IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs March 27, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TREVALE DEMARCO DAVIS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

Nos. 306961, 305774 Barry A. Steelman, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2023-00579-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Trevale Demarco Davis, Defendant, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s

probation revocation of his effective five-year sentence for three counts of aggravated 

burglary and one count of robbery. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion by revoking his probation. After review, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

Charles Patrick Dupree, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellant, Trevale Demarco 

Davis.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Coty G. Wamp, District Attorney General; and Austin Scofield, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal stems from the trial court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation in cases 

305774 and 306961.1 On September 19, 2018, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of 

 

1 Defendant did not include the guilty plea transcripts for his underlying offenses in cases 305744 

and 306961 in the appellate record. Thus, the factual bases for those convictions are unknown.

05/15/2024
- 2 -

aggravated burglary in case number 305774. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences 

of four years’ imprisonment suspended to supervised probation, and restitution of $500. 

Subsequently on February 27, 2019, a Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant on

one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary with the offense 

date of October 25, 2018 in case number 306961. On March 5, 2019, the State filed a 

probation violation report against Defendant alleging violations of his probation in case 

number 305774. The bases of the violations included the conduct underlying the charges 

in case number 306961, failing to report his arrest on those charges, and a positive drug 

screen. As to his drug screen, Defendant admitted to his probation officer he had ingested

methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. On December 11, 2019, Defendant waived his 

right to a hearing and conceded the violations. The trial court ordered a partial revocation, 

sentenced Defendant to the time he had served between March 12, 2019 and December 11, 

2019, and reinstated Defendant’s supervised probation. On that same date, in case number 

306961 Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of robbery and aggravated 

burglary. The trial court sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment on each count, 

suspended to probation with the special conditions to pay $800 in restitution and to have 

no contact with the victim in that case. The trial court imposed the sentence in that case 

concurrently to Defendant’s sentence in case number 305774.

On July 30, 2021, the State filed another probation violation report in both cases. It 

alleged Defendant violated his probation by: (1) committing another burglary on July 3, 

2021;2(2) failing to report his arrest to his probation officer; and (3) failing to make a single 

payment towards his restitution. The trial court issued a warrant for Defendant’s arrest on 

August 6, 2021, and set that Defendant be released on his own recognizance upon arrest.

It appears from the record Defendant was never arrested on that warrant. On April 22, 

2022, the State filed an addendum to the violation of probation report alleging Defendant 

had again violated his probation on April 19, 2022 by: (1) possessing a firearm with the 

intent to go armed; (2) possessing a firearm; and (3) engaging in an assaultive and 

intimidating behavior. Because there was an outstanding capias for Defendant’s prior

violations of probation, the trial court ordered that Defendant be held with no bond. 

A probation revocation hearing was held on March 28, 2023, for case numbers 

305774 and 306961. Officer Christopher Dyess with the Chattanooga Police Department 

testified that he conducted a traffic stop on a car for an improper turn on April 19, 2022. 

Defendant was a back-seat passenger in the car, and after checking the records of the car’s 

occupants, Officer Dyess discovered Defendant had outstanding warrants and was a 

 

2 At the revocation hearing, the trial court acknowledged that the violation report mistakenly called 

it a robbery, but “it was clear from the narrative that it was a burglary.” The violation report attached the 

police incident reports which also confirm the charge was burglary.
- 3 -

previously convicted felon. As Officer Dyess returned to the vehicle, he “observed what 

appeared to [be] the magazine of a handgun under the front passenger seat.” At that point, 

Officer Dyess ordered the occupants to place their hands on the car’s inside roof, and he 

waited for backup. Once other officers arrived, he ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle. 

Officer Dyess stated, “It was at that time that I was made aware that [Defendant] had his . 

. . foot concealing a firearm that was under his feet.” Officer Dyess became aware that 

there was a handgun in the backseat floorboard with Defendant in addition to another 

firearm in the front compartment. Officer Dyess seized a Smith & Wesson .380 handgun 

in the floorboard where Defendant had been seated. The front seat passenger admitted to 

the firearm in the front compartment, but after Officer Dyess read Defendant his Miranda

rights, Defendant “[c]laimed possession” of the .380 handgun and “stated it was his.” 

Defendant admitted he had the .380 handgun for about two weeks. Officer Dyess then 

arrested Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

On cross-examination, Officer Dyess stated that Defendant had three outstanding 

warrants at the time of his arrest, but he could only recall two: aggravated robbery and 

aggravated burglary. At the time of Defendant’s arrest, Officer Dyess was unaware

Defendant was on probation. He stated that although he did not have a written statement 

by Defendant that the firearm was his, his body camera recorded the entire conversation.

Defendant testified on his own behalf and asked the trial court to reinstate his 

probation and give him a time-served sentence. At the time of the revocation hearing, 

Defendant had been in custody for more than eleven months, and he stated that he wanted 

to get out and raise his family. He also said he had a job lined up to work with his stepfather 

in construction. Defendant stated that if he were released, he would live with his mother 

or grandmother, he would not participate in gang activity, and he would ensure that he was 

not around firearms. On cross-examination, Defendant claimed that on the day he was 

arrested, he did not know that a firearm was in the vehicle. Defendant acknowledged, 

however, that he had been released on probation twice before, that both times he pleaded 

guilty to additional felonies, and that each time the judge informed him he could never be 

in possession of a gun. Then he admitted that for the third time, he had violated his 

probation “with another arrest,” but told the court he could “do good on probation.”

The trial court found the testimony of Officer Dyess to be credible. Specifically,

the court found:

[A]fter [Defendant] had been convicted of robbery and these three other 

felony crimes, that he was in a motor vehicle and that underneath him in the 

vehicle was a firearm, and that he claimed possession of the firearm. The 

[c]ourt believes Officer Dyess.
- 4 -

And so based on that, the [c]ourt finds that [Defendant] was in 

violation of probation in [case numbers] 305774 and 306961, and the [c]ourt 

finds that the revocation is sustained.

Because [Defendant] had been on probation for a crime of violence, 

that is robbery, and crimes that involved the entry into the dwelling place of 

others, the [c]ourt finds that when he is in possession of a firearm, that he 

poses a risk of danger of further violence, so the [c]ourt orders that his 

sentence should be ordered into execution to be served in both cases. 

He will receive credit for the time that he’s previously served.

After the trial court revoked Defendant’s sentence, Defendant received a sentence of four 

years in case number 305774 and a concurrent five years in case number 306961, for an 

effective sentence of five years imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. 

The court awarded Defendant eleven months and eight days of jail credit. Defendant timely 

filed a notice of appeal.

II. Analysis

Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it found Defendant 

violated the terms of his probation. The State argues that Defendant is not entitled to relief 

because “he violated several terms of his probation by possessing a firearm after being 

convicted of a felony crime of violence.” We agree with the State.

We review a trial court’s decision to revoke a criminal defendant’s probation under 

an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of reasonableness “so long as the trial 

court places sufficient findings and reasons for its decisions as to the revocations and the 

consequences on the record.” State v. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d 751, 759 (Tenn. 2022). “A 

trial court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, reaches an 

illogical conclusion, bases its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, 

or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.” State v. Davis, 

466 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Tenn. 2015) (citations omitted). “If a trial court fails to state its 

findings and reasons for the revocation on the record, we may conduct a de novo review 

“if the record is sufficiently developed,” or we may remand the case to the trial court to 

make the appropriate findings. State v. Booker, No. E2023-00435-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 

1928840, at * 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 2, 2024) (citing Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 759). 

Probation revocation is a two-step consideration in which a trial court makes two 

separate determinations. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d at 753. First, the court determines whether 

to revoke probation; if so, the court must determine the consequences to apply upon 
- 5 -

revocation. See id. at 757. “[T]hese are two distinct discretionary decisions, both of which 

must be reviewed and addressed on appeal.” Id. at 757-58. “Simply recognizing that 

sufficient evidence existed to find that a violation occurred does not satisfy this burden,”

but the trial court’s findings need not be “particularly lengthy or detailed but only 

sufficient” for a reviewing court’s “meaningful review.” Id. at 758-59. 

A trial court may revoke a defendant’s probation upon a finding by a preponderance 

of the evidence that a defendant has violated the conditions of probation. Tenn. Code Ann. 

§§ 40-35-310(a), -311(e)(1) (Supp. 2021). We have previously explained a trial court’s 

options when it finds that a defendant has violated probation:

[T]he trial court may: (1) order incarceration for some period of time; (2) 

cause execution of the sentence as it was originally entered; (3) extend the 

defendant’s probationary period not exceeding one year; (4) return the 

defendant to probation on appropriate modified conditions; or (5) resentence 

the defendant for remainder of the unexpired term to a sentence of probation.

State v. Brewster, No. E2021-00793-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 2665951, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. July 11, 2022) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-308(c)(1), (2); -310; - 311(e)(1), (2) 

(2021)), no perm. app. filed. “[A]n accused, already on probation, is not entitled to a 

second grant of probation or another form of alternative sentencing.” State v. Jones, No. 

E2023-00155-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 6389810, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2023)

(quoting State v. Shelton, No. E2022-00875-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2261081, at *3 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2023), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 29, 2023)).

Although “a new arrest and pending charges are proper grounds on which a trial 

court can revoke a defendant’s probation, a trial court may not rely on the mere fact of an 

arrest or an indictment to revoke a defendant’s probation.” Booker, 2024 WL 1928840, at 

*4 (citing State v. Harkins, 811 S.W.2d 79, 83 n.3 (Tenn. 1991)). Indeed, the State must 

produce evidence “‘in the usual form of testimony’ to establish the probationer’s 

commission of another offense while on probation.” Id. (first quoting State v. Ellison, No. 

01C01-9708-CR-00361, 1998 WL 272955, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 29, 1998); and 

then citing State v. Chaney, No. 01C01-9801-CC-00010, 1999 WL 97914, at *1 n.2 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Feb. 18, 1999)). The State needs only to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that a defendant violated the law. Booker, 2024 WL 1928840, at *4 (citing State 

v. Edwards, No. W1999-01095-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 705309, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

May 26, 2000), perm. app. dismissed (Tenn. Sept. 11, 2000)). 

Regarding the first prong of Dagnan, Defendant argues the trial court abused its 

discretion when it revoked his probation “without any sworn proof that these violations 

were explained to him or that he had done any of the alleged violations.” Specifically, he 
- 6 -

argues that the State “had not presented . . . proper sworn or competent proof of the alleged 

violations as required by the provisions of [Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-

311(e)(1)(A) and (B).” In support of his argument, Defendant cites to our supreme court’s 

decisions in State v. Hunter, 1 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tenn. 1999), and State v. Hawkins, 811 

S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tenn. 1991), without any explanation as to how these cases support his 

position. In Hunter, the supreme court determined that when a trial court finds a defendant 

has violated the conditions of probation, it “has the authority to cause execution of the 

defendant’s original judgment as it was originally entered, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-310, 

-311, or to extend probation for a period of up to an additional two years” on the original 

probationary period. 1 S.W.3d at 647. In Hawkins, the court acknowledged that for a trial 

court to abuse its discretion in revoking a defendant’s probation, “it must be established 

that the record contains no substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trial judge 

that a violation of the conditions of probation has occurred.” 811 S.W.2d at 82 (citing State 

v. Grear, 568 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tenn. 1978); State v. Delp, 614 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1980)). Thus, while both cases generally discuss a trial court’s options when 

a defendant fails to comply with the terms of his or her probation, neither case stands for 

Defendant’s argument as to the State’s burden of proof in probation revocation hearings.

Regardless, here the record contains substantial evidence to show that Defendant 

violated his probation by committing a new crime. The trial court relied upon the sworn 

testimony of Officer Dyer, who testified that when he returned to the vehicle after 

conducting a records check, he observed what he believed to be “the magazine of a handgun 

under the front passenger seat.” The officer then noticed Defendant “concealing” another

firearm “that was under his feet.” After reading Defendant his Miranda rights, the officer

questioned him about the firearms and Defendant “claimed possession” of the .380 caliber 

handgun in the back seat. He admitted he had the .380 caliber handgun for two weeks. As 

a convicted felon with prior violent felony convictions, Defendant was prohibited from 

possessing a firearm. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B), (c)(1). At that point, 

Officer Dyess arrested Defendant for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. 

As far as Defendant’s argument that he was unaware he could not violate the law as a 

condition of his probation, Defendant’s testimony at the hearing defeats his argument on 

appeal. Defendant admitted that he was twice convicted of felony offenses, including 

aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. Both times he was placed on probation and 

both times, Defendant acknowledged, the trial court had told him he was not able to possess 

a firearm. Defendant also admitted that he had violated his probation multiple times with 

new arrests. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Defendant violated the 

terms of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence by committing a new violation 

of law and was within its discretion to revoke Defendant’s probation. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§§ 40-35-311(e)(2).
- 7 -

Moving to the second prong of Dagnan, a trial court may consider “the number of 

revocations, the seriousness of the violation, the defendant’s criminal history, and the 

defendant’s character” before determining the consequence for a defendant’s probation 

violation. Dagnan, 641 S.W.3d. at 759 n.5. Here, a review of the record shows the trial 

court properly considered many of the factors outlined in Dagnan. First, it considered 

Defendant’s prior violations, noting each time he had violated the terms of his probation 

and pleaded guilty to new felony offenses. The trial court also considered the seriousness 

of the violations and the risk of Defendant committing further violent acts: 

Because [Defendant] had been on probation for a crime of violence, 

that is robbery, and crimes that involved the entry into the dwelling place of 

others, the [c]ourt finds that when he is in possession of a firearm, that he 

poses a risk of danger of further violence, so the [c]ourt orders that his 

sentence should be ordered into execution to be served in both cases. 

The trial court noted Defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of his violations. It 

found that Defendant is a risk for further danger and violence. Defendant’s violations 

demonstrate his low potential for compliance with a probation sentence. See, e.g., Booker, 

2024 WL 1928840, at *5. As stated above, “an accused, already on probation, is not 

entitled to a second grant of probation.” Jones, 2023 WL 6389810, at *3.

 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that Defendant violated his probationary sentence and ordering him to serve the balance of 

his sentence in confinement. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgement of the trial court.

____________________________________

MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE