UNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES:

IMPLEMENTING THE

1986 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

August 6, 1996
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. The author would like to thank Dr. William T.

Johnsen, Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, Colonel Andrew J. McIntyre,

Jr., Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith, and Captain Kenneth Peters,

USN, for their valuable contributions to this monograph. This

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

*******

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs

are available on the Strategic Studies Institute Homepage for

electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/.
iii

FOREWORD

The prestige the U.S. military establishment enjoys today

stands in sharp contrast with its reputation of a decade ago.

Starting with America's military involvement in Viet Nam and

culminating with the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut

bombing, and the Grenada intervention, the U.S. armed forces

endured a prolonged period of criticism. The experiences of that

period, inter alia, convinced the U.S. Congress that the

Department of Defense required a major overhaul.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act was the most significant legislation for the

U.S. Armed Forces since the National Security Act of 1947. The

increased unification the Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to

bring to the Department of Defense was considered too extreme by

some, but insufficient by others. In this monograph, Professor

Douglas Lovelace assesses many of the act's major provisions. He

describes the congressional motivation for passing the act,

assesses the extent to which the act has been implemented,

discusses its impact on the Department of Defense, and offers

recommendations for furthering the purposes underlying the act.

The author's critical analysis leads him to conclude that

the Department of Defense and the nation have benefitted from the

substantial implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As we

approach its 10-year anniversary, however, Professor Lovelace

finds significant room both for the Department of Defense to

complete implementation and for the Congress to enact

modifications to more coherently focus the act on its central

purposes. His thought-provoking analyses, conclusions, and

recommendations should fuel discussions of the extent to which

the act has, or can, achieve its intended results.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

report as a contribution to the assessment of the first decade of

the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR., joined the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) in September 1994 on his retirement from active duty with

the U.S. Army. His military career included a combat tour in

Vietnam and a number of command and staff assignments. While

serving in the Plans, Concepts and Assessments Division and the

War Plans Division of the Joint Staff, he collaborated in the

development of documents such as the National Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Military Net

Assessment, National Security Directive 74 on multilateral

peacekeeping, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming

Multilateral Peace Operations, and others. He was also Director

of Military Requirements and Capabilities Management at the U.S.

Army War College. He holds a B.S. in aerospace management and an

M.A. in business from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University. He is

also a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College and the National War College. His most recent SSI study

is Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights.
v

PRECIS

Since the end of World War II, Congress has taken

significant measures to unify the Armed Forces of the United

States. The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of

the unification trend. Congress continued the evolutionary

process by passing the 1949 and 1958 amendments. In 1986,

Congress passed seminal legislation that significantly

reorganized the Department of Defense (DOD), moving it further

toward a unified structure. In the Goldwater-Nichols Department

of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), Congress sought to

strengthen civilian control of DOD, improve military advice to

civilian leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities

of the combatant commanders, improve strategy formulation and

contingency planning, and provide for more efficient use of

defense resources. As the 10th anniversary of the passage of the

GNA approaches, it is appropriate to examine the act's impact.

This study assesses the extent to which the GNA has been

implemented, examines whether Congress' intent has been realized,

evaluates the impact the act has had on DOD, and discusses what

measures should be taken to consummate or curtail implementation.

The analysis and assessment herein show that DOD has

substantially implemented the act, but also that implementation

is incomplete.

• Generally, the provisions of the act intended to

strengthen civilian control over DOD have been effectively

implemented.

 -By promulgating the Defense Planning Guidance document,

the Secretary of Defense has increased his authority over the

development of programs and budgets. However, the practice of

publishing a new document annually denies DOD components needed

planning stability.

 -The secretary has asserted control of the contingency

planning process by providing the Contingency Planning Guidance

document to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands.

• The act improved the military advice provided to the

National Command Authorities (NCA) by increasing the authority

and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. However, it also allowed the chairman to formulate

military advice without consulting the other members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by permitting him to consult them as he

considers appropriate.

• The act clarified the authority and responsibilities of

the CINCs of the combatant commands, but not to the extent
vi

Congress intended. Also, ambiguity still exists with respect to

the chain(s) of command.

• The act has not been fully implemented with respect to

strategy formulation. The national security strategy reports

submitted to date have not been as comprehensive as Congress

specified.

• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not prepare

the type of strategic plans called for in the act.

• Although emphasis on the military requirements of the

combatant commands has increased, the services continue to

dominate the requirements determination process.

• An effective system for evaluating the preparedness of the

combatant commands to carry out their assigned missions, for

identifying force capability strengths and deficiencies, and for

assessing the impact of such strengths and deficiencies on

strategic plans and policy has yet to be implemented.

• The congressional intent regarding joint doctrine has been

accomplished. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has

developed a robust body of joint doctrine that, inter alia, harmonizes and rationalizes the operational roles of forces

provided by the services. In doing so, joint doctrine facilitates

effective and efficient application of defense resources.

 • Congressional intent concerning the review and

reallocation of roles and functions among the services has not

been completely realized.

• The congressional intent for the periodic review and

adjustment of the missions, responsibilities, and force

structures of the combatant commands has been largely effected.

• The Department of Defense has improved the quality of

joint staffs by implementing the joint officer management

provisions of the act, but that effort may have been constrained

by negative effects on officers who serve in joint assignments.

These conclusions and their underlying analyses suggest

several recommendations:

• Congress should insist that presidents produce national

security strategy reports that are as comprehensive and specific

as the act requires.

• The Secretary of Defense should promote stability in

defense program planning by reverting to a biennial Defense

Planning Guidance publication cycle. Congress should amend the
vii

Goldwater-Nichols Act to permit biennial publication.

• The secretary should establish policy to ensure that the

chairman adequately consults with the other members of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Congress should amend the act to instruct the

chairman to consult the other members on all issues with

potential impact on the services, while allowing him to remain

unbound by such consultations.

• The secretary should conduct a review of the relationship

of the CINCs to their Service component commanders and the

latter's relationship to their Service Chiefs. The review should

affirm the chain of command from the NCA to the CINCs and develop

a concept for the chain of command that runs from the NCA through

the Military Departments. Congress should amend the GNA to

recognize, define, and describe both chains of command.

• The secretary should establish policy that a certain

percentage of Service "OPTEMPO" funding be dedicated to joint

training and exercises. Congress should revise the GNA, expressly

authorizing the secretary to do so.

• The chairman should develop national military strategic

plans keyed to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) periods.

• The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the GNA,

should transfer responsibility for administering the Integrated

Priority List (IPL) process to the chairman from the Director for

Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of the

Secretary of Defense. The chairman should restructure the process

so that it focuses on specific capabilities needed rather than

particular programs, and should use the IPLs as the primary basis

for determining military requirements.

• The chairman should develop and implement a system for

evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands that does

not rely on self-evaluations by the commands. The system also

should identify force strengths and deficiencies as well as

assess their impact on accomplishing national security objectives

and on strategic plans.

• As the Joint Warfighting Center matures, the chairman

should continue to increase its oversight of the joint doctrine

development process.

• If it is the sense of Congress that significant changes in

the roles and functions of the U.S. armed forces are required, it

should establish its own commission to identify needed changes

and propose appropriate legislation.

• The secretary should continue to emphasize full
viii

implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the

GNA with the objective of bringing all services into compliance.

• Congress should add language to the act which would ensure

officers are not rendered less competitive for promotion for

having received joint education and having served in joint

assignments.
1

UNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES:

IMPLEMENTING THE

1986 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT

INTRODUCTION

Reorganizing the military establishment of the United States

has been a subject of considerable congressional interest

throughout much of this century. As early as 1921, Congress began

considering proposals to combine or unify the military

departments under a single executive agency. Between 1921 and

1945, for example, Congress considered some 50 proposals to

reorganize the United States armed forces. Due largely to

opposition from the Departments of War and Navy, however, none of

these initiatives resulted in legislation.1

The experiences of World War II made it clear that, for the

U.S. armed forces, future warfare would be increasingly

characterized by unified operations,2

 and that a centrally

coordinated process for providing U.S. military capabilities was

needed. In a message to Congress (December 1945), President

Truman stated that "there is enough evidence now at hand to

demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department."

He urged Congress to ". . . adopt legislation combining the War

and Navy departments into one single Department of National

Defense."3 President Truman's message led to the National

Security Act of 1947 which created the "National Military

Establishment" and initiated a trend toward unification of the

U.S. armed forces that would continue throughout the remainder of

the century.4

The type of unification advanced by legislation and

considered in this study would not ultimately eliminate the

separate services or merge the military departments into one.5 As

used herein, unification refers to the centralized direction of

the U.S. armed forces and the concomitant subordination of the

military departments and services to a centralized control

structure. This contrasts with a separatist approach by which

each military department would be a relatively autonomous

organization coordinating, and perhaps synchronizing, its

activities with the other departments, but retaining essential

decision making autonomy in most areas.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, informally called the Goldwater-Nichols Act or GNA,

was the most comprehensive defense reorganization package enacted

since the 1947 National Security Act. Designed to accelerate the

unification of the U.S. armed forces by fundamentally altering

the manner in which they were raised, trained, commanded, and

employed, the GNA impacted virtually all major elements of DOD.

Many consider the GNA as instrumental in the success of U.S.
2

forces during Operation DESERT STORM. Nonetheless, a decade after

its passage, there is evidence which suggests that this seminal

legislation has yet to be fully implemented. There also are

indications that implementation may have already gone too far in

consolidating authority within the offices of the Secretary of

Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at

the expense of the military departments and services. The first

purpose of this study, therefore, is to assess the extent to

which the provisions of the GNA have been implemented within the

framework of the act's eight stated objectives.6 The study also

assesses the general effects the GNA has had on the U.S. armed

forces and offers conclusions and recommendations for achieving

the improvements Congress intended when it passed the GNA. The

assessment begins by taking into account the act's historical

context, particularly the events that directly contributed to its

passage.

EARLY UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND CONCERNS

How best to balance the unified and separatist approaches to

DOD organization has been a challenge that has confronted

Congress over the years. Since 1947, Congress has gravitated

toward the unification pole of these contrasting views of armed

forces organization, but the attraction of the separatist

philosophy remains significant. Since the end of World War II,

almost every Secretary of Defense has supported increased

centralization of authority. The military departments, on the

other hand, have generally attempted to retain their autonomy.

In attempts to craft the most effective balance between

these opposing forces, Congress has also had to consider a third

factor. Increased unification of the U.S. armed forces erodes

congressional control over the military, and Congress has sought

to limit that effect by not over-centralizing authority within

the executive branch.7

 The interaction of these dynamics has

resulted in an evolutionary unification process that the GNA has

perpetuated, and which continues as the provisions of the act are

implemented.

A review of the defense reorganization legislation that

preceded the GNA assists in constructing a contextual background

for assessing the act and illustrates its relative significance.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first, albeit

relatively ineffective, piece of unification legislation.

Although the act created the position of Secretary of Defense, it

gave the secretary no real authority over the Secretaries of the

Army, Navy, or Air Force. Congress perceived both the benefits

and the dangers associated with unification, and decided not to

enact more radical legislation for fear of yielding much of its

control over the military to the Executive Branch.8

 By 1949,

however, the Executive Branch was pressing for legislation to
3

achieve greater unification. Commenting on the National Security

Act, President Truman, in a March 1949 message to Congress,

stated:

This act has provided a practical and workable basis

for beginning the unification of the military services

and for coordinating military policy with foreign and

economic policy . . . The past eighteen months have

dispelled any doubt that unification of the armed

forces can yield great advantages to the nation . . .

[but] the act fails to provide for a fully responsible

official with authority adequate to meet his

responsibility, whom the president and the congress can

hold accountable.9

The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act represented

an important, but limited, step in further unifying the U.S.

military establishment. Congress established the Department of

Defense as an executive department and made the Secretary of

Defense responsible for its general direction. It also

redesignated the executive departments of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force as military departments, reducing them in stature, but

instructed that they continue to be "separately administered."10

The congressional intent stated in Section 2 of the

Amendment was:

. . . to provide three Military Departments, separately

administered, . . . to provide for their authoritative

coordination and unified direction under civilian

control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge

them . . . and for their integration into an efficient

team of land, naval, and air forces but not to

establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces

nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to

be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

or Joint Staff) [emphasis in original].11

An important feature of the 1949 Amendment was that, while

clearly avoiding the actual merging of the military departments

and the creation of a "single Chief of Staff," the amendment

provided for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which

were established in 1947 to serve as the principal military

advisers to the president, National Security Council (NSC), and

the Secretary of Defense.12 The JCS Chairman was assigned

significantly circumscribed authority. He was not to exercise

command over the military services nor the Joint Chiefs, and, in

fact, he was not even a voting member of the JCS.13

With the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act,
4

Congress took a further step toward unifying the armed forces but

stopped short of merging the military departments. Nonetheless,

unification pressures continued. By 1958, the benefits of unified

strategic direction of the armed forces were more apparent, but

Congress still feared the creation of too much centralized

authority over the military. The Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of

1947, nonetheless gave the Secretary of Defense real authority

over the U.S. military establishment, to include the power to

reorganize the Department of Defense. The amendment modified the

requirement that the military departments be "separately

administered" to say that they must be "separately organized."14

The 1958 Act,

further subordinated the Military Departments to the

central authority of the Secretary of Defense,

established the chain of command from the President,

through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, to the unified and specified commands, and

provided for the central direction and control of

research and development.15

During the three decades that followed, there was little

congressional action to unify the U.S. armed forces; however, the

Secretary of Defense used his increased authority to take limited

steps toward further unification.16 In the early 1980s, however,

several events helped shape a congressional consensus that DOD

required significant reform.

THE ROAD TO REFORM

The Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the U.S.

Embassy in Tehran, seizing 53 American hostages. The attack on

the embassy should not have come as a complete surprise. Almost 9

months earlier, a similar incident occurred but was resolved

diplomatically.17 Although a contingency plan for the evacuation

of U.S. personnel existed,18 it is unclear if the JCS, in

response to the first attack on the embassy, advised the

Secretary of Defense or the president that the contingency plan

should be made ready for potential execution. In any event, over

5 months elapsed after the second seizure and the taking of

American hostages before the United States mounted a military

response.

The U.S. national leadership was confronted with a situation

for which it seemed unprepared. Direct White House supervision,

excessive devotion to secrecy and compartmentation, and a general

circumvention of the established crisis action planning process
5

characterized operational planning for the rescue mission.19 The

plan that resulted was "joint"20 in that it included forces from

all services but, at the same time, it was not a unified

operation in that it did not provide for unified command, unified

action, or joint training of the forces.21 Acting on the advice

of the JCS that the high-risk mission had a better-than-average

chance of succeeding, President Carter directed that the

operation be executed.22

Operation EAGLE CLAW, designed to rescue the hostages

quickly and dramatically, ended in catastrophe. American

planning, equipment, tactics, and leadership proved inadequate.23

Eight servicemen on the mission were killed, expensive U.S.

equipment and classified information were abandoned, and not a

single hostage was rescued.24 The entire world wondered if the

United States had indeed become a military "paper tiger."

In the months following the failed rescue attempt, a stunned

American public endured the daily media reminders of the

continued plight of the hostages and America's inability to do

anything about it.25 It is not surprising that the Iran hostage

rescue experience aroused congressional suspicions that serious

problems existed concerning how the U.S. armed forces were

commanded, organized, trained, and employed, and that remedial

action was required.26 Those suspicions were confirmed by

subsequent events.

Beirut.

During fall 1983, congressional concern over the command,

organization, and employment of U.S. armed forces again peaked

following a military disaster. The previous year, some 1,200 U.S.

Marines joined French and Italian contingents in a multinational

force. Their mission was to preserve peace in and around Beirut,

Lebanon, facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and

authority of Lebanon's government, and help bring peace to the

war-torn country. The Marines occupied positions in the vicinity

of Beirut International Airport.

In April 1983, a massive explosion destroyed the U.S.

Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 U.S. citizens and over 40 others.

Fighting between indigenous factions intensified throughout the

spring and summer. From March through October 1983, the Marines

suffered a number of casualties (4 dead and 15 wounded) from the

various factions involved in Lebanon's civil war.27 Events

culminated on October 23, 1983, when a suicide bomber attacked

the Marines' headquarters building, killing 241 U.S. military

personnel and wounding over 100 others.28 Shortly thereafter,

President Reagan withdrew the remaining U.S. forces.29
6

Congressional reaction was swift. A delegation from the

Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives

Committee on Armed Services arrived in Beirut by December 12,

1983. Their report to the Committee Chairman (December 19, 1983)

criticized several military aspects of the incident. Transcending

the tactical level, the more notable criticisms included an

ambiguous chain of command, lack of proper oversight by higher

levels of command, lack of adequate intelligence support,

reporting by military sources of incomplete or inaccurate

information,30 the failure of civilian leadership to heed the

advice of senior military leaders concerning the overall risks of

the operation, and the inability of the military to anticipate

and protect against such an attack.31

With the memories of the Iran hostage rescue attempt still

vivid, the Beirut tragedy suggested that the deficiencies of the

U.S. armed forces that contributed to the debacle in Iran had not

been corrected, but somehow had worsened. Those sentiments began

to prevail, and even a successful military operation would not

arrest the congressional movement toward sweeping reform of DOD.

Grenada.

President Reagan came into office with the task of restoring

U.S. prestige, in part by improving the credibility of its

military capabilities. The U.S. experience in Lebanon did not

further that objective. It appeared, however, that the successful

use of military force for a just cause could restore the

confidence of the American people in their military and

government.32 Cuban activities on the island of Grenada

necessitated a military operation that was large enough to be

credible, but not so large as to present significant risk of a

large number of U.S. casualties.33

On October 25, 1983, 2 days after the Beirut bombing, the

invasion of Grenada, Operation URGENT FURY, began.34 The mission

was to secure and evacuate about 1,000 U.S. citizens, defeat the

Grenadian and Cuban forces present, and stabilize the situation

so democratic government could be restored.35

Taken in the whole, Operation URGENT FURY was a success; the

students were freed unharmed, the Bishop government was ousted,

Cuban troops were removed, and democracy was restored. Still,

critics reported many problems with the operation,36 to include a

lack of accurate, up-to-date maps, imperfect intelligence

support, and U.S. casualties resulting from accidents and

fratricide.37 There were interoperability problems among the

services, particularly in the area of communications.38 And,

although some forces acted bravely, they achieved only limited

success. Reportedly, U.S. Army units performed sluggishly, used
7

inappropriate tactics, and suffered from breakdowns in

discipline.39 While the validity of such accounts has been

debated, the fact remains that the overall success of the

operation failed to preclude congressional criticism, and the

Reagan administration again found itself on the defensive.40

Congressional Reaction.

These brief operational sketches and the congressional

reactions they elicited complete the historical context that

shaped the widespread congressional perception that the U.S.

military was in need of reform. As early as June 1983, members of

Congress already were considering changes within the Department

of Defense. Senators John Tower and Henry (Scoop) Jackson, then

Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the Senate Committee on

Armed Services, for example, directed the committee staff to

conduct a study of the organization and decision-making

procedures of the Department of Defense. For the next 18 months,

the study took the form of hearings, interviews, and research. In

January 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn directed that

a more formal and vigorous study be undertaken.41

The Locher Report. The resulting staff study yielded a

report entitled Defense Organization: The Need for Change,

informally known as the Locher Report (October 1985, Study

Director: James R. Locher). The report indicated that consensus

was building in Congress that DOD required reorganization. The

essence of the report was reflected in the testimony of former

Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger:

. . . in the absence of structural reform I fear that

we shall obtain less than is attainable from our

expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will

permit the release of energies and of imagination now

unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.

Without such reform, I fear that the United States will

obtain neither the best military advice, nor the

effective execution of military plans, nor the

provision of military capabilities commensurate with

the fiscal resources provided, nor the most

advantageous deterrence and defense posture available

to the nation.42

The report addressed a wide range of issues affecting the

performance of the DOD, including its four major organizational

elements: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the unified and

specified combatant commands, and the military departments. The

report also addressed two key decision-making processes: the

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the

acquisition process.43 Additionally, congressional review and
8

oversight of defense policies and programs and civilian control

of the military received scrutiny.

The report went beyond the mere cataloging of deficiencies

and issues. It offered numerous recommendations for overhauling

DOD, its decision-making processes, and its organization. The

more significant recommendations included:

• to establish three new Under Secretary of Defense

positions for nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional

defense and force projection;

• to create the position of an Assistant Secretary of

Defense (Strategic Planning);

• to disestablish the JCS and replace it with a Joint

Military Advisory Council consisting of a chairman and a 4-star

officer from each Service who is on his last tour of duty;

• to authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory

Council to provide military advice in his own right and designate

him the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense;

• to authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory

Council to develop and administer a personnel management system

for officers assigned to joint duty;

• to remove the Service component commanders within the

unified combatant commands from the operational chain of command;

and

• to integrating fully the Secretariats' and the Service

headquarters' staffs.

 Although Congress did not directly act on any of the

report's fairly radical recommendations, the report effectively

illuminated numerous deficiencies within DOD.44 Moreover, the

report affirmed the congressional perception of the need for

change within DOD and helped shape the debates that would occur

over the next year. Congressional debate was accompanied by

Executive Branch interest in defense reform.

Presidential Reaction.

In June 1985, out of concern that Congress, if left to its

own devices, might impose ill-advised, or at least unwanted

changes upon the Department of Defense, President Reagan

established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,

informally known as the Packard Commission (after its chairman,

David Packard). Establishing the commission also served to stanch
9

any public perception that the executive branch was not willing

or able to reform one of its departments. The president charged

the commission to:

. . . conduct a defense management study of important

dimension, including: the budget process, the

procurement system, legislative oversight, and the

organizational and operational arrangements, both

formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary

of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the Unified and Specified Command systems, the

Military Departments, and Congress.45

In February 1986, the commission provided the president an

interim report containing several recommendations. The president

officially endorsed the preliminary recommendations in April

1986, and designated many for "quick and decisive

implementation."46 The commission published its findings in June

1986. They were generally consistent with the conclusions of the

Locher Report released some 8 months earlier.47 However, the

commission's key recommendations were considerably less radical:

• defense planning should begin with a comprehensive

statement of national security objectives and priorities;

• the president should issue provisional 5-year budget

levels to the Secretary of Defense;

• the CJCS should prepare a military strategy and options

for operational concepts;

• the CJCS, with the advice of the JCS and the combatant

commanders, should prepare broad military options, framing

explicit trade-offs among the armed forces, and submit

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense;

• the CJCS, with the assistance of the JCS and the Director

of Central Intelligence, should provide net assessments of U.S.

and allied armed forces relative to those of potential

adversaries. The assessments should be used to evaluate risks

inherent in the options developed;

• the president should select a particular option and

specify an associated budget level upon which the Department of

Defense would base its 5-year defense plan and 2-year budget;

• the CJCS should be designated as the principal uniformed

military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of

Defense, representing his own views as well as those of the

corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff;
10

• the Joint Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff should be placed under the exclusive direction of the

chairman;

• the Secretary of Defense should direct that commands to

and reports from the unified and specified commands be channeled

through the chairman;

• the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(VCJCS) should be created;

• broader authority should be assigned to the unified

commanders to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces,

and support activities;

• the Unified Command Plan should be revised;

• the Secretary of Defense should be provided with the

flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of command

to deployed contingency forces; and

• the Secretary of Defense should establish a single unified

command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation.48

During early spring 1986, while both houses of Congress

considered defense reform bills, influential congressmen such as

Senator Goldwater conferred with members of the Packard

Commission. As a result of these discussions, Congress began to

embrace the Packard Commission's recommendations over the more

revolutionary changes recommended in the Locher Report.49 The

interaction between the legislative and executive branches in

producing the package of reform that ultimately resulted is

noteworthy. Congress, in initiating the Locher study effort,

precipitated presidential action to form a Blue Ribbon

Commission. By forming the Packard Commission, endorsing the

commission's recommendations as early as possible, and committing

to their implementation, the president essentially was able to

coopt Congress and influence the reform package it ultimately

adopted.50

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Throughout the first half of 1986, discussions continued

over the need to reorganize the Department of Defense. On one

side of the debate was the U.S. Congress, convinced that reform

was necessary. On the other side were the Secretary of Defense

and the services.51 Interestingly, the president sided with

Congress.52 With the Executive Branch seemingly divided over the

issue of defense reorganization and against the background of the

Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut bombing, and the

incursion into Grenada, Senators Goldwater and Nunn and
11

Representative Nichols were able to build exceptionally strong

bipartisan support for reform.

During the spring and summer, each house passed its version

of the reform bill by an overwhelming majority.53 With the

Congress largely of a like mind concerning defense

reorganization, the joint conference to resolve inter-committee

issues went quickly and smoothly.54 The conference report was

published on September 12, 1986, and this substantial piece of

legislation sailed through the Senate and the House of

Representatives on September 16 and 17, respectively. By October

1, 1986, the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act was law.

Congressional Intent.

Traditional congressional concern over the migration of

control of the military from the legislative to the executive

branch has, in some respects, retarded the evolution toward

unification. Congress recognized the value of separately

organized military departments that competed to best meet the

requirements of the CINCs by offering alternative program

recommendations. Congress also perceived the need for more

unified direction of the U.S. armed forces, but feared that too

much centralization of authority might inhibit the discretionary

authority of Congress over defense matters. The provisions of the

1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act reflect these countervailing concerns.

The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced congressional

dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of

the U.S. armed forces. Congress believed the problems derived

from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense,

Service Secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and Service components, and

the Service Chiefs. In passing the GNA, Congress intended:

(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen

civilian authority within the Department;

(2) to improve the military advice provided to the

president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;

(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the

unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment

of missions assigned to those commands;

(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the

unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate

with the responsibility of those commanders for the

accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
12

(5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and

to contingency planning;

(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;

(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and

(8) to enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military

operations and improve the management and administration of the

Department of Defense.55

Each provision of the act addressed one or more of these elements

of congressional intent. An in-depth analysis of every provision

of the act is beyond the scope of this study. However, an

assessment of the more significant provisions provides a

sufficient basis for determining the extent to which the act has

served its purpose. The assessment that follows is organized

around the elements of the act's stated intent and supported by

analyses of key provisions designed to address each element.

ASSESSMENT

Strengthening Civilian Authority.

This section analyzes the provisions that directly impacted

the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. Since

civilian control exercised by the Secretaries of the Military

Departments was not a major focus of the act, an analysis of

corresponding provisions is not provided in this study.

Congress formulated several provisions of the act to

strengthen directly the authority of the Secretary of Defense.

The two most significant provisions increased the secretary's

influence over program planning conducted by DOD components and

the contingency planning conducted by the CINCs. Other provisions

indirectly enhanced the secretary's control. The more significant

of those relate to improving the advice the secretary receives

from the uniformed military, thus enhancing his ability to

command.

Defense Planning Guidance. First, to increase the

secretary's authority and control over programs developed by DOD

components, the act provided that

[t]he Secretary of Defense, with the advice and

assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, shall provide annually to the heads of

Department of Defense components written policy

guidance for the preparation and review of the program

recommendations and budget proposals of their
13

respective components. Such guidance shall include

guidance on--

(a) national security objectives and policies;

(b) the priorities of military missions; and

(c) the resource levels projected to be available for

the period of time for which such recommendations and

proposals are to be effective.56

The authority provided by this section clearly empowered the

secretary to establish the criteria upon which the military

departments and other DOD components must base their programs.57

The secretary uses the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), a

classified document, as his tool for providing the program

planning guidance required by the act.

The DPG initiates the first phase of the DOD Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).58 The PPBS is the

biennial process by which DOD plans for the force capabilities

that will be needed from 2 to 8 years in the future. It

facilitates the development of programs to attain those

capabilities and translates those programs into budget

submissions. Those programs and budget submissions, rationalized

and synthesized through the PPBS, combine to form the Future

Years Defense Program (FYDP) and yield DOD's portion of the

president's budget. Thus, the DPG provides the initial policy

guidance for the program planning that produces the DOD budget.

By asserting himself in the program planning process early, the

secretary has enhanced his influence over the programs ultimately

submitted for approval.

A review of the DPG to date reveals that it directly

addresses and, on balance, satisfies the intent of the GoldwaterNichols Act. It summarizes the national security and military

strategies, outlines strategic challenges and opportunities,

provides some priority of military missions, and is consistent

with the resources expected to be available during the targeted

6-year planning period.59 Additionally, the CJCS reviews drafts

of the DPG and is afforded the opportunity to provide comments

prior to its publication. Through the DPG, the secretary

influences DOD programs early in the planning phase, and, by

putting his full weight behind the DPG, he sets the standard by

which the programs of DOD components will be evaluated. By doing

so, he has ensured that DOD components take appropriate notice of

his guidance and priorities regarding DOD programs.

This positive assessment of the secretary's promulgation of

policy guidance for the preparation and review of DOD programs

must be qualified. First, the specific priorities set forth in
14

the DPG are few, and the guidance provided is, in many instances,

fairly general. This allows the military departments considerable

latitude in structuring their respective programs. That is

somewhat appropriate, since the departments require a degree of

flexibility if they are to craft programs that most effectively

and efficiently satisfy the CINCs' requirements. In developing

the DPG, the Secretary of Defense must balance the military

departments' need for planning and programming flexibility

against the risk of unnecessary duplication and redundancy that

may result in the absence of specific guidance and priorities.

Another criticism of the DPG involves the timing of its

publication. The GNA called for the Secretary of Defense to

provide his planning and programming guidance annually. However,

the need for stability in planning and for programming supported

by adequate analyses necessitates a two-year PPBS cycle. Since

the DPG, by design, initiates a new PPBS cycle, it logically

became a biennial document.

Congress, however, requires annual budget submissions. The

PPBS accommodates annual budget submissions by providing for

annual budget reviews and adjustments during the years between

those in which new presidents' budgets are developed.

Consequently, every other year, the secretary should be

simultaneously developing planning guidance for a new PPBS cycle

while making adjustments to a mid-cycle budget. One would expect

the mid-cycle adjustments to be relatively minor, given that they

continue to serve the two-year budget submitted the prior year.

What was perceived to be an exception occurred in 1993 when

the Clinton administration determined that a significant midcourse correction in the defense program was required. The

Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was conducted to chart the new course, and

it yielded an off-cycle DPG. With the FY 94-99 DPG published the

year prior and the FY 96-01 DPG still a year away, the FY 95-99

DPG was seen as an anomaly brought on by the new administration's

exercise of its prerogative to set a new course for DOD. The BUR,

its name notwithstanding, was driven by the OSD and the Joint

Staff and was conducted outside the established planning

system.60 Since each Service had developed planning and

programming processes to support the 2-year PPBS, their

participation in the BUR and the development of the resulting DPG

was constrained.

The FY 96-01 DPG was published less than 8 months later. A

year after that, the FY 97-01 DPG was published, again off-cycle.

Work is ongoing to produce the FY 98-03 DPG. Upon its

publication, annual DPGs will have been published for 5

consecutive years. Prudence dictates that DOD should have a

process for making budget adjustments during those years in which

new president's budgets are not developed. It is not clear,
15

however, that annual reinitiation of the PPBS is helpful or

warranted. The DOD components, particularly the military

departments, require stability in the PPBS if they are to use

their forecasting, planning, and analytical processes

effectively.

There is no doubt that the provision of the GNA that gave

rise to the DPG provided the Secretary of Defense with an

effective means of asserting increased control over the

development of DOD programs. However, recognizing the DPG for the

powerful tool it is, a secretary could use it to the effect of

over-controlling and, thus, destabilizing the planning and

programming process. Ironically, while the secretary may be

complying with the letter of the GNA by publishing annual DPGs,

he may not be implementing the congressional intent of improving

DOD program planning.

Contingency Planning Guidance. The GoldwaterNichols Act also

increased the Secretary of Defense's authority and responsibility

in the area of contingency planning.61 The act provides that

[t]he Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the

President and after consultation with the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to

the Chairman written policy guidance for the

preparation and review of contingency plans.62

The tool used by the secretary to implement this provision of the

act is the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).

The CPG is a concise, classified document that the secretary

uses to inform the chairman of general and specific strategic

areas of concern to the civilian leadership for which contingency

planning should be conducted. The chairman then uses this

guidance to fulfill his responsibility to "[provide] for the

preparation and review of contingency plans . . .," also as

required by the GNA.63 The CPG also informs the chairman of the

general requirements of the secretary, or his representatives, to

review contingency plans during their development as well as upon

completion.

 This element of the GNA has been implemented quite

effectively.64 The Joint Staff collaborates with OSD in the

initial drafting of the CPG. The final draft is coordinated with

the chairman before it is forwarded to the secretary for his

approval and subsequent submission to the NSC for presidential

approval. After the CPG is published, the Joint Staff translates

the policy guidance it contains into specific planning guidance

and tasks and inserts them into the Joint Strategic Capabilities

Plan (JSCP), the document by which the chairman tasks the CINCs

to develop operation plans.65 Using this guidance, the CINCs
16

develop plans peculiar to their geographic or functional areas of

responsibility. Even before the plans are completed, the CINCs'

strategic concepts are forwarded to the CJCS for review and

approval. The Secretary of Defense, or his representative,

selectively reviews strategic concepts of particular interest.

OSD-level review occurs again when the completed plans are

submitted for approval.66

Through the CPG, the Secretary of Defense has inserted

himself and his selected representatives squarely into the

contingency planning process. He has done so in a manner that

gives primacy to the policies of civilian leadership,

appropriately defers the actual development of contingency plans

to the uniformed military leadership, and, by involving himself

early, maintains effective civilian control throughout the

planning process. This is precisely what Congress intended in the

GNA.67

Improving Military Advice.

Several significant provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act

sought to improve the military advice given to the president, the

Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. The sponsors of the act

believed the JCS was incapable of providing concise, timely, and

useful advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA).68

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, former

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger bore out this

conclusion:

The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not

preclude the best military advice, provides a

substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such

advice . . . [T]he recommendations . . . must pass

through a screen designed to protect the institutional

interest of each . . . service . . .[N]o service ox may

be gored . . .

The unavoidable outcome is . . . log-rolling, backscratching, marriage agreements, and the like . . . The

proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally

unread, and almost always disregarded.69

Not only did the JCS system inhibit innovative thought, it also

was not an efficient decision-making system. For example, General

David Jones, a former CJCS, described to Congress how the JCS had

spent an entire afternoon arguing over which Service should

provide the attache to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.70

Notwithstanding the widespread deprecation of the JCS,

Senator Goldwater reminded the Senate that the members of the JCS
17

were given an "almost impossible task: to represent their own

services' viewpoint but, simultaneously, to sacrifice that view

to the greater common good of joint considerations." He also

pointed out that "interservice rivalry can be a good thing [and]

we wish to encourage competing views reaching senior-level

decisionmakers. But the JCS process does not encourage

independent thought."71

The congressional concern was echoed by the Packard

Commission. In its report, the Commission stated that "[t]he

president and Secretary of Defense require military advice that

better integrates the individual views of the nation's combatant

commanders and the Chiefs of the services." The report further

concluded that "there is no one uniformed officer clearly

responsible for providing such an integrated view, who can draw

upon the best thinking of, and act as an effective spokesman for,

our senior military leadership."72

To eliminate this shortcoming, Congress assigned increased

responsibility to the CJCS. In the GNA, it transferred the duties

and functions previously the responsibility of the corporate JCS

to the chairman, designated the chairman as the "head" of the JCS

and the principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC, and

directly subordinated the Joint Staff to the chairman.73 The act

further provided that the chairman, subject to the direction of

the president, may participate in NSC meetings.74 Additionally,

the act permitted the Secretary of Defense to assign overall

supervision of certain defense agencies and field activities to

the chairman.75 The act also created the position of the Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the chairman in

discharging his new duties.76

However, Congress tempered the measures taken to increase

the chairman's authority with others that circumscribed it.

Notably, the act vested the chairman with no command authority.

The chain of command prescribed by the act runs from the

president, to the Secretary of Defense, to the CINCs.77 Also, the

other members of the JCS retained their responsibilities as

military advisors to the NCA and NSC. The act provided further

that should a member of the JCS disagree with the advice the

chairman intended to give to the NCA or the NSC, the member may

submit his dissenting view, which the chairman must offer at the

same time he presents his own.78 The act also provided that each

member of the JCS, after informing the Secretary of Defense, may

make independent recommendations to Congress.79 Finally, the act

provided that the chairman shall, as he considers appropriate,

consult the other members of the JCS and convene regular

meetings.80 While the act enlarged the chairman's

responsibilities and authority, it clearly did not intend for him

to become too powerful, nor for the JCS to become an inert

organization.
18

The strengthened position of the chairman has been the most

intensely debated aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By the end

of General Colin Powell's tenure as chairman, a group of critics

asserted that the increased authority of the chairman had

resulted in less effective advice to the NCA because

recommendations were based narrowly on the chairman's views,

rather than on the range of opinions that might emanate from the

JCS. The commentators argued that several provisions of the act

combined synergistically to make the chairman much more powerful

than Congress intended. They claimed that his authority to

preside over the JCS and set the agenda for JCS meetings, his

command of the vitalized Joint Staff, his control of

communications to and from the combatant commanders and the

NCA,81 and his designation as the principal military adviser to

the NCA enable him to prevail on most, if not all, issues within

the uniformed military. Additionally, given the responsibilities

assigned to him in the act to evaluate Service programs and offer

alternative program recommendations,82 some critics allege that

the Service Chiefs are further discouraged from challenging him.

Thus, some commentators claim, the chairman can attenuate debate

and squelch dissent. They also argue that his increased authority

allows him to impose his views upon his civilian leaders.83

Referring to the increased power of the chairman as "the

biggest Washington scandal," Edward Luttwak charged that it

amounts to the "collapse of civilian control over the military

policies and military strategy of the United States." He went on

to assert that,

. . . the power of decision that our civilian President

is supposed to exercise through his appointed civilian

officials has been seized by an all-military outfit

that most Americans have never even heard of: the . . .

‘Joint Staff' that serves the Chairman and Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.84

John Lehman added to the debate by claiming the chairman

generally is not providing the NCA a range of options, but only a

single, take it or leave it, military option that ostensibly

represents the position of the armed forces on the issue at hand.

Referring to the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Lehman

opined that,

[i]n their understandable quest for efficiency, the

military reformers have consolidated the power

previously separated between the Military Departments,

disenfranchised the civilian officials of each service,

and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and arbitrary

power in the person of the Chairman.85
19

Providing what probably has been the most severe criticism

of the chairman's increased authority, Richard Kohn described a

military that is "out of control." Quoting "a senior officer

involved," he asserted that General Powell instituted a system of

command and control in the Pentagon designed "to give the NCA no

options . . . to control the discussion by presenting just one

approach, which was the option of his choice."86

Assessing the merits of the criticisms is difficult because

their substantive bases are not always clear. For example, it is

not completely clear whether Luttwak, Lehman, Kohn, and others

believe that the office of the chairman was made too powerful by

the GNA, or that General Powell became too powerful a chairman

because of his personality and background. Interestingly, the

manner in which the current chairman, General John Shalikashvili,

performs his duties has not drawn such criticism when he, in some

respects, has gone even farther than his predecessor in

consolidating the authority given the chairman under the GNA.87

As a basis for his criticism, Kohn relies extensively on

accounts in Bob Woodward's The Commanders because "no one has

disputed its facts."88 One must remember that many of Woodward's

facts were not substantiated. Luttwak and Lehman, on the other

hand, provide no insights as to the bases for their assertions.

Absent an articulated underlying rationale, an analysis of the

argument that the GNA has brought about a decrease in civilian

control of the military accompanied by ineffective military

advice must be limited essentially to an assessment of the

argument's internal consistency.

In response to Kohn's criticism, General Powell stated that

"[o]f all the problems facing the nation, a crisis in civilmilitary relations is not one of them and things are not out of

control. . . . both Presidents Bush and Clinton expressed

satisfaction with the manner in which I provided my advice."89 If

there has been no perception on the part of either the NCA or the

chairman that there is something wrong with the manner in which

military advice is provided, then it is difficult to make a case

for a loss of civilian control and a concomitant decrease in the

effectiveness of military advice. If there has been reasonable

harmony between the civilian and military leadership, then it is

unlikely there was a crisis in civil-military relations.

Kohn and Luttwak's counter to this conclusion is illogical.

They argue that this very harmony proves the crisis. For example,

Kohn asserts that "[w]ithout any authorization from superiors,

[General Powell] developed a set of concepts designed to

reconfigure the entire military establishment [and] pushed his

vision of a new national strategy."90 The GNA not only authorized

General Powell to develop alternative force concepts, but

required him to do so.91 His authority to develop national
20

military strategy was likewise derived from the act.92 It can

hardly be said he acted without authorization.

The illogic of Kohn and Luttwak's position is further

exposed by the fact that General Powell's superiors, including

the president, accepted his force structure and strategy

recommendations, although they certainly could have asked for

others from General Powell, the JCS, or from the secretaries of

the military departments. One cannot logically argue that because

the NCA accepted the recommendations of the chairman, a crisis in

civil-military relations somehow resulted.

Kohn applied the same flawed logic to the issue of

homosexuals in the military. He asserted that "at a time of

presidential transition, when civilian authority was vulnerable,

General Powell was ‘in the face' of the two most powerful

civilians in military affairs." But once again, the GNA required

the chairman to provide military advice to the NCA. The civilian

leadership may fully or partially embrace the advice, or reject

it entirely. The former chairman was obligated to provide his

best military advice, and that is what he did. The fact that his

civilian leadership heeded his advice is not evidence of even the

voluntary relinquishment of their authority, much less a

breakdown in civilian control of the military. To hold that the

president approved and the Secretary of Defense promulgated the

so called "don't ask, don't tell policy" because of coercion by

the CJCS, and not because of congressional and popular concern

that a more liberal policy might not be in the best interests of

the U.S. armed forces, strains credibility.

Contrary to the critics' charges, the lessons of the Persian

Gulf War provide evidence that the GNA strengthened civilian

control over the armed forces. With his role in overseeing

contingency planning expanded by the act, the Undersecretary of

Defense for Policy, in 1989, called for a change in the focus of

contingency planning for Southwest Asia. He directed that

additional attention be given to the defense of the Arabian

Peninsula against strong regional threats. Consequently, when

Iraq attacked into Kuwait the CINC was already well along in his

planning to repel and reverse such aggression. The Secretary of

Defense concluded that "[c]ivilian control and oversight of the

Department of Defense was enhanced [by the act] as was senior

civilian cognizance of the strategy and planning process."93

Congress, also, seems satisfied with the act's provisions

for improving military advice provided to the NCA. In passing the

act, Congress allowed that problems could surface during its

implementation. In presenting the reform bill to the Senate,

Senator Nunn observed that the executive and legislative branches

would have to monitor implementation to ensure the act produced

the intended effects and should to be prepared to effect
21

modifications, if required.94 Representative Nichols made a

similar observation when he presented the bill to the House of

Representatives. He said, "[t]hose who have worked on DOD

reorganization realize that problems may arise in implementing

such far-reaching legislation. We will attempt to respond to bona

fide problems with legislative modifications when necessary."95

The express invitations to modify the act notwithstanding,

neither the president, the Secretary of Defense, nor the

Congress, has proposed any legislation to modify significantly

the chairman's authority and responsibilities. Therefore, a

problem in civil-military relations that would degrade the

military advice provided by the chairman is difficult to

establish.

Nonetheless, a key issue remains concerning the manner in

which the chairman formulates the advice he provides to the NCA.

There is evidence that the chairman may not always adequately

consult with the other members of the JCS before providing his

advice to the NCA. The chairman has promulgated a formal policy

that "coordination with the services . . . will be sought on

actions that impact on the services' plans or policies . . . [or]

for joint actions that will result in advice by the chairman to

the president, NSC, or Secretary of Defense . . . ."96 This

policy conforms to the requirements and intent of the act.

However, there are indications of inconsistent implementation of

the policy.

The importance of formal JCS meetings in the JCS conference

room appears to have decreased since passage of the GNA,

indicating a decrease in formal consultation.97 Also, just before

retiring, General Carl Mundy, former Commandant of the Marine

Corps, sent a letter to the chairman describing his concerns

about decreasing Service influence over joint issues.98

Additionally, the Service Chiefs were not given a reasonable

opportunity to consult in the development of General

Shalikashvili's first Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).99

To the extent that the NCA are willing to accept the

chairman's unilateral advice, he may be more prone to give it.

However, such advice is apt to be less robust than advice

enriched by prior consultation with the other members of the JCS.

A return to the process of consensus building and voting within

the JCS, however, is neither necessary nor warranted; the

chairman is clearly the senior military adviser to the NCA.

Nonetheless, the chairman obviously can benefit from

consultations with the other members of the JCS, particularly

when the issues under consideration have potentially significant

impact on the services or when the services will be called upon

to implement resulting policy decisions. While some issues may

warrant formal JCS meetings, consultation on others could occur
22

informally or through the proxy of staff coordination.

While the NCA's willingness to accept the chairman's

unilateral advice may not be a civil-military relations problem,

it can affect the quality of the advice the NCA receives. Given

the indicators that previously routine consultation with the

other members of the JCS may be eroding, it may be in the NCA's

best interest to establish policy that ensures the chairman

consults with the other members of the JCS, whenever the services

have vested interests in the issues under consideration.

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the bulk of the

evidence indicates that the act has not only enhanced civilian

control of the armed forces, but has also improved the military

advice provided to the NCA. In the official DOD report on the

Persian Gulf war, the Secretary of Defense noted that the

conflict was the first test of the act in a major war. He

complimented the chairman, the vice chairman, and the other

members of the JCS for the "excellent military advice" they

provided. He reported that the act's strengthening of the

position of the chairman enabled the chairman to bring to bear

his strategic insight and exceptional leadership to ensure the

CINC was provided with all he needed to successfully prosecute

the war.100 In addition to improving civilian control of the armed

forces, the GNA also provided more authority to the CINCs.

Expanding the Authority and Responsibility of the CINCs.

To reduce further the influence of Service parochialism and

better focus DOD strategic planning on the needs of the unified

and specified combatant commanders, Congress determined that the

roles of the CINCs also had to be strengthened.101 Congress

crafted several provisions of the act with that goal in mind. The

act reemphasized and clarified the responsibilities of the CINCs

for accomplishing assigned missions as well as for ensuring their

commands' preparedness to do so.102 It also described, in detail,

command authority, specifying that a CINC has authority to:

• direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military

operations, joint training, and logistics;

• prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces

within the command;

• organize the command and forces within the command;

• employ forces within the command as he considers necessary

to accomplish the command's missions;

• assign command functions to subordinate commanders;
23

• coordinate and approve administrative, support, and

disciplinary activities necessary to carry out missions assigned

to the command;

• select and suspend subordinate commanders and staff

officers; and

• convene courts martial.103

The act also provided that the Secretary of Defense shall

periodically review the authority of the CINCs and ensure their

authority is commensurate with their responsibilities. The act

gave the CINCs the responsibility to report promptly to the

secretary any instances in which they feel their authority to be

inadequate.104 Additionally, Congress considered terms like "full

operational command," traditionally used to describe the

authority of the CINCs, to be inappropriate for describing their

new authority.105 The act gave rise to a new term, "combatant

command," that DOD has formally adopted.106

The act further reinforced the CINCs' authority by directing

the secretaries of the military departments to assign all forces

under their jurisdiction to the CINCs,107 except for those forces

needed to carry out the 12 Service functions.108 Although the act

specified a single, clear chain of command from the president to

the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs,109 it notably did not

provide for an administrative chain of command from the president

to the Secretary of Defense to the military departments. Thus,

while the act allowed each military department to retain

unspecified authority and control over a portion of their forces,

the bulk of the U.S. armed forces were placed under the authority

of the CINCs.

Recognizing the geographic dispersion of the CINCs and the

broad spans of control inherent in the offices of the president

and the Secretary of Defense, Congress included provisions in the

act that allow the chairman to assist the NCA in overseeing the

CINCs. Specifically, the president may direct that all

communications between himself or the secretary and the CINCs go

through the chairman. The president may also direct that the

chairman assist him in the performance of his command functions.

The Secretary of Defense may assign the chairman responsibilities

for assisting in overseeing the combatant commands; however, such

assignment confers no command authority.110

Although the chairman is vested with no command authority,

his role in making the chain of command function effectively is

pivotal. In addition to making him the principal military advisor

to the NCA, the act designated him the spokesman for the CINCs,

especially for the requirements of their commands, and made him
24

responsible for informing other elements of the DOD of the CINCs'

requirements. This provision of the act not only increased the

chairman's real authority, but also enhanced the ability of the

CINCs' to influence the NCA.111

Another provision of the act indirectly, but substantially,

increased the authority of the CINCs. It made the secretaries of

the military departments responsible for "fulfill[ing] (to the

maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational

requirements of the [CINCs]. . . ."112 In short, the CINCs were

made responsible for identifying requirements for military

capabilities, the chairman was made responsible for synthesizing

the requirements, and the services were tasked to fulfill the

requirements. Thus, the services were not to interpret, on their

own, the CINCs' requirements and base Service programs on the

capabilities the services determined to be most important to the

CINCs. Via the GNA, Congress sought to clearly establish the

primacy of the CINCs over the Service chiefs, at least with

respect to the determination of required military capabilities.

Whether these statutory provisions have improved the

abilities of the CINCs to accomplish assigned missions and

focused the services on providing trained, equipped, and ready

forces to satisfy the CINCs' requirements is debatable. Evidence

suggests that the impact of these provisions may not have been as

significant as Congress had intended. On occasion, responsibility

for accomplishment of missions assigned to a CINC have become

blurred. For example, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the

Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the Air Staff's Deputy

Director of Plans for Warfighting Concepts to develop a plan for

a U.S. response. The Air Staff unilaterally developed the plan

without direction from the Commander-In-Chief of the U.S Central

Command (USCINCCENT), the chairman, or the NCA.113 Given that the

Goldwater-Nichols Act clearly assigned the responsibility for

operation planning to the CINCs, the Air Staff's planning

encroached upon USCINCCENT's planning authority and

responsibility.114 The fact that the chairman directed that the

Air Staff's planning cell be expanded to become a joint planning

cell under the Joint Staff's Director for Operations115 did not

negate the Air Force's infringement on the CINC's planning

authority.

Another dynamic decreases the effectiveness of the

provisions of the act designed to increase the CINCs' authority.

Prior to passage of the act, two chains of command existed within

the U.S. armed forces. The operational chain of command ran from

the president, to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to

the CINCs. The administrative and support chain of command ran

from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments.116

The two chains of command converged at the level of the Service

components of the combatant commands. The Service component
25

commanders ostensibly served two masters, the CINCs and the

Service chiefs. Congress concluded that the resulting ambiguity

inhibited the CINCs' ability to exercise command over subordinate

forces and to control resources allocated to their commands.117

Congress intended to solve the problem by clearly prescribing a

single chain of command that runs from the president, to the

Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, to the CINCs.118

In passing the act, Congress intended that a CINC's

"subordinate commanders perceive [the CINC], rather than officers

in the military departments, as the superior whom they serve."119

Congress consciously abandoned the term "full operational

command" because of its historical connotation of circumscribing

the authority of the CINCs.120 In addition to prescribing a single

chain of command, Congress gave the CINCs the authority to

approve the assignment of or to dismiss immediately subordinate

commanders and principal staff officers. It also gave the CINCS

the authority to evaluate formally the duty performance of those

subordinates.121

The type and clarity of authority provided in the act should

have been sufficient to ensure unambiguous organizational

relationships. However, this may not be the case. First, the act

did not give the CINCs true control over the assignment of senior

officers to the commands. The CINCs can refuse to accept

nominated officers,122 but can "hire" officers only if they have

been nominated. By influencing the pools of nominees for senior

positions within the combatant commands, the services can ensure

the officers' residual loyalties after they are assigned. The

CINC's authority over immediate subordinates is further

attenuated by the fact that the services retain influence over

promotions and subsequent assignments of their officers.123 That,

combined with decades of Service indoctrination, causes senior

officers assigned to combatant commands to remain predisposed to

respond to the desires of their services.

A related difficulty results from the act's construct of a

single chain of command. The act does not allow for the "command"

of those Service forces that are not assigned to the CINCs.

Recognizing this reality, the chairman declared that although

there is only one chain of command, it has two branches: one runs

to the CINCs and the other runs to the military departments for

the forces that are not assigned to the CINCs.124 Since the

branching occurs at the Secretary of Defense level, the only

unidimensional link in the "single" chain of command is that

which connects the president and the Secretary of Defense.

Therefore, although Congress, via the GNA, sought to establish a

single chain of command, dual chains persist.125 It should be

noted, however, that the act placed the Service components

exclusively within the CINCs' chain of command. However, the

aforementioned promotion and assignment influence retained by the
26

services may limit the practical significance of that provision.

Thus, the efforts of Congress to buttress the CINCs' authority by

clarifying the chain of command have not been completely

successful.

The CINCs' control over resources is also limited. They have

yet to achieve the degree of control intended by Congress over

the resources the services acquire and allocate to their

commands.126 Simply stated, in the GNA Congress intended that the

CINCs would state their requirements and the services would fill

them to the extent permitted by fiscal constraints. A process

that effects this intent has yet to be perfected.

At present, and for reasons that will be explored more fully

later, the services, not the combatant commands, dominate the

military requirements determination and material acquisition

processes. In addition to exerting primary influence within the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC),127 the services

control the concepts development and research and development

capabilities that yield potential weapons systems and equipment.

In establishing a priority for the systems and equipment he

requires, a CINC currently must do so within the range of

potential capabilities defined by the services. In short, he must

select from a menu developed by the services, and his Service

components may suggest priorities. The process that exists now is

largely one by which the services develop programs for potential

weapons systems and equipment and market them to the CINCs, often

through the Service components.

The CINCs' control over joint training and joint exercises

also remains limited. Currently the CINCs are not provided the

funds needed for joint training and exercises they must conduct

to ensure the readiness of their commands. They still rely on

Service funding.128 By controlling the necessary funds, the

services are able to exert influence over joint training and

exercises properly within the purview of the CINCs. The

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)

recommended that "the CINCs be given more control over the

portion of the Service component training budgets that are

integral to joint training."129

 On balance, it appears that the act strengthened the roles

the CINCs play in the command of forces, operation planning and

execution, and determining requirements for military capability,

but perhaps not to the extent envisioned by Congress. This

conclusion does not imply that the present situation is

unsatisfactory. It merely points out that the act has not been

fully implemented with respect to increasing the authority and

responsibilities of the CINCs and, thus, practical limits remain.
27

Improving Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning.

Through the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress sought to

improve strategy formulation at both the NCA and CJCS levels. At

the NCA level, the act required the president to "transmit to

Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national

security strategy of the United States."130 The national security

strategy report is to be submitted at the same time the

president's budget is submitted. It is to contain,

. . . the national security strategy of the United

States [including] a comprehensive description and

discussion of the following:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of

the United States that are vital to the national

security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and

national defense capabilities of the United States

necessary to deter aggression and to implement the

national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the

political, economic, military, and other elements of

the national power of the United states to protect or

promote the interests and achieve the goals and

objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United

States to carry out the national security strategy of

the United States, including an evaluation of the

balance among the elements of the national power of the

United States to support the implementation of the

national security strategy.

(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help

inform Congress on matters relating to the national

security strategy of the United States.131

In adopting the language of this section of the act,

Congress intended for the president to describe comprehensively

the shortand long-term national security strategies and to

provide assessments of the risks associated with implementing the

strategies. Congress could use the national security strategy

reports to make better informed decisions regarding funding to

support the various elements of national power.

An assessment of the national security strategy reports

produced to date leads to the conclusion that they have not been
28

the comprehensive reports Congress intended. Their very general

nature has prevented them from being more than broad statements

of administration policies concerning national security.132

Consequently, their utility for enabling Congress to assess,

approve, and modify fiscal programs to provide optimally balanced

support of the instruments of national power has been limited.

Without the integrated and substantive evaluation of the balance

among the instruments of national power called for in the act,

congressional efforts to support them necessarily will

fractionate. For example, defense budgets largely have been

debated and defended as separate and distinct issues, and not

within the context of their contributions to synergy among all

the instruments of national power.

Presidential decisions not to fully implement this section

of the act are not surprising. First, to the extent the president

commits to a specific and comprehensive national security

strategy report, he yields flexibility in his ability to

negotiate with Congress regarding budgets and programs. Second,

the greater the specificity the president provides, the more

control he relinquishes to Congress for shaping the resources

allocated to support the various elements of national power.

Third, the more specific the national security strategy, the more

likely it will be at least partially invalidated by unforeseen

geo-strategic developments. Finally, a very specific strategy,

rigidly implemented, could preclude flexible foreign policy

development and implementation. It is understandable that the

president would seek to preserve his flexibility and minimize his

vulnerability to criticism by submitting national security

strategy reports that are sufficiently general to preclude

invalidation and which provide for latitude in foreign policy.

Thus, the presidents' decisions not to implement fully the

national security strategy provisions of the GNA can be at least

partially explained by the constitutionally-created tension

between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S.

government, a valued characteristic of American politics.

Nonetheless, by producing very general reports, the president may

provide greater opportunity for some members of Congress to use

the defense budget to provide home states and districts ample

supplies of defense "pork," even if it results in inefficient

defense spending. On the other hand, it is not clear that if the

president provided the specific and comprehensive national

security strategy report prescribed by the act, he would be

rewarded with more optimal funding for the national priorities he

set forth. On the contrary, he might discover that by committing

to specific national security objectives, a specific strategy for

attaining them, and the precise capabilities required to effect

the strategy, he may have to fight the budget battle with his

hands bound by the very strategy report he submitted. A more

general strategy can accommodate marginal changes without being
29

invalidated, a risk inherent to specific strategies.

The above considerations suggest that, the requirements of

the GNA notwithstanding, the president should probably be allowed

a certain amount of discretion over how much detail he provides

in his national security strategy reports. This suggestion is

supported by the fact that Congress has never refused to accept

the general national security strategy reports submitted by the

current and past presidents. The apparent absence, however, of

congressional and presidential motivation for producing a more

specific report does not necessarily serve the best interests of

the nation. It could well be, as Congress believed when it passed

the GNA, that a more specific report would result in more

efficient application of national resources to national security

needs.133

Reluctance to address the specifics of strategy at the NCA

level seems to have permeated to the level of military strategic

planning as well. The GNA assigned the CJCS specific strategic

and contingency planning responsibilities. With respect to

strategic planning, he is to assist the NCA in providing for the

strategic direction of the armed forces and to prepare strategic

plans which conform to resource guidance provided by the

Secretary of Defense.134

To assist the NCA in providing strategic direction, the

chairman prepares a national military strategy.135 In 1990, the

chairman directed the revision of the Joint Strategic Planning

System (JSPS) to incorporate "the appropriate statutory

responsibilities of the Chairman . . . as delineated in the

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986."136 This revision called for a

national military strategy contained within a larger document,

entitled the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The

strategy set forth in the NMSD was classified, reasonably

comprehensive, and specific. It consisted of approximately 50

pages of text that specified strategic objectives, assumptions,

and priorities.137 However, in 1992, the chairman significantly

altered the content and format of the national military strategy.

This new National Military Strategy (NMS) was (and remains)

unclassified and widely distributed. In comparison to its

predecessor, it read more like national military doctrine and

policy set forth in approximately 10 pages of generalized

narrative.138 Although the chairman continues in other ways to

assist the NCA in the strategic direction of the armed forces,

the formal NMS contributes only in the most general sense to that

process, notwithstanding the intent of the GNA.

The chairman provides for the preparation and review of

contingency plans which conform to NCA policy guidance.139 The

chairman's translation of the policies set forth in the

Secretary's Contingency Planning Guidance into specific planning
30

tasks for the CINCs is promulgated by the chairman's Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan. In response to the JSCP, the CINCs

develop operation plans and submit them to the chairman for

approval.140 In addition to the operation plans deliberately

developed in response to the planning tasks set forth in the

JSCP, the CINCs, following a codified Crisis Action Planning

(CAP) process, also develop plans for unanticipated

contingencies. The chairman is also actively involved in CAP.141

Although the Joint Staff, in consultation with the services

and combatant commands, continues to make improvements, the

contingency planning processes effected by the chairman satisfy

the requirements of the GNA. The translation of policy guidance

into operation plans, using both the deliberate and crisis

planning processes, was demonstrated prior to and after Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait. Following the guidance provided by the Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1989, USCINCCENT began

planning for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against a

strong regional threat. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the

CINC had completed a draft of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90.

With the operational and tactical concepts, logistics concepts,

and force requirements identified through deliberate planning,

the CINC was able to apply the CAP process to convert the draft

OPLAN into an executable plan that yielded excellent results.142

In addition to providing for the preparation and review of

contingency plans, the chairman is also required by the GNA to

prepare strategic plans.143 A strategic plan, global in scope,

could guide the development of and integrate the regional and

functional plans developed by the separate CINCs.144 While the

current planning processes enable the CINCs to develop sound

regional plans, the chairman, due to his global responsibilities

and perspective, is best situated to reconcile, rationalize, and

orchestrate the CINCs' plans. The chairman's efforts in this

regard must be more than merely compiling the CINCs' plans.145 He

should proactively set forth, in a global context, the priority

of the specific objectives for the planning period, the national

strategic concepts for attaining the objectives, and the national

resources that will be applied, including how their application

will be tailored to best serve the established priorities. By

performing this strategy formulation role, the chairman could

ensure that contingency planning better adheres to policy

guidance and would be in a better position to provide strategic

advice to the NCA.

Providing for More Efficient Use of Defense Resources.

To complement the chairman's increased strategic planning

responsibilities, Congress designed several provisions of the GNA

to enable the chairman to promote the efficient use of defense
31

resources. When combined, those provisions describe an integrated

process for determining required military capabilities and

ensuring their efficient provision. The process focuses on the

identification, synthesis, and satisfaction of requirements

identified by the CINCs. The chairman's role in the process is to

solicit the CINCs' requirements, provide national level analyses

of those requirements, assess the extent to which the proposed

programs of the services efficiently satisfy the CINCs'

requirements, and advise the NCA accordingly. Tools which the

chairman can use to fulfill these responsibilities include the

CINCs' Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council (JROC), the chairman's authority to evaluate

the preparedness of the combatant commands,146 and the Chairman's

Current Readiness System.

Three additional provisions of the act also enabled the

chairman to facilitate the efficient use of defense resources:

his responsibility to develop doctrine for the joint employment

of the armed forces; his triennial responsibility to appraise the

roles and functions assigned to the services; and his biennial

responsibility to review the missions, responsibilities, and

force structure of the combatant commands.147 This section

discusses the efficacy of the various tools that Congress

provided to the chairman to enable him to ensure more efficient

use of defense resources.

Determining Requirements. The act requires the chairman to

solicit the requirements of the combatant commands, evaluate,

integrate, and establish priorities for their requirements, and

advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with

respect to their requirements, individually and collectively.148

The secretary then should incorporate, as appropriate, the

chairman's advice and recommendations into the written policy

guidance he issues to DOD components for the preparation of

programs and budgets.149 This process should ensure that the

services and other DOD components consider the requirements of

the CINCs early on, as they develop their programs. Indeed,

Congress intended that the chairman's assessment of program

conformance to the CINCs' requirements would ensure that the

services and other DOD components remained squarely focused on

the CINCs' requirements.150 Currently, there are two distinct

vehicles by which the chairman can help determine the nation's

requirements for specific military capabilities: the CINCS'

Integrated Priority Lists and the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council.

Integrated Priority Lists. The manner in which DOD

identifies, evaluates, integrates, and assesses the requirements

of the CINCs is not completely consistent with the model set

forth in the act. First, the chairman does not formally solicit

the CINCs' requirements. The most direct means by which the CINCs
32

communicate their most important requirements is by submission of

their Integrated Priority Lists to the OSD Director of Program

Analysis and Evaluation, who formally requests them.151 The Joint

Staff receives information copies. The GNA, however, clearly

assigned the responsibility for soliciting the CINCs'

requirements to the chairman, not to OSD.

An associated problem concerns the use of the IPLs once they

are submitted. They are not rationalized at the Joint Staff or

OSD level with any type of overarching strategic plan that might

ascribe relative significance to the various requirements they

contain. Without such a synthesis, it is difficult to establish

an authoritative priority for the various requirements; thus,

their efficacy in predetermining the contents of, or forcing

changes to, Service programs is diminished. This allows the

services to retain considerable autonomy in identifying military

requirements and programming for compensating military

capabilities.

A third problem is that, historically, the IPLs have not

been timely. For example, the IPLs for fiscal years 1996-2001 (FY

96-01) were not submitted until mid-April 1994. By that time, the

services were well along in the development of their recommended

FY 96-01 Program Objective Memoranda (POMs),152 and it was too

late to incorporate new requirements of the CINCs. The best the

services could do was to compare the CINCs IPLs to the services'

draft program objectives and determine the extent to which they

coincided with the CINCs' requirements. It is also difficult to

see how the IPLs helped shape the up-front guidance provided to

DOD components by the Secretary of Defense, given the IPLs' late

submission.153 The effect of these problems with IPL use and

submission has been a lesser focus on the CINCs' definition of

the requirements of their commands than Congress intended in

passing the GNA.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The above

conclusion is warranted, notwithstanding recent initiatives which

expanded the role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council

(JROC) and inaugurated the Joint Warfighting Capability

Assessment (JWCA) process.154 The JWCA process assesses joint

warfighting capabilities in nine areas, ranging from strike

capabilities to warfighting readiness.155 The assessments were

intended to expose opportunities for improving warfighting

effectiveness by identifying requirements, assessing readiness

issues, addressing recapitalization issues, and developing

resource recommendations.156

Nine assessment teams were formed, each sponsored by a Joint

Staff directorate. Although the CINCs are represented, the teams

are composed almost exclusively of Joint Staff, OSD, and Service

personnel. The teams submit recommendations to the JROC, which
33

decides the issues to be briefed to the CINCs and the

recommendations which will ultimately be submitted to the

chairman to assist him in formulating his advice to the Secretary

of Defense. Because the JROC membership consists of the Vice

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chiefs of the

services, and the services are better represented than the CINCs

on the JWCA teams, the services have more influence than the

CINCs over military requirements determined by the JROC process.

The JROC resembles the pre-GNA JCS except the JROC consists

of the vice chairman and vice chiefs of the services. It is

supported by the Joint Staff similar to the pre-GNA JCS.157

However, the JROC differs from the pre-GNA JCS in an important

way; by design, it serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. Therefore, it can remain consistent with the GNA so long

as it does not become an independent entity wielding influence

separate from that of the chairman, particularly with respect to

his role as spokesman for the CINCs' requirements.

That concern can be alleviated, to some extent, by the

chairman's interaction with the process. A case in point is the

recent debate over Theater Missile Defense funding. The JROC

recommended reduced funding for Theater Missile Defense.

Additionally, the Service chiefs drafted a letter for the

chairman's endorsement recommending that funding be reduced.158

The chairman resisted endorsing the Service chiefs' position

because the CINCs placed a high priority on Theater Missile

Defense.159 Thus, the chairman, in his capacity as spokesman for

the CINCs, provided a counterbalance to the services.

On the other hand, the influence of the JROC could grow in a

manner inconsistent with the intent of the GNA. It is noteworthy,

for example, that the council recently testified before Congress.

Its testimony was not confined to requirements for specific

weapons systems but included advice about overall funding levels

for force modernization and recommended personnel levels.160 For

reasons previously stated, the intent of the GNA was to improve

the quality of military advice by transferring many JCS

responsibilities to the chairman. It was not the intent of the

act to permit the chairman to create a shadow JCS, at the vice

chiefs level, to discharge the transferred responsibilities.

Presently, the JROC provides an effective forum through

which the vice chairman, on behalf of the chairman, consults with

the Service Chiefs through their vice chiefs. Nonetheless, if its

recommendations161 depend more on the consensus of its membership

than the integrated requirements of the CINCs, the JROC will not

adhere to the intent of the GNA. One means of preventing JROC

recommendations from becoming products of Service consensus is to

ensure the primacy of the CINCs' stated requirements within the

JROC process. If the chairman were to direct that the JROC must
34

consider the CINCs' IPLs as the principal input into the JWCA

process and the basis of subsequent JROC deliberations, the

requirements of the CINCs would likely drive the requirements

determination process, thus furthering the intent of the GNA.

The chairman relies on the recommendations of the JROC when

preparing the recently instituted Chairman's Program

Recommendation.162 The chairman uses the CPR to influence the

programming guidance the secretary provides to DOD components.163

Additionally, after the secretary has issued his guidance and the

DOD components have submitted their proposed programs, the

chairman, as provided for in the GNA, assesses the extent to

which the programs meet the requirements of the CINCs and the

priorities established in strategic plans.164 He provides his

assessment to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman's Program

Assessment (CPA). This report is also based on the JROC's

recommendations, which are drawn largely from the JWCAs. While in

the past the CPA had minimal impact due to lack of substance, the

current chairman has begun to use it as Congress had intended.165

The question is, however, do the CPR and the CPA adequately

represent the requirements of the CINCs, given that both

documents derive primarily from processes (JROC and JWCA) which

do not use the CINCs' stated requirements as principal input and

in which the combatant commands have limited involvement? An

affirmative answer would be appropriate if the chairman would

solicit, evaluate, and integrate the requirements of the CINCs

via the IPL process, and ensure that the synthesized requirements

serve as the foundation for the JROC's recommendations. The

credibility of the CPA, the assessment of the extent to which the

services' programs satisfy the CINCs' requirements, is

necessarily limited by being based on the recommendations of a

council composed of Service Vice Chiefs. Credibility can be

assured only if it is certain that the requirements for military

capability considered by the JROC focus on the requirements

originally stated by the CINCs. Otherwise, the JROC might be

accused of allowing the services to define the CINCs'

requirements and then allowing the services to assess how well

they satisfied the requirements they defined. That would be

contrary to the intent of the GNA.

A second criticism of the CPA is that it does not assess DOD

programs against the priorities established in strategic plans,

as required by the GNA.166 It is apparent that Congress intended

for the chairman to provide a key synthesis of strategic military

priorities, the requirements of the CINCs, and the programs

designed to satisfy them.167 Congress intended for the chairman to

establish and maintain strategic plans harmonized with the

defense planning period (2-8 years in the future) which would

contain national-level military priorities. Those national

priorities would not only assist the chairman in establishing
35

priorities for the requirements identified by the various CINCs,

but would also provide an objective basis for assessing the

services' POMs. The absence of such strategic plans denies the

chairman one of the bases for conducting his assessment and

prevents him from completely satisfying that provision of the

act.

Preparedness of the Combatant Commands. The GNA further gave

the chairman the responsibility for "[e]stablishing and

maintaining, after consultation with the [CINCs], a uniform

system for evaluating the preparedness of each [combatant]

command to carry out missions assigned to the command."168 The act

also provided that the chairman should "[advise] the secretary on

critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities . . .

identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans

and [assess] the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on

meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic

plans."169

To effect these provisions, the chairman implemented the

Preparedness Evaluation System (PES).170 Under this recently

abandoned system, the CINCs reported on the preparedness of their

respective commands to carry out tasks assigned in the JSCP. They

were also required to specify any significant force deficiencies

identified during the development of their operation plans. The

deficiencies reported would then serve as a basis for identifying

military requirements that may necessitate programmatic action.171

The ultimate product of the PES was the biennial Preparedness

Assessment Report (PAR) which was to contain the chairman's

combined assessment of the preparedness of the combatant

commands. Interestingly, of the three PARs produced, two did not

go beyond the draft stage. The third was approved by the chairman

but was not submitted to the Secretary of Defense.172

The PES was based on self-evaluations by the combatant

commands. The Joint Staff compiled and synthesized the reports

submitted by the various commands and offered some general

observations concerning overall preparedness. However, the Joint

Staff made no effort to evaluate independently the preparedness

of any combatant command. Nor did the Joint Staff assess the

effect that force capability strengths and deficiencies

identified via the PES had on accomplishing national security

objectives or on executing strategic plans. Moreover, while the

combatant commands reported their concerns and deficiencies,

there was no effective process for translating those concerns

into military requirements.

Another difficulty with the PES resulted from its

asynchronous relationship with the DOD PPBS, the process by which

military requirements become military capability. The PES

attempted to identify requirements for military capability by
36

comparing current capability to currently assigned missions. If

programmatic corrective action was required, the requirement had

to be entered into the PPBS. However, the PPBS planning window is

2-8 years in the future, while the plans which exposed the

deficiencies were near-term.173 Consequently, if a deficiency

identified via the PES resulted in programming action, there was

a fair chance that, by the time the resulting military capability

could be fielded, its need would have been obviated by changes in

missions or in the geo-strategic environment. The DOD was

vulnerable to accusations of fielding capabilities which were no

longer required. Therefore, not only was the PES, as applied, of

little use in evaluating the preparedness of the combatant

commands to carry out assigned tasks, it had little utility for

identifying the military requirements of the combatant commands.

For these and other reasons, the PES was replaced in 1995 by the

Chairman's Current Readiness System.

Chairman's Current Readiness System. Rising concern during

1993 and 1994 over the readiness of the United States' armed

forces led to the development of a joint process for reporting

and assessing force readiness.174 The Chairman's Current Readiness

System (CRS), codified in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction (CJCSI), cited as its authority those sections of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act previously cited by the PES as its

authoritative basis.175 Under the CRS, the services report the

readiness of all major units and the CINCs report on their

commands' readiness to integrate and synchronize forces to

execute missions. This near-term process is based on current

readiness reports and 12-months readiness forecasts.176

The CRS has perpetuated, and perhaps exacerbated, the

aforementioned limitations of the PES. Like the PES, the CRS

allows each CINC to evaluate and report the preparedness of his

command. However, unlike the PES, the new system limits the

CINC's reporting to those functional areas that affect his

ability to integrate and synchronize forces.177 The services, on

the other hand, report the readiness of the majority of the

forces assigned to the combatant commands.178 In doing so, the

services are able to highlight the readiness issues of most

concern to them, and the CINCs are not disposed to vet the

services' reports.179 Therefore, Service readiness issues could

dominate this system that purports to evaluate the preparedness

of the combatant commands to carry out assigned missions.

The foregoing assessments suggest that a uniform system for

evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry

out its assigned missions, for identifying force capability

strengths and deficiencies, and for assessing the effect those

strengths and deficiencies have on national security objectives

and strategic plans180 has yet to be successfully implemented.

Additionally, attempts to do so indicate that such a system would
37

be appropriate for identifying near-term risks to carrying out

the national military strategy and could identify current force

deficiencies. Those deficiencies should serve only as a point of

departure for identifying requirements for future military

capabilities. An effective preparedness evaluation system would

have value to DOD and should be pursued.

Joint Doctrine. The GNA assigned the CJCS the responsibility

for developing doctrine for the joint employment of U.S. armed

forces.181 Joint doctrine can enhance the effective and efficient

application of U.S. forces by clarifying and rationalizing the

respective operational roles of the forces provided by the

services. Joint doctrine can create synergies within joint forces

that directly lead to increased operational capabilities at lower

levels of committed resources.

Since passage of the GNA, the chairman has made great

progress in developing a body of joint doctrine that does just

that, and more is yet to come. Currently, about 100 joint

doctrine publications are contemplated. That number will likely

grow as needs for additional doctrine are identified. To date, 62

doctrinal manuals have been published, and 30 more are under

development. They address topics ranging from the overall concept

of joint warfare to the focused conduct of joint mortuary

affairs.182 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M.

Shalikashvili, recently increased the impact of joint doctrine by

directing that the qualifier that appears in all joint doctrine

publications be changed from, "This publication is authoritative

but not directive. . . " to "The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine. . .

except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."183

General Shalikashvili also established the Joint Warfighting

Center and charged it to broaden understanding of joint doctrine

throughout the U.S. armed forces.184 The chairman has implemented

other measures to increase access to and understanding of joint

doctrine. For example, he has begun the repackaging of joint

doctrine publications into attractive, convenient, and easytounderstand booklets and has distributed a Joint Doctrine

Professional Library Desk Set. The set includes a CD ROM

containing the Joint Electronic Library, a collection of all the

approved joint doctrine publications, selected Service

publications, and doctrine related research papers. The chairman

also has made the library available on the Internet

(http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/).

While the development of joint doctrine has proceeded at an

impressive pace, the development process and its products have

been subject to some criticism. The criticism generally centered

around the fact that the development process was consensus-based

and analogous to the pre-GNA JCS system in that it fostered
38

watered-down, bland doctrine. There was also a perception that

doctrine publications were biased by the parochial views of the

services that were designated as the lead-agents for guiding the

development of the various manuals. Since lead-agent

responsibilities were distributed among the services,

inconsistencies across doctrine publications arose.185

The chairman has taken measures to improve the joint

doctrine development process and thus the doctrine it produces.

Notably, the Joint Warfighting Center has assumed a more

assertive role in the management of joint doctrine development.

It recently established the policy that early drafts of doctrine

publications will be produced by joint working groups rather than

by the services designated as lead agents.186 That should preclude

Service parochialism from gaining initial, and often enduring,

footholds in joint doctrine manuals. Additionally, the Joint

Warfighting Center will assist the development effort by

establishing the joint perspective at the beginning and ensuring

it is carried through to publication. In that capacity, the Joint

Warfighting Center also will be in a position to help eliminate

inconsistencies among joint doctrine publications. These

initiatives and others will continue to improve the expanding

body of joint doctrine.

Roles, Missions, Functions. Under the GNA, the CJCS must

triennially review and recommend changes to the assignment of

roles, missions, and functions to the components of the armed

forces that may yield increased effectiveness and efficiency.187

Since the act was passed, two formal reports have been published.

The first, prepared under Admiral William Crowe, received little

notice. The second, submitted by General Powell, received

considerable criticism, not because it contained controversial

recommendations but because it did not.188 For the most part, the

report endorsed the status quo and contributed little to the

expected "peace dividend" because it did not identify ways to

reduce significantly unnecessary duplication and redundancy among

the services.189

In response,190 Congress mandated that the Secretary of

Defense establish an independent Commission on Roles and Missions

(CORM).192 Congress intended for the CORM to "review . . . the

appropriateness . . . of the current allocations of roles,

missions, and functions among the armed forces; evaluate and

report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for

changes . . . ."192

After beginning its study, the CORM determined that Congress

had given the commission the wrong mission and that its proper

task was to assess how to better ensure that the CINCs are

provided the capabilities they need to fulfill their missions.193

Consequently, the CORM purposefully did not address the thorny
39

issues of roles, missions, and functions allocations.194 Indeed,

the vast majority of the CORM's recommendations had nothing to do

with the allocation of roles, missions, and functions. Of those

that did, many were already under study by DOD or in some stage

of actual implementation. The CORM recommended that several other

issues be studied further before being implemented. Only a few

authentic, albeit relatively insignificant, recommendations

concerning roles and functions were made and acted upon.195

The current CJCS elected to endorse the CORM report rather

than submit his own triennial report.196 In short, since the GNA

created the requirement for a triennial assessment and report on

roles, missions, and functions, no significant additions,

deletions, or reallocations have been recommended to Congress.

One explanation could be that no significant changes are

warranted. General Shalikashvili, however, has offered another

possible explanation: such a task may be too difficult for DOD.197

The latter explanation is consistent with the CORM's failure to

recommend significant changes.198 One may reasonably conclude that

the Congressional intent regarding this subject, as expressed in

the GNA, has yet to be fully implemented.

Unified Command Plan. One final provision of the act that

influences the efficient use of defense resources warrants

review. The act required the chairman, at least biennially, to

"review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic

boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command and

recommend to the [NCA] any changes . . . as may be necessary."199

In fulfilling this responsibility, the current and two previous

chairmen have performed biennial reviews of the Unified Command

Plan (UCP). The UCP is the document approved by the president

that describes the unified command structure of the combatant

commands.200 Since the end of the Cold War, various Chairmen of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended several revisions of

the plan.201

The Commission on Roles and Missions suggested that

additional changes to the UCP are necessary to support the new

National Security Strategy and to conform to the post-Cold War

strategic environment. Specifically, the CORM recommended changes

that would enable the U.S. armed forces to adapt more rapidly to

changing threat environments and to reduce seams between CINCs'

areas of responsibility that straddle unstable areas.202 The

chairman's most recent biennial review, conducted after release

of the CORM report, resulted in significant, but different,

recommendations203 which were approved by the NCA.204 In any event,

the chairman, like his predecessors, has complied with the letter

and intent of the GNA.

Improving Joint Officer Management.
40

One of the more significant provisions of the GNA addressed

"policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management

of officers of the . . . active duty list who are particularly

trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters . . . ."205 These

officers were to become skilled in "the integrated employment of

land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national

military strategy, strategic planning and contingency planning,

and command and control of combat operations under unified

command."206 Through joint officer management measures, Congress

intended to improve the quality of the Joint Staff as well as the

quality of the CINCs' staffs. Former Secretary of Defense Frank

Carlucci noted that Title IV of the GNA, Joint Officer

Management, was "the most extensive legislation concerning joint

officer personnel management in history and pose[d] the most

complex implementation requirements since the Defense Officer

Personnel Management Act of 1980."207

To facilitate the development of "Joint Specialty Officers"

(JSOs), Congress prescribed minimum requirements for the number

of joint duty positions that must be filled by qualified JSOs,

their education and tour of duty length, and promotion

requirements for officers who have served or are serving in joint

assignments. Implementation of those provisions has presented a

daunting challenge to DOD.208

Title IV's salient provisions included a requirement for the

Secretary of Defense to publish a list of the joint duty

positions within DOD and to ensure at least half were filled by

JSOs or JSO nominees. Furthermore, he was to designate at least

1,000 critical joint duty assignment positions that could be held

only by fully qualified JSOs.209 By 1988, the secretary had

published a list of 8,452 joint duty assignment positions, 1,000

of which were designated as critical. By 1995, the total number

of joint positions had grown to 9,075. Although the number of

positions designated as critical also grew between 1988 and 1993,

former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney reduced it to the

congressionally mandated 1,000 by 1994, where it has remained.210

This action reflects the challenge of filling critical positions

with fully qualified JSOs. The difficulty stems, in large

measure, from the time required to develop a JSO in accordance

with the education and experience requirements specified by

Congress.

Title IV of the GNA also provided that an officer may not be

selected as a JSO until he/she attends a joint professional

military education school and subsequently completes a full tour

of duty in a joint duty assignment.211 In 1989 Congress elaborated

on the educational requirement by specifying that a two-phase,

sequenced approach be followed. Phase I instruction consists of a

joint curriculum taught in addition to the principal curriculum
41

of Service colleges. Phase II consists of a follow-on, solely

joint, curriculum taught at the Armed Forces Staff College to

officers who are expected to be selected as JSOs.212 Presently,

joint professional military education is not only

institutionalized within the National Defense University but is

also becoming a larger part of the curricula of comparable

Service colleges;213 all services provide Phase I instruction in

their senior colleges.214

Title IV also required the Secretary of Defense to establish

a "Capstone Course" for newly appointed general and flag officers

that would prepare them to work with the other services. The act

required each officer selected for promotion to one-star rank to

attend unless the officer's immediately preceding assignment was

joint, there are no joint requirements for his/her field of

expertise, or it would otherwise be in the best interest of the

officer's Service that he/she not attend.215 Of the 660 officers

promoted to one-star rank over the past 5 years, only 45, or 7

percent, were waived from Capstone attendance, and, over the past

2 years, waivers have dropped to 2 percent.216 As with the

education of potential JSOs, DOD has effectively implemented the

Congressional intent with respect to educating new flag officers.

Generally, DOD has also been successful in effecting the

congressional intent that joint professional education be

followed by the experience of a full joint duty assignment. The

act defined a full joint duty tour as 3 years for flag officers

and 3 1/2 years for all others.217 In subsequent legislation,

Congress redefined the full tour as 2 years for flag officers and

3 years for all others.218 The act gave the Secretary of Defense

the authority to waive tour length requirements for any officer

so long as the average tour length for both categories of

officers met or exceeded the 2and 3-year standards. Additionally,

the secretary could authorize tour lengths as short as 2 years

for officers who had critical operational specialties involving

combat.219

Over the past 5 years, average joint tour lengths have

exceeded the requirements of the act. However, in the case of

flag officers, two of the services have exceeded the average

joint tour length requirement, while two have failed to meet

it.220 This notwithstanding, DOD as a whole has achieved the

stability in joint duty tours intended by Congress.

In Title IV of the act, Congress also set forth a method for

assessing whether the services assigned highly capable officers

to joint duty. The method was based on the expectation that if

high quality officers were, in fact, assigned to joint duty,

their promotion rates should match or exceed those of officers

not performing joint duty. Specifically, the act provided that

officers serving or having served on the Joint Staff are expected
42

to be promoted at a rate not less than that for officers who are

or have served on the staffs of the services. Also, officers who

are serving or have served on other joint staffs are expected to

be promoted at a rate not less than that for non-joint officers

within the same competitive category. The act required the

Secretary of Defense immediately to notify Congress if promotion

rates for any selection board failed to meet the congressional

expectations and to identify any remedial actions the secretary

had taken or planned to take.221

DOD's record in meeting the congressional expectations has

been mixed, with sharp contrasts among the services. Over the

past 5 years, the U.S. Air Force failed to meet joint officer

promotion expectations for the ranks of colonel through major

general on four occasions. For comparable ranks, the U.S. Navy

failed to meet joint officer promotion expectations on one

occasion. The U.S. Army, for comparable ranks, failed to meet

joint officer promotion expectations on nine occasions, and the

U.S. Marine Corps failed on 11 occasions. This record suggests

that the implementation of the joint officer promotion provisions

of the act requires continued DOD emphasis, but it also points to

systemic problems yet to be overcome.

One explanation for why officers who serve, or have served,

in joint assignments are less competitive for promotion to

general relates to the varied promotion policies of the services.

In the Army, for example, generally, superior performance alone

will not result in promotion to general. In most cases, an

officer also must have served in qualifying Service positions

such as battalion command, key staff, and brigade (colonel-level)

command. In short, it is difficult for an officer to become

educated as a joint specialty officer, serve in joint duty

assignments, and still attain the Service prerequisites for

promotion to general.222

Exacerbating this situation is the fact that officers are

often assigned to perform joint duty at the point in their

careers when they are in critical competition for colonel-level

command.223 Since they are obligated to serve in the joint

position for 3 years, or 2 years with a waiver, they are rendered

less competitive during that time for Service command selection.

A delay of even a year in being selected for colonel-level

command means an entirely new year-group of officers is added to

the joint staff officer's competitive pool. Thus, the manner in

which a Service implements the act's joint staff officer

provisions can influence whether the congressional intent is

realized or whether quality officers will be discouraged from

seeking joint assignments.

Overall, DOD has made significant progress in implementing

the complex joint officer management provisions of the act.
43

However, implementation has been imperfect in some respects. This

has been due primarily to the act's joint staff officer

management provisions' incompatibility with the promotion and

command selection systems of some of the services.

CONCLUSIONS

The DOD has substantially, but not completely, implemented

the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The provisions that were intended to

strengthen civilian authority over the armed forces have been

embedded within the DOD structure and processes. The promulgation

of Defense Planning Guidance by the Secretary of Defense has

increased his authority over the development of programs by DOD

components, but the act's requirement that the secretary provide

new planning guidance annually is ill-advised, and the recent

trend of producing a new guidance document annually denies DOD

components needed stability in program development. Major annual

adjustments in planning guidance will likely result in planning

and programming inefficiencies and decreased effectiveness of the

U.S. armed forces. Finally, if the DPG were based more directly

on the Integrated Priority Lists submitted by the CINCs and

contained more specific program priorities and guidance, the

services could develop programs that more efficiently satisfy the

requirements of the CINCs.

As a result of the GNA, the Secretary of Defense and his

designated representatives have become thoroughly involved in

deliberate and crisis contingency planning. Not only has this

strengthened civilian authority over the armed forces, it has

also brought about increased dialogue between senior civilian and

military leaders concerning the planning for potential or

imminent operations. The result has been better comprehension by

civilian leaders of the risks associated with various operation

plans and a concomitant increase in understanding by military

senior leadership of the support civilian leaders may lend to

various operations.

The GNA has improved the quality and the usefulness of the

military advice provided to the NCA, particularly the provisions

of the act that increased the authority and responsibilities of

the CJCS. The present relationship between the chairman and the

NCA conforms to the intent of the GNA. However, evidence suggests

that the chairman's position may have grown too strong in the

eyes of the Service Chiefs. The chairman can relieve their

concern by consulting them more frequently and enforcing Joint

Staff procedures designed to ensure adequate opportunities for

Service staff review of pertinent issues. That would have the

collateral benefit of enhancing the advice the chairman provides

to the NCA.

 The act has not been fully implemented with respect to
44

improving strategy formulation. The national security strategy

reports produced by successive presidents since passage of the

act have not been consistent with the act's requirements. They

have not been sufficiently comprehensive and specific. Although

neither Congress nor the president appears concerned about the

vagueness of the reports, the nation would benefit from the type

of report specified in the GNA.

Likewise, the act's provision for military strategic

planning has not been fully implemented. The chairman does not

prepare the type of strategic plans called for in the act. He

provides for the preparation and review of contingency plans via

the JSCP. But without the benefit of an overarching strategic

plan, the effective national level integration of the CINCs'

contingency planning is problematic. Similarly, the evaluation

and integration of the CINCs' requirements at the national level

and the synthesized assessment of the services' programs are less

coherent because they lack the substantial basis an overarching

national military strategic plan would provide.

Implementation of the act expanded the authority and

responsibility of the CINCs, but not to the extent intended by

Congress. Congress' attempt to specify a single chain of command

has not completely resolved the competition between the chains of

command to the services and combatant commands. Two chains exist

today except that they are called "branches" of the chain of

command. A single chain of command does not reflect reality. The

services must exercise command over the forces that are not

assigned to the combatant commands. The competition between the

two chains that still exists at the Service component level

causes the CINCs' command of the Service component commanders to

be diluted. That helps perpetuate the limited control the CINCs

have over resources provided to the commands by the services.

The real authority exercised by the CINCs is determined,

largely, by the extent to which the CJCS acts as their spokesman.

If he is a consistent advocate for the CINCs, their real

influence will increase. If he is more consistently influenced by

the Service Chiefs, the real authority of the CINCs will be

diminished. Thus, the manner in which the chairman performs his

duties is the critical determinant of the relationship between

the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. There are indications that the

chairman could be a stronger advocate for the CINCs, while still

consulting more frequently with the Service Chiefs. He must

ensure the CINCs' interests are protected within the Servicedominated JROC, that the Service Chiefs do not encroach upon the

authorities of the CINCs, and that the services program and spend

their training funds to support the CINCs' joint training and

exercise requirements. However, the chairman must also ensure the

Service Chiefs are afforded the authority and latitude they need

to perform efficiently the 12 Service functions.
45

 Contrary to the intent of the act, the services have

retained dominant influence in the military requirements

determination process. The JROC improved the joint

rationalization of military requirements, but has yet to achieve

the focus on the CINCs' requirements intended by Congress. The

Chairman's Program Recommendation and the Chairman's Program

Assessment are more influenced by the services than by the CINCs.

The CINCs' involvement in the JROC is limited and the chairman

does not formally solicit, evaluate, integrate, and establish

priorities for their requirements. Additionally, the CINCs are

not well represented within the JWCA process. Combined, these

factors have frustrated the intent of the GNA. If Service

programs are to be effectively rationalized by the Secretary of

Defense in this era of reduced resource availability, the CJCS

must provide useful advice to the secretary. It must be based on

his integration, evaluation, and synthesis of the CINCs'

requirements which, consequently, provide the unifying basis for

the Future Years Defense Program.

An effective system for evaluating the preparedness of the

combatant commands, identifying force capability strengths and

deficiencies, and assessing the impact of the strengths and

deficiencies has yet to be developed and implemented.

The CJCS has developed a robust body of joint doctrine that,

inter alia, harmonizes and rationalizes the operational roles of

forces provided by the services. In doing so, joint doctrine

facilitates effective and efficient application of defense

resources. The chairman's recent initiatives will improve both

the form and substance of joint doctrine, making it better

understood and even more effective. The congressional intent

regarding joint doctrine has been accomplished.

The lack of any significant reallocations of roles and

functions since passage of the GNA indicates that either the

roles and functions of the armed forces are optimally distributed

or have yet to receive the critical review Congress had intended.

The establishment of the congressionally mandated CORM suggests

the latter to be the case, and that Congress' intent with respect

to the triennial review of the roles, missions, and functions of

the armed forces generally has not been realized.

The congressional intent for periodic reviews of the

missions, responsibilities, and force structures of the combatant

commands has been realized. Successive Chairmen of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have conducted biennial reviews, and several

significant revisions of the UCP have resulted. The DOD's

implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the

GNA has been generally successful. An effective joint

professional military education system has been established, the
46

quality of joint staff officers has generally improved, and the

percentage of general/flag officers with joint experience or

training has increased. However, problems remain. Two services

have failed to meet the act's prescribed minimum joint tour

lengths for flag officers. Additionally, all of the services, on

occasion, have failed to meet the joint officer promotion

requirements of the GNA. There is evidence that the joint

education and assignment requirements of the GNA may, in fact,

inhibit an officer's potential for promotion to flag rank.

SUMMARY

The result of DOD's implementation of the GNA has been

continued evolution toward unified armed forces. The Office of

the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant

commands, and the services are arriving at a balanced

relationship in which civilian authority is supreme. The lively

debate that accompanied the recent Commission on Roles and

Missions deliberations demonstrated that the services are still

distinct and independent, despite certain movement toward unified

operations and joint organizations. Implementation of the act has

not resulted in the combatant commands gaining as much, nor the

services losing as much, influence as Congress intended,

particularly within the resource management area. Service

parochialism has been significantly mitigated but still exists.

An admiral assigned to the Joint Staff summed-up the current

situation when he said, "I may wear a purple suit, but it is

still double-breasted." Increased effectiveness and greater

efficiencies are possible through further implementation of the

act. However, the DOD must ensure that the services are not so

reduced in stature and influence that they lose their motivations

and abilities to compete for scarce defense resources and

accomplish their other national security roles and functions.

Determining which portions of the act require more strict

implementation and what supplementary legislation is required to

achieve the increases in effectiveness and efficiency Congress

anticipated are the relevant issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Congress should insist that presidents produce national

security strategy reports that are as comprehensive and specific

as the act requires.

• The Secretary of Defense should promote stability in

defense program planning by reverting to a biennial Defense

Planning Guidance publication cycle. Congress should amend the

Goldwater-Nichols Act to permit biennial publication.

• The Secretary of Defense should establish policy to ensure

that the chairman adequately consults with the other members of
47

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress should amend the act to

instruct the chairman to consult the other members of the JCS on

all issues with potential impact on the services, while allowing

him to remain unbound by such consultation.

• The Secretary of Defense should conduct a review of the

relationship of the CINCs to their Service component commanders

and the latter's relationship to their Service Chiefs. The review

should affirm the chain of command from the NCA to the CINCs and

develop a concept for the chain of command that runs from the NCA

through the military departments. Congress should amend the GNA

to recognize, define, and describe both chains of command.

• The Secretary of Defense should establish policy that a

certain percentage of Service OPTEMPO funding be dedicated to

joint training and exercises. Congress should revise the GNA

expressly authorizing the secretary to do so.

• The chairman should develop national military strategic

plans keyed to the Future Years Defense Program periods.

• The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the GNA,

should transfer responsibility for administering the Integrated

Priority List process to the chairman from the Director for

Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of the

Secretary of Defense. The chairman should restructure the process

so that it focuses on specific capabilities needed rather than

particular programs, and should use the IPLs as the primary basis

for determining military requirements.

• The chairman should develop and implement a system for

evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands that does

not rely on self-evaluations by the commands. The system should

identify force strengths and deficiencies as well as assess their

impact on accomplishing national security objectives and on

strategic plans.

• As the Joint Warfighting Center matures, the chairman

should continue to increase its oversight of the joint doctrine

development process.

• If it is the sense of Congress that significant changes in

the roles and functions of the U.S. armed forces are required, it

should establish its own commission to identify needed changes

and propose appropriate legislation.

• The Secretary of Defense should continue to emphasize full

implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the

GNA with the objective of bringing all services into compliance.

• Congress should add language to the act which would ensure
48

officers are not rendered less competitive for promotion for

having received joint education and having served in joint

assignments.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,

Defense Organization and the Need for Change, Staff Report, 99th

Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1985, p. 49.

2. Unified operations are those that take place within the

unified combatant commands which are composed of forces from two

or more military departments. Unified operations is the generic

term used to describe the wide scope of actions that take place

under the direction of the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the

unified combatant commands. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02,

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 23,

1994, p. 400.

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, The

Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and

Organization, 1944-1978, edited by Alice C. Cole, et. al., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 7.

4. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, pp. 49-53.

5. Although some of the early proponents of unification

advocated such a radical reorganization, that option has not been

seriously considered since at least 1949. Lawrence J. Korb,

"Service Unification: Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies," Naval

Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, 1976, p. 176.

6. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,

Conference Report 99-824, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 3. The provisions

of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act have been codified in Title 10, United States

Code, Armed Forces. Several provisions have been modified by

subsequent legislation; however, none have been deleted or

significantly altered. Therefore, an assessment of the act's

implementation, based on the provisions of the act itself is

appropriate.

7. Korb, pp. 178-179. Generally, the belief is that to the

extent a unified armed forces would speak with one voice,

Congress would be less able to uncover and debate divergent views

on critical defense issues. That, in turn, would inhibit
49

congressional ability to oversee the armed forces reasonably.

8. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, p. 50.

9. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and

Organization, 1944-1978, pp. 77-80.

10. Defense Organization and the Need for Change, p. 52. The

1949 Amendment also removed the secretaries of the military

services from the National Security Council. The Department of

Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978,

pp. 84-86.

11. Ibid., p. 86.

12. The President and the Secretary of Defense make up the

National Command Authorities (NCA). Joint Pub 1-02, Department of

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 253.

13. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment

and Organization, 1944-1978, pp. 94-95.

14. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, pp. 52-53.

15. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment

and Organization, 1944-1978, pp. 161-162.

16. Ibid., pp. 239-241. The fundamental underlying rationale

for the continued movement toward unification was the belief that

independent military departments and services resulted in

unnecessary duplication and waste. Centralized direction and

control, on the other hand, promised better rationalization of

the acquisition and application of forces, leading to increased

effectiveness and efficiency.

17. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, Why it Failed, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985, p. 6.

18. Ibid., p. 20.

19. Ibid., pp. 16-43; Gregory P. Gass, Command and Control:

the Achilles Heel of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, Alexandria,

VA: Defense Technical Information Center, February 13, 1992, p.

11.

20. "Joint" connotes activities, operations, and

organizations in which elements of more than one service of the

same nation participate. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 200.

21. Gass, pp. 11-18.
50

22. Ryan, pp. 12-16, 28-30, 125.

23. Gass, pp. 1-26.

24. Ryan, pp. 1-2.

25. Howard Husock, Seige Mentality: ABC, the White House and

the Iran Hostage Crisis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University,

Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 1988, pp. 1-22; Ryan,

pp. 95-99.

26. Ryan, p. 105. The release of the hostages on January 20,

1981, within minutes of President Ronald Reagan's inauguration,

did not assuage congressional concern.

27. U.S. Department of Defense, Commission on Beirut

International Airport Terrorist Attack, Report of the DOD

Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, Washington, DC, October 23, 1983, pp. 1-34.

28. Ibid., pp. 29-34.

29. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan announced the

redeployment of the Marines, and on March 30, 1984, he reported

to Congress that the United States was no longer involved in the

multinational force in Lebanon. Gary M. Stern and Morton

Halperin, The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984, p. 68.

30. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Investigations

Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Adequacy of U.S.

Marine Corps Security in Beirut. Summary of Findings and

Conclusions of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee

on Armed Services, Staff Report, 99th Congress, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983, pp.1-3.

31. Ibid., pp. 25-70.

32. In an address to the nation on October 27, 1983,

President Reagan suggested a direct relationship between the

Beirut bombing and the invasion of Grenada. "When Threatened, We

Stand Shoulder to Shoulder," The Washington Post, October 28,

1983, p. A14.

33. Reynold A. Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 71-75; "Secrets From the

Reagan Years," Newsweek, October 30, 1995, p. 6.

34. Although planning for the Grenada invasion was underway

by October 14th, the President did not give his approval for the
51

operation until October 24th. William C. Gilmore, The Grenada

Intervention: Analysis and Documentation, New York: Facts on

File, 1984, pp. 31-36.

35. Burrowes, pp. 79-80.

36. In an April 1984 report to the Congressional Military

Reform Caucus, William S. Lind, of the Military Reform Institute,

made the following observation:

The United States required seven battalions of troops, plus

elements of two other battalions, to defeat fewer than 700 Cubans

and a Grenadian army that hardly fought at all. Only about 200 of

the Cubans were troops; the remainder were construction workers

with some militia training. The overwhelmingly superior U.S.

forces took three days to defeat the Cuban defense and about

another five days to secure the entire island. By way of

contrast, the British defeated more than 11,000 Argentines with

just eight infantry battalions in the Falklands.

In addition to criticizing the disappointing performance of

special operations and U.S. Army units, Lind cited deficient

military planning and the insistence of the JCS that all four

services be involved ("just as in the Iran hostage rescue

mission"). William S. Lind, Report to the Congressional Military

Reform Caucus, Subject: The Grenada Operation, Washington, DC:

Military Reform Institute, 1984, pp. 2-5.

37. Fred Hiatt, "Many U.S. Casualties Caused by Accidents,"

The Washington Post, November 1, 1983, p. 1.

38. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, the Battle for Grenada, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 221-230, 333-342.

39. Lind, pp. 2-5.

40. Burrowes, pp. 82-83.

41. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, p. 13.

42. Ibid., p. III.

43. The acquisition process is the process by which

requirements for military capabilities are converted into defense

acquisition programs which yield fielded capabilities.

44. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, pp. 1-12.

45. David Packard, A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to

the President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense

Management, Washington, DC, June 1986, p. 1.
52

46. David Packard, letter dated June 30, 1986, transmitting

to President Reagan the final report of the President's Blue

Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.

 47. Packard, A Quest for Excellence, Final Report to the

President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,

pp. xvii-xviii.

48. Ibid., pp. xvii-xxx. In the interest of brevity and

since they are not central to an assessment of the 1986

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, the

specific recommendations concerning acquisition reform and

government-industry accountability are not provided in this

study.

49. Michael Ganley, "Reorganization Bill Almost Certain to

Reach the President's Desk This Year," Armed Forces Journal

International, Vol. 123, No. 10, April 1986, p. 16.

50. Ibid., pp. 16-18; Michael Ganley, "DOD Reorganization

Bill Sweeps Through Senate on Unanimous Vote," Armed Forces

Journal International, Vol. 123, No. 12, June 1986, pp. 14-16.

51. Then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger believed

that congressionally mandated reorganization of the Department of

Defense was unnecessary and that any increase in the influence of

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff would be at the expense

of the Secretary of Defense. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

Tidal McCoy believed that the DOD was already too centralized and

that the service secretaries needed more, not less, autonomy.

Secretary of the Navy John Lehman claimed that the Executive

Branch had been worshipping "at the alter of the false idols of

centralization and unification" for the past 30 years. Bryan

Howard Ward, United States Defense Reorganizations: Contending

Explanations, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1995, pp.

324-327.

52. Although prior to establishing the Packard Commission in

mid-1985 President Reagan considered defense reorganization an

issue to be handled by the Secretary of Defense, his formation of

the commission and rapid approval of its recommendations evinced

his belief that reform was necessary. Ward, pp. 324-327.

53. On May 7, 1986, the Senate approved its version of the

reorganization bill by a vote of 95 to 0. On August 5, 1986, the

House approved its version by a vote of 406 to 4. It seemed that

in the entire Congress, only four members did not support the

type of reform under consideration. U.S. Congress, Congressional

Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 16,
53

1986, p. S12652; U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, Proceedings

and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, September 17, 1986, pp. H7005-

H7008.

54. The conference met formally on August 13, and September

11, 1986. While over 100 amendments were considered, there were

only three substantive areas that required resolution, and they

were easily resolved. Senator Goldwater characterized the

conference as the most cordial and cooperative in his memory.

Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th

Congress, 2d Session, September 17, 1986, p. H7005; Congressional

Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2d Session,

September 16, 1986, pp. S12652-S12653.

55. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 3.

56. Ibid., p. 5.

57. Prior to passage of the GNA, the Secretary of Defense

promulgated a similar document, the Defense Guidance (DG). The

DPG which resulted from the GNA has proven to be a more

authoritative document. For a description of the discontinued DG, see Department of Defense Instruction 7045.7, Subject:

Implementation of the Planning, Programing and Budgeting System

(PPBS), Gaithersburg, MD: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1984,

p. 2-1.

58. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Department of Defense Directive 7045.14, Subject: The

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), Change 1,

July 28, 1990, p. 3.

59. The actual fiscal guidance upon which DOD components

base their programs, for convenience, is not included in the DPG

but provided in a separate document.

60. The type of review the BUR represented would have

normally been conducted using the Joint Strategy Review (JSR)

process of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). The reason

given for not using the established JSPS was that the Secretary

of Defense wanted to be able to affect the FY 95 budget and the

formal JSR timeline was too long. However, the Report of the

Bottom-Up Review was not published until October 1993. The JSR

could have produced a report months earlier.

61. Contingency planning is the deliberate and crisis

oriented operation planning conducted by the CINCs. Unlike DOD's

program planning that addresses the mid-range planning period,

contingency planning is for potential near-term operations that
54

may be conducted during the next 2 years. Contingency planning

considers the best ways to use existing military capabilities

while program planning helps develop future capabilities.

62. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 5.

63. Ibid., p. 17.

64. U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Reorganization,

Compliance with Legislative Mandate for Contingency Planning,

GAO/NSIAD-91-312, Gaithersburg, MD, September, 1991, passim.

65. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Joint

Strategic Planning System, 1st Rev., Washington, DC, March 17,

1993, p. VII-3.

66. Edward N. Luttwak asserts that presidential appointees

are not allowed to examine contingency plans and that the plans

may be reviewed only by a small cell of selected officials who

have been extended the "privilege" by the Joint Staff.

("Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May, 1994, p. 31.)

This comment is misleading, if not inaccurate. The GoldwaterNichols Act provides that the Undersecretary of Defense for

Policy (USD(P)) will assist the Secretary of Defense in preparing

written policy guidance for the preparation and review of

contingency plans and in actually reviewing the plans.

(Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 7). To implement this

provision of the Act, the Secretary of Defense has authorized the

USD(P), and other members of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, to review contingency plans. Based on this authorization

by the Secretary, the Joint Staff provides the plans for review

by the appropriate OSD officials.

67. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 5.

68. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, p. 158.

The President and the Secretary of Defense make up the National

Command Authorities (NCA). Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 253.

69. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, p. 159.

70. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the

99th Congress, 2d Session, October 3, 1985, p. S12535.

71. Ibid., pp. S12533-12534.
55

72. Packard, A Quest for Excellence, p. 35.

73. Ibid.; Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 17, 15,

19 and 94, respectively.

74. Ibid., p. 21.

75. Ibid., p. 30. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the

Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 5100.1,

Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components,

Washington, DC, September 25, 1987, p. 6.

76. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 18.

77. Ibid., p. 23.

78. Ibid., p. 15.

79. Ibid., p. 16.

80. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

81. Ibid., pp. 16, 19, and 23, respectively.

82. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

83. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," passim; Colin

Powell, John Lehman, William Odom and Samuel Huntington, "An

Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," The National Interest, Summer, 1994, passim.

84. Luttwak, p. 29.

85. Powell, et. al., pp. 23-25.

86. Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control, the Crisis in CivilMilitary Relations," The National Interest, Spring, 1994, p. 11.

87. For example, General John Shalikashvili did, in fact,

assess the programs of the services and offered alternative

program recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. General

Colin Powell stopped short of actually criticizing the services'

programs and his assessment, only a page in length, essentially

said that they were all satisfactory.

88. Kohn, p. 11.

89. Powell, et. al., p. 23.
56

90. Kohn, p. 9.

91. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 18. In part, section

153 of the act requires the Chairman to submit to the Secretary

of Defense alternative program recommendations and budget

proposals within projected resource levels and guidance provided

by the Secretary.

92. Ibid., p. 17.

93. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Interim Report to

Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July

1991, pp. 26-1, 26-2.

94. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the

99th Congress, 2d Session, September 16, 1986, p. S12655.

95. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the

99th Congress, 2d Session, September 17, 1986, p. H7006.

96. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5711.01, Policy on Action

Processing, Washington, DC, July 12, 1993, pp. 2-3.

97. This is based on discussions with Joint Staff officers

who have had access to the JCS meeting schedules. Also, the

office of the Special Assistant to the Chairman for Joint

Matters, which was charged to manage such meetings, has been

eliminated.

98. "Blue Mundy," Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1995, p.

A-1.

99. The Joint Staff developed the report for the current

chairman without the normal lower-level coordination with the

services. The Chairman provided the Service Chiefs with a copy of

the finished report 24 hours before he was to provide it to the

Secretary of Defense. This left the Service Chiefs with

insufficient time to have their staffs assess the adequacy and

fairness of the report from a Service perspective. According to

Joint Staff officers involved in preparing the CPR, the Chairman

submitted the report to the Secretary without consulting the

Service Chiefs because he considered the report to be personal

correspondence between him and the Secretary. (Nonattribution

interview with a senior Joint Staff officer familiar with the

preparation and submission of the CPR.)

100. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to
57

Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992,

p. xxv.

101. A unified command is a command with broad continuing

missions under a single commander and composed of forces from two

or more military departments. A specified command is a command

that has broad continuing missions and is normally composed of

forces from a single military department. U.S. Department of

Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF),

Washington, DC, February 24, 1995, p. xv. Although presently no

specified commands exist, their creation remains provided for in

Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, and the UNAAF

recognizes their viability.

102. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 24. During the joint

conference, a Senate amendment was introduced that would have had

the act specify the basic CINC responsibilities such as security

of the command, mission accomplishment, and directing

coordination among subordinates. The conferees determined the

general responsibilities of the CINCs would be better promulgated

by administrative regulation, and they have been via the Unified

Command Plan.

103. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 24-25.

104. Ibid., p. 25.

105. Ibid., p. 121.

106. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces, p.

III-5.

107. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 23.

108. Ibid., pp. 46, 56, 68. The 12 functions are:

recruiting; organizing; supplying; equipping; training;

servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering; maintaining;

construction outfitting and repair of military equipment; and

construction, maintenance, and repair of real property.

109. Ibid., p. 23.

110. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

111. Ibid., p. 24. For example, the Chairman is responsible

for soliciting, evaluating, integrating, and establishing

priorities for the CINCs' requirements and advising the Secretary
58

of Defense accordingly.

112. Ibid., pp. 47, 56, 69.

 113. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to

Congress, pp. 91-92.

114. If, after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Air

Force was to maintain a Directorate of Plans for Warfighting

Concepts, it seems that the directorate should have been

primarily concerned with developing plans to support the CINC's

concept of operations, not in developing a war-fighting concept

of its own. The Air Force should not be singled out in this

regard; the other services, at one time or another, have also

encroached upon the authority and responsibility of the CINCs. It

should also be noted that USCINCCENT had the final authority to

accept or reject the operation planning conducted by the Air

Staff. The point here is that this type of warfighting planning

should have been performed by the CINC's staff in collaboration

with the CENTAF staff (the CINC's Air Force component).

115. Ibid., pp. 65-66. Also note that the GNA assigned the

Chairman responsibility for preparing strategic plans. GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,

Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

116. Defense Organization and The Need for Change, p. 309

(quoting Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces).

117. Ibid., pp. 307-317.

118. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 23-24.

119. Ibid., p. 123.

120. Ibid., pp. 121-122.

121. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

122. The GNA expressly permits the Secretary of Defense to

overrule a CINC's objection to the assignment of an officer if

the Secretary determines such action to be in the national

interest. Ibid., p. 26.

123. This concern is somewhat mitigated by the GNA's

requirement that the Secretary of Defense provide a Chairman's

evaluation of an officer's joint duty performance for all

recommendations to the President for appointments to lieutenant

general, vice admiral, general, or admiral. Ibid., p. 43.
59

124. Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces, p.

I-7.

125. The GNA assigned the Service Secretaries "authority

necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department . . .," and

specified that Service Chiefs would "exercise supervision,

consistent with the authority assigned to [CINCs] . . . ." The

GNA did not provide a more complete description of the channel of

authority that runs to and through the military departments.

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 46, 53. Nevertheless, S3074

of Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces provides that a

Service Secretary may create "commands" and assign officers to

those commands.

126. John P. White, Directions for Defense, Report of the

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, Washington,

DC, May 24, 1995, pp. 2-4. The Commission on Roles and Missions

(CORM) found that "[t]he CINCs must have greater influence over

the processes and priorities used to acquire the weapons,

equipment, and forces they need to accomplish their warfighting

and other missions . . . ."

127. The membership of the JROC includes the Vice Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (chairman) and the vice chiefs of

the services (members). The purpose of the JROC is to assist the

CJCS in evaluating, validating, and establishing priorities for

military capability requirements. U.S. Department of Defense,

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MCM-76-95,

Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, DC, February 7, 1995, pp. 1-4.

128. A staff officer with the Joint Exercises and Training

Division of the Operational Plans and Interoperability

Directorate of the Joint Staff (the division responsible for

coordinating joint training and exercises with the combatant

commands.) reported that the CINCs are currently funded for some

transportation and incidental costs only, and that they must rely

on the services' training (or OPTEMPO) funds to conduct joint

training or exercises.

129. White, Directions for Defense, pp. 2-8.

130. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 88.

131. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

132. Don M. Snider, The National Security Strategy:

Documenting Strategic Vision, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, March, 1995, pp. 9-10, 14; U.S. Congress,
60

Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Strategy,

Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States

Senate, 100th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 1054.

133. Congressional expectations were summarized by Senator

John Warner when he said "[t]he National Security Strategy Report

should become the foundation document for Members of Congress as

we measure the value and relevance of individual programs ranging

from Pentagon spending to foreign assistance. It will enable

those of us in Congress to assess how each of these programs

contribute to our overall national and military strategies and

foreign policy." National Security Strategy, Hearings Before the

Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, p. 1052.

134. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 19.

 135. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Joint

Strategic Planning System, 1st Revision, March 17, 1993,

Washington, DC, p. I-2.

136. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum of Policy No. 7, Joint

Strategic Planning System, Washington, DC, January, 1990, p. 1.

137. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,

Subject: National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, JSSM-162-

89, Washington, DC, September 21, 1989, passim.

138. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC, January 1992, pp. 5-16. The National Military

Strategy does not focus on what must be done specifically to

protect or promote U.S. interests, but addresses the types of

activities in which the United States should engage to pursue its

interests and why those activities are important. The national

military strategies that have been published starting in 1992

have followed the new, unclassified format.

139. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

140. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, User's Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning

and Execution System), Washington, DC, May 1, 1995, pp. 10-13.

141. Ibid., pp. 9-10.
61

142. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to

Congress, pp. 32-33.

143. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

144. Recalling the Packard Commission's charge that the NCA

requires better integration of the efforts of the CINCs, it seems

logical that the Chairman should provide this integration, in

part, through the development of overarching strategic plans

harmonized with the 6-year defense planning periods. For a more

complete discussion of the need for a national military strategic

plan, see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, U.S.

Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September,

1995, pp. 14-32.

145. For an explanation of why the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan is not, as its title might imply, a strategic

plan as defined by the GNA, see Lovelace and Young, U.S.

Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, pp.

16-17.

146. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 21.

 147. Ibid., pp. 18, 22.

148. Ibid., pp. 17, 24.

149. Ibid., p. 5.

150. Ibid., p. 109.

151. U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense,

Memorandum for the Commanders-In-Chief of the Unified Commands,

Subject: Submission of the FY 1996-2001 Integrated Priority

Lists, Washington, DC, March 2, 1994, pp. 1-2.

152. Each military department submits a Program Objective

Memorandum (POM) to the Secretary of Defense, nominally every 2

years. A POM contains all the programs a military department

proposes to the Secretary of Defense for approval, given the

fiscal guidance previously provided by the Secretary. As the POMs

are collectively reviewed within the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, reconciliation occurs. This typically results in

modification of the POMs.

153. This conclusion is reached with the understanding that

the FY 1996-2001 Defense Planning Guidance was not published

until May 23, 1994, 5 weeks after the IPLs were submitted. When
62

asked how the Secretary can issue the DPG in late May and expect

its guidance to be reflected in the POMs submitted the following

month, OSD officials explained that concurrent planning on the

part of the services and OSD reveals the substance of the

guidance much earlier than the formal publication date of the

DPG. There is difficulty in extending that reasoning to the IPLs.

One might postulate that the concurrent planning conducted by the

services and their components within the combatant commands

informs the services of the CINCs' requirements long before the

formal IPLs are submitted. Even if that were true, the intent of

the Goldwater-Nichols Act would not be accommodated. Relying upon

the service components to identify the CINCs' requirements (and

then filter them through the services' headquarters before they

are reflected in the POMs) does not achieve the focus on the

requirements of the CINCs vice the desires of the services that

Congress intended, nor does it provide the CJCS the opportunity,

a priori, to integrate and establish priorities among the CINCs'

requirements.

154. MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council, passim.

155. Currently, the nine assessment areas are: strike;

ground maneuver; strategic mobility and its protection; air

superiority; deter/counter proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction; command and control and information warfare;

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; overseas

presence; and joint warfighting readiness.

156. MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council, pp. 1-2.

157. The JROC Secretariat is provided by the Force

Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) of the

Joint Staff. The Secretariat, inter alia, provides administrative

support to the JROC, coordinates and integrates Joint Warfighting

Capability Assessments (JWCAs), promulgates JROC decisions, and

coordinates actions of the Joint Staff in its support of the

JROC. Additionally, the Joint Staff provides the JWCA sponsors.

MCM-76-95, Subject: Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council, pp. 4-5.

158. Daniel G. Dupont, "Shalikashvili Balks at Chiefs'

Letter on Missile Defense Spending Cuts," Inside the Army, January 8, 1996, p. 3.

159. Ibid.

160. Rowan Scarborough, "For the Bang, Brass Want Bigger

Bucks," Washington Times, March 28, 1996, p. 4.
63

161. One of the functions of the JROC is to support the Vice

Chairman in his role as Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition

Board (DAB). The JROC also validates to the DAB the need for

acquisition programs to satisfy the requirements of the CINCs and

assigns priorities to the requirements. The DAB, chaired by the

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,

recommends acquisition programs to satisfy the requirements.

162. Non-attribution interview with a senior Joint Staff

officer familiar with preparation of the CPR.

163. Lovelace and Young, U.S. Department of Defense

Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, pp. 20-21.

164. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 17-18.

165. For example, the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA)

for the FY 1994-1999 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) was an

unclassified memorandum a little over 1/2 page in length that

essentially said the POMs all conformed to the CINCs'

requirements. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,

Subject: Chairman's Program Assessment FY 1994-1999, CM-1435-92,

Washington, DC, September 3, 1992. The CPA for the FY 1996-2001

FYDP was a classified document of significant substance that

offered several alternative program recommendations.

166. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

167. Lovelace and Young, U.S. Department of Defense

Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, pp. 3-5, 18-19.

168. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

169. Ibid.

170. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-03.31, Preparedness

Evaluation System, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, January 1993, pp. II-1 through IV-3. Note that this joint

publication is no longer in effect because the Preparedness

Evaluation System has been abandoned.

171. Ibid., p. I-1.

172. Information provided by an officer assigned to the

Evaluation and Analysis Division of the Directorate for

Operational Plans and Interoperability of the Joint Staff, the
64

division that was responsible for preparing the PAR.

173. The plans became effective upon completion of the

deliberate planning process and were subject to major

review/revision at least biennially. Therefore, the useful life

of a capability deficiency analysis associated with plan

development or review was from the present out to 2 years.

174. Representative of this concern was the Defense Science

Board's Task Force on Readiness report, published in June 1994.

It recommended that DOD place increased emphasis on joint, vice

unit or service, readiness, and develop a system for assessing

joint readiness. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Report of

the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness, Washington,

DC, June 1994, pp. ii-iii.

175. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSI 3401.01, Current Readiness

System, Washington, DC, October 1, 1995, p. 1.

176. Ibid., pp. A-1, D-1.

177. Ibid., pp. D-3 through D-6.

178. Ibid., pp. D-1, D-2.

179. The Joint Monthly Readiness Reviews (JMRR) are attended

by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the vice

chiefs of the services, the Joint Staff directors and

representatives of the CINCS, who are normally their liaison

officers. While the chairman's Current Readiness System purports

to evaluate the preparedness of each combatant command to carry

out missions assigned to the command, in actuality it is more

focused on unit readiness reporting by the services. Such

readiness data is processed through service channels and the

CINCs have limited opportunity to review it before it is

officially reported. Nonattribution interview with a senior Joint

Staff officer familiar with the JMRRs.

180. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 17.

181. Ibid., p. 18.

182. A Common Perspective, the Joint Warfighting Center's

Newsletter, Fort Monroe, VA, September 1995, pp. 12-16.

183. On behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the

Staff, the Director of the Joint Staff issued on July 28, 1994, a

memorandum (MCM-90-94) to all Service Chiefs and Unified
65

Combatant Commanders-in-Chief regarding joint doctrine. In this

memorandum the Chairman directed that the authority statement

found in the preface of all joint publications be changed.

184. John Boatman, "Spreading the Word," Jane's Defence

Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 23, December 10, 1994, p. 19.

185. For a more complete discussion of the perceived

problems with joint doctrine development, see Douglas C.

Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, Strategic Plans, Joint

Doctrine and Antipodean Insights, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, October, 1995, pp. 7-12.

186. A Common Perspective, the Joint Warfighting Center's

Newsletter, pp. 4, 8-9.

187. Ibid., p. 18.

188. See, for example, Jose R. Lopez, "Military Plan for

Cutting Services Falls Far Short of Clinton's Vision," The New

York Times, February 13, 1993, p. A-9; Thomas E. Ricks,

"Consolidation of Maintenance Work Is Recommended in Report on

Military," The Wall Street Journal, February 16, 1993, p. B-11F.

189. White, Directions for Defense, passim.

190. Art Pine, "Panel Rebuffs Plan to Alter Military," Los

Angeles Times, February 25, 1993, p. A-14.

191. Robert Holzer, "U.S. Military Braces for Massive

Mission Review," Defense News (Washington), August 29-September

4, 1994, p. 3.

192. White, Directions for Defense, p. ES-1.

193. Ibid., pp. ES-3, 1-4.

194. Ibid., p. ES-5.

195. Of the 63 specific recommendations made by the CORM, 50

had nothing to do with the allocation of roles, missions, and

functions. Of the 13 that were related to roles, missions, and

functions, many were already under study by DOD or in some stage

of actual implementation. The CORM recommended that several

others be studied further before being implemented. Only a few

authentic, albeit relatively insignificant, recommendations were

made and acted upon. White, Directions for Defense, pp. 2-1

through 4-27.

196. Information received from an officer assigned to the

Joint Staff Directorate for Strategic Policy and Plans, the
66

directorate responsible for preparing the Chairman's roles,

missions, and functions report.

197. "The Battle for Superiority in U.S. Roles and

Missions," Jane's Defense Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 14, October 1,

1994, p. 27.

198. Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, "Armed Services Battle to

Standstill Over Roles," Baltimore Sun, May 15, 1995, p. 1; Mark

Yost, "Mission Partly Accomplished," The Wall Street Journal, May

24, 1995, p. 14. The chairman of the CORM, upon the commission's

dissolution, was reappointed to be the Deputy Secretary of

Defense.

199. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 22.

200. Office of the President, Memorandum for the Secretary

of Defense, Subject: Unified Command Plan, Washington, DC,

December 28, 1995, passim.

201. For example, the Strategic Air Command and Forces

Command were disestablished as specified commands; the Strategic

Command was created, and the Atlantic Command's mission was

expanded to include joint force training and integration of most

forces based in the continental United States. White, Directions

for Defense, pp. III-2 through III-7; Office of the President,

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Unified Command

Plan, pp. 5-16.

202. White, Directions for Defense, pp. 2-12, 2-13.

203. Captain John McGillvry, Unified Command Plan, documented briefing, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate,

Joint Staff, Washington, DC, November 6, 1995. The changes

recommended by the Chairman included realignment of boundaries

between some areas of responsibility, and clarification of the

missions assigned to two CINCs.

204. Office of the President, Memorandum to the Secretary of

Defense, Subject: Unified Command Plan, pp 6-7. Two CINCs

objected to changes recommended by the Chairman because they

could potentially result in a shift of naval forces from

combatant commands that had traditionally been commanded by seaservice officers to commands that had always been commanded by

Army officers. Beth Jannery, "Perry Likely to Reject Unified

Command Plan Following CINCs' Objection," Inside the Navy, December 18, 1995, p. 1.

205. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 36.
67

206. Kathleen Van Trees Medlock, A Critical Analysis of the

Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on

American Officership, unpublished PhD. dissertation, George Mason

University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1993, p. 61 (quoting U.S.

Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,

Reorganization of the Department of Defense, HASC No. 99-53),

99th Congress, 2d Session, February 19-March 12, 1986.

207. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to

the Congress on the Amended FY 1988/FY 1989 Biennial Budget,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 11,

1988, p. 154.

208. Even before the Act became law, DOD began work on the

recommendations of the Packard Commission, many of which were

reflected in the Act. Nonetheless, 2 years elapsed after passage

of the Act before provisions of Title IV began to take root.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress

for FY 88/89 Budget, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, January 12, 1987, p. 114.

209. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37-41.

210. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to

the President and Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, January, 1991, pp. 122-123; Office of the

Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and

Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, February, 1992, pp. 144-145;

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the

President and Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, January, 1993, pp. 156-157; Office of the Secretary of

Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January, 1994, pp. E-4, E-5;

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the

President and Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, January, 1995, pp. E-5, E-6.

211. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37.

212. U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on

Armed Services, Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces (No.

2, as amended through December 31, 1994), 104th Congress,

Committee Print for the Committee on National Security of the

House of Representatives, Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1995, pp. 189-190.

213. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint
68

Chiefs of Staff, Military Education Policy Document, CM-1618-93,

Washington, DC, March 23, 1993, passim.

214. As in many other areas of the act, Congress provided

implementation flexibility by giving the Chairman the authority

to grant exceptions, on a case by case basis, to the sequence

requirement.

215. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 38.

216. Annual Report to the President and Congress, January

1991, p. 124; Annual Report to the President and Congress, February 1992, p. 146; Annual Report to the President and

Congress, January 1993, p. 158; Annual Report to the President

and Congress, January 1994, p. E-6; Annual Report to the

President and Congress, January 1995, p. E-7.

217. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, p. 39.

218. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, p. 189.

219. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37-39.

 220. Annual Report to the President and Congress, January

1991, p. 121; Annual Report to the President and Congress, February 1992, p. 143; Annual Report to the President and

Congress, January 1993, p. 155; Annual Report to the President

and Congress, January 1994, p. E-3; Annual Report to the

President and Congress, January 1995, p. E-4. The U.S. Navy and

the U.S. Air Force have exceeded the average tour length

requirement.

221. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization

Act of 1986, Conference Report 99-824, pp. 37-38.

222. Medlock, p. 67.

223. For example, many of the billets on the Joint Staff

require, or request, officers who are graduates of senior service

colleges. Such officers come to the Joint Staff when they are in

the zone of competition for colonel-level command.
69

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BUR Bottom-Up Review

CAP Crisis Action Planning

CD ROM Compact Disc Read Only Memory

CINC Commander-in-Chief

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Instruction

CORM Commission on Roles and Missions

CPA Chairman's Program Assessment

CPG Contingency Planning Guidance

CPR Chairman's Program Recommendation

CRS Current Readiness System

DOD Department of Defense

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

FY Fiscal Year

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

GNA Goldwater-Nichols Act

IPL Integrated Priority List

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities plan

JSO Joint Specialty Officer

JWCA Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment

NCA National Command Authorities

NMS National Military Strategy
70

NMSD National Military Strategy Document

NSC National Security Council

OJCS Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OPLAN Operation Plan

OPTEMPO Operating Tempo

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAR Preparedness Assessment Report

PES Preparedness Evaluation System

POM Program Objective Memorandum

PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

UCP Unified Command Plan

USCINCCENT Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

VCJCS Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Mr. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler