ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Edited by

Douglas T. Stuart

November 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-039-7

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword .....................

1. Introduction

 Douglas T. Stuart..............

2. Present at the Legislation:

 The 1947 National Security Act

 Douglas T. Stuart..............

3. Ike and the Birth of the CINCs:

 The Continuity of Unity of Command

 David Jablonsky ..............

4. The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986:

 Improving The Department

 through Centralization and Integration

 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. ..........

5. Institutionalizing Defense Reform:

 The Politics of Transformation in the Root,

 McNamara, and Cohen Eras

 Joseph R. Cerami ............... 

6. Time for a Revolution: The Transition from

 National Defense to International Security

 Grant T. Hammond ............. 

7. National Security and the Interagency Process

 Forward into the 21st Century

 Gabriel Marcella ............... 

8. Improving National Security Decisionmaking

 Constantine Menges ............. 

iii
9. Servants, Supplicants, or Saboteurs:

 The Role of the Uniformed Officer and

 The Changing Nature of America’s Civil-

 Military Relations

 John Hillen .................. 

10. DoD in the 21st Century

 Lawrence J. Korb ............... 

11. The National Security Act of 2002

 William A. Navas Jr. ............ 

12. Presidential Leadership and National

 Security Policy Making

 Robert D. Steele ............... 

13. Conclusion

 Douglas T. Stuart.............. 

Glossary ...................... 

About the Contributors .............. 

iv
FOREWORD

The pace and scope of change over the last decad

indeed been extraordinary. The United States has 

confronted with not just the collapse of the Soviet e

but also with revolutionary scientific breakthrough

transformation of the global economy, and the eros

many of the basic premises of the Westphalian sys

international order. The U.S. policy communit

attempted to make sense of these and other chang

recourse to bodies such as the National Defense Pan

the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Ce

(USNCS/21). The USNCS/21 is currently in the third 

of its mandated activities. At the end of phase thre

members of the Commission will recommend changes 

institutions of the U.S. national security policym

system. Its conclusions are likely to stimulate a livel

much needed, debate.

The U.S. Army War College chose the the

“Organizing for National Security” for its Tenth A

Strategy Conference in order to contribute to the upc

debate about institutional reform. This volume prov

summary of the proceedings of that conference. It in

historical, analytical, and prescriptive articles relat

the national security bureaucracy. Virtually all 

authors accept that some degree of reform is necessar

system which can trace its roots back to the 1947 Na

Security Act. Not surprisingly, they differ in their op

about which parts of the system are most in need of r

and in their specific recommendations. Se

contributors applaud the trend toward jointness 

armed services and recommend that this serve as a 

for future reforms of the institutions responsib

national security policymaking.

In order for institutional reform to succeed, it wil

to be guided by a coherent and compelling national st

which must, in turn, be anchored in widely-acc

v
national interests. It will also have to be in accord wit

constitutional principles as civilian control of the 

forces and the inviolability of the civil liberties 

Americans. This is a tall order for U.S. policym

Hopefully, the chapters in this volume will offer some 

insights and some encouragement.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vi
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Douglas T. Stuart

The weekend of July 25-27, 1947, was an esp

hectic and stressful period for the Washington 

community. Congress was rushing to wrap u

end-of-term business before adjourning for the su

The budget was the most contentious issue, sinc

Republican majority was still looking for ways to mak

on its promise to cut 15 percent from the $37.5 billio

President Harry S. Truman had requested in Ja

These deliberations were complicated by the fact th

President had also asked Congress for supplem

funding for aid to Greece and Turkey. Legislation al

to be passed in order to terminate 175 war powers whi

President still had at his disposal from World War I

One important piece of legislation was easily disp

with during this weekend. The so-called “unification 

which had already been passed by the Senate, was app

in the House by a voice vote on the afternoon of July 2

commentators referred to the legislation by its o

name—The National Security Act (NSA). The ease 

which the legislation was passed belied the long pro

congressional hearings and the intense struggles 

preceded the final vote. The finished product w

patchwork of compromises which raised many 

questions than they resolved. Commentators wonder

example, how a new “super” Secretary of Defense, wi

help of three assistants, would be able to exercise c

over the military services which were theoretically 

his authority. Some commentators asked how “join

could be achieved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), w

a strong Chairman to control their deliberations. The 

1
of the National Security Council (NSC) was very unce

since President Truman viewed it as a “second”

unnecessary—cabinet. Nor was it clear whether th

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would be asked 

more than simply assist the NSC in the coordinatio

evaluation of intelligence information provided b

separate branches of government. 

Many of these questions were answered by th

1950s. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had 

expanded and given greater authority as the Departm

Defense. The Joint Chiefs had acquired a Chai

although his powers were still circumscribed. The CI

evolved from being a support agency for the NSC i

independent and influential component of the na

security system. Finally, the NSC had become estab

at the “top of policy hill.”

1

The national security bureaucracy which exists 

differs in important respects from the system which 

place by the late 1950s. However, what is most st

about the existing system is not how much has change

how little. The Clinton administration came into 

committed to fundamental reform of the national se

bureaucracy, and some interesting changes have 

place since that time. But these changes are 

understood as exercises in gardening rather 

architecture.

Over the last decade many experts and political le

have asserted that there is a self-evident need for stru

reform in the national security bureaucracy, in light 

dramatic changes which have taken place since the co

of the Soviet empire. During the spring of 1999, th

Army War College selected this issue as the central fo

its Tenth Annual Strategy Conference. Entitled Orga

for National Security in the New Century, the conf

provided an opportunity for policy analysts, gover

representatives, and academic experts to discus

strengths and weaknesses of the existing arrangeme

2
national security policy making and to propose 

reforms. The organizers were careful to anchor 

discussions in presentations on the institutional his

the national security bureaucracy. 

The articles in this volume are based on the proce

of the Tenth Annual Strategy Conference. This publi

would not have been possible without the expert assi

and guidance of several people, including Colonel J

Cerami, Ms. Marianne Cowling, Ms. Victoria 

Professor Douglas Lovelace, Jr., Ms. Rita Rummel, a

Earl Tilford. Special thanks must be reserved for Dr. S

Metz, who played an indispensable role in the design 

conference and in the conceptualization of this book.

This volume will be published shortly before the el

of a new U.S. president. The next president will ent

White House at a time when the United States is en

unprecedented power and influence throughout the 

and at a time when no nation in the world poses a 

military threat to America’s survival. The 

administration would be well advised to take advant

this fortuitous situation to address fundamental pro

in our national security bureaucracy. Hopefully, thi

will provide some valuable guidance about what wor

what does not work in the existing system.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 1

1. Anna Kasten Nelson, “The ‘Top of Policy Hill’: Pr

Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” Diplomatic H

No. 7, Fall 1983, pp. 307-26.

3
CHAPTER 2

PRESENT AT THE LEGISLATION:

THE 1947 NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Douglas T. Stuart

At a time when the two most commonly asked que

about U.S. foreign policy are “Where are we going

“Why are we doing this?,” it is only natural that peop

tempted to look back nostalgically to those perio

American history when foreign policymaking shared 

characteristics with the field of architecture. I have 

given the enviable task of looking back to one such p

when individuals like Harry Truman, George Marsha

James Forrestal wrestled with each other over big iss

principle and policy. This article will focus on one of th

intense debates of this period, which culminated 

passage of the 1947 National Security Act (NSA). Th

is certainly one of the most important pieces of legisla

the 20th century. It established the post-war Na

Military Establishment, composed of the Departme

the Army, Navy, and (a newly created) Air Force, all 

the authority of a Secretary of Defense with cabinet 

The legislation also provided a legal identity for the 

Chiefs of Staff and created the Central Intelligence A

the National Security Council, the National Se

Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and the Res

and Development Board.

The fact that the NSA has not received the k

scholarly attention that it deserves is partly attributa

the inclination of most commentators to treat it as a fo

in the history of the formative period of the Cold War. 

it is placed in this context, the story of the NSA tend

overshadowed by the dramatic events of that period

article begins from the premise that this is a misread

5
the history of the NSA. In fact, the 1947 Act can

understood unless one goes back to debates and dec

which took place during the late 1930s and early 1940

of more than historical significance that these debat

decisions were both logically and chronologically p

post-war discussions about the nature and implicat

the Soviet threat. Because once it is made clear th

national security state has roots which run much d

than the early Cold War era, we have a bas

understanding why there has been so little stru

change in the national security system since the colla

the Soviet Union.

One useful date for beginning this story is July 

when, in the wake of the Japanese invasion of C

President Franklin D. Roosevelt seems to have ma

decision to move the nation away from a posture o

ordered neutrality” and toward military prepare

Over the next 4 years, the President managed a ca

campaign of half-steps, which were designed to gi

United States a running start in the event that wa

unavoidable. 

Aside from the specific concerns that Rooseve

about what the Japanese and Germans were sayin

doing in Asia and Europe, respectively, the Presiden

preoccupied with two broader and deeper trends in 

affairs. First, as a student of geopolitics, he was increa

concerned about the rapidly improving technologies 

power, which seemed to be on the verge of ending f

America’s historic situation of relative invulnerability

Mitchell had been making this argument forcefull

effectively since the early 1930s:

What will the future hold for us? Undoubtedly an attack on 

great centers of population. If a European country attacks 

United States, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Pittsburgh, 

Washington, D.C. will be the first targets.

1

6
The President demonstrated his sensitivity to 

arguments in an address to Congress on May 16, 19

which he noted that although the Atlantic and P

Oceans had served as “reasonably adequate def

barriers” in the past, they could no longer be relied u

protect the nation. Military preparedness, which coul

be achieved by increased defense spending, had to ta

place of geographic isolation as the basis for Am

national security.

FDR’s second fundamental concern in the late 193

to do with the global spread of totalitarian governm

Since coming to office in the midst of the depre

Roosevelt had watched as dictatorial regimes spread 

the globe. Many American commentators celebrate

dynamism and efficiencies of these authoritarian sy

while describing the U.S. system pejoratively as a “m

economy.” Roosevelt and his colleagues were also a

aware of the natural advantages that dictatorships e

in foreign affairs, and in their ability to shift their na

economies into a warfighting mode at very short not

early as January 1933, Roosevelt was advised by W

Lippmann that “The situation is critical, Franklin. Yo

have no alternative but to assume dictatorial power.

The President was too much of an optimist, too con

of his own skills as a leader, and too convinced 

inherent strengths of American democracy to enterta

notion that dictatorship was the wave of the future 

United States. He was also encouraged by the fac

America had at its disposal a community of expert

represented a relatively new field of study called 

administration, which promised to employ theor

management science to create efficiencies in bot

private and public sectors which would make the U

States competitive with the dictatorships of the 

without doing violence to our constitutional system.

As the war approached, one particular book seem

capture both the challenges of the modern world an

7
potential for management science to make the U

States competitive and secure. The book was The Im

War, published in 1941 by E. Pendleton Herring, a Pro

in Harvard’s Government department who wa

associated with Harvard’s new Graduate School of 

Administration. It was one of the first books to use th

“national security,” and it was certainly the 

authoritative pre-war attempt to describe what a na

security bureaucracy should look like. Herring argue

our history had not prepared us for the challenges 

modern world because it had encouraged Americans t

a “persistent suspicion of militarism.” He called for 

approach to foreign policymaking, which would inc

permanent and influential place for military advisers 

top levels of government in times of both war and pea

also recommended that the United States take advan

new technologies of communication and transportat

enhance “centralization, standardization 

regimentation” in ways that would transform 

government from a “negative state” to a “positive 

Herring was confident that a more cooperative relatio

could also be established between the White Hous

Congress, because “the pressure of circumstances clos

separation of powers.” He claimed that radical reform 

foreign policymaking system was necessary because 

threats that the United States was facing in 1941. B

also stressed that the changes that he was proposing 

be necessary for our country in a period of peace as 

because they would undergird a dynamic and influ

foreign policy. “The Roman Phalanx,” Herring remind

readers, “was a necessary preliminary to the Pax Rom

Professor Herring’s book was well received by the 

community. Reviewing the book for The Herald Tr

Louis Hacker noted that:

If Pendleton Herring’s book is a sign of the times, we are at 

in the process of confronting our national problems realistica

It should be said at once that it is one of the most signific

analyses produced by the current emergency.

4

8
Two months after Hacker reviewed the Impact of 

Professor Herring’s thesis was overwhelmingly accep

the American people—as a result of the attack on 

Harbor. The importance of Pearl Harbor is ha

exaggerate in any study of American national se

After December 7, 1941, the American people favored 

approach to foreign policymaking which gave a priv

status to the military while also creating new procedu

civilian-military collaboration.

The experiences of World War II tended to confirm 

the lessons of Pearl Harbor and the wisdom of He

thesis. During the war there was some intere

discussion about what a post-war foreign policy s

should look like, but the more important contribution 

war was the precedents that were set by the establis

of such entities as the Joint Chiefs, the Office of Str

Services (OSS) and the State-War-Navy-Coordin

Committee (SWNCC). As a consultant to the 

Department, the Navy Department and the Bureau 

Budget, Herring was one of a handful of experts who s

closely the functioning of these and other federal ag

during the war. He also chaired the Committee of Rec

War Administration which published in 1946 the o

administrative history of the war effort.

5

One of the principal architects of the wa

decisionmaking apparatus was also one of the peopl

the strongest opinions about the need for specific po

reforms. George Marshall’s experience as Army C

Staff during World War II confirmed his pre-war vie

the need for a complete unification of the armed se

When he attempted to raise this issue with Rooseve

others during the war, he was routinely rebuffed o

grounds that a substantive discussion of this option 

the country was at war might undermine the war 

Marshall was not alone in arguing for the unification 

armed forces, however. One influential ally was S

Harry Truman, who published an article in the Augu

1944, issue of Collier’s magazine entitled “Our A

9
Forces Must Be Unified.” Truman concluded the articl

the statement that:

The road, as I see it, stretches straight and with no turns . . . 

end, of course, must be the integration of every elemen

America’s defense in one department under one authoritat

responsible head. Call it the War Department or 

Department of National Security or what you will, just so 

one department . . . One team with all the reins in one hand 

Under such a set-up another Pearl Harbor will not have to 

feared.

6

Truman attributed his convictions about the ne

unification to his own experiences in the military d

World War I, to the lessons he had learned as a mem

the Senate Appropriations and Military A

Committees, to his chairmanship of the Special Com

to Investigate the National Defense Program and, abo

to the “Record of the Pearl Harbor Hearings.”

7

During the war, FDR’s opposition made it ha

Marshall to cooperate publicly with allies like Trum

the General had to content himself with efforts to p

need for unification on record within the military. He 

by highlighting the findings of the Joint Strategic S

Committee (JSSC) Report (March 1944) and the Richa

Committee Report (April 1945). Both studies came 

favor of the principle of unification. Marshall had 

difficulty in building upon such general statem

however. In a memo dated April 17, 1944, to Fleet Ad

Ernest King, Marshall pressed the argument that sin

JSSC study had recommended that the Joint C

“approve for purposes of study the principle of three se

within one military organization . . .” the leadership 

War and Navy Departments should begin discu

aimed at developing plans for a “sound organization 

top . . .” to administer the new system. He also warne

Congress was beginning to look into the issue of unific

and that “If we cannot solve the question, it is going 

solved for us and probably in a manner that neither th

10
nor the Navy Departments would desire.”

8

 Mar

pressure tactics backfired, however, because they p

Navy leadership on the defensive and convinced th

close ranks with their allies in Congress to 

unification.

It is worth noting that prior to World War II, the se

spoke with one voice in their opposition to unification

was due not only to the fact that both services wan

preserve their independence but also to the fac

Congress was primarily interested in unification 

pretext for making deep cuts in the defense bud

statement in 1932 by Army Chief of Staff Do

MacArthur in opposition to one such legislative prop

typical of the common position taken by the Army and 

during this period;

. . . I give it as my fixed opinion that such an amalgamation 

proposed would endanger victory for the United States in ca

of war. . . . Pass this bill and every potential enemy of t

United States will rejoice.

9

By the second year of the war, however, most 

spokesmen agreed with Secretary of War Henry St

that in an age of “triphibious warfare” the services co

longer afford to think or act in isolation from each othe

Army’s new position was summarized in a report to G

Marshall by Brigadier General William F. Tom

Director of the Special Planning Division of the 

Department in October 1943:

. . . This war is, and future wars undoubtedly will be, largel

series of combined operations in each of which ground, air, a

sea forces must be employed together and coordinated und

one directing head . . . .

10

Marshall and some of his colleagues in the War Depar

were also very sensitive to the risk that, if unificatio

not accomplished, it would be the Army which woul

the most serious hits from budget cutters when th

ended.

11
While the experience of Pearl Harbor and the first 

of the war convinced the Army leadership that un

command had to be established at the top, the Navy, w

tradition of self-reliant solutions to challenges from n

the sea, but the land and air as well, claimed that 

already solved the problem of unity of command—wit

own service. This argument is best illustrated b

comments of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Ar

Gates, during the 1944 Unification Hearings by the 

Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy (Wo

Committee). Gates argued that if “consolidation

necessary, the government should consider “mergin

whole military establishment into the existing Navy

it already had an integrated force with sea, land, a

components.

11

The mix of principled and particularist interests 

made the debate over unification so difficult and in

also complicated post-war discussions about the r

preservation, or elimination of other entities whic

been established during the war. For example, most 

believed that some type of intelligence service was go

be necessary after the war. But all of the major institu

players also understood that control of information wo

an enormous source of post-war power and influenc

every agency wanted a piece of the action. The Tr

administration at first attempted to resolve the inev

turf war by coordination schemes—most notab

creation of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA

the Central Intelligence Group (CIG).

12

 In his me

Dean Acheson speaks with disdain of all such formu

coordination, noting that “A good many of us had c

teeth and throats on this sort of nonsense.”

13

 I

instance, at least, Acheson’s suspicions conce

inter-agency coordination proved well founded

Truman had to accept that some form of independent 

would have to be created to centralize intellig

Unfortunately, William Donovan and his colleagues 

OSS had made so many enemies in Washington duri

12
war that the creation of a successor organizatio

extremely controversial. 

The Washington policy community also recognize

after the war the government would need a new syst

consultation between the civilian and military depart

involved in foreign and security affairs. Here the mod

the aforementioned SWNCC, even though the wa

record of this organization was quite limi

Policymakers also studied British institution

procedures for civilian-military consultation in times 

and peace. The British Committee on Imperial Defen

of special interest as a model for civil-military cooper

It was left to Truman and his advisors, however, to 

how much power such an entity should be given, and w

what agency, should lead it.

The Truman administration also needed to devel

institutional machinery to harness the power of scien

technology in the post-war era. The Office of Sci

Research and Development(OSRD), under the dy

leadership of Vannevar Bush, had evolved during 

War II into a very influential institution, with it

budget, direct access to the President and key congres

and with close positive ties to the leadership of the W

Navy Departments. Encouraged by the success of the 

during the war, Senator Harley Kilgore and others p

for the creation of a strong post-war agency to dir

aspects of scientific research and development. They 

challenged, however, by spokesmen for various in

groups—scientists, businessmen, military leaders

were concerned about preserving their autonomy and 

access to scientific innovations.

15

Finally, Truman and his advisers had to decid

much control the government should attempt to a

over the post-war economy. In this regard, the less

World War II were a matter of dispute. Depending upo

generous one wanted to be, Roosevelt’s management 

wartime economy could be described as multidirectio

13
directionless. One insider, who clearly leaned towa

latter interpretation, described the President’s effo

“bitched, botched, and buggered from start to finish.”

most people looked at America’s wartime experienc

concurred with the judgment of the Bureau of the Bu

post-war report on The United States At War: “The re

one in which the American people can take pride.” 

Americans also agreed with the principal conclusion 

Bureau’s study:

The speed with which the democracies did accept the challe

and the manner in which they overwhelmed those who sou

gain through war suggests that there is no need to reexam

the claims to administrative superiority of authoritar

governments.

17

America had won the war by “resisting even the sem

of autocratic rule,” by working with big business a

encouraging the natural competitive advantages 

democratic capitalist system. Based on these lessons

Americans were reticent to give Washington too 

control over the post-war economy.

All of these issues began to converge on Pre

Truman in the summer of 1945, as both Congress a

media became more involved in the debates ove

creation of post-war institutions. By this time, 

individuals in the Navy leadership had concluded tha

had already lost the battle over armed forces unific

and that the services would be combined in accordanc

Marshall’s and Truman’s wishes. A key problem f

Navy in the management of its campaign ag

unification was that it did not seem to stand for an

other than resistance to innovation. This problem 

solved, however, when Navy Secretary Forrestal ask

old friend Ferdinand Eberstadt to undertake a study 

whole unification issue. Eberstadt had served as Dire

the Army Navy Munitions Board during the war

experience had left him with a deep disdain for both 

(“an apostle of confusion”) and Truman.

18

 On the 

14
hand, Eberstadt had gained an appreciation of the m

services, and of their ability to cooperate to accom

common goals. Eberstadt made it clear to his staff 

outset that it was important that they retain 

independence and not be perceived as merely a propa

arm of the Navy Department. In fact, howeve

Eberstadt report was a Navy product, commissioned 

Navy and staffed almost entirely by Naval officer

Eberstadt himself was, as Forrestal had assured Ad

King, “a member of the Navy team.”

19

To put the matter simply, Eberstadt felt that the 

of interservice coordination during the wa

commendable, and that the wartime experience d

demonstrate the need for full unification. He also w

about the establishment of any “General S

arrangement, or the creation of a powerful Chief of S

peacetime, as potential threats to the tradition of c

control of the military.

But Eberstadt was not brought in to be just a

opponent of unification. The final report that Ebe

presented to Forrestal in September of 1945 argued th

issue of armed forces unification was just a small pa

necessarily larger debate about post-war p

coordination. New arrangements needed to be put in 

in order to facilitate civilian-military cooperation on 

of foreign policy, defense, science, and economic pla

New machinery to coordinate intelligence gatherin

analysis was required. Above all, a new attitude had 

nurtured in Washington—informed by the logic of na

security. If much of Eberstadt’s report sounde

Herring’s arguments in 1941, part of the reason wa

Herring served as one of Eberstadt’s primary assista

the drafting of the report.

20

The Navy did not like every conclusion in the Ebe

report. In particular, they bristled at the study’s supp

the establishment of a separate Air Force. Ebers

report nonetheless gave the Navy the ammunition 

15
needed to recruit both public and congressional supp

a system of coordinated agencies for foreign and d

policymaking as an alternative to the unification 

armed services. When the National Security Act was 

signed into law nearly 2 years later (on July 26, 19

bore a striking resemblance to the recommendations 

were put forth by Eberstadt and his team. Rather t

single, unified military force, the legislation establis

National Military Establishment (NME), with 

independent services. The Navy failed to block the cr

of a separate Air Force, but obtained statutory prote

for land-based Naval Air and for the Marine Corp

Joint Chiefs of Staff was transformed from a temp

wartime arrangement to a permanent component 

NME, but the Chiefs were expected to work throug

under) the newly created Office of the Secretary of De

The Joint Chiefs were given their own staff, of not mor

100 people, but the bill did not allow for the creation of 

chairman, who might have been able to bolste

negotiating position of the Chiefs in their dealings w

Secretary of Defense over issues that had the suppor

three services.

The new Secretary of Defense, meanwhile, was n

like the “super” cabinet member that some journ

described at the time. In fact, Eberstadt testified on t

day of the Senate hearings on the National Security A

the powers delegated to the Secretary of Defense 

“disturbingly general and indefinite.” He noted th

proposed legislation authorized the Secreta

“administer” the entire NME, but did not give hi

requisite authority to accomplish this task. He also w

that the proposed bill lacked a “definite mechanis

fostering unity and teamwork among the military se

through appropriate programs of joint educatio

training at various stages.”

21

The NME looked nothing like the ambitious pla

armed forces unification espoused by Truman, Ma

and most of the Army leadership. Kenneth Roya

16
incoming Secretary of the Army, complained that th

arrangement ." . .will not save money, will not be eff

and will not prevent interservice rivalry.”

22

 Suppor

the Navy, who could afford to be magnanimous in v

offered reassuring statements about the proven abi

the services to work together in defense of the na

interest. But the Navy also moved quickly to prepare 

possibility that the National Security Act was ju

battle in a long war over unification. Shortly aft

passage of the legislation, the office of the Chief of 

Operations created OP 23, a study group whose ma

was to keep the Navy leadership informed 

developments relating to the issue of unification

prepare for a new round of attacks by the Army. Acc

to Admiral Arleigh Burke, who took over direction of 

in 1948, “It was a jolt to senior naval officials” wh

Army began to make a new case for unification shortl

the passage of the National Security Act.

23

 It was left 

first Secretary of Defense to referee the continuing d

between the Navy and the Army, and to help th

traditional services to make room for a very ambitiou

assertive Air Force.

The NME was not the only portion of the new na

security bureaucracy to be subjected to severe chal

during the period immediately following the passage 

legislation. Other institutions created by the 1947 Ac

also tested, and some did not survive the shake-ou

National Security Resources Board was the most sign

failure. The framers of the 1947 Act established the 

to insure rapid, comprehensive, and efficient mobiliza

the nation’s resources in the event of a new thr

national security. Eberstadt believed that, in accor

with his recommendations,

The Statute [NSA] created no more important agency than t

National Security Resources Board. It has been placed on t

same level as the National Security Council and the Milita

Establishment—directly under and responsible to t

President himself.

17
He described the NSRB as “a kind of economic and 

general staff” which should wield during peac

whatever powers were necessary to adequately prepa

a national emergency.

24

 As previously mentioned, how

Americans came out of the war with a new confide

unfettered capitalism and a new suspicion of gover

efforts to regulate the economy. And no one was 

suspicious of “general staffs” with open-ended man

than Truman. Over the next few years, the Pre

resisted the efforts by Arthur Hill, the abrasive Chairm

the NSRB, to exploit the growing national concern abo

Soviet threat to expand the influence of his agency. D

the Korean War, the President used the situation of l

national emergency to shift many of the responsibili

the NSRB to a new Office of Defense Mobilization

NSRB was finally abolished by the Reorganization 

1953, and much of the responsibility for mobili

planning devolved to the separate military services.

Truman was able to draw upon the support of the S

Secretaries in his campaign to contain the NSRB be

the armed forces feared any new institutional const

on their budgeting and contracting activities. The 

services also resisted efforts to transform the Researc

Development Board (RDB), which was established 

1947 Act under the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

regulatory agency with direct control over their labora

and contracting activities. Vannevar Bush accepte

position of Director of the new science agency becau

believed that the office could provide him with the 

kind of power and influence that he had exercised d

the war. This was a naive assumption, since by the tim

Bush took over at RDB, the armed services had estab

themselves as independent (and indispensable) spon

basic research at the major laboratories and unive

across the country. Pascal Zachary describes Bush’s 

to use the RDB to reign in the military services 

slow-motion automobile wreck.”

25

18
While agencies like the NSRB and the RDB d

survive the shakeout period, other creations of the 19

survived challenges during their formative years an

prospered in the Cold War atmosphere of 

Washington. The National Security Council demons

the most impressive ability to endure in a threa

post-war environment. President Truman suppor

principle the creation of a successor to the wartime SW

for the coordination of civilian and military advic

nonetheless worried about the possibility that th

agency would impinge upon the constitutionally-desig

powers of the President. Consequently, Truman kep

control over the NSC after its establishment, and 

called meetings of the organization prior to the onset 

Korean War. The NSC nonetheless persisted in

Eisenhower era, and then began to take root at the 

policy hill."

26

Conclusion.

This brief introductory article can only tell a sma

of the story of the debates which culminated in the pa

of the 1947 National Security Act and the struggles 

immediately followed the passage of the legislation. T

is best understood as a major setback for both Truma

Marshall. Both men were publicly committed t

unification of the armed forces at the end of World W

and both were frustrated by the very effective campa

resistance to unification which was organized by the 

and its friends in Congress. Truman and Marshal

nonetheless able to shake off this defeat, make the b

the situation, and move on to other issues. The bigges

in all of the struggles surrounding the 1947 Na

Security Act was the State Department, which disco

over time that the new arrangements institutionaliz

marginalization of State in ways that had 

understandable during the war but were unpreceden

peacetime. State tried to resist these trends, of course

first memo to the President after becoming Secret

19
State, George Marshall opposed the creation of both th

and the NSC, as infringements on the constituti

designated authority of both the President and the 

Department.

27

 Dean Acheson also fought a v

rear-guard action to preserve State’s influence with

policy community. His use of the Policy Planning S

formulate NSC-68 is a particularly interesting exam

this campaign. By the time that Acheson left 

however, the momentum had clearly shifted in favor 

Pentagon-NSC nexus. One illustration of this fact is t

his first day in office as Acheson’s replacement, John 

Dulles advised Paul Nitze that the important work 

Policy Planning Staff within State would need to be s

to the National Security Council, and that he, as Sec

of State, hoped to be able to spend 90 percent of his tim

the NSC people.

28

One of the ironies of this story is that Forrestal, w

be counted as the big winner in the struggle, was crus

the machinery which he was personally responsib

creating. 

Which leads to an obvious question: Why is it that

having succeeded in blocking efforts to establis

Secretary of Defense as an influential player in th

National Military Establishment, Forrestal acc

Truman’s offer to become the first Secretary? The a

seems to be that Forrestal saw the Secretary’s pow

within the National Military Establishment per s

rather in the larger network of national sec

institutions created by the National Security Act

meeting held in his office just days after his appointm

Secretary of Defense, Forrestal obtained support f

plan to locate the National Security Resources Boar

National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Sta

Munitions Board, the Research and Development B

and the office of the Director of the Central Intell

Agency “as close as possible to the Secretary of De

within the Pentagon. It was also suggested that the bu

be renamed the “National Defense Building.”

29

 For

20
also assumed that the NSC would be the real driving f

the new national security system, and that the Pre

would not be able to routinely perform his duties as ex 

chairman of the NSC. Under these circumstances, For

believed that the President would designate the Sec

of Defense as the “presiding officer” of the NSC and th

would be his power base.

30

 Just one week after the Pen

meeting, however, Truman’s assistant Clark Cliffor

the President a long memo in which he recommende

“In the absence of the President, it would seem appro

that the Secretary of State—as ranking member—se

Chairman [of the NSC].”

31

 In fact, Truman resolve

issue by rarely convening the NSC prior to the Korean 

I will conclude by considering Ernest May’s obser

that nothing in the 1947 legislation made it inevitab

the government would come to look like a wa

government, “with the military ascendant 

military-security concerns dominant.”

32

 This is true 

looks at the institutions which were created b

legislation, but not at the debates which go back 

pre-World War II era. These debates make it clear th

United States was about to embark on a new foreign 

based not only on new ambitions, but on new fears, 

would not be mitigated by victory over the Germa

Japanese enemies. Nor, for that matter, by the colla

the Soviet enemy 5 decades later.

ENDNOTES  CHAPTER 2

1. “Winged Defense,” p. 16, quoted in Michael Sherry, The 

American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon, New Hav

Yale University Press, 1987, p. 30.

2. Quoted by David Kennedy, in Freedom from Fear: The Am

People in Depression and War, 1929-1945, New York: Oxford Un

Press, 1999, p. 111.

3. E. Pendleton Herring, The Impact of War: Our Am

Democracy Under Arms, New York: Farrar and Rhinehold, 1941, 

21
4. The New York Herald Tribune, October 19, 1941.

5. E. Pendleton Herring, The United States at War . . . , P

Under the Auspices of the Committee of Records of War Adminis

Bureau of the Budget, Washington, DC: U.S. Government P

Office, 1946.

6. “Our Armed Forces Must Be Unified,” Collier’s, August 2

reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affai

Congress, 1st Session, Department of Armed Forces, Depart

Military Security, October 17-December 17, 1945, pp. 192-197.

7. Memoirs by Harry Truman: Volume Two, Years of Trial an

New York: Doubleday, 1956, pp. 46-7.

8. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 4, Larry Bra

Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 417

9. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Commi

Expenditures in Executive Departments, 72nd Congress, 1st S

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1932, pp. 2

10. The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Vol. 4, p. 156.

11. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Select Comm

Post-War Military Policy, Proposal to Establish a Single Depart

Armed Forces, 78th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1944, p. 226.

12. For documents and analysis, see The CIA Under Harry T

Michael Warner, ed., published by the History Staff of the Cente

Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence A

1994, in particular, pp. 29-33.

13. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Departme

York: Norton, 1969, p. 161.

14. Created in December of 1944, SWNCC dealt mainly w

terms of surrender and planning for military occupation.

15. For a discussion of the Kilgore and Bush proposals, see 

Kleinman, Politics on the Endless Frontier: Post-war Research P

the United States, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995,pa

16. Bruce Catton, quoted by Michael Sherry, In the Shadow 

The United States Since the 1930’s, New Haven, CT: Yale Un

Press, 1995, p. 70.

22
17. The United States At War, p. 504.

18. See the analysis of Eberstadt’s views by Jeffery D

Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 190

College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1991, in par

p. 59.

19. Ibid., p. 94.

20. The Eberstadt Report is reprinted in U.S. Congress, 

Committee on Naval Affairs, Report to Hon. James Forrestal, Se

of the Navy, On Unification of the War and Navy Departme

Post-war Organization for National Security, 79th Congre

Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oct

1945.

21. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed S

National Security Act of 1947, Hearings on S. 758, 80th Congr

Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19

674-5. 

22. Quoted in Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, Couns

President, New York: Random House, 1992, p. 157

23. A Study of OP-23 and its Role in the Unification Debates 

is found in Oral History of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Vol. IV, U.S

Institute, Annapolis, MD, 1983, p. 77.

24. See the Report by F. Eberstadt to Arthur M. Hill, Wash

DC, June 4, 1948, Harry S. Truman Library, Papers of H

Truman, President’s Secretary’s Files, pp. 8-9.

25. Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the Am

Century, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999, p. 336.

26. See Anna Nelson, “The `Top of Policy Hill’: Pr

Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” Orbis, 7, Fall 1

307-26.

27. “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Pre

February 7, 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947

National Security Policy, Washington, DC: U.S. Government P

Office, pp. 712-13.

28. See Leonard Mosley Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Al

John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network, New York: Dia

1978, pp. 307-308.

23
29. “Memorandum for the Secretary,” August 2, 1947, Pa

Ralph Stohl, Box #52, Harry S. Truman Library, p. 1.

30. Ibid., p. 7.

31. “Memorandum for the President,” August 8, 1947, Pa

Clark M. Clifford, Box #12, Harry S. Truman Library, p. 3.

32. “The U.S. Government: A Legacy of the Cold War,” InTh

the Cold War, Michael Hogan, ed., New York: Cambridge Un

Press, 1992, p. 219.

24
CHAPTER 3

IKE AND THE BIRTH OF THE CINCS

THE CONTINUITY OF UNITY OF COMMA

David Jablonsky

“The past is never dead,” Gavin Stevens tells T

Drake in William Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun. “I

even past.”

1

 This was particularly true for D

Eisenhower in April 1958 when, as President of the U

States, he outlined proposals to Congress fo

reorganization of the Defense Department. The pro

were primarily concerned with the principle of un

command at the highest levels. The central focus w

unified command, the multi-service combatant str

used to divide military responsibility into the

throughout the world. The primary issue was the n

and extent of authority: By the commanders-in

(CINCs) of the unified commands over their comp

commanders and by the President and the Secret

Defense over the CINCs.

The issue of unity of command had its origins 

interwar years, when the Joint Board of the Army and 

prescribed the primary method of coordination betwe

services to be mutual cooperation, the method in ef

the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I

disaster, the investigating committee concluded

inherent and intolerable weaknesses of comma

mutual cooperation were exposed.”

2

 As a conseq

shortly after Eisenhower joined the War Department

Plans Division (WPD) in 1941, there was a ge

consensus on the need for unity of command in the 

Soon, he was involved in discussions about all aspe

unified commands and unified direction of those comm

from Washington. For the next 17 years he 

25
consistently continue this involvement, whether as C

various unified and combined commands, as Chief of S

the Army, as acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o

(JCS), or as President of the United States. Throughou

period there was a consistency in his approach to u

command that was based on an abiding belief in jointn

belief, as he wrote in his 1958 proposals, that

separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If e

again we should be involved in war, we will fight it . . . with 

services, as one single concentrated effort.

3

The War Years.

There were many notable accomplishments a

U.S.-U.K. ARCADIA Conference which took pla

Washington from December 23, 1941, to January 14

Chief among them was the informal emergence by Feb

9, 1942, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as counterparts 

British Chiefs in the newly formed Combined Chiefs o

(CCS). Equally important was the British acceptance 

American approach to unified command. At the time 

ARCADIA Conference, the British had been fighti

over two years under a committee system in each t

composed of “Commanders in Chief” from the three se

none of whom was provided full authority or respons

for the total theater operation. It was Eisenhower’s 

WPD to prepare General George C. Marshall for his at

at the second meeting to overcome the British prefere

this system and to gain agreement for a unified com

structure. The strength of the Allied effort in any thea

advised in a memorandum to the Army Chief of Staf

would be greatly increased through single, intellig

command. The many organizations . . . cannot possibly oper

at maximum effectiveness so long as cooperation alone dicta

their employment, no matter how sincere a purpose may ins

the cooperative effort.

4

26
The next day, Christmas 1941, Marshall introduce

question of unified command in each “natural the

arguing the need for one commander on the ground to 

a “clearing house” for all directives and recommend

and to provide general direction to theater strateg

tactical operations.

5

 The British were unconvinced. 

the meeting, Marshall directed Eisenhower to prep

letter that “would serve as a concrete suggestio

establishing a unified command in the Pacific Theat

only area in which the combined forces of the Allies 

actually fighting.

6

Eisenhower’s draft directive for the command kno

ABDA (Australia, British, Dutch, American) was de

to make the concept of unified command more palata

demonstrating that there would be no risk to the inter

any of the powers involved. To this end, he placed num

restrictions on the actions of the supreme commander 

new theater that were as severe as those under 

Marshall Foch had labored as Allied Commander in 

After obtaining approval of Eisenhower’s draft directi

bedside conference with President Franklin D. Roo

Marshall presented it to the American and British C

After extensive discussions, the CCS and the two he

state agreed by early January on a directive sim

Eisenhower’s draft to the ABDA Supreme Comm

General Archibald Wavell, the former CINC of B

forces in India. It was a masterful achievement by Ma

who had accomplished his primary objective at ARCA

agreement to the principle he believed should gove

command structure. “Unity of command in ABDA 

seems assured,” a tired Eisenhower noted on his w

pad. “Good start!—but what an effort. Talk—talk—t

Eisenhower’s key role in discussions about un

command was due to a number of organizational chan

Washington. Marshall was reorganizing the 

Department in a manner designed to give the posi

Chief of Staff broad and unequivocal powers over the 

Army. This, in turn, had the effect of placing a great a

27
of power in WPD, which was renamed Operations Di

(OPD) on March 22,1942. Marshall turned to that a

as Ike noted when he became Chief of WPD, “for all the 

and Combined work . . . , all plans and operations so 

actual theaters are concerned.”

8

 Equally important w

ad hoc emergence of the JCS as a body that reported 

President, the only civilian in the chain of comman

that issued orders and supervised theater comma

through one of its members acting as the executive ag

the Joint Chiefs. The result was that Eisenhowe

constantly involved at the highest level in all m

concerned with unified and combined commands. In M

for instance, he drafted a “former Naval person” mess

the command status in China for Roosevelt to dispa

Winston Churchill.

9

 And that same month, whe

President proposed a division of global respons

between the United States and the United Kingdom 

three general areas, it was Eisenhower who created a 

justifying the proposals that was accepted informa

both heads of state and their chiefs. Unde

arrangement, operational responsibility was given 

United States for the Pacific area, to the United Kin

for the Indian Ocean and Middle East, and jointly t

countries for Europe and the Atlantic. Although the

never any formal approval of the Eisenhower stud

Allies acted for the remainder of the war as if ther

been.

10

By the time of his global study, Eisenhower wa

heavily involved as the newly promoted head of WPD 

issue of unified commands within the American forc

the U.S.-dominated Pacific, General Douglas MacA

would not serve under a naval officer, and the Nav

opposed to placing most of its ships under his contro

solution, Eisenhower helped to establish two sep

commands in the Pacific. On March 9, 1942, he prep

memorandum for Marshall to the JCS outlining a de

division of the Pacific into two theaters of operation, 

was approved after a few compromises at the JCS m

28
that same day. At the end of the month, the Joint 

issued a directive establishing the two Pacific Comm

the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under Ge

MacArthur and the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) 

Admiral Chester Nimitz. The next week, Eisen

drafted a directive to MacArthur defining the S

boundaries and establishing the new com

arrangements. The CCS was to exercise general jurisd

over grand strategic policy; the JCS would exercise s

jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to th

operational strategy in SWPA, with the Army Chief o

acting as the executive agent: “All instructions to you 

issued by or through him.”

11

 As for the combined asp

the new command, Eisenhower was careful to provide 

authority to the new CINC than he had granted und

political limitations of the ABDA structure. “Comma

of all armed forces within your area,” he concluded,

will be immediately informed by their respective governme

that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructio

issued by you in conformity with this directive will 

considered by such commanders as emanating from th

respective governments.

12

Other command arrangements with the Navy we

always so easy to work out during the winter and sp

1942. Eisenhower did not question Admiral Ernest 

overall commitment to jointness. “He said at one t

me,” he recalled later of an encounter at the time wi

irascible CNO, “. . . one of the things I continually s

myself for is to see whether I am acting according to l

merely out of blind loyalties of 40 years in the Na

Nevertheless, King proposed separate Army and 

commands in the Caribbean, which Eisenhower a

Marshall to resist because “the Army looks upon the a

a single theater.”

14

 There was also a constant battle w

Navy over unity of coastal command, which Eisen

eventually brought to a successful conclusion. It could 

exasperating process. “Fox Conner was right about a

29
he wrote on his desk pad in February. “He could wel

included the Navy!”

15

Eisenhower may have been referring to his expe

that same month as a permanent member, along w

naval counterpart, of the Joint Planning Committee 

tasked the previous summer by the Joint Board to rep

a recommendation to establish a Joint General Staf

both services as well as the position for “an officer 

Army or the Navy as Chief of the Joint General Staff

JPC report at the end of February was signed by both 

announcing their inability to agree and the irreconcil

of their respective positions. The Admiral fa

increasingly joint relations, but advised that o

combination of extended time and education could in

officers of one service sufficiently about the other ser

make any joint general staff either feasible or adv

Eisenhower, on the other hand, favored 

recommendation, emphasizing that “coordinati

cooperation is ineffective,” and that officers assigne

joint staff billet would soon discover that “their exc

responsibility to the Commander in Chief for the oper

of all the armed forces should tend to free them fro

purely service points of view.”

16

 As a result of the l

agreement between the Army and Navy, the matte

deferred for later study; and, by the time it was raised 

more than a year later, it had merged into the studie

would bring increasing focus on the larger issue of 

forces unification.

For Eisenhower, there were two importan

interrelated consequences from these experiences at 

To begin with, Marshall recognized his growing exper

the complex world of unified and combined command

had him in May 1942 draw up a directive for the 

American commander in a European Theater of Oper

(ETO). The second consequence was that Eisenhowe

become convinced that there should be no restrictions 

authority of the commander as he had written in

earlier proposal at ARCADIA for the ABDA comm

30
The head of the ETO must have complete control ov

planning and implementation of operations. 

essential,” Eisenhower insisted, “. . . that absolute u

command should be exercised by the Theater Comm

to be designated.”

17

When Eisenhower was appointed in June 1942 to 

out his own directive for the ETO, he knew from a v

England the previous month that he could expect resi

from the British to the formation of unified comman

any Allied operation. These expectations were confirm

August when Eisenhower was appointed as comman

the Allied North African expedition and attemp

establish control over all the services of both countr

include direct command of the ground forces not only 

landings, but for the follow-up operations as wel

British authorities, however, provided a directive fo

First Army Commander that was essentially a cop

1918 directive, reserving all tactical control to the B

commander who could appeal to the British governm

he thought his forces might be “imperiled” by 

direction.

18

 Eisenhower protested that the instru

violated every concept concerning unity of comman

should be rewritten

in the form of a short statement of principles, emphasiz

unity of the whole" and the purpose of both countries" to un

the Allied force and to centralize responsibility for 

operation. . . .

19

It was the new commander at his best—concili

impersonal and objective, yet quietly passionate 

unity of command and unified operations. In the en

British agreed to his request, thus establishi

important new basis for Allied operations. “From the 

came over here,” an elated Eisenhower wrote Marsh

October, 

I have dinned into the British the fact that you consider

unity of command to exist only when the Commander of 

Allied Force had the same authority . . . with respect to 

31
troops involved, as he had to those of his own nationality. I 

now benefiting from this crusade. . . .

20

The issue appeared again, however, when the 

issued directives in late January 1943, stipulatin

Eisenhower’s three deputies would “cooperate” with 

other in planning and executing the invasion of Sicil

compound the matter, the three subordinate air, lan

sea commanders were all British: Air Chief Marshal A

Tedder, General Harold Alexander, and Admiral A

Cunningham. Nevertheless, Eisenhower was determi

operate his theater as a truly unified command. The B

system of cooperation, he emphasized in a pass

message to Marshall, was inadequate to the dema

modern conflict. A theater CINC must be free to 

decisions “under the principle of unity of command;” 

the future he would be on his guard “to preven

important military venture depending for its contr

direction upon the ‘committee’ system of command.”

2

Eisenhower succeeded in this goal for the 

operation by means of his internal administ

arrangements as well as by the force of his own perso

and his focus on unity of command. He maintained 

contact with his air and sea commanders, co-locating 

headquarters with his own in the St. Georges Ho

Algiers. And although he permitted Alexander to com

only those ground forces actually engaged in comb

maintained close liaison with the British general th

personal visits, phone calls, messages, and the excha

staff officers. Ultimately, the three commanders resp

to Eisenhower’s efforts as commander-in-chief and h

him create the organization for unified command th

Combined Chiefs had denied him in a formal directiv

By the end of the Sicilian campaign, Eisenhowe

strengthened his position with a command structur

was approaching the ideal organization that h

outlined to the British Chiefs the previous Au

Alexander was in charge of those land forces in 

32
engaged in actual operations, while Eisenhower re

his position of overall ground commander. And 

directly under him, Tedder and Cunningham had com

control of the theater air and sea forces. So impressed 

the Combined Chiefs with the control exercis

Eisenhower under his unified structure, that 

authorized him full discretion in choosing the time

places for future landings in his Mediterranean thea

September 1943, Eisenhower summarized his vie

these experiences to Lord Louis Mountbatten, re

appointed by the CCS as Supreme Commander 

Southeast Asia Theater and anxious for advice “o

pitfalls to avoid and the line you consider one shoul

up.”

23

 Mountbatten’s three deputies, Eisenhower ad

would be accustomed to dealing directly with thei

national ministers and would have senior subordina

opposite nationality who would also deal directly wi

authorities from their own countries. He recommende

these channels “should be interfered with as lit

possible,” but cautioned Mountbatten that no one else 

be allowed to communicate with the Combined Chief

practical result, he concluded, “was that 

recommendations as to operations . . . and reques

needed resources must likewise pass through 

Drawing upon his own experiences with the Com

Chiefs, and the strengths of the personal traits tha

allowed him to operate fully as a CINC without a f

charter of complete control, he concluded that:

while the set-up may be somewhat artificial and not always 

clear-cut as you might desire, your personality and good sen

must make it work. Otherwise Allied action in any thea

will be impossible.

24

A few months later, after being appointed to com

OVERLORD, Eisenhower once again encoun

situations that were not so “clear-cut” as he attemp

resolve organizational problems concerning his 

command structure under Supreme Headquarters, 

Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). In the Mediterrane

33
had commanded all the U.K. and U.S. military assets 

theater. In his new capacity, he did not initially have c

of the British and American strategic bombing force

important point for him based on the recent experien

Salerno. As a consequence, Eisenhower requested th

least for several months before and after the Norm

invasion, the bombers be placed at his disposal to d

the railroad infrastructure in France and the Low Cou

and to prevent speedy German reinforcements on

location of the cross-channel assault had been rev

Initially, the SHAEF Commander’s proposal for wha

to be called the “Transportation Plan” was resisted 

commanders of the two strategic bombing forces

perceived their primary missions as the destruction 

industrial infrastructure in the German heartland

arguments over the issue swept back and forth d

February and March 1944. Eisenhower remained ada

finally forcing a decision in his favor by being prepar

inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff that unless the m

is settled at once I will request relief from this comma

Eisenhower’s stance, Stephen Ambrose point

concerning the ultimate effectiveness of the Transpor

Plan, “was perhaps his greatest single contribution 

success of OVERLORD.”

26

Eisenhower also drew on his Mediterranean expe

when he stipulated that General Bernard Montgome

to command only the ground forces committed 

Normandy assault. Once the Allied forces had achie

breakout from the landing beaches, Eisenhower plan

have the British general revert to command of one 

group of British and Canadian armies, while General 

Bradley would take command of the other army gr

American forces. At one point, Montgomery propose

he continue as a ground force commander after Norm

through the fall of 1944 while retaining command 

army group—an idea that Eisenhower termed “fan

since it would have placed the British commander 

position to draw at will, in support of his own ideas, up

34
strength of the entire command.”

27

 Eisenhower was 

something. For later, when the British were una

persuade him to change his so-called “broad-front” st

for moving on the Rhine and the industrial heartl

Germany, they raised the idea of altering SH

command structure in order to achieve their objective

single thrust to Berlin. At Montgomery’s suggestio

British Chiefs proposed that General Alexander, then 

of the Mediterranean Theater, substitute for Tedd

SHAEF deputy and assume the role of a single g

commander to ease Eisenhower’s task of both plannin

implementing the European War. Eisenhowe

adamant in his refusal, notifying General Alan Brook

head of the British Imperial Staff, that there could ne

any question “of placing between me and my Army 

Commanders any intermediary headquarters either o

or unofficial.”

28

This lack of a land commander, as Montgomery p

out, diminished overall direction on the battlefield. 

was a price that was paid to hold together the alliance

Alexander had demonstrated as ground commander 

other theaters, the same pressures would apply to wh

was in charge. And those pressures, as Eisenhowe

knew, could come from the very top, as demonstrated 

vehemence with which Brooke and Marshall defend

interests of their respective armies, even when those 

were under his command.

In the end, there was no other commander on eith

in World War II who had more complex unifie

combined command experiences than Eisenh

Moreover, it is easy to forget from a perspective o

half-a-century how unique those experiences were. 

that conflict, no American had ever been in charge of a 

unified command consisting of armies, navies

airforces; and none had ever directed an allied com

There were, of course, unified and combined operati

other theaters of the global war. But they were less com

in the Central Pacific because the forces were prim

35
naval; and in the Southwest Pacific, the Middle Eas

Southwest Asia because the forces were much sma

each theater. Finally, in the European and African the

the German, Italian, and Russian forces were domina

army ground troops with no attempts to organize 

forces jointly under anything approaching u

commands. And in fact, only Japan among the Axis p

attempted to unite its three services under the comm

one officer.

The Post-War Years.

From the end of World War II until he assum

Presidency of the United States in 1953, Eisenhower s

in a number of positions that caused him to mainta

focus on the principle of unity of command, but 

environment that was far more complex and fa

malleable than he had been accustomed to as a wa

Supreme Commander. In that position, there had b

single overriding goal. But during his tenure as Army 

of Staff from December 1945 to February 1948, Eisen

entered political-military conflicts as the military h

one of the services, an interested party who, despite 

primus inter pares in prestige, was only one among eq

power. After SHAEF, it was a time of frustrati

Eisenhower. Shortly after assuming his new duti

wrote his son that the position of Army Chief “was a 

place to light after having commanded a theater of w

And more than halfway through his tenure, he confide

“since my own method worked well for me when I was 

‘Czar’ in my own sector, I find it difficult to readjust 

demands of this city.”

30

Much of the frustration had to do with Eisenh

efforts to achieve unity of command at all levels. In th

despite a general agreement to retain the unified com

system in peacetime, there were major disagree

between the Navy and the Army over which service 

have command of various Pacific areas. Througho

36
spring and summer of 1946, the new Army Chief of Sta

constantly involved in representing General MacAr

position to the JCS. But there were pressur

compromise, as he noted in August, in the form o

report of the Pearl Harbor Committee, the urgent des

the two Secretaries for an early solution to the problem

the demands of the press and public for elimination of 

Harbor’ conditions.”

31

 Moreover, Eisenhower had 

enlarged the issue by that time to encompass a 

structure to achieve “sound unified com

arrangements at the earliest possible time” in 

theaters and areas in the world where in certain cas

situation is at least as acute as in the Pacific.

September, he forwarded a draft global unified com

plan to the JCS which outlined the roles of the Joint C

as well as of unified and component commanders

proposal, however, also included a new plan for the P

that was unacceptable to the Navy. At the same tim

Navy also rejected an Air Force proposal that the Str

Air Command (SAC), operating under one commande

global basis, should be supported by other CINCs.

By early December, an increasingly impa

Eisenhower had worked out compromise wording o

authority acceptable to both services, and had 

important concessions to the Navy in the Pacific, le

MacArthur without any reference to that ocean in hi

It was a far different experience than the heady wa

days at OPD four years before, when Eisenhowe

written the directive for MacArthur’s command of a 

Pacific theater of operations. When President Ha

Truman approved the first Unified Command Pl

December 14, 1946, MacArthur was desig

Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), one of 

unified commands, and one which limited his autho

effect to the Philippines, Korea, and Japan. 

importantly, however, the document retained Eisenh

proposals, based on recent changes to the 1935 m

Joint Action of the Army and Navy (JAAN), for the 

37
commanders in the global unified plan. Unified comm

would consist of two or more components, each compon

be commanded by an officer authorized to commu

directly with his appropriate service headqua

concerning administration, logistics, and training

commander of the unified command would operate 

joint staff composed of appropriate members of the s

components under his command. Finally, the JCS 

exercise strategic direction, as it had in wartime, ass

forces to the unified commands as well as stipulati

missions and tasks for those commands. The JCS wou

continue the wartime practice of designating a servic

to act as an executive agent for the Joint Chiefs to o

the operation of each unified command.

33

All in all, the first Unified Command Plan 

tremendous accomplishment for the new Army Ch

Staff—the result of conciliation, principled compr

and the ability to move beyond service parochialism 

global vision. Typically, Eisenhower played dow

Service infighting and his pivotal role when he remin

Congressional Committee the following May th

wartime experience

was that of a unified single commander, having all serv

under my command. . . .

The team that I saw developed in that area, in my convict

was the only kind of team that could have won the Europ

war. I think that lesson is so clearly understood by all of us t

there is no one of the services that objects or would tolerate 

other solution except the single command in a single theate

war. We have believed that so much that we have attempte

carry that into our peacetime practices in attempting to set u

single commander in the Western Pacific, the Central Pacifi

the Caribbean, and so on. No matter from what service 

comes, he commands the operations, the defenses and strat

concerns in those areas.

34

The presence of the Army Chief at the congres

hearing was also a reflection of the larger issue of d

38
unification that had been festering since early in th

For Eisenhower, the successful wartime experience 

field under unity of command made a compelling arg

for unification at the highest level of the armed force

clear and accountable authority down to the u

commanders in the field. “I am convinced,” he testi

November 1945,

that unless we have unity of direction in Washington, throu

the years of peace that be ahead, we may enter anoth

emergency, in a time to come, as we did in Pearl Harbor.

35

To this end, he favored the War Department propo

unify all services under a single, cabinet-level he

Secretary of National Defense, who would in turn be s

by a single Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Na

the other hand, proposed to maintain a coordinate, 

unified organization, with a committee system to 

activities of the War and Navy departments and to int

military policy and programs with overall domest

international requirements.

Both services outlined their proposals before a S

committee in October 1945. The War Department pl

presented by General J. Lawton Collins, was confusin

inconsistent, particularly in the peculiar dual relatio

of the service chiefs as subordinates to the Chief of S

the Armed Forces in the departmental hierarchy, 

equal members of the advisory Joint Chiefs of St

addition, the solid command line used by Collins 

chart clearly showed the theater commanders d

under the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, thus im

that he alone would direct operations by the CINCs 

field. Collins was at great pains to emphasize that the 

Chief of Staff would not have a large staff and th

individual service chiefs would continue to act for the 

Chiefs as executive agents to carry out the JCS dire

with the operational staffs of their own services. 

weeks later, before the same committee, Eisen

rejected the solid command line on the organizational 

39
The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, he recomme

should be removed from the chain of command betwe

Secretary on the one hand and the service chiefs and t

commanders on the other, and be depicted in the ad

organizational box of the JCS as the chief advisor 

civilian head. Eisenhower was sure that this had be

original intent since “by drawing him as he appears 

chart, it looks like he is the fabulous man on horsebac

we are always talking about.”

36

On December 19, 1945, President Truman s

unification message to Congress that clearly favor

single department proposed in the Collins 

Nevertheless, Secretary of the Navy James Forrest

optimistic as the new year began, since the new Army 

of Staff and his naval counterpart, Admiral Chester N

had already begun negotiations that appeared lik

settle what the Secretary termed the unification la

“Eisenhower is a good practical Dutchman and 

Nimitz,” Forrestal observed, “and between them I b

we will make progress.”

37

 Another year would 

however, before both chiefs and both service secre

could arrive at a draft proposal for unification, and 

then it required presidential decisions on se

intractable issues. Eisenhower was committed throu

the process to establishing overall unity of com

exercised by a civilian secretary. “I personally do no

what the language of the bill is,” he testified to Co

that spring.

I want to get started with a man to whom we can all go, a civi

who comes down here and tells you people. . . . “Here is 

picture of national security of the country; here is what we th

we need. . . .” That is important to me.

38

The compromise unification proposal was dispatc

Congress early in 1947 and emerged with 

modifications after prolonged hearings and deliberati

July 26 as the National Security Act. The new law cre

coordinated defense establishment more in keeping 

40
the Navy model—an organization which Eisenhower 

characterized as “little more than a weak confedera

sovereign military units.”

39

 The compromise was 

noticeable in the powers provided to the Secret

Defense, who instead of presiding over one single exe

branch department, was to head a National M

Establishment consisting of three executive departm

one for each service and administered by cabine

secretaries. The services, which now included an Air 

retained their essential autonomy as well as the rol

missions that had emerged from the war—a s

explicitly acknowledged in the Act’s provision “for 

authoritative coordination and unified direction 

civilian control but not to merge them.” Equally impo

the Act established the JCS as a permanent organi

served by a joint staff limited to 100 officers divided 

equal numbers from each of the military department

Joint Chiefs were provided with statutory authoriza

continue their wartime roles: To act as the pri

military advisors to the President and the Secret

Defense; to prepare strategic plans and provide f

strategic direction of the armed forces; and “to est

unified commands in strategic areas when such u

commands are in the interest of national security.”

40

Despite his support for the unification compr

Eisenhower revealed some key reservations i

occasionally unguarded testimony to the House and S

committees in the spring of 1947. The idea that th

would continue as a collaborative, coordinated 

obviously bothered him when he acknowledged 

persistent questioning that

there is weakness in any council running a war. . . . In war, y

must have a decision. A bum decision is better than none. A

the trouble is that when you get three, you finally get none.

41

One solution was a single Chief of Staff, which he adm

was his personal preference, but too disruptive an 

“Time may bring it about, and it may show that this 

41
better system.”

42

 In the meantime, it was necess

establish a truly joint culture. It was a basic fact, he p

out, that

when you have kept services apart and you wait until men 

50 before they begin to meet and know much about each othe

is pretty difficult to develop the kind of team play that applie

one of the Knute Rockne football teams.

43

A year later, Eisenhower returned to the theme 

farewell memorandum to Secretary of Defense For

“Someday it will be possible,” he wrote,

to give to selected officers of the several services ‘combined ar

commissions that will transcend in prestige and in public reg

anything they could hold of comparable rank in one of 

individual services.

44

The memorandum was also a reminder of the need 

evolutionary approach to the provisions of the Na

Security Act.

There should be no hesitancy in using the ‘trial and er

method so long as these proceed from minor innovation tow

larger and more radical objectives in final result.

45

The two men were able to act on this advice whe

than a year later, Forrestal asked Eisenhower to se

his adviser and informal Chairman of the JCS. 

December 1948 to July 1949, Eisenhower divided hi

between his duties as President of Columbia Universi

his responsibilities as Chairman in increasingly 

sessions with the Joint Chiefs. He later recalled th

Chairman, “I was an umpire between disputing se

sometimes a hatchet man on what Fox Conner used 

Fool Schemes.”

46

 A major motivation for Forrestal w

use Eisenhower effectively as a senior military a

interacting with the JCS in order to obtain an amen

to the National Security Act that would prov

permanent Chairman for that body. “With Ike here 

days,” he confided in his diary, “I think we can g

42
pattern set and prove its workability by prag

experience.”

47

 At first, however, Eisenhower was 

inclined to focus on a self-imposed majority rule proc

for the JCS, whereby if the Joint Chiefs failed three ti

reach unanimity on a given issue, the majority view 

prevail. But after his initial experiences of attempt

adjudicate bitter interservice parochial dispute

changed his mind. “The JCS need a chairman at th

least—and by that I mean a fourth member who can d

himself from his service background.”

48

By that time, Eisenhower was heavily involved 

aspects of proposed changes to the 1947 Act. The Chai

he suggested, should “take precedence” over all othe

be a non-voting member of the JCS, a move that would 

to allay suspicions that the man was going to be an arb

boss.”

49

 Nor should there be any fixed ceiling for the 

Staff. In addition, he was particularly concerned th

right of service secretaries to appeal directly t

President and the Director of the Budget be elimina

was a matter, after all, of the centralizing spirit of th

and how that was to be conveyed in the pro

amendments.

I think that the language should carry the clear intent 

Congress to place the maximum amount of authority in t

hands of the Secretary of Defense with restrictions imposed 

only a few vital areas where obviously Congress should dict

the type of organization desired. My impression of the law 

now written is that it sets up an official upon whom is plac

great responsibility and then a deliberate shackle w

imposed upon him to the extent that his effectiveness 

curtailed.

50

On August 10, President Truman signed PL 21

National Security Amendments of 1949, which transf

the National Military Establishment into the exe

Department of Defense. The amendments, reflecting 

congressional modifications, remained essen

concerned with the two issues for which Eisenhowe

provided input: The extent to which the Secret

43
Defense’s formal authority was to be increased an

scope of the authority of the Chairman position that 

be added to the JCS. In terms of the Secretar

qualifying “general” was removed from the or

description of his “direction, authority, and con

Equally important, the service secretaries lost consid

power with their removal from the National Se

Council and their loss of cabinet status, although the

retained statutory obligation to “separately” adm

what were now military departments. As fo

recommendation that the Chairman “head” the JCS a

as the principal adviser to the President and the Sec

of Defense, Congress agreed that he would preside ov

Joint Chiefs as a non-voting member. The JCS, howev

the chairman, would be the principal advisers and 

capacity would be aided by a Joint Staff increased to 2

addition, although the service secretaries and m

chiefs were no longer permitted to deal directly wi

President or the Budget Director as Eisenhowe

recommended, they were allowed, after informin

Secretary, to take to Congress, “any recommend

relating to the Department of Defense.” Finally, the ne

specifically prohibited any of the major combat funct

the military departments from being “transfe

reassigned, abolished or consolidated.”

51

This last prohibition reflected the continued sens

to service roles and missions, an issue deliberate

addressed in detail in 1947. This issue had ostensibl

settled by the so-called Key West Agreement, ham

out by Forrestal and the JCS in April 1948, 2 month

Eisenhower quit as Army Chief. Equally important, it 

reflection of trends set in train by the Key West Agre

that would increase the tensions between the autho

service component commanders and that of u

commanders. To begin with, the overwhelming inte

the chiefs at that conference was to protect the integ

their service activities in operational commands inv

more than one service. Moreover, the agreement pr

44
that the JCS continue the well established pract

designating one of its members as executive agent fo

unified command. All this was compounded by the 194

which not only explicitly forbade the Secretary to int

with the combat functions of the forces being assig

unified commands, but increased the power of the s

chiefs even as it diminished that of the service secre

The chiefs, of course, were still individually respons

their secretaries. But collectively the Joint Chiefs we

principal military advisers of the Secretary of Defens

since they were the only service departm

representatives provided a statutory role i

departmental policy process, they became, as they 

World War II, the spokesmen for their services.

These trends culminated in 1951 with the publica

the Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF) manual, th

joint document to supercede the 1935 JAAN. In th

post-war change to the old document, which Eisen

had cited in establishing the first Unified Command 

the CINCs were explicitly given command over s

components, as the organizational norm. In th

document, that command was couched in terms of exc

and even then in terms that were solicitous of the serv

Unless authorized to do so by the appointing authority, t

commander of a unified command does not exercise dir

command of any of the Service components or of a subordin

force. In exercising command, he shall take cognizance of t

prerogatives and responsibilities of his Service compone

commanders. . . .

52

By 1951, Eisenhower had assumed duties as th

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a po

as much political as military, which within a few mon

was referring to as “this dismaying and unattr

assignment. . . .”

53

 Part of his frustration had to d

conflicting parochial national interests—whether it w

British insistence that one of their admirals be CI

either the Atlantic or Mediterranean Command, or F

45
suspicions of any attempts to rearm the Germans

German issue was particularly frustrating beca

involved Eisenhower in discussions about centr

command in a European Defense Force in whi

believed, but which was doomed to failure precisely be

of the degree of national integration down the ch

command that he found so attractive. In fact, m

Eisenhower’s frustration was focused on the Joint 

who complicated his efforts to build a unified struct

indulging in service rivalries in their dealings wi

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), by refus

share intelligence as well as atomic weapons and se

and by resisting efforts to transfer operational con

U.S. units to NATO. These types of problems 

symbolized by IRONBARK, the JCS war plan that ha

basic assumption that NATO forces could delay b

prevent the onslaught of communist forces across E

This assumption was at odds with the political-m

NATO strategy that required a vigorous defense alo

Rhine, for which the Europeans were struggling to p

manpower and resources. Eisenhower recognized th

for the JCS to prepare emergency war plans on a 

basis. “However, with respect to my area,” he rem

them,

the fact that the U.S. has taken the lead in establishing a uni

command structure, and has, with other nations, agreed 

place its forces under that command, makes it mandatory t

U.S. emergency plans recognize clearly my authority as 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe. . . . I consider, theref

that it must be made absolutely clear that the directive of 

President, placing all U.S. forces in Europe under 

operational command for the accomplishment of my miss

has no qualifications or limitations. . . .

54

The Presidency.

Eisenhower’s earlier experiences concerning un

command virtually assured that defense reorgani

would be an immediate priority for him when he ass

46
the office of President in January 1953. It was still, 

had believed since agreeing to the 1947 comprom

matter of organizational evolution. “Valuable lesson

been learned through six years of trial by exper

Moreover, there were what he termed “changing cond

in the domestic and international arena. To begin 

America would have to continue to live through year

were “neither of total war nor total peace,” in which 

standing forces would have to be used efficientl

effectively in unified commands around the wo

reassure allies, to deter aggression, and, if deterrence 

to fight and win. Efficiency was the key to maint

freedom and economic solvency, both of which he be

were vital components of national security. At the 

time, Eisenhower still had concerns about the lack 

centralized civilian control, which had not been alle

by the 1949 Act or the experiences in the intervening 

In fact, even as the status of the service secretarie

declined in the wake of that Act, the JCS had returned 

dominant position of World War II in the Korean co

directing combat operations and dealing directly wi

President concerning implementation of United N

(U.N.) directives. As a consequence, the new Pre

believed there was a need to reduce the role and po

power of the JCS, which had already begun to deadl

reduced budgetary allocations as the Korean War ca

an end.

55

To resolve these issues, Eisenhower appointe

Rockefeller Committee in early February to develop s

recommendations for Department of Defense 

reorganization. The April 11 Committee Report con

the general tenor of the criticism concerning the 

concluding that in order for the Joint Chiefs “to rise 

the particular views of their respective services,” they 

be moved out of all command channels and serve on

planning and advisory staff.

56

 This conclusion, how

presented the committee with a dilemma. One 

believed that the only way the Joint Chiefs would tran

47
service interests was to end their relationships wi

services. They recommended a hierarchical, genera

model that would terminate the “dual-hat” role of th

Acting solely in a “staff” capacity for the Secretary, the 

Chiefs would turn naturally from “parochial” to “nat

advice. Another group opposed a complete sepa

between operational and planning responsibilities

compromise was to strengthen the position of the Cha

in order to bring about a reorientation of the JCS a

subordinate staff structure, in which the JCS staff r

the Secretary would be emphasized and the role of the 

as service representatives would be de-emphasized, b

ended.

57

Eisenhower incorporated this compromise propo

well as other committee recommendations, into his A

message forwarding the reorganization plan to Con

He was careful to point out that the JCS, as provided 

1947 National Security Act, “are not a command bod

are the principal military advisers to the Presiden

National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defe

In their dual-hat capacity, however, the JCS could no

effectively on joint matters while fulfilling 

responsibilities to the secretaries for the efficiency o

services and their readiness for war. One way to furth

strategic planning and military advisory capabilities 

“clearly overworked” chiefs, the solicitous Pres

concluded, was to make the Chairman solely responsi

managing the work of the Joint Staff and its Direc

include the provision that the service of officers on tha

would be subject to the Chairman’s approval.

Eisenhower was equally solicitous on the related is

clarifying lines of civilian authority, which he as

Congress could be attained without any legislative ch

It was simply a matter of altering by executive orde

part of the Key West Agreement that had legalized the 

Chiefs executive agent system for each unified com

This practice, the President emphasized, had 

“considerable confusion and misunderstanding” 

48
respect to the relationships of the JCS to the Secret

Defense and of the individual service chiefs to their s

secretaries. As a consequence, he intended to dire

Secretary of Defense to revise the Key West Agreeme

to designate a military department as executive age

each unified command. “Under this new arrangemen

concluded, “the channel of responsibility and authori

commander of a unified command will unmistaka

from the President to the Secretary of Defense 

designated civilian Secretary of a military departme

the same time, however, Eisenhower also included a

verbatim what the Rockefeller Committee terme

important proviso” as part of its internal comprom

compromise in this case that continued the ambiguity 

chain of command.

It will be understood, however, that for the strategic direct

and operational control of forces and for the conduct of comb

operations, the military chief of the designated milita

department will be authorized by the Secretary of Defense 

receive and transmit reports and orders and to act for th

department in its executive agency capacity. Th

arrangement will make it always possible to deal promp

with emergency or wartime situations.

In October 1953, the Secretary of Defense issu

executive order revision of the Key West Agreement d

from the President’s April 30 message. The a

legislation concerning the reorganization plan had a

passed at the end of June. In the hearings on 

legislation, there were some traditional concerns th

changes concerning the Chairman could lead to a m

horseback. But after “clarifying the matter” for legis

leaders, Eisenhower was generally able to quiet 

concerns.

59

 In addition, there was a general tendency 

part of most congressmen and witnesses in the heari

defer to the new leader who had justified his reorgani

request as “a former soldier who has experienced m

war at first hand, and now as President and Comman

Chief of the Armed Forces and the United Sta

49
Admiral Leahy, for instance, testified that the ch

proposed in the plan would create a system greatly dif

from the World War II experience. But since the U

States had been so successful in that conflict, the com

chairman asked, why should the changes i

reorganization plan be approved? “President Eisen

wants it,” the Admiral replied; “that is all.” Was th

only reason, the chairman continued. “That is th

reason I can see,” Leahy explained.

. . . . He has been a grand soldier and he has been in it all his 

When people ask me whether I object to this or not, I say, “H

can I object to it if the President approves it?” He has m

experience in wars than I have had. He is recognized as 

expert. So if he wants it why not let him have it? That is 

answer to it.

61

This kind of deference had long since disappea

Eisenhower’s second term. There were new tensions w

the military establishment brought about by the risin

of fielding modern forces for war in an environment o

budgets. All this was intensified by the October 1957 

launch of Sputnik, which led to renewed public d

concerning DoD organizational structure and to ala

predictions from independent studies and comm

Eisenhower had already formed several advisory gro

the subject, primarily to reinforce his ideas on un

command. “Military organization was a subject I ha

lived with,” he recalled later in classic understatemen

I had definite ideas of the corrective measures that n

to be taken.”

62

 On January 9, 1958, he presented his S

the Union address to Congress and listed 

reorganization as the top priority of the eight tasks 

out for his administration. He would send sp

recommendations to Congress by separate messa

concluded, to enthusiastic applause.

That message on April 3 represented the culmina

Eisenhower’s thoughts and experiences concerning u

command since the early days of World War II. That c

50
had proved that warfare could no longer be w

effectively under separate service efforts. But in the d

and eventual compromise that marked the 

reorganization, “the lessons were lost, tradition won

In 1949 and 1953, there were reforms leading to inc

centralization and authority for the Secreta

Defense—all necessary given the new technologies a

Cold War requirements for readiness and deterrenc

process had been slowed, however, by concerted resi

from the separate services and their friends in Con

The service leaders, Eisenhower emphasized, were h

in their forceful presentations of their views o

importance of their programs in the overall national ef

But service responsibilities and activities must always be o

the branches, not the central trunk of the national secur

tree. . . . We must cling no longer to statutory authority. W

must free ourselves of emotional attachments to serv

systems of an era that is no more.

The central theme of Eisenhower’s April proposal

had been in his 1945 Congressional testimony, wa

unity of command must run in a symbiotic thread fro

highest level down into the theater commands.

The need for greater unity today is most acute at t

points—in the office of the Secretary of Defense and in t

major operational commands responsible for actual combat 

the event of war.

In terms of the operational level, the President speci

addressed the organizational deficiencies of the u

commands that limited the CINCs authority ove

component commands, their influence over resource

their ability to promote greater unity of effort within 

commands. The solution was to build upon the World 

experience and organize forces into “truly un

commands as the “cutting edge” of the entire d

organization. 

51
Because I have often seen the evils of diluted comman

emphasize that each unified commander must h

unquestioned authority over all units of his command.

The key to reform in the field was clear command 

from the President to the CINCs in order to avoid con

of authority and defusion of responsibilities. The ex

chain of command from the 1953 reorganiza

Eisenhower explained, had expanded from the s

secretaries to the point that “ultimately the chief 

individual service issues in the name of the Secret

Defense orders to a unified commander.” That th

“staff” taking over responsibilities of the “line

self-evident, since the role of the Joint Chiefs, he rem

the Congress, should be only to furnish professional 

and staff assistance to the Secretary of Defense. To th

he had directed the Secretary to discontinue the 

military departments as executive agents for u

commands. “I consider this chain of command cumbe

and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in t

war,” Eisenhower emphasized. “Clearly, Secretar

military departments and chiefs of individual se

should be removed from the command channel.”

The result was an operational chain of com

“running from the Commander in Chief and Secret

Defense directly to unified commands.” At the same 

Eisenhower planned to maintain the support channel 

CINCs through the military departments which, relie

his directive of responsibility for military operations

concentrate on the administration, training, and logis

their service forces assigned by the Secretary to the u

commands. But for this support channel to work, prov

in the current law must be eliminated, such as th

prescribing “separate administration” by the s

secretaries of their departments which inflicted “ne

and injurious restraints on the authority of the Secre

Defense.” And chief among such provisions, as Eisen

examined the command linkage to the CINCs, wa

specter of service functions that always hovered o

52
fringes of such considerations. The 1949 law had con

the first explicit statutory limitations on exec

alterations of combatant functions—an ironic outco

the efforts that year to clarify and strengthen the D

Secretary’s power. Now in the spring of 1958, Eisen

proposed in the strongest terms that these restricti

amended in order “to remove any possible obstacles 

full unity of our commands and the full command ove

by unified commanders!” This recommendation, he a

did not contemplate any repeal of laws prescribin

composition of the services, nor would it have such an e

All these changes would also require the JCS to ch

In order for that body to assist the Secretary of Defe

his exercise of direction over the unified comm

Eisenhower asked Congress to raise or remove the sta

limit of 210 officers on the Joint Staff, and to authori

Chairman to assign duties to that staff and to appo

Director. As for the service chiefs, the President w

solicitous as he had been in 1953 of their du

“burdens.” He proposed, therefore, that the law be ch

to emphasize that each chief was authorized to de

much of his service responsibilities to his vice chief

allowing him to make the JCS role the primary 

Finally, Eisenhower served notice to Congress that h

changing the Joint Staff committee system, whi

perceived as a vestigial organization from 1942 wh

staff reflected the informal nature of the JCS. “

allowed my interservice and inter-allied staff to be sim

organized in the theaters I commanded during Worl

II,” he explained, “the delays and resulting indecisiv

would have been unacceptable to my superiors.” Th

system would center on an integrated operations di

with joint directorates designed to make it easier f

Joint Staff, as it assumed the duties heretofore perf

by the service staffs, to work with similar structures 

unified commands.

In considering the reorganization proposal, the A

Service committees in both Houses agreed wit

53
necessity to organize the operational commands into 

unified” military structures tailored for a rapidly cha

world. But they expressed concerns about the meth

achieve that objective, particularly concerning the r

to grant the Secretary of Defense greater author

determine the service roles and missions. In a s

manner, both committees were concerned abou

increase in the authority of the Chairman and the size 

Joint Staff, and were generally not persuad

administration arguments that delegation of service 

to the vice chiefs would not sever the ties of the ch

their individual services. Nor were the committees 

convinced that the words “separately administere

currently applied to the military departments, po

threat to the Secretary, or for that matter, that ther

any challenge that could mitigate his authority ov

CINCs. Even the popular General Omar Bradley cou

escape unscathed at one point in his continued insi

that the Defense Secretary did not have adequate auth

”Can you suggest to the committee," the exasperated 

chairman asked, “any English word that carries 

authority than ‘direction, authority and control’?”

64

The House and Senate committee hearings on v

modifications of the proposed legislation lasted from M

July. Eisenhower was extremely active throughou

period, meeting with key legislative leaders and w

influential persons to marshal pressure on Congres

strong were my convictions on the need for this reform

The result was a compromise bill that clearly favor

administration. The legislation granted the Presi

request for authority concerning service comb

functions, but also provided that Congress would ha

days to reject by simple majority any transfer or aboli

such functions. Eisenhower considered that the 

provision “made a small hole in the doughnut,” since 

emergency he was also authorized to transfer 

combatant functions without consulting Congress.

66

54
There was a similar pattern of compromise wi

authorization of the Chairman to vote in the JCS 

manage the Joint Staff. The Chairman was permit

select that staff, but only “in consultation” with the 

and to manage it, but only “on behalf” of that collabo

body. Moreover, the legislation specifically authoriz

Chiefs to retain their right to assign duties to the Joint 

And there was no way for the President to gloss over w

termed “legalized insubordination” in the final legis

that authorized the service secretaries and the m

chiefs to go directly to Congress with “any recommend

relating to the Department of Defense that they might 

proper.” Still, Eisenhower consoled himself with Pre

Ulysses S. Grant’s reaction to similar circumstan

cannot make the Comptroller General change his min

I can get a new Comptroller General.”

67

Balanced against these compromises wer

authorizations for the Chairman to vote in 

deliberations; for the service chiefs to delegate s

duties to their Vice Chiefs; and for the Joint Staff to in

its size to 400 officers. Moreover, in terms of the m

departments, the words “separately administered” 

replaced with the specification that each department 

be “separately organized” under its secretary wi

services functioning under the “direction, authorit

control of the Secretary of Defense.” More importa

Eisenhower, the 1958 law authorized him, acting th

the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the J

establish unified commands, to assign their missions, 

determine their force structure. In turn, the CINCs o

commands were made responsible to the President a

Secretary of Defense for implementing assigned mis

To this end, the law delegated the CINCs full “opera

command” over assigned forces that could on

transferred with presidential approval. At the same 

the responsibility for the administration, trainin

support of these component forces was maintained 

respective military departments. Finally, by sep

55
executive action, the Secretary of Defense discontinu

system of executive agents for the unified comm

Henceforth, the chain of command was to begin wi

President and run through the Secretary of Defense 

CINCs.

The Evolutionary Process.

When he signed the Defense Reorganization Bill in

on August 6, 1958, Eisenhower praised it as a rema

achievement. His positive reaction was understan

since the new legislation represented a major move fro

coordinate philosophy that had triumphed in 1947 t

his ideal of centralized civilian authority. That aut

extended on the one hand in a direct operational line 

CINCs and on the other, in an administrative and su

line to those commanders through the mi

departments. In theory, those two lines would be br

together for the Secretary within the JCS advisory sy

The effort would be led by the Chairman, grad

approaching the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 

outlined so long ago in Eisenhower’s interpretation 

Collins Plan. Under this system, the service chiefs 

bring their superior expertise on service force capab

and programs to the joint arena, and at the same time 

emerge from the JCS deliberations with a br

perspective on national defense that would be used a

exercised their individual service responsibi

Moreover, the new law granted more sweeping autho

the CINCs than Eisenhower had exercised over a

American forces assigned to OVERLORD. “In m

experience in the European theater,” he acknowledg

I had found little difficulty with a loose theater organiza

partly because of the spirit of cooperation existing in wart

and partly because I was the administrative commander o

far the largest single component force in Europe, the Un

States Army, which included the Air Force.

68

56
The changes, however, were deceptive. To begin 

the military departments and services exercised resid

facto power and influence out of all proportion to the

statutorily assigned duties. The Office of the Secret

Defense was still not organized for full and eff

integration of service capabilities into the forces re

for the missions of the Unified Commands. Nor we

Joint Chiefs, the principal staff contact for the CINC

to make meaningful programmatic inputs. 

consequence, the unified commanders had to plan fo

missions with resources provided by the services thro

process defended by the services. The result was th

CINCs had limited power to influence the capabi

assigned forces, leaving the services and thu

components with the primary influence on bot

structure and the readiness of the forces for whic

CINCs were responsible. This continued strengt

independence of the component commands would in 

aspects insure that despite Eisenhower’s termination 

executive agent arrangement, the practice would p

outside the formal DoD directive.

This failure to adequately implement Eisenh

concept of unified command resulted over the next s

decades in operational deficiencies that be

increasingly evident during the Vietnam War, the seiz

the Pueblo, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt, an

incursion into Grenada. The 1983 Grenada operati

particular, caused Congress to focus its efforts on en

that the CINCs had sufficient authority both to ma

unity of command during operations and to pr

effectively for assigned missions. To that end, it wou

be necessary to make the Chairman of the JCS respo

for developing joint doctrine and joint training po

That same year, former Secretary of Defense J

Schlesinger summarized the problem before the S

Committee on Armed Services.

In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle 

“unity of command” is inculcated. Yet at the national level i

57
formerly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of comman

endorsed if and only if it applies at the service level. 

inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and 

ultimate ambiguity of command.

69

These types of continuing problems leading up 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 were something Eisen

would have understood from his 17-year involvemen

the problems of unity of command at the nationa

theater levels. At the August 1958 signing o

Reorganization Act, he reminded his associates “th

law was just another step toward what the majo

experienced military men knew was necessary.”

7

Eisenhower’s underlying philosophy was expressed 

1949 testimony concerning the first changes to the Na

Security Act.

We are expecting perfection too quickly. It is just exac

gentlemen, as when we were waging a great war in Europe

We get a set-back, deliberately risked to get ahead with 

war. . . . These set-backs are an inescapable part of all gr

activity. . . .

71

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 3

1. William Faulkner, Requiem For A Nun, New York: R

House, 1951, p. 92.

2. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of th

Harbor Attack, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

1946, p. 245. See also U.S. Joint Army and Navy Board. Joint A

the Army and the Navy (JAAN), Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, 1935, p. 5.

3. The Department of Defense. Documents on Establishm

Organization, 1944-1978 (hereinafter DoD Documents), Alice C

Alfred Goldberg, Samuel A. Tucker, Rudolf A. Winnacke

Washington, DC: OSD Historical Office, 1978, p. 175.

4. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight 

Eisenhower. The War Years (hereinafter EP), Vols. I-V, Baltimo

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970, Vol. I, No. 22, p. 24.

58
5. Ibid., No. 23, p. 25.

6. Ibid., p. 26.

7. Ibid., No. 32, p. 35. For Eisenhower’s draft ABDA direct

Ibid., No. 24, pp. 28-31. On the final instructions, see Ibid., No. 

Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 19

606-610. 

8. EP, Vol. I, No. 119, p. 101. Ike became Director of W

February 16, 1942. On War Department reorganization, see Ib

167, pp. 161-163; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 

City, NY: Doubleday & company, Inc., 1948, pp. 31-49; Ray S

Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, Washingt

Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951, pp. 90-142; Step

Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General 

D. Eisenhower, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 

29; and Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends, 

City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1967, p. 248, in which he looks 

“the frantic, tumultuous months I spent in the War Departmen

Planning Section and later as Chief of Operations. . . .”

9. Eisenhower drafted a March 19, 1942, memorandu

Secretary of War Stimson to the President with an attached mes

FDR to send to Churchill on the command status of General Sti

China. EP, Vol. I, No. 201, pp. 194-195. The message was sent on 

20 as Eisenhower had drafted it; and Churchill later reprinte

World War II memoirs. Winston S. Churchill, The Second Wor

Vol. IV. The Hinge of Fate, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company

pp. 169-170.

10. For Eisenhower’s March 8, 1942, memorandum to M

recommending that his study be proposed to the Presid

implement his verbal instructions of March 7,” see EP, Vol. I, N

pp. 174-176. Marshall’s primary revision of Eisenhower’s study 

change the term “area” to “theater.” Ibid., No. 1, p. 176. See also M

Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition W

1941-1942, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military H

1958, pp. 165-167.

11. EP, Vol. I, No. 222, p. 223. For Eisenhower’s March 9

memorandum on the division of the Pacific for Marshall’s dispatc

JCS, see Ibid., No. 180, pp. 176-177. For the March 30, 194

Directive, see Morton, pp. 244-256, 614-618.

59
12. EP, Vol. I, No. 222, p. 223.

13. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Expenditures 

Executive Departments. Hearings on H.R. 2319. National Secu

of 1947. 80th Congress, 1st Session (hereinafter Hearings, H.R

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947, p. 30

similar recollection, see Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 252.

14. EP, Vol. I, No. 204, p. 197.

15. Ibid., No. 199, pp. 100-101.

16. Lawrence J. Legere, Jr., “Unification of the Armed F

Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1951, p. 200; and EP, Vo

165, note 3, pp. 159-160.

17. EP, Vol. I, No. 293, p. 295. See also Chandler, “Introductio

VOL. I, p. xxi.

18. Ibid., No. 541, p. 603. On Eisenhower’s May visit to Engla

his May 30, 1942, “Memorandum for Record” on BOLERO, Ib

318, pp. 318-326. On Eisenhower’s idea for TORCH organization

memorandum to General Ismay on August 6, the day he was ap

TORCH commander. Ibid., No. 411, pp. 444-447.

19. Ibid., No. 541, p. 603.

20. Ibid., No. 559, p. 627. “You will carry out any orders is

him,” the final directive informed the British commander con

Eisenhower. Ibid., No. 541, note 1, p. 604.

21. Ibid., No. 811, note 2, p. 946.

22. Ibid., No. 811, p. 944.

23. Ibid., Vol. III, No. 1256, note 1, p. 1424.

24. Original emphasis. Ibid., pp. 1421, 1423.

25. Ibid., No. 1601, p. 1785.

26. Ambrose, p. 367.

27. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 284-288.

28. EP, VOL. IV, No. 2284. See also Stephen Ambrose, “Eise

as Commander: Single Thrust Versus Broad Front,” Ibid., Vol

60
46-48; Chandler, “Introduction,” Ibid., p. xxvi; and Louis Galam

Ibid., Columbia University, Vols. X-XI, Baltimore: The Johns H

University Press, 1984, Vol. X, No. 321, p. 420, in which Eise

writes in 1949 to Montgomery’s wartime chief of staff:

I feel that I learned many, many things during the war and 

had to do the whole thing over again there are ma

arrangements I would alter and revise. I would nev

however, in such a command as we had in Europe appoin

so-called ground “Commander in Chief.”

29. Louis Galambos, ed., Ibid., Chief of Staff., Vols. 

Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, Vol. VII, N

p. 637.

30. Ibid., Vol. VIII, No. 1465, p. 1683.

31. Ibid., No. 1074, p. 1258.

32. Ibid., No. 1108, p. 1297.

33. Ibid., p. 1299. In his September 14, 1946, proposal to t

Eisenhower quoted from Chapter 2, paragraph 12, of the 1935 J

amended in 1945 to reflect the wartime command structu

Change 17, June 26, 1945, JAAN, pp. 5-6. See also Ronald H

Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson, Willard J

The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993, Washingt

Joint History Office, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 

13.

34. Hearings, HR 2319, p. 288.

35. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, H

on S. 84 and S. 1482, 79th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1945, p.362.

36. Ibid., p. 366, On Collins, see Ibid., pp. 155-180.

37. Jeffery M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal. A N

Security Partnership, 1909-1949, College Station: Texas 

University Press, 1991, p. 131. For Truman’s December 19

message to Congress, see DoD Documents, pp. 7-16.

38. Hearings, HR 2319, p. 326. Forrestal reported that Eise

believed “the broad principle of a Secretary of Common Defense 

61
be accepted with the details to be worked out afterwards.” Walte

ed., The Forrestal Diaries, New York: The Viking Press, 1951, 

39. DoD Documents, p. 177.

40. For the quotations and provisions of the 1947 National S

Act, see Ibid., pp. 35-50.

41. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, H

on S.758, A Bill to Promote the National Security by Providin

National Defense Establishment. 80th Congress, 1st S

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947, pp. 1

42. Ibid., p. 99. For Forrestal’s adverse reaction to Eisen

testimony, see Forrestal Diaries, pp. 269-270.

43. Hearings, HR 2319, p. 99.

44. Eisenhower added: “The thought injects itself, howev

when this does become possible, it may no longer be necessary, be

the perfection of cooperation.” Original emphasis. EP, VOL. 

2055, p. 2251.

45. Ibid., p. 2243. Eisenhower also addressed this theme 

official farewell report:

Fortunately, the Act does not bind the National Milit

Establishment to a detailed and blueprinted program . 

leaving the development of organization and administra

practices to time and experience.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Final Report of the Chief of Staff United 

Army, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948

46. Eisenhower, At Ease, p. 352.

47. Forrestal Diaries, p. 540.

48. EP, Vol. X, No. 313, note 5, p. 399.

49. Ibid., No. 327, 433 and NO. 288, p. 358.

50. Original emphasis. Ibid., No. 288, p. 359.

51. For the quotations and provisions of the 1949 amendme

DoD Documents, pp. 84-106.

62
52. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Joint 

Armed Forces (JAAF) (Army-FM 110-5; Air Force AFM 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Septem

1951, p. 30.

53. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. NATO a

Campaign of 1952, Vols. XII-XIII, Louis Galambos, ed., Baltimo

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984, Vol. XII, No. 58, p. 91.

54. Ibid., No. 405, p. 592.

55. All quotations in DoD Documents, pp. 150-151. See also 

David Eisenhower, The White House Years, Mandate for C

1953-1956, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 19

445-447 and 449-450; and John C. Ries, The Management of D

Organization and Control of the U.S. Armed Services, Baltimo

Johns Hopkins Press, 1964, p. 152.

56. DoD Documents, p. 131.

57. Ries, pp. 152-154; and DoD Documents, pp. 131-136.

58. All quotations and provisions of the April 30, 1953, mes

Congress are contained in DoD Documents, pp. 149-157.

59. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 448. Unlike 

reorganizations, the 1953 plan was submitted under a 

congressional device established in the 1949 Act, which a

presidential reorganization proposals after a 60-day period wi

disapproving resolution from either House of Congress to beco

Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan No. 6 took effect on June 3

DoD Documents, pp. 157-159. The October 1, 1953, revision of 

West Agreement was incorporated into DoD Directive 5100.

March 15, 1954. Ibid., pp. 293-305.

60. Ibid., p. 149.

61. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Ope

Hearings on H. J. Res. 264, (Reorganization Plan No. 6 o

[Department of Defense]), 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953, pp. 211 and 224-225.

62. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging 

1956-1961, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965, p. 244.

63. For the quotations and provisions hereafter from the 

message, see DoD Documents, pp. 175-186.

63
64. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Se

Reorganization of the Department of Defense. Hearings pursuan

11001, HR 11002, HR 11003, HR 11958, and HR 12541, 85th Co

2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offic

p. 6474.

65. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 251.

66. Ibid., p. 252.

67. Ibid. For the provisions of the final law, see DoD Docume

188-230.

68. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 247.

69. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Se

Hearings, Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Proced

the Department of Defense, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984, Part 5, p. 187. See also J

Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” Joint Force Qu

No. 13, Autumn 1996, p. 15; and U.S. Congress, Senate, Comm

Armed Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Chang

Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government P

Office, 1985, pp. 3-4, 84, 87, 162, 168, 303 & 309-310.

70. Ibid., p. 253.

71. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, He

The National Defense Program—Unification and Strateg

Congress, 1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government P

Office, 1949, pp. 563-564. In September 1948, in response to 

questions posed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, the creator of the coo

organization that emerged in 1947, Eisenhower wrote:

I believe that the 1947 Act represents a distinct advanc

believe changes will prove necessary, but I believe that a

them should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

EP, Vol. X, No. 165, p. 207.

64
CHAPTER 4

THE DoD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 19

IMPROVING THE DEPARTMENT

THROUGH CENTRALIZATION AND

INTEGRATION 

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Reorganizing the military establishment of the U

States has been a subject of considerable congres

interest throughout much of this century. As early as 

Congress began considering proposals to combine or 

the military departments under a single executive a

Between 1921 and 1945, for example, Congress cons

some 50 proposals to reorganize the U.S. armed force

largely to opposition from the Departments of Wa

Navy, however, none of these initiatives result

legislation.

1

The experiences of World War II made it clear th

the U.S. armed forces, future warfare would increasin

characterized by unified operations,

2

 and that a cen

coordinated process for providing U.S. military capab

was needed. In a message to Congress (December 

President Harry S. Truman stated that “There is e

evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond questi

need for a unified department.” He urged Congress 

adopt legislation combining the War and Navy depart

into one single Department of National Defe

President Truman’s message led to the National Se

Act (NSA) of 1947 which created the “National M

Establishment” and initiated a trend toward unifica

the U.S. armed forces that would continue througho

remainder of the century.

4

65
The type of unification advanced by legislatio

considered in this chapter has not eliminated the se

services or merged the military departments into on

used herein, unification refers to the centralized direc

the U.S. armed forces and the concomitant subordina

the military departments and services to a centr

control structure. This contrasts with a separatist app

by which each military department would be a rela

autonomous organizationcoordinating, and pe

synchronizing, its activities with the other departm

but retaining essential decisionmaking autonomy in 

areas.

The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beg

of a process of unification which continues today. Co

contributed to the evolutionary process by passing th

and 1958 amendments. In 1986, Congress passed se

legislation that significantly reorganized the Departm

Defense (DoD), moving it further toward a u

structure. In the Goldwater-Nichols Department of D

Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), Congress sou

strengthen civilian control of DoD, improve military 

to civilian leadership, clarify the authority 

responsibilities of the combatant commanders, im

strategy formulation and contingency planning

provide for more efficient use of defense resources. O

decade old, the Act has been substantially implemen

most respects. The GNA is the most comprehensive d

reorganization package enacted since the 1947 Na

Security Act. Designed to accelerate the unification 

U.S. armed forces by fundamentally altering the man

which they were raised, trained, commanded

employed, the GNA has affected virtually all 

elements of DoD. Many consider the GNA instrumen

the success of U.S. forces during OPERATION DE

STORM. Some believe that the question confrontin

now is what initiatives are required to progres

department beyond the framework established by 

Still others believe that the process and pattern of r

66
which led to passage of the Act should be replica

achieve a commensurate degree of unification amo

various national agencies involved in formulatin

implementing national security strategy. The purp

this chapter is to analyze the GNA in order to pro

historical context for the contemporary debate abou

steps should be taken to improve further the function

the DoD within the overarching national security stru

UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND CONCERNS

How best to balance the unified and sepa

approaches to DoD organization has been a challeng

has confronted Congress over the past half-century. 

1947, Congress has gravitated slowly toward the unifi

pole of these contrasting views of armed forces organiz

but the attraction of the separatist philosophy re

significant. Since the end of World War II, almost 

Secretary of Defense has supported incr

centralization of authority. The military departmen

the other hand, have generally attempted to retain 

autonomy.

In attempts to craft the most effective balance be

these opposing forces, Congress has recognized 

increased unification of the U.S. armed forces e

congressional control over the military. Consequ

Congress has sought to limit this erosion b

over-centralizing authority within the executive br

The interaction of these dynamics has resulted 

evolutionary unification process that continu

implementation of the GNA nears completion.

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first, 

relatively ineffective, piece of unification legisl

Although the act created the position of Secret

Defense, it gave the Secretary no real authority ov

secretaries of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. Co

perceived both the benefits and the dangers associate

unification, and decided not to enact more ra

67
legislation for fear of yielding much of its control ov

military to the executive branch.

7

 By 1949, howeve

executive branch was pressing for legislation to a

greater unification. Commenting on the National Se

Act, President Truman, in a March 1949 messa

Congress, stated:

This act has provided a practical and workable basis 

beginning the unification of the military services and 

coordinating military policy with foreign and economic policy 

The past 18 months have dispelled any doubt that unificatio

the armed forces can yield great advantages to the nation 

[but] the act fails to provide for a fully responsible official w

authority adequate to meet his responsibility, whom 

president and the Congress can hold accountable.

8

The 1949 Amendment to the National Securi

represented an important, but limited, step in f

unifying the U.S. military establishment. Con

established DoD as an executive department and ma

Secretary of Defense responsible for its general dire

Congress also redesignated the executive departme

the Army, Navy, and Air Force as military departm

which reduced them in stature, but the legislatio

instructed that they continue to be “separ

administered.”

9

The congressional intent stated in Section 2 

Amendment was:

. . . to provide three military departments, separat

administered, . . . to provide for their authoritat

coordination and unified direction under civilian control of 

Secretary of Defense but not to merge them . . . and for th

integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air fo

but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the arm

forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is no

be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staf

Joint Staff) [emphasis in original].

10

An important feature of the 1949 Amendment wa

while clearly avoiding the actual merging of the m

68
departments and the creation of a “single Chief of Staf

amendment provided for a Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff (CJCS). The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was give

identity by the 1947 NSA, with a mandate to serve 

principal military advisory agency to the President, 

and the Secretary of Defense.

11

 The 1949 amendment 

NSA created the position of CJCS, but signifi

circumscribed his authority. He was not to ex

command over the military services nor the Joint C

and, in fact, he was not even a voting member of the JC

With the 1949 Amendment to the National Securi

Congress took a further step toward unifying the 

forces but stopped short of merging the mi

departments. Not surprisingly, unification pres

continued. By 1958, the benefits of unified str

direction of the armed forces were more apparen

Congress still feared the creation of too much centr

authority over the military. With the DoD Reorgani

Act of 1958, which amended the NSA, Congress nonet

gave the Secretary of Defense real authority over th

military establishment, including the power to reor

DoD. The amendment modified the requirement th

military departments be “separately administered” 

that they must be “separately organized.”

13

 The 1958 

further subordinated the military departments to the cent

authority of the Secretary of Defense, established the chain 

command from the President, through the Secretary 

Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the unified a

specified commands, and provided for the central direct

and control of research and development.

14

During the next 25 years, there was little congres

action to unify the U.S. armed forces, but the Secret

Defense used his increased authority to take limited 

toward further unification.

15

 In the early 1980s, how

several events helped shape a congressional consensu

DoD required significant reform.

69
THE ROAD TO REFORM

The Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants storm

U.S. Embassy in Tehran, seizing 53 American hostage

attack on the embassy should not have come as a com

surprise. Almost 9 months earlier, a similar in

occurred but was resolved diplomatically.

16

 Altho

contingency plan for the evacuation of U.S. pers

existed,

17

 it is unclear if the JCS, in response to th

attack on the embassy, advised the Secretary of Defe

the President that the contingency plan should be 

ready for potential execution. In any event, over 5 m

elapsed after the second seizure and the taking of Am

hostages before the United States mounted a m

response.

The U.S. national leadership was confronted w

situation for which it seemed unprepared. Direct 

House supervision, excessive devotion to secrec

compartmentalization, and a general circumvention 

established crisis action planning process charact

operational planning for the rescue mission.

18

 The pla

resulted was “joint”

19

 in that it provided for forces fr

services but, at the same time, it was not a unified ope

in that it did not provide for unified command, u

action, or joint training of the forces.

20

 Acting on the 

of the JCS that the high-risk mission had a bette

average chance of succeeding, President Jimmy C

directed that the operation be executed.

21

OPERATION EAGLE CLAW, designed to quick

dramatically rescue the hostages, ended in catast

American planning, equipment, tactics, and lead

proved inadequate.

22

 Eight people on the mission 

killed, expensive U.S. equipment and classified inform

were abandoned, and not a single hostage was resc

The entire world wondered if the United States had i

become a military “paper tiger.”

70
In the months following the failed rescue attem

stunned American public endured the daily m

reminders of the continued plight of the hostage

America’s inability to do anything about it.

24

 It 

surprising that the Iran hostage rescue experience ar

congressional suspicions about the way in which th

armed forces were commanded, organized, trained

employed.

25

 Those suspicions were confirm

subsequent events.

Beirut.

During the fall of 1983, congressional concern ov

command, organization, and employment of U.S. 

forces again peaked following another military dis

The previous year, some 1,200 U.S. Marines joined F

and Italian contingents in a multinational force. 

mission was to preserve peace in and around B

Lebanon, facilitate the restoration of the sovereignt

authority of Lebanon’s government, and help bring pe

the war-torn country. The Marines occupied positions 

vicinity of Beirut International Airport (BIA).

In April 1983, a massive explosion destroyed th

Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 U.S. citizens and ov

others. Fighting between indigenous factions inten

throughout the spring and summer. From March th

October 1983, the Marines suffered a number of casu

(4 dead and 15 wounded) from the various factions in

in Lebanon’s civil war.

26

 Events culminated on Octob

1983, when a suicide bomber attacked the Ma

headquarters building, killing 241 U.S. military per

and wounding over 100 others.

27

 Shortly there

President Reagan withdrew the remaining U.S. force

Congressional reaction was swift. A delegation fro

Investigations Subcommittee of the Hou

Representatives Committee on Armed Services arri

Beirut by December 12, 1983. Their report to the Com

Chairman (December 19, 1983) criticized several m

71
aspects of the incident. Transcending the tactical lev

more notable criticisms included an ambiguous ch

command, lack of proper oversight by higher lev

command, lack of adequate intelligence support, rep

by military sources of incomplete or inacc

information,

29

 the failure of civilian leadership to he

advice of senior military leaders concerning the overal

of the operation, and the inability of the milita

anticipate and protect against such an attack.

30

With the memories of the Iran hostage rescue at

still vivid, the Beirut tragedy suggested tha

deficiencies of the U.S. armed forces that contributed 

debacle in Iran had not been corrected, but someho

worsened. Those sentiments began to prevail, and e

successful military operation would not arres

congressional movement toward sweeping reform of 

Grenada.

President Ronald Reagan came into office with th

of restoring U.S. prestige, in part by improvin

credibility of its military capabilities. The U.S. experie

Lebanon did not further that objective. Some be

however, that the successful use of military force, for 

cause, could restore the confidence of the American 

in their military and government.

31

 Cuban activities 

island of Grenada necessitated a military operatio

was large enough to be credible, but not so large 

present significant risk of a substantial number o

casualties.

32

On October 25, 1983, 2 days after the Beirut bom

the invasion of Grenada, OPERATION URGENT F

began.

33

 The mission was to secure and evacuate 

1,000 U.S. citizens, defeat the Grenadian and Cuban 

present, and stabilize the situation so that a demo

government could be restored.

34

72
Taken as a whole, OPERATION URGENT FURY 

success; the students were freed unharmed, the gover

of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was ousted, Cuban 

were removed, and democracy was restored. Still, 

reported many problems with the operation.

35

 

included a lack of accurate, up to date maps, imp

intelligence support, and U.S. casualties resulting 

accidents and fratricide.

36

 There were interopera

problems among the services, particularly in the a

communications.

37

 And although some forces acted br

U.S. Army units reportedly performed sluggishly

inappropriate tactics, and suffered from breakdow

discipline.

38

 While the validity of such claims has 

debated, the fact remains that the overall success 

operation failed to preclude congressional criticism, a

Reagan administration again found itself o

defensive.

39

Congressional Reaction.

The military setbacks of the late 1970s and early 

provided the historical context that shaped the wides

congressional perception in 1983 that the U.S. milita

in need of reform. As early as June of that year, mem

Congress were calling for changes within DoD. Se

John Tower and Henry (Scoop) Jackson, then Cha

and Ranking Minority member of the Senate Commit

Armed services, respectively, directed the committe

to conduct a study of the organization and decisionm

procedures of DoD. For the next 18 months, the stud

the form of hearings, interviews, and research. In Ja

1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn di

that a more formal and vigorous study be undertake

The Locher Report.

The resulting staff study yielded a report en

Defense Organization: The Need for Change, infor

known as the Locher Report (October 1985, Study Di

73
James R. Locher). The report indicated the consensu

was building in Congress that DoD required reorganiz

The essence of the report was reflected in the testim

former Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger:

. . . in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obt

less than is attainable from our expenditures and from 

forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies an

imagination now unduly constrained by the exist

arrangements. Without such reform, I fear that the Un

States will obtain neither the best military advice, nor 

effective execution of military plans, nor the provision 

military capabilities commensurate with the fiscal resou

provided, nor the most advantageous deterrence and defe

posture available to the nation.

41

The report addressed a wide range of issues affecti

performance of the DoD, including its four 

organizational elements: the Office of the Secret

Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs o

(OJCS), the unified and specified combatant comm

and the military departments. The report also add

two key decisionmaking processes: the Plan

Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) an

acquisition process.

42

 Additionally, congressional r

and oversight of defense policies and programs and c

control of the military received scrutiny.

The report went beyond the mere catalogi

deficiencies and issues. It offered num

recommendations for overhauling DoD, its decisionm

processes, and its organization. The more signi

recommendations included:

• establishing three new Under Secretary of D

positions—for nuclear deterrence, North At

Treaty Organization (NATO) defense, and re

defense and force projection;

• creating the position of Assistant Secretary of D

(Strategic Planning);

74
• disestablishing the JCS and replacing it with a 

Military Advisory Council consisting of a cha

and a four-star officer from each service who is 

last tour of duty;

• authorizing the chairman of the Joint M

Advisory Council to provide military advice in h

right and designating him as the principal m

advisor to the Secretary of Defense;

• authorizing the chairman of the Joint M

Advisory Council to develop and adminis

personnel management system for officers as

to joint duty;

• removing the service component commanders w

the unified combatant commands from 

operational chain of command; and

• fully integrating the Secretariats’ and the s

headquarters’ staffs.

Although Congress did not directly act on any 

report’s fairly radical recommendations, the r

effectively illuminated numerous deficiencies within D

Moreover, the report affirmed the congressional perc

of the need for change within DoD and helped sha

debates that would occur over the next year.

Presidential Reaction.

In June 1985, out of concern that Congress, if lef

own devices, might impose ill-advised, or at least unw

changes upon DoD, President Reagan established th

Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, infor

known as the Packard Commission (after its chai

David Packard). Establishing the commission also ser

stanch any public perception that the executive branc

not willing or able to reform one of its department

President charged the commission to:

75
. . . conduct a defense management study of import

dimension, including: the budget process, the procurem

system, legislative oversight, and the organizational 

operational arrangements, both formal and informal, am

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Organization of 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Comm

systems, the military departments, and Congress.

44

In February 1986, the commission provide

President with an interim report containing s

recommendations. The President officially endorse

preliminary recommendations in April 1986

designated many for “quick and decisive implementat

The commission published its findings in June 1986

were generally consistent with the conclusions of the L

Report released some 8 months earlier.

46

 Howeve

commission’s key recommendations were considerab

radical:

• defense planning should begin with a compreh

statement of national security objective

priorities;

• the president should issue provisional 5-year b

levels to the Secretary of Defense;

• the CJCS should prepare a military strateg

options for operational concepts;

• the CJCS, with the advice of the JCS an

combatant commanders, should prepare 

military options, framing explicit trade-offs a

the armed forces, and submit recommendations 

Secretary of Defense;

• the CJCS, with the assistance of the JCS an

Director of Central Intelligence, should provi

assessments of U.S. and allied armed forces re

to those of potential adversaries. The assess

should be used to evaluate risks inherent 

options developed;

76
• the president should select a particular optio

specify an associated budget level upon which 

would base its 5-year defense plan and 2-year bu

• the CJCS should be designated as the pri

uniformed military advisor to the president, the 

and the Secretary of Defense, representing h

views as well as those of the corporate JCS;

• the Joint Staff and the OJCS should be placed 

the exclusive direction of the chairman;

• the Secretary of Defense should direct that comm

to and reports from the unified and spe

commands be channeled through the chairman

• the position of vice chairman of the JCS sho

created;

• broader authority should be assigned to the u

commanders to structure subordinate comm

joint task forces, and support activities;

• the Unified Command Plan should be revised;

• the Secretary of Defense should be provided wi

flexibility to establish the shortest possible cha

command to deployed contingency forces; and

• the Secretary of Defense should establish a 

unified command to integrate global air, land, a

transportation.

47

During early spring 1986, while both houses of Co

considered defense reform bills, influential congre

such as Senator Barry Goldwater conferred with me

of the Packard Commission. As a result of these discus

Congress began to embrace the Packard Commis

recommendations over the more revolutionary ch

recommended in the Locher Report.

48

77
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Throughout the first half of 1986, discussions con

regarding the need to reorganize DoD. On one side 

debate was the U.S. Congress, convinced that refor

necessary. On the other side were the Secretary of D

and the services.

49

 Interestingly, the president side

Congress.

50

 With the executive branch seemingly d

over the issue of defense reorganization and again

background of the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the 

bombing, and the incursion into Grenada, Senators 

Goldwater and Sam Nunn and Representative Bill N

were able to build exceptionally strong bipartisan su

for reform.

During the spring and summer, each house pass

version of the reform bill by an overwhelming majo

With the Congress united in support of de

reorganization, the joint conference to re

inter-committee issues went quickly and smoothly.

conference report was published on September 12, 

and this substantial piece of legislation sailed throu

Senate and the House of Representatives on Septem

and 17, respectively. By October 1, 1986, the GNA was 

Congressional Intent.

Traditional congressional concern over the migra

control of the military from the legislative to the exe

branch has, in some respects, retarded the evolution t

unification. Congress recognizes the value of sepa

organized military departments competing to me

requirements of the combatant CINCs by off

alternative program recommendations. Congres

worries that too much centralization of authority 

inhibit its discretionary authority over defense matte

the same time, however, Congress recognizes the ne

more unified direction of the U.S. armed forces

provisions of the 1986 GNA reflect these counterv

concerns. 

78
The scope of the legislation clearly evid

congressional dissatisfaction with the lack of u

direction of, and action by, the U.S. armed forces. Co

believed the problems derived from dysfunc

relationships among the Secretary of Defense, s

secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and service compo

and the service chiefs. In passing the GNA, Co

intended:

1. to reorganize DoD and strengthen civilian aut

within the Department;

2. to improve the military advice provided t

resident, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;

3. to place clear responsibility on the commande

unified and specified combatant commands fo

accomplishment of missions assigned to those comm

4. to ensure that the authority of the commanders 

unified and specified combatant commands is 

commensurate with the responsibility of those comma

for the accomplishment of missions assigned to 

commands;

5. to increase attention to the formulation of st

and to contingency planning;

6. to provide for more efficient use of defense resour

7. to improve joint officer management policies; a

8. to otherwise enhance the effectiveness of m

operations and improve the management 

administration of DoD.

53

Each provision of the Act addressed one or more of 

elements of congressional intent. An in-depth analy

every provision of the Act is beyond the scope of this 

However, an assessment of the more significant prov

provides a sufficient basis for determining the ext

which the Act has served its purpose. A summary 

Act’s major provisions follows.

79
Strengthening Civilian Authority.

Congress formulated several provisions of the 

strengthen directly the authority of the Secreta

Defense. The two most significant provisions increas

secretary’s influence over program planning conduc

DoD components and the contingency planning cond

by the CINCs. Other provisions indirectly enhance

secretary’s control. The more significant of these re

improving the advice the secretary receives fro

uniformed military, thus enhancing his ability to comm

Defense Planning Guidance.

First, to increase the secretary’s authority and c

over programs developed by DoD components, th

provided that

the Secretary of Defense, with the advice and assistance of 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annuall

the heads of Department of Defense components written po

guidance for the preparation and review of the progr

recommendations and budget proposals of their respec

components. Such guidance shall include guidance on—

 a. national security objectives and policies;

 b. the priorities of military missions; and

 c. the resource levels projected to be available for the perio

 time for which such recommendations and proposals are 

 be effective.

54

The authority provided by this section c

empowered the secretary to establish the criteria 

which the military departments and other DoD compo

must base their programs.

55

 The secretary uses the D

Planning Guidance (DPG), a classified document, as h

for providing the program planning guidance requi

the Act.

The DPG initiates the first phase of the DoD P

The PPBS is the biennial process by which DoD plans 

force capabilities that will be needed from 2 to 8 years 

80
future. It facilitates the development of programs to 

those capabilities and translates those program

budget submissions. By asserting himself at an early 

in the program planning process, the secretar

enhanced his influence over the programs whic

ultimately submitted for approval.

Contingency Planning Guidance.

The GNA also increased the Secretary of Def

authority and responsibility in the area of contin

planning.

57

 The Act provides that

the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the preside

and after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chi

of Staff, shall provide annually to the Chairman written pol

guidance for the preparation and review of contingen

plans.

58

The tool used by the secretary to implement this provi

the Act is the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG

The CPG is a concise, classified document th

secretary uses to inform the chairman of genera

specific strategic areas of concern to the civilian leade

for which contingency planning should be conducte

chairman then uses this guidance to fulfill his respons

to “[provide] for the preparation and review of contin

plans . . .,” also as required by the GNA.

59

 The CP

informs the chairman of the general requirements 

secretary, or his representatives, to review contin

plans during their development as well as upon comp

This element of the GNA has been implemented 

effectively.

60

Through the CPG, the Secretary of Defense has in

himself, and his selected representatives, squarely in

contingency planning process. He has done so in a m

that gives primacy to the policies of civilian leade

appropriately defers the actual development of contin

plans to the uniformed military leadership, an

81
involving himself early, maintains effective civilian c

throughout the planning process. This is precisely 

Congress intended in the GNA.

61

Improving Military Advice.

Several significant provisions of the GNA sou

improve the military advice given to the presiden

Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. The sponsors of t

believed the JCS was incapable of providing concise, t

and useful advice to the National Command Auth

(NCA).

62

 Testifying before the Senate Armed se

Committee, former Secretary of Defense Jam

Schlesinger bore out this conclusion:

The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not preclude 

best military advice, provides a substantial, though 

insurmountable, barrier to such advice . . . [T

recommendations . . . must pass through a screen designe

protect the institutional interest of each . . . service. . . . [

service ox may be gored. . . .

The unavoidable outcome is . . . log-rolling, back-scratch

marriage agreements, and the like. . . . The proffered advic

generally irrelevant, normally unread, and almost alw

disregarded.

63

Not only did the JCS system inhibit innovative thou

also was not an efficient decisionmaking system

example, General David Jones, a former CJCS, descr

Congress how the JCS had spent an entire afte

arguing over which service should provide the attache 

U.S. Embassy in Cairo.

64

To eliminate these shortcomings, Congress as

increased responsibility to the CJCS. In the GN

transferred the duties and functions previousl

responsibility of the corporate JCS to the chai

designated the chairman as the “head” of the JCS a

principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC, and d

subordinated the Joint Staff to the chairman.

65

 Th

82
further provided that the chairman, subject to the dir

of the president, may participate in NSC meeti

Additionally, the Act permitted the Secretary of Defe

assign overall supervision of certain defense agencie

field activities to the chairman.

67

 The Act also creat

position of the vice chairman of the JCS to assi

chairman in discharging his new duties.

68

However, Congress tempered the measures tak

increase the chairman’s authority with others 

circumscribed it. Notably, the Act vested the chairma

no command authority. The chain of command pres

by the Act runs from the president, to the Secret

Defense, to the CINCs.

69

 Also, the other members of th

retained their responsibilities as military advisors 

NCA and NSC. The Act provided further that, sh

member of the JCS disagree with the advice the cha

intended to give to the NCA or the NSC, the membe

submit his dissenting view, which the chairman mus

at the same time he presents his own.

70

 The Ac

provided that each member of the JCS, after informi

Secretary of Defense, may make indepen

recommendations to Congress.

71

 Finally, the Act pr

that the chairman shall, as he considers approp

consult the other members of the JCS and convene r

meetings.

72

 While the Act enlarged the chair

responsibilities and authority, it clearly did not inte

him to become too powerful, nor for the JCS to beco

inert organization.

The lessons of the Persian Gulf War provide ev

that the GNA strengthened civilian control over the 

forces.

73

 In the official DoD report on the war, the Sec

of Defense noted that the conflict was the first test of t

in a major war. He complimented the chairman, th

chairman, and the other members of the JCS fo

“excellent military advice” they provided. He reporte

the Act’s strengthening of the position of the cha

enabled the chairman to bring to bear his strategic i

and exceptional leadership to ensure the CINC 

83
provided with all he needed to successfully prosecu

war.

74

Expanding the Authority and Responsibility of 

CINCs.

In addition to improving civilian control of the 

forces, the GNA also provided more authority to the C

This was done in order to reduce further the influe

service parochialism and better focus DoD str

planning on the needs of the unified and spe

combatant commanders.

75

 Congress crafted se

provisions of the Act with this goal in mind. Th

reemphasized and clarified the responsibilities 

CINCs for accomplishing assigned missions as well 

ensuring their commands’ preparedness to do so.

76

 

described, in detail, command authority, specifying 

CINC has authority to:

• direct subordinate commands in all aspects of

military operations, joint training, and logistic

• prescribe the chain of command to the comman

forces within the command;

• organize the command and forces withi

command;

• employ forces within the command as he con

necessary to accomplish the command’s missio

• assign command functions to subord

commanders;

• coordinate and approve administrative suppor

disciplinary activities necessary to carry out mi

assigned to the command;

• select and suspend subordinate commander

staff officers; and

84
• convene courts martial.

77

The Act also provided that the Secretary of Defens

periodically review the authority of the CINCs and e

that their authority is commensurate with 

responsibilities. The Act gave the CINCs the respons

to report promptly to the secretary any instances in 

they feel their authority to be inadequate.

78

 Additio

Congress considered terms like “full operational comm

traditionally used to describe the authority of the CIN

be inappropriate for describing their new authority.

Act gave rise to a new term, “combatant command

DoD has formally adopted.

80

The Act further reinforced the CINCs’ author

directing the secretaries of the military departme

assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the CI

except for those forces needed to carry out the twelve s

functions.

82

 Although the Act specified a single, clear 

of command from the president to the Secretary of D

to the CINCs,

83

 it notably did not provide f

administrative chain of command from the president 

Secretary of Defense to the military departments. 

while the Act allowed each military department to 

unspecified authority and control over a portion of 

forces, the bulk of the U.S. armed forces were placed 

the authority of the CINCs.

Recognizing the geographic dispersion of the CINC

the broad spans of control inherent in the offices 

president and the Secretary of Defense, Congress inc

provisions in the Act that allow the chairman to ass

NCA in overseeing the CINCs. Specifically, the pre

may direct that all communications between himself 

secretary and the CINCs go through the chairman

president may also direct that the chairman assist h

the performance of his command functions. The Secre

Defense may assign the chairman responsibiliti

assisting in overseeing the combatant commands; how

such assignment confers no command authority.

84

85
Although the chairman is vested with no com

authority, his role in making the chain of command fu

effectively is pivotal. In addition to making hi

principal military advisor to the NCA, the Act desig

him as the spokesman for the CINCs, especially f

requirements of their commands, and made him respo

for informing other elements of DoD of the C

requirements. This provision of the Act not only inc

the chairman’s real authority, but also enhanced the 

of the CINCs’ to influence the NCA.

85

Another provision of the Act indirectly

substantially, increased the authority of the CINCs. It 

the secretaries of the military departments responsi

“fulfill[ing] (to the maximum extent practicable) the c

and future operational requirements of the [CINCs]. 

In short, the CINCs were made responsible for iden

requirements for military capabilities, the chairma

made responsible for synthesizing the requirement

the services were tasked to fulfill the requirements. 

the services were not to interpret, on their own, the C

requirements and base service programs on the capab

the services determined to be most important to the C

Via the GNA, Congress sought to clearly establis

primacy of the CINCs over the service Chiefs with res

the determination of required military capabilities.

Improving Strategy Formulation and Continge

Planning.

Through the GNA, Congress also sought to im

strategy formulation at both the NCA and CJCS lev

the NCA level, the Act required the president to “trans

Congress each year a comprehensive report on the na

security strategy of the United States.”

87

 The na

security strategy report is to be submitted at the sam

the president’s budget is submitted. It is to contain,

86
. . . the national security strategy of the United 

[including] a comprehensive description and discuss

the following:

1. The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives 

United States that are vital to the national security 

United States.

2. The foreign policy, worldwide commitments

national defense capabilities of the United States nec

to deter aggression and to the national security strat

the United States.

3. The proposed short-term and long-term uses 

political, economic, military, and other elements 

national power of the United States to protect or pr

the interests and achieve the goals and objectives re

to in paragraph (1).

4. The adequacy of the capabilities of the United 

to carry out the national security strategy of the U

States, including an evaluation of the balance amo

elements of the national power of the United Sta

support the implementation of the national se

strategy.

5. Such other information as may be necessary t

inform Congress on matters relating to the na

security strategy of the United States.

88

In adopting the language of this section of th

Congress intended for the president to des

comprehensively the short and long-term national se

strategies and to provide assessments of the 

associated with implementing the strategies. Con

could use the national security strategy reports to 

better informed decisions regarding funding to suppo

various elements of national power.

Congress recognized the need to address the spec

strategy at the military strategic planning level as we

GNA assigned the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

87
specific strategic and contingency planning responsib

With respect to strategic planning, he is to assist the N

providing for the strategic direction of the armed forc

is to prepare strategic plans which conform to re

guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense.

89

To assist the NCA in providing strategic directio

chairman prepares a national military strat

Additionally, the chairman provides for the preparatio

review of contingency plans which conform to NCA 

guidance.

91

 The chairman uses his Joint Str

Capabilities Plan (JSCP) to translate the policies se

in the secretary’s Contingency Planning Guidanc

specific planning tasks for the CINCs. In response 

JSCP, the CINCs develop operation plans and submi

to the chairman for approval.

92

In addition to providing for the preparation and r

of contingency plans, the chairman is also required 

GNA to prepare strategic plans.

93

 A strategic plan, glo

scope, is meant to guide the development and integra

the regional and functional plans developed by the se

CINCs.

94

 While the current planning processes enab

CINCs to develop sound regional plans, the chairma

to his global responsibilities and perspective, i

situated to reconcile, rationalize, and orchestra

CINCs’ plans. The chairman’s efforts in this regard m

more than merely compiling the CINCs’ plans.

95

 

expected to proactively set forth, in a global contex

priority of the specific objectives for the planning perio

national strategic concepts for attaining the objectiv

national resources that will be applied, and guidance 

how their application will be tailored to best serv

established priorities. By performing this str

formulation role, the chairman can ensure that contin

planning better adheres to policy guidance and is in a 

position to provide strategic advice to the NCA.

88
Providing for More Efficient Use of Defense

Resources. 

To complement the chairman’s increased str

planning responsibilities, Congress designed se

provisions of the GNA to enable the chairman to pr

the efficient use of defense resources. When combined

provisions describe an integrated process for determ

required military capabilities and ensuring their ef

provision. The process focuses on the identific

synthesis, and satisfaction of requirements identified 

CINCs. The chairman’s role in the process is to soli

CINCs’ requirements, provide national level analy

these requirements, assess the extent to which the pro

programs of the services efficiently satisfy the C

requirements, and advise the NCA accordingly. Tools 

the chairman can use to fulfill these responsibilities in

the CINCs’ Integrated Priority Lists, the 

Requirements Oversight Council, the chairman’s aut

to evaluate the preparedness of the combatant comma

and the chairman’s Current Readiness System.

Three additional provisions of the Act also enab

chairman to facilitate the efficient use of defense reso

his responsibility to develop doctrine for the 

employment of the armed forces, his triennial respons

to appraise the roles and functions assigned to the se

and his biennial responsibility to review the mis

responsibilities, and force structure of the comb

commands.

97

Improving Joint Officer Management.

One of the more significant provisions of the 

addressed 

policies, procedures, and practices for the effecti

management of officers of the . . . active duty list who a

particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters . . . 

89
These officers were to become skilled in “the inte

employment of land, sea, and air forces, including m

relating to national military strategy, strategic pla

and contingency planning, and command and con

combat operations under unified command.”

99

 Th

joint officer management measures, Congress inten

improve the quality of the Joint Staff as well as the q

of the CINCs’ staffs.

To facilitate the development of “Joint Spe

Officers” (JSOs), Congress prescribed min

requirements for the number of joint duty position

must be filled by qualified JSOs, their education and 

duty length, and promotion requirements for officer

have served or are serving in joint assignm

Implementation of these provisions has presen

daunting challenge to DoD.

100

Title IV’s salient provisions include a requireme

the Secretary of Defense to publish a list of the join

positions within DoD and to ensure that at least ha

filled by JSOs or JSO nominees. Furthermore, he 

designate at least 1,000 critical joint duty assig

positions that could be held only by fully qualified JS

Title IV of the GNA also provides that an officer may 

selected as a JSO until he/she attends a joint profes

military education school and, subsequently, compl

full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment.

102

Title IV also requires the Secretary of Defen

establish a “Capstone Course” for newly appointed g

and flag officers that prepares them to work with the 

services. The Act requires each officer selecte

promotion to one-star rank to attend this course, u

The officer’s immediately preceding assignment was 

there are no joint requirements for his/her field of exp

or it would otherwise be in the best interest of the of

service that he/she not attend.

103

90
CONCLUSIONS

Since passage of the NSA in 1947, Congress has s

progressively to unify effort within DoD, improv

quality and fidelity of the military advice provided 

national command authorities and the NSC

strengthen civilian control over the U.S. Armed force

last significant congressional action to these end

passage of the 1986 GNA. DoD’s implementation 

GNA has contributed to the evolution toward unified 

forces. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the cha

and other members of the JCS, the Joint Staf

combatant commands, and the services are arrivin

balanced relationship in which civilian author

supreme.

The DoD has substantially implemented the Ac

now is in a position to progress beyond its provision

DoD’s continued evolution depends on the institu

progress of other agencies of the government invol

national security strategy formulation 

implementation. The most important question fo

future is how a unified Department of Defense can a

synergy with the other agencies of national gover

that also “provide for the common defense and promo

general welfare.” Perhaps an approach analogous 

passage of the GNA is appropriate.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 4

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Defense Organization: The N

Change, Staff Report to the Committee on Armed services of the 

States Senate, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 49.

2. Unified operations are those that take place within the 

combatant commands which are composed of forces from two 

military departments. Unified operations is the generic term 

describe the wide scope of actions that take place under the dire

the CINCs of the unified combatant commands. Office of the Ch

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of 

91
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994, p. 400.

3.Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Offic

Department of Defense; Documents on Establishment and Organ

1944-1978, edited by Alice C. Cole, et al., Washington, D

Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 7.

4. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, pp. 49-53.

5. Although some of the early proponents of unification ad

such a radical reorganization, that option has not been se

considered since at least 1949. Lawrence J. Korb, “Service Unif

Arena of Fears, Hopes, and Ironies,” Naval Institute Proceedings

Review, 1976, p. 176.

6. Generally, the belief is that to the extent that unified arme

would speak with one voice, Congress would be less able to unco

debate divergent views on critical defense issues. That, in turn

inhibit congressional ability to reasonably oversee the armed fo

7. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, p. 50.

8. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishm

Organization, 1944-1978, pp.77-80.

9. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, p. 52. Th

Amendment also removed the Secretaries of the Military servic

the NSC. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishm

Organization, 1944-1978, pp. 84-86.

10. Ibid., p. 86.

11. The President and the Secretary of Defense make up th

Joint Pub 1-02, p. 253.

12. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishm

Organization, 1944-1978, pp. 94-95.

13. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, p. 52-53.

14. The Department of Defense; Documents on Establishm

Organization, 1944-1978, pp. 161-162.

15. Ibid., pp. 239-241. The fundamental underlying rationale 

continued movement toward unification was the belie

independent military departments and services resu

92
unnecessary duplication and waste. Centralized direction and 

on the other hand, promised better rationalization of the acquisit

application of forces, leading to increased effectiveness and effi

16. Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission, Why it 

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985, p. 6.

17. Ibid., p. 20.

18. Ibid., 16-43. Gregory P. Gass, Command and Cont

Achilles Heel of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, Alexandr

Defense Technical Information Center, February 13, 1992, p. 1

19. “Joint” connotes activities, operations, and organizat

which elements of more than one Service of the same nation part

Joint Pub 1-02, p. 200.

20. Gass, pp. 11-18.

21. Ryan, pp. 12-16, 28-30, 125.

22. Gass, pp. 1-26.

23. Ryan, pp. 1-2.

24. Howard Husock, Seige Mentality: ABC, the White House 

Iran Hostage Crisis, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, K

School of Government Case Program, 1988, pp. 1-22. Ryan, pp

Ryan, pp. 95-97.

25. Ibid., p. 105. The release of the hostages on January 20

within minutes of President Reagan’s inauguration, did not a

congressional concern.

26. U.S. Department of Defense Commission on 

International Airport Terrorist Attack, Report of the DoD Com

on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, October 23, 1983, pp. 1-34.

27. Ibid., pp. 29-34.

28. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan announc

redeployment of the Marines, and on March 30, 1984 he repo

Congress that the United States was no longer involved 

multinational force in Lebanon. Gary M. Stern and Morton H

The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go to War, Westpo

Greenwood Press, 1984, p. 68.

93
29. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Adequacy 

Marine Corps Security in Beirut. Summary of Findings and Conc

of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed s

98th Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

1983. pp.1-3.

30. Ibid., pp. 25-70.

31. In an address to the nation on October 27, 1983, Pr

Reagan suggested a direct relationship between the Beirut bomb

the invasion of Grenada. “When Threatened, We Stand Shou

Shoulder,” The Washington Post, October 28, 1983, p. A14.

32. Reynolds A. Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in G

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1988, pp. 71-75; “Secrets Fr

Reagan Years,” Newsweek, October 30, 1995, p. 6.

33. Although planning for the Grenada invasion was under

October 14, the president did not give his approval for the op

until October 24. William C. Gilmore, The Grenada Interv

Analysis and Documentation, New York: Facts on File, 1984, pp. 

34. Burrowes, pp. 79-80.

35. In an April 1984 report to the Congressional Military 

Caucus, William S. Lind, of the Military Reform Institute, m

following observation:

The United States required seven battalions of troops, p

elements of two other battalions, to defeat fewer than 

Cubans and a Grenadian army that hardly fought at all. O

about 200 of the Cubans were troops; the remainder w

construction workers with some militia training. T

overwhelmingly superior U.S. forces took 3 days to defeat 

Cuban defense and about another 5 days to secure the en

island. By way of contrast, the British defeated more t

11,000 Argentines with just eight infantry battalions in 

Falklands.

In addition to criticizing the disappointing performance of 

operations and U.S. Army units, Lind cited deficient military p

and the insistence of the JCS that all four services be involved (

in the Iran hostage rescue mission”). William S. Lind, Repor

Congressional Military Reform Caucus, Subject: The G

Operation, Washington, DC: Military Reform Institute, 1984, p

94
36. Fred Hiatt, “Many U.S. Casualties Caused by Acc

Washington Post, November 1, 1983, p. 1.

37. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, The Battle for Grenada, Lex

MA: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 221-230, 333-342.

38. Lind, pp. 2-5.

39. Burrowes, pp. 82-83.

40. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, p. 13.

41. Ibid., p. III.

42. The acquisition process is the process by which requirem

military capabilities are converted into defense acquisition pr

which yield fielded capabilities.

43. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, pp. 1-12.

44. David Packard, A Quest for Excellence, Final Repor

President by the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Mana

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1986, 

45. David Packard, letter, June 30, 1986, transmitting to Pr

Reagan the Final Report of the President’s Blue Ribbon Commis

Defense Management.

46. Packard, pp. xvii-xviii.

47. Ibid., pp. xvii-xxx. In the interest of brevity and since t

not central to an assessment of the 1986 Department of D

Reorganization Act, the specific recommendations conc

acquisition reform and government-industry accountability 

provided in this study.

48. Michael Ganley, “Reorganization Bill Almost Certain t

the President’s Desk This Year,” Armed Forces Journal Intern

April 1986, p. 16.

49. Then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger believ

congressionally mandated reorganization of the DoD was unne

and that any increase in the influence of the CJCS would be 

expense of the Secretary of Defense. Assistant Secretary of the A

Tidal McCoy believed that DoD was already too centralized and t

service secretaries needed more, not less, autonomy. Secretar

Navy John Lehman claimed that the executive branch ha

95
worshipping “at the altar of the false idols of centralizati

unification” for the past 30 years. Bryan Howard Ward, United 

Defense Reorganizations: Contending Explanations, Ann Arb

UMI Dissertation services, 1995, pp. 324-327.

50. Although prior to establishing the Packard Commis

mid-1985, President Reagan considered defense reorganiza

issue to be handled by the Secretary of Defense. His formatio

Commission and rapid approval of its recommendations evin

belief that reform was necessary. Ward, pp. 324-327.

51. On May 7, 1986, the Senate approved its version 

reorganization bill by a vote of 95 to 0. On August 5, 1986, the 

approved its version by a vote of 406 to 4. It seemed that in th

Congress, only four members did not support the type of reform 

consideration. The United States Congress, Congressional 

Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2nd S

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Septem

1986, pp. H7005-H7008. Congressional Record, Proceedin

Debates of the 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, D

Government Printing Office, September 16, 1986, p. S12652.

52. The conference met formally on August 13 and Septem

1986. While over 100 amendments were considered, there we

three substantive areas that required resolution and were 

resolved. Senator Goldwater characterized the conference as th

cordial and cooperative in his memory. Congressional R

Proceedings and Debates of the 99th Congress, 2nd S

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Septem

1986, p. H7005. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debate

99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, September 16, 1986, pp. S12652-S12653.

53. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 3.

54. Ibid., p. 5.

55. Prior to passage of the GNA, the Secretary of D

promulgated a similar document, the Defense Guidance (DG). T

which resulted from the GNA has proven to be a more autho

document. For a description of the discontinued DG, see Depart

Defense Instruction 7045.7, p. 2-1.

96
56. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of 

Directive 7045.14, Subject: The Planning, Programming, and Bu

System (PPBS), Change 1, July 28, 1990, p. 3.

57. Contingency planning is the deliberate and crisis o

operation planning conducted by the CINCs. Unlike DoD’s p

planning that addresses the mid-range planning period, cont

planning is for potential near-term operations that may be con

during the next 2 years. Contingency planning considers the be

to use existing military capabilities while program plannin

develop future capabilities.

58. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 5.

59. Ibid., p. 17.

60. U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Reorgan

Compliance with Legislative Mandate for Contingency Pla

GAO/NSIAD-91-312, Gaithersburg, MD, September, 1991.

61. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 5.

62. Defense Organization: the Need for Change, p. 15

President and the Secretary of Defense make up the NCA. Jo

1-02, p. 253.

63. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, p. 159.

64. Congressional Record—Senate, October 3, 1985, p. S 12

65. Ibid.; Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorgan

Act of 1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 17, 15, and 

respectively.

66. Ibid., p. 21.

67. Ibid., p. 30. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Depart

Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense 

major Components, September 25, 1987, p. 6.

68. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 18.

69. Ibid., p. 23.

97
70. Ibid., p. 15.

71. Ibid., p. 16.

72. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

73. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Conduct of the Persi

War, Interim Report to Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, July 1991, pp. 26-1, 26-2.

74. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Conduct of the Persi

War, Final Report to Congress, Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, 1992, p. xxv.

75. A unified command is a command with broad con

missions under a single commander and composed of forces from 

more military departments. A specified command is a comma

has broad continuing missions and is normally composed of forc

a single military department. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staf

Pub 0-2, Unified Action of the Armed Forces (UNAAF), Washingt

Joint Staff, February 24, 1995, p. xv. Although, presently, no s

commands exist, their creation remains provided for in Title 10, 

States Code and the UNAAF recognizes their viability.

76. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 24. During the Joint confe

Senate amendment was introduced that would have had the Act 

the basic CINC responsibilities such as security of the com

mission accomplishment, and directing coordination 

subordinates. The conferees determined the general responsibi

the CINCs would be better promulgated by administrative reg

and they have been via the Unified Command Plan.

77. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), pp. 24-25.

78. Ibid., p. 25.

79. Ibid., p. 121.

80. Joint Pub 0-2, pp. III-5.

81. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 23.

82. Ibid., pp. 46,56,68. The twelve functions are: rec

organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mob

98
demobilizing, administering, maintaining, construction, outfitt

repair of military equipment, and construction, maintenan

repair of real property.

83. Ibid., p. 23.

84. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

85. Ibid., p. 24. For example, the chairman is respons

soliciting, evaluating, integrating, and establishing priorities 

CINCs’ requirements and advising the Secretary of D

accordingly.

86. Ibid., pp. 47, 56, 69.

87. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 88.

88. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

89. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 19.

90. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memor

of Policy No. 7, (1st Revision—March 17, 1993), Joint S

Planning System, Washington, DC: Joint Staff, pp. I-2.

91. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 17.

92. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, User’

for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and Execution S

Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 1, 1995, pp. 10-13.

93. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 17.

94. Recalling the Packard Commission’s charge that th

requires better integration of the efforts of the CINCs, it seems 

that the chairman should provide this integration, in part, thro

development of overarching strategic plans harmonized with the 

defense planning periods. For a more complete discussion of the n

a national military strategic plan, see Douglas C. Lovelace, J

Thomas-Durell Young, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Pl

The Missing Nexus, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute, September 1995, pp. 14-32.

99
95. For an explanation of why the Joint Strategic Capabiliti

is not, as its title might imply, a strategic plan as defined by th

see Lovelace and Young, pp. 16-17.

96. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 21.

97. Ibid., pp. 18, 22.

98. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganizatio

1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 36.

99. Kathleen Van Trees Medlock, A Critical Analysis of the Im

the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Offi

dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 1993

(quoting U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed se

Reorganization of the Department of Defense, 99th Congress, 2d S

February 19-March 12, 1986, H.A.S.C. No. 99-53).

100. Even before the Act became law, DoD began work 

recommendations of the Packard Commission, many of whic

reflected in the Act. Nonetheless, 2 years elapsed after passag

Act before provisions of Title IV began to take root. Casper Wein

Annual Report to the Congress for FY 88/89 Budget, Washingt

Office of the Secretary of Defense, January 12, 1987, p. 114.

101. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza

of 1986, Conference Report (99-824), pp. 37-41.

102. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza

of 1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 37.

103. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza

of 1986, Conference Report (99-824), p. 38.

100
CHAPTER 5

INSTITUTIONALIZING DEFENSE REFOR

THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION

IN THE ROOT, MCNAMARA, AND COHE

ERAS

Joseph R. Cerami

In November 1997, Secretary of Defense William 

released a “Defense Reform Initiative Report

announced several areas for public management refo

the Department of Defense (DoD), in support of on

executive branch reinvention programs. This chapter 

at the Root reforms of the early 20th century an

McNamara reforms of the 1960s, and then offers 

comments about the prospects for success for the on

1997 Defense Reform Initiative. The theoretical lite

on reinvention and transformation will also be u

analyze and evaluate Secretary Cohen’s reform effort

to address several key questions relating to defense r

What is the role of senior leadership today? 

combination of knowledge, skills, abilities, and expe

are required for senior leaders in DoD? Ar

environmental conditions within DoD right for re

What will be the catalyst for change in our current 

globalization? Are current business models useful gu

defense reform? Can executive-legislative conflict be t

into cooperation and compromise in order to im

defense management?

The Root Reforms.

Several themes stand out in the history of m

reform in the United States. These include exe

leadership, budget control and integration, exec

101
legislative-bureaucratic conflict, “scientific 

business-like” public management, and civil-m

relations.

1

 Studies of Progressive Era reform e

highlight the internal struggles for executive c

between the civilian Secretary and the 

general-in-chief. These civil-military struggles 

complicated by the autonomy of the Army bureaus, s

the ordnance and commissary organizations, that 

themselves with congressional committee member

decentralized bureau system was flawed from a mana

efficiency and effectiveness perspective—but pow

politically. The catalyst for change was failure, especi

Army logistics and administration, during the Sp

American War.

2

 Initiating change required a ded

group of individuals, typically describe

Neo-Hamiltonians.

3

 The most influential of 

Progressive reformers, was Elihu Root, who was n

Secretary of War in 1898. While not a military exper

had demonstrated impressive skills as a public ma

while serving as governor for the territories of Puert

and the Philippines. Root also had exceptional skill

lawyer and negotiator. Significantly, Root had experie

“dealing with legislative committees and dra

legislation”

4

 and spent several years shepherdin

reforms through Congress and the legislative proces

Secretary Root sought to improve the Army’s in

structure, including strengthening the top leadersh

modernizing the staff and planning functions. His id

military organization were taken from the writi

Emory Upton and the Prussian general staff system

was able to implement his administrative 

organizational reforms by personally draftin

legislation that made reform possible. Elting M

described his 1903 General Staff bill as

the most enlightened piece of legislation dealing with milit

organization ever passed in this country . . . [which] was alm

exclusively the work of Elihu Root.

7

102
Most importantly, the legislation codified the Am

tradition of civilian supremacy of the military, 

remains a foundation of the American syst

government.

8

 In effect, Root based his reforms 

broad-based synthesis of Progressive Era govern

reform theory, Taylor’s scientific management, U

military writings, the Prussian general staff mode

traditional American democratic values.

Even a very brief survey of Root’s record as Secre

War is sufficient to demonstrate the scope and signif

of the military reforms that he was able to accomplis

also sufficient to generate three important questions: 

Prussian General Staff model still a useful po

reference for DoD reform? Are any of the condition

made it possible for Root to accomplish his reforms 

early twentieth century in place today? Is Roo

appropriate model for a modern Secretary of D

engaged in reform and innovation?

The McNamara Reforms.

The era of the McNamara DoD reforms also stan

as a significant period of change in defense manageme

the time that Robert McNamara came to the Of

Secretary of Defense, the post World War II grow

government agencies had created significant pressu

the creation of a new system to rationally allocate f

resources. Furthermore, information technolog

computers had significantly enhanced the governm

capability for quantitative data analysis. These are s

the factors that convinced McNamara that it was 

necessary and possible to introduce a 

Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) w

the Department of Defense.

The political conditions also seemed to be in place 

time that the Kennedy administration took office in 

The National Security Act of 1947 had placed the 

Navy, and Air Force within a new National M

103
Establishment (NME) under the titular control of 

Secretary of Defense.

9

 Unfortunately, the NME s

precipitated intense rivalry between the services tha

time and effort to overcome. Congress enacted add

legislation a decade later to try to resolve some of the 

difficulties in establishing the new defense organiz

The DoD Reorganization Act of 1958 clarified the Sec

of Defense’s authority over the services in the ar

budgeting, force structure, and research 

development.

1 0

 Reform to integrate plan

programming, and budgeting was now possible.

Armed with this new legislative authority, it rem

for McNamara and his staff to implement Plan

Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) refor

DoD. Their goal was to develop a process to coor

strategy and plans, force requirements and program

resources and budgets. The intent was to cent

decisionmaking and design explicit criteria for 

systems acquisitions.

11

 In keeping with the PPB co

they sought an analytical approach to assessing cos

needs and developing alternatives to present t

Secretary of Defense. They would develop mul

programs through the Five-Year Defense Plans. In 

view, an analytical, largely civilian staff would be free 

influence of military parochialism and thus be indepe

both intellectually and careerwise.

12

Prior to PPB, under performance budgeting appro

budgets and military strategy were not related. McN

set out to fix the problems of the existing system, wh

that point had simply set DoD ceilings for each of the 

services.

13

 PPB was designed to reverse the trad

informational and decision flows within DoD. In the 

estimates were sent upward in the organization t

approval in light of existing resources. By contrast, as 

Schick has observed, PPB established a “top p

approach in which the “critical decisional process—t

deciding on purposes and plans—has a downwar

disaggregative flow.”

14

 Schick also correctly predicte

104
this would in turn require the centralization of 

making, and subsequent DoD reforms did aim to cen

key budgeting and planning functions.

DoD operations research analysts Alain Enthove

Wayne Smith have provided an insiders’ history 

McNamara PPB reforms. In their book How Mu

Enough?, Enthoven and Smith chronicle the roles tha

played in support of McNamara’s efforts to shap

defense program in a centralized, top down fashion.

authors proposed that their systems analysis organiz

working directly for the Secretary of Defense, would p

the analytical staff that would make the relevan

available for making major program and spending dec

within DoD.

16

 Enthoven and Smith’s focus w

developing a sophisticated approach to budg

integration that went well beyond the simple cont

bookkeeping function. In the Whiz Kids’ view, the p

would optimize the national interest and minimi

tradition of service budget compromises. To their 

their vision for linking planning, programming

budgeting is still in effect today within the De

Department.

17

Enthoven and Smith also write about the m

problems that the McNamara team faced, and the 

mistakes that they made, starting in 1961.

18

In sum

they argue that: There was no centralized leadershi

the services; no centralized planning; no coordinat

research and development programs; no quantitativ

analysis; no analysis staff in DoD; and no adequat

accounting standards.

The Failings of PPB.

It is significant to point out that President L

Johnson’s attempt to extend the PPB system in all f

agencies failed. Hal Rainey notes that Johnson’s 

failed to meet the conditions for successful organiza

change. That is, the initiative lacked “sustained su

105
from higher levels, participative planning, and fl

implementation.”

19

 Rainey adds that “the reason f

failure of PPBS was not necessarily that it was a bad i

was a well-intentioned innovation advocated by 

experts in public administration.”

20

Schick echoes Rainey’s assessment in a 1973 art

Public Administration Review. He takes note of the 

Office of Management and Budget memorandum that 

the “Demise of Federal PPB.”

21

 He writes of the pr

purpose of PPB to recast the budgetary role i

bureaucracy, that is, to transform the budget in

instrument for deciding the purposes and progra

government. Cost-effectiveness and analysis were to 

as change agents. Schick concludes that PPB failed be

it could not penetrate budget routines. Trying to for

DoD system on other government agencies, w

integrating planning and analysis at the top of the age

led to failure.

Schick, Rainey, and Henry Mintzberg, all agre

PPB was introduced across the board without ade

preparation within the organizations.

22

 The implem

directives were insensitive to bureaucratic trad

institutional loyalty, and personal relationships

reforms also suffered from inadequate support, leade

and resources. A third problem area was in the re

policy analysis itself. Good analysts and data were in 

supply. 

Schick also borrows from political scientists C

Lindblom and Aaron Wildavsky to point out d

problems. In their assessment, Lindblom and Wild

claim that PPB attempted to ride roughshod over Am

political values.

23

 They highlight the bargai

incremental, “muddling through,” model in Am

public administration.

24

 In effect, budgets traditi

have been instruments of conflict suppression. PPB s

to escalate conflict. After all, PPB sought to de

consistent program objectives, build an understand

106
program purposes, terminate low-yield programs, exp

range of program alternatives, and unveil the cost

benefits of all federal programs. All of these initiative

the comfort level out of the traditional increm

approach and fueled the fires of bureaucrati

interservice competition.

Another part of the problem with PPB was 

education and background of its pioneers. They wer

and foremost economists and systems analysts. “They 

little about public administration or about the tardin

budgeting for the vast changes they undertook.”

25

 Th

of knowledge of public administration in general, a

fields of public management, organization theor

development, all help to account for the ham-ha

top-down manner by which McNamara’s innovation

implemented within the bureaucracy. McNam

problems would have been even more serious if h

attempted to make changes across the cabinet and d

agencies rather than within DoD.

26

Another problematic aspect of PPB relates to the 

Congress.

PPB was conceived almost exclusively from an execut

perspective, as if Congress does not exist and that all it tak

to make a budget is to review agency requests within 

administrative setting. Moreover, PPB was engineered in 

way that enabled the Bureau of the Budget to bypa

Congress. The appropriation accounts were not restructur

nor were significant alterations made in the budg

submissions to Congress. The special PPB plans and analy

were destined for executive use and were not incorporated in

the flow of data to Congress.

27

These problems were further compounded by the exe

branch’s reluctance to show its program analy

Congress because of traditional fears of legis

micromanagement. 

The struggle between the White House and Co

continues today in the Gore reinvention efforts. A 

107
article highlights the conflict between Gore’s exe

branch “Performance-Based Organization” initiative

Congress’s “Government Performance and Results 

1993.” The author writes that “The NPR (Na

Performance Review) is an instrument in the 

struggle between the Clinton administration and 

elements in Congress over the role and organization 

federal government.”

28

Comparing Root and McNamara.

A comparison of the Root and McNamara reform 

leads to several insights, which are relevant to the pos

War situation. Root called for reform within the overa

context of the Progressive Era. In that period, 

administrators searched for principles of scie

management to find ways to improve govern

effectiveness and efficiency. Root remained with

mainstream of institutional reformers in 

Neo-Hamiltonian mold. The German general staff s

provided the benchmark for comparison. Root’s ide

guided by the emerging public management theory, w

centralization and streamlining under the exe

branch. James Hewes, in From Root to McNamara 

that: 

The principal issue in the development of the organization 

administration of the War Department/Department of 

Army from 1900 to 1963 was executive control . . . . Tight con

had existed . . . within the headquarters of each of a serie

autonomous bureaus, which largely governed themselves un

the detailed scrutiny of Congress. The question was whet

tight authority should be imposed on the bureaus at the leve

the Secretary of War.

29

The McNamara era was an extension of exe

control by further centralizing defense management 

the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the 

services. McNamara’s guiding theory was not derive

public administration, nor was he an experi

108
government manager like Root. His emphasis on sy

analysis and economics was derived directly fro

education in a management school and executive 

experience in the hierarchical world of the autom

industry. McNamara’s corporate experience did not p

him adequately for the inside game of Washington p

There is no evidence that he approached Root’s abi

work through Congress to institute reforms. While 

achieved a legislative mandate for his manage

innovations, McNamara’s reforms were done inter

largely within the executive branch, and often in the 

a hostile Congress.

Clearly, during their tenure, McNamara’s analys

Congress as the enemy. Enthoven and Smith, in 

chapter on “Unfinished Business” call for more ba

and informed congressional debate and involvem

military issues.

30Their writing is filled with ane

pointing to an “unholy” alliance between Congres

senior military officers. Their discussion does not 

Root’s sophisticated political approach. As Secretary 

he faced similar congressional opposition. But Root, 

McNamara, was able to work out a successful legis

strategy to neutralize his political and military oppo

and legitimize his reform effort. Both men wan

achieve similar goals, but Root’s understanding of po

realities caused him to build an alliance with Congre

criticize them openly for their lack of informatio

balance.

DoD Reform in the Cohen Era: Transformation 

Reinvention.

The tendency to regard Congress as the enemy 

view government as another form of business organi

continues to this day. During the 1990s, calls for DoD r

rely heavily on the latest business practices. The lite

in public management and change includes ideas rega

transformation and reinvention. Rainey summariz

109
literature and identifies a number of conditions for ef

transformation. These include creating conditions i

major areas: (1) need; (2) leadership; (3) participatio

(4) implementation.

31

 Rainey notes that there mus

widespread belief in the need for change. This belief m

coupled with clear, sustained leadership and suppor

top executives. At the same time, there must be 

participation throughout the organization in diag

problems and planning change. Also, there must be fl

incremental implementation with experiment

feedback, and adaptation. All must build on prior suc

institutionalize change.

Within the business management community, Ko

viewed as an expert on transformation, leadership

change. In a 1995 article, he lists the following “Eight 

to Transforming Your Organization.”

32

1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: Exam

market and competitive realities. Identifying 

discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportun

2. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coali

Assembling a group with enough power to lead the c

effort. Encouraging the group to work together as a 

3. Creating a Vision: Creating a vision to help 

the change effort. Developing strategies for achievin

vision.

4. Communicating the Vision: Using every v

possible to communicate the new vision and stra

Teaching new behaviors by the example of the g

coalition.

5. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: G

rid of obstacles to change. Changing systems or stru

that seriously undermine the vision. Encouragin

taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actio

6. Planning for and Creating Short-Term 

Planning for visible performance improvements. Cr

110
those improvements. Recognizing and rewa

employees involved in the improvements.

7. Consolidating Improvements and Prod

Still More Change: Using increased credibility to c

systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit the v

Hiring, promoting, and developing employees wh

implement the vision. Reinvigorating the process wit

projects, themes, and change agents.

8. Institutionalizing New Approaches: Articu

the connections between the new behaviors and cor

success. Developing the means to ensure leade

development and success.

Public management reforms regarding transform

are linked to the literature on reinvention. “The Gore R

on Reinventing Government” is in step with the 

notions of organizational change and reform. The doc

is filled with references to fostering “historic change—

way government works.”

33

 The NPR includes a 

principles for reform:

34

We will invent a government that puts people firs

• Cutting unnecessary spending

• Serving its customers

• Empowering its employees

• Helping communities solve their own problems

• Fostering excellence

Here’s how. We will:

• Create a clear sense of mission

• Steer more, row less

• Delegate authority and responsibility

111
• Replace regulation with incentives

• Develop budgets based on outcomes

• Expose federal operations to competition

• Search for market, not administrative, solution

• Measure our success by customer satisfaction

The NPR is thus filled with management co

similar to those in the reinvention and transform

literature. In keeping with the principles of transform

the NPR includes the stages of agenda settin

implementation. Agenda setting occurred during 

initial 6-month review of the federal government, citi

leadership in an effort that included teams of f

employees.

35

 Specific reform programs, “success st

are highlighted throughout the report.

The NPR has its share of critics in the writings of 

administration scholars and others.

36

 In its defens

report points out that it is aimed at improving 

government works, and not what it does.

37

 So it is o

the charge that it is primarily concerned with improvi

effectiveness and efficiencies of government. It can a

criticized for focusing on cutback management. In 

Chapter 4 is entitled “Cutting Back to Basics” and ca

cutting programs, eliminating duplication, collecting 

and reengineering to cut costs. However, that repr

only part of the total package. To evaluate the NPR i

of the transformation literature, we can compare how 

proposals fit within Rainey’s condition and Ko

transformation model.

The NPR’s opening paragraph makes a case f

widespread belief in the need for change:

Public confidence in the federal government has never b

lower. The average American believes we waste 48 cent

every tax dollar. Five of every six want “fundamental change

112
Washington. Only 20 percent of Americans trust the fede

government to do the right thing most of the time—down fr

76 percent 30 years ago.

38

Throughout the introductory chapter the report estab

the widespread perception of the need for gover

change. It cites polls of the American people, and cri

from federal workers, state and local politician

administrators, and Congress. The fact that the 

President has his name on the report and the Presid

quoted throughout lends credibility to Rainey’s s

condition, that is, that clear and sustained leadership 

government’s top executives is fundamental. The 

condition, of flexible and incremental implementat

also validated. The Preface of the NPR calls for cr

Reinvention Teams and Laboratories, which se

institutionalize new approaches.

39

The rhetoric in the report is meant to signal a clear 

of urgency. The report notes that the

movement to reinvent government . . . is driven . . . by absolu

necessity. . . . Government is broken, and it is time to fix it.

40

Gore repeatedly cites the impatience of taxpayers 

rationale for making reinvention urgent. The repor

addresses the importance of a guiding coalition. It me

the broad support for bureaucratic reform in Congre

all levels of government. The NPR vision inc

developing a government that works better and cos

through revolutionary change. This is captured in Pre

Clinton’s citation in the Introduction:

Our goal is to make the entire federal government both l

expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of o

national bureaucracy away from complacency a

entitlement toward initiative and empowerment. We intend 

redesign, to reinvent, and to reinvigorate the entire natio

government.

41

113
This goal has been reinforced through the Vice Pres

personal commitment and travel to build suppo

reinventing government. Another key transform

principle is empowerment, which is covered i

dimensions. First, Chapter 3 of the report emph

empowering federal employees to get results th

decentralizing the bureaucracy, developin

entrepreneurial spirit, and cutting “red-tape.” A s

dimension calls for empowering state and 

governments.

42

To illustrate the idea of creating short-term win

NPR cites several examples. These include one s

story from the DoD:

The military: the most conservative, hierarchical a

traditional branch of the government and the bureaucracy le

likely to behave like a cutting-edge private company, rig

Wrong. One of Washington’s most promising reinvention sto

comes from the Air Combat Command.

43

The report also conforms to the transformation mo

seeking instruments that can consolidate improveme

notes the significance of the Government Performan

Results Act of 1993 and highlights its requireme

agencies’ 5-year strategic plans and perform

budgeting.

44

 Performance budgeting is being ext

throughout federal agencies. Thus, through legislatio

its efforts to build support within the cabinet, the NPR 

to institutionalize the reinvention initiatives. The str

plans and prodding of the Office of Management and B

(OMB) all contribute to a long-term process in keepin

transformation principles. The NPR notes 

transforming major corporations can take 6 to 8 year

it is reasonable to expect that the federal governme

take longer.

45

Appendix A of the NPR lists more specific “

recommendations, by agency.”

46

 For DoD, it list

significant areas and 12 others for improvements. Th

areas of significance include early Clinton Administ

114
strategy and force structure requirements—the Botto

Review (BUR)—and acquisition reform. Of t

recommendations, most fall in the category of efficien

effectiveness enhancements, such as more privatiz

productivity enhancements, incentives, organiza

restructuring, etc. It is interesting to note that nine 

fourteen items are listed as “cbe” (cannot be estimate

to data limitation or uncertainties about implemen

time lines) for changes in spending and receipts.

47

There is little to note regarding significant chan

the basic PPBS processes of the McNamara era. The 

set the military force structure in 1993 with its requir

for conducting two major theater wars modeled aft

Persian Gulf War scenario. This has remained rela

unchanged during the Clinton Administration. Acqu

reform remains a perennial reform issue for DoD

continual calls for eliminating $600 toilet seats, 

hammers, etc., as well as reducing the perceived 

fraud, and abuse of defense contractors and pork-

politics. 

All in all, the 1993 NPR does follow the princip

transformational management when it discusses cha

the management practices of the federal govern

However, when it comes to the specifics of the D

Department program, the Gore Report called for rela

little new in transforming DoD in terms of the key asp

planning, programming, budgeting, or execution. Th

was not the final word for 1990s DoD reform, howev

Defense Reform Initiatives.

William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense f

second Clinton Administration has made reinvention 

his major areas of emphasis. Both his November 

“Defense Reform Initiative” and the 1998 “Annual Re

the President and Congress” returned to the id

reforming defense management. For the fe

government in the Clinton Administration, the Gore R

115
set the agenda, and Cohen signed on to the reinv

concept. In Cohen’s opening paragraph in the D

Reform Initiative he writes:

Having inherited the defense structure that won the Cold W

and Desert Storm, the Clinton Administration intends to le

as its legacy a defense strategy, a military, and a Defe

Department that have been transformed to meet the n

challenges of a new century.

48

In the same vein, the final section of the introduc

titled “Transforming Our Military.”

49

 This section st

using advanced information and other new technolo

transform warfighting and develop new ways of orga

and employing military forces. To carry out the new d

strategy and operational concepts, Cohen cal

“fundamental reform in how the Defense Depar

conducts business.”

5 0

 DoD has jumped on 

transformation bandwagon and the Secret

introduction is filled with ideas similar to Kotter and 

Cohen uses the metaphor of DoD going on a diet. In his 

DoD put on “excess pounds, built up during the long w

of the Cold War.”

51

 He suggests that: “Losing w

successfully requires not a one-time diet, but a perm

change in lifestyle.”

The final section of this chapter will look in more 

at what the permanent lifestyle change entails. C

Cohen stresses the theme of more business-like 

management. Again, his introduction highlights this p

DoD has labored under support systems and business pract

that are at least a generation out of step with modern corpor

America. DoD support systems and practices that were o

state-of-the-art are now antiquated compared with the syste

and practices in place in the corporate world, while ot

systems were developed in their own defense-unique cult

and have never corresponded with the best business practice

the private sector. This cannot and will not continue. T

Defense Reform Initiative reflects the insights of numer

business leaders who have restructured and downsized th

116
corporations and not only survived but thrived in a rapi

changing marketplace.

Taken within the context of the innovation 

transformation literature, the Cohen initiatives are fo

narrowly. Mostly the reforms center on what are ca

Chapter 1: Best Business Practices. Chapter 1 calls 

“Revolution in the Business Affairs of the Departm

Defense [which] includes adopting and adapting th

business practices of the private sector to the busin

defense.”

52

 Included in Best Business Practices are 

free logistics and acquisition systems; using purchase 

electronic catalogues; reengineering the systems us

shipping household goods; etc. These electronic, Int

and paper free practices for administration, financ

logistics no doubt make sense in the information age. 

proposals seem worthwhile for improving how DoD d

support business. They are not geared to transformi

nature of what DoD does with respect to either role

missions or strategy, force structure or budg

requirements. 

The same is true of Chapter 2: Changin

Organization. Again, there is no attempt to addr

reform what DoD does. Instead the chapter focus

organizational changes that fall squarely into the ca

of cutback management. While some of these reform

be overdue for trimming the aforementioned Cold W

there is no accompanying analysis linking organiza

cuts to changes in DoD functions, roles or mission

chapter generally points out

three central principles guiding the changes: Departme

headquarters should be flexible enough to deal with futu

challenges; the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) shou

focus on corporate-level tasks; and operational manageme

tasks should be pushed to the lowest appropriate level. A

result, all headquarters structures should be thinn

flattened, and streamlined. . . .

53

117
The highlights of the reorganization stress the level 

expected:

• OSD reduced 33 percent from FY 1996 over th

18 months;

• Defense Agencies personnel reduced 21 percen

five years;

• Personnel in DoD Field Activities reduced 36 p

over 2 years;

• Joint Staff personnel reduced 29 percent by FY 2

• All other headquarters reduced 10 percent 

2003;

• Headquarters of Combatant Commands redu

percent by FY 2003;

• Reduce Presidentially Appointed, Senate-conf

OSD positions by 9 percent;

• Eliminate the entire category of Defense Su

Activities;

• Reduce number of non-intelligence Defense Ag

by 8 percent;

• Reduce the number of DoD Field Activities 

percent.

Overall, these cuts are expected to result in a to

percent reduction in OSD personnel.

54

 As opposed 

transformational notion of flexible, increm

implementation, Cohen has opted to “jump-start the r

process.”

55

 This is to be aided by a set of principl

agenda of organizational changes in a series of initia

The guiding philosophy is that DoD will be positioned 

future challenges by empowering subordinate acti

weeding out redundancy, and strengthening O

118
prepare for the longer-term for strategy, program

financial planning.

Another transformation principle addressed 

report is that of institutionalizing the new approach. 

proposes a Defense Management Council (hereafter, 

at the undersecretary (vice chiefs of service staff) l

The DMC will work for the Deputy Secretary of Defen

be responsible for reform initiation, implementatio

oversight. The DMC is thus expected to promote integ

and general savings and improve performance throu

DoD in the years ahead. Yet the DMC remains at the 

the centralized DoD pyramid. There are no propos

decentralization, or involving all layers of the organiz

as the New Public Management favors.

The report also targets the Joint Chiefs of 

(hereafter, JCS) organization. Under the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act the position of the Chairman a

JCS staff were strengthened at the expense o

individual armed services. While applauding the soun

of the legislation, the JCS and the subordinate re

Combatant Commands are also marked for reductio

Another business-like practice Cohen highlig

privatization or contracting out. Chapter 3 focus

“Streamlining Through Competition.” Here he pr

relying on the “competitive powers of the marketpl

help us become more efficient.”

58

 The Initiative emph

its roots in OMB Circular A-76 from the Eisen

Administration. The circular, proposed in 1955, pub

in 1966, updated in 1979 and 1983, and revised in 199

the rules for public-private competitions. Cohen cite

cost comparisons from 1978-1994, which resulted in 

that 2,000 competitions, with an average annual sav

$1,478 million, and a 31 percent savings overall.

5

potential of future cost savings sets an example f

positive possibilities of these competitions and rein

the transformation notion for “creating” short-term w

119
A final initiative in Cohen’s report calls fo

additional rounds of Base Realignment and Cl

(BRAC). Chapter 4 points to “Eliminating Unn

Infrastructure” and compares the relative drawdown 

defense budget (-40 percent), military personne

percent), and domestic base structure (-21 percent). 

calls for two additional rounds of BRAC in 2001 and 2

correct this imbalance.

60

 In fact, in Bill S.1814, “D

Reform Act of 1998,” the Senate has written one s

regarding “Congressional Disapproval” of base closu

realignment (without meeting several on

conditions).

61

 The politics of defense reform, wh

executive branch initiative, must include congres

backing and account for conditions of divided governm

well as traditional, executive-legislative branch tens

The 1998 Secretary of Defense’s “Annual Report 

President and the Congress” echoes the Defense R

Initiative’s calls for reform. It includes four 

principles: reengineer, consolidate, compete, and elim

In a section titled, Strategic Planning: DoD, the R

notes six critical corporate-level goals consistent wi

Government Performance and Results Act:

62

• Goal 1. Shape the international environment th

DoD engagement programs and activities.

• Goal 2. Shape the international environmen

respond to the full spectrum of crises by pro

appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile for

• Goal 3. Prepare now for an uncertain futu

pursuing a focused modernization effort 

maintains U.S. qualitative superiority i

warfighting capabilities.

• Goal 4. Prepare now for an uncertain futu

exploiting the Revolution in Military Affa

transform U.S. forces for the future.

120
• Goal 5. Maintain highly ready joint forces to pe

the full spectrum of military activities.

• Goal 6. Fundamentally reengineer the Depar

and achieve a 21st century infrastructure by red

costs while maintaining required mil

capabilities across all DoD mission areas.

A skeptic might say that in addition to a De

Department that is reengineered to work better an

less, the report urges the organization to do 

Simultaneously, the Department is expected to ma

current capabilities, while shaping the interna

environment and preparing for the uncertain f

Whether it can perform those diverse tasks as w

reform its management structure remains an 

question. 

Conclusions: Kotter’s Cautions and Advice on

Leading Transformations.

Kotter’s research provides several lessons on why 

of the more than 100 transformation efforts failed. Hi

general lesson is that the change process goes thro

series of phases and takes a considerable period of tim

cautions against skipping steps. A second general les

that a critical error can have a devastating impac

could argue that Cohen’s initiatives to “jump 

transformation may signal a lack of patience for th

haul. The much criticized Clinton Administra

amendment to the earlier BRAC legislation, to ma

existing depots in the electorially important states of 

and California, may represent critical errors.

63

 Kotte

eight major errors that can cause transformat

fail.

64Ongoing DoD reform shows evidence of eac

long-term cures may be possible for the future hea

DoD.

121
Error #1: Not Establishing a Great Enough Sen

Urgency.

According to Kotter, this step is essential to motiva

organization to change. It requires a “hard look” 

organization’s competitive situation, market pos

technological trends and financial performance. In 

the Congress called on DoD to conduct a Quadr

Defense Review (QDR) with a follow-on “outside” rev

an expert National Defense Panel (NDP).

The error: the QDR focused on reinforcing the ca

Revolution in Business Practices. Otherwise, in ter

force structure, missions, budgets, and wea

acquisitions it remained well within the parameters 

status quo. In relative terms the NDP report, 

“Transforming Defense,” is more change-oriente

transformational. The NDP criticized DoD for maint

the strategic requirement for conducting two major re

contingencies.

65

 The panel proposed shifting resource

experimentation, research, and development o

technologies. It also called for developing new opera

concepts, relooking missions (especially peacekeepin

humanitarian operations), and canceling major we

system acquisition plans. In keeping with the e

discussion on the problems of PPBS, the pane

recommended that DoD “rethink the Plan

Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to m

less burdensome and more receptive to innovatio

change.”

66

DoD’s conservative approach on current strategy

structure, and weapons requirements may not establi

needed sense of urgency. At the same time the pointe

in the Defense organizations will also hurt the motiva

transform. Setting future goals to the year 2003 for si

personnel and organizational cuts gives the appeara

cutback management as opposed to transformation.

122
A cure: Kotter recommends hiring and promoting 

leaders into senior-level jobs. Certainly it will r

exceptional executive leadership to manage transform

and day-to-day work simultaneously. Naturally a 

priority for the Secretary of Defense will be to hir

senior civilian and military leaders who 

ambidextrous—who will help guide a long

transformation, while managing short-term opera

and administrative responsibilities.

Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful Enough Gui

Coalition. 

Kotter notes that an effective guiding team mus

strong line leadership. That is why the Secretary h

must spearhead the reform movement. The lesson i

the Secretary must be directly involved in leadin

reform movement internally, along with the D

Secretary of Defense, the Defense Management Co

and other key stakeholders. External coalitions will b

important. The Secretary should seek to maintain key 

in the White House, while building bridges to Congr

A cure: the Secretary should look to the Progressiv

Root Reforms for a model of congressional relation

avoid McNamara’s sole reliance on presidential su

Given the current public lack of interest in defense i

the Secretary will be forced to work inside the Wash

beltway to build a powerful coalition inside the Pen

the White House, and Congress. DoD reports s

continue to show how initiatives are in synch wi

Government Performance and Results Act.

Error #3: Lacking a Vision.

The DoD vision must avoid becoming shop-wor

maintain a clear direction for reform. If the Sec

continues a conservative approach, then the reform 

could get lost in the myriad of daily details in the cond

the business of defense.

123
A cure: the vision should be refreshed period

through high-level meetings of civilian and military d

officials. Periodic updates of the vision will help to 

transformation on the agenda. The NDP’s more aggr

proposals for transforming defense in a context wide

the QDR should be evaluated. More forward lo

changes regarding transformation and experimen

will help sustain the momentum for reform.

Error #4: Undercommunicating the Vision by a

Factor of Ten.

Kotter writes “Without credible communication, 

lot of it, the hearts and minds of the troops are 

captured.”

67

 As noted in the previous section, period

updating the vision, through a process that includes 

members of the organization, at all levels, can he

communication process. Kotter notes also that t

“particularly challenging if the short-term sacrifices in

job losses.”

68

A cure: to help Kotter suggests including new g

possibilities and fair treatment during downsizing. 

trends towards globalization, new threats, and 

technologies there should be many ways to refocus, 

grow portions of the defense organization. Prov

incentives to shift agency assets and individuals int

security areas should help to reinforce the transform

vision. To emphasize fair treatment during organiza

and personnel downsizing, resources will have 

allocated to provide education, transition, and seve

packages to individuals forced to leave government se

Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to the New

Vision.

Removing obstacles to transformation in DoD, s

bureaucratic inertia, service parochialism

conservative culture is sure to be a significant pro

Rainey notes that one of the benefits of Gore’s NPR is 

124
“revealed many of the obstacles to reform.”

69

 In the c

DoD these obstacles will be further complicated due 

anxieties future downsizing will create.

A cure: Kotter suggests examining the organiza

structure itself, along with the personnel sel

compensation and appraisal systems. No doubt 

require a holistic evaluation of the total manag

system to remove obstacles. The Defense Manag

Council’s charter gives it oversight responsibilities

Secretary should have them directly address the prob

“obstacles” by analyzing potential threats to transform

and developing solutions to overcome them. Give

assumptions and planning for downsizing, tradi

interservice rivalries, and organizational complexity

safe to assume that managing obstacles to transform

should be a full-time concern of the DMC.

Error #6: Not Systematically Planning for and

Creating Short-Term Wins.

Kotter calls for actively creating short-term wins w

12 to 24 months. Gore’s innovation awards pro

(Hammer Awards) represents one method for doin

Other visible symbols and incentives should be create

Senate Armed Services Committee has used legislatio

oversight to redirect one of the Combatant Comma

spearhead joint service experimentation.

70

 T

congressional initiatives are in keeping with the state

goals and the NDP’s call for “A Transformation Strate

A cure: The Secretary should find ways to emphas

support of these congressional initiatives and incen

Supporting transformation will also help to bui

coalition on Capitol Hill and among those influ

members of the defense community that are encou

experimentation with new technologies, organiza

structures, and weapons systems. For instanc

Secretary can help insure that the new experimen

roles and missions are fully supported. He can set per

125
policies to insure that the best and brightest of each 

military services are selected to serve in 

experimentation headquarters. He can create positio

senior executive service members to go directly from D

the Command to maintain his personal influence. H

insist that the leaders of the organization be taken car

their services, with key follow-on assignment

promotions. Through personnel and budgetary incen

along with active personal involvement, the Secret

Defense can create a success in one key ar

transformation.

Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon.

Kotter researched transformation efforts 

seven-year periods.

72

 He noted that the amount of c

peaked at around five years, or 36 months after the fi

of visible wins. Thus, he encourages leaders t

short-term wins to tackle larger problems.

A cure: In DoD for example, creating the successes 

experimentation command could be used in the m

Kotter suggests. Conducted correctly, the experi

should lead to proposals for systemic and stru

changes in military force structures and equip

requirements. Implementing those changes may r

major changes to the services in terms of reso

organizations, personnel, equipment and doc

Potentially, these will require subsequent changes 

services priorities regarding budgets, force struc

training, and weapons systems acquisitions. Simply s

up the experimentation command, without prepari

the major battles ahead will be shortsighted. The 

leadership will have to link experimentati

implementation and move the goal posts well b

complying with the expected legislative initiatives.

126
Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes in the

Corporation’s Culture.

Kotter points to two factors that are partic

important in “institutionalizing change in corp

culture” or seeping change into the “bloodstream 

corporate body.”

73

 The first factor is actually showi

improved performance resulting from new appro

behaviors, and attitudes. The second factor is makin

that the next generation of top management personif

new approach. Again, it is important to reca

importance of the leadership of Elihu Root durin

earlier reform period. While he had enemies within th

Department and Congress, he was able to work sk

and patiently to implement the needed reforms.

A cure: Perhaps the wisest advice to the Secretary 

be to study Root’s example. The lessons are the

highlighting necessary executive leadership skills to r

those areas of DoD management that are suited to sci

and business-like practices. At the same time, to 

obstacles to past transformation attempts, the poli

recruiting and sustaining a viable coalition for change 

include building strong civil-military relations a

political, military, and agency leaders.

Anchoring the transformation initiatives in the cu

of the Department of Defense, as well as the service

require as much executive leadership as will findin

right organizational structures and processes

Secretary of Defense should look closely at the Na

Defense Panel recommendations for broadening the s

initiatives, to include reforming the PPBS process

historic conditions, in part shaped by Gore’s NPR, as w

changes in the international security environment

right for reform. If DoD truly intends to be entrepren

in its approach to public management, then the Sec

will have to employ a full range of individual skills to b

political coalition that will transform the Departm

127
Defense on a scale that rivals the lasting reforms of 

Root.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Richard D. White, “Civilian Management of the Military

Root and the 1903 Reorganization of the Army General Staff,” J

of Management History, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1998, pp. 43-59. For the hi

Army reforms, see Russell F. Weigley, History of the United 

Army, New York: Macmillan, 1967; Allan R. Millett and 

Maslowski, For the Common Defense, New York: Free Press, 19

James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organizat

Administration, 1900-1963, Washington, DC: Center of M

History, United States Army, 1975.

2. White, p. 46.

3. White identifies the author of this label as Samuel Hunt

See The Soldier and the State, Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957, 

4. White, p. 48.

5. Ibid., p. 55.

6. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

7. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

8. For a critical assessment of concerns regarding the current 

of civil-military relations, see Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Contr

Crisis in Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest, V

Spring 1994.

9. For a recent examination of the National Security Act of 1

David Jablonsky, et al., “U.S. National Security: Beyond the Col

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War Colle

The Clarke Center, Dickinson College, July 26, 1997.

10. Enthoven and Smith, p. 2. See also Schick, p. 274.

11. Ibid., pp. 33-47.

12. Enthoven and Smith devote considerable attention 

problems of interservice rivalry and military analysts. They b

greater objectivity was possible with civilian defense intell

Chapter 3 focuses on “Why Independent Analysts,” pp. 73-116.

128
13. Enthoven and Smith, p. 13.

14. Schick, 276.

15. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is E

Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, p. 6.

16. Enthoven and Smith, p. 80.

17. For a detailed description of DoD and Army PPBS, see H

Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1999-2000, C

PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1999.

18. Enthoven and Smith, pp. 21-27.

19. Hal G. Rainey, Understanding & Managing 

Organizations, 2nd ed., San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1997, 

20. Rainey, p. 328.

21. Allen Schick, “A Death in the Bureaucracy: The De

Federal PPB,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 33, 

March/April 1973, p. 146.

22. Schick, 1973, pp. 148-149.

23. Schick, 1973, p. 149.

24. See Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Th

Public Administration Review, 1959, as reprinted in Shafritz an

eds., Classics of Public Administration, 4th ed., Fort Wor

Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1997.

25. Schick, 1973, p. 150.

26. Schick also provides a review of Nixon’s 1971 plans t

major reforms in the cabinet by creating single organizati

community development, human resources, natural resourc

economic affairs. These initiatives were overcome by the Wa

scandal. While these proposals are beyond the scope of this pap

would be interesting to review in light of ongoing reinvention 

See Schick, 1973, p. 151.

27. Ibid., 1973, p. 154.

129
28. Alasdair Roberts, “Performance-Based Organiz

Assessing the Gore Plan,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 57

November/December 1997, p. 474.

29. James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara

Organization and Administration, 1900-1963, Washington DC: 

of Military History, United States Army, 1975, p. ix.

30. Enthoven and Smith, p. 310.

31. Rainey, p. 339.

32. John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation 

Fail,” Harvard Business Review, March-April 1995, p. 61.

33. Al Gore, “The Gore Report on Reinventing Govern

Washington, DC: Random House, September 7, 1993, p. i.

34. Ibid., p. 7.

35. Ibid., p. i.

36. For a review of this criticism, see Rainey, pp. 367-8. R

assessment of the NPR is positive. He writes:

Controversy over the sincerity, design, and effects of 

initiative will continue for years. The NPR is nevertheles

major development in the effort to enhance excellence in pu

management.

37. Ibid., p. ii.

38. Ibid., p. 1. The data from the polls are footnoted. Of cou

nature of these kinds of survey can be subjected to v

interpretations.

39. Ibid., p. i.

40. Ibid., p. 6.

41. Ibid., p. 1.

42. Ibid., p. 35.

43. Ibid., p. 54.

44. Ibid., p. 73.

130
45. Ibid., p. 9.

46. Ibid., p. 133.

47. Ibid., pp. 136-7.

48. William S. Cohen, “Defense Reform Initiative R

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 

i.

49. Ibid., p. ii.

50. Ibid., p. iii.

51. Ibid., p. iv.

52. Ibid., p. 1.

53. Ibid., p. 15.

54. Ibid., p. 17.

55. Ibid., p. 17.

56. Ibid., p. 18.

57. Ibid., p. 25. The initiative only calls for a reduc

“approximately 170 billets” for the Joint Staff and does not spe

CINC staff reductions.

58. Ibid., p. 27.

59. Ibid., p. 29.

60. Ibid., p. 37.

61. S.1814, “Department of Defense Reform Act of 

(Introduced in the Senate); Sec. 704, “Closure and Realignm

Military Installations,” http://thomas.loc.gov, May 3, 199

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 Repor

Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) Process, 

Senate Armed Services Committee, notes that:

It was extremely disappointing that politics prevailed a

prevented the Committee from approving additional ba

closure rounds.

131
The report points out that the amendment to authorize two ad

BRAC rounds was defeated on a 9-to-9 tie in committee. The Com

Report agrees with Secretary Cohen’s initiative for a continu

BRAC and concludes with a call for pursuing BRAC in the futu

62. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Annual Repor

President and the Congress,” Washington, DC: U.S. Gove

Printing Office, 1998, p. 14.

63. For instance, the SASC Report on the BRAC Process no

“politicization in the last BRAC process which permitted the Pr

to implement privatization in place at Kelly [Texas] and Mc

[California] Air Force Bases.”

64. This section summarizes Kotter’s discussion of transfor

errors, pp. 59-67.

65. Philip A. Odeen, et al., “Transforming Defense: N

Security in the 21st Century,” Report of the National Defense 

December 1997, p. 2.

66. Ibid., p. vi.

67. Kotter, p. 63.

68. Ibid., p. 63.

69. Rainey, p. 368.

70. Personal interview with Frederick M. Downey, Office of 

Joseph Lieberman, Washington, DC, April 29, 1998.

71. Odeen, p. 57. Two specific proposals call for “A Broad N

Security Approach,” p. 67; and “Institutionalizing Change” t

joint field tests, Joint Forces Command responsibility, Joint Ba

headquarters, Integrated service battle labs and establishin

national training centers, p. 68.

72. Kotter, p. 67.

73. Ibid., p. 67.

132
CHAPTER 6

TIME FOR A REVOLUTION:

THE TRANSITION FROM NATIONAL

DEFENSE

TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Grant T. Hammond

Introduction: On Evolution and Revolution.

Though there are many definitions of the term

Oxford English Dictionary in one of its entries d

evolution as “the process of evolving, developing or w

out in detail what is implicitly or potentially contained 

idea or principle.” It defines revolution, the way it i

here, as “an instance of great change or alteration in 

or in some particular thing.”

1

 This chapter contend

mere evolution will no longer suffice in the organizatio

process of providing for the common defense. Revolu

required. 

This is true for several reasons.

1. There was less guidance and structural impera

the U.S. Constitution for dealing with foreign and d

policy than with most other tasks of government.

2. The transformations that have occurred domes

and internationally have presented us w

fundamentally different strategic, political, economi

technological environment.

3. The role that the United States plays in the 

today is vastly different from that presumed to be th

by the founders of the Republic or by the developers 

post World War II U.S. security apparatus.

133
4. That security system is so fundamentally flawe

the United States can no longer afford patchwork fix

must radically transform it in order to meet its oblig

at home and abroad.

5. What the United States does cannot be rad

transformed without serious reconsideration of why 

it, and without fundamental reorganization o

structures which the government relies upon to prov

the common defense.

6. What is now required is a realization that, by d

more than design, the task of providing for the co

defense has been redefined. The task is no longer 

providing for national defense but rather a larger a

more complex task of providing for and susta

international security.

Doing so requires not evolution, but revolution

longer the United States waits, the more difficult the 

will become and the less likely its success. Not m

major transformations invites not only national de

U.S. policies, however well intentioned, but a

fundamental disruption of the international system.

The reason why these contentions are true are pres

below. Declaring itself “the world’s last rema

superpower” and repeating the phrase in hopes that 

prolong the supposed circumstance that it implies 

insufficient policy prescription for the future

inescapable reality of these contentions is that the pol

bureaucratic process, partisan politics and intra-s

rivalries must somehow be transcended if the United 

is to do what needs to be done. It is not just a ma

military force structure and capabilities at the momen

much more a matter of strategic thinking 

reorganization, in order to provide for the common d

that is, or should be, under review. It has been over a d

since the end of the Cold War and the end of the Gul

The United States is still unsure of its role and its str

This chapter argues that we need a revolution in na

134
security affairs, describes what such a revolution 

entail, and then sketches in broad strokes wha

post-revolutionary regime might look like. It is pur

broad and provocative, in order to stimulate discuss

the issues involved. It calls for creative adaptation to 

world and a domestic political context that, in many 

have already passed us by.

The Environment—International.

This is not our forefathers’ world. Instead of a 

dominated by several great Empires (British, F

Austro-Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman, Dutch

Spanish), we now contend with a world that has rough

states and is globally interconnected. What is more

are approximately 800 international governm

organizations (IGOs), which were virtually nonexist

the 18th century. In addition, there are nearly ten 

that number—nearly 8,000—international 

governmental organizations (INGOs).

2

 Wh

isolationism in the strict sense was at least possible 

18th century, we now live in a world where such a stra

virtually impossible—politically, economically, and 

culturally. The center of power in the 18th centur

unquestionably European. It is now located in 

America and, in many ways (population size, ma

financial growth, and trade) in the Asia-Pacific regio

The international system has changed not only 

and nature. It has also changed in more fundamental 

Increasingly, traditional conventional war is no lon

paying proposition—even for the victor.

3

 As a result, 

still of great importance, political and military capab

are not as all consuming as they once were. Instead

might be called “technomic vitality,” the pa

technological advances and economic health, deter

the pecking order in world affairs.

4

The basic characteristics of the United States a

relations with the rest of the world have also ch

135
considerably. At the end of the 18th century, the U

States was a nation of newly independent colonies wi

major international commitments. It now finds itse

world with defense obligations to 47 countrie

personnel of the U.S. armed forces deployed t

countries.

5

 It has millions of our citizens who reg

travel abroad and millions more who live and work a

The Department of State estimates that there are 

million Americans living abroad—working for Am

companies, foreign-owned subsidiaries or fo

businesses, studying abroad or retired abroad.

6

 Th

unimaginable in 1787 and relatively rare even in 19

American economic ties are considerable, and not 

terms of resources and markets for American bus

Something on the order of 1 in 6 Americans depen

exports for his or her job. Foreign capital—in excess 

billion a month—is absolutely essential; to finan

national debt, to fuel the stock market, and to 

businesses expanding.

7

 As seen recently in Russia

Asia, and Latin America, the condition of foreign m

and financial circumstances have an impact on 

financial well being as well. Furthermore, as the disso

of Yugoslavia, and events in Rwanda, Haiti, and So

have revealed, there is a definite correlation be

economic well being, the maintenance of civil law and 

and ethnic and factional hostilities. The United State

indeed be the most powerful nation on earth. But thi

not mean that it is not vulnerable, and even fragile, 

certain circumstances.

There are perils in being the last remaining super

that the United States has not fully confronted. 

important among these is the decision on just wh

American purpose in the world should be. Without 

sense of purpose it is difficult to know what to do or 

proceed. The Commission on Roles and Missions (CO

DoD was greatly hampered in many ways, not the le

which was the lack of a clear national consensus or dir

on just where the United States was headed and 

136
Deciding how best to go about getting there is a seco

consideration. 

This is not a novel problem for the republic. The U

States has never decided which dimension of its 

personality is to be paramount in its relations wi

world. On the one hand, for much of its history it has s

to be aloof and isolationist, preferring to be the “shini

on a hill”

8

 of Reagan rhetoric, for others to emulate. S

as a passive example while shunning the messy busin

actually making the world a better place has had 

appeal. On the other hand, more recently, the United 

has given way to a renewed fit of Wils

interventionism. America now is apparently more wil

not exactly ready or able, to go off on crusades to rema

world in its own image. “Engagement and Enlarge

was the first National Security Strategy of the C

administration. The expansion of choice i

aspects—democracy in politics, market econom

economics, tolerance in religion, multi-culturali

society—is its mantra, however differentially applied

The confusion and moral quandaries which are c

by this strategy are highlighted by numerous 

dilemmas. These include: the tension betwee

administration’s concern about human rights abuse

its desire to grant most favored nation status for Chin

friction between political, military, and eco

considerations relating to India and Pakistan and n

testing by these governments; and the contradi

between the Department of State’s responsibili

certifying countries on drugs and the administra

desire for trade and good neighborly relations with M

and Colombia. In all of these cases, it is less the prin

than the exceptions that cause difficulties. And wha

do we have to hold others to “our” standards? The U

States may think this a matter of claiming the mora

ground, but others may view our policies as b

discrimination and cultural imperialism. These are no

137
questions to solve when implementing policy. Consi

and constancy are both difficult.

The world in 1947, when the National Security A

passed, was a vastly different place than it is toda

National Security establishment that it created was 

fully implemented. It was born of the experiences 

coming of war in the late 1930s and the waging of Wor

II. The United States was not yet fully frozen into 

War with the Soviet Union. The world’s population 

little over 2.5 billion, far less than half what it is 

Decolonization was in its early stages, and colonial em

still colored the maps of the world. There were 53 me

of the United Nations, only about a fourth of what it is 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) d

exist, nor did supersonic aircraft, intercontinental m

or precision guided munitions. Computers were 

“software” was not a word, the internet was non-ex

and “hardware” meant a hammer and nails. G

interdependence existed only in a negative way—the s

of global conflict—and was neither a positive econom

informational reality.

The biggest problem facing the world in the 

following World War II was recovery from that 

disaster—economically, politically, socially

psychologically. There were still millions of refugees 

repatriated, Britain was still under food rationing, an

war raged in China. The international drug trade wa

major problem, nor was illegal immigration. World 

and finance were relatively anemic. In the United S

segregation was still law. Such ubiquitous featu

everyday life as cell phones and television, CNN 

satellites were nonexistent, not to mention g

engineering and space exploration. The United Stat

an atomic monopoly, nearly 50 percent of the pla

Gross National Product (GNP), and a merchant marin

single biggest change in the last 50 years has bee

relative decline of the lead of the United States in so 

political, military, social, and economic indicators vi

138
the rest of the world. The international arena has ch

so greatly, quantitatively and qualitatively, tha

virtually unrecognizable in many ways. Given that d

of change, why shouldn’t our national security organi

also undergo fundamental change as well?

The Environment—Domestic.

The Constitution of the United States of Americ

upon both the executive and legislative branch

government to “provide for the common Defense,” al

different ways.

9 The “common Defense” was defense 

nation and of the noble experiment in “Ame

exceptionalism” that had to be preserved and nur

Granted, the authors of the Constitution never envi

the sort of growth in the defense establishment th

occurred since the founding of the republic. Nor cou

founding fathers have seen that two principles to 

they were firmly committed—relative isolationism in 

politics and the absence of a large standing m

force—would be so thoroughly displaced by wha

sought to avoid.

The Constitution has served us extremely well in 

areas of concern for the state. Where it falls short is 

areas of foreign affairs and military preparedness.

10

 T

no fault of the drafters of the document for the wo

which they lived and the principles that guided 

thinking have been changed virtually beyond recog

There are no other areas where the shortfall in guidan

been so great. Thus, there is little in the w

Constitutional prescription to govern how we organ

provide for the common defense or the manner in wh

pursue that goal.

Furthermore, providing for the common defense 

business and big politics. DoD is the largest single fu

element in the annual budget. It represents, th

basing, procurement and hiring in both the civilia

military sectors, a roughly $300 billion enterprise 

139
affects every state and Congressional district in the n

It provides ample opportunity for not only check

balances but vicious intra-governmental, inter-servi

partisan rivalries of monumental proportions. The se

are charged with having to train, organize, and equi

regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) are the one

deploy and employ military force, but they have rela

little say in the budgetary process. The Office 

Secretary of Defense and numerous other offices 

Pentagon massage the service requests. The Presiden

include the defense budget in his annual budget r

from the executive branch. But it is the memb

Congress who must decide on funding, prior

amendments, and such. They do so based largely on 

understanding of the interests of their states and di

rather than on the needs of the nation or the interna

community. The opportunities for conflict are legion

The era in which the National Security Act of 194

passed was characterized as one of bi-partisans

foreign and defense policy following World War II. 

nowhere near the impact on the economy that it now 

The politics of defense have also changed considerabl

the last five decades. Since 1947, the pendulum of po

power has swung to the “Imperial Presidency” of the 

era, then to what could be characterized as an “Im

Congress” during the Clinton era. Given these shift

amazing that the defense budget makes as much sens

does.

That said, there has been no dearth of st

recommendations, reviews, and reform initia

addressing these concerns. The most recent e

beginning with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, are well k

In the post-Cold War/post-Gulf War era, defense r

efforts have become a virtual national pastime for r

officers and politicians, members of the de

intelligentsia, Congress and the Executive Branch. 

have been, in rather rapid succession, the Base Force 

the Bottom Up Review (BUR), CORM, the Quadr

140
Defense Review (QDR), the National Defense Panel 

and the Commission on National Security for th

Century as well as several rounds of Base Realignme

Closure (BRAC) studies. Curiously, the QDR is coterm

with presidential elections, which magnifies rather 

mitigates partisan political influence. There is 

argument about more rounds in the BRAC process, w

military seeking to cut needless infrastructur

Congressmen reluctant to have their districts lose f

money or jobs.

The process of assessing the shortfalls of the d

establishment, the calls for a variety of reforms, the n

reorganize the defense department or national se

organization as a whole have been a long-standing f

of the American defense establishment. There have 

concerns expressed about the lack of truly strategi

range planning; the failure of the budgeting, procur

and accounting systems; the need for a new comman

force structures; and the necessity for reorganization 

machinery providing for national security and the d

industry which supplies it.

11

 The Reports and Commis

their titles and chairmen, and the debates they 

inspired have been continuing features of both exe

and congressional concern for over 50 years. Some of 

have been acted upon but most have not. To them m

added the scores of journalistic reports, academic 

congressional hearings, and efforts at reform which 

been a steady drum beat in our national life.

12

 Indeed

have been charges of fraud, waste and abuse, corrupt

merely poor organization and institutiona

inefficiencies since the country was founded.

13

 Nea

have concluded that there are serious flaws in the w

which we organize to provide for the common defens

relatively little has been done to address the 

criticisms of these myriad reports, studies, and ch

Why? More appropriately, why not?

The answers, as with most explanations, are a

simple and complex. Recently, on the simple side 

141
ledger, is the historical reality that the United Stat

lived for over half a century with a set of compromises 

organization of our national defense establishmen

were built into the National Security Act of 1947. As R

Art has explained it, the United States “created a d

organization that has a host of organizational ineffici

built into it. Unification of the armed forces was purc

at the price of permitting duplication and over

function.”

14

Four characteristics capture the manner in which the Un

States has organized its defense establishment since 19

First, the defense establishment remains a system of 

measures, falling somewhere between a truly integrated, hig

centralized system on the one hand and a loosely coordina

committee-run structure on the other. Second, 

organizational changes that have been made since 1947 h

been modest on the military side but radical on the civilian s

Third, through the three major reorganizations since 1945 

1947, 1949, and 1958), the services have managed to ret

considerable autonomy to develop war plans and to alloc

resources in a manner that each judges best suited to its o

interests, without due regards for what the other services n

or are doing, much less what the overall national defe

requires. Fourth, since the 1958 Defense Reorganization A

when the Secretary of Defense was given considerable power

assert real operating control over the entire defe

establishment, a fundamental imbalance has persisted betw

the centralizing powers of the Office of the Secretary of Defe

(OSD) and the coordinating powers of the Chairman of the J

Chiefs.

15

Despite the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 

(after these remarks appeared in print) the same ch

are largely true today.

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act o

did have a big impact on the U.S. military. Among 

things, it made the Chairman of the Joint Chie

principal military advisor to the President, thus crea

competition with the Secretary of Defense. It increas

strength of the regional CINCs, but did not give the

142
power in the budgeting process. It also further emasc

the civilian service secretaries. While the military con

to repeat the mantra of jointness, and J-7 writes 

doctrine for nearly every task one might be ask

perform, the realities are far less than the appea

would suggest. A cynic would say Goldwater-Nichols 

way to guarantee that all the services participate in 

major use of military force. A booster would say that w

the future are likely to be both joint and combine

jointness is only rational and prudent. Both wou

correct. Indeed, many of the problems with to

American defense establishment are similar to thos

were identified by James Fallows in his 1980 book Na

Defense—a book that was written prior to the passage 

Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The Perils of Being the Last Remaining

Superpower.

However much we may like the sound of it and ho

soothing it may be to bask, albeit temporarily, in the g

being the self-proclaimed last remaining superpowe

reality is fraught with difficulties and burdened with 

rather substantial obligations and responsibilities. 

United States up to the task? Just how should it go 

doing it? Some would like it to retain this m

permanently and to actively promote a “Pax America

the next century, while others think the momen

passed. Some would like to make William Wohl

“Unipolar World” a manifest reality of some duration 

others seek a more limited role for the United States

as that favored by Robert Art and others who see “Se

Engagement” as the answer.

16

 In between are 

prescriptions for and images of America which rang

being lonely to being a bully.

17

 Some see the United 

as ready but reluctant. Others see it as not unwilli

unable to exert leadership in the world. There is some 

in most of these views.

143
Regardless of one’s views on America’s proper role 

world, there is another issue. The test of national se

used to be the ability and willingness of the nation 

unilaterally, to include the use of force if deemed nece

in defense of the nation’s interests. However, bot

National Security Strategy of the United States an

National Military Strategy assume that when force i

by the United States in the future, it will be as pa

coalition, either permanent or ad hoc. Americans 

others to assist them in their international action

United States needs others to permit (via U.N. Resolu

pay for (through NATO burden sharing; Saudi or Jap

cash payments), and participate (regional states in th

of intervention, if not the U.N.) in the applicat

American military power abroad. But international 

by committee is often slow, cumbersome, belated

ineffectual.

The other options are “selective engagement” ba

principles and precepts which can be stated in advan

generally adhered to in policy execution. However, a

takes place in a circumstance where the American 

may not perceive or care about international security

others will be paying for the investments that the U

States makes in the world—in physical, financia

human terms—some Americans believe that they ne

be overly concerned. But, it would be helpful if there w

consensus on why a specific action is important, and 

general agreement on how best to go about it. S

consensus would be easier to develop if it could be gui

another “Long Telegram,” the equivalent of the “M

article for the current era. The problem is that with

all-consuming peer competitor on which to focus, it is 

unlikely that such a document will be created and acce

There are risks and opportunity costs associated 

the adoption of any of the proffered strategies for th

haul. They need to be debated thoroughly and we

carefully. The opportunity costs revolve around the m

of our current strategic situation. It is a relatively b

144
period, in terms of threats to the United States, which 

us the time to catch our breath and decide how b

contend with the future without having to worry a

serious, immediate threat to the nation. America h

luxury of not having to fight a war of necessity and 

able to decide upon wars of choice. As George Bush obs

after the Gulf War, America finds itself for the third t

a century in a position of being able to help shap

security regime for the future. It is an opportunit

should not be squandered and one that may not occur 

at least for some time.

On the other hand, it is a situation that is also 

danger. In promoting engagement and a philosop

choice, the United States stands, if not guilty by i

closely associated with the charge of cultural imperi

Worse, in the eyes of many, America is the bully o

playground of international relations. It can afford n

the labels nor the reality if it hopes to have a benig

peaceful impact on the world. Yet both its shor

rhetoric and its actions seem to get in the way of Am

long-term goals and preferences. The United States s

accused in some quarters of seeking world dominati

default if not by design. It is seen as the engine respo

for the homogenization and Americanization of the g

nearly every aspect; from finance to movies, food to re

clothing to music.

Americans also suffer from a feeling of perpetua

regardless of our actions. We feel damned if we d

damned if we don’t intervene. The nonlogical but comp

emotional rationalizations of “if not here, where?” a

not now, when?” are difficult to refute and tug 

heartstrings of American sensibilities that abhor fa

the slaughter of innocent civilians, genocide, etc. Wh

think of as assistance is usually intended to be short 

for humanitarian reasons and well-intentioned on ou

The fact that others may see such efforts as part of 

Americana” rather than a “Pax Americana,” is diffic

many Americans to understand. To many in the rest 

145
world, particularly the Islamic world, it is increasi

matter of “The West Against the Rest.”

18The fact that 

not our intention is essentially irrelevant.

Americans must confront the fact that despite 

intentions, there are many problems in the world th

United States just cannot solve. The current experie

Kosovo is a case in point. An air campaign to punish S

President Slobidan Milosevic for ethnic cleansing in K

is not likely to solve the problem for Albanian re

fleeing the area. In the name of democracy 

self-determination, principles Americans hold dea

United States and its NATO allies may well be writi

requiem for a “new world order” in the wars of succ

and secession in Yugoslavia. The fact that this 

unintended consequence may be of little solace 

concerned.

The System is Broken.

As defined in Joint Publication 1-02, “national sec

is

a collective term encompassing both national defense 

foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condi

provided by: a) a military or defense advantage over a fore

nation or group of nations, or b) a favorable foreign relati

position, or c) a defense posture capable of successfully resist

hostile or destructive action from within or without, over

covert.

19

This is a matter for national decision. But increas

during and particularly after the Cold War, the U

States is more concerned about creating a g

environment in which it can survive and prosper a

which the ideals of the American political system 

flourish. Doing so constitutes an effort to shape not m

national security but an international sec

environment. That is both a larger, and more proble

agenda.

146
The scope, scale, and magnitude of the pro

confronting the United States are much larger tha

used to be. So, too, is the supposed “system” of gover

that has grown out of all proportion to what was in

envisioned in 1947. DoD has 36 separate organizati

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, it 

Defense agencies, 10 field activities, 10 laboratories, 

unified and combatant commands. DoD is divided into 

service secretaries and departments, each with the

sizeable staffs; four services, each with a Re

component and two with Guard components; as we

Inspector General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) a

eight-division Joint Staff. The Army has 113 sep

installations, the Air Force has 93, the Navy has 74, a

Marines has 19, both at home and abroad. Instead 

Office of the Secretary of Defense with a staff of 1

established by the 1947 National Security Act, the

now hundreds of staff officers working for the secretar

thousands in the service and joint staffs in the Pentago

Add to this the executive and congressional play

the national security process, and the picture become

more complicated. There are over 50 congres

committees and subcommittees that have something 

with national security. The White House has the Na

Security Council, the National Economic Counc

President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, an

U.S. Special Trade Representative. Then there a

specialized agencies in the executive branch, such 

Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security A

the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Na

Reconnaissance Organization, as well as a whole se

shops in cabinet departments as diverse as Comm

Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury. To this list, one ca

numerous shops in the Department of State—35 se

ones—as well as a number of related agencies such 

U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for Interna

Development. 

147
Two things emerge from this cursory overview 

players in the national security bureaucracy. First, be

of the large number of separate components involv

information gathering, analysis, decisionmaking

dissemination, getting a timely response from this ar

governmental organizations is difficult if not impo

Second, the notion that quick, effective, and ef

coordination can occur routinely may be fiction. M

checking with principals—let alone deputies, r

agencies, and intelligence sources— becomes a 

consuming process.

Coordination supposedly occurs throug

interagency process, which is surveyed by Gabriel Ma

in this volume. The interagency process coordinates a

U.S. Government agencies, and occasionally Interna

Governmental Organizations or Non-Governm

Organizations, to craft policy initiatives and respon

events as they unfold. It usually involves the delegati

lead agency responsible for determining the ag

extracting agreement, and implementing decisions

phrase imparts a notion of a well-oiled policy machin

largely a myth. Neither adaptation nor control is po

given the crazy quilt of organizations and players 

national security arena. The sheer difficulty of hol

meeting, even a conference call, is daunting. The “sy

that we now have is too large, unwieldy, and comp

respond effectively or initiate the changes that are req

Both the purpose and the process are in need of atte

We need to start over.

America’s Role in the World.

Virtually every aspect of our role in the worl

changed. The chart below summarizes the transitio

both definition and focus—in the role of the United Sta

the world and the changing requirements for the co

defense. 

148
I will survey each of these changes before proceeding 

next set of issues. What is the cumulative impact of 

trends?

The fundamental transformation relates to the n

move from a system which provides for national defe

one which provides for international security. This 

task is larger in context, continuous in attention, and 

complex in execution, particularly for a multi-cu

democratic republic such as the United States. Provid

the common defense used to be defined as protecti

nation from attack by other states. War would be de

when the nation was threatened, the citizenry an

economy would be mobilized, and Americans would 

forth beyond their ocean moats to give battle. No

problem is more complex. The United States must sha

international environment conducive to the surviva

prosperity of American values, institutions, citizen

assets. The assumption of the National Security St

and the National Military Strategy of the United St

that the

The United States will employ force only as a pa

coalition. Since the Gulf War, the United States has n

149

Former Focus Current/Future Focu

National Defense International Security

Unilateral Action Coalition Diplomacy

Threat Based Policy Objective Based Policy

Control Adaptation

Capabilities Intentions

Domestic Politics International Politics

 the Key the Key

Force Application Statecraft and Negotiat

War Preparation Peace Preservation

Win by Out-producing Foe Win by Outwitting Foe
others to permit, pay for, and participate in the appli

of American military force. That is a fundam

transformation. Similarly, throughout the Cold Wa

United States focused on the identification of threat

the Communist world and the formulation of contin

plans to counteract these threats.

At present, by contrast, it is increasingly obvious t

cannot control all of the possible threats to the U

States. The array of hypothetical threats is limited o

the imaginations of contractors and members of the 

services, and, in any event, America does not posse

will or the resources to counteract them all. Wh

United States can, and should, control, however, a

objectives we wish to accomplish in the world. Kn

what we wish to accomplish must necessarily prece

effort to do so.

The United States has always been more focus

capabilities than intentions. For much of the Cold W

United States measured threats by the capabilities 

possessed because it could. This gave logic to bud

requests—the USSR has this, so the United States 

that. It was a costly and inefficient way to attempt to 

readiness for war. At present, it is increasingly impor

pay attention to the intentions of others—of both alli

adversaries—as well as to their capabilities. Ass

intentions as well as capabilities may produce inter

opportunities as well as threats, and requir

investment in human intelligence (HUMINT) as w

overhead imagery. The United States has tended to 

far more assets in the latter than in the former. It tr

much of the Cold War to control the pace, nature, inte

scope, and outcome of the competition with others. B

chaotic, nonlinear, unknown and largely unknowable 

environment, seeking to control events may be a 

errand and may be part of the problem, not part 

solution. Most organisms and organizations that 

survived and prospered have been those that were a

adapt well and quickly to changing circumsta

150
Improvisation and “work-arounds” are a hallmark 

American military. Why not train and educate an ada

force rather than seeking to control what cann

controlled?

For most of its history, the United States has been 

afford the luxury of doing much as it pleased and foll

its domestic agenda which has been the driver in Am

decisionmaking. It has not had to worry greatly 

others and the general international climate. Increas

however, we are linked and interdependent 

international forces, actors, and events. Pretending w

ignore or override them is both wrong and dang

Furthermore, contending in the international arena d

our mostly isolationist past was seen as the applica

the ultimate sanction of superior force. After the aber

of war was finished, we would return home to peac

increasingly, the application of force doesn’t pay, ev

the victor. Statecraft, diplomacy, and negotiation a

better means of conflict resolution, and less costly

others are far better at this and its tange

skills—language fluency, long-term views, prag

dealings—than Americans, who have disinvested 

capacity to conduct routine skillful diplomacy on 

fronts. 

The ultimate threat and final arbiter in interna

relations has been the act of war. As Charles Til

commented, “States make war, and wars make sta

But the stakes and costs have escalated beyond the ca

of most states to absorb them. Increasingly, it is 

preservation, not war waging, that is the problem f

international system. How can the United States 

transformation of the international system by force of 

and thereby legitimize the use of force, while at the 

time trying to preserve the status quo and promot

peaceful change? It is not strong states with aggr

designs on neighbors, totalitarianisms from both th

and the right, that threaten the international system 

Rather, it is the weakness of states and their disinteg

151
that rocks the international system. But war, when 

come for the United States, has generally been 

business. America won by outproducing the adversar

German Panzer tanks were unquestionably better th

American Sherman tanks in World War II. The Ge

produced a total of roughly 21,500 of the former in 7 

while the United States built over 40,000 of the latt

years. Moreover, the United States built nearly as 

tanks in a month—over 2,000—as the Germans did in 

years.

22

 Given the high cost of war material, the U

States may not be able to afford the luxury 

economically profligate solution to its prob

Increasingly, America needs to be able to outw

enemies, not merely out-produce them. This is partic

true in an era in which social security has defeated na

security as the primary concern of the body politic.

These general trends are supplemented by yet an

set of trends which also have significant implicatio

America’s ability to provide for the common defense. 

are as follows.

152

Former Focus Current/Future Focu

Politico-Military Economic-Social-

 Emphasis Psychological Empha

Regional Global

Military Jointness Civilian & Civil-

 Military Jointness

Technology Strategy

Competition Cooperation

Military Intelligence Cultural

 Anthropology/Ethnolo

The Services The CINCs

Department of Defense The U.S. Government

Right Place Right Time
The collective imperative of these transformati

revolutionary change in the way the United S

organizes to provide for international security as w

national defense.

It is no longer mainly about political and m

problems and solutions. These are increasingly irrelev

many global problems. It is often the other eleme

national power—ones in which the United State

disinvested, relatively speaking—that are more pert

A better understanding of the realities that underli

international problems (Somalia, the Balkans) and 

ultimate solutions would go a long way towards m

U.S. actions more appropriate and effective. For exa

while containment led the United States to pursue a v

“pactomania” approach to global problems—th

regional military arrangements in the 1950s—these a

necessarily the most appropriately sized entities t

with current and future problems. Most transna

problems involve regions that are smaller than stat

involve many of them, or larger than states and th

susceptible to national solutions. Increasingly, 

issues—the availability of fresh water, global war

pollution—are global in their consequence and hence

solution. The political-military alignments of the Col

are insufficient to the tasks at hand. A global 

gathering, assessment, and dissemination proc

required, along with a global vision to address these is

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, th

military has been driven toward the realizat

“jointness.” As discussed by Douglas Lovelace i

volume, jointness is the increasing integration of the A

Services, and the quest for common solutions to m

problems that confront all of the services. It is mean

direct challenge to the traditional parochial approac

the Services have brought to debates about na

security. While much progress has been made wi

development of joint doctrine, there is still more lip s

than reality associated with this concept. Further

153
there is little jointness among the active duty forces a

reserve and national guard components, and eve

among the military and their civilian counterpart ag

and institutions. There is also no equivalent eff

jointness among the civilian government agencies, to 

functions, integrate effort, and eliminate duplication

regrettable of all, there is a growing gap betwee

military and civilian society where neither understan

other as they should.

Traditionally, and increasingly, given the commi

to Joint Vision 2010 and its follow-on documents

United States has placed its faith in science, engine

and technology to achieve and sustain a qualitativ

over current or future adversaries. While this 

reasonable choice, it masks the reality that not all pro

are technological nor have technological solu

Understanding the strategic environment, and know

when, how, why, and where to employ technological m

is a far more difficult challenge than the mere acquisi

the technology, however sophisticated it migh

Developing the strategy that underlies the selectio

employment of technology is the more important part 

problem. Americans tend to be captivated by things, a

by their purpose. We tend to focus on the hardware a

rather than the second and third order consequence

may flow from its application. Furthermore, an Am

strategy may require more than intermittent compe

with adversaries. It may demand sustained compe

and cooperation with allies and adversaries 

something that Americans are not comfortable doin

with which we have little experience. Because 

capitalist system, and the American emphasis on indi

effort, competition seems the norm to Americans. Th

less of an understanding of the necessity to cooperate a

as compete with both adversaries and allies. The y

yang of the international system over the long haul r

both capacities.

154
The United States has invested massive amou

time, money, and effort in military intelligence 

national technical means to identify threats to the nat

has invested less in thinking about just who our pot

adversaries might be and what makes them tick. Ove

imagery, multi-spectral imaging, and electronic 

capture and assessment may not reveal what needs 

known about what another society, polity, or economy 

values or how and why it functions as it 

Unfortunately, the United States has spent far less 

money, and effort trying to understand the percep

languages, and values of those who share the planet w

than many of them have invested in trying to unde

us. Knowing these things—about friend, foe, and byst

alike—will be increasingly important in our interdepe

world. Cultural anthropology and ethnology a

important, if not more important, than military intell

in understanding others and our relations with them

America’s military requirements have traditi

been interpreted through the eyes of the major s

components who train, organize, and equip the 

military in DoD. There are three departments, four se

four Reserve, and two Guard systems, which we atte

integrate with the armed forces of other nations in joi

combined operations as necessary. But it is the region

unified CINCs that deploy and employ forces, n

services. The services have the primary control 

budget, despite some CINC inputs to the Joint Re

Operations Command (JROC). The CINCs have 

“chopped” to them when action is required, but th

complicated and cumbersome system. More power s

devolve to the CINCs, as a logical extensi

Goldwater-Nichols. But beyond that, both national d

and international security demand the effective use o

than the assets of DoD. For more than half a century

has functioned as the major guarantor of national se

But it is too big in size and too narrow in focus to co

effectively in today’s world. The policymaking p

155
requires data fusion and information integration fro

only DoD, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Na

Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance 

(NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 

security agencies in the U.S. Government but al

agencies and functions of other departments. These in

not only State, Justice, Commerce, and Treasury, bu

Agriculture, Transportation, and Education as w

agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, F

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and others

integrated into a U.S. Government—wide foc

international security. The international aspects of m

these agencies are under-funded and understaf

precisely the time of greatest need for speci

information and competencies.

Lastly, and most generally but importantly, the U

States may be focused on the wrong part of many 

problems it faces. In the past, winning wars and prev

a fait accompli against our allies and policies require

the United States be in the right place to thwa

adversary’s plans. But the United States has with

from much of the world. It does not have nearly as 

bases abroad nor as many people stationed perma

overseas as it used to have. The real BRAC process ac

occurred overseas—with 65 percent of U.S. bases in E

and 24 percent of those in the Far East being c

Increasingly the speed, range, and accuracy of weapon

improvements in communications, surveillance

transportation mean that time and timing are cr

Doing things at the right time is as important, or 

important, than doing them in the right place. Establ

or preventing a fait accompli is time dependent as w

place dependent. Global reach is necessary, but if it c

be achieved at the right time, it may be worthless

places a premium on rapid, adaptive Observ

Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) loops and de

processes, something that is increasingly difficult f

U.S. Government to accomplish.

156
The cumulative impact of the issues raised abov

been largely ignored. It is time to address the col

implications and act accordingly. Failure to do s

contribute to the ebb of American power and prestig

the erosion of America’s capability to act. It is not Am

capabilities that may be called into question as mu

American intent. Thinking through what we w

accomplish and why, and how this may or may not u

are critical tasks. The United States may be as much i

of an entrance strategy as an exit strategy when it pre

for the next Gulf War or Kosovo operation. If the U

States does not know what it seeks to accomplish, as w

why and how, then perhaps its intervention will be sti

from the outset.

War may be too important to be left to the genera

peace is too important to be left only to the politicians

is true because, increasingly, peacetime preparedness 

key to victory in war. There are also an increasing num

“less than war” applications of military force occ

during ostensible periods of peace. The real struggle m

the peacetime competitions that war only validates. 

United States hopes to compete and cooperate succes

in this century to help manage a relatively pe

international security system, it needs to pay more th

service to the imperatives of the National Military St

of shape, respond, and prepare now. It needs to de

strategy that is principled, affordable, and adaptive f

long haul. Such an effort is not, and should n

dependent on having a peer competitor to plan ag

Rather it requires vision, commitment, and leadersh

is positive, sustainable, and inclusive.

It also requires an organization designed to accom

the task. The national security machinery of over 50 

ago is part of the problem, not part of the solution. It i

not just for a conceptual revolution to understand 

what it is we are about, but also for an organiza

revolution to accomplish what we seek to do. Thi

problem of political leadership for the president, po

157
courage for Congress, and political change for the coun

failure to address these problems—and soon—will l

both our demise as a nation and the failure of the ef

establish a modicum of international security in the 

in the 21st century.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 6

1. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, 2

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Vol. I, “Evolution,” entry 

354; Vol. II, “Revolution,” entry III, 6, b, p. 617.

2. The number of “non-state actors” is over 40 times larger t

number of states, and they play an increasingly important 

international affairs whether as U.N. agencies, terrorist 

economic unions, producer cartels, or private voluntary organ

such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, Oxfam, and the like.

3. See Grant T. Hammond, “The Paradoxes of War,” Join

Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1994, pp. 7-16.

4. “Technomic vitality” was a term coined in the research 

two Chief of Staff Air Force (CSAF) directed studies entitled “Sp

2020” and “Air Force 2025.” It refers to the synergy, growth, and 

of change in technology and economic growth and was seen as 

factor in determining national capabilities in the future.

5. The number of countries with some U.S. military deployed 

a wide range of circumstances ranging from NATO allies in 

countries we have bases, detachments involved in fighting th

war,” National Guard partnership programs with countries in E

Europe and former Soviet Socialist Republics, listening pos

satellite ground stations around the world, peace keepi

humanitarian relief operations, forward support loc

prepositioned equipment stocks and personnel to monitor them

bases and gunnery ranges, aerial ranges, space monitoring fa

etc.

6. U.S. Department of State, “Overseas Digest for Am

Abroad,” located at http://overseasdigest.com/amercian.

7. See Table No. 838, “Foreign Purchases of Sales of U.S. Sec

by Type of Security, 1980-1998, and by Selected Country, 1998,” 

Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 

533. The total foreign investment in the U.S. in 1998 was $278.2 

158
This does not include an additional $201 billion of foreign purch

U.S. businesses through mergers and acquisitions. See Bu

Economic Analysis News Release, Wednesday, June 9, 1999. “

Investors’ Spending to Acquire or Establish U.S. Businesses To

Billion for the First Time in 1998,” availab

http://www.bea.doc.gov.

8. This is a quotation from John Winthrop, “A Model of Ch

Charity,” 1630, which is itself a Biblical reference to Matthew, 

9. The legislative powers are spelled out in Article I, Section 

executive powers are detailed in Article II, Section 2.

10. The current national security structure and organizatio

United States is not authorized in the Constitution nor are man

constituent portions of the U.S. Armed forces—the U.S. Air Fo

National Guard structure, or the Reserve components of th

military. For that matter, neither are DoD, the NSC, the NRO, t

the NSA, DIA, or a host of other entities. None of the Amendmen

Constitution deal with issues of national security.

11. See, for example, some of the more recent books and artic

as David E. Snodgrass, “The QDR: Improve the Process to Impr

Product,” Parameters, Vol. XXX, No. 1, Spring, 2000, pp. 57-68

R. Schlesinger, “Raise the Anchor or Lower the Ship: Defense Bu

and Planning,” The National Interest, Fall 1998, pp. 2-12; Pau

David Gompert, Richard Hillestad and Stuart Johnson, Transf

the Force: Suggestions for DoD Strategy, Santa Monica, CA: RAN

Paper, 1998; Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: C

and Change in American Foreign Policy, Chicago, IL: Unive

Chicago Press, 1999; Eugene Gholz and Harvey Sap

“Restructuring the U.S. Defense Industry,” International Secur

24, No. 3, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 5-51; and John Hillen, “Defense’

Spiral, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 2-

12. Among these, Ashton B. Carter and William James 

Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, Wash

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999; Richard N. Haas, “Wha

With American Primacy,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 1

37-49; Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st C

Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997; Barry R

and Andrew Ross, “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Str

International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/1997, pp

Franklin C. Spinney, “Defense Spending Time Bomb?,” Ch

July-August 1996, pp. 23-33.; and The United States Commis

159
National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American S

in the 21st Century, September 15, 1999.

13. The problem is an old one, indeed, almost as old as the R

itself. In 1782 the Congress instructed Superintendent of F

Robert Morris to investigate “fraud, negligence, or waste of 

property” in Revolutionary War procurement. It sought com

bidding, but got cronyism among Morris’s friends instead. N

decade later, it had instructed Alexander Hamilton in 1791 to rep

the encouragement and promotion of such manufactures as 

tend to render the United States independent of other nati

for essential, particularly for military supplies.

These instructions are cited in Richard F. Kaufman, The War Pr

New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1979, p. 7; and Drew McCoy, The 

Republic, New York: W. W. Norton, 1980, p. 148, respectively. Th

military–industrial complex and both its evils and its necessity 

matter of concern well over 200 years ago. During the Col

uttering the phrase “national security” could invoke money, s

and massive resources—public and private—often with little 

scrutiny or debate. See the overview by Kate Doyle, “The End of S

National Security and the Imperative for Openness,” World 

Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 34-51.

14. Robert J. Art, “Introduction: Pentagon Reform in Comp

and Historical Perspective,” in Robert J. Art, Vincent Dav

Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Reorganizing America’s D

Leadership in War and Peace, Washington, DC: Pergammon B

1985. p. xii.

15. Ibid., p. xiii.

16. See William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar 

International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 3-41; Sa

Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” Intern

Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 71-81; Joshua Muravch

Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge to Neo-Isolat

Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996; Condoleezza Rice, “Promot

National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January/Fe

2000, pp. 45-62; Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Stra

Selective Engagement,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3, 

1998/99, pp. 79-113; and Joseph Nye, “The New National In

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July/August 1999, pp. 22-35.

160
17. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” 

Affairs, Vol. 78, No, 2, March/April 1999, pp. 35-49; Garry Wills

of the Free World,” Foreign Affairs, Ibid., pp. 50-59. See also R

Haas’s notion in his The Reluctant Sheriff: The U.S. After the Co

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998.

18. See Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, “Must It Be t

Against the West?,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 274, No. 6, De

1994, pp. 61-84.

19. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictio

Military and Associated Terms, March 23,1994, as amended t

January 24, 2000, Washington, DC: Joint Staff (Documents Di

2000, p. 305.

20. These, and information about them, can be fo

http://www.defenselink.mil.

21. Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of Europea

Making,” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National S

Western Europe, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 

also Bruce D. Porter, War and the Ruse of the State: The M

Foundations of Modern Politics, New York: Free Press, 1996.

22. For information see www.shadowsfolly.com/wwII/G

and www.valourandhorror.com/DB/SPEC/tanks_2.html.

23. See Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expandin

Vision 2010, Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, May 19

Joint Vision 2020, June 2000.

161
CHAPTER 7

NATIONAL SECURITY

AND THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS:

FORWARD INTO THE 21st CENTURY

Gabriel Marcella

Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions 

others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength com

from the transformation of resources into capabilities. W

infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilit

and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft see

through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, a

irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deplo

and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts 

war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of the

three arts are the paladins of statecraft.

1

Chas W. Freeman, Jr.

The Interagency Process and Purposeful

Adaptation.

The comments of Ambassador Chas W. Freema

speak to the skillful use of influence and power to pr

the national interests in a competitive world. It is 

order even for the United States, the only fully equ

globally deployed, interagency superpower. America 

indispensable anchor of international order an

increasingly globalized economic system. Nothing qui

it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers as 

Byzantium, China, Spain, England, and France ac

extraordinary sophistication, enormous institutiona

cultural influence, and longevity, but they never ac

the full articulation of America’s global reach.

163
Today the United States forward deploys som

diplomatic missions in the form of embassies, consu

and specialized organizations. It possesses a u

military command system that covers all regions 

world and even outer space. It is the leader 

interlocking set of alliances and agreements that pro

peace, open trade, the principles of democracy, h

rights, and protection of the environment. Ame

capital, technology, and culture influence the 

American power and influence is pervasive 

multidimensional. All the instruments of national 

are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integrat

bringing the instruments into coherent effectiv

remains. Presidents and their national security staffs 

to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success, th

the use of the “interagency process.”

The interagency decisionmaking process is un

American in character, size, and complexity. Give

expanding responsibilities and declining resour

dollars and manpower, it is imperative that na

security professionals master it in order to work effec

within it. The complex challenges to national security 

21st century will require intelligent integration of res

and unity of effort within the government.

The United States first faced the challenge of str

integration within an embryonic interagency p

during World War II. Mobilizing the nation an

government for war and winning the peace highlight

importance of resources and budgets, of integ

diplomacy with military power, gathering and ana

enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting join

combined military operations, managing coa

strategies and balancing competing regional prio

From the war and the onset of the Cold War eme

number of institutional innovations, including

structure of the modern Department of State

Department of Defense, the Air Force, a centr

intelligence system and unified military command sy

164
the predecessor of the U.S. Agency for Interna

Development (Point Four), North Atlantic T

Organization (NATO) and other alliances, and the U

States Information Agency.

There is probably no period in American history li

late 1940s and early 1950s that is so formative of the k

national and institutional learning that John P. Love

“purposeful adaptation.” He defines it as “the ne

develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are sensi

national needs and aspirations and to the realitie

changing world environment.”

2

 The evolution o

interagency process parallels America’s purp

adaptation to the changing global realities of the la

decades. But it has not been an orderly evolution, i

because of serious structural and cultural impedim

such as poor institutional memory.

3

 Prominent his

markers along this path include such documents as N

the intellectual framework for the containment st

against the Soviet Union, and the Weinberger Do

which articulated criteria for the use of military powe

dramatically influenced the shape of American strat

the 1980s and 1990s.

In 1945, American statesmen faced three chall

forging a system of collective security, prom

decolonization, and building a stable international fin

order. These, and 4 decades of intense threat from the 

superpower, had a decisive impact on the intera

process. With the end of bipolar ideological and geopo

conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda is cap

by free trade, democratization, subnational ethni

religious conflicts, failing states, humanit

contingencies, ecological deterioration, terro

international organized crime, drug trafficking, an

proliferation of the technology of weapons of 

destruction. At the dawn of a new era, is the policym

system which was developed and refined for the str

imperatives of the Cold War adequate to meet a 

different set of challenges?

165
The National Security Council: Coordination v

Policymaking.

To bring strategic coherence, consensus

decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities 

emerging superpower, the National Security Act (N

1947 created the National Security Council (NSC

mandate was:

. . . to advise the President with respect to the integratio

domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the natio

security so as to enable the military services and the ot

departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate m

effectively in matters involving the national security.

. . . other functions the President may direct for the purpos

more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of 

departments and agencies of the Government relating to 

nations security. . .

. . . assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and r

of the United States. . .

. . . consider policies on matters of common interest to 

departments and agencies of the Government concerned w

the national security . . .

The statutory members are the president, th

president, secretaries of State and Defense. All 

present are advisors: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Director Central Intelligence, and cabinet member

Council need not convene formally to function. Inde

late 1999 the Clinton NSC had met formally only 

March 2, 1993. There are alternatives to formal mee

such as the “ABC” luncheons of Secretary of 

Madeleine Albright, Assistant to the President for Na

Security Affairs Sandy Berger, and Secretary of D

William Cohen, and the deputies breakfasts and lu

The “NSC system” of policy coordination and integ

operates 24 hours a day. The Assistant to the Preside

National Security Affairs directs the staff. The emerge

166
the modern “operational presidency,”

4

 brought to th

greater authority over the development 

implementation of policy, thus creating a new power 

that competes for jurisdiction with the Departme

State and Defense.

The NSC staff, known as the Executive Secretaria

varied in size and function. In 1999 the staff com

about 208 (of which 101 were policy personnel an

administrative and support personnel) profess

covering regional and functional responsibilities. S

are detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intell

community, the civil service, the military services 

policy positions in September 1999), academia, an

private sector. The staffing procedures are personali

the president’s style and comfort level. The structure 

staff, its internal and external functioning, and the d

of centralized control of policy varies. Presidents J

Carter and William Clinton have favored a very centr

system, Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush l

The first two Presidential Decision Directives of the C

administration, dated January 20, 1993, set fort

structure and function of the NSC staff and group

report to it, as depicted below:

167
The day-to-day policy coordination and integration i

by the NSC Staff, divided into functional and geog

directorates:

The Principals Committee members are the c

level representatives who comprise the senior foru

national security issues. The Deputies Committee in

assistant secretary level officials who monitor the w

the interagency policy formulation and articulation pr

do crisis management, and, when necessary, 

unresolved issues to the Principals for resol

Interagency Working Groups (IWGs) are the heart an

of the process. They may be ad hoc, standing, regio

functional. They function at a number of levels, 

regularly to assess routine and crisis issues, frame 

responses, and build consensus across the governme

unified action. The fluid nature of the process mean

IWGs do not always have to come to decisions. The s

168

National Security Council Staff.
prefers that issues be decided at the lowest level poss

issues are not resolved there, they are elevated to th

level and, when appropriate, to the Deputies Comm

Who chairs the different IWGs and committees can 

between the NSC director and a senior State Depar

official.

Policy is often made in different and subtle 

Anthony Lake, writing in Somoza Falling: The Nicar

Dilemma, A Portrait of Washington At Work, discusse

the answer to an important letter can help set policy. 

the importance of interagency coordination an

importance of being the one (bureau, office, agency

drafts it.

. . . policy flows as much from work on specific items—like t

letter from Perez [to Carter]—as it does from the large, form

interagency “policy reviews” that result in president

pronouncements.

5

Each action is precedent for future actions. Speeches

conferences, VIP visits, and presidential travels ar

important. Lake elaborates:

Policy is made on the fly; it emerges from the pattern of spec

decisions. Its wisdom is decided by whether you have so

vision of what you want, a conceptual thread as you go along

The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordi

and integration of foreign policy and national se

matters across the vast government. Specifically, it:

1. provides information and policy advice t

president;

2. manages the policy coordination process;

3. monitors implementation of presidential 

decisions;

4. manages the interdepartmental dimensions of c

5. articulates the president’s policies;

169
6. undertakes long term strategic planning;

7. conducts liaison with congress and foreign g

ments; and,

8. coordinates summit meetings and national se

related trips.

There is a natural tension between the 

coordination function of the NSC and policymaking. J

Carter’s Director of Latin American Affairs at the 

Robert Pastor, argues that:

. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part from 

former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s contro

implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxi

about the NSC usurping policy, and the NSC tends to 

concerned that State either might not implement 

president’s decisions or might do so in a way that would m

decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wron

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body but, i

it oscillates between the poles—taking policy contro

some issues while allowing the State or Defense to 

lead agency on most national security and foreign 

issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo cr

1998-99, the NSC staff may take over policy contro

State. Similarly, policies toward Cuba and Haiti in 19

were handled directly out of the White House because 

deeply rooted domestic dimension of these issues

Oliver North Iran-Contra caper created an auton

operational entity within the NSC staff. But this w

aberration that does not invalidate the general rul

salient point is that proximity to the president giv

NSC staff significant policy clout in the interagency pr

Such clout must be used sparingly lest it cause resen

and resistance or overlook the policy wisdom and 

available elsewhere in the executive departments.

By late 1999, the Clinton administration 

established other formal bodies under the umbrella 

NSC:

170
1. Executive Committees, established by PDD 

complex humanitarian contingencies;

2. Peacekeeping Core Group, established by PDD 

3. Counter-terrorism Security Group, establish

PDD 42, amended by PDD 62;

4. Special Coordination Group, established by P

for international crime;

5. Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness G

established by PDD 62; and,

6. Critical Infrastructure Coordinating G

established by PDD 62.

These groups have reached across the netwo

executive departments.

Towards a Theory of the Interagency Process: 

Does the President Mobilize the Government?

The interagency is not a place. It is a process inv

human beings and complex organizations with dif

cultures, different outlooks on what’s good for the na

interest and the best policy to pursue—all driven 

compulsion to defend and expand turf. The proc

political (therefore conflictual) because at sta

power—personal, institutional, or party. The “power 

involves the push and pull of negotiation, the guard

policy prerogatives, the hammering out of compro

and the normal human and institutional propens

resist change.

8

 Regardless of the style of the preside

the structures developed for the management of na

security policy, the NSC-dominated interagency p

performs the same basic functions: identifies policy 

and questions, formulates options, raises issues 

appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions 

appropriate, and oversees the implementation of dec

throughout the executive departments.

171
It is helpful to view policy at five interrelated 

conceptualization, articulation, budge

implementation, and post-implementation analysi

feedback. Conceptualization involves the com

intellectual task of policy development, such 

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). Articulation 

public declaration of policy by the president o

subordinates. This is critical in a democracy in or

engage public support. Budgeting involves testimony 

Congress to justify policy goals and to request fu

Implementation is the programmed application of res

in the field in order to achieve the policy objec

Post-implementation analysis and feedback i

continuous effort to assess the effectiveness of policy 

make appropriate adjustments.

The ideal system would have perfect goal se

complete and accurate intelligence, comprehensive an

and selection of the best options, clear articulation of 

and its rationale, effective execution, thoroug

continuous assessment of the effects, perfect learnin

experience and the ability to recall relevant experien

information. 

Source: John P. Lovell, The Challenge of American Foreign 

Purpose and Adaptation, p. 26.

172
Such perfection is impossible. The reality is:

173

TASK CAPABILITY

Goal Setting

National interests are obje

competing claims; g

established through poli

struggle

Intelligence

Always incomplete, suscep

to overload, delays 

distortions caused by bi

and abiguity in interpretat

Option Formulation

Limited search for opti

comparisons made in gen

terms according 

predispositions rather 

cost-benefit analysis

Plans, Programs, Decisions

Choices made in accord

with prevailing mind sets, o

influenced by groupthink 

political considerations

Declaratory Policy

Multiple voices, contradic

and confusion, self-ser

concern for personal image 

feeding the appetite of 

media

Execution

Breakdowns in communica

fuzzy lines of author

organizational parochial

bureaucratic politics, delay

Monitoring and Appraisal

Information gaps, va

standards, regidities 

adaption, feedback failures

Memory Storage and Recall

Spotty and unreliable, sele

learning and applicatio

lessons

9

POLICY IN PRACTICE
 Effective policy requires vision, control, resources

system of accountability. The most compelling challen

the executive is to retain policy control. Since pres

don’t have the time and expertise to oversee policymak

detail (though Jimmy Carter tried), they del

responsibility. But “nobody is in charge” is an often

criticism of the interagency process. By deleg

responsibility, control becomes more diffused, an

policy effort is diluted. Moreover, the quest for res

brings in another stakeholder, Congress, which h

constitutional responsibility to scrutinize policy initi

and vote monies for foreign affairs and national defen

this point, a literal Pandora’s box of player

expectations are opened. The numerous congres

committees and their staffs have enormous impa

national security and foreign policy.

The president begins to mobilize his govern

immediately upon election. A transition team works c

with the outgoing administration for the purp

continuity. The incoming president begins nominati

cabinet, which must then be confirmed by the Senate

6,000 presidential level appointees will fill the subc

positions, staff the White House and the NSC, ta

ambassadorships (serving ambassadors traditio

submit their resignation when the occupant of the 

House changes), and move into second, third, and 

level positions in the executive departments. The purp

these nominations is to gain control and esta

accountability to the president and his agenda. In h

administration, Clinton faced problems associated 

never finishing the staffing of his government.

Thus there is a high turnover and the injection o

talent, at times inexperienced and equipped with 

predispositions about national security, at the top ec

of American government every time the part that co

the White House changes. Continuity of government r

in the non-partisan professionals of the federal civil s

the diplomatic service, the military, and the intell

174
community. The transition to a new administratio

period of great anticipation about the direction of 

Consequently, the entire interagency produces tran

papers to assist and inform the newcomers, and t

protect the institutional interests of the va

departments from unfriendly encroachment.

The first months of a new administration are a pe

learning. Newly appointed people must famil

themselves with the structure and process of policym

This necessity invariably leads to a trial-and

atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the m

think tanks and the foreign policy and defense commu

write papers recommending specific policies. These h

inform the new administration about the ce

commitments of U.S. policy and provide opportunit

departments and agencies to define institutional tu

stake a claim to resources. The administration itse

also mandate policy reviews (Presidential R

Directives) that eventually produce new guidance for p

Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrin

other ways in which the incoming administr

establishes its identity. The State of the Union mess

one of the preeminent sources of presidential activism 

engages the interagency. The congressionally-man

National Security Strategy (NSS) document, which 

the president’s signature and is supposed to be pro

annually, is also eagerly awaited (though not with 

intensity across departments) as an indicator 

administration’s direction in national security and f

policy. The NSS is eagerly awaited for another rea

well. It is the best example of “purposeful adaptation” 

American government to changing global realitie

responsibilities. It expresses strategic vision—wh

United States will stand for in the world, wha

administration’s priorities are, and how the diplo

economic, and military instruments of national pow

be arrayed.

175
Since it is truly an interagency product, the NS

serves to provide direction to the interagency syst

understand the president’s agenda and prioritie

develops a common language that gives coherence to 

It is also more than a strategic document. It is po

because it is designed to enhance presidential autho

order to mobilize the nation. Finally, the NSS te

document as well as drive policy initiatives, especia

election years.

The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threa

Bush administration expanded it by including 

regional strategies, economic policy, arms contro

transnational issues and the environment. The C

document of 1994 proposed “engagement and enlargem

promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and se

through strength. The 1995 version added criter

judging when and how military forces would be us

1997, the integrating concepts of “shape,” “prepare

“respond” came into prominence. To the core object

enhancing security and promoting prosperity 

democracy were added fighting terrorism, interna

crime and drug trafficking, and managing the interna

financial crisis. Homeland defense against the thr

mass casualty attacks and regional strategies com

the agenda in 1997.

Another instrument used by the Clinton team 

aforementioned Presidential Decision Directive pr

Previous administrations have titled these docu

differently, such as Bush’s National Security De

Directive. The two Clinton administrations produc

PDDs by February 2000 (Bush, 79 National Se

Directives; Reagan, 325 National Security De

Memoranda; Carter, 63 presidential Direc

Nixon-Ford, 348 National Security Decision Memo

and Kennedy-Johnson, 372 National Security A

Memoranda). Each administration attempts to use 

documents to put its own stamp on national securi

foreign policy, though there is great continuity 

176
previous administrations. Thus, whereas Re

emphasized restoring the preeminence of Ame

military power and rolling back the “evil empire,” C

focused on open trade, democratization, conflict reso

humanitarian assistance, fighting drug traffickin

consumption, counter-terrorism and non-proliferatio

PDDs are macro-level documents, normally clas

that take much deliberate planning to develop. They 

from intensive interaction among the agencies. The p

begins with a Presidential Review Directive, which 

the relevant agencies to develop a new policy based on 

guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 1

counternarcotics, the “Andean Strategy” of November 

emphasized greater balance between supply and de

strategies. PDD 25, “U.S. Policy on Reforming Multil

Peace Operations” (May 1994), set down an elaborate 

guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operatio

became so effective that the United Nations adopted 

planning its own peace operations, an excellent exam

the international transfer of American purpo

adaptation.

An instructive example of the Clinton administra

application of one of its Directives is PDD 21 whic

effect on December 27, 1993. This document emph

democracy promotion and free trade in Latin Amer

was addressed to more than twenty department

agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secret

the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney Ge

Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director 

Office of Management and Budget, United States 

Representative, Representative of the United States 

United Nations, Chief of Staff to the president, Assist

the president for National Security Affairs, Direc

Central Intelligence, Chair of the Council of Eco

Advisors, Assistant to the president for National Eco

Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adminis

of the Agency for International Development, Director 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Administra

177
the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director 

United States Information Agency.

The point of listing departments and agencies 

identify the interagency stakeholders relating t

regional policy. Inevitably, the size of the stake wil

greatly among regions and issues. The stakeholde

related by functional interdependence; they 

different resources, personnel, and expertise that m

integrated in order for policy to be effective. It is an iro

of the interagency that no national securi

international affairs issue can be resolved b

agency alone. For example, the Department of D

needs the diplomatic process that the Department of 

masters in order to deploy forces abroad, build coal

negotiate solutions to conflicts, conduct noncomb

evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught in d

circumstances abroad, and administer security assis

The Department of State in turn depends on the log

capabilities of Defense to deploy personnel and ma

abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, su

military-to-military contacts, and give substan

alliances and defense relationships. The Office of Na

Drug Control Policy, a new cabinet position, must re

range of agencies to reduce the supply abroa

consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all re

intelligence input to make sound decisions.

Ideally in response to the promulgation of a PD

agencies will energize their staffs and develop the ele

that shape the policy programs. But this takes tim

seldom creates optimum results, in part becau

competing priorities of policymakers, limited 

constrained resources, and congressional inpu

example, with respect to U.S. Latin American polic

Haiti crisis of 1992-1994 and congressional passage 

North America Free Trade Act consumed most of the k

energy of the Clinton Administration’s NSC staff a

Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Departm

State during 1993-94.

178
In theory, once the policy elements are put togeth

costs are calculated, they are submitted to Congre

approval and funding, without which policy is me

collection of words of expressions of hope. The r

however, is that a PDD is not a permanent guide 

actions of agencies. Rarely is it fully implemented. It 

overtaken by new priorities, new administrations, a

the departure of senior officials who had the stake

personal relationships, the know how, and the institu

memory to make it work. A senior NSC staffer, 

Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Polic

Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one cannot b

about whether a PDD from a previous administration 

in force because for security reasons no consolidated 

these documents is maintained. Moreover, PDDs and 

presidential documents are removed to presid

libraries and archives when a new president takes o

senior Defense Department official states that PDD

rarely referred to after they are final, are usually over

by events soon after publication, and are rarely upda

this respect the interagency evaluation of PDD 

effectiveness, published in May 1997, is instructive: 

56 no longer has senior level ownership. The Ass

Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the 

officials who initiated the document have moved on t

positions.”

10

PDD 56: Ephemeral or Purposeful Adaptation?

PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s Poli

Managing Complex Contingency Operations, is perha

mother of all modern PDDs. It is useful to examine P

as an example of an interagency product and as 

intended to influence the very process itself. PDDs nor

deal with the external world of foreign policy and na

security. PDD 56 is radically different, for it goes b

that and attempts to generate a cultural revolution 

way the U.S. Government prepares and organizes t

with these issues. It is a superb example of codifying l

179
of “purposeful adaptation” after fitful efforts by Am

civilian and military officials in the afterma

problematic interventions in Panama (1989-90), So

(1992-1994), and Haiti (1994-1995).

11

 The intent w

institutionalize interagency coordination mechanism

planning tools to achieve U.S. Government unity of ef

complex contingency operations. It tried to institutio

five mechanisms and planning tools:

1. An Executive Committee chaired by the De

Committee (Assistant Secretaries),

2. An integrated, interagency Political-Mi

Implementation Plan,

3. Interagency Rehearsal,

4. Interagency After-Action Review,

5. Training.

The philosophy behind the document is that intera

planning can make or break an operation. Moreover

involvement in planning can accelerate contribution

civilian agencies that are normally culturally impede

strategic and operational planning.

12

 PDD 56 was a

extensively and adapted to new contingencies, su

Eastern Slavonia (1995-1998), Bosnia from 

Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-E

conflict since 1998, and the Kosovo contingency of 19

The March 1999 review commented:

PDD 56 is intended to be applied as an integrated packag

complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since its issuanc

1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as intended. Three m

issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD 56.

It recommended:

1. greater authority and leadership to promote PD

2. more flexible and less detailed political-m

planning, and

180
3. dedicated training resources and greater outre

Imbedded in the three recommendations ar

recurring problems of the interagency: the need for de

authority (“nobody’s in charge”), contrasting appro

and institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic v

military) with respect to planning, and the lack of ince

across the government to create professionals exp

interagency work. PDD 56 is a noble effort to pr

greater effectiveness. It may yet bear fruit, if its philo

of integrated planning and outreach to the intera

takes root. It is encouraging that, in late 1999, the P

planning requirement became an annex to contin

plans.

The Operational Level of the Interagency Proc

Ambassador, Country Team and Regional Milit

Commanders.

Up to this point this chapter has discussed the na

strategic level of the interagency process, that is, 

occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency p

spans three levels: the national strategic, the opera

and the tactical. In the field, policy is implement

ambassadors and their country teams, often workin

the regional unified commanders. The embassy co

team is a miniature replica of the Washington intera

system, with which it is in constant communication. 

country team, the rubber literally meets the ro

interagency implementation. Ambassadors 

commanders-in-chief (CINCs) rely on each other to pr

policies that will enhance American interests in a co

and region. CINCs have large staffs and awesome res

compared to the small staffs and resources of ambass

Moreover, their functions are different. The amba

cultivates ties and is a conduit for bilateral communic

through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she pro

understanding of U.S. foreign policy, promotes Am

culture and business, and is responsible for Am

citizens in that country. The ambassador is the pe

181
emissary of the president, who writes the ambass

formal letter of instruction.

The letter charges the ambassador,

to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, 

supervision of all executive branch officers in (name of count

except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area milit

commander . . . .

There is enough ambiguity in the mandate to requir

ambassador and CINC to use common sense and

non-bureaucratic way, work out issues of comman

control over U.S. military personnel in the country. In 

control is shared, with the ambassador having policy c

and the CINC having control over day-to-day operati

is essential that both work closely together to ensur

military operations meet the objectives of U.S. policy

This is particularly the case in military operations 

than war. Before and during noncombatant evacua

peace operations, exercises, disaster relie

humanitarian assistance, such cooperation w

imperative because of the different mixes of diplo

force, and preparation required. A successful U.S. 

effort requires a carefully calibrated combinat

diplomatic and military pressure, with econ

inducements added. The security assistance officer 

embassy (usually the commander of the Military Ad

Group) can facilitate communication and help to brid

policy and operational distance between the amba

and the CINC. So can State’s Political Advisor to the 

a senior ranking foreign service officer whose functio

provide the diplomatic and foreign policy perspect

military operations.

13

 The personal and profes

relationship between the Political Advisor and the C

the key to success.

The CINC represents the coercive capacity of Am

power through a chain of command that goes 

president. He and his sizable staff command the opera

182
tempo, deployments, readiness, exercises, and train

divisions, brigades, fleets, and air wings—reso

language, and culture that are the opposite of the 

diplomacy. CINCs also have a regional perspe

strategies, and programs while ambassadors are focu

advancing the interests of the United States in one co

Since all military activities have diplomatic impac

necessary that the CINC work harmoniously wit

ambassador in order to achieve common pur

Ambassador and CINC interests intersect at the M

Advisory Group (MAAG, also called Military Liaison 

Office of Defense Coordination) level. The commander 

MAAG works for both the ambassador and the CINC

In the spectrum from peace to crisis to wa

ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the low

of the spectrum. As the situation moves toward wa

CINC assumes greater authority and influence. Hait

is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambas

to CINC takes place. The American ambassad

Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of U.S. 

until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military 

arrived in September of that year. Once the military 

was completed, policy control reverted to Swing

restoring the normal pattern of military subordinat

civilian authority. In the gray area of military oper

other than war, or in what is called an “immature” m

theater such as Latin America, disputes can arise be

ambassadors and CINCs about jurisdiction over 

military personnel in the country. The most illustrativ

in 1994 between CINC of the U.S. Southern Com

General Barry McCaffrey, and U.S. Ambassadors to B

Charles R. Bowers and Colombia Morris D. Busby

dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington b

Secretaries of State and Defense.

14

 This situ

demonstrates very clearly that ambassadors and C

must work closely together to coordinate U.S. m

activities. 

183
The Continuing Problems of the Interagency

Process.

The tensions generated by cultural difference

jealousy over turf will always be part of the intera

process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dom

the national security system, though there are 

cultures and even subcultures. The former uses wo

solve problems while the latter uses force. Cu

differences are large but communicating across th

possible.

15

 Table 1 compares the cultures of military o

and diplomats.

The principal problem of interagency decisionmak

lack of decisive authority; there is no one in ch

As long as personalities are involved who work well to

and have leadership support in the NSC, interagency 

will prosper, but such congruence is not predictabl

world situation does not wait for the proper alignment 

planets in Washington. There is too much diffusion of 

control. This is why it is time to implement an NSC-c

national security system, with appropriate adjust

that align budget authority with policy responsibility

system would consolidate in the NSC the function

performed by the Policy Planning Staff at State an

strategic planning functions done at Defense. 

reorganization recognizes the reality that the White 

is where an integrated approach to national se

planning must take place.

Asymmetries in resources are another impedimen

Department of State, which has the responsibil

conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Indee

military has more money to conduct diplomacy. The 

Department’s diplomats may have the best words in 

in terms of speaking and writing skills, and s

knowledge of foreign countries and foreign affairs, bu

very small organization that has been getting s

budget allocations from Congress in recent years. The 

of foreign service officers equates in number to abou

184
185

Military Officers Foreign Service Officers

Mission: prepare for and fight war Mission: conduct diplomacy

Training is a major activity, important

for units and individuals

Training is not a significant activ

not important either for units or

individuals

Extensive training for episodic,

undesired events

Little formal training, learning by

experience in doing desired activi

(negotiating, reporting)

Uncomfortable with ambiguity Comfortable with ambiguity

Plans and planning--both general and

detailed--are important core activities

Plan in general terms to achieve

objectives but value flexibility an

innovation

Doctrine: important Doctrine: not important

Focused on military element of foreign

policy

Focused on all aspects of foreign 

Focused on discrete events and

activities with plans, objectives,

courses of action, endstates

Focused on on-going processes wi

expectation of an “endstate”

Infrequent real-world contact with

opponents or partners in active war

fighting

Day-to-day real-world contact wit

partners and opponents in active

diplomacy

Officer corps commands significant

numbers of NCOs and enlisted

personnel

Officers supervise only other offic

core (political and economic) activ

NCOs and enlisted personnel perform

many core functions (war fighting)

Only officers engage in core activ

(diplomacy)

Leadership: career professional

military officers (with the military

services and in operations)

Leadership: a mix of politicians,

academics, policy wonks, and car

Foreign Service professionals at

headquarters and in field

All aspects of peace operations,

including civilian/diplomatic,

becoming more important

All aspects of peace operations,

including military, becoming mor

important

Writing and written word less

important, physical actions more

important

Writing and written word very

important. Used extensively in co

of diplomacy

Teamwork and management skills are

rewarded, interpersonal skills

important internally

Individual achievement and inno

ideas rewarded, interpersonal ski

important externally

Accustomed to applying large

resources, manpower, equipment, and

money to achieve goals

Accustomed to applying meager

resources to achieve goals

Adapted from Robert Johnson, Foreign Service Officer, “Teaching Notes,” Department of

National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College.

 Comparing Military Officers and Foreig

Service Officers.
Army brigade (a typical brigade is about 3,600)

Department of State’s technology is primitiv

professional development of the kind that the militar

is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the military, State l

strong domestic constituency of support.

The resource barons, those with people, m

technical expertise, and equipment reside i

Department of Defense (DoD) and the military se

Consequently, the military, especially the Arm

constantly being asked to provide resource

nation-building purposes in such places as Hait

Panama. It is tempting to reach out to DoD because it 

only institution with an expeditionary capabilit

fungible resources and expertise. It can get there qu

show the flag, bring significant resources to bear, stab

situation, and create an environment secure enou

other agencies to operate. Other baronies exist, of c

including the Agency for International Developmen

intelligence community, the Departments of Justic

Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control Po

Finally, the personnel systems of the various agen

the U.S. Government do not promote profess

ization and reward service in interagency jobs. 

is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilia

military cadres that are experts in interagency 

coordination, integration, and operations. Some o

already takes place. Military officers are assigned to v

departments (for example, 35 officers from all service

in the regional and functional bureaus of the Departm

State). Likewise, diplomats are allocated to militar

civilian agencies, such as Political Advisors at the re

unified commands, the Special Operations Comma

peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, variou

positions in the Pentagon, and the war colleges. 

programs must be expanded. There ought to be ince

for national security professionalism, as there a

service and joint activities. For civilians, incl

employees of the Department of State, something a

186
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act for jointness in the m

is needed. Promotions should be based not on

performance at Foggy Bottom and in embassies abroa

on mandatory interagency tours as well. Sim

professional development incentives should apply t

servants who work in the national security arena.

Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would r

significant changes in personnel systems and c

tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 

Transforming Defense: National Security in the 

Century, recommended creating “an interagency ca

professionals, including civilian and military officers, 

purpose would be to staff key positions in the na

security structures.”

16

 The Report also recommen

national security curriculum for a mix of civilian, mi

and foreign students. The Defense Leadershi

Management Program of the Department of Defe

Master’s level initiative in national security studi

civilian personnel, is an important step in this direct

Implications for the Military Professional.

The changing strategic environment has cr

implications for career military professionals. The na

future warfare is likely to be more military operations 

than war, requiring more mobile, flexible, and light 

Future war will also require a more intellectual m

officer, one who understands the imperative of hav

work with the panoply of civilian agencies, non-gover

organizations, the national and international medi

with foreign armed forces. It is a commonplace of st

that American forces will rarely fight alone again; th

do so in coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian 

of the people, the armed forces, and the governmen

encompasses the global community. The implicatio

clear; the military officer will have to develop g

diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater understand

187
international affairs, greater facility in foreign lang

and more than a passing acquaintance with economi

Tomorrow’s warrior will likely work with ci

counterparts across a spectrum of activities short o

These include: strategic planning and budg

humanitarian assistance, peace operations, co

narcotics, counter terrorism, security assist

environmental security, human rights, democratiz

civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence

planning and termination strategy, command and con

forces, continuity of government, post-co

reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis manage

overseas basing, alliances, non-combatant evacuation

homeland defense.

The future officer will also need greater apprecia

the institutional diversity and complexity of govern

because of the need to advise a diversity of civilians 

utility of military power in complex contingencies th

neither peace nor war, as Americans are accustom

think of them. He or she will have to work in tandem 

civilian agencies and non-government organiza

unaccustomed to command systems and delib

planning, and who often do not understand the lim

military power.

17

 Lastly, instruction on the intera

system and process should be mandatory for civilian

military alike. It must have a sound theoretical foun

in national security decisionmaking, strategic pla

and organizational behavior, expanded by sophist

case studies of relevant historical experiences.

What attributes should the military officer bring? 

all, the ability to think in terms of all the instrume

national power and respect for the functions and cultu

diverse departments and agencies. Communication 

are paramount. The effective interagency player wil

to write and speak well. He or she will be bilingual, a

function in military as well as civilian En

Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of intera

188
communication. The military briefing, though an exc

vehicle for quickly transmitting a lot of informat

formatted style, is not acceptable. One must b

conscious of rank because ranks will vary amon

representative around a table. A person of lower ran

be in charge of a meeting. A sense of humor, pa

endurance, and tolerance for ambiguity will help

ability to “stay in your box” and articulate the perspec

your department will be respected. The capac

anticipate issues, to consider the second and third 

effects from the national level down to the country tea

theater levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the intera

requires diplomatic and negotiating skills, the abi

network, and mastery of the nuances of bureau

politics and language.

18

The most evolved democracy in the world has the 

cumbersome national security decisionmaking proc

the world. Inefficiency is the price the founding f

imposed for democratic accountability. But some 

inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture

its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused reso

and the propensity to segment peace and diplomacy 

war and military power. Major structural changes m

made in the interagency system in order to ha

intelligently human talent and resources. It is time to 

away from a system designed for the problems of 

toward one that is appropriate to the challenges of th

century.

189
190

U.S. Departments and Agencies Involved i

Foreign Affairs

White House

Na tional Se cu rity Coun cil

Of fice of the Spe cial Trade Rep re sen ta tive

Of fice of Na tional Drug Con trol Pol icy

Na tional Eco nomic Coun cil

De part ment of De fense

Of fice of Sec re tary of De fense

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines

On-Site Inspective Agency

De part ment of Trea sury

In ter nal Rev e nue Ser vice

United States Cus toms Ser vice

Se cret Ser vice

Bu reau of Al co hol, To bacco, and Fire arms

De part ment of Ag ri cul ture

For eign Ag ri cul tural Ser vice

De part ment of Com merce

For eign Com mer cial Ser vice

Travel and Tour ism Administration

Na tional Oce anic & At mo spheric Agency

Na tional Ma rine Fish eries Ser vice

In ter na tional Trade Admininistration

Trade Commision

De part ment of Jus tice

Fed eral Bu reau of In ves ti ga tion

Im mi gra tion and Nat u ral iza tion Ser vice

Bor der Pa trol

Drug En force ment Ad min is tra tion

U.S. Mar shals Ser vice

For eign Claims Set tle ment Com mis sion

Na tional Cen tral Bu reau--International

Crim i nal Po lice Or ga ni za tion

De part ment of Trans por ta tion

Coast Guard

Fed eral Avi a tion Ad min is tra tion
De part ment of En ergy

As sis tant Sec re tary for De fense Programs

De part ment of La bor

Dep uty Under sec re tary for In ter na tional Affairs

De part ment of State

U.S. For eign Ser vice

United States In for ma tion Agency

Agency for In ter na tional De vel op ment

Over seas Pri vate In vest ment Cor po ra tion

De part ment of Health & Hu man Ser vices

So cial Se cu rity Ad min is tra tion

Pub lic Health Ser vice

Cen ters for Dis ease Con trol and Pre ven tion

De part ment of the In te rior

As sis tant Sec re tary for Ter ri to rial & Intl Af fairs

Of fice of Na tional Drug Con trol Pol icy

In de pend ent Agencies

Cen tral In tel li gence Agency

En vi ron men tal Pro tec tion Agency

Ex port Im port Bank

Fed eral Com mu ni ca tions Com mis sion

Fed eral Mar i time Com mis sion

Fed eral Trade Com mis sion

Na tional Aero nau tics & Space Administration

Na tional Sci ence Foun da tion

Na tional Trans por ta tion Safety Board

Nu clear Reg u la tory Com mis sion

Pan ama Ca nal Com mis sion

Peace Corps

U.S. Postal Ser vice

Con gress

Gen eral Ac count ing Of fice

(Those with per son nel sta tioned over seas are indicated in bold

per son nel are sta tioned at U.S. em bassies, con sul ates, mis sion

mil i tary head quar ters, U.S. mil i tary bases, mul ti lat eral or ga n

and de ployed in peace keep ing and other roles.)

191
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Arts of Power: Statecraft and Dip

Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, 

2. John P. Lovell, The Challenge of American Foreign 

Purpose and Adaptation, New York: Collier MacMillan, 1985, p

3. A 1987 report of the National Academy of Public Adminis

noted:

. . . the institutional memory of the United States Governm

for important national security affairs was worse than tha

any other major world power and had resulted in mistakes 

embarrassments in the past which would be bound to recu

Strengthening U.S. Government Communications: Report 

National Academy of Public Administration, Washington, DC, 

227, cited in Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, “Institutional M

Improving the National Security Advisory Process,” in James 

ed., Grand Strategy and the Decisionmaking Process, Washingt

National Defense University, 1991, p. 194.

4. Anthony Lake, I.M. Destler, and Leslie Gelb, Our Own 

Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy, New York

and Schuster, 1985.

5. Anthony Lake, Somoza Falling: The Nicaraguan Dilem

Portrait of Washington At Work, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989

6. Lake, p. 114.

7. Robert Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The United Sta

Nicaragua, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, p

8. Hedrick Smith, The Power Game: How Washington Work

York: Random House, 1988.

9. Adapted from John P. Lovell, The Challenge of American 

Policy, p. 32.

10. Institute of National Strategic Studies, National D

University, “Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Direc

A Plan of Action for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Washington, DC: N

Defense University, March 1999, p. 16.

192
11. For an excellent analysis of lessons learned and pruden

recommendations from recent U.S. military interventions, see: 

Fishel, Civil-Military Operations in the New World, New York: P

1997; John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Execu

Restoration of Panama, Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies In

April 15, 1992. A penetrating analysis of the operational and 

dimensions of the interagency process, particularly as they appl

U.S. Army at the operational and tactical levels, is Jennif

Morrison, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Oth

War: Implications for the U.S. Army, Santa Monica: RAND 

Center, 1997.

12. An excellent Handbook for Interagency Management of C

Contingency Operations issued in August 1998, contains in ea

digestible form much wisdom about how to do it right.

13. Excellent advice on how the ambassador and the r

unified commander should work together is found in Ted Russe

Role of the Ambassador, the Country Team, and Their Relatio

Regional Commanders,” in U.S. Army War College, Course D

Regional Appraisals, AY 97, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1997, pp. C

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Departm

State and the Department of Defense covers the function of the P

Advisor. The MOU,

recognizes the valuable role POLADs render to t

Department of Defense and the Department of State 

assessing the political implications of military planning a

strategy and in serving as the principal source of counsel 

international issues to their respective Commanders-in-Ch

. . . the deep level of commitment and cooperati

acknowledged by the Secretary of State and the Secretary 

Defense in executing foreign and security policy established 

the President.

14. For specifics, see the telegrams dated June 6, 199

USCINCSOUTH, June 8, 1994, from Embassy La Paz, and June 

from Embassy Bogota.

15. The classic study of the role of culture and turf in govern

James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do a

They Do It, New York: Harper Collins, 1989. Pertinent are the e

studies: George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, “National Power a

Interagency Process, “Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1995, p

Douglas A. Hartwick, “The Culture at State, the Services, and M

Operations: Bridging the Communication Gap,” Washingto

193
National War College, April 12, 1984; Rosemary Hansen and Ri

“Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus: Imp

Communications and Promoting National Security,” Pal

Stanford University, May 1998. Other impediments to 

decisionmaking are: groupthink, information overload, insu

information, lack of time, faulty analogy, insufficient ana

options, and the personal predispositions of the decisionmak

interaction of these factors are explored in the writings of Ir

Janis, Alexander George, and Graham Allison.

16. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: N

Security in the 21st Century, Arlington, VA, 1997, p. 66.

17. There are indications that even the Department of St

first among equals of the executive departments, is begin

understand the value of strategic planning. See: Secretary’s O

Resources, Plans, and Policy, U.S. Department of Stat

Department of State Strategic Plan, Washington, DC, Septembe

Excellent advice on how military culture should interact w

culture of nongovernment organizations during humanitaria

operations, peacekeeping, and stability operations is Judith S

“The Challenge of Civil-Military Cooperation in Peaceke

Airman-Scholar, Vol. IV, No.1, Winter 1998, pp. 26-35.

18. Military officers contemplating assignment to the Pent

civilians wishing to understand how to work with counterpart

should read the advice in Perry Smith, Assignment Pentag

Insider’s Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace, 2nd ed., rev., Wash

DC: Brassey’s, 1992.

194
CHAPTER 8

IMPROVING NATIONAL SECURITY

DECISIONMAKING

Constantine Menges

As we look at the issue of improving national se

decisionmaking, it is important to take a mom

recognize that overall, since the end of World War 

United States has been extremely successful in its na

security policy. The most important example of that s

is the fact that the Soviet Union, despite its eno

military strength, its range of instruments and its cu

was in fact contained and deterred from launching ei

nuclear or a conventional war and that, in time, the 

Union unraveled peacefully. Another example of Am

enormous success has been the democratic reconstr

after World War II of Germany, Italy, Austria, and J

This was an exceptional act of statesmanship on the 

the United States which made it possible for the me

women in those countries to establish stable demo

political systems. In fact, the history of the last 50 

illustrates clearly a fundamental axiom of interna

politics, which is that the political character of govern

is most important in determining the foreign po

states.

Turning to the topic—improving national se

decisionmakingI shall provide a few perspectives, 

few examples of problems that have arisen over th

decades, briefly analyze the reasons for these problem

conclude with some suggestions for improvin

decisionmaking process.

195
Perspectives.

My former colleague, Dr. Carnes Lord, has writt

excellent book on this issue, and I agree with him th

president is at the center of decisionmaking. The pre

has not only the right but also the duty to lead in na

security decisionmaking since the Constitution sp

that it is his fundamental task to assure the “co

defense”. All of the executive branch directly work f

president whom we elect. We understand that the pre

has essentially four full time jobs: he is the symbolic 

of our country, the leader for domestic policy, the lead

national security policy, and the leader of his political 

So presidents are always very, very busy and 

challenged to use their time and authority to greatest 

Furthermore, each member of the president’s cab

also charged with a range of responsibilities tha

exceptionally demanding. First, he or she has to impl

the policies that have already been decided upon. S

each cabinet member has to manage his or her organi

while at the same time managing relations with Con

Third, those managing institutions involved in f

policy making have to develop relations with 

counterparts among our allies and in other key cou

This does not leave a lot of time for the fourth task tha

a sense, written in invisible ink: to look to the fut

prudent anticipation of new problems, issues

opportunities.

It is also worth emphasizing that there is som

about all issues of national security decisionmaking 

somewhat different from other domains of policy

difference is that conflicting views and judgments a

the president’s advisers are an intrinsic aspect of na

security decisionmaking. Different individuals, dif

organizations are going to approach the same problem 

different perspectives. Often they will have dif

understandings about the current facts and trends. B

most important reason for conflict is that views 

196
actions taken or not taken today, and about their eff

the future, are always matters of judgment—th

usually no way of proving the validity of one or a

policy choice in advance.

This does not mean that foreign policy judgmen

derived from guess work, or that the opinion of an indi

who has not thought deeply about a particular situa

equal to the opinion of one who has spent his o

professional career dealing with similar issues. But 

mean that, in the end, conflict—both within and amo

participants—is intrinsic to national sec

decisionmaking. Under these circumstances, the 

always is: will the conflict be fair and open and honora

will it be characterized by manipulation and dece

perhaps including the manipulation of the president

My 1988 book, Inside the National Security Counc

written because, in my experience as a national se

advisor to the president, I witnessed important mem

the Executive branch who sought to substitute their f

policy views for the decisions made by the presiden

who also sought to manipulate the decisions made 

president. Perhaps this was also part of the reason w

Lord wrote his book. We both saw a great deal of dec

and manipulation, which only compounded the in

challenges to good decisionmaking.

National security issues can be divided into four 

The first are issues relating to ongoing policy matter

annual budgets for defense, relations with the 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) government

These are important issues, but they are regularized 

a sense predictable. The second type are issues relat

the use of force. Some well-known examples are: B

1948; Korea, 1950; Cuba, 1962; Iran, 1979; Panama

Iraq, 1990; and Kosovo, 1999. I would suggest th

issues relating to the use of force, there is a regul

process that more or less works when the issue gets 

top and is acted upon. The third kind of issue rela

197
major policy shifts, where there is a reconsiderat

policies which have been established toward 

countries (Russia, China) or on major issues (na

missile defense). These are issues involving 

consequences, where there tends to be a policy that ha

settled and perpetuated year after year. Nonetheless

are times when there is a need to consider changing 

policies. The fourth type of issue involves emerging t

or opportunities that may require a fundam

reassessment of U.S. interests and goals.

Among the four types of issues listed above, 

involving major policy shifts as well as issues inv

emerging threats or opportunities are the two areas 

change in the decisionmaking process is most needed

examples will help to illustrate this view.

Examples.

The first example is from 1968 when I was at the 

Corporation. At that time, one could look at the 

established right wing dictatorships in Spain and Po

and say that the authoritarian rulers were likely to le

the next few years because of their advanced age. It wa

clear that when these leaders passed away there wo

an opportunity for democratically inclined individu

these countries to press for political democracy. At the 

time, however, there would also be an opportunity f

clandestine but well-organized Communist parties in 

countries to move those countries into the Comm

sphere. It was also reasonable to expect that the 

Union would try to make this happen.

My suggestion in 1968 was that in the few rem

years before the crisis hit, the West should begin to id

analyze, and assess which groups and individuals fa

democracy, and then use appropriate means to enco

and help them. There were institutions in Eu

especially in Germany, that could have been help

198
doing this. Unfortunately, in Washington, DC, there w

interest and no proactive strategy.

What happened? What happened is illustrated 

revelation of former Central Intelligence Agency 

Director William Colby, whom I respect very much. 

memoirs, Colby notes that in 1974 the CIA closed its s

in Lisbon, Portugal to save two job slots because there 

temporary government freeze or job reduction at the 

Concurrently, the Soviet Union worked to radicalize a 

element of the Portuguese military which staged a c

1974. The Soviet Union conducted with skill a major 

operation in support of the Portuguese Communist 

flying the Portuguese Communist Party leader back 

from Moscow. The result was that in a matter of m

Portugal began to move rapidly into the Communist o

Portugal had become communist in 1974-1975, it 

judgment that Spain, following Franco’s death in 

could well have followed and NATO could have been 

with two new Warsaw Pact members, with popul

totaling 35 million people, on its western border. 

Soviet assertiveness in the 1970s, its military build

success in helping 11 new pro-Soviet regimes take 

(including Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua) s

defeat in Western Europe could have had very ne

consequences. Fortunately, the situation was t

around in time, but it took quite a bit of last-minute ef

it had not been turned around, it could have be

extremely dangerous situation.

In the late 1970s, a destabilization process began in 

In this case, there were essentially three competing g

A group of moderates who wanted constitut

government, radical Islamic elements, and the Ir

Communist Party and allied groups supported, as 

been in 1944 and again in 1953, by the Soviet Unio

many months in 1977 and 1978, I urged the C

administration to give serious attention to the eve

Iran and I proposed a strategy of political preventive 

designed to help the Iranian moderates in coalition w

199
military to move toward a constitutional trans

perhaps under a constitutional monarchy as in 

Unfortunately, the U.S. Government’s response t

was—no time, no interest, and no action—until the 

weeks when it was too late. And here we are, more th

years later, with a regime in Iran that hopefully 

become more moderate, but one that remains a s

threat to the United States and its allies and is se

weapons of mass destruction. I believe that this sit

could have been prevented if there had been timely a

but none was taken.

Another example of missed opportunities has 

Russia since 1992. With the dissolution of the Soviet 

and Russian president Boris Yeltsin’s ascent to pow

United States was presented with an enormous oppor

to help encourage the building of genuinely demo

parties, democratic labor unions, and demo

institutional infrastructure that could have supporte

the democratic transition process and the efforts 

Senators Samuel Nunn and Richard Lugar to rad

reduce the Russian nuclear threat. The remarkable 

about the Russian case is that, in spite of the fac

presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton publicly esp

these goals, and in spite of the fact that the United 

invested more than 25 billion dollars in direct assista

the former Soviet Union, and more than 140 billion d

in overall assistance to the democracies, very little wa

to help build democratic political parties and trade u

In October 1992, the U.S. Congress enacted the Fr

Support Act, proposed by President Bush, which pr

billions in assistance for post-Communist Russia. T

office in January 1993, these funds were availa

President Clinton, but he did not take hold of this issu

really lead national policy, as President Harry S. Tr

had done with the Marshall Plan. There was a lar

ineffectual effort to help the Russian people succeed in 

aspirations for an effective democratic transition. Th

probably the highest national security priority of the U

200
States during the 1990s in light of the fact that Russia

its remaining 6,000 operational strategic nuclear m

continues to pose such a potential military threa

because the political character of the regime in M

makes such an enormous difference for the world.

Another example that the national sec

decisionmaking system is regrettably flawed in the d

of anticipating events is the tragedy of former Yugo

during the early 1990s. In the spring of 1991, right aft

end of the Gulf War, there was an attempt to infor

Executive branch leadership that there was a 

probability of war in Yugoslavia, and that this might 

time for preventive diplomacy. As we now know, prev

diplomacy did not occur. In fact, the U.S. Secretary of 

flew to Yugoslavia the day before the war began—a 

late. 

Likewise, in 1993 after 2 years of war and eno

suffering, a plan was presented to two members 

Clinton foreign policy cabinet, to help those in Serb

other parts of the former Yugoslavia who w

democracy: to help them to organize; to help them to 

broadcasting facilities; to help them end the dictators

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic through po

means by providing political assistance, as the U

States knows how to do and has done in the past. Th

not done in 1993 or for years thereafter. We kno

consequences have included much more suff

bloodshed, displacement of populations in this regio

in 1999, the very real risk of a major confrontation 

Russia (and perhaps its “strategic partner” China) foll

the NATO attacks against Serbian forces. 

Last, a current example: starting in the fall of 1

was suggested to senior officials in the Cl

administration that Colonel Hugo Chavez of Venezu

candidate for the presidency of that country, would 

likelihood establish a radical military based dictat

that would be allied with the Castro regime, the comm

201
guerillas in Colombia, and other anti-democratic gro

Latin America. The strategic consequence for the U

States could be highly negative because Colonel C

would control approximately two to three billion d

annually in oil revenues which would give him the ab

finance his radical activities including destabilizing a

to elements of the military in other Latin Am

countries and possible geopolitical cooperation 

anti-U.S. oil producers such as Iraq, Iran, and Libya

This assessment was based upon the fact that C

Chavez had been a leftist radical ever since his day

military academy student, had for years attemp

organize a radical movement within the Venez

military, had in 1992 allied with the small Castro-sup

Venezuelan armed Communist movements and elem

the Venezuelan military to attempt a coup aga

democratically elected president, and had worked c

with the Colombian Communist guerillas after he re

amnesty in 1995. The judgment, which was repea

senior U.S. government officials in February and 

1999 (a month before this analysis was presented) wa

as President of Venezuela, Chavez would 

pseudo-constitutional means and disguised coerc

establish his de facto dictatorship but would seek to r

on rhetorically good terms with the United States, co

as a major foreign oil supplier to the United State

would not interfere with U.S. and other foreign bu

operations in Venezuela. Essentially, Chavez would u

Chinese approach of deriving economic benefits fro

United States and other democracies while pursuing 

internal and international policies he decided upon.

Given Venezuela’s 40 years as a political democra

the existence of two strong democratic political p

independent labor unions, media, and the instituti

civil society, the proposal made to the U.S. Governme

that encouragement should be given to the demo

parties of Venezuela—discredited by poor performan

some corruption—to choose new leadership and un

202
compete in the presidential election and thereafter u

political and other institutions of Venezuela to restra

counter the authoritarian tendencies and actions of C

Chavez. It was also proposed that under the term

unanimous 1991 Organization of American States de

all member governments would work together to pr

democracy if threatened from within by any m

country, and that the United States would work disc

to support a coalition of Latin American democracies t

the democratic movement in Venezuela and closely m

the negative actions of Colonel Chavez. The 

Government decided to take no action, and the c

months and years will reveal how seriously this 

threaten U.S. national security interests.

Analysis.

What explains a frequent pattern where the na

security decisionmaking institutions, staffed by indiv

who are well meaning, experienced, and intelligent, 

take the time to examine seriously emerging pot

future threats?

The following are four possible explanations. F

what I call the paradox of foresight. This involves the 

that, when a problem is still small enough to be deal

preventively it is usually too small to generate intere

alone consensus, at any level in the nat

decisionmaking process. Second, there is the int

unprovability of judgments about future opportuni

threats. The present is the present, but the fut

conjectural. Most people tend to view the future 

continuation of the present, and discontinuities are a

seen as somewhat anomalous and unlikely. This is a n

reflex, and usually correct.

Third, most emerging national security problem

complex, multifaceted, and very political in nature

means that they do not fall easily within any one ag

jurisdiction. The Department of State always se

203
control all aspects of foreign policy, but in fact it pre

conduct diplomacy—that is, negotiate with governm

The Department of Defense is very focused on its pr

functions of deterring serious threats, preparing to p

in nuclear and conventional wars, and managing c

deployments and ongoing operations. Defense tends 

be looking for new problems and issues. The CIA, whi

the primary responsibility for looking ahead, is at 

limited by the “mindset” problem of prevailing cons

thinking within the organization, as well as 

reluctance to bring unproven and therefore low prob

contingencies to the attention of policymakers. 

organization, it is also often reluctant to move towar

tasks and responsibilities in direct political action, giv

problems that it confronts with congressional oversig

public criticism when there are visible setbacks.

A fourth reality that undermines the abil

decisionmakers to respond to new threats and opportu

has to do with the indispensability of presid

leadership in a situation when every president is face

immense demands on his attention and 

Understandably, presidents are not looking fo

problems and issues. On the other hand, they do not w

be surprised by events. President Jimmy Carter illus

this fact in a letter which he wrote to then CIA D

Stansfield Turner (which, remarkably enough, was q

in the national media about an hour or two after it was 

To paraphrase, the handwritten note said: Dear Stan

so disappointed that the CIA failed to alert me 

problems in Iran and that now we face this enormous c

When it comes to issues involving major policy shi

of the problems that I have just mentioned apply, bu

are compounded by two other difficulties. The first 

current policy obviously has its strong supporters 

within the government and outside the govern

Second, the risks of continuing a policy always seem 

much less than the risks of changing it.

204
Suggestions.

We now come to the question, how do we impro

decisionmaking process? How do we move toward 

better in the future? Let us start with the fact that, 

post World War II era, the national security decisionm

process virtually always involves four organization

three different decisionmaking levels within the 

institutions. The National Security Council, Departm

State, Department of Defense, and the CIA are th

principal organizations. The three decisionmaking 

above the operational level are:

1. the interagency group at the assistant secretary 

2. the undersecretary/deputy secretary level 

called the senior interagency group); and

3. the National Security Council as the convening 

in which members of the cabinet and their key staff d

issues with the president.

If one studies all of the presidential administr

since the enactment of the National Security Act of 

whatever the particular nomenclature, this is esse

how things have worked. This system, in my view, is 

to stay with us. The question then becomes—how do

improve the system so that it performs more effectiv

My recommendation is that, to cope with em

potential threats and opportunities, the government s

establish a system of monthly interagency meetin

which time would be set aside for discussion and an

relating to emerging threats and opportunities. This 

occur in two phases. First there would be an uncla

discussion which would draw upon the skills and judg

of experts who are not currently in the Executive bran

who have concerns about specific major issues. This 

include individuals at universities, at the military an

and educational institutions, at the RAND Corpor

Center for Naval Analysis, and so forth. There would n

205
be staff that winnows out suggestions, papers, pub

articles and op-eds in order to have a reasonable rang

number of presentations, but the meeting should cer

involve people who feel that current policy shou

changed.

Government participants would be the intera

principals at both the assistant secretary an

under/deputy secretary levels. They would listen 

presentations, discuss them with the experts who 

presented, but not necessarily offer their v

Immediately following (or perhaps a week or so later)

should be a classified meeting of the principals 

assistant and under/deputy secretary level to discu

issues raised by the outside experts and to decide wh

any of these issues should lead to new analytic work w

the government or whether any should be brought 

president at a National Security Council meeting

approach allows the government to reconsider the ex

consensus views by drawing upon the enormous wea

talent that exists in the countryinformed experts w

not busy with the day-to-day activities of governmen

When it comes to major policy shift issues, such a

policy toward Russia, China, or national missile defe

would recommend that these issues be reviewed in the 

way, no less than once every 6 months. Once agai

review process should start at the interagency lev

then move up to the National Security Council leve

once again, the system should be designed so that e

are brought in from the outside to provide dif

perspectives in the unclassified meeting. This is one w

which the policy leaders within the U.S. Government 

obtain a wide range of opinions and advice in order 

and stretch their own thinking. At the same tim

system needs to be flexible enough to allow individu

the government to consult candidly with each other 

whether they want to move a particular issue up 

presidential level.

206
A last point is that, when we think abou

decisionmaking process, the key organization servi

president needs to be the National Security Counci

which acts as the president’s eyes and ears in the Exe

branch. It is the group of individuals who do not 

day-to-day program management responsibilities; in

they work directly for the president who is accounta

the American people for the results of national se

policy. 

The National Security Council staff has four in

responsibilities. First, to assure that the president h

information to make the key decisions that need to be 

and that the policy debate is fair, with all relevant ag

having a fair hearing before the president. Seco

monitor the implementation of decisions made b

president (which are usually written in the form of na

security decision directives). Third, to coordina

political, economic, military, and intelligence aspects 

U.S. policy. And fourth to provide information that he

president of the United States deal effectively 

emerging threats and opportunities and make major 

changes when they are needed. Therefore the Na

Security Council staff should serve as the custodian 

two-stage process that I have outlined.

In order for the NSC staff to perform these fun

effectively for the president, the senior staff membe

each part of the world and for each major functiona

should be individuals who are independent of the ex

executive agencies. A Foreign Service Officer or a m

or CIA officer on a 1-year or 2-year assignment can ma

important contribution to the National Security C

(NSC) staff. But he or she is going to be tied, to some e

to the perspectives of his or her agency which als

decide on their promotions and future assignme

believe that the pattern that has grown out of having m

Foreign Service Officers staff the key positions in th

essentially gives the president two Departments of 

One Department of State may have much to contribu

207
two is one too many for any president. The issue 

independence of the senior NSC officials is very imp

because every president depends on these individu

keep him in charge of foreign policy.

These suggested changes would not pla

unreasonable burden on the national security institu

The open meetings I am suggesting would be of no 

than two hours duration, perhaps ten times each y

they helped to prevent one major crisis over a thre

period, this would have been time well spent. Obv

doing this would require a National Security Counc

that is fair-minded, brings issues forward, and reach

to people with different points of view. This inno

might well significantly improve the national se

decisionmaking process in the domains of policy chan

prudent foresight.

208
CHAPTER 9

SERVANTS, SUPPLICANTS, OR SABOTEU

THE ROLE OF THE UNIFORMED OFFIC

AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERI

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

John Hillen

Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern 

civil-military relations have a great advantage in the sea

for security. They increase their likelihood of reaching t

right answers to the operating issues of military poli

Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern 

civil-military relations squander their resources and r

uncalculated risks.

Samuel Huntington

The Soldier and the State

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NA

1999 war against Serbia over Kosovo has been analy

many different contexts. Much has been made ov

conflict’s implications for NATO’s future, transat

relations in general, humanitarian intervention 

Balkan stability, and many other areas. But the w

which Kosovo illuminated the contemporary angs

America’s civil-military relations is worth highlighti

the end, more questions were raised than answered 

the role of the uniformed officer in the nation’s str

affairs. Kosovo showed that America has not yet fou

post-Cold War civil-military boundaries between diss

disloyalty, political identity vs. politicization, and adv

interference. 

When viewing Kosovo through a civil-military pris

inescapable irony becomes clear. Although Kosovo 

war waged by a governing elite whose formative po

209
experience was protesting American involveme

Vietnam, the strategy was eerily similar. Like Vietna

United States decided to use coercive force in Kos

induce a change in the behavior of one party to an in

conflict. Like Vietnam, U.S. military power was a

incrementally—gradually escalating as it became o

that preceding actions were failing. Like Vietnam, 

was considerable ambiguity over how the mi

pressure—even if “effectively” applied—could lead 

sustainable political solution. Like Vietnam, few wer

what “effective” meant, or how it could be measured

Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were fairly united in 

early opposition to the president’s strategy. It appear

at least in the early stages of both conflicts, the 

difference between these episodes was that only in K

did the Joint Chiefs immediately disassemble in pu

leaking their displeasure to the press.

2

The lessons of Vietnam were very much in the mi

America’s military leaders at the start of the K

Operation. Indeed, the single most influential book a

senior military leaders in this country over the past s

years has been H.R. McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty: L

Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staf

the Lies That Led to Vietnam. In the book, McMaster 

to light the way in which the Joint Chiefs accepte

strategy of graduated pressure in Vietnam even t

they felt, from the very beginning, that the effort was 

flawed. McMaster concludes that President Johns

exactly the advice he wanted because he made clear 

chiefs that he would accept only military advice 

conformed with his political agenda. The chiefs comp

Only months before the start of the Kosovo ope

McMaster briefed the Joint Chiefs and the Command

Chief of the military’s regional commands. These me

all been junior officers during Vietnam. He told them

In telling the story of how and why decisions were made in 

period 1963 to 1965 that slowly transformed our commitm

210
[in Vietnam] from an advisory and support effort into 

American War, I found that the nature of the civil-milita

relationship prevented the Joint Chiefs of Staff from provid

their best military advice to the National Comma

Authority. Indeed, an insidious relationship between t

nation’s top civilian and military officials rendered Preside

Lyndon Johnson’s Administration incapable of deali

effectively with the complexity of the situation in Vietnam

It was with this denouement in mind that the Joint Ch

Staff confronted Kosovo. For military planners, K

meant ambiguous, contradictory, and unattainable 

self-imposed constraints designed to fit political ag

and the incremental and indecisive application of forc

conflict was waged in a way that was so fundament

odds with contemporary military thinking tha

Pentagon was quite happy to have the press a

responsibility directly to the Secretary of State—labe

“Madeleine’s War.” One can only speculate wheth

Joint Chiefs were keeping in mind the regrets 

Vietnam era’s “five silent men” when they sent a clear 

message to the President in the first weeks of the cam

“If this fails, we are not going down with you.”

Was this the real civil-military lesson of Vietnam

the role of senior uniformed military officers is to gi

President their honest military advice, and upon 

being taken, cover their reputations through the 

offices of the Washington Post? One would hope not. A

there is tremendous confusion among 

communities—political and military—abou

relationship between their respective leaders over m

strategic. Much of the confusion stems from some 

episodes that have pushed civil-military relations tow

post-Cold War nadir. Observers are familiar wit

(sometimes thinly) veiled strain between an administ

whose political elite struggled to avoid service in Vi

and a military elite who fought there as junior of

Besides that, the relationship between Congress an

senior military is particularly strained. The extraord

211
timing of military actions against Iraq 

Sudan/Afghanistan in 1998 led many on the Hill to 

that the Joint Chiefs were complicit in “Wag the 

strategies. Recent hearings have been mark

acrimonious challenges to senior military lea

integrity.

4

 Many congressional leaders seem to pri

view the Joint Chiefs as obsequious executive b

“yes-men” rather than objective leaders with th

interests of the country and the entire government in m

To repair these views and bridge these gaps, the 

the uniformed officer must be recast in the cont

America’s new civil-military environment. While S

Huntington, S. E. Finer, Morris Janowitz, and 

provided early markers, today’s environment require

new thought be given to the same questions they sou

answer in their time.

5

 The extraordinary changes 

strategic environment and the domestic political scen

rendered their classic works models rather than g

There is not the space here for a complete exposition 

new civil-military environment and what is likely to 

it over the next decades. It is helpful, however, to surv

state of the debate about this environment and la

foundation for some recommendations about the role 

uniformed officer in the future.

America’s Civil-Military Future: Crisis or

Transition?

Two schools of thought dominate the contemp

debate over the civil-military present and future. One 

maintains that there is a crisis in civil-military rela

There are four basic elements to this crisis.

The first sign of crisis is that the military is bec

more outspoken on matters of strategy and policy—ar

which the military is merely to advise civilian leaders 

executing their decisions.

6

 This school holds f

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell in part

disdain for his very public resistance to newly e

212
President Bill Clinton’s decisions regarding homos

serving in the military and the possibility of an 

intervention in Bosnia in 1993. Powell has since 

succeeded by a more pliant set of Chairmen appoin

the Clinton administration, but adherents to this sch

thought still maintain that the problem has 

institutionalized. With the passage of 

Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the Chairman has re

a disproportionate amount of influence that could we

to challenges to civil authority.

The second element of crisis is the growing gap be

the military and civilian cultures in America.

7

 Thos

warn of this trend speak not only of a physical disco

between the military and society (due to a sm

professional force serving an ever growing country) b

“nearly unbridgeable cultural divide.”

8

 The militar

society will not only have less contact with each other 

future, they will develop diametrically opposing cu

values. Adherents to these ideas maintain that this w

to an insular and resentful military that will h

deteriorating American society in contempt. Moreove

military will hold itself in too high a regard to be the h

servant and protector of American society. These idea

captivated many public leaders. The Secretary of De

among other top officials, has stated that “reconnecti

military to society” is a top priority.

The third element is related to the first two in 

separate crisis could develop from the growing 

between military and civilian leadership. Increasing

two communities are “raised” apart and do not 

formative experiences that might give them comp

world views and values when they come to lead

positions in their respective communities. Many obs

maintain that this is a long-term trend and 

phenomenon particular to the Clinton Administratio

Finally, the fourth element of a continuing civil-m

crisis is the overt politicization of the uniformed mi

213
Warnings here are painted against a somewhat ide

backdrop of a professional military that was scrupu

apolitical until the past 25 years. Adherents maintai

since the 1970s, the uniformed military—especial

officer corps—has become overwhelmingly and ac

Republican, conservative, and evangelically Christi

separate observation has been made about the politici

of recently retired military officers whose endorsemen

sought by political leaders and who are then rewarde

political spoils for their services.

As one might expect, there is a separate set of obs

(of whom I am one) who maintain that there 

civil-military crisis. According to this group, wha

United States is experiencing is merely the pa

transition due to changes in the political and str

landscape.

In response to the first “charge” of unreasonable m

dissent from civilian dictates, I would answer 

professional dissent is required at times, while disloy

the execution of civilian orders can never be tole

Despite the warnings of the crisis school of thought

has been no evidence of the latter—even in its sm

form. In fact, the greater danger to the civil-military b

comes from the opposite, when senior military leade

obliged to be policy lap-dogs for civilian officials, or 

they work their dissent through disingenuous chann

bureaucratic obfuscation and under-cutting. As McM

warned about Vietnam, the suppression of honest d

can accumulate with nefarious effect. In the best 

defense of an active “voice” for senior military leaders

Sarkesian wrote,

Disagreements that arise among the military, the presid

and members of Congress should not be stifled, as was the c

during the Vietnam War, but should be aired honestly with

prejudice to the military’s obedience to, and implementation 

civilian directives. Nor should the armed forces wait unt

debate occurs before presenting its perspective and objection

a given policy line. Military professionals ought to be as fre

214
make known their technical judgments as enginee

scientists, or doctors without conjuring fears that they a

trying to escape civilian control. The alternative, after all, is 

perpetuate the timidity, extreme defensiveness, and fear 

criticism from the public and Congress that seems to perva

the military today.

10

Promoting such a role for the uniformed militar

undoubtedly cause friction—something that the 

political and military officials seem determined to av

the politically correct and thoroughly “spun” world in 

they operate. This sort of friction, however, is natur

healthy in a democracy. Moreover, it is part and pa

America’s civil-military history—a successful t

general but one not without the friction that accom

constructive political engagement on the part 

military. As General Matthew Ridgway warned 

memoirs, 

Civilian authorities must scrupulously respect the integri

the intellectual honesty, of its officer corps. Any effort to fo

unanimity of view, to compel adherence to som

politico-military “party line” against the honestly express

views of responsible officers . . . is a pernicious practice wh

jeopardizes rather than protects the integrity of the milita

profession.

11

I will not dwell on the second “charge” of the crisis s

as I have written on it elsewhere.

12

 It is worth notin

however that the three principal tenets of this charge 

eminently disputable. First, while there is a growin

between the military and society, it is characterize

divergence in shared experience and understanding

an antagonistic cultural divide. Despite dec

participation from the populace, the military remains 

the most admired institutions in America and there i

evidence that any segment of the population other t

small portion of the elite begrudges the armed service

martial culture and particular ethos. Second, it 

fundamentally unhealthy, nor remotely dangerou

facto, for a democracy to have a military and a g

215
society that differ from each other in their values, cu

and ethos. What serious observer would maintain tha

must have exactly congruent cultures in order to co-e

a free society? Last, momentum gained from the fir

tenets, which results in calls to “close the gap” by m

the military accommodate contemporary societal m

will in the end hurt society more than help it. Not on

such calls force a lowest cultural common denom

approach on the military, they will remove from the m

the very ethos that it needs for the missions that 

justify its existence.

On the matter of the third charge, I agree that m

and civilian leadership today has less in common th

any other time in recent American history. Similarly, 

fourth charge, I agree that the officer corps is more o

Republican and conservative than in the past. But b

these facts are phenomena, not necess

civil-military emergencies. The distinction is pro

Both facts are rooted in the Vietnam conflict and c

explained by the socio-political evolution of this co

over the past 30 years. In that short span, one politica

(which has held the White House for the last 7 

accommodated the anti-war movement, neo-Ma

radical environmentalism, feminism, multiculturalis

rights, and other socio-political movements that 

anathema to a conservative, traditional institution s

the military. To many in uniform during this per

seemed that the Democrats left the military and 

blamed it for looking Republican. I suspect that the f

between civilian and military leaders and the po

imbalance in the services will re-adjust themselve

time. The effects of the “cultural wars” that started in 

will take at least another generation to wash out. 

important, despite these alleged “problems,” there 

been no civil-military incidents of any note that 

resulted. Some bruised egos and political sensibilities 

these issues appear to be sociological phenomena tha

216
had no discernible negative impact on civil-mi

relations.

Nonetheless, the fact that there has been no “Seven 

in May” occurrence does not mean all is well. Indee

incumbent on both the civilian and mi

communities—as well as adherents to both scho

thought about the current state of affairs—to j

producing a set of rules for civil-military relations 

future. In order to do this, one must place the imm

aspects of American civil-military relations in the con

the changing civil-military environment. This ex

makes clearer the questions that need to be asked abo

shape of America’s civil-military future. I offer here 

thoughts on how to understand and evaluate the sh

dynamics that will shape this future. By b

understanding the context in which they will em

American leaders can begin to discern the parame

successful civil-military relations much as Huntingto

others did two generations ago.

The New Landscape and What it Portends.

Ultimately, the new boundaries of civil-mi

relations —while rooted firmly in the Constitution a

rule of law—will be subjective in nature. The lines be

political engagement and political interference, be

political identity and politicization, and bet

constructive dissent and destructive disloyalty will be 

debated and not clearly seen. There are six var

shaping the development of those lines today and 

near future.

• The lack of consensus over strategy and the 

military force. Ultimately, civil-military relatio

determined by three sets of pressures: legal, so

and functional. Disagreement over the function

of the military in America’s affairs will 

civil-military relations in a constant sta

agonizing flux. The famous exchange between 

217
Powell and Secretary of State Madeleine Al

over the use of the military is perhaps the best k

example of this. Fundamental differences over t

of the military in so-called Operations Other 

War are likely to continue and perhaps eve

worse. This is curious for historians, who kn

instance that in over 275 shooting mi

deployments since 1789, the U.S. military has b

only five declared wars. Despite that hi

“warfighting” remains the dominant physica

psychological template on which the nation 

and drills its forces. This split between wh

military is doing day-to-day and who it thinks 

its core will continue to tear at the fab

civil-military relations for the foreseeable fut

clear and cohesive national security strategy (

than the public relations pabulum the White 

issues today) would go a long way toward recon

these strains.

• The relative sophistication of the politica

military communities have gone in opp

directions.

13

 Since the end of the Vietnam co

which the military views as being lost 

combination of McNamara’s whiz kids and fe

political leaders, the uniformed services 

struggled mightily to increase their own po

acumen and sophistication. It is not unusual to

see dozens of junior officers destined for headqu

staff jobs gaining advanced degrees in public 

and political science at the best universit

America. On the other hand, civilian leade

increasingly unaware of military science, or 

history, culture, and traditions of the armed 

Programs to encourage participation and educa

military affairs should be a top priority for the 

ranks of the civil service dealing with str

matters. Without them, the uniformed militar

fill the knowledge vacuum with savvy officer

218
will take the political initiative and thereby inc

distrust and resentment of civilian leaders.

• Goldwater-Nichols merely fired the first salvo 

organizational war between the services ov

issue of jointness. The continuing evolution of t

of policies and processes will shape civil-m

relations for some time to come. 

Goldwater-Nichols, the powers and prestige 

Joint Staff, the Chairman, and the Secret

Defense have risen. Ironically, the powers 

civilians in the office of the Secretary of Defens

diminished. This is principally because whi

civilians are busy setting policy, the indiv

services—armed with over 85 percent of the Pen

budget and under almost no constraints on how 

spend it—are building the forces they wish to 

order to execute their particular vision. In a 

bureaucracy, those with the budget authority 

the policy. So long as the policy makers (civilian

separated from those who plan and build the 

(military), a fundamental disconnect will remai

will skew not only America’s strategy—b

civil-military relations.

14

• The growing gap between the military and soc

real and must be addressed by policy. As noted 

the gap between the military and society on iss

culture and values is one that has always existe

should remain. It should, of course, be manag

good civil-military policies but there is certai

need to “close the gap” by making the militar

more like society at large. There is, however, a n

address the gap in shared experience, understa

and appreciation that comes from fewer and 

Americans having contact with their military. 

with others, I have written about potential sol

to this problem.

15

 In general, the military must 

much bolder personnel and public relations poli

219
order to cycle more of America—both physical

psychologically—through its ranks. With a se

eminently achievable policies directed at a r

problem—the lack of interest in public service a

American elites—the military could make 

strides to fix this area of friction as well.

• Finally, the uniformed military can help redu

civil-military angst by reconnecting not only 

America at large, but also with the rest 

government. As General Fred Weyand has 

“The American Army is not so much an arm 

Executive Branch as it is an arm of the Am

people.”

1 6

 Improving the relationship 

Congress—to include consultation over policy a

merely budgetary issues—would restore the 

structure of the Clausewitzian trinity betwee

military, the people, and the government. Con

after all, represents two sides of the trinity

people and the government. In recent time

civil-military relationship has treated the Pre

as the government and polls or editorial pages 

will of the people. This is a profou

anti-constitutional set of devices and has throw

entire civil-military system out of balance. A

constitutional scholar noted, the American sys

“an invitation to struggle” between the branc

government over issues relating to foreig

defense policy. Thus Madison and others ac

some inefficiencies for the sake of demo

governance and civilian control. McMaster note

the Joint Chiefs of the Vietnam era were comp

helping the President to “circumven

constitution.” If the nation does not restore the 

role of Congress and the relationship be

Congress and the military, we could face this pr

again.

220
By recognizing the shifting variables that 

America’s civil-military relations, both the politica

military communities can work to restore a proper r

the uniformed officer and a healthy relationship be

these two parties. It should be emphasized that the m

must be involved in this process and not merely accep

rules of civil-military relations. Civilian control 

military is a hallmark of modern democracies but it do

mean that the military cannot participate in deciding 

nature of a healthy civil-military balance. In the pa

years, most senior uniformed leaders have shrunk 

entering the contemporary debates outlined here. It 

instance, amazing to me that the only public officia

have taken the opportunity to address the “gap” issu

the perspective of the military are those civilians 

seminal experience was in avoiding military se

Uniformed leaders must participate in the discussion

decisions that will shape America’s civil-military futu

not do so is to doom civil-military relations to a rock

for some time to come.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. To this day, the American public is not even quite sur

caused our ultimate victory. Most of the players involved 

campaign have offered theories trumpeting almost exclusiv

significance of their role and actions.

2. See Bradley Graham, “Joint Chiefs Doubted Air Strateg

Washington Post, April 5, 1999, p. A1. Showing their political a

the intelligence community was actually the first rat off th

beating the JCS by a few days in the “I told you so" game.

3. McMaster presentation to the CINC’s conference, 1998.

4. Among many others, I am reminded in particular of the ex

in September of 1996 between General John Shalikashvili and S

John McCain. McCain, who knew full well that Bosnia plann

continuing apace (several Hill staffers had already been mobil

1997 reserve tours in theater), was aghast when the Chairma

Joint Chiefs assured him that there were no plans to contin

221
Bosnia mission past the promised 1-year duration. McCain storm

of the hearing room.

5. I am, of course, referring to the classics Soldier and th

(1957), The Man on Horseback (1962), and The Professional 

(1960).

6. See especially Richard Kohn, “Out of Control: The C

Civil-Military Relations,” The National Interest, Vol. 35, Sprin

pp. 3-17.

7. See Thomas Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between Milita

Society,” The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 66-78.

8. James Kitfield, “Standing Apart,” National Journal, J

1998, p. 1352.

9. See Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, “Grand A

the Republicans,” The New Republic, December 8, 1997; and Ol

International Security, 1999.

10. Sam C. Sarkesian, “The U.S. Military Must Find Its 

Orbis, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1998, p. 428.

11. General Matthew Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Mat

Ridgway, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956, p. 270.

12. See “Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?,” Orbis, Vol. 43

Winter 1999. Reprinted in Parameters, Autumn 1999.

13. See Don Snider’s presentation at this conference for som

and analysis on this phenomenon.

14. I detail this issue in “Defense’s Death Spiral,” Foreign 

July/August 1999.

15. See Charles Moskos, “Overcoming Military Recruitmen

Without the Draft,” The Washington Post, March 3, 1999; and my 

“The Gap Between American Society and the Military: Keep It, 

It, Manage It,” presented to the American Bar Association on No

13, 1998.

16. Quoted in Harry Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam 

Context, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S

War College, 1981, p. 7.

222
CHAPTER 10

DoD IN THE 21st CENTURY

Lawrence Korb

Introduction.

The organization and operation of the Departm

Defense (DoD) in the 21st century, like the last half 

20th century, will be a product of the conflicting and 

contradictory objectives that it must achieve. For pu

of analysis, these cross pressures may be placed int

categories.

First, DoD must be organized and operated to e

civilian control while not undermining or diluting m

professionalism. Therefore, civilian control must n

exercised in such a manner that military opinion

expertise are excluded from or downgraded with

decisionmaking process. On the other hand, m

considerations cannot be allowed to dominate the pr

Maintaining a proper balance or equilibrium in thi

has been and will be both a delicate and challenging 

Second, DoD must serve the needs of both the exe

and legislative branches simultaneously. Whi

president is the chief executive and commander-in-c

the armed forces, the Congress has the constitu

mandate to raise armies and maintain navies, est

personnel policies for the armed services, and declar

Since the branches are often controlled by different p

and most often have different perspectives 

constituencies, high-level DoD officials find it diffic

serve both branches equally well. If they defer to the 

of the president, the Congress often criticizes the

slighting the legislature’s constitutional responsib

223
But if DoD’s executives, particularly uniformed leade

their complaints about the executive branch’s polic

legislative hearings, the president, in the wo

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, will accuse th

“legalized insubordination.”

Third, the political system wants DoD to be unifie

efficient without undermining the independ

uniqueness, and statutory responsibilities of the 

separate and very different military departments an

armed services. Whether it be in procurement, log

training, or strategy, the politicians and the public ex

receive the advantages of centralization 

decentralization at the same time.

Fourth, the department must be organized to fu

efficiently and effectively during both war and pea

organizational structure designed to optimize the Pla

Programming, and Budgetary System (PPBS) 

probably will be able to handle equally well a peaceke

mission or the enforcement of a no-fly zone.

To make a prediction or projection about how Do

cope with these conflicting pressures in the next cent

is useful to take a look back at the last half-century of 

operations. While history will not repeat itself exactl

reasonable to assume that DoD will respond to 

conflicts in a similar manner.

The Civil-Military Balance.

For the most part, the balance between civilia

military concerns has been well maintained. Howev

occasion strong individuals have upset the balanc

example, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense 

1961-68, made use of the powers granted to the sec

and his office by the 1949, 1953, and 1958 reorganizat

dilute the impact of the military professionals with

policy process. McNamara employed a decisionm

process, PPBS, and an analytical technique, sy

224
analysis, that diminished the influence of military exp

in deciding how and where to spend defense reso

However, the military professionals eventually learne

to employ PPBS and systems analysis to enhance 

military perspectives, and none of McNamara’s succ

has been able or willing to use the powers of the of

exclude military input to the extent that McNamar

Ironically, while most of McNamara’s successors esc

his methods, they continued to employ his decisionm

tools, i.e., PPBS’ and systems analysis.

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Ch

Staff (JCS) from 1989 through 1993, became the m

equivalent of McNamara. Relying on the powers gran

the Chairman of the JCS by the Goldwater-Nichols 

1986 and the political and bureaucratic skills he dev

at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Of

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the White H

Powell dominated the policy process in the immediat

Cold War period. U.S. military strategy and 

employment doctrine were developed by him. So gre

his impact that we now speak of the “Powell Doc

Moreover, he openly and successfully challenged

writing op-ed pieces and giving public speeches, Pre

Bill Clinton on his campaign promises to allow gays to 

openly in the military, reduce military spending, an

the Serb onslaught in Bosnia. However, Powell

successors, Generals John Shalikashvili and H

Shelton, have assumed a much more low key role. The

deferred to President Clinton on such controversial 

as deploying forces to Bosnia and conducting an a

against Kosovo.

While neither McNamara nor Powell did perm

damage to the civilian-military balance, they 

demonstrated that the potential now exists for ups

the balance. This potential exists becaus

reorganizations of 1949, 1953, 1958, and 1986 

enhanced significantly the powers of both the secreta

chairman. Therefore, since there is little prosp

225
undoing these reorganizations, the president an

Congress must guard against strong individuals 

those powers to overwhelm either military or c

considerations. Moreover, as fewer and fewer civilian

military experience, the President must ensure th

secretary and his key advisors are not afraid to cha

the uniformed military.

The Executive-Legislative Balance.

Because of the separation of powers and the sys

checks and balances which is built into our political sy

senior military and civilian officials in DoD are in a n

position when it comes to satisfying the needs of bo

President and the Congress. The problems usually 

from DoD officials supporting the executive line on 

while being less than candid with the Congress. Ov

past 50 years, senior Pentagon officials have been les

forthcoming with Congress on such controversial su

as the progress of the war in Vietnam, the killing 

marines in Lebanon, opinions regarding the war in th

the length of the deployment in Bosnia and the readin

the armed forces in the late 1990s. With the end of th

War, however, Congress has become increasingly ass

in national security policy and will continue to ins

more candor from DoD officials, particularly the unif

military.

Moreover, the resurgent Congress will contin

establish its own bodies, like the National Defense 

and the Commission on National Security/21st Centu

provide it with an alternate source of advice, partic

from retired military. The executive may find 

development troubling, but, just as in other area

balancing the budget and welfare reform, it will be re

to reacting rather than initiating. For example, in late 

President Clinton and Secretary William Cohen reac

the anticipated testimony of the Chiefs before the Co

226
by agreeing to a large increase in their own d

program.

Centralization vs. Decentralization.

Because it has within it three departments an

armed services whose existence predated it, DoD will 

be totally unified or completely efficient. The Pentago

always have a myriad of accounting and procur

systems, training practices, personnel policies

duplicative weapon systems, (including four air f

laboratories, and missions. Nonetheless over the p

years, the power of the Central government (OSD and 

has grown at the expense of the services. DoD now all

resources on the basis of programs or missions rathe

by individual service. OSD can, if it wishes, contr

personnel, logistic, and even acquisition policies 

individual departments. For all practical purpose

main function of the service secretaries and the s

chiefs is to implement the policies of OSD and the JC

example, after the Lieutenant Kelly Flinn episode

made all the services adopt a common fraternization 

the Air Force, Navy, and Marines are developing a co

fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter; and, finally, it 

Secretary and the Chairman who represent and spe

the Department at interagency meetings.

Military operations are now conducted jointl

military officers aspiring to higher command must com

a specified number of joint assignments. The military 

of service have become advisers to the Chairman, who 

ensures that a military point of view, his, is inserted in

policy process. Indeed, the service chiefs were not 

consulted by General Henry Shelton prior to the 

missile attack on Osama Bin Laden in August 1998.

If anything, these trends will accelerate in the 

century because the scarcity of resources will compe

more consolidation, most probably in such areas as lo

and intelligence. However, there will never be a comp

227
unified department or a single armed services alon

Canadian model. The individual services have too 

tradition and too much clout—both in Congress and 

the American public—to be completely ignored. T

probably the reason why Secretary of Defense 

refused to challenge the Marines on the issue of g

integrated basic training, and why Secretary of D

Dick Cheney was not able to prevent the Marines 

obtaining the V-22. These service “victories

nonetheless be few and far between in the future, 

would not be surprising if the next DoD reorganizati

not completely eliminate the service secretaries.

Peace and War.

The system for providing the Secretary of Defens

advice on policy, strategy, and budgets works reaso

well. He has enough civilian advisers with the nec

expertise to balance the individual and joint m

perspectives. But when it comes to such technical ar

military operations and the readiness of the armed 

he must rely primarily on the JCS for advice. Theoret

his civilian advisers could challenge estimates of w

would take to conduct an operation or make a unit rea

battle, but OSD is not organized or equipped to 

Moreover, as fewer and fewer civilians in OSD have m

experience, they will be less inclined to do so. The

OSD needs to establish an organization of analyst

operational expertise and experience to challeng

military professionals on why it takes 400,000 m

people to bring peace to Bosnia or why an army tan

must drive 800 miles a year to be “ready.”

Conclusion.

In the next century DoD will continue to deal with 

cross pressures and continue to be criticized for leani

much or too little in one direction or another. At tim

Pentagon will also probably go too far in one direct

228
another. However, if history is any guide, this tiltin

generate an equal or opposite reaction that will resto

proper balance between military and civilian, executi

legislative, centralization and decentralization, an

and peace.

229
CHAPTER 11

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 200

William A. Navas, Jr.

It must be realized that there is nothing more difficult to pl

more uncertain of success, or more dangerous to manage th

the establishment of a new order of government; for he w

introduces it makes enemies of all those who deriv

advantage from the old order and finds but lukewa

defenders among those who stand to gain from the new on

Machiavelli, The Prince

Introduction.

In the life of a nation, the end of war marks 

beginning. There is a marked parallel, almost su

between the events after the end of World War II wh

to the National Security Act of 1947 and the situation 

as we struggle to reform our national security policym

process and organization to deal with the challenges 

new century. Actually there are those who posit, and 

to agree with them, that the end of the Cold War is ac

the end of a 75-year-long conflict, which started in 191

ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Soviet Union a

symbolic crumbling of the Berlin Wall. The fail

Versailles and the emergence of Weimar Germany s

stage for the unfinished business of the “war to e

wars.”

As with the end of every major war (the Cold W

being an exception), changes are deemed necess

support a new security strategy. These changes refle

perceptions of what the new realities are and the “l

learned” from the last war. President William J. Clint

made this argument in his December 1999 Na

231
Security Strategy.

1

 Today we are at a juncture, wheth

realize it or not, where forces are being set in motio

major revision of our national security structure. This 

offers a case for those changes.

Background.

In 1945, the soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen 

Army and the Navy returned triumphant from their b

in Europe and the Pacific. But success was no insu

against change. There would be painful years ahead 

U.S. military modernized both its organization a

philosophy. The idea of change was anathema to m

uniform (except for the Army Air Forces, who wanted 

own military branch and got it). The Army and the Na

never been part of the same military command structu

fact, their internal command and management system

cultures were as different as the uniforms they 

Making them so was to be a painful process of compr

Periodically over the years, various leaders had pro

reform, but only a national disaster of the magnit

Pearl Harbor was impetus enough to force change. Th

the “burning platform” of 1945—the horrific even

blamed on incredibly poor coordination and communi

between the Army and the Navy, which together had s

defense responsibility for the Hawaiian Islands. The 

was a bias for change among the American public.

The National Security Act of 1947 and its amendm

1949 implemented that change. The act and the d

preceding it also gave new meaning to the term na

security. In the 1940s, national security was seen prim

as protection from external invasion. Clearly the m

dimension of national security was first among equa

The new concept saw national security as a deci

discipline that is neither primarily foreign nor d

policy. Rather, national security is treated 

overarching, interdisciplinary paradigm embr

elements and responsibilities of a number of departme

232
a dynamic relationship. This new concept 

institutionalized in the national security bureaucrac

was established in 1947, and, in particular, in th

National Security Council (NSC).

Breaking Old Paradigms.

Today America faces significant technolo

economic, political, and social challenges in the na

security environment. Adapting our strategy to thi

environment will place great demands upon all 

national security institutions, including Congres

Defense Department, the Department of Stat

intelligence community, the National Security Counc

in particular the military services. Any major chang

require commitment from all involved. To succeed in 

an endeavor we must understand the motives th

behind the puzzling and often contradictory behav

America’s military forces. Carl Builder

2

 has observe

this has little to do with what party controls the 

House or who writes the budget.

An understanding of the motives of the three se

must begin with an appreciation of their entre

institutions and distinct “personalities” or cultures.

• The Navy sees itself mainly as heir to a gl

tradition dating back to the British navy. Equ

with its own land and air force, it jealously gua

independence and is happiest when left alone.

• The Air Force is the embodiment of a single idea

that also happens to be a strategy of war. Not 

“the Air Force” but love of flight and flying ma

binds it’s members together.

• Traditionally the Army has considered itse

nation’s servant, charged with tea

citizen-soldiers the art of war in times of crisis. 

heady memory of triumph in the closing mon

233
World War II and the need for a large fo

deployed Army during the Cold War contradi

modest role and have exacerbated the hist

tension between the Army and its principal r

component, the National Guard.

• If the operational concept before World War 

that:

• the Navy was the instrument for wielding sea 

as the most important and flexible kind of m

power for the United States as a maritime nat

• and the Army, as the nation’s obedient and 

military servant, was the neutral instrument o

policy, keeping itself prepared to meet the 

demands that the American people have histo

imposed upon it, but especially prepared to 

America’s citizenry into an expeditionary fo

defeat America’s enemies overseas;

• then the establishment of the Department of D

(DoD) might have had the effect that some fea

the tumultuous days before the reorganizat

1947.

One exasperated spokesman for the Army express

fear very well,

. . . the only way to overcome the Navy’s resistance 

reorganization] would be to do away with the War Departm

transfer all its elements to the Navy, and redesignate t

organization as the Department of Defense.

3

Those words, uttered in frustration, have proven 

somewhat prophetic.

The demands of the Cold War, with the need to p

power overseas, maintain forward deployed forces 

services), contain the spread of communism, and eng

what we call today Major Regional Conflicts (K

234
Vietnam) made DoD the defacto U.S. Navy—the instr

for wielding U.S. military power across the 

Meanwhile, the role of the Army changed from tha

“soldier in support of the nation” to that of an “ins

ready armored defender of Western Europe.” And t

Force, the new service, found its own niche, in particu

the instrument for the delivery of our nuclear power 

era of strategic war and deterrence and, later on, 

advocate of the supremacy of air power. On the other 

the Navy and Marine Corps remained comfortable 

their traditional roles. The last Secretary of the Navy 

the reorganization, James Forrestal, would become th

Secretary of the newly established DoD.

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act o

(some say it accomplished what Truman wanted to 

1947 and fell short) reinforced this situation by taking 

power from the Service Secretaries and concentratin

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who was advise

very strong Chairman and a Joint Staff with a 

command line to the Unified and Spe

Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). The strong personali

individuals like Admiral William Crowe and Genera

Powell established the primacy of the Chairman with

system. That is where we were when the Cold War en

1989, more than a decade ago.

A Decade of “False Starts.”

The last 10-plus years have been no less trauma

the American Military than the years after World Wa

October of 1989, the Soviet Union collapsed and the 

Wall came down. We were getting ready to deal wi

“New World Order” and to distribute the “Peace Divid

We had started our “downsizing” (another o

fashionable euphemisms), had gone throug

“Commission on Roles and Missions,” and were consi

the permutations and combinations of the “Base F

Then in August 1990, the same day that President 

235
was delivering a major national security speech 

Aspen Institute in Colorado, Iraqi President Sa

Hussein invaded Kuwait. In 100 days, the United Sta

a coalition that stopped the aggression, expelle

aggressors from Kuwait, and caused major damage 

war fighting capabilities of Iraq. For the first time in 

than 40 years, American military forces returned vict

from war. The overwhelming support of the Am

people and the quick victory over Iraq had a euphoric 

on the U. S. Military services, in many ways similar 

atmosphere in 1945. Once again there were parade

national heroes. There was even talk of re-establishi

five-star rank. But once again, as at the end of World W

success was not an insurance against change.

This time change came in the political landscape a

In 1992, a very popular president during the Gulf W

his bid for re-election to a candidate with no m

service. “It’s the economy, stupid” was one of the 

popular slogans during that political campaign

American people had once again put the war behind 

and were looking at domestic issues and challenges. 

were no major threats looming out there. Threats 

survival of the United States, such as those posed 

Soviet Union during the Cold War, would be at the t

hierarchy and would be an “A list.” But that list is 

today. According to Dr. Bill Perry in his recent 

co-authored with Mr. Ash Carter,

the emptiness of the A list is disorienting for Americans w

made the huge transition from defeating aggression

deterring aggression after World War II, but who now

consequence, tend to conceive national security exclusivel

terms of threats to be deterred or defeated.

4

They go on to say that what is left are the two 

Regional Contingencies in the Persian Gulf and the K

Peninsula that undergird Pentagon planning 

budgeting that form the “B list” of imminent threats t

interests, but do not threaten the survival or the way 

236
of Americans. A third place is occupied by the Ko

Bosnias, Somalias, Rwandas, and Haitis. They com

“C list” of important contingencies that indirectly affe

security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests

these contingencies “wars of conscience” or “w

interest” depending on how they are portrayed by eith

Wall Street Journal or CNN.

5

It appears that Americans, in times of interna

tensions and instability (when we have an “A list”), p

Republican administration, strong in national sec

with a Democratic congressional majority to provi

balance of power and advocate for domestic issue

perception of the United States being the only rem

superpower shifted that equation to where we have h

consecutive Democratic administrations and a Repu

controlled Congress.

This interesting phenomenon (the reversal 

traditional political roles between parties and who co

which branch of government) will be very important 

years ahead as we attempt to establish a new framew

allow us to pursue a national strategy for the next ce

For after all, it is the Congress that raises a

maintains a navy, disciplines the militia and declare

in addition to the more mundane tasks of appropriatin

authorizing, on a yearly basis, the “ways and means” 

execution of what by definition should be a long 

strategy to provide for the “common defense.” Up t

point DoD has developed the strategies, prepare

programs, and submitted the budgets to Congress

services, executing their Title 10 functions, have ma

equipped, trained, and sustained the forces. Will Co

have the political will to “break some crockery” in or

provide the necessary legislation (and int

restructuring of their own committee and sub-com

structures) to effect the required changes, as it did in 1

In 1993 the incoming administrations’ effo

re-structure defense culminated with Secretary Les A

237
Bottom-Up Review, which downsized the armed forc

provided a strategy to fight two nearly simultaneous 

regional contingencies, while generating fund

investments in modernization and recapitalization

interesting that this was accomplished early in his t

prior to the appointment and confirmation of the s

secretaries. This further weakened the position 

service secretaries, who did not participate in the 

debate but still had to execute the decisions.

During the second term of the Clinton administr

initially under Secretary William Perry, and reported 

Secretary William Cohen, DoD published the results 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in the summer of 

This report, mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Ac

as many have stated, “dead on arrival” when i

delivered to Congress. Most of the policy issues were 

at DoD and Joint Staff levels with modest partici

from the service secretaries (the Army’s in particula

The National Defense Panel, also mandat

Congress, submitted its report on December 1997, ma

series of recommendations for the United States to la

transformation strategy to meet the range of se

challenges in 2010 to 2020. The report stated that:

Transforming the armed forces into a very different kind 

military from that which exists today, while supporting U

near-term efforts, presents a significant challenge. Beyo

Defense (emphasis added), we must also transform the man

in which we conduct foreign affairs, foster regional stability, 

enable projection of military power.

It concluded that:

In the increasingly complex world that we foresee, DoD and 

armed services cannot preserve U.S. interests alone. Defens

but one element of a broader national security structure. If 

are to be successful in meeting the challenges of the future, 

entire U.S. national security apparatus must adapt and beco

more integrated (emphasis added), coherent and proactive.

238
They were right on the mark on these issues.

If “form follows function” and we have a stated st

to enhance our security, to bolster America’s eco

prosperity and to promote democracy abroad—as sta

the White House’s National Security Strategy, the

question that Congress needs to ask is . . . Do we ha

adequate systems, processes, and organizati

accomplish the tasks required by the strategy?

8

 I

sobering task indeed. For at stake is the survival 

nation itself. There are great risks but also 

opportunities because experts tell us that we have a 

of about 20 years (a strategic pause) before the nex

competitor appears. If the United States is going to 

fundamental changes, intuition tells us that the t

now. There is an old adage that says, “the best time to 

a tree was 20 years ago, the next best time is now.”

We have spent more than 10 years dealing wit

issue at the margins, the good news is that there hav

some encouraging initiatives within the Services and w

DoD during this period. The bad news is that the U.S. 

making community has not yet confronted the necess

fundamental change in the way that national se

policy is formulated and managed.

The Way Ahead.

Just as the advent of nuclear power mandated a 

restructuring of the National Defense Establishment 

end of World War II, so today’s Revolution in M

Affairs, the threats of nuclear proliferation, domest

transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destru

homeland security, and the potential emergence 

future of a power that may challenge our vital na

interests (a new “A list”) require a comprehensive “out 

box” thinking in order to create a new National Se

Establishment which is capable of meeting the challen

the next era. Today those challenges demand 

cooperation across all levels of government—federal, 

239
and local—and across a wide range of agencies, inc

the Departments of Defense and State, the Intell

Community, law enforcement, emergency services, m

providers, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO

The United States cannot afford to wait for 

“burning platform” like Pearl Harbor to create a b

action. This would be criminal. What is needed 

pragmatic, bipartisan approach which deals honestl

the issue of national security as we see it evolving in th

century. The administration and the Congress need to 

this a top priority.

The Secretary of Defense has established the 

Commission on National Security/21st Century, w

mandate to conduct a 2 1/2-year effort to assist the pre

and Congress in confronting this challenge. The work 

Commission is guided by three goals: to determin

global security environment of the first quarter of th

century; to analyze the character of the nation durin

time frame and develop an appropriate national se

strategy; and to recommend alternatives to the c

national security apparatus and processes to impleme

new strategy. The work of that group and the result

far are encouraging. The most important question is 

actions will “the powers that be” take once the final w

completed and the report is published? Congress an

National Security Council should work wit

Commission to put in motion the actions that are requ

effect the necessary changes. A restructuring of the 

and magnitude of 1947 might be required. We must be 

to break old paradigms and challenge entrenched int

in order to succeed. After all, the security of its citizens 

primary function of government. We need the same 

and enthusiasm to fix our national security as we e

for our Social Security.

The United States is at a historic juncture where i

lead in the world arena to protect our people and our 

life. This is accomplished by a sustained commitm

240
diplomacy and a strong national security posture. As 

in the preface to the National Security Strategy Rep

At this moment in history, the United States is called upon 

lead—to marshal the forces of freedom and progress; 

channel the energies of the global economy into last

prosperity; to reinforce our democratic ideals and values; 

enhance American security and global peace.”

9

A new National Security Act that establis

Department of National Security, bringing together 

State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Justice, E

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (F

to be able to meet the national security challenges 

future may be the solution.

Following are some recommendations that mig

worth considering as the U.S. begins to confront the ne

reform the national security policy making system.

• Restructure the service staffs along functional 

than operational lines. This is consistent wi

goals of the Goldwater Nichols Act and will he

services to perform their Title 10 duties of ma

equipping, training and sustaining.

• After 50 years, the NSC has taken many form

roles under different presidents. Howeve

inexorable forces of the international syste

driving modern presidents into more int

involvement in national security affairs.

10

 I

trend continues, then serious consideration sho

given to the development of a new set of princip

the organization and functions of the NSC and 

Staff. These principles should be adaptable eno

accommodate the desires and styles of each occ

of the White House, while at the same time as

that the President receives well thought out, un

and unvarnished alternatives and courses of 

for his consideration. One helpful reform of th

241
would be the introduction of a Goldwater-Nicho

personnel policy in order to avoid the inev

parochialism and careerism associated wit

current system of staffing of NSC positions.

• The National Security Panel noted in their 

Report that all elements of national power, inc

military, diplomatic, and economic elements, n

to be integrated in order to meet the se

challenges of the 21st century.

1 1

 They 

recommended, and I strongly support this pro

that some agencies which have traditionally 

domestic focus should now play a larger interna

role. One example is the U.S. Coast Guard, wh

part of the Department of Transportation

service can play an important role as a model fo

of the navies of the world.

• Make foreign and national security policy an 

during the current and future presidentia

congressional campaigns, in order to kno

candidates’ views, educate the public, and exp

mandate to elected officials from the Am

people. 

• Reinstate a form of draft to provide for uni

military training or some other form of na

service as a means of reinforcing the sen

citizenship obligation among young Americans

could help tremendously with the current man

shortfalls in the Services and reduce defense c

• Institutionalize the Weinberger Doctrine—

 1. Do not commit combat forces overseas unle

engagement is deemed vital to our national interest.

 2. If combat troops are committed, 

wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winnin

with clearly defined political and military objectives

242
 3. The commitment of combat forces abroad sho

a last resort.

• Establish Commanders-in-Chief (CI

responsibilities based on the nature of the th

operational or functional responsibilitie

geography. 

• Re-engage the American people in national se

matters to avoid the “law enforcement synd

when Americans no longer feel the obligation to 

fellow citizen in distress but lock themselves u

dial 911 for the law enforcement “professiona

deal with the situation. Increased emphasis 

Reserve Components and reinstating some fo

draft would facilitate this process.

• Sponsor a Revolution in Business Affairs to free 

of the tyranny of the Planning, Program

Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) w

5-year “directed economy” approach to the S

Project Objective Memorandum (POMs). We n

reduce the DOD decision cycles in order to 

advantage of the explosion of technology.

• Create a Homeland Security “czar” to coordina

efforts of consequence management for che

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high 

explosive acts of terrorism among federal, state

and non-government players.

Proposals such as these need to be discussed and 

as alternatives to the status quo if we are to succes

develop a unified and shared vision in support of 

National Security Act. After a 75-year period of co

America is the only remaining superpower. History w

harsh in her judgment if we fail to capitalize upo

opportunity.

243
ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 11

1. The White House, A National Security Strategy for 

Century. See www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/.

2. Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War, Baltimore, MD

Hopkins University Press, 1989.

3. David C. Jones, “What’s Wrong With Our D

Establishment” New York Times Magazine, November 7, 1982

quoted by James L. Lacy, Within Bounds: The Navy in P

American Security Policy, Center for Naval Analyses, CNA 05 8

July 28, 1983, p. 596.

4. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry,Preventive Defense

Security Strategy for America, Washington, DC: The Bro

Institution Press, 1999.

5. Morley Saffer, on Larry King Live, April 6, 1999.

6. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense R

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997; s

http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/quad.html.

7. Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st C

Report of the National Defense Panel, December 199

http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/. 

8. See www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy.

9. Ibid.

10. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Shoemaker, Str

Function and the NSC Staff: An Officers’ Guide to the NSC, Carli

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1989.

11. Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st C

Report of the National Security Panel, December 1997.

244
CHAPTER 12

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP

AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAK

Robert D. Steele

Background

The Ninth Annual Strategy Conference, held at th

Army War College in 1998, addressed the the

“Challenging the United States Symmetricall

Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated?” In the 

of that event, a number of speakers and partici

including the author, reflected on our existing policym

process and our existing force structure, but w

making recommendations for specific changes.

In the largest sense, the Ninth Annual Str

Conference called into question every aspect of Joint 

2010 and clearly identified a need to come to grip

several asymmetric threats for which our existing 

structure is not well suited as a primary defen

summary of the conference was subsequently publish

is readily available online.

2

In the aftermath of last year’s conference, and ag

the invitation of the Army War College, the a

undertook the task of considering and integrating 

aspects of presidential leadership and national se

policymaking:

1. Implications of the symmetric threat;

2. Organizational pathologies in policymaking;

3. Potential Information Solutions.

245
Out of that reflection and in keeping with guidance 

effect that one should seek to provoke with “big ideas

might or might not be immediately or practically ame

to adoption, the author selected the following three id

presentation to the Tenth Annual Strategy Conferen

1. Four threat types need four forces after next;

2. Must modify White House staff and leade

method for three departments;

3. Need a national information strategy and a v

intelligence community approach.

When considered together, these three ideas s

that we must simultaneously reinvent how we think 

threat, how we organize to deal with the threat, and h

communicate both internally and externally as we 

plans and execute operations to confront the threat. A

our challenge is neither technical nor financial but 

intellectual—how do we modify our perception

information collection, our information processing, a

information sharing so as to permit the president 

much more effective in understanding the th

confronting the threat, and neutralizing the threat?

Setting the Stage.

As we consider how best to restructure the man

which the president provides leadership with resp

national security matters as well as how that leader

implemented, we must face three realities.

First, the Department of Defense (DoD), wh

course it is directed to follow in the early decades of th

century, is severely underfunded. As one distingu

former Secretary of Defense stated in congres

testimony early in 1999:

. . . the course on which we are now embarked invo

increasing strains and growing costs in the short term, an

unsustainable in the long run.

246
. . . we shall need gradually to increase procurement outlays 

$100 Billion per year (from $40 Billion).

(this does not address) homeland defense . . . which) wou

include protection against chemical and biological weapo

protection of the critical infrastructure against cyber attac

space control . . . and certain other areas.

3

Of special interest to us all is the noted reference 

fact that “traditional” DoD funding shortfalls are bei

forward that do not provide for homeland defense

concepts and doctrine as well as the legislation nee

determine who is responsible for homeland defens

how that is handled in relation to DoD as well as 

departments of government, do not exist.

Second, even if the president were to choose a ra

course and seek to make substantive changes in h

make policy and execute national security initiatives, 

take many years—from 5 to 25—before such cha

agreed to by Congress, accepted by the public, and 

institutionalized.

4

Third and finally, we come to the complex nat

bureaucracy. No matter what the president may decid

what Congress may legislate, ultimately it will take ye

effect substantive change within the U.S. Gover

bureaucracy if we adhere to traditional for

change—this paper proposes a nontraditional solutio

can be implemented immediately.

Four Threat Types.

As the United States prepares to enter the 21st ce

there is much discussion about Joint Vision 2010 a

“force after next.” Unfortunately, the net asses

process, so well-regarded during the Cold War, has 

us. Furthermore, the Revolution in Military Affairs 

is nothing more than a perpetuation of our fascinatio

technical solutions, and fails completely with regard 

much more complex issues of human conflict, cu

247
history, diminishing resources, and sustainability. W

out of precision munitions in 8 days during the Gul

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ran 

precision munitions for Serbian attacks in just three 

There are those who feel that our stocks of conven

ammunition for plain infantry are also severely inadeq

The net assessments process of the 21st centur

have to deal with four threat types, not one; it must b

to deal easily with both domestic or home front issue

are not obviously military in nature; and it must als

with the human factors associated with avoiding a

as deterring threat conditions from arising both at 

and abroad. By human factors I mean historical, cu

social, and psychological intelligence, four for

intelligence at which we are especially poor.

Figure 1 shows that each threat type relies on dif

forms of power, different forms of concealment

different objectives. At the same time, we see that be

the four types of threat there are also four different 

of nontraditional conflict.

248

PHYSICAL

STEALTH,

PRECISION

TARGETING

NATURAL

STEALTH,

RANDOM

TARGETING

CYBER -

STEALTH,

DATABASE

TARGETING

IDEO -

STEALTH,

MASS

TARGETING

GUERRILLA

WAR

CULTURAL

WAR

HIGH TECH

BRUTES

(MIC / HIC)

LOW TECH

BRUTES

(LIC)

HIGH TECH

SEERS

(C3I WAR)

LOW TECH

SEERS

(JIHAD)

MONEY--RUTHLESSNESS

POWER BASE

KNOWLEDGE--IDEOLOGY

TERRORISM

ECONOMIC

WAR

Figure 1. Four Threat Types.
High-Tech Brutes—The Violent State Threat.

DoD and the U.S. intelligence community dedica

majority—well over 80 percent, if not 90 percent—o

resources to training, equipping, and organizing 

focused on dealing with the “high-tech brute,” the v

state.

This warrior class relies on strategic nuclea

conventional capabilities including uniformed troop

marked equipment. It applies high-technology to a

some physical stealth, and relies heavily on pre

targeting.

This is the only threat that we focused on duri

Cold War, and this is the threat that we understand 

Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, India, Pakistan, an

much lesser extent, Cuba represent this kind of threa

major countries in Europe, were they to becom

enemies, also represent this kind of threat.

This is the easiest threat to monitor and the e

threat to plan against because it is so obvious, so larg

so complex that it cannot, by and large, surprise us.

Low-Tech Brutes—The Violent Non-State Thre

The “low-tech brute” is violent but generally do

represent a state. Transnational criminal gangs p

both defense and intelligence agencies with a threat 

is extremely difficult to detect in the absence of a per

human intelligence network. This type of threat als

“random” in nature in that it does not have obvious m

goals and can rely on an unlimited fifth column of 

well-paid volunteers, or volunteers recruited for one-t

extremis support tasks.

The low-tech brute is the most common threat 

good order and prosperity of organized states and 

peoples. Unlike “low-intensity conflict” (LIC) threa

which Congress wisely created the Special Oper

249
Command and the new Special Operations and 

Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) Program, the low-tech br

not state-sponsored but rather an aggregation of v

individuals who come together in random or covert 

that are extraordinarily difficult for our intelligence a

enforcement communities to detect and counter.

Perhaps more to the point, our national se

structure—in policymaking terms, in acquisition 

and in day-to-day operational capability terms—

geared to effectively challenge this threat class.

Low-Tech Seers—The Non-Violent Non-State

Threat.

This “threat” class is not inherently violent alt

some of its extremist elements may be. It should be v

primarily as a challenge characterized by the unre

and largely legitimate needs of large groups of people 

circumstances, culture, and history force them 

confrontations with either established states or 

non-state groups. At root, this threat class is about 

food, and freedom from fear.

Our intelligence community, with the tacit if n

active consent of our national security policymaker

neglected this threat because it has been perceived 

that does not require the collection of secrets and on

can be adequately understood through common aca

think tank, business, and other non-governmental st

More recently we have begun to realize the error 

ways. The Associate Director of Central Intelligen

Analysis and Production, Dr. John Gannon, has s

publicly several times about the challenges facing us 

2015 timeframe, and he clearly appreciates the na

security implications of population growth, migratio

immigration, the environment including energy and 

supplies, and disease. In May 2000, the administ

declared that Auto-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AI

250
now a national security threat. This is all to the goo

just as it took us 50 years to evolve a national se

structure—including the all-important intelligence su

structure—so also will it take us at least a decade, 

more, to redirect our sources and methods so 

adequately address this threat.

High-Tech Seers—The Volatile Mixed Threat.

In just the past few years, a new threat has cata

itself to the top position in our consciousness. Alt

terms such as cyberwar and information warfare 

vogue, this threat is much more complex. On the one 

we see in this threat class deliberate state-spon

capabilities to wreak havoc with our dom

infrastructure (power, communications, transport

and finance) as well as individual or gang capabilitie

very destructive while remaining anonymous. On the 

hand, we see more subtle uses of electronic access to co

economic espionage at the state level, “political theft” 

terrorist gang level, and plain theft at the individua

This threat class also includes information vandali

our own disgruntled citizens as well as outsiders

corporate irresponsibility in failing to provide pr

developed communications and computing product

are “safe” on the information superhighway.

Let us take each in turn. Winn Schwartau was th

to warn America publicly and effectively abou

vulnerability of our critical infrastructures, with his 

Terminal Compromise (1990) and Information Wa

Chaos on the Electronic Superhighway (1994). I m

issued a press release in August 1994 documentin

urgent need for a $1 billion a year investment in c

infrastructure protection. We have a very long way 

before our financial, transportation, power

communications systems are safe from attack becau

have spent decades building computer-driven system

“assumed” there was no threat other than n

251
operational inefficiencies. The entire insurance progr

such systems is geared toward “acts of God” and not 

man. The moment one contemplates vulnerabilit

deliberate human attacks on our most fundam

electronic systems, the risk of catastrophe increas

several orders of magnitude.

We also have a grave problem in dealing with indi

insider attacks against all manner of electronic sy

because no one ever contemplated the possibility 

trusted employee would deliberately tamper with 

computer software and hardware. Fully 20 percent 

losses in the electronic world are attributable to i

attacks that are motivated by either dishonesty or a 

for revenge. This is four times the losses from o

attacks.

5

Finally, we come to the whole issue of what com

appropriate “due diligence” on the part of bot

manufacturers of computer hardware and software, a

the part of organizations that install and admi

electronic systems on behalf of their stockho

employees, or members. The reality is that there a

standards today. There is nothing comparable 

accounting and other fiduciary standards for elec

systems. We are still operating our critical infrastru

on the basis of “buyer beware,” or “as is” without war

This is completely unacceptable since the center of g

for national security is now in the private sector—

intellectual property and in our critical infrastructur

Existing Organizational Pathologies.

As we contemplate presidential leadership options 

national security policymaking process, we quickly id

three major problem areas:

First, the National Security Council staff structure 

limited. It is formed along regional and issue area line

are undeniably important, but not staffed in conso

252
with the emerging fault lines—the environmental ele

for example, has the fewest people assigned to it, a

senior position is too easily left vacant.

Second, we have schisms among the three 

Departments dealing with national security: De

State, and Justice. As now managed and organized, t

longer provide the United States with the most ef

arrangements for: defending our population, resourc

interests; for exerting necessary influence abroad; a

dealing with individual and gang threats to our pros

and personal security. The schisms between Defense, 

and Justice are of three kinds: conceptual, financia

informational.

1. Conceptually we have not yet devised co

approaches for dealing with emerging crises su

Burundi, Somalia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, an

Lanka—we are especially poor at early warning, at 

resolution or deterrence, and at transitioning 

diplomatic to enforcement to military means;

2. Financially we still have the bulk of the m

invested in standing armies that are increasingly hol

both personnel and technical terms; and

3. Informationally we do not have an integ

operational, resource management, or intelligence s

adequate to the task of harmonizing cross-departm

inputs, decision processes, and outputs.

Third, and finally, we have a strategic vacuum o

with no element on the National Security Council ha

clear mandate and the necessary resources to marsh

the president and the Cabinet the necessary mix of p

sector and other capabilities through which to achiev

historical and cultural understandings while also as

access to the widest possible range of multi-lingual con

Where we see major gaps in the existing White 

staff structure are: with respect to policy development 

interface of external requirements and int

253
capabilities; with respect to the deliberate introduc

“grand strategy” as well as deliberate net assessmen

operational control over integrated defense, diplomat

transnational justice initiatives; with respect to 

improved national intelligence capabilities that 

exploit open sources of information; and with resp

improved control and coordination of national invest

in research.

General Organizational Changes.

Three kinds of organizational change are recomm

to improve presidential leadership with respect to na

security policymaking.

First, the National Security Council staffing plan 

to be modified to achieve the following objectives:

1. Provide for equal focus on each of the four threat 

2. Provide for cross-cutting staffing between se

and competitiveness issues;

3. Significantly upgrade the role of intelligence 

White House staffing process;

4. Introduce a dedicated strategy element co-equal 

policy and intelligence elements;

5. Introduce a national research element co-equal 

other elements.

Second, and this would naturally require congres

support in the form of legislation, establish the posi

Secretary General for National Security. This po

would have executive authority over the Secretar

Defense and State as well as the Attorney Genera

would thus be able to better realign resources and int

programs of common interest. One of the three indivi

ideally the Secretary of State, could, if desire

“double-hatted” as Secretary-General, if the first incu

is to be considered a pathfinder in testing this idea.

254
Third and finally, we must develop an integrate

Assessments and Operations Staff under the cogniza

the Secretary General for National Security.

These suggested changes avoid major organiza

restructuring, avoid any dislocation between the ex

executive structure and existing legislative authori

committees, and avoid any major new program

initiatives.

At root, these suggested changes are built on 

simple principles:

1. Put one person in charge of the three Departme

the policy and resource level;

2. Provide for the needed day-to-day decisiv

regarding cross-departmental activities, pers

assignments, and incremental resource realignment

3. Provide for the needed information sy

integration, especially with regard to shared opera

and intelligence information.

Recommended National Security Council Staff

Changes.

The existing staff arrangements in the NSC han

the president in the following ways:

1. national security and competitiveness policy a

always reconciled—some would even say never;

2. national intelligence is severely limited in its ab

exploit open sources of information and harness distr

private sector and international expertise on behalf 

president and public policymaking;

3. we have no global strategy office nor any me

providing continuing education to presidential appo

and their private sector counterparts—we have no ef

means of “thinking in time” or across cultural and re

and ethnic boundaries;

7

255
4. national research is fragmented among depart

and special programs.

Block and wire diagrams are an unfortunat

necessary evil. Figure 2 is intended to illustrate some 

alterations in our concepts for approaching presid

leadership with respect to national security policyma

The most basic aspect of a new approach to presid

leadership must be reflected in the integration of na

policymaking between national security and na

competitiveness together with the simultaneous ele

of global strategy (more properly “grand strategy” b

pundits would take unfair advantage), nat

intelligence, and national research to the top table. W

discuss each of these blocks in turn.

National Policy.

Figure 3 illustrates an approach to nat

policymaking that provides balance between three 

tracks in national policy: security, competitivenes

treasury, while also providing for directed attention t

256

Director General

National Policy (NP)

Director General

Global Strategy (GS)

Director General

National Intelligence (NI)

Director General

National Research (NR)

Chief of Staff

President

Director General

National Policy (NP)

Director General

Global Strategy (GS)

Director General

National Intelligence (NI)

Director General

National Research (NR)

Chief of Staff

President

Director General

National Policy (NP)

Director General

Global Strategy (GS)

Director General

National Intelligence (NI)

Director General

National Research (NR)

Chief of Staff

President

Figure 2. Top-Level Presidential Staff

Leadership Positions.
of the four threat types. Perhaps most importantly

threat type has its policy counterpart in each of the 

tracks.

Ideally, what will emerge out of such a staffing app

is a matrixed policy, planning, and programming p

that specifically charts national treasury, na

competitiveness, and national security investme

relation to one another.

A situation like Kosovo, for example, would 

inspired, several years before-hand, a deliberate calcu

of the costs of substantial foreign assistance to in

resettlement funding intended to avoid the genocid

has occurred, versus the costs of an after-the-fact 

bombing campaign seeking to limit the genocide an

consolidation of Serbian power.

Such a staff approach would place a very high va

understanding and utilizing non-military sources of 

while also appreciating the degree to which others ca

non-military sources of power to affect U.S. na

security and U.S. competitiveness.

257

Associate Director

High Intensity Conflict

Associate Director

Low Intensity Conflict

Associate Director

Environment

Associate Director

Cyberwar

Deputy Director

National Security

Associate Director

National Education

Associate Director

Sustainable Growth

Associate Director

Natural Resources

Associate Director

Infrastructure

Deputy Director

National Competitiveness

Associate Directo

Entitlements

Associate Directo

Global Assistanc

Associate Directo

Internal Revenue

Associate Directo

Electronic System

Deputy Director

National Treasury

Director General

National Policy

Associate Director

High Intensity Conflict

Associate Director

Low Intensity Conflict

Associate Director

Environment

Associate Director

Cyberwar

Deputy Director

National Security

Associate Director

National Education

Associate Director

Sustainable Growth

Associate Director

Natural Resources

Associate Director

Infrastructure

Deputy Director

National Competitiveness

Associate Directo

Entitlements

Associate Directo

Global Assistanc

Associate Directo

Internal Revenue

Associate Directo

Electronic System

Deputy Director

National Treasury

Director General

National Policy

Figure 3. Balanced Approach to Nation
Global Strategy.

David Abshire has written an entire book on w

strategic element might look like if placed with

National Security Council.

8

 His thoughts on the need 

autonomous oversight body for strategic thinkin

counter to the popular misconception among policym

that they can handle strategic thinking en passant.

Figure 4 suggests a distinction between broa

independent global strategizing and integrated res

management. The global strategy arm is provided 

international strategic council as well as a global rese

providing recurring independent looks at long-range i

The global strategy arm should have the flexibi

undertake special projects while also being responsi

recurring leadership retreats at which a mix of exec

legislative, and private sector leaders would review a 

strategic question.

On the response side, we move away from the p

term “crisis management” and provide for a more ba

and integrated response capability. The Response C

258

Associate Director

Strategic Council

Associate Director

Special Projects

Associate Director

Global Reserve

Associate Director

Leadership Retreats

Deputy Director

Global Strategy

Associate Director

Response Center

Associate Director

Non-State Actors

Associate Director

Civilian Reserve

Associate Director

Public Liaison

Deputy Director

Response Management

Director General

Global Strategy

Associate Director

Strategic Council

Associate Director

Special Projects

Associate Director

Global Reserve

Associate Director

Leadership Retreats

Deputy Director

Global Strategy

Associate Director

Response Center

Associate Director

Non-State Actors

Associate Director

Civilian Reserve

Associate Director

Public Liaison

Deputy Director

Response Management

Director General

Global Strategy

Associate Director

Strategic Council

Associate Director

Special Projects

Associate Director

Global Reserve

Associate Director

Leadership Retreats

Deputy Director

Global Strategy

Associate Director

Response Center

Associate Director

Non-State Actors

Associate Director

Civilian Reserve

Associate Director

Public Liaison

Deputy Director

Response Management

Director General

Global Strategy

Figure 4. Enhancing Presidential Capabili

for Strategic Action.
intelligence community, Net Assessments, Na

Security Operations staff and others. The Response C

equipped, and organized to leverage people—a c

reserve of experts, the mass media, and large non

National Intelligence.

The national intelligence community, traditi

secrets

relation to either national security—its focus durin

Cold War—or national competitiveness and elec

There is nothing wrong with the very good people 

very good process embodied in national intelligence. W

organization, resource trade-offs, and outreach to bo

U.S. private sector and to other international intell

In the absence of any internal reform responsive 

Aspin-Brown Commission, we must return to legisla

leading the charge for a complete makeover of our na

intelligence community.

The fundamental proposition in the Figure 5 is th

existing classified intelligence community is goo

not good enough to fully satisfy presidential require

for what joint doctrine calls Relevant Information. 

president needs a Director General for Nat

routine staff capabilities while overseeing the foll

substantive enhancements.
1. Elevation of the National Intelligence Council to 

co-equal to that of the entire classified intelli

community. This larger body of perhaps 60 experts 

provide direct support to the president, the Cabine

congressional leaders.

2. Creation of a 60-person Global Knowledge Forum 

a budget of between $1.2 and $1.5 billion a year with 

to acquire open source intelligence on behalf of the pre

and the executive departments as well as the cla

intelligence community.

3. Establishment of a 15-person administrative f

for a University of the Republic charged with br

together leadership “cohorts” across governmen

private sector lines.

11

National Research.

Both national security and national competitiv

depend heavily on national research. The problem

duplicative waste (government not knowing what p

sector has already mastered) have gotten out of 

especially in the high-profile Critical Technologies a

260

President

University of the Republic

Executive Director

President's Advisory Board

Chief of Staff

National Intelligence Staff

Executive Director

National Intelligence Forum

Director

Classified Intelligence

Director

National Intelligence Council

Director

Global Knowledge Forum

Director General

National Intelligence

President

University of the Republic

Executive Director

President's Advisory Board

Chief of Staff

National Intelligence Staff

Executive Director

National Intelligence Forum

Director

Classified Intelligence

Director

National Intelligence Council

Director

Global Knowledge Forum

Director General

National Intelligence

President

University of the Republic

Executive Director

President's Advisory Board

Chief of Staff

National Intelligence Staff

Executive Director

National Intelligence Forum

Director

Classified Intelligence

Director

National Intelligence Council

Director

Global Knowledge Forum

Director General

National Intelligence

Figure 5. Enhancing National Intelligen

Support to the President.
Figure 6 proposes one response to this challenge

staff element will provide for presidential leadershi

research, with one half of the staff serving to 

coordinate government investments in directed res

while the other half of the staff will improve the ab

government to work jointly with selected private 

partners in a variety of consortiums exempted 

anti-trust actions by the Department of Commerce.

A National Academy for Human Developm

suggested because the United States is spending too 

money on technology and not nearly enough on h

factors. 

By placing this staff at the presidential level inst

the departmental level, opportunities for presid

leadership will be enhanced in other ways. The othe

elements (national security, national competitiv

national treasury) will be better able to matrix 

requirements away from the parochialism o

departments.

261

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Na io al Oceanographic and

Atmospheric Administration

National Laboratories

De ar me t o En rg

De en e A va ce Re ea ch

ro ec s A en y

D pu y D re to

In ep nd nt ge ci s

N ti na Sc en e F un at on

at on l A ad my f S ie ce

Na io al on or iu fo

Hi h P rf rm nc Co pu in

Na io al ca em fo

Hu an ev lo me t

D pu y D re to

Co so ti ms

ir ct r G ne al

at on l R se rc

Na io al er na ti s a d

S ac Ad in st at on

at on l O ea og ap ic nd

tm sp er c A mi is ra io

Na io al ab ra or es

ep rt en of ne gy

ef ns Ad an ed es ar h

P oj ct Ag nc

De ut Di ec or

nd pe de t A en ie

Na io al ci nc Fo nd ti n

N ti na Ac de y o Sc en es

at on l C ns rt um or

ig Pe fo ma ce om ut ng

at on l A ad my or

um n D ve op en

De ut Di ec or

on or iu s

D re to Ge er l

N ti na Re ea ch

at on l A ro au ic an

Sp ce dm ni tr ti n

N ti na Oc an gr ph c a d

A mo ph ri Ad in st at on

at on l L bo at ri s

D pa tm nt f E er y

D fe se dv nc d R se rc

Pr je ts ge cy

ep ty ir ct r

I de en en Ag nc es

at on l S ie ce ou da io

Na io al ca em of ci nc s

N ti na Co so ti m f r

H gh er or an e C mp ti g

N ti na Ac de y f r

H ma De el pm nt

ep ty ir ct r

C ns rt um

Di ec or en ra

Na io al es ar h

Figure 6. Establishing Presidential Leader

Over Research.
Cabinet and Operational Changes.

Apart from changes within the president’s imm

staff, this chapter recommends only two other chan

significance. First, and this would require congres

legislation, we should acknowledge the complexity 

inter-relationship between the three major depart

responsible for national security and put a “human 

loop.” Specifically, it is recommended that a Sec

General for National Security be placed abov

Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Attorney Ge

The latter three would remain members of the Cabin

retain all of their previous prerogatives.

We must mention General Colin Powell here. Rega

of who wins the presidential election in November 2

would make sense to appoint Colin Powell as Secret

State and also as the first Secretary General for Na

Security, with the South-Central campus, adjacent to 

as the shared national security staff facility. His statu

good will would comfort both the public an

international community as we experiment with th

system. The prestige of State would be elevated, D

would be under control, and Law Enforcement 

receive attention from a leader of great gravitas.

Secretary General for National Security.

The Secretary General would serve as a presid

surrogate in addressing the constant day-to-day dec

that require guidance in order to rapidly resolve iss

policy, planning, and programming within the 

context of the budget submitted to Congress b

president and appropriated by Congress for operatio

more than 10 percent of any one department’s budge

be subject to administrative reallocation.

262
The Secretary General would focus primarily o

larger policy issues where the secretaries themselve

not been able to come to rapid resolution, and would se

a means of integrating national security policy m

across departmental boundaries.

12

Integrated Net Assessments and Operational

Direction.

Second, the Secretary General would require bo

integrated Net Assessments staff, and an integ

Operations staff. Both could be built around a very m

cadre of the “best and the brightest” drawn from each 

three departments to create truly inter-agency capabi

The Net Assessments staff, to be elevated abov

three departments and given a substantial budg

conducting net assessments in relation to each of th

threat types (to include relative homefront vulnerab

would be the primary means by which the Sec

General would examine alternative options for propos

the president new capabilities and realignme

resources between the three departments.

263

Director

Net Assessments

Director of Operations

National Security

Secretary of

State

Secretary of

Defense

Attorney

General

Secretary General

National Security

Director

Net Assessments

Director of Operations

National Security

Secretary of

State

Secretary of

Defense

Attorney

General

Secretary General

National Security

Director

Net Assessments

Director of Operations

National Security

Secretary of

State

Secretary of

Defense

Attorney

General

Secretary General

National Security

Figure 7. Enhancing Presidential Leaders

for National Security.
1. The existing DoD Net Assessments staff 

continue to focus on conventional threats an

Revolution in Military Affairs.

2. A new element would focus exclusively on S

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and would inc

mix of paramilitary, peacekeeping, and transnation

enforcement experts.

3. Another new element would bring together expe

major religious and ethnic groups as well as environm

issues, and focus on assessments of alternative tim

and costs for precluding major clashes between large g

of non-state actors.

4. Finally, a new element would be added, which 

focus upon a mix of trade and technology compe

economic espionage and information warfare.

Although the Secretary General should hav

authority to realign up to 10 percent of any Departm

resources in any single fiscal year, multi-year initi

and major realignments would have to be subm

through the president’s budget process and approv

Congress.

At the same time that the Secretary General 

require a Net Assessments process, there would a

required a joint Operations staff. A portion of the ex

Joint Staff could be assigned as the cadre for this ele

Modest in size, its role would be to serve as an opera

interface to the three departments, the national intell

community, the Net Assessments staff, and the presid

staff. 

This staff, also, would be organized by threat typ

help bring together inter-departmental reso

applicable specifically to each threat type. A sign

mission for this operational staff would be to recom

“on the fly” adjustments to departmental programs.

264
Budget Realignments.

Depending on who is counting what, the DoD b

ranges from $250 billion to $270 billion per year (wit

construction) to over $300 billion a year 

DoD-controlled national intelligence elements). Rega

of whether or not the United States gets the add

procurement funds that many concerned leaders 

advocated, some form of interim adjustment of 

priorities must be made, to allow us to develop m

mandatory capabilities against emerging threats.

While remaining under the oversight of the 

services and national security committees, it is ess

that additional funds be earmarked for emerging t

(for which a new sub-committee has fortuitously 

formed this year on the Senate side) and for cultur

information war. The Emerging Threats ove

authorities in Congress will require some form of cros

authorization authority with their counterparts o

Judiciary committees (to address special operation

transnational crime) and on the Foreign Affairs comm

265

BUDGET

70% of DoD Budget for

Traditional Warfighting

20% of DoD Budget for

Emerging Threats

10% of DoD Budget for

Cultural & Information War

BUDGET

70% of DoD Budget for

Traditional Warfighting

20% of DoD Budget for

Emerging Threats

10% of DoD Budget for

Cultural & Information War

Figure 8. Leveraging the DoD Budget.
(to address realignments toward information peaceke

and assistance).

Reserve and Guard Implications.

The Reserve and National Guard forces that exist 

are a vestige of the past, when generic manpower w

critical weak link in mobilization. Utilizing the Reser

the National Guard was primarily about bodies—

manpower and being able to supplement the activ

forces. While that aspect remains, what has really b

important about the Reserve and the Guard, at 

conceptually, is their ability to “bank” special skill

need not be on active duty until they are ac

needed—this is about brainpower.

Instead of fruitlessly attempting to train active 

personnel in specific foreign languages they are allow

use for only one operational tour before returning 

normal career pattern, the United States should u

Reserve. We should create entire regiments dedica

specific language groups (e.g., Arabic, Chinese, Rus

with each regiment having a battalion of intell

266

Figure 9. Leveraging Private Sector Thro

Reserve and Guard
specialists, a battalion of military police, a battal

engineers, and a battalion of judge advocates and 

affairs specialists.

With such a regiment, it would be a simple ma

rotate each company within the battalion in sequenc

in this way provide for very high quality foreign lan

and foreign area support. Such a regimental organi

could be “virtual” in that members could be lo

anywhere in the world, training together just once a 

but familiar with one another through collaboration 

and online exercises, and intimately familiar with 

area of interest because of their civilian employment

The National Guard could fruitfully consider a com

make-over in which it becomes the heart of Hom

Defense, with separate battalions or even brigades t

to support law enforcement, to carry out disaster relie

to provide for electronic security and counterintelli

The legal restrictions on the use of the military to car

law enforcement duties within our borders are soun

represent an old paradigm. Those elements of the Na

Guard assigned to law enforcement duties should in 

a law enforcement reserve, not a military reserve

should have all of the training, certification, and aut

of a normal law enforcement officer.

The Reserve and the National Guard would a

excellent environments within which to test new rol

relationships, as well as new legal parameters, w

interfering with our active duty readiness, and w

detriment to the effectiveness of our active duty forc

Private Sector Roles and Responsibilities.

The 21st century will see a transformation 

relationship between government and the private s

between the military and commercial providers, be

law enforcement and private security companies.

267
“Overt action” will replace “covert action” as the pr

means of influencing emerging threat groups

combination with legislative incentives and insuranc

premiums as well as employee demands, multina

corporations will finally find that their best interes

served if they plan jointly with government fo

achievement of selected national security objecti

mutual interest. A major task for the Emerging T

Subcommittee in the Senate will be that of leadin

discussion and definition of what these new role

responsibilities for the private sector must be.

In relation to information warfare and eco

security, it will be incumbent on Congress to pas

diligence” legislation that places the major respons

for self-protection on the private sector, while also req

the communications and computing industries to live 

tough real-world standards for “safe computing.”

Finally, both Congress and the Administration wi

to come together to establish in carefully selected 

where consensus is achievable, both a national inform

strategy and a Command, Control, Communica

Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) industrial polic

268

PRIVATE SECTOR

50-50 Split in Relation to

Emerging Threats

75-25 Private Sector Role in

Relation to IW/Economic Security

Need both a National Information

Strategy & a C4I Industrial Policy

PRIVATE SECTOR

50-50 Split in Relation to

Emerging Threats

75-25 Private Sector Role in

Relation to IW/Economic Security

Need both a National Information

Strategy & a C4I Industrial Policy

Figure 10. New Roles and Responsibiliti

for the Private Sector.
have neither a national information strategy today, 

industrial policy. The National Information Infrastr

is primarily focused on connectivity and was origin

plan to provide five selected research centers with ver

bandwidth—the plan was hijacked by the civil libert

and became a popular initiative to wire school

businesses into the Internet. At the same time, th

Government historically eschews an “industrial poli

fear of being tarred with the brush of govern

interference with business. In fact, the vulnerabi

America to both electronic attack and global eco

instability are so great that nothing less than a coh

collaborative effort between the government (both F

and State) and the private sector (with the knowledg

the resources) will permit us to establish a na

information strategy as it pertains to homeland defen

home-based aspects of both national security and na

competitiveness.

Information Strategy.

Today’s decisionmaker, from the president an

Secretary of Defense down to the most junior comm

lacks both a focused collection capability for obtain

Relevant Information, and a reliable “all-source” an

system able to fuse secret and non-secret source

distilled, reliable and timely “intelligence.”

14

 The c

staff process for any decisionmaker relies almost comp

on a stream of “free” inputs received from count

bureaucracies, international organizations, and p

sector parties pursuing their own agendas. At the 

time, the narrowly focused secret or restricted ste

information is often afforded direct access t

decisionmaker without being subject to in-depth 

scrutiny and proper integration with unclassified o

and external information. Functionally, today’s 

process lacks the organization, knowledge, and fu

necessary to methodically obtain information from s

international and other non-governmental organizat

269
to manage the collection of original information 

external sources. Over-arching both these limitations

is no top-level Relevant Information analysis 

organization that is able to provide the decisionmake

filtered, fused and analyzed “all-source” decision-su

The major initiative in the early 21st century within d

must be the restoration of command responsibility for 

properly informed, to include major procurement a

pertaining to open sources of information.

Changing Rules of the Game.

The United States has spent decades—a half-cen

refining an information management system 

assumes that

1. secret sources and methods are the heart 

national-level decision-support process;

2. leaders will decide and the people will follow; a

3. our most important decisions are “time-sen

with relatively obvious detail.

270

INFORMATION UNIVERSE

Relevant and Irrelevant-- Open and Secret

Decision-Maker

Integration, Reflection & Decision

R

A

N

D

O

M

S

E

C

R

E

T

EXISTING INPUT

normal staff

process,

counterparts,

family/friends

OPEN SOURCE

INPUT

Internet &

private sector

fee-for-service

Information Management Staff

Collection Management, Fusion, Analysis & Presentation

INFORMATION UNIVERSE

Relevant and Irrelevant-- Open and Secret

Decision-Maker

Integration, Reflection & Decision

R

A

N

D

O

M

S

E

C

R

E

T

EXISTING INPUT

normal staff

process,

counterparts,

family/friends

OPEN SOURCE

INPUT

Internet &

private sector

fee-for-service

Information Management Staff

Collection Management, Fusion, Analysis & Presentation

Figure 11. Enhancing Internal Capabilit

Through Relevant Information.
Our traditional construct is still applicable to 

issues, but both our political environment an

information environment have turned many of our 

premises upside down. We are entering a century wh

ability to master open sources—the vast flood of 

sources in many languages, many mediums, many le

detail—will be vital to public decisionmaking abou

complex issues including the survival of several gener

across several continents. Unfortunately, we 

constrained our ability to confront the challenges of th

As Senator David L. Boren notes in his foreword 

book, On Intelligence, presidential policymaking 

future must pay much greater heed to cultura

psychological factors. Our decisions in the future m

made in partnership with non-governmental organiza

as they control the majority of the needed informatio

also have superior networks for achieving consensus w

their chosen issue areas.

15

What this really boils down to is a need to both thin

produce, intelligence in forms that can be shared 

271

TIME

IMPACT

SHORT

TIME

IMPACT

LONG

MULTI-CULTURAL &

TRANS-NATIONAL

EQUITIES

SINGLE-CULTURE

SINGLE-ORGANIZATION

EQUITIES

LEADERS

DECIDE

PEOPLE

DECIDE

TOP-DOWN

COMMAND & CONTROL

SECRET

SOURCES & METHODS

BOTTOM-UP

INFORMATION-SHARING

OPEN

SOURCES & METHODS

OBVIOUS DETAIL

OBSCURE DETAIL

OLD

NEW

Figure 12. From “Control” to Consensu
domestic as well as international constituencies. We 

in other words, turn our own intelligence community 

head, and focus on creating a new and much enh

community that embraces the private sector’s mast

open sources of intelligence, while refocusing our 

capabilities much more narrowly.

Building Blocks for Creating a “Smart Nation.”

In the age of information, “warfare” and “na

security” are at root about how a nation manag

intellectual resources. A nation’s ability to dis

discriminate, distill, and digest “intelligence” is th

competency in the age of information.

Policy intelligence cannot and should not ex

isolation. To be truly effective in a networked world 

the “butterfly effect” can have significant unantic

consequences, policy intelligence needs to have four p

international intelligence that draws on military, coa

law enforcement, and business as well as media so

domestic intelligence that draws on legally and eth

available domestic sources of all kinds; stra

intelligence that deliberately draws out altern

scenarios and thinks unconventionally about both do

and international issues; and integrative intelligenc

makes sense of the other three in relation to both ex

threats and domestic imperatives.

The foundation for a “smart nation” is an edu

citizenry. Indeed, a wise man once said that “a nation

defense is an educated citizenry.” A major aspect 

national information and intelligence strategy must 

development of architectures and protocols, incl

oversight standards, that nurture civic duty, ed

citizens as to both the threats and opportunities 

America, and provide a means for individual citiz

contribute vital indications and warnings at every l

government.

272
Elements of a National Information Strategy.

Three specific elements of a national inform

strategy are recommended. None exists today, nor 

one of these three elements being seriously discussed 

level of government.

First, it is essential that a national strategy be d

for the digitization and preservation of content. Alt

our leaders have long understood that vast sto

knowledge were going to waste for lack of connectivi

vaunted National Information Infrastructure (NII

little to encourage the organization and enhancem

web-based knowledge. A wide variety of standards, a

as financial incentives, are required if we are to r

move dissertations, conference proceedings, and 

mainstream publications to a web-based architectur

is properly indexed and also properly protected in te

electronic copyright and electronic payment.

Second, it is essential that the process for deve

standards for software be accelerated and also stabili

minimal standard for compound documents (integrate

and images) is required by law if we are to levera

power of the Internet and the power of desktop capab

across organizational lines. Security and inter-c

standards are also required and they mu

understandable by anyone with access to a compute

current debate over Microsoft illustrates this pr

perfectly—Microsoft’s continued unwillingness to ma

Application Program Interfaces (API) transparen

stable could be said—has been said by some—to 

seriously undermined U.S. national security and na

competitiveness.

Finally, we need a digital Marshall Plan as we

digital New Deal. America lives in a glass house 

terribly vulnerable, not only to asymmetric attacks 

electronic infrastructure, but to self-generated 

caused by ignorance and a lack of global understandin

273
must bring Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Balkan

Latin America into the 21st century, and do so in the 

manner that we evinced when saving Europe i

aftermath of World War II. At home, we must exert s

efforts to empower every individual, whether schoolc

adult with reading difficulties, so as to make our 

population, within a single generation, Internet-capa

Elements of a DoD Information Strategy.

I have written elsewhere

16

 about inform

peacekeeping as the purest form of war and abo

central role that intelligence must play in the 21st ce

It is vital for all of us to understand that in the Inform

Age, bytes are bullets, we are in a state of constant 

and competition, and we require the total mobilizatio

of the brain-power, all of the intellectual property, all 

information, that is in any way available for harness

the common good. In this era, the heart of national se

and national defense lie in the domains of informatio

intelligence and not in the traditional domains of 

forces. DoD, however, must still take the lead.

274

NATIONAL STRATEGY

PRIORITY TO DIGITAL

CONTENT IN REAL-TIME

DIGITAL MARSHALL PLAN

FOR REST OF WORLD

ACCELERATE STANDARDS

FOR SHARABLE DATA

NATIONAL STRATEGY

PRIORITY TO DIGITAL

CONTENT IN REAL-TIME

DIGITAL MARSHALL PLAN

FOR REST OF WORLD

ACCELERATE STANDARDS

FOR SHARABLE DATA

Figure 13. Recommended National Informa

Strategy.
This chapter suggests that DoD ask not wha

president can do for DoD but rather ask what DoD can 

the president. The bottom line here is that only DoD h

resources—if managed wisely—to provide the pre

with the flexibility to create new methods for man

national security, and for funding new priorities th

unconventional in nature and span tradit

departmental boundaries.

DoD must choose to pay the bill for this larger na

construct—it must help pay the bill for a restructur

the National Security Council; for the creation of a po

of Secretary General for National Security; for the cr

of four separate net assessment centers; and for the fu

of modest but very valuable initiatives including a 

Marshall Plan and a digital New Deal.

DoD can set the example for how policy and oper

will be managed in the 21st century by going virtual 

task forces and devising means for rapidly and r

including private sector experts—from all walks of l

nations, with and without clearances, int

decisionmaking process.

275

DoD STRATEGY

Pay the bill, leverage information

Go virtual on task forces including

private sector experts, coordination,

archives

Migrate from existing C4ISR toward

web-based commercial network,

release best encryption to public

$$$

Figure 14. Recommended DoD Strategy
At the same time, because this kind of global v

architecture must of necessity be web-based, it is ess

that DoD plan now for quickly migrating away fr

existing Command, Control, Communications, Comp

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C

infrastructure. DoD must become the champio

permitting presidential-level encryption—the best th

National Security Agency is capable of devising—in

public domain, for the simple reason that in the 

century, the president’s most important counselor

sources of insight are going to be in the private sect

within the U.S. Government. Only DoD can lead this r

migration.

Elsewhere, in the rapid expansion of NATO w

constantly increasing number of bi-lateral Partne

Peace (PfP), we see opportunities for new forms of re

intelligence concepts, doctrine, and architectures. Th

can be best served by having NATO move away fro

U.S.-dominated C4I infrastructure that is very secr

very expensive, and adopt instead an Internet-

architecture that anyone can join at whatever their l

computer and communications sophistication.

Also in Europe we see the forthcoming demise 

Western European Union (WEU) actually sparking 

robust discussion about the need for a Euro

intelligence policy and regional European intell

architectures. The WEU Satellite Centre at Tor

having proven its value, is likely to become the cente

of the first-ever regional intelligence community, 

selected national and even U.S. capabilities are con

“virtually” to produce regional intelligence. The U

Kingdom Open Source Information Centre; the 

Analysis Center at Molesworth, and the German 

project to mix civilian, military, and law enforc

intelligence specialists are all candidates for v

integration to serve both Europe and NATO.

276
Virtual Reach.

Figure 15 describes this new approach to inform

sharing. Instead of relying on a single President’s 

Brief as the top-level intelligence document for eac

instead of relying on a tiny cadre of grossly over-w

members of the National Security Council staf

president, and his principals in government, will 

achieved a “virtual reach” that embraces and levera

knowledge available throughout the government (and 

to the state and local governments), all knowledge ava

throughout the nation, including the richest po

sources of knowledge in academia, the media, an

business community, and all knowledge available glob

We have a long way to go before we can move with

virtual intelligence community with ease. New stan

and understandings will have to be deve

encompassing how we share information, ho

compensate one another for shared information, how w

for selected services, and how we authenticate indiv

and organizations as sources of information. This is n

short of a major global campaign to “make sense” 

national, ethnic, class, and educational boundaries. J

the world once had to devise fuel, rail, and hig

standards to facilitate global commerce, so now mu

world establish information exchange and inform

compensation standards.

277
Conclusion.

The conclusions to this study are straight-forwar

1. DoD leadership must empower the president—

not work the other way around. DoD leadership, work

concert with its authorization and appropria

counterparts in the Senate and the Hou

Representatives, must come to a deliberate understa

of the world, of the need, and of the means by wh

empower the president and restore coherence to 

national security policy making and operations.

2. DoD has the funds to enable full cooperation from 

the Department of State and the Department of J

This entire program will cost no more than $3 bil

year—$1.5 billion for a national intelligence make-ove

fully integrates open sources of intelligence into F

decisionmaking—and $1.5 billion a year for a global 

Marshall Plan that has digital New Deal elements h

home.

278

Global Distributed Knowledge

National Distributed Knowledge

Government Knowledge

PREZ

1B 10B 100B 1 TRILLION

VIRTUAL REACH

Global Distributed Knowledge

National Distributed Knowledge

Government Knowledge

PREZ

1B 10B 100B 1 TRILLION

Global Distributed Knowledge

National Distributed Knowledge

Government Knowledge

PREZ

1B 10B 100B 1 TRILLION

VIRTUAL REACH

Figure 15. Creating the Virtual Intelligen

Community.
3. There is no need to physically restructur

government. Speaking in very practical term

Secretary General for National Security and all of th

elements proposed for the National Security Council 

housed in the South Central campus near the Depar

of State and recently vacated by the Central Intell

Agency.

4. There will need to be a Presidential De

Memorandum and consensus on the Hill in order to a

legislation with the necessary statutory authority fo

the new Secretary General for National Security

several of the president’s principal staff includin

Director General for National Policy, Director Gene

National Intelligence, the Director General for G

Strategy, and the Director General for National Rese

The United States is at a juncture where the pre

can neither direct nor persuade. Presidential leaders

national security policymaking requires a startlin

forward, a leap that can only be financed 

bureaucratically enabled by the Department of Defe

will take a small group of like-minded leaders, but if 

group can be put into place, the rest of the departmen

hence the rest of the government, will follow. Only 

way can cohesion and continuity be restored to presid

leadership and national security policymaking.

ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 12

1. The original version of this paper 

www.oss.net/Papers/white/S99Paper.doc. A published versio

www.defensdaily.com/reports/securpolicy1099.htm.

2. “TAKEDOWN: The Asymmetric Threat to the Nation,” 

Daily Network, December 1998, at www.defensedaily.com/r

takedown.htm.

3. Dr. James Schlesinger said this to the Senate Committee 

Budget, February 24, 1999. The complete text of his rem

reprinted in Colloquy, April 1999.

279
4. The political science literature makes reference to a 6-yea

as the norm for change in organizations that desire change. S

Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), writing in Miles to Go: A P

History of Social Policy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 

1997, writes of how it takes 25 years to effect significant change 

policies and the organizations and spending patterns that refle

policies. 

5. Mich E. Kabay, The NCSA Guide to Enterprise S

Protecting Information Assets, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996, C

1, Figure 1, p. 11. The figure in the book is superseded 

information, provided by Dr. Kabay in personal communicat

Robert Steele, OSS CEO, March 12, 1998.

6. The Clinton administration National Security Council 

following elements, in this order of priority:

Of fice of the Na tional Se cu rity Ad vi sor

Ex ec u tive Sec re tary

African Affairs

Asian Affairs

Central and Eastern Europe

Defense Policy and Arms Control

Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

Environmental Affairs

European Affairs

Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs

Intelligence Programs

Inter-American Affairs

This is actually a pretty good organization for dealing with the sp

of defense and diplomatic issues. It can be functionally im

especially in relation to transnational criminal and financial 

cultural, migration and health issues, and science & technology 

One alternative treatment of how best to improve national s

policymaking in relation to home defense, finance and trad

science and technology is provided in Stephen A. Cambone, 

Structure for National Security Policy Planning, Washingto

Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998.

7. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Ti

Uses of History for Decision Makers New York: Free Press, 1988, 

a valuable study of how different times provide different measu

different perspectives from which to address the same fact

suggest these measures and perspectives should be operational

the White House within the global strategy unit. This same unit 

also be conscious of the full range of works on clashing civili

cultural imperialism, religious filters, and so on. If the N

Intelligence Council is the integrator of “real world” informatio

280
the global strategy unit must be the integrator of the intangible 

and the “wild card” aspects that tend to be set aside by the day

analysts and their managers.

8. David M. Abshire, Preventing World War III: A Realistic 

Strategy, New York: Harper & Row, 1988.

9. For a complete critique of our existing intelligence com

and detailed recommendations on where we need to go, 

Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, A

International Press, May 2000. With a foreword by Senator D

Boren (former Chairman of the Senate Select Commit

Intelligence) and supporting blurbs from The Honorable Dic

former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as well as 

European flag officers, the book includes detailed recommendat

dramatically enlarging the scope and substantially chang

nature of the U.S. Intelligence Community. With a 50-page an

bibliography that integrates Silicon Valley, Internet, manag

and hacking books with the more traditional literature; a 

index; and 30 pages of proposed legislation, the National Securit

2001, this is a basic reference work on intelligence. Available 

from www.amazon.com. 

10. On Intelligence, endnote 11, Chapter 8.

11. Ibid., endnote 11, Chapter 12. Harlan Clevelan

Knowledge Executive: Leadership in an Information Society, Ne

E.P. Dutton, 1985, makes a compelling case for precisely this 

“higher education” for policymakers.

12. OODA Loop: Devised by Col John Boyd, “Orient, O

Decide, Act.” As Bill Gates has noted in his latest book, Busines

Speed of Thought, New York: Time Warner, 1999, th

characteristic of the 21st century is going to be “velocity.” Th

was made in the 1980s by Brigadier Simpkin in his book, Rac

Swift: Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare, Washington, DC: Br

1985.

13. In the early 1990s David Ignatius, then editor of the O

section of The Washington Post, wrote a very provocative piece 

overt groups were proving much more effective than covert cam

to foster democracy and achieve other worthy goals.

14. The conventional understanding of “intelligen

information that is inherently classified is incorrect. Data is 

print, signal, or image. Information is data that has been collate

281
generically useful product that is generally broadcast. Both t

York Times and most of what is now called “intelligence” are a

unclassified or classified information. Intelligence is informat

has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, distilled, and de

to a decisionmaker in order to answer a specific question

intelligence is not classified.

15. Jessica Matthews makes this argument in “Power 

Foreign Affairs, January-February 1997.

16. On Intelligence, endnote 11, Chapter 10.

282
CHAPTER 13

CONCLUSION

Douglas T. Stuart

As this volume goes to the printer, the American 

are once again engaged in the quadrennial proc

selecting a new president. Whichever candidate is e

the new commander in chief will confront daunting na

security problems, many of which have been discus

this volume. He may also have to make substantial ch

in the national security bureaucracy in order to cop

these problems.

The incoming president will be able to draw on 

sources of information and advice as the 

administration begins to consider reconstructin

machinery for national security planning and exec

One particularly valuable resource will be the Comm

on National Security/21st century, which will be subm

its Stage Three report to the Secretary of Defense 

spring of 2001. Their report will offer sp

recommendations for reform of the national se

bureaucracy. 

The incoming president (or, more realistically, his 

advisers) will also benefit from reading this volu

members of the next administration do pick up this 

they will find several interesting and, we believe, imp

points of consensus among the contributors. Three 

special mention.

First, most of the authors in this volume have 

asserted or implied that 21st century threats to 

national security will be more complex, multifacete

variable than at any time in our history. These threa

provide both challenges and opportunities for a 

283
Administration seeking to reform national se

institutions. Furthermore, to a much greater extent t

the past, these threats will be composed of both do

and international elements. Transnational crime, 

Senator John Kerry has described as the “new 

epitomizes the problem of “intermestic” threats 

national security. Arguing that the “new war” a

transnational crime demands both coordi

international action and American leadership, 

concludes that:

While none of us is willing—nor should we be—to give up 

sovereignty; we must reexamine and, if necessary, change so

laws to harmonize with a new, effective system of internatio

law.

1

As the president’s incoming team develops plan

procedures for confronting intermestic threats to 

national security, they would be well advised to 

Senator Kerry’s argument. But they would also b

advised to err in favor of caution as they review propos

the application of the machinery of internationa

fighting to issues which have traditionally been with

purview of domestic law enforcement. Such proposa

founder on three realities:

• Public opposition to perceived infringements 

constitutionally-protected civil liberties of 

citizens.

• Congressional resistance to the expansi

executive authority.

• The exacerbation of existing tensions in civil-m

relations. 

The second point of consensus among most 

contributors to this volume is that a national se

bureaucracy that was created in 1947 cannot adeq

address the 21st century global security environment

284
allowing for the changes which have taken place 

national security system over the last 5 decades(succ

revisions of the National Security Act, passage 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, etc.) the system is simply to

moving and unresponsive in its processes, too “stove 

in its structure and too narrow in its focus. Defendi

national security of the United States in the a

globalization and information will require dramatic re

to the U.S. Government’s industrial age organization

planning processes.

Several contributors to this volume have respon

these defects by recommending some form of Gold

Nichols Act for the interagency process. To the exten

such a reform would require omnibus legislatio

incoming president may be well advised to steer clear 

kind of ambitious structural reform at the beginning 

administration. The need is certainly great, but the t

and the circumstances may not be conducive to succe

Determining the scope and timing of defense refor

be a major issue for the next administration. Harry Tr

was able to work with the “damned 80th Congress” t

the 1947 National Security Act because all parties sh

sense of emergency derived from their common exper

with Pearl Harbor and World War II. No comp

“burning platform” (to borrow William Navas’ p

exists today.

This having been said, the incoming president s

waste no time in reaching out to key members of Cong

establish new, informal procedures for dialogue on iss

national security and defense reform. As Harold Ko

observed in The National Security Constitution, “

Congress enacted the National Security Act of 19

greatest error was its failure to address its own role 

national security system.”

2

 The transformation 

relationship between the president and Congress 

area of national security is one of the least appreciate

most problematic aspects of the history of the 194

285
Congressional punishment, or micromanagement, 

executive branch, by means of such devic

appropriations and oversight, is no substitu

productive executive-legislative consultation on iss

national security. It will not be easy for the inc

president to establish new procedures for working 

members of the House and Senate, in particular beca

generational and demographic changes in the mak

Congress. But new procedures and attitudes are ess

for the efficient handling of America’s national se

challenges. They are also a necessary first step t

fundamental reform of the national security burea

for the 21st century.

The third point of agreement is that any reform 

national security bureaucracy must be guided by a co

and compelling national security strategy. This will 

extraordinarily difficult task, due to the aforemen

complexity and fluidity of the threat environmen

problem will be exacerbated by the fact that no major 

poses a near-term threat to American survival

combination of multiple, abstruse, and asymmetric th

and an overall environment of relative security, a

conducive to the articulation of a coherent and comp

national security strategy. But difficulty will not exem

incoming president from the responsibility to develop 

strategy.

As the only branch of the government that has a 

and well-established infrastructure dedicated to str

planning, the Department of Defense (DoD) is in a u

position to assist the president in formulating s

strategy. 

One important instrument which is available 

Secretary of Defense to help shape future discussions 

national security is the congressionally man

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2001 Q

currently under construction within the de

community. The primary QDR authors would b

286
advised to begin by accepting one of the conclusions 

Phase Two report of the U.S. Commission on Na

Security/21st Century: “. . . American national se

strategy must find its anchor in U.S. national inter

The concept of national interest is a notoriously so

unreliable guide for foreign and defense planners, bu

also an unavoidable and indispensable preconditi

thinking about national security.

The Phase Two Commission report made a very m

attempt to stimulate thinking about America’s intere

did the 1997 QDR, which sought to distinguish be

vital, important, and humanitarian interests.

4

 The 

2001 authors should consider being much 

ambitious—and accord a high priority to the articula

a coherent and compelling vision of U.S. national inte

Ideally, this vision will be specific enough to guide pol

also general enough to obtain the support of a 

cross-section of the Washington policy community a

American people.

Formulating such a list of interests will be a dema

exercise but it will also be beneficial, in three ways

and most importantly, a well-constructed list of na

interests will provide the logical basis for the 

proposed national security strategy. Second, a listing 

national interests will stimulate national debate 

America’s role in the post-Cold War international sy

Third, in order to develop a list of U.S. national inte

DoD will have to work closely with other executive b

agencies, including the Department of State an

National Security Council (NSC). Ideally, this exerci

result in the establishment of new procedures fo

habits of, interagency consultation and policy coordin

Until the American people, Congress, and the preside

ready to pass a new National Security Act, these ty

modest improvements in interagency cooperation m

the best that we can hope for.

287
ENDNOTES – CHAPTER 13

1. John Kerry, The New War: The Web of Crime that Th

America’s Security, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997, p.18

2. Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing 

After the Iran-Contra Affair, New Haven: Yale University Pres

p. 166.

3. Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving S

and Promoting Freedom, April 15, 2000. The report is available 

at www.nssg.gov/PhaseII.pdf.

4. According to the 1997 QDR, “Decisions about whether an

to use military forces should be guided, first and foremost, by t

interests at stake. . . .” The QDR is available on l

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/sec3.html.

288
GLOSSARY

ABDA Australia, British, Dutch, Ameri

AIDS Auto Immune Deficiency Syndro

API Application Program Interfaces

BIA Beirut International Airport

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

BUR Bottom-Up Review

C

4

I Command, Control,

Communications, Computers, an

Intelligence

C

4

ISR Command, Control,

Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIG Central Intelligence Group

CINCFE Commander in Chief, Far East

CINCs Commanders-in-Chief

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of S

CPG Contingency Planning Guidance

CSAF Chief of Staff Air Force

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency

DMC Defense Management Council

DOD Department of Defense

DPG Defense Planning Guidance

ETO European Theater of Operations

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Managemen

Agency

GM General Motors

289
GNA Goldwater-Nichols Act

GNP Gross National Product

IWGs Interagency Working Groups

JAAF Joint Action Armed Forces

JAAN Joint Action of the Army and Na

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JPC Joint Planning Committee

JROC Joint Resource Operations

Command

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSOs Joint Specialty Officers

JSSC Joint Strategic Survey Committe

LIC Low-Intensity Conflict

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Gro

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organizat

NCA National Command Authorities

NCOs Non-Commissioned Officers

NEO Noncombatant Evacuation

Operations

NIA National Intelligence Authority

NII National Information

Infrastructure

NME National Military Establishment

NPD National Defense Panel

NPR National Performance Review

NRO National Reconnaissance Office

NSA National Security Agency

NSC National Security Council

NSRB National Security Resources Boa

NSS National Security Strategy

JCS Organization of the Joint Chiefs 

 Staff

290
OMB Office of Management and Budge

OODA Observation-OrientationDecision-Action

OPD Operations Division

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSRD Office of Scientific Research and

Development

OSS Office of Strategic Services

PfP Partners for Peace

POA Pacific Ocean Area

POM Project Objective Memorandum

PPB Planning-Programming-Budgetin

PPBS Planning, Programming, and

Budgeting System

QDR Quadrennial Defense Review

RDB Research and Development Boar

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

SAC Strategic Air Command

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied

Expeditionary Force

SOLIC Special Operations and Low

Intensity Conflict

SWNCC State-War-Navy-Coordinating

Committee

SWPA Southwest Pacific Area

UN United Nations

WEU Western European Union

WPD War Plans Division

291
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

JOSEPH R. CERAMI, a U.S. Army colonel, is Chairm

the Department of National Security and Strategy 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl

From 1993 to 1998, he served as Director of Interna

Security Studies and taught the core strategy cours

advanced courses on Vietnam and Congress i

Advanced Warfighting Studies Program. Colonel C

has held command and staff positions in the Field Ar

and as an operations and plans officer in the United S

Germany and Korea. From 1980 to 1983, he was Ass

Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military Aca

Colonel Cerami has published articles in Param

Military Review, and Field Artillery. He has a B

Engineering from West Point, an M.A. in Governmen

the University of Texas at Austin, and an M.M.A

Theater Operations from the School of Advanced M

Studies, at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He is currently a 

candidate in the Pennsylvania State University Sch

Public Affairs.

GRANT T. HAMMOND is Director of the Cent

Strategy and Technology and Professor of Interna

Relations at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL. H

teaches in the Department of Strategy, Doctrin

Airpower but was the first civilian Chair of the Depar

of National Security Studies at the Air War College 

1992-94 and was the first Chair of National Se

Strategy, 1994-96. Dr. Hammond holds an A.B. 

Harvard in Modern European History and an M.A. an

in International Relations from the Paul H. Nitze Sc

Advanced International Studies of The Johns Ho

University. He was commisioned in the U.S. Army in 

and served in the U.S. Army Reserve until 197

Hammond has held fellowships from the U.S. Gover

(NDEA), the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the Am

Council on Education, the Mellon Foundation, and th

293
Foundation. He was elected to membership in the C

Club, Washington, DC, in 1994. In addition to teachin

Hammond has held a variety of administrative 

having served three times as a department chair, be

Associate Dean and Dean at Lenoir-Rhyne College, an

Executive Officer of the Center for International Aff

Harvard University. He is a recognized expert in case 

teaching and learning, has worked as a consulta

Capitol Hill and for SRI Incorporated, and has also 

featured speaker on creativity and leadersh

conferences for American business and industry. He 

major participant in two Chief of Staff of the Air 

(CSAF) commissioned year-long studies—SPACE

2020 in 1993-94 and AF 2025 in 1995-96 for which h

twice awarded the Meritorious Civilian Service A

Since joining the Air War College in 1989, Dr. Ham

has received annual awards for his lecturing, tea

research, and writing, including the Air Univ

Commander’s Outstanding Faculty Achievement A

1991 and the Air War College’s Outstanding Te

1998-99. Dr. Hammond is a frequent guest lecturer at 

and abroad on defense issues, future conflict, cr

thinking, strategy, airpower and peace keeping. Hi

book was Countertrade, Offsets and Barter in Interna

Political Economy (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990

second book, Plowshares Into Swords: Arms Ra

International Politics, 1840-1991 (University of 

Carolina Press, 1993) was reviewed by Colin Gr

Survival “as the book for which generations of scholar

been waiting.” He has published articles in a num

journals including Air Power Journal, Defense An

Joint Force Quarterly, The Journal of Conflict St

Washington Quarterly, Small Wars and Insurge

Naval War College Review, and the Journal of Inno

and Management, and contributed numerous book ch

as well. He has completed another—The Mind of War

Boyd and American Security—and is working on two 

The Cosmology of War and Plumber, Soldier, State

Sheik: The Crises of October 1973.

294
JOHN HILLEN is the Chief Operating Officer at 

ECN, Inc., an alternative trading system on Wall 

that functions as an electronic stock exchange. Wh

wrote this chapter, Dr. Hillen was Senior Fello

Political-Military Studies and Special Assistant 

President and CEO at the Center for Strategi

International Studies (CSIS). Prior to coming to CS

was the Olin Fellow for National Security Studies 

Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Hillen is a forme

Army officer and decorated veteran of close combat 

Persian Gulf War. An Army paratrooper, he contin

serve as a reserve officer in the U.S. Special Oper

Command. He received his education at Duke Univ

King’s College London, and Oxford, where he earn

doctorate in international relations. A contributing ed

National Review, Dr. Hillen has published widely in 

other journals and newspapers including Foreign A

Orbis, The International Herald Tribune, The Wash

Post, The Wall Street Journal, and The Christian S

Monitor. He has contributed to many books and 

author of Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN M

Operations (Brassey’s Inc) and editor of Future Visio

U.S. Defense Policy (CFR Press). In 1999 Dr. Hille

appointed a member of the Congressionally man

National Security Study Group chaired by former Se

David Boren and Warren Rudman.

DAVID JABLONSKY, a retired U.S. Army Colonel, 

Professor of National Security Affairs, Departm

National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War Colle

has a B.A. from Dartmouth College in European histo

M.A. in international relations from Boston Universit

an M.A. and Ph.D. in European history from K

University. He is the author of five books, 

monographs, and numerous book chapters and articl

Jablonsky has held the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy a

George C. Marshall Chair of Military Studies at th

College.

295
LAWRENCE J. KORB is Vice President and Direc

Studies and holder of the Maurice Greenberg Chair 

Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Co

he served as Director of the Center for Public 

Education and Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy S

Program at the Brookings Institution, Dean of the Gra

School of Public and International Affairs at the Univ

of Pittsburgh, and Vice President, Corporate Operati

the Raytheon Company. Mr. Korb served as Ass

Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Af

Installations and Logistics) from 1981 through 1985. I

position, he administered about 70 percent of the d

budget. Mr. Korb is Chairman of the Board fo

Committee of National Security, and a Board Member 

Washington Center, the Procurement Round Table, a

National Military Family Association. He is also a m

of the International Institute of Strategic Studie

National Academy of Public Administration, and the 

Strategy Group. He was a member of the Defense Ad

Committee for President-Elect Reagan (1980) 

member of the Defense Issues Group for President

Bush (1988). Mr. Korb received his M.A. from St. 

University in 1962 and his Ph.D. in 1969 from the 

University of New York at Albany. He has held s

academic positions, among them: Assistant Profes

Political Science, the University of Dayton, 19

Associate Professor of Government, U.S. Coast 

Academy, 1971-75; Professor of Management, U.S. 

War College, 1975-1980; and Adjunct Professor in Na

Security Studies, Georgetown University, 1981-93

Korb served on active duty for 4 years as Naval 

Officer and retired from the Naval Reserve with the r

Captain. Mr. Korb’s 15 books and 150 articles on na

security issues include The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Th

Twenty-five Years; The Fall and Rise of the Pentago

American National Security: Policy and Proces

articles have appeared in such journals as Foreign A

Public Administration Review, The New York 

Sunday Magazine, Naval Institute Proceedings

296
International Security. Over the past decade Mr. Ko

made over 500 appearances as a commentator on 

shows as the Today Show, Good Morning America, Fa

Nation, This Week with David Brinkley

MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour, The News Hour wit

Lehrer, Nightline, 60 Minutes, Larry King Live

Crossfire. His op-ed pieces have appeared in such 

newspapers as The Washington Post, The New York T

The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times

Philadelphia Inquirer, and The Christian Science Mon

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR., became the Director 

Strategic Studies Institute in May 2000. He hold

Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research Chair at th

Army War College. His army career included a comba

in Vietnam and a number of command and 

assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concept

Assessments Division and the War Plans Division 

Joint Staff, he collaborated in the developme

documents such as the National Military Strategy, the 

Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Joint Militar

Assessment, national security directives, and presid

decision directives. He also was Director of M

Requirements and Capabilities Management at th

Army War College. He is a graduate of the U.S. 

Command and General Staff College and the Nationa

College. He holds an MBA from Embry Riddle Aerona

University and a J.D. from Widener University Sch

Law. He is a member of the Pennsylvania and New J

bars. He has published extensively in the areas of na

security and military strategy formulation, future m

requirements, and strategic planning.

GABRIEL MARCELLA is Professor of Third World S

with the Department of National Security and Str

U.S. Army War College. He served as International A

Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Sou

Command, Panama, 1987-89. Dr. Marcella has w

extensively on strategy, low-intensity conflict, and 

American policy. His writings have appeared in the Jo

297
of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Es

Internacionales, Inter-American Economic Af

North-South, Analysis, Seguridad Estrategica Reg

Military Review, Parameters, Air University Review, 

various edited volumes. His most recent works in

Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democr

Latin America; Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Tro

Outlook for US Policy Toward Haiti; Haiti Str

Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Han

and Exit; War and Peace in the Amazon: Str

Implications for the United States and Latin America 

1995 Ecuador-Peru War; and The Presidential Ad

System and the Making of Latin American Policy. 

co-author/co-editor of the forthcoming book, Se

Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Resolvin

Ecuador-Peru Conflict. In addition, he has served on 

study commissions dealing with Caribbean sec

Central American recovery and development, interna

terrorism, and U.S. interests in Latin America. His c

research focuses on civil-military integration in na

security decisionmaking.

CONSTANTINE MENGES, is currently a Senior F

with the Hudson Institute; from 1990 to 2000 he 

professor and director of the Program on Transiti

Democracy at the George Washington University. H

received his Ph.D. in International Relation

Comparative Politics (Soviet Union, Germany) 

Columbia University, Dr. Menges has worked on S

European, and other geopolitical issues as w

transitions to democracy in key world regions as a sc

author, and senior government official. He has wor

the policy level for three U.S. presidents, most recentl

1981-86, including 3 years in the White House as S

Assistant to the President for National Security A

where transitions to democracy were amon

responsibilities. During the 1970s, his public s

responsibilities included international economic diplo

and he also served at the Department of Health, Educ

298
and Welfare as Assistant Director for Civil Rights a

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Education. Dr. Meng

published a large number of articles and books on f

policy: Spain: The Struggle for Democracy (1978); Ins

National Security Council (Simon and Schuster, 

paperback 1989), on the President and the mak

foreign policy; The Twilight Struggle (1990) on the f

policies from 1979-89 of the U.S. and the Soviet Union 

regional conflicts; The Future of Germany and the A

Alliance (1991), which explains the process of comm

unraveling in Europe and conceptualizes the sta

transition to democracy; and as editor and contribu

Transitions from Communism in Russia and E

Europe (1994) and Partnerships for Peace, Democrac

Prosperity (1997). Articles by Dr. Menges have appea

the New York Times, The Washington Post, The 

Republic, National Review and Commentary; he ha

appeared frequently on the national media to d

international trends and issues. He is founding editor 

journal, Problems of Post-Communism. His work on f

policy has also involved extensive experience a

including research travel to Eastern Europe since 196

to the former Soviet Union since the 1970s. Dr. Meng

been a witness to a number of transforming e

including: the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 wh

worked to help individuals escape; the 1968 Sov

invasion to suppress reform in Czechoslovakia wh

worked with the non-violent resistance; and the U.S

rights movement where he served as a volunte

Mississippi during the summer of 1963.

WILLIAM A. NAVAS, JR., a retired U.S. Army 

general, was the Director, Army National Guard, Na

Guard Bureau, Washington, DC. As Directo

formulated, developed, and coordinated all prog

policies and plans affecting the Army National Guar

its more than 362,000 citizen-soldiers. Prior t

assignment, General Navas served since 1987 in a var

senior level positions in the Department of Defense, 

299
Deputy Director Army National Guard, Vice Chief 

National Guard Bureau, Military Executive of the R

Forces Policy Board and most recently as the D

Assistant Secretary of Defense/Chief of Staff for R

Affairs. General Navas was commissioned as a R

Army officer in 1965 through Army ROTC fro

University of Puerto Rico in Mayaguez, and first s

with U.S. forces in the Federal Republic of German

later commanded a Combat Engineer company in Vie

Captain Navas left active duty in 1970 and joine

Puerto Rico Army National Guard. Like many Guard

General Navas has served in more than one branch. 

Guard he commanded Engineers at the company leve

battalion each of Military Police and Infantry. He ha

an operations and training officer at battalion, brigad

State headquarters levels. As a Colonel, he command

first Engineer Training Exercise in Central Americ

last State assignment before going to the National 

Bureau was as Director of Plans, Operations, Trainin

Military Support, (G3) Puerto Rico Army National G

In addition to an undergraduate degree in civil engine

General Navas holds a Master of Science in Manag

Engineering from the University of Bridgepo

Connecticut. He has attended numerous military sc

including the Command and General Staff College, of 

he is a Distinguished Graduate (1976), an

Inter-American Defense College.

ROBERT D. STEELE is a retired Marine Corps in

and intelligence officer. He is the founder and presid

Open Source Solutions, Inc. and is an acknowledged 

on computer and information vulnerabilities. Mr. 

holds graduate degrees in International Relation

Public Administration from Leigh University an

University of Oklahoma. He has also earned certifica

intelligence policy from Harvard University and in d

studies from the Naval War College.

DOUGLAS T. STUART holds the Robert Blaine W

Chair in Political Science and is Director of the C

300
Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Contemp

Issues at Dickinson College. He is also an adjunct pro

at the U.S. Army War College. He received his Ph

International Relations from the University of Sou

California in 1979. Dr. Stuart is the author or editor 

books, four monographs, and over 25 published a

dealing with international affairs. His areas of res

specialization include U.S. European security rela

and Asian security and arms control. He is a member 

editorial board of Westview Press (“Dilemmas in 

Politics” series), a Councilor with the Atlantic C

(Washington, DC), and a member of the Interna

Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, London) an

Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI, Rom

Stuart is a former NATO Fellow, and a regular lectu

the U.S. Army War College. During the 1989-90 aca

year, he was a visiting scholar at the Brookings Insti

in Washington, DC. In 1994, Dr Stuart completed a 

research project on the future of European se

(sponsored by the Ford Foundation) and began an 18-

project under the auspices of the IISS to esta

guidelines for American military policy in post-Col

Asia. This research resulted in an Adelphi Paper in 

1996. In the summer of 1996, Professor Stuart began 

on an ongoing project relating to the 1947 National Se

Act and its ramifications for U.S. foreign and security 

making. During his 1997-98 sabbatical, he und

research relating to this topic while serving as a v

scholar at the Elliott School of International Affairs, G

Washington University, Washington, DC. Dr. S

received Dickinson’s Ganoe Award for Inspira

Teaching in 1992, and its Distinguished Teaching P

1996. 

301
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Dr. Douglas T. Stuart

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler