FACING THE HYDRA:

MAINTAINING STRATEGIC BALANCE

WHILE PURSUING A GLOBAL WAR

AGAINST TERRORISM

Conrad C. Crane

May 2002
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ISBN 1-58487-091-5

ii
FOREWORD

As the global war on terrorism continues, members of

Congress and media pundits are starting to say that

American military forces are being stretched too thin by

far-flung commitments. While Bush administration

officials dispute this, they have expressed desires to reduce

peacekeeping commitments and reexamine the number of

overseas stations and deployments.

Dr. Conrad Crane analyzes the impact of the war on

terrorism and the requirements of the 2001 Quadrennial

Defense Review on the many essential missions conducted

by the U.S. Armed Forces. Focusing primarily on the Army,

he highlights the requirements associated with combat

operations against terrorists, accelerating transformation

and the new emphasis on homeland security and force

protection. At the same time, he points out that the Army

and the other Services must remain involved worldwide in

day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence activities;

execution of peace operations and other smaller-scale

contingencies; and remaining ready for other major combat

operations.

Dr. Crane asserts that these obligations require the

Army to reshape and expand its force structure. Failure to

do so places critical missions at risk around the world, and

could lead to replacement of operational “victory” in the war

on terrorism with strategic failure as regional instability

increases.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this

study as a contribution to the defeat of global terrorism.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

CONRAD C. CRANE joined the Strategic Studies Institute

in September 2000 after 26 years of military service that

concluded with 9 years as Professor of History at the U.S.

Military Academy. He has written or edited books on the

Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and

published articles on military issues in such journals as The

Journal of Strategic Studies, The Journal of Military

History, The Historian, and Aerospace Historian, as well as

in a number of collections and reference books. He holds a

B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy along with an M.A.

and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the

U.S. Army War College.

iv
SUMMARY

Arguments to maintain strategic balance while fighting

the global war on terrorism usually fall on receptive ears in

the Pentagon. Although some are ready to disengage

internationally to focus on fighting terrorists, most clearly

see the value of continuing activities that deter crises and

assist tremendously in the resolution of conflict when

deterrence fails. Fewer seem to realize that maintaining

strategic balance will require more than just better

guidance, planning, and training. Increased force

structure—accompanied by revisions in the makeup of that

structure and by reallocation between the Active and

Reserve Components—will be required to enable the

Services to win both operational and strategic victory in the

war on terrorism, while also keeping the peace in other

parts of the world.

Following the terrorist attacks on New York and

Washington, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

told the Army and the other services to focus their efforts on

conducting major combat operations, strengthening

homeland security and force protection, and accelerating

transformation. However, the Army must simultaneously

continue its operations along three other axes. It must

remain committed to day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and

deterrence activities around the world; sustain its

capability to execute peace operations and other

smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs); and remain ready to

conduct other major combat operations. If the Army fails in

these critical missions, operational “victory” in the war on

terrorism will be replaced by strategic failure as regional

instability increases around the world.

To meet its concurrent obligations, the Army will have to

reshape and expand its force structure. Several factors—

including an increase in the number of SSCs, which

highlighted shortfalls in the Active Component’s combat

v
support and combat service support force structure—were

stretching the Army operationally even before September

11. The new demands of homeland security, force

protection, and transformation acceleration will only

exacerbate the situation. Peace operations resulting from

the war will also require heavy engagement of Army forces,

no matter how involved they have been in combat

operations thus far. Although the Active Component may be

the first priority for expansion and reshaping, the Reserve

Components will also need to be reconfigured to provide

better support for homeland security; their roles in SSCs

and warfighting missions will have to be reexamined in

light of the new geostrategic environment. These changes

will require a reevaluation of Total Force policies that have

been in existence since the 1970s. To protect against

overcommitment of ground forces, further expansion of the

war against terrorism must be minimized, at least until

adequate forces are built up.

The Army must adapt to the changed circumstances of

September 11, but it cannot allow a focus on the battles

against terrorism to allow it to lose its perspective on the

broader strategic issues in play, particularly world-wide

engagement and transformation. The Army’s long-term

vision remains viable, and the course to reach it must be

maintained.

vi
FACING THE HYDRA:

MAINTAINING STRATEGIC BALANCE

WHILE PURSUING A GLOBAL WAR

AGAINST TERRORISM

The post-September 11 world may have added certain

missions to our national security agenda, but it hasn’t taken

any away.

Michael O’Hanlon1

While the opening quote adequately captures the

increased burden currently being placed on U.S. military

forces, Michael O’Hanlon does not have it completely right.

The terrorist attacks against New York and Washington did

not add mission areas to the security agenda; they just

expanded and reprioritized existing ones. That result is

evident in the recent Department of Defense (DoD)

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, which “places

new emphasis on the unique operational demands

associated with the defense of the United States and

restores the defense of the United States as the

Department’s primary mission.”2 The report also places

high priority on the ability to conduct major combat

operations today and on transforming the military services

for the future. While the QDR and recent military actions

have put the focus clearly on homeland security, the global

war on terrorism, and transformation, nothing has

decreased the importance of the Army’s other

pre-September 11 missions of peacekeeping, engagement,

and deterrence.

The dominant National Military Strategy paradigm of

the 1990s—“shape, respond, prepare”—has been replaced

in the QDR Report by a more specific and somewhat

narrower strategic framework: assuring allies, dissuading

military competition, deterring threats and coercion, and

decisively defeating adversaries.3 Along with its sister

1
Services, the Army is currently concentrating on decisively

defeating adversaries and even more narrowly on actions to

combat terrorists and those who support them. President

George W. Bush and his cabinet have been clear that this

will be a long struggle, however, and the Army must not

neglect its many other important missions during that time.

Victory over terrorism will be meaningless if it is not

accompanied by the preservation and spread of peace,

security, democracy, and free market ideas that those other

military missions support. Leaders must maintain a broad

strategic perspective and remain cognizant of the impact of

operations in the current war on how the Armed Services

execute their other responsibilities to protect the national

interests.

The QDR Report provides only limited specific guidance

on these other priorities, but they are essential for global

strategic success. Many in Congress have been frustrated

by the document’s absence of detailed recommendations,

and Army and Marine Corps planners have complained

about “a lack of emphasis—specificity—about the value of

land forces.” Critical operational goals listed for military

transformation emphasize the application of “high volume

precision strike” in great depth, and the most extensive

future missions envisioned for ground forces appear to be

defending bases of operations and the homeland.4 The QDR

Report deals primarily with issues concerning deterrence

and warfighting, mentions what the old framework called

“engagement” activities just within the context of security

cooperation, and only tangentially discusses smaller-scale

contingencies (SSCs) as part of a new force-sizing construct.

The words “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” do not

appear in the document. It is up to the senior Army leaders

to make the case for landpower as part of a balanced joint

force, and to point out the value of peace operations and

engagement activities in preventing and deterring conflict.

U.S. needs and interests require a broad and balanced

strategy that looks beyond the text of the QDR and current

operations in Afghanistan. O’Hanlon is correct that none of

2
the tasks which had strained military force structures

before September 11 have gone away. When the terrorists

attacked, the 10th Mountain Division was already planning

for deployments to Kosovo and Egypt. Soon it had elements

in five additional nations, including Afghanistan. The few

troops left behind at Fort Drum, New York, were scrambling

to maintain base security and retain combat readiness for

other missions.5 National Guard troops have been deployed

domestically and around the world to augment security

forces for significantly-expanded force protection

requirements, while at the same time preparing for

scheduled deployments to Bosnia and Kuwait. The Army is

not the only service feeling the strain. Combat air patrols

over American cities are exhausting airmen and equipment,

while the additional duties assumed by the Coast Guard

have stretched that organization to its limits and beyond.6

The Army will understandably place high priority on

contributing to winning the war against terrorism,

including augmenting homeland security and accelerating

transformation. However, the Service must simultaneously

conduct operations along three other axes. It must continue

its involvement in day-to-day assurance, dissuasion, and

deterrence activities around the world (previously known as

shaping and engagement); sustain its capability to conduct

peace operations and other smaller-scale contingencies; and

remain ready to conduct major combat operations. The

Army was already stretched by its operational tempo before

September 11; the new demands will only exacerbate that

situation. They must not be used as an excuse to divert the

Service from accomplishing its other essential missions.

Maintaining a balance to perform all these tasks with

acceptable risk will require reallocating assets between the

Active (AC) and Reserve Components (RC), as well as

creating additional force structure. It also should prompt a

reexamination of Total Force policies.

3
MAINTAINING BALANCE FOR STANDARD

MISSIONS

If we want to decrease the number of contingencies to which the

US is asked to send troops, we must aggressively pursue

engagement as a means of preventing such conflicts before they

happen.

Rep. Ike Skelton7

Assuring and Deterring.

Before examining the Army missions most expanded

and reprioritized by the QDR and the war on terrorism, it is

necessary to analyze the other important tasks that still

must be performed. The first of these involves normal

peacetime assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence missions.

Deterrence is very much a function of warfighting

capabilities, which will be discussed later, while assurance

and dissuasion have been heavily emphasized as part of

engagement tasks described in recent versions of American

National Security Strategy and National Military

Strategy.8

The Joint Strategic Planning System still requires

regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) to develop a

Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) to link regional activities

with national strategic objectives. Essential mission

categories addressed in the TEP include operations,

combined exercises, security assistance, combined training

and education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance,

and monitoring treaty obligations.9

The Army must not allow an increased emphasis on force

protection and other operations against terrorism to deflect

it from supporting the CINCs in their efforts to remain

engaged overseas. Through its 150,000 forward-stationed

and deployed soldiers, the Army provides over 60 percent of

America’s forces committed to the CINCs’ assurance,

dissuasion, and deterrence efforts.10 Often such involvement can shape the regional environment to prevent

4
conflicts or facilitate responses when they occur. The U.S.

ability to conduct current operations against Afghanistan

was aided considerably by 82nd Airborne Division and 10th

Mountain Division exercises with Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan in 1997 and 1998.11

Though the Bush administration showed an early

predilection to reduce forward military presence, it found

disengagement difficult, and “today the US global military

presence is perhaps more pervasive than ever.”12 Army

forces were deployed in 150 countries in Fiscal Year 2000,

and the pace has not slackened. The QDR Report advocates

even more overseas basing of troops to speed their

employment, facilitate security cooperation, maintain

“favorable regional balances,” and strengthen the nation’s

“forward deterrent posture.” It recognizes the need for

“steady-state levels of air, land, and naval presence in

critical regions around the world.”13 To support operations

in Afghanistan, the United States is creating an

infrastructure of new bases and political agreements that

will ensure an expanded American presence in Central Asia

for many years.14 The coalitions forming to combat different

aspects of terrorism include a number of new partners and

will provide even more opportunities for military-tomilitary contacts along with other assurance and security

cooperation activities.15 These will remain an especially

important responsibility for Army forces.

Neglect of this mission area will have serious

implications for the conduct of the National Security

Strategy envisioned by the QDR Report. Problems will

fester and lead to crises that could have been prevented or

defused in their early stages. The chance to gain or maintain

forward bases essential for rapid response will be lost. U.S.

leverage to influence regional governments and their

militaries will be lessened. Without an active American

presence, coalitions will be weakened and allies will feel

insecure. All of these repercussions will encourage military

competition and embolden potential adversaries.

5
Smaller-Scale Contingencies.

An important theme in Bush’s political campaign was

that he would avoid his predecessor’s error of bogging down

the American military in humanitarian interventions and

peacekeeping. However, before the end of his first year in

office, he had confirmed the vital importance of U.S.

involvement in the Balkans, and even deployed more troops

to Macedonia.16 Despite his professed aversion to

nation-building, he has also committed the United States to

financial support for the massive effort to rebuild

Afghanistan.17 Even before that announcement, Army

Special Forces soldiers had already started the process in

Kandahar, assisting residents with food and water supplies,

working to restore schools and police services, and making

recommendations that they knew would shape future

government policy. Reporters have noted that soldiers are

performing “the most public of the diplomatic missions in

the former combat zone... taking up the delicate task of

helping reconstruct a civic fabric.” Among the first U.S.

soldiers into liberated Mazar-I-Sharif was a civil affairs

detachment that immediately began revitalizing the local

hospital, and the 10th Mountain Division helped build a

new one there.18 The President has also announced that the

United States would help establish and train the Afghan

army and police force, which will assuredly require more

military commitments.19

If the war on terrorism spreads to other theaters, there

will be even more opportunities for the United States, and

especially its Army, to stabilize and rebuild countries and

societies that have spawned terrorism or been exploited by

its practitioners. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has

expressed his willingness to deploy American armed forces

to “15 more countries” if that is what it takes to combat

terror. Such actions usually have long-term military

implications.20 Historically, the Army has been America’s

primary tool to achieve any lasting impact from major

military deployments. The recent record highlights that,

6
when ground troops leave too quickly, as in Haiti or

Somalia, the situation soon reverts to the conditions that

initially required the intervention. In Bosnia and Kosovo,

stability and meaningful change are only possible if ground

troops remain.21

Consequently, one result of the global war on terrorism

will undoubtedly be to increase American involvement in

peace operations such as those in the Balkans. At the same

time, there is no sign that current peacekeeping missions

can go away without adverse strategic impacts.

Understanding this reality, the QDR Report states that

“these long-standing commitments will, in effect, become

part of the U.S. forward deterrent posture.”22 Unless

soldiers continue to perform security and nation-building

tasks in the Balkans, the recent increases in ethnic violence

can easily escalate again into full-scale war.23 The Bush

administration has reassured NATO allies that the United

States will not prematurely pull out of these Balkan

missions, although Rumsfeld has proposed reductions of all

peacekeepers in Bosnia “because the police work there has

begun to strain armies needed to fight terrorism.”24 He

would also like to withdraw American troops from the

multinational observer force in the Sinai Peninsula.25 These

peace operations remain very important for regional

stability. Even while the Army initiates new operations

against terrorism, it should be wary of any calls to endanger

these peacekeeping missions to provide resources for the

new war.

Even before September 11, however, Army force

structure was under severe strains from the demands of

peace operations. SSCs are particularly hard on certain

active duty “high demand/low density” units in the

Quartermaster and Transportation branches. Recent

deployments have revealed additional significant shortfalls

in Civil Affairs personnel and intelligence capabilities.

Extensions of the Balkan missions have highlighted more

inadequacies in the total available number of a variety of

other combat support (CS) and combat service support

7
(CSS) units that are distributed between AC and RC.

Excessive deployments for SSCs have also had a severe

impact on Reserve and National Guard units not

accustomed to such use.26 In addition, their availability for

support functions and active duty rotations will be severely

curtailed by the demands of force protection and homeland

security.

Future Army missions like those in Bosnia and Kosovo

should not be accepted lightly. However, there will be

times—even in the midst of the war against terrorism—

when national interests will require humanitarian

assistance, nation-building, and secure peace operations

that only American military forces can provide. Effective

and efficient “peace-building” efforts must remain an

important element of any national security strategy. The

current situation in Afghanistan highlights again that

post-conflict societies can become breeding grounds for

crime and terrorism if some sort of order is not imposed.

Influential members of Congress have already called for

American peacekeepers there, and major newspapers—

irrespective of their political inclinations—are advocating a

significant U.S. role in nation-building. One project they

have proposed is the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s “ring

road,” which is so vital to the restoration of trade. This task,

especially in such a precarious security environment, is

perfectly suited to the capabilities of the U.S. Army and its

engineers.27

To prevent peacekeeping assignments from dragging on

and tying up scarce assets, the Army and supporting

agencies must become better at nation-building. Though

the Bush administration, as well as the Army leadership,

remain reluctant to accept such a mission, long-term

solutions to create a more stable world will require the

United States to perform it. Only the Army—not the Air

Force, Navy, or Marines—can really do it in an environment

of questionable security. Success in stabilization operations

and strategic success in the war against terrorism will be

closely linked because of the cause-effect relationship that

8
exists between them. The Army should be daunted by—and

prepare for—the responsibilities it might assume to help

stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan and other countries after

bin Laden and his supporters are rooted out. This effort

should be accompanied by the development of appropriate

doctrine for such peace-building missions. Though the U.S.

burden in these operations can be lessened by relying as

much as possible on allied participation, there is no

substitute for the presence of ground forces from the most

powerful nation in the world to reassure friends, sustain

coalitions, and deter potential adversaries. If stability in a

region such as the Balkans is determined to be a vital

American interest, then it cannot be allowed to return to

chaos because of the distractions of the war on terrorism.

Months before September 11, the Center for Army

Analysis predicted the United States would face a future of

25 to 30 ongoing SSCs each month.28 Though it discusses

SSCs only briefly, the QDR Report does state “DoD will

ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces

and capabilities to ensure that it does not overstress

elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale

contingencies.” Achieving this goal will require modifying

the AC Army force structure, and will almost certainly

involve increasing its size. In a recent speech, Rumsfeld

admitted that the existence of low-density, high-demand

assets that have been so overworked by SSCs signified that

“our priorities were wrong, and we didn’t buy enough of

what we need.” He advocated adding them as part of his

transformation efforts.29 There is no reason still to have

such force shortfalls, and they must be addressed.

Major Combat Operations.

The Army must also retain its ability to deter and fight

other wars besides the global war on terrorism.

Cross-border wars of aggression are not the most likely type

of conflict predicted for the future, but they are certainly not

impossible and clearly require forces ready to fight them. In

9
fact, it is precisely because U.S. forces are so ready to fight

them that they are so unlikely. Even in the war on

terrorism, where major ground forces have initially had

only limited utility, they will still be essential if operations

expand to take on other states that support terrorism and

are more robust than Afghanistan. The most powerful

military force on the planet remains a joint force based

around a heavy corps, and these units must not be allowed

to atrophy. Cross border incursions remain a threat in Asia

and the Middle East. The Bush administration’s stern

warning to Iraq not to take advantage of America’s

concentration on terrorism would not be an effective

deterrent without the joint force, including landpower, to

back it up.

The primary focus of the QDR Report is on dissuading

and deterring potential adversaries from threatening the

interests of America and its allies, and on winning wars if

deterrence fails. The document’s new force-sizing paradigm

still envisions swiftly defeating attacks in two theaters of

operation in overlapping timeframes, but only one of those

campaigns will involve a decisive defeat including the

occupation of territory or a possible regime change.30

Combined with the perception of some Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials that the campaign in

Afghanistan was won by airpower and allies, this new

force-sizing construct has the potential to bring calls for a

reduction of heavy land combat forces.31 Critics may accept

the need to keep such forces for the decisive defeat, but will

argue for Army force structure cuts in the allocation for the

second conflict. However, the larger Army that fought and

won Operation DESERT STORM is already long gone. The

current active force is probably too small to fight a major

land war against a state like Iraq without even more

coalition landpower augmentation than was received in the

Gulf War. Additionally, adequate funding must be found to

modernize the legacy forces which will have to fight nearand mid-term wars.32 And the paradox of deterrence is that

the weaker a nation’s armed forces are perceived to be, the

10
more likely it is to have to employ them. In the long-run,

taking risk in this mission area has the most significant

impact on the ability of the United States to protect its

interests and achieve the goals outlined in the QDR Report.

MEETING EXPANDED REQUIREMENTS

The war on terrorism has more targets than the United States

has resources to fight at once.

Florida Times-Union editorial33

Winning the War against Terrorism.

The most important current mission for the Army is to

make the maximum possible contribution to winning the

war against terrorism. So far it has performed superbly as

part of a joint force in varied operations in distant theaters.

Special Forces have received widespread acclaim for their

courage and ingenuity in Afghanistan; they will garner even

more accolades for their subsequent deployment to the

Philippines. Troops from the 10th Mountain Division and

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) have established and

garrisoned new bases in numerous locations in Central

Asia. They have begun assuring and training new allies

while detaining and deterring old adversaries. III Corps

soldiers from Fort Hood, Texas, have been deployed for

long-term assignments, primarily to handle detainees, to

Afghanistan, Kuwait, Turkey, and Cuba. Military police

units in Guantanamo Bay have been augmented by

reservists for a mission the Corps Commander predicts will

last “for a long time, maybe forever.”34

Many commentators and administration spokesmen

have described a new method of warfare involving Special

Forces, airpower, and indigenous allies. This approach had

great initial operational success in Afghanistan, and might

be appropriate for the next stages of the war when applied in

similar circumstances in the Philippines, Yemen, or

Somalia. However, operations against those nations

11
described as an “axis of evil” by Bush—Iran, Iraq, and North

Korea—will undoubtedly require much more extensive

forces. The Army has already found it is running short of

Special Forces soldiers just to meet current requirements.35

Wherever the next operations are conducted, they are

certain to place a heavy load on the Army, if not for

significant combat operations, then certainly for peace

operations, assurance, and deterrence. Performing all these

missions well will be essential for strategic victory, and they

will not be easy or short in duration. Major General Richard

Cody, commander of the 101st Airborne, has described his

unit’s mission in Afghanistan as a “marathon,” a revealing

term that describes projections of both the level of effort and

time required.36 Strategic rationale may or may not exist for

spreading the war beyond Afghanistan. Until adequate

forces are available, though, the spread of the war on

terrorism should be limited or at least carefully controlled.

Homeland Security and the Total Force.

Not all key operations in the war against terrorism will

be conducted overseas. The greatest challenge that the QDR

Report poses for the Army’s maintenance of strategic

balance is in the document’s emphasis on homeland and

base security, and RC responsibilities for them. There

appears to be much confusion, and reluctance by both active

and reserve leaders, about assuming the military role in

this important mission. There have been disputes over a

new headquarters to control homeland defense forces.37

Secretary of the Army Thomas White, Interim DoD

Executive Agent for Homeland Security, stated that he

expected the armed services to “work themselves out of a

job” as civilian agencies build up their own capabilities.38

Lieutenant General Russell Davis, Chief of the National

Guard Bureau, warned that reconfiguring his forces to

perform Homeland Security would endanger the Total

Force standard and reduce the strategic reserve.39

12
This multifaceted mission is not one that the Army, or its

RC, can—or should—avoid. Failure will leave the homeland

and bases vulnerable to terrorists, and threaten the nation’s

ability to support and sustain every other mission. Some of

the impact of new requirements on the RC is already

apparent. Sixteen percent of Virginia’s National Guard has

been called to active duty for up to 2 years. They are flying

combat air patrols and guarding airports, nuclear power

plants, and federal installations.4 0 Base security

requirements have increased worldwide. Over 1,000 Illinois

National Guardsmen have been activated for at least 9

months to protect U.S. installations in Europe.41 Other

Guardsmen are manning entry gates at posts throughout

the continental United States.42 By the end of January

2002, over 80,000 RC troops had been called to duty, and

more were slated to be deployed to augment civilian

agencies securing U.S. borders.43 This is only the beginning

of a long-term commitment to homeland defense, which only

adds to the existing responsibilities for consequence

management. If these missions remain with the RC, that

will seriously compromise their ability to support a major

theater war. If more of the RC is committed to duties at

home, deployment schedules for the Balkans could also be

affected, increasing the burden on active forces for

peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. The shortage of

CS/CSS assets in the AC that was revealed by the demands

of SSCs during the 1990s has been exacerbated even more

by the new security situation. This has had a significant

impact on the Army Reserve. The demands of homeland

defense, as well as other missions for the war on terrorism,

are now causing considerable strain for high demand

Reservists like mortuary affairs units, chemical and

biological defense specialists, truck companies,

psychological operations detachments, intelligence experts,

and civil affairs detachments. Lieutenant General Thomas

Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve, concedes that the active

Army is too small and needs augmentation in these

overworked specialties.44 Rumsfeld’s determination to

increase the number of such units has been mentioned

13
earlier. The growing requirements for homeland security

have also highlighted significant shortcomings in the

structure and training of the RC. To meet the expectations

of the QDR Report and the needs of the nation, the RC will

need to be overhauled. A number of studies have advocated

the creation of a major continental air defense system like

the Nike Hercules batteries that spanned the nation in the

1960s, and which also included RC units.45 The QDR Report

instructs DoD to bolster its ability to work with other

homeland security organizations, and to “place new

emphasis upon counter terrorism training across federal,

state, and local first responders,” drawing on RC

capabilities.46 National Guard leaders recognize that their

organization will need to be reconfigured if they are given

the homeland security mission, and will have to relinquish

“units that are not as relevant.”47 Additionally, some hard

choices will need to be made about who serves in those RC

units most likely to be called up for homeland duties. A large

number of citizen-soldiers today come from the public safety

sector, and taking trained first responders away from local

fire and police departments degrades their essential

capability.48

This process of realigning the RC will also necessitate a

reexamination of Total Force policies initiated when

General Creighton Abrams was Chief of Staff of the Army in

1973. He commanded a force undergoing a traumatic

transition. Facing a significant drawdown and the shift to

an all-volunteer armed force, Abrams’ primary goals were to

establish an active force structure that maintained 16

division flags, while also increasing the readiness of the

Reserve Components. He had extensive experience with the

Reserves and wanted to tailor their responsibilities better to

match capabilities. His subordinates later claimed that he

also had a long-term vision to ensure that no president could

ever again fight another Vietnam without mobilization, but

that is not clear from available documents. Whatever his

intent, Abrams and his staff began to integrate reserves into

the force structure so that no major deployment would be

14
possible without them, not only ensuring that these units

would be available in a major conflict, but also that any

president desiring to employ large forces would have to

garner the necessary political backing from a country

unified enough to support the call up of the reserves

necessary to sustain the operation.49

One impact of this approach could be seen in the debates

over the Reserve deployment for Operation DESERT

STORM. However, Total Force policies did not limit

presidential initiative during the rest of the 1990s, and

instead have caused considerable strain in often-deployed

reserve units. It is apparent from the documentary evidence

that Abrams’ primary motivations for reorganizing Army

force structure were to preserve divisions in the AC and

assign optimum missions to the RC. The latter rationale is

particularly applicable to current Homeland Security

requirements. The increasing emphasis on rapid

employment, forward basing, and transformational

technology will reduce the utility of RC organizations in

future major combat operations overseas, but will have less

effect on their employment at home. Assigning such

responsibilities to the RC will require analysis and

adjustment of mobilization plans, but that does not mean

the end of the Total Force. Many aspects of homeland

security will require a full-time commitment best provided

by active duty forces, so both components will have to

remain integrated at home. And RC augmentation will still

be viable for the later stages of extended major combat

operations and SSCs.

Davis’ warnings mentioned earlier were in response to

proposals by defense analysts like Daniel Gouré, who

advocates that the Army must be able to win the first major

theater war of the new force-sizing paradigm without

having to rely on RC augmentation.50 This idea actually

deserves serious consideration, and not just because of the

responsibilities of homeland security. As mentioned above,

emerging operational concepts like “Rapid Decisive

Operations,” as well as the QDR Report itself, emphasize

15
the need for speedy response to crises with agile forces,

many of them forward-deployed. Waiting for RC

reinforcement will make that ideal impossible to achieve.

Even before the emergence of these new concepts, it would

have been extremely difficult for some RC units to meet

planners’ mobilization expectations.51 It might still be

possible to rely on RC augmentation for the later stages of

major contingencies, especially for follow-on combat forces,

but some CS/CSS shifts to the AC are undoubtedly

necessary.

Transforming the Force.

While the Army must continue to emphasize the

importance of a balanced joint force ready to fight and deter

wars today, it must also simultaneously maintain its focus

on long-term transformation. The evolving requirements of

the war against terrorism will highlight even more the

necessity for lighter, smarter, and more agile forces. As

originally conceived, transformation was to prepare the

Army for future wars. Transformation now needs to be

shaped by the new geostrategic focus on terrorism and then

accelerated to allow the new capabilities to bring increased

levels of effectiveness to the war against terror.

There are signs that this acceleration has already begun.

The Army leadership has shifted spending priorities,

announced a plan to streamline its headquarters, and

moved up the fielding date for the Objective Force.

Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White wrote in a memo

accompanying the annual Program Objective

Memorandum to OSD that the Army was transitioning “to a

force postured to fight a global war on terrorism.” Planners

are also considering increasing the number of Interim

Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) to be fielded, even at the

cost of delaying the modernization of current heavy forces.52

The QDR Report provides additional impetus to this

drive for reform. It announces, “Transformation is at the

heart” of the new defense strategy. Though the operational

16
goals described in the report are vague concerning the

contributions of landpower, the Army is directed to

accelerate the introduction of its IBCTs, as well as to

enhance ground force capabilities in the Persian Gulf. The

report recognizes that additional funding will be required to

meet these objectives because of the markedly-increased

requirements already resulting from the war against

terrorism. 5 3 Rumsfeld has even made military

transformation a higher budget priority with its own

separate Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). However,

the Army may have its work cut out for it to take advantage

of this PDM, since it emphasizes new technologies for

stand-off precision attack, missile defense, and information

operations.54 But the Service must stay the course and

achieve its goals. Otherwise it risks being unprepared for

future threats, losing its advantage on the battlefield, and

becoming less relevant to the protection of the nation and its

interests.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Recommendations.

1. The Army must not allow the demands of homeland

security, force protection, and the war on terrorism to

detract from the other global missions that deter new crises

and facilitate response when deterrence fails.

2. The Army should embrace homeland security and

peace operations—including some nation-building—as

important Service missions, and prepare for increased

amounts of these tasks, especially in peacekeeping, as the

war on terror continues.

3. Until adequate forces are available, the spread of the

war should be minimized as much as possible to avoid

overcommitment, especially by accumulation of postconflict responsibilities.

17
4. The Army needs to increase its active force

structure—and probably its total force structure—to meet

expanding mission requirements.

5. The Army needs to reexamine Total Force policies and

restructure the RC to provide better support for the Army’s

homeland security, SSC, and warfighting missions.

6. Army transformation should be accelerated to prepare

the force better for the next phases of the current war and

future threats.

Conclusions.

The war against terrorism is only one of many essential

missions the Army must perform. It must be very forthright

with Congress and the Bush administration about the

additional forces needed to conduct its myriad of important

duties. The Army Staff should immediately develop plans

and gather support to begin the process of expanding and

restructuring the Total Force. Recruiting, training, and

equipping new soldiers and units will take years. While

large scale Army Reserve and Army National Guard

mobilization and some limited economy of force efforts

might suffice in the short term to meet Army requirements,

these arrangements cannot be maintained for a long period

without debilitating the force and raising the risk for

long-term missions.

In summary, maintaining strategic balance will require

more than just better guidance, planning, and training.

Increased force structure—accompanied by revisions in the

makeup of that structure and by reallocation between the

AC and RC—will be necessary to enhance the Army’s ability

to fight the war against terrorism while also keeping the

peace in other areas. The simultaneous and ongoing

demands for homeland security, anti-terrorist strikes,

peace operations, and deterring war will require more land

forces, especially in the AC, and mostly in the areas of CS,

CSS, and Special Operations Forces.55 Increasing

18
intelligence assets will be especially crucial. Forces will

need to be reapportioned between the AC and RC. RC units

will have to be reconfigured to handle new and existing

long-term requirements. At the same time, the Army cannot

become so focused on current operations that the

momentum and direction of transformation are lost. The

world changed on September 11, 2001, and the Army must

adjust accordingly. But its long-term vision remains viable,

and the course to reach it must be maintained.

ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Brad Knickerbocker, “War May Prod Military

Reforms,” Christian Science Monitor, January 3, 2002, p. 1.

2. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 30, 2001, p. 17

(hereafter QDR Report).

3. QDR Report, pp. 11-13. The old paradigm was broader in its

emphasis on varied engagement activities and training.

4. Ibid., p. 30; Gail Kaufman, Jason Sherman, and Amy Svitak,

“Pentagon Delays Hard Choices,” Defense News, October 1-7, 2001, p. 1;

Christian Lowe, “Did QDR Slight The Corps?” Marine Corps Times,

October 22, 2001, p. 22.

5. David Wood, “Army Post Quiet As Troops Deploy,” New Orleans

Times-Picayune, January 13, 2002, p. 28.

6. “National Guard Troops Heading To Kuwait,” Wisconsin State

Journal, January 20, 2002; Adam J. Hebert, “DOD Weighs Air Defense

Options As Patrols Become Unsupportable,” Inside the Air Force,

January 25, 2002, p. 1; Dennis O’Brien, “Coast Guard Is Pushed To The

Limit,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 10, 2002.

7. Kim Burger, “US Finds Force Disengagement Difficult,” Jane’s

Defense Weekly, September 12, 2001.

8. See for instance the 1997 National Military Strategy, Shape,

Respond, Prepare Now—A Military Strategy for a New Era, and the

2000 National Security Strategy, A National Security Strategy for a

Global Age.

19
9. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Theater Engagement

Planning,” Manual 3113.01A, May 31, 2000.

10. Association of the United States Army, The Research,

Development and Acquisition “Death Spiral”: Future Readiness at Risk,

Washington, DC: Institute of Land Warfare, October 2000, p. 5.

11. J. S. Newton, “Terrain is Familiar for 82nd,” Fayetteville

Observer, October 9, 2001.

12. Peter Grier, “A Reluctant Empire Stretches More,” Christian

Science Monitor, January 17, 2002, p. 1.

13. QDR Report, pp. 14-15, 20-21.

14. Grier.

15. Associated Press, “U.S. Expands Military Ties Worldwide,”

January 15, 2002,http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,43019,00. html.

16. “Mission Creep: That’s Good,” Los Angeles Times, September 2,

2001.

17. Howard LaFranchi, “US To Help ‘Nation-Build’ in Afghanistan,”

Christian Science Monitor, December 18, 2001, p. 2; “Bush Reverses

Stance on Foreign Policy,” Fox News Channel Politics, December 27,

2001, at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,41632,00.html; Don

Feder, “Hazards of Nation-Building,” Washington Times, December 28,

2001, p. 16.

18. Susan Sevareid, “Elite Troops Scout Foes, Intelligence,”

Washington Times, January 9, 2002, p. 11; Thom Shankar, “The Stripes

Are On Their Sleeves, Not Their Pants,” New York Times, January 13,

2002; Liam Pleven, ”U.S. Troops Help Restore Services,” Long Island

Newsday, December 11, 2001; Chris Iven, “10th Mountain Division

Works in Mazar-E-Sharif,” Syracuse Post-Standard, January 12, 2002,

p. 1.

19. Karen DeYoung, “Bush Says U.S. Will Help Train Afghan Army,

Police,” Washington Post, January 29, 2002, p. 8.

20. Tom Infield, “Rumsfeld: Forces Should Go Where Terrorism

Fight Is,” Philadelphia Inquirer, January 17, 2002.

21. Conrad Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions

in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2001, p. 8.

20
22. QDR Report, p. 21.

23. Sandra Jontz, “Soldiers From Camp Comanche Patrol

Republika Srpska With Personal Touch,” European Stars and Stripes,

August 20, 2001; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Rule of Law is Elusive in Kosovo,”

Washington Post, July 29, 2001, p. 1; Doug Bandow, “Kosovo

Deployment With No End In Sight?” Washington Times, August 4, 2001,

p. 10; David Kasar, “KFOR Perplexed as Ethnic Strife Returns,”

European Stars and Stripes, August 13, 2001.

24. “No, They’re Not Incompatible,” The Economist, August 18-24,

2001; Sally Buzbee, “Rumsfeld Seeks Peacekeeper Cuts,” Washington

Times, December 19, 2001, p. 15.

25. Esther Schrader, “Rumsfeld Seeks Pullout of U.S. Forces From

Sinai,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 2002.

26. Crane, pp. 27-30.

27. Mark Landler, “United States Should Join Peacekeepers, Biden

Says,” New York Times, January 13, 2002; Miles Pomper, “Members

Return From Afghanistan Urging Greater Postwar U.S. Role,”

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, January 19, 2002, p. 193; “The

Challenge in Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 5, 2002; “Winning

the Peace,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2002. The ring road is the

traditional route linking key Afghan cities.

28. Center for Army Analysis, “Stochastic Analysis of Resources for

Deployments and Excursions: A Historical Perspective,” December

2000.

29. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Remarks on Defense

Transformation,” Washington, DC: National Defense University,

January 31, 2002.

30. QDR Report, p. 21.

31. Neil Baumgardner, “Army Gearing Up To Defend Force

Structure,” Defense Daily, January 7, 2002, p. 3.

32. Sean Naylor and Jason Sherman, “Terror War Forces New

Paradigm,” Defense News, October 22-28, 2001, p. 1.

33. “Iraq: Second Thoughts,” Florida Times-Union, February 8,

2002.

21
34. Kevin J. Dwyer, “Guantanamo Bay Mission Long Term For III

Corps Units,” Killeen Daily Herald, January 16, 2002; David Wood,

“Army Takes On Unusual Chore Of Indefinite Postwar Detention Of

Enemy,” Newshouse News Service at Newshouse.com, February 7,

2002.

35. Rom Martz, “Wanted: Special Forces,” Atlanta Journal and

Constitution, January 22, 2002.

36. César G. Soriano, “General: Mission Will Be ‘Marathon’,” USA

Today, February 6, 2002, p. 8.

37. Elaine M. Grossman, “Military is Embroiled in Debate Over

Who Should Guard United States,” Inside the Pentagon, September 20,

2001, p. 1; and “Rumsfeld Envisions New Command Responsible For

Homeland Security,” Inside the Pentagon, January 17, 2002, p. 1.

38. Dale Eisman, “Military Wants to Phase Out of Homeland

Security Role,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, October 27, 2001.

39. Lieutenant General Russell C. Davis, “NGAUS Executive

Council Remarks CNGB,” November 17, 2001, http://www.ngb.

dtic.mil/chief/speeches/11_17_01_ngaus-exec_davis.shtml.

40. Jack Dorsey, “State’s Guard Duties Take on New Importance

Since Sept. 11,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 11, 2001.

41. Richard Wronski, “Guard Heads to Europe,” Chicago Tribune,

January 8, 2002.

42. Wayne Hall, “Guardsmen Reinforce Point Security,” The Times

Herald-Record, December 18, 2001; Terry Joyce, “Lowcountry

Guardsmen Protect Ga. Base,” Charleston Post and Courier, February

11, 2002.

43. Abraham McLaughlin, “US Guard Call-Up Hits Cities Hard,”

Christian Science Monitor, January 28, 2002, p. 1; Elaine M. Grossman,

“National Guard Troops To Aid Civilian Agencies In Securing U.S.

Borders,” Inside the Pentagon, January 31, 2002, p. 1.

44. Harry Levins, “Shortage of Personnel in Active Army Puts

Squeeze on Reserves,”St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 27, 2001, p. 10.

45. See, for instance, The Heritage Foundation Homeland Security

Task Force, Defending the American Homeland, Washington, DC:

Heritage Foundation, January 2002.

22
46. QDR Report, p. 19.

47. Erin Q. Winograd, “Officials: Homeland Defense Mission Will

Mean Changes For the Guard,” Inside The Army, November 19, 2001, p.

1; Bryan Bender, “National Guard Faces Drastic Overhaul,” Boston

Globe, November 20, 2001, p. 12.

48. Kris Axtman, “Call-Up Of Reserves Leaves Gaps In Many Police

Forces,” Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2001; McLaughlin.

49. Interview of Lieutenant General Donald Coles by Lieutenant

Colonels Albin G. Wheeler and Ronald E. Craven; and Interview of

General James G. Kalergis by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Lightner, both in

“The General Creighton Abrams Story” files, The Papers of Creighton

Abrams, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute

(USAMHI); Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and

The Army of His Times, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992, pp.

350-368. Sorley is convinced that Abrams intended from the start to

limit presidential power, but that objective is not mentioned in

contemporary documents or interviews in the Abrams Papers at

USAMHI. That motivation was not mentioned by any of his

subordinates until the 1980s.

50. Daniel Gouré, “Strategic Reality Requires New Force

Structure,” Defense News, November 12-18, 2001, p. 21.

51. Interview with Lieutenant General John Riggs, currently

director of the Objective Force Task Force and former commander of the

First U.S. Army, at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA,

January 28, 2002.

52. Sean Naylor, “Army Leaders Consider Speeding Up Plans For

Transformation,” Army Times, October 29, 2001, p. 18; “Objective Force

Must Be Deployed By Decade’s End, Army Official Says,” Aerospace

Daily, November 9, 2001.

53. QDR Report, pp. 16, 27, 29-48.

54. Amy Svitak, “Rumsfeld Gives U.S. Transformation Its Own

Spending Plan,” Defense News, January 14-20, 2002, p. 3.

55. However, it will be difficult to expand SOF very quickly because

of the time and effort required to develop and train such soldiers. In the

meantime, SOF missions will have to be carefully controlled, or ways

must be found to utilize regular forces instead.

23
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell