THE REGIONAL SECURITY CRISIS

IN THE ANDES:

PATTERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

Judith A. Gentleman

July 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-058-3

ii
FOREWORD

Colombia is a paradigm of the failing state that has eno

implications for American foreign policy and the adapta

U.S. air and landpower to the hemispheric threat enviro

The instability, corruption, displacement of people, and v

generated by Colombia’s unholy trinity of narcotics traff

insurgents, and paramilitaries are spilling over into virtu

of northern South America and Panama. Thus, the stabil

political sovereignty of the region are being compromised. A

the same time, progress toward achieving the Free Trade A

the Americas (FTAA) and the economic integration 

Western Hemisphere by 2005 are being severely threa

Clearly, vital interests are at stake.

In this timely monograph, a colleague at the Air War C

Dr. Judith Gentleman, outlines some of the deta

implications of the regional security crisis in the And

makes recommendations for U.S. civil-military involvem

the hemispheric security arena. She argues for the United 

to lead in the articulation of strategic objectives, while des

a defensible and feasible policy that critical elements in 

America, Central and South America, Europe, and Jap

understand and support. She specifically argues for th

military to build stronger and more cooperative se

relationships within the circle of affected states a

Colombia. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join w

North-South Center in offering this monograph as a contr

to the international security debate on the situation in Col

It is critically important to the vital interests of the United 

Colombia, the hemisphere, and the global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
PREFACE

This monograph is an invaluable contribution 

ongoing study of Plan Colombia begun in February 2

the U.S. Army War College and the Dante B. F

North-South Center of the University of Miami. I

presentation, Dr. Judith A. Gentleman of the U.S. A

College demonstrates the widening impact of the “sp

effect” into each of Colombia’s neighbors and into Braz

Panama. She then proposes sensible ideas wor

policymakers’ consideration.

For some time it has been apparent that the cr

Colombia is no longer confined to that country. In 

under no imaginable scenario can Colombia’s proble

contained within it. The activities of drug trafficke

guerrillas are on the rise in the entire region, comin

Colombia. 

Given such compelling evidence of spillover, why 

regional, cooperative response been so slow in taking s

Dr. Gentleman goes right to the heart of the mat

pattern of competing objectives and inherent tensio

begin, Plan Colombia was seen in the region 

U.S.-inspired initiative by Colombia, about whic

neighboring countries were not consulted in advan

objectives, while broad, were supported only in 

military component (and by the United States a

Moreover, the United States and Colombia were not 

in harmony as to the true objective, which, for the U

States was suppression of the drug trade; and for Colo

pacification of the guerrilla insurgency.

The Andean countries have also come around slow

grudgingly to the concept, as the author points out, tha

extensive international cooperation will work in an 

globalization. To do so, however, requires at least p

renunciation of the cherished principles of “nonint

v
tion, national self-determination, and soverei

Meeting in Cartagena in April 2001 before the Quebe

Summit of the Americas, Andean leaders agreed 

regional counternarcotics strategy. They also called 

United States to renew the Andean Trade Preferen

and to include Venezuela in it. Such agreement is a 

step forward.

Much depends on the support of the United Sta

such a comprehensive regional approach. The 

administration has responded positively with it

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) of over $800 m

announced in May 2001. It will expand assistanc

seven countries in the areas of alternative eco

development, infrastructure development, human 

activities, and initiatives other than fighting na

trafficking. The new U.S. approach may well dra

promised (but not delivered) European assistance 

developmental aspects of Plan Colombia.

Dr. Gentleman recommends, however, that the ne

regional approach avoid simply responding to “po

constraints rather than strategic analysis,” by whi

means “the political predilections” of Colombia’s neig

She makes the case that a better level of analysis be a

to design a “defensible and feasible” policy and t

“special envoy” be appointed for the Andean reg

oversee and coordinate the program.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-So

 Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

JUDITH GENTLEMAN is a Professor of Interna

Security and Latin American studies in the Departm

Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Ai

College. She previously taught at the University o

Hampshire and was a Fulbright Scholar at the Unive

de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia, and at El Colegio de M

Mexico City, Mexico. She was also a Research Fellow 

Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of Calif

San Diego. She earned her Ph.D. degree at the 

University of New York at Buffalo. Among her public

are articles and reviews published in Political S

Quarterly , the Journal of Interamerican Studies and 

Affairs, the Latin American Research Review an

American Political Science Review. She is the author, 

and co-editor of Mexican Oil and Dependent Develop

Mexican Politics in Transition and Mexico’s Alter

Political Futures. Her recent work has focused 

Colombia’s political conflict, regional security in the A

and Mexico’s political transition.

vii
THE REGIONAL SECURITY CRISIS

IN THE ANDES:

PATTERNS OF STATE RESPONSE

THE ANDEAN CRISIS AND GLOBALIZATION

The growing security crisis in the nations of the A

Ridge has focused attention upon the seemingly intra

problem of consolidating democratic governments 

context of increasing political, economic, and m

difficulties. Throughout the region, the governme

Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, 

with neighboring states Panama and Brazil

themselves confronted by a series of security chal

that reflect the influence of globalization upon trad

dimensions of conflict in the region. Globalization h

only redefined security issues in a generic sense,

1

 bu

complicates and dramatically increases the difficulty 

face in shaping responses by traditional national me

Analysts have suggested that effective state sover

is being whittled away under pressure from the for

regionalization and globalization. While there is 

agreement on the precise definition of globalization, s

elements have gained broad currency. Of particular 

the growing phenomenon of “the inability of nation-st

cope with global problems that require global solu

such as demography, ecology, human rights, and n

proliferation.”

2

 The nations of the Andean Ridge app

be increasingly overwhelmed by external forces 

converged with domestic problems to create n

insurmountable obstacles to crisis managemen

development. 

Specifically, the weak states of the Andean area a

confronted by networks of drug and arms trafficki

pressure from rising domestic discontent and insur

and increasingly by international criminal networks 

1
these illegal financial resources. They also face dema

other international actors that national leaders co

these challenges to national authority. Simultane

these states face demands from international organiz

and external states to conform to norms of politica

economic liberalization deemed to be foundation

contemporary market democracy. Throughout the A

Ridge, levels of democratic practice that had been ac

earlier have now eroded in the face of these chall

From Peru to Venezuela, their are increasing indic

that the regional states lack the capacity to surmount 

difficulties by traditional means.

Historically, states in the region have placed h

priority upon the values of sovereignty, noninterve

and national self-determination, thereby res

multilateral or collective approaches to problems aff

the region. The record of successful collaboratio

regional problem-solving has been spotty at best. 

states have been eager to utilize internat

organizations and forums and international law as 

to achieving national ends, much less common has b

willingness to work collectively on a sustained basis 

regional level. The acute nature of the deepening cr

the region may be promoting a new direction in re

relations, however, with far greater emphasis 

collective determination than has been seen before

monograph will examine the sources of the security cr

the region, discuss national responses to the chal

faced by these states, and assess the likelihood that re

states may begin to successfully overcome the constra

traditional political culture while mapping out stra

for collectively confronting the region’s security challe

THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS

The current axis of the Andean crisis is to be fou

Colombia, where a historically weak state has been 

overwhelmed by an insurgency now harness

narcotrafficking, in turn propelling the developm

2
powerful paramilitary forces and assorted cri

elements, many with ties to international networks. 

same time that these forces continue to become 

powerful, the Colombian state’s capacity to respon

been weakened further due to corruption, an im

justice system, a weak military, woefully outgunne

enforcement capability, and the inability of the po

class to make progress toward a negotiated 

settlement. So riven with conflicts at this point 

history, the Colombian state, as some argue, may 

ceased to exist as measured by any convent

understanding of sovereignty, certainly when defin

terms of territorial control.

Colombia’s deepening crisis pushed the United 

into far greater involvement in the region for three re

First, Colombia had become the premier cocaine sou

the United States. Second, the United States ide

Colombia as one of a group of key states whose democ

were in jeopardy and upon which special efforts neede

focused. This group also included Indonesia, Ukrain

Nigeria.

3

 Third, the United States regards Colombia 

greatest threat to regional stability now facing the 

American region. At the Fourth Defense Ministerial 

Americas, convened at Manaus, Brazil, in October 

then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen li

Colombia’s political pathology to a disease, observin

“it will spread like a cancer to other regions.”

4

 He a

that democracy in Latin America was, simply put, a

because of Colombia’s crisis.

5

 As the Colombia Task 

report of the Council on Foreign Relations an

Inter-American Dialogue reported,

Colombia’s deterioration spreads instability and confl

beyond its borders. Insurgent and paramilitary groups ha

made frequent incursions into the neighboring countries 

Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama. Such incursions could w

increase. The wider region is increasingly uncerta

reflecting both real spillover effects and independe

troublesome political developments. A stronger Colom

means a stronger region and a stronger Western Hemispher

3
In still another perspective, former Assistant Sec

of State Bernard Aronson argued that U.S. inter

Colombia’s security crisis was shaped by three i

drugs, migration, and oil.

7

 Although the Colombia 

long remained a second tier matter for the United 

when compared to security issues involving Asia 

Middle East, for example, the increasing destabili

there came to be viewed in the late 1990s as a p

matter. The former U.S. “Drug Czar,” General (Re

Barry McCaffrey, urged that more attention be fo

upon the growing regional crisis, but recognized th

U.S. domestic political environment would more 

support such efforts if the emphasis were placed upon 

and military and law enforcement assistance. At the 

time, the Pastrana government was urged to dev

comprehensive approach to the crisis and, with subst

U.S. involvement, unveiled the ambitious Plan Colom

2000. 

The Clinton administration enthusiastically end

Plan Colombia as the coherent, feasible approach th

needed. Problems soon emerged, however. The U

States was widely seen to have all but developed th

itself. Neither Colombia nor the United State

consulted neighboring states, nor even kept them info

Ecuador’s Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller complain

example, that “this was a ball to which we were not in

Ecuador was not consulted at all.”

8

 The failure to c

only made matters worse when U.S. officials also r

acknowledged that the plan would put pressu

bordering states, increasing the security problems for 

nations. Nonetheless, the United States pushed f

plan’s acceptance and campaigned to build support f

plan throughout the region.

In the meantime, dramatic upheaval unf

throughout the Andes. Of all the states affect

narcotrafficking and by the Colombia crisis, Ecuado

perhaps the most severely affected because of its l

ability to respond. Having thus far successfully av

4
being pulled into the Colombian conflict, Ecuador no

itself threatened by major incursions of refugees tha

likely to flee Colombia once the counternarcotics off

into southern Colombia commenced in the period 2001

under the terms of Plan Colombia. Foreign Mi

Moeller worried about “the cancerous tumor being re

from Colombia and metastasizing in Ecuador.”

9

 W

not to be drawn into the conflict, Ecuador acknow

that the Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries h

many years freely used Ecuadorian territory for re

recuperation as well as for resupply. In add

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) ele

were known to have established settlements for 

members, and, indeed, intermarriage had be

commonplace between FARC elements and Ecua

nationals on the northern Ecuadorian border.

Northern Ecuador had also become an important s

point for growing narcotrafficking and guerrilla inter

southern Colombia. Given its weak military capab

and not wishing to directly confront Colombian irr

military forces, Ecuador’s approach had been to rely 

the FARC’s stated commitment to avoid using Ecua

national territory for armed activity. In a bargain 

compelling outside force, Ecuador sought to keep Colo

incursions confined to noncombatant purposes. No 

agreement had been reached, however, either wit

Colombian paramilitaries who had been growi

strength, or with narcotraffickers. In effect, Ecu

already beset by its own overwhelming politica

economic difficulties, including a recent attempted 

found itself politically and militarily threatened b

Colombia crisis. Evidence suggested that the im

bargain with Colombia’s narcotrafficking interests ha

seriously aground. U.S. Southern Comm

(USSOUTHCOM) Commander-in-Chief General 

Pace testified before the U.S. Senate in 2001 that nur

of coca and heroin poppy seedlings had been found in r

areas of Ecuador, and that guerrillas working with 

5
traffickers had been spotted moving across Colo

borders into both Ecuador and Panama.

10

Despite progress by the Fujimori government in qu

insurgency and drug trafficking throughout the 1990s

had emerged from the summer 2000 national electi

complete disarray, the subject of an Organizat

American States (OAS) diplomatic sanction and diplo

intervention. These were then followed by the dra

implosion of the Fujimori government itself. Furthe

assessments suggested that coca cultivation had once 

begun to increase, with indications that the acreage 

coca cultivation had in fact grown over the previous 2 

Arguably, it was the political firestorm ignited b

alleged involvement of President Fujimori’s pri

political associate and director of national intelli

Vladimiro Montesinos, in arms trafficking and arms s

Colombian guerrillas, all with the apparent compli

the Peruvian military, that brought an end to the Fu

regime.

11

 While certainly Fujimori’s record of ele

manipulations also contributed to public deman

political change, it was not until Fujimori found h

mired in the Colombian problem over arms traffickin

the FARC did the regime collapse, opening the d

wide-ranging investigations of the military’s and 

government officials’complicity in drug trafficking.

12

Elsewhere in the Andes, Bolivia experien

resurgence of chronic instability, once thought to hav

largely allayed due to success in the counterdrug wa

due to the Banzer government reforms. While not d

tied to the Colombian crisis, its difficulties stemmed in 

part from controversy over the government’s counte

policy. Following decades of turmoil, under the leader

former General Banzer, now Bolivia’s elected preside

nation seemed to be on the brink of resolving the is

illegal drug production, having succeeded in implem

all but the final elements of its “Dignity Plan.” Indeed

with Peru, Bolivia had been touted internationally 

success story, one demonstrating that it was poss

6
defeat the scourge of illegal drug production throu

aggressive policy of crop eradication and altern

development. 

With the onset of 2001, however, it became clea

neither eradication nor alternative development ha

the day.

13

 Indeed, the plan to build several small gar

to hold the line on the dismantled fields incite

coca-producing peasantry to violence agains

government. Despite all the public declarations of su

the cocaleros apparently had every intention of return

coca production once the crop eradication sweep

terminated and counterdrug forces had returned 

barracks. Clearly, the lucrative nature of drug prod

continued to appeal to Bolivia’s impoverished pea

who were unwilling to follow through with the who

relocation of population from drug-producing regi

zones suitable for “alternative development.”

14

At the same time, for Venezuela, Colombia’s 

increasingly put pressure on the Chavez governmen

led to strained relations with the United States. Ven

viewed itself as the victim of Colombia’s crisis, suf

frequent incursions by refugees, guerrillas, paramili

and narcotraffickers, and it thus voiced concerns ov

prospects for a further widening of the conflict. Ven

had already become home to hundreds of thousa

Colombian economic migrants in the 1980s and 1990

the prospect of further conflict in Colombian ter

adjacent to the Venezuelan border promised to escala

numbers of Colombian nationals seeking refuge outs

reasons of personal safety.

On Colombia’s northern border, Panama so

alarms over the extensive, repeated territorial incurs

insurgent and paramilitary elements from Colombia. 

territory well controlled by central authority, and wit

military of its own to, at least in theory, defend the ter

from illicit use, the Darien province of Panama beca

area of essentially free reign for Colombian insurgen

7
paramilitary forces. Increasingly, Panamanians exp

concern that the Moscoso government’s prospec

dealing both with of the internal pressures (stem

largely from corruption, some owing to narcotraffickin

money laundering) and with the external pres

(involving narcotrafficking, insurgency, 

paramilitaries) were slim at best. A tendency to igno

problem was made more difficult to sustain wit

promise delivered by United Self Defense For

Colombia (AUC) paramilitary commanders that they 

consider Panama fair game if Colombian insurgents 

able to use Panamanian territory with impunity.

Of all the countries considered, Brazil arguably 

some of the more daunting challenges deriving fro

Colombian crisis, chiefly owing to its vast ungu

Amazonian territories. To begin with, counterdrug eff

the Andes increasingly had pushed narcotraff

operations into Brazil as a result of the widely 

“balloon effect.” With Brazilian national territory (lan

and riverine) increasingly impacted by this traffic, 

felt increased pressure upon its already weak abi

protect national resources and the sovereignty of na

territory. Essentially, Brazil could control neith

airspace, ground, or riverine traffic. With only relative

federal police to monitor the entire country for counte

operations, Brazil faced heavy odds in contending wi

threat to its territory.

While Brazil’s Amazon region had never been 

controlled, Brazil’s national security officials increa

recognized that the future pattern of development 

region could be seriously affected by the myriad 

unmonitored activities taking place. Mining ac

forestry, and indigenous communities were all affec

the uncontrolled situation in the region. The arr

Brazil’s leading drug lord, Luis Fernando Da 

(Fernandinho Beira-Mar), by Colombian forc

Colombian territory in the spring of 2001 brought int

relief the growing ties between narcotics trafficking a

8
Colombian insurgency. “Fernandinho” had allegedly s

both as a major trader in cocaine from the FARC an

supplier of arms to the FARC, all via Brazilian ter

reportedly relying upon Paraguayan, Russian

Surinamese organized crime elements in the process

STATE RESPONSES TO THE ANDEAN CRISIS

Colombia.

With the success of counterdrug operations in Per

Bolivia in the first half of the 1990s, and with the succ

interdiction of the Andean air bridge, more and 

elements of cocaine production moved to Colombia 

former, more dispersed producing areas. With the de

the centralized cartels in Colombia in the 1980s and 

the industry moved in several new directions, the 

important of which came to be the strengthening 

between producers and both the FARC and the AU

so-called paramilitaries. Initially, the FARC swell

coffers with “tax payments” from coca producers, as d

AUC at a later point. Over time, however, the 

reportedly became more directly involved in various 

of coca production, increasing coca production by a th

the demilitarized zone, the despeje, over which 

exclusive control.

16

 Ceded temporarily to the FARC 

Pastrana government as a confidence-building me

designed to get the peace negotiations off the groun

area the size of Switzerland also came to be used 

platform for hiding kidnap victims and for incr

military preparations.

The Colombian crisis had now all but spiraled 

control. Law enforcement was incapable of dealing 

either escalating traditional crime or the escalating 

associated directly or indirectly with drugs. The j

system was equally incapable of contributing to a so

as it had been both corrupted and intimidated. Th

priority, that of regaining control over the na

9
territory, was now arguably beyond the reach of eith

Colombian military or the police without subst

improvements in capabilities. Nearly two million p

had been displaced by the violence and either were in

refugees flooding into Colombia’s cities, or ha

Colombia for neighboring countries.

17

 The nation’s 

had left en masse, with immigration rates into the U

States skyrocketing and with a special protected 

designation for such Colombians under consideration 

U.S. Congress. The economy had gone into a tailspin

the country experiencing its first serious recess

modern history. Nearly half of the nation’s territor

effectively beyond state control. The most compelling 

forces in the Colombian state were the nearly 20,000 

elements of the insurgent armies (along with their 3

civilian militia supporters) and the over 8,000 (and gro

AUC paramilitary forces.

At the behest of the United States, as we noted e

the Colombian government developed Plan Colombia 

approach to resolving some of these issues. The mult

multi-billion dollar plan existed at two level

conceptual level and the practical level. At the conc

level, the plan appeared to be a comprehensive appro

issues of social development, human rights

enforcement, economic development, and peacemaki

the practical level, however, the only part that was lik

be funded was the U.S.-sponsored element that ta

counterdrug efforts. The U.S. contribution of $1.3 bill

the total proposed $7.5 billion) focused upo

development of a military capability designed to su

law enforcement counterdrug efforts. Pledges of no

international financial support were disappointing. 

the European Union pledged several hundred m

dollars, and the Inter-American Development Bank (

offered support to social development projects, the b

the financing had to be shouldered by Colombia 

chiefly through loans.

18

10
The approach espoused by the Colombian gover

for confronting its internal crisis was based on a two

process: (1) peace negotiations with insurgents whe

when possible, and (2) armed confrontation wit

narcotraffickers, principally with U.S. support. Put s

the primary preferred goal of the Colombian gover

was to reach peace with the insurgency, while the pr

goal of U.S. policymakers was to curtail the productio

export of Colombian cocaine to the United States. In 

words, in principle (though not in practice) the Colo

government’s objectives and the U.S. Governm

objectives were very different. Reflecting this distin

the United States provided assistance to su

Colombia’s development of three specially tr

anti-narcotics battalions, and provided several hu

U.S. military personnel along with several hundred c

contractors to support counterdrug training activitie

At the same time, despite substantial effo

modernize the organization of Colombia’s armed 

those combatant forces remained very limited in 

capability to confront their principal foe, the insur

Despite these limitations, as a result of its partnershi

the Untied States, the government concentrated 

resources on those forces it believed to be of seco

concern, narcotraffickers. While the profits earned 

FARC from narcotrafficking connections certainly pl

pivotal role in their ability to sustain operations, Colo

analysis suggested that drug trafficking could not b

down if the insurgency were not first defeated. In 

words, the government apparently saw no other sou

support available to meet its urgent requirements. 

weakened state, it accepted the U.S. initiative as th

game in town.

As noted previously, at the outset both the Colo

and the U.S. Governments acknowledged that the pla

likely to produce spillover effects, broadening the con

narcotraffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary 

increased their use of neighboring states’ terri

11
thereby regionalizing the conflict. While regional le

were willing to support President Pastrana’s efforts to 

a negotiated peace settlement, they voiced serious obj

to Plan Colombia due to the spillover potential res

from the military rather than socio-economic emphas

was felt to characterize the plan. While defenders note

nearly 80 percent of the proposed funding wa

nonmilitary expenditures, detractors noted that th

firm commitment was, in fact, the U.S. commitm

military and law enforcement expenditure.

Despite anxious U.S. and Colombian appeals for su

at the meeting of the presidents of South Americ

countries, convened by Brazil in Brasilia in Sept

2000, such appeals met with only measured su

Chilean President Lagos reported that the president

support “the peace process, which implies negotiatio

“distinct from the problem of narcotics traffic

Colombian Foreign Minister Guillermo Fernandez d

complained about this response, arguing that “it is 

and counterintuitive that Colombia’s efforts to stren

itself to fight the threat it faces are the subject of comp

when no one criticizes the arms buildup of the insur

We want cooperation, not unfair criticism.”

19

A vocal opponent of the plan was Venezuelan Pre

Hugo Chavez, who declared, “We support Plan Colom

long as it does not generate combat activities that 

complicate our situation,” noting further that he fear

threat of “the Vietnamization of the entire Am

region.”

20

 Chavez also argued that “[the plan] is go

make the conflict even more tense and is going to w

armed clashes.” He further observed, “Peace cann

achieved by arms, that is a great contradiction.”21 E

assurances offered by both Presidents Pastrana and C

apparently did little to allay the fears of regional le

that the spillover effects of Plan Colombia cou

adequately handled. During his visit to Colombia in A

2000, President Clinton admitted that the plan would 

“cause the problem to spill over the borders” of neigh

12
countries, but added that the United States would p

“a substantial amount of money to help other countrie

with those problems at the border when they start.”

2

assurances were in no way sufficient to bridge th

between the U.S. plan and South American objection

Venezuela’s Response.

Under President Chavez’s leadership, Venezuela s

to chart an independent course with respect t

Colombian crisis and the problem of narcotrafficking. 

efforts reflected the continuing and longsta

difficulties in Venezuelan-Colombian relations, alon

the increasingly tense relations between Venezuela a

United States. From the outset, Chavez’s populist m

had struck a discordant note with Colombian authorit

the Venezuelan leader never missed an opportun

criticize the Colombian “oligarchy,” pointing to unfav

contrasts between Colombia’s internal social policie

his own “Bolivarian Revolution.” To the consternat

Bogota, Chavez sponsored talks in Caracas be

representatives of the FARC and the Colom

government itself. Although Bogota viewed Chav

engaging in unwanted meddling, it did send the na

Attorney General to participate in the talks. Yet rel

were rubbed raw by the experience. Venezuela’s D

Minister Rangel went so far as to state publicly 

Venezuela has the right to talk “with those who 

power.” Further commenting upon the Colom

annoyance over the matter, he suggested tha

Colombians “would get over it.”

23

 A FARC deleg

including Olga Marin, daughter of FARC chief M

Marulanda, had been hosted at a meeting of the 

American Parliament in the Venezuelan Na

Assembly in November 2000.

24

 Caracas was gen

thought to have good contacts with the FARC, if for no 

reason than to be in a position to hold the insurgency 

and to maintain some leverage over their forces. They 

thus not pose uncontainable problems to the Venez

13
government, or so it was hoped. At the same time

outreach to Colombia’s insurgents was designed to se

testimony to Chavez’s domestic constituency as to 

leader’s progressive credentials.

Such irritations notwithstanding, Venezuel

suffered incursions from Colombians over its bord

many years. As one news broadcast described the situ

“Venezuela is constantly suffering the negative effe

Colombian drug trafficking: the air, river, and land 

are disrupted and those who are not part of the proble

have to suffer the consequences of this same problem

that is unpredictably grave.” Colombian insurgent

kidnapped scores of Venezuelan ranchers and bu

leaders, and the 1,400-mile border offered porous t

points for illicit trafficking of narcotics, weapons

people. Recently Colombian kidnapping gangs were f

to seize Venezuelan ranchers to “sell” them to Colo

guerrillas.

25

 At the same time, Colombian auth

charged that Colombia’s insurgents routinely ob

weapons from the Venezuelan armed forces.

26

Venezuela’s release in 2001 of National Liberation 

(ELN) insurgent Jose Maria Ballestas, hijacke

Colombian commercial flight in 1999, only served to f

sour relations.

27

 Finally, Venezuela complained 

Colombian traffickers used Venezuelan territory as a 

route for shipping drugs destined for the Eur

market.

28

 Nonetheless, Venezuela remained ste

under Chavez in refusing to allow U.S. counte

operations on Venezuelan national territory and con

to refuse to reauthorize counterdrug surveillance flig

the United States in Venezuelan airspace that had 

stopped by the Chavez government. In that re

Venezuelan authorities also suggested that the new 

Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Aruba and Cu

represented nothing more than a staging platform f

invasion of South America by the United States. 

recently, however, Defense Minister Rangel repo

14
agreed to visit with USSOUTHCOM and Ame

operations at Key West.

Venezuela suffered increasing influxes of refug

Colombian paramilitaries cleared towns on the Colo

side of the border of suspected insurgent sympath

These influxes were in addition to the tens of thousa

Colombians who had previously, from the Venezuelan 

of view, “colonized western Venezuela.”

29

Both President Chavez and Venezuela’s former d

minister warned that Colombia’s efforts must not w

Venezuela’s difficulties, suggesting that Colombia’s c

could spread and provoke a “medium intensity” re

conflict.

30

 Then Defense Minister Ismael Hurtado S

noted, “We’re worried about the military plan. The wa

it’s done could generate more violence.”

31

Chavez commented at length about Plan Colomb

We are terribly affected by the war in Colombia. Peasa

have been kidnapped or murdered; there is terror on t

border. It is a lawless land. We want peace. But peace cann

be achieved with 80 Blackhawks or military trainers, but 

dialogue. So it is a terrible mistake that the governments 

the United States and Colombia are making. We are warn

that the conflict could escalate and become another Vietnam

Indeed, such fears seemed to be well borne o

Colombia accused Venezuela of an illegal military inc

(not the first) in October 2000. Colombia’s Defense M

Luis Ramirez charged that Venezuelan forces in

Colombian national territory with 30 helicopter

troops, and that Venezuelan military aircraft had 

rockets and destroyed houses and livestock. Venez

then Foreign Minister Jose Rangel denied this and 

Colombia’s claim “irresponsible” and a “vulgar lie.”

33

In the meantime, Venezuela deployed thousan

reinforcements to its Colombian border to deal with 

levels of conflict, stationing 10,000 soldiers in wha

described as “two theaters of operation.”

34

 In an early 

15
what would later come to be a willingness to cooperat

regional basis, however, Chavez also floated a trial b

proposing that South American states form a NAT

military alliance to deal with regional problems, a me

that was vetoed by Brazil’s Foreign Minister Luiz 

Lampreia as antithetical to Brazil’s own interests.

35

President Chavez sought to distance himself from 

influence in the region in a number of different 

particularly with respect to U.S.-sponsored counte

operations. In addition to the suspension of U.S. ove

rights, the Venezuelan government also issued a diplo

protest to the United States over the presence of 

Coast Guard vessel that had entered Venezuelan wa

support of counterdrug operation. The United S

argued that this arrangement had been provided for u

prior treaty arrangement. More generally, Chavez sou

declare his independence from the United States by, a

other things, developing close relations with Cuba, a

turning to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Cou

(OPEC) through overtures to Saddam Hussein, inclu

visit to Iraq as well as a planned visit to Iran.

36

In sum, Venezuelan authorities deplored wha

characterized as primarily a military approa

Colombia’s internal problems and one that set the sta

U.S. intervention in the region. Moreover, Venez

officials went so far as to argue that U.S. military sup

Colombia would create a worrisome regional m

imbalance, but offered assurances that Venezuela 

not embark upon an arms buildup in response to 

Colombia.

37

Ecuador’s Response.

Of all the frontline states, Ecuador faced what m

the bleakest implications deriving from the Colo

crisis. The 1990s had been a time of enormous do

financial and political turmoil that left the state tee

on the brink of collapse. As pressure from Col

16
mounted with the increasing penetration of Ecua

territory by Colombians, Ecuador had little in the w

resources that it could bring to bear upon its problem

its already severe internal crisis. Gustavo Noboa, th

Ecuadorian president in 5 years, came to office 

aftermath of a coup staged by a coalition force of disgr

junior army officers and indigenous rights act

aggrieved by the nation’s economic crisis.

38

 The 

attempt fizzled only after the very direct diplo

intervention by the leaders of neighboring states and 

particularly by the United States. All issued s

warnings concerning the isolation Ecuador would fac

it to abandon democracy.

Ecuador’s difficulties stemmed from an array o

international and domestic factors. Its most recent 

emerged as a result of pressures from political, fina

investor, human rights, indigenous rights, and insu

forces.

39

 Desperate for solutions, the government sou

achieve economic stability by “dollarizing” the eco

Most observers agreed that this measure alone co

little to secure stability for an economy in need of s

structural reform. So severe were Ecuador’s politic

economic difficulties that fully 4 percent (500,000) 

population had left the country in the 1999-2000 per

least one observer pointed to “globalization an

economic transition that has hit the region hard”

40

 

chief reasons for Ecuador’s (and other similarly af

states) acute difficulties. Ecuador had little capac

respond to rising pressure from the Colombian situ

although it moved some forces to the Colombian bor

order to try to increase security.

41

Sensing weakness, the FARC bluntly demande

Ecuador remain strictly neutral with regard t

Colombian conflict, that it should refrain from supp

Plan Colombia, and that it should resist the use 

“fusarium oxysporum” fungus to eradicate coca c

According to FARC representatives,

17
There are certainly democratic sectors in Ecuador which are 

going to support Plan Colombia, and we believe there 

sectors within the Ecuadorian armed forces that are also 

going to open fire on their Colombian brothers. The Colomb

guerrillas do not consider the Ecuadorians or their army as th

enemies, neither do they consider the Venezuelans, Peruvia

Brazilians, or Panamanians as their enemies. We have eno

land there. To come and fight here, to Ecuador; that would 

outrageous.

43

Despite such “assurances,” Ecuador nonetheles

compelled to double its border forces to 4,000 troops

44

pressure in southern Colombia mounted. Ecuad

Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller announce

implementation of a combined armed forces and 

border patrol program.

45

 According to Colombian so

Ecuador had become the principal source of supplies 

FARC, including “food supplies, medicine, provi

weapons, ammunition, explosives, uniforms.”

46

 Ecua

authorities struggled to respond with limited reso

Farmers were being driven off of their land; the Ecua

army had discovered four cocaine labs in Ecuad

territory; Colombian paramilitaries were reported 

running extortion rings in Ecuador; and FARC and 

armed belligerents crossed regularly into Ecuad

territory with impunity.

47

 Reports indicate that hund

Ecuadorian residents of the border area had fled in th

of threats from both Colombian guerrillas and Colo

paramilitaries.

48

 New evidence suggested FARC com

in the kidnapping of oil workers in Ecuador, an ac

originally was thought to have been the work of in

criminal elements.

49

 For Foreign Minister Mo

however, the problem, more ominously, was that 

“ideological infiltration” of the border.

In the summer of 2000, the Ecuadorian Na

Security Council (CSN), under the leadership of Pre

Noboa, announced that the war on drugs would be a p

of the Ecuadorian government, and that the gover

would devote special efforts to this objective throug

18
creation of an “Executive Unit” that would focus upon 

and economic development in the region to be impac

Plan Colombia.

50At the same time, President 

endorsed Plan Colombia

51

 and asked the United Sta

$160 million in assistance to help create an economic 

zone on its border with Colombia. In particular, Ec

sought assistance to deal with Sucumbios province 

Colombian irregular forces congregated freely. Ecuad

sought additional assistance to acquire helicopter

boats, and reconnaissance equipment. The $160 m

would be part of Ecuador’s 4-year $300 million progr

stabilize the border region.

52

 According to Noboa, m

the funds would be used to support social and eco

development initiatives in the region. Ecuador had 

allotted $20 million in the emergency supplem

appropriation passed by the U.S. Congress in supp

Plan Colombia in 2000, but much more would be nee

stabilize the situation. Ecuador requested fu

assistance in financing five camps for refugees plann

location on the Colombian border. The United Nation

warned Ecuador to expect an influx of 25-30,000 ref

with the number potentially exceeding 40,000. Re

would be expected to stream into Ecuador from Colo

Putumayo province once the southern offensiv

Colombia began, and indeed Ecuador reported that 

refugees had arrived in the early days of the Colo

operation.

53

 Without enhanced financial suppor

Ecuadorian President suggested that Ecuador migh

to reconsider its agreement with the United States to 

the use of its territory by U.S. antidrug aircraft.

The U.S.-Ecuadorian agreement in question estab

a Forward Operating Location (FOL) at Manta Air 

Base on Ecuador’s Pacific coast. Under the term

50-year lease agreement and with a $62 million expen

in runway, hangar, dormitory, and other constr

upgrades, Manta stood as one of the leading U.S. m

initiatives in the region.

54

 Manta would have 400 

service personnel by October 2001, and would serv

19
base for airborne warning and control system (AW

reconnaissance aircraft and tanker refueling cap

deployed in support of counterdrug reconnaissance.

55

the FARC point of view, the establishment of the U.S

at Manta constituted a “declaration of war,” and the 

warned that if U.S. aircraft were to fly out of Ma

eradicate crops, the guerrillas would strike targ

Ecuador. 

In response to the perceived threat, Ecuador sta

5,000 troops along the Colombian border in the provin

Napos and Sucumbios. According to Ecuadorian so

the FARC had previously identified Sucumbios 

“strategic area,” and its intention was to hold thi

secure sanctuary.

56

 In sum, Ecuador faced in

pressures from virtually all quarters and, because 

weakness, sought to stengthen its relationship wi

United States, a measure that was likely to draw it 

directly into Colombia’s crisis. Some Ecuad

authorities worried that Manta would transform Ec

into the “new Panama,” stripping it of any sov

pretensions and exposing it to even greater ex

threat.

57

The Peruvian Response.

Unlike other states in the Andean Ridge, Per

conducted an intensive counterdrug and counterinsur

offensive for over a decade. With President Fuji

ascent to power and subsequent initiatives, Peru dev

a set of capabilities that enabled it to establish sover

over its territory and to attack fundamental eco

issues. While the process led to an increas

authoritarian and violent pattern of rule, replete 

human rights abuses and political repression, equili

appeared to be maintained within the system. A cons

had been forged between the political class, the bu

class, and the military over the courses of action that 

be taken to reestablish sovereignty over Peruvian ter

20
Peru aggressively pursued narcotraffickers and insur

essentially winning a military victory over both grou

One clear Peruvian advantage was a well-develop

credible military capability and a willingness to use fo

addition, Peru’s insurgent forces never developed the 

of links with narcotraffickers that proved to 

devastating in Colombia. Further, Peru develo

strategy for defeating the insurgents that focused 

arming the rural population through the mechan

state-sponsored rondas campesinas or self-defense 

Compared to the Colombian self-defense forces that e

over time, the Peruvian rondas proved much 

successful, coming to serve as a legitimate auxiliary 

armed forces of the state. Peru also adopted an aggr

policy of air interdiction of drug traffickers, shooting 

scores of national aircraft involved in illicit activity.

The onset of the Colombian crisis proved to be mor

a match even for the tested Fujimori establishment. I

the political failures of the 2000 electoral period may 

been a manifestation of the exhaustion of Fuji

political acumen, after years of apparent success. One 

not argue that a revolt by civil society caused the de

the system, since Peruvian civil society was excee

docile. Instead, the fundamentally corrupted chara

the regime, coupled with the inflammatory nature 

FARC-arms trafficking allegations, triggered a colla

consensus among the ruling political and military 

causing the regime’s profound deterioration beginn

the summer of 2000. Neither rigged elections

Comandante Gonzalo, nor the Tupac Amaru Revolut

Movement (MRTA) seizure of the Japanese Embass

the contest of wills between the United States and Per

often characterized their relationship in the 1990s 

compare with the delegitimizing impact of the 

trafficking charges, especially as seen within the 

context of massive government corruption. Vlad

Montesinos’ involvement in arms trafficking t

Colombian FARC forces proved to be a far more devas

21
event than the accumulated difficulties of 10 ye

internal war in Peru.

58

In the meantime, evidence suggested tha

weakening of the Peruvian state led opportunistic ele

in the drug industry to begin once again to revive c

production in Peru despite much progress on the is

Although data show that coca production fell in 2000 

fifth consecutive year, dropping from 233,168 acres p

to 84,474, there were numerous indications that Peru 

new trafficking challenges ahead. The FARC’s 14th 

was reported to control labs in the Peruvian jungle be

the Napo and Putumayo rivers that ran directly into B

Observers suggested that local narcotrafficking int

were preparing to build up production in Pe

anticipation of the implementation of Plan Colo

essentially by paying higher prices to producers. Price

steadily in Peru; poppies were now being grown and 

cocaine processing was evident, as was the developm

more labs. More Colombians and Mexicans were foun

involved. Regrowth was observed in once abandoned 

and many new fields and new seed beds were 

observed.

60

Peru’s former Minister of Foreign Relations, forme

Representative, and current chair of the Congress’s F

Relations Commission, Francisco Tudela van Br

Douglas, argued that, within the context of the re

struggle for development, a major potential threat 

rejection of globalization in the name of defe

“reactionary utopias” or “bucolic utopias.” Tudela sug

that bucolic reactionary politics may increasingly be 

to drug trafficking in the Andean (and other regional) 

behind what he terms the “smokescreen of ethnic po

In other words, some of those defending such bucolic u

may be doing so disingenuously, using this political a

to mask their true illegal intentions. According to T

Plan Colombia created “huge awareness and big 

principally the fear of injecting large amounts of mone

an economy with rampant illegal activity. Resource

22
fall into the wrong hands, producing far worse outc

There were also fears of diasporas and of a domino 

For Peru, the spillover from the Colombian crisi

expected to come through Ecuador, which is contigu

Peru. In addition, there was concern as to wheth

FARC would move into eastern Ecuador, thus triggeri

Colombianization of that country.

61

The Bolivian Dilemma.

In the fall of 2000, Bolivia found itself confron

protests and labor strikes, leaving numerous dea

wounded. While teachers were part of the st

contingent, most of the rancor stemmed from the fai

alternative development programs to adequately subs

for coca production. The United States had committe

million for counterdrug efforts in the Chapare and Y

regions and allocated $85 million for altern

development in these two areas.

62

 Coca growers’ u

however, as they had for years, fought to sto

eradication program and to demilitarize the Chapare 

by staging roadblocks throughout the nation, le

Bolivia to economic and political crisis. Bolivia’s capita

La Paz, faced food shortages and was all but blocked o

the rest of the country, as 35,000 coca growers stood 

ground. 63 Yet the Banzer government remained comm

to the total eradication of illegal coca leaf by the end 

2002 presidential term. Even so, peasants who dep

upon the crop for their livelihood in one of the re

poorest countries resisted: “The government says 

take our land and send us to jail if we persist in gr

coca. We will have no alternative but to defend ours

like in Colombia.”

64

 The cocaleros were partic

incensed over the news that the government 

construct, with U.S. financing, several small garris

the coca growing areas to insure that the crop would 

replanted.

23
In the 1990s, Bolivia in fact achieved dramatic suc

reducing national acreage devoted to coca production

cultivation was reduced from 78,400 illegal acres to 

according to U.S. sources.65 According to Bolivian so

this signified a loss of some $700 million in illega

income in just 2 years.

66

 Ironically, the economic 

created by success in the counterdrug effort help

plummet Bolivia into financial and social crisis

government responded by appealing to Washington fo

relief and for improvement in trade relations in texti

economic sector emphasized by Bolivia to provide 

alternatives to the drug industry. Such appeals appea

hold little promise, particularly vis-à-vis textiles. A

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted durin

August 2000 visit to Bolivia: “We did discuss the is

textiles. I have to tell you, though, that this is a 

complicated problem as far as our trade relations wi

country is concerned.” Nevertheless, Albright note

Bolivia had received $450 million in debt forgivenes

the period 1991 to 1999 and also received $115 m

annually in other assistance.67

Bolivia’s economic problems continued to worsen d

the years of the counterdrug regime and the B

government. In the spring of 2000, the nation was g

by a paralyzing strike involving a water project that 

privatize water investments, dramatically raising pri

the population. Ambushes, protests, and small

insurrections increasingly became the stuff of eve

Bolivian life.

68

 While few observers believed tha

government faced a threat to its existence solely due 

increasing ferment, it was unable to quell rising lev

discontent. In an attempt to mollify those who decri

government’s mistreatment of the indigenous popu

and who urged the white population to leave the co

the government agreed to appoint a minister for pe

and indigenous affairs. An array of economic conce

were also promised, suggesting that the cycle of prote

concession would continue to spiral farther. In this co

24
the potential for a balloon effect in Bolivian na

production was a real concern despite the governm

pledge to end all illegal coca production by the end of 2

The Challenge to Panama.

Despite Panama’s desire to maintain a pose of neu

as its best shield against being drawn into the Colo

crisis,69 Carlos Castano, the head of Colombia’s feared 

paramilitary “self defense” forces, accused Pan

National Guard of openly cooperating for financia

with Colombia’s insurgents and declared that he reg

the Guard as a “military objective.”

70

 Despite these th

some such as Ricardo Arias Calderon argued that Pa

must insist upon maintaining its neutrality to safe

the Canal, and further suggested that a Contado

effort be developed to forge a regional peace, with 

potentially taking the lead in the effort.

71

 Pan

ambassador to the United States, Guillermo 

commented that “Plan Colombia is for Colombia. Pa

does not want to get involved in the internal proble

Colombia. We’ve been shying away from that in 

way.”

72

Threats to Panamanian citizens were escalatin

Roman Catholic bishop of Darien, Romulo Emilian

forced to flee the province because of threats fro

Colombian paramilitary forces. While Panama’s Pre

Mireya Moscoso promised more support to those attem

to police the border, Panamanian territory 

transgressed and utilized with impunity by insurgen

paramilitary forces. Colombian civilians fled in incr

numbers to Panama as refugees from both insurgen

paramilitaries. Although Panamanian police twice en

with FARC insurgents in Panama’s Darien province d

2000, these Panamanian forces had little or no capa

respond and were no match for the well-equippe

comparatively well-trained forces of the FARC an

AUC. 

25
Panama has been used continuously as a major ven

arms shipments, a practice that was likely to increase 

FARC boosts its forces to an expected 30-35,000 comb

in response to Plan Colombia. By the same token, th

was expected to increase its forces in response 

expected FARC increases. To the extent that 

shipments traversed Central America and impl

Central America, the expansion of the network of corr

and criminality could only be expected to expand furt

Indeed, the problem of arms-for-cocaine trafficking re

deeply into Mexico, America’s own neighbor, where 

cooperation with Mexico’s Tijuana Cartel was under 

by Mexico’s new Fox administration.

Since the implementation of the Panama 

Treaties, discussions have taken place concernin

possibility of establishing a new arrangement for 

presence in Panama. At the time of final implement

negotiations had taken place to establish a Multina

Drug Center, but final agreement was never reache

prospect of a return of U.S. forces to Panama was a d

matter for Panamanians, but the Panamanian gover

was able to forge an agreement with the United Sta

the training of 1,000 Panamanian police assigned to 

patrol. 

Panama’s substantial involvement in money laun

activities was a source of continuing concern. In July 

the U.S. Department of Treasury included Panama 

blacklist of states that were not cooperating with eff

control money laundering activities.

74

 Panama 

included on the U.S. Financial Action Task Force 

Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories. Pa

however, pressured the United States to be removed 

the list as acknowledgement of its cooperation in rec

Peru’s Vladimiro Montesinos into the country 

temporary asylum basis at the request of the United 

and the OAS. Panama did so because it had been a

that a military coup was in the offing in Peru as a re

the Montesinos affair.

26
President Moscoso’s position was that Plan Col

was a matter between Colombia and the United State

declared her intention to avoid having Panama b

involved in the program. At the same time, Panam

singularly ill-equipped to grapple with the illega

criminal operations that were at the root of the Colo

crisis. Some would argue that Panama faced the ch

becoming entirely overwhelmed by Colombian for

seeking to establish, once again, what could only amo

a protectorate relationship with the United S

Ultimately, concern for the security of the Panama 

may further increase pressures on Panama to take 

formal steps in that direction. The recent seizure of a

by FARC forces from a former U.S. base may indi

rising threat in Panama.

The Brazilian Calculus.

At the Fourth Defense Ministerial of the Am

convened in the city of Manaus, Brazil, Brazilian pre

Fernando Henrique Cardoso issued a call for “s

cooperation” to deal with the drug problem. This woul

part of a new concept of security for the region. “We s

broad concept of regional security which depen

democracy and sustainable development, values tha

taken root from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.”

75

 One 

president’s greatest concerns was the need to shie

Amazon region from the further spread of narcotraffi

Toward that end, some years ago the Brazilian gover

launched its plan for the Surveillance of the Amazon S

(SIVAM/SIPAM). The $1.7 billion system of radar

sensors, to be supported by reconnaissance and f

aircraft, was to provide the “eyes” and the “reach” f

Brazilian government into the Amazon to esta

sovereignty in its vast, unwatched, and uncontrolled 

The system, according to Cardoso, would enab

government to “reinforce our presence with technolog

just with men.”

76

 Yet Cardoso stated at the D

Ministerial meetings held in Manaus that “the proble

27
domestic problem,” and that “we are not interested a

any kind of Brazilian intervention in Colombia.”77

There was no doubt about Brazil’s deep concern o

border areas and its Amazon territories. Br

commitment to its new enormously expensive surve

system came in a period of dramatically reduced o

defense spending for the Brazilian state. Furth

dovetailed with the wholesale redesign of Brazilian d

policy that shifted the focus of the nation’s defense

Brazil’s southern border with Argentina to its northe

western borders in the Amazon region. In addit

preparations for the deployment of SIVAM/SIPAM, 

also deployed additional police along its 1,000 mile 

with Colombia. More dramatically, in reaction to pr

on its border, Brazil stationed a total of 23,000 troops 

the border in 63 locations, up from a force of 6,000 in 

These forces were to remain stationed in these pos

throughout the duration of Plan Colombia.

78

Put most directly, however, Brazilian authorities d

support Plan Colombia. While they supported a nego

settlement, they did not support what was viewed 

military approach to the problem. They feared 

intervention in the region, worried about sover

issues, and wished to preserve their own leadership o

as the major regional power. Brazilian officials ch

characterize the insurgent crisis as an exclusively in

political matter (much as did the United States) that 

have to be resolved politically within Colombia. A

other states in the region, the government feared 

heightened military activity in Colombia would simpl

the problem across Brazil’s borders. Moreover, Bra

authorities worried about the environmental effects o

fumigation in Colombia and the potential for wind

Colombia to carry chemicals over the Amazon.

According to General Alberto Cardoso, Pres

Cardoso’s chief security advisor, “For Brazil, Colom

causing the biggest worry. Our attention is dedicated 

28
effects it could have on Brazil, like the flight of gue

and the transfer of [drug] laboratories and plantati

Although President Cardoso indicated that Pre

Pastrana “deserves our firm support,”

80

 Foreign M

Lampreia clearly delineated Brazil’s intent duri

August 2000 visit to Brasilia by U.S. Secretary of 

Albright who was seeking Brazil’s support for 

Colombia. The Foreign Minister outlined Brazilian 

with regard to possible cooperation with the United 

and Colombia as follows:

Now, your question about possible common action program

No, I would say that we do not have the same degree 

commitment with the drug trafficking program of Preside

Pastrana or his peace plan. But that being said, we’ve t

President Pastrana that we will review with interest, and 

course, within our possibilities, we will try to answ

positively to any request from Colombia to try to help th

development and their peace process, but we have no intent

of participating in any common or consorted internatio

action in the country.

81

According to one newspaper report, Minister Lam

“stressed the autonomy of Brazil, Latin America’s l

country, and said Brazil would not participate in the 

Washington campaign to help battle Colombian 

traffickers.”

82 In a similar vein, Minister Lamprei

outlined Brazil’s disagreement with regional ca

sanctions on Peru for its electoral irregularities of the 

and summer 2000.

Warning of the likely flight of drug operatives into 

once Colombia’s southern offensive began in Dec

2000, representatives of the USSOUTHCOM repo

sought to encourage collaboration with Brazil and pro

police, military, and intelligence cooperation, but fo

less than enthusiastic response.83 On the other hand, 

Brazil did not support what it viewed as the m

approach taken by the United States and Colom

nonetheless expressed willingness to share intell

gathered from the SIVAM system with Colombia. Alt

29
the Brazilian legislature in 1998 passed an aggr

shoot-down policy designed to control aircraft en

Brazilian airspace illegally,

84

 the policy had yet 

implemented to the consternation of some military an

enforcement authorities. Nevertheless, Brazil repo

intended to spend $3.5 billion for fighter aircraf

transport aircraft to support its new surveillance sy

and planned to “refurbish 100 jets” in support 

program.

85

 Brazil also reportedly entered a partn

with the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Com

(EADS) to support Amazon surveillance operation

held discussions for purchase of heavy troop tra

helicopters with Russia’s Rosoboronexport.

86

 In sum, 

moved aggressively to respond at the national level 

perceived regional threat despite its marked relucta

participate in region-wide, collective security soluti

the crisis.

FARC insurgents routinely used Brazilian territ

sanctuary and to obtain food, medicine, and supplies. 

also served as an important transshipment ven

narcotics, and had become a substantial source of pre

chemicals. Brazilian territory had already been the s

rare occasion) of military engagement involving Colo

forces. Yet a precedent was set when Colombian troo

to Brazilian territory following the FARC assault in M

1998. Although Colombian forces counterattacke

partially retook the city by staging from Brazil, Bra

authorities preferred to declare this use of Bra

national territory as primarily involving humani

considerations for the beleaguered Colombian tro

order to avoid a confrontation with Colombia ov

issue.

87

Brazil’s overall policy conformed to its longsta

principles of independence and reluctance to cooper

formal military terms with projects involving the U

States. More than any other state touched by the spre

contagion, Brazil had the resources to marshal a defe

its territory and sovereignty largely on its own term

30
this would be no guarantee of success because 

elusiveness and mobility of opposing forces an

insidiously corrupting influences upon what wer

out-manned law enforcement and military forces.

At present, despite the fact that there are 23,000 

stationed in the Amazon area, they are poorly prepa

tackle the agile forces that constitute the pot

adversary. Further, Brazil currently only has a han

police outposts available to contest illegal entry and 

activities. While Brazil recognized that the border m

fortified, it did not adopt a “Maginot line”approach. It 

more the onslaught of massive drug use, 

manufacturing, and arms trafficking, recognizing 

domestic Brazilian drug consumption levels had 

skyrocketed. Brazil has already suffered spillover effe

2 decades in its border region with Colombia: cocaine 

had routinely been routed in from Peru, and the r

drug was imported from Colombia for export or for do

consumption. Brazil also feared the prospects of U.S. 

forces on its border, owing to longstanding suspicions 

U.S. intentions in the Amazon region. In recognit

these growing fears, Brazil recently announced a 3-ye

million program dubbed Operation COBRA which 

increase police presence at border crossings, on water

and in air space. The program involved seven Bra

federal agencies as well as the army. 88

A NEW AGENDA

Although U.S. authorities readily admitted 

attention would have to be paid to the regional implic

of both the crisis in Colombia and Plan Colombi

approach taken tended to be bilateral and reactive 

than proactive on a multilateral basis. As Ecuador’s F

Minister admitted, Colombia had provided no inform

about its plan to neighboring states. Indeed, few w

Colombia had much of a sense of the plan’s objective

the regional nature of the problem was clearly no

31
senior U.S. officials. Former Under Secretary of 

Thomas R. Pickering observed that, with respect to re

for aid to the region, “I think this is evolving now in

just a pure Colombia issue, but an Andean regional 

something it has always been. I think in future years 

will be a broader regional aspect to this as we pla

propose to the Congress new budgets for this k

activity.”

89

Though the Clinton administration’s reaction 

growing crisis in the Andes had focused narrowly 

Colombia, the hemispheric summit process had also t

to overlook the explicit regional threat. Indeed, at th

Santiago summit, virtually no mention was made 

threat to Colombia and adjacent states, although the 

of narcotrafficking was certainly addressed.

90

 The sit

would change in important ways with the advent of th

Quebec Summit.

Prior to the Summit, regional leaders trave

Washington in unprecedented numbers (for such an 

point in a new U.S. administration) to consult abo

urgency of the regional crisis and to appeal for 

approach. While the Bush administration sought to 

cautiously, it was clear that even the more li

counterdrug option that had previously characterize

policy in the region was facing more and more co

challenges. The State Department’s annual repo

narcotics stated:

With the drug trade now an organic part of the Colombian c

conflict, the question facing the antidrug coalition will be how 

reduce the supply of illegal drugs without exacerbating l

conflicts that threaten regional stability.

91

Several factors appear to have converged to encou

series of new initiatives from regional leaders conc

the crisis. To begin with, the election of Vicente F

Mexico appeared to have facilitated Colombia’s app

“rapprochement” with President Chavez of Vene

32
leading to the revival of the long moribund “Group of T

(Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico). The subse

improved spirit of amicability, following “intense diplo

efforts to mend relations,” led to new initiatives 

Colombian-Venezuelan relationship, includin

announcement of joint border operations wit

Colombian and Venezuelan armed forces.

92

This measure of progress in turn facilitate

convening of the meeting of the Andean leade

Cartegena, Colombia, on April 19, 2001, immediately 

to the Quebec Summit. This meeting produced s

dramatic developments. First, in a remarkable turn

President Chavez announced that he no longer ha

reservations concerning Plan Colombia. While denyin

his policy had changed, he declared, “What we had w

about, not against Plan Colombia, but against its m

component, that chapter has been closed. Doubt

existed in any instance regarding Plan Colombia hav

been clarified.”

93

 Chavez elsewhere explained tha

briefings he had received revealed a plan for socio-eco

development that addressed inequality and that des

support. 

With Chavez no longer an obstacle to a re

approach, the Andean leaders next developed wha

termed a “Regional Counternarcotics Strategy.”

9

strategy called for the formation of a bloc for “po

cooperation to deal with the scourge of illicit drugs 

create alternatives for development that would pr

legal employment.”

95

 As a cornerstone of the approac

Andean leaders called for renewal of the U.S. Andean 

Preferences Act set to expire in December 2001 to stim

economic growth and employment in the region

proposal called for the inclusion of Venezuela in the gr

beneficiary nations. The leaders asked that the A

amended to cover all products manufactured in the r

specifically emphasizing the inclusion of textiles.

96

 

provided for a full exemption from tariffs and quot

Andean production. The new strategy, among other t

33
called for cooperating states to create joint policies 

reach border agreements in order to combat drug carte

At the Quebec Summit, the Andean leaders prese

letter to President Bush, again urging renewal of a 

generous Andean Trade Preferences Act, declarin

need real help.” Together, the leaders of Colombia, 

Bolivia, and Ecuador (acting on their own and Venez

behalf) urged swift action to improve the region’s eco

prospects. While a spirit of cooperation prevailed d

President Chavez’s declaration that Venezuela might 

able to join the Free Trade of the Americas Act (F

unless approved by popular referendum, the prosp

Andean regional cooperation in problem-solving app

to have brightened considerably.

For its part, the Bush administration unveil

proposal for Fiscal Year 2002 support for the regio

Andean Regional Initiative proposed to triple the amo

support for Colombia’s neighboring states and substa

increased the proportion of funds devoted to eco

development as compared to interdiction. While app

to be responsive to calls for a broader approach 

region’s problem, the Andean Regional Init

nonetheless established performance goals of a 30 p

reduction in Colombian coca production between Ja

2000 and December 2002, and called for the elimina

all illegal coca production in Bolivia by the end of ca

year 2002.

98

While the performance goals identified by the ini

appear to be predictably one-dimensional, the Summ

produced a commitment to support investment in the 

preparatory to the FTAA. The World Bank and the 

reportedly pledged $20 billion to “strengthen demo

foundations” in the region.

99

 Performance cr

associated with these funds were likely to t

foundational issues of national development as stip

by the program’s purposes.

34
The multifaceted crises of the Andean Ridge stat

spillover from the acute Colombian crisis threa

stability, democracy, and economic prospects in the r

The complexity and the reverberatory interna

character of these threats outstripped the capability 

majority of states in the region to resist these pres

Within the context of expanding globalization, one 

have expected that the first inclination on the part 

besieged states would have been a collaborative appro

meeting these challenges. Yet, as globalization increa

undermined state sovereignty, leaders in turn fo

correspondingly more difficult to embrace approache

further reduced national sovereignty, even for pla

purposes. This is particularly the case in the 

American environment where the political culture of f

policy tradition has so emphatically elevated to prima

principles of non-intervention, national self-determin

and sovereignty.

The Andean crisis had reached such proportions 

minds of regional leaders, however, that they beg

consider the benefits of collective action. While 

leadershad yet to agree upon a regional security appro

the crisis, their efforts to coordinate economic p

develop an avenue to cooperative border manage

arrive at coordinated counterdrug policies, and, pe

most importantly, reach a unified position on the U

States, were positive steps toward fashioning a re

stance. At the same time, optimism had to be tempe

the record of prior efforts toward Andean reg

cooperation that have proved disappointing.

Certainly U.S. reaction to these initiatives would 

the utmost importance in either encouragi

discouraging such innovation. Also important wou

Brazil’s decision either to embrace a new approach 

issue, taking a cue from the Andean leaders, or to r

largely aloof from regional security cooperatio

contrast, Mexico’s new leaders appeared to be crea

model for the region for a new era of regional se

35
cooperation. For their part, as the Andean states sou

recover stability and defeat their adversaries, they 

being forced to grapple with complexities i

international environment that would require chan

their approach to interstate behavior, changes tha

were now apparently more willing to accept.

CONCLUSION

For the moment, despite speculation concerni

future attitude to the Colombian crisis, the 

administration remains committed to supporting 

Colombia.

100

 Early reports from the administ

suggested a degree of uncertainty regarding the o

policy approach, the heightened emphasis upon W

Hemisphere affairs notwithstanding. Indications hav

that the entire policy will be undergoing extensive rev

In the interim, the administration has broaden

focus on the issue to include more emphasis 

development programs along with more emphasis 

support for Colombia’s neighboring states.

101

 U.S. Sec

of State Colin Powell has suggested that the A

Regional Initiative represents a more comprehe

perspective. Powell stated that the

regional initiative that I will be defending before the Congress 

allows us in future years not just to focus on narco-traffickin

Colombia but to see the problem as a regional problem an

invest in human rights activities, to invest in infrastruct

development, to invest in economic opportunities that 

encourage people to move away from narco-trafficking , an

see this problem as a regional problem and not just a sim

problem of narco-traffickers in Colombia alone. 102

The Andean Regional Initiative has been descri

providing “comprehensive and coordinated assista

seven different countries” impacted by the Colombian 

and was developed in consultation with the seven rec

states and with European and “other potential dono

This new level of coordination represents a po

36
beginning for what needs to be a systematic mul

analysis of the problem. U.S. authorities have argue

this kind of coordination was not possible in the mom

crisis to which the $1.3 billion supplemental Plan Col

appropriation responded.

104

According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Sta

Western Hemisphere Affairs William R. Brownfiel

shift resulted from criticism of the plan and of the U

States package of support for the plan which was labe

being too focused on “security and law enforcemen

“overly focused on Colombia.”

105

 The complaints of in

groups, the United States Congress, the news medi

European donor countries; consultations in Bogot

Madrid; and the influence of Mexico and Brazil push

administration to redirect its energies and resources 

three ds—democracy, development, and drugs. Elsew

other administration officials had argued that the 

package of U.S. support for Plan Colombia empha

security and hardware acquisition had laid the nec

groundwork that would permit more emphasis later 

programs geared to social stabilization.

While the shift in emphasis had much to commend 

conclusion implicit in the change was that Colo

security situation had improved to the point 

substantial new sums could be profitably introduce

Colombian social programs designed to defend dem

and to promote development, including improvem

justice systems, alternative crop development, and so 

Yet no evidence to that effect was presented or even 

at. Indeed, Colombian government plans called f

addition of 10,000 more soldiers per year to the army 

the army and police are large enough to provide secur

their entire country.”

106Moreover, the administratio

not seemed to move closer to confronting a central dile

if it were to continue to identify drugs as its chief co

then how would it respond to the Colombian D

Minister Ramirez Acuna’s assertion that “fightin

drugs has gone from being a criminal problem to a m

37
one.”

107

 The “military” aspect of the problem was driv

the strengthening alliances between insurg

paramilitary forces, and narcotraffickers. It would b

and less possible to engage in the kind of sem

sleight-of-hand that characterized U.S. policy in the 

driven by U.S. resistance to intervening in a civil wa

his part, General Pace observed in testimony to the 

Armed Services Committee:

If you asked me to make a distinction between narcotraffick

and the insurgents, I can draw that line for you. But it is a v

very clouded line. And in fact in my mind it is a distinction t

probably has lost its value. The bottom line from my perspec

is that if you are trafficking in drugs, regardless of what else 

do, if you are trafficking in drugs you are a narcotrafficker. A

the symbiotic relationship between the insurgents and 

narcotraffickers has so confused that distinction that it’s v

difficult to do.

108

More worrisome still was that the apparent sh

emphasis in assistance to Colombia was based not u

strategic analysis of the conflict, but rather upo

administration’s response to the political predilecti

interested parties largely outside of Colombia. Tha

say, changes in policy emphasis appeared to be, now 

than ever, a function of political constraints rathe

strategic analysis. This, in turn, calls into questio

chances for the policy’s success. Given the weight of 

constraints, the challenge for the administration wil

find a way to observe the precepts of collective security 

maintaining a coherent strategic policy.

If there is to be any maturation of U.S. policy towa

Andean region, it will be incumbent upon the 

administration to conduct a sound strategic analysis 

region’s destabilization, lead in the articulation of str

objectives, and design a defensible and feasible polic

can gain the support of critical congressional, in

group, and news media elements in the United S

above and beyond the concurrence of the Andean and 

impacted states. Given the importance attached b

38
Bush administration to achieving a free trade agreem

2005 and given the difficulties faced in simply renewi

Andean Trade Preferences Act to the satisfaction 

parties, the United States will have to devote consid

political resources to moving policy beyond the piec

improvisation that now substitutes for strategy.

The engagement responsibilities of the U.S. milit

the Andean area have been extensive. The United 

Security Strategy for the Americas (2000) outline

military taskings in the Andean Ridge nations as fo

upon defense partnerships.

109

 The scope of supp

Andean states in counterdrug interdiction has 

steadily since the late 1980s. At the operational lev

problem for USSOUTHCOM has remained that of re

scarcity, particularly in the areas of intellig

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and “in na

theater and tactical collection and processing for s

intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT

imagery intelligence (IMINT).

110

In addition, SOUTHCOM Commander-in-Chief G

Peter Pace has identified the need for improved bud

support for foreign military sales and financin

testimony to the House Armed Services Committee

noted that Congress had allocated $220 million in 19

this activity, but in 2000 the budget stood at onl

million, “a drastic reduction in the amount of money t

spend in assisting our friends in the region to build 

own capabilities.”

111

Still another problem area may be the issue of the 

contractors to support Department of Defense (DoD

other U.S. Government agencies’ commitments 

region. Increasingly, the reliance upon contractors ha

called into question by congressional critics and b

Colombian government itself, as witnessed b

termination of Military Professional Resources, Inc. (M

responsibilities for DoD-sponsored assistance t

Colombian Ministry of Defense. How U.S. Gover

39
agencies, and DoD in particular, will replace these 

remains to be determined and may gravely comp

matters.

112

A major challenge facing the U.S. military in th

term will involve maintaining the support of re

partners in cooperative programs, given Washin

perceived strategic uncertainty. Enhancing the conf

of partners in Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela will be 

utmost priority. As a matter of official policy, howev

current U.S. military tasking in the Andean Ridg

remains clear: counterdrug support. Without an o

strategic reconsideration of the region’s problem and 

threat to hemispheric democracies, the U.S. militar

continue to focus upon training and operational supp

regional states’ counterdrug operations and ass

partner nations with the enhancement of thei

counterdrug detection and interdiction capabi

Ultimately, regardless of whether the overall policy g

U.S. military tasking shifts marginally or dramatical

more that U.S. military leadership can do to pr

region-wide security cooperation and to build coope

relationships within the circle of impacted states

overcoming traditions of bilateralism, the greate

prospect for long-term success in reducing the le

regional instability.

ENDNOTES

1. Bernard Aronson, Conference presentation on “Support

Peace Process,” CNA/NDU Workshop “Colombia: Strategic End 

Goals and Means,” October 6, 2000, Alexandria, VA.

2. Arie M. Kacowicz, “Regionalization, Globalizatio

Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping,” Revised 

of paper presented at the IPSA Study Group II: New World O

Workshop on Globalisms and Regionalism, Center for Developm

the Environment, University of Oslo, Norway, August 7

Columbia International Affairs Online, CIAO Working P

https://wwwc.cc.Columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao/wps/kaa01.htm

See also Simon Reich, “What Is Globalization? Four Possible An

40
Columbia International Affairs Online, CIAO Working P

https://wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dic/ciao/wps/rhs01/

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Globalization: What

What’s Not? (And So What?),” Foreign Policy, No. 118, Spring 2

104-119; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Globalization and American Powe

National Interest, No. 59, Spring 2000, pp. 46-56.

3. “Albright Garners Support for Colombia Plan,” The T

India, August 20, 2000, wysiwyg://12/http://www.timesofind

200800/20amrc10.htm.

4. Axel Bugge, “America’s Defense Chiefs Have Eyes On Col

Reuters, October 16, 2000. 

5. “Plan Colombia Keeping U.S. Trade Off Track,” Strat

0048 GMT 001025.

6. Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia. Fo

Constructive U.S. Policy, Report of an Independent Task 

Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Inter-Am

Dialogue, September 2000, p. 16, www.cfr.org.

7. Aronson.

8. Gary Crosse, “Ecuador Official Warns U.S. of Colomb

Spillover,” Reuters, March 2, 2001.

9. Michael Shifter, “This Plan Isn’t Working,” Washingto

December 10, 2000.

10. Anthony Boadle, “Cocaine Trade Flourishes Unabated 

Report,” Reuters, March 1, 2001.

11. Howard LaFranchi, “Latin America’s Murky Arms 

Christian Science Monitor, December 23, 2001, http://www

dtic.mil/Dec2000/s20001214latin.htm.

12. Tim Golden, “C.I.A. Links Cited on Peru Arms Dea

Backfired,” New York Times, November 6, 2000, p. A3; Anthony 

“U.S. Allies in Drug War in Disgrace,” Washington Post, May 9, 

1, http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2001/e20010509disgrace.htm.

13. “Empeora la situacion del gobierno del Presidente B

http://eltiempo.terra.com.co/17-04-2001/inte_3.html./; 

Farthing and Ben Kohl, “Bolivia’s New Wave of Protest,” NACLA 

on the Americas, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, March/April 2001, pp. 8-11

41
14. Vanessa Arrington, “Strikes Shut Down Bolivia for a Day

24, 2001, AP; interview with U.S. Embassy official (La Paz, 

April 23, 2001.

15. Juan Forero, “Fugitive Brazilian Drug Lord Captu

Colombian Army,” New York Times, April 23, 

http://www.ebird.dtic.mil/Apr2001/e20010423fugitive.htm.

16. Briefing with Assistant Secretary Rand Beers and O

Deputy Director Robert Brown on the 2000 Narcotics Certi

Determinations, U.S. Department of State, March 1,2001, by 

Colombian military reports allege that the capture of the Brazili

lord Fernandinho revealed that the FARC was exporting one-ha

of Colombia’s cocaine production to Fernandinho. Shasta Dar

“Brazil Drug Trade to Survive Arrest of Cocaine King,” Reuter

23, 2001.

17. Juan Forero, “Prosperous Colombians Flee, Many to 

Escape War,” Washington Post, April 10, 2001, p. A1.

18. Christopher Marquis, “Ambitious Antidrug Plan for Colo

Faltering,” New York Times, October 15, 2000, p. A10; Adrian 

“Donors Pledge $300mln for Colombia Peace Drive,” Reuters, A

2001.

19. Larry Rohter, “Latin Leaders Rebuff Call By Clin

Colombia,” New York Times, September 2, 2000, http://ebi

mil/Sep2000/s20000905latin.htm.

20. Ibid.

21. “Venezuela, Panama Voice Fears on Plan Colombia,” R

October 19, 2000. Also see “Ecuador y Venezuela piden accion r

frente al Plan Colombia,” El Nacional, 19 de Octubre de 

http://www.el-nacional.com/eln19102000/pa2s2.htm.

22. Ibid.

23. Tim Johnson, “Colombia’s Internal Strife Causes E

Troubles,” Miami Herald, August 18, 1999, http://www.hera

content/today/docs/091425.htm.

24. Juan Forero, “Another Bump in a Rocky Road for Colom

Venezuela,” Washington Post, November 30, 2000, http://www

dtic.mil/NOV2000/e20001130bump.htm.

42
25. Scott Wilson, “Influx Burdens Venezuela,” Washingto

October 1, 2000, p. A28, http://www.washingtonpost.com

wp-dyn/A45711-2000, September 29, 2000.

26. “Venezuela Terms Colombian Military Chief’s Sta

‘Deplorable,’” Globovision television web site, Caracas, July 11

from BBS Summary of World Broadcasts.

27. Scott Wilson, “Venezuela and Colombia Square Off Over 

Washington Post, March 17, 2001, p. A16, http://www.washing

com/wp-dyn/world/issues/colombiareport/A9027-20001Mar1

28. Alexandra Olson, “Venezuela Nabs 10 Tons of Cocai

Week,” Chicago Tribune, August 27, 2000, http://ebird.dt

Aug2000/s20000828venezuelanabs.htm.

29. Wilson, “Influx Burdens Venezuela.”

30. Axel Bugge, “Americas Defense Chiefs Have Eyes on Col

Reuters, October 16, 2000.

31. Peter Muello, “Colombia’s Neighbors Bristle at Rebuke b

Washington Times, October 20, 2000.

32. “Chavez: End Tyranny of the Small Elite,” Washingto

October 15, 2000, p. B1, http://www.washingtonpos

ac2/wp-dyn/A7305-2000. 

33. Andy Webb-Vidal, “Military Incursion S

Colombian-Venezuelan Relations,” Financial Times, October 1

http://news.ft.com.

34. Tim Johnson, “Colombia’s Internal Strife.”

35. Larry Rohter, “Latin Leaders Rebuff Call By Clin

Colombia.”

36. Andres Oppenheimer, “Is Chavez Picking a Fight?” 

Herald, October 29, 2000, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov

s2000ll01chavez.htm.

37. Javier Ignacio Mayorca, “Defense Minister: Venezuela 

Embark on Arms Race as Result of Plan Colombia,” Foreign Br

Information Service (FBIS) LAP-200104240000000099 Cara

Nacional (Internet Version –WWW), April 24, 2001. For that 

the charge concerning a U.S. induced military imbalance t

43
support of Plan Colombia to the Colombian military was also a 

that could be heard occasionally in Chilean military circles.

38. Sebastian Rotella, “Andean Region Teeters Between A

Tyranny,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2000, http://ebird.d

Sep2000/s20000901andean.htm.

39. Ibid.

40. Anthony Faiola, “S. America’s Expanding Exodus,” Was

Post, November 29, 2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com

wp-dyn/A3726-2000Nov29.

41. Xavier Munoz, “Ecuadorian Armed Forces Police M

Discuss Increased Security on Border with Colombia,” 

LAP200104170000009GuayaquilCRESatelital(WWW-Text), A

2001.

42. “Colombian Rebels Warn Ecuador to Remain Neu

Colombian Conflict,” CRE Satelital radio web site, Guayaquil, E

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 21, 2000. Lexis-Nexi

43. Ibid.

44. Andrew Selsky, “Borderline Dangerous? Colombia O

Likely to Stir Up Guerrillas,” Seattle Times, August 30

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/nation-world/html98

_20000830.html.

45. “Minister Denies Biological Agent Used To Destro

Plants,” El Espectador web site, Bogota, Colombia, July 18, 200

21, 2000, Lexis-Nexis.

46. “Ecuadoran Police Dismantle Ring Smuggling Sup

Colombian Rebels,” El Espectador web site, Bogota, Colombia, J

2000, July 13, 2000, Lexis-Nexis.

47. “Colombia’s Creeping War,” Washington Post, October 

p. A1.

48. Gary Crosse.

49. “Colombia Discovers New Evidence Linking FA

Kidnapping of US Oil Workers in Ecuador,” 

LAP20010423000114 Bogota Cambio (Internet Version-WWW

23, 2001.

44
50. “Security Council Discusses Implications of Plan Colom

Espectador web site, Bogota, Colombia, July 13, 2000, July 15

Lexis-Nexis.

51. “Ecuador: Seeking the Benefits of a Plan Colo

Stratfor.com, October 23, 2000.

52. Anthony Boadle, “Ecuador Asks U.S. For $160 min in An

Aid,” Reuters, October 23, 2000.

53. “Ecuador Shelters More Than 8,000 Colombian Ref

http://www.countrywatch.com.

54. U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Madel

Albright and Ecuadorian Minister of Foreign Relations Heinz M

Joint Press Availability. Carondelet Palace, Quito, Ecuador, Au

2000, http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/ 000818a

55. “Ecuadorean Base a U.S. Hub to Fight Drugs,” Mont

Advertiser, March 15, 2001, p. 7A.

56. “Security Council Discusses Implications of Plan Colom

57. Anthony Faiola, “U.S. Base in Ecuador Stirs D

Washington Post, January 25, 2001, http://www.ebird.dt

Jan2001/e20010125USbase.htm.

58. For a discussion of the arms scandal, see Anthony Faiol

Fujimori’s Grip on Power Slipped in Arms Sca

InternationalHerald Tribune, September 25, 

http://www.iht.com/IHT/TODAY/MON/IN/lima.2.html. A

William C. Rempel and Sebastian Rotella, “Arms Dealer Im

Peru Spy Chief in Smuggling Ring,” Los Angeles Times, Nove

2000, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2000/e2000ll01arms.htm.

59. Anonymous interview with U.S. Government official, 

2001. 

60. U.S. Government official, Lima, Peru, 2001.

61. Francisco Tudela, Presentation to the U.S. Air War 

delegation, March 6, 2001, Lima, Peru.

62. Marcela Sanchez, “White House Backs Embattled B

Washington Post, September 28, 2000, http://washingt

com/ac2/wp-dyn/A39344-2000Sep28.

45
63. See Clifford Krauss, “Bolivia Makes Key Concess

Indians,” New York Times, October 7, 2000, p. A5.

64. Clifford Krauss, “Bolivia Wiping Out Coca, At a Price,” N

Times, October 23, 2000, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct

e20001023bolivia.htm.

65. Ibid.

66. “Latin America Sees U.S. Drug Policy as Hypocrisy,” 

Herald, October 23 2000, http://www.ds-osac.org/globa

story.cfm.

67. Albright and Murillo.

68. Krauss.

69. “Nervous in Darien,” Economist, October 7-13

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2000/s20001011nervous.htm.

70. Larry Rohter, “Rebel War in Colombia Widening, Pu

Neighbors,” New York Times, September 19, 1999, http:/

dtic.mil/Sep1999/s19990920rebel.htm.

71. Ricardo Arias Calderon, Presentation to Confere

“Implementing Plan Colombia: Strategic and Operational Impe

for the U.S. Military,” U.S. Army War College and the North

Center, University of Miami, February 1, 2001, Miami, FL.

72. Christopher Marquis, “U.S. Weighs Expanding Aid 

Colombia’s Neighbors,” Washington Post, December 4, 2000, p. 

73. Ibid.

74. “Reconsidering Panama,” Washington Post, October 4

http://washingtonpost.com/ac2?wp-dyn/A9098-2000Oct4.

75. “South American Defense Ministers Discuss Collaborativ

War,” October 17, 2000, http://www.cnn.com/2000/WO

americas/10/17/brazil.defense.ap/index.html.

76. Ibid.

77. Larry Rohter, “U.S. Aid to Colombia Worries Hemis

Defense Leaders,” New York Times, October 18, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2000/e2000/10/18usaid.htm.

46
78. “Brazil Says ‘Plan Colombia’ Biggest Security Risk," August 2

http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/08/29/brazil.army.colombi

79. Ibid.

80. “South American Defense Ministers Discuss Collaborativ

War.”

81. U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Madel

Albright and Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations Luiz 

Lampreia, Joint Press Availability, Itamaraty Palace, Br

Ministry of Foreign Relations, Brasilia, Brazil, August 15

http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000815.htm

82. “Brazil Will Not Back U.S. Plan To Assist Colombia Dru

New York Times, August 16, 2000, http://ebird.dti

Aug2000/e200000816brazil.htm.

83. “USA Asks Brazil to Step Up Drug Watch on Colombian B

O Globo web site, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 29, 2000, July 1

Lexis-Nexis.

84. Larry Rohter, “Latest Battleground in Latin Dru

Brazilian Amazon,” New York Times, October 30, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct 2000/e20001030latest.htm.

85. Ibid.

86. “Brazil Feels the Impact of Colombia’s Drug War,” Stratf

May 4, 2001, http://www.straffor.com/home/giu/archive/050

87. Ibid.

88. Stephen Buckley, “Brazil Fears Fallout of Drug Crack

Washington Post, October 1, 2000, p. A28.

89. Marquis, “U.S. Weighs.”

90. David Spencer and Heather Noss, “Colombia: A Strate

State, Goals and Means,” A Workshop Report, Center for S

Studies, CNA, Alexandria, VA, 2000, p. 9.

91. Christopher Marquis, “Cultivation of Coca Crop Shifts S

to Colombia,” New York Times, March 2, 2001, p. A5.

92. Phil Stewart, “Colombia, Venezuela to Join Forces on B

Reuters, April 10, 2001.

47
93. Javier Mozzo Pena, “Venezuela’s Chavez Changes, Bac

Colombia,” Reuters, April 18, 2001.

94. “Andean Nations Design Regional Counternarcotics St

FBIS, LAP20010419000029 Bogota El Tiempo (In

Version-WWW), April 19, 2001.

95. Ibid.

96. Andrew Selsky, “ Colombia Seeks U.S. Trade Break,” A

22, 2001.

97. “Colombia: Andean Countries Unify Positions,” 

LAP20010419000055 Medellin El Colombiano (In

Version-WWW) April 19, 2001.

98. U.S. Department of State, “Excerpt: Bush Budget Inclu

Million for Andean Counterdrug Initiative,” April 9, 2001, DOS 

99. Anthony DePalma, “Talks Tie Trade in the Amer

Democracy,” New York Times, April 23, 2001, p. A1.

100. See “On the Record Briefing On the Andean R

Initiative,” R. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary of St

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Department of State; William R. Brownfield, Deputy As

Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Depart

State; and Michael Deal, Acting Assistant Administrator of the 

for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for Intern

Development, May 16, 2001; DOS, PA email; “Transcript: 

Secretary Grossman Briefs at Colombia Donors Conference,” 

2001, DOS Washington File-Americas email.

101. Grossman; “Text: Under Secretary Grossman Urg

Support for Plan Colombia, “Statement to EU/IDB confere

Colombia, Brussels, April 30, 2001, DOS Washington File-Am

April 30, 2001 email; Christopher Marquis, “New Drug Plan 

Focus in Latin America,” New York Times, May 17, 

http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2001/e200110517drug.htm.

102. “Transcript: Secretary of State Addresses Council 

Americas, May 7, 2001,” DOS Washington File-Americas, May 

DOS email.

103. “Brownfield, “On the Record Briefing.”

48
104. Off-the-record comments by a former Clinton adminis

official and a current Bush administration official.

105. “On the Record Briefing.”

106. Testimony of General Peter Pace, Commander-in-Chi

Southern Command, Hearing of the House Armed Services Com

“The Posture of U.S. Military Forces,” April 4, 2001. Lexi

Congressional Universe.

107. Joshua Cooper Ramo, “America’s Shadow Drug War,

May 7, 2001, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Apr2001/s20010430america

108. Pace testimony.

109. Department of Defense, United States Security Strateg

Americas, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Operations and Low Intentisty Conflict, Inter-American Affair

pp. 29-31.

110. Pace testimony.

111. Ibid.

112. “Plan Colombia at the Pentagon,” Spec

Washingtonpost.com, Wednesday, March 28, 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A5257-2001

Tod Robberson, “Shedding Light on a Dark War,” Dallas Mornin

May 3, 2001, http://ebird.dtic.mil/May2001/s20010504sheddi

David Adams and Paul de la Garza, “Contract’s End Hints of Co

Trouble,” St. Petersburg Times, May 13, 2001, p. 1, http:/

dtic.mil/May2001/e20010514contracts.htm.

49
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Judith A. Gentleman

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams