IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10299

Summary Calendar

DELBERT GLENN ROGERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

PETER CASWELL, Case Manager; MICHAEL SEARCY, Operation Specialist; 

KARA GOUGLER, Civil Commitment Manager; KRISTIAN LUERA, M.A., 

LPC-Intern, ASOTP,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:18-CV-181

Before SMITH, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Delbert Glenn Rogers, currently resident # 02634254 at the Texas Civil 

Commitment Center, has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

(IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). By moving to proceed IFP, he is challenging the district 

court’s certification decision that his appeal is not taken in good faith under 28 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 28, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Our inquiry is limited to whether the appeal “involves legal points arguable on 

their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 

(5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

On appeal, Rogers challenges the requirement that he wear a monitor as 

a condition of his civil commitment. He raises this argument for the first time 

on appeal, and, thus, we need not consider it. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder 

Co., 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999).

Rogers asserts that the district court wrongly denied his second request 

to amend his § 1983 complaint on the ground that the pleading did not contain 

adequate factual allegations. However, the request was denied because Rogers 

did not follow a local court rule requiring that a proposed amended pleading be 

filed with a motion seeking leave to amend or supplement the initial pleading. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. See 

Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 402 (5th Cir. 1996); Layfield v. Bill Heard 

Chevrolet Co., 607 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979). To the extent that Rogers 

challenges the district court’s order that he respond to a questionnaire to 

clarify his claims after he filed his complaint, the order was appropriate. See 

Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976).

Moreover, Rogers argues that Peter Caswell, his case manager, exhibited

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. However, the facts do not reflect 

that the condition about which he informed Caswell—i.e., warmth from a leg 

monitor worn as a condition of his commitment—is a medical need for which 

treatment is recommended or is a condition that is so obvious that even laymen 

would recognize that care is needed. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 

n.12 (5th Cir. 2006). Even if warmth is a serious medical need, Rogers did not

state that Caswell was aware of facts from which he could infer that the injury

suffered by Rogers was indicative or suggestive of a serious medical need, drew 

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the inference, and unnecessarily caused harm with his response. See Tamez v. 

Manthey, 589 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2009). At worst, Caswell was negligent

in his assessment of the harm caused by the monitor, which does not establish

a claim for deliberate indifference. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 

(1994); Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346.

According to Rogers, the leg monitor ultimately burned him while 

Caswell was away on vacation and he was not treated until Caswell returned 

and approved medical care. To the extent that Rogers maintains that the delay 

in treatment should be imputed to Caswell, his claim is unavailing. He has 

failed to allege facts suggesting that any injury caused by the leg monitor was 

serious enough to require care earlier than he received it or that the delay 

exacerbated his injury to the point that it became a serious medical need. In 

effect, Rogers failed to allege that any delay resulted from deliberate 

indifference and caused substantial harm. See Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 

463 (5th Cir. 2006).

Contending that he was targeted for retaliation after he filed grievances, 

Rogers asserts that Kristian Luera, a care worker, threatened him and 

conspired with Caswell to conceal their misconduct by fabricating and altering

records. He asserts that, because of these actions, he did not advance to the 

next tier of his treatment program. 

While Rogers asserted a constitutional right that he exercised (i.e., filing 

grievances), see Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684-86 (5th Cir. 2006), he failed 

to allege with specificity the other elements of a claim for retaliation. He has 

not alleged that a defendant intended to retaliate against him because he filed 

grievances and that he experienced an adverse action because of a retaliatory 

motive. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999). His belief 

that he was targeted does not state a claim for retaliation, see id. at 325, and 

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his assertion that there was a conspiracy against him is conclusory, see Wilson 

v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rogers contends that Kara Gougler, the civil commitment manager at 

the Texas Civil Commitment Office, and Michael Searcy, an operation 

specialist in charge of the grievance process, engaged in a cover-up of 

misconduct and abuse of power. He maintains that Gougler mishandled 

grievances and that she and Searcy did not act after being informed through 

the grievance process of others’ misbehavior. Rogers asserts that Gougler and 

Searcy are responsible based on their roles as supervisors. 

Because Rogers has no right to have his grievances resolved in his favor 

or to have his complaints reviewed pursuant to his preferred process, his 

assertion that Gougler and Searcy are responsible for constitutional violations 

due to their involvement in the grievance process is unavailing. See Geiger v. 

Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2005). Also, he has not alleged a basis 

for supervisory liability because he neither specifies a constitutional violation 

in which they were involved nor ascribes to them an unconstitutional policy. 

See Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Finally, Rogers argues that he was denied medical care and was targeted 

due to his race. However, he does not allege an act that reflects discriminatory 

animus or offer facts showing that, due to his race, he was treated differently 

than a similarly situated person. See Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th 

Cir. 1995); Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1992). 

Rogers has not shown that the district court erred in certifying that his 

appeal was not taken in good faith. Accordingly, his IFP motion is denied. See 

Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202. The appeal lacks arguable merit and is dismissed as 

frivolous. See id. at 202 n.24; Howard, 707 F.2d at 219-20; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED.

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