REFINING AMERICAN STRATEGY IN AFRICA

Steven Metz

February 2000
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

The author would like to thank Ambassador Daniel Simpson,

Ambassador Marshall McCallie, Tony Marley, Scott Fisher, Herb Howe,

Jeffrey Hill, Jeffrey Herbst, David Bennett, Peter Blay, and,

particularly, Dan Henk (his mentor and frequent traveling companion

across Africa) for useful suggestions on earlier versions of this

manuscript or the ideas included in it. All flaws which remain do so

despite their efforts.

*****

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forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report

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ISBN 1-58487-014-1

ii
FOREWORD

Traditionally, the United States has not been a major

player in the security environment of Sub-Saharan Africa,

relying instead on European nations to provide outside

assistance to African states. Today, it is appropriate to

rethink this neglect. Africa is undergoing vast political,

social, and economic changes. A consistent and welldesigned American strategy in the region could help tilt the

scales in favor of security and stability.

In this study, Dr. Steven Metz provides a broad overview

of the African security environment as a basis for

recommendations on the refinement of American strategy

in that region. He assesses both the opportunities for

positive change which exist today, and the obstacles. While

only Africans themselves can determine the future of their

region, an American strategy which discourages proxy

aggression, encourages private initiatives in the economic

and political spheres, and uses the U.S. military,

particularly the Army, to engage its African counterparts

could pay great dividends.

American defense strategy calls for using the military to

help shape the global security environment, preempting

and deterring conflict and building regional mechanisms for

security. This is a particularly wise approach to SubSaharan Africa. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased

to offer this study as part of the ongoing debate over how the

U.S. military can best contribute to the mission of shaping

the security environment.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. STEVEN METZ has been Research Professor of

National Security Affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute

since 1993. Prior to that, he served on the faculty of the Air

War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, and several universities. He has also served as an

advisor to U.S. political organizations and campaigns,

testified in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives,

and spoken on military and security issues around the

world. He is author of more than seventy articles, essays,

and chapters on such topics as nuclear war, insurgency,

U.S. policy in the Third World, military strategy, South

African security policy, and United Nations peace

operations. Dr. Metz’s current research deals with the role

of the American Army in the 21st century, the African

security environment, and the effect of the information

revolution on military strategy. He holds a B.A. in

Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies from the

University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political

Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

iv
REFINING AMERICAN STRATEGY IN AFRICA

Introduction.

Amani iwe kwenu. This Swahili benediction, which

means “may peace be with you,” is an appealing thought but

remains only a dream for Sub-Saharan Africa. At the

beginning of the 21st century, that region is characterized

by increasing violence and instability as governments,

facing the pressures of globalization and the information

revolution, lose the ability to control pent-up discontent. In

states with relatively strong economies and civil societies,

this has sparked pressure for increased government

accountability and popular participation. In less resilient

states, the devolution of state power has led to collapse,

fragmentation, and violence. Some, like Somalia, Sierra

Leone, and Liberia, tumbled into near-anarchy. Others

have spent years trying to wrest control of their hinterlands

from rebel warlords. As a result, Africa entered the 21st

century the most war-torn region on earth.

1

Facing thunderstorms of violence and diminishing

interest by outside powers, Africa’s leaders have attempted

to forge some sort of new, post-Cold War strategic

framework. This has renewed the search for “African

solutions to African problems.” Because of the great value

that African culture places on collective action, the most

tangible gains have come from building on existing

structures. Regional economic organizations such as the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),

the Southern African Development Community (SADC),

and, to a lesser extent, the East African Community (EAC)

have assumed security functions, in part to compensate for

the weaknesses of the continent-wide Organization of

African Unity (OAU).

But every step forward brings one backwards. At the

same time that the region’s leaders attempt to build a new

1
strategic framework, they seem to have lost any inhibition

on intervention in neighboring states. The old dictum that

“the enemy of my enemy is my friend” dominates the

security policy of African states. Proxy conflict is the coin of

the realm. And security policy—like politics in general—

remains personalized. Animosities among the region’s

leaders shape the strategic environment as much as

national interests. Positive and negative trends in Africa

remain locked in a fragile counterpoise. In coming years the

continent could go either way, slipping into greater violence

or slowly moving toward greater stability. For the United

States, this creates a moment of opportunity when wise

strategy could bring great benefits.

Admittedly, Africa is a not a top priority for the United

States. The 1998 National Security Strategy of the United

States lists Africa last among the world’s regions.

2

 This is

not coincidence. As a 1995 report by the Department of

Defense notes, “America’s security interests are very

limited.”

3

 The tendency is thus to relegate Africa to the

periphery of American strategy, to accord it our second-best

efforts, or to ignore it entirely.

4

 But to do so risks letting

substantial opportunities fade away. This would not be

wise. After all, the United States does have strategic

concerns in Sub-Saharan Africa. Serious transnational

threats emanate from the region including state-sponsored

terrorism, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferation,

international crime, environmental damage, and pandemic

disease.

5

 Nigerian organized crime groups are heavily

involved in the global heroin trade, and South Africa,

Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire are becoming important

transshipment points for drugs.

6

 And Africa is the scene of

recurrent humanitarian disasters, often as a result of

armed conflict. To ignore them detracts from the humanity

of all who have it in their power to respond, and pushes the

sort of world order that Americans seek a little further

away. In addition, economic opportunities in Africa are

growing. By volume, about 14 percent of U.S. crude oil

imports come from Africa (compared to 18 percent from the

2
Middle East).

7

 While U.S. exports to Sub-Saharan Africa

account for less than 1 percent of U.S. exports, they do

exceed those to the former Soviet Union and currently

account for 100,000 U.S. jobs.

8

 Direct investment is also

increasing.

9

This suggests that the United States should remain

engaged in Africa but do so in a way that generates the

maximum effectiveness from every effort. Clearly

promotion of political and economic reform must be at the

center of American policy. But security cannot be

overlooked. Democracy and development require security

which is in short supply across Africa. To assist African

states in building a more secure region, the United States

must promote improved civil-military relations, help with

the professionalization of African militaries, and assist with

the construction of regional structures to prevent or resolve

conflict. This is a tall order. The American public and its

elected leaders have little understanding of or concern for

Africa. Those who craft and implement American policy face

a constant struggle to sustain interest and obtain the

resources necessary to influence the region. This means

that the maximum impact must be derived from every

program and effort: American strategy in Africa must be

both creative and careful. The Clinton administration has

laid the foundation for success. To seize the region’s

opportunities, this must now be refined. The U.S. military— 

particularly the Army—can play a vital part.

The Players.

The African security environment may be the most

complex on earth, with a sometimes bewildering array of

actors, shifting affiliations, and unique characteristics. It is

a series of interlinked systems and groupings. Two divisions

are particularly relevant. First is the subregional one, with

overlapping but discernible western, eastern, central, and

southern sections. Of these, the western and southern are

the most coherent as political groupings. And, both are

centered around major regional powers (Nigeria and South

3
Africa). Both have important regional economic

organizations (ECOWAS and SADC) which have experience

with regional peace enforcement or stability operations.

10

The second grouping is linguistic, with Anglophone and

Francophone blocs (and, to a lesser extent, some degree of

Lusophone solidarity).

11

Both states and non-state organizations play a

significant role in African security. In the near term,

Nigeria and South Africa are the most powerful states due

to size and, in the case of South Africa, level of development.

For other African nations, political influence tends to reflect

the charisma, reputation, and domestic power base of the

leader. Exogenous states are also important in the African

security environment, particularly the United States,

France, and the United Kingdom. While France was one of

the most influential external actors in Africa from the 1960s

through the 1990s, its enthusiasm is waning. Many

analysts—particularly in France itself—argue that Paris’

association with the former regimes in Rwanda and

Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo eroded French

influence and increased the leverage of the United States.

12

This has led to rather significant changes in French policy.

During the summer of 1997, for instance, Paris announced a

40 percent cut-back in its military presence in Africa.

13

Among Francophone African militaries, the perception of

French decline has led to a desire to build closer ties with the

United States, particularly, the U.S. military.

14

 Portugal

has implemented a few security cooperation programs with

its former colonies like Angola.

15

 And, some African states

actively seek ties with non-traditional partners such as

Saudi Arabia, North Korea, and Iran.

16

International organizations in general play a larger role

in Africa than in most other regions of the world. The OAU

has the potential to be very significant but remains

ineffective. The OAU was founded in 1963, in part, to

protect fragile, new sovereignties. Its charter did not

envision intervention in the sort of internal struggles that

characterize Africa today. The OAU is hamstrung by a

4
structure which allocates nearly all power to summits of the

member nations’ heads of state. Personal and ideological

animosities among these heads of state often create

problems (and nearly tore the OAU apart in the 1980s).

17

The OAU’s first attempt at peacekeeping in Chad in the

early 1980s was widely viewed in Africa as an embarrassing

failure.

18

 The OAU did provide observers following the

negotiated settlement of disputes such as Rwanda (1992-93)

and Burundi (1993-96) but remains reluctant to undertake

peace enforcement, particularly in intrastate conflicts.

19

Absent fundamental structural change, the OAU could

succeed at small-scale, permissive peace operations where

consensus exists among the competing factions, but is

unable to organize peace enforcement operations or stop

armed conflict between member states.

20

 Because of the

shortcomings of the OAU, the United Nations (U.N.) has

long been involved in Africa. The Congo Crisis of the early

1960s, for instance, was the U.N.’s first attempt at peace

enforcement. And, now led by its second African secretarygeneral in a row, the U.N. works hard to focus world

attention on African problems.

21

 Over the mid-term, at

least, any major peacekeeping or peace enforcement

activities in Africa which involve outside support are likely

to be U.N. operations or, at least, conducted with a clear

U.N. mandate.

Subregional international organizations have been a

feature of Africa’s political landscape for decades. Most

began as mechanisms for economic cooperation. Recently,

the trend has been toward the expansion of economic

subregional organizations into the security realm. SADC,

for instance, created a formal organ for defense, politics, and

security in 1996.

22

 In September 1998, this was used to

justify an intervention into Lesotho by troops from South

Africa and Botswana (at the invitation Prime Minister

Pakalitha Mosisili).

23

 ECOWAS entered the security arena

with the dispatch of multinational peacekeepers to Liberia

in 1990. In 1999 it moved even further into the security field

by establishing a Mediation and Security Council, a

5
multinational stand-by force, and several Zonal Observation bureaus.

24

 Like SADC, ECOWAS is more an unequal

coalition of a major regional power—Nigeria in this

case—assisted by smaller states than a true gathering of

equals. It has been seen by some other African nations as

simply cover for the spread of Nigerian influence.

25

 Today

there are signs that the East African Community (EAC)

may follow SADC and ECOWAS by moving from a purely

economic organization to one which at least encourages

security cooperation among its members.

These multinational interventions under the aegis of

subregional organizations signaled a major change in the

African security environment. In the past, outsiders

sometimes intervened to eliminate undesired regimes or

protect endangered friends; now Africans do it themselves.

But in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Democratic

Republic of the Congo, and Lesotho, African states learned

that their region’s internal conflicts are extraordinarily

complex and often expensive in both blood and money.

26

 It

remains to be seen whether subregional organizations—

which do provide a degree of legitimacy for intervention—

can be more successful at conflict prevention and resolution

rather than simply intervention.

Financial and monetary organizations like the World

Bank, African Development Bank, and the International

Monetary Fund indirectly affect African security. Austerity

programs or decisions to deny assistance can destabilize

African states and stoke insecurity, particularly when

tension is already high. Foreign or multinational

corporations can play similar roles. While charges that

Western corporations cause or manipulate African violence

for their own ends are almost always overstatements,

corporate decisions, like those of international economic

organizations, can overturn governments and pave the way

for violence. For instance, the drying up of foreign aid,

investment, and lending led to the downfall of Mobutu Sese

Seko in Zaire by removing the fuel for his extensive

patronage system. This is one of the key contradictions of

6
security in Africa: patronage is often the main basis for

stability, but economic growth is contingent on reform

which undercuts patronage and corruption. This puts

Africa’s old-fashioned “strong men” in unwinnable

situations. If they resist reform, eventually pressure from

below will become unbearable. But if they undertake

serious reform, they lose their patronage-based support.

Transnational or international humanitarian relief

organizations (HROs) and foreign missionary groups also

play important roles in Africa, particularly in addressing

the suffering associated with conflict. The need to establish

links with them has added a new twist to American strategy

in Africa.

27

 In the past, HROs were suspicious of all armed

forces and tried to keep the greatest possible distance from

them. Today, the various warlord and militia leaders who

stoke violence in Africa often target or coerce HROs, forcing

the relief organizations to seek protection from military

forces. And, finally, the international media helps mobilize

world public opinion for involvement in the resolution of

African crises and the amelioration of human disasters.

Often, the less vital the American interests in a region, the

greater the role the media plays in defining humanitarian

concerns and shaping strategy. This certainly holds for

Africa.

The Security Environment.

In the broadest sense, the African security environment

is shaped by the comparative weakness of the states which

compose it.

28

 Sub-Saharan Africa is the region where the

nation-state’s “roots are shallowest.”

29

 Many African

nations face internal separatist or rebel movements. Most of

these are essentially competitors with the state for wealth

and political power—which tend to be coterminous in

Africa—but use regional, ethnic, or religious differences to

mobilize support. Some of the more powerful rebel

movements like Jonas Savimbi’s Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA) or John Garang’s Sudan

People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) control and administer

7
territory and take on the trappings of a state, with budgets

derived from smuggling and “taxation” of multinational

corporations, “diplomatic” relations with outsiders, and

worldwide campaigns to mobilize political and financial

support. Most of Africa’s geographically large states like

Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola are

more titular states than real ones. Politically, culturally,

and economically, the subregions of these large states are

more disparate than unified.

Given the weakness of political institutions, personality

plays a larger role in African affairs than in any other region

of the world. Often, interstate cooperation or antagonisms

reflect relations between individual heads of state rather

than national interests. Nowhere was that clearer than in

1996-97 war in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo, as

many African leaders seized the opportunity to strike at

Mobutu in revenge for his support of their enemies in the

past. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame,

and Angola’s Jose Dos Santos (among others) provided vital

support to the rebels. During the initial stages of the war,

South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Kenya’s President

Daniel Arap Moi attempted to mediate. Because of personal

animosities, Moi excluded rebel leader Kabila, which

virtually guaranteed failure.

Despite widespread rhetorical support for territorial

integrity and the inviolability of the borders inherited at the

time of independence, most African borders are permeable,

with only sporadic or weak control of the flow of people and

goods from country to country. This blurs the distinction

between external and internal security problems. Violence

often pits an insurgent or secessionist movement against

the central government or, increasingly, ethnic militias

against governments or other groups. Many of these

conflicts generate substantial refugee flows, thus turning

internal violence into an international problem. Since

refugees can overwhelm or distract opponents and attract

international attention, antagonists in a conflict sometimes

deliberately create or exacerbate refugee problems. Food

8
and medical care become weapons. Those who control them

have wealth and power; those who do not are weak. U.N.

agency support often conveys a degree of legitimacy to

insurgent movements so they seek it by both violent and

nonviolent means. Both governments and their enemies

seek to manipulate the efforts of humanitarian relief

organizations. 

Attracting external sponsorship is vital in African

conflicts. Rebels typically seek arms, money, training, and

political support from ethnic kinsmen, expatriate

countrymen in developed countries, international relief

agencies, ideological allies, or the regimes of neighboring

states. States do the same thing, frequently turning to

sources outside Africa. Those with access to natural

resources like diamonds have the capacity to acquire war

material.

30

 Rebels purchase what they need. States also buy

support with resources or concessions, and sometimes use

ideology or other means to find patrons. Since the end of the

Cold War, most African states have turned to Europe or the

United States for assistance, but other states occasionally

dabble in African conflicts. Israel maintained a program of

military assistance supporting sales to African countries

long after the Cold War ended. Iran and China have

supported the Sudanese government in its ongoing war

against the SPLA, while the rebels have gotten help from

Uganda, Kenya, and Israel (via Ethiopia).

31

 Libya funds a

number of friendly states and some rebel movements.

States unable to find a patron sometimes turn to

mercenaries (although with very mixed success).

The comparative weaknesses of African states affect

their militaries. Budgets are often inadequate to support

existing forces and government bureaucracies, whether

military or civilian, are bloated. But downsizing is fraught

with the potential for turmoil, coups, and banditry by

officers and soldiers who see their livelihood threatened.

Enlisted personnel of most African militaries are very

poorly paid (if paid at all). Even officers in some African

armies must engage in outside business to attain a reason9
able lifestyle. Since governments offer no employment

assistance in Africa, many states use the military as an

employment program, often taking the uneducated,

illiterate, and sickly into the service. Few Africa states have

successfully built a national consensus on the nature of the

security threat they face, and thus have difficulty with

military force sizing and development. Troop strength often

reflects historical circumstances rather than present

danger. 

Although there are exceptions, Africans often regard

their militaries as tools of a regime rather than servants of

the people. In some countries, one region or ethnic group

dominates the military. As a result, the relationship

between armed forces and society can be characterized by

suspicion or outright fear. This is compounded in some cases

by security services that prey on the population and, in

others, by the willingness of the regime to use military

forces in a coercive internal security role. Since Africa has a

long history of military intervention in politics, civilian

regimes often distrust their security services, deliberately

keeping them weak or divided as insurance against coups.

With the recent movement toward democracy, a number of

African states have begun to reform their system of

civil-military relations, but much work remains to be

done.

32

African militaries are seldom able to acquire modern

equipment or undergo realistic, large-unit training.

According to The Monitor of Kampala, “In most African

armies, indiscipline, economic problems and laxity in

management have relegated training to the back seat. It is

not unusual to find entire brigades who have not fired a rifle

since their basic training.”

33

 African militaries are

particularly weak at maintenance of complex equipment;

strategic mobility; advanced command, control, and

intelligence; airpower; and, naval power. This is

debilitating in the extraordinarily demanding nature of the

African environment. Often the major equipment that

African militaries do acquire is inappropriate and

10
expensive. Recently, for instance, Uganda sought T-55 main

battle tanks while Zimbabwe bought six Hind attack

helicopters from Russia and was seeking additional MiG

fighter jets.

34

 Sometimes African militaries do not have

people qualified to operate and maintain the equipment

they do have. Because of these problems, few African states

other than South Africa and, perhaps, Nigeria, Ghana,

Ethiopia, Angola, and Zimbabwe are capable of power

projection or sustained, intense military operations despite

a wealth of experience and leadership talent.

35

In general, the African security environment is one in

which the Western approach to strategy which stresses

nation-states, national governments, and national interests

must be modified. Non-state factors, actors, and considerations are as important as national interests. Foreign

policies and security strategies are often associated with a

particular regime, group, or individual rather the nation as

a whole. They are often designed to augment or preserve the

power of an individual, his clients, and his ethnic kinsmen

rather than promote national interests. And a change of

leadership sometimes brings a fundamental change in

foreign policy and national security strategy. Personal ties

and friendships as well as regional, ethnic, and religious

connections help define strategic interests, objectives, and

partners.

Because African foreign policy and national security

strategy, like African politics in general, is imbued with

flexibility and personalization, they tend to be dominated by

informal methods and procedures. Shifting coalitions are

the norm. Consensus-building among the powerful—a

traditional political technique in much of Africa—is an

important part of the regional security system. This

emphasis on individuals and consensus-building rather

than the application of power resources through formal

structures means that consultations are a vital element in

the African regional security environment. Such consultations can occur in a variety of traditional and nontraditional

fora. Any actor seeking to shape the environment must be

11
adept at recognizing the available fora, organizing

consultation, and building consensus.

The Nature of Conflict.

With a few exceptions such as Somalia’s 1977 invasion of

Ethiopia, Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in 1979, Zaire’s

invasion of Angola in 1975, the strategy of regional

destabilization practiced by South Africa during the

apartheid era, and the ongoing and exceptionally bloody

war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, African states have

seldom used overt military force against their neighbors.

Instead they rely on indirect aggression and proxy violence.

At various times this phenomenon has been associated with

wars of decolonization and national liberation. Examples

include support to the South West Africa People’s

Organization by Angola, support to the Zimbabwe African

People’s Union by Zambia, and support to the African

National Congress by Tanzania and Zambia. At other times,

proxy violence has been linked to ideological conflict such as

South Africa’s support to the Mozambique National

Resistance and the Union for the Total Independence of

Angola. Today, most indirect aggression or proxy violence is

part of religious, ethnic, and personal conflict. This has

included aid to successive waves of Congolese rebels by

Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and others; Burkina’s apparent

early sponsorship of Liberian warlord Charles Taylor; and

support to the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army by

neighboring states.

While traditional, cross-border, state-on-state warfare is

rare in Africa, internal conflict arising from a struggle for

control of the government is common and thus constitutes a

major source of instability and insecurity. In 1999, the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo,

Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, Uganda, and

Angola were all wracked by internal war.

36

 Other

long-standing conflicts were in hiatus but capable of

exploding at any time. At the root is the struggle for power

and resources, but ideology or ethnicity was often used to

12
mobilize support and define “us” and “them.” What makes

these internal conflicts particularly debilitating is the

tendency for them to become internationalized. Refugee

flows away from areas of violence can destabilize

neighboring states whose ability or willingness to protect

and sustain the refugees is often limited. By 1998, Africa

was home to approximately 8.1 million refugees (out of a

world total of 22 million).

37

 Even internal refugee flows can

cause a breakdown of basic services and great suffering. In

Angola, for instance, a million people have fled fighting

between the government and UNITA, crowding into

already-overburdened cities and threatening the country

with a humanitarian disaster.

38

 When refugee problems are

not solved quickly, they can eventually spark wider

destabilization. It was largely the children of refugees who

had fled Rwanda for Uganda in 1959 and 1961 who formed

the insurgency that ultimately took power in Kigali.

Today the most pervasive security problem in Africa is

what are called “complex emergencies” growing from the

combination of weak states, ethnic tensions and the

suppression of minorities, corrupt and dictatorial regimes,

support for these regimes by international arms traders,

chronic poverty and underdevelopment, and the debt

burden.

39

 Complex emergencies do not entail traditional,

force-on-force warfare, but sustained, low intensity (albeit

often brutal) violence involving militias, warlord armies,

state forces and, sometimes, private security forces. They

are sometimes linked to environmental problems like

drought or desertification and, in turn, sometimes spawn

other environmental problems like epidemic disease.

Invariably, complex emergencies generate refugees who

become both the victims of and pawns in the conflict.

Economic, Political, and Social Challenges.

The United States seeks an Africa where Americans can

do business and cooperate in resolving shared problems, but

where the need for direct U.S. military involvement is

minimal. Within African states, the United States seeks

13
competent, accountable governance with regular, peaceful

transfers of power and institutionalized methods for public

input into open policymaking procedures. Rule of law

should be the norm, with respect for human and minority

rights. Economically, the United States would like to see

sustainable, ecologically sound development which

increases Africa’s standard of living and makes African

states more competitive in the global economy. In security

terms, the United States seeks peace and stability, regional

cooperation on shared problems, resolution of the conflicts

that cause complex emergencies, solutions to Africa’s many

refugee problems, the building of stable civil-military

relations with civilian control of the military, abandonment

of proxy aggression, and development of military forces

adequate to protect national security but which are not a

burden on economic growth. Attaining these things will not

be easy: the obstacles are immense.

Economically, most African states are emburdened by

their past. As the European powers developed their African

colonies, they did not seek to create self-sustaining

economies with internal markets. Instead, they deliberately

designed economies that would produce primary products

for export but remain dependent on the colonial power for

manufactured goods. With the exception of South Africa, no

African state has been able to fully transcend its pervasive

economic dependence on outsiders. To a large extent,

African nations remain producers of primary products,

whether agricultural ones or minerals like copper and

petroleum. Since the mid-1970s, commodity prices have

fluctuated wildly within the global economy with prices

controlled by markets or organizations outside the

producing nations. As a result, African states have only

minimal control over their national income. This

complicates economic planning. Few African states have

well-developed internal markets so national infrastructures remain oriented toward export markets. The

extensive intra-African trade of the pre-colonial period

virtually ended, thus stifling any sort of regional

14
integration or division of labor. And, emphasis on extractive

industries and primary products has done little to

encourage the kind of educational establishments suited to

the needs of developing countries.

40

Poor economic decisions by African leaders have

exacerbated the problems they inherited. In contrast to the

“Asian” economic model that stressed financial and

budgetary discipline, encouragement of the private sector,

slow building for long-term growth, and integration into the

global economy first through labor-intensive manufacturing and then capital- and technology-intensive industry,

most African states pursued alternative development

strategies. Often, these were state-centric and—because of

sensitivity to dependence—designed for self-sufficiency

rather than integration into the global economy. This

turned into a dead end and left Africa far behind other

developing areas like Latin America or the Asia-Pacific once

it became clear that only integration into the world economy

could fuel sustained growth.

At the same time government bureaucracies were used

more for patronage than for efficient administration. They

thus tended to be exceptionally bloated, causing persistent

and debilitating budgetary deficits. Industrial projects were

fueled by external borrowing and controlled by the state,

thus stifling the growth of the entrepreneurial class and

generating inefficient industry, often large-scale “show”

projects that did not match the needs or the capabilities of

the local workers and managers. Borrowing was so

extensive that debt servicing takes 25 percent of SubSaharan Africa’s export earnings.

41

 Nigeria spends between

35 and 40 percent of its national budget to service its debt.

42

Of the 36 low income nations that the World Bank rates as

“severely indebted,” 29 are in Africa; 23 of these have a debt

burden greater than their gross national product.

43

 Much of

the capital that flows into Africa ends up in the overseas

bank accounts of the region’s leaders. The capital held

overseas by Africans is equivalent to 39 percent of gross

domestic product, compared to 6 percent for Asia.

44

 At the

15
same time, the weakness of the educational system and the

persistent “brain drain”—the tendency of Africans educated

in North America or Europe to stay there rather than return

home—hindered economic growth and forced many foreign

corporations to rely on their own managers and technicians

rather than local ones.

Cultural factors also complicated economic development. African culture emphasizes obligation to family and

kin. An African who acquires power, prestige, or wealth

feels a moral obligation to use it to benefit family members,

clients, or co-ethnics. To take one example, Félix

Houphouët-Boigny, the long-time president of Côte d’Ivoire,

lavished public money on projects in his home town of

Yamoussoukro, a small and obscure place. These included a

$300 million Roman Catholic basilica bigger than St. Peter’s

in Rome. Henri Konan Bédié, who followed HouphouëtBoigny as the Ivorian president, stopped work in

Yamoussoukro and instead poured money into his home

town of Daoukro, an equally small and obscure place.

45

 The

December 1999 coup which removed Bédié from office will

undoubtedly end this spate of projects. This is symptomatic

of a common pattern throughout Africa.

While the obligation to help clients and relatives

provides social and economic support structure to its

participants, it can lead to conflict and instability since

everyone recognizes the immense stakes of political

competition. Democracy works best when the stakes of the

contest are at their least. When not only political power but

wealth hinges on elections or political competitions, the

tendency is for no-holds barred methods and for the losers to

refuse to willingly accept defeat. At a minimum, the political

spoils system leads to debilitating nepotism, corruption,

and mismanagement which hinders development.

46

 As

David Passage notes, “Far more foreign exchange flows out

of Africa each year into European, Asian, and American

banks than is given to Africa by all foreign-assistance

programs from all foreign sources combined! Africa is being

robbed blind by its leaders . . .”

47

 This is, perhaps, painfully

16
blunt, but the problem is real. To take one example,

President Obasanjo of Nigeria estimates that between $4

and $5 billion was looted by the government of his

predecessor.

48

Corruption, of course, is not limited to Africa. Suharto’s

Indonesia, Marcos’ Philippines, Mexico under Salinas, and

others have matched or surpassed anything seen in Africa.

It was rampant in the United States during Prohibition and

remains a problem, particularly among big city law

enforcement agencies. But corruption is a major obstacle to

African development.

49

 Former Tanzanian Prime Minister

Joseph S. Warioba and former Minister of Justice Frederick

Werema, in a paper at an anti-corruption conference in

Washington, DC, stated, “In many African countries

corruption is very pervasive.”

50

 Even in states like Uganda,

often considered a model for economic and political reform,

corruption has become a serious burden, siphoning off as

much money as the World Bank spends in the country each

year.

51

 As Stuart Eizenstat, Under Secretary of State for

Economics, Business, and Agriculture noted, corruption “is

a wild card that increases uncertainty by making it difficult,

if not impossible, to predict whether the return will justify

the risk.”

52

 At a time when Africa desperately needs capital

to fuel development, foreign investment is dissuaded not

only by Africa’s lack of infrastructure, and educated

workforce, and functioning legal systems, but also by the

depths of corruption and nepotism. Put simply, Africa has

not made itself an attractive economic partner when

compared to other developing areas like Latin America or

the Asia Pacific.

The combination of weak infrastructure, corruption, and

a labor force that lags behind that in most other parts of the

world in terms of education and health leaves Africa

dependent on foreign aid. Africa has received the bulk of

assistance disbursed by the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund over the past decades, and at

least as much in governmental bilateral aid.

53

 Dependence

on foreign aid remains a tremendous liability. Aid, which

17
accounted for 10-20 percent of the Gross National Product

(GNP) of many African nations by the 1980s, has been

declining in part because donors, like lenders, have become

frustrated by the paucity of tangible results from earlier

transfers.

54

 As David Rieff notes, “By most criteria, Africa

has received more aid than any other region of the world.

And yet, for the very tangible good it has done, aid has

clearly had a far more minimal effect on Africa’s

development than either donor countries or recipients ever

imagined.”

55

Through a combination of colonialism’s legacy, poor

economic decisions, and the structure of the world economy,

Africa has undergone a long-term degradation of its

economic situation. Most countries are behind where they

were in the 1960s. The 1980s in particular were a decade of

regression. The few states that did experience economic

growth saw it swallowed up by population increases. In the

early 1990s, though, a number of African countries

undertook serious reforms designed to stabilize their

economies, liberalize exchange rates, encourage

productivity in the private sector, and open the way for

increased trade and investment. The results were

significant, leading to what the U.S. State Department—in

a very optimistic spin—called “a major economic

transformation.”

56

 Yet even the U.N. admits that the

recovery is fragile and any gains are easily eroded by bad

harvests and downturns in the global market for primary

products.

57

 The World Bank estimates that it will take

long-term annual growth of 8-9 percent to make significant

progress in reducing poverty in Africa.

58

 But growth has

already begun to slow in Sub-Saharan Africa, from 4.2

percent in 1996 to 3.5 percent in 1997 and is expected to fall

again in 1998 to 2.1–2.4 percent before rebounding to 3.5

percent in 1999–2000 under relatively favorable

assumptions.

59

 Today, as Marina Ottaway notes, “African

countries remain marginal to all global trends.”

60

The long-term prospects for economic development in

Africa are not bright. Deforestation, overgrazing, and

18
harmful irrigation practices have turned vast areas of

Africa into a wasteland.

61

 Population growth continues to

outstrip expansion of Africa’s educational and health care

systems, thus limiting the quality of the workforce there

when compared to other parts of the world. In today’s

globalizing economy, cheap labor is no longer enough. It is

high quality labor that helps attract capital and thus fuels

growth. Equally important, Africa’s nearly obsessive fear of

dependency and the tendency of the region’s leaders to see

political power as an opportunity to reward followers limit

the extent to which it can undertake the steps that allow a

nation to integrate into the global economy: developing

transparent governance and finance, limiting state control

of the economy, and building a noncorrupt, effective judicial

system. As a result, Africa is falling further behind both the

advanced parts of the world and the advancing parts.

African states also bear an unfortunate political legacy

from the colonial period. Since borders were drawn

according to European politics rather than African realities,

most of Africa’s new states included a mix of ethnic

groups—some of which were often traditional enemies—

while other ethnic groups were split between colonial

empires and, later, between independent African states.

Politics became a zero sum game where an electoral victory

or seizure of power by a member of one ethnic group was

seen as the opportunity to reward that group at the expense

of others through the distribution of jobs and contracts to

clients and family members.

European metropoles often centralized administrative,

political, and economic power while suppressing political

pluralism in their African possessions.

62

 At the time of

independence, no African state had a firm foundation for

pluralistic democracy. There were few good models of rule

by law, an independent judiciary, a free press, or a vibrant

civil society built on local government and civic or political

organizations. Not surprisingly, most African states have,

since independence, suffered what is called “personal rule”

often by dictator who either seized power through force or

19
was elected and subsequently suppressed political

opposition.

63

 Most attempted to build at least a facade of

democracy immediately after independence, but nearly

every one saw open government crumble. These ranged

from outright and undisguised dictatorships such as those

of Idi Amin in Uganda, a dynasty of generals in Nigeria, or

Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire to those with thin veneers of

democracy such as Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Daniel

Arap Moi’s Kenya. Only Botswana and Mauritius have

sustained multiparty systems with regular and honest

elections. 

In the 1990s, Africa appeared to undergo a democratic

awakening. Between 1990 and 1995, 38 of the then 47

countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had held competitive,

multiparty national elections.

64

 Where there were 5 African

countries that could be described as democratic in 1989,

there were 20 in 1998—progress that U.S. Assistant

Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan E. Rice calls

“slow but pulsing.”

65

 But, as Richard Joseph notes, much of

what looked like political reform in Africa was actually

perception manipulation by leaders who recognize that

continued international respectability and access to aid and

credit are contingent on the appearance of democracy.

66

 To

do this, some held national conferences or elections with no

plans for institutionalizing the transfer of power. Others

found subtle ways of preserving personal power like

Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe or Yoweri Museveni of Uganda,

both whom dusted off the old notion of “single party

democracy” used to justify personal rule in the 1960s. In

fact, most African leaders “remain extremely suspicious of

popular participation and even more so of party politics.”

67

So long as political power leads to control of national wealth

and is seen as a means of building and sustaining a

patronage network, real democracy will remain elusive.

There are social obstacles to the attainment of stability

and prosperity in Africa as well. One of the most devastating

is the AIDS epidemic. The numbers are simply numbing.

According to Dr. Peter Piot, Executive Director of the Joint

20
U.N. Program on HIV/AIDS, 20 million people in

Sub-Saharan Africa are infected with HIV or have AIDS.

68

This means 1 of every 13 people between the ages of 15 and

49 will die of the disease. By 1998, AIDS had surpassed

malaria as the main cause of death in Africa.

69

 Nigeria,

Uganda, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo,

Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa are particularly

hard hit. For instance, in Zimbabwe where the adult

infection rate is estimated at 26 percent, there were 130,000

AIDS deaths in 1997 and nearly half a million AIDS

orphans.

70

 In Botswana, the infection rate is 25 percent, the

1997 death toll was 15,000 (in a country of 1,448,454) and

there are 28,000 AIDS orphans.

71

 Life expectancy in

Botswana is expected to drop from 61 years in 1990-95 to 47

years in 1995-2000 because of AIDS.

72

 And in South

Africa—the continent’s most developed country and its

potential economic locomotive—the AIDS infection rate

among adults is expected to climb from a debilitating 11

percent to a disastrous 18 percent by the year 2005.

73

 Other

estimates contend that by 2010 it could be 25 percent given

the strong cultural barriers to the sorts of activities that

prevent AIDS.

74

 Some 1500 more South Africans are

infected with AIDS every day.

75

 The Health Minister of

Nigeria estimated that 5.8 million Nigerians were HIV

positive or had AIDS, and it was spreading at a rate of one

person per minute.

76

The AIDS epidemic has been particularly damaging to

development. Farms are idle and agricultural jobs remain

unfilled because disease has devoured the work force.

77

 The

impact on professionals is equally dire. In Zimbabwe, whole

businesses and university departments have closed as a

result of AIDS deaths.

78

 About a quarter of the police force in

South Africa is HIV positive or has AIDS.

79

 Ugandan

President Museveni admitted frustration with spending

money to train military officers, only to have most of them

die of AIDS in a short period of time.

80

 Estimates of HIV

infection among regional armies include 50 percent in

Congo and Angola, 66 percent in Uganda, 75 percent in

21
Malawi, and 80 percent in Zimbabwe.

81

 In some African

countries, three-quarters of the military hospital beds are

occupied by AIDS patients. This complicates the relationship between African militaries and the United States since

it is difficult to find HIV-negative candidates to attend

American schools and training.

82

 At best, Africa will take

decades to recover from this since it must overcome cultural

and perceptual factors that hinder the behavior

modification that can stem the spread of AIDS, and then set

about rebuilding its human infrastructure. Currently, there

are few signs that corrective actions are being taken.

Population growth also continues to pose an impediment

to economic growth in Africa. The World Bank’s World

Development Report for 1998/99 shows Africa with a 2.8

percent annual growth rate (using 1994 statistics)—nearly

double the rate in the second-fastest growing continent of

Asia. AIDS makes this worse by killing people in their most

productive years, leaving whole villages composed solely of

the very old or the very young. In many rural areas,

population growth has led or is leading to environmental

problems such as deforestation and desertification.

83

 And, it

is not only the aggregate amount of population, but the

distribution that creates problems. Africa is experiencing

an extensive migration to its cities where growing slum

belts are a potential hotbed of violence, crime, and disease.

While Africa is currently the least urbanized continent, its

cities are expected to undergo “explosive growth in the

future,” thus overwhelming the ability of the governments

to provide basic services.

84

Military Challenges.

African militaries are and will remain crucial political

actors. “The question is not,” according to William

Gutteridge, “whether armies will participate in politics but

to what extent and by what means.”

85

 But Africa needs

continued reform of its civil-military relations. Developing

healthier civil-military relations, though, is an extraordinarily complex process. Simply discouraging coups by

22
the military is not enough. In many cases, military

intervention in politics is motivated by the belief on the part

of officers that removal of a civilian regime is necessary to

save the nation. Until African states have competent,

ethical, accountable civilian rulers (and civil servants who

can exercise control over the military), the armed forces will

be tempted to intervene.

86

 With the exception of the states

like Zimbabwe and Angola, where the contemporary

military can trace its roots to a liberation force, most African

armed forces are the direct descendents of colonial security

establishments. They were originally designed to suppress

internal threats and sometimes are still seen as a tool for

government control or for the military’s own selfenrichment than as the protector of the citizenry. Even

when such perceptions are not justified, many African

militaries have an “image problem” deriving from the past.

South Africa, which has by far the most elaborate and

extensive program for reforming civil-military relations,

may provide a model (or at least a source of ideas) for other

African states.

87

In many cases, African armed forces are rife with

internal divisions based on ethnicity, regionalism, religion,

or clientelism. Despite the fact that many Africa officers

have received education in American or European military

schools and taken part in multinational peacekeeping

operations, the professionalism of the armed services varies

across the continent. In some, professionalism dominates,

In others, the tendency is toward persistent political

meddling, self-enrichment, and basing promotion and

assignment on ethnicity or patronage. Noncommissioned

officers and enlisted personnel tend to be very poorly

trained and educated. And, nearly every African military is

hindered by the absence of formal processes for linking

national security objectives to military budgets and

operational readiness. To take one example, in recent years

the Zimbabwean military released large numbers of troops

for long-term home leave because it could not afford to feed

23
them at the same time that it purchased new staff cars for

all field and flag grade officers.

88

The security environment in which African militaries

operate also poses serious and persistent challenges to

stability. The continent is awash in arms and traversed by

arms merchants, many of whom came from military or

intelligence services in the former Soviet bloc or South

Africa.

89

 Some of the weapons available in Africa are the

residue of the Cold War era when outside states plied their

clients with military hardware. Others are more recent

purchases from the world market. The demise of the Soviet

Union and the end of the Cold War made military

equipment available at discount rates.

90

 When Ugandan

President Museveni began looking for tanks in 1999, he

found that T-55s were available for the equivalent of

$30,000—substantially less than the Toyota Land Cruisers

and Land Rovers which are so popular in Africa.

91

 Similarly,

the end of the Cold War led Western and Asian arms makers

to seek new markets, including Africa.

Although it is impossible to accurately gauge the

number of small arms in circulation in Africa, the number is

enormous. For example, Mozambique may have imported

as many as 6 million small arms during its civil war, while in

South Africa there are 4.1 million licensed firearms in

civilian hands and somewhere between 400,000 and eight

million illegal ones.

92

 Africa also has the heaviest

concentration of landmines in the world, with over 30

million.

93

 The situation is so serious that the U.N. Security

Council passed a resolution expressing “grave concern at

the destabilizing effect of illicit arms flows, in particular of

small arms, to and in Africa and at their excessive

accumulation and circulation, which threaten national,

regional and international security and have serious

consequences for development and for the humanitarian

situation in the continent.”

94

To further complicate matters, Africa has long attracted

international mercenaries. Since independence, European

24
soldiers of fortune like “Mad Mike” Hoare and Bob Denard

plied their trade on the continent.

95

 Today, mercenarism is a

still a factor. During the collapse of the Mobutu regime in

Zaire, the dying dictator hired French, Belgians, South

Africans, Bosnians, Serbs, Russians, and Ukrainians in a

failed attempt to stave off Laurent Kabila’s rebel force.

96

 A

Belgian named Christian Tavenier—an old hand among the

white mercenaries who worked in Africa—commanded

some of the foreign forces.

97

 The formation of a corporation

called Executive Outcomes in 1989 added a new

twist—home grown African mercenaries. Executive

Outcomes was composed of combat veterans from the

ex-South African Defence Force (SADF). It not only offered

military advice and consulting, but also combat forces which

saw action in Angola and Sierra Leone.

98

 While Executive

Outcomes officially closed shop at the end of 1998 (largely in

response to South Africa’s passage of the Military and

Foreign Assistance Act which prohibited South African

citizens or corporations from providing mercenary services),

a successor or successors may emerge.

99

 In fact, there were

reports in early 1999 that South African mercenaries

simply relocated to Eastern Europe and continued to supply

the Angolan rebels (who could pay with the proceeds of

diamond sales).

100

 This is simply the starkest example of a

wider trend toward the privatization of security in Africa.

101

The African security system has seen the persistence of

armed separatist movements and violent ethnic conflict,

now made even more dangerous by an increase in armed

intervention by other African states. The idea that “the

enemy of my enemy is my friend” has a long history in Africa

as regimes often offer support and sanctuary to armed

groups fighting an unfriendly neighbor. Initially, this was

an aspect of the ideological and racial wars in the continent.

South Africa, for instance, backed the Mozambique

National Resistance (RENAMO), “Super-ZAPU” in

Zimbabwe, and UNITA in Angola because other African

states supported movements fighting against white

minority rule like the African National Congress and Pan

25
African Congress in South Africa, the Zimbabwe African

National Union (ZANU) in Rhodesia, and the Southwest

Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. Today,

proxy aggression has escalated to the point that it is one of

Africa’s most pressing security problems.

As the African security environment has evolved, some

African states have broken with the tradition of eschewing

direct intervention in their neighbors. ECOMOG—a

military observer group from the Economic Community of

West African States—intervened in Sierra Leone, Liberia,

and Guinea-Bissau, while a SADC force fought in

Lesotho.

102

 The driving idea is that regional integration has

reached the point that internal violence invariably spills

over and endangers neighboring states. The most

dangerous intervention of all has occurred in the drifting

hulk of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In

many ways, that country—if “country” is now not too strong

a word—is a distillation of all of the pathologies that hinder

development, stability, and progress in Africa.

103

 It was

particularly ill-prepared for independence by its Belgian

colonial masters and is an artificial political entity, more an

amalgam of weakly related regions than a nation. Under

Mobutu, it reached unsurpassed levels of corruption,

keeping a land rich in natural resources among the poorest

on earth. A new word was invented to describe the Zairian

system of government: “kleptocracy”—a system where

corruption and theft form the core of political leadership and

administration. Zaire become the paragon of personal rule

and repression, as well as the sort of dual economy where an

extractive sector enriched a tiny elite while most people

fended for themselves in the informal sector. In the security

realm, Zaire could not defend itself, thus attracting

intervention by outsiders interested in its wealth and

actually inviting intervention to save the regime.

104

More recently, DRC has seen extensive direct

intervention by other African states which, depending on

one’s political perspective, sought to solidify their own

national security or carve out a profitable sphere of

26
influence. There were reports, for instance, that

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe—facing an

imminent economic disaster at home—demanded

preferential treatment for Zimbabwean corporations over

South African ones by the DRC as a condition for military

intervention in support of the Kabila government.

105

Rumors also spread that Uganda was seeking deals in gold

and diamonds as payment for its support of the Congolese

rebels.

106

 The end result has been what Georgetown

University Professor Herbert Howe calls “states as

mercenaries.”

107

By the autumn of 1998, a number of African states were

involved in the DRC conflict in one way or the other.

108

 The

result has been Africa’s first “great war.”

109

 But it may not

be the last. History may show that DRC was the first of

many conflicts arising from the emergence of a new,

post-Cold War geostrategic configuration in Africa, this

time pitting primarily the Central African nations of

Uganda and Rwanda, who support the Congolese rebels

now attempting to overthrow Kabila, against Zimbabwe,

Namibia, and Angola, who back the regime.

110

 To further

complicate matters, an array of often-brutal rebel

groups—including genocidal Rwandan Hutus—are also

involved.

111

 As South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz

Pahad noted, the conflict in DRC has the potential to

“explode into major conventional war involving many of the

continent’s armies.”

112

 In August 1999, such a possibility

seemed horrifyingly close as Uganda and Rwanda—two

former allies bound by common interests and personal ties

between Museveni and Kagame—found their militaries in

combat against one another.

113

 This escalated to the point

that Museveni issued a public warning that he was

prepared for full-scale war with Rwanda.

114

 And the “Congo

effect” is having an adverse political and economic impact

within the intervening states.

115

 Zimbabwe, for instance,

appears to be having a very difficult time sustaining its

military effort.

116

 Uganda’s defense spending for fiscal year

1999 was 30.6 percent above budget, in part because of the

27
intervention in DRC.

117

 The pattern of state failure followed

by outside intervention is likely to cause wild fluctuations in

African defense budgets unless some effective method for

regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping emerges.

Opportunities.

Even given the immense challenges faced by African

leaders, there has been a sort of “one step forward, a half

step backwards” progress. But several “wild cards” could

radically change current trends. One of the most dangerous

would be an explosion of serious internal violence in

Nigeria, Ethiopia, or South Africa. All have serious internal

schisms and have experienced sporadic violence. In

mid-1999, South Africa undertook a surprisingly peaceful

election and transfer of power from Nelson Mandela to

Thabo Mbeki. In 1999, Nigeria took another stab at

democracy with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as

president. Secretary of State Albright designated Nigeria’s

democratic transition one of four in the world which the

United States has a vital interest in supporting (along with

Colombia, Ukraine, and Indonesia). So far, the transition

has been stable. President Obasanjo has faced political

opposition and sporadic outbreaks of ethnic violence, but

has pursued vital steps like deregulation of the economy

and an anti-corruption campaign.

118

 According to Howard

Jeter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African

Affairs, “Nigeria now has the best chance in decades to turn

a new democratic chapter in its history.”

119

The political transitions in South Africa and Nigeria are

very hopeful signs. Still, the December 1999 overthrow of an

elected government in Côte d’Ivoire—long considered one of

Africa’s most stable states—is a reminder that upheaval is

never far away.

120

 The potential for reversal and violence

remains in Africa’s giants, particularly in Nigeria but also

in South Africa. If major conflict did break out in any of

Africa’s large states, the result could be disastrous,

including major refugee flows, the spread of instability and

violence to weaker neighbors, and a strong possibility of

28
some sort of international intervention, conceivably

involving the United States. Similarly, there is also the

possibility that other African states will be overwhelmed by

the difficulties and tensions associated with economic and

political reform. This could lead to regression toward even

more personal rule and parasitic economic policies, and to

many failed states, each generating its own internal power

struggles and humanitarian disasters.

Other possibilities also merit consideration. Africa

might see the power of multinational criminal cartels

increase to the point that they control or threaten the state

as in Colombia or Mexico. Certainly African governments

would be susceptible to such an onslaught. Africa is also ripe

for the emergence of some sort of charismatic new leader or

new ideology that could dramatically re-draw the divisions

and groupings in the continent. There is also the possibility

that the current conflict in DRC may lead to a system of

hostile subregional blocs.

On the other hand, Africa may continue along the road of

political and economic reform. African leaders recognize

that with their leverage over aid donors diminished by the

end of the Cold War, only states undertaking reform can

count on outside help. The currents of change in Africa are

also driven by a true public awakening associated with the

global communications revolution. Some Africans—at least

in the cities—now know that reformers in places like the

Philippines and Indonesia were able to spark change, and

thus they are less willing to tolerate repression. As analyst

John Makumbe writes:

The resurgence of civic protest in virtually all sub-Saharan

African countries since the late 1980s has resulted, inter alia,

in the transformation of the continent’s governance and

political systems, with civic groups in most of these countries

demanding that their government be democratic, transparent

and accountable to the people.

121

The combination of a desire for change and frustration

with the old models based on socialism, personal rule, and

29
parasitism may open the way for what South African

Deputy President Thabo Mbeki calls the “African

renaissance.”

122

From an American perspective, there is one more

opportunity that warrants consideration: U.S. influence in

Africa is at an apogee. Because of America’s ascendant

political, economic, cultural, and military position, many

Africans believe the road to stability and prosperity runs

through Washington. The time is past when disdain for the

United States was acceptable and expected among African

leaders and intellectuals. At the same time, the large (and

growing) number of African émigrés in the United States

and the increasing influence of African-Americans enlarges

the constituency for an active American role on the

continent. While there is always the risk that Africans may

become frustrated by the gap between what the United

States could do and what it will do given the demands of

world leadership, the potential for even greater American

influence is real and tangible.

Any short-term gains to the United States that accrue

from some sort of massive effort in Africa will be limited.

Africa is a long-term project. Even the best-designed U.S.

strategy will not reap benefits for decades. But the costs if

Africa disintegrates in terms of the demand for humanitarian interventions or transnational threats that could

arise would be substantial. Given this, an American

national security strategy that attempts to gain maximum

benefit from a limited expenditure of political, military, and

economic resources makes sense.

American Strategy.

In a region as large as Sub-Saharan Africa, American

strategy must identify and cultivate partners. Due to the

limited and inconsistent nature of American involvement in

Africa and suspicion of U.S. intentions on the part of African

leaders, Washington has few long-standing relationships.

U.S. security assistance has been important for some

30
countries, but not vital. With a handful like Botswana, the

relationship has been fairly stable. With others, it has

undergone great peaks and valleys as policies shift in

Washington and regimes change in Africa. Zaire, Sudan,

Somalia, and Nigeria, for instance, once received a fair

amount of American aid and now receive little other than

humanitarian support.

Today, Africans remain leery of old fashioned

patron-client relationships with external powers but are

interested in strategic partnerships. Identifying the best

partners is thus vital to the refinement of American

strategy. One way of doing this is to focus on the largest and

most influential African states. Using this method,

relations with South Africa and Nigeria are clearly the most

important. South Africa is easy. It not only has the most

advanced economy in Africa and one of the most

professional and powerful militaries, but is also very

attractive as a political partner being a genuine democracy

with effective political institutions, working structures for

human and civil rights, and one of the world’s most

respected leaders.

123

 In fact, the South Africa-U.S.

relationship is cordial and improving, particularly in the

security sphere. During the Clinton Administration, Vice

President Al Gore has represented the United States at

what is called the U.S.-South African Binational

Commission, which provides a regular framework for

discussions between the two countries to manage

cooperation and the expansion of relations. The February

1999 meeting of the Binational Commission was the sixth in

the series.

124

 At the same time, U.S. Secretary of Defense

William Cohen and South African Defence Minister Joe

Modise approved draft diplomatic papers to establish a legal

framework for U.S. military activities in South Africa,

beginning with support to the April 1999 Blue Crane

multinational peacekeeping exercise.

125

While the relationship between the United States and

South Africa is a vitally important one, it does have inherent

limitations. Leaders of the Africa National Congress—

31
South Africa’s ruling party—remember that they received

no support from the United States during their years of

struggle against apartheid. Bitterness and even hostility

linger.

126

 South Africa remains leery of being seen as

Washington’s surrogate or junior partner. This has led

Pretoria to refuse any sort of participation in the African

Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). But South Africa is

equally unwilling to step out on its own and assume a

regional leadership role. The persistent gap between South

Africa’s capacity and its confidence often frustrates

American policymakers. There are, though, sound political

and psychological reasons for Pretoria’s hesitancy. South

Africa has great economic, political, and military potential,

but is haunted by its history of racial repression and

regional destabilization. Its current political leaders are

still imbued with their decades-long tradition of dependence

on the support and goodwill of others. They simply are not

accustomed to the responsibilities and burdens of power. As

a result, they go to great lengths to avoid antagonizing or

intimidating other states. From the American perspective,

the net result is an abdication of the potential for

leadership. It is impossible to tell if or when this will change.

Nigeria poses even greater problems for American

policymakers. By virtue of its size and military prowess, it

has the potential to be an important partner. Through

ECOMOG—the military intervention force of the Economic

Community of West African States—Nigeria has played a

central role in peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone and

Liberia.

127

 But the fact that Nigeria has been ruled by

military governments for most of its history has prevented

the maturation of this relationship. In addition, Nigeria’s

recent rulers have allowed their citizens to play a prominent

role in the international drug trade. According to the U.S.

State Department Narcotics Control Strategy Report:

Nigeria is the hub of African narcotics trafficking, and Nigerian

poly-crime organizations continue to expand their role in

narcotics trafficking worldwide. Nigerian trafficking

organizations control the drug markets of Sub-Saharan Africa,

32
and operate drug distribution networks from strategic

locations throughout the world. Nigerians transport a large

portion of the heroin abused in the United States; they

smuggle South American cocaine to Europe and Africa,

especially South Africa, and they export marijuana—the only

narcotic cultivated in Nigeria—to Europe and other countries

in West Africa. The Government of Nigeria counter-narcotics

programs have failed to materialize or have been ineffective.

Efforts by the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency have

been hindered by widespread corruption in law enforcement

and other agencies and by the lack of clear policy guidance and

substantive government support. Counter-narcotics

legislation has been enacted, but has produced no

prosecutions or convictions of major drug traffickers.

128

Even during the corrupt and repressive Babangida and

Abacha regimes, the United States continued some degree

of cooperation with Nigeria, particularly on multinational

peacekeeping and in counternarcotics. If Nigeria’s recent

democratic reforms prove durable and the country

diminishes the role of Nigerian narcotics traffickers—both

of which are long shots given its history of failed democratic

transitions and corruption—that country might become one

of the United States’ most important African partners. In

Assistant Secretary of State Rice’s words, “As South Africa

did at the end of this century, Nigeria has the chance to do at

the turn of the next century to better the lives of hundreds of

millions of Africans at home and abroad.”

129

Besides building and improving ties with Africa’s

regional powers, American strategy has also cultivated

relations with a range of smaller states, particularly those

which combine an interest in peacekeeping with some

degree of economic and political reform. These include

Botswana, Ghana, Senegal, Uganda, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire,

Malawi, Mali, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. A number of other

states might join this group if they undertake changes in

regional and internal policy.

Great Britain and France are valuable partners in Africa

as well. Both retain a significant role in military training in

their former colonies. In Zimbabwe, for instance, the British

33
Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) coordinates

a region-wide program aimed at military cooperation and

coordination, particularly on international peacekeeping.

There is another BMATT in Ghana. France has similar

programs, particularly in West Africa. The main effort is the

Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix

(RECAMP) program.

130

 This provides training, education,

and equipment for peacekeeping. Although its success has

been mixed, RECAMP attempts to operate through

subregional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC,

and prepositions a fairly substantial amount of equipment

for use by African peacekeeping forces.

131

 The first

large-scale RECAMP training program, Operation

Guidimakha, took place in Senegal in February 1998. This

involved 3,600 troops from 11 African and Western

countries. The Scandinavian countries are major aid donors

and are becoming increasingly involved in peacekeeping.

For instance, a U.N. Military Observer Course housed at the

Zimbabwean Staff College and funded by Denmark draws

students from all over Africa.

132

 Japan is a growing provider

of aid in Africa. In the summer of 1999, for instance, Tokyo

announced significant aid projects in Senegal, Tanzania,

South Africa, Zambia, and Côte d’Ivoire.

133

Africans, remembering the weakness and dependency

associated with colonial status, are intensely protective of

their autonomy. This is why African leaders often appear

ambivalent about relationships that Americans see as

mutually beneficial. For the United States, this means that

working with African states in multinational fora is often

more effective than bilateral efforts. Actions like

humanitarian interventions require legitimization by the

U.N., the Organization of African Unity or, at least, one of

Africa’s major subregional organizations. Many African

states even prefer that aid and assistance programs like

ACRI take place through multilateral channels rather than

bilateral ones.

President Clinton’s strategy in Africa has focused on

three key areas: enhancing security, promoting prosperity,

34
and promoting democracy.

134

 The administration has

identified three types of security threats which American

strategy must counter. The first are transnational problems

including state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking,

international crime, environmental decay, and disease.

Although weapons of mass destruction are not a problem in

Sub-Saharan Africa today, the Clinton strategy supports

South Africa’s nuclear disarmament, the extension of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the establishment of

the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The second threat

to security in Africa comes from “rogue states,” particularly

Libya and Sudan. Both support international terrorism and

Libya has actively sought weapons of mass destruction and

conventional military capabilities that threaten its

neighbors. The third threat is the most pervasive of all:

violence growing from internal political instability in places

like Angola, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, the Democratic

Republic of Congo, and Congo-Brazzaville. A fourth threat

has been added by the seemingly irrational EthiopiaEritrea war where two poverty-stricken countries are

fighting over a small piece of barren land.

135

The Clinton Administration’s approach to these threats

has been to establish partnerships to strengthen African

security mechanisms. The most important program has

been ACRI.

136

 This is a scaled-down version of a more

ambitious program called the African Crisis Response

Force, proposed in late 1996, which sought to create an

African military organization that could respond to complex

emergencies with only limited outside help. For a variety of

reasons, this met with a less than overwhelming reception

when announced by Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Despite the rebuff, the Clinton Administration continued to

pursue the idea of an organic peacekeeping capability in

Africa, eventually settling on ACRI through which U.S.

Army Special Forces provided training and limited

nonlethal equipment to African militaries.

137

 The emphasis

is on commonality of communications, basic soldiering

skills, and specific military activities required in

35
peacekeeping with the ultimate objective of helping African

military units meet U.N. standards in peacekeeping and

humanitarian relief practices. By 1999, units from Senegal,

Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, and Benin had received

ACRI training.

138

 ACRI-trained units had participated in

peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the

Central African Republic.

139

 Perhaps more importantly,

some of Africa’s major powers were leaning toward

participation. President Moi of Kenya had committed his

nation to engagement in the ACRI process.

140

 And American

officials had begun to encourage Nigerian involvement.

141

During its initial phase, ACRI was often criticized for its

“one size fits all” approach. The training dealt solely with

basic soldier skills and peacekeeping activities. While this

was appropriate for some African militaries, others such as

Kenya, South Africa, and Ghana were advanced to the point

that they did not need such rudimentary training. By 1999,

ACRI had begun to mature and expand.

142

 Efforts were

underway to tighten the connections between ACRI and the

exercise programs run by the unified commands, and to

augment coordination with the training offered by

European states, particularly the United Kingdom, France,

and Belgium. In addition, ACRI is developing programs to

offer training in higher command and control rather than

simply battalion-level training and improving cooperation

with Africa’s major sub-regional organizations, SADC,

ECOWAS, and the East African Community.

In 1998, the Clinton Administration announced the

formation of the African Center for Security Studies

(ACSS). ACSS will be a senior level program to educate both

military and civilian leaders on topics such as civil-military

relations, national security decisionmaking, and defense

planning and management. According to the White House,

“The goal is for ACSS to be a source of academic, yet

practical instruction in promoting the skills necessary to

make effective national security decisions in democratic

governments, and engage African leaders in a substantive

dialogue about defense policy planning in democracies.”

143

36
The first ACSS course was held in Dakar, Senegal in

November 1999.

144

 The second will be in Botswana in June

2000. After several years of rotating seminars, decisions

will be made about building a permanent school.

The second precept of the Clinton strategy in Africa is

promoting prosperity. The basic idea is that a prosperous

and growing Africa would be a better partner for the United

States on both economic and security issues. And, the

administration believed, economic growth requires

integration into the global economy and market-oriented

economic reforms.

145

 The core program is the President’s

Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in

Africa which combines technical assistance to help

liberalize trade and investment, an anti-corruption

initiative, extinguishing bilateral concessional debt, and

organizing a U.S.-Africa Economic Cooperation Forum.

146

 It

also calls for the Overseas Private Investment Corporation

to dedicate three quarters of a billion dollars to encourage

private sector investment in Africa.

147

 The Clinton

Administration has lobbied Congress for passage of the

African Growth and Opportunity Act.

148

 This legislation

would grant special trade benefits to Sub-Saharan African

countries which met economic reform requirements. It

passed the House of Representatives in 1998 but was

blocked in the Senate by representatives of textile

producing states. It was re-introduced in 1999 with

Assistant Secretary of State Rice calling it “the single most

important piece of legislation we have considered on Africa

in more than a decade.”

149The third precept of the Clinton

strategy is promoting democracy. The rationale is that,

In Africa as elsewhere, democracies have proved more

peaceful, stable and reliable partners with which we can work

and are more likely to pursue sound economic policies.

150

The administration encourages democracy and rule of

law, particularly in key countries like Nigeria, Kenya, and

the Democratic Republic of Congo. It also helps with the

running of elections in countries like Ghana, Mozambique,

37
and Tanzania, and has a number of other programs to

consolidate and sustain democracy. But while the Clinton

strategy places a high premium on democracy and human

rights, it also, in the words of Assistant Secretary of State

Rice, stays “actively engaged even in flawed, imperfect

democracies.”

151

 The key question is how hard to push the

truly recalcitrant governments. In general, the Clinton

Administration has eschewed sanctions in all but the most

egregious cases such as Sudan and Nigeria. Most of the

time, it is willing to overlook the absence of political reform

in nations that cooperate on other issues, such as

Zimbabwe.

The U.S. military plays an important role in

implementing the Clinton strategy in Africa. In fact,

military-to-military contacts have increased dramatically

during the past 2 years.

152

 Most of the continent is in the

U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) area of responsibility. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is

responsible for Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia,

Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Seychelles. The U.S. Pacific

Command is responsible for Mauritius, Comoros, and

Madagascar. Cape Verde and Sao Tome fall within the area

of responsibility of the U.S. Atlantic Command (but

EUCOM has assumed security assistance responsibility).

Since EUCOM deals with 35 African countries, it is by far

the most important. U.S. military involvement focuses on

training, security assistance, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and noncombatant evacuations.

153

The U.S. military fosters professional and

democratically-oriented militaries, and supports regional

approaches to peacekeeping and humanitarian crises. This

is done through bilateral security assistance programs,

ACRI, regional exercises, support to the OAU Crisis

Management Center, and to subregional organizations like

SADC and ECOWAS. When humanitarian crises do occur,

the United States seeks to stabilize the situation while

helping other states and agencies take over the mission. To

prepare to provide a prompt response to humanitarian

38
crises, EUCOM and CENTCOM components conduct joint

task force (JTF) exercises with African humanitarian relief

scenarios. The U.S. military also maintains relationships

with international organizations that might participate in

an African disaster.

Regional engagement activities in Africa include:

• Combined exercises such as Military Medical

Exercises in Africa (MEDFLAG) and the FLINTLOCK

regional program which is a Joint Chiefs of Staff-sponsored

exercise designed to promote regional cooperation.

154

• Combined training including Joint Combined

Exchange Training (JCET) exercises in which U.S. Special

Forces train with host nation forces.

• The African Crisis Response Initiative.

• Combined education including the African Center for

Security Studies.

• Military contacts including flag officer visits, maritime

engagement programs such as port calls, civil affairs

democracy seminars, civil-military relations mobile

training teams, chaplain programs, assistance to the OAU

Crises Management Exercise, steps to enhance interoperability with potential coalition partners, including the

United Kingdom and France.

• Security assistance programs including foreign

military financing (FMF); foreign military sales (FMS);

foreign military sales—training (FMS-T); direct

commercial sales (DCS); International Military Education

and Training (IMET), which sends officers and

noncommissioned officers from 31 African countries to

American military schools; expanded IMET, which provides

training for other sorts of security officials; and the excess

defense articles (EDA) program.

• Humanitarian assistance programs including

Humanitarian Assistance Program—Excess Property

(HAP-EP); Humanitarian Civil Assistance Program (HCA)

39
in which U.S. military units on overseas training and

operational deployments conduct humanitarian projects

such as well drilling and school construction; Humanitarian

Assistance Program (HA), which provides funding for

humanitarian projects; and demining activities.

There are other combined exercises as well. In May 1999,

for instance, an exercise aimed at enhancing Kenya’s ability

to patrol its coastline and detect drug traffickers involved

the U.S. Coast Guard as well as the Kenyan Navy, military

police, Wildlife Service, and Revenue Authority.

155

 All of

these exercises and programs are prioritized according to

the capability of the partner state to help meet American

objectives. 

Strategic Adjustments.

Current American national security strategy in Africa is

not seriously flawed. Given the limited strategic resources

that the United States can (or should) expend there, the

narrowness of public concern for the continent, and the

vacillations in concern among American political leaders,

the strategy that emerged after the Cold War adequately

protected American national interests in Sub-Saharan

Africa. It could, however, be refined. This is vital if the

United States is to capitalize on its current position to help

build a more stable and prosperous Africa.

Grand Strategy. Ultimately, Africa’s economic future

depends on two things. First is the continuation of reform to

make Africa attractive to global capital. This entails

controlling or eradicating corruption and nepotism,

building effective legal systems, implementing transparent

government budgeting procedures, and integrating local

banking systems with global ones. These are not easy steps

and will continue to encounter resistance. Because Africa’s

colonial past is so recent, sensitivity to autonomy and

sovereignty remain intense. But in today’s globalizing

economy, some degree of autonomy and sovereignty must be

surrendered if a state is to prosper.

156

 A state can choose

40
poverty-stricken autonomy or integration with at least the

potential for prosperity. Africans must comes to grips with

this. The second determinant of Africa’s future is success at

cultivating the continent’s own entrepreneurs. This

includes both business entrepreneurs who must make and

lead an economic revolution, and political entrepreneurs

who must help build a vibrant civil society that can

counterbalance the power of the government and provide a

training ground for future leaders. States which prosper

will be those which support their entrepreneurs by

education, providing access to venture capital, opening

markets by ending state monopolies and cronyism, and

building legal systems to mitigate the risk inherent in

entrepreneurship. 

The United States should actively support the growth of

African entrepreneurs, both economic ones and political

ones. This is not something best done through

government-to-government mechanisms. The Clinton

policy reflects this. Rather than follow the old, failed

procedures of foreign assistance, the administration has

sought to integrate Africa into the world community

through trade preferences and debt relief. This is a useful

start, but there should be a “micro” level to this strategy to

support the “macro” level. The United States should help

build Africa’s economic private sector both by encouraging

trade and investment, and by finding ways for the American

private sector to provide business and entrepreneurial

education, training, and advice throughout Africa.

Since integration into the global economy is a

prerequisite for economic success, Washington should, in

conjunction with friends in Europe and Asia, develop a

comprehensive program to help Africa become more

“wired.”

157

 This would entail a wide range of educational

programs as well as supporting private sector efforts to

build information infrastructures. Efforts are underway in

this arena. In October 1999 the Global Information

Infrastructure Commission—Africa, which is a forum for

African private sector leaders to advance their region’s

41
information infrastructure, held its first meeting in Addis

Ababa.

158

 Hopefully, this will be a first step in a long-term

process. At a broader level, the Center for International

Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of

Commerce that promotes private enterprise and market

institutions, should become involved in Africa. So far this

organization has focused on Latin America, Eastern

Europe, and the former Soviet Union, but has the potential

to support American strategy in Africa as well.

159

 A

coherent American strategy for Africa would help link and

support these private-sector initiatives.

This same general rule holds with the building of civil

society. American strategy should find a way to encourage

the immensely rich civil sector in the United States to

provide assistance and advice to African counterparts.

American community and local political organizers are

best-equipped to assist Africans with these sorts of

functions. Work done by organizations like the

International Republican Institute and the National

Democratic Institute for International Affairs is vital and

should form an integral element of American policy.

160

 The

same holds for outreach efforts by American trade unions

and civic organizations of all types. Organizations like the

Center for Civil Society International also do very

important work encouraging collaboration between

voluntary organizations in the United States and their

counterparts in the former Soviet Union.

161

 Something

similar is needed in Africa.

In general, U.S. strategy on the continent must find

creative ways to link private and nongovernmental

initiatives with official actions. Such an approach would be

difficult to bring to fruition. Strategy usually entails

government-to-government relationships. American

policymakers still think terms of what the U.S. Government

can provide African governments. Certainly government

actions must be central. Africa will never attain stability

and security, for instance, without major debt relief. The

U.S. Government can and must take the lead on this. But, at

42
the same time, Africa cannot build prosperous stable

democracies without vibrant private sectors of the economy

and active civil societies. These things need jump starts. A

creative, truly “out of the box” American grand strategy that

encourages them could prove significant, perhaps even

decisive.

Defense Strategy. In the defense realm, the United

States should move toward deeper ties with a more narrow

range of partners. African states that meet stringent

conditions, particularly real political and economic reform

(not “one man, one vote, one time”) including the regular

transfer of political power, effective rule by law, and serious

progress on stifling corruption, should have access to a

wider array of security assistance. Certain activities should

remain open to all African states, including participation in

the African Center for Security Studies and cooperation on

humanitarian relief. For other things, the bar should be

raised higher. Those who meet the conditions also should

have trade preferences, debt relief, economic assistance,

and ready access to IMET and other types of military

engagement activities. The United States might even

consider some sort of limited security guarantees for

partners who meet the conditions and desire them.

The United States should also use every means available

to encourage Africans to abandon proxy aggression. States

that practice it should face international sanctions. The

United States should lead efforts in the U.N. to have proxy

aggression treated the same as overt cross-border

aggression. The United States should also encourage its

Africa partners to explore the idea of formal mutual security

and nonaggression pacts. These things have been absent

from the region largely because African states have clung to

the notion that the OAU already institutionalizes sovereign

equality and nonaggression. This is simply fiction. Africans

would greatly benefit from greater formalization of the

principles which undergird the OAU. While this would not

immediately purge proxy aggression from the continent, it

could help deter it.

43
Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration appears to

be moving toward actual involvement in proxy aggression

rather than discouragement of it. In November 1999,

administration officials, led by Assistant Secretary of State

Susan Rice, developed a plan to provide food assistance to

the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. While this new policy

was explained on humanitarian grounds, it is widely seen as

an attempt to pressure and isolate the government in

Khartoum similar to the “Reagan Doctrine” while provided

aid to anti-communist guerrillas in Latin America and

Africa.

162

Instead of supporting insurgents, the United States

should discourage them. This should include helping its

African partners to develop better doctrine and training for

counterinsurgency. The prime security threat faced by

African militaries is some form of internal insurgency, often

with external sponsorship. The United States, along with

many militaries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America,

learned that an insurgency cannot be countered solely with

military means. Counterinsurgency requires a holistic

strategy with political and economic components designed

to augment the legitimacy of the government and transform

the military into the protector of the nation’s citizens.

163

African militaries are far behind the rest of the world in

understanding this. A refined American security strategy

for Africa should stress counterinsurgency strategy and

make use of advisers from other states who have been

successful at it.

At the same time, the U.S. military should reorganize

the way it allocates responsibility for Africa. Currently,

Africa is a poor stepchild in several of the unified commands

which are responsible for American military activities.

Since EUCOM focuses—logically enough—on Europe and

the Central Command on the Persian Gulf, attention to

Africa is erratic. The commanders of EUCOM and

CENTCOM have little time to devote to the region and only

pay it serious attention during crises. By concentrating

responsibility for U.S. military activities in Africa into one

44
unified command, creating a subunified command, and

giving a single flag officer full responsibility for the region,

attention might be less fleeting.

The United States must also explore the creative use of

contractors in African security. Because of Africa’s

historical experience with mercenaries, its leaders are

extremely sensitive to the privatization of security

functions. Yet Africa is a region where contractors can help

compensate for the weaknesses of state security services,

particularly in high-skill areas like intelligence analysis,

logistics, engineering, and medical services. There will be

any number of instances where American money would be

most effectively spent by hiring contractors to substitute

either for African militaries or for the American military. As

one example, the Alexandria, Virginia-based firm of

Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI),

which is composed primarily of retired U.S. military

officers, is developing and implementing the curriculum of

the African Center for Security Studies. MPRI, under

contract to the U.S. Department of State and United States

Agency For International Development, has also formed a

team to build a detailed action plan for the transformation

of the Nigerian military and Ministry of Defence.

164

 In the

American response to the conflict in Rwanda in 1994,

contractors like Brown and Root Corporation played a major

role in providing relief services, and thus lessening the

burden on the American military. The key is to be very

careful. MPRI and Brown and Root are above reproach.

165

 If

the United States does rely more on contractors in Africa, it

must assure these high standards remain in place.

Refinement of American strategy also demands a more

astute understanding of Africa. Conflict there is seldom

about ideas or ideology, and only about ethnicity or identity

in an indirect way. Nearly every African conflict is a

struggle for resources. As repugnant as the idea is, the most

effective way to quell African conflicts may be to buy out the

leaders of warring sides. While this could probably not be

done literally, it might be possible to offer faction leaders

45
things like training and loans which would allow them to

satisfy their desire for material reward in a nonviolent

fashion. The treatment of Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe

might serve as a model for this. Following the end of the war

there, Nkomo was encouraged to withdraw from politics

through a series of actions that allowed him to become

extremely wealthy—by some accounts, the richest person in

the country.

166

 Of course, the ultimate resolution of a

conflict also requires addressing the needs that motivated

the rank and file—any conflict resolution package must

include focused development assistance from some source.

But leaders who do not have their personal desires (or

personal greed) sated will often return to the field at some

point in time.

Shaping. For the U.S. military, the key to shaping

activities in Africa is professional military education.

Nothing can bring larger rewards for a smaller investment.

The money that the United States spends on African

professional military education helps African states

improve civil military relations and build more effective

security forces, but also establishes working relationships

between Americans and Africans that are invaluable during

coalition operations. The prime complaint that most

Africans have about American professional military

education is its limited availability. There are simply too

few slots at the American staff and war colleges for

Africans.

167

 Admittedly, there are good reasons for this: the

United States has many friends and allies around the world

and only so many seats in its military schools, but if the

efforts in Africa were focused on a handful of true partners

and provided regularly, the impact of professional military

education would be augmented. In addition, the United

States should follow the example of Great Britain and

France, and supply an instructor to some of the Africa war

and staff colleges. South Africa, Ghana, Zimbabwe,

Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire (pending the return of civilian

government), and Kenya would all be good candidates.

46
ACRI and ACSS are useful means of shaping the African

security environment, but both need refinement and

expansion. ACRI needs continued salesmanship. This

should be “bottom up” as well as “top down.” While

Ambassador Marshall McCallie, who headed the ACRI

Interagency Working Group from 1997-1999, and the U.S.

defense attaches in Africa have done yeoman work in

explaining ACRI, the effort must continue. Both the

Department of Defense and the Department of State should

sponsor ACRI (or, better yet, regional peacekeeping)

seminars or conferences throughout Africa. Phrased

differently, ACRI needs a broad based “engagement plan”

with both international and domestic components. ACRI

should also expand training to include support to civilian

officials during natural disasters and pandemic disease as

well as peacekeeping.

The next step should be a program to augment the ability

of Africans to plan, command, and control both

humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. No

African country currently has the capability to deploy a

headquarters for a multi-brigade operation in any but the

most peaceful environments.

168

 Developing such capability

could begin with a regular series of wargames, staff

exercises, and simulations involving a range of African

participants (both military and civilian) as well as

Americans and Europeans. American facilities such as the

Army’s Battle Command Training Program, simulation

programs run by private corporations, and the Army’s

Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks could

provide the appropriate venue for this. Regular staff talks

and conferences involving Africans, Europeans, and

Americans could pave the way. African countries generally

lack the funds to support such conferences, so their external

partners should be willing to pick up the tab.

Even now American strategists should plan for the

future development of ACSS. One fruitful line might be to

think of ACSS as the first college in an African “democratic

university.” In other words, the United States (and its

47
European allies) should consider ACSS-like schools for law

enforcement, economics, and political organization in

addition to defense planning and management. All of these

could be affiliated colleges of some sort of overarching

university. The U.S. Department of Defense and the

Congress must sustain support for ACSS and consider

expanding it so that African states can build the expertise

they need in the defense arena. To push the process even

further, the United States should run regular seminars for

African defense scholars and civilian defense officials.

Publication of a journal dealing with African security affairs

would be helpful. And, the United States should consider

including African civilians as students in its war colleges. At

a more fundamental level, the United States must make a

long-term commitment to ACSS. So far the Clinton

Administration has not given it a strong institutional

sponsor to manage it and, more importantly, serve as its

advocate in the budgetary process.

The United States should actively support African-led

and designed programs to improve regional cooperation in

peacekeeping even if we have little control over them. A key

form of support could be funding for transporting the

“players” from African countries to exercise sites. The next

step would be to begin augmenting the ability of African

militaries to provide their own logistics, mobility, and

intelligence support. They could develop the capacity to

plan, lead, and control even more complex peacekeeping

operations within 5 years if given appropriate assistance. It

will be at least 10 years before most African militaries could

deploy and sustain peacekeeping forces for extended

periods of time far beyond their national borders without

assistance. 

The United States should actively pursue the greater

involvement of Army National Guard units in shaping the

African security environment. Army Special Forces were

precisely the right units to provide the first phase of ACRI

training, but it is time for a shift. Involving Army National

Guard units would be particularly beneficial because they

48
are experienced at supporting civilian authorities during

disasters and crises—specifically the skills African

militaries need. The National Guard State Sponsorship

Program through which the Army National Guard of a

specific state develops a partnership with the military of a

state from the former Soviet Union should be extrapolated

to Africa. This would not only help expand the constituency

for Africa within the United States, but would also help

African nations better understand the advantages of a

military that includes a strong reserve component. In fact,

American strategy in Africa should actively encourage

nations there to consider moving toward a military with a

small professional cadre and a larger reserve component,

both as a means of stretching defense budgets and

improving civil-military relations.

Responding. Americans often have a difficult time

understanding African conflicts, in part because our

Clausewitzian mindset leads us to believe that all organized

violence is directed at political goals. That is only partially

true for many of Africa’s brutal, low-level wars where

violence is used as much for group bonding and psychic

fulfillment as for the attainment of political objectives. In

places like Sierra Leone and Rwanda, passion totally

subsumes “reason.” Even for the warlords who make and

lead such wars, the goals are less purely political than

economic. Political power and military strength bring

wealth which can be used both for personal consumption

and to fuel a patronage network. The American approach to

Africa’s wars is to encourage a negotiated settlement and

political power sharing. This seldom works if the greed of

the warlords is not sated. Buying off rebel leaders—however

repugnant—might be more effective and efficient.

One thing about Africa is certain: the United States will

be asked to participate in intervention of one sort or the

other. When this happens, Washington should participate

in operations that: (1) are authorized by a resolution of the

U.N. or OAU; and, (2) seek to restore a democratically

elected government, create sanctuaries for humanitarian

49
relief in a conflict where no cease-fire exists, or enforce a

cease-fire and negotiations in a traditional “Chapter VI”

style peacekeeping operation. In nearly all cases, American

military support to such interventions should take the form

of planning, intelligence, training, logistics, and mobility

rather than the use of U.S. combat forces.

Given the likelihood of African interventions, the

EUCOM should establish a permanent joint task force

(JTF) to provide support (preferably under a subunified

command). This JTF should have standing liaisons with the

CENTCOM, European states interested in Africa,

international organizations and nongovernmental

organizations active in Africa, and as many African states

as can provide them. It should have two missions. The first

would be to augment regional understanding and

cooperation before crises occur by making maximum use of

educational, training, and research resources of the U.S.

military. To do this, the JTF should: (1) hold wargames,

conferences, and exercises tailored to the needs of African

militaries and focusing on command and control of

humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations; (2) assist

with African peacekeeping exercises like the “bird” series

held by SADC (Blue Hungwe, Blue Crane); (3) hold an

annual “reunion” of African graduates of American military

schools in order to renew and strengthen professional

working relationships; and (4) publish a journal (in both

English and French) that focuses specifically on military

professionalism, civil military relations, and multinational

operations in Africa. The second mission of the JTF would

be control of American military involvement in actual

interventions.

169

Conclusions.

In the coming decade, Africa is likely to move one step

forward and one step backwards, often at the same time.

Some nations will take strides in their quest for stability,

prosperity, and democracy by taking the steps necessary to

integrate into the globalizing economy. Others will regress.

50
There will always be a tendency in the United States to

write the continent off, in part because its problems are

complex and difficult for Americans to understand. This

would be a mistake—a small investment of strategic

resources in Africa has the potential to pay big dividends.

But so long as American strategy focuses purely on

government-to-government initiatives and so long as it

treats all African states except the most egregious abusers

of human rights as equally deserving partnership, its

impact will be diluted, distorted, and muted. A strategy of

conditional engagement would more effectively use the

limited strategic resources that the United States can

expend in Africa, but would generate criticism from both

Africa and from elements of the American Africanist

community. African states have long resisted attempts to

“divide” them. For instance, when the Clinton Administration planned a March 1999 conference on African

economic development and technological cooperation, it

initially invited only select countries, particularly those

committed to economic liberalization and free trade. But

African leaders objected, arguing that it is “inappropriate”

for the administration to “pick favorites.”

170

In reality, it is perfectly appropriate. So long as the

United States bends to African pressure to treat all states

there equally, U.S. policy will provide only limited incentive

for those truly committed to reform. The United States has a

perfect right to establish the conditions for assistance by

whatever criteria it deems appropriate. The United States

has no moral obligation to provide assistance or

partnership, and no nation has a “right” to it. By increasing

the rewards for real economic and political reform, a

strategy of constrained engagement would better encourage

it. Those African states truly committed to reform must

develop the courage to weather the criticism that their

foresight provokes from their regressive brethren. U.S.

policy should assist this through conditional engagement. If

this provokes criticism, so be it.

51
In the military realm, Africa will remain an arena where

relatively low-cost military-to-military contacts, if done

wisely, in a spirit of partnership, and consistently, can have

major payoffs. Africa is not a warfighting theater; military

professional education will remain the prime resource of

American security policy. The United States should use it to

maximum benefit, adopting programs that reward African

military partners who continue on the path to reform and

severing ties with those who do not. At the same time, the

United States should press for the rationalization of African

militaries, including adoption of a reserve based force. And,

U.S. strategy should assure that African civilian leaders

have the education and tools to exercise effective oversight.

During the last year of his presidency, President Clinton

elevated African issues on his list of national priorities.

171

 In

December 1999, the American representative to the U.N.,

Richard C. Holbrooke, announced a series of new initiatives

designed to help resolve ongoing African crises.

172

 In

January 2000, Vice President Al Gore presided over a

session of the U.N. Security Council which was to deal with

the spread of AIDS in Africa—the first time that body ever

focused on a health issue.

173

 At about the same time,

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright was participating

in discussions on the formation of a U.N. peacekeeping force

to help implement a settlement in Congo.

174

These are useful steps, but the refinement of American

strategy in Africa continues to face pressing problems. It

remains very difficult to convince Congress to support

activities in Africa. For instance, at the same time that

Secretary Albright was participating in the talks designed

to end the conflict in Congo—which is sometimes called

“Africa’s first world war”—Senator John Warner (R-VA),

chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stated

that the United States should focus on conflict resolution in

the Balkans and reject further commitments in Africa.

175

This illustrates the fragility of congressional interest in

Africa.

176

 In the House of Representatives, AfricanAmerican members usually provide a foundation of support.

52
But in the Senate, Africa is a tough sell. When there are

champions for Africa like Senator Dick Clark (D-IA) in the

1970s or Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) in the 1980s, interest

and support are somewhat higher. In the absence of such a

champion, Africa receives very little attention and the

architects of America’s Africa strategy must worry about

sustaining even successful programs like ACRI.

But even the best designed American strategy for Africa

backed by constant effort will not work miracles. Only

African leaders can determine whether the continent moves

toward prosperity and stability or disintegrates into further

misery. But with a small investment of strategic resources,

the United States might be able to tip the scales, at least in

key countries. A strategy of persistent, conditional

engagement would help. Africa has a great need for creative

approaches to its problems, and a refined American strategy

can help provide them. Amani iwe kwenu.

ENDNOTES

In 1998 the Foreign Broadcast Information Service replaced the

paper version of its reports with Internet reports. This study includes

citations to both the old and new versions.

1. Arms and Conflict in Africa, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, July 1999, p. 1, reprinted at

http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/9907_africa_conflict.html.

2. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC:

The White House, October 1998, pp. 54-57. (Henceforth National

Security Strategy 1998.) For the sake of brevity, the word “Africa” will be

used throughout this manuscript to mean “Sub-Saharan Africa.”

3. United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of International

Security Affairs, August 1995, p. 3.

4. For a comprehensive study of this tendency, see Peter J.

Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, New York: Cambridge University Press,

1994. Also useful is Michael Clough, Free At Last? U.S. Policy Toward

53
Africa and the End of the Cold War, New York: Council on Foreign

Relations Press, 1992.

5. National Security Strategy 1998,pp. 54-55.

6. Susan E. Rice, “United States Interests in Africa: Post-Cold War,

Post-Apartheid,” the 1999 Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture, Rhodes

House, Oxford, England, May 13, 1999, reprinted at http://www.state

.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990513_rice_oxford.html.

7. Susan E. Rice, “U.S. Interests in Africa: Today’s Perspective,”

Address at the Columbia University Institute of International and

Public Affairs, October 20, 1998, transcript at http://www.state.gov

/www/regions/africa/rice_981020.html.

8. Rice, “United States Interests in Africa: Post-Cold War,

Post-Apartheid.”

9. U.S. Trade and Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, Fact Sheet

released by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs,

March 27, 1998, at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/fs_

trade_980327.html.

10. For background on the two organizations, see “Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS),” Fact Sheet Released by

the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, March 4, 1998;

and “The Southern Africa Development Community,” Fact Sheet

Released by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs,

December 4, 1997. For analysis, see ‘Funmi Olonisakin, “Rethinking

Regional Security in Africa: An Analysis of ECOWAS and SADC,”

Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol. 20, No. 2, November 1998, pp.

44-75; and Michelle Pitts, “Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict:

The ECOMOG Experiment,” The Journal of Conflict Studies, Vol. 19,

No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 49-68.

11. While linguistic divisions were significant before and

immediately after decolonization (which stretched from the late 1950s

to the 1990s, peaking in the 1960s), they are less so now.

12. For instance, Michele Maringues, “Analysis,” Le Monde (Paris),

June 11, 1997, p. 4, reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service

(FBIS)-WEU-97-113; and, “Cooperation Minister: France Lost Ground

to U.S. in Africa,” AFP (Paris) broadcast of August 29, 1997, transcript

in FBIS-WEU-97-241. 

13. Jacques Isnard, “France Overhauling African Military Setup,”

Le Monde (Paris), July 21, 1997, p. 2, reprinted in FBIS-WEU-97-203;

54
and, “European Partners Urged to Fight U.S. Influence in Africa,” AFP

(Paris) broadcast, July 4, 1997, reprinted in FBIS-WEU-97-185.

14. This assessment is based on the author’s discussion with African

military officers and defense officials during visits to Mali, Burkina

Faso, and Senegal in 1998.

15. “Official Details Portuguese-Angolan Military Cooperation,”

broadcast on Radio Nacional Network, Luanda, May 19, 1999, reprinted

on the FBIS Internet site, May 19, 1999.

16. “South Africa for Military Cooperation With Saudi Arabia,”

broadcast on Saudi Arabian Television Network, Riyadh, May 21, 1999,

transcript on the FBIS Internet site, May 21, 1999; “Agreement on

Mutual Cooperation Signed With Sudan,” broadcast on KCNA,

Pyongyang, May 3, 1999, transcript on the FBIS Internet site, May 3,

1999; and, “Iran, Zimbabwe To Expand Defense Ties,” broadcast on

IRNA, Tehran, May 8, 1999, transcript on the FBIS Internet site, May 8,

1999.

17. See Azzedine Layachi, “The OAU and Western Sahara: A Case

Study,” in Yassin El-Ayouty, ed., The Organization of African Unity

after Thirty Years, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

18. ‘funmi Olonisakin, “African ‘Homemade’ Peacekeeping

Initiatives,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp.

350-356.

19. James O.C. Jonah, “The OAU: Peace Keeping and Conflict

Resolution,” in El-Ayouty, ed., The Organization of African Unity after

Thirty Years, pp. 9-12; and, I. William Zartman, “African Regional

Security and Changing Patterns of Relations,” in Edmond J. Keller and

Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in the New International Order:

Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security, Boulder, CO:

Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp. 53-55.

20. The Cairo Declaration of 1993 committed the OAU to enhance its

conflict resolution and management capability. The United States has

provided modest support for this. It remains to be seen whether it will

succeed.

21. For a good summary of U.N. activities in Africa, see Christopher

Clapham, “The United Nations and Peacekeeping in Africa,” in Mark

Malan, ed., Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?, Halfway House, South

Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

55
22. See Jakkie Cilliers, “The SADC Organ for Defence, Politics, and

Security,” Institute for Defence Policy Papers, No. 10, October 1996; and,

Mark Malan, SADC and Sub-Regional Security: Unde Venis et Quo

Vadis, Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies,

1998.

23. “Lesotho Foreign Minister Defends Request for SADC Aid,”

broadcast on Johannesburg SAPA, September 22, 1998, reprinted on

the FBIS Internet site, September 22, 1998.

24. “Yearender Views Africa in the 21

st

 Century,” Xinhua (Beijing),

December 22, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS Internet site, December 21,

1999.

25. Olonisakin, “African ‘Homemade’ Peacekeeping Initiatives,” pp.

356-365. See also Eboe Hutchful, “The ECOMOG Experience With

Peacekeeping in West Africa,” in Malan, ed., Whither Peacekeeping in

Africa?

26. See Max A. Sesay, “Collective Security or Collective Disaster?:

Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 26, No.

2, June 1995, pp. 205-222; Stephen F. Burgess, “African Security in the

Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and

Multilateralism,” African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, September

1998, pp. 37-61; Roy May and Gerry Cleaver, “African Peacekeeping:

Still Dependent?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 2, Summer

1997, pp. 1-12; and Earl Conteh-Morgan, “Conflict and Militarization in

Africa: Past Trends and New Scenarios,” Conflict Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.

1, Winter 1993, pp. 39-40.

27. Dan Henk, Peace and Security in Africa: Contributions by the

United States, Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security

Studies, 1999, pp. 23-25.

28. For analysis, see Richard Cornwell, “The Collapse of the African

State,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, eds. Peace, Profit or

Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies,

Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

29. “Unmaking and Remaking the State,” Africa Confidential, Vol.

36, No. 1, January 6, 1995, p. 1.

30. See Gumisai Mutume, “The Economics of Financing War in

Africa,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), October 20, 1999

(electronic download); and Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, and Ralph

Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human

Security, Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2000.

56
31. In December 1999, Uganda and Sudan signed a peace

agreement in which they pledged to stop supporting rebel movements

attempting to overthrow the other. See Karl Vick, “Uganda Signs Peace

Deal With Sudan,” Washington Post, December 9, 1999, p. A33.

32. See Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, Armies and

Democracies in the New Africa:Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies

Institute, 1996.

33. “African Armies Can’t Stand Fire,” The Monitor (Kampala),

September 1, 1999, p. 2.

34. “Museveni Begins Probe Into Tank Purchase,” The New Vision

(Kampala), January 2, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS Internet site,

January 2, 1999; “Zimbabwe: Official Denies Extra Funds Sought for

DRC War,” South African Press Agency, Johannesburg, May 20, 1999,

reprinted on the FBIS Internet site, May 20, 1999.

35. South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana have commercial airlines and

ocean-going fleets which could used for military lift. Nigeria has

employed commercial shipping to transport its military forces into and

out of Liberia during the course its ECOMOG involvement.

36. Jean-Pierre Campagne, “Africa Still Torn Apart by Armed

Conflict in 1999,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), December

31, 1999 (electronic download).

37. Arms and Conflict in Africa.

38. “Angola Slides Toward Catastrophe,” story from the Associated

Press newswire, May 28, 1999.

39. Mark Malan, “The Crisis in External Response,” in Cillier and

Mason, eds. Peace, Profit or Plunder? p. 39.

40. Kofi Annan,The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable

Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, Secretary General’s

Report to the United Nations Security Council, April 16, 1998, p. 3.

41. David Rieff, “In Defense of Afro-Pessimism,” World Policy

Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 1998/99, p. 11.

42. Douglas Farah, “Nigerian Leader Pushes for Debt Relief,”

Washington Post, October 30, 1999, p. A20.

57
43. World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1998, external debt

chart at http://www.worldbank.org/data/gdf/edt_gdf2.pdf.

44. Lewis Machipisa, “Africa Loses Millions Through Capital

Flight,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), May 13, 1999

(electronic download).

45. Normitsu Onishi, “Ivoirian’s Birthplace Recalls Its Brief,

Shining Moment as a Would-Be Capital.” New York Times, January 7,

2000 (electronic download).

46. See Chris Heman and Barbara Lipietz, Corruption and

Development: Some Perspectives, Halfway House, South Africa:

Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

47. David Passage, “Africa: New Realities and U.S. Policy,” Special

Warfare, Summer 1998, p. 26.

48. Farah, “Nigerian Leader Pushes for Debt Relief,” p. A20.

49. For instance, in a worldwide survey of corruption, Transparency

International has ranked many African states very low with Cameroon,

Tanzania, and Nigeria considered among the most corrupt.

Transparency International, “The Corruption Perceptions Index 1998,”

http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html.

50. Frederick Werema and Joseph S. Warioba, “Principles and

Guidelines to Combat Corruption,” a paper presented at the

International Conference on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding

Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials," Washington, DC,

February 24-26, 1999, reprinted at http://www.usia.gov/current

/news/geog/af/99022303.aaf.html?/products/washfile/newsitem

.shtml.

51. Karl Vick, “Uganda’s Glow Fades,” Washington Post, February

7, 1998, p. A23.

52. Stuart Eizenstat, “Corruption Corrodes Public Trust,”

comments before the Frameworks To Address Corruption Conference,

Washington, DC, October 8, 1998, reprinted on U.S. Information

Agency Washington File Internet site. World Bank President James

Wolfensohn has echoed the sentiment. See Charles W. Corey,

“Confronting Bribery and Corruption Key to Development,” U.S.

Information Service Washington File, February 23, 1999, reprinted at

http://www.usia.gov/current/news/geog/af/99022302.aaf.html?/

products/washfile/newsitem.shtml. 

58
53. Jerome Hule, “Africa Collected the Most Aid,” Daily Mail and

Guardian (Johannesburg), April 30, 1999 (electronic download).

54. Karen DeYoung, “Foreign Aid Shrinking in an Age of

Prosperity,” Washington Post, November 25, 1999, p. 1.

55. Rieff, “In Defense of Afro-Pessimism,” p. 11.

56. “Africa: Macroeconomic Overview,” Fact Sheet released by the

U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, March 27, 1998.

57. United Nations Economic and Social Policy Division, Economic

Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 1998,

http://www.un.org/Depts/eca/divis/espd/toc.htm.

58. “Africa: Macroeconomic Overview.”

59. Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries

1998/99: Beyond Financial Crisis, Appendix 1: Regional Economic

Prospects, http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep98-99/appx1/

safrica.htm.

60. Marina Ottaway, “Africa: Think Again,” Foreign Policy, No. 114,

Spring 1999, p. 20.

61. “Exploitation Turning Vast Areas of Africa Into a Virtual

Wasteland,” CNN.com, October 16, 1999 (electronic download).

62. Annan, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable

Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, p. 3. An exception to this

was the British method of “indirect rule” used in Northern Nigeria and a

few other places. This, like London’s administrative policy in India, left

local political structures intact, and ruled through them.

63. The concept of “personal rule” in this context was developed in

Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa:

Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1982.

64. Larry Diamond,Prospects for Democratic Development in Africa, 

Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1997,

p. 2. See also John A. Wiseman, The New Struggle for Democracy in

Africa, Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1996; and Marina Ottaway, ed.,

Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead, Boulder, CO: Lynne

Rienner, 1997.

59
65. Susan E. Rice, “Democracy in Africa,” statement before the

Subcommittee on Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

Washington,DC,March12,1998,reprinted at http://www.state.gov/

www/regions/africa/rice_98312.html.

66. Richard Joseph, “Africa, 1990-1997: From Abertura to Closure,”

Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9, No. 2, April 1998, pp. 3-17; and, Cornwell,

“The Collapse of the African State,” pp. 69-71.

67. Ottaway, “Africa,” p. 14.

68. UNAIDS Press Release, Abidjan, December 7, 1997.

69. “AIDS Is Biggest Killer in Africa—UN Report,” Daily Mail and

Guardian (Johannesburg), May 13, 1999 (electronic download).

70. UNAIDS/WHO, Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and

Sexually Transmitted Disease: Zimbabwe, 1998, p. 3.

71. UNAIDS/WHO, Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV/AIDS and

Sexually Transmitted Disease: Botswana, 1998, p. 3.

72. United Nations Population Division, Department and Economic

and Social Affairs, The Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS, reprinted at

http://www.popin.org/pop1998/6.htm.

73. Samantha Sharpe, “AIDS Is Business’s ‘Single Biggest Crisis’,”

Johannesburg Business Day, January 27, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS

Internet site, January 27, 1999.

74. Lynne Duke, “Ignorance Feeds Deadly South African AIDS

Epidemic,” Washington Post, February 16, 1999, p. A1.

75. Mokgadi Pela, “SA’s AIDS Time Bomb,” Johannesburg Sowetan, 

December 1, 1998, reprinted on the FBIS Internet site, December 1,

1998; Dan Fuphe, “HIV-AIDS Spreading Rapidly in S. Africa,”

Johannesburg Sowetan, November 23, 1998, reprinted on the FBIS

Internet site, November 23, 1998.

76. “Health Minister Says 5.8 Million HIV Positive,” The Guardian

(Lagos), December 2, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS Internet site,

December 2, 1999.

77. Jon Jeter, “AIDS Sickening African Economies,” Washington

Post, December 12, 1999, p. A1.

60
78. Reports by U.S. embassy personnel, Harare, to the author, June

1998.

79. Phalane Motale, “Shock Claim About HIV in Police Force,”

Johannesburg Star, December 1, 1998, reprinted on the FBIS Internet

site, December 1, 1998.

80. “Ugandan President Says Army Losing Most Officers to AIDS,”

The New Vision (Kampala), January 31, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS

Internet site, January 31, 1999.

81. Claire Bisseker, “Africa’s Military Time Bomb,” Johannesburg

Financial Mail, December 11, 1998, reprinted on the FBIS Internet site,

December 11, 1998.

82. Discussions between the author and U.S. military attaches to

several African countries.

83. See Lester R. Brown, Gary Gardner, and Brian Halweil, Beyond

Malthus: Sixteen Dimensions of the Population Problem, Worldwatch

Paper Number 143, Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1998.

84. Molly O’Meara, “Exploring a New Vision for Cities,” in State of

the World 1999: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a

Sustainable Society, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 136.

85. William Gutteridge, “Undoing Military Coups in Africa,” Third

World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1985, p. 79. This point is a

common one among writers on Africa. See, for instance, Claude E.

Welch, Jr., No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics

in Africa and Latin America, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987, p. 4; and

John W. Harbeson, “Military Rulers in African Politics,” in John W.

Harbeson, ed., The Military in African Politics, New York: Praeger,

1987, p. 2.

86. For an elaboration of this argument, see Kent H. Butts and

Steven Metz, Armies and Democracy in the New Africa: Lessons from

Nigeria and South Africa, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War

College Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

87. See Steven Metz, “The Conceptual Transformation of the South

African Military: Changing Strategy, Ethos, and Civil-Military

Relations,” in Robert Rotberg, ed., War and Peace in Southern Africa:

Crime, Drugs, Armies, and Trade, Washington, DC: Brookings

Institution Press, 1998.

61
88. Story recounted to the author by a former international military

advisor with experience in Zimbabwe, 1998.

89. Arms and Conflict in Africa.

90. Ibid.

91. “Museveni Begins Probe Into Tank Purchase.”

92. Virginia Gamba and Sarah Meek, “Introduction,” in Virginia

Gamba, ed., Society Under Seige: Licit Responses to Illicit Arms,

Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1998, pp.

3-4. See also Sarah Meek, ed., Controlling Small Arms Proliferation and

Reversing Cultures of Violence in Africa and the Indian Ocean, Halfway

House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1998; and, Tandeka

Nkiwane, Martinho Chachiua, and Sarah Meek, Weapons Flows in

Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland, Halfway House, South Africa:

Institute for Security Studies, 1999.

93. Message from Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the

Organization of African Unity to the First Continental Conference of

African Experts on Landmines, Kempton Park, South Africa, May

19-21, 1997, reprinted in Jakkie Cilliers, ed., Toward a Landmine-free

Africa: The OAU and the Legacy of Anti-personnel Mines, Halfway

House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, p. 7.

94. United Nations Security Council resolution 1209, November 19,

1998, United Nations document S/1998/1091.

95. See Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries, New York:

Paragon House, 1987.

96. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., “Pocketing the Wages of War,” New York

Times, February 16, 1997 (electronic edition); Howard W. French, “In

Zaire’s Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for Combat,” New

York Times, February 12, 1997 (electronic edition); AFP (Paris),

broadcast of January 24, 1997, transcript in FBIS-AFR-97-016; AFP

(Paris), broadcast of January 21, 1997, transcript in FBIS-AFR-97-014;

Stephen Laufer, “Further on Expansion of Mercenary Group,” Business

Day (Johannesburg), January 17, 1997 (electronic edition); Serge

Dumont, “Kinshasa Said To Have Recruited Israeli Mercenaries,” Le

Soir (Brussels), February 5, 1997, p. 7, reprinted in FBIS-AFR-97-024;

James C. McKinley Jr., “Mercenary Who Came to Zaire and Left a

Bloody Trail,” New York Times, March 19, 1997 (electronic edition);

Milan Radonjic, “Our Pilot Killed in Zaire,” Gradjanin (Belgrade), April

8, 1997, p. 10, reprinted in FBIS-EEU-97-100; Zoran Petrovic

Pirocanac, “More Than 1,000 Serb Republic Army Combatants—

62
Mercenaries in Zaire,” Blic (Belgrade), February 22-23, 1997, p. 6,

reprinted in FBIS-EEU-97-038; “Mercenary Force Reportedly Sent to

Zaire,” The Star (Johannesburg), December 2, 1996, p. 1, reprinted in

FBIS-AFR-96-233; and, Khareen Pech and James Tomlins, “Former

SADF Soldiers Said Joining White Legion in Zaire,” The Sunday

Independent (Johannesburg), January 12, 1997, p. 5, reprinted in

FBIS-AFR-97-008.

97. AFP (Paris), broadcast of January 24, 1997, transcript in

FBIS-AFR-97-016.

98. See David Isenberg, “Soldiers of Fortune, Ltd.: A Profile of

Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms,” Center for Defense

Information Monograph, November 1997; idem., “The New

Mercenaries,” Christian Science Monitor, October 13, 1998, p. 13; David

Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy, No. 112, Fall 1998, pp.

68-81; Khareen Pech, “Executive Outcomes—A Corporate Conquest,” in

Cilliers and Mason, eds., Peace, Profit, or Plunder?; and Herbert M.

Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of

Executive Outcomes,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2,

1998, pp. 307-331.

99. Robert Block, “African Supplier of Mercenaries Shuts, Says It

Wants to Give Peace a Chance,” Wall Street Journal, December 11,

1998, p. A13. For background on the legislation that led to Executive

Outcome’s demise, see Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, “Mercenaries

and Mischief: The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Bill,”

Institute for Security Studies Papers No. 25, September 1997.

100. Jimmy Seepe, “SA’s Dogs of War Move to E Europe,”

Johannesburg Sowetan, February 3, 1999, p. 7, reprinted on the FBIS

Internet site, February 3, 1999.

101. Jakkie Cilliers and Richard Cornwell, “Mercenaries and the

Privatisation of Security in Africa,” African Security Review, Vol. 8, No.

2, 1999, and, pp. 31-42.

102. Michelle Pitts, “Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict:

The ECOMOG Experiment,” Journal of Conflict Studies,Vol. 19, No. 1,

Spring 1999, pp. 49-68; and, Stephen F. Burgess, “African Security in

the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and

Multilateralism” African Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 2, September

1998, pp. 37-61.

103. For detail, see Steven Metz, Reform, Conflict, and Security in

Zaire, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies

Institute, 1996; and William G. Thom, “Congo-Zaire’s 1996-97 Civil War

63
in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the

Era of Independence,” a paper presented at the 40

th

 Annual Meeting of

the African Studies Association, Columbus, OH, November 1997.

104. See Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline

of the Zairian State, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.

105. “DRC Slams Door on SA Trade, Favours Zim,” The Zimbabwe

Independent (Harare), October 23, 1998, reprinted by AfricaNews

Online at http://www.africanews.org/central/congo-kinshasa/

stories/19981023_feat6.html.

106. Ian Fisher, “Uganda’s Help to Congo Rebels Raises Questions

About Motives,” New York Times, December 21, 1998 (electronic

reprint).

107. Herbert Howe, presentation at the Global Coalition on Africa

Seminar on the Privatization of Security in Africa, Washington, DC,

March 12, 1999.

108. J.L. Katambwa Mike, “Eleven Countries Said ‘Facing Off’ in

Eastern DRC,” Kinshasa Umoja, September 30, 1998, p. 2, reprinted on

the FBIS Internet site, October 15, 1998.

109. David Shearer, “Africa’s Great War,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 2,

Summer 1999, pp. 89-106.

110. In February 1999, Angola announced that it was withdrawing

its forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to focus on

its internal struggle against UNITA. See “Angola ‘Pulls Out’ of DRC,”

The Post of Zambia, February 24, 1999, reprinted by AfricaNews Online

at http://www.africanews.org/central/congo-kinshasa/stories/

19990224_feat1.html.

111. Lynne Duke, “Congo, Allies Beef Up Anti-Guerrilla Forces,”

Washington Post, October 24, 1998, p. A12.

112. Quoted in Stephen Laufer, “Congo Conflict May Explode Into

Continent-Wide War,” Business Day (South Africa), October 23, 1998,

reprinted on the Africa NewsOnline web site at http://www

.africanews.org/central/congo-kinshasa/stories/19981023_feat4.

html.

113. Karl Vick, “New African Leaders Turn on Each Other,”

Washington Post, September 2, 1999, p. A29.

64
114. “Museveni Says Uganda Ready for Full-Scale War in DRC,”

The New Vision (Kampala), August 31, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS

Internet site, August 31, 1999.

115. Lynne Duke, “Combatants Feel ‘Congo Effect’,” Washington

Post, January 29, 1999, p. A19.

116. The government of Zimbabwe claims that the cost of its

military intervention is being paid by Kabila’s government which is, in

turn, financed by an unidentified source, rumored to be Libya

(“Zimbabwe: Official Denies Extra Funds Sought for DRC War.”)

117. Vincent Mayanja, “Uganda: Minister Notes Increased Defense

Spending,” AFP, Paris, broadcast of May 19, 1999, transcript on the

FBIS Internet site, May 19, 1999.

118. “Obasanjo Says Deregulation in Economy to Continue,” New

Nigerian (Kaduna), December 24, 1999, reprinted on the FBIS Internet

site, December 27, 1999; and, Norimitsu Onishi, “Nigeria Leader

Amazes Many With Strong Anti-Graft Drive,” New York Times,

November 23, 1999 (electronic download).

119. Howard Jeter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African

Affairs, Testimony before the House International Relations

Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, August 3, 1999, reprinted at

http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990803_jeter_

nigeria.html.

120. Karl Vick, “Military Clamps Down in Ivory Coast,” Washington

Post, December 26, 1999, p. A33.

121. John Mw Makumbe, “Is There a Civil Society in Africa?”

International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2, April 1998, p. 317.

122. Thabo Mbeki, address to the Corporate Council on Africa’s

“Attracting Capital to Africa” Summit, Chantilly, VA, April 19, 1997,

reprinted at http://www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/1997/

sp970419.html; idem., “The African Renaissance, South Africa, and the

World,” speech at the United Nations University, April, 9, 1998,

reprinted at http://www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/

sp980409.html; and, idem., statement at the African Renaissance

Conference, Johannesburg, September 28, 1998, reprinted at

http://www.anc.org.za.ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/tm0928.html.

For analysis of Mbeki’s concept, see Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko,

“South Africa and the African Renaissance,” International Affairs, Vol.

74, No. 2, April 1998, pp. 271-288.

65
123. While the South African military is far more effective and

professional than the African norm, its weak performance during a 1998

intervention to quell a conflict in Lesotho did cause some analysts to

question its effectiveness. See, for instance, Howard Barrell, “Just How

Effective Is South Africa’s Army,” Electronic Mail and Guardian,

October 2, 1998. The South African National Defence Force is still mired

in the very complicated process of integrating diverse components,

including the apartheid-era South African Defence Force (SADF), the

military wings of the African National Congress (Umkhonto we Sizwe or

MK) and the Pan-African Congress, and the military forces of the former

“tribal homelands” of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei.

See Metz, “The Conceptual Transformation of the South African

Military”; and Jakkie Cilliers, ed., Continuity in Change: The SA Army

in Transition, Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security

Studies, 1998.

124. See the Binational Commission web page at http://www.usia

.gov/regional/bnc/usafrica/soafbnc.htm.

125. “U.S., S. Africa Plan for Closer Ties,” New York Times,

February 10, 1999 (electronic download).

126. Discussions by the author with U.S. embassy personnel,

Pretoria, June 1998.

127. Assistant Secretary of State Susan E. Rice, “Prospects for

Democracy in Nigeria,” statement before the House International

Relations Committee, June 25, 1998, reprinted at http://www.state.gov 

/www/regions/africa/rice_980625.html.

128. U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs, Narcotics Control Strategy, 1997, March

1998, reprinted at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law /

1997_narc_report/afrme97_part2.html.

129. Rice, “Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria.”

130. Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Constructive Disengagement: Western Efforts to Develop African Peacekeeping, Halfway House,

South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1998, pp. 13-22.

131. Jim Fisher-Thompson, “French General Details Renewed

Commitment to Africa,” USIS Washington File, June 3, 1999, reprinted

at http://www.eucom.mil/programs/acris/usis/99jun03.htm.

132. Conversations with the director of the Regional Peacekeeping

Centre by the author, Harare, June 1999.

66
133. “Japan To Offer 1.78 Billion Yen to Tanzania, Senegal,”

broadcast of Tokyo Kyodo News Service, June 21, 1999, transcript on

the FBIS Internet site, June 21, 1999; “Japan Pledges $1.5 Billion Over

Next Five Years,” Business Day (Johannesburg), June 17, 1999,

reprinted on the FBIS Internet site, June 19, 1999; “Japan To Give 1.5

Billion Yen Grant Aid to Zambia,” Tokyo Jiji Press, broadcast of June

29, 1999, transcript on the FBIS Internet site, June 29, 1999; and

“Japan Offers 1.95 Billion Yen Aid to Côte d’Ivoire,” Tokyo Kyodo News

Service, June 29, 1999, transcript on FBIS Internet site, June 29, 1999.

134. National Security Strategy 1998, pp. 54-57.

135. See Karl Vick, “Old Tactics, New Arms, Lethal Results,”

Washington Post, March 21, 1999, p. A25.

136. For background and analysis, see Dan Henk and Steven Metz,

The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The

African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.

137. By 1999, some of the training responsibilities were being

handled by contractors, particularly Military Professional Resources

International (MPRI) rather than U.S. Army Special Forces.

138. See the ACRI web site at http://www.eucom.mil/programs

/acri/index.htm.

139. Comments of Ambassador Aubrey Hooks quoted in Jim

Fisher-Thompson, “Secretary of State Albright Highlights U.S. Africa

Initiative,” USIS Washington File, October 18, 1999, reprinted at

http://www.eucom.mil/programs/acri/usis/99oct18.htm.

140. Author’s discussions with Ambassador Aubrey Hooks and

Scott Fisher of the ACRI Office of the U.S. Department of State,

November 1999 and January 2000.

141. Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Pickering Says U.S. Wanted To Work

With Nigerian Military,” USIS Washington File, November 8, 1999,

reprinted at http://www.eucom.mil/africa/nigeria/usis

/99nov08.htm; and, “U.S. Urges Nigeria To Join Africa Crisis Response

Program,” The Guardian (Lagos), December 20, 1999, reprinted on the

FBIS Internet site, December 20, 1999.

142. This section is based on the author’s conversations with

members of the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the

ACRI office at the Department of State.

67
143. White House Fact Sheet on the African Center for Security

Studies, April 3, 1998.

144. See Susan Ellis, “African Center for Strategic Studies Begin

November 1 in Dakar,” USIS Washington File, October 22, 1999,

reprinted at http://www.eucom.mil/programs/acri/usis/99oct22.

htm; and Cindy Elmore, “DOD Africa Center Session Puts Spotlight On

Stability,” European Stars and Stripes, November 23, 1999, p. 4.

145. Susan Rice, “U.S. Economic Policy Toward Africa,” address

before the Harvard University Business School, Africa Business

Conference, Boston, MA, January 30, 1999, reprinted at http://www.

state.gov/www/regions/africa/990130_rice.html.

146. Susan Rice, “U.S.-Africa Relations,” Remarks at the Agostinho

Neto University School of Architecture, Luanda, Angola, October 29,

1998, reprinted at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/

rice_981029.html; and Madeleine K. Albright, “U.S. Policy Toward

Africa,” address on U.S. Policy Toward Africa at George Mason

University, Fairfax, VA, March 19, 1998, reprinted at http://secretary.

state.gov/www/statements/1998/980319.html. See also “President’s

Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity and African Growth

and Opportunity Act,” fact sheet released by the U.S. State Department

Bureau of African Affairs, March 27, 1998; “U.S. Assistance and Debt

Relief in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Fact Sheet released by the U.S. State

Department Bureau of African Affairs, March 27, 1998; and Theodros

Dagne, “Africa: Trade and Development Initiatives by the Clinton

Administration and Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report

98-92, March 2, 1998.

147. Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

comments at the U.S.-Africa Energy Ministers Conference, Tucson,

December 14, 1999, reprinted at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_

remarks/1999/991214_rice_energy.html.

148. See, for instance, Secretary of State Albright’s statement

before the Senate Finance Committee, June 17, 1998, reprinted in U.S.

Department of State Dispatch, July 1998, pp. 9-11.

149. Susan Rice, Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of

the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC,

February 11, 1999, reprinted at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/

africa/990211_rice.html. At about the same time, Representative Jesse

L. Jackson, Jr. (D-Ill) introduced even more far-ranging legislation

called the Human Rights, Opportunity, Partnership and Empowerment

for Africa Act which called for debt relief and development assistance in

68
addition to trade preferences. See Guy Gugliotta, “Squaring Off Over

African Trade,” Washington Post, February 24, 1999, p. A4.

150. National Security Strategy 1998, p. 57.

151. Susan Rice, “Democracy in Africa,” statement before the

Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

March 12, 1998, reprinted at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/

africa/rice_980312.html.

152. Dana Priest, “U.S. Deepens African Military Contacts,”

Washington Post, December 13, 1998, p. A43. For detail and analysis,

see Dan Henk, Uncharted Paths, Uncertain Vision: U.S. Military

Involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Wake of the Cold War, U.S.

Air Force Academy, CO: USAF Institute for National Security Studies,

1998.

153. See the summary of the EUCOM strategy at http://www.

eucom.mil/africa/publications/STRATEGY.HTM.

154. For an outstanding analysis of MEDFLAGS, see C. William

Fox, Military Medical Operation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The DoD

“Point of the Spear” for a New Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.

155. “Kenyan, U.S. Security Personnel Conduct Joint Exercise,”

broadcast on Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, Nairobi, May 16, 1999,

transcript on the FBIS Internet site, May 16, 1999.

156. See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New

York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, pp. 83-92.

157. On the obstacles to including Africa in the information

revolution, see Lewis Machipisa, “Africa Lags Behind In the

Information Race,” Daily Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), October

28, 1999 (electronic download).

158. See http://www.giic.org/giicafrica/. The Global Information

Infrastructure Commission–Africa (GIIC-Africa) is a regional initiative

of the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC) of the

Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The

mission of GIIC is to foster private sector leadership and private-public

sector cooperation in the development of information networks and

services to advance global economic growth, education and quality of

life. The GIIC is an independent, nongovernmental initiative involving

leaders from developing as well as industrialized countries. During its

3-year mandate it is intended to: (1) Strengthen the leadership role of

69
the private sector in the development of a diverse, affordable and

accessible information infrastructure; (2) Promote involvement of

developing countries in the building and utilization of truly global and

open information infrastructure; and, (3) Facilitate activities and

identify policy options which foster effective applications of

telecommunications, broadcasting and information technologies and

services. See http://www.giic.org/mission.html.

159. See the CIPE web page at http://www.friends-partners.org

/oldfriends/ccsi/csusa/business/prventpr.html.

160. For information on the International Republican Institute, see

http://www.iri.org/. On the National Democratic Institute for

International Affairs see http://www.ndi.org/.

161. See http://www.friends-partners.org/oldfriends/ccsi/info/

ccsi.htm.

162. Jane Perlez, “U.S. Weighs Using Food as Support for Sudan

Rebels,” New York Times, November 29, 1999 (electronic download).

163. See Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity

Conflict, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army,

1990, chapter 2. For detail, see Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency:

Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

164. Information from the MPRI web page at http://www.mpri.

com/current/personnel.htm.

165. For information on Brown and Root, see their web site at

http://www.halliburton.com/brs/default.asp.

166. Discussions between the author and U.S. diplomatic personnel

in Zimbabwe and Washington, DC.

167. For instance, at the U.S. Army War College, there are usually

two students per year from Sub-Saharan Africa out of the dozens of

countries that would like a slot.

168. William D. Bajusz and Kevin P. O’Prey, “An All-African Peace

Force: An Immediate Option or Long-Term Goal for the Region?”

Strategic Forum, No. 86, October 1996, p. 4.

169. This idea was suggested to the author by LTC (Ret) Tony

Marley, one of the more astute and experienced experts on African

military issues.

70
170. Thomas W. Lippman, “50 African Nations Parley Here on

Economic Development,” Washington Post, March 16, 1999, p. A18.

171. Richard C. Holbrooke, United States Representative to the

United Nations, statement in Pretoria, South Africa, December 6, 1999,

reprinted at http://www.un.int/usa/99_139.htm.

172. Barbara Crossette, “Holbrooke to Unveil Series of Initiatives

for Dealing With Africa,” New York Times, December 6, 1999 (electronic

download); and, Colum Lynch, “U.S. Turns Spotlight on Africa,”

Washington Post, January 6, 2000, p. A12.

173. Katharine Q. Seelye, “Gore to Preside at Security Council

Session on AIDS Crisis,” New York Times, January 10, 2000 (electronic

download).

174. Barbara Crossette, “At U.N., 7 African Leaders Discuss Ending

Congo War,” New York Times, January 25, 2000 (electronic download).

175. Colum Lynch, “Senator Warner Urges U.N. to Put Balkans

Missions Ahead of Africa,”Washington Post, January 22, 2000, p. A20.

176. See Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa, pp.

37-41. For a case study that emphasizes congressional politics, see

Steven Metz, “The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of

American Policy Toward South Africa, 1969-1981,” Ph.D. dissertation,

the Johns Hopkins University, 1985.

71
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