12556 Federal Register / Vol. 86, No. 41 / Thursday, March 4, 2021 / Proposed Rules 

and recordkeeping requirements and 

Volatile organic compounds. 

Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. 

Dated: February 23, 2021. 

John Blevins, 

Acting Regional Administrator, Region 4. 

[FR Doc. 2021–04060 Filed 3–3–21; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION 

47 CFR Parts 1 and 73 

[AU Docket No. 21–39; DA 21–131; FR ID 

17492] 

Auction of AM and FM Broadcast 

Construction Permits Scheduled for 

July 27, 2021; Comment Sought on 

Competitive Bidding Procedures for 

Auction 109 

AGENCY: Federal Communications 

Commission. 

ACTION: Proposed rule; proposed auction 

procedures. 

SUMMARY: The Office of Economics and 

Analytics (OEA), in conjunction with 

the Media Bureau (MB), announces an 

auction of certain AM and FM broadcast 

construction permits. This document 

seeks comment on minimum opening 

bid amounts and the procedures to be 

used in Auction 109. 

DATES: Comments are due on or before 

March 15, 2021, and reply comments 

are due on or before March 22, 2021. 

Bidding in this auction is scheduled to 

begin July 27, 2021. 

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file 

comments or reply comments in AU 

Docket No. 21–39. Comments may be 

filed using the Commission’s Electronic 

Comment Filing System (ECFS) or by 

filing paper copies. All filings in 

response to the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice must refer to AU Docket 

No. 21–39. The Commission strongly 

encourages interested parties to file 

comments electronically. 

• Electronic Filers: Comments may be 

filed electronically using the internet by 

accessing the ECFS at https://

www.fcc.gov/ecfs/. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Paper Filers: Parties who choose to 

file by paper must file an original and 

one copy of each filing. 

• Filings in response to the Auction 

109 Comment Public Notice can be sent 

by commercial courier or by the U.S. 

Postal Service. All filings must be 

addressed to the Commission’s 

Secretary, Office of the Secretary, 

Federal Communications Commission. 

• Commercial deliveries (other than 

U.S. Postal Service Express Mail and 

Priority Mail) must be sent to 9050 

Junction Dr., Annapolis Junction, MD 

20701. 

• U.S. Postal Service first-class, 

Express, or Priority mail must be 

addressed to 45 L Street NE, 

Washington, DC 20554. 

• Until further notice, the 

Commission no longer accepts any hand 

or messenger delivered filings. This is a 

temporary measure taken to help protect 

the health and safety of individuals and 

to mitigate the transmission of COVID– 

19. 

• Email: OMB and MB also request 

that a copy of all comments and reply 

comments be submitted electronically to 

the following address: auction109@

fcc.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Auction legal questions: Lynne Milne 

or Lyndsey Grunewald at 202–418– 

0660. 

General auction questions: Auctions 

Hotline at 717–338–2868. 

AM/FM service questions: James 

Bradshaw or Lisa Scanlan or Tom 

Nessinger at (202) 418–2700. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a 

summary of the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice, AU Docket No. 21–39, 

DA 21–131, released on February 8, 

2021. The complete text of the Auction 

109 Comment Public Notice, including 

its attachment, is available on the 

Commission’s website at www.fcc.gov/ 

auction/109 or by using the search 

function for AU Docket No. 21–39 on 

the Commission’s ECFS web page at 

www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Alternative formats 

are available to persons with disabilities 

by sending an email to FCC504@fcc.gov 

or by calling the Consumer & 

Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 

418–0530 (voice), (202) 418–0432 

(TTY). 

I. Introduction 

1. By the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice, the Commission 

announces an auction of four AM 

construction permits and 136 FM 

construction permits, with bidding to 

start on July 27, 2021, and seeks 

comment on the procedures to be used 

to conduct Auction 109, as well as upon 

minimum opening bids for the permits. 

2. Auction 109 will offer all of the FM 

radio permits that were previously 

included in the inventory for Auction 

106, as well as six additional FM 

permits. Auction 106 was postponed on 

March 25, 2020, with no appointed date 

for resumption, due to the Covid–19 

pandemic. That auction is now 

canceled; applications submitted by 

entities seeking to participate in 

Auction 106 have been dismissed. All 

applicants wishing to participate in 

Auction 109, regardless of whether they 

may have previously filed a short-form 

application (FCC Form 175) for Auction 

106, will be required to file a new shortform application to participate in 

Auction 109. A window for filing shortform applications to participate in 

Auction 109 will be announced in a 

subsequent public notice in this 

proceeding. 

II. Construction Permits 

3. Auction 109 will offer four AM 

construction permits and 136 FM 

construction permits. Attachment A to 

the Auction 109 Comment Public Notice 

lists each permit to be offered. Under 

the policies established in the Broadcast 

Competitive Bidding Order, 63 FR 

48615, September 11, 1998, an applicant 

may apply for any AM construction 

permit or vacant FM allotment listed in 

Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice. If two or more 

short-form applications (FCC Form 175) 

specify the same AM permit or FM 

allotment, they will be considered 

mutually exclusive, mutual exclusivity 

exists for auction purposes, and the 

construction permit will be awarded by 

competitive bidding procedures. Once 

mutual exclusivity exists for auction 

purposes, even if only one applicant is 

qualified to bid for a particular 

construction permit in Auction 109, that 

applicant is required to submit a bid in 

order to obtain the construction permit. 

4. AM Construction Permits. Auction 

109 will offer four construction permits 

in the AM broadcast service. 

Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice lists the 

community of license, channel, class, 

and coordinates for each AM permit 

being offered. 

5. The construction permits to be 

auction are for four previously licensed 

AM stations, listed in Attachment A to 

the Auction 109 Comment Public 

Notice, the license renewals of which 

were dismissed with prejudice in a 

hearing before the Commission’s 

Administrative Law Judge and the call 

signs deleted. 

6. To facilitate the auction of the four 

AM permits, the four AM facilities will 

be treated as existing allotments, using 

the coordinates, AM station frequency 

and class, and community of license of 

the respective AM facility as listed in 

Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice. The Media 

Bureau has protected these four AM 

stations by freezing the filing of any 

minor modification applications that 

would be mutually exclusive with the 


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facilities of the four AM stations. 

Because protections extend to the 

previously licensed facility parameters, 

applicants will be limited in their 

opportunities to modify these AM 

permits. 

7. FM Construction Permits. Auction 

109 will also offer 136 construction 

permits in the FM broadcast service. 

The construction permits to be 

auctioned include all of the 130 FM 

allotments that had previously been 

listed in the inventory for Auction 106 

as well as six additional FM allotments. 

The FM allotments offered in Auction 

109 include 34 construction permits 

that were offered but not sold or were 

defaulted upon in prior auctions. 

Attachment A identifies those 

previously offered permits and the 

auctions in which they were offered. 

8. Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice lists the specific 

vacant FM allotments for which the 

Commission will offer construction 

permits in this auction, along with the 

reference coordinates for each vacant 

FM allotment. These comprise FM 

channels added to the Table of FM 

Allotments, 47 CFR 73.202(b), pursuant 

to the Commission’s established 

rulemaking procedures and assigned at 

the indicated communities. 

9. Each applicant in the FM service 

has the opportunity to submit a set of 

preferred site coordinates as an 

alternative to the reference coordinates 

for the vacant FM allotment upon which 

the applicant intends to bid. A future 

public notice announcing the 

procedures for Auction 109 will provide 

guidelines for completing FCC Form 175 

and exhibits, including detailed 

instructions for specifying preferred site 

coordinates. 

III. Proposed Bidding Procedures 

10. Simultaneous Multiple-Round 

Auction Design. OEA and MB propose 

to use the Commission’s simultaneous 

multiple-round auction format for 

Auction 109. As described further 

below, this type of auction offers every 

construction permit for bid at the same 

time and consists of successive bidding 

rounds in which qualified bidders may 

place bids on individual construction 

permits. Typically, bidding remains 

open on all construction permits until 

bidding stops on every construction 

permit. OEA and MB invite comment on 

this proposal. 

11. Bidding Rounds. The Commission 

will conduct Auction 109 over the 

internet using the FCC auction bidding 

system. A bidder will also have the 

option of placing bids by telephone 

through a dedicated auction bidder line. 

12. Under this proposal, Auction 109 

will consist of sequential bidding 

rounds, each of which would be 

followed by the release of round results. 

The initial bidding schedule will be 

announced in a public notice to be 

released at least one week before the 

start of bidding. 

13. OEA and MB propose that the 

initial bidding schedule may be 

adjusted in order to foster an auction 

pace that reasonably balances speed 

with the bidders’ need to study round 

results and adjust their bidding 

strategies. Under this proposal, such 

changes may include the amount of time 

for the bidding rounds, the amount of 

time between rounds, or the number of 

rounds per day, depending upon 

bidding activity and other factors. OEA 

and MB request comment on this 

proposal. Commenters on this issue 

should address the role of the bidding 

schedule in managing the pace of the 

auction, specifically discussing the 

tradeoffs in managing auction pace by 

bidding schedule changes, by changing 

the activity requirement(s) or bid 

amount parameters, or by using other 

means. 

14. Stopping Rule. In accordance with 

47 CFR 1.2104(e), stopping rules are 

established before or during multiple 

round auctions in order to complete the 

auction within a reasonable time. For 

Auction 109, OEA and MB propose to 

employ a simultaneous stopping rule 

approach, which means all construction 

permits remain available for bidding 

until bidding stops on every 

construction permit. Specifically, 

bidding will close on all construction 

permits after the first round in which no 

bidder submits any new bid, applies a 

proactive activity rule waiver, or 

withdraws any provisionally winning 

bid (if bid withdrawals are permitted in 

this auction). Thus, under the proposed 

simultaneous stopping rule, bidding 

would remain open on all construction 

permits until bidding stops on every 

construction permit. Consequently, 

under this approach, it is not possible 

to determine in advance how long the 

bidding in this auction will last. 

15. Further, OEA and MB propose to 

retain the discretion to exercise any of 

the following stopping options during 

Auction 109: (1) The auction would 

close for all construction permits after 

the first round in which no bidder 

applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws 

a provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or no bidder places any new 

bid on a construction permit for which 

it is not the provisionally winning 

bidder. Absent any other bidding 

activity, a bidder placing a new bid on 

a construction permit for which it is the 

provisionally winning bidder would not 

keep the auction open under this 

modified stopping rule. (2) The auction 

would close for all construction permits 

after the first round in which no bidder 

applies a waiver, no bidder withdraws 

a provisionally winning bid (if 

withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), or no bidder places any new 

bid on a construction permit that 

already has a provisionally winning bid. 

Absent any other bidding activity, a 

bidder placing a new bid on an FCCheld construction permit (a construction 

permit that does not already have a 

provisionally winning bid) would not 

keep the auction open under this 

modified stopping rule. (3) The auction 

would close using a modified version of 

the simultaneous stopping rule that 

combines (1) and (2) above. (4) The 

auction would close after a specified 

number of additional rounds (special 

stopping rule) to be announced in 

advance in the FCC auction bidding 

system. If this special stopping rule is 

invoked, bids will be accepted in the 

specified final round(s), after which the 

auction will close. (5) The auction 

would remain open even if no bidder 

places any new bid, applies a waiver, or 

withdraws any provisionally winning 

bid (if withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction). In this event, the effect will be 

the same as if a bidder had applied a 

waiver. The activity rule will apply as 

usual, and a bidder with insufficient 

activity will either lose bidding 

eligibility or use a waiver. 

16. OEA and MB propose to exercise 

these options only in certain 

circumstances, for example, where the 

auction is proceeding unusually slowly 

or quickly, there is minimal overall 

bidding activity, or it appears likely that 

the auction will not close within a 

reasonable period of time or will close 

prematurely. Before exercising these 

options, OEA and MB will likely 

attempt to change the pace of the 

auction by changing the number of 

bidding rounds per day or the minimum 

acceptable bids, for example. OEA and 

MB propose to retain the discretion to 

exercise any of these options with or 

without prior announcement during the 

auction. OEA and MB request comment 

on these proposals. Commenters should 

provide specific reasons for supporting 

or objecting to these proposals. 

17. Auction Delay, Suspension, or 

Cancellation. Pursuant to 47 CFR 

1.2104(i), OEA and MB may delay, 

suspend, or cancel bidding in the 

auction, at any time before or during the 

bidding process of Auction 109, in the 

event of a natural disaster, technical 

obstacle, network interruption, 


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administrative or weather necessity, 

evidence of an auction security breach 

or unlawful bidding activity, or for any 

other reason that affects the fair and 

efficient conduct of competitive 

bidding. Notification of any such delay, 

suspension, or cancellation will be 

provided by public notice or through 

the FCC auction bidding system’s 

messages function. If bidding is delayed 

or suspended, the auction may resume 

starting from the beginning of the 

current round or from some previous 

round, or the auction may be cancelled 

in its entirety. This authority will be 

exercised solely at the discretion of OEA 

and MB, and not as a substitute for 

situations in which bidders may wish to 

apply activity rule waivers. OEA and 

MB seek comment on this proposal. 

18. Upfront Payments and Bidding 

Eligibility. In keeping with the usual 

practice in spectrum auctions, OEA and 

MB propose that applicants be required 

to submit upfront payments in 

accordance with 47 CFR 1.2106 as a 

prerequisite to becoming qualified to 

bid. As described below, the upfront 

payment is a refundable deposit made 

by an applicant to establish its 

eligibility to bid on construction 

permits. Upfront payments that are 

related to the specific construction 

permits being auctioned protect against 

frivolous or insincere bidding and 

provide the Commission with a source 

of funds from which to collect payments 

owed at the close of the bidding. As 

required by 47 CFR 1.2106(a), a former 

defaulter must submit an upfront 

payment equal to 50 percent more than 

the amount that would otherwise be 

required. 

19. OEA and MB seek comment on an 

appropriate upfront payment for each 

construction permit being auctioned, 

taking into account such factors as the 

efficiency of the auction process and the 

potential value of similar construction 

permits. With these considerations in 

mind, upfront payments are specified in 

Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice. OEA and MB 

seek comment on those proposed 

upfront payment amounts. 

20. It is proposed also that the amount 

of the upfront payment submitted by a 

bidder will determine its initial bidding 

eligibility in bidding units, which are a 

measure of bidder eligibility and 

bidding activity. OEA and MB propose 

to assign each construction permit a 

specific number of bidding units, equal 

to one bidding unit per dollar of the 

upfront payment amount listed in 

Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice. The number of 

bidding units for a given construction 

permit is fixed and does not change 

during the auction as prices change. If 

an applicant is found to be qualified to 

bid on more than one permit being 

offered in Auction 109, such bidder may 

place bids on multiple construction 

permits, provided that the total number 

of bidding units associated with those 

construction permits does not exceed 

that bidder’s current eligibility. A 

bidder cannot increase its eligibility 

during the auction; it can only maintain 

its eligibility or decrease its eligibility. 

In calculating its upfront payment 

amount and hence its initial bidding 

eligibility, an applicant must determine 

the maximum number of bidding units 

on which it may wish to bid (or hold 

provisionally winning bids) in any 

single round and submit an upfront 

payment amount covering that total 

number of bidding units. OEA and MB 

request comment on these proposals. 

21. Any applicant that submits a 

short-form application, but fails to 

timely submit an upfront payment, will 

retain its status as an applicant in 

Auction 109 and will remain subject to 

the rules prohibiting certain 

communications but, having purchased 

no bidding eligibility, will not be 

eligible to bid. An applicant that fails to 

become a qualified bidder for any other 

reason also will retain its status as an 

Auction 109 applicant and will remain 

subject to the rules prohibiting certain 

communications. 

22. Activity Rule. To ensure that the 

auction closes within a reasonable 

period of time, an activity rule requires 

bidders to bid actively throughout the 

auction, rather than wait until late in 

the auction before participating. For 

purposes of the activity rule, the FCC 

auction bidding system calculates a 

bidder’s activity in a round as the sum 

of the bidding units associated with any 

construction permits upon which it 

places bids during the current round 

and the bidding units associated with 

any construction permits for which it 

holds provisionally winning bids. See 

47 CFR 1.2104(f). Bidders are required 

to be active on a specific percentage of 

their current bidding eligibility during 

each round of the auction. OEA and MB 

propose a single-stage auction with the 

following activity requirement: In each 

bidding round, a bidder desiring to 

maintain its current bidding eligibility 

is required to be active on 100% of its 

bidding eligibility. Thus, the activity 

requirement would be satisfied when a 

bidder has bidding activity on 

construction permits with bidding units 

that total 100% of its current eligibility 

in the round. If the activity rule is met, 

then the bidder’s eligibility does not 

change in the next round. Failure to 

maintain the requisite activity level will 

result in the use of an activity rule 

waiver, if any remain, or a reduction in 

the bidder’s eligibility for the next 

round of bidding, possibly curtailing or 

eliminating the bidder’s ability to place 

additional bids in the auction. OEA and 

MB seek comment on these activity 

requirements. Commenters that oppose 

a 100% activity requirement should 

explain their reasons with specificity. 

23. Activity Rule Waivers and 

Reducing Eligibility. Pursuant to the 

proposed simultaneous multiple round 

auction format, when a bidder’s activity 

in the current round is below the 

required minimum level, it may 

preserve its current level of eligibility 

through an activity rule waiver, if 

available. An activity rule waiver 

applies to an entire round of bidding, 

not to a particular construction permit. 

Activity rule waivers can be either 

proactive or automatic. Activity rule 

waivers are primarily a mechanism for 

a bidder to avoid the loss of bidding 

eligibility in the event that exigent 

circumstances prevent it from bidding 

in a particular round. 

24. The FCC auction bidding system 

will assume that a bidder that does not 

meet the activity requirement would 

prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if 

available) rather than lose bidding 

eligibility. Therefore, the system will 

automatically apply a waiver at the end 

of any bidding round in which a 

bidder’s activity level is below the 

minimum required unless: (1) The 

bidder has no activity rule waiver 

remaining; or (2) the bidder overrides 

the automatic application of a waiver by 

reducing eligibility, thereby meeting the 

activity requirement. If a bidder has no 

waivers remaining and does not satisfy 

the required activity level, the bidder’s 

current eligibility will be permanently 

reduced, possibly curtailing or 

eliminating the ability to place 

additional bids in the auction. 

25. A bidder with insufficient activity 

may wish to reduce its bidding 

eligibility rather than use an activity 

rule waiver. If so, the bidder must 

affirmatively override the automatic 

waiver mechanism during the bidding 

round by using the reduce eligibility 

function in the FCC auction bidding 

system. In this case, the bidder’s 

eligibility would be permanently 

reduced to bring it into compliance with 

the activity rule described above. 

Reducing eligibility is an irreversible 

action; once eligibility has been 

reduced, a bidder cannot regain its lost 

bidding eligibility. 

26. Under the proposed simultaneous 

stopping rule, a bidder would be 

permitted to apply an activity rule 

waiver proactively as a means to keep 


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the auction open without placing a bid. 

If a bidder proactively applies an 

activity rule waiver (using the proactive 

waiver function in the FCC auction 

bidding system) during a bidding round 

in which no bid is placed or withdrawn 

(if bid withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction), the auction will remain open 

and the bidder’s eligibility will be 

preserved. An automatic waiver applied 

by the FCC auction bidding system in a 

round in which there is no new bid, no 

bid withdrawal (if bid withdrawals are 

permitted in this auction), or no 

proactive waiver would not keep the 

auction open. 

27. Consistent with prior Commission 

auctions of broadcast construction 

permits, OEA and MB propose that each 

bidder in Auction 109 be provided with 

three activity rule waivers that may be 

used as set forth above at the bidder’s 

discretion during the course of the 

auction. Comment is sought on this 

proposal of three activity rule waivers. 

28. Reserve Price or Minimum 

Opening Bids. Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 

309(j)(4)(F) and 47 CFR 1.2104(c), (d), 

OEA and MB seek comment on the use 

of a minimum opening bid amount and 

a reserve price prior to the start of 

bidding in this auction. Normally, a 

reserve price is an absolute minimum 

price below which a construction 

permit or license will not be sold in a 

given auction. A minimum opening bid, 

on the other hand, is the minimum bid 

price set at the beginning of the auction 

below which no bids are accepted. It is 

generally used to accelerate the 

competitive bidding process. 

29. OEA and MB propose not to 

establish separate reserve prices for the 

construction permits offered in this 

auction. OEA and MB propose to 

establish minimum opening bid 

amounts for Auction 109. Based on 

experience in past broadcast auctions, 

setting a minimum opening bid amount 

judiciously is an effective bidding tool 

for accelerating the competitive bidding 

process. 

30. For Auction 109, proposed 

minimum opening bid amounts were 

determined by taking into account the 

type of service and class of facility 

offered, market size, population covered 

by the proposed broadcast facility, and 

recent broadcast transaction data, to the 

extent such information is available. 

Attachment A to the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice lists a proposed 

minimum opening bid amount for each 

construction permit available in 

Auction 109. OEA and MB seek 

comment on the minimum opening bid 

amounts specified in Attachment A to 

the Auction 109 Comment Public 

Notice. 

31. If commenters believe that these 

minimum opening bid amounts will 

result in unsold construction permits, 

are not reasonable amounts at which to 

start bidding, or should instead operate 

as reserve prices, they should explain 

why this is so and comment on the 

desirability of an alternative approach. 

Commenters should support their 

claims with valuation analyses and 

suggested amounts or formulas for 

reserve prices or minimum opening 

bids. In establishing the minimum 

opening bid amounts, OEA and MB seek 

comment particularly on factors that 

could reasonably have an impact on 

bidders’ valuation of the broadcast 

spectrum, including the type of service 

and class of facility offered, market size, 

population covered by the proposed AM 

or FM broadcast facility and any other 

relevant factors. Commenters also may 

wish to address the general role of 

minimum opening bids in managing the 

pace of the auction. For example, 

commenters could compare using 

minimum opening bids—e.g., by setting 

higher minimum opening bids to reduce 

the number of rounds it takes for 

construction permits to reach their final 

prices—to other means of controlling 

auction pace, such as changes to 

bidding schedules, percentage 

increments, or activity requirements. 

32. Bid Amounts. OEA and MB 

propose that if a qualified bidder has 

sufficient eligibility to place a bid on a 

particular construction permit, in each 

round, the bidder will be able to place 

a bid on the given construction permit 

in any of up to nine different amounts: 

The minimum acceptable bid amount or 

one of the additional bid amounts. 

33. Minimum Acceptable Bid 

Amounts. The first of the acceptable bid 

amounts is called the minimum 

acceptable bid amount. The minimum 

acceptable bid amount for a 

construction permit will be equal to its 

minimum opening bid amount until 

there is a provisionally winning bid for 

the construction permit. Once there is a 

provisionally winning bid for a 

construction permit, the minimum 

acceptable bid amount for that 

construction permit will be equal to the 

amount of the provisionally winning bid 

plus a specified percentage of that bid 

amount. The percentage used for this 

calculation, the minimum acceptable 

bid increment percentage, is multiplied 

by the provisionally winning bid 

amount, and the resulting amount is 

added to the provisionally winning bid 

amount. If, for example, the minimum 

acceptable bid increment percentage is 

10%, then the provisionally winning 

bid amount is multiplied by 10%. The 

result of that calculation is added to the 

provisionally winning bid amount, and 

that sum is rounded using the 

Commission’s standard rounding 

procedure for auctions as described in 

the public notice. If bid withdrawals are 

permitted in this auction, in the case of 

a construction permit for which the 

provisionally winning bid has been 

withdrawn, the minimum acceptable 

bid amount will equal the second 

highest bid received for the construction 

permit. 

34. Additional Bid Amounts. Under 

this proposal, the FCC auction bidding 

system will calculate the eight 

additional bid amounts using the 

minimum acceptable bid amount and an 

additional bid increment percentage. 

The minimum acceptable bid amount is 

multiplied by the additional bid 

increment percentage. The result then 

will be rounded using the Commission’s 

standard rounding procedures for 

auctions as described in the public 

notice. That result is the additional 

increment amount. The first additional 

acceptable bid amount equals the 

minimum acceptable bid amount plus 

the additional increment amount. The 

second additional acceptable bid 

amount equals the minimum acceptable 

bid amount plus two times the 

additional increment amount; the third 

additional acceptable bid amount is the 

minimum acceptable bid amount plus 

three times the additional increment 

amount; etc. If, for example, the 

additional bid increment percentage is 

5%, then the calculation of the 

additional increment amount would be 

(minimum acceptable bid amount) * 

(0.05), rounded. The first additional 

acceptable bid amount equals 

(minimum acceptable bid amount) + 

(additional increment amount); the 

second additional acceptable bid 

amount equals (minimum acceptable 

bid amount) + (2*(additional increment 

amount)); the third additional 

acceptable bid amount equals 

(minimum acceptable bid amount) + 

(3*(additional increment amount)); etc. 

35. For Auction 109, a minimum 

acceptable bid increment percentage of 

10% is proposed. This means that the 

minimum acceptable bid amount for a 

construction permit will be 

approximately 10% greater than the 

provisionally winning bid amount for 

the construction permit. To calculate 

the additional acceptable bid amounts, 

a bid increment percentage of 5% is 

proposed. OEA and MB request 

comment on these proposals. 

36. Bid Amount Changes. Consistent 

with past practice, OEA and MB 

propose to retain the discretion to 

change the minimum acceptable bid 

amounts, the minimum acceptable bid 


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percentage, the additional bid increment 

percentage, and the number of 

acceptable bid amounts if circumstances 

so dictate. See 47 CFR 1.2104(d). OEA 

and MB propose to retain the discretion 

to do so on a construction permit-byconstruction permit basis. OEA and MB 

propose also to retain the discretion to 

limit (a) the amount by which a 

minimum acceptable bid for a 

construction permit may increase 

compared with the corresponding 

provisionally winning bid, and (b) the 

amount by which an additional bid 

amount may increase compared with 

the immediately preceding acceptable 

bid amount. For example, a $1,000 limit 

could be set on increases in minimum 

acceptable bid amounts over 

provisionally winning bids. In this 

example, if calculating a minimum 

acceptable bid using the minimum 

acceptable bid increment percentage 

results in a minimum acceptable bid 

amount that is $1,200 higher than the 

provisionally winning bid on a 

construction permit, the minimum 

acceptable bid amount would instead be 

capped at $1,000 above the 

provisionally winning bid. OEA and MB 

also seek comment on the circumstances 

under which such a limit should be 

employed, factors to consider when 

determining the dollar amount of the 

limit, and the tradeoffs in setting such 

a limit or changing other parameters, 

such as changing the minimum 

acceptable bid percentage, the bid 

increment percentage, or the number of 

acceptable bid amounts. Bidders would 

be notified by announcement in the FCC 

auction bidding system during the 

auction if this discretion is exercised. 

37. OEA and MB seek comment on 

these proposals. If commenters disagree 

with the proposal to begin the auction 

with nine acceptable bid amounts per 

construction permit, they should 

suggest an alternative number of 

acceptable bid amounts to use. 

Commenters may wish to address the 

role of the minimum acceptable bids 

and the number of acceptable bid 

amounts in managing the pace of the 

auction and the tradeoffs in managing 

auction pace by changing the bidding 

schedule, activity requirement, bid 

amounts, or by using other means. 

38. Provisionally Winning Bids. The 

FCC auction bidding system will 

determine provisionally winning bids 

consistent with practice in past 

auctions. At the end of a bidding round, 

the bidding system will determine a 

provisionally winning bid for each 

construction permit based on the 

highest bid amount received for that 

permit. The FCC auction bidding system 

will advise bidders of the status of their 

bids when round results are released. A 

provisionally winning bid will remain 

the provisionally winning bid until 

there is a higher bid on the same 

construction permit at the close of a 

subsequent round, unless the 

provisionally winning bid is withdrawn 

(if bid withdrawals are permitted in this 

auction). Provisionally winning bids at 

the end of the auction become the 

winning bids. As a reminder, 

provisionally winning bids count 

toward activity for purposes of the 

activity rule. 

39. The FCC auction bidding system 

assigns a pseudo-random number 

generated by an algorithm to each bid 

when the bid is entered. If identical 

high bid amounts are submitted on a 

construction permit in any given round 

(i.e., tied bids), the FCC auction bidding 

system will use a pseudo-random 

number generator to select a single 

provisionally winning bid from among 

the tied bids. The tied bid with the 

highest pseudo-random number wins 

the tiebreaker and becomes the 

provisionally winning bid. The 

remaining bidders, as well as the 

provisionally winning bidder, can 

submit higher bids in subsequent 

rounds. However, if the auction were to 

end with no other bids being placed, the 

winning bidder would be the one that 

placed the provisionally winning bid. If 

the construction permit receives any 

bids in a subsequent round, the 

provisionally winning bid again will be 

determined by the highest bid amount 

received for the construction permit. 

40. Bid Removal. The FCC auction 

bidding system allows each bidder to 

remove any of the bids it placed in a 

round before the close of that round. By 

removing a bid placed within a round, 

a bidder effectively unsubmits the bid. 

In contrast to the bid withdrawal 

provisions described below, a bidder 

removing a bid placed in the same 

round is not subject to a withdrawal 

payment. Once a round closes, a bidder 

may no longer remove a bid. Consistent 

with the design of the bidding system, 

bidders in Auction 109 would be 

permitted to remove bids placed in a 

round before the close of that round. 

41. Bid Withdrawal. OEA and MB 

propose not to permit bidders in 

Auction 109 to withdraw bids. When 

permitted in an auction, bid 

withdrawals provide a bidder with the 

option of withdrawing bids placed in 

prior rounds that have become 

provisionally winning bids. A bidder 

would be able to withdraw its 

provisionally winning bids using the 

withdraw function in the FCC auction 

bidding system. A bidder that 

withdraws its provisionally winning 

bid(s), if permitted, is subject to the bid 

withdrawal payment provisions of 47 

CFR 1.2104(g), 1.2109. 

42. The Commission has recognized 

that bid withdrawals may be a helpful 

tool for bidders seeking to efficiently 

aggregate licenses or implement backup 

strategies in certain auctions. The 

Commission has also acknowledged that 

allowing bid withdrawals may 

encourage insincere bidding or 

increased opportunities for undesirable 

strategic bidding in certain 

circumstances. The Commission stated 

that this discretion should be exercised 

assertively, with consideration of 

limiting the number of rounds in which 

bidders may withdraw bids and 

preventing bidders from bidding on a 

particular market if a bidder is abusing 

the Commission’s bid withdrawal 

procedures. In managing the auction, 

therefore, OEA and MB have discretion 

to limit the number of withdrawals to 

prevent bidding abuses. 

43. Based on this guidance and on 

experience with past auctions of 

broadcast construction permits, the 

public notice proposes to prohibit 

bidders from withdrawing any bid after 

the close of the round in which that bid 

was placed. In light of the site-specific 

nature and wide geographic dispersion 

of the permits available in this auction, 

which suggests that potential applicants 

for this auction may have fewer 

incentives to aggregate permits through 

the auction process (as compared with 

bidders in many auctions of wireless 

licenses), it is unlikely that bidders will 

have a need to withdraw bids in this 

auction. Further, bid withdrawals, 

particularly if they were made late in 

this auction, could result in delays in 

licensing new broadcast stations and 

attendant delays in the offering of new 

broadcast service to the public. OEA 

and MB seek comment on this proposal 

to prohibit bid withdrawals in Auction 

109. Commenters advocating alternative 

approaches should support their 

arguments by taking into account the 

construction permits offered, the impact 

of auction dynamics and the pricing 

mechanism, and the effects on the 

bidding strategies of other bidders. 

44. Post Auction Payment: Interim 

Withdrawal Payment Percentage. In the 

event bid withdrawals are permitted in 

Auction 109, OEA and MB propose that 

the interim bid withdrawal payment be 

20% of the withdrawn bid. As required 

by 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1), a bidder that 

withdraws a provisionally winning bid 

during an auction is subject to a 

withdrawal payment equal to the 

difference between the amount of the 

withdrawn bid and the amount of the 

winning bid in the same or a subsequent 


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auction. However, if a construction 

permit for which a bid has been 

withdrawn does not receive a 

subsequent higher bid or winning bid in 

the same auction, the Commission 

cannot calculate the final withdrawal 

payment until that construction permit 

receives a higher bid or winning bid in 

a subsequent auction. In such cases, 

when that final withdrawal payment 

cannot yet be calculated, the 

Commission imposes on the bidder 

responsible for the withdrawn bid an 

interim bid withdrawal payment, which 

will be applied toward any final bid 

withdrawal payment that is ultimately 

assessed. 

45. The percentage amount of the 

interim bid withdrawal payment is 

established in advance of bidding in 

each auction and may range from 3% to 

20% of the withdrawn bid amount. The 

Commission has determined that the 

level of interim withdrawal payment in 

a particular auction will be based on the 

nature of the service and the inventory 

of the licenses being offered. The 

Commission noted specifically that a 

higher interim withdrawal payment 

percentage is warranted to deter the 

anti-competitive use of withdrawals 

when, for example, bidders will not 

need to aggregate the licenses being 

offered in the auction or when there are 

few synergies to be captured by 

combining licenses. In light of these 

considerations with respect to the 

construction permits being offered in 

this auction, OEA and MB propose to 

use the maximum interim bid 

withdrawal payment percentage 

permitted by 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(1) in the 

event bid withdrawals are allowed in 

this auction. OEA and MB request 

comment on using 20% for calculating 

an interim bid withdrawal payment 

amount in Auction 109. Commenters 

advocating the use of bid withdrawals 

should also address the percentage of 

the interim bid withdrawal payment. 

46. Post Auction Payment: Additional 

Default Payment Percentage. Any 

winning bidder that defaults or is 

disqualified after the close of an auction 

(i.e., fails to remit the required down 

payment by the specified deadline, fails 

to make full and timely final payment, 

fails to submit a timely long-form 

application, or whose long-form 

application is not granted for any 

reason, or is otherwise disqualified) is 

liable for a default payment under 47 

CFR 1.2104(g)(2). As required by 47 CFR 

1.2109, this payment consists of a 

deficiency payment, equal to the 

difference between the amount of the 

Auction 109 bidder’s winning bid and 

the amount of the winning bid the next 

time a construction permit covering the 

same spectrum is won in an auction, 

plus an additional payment equal to a 

percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of 

the subsequent winning bid, whichever 

is less. 

47. In advance of each auction, a 

percentage between 3% and 20% of the 

applicable winning bid is set pursuant 

to 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2) to be assessed as 

an additional default payment. As the 

Commission has indicated, the level of 

this additional payment in each auction 

will be based on the nature of the 

service and the construction permits 

being offered. 

48. Consistent with the percentage in 

prior auctions of broadcast construction 

permits, OEA and MB propose for 

Auction 109 to establish an additional 

default payment of 20%. As the 

Commission has noted, defaults weaken 

the integrity of the auction process and 

may impede the deployment of service 

to the public, and an additional 20% 

default payment will be more effective 

in deterring defaults than the 3% used 

in some earlier auctions. In light of 

these considerations, for Auction 109 an 

additional default payment of 20% of 

the relevant bid is proposed. OEA and 

MB seek comment on this proposal. 

IV. Procedural Matters 

49. Paperwork Reduction Act. The 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) has approved the information 

collections in the Application to 

Participate in an FCC Auction, FCC 

Form 175. OMB Control No. 3060–0600. 

The Auction 109 Comment Public 

Notice does not propose new or 

modified information collection 

requirements subject to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public 

Law 104–13. Therefore, it does not 

contain any new or modified 

information collection burden for small 

business concerns with fewer than 25 

employees pursuant to the Small 

Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 

Public Law 107–198. See 44 U.S.C. 

3506(c)(4). 

50. Ex Parte Rules. This proceeding 

has been designated as a permit but 

disclose proceeding in accordance with 

the ex parte rules. Participants in this 

proceeding should familiarize 

themselves with the Commission’s ex 

parte rules, especially 47 CFR 1.1200(a) 

and 1.1206. 

IV. Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis 

51. As required by the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended 

(RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601—612, the 

Commission prepared Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analyses (IRFAs) in 

connection with the Broadcast 

Competitive Bidding Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (NPRM), 62 FR 65392, 

December 12, 1997, and other 

Commission NPRMs (collectively, 

Competitive Bidding NPRMs) pursuant 

to which Auction 109 will be 

conducted. Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses (FRFAs) likewise were 

prepared in the Broadcast Competitive 

Bidding Order, 63 FR 48615, September 

11, 1998, and other Commission 

rulemaking orders (collectively, 

Competitive Bidding Orders) pursuant 

to which Auction 109 will be 

conducted. The Office of Economics and 

Analytics (OEA), in conjunction with 

the Media Bureau (MB), has prepared 

this Supplemental Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (Supplemental 

IRFA) of the possible significant 

economic impact on small entities of the 

policies and rules addressed in the 

Auction 109 Comment Public Notice, to 

supplement the Commission’s Initial 

and Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses completed in the Competitive 

Bidding NPRMs and the Competitive 

Bidding Orders pursuant to which 

Auction 109 will be conducted. Written 

public comments are requested on this 

Supplemental IRFA. Comments must be 

identified as responses to the 

Supplemental IRFA and must be filed 

by the same filing deadlines for 

comments specified on the first page of 

the Auction 109 Comment Public 

Notice. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 603(a), the 

Commission will send a copy of the 

Auction 109 Comment Public Notice, 

including this Supplemental IRFA, to 

the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the 

Small Business Administration (SBA). 

52. Need for, and Objectives of, the 

Public Notice. The proposed procedures 

for the conduct of Auction 109 as 

described in the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice would constitute the more 

specific implementation of the 

competitive bidding rules contemplated 

by Parts 1 and 73 of the Commission’s 

rules, adopted by the Commission in 

multiple notice-and-comment 

rulemaking proceedings, including the 

Commission’s establishing in the 

underlying rulemaking orders 

additional procedures to be used on 

delegated authority. More specifically, 

the Auction 109 Comment Public Notice 

seeks comment on proposed procedures, 

terms and conditions governing Auction 

109, and the post-auction application 

and payment processes, as well as 

seeking comment on the minimum 

opening bid amounts for the specified 

construction permits, and is fully 

consistent with the underlying 

rulemaking orders, including the 

Broadcast Competitive Bidding Order 


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and other relevant competitive bidding 

orders. 

53. The Auction 109 Comment Public 

Notice provides notice of proposed 

auction procedures and adequate time 

for Auction 109 applicants to comment 

on those proposed procedures. See 47 

U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(E)(i). To promote the 

efficient and fair administration of the 

competitive bidding process for all 

Auction 109 participants, including 

small businesses, the Auction 109 

Comment Public Notice seeks comment 

on the following proposed procedures: 

Use of a simultaneous multiple-round 

auction format, consisting of sequential 

bidding rounds with a simultaneous 

stopping rule (with discretion to 

exercise alternative stopping rules 

under certain circumstances); a specific 

minimum opening bid amount for each 

construction permit to be offered in this 

auction; a specific number of bidding 

units for each construction permit; a 

specific upfront payment amount for 

each construction permit; establishment 

of a bidder’s initial bidding eligibility in 

bidding units based on that bidder’s 

upfront payment through assignment of 

a specific number of bidding units for 

each construction permit; use of an 

activity requirement so that bidders 

must bid actively during the auction 

rather than waiting until late in the 

auction before participating; a singlestage auction in which a bidder is 

required to be active on 100% of its 

bidding eligibility in each bidding 

round; provision of three activity 

waivers for each bidder to allow it to 

preserve eligibility during the course of 

the auction; use of minimum acceptable 

bid amounts and additional bid 

increments, along with a proposed 

methodology for calculating such 

amounts, while retaining discretion to 

change the methodology if 

circumstances dictate; a procedure for 

breaking ties if identical high bid 

amounts are submitted on a 

construction permit in a given round; 

whether to permit use of bid 

withdrawals; establishment of an 

interim bid withdrawal percentage of 

20% of the withdrawn bid in the event 

bid withdrawals are allowed in Auction 

109; and establishment of an additional 

default payment of 20% under 47 CFR 

1.2104(g)(2) in the event that a winning 

bidder defaults or is disqualified after 

the auction closes. 

54. Legal Basis. The Commission’s 

statutory obligations to small businesses 

participating in a spectrum auction are 

found in 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(B) and 

309(j)(4)(D). The statutory basis for the 

Commission’s competitive bidding rules 

is found in 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 301, 303(e), 

303(f), 303(r), 304, 307, and 309(j). The 

Commission has established a 

framework of competitive bidding rules 

pursuant to which it has conducted 

auctions since the inception of the 

auction program in 1994 and would 

conduct Auction 109, including 47 CFR 

part 1, subpart Q. See 47 CFR 73.5000, 

73.5002–73.5003, 73.5005–73.5009. In 

promulgating those rules, the 

Commission conducted numerous 

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act 

Analyses (IRFAs) to consider the 

possible impact of those rules on small 

businesses that might seek to participate 

in Commission auctions. In addition, 

multiple Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Analyses (FRFAs) were included in the 

rulemaking orders which adopted or 

amended rule provisions relevant to 

Auction 109 Comment Public Notice. 

The Commission has directed that OEA, 

in conjunction with MB, under 

delegated authority, seek comment on a 

variety of auction-specific procedures 

prior to the start of bidding in each 

auction. See 47 CFR 1.2104(c), (d), (e), 

(f), (g), (i). 

55. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities to Which the 

Proposed Procedures Will Apply. The 

RFA directs agencies to provide a 

description of and, where feasible, an 

estimate of the number of small entities 

that may be affected by the proposed 

procedures, if adopted. 5 U.S.C. 

603(b)(3). The RFA generally defines the 

term small entity as having the same 

meaning as the terms small business, 

small organization, and small 

government jurisdiction. 5 U.S.C. 

601(6). In addition, the term small 

business has the same meaning as the 

term small business concern under the 

Small Business Act. See 5 U.S.C. 601(3) 

(adopting by reference the definition of 

small business concern in the Small 

Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632). A small 

business concern is one which: (1) Is 

independently owned and operated, (2) 

is not dominant in its field of operation, 

and (3) satisfies any additional criteria 

established by the SBA. See 15 U.S.C. 

632. 

56. The specific procedures and 

minimum opening bid amounts on 

which comment is sought in the 

Auction 109 Comment Public Notice 

will directly affect all applicants 

participating in Auction 109. The 

number of entities that may apply to 

participate in Auction 109 is unknown. 

Based on the number of applicants in 

prior FM auctions, OEA and MB 

estimate that the number of applicants 

for Auction 109 may range from 

approximately 130 to 260. This estimate 

is based on the number of applicants 

who filed short-form applications to 

participate in previous open auctions of 

FM construction permits held to date, 

an average of 1.8 short-form 

applications were filed per construction 

permit offered, with a median of 1.2 

applications per permit. The actual 

number of applicants for Auction 109 

could vary significantly as any 

individual’s or entity’s decision to 

participate may be affected by a number 

of factors beyond the Commission’s 

control. 

57. Radio Stations. This U.S. 

Economic Census category comprises 

establishments primarily engaged in 

broadcasting aural programs by radio to 

the public. Programming may originate 

in their own studio, from an affiliated 

network, or from external sources. 

According to the most recent Report and 

Order, 85 FR 37364, June 22, 2020, to 

assess annual regulatory fees, 

Commission staff identified from the 

Media Bureau’s licensing databases 

9,636 licensed radio facilities subject to 

annual regulatory fees as of October 1, 

2019, excluding from this count radio 

stations exempt from required annual 

regulatory fees. 

58. In 13 CFR 121.201, the SBA 

established a small business size 

standard for this category, NAICS code 

515112, as firms having $41.5 million or 

less in annual receipts. Economic 

Census data from 2012 shows that 2,849 

radio station firms operated during that 

year. Of that number, 2,806 firms 

operated with annual receipts of less 

than $25 million per year, 17 with 

annual receipts between $25 million 

and $49,999,999, and 26 with annual 

receipts of $50 million or more. 

Therefore, based on the SBA’s size 

standard, the majority of such entities 

are small entities. 

59. According to Commission staff 

review of the BIA/Kelsey, LLC’s Media 

Access Pro Radio Database (BIA) as of 

January 26, 2021, nearly all AM and FM 

full-service radio stations 

(approximately 15,478 of 15,483 total 

stations, or 99.97%) had revenues of 

$41.5 million or less and thus qualify as 

small entities under the SBA definition. 

The SBA size standard data, however, 

does not enable a meaningful estimate 

of the number of small entities who may 

participate in Auction 109. 

60. Also, in assessing whether a 

business entity qualifies as small under 

the SBA definition, 13 CFR 

121.103(a)(1), business control 

affiliations must be included. Business 

concerns are affiliates of each other 

when one concern controls or has the 

power to control the other, or a third 

party or parties controls or has the 

power to control both. The estimate 

therefore likely overstates the number of 

small entities that might be affected by 


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this auction because the revenue figure 

on which it is based does not include or 

aggregate revenues from affiliated 

companies. Moreover, the definition of 

small business also requires that an 

entity not be dominant in its field of 

operation and that the entity be 

independently owned and operated. 

The estimate of small businesses to 

which the proposed competitive 

bidding rules may apply does not 

exclude any radio station from the 

definition of a small business on these 

bases and is therefore over-inclusive to 

that extent. Furthermore, it is not 

possible at this time to define or 

quantify the criteria that would 

establish whether a specific radio 

station is dominant in its field of 

operation. In addition, it is difficult to 

assess these criteria in the context of 

media entities and therefore estimates of 

small businesses to which they apply 

may be over-inclusive to this extent. 

61. Further, it is not possible to 

accurately develop an estimate of how 

many of the entities in this auction 

would be small businesses based on the 

number of small entities that applied to 

participate in prior broadcast auctions, 

because that information is not collected 

from applicants for broadcast auctions 

in which bidding credits are not based 

on an applicant’s size (as is the case in 

auctions of licenses for wireless 

services). 

62. In 2013, the Commission 

estimated that 97% of radio 

broadcasters met the SBA’s prior 

definition of small business concern, 

based on annual revenues of $7 million. 

The SBA has since increased in NAICS 

code 515112 of 13 CFR 121.201 that 

revenue threshold to $41.5 million, 

which suggests that an even greater 

percentage of radio broadcasters would 

fall within the SBA’s definition. The 

Commission has estimated the number 

of licensed commercial AM radio 

stations to be 4,347 and the number of 

commercial FM radio stations to be 

6,699 for a total number of 11,046. As 

of January 2021, 4,347 AM stations and 

6,694 FM stations had revenues of $41.5 

million or less, according to 

Commission staff review of the BIA 

Database. Accordingly, based on this 

data, OEA and MB estimate that the 

majority of Auction 109 applicants 

would likely meet the SBA’s definition 

of a small business concern. 

63. Description of Projected 

Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 

Compliance Requirements for Small 

Entities. In the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice, no new reporting, 

recordkeeping, or other compliance 

requirements for small entities or other 

auction applicants are proposed. The 

Commission designed the auction 

application process itself to minimize 

reporting and compliance requirements 

for applicants, including small business 

applicants. To participate in this 

auction, parties will file streamlined, 

short-form applications in which they 

certify under penalty of perjury as to 

their qualifications. Eligibility to 

participate in bidding is based on an 

applicant’s short-form application and 

certifications, as well as its upfront 

payment. In the second phase of the 

auction process, there are additional 

compliance requirements for winning 

bidders. Thus, a small business that fails 

to become a winning bidder does not 

need to file a long-form application and 

provide the additional showings and 

more detailed demonstrations required 

of a winning bidder. 

64. Steps Taken to Minimize the 

Significant Economic Impact of Small 

Entities, and Significant Alternatives 

Considered. The RFA requires an 

agency to describe any significant, 

specifically small business, alternatives 

that it has considered in reaching its 

proposed approach, which may include 

the following four alternatives (among 

others): (1) The establishment of 

differing compliance or reporting 

requirements or timetables that take into 

account the resources available to small 

entities; (2) the clarification, 

consolidation, or simplification of 

compliance and reporting requirements 

under the rule for such small entities; 

(3) the use of performance rather than 

design standards; and (4) an exemption 

from coverage of the rule, or any part 

thereof, for such small entities. 5 U.S.C. 

603(c)(1)–(4). 

65. OEA and MB intend that the 

proposals of the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice to facilitate participation 

in Auction 109 will result in both 

operational and administrative cost 

savings for small entities and other 

auction participants. In light of the 

numerous resources that will be 

available from the Commission at no 

cost, the processes and procedures 

proposed in the Auction 109 Comment 

Public Notice should result in minimal 

economic impact on small entities. For 

example, prior to the start of bidding, 

the Commission will hold a mock 

auction to allow qualified bidders the 

opportunity to familiarize themselves 

with both the bidding processes and 

systems that will be used in Auction 

109. During the auction, participants 

will be able to access and participate in 

bidding via the internet using a webbased system, or telephonically, 

providing two cost-effective methods of 

participation and avoiding the cost of 

travel for in-person participation. 

Further, small entities as well as other 

auction participants will be able to avail 

themselves of a telephone hotline for 

assistance with auction processes and 

procedures as well as a telephone 

technical support hotline to assist with 

issues such as access to or navigation 

within the electronic FCC Form 175 and 

use of the FCC’s auction system. In 

addition, all auction participants, 

including small business entities, will 

have access to various other sources of 

information and databases through the 

Commission that will aid in both their 

understanding of and participation in 

the process. These mechanisms are 

made available to facilitate participation 

by all qualified bidders and may result 

in significant cost savings for small 

business entities that utilize these 

mechanisms. These steps, coupled with 

the advance description of the bidding 

procedures, should ensure that the 

auction will be administered efficiently 

and fairly, thus providing certainty for 

small entities, as well as other auction 

participants. 

66. Federal Rules That May Duplicate, 

Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed 

Rules. None. 

Federal Communications Commission. 

Marlene Dortch, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2021–04033 Filed 3–1–21; 4:15 pm] 

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Fish and Wildlife Service 

50 CFR Part 17 

[Docket No. FWS–R2–ES–2020–0130; 

FF09E21000 FXES11110900000 212] 

RIN 1018–BF21 

Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 

and Plants; Endangered Species 

Status for Arizona Eryngo and 

Designation of Critical Habitat 

AGENCY: Fish and Wildlife Service, 

Interior. 

ACTION: Proposed rule. 

SUMMARY: We, the U.S. Fish and 

Wildlife Service (Service), announce a 

12-month finding on a petition to list 

the Arizona eryngo (Eryngium 

sparganophyllum), a plant species 

native to Arizona and New Mexico in 

the United States, and to Sonora and 

Chihuahua in Mexico, as an endangered 

species and to designate critical habitat 

in Arizona under the Endangered 

Species Act of 1973, as amended (Act). 

After a review of the best available 

scientific and commercial information, 


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