Joint Special Operations University

7701 Tampa Point Boulevard

MacDill AFB FL 33621

https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications

JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

In this compelling new monograph by Retired U.S. Army Brigadier 

General Russ Howard and U.S. Marine Corps Major John Duvall, 

Jr., the authors leverage their vast experiences and knowledge of 

the region to explore the Obama Administration’s Asia Pivot strategy, announced in 2011, and its impact on Special Operations. The 

authors begin by defining this vast region. They then look at the 

U.S. strategic goals, evaluate the threats, and provide an analysis of 

the progress of where America is today along with the importance 

and impact on special operations. This monograph is the culmination of two years of analysis of the “pivot to Asia” by the authors. It 

provides a starting point for all SOF to gain a better understanding 

of this vast region and the future role SOF could play to counter the 

threats to our national interests. 

ISBN 978-1-933749-99-0

The Asia Pivot: Implications for 

U.S. Special Operations Forces

Russell D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.

JSOU Report 16-7

JSOU Report 16- 7 The Asia Pivot Howard and Duvall
Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs; Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Senior Research Fellow and adjunct professor, 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 

Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Louis Alberto Ordóñez Rubio,

Vice Admiral, Colombian Navy, Ret.,

Ph.D., Education, Director, Centro Regional de 

Estudios Estrategicos en Seguridad

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Geographic Combatant Command operations 

in order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.
JSOU Report 16-7

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

The Asia Pivot: Implications 

for U.S. Special Operations 

Forces

Brigadier General (Retired) Russell D. Howard, 

U.S. Army and

Major (Retired) John P. Duvall, Jr., 

U.S. Marine Corps
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in July 2016.

ISBN 978-1-933749-99-0
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization. A Case Study of 

Task Force 714 in Iraq, June 2016, Richard Shultz

2017 Special Operations Research Topics, June 2016

Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in Unconventional Warfare, 

March 2016, Riley Post and Jeffrey D. Peterson

2016 Special Operations Essays, March 2016

The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing, February 2016, Jarret Brachman

Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments, January 2016, Robert Haddick

SOF Role in Combating Transnational Crime, January 2016

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, December 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion, 

November 2015, Colin S. Gray

Countering Violent Extremism in Mali, November 2015, Mark Moyar

The 2005 Iraqi Sunni Awakening: The Role of the Desert Protectors Program, 

October 2015, William Knarr

2016 Special Operations Research Topics

On the cover. South Korean sailors assigned to Special Warfare Flotilla 

and members of U.S. Navy SEAL Team 17 prepare to conduct a visit, board, 

search, and seizure exercise 22 March 2013 during exercise Key Resolve in 

Chinhae, South Korea. Key Resolve is a combined U.S.-South Korea training exercise held annually to ensure the operational readiness of air, space, 

and cyberspace operations in the Korean theater of operations. Source: U.S. 

Navy photo/Lieutenant Commander Cheol Kang.

Back cover. The 1st Special Forces Group conducts helocast operations near 

Bellows Air Force Station, Hawaii. Source: U.S. Marine Corps.
v

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................... vii

About the Authors .........................................................................ix

Introduction .................................................................................. 1

1. The Asia-Pacific Region ............................................................. 7

2. U.S. Military and the Pivot ...................................................... 19

3. Strengthening Alliances ........................................................... 33

4. USSOF’s Role—or Non-Role—in the Pivot .............................. 71

5. Conclusion ............................................................................. 79

Appendix A: Acronym List .......................................................... 83

Endnotes ..................................................................................... 85

vii

Foreword

In this compelling new monograph by Retired U.S. Army Brigadier General 

Russ Howard and U.S. Marine Corps Major John Duvall, Jr., the authors 

leverage their vast experiences and knowledge of the region to explore the 

Obama Administration’s Asia Pivot strategy, announced in 2011, and its impact 

on Special Operations. The authors begin by defining this vast region. They 

then look at the U.S. strategic goals, evaluate the threats, and provide an analysis of the progress of where America is today along with the importance and 

impact on special operations. 

The authors review the impact of the five years since the 2011 announcements, looking at the numerous trips to Asia made by President Obama to 

reinforce U.S. relationships. Howard and Duvall state the original “intent of 

the pivot was to direct diplomatic, economic, and military resources toward 

the Asia-Pacific region in order to reassure both U.S. allies and adversaries 

of its commitment to remain the predominant power in Asia.” The authors 

draw from former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, “who outlines five 

specific areas to achieve the U.S. goals: 1) strengthening alliances; 2) deepening partnerships with emerging powers; 3) building a stable, productive, and 

constructive relationship with China; 4) Empowering regional institutions; 

and 5) helping to build a regional economic architecture.”

Howard and Duvall also address the ongoing disagreement regarding terminology—‘pivot’ vs ‘rebalancing’—but both agree in the importance of focusing 

on the region. They suggest the threats from China, North Korea, the Islamic 

State, and foreign fighters will require the skills and special operations core 

activities of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) by countering these organizations by placing emphasis on foreign internal defense and counterterrorism.

This monograph is the culmination of two years of analysis of the “pivot 

to Asia” by the authors. It provides a starting point for all SOF to gain a better 

understanding of this vast region and the future role SOF could play to counter 

the threats to our national interests.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

ix

About the Authors 

Brigadier General Russ Howard (U.S. Army retired) is an adjunct professor of terrorism studies and a senior research fellow at the Middlebury 

Institute of International Studies at Monterey. He is also a senior fellow at 

the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and a senior advisor to Singapore’s Home Team Academy. General Howard was 

founding director of the Jebsen Center for CounterTerrorism Studies at The Fletcher School of Law and 

Diplomacy, Tufts University, and head of the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, where he was 

also founding director of the Combating Terrorism 

Center. 

General Howard’s Army positions include chief 

of staff fellow at the Center for International Affairs, 

Harvard University, and commander of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. Other assignments 

include assistant to the Special Representative to the Secretary General 

during United Nations Operations in Somalia II, deputy chief of staff for 

I Corps, and chief of staff and deputy commander for the Combined Joint 

Task Force, Haiti/Haitian Advisory Group. He previously was commander of 

3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, 

and served as administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner and as 

a special assistant to the commander of U.S. Southern Command. 

As a newly commissioned officer, Howard served as an “A” team commander in the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active 

component and served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During 

this period he served as an overseas manager of American International 

Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia, and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific Airlines. He was re-called to active duty in 1980 and served 

initially in Korea as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations 

Command at Fort Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 

1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 
x

General Howard has a B.S. in industrial management from San Jose State 

University and a B.A. in Asian studies from the University of Maryland. He 

also has an M.A. in international management from the Monterey Institute 

of International Studies and a master of public administration from Harvard University. He was an assistant professor of social sciences at the U.S. 

Military Academy and a senior service college fellow at The Fletcher School. 

His previous JSOU Press publications are Intelligence in Denied Spaces: New 

Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (2007), Educating Special 

Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment (2009), Cultural 

and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, 

and Potential Alternatives (2011), and The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? (2013). 

Major John P. Duvall, Jr. (U.S. Marine Corps retired) is an M.A. candidate at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey 

in the Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies Program, with Spanish language. He is also an adjunct professor for the Marine 

Corps University’s professional military education 

program, where he teaches courses for the Marine 

Corps’ Expeditionary Warfare School and Command and Staff College distance education programs 

to both U.S. and international officers attending the 

Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language 

Institute. 

Following OCS, commissioning, and The Basic 

School, Major Duvall attended the Marine Corps 

Combat Engineer Officer’s Course, after which he was assigned to 1st Combat 

Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, 

where he served as a platoon commander and in various staff billets. He was 

then deployed to Kuwait to serve with Coalition Joint Task Force-Kuwait 

as the ground operations officer in support of operations Desert Spring and 

Southern Watch. Subsequently, he was assigned to be the operations officer 

then executive officer for Marine Corps Embassy Security Group, Region 

2 (Middle East/South Asia), based at the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus. 

After spending a year at the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warfare School in 

Quantico, Virginia, he was then assigned to 9th Engineer Support Battalion, 
xi

3d Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force, in Okinawa, 

Japan, where he commanded three different companies and subsequently 

served as the operations and then executive officer. Major Duvall’s last operational assignment was as a lead planner for the War Plans Branch, C5, Plans, 

Policies, and Assessments, for Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

Major Duvall has a B.A. in philosophy from Auburn University. In addition to attending the Expeditionary Warfare School, he attended the Naval 

Postgraduate School’s National Security Affairs Department. While there, he 

also graduated from the Naval College of Command and Staff at the Naval 

War College’s satellite campus aboard the Naval Postgraduate School. This 

is his first publication for JSOU Press. 

1

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

Introduction 

When this project commenced in February 2013, the United States 

appeared to have a new grand security strategy—the Asia ‘pivot.’ 

The decision to prioritize U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region had already 

been expressly stated in official documents in 2011. This level of interest was 

reinforced repeatedly during that year, and it was reemphasized in early June 

2014, when President Barack Obama visited four Asian countries, including 

traditional U.S. allies South Korea and the Philippines.1 In November that 

year, the President again visited Asia. He first went to Beijing for the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference, where he emphasized 

the importance of trade via the Trans-Pacific Partnership, followed by a 

visit to Burma to attend the East Asia Summit. He closed out his second 

trip to the region that year with a visit to Brisbane, Australia, for the G-20 

summit, which reinforced President Obama’s stated commitment to rebalance America’s relationship with Asia.2

When conceived in 2011, the U.S. pivot toward Asia made sense, especially 

after more than a decade of intense focus on the Middle East and Afghanistan. It was welcome news to America’s Asia-Pacific allies and security partners because the region was quickly becoming a very tough neighborhood.3

Disputes between Asian nations seemed to be boiling over, which threatened 

the stability of a region vital to the U.S. economy. For example, Japan and 

South Korea—both U.S. allies—were barely communicating, while China 

was butting heads with its neighbors and the U.S. over a number of issues, 

including Beijing’s newly established and legally problematic air defense 

identification zone over the East China Sea.4

However, after more than two years’ work on this project, questions have 

arisen about the future of the Asia pivot, and headlines in several major 

media outlets have not been reassuring. Two that come to mind are, “The 

Year the U.S. Pivoted Back to the Middle East,” which ran in the Financial 

Times on 23 December 2013, and “Can Joe Biden Rescue the Asia Pivot?” 

which appeared on Politico on 2 December 2013.5 Other commentaries, such 

as the Voice of America broadcast on 23 December 2013, titled “U.S. Rebalance to Asia Overshadowed by Tensions with China,” contend that the pivot 

had at least been “sidetracked.”6 On 20 December, the Council of Foreign 
2

JSOU Report 16-7

Relation’s “Expert Roundup” bluntly asked, “What Happened to the Asia 

Pivot in 2013?”7 Even the President’s May 2014 trip to Asia left some doubt 

about the pivot. On the one hand, he tried to reassure U.S. friends and 

allies in the region, such as South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, of 

his commitment to remain supportive at a time when China could become 

more assertive or even belligerent on the Pacific Rim. On the other hand, the 

president encouraged these countries to show restraint toward China, even 

insisting that Washington is seeking to build solid relations with China and 

hopes to enlist Beijing’s help in finding solutions to various issues.8

Interestingly, Washington’s renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region is 

not so much a paradigm shift as the revival of a traditional U.S. security 

role in the region.9 According to Patrick Mendis of George Mason University, “since the Cold War, the U.S. has underwritten the regional security 

architecture in the Asia Pacific through bilateral treaties with allies such as 

Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.”10 However, 

many of these relationships have atrophied during the past decade, due to 

U.S. priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps because of a reduced U.S. 

presence in Asia, tensions there have intensified, mostly as a result of Beijing’s 

bellicose behavior in the South China Sea. A case in point is the air defense 

identification zone China announced on 23 November 2013. The zone is in 

a disputed area of the East China Sea, where both China and Japan claim 

three small islands. China requires all aircraft to identify themselves when 

entering the zone they have claimed, and suggests that its military can take 

“emergency defensive measures” against any unidentified aircraft in that 

area.11 Beijing’s announcement of this defense identification zone has added 

to the perception that China might resort to the use of force in its own neighborhood. This has caused our traditional allies to favor a U.S. return to its 

post-Cold War “balancer” role so China will not do something provocative, 

such as attempt to overpower its neighbors.12

The initial intent of the pivot was to direct diplomatic, economic, and 

military resources toward the Asia-Pacific region in order to reassure both 

U.S. allies and adversaries of its commitment to remain the predominant 

power in Asia. According to former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, 

the pivot’s specific objectives were to achieve a “stable security environment 

and a regional order rooted in economic openness, peaceful resolution of 

disputes, and respect for universal rights and freedoms.”13 Reaching these 

goals, said Donilon, would be achieved through action in five specific areas:
3

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

• Strengthening alliances;

• Deepening partnerships with emerging powers;

• Building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with 

China;

• Empowering regional institutions; and

• Helping to build a regional economic architecture.14

Most agree that the rationale for the pivot was valid. Many analysts and 

policymakers are increasingly worried about an arms buildup in the AsiaPacific region, “which could lead to further nuclearization of the region, as a 

number of nations crank up military budgets in response to China’s growing 

military might, as well as threats from North Korea.”15 These same analysts 

and policymakers also worry that America’s status as the world’s dominant 

superpower is in decline, leaving a perceived vacuum that China could use 

to further strengthen its clout. One commentator posited that China’s bellicose manner was the best argument for the pivot. Writing in the Bangkok 

Post, Alan Dawson contended that Beijing is the top salesman for the pivot, 

because its adventurous actions make a better argument for the pivot than 

President Obama does and are in fact superior to the entire propaganda 

arm of the U.S. Government: “China’s ever-expanding military, its hugely 

arrogant claim to everything in and under the China Seas, its increasing 

efforts to split the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) politically over the disputed islands—these are the best selling points that the U.S. 

pivot could receive.”16 The pivot initially did seem to be good foreign policy. 

In a non-threatening manner—at least from an Obama administration perspective—the pivot enabled the U.S. to inform a bellicose North Korea and 

an increasingly powerful China that it intends to leverage its power in the 

region to protect U.S. interests and those of its allies.17

However, not all agreed that ‘Asia pivot’ was a good name for the change 

in policy, let alone good policy. Indeed, many objected to the name because 

the U.S. in fact had never left Asia. ‘Non-pivoters’ suggested that the term 

should be ‘rebalancing,’ which “encompasses two separate processes—the 

U.S. military is rebalancing its global assets from other regions to Asia, as 

well as rebalancing within the Asia-Pacific region, reducing the concentration 

of forces from northeast Asia to a more widely distributed focus throughout 

the entire region.”18 Not all analysts agree that the pivot or rebalancing to 

the Asia-Pacific region is the result of a good geostrategic assessment, or that 
4

JSOU Report 16-7

the new policy—whatever its name—is good for U.S. policy in the region. 

For example, Stephen Cohen and Robert Ward of the Brookings Institution 

contend that President Obama’s Asia pivot reflects a “desire to exchange the 

long, costly, and increasingly politically unpopular war in Afghanistan, as 

well as the broader focus on the unstable, violent Middle East, for the relative 

stability of East Asia,” where America’s air and naval strength dominate and 

traditional allies such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines cooperate.19

Robert Ross, a Boston College professor and a fellow at the Harvard Center 

for International Affairs, argues that the pivot unnecessarily antagonizes 

China at a time when U.S.-China relations are fragile.20

The American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Auslin also believes that 

the pivot to Asia may be short-sighted for reasons related to China, but for 

other reasons as well. According to Auslin, President Obama has “riskily bet 

his foreign policy legacy on transforming a region where tensions among 

nations seem to be growing, not lessening.” As for China, Auslin notes in a 

Wall Street Journal article titled “Asia Pivot, Take Two” that tension between 

China and Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands raises red flags. According to Auslin, “Tokyo has made clear that it expects American backing in its 

attempts to maintain control over the islands.”21 Auslin notes that, while the 

Obama administration has refused to take a stand on the issue of the islands’ 

sovereignty, it acknowledges that the U.S.-Japan defense treaty applies to 

territories under the administrative control of Japan. Therefore, says Auslin, 

“should China press the issue, Mr. Obama may not have the luxury of staying above the fray.”22 Auslin notes in the article that North Korea is another 

potential headache for the Obama administration: “After being outmaneuvered and embarrassed by new leader Kim Jong-un over the February 2013 

failed missile and nuclear agreement, Mr. Obama has to reassess his North 

Korea strategy. Does the U.S. want to put more pressure on Pyongyang, or 

possibly re-enter negotiations?”23 Meanwhile, Auslin warns that conflict 

elsewhere will further endanger President Obama’s pivot, if not render it 

misguided. Hamas rockets falling on Israel, “a nuclear crisis with Iran, or a 

wider Middle East war, will absorb Mr. Obama’s energies in some form this 

term, leaving his laudable Asia vision unfulfilled.”24 Indeed, the ghosts of 

crises past continue to disturb President Obama’s Asia pivot, with “renewed 

violence in Iraq and the complexities of not losing all gains in Afghanistan 

after the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2014 ... perhaps highest on the list of 

unfinished business.”25
5

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

Possibly the greatest threat to the U.S. Asia pivot is the gains made in Iraq 

and elsewhere by the terrorist group the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL). Not only is ISIL engaged in a brutal civil war with the Syrian government, it also has crossed the border into Iraq, overtaking important cities 

like Mosul along the way, overrunning Iraqi army positions, and massacring 

Iraqi soldiers as they surrender, along with civilians by the thousands, then 

burying them in mass unmarked graves.26 ISIL has commandeered U.S. 

military equipment from defeated Iraqi units, robbed banks, and released 

prisoners, all to help replenish its supplies of money and manpower. Additional funding streams from trafficking in black market oil, captured humans 

(primarily women and children sold as slaves), stolen weapons, and looted 

antiquities combine to bring ISIL millions of dollars a week.27

With ISIL’s taking of the Haditha Dam in western Iraq and the group’s 

close proximity to the U.S. consulate in Erbil, President Obama ordered 

airstrikes to help the Iraqi government regain control of the dam, which 

ISIL could use as a weapon, and to help push ISIL fighters back from Erbil 

in an effort to protect the U.S. diplomats in the consulate. Despite some 

negotiation breakthroughs, brewing crises in the Middle East—such as Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions, the continuing Syrian civil war, the collapse of Iraq’s new 

government under Haider al-Abadi due to pressure from ISIL, and Israel’s 

incursions into the Gaza Strip—call into question the wisdom of shifting 

resources to the Asia-Pacific region.28

Finally, former Congressional Research Service specialist Stanley R. Sloan 

contends that the pivot policy rhetoric may have seriously eroded U.S. credibility and degraded its capacity to promote its interests in Europe and the 

Middle East. According to Sloan, the potential political damage resulting 

from a perceived lack of U.S. commitment and leadership is far more consequential than just a physical shift of military resources. What, asks Sloan, 

has the U.S. gained by “shining a bright light on Asia?”29

What, indeed, if the shift has emboldened Russian President Putin to 

exhibit aggressive behavior in Ukraine in an attempt to restore Russia’s status 

in the world? Indeed, President Putin has recently embarked on an Asia pivot 

strategy of his own by signing the biggest single trade agreement in history 

with China. The agreement is a $400 billion, 30-year natural gas deal, which 

is a clear signal of Russia’s economic and strategic pivot toward Asia.30

This work is divided into four sections. In Section I, the authors offer a 

definition of what constitutes the Asia-Pacific region, explain why the region 
6

JSOU Report 16-7

is important, and describe what impending threats are facing the region. 

In Section II, the relationship between the pivot and United States Special 

Operations Forces (USSOF) and conventional force laydown in the U.S. 

Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) is discussed. For 

organizational purposes, former National Security Advisor Tom Donilon’s 

five Asia pivot goals (strengthening alliances; deepening partnerships with 

emerging powers; building a stable, productive, and constructive relationship with China; empowering regional institutions; and helping to build a 

regional economic architecture) provide the major subheadings in Section 

III, which is the main body of this monograph.31 Finally, in Section IV, we 

discuss the USSOF role, recap the key points of the monograph, and suggest 

a roadmap for the future of the Asia pivot. 

While the arguments for and against the U.S. Asia pivot continue to 

percolate, the authors believe that the pivot has merit and are writing this 

monograph from that point of view. Furthermore, the authors believe that 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) should play a major part in U.S. national 

security policy, pivot or no pivot, and presents the SOF portion of the monograph from that perspective. To that end, this monograph will serve as a 

good primer for SOF familiarization of the Pacific AOR.
7

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

1. The Asia-Pacific Region 

Definition

There is no one clear definition of the Asia-Pacific region. Most definitions include Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Oceania. Some 

include Russia, which is on the northern edge of the Pacific, the nations 

of Central America, and those of South America that border the western 

Pacific—Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. For the purposes of this 

monograph, the Asia-Pacific region is defined as the area that falls under 

the USPACOM AOR (see map, Figure 1).32 This area includes 36 countries 

and covers approximately 52 percent of the entire globe. Unique to the Asia 

Pacific region is its composition: 83 percent of it is covered by water and 

more than half of the world’s 7.2 billion people live in the Asia-Pacific region 

on the remaining 17 percent that is covered by land, where they speak more 

than 3,000 different languages and dialects.33

Why the Region Is Important

The Asia-Pacific region is very diverse and it is important for economic, 

political, and security reasons. “Contained in the thirty-six nations in USPACOM’s area of responsibility are the world’s two largest economies after the 

U.S. (China and Japan), and five smallest economies. The region also contains 

the world’s most populous nation (China), the largest democracy (India), the 

largest Muslim-majority (Indonesia), and the smallest republic (Nauru).”34 

Seven of the world’s 10 largest armies are in Asia-Pacific nations, as are the 

world’s largest and most sophisticated navies and five of the world’s eight 

declared nuclear powers.35

The Asia-Pacific region’s tenfold increase in gross domestic product over 

the past three decades is the fastest economic growth of any region in the 

world. “Even with external shocks, such as the global financial crisis, natural 

disasters and political transitions, most of Asia’s economies, led by China 

and India, have demonstrated a high degree of economic resilience relative 

to the rest of the world.”36
8

JSOU Report 16-7

Figure 1. U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility. Source: USPACOM
9

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

What Are the Threats?

The vast diversity of the Asia-Pacific region results in a similar diversity of 

threats, both conventional and unconventional. The People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) presents threats to U.S. security that span the entire range of 

military operations, from the strictly conventional to highly sophisticated 

cyber warfare. The South China Sea is one of the most contentious areas in 

the world, due to numerous nations’ overlapping claims of sovereignty, the 

amount of trade that passes through it, and the natural resources its seabed 

contains. North Korea maintains a vast conventional military, as well as 

nascent nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile programs and a potent 

cyber-warfare capability. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines are havens 

for Islamic nationalist groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 

(MILF), as well as transnational terrorist organizations like Abu Sayyaf. The 

remainder of this section details these various threats. 

China. The first two decades of the 21st century have been and continue to 

be a period of intense modernization of the People’s Liberation Army by the 

Chinese government, which sees it as an essential element in “preserving and 

sustaining” what China’s leaders call a “period of strategic opportunity.”37 

According to the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, China sees this 

period as:

an opportunity to focus on fostering a stable external environment 

to provide the PRC the strategic space to prioritize economic growth 

and development and to achieve “national rejuvenation” by 2049. At 

the same time, Chinese leaders express a desire to maintain peace 

and stability along their country’s periphery; expand their diplomatic 

influence to facilitate access to markets, capital, and resources; and 

avoid direct confrontation with the United States and other countries. This strategy has led to a growing Chinese presence in regions 

all over the world, and particularly on its periphery, creating new and 

expanding economic and diplomatic interests. China’s expanding 

interests have led to friction between some of its regional neighbors, 

including allies and partners of the United States.38

China’s increasing rate of growth in defense spending, coupled with 

its continued lack of transparency, have created suspicion about the PRC’s 
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JSOU Report 16-7

motives, not only in the U.S., but in most of the countries in the Asia-Pacific 

region. In 2013, China’s military budget was nearly $120 billion, a 5.7 percent 

increase over the previous year. This increase continued a pattern nearly two 

decades old of increased military investment by the Chinese government. 

These investments have focused on modernizing key strategic forces, such 

as “advanced intermediate- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles” used for “long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles,” all of 

which are critical to China’s anti-access/area-denial operational concept.39 

According to Sam LaGrone of the U.S. Naval Institute News, recent 

U.S. naval war games, which included the new numbers and capabilities 

of Chinese anti-ship missile technology, have given the U.S. Navy cause to 

reconsider the size of its surface fleet, as it may not be large enough to face 

China in a conventional naval conflict. Previous ‘force structure assessments’ 

concluded that 88 surface ships would be sufficient to face the Chinese threat, 

but those numbers are now being reevaluated. According to LaGrone, a 

surface fleet of more than 100 is now being considered necessary.40 Whether 

the U.S. Navy attempts to address Congress regarding such an increase is 

yet to be seen. Meanwhile, China 

also continues to invest in counterspace weapons, numerous offensive 

cyber capabilities, and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. The first at-sea 

testing of China’s first and only 

aircraft carrier took place in 2013. 

The common denominator in all of 

these investments is a projection of power, especially into China’s Exclusive 

Economic Zone (EEZ), and an increasingly long range.41

Another area of contention with China is the South China Sea, a small 

section of the Pacific Ocean approximately 1,423,000 square miles (3,685,000 

square km) in area.42 It is bordered to the north by mainland China, to the 

east by Taiwan and the Philippines, to the west by Vietnam, Thailand, and 

the Malay Peninsula, and to the south by Singapore and Indonesia. The sea 

is filled with hundreds of uninhabitable islands, atolls, and shoals, some of 

which are exposed only at low tide. These various and seemingly unimportant spots of land are the subject of various claims of sovereignty by the countries that border the sea. The South China Sea’s strategic implications are 

numerous and varied for the countries that surround it, and for the countries 

recent U.S. naval war games ... 

have given the U.S. Navy cause to 

reconsider the size of its surface 

fleet, as it may not be large enough 

to face China in a conventional 

naval conflict.
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

that conduct trade with the countries of Asia. For example, the Malacca 

Strait, one of the world’s most critical and crowded shipping lanes, connects 

the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean and feeds about one-third of the 

world’s shipping into the waters of the South China Sea. The strait is also 

the primary route through which the vast majority of crude oil passes on 

its way from the petroleum states of the Persian Gulf to China, Japan, and 

Korea, among others. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, $5.3 

trillion in U.S. trade dollars passed through the South China Sea in 2011, 

23 percent of which came to the United States. The seabed allegedly holds 

11 billion barrels of oil reserves (a little less than one percent of the world’s 

proven oil reserves) and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (approximately 

three percent of the world’s proven gas reserves).43

The contentious nature of claims to the South China Sea is primarily due 

to China’s declaration of a 200-mile EEZ, which is outlined in the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as if the sea were 

China’s territorial waters.44 Thus, China claims sovereignty over all of the 

islands in the South China Sea and the rights to natural resources (fish, minerals, hydrocarbons, etc.) that go with that sovereignty. Additionally, China 

is conducting numerous land reclamation projects—essentially constructing 

islands in the area on which to build outposts and an airstrip. According to 

retired Navy Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, USPACOM’s previous combatant commander: 

Although land reclamation cannot, for example, change a submerged 

feature into a natural island that generates any legal entitlements to 

maritime zones, the completion of these projects will give China 

the ability for greater presence, increase dwell time for military and 

coast guard assets, and expand the areas covered by surveillance 

and area-denial systems.45

Additionally, in the words of Michael McDevitt:

China’s approach in the South China Sea is best described as “peacefully coercive.” It carefully avoids direct involvement of its navy, and 

instead relies upon its Coast Guard and fishing fleet to pursue what 

is often characterized as a “salami slice” strategy, in taking small, 

incremental steps that are not likely to provoke a military response 
12

JSOU Report 16-7

from any of the other claimants, but over time gradually change the 

status quo regarding disputed claims in its favor.46

Due to the overlapping nature of the various EEZs of the countries that 

border the South China Sea, the U.S. remains neutral on all claims of sovereignty over the islands. In 1995, however, the United States issued its first 

policy declaration regarding the contentious nature of the South China Sea. 

The U.S. advocates for a “peaceful, non-coercive diplomatic resolution that 

preserves regional stability and freedom of navigation” in what has developed into one of the globe’s busiest sea lines of communication and whose 

seabed contains significant and, importantly, local natural resources ready 

to feed the rapidly growing economies of Asia.47 Today, 20 years later, that 

policy has not changed. 

China argues against this U.S. policy position, and it disputes U.S. advocacy of the UNCLOS allowance for both military and commercial vessels 

to freely navigate the seas inside a coastal nation’s EEZ. China argues that 

military activity inside its EEZ is not one of the “peaceful” activities allowed 

under the UNCLOS, and it essentially claims total sovereignty over its EEZ, 

which the UNCLOS allows only within a nation’s 12 nautical mile territorial 

water boundary.48 This difference in interpretation and compliance has led to 

various incidents over the years between the United States and China in the 

South China Sea. The first was in 2001, when a Chinese J-8 fighter collided 

with a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft over international waters but inside 

China’s EEZ, which caused the U.S. EP-3 to make an emergency landing on 

China’s Hainan Island. The Chinese pilot was killed, and the U.S. crew was 

held and interrogated for 10 days before being released. China dismantled 

the EP-3 before eventually returning it to the United States in July 2001. 

A second incident occurred in March 2009, when the United States Naval 

Ship Impeccable, a U.S. Military Sealift Command surveillance ship, was 

conducting operations within the Chinese EEZ but outside of Chinese territorial waters. A Chinese naval frigate, two Chinese fishing trawlers, and 

other Chinese vessels harassed the Impeccable for four days by conducting 

provocative maneuvers considered by most observers to be outside the realm 

of responsible seamanship, and which threatened the safety of the Impeccable and its crew. A third incident occurred in August 2014, when a Chinese 

J-11 fighter intercepted and shadowed a U.S. P-8 surveillance aircraft (the 

successor to the EP-3) that was flying over international waters but inside 
13

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

China’s EEZ; the J-11 reportedly came within 20 feet of the U.S. P-8.49 If past is 

prologue, future confrontations in the South China Sea are a near certainty. 

U.S. military operations in the area are key to maintaining its stability, and 

stability is in the interest of every country in the region, including China, 

and every country that conducts trade with countries in the region. The U.S. 

and China see their respective roles in the South China Sea differently, and 

that difference must be reconciled if stability in the region is to be assured.

North Korea. North Korea remains one of the most persistently troublesome 

puzzling foreign policy foes for the U.S. and the region. The leadership in 

Pyongyang, which is based on the Kim family’s ‘cult of personality’ and 

has been maintained with nothing less than crushing brutality, has shown 

astonishing resilience since its inception 67 years ago. This resilience is due 

in significant part to North Korea’s primary backer, China. China provides 

North Korea with food and energy, assistance that is vital to the North 

Korean people and on which the regime heavily relies, especially since South 

Korea terminated its aid program. China is responsible for an astonishing 

60 percent of North Korea’s overall trade.50 China’s aid is pragmatic, as it has 

immense interest in a stable Korean peninsula. For one thing, war between 

the two Koreas would result in a massive humanitarian crisis on the ChinaNorth Korea border. China currently repatriates North Koreans who illegally 

cross the border, an act many human rights groups condemn, due to North 

Korea’s abhorrent human rights record.51 The collapse of the Kim regime 

could result in a similar crisis, thus China continues to support the regime 

at the United Nations (UN) and during six-party talks.52

Besides its nascent nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile programs, the Kim regime maintains a diverse repertoire of illicit pursuits and 

aggressive actions that it attempts to use for geopolitical leverage in diplomatic negotiations with its regional neighbors and the United States. These 

include manufacturing and trafficking in illegal drugs, counterfeiting U.S. 

currency, cyber warfare and espionage, black market weapons sales, and 

violent military provocations toward South Korea and other countries inside 

and outside the region.53 To deal with these issues, the Obama administration 

has adopted a policy position, according to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, of “strategic patience in close consultations with our Six-Party 

allies,” which suggests that “the United States could afford to wait for North 

Korea to make its decision to denuclearize.”54
14

JSOU Report 16-7

However, denuclearization must not be the only desired end state of the 

U.S. ‘strategic patience’ policy, as North Korea’s threat arsenal is varied and 

substantial. For example, in November 2014, a massive cyber attack hit Sony 

Pictures Entertainment, a top Hollywood film production studio. A group 

calling itself the Guardians of Peace claimed responsibility for the attack, 

saying it objected to a forthcoming Sony Pictures film called The Interview, 

a satire depicting the assassination of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, 

and threatened to attack theaters that showed the film when it opened on 

Christmas Day. The cyber attack also resulted in the release of thousands of 

private emails between Sony executives and certain high-profile celebrities, 

some of which were quite embarrassing. Additionally, the attackers released 

several films on the Internet before they opened in theaters, which took a big 

cut out of Sony’s multimillion dollar investment in those films. Based on an 

initial cyber-forensic analysis of the attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has alleged it originated in North Korea. One piece of evidence cited is 

that the attack bears a striking resemblance to a March 2013 attack against 

South Korean banks and media companies, as well as other malware attacks 

known to have been executed by the North Korean government.55 Some 

cybersecurity experts argue that North Korea does not have the capability 

to conduct such a sophisticated attack, and that the real perpetrators are 

conducting the cyber version of a “false flag” operation.56

Nevertheless, the Obama administration seems convinced that North 

Korea is the perpetrator—at least that is what it is saying publicly. At a press 

conference held on 19 December 2014, President Obama stated, “We will 

respond [to North Korea] proportionately, and we will respond in a place and 

time and manner we choose.”57 The following day, a senior administration 

official said that the administration was looking at re-designating North 

Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, which carries a significant international 

stigma. The Wall Street Journal noted that: 

[state sponsor of terrorism] designation by the U.S. ... triggers economic and trade sanctions, though any such measures would be 

largely symbolic, given the historically low levels of trade between 

the U.S. and North Korea. The terror designation ... carries additional implications for international financing and credit, such as 

through the World Bank and other institutions.58
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

It is assumed that the president will take additional classified actions to 

address this attack, and North Korea’s cyber-warfare threat in general. 

If this attack was indeed executed by North Korea, then the U.S. should 

take immediate notice, as it would indicate a level of maturity and prowess in 

cyber warfare previously unexpected from North Korea, at least without some 

assistance from a country like 

China or Russia. Although the 

attack did result in significant 

economic damage to Sony and 

its shareholders, the U.S. is 

fortunate that it was against a 

large corporation and did not 

result in the loss of life, and that it was not an attack on a piece of priority 

infrastructure, like an electric grid or a water treatment facility for a large 

urban center. As such, if leveraged properly, the attack should provide the 

U.S. Government and other private entities a valuable case study in all the 

elements of cybersecurity. Summing up, it would seem that North Korea’s 

nuclear and missile capabilities, which are still in their infancy and for which 

the U.S. is prepared, are not the only significant threat the ‘hermit kingdom’ 

can presently muster. Thus, the U.S. pivot toward Asia must ensure that it 

will address all warfare domains, from the traditional physical domains 

associated with conventional warfare to the nontraditional domains like 

cyberspace, when planning for potential North Korean threats.

Terrorism and Insurgency. Terrorist and insurgency groups have a serious 

impact in several areas of the Asia-Pacific region. Although their goals can 

vary widely, the vast majority of these groups are Islamist fundamentalists. 

Some are ethno-separatists fighting secular governments in the region in an 

attempt to form their own Islamic states in Muslim-majority areas. Others 

have the ambitious goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate in the region. 

Others are global jihadist groups with known or suspected ties to al-Qaeda. 

These various groups primarily operate in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 

Thailand, and the Philippines.59

The two dominant terrorist organizations in the region are Jemaah 

Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf. Jemaah Islamiyah was formed slowly over time 

by a core group of Southeast Asian Islamist radicals with various goals, 

“from establishing an Islamic regime in Indonesia, to establishing an Islamic 

the U.S. pivot toward Asia must ensure 

that it will address all warfare domains, 

from the traditional physical domains 

... to the nontraditional domains like 

cyberspace.
16

JSOU Report 16-7

caliphate over Muslim regions of Southeast Asia and northern Australia, to 

waging jihad against the West.”60 Their first known attack was the horrific 

nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, which killed more 

than 200 people and injured well over 200 more. After the Bali bombing, the 

U.S. and the UN designated Jemaah Islamiyah a foreign terrorist organization, and the group’s activities have been significantly curtailed due to governments in the region hunting down and arresting or killing its members. 

Analysts warn that, despite this weakening, Jemaah Islamiyah still maintains 

a latent capacity to conduct terrorist attacks and needs to be monitored in 

case it reconstitutes itself into a more potent group.61

Abu Sayyaf is a violent Islamist group with links to al-Qaeda that operates 

out of the southern island of Mindanao in the Philippines, and the islands 

of Basilan, Jolo, and the rest of the Sulu archipelago. It was formed in 1991 

when it split from the MILF—the Philippine insurgent group—and is now 

listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States. Abu Sayyaf is 

known to carry on drug trafficking and indiscriminate bombings, and to 

kidnap and hold hostages, particularly Westerners, for ransom. 

Abu Sayyaf’s most notable kidnapping occurred in May 2001, when several members of the group entered a Philippine resort and kidnapped 20 

people, including three Americans. The group demanded a ransom, and 

when it was not paid, Guillermo Sobero, one of the three American hostages, 

was beheaded. The other two Americans were Martin and Gracia Burnham, 

a Christian missionary couple whom Abu Sayyaf held hostage on Basilan. 

Approximately a year later, in June 2002, the Philippine military launched 

a raid in an attempt to rescue the couple. During the firefight that ensued, 

Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse were killed. Martin’s wife Gracia 

Burnham was shot in the leg, but she survived and was rescued.62 Abu Sayyaf 

still operates in the Philippines, but the Philippine military, with U.S. help, 

has been able to degrade its capability significantly. But, as with Jemaah 

Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf maintains its ability to strike and could cause significant disruption in the region. 

The region suffers not only at the hands of Islamist terrorists; it also must 

deal with ongoing Islamist insurgencies, primarily in the Philippines. For 

decades, the Philippine government has been fighting a well-rooted Muslim 

insurgency on its southern islands of Mindanao, Basilan, and the Sulu archipelago, often with help from the U.S. military. Two insurgent groups are 
17

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

operating in the southern Philippines: the MILF and the Moro National 

Liberation Front (MNLF). 

In 1971, Moro separatists formed the MNLF with the goal of establishing 

an independent Moro nation in the southern Philippine islands. The MNLF 

is essentially an ethno-separatist Islamist insurgency. The MILF was formed 

in 1991 as a splinter faction of the MNLF. The MILF is the country’s largest insurgent group, and it is also an Islamist insurgency aiming to form 

a separate Islamic nation in the southern Philippines. The MNLF and the 

MILF are essentially fighting for the same ground, the difference being that 

the MILF has a more radically Islamist viewpoint. 

The MILF’s efforts seemed to have paid off, as the group signed a peace 

agreement with the Philippine government in March 2014. The Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro creates a new administrative area called 

Bangsamoro, which replaces the previous Autonomous Region in Muslim 

Mindanao. This agreement gives the MILF a greater level of political autonomy, particularly over tax revenues. This agreement could cause problems, 

as it conflicts in some ways with the Philippine government’s 1997 agreement with the MNLF.63 The government hopes that providing the Muslim 

population in the southern islands a certain level of political autonomy will 

enfranchise those who previously felt slighted by the Christian-dominated 

government in Manila, and will thus bring any remaining insurgents into 

the political fold. The next 18 to 24 months will be critical to the agreement’s 

success or failure. The more extreme members of the MILF might feel this 

agreement does not suit them, and if the past is any indicator, it is a very real 

possibility that new insurgent groups seeking to express their discontent will 

emerge in this fractious country.64

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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

2. U.S. Military and the Pivot 

Approximately 360,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel are assigned 

to the Asia-Pacific region under USPACOM; approximately 10 percent of them are civilians who work for the U.S. Department of Defense. 

The primary military forces assigned to the region include the U.S. Navy’s 

Pacific Fleet, which consists of approximately 200 ships manned by 140,000 

personnel; these include five of the 11 aircraft carrier strike groups the Navy 

maintains and just under 600 aircraft. The U.S. Marine Corps’ Pacific forces 

include two Marine Expeditionary Forces (I MEF and III MEF), which consist of approximately 640 aircraft and 86,000 personnel. The U.S. Air Force 

has more than 300 aircraft and approximately 29,000 personnel assigned to 

the region, whereas the U.S. Army has more than 60,000 personnel in Korea, 

Japan, and other locations within USPACOM’s AOR. There are more than 

1,200 Special Operations personnel operating in the USPACOM AOR, and, 

finally, the U.S. Coast Guard frequently supports U.S. military forces in the 

region.65 As of this writing, it is not completely clear what changes in force 

numbers the Asia pivot policy will bring, but the goal is to have 60 percent 

of U.S. naval and air forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific AOR.66 However, the 

U.S. military is discovering that the logistics involved in shifting personnel 

to meet the pivot’s objectives are expensive. According to Paul McCleary 

of Defense News, the “shifting of troops and material across the globe, and 

then finding them homes, shelter, and storage space, is complex and won’t 

come cheap.”67

Army

The pivot has had more of a logistical and administrative impact on the 

Army than on the other services. The Army has approximately 60,000 uniformed and civilian personnel assigned to the USPACOM AOR located in 

Korea, Japan, Hawaii, and Alaska, and at Joint Base Lewis-McCord outside of 

Tacoma, Washington, home to the headquarters of the U.S. Army’s I Corps, 

which historically has been operationally aligned with the Asia-Pacific 

region. Since the Obama administration announced its Asia pivot strategy 

in late 2011, the Army has been looking for a way to re-task its Asia-Pacific 

theater forces to increase their operational relevance in a region historically 
20

JSOU Report 16-7

dominated by the Navy and Marine Corps. As such, U.S. Army Pacific Command has devised a new theater engagement plan called Pacific Pathways. 

According to Wyatt Olson of Stars and Stripes, “Under Pacific Pathways, the 

Army will develop small units [of about 700 soldiers] that will be forwarddeployed for quick response to humanitarian emergencies or regional threats. 

The plan is also a way for the Army to create a semi-permanent presence in 

parts of the Pacific where it’s not politically or financially feasible to establish 

bases.”68 As described by General Vincent Brooks, Commanding General of 

U.S. Army Pacific Command, who developed Pacific Pathways: 

the FY14 Proof of Principle includes a Stryker equipped Task Force 

with Aviation assets; it employs some of the Army’s most ready units; 

and it provides the US Pacific Command Commander a prepared 

force in the likelihood of a contingency. FY14 Pacific Pathways 

lessons learned will be applied to the subsequent 5-year plan that 

includes 29 Exercises (14 Joint, 15 Army Bilats) in 12 Indo-Asia-Pacific 

countries (to include 5 treaty allies). Pacific Pathways directly reflects 

the Army’s Regional Alignment of Forces and allows US Army 

Pacific to employ scalable and tailorable packages throughout the 

region in exercises and engagements where Soldiers increase their 

cultural awareness, working with multiple foreign partners while 

continuing to develop individual and collective training skills. 

Pacific Pathways is a visible demonstration of the United States’ 

commitment to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region’s security—US Soldiers 

working alongside partner nations and joint forces, a part of the 

military expression of the strategic rebalance.69

But this ambitious plan has its critics. One of them is Aaron Marx, a 

former Marine Corps pilot and retired Lieutenant Colonel. While still on 

active duty, Marx was selected to be a federal executive fellow at the Brookings Institution. While there he wrote “The Wrong Path in the Pacific,” 

a scathing opinion piece on the Army’s Pacific Pathways program. Marx 

makes the argument that the Army is not complementing Navy and Marine 

Corps capabilities, as General Brooks often argues, and is instead needlessly 

replicating an existing capability that has been in place for decades. During 

that time, the Navy and Marine Corps have cultivated personal relationships 

with the militaries of the Asia-Pacific region through training exercises and 

actual operations, and thus they have acquired expertise in the primary 
21

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

mode of assistance many countries in the region have needed: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. They also have developed and 

inculcated the operational doctrine needed to build a foundation for such 

operations within the Navy and Marine Corps team. Marx emphasizes these 

points by bluntly stating that “the Navy and Marine Corps team does not 

need the assistance with theater engagement, bilateral training, emerging 

crises or natural disaster response that Pacific Pathways seeks to provide. The 

Navy and Marine Corps team just needs the ships and budgetary support to 

continue doing what it already does and has done since 1775.”70

Despite what many might cynically consider nothing but an inside-theBeltway battle for defense dollars, General Brooks believes the units assigned 

to the Army Pacific Command are ready to play a valuable operational role 

in the Asia pivot. According to General Brooks, “We can no longer afford 

to build [combat] units and put them on a shelf to be used only in the event 

of war.”71 However, the majority of these units are either deployed or based 

east of the International Date Line, in Hawaii, or in Washington State, and 

therefore are constrained by what military 

planners call the ‘tyranny of distance’ 

so characteristic of the region. As such, 

they must spend considerable time and 

resources—scarce commodities during 

a crisis of any kind—just getting to their 

destination due to the sizable distances that must be traversed. Pacific Pathways is designed to mitigate any time and resources lost to the tyranny of 

distance while also testing the Army’s ability to be flexible and expeditionary—traits it will need if it wants to get a permanent operational seat at the 

Asia-Pacific table. 

Marines 

The U.S. Marine Corps’ operational history in the Pacific is significant and 

substantial. It is also diverse, ranging from combat operations in the Philippines and China during the late 1800s, to its island-hopping campaign 

against the Japanese during World War II, to today’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations, which are conducted by Marine 

Expeditionary Units (MEU). Thus, the Obama administration’s pivot toward 

the Asia-Pacific region is a natural fit for a Marine Corps that has been active 

We can no longer afford to 

build [combat] units and put 

them on a shelf to be used 

only in the event of war.
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JSOU Report 16-7

in the region for over a century. However, that does not mean the current 

Marine Corps force is the correct size or optimally located to carry out the 

rebalancing. 

For nearly a decade, the Marine Corps, for both political and operational 

reasons, has been realigning its forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region. It 

has focused in particular on the approximately 19,000 personnel forwarddeployed in the Pacific west of the International Date Line. Approximately 

18,000 of them are on the Japanese island of Okinawa, where Marines have 

been stationed since winning the Battle of Okinawa in 1945.72 The reasoning behind the Marines’ continued presence on the island has evolved in 

accordance with U.S. defense strategy and force posture, regional conflicts, 

and other various geopolitical factors. Okinawa has long hosted the Marine 

Corps’ forward-deployed operational headquarters, III MEF; during certain 

HADR operations, the USPACOM commander can task the commanding 

general of III MEF with leadership of Joint Task Force (JTF) 505, which was 

developed specifically to execute these missions. 

According to the Defense Department, JTF 505 is able “to integrate and 

coordinate with foreign military units and nongovernmental relief organizations supporting the disaster efforts”; the “duration and extent of ... 

[their] support will depend on the needs” of the host nation.73 III MEF is in 

command of the Marine Corps’ operational rapid response force, 3d Marine 

Expeditionary Brigade, which is a scalable, task-organized Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) consisting of a command element, a ground 

combat element, an air combat element, and a logistical/support element, all 

of which are ready to deploy to support any crisis along the range of military operations. The 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade can go from being 

operationally tasked by USPACOM to execution within six hours, and can 

self-sustain its operations for 30 days. III MEF also commands a tactical 

rapid response force in the 31st MEU, a fully equipped MAGTF of approximately 2,200 personnel who are perpetually embarked on a two-ship U.S. 

Navy Amphibious Ready Group. Like most MEUs, the 31st is commanded 

by a Marine colonel and contains the following: 

1. a command element 

2. a reinforced infantry battalion at its core, supported by a small reconnaissance unit, mechanized Amphibious Assault Vehicles, Light 

Armored Reconnaissance vehicles, and combat engineers 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

3. a composite squadron of various aircraft

a. 8 x AV-8B Harriers for close air support

b. 2 x KC-130J Hercules for transport and tanker support

c. 10 x MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor for assault support

d. 3 x UH-1Y Hueys for command/control and close air support

e. 4 x AH-1W Cobras for close air support

f. 4 x CH-53E for assault support and heavy lift to include sling-loads

4. a combat logistics battalion providing the full range of logistical 

support 

All three subordinate commands are headed by a lieutenant colonel. The 

31st MEU conducts periodic deployments in support of USPACOM’s theater security cooperation, military-to-military engagement/training, crisisresponse responsibilities, and various other missions, where the forces have 

the ability to go from being tasked to executing the mission within six hours. 

When the 31st MEU deploys, it has the ability to fully sustain itself for 15 

days.74

Okinawa provides III MEF with excellent basing infrastructure, training areas, and a geographic locale from which it can, for example, project 

power on the Korean peninsula or respond to a humanitarian crisis in the 

Philippines.75 Nevertheless, occupying this location has carried a political 

price over the years. Okinawans have demonstrated regularly at the gates of 

U.S. military bases to protest their presence on the island and demand their 

closure. These protests have ranged in size from just a few people to several 

thousand protesters, and historically they have been peaceful.76 However, 

a tipping point was reached in September 1995, when three U.S. servicemen, two Marines and one sailor, were accused of kidnapping, beating, and 

raping a 12-year-old Japanese girl. The three men were eventually turned 

over to Japanese authorities, but the seven weeks it took for that to occur 

infuriated the Japanese public, which was under the impression that the U.S. 

military was trying to protect the alleged rapists and that justice was not 

being served.77 All three men were subsequently convicted and sentenced 

for up to seven years in a Japanese prison. Upon their release, all three were 

dishonorably discharged from the military. As a result of this tragic incident, the U.S. and Japanese governments negotiated an agreement to reduce 
24

JSOU Report 16-7

the amount of Okinawan territory the U.S. controlled by 20 percent. This 

agreement led to the establishment in 1996 of the U.S.-Japan Special Action 

Committee on Okinawa, an organization created to implement the basereduction agreement.78

There currently are approximately 18,000 Marines on Okinawa, as well 

as tens of thousands of military dependents, spread over nine bases and 

one airfield. Over the years, the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma has 

been the most contentious. Since the airfield was constructed in 1945, the 

surrounding land has been fully developed with civilian infrastructure. 

This makes flight operations potentially hazardous for the civilian population and Marine aircrews alike, as there is little room for an aircraft having 

an emergency to make an off-field landing. There was one such incident in 

2004, when a Marine CH-53D helicopter experienced an inflight emergency. 

In attempting to make an emergency landing at Futenma, it struck an Okinawan university administration building and crash-landed at the base of 

the building. Several large pieces of the helicopter separated from the main 

airframe and fell to the ground in residential areas. Luckily, no civilians 

were injured or killed, and the helicopter crew survived the incident with 

minor injuries.79

However, the crash prompted the U.S. Government, in conjunction with 

the Japanese and local Okinawan governments, to take a serious look at 

relocating Futenma. Thus, in 2006, Washington and Tokyo reached an agreement under the Defense Policy Review Initiative to build a new airbase in 

the sparsely populated seaside village of Henoko, located on the eastern 

Okinawan coast north of the main U.S. bases, already home to an isolated 

U.S. base named Camp Schwab. According to the relocation plan, once air 

operations were moved to Schwab, Futenma and several other Marine bases 

would be closed and some 8,000 Marines and their families would be transferred from Okinawa to Guam.80 Paul McCleary of Defense News explained: 

“The plan is to shift roughly 4,800 Marines [from Okinawa] to Guam, 2,700 

to Hawaii and 2,500 to Australia, with others coming back to the US mainland.”81 However, because the new airfield was to be built by reclaiming land 

in Oura Bay off the coast of Henoko, the project ran into several delays due 

to environmental and political concerns. The Japanese government gave its 

approval for work to begin on the airfield in August 2014, over the objections of the local Okinawan government and the civilian anti-U.S. basing 

movement.82 If history is any indicator, it will be years if not decades before 
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the airfield is finished and the Marine Corps executes its relocation plan. 

Moreover, the U.S. and the government of Guam have yet to decide on sites 

for basing and training, and it will take years to construct the infrastructure 

needed on the island to accommodate the additional U.S. military members 

and their dependents who eventually will be moved there.83

Meanwhile, an agreement reached in November 2011 between Washington and Canberra has allowed Marine Corps units to rotate annually into 

Darwin, Australia, during the months of April to October, beginning in 

2012, as part of the Marine Corps’ well-established Unit Deployment Program (UDP). From November to March, during the Southern Hemisphere’s 

summer monsoon season, which significantly affects Darwin, the UDP force 

will instead deploy to Okinawa. The size of the first rotation in April 2012 

was approximately 200 Marines; each additional rotation increased in size 

and capacity. The size of Marine Rotational Force-Darwin is expected to 

be 2,500 by 2016.84 This Darwin UDP unit, which is a scalable, land-based 

MAGTF, has been named Marine Rotational Force-Darwin. Based at Australia’s Robertson Barracks outside the city, its mission is to increase U.S. 

theater security cooperation and military-to-military engagement in the 

region, and to assist U.S. partners in the region by building military capacity. 

The force also will have the capability to respond to a wide range of potential 

regional crises, if needed.85

Air Force 

The U.S. Air Force is also looking to deploy to Australia. According to John 

Reed at Foreign Policy, the Air Force already has begun deploying air units to 

Australia, as well as to India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 

and Thailand. These deployments are designed to help the Air Force “develop 

a network of [allied nation] bases in the region” that they can use to “build 

ties to allies that operate American equipment and know how to work with 

the U.S. military.”86 According to General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, former 

head of U.S. Air Force operations for USPACOM, “One of the main tenets of 

our strategy is to expand engagement and interoperability and integration ... 

with our friends’ and partners’ militaries ... We exercise together; we train 

together; we build their capability; and we also get familiar with them and 

the environment.” Carlisle believes such extensive integration and training 

“will pay tremendous dividends” in the future, since the Air Force does not 
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JSOU Report 16-7

want or intend to build extensive U.S. owned and operated basing infrastructure in the Pacific.87 “In a lot of ways, we’ll increasingly move south and 

west with the rotational presence—Darwin, Tindal [in Australia], Changi 

East in Singapore, Korat in Thailand, Trivandrum in India,” Carlisle said.88 

According to Carlisle, the Air Force will deploy additional V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft throughout the Pacific to help transport SOF.89

The Air Force already occupies and maintains six major air bases in the 

Pacific west of the International Date Line: Misawa and Yokota in mainland 

Japan, Kadena in Okinawa, Kunsan and Osan in Korea, and Andersen in 

Guam.90 They host several permanently stationed units, leaving little room 

for rotational forces. Three operational-level Air Force units provide support 

to the USPACOM AOR. The 5th Air Force, established in 1941, occupies the 

three bases in Japan, with its headquarters at Yokota Air Base. There are 

15,000 airmen spread across the three Japanese bases; their primary mission is to defend Japan and partner with the Japanese Self Defense Force in 

responding to contingencies in the region. It maintains a varied assortment 

of aircraft, including F-15 and F-16 fighters, E-3 AWACS for airborne command and control, KC-135 tankers, HH-60G Pave Hawk for search-and-rescue operations, and smaller aircraft for executive transport, among others.91 

The 7th Air Force is located at two air bases on the Korean peninsula; its 

mission is to support the Republic of Korea’s armed forces. The 8th Fighter 

Wing at Kunsan contains two squadrons of F-16 fighters, while the 51st 

Fighter Wing at Osan Air Base contains one squadron of F-16 fighters and 

one of A-10s for close air support.92 The 734th Air Mobility Squadron, which 

is located at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, primarily a way-station for 

aircraft crossing the Pacific, provides a variety of ground-based support and 

basing for the newly instituted, ongoing 4- to 6-month rotations for various 

B-52, B-1, and B-2 bomber detachments.93

As the Air Force shifts its capacity away from Afghanistan to the AsiaPacific region, it will move additional B-1 bombers, MQ-9 Reapers, U-2 

reconnaissance aircraft, and Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles into 

the region, some permanently and some on a rotational basis.94 According 

to Eric Fanning, former chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and 

recently appointed Secretary of the Army, “air power is particularly suited 

to meet the challenges posed by [the] Asia Pacific’s vast distances and current threats.” Referring to the rebalance in the Asia-Pacific theater, Fanning 

noted that the Air Force is “dedicated to building and sustaining long-term 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

relationships in the region that help build capacity among our allies, friends 

and partners.” He explained that “maintaining the rebalance to the Pacific 

requires a stable level of presence in the Pacific, despite anticipated force 

reductions.” Fanning also noted that the budget constraints faced by the Air 

Force and the Defense Department in general make cooperating with allies 

sensible, since each force will gain efficiencies, and therefore effectiveness, 

in the process.95

Navy

At present, the U.S. Navy has about 285 grey-bottom (i.e., combat) ships 

evenly divided among the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. This number will 

begin to decline as some older vessels are retired and not replaced. As a 

result of the Asia pivot, the percentage of the number of ships will change, 

with 60 percent assigned to the USPACOM AOR by 2020.96 This 60 percent 

figure includes some of the Navy’s most sophisticated ships and aircraft. For 

example, four Littoral Combat Ships, which can operate in shallower waters 

than other vessels, will be stationed in Singapore. The list also includes the 

EA-18G plane, which can jam enemy air defenses and fly faster than the 

speed of sound. One Virginia-class submarine—the Navy’s most advanced—

is also on the list, as are Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and other 

electronic surveillance aircraft that will be transferred from Afghanistan.97

Of the Navy’s 11 aircraft carriers, five are already assigned to the Pacific, 

and six of its most sophisticated ballistic-missile defense-capable destroyers will be transferred from Rota, Spain, to Asia. Four of the destroyers will 

remain in Rota to provide ballistic-missile defense in Europe.98 The Navy also 

maintains 11 civilian cargo vessels in Guam, which are loaded with military 

equipment for all branches of the U.S. military as part of Maritime Preposition Ships Squadron-3, which in turn is part of Military Sealift Command, 

whose mission is to provide an immediate sealift of vital equipment and 

supplies to support designated operations.99

Within the past 18 months, the Pentagon replaced three warships based 

out of Yokosuka, Japan, with newer and more modernized versions of the 

same class. The Navy expects to replace one more next year.100 A squadron 

of P-8s, the Navy’s new submarine hunter aircraft that is meant to replace 

the aging P-3, is now operating out of Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, not far 

from the East China Sea and China’s self-declared air defense identification 
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JSOU Report 16-7

zone. The P-8s are state-of-the-art reconnaissance aircraft built on a modified 

and extended Boeing 737 airframe. They have a longer range than the P-3s, 

giving them greater time on station. They also carry the Harpoon anti-ship 

missile torpedoes and other weapons. While they are designed to hunt submarines and surface warships, when on patrol over the ocean they are also 

a formidable surveillance and intelligence-gathering platform.101 Finally, the 

air wing aboard the Nimitz-class carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76)—

permanently based out of Yokosuka, Japan, as of October 2015—carries the 

F/A-18F Super Hornet.102 Super Hornets are superior to their predecessor in 

load, speed, and range, and they have the ability to carry out a variety of 

missions.103 Rear Admiral Mark C. Montgomery, 

a former commander of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier strike group and current 

director of operations for USPACOM, believes 

the U.S. strategic rebalancing has resulted in an 

increased number of surface combatants, cruisers, and destroyers that support the strike group, 

allowing for a greater combatant presence in the 

Pacific. Montgomery believes this expanded U.S. 

military presence in the Asia-Pacific region will have a calming effect on any 

regional tensions and budding territorial disputes.104

However, the Navy is lacking in one vital mission area: amphibious shipping. According to retired Admiral Samuel Locklear III, former commander 

of USPACOM, he did not have the capability in his AOR to conduct a contested amphibious landing, a core mission of the Navy and Marines Corps. 

Four amphibious ready groups reside in the USPACOM AOR: three in San 

Diego and one in Sasebo, Japan. The admiral has requested, via the Pentagon, 

additional amphibious lift capability, but in today’s global operational environment, amphibious ready groups are a low-density, high-demand requirement needed to address international crises across the range of military 

operations and across the globe. During his remarks to Congress in March 

2014, Admiral Locklear stated, “I’m not the only combatant commander that 

desires amphibious shipping or the Marines that are on them. So there is a 

global competition among us as the world situation kind of moves around. 

The global demand signal today is ... greater than what we can resource.” 

The admiral believes that now and in the future, the geographic lay down of 

USPACOM’s AOR needs adequate amphibious lift in order to accomplish its 

this expanded U.S. 

military presence in 

the Asia-Pacific region 

will have a calming 

effect on any regional 

tensions and budding 

territorial disputes.
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

various missions: “In the Pacific, though, it is my view that as the Marines 

come back ... we should optimize the capability of the Marines ... particularly in the area west of the [international] dateline. And to do that we have 

to have adequate amphibious lift.”105 Amphibious shipping in the USPACOM 

AOR will be critical if the pivot is to succeed.

The Current Role of USSOF in the USPACOM AOR

Information regarding the current role of USSOF in Asia is hard to come 

by. This is likely due to the heavy SOF demand in the Middle East/North 

Africa and Central/South Asia. But, despite this drain on USSOF, the U.S. 

military has approximately 1,200 special operations personnel assigned to 

the USPACOM AOR under the sub-unified command, Special Operations 

Command, Pacific (SOCPAC).106 SOCPAC is composed of three subordinate commands that are aligned by service component: the Army’s 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group located at Torii Station, Okinawa, Japan; 

the Air Force’s 353rd Special Forces Group at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 

Japan; and Naval Special Warfare Unit One, at U.S. Naval Base Guam.107

SOCPAC’s mission and that of its component units are “to deploy throughout 

the Pacific, supporting USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Program, 

deliberate plans, and real world contingencies.” Every year, SOCPAC units 

“conduct small unit exchanges, joint and combined training events, and 

operational deployments throughout the Pacific, fostering interoperability 

with host nation partners and facilitating strategic and operational objectives.” Smaller elements engage in “ongoing counterdrug and humanitarian 

demining operations, training host nation forces” throughout the USPACOM 

area of responsibility.108

When ordered, SOCPAC can deploy as a JTF in support of USPACOM 

operations. For example, in early 2002, SOCPAC was ordered to stand up 

JTF 510, act as its command element, and deploy to the Southern Philippines 

in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. While there, JTF 510 conducted 

counterterrorism operations, capacity building, information operations, and 

intelligence gathering in support of the Philippine government and its armed 

forces. The command element of JTF 510 redeployed back to Hawaii in September 2002, but it left behind a smaller unit called Joint Special Operations 

Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) to continue operations with the Armed 

Forces of the Philippines in their fight against Islamist terrorist groups like 
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JSOU Report 16-7

Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. JSOTF-P was dissolved in the fall of 2014, 

with only a small group left behind to work with the Philippine military 

headquarters instead of ground tactical units.109

Exercises

Today, SOCPAC units operate throughout the USPACOM AOR, helping 

partner nations build their conventional military capabilities, counterterrorism and asymmetric capabilities, expand their units’ cultural knowledge, 

prepare for future threats, and build governmental capacity and resilience in 

order to face such threats. SOCPAC is able to do this through USPACOM’s 

robust theater cooperation plan, which involves numerous annual exercises 

in various countries. For example, the U.S. and the Philippines armed forces 

hold an annual exercise in the Philippines called Balikatan. In 2015, Balikatan included three distinct parts: a combined arms live fire exercise, a command post exercise (CPX, or staff planning exercise), and various HADR and 

civil-military operations (CMO) in support of the Philippine population. A 

combined total of more than 11,000 U.S. and Philippine troops participated 

in the 10-day exercise, including USSOF. Despite Chinese assertions that the 

bilateral military exercises that make up Balikatan are aimed at China and 

its territorial expansion via island reclamation projects in waters claimed 

by both the Philippines and China, U.S. officials have consistently denied 

that the exercises are directed toward China in any way and repeated their 

assertions that the Philippines and China should resolve their territorial 

disputes peacefully via the tenets of international law.110

In South Korea, the U.S. holds several exercises every year in conjunction with the country’s armed forces. Every year during August/September, 

U.S. Combined Forces Command and the South Korean Armed Forces get 

together for an exercise called Ulchi-Freedom Guardian (UFG, formerly 

known as Ulchi-Focus Lens). UFG is a CPX that uses a massive computer 

simulation designed to exercise the U.S. and South Korean military staffs in 

scenarios that test various elements of the operational campaign plan for the 

defense of South Korea against an invasion by North Korea. While UFG is 

primarily a staff planning exercise, Foal Eagle is the largest annual field training exercise held by U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the South 

Korean military that brings together ground, naval, air, marine, and special 

operations forces. U.S. and South Korean SOF have a close relationship that 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

manifests as the 39th Special Forces Detachment, 1st Special Forces Regiment, a unique SOF unit that works embedded with the South Korean SOF 

units. According to T. D. Flack of Stars and Stripes, 39th Special Forces 

Detachment, 1st Special Forces Regiment “teach[es] tactics, techniques and 

procedures” during peacetime and “act[s] as ‘coalition support team leaders’” 

during wartime.111 Conducted annually in March, this defensive field training exercise is designed to demonstrate to both our South Korean allies and 

North Korea the U.S. resolve to defend South Korea from an attack by the 

North. The Key Resolve exercise, held annually at approximately the same 

time of year, is a CPX similar to UFG, in that it uses a computer simulation 

to exercise the staffs of both the U.S. CFC and the South Korean military 

in the conduct of the campaign plan to defend South Korea from a North 

Korean invasion. U.S. and South Korean SOF are both key elements in the 

conduct of all these training exercises.112

Another important exercise is Cobra Gold, hosted annually in February 

by the United States’ oldest ally in the region, Thailand.113 It is also one of the 

largest and most important annual training exercises in the world for the 

U.S. military. Similar to Balikatan, Cobra Gold contains three distinct parts: 

a combined arms live fire exercise, a CPX, and various CMO and HADR 

operations in support of the Thai population. In 2015, 26 countries participated in Cobra Gold, including for the second consecutive year, China’s 

People’s Liberation Army. As in 2014, the People’s Army was restricted to 

noncombat roles, thus it participated only in the HADR and CMO exercises. 

Cobra Gold 2015 was mired in controversy due to the military coup in 

Thailand on 22 May 2014, and the subsequent establishment of a military 

junta government. Then on 26 January 2015, Assistant Secretary of State 

Daniel Russel, whom the current military government had invited to visit 

Thailand, criticized the Thai military junta. According to Erik Slavin of 

Stars and Stripes, “Russel bluntly discussed the coup and prosecution of 

Thailand’s democratically elected government, which the military and political opponents viewed as corrupt, during [a] ... speech at Chulalongkorn 

University and in a subsequent television interview.” The Thai government 

took the comment as an insult, and it could cause lasting damage to future 

U.S.-Thai bilateral relations.114 Due to the coup and the subsequent actions 

of the Thai junta, the U.S. military stated that it would refocus and “scale 

down” its participation in Cobra Gold 2015.115 The U.S. ultimately declined 

to participate in combat and live-fire exercises, but it did participate in the 
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JSOU Report 16-7

various HADR and CMO events, including those with the Chinese. Then, 

in April 2015, the U.S. embassy in Bangkok and USPACOM issued a joint 

statement indefinitely postponing a planning meeting in Hawaii for Cobra 

Gold 2016, citing Thailand’s ongoing political situation. However, the Thai 

government is moving forward with its planning as if Cobra Gold 2016 will 

be conducted.116
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

3. Strengthening Alliances

In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has formal treaty alliances 

with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The 

Asia pivot may require that treaty documents be reviewed to ensure they 

still reflect the political and security goals of the participating nations. The 

treaties should also be nimble and adaptable enough to deter provocation 

from the full spectrum of state and non-state threats, and to meet other 

challenges of the future international security environment.117 China’s recent 

warning against military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region seems to have 

fallen on deaf ears in Washington. In fact, the U.S. is considering a new 

“security architecture” in the region with its treaty allies and other partners. 

According to the Philippine Star, “the new security arrangement is being 

forged as regional tensions rise over China’s increasingly aggressive moves 

to stake its territorial claim over waters around it, including nearly the entire 

South China Sea.”118 The new security architecture is part of the pivot and 

is an extension of the traditional ‘hub-and-spoke’ security system the U.S. 

has led in the Asia-Pacific region since the Cold War, the U.S. being the hub 

at the center of the ‘spokes’ that include its present treaty partners, as well 

as Taiwan and South Vietnam. These relationships are bilateral, with the 

U.S. the dominant partner. Today’s variant of this ‘hub-and-spoke’ security 

system includes traditional treaty partners the Philippines, Australia, Japan, 

and Thailand, and possibly two new ‘spokes,’ Singapore and Malaysia. 

The following discusses the pivot vis-à-vis SOF and traditional U.S. treaty 

partners, followed by potential new partners, allies, and other states in the 

region. Opinions about the pivot differ among the 32 nations in the AsiaPacific region: some are in favor, others are not, and some are ambivalent. 

While a detailed discussion of the attitudes of all states is not viable in 

this paper, this section will provide a basic understanding of each nation’s 

position and an appreciation of just how complex a major shift toward the 

region might be. 

Australia. Australia has worked hard in recent decades to develop foreign 

relations with Asia and the Pacific region. Since 1951, Canberra also has 

developed a close relationship with Washington, based on a military alliance and defense cooperation that includes SOF, as outlined in the Australia, 
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JSOU Report 16-7

New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). At present there are 

growing concerns in Australia over the changing dynamic in Southeast 

and North Asia. These concerns are shared by longtime Australian allies 

Japan and South Korea, which question the credibility and longevity of U.S. 

security guarantees in North Asia; China’s aggressive stance toward Japan 

and, by implication, its ally the U.S.; and the new activism and autonomy 

of the next generation of growth economies, which Australia considers to 

be India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia.119 Furthermore, the current 

deterioration in relations between Australia and Indonesia over Australia’s 

spying on Indonesian trade deliberations with the U.S. threatens regional 

stability, the strengthening of regional trade organizations with China, and 

Australia’s pursuit of broader trade liberalization as an element of its foreign 

policy goals.120 Australia understands the need for and challenge of improving relations with Indonesia and perceives any Indonesian pull away from 

the U.S.—Canberra’s most influential advocate in Jakarta—as an even larger 

barrier to overcome, as Australia’s ability to accomplish the majority of its 

foreign policy goals depends on its bilateral relationship with the U.S.121 As 

a result, Australians critical of the U.S. Asia pivot are concerned about any 

bilateral political issues that might interfere with U.S. commitments to the 

region. 

Nevertheless, Australia is not unlike other countries in Southeast Asia, 

as it welcomes the renewed U.S. interest as a counterbalance to China’s 

dominance in the region. As Hugh White, a professor of strategic studies 

at Australian National University in Canberra, puts it, “Australia is in a 

very complicated position in this. None of us want to live in an Asia dominated by China, but none of us want to have an adversarial relationship 

with China.122 Such a view could provide an opening for additional USSOF 

and conventional military engagement throughout the region in an effort 

to demonstrate to Canberra and other U.S. allies that Washington is serious 

about its pivot strategy, and to ease Beijing’s concerns about U.S. encirclement. Furthermore, Beijing’s opposition to President Obama’s November 

2011 announcement about bringing U.S. Marines to Darwin was labeled by 

some senior Australian officials as predictable rhetoric, indicating that the 

“relationship between the United States and Australia predates any American concern with them. China accepts that Australia does things with the 

U.S.”123 Moreover, while the U.S.-Australian military partnership is no doubt 

expanding under the Asia pivot, Pentagon officials have emphasized that the 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

U.S. military is interested only in operating in Australia as a guest and not 

in developing its own bases ‘down under.’124

While the concept of the U.S. military operating as a guest in foreign 

nations appears less hostile and much more cooperative than developing its 

own large-scale military installations abroad, critics of the pivot argue that 

the ‘lily pad’ approach (i.e., small, austere, strategically placed bases located 

in areas of known instability, which belong to U.S. allies and from which 

the U.S. has obtained permission from the host nation to conduct military 

operations) is “partly a matter of economics—it’s much cheaper to piggyback 

off an allied country’s facilities—or, in some cases, a country that may be 

none too willing, but not in a position to say no.”125 Critics believe that the 

U.S. is using this approach because of financial strains, due to a combination of the cost and the budgetary deadlocks in Congress.126 With the U.S. 

military reducing its global footprint in this way, allied countries can share 

the burden. However, critics argue that Australia should “not be forced to 

choose between its principal military 

ally and its largest trading partner” as 

the U.S. broadens its presence in the 

Asia-Pacific region.127 Despite its strong 

historic defense ties with the U.S., Australia’s interdependent but asymmetrical trade with China must not be ignored, as “even Japan and Korea cannot 

constitute a replacement for China as an Australian resources customer.”128 

Japan. The U.S.-Japan security alliance was forged in the aftermath of World 

War II and remains an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia. Revised 

in 1960, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security grants the United 

States the right to military bases on the Japanese archipelago, which includes 

Okinawa, in exchange for a U.S. guarantee to defend Japan in the event of an 

attack. The alliance’s resilience was tested after the devastating March 2011 

earthquake and consequent tsunami that struck Tohoku.129 The nation’s two 

defense establishments conducted rescue operations in tandem under Operation Tomodachi, the largest bilateral mission in the history of the alliance. 

“U.S. forces aided the Self Defense Force in clearing Sendai’s airport, assisted 

in search-and-rescue teams, and prepared Japan’s defense readiness ... The 

U.S. operation engendered an incredible amount of goodwill, especially in 

the affected regions of Japan.”130

With the U.S. military reducing 

its global footprint in this way, 

allied countries can share the 

burden.
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JSOU Report 16-7

Operation Tomodachi has translated into enthusiasm for the U.S. Asia 

pivot; coincidentally, Japan is going through a pivot of its own. It is moving 

away from policies appropriate for a passive, defeated nation that is restricted 

by its constitution from having an expeditionary defense force, and toward 

those of a more aggressive nation that is sensitive to China’s encroachment 

on islands viewed by Tokyo as Japanese territory.131

China’s assertive behavior is the primary reason for Japan’s security pivot. 

For example, in September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat rammed a Japanese 

patrol boat in the waters off of the Senkaku Islands that lie south of Okinawa 

in the East China Sea. This was the first incident in what would become an 

increasingly volatile dispute between Japan and China over who owns the 

islands (known as the Diayou Islands in China). The saber-rattling between 

Japan and China continues, and it has escalated to the point where there are 

very real fears that a misstep by either side could lead to a war.132

Explaining the more aggressive policy shift, Japanese Prime Minister Abe 

told the Japanese daily Yomiuri Shimbun, “I have given instructions to take 

resolute measures against attempts to enter our territorial waters and make 

a landing. If they do land, then of course we will forcibly expel them.”133 Abe 

further explained that it has been more than 60 years since Japan’s constitution was ratified and its contents have become obsolete. “The spirit of writing 

our own constitution is what will take us to the next era,” he said. If Abe is 

successful in rewriting the constitution, it would be the first change since 

the document was drafted by American occupying forces in 1946.134

One expected result of the constitutional change will be a new defense 

plan that reflects Japan’s growing concerns over China’s increasing military 

assertiveness and territorial demands. Under the new defense plan, Japan 

will spend about $240 billion over the next five years on new equipment 

and related costs. Increased spending will include funding for surveillance 

drones, fighter jets, naval destroyers, and long-range surveillance planes to 

patrol the East China Sea and other waters surrounding Japan in order to 

challenge China’s military assertiveness.135 Nearly half of Japan’s ground 

forces will be reconfigured for rapid deployment.136 As journalist Kurt Spitzer 

explains: 

a special Marine Corps-like unit will be organized to guard Japan’s 

southwest islands, which sprawl across a vast area of ocean south of 

Japan’s main islands. For the first time, Japan will buy V-22 Osprey 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

tilt-rotor aircraft, amphibious assault vehicles and other equipment 

designed primarily for amphibious warfare.137

This reorganization, in conjunction with USSOF assets already in place 

throughout Japan, provides an excellent opportunity for USSOF to expand 

its engagement with a stalwart U.S. ally in the region. 

New Zealand. Progress toward its Asia pivot has allowed renewed security 

cooperation between the U.S. and New Zealand. In late June 2012, the U.S. 

and New Zealand signed a defense agreement in Washington that, according to New Zealand’s defense minister, Jonathan Coleman, “recognizes the 

significant security cooperation that exists between New Zealand and the 

U.S. within the context of our independent foreign policy, and seeks to build 

upon that cooperation in the years ahead.”138 The declaration provides a 

framework for cooperation, focusing on the exchange of information and 

strategic perspectives, and on increased understanding of defense policies. 

At the signing, the two parties agreed that the partnership would cover maritime security cooperation, HADR, and peacekeeping support operations.139

The renewed security cooperation comes amid New Zealand’s longtime ban 

on nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered warships entering its ports, which in 

1986 led the U.S. to suspend its security obligations to New Zealand under 

the ANZUS Treaty.140

The Asia pivot is receiving moderate criticism from John Bruni, a director 

at SAGE International, who argues that the pivot is putting longtime regional 

allies of the U.S., like New Zealand, in a difficult position. Bruni points out 

that “most of Asia trades heavily with China despite remaining skeptical 

about its political machinations.”141 New Zealand falls into this category, as 

it benefits from strong commercial ties to China, while simultaneously being 

concerned about China’s human rights record and growing naval capabilities.142 As for the security and defense cooperation the pivot would call for, 

Bruni believes that U.S.-New Zealand cooperation is limited due to the size 

of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). He explains that “while highly 

professional, there are obvious limits to what New Zealand can do to support 

U.S. operations, beyond lending their special forces personnel, intelligence 

assets and possibly an aircraft or warship.”143

Despite these criticisms, the NZDF SOF units have a history of training 

with the U.S. and the Australian SOF units during the biennial exercise, 
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Talismen Sabre, most recently in July 2015.144 As the pivot matures, one 

should expect the number of this type of SOF exercise to increase. Robert 

Ayson, director of the Center for Strategic Studies, and David Capie, a 

senior lecturer at the School of History, Philosophy, Political Science, and 

International Relations at the Victoria University of Wellington, agree with 

this assessment. Ayson and Capie argue that defense cooperation between 

the U.S. and New Zealand has been picking up since President Obama’s 

announcement of the Asia pivot in 2011. For example, in April 2012, “US 

Marines and army personnel took part in a major exercise in the middle of 

New Zealand’s North Island.”145 NZDF soldiers are also training with U.S. 

Marines in California, and New Zealand participated in the combat-focused 

Rim of the Pacific maritime exercises near Hawaii.146 Recent policy developments and high-level dialogue between the two nations reflect the rapidly 

strengthening security relationship that had been handicapped since 1986.

Philippines. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America was signed on 30 August 1951, 

in Washington. It confirms that either party will come to the defense of 

the other if attacked by an external power.147 For several years, the U.S. 

maintained large military bases in the Philippines that were integral to U.S. 

regional security plans and operations.148 However, in 1991, the Philippine 

senate rejected a new basing agreement, effectively ending the major U.S. 

military presence in the Philippines. Today, more than 20 years after the U.S. 

military bases were shut down because of anti-American sentiment, there 

is some enthusiasm for bringing U.S. military personnel back. Washington 

and Manila have agreed via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, 

signed by President Obama during a state visit in April 2014, to increase 

the U.S. military presence in the region as a counterweight to a bellicose 

and domineering China.149 This is not the first time Manila has changed 

its mind about allowing a U.S. military presence back into the Philippines. 

Under a 2002 agreement between Washington and Manila, several hundred 

U.S. counterterrorism troops deployed to the country to train Philippine 

soldiers for counterinsurgency operations to help contain al-Qaeda-affiliated 

insurgents on the island of Mindanao in the southern Philippines.150 That 

operation has since transitioned to a much smaller USSOF advisory force.151 

Moreover, in much the same way that a disaster helped reaffirm U.S. popularity in Japan, the October 2013 typhoon that devastated the Philippines 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

has had much to do with newfound positive opinions about the U.S. and its 

military. The typhoon provided a ready test case for the importance of a U.S. 

presence in the region. America’s response to the typhoon, which racked 

the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries, is the latest example 

of the U.S. winning both goodwill and political points with an Asia-Pacific 

country while responding to a natural disaster. During both the Japanese 

and Philippine disasters, “the U.S. military’s positioning of forces in the 

region allowed it to provide robust assistance more quickly and effectively 

than any other nation.”152 America’s ability to respond to crises when other 

countries—particularly China—were unwilling or unable to do so earned 

the U.S. additional credibility in the region. “The United States, for all of 

our problems, still has a lot of good working relationships and good will in 

that area of the world,” said Auslin. “The tragedy here is unfortunately an 

opportunity for us to show what we can do.”153

In fact, the mostly military U.S.-led response to the devastation wrought 

by the October 2013 typhoon was impressive. About 50 U.S. ships and aircraft 

were deployed to the disaster zone, including 10 C-130 transport planes, 12 

V-22 Ospreys, and 14 Seahawk helicopters, which were deployed from an 

aircraft carrier to airdrop supplies. The relief efforts underscored expanding 

U.S.-Philippine military cooperation, which could grow even stronger in the 

wake of the catastrophe as the United States pursues its pivot toward Asia. 

When U.S. ships “deliver food, water and medicine, they are also delivering 

good will that could ease the way for the United States to strengthen its often 

controversial military presence in one of Southeast Asia’s most strategic 

countries.”154 The U.S. was a major beneficiary of a very bad situation. “It is 

not that the United States used assistance to promote rebalancing, but that 

rebalancing enabled the U.S. to respond so decisively,” said Asia security 

expert Carl Thayer.155

South Korea. The U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty was signed 

in October 1953, two months after the end of the Korean War. The treaty is 

one of the most important and enduring U.S. alliances, and it has guaranteed 

South Korea’s national security not only by deterring further North Korean 

attacks, but also by providing a continental base for U.S. forces to face China 

and Russia, and to provide a frontline defense for Japan.156 “The alliance 

has also augmented South Korea’s military forces and provided a nuclear 

umbrella, thus enabling the South Koreans to pursue economic progress 
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JSOU Report 16-7

with relatively low military budgets.”157 Part of that economic progress has 

included building its own robust arms industry, which supports its military 

forces with tanks, missiles, howitzers, and more.158

In 1978, the CFC was established in Seoul to oversee a wartime response 

by U.S. and South Korean forces to any North Korean aggression. The CFC 

has been commanded by a U.S. general since its inception. While South 

Korea presently retains peacetime control of its approximately 639,000 service members, control in the event of war would transfer to a U.S. four-star 

general, who would command the CFC. South Korean defense ministry officials report that South Korea has asked the United States to reexamine a plan, 

which already has been delayed, to give Seoul wartime control of its military 

forces in 2015. The transfer was originally 

planned for 2012 but was delayed three 

years ago. The threat from North Korea 

has been the glue that held the alliance 

together, says Donald P. Gregg, chairman 

of the Korea Society and former U.S. ambassador to South Korea.159

Indeed, according to discussions at a 2013 Wilson Center conference 

titled South Korea and the U.S. Pivot to Asia, “relations between Seoul 

and Washington are perhaps now stronger than they ever have been since 

the signing of the bilateral military alliance 60 years ago.”160 Conference 

attendees agreed that the U.S. and South Korea are facing new challenges 

that will require them to deepen existing ties amid growing tensions in the 

Asia-Pacific region. These challenges include a surge in China’s political 

power and economic might, and increasing hostility from North Korea. In 

the face of these challenges, conference attendees concluded, “the alliance 

between South Korea and the United States is expected to strengthen further 

as the region undergoes sweeping changes.”161 Such changes leave room for 

substantial growth and operation creativity in U.S. and South Korean SOF 

integration. 

Thailand. As the first U.S. ally in Asia, Thailand and the United States share a 

unique relationship. Initial contact between the two nations occurred in 1818, 

when Thailand was still known as Siam.162 Since then, the two nations have 

developed a strong relationship based on common economic and security 

interests. Thailand is a significant U.S. trade and investment partner, exporting items such as rice, sugar, rubber, shrimp, and tin, as well as electronics, 

The threat from North Korea 

has been the glue that held 

the alliance together.
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

computers and parts, and medical equipment through its manufacturing 

and high-technology industries.163 At the same time, Thailand is a key strategic partner for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region, providing sustained 

military-to-military cooperation and granting U.S. access to Thai military 

facilities.164 For example, the Joint United States Military Advisory Group is 

the U.S. security assistance organization in Thailand that supports a number 

of missions, including the joint combined bilateral exercise program, which 

averages 40 exercises annually.165 Cobra Gold 2014, the Asia-Pacific’s largest 

joint exercise with the U.S., kicked off in Thailand on 11 February 2014, with 

participants from the U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, South 

Korea, and Malaysia. The aim of Cobra Gold is to “advance regional security 

and provide effective response to regional crises through a multinational 

force from nations that share common goals and security commitments in 

the Asia-Pacific region.”166

A September 2006 coup in Thailand, which the Thai military led against 

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, has left the country in a state of political 

instability. It set off “power struggles among established power centers, which 

spilled over into unprecedented street violence in 2010 and large demonstrations in late 2013.”167 The main leader of the protests, Suthep Thaugsuban, is 

calling for a major revamping of the government, including replacing the 

notoriously corrupt police with “security volunteers,” rewriting the constitution to ban populist policies, and replacing parliament with a “people’s 

council.”168 Relations between Bangkok and Washington do not appear to be 

affected by the political instability troubling Thailand, although “Bangkok’s 

reliability as a partner, and its ability to be a regional leader, are uncertain.”169

Those critical of President Obama’s Asia pivot argue that his November 

2012 visit to Thailand, during which he expressed “unequivocal support for 

the government led by Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra,” belies certain 

U.S. attitudes toward the Thaksin family’s leadership.170 Skeptics of the Asia 

pivot thus interpret Washington’s recent change toward Thailand’s leadership 

as a necessary move to keep Bangkok from seeking support elsewhere—

namely, China. With Beijing supporting Thaksin’s government, Thailand 

would be inclined to support China in regional trade and territorial issues, 

such as “China’s policy of treating the South China Sea dispute as a bilateral 

issue with each of the claimant countries.”171 As Thailand does not have a 

stake in the South China Sea dispute, it has nothing to lose by supporting 

China.
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JSOU Report 16-7

Proponents of a larger U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region see increased 

involvement with Thailand as a strategic partnership. In recent years, Thailand has pushed to establish itself as a regional leader by “assisting in the 

development of poorer countries, both within and outside the immediate 

region through its ‘Forward Engagement’ foreign policy.”172 Through the 

U.S.-ASEAN Partnership for Good Governance, Equitable and Sustainable 

Development, and Security, the U.S. Asia pivot puts the U.S. in a good position to back Thailand’s stance as a regional leader in Southeast Asia. This 

five-year project, which began in 2013, is supported by United States Agency 

for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. State Department. Its 

goal is to strengthen institutions and develop “regional policies to advance 

ASEAN’s vision for political-security and social-cultural integration.”173 Yet 

opponents continue to argue that increased engagement with the region as a 

whole will detract from the stronger bilateral relations the U.S. enjoys with 

its traditional allies, such as Thailand, because of a greater need to adopt a 

more diplomatic position suitable for the entire Asia-Pacific. 

Deepening Partnerships with Emerging Powers

One major objective of the Asia pivot is to strengthen bilateral arrangements with the region’s emerging powers, including China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Mongolia, and the Pacific island 

countries. It is “all part of a broader effort to ensure a more comprehensive 

approach to American strategy and engagement in the region. Increased 

interactions with India and Indonesia are particularly notable, given the 

rapidly rising regional influence of the two nations.”174

India. In this monograph, a rising China is cited as a reason for the Obama 

administration’s pivot toward Asia. Robert M. Hathaway, director of the 

Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 

in Washington, believes the rising China excuse is a “vast oversimplification.”175 However, says Hathaway, “many in India, where the People’s Republic 

of China is widely viewed as the country’s greatest long-term threat, will 

applaud Washington’s new emphasis on Asia.” Nonetheless, he adds, India 

has no desire to get in the middle of a U.S.-China confrontation and will not 

be “cast as a junior partner to the United States in a cold war with China.”176

India’s ambiguity reflects different views in Washington and New Delhi 

on the nature and the locus of the Chinese challenge. Indian strategists worry 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

that Washington wants India to help thwart Chinese ambitions in the South 

China Sea or elsewhere in East Asia, while simultaneously ignoring China’s 

activities in Pakistan that threaten India’s security interests. Two examples 

of this come to mind: Beijing’s support for construction in the Gwadar Port, 

Pakistan, and Chinese support for Pakistan’s nuclear activities in particular. 

Alleged Chinese inroads in Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka are 

also of concern to New Delhi.177

Indians are concerned about the U.S. pivot toward Asia for another 

reason. In the near term, New Delhi is not convinced that the Afghans are 

ready to assume full responsibility for their country’s security, now that the 

U.S. has ended combat operations in Afghanistan. Many in India believe the 

U.S. should stay the course in Afghanistan, and not—as some put it—leave 

India holding the bag.178

Indonesia. As Southeast Asia’s largest country and a founding member of 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Indonesia is in a critical position 

for renewed U.S. interest in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite a historically 

cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Indonesia, the George W. 

Bush administration’s lack of overt engagement in the region, due to a preoccupation with the Middle East, created the perception that Southeast Asia 

was of waning significance to Washington.179 This perception was enhanced 

by China’s increased involvement in the region, as its attention “was clearly 

illustrated by the unfailing attendance of top Chinese leaders at ASEANdriven regional meetings.”180 With the perceived waning of U.S. interest and 

China’s increased presence in the region, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a professor 

at the Research Center for Politics at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, 

believes this setting “gave East Asian countries a rare window of opportunity to develop a new set of relationships among themselves, particularly for 

managing China’s rise in a more inclusive way.”181

However, this shift left ASEAN member nations and other countries in 

the region vulnerable to China’s influence as the only dominant regional 

power. Despite this potential vulnerability, Indonesia has increased bilateral 

relations with China, including signing a strategic partnership agreement in 

2005, which opened the way for more trade, investment, and maritime cooperation.182 Bilateral cooperation with China may be strategically motivated, 

as Anwar explains: “Indonesia, like other members of ASEAN, strongly 

believes that the best way to ensure that China’s policy toward the region 
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JSOU Report 16-7

is friendly is by convincing Beijing that it has a direct strategic interest in 

Southeast Asian security and prosperity.”183

Within this framework, Indonesia’s primary objectives are to promote 

stability and ensure autonomy in Southeast Asia, freeing the region from 

great power influence.184 To this end, Indonesia has sought to minimize the 

development of regional institutions in which “China’s power would outweigh that of other members.”185 To balance China’s influence further, Jakarta 

has advocated extending membership in the East Asia Summit to Australia, 

India, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States. However, because of 

Indonesia’s concerns about China’s potential to alter the region’s stability, 

Jakarta fears that renewed U.S. interest in the region is a result of China’s 

rise instead of a genuine interest in the value of the country and the region.186

For the most part, Indonesia welcomes increased relations with the 

United States. Since the beginning of the Obama administration, Indonesia 

has sought to deepen the relationship, culminating in a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement signed in November 2010, which resulted in cooperation 

on issues of health, science, technology, and entrepreneurship.187 Yet, according to Anwar, critics of the U.S. Asia pivot are concerned “that Washington 

has placed too much emphasis on the military dimensions of this strategy.”188

Even Indonesia’s foreign minister initially stated that the proposed rotational 

basing of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia, could raise regional tensions.189 Moreover, U.S. troops in Darwin are in close proximity to Indonesia’s troubled province of Papua, “where the giant U.S. mining company 

PT Freeport Indonesia operates.”190 Pundits in Indonesia fear these forces 

could be used to “intervene on behalf of the often security-beleaguered PT 

Freeport Indonesia.”191

As mentioned previously, Indonesia welcomes renewed U.S. interest in 

the Asia-Pacific region. Arguably, this is due to Chinese “naval advances 

and its designation of its South China Sea territorial claims as a ‘core’ interest” that directly threatens Indonesia.192 Indonesia has chosen to counter 

China’s position in the South China Sea disputes through ASEAN and to 

maintain stability through multilateral diplomacy, where the U.S. could 

play a central role. To solve these disputes diplomatically, Indonesia must 

also concern itself with the interests of its fellow ASEAN members. As Ann 

Marie Murphy, associate professor at Seton Hall University, explains, “Vietnam and the Philippines, which have borne the brunt of recent Chinese 

naval assertiveness, have called for greater ASEAN backing and also sought 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

outside support, particularly from the U.S.”193 The U.S. Asia pivot could prove 

advantageous for Indonesia’s balancing act in maintaining cohesion among 

ASEAN members.

Malaysia. According to Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the 

country’s foreign policy is based on non-interference, respect for “the internal affairs of other nations,” and promoting universal peace while safeguarding its own national interests.194 As such, Kuala Lumpur seeks to maintain 

regional security and stability by promoting friendly regional and international ties to other countries and international organizations. Much of what 

Malaysia emphasizes in its foreign policy can be achieved through increased 

relations via the U.S. Asia pivot.

First, with trade between the U.S. and Malaysia already near $40.3 billion 

as of 2013, Malaysia’s support and involvement in the U.S.-created TransPacific Partnership could foster even more significant trade relationships.195

An added benefit of Malaysian involvement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 

is that it could attract more interest from the U.S. commercial sector, which 

is eager to reach out and create its own ties in the region. Second, deepening 

ties with the U.S. carries significant security benefits as China becomes ever 

more belligerent in its claim to islands in the East and South China seas.196

With peace and stability in the region a high priority for Malaysia, the June 

2013 meeting between Malaysian Defense Minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein and then U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel not 

only underscored the importance of enhanced security cooperation as a 

confidence-building measure, but also as an opportunity to grow through 

exercises, training, and interoperability.197 Finally, the April 2014 meeting of 

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, hosted in Honolulu by Secretary 

Hagel, highlighted how further cooperation can be enhanced in the region 

during unforeseen disasters such as the missing Malaysian airliner MH370 

and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.198 The goal of this meeting, according to Hagel, was for Southeast Asian nations “to feel even more clarity about 

the U.S. commitment to the area, our coordination, our communications, 

the areas where we can cooperate more.”199

Singapore. Much like the rest of the Southeast Asian neighborhood, Singapore’s foreign policy is based on maintaining political and economic stability in the region.200 To this end, Singapore, along with other countries in 

the region, welcomes heightened relations with the United States. Nicholas 
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JSOU Report 16-7

Fang, executive director of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 

says Singapore finds the U.S. military presence reassuring.201 The U.S. Navy 

began rotating its four littoral combat ships as of April 2013, stationing them 

at the Changi naval base in the east of Singapore.202

However, doubts about the U.S. commitment to its Asia pivot remain. 

Barry Desker, dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at 

Nanyang Technological University, argues, “You’re not going to have a significant shift of U.S. forces to this part of the world,” because of continued 

turmoil in the Middle East and Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to 

restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.203 Additionally, some skeptics 

in Asia and the U.S. view President Obama’s Asia pivot as a marketing job 

to distract from “a post-financial crisis America in terminal decline—and 

a China that was unstoppably ascendant.”204 Finally, those doubtful about 

President Obama’s Asia pivot believe that the policy needs to move away from 

an emphasis on a growing military presence and increased security cooperation, and to focus instead on its primary objective of being a diplomatic, 

economic, and cultural strategy.205 As such, any role for USSOF in cultivating 

relations with Singapore will be minimal at best in the near future. 

Vietnam. U.S.-Vietnam relations began to normalize in 1995 during the 

Clinton administration. Since then, relations have deepened and diversified over security and human rights issues, trade agreements, and military 

cooperation. The U.S. Asia pivot has come at a critical moment for Vietnam, 

as tensions over the South China Sea dispute have intensified. The dispute 

is causing Vietnam and other regional allies 

to form stronger ties with the U.S. for military and diplomatic backing against China, 

which, in 2010, became more assertive in its 

territorial claims.206 In fact, in 2012, then 

U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited 

Cam Ranh Bay, a vital naval base for the U.S. 

during the Vietnam War, to mark Washington’s deepening partnership with 

Hanoi and to counter China’s growing influence and military assertiveness 

in the Asia-Pacific region.207

Although China has attempted repeatedly to forge stronger ties with 

Vietnam, leaders in Hanoi interpret China’s growing influence in the region 

as a cause to question Beijing’s strategic position.208 This makes Vietnam a 

The U.S. Asia pivot has 

come at a critical moment 

for Vietnam, as tensions 

over the South China Sea 

dispute have intensified.
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

key opportunity for the U.S. Asia pivot, as Hanoi looks away from China to 

deepen its security and diplomatic partnerships. During Secretary Panetta’s 

visit to Vietnam in 2012, the two nations outlined the parameters of the 

general agreement, which was signed in 2011. It included increased military-to-military cooperation in five key areas: high-level dialogues, maritime security, search-and-rescue operations, peacekeeping operations, and 

HADR.209 However, as Richard Weitz, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, 

points out about the U.S. Asia pivot, “the geographic focus of this effort has 

been in Southeast Asia, which complements the large, fixed U.S. bases in 

Northeast Asia and also provides for superior access to vital shipping lanes 

in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.”210 Weitz hints at the underlying criticism of the Obama administration’s Asia-Pacific national security 

strategy as being largely focused on military cooperation.211

Deepening ties with Vietnam is not solely based on military cooperation, 

however. Weitz points out that, between 2002 and 2010, Washington and 

Hanoi developed stronger economic ties, with trade between the two nations 

growing “more than six-fold, to $18.6 billion.”212 Yet with maritime disputes 

at the core of the Southeast Asian nations’ concerns about China, increased 

defense cooperation with the U.S. is the most attractive aspect of Washington’s Asia pivot for Hanoi. Furthermore, deepening relations between the 

U.S. and Vietnam, and with other ASEAN member states for that matter, 

could take time and should be done cautiously, as ASEAN nations “also have 

extensive and mutually beneficial economic ties with China, which they do 

not want to jeopardize by directly confronting Beijing over its maritime 

claims.”213 Although Vietnam sees the U.S. as a counter to Chinese dominance in the region, Hanoi does not want to confront Beijing openly, nor 

does it want to be a participant in a U.S.-Chinese military confrontation. 

Thus, Hanoi maneuvers accordingly to make Washington appear to be the 

driving force behind the rebalancing.214

Counter to Weitz’s opinion, Carlyle Thayer, emeritus professor at the 

University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, 

argues that Vietnam is not increasing relations with Washington to oppose 

Beijing. Because of Hanoi’s commitment to maintaining its independence, 

“Vietnam has learned from history that too much reliance on a major power 

can have negative consequences.”215 Rather, Thayer contends, Vietnam is pivoting between China and the U.S. “to develop comprehensive ties with each 

and make each bilateral relationship important in its own right.”216 Thayer 
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supports his point by comparing the level of defense cooperation Vietnam 

exercises with both the U.S. and China; both countries exchange high-level 

visits, maintain strategic dialogue, and are allowed one naval port visit per 

year in Vietnam.217

While it is clear from both sides of the pivot argument that the U.S. and 

Vietnam are strengthening military ties, critics maintain that the U.S. is 

lagging in economic investment in Vietnam. Because China is a “feared 

ancient rival,” Hanoi would rather not take Beijing’s money, as it considers 

China “the Big Brother of the North.”218 However, the immediacy of Hanoi’s 

needs is making it difficult to resist. China’s rise is shaping regional trade 

relationships and alliances, making Washington’s Asia pivot seem “almost 

after the fact.”219

Other Nations in the USPACOM Area of Operations

Bangladesh. Bangladesh is important to U.S. national security interests 

for three reasons. First, it is the third largest Muslim state in the world 

and “stands out for its moderate secular values and success in fending off 

political use of religion.”220 Second, because its relations with Pakistan and 

Afghanistan are ‘in tatters,’ the U.S. needs to forge deeper strategic relationships with the ‘marginal states’ in the region, including Bangladesh. “Such 

states,” writes Doug Lieb in the Harvard International Review, “are often 

overlooked in a structural realist world view that privileges the study of 

large countries.”221 Third, Bangladesh is a maritime country with significant 

potential for securing Indian Ocean sea lines of communication.222 As such, 

in 2012, USPACOM deployed SOF assist teams to Bangladesh to take part in 

counterterrorism cooperation operations to assist Bangladesh in building 

capacity to help mitigate their internal counterterror and counterinsurgency 

challenges.223 According to then USPACOM Commander Admiral Robert 

Willard, Bangladesh has become an exceptionally effective partner in the 

ongoing battle against Islamist terror by cooperating, for example, with India 

and the U.S. to help counter violent activity by organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba.224 Moreover, according to Admiral Willard, “the Bangladesh 

army is primarily responsible for and has achieved major advancements in 

the protection of its citizens during the annual cyclone season and the inevitable flooding and related disasters with which Bangladesh repeatedly contends.”225 However, Bangladesh has non-traditional security vulnerabilities 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

too, such as cyclones and earthquakes, which require weather forecasting 

technologies and assistance with disaster relief and climate change issues. 

According to Nilanthi Samaranayake, a strategic studies analyst at CNA, a 

nonprofit research and analysis organization located in Arlington, Virginia, 

these vulnerabilities underscore “the prospects for advancing U.S. security 

ties with Bangladesh,” and with other South Asia maritime states such as 

Sri Lanka and the Maldives.226

Bhutan. The United States and Bhutan have never had much of a relationship. 

Bhutan was never colonized and thus has existed in self-imposed isolation 

for much of its history. Television was banned until 1999, and until recently, 

tourism was rare. During the early 20th century, the United Kingdom handled Bhutan’s external relations. India took Britain’s role after World War II, 

until Bhutan gained full control over its foreign affairs in 2007. Today, the 

U.S. has little trade with Bhutan. The American diplomatic post in New Delhi 

handles whatever Bhutan-related issues arise. According to the U.S. State 

Department, only ‘several’ Bhutanese travel to the U.S. through governmentsponsored programs every year, and a paltry ‘few’ Bhutanese military officers 

have attended courses at the U.S. Defense Department’s Asia-Pacific Center 

for Security Studies in Hawaii. While Bhutan joined the United Nations in 

1971, it does not have diplomatic relations with any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, including the United States and China.227 

Due to Bhutan’s relative geographic and diplomatic isolation, as well as its 

small military, SOF engagement by the U.S. should be a low priority. 

Brunei. President Obama cancelled a major trip to Brunei, and to Malaysia 

and the Philippines, in October 2013 because of the U.S. Government shutdown that month, raising questions about his commitment to the Asia pivot. 

He also cancelled his plans the following week to attend the APEC summit in 

Indonesia and the ASEAN summit in Brunei, where world leaders gathered 

to discuss economic and security issues.228

Brunei has much to gain from closer cooperation with the U.S. and other 

major powers. The country is predisposed to geopolitical insecurity because 

it is composed of two divided enclaves that are completely surrounded by 

its much more powerful neighbor, Malaysia. This is further exacerbated by 

historically contested maritime interests in the South China Sea, a conflict 

that Robert Kaplan argues, in a special report for the 15 August 2011 issue of 

Foreign Policy, is likely to prevail well into the future. “Because of its small 
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JSOU Report 16-7

size (about the size of Delaware), Brunei is disproportionately vulnerable to 

the ongoing Asian military modernization and contested island problems, 

which threatens the current regional balance of power; of particular concern 

is Chinese military assertiveness.”229

Brunei is also faced with several non-traditional security threats, such as 

the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2013, which demonstrated Brunei’s and other 

ASEAN members’ susceptibility to catastrophic natural disasters. “Transnational crime, most prominently in the areas of piracy, drug trafficking, 

and cyber-crime, and environmental security threats such as forest fires and 

illegal logging also contribute to national insecurity.”230 To counter these 

threats, Brunei has preferred to use soft diplomacy rather than coercive 

military action, but it is likely in the years ahead that Brunei will strengthen 

its national security by improving both diplomatic and military capabilities. 

Diplomatically, dispute resolution within the ASEAN community will likely 

occur. Brunei’s national security enhancements will include the further 

deepening of its bilateral military ties with major and regional powers, and 

investing in ‘net-centric’ military modernization.

Burma.231 The post–World War II history of Burma has been marked by 

ethnic conflict that has resulted in one of the world’s longest running civil 

wars. During this time, the UN and other international organizations have 

reported consistent and systematic human rights violations. However, with 

the military junta’s gradual relinquishing of control in 2011 and the release 

of a number of prominent political prisoners, including human rights activist Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma has taken considerable steps to improve its 

human rights record. The European Union and the U.S. have recognized 

this improvement in recent years, which has led to the easing of trade and 

economic sanctions. However, Burma’s government still faces accusations 

of human rights violations for its treatment of the largely Muslim Rohingya 

ethnic minority, including its poor response to religious clashes that have 

been described by numerous human rights organizations as a policy of ethnic 

cleansing.

In view of its isolation from the West, China and India have maintained 

close relations with Burma with several of their companies operating in 

the country. In 2008, India suspended military aid to Burma, citing human 

rights abuses by the ruling military junta, but it preserved its commercial 

ties, thereby providing the same abusive regime with a revenue stream. 
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Burma’s 2010 election reforms have led to a thawing in its foreign relations 

with Western countries. Most notably, the U.S. relaxed restrictions on foreign aid to the country in November 2011 and announced the resumption 

of diplomatic relations on 13 January 2012.

A series of high-profile visits between the U.S. and Burma has signaled 

discussions about its role in the Asia pivot.232 According to Irrawaddy

contributor William Boot, improved U.S.-Burma relations are integral to 

countering China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean. In addition to its existing economic interests in Burma, China has plans “to further strengthen 

its infrastructure to the Indian Ocean with a new railway route from its 

southwestern Yunnan Province through Burma to the coast at Kyaukphyu, 

where its oil transshipment port is based.”233 At the same time, the U.S. has 

proposed its own infrastructure projects in Burma, such as bidding for the 

contract to expand Yangon’s international airport and constructing new 

roads, in particular through “the main commercial corridor between Yangon 

and Mandalay.”234 Moreover, although the level of China’s presence in the 

country is not likely to change, Burma’s warming relations with Western 

countries is providing a strong commercial competitor in the form of multinational corporations.

David Steinberg, writing for the Asia Times, cautions that a U.S. pivot 

toward Burma that is perceived as too imposing, influential, or condescending could result in a move away from the positive warming of relations to 

a more neutral stance.235 Steinberg recalls China’s extensive presence that 

“failed to take into account [Burma] sensitivities, which clearly indicated a 

mushrooming resentment against the obvious tilt toward, and influence of, 

China.”236 Steinberg predicts that, in the face of warming relations with the 

West and continued aid and commercial interest from its regional partners, 

Burma is positioning itself to gain assistance from multiple actors and a 

return to a familiar policy: “a balance among all external interests that could 

subvert its autonomy.”237

Opponents to warming relations between the U.S. and Burma cite more 

than the country’s human rights record alone, which suggests that the 

Obama administration should move with caution, despite Burma’s recent 

shift toward democracy and respect for human rights. According to Bibhu 

Prasad Routray, a visiting fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Burma has failed to address a number of issues, such as slow progress on 
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constitutional reform, the regime’s record in ending ethnic conflicts, and its 

under-preparedness in acting as an unbiased arbiter in religious clashes.238 

Cambodia. Cambodia is one of the Asian countries in which the U.S. is 

competing for influence. Attempts to strengthen bilateral relations between 

the U.S. and Cambodia have been made in the areas of promoting security, 

democracy, human rights, economic development, and combating corruption. The country still has border disputes with Vietnam over some offshore 

islands, and with Thailand over undefined maritime boundaries and land 

adjacent to the Preah Vihear Temple. Ironically, China is America’s major 

competition for favor in Cambodia, but it has not always been that way. “In 

1984 when the current prime minister Hun Sen was the country’s foreign 

minister, the ministry published a book titled Chinese Rulers’ Crimes Against 

Kampuchea.”239 The book elaborated Beijing’s role in propping up the notorious Khmer Rouge regime, which was responsible for murdering 1.7 million 

people. However, thanks to China’s smart diplomacy and generous aid ($2.1 

billion since 1992), as well as growing private investment and trade, it has 

now emerged as the most influential presence in Cambodia.240 Cambodia 

recently has been touted—at least by Beijing—as one of China’s most reliable states. However, that reliability may be starting to change as “stirrings 

of political change” now grip Cambodia.241

In 2008, according to the Washington Post, the U.S. Government, concerned that Cambodia could become a refuge for al-Qaeda sympathizers, 

agreed to help the country create a special counterterrorism unit. This decision 

was based on a 2003 incident in which the 

leader of an Indonesian-based al-Qaeda 

affiliate was found to have spent several 

months hiding in Cambodia. During the 

same timeframe, four other members of the 

same al-Qaeda affiliate were arrested and charged with planning to bomb 

the U.S. and British diplomatic missions in Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital.242 In 2012, the Pentagon deployed USSOF advisers to train a Cambodian 

counterterrorism battalion in an effort to continue its military outreach and 

engagement policy throughout the USPACOM region.243 The Washington 

Post reported: 

Cambodia recently has 

been touted—at least by 

Beijing—as one of China’s 

most reliable states.
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the training has persisted despite concerns about the human rights 

record of Cambodia’s authoritarian ruler, former Khmer Rouge 

commander Hun Sen, who in the past has relied on his military to 

execute and intimidate political opponents ... U.S. military leaders 

said they are eager to bolster relationships with countries across Asia, 

even those with checkered human rights records, but are careful to 

do so in a way that encourages reforms and does not ignore abuses.244

To emphasize this point, then U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, 

during a 2012 visit to Cambodia, stressed the importance of Cambodia’s 

leaders respecting human rights, the rule of law, and a more complete political system.245 Cambodia’s human rights record is a major concern in terms 

of increasing cooperation with the United States. Indeed, although President 

Obama’s visit to Cambodia in November 2012 marks the first time a U.S. 

president has visited the country since the Vietnam War, the two countries’ 

leaders held private meetings regarding U.S. concerns about human rights 

in Cambodia.246

The U.S. faces significant difficulties in its pivot toward Cambodia because 

of the Phnom Penh-Beijing axis, as demonstrated by Cambodia’s continued 

alliance with Beijing’s positions in regional forums (e.g., ASEAN), which 

“plays a crucial role in the two countries’ strengthening bilateral ties.”247

Moreover, China has been a historic supporter of the Hun Sen government 

and has provided significant foreign aid to the country, making it even more 

difficult for the U.S. to convince Cambodia of the benefits of a U.S. Asia pivot. 

According to Roberto Tofani in World Politics Review:

Since recognizing the coup government led by Hun Sen in 1997, 

Beijing has supported the former Khmer Rouge cadre with diplomatic and financial aid. In 2004 China emerged as Cambodia’s No. 

1 foreign investor. Since then, bilateral trade between Cambodia and 

China has increased dramatically: In 2011 it reached $2.5 billion, up 

73.5 percent from a year earlier, with both sides aiming to double the 

figure by 2017. On the investment side, during the first six months 

of 2012, Cambodia’s garment and textile industry and rice-milling 

sector attracted a combined $141 million from China, according to 

a report by the Council for the Development of Cambodia.248
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JSOU Report 16-7

There also is doubt in the region about Washington’s economic capability 

to follow up with its commitment to strengthen and modernize its security 

alliances in the Asia-Pacific region because of continued U.S. obligations 

in the Middle East. However, Curtis Chin, former U.S. ambassador to the 

Asian Development Bank, argues that more could be done in Cambodia and 

other Asia-Pacific nations than just increasing security cooperation. Chin 

recommends that the U.S. Asia pivot take on a cultural and educational 

element, the benefit being that this could be done “with and without formal 

U.S. government support, to help Cambodians to ‘fulfill their dreams’ in 

running their own business and in helping American entrepreneurs and 

businesses succeed in Cambodia.”249

Fiji. Fiji’s relations with the U.S. and with regional leaders Australia and New 

Zealand soured after the December 2006 military coup, led by Josaia Bainimarama against Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase over allegations of corruption in the government. As a result, the U.S. withdrew much of its direct aid 

to Fiji, and it presently “contributes through its membership in multilateral 

agencies and USAID funding of regional environmental projects.”250 Given 

that Section 7008 of the U.S. Foreign Operations Appropriations Act states 

that, when a country undergoes a military coup, “the United States government is required by law to take action and review its assistance programs 

directed to that country to determine which remain relevant to U.S. policy, 

and which should be suspended,” the U.S. is restricted in providing critical 

defense and security aid to Fiji.251 Specifically, the U.S. cannot provide “aid 

related to military financing, International Military Education and Training 

Grants, peacekeeping operations, and military aid that falls under Section 

1206 of the 2006 Defense Authorization Law.”252 Diplomatic tensions surged 

after events in 2009, when Bainimarama failed to deliver on a promise to 

hold elections and return to democracy.253

Not only is the U.S. crippled on a key aspect of the Asia pivot due to its 

policy stance toward Fiji’s interim government, but Suva’s rejection by its 

regional allies in Canberra and Wellington have caused the country to turn 

elsewhere for support and assistance. According to Elke Larsen, a research 

assistant with the Pacific Partners Initiative at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Fiji has broken “its isolation by seeking new powerful friends to help replace the loss of traditional support. Fiji undertook a 

‘look north’ policy with China becoming an important aid donor, Russia 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

strengthening its ties through visiting officials, and, most recently, the opening of Fiji’s new embassy in South Korea in July 2012.”254 Finally, security 

cooperation with Fiji could be a critical weakness in bringing this small 

island nation into the Asia pivot fold; the military is a respected institution 

in Fiji and relatively large for the size of the country, thus it touches the lives 

of most of the nation’s families.255

Kiribati. Kiribati’s foreign relations have developed significantly in international forums through its advocacy of global climate change efforts. Indeed, 

an article published in The Guardian on 16 April 2013, said that Phil Glendenning, president of the Refugee Council of Australia, advised Canberra 

“that it should prepare to create a new migration category for those fleeing 

the effects of climate change.”256 Climate change and rising sea levels pose 

a serious threat to the continued existence of small, low-lying Pacific island 

nations, including Kiribati. 

U.S. relations with Kiribati began in 1979 with the signing of a treaty of 

friendship after Kiribati gained independence from the United Kingdom. 

U.S.-Kiribati relations are founded on cooperation on many issues, such as 

regional security, sustainable development, and climate change.257 In 2008, 

the U.S. and Kiribati signed a cooperative maritime law enforcement agreement that allows Kiribati law enforcement personnel to embark on select U.S. 

Coast Guard and Navy vessels to patrol its territory.258

Laos. Critics of President Obama’s Asia pivot caution against engaging further with Laos without acknowledging the country’s less than stellar human 

rights record. Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow for Southeast Asia with the 

Council on Foreign Relations, warns that establishing deeper security and 

military ties with a country that has been accused of human rights violations and religious and political persecution could reinforce a military that is 

already dominating politics.259 Furthermore, Kurlantzick argues that there is 

“little reason to believe that these militaries will cease their abuses of human 

rights, or that they would support broader U.S. interests over what’s required 

to keep themselves firmly entrenched in power.”260 Kurlantzick closes by 

pointing out that several smaller Southeast Asian countries aside from Laos, 

such as Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand, already receive significant aid from 

China. Although it’s difficult to gauge how big a donor China is to Laos, one 

of the most closed societies in the world, China provides extensive training 
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JSOU Report 16-7

to Lao soldiers and could be the country’s largest donor, which is a strong 

indicator of which side Laos might favor.261

Full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Laos were restored in 

1992; in July 2012, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s historic visit 

to Laos ended a 57-year hiatus from such high-level diplomatic visits and 

introduced the Obama administration’s Asia pivot to the country.262 In addition to heightened dialogue with the U.S., Laos is on its way to increasing its 

presence in the international community through the World Trade Organization, of which it became a full member on 2 February 2013; it applied for 

membership in 1997.263 Nevertheless, Stuart Grudgings, writing for Reuters, 

comments that, “since 2011, China has consolidated its position as the largest trade partner with most Asian countries and its direct investments in 

the region are surging, albeit from a much lower base than Europe, Japan 

and the United States.”264 Grudgings identifies Laos, among other smaller 

countries in the region, as a “client state” of China because it has been drawn 

into China’s economic orbit and supports that country’s stance in regional 

disputes.265 As a result, the U.S. is fighting an uphill battle, where any gap in 

foreign engagement could reinforce Southeast Asian nations’ “bandwagoning with China,” reports Carl Thayer, emeritus professor at the Australian 

Defense Force Academy in Canberra.266

The Maldives. The Maldives is important because of the country’s strategic 

location near major sea lanes. Nearly three-fourths of the world’s seaborne 

petroleum trade passes through Indian Ocean choke points close to the Maldives.267 China is the leading importer of petroleum via these sea lanes, and 

Chinese strategists consider the Maldives a critical staging area to protect 

important sea lines of communication and to counter its military rivals. It 

thus should not be surprising that the U.S. has engaged the Maldives government in a status of forces agreement that would give the U.S. limited 

basing rights in the island nation.268 Due to the geostrategic location of the 

Maldives within the Indian Ocean, various roles for USSOF can easily be 

imagined lest resource and manpower constraints divert SOF to other areas 

within the USPACOM AOR.

The Marshall Islands. On 24 April 2014, the Marshall Islands filed a lawsuit in the International Court of Justice against the United States, United 

Kingdom, Russia, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.269 

The suit demands that these nuclear weapons states meet their disarmament 
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obligations and accuses them of “flagrant violations” of international law.270 

There is a long history of U.S.-led nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall 

Islands, from 1946 to 1958, which is a major point of contention in the two 

nations’ relations.271 The U.S. has paid citizens of the Marshall Islands more 

than $2 billion in compensation for damages attributed to nuclear weapons testing, including private injury, property loss, and class action claims 

alone.272

Despite this compensation for nuclear weapons testing, the U.S. maintains “full authority and responsibility for security and defense of the Marshall Islands, and the Government of the Marshall Islands is obligated to 

refrain from taking actions that would be incompatible with these security 

and defense responsibilities.”273 This authority came with the implementation of the Compact of Free Association, which went into force in 1986.274 

As the Marshall Islands comprise low-lying islands in the Pacific, they are 

vulnerable to transnational threats, natural disasters, and the effects of climate change.275

The U.S. maintains the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test 

Site in the Marshall Islands, which is located on the Kwajalein Atoll and 

is referred to as the U.S. Army Kwajalein Atoll.276 With a lease for 11 of the 

atoll’s 100 islands, the U.S. conducts ballistic missile and missile interceptor 

testing there, as well as space operations support.277

Micronesia. Like the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia 

(FSM) became a sovereign nation in 1986 under the Compact of Free Association with the United States. FSM’s primary source of revenue is the United 

States, which has agreed to provide over $130 million each year in direct 

assistance until 2023.278 The U.S. State Department notes on its website that 

“the Governments of FSM and the United States maintain deep ties and a 

cooperative relationship,” which includes 25 U.S. federal agencies operating 

programs in the FSM.279 Under the Compact of Free Association, the United 

States “has full authority and responsibility for the defense and security of 

the FSM.”280 In addition, citizens of the FSM join the U.S. military at almost 

double the per capita rate of Americans.281

However, the U.S. is not the only nation interested in the FSM. China 

has been investing hundreds of millions of dollars in its diplomatic relationship with the FSM since 2000.282 Already anticipating the expiration of the 

U.S.-FSM Compact in 2023, China has deposited some of its money into a 
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JSOU Report 16-7

trust fund to support the FSM after that year, “when it is likely to face severe 

budgetary deficits as the Compact with the U.S. comes to an end.”283 China 

is interested in expanding its fishing interests in the FSM’s territorial waters, 

as well as investing in development of the state of Yap, which would push 

along the FSM’s own plans to strengthen its tourism industry. If China’s 

proposals and investment plans succeed, the FSM would no longer need a 

comprehensive assistance package after 2023, such as the one it receives from 

the U.S. as a Freely Associated State. China’s interest will pose a security risk 

to the U.S. if the Compact is not renewed in 2023, as the U.S. would “lose 

its full international defense authority for the islands and their territorial 

waters.”284 What’s more, the FSM will still need foreign military assistance 

for its national security, raising the question of whether that will come from 

the U.S.

Mongolia. Despite healthy cooperation between the U.S. and Mongolia, Professor Jeffrey Reeves of the University of Hawaii’s East-West Center argues 

that the Asia pivot will have little impact on future U.S.-Mongolian relations. It is true that Mongolia’s military has benefited from its association 

with the U.S., particularly as a coalition partner in Afghanistan, but to the 

Mongolian public and policymakers, “the U.S. is a distant foreign power 

with little influence over Mongolia’s domestic security and a nominal actor 

in Mongolia’s domestic economy.”285 While the U.S. has put a lot of effort into 

its relationship with Mongolia by supporting rule of law programs and direct 

development assistance, other countries, notably China, Russia, and Japan, 

have much larger trading relationships and economic impact 

in Mongolia than the U.S.286

Reeves says that public opinion 

in Mongolia ranks cooperation 

and communication with China 

as much more important than 

relations with the United States. “Consequently, any predilection Mongolia 

might have for cooperation with the U.S. is more than offset by the benefits 

it receives from its ties with China.”287

Nauru. The U.S. State Department indicates on its website that diplomatic 

relations with Nauru have been cordial since they were established in 1976, 

although the U.S. provides no development assistance to the country.288 The 

public opinion in Mongolia ranks 

cooperation and communication with 

China as much more important than 

relations with the United States.
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

state department also notes that trade between the two nations is limited 

because of Nauru’s “small size, remoteness, and economic problems.”289 

Nauru is the smallest nation in the Asia-Pacific region, with a once-burgeoning phosphate mining outfit that made the islanders very wealthy; at 

one point citizens of Nauru had the highest per capita income in the world.290 

However, the exhaustion of Nauru’s only natural resource, combined with 

years of environmental damage from the strip mining used to extract it, left 

the small island nation devoid of its primary revenue stream and most of its 

habitable environment.291

Nauru currently relies financially on payments for fishing rights in its 

territorial waters, rent from the reopening of Australian detention centers for 

refugees, and development assistance, primarily from Australia.292 With no 

regular military forces, Nauru’s defense needs are met through an informal 

agreement that places the nation’s security responsibilities on Australia.293

Nepal. Nepal remains one of the world’s poorest countries, ranking 157 out 

of 187. More than 30 percent of its people live on less than U.S. $14 per month, 

while the overall poverty rate remains at 25 percent. In the country’s midwestern and far western regions, rates are 45 percent and 46 percent, respectively. Some 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas and depends on 

subsistence farming. Each day, about 1,600 people migrate to the capital to 

look for jobs, an indication of growing rural poverty and unemployment.294 

The U.S., which has a strategic partnership with India, is keen to boost its 

presence in Nepal as part of its wider Asia pivot. 

Palau. Palau became a sovereign nation in 1994, after undergoing an eightyear period of transition to independence under the Compact of Free Association with the United States, which it signed in 1986. Under the Compact, 

the U.S. is responsible for the island nation’s defense and security for 50 years, 

although the U.S. has not stationed any military forces there.295 The U.S. and 

Palau cooperate on a number of issues, such as regional security, sustainable 

development, climate change, fisheries protection, and the environment.296 

Palau relies heavily on U.S. assistance, but the nation also has a small tourism 

industry, with many visitors coming from Taiwan. As a result, Taiwanese 

aid also contributes to Palau’s economy.297

Papua New Guinea. Diplomatic relations were established between 

the United States and Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 1975. The U.S. State 
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JSOU Report 16-7

Department noted the importance of this bilateral relationship because of 

PNG’s critical role as the most populous Pacific island state in maintaining 

“peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region.”298 The state department also 

noted military-to-military cooperation between the U.S. and PNG, which 

focuses on joint humanitarian exercises and training for PNG military personnel through small-scale joint training exercises.299 In addition to security 

cooperation, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations issued a report 

in April 2014 on funding President Obama’s pivot toward the Asia-Pacific 

region, in which it specifically states that “development partnerships are a 

critical pillar of U.S. economic statecraft and foreign policy. U.S. development 

partnerships support the markets, infrastructure, and rule of law necessary 

to attract and sustain U.S. businesses, all while fortifying bilateral relationships important to other U.S. interests and values.”300 This report specifically 

identifies a new USAID mission that was developed in Papua New Guinea. 

However, the new mission was developed under a USAID budget that has 

been called severely underfunded and that fails to reflect the importance of 

the region in accordance with the stated goals of the pivot policy:301

The FY2015 budget request for U.S. development funding to the 

region is merely a return to FY2010 levels, even while USAID staff 

numbers have increased 65 percent and new missions have been 

established in Burma and Papua New Guinea.302

The report also attempts to address the major criticism of President 

Obama’s rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, which involves 

the nonmilitary pillars of the Asia pivot. Any role for USSOF in PNG should 

wait until the nonmilitary elements of the Asia pivot have first been instituted and resourced. Provided these elements of the pivot result in relative success and the foundations of bilateral trust are laid, only then should 

USSOF engagement be considered.

Samoa. In 1971, the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the newly 

founded Independent State of Samoa, which gained its independence from 

New Zealand that same year.303 Having no military, Samoa has informal 

defense ties with New Zealand, “which is required to consider any Samoan 

request for assistance under the 1962 Treaty of Friendship.”304 However, the 

U.S. and Samoa cooperate on regional security issues and international law 

enforcement, having signed a mutual law enforcement agreement in June 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

2012.305 Through this agreement, Samoan maritime officials are permitted 

to use U.S. Coast Guard and Navy vessels to conduct maritime policing 

throughout Samoan waters.306

The U.S. has a longstanding and active Peace Corps mission in Samoa, 

as well as two Fulbright programs and grants “to civil society and private 

sector organizations to address issues of economic development, women’s 

empowerment, health, climate change, and education.”307 Relations between 

the U.S. and Samoa are good; in fact, during Pacific Partnership 2013, the 

U.S. Navy participated in a friendly Samoan longboat race against the Don 

Bosco Longboat Rowing Team as a part of a cultural exchange.308 The Pacific 

Partnership focuses on increasing maritime security through common goals 

of participant nations, which, aside from the U.S. and Samoa, includes Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Malaysia, and New Zealand.

Solomon Islands. Diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Solomon 

Islands were established after the Solomon Islands gained independence 

in 1978 from the United Kingdom.309 The two nations are committed to 

cooperating on “improving regional stability, promoting democracy and 

human rights, responding to climate change, increasing trade, and promoting sustainable economic development.”310 USAID assistance in the Solomon 

Islands includes supporting programs concerned with the impact of global 

climate change, as well as disaster relief efforts and education. In addition to 

assistance programs, the U.S. and Solomon Islands cooperate on security; the 

U.S. Coast Guard trains Solomon Islands border protection officers, while 

the U.S. military provides military education and other training courses to 

Solomon Islands national security officials.311

The Solomon Islands is still recovering from an internal conflict between 

the Isatabus and migrant Malaitans over accusations that the Isatabu Freedom Movement was taking land and jobs from the Malaitans. Although 

the fighting began in 1998, tensions between rival militia groups caused the 

conflict to last throughout the next decade. In July 2003, after a botched peace 

deal signed in late 2000 failed to curb the violence, an Australian-led peacekeeping force titled the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 

(RAMSI) arrived in the Solomon Islands.312 The military phase of RAMSI’s 

mission ended in 2013. RAMSI’s current focus is on building capacity within 

the Royal Solomon Islands Police.313
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Sri Lanka. After years of conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 

(LTTE), Sri Lanka achieved what few other countries can claim—it defeated 

a violent terrorist group and ended decades of fear. Unfortunately, questions 

about Sri Lanka’s human rights record inhibit closer security cooperation 

between Sri Lanka and the United States. The Obama administration went 

ahead with a resolution against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council held in Geneva in March 2014 because it contended that the Sri Lankan 

government failed to fulfill its international human rights obligations, which 

it promised to do after the defeat of the LTTE organization in 2009.314 Jaliya 

Wickramasuriya, Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the United States from 

2008 to 2014, believes that U.S. concerns about his country’s human rights 

record are unfounded. Ambassador Wickramasuriya believes there are many 

avenues for cooperation between the U.S. and Sri Lanka, “including in the 

strategic and defense area where Sri Lanka can offer its experience in defeating terrorism.”315 According to Ambassador Wickramasuriya:

it has been only three and a half years, but already much has been 

accomplished. Nearly all 1.5 million landmines laid by the LTTE have 

been removed, and 300,000 internally displaced people resettled. 

Sri Lanka is also satisfying a comprehensive process of reconciliation based on recommendations of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). Amnesty has been granted to over 

12,000 former LTTE combatants and child soldiers who are being 

reintegrated into society. 225 ex-combatants face legal proceedings 

for criminal charges, and a court of inquiry has been convened to 

explore allegations of wrongdoing against the Sri Lankan Armed 

Forces.316

The ambassador answers critics in the U.S. who favor investigating 

alleged Sri Lankan human rights violations by citing his country’s success 

in defeating a major terrorist organization. “We ... pride ourselves for having 

defeated a terrorist group that the Federal Bureau of Investigation called the 

world’s deadliest. And we pride ourselves in freeing our people and helping 

them to overcome the hardship caused by years of strife.”317 In terms of the 

Asia pivot, Sri Lanka’s success against a formidable terrorist foe could be 

an example—perhaps even a template—for U.S. efforts against a number of 
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terrorist groups, thus USSOF engagement with Sri Lankan forces should be 

considered a priority. 

Timor-Leste. Because of the Asia pivot’s security focus, even little TimorLeste is seeing increased military engagement with the U.S. In late February 

2014, the U.S. Navy and Timor-Leste Defense Force conducted their second 

Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise, which is part 

of an “annual bilateral exercise series between the U.S. Navy and the naval 

forces of Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.”318 During CARAT, U.S. Navy sailors and 

their Timor-Leste counterparts trained across multiple disciplines, including 

damage control, military medicine, small boat operations, and navigation.319

In addition to CARAT, the U.S. and Timor-Leste interact through annual 

port calls by the U.S. Navy, visits by high-level U.S. Navy leaders to TimorLeste, and ongoing civic action projects by U.S. Navy Seabees (part of the 

U.S. Navy Construction Battalion).320

In recent news, Timor-Leste and Australia are feuding over a treaty preventing Timor-Leste from collecting taxes on the natural gas pipeline that 

extends from the Bayu-Undan gas-condensate fields in the Timor Sea to the 

Darwin liquefied natural gas plant operated by ConocoPhillips.321 Taking 

the dispute all the way to the 

International Court of Justice in 

The Hague, Timor-Leste alleges 

that Australia “bugged its cabinet offices to obtain commercial 

advantage in negotiations for the 

maritime deal, which was struck 

when the country was still recovering from violence sparked by its 1999 

vote for independence from Indonesia.”322 Such maritime disputes between 

regional forces, both big and small, could complicate the Asia pivot as the 

U.S. tries to balance its relations with regional leaders, such as Australia, with 

the newer relationships developing with smaller players, such as Timor-Leste.

Skeptics of President Obama’s Asia pivot are deeply concerned over 

renewed U.S. ties to Indonesia, which were cut in 1999 due to Indonesian 

abuses in Timor-Leste.323 With the $500 million sale of eight Apache helicopters to Indonesia announced in August 2013, human rights groups are 

Skeptics of President Obama’s Asia 

pivot are deeply concerned over renewed U.S. ties to Indonesia, which 

were cut in 1999 due to Indonesian 

abuses in Timor-Leste.
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concerned about the U.S. aircraft being used to suppress people in TimorLeste and West Papua.324

Tonga. Like its relations with many of the low-lying Pacific island nations, 

the U.S. cooperates with Tonga on a wide range of issues, including human 

trafficking, combating the effects of climate change, maritime security, and 

fostering regional cooperation and development.325 The U.S. and Tonga have 

a history of security cooperation; Tonga deployed soldiers to Iraq from 2004 

to 2008, and another contingent in Afghanistan in 2010 as a part of the 

International Security Assistance Force.326

Since 2010, the U.S. and Tonga have conducted Operation Coral Reef, 

a weeklong training exercise that involves the militaries of Australia, New 

Zealand, Tonga, and the U.S. to validate the U.S. Army Pacific Contingency 

Command Post capabilities. The countries also continue to participate in 

humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and combat skills training.327

Tuvalu. In 1979, Tuvalu signed a treaty of friendship with the U.S., “which 

recognized Tuvalu’s possession of four islets formerly claimed by the United 

States.”328 The U.S. and Tuvalu cooperate on combating climate change, 

reinforcing maritime security, and enhancing economic development programs.329 Climate change is a critical issue for Tuvalu, as data from the 

National Research Council “predicts that global sea levels could rise by as 

much as 55 inches by 2100 ... which ... could threaten the country’s very 

existence.”330

Vanuatu. U.S.-Vanuatu relations were established in 1986 and consist of 

shared goals, such as strengthening democracy, enhancing security, and promoting development.331 The U.S. primarily provides aid to Vanuatu through 

international and regional organizations. The Peace Corps and USAID are 

also involved in Vanuatu, assisting communities in health and education, 

adapting to climate change, and supporting disaster relief efforts.332

In April 2011, the U.S. military presence in Vanuatu reached its highest 

level since WWII. Over 1,000 military personnel from France, Australia, 

New Zealand, and the U.S. (the majority from the U.S.) gathered in Vanuatu to take part in a humanitarian exercise as a part of the Pacific Partners 

mission.333
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Building a Stable, Productive, and Constructive Relationship 

with China

China’s growing military budget, capabilities, and assertive behavior, particularly in the South China Sea, have been a source of concern to the U.S. 

and many Asia-Pacific nations. Some pundits and academics believe China 

could pose serious security challenges to U.S. national interests and those 

of its allies and friends. Those who are concerned about China’s ‘rise’ are 

frustrated by Beijing’s lack of transparency about the nature of its military 

modernization, capabilities, and intentions.334 Other academics don’t agree, 

claiming that China’s rise is typical and normal for an emerging power 

with growing regional and international interests. They admit that China’s 

lack of transparency about specific defense issues matters, but suggest that 

it shouldn’t distract observers from seeing the bigger picture concerning 

China’s military development. 

Observers such as Robert Ross of Boston College and Andrew Erickson 

of the U.S. Naval War College, who are not overly concerned about China’s 

increased military posture, assert that the People’s Liberation Army will 

continue to develop the resources and capabilities it needs to protect its contested periphery, particularly in the Near Seas (the Yellow, East, and South 

China seas).335 “This development has the potential to seriously challenge 

the interests of the U.S., its allies, and other partners in the region, as well 

as access to and security of a vital portion of the global commons—waters 

and airspace that all nations rely on for prosperity, yet which none own.”336 

Military experts in Beijing contend that China has no problem with 

Washington seeking involvement in the region’s prosperity, but that it is concerned the U.S. Asia pivot might be aimed at China and thus could disturb 

the ‘Chinese dream’ of national rejuvenation. More to the point, a Chinese 

defense ministry report released on 13 April 2013, notes that the pivot has 

already destabilized the Asia-Pacific region.337 According to the 40-page 

report, titled “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” there is 

more than a little angst in China about the pivot. Without naming specific 

states, the report notes that “some countries are strengthening their AsiaPacific military alliances, expanding military presence in the region, and 

frequently making the situation there more tense.” In accomplishing the 

pivot, the report contends:
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the U.S. will deploy 60 percent of its naval fleet in the Pacific by 

2020. Singapore will be home to four new U.S. littoral warships, 

intended for combat close to shore. Indonesia is seeking to buy a 

broad array of American hardware and wants to take part in joint 

maneuvers. The Philippines is trying to host more U.S. troops on 

a rotating basis, and Australia has agreed to allow up to 2,500 U.S. 

marines to be based in its north-central city of Darwin.338

And those are just some of the military moves expected under the Asia 

pivot policy. When asked at a news conference on the report’s release whether 

Washington’s military expansion was raising tensions in Beijing, China’s 

defense ministry spokesman Colonel Yang Yujun said, “Certain efforts 

made to highlight the military agenda, enhance military deployment and 

also strengthen alliances are not in line with the calling of the times.” Such 

moves “are not conducive to supporting peace and stability in the region,” 

he added.339

Empowering Regional Institutions

A major objective of the Obama administration’s Asia pivot is to fully engage 

the region’s multilateral institutions. It will be a “way of supplementing, but 

not supplanting, America’s important bilateral ties.”340 ASEAN and the APEC 

forum are the two principal regional organizations that will be affected by 

the pivot, or at least that is the intent. For example, the U.S. “has opened 

a new U.S. mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of Amity 

and Cooperation with ASEAN.”341 As for APEC, the U.S. considers it the 

Asia-Pacific region’s premier economic institution. It has aided U.S. export 

expansion and helped create and support high-quality jobs throughout the 

United States.342

ASEAN and the Asia Pivot. The Obama administration’s Asia pivot has 

generally been welcomed by ASEAN member countries. “After a period of 

relative decline that coincided with China’s rapid ascendance in regional 

affairs, the U.S. pivot to Asia seems to have redressed this imbalance.”343

ASEAN members are nervous about Beijing’s growing influence, its rapidly 

increasing military power, and its use of bullying tactics to advance maritime 

territorial claims to other countries’ rightful 200 nautical mile EEZ in the 

South China Sea.344
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For the most part, Indonesia has welcomed the Obama administration’s 

decision to rebalance U.S. policy toward Asia. Indonesia, which was highly 

critical of the Bush administration and the war in Iraq, has engaged with 

the United States more closely since President Obama’s election. President 

Obama is widely popular in Indonesia because he spent some of his early 

years in Jakarta. Furthermore, his administration’s policies of multilateralism and rebalancing toward Asia have reinforced this popularity and raised 

U.S. stock considerably in Southeast Asia’s largest country and the world’s 

most populous Muslim nation.345

From Jakarta’s perspective, the importance Washington attaches to Indonesia is not simply as a counterbalance to China’s rise but also is based on 

Jakarta’s perceived self-importance and worldview. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia has made strides to enhance its international footprint, 

particularly in key bilateral relationships. For example, President Yudhoyono 

proposed in November 2008 that Jakarta and Washington sign a comprehensive partnership to broaden and deepen relations between the two countries, 

which was quickly endorsed by the Obama administration. The Comprehensive Partnership Agreement was signed during President Obama’s first 

visit to Indonesia in November 2010, “which may have marked the highest 

point in bilateral relations” between the two countries.346

While some Indonesians welcome the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia, 

others have raised concerns that the Obama administration has emphasized the military component of the pivot’s strategy too much. The rotational 

basing of 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia, is particularly troubling 

to some. According to an International Business Times article from 2013:

at the national level, Indonesians have also reacted negatively to 

the presence of U.S. troops. Darwin is located just a short distance 

from Indonesia’s troubled province Papua, where the giant U.S. 

mining company PT Freeport Indonesia operates. Besides reflecting 

Indonesia’s hostility to foreign military bases close to its national 

borders, many political pundits in Jakarta have expressed concerns 

that the U.S. forces in Darwin could be used to intervene on behalf 

of the often security-beleaguered PT Freeport Indonesia. Although 

such a scenario is highly unlikely, many in Indonesia still remember 

the United States’ support for regional rebels in the late 1950s, when 
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Washington used the protection of U.S. oil companies in Sumatra 

as a pretext for intervention.347

Answering the critics, President Obama has reassured Indonesian President Yudhoyono that the Darwin deployment is mostly intended to improve 

disaster relief readiness.348

APEC and the Asia Pivot. Established in 1989, the APEC organization has 

21 member states, which include the world’s largest economies—the United 

States, China, Japan, Russia, Canada, Australia, and others. Its purpose is 

to promote economic cooperation, raise living standards, promote sustainable economic growth, and cultivate free trade across the entire Asia-Pacific 

region. In November 2014, APEC held a summit in Beijing that President 

Obama attended, bringing with him several items to discuss. What the longrange impact of this visit will be is anyone’s guess. This visit came after the 

U.S. midterm elections, where President Obama, his party, and his agenda 

were seriously rebuked. As such, “in both Beijing and Washington, Obama 

is widely viewed as both a lame duck and a hobbled world leader, unable to 

match his rhetoric with actions.”349 Despite this perceived lame duck status, 

President Obama was able to obtain some bilateral agreements with China 

at APEC. According to Hu Shuli of the South China Morning Post, both the 

U.S. and China agreed to:

reduce tariff barriers for hi-tech products; there was a breakthrough 

in their 17-year negotiations on an IT agreement; and they committed 

to reducing greenhouse gases over the next 15 to 20 years. They also 

said they would extend business, tourist and student visas, while 

agreeing to increase mutual trust between their armed forces.350

One agreement on which President Obama hoped to make progress at the 

APEC summit but did not was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the free-trade 

initiative that notably excludes China. The Trans-Pacific Partnership would 

open and thus increase opportunities for a vast array of American businesses 

by providing unfettered access to some of the world’s fastest growing markets in the Asia-Pacific region.351 China sees this as the U.S. meddling within 

its EEZ, a feeling accentuated by China’s heavy reliance on seaborne trade 

through waters the U.S. Navy controls, an arrangement with which Beijing has 

never been comfortable. As such, China has been looking westward to develop 

modern-day ‘silk road’ trading routes that will result in land-based economic 
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and security ties with the energy-rich Central Asian states, Russia, and other 

countries in order to limit U.S. influence in Chinese economic affairs.

One creative example of this overland trade route development is the 

Gwadar Port in Pakistan. Gwadar is a deep-water port located on Pakistan’s 

Baluchistan coast, which lies just outside the Strait of Hormuz, a major maritime choke point patrolled by the U.S. Navy. Although the port is owned by 

the Pakistani government, a Chinese firm managed the multibillion-dollar 

construction project and, in February 2013, the Pakistani government handed 

control of the port over to the China Overseas Port Holding Company. During 

the handover ceremony, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari said the Gwadar 

project was of strategic importance for China, since almost 60 percent of China’s crude oil comes from the Gulf countries, a figure that will likely increase 

in the coming decades.352 Once combined with an expanded overland route via 

the Karakoram Highway, which will stretch from Gwadar through Pakistan 

and into China, Gulf tankers will be able to offload their crude at Gwadar, 

where it will be loaded onto trucks or railcars headed to China.353 This overland 

route will allow seaborne tankers headed to China from the Gulf to avoid sailing through the Strait of Malacca, a maritime choke point that China knows 

is subject to U.S. Navy patrols and thus to potential U.S. interference. 

Overall, this vision of a new regional ‘silk road’ trading system underscores Beijing’s seaborne vulnerabilities and its attempt to mitigate them by 

expanding these overland trade ties with Eurasia, especially for the energy 

imports needed to power its unprecedented economic growth. Moreover, 

these overland routes are designed to limit U.S. ability to influence China’s 

important energy trade with the Middle East.354 The result is a competition 

for influence, economic or otherwise, throughout the region by the world’s 

two largest economies.

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4. USSOF’s Role—or Non-Role—in the 

Pivot

Journalist Fareed Zakaria, in an opinion piece that appeared in the 

Washington Post on 16 April 2015, hit on something germane to this 

paper: “The Obama administration’s foreign policy energies are fully engaged 

in the Middle East—negotiating the Iran deal, sending Special Operations 

forces into Iraq, supporting Saudi airstrikes in Yemen, working with the 

Syrian rebels. Whatever happened to the pivot to Asia?”355 Indeed, as of this 

writing, the 1st Special Forces Group commander and his staff—whose mission focus and AOR are Asia—are the core command element for Special 

Forces in Iraq. Thus, as Fareed’s comment—“sending Special Operations 

forces [back] into Iraq”—suggests, it seems that the Asia pivot does not apply 

to SOF, particularly Special Forces.

Interestingly, with all the hoopla about the Asia pivot formula, USSOF 

have been pretty much left out of the equation. Several recent articles do not 

mention Army Special Forces at all. For example, in their comprehensive 

article, titled “The Role of the Army in Asia,” retired Army Colonel and 

SOF advocate Al Wilner and coauthor Thomas Bickford do not so much as 

mention Special Forces.356 The same is true of Sydney J. Freedberg’s article 

in Breaking Defense, “Senate Armed Services Committee Pushes for Bigger 

Army Role in Pacific vs. China.”357 A recent Wall Street Journal article, “The 

New Way the U.S. Projects Power Around the World: Commandos,” mentions SOF’s role in Asia only to note they were “winding down what they consider a successful campaign, begun soon after the September 11 hijackings, 

to help Filipino forces stymie the al-Qaeda-aligned Abu Sayyaf Group.”358

With the potential threats addressed in this monograph, in particular 

China and North Korea but also the Islamic State and foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria, it would seem to call for SOF operations in the AsiaPacific AOR to be ramping up, not winding down. The Asia-Pacific region 

is becoming an ever more dangerous place, possibly more dangerous than 

suggested by the threat analysis conducted just months ago for Section I of 

this monograph. Several recent events prove the point.
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China. In recent months, China is believed to have hacked the computer networks of several U.S. interests, while simultaneously expanding its military 

influence in the Asia-Pacific region and threatening America’s traditional 

allies, particularly the Philippines. As of this writing, the U.S. government 

is scrambling to figure out the impact of more than 22 million government 

personnel records having been hacked, allegedly by the Chinese.359 Meanwhile, without mentioning the U.S. by name, a recently published Chinese 

white paper comments on a “meddlesome power” interfering with China’s 

sovereignty by challenging its claim to much of the South China Sea.360

Obviously not mentioned in the white paper is China’s harassment of U.S. 

aircraft over international waters, as harassing the U.S. and its allies seems 

to be ‘business as usual’ for China.361 Early in 2015, a Chinese coast guard 

vessel rammed three Philippine fishing boats off the Scarborough Shoals, 

an area contested by the Philippines and China and recently occupied by 

the Chinese.362 Of special interest to this monograph is Beijing’s increased 

investment in its special operations forces, which are growing in number and 

expertise. This development is extremely concerning to China’s neighbors.363

North Korea. While rumors circulate of domestic political unrest and 

social upheaval in North Korea, the rogue regime’s saber-rattling continues 

unabated as it issues threats that run from the absurd to the downright scary. 

In 2014, North Korea berated President Obama for allowing the release of the 

political satire-comedy, The Interview, which depicted North Korean leader 

“Kim Jong-un as a vain, buffoonish despot.”364 Alternating between threats 

and weeping, North Korea claimed that their leader has been misunderstood.365 North Korea’s foreign minister offered a more serious response in 

a speech at a UN conference in March 2015. He stated his country would use 

a preemptive strike if necessary to stop “an ever-increasing nuclear threat” 

from the United States. While he did not elaborate on the specifics of that 

threat, the minister did once again lambast the U.S. and South Korea for 

holding military exercises. However, this was the first time in recent memory 

that nuclear retaliation to the military exercises was mentioned.366

More concerning are the reports of a possible collapse within North 

Korea. Former ambassador to South Korea Christopher R. Hill, and many 

others, assert that the question is no longer if but when North Korea will 

collapse, citing civil unrest in North Korea as a precursor to catastrophe.367 

The following excerpt from a Japan Times article is instructive:
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The North’s behavior almost certainly reflects mounting turmoil 

among the elite. For more than a year, the regime has been carrying out a purge of high-level officials, beginning with the execution 

of Kim’s uncle, Jang Song Taek, in 2013. Subsequent executions of 

Jang’s entourage and advisers, the recall of Jang’s associates from 

posts abroad, and the attempted kidnapping in France of the son 

of one of his assistants attest to the level of alarm in Kim’s inner 

circle. The elevation of Kim’s inexperienced 27-year-old sister, Kim 

Yo Jong, to a senior post, is another indication of growing anxiety.368

A collapse in North Korea would create several challenges for the U.S. 

and its Asian partners. Estimates are that it would take more than 600,000 

military and police personnel from South Korea, the United States, and other 

nations to establish order, and the cost to ‘rehabilitate’ the country would be 

trillions of dollars. However, the biggest challenges would be to eliminate 

potential pockets of resistance—the Kim family and military elites may not 

resign willingly—and to find and secure North Korea’s weapons of mass 

destruction.369

The Islamic State and Foreign Fighters. The Islamic State is known to be 

making overtures to counterpart organizations in Asia.370 The threat of 

Islamic extremists deploying terrorist tactics across Southeast Asia is making 

an unwelcome comeback in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, the Philippines, 

and even Singapore. However, Gavin Greenwood, a regional security analyst 

with Hong Kong-based Allan & Associates, is not that concerned. Not yet. 

According to Greenwood, “[ISIL’s] main impact on the region is to serve 

as an inspiration for Islamic radicals rather than a movement that poses a 

direct threat to any Southeast Asian countries.”371 Singapore’s prime minister 

is not so sure; at the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore on 29 May 2015, 

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said that “Southeast Asia is a key recruitment center for [ISIL].” He explained that more than 500 Indonesians and 

dozens of Malaysians have traveled to Syria and Iraq to help ISIL. “[ISIL] has 

so many Indonesian and Malaysian fighters that they form a unit by themselves—the Katibah Nusantara-Malay Archipelago Combat Unit.” Former 

U.S. Special Operations Command Commander General Joseph Votel concurred, noting there had been an “‘incredible eruption’ in foreign fighters 

flowing into the Middle East from all over the world in support of the Islamic 

State group and its affiliates, increasing connections between transnational 
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criminal organizations and violent extremist groups, and ISIL-inspired flareups in Africa and Asia.”372 Approximately 500 to 1,000 foreign fighters have 

traveled from Asia to Iraq and Syria to help the ISIL effort—no one really 

knows how many.373 Perhaps the most up-to-date estimates of Asian foreign 

fighters appeared recently in The Strategist, an Australian publication:

The number of Southeast Asian foreign fighters operating overseas is 

troubling. The Indonesian Government has stated that approximately 

60 of its citizens are active in Iraq and Syria (although unofficial 

estimates put this figure closer to 200).374 The Malaysian Government 

disclosed that more than 100 Malaysians may be operating overseas 

alongside [ISIL]. And the Philippines Government estimates that 

more than 200 Filipinos may have joined [ISIL], with over 100 known 

to be actively fighting alongside ISIS militants. Even Singapore has 

confirmed that a handful of its citizens are engaged with extremist 

groups, with Interior Minister Teo Chee Hean stating in July that 

at least two Singaporeans are known to be fighting in Syria—one 

has been detained by authorities after attempting to travel to the 

Middle East to “engage in armed jihad.”375

The concern among Asian leaders is that the present generation of foreign 

fighters will emulate those who started extremist organizations such as Abu 

Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah when they returned from the Soviet-Afghan 

War, as they could become the nucleus for new Islamist extremist organizations. Singapore is not the only Asian nation concerned about ISIL and 

returning foreign fighters. In August 2014, Malaysian police foiled plans for 

a spate of bombings planned by Islamic extremists who were inspired by 

ISIL: “The 19 suspected militants arrested from April to June were formulating plans to bomb pubs, discos and a Malaysian brewery of Danish beer 

producer Carlsberg, said Ayob Khan Mydin, deputy chief of the Malaysian 

police counterterrorism division.”376 Meanwhile, the Indonesian government 

has launched a counter-ISIL campaign on the eastern island of Sulawesi, 

which is conducted by special forces units who are assisting local police.377 

Finally, a returning foreign fighter was arrested in Australia on 24 July 

2015. Australian Federal Police said in a statement on 25 July that Adam 

Brookman, 39, was on warrant relating to his alleged involvement in the 

conflict in Syria. “He is the first Australian involved with the Islamic State 

known to have returned home since the Sunni fighters swept into western 
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Iraq in June last year and declared the establishment of a caliphate, Monash 

University terrorism expert Greg Barton said.”378 The London-based International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence estimates 

that between 100 and 250 Australians have joined Sunni militants in Iraq 

and Syria. Some have returned, but Brookman, who is a Muslim convert, is 

the only returning foreign fighter charged and arrested. The rest have not 

been charged because of lack of proof.379

Why This Matters

Threats beyond the four discussed above—both manmade and natural—

are emanating from Asia and directed at the U.S. and nations friendly to 

American interests. However, for the purposes of this monograph, these four 

make the point that USSOF bear responsibility for and have the capabilities 

to address all of them, except taking on Chinese hackers. Special operations 

activities include the following: 

direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass 

destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare (UW), 

foreign internal defense, security force assistance, hostage rescue 

and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, 

military information support operations, and civil affairs operations and such other activities as specified by the President or the 

Secretary of Defense.380

Each of these activities could be a stand-alone mission to counter one 

or more of the four threats, or an action that combines one or more core 

missions, or a force multiplier mission conducted with conventional forces 

or allies. 

SOF’s most important mission responsibility and capability vis-à-vis 

China would be foreign internal defense (FID), which would train the armed 

forces of those countries currently or potentially threatened by China. 

Resource constraints and geopolitical dynamics will result in a prioritization 

of USSOF engagement to those countries most in need, like the Philippines 

and Vietnam, and the acceptance of risk in those less so, like Indonesia and 

the Malay Peninsula to include Singapore, and Thailand. Examples of FID 

implementing operations include joint combined exercises for training, joint 

exercises, military training teams, and train-and-equip missions. If China 
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becomes more aggressive in the region, violates any nation’s sovereignty, 

or becomes more geographically expansive, SOF unconventional warfare, 

direct action, military information support operations, and theater searchand-rescue and strategic reconnaissance missions would keep SOF busy 

supporting conventional forces. 

As for North Korea, if it were ever foolish enough to invade South Korea, 

all of the core activities appropriate for a response to a more assertive China 

would apply to North Korea. However, the more likely scenario is the collapse of North Korea, in which case SOF’s predominant missions would be 

humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and military information support 

operations. If the collapse were not complete, direct action and counterterrorism would be added to the SOF mission set. According to retired Special 

Forces Colonel David Maxwell, a former Special Forces commander in Asia 

and now a professor at Georgetown University, “The regime in Pyongyang 

could collapse without necessarily its army corps and brigades collapsing, 

so we might have to mount a relief operation at the same time that we’d be 

conducting combat ops.”381 Loose nukes in North Korea could be a major 

problem whether or not a collapse were complete. Locating and securing 

North Korean nuclear materials and/or weapons would be a nightmare for 

those responding to a collapse. “Locating these materials will be extremely 

difficult, as outsiders (and most insiders) have 

an imprecise idea of how many, and little to 

no idea of where, nuclear materials and actual 

devices may be.”382 Because timeliness—finding and fixing the nuclear locations quickly—

would be important, this mission could be 

distinct from other aspects of the effort and would most likely fall to SOF 

who should have the capability to infiltrate possible sights quickly.383

USSOF counterterrorist activities will be important in responding to 

an expanding ISIL presence in Asia. Twelve years of sustained counterterrorism operations in multiple locations around the world have honed SOF 

acumen, particularly those conducted in conjunction with direct action 

activities. However, even more important will be indirect action against an 

expanding ISIL, which will entail FID missions that involve partnering with 

and training other Asian militaries and specialized police organizations, 

but particularly their special operations forces, to counter ISIL operations 

in the Asian theater, which are well within the USSOF activities portfolio. 

Loose nukes in North 

Korea could be a major 

problem whether or not a 

collapse were complete.
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New individual and group foreign fighter activities could be ‘nipped in the 

bud’ by security forces that receive better training. 

What to Do

The Obama administration’s security policy correctly asserts that the U.S. 

needs partners with whom to address terrorism and other international 

threats.384 Empowering those partners is an important task for USSOF, particularly Special Forces. In contrast to the past dozen years, when SOF have 

been engaged in necessary direct action against terrorists in the Middle East 

and South Asia, SOF will now be more wisely employed in capacity-building 

and empowering the military capabilities of Asian states. FID and counterterrorism training will be important. Therefore, helping U.S. partners build 

their capacity to defend against conventional external threats, such as what 

may emanate from China, or in South Korea’s case from the north, will be 

important.385 Helping partners build the capacity to address current and 

future terrorist threats and the problem of returning foreign fighters will 

also be important SOF responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific AOR.

Building partner capacity will be a challenge because SOF operator 

resources are insufficient for the Asia-Pacific regions and other theaters of 

operation.386 In Building Partner Capacity, Dr. Harry R. Yarger describes 

the lack of SOF capacity not just in Asia-Pacific terms, but as being “clearly 

insufficient for the demands of the 21st Century.”387 While SOF forces can 

be increased to some degree, says Yarger, “SOF operator capacity will be 

challenged again and again and will remain short of the overall need.”388 

Yarger wrote: 

The [SOF] force strength issue creates a strategic Catch-22 in force 

allocation for decision-makers: prioritization of SOF manpower 

in one mission area—functional or geographic—creates shortage 

issues elsewhere. The experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

greater global effort against terrorism illustrate this quandary and 

its consequences.389

Yarger explains that SOF gained important combat experience during the 

past 12 years, but “overall SOF capacity was lost because indirect capabilities 

were applied to direct action needs.”390 In other words, the building partner 
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capacity skills that are important for present and future needs were allowed 

to atrophy during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. 

Indeed, the so-called global war on terrorism moved SOF from the 

periphery to the center of U.S. military strategy—from a supporting actor 

to a starring role.391 According to Steven Metz, director of research at the 

U.S. Army War College, the change of roles came with costs. “The intense 

involvement in global counterterrorism undercut SOF’s longstanding balance between direct and indirect capabilities. Tracking down terrorists and 

high-value targets, rather than training and advising partner militaries, 

became the core mission.”392 The hope was that drawing down troops in 

Iraq and Afghanistan would correct the imbalance between SOF indirect 

and direct missions, slightly favoring the indirect, which is the more likely 

requirement, particularly in Asia. 

Some recent changes in the 3rd Special Forces Group’s area of responsibility are encouraging. The 3rd Group’s AOR was Africa, but in 2010, because 

of the global war on terrorism, it was changed to Pakistan and Afghanistan; 

however, it recently reverted back to Africa. As a recent Army Times article 

explains, “The Army’s 3rd Special Forces Group is going back to its roots.” 

This fall, the 3rd Group, from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, began shifting its 

area of operations back to Africa. The group expects to complete its transition out of the Middle East and Central Asia by “next summer as the wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down.”393 This is also good news for the 10th 

Special Forces Group, which has been doing double duty covering Europe, 

its traditional AOR, and Africa at the same time. Now the 10th Group can 

focus on Russian adventurism and a host of other terrorism and returning 

foreign fighter issues that are currently plaguing Europe. 

That is the good news. The bad news is that SOF, particularly Special 

Forces, are staying in and returning to Iraq in numbers disproportionate to 

those of their conventional colleagues in Afghanistan. Almost as soon as the 

American military withdrawal in Iraq was complete, Special Forces soldiers 

returned there to conduct counterterror operations and attempt to protect a 

pro-Iran Shiite regime in Baghdad against a Sunni-based insurgency, while 

at the same time supporting a Sunni-led movement against the Iran-backed 

dictatorship in Syria.394
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5. Conclusion 

Researching and writing this monograph, The Asia Pivot: Implications 

for U.S. Special Operations Forces, has been a two-year undertaking. 

Countless hours have been spent reviewing hundreds of sources to make 

sense out of an Obama administration foreign policy that has yet to be fully 

developed. This unfinished policy has caused leading analysts such as Fareed 

Zakaria to ask, “Whatever Happened to Obama’s Pivot to Asia?”395 There 

are many reasons the pivot policy has not been actualized. For one, threats 

and actions by the Islamic State have required the U.S. to return military 

assets—particularly SOF assets—to the Middle East, which otherwise would 

likely have been allocated to Asia. A more aggressive Moscow has General 

Joe Dunford, U.S. Marine Corps, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

and General Mark Milley, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, naming Russia—not 

China or North Korea—the number-one threat to the United States.396 Some 

might say the Asia pivot has been overcome by unforeseen events; others 

might say failed Middle East policies and major power politics have delayed 

the pivot unnecessarily. 

This monograph reports on the state of the pivot as it stands today. It 

reflects the pivot’s importance in U.S. security policy for the Asia-Pacific 

region, but laments the fact that American power, particularly SOF assets, 

has atrophied to the point that regions of the globe must be prioritized in 

terms of their importance. 

Considering the state of the pivot, some might consider this monograph 

a work in progress, which is partially correct. However, studying the pivot 

for two years has yielded important findings about the Asia-Pacific region, 

including its importance to U.S. and international affairs and the attitudes 

of the 32 countries watched over by USPACOM. Section I of this monograph 

described the Asia-Pacific region’s importance in political, security, and 

economic terms. It specifically addressed the security situation relative to 

China, North Korea, and increased terrorist and insurgent activity, all of 

which represent potential or impending threats. 

Section II looked at the U.S. military services in the Asia-Pacific AOR, 

noting what changes have been made in the movement of personnel 

and equipment to support the pivot. Coauthor John Duvall is primarily 
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responsible for this section, as he has recent operational experience in the 

theater. He reports that some U.S. air and sea military equipment has been 

moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and that Marines now rotate units 

in and out of Australia. However, large organizational changes have not 

occurred—at least not yet. As for SOF, other than some CV-22 Osprey aircraft, not much new equipment has been moving into the theater. In some 

ways, the SOF personnel situation is worse than before the pivot was conceived, as the 1st Special Forces Group Headquarters is now sequestered in 

Iraq for the conceivable future, leaving the USPACOM AOR without one of 

its most important command and control assets. 

Section II concludes with an examination of the applicability of SOF’s traditional core activities in an increasingly hostile Asia-Pacific region.397 These 

core activities are matched against requirements to address four potential 

threats: China, North Korea, terrorism (the most egregious threat coming 

from the Islamic State), and foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria. 

Our analysis suggests that all SOF core competencies are desirable, given the 

range of threats in the region, but capacity may be a problem. The question is, 

given the number and complexity of the threats in the Asia-Pacific AOR, will 

SOF capacity be enough? Moreover, does the Asia pivot, in whatever form it 

finally takes, allow adjustments that reflect changing capacity requirements?

Section III addressed the Asia pivot in the Obama administration’s terms, 

using five objectives framed by former National Security Adviser Thomas 

E. Donilon to guide the discussion and analysis. The section included an 

analysis of the acceptance—or non-acceptance—of the pivot policy by all 

of the 32 Asia-Pacific countries that fall under the USPACOM AOR. Using 

Donilon’s objectives, nations with which the U.S. has treaties were listed 

first, followed by nations of significant interest to the U.S., ending with the 

remaining countries in the region. Most of these nations agree that the pivot 

would be good policy if implemented, but some, such as Indonesia, have 

voiced skepticism about the pivot being an excuse for U.S. adventurism in the 

region. The section is rounded out with a discussion on empowering regional 

institutions, specifically ASEAN and APEC, and a segment on China from 

the perspective of cooperation instead of confrontation. Some might view 

this as hedging our bets, as much of our analysis views China as a potential threat. However, China predictably tends to act in its own interest, so 

encouraging China to view its interests as sympathetic to those of the U.S., 

particularly in terms of terrorists and foreign fighters, is worth the effort. 
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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

After two years of researching the Asia pivot, the authors conclude that 

the policy is still a good idea. However, we lament the need for any type of 

pivot, in Asia or elsewhere. Comments made by retired Colonel Maxwell 

are integral to our conclusions.398 He stated, “If the U.S. is a global power 

as Washington, D.C., advertises, it should not have to ‘pivot’ anywhere.” 

We concur with Maxwell that the U.S. has global interests and thus should 

be able to act globally in concert with its allies—or, if necessary, unilaterally. Maxwell contends that the pivot concept suggests a zero sum game in 

national security matters, which indicates that some regions are more important than others. Advancing the notion of a pivot telegraphs U.S. intentions 

and undercuts America’s legitimacy around the world by signaling that it 

has ‘favorites.’ This raises the question of how the Asia pivot is perceived by 

U.S. NATO allies, fledgling governments in Iraq and Afghanistan, counternarcoterrorism allies in Colombia, and so on. 

As a practical and political matter, the pivot may be in jeopardy. Strong 

advocates, such as Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell and secretaries Clinton and Panetta, are no longer with the administration.399 Who 

then are the new advocates? Are there any? And, finally, with the upcoming 

presidential election, who might champion a revitalized Asia pivot? Time 

will tell. 

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Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

Appendix A: Acronym List 

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty

AOR area of responsibility

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CARAT Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training

CFC Combined Forces Command

CMO civil-military operations

CPX command post exercise

EEZ (China’s) Exclusive Economic Zone 

FID foreign internal defense

FSM Federated States of Micronesia

HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

JSOTF-P Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines

JTF Joint Task Force

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

NZDF New Zealand Defence Force
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JSOU Report 16-7

PNG Papua New Guinea

PRC People’s Republic of China

RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

SOCPAC Special Operations Command, Pacific

SOF Special Operations Forces

UDP Unit Deployment Program

UFG Ulchi-Freedom Guardian

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USPACOM U.S. Pacific Command

USSOF U.S. Special Operations Forces
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Endnotes 

1. Melkulangara Bhadrakumar, “Obama Resets the Pivot to Asia,” Asia Times, 6 May 

2014. Accessed 16 July 2014 at: http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2014/05/06/

obama-resets-the-pivot-to-asia-i.html.

2. Matt Spetalnick and Matt Siegel, “In Veiled Message to China, Obama 

Renews Commitment to Asia-Pacific Pivot,” Reuters, 15 November 2014. 

Accessed 18 November 2014 at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/15/

us-g20-summit-obama-idU.S.KCN0IZ04H20141115. 

3. John Garnaut, “Leader’s Ploy More than Navel Gazing,” Sydney Morning Herald, 

27 April 2013. Accessed 1 May 2013 at: http://www.smh.com.au/world/leadersploy-more-than-naval-gazing-20130426-2ijxx.html.

4. Joseph Lederman, “VP Biden Trying to Show U.S. Still Focused on Asia,” Associated Press, 30 November 2013. Accessed 30 November 2013 at: http://news.yahoo.

com/vp-biden-trying-show-us-still-focused-asia-133542614--politics.html.

5. Gideon Rachman, “The Year the U.S. Pivoted Back to the Middle East,” Financial 

Times, 23 December 2013. Accessed at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cad2fc6e671e-11e3-a5f9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2otwVEXC5. See also: Josh Gerstein, 

“Can Joe Biden Rescue the Asia Pivot,” Politico, 2 December 2013. Accessed 

28 December 2013 at: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/joe-biden-asiapivot-100620.html.

6. Daniel Schearf, “U.S. Rebalance to Asia Foreshadowed by Tensions with China,” 

23 December 2013. Accessed 24 December 2013 at: http://www.voanews.com/

content/us-rebalance-to-asia-overshadowed-by-tensions-with-china/1815731.

html.

7. Elizabeth C. Economy, “What Happened to the Asia Pivot in 2013?” Council on 

Foreign Relations, Expert Roundup, 20 December 2013. Accessed 24 December 

2013 at: http://www.cfr.org/china/happened-asia-pivot-2013/p32108?cid=rssanalysisbriefbackgroundersexp-what_happened_to_the_asia_pivo-122013.

8. Bhadrakumar, “Obama Resets the Pivot to Asia.”

9. Patrick Mendis, East Asia Forum, 6 March 2013. Accessed 23 May 

2013 at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/03/06/how-washingtonsasia-pivot-and-the-tpp-can-benefit-sino-american-relations/.

10. Ibid.

11. Barbara Demick, “China Ups Ante in Conflict with Japan with New Air 

Defense ID Zone,” Los Angeles Times, 23 November 2013. Accessed 29 November 2013 at: http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-china-airdefense-20131123,0,6347841.story#ixzz2m2KPkqba.

12. Ibid. 
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13. Trevor Moss, “America’s Pivot to Asia, a Report Card,” The Diplomat, 5 

May 2013. Accessed 9 May 2013 at: http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/05/

americas-pivot-to-asia-a-report-card/?all=true.

14. Ibid.

15. Yuka Hayashi and Patrick Barta, “Pentagon Cuts Feared Tripping Up Pivot to 

Asia,” Wall Street Journal, 3 May 2013. Accessed 4 May 2013 at: http://online.

wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582004578456683694045890.html. 

16. Alan Dawson, “Obama Summit Absence Will Not Hurt Asia Pivot Policy,” Bangkok 

Post, 14 October 2013. Accessed 16 October 2013 at: http://www.bangkokpost.com/

news/local/374512/obama-summit-absence-will-not-hurt-pacific-pivot-policy.

17. Anna Morris, “Pivot to Asia Passes First Test in Asia Crisis.” World Politics 

Review, 22 April 2013. Accessed 1 May 2013 at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.

com/articles/12887/u-s-pivot-to-asia-passes-first-test-in-korea-crisis.

18. Richard Weitz, “Pivot Out, Rebalance In,” The Diplomat, 3 May 2012. Accessed 

28 December 2013 at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/pivot-out-rebalance-in/.

19. Stephen Cohen and Robert Ward, “Asia Pivot, Obama’s Ticket out of the Middle 

Ease?,” The Diplomat, 21 August 2013. Accessed 8 September 2013 at: http://

thediplomat.com/2013/08/21/asia-pivot-obamas-ticket-out-of-middle-east/.

20. Robert Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 

2012. 

21. Michael Auslin, “Asia Pivot, Take Two,” Wall Street Journal, 19 November 2012. 

Accessed 23 May 2013 at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873233

53204578128533776559640.html. 

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Michael Auslin, “Obama Pivots to Syria from Asia,” Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2013. Accessed 6 September 2013 at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10

001424127887324432404579050291241305068.html. 

26. John Hall, “Massacre of the Tribes: 228 Found Murdered in Just Two Days as 

ISIS Militants Exact Bloody Revenge on Sunni Leaders Who Sided with Iraqi 

Government against Them,” The Mail Online, 30 October 2014. Accessed 13 

November 2014 at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2814420/Massacretribes-228-murdered-just-two-days-ISIS-militants-exact-bloody-revenge-Sunnileaders-sided-Iraqi-government-against-them.html.

27. Associated Press, “ISIS Makes $3M per Day from Oil Smuggling, Human Trafficking,” New York Post, 15 September 2014. Accessed 15 December 2014 at: http://

nypost.com/2014/09/15/isis-makes-3m-per-day-from-oil-smuggling-humantrafficking/.

28. Auslin, “Obama Pivots.”
87

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

29. Stanley R. Sloan, “Keep Your Eyes on the Prize: The Asia Pivot,” War 

on the Rocks, 9 September 2013. Accessed 8 December 2013 at: http://

warontherocks.com/2013/09/keep-your-eyes-on-the-prize-the-asia-pivot/.

30. Kenneth Courtis, “Russia Pivots to Asia,” The Globalist, 25 May 2014. Accessed 

22 July 2014 at: http://www.theglobalist.com/russia-pivots-to-asia/. 

31. Ibid.

32. See: http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMAreaofResponsibility.

aspx.

33. See: http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/facts.shtml.

34. Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, prepared statement, House of Representatives 

Armed Services Committee, 15 April 2015. Accessed 24 April 2015 at: http://

www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/tabid/6706/Article/585175/pacomus-house-of-representatives-armed-services-committee-prepared-statement.

aspx. 

35. Samuel J. Locklear III, “Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Defending the Shared Domains,” 

speech to Canadian Defense Association, 21 February 2013. Accessed 26 December 

2013 at: http://www.pacom.mil/commander/21_feb_13-asia-pacific-rebalance_

defending-the-shared-domains.shtml.

36. Jennifer Hendrixson White, Asia‐Pacific Economic Update 2012, Vol. 4. Honolulu: 

U.S. Pacific Command, October (rev. December 2012), 3.

37. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and 

Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014,” 24 April 

2014. Accessed 20 November 2014 at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_DoD_

China_Report.pdf, i. 

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Sam LaGrone, “Global Guided Missile Expansion Forcing U.S. Navy to Rethink 

Surface Fleet Size,” U.S. Naval Institute News, 21 April 2015. Accessed 27 April 

2015 at: http://news.usni.org/2015/04/21/global-guided-missile-expansionforcing-u-s-navy-to-rethink-surface-fleet-size?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_

medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation Report&utm_campaign=SitRep0422.

41. Ibid., ii.

42. Eugene C. LaFond, “South China Sea,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 21 July 2013. 

Accessed 15 December 2014 at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/

topic/556146/South-China-Sea. 

43. “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed 15 December 2014 at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/

p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide.

44. See: https://treaties.un.org, page 419, article 57.

45. Locklear, “Asia-Pacific Rebalance.”
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JSOU Report 16-7

46. Michael McDevitt, “The South China Sea: Navigating the Most Dangerous Place in the World,” War on the Rocks, 25 November 2014. Accessed 15 

December 2014 at: http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/the-south-china-seau-s-policy-and-options-for-the-future/. 

47. Ibid.

48. M. Taylor Fravel, Michael A. McDevitt, and Lewis M. Stern, “The Long Littoral 

Project: South China Sea, a Maritime Perspective on Indo-Pacific Security,” 

Center for Naval Analysis, March 2013, 38-42.

49. Wendell Minnick, “China Incident with U.S. P-8 Sparks Debate on Pacific 

Posture,” Defense News, 31 August 2014. Accessed 16 December 2014 at: 

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140831/DEFREG03/308310014/

China-Incident-U.S.-P-8-Sparks-Debate-Pacific-Posture.

50. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear 

Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, 5 December 

2014. Accessed 18 December 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf.

51. Kenneth Roth, “Red Handed: China Is Also Complicit in North Korea’s 

Crimes Against Humanity,” Human Rights Watch, 19 February 2014. 

Accessed 18 December 2014 at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/

red-handed-china-also-complicit-north-koreas-crimes-against-humanity.

52. Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart, “North Korea.”

53. Ibid.

54. Scott A. Snyder, “U.S. Policy Towards North Korea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 

January 2013. Accessed 18 December 2014 at: http://www.cfr.org/north-korea/

us-policy-toward-north-korea/p29962.

55. Devlin Barrett, “FBI Says North Korea Behind Sony Hack,” Wall Street Journal, 

19 December 2014. Accessed 20 December 2014 at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/

fbi-says-north-korea-behind-sony-hack-1419008924. 

56. William Boot, “Sony Hackers Guardians of Peace Troll FBI, Anonymous Convinced Hack Didn’t Come from North Korea,” The Daily Beast, 20 December 2014. 

Accessed 20 December 2014 at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/

20/sony-hackers-guardians-of-peace-troll-fbi-fbi-is-the-best-in-the-world.html.

57. Devlin Barrett, “Obama Says Sony ‘Made a Mistake’ Canceling Film,” Wall Street 

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articles/obama-says-sony-made-a-mistake-canceling-film-1419017168.

58. Carrol E. Lee, “U.S. Considers Relisting North Korea as State Sponsor of Terror,” 

Wall Street Journal, 19 December 2014. Accessed 20 December 2014 at: http://

www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-considers-relisting-north-korea-as-state-sponsor-ofterror-1419024979?KEYWORDS=carol lee.

59. Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, Michael 

F. Martin, and Larry A. Niksch, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Congressional 

Research Service, 16 October 2009. Accessed 28 December 2014 at: https://www.

fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf. 
89

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60. Ibid., 4.

61. Ibid., 4.

62. “Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines, Islamist separatists),” CFR Backgrounder, 27 May 

2009. Accessed 28 December 2014 at: http://www.cfr.org/philippines/abu-sayyafgroup-philippines-islamist-separatists/p9235#p4.

63. “The Philippines: A Peace Deal Is Signed, but Challenges Lie Ahead,” Stratfor: Geopolitical Diary, 28 March 2014. Accessed 28 December 2014 at: 

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64. Mark Munson, “Has Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines Been a Success?” Small Wars Journal, 5 April 2013. Accessed 28 December 2014 at: 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/has-operation-enduring-freedomphilippines-been-a-success.

65. “USPACOM Facts: Headquarters, US Pacific Command,” USPACOM. Accessed 

18 November 2014 at: http://www.pacom.mil/about-uspacom/facts.html.

66. Robert Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work on the Asia-Pacific 

Rebalance,” Council on Foreign Relations-Transcript, 30 September 2014. 

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67. Paul McLeary, “US Pacific Shift Carries Hefty Logistics Price Tag,” Defense 

News, 15 July 2013. Accessed 14 December 2013 at: http://www.defensenews.

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68. Wyatt Olson, “Pacific Pathways: Army Prepares New Tack for Deploying 

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69. General Vincent K. Brooks, “2014 Green Book: Rebalanced and Beyond.” 30 September 2014. Accessed 14 February 2015 at: http://www.army.mil/article/134913/.

70. Aaron Marx, “The Wrong Path in the Pacific,” Up Front (Brookings Blog), 14 

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71. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Army’s ‘Pacific Pathways’ Initiative Sets Up Turf Battle 

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90

JSOU Report 16-7

73. JTF 505 News Release, “Joint Task Force 505 Activates for Operation Damayan,” 

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74. U.S. Marine Corps, “31st Marine Expeditionary Unit.” Accessed 24 February 

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76. Tamara Lipper and Barbara Starr, “Thousands Protest U.S. Okinawa Base,” 

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77. The delay was the result of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement protocols 

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80. David Allen and Chiyomi Sumida, “Japanese Ministry Says Camp Schwab 

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81. Pettyjohn, “The Battle of Futenma Isn’t Over”; and McLeary, “US Pacific Shift.”

82. Erik Slavin, Chiyomi Sumida, and Jon Harper, “Okinawa Governor Signs 

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83. Travis J. Tritten, “US Restarts Efforts to Move Okinawa Marines to Guam,” Stars 

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84. Australian Defence Facilities, “US Marine Rotational Force-Darwin,” Nautilus 

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85. Donna Miles, “Rotational Force in Australia Paves Way for Big Growth in 2014,” 

American Forces Press Service, 24 September 2013. Accessed 25 February 2015 

at: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120844.
91

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

86. John Reed, “U.S. Deploying Jets Around Asia to Keep China Surrounded,” 

Foreign Policy, 29 July 2013. Accessed 29 February 2015 at: http://foreignpolicy.

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87. Ibid. 

88. Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Air Force on China threat,” Washington Times, 

28 August 2013. Accessed 9 June 2015 at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/

news/2013/aug/28/inside-the-ring-air-force-on-china-threat/?page=all.

89. Ibid.

90. U.S. Air Force, “Units,” Pacific Air Forces. Accessed 28 February 2015 at: http://

www.pacaf.af.mil/index.asp.

91. U.S. Air Force, “Units,” 5th Air Force. Accessed 28 February 2015 at: http://

www.7af.pacaf.af.mil.

92. U.S. Air Force, “Units,” 7th Air Force. Accessed 28 February 2015 at: http://

www.5af.pacaf.af.mil.

93. Eloise Ogden, “Coming Home: B-52 Squadron Returning after 6-Month Deployment in Guam,” Minot Daily News, 6 October 2012. Accessed 28 February 2015 

at: http://www.minotdailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/569636.html.

94. McLeary, “US Pacific Shift.”

95. Alexander Reidal, “Acting SecAF Highlights Challenges of Pacific Rebalance 

and Space Operations,” Official U.S. Air Force Website, 22 November 2013. 

Accessed 3 December 2013 at: http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/

Article/467586/acting-secaf-highlights-challenges-of-pacific-rebalance-spaceoperations.aspx.

96. McLeary, “US Pacific Shift.”

97. Ibid.

98. Shejana Farberov, “US to Shift 60 Percent of Its Fleet to the Pacific as China 

Continues to Build Up Its Military,” The Mail Online, 2 June 2012. Accessed 3 

December 2013 at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2158343/U-S-Navyshift-60-PER-CENT-fleet-Pacific-China-builds-military.html; and McLeary, “US 

Pacific Shift.”

99. Military Sealift Command, “Maritime Preposition Ships Squadron-3.” Accessed 

28 February 2015 at: http://www.msc.navy.mil/leadership/mps3.htm.

100. Kirk Spitzer, “US Upgrading in the Pacific, but Pivot Questioned,” USA Today, 

17 December 2013. Accessed 19 December 2013 at: http://www.usatoday.com/

story/news/world/2013/12/17/us-japan-asia-security-strategy/4049517/.

101. Ibid.

102. Commander, Naval Installations Command, Carrier Air Wing FIVE (CVW-5). 

Accessed at: http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrj/installations/naf_atsugi/

about/tenant_commands/cvw_5.html/.

103. Spitzer, “US Upgrading in the Pacific.”
92

JSOU Report 16-7

104. “US Pivot to Asia Gaining Strength,” Agence France-Presse, 25 October 

2013. Accessed 9 November 2013 at: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/88649/

us-pivot-to-asia-gaining-strength-admiral. 

105. Jon Harper, “Commander: US Military Can’t Conduct Amphibious Operations 

in the Pacific,” Stars and Stripes, 25 March 2014. Accessed 28 February 2015 at: 

http://www.stripes.com/news/commander-us-military-can-t-conduct-amphibious-operations-in-the-pacific1.274419?utm_medium=twitter&utmsource=dlvr.

it -.UzG4nvZXenA.

106. U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Focus on Asia-Pacific: Rebalance.” Accessed 

28 May 2015 at: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2015/0415_asia-pacificrebalance/?source=GovDelivery. 

107. Special Operations Command, Pacific, homepage. Accessed 7 June 2015 at: http://

www.socpac.socom.mil/default.aspx.

108. Ibid.

109. Gordon Arthur and James Hardy, “US, Philippines start ‘PHIBLEX’ Drills as 

Special Forces Mission Draws Down,” IHS Janes 360, 4 October 2014. Accessed 

7 June 2015 at: http://www.janes.com/article/44106/us-philippines-start-phiblexdrills-as-special-forces-mission-draws-down.

110. Jaime Laude, “Phl-US war games to be held in West Phl Sea,” The Philippine Star, 

7 April 2015. Accessed 7 June 2015 at: https://ph.news.yahoo.com/phl-us-wargames-held-000000645.html. 

111. T. D. Flack, “Special Forces Detachment Korea Redesignated: Ceremony In 

Seoul Marks Change to 39th Special Forces,” Stars and Stripes, 17 October 

2005. Accessed 8 June 2015 at: http://www.stripes.com/news/special-forcesdetachment-korea-redesignated-1.39635.

112. Per the co-author, Major John P. Duvall, Jr., USMC (retired), who helped plan 

for and then participated in these exercises while stationed on Okinawa, Japan, 

as part of III Marine Expeditionary Force from 2004 to 2008.

113. Prashanth Parameswaran, “US-Thailand Relations and Cobra Gold 2015: 

What’s Really Going On?” The Diplomat, 5 February 2015. Accessed 7 June 

2015 at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/u-s-thailand-relations-and-cobragold-2015-whats-really-going-on/.

114. Erik Slavin, “Thai Military Ruler: Beijing Gets Us, Washington Doesn’t,” Stars 

and Stripes, 9 February 2015. Accessed 7 June 2015 at: http://www.stripes.com/

news/pacific/thai-military-ruler-beijing-gets-us-washington-doesn-t-1.328527.

115. Parameswaran, “US-Thailand Relations and Cobra Gold 2015: What’s Really 

Going On?” 

116. Erik Slavin, “Cobra Gold Planning Postponed; No Decision Made on US Participation,” Stars and Stripes, 16 April 2015. Accessed 7 June 2015 at: http://

www.stripes.com/news/cobra-gold-planning-postponed-no-decision-made-onus-participation-1.340452.
93

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

117. Rouben Azizian, “United States and the Asia Pacific: Balancing Rhetoric with 

Action,” in From APEC 2011 to APEC 2012: American and Russian Perspectives on 

Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, ed. Rouben Azizian and Artyom Lukin. 

Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, and Vladivostok: FarEastern 

Federal University Press, 119. Accessed 29 May 2013 at: http://www.apcss.org/

wp-content/uploads/2012/09/APCSS-FEFU-10Aug12.pdf.

118. “U.S. Forming New Security Alliance in the Asia Pacific,” The Philippine Star, 

25 May 2014. Accessed 1 August 2014 at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/

2014/05/25/1327015/us-forming-new-security-alliance-asia-pacific. 

119. Max Suich, “Australia Pivots to Asia as U.S. Wobbles,” The Australian, 30 November 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/

features/australia-pivots-to-asia-as-us-wobbles/story-e6frg6z6-1226771739041.

120. Michael R. Gordon, “Indonesia Takes Aim at Australia over Spying on Talks,” New 

York Times, 17 February 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://www.nytimes.

com/2014/02/18/world/asia/indonesia-takes-aim-at-australia-over-spying-butnot-the-us.html?referrer=.

121. Suich, “Australia Pivots.”

122. Craig Whitlock, “U.S., Australia to Broaden Military Ties amid Pentagon Pivot to 

SE Asia,” Washington Post, 26 March 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-expand-ties-with-australiaas-it-aims-to-shift-forces-closer-to-se-asia/2012/03/19/gIQAPSXlcS_story.html.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid. 

125. Richard Tanter, “The U.S. Military Presence in Australia. The ‘Asia-Pacific Pivot’ 

and ‘Global NATO,’” Global Research, 11 November 2013. Accessed January 

2014 at: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-us-military-presence-in-australia-theasia-pacific-pivot-and-global-nato/5357653.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid. 

129. Beina Xu, “The U.S. Japan Security Alliance,” CFR Backgrounder, 30 December 2012. Accessed 24 December 2013 at: http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japansecurity-alliance/p31437#p6.

130. Paul Scracic, “Turning Japanese: Obama’s ‘Asia Pivot’ Centers on Japan.” 

Atlantic, 7 March 2013. Accessed 3 November 2013 at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/turning-japanese-obamas-asia-pivotcenters-on-japan/273779/.

131. Ibid. 

132. Ibid. 
94

JSOU Report 16-7

133. Yuka Hayashi, “Japan’s Leader Charts Path for Military’s Rise,” Wall Street 

Journal, 23 April 2013. Accessed 9 May 2013 at: http://online.wsj.com/article/

SB10001424127887323551004578438253084917008.html. 

134. Ibid. 

135. Kirk Spitzer, “Japan’s Hawks Unveil Sweeping Defense Upgrade,” USA Today, 

17 December 2013. Accessed 19 December 2013 at: http://www.usatoday.com/

story/news/world/2013/12/17/japan-security-plan/4048729/.

136. Ibid. 

137. Ibid. 

138. Miles Yu and Geostrategy-Direct.com, “U.S. Signs Asia ‘Pivot’ Pact with New 

Zealand Despite Ban on Ships,” World Tribune, 3 July 2012. Accessed January 

2014 at: http://www.worldtribune.com/2012/07/03/u-s-signs-asia-pivot-pact-withnew-zealand-despite-ban-on-ships/.

139. U.S. Department of Defense, “United States, New Zealand Sign Defense Cooperation Agreement,” news release, 19 June 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15388.

140. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with New Zealand,” fact sheet, Bureau 

of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 31 January 2014. Accessed January 2014 at: 

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35852.htm.

141. John Bruni, “ANZUS and the Asia Pivot: A Fork in the Road?” The International 

Relations and Security Network, 18 February 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: 

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=e

n&id=159134&contextid774=159134&contextid775=159107&tabid=1453521731.

142. Ibid. 

143. Ibid.

144. Courtney Todd, “US, Australian and New Zealand Special Forces Troops Attack 

Mock Enemy Force in Darwin,” NT News, 14 July 2015. Accessed August 2015 

at: http://www.ntnews.com.au/news/northern-territory/us-australian-andnew-zealand-special-forces-troops-attack-mock-enemy-force-in-darwin/

story-fnk0b1zt-1227441652283.

145. Robert Ayson and David Capie, “Part of the Pivot? The Washington Declaration and U.S.-NZ Relations,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, East-West Center, 17 July 

2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/

part-the-pivot-the-washington-declaration-and-us-nz-relations.

146. Ibid.

147. See: http://www.chanrobles.com/mutualdefensetreaty.htm#.UsW2G0CA1Ms.

148. Phil Shenon, “Philippine Senate Votes to Close U.S. Bases,” New York Times, 

16 September 1991. Accessed 24 December 2013 at: http://www.nytimes.

com/1991/09/16/world/philippine-senate-votes-to-reject-us-base-renewal.html.
95

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

149. Seth Robson, “US Military’s Return to the Philippines Sparks Economic Hopes,” 

Stars and Stripes, 21 August 2014. Accessed August 2015 at: http://www.stripes.com/

news/us-military-s-return-to-the-philippines-sparks-economic-hopes-1.298937. 

150. Carol J. Williams, “Philippine Leaders Want U.S. Troops Back as Bulwark 

against China,” Los Angeles Times, 9 August 2013. Accessed 24 December 

2013 at: http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/09/world/la-fg-wn-philippinesus-troops-china-20130808.

151. Arthur and Hardy, “US, Philippines start ‘PHIBLEX’ drills.”

152. Dan Lamothe, “People Hate U.S. Bases in Asia—Until Disasters Strike,” Journal 

Sentinel, 12 November 2013. Accessed 18 November 2013 at: http://www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/people-hate-us-bases-in-asia--until-disaster-strikesb99141021z1-231622041.html. 

153. Ibid.

154. Manuel Mogato and Aubrey Belford, “Dramatic U.S. Humanitarian Effort in the 

Philippines Aids Asia Pivot,” Manila Tacloban, 18 November 2013. 

155. Ibid.

156. Kongdon Oh, “U.S.-ROK, the Forgotten Alliance,” Brookings East Asia Commentary, October 2008. Accessed 3 August 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/

research/opinions/2008/10/south-korea-oh. 

157. Ibid.

158. Michael Peck, “The Five Most Deadly Armies of Asia,” The National Interest, 

3 November 2014. Accessed 5 November 2014 at: http://nationalinterest.org/

feature/the-five-most-deadly-armies-asia-11589?page=show. 

159. Jayshree Bajoria and Youkyung Lee, “The U.S.-South Korea Alliance,” CFR 

Backgrounder, 13 October 2011. Accessed 3 August 2014 at: http://www.cfr.org/

south-korea/us-south-korea-alliance/p11459. 

160. “South Korea and the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Wilson Center Conference, 3 April 

2013. Accessed 30 December 2014 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/

south-korea-and-the-us-pivot-to-asia?page=1.

161. Ibid. 

162. Chaiyong Satjipanon, “America’s Asian ‘Pivot’ Reunites Old Friends with Common 

Values,” The Global Post, 4 April 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/america-s-asian-pivotreunites-old-friends-common-values.

163. Ibid.

164. Emma Chanlett-Avery and Ben Dolven, “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations,” CRS Report RL32593. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 20 December 2013.

165. “What Is JU.S.MAGTHAI?” JU.S.MAGTHAI. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

www.jusmagthai.com/.
96

JSOU Report 16-7

166. Terri Moon Cronk, “Exercise Cobra Gold 2014 Kicks Off in Thailand,” IIP Digital, 

12 February 2014. Accessed January 2014 at: http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/

english/article/2014/02/20140212292843.html#axzz30QywFRHk.

167. Ibid.

168. Thomas Fuller, “Protests Continue in Thailand after Election Is Set,” New 

York Times, 9 December 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.nytimes.

com/2013/12/10/world/asia/thailand-protests.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0. 

169. Chanlett-Avery and Dolven, “Thailand.”

170. Patrick Jory, “The U.S. ‘Pivot to Asia’ and the Political Crisis in Thailand,” East 

Asia Forum, 18 December 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/18/the-us-pivot-to-asia-and-the-political-crisis-in-thailand/. 

171. Ibid.

172. “Thailand Info,” United Nations Thailand, 2008. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

un.or.th/thailand/development.html.

173. “ASEAN-U.S. Partnership for Good Governance, Equitable and Sustainable Development and Security,” U.S.AID, updated 14 March 2014. 

Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.usaid.gov/asia-regional/fact-sheets/

asean-us-partnership-good-governance-equitable-sustainable.

174. Azizian, “United States and the Asia Pacific,” 121. 

175. Robert Hathaway, “India and the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Yale Global Online, 24 

February 2012. Accessed 24 November 2013 at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/

india-and-us-pivot-asia. 

176. Ibid. 

177. Ibid. 

178. Ibid. 

179. Dewi F. Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective on the U.S. Rebalancing Effort toward 

Asia,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 26 February 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=320#.UyHwPO-PLX5.

180. Ibid. 

181. Ibid. 

182. “China and Indonesia Seal Strategic Pact,” New York Times, 26 April 2005. 

Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/25/world/asia/25ihtindonesia.html?_r=0.

183. Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective.”

184. Ann M. Murphy, “Indonesia in Asia’s Changing Balance of Power,” World Politics 

Review, 11 March 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.

com/articles/12779/indonesia-in-asia-s-changing-balance-of-power.

185. Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective.”

186. Ibid.
97

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

187. U.S. Department of State,“United States-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership,” 

Office of the Spokesperson, 8 October 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://m.

state.gov/md215196.htm.

188. Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective.”

189. Freya Petersen, “Indonesia Calls U.S. Troop Buildup In Darwin ‘Too Close For 

Comfort’,” Global Post, 19 November 2011. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/down-under/indonesia-australia-ustroops-darwin-down-under.

190. Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective.”

191. Ibid.

192. Murphy, “Indonesia in Asia’s Changing Balance.”

193. Ibid. 

194. “Foreign Policy Overview,” last updated 3 April 2014. Accessed at: http://www.

kln.gov.my/web/guest/foreign_policy.

195. “Obama’s Visit to Underscore Importance of Asia Pivot,” Borneo Post Online, 

15 February 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://www.theborneopost.

com/2014/02/15/obamas-visit-to-underscore-importance-of-asia-pivot/.

196. Ibid.

197. “Readout of Meeting Between Secretary Hagel and Malaysian Minister of 

Defence Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein,” U.S. Department of Defense, 

2 June 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.

aspx?releaseid=16057.

198. Lolita C. Baldor, “Hagel to Meet with Malaysian Counterpart,” Miami Herald, 

1 April 2014. Accessed April 2014 at: http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/

04/01/4033372/hagel-to-meet-with-malaysian-counterpart.html.

199. Ibid.

200. “Singapore’s Foreign Policy,” Embassy of the Republic of Singapore. Accessed 

January 2014 at: http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/manila/

about_singapore/foreign_policy.html.

201. Mariko Oi, “U.S.S. Freedom Arrives in Singapore as Part of U.S. ‘Pivot,’” BBC 

News Asia, 17 April 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.bbc.com/news/

world-asia-22156283. .

202. Ibid.

203. Andrew Browne, “China’s World: The U.S. ‘Pivot’ Toward Asia Takes Another 

Turn,” Wall Street Journal, 10 September 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323595004579064980509607984. 

204. Ibid.

205. Richard Weitz, “Global Insights: Hagel Reaffirms U.S. Pivot to Asia at Shangri-La,” World Politics Review, 4 June 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12994/global-insights-hagel-reaffirms-us-pivot-to-asia-at-shangri-la. 
98

JSOU Report 16-7

206. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Vietnam Solution,” The Atlantic, 21 May 2012. Accessed 

January 2014 at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/06/

the-vietnam-solution/308969/2/. 

207. William Wan, “Defense Secretary Leon Panetta Highlights U.S. Ties to Vietnam 

During Visit,” Washington Post, 3 June 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/defense-secretary-leon-panettahighlights-us-ties-to-vietnam-during-visit/2012/06/03/gJQAOWcLBV_story.

html.

208. Ibid.

209. Carlo Muñoz, “U.S., Vietnam Defense Chiefs Reach Deal to Strengthen 

Military Ties,” The Hill, 4 June 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://thehill.com/policy/defense/230677-us-vietnam-strengthen-military-ties; and 

Richard Weitz, “Global Insights: U.S.-Vietnam Ties Show Progress, Pitfalls of Asia 

Pivot,” World Politics Review, 19 June 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12072/global-insights-u-s-vietnam-ties-showprogress-pitfalls-of-asia-pivot.

210. Ibid.

211. Ibid.

212. Ibid. 

213. Ibid.

214. Ibid.

215. Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam Looking to Play Pivotal Role with Both China and 

U.S.,” The Global Times, 24 July 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

globaltimes.cn/content/723033.shtml#.U2b1Le9OXX4.

216. Ibid.

217. Ibid.

218. Howard Fineman, “Asia Has ‘Pivoted-to Itself,” Huffington Post, 10 April 2014. 

Accessed April 2014 at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/10/asia-pivotobama_n_5124532.html.

219. Ibid.

220. Shah Hussein Imam, “Pivoting to Asia, U.S. Is Limbering up to Bangladesh,” Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka, 7 August 2012. Accessed 13 

November 2013 at: http://www.jdslanka.org/index.php/2012-01-30-09-31-17/

geopolitics/160-us-limbering-up-to-bangladesh.

221. Ibid.

222. Ibid. 

223. “Counter-Terrorism: US Special Forces Stationed in India, Reveals Pentagon,” 

The Times of India, 2 March 2012. Accessed August 2015 at: http://timesofindia.

indiatimes.com/india/Counter-terrorism-US-special-forces-stationed-in-Indiareveals-Pentagon/articleshow/12107378.cms. 

224. Ibid.
99

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

225. Ibid.

226. Imam, “Pivoting to Asia.”

227. “U.S. Relations With Bhutan,” U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, 15 July 2014. 

Accessed 29 December 2014 at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35839.htm.

228. Steve Holland and James Pomfret, “Obama Cancels Asia Tour Over Shutdown,” 

Reuters, 4 October 2013. Accessed 2 November 2013 at: http://www.reuters.com/

article/2013/10/04/us-usa-fiscal-obama-cancel-idU.S.BRE99302J20131004.

229. Edie Walsh, “Brunei Darussalam’s National Security Strategy,” ISN Digital 

Library, 7 November 2011. Accessed 30 December 2014 at: http://www.isn.ethz.

ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=133571&.

230. Ibid.

231. Since 1989, the military-led government in Burma as well as the current parliamentary government has promoted the name “Myanmar” as a more conventional 

name for their state; the U.S. Government has not adopted the name and continues 

to refer to the country as Burma. This monograph will do the same.

232. Visit to Burma by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 28 November 

2011; a 19 November 2012 visit by President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Burma; and a May 2013 visit to the U.S. by Myanmar President 

Thein Sein.

233. William Boot, “Trade with Myanmar Key Part of U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Irrawaddy, 

25 July 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.irrawaddy.org/business/

magazine-business/trade-with-myanmar-key-part-of-us-pivot-to-asia.html. 

234. Ibid.

235. David Steinberg, “China Counter-Pivots on Myanmar,” Asia Times, 18 March 

2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/

SEA-01-180313.html.

236. Ibid. 

237. Ibid.

238. Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Myanmar: Obama’s Visit and the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” 

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 5 December 2012. Accessed January 2014 

at: http://www.ipcs.org/article/southeast-asia/myanmar-obamas-visit-and-theus-pivot-to-asia-3774.html. 

239. Nayan Chanda, “The Importance of Obama’s Asian Pivot,” The Times of India, 

24 November 2012. Accessed 13 May 2013 at: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-11-24/edit-page/35317896_1_south-china-sea-presidential-visitobama-policy. 

240. Ibid.

241. Economy, “What Happened?”

242. Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Expands Counterterrorism Assistance in Cambodia in 

Spite of Human Rights Concerns,” Washington Post, 15 November 2012. Accessed 

August 2015 at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
100

JSOU Report 16-7

us-expands-counterterrorism-assistance-in-cambodia-in-spite-of-human-rightsconcerns/2012/11/15/f2df3de8-2e59-11e2-abff-7d780620a97a_story.html.

243. Ibid.

244. Ibid.

245. Ibid.

246. Roberto Tofani, “Cambodia Highlights Challenges to U.S. Asia Pivot,” World Politics Review, 21 December 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12590/cambodia-highlights-challenges-to-u-s-asia-pivot.

247. Ibid.

248. Ibid.

249. Curtis S. Chin and Jose B. Collazo, “U.S. ‘Pivot’ to Asia Can Help Here,” Phnom Penh 

Post, 5 November 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.phnompenhpost.

com/analysis-and-op-ed/us-%E2%80%98pivot%E2%80%99-asia-can-help-here.

250. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Fiji,” Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 31 January 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1834.htm.

251. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Towards Fiji: Section 7008,” Embassy of 

the United States in Suva. Accessed January 2014 at: http://suva.usembassy.gov/

section_7008.html.

252. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Policy Towards Fiji.”

253. Elke Larsen, “Bringing Fiji Back into the Fold: A U.S. Perspective,” Center for 

Strategic & International Studies, 9 August 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

csis.org/publication/bringing-fiji-back-fold-us-perspective.

254. Ibid.

255. Ibid.

256. Bernard Lagan, “Australia Urged to Prepare for Influx of People Displaced by Climate Change,” The Guardian, 16 April 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

theguardian.com/environment/2013/apr/16/australia-climate-change-refugeestatus.

257. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Kiribati,” Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 31 January 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1836.htm.

258. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Kiribati.”

259. “Laos: Attacks Intensify Against Lao, Hmong People,” Business Wire, 4 

March 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.businesswire.com/news/

home/20130304006755/en/Laos-Attacks-Intensify-Lao-Hmong-People#.

UyerLu9OXX4. 

260. Joshua Kurlantzick, “The Moral and Strategic Blindspot in Obama’s Pivot to Asia,” 

Council on Foreign Relations, 20 November 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: 

http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/moral-strategic-blindspot-obamas-pivot-asia/

p29527.
101

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

261. Ibid.

262. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Laos,” Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, 31 January 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://www.state.

gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2770.htm; and “U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Historic 

Laos Visit,” BBC News Asia, 11 July 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

bbc.com/news/world-asia-18792282. 

263. “Laos Ratifies Membership Package, Will Join WTO on 2 February,” World Trade 

Organization, 3 January 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.wto.org/

english/news_e/news13_e/acc_lao_08jan13_e.htm.

264. Stuart Grudgings, “As Obama’s Asia ‘Pivot’ Falters, China Steps into the Gap,” 

Reuters, 6 October 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.reuters.com/

article/2013/10/06/us-asia-usa-china-idU.S.BRE99501O20131006.

265. Ibid. 

266. Ibid. 

267. “U.S. Woos Maldives with SOFA,” CASS-India. Accessed 18 January 2014 at: 

http://www.cassindia.com/inner_page.php?task=research&&id=24.

268. Ibid.

269. Cara Anna, “Marshall Islands Sues 9 of the World’s Nuclear Powers in International 

Court,” The World Post, 24 April 2014. Accessed April 2014 at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/24/marshall-islands-sues-nuclear-powers_n_5209379.

html. 

270. Ibid.

271. Avner Cohen and Lily Vaccaro, “The Import of the Marshall Islands Nuclear 

Lawsuit,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 May 2014. Accessed May 2014 at: 

http://thebulletin.org/import-marshall-islands-nuclear-lawsuit7143.

272. U.S. Department of State, “The Legacy of U.S. Nuclear Testing and Radiation Exposure in the Marshall Islands,” Embassy of the United States in Majuro. Accessed 

January 2014 at: http://majuro.usembassy.gov/legacy.html#_compensation.

273. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Marshall Island,” Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 4 February 2014. Accessed February 2014 

at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26551.htm.

274. Ibid.

275. Ibid.

276. Reagan Test Site, “U.S.AKA Base Operations,” U.S. Army. Accessed January 2014 

at: http://www.smdc.army.mil/kwaj/baseops.html.

277. Ibid.

278. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with the Federated States of Micronesia,” 

Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 3 February 2014. Accessed 

February 2014 at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm.

279. Ibid.
102

JSOU Report 16-7

280. Ibid.

281. Ibid.

282. Scott Leis, “Micronesia’s Future between China and the U.S.,” East Asia Forum, 16 

June 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/16/

micronesia-s-future-between-china-and-the-us/. 

283. Ibid. 

284. Ibid.

285. Jeffrey Reeves, “Mongolia’s Strategic Calculus,” The Diplomat, 15 October 2012. Accessed 12 November 2013 at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/

mongolia-and-the-us-pivot-ulaanbaatars-perspective/.

286. Catherine Cheney, “Clinton’s Mongolia Trip Shows Economic Side of Asia 

Pivot,” World Politics Review, 10 July 2012. Accessed 12 November 2013 at: 

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/12149/clintons-mongolia-tripshows-economic-side-of-u-s-asia-pivot. 

287. Reeves, “Mongolia’s Strategic Calculus.”

288. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Nauru,” Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 31 January 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16447.htm.

289. Ibid.

290. Nick Squires, “Nauru Seeks to Regain Lost Fortunes,” BBC, 15 March 2008. 

Accessed January 2014 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_

own_correspondent/7296832.stm. 

291. Philip Shenon, “A Pacific Island Nation Is Stripped of Everything,” New York 

Times, 10 December 1995. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.nytimes.

com/1995/12/10/world/a-pacific-island-nation-is-stripped-of-everything.html.

292. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Nauru.”

293. Central Intelligence Agency, “Nauru,” The World Factbook. Accessed January 2014 

at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nr.html. 

294. W. A. Sunil, “Nepal Maoists Suffer Landslide Election Defeat,” World Socialist 

Website, 6 December 2013. Accessed 14 January 2014 at: https://www.wsws.org/

en/articles/2013/12/06/nepa-d06.html.

295. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Palau,” Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 4 February 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1840.htm.; and Central Intelligence Agency, “Palau,” 

The World Factbook. Accessed January 2014 at: https://www.cia.gov/library/

publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ps.html. 

296. Ibid. 

297. “Palau Profile,” BBC News Asia, 21 May 2014. Accessed May 2014 at: http://www.

bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15446659.
103

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

298. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Papua New Guinea,” Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 3 February 2014. Accessed February 

2014 at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2797.htm.

299. Ibid.

300. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Re-balancing the Rebalance: 

Resourcing U.S. Diplomatic Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 17 April 2014. 

Accessed April 2014 at: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html.

301. Ibid. 

302. Ibid.

303. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Samoa,” Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 31 January 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1842.htm.

304. Central Intelligence Agency, “Samoa,” The World Factbook. Accessed January 2014 

at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ws.html.

305. Ibid.

306. Ibid.

307. Ibid.

308. “Pacific Partnership Races Against Samoa Longboat Rowing Team,” U.S. Pacific 

Fleet, 9 June 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.

aspx/030211.

309. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with the Solomon Islands,” Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 18 February 2014. Accessed February 

2014 at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2799.htm.

310. Ibid. 

311. Ibid.

312. Australian Government, “Solomon Islands Country Brief,” Department of 

Foreign Affairs and Trade. Accessed August 2015 at: http://dfat.gov.au/geo/

solomon-islands/Pages/solomon-islands-country-brief.aspx. 

313. Ibid.

314. “U.S. Explains Human Rights Resolution Against Sri Lanka,” NDTV-World Press 

Trust of India, 19 March 2013. Accessed 17 January 2014 at: http://www.ndtv.com/

article/world/us-explains-human-rights-resolution-against-sri-lanka-344114. 

315. Jaliya Wickramasuriya, “A Role for Sri Lanka in the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” The 

Hill, 27 March 2013. Accessed 23 January 2014 at: http://thehill.com/blogs/

congress-blog/foreign-policy/290585-a-role-for-sri-lanka-in-us-pivot-to-asia.

316. Ibid. 

317. “Ambassador Urges Facts Over Fiction in Sri Lanka’s Defeat of Terrorism,” Embassy 

of Sri Lanka Website, 24 June 2011. Accessed 29 December 2013 at: http://www.ndtv.

com/article/world/us-explains-human-rights-resolution-against-sri-lanka-344114.
104

JSOU Report 16-7

318. “U.S. Navy and Timor-Leste Defense Force Build Relationships during Second 

CARAT,” United States Navy, 28 February 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: 

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=79395.

319. Ibid.

320. Ibid.

321. Rick Wilkinson, “East Timor not entitled to Bay-Undan gas pipeline tax, Australia 

warns,” Oil & Gas Journal, 1 April 2014. Accessed April 2014 at: http://www.ogj.

com/articles/2014/04/east-timor-not-entitled-to-bayu-undan-gas-pipeline-taxaustralia-warns.html. 

322. Jamie Smyth and Ben Bland, “East Timor Takes Australia to Court Over Spying 

Dispute,” Financial Times, 20 January 2014. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

ft.com/cms/s/0/5499c5e6-819f-11e3-87d5-00144feab7de.html#axzz30R5NBfT2.

323. Prodita Sabarini, “Rights Should Be Part of U.S. ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” Boston Globe, 

6 January 2014. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/01/06/rights-should-part-pivot-asia/RfqI1Ij24ZIwmNMZoXFJIO/story.

html.

324. Phil Stewart, “U.S. to Sell Indonesia Apache Attack Helicopters in $500 Million 

Deal,” Reuters, 26 August 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.reuters.

com/article/2013/08/26/us-indonesia-helicopters-idU.S.BRE97P0CH20130826; 

and Sabarini, “Rights Should Be Part.”

325. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Tonga,” Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 19 August 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.

state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16092.htm.

326. Ibid.

327. “U.S.ARPAC Contingency Command Post Soldiers deploy to Tonga,” U.S. Army, 

21 September 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.army.mil/article/87779/

U.S.ARPAC_Contingency_Command_Post_Soldiers_deploy_to_Tonga/.

328. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Tuvalu,” Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 19 August 2013. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/16479.htm.

329. Ibid.

330. Matt Siegel, “A Tiny Pacific Island Nation That Does Not Smell Like Paradise,” New York Times, 16 October 2012. Accessed January 2014 at: http://

www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/world/tuvalu-a-pacific-landscape-befouled.

html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

331. U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Vanuatu,” Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs fact sheet, 18 February 2014. Accessed February 2014 at: http://

www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2815.htm.

332. Ibid. 
105

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

333. Thompson Marango, “Biggest U.S. Military Presence since WW II,” Vanuatu 

Daily Post, 17 April 2011. Accessed January 2014 at: http://www.dailypost.vu/

content/biggest-us-military-presence-ww-ii.

334. Adam S. Erickson and Adam P. Liff, “China’s Military Development, Beyond 

the Numbers,” The Diplomat, 12 March 2013. Accessed 3 June 2013 at: http://

thediplomat.com/2013/03/12/chinas-military-development-beyond-the-numbers/

comment-page-1/.

335. Ibid.

336. Ibid.

337. Li Xiokun, “U.S. Policy Destabilizing Asia Pacific Region,” People’s Daily 

Online, 17 April 2013. Accessed 1 May 2013 at: http://english.peopledaily.com.

cn/90883/8210691.html. 

338. Ibid.

339. Ibid.

340. Ibid., 123. 

341. Ibid.

342. Ibid.

343. Anwar, “An Indonesian Perspective.”

344. Richard Cronin, “Obama Faces Serious Challenge on Pivot to Asia,” International 

Business Times, 11 November 2013. Accessed 11 November 2013 at: http://www.

ibtimes.com/obama-faces-serious-challenges-pivot-asia-1454202.

345. Ibid.

346. Ibid.

347. Ibid.

348. Ibid.

349. Stuart Leavenworth and Anita Kumar, “In Beijing, Obama Has One More 

Chance to ‘Pivot’ to Asia,” Stars and Stripes, 8 November 2014. Accessed 12 

November 2014 at: http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/in-beijing-obama-hasone-more-chance-to-pivot-to-asia 1.313158?utm_source=feedburner&utm_

medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+starsandstripes%2Fgeneral+%28St

ars+and+Stripes%29. 

350. Hu Shuli, “Apec Agreements Help Warm the World’s Most Important Bilateral 

Relationship,” South China Morning Post, 19 November 2014. Accessed 28 January 2015 at: http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1643648/

apec-agreements-help-warm-worlds-most-important-bilateral.

351. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Trans Pacific Partnership,” undated. 

Accessed 12 November 2014 at: http://www.ustr.gov/tpp.

352. “Pakistan Hands Over Gwadar Port Operation to China,” The Nation, 13 February 

2013. Accessed 13 November 2014 at: http://nation.com.pk/national/18-Feb-2013/

pakistan-hands-over-gwadar-port-operation-to-china. 
106

JSOU Report 16-7

353. “Gwadar Port Integral to China Maritime Expansion,” Agence France-Presse, 

17 February 2013. Accessed 13 November 2014 at: http://tribune.com.pk/

story/508607/gwadar-port-integral-to-china-maritime-expansion/. 

354. “In Beijing, Regional Leaders Balance Competing Visions for Asia,” STRATFOR, 

12 November 2014. Accessed 12 November 2014 at: http://www.stratfor.com/

geopolitical-diary/beijing-regional-leaders-balance-competing-visions-asia#axz

z3IsdZYXjQ. 

355. Fareed Zakaria, “Whatever Happened to the Asia Pivot?” Washington Post, 16 

April 2015. Accessed at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-forgottenpivot-to-asia/2015/04/16/529cc5b8-e477-11e4-905f-cc896d379a32_story.html.

356. Thomas Bickford and Albert Wilner, “The Role of the Army in Asia,” War 

on the Rocks, 3 June 2015. Accessed at: http://warontherocks.com/2015/06/

the-role-of-the-u-s-army-in-asia/.

357. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Senate Armed Services Committee Pushes for Bigger 

Army Role in Pacific vs. China.” Breaking Defense, 27 May 2015. Accessed at: 

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/05/sasc-pushes-bigger-army-role-in-pacificvs-china/.

358. Michael M. Phillips, “New Way the U.S. Projects Power around the Globe: Commandos,” Wall Street Journal, 24 April 2015. Accessed at: http://www.wsj.com/

articles/sun-never-sets-on-u-s-commandos-1429887473.

359. Jack Date and Mark Levine, “22 Million Affected by OPM Hack, Officials Say,” 

ABC News, 9 July 2015. Accessed at: http://abcnews.go.com/US/exclusive25-million-affected-opm-hack-sources/story?id=32332731.

360. Wendell Minnick, “White Paper Outlines China’s Ambitions,” Defense News, 27 

May 2015. Accessed at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/

warfare/2015/05/26/china-us-pentagon-taiwan-report-south-east-sea-islandsreefs-s400-su35-missiles-satellite-space-deterrence/27957131/.

361. Ibid.

362. Louis Bacani, “Stop Harassing our Fishermen,” The Philippine Star, 16 February 2015. Accessed at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/02/06/1420866/

philippines-china-stop-harassing-our-fishermen.

363. Darryl J. Lavender, “China’s Special Operations Forces Modernization, Professionalization and Regional Implications,” Unpublished paper, U.S. Army War 

College, March 2013, 18. Accessed at: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q

=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.

dtic.mil%2Fcgi-bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA589222&ei=kCl3VdL1MIW

qogTOpoH4Cg&usg=AFQjCNF_qziV5Lj0l_57kbFlVPOvp1LPFQ&sig2=xy_88

4rI7x0wKgNnDspfTw.

364. Stephen Evans, “The Interview: Hollywood Romp with a Political Punch,” BBC, 

27 December 2014. Accessed at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30609790.

365. “North Korea Berates President Obama over The Interview Release,” BBC, 27 

December 2014. Accessed at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30608179.
107

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

366. “North Korea Threatens ‘Preemptive Nuclear Strike’ Over US-South Korea 

Drills,” RT News, 5 March 2015. Accessed at: http://www.rt.com/news/237849-

north-korea-threatens-strikes/.

367. Guy Taylor, “U.S., China, South Korea Should Prepare for North Korea’s 

Collapse, ex Envoy Says,” Washington Times, 4 March 2015. Accessed 

at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/4/us-china-southkorea-should-prepare-north-koreas-c/print/.

368. Kent Harrington and Bennett Ramberg, “Managing North Korea’s Collapse,” 

Japan Times, 23 January 2015. 

369. Robert Peters, “If North Korea Collapses, What Happens to Its Nightmare 

Weapons of War?” The National Interest, 2 May 2015. Accessed at: ttp://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-north-korea-collapses-what-happens-its-nightmareweapons-12788.

370. Luke Hunt, “ISIS, a Threat Well Beyond the Middle East,” The Diplomat, 7 

July 2014. Accessed at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/isis-a-threat-wellbeyond-the-middle-east/.

371. Ibid. 

372. Joe Gould, “Special Operators Face Terrorist Evolution,” Defense News, 27 May 

2015. Accessed at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/show-daily/

sofic/2015/05/24/special-operations-islamic-state-mideast-socom-sof-budgetisis/27719901/.

373. David L. Edwards, “Ignored in Asia, the ISIL Threat,” Small Wars Journal, 22 

January 2015.

374. Gabrielle Dunlevy, “Australia and Indonesia Face New Wave of Terror,” The 

Australian, 21 August 2014. Accessed at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/

news/latest-news/aust-indonesia-to-discuss-terror-threat/story-fn3dxix6-1227

030016624.

375. Simone Roworth, “Foreign Fighters and Southeast Asia,” The Strategist, 5 September 2014. Accessed at: http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/foreign-fighters-andsoutheast-asia/.

376. “Islamic Militants Plan.” Accessed at: http://news.yahoo.com/malaysia-militantsplotted-isil-inspired-attacks-police-104131404.html.

377. “Indonesia Launches anti-ISIL Operation,” World Bulletin, 20 April 2015. 

Accessed at: http://www.worldbulletin.net/haber/158107/indonesia-launchesanti-isil-operation.

378. “Australian Islamic State Nurse Arrested on Return Home,” Fox News (Associated 

Press), 25 July 2015. Accessed at: http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/07/25/

australian-islamic-state-nurse-arrested-on-return-home/?intcmp=hplnws.

379. Ibid.

380. “Special Operations,” Joint Publication 3-0, 2014, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, x. Accessed at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf.
108

JSOU Report 16-7

381. Robert D. Kaplan, “When North Korea Falls,” The Atlantic, October 2006. 

Accessed at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/10/

when-north-korea-falls/305228/.

382. Michael E. O’Hanlon, “North Korea Collapse Scenarios,” Brookings Institution, 2009, Accessed at: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/06/

north-korea-ohanlon.

383. Ibid.

384. Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President of the United States at the 

United States Military Academy 2014,” The White House, 28 May 2014. 

Accessed at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/

remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony.

385. Robert Haddick, Challenges in the Asia Pacific Theater for U.S. and Partner Nation 

Special Operations Forces, (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations 

University Press, 2014), 70. Accessed at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU14-6_Haddick_ChallengesintheAsiaPacific_FINAL.pdf.

386. Harry R. Yarger, Building Partner Capacity, (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint 

Special Operations University Press, 2015), 103. Accessed at: http://jsou.socom.

mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU15-1_Yarger_BPC_FINAL.pdf.

387. Ibid.

388. Ibid. 

389. Ibid.

390. Ibid.

391. Steven Metz, “Role Reversal, U.S. Special Operations Forces After the Long War,” 

World Politics Review, 3 March 2015. Accessed at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.

com/articles/15209/role-reversal-u-s-special-operations-forces-after-the-long-war.

392. Ibid.

393. Michelle Tan, “Third Special Forces Group Returns its Focus to Africa,” 

Army Times, 1 July 2015. Accessed at: http://www.armytimes.com/story/

military/2015/07/01/3rd-special-forces-group-returns-to-africa/29578051/. 

394. Tom Haydon, “U.S. Special Forces Deployed in Iraq; Again.” New York 

Times, 25 September 2012. Accessed at: http://www.thenation.com/article/

us-special-forces-deployed-iraq-again/.

395. Zakaria, “Whatever Happened to Obama’s Pivot to Asia?” 

396. Dan Lamothe, “Russia Is Greatest Threat to the U.S., Says Joint Chiefs Chairman 

Nominee Gen. Joseph Dunford,” Washington Post, 9 July 2015. Accessed at: https://

www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/07/09/russia-is-greatestthreat-to-the-u-s-says-joint-chiefs-chairman-nominee-gen-joseph-dunford/; 

and David Lagrun and Laura Strum, “Russia Greatest Threat to U.S., Milley Tells 

Lawmakers,” 21 July 2015. Accessed at: http://www.army.mil/article/152619/

Russia_greatest_threat_to_US__Milley_tells_lawmakers/.
109

Howard and Duvall: The Asia Pivot

397. SOF’s traditional core activities include direct action, special reconnaissance, 

counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force 

assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian 

assistance, military information support activities, civil affairs, and countering 

weapons of mass destruction. Special Operations Forces Reference Manual: Fourth 

Edition, (MacDill AFB, FL: JSOU Press, 2015), 1-6.

398. Email exchange with David Maxwell, 28 May 2015.

399. Akritti Sethi, “What Happened to Obama’s Asia Pivot?” International Policy 

Digest, 23 November 2014. Accessed at: http://www.internationalpolicydigest.

org/2014/11/23/what-happened-to-obama-s-asia-pivot/.