is generally binding on all states. 

Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgment), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal 

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY, 15 July 1999, para 233.
Part III

Spirituality

—343—

War is the realm of physical exertion and suffering. These will 

destroy us unless we can make ourselves indifferent to them, and 

for this, birth or training must provide us with a certain strength of 

body and soul.

-Carl von Clausewitz, On War1

The United States is a nation at war. Since 11 September 2001, hundreds of thousands of American service members have deployed 

to Iraq or Afghanistan in support of U.S. Overseas Contingency 

Operations (formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism). At 

the time of this writing, the number of American deaths associated with these operations stands at 6,325, with the number of 

those wounded in action at 47,266.2

 These casualty numbers only 

reflect those whose wounds are visible. Many more suffer serious, 

invisible, psychological injuries resulting from combat and operational stress. 

To what extent are American troops affected by these invisible 

wounds of combat? A recent study by the U.S. Army determined 

1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 101.

2 Statistics provided by the Department of Defense as of 10 December 2010, 

http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf. 

Spiritual Injuries

Wounds of the American Warrior on the 

Battlefield of the Soul

David Gibson and Judy Malana
344 | Aspects of Leadership

that “8 to 14 percent of infantry soldiers who served in Iraq or 

Afghanistan returned seriously disabled by mental health problems, between 23 and 31 percent returned with some impairment, 

and about half the soldiers with either posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or depression also misused alcohol or had problems 

with aggressive behavior.”3

 While much has been documented 

on the mental health aspect of troops, the nature of warfare itself 

is vastly complex, touching on not only the body and mind of a 

warrior, but also his/her spirit.

In describing the nature of warfare, Sir John Keegan wrote,

What battles have in common is human: the behavior of men 

struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their 

sense of honor and the achievement of some aim over which 

other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore 

always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes 

of insubordination; always of anxiety, sometimes of elation or 

catharsis; always of uncertainty and doubt, misinformation 

and misapprehension, usually also of faith and sometimes of 

vision; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion; above all, it is always a study of solidarity and 

usually of disintegration—for it is towards the disintegration of 

human groups that battle is directed.4

The trauma and stress experienced on the battlefield can without 

a doubt affect the very core of a person’s being. Warfighters are 

confronted with the issues of life and death in ways that the 

average citizen may never understand. The experience of combat 

can breed an intensity of emotions, such as rage, fear, guilt, and 

anxiety. Traumatic events “frequently call into question existen3 Scott Hensley, “PTSD and Depression Common in Returning Combat Soldiers,” NPR blog, 7 June 2007, http://www.npr.org/blogs/

health/2010/06/07/127541187/ptsd-depression-iraq-afghanistan-soldiers.

4 John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1978), 303.
Spiritual Injuries | 345

tial and spiritual issues related to the meaning of life, self-worth, 

and the safety of life.”5 For those who hold religious beliefs, the 

question of redemption, forgiveness, good vs. evil, and the nature 

of God can also be called into question. If left unaddressed, the 

trauma and stress of warfare can ultimately shatter a person’s 

soul. As one Vietnam veteran and former military chaplain so 

aptly observed, “A foxhole can make an atheist out of a believer.”6

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the spiritual dimension 

of invisible injuries sustained on the battlefield. Spiritual injury is 

a concept that is relatively unexplored in clinical research but one 

that is crucial to the dialogue of restoration and healing. It results 

from a person’s inner conflict between his/her worldview and 

what was experienced. The dynamics of this type of conflict are 

spiritual, moral, and/or ethical. The intent of the chapter is not to 

pathologize spiritual injury as a new medical condition, but to call 

attention to its effects on the American warfighter. This chapter 

will also address what leaders can do to mitigate the impact of 

spiritual injury on service members. 

First, discussion will be given to the stressful environment that 

service members face. Identifying the uniqueness of battlefield/

war zone stressors, as well as the stressors faced in an operational setting are a basis for understanding the context in which 

spiritual injury can occur. The next section will explore what is 

known and understood in the clinical realm regarding the psychological wounds of war. While there is a lack of clinical research 

about the connection between spiritual injury and combat-related 

trauma, what is known about combat trauma, combat and operational stress, reactions, injuries, and illness can provide a foun5 Mark. W. Smith and David W. Foy, “Spirituality and Readjustment Following 

War Zone Experiences,” in Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research and Management, 

ed. Charles R. Figley and William P. Nash (New York: Routledge, 2007), 295.

6 William P. Mahedy, Out of the Night: The Spiritual Journey of Vietnam Vets (New 

York: Ballatine Books, 1986), 142.
346 | Aspects of Leadership

dation for, and inform the understanding of, spiritual injury. In 

the next section, discussion will focus on the processes and rites 

from various religious traditions that can help warfighters find 

restoration and healing from their experiences in combat. While 

the military’s purpose is to win wars, the individual warfighter 

should not lose his or her soul in the process. The final section will 

examine strategies through which effective leadership can help 

lessen the effects of spiritual injury and foster spiritual healing. 

As the Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 6-11C on 

Combat Stress states, “Leaders at all levels are responsible for preserving the psychological health . . . (wellness of body, mind, and 

spirit)” of their personnel.7

War

Characteristics of the Battlefield

The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are characteristic of 

asymmetric warfare. While there is not a standard definition of 

asymmetric warfare among the branches of the U.S. Armed Forces 

or Coalition nations, it is generally held that it is “an armed conflict, in which the conventional armed forces of one party, which 

uses regular means, is opposed by an unconventional army using 

irregular means.”8 Because the United States “possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority,” its enemies have 

resorted to “mixing modern technology with ancient techniques 

of insurgency and terrorism.”9

7 Department of the Navy, MCRP 6-11C, NTTP 1-15M, Combat and Operational Stress Control (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the 

Navy, 2010), 1, http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Pages/MCRP6-

11C%28PRELIM%29.aspx#.Tyaj9Eoxoio.

8 Ted van Baarda and Désirée Elisabeth Maria Verweij, The Moral Dimension of 

Asymmetrical Warfare: Counter-Terrorism, Democratic Values and Military Ethics

(Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 15.

9 Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 

Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), ix, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/

army/fm3-24.pdf.
For those in the direct line of fire, the asymmetric nature of combat 

in Iraq and Afghanistan can pose great challenges. Adding to 

the complexity of the battlefield, the enemy is “invisible”; they 

do not wear uniforms, drive military vehicles, or muster in garrisons. They look like everyday citizens in ordinary towns. They 

can be men, women, and even children. The distinction between 

enemy combatants and noncombatants is blurred, escalating the 

complexity of the battlefield.10 Because they are nondescript and 

blend seamlessly into a community, insurgents potentially cloud 

the American warfighters’ ability to adhere to theater rules of engagement (ROE). The enemy is essentially anonymous, using the 

culture, dress, and everyday life as a way to conceal themselves. 

Much to the frustration of the American warfighter, an unknown 

enemy is not easily defeated on the battlefield.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been and will continue 

to be the weapons of choice for insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines IEDs as 

devices “placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary 

chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised 

from nonmilitary components.”11 IEDs can be homegrown or 

factory made. They are a low-cost, technologically simple, and effective means to level the battlefield. With its variety of form and 

mechanisms, IEDs are difficult to detect and defend against. They 

can be hidden anywhere, and make anything or anyone suspect. 

Additionally, given their capability to detonate in close proximity to intended targets at a predetermined angle, IEDs can have 

the same effect as precision-guided weapons.12 Even when IEDs 

10 Alexandra Zavis and Garrett Therolf, “Militants Use Children to Do Battle in 

Iraq: As More Youths Are Recruited, Boys Outnumber Foreign Fighters at U.S. 

Detention Camps,” Los Angeles Times, 27 August 2007, http://articles.latimes.

com/2007/aug/27/world/fg-childfighters27.

11 James Bevan, ed., Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference (Geneva: 

Small Arms Survey, 2008), 171.

12 John Moulton, “Rethinking IED Strategies: From Iraq to Afghanistan.” Military Review 89 (July 2009): 26–33.

Spiritual Injuries | 347
348 | Aspects of Leadership

do not wound or kill troops, the mere suspicion of an IED’s presence restricts and complicates movements on the battlefield. This 

keeps service members on a heightened level of alert constantly, 

which in and of itself can cause stress injuries.

In his recent book, Lethal Warriors, journalist David Phillips describes the intensity of IEDs:

Troops had few effective means of detecting or defeating these 

concealed weapons and no clear enemy to counterattack, 

leaving them only a tense, helpless fear they experienced day 

in and day out. Hopelessness, helplessness, and uncertainty are 

some of the most toxic emotions that lead to damaging doses of 

combat stress, which means the modern type of warfare may 

not be as loud or bloody as the invasions of D-Day or the Tet 

Offensive in Vietnam, but it is no less vicious, and because there 

are no battle lines in Iraq or Afghanistan, troops almost never 

get a break. Troops like to say it is 360/365-all around, every 

day.13

The Pentagon does not release the actual numbers of American service members killed or wounded by IEDs. However, it 

is estimated that since 2003, IED attacks in Iraq are responsible 

for roughly 70 percent of American casualties.14 In Afghanistan, 

they are responsible for approximately 30 percent of Americans 

killed or wounded.15 It is estimated that between August 2008 and 

August 2009, IED attacks doubled and continue to remain at their 

highest levels to date.16 As insurgent use of IEDs increases, it can 

13 David Philipps, Lethal Warriors: When the New Band of Brothers Came Home

(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 11.

14 “IED’s the Insurgents Deadliest Weapon,” The Times (London), 8 December 

2008, http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/46075,news-comment,news-politics,I.E.D.’sthe-insurgents-deadliest-weapon, 2.

15 Clay Wilson, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects 

and Countermeasures (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of 

Congress, 2006), 1.

16 Committee on Armed Services, Oversight and Investigations 

Subcommittee, Update to HASC O&I Report: “The Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization: DOD’s Fight Against I.E.D.s Today and Tomorrow”

(Washington, DC, U.S. House of Representatives: 2008), 39. 
be expected that the number of those who suffer stress and spiritual injury will also increase.

The trend toward asymmetric warfare will most likely not decrease in the near term. The 2010 Joint Operating Environment 

report, which highlights the current and future battle space for 

American warfighters, predicts that “future integrated close 

combat will place increased demands on the physical, psychological, and spiritual domains.”17 These demands will accumulate 

and continue to take a toll on service members.

War Zone Stressors

What are some of the other war zone conditions that service 

members must endure on the battlefield that create stress? According to the National Center for PTSD, war zone stressors can 

include “combat exposures (firing a weapon or being fired upon 

by enemy combatants or friendly fire), perceived threat, low-magnitude stressors (uncomfortable living and working conditions), 

exposure to suffering, witnessing civilians suffering, and exposure to death and destruction.”18 The cumulative effect of combat 

and operational stress takes a toll on service members, in which 

personnel are 

. . . taxed physically and emotionally in ways that are unprecedented for them. Although soldiers are trained and prepared 

through physical conditioning, practice, and various methods 

of building crucial unit cohesion and buddy-based support, 

inevitably, war zone experiences create demands and tax soldiers and unit morale in shocking ways. In addition, the pure 

physical demands of war zone activities should not be underestimated, especially the behavioral and emotional effects of 

circulating norepinephrine, epinephrine, and cortisol (stress 

17 David J. Hufford, Matthew J. Fritts, and Jeffrey E. Rhodes, “Spiritual Fitness,” 

Military Medicine (2010): 73–87. 

18 Department of Veterans Affairs, Iraq War Clinician Guide 2nd Edition, June 

2004, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/manuals/iraq-war-clinician-guide.

asp.

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350 | Aspects of Leadership

hormones), which sustain the body’s alarm reaction (jitteriness, 

hypervigilance, sleep disruption, appetite suppression, etc.).19

War zone stressors contribute to the risk for chronic PTSD. With 

multiple deployments, the stress is compounded and the severity 

of stress injuries increases exponentially. 

With wars on two fronts and numerous military operations other 

than war, U.S. military troops are stretched thin. The repeated 

combat deployment tours and the lack of decompression time 

between tours have taken a serious toll. In commenting on this 

high operational tempo, General George W. Casey, former U.S. 

Army chief of staff said, “The human mind and body wasn’t 

made to do repeated combat deployments without substantial 

time to recover.”20

In addition to combat exposure, concern on the home front has 

compounded stress in the lives of service members. Family life 

and disruptions are significant issues. Constant deployments with 

the addition of fear and uncertainty for loved ones are unsettling 

and disruptive to family routines and stability. Thus, American 

warfighters are no longer the only casualty of war; their families 

are now at risk of being worn down to the point where they too 

become susceptible to stress injuries and spiritual injuries.

At the time of this writing, it is estimated that since 9/11, over 

$1.283 trillion has been spent on the war effort thus far.21 While the 

cost of such things as equipment and materiel can be measured 

in dollars, the cost of the war in terms of physical, psychological, 

19 Brett Litz and Susan M. Orsillo, “The Returning Veteran of the Iraq War: 

Background Issues and Assessment Guidelines” in Iraq War Clinician Guide, 22.

20 Doug Stanling, “Army Wants to Reduce Combat Zone Deployments to 9 

Months,” USA Today, 21 June 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/

ondeadline/post/2010/06/army--wants-to-reduce-combat-zone-deployments-to9-months/1. 

21 Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, 7-5700, RL33110 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, 2011), 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf.
and spiritual damage is not as easily documented. One thing is 

known: America will be expending funds for the treatment of its 

warriors for many years to come. For instance, it was reported 

that in 2009 the Veterans Administration spent approximately 

$5.6 billion dollars in compensation to veterans with mental disorders as a result of their service in the Vietnam War22—a conflict 

that ended thirty-five years ago. In terms of veterans of the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT) era, the cost could be even more staggering. In their book, The Three Trillion Dollar War, authors Joseph 

Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes estimate that the cost of caring for Iraq 

and Afghanistan veterans over their lifetimes could topple $717 

billion with a significant portion covering mental disorders (such 

as PTSD, which is considered a “signature wound” of the current 

war).23 Of course, any dollar amount can never adequately describe the value of the loss of life or limb, or even characterize the 

potential devastation that combat and combat-related operations 

can have on each individual touched by war.

Wounds of War

In order to better understand the concept of spiritual injury as it 

relates to combat, it is helpful to understand what is known about 

combat trauma in general. Most research and documentation 

about combat trauma primarily addresses the physiological and 

psychological dimensions. Likewise, military doctrine regarding 

combat trauma mainly focuses on these areas. Combat trauma is 

indeed complex, and no one body of research can address all the 

22 Tim Jones and Jason Grotto, “Costs Soar for Compensating Veterans with 

Mental Disorders: PTSD and Other Psychological Disorders are Becoming 

a Costly Consequence of Wartime Service,” Chicago Tribune, 12 April 2010, 

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-04-12/health/ct-met-veterans-mentalillness-20100412_1_disorders-service-related-disability.

23 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True 

Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 61–113.

Spiritual Injuries | 351
352 | Aspects of Leadership

facets of the phenomenon. The next section of this chapter focuses 

on the current understanding of the invisible wounds of war.

Combat Trauma

What makes trauma related to combat unique? The word “trauma” 

is derived from the Greek word for “wound”: “Trauma is a wound 

which can create distress in many ‘systems’: physiological, neurological, cognitive, behavioral, emotional, social, psychological, 

and spiritual.”24 It has a broad definition and is generally applied 

to events that are perceived to be life threatening. 

The perception of threat is subjective to each individual experiencing the event.25 Trauma can “shatter the assumptions” of one’s 

core beliefs about the world concerning “benevolence, meaning, 

and self-worth.”26 Trauma then becomes a deeply personal phenomenon that splinters personal sustaining beliefs, floods an individual with a deluge of intense emotions, endangers a person’s 

sense of control, and can alienate a person from him/herself and 

the world.27 It can also threaten a person’s capacity to sustain 

him/herself and to recover.

Combat trauma involves “multiple events (even daily) over 

an extended period of time (7–12 months) with multiple 

deployments.”28 Actions such as killing, which may be morally 

questionable outside the context of the battlefield, are sanctioned 

24 Brian Hughes and Georgia Handzo, Spiritual Care Handbook On PTSD/TBI

(Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2010), 6.

25 Charles W. Hoge, Once a Warrior, Always a Warrior: Navigating the Transition 

from Combat to Home—Including Combat Stress, PTSD, and MTBI (Guilford, CT: 

GPP Life, 2010), 18–20.

26 Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of 

Trauma (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 6. 

27 Naval Chaplain’s School, Understanding and Addressing Combat Stress for Caregivers. U.S. Navy Professional Development Training Course, 2008, 281.

28 Kent Drescher, “Suggestions for Including Spirituality in Coping with Stress 

and Trauma,” PowerPoint PDF, 6, http://uwf.edu/cap/HCWMS/materials/Drescher%20-%20Suggestions%20for%20Including%20Spirituality%20in%20Coping%20with%20Stress%20and%20Trauma.pdf.
by one’s nation and are incorporated into the rules of engagement. 

The multiple roles in combat add to the potential for a trauma 

injury. Service members may be pressed into roles such as observer, direct victim, and actor/perpetrator. Consequently, the range 

and intensity of symptoms may be expanded and increased.29

Combat and Operational Stress

The physical and psychological effects of the battlefield, unique 

war zone stressors, and constant deployments are a springboard 

from which a person can experience combat and operational 

stress. Combat and operational stress is the term currently used 

among the different branches of service. The U.S. Army identifies 

combat and operational stress as “the physiological and emotional 

stresses encountered as a direct result of the dangers and mission 

demands of combat.”30 The U.S. Marine Corps defines it as “the 

mental, emotional, or physical tension, strain, or distress resulting 

from exposure to combat and combat-related conditions.”31

Not all stressors in the war zone are from the direct exposure to 

combat. Operational stress can be just as damaging as being in the 

direct line of fire. The Navy and Marine Corps define operational 

stress as “changes in physical or mental functioning or behavior 

due to the experience or consequences of military operations other 

than combat—during peacetime or war, and on land, at sea, in the 

air, or in the home.”32 Operational stress can occur with individuals in support positions, such as those handling human remains 

or body parts. Military members serving in peacekeeping and 

peace-enforcing operations are also vulnerable to highly traumat29 Ibid.

30 Department of the Army, FM 4-02.51, Combat and Operational Stress Control

(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), 1, www.fas.org/

irp/doddir/army/fm4-02-51.pdf. . 

31 Department of the Navy, FM 90-44/6-22.5/MCRP 6-11C, Combat Stress (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Navy, 2000), iii, www.au.af.mil/au/

awc/awcgate/usmc/mcrp611c.pdf.

32 FM 4-02.51, Combat and Operational Stress Control, 3.

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ic and stressful situations. Depending on the mission, they may 

“witness death and dying, be charged with the clearing of civilian corpses, be confronted with unexploded land mines, be fired 

upon as a result of misunderstandings, and witness destruction 

of property, or atrocities committed against fellow peacekeepers 

and civilians.”33

Historically, the terminology used to describe physiological and 

psychological injuries has varied. During the Civil War, these 

conditions were known as “soldier’s heart” and “nostalgia.” A 

soldier was said to be suffering from a “soldier’s heart” if he experienced increased cardiovascular activity or blood pressure with 

no present medical condition. “Nostalgia” was a term to describe 

emotional conditions such as homesickness, explosive aggression, and disciplinary problems.34 Mental health casualties in the 

First World War were labeled as “shell shocked” from the effects 

of artillery shelling on their nervous system. Soldiers during the 

Second World War were considered to have “battle fatigue” or 

“battle exhaustion.”35 During the Korean War, with better diagnostic methods and treatments available, the term “combat stress 

reaction” was coined. While the labeling of these physiological 

and psychological conditions has changed over time, their impact 

on the warfighter has not.36

Combat and Operational Stress Reactions, Injuries, 

and Illnesses

Reactions from combat and operational stress include fatigue; 

muscular tension; shaking and tremors; problems with digestive, 

33 Elisa E. Bolton, Traumatic Stress and Peacekeepers. Department of Veterans 

Affairs website, 5 July 2007, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/traumaticstress-peacekeepers.asp. 

34 Todd C.Helmus and Russell W. Glenn, Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 

2004), 10.

35 Hans Binneveld, From Shellshock to Combat Stress: A Comparative History of 

Military Psychiatry (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1997), 2–5. . 

36 Charles R. Figley and William P. Nash. Combat Stress Injury Theory, Research, 

and Management, Routledge Psychosocial Stress Series (New York: Routledge, 

2007), 33. 
circulatory, and respiratory systems; anxiety; irritability; and depression.37 These symptoms can be mild and self-limiting. Combat 

and operational stress can be masked by negative behaviors and 

can lead to more severe mental health conditions. Disciplinary 

problems, alcohol abuse, illicit drug use, aggression, and the threat 

of self-harm are common reactions to stress. Other manifestations 

include criminal acts such as mutilating dead enemy bodies, brutality, and torture.38 Jonathan Shay described these negative reactions to combat stress as “the painful paradox,” in which “fighting 

for one’s country can render one unfit to be its citizen.”39

Combat and operational stress injuries can lead to mental illness, 

such as posttraumatic stress disorder. In 1980, the American Psychiatric Association described PTSD as a mental disorder with 

debilitating, chronic, and long-lasting symptoms. Much of the 

initial research on PTSD focused on the psychological trauma of 

Vietnam veterans.40 The current research on PTSD indicates that 

stress and injury in the moral domain of the human psyche can 

lead one down the path of PTSD. In his book, War and the Soul, 

Edward Tick, a leading clinical psychotherapist working with 

combat veterans suggests, “Moral pain with its incumbent harm 

to the soul is a root cause of PTSD. If we do not address the moral 

issues, we cannot alleviate it, no matter how much therapy or 

how many medications we apply.”41

The Nature of Spirituality

The nature of spirituality is a broad topic that seeks out and incorporates transcendent relationships beyond the self. Spirituality 

37 FM 90-44, Combat Stress, v.

38 U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, USACHPPM Technical Guide 240, Combat Stress Behaviors, 1999, http://www.docstoc.

com/docs/7273919/USACHPPM-Technical-Guide-240-Combat-Stress-Behaviors, 2.

39 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam. (New York: Scribner, 1994), xiii.

40 George Fink, ed., Encyclopedia of Stress, vol.2 (New York: Academic Press, 

2000), 2.

41 Edward Tick, War and the Soul: Healing Our Nation’s Veterans from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 2005), 117.

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has been defined as “a person’s pursuit to connect to something 

or someone beyond him or herself as a means of making meaning 

or significance.”42 This is of particular importance, for in finding 

meaning and significance one finds purpose and coping skills 

not only for a traumatic event but for life itself. “This meaning or 

significance can be found in relationship with self, others, ideas, 

nature, higher power, art, or music. These relationships are prioritized by the person seeking meaning (Navy Medicine).”43

According to military medicine and the doctrine for Total Force 

Fitness for the 21st Century, the concept of spirituality “includes 

an array of domains including values, feelings, aspirations, and 

so forth, typically reflecting common theological assumptions 

about the human spirit.”44 Spirituality is not the same as religion. 

Religion implies institutions based on a person’s spirituality. The 

military’s concept of total fitness for each war fighter emphasizes 

“spiritual fitness,” which includes healthy spiritual beliefs (positive personal worldviews), values (which guide moral decision 

making), practices (both inward and outward expressions of 

faith), and core beliefs (purpose and meaning of life).45

Spirituality and Mental Health Research

The scientific study of spirituality and mental health is a relatively 

new field. Twenty years ago, of the health research journals that 

included the topic of religion/spirituality, less than 3 percent were 

psychology journals, less than 2 percent were psychiatry journals, 

less than 1 percent were medical journals, and approximately 12 

percent were nursing journals.46 However, since 1990, there has 

been a growing trend with a five-fold increase of research in this 

42 Kent Drescher, Mark Smith, and David Foy, “Spirituality and Readjustment 

Following War-Zone Experiences” in Combat Stress Injury, 295–320.

43 Hughes, Spiritual Care Handbook, 17.

44 Hufford, “Spiritual Fitness,” 74.

45 Ibid. 74–75. 

46 Understanding and Addressing Combat Stress for Caregivers, 283.
area.47 There is a mounting body of research that indicates spirituality and trauma interact. 

In regard to the broader topic of the moral domain where spirituality is often clinically relegated, leading voices in the field of 

PTSD research and clinical psychology recognize that like spirituality, the moral aspects of trauma have been, until recently, unexplored. The general reasons for this absence of exploration have 

been that clinicians have not asked the right questions and have 

felt that patient shame might prevent disclosure; clinicians may 

also feel helpless or unprepared in this area, may be too frightened of their own reactions, or may be perceived as being judgmental.48 Regardless of the reasons, this type of trauma “calls for 

particular attention, since it is so severe in veterans, so neglected 

by the therapeutic community, and under modern political and 

technological conditions, more endemic to the practice of warfare 

than ever before.”49

Spiritual Injury

Inner Conflict

The current body of literature by scholars and clinical researchers working with combat veterans suggests that spiritual injury 

is very much a part of an inner conflict. The assumption is that 

an individual’s moral, ethical, and spiritual dimensions interact 

to form meaning, purpose, values, and perceptions of oneself and 

the outside world. An inner conflict arises when these perceptions 

are in stark contrast to what is experienced.

Inner conflict injury can be defined as “damage to individuals’ 

conceptions of themselves, other people, important institutions, 

47 Hufford, “Spiritual Fitness,” 73.

48 Brett Litz, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair.” Presentation, Navy and Marine 

Corps Combat Operational Stress Control Conference, San Diego, CA, 18 May 

2010.

49 Tick, War and the Soul, 110.

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or the Divine resulting from betrayal of deeply held values and 

beliefs, either by the individuals, themselves, or by others they 

trust.”50 For example, warfighters may be involved in potential 

injurious acts such as “perpetrating, failing to prevent, or bearing 

witness to acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs or they 

may experience conflict about unethical behaviors of others. 

Warriors may also bear witness to intense human suffering and 

cruelty that shakes their core beliefs about humanity . . . ”51 The 

following are other examples of the various ways inner conflict 

can manifest itself in a military setting:

• A Marine orders his team to open fire on a vehicle refusing 

to stop at a checkpoint, even though he can see it is filled 

with women and children.

• A Navy corpsman fails to save the life of his platoon commander after he was shot in the upper chest but believes he 

could have succeeded if he had had better training.

• A young sailor on deployment fails to be at his wife’s side 

as she dies from breast cancer because his commanding 

officer said he was needed aboard ship during its underway period.

• A Marine squad in Afghanistan makes a pact to get brutal 

revenge on the Taliban fighters responsible for the cruel 

death of one of their own unit members.

• A Navy or Marine Corps leader promises to bring back the 

husband of a young bride and the father of her infant child 

but because of unexpected events, fails to do so.52 

50 William P. Nash, et al, “Moral Injury: What Every Leader Should Know,” 

Presentation, Navy and Marine Corps Combat Operational Stress Control Conference, San Diego, CA, 18 May 2010.

51 Brett T. Litz, et al., “Moral injury and Moral Repair in War Veterans: A 

Preliminary Model and Intervention Strategy,” Clinical Psychology Review 29 

(2009): 695–706.

52 Nash, “Moral Injury.”
In these examples, a person’s self-perception makes the difference between “moral courage vs. moral failure; ethical decision 

making vs. ethical violations; honor vs. dishonor; faithfulness vs. 

betrayal; purity vs. defilement (miasma, pollution); killer vs. murderer; pride vs. shame; forgivable vs. unforgivable; meaning vs. 

meaninglessness.”53

What is distinctive about the spiritual domain that sets it apart 

from the moral, ethical, and psychological variables is the fractured transcendent relationship between the self and the outside 

world (to include the Divine). Robert Kane, in his book Through 

the Moral Maze, describes this fracture as the loss of one’s “spiritual center”: the place where one finds access to the divine and 

nearness to it. To lose one’s spiritual center is to lose access to 

one’s God.54 This can result in spiritual alienation (from God and 

others) and the loss of meaning. Both of these concepts have been 

identified by clinicians as distressing issues to veterans seeking 

treatment for PTSD.55 Spiritual injury is reflected in statements 

such as 

“I was totally alone.” 

“I was not myself.” 

“I saw myself dead.” 

“I lost my innocence, sanity, and faith.” 

“Time stopped.”

“Did I die there?” 

“I became mean and cold.”

“I was afraid.” 

53 Ibid.

54 Robert Kane, Through the Moral Maze: Searching for Absolute Values in a Pluralistic World (New York: Paragon House, 1994), 3–5.

55 Margaret Nelson-Pechota, “Spirituality and PTSD in Vietnam Combat Veterans,” National Conference of Viet Nam Veteran Ministers website, http://www.

warveteranministers.org/spirituality_intro.htm.

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“I never talked about it.” 

“I reject religion.” 

“Nothing prepared me.”56

Spiritual injury is clinically understood in relation to the moral 

and ethical dimension of a person’s being. Clinical psychologist 

Dr. Brett Litz, a leading authority on PTSD, asserts that “potentially morally injurious events, such as perpetrating, failing to 

prevent, or bearing witness to acts that transgress deeply held 

moral beliefs and expectations may be deleterious in the long 

term emotionally, psychologically, behaviorally, spiritually, and 

socially (what we label as moral injury).”57 Spiritual injury occurs 

as part of an inner conflict, where a person’s worldview (spiritual, 

moral, or ethical) is in direct contrast to what he/she has experienced in life. Spiritual red flags (similar to medical symptoms) 

include loss of faith, negative religious coping, lack of forgiveness, and overwhelming guilt.

Spiritual Red Flags

According to a study conducted with combat veterans in a residential treatment program for PTSD, clinician Kent Drescher surveyed 100 Vietnam War veterans and over 50 OIF/OEF veterans 

regarding spirituality and combat trauma.58 His research indicated three areas in which spiritual injury was manifested: loss of 

faith, negative religious coping, and forgiveness.

Loss of Faith

Of those surveyed, 60 percent indicated they experienced a “significant loss of faith.” The men were, on average, 24 years old 

56 Kent D. Drescher, Peter E. Bauer, and Bill Carr, “Spiritual Injuries of War,” 

PowerPoint PDF, http://www.careforthetroops.com/presentations/Peter%20

Bauer%20Source-Spiritual_Injuries_of_War.pdf.

57 Brett Litz, “Moral Injury and Moral Repair,” (presentation, Navy and Marine 

Corps Combat Operational Stress Control Conference, San Diego, CA, 18 May 

2010).

58 Drescher, “Spiritual Injuries of War.”
when their loss of faith occurred. The percentage of those who 

reported a loss of faith within the last five years was 62 percent. 

Loss of faith is associated with depression, social isolation, a sense 

of a foreshortened future, and a hightened awareness of life’s fragility. Vietnam War chaplain William Mahedy, in his book, Out of 

the Night: The Spiritual Journey of Vietnam Vets, indicates, “It is not 

only about the loss of faith but also about the desperate struggle 

to find God in the midst of hell. In spite of lengthening shadows of 

despair and doubt, soldiers in the field often sought God, wanting 

nothing more than to experience touches of His mercy, forgiveness, and above all deliverance from evil.”59

Negative Religious Coping

The results of the survey indicated that the majority of OIF/OEF 

combat veterans harbored negative religious coping thoughts. 

These thoughts were characterized by questions about God’s 

presence and power, expression of chronic strong anger toward 

God, expression of frequent dissatisfaction with congregations 

and clergy members, and punitive interpretations of negative 

circumstances. Fifty-three percent of combat veterans responded 

that they felt God was punishing them for their sins or lack of 

spirituality. Likewise, 53 percent of combat veterans wondered 

whether God had abandoned them.60

Lack of Forgiveness

The survey results indicated that for OIF/OEF combat veterans, 

80 percent had seldom or never forgiven themselves for things 

that they had done wrong. Seventy-four percent had seldom 

or never forgiven those that had hurt them and 50 percent had 

seldom or never known whether God had forgiven them.

Forgiveness is a broad term that can generally be defined as a 

“process of letting go of negative thoughts, feelings, and reactions 

59 Mahedy, Out of the Night, 141.

60 Drescher, “Suggestions for Including Spirituality in Coping with Stress and 

Trauma.”

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toward the offender (and often toward oneself), as well as seeking 

to gain a more compassionate understanding of the offender.”61 It 

is not the same thing as pardoning, excusing, or condoning acts of 

the offender. The issue of forgiveness is one that can create tension. 

It suggests forgiveness should be bestowed upon an enemy (even 

though he/she has killed a soldier’s friends and fellow comrades) 

or upon a military organization that deployed a soldier despite 

his/her wishes, a leader who made an unwise or unprofessional 

decision resulting in tragic consequences, or even God for allowing the things of combat to happen. It also suggests a person can 

forgive him/herself for the acts he/she committed or “perceived 

errors, mistakes, or lack of action.”62 Lack of forgiveness has been 

associated with more severe PTSD and more severe depression.

Guilt

An issue not specifically mentioned in the survey of combat veterans, but no less important to spirituality, is the concept of overwhelming guilt. Guilt can take the form of commission and omission—where an individual expresses guilt over actions that he/

she had done or failed to do. The concept of survivor’s guilt is 

also a factor in spiritual injury. It is when an individual survives 

where others did not.

The Los Angeles Times reported the tragic story of Marine Sergeant 

Jeff Lehner, whose deployment in Afghanistan left him with 

PTSD. During his time there, he witnessed the “unspeakable” and 

was unable to stop what he thought was morally wrong. The reporter, Ann Louise Bardach wrote,

His case was compounded, his friends said, by strong feelings 

of “survivor’s guilt” involving the crash of a KC-130 transport 

plane into a mountain in January 2002—killing eight men in 

his unit. He’d been scheduled to be on the flight and had been 

reassigned at the last minute. As part of the ground crew that 

61 Ibid.

62 Figley and Nash, Combat Stress Injury, 306.
attended to the plane’s maintenance, he blamed himself. Afterward, he went to the debris site to recover remains. He found 

his fellow soldiers’ bodies unrecognizable. He also told me he 

was deeply shaken by the collateral damage he saw to civilians 

from U.S. air attacks—especially the shrapnel wounding of so 

many Afghan children.63

The article goes on to depict a man troubled and haunted by 

his memories in Afghanistan and his inability to find adequate 

help for his PTSD through an overwhelmed Veterans Administration. Sergeant Lehner’s psychologist was so concerned about 

his behavior that she called his home one night and spoke to his 

father briefly before he handed the phone to Sergeant Lehner. As 

the phone line went static, the psychologist feared the worst and 

called the police. They arrived too late. Sergeant Lehner shot his 

father and himself. This murder-suicide is a tragic story and is a 

somber reminder of the reality of combat trauma and the power 

of overwhelming guilt. The question then becomes, “How can a 

damaged spirit be restored?”

Spiritual Repair

The importance of incorporating spiritual practices into treatment of psychological disorders is paramount to restoration and 

healing. Edward Tick argues for this integration by stating that 

“the common therapeutic model . . . misses the point that PTSD is 

primarily a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic disorder—in effect, not 

a psychological but a soul disorder . . . such aspects can be healed 

only by strategies aimed at them directly in this context. For this 

reason, it is crucial that we expand our psychological focus to a 

more holistic view.”64

63 Ann Louise Bardach, “For One Marine, Torture Came Home,” Los Angeles 

Times, 12 February 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2006/feb/12/opinion/

op-bardach12.

64 Tick, War and the Soul, 108.

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Purification and Cleansing

Purification and cleansing rituals are part of various religious 

traditions, both Western and Eastern. These traditions focus on 

the removal of uncleanliness and defilement as a part of worship 

through such means as repentance, cleansing, and transformation. For example, Christianity practices confession and baptism, 

Judaism offers the Ten Days of Repentance and Atonement, Islam 

incorporates ritual purification for prayer, Buddhism offers the 

wheel of karma to transform one’s legacy after hurtful actions, 

and the Native American Indian tradition uses the sweat lodge for 

purification.65 Purification and cleansing rituals can help combat 

veterans atone for the immorality and impurity they may feel as a 

result of their actions on the battlefield.

Spiritual Rituals and Practices

Spiritual rituals and practices keep one connected to his or her 

spiritual center. To have a spiritual center is to maintain connectedness to one’s roots, maintaining a “historically defined sense of 

belonging to the cosmos. The idea of roots is built into the very 

meaning of the term ‘religion’ in English, which comes from the 

Latin re-ligio and literally means a ‘linking backward’ to one’s 

origins. There is a connection here to the fact that the religious 

quest is concerned with the ‘meaning of life.’”66

The search for the “meaning of life” is a pursuit to answer the 

basic questions of life itself: Who am I? Why am I here? What is 

fair/right? What is truth? What is love? Why is there suffering/

evil? Where am I going? The sudden and overwhelming nature 

of a violent trauma can shatter the foundations that support the 

“meaning of life” for an individual. It is through spiritual rituals 

and practices that one can reconnect to his or her roots and find a 

sense of belonging and connectedness. 

65 Ibid., 207.

66 Kane, Through the Moral Maze, 143–44.
Rituals then become symbolic actions by individuals that express 

meaning and purpose. Religious traditions have a variety of spiritual rituals and practices, such as worship, prayer, meditation, and 

reciting litanies. The benefits of incorporating rituals and spiritual 

practices can include improved self-esteem, enhanced motivation 

and commitment to change, service toward others, and a healthy 

social network that gives a sense of meaning, purpose, and value.67

Rituals that can be specific for warfighters include memorial services for fallen comrades and the simple act of reading poetry 

by war survivors in a group or including an empty chair as a reminder of those who were killed in combat. In a larger communal 

sense, it can be participating in Armed Forces Day, Memorial Day, 

Veterans Day commemorations, and POW/MIA remembrances, 

as well as visiting war memorials.68

Storytelling

A story is a “map for the soul,” a living thing, a divine gift. It is 

thought that when a person tells his or her story and listens to 

others’, that person comes “in touch with all three: life, divinity, 

and soul.”69 Storytelling is a way of preserving personal histories 

and reveals patterns and meanings that may have been missed. 

It has a way of bringing a community together and “transforms 

both the actor and listener alike into communal witnesses.”70 Thus 

stories become “powerful constructs that can resonate in both 

those that tell them and those who hear them.” They have the 

ability to connect individuals as a means of making sense of a 

traumatic event.71

While it may be a natural tendency for warfighters to remain 

silent regarding their traumatic experiences on the battlefield, re67 Understanding and Addressing Combat Stress for Caregivers, 288.

68 Figley and Nash, Combat Stress Injury, 295–308.

69 Tick, War and the Soul, 217.

70 Ibid.

71 Roy Baumeister and Leonard Newman, “How Stories Make Sense of Personal 

Experiences: Motives That Shape Autobiographical Narratives,” Personality and 

Social Psychology Bulletin 20 (1994): 676.

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search has shown that storytelling is one of the most important 

components of effective therapy. Having the opportunity to tell 

one’s story to someone who is caring, compassionate, and empathetic helps that individual move forward from the traumatic 

experiences. Storytelling is also “one of the most important rituals 

after returning from war.”72 The tradition of postwar storytelling 

links all the way back to the Greek tragedies of Sophocles’ “Ajax” 

and “Philoctetes.” Such stories reveal that the tragic results of war 

on an individual’s body, mind, and soul are not simply a phenomenon of modern warfare, but have affected military personnel for at least 2500 years. In the telling of the story, healing begins 

to surface through the affirmation of the individual and the collective experience of all involved. In so doing, all learn to know 

themselves and others, thus shaping their identities, emotions, 

hopes, dreams, and desires.

Theodicy and Letting Go

The problem of suffering is one that has plagued humankind from 

perhaps its beginning. Theodicy asks, “How can God who is all 

loving and all powerful allow traumatic events to happen?” A 

soldier on the battlefield might ask, “Why did God allow innocent 

children to be killed in the line of fire?” or “Why did I survive and 

my buddy did not?” or “If God is so loving, why was I allowed 

to experience the things I did?” From a Judeo-Christian perspective, theodicy challenges the ideal of God’s justice and care. Theologically, there are various ways the problem of suffering has been 

answered—whether God chooses not to intervene or provides a 

means for moral growth. The question of theodicy leaves room for 

the mystery of the Divine—there is much unknown and even unanswerable. While an individual may go on seeking answers, the 

act of voicing questions provides a framework to find meaning.

The concept of theodicy does not exist in the Buddhist or Hindu 

religious traditions. In these Eastern religions, all suffering is de72 Hoge, Once a Warrior, 116.
served.73 However, the meaning in suffering (whether deserved 

or not) seems, from a human standpoint, to be unanswerable. The 

inward practice of meditation, particularly Buddhist koan tradition that teaches meditation on the unanswerable questions of 

life, has value in relation to spiritual recovery.

Noted Army psychiatrist, Charles Hoge, in his recent book, Once 

a Warrior, Always a Warrior: Navigating the Transition from Combat 

to Home Including Combat Stress, PTSD, and mTBI, urges returning warriors to let go of the unanswerable questions that ignite 

complex emotions that can start one down a path of “chronic 

hopelessness, guilt, shame, self-blame, (and) depression.”74 He 

praises the Zen Buddhist tradition of koan as a way of reprogramming the brain; asking (or meditating on) the unanswerable questions of war paradoxically “kicks the brain circuitry out of its propensity to get stuck in these types of questions.” The end result is 

being unstuck from a cycle of unanswerable questions.

Meaning Making

Meaning making refers to the “process of working to restore 

global life meaning when it has been disrupted or violated.”75

A seminal work on the topic is Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for 

Meaning. Frankl, an Austrian psychiatrist and Holocaust survivor, developed logo therapy, which is a coping strategy that finds 

meaning even in the midst of tragic suffering. Finding meaning 

makes extreme circumstances bearable and can usher in a purpose 

for living. “We can discover this meaning in life in three different 

ways: (1) by doing a deed; (2) by experiencing a value; and (3) by 

suffering.”76

73 Ian G.Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San 

Francisco: Harper, 1997), 300–1.

74 Hoge, Once a Warrior, 233.

75 Crystal L. Park, “Religion and Meaning” in Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal 

L. Park, ed, Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality (New York: 

Guilford Press, 2005).

76 Viktor Emil Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 

111.

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Clinical research indicates that traumatic and damaging events 

are easier to endure and adjust to when “understood within a benevolent religious framework, and attributions of death, illness, 

and other major losses to the will of God or to a loving God are 

generally linked with better outcomes.”77 An example of this 

linking is seen in an interview with combat veteran Mark Clester, 

where he recalls his fourteen-hour ordeal in a firefight outside of 

Fallujah in 2003:

We turned on this road, and we knew it was a bad situation. 

Immediately, we offered a prayer to God. It was a quick prayer, 

but we understood He was in ultimate control of the situation 

and we asked for his Divine intervention. In reality we should 

have been defeated. The IEDs should have gone off, but instead 

they failed to explode. We needed God and He was there. None 

of my Marines were killed that day and we know it was because 

of God. Throughout the whole ordeal I had peace knowing that 

God was providential.78

The Role of Leadership 

The Marine leader has a role in the prevention of and recovery 

from stress injuries. As retired Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, 

USMC, states, “An injured Marine is lost to the force, whether 

the injury is physical or psychological.”79 The same can be said 

for stress injuries that are ethical, moral, and spiritual in nature. 

When a Marine is injured, unit leadership is paramount to his or 

her recovery. This is accomplished by fostering a climate of community at the unit level and through training and supporting 

77 Paloutzian and Park, Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 

309.

78 Lieutenant Colonel Mark Clester (Ret.) USMC, interview with CDR Judy 

Malana, 19 December 2010. 

79 Jonathan Shay, Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma and the Trials of Homecoming. (New York: Scribner, 2002), 208.
competent, open-minded, and ethical military leaders who have 

the full support of their superiors.80

Dr. Jonathan Shay states in Odysseus in America: Combat Trauma 

and the Trials of Homecoming “that there are three keys to preventing psychological and moral injury in military service, and that 

these keys are in the hands of military line leaders and trainers. 

These are

• Positive qualities of community in the service member’s 

. . . unit, of which stability is the most important (cohesion);

• Prolonged, progressive training that works for what troops 

really have to do and face; and

• Competent, ethical, and properly supported leadership.”81

With leadership being so critical to the prevention and recovery 

of these types of injuries, how does a Marine leader build unit cohesion and resilience, identify those at risk, take steps to mitigate 

potential injury, and use available resources? A successful strategy for dealing with stress injuries will be built around three key 

factors: (1) strong leaders who exhibit passionate, moral, ethical, 

and spiritual leadership; (2) implementation of the USMC’s 

Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) programs; and (3) utilization of the unit’s chaplain. 

Leadership Strategies

As with any other aspect of military leadership, having wellthought-out and effective strategies for accomplishing mission 

objectives is important and there are strategies that a leader must 

employ in addressing stress injury. First, as the 2007 Tri-MEF 

COSC Conference stated, “Combat Operational Stress Control is 

a leadership issue. Solid leadership, unit cohesion, realistic training, and high morale are vital to preventing and ameliorating 

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

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combat operational stress.”82 General James F. Amos, 35th Commandant of the USMC, states that “taking care of the Marines not 

only includes the proper treatment of the physical injuries associated with combat, but it also involves dealing with the mental 

injuries which can result from combat . . . ”83

By its very nature, being a Marine is stressful. Marines are the nation’s premier “shock troops,” repeatedly thrust into tough and 

challenging operations around the world. Frequent deployments 

and family separations have always been a part of the USMC, and 

Marine leaders by necessity must be acutely aware of the need 

to manage stress in getting the job done while preserving warfighter verve. However, it has not always been possible to control 

combat and operational stress within the Marines’ capacity to 

adapt. These types of injuries will always be a risk to Marines and 

impact Marine Corps operations.

 It is imperative for Marine Corps leaders to be intensely aware 

of the conditions that expose Marines to the risk for stress injuries. Equally, every effort must be made to prevent stress injuries 

whenever possible, i.e., there must be a balance between repetitive and realistic training that prepares Marines for combat, while 

not creating stress injuries through that training. Similarly, it is 

imperative that stress injuries be quickly identified and appropriate care given to those in need.

Underpinning a Marine leader’s ability to lead is the ethical, 

moral, and spiritual leadership displayed in his/her personal life 

on and off the battlefield. As Doug Crandall has so aptly shown, 

“A leader’s integrity serves as a foundation for the moral and 

ethical execution of missions, which protects his or her subordi82 Conference Notes, Tri-MEF Combat Operation Stress Control (COSC) 

Conference, 5–7 September 2007, http://www.i-mef.usmc.mil/external/imef-01/

staff_sections/TriMEF_COSC_CONF_NOTES_Final.pdf.

83 U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration, Combat Stress: A 

Concept for Dealing with the Human Dimension of Urban Conflict (Quantico, VA: 

Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration, 2007), http://www.marines.

mil/news/publications/Documents/Combat%20Stress.pdf.
nates’ moral justification for fighting and sustains their will to 

win.”84 “Leaders are expected to reflect and uphold the morals, 

norms, and principles of conduct that are universal to the population they are leading. They must assess and reflect upon all conditions and possible outcomes prior to making a decision.”85

Jonathan Shay argues in Achilles in Vietnam that a failure by leadership to display consistent ethical, moral, and spiritual leadership 

was a major contributor of PTSD injuries in Vietnam veterans. He 

argues that military units are social constructs built upon shared 

expectations and values. “The moral power of an army is so great 

that it can motivate men to get up out of a trench and step into 

enemy machine gun fire. When a leader destroys the legitimacy 

of the army’s moral order by betraying ‘what’s right,’ he inflicts 

manifold injuries on his men.”86

In a similar manner, General James N. Mattis warns leaders not 

to neglect the spiritual dimension in their personal lives and in 

the lives of their subordinates, and warns of the impact such 

neglect can have. He says, “ . . . your spiritual path is much more 

of your own choosing. Just make real sure that you don’t dismiss 

this as something of idle interest or not that important, because 

with the physical and the mental, you can aspire and kick ass. You 

can sometimes put things on the spiritual level behind you; the 

problem is that we endanger our very country [when we do so].”87

The Marine Corps’ success originates in its foundational values 

and the synergy created when individual, unit, and institution84 Doug Crandall, ed., Leadership Lessons from West Point (San Francisco, CA: 

Jossey-Bass, 2006), 259.

85 Kevin G. Bezy and Joseph Makolandra, “Spiritual and Ethical Leadership,” 

Connexions website, http://cnx.org/content/m26889/latest/. (Instructional Module was written and published by Kevin Bezy and Joseph Makolandra, doctoral 

students from Virginia Tech and is a chapter in a larger collection entitled, 21st 

Century Theories of Educational Administration.)

86 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, 196.

87 James N. Mattis, “Ethical Challenges in Contemporary Conflict: The Afghanistan and Iraq Cases” (Stutt Lectures, U.S. Naval Academy, 23 February 2006), 15, 

www.usna.edu/Ethics/Publications/ MattisPg1-28_Final.pdf. 

Spiritual Injuries | 371
372 | Aspects of Leadership

al values, including the spiritual, are aligned. Consequently, the 

most powerful thing a Marine leader can do to help his or her 

Marines is “set the example.” This is done primarily by aligning 

personal actions and beliefs with the shared values congruent to 

the Marine Corps. Leading by example makes values real, thus, 

one is able to encourage the heart and soul of those he or she is 

charged to lead. Because of the creditability garnered through 

leading by example, a leader can then implement a model of the 

human spirit that builds spiritual resilience, helping the spiritually injured recover.

The USMC Strategy to Address Stress Injuries

The second leadership strategy in addressing combat and operational stress is the USMC COSC program. Its intent is to maintain 

a resilient, ready force and promote the long-term health and wellbeing of Marines, sailors, and their families.88 For unit leaders, it is 

essential that they understand and implement USMC COSC doctrine. The components of the doctrine are built around three tools: 

the COS Continuum, Combat & Operational Stress First Aid, and 

the “Five Core Leadership Functions.” 

The COS Stress Continuum is the foundation for all COSC and 

Operational Stress Control (OSC) doctrine, training, surveillance, 

and interventions in both the Marine Corps and Navy. It is evidence-based and consistent with the Marine Corps’ culture and 

warrior ethos. The model highlights the shared responsibility 

leaders have with that of medical personnel, mental health professionals, and chaplains for force protection and force conservation.

The second aspect of the USMC COSC response is Combat and 

Operational Stress First Aid (COSFA). COSFA is a flexible, mul88 Greg Goldstein, U.S. Marine Corps Combat and Operational Stress Control 

Program Update (presentation, Navy and Marine Corps Combat & Operational 

Stress Control Conference, 18–20 May 2010), http://www.med.navy.mil/sites/

nmcsd/nccosc/coscConference/Pages/2010/coscConference2010MediaDay1.aspx.
tistep process for the timely assessment and preclinical care of 

stress reactions or injuries in individuals or units. Its goals are to 

preserve life, prevent further harm, and promote recovery. There 

are two components: “Primary Aid,” which focuses on safety and 

calming to save a life and thwart further injury; and “Secondary 

Aid,” which guides individuals, peers, leaders, and caregivers to 

work together to promote recovery or facilitate appropriate referral for further evaluation or treatment.

Lastly, COSC is a leadership issue having “Five Core Leadership 

Functions.” The USMC has identified these functions as strengthen, mitigate, identify, treat, and reintegrate.89

(1) Strengthen: Leaders design activities that enhance and 

build resilience, such as hard, realistic training that develops 

physical strength, mental strength, and endurance. It is leadership that strengthens unit cohesion by building mutual trust 

and support, which is an essential component of resilience. It 

is leadership that instills confidence and provides a model of 

ethical and moral behavior that strengthens the individual and 

unit as a whole.

(2) Mitigate: Mitigating stress is about balance. While there is 

the need to intentionally stress Marines in order to train and 

prepare them, leaders must ensure adequate sleep, rest, recreation, and spiritual renewal to allow for recovery. It is imperative to also identify stress reactions or injuries early, before they 

become entrenched. Leaders must know the individuals in their 

command, recognize when confidence has been shaken, and 

conduct after action reviews (AARs) in small groups at the completion of a mission to defuse stress, build confidence, acknowledge loss, and give permission to grieve. Leaders must live and 

enforce core values, and own up when they make mistakes.

89 FM 90-44, Combat Stress, 17–20.

Spiritual Injuries | 373
374 | Aspects of Leadership

(3) Identify: The leader must know the strengths and weaknesses of his or her Marines and sailors, and be aware of the challenges that they face within the command and in their personal 

lives. On a day-to-day basis, Marine leaders must know which 

stress zone each unit member is in. Leaders must know how 

to recognize stress reactions, injuries, and illnesses. They must 

be able to identify when the moral compass has been fractured 

and a member is left experiencing excessive blame or shame. 

The key to preventing these types of stress injuries is to balance 

competing priorities, while removing stressors not essential 

to training or mission accomplishment. Finally, one must set a 

good example by effectively managing one’s own stress.

(4) Treat: Ensure that those with any type of stress injury or 

illness get help. Train Marines to take care of each other, by restoring meaning, making amends, and promoting forgiveness. 

The first line of defense to stress injuries is an observant buddy, 

who can help a fellow Marine navigate the stress. Marines 

should be encouraged to seek out a leader, chaplain, counselor, 

or corpsman when feeling excessive stress and get definitive 

medical or psychological treatment when they reach the ill or 

injured stress zones on the COSC Continuum.

(5) Reintegrate: Marines receiving treatment for stress-related 

injuries need to be welcomed back to the unit. This offers the 

injured an opportunity for redemption and acceptance. Doing 

so helps neutralize the stigma associated with getting help; 

dampens casual derogatory comments that, when left unchecked, may prevent other Marines from seeking help when 

needed; and exhibits actions that restore the confidence to the 

stress-injured. Communication with treating professionals such 

as medical and mental health professionals and chaplains is important. And above all, they must remember that healing is a 

slow process.
The Chaplain’s Role in Preventing and Treating Spiritual 

Injuries

The third leadership strategy in addressing combat and operational stress is utilization of the unit chaplain. He or she is the 

principal professional resource and advisor to a Marine leader in 

addressing ethical, moral, and spiritual injuries. Unlike the embedded news reporters who are assigned to military units for 

short durations of time during war, chaplains are organic to the 

unit. This insider status enables chaplains to discern not only the 

religious needs of personnel, but also their moral, ethical, and 

spiritual well-being. Chaplains share in the same experiences 

and demands placed upon a unit, gaining credibility and useful 

insights into how to help individuals directly and advise the 

command in how best to target resources to an individual with 

stress-related injuries. 

By virtue of the chaplain’s position in the unit, he or she gains the 

ability to enter into the life of those in combat. Thus, the chaplain 

offers a humanizing point of reference to buffer against the moral 

disengagement of personnel who can be drawn into moral ambiguity by the emotional and ethical demands of asymmetrical 

warfare. Moral disengagement is the psychological, ethical, emotional, and spiritual process that creates the conditions in which 

moral, ethical, and spiritual injuries can occur.90

Navy Captain and Chaplain Robert Phillips points out, “Unlike 

other helping professionals such as psychologists or counselors, 

the chaplain’s presence and human interaction are framed by a 

context of faith and recognition of the spiritual dimensions and 

struggle implicit in the warrior’s response to the crisis. The point is 

not to place chaplains over against other forms of helping profes90 Robert J. Phillips, The Military Chaplaincy of the 21st Century: Cui Bono?, 

International Society for Military Ethics website, http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME07/

Phillips07.html.

Spiritual Injuries | 375
376 | Aspects of Leadership

sional presence, but to nurture synergy to maximize assistance.”91

Thus, chaplains become one of the unit leader’s most valuable 

resources for identifying, assessing, and managing the recovery of 

those suffering ethical, moral, and spiritual injuries.

Conclusion 

The battlefield is a daunting place. The harsh environment and 

war zone stressors can overwhelm a soldier’s coping mechanisms 

and lead him/her down a path of combat and operational stress 

injuries and illnesses, and potentially chronic PTSD. The moral 

domain of inner conflict is the hearth of spiritual injury, that is, 

a clash between what is believed about the world and the brutal 

reality of war, and the fact that the horrors of violence and suffering can cause hidden injuries to the soul.

Understanding the dynamics of spiritual injuries sustained on the 

battlefield is essential to the restoration and healing of warfighters. Although it is a concept that has been chiefly unexplored in 

the clinical realm, it has gained importance and is garnering more 

attention as large numbers of American service members continue to be affected by this war. The USMC sees Combat Operational 

Stress Control as a leadership issue. Strong, effective leadership 

is paramount in the treatment and recovery of Marines. While 

the military continues to march into battle, the warfighter is not 

without hope and restoration of the soul. 

91 Ibid.
—377—

It is in the national interest that personnel serving in the Armed 

Forces be protected in the realization and development of moral, 

spiritual, and religious values consistent with the religious beliefs of 

the individuals concerned. To this end, it is the duty of commanding 

officers in every echelon to develop to the highest degree the conditions and influences calculated to promote health, morals, and spiritual values of the personnel under their command.

-General George C. Marshall1

Growing conceptual agreement recognizes and seeks to engage 

spirituality as an element of character for members of the U.S. 

military. For example, spirituality, or the domain of the human 

spirit, is one of the three elements of the character development 

model for cadets at the U.S. Military Academy—along with the 

ethical and social domains.2

 Across the Army and the Department 

An earlier version of this chapter was published in the Journal of Healthcare, Science 

and Humanities (vol 1, no 2, July 2011), a joint venture of the Bureau of Navy 

Medicine and Smithsonian Scholarly Press, and is in the public domain. The 

article can be found at http://nmvaa.org/mhrl/subPage.php?sp=13.

1 Stewart W. Husted, George C. Marshall: The Rubrics of Leadership (Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College Foundation Press, 2006), 179.

2 Don M. Snider, Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet 

Prayer, ed. Lloyd J. Matthew (New York: McGraw Learning Solutions, 2008).

Soldier Spirituality in 

a Combat Zone

Preliminary Findings

Franklin Eric Wester
378 | Aspects of Leadership

of Defense (DOD), holistic fitness programs include spiritual fitness.3

 And in the areas of training, education, and development, 

leaders aspire to inculcate character development, including spirituality, to complement military training soldiers receive.4

In military leadership, spirituality and cognate constructs such 

as morals and values, as noted by General Marshall above, have 

long been viewed as integral aspects of command responsibility. 

Character development—including character development that 

addresses spirituality—is understood as a facet of military leadership. A strong spirit in military members may be viewed as instrumental in fostering ethical conduct and personal resilience. This 

paper examines spirituality and identifies correlations between 

spirituality and moral attitudes and behavior along with emotional and physical resilience. 

From a wider perspective, military service has traditionally been 

viewed as offering potential to build character.5

 The services established Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) programs 

that have character building as a central tenant. In decades past, 

particularly when conscripted service was used, one popular idea 

advanced by some was the “option” of military service in lieu of 

short jail time for petty crimes. This was understood as a way to 

give offenders a chance to “grow up” and benefit from the structure of military life. In today’s era of an all-volunteer (recruited) 

force, military life is still viewed as fostering personal discipline 

and maturity.

3 The Army-established Comprehensive Soldier Fitness website, available at http://

csf.army.mil/; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3405.01, 

Chairman’s Total Force Fitness Framework, Appendix E to Enclosure A, September 

2011, A-2, www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3405_01.pdf. 

4 Joe Doty and Walter Sowden, “Competency vs. Character? It Must Be Both!” 

Military Review (2009): 72; and Training and Doctrine Command, The U.S. Army 

Concept for the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations, 2015–2024, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7 (Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, 2008), 15.

5 Bill Shaw, “Military Service Builds Character,” Brazosport Facts, 10 November 

2008.
Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 379

This paper examines results from the Army’s Excellence in Character, Ethics, and Leadership (EXCEL) survey about spirituality 

and how it affects ethics and the resilience of soldiers.6 These findings are based on a sample of more than 1,250 soldiers in a combat 

zone, and this paper offers a preliminary discussion of findings 

about spirituality and a three-factor construct of spirituality. The 

three-factor model emerged from the survey data by calculating 

fit indices of scores on 15 items (fit indices will be described below 

[see “Spirituality Defined for This Study”]). Higher mean scores 

of spirituality are examined taking demographic variables into 

account. Correlations between spirituality, ethics, and resilience 

are reported, showing how spirituality interacts with measurements of ethics and resilience. The findings also point to areas for 

further research.

The EXCEL survey presents an honest and thought-provoking 

perspective from soldiers in a combat zone. The interdisciplinary 

survey addresses more than 20 constructs including ethical attitudes, values and behavior, leadership, physical and emotional 

health, and spirituality. Items about spirituality were included 

within the larger, interdisciplinary research instrument. Spirituality, ethics, and resilience converge to give some contours of the 

interactions of these factors as elements of character in soldiers. 

Background of the Army EXCEL Study

In 2008, the U.S. Army initiated designs and plans for the Multinational Forces, Iraq (MNFI) Survey-2009. The study was requested by General David H. Petraeus as he relinquished command of 

the Multinational Forces in Iraq in September of 2008. The study 

6 Rightly and by design, individual religious beliefs and practices have been 

protected in the military with attention to the twin principles of avoiding the “establishment” of religion for soldiers and urging “free exercise” through a pluralistic 

military chaplaincy.
380 | Aspects of Leadership

had the backing of the chief of staff of the Army and was implemented by the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE) 

in collaboration with the Institute for National Security Ethics and 

Leadership at National Defense University, the U.S. Army Chaplains Corps, and a wide range of military and civilian academic 

partners. The study tests a wide range of constructs about the 

ethical attitudes and behavior of U.S. land forces. The intent of 

this study was to aid leaders in self-assessment, reflection, and 

continuous learning.

The survey was developed to examine findings from earlier 

reports conducted by the Mental Health Assessment Team (MHAT 

IV and V). In these reports, significant percentages of soldiers and 

Marines stated they would not report a fellow member of the military for “killing or wounding an innocent noncombatant.”7

 The 

Army set a high priority on ethics and ethical decision making 

in the face of sustained operational demands. In a combat zone, 

ethical dilemmas abound, and soldiers are constantly faced 

with demanding challenges. Lapses like Abu Ghraib and other 

severe ethical failures make it evident that ethics training is an 

ongoing necessity.8 Survey results reveal correlations between an 

7 Office of the Surgeon, Multinational Forces, Iraq, and Office of the Surgeon 

General, U.S. Army Medical Command, Mental Health Advisory Team IV Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07 Final Report, 17 November 2006, http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/reports/mhat/mhat_iv/MHAT_IV_Report_17NOV06.pdf. See p. 

37 indicating 45 percent of soldiers would not report a unit member for killing or 

wounding an innocent noncombatant.

8 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., BG, USAF, “The Joint Force Commander and Force Discipline,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2005, 34–38. Charles Dunlap 

wrote of the effects that the Abu Ghraib prison abuse had on the military: “The 

highly publicized reports of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal energized the 

Iraqi insurgency and eroded vital domestic and Coalition support. Most damaging was the negative reaction of ordinary Iraqis, a constituency whose backing is 

essential to strategic success. A 2004 poll found that 54 percent of them believed 

all Americans behave like those alleged to have taken part in the abuse. So adverse 

were the strategic consequences that it is no overstatement to say that Americans 

died—and will continue to die—as an indirect result of this disciplinary 

catastrophe.” 
individual’s level of spirituality and two other constructs: ethics 

and resilience. The EXCEL research findings indicate spirituality 

measurably correlates with five factors of ethics, such as moral 

courage and moral confidence, as well as increased psychological 

and physical resilience.

Spirituality Defined for This Study

Definitions of spirituality have evolved over the past decades and 

vary across diverse faith groups and cultures. The word suggests 

a journey or process tied to spirit defined in this research project as 

a multidimensional, cohesive core of the individual expressed in 

beliefs, ideas, practices, and connections.9

 Going into this survey 

of soldiers, the working hypothesis was that spirituality could 

be assessed using three subscales: “Spirituality incorporates the 

three elements of a spiritual worldview, personal piety, and connection to a faith community.” These are relevant, though not sufficient, factors of spirituality.

The three subscales in the design did not achieve acceptable levels 

calculating from fit indices using five items per subscale. What 

emerged from calculating fit indices of spirituality items confirmed that spirituality is indeed multidimensional, but along different subscales. These spirituality items clustered around three 

factors, but in a different combination: connection to others, religious identification, and hopeful outlook. These three factors 

do not account for all elements of spirituality. By analyzing data 

from the survey questions, a unifying construct of spirituality 

emerged along three subscales. With the exception of four ques9 Kenneth Pargament and Patrick Sweeney, “Building Spiritual Fitness in the 

Army: An Innovative Approach to a Vital Aspect of Human Development,” 

American Psychologist 66 (2011): 58–64. Also, Patrick Sweeney, S.T. Hannah, and 

Don Snider, “The Domain of the Human Spirit” in Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer, ed. L.J. Matthews (Sisters, OR: Jericho, 

2007), 23–50.

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 381
382 | Aspects of Leadership

tions, all of the spirituality questions on the survey fell under one 

of these three subscales. Thus, the EXCEL study does not cover all 

dimensions of spirituality, but it does reveal a workable model of 

spirituality for the soldiers surveyed. Using this alternative measurement model, a three-factor substructure provides extremely 

strong fit indices.

Spirituality, like other constructs such as stress, social support, 

or self-worth, cannot be observed directly. Calculating a fit index 

is one statistical method used to assess how well specific items 

measure a particular factor. By statistically analyzing patterns of 

responses on several items, it is possible to calculate the relative 

“fit” of items around conceptual models. Two calculations of fit 

indices are shown. A fit index above .90 is considered extremely 

strong. Fit indices at .75 are acceptable. As shown, the fit of the 

three-factor model is much better than a one-factor model. Table 

1 presents the fit indices of the items structured into three factors. 

*X2: Chi-square, also called the discrepancy function, expresses the likelihood or goodness of 

fit. The lower the number, the closer the fit.

NFI: Normed Fit Indices. Expresses the covariance among items. Zero indicates no covariance 

and 1.0 is exact covariance. This calculates an adjustment to the non-normed index accounting 

for sample size and degrees of freedom.

CFI: Comparative Fit Indices. CFI expresses the fit of items to form a factor and is used to 

avoid underestimation of fit noted in small samples. This is a rather large sample so the fit 

index here is strong.

U.S. Army Chaplaincy and DOD Terms of Reference 

on Spirituality

The three-factor construct of spirituality parallels and complements the definition of spirituality that the Army chief of chaplains employs, which is “a process transcending self and society 

that empowers the human spirit with purpose, identity, and 

Factor Structure χ2 Normed Fit Index Comparative Fit Index

3 Factors 335.12 .952 .958

1 Factor 1662.12 .759 .764

Table 1*. Fit Index.
meaning.”10 The three factors of the EXCEL model of spirituality connect to the three functions in the chaplaincy definition: 

empowering people with purpose, identity, and meaning. The 

chaplaincy definition also incorporates awareness of that which 

transcends self and society. Comparing the EXCEL model to the 

Army chaplaincy definition, connection to others relates to identity; religious identification relates to both identity and meaning; 

and hopeful outlook relates to purpose.

Another definition comes from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Instruction on the Total Force Fitness (TFF) framework. 

TFF addresses spirituality, defining it as “the expression of the 

human spirit in thoughts, practices, and relationships of connection to self, and connections outside the self, such as other people, 

groups, nature, and concepts of a higher order.”11

Although these definitions all take a different view of spirituality, they overlap and incorporate common ideas. The three factors 

that fit the data from the EXCEL survey cluster along three identifiable constructs: connection to others, religious identification, 

and hopeful outlook. These factors, when present, correlate in 

the lives of soldiers to positive attributes and may act as a buffer 

against some psychological and physical risk factors. Each of the 

three factors is considered further and then examined in light of 

correlations between spirituality and subscales addressing ethics 

and resilience.

Methods in the EXCEL Study

Survey Design 

The EXCEL survey is a paper-and-pencil instrument survey that 

10 Provided by e-mail from staff at the Center for Spiritual Leadership (CSL) at 

the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina on 14 

May 2010.

11 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, Total Force Fitness Framework-Spiritual Fitness Domain, Enclosure B5 (working draft from the Office of 

the Joint Staff Chaplain, 23 March 2010). See also, Chairman’s Total Force Fitness 

Framework, Appendix E to Enclosure A, A-2.

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 383
384 | Aspects of Leadership

collects demographic and survey data primarily using Likert 

scales.12 EXCEL addresses topics ranging from ethical attitudes, 

actions, and observed behaviors in others to leadership, attitudes 

about the Army, general physical concerns, attitudes, and well-being. The survey was designed in four versions: version A (which 

featured just core questions), version B (which featured core questions and spirituality items), version A-leader (which was administered only to leaders and featured core questions), and version 

B-leader (which was administered only to leaders and featured 

both core questions and spirituality items). Surveys were collected from 2,572 soldiers deployed in Iraq between 20 June 2009 and 

24 July 2009.13 To protect the anonymity of participants, data was 

collected from randomly selected units.

Survey Items

Fifteen items relating to spirituality were included in the EXCEL 

survey at the request of the Institute for National Security, Ethics, 

and Leadership (INSEL) at National Defense University and the 

U.S. Army Chaplain Corps. Items were selected from established 

surveys. All items were formatted using a five-point Likert scale 

in line with the layout of the larger survey.

Thirteen of the 15 items included in EXCEL were based on “Dimensions of Religion/Spirituality and Relevance to Health Research” by Haber et al. from the VA Palo Alto Health Care System. 

The purpose of the Haber study was to “identify unique religion/

spirituality (R/S) factors that account for variation in R/S mea12 Likert scales measure the degree of agreement or disagreement with a specific 

item (a single trait). Social science surveys use multiple items to assess an individual trait, and researchers use statistical analysis to develop factors for correlation 

studies.

13 S. Hannah, J. Schaubroeck, B. Avolio, S. Kozlowski, R. Lord, and L. Trevino, 

ACPME Technical Report 2010-01, MNF-1, Excellence in Character and Ethical Leadership (EXCEL) Study. (West Point, NY: Army Center of Excellence for 

the Professional Military Ethic [ACPME], U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 

TRADOC, 2010.)
sures of interest to health research.”14 That research focused on 

identifying religious and spiritual items relevant in health care 

research through meta-analysis of personality and medical instruments. Haber et al. took many of their questions from other wellestablished studies, including the Brief Multidimensional Measure 

of Religion and Spirituality by Fetzer Institute/National Institution 

of Aging and R. L. Piedmont’s Development and Validation of the 

Spiritual Transcendence Scale: A Measure of Spiritual Experience. In 

addition, Haber et al. used what they called two “classic measures 

with exceptional histories of use.”15 The first is the Spiritual WellBeing Scale by C. W. Ellison, which measures well-being associated with God and existentialism. The second is “The Age-Universal” version of Allport and Ross’s Religious Orientation Scale.

These sources, combined with one of Haber’s “Religion/Spirituality Motivation, Devotion, and Coping” questions and two MNFI-specific questions, make up the 15 items. Appendix A provides 

a complete list of the 15 items and their sources.

In the design, the 15 spirituality items were to measure three 

dimensions of spirituality in individuals: spiritual worldview, 

prayer/personal piety, and connection to a faith community. 

These address private and personal spirituality, as well as the 

public aspects of spirituality, paralleling the approach in a study 

by Greenfield, Vaillant, and Marks.16 Also, by matching leader 

14 Jon Randolph Haber, Theodore Jacob, and David J. C. Spangler, “Dimensions 

of Religion/Spirituality and Relevance to Health Research,” The International 

Journal for the Psychology of Religion 17 (2007): 271. Please refer to this article for 

information about the other studies from which Haber el al. derived survey 

questions.

15 Ibid.

16 Emily Greenfield, George Vaillant, and Nadine Marks, “Do Formal Religious 

Participation and Spiritual Perceptions Have Independent Linkages with Diverse 

Dimensions of Psychological Well-Being?” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 50 

(2009): 196, examined a two-factor model of spirituality distinguishing “spiritual 

perceptions” as the inner perspectives of individuals and “religious participation” as 

public practice.

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 385
386 | Aspects of Leadership

scores with scores of followers in their units, future analysis can 

examine spirituality within units and interactions between leaders 

and followers in multifactorial analysis.

Survey Participants

This paper focuses on data from version B and version B-leader. 

Of the 2,572 soldiers surveyed, 1,366 completed version B and 

version B-leader, which included the spirituality items shown in 

appendix A. Of 1,366 version B surveys, there were 1,263 valid responses, meaning surveys were sufficiently complete to be tabulated and analyzed. Table 2 presents a summary of demographics 

of version respondents. Note that 61 percent of respondents were 

under age 27, and 76 percent were grade E5 (sergeant) and below.

Based on a literature review, this is the largest sample to assess 

soldiers’ spirituality in a combat zone. The Army does collect 

annual data on religious preference for soldiers but not qualitative survey data. The closest comparable sample probing aspects 

of spirituality numbered 800 in an unpublished thesis from World 

War II probing the effect of combat on religious belief and personal morality.17

From a review of relevant literature, surveys addressing spirituality and well-being most often sample populations in hospitals 

or other treatment facilities, college students, or congregational 

members. No comparable data was previously available about 

military personnel in a combat zone.

17 Mahlon W. Pomeroy, “The Effect of Military Service and Combat Experience 

on Religious Beliefs and Personal Morality” (master’s thesis, Syracuse University, 

1946). Pomeroy and a colleague collected data about the meaning and importance 

of faith in God and attitudes about prayer from 800 soldiers in hospital wards at 

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, during January through March of 1946. He reports 

that 65,000 soldiers passed through Camp Kilmer some weeks. His major findings 

were that “men felt their religion meant more to them now than before the war,” 

that “God evidently seemed more personal to the men now,” and “34 percent indicate that they pray more now than before the war, and only 9 percent pray less.”
Procedures

To obtain a representative sample, the Multinational Forces, IraqInspector General (MNFI-IG) randomly selected two brigadesized units from each of the four Army divisions then serving 

in Iraq. Two battalions were randomly selected within those brigades; from each of those battalions, three companies were randomly selected, and from each of the companies, three platoons 

were randomly selected. In addition to these troops, key leadership at the platoon, company, and battalion levels also participated in the survey, thus allowing the survey to assess the culture/

climate individual leaders developed in their areas of responsibility. Battalion chaplains and chaplain assistants carried surveys 

to forward operating bases. They implemented survey adminisGender* Male Female Unknown

1123 130 13

Age Number Percentage

18–22 378 27.7

23–27 457 33.5

28–32 219 16.0 

33–37 130 9.5

38–42 77 5.6

43–47 43 3.1

48+ 13 1.0

Unknown 49 3.6

Marital Status Unmarried Married Unknown

736 611 19

Army Component Active Component Reserve Component

909 428 29

* Respondents did not answer the question on gender in 100 surveys out of the total that included the 

spirituality questions. We calculated our percentages and distributions on correlations that involved gender 

(only a few) using 1266 (instead of 1366) as the denominator.

Table 2. Summary of Demographics.

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 387
388 | Aspects of Leadership

tration protocols, distributing and collecting surveys in platoonsized elements (20–40 individuals). Chaplains and chaplain assistants were chosen to administer the surveys because of their 

formal obligations for confidentiality and their role as trusted 

agents. 

To protect privacy and ensure anonymity, respondents filled out 

the survey and returned it to the unit chaplains who served as 

survey administrators. Data collectors placed surveys in sealed 

folders immediately upon collecting them from participants. 

Chaplains used a coding scheme with each unit. This scheme randomly assigned a code to each unit and the code was written on 

the outside of each sealed envelope. Using these precautions, it 

was not possible to associate an individual’s recorded data with 

that individual or his/her military unit, unless the individual 

failed to follow instructions and put his or her name on the survey. 

Chaplains were the only people to have access to both the unit 

designation and their data, and each chaplain had access to approximately 1/20th of the full sample’s data. The paper surveys 

were transported from chaplains to the MNFI staff and shipped 

to CAPE at West Point, New York. From the time the chaplain 

turned in the sealed envelopes for shipping, neither the staff nor 

the CAPE knew the unit designations and thus were unable to 

determine the unit from which any survey set came. Data was 

entered, analyzed, and reported by code only.

All leaders surveyed were also asked to rate certain effects of 

leadership at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. Further, 

leaders were asked to evaluate the leadership and unit performance of subordinate leaders at the next level down from them. 

All soldiers completing the survey reported on their individual 

ethical behavior and beliefs, rated the ethical behavior of their 

immediate leaders and their peers, and evaluated the culture 

and climate in their respective units and their psychological and 
somatic conditions. All respondents receiving version B (leaders 

and followers) rated themselves on three factors of spirituality. 

When the survey respondents completed their surveys, the chaplains and chaplain assistants collected the surveys and sent them 

to the MNFI-IG. The surveys were shipped to CAPE. The data 

was provided to the following individuals for further analysis: 

Colonel Sean T. Hannah, PhD, CAPE director, in conjunction with 

several leading university researchers, including (alphabetically) 

Dr. Bruce Avolio, University of Washington; Dr. Steve Kozlowski, 

Michigan State University; Dr. Robert Lord, University of Akron; 

Dr. John Schaubroeck, Michigan State University; and Dr. Linda 

Trevino, Pennsylvania State University. The draft technical report 

of the data was prepared by Dr. John Schaubroeck and Colonel 

Hannah with assistance from the following doctoral students at 

Michigan State University: Nikolaos Dimotakis, Katherine Guica, 

Megan Huth, and Chunyan Peng.18

Three Factors of Spirituality

Connection to Others

McMillan and Chavis, writing about inclusion with others, 

defined sense of community as “a feeling that members have of 

belonging, a feeling that members matter to one another and to 

the group, and a shared faith that members’ needs will be met 

through their commitment to be together.”19 Spirituality is often 

expressed through community activities, such as worship and 

service to others. Spirituality acknowledges realities beyond the 

self, and soldiers report a connection to others as a dimension 

of spirituality. This factor correlates with intentions for ethical 

actions, moral attitudes, and a general increased ability to withstand the rigors of combat. Members of the military are familiar 

18 Hannah, ACPME Technical Report (DRAFT), 1. 

19 David McMillan and David Chavis, “Sense of Community: A Definition and 

Theory,” Journal of Community Psychology 14 (1986): 9.

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 389
390 | Aspects of Leadership

with feeling a common bond with each other, just as Shakespeare 

coined the famous phrase, “we happy few, we band of brothers.”20

But this sense of connection to others goes far beyond camaraderie or esprit de corps. 

While esprit de corps is important, it is vital for a soldier to feel 

not only like she or he belongs to the unit but also belongs to the 

rest of the human race. Soldiers who integrate this perception at a 

deep level of their humanity recognize even their enemies are still 

part of humanity and deserve certain rights and protections. A 

connection to others may mitigate enemy abuses, POW mistreatment, and civilian casualties.

The following items comprise the subscale for the factor “connection to others”:

Q.151 I feel that on a higher level all of us share a common bond.

Q.152 Although there is good and bad in people, I believe that 

humanity as a whole is basically good.

Q.154 Although individual people may be difficult, I feel a bond 

with all of humanity.

Religious Identification

Spirituality is not experienced in a vacuum. Soldiers who recorded a higher level of spirituality tended to connect that spirituality 

to some level of participation in recognized religious activity—

prayer, prayer by others, and worship. Though definitions of spirituality are sometimes vague, the spiritual practices of soldiers 

can be quite clear and specific. For soldiers, practice is important, 

and practice is a prominent factor in their expression of spirituality. In correlating scores for “total spirituality,” the two items most 

closely related to this score are those that express beliefs about 

prayer:

20 William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 4, Scene 3, http://shakespeare.mit.edu/

henryv/henryv.4.3.html.
Q.160 I believe my personal prayers help me during this deployment. (.794)

Q.161 I believe the prayers of my family and friends back home 

help me. (.786)

The EXCEL study data indicates when soldiers were surveyed 

concerning spirituality, their spirituality was most typically described with recognizable religious identifiers such as prayer, 

chapel attendance, and corporate worship, which are common 

to organized religion. In addition to the two items about prayer, 

three other items were used to measure this factor:

Q.155 My spiritual life is an important part of who I am as a 

person.

Q.159 I go to my place of worship (chapel, church, synagogue, 

temple) because it helps me connect with friends.

Q.162 I believe the presence and ministry of my unit chaplain 

brings value to the unit.

Religion and spirituality are sometimes complicated to discuss. As 

the instruction issued by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

points out, “Defining ‘spirituality’ in the Armed Forces is difficult 

because of the diversity of service members and their preferred 

spiritual practices and the confusion, ambiguity, and blurred lines 

that exist between understanding and defining ‘spirituality’ and 

religion.”21 The EXCEL study shows spirituality is experienced 

through religious identification. This underscores the need to 

ensure that individual soldiers have the opportunity to practice 

their respective beliefs with freedom and respect. Soldiers who 

make use of these opportunities have a higher level of spirituality 

and, as considered below, this translates into increased resiliency 

and a strengthened personal ethic. 

21 CJCSI Total Force Fitness Framework, Enclosure B5.

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392 | Aspects of Leadership

Hopeful Outlook

A third factor of spirituality, called hopeful outlook, emerged from 

the survey. Hope, optimism, and positive outlook are notable 

given the conditions under which these surveys were collected—

living in a combat zone. 

This hopeful outlook was revealed through soldiers’ responses 

to the following items:

Q.157 I feel a sense of well-being about the direction in which 

my life is heading.

Q.163 I feel good about my future.

Q.164 I have forgiven myself for things that I have done wrong.

This last item acknowledges the issue of guilt, which combat veterans face. Guilt can often become a debilitating symptom if not 

properly processed and dealt with. This will be discussed as an 

aspect of resilience.

Frequency Distributions on Spirituality Items

Responses of soldiers in the survey items about spirituality were 

distributed across a wide range of scores. Roughly one-third of 

respondents indicated they were not in agreement with these 

items about spirituality, one-third of respondents were neutral, 

and one-third of respondents were in agreement. Two frequency 

distribution graphs are included that illustrate the lowest and 

highest response patterns for spirituality scores. In both graphs, 

responses are grouped into three categories: strongly disagree/

disagree; neutral; agree/strongly agree. Also, each graph depicts 

the distribution from version B and version B Leader surveys. 

Leaders tended to agree or strongly agree more with items measuring spirituality compared to the larger sample of respondents.
Figure 16 shows the distribution of the highest scores on one of 

the spirituality items: Q164, I feel good about my future. In this 

distribution, 156 total respondents marked strongly disagree/

disagree; 352, neutral; and 755, agree/strongly agree. This item 

reflects a prevailing positive outlook among the soldiers surveyed 

about their futures.

Figure 17 shows the distribution of the lowest scores on one of 

the spirituality items: Q159, If I have a problem or difficult situation, the people in my chapel community will comfort me and get 

me through it. In this distribution, 383 total respondents marked 

strongly disagree/disagree; 484, neutral; and 386, agree/strongly 

agree. This item indicates that even though it has the lowest scores 

for any of the items assessing spirituality, the response pattern 

is equally divided between those feeling connected and not connected to a church or chapel community with the largest group in 

the neutral range. Count

Survey Version

Version B

Leader Version B 600

400

200

0

Disagree Neutral Agree

Figure 16. I feel good about my future.

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394 | Aspects of Leadership

Regarding spirituality, a literature review identified no longitudinal studies that span the adult life cycle (from early adulthood to 

senior adulthood) that could provide conceptual descriptions of 

spiritual development. Most evidence of spiritual development 

comes from the study of individual lives22 or is generalized from 

other fields such as analytic psychology,23 moral development,24

or faith development tied to a quest for meaning without regard 

to transcendence.25

In table 3, the three factors using subscales for spirituality and the 

spirituality total scores are listed with means from the Likert scale. 

The strongest correlations26 (at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed) indicate

22 Eugene Bianchi, Aging as a Spiritual Journey, 2nd ed. (New York: Crossroad, 

1987).

23 Carl G. Jung, Man and His Symbols (New York: Laurel, 1964).

24 Lawrence Kohlberg, Essays on Moral Development, Vol. I: The Philosophy of 

Moral Development (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1981).

25 James Fowler, Stages of Faith (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).

26 The significance of the correlations is as follows: 

Strong > .350; Moderate .300 to .349; Modest .200 to .299; Slight .100 to .199. Count

Survey Version

Version B

Leader Version B

500

400

300

200

100

0

Disagree Neutral Agree

Figure 17. If I have a problem or difficult situation, the people in my chapel 

community will comfort me and get me through it.
• Higher spirituality scores correlated modestly with older 

respondents (.268)

• Higher spirituality scores correlated modestly with increased rank (.213)

• Higher spirituality scores correlated slightly with women 

(.121)

• Higher spirituality scores correlated slightly with higher 

education (.168)

• Higher spirituality scores correlated slightly with marriage 

(.073)

• Higher spirituality scores correlated slightly with having 

children (.145)

The cross-sectional data in this study indicate variables of age and 

rank produce the strongest statistically significant differences in 

all measures of spirituality but leave open the reasons for these 

differences. 

Connection to 

Others

Religious 

Identification

Hopeful 

Outlook

Total 

Spirituality 

Score

Mean (R=1-5) 3.0347 3.0343 3.4717 3.1517

Gender .114** .100** .088** .121**

Age .242** .232** .181** .268**

Education .155** .127** .128** .162**

Component -.079** -0.054 -0.023 -.064*

Married .026 .063* .093** .073**

Children .090** .137** .118** .145**

Rank .205** .161** .179** .213**

Table 3. Factor/Demographics.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Notes: Range of Likert scale = 1-5 and N=1,223 to 1,263

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396 | Aspects of Leadership

In the EXCEL data, there are two additional items of note in the 

correlations. First, there was no statistically significant correlation 

between the number of deployments and any reported higher or 

lower total spirituality scores or scores on any of the three subscales. Second, an interesting and very strong correlation emerged 

in using single items about spirituality and the total spirituality 

score. The item that best correlates (.794) with the total spirituality score is belief in the benefits of personal prayer. This is nearly 

identical and closely followed (.786) by the item regarding belief 

in the benefits of prayers by family members and friends. The 

convergence of belief about prayer and the practice of prayer may 

be of particular interest. These responses on the belief in the effectiveness of prayer provide justification for chaplains and leaders 

to encourage soldiers’ spiritual practice and growth.

Five Factors of Ethics Correlating with 

Spirituality

In addition to describing spirituality, this paper examines correlations between spirituality and two constructs: ethics and 

resiliency. Correlations between spirituality and five factors of 

ethics will be reported. Further below, resiliency will be analyzed 

describing correlations between spirituality and two factors: emotional and physical resiliency. In ethics, measuring individual responses indicated a positive correlation between spirituality and 

the following factors:

• Moral courage/ownership (.408, strong)

• Moral efficacy (.391, strong)

• Embracing Army values (.387, strong)

• Intent to report unethical conduct (.335, moderate) 

• Soldier identification (.295, modest)
These five factors taken together could frame a useful approach to 

the ethical dimension of character. Using these to further specify 

the ethical dimension of character with soldiers may fit alongside 

the three-factor model for examining the domain of the human 

spirit or spirituality. 

Table 4. Correlations Between Spirituality Scales and Ethics Variables.27

Notes: N = 1107-1220. * p <.05. ** p <.01.

The correlations in table 4 above indicate probabilities < 0.01, and 

there are notably strong correlations between total spirituality 

scores and moral courage/ownership, moral efficacy, and embracing Army values. These correlations are all between .387 and .408, 

indicating a notable interaction in the character of individuals who 

identify with the Army values—and believe and intend to act on 

those moral ideas—with those who report beliefs and practices of 

spirituality.

Moral Courage/Ownership (.408)

The EXCEL study used seven items to assess personal moral 

courage and beliefs about ownership of moral responsibility. 

These items asked whether or not a soldier would address unethical acts. Each item was anchored on a five-point Likert scale 

ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

28

27 Dr. John Schaubroeck, “Correlational Analyses of Spirituality Scales Report” 

(unpublished, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic [CAPE], April 2010,) 1. 

28 Hannah, ACPME Technical Report (DRAFT), 37. 

Factor/Spirituality 

Scale

Connection to 

Others

Religious 

Identification

Hopeful 

Outlook

Total 

Spirituality 

Score

Moral courage/

ownership .335** .277** .380** .408**

Moral efficacy .331** .257** .380** .391**

Embracing Army 

values .318** .286** .345** .387**

Report intentions .309** .232** .283** .335**

Soldier identification .274** .219** .234** .295**

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 397
398 | Aspects of Leadership

“A majority (56 percent to 72 percent, depending on the ethical 

issue) of soldiers reported that they would confront others for 

unethical acts and would stand in the way of ethical misconduct as shown in table 26 [table 5 below]. Soldiers were most 

likely to agree that they would confront a peer, rather than a 

leader, if they observed that person committing an ethical 

act. Soldiers were least likely to agree that they would not 

accept anyone in the unit behaving unethically, but even in this 

case the majority of soldiers agreed.”29

Table 5. Soldier Self-Reports on Personal Moral Courage/Ownership.30

Notes: N=2572 individual soldiers. Effective sample size ranges from 2434 to 2468 

(includes versions A & B).

In a forthcoming paper, Hannah and Avolio propose a psychological concept of moral potency comprised of moral courage/

ownership and moral efficacy.31 Moral potency is framed as the 

link between moral cognition (built out of awareness and understanding) with moral action.32 Moral potency is proposed as the 

key valence in understanding an answer to the question “why do 

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Sean Hannah and Bruce Avolio, “Moral Potency: Building the Capacity for 

Character-Based Leadership,” Consulting Psychology Journal (forthcoming).

32 James Rest, Development in Judging Moral Issues (Minneapolis: University of 

Minnesota Press, 1979).

Percent (disagree 

or strongly 

disagree)

Percent 

(agree or 

fully agree) 

I will confront my peers if they commit an unethical act 9.6 71.8

I will confront a leader if he/she commits an unethical 

act 10.8 69.1 

I will always state my views about an ethical issue to 

my leaders 11.5 63.4 

I will go against the group’s decision whenever it 

violates my ethical standards 12.5 58.1 

I will assume responsibility to take action when I see an 

unethical act 10.4 62.9 

I will not accept anyone in my unit behaving unethically 12.9 55.7 

I feel it is my job to address ethical issues when I know 

someone has done something wrong 13.2 56.0
leaders who recognize the right ethical decision or action to take 

still fail to act when action is clearly warranted?” Moral action is 

preceded by moral awareness and understanding, and perhaps it 

is in the area of moral potency where spirituality activates one’s 

sense of identity, courage, and responsibility.

Moral Efficacy (.391)

Moral efficacy is, essentially, “one’s confidence in his or her capabilities to organize and mobilize the motivation and cognitive 

resources needed to attain desired moral ends while persisting in 

the face of moral adversity.”33 Moral efficacy is important for individual soldiers who are facing complex moral dilemmas in the 

contemporary operating environment on a regular basis. Moral 

efficacy is developed over time in an individual’s life and indeed 

is never completely developed. An integrated approach involving cognitive, affective, and social domains would likely enhance 

moral confidence.

Embracing Army Values (.387)

The American military is a values-based organization. These 

values are uniquely expressed by the “Army Values,” “The Soldier’s Creed,” and “The Warrior Ethos” as outlined by the Department of Defense; its ideals are established within the Constitution of the United States of America. The Army values are 

presented as those attributes by which a soldier must live. The 

expectation is mandated across forces and applies regardless of 

the soldier’s MOS or rank. There are seven values stipulated as 

vital to the success of the warrior, thereby facilitating success of 

the Armed Forces. These values are loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Soldiers who 

reported that they had internalized the seven Army values to a 

great extent also reported lower levels of misconduct. They also 

reported higher levels of moral courage, that is, higher levels of 

intention to confront others for misconduct. 

33 Snider, “The Domain of the Human Spirit,” 82. 

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Intentions to Report Unethical Conduct (.335)

Six items assessed whether the respondent would report unit 

members if he/she observed unethical behavior directed toward 

a noncombatant. Each item was anchored on a five-point Likert 

scale with responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Soldiers reported an intention to report a fellow unit 

member if that member was observed mistreating noncombatants 

as shown below in table 5. In particular, 70 percent would report 

a unit member for injuring or killing a noncombatant, while 57 

percent would report “a buddy” for “abusing” a noncombatant. A 

minority of 15 percent stated they would not report a fellow unit 

member for these unethical behaviors.34 Note that higher spirituality scores correlated with higher likelihood that soldiers would 

respond with their intention to report such misconduct.

Soldier Identification (.295)

Soldier identification means, in a word, internalization. The 

soldier internalizes the Army’s values and identifies with the 

roles and responsibilities of being a soldier. These are the aims 

of character development as the Army furthers initiatives in the 

tiered learning model of “training-educating-development.” The 

pamphlet, US Army Concept of the Human Dimension in Full Spectrum Operations,

35 discusses how the Army aims to have soldiers 

internalize Army values as part of their identity by linking physical, moral, and cognitive components. 

Three Factors of Resilience Correlating with 

Spirituality

Army medical research psychologists who investigate resilience 

34 Hannah, ACPME Technical Report (DRAFT), 36.

35 Department of the Army, U.S. Army Concept of the Human Dimension in Full 

Spectrum Operations, 2015-2024, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7 (Fort Monroe, VA: 

Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-

3-7.doc.
(or “hardiness”) define resilience as “the ability of adults in otherwise normal circumstances who are exposed to an isolated 

and potentially highly disruptive event such as the death of a 

close relation or a violent or life-threatening situation to maintain relatively stable, healthy levels of psychological and social 

functioning.”36 The term resilience has gained in usage in recent 

years, while military personnel have long been known for their 

endurance. For service members, resiliency includes not only sustaining themselves physically and emotionally while in combat 

but also coming home fit. “The final step in the long road home 

for the veteran is completing this initiation as a warrior. A veteran 

does not become a warrior merely for having gone to war. A 

veteran becomes a warrior when he learns to carry his war skills 

and his vision in mature ways. He becomes a warrior when he has 

been set right with life again.”37

The effect of combat and the need to adapt upon returning home 

is reiterated by a university professor of philosophy who observes 

the effects of combat on veterans as students. She writes how war 

involves a “ . . . shifting of habit and attitude. The point is that in 

putting on a uniform and going to war, a soldier grows skin that 

does not shed lightly. And even when it is time to slough that 

skin, after years of service, it does not come off easily.”38 Because 

combat affects soldiers on many levels, the need for resiliency is 

amplified—before, during, and after deployment. 39

36 Paul T. Bartone, Mark A. Vaitkus, and Robert C. Williams, Psychosocial Stress & 

Mental Health in the Forward-Deployed Military Community (Heidelberg, Germany: U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe, 1994); George A. Bonanno, “Loss, 

Trauma, and Human Resilience: Have We Underestimated the Human Capacity 

to Thrive After Extremely Aversive Events?” American Psychologist (2004): 20. 

37 Edward Tick, War and the Soul: Healing our Nation’s Veterans from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 1st Quest ed. (Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 2005), 251. 

38 Nancy Sherman, “Soldiers’ Moral Wounds,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, 

11 April 2010, 1–8.

39 The U.S. Army Medical Department first called their resilience program “Battle-Mind Training”; now it is calling the program simply “Resilience Training.” For 

more information on the program, see https://www.resilience.army.mil/. 

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 401
402 | Aspects of Leadership

Emotional Resilience

Regarding emotional resiliency, soldiers displayed the following 

correlations between their level of spirituality and emotional resilience:

• Higher spirituality scores correlated strongly with positive 

affectivity (.442, strong) 

• Higher spirituality scores inversely correlated with negative affectivity (-.185, slight)

Positive affectivity reflects the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active, and alert. In table 6, positive affectivity correlated with spirituality and is similar to results from previous studies 

(see Greenfield et al.; Vaillant and Marks; Ellison and Fan; and 

Maselko and Kubzansky).40 These indicate a potentially notable 

and strong linkage between spiritual perceptions and psychological well-being. Positive affectivity is generally viewed as a buffer 

against risks for depression, a serious variable in suicide risk. Also, 

the inverse correlation between spirituality and negative affectivity indicates some interaction between these constructs. Given 

that the soldiers surveyed were in a combat zone, the EXCEL 

survey found a surprisingly high level of hopeful outlook as well 

as other items reflecting positive views of the future regarding the 

soldier’s situation in Iraq. Among the items describing hopeful 

40 See References section of original publication in Journal of Healthcare, Science 

and the Humanities 1 (2011): 87–91.

Connection 

to Others

Religious 

Identification

Hopeful 

Outlook

Total 

Spirituality 

Score

Positive 

Affectivity .339** .321** .424** .442**

Negative 

Affectivity -.157** -.084** -.215** -.185**

Table 6. Variable/Spirituality Scale.

Notes: N = 1107-1220. * p <.05. ** p <.01.
outlook is one item assessing the perspective of soldiers who 

forgave themselves for actions that occurred during combat. This 

capacity to forgive oneself is related to emotional health in the 

period following combat deployment. 

Resilience and Dealing with Guilt

Absolution from guilt is a core dynamic for combat veterans reentering life after war.41 Encountering veterans as college students, 

one professor writes of how many combat veterans struggle with 

guilt. While researching for a recent book, Sherman found “. . . in 

virtually all of my interviews, guilt was the elephant in the room.” 

She categorized the guilt soldiers experience into three forms: accident guilt, luck guilt, and collateral damage guilt. The first of 

these, accident guilt, is rather straightforward; it refers to the type 

of guilt veterans experience for mishaps that occurred in combat 

resulting in the loss of fellow soldiers or the lives of innocents. 

Although no one person can be found responsible in these types 

of situations, veterans still may blame themselves and experience 

accident guilt. Luck guilt is a form of guilt Sherman describes as a 

generalized form of survivor guilt. Sherman interviewed Marines 

who recently returned from Iraq and who were touring Annapolis. They felt genuine guilt about relaxing on a sailboat while their 

brothers were still in combat. The most troubling kind of guilt 

Sherman studied is what she calls collateral damage guilt, associated with the unintended killing of innocents by the actions of 

someone in combat.42

Physical Resiliency

A soldier’s physical health is a large part of resiliency. During 

deployment, soldiers may endure a wide array of physical hard41 Larry Dewey, War and Redemption: Treatment and Recovery in Combat-Related 

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 201. 

42 Sherman, “Soldiers’ Moral Wounds,” 1–8. See also Nancy Sherman, The 

Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers (New York: Norton, 

2010).

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 403
404 | Aspects of Leadership

ships. When they return home, it is essential for them to receive 

treatment for injuries and ailments incurred during deployment 

in order to prepare for future deployments. Since the ongoing 

process of deployment, redeployment, training, and subsequent 

additional deployments is a reality, resiliency is important. The 

correlation between a soldier’s level of spirituality and his or 

her physical health is a vital link. The EXCEL study revealed an 

inverse relationship between a soldier’s spirituality and somatic 

complaints and fatigue.

• Spirituality inversely correlated with physical and psychological fatigue (-.183)

• Spirituality inversely correlated with somatic complaints 

(-.146)

This study is consistent with other investigations that link spirituality with physical health. Among military populations, Frederick M. Dini, LCDR, SC, USN, wrote an unpublished masters-level 

thesis on a strategy for a military spiritual self-development tool 

and physical well-being.43 Dini reports these studies show posi43 Peter C. Hill and Kenneth I. Pargament, “Advances in the Conceptualization 

and Measurement of Religion and Spirituality: Implications for Physical and Mental Health Research,” American Psychologist 58 (2003): 64–74; Doug Oman and 

Carl E. Thoresen, “Do Religion and Spirituality Influence Health?”; Lis Miller and 

Brien S. Kelley, “Relationships or Religiosity and Spirituality with Mental Health 

and Psychopathology,” in Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 

ed. Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal L. Park (New York: The Guilford Press, 

2005), 435–78. 

Variable/

Spirituality Scale

Connection 

to Others

Religious 

Identification

Hopeful 

Outlook

Total 

Spirituality 

Score

Somatic 

Complaints -.140** -.064* -.154** -.146**

Fatigue -.162** -.124** -.160** -.183**

Table 7. Variable/Spirituality Scale.

Notes: N = 1107-1220. * p <.05. ** p <.01.
tive correlations between spiritual development and health in the 

following areas: lower blood pressure, improved physical health, 

healthier lifestyles and less risky behavior, improved coping 

ability, less depression, faster healing, lower levels of bereavement after the death of a loved one, a decrease in fear of death, 

and higher school achievement.44 These studies describe civilian 

populations. For military populations, physical health is potentially a life-and-death issue. A soldier’s health and personal resiliency can very well mean the difference between coming home 

or not. 

Conclusions and Implications

This paper describes three factors that express aspects of spirituality and reports measurable correlations between spirituality, 

ethical attitudes and actions, and personal resilience. While spirituality is not identical to religious practice, the survey findings 

about soldiers in combat indicate beliefs about the benefits of 

prayer and participation in worship most strongly correlate with 

overall spirituality scores. The convergence of belief about prayer 

and the practice of prayer may offer a primary means for engaging soldiers regarding spirituality from a variety of religious 

perspectives. Also regarding spirituality survey scores correlate 

moderately with age and rank, and spirituality scores correlate 

slightly with gender (higher in women), education, having children, and marriage. 

Spirituality positively correlates with both ethical attitudes and 

intentions. Spirituality strongly correlates with moral courage/

ownership, moral efficacy, and embracing Army values. Spirituality moderately correlates with intention to report ethical violations observed in others and with soldier identification. These 

44 William G. Huitt and Jennifer L. Robbins, “An Introduction to Spiritual Development” (paper presented at the 11th Annual Applied Psychology in Education, 

Mental Health, and Business conference, Valdosta, GA, October 2003), 6.

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406 | Aspects of Leadership

attitudes and intentions may be understood as an expression of 

character with spirituality as one dimension of character. From a 

leadership perspective, fostering moral potency may be a direct 

benefit for deepening spirituality as a dimension of character.

Spirituality correlates with indications of emotional and physical well-being. As reported in other research, there are apparent 

connections between spirituality and measures of emotional and 

physical health. These findings about soldiers provide data that 

support the Army’s efforts to strengthen physical and emotional 

well-being.

Regarding character, mid-grade and senior noncommissioned 

officers (NCOs) offered perspectives as they presented personal 

reports of exemplary conduct observed or performed in close 

combat during an ethics and leadership program at Joint Forces 

Command.45 The theme of the symposium was ethical decision 

making and high-performing teams. It involved approximately 

100 combat-seasoned members of the armed forces, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, civilian academics, and law enforcement leaders—all focused on ethical 

conduct in ambiguous and hostile situations. The NCOs observed 

that “members of the military operate both with highly trained 

skills and a human and moral core. This core of character is formed 

before and beyond the military. While in uniform, experiences can 

both test and potentially help develop moral strength.”46 This captures the essential context of how personal spirituality and significant family and community influences affect men and women 

in military service, both in terms of their moral awareness and 

understanding as well as their resilience under stress.

45 Final Report (limited distribution) from the Symposium on Ethical DecisionMaking and Behavior in High Performing Teams, cohosted by Joint Forces Command, the Center for the Army Professional Ethic, and the Institute for National 

Security Ethics and Leadership, Suffolk, VA, 2–3 June 2010, 11.

46 Ibid.
The EXCEL study helps bring spirituality and its effects into the 

realm of legitimate study, worth scientific inquiry and further 

analysis. Though often categorized as the domain of anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, and religious leaders, the topic 

of spirituality deserves to be brought into a wider, interdisciplinary line of effort. In efforts to develop ethics, resilience, and 

character, the benefits of including spiritual growth could be an 

area for continued research. Data from the EXCEL study could 

be analyzed to measure whether the amount of combat exposure, 

length of deployment, or frequency of deployments affect spirituality. A longitudinal study measuring spirituality during intervals 

of military service may indicate increases or decreases in factors 

of spirituality. Additionally, research could examine whether or 

not leadership styles, as measured in the EXCEL survey, correlate with spirituality scores among leaders or if the spirituality of 

leaders has effects on scores of spirituality among followers. 

Recommendations for Leaders and Chaplains

Leaders in military service can apply findings from the EXCEL 

study by acknowledging the value and positive impact of religious and spiritual activities on ethical behavior and resilience. 

Leaders can ensure troops have opportunities to practice their 

faith. Leaders interested in fostering character development can 

promote service members’ participation in spiritual activities as 

a means of moral development within the limitations of regulations. They can provide adequate resources (funding, time on the 

training schedule) to unit chaplains to offer spiritual fitness training and activities. In speaking about ethical attitudes and behavior, leaders of all ranks can include spiritual values in reinforcing 

moral courage, responsibility, and reporting unethical conduct. 

Although this research was not structured to demonstrate a clear 

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 407
408 | Aspects of Leadership

causal relationship between spirituality and ethics or resilience, 

there are correlations that indicate measurable interactions.

Chaplains can contribute to the moral, emotional, and physical 

strength of the force by assisting military members in strengthening their spirituality according to the faith tenants of those 

individual military members. Chaplains can foster relationships 

in faith communities as a means for reinforcing ethical behavior. 

In their religious training, chaplains can incorporate moral dilemmas and address what scriptures say about moral decision 

making. Since beliefs about prayer were prominent in the measures of spirituality in this study, chaplains can pray. Chaplains 

can provide instruction on prayer and conduct prayer services. 

In interacting with military members, chaplains can emphasize 

prayer as a means of resilience, as an item of personal protective 

gear. Effective chaplains will encourage connections “back home” 

with those who will offer prayers on behalf of military members. 

In their daily work, chaplains can provide scripture studies and 

instruction on the meaning and purpose of life and God working 

in spite of evil situations. Finally, chaplains can emphasize the 

practical application of love. Love is about selfless service and 

treating others with respect and dignity—others within the ranks, 

and even adversaries. 
Appendix A

EXCEL Spirituality Questions with 

References47

1. I feel that on a higher level all of us share a common bond. 

- Question source: Piedmont Spiritual Transcendance Scale 

- Original question: I feel that on a higher level all of us share a 

common bond. 

2. Although there is good and bad in people, I believe that humanity as a whole is basically good. 

- Question source: Piedmont Spiritual Scale 

- Original question: Although there is good and bad in people, I 

believe that humanity as a whole is basically good. 

3. There is an order to the universe that transcends human 

thinking. 

- Question source: Piedmont Spiritual Scale 

- Original question: There is an order to the universe that transcends human thinking. 

4. Although individual people may be difficult, I feel a bond 

with all of humanity. 

- Question source: Piedmont Spiritual Scale 

- Original question: Although individual people may be difficult, I 

feel an emotional bond with all of humanity. 

47 Jon Randolph Haber, Theodore Jacob, and David J. C. Spangler, “Dimensions 

of Religion/Spirituality and Relevance to Health Research,” The International 

Journal for the Psychology of Religion 77 (2007): 265–88.

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 409
410 | Aspects of Leadership

5. My spiritual life is an important part of who I am as a person. 

- Question source: Allport’s Extrinsic Religion48

- Original question: Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my 

daily life. 

- Original question: Although I believe in my religion, many other 

things are more important in life. 

6. I feel deep inner peace or harmony. 

- Question source: Existential Well-Being49

- Original question: I feel deep inner peace or harmony. 

7. I feel a sense of well-being about the direction in which my 

life is heading. 

- Question source: Existential Well-Being50

- Original question: I feel a sense of well-being about the direction 

in which my life is heading. 

8. I have the sense of a larger of purpose in my life. 

- Question source: Existential Well-Being51

- Original question: I have been able to step outside of my ambitions and failures, pain and joy, to experience a larger sense of 

fulfillment. 

9. I go to my place of worship (chapel, church, synagogue, 

temple) because it helps me to connect with friends.

- Question source: Fetzer/NIA Religious Support52

- Original question: I go to my place of worship (church, synagogue, temple) because it helps me to make friends. 

- Original question: I go to my (church, synagogue, temple) mostly 

to spend time with my friends. 

48 “The Age-Universal” version of Allport and Ross’s Religious Orientation Scale, 

as reported by Haber, 278.

49 “Spiritual Well-Being Scale” by C. W. Ellison, as reported by Haber, 277.

50 Ibid. 

51 Ibid.

52“Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religion and Spirituality” by Fetzer Institute/National Institution of Aging, as reported by Haber, 278.
10. I believe my personal prayers help me during this 

deployment.

- Question source: R/S Motivation, Devotion, & Coping

- Original question: How important is it to you to be able to turn to 

prayer when you are facing a personal problem? 

11. I believe the prayers of my family and friends back home 

help me. 

- Question source: This question was created by the Chaplain Corps 

to determine the recognized level of spiritual support from home.

12. I believe the presence and ministry of my unit chaplain 

brings value to the mission. 

- Question source: This question is a military-centric question 

created to meet the specific needs of the Chaplain Corps.

13. I feel good about my future. 

- Question source: Existential Well-Being 

- Original question: I feel good about my future. 

14. I have forgiven myself for things that I have done wrong. 

- Question source: Existential Well-Being 

- Original question: I have forgiven myself for things that I have 

done wrong. 

15. If I have a problem or difficult situation, the people in my 

chapel community will comfort me and get me through it. 

- Question source: Fetzer/NIA Religious Support

- Original question: If you were ill, how much would the people in 

your congregation help you out? 

- Original question: If you had a problem or difficult situation, how 

much comfort would the people in your congregation be willing 

to give you?

Soldier Spirituality: Preliminary Findings | 411

—413—

In a recent discussion with senior noncommissioned officers at 

the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Directorate of Training and Development, Army chaplain Major Mark Johnston suggested that there are “[t]hree questions that challenge the whole 

purpose of spiritual fitness [in the Army]: what it is, can we train 

it, and if so, how.”1 The fact that even the chaplains are not sure 

of the answers to these questions illustrates the cognitive dissonance in the U.S. Army with regard to the concept of spiritual 

fitness and the core concepts that underlie it. Indeed, without a 

proper understanding of the terms “spirit” and “spirituality,” a 

coherent conception of ethics, law, and their relationship cannot 

be constructed. This chapter attempts to answer Major Johnston’s 

three questions. In order to do so, it first examines the term “spiritual fitness” and reveals a philosophical incoherence in the official 

institutional documents governing the use of the term. Second, it 

examines the relationship between the philosophical incoherence 

of the term “spiritual fitness” as used in official organizational 

documents and the cognitive dissonance with regard to the term 

“spirit” and the concepts of “spiritual fitness” and “spirituality” 

1 Eric B. Pilgrim, “Spiritual Fitness: What Is It, Can We Train It and If So, How,” 

U.S. Army Hooah4Health.com, accessed 31 December 2010, http://www.hooah4health.com/spirit/FHPspirit.htm. 

The Spiritual as the Nexus for 

the Ethical and 

the Legal

Jeffrey S. Wilson
414 | Aspects of Leadership

in professional discourse (journals, books, and blogs). How this 

cognitive dissonance weakens the conceptual basis of professional identity in the Army and inhibits the evolution of a professional ethic that explicitly displays the links between spirituality, 

morality, and law will be emphasized. Third, it will argue for an 

official working definition of the term “spirit” and the concepts 

of “spiritual fitness” and “spirituality.” A definition of such terms 

and concepts will clarify the Army’s conceptual basis of professional identity and enhance the evolution of a professional ethic 

that explicitly displays the links between spirituality, morality, 

and law. Finally, two intertwined historically centered objections 

will be considered that may seriously challenge this view and a 

reply to those objections will be offered in the conclusion.

Significance of the Issue under Discussion

Since spirituality plays a key role in the philosophical underpinning of any logically coherent construction of ethics and law, both 

legal and ethical education must begin with an education in the 

spiritual. Therefore, legal and ethical education that ignores the 

spiritual is fragmented in a way that renders it incoherent in both 

theoretical and practical realms. This fragmentation is particularly destructive in the military organizations of liberal democratic nation-states, whose essential telos (ultimate end or purpose)

demands that every person in the organization be able to articulate justificatory arguments for the use of potentially lethal force in 

defense of values, beliefs, institutions, and fellow citizens. I center 

the discussion here on the term “spiritual fitness” because at the 

time of writing there is no institutionally driven dialogue within 

the U.S. Army concerning the root terms “spirit” and “spirituality.” I will begin with an exploration of spiritual fitness. 
The Spiritual as the Nexus | 415

Spiritual Fitness: The Concept and the Problem

The notion of spiritual fitness is receiving much attention at the 

time of this writing. This is due in part to the ongoing effort 

within the Army to refine its ethic, solidify its conceptual framework for professional identity, and generate an Army-wide discussion of the relationship between these abstract concepts and 

organizational effectiveness. The first explicit appearance of spiritual fitness in Army doctrine only occurred in September 1987, 

when Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-63-12, 

Spiritual Fitness, was released. Over a decade earlier, the Army 

undertook the comprehensive revision of its normative ethical 

framework that resulted in the Army values and the warrior 

ethos. The institution officially manifested awareness of the fact 

that “life as a human being and as a soldier [the term “soldier” 

was not yet officially capitalized in all official Army documents] 

depends upon both physical and emotional states of being.”2

 The 

definition of spiritual fitness offered in 1987 is still in use today, although the Army Health Promotion Program, in which it resides, 

is now articulated in Army Regulation (AR) 600-63. In the May 

2007 version of AR 600-63, spiritual fitness is defined as the “development of the personal qualities needed to sustain a person in 

times of stress, hardship, and tragedy. These qualities come from 

religious, philosophical, or human values and form the basis for 

character, disposition, decision making, and integrity.”3

The definition of spiritual fitness has presented Army leaders 

with a conceptual quandary in the logical structure of the path to 

it. By reframing the definition of spiritual fitness into a syllogism, 

one can see how it connects a number of complex philosophical 

concepts in a puzzling way:

2 Department of the Army, Spiritual Fitness, DA PAM 600-63-12 (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, 1987), 1.

3 Department of the Army, Army Health Promotion, AR 600-63 (Washington, 

DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 37.
416 | Aspects of Leadership

(1) If a person is to be spiritually fit, then a person must develop 

the qualities needed to sustain him or her in times of stress, 

hardship, and tragedy.

(2) If a person is to develop the qualities needed to sustain him 

or her in times of stress, hardship, and tragedy, then a person 

must develop some sense of character, disposition, decision 

making, and integrity.

(3) If a person is to develop some sense of character, disposition, 

decision making, and integrity, then a person must access some 

set of religious, philosophical, or human values.

(4) Therefore, if a person is to be spiritually fit, then a person 

must access some set of religious, philosophical, or human 

values.

This syllogism, and the definition of spiritual fitness that inspires 

it, manifest two fallacies in its substance: the fallacy of vagueness 

and the fallacy of the false dichotomy. It is possible to commit the 

fallacy of vagueness when an expression allows “for a continuous 

range of interpretations [because] the meaning [of key terms in 

the expression] is hazy, obscure, and imprecise.”4

 When the definition claims that certain qualities “form the basis for character, 

disposition, decision making, and integrity,” one is conceptually 

lost: is not integrity itself a disposition and an aspect of character? Is 

not decision making a skill that manifests a disposition?

It is possible to commit the fallacy of the false dichotomy when 

one “presents two nonjointly exhaustive alternatives as if they 

were jointly exhaustive.”5 When the definition posits that certain 

qualities “come from religious, philosophical, or human values,” 

one is again conceptually lost: if religious and philosophical values 

are not human values, then what are they? The structure of the 

definition implies that the former two categories of value are 

4 Patrick J. Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic, 10th ed.(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2008), 76–77.

5 Ibid., 676.
somehow separate from each other and from the latter; however, 

it is unclear how or why. 

Given the philosophical incoherence with the definition of spiritual fitness as currently stated in official U.S. Army documents, 

it is little wonder that the U.S. Army Chaplain’s Corps, who is 

the “proponent for Army moral leadership training,”6

 seems to 

be confused about how to proceed with such a mission. Interestingly, the formal charter for the moral leadership training mission 

does not mention spiritual fitness per se, yet specifies that moral 

leadership training must focus on the “education and application 

of current Army values”7 and on “the virtues and values that were 

formative in the shaping of America and are still present in the 

contemporary military setting.”8 The moral leadership training 

rubric “recognizes the inherent dignity of all people, the value of 

the state, the virtues of leadership, selfless citizenship, and duty 

[and also] examines the religious and spiritual connections associated with ethical decision making, personal values, and personal 

relationships.”9 The rubric for moral leadership training manifests the same kinds of philosophical incoherence. The definition 

of spiritual fitness fails to explain the dichotomy between “religious” and “spiritual,” and to conceptualize a difference between 

“virtues” and “values.” Finally, it fails to recognize a “personal” 

sphere of value that is somehow discrete from a professional 

sphere without an articulation of how soldiers should understand 

that separation.

Another separation that is implied but not articulated in depth 

is that between church and state. The religious connotations inherent in the discussion of spiritual fitness and morality are troubling for a government institution in a pluralist society such as the 

6 Department of the Army, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, AR 165-1 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2009), 2.

7 Ibid., 31. The seven Army values as of the time of this writing are loyalty, duty, 

respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.

8 Ibid. 

9 Ibid. 

The Spiritual as the Nexus | 417
418 | Aspects of Leadership

United States. The fact that the U.S. Army chief of chaplains is the 

proponent for moral leadership training and is heavily involved 

in spiritual fitness education only adds to popular misconceptions of the essential goals and ambitions of both institutional processes. For example, in December of 2010, the Wisconsin-based 

Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF) took the Army to task 

in an open letter to Secretary of the Army John McHugh. FFRF 

posed specific questions about the spiritual fitness component of 

an assessment instrument administered to soldiers periodically to 

assess what the Army calls “comprehensive soldier fitness.” FFRF 

alleged that the Army was, in effect, endorsing a link between 

being a person of faith and being a good soldier.10 Research into 

the links between what the Army calls spiritual fitness and overall 

health often feature rubrics that manifest the same kinds of philosophical questions, if not always the same kinds of philosophical 

problems. For example, the HOPE rubric11 endorsed by the American Academy of Family Physicians defines the term “religion” as 

one of many paths to “spirituality.” Yet the HOPE rubric recognizes how difficult it is to separate “religion” and “spirituality” 

when looking for specific correlations between patient attitudes 

and patient condition.12

In the Sergeants Major Academy discussion, Chaplain Johnston contends that “spiritual fitness is a basic upon which the 

Army values flourish,” and “the fruit of spiritual fitness ought 

to be selfless service, ought to be loyalty, and ought to be personal courage.”13 One can reasonably suppose that the chaplain 

10 Adelle M. Banks, “Army Faces Questions over ‘Spiritual Fitness’ Test,” 

The Christian Century, 6 January 2011, http://www.christiancentury.org/article/2011-01/army-faces-questions-over-spiritual-fitness.htm.

11 H=sources of hope, strength, comfort, meaning, peace, love, and connection; 

O=the role of organized religion for the patient; P=personal spirituality and practices; E=effects on medical care and end-of-life-decisions.

12 Gowri Anandarajah and Ellen Hight, “Spirituality and Medical Practice: Using 

the HOPE Questions as a Practical Tool for Spiritual Assessment,” American Family Physician 63 (2001), http://www.aafp/2001/0101/p81.html. 

13 Pilgrim, “Spiritual Fitness.”
sees all seven Army values as fruits of spiritual fitness, and here 

he suggests one plausible approach to reframing spiritual fitness 

in a way that is philosophically coherent. However, he is constrained by the lack of a definition for “spirit” and “spirituality” 

that would enable a new syllogism. Such a syllogism could link 

the goals of Army moral leadership training with the concept of 

spiritual fitness and the existing Army values in a coherent and 

easily communicable way. Chaplain Johnston correctly noted that 

“we don’t know how to define spiritual fitness easily, we do not 

know how to train it well, and we do not know how to facilitate 

that training so that it becomes a real part of life.”14 This essay 

offers a path forward with three components: a suggested definition of “spirit,” a suggested definition of “spirituality,” and a 

suggested model for illustrating a nexus between spirit, spirituality, morality, and law. This chapter’s objective is to enable a more 

philosophically coherent rubric for spiritual fitness and for moral 

leadership training in the U.S. Army that makes the Army values 

the bedrock for spiritual fitness. Though articulated in Army-centric language, this framework is applicable to other services struggling with similar philosophical problems within the framework 

of their own service cultures.

Terms

Spirit and Spirituality

The Oxford English Dictionary contains 24 distinct ways to define 

“spirit,” but the one that is most appropriate to this discussion is 

the following: “a particular character, disposition, or temper existing in, pervading, or animating, a person or set of persons; a 

special attitude or bent of mind characterizing men individually 

or collectively.”15 This definition of “spirit” clearly decouples the 

concept from religion and other supernatural metaphysics and 

14 Ibid.

15 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, s.v. spirit, http://dictionary.oed.com.

The Spiritual as the Nexus | 419
420 | Aspects of Leadership

focuses attention on a quality that can describe the intellectual 

(“bent of mind”), emotional (“temper”), and psychological (“attitude”) orientation of an individual or a group. These intellectual, emotional, and psychological orientations can properly be 

called “things of the spirit;”16 further, “attachment to or regard 

for” spiritual things “as opposed to material or worldly interests” 

can properly be called “spirituality.”17

Nexus 

This essay uses the biological definition of “nexus,” understood 

as “an area of fusion or close contact between two adjacent cell 

membranes, which is characterized by low electrochemical 

resistance,”18 as the conceptual linkage (“area of fusion”) between 

the spiritual, the moral, and the legal in an institutional ethic.

A New Conceptual Framework for Spiritual 

Fitness and Moral Leadership

The soldier’s spirit can be understood as a manifestation of a 

disposition to live a life in accordance with the Army values of 

loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Attention to and disposition toward authentic expression of the Army values, therefore, displays an emotional, psychological, and intellectual spirituality, in that adherence to the 

Army values trumps “material or worldly interests” in the way 

one lives. This holistic (emotional, psychological, and intellectual) 

spirituality manifests no connection to a supernatural metaphysics. Such a values-based spirituality grounds the soldier’s orientation to morality and law—two separate spheres in which a soldier 

must make informed judgments that will hopefully express the 

worldview encompassed by the Army values in a consistent 

manner. It is easy to see, then, the relationship between a coherent 

spirituality and a coherent orientation to morality and law.

16 Ibid., s.v. spirituality. 

17 Ibid., s.v. spirituality.

18 Ibid., s.v. nexus. 
Chaplain Johnston notes how challenging it is for the U. S. Army 

to articulate and give new soldiers reasons for internalizing an organizational sense of spirituality.19 He rightly emphasizes that the 

U.S. Army must begin the spiritual fitness discussion with new 

soldiers at “the very foundational level.”20 In addition, the Army 

must adopt a method for defining “spirit” and “spirituality” from 

day one of basic training in a secular framework that rests upon 

the Army values. It is important for the Army to move into a discussion of spiritual fitness that serves as a nexus for an orientation 

toward morality and law. Such a move would avoid the philosophical incoherence that has led to the problems the U.S. Army 

faces in defining, training, and facilitating a discussion of spiritual 

fitness and its relation to moral leadership.21

Spiritual as Nexus of Moral and Legal: Refining 

and Extending the Syllogism

By incorporating all that has been discussed thus far, a new syllogism can be articulated that links concepts of spirit, spirituality, 

spiritual fitness, morality, and law together. Such a new syllogism 

establishes a conceptual relationship between manifestation of 

spirit as understood in a particular way and manifestation of the 

qualities that define a good soldier. This syllogism is presented in 

a way that seeks to reinforce Chaplain Johnston’s assertion that 

“good soldiers are soldiers who maintain hope, who maintain serenity, who seek to respect life and are responsible”:22

(1) If a soldier manifests the dispositions and attitudes of the 

Army values, then a soldier manifests spirit.

(2) If a soldier manifests spirit, then a soldier manifests a spirituality that trumps material and worldly concerns.

19 Pilgrim, “Spiritual Fitness.” 

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

The Spiritual as the Nexus | 421
422 | Aspects of Leadership

(3) If a soldier manifests a spirituality that trumps material and 

worldly concerns, then a soldier manifests “development of the 

personal qualities needed to sustain a person in times of stress, 

hardship, and tragedy.”23

(4) If a soldier manifests development of the personal qualities needed to sustain a person in times of stress, hardship, and 

tragedy, then a soldier is spiritually fit.

(5) If a soldier is spiritually fit, then a soldier “recognizes the 

inherent dignity of all people, the value of the state, the virtues 

of leadership, selfless citizenship, and duty.”24

(6) If a soldier recognizes the inherent dignity of all people, 

the value of the state, the virtues of leadership, selfless citizenship, and duty, then a soldier manifests the qualities of a moral 

leader.25

(7) If a soldier manifests the qualities of a moral leader, then the 

soldier is a good soldier.

(8) Therefore, if a soldier manifests the dispositions and attitudes of the Army values, then the soldier is a good soldier.

The new syllogism will enhance what social psychologist and 

philosopher Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi calls “flow” in soldiering—

the “optimal experience”26 of being a soldier in the U.S. Army—

to a degree not possible for a person who is not spiritually fit. I 

believe that the spiritually fit soldier is not merely a better soldier 

in an extrinsic sense of being more active, reflective, and participatory in all aspects of professional practice, but a better soldier 

in an intrinsic sense, one who is able to thoroughly appreciate 

the experience of soldiering. If, as Csikszentmihalyi argues, the 

23 Department of the Army, Army Health Promotion, 37.

24 Department of the Army, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, 31.

25 Ibid. Note that the term “moral leader” is used in this essay to denote a person 

with the qualities listed who can lead by example, whether or not the person holds 

a leadership position in a technical sense within an organizational hierarchy.

26 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New 

York: Harper Perennial, 1990), 3.
“optimal state of inner experience is one in which there is order 

in consciousness,”27 then a soldier who is spiritually fit sees that 

there is no dichotomy between the person he is and the soldier 

he is. In a true flow experience, there is no meaningful sense of 

having to put on the Army values when one puts on the uniform 

and take them off while living life outside of the nominal duty 

day. I believe that the syllogism offered here recognizes Csikszentmihalyi’s observation that “[e]verything we experience—joy 

or pain, interest or boredom—is represented in the mind as information [and that control of] this information [will enable us 

to] decide what our lives will be like,”28 even under conditions of 

“stress, hardship, and tragedy.”29 The connection between being 

spiritually fit and being a good soldier enables even new soldiers 

to see how they can use the framework of the Army values to 

“join all experience into a meaningful pattern [in order to feel] in 

control of life [in a way that] makes sense.”30

Good Soldiers and the OODA Loop

In addition to offering a syllogism that is intended to connect the 

Army values to good soldiers, this essay also suggests that the 

graphic representation of human cognition in John Boyd’s OODA 

Loop offers a complementary vehicle for enabling focused discussions in Army schooling and unit training. John Boyd was a 

U.S. Air Force fighter pilot who, as a colonel in the 1970’s, revolutionized the way defense analysts think about the relationship between thought and action, particularly in the realm of air 

combat.31 Standing for “observe-orient-decide-act,” the OODA 

Loop has been applied to numerous professional applications 

27 Ibid., 6.

28 Ibid.

29 Department of the Army, Army Health Promotion, 37.

30 Csikszentmihalyi, Flow, 7.

31 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York: 

Little Brown, 2002), 4–10.

The Spiritual as the Nexus | 423
424 | Aspects of Leadership

outside the military, particularly in organizational management, 

knowledge management, and leadership theory.32 Although Boyd 

himself never published his theory concerning how the OODA 

Loop could enable one to understand the past and enable competitive advantage in the present, Boyd’s ideas have been promulgated by the scores of people—military and civilian alike—who 

heard him personally present graphics-laden briefings over a 

roughly 20-year period.33 The graphic below (figure 18) is one of 

hundreds available that represent Boyd’s OODA Loop concept, 

chosen here because of its clarity and for its explanatory notations 

provided by the knowledge management consulting firm material it is drawn from.34

32 Ibid., 334.

33 Ibid., 327–44. Boyd died in 1997.

34 Joe Firestone, “OODA LOOP,” Joe Firestone’s Blog on Knowledge and Knowledge Management, http://kmci.org/alllifeisproblemsolving/archives/the-ooda-loopand-double-loop-learning/. 

Observe Orient Decide Act

Unfolding

Circumstances

Outside

Information

Implicit 

Guidance

& Control

Implicit 

Guidance

& Control

Unfolding

Interaction

With

Unfolding Environment

Interaction

With Environment

Feedback

Feedback

Observations Action

(Test)

Decision

(Hypothesis)

Feed

Forward

Feed

Forward

Feed

Forward

Note how orientation shapes observation, shapes decision, shapes

action, and in turn is shaped by the feedback and other phenomena coming into our 

sensing or observing window.

Also note how the entire “loop” (not just orientation) is an ongoing many-sided 

implicit cross-referencing process of projection, empathy, correlation, and rejection.

Cultural

Traditions

Genetic Heritage

New 

Information Previous

Experience

Analyses &

Synthesis

Figure 18. OODA Loop.
This essay argues that the U.S. Army should insert the conceptual 

link between the Army values and the concept of a good soldier 

into the soldier’s OODA Loop, mainly in the “orient” phase. Thus 

the good soldier would acquire deeper understanding of certain 

“cultural traditions,” particularly those relating to how the basic 

documents of American government recognize the inherent 

dignity of all people and the value of the state. As the soldier 

matures and develops, the tools provided him in the training and 

education programs through which the Army values are communicated will enable him to use the experience of others (his teachers and soldiers he sees in case studies derived from actual situations) and his own experience as data points in an ever-deepening 

analysis and synthesis process through which decisions are made. 

The OODA graphic notes that “orientation shapes observation,”35

and in a way this phrase epitomizes the heart of the argument in 

this essay. Through this process, the U.S. Army can inform soldiers’ orientation and thus enable them to reframe their past experience and learning in light of new knowledge of the Army as an 

institution. Soldiers will acquire new knowledge and a better understanding of human dignity and equality. These are important 

notions as they are at the foundation of the basic documents that 

soldiers swear to uphold and defend. With this, the U.S. Army 

will enable the formation of good soldiers, while contributing to 

the development of good citizens, neighbors, and friends. Then, 

once they have internalized the Army values and are spiritually 

fit, they will be able to orient a lens on particular decisions, even 

those made under conditions of great stress. Soldiers will acquire 

an appreciation for and will be able to apply moral and legal constructs that are in line with those values. An environment based 

on dignity and respect will affirm decisions made in their light. 

Further observation of the world will take place with that input in 

the literal and figurative memory bank of orientation in the next 

35 Ibid. 

The Spiritual as the Nexus | 425
426 | Aspects of Leadership

decision situation the soldier faces, thereby reinforcing the habit 

of orienting one’s behavior in all areas of life in light of an everdeepening sense of intrinsic human dignity and equality. The 

various documents discussed in this essay demonstrate—some 

more directly than others—that the bedrock of American national, as well as political, identity is the commitment to intrinsic 

human dignity and equality. The argument offered here suggests 

and explicates ways to teach soldiers about that commitment by 

reframing the concepts of spirit, spirituality, and spiritual fitness 

in a more naturalistic way than they have been framed within the 

U.S. Army in recent years. 

Objections

An objection to the view offered here is that it does not take into 

adequate account the explicitly religious spirituality offered in the 

foundational documents of the U.S. government or of the explicitly religious (though pluralistically so) spirituality of the American 

society from which soldiers come, and for which they defend. In 

a society in which political independence is but one manifestation 

of the “separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature 

and of Nature’s God” entitles a people, further acknowledges 

“unalienable Rights” with which people are “endowed by their 

Creator” and which posits a “firm reliance on the protection of 

divine Providence,” one might argue that it would be appropriate 

to infuse any organizational sense of spirituality in a government 

institution with the same supernatural metaphysics, albeit in a 

general way.36 AR 165-1, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, frames 

the role of the Army chaplaincy as representative of “the unique 

commitment of the American social and religious culture that 

values freedom of conscience and spiritual choice as proclaimed 

in the founding documents.”37 Yet, in authorizing the Army 

36 U.S. Declaration of Independence, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/

declaration_transcript.html.

37 Department of the Army, Army Chaplain Corps Activities, 1.
chaplaincy, the U.S. Congress “recognize[d] the necessity of the 

Chaplain Corps in striking a balance between the establishment 

and free exercise clauses” of the U.S. Constitution.38 

One might object also that the benefit to the U.S. Army in adopting a more naturalistic concept of spiritual fitness, though doing 

so might reduce cognitive dissonance with regard to spiritual 

fitness, comes at the cost of an essentially American identity. To 

frame the important historical and philosophical roots in these 

related objections, I turn to two foreign commentators on the 

American identity, writing a century apart: Alexis de Tocqueville 

and Denis W. Brogan.

Alexis de Tocqueville, a nineteenth-century French political writer 

and historian, thought that any society/community committed to 

the intrinsic moral equality of every person would experience a 

complicated relationship with spirituality: the greater the sense of 

equality and pluralism, the more complicated the complexity. He 

believed that “complete religious independence”—understood as 

an absence of the idea of God in the practical life of a community—and “entire political freedom” were incompatible, saying 

that “if a man is without faith, he must serve someone and if he 

is free, he must believe.”39 In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville 

highlights the way religion can impose a “healthy restraint upon 

the intelligence” which is “very useful for [fostering a sense of 

human] happiness and importance in this [world].”40 Because 

“times of enlightenment and equality”41 generate an intellectual 

environment where “everything in the domain of [human] intelligence is shifting,”42 religion responds to human desire for “a 

38 Ibid.

39 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays on America (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), 512.

40 Ibid., 511.

41 Ibid., 513.

42 Ibid., 512.

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428 | Aspects of Leadership

firm and stable state in [the] material world;”43 one which, in de 

Tocqueville’s view, can prevent a political community of free and 

equal persons from sliding into the paralyzing suffocation of selfgratification.44 This can arise in the absence of the kind of religious 

and political authority that characterized the Europe from which 

the Americans fled.45

However, de Tocqueville cautions against religions that attempt to 

“stretch their powers beyond matters religious”46 and embark on 

a project of “restraining the free flight of the human mind in every 

respect”47 in an effort to define and codify the very conception of 

spirituality within an explicitly political context.48 Of all the ways 

that Alexis de Tocqueville displays his admiration for American 

society, he shows appreciation for the American way of keeping 

religion (and the general sense of the spiritual writ large) within 

“proper bounds . . . within a circle of religious matters [alone].”49

Roughly a century after de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in 

America, Denis W. Brogan, a British intellectual, wrote in The 

American Character that America is “built like a church on a rock 

of dogmatic affirmations.”50 This is evidence of not only a firm, 

but a “lively conviction [in the American character] of divine interest and direction.”51 Even before the well-known allusions to a 

supernatural metaphysical commitment in the Declaration of Independence, the immediate predecessors of the founding fathers 

uttered equally “famous assertions of faith in things unseen.”52

Brogan poses rhetorical questions as he wonders at the source of 

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid., 511.

45 Ibid., 511–12.

46 Ibid., 513.

47 Ibid., 511.

48 Ibid., 513.

49 Ibid.

50 Denis W. Brogan, The American Character (New York: Knopf, 1944), 128.

51 Ibid., 129.

52 Ibid., 128–29.
the deep and abiding faith in men such as Lord Baltimore, who, 

“in 1649, noted the evils arising from ‘the inforcing [sic] of the 

conscience in matters of Religion’ and so came out for the toleration of all Christians—this in an age when the Inquisition was 

still going strong.”53 Further, Brogan asks “[w]ith what Hebraic 

confidence in their mission did the people of Massachusetts in 

1780 acknowledge ‘with grateful hearts the goodness of the great 

Legislator of the universe, in affording us . . . an opportunity . . . of 

forming a new constitution of civil government, for ourselves and 

posterity and devoutly imploring His direction in so interesting a 

design[?]”’54 In fact, Brogan thinks that the whole idea of a “government of laws and not of men”55 is but one in a long series of 

articulated “aspirations [and] hopes [which, although they may 

seem] extravagant [and] meaningless . . . to the critical, have been 

fighting words, hopes, and beliefs leading to action [for a polity 

that, uniquely of all polities past and present, cherishes the idea 

of] absolutes in ethics.”56

When Brogan asserts that an essence of American identity is the 

idea that “good is good, even if they quarrel over what, in the 

circumstances, is good [Brogan’s italics],”57 he might as well be 

referring to the conversation over the notion of spiritual fitness 

in the U.S. Army today. What is not a matter of contention is the 

idea that spiritual health is a nexus of physical health and psychological health, and as such has a nonmaterial but comprehensible 

reality. What are matters of contention are the essential nature 

of spiritual health and the characteristics and dimensions of administrative mutability with regard to that essence. The view that 

has been offered here posits that the essential nature of spiritual 

fitness is philosophical coherence with regard to a set of values 

53 Ibid., 129.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., 130–31.

57 Ibid., 132.

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in the choices a person makes in all areas of his or her life. Such 

philosophical coherence can enable a person to manifest in his or 

her own being exactly what AR 600-63 states spiritual fitness is: 

the “development of the personal qualities needed to sustain a 

person in times of stress, hardship, and tragedy.”58 An alternate 

view, though, might suggest that the essential nature of spiritual 

fitness in an American context is betrayed by this essay’s view 

because it decouples faith in a supernatural metaphysics—something that Alexis de Tocqueville and D.W. Brogan have argued 

is essential to American identity in a psychological as well as a 

social and political sense—bedrock for the “development of the 

personal qualities needed to sustain a person in times of stress, 

hardship, and tragedy.”59 This alternate view might suggest that 

relying on a secularized conception of spiritual fitness would be 

meager and inadequate sustenance indeed “in times of stress, 

hardship, and tragedy.”60

Reply and Conclusion

In considering a response to the objections recognized here, I 

revisited two especially powerful narratives of American character that have influenced my own life and the lives of many 

military professionals: those of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel 

Barry B. Bridger and U.S. Navy Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale. Both men were shot down, imprisoned in North Vietnam 

for several years, and withstood torture that included prolonged 

periods of solitary confinement. Both men cite American values 

as the spiritual and psychological strength that enabled them to 

survive physically and morally. They maintained moral integrity 

and helped the other prisoners do the same. In an October 2010 

address at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota, Bridger 

58 Department of the Army, Army Health Promotion, 37. 

59 Ibid. 

60 Ibid. 
said that the story of his survival is a “story about the power of 

American values,” which centered on the unwillingness “to let 

each other down, because when it felt like we lost everything else, 

we only had one duty left [and that was] to care for each other.”61

In his well-known 1978 essay for The Atlantic Monthly entitled 

“The World of Epictetus,” Stockdale, too, noted that the “object 

of our highest value was the well-being of our fellow prisoners.”62

Stockdale wrote that to “love our fellow prisoners was within our 

power,” and noted how the best way to manifest that love was to 

“keep [one’s] conscience clean [and refrain from making] that first 

compromise.”63

At first glance, these two testimonies seem to reinforce the syllogism I offer here, linking spiritual fitness with a defined set of 

values that in turn define character without an appeal to supernatural metaphysics. However, a closer read of Bridger’s and 

Stockdale’s testimonies reveals that, in both cases, it was the manifestation of a specifically religious sense of spirituality—faith—

that most clearly signaled to the community of prisoners (and to 

the enemy, for that matter) how well they were holding up under 

pressure. As the senior American, Stockdale rallied his men under 

an ethic of “compassion, rehabilitation, and forgiveness,” [telling] 

fellow prisoners that it was “neither American nor Christian to 

nag a repentant sinner to his grave” [explicitly referring here to 

his efforts to head off an attitude of self-pity in their situation and 

to give everyone the best possible chance to return with a degree 

of honor intact].64 Similarly, Bridger notes that his most intense 

period of torture resulted from a “religious rebellion” in which 

61 Rachel Waller, “Former Vietnam POW Shares His Story with Grand Forks 

Airmen,” Air Force Print News Today, 27 October 2010, http://www.amc.af.mil/

news/story_print.asp?id=123228286.

62 James B. Stockdale, “The World of Epictetus,” in Vice and Virtue in Everyday 

Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics, ed. Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers 

(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich College Publishers,1993), 664.

63 Ibid., 670.

64 Ibid., 663.

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he and 35 fellow prisoners attempted to openly display their faith 

in God—the punishment was several months in solitary confinement.65 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that, although it is clear 

that the values upon which the prisoners relied in order to maintain their sanity and their moral integrity were not explicitly religious in essence, it might well have been that their expression in 

a religious context was the most effective evidence that the men 

were in fact spiritually fit. This explanation would fall under the 

AR 600-63 definition: that it was their religious affiliation and 

expression more than anything else that testified to their development of “the personal qualities needed to sustain a person in 

times of stress, hardship, and tragedy.”66

Stockdale’s phrasing of a core tenet of conduct explicitly recognizes an implicit dualism in the general character of American 

spiritual identity—a dualism that both Alexis de Tocqueville 

and Denis W. Brogan recognized and commented upon. When 

Stockdale admonished his men that it was “neither American nor 

Christian” to fail to forgive prisoners who had somehow collaborated with their captors but had since repented, he reflected and 

advanced a connection between the two. He had good reasons to 

believe that they would be recognized and given moral weight 

by the men whose behavior he was supposed to inspire. Is it any 

wonder, then, that particular ways of thinking about spirituality 

in American institutions such as the U.S. Army continue to reflect 

and advance (intentionally or not) the same dualism today?

The discussion in the U.S. Army about spiritual fitness remains 

generally useful and continually evolving. Such a discussion is 

important for the integration of physical, psychological, and emotional health for soldiers and their families. In Politics and Passion, 

Michael Walzer observes that “[c]onsidered as individual men 

65 Waller, “Former Vietnam POW Shares His Story.” 

66 Department of the Army, Army Health Promotion, 37.
and women, none of us are fully autonomous, and none of us 

are fully integrated into and bound by any of our groups. We are 

each unique, one and only one; and we are at the same time tied 

closely to specific others in ways we sometimes resist, sometimes 

embrace.”67 When the ties fall into one of the first three of Walzer’s 

four categories of involuntary association (familial and social, cultural, political), the embracing of such association is usually easy 

to see and understand.68 Involuntary moral associations, though, 

are often harder to recognize and embrace—especially when the 

moral import of such associations seems, once recognized, to 

define who we are in ways that transcend any or all of the other 

three.

One could suggest that Americans might share an involuntary 

moral association with religious spirituality, especially in its Judeo-Christian form. The Army and the U.S. government could as 

well consider more explicitly recognizing in official policy such 

association. Yet doing so might exacerbate tensions between advocates of more individual liberal autonomy on the one hand and 

advocates of more communitarian concerns on the other. It can 

be argued, however, that this tension may be at the heart of what 

it means to be an American in the first place. I cannot decisively 

reply to this objection, that the reduction in institutional cognitive 

dissonance that might be achieved by adopting the framework 

I offer here might come at the cost of alienating the institution’s 

members from involuntary moral associations that they recognize 

and value. However, I recognize the coherence of that objection as 

I continue to reflect on the issues discussed in this essay.

I would like to recall Major Johnston and his suggestion that there 

are “[t]hree questions that challenge the whole purpose of spiritual fitness [in the Army]: what it is, can we train it, and if so, 

67 Michael Walzer, Politics and Passion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 

140.

68 Ibid., 3–8.

The Spiritual as the Nexus | 433
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how.”69 I noted that the fact that even the chaplains are not sure 

of the answers to these questions illustrates the cognitive dissonance in the U.S. Army with regard to the concept of spiritual 

fitness and the core concepts that support it—“spirit” and “spirituality”—concepts without which I believe coherent conceptions 

of ethics, law, and their relationships cannot be constructed. In 

offering one way of answering Major Johnston’s three questions, 

I have neither eliminated the cognitive dissonance nor decisively 

refuted what I see to be the most serious objections to the view I 

offer. However, I think I have provided a deductive argument that 

links the Army values, spiritual fitness (defined in a naturalistic, 

institutionally focused way), professionalism (the idea of a good 

soldier), and character (the idea of a good person). The ongoing 

discussion within the Army and between the Army and the other 

services is neither simple nor anywhere close to being over. Yet 

such a discussion can be inspirational to service personnel as well 

as to the polity from which they come and for which they serve. 

In a 1970 lecture at the U. S. Air Force Academy entitled “The Military in the Service of the State,” British General Sir John Winthrop 

Hackett observed that “the major service of the military institution to the community . . . it serves may well lie neither within 

the political sphere or the functional. It could easily lie within 

the moral [as a] well from which to draw refreshment for a body 

politic in need of it.”70 In that spirit, the U.S. Army can, through 

continued open and honest dialogue, be a catalyst for a more reasoned discussion in the polity writ large of spirituality and its importance in the United States.

69 Pilgrim, “Spiritual Fitness.” 

70 General Sir John Winthrop Hackett, The Military in the Service of the State 

(Colorado Springs, CO: USAF Academy Press, 1970), 19.
—435—

Marines are often portrayed as individuals who serve the United 

States in uniform and exemplify the highest moral principles. 

These principles are often assumed to be rooted in religious tradition and the personal application of a faith tradition. In fact, 

many leaders express the hope that the positive values of religion 

in individual service personnel will automatically result in ethical 

behavior in military operations. Military commanders, leaders, 

chaplains, and ethicists consistently support training regimes to 

teach moral and ethical principles and decision making for individuals based on confidence in that assumption. 

The traditional, albeit often subconscious, assumption is that personal religiosity and ethical behavior are positively related. There 

are few that publicly challenge this basic idea. The result is that 

the relationship between personal faith, religious institutions, and 

the ethical behavior of uniformed personnel is seldom studied 

in any serious, systematic way. There is little research to answer 

questions such as can personal morality be measurably different in incoming personnel depending on their religious identity? 

Does a soldier’s faith system or belief in personal responsibility 

to a “higher authority” make him a more ethical or moral professional? Are spiritual or religious commanders more ethical in 

The Religious Factor in 

Military Leadership

Pauletta Otis
436 | Aspects of Leadership

their decision making? Are religious service members more aware 

of the short- and long-term consequences of ethical standards? 

Are military members more subject to indecision, guilt, PTSD, or 

leaving the USMC as a result of seeing or experiencing a “lack of 

ethical behavior?” Can the “raw material” be changed (for good 

or bad) by military teaching/training? 

The short answer to each of the above questions is we don’t know; 

there is no specific research on whether a self-defined “spiritual” 

or “religious individual” is more moral or behaves more ethically than one who is not.1

 Academics, commanders, and chaplains pontificate on the questions, but clear answers are simply 

not there. There are three very good reasons for this: (1) in some 

cases, we do not want to know; (2) there is no basic framework for 

addressing some of the research questions; and (3) although the 

United States’ population (as reflected in the military population) 

is self-defined as “religious,” the separation between institutionalized religion and institutionalized warfare is an important factor 

in just how these questions are handled within military circles.

This essay focuses on the relationship between personal spirituality and ethical behavior, religious identity and ethical behavior, 

and how either individual faith or religious institutions relate to 

the mission and requirements of the U.S. Department of Defense. 

Suggestions are also made for further research. The author posits 

four fundamental assumptions: (1) religion and war concern life 

and death; (2) military personnel, including commanders, reflect 

the values and behaviors of a society; (3) military forces, as a specialized professional part of a society, are given specific responsibility for warfare by the government; and (4) the United States’ 

military and its leadership reflect the values, principles, and prac1 For that matter, rigorous studies that address differences between ethnic, race, 

gender, age, service, or military specialty in relationship to ethical behavior are 

notably absent for the same reason.
The Religious Factor | 437

tices of American society, including religious or “faith-based” 

values; they are constrained by law and principle with regard to 

specifics of that relationship.2

In anthropological or sociological terms, the United States government (USG)/ Department of Defense (DOD) replaced the social 

control mechanisms of the institutions of religion (the church, 

mosque, temple, synagogue) with the institutions of the military.3

This implies that, although values and beliefs are held by individual soldiers, sailors, and Marines, the enforcement and reinforcement of those values are sustained by institutional commitment. 

The DOD’s institutional commitment to moral and ethical behaviors is a direct reflection of American society, traditions of the military, and the laws and policies of the state. The balance between 

military effectiveness and moral commitment to ethical behavior 

is, and should be, a subject of conversation and contention. New 

issues of “just war” and “justice in war” are a result of changing 

social, environmental, economic, and political environments and 

challenge the application of existing moral and ethical principles 

in “new” contexts. The ethical principles taught may or may not 

be based on religious principle or secular consequentialism, but 

the effect is that they provide a basis for unity of command, principled leadership, common values, and standards of behavior for 

all service personnel. 

It is important to clarify concepts used in this essay. Generally 

speaking, when DOD members speak of individual “religiosity,” 

they use the terms, “faith-based” or “spirituality.” The term “religion” is used to refer to an institutional affiliation, such as “Christian, Muslim, Jewish” or in more detailed assessment to Christian 

2 Pauletta Otis, “Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century,” in Religion and 

Security: The New Nexus in International Relations, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis 

R. Hoover (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).

3 James A. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
438 | Aspects of Leadership

denominations, such as “Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran.” In point 

of fact, the DOD has traditionally recognized religious affiliation 

as a basis for death notification, ceremonies, and burial services 

and, derivatively, for assigning chaplains to provide such services.

Religion and Warfare

That there is a relationship between religion and war is unquestionable; both concern the basic issues of life and death. Every 

known religion deals with questions about war as a part of the 

theological/ideological inquiry: What is the value of life? How 

should life be lived? Military members are forced to think about 

“just war” and “justice in war” simply as part of their day jobs, 

for example, when is taking life in “war” required? How should 

that be done? Who lives and who dies? If there is a dearth of institutionalized handling of the topics of spirituality, religion, and 

warfare as evidenced in moral and ethical behaviors, it is not 

because individual soldiers are unaware of the relationship. If the 

leadership does not verbalize this relationship, it is often because 

commanders recognize the importance of the things that unite as 

more significant than the things that divide.

It may be useful to understand religion in two ways: as individual 

belief and/or as a group adherence to a theology with attendant 

beliefs and behaviors that provide coherence and meaning for the 

group. Religion, for individuals, is very often assumed to be a 

matter of personal beliefs and behaviors rooted in a faith tradition. 

Religion is assumed to link the individual to the transcendent, i.e., 

individuals are responsible to a “higher power” for earthly behaviors. Individuals take what they know of a faith tradition and 

apply it to their lives—in personal adaptation to circumstances. 

Morality and ethics become a matter of personal conscience. The 

problem with this, of course, is that it is not “predictive”—indi-
viduals can understand the ideal, consider themselves responsible to a higher power, and still not behave in ways that reflect 

the social norms of morality and ethics held by the larger society. 

The society’s responsibility becomes one of teaching and enforcing codes of behavior with or without a socially normed “body of 

received truth.”

Religion for groups includes the ideas/theology, codes, beliefs, 

and behaviors that reflect the ideals of the society and provide 

social guidance for individuals’ behavior. Theology provides 

“ideal” behavior with reference to the transcendent power and 

provides guidance for individual behaviors that correspond 

to those ideals, including means and methods of social control 

that provide incentive and disincentive for behaviors in order 

to support group survival. For anthropologists and sociologists, 

religion for a society provides coherence through theology and 

contributes to long-term adaptability. This means that the codes, 

beliefs, and behaviors are “theological” and adapted to ethnic, 

national, and group requirements for survivability. An example 

might be the “theology of Christianity” as adapted to Russia, 

Greece, England, Nigeria, and the United States: the theology is 

basically the same, but the group adaptations are quite different 

when studied in relationship to specific cultures.

Figure 19 illustrates the relationship between “levels of analysis” 

of religious factors: theology (ideology with a “God factor”) provides ideals in relationship to the transcendent; codes provide 

rules of behavior for societies with attendant rewards and punishments; beliefs are cultural adaptations of religious theology/

codes; and actual behaviors are what we “see” and can measure 

concerning religious behavior, including individual and group 

morality and ethics.

The Religious Factor | 439
440 | Aspects of Leadership

The U.S. military has a theoretical dilemma: individuals who 

say they have a faith tradition do not necessarily see themselves 

responsible to the larger “religious” traditions that “norm” the 

ethics of a society; religious institutions provide norms, but different religious institutions provide competing norms in the public 

square (for example, DOD). 

Perspectives on the Relationship between 

Individual Faith, Institutionalized Religion, 

and DOD Policy

There are three basic perspectives on religion in the U.S. Armed 

Services: 

(1) The U.S. military is a direct reflection of the United States as a 

Christian country, and therefore all DOD policies and the activities of individual servicemen and women may be interpreted in 

the light of adherence to Christian values, beliefs, and behaviors. 

Those values are reflected in moral and ethical behavior of individual servicemen and supported by commanders. Churches and 

other religious organizations are encouraged to support the U.S. 

defense “establishment” and foreign policy, and to encourage religious activities within DOD; 

IDEOLOGY (RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY)

CODES

BELIEFS (local adaptation)

BEHAVIORS (IDEAL, ACTUAL)

Figure 19. Relationship Between “Levels of Analysis” of Religious Factors.
(2) The U.S. military is entirely secular wherein religion has no 

place in the secular state so that morals and ethics can and should 

be taught entirely separate from religion. Churches, mosques, 

synagogues, and related organizations have no role whatsoever 

in U.S. military activities; and 

(3) The U.S. military reflects the values and behaviors of a religious 

constituency that is plural, diverse, and contentious, so that religious teaching should not be excluded from the public square but 

the military’s requirement for unit/service cohesiveness should 

remain the priority. Under this third model, an individual’s rights 

to religious beliefs and behaviors are encouraged insofar as they 

do not damage the “whole,” and religious institutions are not 

allowed to interfere in the conduct of military operations.

Each of the above perspectives has differing implications regarding the relevance of religion as related to leadership. If perspective 1 is correct, then military leaders can and should be adherents in religious organizations and lead in actions that support 

the overlap of religion and military activities; if perspective 2 is 

correct, then military leaders/commanders should not refer to 

or support any religiously factored belief or behavior in military 

activities, regardless of their own personal beliefs or faith tradition; and if perspective 3 is correct, the appropriate separation of 

church and state as premised in the U.S. Constitution should be 

followed, which implies that personal faith is essential for military leaders but that institutions of church and state should not 

overlap any more than is appropriate and legal.

Perspective 1: The United States is a Christian country and 

DOD is a reflection of that fact; ethics should be taught and 

enforced as related to Christian principles. 

Many people in the United States believe that the United States is 

a Christian country and that the armed services reflect that fact.4

 

4 Amy Patterson Neubert, “Religious Diversity Increases in America,” Purdue 

University website, 19 October 2010, www.purdue.edu/newsroom/research/2010/

101019StraughnReligion.html.

The Religious Factor | 441
442 | Aspects of Leadership

The logic and evidence in support of this contention is largely 

based on an interpretation of history and tradition, the fact that 

many individuals in the U.S. armed forces are Christian, that “just 

war” and “justice in war” principles are based on Christian principles, and that the United States is a Christian country by numerical percentage. Note that in table 8, approximately 68 percent 

of respondents considered themselves “Christian.” The evidence 

that the United States is a Christian country by history and tradition seems incontestable; the evidence that the United States military has a Christian agenda is more problematic. It is even more 

difficult to assess whether calling oneself a “Christian” is predictive of higher moral and ethical standards than adherents of other 

religions or ideologies. 

Religious Preference Military Civilians 

All preferences 100 100

Protestant 35 45

Catholic/Orthodox 22 26

Other Christian 11 3

Atheist/no religion 21 19

Jewish <1 1

Muslim/ Islam <1 1

Buddhist/ Hindu <1 2

Other religions 11 3

Insofar as history and tradition are concerned, it is true that most 

of the founding fathers were Christian by identity or definition, if 

not by personal adherence. The populations of the first 13 states 

also had a Christian identity, and many of the states prohibited 

other religions. The principles of “just war” and “justice in war” 

are based on the writings of St. Augustine and St. Aquinas; they 

Table 8. Percentage of Religious Preferences of the U.S. Population and Military 

Personnel, 2001.
have at their core a system of values that relate specifically to 

Judeo-Christian traditions. Religious beliefs, generally Christian, 

have had a role in shaping the leadership of the country and its 

military. The symbols and rituals of war are identifiably Christian. 

Further, Christianity, in its various forms, helped shape the battlefields of the Revolutionary War, Civil War, Spanish-American 

War, the Philippine War, and the First and Second World Wars.5

In terms of the U.S. population, a recent report issued by Purdue 

University stated that many Americans believe that “being a 

Christian” is a key aspect of “being American.”6 A similar poll 

conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute found that 42 

percent of Americans believe that “America has always been and 

is currently a Christian nation.”7 The research also indicated that 

those who were Christian were more likely to answer this question in the affirmative than those who were not. Non-Christians 

consistently reported that it was not necessary to be a Christian 

to be a “good American.” Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life asked different questions from another perspective and used a different metric. It found (1) that the number 

of mainline Protestants and Catholics make up approximately 

60 percent of the population; (2) that there is no direct relationship between income, education, and religious affiliation; (3) that 

Americans ages 18 to 29 are considerably less religious than older 

Americans yet remain fairly traditional in their religious beliefs 

and practices; (4) that contrary to common misperception, only 6 

percent of voters in the last election were contacted by religious 

groups about issues or their vote; (5) that nearly 72 percent say 

they attend religious services at least a few times a year—roughly 

5 Edwin S. Gaustad, A Documentary History of Religion in America (Grand Rapids, 

MI: William B. Eerdsman Press, 1982).

6 Neubert, “Religious Diversity Increases in America.”

7 Public Religion Research Institute, American Values Survey,1–14 September 

2010; findings based on a random sample of 3,013 adults, http://publicreligion.

org/research/2010/10/religion-tea-party-2010/.

The Religious Factor | 443
444 | Aspects of Leadership

one-quarter say they seldom or never attend religious services (27 

percent); and (6) that there were few changes in these statistics in 

the past decade.8

No research was found that asked whether being a good “Christian” or being “religious” was a necessary qualification for service 

in the armed forces or whether being self-identified as a good 

“Christian” produced Christian ethical behavior. Military commanders invariably avoid the question in favor of a character 

assessment: is the soldier, Marine, or airman a person of good 

character in terms of ethics and morals (noted as honor, loyalty, 

and commitment)? Although these may be attributes of a good 

“Christian,” they may also be the attributes of a good Muslim, 

Jew, Hindu, or member of any other faith. It is also noted that 

there are Christians (Muslims, Jews, Hindus, etc.) who do not have 

good character. The major conclusion is that military leadership 

focuses on the attributes of character, not on religious affiliation, 

when making a judgment about leadership, ability to command, 

or what “makes a good Marine.”9

 

The complementarity of Christian identity, U.S. citizenship, and 

military service poses several inherent problems.10 The first is the 

principle of inclusive pluralism—the belief that all, regardless 

of religion, are entitled to equal treatment. If American identity 

and that of its military forces are exclusively Christian, then the 

8 Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and Public Life has a well-respected 

research capability and is the source of much of what we know about religion in 

the United States and how it affects the public domain. See http://www.pewforum.

org/.

9 The debate over gays in the military was framed by some commentators as being 

a “religious” or moral/ethical issue. The conversation in military circles tended to 

focus on military effectiveness (author’s perspective only).

10 In an informal survey of 25 Marine Corps officers at Command and Staff College, it was unanimously reported that (1) promotion and advancement were not 

related in any way to religious preference; (2) they had not experienced proselitization; and that (3) it was not necessary to be a good Christian to be a good officer 

(January 2011). Please contact author for details.
participation of non-Christians in the military should be precluded. If the United States is a Christian country, then the Defense 

Department should have rules and responsibilities that directly 

mirror biblical principles, and leaders should have a test of religion before taking command. Foreign and defense policy should 

be held to the rigorous religious standards of Christianity. All 

“others,” i.e. other countries, cultures, and religions should likewise be assessed primarily with regard to their religious identity 

and how “close” they are to Christian principles.11

There are selected individuals and groups who not only believe 

that the United States is a Christian country, but that the U.S. military should self-consciously and vigorously promote Christian 

identity. They believe that the U.S. military cannot be a moral or 

ethical organization without complete correspondence of Christianity and U.S. military identities. This advocacy is reflected, but 

not officially supported, by a number of authors who believe that 

they speak for the DOD. Stephen Mansfield, the author of Faith 

of the American Soldier, exhorts soldiers to follow the example of 

the Crusaders in their religious devotion; Shariah: The Threat to 

America: An Exercise in Competitive Analysis, edited by Lieutenant 

General William (Jerry) Boykin, defines the enemy in religious 

terms.12 Publishing companies recognize the “salability” of religion and warfare and publish a large number of books wherein 

the authors portray heroes as both Christian and military.13

11 David Reiff, “The Crusaders: Moral Principles, Strategic Interests, and Military 

Force,” World Policy Journal 17 (2000): 39–47.

12 These arguments are reminiscent of the Cold War arguments discussed by 

Lori Lyn Bogle in The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind (College Station: 

Texas University Press, 2004). Stephen Mansfield, Faith of the American Soldier 

(New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2005); Lieutenant General William (Jerry) 

Boykin, ed., Shariah: The Threat to America: An Exercise in Competitive Analysis

(Washington, DC: Center for Security Policy Press, 2010).

13 A cursory glance at lists of recent publications, especially during the period of 

2001 to 2011, indicates an amazing increase in the number of books published on 

the subject of religion relating to warfare.

The Religious Factor | 445
446 | Aspects of Leadership

Perspective 2: The United States is a strictly secular state and 

the military should reflect secular arrangements; ethics must be 

taught separately from any religious tradition. 

The traditional separation of state and church has worked very 

well for the United States.14 The writers of the U.S. Constitution, 

acknowledging the religious wars of Europe, bowing to practical 

politics, and respecting the rights of individuals to practice their 

own religions, were extremely careful not to establish an official 

church that would link the power and resources of the government with the power and resources of a religion. Whether the 

framers meant for the United States to ignore religion entirely and 

rely on the scientific premises of the liberal state is unknown, but 

certainly the Constitution is not built around religion or religious 

institutions.15 The debate between the secular Constitution and 

the sacred Constitution will not be settled here, and suffice it to 

note that the military has had an uneven history in this regard but 

that the principles of a secular military have been the most workable for military forces.16

The world’s experiences in the twentieth century weighed heavily 

on the side of the benefits of a secular approach. In World War I 

and II, there was an unsavory connection between religion, national fascism, and militarism. Religion, albeit universally found 

14 The United States became a country subsequent to the vicious religious-political European wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a result, the 

framers of the U.S. Constitution, historically aware and uncommonly prescient, 

set out new guidelines for the relationship between church and state—commonly 

referenced as the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause in the First 

Amendment. The country continues to struggle with the various ramifications of 

this arrangement and continues to use the courts as a virtual battleground.

15 Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore in The Godless Constitution (New York: 

W.W. Norton, 1997) take the view that the U.S. Constitution is a strictly secular 

document.

16 One of the most insightful books on this subject is Jonathan H Ebel, Faith in 

the Fight: Religion and the American Soldier in the Great War (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 2010).
as part of culture and society, came to be seen around the world as 

dangerous when linked to politics (or war) in any way.17

After the Cold War, with its endless arguments over the role of 

ideology, the debate about the causes of warfare focused on “idealism” or “realism.” The Cold War warriors maintained that the 

role of ideas was dominant in predictive analysis, and the realists 

maintained that self-interest was more explanatory. Interestingly 

enough, the concept of “idealism” did not pertain to religious 

issues. Religion was simply left out of the discussion. The “realists” eventually took center stage and focused on the elements of 

material power that could be measured, such as the size of a military, capability assessment, economic resources, and weapons. 

Ideas, ideologies, and theology (when it was even mentioned) 

were seen as supporting, but not leading, international affairs. 

Religion as explanatory either in its own capacity or as a part of 

culture, was seen as an artifact of history.

Ironically, the scientific secular approach seemed insufficient to 

deal with the issues surrounding interrogation, torture, rendition, 

and the other matters that depend on individual and institutional 

values, morality, and ethics. From a strictly secular, self-interest 

power approach, the use of torture was a rational act. Those from 

a “secular humanist” perspective called for morality based on 

common humanity, humanitarian law, and even scientific behavioral analysis, but those arguments did not seem to win the day.18

Insofar as military services are concerned, religious issues are 

handled by commanders and settled as military issues rather than 

as intrinsically “religious.” Although religious diversity has been 

a reality since 1775, religious differences have been downplayed 

in favor of military discipline throughout the course of U.S. mili17 See Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment (New York: Macmillan, 1986).

18 Intelligence Science Board, Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art 

(Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, 2006), www.ndic.

edu/press/3866.htm.

The Religious Factor | 447
448 | Aspects of Leadership

tary history. The codification of religious accommodation of differing religions was only officially institutionalized in 2009 with a 

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) dated 5 February 2009, 

stating that DOD will

Promote an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the 

highest level of responsibility possible. In this environment, 

Service members shall be evaluated only on individual merit, 

fitness, and capability. Unlawful discrimination against individuals or groups based on race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin is contrary to good order and discipline and counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment and 

shall not be condoned.

In summary, the idea of the United States as a secular state is premised on the First Amendment’s restrictions on the federal government with regard to establishment of an official church and 

protection of religious freedoms. The U.S. Department of Defense 

generally subscribes to those principles both on constitutional 

grounds and with the idea that a good military cannot afford religious divisions.

Perspective 3: Religion is supported for individuals, but religious institutions are constrained by law; ethics should be 

taught as reflecting religious principles, but not in relationship 

to specific religious institutions.

The third perspective on the relationship of religion and the U.S. 

military may have the most explanatory power when seen from 

American political and religious history and law. This position 

rests on the assumption that people/the polity can vary widely in 

their religious viewpoints, identities, and beliefs under conditions 

of free speech, assembly, petition, and religion but that the Department of Defense is constrained by law and policy with regard 

to religious factors both within the services and in relationship to 

foreign and defense policy.
Religion is protected along with speech, petition, and assembly—ideas and communication—as fundamental to freedom and 

liberty: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 

of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 

the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people 

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 

redress of grievances.”19 Acknowledging the risk inherent in competing power structures, the writers maintained that the institutions of religion and government should be “separate,” i.e., no 

“establishment” of religion. This organization of church-state and 

faith-polity in the United States can be illustrated in figure 20: 

Most of the founders believed that religious belief was conducive 

to good citizenship and public morality, and was the basis of the 

successful working of a nation; however, they balked at any official church establishment.20 George Washington, in his role as 

general and then president, set a useful precedent in practicing a 

19 Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy and The Twin Tolerations,” Journal of 

Democracy 11 (2000): 37–57.

20 Daniel L. Dreisbach, Mark David Hall, and Jeffry H. Morrison, eds, The 

Founders on God and Government (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).

U.S. Secular and Sacred

Arrangements

Church State

Communities Polity

of Faith

Culture Free Exercise Establishment Clause

Control

Less Order - ORDER

Policy

Arena

Figure 20. U.S. Secular and Sacred Arrangements.

The Religious Factor | 449
450 | Aspects of Leadership

personal faith, supporting religious diversity and pluralism, and 

encouraging good morals among soldiers and citizens, yet not 

publically advocating for a specific church or faith tradition. 21

The people of the United States, the government, and the Department of Defense have, in general, maintained this position since 

1793. The influence of religion on the Pentagon is through the 

moral and ethical principles of the individuals in uniform; there 

is no need for religion to take a more formalized role if it means 

that the mission will be compromised through dissention in the 

ranks. Religious influence as found in military hymns, rituals, and 

symbols, is hidden in plain sight.

Department of Defense directives are clear about precluding 

religious preference in the workplace, providing for individual worship and religious practice when and if it is secondary to 

mission definition, and accommodating individuals, not religious 

institutions. An example is that the religious place of worship on 

a military base (regardless of the religion) is technically a “community center” and therefore is multifunctional.

 Another example is that chaplains are recruited from denominations or various religions, but they must serve all service personnel regardless of the service member’s denominational affiliation 

simply because they are uniformed personnel. The U.S. military 

chaplains ensure religious freedom for all service personnel and 

have a ministry of presence that is meant to ensure that commanders are always aware of the ethical and moral dilemmas of 

warfare. 22

21 Michael Novak and Jana Novak, Washington’s God: Religion, Liberty and the 

Father of Our Country (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2006).

22 The government may fund religious activity if done in order to accommodate 

the religious needs of people who, because of government action, no longer have 

access to religious resources. This, in effect, requires religious pluralism—the accommodation of all persons with regard to religious needs. The caveat is that of 

“military necessity,” i.e. the religious accommodation cannot impede other official 

requirements, provide an undue burden on the government, or promote a specific 

religion. See Joint Publication 10-5, Religious Affairs in Joint Operations, chaplain.

ng.mil/Docs/Documents/jp1_05.pdf. 
The consequences of this position of personal faith and accommodation of religious preferences, yet separation of church and 

state, in the Pentagon is clearly anathema to those who would like 

to see religion as the dominant force in both the U.S. military and 

in relationship to the deployment of forces in the international 

arena. They believe that by not having a more visible role, religion 

will lose its power, Christianity will be defeated by the enemy, 

and moral and social decay are certain. Those who believe that 

the military should be strictly secular are equally convinced that 

all religious services, accommodation, symbols, and ceremonies 

should never involve religion in any way, shape, or form. The 

reality is far more complex than either of these simplistic viewpoints.23

The delicate balance between too much and too little is always 

a homeostatic process—new problems, leaders, understandings, 

political pressures, and international events conspire to make it a 

“work in progress.” Nevertheless, both military doctrine and military practice provide clear guidelines for legal behavior within 

the services with regard to religious accommodation rather than 

religious differentiation.

Figure 21 illustrates that the Department of Defense is singularly 

insulated from some of the more contentious debates in American 

society. Both law and policy, as defined in the Constitution, by 

Congress, and by the president, constrain practices with regard 

to religion. 

Summary: Personal Ethics, Religious Factors, 

and Military Leadership

The U.S. military tends to mirror the rest of the U.S. polity with 

regard to religious belief. It differs in that military organiza23 These positions were clearly in evidence and were the basis for serious dissention in the recent reports from the U.S. Air Force Academy events of 2009–11. 

For more information, contact the author of this essay.

The Religious Factor | 451
452 | Aspects of Leadership

tion demands setting priorities during times of war. Unity of 

command, unit morale, ethical behavior, and attention to the Law 

of Armed Combat are critical to mission success, force protection, 

and saving lives. 

Some of the major findings in this study are 

• Individuals in the U.S. military are religious in that most 

service personnel have faith traditions and believe in a 

“higher power.”

• The profile of religious adherence in the U.S. military reflects 

to a substantial degree the profile of the U.S. population in 

general.

• The traditional belief in separation of church and state in the 

U.S. military, along with a need for unit cohesion to accomplish a military mission, has produced a system that discourages divisive beliefs and practices. 

• An interpretation of the U.S. military as led or unduly influenced by institutionalized Christianity is unfounded.

• An interpretation of the U.S. military as strictly “secular” is 

naïve and unfounded.

Individual beliefs

and values

Media Self-Appointed

Spokesmen

Politicos

organized

religion

public

opinion

RELIGION IN THE U.S. MILITARY

constitutional law

official Policy

Figure 21. Religion in the U.S. Military.
• The U.S. military, in recognition of and with respect for individual religious rights and with respect for the constitutional 

separation of church and state, has instituted policies and 

culturally normed practices that emphasize unity and de-emphasize religious differentiation.

• Ethics is taught as individual responsibility and reinforced 

by the institutions of the U.S. military; ethical principles and 

standards are derivative from traditional Western Christian 

principles as interpreted in light of warfare requirements.

The Way Forward

The United States—as reflected in both military and civilian institutions—has developed a unique system to address the positive 

influences that religion has to offer without taking on the “divisiveness” of religious institutions. Any accusation that the U.S. 

Department of Defense is “conspiracy driven” either by being 

overly evangelical or overly secular is not verifiable in any systematic research. Neither “liberal” nor “conservative” parties 

wish to destroy the fundamental requirement for military cohesiveness. The Department of Defense has a system it can live with; 

the system is far from perfect and under consistent scrutiny but 

has found the delicate balance between religion in warfare and 

military requirements. Given the above statement, it is relatively 

safe to assume that the future will look much like the past: traditional religious values will continue to underlie military ethics, 

and the changing war environment(s) will require continual and 

constant attention to ensure that military ethics conform to basic 

principles. It is also important to remember that no matter how 

this is put into practice, the “devil is in the detail” will be, and 

should be, contentious. This is consistent with the idea of democratic governance in the public domain. It is also important for 

every service member as it helps define the enduring moral and 

The Religious Factor | 453
454 | Aspects of Leadership

ethical base of his/her profession and provides guidance for military conduct in a changing world. 

The leadership in the Department of Defense has the obligation 

to ensure that ethics and guidance for practices that conform to 

ethical principles be part of the “situational awareness” at every 

level of command, in every operation, for every military specialty. 

Professional military educators, ethicists, and chaplains may be 

assigned a formal responsibility for keeping ethics in teaching 

and training environments, but this does not absolve each and 

every military member from an obligation to know and act according to ethical principles in the profession of arms. 
—455—

Let me begin with a few confessions: First, I do not profess to 

be an expert on spiritual leadership and find it an extraordinary 

concept to even try to define. It is a term for which I have searched 

high and low to find a common definition and have concluded 

that none exists. However, for the purpose of this chapter, I define 

the term as follows: Spiritual Leadership is the use of an amalgamation 

of natural, learned, and spiritual qualities in order to influence ethical 

behaviors of self and others in the interest of morally acceptable objectives and outcomes. I emphasize the term amalgamation to avoid the 

assumption that any one of the aforementioned qualities should 

be dominant for a person to be an effective spiritual leader. In 

other words, it is arguable that a warrior may be successful in the 

battle space by implementing only natural and learned qualities, 

without the potential advantage of spiritual influence. Moreover, 

worship in the U.S. Armed Forces demands religious neutrality 

and individual choice of chaplains. In this regard, the commander’s legal role and the chaplain’s religious role should be distinctive; however, it remains the commander’s overall responsibility 

to ensure the environment exists wherein individual spiritual 

needs can be pursued. 

My first combat experience took place during the Gulf War of 

1991, also known as Operation Desert Storm. Prior to this engageSpiritual Leadership in the 

Battle Space 

Who is in Charge? A Personal Essay

Arnold Fields
456 | Aspects of Leadership

ment, I had often pondered how I would ultimately respond to 

the real, unequivocal effects of combat if the opportunity ever 

emerged. Similarly, I was concerned about my troops and their 

worries about combat and how they would ultimately respond 

under fire. About two days prior to Desert Storm’s ground war, 

I visited the foxholes of as many troops as possible. Everything I 

had read or had been told suggested that as much as 30 percent 

of the battalion could be lost to the enemy as we penetrated the 

extensive minefield the Iraqi army had constructed. My Marines 

and sailors were obviously concerned about their welfare, but it 

was also clear to me that they were ready for the fight. I emphasized visiting the lead company because it would be the most at 

risk and subject to casualties while leading the fight through the 

minefield. 

There had been much informal commentary among the troops 

about the war’s potential effects and the injuries they could incur. 

The officers spoke freely of their concerns, often in small groups 

while sipping cups of coffee. With smiles and nervous laughter, 

they rhetorically discussed their potential injuries and considered 

them in a sort of hierarchy: “Would I prefer to lose an arm or a leg, 

and if a leg, which one? And if an arm, which one? What about 

an eye versus a leg?” My personal worries were not unlike those 

of my officers, although I did not express them in order to avoid 

demoralizing the battalion. 

I also escorted press reporters who visited our base camp and 

introduced them to our battalion surgeons whose unexpurgated 

show-and-tell briefings left nothing to the imagination regarding 

anticipated injuries, triage, and treatment. The reporters were obviously shocked by the briefings and the impending threat.

If spiritual leadership were ever to be a factor in the battle space, 

this was certainly the moment. 
Spiritual Leadership | 457

In order to begin a discussion on the idea of spiritual leadership, 

one must consider a common point of departure, which is this: 

military personnel are in denial if they do not believe that commanders are spiritual leaders in the battle space. The modern 

battle space demands a holistic approach to leadership and ethics, 

and spiritual leadership is as much the commander’s personal 

responsibility as is good order and discipline in the ranks. I had 

been naïve at the beginning of Desert Storm and would ultimately 

find that the battalion expected more than just my tactical leadership as we maneuvered in the face of the formidable Iraqi army. 

Modern conflict is occurring in an asymmetrical environment 

where military operations almost always involve combined U.S. 

and allied forces and supporting contributors. Iraq and Afghanistan are two of the most recent examples where multiple nations 

have brought their resources to bear upon multilateral, as well as 

unilateral, interests and strategic objectives. Military commanders 

and diplomats are expected to provide leadership in this widely 

diverse environment made up of people representing different 

ethnicities, cultures, socioeconomic classes, and religions.

Human understanding has long been an imperative for the warfighter and for success in conflict. It is more often manifested in 

the intelligence preparation of the battle space (IPB), but there 

should be a more intrinsic consideration of human understanding 

that transcends the enemy’s battlefield capabilities and peers into 

his soul. The ancient warrior Sun-Tzu wrote, “One who knows 

the enemy and knows himself will not be in danger in a hundred 

battles. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself 

will sometimes win, sometimes lose. One who does not know 

the enemy and does not know himself will be in danger in every 

battle.”1

 I believe this philosophy is as much a lesson in basic life 

1 Sun-Tzu, The Art of War: Planning Attacks, Chapter 3, http://www.sonshi.com/

sun3htm.html. 
458 | Aspects of Leadership

and human understanding as it is the battle space imperative 

Sun-Tzu recommended.

The Marine Corps Manual, 1980 edition, defines leadership as “the 

sum of those qualities of intellect, human understanding, and 

moral character that enables a person to inspire and to control 

a group of people successfully.”2

 This is the definition to which 

I was introduced when I enlisted in 1969, and I believe that this 

definition, together with its intent, remains as relevant today as it 

did more than 40 years ago. Each leadership challenge that I encountered on active duty and as a civilian has involved intellect, 

human understanding, moral character, or a combination of all 

three of these qualities. These are important qualities for success, 

but human understanding has emerged as the most useful to me. 

The asymmetrical imperatives of the modern-day battle space 

have necessitated greater human understanding not just as a 

fundamental human aspiration, but as a matter of survival and 

mission accomplishment. In retrospect, the cultural familiarization and training my Marines and I received in 1970 was helpful 

before we deployed to the Mediterranean, but it was largely onedimensional and passive. It consisted of lectures, pictures, short 

stories, and movies. The entire training element was brief and was 

completed in less than one day. Today, there is almost total immersion where certain knowledge and cultural skills are mandatory and a prerequisite to deployment.

These factors are an integral component of the still-emerging 

strategic communications (SC) concept, which acknowledges 

that winning in conflict requires more than tactical or operational 

success. Strategic communications has been described as the orchestration and/or synchronization of actions, images, and words 

to achieve a desired effect and is considered an extremely impor2 Marine Corps Manual, W/Ch 1–3 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department 

of the Navy, 1980), Glossary A-2, http://www.usmc.mil/news/publications/Documents/MARINE%20CORPS%20MANUAL%20W%20CH%201-3.pdf. 
tant joint concept. There are nine SC principles, four of which I 

find relevant to spiritual leadership in the battle space: “leadership driven”; “credible” (involving perceptions of truthfulness 

and respect); “understanding” (defined as a deep understanding 

of others); and “pervasive” (where every action sends a message).3

The revolution in technology and communications over the past 

few years has made understanding the human, thus also the spiritual, dimension of leadership even more important. Leaders at all 

levels are challenged by the need to get the facts, provide updates, 

fix the problem, and convince everyone that rules were obeyed, 

ethical standards were upheld, and all related activities met the 

expected standards of good order and discipline. As a battalion 

commander during Operation Desert Storm, I did not feel that my 

division commander, fellow battalion commanders, or I had to be 

seriously concerned about asymmetry as a factor in accomplishing the mission. In general, we employed conventional tactics, 

techniques, procedures, and equipment, and were successful. We 

knew who the enemy was, where the enemy was located, and 

could recognize the uniform. The forward edge of the battle area 

(FEBA) was well defined and the distinctive rear remained mostly 

secure throughout the war. 

We have recently entered a stage on the continuum of conflict and 

national security where military roles and other governance dimensions are much more diffused and therefore less well defined. 

For example, in a tragic incident, one of my civilian staff members, 

a Department of State employee, was assassinated while performing duties as senior advisor to the Iraqi government. I was the 

employee’s direct supervisor, considered him my “troop,” and 

elected to escort his remains home to his family in the United 

States. Ironically, during over 34 years of active military service, 

I never had cause to take on such a task. The Army’s protocol for 

3 U.S. Department of Defense, Principles of Strategic Communications, 2008, www.

au.af.mil/info-ops/documents/principles_of_sc.pdf.

Spiritual Leadership | 459
460 | Aspects of Leadership

handling the remains was basically the same as those for several 

Marines who had been recently killed in action. They were all 

transported in the same vehicle from a military hospital to a 

makeshift morgue facility at the Baghdad International Airport 

where they were processed for further movement. Each set of 

remains was eventually placed in a flag-draped metal casket and 

preserved for transportation. There was no distinction between 

the deceased warriors and the civilian, all of whose remains were 

flown on the same U.S. Air Force C5 aircraft to Dover Air Force 

Base in New Jersey. A Marine honor detachment met the aircraft 

when it landed at Dover and the remains were ceremoniously 

removed using protocol, which, again, in no way distinguished 

the civilian remains from the deceased Marines. This episode 

was a very poignant example to me of warfare’s changing face 

and gave cause to recall a question I had posed to Department 

of Defense senior leaders while I was on active duty: Who is the 

warrior? Is it still the traditional person dressed in a well-defined 

uniform, trained in a common set of skills, indoctrinated in a 

certain battlefield code of ethics, and sent off to war? Or has the 

evolution of war and conflict created a battle space condition in 

which the duties and expectations of civilians directly contributing to the mission cannot be easily distinguished from those of the 

traditional warrior? I believe it is the latter, which suggests to me 

that military leaders should be more adaptable, trained accordingly, and prepared to take on uncommon leadership dimensions, 

including spiritual leadership.

The Department of Defense defines battle space as “the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the 

mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included 

enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within 
the operational areas and areas of interest.”4

 Battle space is conceptual and is not assigned by a higher commander; commanders determine their own battle space based on their mission, the 

enemy and their concept of operations, and force protection. They 

use experience and understanding to adapt their battle space 

as the situation or mission changes. According to MCDP 1-0, 

Marine Corps Operations, the battle space is normally composed 

of an area of operations (AO), an area of influence, and an area 

of interest.5

 Keeping this definition in mind, there is apparently 

no shape, form, or permanence to the battle space. Ownership is 

ambiguous and may therefore overlap with the interests of adjacent commanders. One thing is clear: commanders must have 

influence in their battle space if the mission is to be accomplished 

and must be able to effectively coordinate and de-conflict issues 

with adjacent commanders. Actual ownership is a matter of perspective because objectives are being pursued in a space where 

tactical, operational, and strategic initiatives are simultaneously 

underway. As this continuum plays out, anyone from the president, who is always in command, to a fire team leader, could be 

perceived as being “in charge.” When viewed from this perspective, the battle space offers a fluid, unpredictable, amorphous, 

and dangerous environment where not even terrain is a constant. 

I asked my church pastor, Dr. Michael Bledsoe, to share a perspective on spiritual leadership in the battle space; he offered the 

following: 

The person in charge in the battle space is that person who 

masters not only the variables of terrain, numbers, etc., but the 

person in charge is that one who has charge over not only his 

4 DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

5 U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Navy, 2001), 4-3, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/

mcdp10.pdf.

Spiritual Leadership | 461
462 | Aspects of Leadership

body and his tools, but is possessed by those ineffable qualities 

of the spirit that include a resolute courage, an abiding devotion 

to comrades, a fearlessness in the face of confrontation, and an 

enduring belief that s/he is part of something greater so that 

even if s/he were to die, that greater purpose and higher cause 

will continue.6

There are examples of commanders whose strength in leadership 

had prepared the unit so well that when the leader was lost early 

in battle, the mission continued and intended objectives were 

accomplished. According to educational psychologist Dr. Bruce 

Tuckman, some organizations are able to reach this high level of 

maturity, which he refers to as the “performing phase” of group 

development. In his model published in 1965, Dr. Tuckman explains that teams progress through four distinct developmental 

stages: 

(1) Forming, which requires a high degree of dependence on the 

leader for guidance and direction; 

(2) Storming, where team members vie for position as they 

attempt to establish themselves in relation to each other and the 

leader and are inclined to challenge their fellow team members 

as well as the team leader; 

(3) Norming, characterized by agreement and consensus that 

largely form among the team members whose roles and responsibilities appear to be clear, and the members respond well to 

facilitation by the leader; and 

(4) Performing, where the team is more strategically aware, 

knows clearly what it is doing and why, and requires no participation from the leader.7

6 Michael Bledsoe, pastor, Riverside Baptist Church, and professor, Howard University School of Divinity, e-mail message to author, 15 February 2011.

7 Mind Tools, Essential Skills for an Excellent Career, “Forming, Storming, Norming and Performing: Helping New Teams Perform Effectively, Quickly,” Mindtools.com, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newLDR_86.htm.
Dr. Tuckman may not have had spiritual leadership in mind 

when he wrote about these phenomena, but there is a relationship 

between Dr. Tuckman’s 1965 view and Dr. Bledsoe’s 2011 perspective regarding the leader’s enduring impact and effect. Some 

organizations eventually achieve an advanced stage of organizational development in which the leader’s physical presence may 

not be necessary for the mission to be accomplished.

Dr. Louis W. Fry, professor of management at Tarleton State University in central Texas, offers the following:

Spiritual leadership is a causal leadership theory for organizational transformation designed to create an intrinsically motivated, learning organization. The purpose of spiritual leadership is 

to create vision and value congruence across the strategic, empowered team, and individual levels, and ultimately, to foster 

higher levels of organizational commitment and productivity. 

Spiritual leadership comprises the values, attitudes, and behaviors that one must adopt in intrinsically motivating self and 

others so that both have a sense of spiritual survival through 

calling and membership—i.e., they experience meaning in their 

lives, have a sense of making a difference, and feel understood 

and appreciated.8

He further argues that humility and integrity are essential components the spiritual leader must possess and suggests that humility 

allows him or her to first consider the importance of others rather 

than him or her self. Thinking too highly of ourselves prevents us 

from fully caring about others and setting the example we would 

wish them to emulate. People repudiate those who are dishonest and lack integrity. Every military professional is expected to 

have integrity; it is one of the traditional 14 leadership traits that 

8 Louis W. Fry, “Spiritual Leadership and Army Transformation: Theory, Measurement, and Establishing a Baseline,” The Leadership Quarterly 16 (2005): 835–62, 

http://www.tarleton.edu/Faculty/fry/SLTSpIssueArmy.pdf. 

Spiritual Leadership | 463
464 | Aspects of Leadership

have been an integral part of Marine Corps leadership doctrine. 

Warriors may not consider themselves to be humble, but they 

are expected to be unselfish and to lead by example. This often 

means ensuring that the welfare of the troops is in place before the 

leaders consider their own needs and comfort. Marines know that 

this is particularly true in the field where the officers are expected 

to always be the last to eat. Marines also expect their leaders to set 

the example at all times, and there is no tolerance for substandard 

physical performance. As a leader, during physical training and 

testing, I endeavored to be the first on the pull-up bar to perform 

20 pull-ups, the first to complete the desired 80 sit-ups in two 

minutes, and the first to complete the three-mile run. But as might 

be expected, I was not consistently able to be the most proficient 

in performing these events; someone was always younger, faster, 

and more agile. However, the important point is that the troops 

expect the leader to be present and to participate even when being 

clearly outperformed by junior troops. In my view, the leader’s 

mere presence and willingness to be tested with the troops—and 

outperformed by them—is a form of humility.

As we examine these ideas about what constitutes an effective 

leader, it becomes apparent that the characteristics and desired 

outcome of spiritual leadership are not unlike those of a good 

leader in general. Each leader in the battle space is in search of

behaviors that do the right thing, work together for the benefit 

of the whole, are pleasing to the nation, and ensure mission accomplishment. As we take note of these facts, it is fair to say that 

spiritual leadership requires the understanding and application 

of distinctive attributes that must be practiced if spiritual leaders 

are to be successful. They should be accountable not only to their 

commanders and troops but also to a higher spiritual power.9

 This 

requires a faith not only in the warrior’s training, equipment, and 

9 Henry and Richard Blackaby, Spiritual Leadership: Moving People on to God’s 

Agenda (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman and Holman Publications, 2001), 16–20.
ethos, all of which are profound in modern warfare, but also in 

the “force” of spiritual or other origin, which I believe drives humanity toward good and away from evil. It is for this very pursuit 

that so many wars have been and likely will be fought. First Lieutenant David Stuckenberg, a pilot in the United States Air Force, 

offers the following:

Faith gives both leaders and subordinates essential character 

qualities not imparted through organized instruction, which are 

vital elements to a disciplined and restrained military force. To 

avoid a tangential debate about definitions of what faith means 

and the differences between faith and religion, I will pause 

to provide the best definition I have heard, from Hebrews 11: 

“Faith is the substance of things hoped for and the evidence of 

things not seen.” Both my personal view and what I have witnessed when men and women claim to have faith is that they 

ultimately believe there is a higher power in the universe which 

has established governance for man and that we will ultimately 

answer to him for our individual actions. In other words, people 

of faith believe in accountability and consequences whether 

good or bad will result from their actions.10

The spiritual leader’s task is to move people toward goodness and 

to believe that every act of leadership is intended for this purpose. 

Even Machiavelli may have hinted at this by accepting that the 

state as he knew it could not stand outside the confines of religion 

because it was bound to use God for political ends.11 The military 

operational mission imposed by legitimate government authorities should be perceived as a means to accomplish an objective 

that will bring about a positive impact on the nation or on humanity in general. Every war in which the United States has engaged 

10 First Lieutenant David Stuckenberg, active duty U.S. Air Force pilot, e-mail 

message to author, 16 December 2010. 

11 Lauro Martines, Fire in the City: Savonarola and the Struggle for the Soul of 

Renaissance Florence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 6. 

Spiritual Leadership | 465
466 | Aspects of Leadership

has been in the interest of what was believed to be a just cause. 

Freedom, democracy, and a sense of well-being have usually been 

the desired end state. The overall effect is that spiritual leaders 

inspire and influence not only the religious but the secular as well, 

whether or not they are under the leader’s direct control or authority. I believe that leaders in the United States Armed Forces 

are spiritual leaders because they are asked to engage only in just

wars and conflicts, and they have been trained to employ leadership doctrine and traits that are founded upon truths and universally expected and accepted behaviors. Personally, I would find 

it difficult to be considered a spiritual leader without having at 

least a measure of faith. And I would be challenged to confidently 

follow a leader for whom faith is not a relevant factor in the battle 

space.

I developed my personal faith early in life and it has strengthened over the years as a result of studying the Christian Bible, 

attending religious services, and resolving various leadership 

and personal challenges I have encountered. My spiritual journey 

has been very enlightening and satisfying; however, despite this 

positive life experience, I still have difficulty offering a spiritual 

rationale for killing in the name of freedom—and am inclined to 

believe most warriors have similar concerns even though they 

may dutifully follow through in carrying out their oath of service. 

Specifically, I find the Ten Commandments to be very clear and 

unequivocal. But for me, the spiritual leader in the battle space, 

the sixth commandment has been the most troubling. It has not 

been a problem in my private life because I have never had a 

personal desire to take the life of a human being. However, as 

a Marine leader sworn to protect and defend the Constitution, I 

was prepared to carry out my oath to the fullest extent necessary 

and expected. Nonetheless, fighting and killing in the name of 

freedom remain a moral dichotomy for me and, I believe, for our 
nation as well. How can genuine spiritual leadership take place 

in the battle space where every soldier is trained to be a quick 

and efficient killer? This poses a serious dilemma and, in my 

view, except through personal faith, understanding, and spiritual 

leadership, there is apparently no ready remedy at any level in 

our country by which to fully resolve this question so central to 

understanding the morality of war. Although the Bible may cite 

instances where God apparently sanctioned killing, such as in the 

account of David and Goliath,12 stories like these do not always 

mitigate or relieve the emotional scars and posttraumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) that trouble soldiers who have personally killed 

or supported a teammate in killing an enemy.13 Despite these 

ongoing concerns, citizens continue to demand peace and a secure 

environment in which to live, work, raise families, and contribute 

to the body politic and, as such, have supported the U.S. Armed 

Forces and the conflicts in which they have been tasked to engage. 

Death and destruction are always expected outcomes. Government planners and policy makers at the strategic and operational 

levels may debate war’s morality, efficacy, and lethality, but it is 

more often at the tactical level and the young warrior’s trigger 

finger that the morality question is ultimately resolved. It is he 

who is left with the need for decision and immediate action as 

the enemy advances and the warrior’s life is in question. I doubt 

that there is any ultimate remedy other than faith by which the 

warrior may find comfort when faced with life or death situations 

in the battle space. It takes time to develop faith resilient enough 

to withstand the many challenges all warriors undoubtedly face 

in the battle space.

12 1 Samuel 17: 1-58.

13 Mary E. Card-Mina, “Leadership and Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome,” Military Review (January-February 2011). 

Spiritual Leadership | 467
468 | Aspects of Leadership

Conclusion

I played a de facto role as the battalion’s spiritual leader, a thought 

that did not enter my mind until well after the Desert Storm war. 

Yes, I had tried my best to physically, mentally, and spiritually 

prepare the Marines and sailors for the horrors of war, although 

the sum total of my actions at the time was not considered spiritual leadership. As the realization of an imminent ground attack 

into Kuwait became evident, so did the aphorism, “There is no 

atheist in foxholes.” It suggests that in times of extreme stress 

or fear in warfare, all people will believe in or hope for a higher 

power. I observed that the attendance rate at religious services 

began to increase as the air war continued and the Iraqi government refused to compromise. I was comforted by an almost 

daily stream of visits to my tent during which handwritten notes 

of encouragement and Bible verses were conspicuously placed, 

usually while I was away. 

The battalion chaplain certainly did his share, always engaging 

the troops and carrying out a robust religious activities program in 

the field. He was in fact the battalion’s religious leader. However, 

I believe the Marines and sailors expected me—the battalion commander—to provide the spiritual leadership. I have labored over 

these reflections, wondering how I might have improved the 

battalion’s spiritual readiness and my overall effectiveness had 

I better understood spiritual leadership and accepted it up front 

as the commander’s role and responsibility. Moreover, I could 

have done more to ensure that there was a spiritual dimension to 

the whole of my Marine Corps leadership experiences. In other 

words, I was the de facto spiritual leader and should have more 

formally accepted this role. I, the battalion commander, should 

have been the “stream of traffic” delivering spiritual messages 

of support and encouragement to the troops’ tents and foxholes 

rather than the troops having come to me. They had apparently 
recognized me as their spiritual leader; however, the leadership 

training I received during my career had not conditioned me to 

anticipate this specific aspect of battle space leadership, which I 

now believe is the commander’s personal responsibility. 

The modern battle space is a complicated environment in which 

to pursue the nation’s objectives and to ensure that “good” always 

prevails. Strong leadership is important and successful leaders are 

best characterized by their ability to employ their intellect, human 

understanding, and moral character in a way that accomplishes 

the mission by positively influencing the diverse human dimensions of the battle space. I believe that spiritual leadership is a 

battle space imperative that helps to unify an otherwise diverse 

and asymmetrical environment. It is the commander’s calling 

to accept this uncommon responsibility, as it is a fundamental 

element of the holistic leadership I now believe each warrior 

expects.

Spiritual Leadership | 469

—471—

Lieutenant Colonel Carroll J. Connelley is currently teaching 

law and ethics at the U.S. Naval Academy, where he is serving as 

the deputy director of the Leadership, Education, and Development Division. He received his commission from the U.S. Naval 

Academy in 1995 and served in various leadership positions and 

deployments. Since completing his juris doctorate, he has deployed to Iraq as the principle legal advisor to RCT-2, become 

the command judge advocate for The Basic School, deployed in 

support of CJTF-HOA as the operational law SJA, and served as 

the Law of War Program director for the Lejeune Leadership Institute at Marine Corps University.

Dr. Paula Holmes-Eber is professor of operational culture at 

Marine Corps University. She holds a BA in psychology from 

Dartmouth College and an MA and doctorate in anthropology 

from Northwestern University. She is the author of three books: 

Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications

(2008 with Barak Salmoni); Applications in Operational Culture: 

Lessons from the Field (2010 with Patrice Scanlon and Andrea 

Hamlen); and Daughters of Tunis: Women, Family, and Networks in a 

Muslim City (2002).

Contributors
472 | Aspects of Leadership

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Christmas is a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School and a distinguished graduate of the 

Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He is currently the 

director of warfighting at the Marine Corps’ Command and Staff 

College, after having served in a wide variety of positions while 

deployed in support of both Operations Enduring Freedom and 

Iraqi Freedom, including command of 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines 

while deployed in support of OEF in Marjeh, Afghanistan. 

Geoffroy Murat is a doctoral candidate at the Raymond Aron 

Center of the EHESS (L’École des hautes études en sciences sociales or School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) in Paris. 

He is doing a comparative thesis on the teaching of military ethics 

in American and French military academies, thanks to a stipend 

from the French ministry of defense. Mr. Murat is also the founder 

of Nicomak, a company that provides ethical training for companies and schools. His primary focus of research involves the analysis of ethics pedagogy and the effect various approaches have on 

the individual and collective behavior of service members. 

Major Clinton Culp (Ret.) enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps in 

1985 and upon receiving his commission in 1997, was assigned 

to 2d LAR as a platoon commander. He has experienced two deployments to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): first, 

as an Afghan National Army advisor while officer in charge of 

the Mountain Leader Course; second, as the liaison officer to the 

UN Joint Election Management Body with 6th Marines. He deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom as the weapons 

company commander for 3/6. After serving as University of 

Idaho’s Marine officer instructor (MOI), he retired in 2009. He is 

currently working toward a doctorate in the pedagogy of ethics 

and character development.
Contributors | 473

Captain Emmanuel Goffi, French Air Force, is a specialist in military ethics. He is a lecturer in international relations at the French 

Air Force Academy and teaches international relations at the DSI 

(Diplomatic Studies Institute) in Marseille. He holds a master’s 

degree in international affairs and a research master’s in comparative military history and geostrategy. He is currently working on a 

doctorate in political science at the Institute of Political Studies in 

Paris (Sciences Po)—CERI. He is the author of Les armées françaises 

face à la moral: Une réflexion au cœur des conflits modernes (Editions 

l’Harmattan, 2011). 

Dr. Peter Bradley teaches psychology and ethics at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is an active researcher in the areas 

of ethics and mental health in the military. A former lieutenant 

colonel, he retired from the Canadian Forces in 2004 with 33 years 

of service in the infantry and personnel branches.

Dr. Paolo Tripodi is professor of ethics and ethics branch head 

at the Lejeune Leadership Institute, Marine Corps University. 

He served as professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps 

War College and was the MCU Donald Bren Chair of Ethics and 

Leadership. He has held academic positions at the U.S. Naval 

Academy (Annapolis, MD); the Catholic University of Chile (Santiago, Chile); and the Nottingham Trent University (Nottingham, 

UK). Dr. Tripodi trained as an infantry officer and received his 

commission with the Italian Carabinieri upon graduation from 

the School of Infantry and Cavalry in Cesano, and the Carabinieri 

Officer’s School in Rome, Italy.

Dr. Clyde Croswell is president of Community-L, Inc., a human 

resource and organization development firm, and adjunct faculty 

with George Washington University and Shenandoah University. 

His research interests and consulting practice focus on mindfulness, leadership complexity, self-organizing systems, affective 
474 | Aspects of Leadership

learning, and applying twenty-first-century affective neuroscience, phenomenology, and science of mind to organizational 

transformations. Lieutenant Colonel Croswell (Ret.) is a veteran 

with 29 years of service in the U.S. Marine Corps, and he has 

consulted to the Virginia Bankers, The Marine Corps University, 

American Woodmark Corporation, OakCrest Companies, The 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Educational Field Services. 

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Yaroslaski, U.S. Marine Corps, is currently the future plans officer at Marine Forces Cyberspace 

Command. He has led Marines in combat operations in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan. LtCol Yaroslaski has participated in multilateral training exercises and planning events with military and 

civilian leaders from more than 15 foreign countries. His latest 

deployment was as the leader of a team of advisers assigned to 

the Afghan National Army. His areas of interest are primarily the 

role of ethical leadership and cultural understanding in the development of military organizations. He holds masters degrees in 

military studies, operational studies, and strategic studies.

Major Winston S. Williams is a professor in the international 

and operational law department at The Judge Advocate General’s 

Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS). Maj Williams has served in 

the U.S. Army since 1998. His most recent assignments include 

senior legal observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training 

Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana; and trial counsel/operational 

law attorney for 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne 

Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While serving with 3rd 

BCT, he spent 15 months in Iraq advising commanders on rules of 

engagement, detention operations, and rule of law. Other assignments include chief of administrative law, 82nd Airborne Division; executive officer, D Company, 35th Engineer Battalion, Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri; and assault and obstacle platoon leader, 

B Company, 44th Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, Re-
public of Korea. Maj Williams holds a BS in civil engineering 

from Florida A&M University, a JD from University of Tennessee 

College of Law, and an LL.M. in military law (international and 

operational law specialty) from TJAGLCS.

Laurie R. Blank, Esq., is the director of the International Humanitarian Law Clinic at Emory University School of Law. Professor 

Blank is the codirector of a multiyear project on military training 

programs in the law of war and coauthor of Law of War Training: 

Resources for Military and Civilian Leaders (2011). She is also the 

coauthor of an upcoming casebook on the law of war, International Law and Armed Conflict: Fundamental Principles and Contemporary Challenges in the Law of War (2013) and the project director 

of the Rules of War and Tools of War project. Professor Blank was a 

program officer in the rule of law program at the United States Institute of Peace and is the author of numerous articles and opinion 

pieces on topics in international humanitarian law.

Jamie Williamson, Esq., serves as the legal advisor for the Washington delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC). In this capacity, he is responsible for legal support to the 

ICRC activities in the United States and Canada, with particular 

focus on Guantanamo and military operations in Afghanistan and 

Iraq. He was the ICRC regional legal advisor based in Pretoria, 

South Africa and served with the UN ad hoc international criminal tribunals in Tanzania and the Netherlands, as well as at the 

special court for Sierra Leone, where he worked on the first international judgments on the crimes of genocide and war crimes 

in noninternational armed conflicts. From 2002, Mr. Williamson 

headed the Chambers legal support section of the ICTR Appeals 

Chamber based in The Hague. He has published numerous 

papers, including noteworthy contributions on repression of war 

crimes, international justice, and the challenges to international 

humanitarian law in modern-day conflicts. 

Contributors | 475
476 | Aspects of Leadership

Lieutenant Colonel Chris Jenks is an active duty judge advocate 

in the United States Army. He received an LLM with distinction 

from Georgetown University, an LLM in military law from the 

Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS), 

and a JD from the University of Arizona College of Law. LtCol 

Jenks began his Army service in 1992 as an infantry officer following graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. 

He served in the Republic of Korea as the chief of international 

and operational law for U.S. Army units operating near the demilitarized zone and North Korea. He then deployed to Mosul, 

Iraq, where he provided law of armed conflict advice for the employment of artillery, close air support, and direct fire weapons 

during enemy engagements. LtCol Jenks has published articles 

on international criminal law, human rights law, and government contractors as well as spoken on those same topics at universities in the United States and Australia and with the armies 

of several different European, African, and Middle Eastern 

countries. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth L. Hobbs is a U.S. Air Force judge 

advocate and serves as the legal advisor for NATO School, 

Oberammergau, Germany. LtCol Hobbs advises an organization staffed by personnel from 25 nations that provides military 

instruction each year to more than 10,000 students from over 60 

countries. He also provides academic support as a course director 

and lecturer on legal and operational issues at NATO School, as 

part of Mobile Education and Training Teams, and as a guest lecturer at other educational institutions in Europe and Asia. LtCol 

Hobbs holds a BA from Hendrix College, a JD from St. Mary’s 

University School of Law (San Antonio, TX), and an LLM in military law from TJAGLCS. LtCol Hobbs began his military service 

in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1988 as a combat engineer.
CDR David Gibson, Chaplain Corps, USN, has 27 years of military service, having had numerous assignments with the USN, 

USMC, and USCG. He holds a doctorate from Regent University 

(Virginia Beach, VA) in organizational strategy and leadership, 

and is ordained by the Church of God (Cleveland, TN). CDR 

Gibson served as the technical representative for the team that designed, developed, and delivered the USN Chaplain Corps/Navy 

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) training in Combat 

and Operational Stress Control (COSC), a three-year program that 

used leading experts in the field to develop the Department of 

the Navy’s response to PTSD, TBI, and combat/operational stress 

and trained over 3500 attendees. He was a member of the USMC 

TRI-MEF COSC Working Group, and has presented at DOD and 

VA Conferences on COSC. He is also an instructor for the “Combat 

and Operational Stress Control First Aid Course.”

Lieutenant Commander Judy Malana is a chaplain who has 

served in ashore, afloat, and forward deployed units with the 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. She is an alumna of the 

University of California, Los Angeles (BA, design); Bethel Theological Seminary (masters of divinity); the National Graduate 

School (MS, quality systems management); and Marine Corps 

University (masters of military studies). She completed advanced 

graduate studies at Salve Regina University and is a doctoral candidate in humanities. LtCdr Malana is currently a student at the 

Naval War College, working toward an MA in national security 

and strategic studies.

Colonel Chaplain Franklin Eric Wester, USA, (Ret.) is the assistant to the presiding bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 

in America for federal chaplaincy ministries overseeing all military, veterans affairs, and federal prison chaplains. He served as 

senior military fellow at the Institute for National Security Ethics 

and Leadership, National Defense University (Fort McNair, 

Contributors | 477
478 | Aspects of Leadership

Washington, DC). He holds masters degrees from the U.S. Army 

War College, New Brunswick Theological Seminary, and Trinity 

Lutheran Seminary. His published articles include “Preemption 

and Just War” (2004) and “Armed Force in Peace Operations” in 

Parameters. He served as executive assistant to the joint working 

group co-locating Army, Navy, and Air Force chaplain schools 

into a single campus at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; as command 

chaplain, U.S. Army Reserve Command; and on staff for the Army 

Chief of Chaplains.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Wilson, USA, has devoted much of 

his 25 years in service to ethics training and education. He holds 

a BA in philosophy from Western Illinois University, an MA in 

philosophy from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 

and a doctorate in educational leadership, management, and 

policy from Seton Hall University (New Jersey). LtCol Wilson has 

taught ethics at West Point for 10 years and serves as an adjunct 

instructor in philosophy at Mount Saint Mary College and Saint 

Thomas Aquinas College. His scholarship focuses on character 

education and applied ethics.

Dr. Pauletta Otis is professor of security studies at the Command 

and Staff College, Marine Corps University. She served as professor of international strategic studies at the Department of Defense’s Joint Military Intelligence College and was a senior research fellow for religion in international affairs at Pew Forum 

(Washington, DC). Formerly a tenured full professor of political 

science and international studies at Colorado State UniversityPueblo (1989–2004), her doctorate was awarded from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver 

(1989). Selected publications include Handbook of Religion and Security (Routledge Press, Fall, 2012); “Ethics in the Times of War”

in Ethics: Beyond War’s End (Georgetown University Press, 2012); 

“Anthropology and Arms Control” in Arms Control, edited by 
Paul Viotti (ABC Clio Press, 2012); “The U.S. Military Chaplaincy: 

Ministry of Presence and Practice” in the Journal of Religion and Security (December 2009); “Religion in Information Operations” in 

Ideas as Weapons (2009); “The U.S. Military Chaplaincy: Ministry 

of Presence and Practice” in Religion and Security (2009); “Armed 

with the Power of Ideas” in Armed Groups: National Security, Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency (Naval War College, 2008).

Arnold Fields is a retired Marine Corps major general who served 

more than 34 years on active duty. He is a combat veteran and 

commanded a Marine infantry battalion during Operation Desert 

Storm. Gen Fields also served as commanding general, Marine 

Corps Bases Hawaii; deputy commanding general, Marine Forces 

Europe; and director of the Marine Corps Staff. He retired from 

the Marine Corps in 2004 and served with the Department of 

State in Iraq; the Department of Defense as deputy director of 

the Africa Center for Strategic Studies; and accepted a presidential appointment as special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction. He is a member of the Board of Visitors of Marine 

Corps University and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public 

Administration.

Contributors | 479

The study of leadership is broad, complex, and multidisciplinary in 

nature. Aspects of Leadership brings together scholars 

from different disciplines and practitioners from a broad variety of 

backgrounds to address three key areas: Ethics, Law, and 

Spirituality. 

The essays in this book are intended to inform leaders, and the 

general public, about the challenges of ethical decision making, the 

application of the law of war, and the important role of spirituality. 

Aspects of Leadership will educate readers and generate important 

questions that leaders should ask themselves, encouraging them to 

reflect upon their pivotal roles in these three areas.

ISBN 978-0-16-091368-6

9 780160 913686

90000

Front cover: Official Marine Corps 

photo by Cpl Charles Mabry

MARINE CORPS

U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S

Lieutenant Colonel Carroll J. Connelley is an infantry 

officer turned judge advocate who has served in Iraq and Africa as 

an operational lawyer. He is currently stationed at the U.S. Naval 

Academy as the deputy director of the Leadership Education and 

Development Division and as professor of leadership, ethics, and law. 

Dr. Paolo Tripodi is professor of ethics and leadership and serves 

as the Ethics Branch head at the Lejeune Leadership Institute, Marine 

Corps University. Dr. Tripodi trained as an infantry officer and served 

with the Italian Carabinieri.