J-A08013-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JAMES V. DAVIS

v.

LINDA PALMISANO

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1513 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County

Civil Division at No(s): No. 2018-00094

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2020

Linda Palmisano (Appellant) appeals from the judgment1 entered in the 

Wayne County Court of Common Pleas following a bench trial, which awarded

James V. Davis a prescriptive easement over Appellant’s property. Appellant 

argues: (1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 

necessary parties were not joined; (2) the court erred in finding Davis 

established adverse or hostile use of the subject roadway; and (3) the court 

erred in not considering Pennsylvania’s Unenclosed Woodlands Act of 1850

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1 Appellant purported to appeal from the trial court’s April 22, 2019, order 

denying her post-trial motion. However, the appeal lies properly from 

judgment entered on May 15, 2019. See Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. 

Tedco Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (generally, an 

appeal to this Court lies from the judgment entered subsequent to the trial 

court’s disposition of post-verdict motions, not from the order denying posttrial motions). We have amended the caption accordingly.
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(the Act), 68 P.S. § 411, which bars a right of way over unenclosed woods. 

After careful review, we deny relief on the first two issues, but vacate the 

judgment and remand for the trial court to reconsider Appellant’s Unenclosed

Woodlands Act claim.

The properties at issue are located in Tyler Hill, Wayne County. On 

November 22, 2006, Appellant acquired a 53-acre lot from her brother, Robert 

Wester, who had purchased the property with his wife in 1991. Appellant’s 

property surrounds the eastern and southern boundaries of Davis’ land-locked 

property, a 4.6-acre lot. Davis acquired his property by deed dated

September 10, 1996; at trial, however, he stated he has lived on that property

for both 25 years and 66 years. N.T. Trial, 2/11/19, at 5, 9.

North of Davis’ and Appellant’s parcels lies a 53-acre parcel, referred to 

by Davis as the “Woods Lot.” At trial, Davis testified his parents bought the 

Woods Lot in approximately 1958, when he was 6 years old, from the prior 

owners, the Woods family. N.T. at 18. Davis later owned it, but he deeded 

the property to his daughter, Kelly Marlene, who currently owns it with Michael 

Dietrich, Jr.2 Id. at 41. We further note Davis’ testimony that in 1910, his 

grandfather bought a farm, possibly located in the Woods Lot, and thus the 

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2 Kelly Marlene’s last name and relationship to Michael Dietrich, Jr. are not 

clear from the record.
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Woods Lot has been in his family for 109 years.3 Id. at 7, 10, 20. Finally, we 

note that a southern portion of Appellant’s property is adjacent to a parcel 

owned by Davis’s sister and brother-in-law, Marlene and Antony Virbitsky.

The deed to Davis’ property granted the right to use a 50-foot wide right 

of way on the western boundary of Appellant’s property. However, for ingress 

and egress to his property, Davis instead used “Woods Road,” which traversed 

over another portion of Appellant’s property. Trial evidence showed that 

Woods Road continued, for a short distance, through the Virbitskys’ property 

as well as another parcel owned by Davis’ daughter, before reaching the public 

road, Sky Lake Road. See N.T. at 12; Appellant’s Trial Exhibit 4 (map).

In March of 2016, in preparation of selling her property, Appellant

advised Davis to cease using Woods Road and to develop and use the 50-foot 

wide right of way provided in his deed. N.T. at 58. Davis did not comply, and 

in December of 2017, Appellant installed a chain, blocking Davis’ use of Woods 

Road.

On March 1, 2018, Davis commenced the underlying action in equity 

against Appellant. Davis claimed adverse possession of Woods Road and, in 

the alternative, sought a prescriptive easement over Woods Road. On March 

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3 These seeming inconsistencies in Davis’ testimony do not relate to his use 

of the Woods Road and do not affect our disposition. Instead, we consider his 

testimony as a whole for the contextual history that the land has been 

associated with Davis’ family for three generations.
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6th, upon agreement by the parties, the trial court issued an order prohibiting 

Appellant from interfering with Davis’ use of Woods Road.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial on February 11, 2019. Davis 

testified that he and his family have used Woods Road since 1910 to access 

both his property and Woods Lot, Woods Road was the only means of vehicular 

access, and that he has improved Woods Road. N.T. at 6-7, 10, 12, 14, 20, 

25. Davis acknowledged that Woods Road traversed “across the corner of”

his sister’s property before reaching Sky Lake Road. Id. at 12-13. With 

respect to the 50-foot wide right of way in his deed, Davis described it as 

undeveloped, covered with woods, rocks, and boulders, and not traversable 

by vehicle. Id. at 11. Davis denied that anyone, including Appellant’s brother, 

ever granted him permission to use Woods Road, and denied that Appellant 

withdrew such permission in March of 2016 when she informed him to cease 

use. Id. at 26-28. Davis also presented the testimony of his friend, Elias 

Varga, that he has used, without permission from anyone, Woods Road for 

more than 50 years to visit Davis and to hunt on Woods Lot. Id. at 34-35.

Appellant, meanwhile, testified that when she acquired her property in 

2006, she did not know whether Woods Road existed. N.T. at 64. 

Nevertheless, she stated she and her brother both allowed Davis to use Woods 

Road, but she revoked that permission in March of 2016. Id. at 54, 58. 

Appellant further pointed out that Davis had a deeded right of way, as well as 

the equipment and knowledge to develop it, but he simply refused to use his 
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right of way in favor of Woods Road as a “convenience.” Id. at 61-62. 

Appellant also argued the Unenclosed Woodlands Act prohibited a prescriptive 

easement over that portion of her property because it was unenclosed 

woodlands. Id. at 70. To this end, we note that both Appellant and her expert 

witness in land surveying, James Motichka, described the relevant land as “all 

woods” and “[o]pen woods,” respectively, without any fences or walls. Id. at 

44, 55.

On March 22, 2019, the trial court issued a verdict in favor of Davis, 

along with an opinion. While the court concluded that Davis failed to establish 

adverse possession over Woods Road, it awarded him a prescriptive 

easement, finding he adversely, openly, notoriously, and continuously used 

Woods Road for more than 21 years. Trial Ct. Op., 3/22/19, at 4.

Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion, arguing the trial court failed 

to consider her unenclosed-woods claim under 68 P.S. § 411. Appellant also

averred, for the first time, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

because “necessary and indispensable landowners” — Davis’ daughter and 

sister, whose properties Woods Road also traversed — were not joined. 

Appellant’s Post-Trial Motions, 4/1/19, at 2 (unpaginated). Finally, Appellant 

contended that the trial evidence was insufficient to establish Davis’ use of 

Woods Road was adverse, but instead it showed his use was by “friendly or 

neighborly accommodation.” Id. at 3. The court denied the motion without 

any further opinion.
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Judgment in favor of Davis was entered by praecipe on May 15, 2019. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial court’s 

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court did not issue a 

Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant presents three issues for our review:4

I. Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this 

matter because necessary and indispensable parties who owned 

fee title interests in significant portions [of] the claimed easement 

were not joined in this action despite the trial court awarding Davis 

an eas[e]ment over their properties?

II. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the evidence 

introduced at trial was sufficient to establish by clear and definitive 

proof that Davis’ use of the alleged prescriptive easement was 

adverse, notorious, hostile and such that would put [Appellant] or 

her predecessors in title on notice that it was being done under a 

claim of right rather than as a friendly or neighborly 

accommodation?

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law by failing to consider evidence and make findings 

related to the character and nature of the lands in question and 

further consider the application of 68 P.S. § 411 which prohibits 

the acquisition of a prescriptive easement across “unenclosed 

woodlands”?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

In her first issue, Appellant avers that the trial court lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over this matter because Marlene and Anthony Virbitsky

and Kelly Marlene and Michael Dietrch, Jr. were not joined as “necessary and 

indispensable parties[,]” “despite the trial court awarding Davis an easement 

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4 We have reordered Appellant’s issues for ease of disposition.
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over their properties.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant reasons that because 

Woods Road crossed their properties before meeting the public road, Davis 

cannot make use of Woods Road unless he also established access rights 

across their portions of Woods Road. Id. at 11-12. In support, Appellant 

relies on Barren v. Dubas, 441 A.2d 1315 (Pa. Super. 1982), which she 

summarizes as holding that in a dispute over the existence of an easement, 

“the owners of all of the servient tenements have a material interest in the 

matter and should be joined as defendants even if they did not have any role 

in the circumstances that precipitated the controversy.” Id. at 12-13, citing

Barren, 441 A.2d at 1316.

Davis contends Appellant has waived appellate review of this issue 

because she did not raise it prior to the close of trial. See Davis’ Brief at 12-

13. As stated above, Appellant raised this issue for the first time in her posttrial motion.

Generally, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(b), 

issues not preserved before or at trial are waived.5 Bd. of Supervisors of 

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5 Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1(b) provides that generally, posttrial relief may not be granted unless the grounds for relief

(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings or 

by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of fact 

or conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method 

at trial; and

Note: If no objection is made, error which could have been 
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Willistown Twp. v. Main Line Gardens, Inc., 155 A.3d 39, 44 (Pa. 2017). 

This Court has stated, however, that claims of lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction or failure to join an indispensable party are never waived. Drake 

Mfg. Co. v. Polyflow, Inc., 109 A.3d 250, 258 (Pa. Super. 2015). As 

Appellant points out, Barren explained:

Failure to join an indispensable party “goes absolutely to the 

court’s jurisdiction and the issue should be raised sua sponte.”

See also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032[(a)] (defense of failure to join 

indispensable party not waived by failure to raise it by preliminary 

objection, answer, or reply). “As we have said many times, if all 

necessary and indispensable parties are not parties to an action 

in equity, the court is powerless to grant relief.” “In Pennsylvania, 

an indispensable party is one whose rights are so directly 

connected with and affected by litigation that he must be a party 

of record to protect such rights, and his absence renders any order 

or decree of court null and void for want of jurisdiction.”

See Barren, 441 A.2d at 1316 (some citations omitted). Even if “the trial 

court’s jurisdiction is not challenged in that court or on appeal, ‘the absence 

of an indispensable party goes absolutely to the court’s jurisdiction and the 

issue should be raised sua sponte.’” Huston v. Campanini, 346 A.2d 258, 

259 (Pa. 1975) (citation omitted).

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corrected in pre-trial proceedings or during trial by timely 

objection may not constitute a ground for post-trial relief. . . .

(2) are specified in the motion. The motion shall state how 

the grounds were asserted in pre-trial proceedings or at trial. 

Grounds not specified are deemed waived unless leave is granted 

upon cause shown to specify additional grounds.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(1)-(2). 
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Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has not waived appellate review of 

her claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the failure to 

join indispensable parties. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1032(a); Huston, 346 A.2d at 

259; Barren, 441 A.2d at 1316. After careful review, however, we conclude 

that Appellant’s argument lacks merit.

In considering the question of subject matter jurisdiction, our standard 

is review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Estate of Ciuccarelli, 

81 A.3d 953, 958 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the trial court did not grant Davis 

prescriptive easements over the Dietrichs’ and the Virbitskys’ properties. 

Instead, it is clear the court’s order granted an easement only over Appellant’s 

property. Appellant’s argument — that additional property owners, whose 

lands a disputed easement also traverses, must be joined by as indispensable 

parties — is not supported by legal authority.

In Barren, the plaintiffs sought a prescriptive easement to an alleyway 

traversing the defendants’ adjoining parcel of land. Barren, 441 A.2d at 

1315. The trial court entered a decree nisi recognizing the easement. Id. at 

1316. The defendants then filed exceptions, alleging that the court erred in 

not allowing evidence that they “had conveyed a portion of the servient 

tenement to [another couple] prior to the commencement of [the] 

proceedings.” Id. The trial court ruled that the third couple was an 

indispensable party and modified its decree nisi accordingly. Id.
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On appeal, this Court considered whether the third couple who had 

purchased a part of the servient tenement were indispensable parties who 

should have been joined in the litigation. Barren, 441 A.2d at 1316-1317. 

We noted:

[T]here can be no question that the fee simple owner 

of the servient tenement is an indispensable party. 

The right to the use and enjoyment of his property will 

be adversely affected by any litigation involving the 

easement and, therefore, he must be joined. The 

failure to do so deprives the court of jurisdiction.

Similarly, when there is a dispute as to the existence of an 

easement, all owners of servient tenements have a material 

interest in the controversy and should be joined as defendants, 

even though such an owner may have had no part in the 

interference with, or obstruction of, the alleged easement. 

Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 409, 411 (1953) (“Necessary parties 

defendant to suit to prevent or remove obstruction or interference 

with easement of way”). Cf. [Huston, 346 A.2d at 259] (persons 

to whom vendors allegedly sold restaurant after declaring 

forfeiture and repossession from plaintiffs were possible bona fide 

purchasers, and, therefore, indispensible parties); Tigue v. 

Basalyga, [304 A.2d 119, 120 (Pa. 1973)] (in suit to set aside 

deed allegedly obtained through fraud, deceased’s personal 

representative was indispensible party); Kelley v. Kelley, . . .

115 A.2d 202 ([Pa.] 1955) (when adjudicating interests in coal 

lands, all co-tenants are indispensible parties); Biernacki v. 

Redevelopment Authority of the City of Wilkes-Barre, [379 

A.2d 1366, 1368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977)] (“Clearly, the owner of real 

estate is an indispensible party to proceedings seeking transfer of 

the title to the property to another and culminating in an order 

purportedly vesting title in another. It would be difficult to imagine 

a darker cloud on one’s title than that created by the court’s order 

in this case.”) (condemnation case).

Id. at 1316-17 (some citations omitted). This Court determined that the third 

couple — found to be owners of part of the servient tenement — were 

indispensable parties. Id. at 1317. This Court then concluded that without 
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their joinder, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a decree. Id.

The facts in Barren are distinguishable from those in the matter sub 

judice. Whereas the indispensable parties in Barren owned part of the very

property claimed to be a servient tenement, here, Davis’s complaint did not 

seek prescriptive easements to any part of the Dietrichs’ and Virbitskys’

lands — and, as stated above, the trial court’s order did not affect the 

Dietrichs’ or Virbitskys’ property rights. While it was undisputed that Woods 

Road continued over the Dietrichs’ and Virbitskys’ properties before reaching 

the public road, we have not discovered any authority supporting Appellant’s 

assertion that they should have been joined as indispensable parties.

The authority cited by the Barren Court, set forth in the long quotation 

above, does not support Appellant’s argument. First, Barren cited the

American Law Reports, which states:

In discussing the question of necessary parties defendant to a suit 

to prevent or remove an obstruction of, or interference with, an 

easement of way, the courts have considered the necessity of 

making parties defendant such possibly interested persons as . . . 

those through whose land, as well as that of defendant, the 

easement of way passed[.FN]

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[FN] See McNeil v. Kennedy, [107 S.E. 203 (Va. 1921)].

See 28 A.L.R. 409 § 3; Barren, 441 A.2d at 1316. While this paragraph 

referred to other landowners besides the defendant, we consider it in 

conjunction with the 1921 Virginia decision cited therein. In McNeil, the trial 

court granted the plaintiff a right of way over the defendant’s land, although

the plaintiff would have to pass through others’ lands before reaching the 
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public road. McNeil, 107 S.E. at 203. On appeal, the defendant argued that 

the other landowners were necessary parties. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court 

disagreed, noting the plaintiff’s bill made “no allegations against the absent 

parties,” and “[t]he fact that said right of way runs through their lands, as 

well as that of defendant, [did] not make them necessary parties.” Id. at 

204.

The Pennsylvania case law cited in Barren likewise involve the owners 

of the property that was the subject of litigation, and not owners of adjacent 

property. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Diamond Fuel Co.,

346 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1975) (in action to establish right of way, fee simple 

owner of servient tenement should have been joined as indispensable party); 

Huston, 346 A.2d at 258-59 (in buyers’ action to compel specific performance 

of contract to purchase real estate, individuals to whom the sellers averred 

they had already transferred property should have been joined as 

indispensable parties); Tigue, 304 A.2d at 119-20 (in action to set aside deed 

conveying title to real estate to grantee, where complaint was filed after 

grantee’s death, personal representative of grantee’s estate should have been 

joined as indispensable party); Biernacki, 379 A.2d at 1367-68 (in husband 

and wife’s action seeking return of property that was taken by eminent

domain, the current title owner of the property, a realty company, should have 
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been joined as indispensable party).6 Pursuant to these principles, the 

Dietrichs and Virbitskys were not indispensable parties, and the trial court 

properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Davis’ complaint.

In her second issue, Appellant alleges the trial court erred in finding the 

evidence was sufficient to establish that Davis’ use of Woods Road was 

adverse, notorious, hostile, or in a manner that put her or her predecessors 

in title on notice that the use was under a claim of right. Appellant maintains 

there was no “clear delineation regarding the specifics of Davis’ alleged use”

of the various properties discussed at trial; Appellant reasons that although 

Davis testified that he has used Woods Lot for 60 years, he did not acquire 

his property, over which the alleged easement traverses, until 1992. 

Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. Appellant also contends that although Davis’s trial 

testimony suggested he also sought an easement over Woods Road for the 

benefit of Woods Lot, such relief would be improper because Davis did not 

own Woods Lot. Meanwhile, Appellant asserts the evidence simply established 

“a long-standing ‘neighborly accommodation’” for Davis to use Woods Road, 

where Appellant’s brother previously allowed his friend, Davis, to use the road. 

Id. Appellant also cites her testimony that in 2016, Davis complied with her 

request to remove his dumpster that was kept in “the ‘Woods Road’ area.” 

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6 Biernacki is an opinion issued by the Commonwealth Court, whose decisions 

are not binding on this Court; nevertheless, we may find Biernacki has 

persuasive authority. See Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 

2014).
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Id. at 21. Appellant claims this acquiescence reflected Davis’

acknowledgement that she controlled the property. No relief is due.

In reviewing bench trial verdicts, we consider

whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent 

evidence and whether the trial court committed error in any 

application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must 

be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a 

jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings 

of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or 

if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, where 

the issue concerns a question of law, our scope of review is 

plenary.

Williams v. Taylor, 188 A.3d 447, 450 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

This Court has stated:

A prescriptive easement is created by (1) adverse, (2) open, (3) 

notorious, (4) continuous and uninterrupted use for a period of 

twenty-one (21) years. Moreover, the party asserting the 

easement must demonstrate clear and positive proof. Permissive 

use defeats a claim of a prescriptive easement. The landowner 

has the burden of proving consent, but only after the alleged 

easement holder proves the use was adverse, open, notorious, 

and continuous for 21 uninterrupted years.

Affordable Outdoor, LLC v. Tri-Outdoor, Inc., 210 A.3d 270, 281 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Under Pennsylvania law, a landowner who is 

in privity with the prior adverse possessor may tack prior use of an easement 

onto his own period of use to establish continuous possession for the required 

21 years. Matakitis v. Woodmansee, 667 A.2d 228, 231 n.1 (Pa. Super. 

1995).

Here, the trial court credited Davis’ testimony that “he has accessed his 
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property by way of Woods Road for more than [60] years . . . without asking 

leave and without objection.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. The court thus found that 

Davis showed adverse, open, notorious, and continuous use, and thus 

established the existence of a prescriptive easement. These findings are 

supported by the record. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 450. While Appellant 

testified that her brother bought his lot in 1991 and allowed Davis to use 

Woods Road, N.T. at 53-54, Davis repeatedly testified that his family has used 

Woods Road since 1910, he has “always used [it] thinking . . . that was” his 

right, and he used it without anyone’s permission. Id. at 7, 23, 29. To the 

extent that Appellant avers that the trial court should have weighed the 

parties’ competing evidence in her favor, we defer to the trial court’s findings 

of fact. See Williams, 188 A.3d at 450. Finally, although we agree with 

Appellant that at trial, Davis referred to his family’s historical use of Woods 

Road to reach Woods Lot, we reiterate the trial court granted a prescriptive 

easement only to Davis, and not to any owner of Woods Lot. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.

In her final issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in failing to 

consider evidence and make findings of fact under the Unenclosed Woodlands 

Act. Appellant contends that undisputed trial evidence established that the 

pertinent portion of her property was unenclosed woodlands, and thus a 

prescriptive easement was prohibited by the Act. Appellant’s Brief at 18. She 
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maintains the trial court did not address this issue and requests reversal of 

the order denying her post-trial motion.

This Court has stated:

Generally, under the common law, one may acquire a 

prescriptive easement through someone else’s property by 

proving “(1) adverse, (2) open, (3) notorious, (4) continuous and 

uninterrupted use [of the easement] for a period of 21 years.”

However, in 1850, the General Assembly carved out an exception 

to that general rule by forbidding the acquisition of prescriptive 

easements through unenclosed woodlands. The Unenclosed 

Woodlands Act dictates:

No right of way shall be hereafter acquired by user, 

where such way passes through un[e]nclosed 

woodland; but on clearing such woodland, the owner 

or owners thereof shall be at liberty to enclose the 

same, as if no such way had been used through the 

same before such clearing or enclosure.

68 P.S. § 411

Williams, 188 A.3d at 451 (some citations omitted).

The legislature, however, did not define the term “woodlands.” 

Williams, 188 A.3d at 451. Nevertheless, this Court has stated that “[i]t is 

the character of the land itself which is determinative of the application of the 

Act of 1850,” Sprankle v. Burns, 675 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Super. 1995), 

and that a “‘woodland’ is an area of land that trees and bushy undergrowth 

cover, synonymous with a ‘forest.’” Williams, 188 A.3d at 454.

Here, we agree that the trial court did not make any specific findings of 

fact or conclusions of law on the record in response to Appellant’s claim, 

properly preserved at trial, concerning the Unenclosed Woodlands Act. The 
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trial court did not address this issue at trial, in its May 22, 2019, opinion, or 

April 22nd order denying Appellant’s post-trial motion. Accordingly, we vacate 

the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s post-trial motion and remand for 

the trial court to consider this claim. The trial court may request briefs or 

hear argument in reviewing the evidence already presented at trial.7

In sum, we hold the Dietrichs and Virbitskys were not indispensable 

parties and thus the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction 

and the court did not err in finding Davis’ use of Woods Road was hostile and 

adverse. However, we agree with Appellant that the trial court did not enter 

on the record any findings of fact or conclusions of law addressing the 

applicability of the Unenclosed Woodlands Act. We thus vacate the judgment

and the trial court’s April 22, 2019, order denying Appellant’s post-trial 

motion, and remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of reconsidering 

Appellant’s Unenclosed Woodlands Act argument.

Judgment vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

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7 See Claudio v. Dean Mach. Co., 831 A.2d 140, 146 (Pa. 2003) (“In certain 

situations, it may be proper for a trial court to permit a post-trial evidentiary 

hearing to determine if new evidence offered in support of a post-trial motion 

constitutes after-discovered evidence. However, where the new evidence 

cannot be characterized as after-discovered evidence, such an evidentiary 

hearing is not contemplated by [Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(a)(5) (“After trial and upon 

the written Motion for Post-Trial Relief filed by any party, the court may . . . 

enter any other appropriate order.”)]).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/20/2020