A 21st CENTURY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

FOR THE AMERICAS: MULTILATERAL

COOPERATION, LIBERAL PEACE,

AND SOFT POWER

Joseph R. Núñez

August 2002
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

The author would like to thank the Institute of National Security

Studies (USAF), the Latin American Institute (University of New

Mexico), and the U.S. Army War College Foundation for their support of

the research for this monograph.

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ISBN 1-58487-094-X

ii
FOREWORD

This monograph by Colonel Joseph R. Núñez is a

constructive response to the question of “How can the

United States best develop security cooperation within the

Americas?” In it, he develops the necessary background to

make the persuasive argument that it is time for the United

States to employ strategic restraint and reassurance of

allies to develop a new security architecture that is effective

and efficient, not to mention reflecting of our values and

interests.

The current security architecture of the Western

Hemisphere needs major change. To better address current

and future threats, the United States must be able to

demonstrate the type of leadership that reflects the “soft

power” and liberal peace realities of our hemispheric

neighborhood. Of course, this will require the recognition

and assistance of other leading states that provide real

legitimacy and better representation for this new security

structure. The threats and challenges that Colonel Núñez

articulates are no longer state versus state on a path to

eventual war, but more internal, where weak institutions

struggle to deal with terrorism, natural disasters,

governmental corruption, insurgency, crime, and

narcotrafficking. Many of these problems transcend

borders, further complicating matters.

Colonel Núñez argues that the United States is the only

country that can provide the new direction for security

cooperation, but must rely upon Canada, Mexico, Brazil,

Argentina, and Chile to develop the consensus for change

and materially contribute to the creation of standing

multinational units. He senses that issues such as state

sovereignty and the role of the Organization of American

States must figure significantly in the overarching security

structure, and that these new brigade-sized units must be

iii
able to rapidly deploy to handle missions immediately, not

after the fact in an ad hoc and disorganized manner.

This is a most timely monograph. With current concerns

about the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the strength

of democratic regimes, along with the growing need for

homeland—even hemispheric—security, it is most

important that we seriously consider new ways to respond

to our strategic situation. While the innovative system

detailed in this monograph is an ambitious venture, it also

reflects great logic, grand strategy, and sound assessments

about the Americas. A new security community must be

developed to reflect our emerging economic community and

uphold shared democratic values.

The mission of the U.S. military, and the Army in

particular, is to be prepared to allocate resources for this

new security system that complements many

transformation themes already embraced, yet in a truly

multinational manner that builds trust, respect, cohesion,

and results in mission success through competence,

interoperability, and rapid deployment. This monograph

provides an excellent opportunity for policymakers to

consider a new security architecture, complete with details

for implementation. The Strategic Studies Institute is

pleased to publish this work as a contribution to the

national security debate on hemispheric security

cooperation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

JOSEPH R. NÚÑEZ, a colonel in the U.S. Army, is a

Professor in the Department of National Security and

Strategy of the U.S. Army War College. With over 25 years

of service, Colonel Núñez has commanded at the company

and battalion level, taught Political Science in the

Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy

(West Point), and deployed to Haiti in 1994 with the 10th

Mountain Division (Light Infantry) for Operation UPHOLD

DEMOCRACY. His research interests are focused on the

Americas and reflected in his dissertation research. Most

recently, the Strategic Studies Institute published his

monograph, Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A

New Strategy for Peace (also published as an article in

Aerospace Power Journal in Spanish). His Op-Ed piece,

“Homeland and Hemisphere,” was published by the

Christian Science Monitor on December 20, 2001. Colonel

Núñez is regularly cited by major newspapers throughout

North America, South America, and Europe for his views on

security issues within the Western Hemisphere. A cum

laude graduate of St. Lawrence University, he holds an

M.A. in Government from the University of Virginia, and is

currently completing a Ph.D. in International Relations

from the University of Virginia. He is also a graduate of the

U.S. Army War College.

v
vi
SUMMARY

The main focus of this monograph is on security

cooperation within the Americas. Essentially, much

emphasis has been placed on economic cooperation (free

trade agreements), but little thought has been given to

security cooperation. Existing collective defense systems

(Rio Treaty of the Organization of American States [OAS])

are a relic of the Cold War and not sufficient for the

challenges and threats of today.

The Americas are evidence of liberal or democratic

peace. States do not war against each other because values

and trade discourage major conflicts. The greater challenge

to the state is internal, particularly given the problems of

natural disasters, insurgency, drugs, violent crime, poverty,

and other problems. Because of spillover effects, domestic

issues often become transnational, such as with the drugs,

weapons, and people that move across borders. Add to these

the problems of natural disasters, and one can see that

major changes are needed to the security architecture of the

Western Hemisphere.

The United States has leadership responsibilities but

must exercise them within a soft power framework that

reflects strategic restraint and reassurance. Without a

win-win strategy (we gain—they gain) for the states that

constitute the OAS, the future does not look bright for

promotion of U.S. interests and values. Key to successful

U.S. leadership is the recognition of certain sub-regional

leaders—Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and

Chile—that can add significant legitimacy to a new security

architecture, along with the component forces to create

standing multinational units. These units would constitute

the reactivation of the First Special Service Force (FSSF), a

famous Canadian-American brigade-size unit from World

War II. The United States, Canada, and Mexico would form

the First Special Service Force—North or FSSF(N) and

vii
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile would form the First Special

Service Force—South or FSSF(S).

These units are under the control of the OAS through a

newly created security council comprised of the FSSF

states. Such forces are organized to be deployable rapidly to

handle missions that include humanitarian assistance,

peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and small-scale

contingencies. An FSSF can only be deployed if member

countries approve the mission, which works to respect the

sovereignty of individual states and increases the scope of

input in the decisionmaking process.

This is obviously an ambitious and radical agenda of

change. Yet given current opportunities (free trade) and

challenges (democratic backsliding), a new security system

that promotes better cooperation, coordination, and results

is certainly warranted. An incipient economic community

(Free Trade Area of the Americas [FTAA in 2005]) within an

existing democratic community requires a new security

structure that can support and defend it, now and in the

future.

viii
A 21st CENTURY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

FOR THE AMERICAS: MULTILATERAL

COOPERATION, LIBERAL PEACE,

AND SOFT POWER

...I think we shortchange ourselves in our own hemisphere

from not paying more attention beyond the Free Trade Area of

the Americas, which obviously is very important.1

Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ)

We seek not just neighbors but strong partners. We seek not

just progress but shared prosperity. With persistence and

courage, we shaped the last century into an American century.

With leadership and commitment, this can be the century of

the Americas.... Should I become president, I will look south,

not as an afterthought, but as a fundamental commitment to

my presidency.2

Gov. George W. Bush (R-TX)

Introduction and Significant Trends.

Each century there are few opportunities for a major

power—such as the United States—to make a monumental

change in grand strategy for an important region of the

world. Today, the nation states of the Western Hemisphere

possess a fleeting moment to create a new community.

Regionalism is on the rise around the world and in the

Americas, and with it comes new ways of interacting

economically, politically, socially, and militarily. States

devote considerable thought and planning to economic

issues, particularly trade, but precious little has been

devoted to the security cooperation imperative that arises

from these other integration areas.

This monograph addresses the task of creating a

security cooperation architecture in the Americas. Existing

1
cooperative defense measures are not in harmony with

current security needs, a fact that was echoed throughout

the hemisphere in the aftermath of the September 11, 2002,

terrorist attacks when words took the place of action.

Moreover, security cooperation in the 21st century requires

a greater sense of partnership that provides major benefits

to all states that participate. Thus, the United States must

be willing to be less directive and more willing to listen to

the concerns of other states in the region In return, the

hemispheric neighbors of the United States must be

prepared to share the security responsibilities that arise

from this cooperation.

In attempting to tackle a major strategic challenge, that

of devising a security architecture for the Americas, some

major trends must be acknowledged as foundational for this

new “security edifice.” These trends address economic,

political, security, governmental, leadership, and terror

issues that affect the prospects for hemispheric cooperation.

The first trend is that the Free Trade Area of the

Americas (FTAA) will be approved by 2005,3 and shall

include all nation states in the Western Hemisphere, except

Cuba (and possibly Venezuela). Related to this assumption

is that domestically, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) is

enacted by Congress, and internationally, Mercosur

(particularly Brazil) maintains a positive view toward

participation in the FTAA. Capitalism, despite the

criticisms of some regional leaders, is still the only viable

economic system. Most of the anticapitalistic rhetoric is

directed at the distribution of benefits, not whether it works

to produce gains or development.

The second trend is that the Americas remain a “Zone of

Peace.” Liberal (or Democratic) Peace prevails. That is,

states continue to abhor “total war” as a means of resolving

problems. The Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1995 was hardly a

war. Fighting occurred, but was limited in scope (fighting

restricted to a long disputed and small border zone),

severity (few casualties), size (limited forces and logistics),

2
and time (fighting lasted less than a month, and

peacekeepers quickly deployed at the request of Ecuador

and Peru). Thus, the last major war in the Americas was the

Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay that began 70

years ago.

The third trend is that the security dilemma from

Canada to Chile is largely internal or domestic, and

intensified by transnational nonstate actors. Presidents,

legislatures, judiciaries, and militaries are more concerned

about internal collapse—resulting from domestic

pathologies—than a foreign army crossing their border to

conquer their homeland. Feeding these fears are

monumental problems—narcotrafficking, arms smuggling,

violent crime, insurgency, corruption (money laundering to

bribery), and terrorism—as well as murky business and

political dealings that cross borders, regions, continents,

and the world. Essentially, these are strategic criminal

enterprises that states find difficult to counter on their own.

The fourth trend is that democracy will endure and

strengthen throughout the Western Hemisphere. Even so,

backsliding will occur and complicate political analysis of

the region. Many countries will take several steps forward

in their maturity as democratic states, and then move one

step backward. In some cases, backsliding may exceed

forward movement, yet that should not distort the overall

picture of the region’s dedication to democracy. Democracy

has been strengthened already in Mexico, Brazil, and Chile,

to name a few. Others like Venezuela, are moving

backward, although the pro-democracy movement against

President Hugo Chávez, truly an “elected dictator,” grows

stronger each day. The challenge is to go beyond democratic

elections to achieve democratic and legitimate governance.

The fifth trend is that hemispheric security initiatives

require the leadership of the United States, or they will not

come to fruition. Like it or not, the United States is the

hegemonic force in the Americas because of its economic,

political, military, and cultural power. How that power is

3
used, hard versus soft, determines the level of cooperation

that can be achieved. Of course, leaders require followers, so

other states must be given incentives to join in and perform

certain roles. Unless concerns over matters like

sovereignty, distribution of gains, and fulfilling promises

are addressed effectively within the hemisphere, security

cooperation will not be realized. Further complicating

matters is the recognition that the United States can only

demonstrate effective leadership in the Americas by relying

on sub-regional leaders to assist materially with the

creation and operation of a new security architecture. We

have interdependent destinies that require cooperation in

the protection of values and interests.

The final trend is that the terrorist attacks of September

11 motivated the United States to address its vulnerability,

not only by improving domestic security measures, but also

by emphasizing immediate security cooperation within

North America, and within the Americas over the longer

term. This step is clearly positive for addressing the huge

void in hemispheric security. Yet this opportunity must be

acted on quickly, lest it fade from public and government

attention.

Security Cooperation: The Strategic Challenge.

Hegemony is not a dirty word, but its usage today often

elicits negative and visceral responses because it is

interpreted as imperialism, when it actually connotes

leadership. Thus, the key issue is how leadership is

used—for good or bad ends. The realist school of

international relations is correct in ascribing anarchy to the

international system.4 There is no authority above all

states. However, that view does not mean that states will

not follow the lead of other states. Power does matter, but

what is most important is how that power is used, which

explains why a leading state, such as the United States,

would use institutions to restrict its power—it reduces

“fears of domination and abandonment by secondary

4
states.”5 Essentially, G. John Ikenberry is advocating a

system reflecting liberal hegemonic stability. If such an

approach worked well in Europe after World War II, then

surely it can work in the Americas after the Cold War. This

is precisely what is needed within the Americas in the 21st

century.

Realists overemphasize power and liberals

de-emphasize it; both approaches are wrong in this regard.

Leadership based on soft power engenders constructive

cooperation, as opposed to hard power, the arrogance of

might that reinforces negative images of the United States

among our hemispheric partners.6 The guru of soft power,

Joseph Nye, understands well that the key to success is

getting other countries not so much to do things they oppose,

but rather, to find things we can cooperate on—that is the

essence of soft power.7 To a large extent, Washington has

applied this approach in the realm of democracy and trade,

but has done little of this in security cooperation.

The implications of liberal hegemonic stability for

security cooperation are several and require important

attitudinal changes for U.S. political leaders. From a

domestic political—executive and legislative—perspective,

humanitarians8 must be convinced to relinquish their

reluctance to lead. Conversely, jingoists9 must be exhorted

to refrain from irresponsible leadership. Within the

Americas, the role for Washington is to work closely with

other states to promote the two main pillars of liberalism,

democracy and capitalism. This requires a completely

different strategy, an expanded dialogue, and a willingness

to cooperate in a truly multinational manner.

A completely new strategy is required that takes a

long-term view (short-term views often work against

cooperation because they emphasize domestic

protectionism over the greater gains of working together

openly), recognizes the virtues and value of our regional

partners, and reflects the interconnectedness of political,

military, and economic issues. The components of this

5
strategy: democracy, free trade, and security cooperation,

are linked through overlapping concerns over human

rights, poverty, justice, development, crime, and

insurgency. Our neighbors recognize this connection. When

asked what was the greatest threat to the national security,

Mexico’s former—now representative to the United Nations

(U.N.)—national security adviser, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser,

answered: “Poverty.”10 If economic programs fail to bring

widespread development, poor people may be willing to risk

their lives to bring revolutionary change or engage in

criminal activity, thus creating a security dilemma for the

state. This nexus is now recognized by the Bush

administration. President Bush’s aide on international

economics reports to the economic adviser and national

security adviser. 1 1 Thus, economic and security

considerations are discussed concurrently and

symbiotically.

Another challenge for strategists is to determine how to

reshape the security architecture so that it reflects a

cooperative regional approach that addresses the current

needs of Western Hemisphere states. The second genesis for

security cooperation in the Americas was the defense

ministerial process that began in 1995 with Secretary of

Defense William Perry inviting hemispheric defense chiefs

to Williamsburg, Virginia, for a meeting that is now

perpetuated biannually.12 This was the second genesis

because the original hemispheric security cooperation

began with the creation of the Inter-American Defense

System more than a half century ago in response to World

War II.13 After the war, it transformed itself into a Cold War

organization to counter communism. This system is widely

viewed as existing in a state of decline since member states

consider it obsolete, even anachronistic. It has not kept up

with the security needs of this hemisphere, particularly the

relationship between security and economic vitality. This

task of change is particularly difficult since very little has

been written on the subject, unlike Europe where security

6
cooperation has evolved steadily along with economic

integration.14

Most who deal with the FTAA are loath to discuss the

connection between trade and security, and this is because

many reject, even avoid, the argument that security issues

have a major impact on free trade. One who goes against

this “conventional wisdom” is Robert Zoellick, the Bush

administration’s trade representative.

Economic integration, in the Zoellick world-view, is

inextricably bound up with democracy and freedom as well as

with prosperity. Long before September 11th, he was linking

trade and security policy. America, he said, should promote

free trade by any means available, across the globe. After that

day of horror, he spoke of trade policy as part of the war

against terrorism.15

In the same camp is political scientist Georges Fauriol,

who had the strategic vision to see the interdisciplinary

nature entailed in the creation of a hemispheric economic

community.16 He recognized that the focus was too narrow.

Fauriol notes that the Summit of the Americas process

addresses more than economics, but it “is not yet coherent or

strategic.”17 Furthermore, he argues that “what is at stake

for the peoples of the Americas goes far beyond a primarily

economic agreement.”18

Some readers may be skeptical of the kinds of inter- American

linkages argued here. Critics might question the logic of

integrating the evolving South American defense

considerations into an already complex FTAA process. The

study argues that the achievement cannot be limited only to a

simple set of trade negotiations. The institutionalization of

democracy in South America in the last decade not only

represents the thrust of U.S. foreign policy interests, but also

the basis for the transformations sweeping the region. With

the end of the Cold War, international security structures are

now accompanied by an unequivocal call for the ideals of

democratic governance. From the political and security

suspicions of the past, the acrimonious foreign policy clashes,

and the occasionally anxious economic relations, a new spirit

7
of partnership has emerged. The Western Hemisphere now

entering the 21st century is truly changed—a testimony to the

positive results of rebuilding relationships on the basis of

cooperation and trust.19

Also stressing the value of security cooperation is

economist Patrice Franko, who has argued for the need of a

new regional security framework to complement the

FTAA.20 She makes an unfortunate assumption that the

new security architecture is needed upon the creation of the

FTAA; this is too late. But given political realities at the

domestic and international level, the new security

community may have to wait for the inception of an

economic community. In addition, though Franko cites the

need for such a cooperative approach to defense issues, and

documents this well, the reader is left without any

recommendation as to how this approach is to manifest

itself.

Hemispheric security architecture has also been

outlined by political scientist Donald Schulz on the basis of

his dialogue on the subject with the author.21 The basis for

Schulz’s ideas is a commitment to values, recognition that

cooperation can be achieved if structured properly to respect

sovereignty and achieve common goals, and analysis that

assesses opportunities as exceeding challenges if

approached strategically and consistently. The idea of a

community of the Western Hemisphere is not new; in fact, it

has been around for almost 2 centuries.22

It is important to note that in the aftermath of the

terrorist attacks on the United States, key members of the

OAS wanted to contribute materially to our counterterrorist

campaign, but invoking the Rio Treaty, a relic of our Cold

War collective defense measures, provided little military

support because it has no effective avenue for military

cooperation.23 If the OAS security structure is lacking,24 so

is the current strategic approach of the United States

toward the Western Hemisphere. There is no single military

command that encompasses the Americas. Currently, we

8
have bilateral military arrangements with Mexico and

Canada.25 All military activity with governments from

Guatemala to Chile is under the U.S. Southern Command

(SOUTHCOM).

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

has been in effect since 1995, yet until 2002 there was no

security structure to match it. The North American

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) provides for a

measure of security cooperation with Canada, but there is

little or none with Mexico. This security shortcoming is in

the process of being resolved, but the level of Canadian and

Mexican cooperation is uncertain.

After America26 was attacked, the United States finally

recognized that homeland defense was important and

required a strategic response. Much of the focus was

domestically oriented, but some argued for a broader

approach to security.

In the first place . . . we do not live on a remote island, and we

know that threats can touch us. We are part of North America,

sharing vast borders with Canada and Mexico. There can be no

homeland security unless we significantly improve security

cooperation with our neighbors. Current arrangements are, at

best, incomplete.

Second, an existing economic arrangement requires

politico-military support. Canada, Mexico, and the United

States are members of the North American Free Trade

Agreement. This economic community has the potential to

serve as a gateway to improved security cooperation, as long as

we remember two imperatives—strategic restraint and

reassurance. We must respect the sovereignty of our

neighbors by treating them as partners. Also needed is better

communication on how to work together to promote mutual

benefit.

Third, our true strategic destiny is as part of the Americas, a

community of states from Canada to Chile that have largely

embraced democracy and capitalism. President Bush is

committed to making this vision a reality, as the Free Trade

Area of the Americas moves ahead. Such an agreement

9
requires better security arrangements than we have within our

command structure or exists within the framework of the

Organization of American States.27

Presently, the United States is working to construct a

Northern Command that will—no big surprise—include our

NAFTA partners. What started out as a push for a

Homeland Defense Command evolved into a command

structure that encompasses North America; this change

appears to have come from Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld and his top aides, who were apparently more

influenced by views outside than inside the Pentagon.

Rumsfeld was critical of the existing Unified Command

Plan (UCP), which approaches the world according to

regions. As Thomas Ricks noted based on conversations

with Rumsfeld, “Transnational concerns, such as terrorism

and weapons proliferation, have not received adequate

attention from senior commanders, who don’t have the

capabilities to coordinate with law enforcement or to track a

threat from one continent to another.”28 Ricks also brought

to public attention that the Pentagon was considering

formation of an Americas Command. It would be tasked

with the defense of the Western Hemisphere, with

homeland defense being part of the mission.29

An Americas Command is not a new idea. The National

Defense Panel (NDP) in 1997 recommended creating such a

security organization. The NDP envisioned a command that

included the United States, Canada, Mexico, Central

America, the Caribbean Basin, and all of South America. It

retained SOUTHCOM as a subordinate (or sub-unified)

command, and created a Homeland Defense Command as

another subordinate command.30 While the NDP concept of

an Americas Command is sound, strategic, and needed, the

panel’s rationale for a Homeland Defense Command (HDC)

is flawed. The panel argued that the HDC “would be created

for such missions as augmenting border security

operations, defending North America from information

warfare attacks and air and missile attacks, and

augmenting consequence management of natural disasters

10
and terrorists attacks.”31 Such responsibilities are

important, but not sufficient in scope to warrant a single

command, particularly since the military has a supporting

role—civilian law enforcement agencies have the leading

role. Secondly, a command with such a moniker would be

appropriate if it only involved the United States. Since

Canada and Mexico will be included in the command, the

command name is an affront to our NAFTA partners.32

Thus, a Northern Command makes much greater sense.33

Canada and Mexico as Security Partners

of the United States

Since September 11, both Canada and Mexico have

expressed great interest and concern about a new security

architecture for North America. It should be of surprise to

no one that the Canadians are more favorably oriented

toward increased security cooperation. NORAD provides a

working framework for security cooperation. Historically,

the United States and Canada worked closely during World

War I and II; this cooperation produced a strong defense

partnership. Ottawa and Washington are also members of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Most Canadians see the U.S. initiative to create a

Northern Command through the dilemma that journalist

Jim Travers describes as the choice to “share defence or be

tossed aside.”34 Borrowing an analogy from classical

literature, Travers describes Canada’s security challenge:

Shocked awake by Sept. 11, Washington, or Gulliver, is not

about to be constrained by the petty concerns of the

Lilliputians. Canada is the most exposed of the Lilliputians.

Perched precariously along the great undefended cliché and

historically committed to securing America’s back door, this

country faces an unambiguous imperative: It can share

responsibility for continental defence or it can be tossed aside

as Gulliver stirs.35

Reflected in these choices are concerns about the

adequacy of Ottawa’s military, the uneasiness of living next

11
to a superpower, and concern that Canada might be

abandoned if it does not act to pull its share of continental

security mission. But worse scenarios are seen by other

Canadians.

Dr. Douglas Bland believes that the recent terror attacks

significantly have changed the important relationship

between the two countries. Critical to this change is the

huge impact that would result from Canada not doing its

part to cooperate in preventing terrorism from penetrating

the United States from the north.

Thus, Canada’s most important coalition may be headed for

radical transformation, from one based since about 1950 on a

threat of over-the-pole air attacks and from 1989 on no threat at

all, to an overwhelming, all-encompassing concern for the

security of the homeland. In this circumstance, the United

States will undoubtedly look to Canada to share the burden of

homeland security in hitherto unimagined ways, which will

impose considerable tangible and intangible costs on

Canadians. Should Canada hesitate or seek to avoid these new

obligations, it seems likely that the United States will blockade

its northern border, and undertake covert intelligence

operations in Canada whenever the president deems it

necessary. Canada faces no greater foreign and defence policy

challenge than finding an appropriate and credible way to

reassure the United States that Canada can live up to the 1938

Roosevelt-Mackenzie King agreement that no attack on the

United States could come through Canadian territory.36

While Bland’s concerns are not to be taken lightly, the

good news is that Ottawa is moving more toward

Washington on security matters, while still raising

concerns about sovereignty and consultation. Canada has

taken significant steps to improve border security in

recognition of the need “to safeguard the Canadian and the

American homeland,” notes Michael Kergin, the

Ambassador of Canada to the United States.37 Perhaps

recognizing that the costs are too unbearable should Ottawa

not improve its security posture, it is strengthening

bilateral relations with Washington. Ambassador Kergin

12
puts it bluntly, “Like many countries in the world today, the

United States is Canada’s primary foreign policy concern . . .

without the United States, Canada is pretty isolated.”38 He

argues that Canadian interests and U.S. interests have

much more in common—citing trade, rule of law, and

democracy—than any differences that exist, so it is wise to

join as partners in the war against terrorism.39

Essentially, John Manley, the Deputy Prime Minister of

Canada—now Finance Minister—argues along the same

lines. A complex set of intersecting issues—border reform,

transportation, law enforcement, financial and

immigration issues, and security cooperation—challenge

Canadians to make what Manley calls “clear and conscious

choices as a nation . . . what we value, what we will seek,

what we must defend—and, ultimately, what we are willing

to do in order to achieve these.”40 Acknowledging that

sovereignty is an important concern of Canada, he argues

that it “is fundamentally about making choices, and about

acting responsibly in the national interest so that we are

able to preserve that field of choice for ourselves...

sovereignty must be dynamic—or else our country cannot

be.”41 Thus, if Canada wants to preserve its favorable

situation—the number one trading partner of the United

States—it must get beyond the shrill rhetoric about

“American imperialism,” something that is present in

academic circles and the media.42 Manley recognizes that

Canada can better preserve its sovereignty by

constructively engaging with the United States to address

bilateral responsibilities as well as benefits—there is no

free lunch. He addresses the interdependent relationship:

Canada and the U.S. are fully cognizant that the bulk of our

massive two-way trade derives from companies operating

near, around and across the border. This remains a key driver

for jobs and prosperity in both Canada and the USA, and lies

at the core of our economic security. But we know that without

a foundation of confidence—meaning consistent,

comprehensive and effective security measures—this will

falter. . . . Much of the almost 135-year history of our nation

13
has been about how we establish and exercise our sovereignty

within a shared North American space—almost always

accompanied by ritual fear and anxiety over how a greater

North America might mean a diminished Canada (this has

always struck me as absurd, since we occupy the bulk of North

American territory!).43

Until recently, Canada was known for its peacekeeping

and little else in the military realm, at least since the end of

World War II. That has changed significantly in 2002. Now

Canadian military forces are engaging in combined combat

operations with the United States in Afghanistan against

al-Qaida fighters, and are performing very well. Even before

Canadian troops entered the fray, they were well-regarded

by American commanders. Referring to the soldiers of the

Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, Colonel Frank

Wiercinski told reporters that because the soldiers were

well-trained and equipped, they would be integrated fully in

his task force. Wiercinski stated, “We want to bring

capability that we both can put together, and by doing that

make ourselves stronger by using the best of each. And I

think we’ve done that. They bring capability, not liability, to

this fight. ...I know (the Patricias) are a great battalion.”44

Canadian military forces’ ability was verified on March

14, 2002, when they engaged in a fierce battle near

Shah-e-Kot as part of Operation ANACONDA. The

Canadian-American offensive demonstrated the resolve

and abilities of both countries. It was also a historic event,

since it was almost 50 years—dating back to the Korean

War—that a Canadian military force had participated in a

ground offensive.45 Canadian performance obviously

impressed U.S. military commanders because the Princess

Patricia unit was placed in charge of Operation HARPOON,

a mission to flush out enemy fighters that remained in

mountainous caves.46

If Canada is moving deliberately to improve its security

cooperation with the United States, the same cannot be said

for Mexico. Military actions do not match the political

rhetoric—even if President Vicente Fox’s election in 2000

14
foreshadowed many democratic gains for Mexico, along

with the decline of the Institutional Revolutionary Party

(PRI). Of all the major militaries in the hemisphere—these

include the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil,

Argentina, and Chile—Mexico is in need of the greatest

reform and improvement. Though large in size, a force of

240,000 members, it is neither well-trained nor

well-equipped, and is not well-regarded by other militaries

within the Americas. It still operates as a feudal

bureaucracy, a vestige of the corporatism found under the

old one-party-dominated political system.

The Mexican military is almost completely focused on

domestic security and is a virtual neophyte in the

international system. Constitutionally, it is prohibited from

most forms of deployment outside the borders of Mexico.

This institutionalized policy of nonintervention was a

rational response for a nonaligned state that did not want to

get involved in the Cold War duel between the United States

and the Soviet Union. It no longer makes sense in this new

century. But the military in Mexico extremely resists

change, save for an occasional episode of humanitarian

assistance in Central America. Even so, the hermeticallysealed glass bubble in which the military has thrived is

cracking, exposing it to greater scrutiny, accountability,

and potentially new missions.

Even before Fox was elected as the first non-PRI

president in modern times, the military’s luster was

somewhat tarnished in the mid-to-late 1990s by two major

problems. The first was the public criticism that

arose—President Raúl Salinas de Gortari did little to

protect the military—over their brutal handling of

counterinsurgency operations in Chiapas, Guerrero,

Oaxaca, and other areas in the south. The second was the

exposure and sacking of senior military officers for drug

corruption, as the military assumed a greater role in

fighting drug trafficking.47 By the time the National Action

Party (PAN) succeeded in the national election that brought

Fox to power, the military was beginning to make small

15
changes to blunt criticism, a reactive coping mechanism

more than a vision for future reform. Ginger Thompson

perceptively explains this difficult transition:

Since the 1940’s when military generals gave up control of the

Mexican government and promised to stay out of politics,

civilian sectors of the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary

Party abided by promises to stay out of military affairs,

including scrutiny of the military’s multibillion-dollar budget

and investigations of military conduct. Those quid pro quo

agreements are gradually being challenged by an activist civil

society and Mexico’s first democratically elected president. . . .

For the first time, Mexico’s secretary of defense, Gen. Clemente

Vega Garcia, broke the military’s tradition of official silence and

appeared before Congress to discuss military operations over

the last year.48

Concerning security cooperation, the Mexican Armed

Forces are now challenged to consider new missions beyond

the national territory by a powerful force, the

internationalist agenda of the Fox Administration. The

transition to executive electoral democracy and the success

of NAFTA provides the fuel for the new president’s engine of

change. Mexico is no longer a subregional big fish in a small

pond. It is now a regional or hemispheric power with global

aspirations. As Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan point out,

“Fox has brought new confidence to a nation that

historically has been defensive and inward-looking. Armed

with assurance, Fox has vowed to forge a more equal

relationship with the United States . . .”49 In many areas, he

has succeeded in placing Mexico on a better footing with the

United States, but security cooperation is not one of those

areas yet.

Providing strategic international focus to President Fox

is the duty of Jorge Castañeda, his Foreign Minister, a man

who is most difficult to describe as a political thinker,

mainly because he has moved from being a reactive

nationalist to an energetic internationalist. Castañeda

consistently amazes politicians and journalists with his

quickly devised statements. In early 2001, he astounded

16
listeners during a radio interview when he presaged a new

turn in foreign policy for Mexico.

Mexico said yesterday that it is open to the possibility of

joining United Nations peacekeeping operations around the

world, signaling a foreign policy shift in Latin America’s

second-most-populous nation. ‘Yes, there will be more active

participation,’ Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda said. ‘If we

were asked to participate and we had the capacity to do so, and

we felt it would be useful and agreed with the cause, then we

would consider the possibility,’ Castañeda said. . . . He

said Mexico’s more active international role could come

‘through the armed forces, or other types (of participation)

with civil components, engineers, medical doctors, nurses,

etc.’50

President Fox picked up on independent-minded

Castañeda’s remarks and endorsed them. This was an

important signal to observers. The president found merit in

his foreign minister’s bold assertions on Mexico’s new

international direction for security. Fox’s words were full of

reflection and projection:

‘I believe that we have matured enough to go in the world and

take part in what is happening there, regardless of whether we

like it or not, or whether or not it suits our interests,’ he said.

Fox urged the diplomats to think of themselves as the heralds

of an ‘extremely dynamic’ foreign policy that defends national

interests ‘in an intelligent way.’ In the past, he noted, ‘perhaps

we were a bit isolated because we were ashamed about not

having reached full democracy and this possibly led us to paint

ourselves into a corner with certain political attitudes that we

defended.’ Now, however, Mexico was in a position to assume

its place in the world as ‘proactive defender of human rights’

and let the international community know about far-reaching

changes it has experienced in its social and political

orientation. For that reason, Fox said, his administration

would consider any invitation for Mexican troops to take part

in international peacekeeping missions.51

Despite the executive pronouncements on Mexico’s

interest in participating in international peacekeeping

operations, it was soon clear that the military was not

17
prepared for nor interested in this new mission. When a

very senior ranking military officer was asked if the

Mexican Armed Forces were going to take on international

peacekeeping duties, his quick and emphatic reply was

“impossible!”52 This was not surprising because the military

has several significant obstacles to hurdle in order to

participate effectively in the international arena. The first

challenge is obviously attitude. The senior military leaders

did not grow up with peacekeeping, so they resist adopting

this mission change, a natural organizational reaction.

Second, the military is deficient in logistical and

deployment capabilities. Third, Mexican troops are not

trained for such missions.

Nevertheless, the Mexican Armed Forces are being

forced to change by the other two members of the

Clausewitzian Trinity—the government and the people.53

The government has pressed the military to change,

bolstered by the people who are exposing the military for

human rights abuses and corruption. This process of change

will continue.

If it was just up to the Fox administration, security

cooperation would advance without much trouble, for

administration members understand how interdependent

the North American states have become. The challenge to

bringing Mexico into a security partnership with Canada

and the United States is the resistance of the Mexican

Senate, particularly the opposition parties (PRI and PRD).

Countering Fox, they employed a constitutional provision to

restrict him from traveling to the United States and

Canada. Furthermore, opposition senators criticized the

president for bringing Mexico closer to the United States in

trade and security matters.54 In particular, there was great

concern expressed over Mexico’s signing a new border

agreement with the United States, which PRI

representatives said would “jeopardize territorial rights.”55

They also complained about joint military exercises with the

United States that occurred without legislative approval.

Finally, they railed against the president for working with

18
the United States to create a “unified North American

military command that could subject our armed forces to

foreign command.”56

Therein lies the problem. The legislature is dominated

by nationalistic representatives who are poorly informed

about international affairs. The opposition takes a bit of

truth and weaves it into a mysterious web of international

intrigue. While the United States is deeply interested in

having Canada and Mexico as security partners and

integrated within the emerging Northern Command, there

is nothing threatening to the sovereignty of Canada or

Mexico through this cooperation. But most Mexican

politicians see evil intent in anything Mexico City might do

with Washington.

Moreover, long-term strategic security visions57 have

been confused with current initiatives. The United States is

not interested in subjecting Mexican military units to U.S.

command. But this will not stop Mexican opposition

politicians from making up bizarre stories. Part of the

reason for this is that a prominent journalist for El

Financiero, Dolia Estevez, the leading financial newspaper

in Mexico (or Latin America for that matter), periodically

has written since 1999 about new ideas in security

cooperation within North America. Recently, she wrote

about how Mexico might play a role in the Northern

Command proposed by Washington.58 Obviously she was on

to something. Two days before her article was published, an

Associated Press article by Will Weissert confirmed that

Mexico was interested in security cooperation:

Mexico’s defense secretary, Gen. Clemente Vega, was flying to

Washington on Thursday [April 11, 2002] to discuss military

cooperation that might link U.S., Mexican and Canadian

forces against terrorism in a way that NAFTA has linked

North America’s economies. The plan apparently is based on a

U.S. Army War College report in 1999 that suggested a North

American peacekeeping force that would be headquartered in

the United States. . . . ‘One of the programs the general will

discuss in the United States is a continental command that

19
would use the North American Free Trade Agreement as a

basis,’ a [Mexican] Defense Department spokesman said. . . .

The newspaper El Sol reported on Tuesday that such talks were

part of Vega’s agenda and quoted U.S. officials as saying

discussion of the idea was ‘a positive step.’59

Once the Mexican Senate got hold of these articles, it

added security cooperation as another reason to deny

President Fox travel to the United States. The legislative

accusations elicited a response from the Jorge Castañeda.

He denied that the Northern Command had anything to do

with Mexico; that this was just an internal initiative of the

United States to revise its Unified Command Plan.60

Following that, the U.S. ambassador offered another

explanation to refute the wild claims of the opposition

parties.61 The upshot of all this is that security cooperation

will grow, but very slowly, due to the incredible level of

distrust within the opposition parties.62

Building Security Cooperation Through Brazil

and the Southern Cone Connection.63

Brazil looms large as a political, economic, and military

force with South America, making it a pivotal state.64 It is

arguably the leading force—not in charge but certainly a

strong leadership example that is respected—of the

subregion for several reasons. First, it geographically

dominates South America as the largest country; it is more

than twice as large as the second largest country—

Argentina. Second, Brazil is the seventh largest economy in

the world, far outpacing Argentina (ranked 17th), and

larger than NAFTA member Mexico (ranked 12th).65 Third,

it also leads South America demographically, with over 156

million people, thus making it the second most populated

country in the Americas.66 Fourth, it has substantial

cultural influence within South America and beyond. From

soccer to music, Brazil is admired and emulated.

Fifth, Brazil possesses the largest active duty military

force in South America—second within the Americas

20
behind the United States—with 287,600 personnel in

uniform.67 Brazil’s military has transformed from a strictly

conventional force into a versatile force that has garnered

much peacekeeping experience over the last decade, thus

gaining even more respect from other militaries in the

region.68 That said, most of its peacekeeping experience has

been concentrated in the former Portuguese colonies of

Africa. Closer to home, Brazil was instrumental—along

with Argentina, Chile, and the United States—in the very

successful peacekeeping operation that took place between

Peru and Ecuador in 1995.69 Currently, the greatest portion

of the Brazilian military is deployed in the western part of

the country, protecting the Amazon region, and deterring

guerrilla incursions from Colombia. Of all Colombia’s

geographic neighbors, the one that the guerrillas most fear

as a military force is Brazil.

Lastly, Brazil is the leading force within Mercosur—or

Common Market of the South. It sees itself as a subregional

hegemon in pursuit of continental hegemony through an

expanded Mercosur.70 However, the likelihood of an

expanded Mercosur grows dimmer over time, as the FTAA

movement threatens to engulf or ignore it, largely because

Mercosur has not produced economic results—particularly

from Argentina’s current view. Given all of these factors, it

is easy to see why Brazil is a key piece of the current (and

future) hemispheric puzzle.

If one is wondering why so many facts were detailed

above, it is because most people in the United States know

little about Brazil, and that is most unfortunate and

problematic for resolution of trade and security challenges.

Another outcome of this ignorance about Brazil is what

might best be called the “Aretha Franklin factor.”

Brazilians yearn for R-E-S-P-E-C-T, and rightly complain

when they do not get it. From being overlooked for a

permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council to the

ignorance of the “soft power” leadership Brazil has

demonstrated in South America, it is now even more

determined to achieve greater international standing for

21
what it has done and will continue to strive for politically,

economically, and militarily. Truly Brazil is an enigma in

the international state system, for it is neither a great power

nor a lesser power. Contrary to the assertions of political

scientist Joseph Tulchin, it is neither a rule-maker nor a

rule-taker.71 Brazil’s actions regarding the FTAA process

are proof of this—it does not control the process nor is at the

mercy of the process.

If Mexico is the gateway to a hemispheric community of

nations, then Brazil is the gatekeeper. More than any other

country in South America, Brazil holds the most influence

as to whether cooperation will occur. Concurrently, this

country confounds the critics by its Janus-faced nature. Its

president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, now a devoted free

market disciple, was once a leading critic of capitalism.72

Cardoso’s politics has also changed, from devout socialism

to a blend of democracy, capitalism, and socialism.73

Cardoso’s abiding concern for the poor in his country is

understandable, as it is at once one of the richest and

poorest countries in the Americas—just visit Rio de Janeiro

to understand this bizarre economic paradox.74

Finally, in the security realm, as Brazil portrays to the

international community a strong interest in asserting

itself as a leader, it is also concerned about its inability to

stem the growing violence erupting in the favelas (urban

slums)—call this internal insecurity. While Mexico may

share similar concerns, its domestic difficulties pale in scope

and size when compared to Brazil. Nevertheless,

revolutionary change is not found in Brazil’s past—unlike

Mexico—and it does not appear to be part of its future,

despite concerns over who succeeds Cardoso as president.

As Maria D’Alva Kinzo points out, “political rupture has

never been a feature of the process of change, and Brazil’s

current democratization has not diverged from this

historical pattern.”75 Instead of revolution, Brazilians are

more concerned that lawless urban protectorates will

continue to grow, forcing the country to become more like a

police state and less like a democracy.

22
What is now motivating Brasilia to give more favorable

consideration to security cooperation, particularly as it

relates to the Colombian security conundrum, is an evolving

realization that it must play a role in countering the

spillover effects. Initially, Brazil balked at Plan Colombia,

just like other neighboring countries. One complaint was

that the United States failed to consult Brazil, preferring to

focus on a major bilateral deal with Colombia, with lesser

deals for Bolivia and Peru. This was a valid objection as it is

clear that regional approaches are required to the problems

in and spreading from Colombia.76 On the other hand, part

of the problem was Brazil’s initial resistance to cooperate on

an approach to quelling the contagion that crosses borders.

Brazil saw this as someone else’s problem. Over the last

year, this has changed. Brazilians now recognize two

important strategic challenges that must be handled, one

domestic and the other international.

While the Brazilian military does not fear Colombian

guerrillas as a threat to the country’s territorial

sovereignty, the military is becoming increasingly

concerned about the negative effects of drug trafficking,

arms smuggling, and logistics—such as the trade in

precursor chemicals for cocaine production—upon the

stability of Brazil. Privately, there is acknowledgement that

the drug trade has fueled a huge increase in criminal

activity, so much so that many favelas are now classified as

“off limits” to government authority—unless they employ

military or quasi-military operations—because of the

well-armed and violent gangs that find sanctuary there.

Senior officials, military and civilian, admit that something

must be done to stem this tide, and pursuing partnerships

with other states is a necessary endeavor within South

America.77

If Brasilia does not come up with a significant role in

aiding regional security, there will be major negative

consequences. Internationally, Brazil is compelled to act or

lose any leadership momentum it may have built; it will be

viewed as a soft power state that is devoid of hard power.

23
This is not to say that Brazil—or the international

community—should intervene directly in Colombia,78

rather it has many options to consider that can facilitate the

sharing of information to track and intercept transborder

challenges to state authority and stability. This is a most

difficult mission for Brasilia to take on, particularly since

there are internal and external criticisms to overcome.79

Nevertheless, there is a growing instability along the

Andean Ridge and beyond; this is a clarion call for Brazilian

leadership in security cooperation. Without it, there will

greater instability throughout region, no matter what the

United States might do.

Argentina.

The land of silver is another paradox. As Argentina has

contracted economically, its military has become a more

professional, though smaller, force. Proof of this was

demonstrated during the recent Argentine political,

economic, and social crisis, where the military stayed in the

barracks. As Professor Andres Fontana of Belgrano

University recently stated, “There has definitely been a

change of values and mentality.”80 This is not the military of

Juan Peron or even Leopoldo Galtieri. Today the military is

not a threat to the state. Civil-military relations are strong,

largely because the military does not see itself as a primary

actor in the resolution of political disputes, nor does it want

to control the state. When interviewed about the turmoil in

Argentina, Lieutenant General Ricardo Brinzoni,

commander of the Argentine Army, said that “resorting to

‘the military option’ was no longer possible because both

civilians and the military preferred it that way.”81 The

extensive and unpleasant experience with military rule

caused an important change in how the military should

relate to the government and society.

With a total of 41,400 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and

marines, the military is significantly smaller than what it

was just 2 decades ago. Nonetheless, with this major force

24
reduction, Argentina can still claim to be one of the most

progressive peacekeeping forces in the world. However, this

distinction has come at a high price according to analysts for

Jane’s Defence Weekly:

In a world where nearly all armed forces have seen great

changes in recent years, Argentina’s armed forces are in a

class of their own. Until the disaster of the 1982

Falklands/Malvinas War, the armed forces boasted great

political sway in addition to military significance. However,

the past 15 years have seen the armed forces slashed in size,

lose political power and face massive budget cuts . . . They have

also totally changed their strategic perceptions of their

neighbours and former rivals . . . Peacekeeping and peace

enforcement have become major roles for the Argentine forces.

This decade alone, they have deployed to Africa, Cambodia,

the Caribbean, Central America, Cyprus, the former

Yugoslavia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. But those

operations have been conducted on a shoestring budget and

the resource benefits to the forces, in many ways, have not

been recouped. Despite President Carlos Menem’s use of the

armed forces in his determined policy of bringing

international respectability to Argentina, they have not

received much priority on matters outside that role.82

Diplomatically, Argentina enjoys good relations with

Brazil and Chile through Mercosur and numerous

combined military exercises. These exercises or

confidence-building measures (CBMs) are designed to

promote transparency, understanding, trust, and shared

democratic values. They have been an important initial step

in building security cooperation.83 Even so, without

increased funding, Argentina will be hard-pressed to

maintain a modern, well-trained, and significant—in

size—military force. Its further decline would challenge its

ability to remain a neutral actor in the domestic political

realm.

During the 1990s, Argentina became one the United

States’ closest allies in the Americas. It enjoys a special

status as a non-NATO ally, and for all intents and purposes,

functions as a quasi-member of NATO. It may be

25
geographically separated from Europe, but enjoys a

convergence of interests with the NATO that ranges from

peacekeeping to peace enforcement. In the realm of

cooperative security, Argentina is determined to become

NATO’s South Atlantic partner.84 It is also an advocate of a

regional security system, and recognizes that transnational

security issues require better cooperation within South

America, and the Americas as a larger entity.

Argentina’s peacekeeping initiatives are very

farsighted. Though geographically placed in the Southern

Cone of South America, it has soldiers (and police) deployed

all over the world on peacekeeping missions. At last count,

the U.N. had 612 Argentinean soldiers and police deployed

on various missions on several continents.85 Argentina

consistently ranks in the top 20 to 25 countries among

contributors to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It ranks

second in South America behind Uruguay. Perhaps it

greatest international military achievement to date is its

membership in the multinational Standby High Readiness

Brigade (SHIRBRIG) designed expressly for U.N.

peacekeeping. Led by Denmark, this unit consists of

soldiers from Argentina, Austria, Canada, Finland, Italy,

Jordan, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania,

Spain, and Sweden. SHIRBRIG has evolved since its

inception in 1995, when it was little more than an idea, to

today, where if activated by the U.N., it would consist of four

to five thousand soldiers. It is the rapid reaction force that

many have long called for to deal with emergencies that

develop quickly and with little notice.86

Within Argentina, the military can proudly claim

ownership of Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto

para de Paz (CAECOPAZ), an Argentine joint peacekeeping

operations center. CAECOPAZ was inaugurated by

President Carlos Menem on June 27, 1995. Located in the

garrison of Campo de Mayo, not far from the capital city of

Buenos Aires, it provides instruction in Spanish.

Particularly significant is that the school is multinational—

open to all countries—and sanctioned by the Department of

26
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the U.N.87 This school

and Argentina’s membership in SHIRBRIG represent a

commitment by the military to transformation, from an

archaic territorial force to a modern, intelligent,

well-trained, international force that serves the needs of

democracy and advances the country’s standing

internationally.88

Chile.

Though small in population, with just over 15 million

people, Chile stands out in a major way on the regional and

world stage. It is without question the strongest democracy

in South America, low in corruption and high in

opportunity. It is an economic powerhouse, largely due to

careful planning and difficult choices. More than a decade

ago, Chile developed a long-term free trade strategy and

paid the short-term cost of economic dislocation, losing

thousands of jobs in the textile industry, but eventually

developed even more positions for workers in a vibrant

export economy that is the envy of the world. President

Ricardo Lagos explains:

It seems to me that what we have been able to accomplish in

Chile is important from the point of view of a small country

that decided that in this century, the 21st, we are going to be

living in a global economy. So, when we are talking about

trade, we are talking about the kind of development that we

have in our own country today. It’s true that during the last

decade we were able to double our gross domestic product. It’s

true that during the last decade only two countries were able

to have a bigger rate of growth than Chile, China and

Singapore . . . the kind of opening of the Chilean economy

requires us to have a very strong commitment to this kind of

free trade. Of course we belong to Latin America, and in

Mercosur countries we are associate members of Mercosur,

and the reason we are not full members of Mercosur is the

difference in tariffs.89

Chile has excellent relations with its neighbors in South

America except with Bolivia, mainly due to past conflicts

27
that resulted in a territorially reduced Bolivia and a greater

Chile. Yet, while it seeks comity, Chile is known for its

tendency to set its own course in political, economic, and

military matters. Having never lost a war, and possessing a

model economy and a political system that is arguably more

progressive than the United States, it is understandable

how Chile is able to carry itself proudly in international

affairs (post-Pinochet era). More importantly, it is a global

player—with impeccable credentials—that sees its future

depending upon the vitality of its hemispheric and

international partners. Its relations with the United States

are very close, yet Chile has not lost its independent streak,

carefully but firmly chiding Washington when it moved too

slowly on formal recognition of Chile as a vital trade

partner.

The Chilean military reflects the progressive norms of

the country. Its active duty force of 87,500 makes it the

largest military on a per capita basis within South

America.90 It is well-trained, highly educated, wellequipped, and well-respected within the Americas. The

military’s funding is bolstered by a major infusion of money

annually from the “copper law,” in addition to its regular

military budget.91 Chile’s military has a strong partnership

with the United States. Evidence of this can be found in

numerous cooperative training missions and the

willingness of Chile to purchase our military hardware.92

Internally, the Chilean military has improving civilmilitary relations.93 The military leadership is committed to

respecting civilian authority, even if it means adjusting to

further scrutiny and transparency, and this is aided by the

fact that as an institution it is highly respected by society.

Chile is a relative novice at peacekeeping, having been

focused more on conventional military doctrine, training,

and operations. While it has experience in conflict

resolution that dates back to the 1930s, it has only become a

significant contributor to U.N. operations within the last

decade. Its most significant U.N. operation so far was in

East Timor, where Chile provided an aviation brigade,

28
along with some ground forces.94 The interest in

peacekeeping is growing. Currently, Chile has a total of 44

military and police deployed on U.N. peacekeeping

operations.95 No doubt this commitment will increase in the

future.

Putting It All Together: The New Hemispheric

Security Architecture.

Before explaining how this new system should operate,

it is important to establish what the ends are. The principal

result sought is to transform our security architecture from

an archaic collective defense framework to one that

reinforces our incipient hemispheric community. It must be

able to capitalize on the synergy resulting from shared

values and interests. It must strengthen our democratic ties

and improve opportunity by addressing the current security

needs of the Americas. This raises many questions. What

should this new system be able to do? What controls are

needed? Who are the key players? What international

organization is best suited to managing and directing this

security system?

An important principle that should guide security

cooperation is that to be effective, it must be organized,

professional, and able to quickly respond to problems. We no

longer need a body of bureaucrats that is adept at discussion

but empowered to do little. This new security architecture

must be empowered to act decisively and competently. After

all, if we—the states of the region—are going to construct a

hemispheric economic community, there had better be a

security community that can protect it, and without delay.

In essence, the new security architecture must have

standing multinational forces (SMFs) that can handle

humanitarian assistance missions, peacekeeping, peace

enforcement, and other small scale contingencies (SSCs).96

Agreements, structures, and organizations are meaningless

unless they can perform. Thus, only standing multinational

units can truly execute this requirement. Anyone who has

29
served in the initiation phase of an operation such as

peacekeeping or peace enforcement understands just how

important this new standard (of SMFs) is, since the level of

chaos is often under-reported in official channels. Thus, the

primary end of this security structure is that it must be able

to deploy expeditiously—regionally and globally—to deal

with natural disasters, border disputes, failed states,97 and

other challenges that rapidly emerge.

To safeguard the sovereignty of states, effective controls

are needed to prevent any one state from dominating the

agenda and controlling the missions. If we are truly to

uphold liberal values, each state must be respected and

given an important say as to whether its soldiers can be

employed on a mission considered by the security structure.

Without broad agreement of member states, the security

architecture loses the legitimacy that is the foundation for

security cooperation.

International organizations, once created, are difficult to

replace, and almost impossible to dismember once they have

decades of experience. The OAS certainly is an example of

this, albeit on a regional basis. Yet, even though its security

structure—the Rio Treaty—is largely obsolete, there is

potential for major reform and revitalization. Moreover,

having seen positive changes in other OAS areas—such as

the Democratic Charter98—it is no longer good form to

impugn the ability of this venerable organization to

embrace change and become more relevant to the Americas.

The fact is only one body speaks for the Americas, and it is

the OAS.

If the security architecture relies most upon standing

multinational units, are there any examples to follow in

form or function? A current “almost-standing” multinational unit is, of course, SHIRBRIG. It is, however, more

standby than standing. Reaching back to World War II

there was a standing multinational unit that is an excellent

model to consider.

30
The First Special Service Force (FSSF) was a

collaborative effort between Canada and the United States.

Colonel Robert T. Frederick of the U.S. Army was given

command of this multinational brigade, formed in 1942, to

conduct cold weather operations.99 Originally configured as

a commando unit that could conduct diversionary attacks

through airborne delivery of personnel and special

transport vehicles, the unit was converted into a versatile

assault group.100 The Canadian and American soldiers

worked well together, and took great pride in their elite

status, having been recruited from lumberjacks, forest

rangers, hunters, woodsmen, game wardens, prospectors,

and explorers.101 They trained on skis and developed

proficiency on a host of weapons.

Through the generation of day-to-day habits in the training

program the Force had become, in itself, an individuality, a

separate entity that was neither Canadian nor U.S., but just

plain Special Service Force. The initial selection of rugged

individualists to man this force, and of highly aggressive,

capable officers to lead it had produced a singular unit made

up of what has been described as ‘the leaders of gangs.’ The

individual soldier, almost to a man, had resourcefulness,

mental and physical toughness, and an initiative that

surmounted all obstacles.102

From the Aleutians to European campaign in Italy and

France, members of the Devil’s Brigade (as the enemy called

them) fought with great valor and success, often sustaining

significant casualties. Their incredible esprit de corps made

them very aggressive in battle, much to the chagrin of the

other side. The Canadian journalist Sholto Watt, of the

Montreal Standard, summarized the accomplishments of

the unit:

But the importance of the First Special Service Force in world

history, and their influence on the future, are much greater

than even their outstanding military merit would deserve.

The significance of this Force is that it was the first joint

[multinational] force of its kind, drawn from two neighbor

democracies, and that it was a brilliant success throughout. It

31
is by no means fanciful to see it in the prototype of the world

police of that world community which has for so long been the

dream of goodwill....103

It is time to bring back the First Special Service Force,

making it the cornerstone for hemispheric security

cooperation in the 21st century. Certainly there is no need to

wait for another Great War to operate in a truly

multinational manner. Through the descriptions of selected

states in North and South America it should be clear that

they form the building blocks for regeneration of the FSSF.

Canada, the United States, and Mexico could cooperate in

providing military forces to create the First Special Service

Force (North) or FSSF(N). Brazil, Argentina, and Chile

could cooperate in providing the force structure to build the

First Special Service Force (South) or FSSF(S).

These units represent the beginning phase of the new

security cooperation architecture, which is to say that more

forces can be added to the security structure or even to each

force. For example, shortly after the FSSF(S) is formed,

other states may desire to join. Uruguay and Paraguay

might very well be interested in joining with Brazil,

Argentina, and Chile. They should be encouraged to become

involved and expand the partnership. If states within

Central America, the Andean Ridge of South America, and

the Caribbean want to form an FSSF, they should be

encouraged to do so. A long-term goal is to have all states

within the Americas represented.

What should comprise an FSSF? To execute competently

a wide range of missions, it should have combat arms,

combat service, and combat service support units.104 It will

also need rotary and fixed wing aviation units to ensure that

these brigades are rapidly deployable.105 To be a fully

capable and self-contained brigade task force, it must have

between five and six thousand soldiers and airmen (though

it might also have marine and navy liaison detachments).

Since they will be multinational, interoperability

challenges must be addressed. Each force must have a

32
primary and secondary language—some might even speak

three languages. Equipping the force has to be sorted out in

a manner that uses the best equipment from member

countries and encourages cooperative ventures among

defense industries. Only the best soldiers should be

permitted to join this elite force, because they will need

great intelligence, dedication, and understanding to

succeed as members. Those that join the FSSF should

expect to sign on for a minimum of 3 years to facilitate using

all their talents and maintain the highest level of unit

readiness. Each FSSF will provide liaison sections to other

FSSF units to improve training, deployment, and mission

coordination.

Perhaps the most important benefit from recreating the

FSSF is the true understanding, respect, friendship, and

trust that is realized when soldiers train together, live

together, and socialize together. Anyone who has served in

an elite military unit understands the bonding that occurs

when troops join with a common purpose and build

teamwork to bring out the best in individuals and succeed as

a collective entity. The only problem with combined training

exercises is that they end just as soldiers from various

countries are beginning to get acquainted. That is an

important reason for developing standing multinational

units. The synergy realized in international military

relations from an FSSF will be immense and positive

because FSSF members will return to their countries with

different ideas about cooperation and will have an impact on

the views of other soldiers, officers, family members, and

neighbors.

No matter how command and control is accomplished,

there will be complaints. Putting that aside, control of the

force for deployment can only rest with the OAS, in a new

security council that will oversee the FSSF units. To respect

the sovereignty of states that have military forces within an

FSSF, each state must provide express consent for each

mission chosen by the OAS. Unless all states agree, the force

cannot be deployed. Using this rule supports two important

33
requirements noted earlier: strategic restraint and

reassurance. Large states cannot manipulate smaller states

into executing an agenda that is contrary to their values

and/or interests. Making consultation with all states a

requirement alleviates the concerns that smaller states

might have. An important by-product of this rule is that it

engenders consultation, consideration, fairness,

transparency, and more deliberate and diverse

decisionmaking.

As to day-to-day command of the proposed FSSF(N) and

FSSF(S), another issue for the gnashing of teeth, only so

much can be shared. Ultimately, there can only be one

commander of a military organization. FSSF(N) should be

commanded by a brigadier general from the United States,

with deputy commanders from Canada and Mexico.

FSSF(N) should be operationally under the Northern

Command, even though it is ultimately accountable to the

OAS. FSSF(S) should be commanded by a brigadier general

from Brazil, with deputy commanders from Argentina and

Chile. Operationally, FSSF(S) should be under a regional

command based in Brazil. Both the United States and

Brazil should serve as leaders for the reasons already

outlined. With leadership comes responsibility, meaning

that these countries will have to provide significant

physical, human, and financial resources for these units

which will be based in their countries, although training

missions must be executed in all member countries.

The OAS Security Council responsible for the

deployment of each FSSF is also responsible for organizing

higher level headquarters and additional forces depending

on mission requirements. The Security Council should be

composed of Canada, the United States, Mexico, Brazil,

Argentina, and Chile as a starting point. The OAS Security

Council can have as many as 10 members, with some

designated on a rotating basis. Any recommendation for

action by this council must first receive a two-thirds

majority vote of support from the OAS General Assembly.

34
The primary role of FSSF units is to serve on missions

within the Western Hemisphere. The secondary role is to be

available for offer by the OAS to the U.N. for peacekeeping

missions. Even so, individual states may be the catalyst for

generating the support of such a mission. Given the high

probability of deployment, no more than one FSSF should be

deployed outside of the Americas until such time as there

are at least three such separate brigades in the OAS

inventory. The logic is that too many U.N. commitments

could deprive the hemisphere of a force to respond to its own

emergency situations. The OAS would do well to have a

security liaison section assigned to the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations, in order to

improve mission planning, coordination, and response.

Recommendations.

It is crucial that the United States take the lead in

expanding security cooperation within the Western

Hemisphere. The next 5-10 years are critical to achieving a

greater sense of community within the Americas. If

opportunities are not met with action, undoubtedly this

would result in the loss of standing of the United States in

the eyes of its hemispheric neighbors, not to mention the

damage done to advancement of interests and values. Given

this, the following recommendations are made:

Conduct a hemispheric security conference with the

support of the OAS by October 1, 2003. The conference

should focus on the creation of a new security

structure. The United States should enlist the

support of Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and

Chile as cosponsors of the conference. A new OAS

security structure should be created and staffed by

January 1, 2004.

Reactivate the First Special Service Force (FSSF),

with a northern unit consisting of Canada, the United

States, and Mexico. This unit will be known as

35
FSSF(N). A second southern unit consisting of Brazil,

Argentina, and Chile will be known as FSSF(S). These

units are to be operable by October 1, 2004.

Ensure that the FSSF (N + S) is properly filled,

provisioned, and trained, so that it is fully prepared to

deploy within the Americas on a potential mission by

October 1, 2005.

Encourage other member states of the OAS to create

additional FSSFs by October 1, 2005, so that

sufficient units are available by October 1, 2006, to

handle missions within and outside the Americas

simultaneously.

Conclusion.

A new security architecture is needed in the Americas

that reflects the movement toward economic community

and commitment to democratic—more accurately

liberal—values. It should also reflect a new type of

leadership that employs strategic restraint and

reassurance of allies.106 One of the great ironies in life is that

the harder one tries to lead, the less likely that others will

follow. Good leadership, defined as having loyal followers,

occurs when the focus is not so much being in charge, as it is

developing a sense of teamwork that shows respect for the

opinions and ideas of the team. Essentially, this is what soft

power is all about—getting others to do things they see as

being consistent with their own values and interests. The

“sovereignty clause” contained in this new security

architecture reflects soft power. No state is compelled to join

in a mission that it does not support. This builds trust and

confidence.

A subtle but important distinction is that the focus is on

security cooperation, not defense integration. Defense

integration raises a host of sovereignty issues that argue

against such a program. Security cooperation provides

opportunities to improve the way we collectively respond to

36
challenges within and without the Western Hemisphere,

yet under a process that does not upset existing state

defense structures or diminish the authority of the state in

the security realm. It is also important to note that this is an

indirect approach to fighting scourges such as drug

trafficking and guerrilla insurgencies. Cooperation

provides the sharing of information, ideas, and concerns.

This by itself assists states in their duty to protect the safety

and rights of their citizens. This is not the primary duty of

standing multinational units. They can assist, but only

when there is consensus of all member states, which is most

unlikely.

While confidence-building measures were a positive step

in hemispheric security cooperation, it is clearly time to

move on to the next phase, a security system that reflects

the realities of the 21st century and is attuned to regional

security virtues and challenges. Today the Americas need

competent standing multinational units that can uphold

peace and fight natural disasters immediately, not a

bureaucratic machinery that is slow to respond and usually

disorganized when assembled and initially deployed. We

can and must do better. A revised OAS security framework

and First Special Service Force component units are the

best ways to address the challenges of the future, promote

cooperation, strengthen democracy, expand opportunity,

and build lasting trust and respect. Let us get to work to

build a better community of states within the Americas.

ENDNOTES

1. House Committee on International Relations, “Hearing on the

Proposed Fiscal 2003 Budget Request for Foreign Affairs, Federal

Document Clearing House, February 6, 2002.

2. Glen Johnson, “Bush Stresses Latin America as US Priority

Pushes ‘Special Relationship’ with Mexico,” Boston Globe, August 26,

2000, p. A1.

37
3. If the FTAA is not passed by 2005, there is still good reason to

believe that it will continue to be pursued and eventually realized

within the first decade of the 21st century.

4. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great

Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002, pp. 29-54.

5. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint,

and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2001, p. 15.

6. Kenneth Maxwell, “Avoiding the Imperial Temptation: The

United States and Latin America,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 16, Fall

1999, pp. 57-67.

7. Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead, New York: Basic Books, 1990. See

also Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only

Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, New York: Oxford University Press,

2002.

8. I use this term to describe those who often echo the criticisms

furnished by human rights organizations. Their policy positions on

Colombia have not led to peace, but rather have indirectly contributed to

the escalation of violence or abuse of human rights, an ironic twist

indeed. That is not to say that human rights organizations do not play a

constructive role in identifying crucial problems, but rather the

difficulty lies in their inherent biases and inability to articulate effective

strategies to end insurgencies or improve human rights. See, for

example, Robert L. Pollock, “Peace Doesn’t Come From a Process,” Wall

Street Journal, February 28, 2002, p. A18. See also Editorial, “Help for

Colombia,” Washington Post, February 24, 2002, p. B6; and Peter F.

Romero, “Save Colombia,” Washington Post, February 20, 2002, p. A15.

Perhaps the best article on this subject is Mary Anastasia O’Grady,

“Colombia’s Anti-Terrorist Efforts Deserve US Help,” Wall Street

Journal, March 29, 2002, p. A13.

9. I use this term to describe those who have been the unrelenting

advocates for a counterdrug strategy that has largely failed. See for

example General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Efforts to Develop

Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little

Progress and Face Serious Obstacles, Washington: GAO Reports, 2002.

See also Reuters, “Colombia’s Coca Crop Up, U.S. Says,” New York

Times, March 9, 2002, p. 5; and Associated Press, “Thriving Peru Coca

Hampers Drug War,” Associated Press, March 13, 2002.

38
10. Philip Bennett, “Fox’s Cutting Edge; For Mexico’s New

President, the Future Begins at the Border,” Washington Post, January

14, 2001, p. B1.

11. Tom Raum, “Bush Creating New White House Post,” Associated

Press, January 16, 2001.

12. Official Report, Defense Ministerial of the Americas,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995. The second

Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) was held in 1996 in

Bariloche, Argentina. The third DMA was held in 1998 in Cartagena,

Colombia. The fourth DMA was held in 2001 in Manuas, Brazil.

13. J. Fred Rippy, South America and Hemisphere Defense, Baton

Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1941. On a broader basis,

the idea of a hemispheric community dates back to the early 1800s, but

was opposed by the Federalists in the United States and Simon Bolivar

in South America. Another wave of hemispheric solidarity developed in

the 1880s but did not engender much support.

14. Francois Heisbourg, “European Defence: Making it Work,”

Chaillot Papers 42 (September 2000). The European Union (EU) has a

multinational unit—Franco-German Corps—to protect the interests of

member states, and more states are now furnishing units to the EU.

15. Lexington, “Bob Zoellick’s Grand Strategy,” Economist, March

2, 2002, p. 35.

16. Georges A. Fauriol and William Perry, Thinking Strategically

About 2005: The United States and South America, Washington: Center

for Strategic and International Studies, 1999.

17. Ibid, Foreword.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Patrice M. Franko, Toward a New Security Architecture in the

Americas: The Strategic Implications of the FTAA, Washington: CSIS

Press, 2000.

21. Donald E. Schulz, The United States and Latin America:

Shaping an Elusive Future, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, pp. 41-46.

39
22. Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and

Decline, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1954.

23. For elaboration on this, see Joseph R. Núñez, “Homeland and

Hemisphere,” Christian Science Monitor, December 20, 2001, p. 9.

24. Ginger Thompson, “Fox Urges Scrapping of 54-Year Treaty

Between U.S. and Mexico, New York Times, September 8, 2001, p. A6.

President Vicente Fox of Mexico called today for the

dismantling of a 54-year-old treaty between the United

States and Latin American nations that was aimed at

protecting the hemisphere against Communism and

replacing it with pacts that would combat widespread social

ills and organized crime. . . . And he urged the organization

[OAS] to begin work on the development of new regional

strategies that would take on ‘the real threats that stalk us,’

including extreme poverty, human rights abuses,

environmental degradation and natural disaster.

25. This will be true until October 1, 2002, when Northern

Command is formally created. Northern Command, according to the

new Unified Command Plan, will include Canada, the United States,

Mexico, and a portion the Caribbean.

26. The term America is used in recognition of the fact that victims

of the World Trade Center were not just from the United States; they

also included a significant number from Canada, Mexico, Brazil, and

others from the Americas. Of course, victims were also from many other

countries.

27. Núñez, “Homeland and Hemisphere,” p. 9.

28. Thomas E. Ricks, “Military Overhaul Considered,” Washington

Post, October 11, 2001, p. A1.

29. Ibid.

30. National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National

Security in the 21st Century, Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel,

1997, p. 72.

31. Ibid.

32. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Fiscal Year

2003 Department of Defense Budget,” Federal News Service, February

5, 2002, p. 38. In testifying before the Senate Armed Services

40
Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testified that the

new Northern Command “would focus primarily on the defense of the

continental United States and our neighbors. . . .”

33. Núñez, “Homeland and Hemisphere.”

34. Jim Travers, “Share Defence or be Tossed Aside,” Toronto Star,

February 26, 2002, A23.

35. Ibid.

36. Douglas Bland, “Canada and Military Coalitions: Where, How

and with Whom?” Policy Matters, Vol. 3, February 2002, pp. 26-27.

37. Michael Kergin, “Canada and the United States: Facing a New

World Reality—Together,” speech presented to the Greater Miami

Chamber of Commerce, February 6, 2002.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. John Manley, “Address by the Honourable John Manley, Deputy

Prime Minister of Canada and Minister of Infrastructure and Crown

Corporations, to the Canadian Club,” February 11, 2002.

41. Ibid.

42. For a critical assessment of the Canadian-American

relationship see Stephen Clarkson, “Lockstep in the Continental Ranks:

Redrawing the American Perimeter After September 11th,” Canadian

Center for Policy Alternatives, February 2002. See also James Laxer,

“Surviving American Imperialism,” Toronto Star, February 17, 2002,

A13; and Paul Hellyer, “The Americans Will Dictate Our Military

Roles,” Globe and Mail, February 7, 2002, p. A11. For a more balanced

analysis, finding fault with Ottawa and Washington, see Jim Travers,

“Future Bleak if Canada in Lockstep with the U.S.,” Toronto Star,

February 7, 2002, p. A27.

43. Manley.

44. Mitch Potter, “Canadian, U.S. Troops ‘a Team’ in Kandahar: It’s

‘One for All, All for One,’ says top U.S. Commander,” Toronto Star,

February 6, 2002, p. A1.

41
45. Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, “U.S., Allied Forces Patrol

Battle Zone, Pursue Survivors; Canadian Troops Join in Brief

Firefight,” Washington Post, March 15, 2002, p. A14.

46. Bryan Bender, “Canadians Search for Al Qaeda Fighters,”

Boston Globe, March 14, 2002, p. 1. See also Newswire, “US, Canadian

Troops Battle al-Qaida, Associated Press, March 14, 2002; and Steve

Thorne, “Canadians Kill 3 Al Qaeda Fighters,” Toronto Star, March 15,

2002, A10.

47. For more on this, see Joseph R. Núñez, “A New United States

Strategy for Mexico,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 8,

No. 2, Summer 1999.

48. Ginger Thompson, “Rights Group Says Mexico Ignores Abuses

by Military,” New York Times, December 6, 2001, p. A18.

49. Mary Jordan and Kevin Sullivan, “Mexico Steps Into Spotlight;

New President Sets a Bold Course in U.S., Regional Relations,”

Washington Post, January 31, 2001, p. A14.

50. Reuters, “Mexico Could Join U.N. Peacekeeping Efforts

Worldwide; Fox Initiates Shift in Foreign Policy,” San Diego

Union-Tribune, January 5, 2001, A18.

51. Global News Wire, “Fox Announces ‘More Dynamic’

International Role for Mexico,” EFE News Service, January 6, 2001.

52. Conversation related to the author by a colleague who posed the

question to this general officer on August 7, 2001, in the United States

during an official visit.

53. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 89.

54. Susan Ferriss, “Mexico Chief Says Politics Behind Travel Curb,

Fox Ties to U.S. Bring Backlash,” Atlanta Journal—Constitution, April

11, 2002, p. A10. See also Ginger Thompson, “Mexico Bars Its President

From Trips Next Week,” New York Times, April 10, 2002, p. 7; and Kevin

Sullivan, “Travel Ban Reflects Frustration in Mexico With Fox;

President’s Trip Was to Promote Trade; Critics in Congress See Few

Benefits From Close U.S. Ties,” Washington Post, April 11, 2002, p. A18.

55. Ferriss, p. A10.

56. Ibid.

42
57. Such as those presented by the author.

58. Dolia Estevez, “Busca Incorporar a México en Comando

Norteamericano,” El Financiero, April 12, 2002, p. 7.

59. Will Weissert, “Mexican Defense Minister to Discuss Possible

Joint North American Force,” Associated Press, April 10, 2002. The

report cited was written by Colonel Joseph R. Núñez. See also Joseph R.

Núñez, “A New U.S. Strategy for Mexico,” Low Intensity Conflict & Law

Enforcement, Vol. 8, No. 2, Summer 1999.

60. José Luis Ruiz, “No Compete a México Informar Lo Que Hace

EU,” El Universal, April 13, 2002, p. 1.

61. Jeffrey Davidow, “EU No Busca Subordinación De Las Fuerzas

Armadas de México,” El Universal, April 15, 2002, p. 5.

62. Aside from the support by the Fox administration for security

cooperation, there is growing evidence that the Mexican people do not

agree with the international positions of the PRI and PRD. See

Gretchen Peters, “In Mexico, War Between Fox and Congress Escalates;

President Fox Was Supposed to be in the US This Week, But Congress

Said No,” Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2002, p. 7. “So far, most

Mexicans have sided with Fox. A telephone poll by the daily newspaper,

Reforma, found that 67 percent of respondents believed the legislators

acted wrongly; 71 percent saw insufficient reason to block Fox’s trip; and

35 percent gave Congress low marks in general. More than half said

legislators were putting party interests ahead of the national good.”

63. For an excellent overview on security cooperation on Brazil and

the Southern Cone, see David Pion-Berlin, “Will Soldiers Follow?

Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern Cone,”

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, Spring

2000, pp. 43-69. A key point made by Pion-Berlin is that Mercosur has

had a very positive effect on security cooperation between Brazil and the

Southern Cone countries. Pion-Berlin also perceptively notes that the

militaries in these countries have become attuned to the economic

reality that it is in their own best interest to cooperate with other

militaries in the region—one could call this the nexus of economic and

security interdependence.

64. Jean Krasno, “Brazil,” in Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul

Kennedy, eds., The Pivotal States, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999,

pp. 165-168.

43
65. World Bank, World Development Report: 2000-2001, New York,

NY: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 274-275.

66. Regional Surveys of the World, South America, Central America,

and the Caribbean 2000, London, UK: Europa Publications, 2000, p.

149.

67. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military

Balance: 2001-2002, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.

223-224.

68. Max Manwaring, “Brazilian Security in the New World

Disorder: Implications for Civil-Military Relations,” in Richard Millett

and Michael Gold-Biss, eds., Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin

American Military in Transition, Miami, FL: North-South Center Press,

1996, pp. 223-240.

69. For the best source on this conflict see Gabriel Marcella and

Richard Downes, eds., Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere:

Resolving the Ecuador Peru Conflict, Coral Gables, FL: North-South

Center Press, 1999. It should be noted that the senior ranking officer

during the entire peacekeeping mission was a Brazilian general.

70. Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin

American Relations, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.

335-336.

71. Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, “Latin America in the

International System: A Call for Strategic Thinking,” in Joseph S.

Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach, eds., Latin America in the International

System, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 16-31.

72. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and

Development in Latin America, Berkley, CA: University of California

Press, 1979.

73. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Reinventing Democracy in Brazil,

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

74. Alan Gilbert, The Latin American City, London: Russell Press,

1998, pp. 14-17, 42. According to the World Bank (1990), 56 percent of

urban Brazilians were either poor or extremely poor and 87 percent of

the rural population was either poor or extremely poor. No other Latin

American country had more poverty than Brazil.

75. Maria D’Alva G. Kinzo, “Transitions: Brazil,” in Manuel Antonio

Garretón M. and Edward Newman, eds., Democracy in Latin America:

44
(Re)constructing Political Society, Tokyo: United Nations University

Press, 2001, p. 41.

76. I address this in Joseph R. Núñez, Fighting the Hobbesian

Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 27-28, 32-33.

77. Author interviews with senior Brazilian officials, military and

civilian, in the Ministry of Defense, Brasilia, Brazil, June 4-8, 2001.

Author discussions with senior Brazilian military officers in the United

States between March 1 and April 12, 2002.

78. Núñez, Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity, pp. 13-16.

79. For an excellent discussion of Brazil’s challenges in asserting

leadership, see Thomaz Guedes da Costa, “Brazilian Leadership in

South America: Possibilities and Limits at a Crossroads in US-Brazil

Relations,” a chapter in a book on hemispheric security cooperation to be

published by National Defense University Press in 2002.

80. Larry Rohter, “In Argentine Crisis, Military Stays in Step,” New

York Times, February 24, 2002, p. 16.

81. Ibid.

82. James Bain, Marcela Donadio, Ian Kemp, Hal Klepak, and Luis

Tibiletti, “Commitment To New Order,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,

September 29, 1999, p. 1.

83. For more on confidence-building measures, see Francisco Rojas

Aravena, “Confidence Building Measures and Strategic Balance: A Step

Toward Expansion and Stability,” in Joseph S. Tulchin and Francisco

Rojas Aravena, with Ralph H. Espach, eds., Strategic Balance and

Confidence Building Measures in the Americas, Washington: Woodrow

Wilson Center Press, 1998.

84. Jorge Dominguez, Minister of Defence of the Argentine

Republic, “Argentina, NATO’s South Atlantic Partner,” NATO Review,

Vol. 47, Spring 1999, pp. 7-10.

85. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Monthly Summary of

Contributors,” United Nations, March 31, 2002, http://www.un.org/

Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/mar02.htm.

86. H. Peter Langille, “SHIRBRIG: A Promising Step Towards a

United Nations That Can Prevent Deadly Conflict,”Global Policy

Forum, Spring 2000, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/

45
reform/canada.htm. See also Backgrounder, “The Origins and Status of

SHIRBRIG,” Department of National Defence (Canada), September 20,

2000, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2000/sept00/21shirbrig_b_e.htm,

and News Release, “Canadian Forces Deploy Peacekeepers to the U.N.

Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Department of National Defence

(Canada), November 21, 2000, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/

2000/nov00/21eclipse1_n_e.htm.

87. This information was derived from the official CAECOPAZ

Internet site at http://www.un.int/argentina/english/caecopaz/caeco.htm.

88. For an excellent analysis of this military transformation, see

Herbert C. Huser, “Democratic Argentina’s ‘Global Reach:’ The

Argentine Military in Peacekeeping Operations,” Naval War College

Review, Vol. 51, Summer 1998, pp. 55-69.

89. Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile, “U.S.-Chile Free Trade

Agreement and the FTAA,” speech before the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce, Federal News Service, April 16, 2001.

90. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military

Balance, 2001-2002, London: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.

226-227.

91. Guillermo Pattillo, “El Presupuesto de Defensa en Chile:

Procesos Decisionales y Propuesta de Indicadores de Evoloción,”

Security and Defense Studies Review: The Interdisciplinary Journal of

the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Vol. 1, Winter 2001. See also

CESIM, “Ley Reservada del Cobre: Fuente y Mechanismo de Recursos

para la Defensa de Chile,” http://www.cesim.cl/pags/investigacion/

pags/20000606175132.html.

92. Anonymous, “Chile Signs for F-16s, Postpones Frigates; US Now

Focuses on Brazilian F-X,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy,

Vol. 30, February 2002, p. 3.

93. It is important to note that the memories of the Pinochet military

dictatorship have not completely faded away. Even so, the military

appears to be adjusting well to greater civilian control.

94. This information was derived from the Chilean Army,

http://www.ejercito.cl/internacional/timor.htm.

95. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Monthly Summary of

Contributors,” United Nations, March 31, 2002, http://www.un.org/

Depts/dpko/contributors/mar02.htm.

46
96. These operations encompass the full range of military

operations beyond peacetime engagement activities but short of major

theater warfare. Beyond missions already noted, these include

show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, nocombatant

evacuation operations, counterterrorism operations, and disaster relief.

Frankly, it is conceivable that over time and with the support of member

states, these standing multinational forces could be employed in major

theater warfare operations, although such a mission would be a

secondary priority.

97. A good example where such forces might be needed in the future

is Haiti, where the government is experiencing incredible difficulty in

providing basic public services (such as human security) and seems

unwilling to reconcile with opposition parties in any meaningful way.

98. General Assembly of the Organization of American States,

Inter-American Democratic Charter, Lima, Peru: Organization of

American States, September 11, 2001.

99. Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force: A War

History of the North American, 1942-1944, Washington, DC: Infantry

Journal Press, 1947, p. 10. See also Joseph A. Springer, The Black Devil

Brigade: The True Story of the First Special Service Force, Pacifica, CA:

Pacifica Military History, 2002.

100. Ibid., p. 42.

101. Ibid., p. 14.

102. Ibid., p. 47.

103. Ibid., pp. 299-300.

104. For many missions, there is a much greater need for combat

support and combat service support units than combat units. For

example, during humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping

operations, military police, engineers, transportation, and medical

units are often more necessary than infantry units. Ideally, such units

must be able quickly to tailor their organization to meet mission

requirements, which includes leaving some elements behind, using

elements for other purposes, or adding units from outside the

organization. Also, there is a need to integrate special operations forces

as part of the FSSF.

105. The standard for rapid deployment is that a battalion task force

(up to 1,200 personnel) must be able to deploy within 24 hours of

47
notification. The entire FSSF must be able to be deployed within 72

hours of notification.

106. The reassurance of allies is a new theme in Washington that

replaces the vague notion of “engagement.” For more on it, see Donald

H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, September 30, 2001, pp. 11-16.

48
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Colonel Joseph R. Núñez

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell