HIZBALLAH: TERRORISM, NATIONAL

LIBERATION, OR MENACE?

Sami G. Hajjar

August 2002
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the

Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report

is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Authors Note: There are many English spelling variations of Arabic

names such as Hizballah (Hezbollah; Hizb’ullah, Hizbollah); Shiite

(Shi’a, Shi’i); Shab’a (Shebaa, Cheb’a); al-Qa’ida (Al Qaeda), and so on.

In this monograph, I will use one consistent spelling throughout unless

the term is part of a direct quote, in which case the original spelling will

be retained.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report

may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133,

FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.

army.mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://www.carlisle.army.

mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail

newsletter to update the national security community on the research of

our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming

conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a

strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are

interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at

outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-097-4

ii
FOREWORD

The Lebanese Hizballah, or the Party of God, has been a

player in Lebanese and regional politics since 1982. It

gained international notoriety as a result of the 1983 suicide

attack that claimed the lives of 241 U.S. Marines, then

stationed in Lebanon. Hizballah was also responsible for a

series of kidnappings of U.S. and Western hostages during

the 1980s, and attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in

Argentina during the 1990s. Since its inception, Hizballah

has been engaged in a prolonged fight against Israel and its

South Lebanon Army (SLA) ally, and took credit for the

Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the

dismantling of the SLA. It remains at odds with Israel over

its continued occupation of an enclave in the Golan Heights

along the Lebanon-Syria border. Hizballah is a strong

supporter of the Palestinian cause.

In his State of the Union address in January 2002,

President George W. Bush specifically mentioned Hizballah

as part of a “terrorist underworld” that threatens U.S.

interests. Hizballah has been on the Department of State’s

list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations since 1997.

The author of this monograph, Dr. Sami Hajjar, reviews

the history of Hizballah since its inception in 1982, and

examines its role in the recent political turmoil of Lebanon

and the region. Not only is Hizballah’s role central in the

dispute over the Shab’a Farms enclave between Lebanon

and Israel, it is part of an entangled set of linkages involving

Syria, Iran, the United States, the European Union, and the

Palestinians. The challenge that Hizballah poses to U.S.

policy in the Middle East involves complicated strategic

issues, not merely problems of terrorism that could be dealt

with by countermeasures.

iii
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

monograph as a contribution to the national security debate

on this important subject as our nation engages in a war on

terrorism with diverse international manifestations.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

SAMI G. HAJJAR was born in Beirut, Lebanon. He was

educated at the American University of Beirut where he

obtained a B.A. and M.A. in Public Administration, and the

University of Missouri-Columbia where he obtained a Ph.D.

in Political Science in 1969. He was a Professor of Political

Science at the University of Wyoming from 1966-1987

where he taught a variety of courses including Middle East

Politics and Islamic Political Theory. Hajjar was also

assigned for 2 years to the Wyoming Governor’s Office and

worked on international trade promotion. In 1987 he joined

the U.S. Information Agency and served in Saudi Arabia as

Cultural Affairs Officer, and in the United Arab Emirates as

Public Affairs Officer, before returning to Washington in

1992 as Gulf Desk Officer. In 1993 he resigned the Foreign

Service to become consultant to the Emirates Center for

Strategic Studies in Abu Dhabi. In September 1994 until his

retirement in January 2002, Dr. Hajjar served at the U.S.

Army War College as Professor and Director of Middle East

Studies in the Department of National Security and

Strategy. He is currently on assignment with the Strategic

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. Dr. Hajjar is the

author of numerous professional articles in Middle East

studies, public administration, and political science.

v
SUMMARY

In this monograph, the author advances the thesis that

the conditions that give rise to acts of terrorism must be

dealt with as urgently as combating those responsible for

such acts. In the case of Hizballah, those conditions are

essentially political. The situation contributing to the rise of

Hizballah involves the political, economic, and social

circumstances of the Shiite community of Lebanon as the

country began to experience civil strife in the mid-1970s.

The immediate cause for the creation of the organization

was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, resulting in the

prolonged occupation of south Lebanon.

The monograph examines the formation and

development of Hizballah in the context of the Lebanese

confessional political system that rests on a delicate balance

between the country’s religious sects. Historically, the

system favored the Christian and the Muslim Sunni

communities, but as the Shiite community became the

largest sect in Lebanon, it demanded a greater share of the

nation’s pie. Hizballah has its roots in this larger Shiite

insurrectionist movement.

As a religious party, clerics occupy a central role in

Hizballah’s leadership structure. The party organization is

hierarchical with a definite link to Iran, since Iranian

religious and political leadership is an important source of

guidance. Several organizational entities direct and control

the party’s functional and regional activities, including

social services and military wings. Additionally, Hizballah’s

ideological culture rests on a Manichean view that divides

the world between oppressors and oppressed. Politically,

the United States and Israel are viewed as having a

symbiotic relationship, and regarded as oppressors and evil.

Hizballah’s work on the behalf of its constituency and its

resistance activities against the Israeli occupation of South

vii
Lebanon earned the party a respectable bloc of seats in the

Lebanese Parliament, and the admiration of many Arabs

and Muslims. In the dispute between Lebanon and

Israel—also involving Syria and the United Nations

(U.N.)—over the Shab’a Farms enclave located on the

eastern slopes of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights,

Hizballah plays a pivotal role. Even beyond the Shab’a

Farms border dispute, the entire Lebanon-Israel border

issue is made complicated for lack of clear documentations

dating to the French and British mandate period, position

adjustments made by Israel during its occupation of south

Lebanon, and U.N. involvement in demarcating the border

to certify Israeli withdrawal.

For the United States, Hizballah is regarded as a

terrorist organization. The Arabs, on the other hand, view

Hizballah’s activities as legitimate national liberation

efforts. Both views are supported by objective evidence.

Utilizing a geographic context, the author assesses the

threat of Hizballah at the Lebanese, regional, and

international levels. Lebanon remains a fragile body politic,

and events on the Lebanon-Israel border involving

Hizballah and possibly Palestinian refugees in the area

could rekindle civil strife. At the regional level, Hizballah’s

efforts on behalf of the Palestinians and the quest to liberate

the Shab’a Farms could trigger a wider regional conflict

especially because of the intimate involvements of Syria and

Iran in these efforts. Finally, no credible evidence exists

linking Hizballah to recent international terrorist

incidents.

The author concludes with several observations:

Hizballah is a complex party firmly grounded in the culture

of its constituency and is part of Islamic national liberation

movements, it is engaged in guerrilla warfare against

Israeli occupation, and despite its identifiable

organizational structure, has a mercurial center of gravity.

His recommendations: The United States should not engage

Hizballah militarily, should encourage Israel to vacate the

Shab’a Farms, and should give priority to the Syria-Israel

viii
track in the peace process. The menace of Hizballah is

related to what is fundamentally a strategic challenge to

U.S. Middle East policy that cannot be resolved through

tactical measures.

ix
HIZBALLAH: TERRORISM, NATIONAL

LIBERATION, OR MENACE?

In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002,

President George W. Bush informed Congress and the

American public that one of the goals of his administration

“is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening

America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass

destruction.” He went on to name the regimes of North

Korea, Iran, and Iraq as the culprit states, and with their

terrorist allies, that “constitute an axis of evil. . . . They could

provide these arms to terrorists, giving the means to match

their hatred.”1

The Department of State, pursuant to the Immigration

and Nationality Act as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, designates certain

international organizations and groups as Foreign

Terrorist Organizations (FTO). These designations are

valid for 2 years, after which they expire. The Secretary of

State can redesignate an organization if it has been

determined that the organization has continued to engage

in terrorist activity.2 The Lebanese organization Hizballah

(literally, Party of God) has been designated as FTO in the

State Department’s reports for its involvement in several

anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in the 1980s, and attacks on the

Israeli Embassy and other Jewish targets in Argentina in

the 1990s.3

Given the symbiotic relationship between Iran and

Hizballah, the U.S. concern about Hizballah garners added

significance following the President’s inclusion of Iran in

the “axis of evil” triumvirate. This monograph examines

Hizballah as a challenge to U.S. policymakers in planning

the war on terrorism. It delineates the threats posed by

Hizballah and their political ramifications for Lebanon, the

region, and U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East.

1
The circumstances that gave rise to Hizballah, the

precarious nature of the Lebanese political system in the

wake of that country’s civil war, and the volatile nature of

the region in light of the unsettled Arab-Israeli conflict are

complicating factors for U.S. policymakers in confronting

the challenge of Hizballah. My primary thesis is that the

conditions that give rise to acts of terrorism must be dealt

with as urgently as combating those responsible for such

acts if the war on terrorism is to be won. In the case of

Hizballah, those conditions, as will be demonstrated, are

essentially political. This thesis explains why the war on

terrorism will be unconventional and a long ordeal.

Formation and Development of Hizballah.

The principal cause of Hizballah’s creation was the

Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The invasion took place

in the context of momentous regional political and security

developments in which Lebanon became a focal point. A

major development in the modern history of the region was

the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 that brought Sinai, Gaza, and

the West Bank under Israeli occupation. While Lebanon

was not directly involved in the war, the impact of Arab

defeat was to reverberate in Lebanon a few years later and

seriously threaten its unity and independence.

The Arab response to the Israeli occupation was the “war

of attrition” that Egypt waged between 1967-70, and Syria’s

prompting Palestinian commandos to infiltrate Lebanon

and wage attacks on Israel. This military strategy led the

Palestinians to conclude that Arab armies were incapable of

confronting Israel in conventional warfare, and they

adopted guerrilla warfare tactics as means for liberation

and eventual statehood. Their main base of operations after

the 1967 war was in Jordan whose majority population

consisted of Palestinian refugees. Shortly thereafter,

Palestinian guerrilla organizations found themselves in a

struggle with the government of King Hussein over control

of the country. In September 1970 the king got the upper

2
hand, and scores of Palestinian fighters were forced to leave

the country.4 It was the influx of large numbers of

Palestinian refugees into Lebanon and the reality of the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headed by Yasir

Arafat, becoming a “government within a government” that

contributed directly to Lebanon’s prolonged civil strife,

which began in earnest in mid-1970. Lebanon became the

launching site for Palestinian guerrilla activities against

Israel and for Israeli retaliations. Ultimately these

skirmishes led to the eruption of full-scale civil war between

leftist Muslims supported by Syria and the PLO, and

conservative Christians supported by Israel. As the civil

war progressed, the authority of the central government of

Lebanon collapsed in 1976, with the Army breaking down

along sectarian lines, and Syria and Israel intervening

directly to defend their interests. The Israeli 1982 invasion

that expelled the PLO leadership to Tunis and resulted in

the prolonged occupation of south Lebanon was the single

direct event that gave rise to Hizballah, but the

organization was spurred by the general unsettled regional

political environment following the 1967 war.5

Because of Lebanon’s confessional political system that

allocates major political offices and bureaucratic

appointments along religious sectarian lines, significant

demographic shifts could destabilize the very foundations of

the system. These foundations were based on the 1943

National Pact—Lebanon’s unwritten constitution—among

the country’s traditional leaders at the time. It established

the representation ratio of 6/5, whereby the Chamber of

Deputies (parliament) would be made up of six Christian

deputies for every five Muslim deputies, the president of the

republic would be a Maronite Christian, the Speaker of

Parliament would be a Shiite, and the prime minister would

be a Sunni Muslim, and so on, accounting for all senior

positions in government. The logic of this arrangement was

based on the country’s 1932 census in which the Maronite

Christians constituted a plurality of the population, and all

Christians comprised a slight majority of the Lebanese.6

3
Consequently, system survival favored the status quo and

meant that the delicate balance between the Christian and

Muslim communities had to be preserved. This is why

Lebanon has never had an official census after 1932.7

The same system that gave political advantages to the

Christians also gave them relative economic advantages

over time. But also over the years, the Shiite community,

traditionally concentrated in the rural Beqa’ valley and

south Lebanon by virtue of its heavy involvement in the

agricultural sector, began to increase in numbers due to

higher birth rates common among rural communities. The

economic gap between the Shiites and the Christians, as

well as between the Shiites and the commercially oriented

Sunni community, began to widen.8 Since the political

system was inelastic, the Shiite community was being

gradually transformed from a passive and marginal group

to a more activist group demanding a greater share in

Lebanon’s pie. The transformation was largely due to a

gifted cleric, Musa al-Sadr, who was born in Iran to a family

with some roots in Lebanon. He arrived in south Lebanon in

1959 to lead the Shiite community of the coastal city of Tyre.

He rapidly rose to become the acknowledged leader of

Lebanon’s Shiites on the strength of his educational

background as a lawyer and religious scholar, religious

training and tutelage under leading Ayatollahs in Iran and

Iraq, charismatic personality, and oration skill.9 Utilizing

traditional Shiite symbols and institutions, Al-Sadr was

able to energize the Shiite community by virtue of his rise to

the position of chairman of the Shiite Higher Council. He

urged the community to become more assertive and to seek

emancipation from economic deprivation that had been

associated with the community’s agrarian traditions. This

he attempted to accomplish within the existing Lebanese

political system, considering the Shiite community an

existential part of the Lebanese mosaic.10

Approximately 3 years into the civil war, and a few

months following the Israeli invasion in March 1978 to

destroy Palestinian bases and establish a “security zone” in

4
the south, Musa al-Sadr accepted an official invitation to

visit Libya. On August 31, 1978, al-Sadr, along with two

companions, disappeared, and their whereabouts and fates

remain a mystery to this date—hence the title of Fouad

Ajami’s book, The Vanished Imam.

Al-Sadr has become a larger-than-life figure among the

Shiites of Lebanon. No comparable personality has come

forward to replace him, although Nabih Birri, a lawyer by

training, not a cleric, and currently Speaker of Parliament,

took over the leadership position of “Afwaj al-Muqawamah

al-Lubnaniya”(Legions of the Lebanese Resistance), known

by its acronym AMAL (Amal) which means “hope,” that

al-Sadr created in 1975 as a Shiite militia. Initially, al-Sadr,

it seemed, intended his militia to fight Israel in the south

and to be an auxiliary to the Lebanese Army. However,

Amal became but one of several armed groups representing

major Lebanese religious factions and various Palestinian

groups that dotted the Lebanese landscape as civil strife

began to rage.11

Radical members of Amal formed Hizballah. They

objected to Amal’s moderate policies and Nabih Berri’s

presumed willingness to seek political accommodation

rather than military confrontation in the wake of the 1982

Israeli invasion. These members were previously associated

with other various Shiite groups. Prominent among them

was the Lebanese al-Da’wa (Call) movement whose

intellectual roots were based on the 1960s Shiite revival

movement in Najaf Iraq, and with Islamic Amal, the

breakaway faction of the main Amal movement. The party’s

formation was aided by the fact that Syria permitted at the

time some 1,000 members of the Iranian Pasdaran

(Revolutionary Guard) consisting of military and civilian

instructors to locate in the Beqa’ valley. The Iranians

provided funds and training that directly contributed to the

rapid rise of Hizballah and its anti-Western and anti-Israeli

stances that were in line with Syrian and Iranian policies.12

5
Ideologically, Hizballah was inspired by the two

prominent ayatollahs associated with Shiite revivalism—

the Iraqi Baqir al-Sadr and the Iranian Ruhallah Khomeini.

Baqir al-Sadr founded the Iraqi al-Da’wa party in 1968,

whose purpose was to organize Muslim believers to seize

power and create an Islamic state as a prelude to spreading

the Islamic da’wa to the rest of the world. Ayatollah Baqir

al-Sadr, executed by the regime of Saddam Hussein in 1980

for his support of Iran’s Islamic revolution, was a major

source for Hizballah’s radical ideas. The other principal

source was Ayatollah Khomeini, who for many years was in

exile in Najaf where he masterminded the 1979 Iranian

revolution and became that country’s Supreme Leader.

From Khomeini, Hizballah adopted the “theory that a

religious jurist (Vali-Faqih) should hold ultimate political

power. The authority of this jurist, both spiritual and

political, may not be challenged; he must be obeyed.

Hizballah sees itself fulfilling the messianic role of turning

Lebanon into a province of Islam.”13 The hardened political

realities of Lebanon, however, led Hizballah’s leadership to

reevaluate the party’s ideological basis and political

strategy.

Professor Magnus Ranstorp points out, in his extensive

study on the party, that its establishment with Iranian

assistance occurred in three phases.14 The first phase is a

reference to the initial arrival of Iranian Pasdaran into

Lebanon immediately after the 1982 Israeli invasion. They

provided the radical Islamic Amal with military training

and embarked “on the systematic recruitment and

ideological indoctrination of radical Shi’ites in the Biqa’a

area.”15 Their successful recruitment efforts were aided by

substantial Iranian funding that paid for military training

centers and a number of community services such as

schools, clinics, hospitals, and cash subsidies to the poor.

During this early phase, the founding Shiite clergy drafted

Hizballah’s charter and constitution, calling for the

establishment of an Iranian-style Islamic republic in

Lebanon. Sheikh Subhi al-Tufaili, a founding member, was

6
declared in the Biqa’ city of Ba’albek, in December 1982, as

president of the envisioned Islamic republic of Lebanon.

The next phase involved Hizballah’s activities in the

southern outskirts of the capital city of Beirut where large

numbers of Shiites lived in desperate conditions, most

having been displaced from their farms and homes in the

south because of the Israeli invasion and occupation of that

region. In addition to the party’s ability to recruit members

due in part to the assistance of prominent clergy of al-Da’wa

like Sheikh Hassan Nasserallah (who rose later to the

position of secretary-general and oversaw the Israeli

withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000), it was able to

attract Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, a

leading Shiite personality. Ayatollah Fadlallah was a

central figure in the Lebanese Shiite community as head of

the Council of Shiite Religious Scholars, and his association

with Hizballah gave the party a major boost and a spiritual

guide aligned with Iran.16

The last phase was associated with Hizballah’s

expansion into southern Lebanon. A number of factors

conjoined to propel the party to prominence in the south.

The ouster of the Palestinians from the region by the Israel

in 1982; the failure of Amal to challenge the Israeli presence

in the region; the success of Hizballah’s attack on the U.S.

and French contingencies of the Multinational Force on

October 23, 1983, in Beirut; the relative successes of suicide

attacks against Israeli targets in south Lebanon; and the

influx of Iranian aid and influence through such local clerics

as Sheikh Ragib Harb (assassinated by Israeli agents in

1984)—all helped to raise the militancy fervor of the party.

Consequently, Hizballah created a military wing in the

mid-1980s under the name Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah

(Islamic Resistance) whose purpose was the liberation of

south Lebanon from Israeli occupation. All these

developments contributed substantially to the prominence

of Hizballah and presented a serious challenge to Amal as

the major representative of the Lebanese Shiite community.

As Ranstorp observed:

7
The rapid growth and popularity of the Hiz’ballah in these three

regions was achieved not only by a successful combination of

ideological indoctrination and material inducement by

Hizb’allah through the infusion of Iranian aid and military

assistance. It was also achieved by the ability of the Hizb’allah

leaders to mobilize a destitute Shi’i community, disaffected with

the continuing Israeli occupation, and unite it within the

framework of an organisation with clearly defined and

articulated political objectives. This was achieved through the

provision of concrete and workable solutions to the fundamental

political, social, and economic needs of the Shi’a community in

the absence of any central Lebanese authority and in the

presence of the civil war.17

Organization and Ideological Evolution.

As a party and movement whose ideology is grounded in

religious thought, clerics occupy a central role in the

leadership structure. The religious character of the

leadership results, furthermore, in a party organizational

hierarchy with emphasis on the role of ulema (clerics) in

society that is in line with Shiite practice. Authority flows

from the top, and control of party members is enhanced by

the fact that the lines of authority are traced back to and

sanctioned by religious ulema. Such an organizational

philosophy means that “[t]he highest authority in the

Hizb’allah clerical hierarchy is not only allotted to the most

learned practitioners of Islamic jurisprudence, obtained

only after many years of religious training and scholarly

activity, but is also based on the number of students and

followers belonging to each cleric.”18 Furthermore, and as

Rasnstorp goes on to explain, the link that Hizballah has

with Iran contributes further to the control the leadership

has over the organization. This is because the Iranian

religious and political leadership is a source of ultimate

(final) guidance on issues that otherwise might be a cause of

dissentions or disagreements. It would be incorrect to

deduce, however, that Hizballah’s leadership is totally

subservient to Iran’s ayatollahs. For instance, Hizballah’s

Lebanese spiritual guide, Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah,

8
is critical of the Velayate Faqih (guardianship of the

jurisconsult) concept as practiced in Iran, and regards

himself as much a grand ayatollah with independent

standing among the broad Shiite community. This is

especially significant for, since the death of Ayatollah

Khomeini, there has not been an acknowledged Vali-Faqih

in Iran. Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Khamene’i, holds

the title of Supreme Leader (Rahbar), not the prestigious

designation Vali-Faqih. The net result was that Fadlallah’s

influence as Hizballah’s spiritual mentor has increased

since the death of Khomeini. Still, Iran’s status as the

leading Shiite nation and its financial contributions to the

coffers give its leadership considerable influence, although

not outright control.19

Dr. A. Nizar Hamzeh, who has written extensively about

Hizballah, constructed an organizational chart of the party

based on its various activities, publications, and

newspapers reports. For purposes of this monograph, a

general overview of the party’s organizational structure

based on Hamzeh’s exposition is presented.20

Hizballah’s highest decisionmaking entity is a Supreme

Shura (consultative) Council. Its 17 members are

predominantly clergy but include a group of security and

paramilitary leaders. This council makes the party’s

strategic decisions in all areas of legislative, executive,

judicial, political, and military affairs. Decisions are by a

majority vote, and if need be, matters could be referred to

the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamene’i, in Iran. The

link to Iran is, therefore, more than tactical or cursory.

The day-to-day activities of the party are supervised by

representatives of the party’s regional or district heads (the

four districts are Beirut, the southern suburbs, the South,

and the Biqa’) plus five additional members appointed by

the Supreme Shura Council. The Secretary General is an

ex-officio member. He and his deputy are entrusted with

administering the affairs of the party and are its most

visible leaders. Currently the Secretary General is Sayyid

9
Sheikh Hasan Nassrallah, a gifted orator and a brilliant

strategist.

A supervisory organ of the party is a 15-member

Politburo that coordinates the works of the various party

committees. The committees, of which there are several,

focus on three main functional areas: security issues, social

services including financial and administrative affairs,

and religious activities including propaganda and mass

media. It is generally acknowledged that the social

services the party engages in have been extremely effective

and are what endear it to many in the Shiite community of

Lebanon. They include assistance in medical needs,

housing, public utilities, and even financial aid to a

clientele that numbers in the thousands. Hizballah, in this

regard, performs services that are usually expected of local

governments.

Lastly, Hizballah’s organizational chart includes what

Hamzeh labels as a “combat organ” made up of two

sections: the Islamic Resistance (al-muqawamah

al-Islamiyah) whose members are combatants when

mobilized; otherwise they have normal civilian

occupations—a fact that makes them a difficult target for

enemy forces. The second section is the Islamic Holy War

(al-jihad al-Islami), and, together with the first section, it

comes under the direct supervision of the Supreme Shura

Council. Furthermore, the first section “was in charge of

suicidal attacks against Western and Israeli targets, the

second one leads more conventional attacks against Israeli

troops in the south.”21

Ideologically, we have already noted the association

that Hizballah has to Iran. This link guided the Hizballah

leadership to develop basic radical ideological stances

involving beliefs regarding the nature of conflict, the

character of the ideal state, relations to other Muslims,

and views of the Western world.22

Hizballah adheres to a Manichean notion of the world

as being divided between oppressors (mustakbirun) and

10
oppressed (mustad’ifin). The relationship between the two

groups is inherently antagonistic—a conflict between good

and evil, right and wrong. This is a central concept in

Hizballah’s ideology, which, if rigidly applied to the realms

of regional and international politics, would allow little

room for compromise. The conflicting relationship cannot be

resolved by some mechanism leading to a win-win situation.

Rather, “the meek shall inherit the earth,” not in the life

after, but here and now through their activism. Also,

oppression takes economic, cultural, political, and social

forms, and oppressors transcend any particular nationality

or religion. Consequently, in the context of Hizballah’s

immediate political reality, the economic circumstances of

the Shiites in Lebanon and Israeli occupation of south

Lebanon, a region inhabited primarily by Shiites, identifies

them as oppressed. Political activism is required to rectify

their economic condition, and military resistance is

essential to deal with the occupation.

As for the conception of the state, readers familiar with

the Shiite notion of the Hidden Imam recognize that an

ideal government cannot be established until the return of

this divinely-anointed Imam.23 In the absence of the ideal,

Hizballah adheres to a concept of an Islamic state akin to

the one preached and practiced by Iran. Being an Islamic

movement, Hizballah regards it imperative to establish an

Islamic state as a religious duty, and because it is the best

form of government capable of bringing about the political

ideals of justice, equality, and freedom until the return of

the Hidden Imam (Mahdi). In the words of Hussein

al-Musawi, founder of Islamic Amal,

we are faithful to imam Khomeyni politically, religiously and

ideologically. In accordance with Khomeyni’s teaching we

strive to fight all manifestations of corruption and vanity in

this world, and all who fight the Muslims. . . . Our struggle is in

the east as well as the west. . . . Our goal is to lay the

groundwork for the reign of the Mahdi of earth, the reign of

truth and justice.24

11
The creation of an Islamic state means, in more concrete

terms, that such a state will be based on Sharia law (Islamic

law). Sharia, however, has multiple sources, and each is

subject to different interpretations by the various sects and

scholars, not to mention that there is no unanimity on the

authenticity of all the acknowledged sources. In the context

of the Lebanese confessional mosaic, it is not surprising that

Hizballah’s scheme for an Islamic state is opposed by the

Christian community, Sunni Muslims, Druze, and even a

majority of Shiites who prefer the laxity of a secular

Lebanese republic. Aware of this reality and based on the

Quranic verse “Let there be no compulsion in religion”

(2:256), Hizballah does not include the establishment of an

Islamic state as part of its political program, although the

concept remains central to the party’s ideology.

Also ingrained in Hizballah’s ideology is a complex

notion of Islamic universalism deduced from yet another

expression of the Manichean vision. It is a vision akin to St.

Augustine’s dichotomy that groups humanity into a “City of

God” and a “City of Satan.” In Hizballah’s construct, Muslim

believers, presumably all Muslims regardless of sect,

constitute the “Party of God” in a general sense. They are

the “umma islamiyyah” (Islamic nation) and that binds

them together. The antithesis of this group would be,

obviously, the “Party of Satan” or the multitudes of

unbelievers.25

The regional implication of this ideological outlook is

that Hizballah regards Palestinians as members of the

“Party of God” or umma whose plight concerns the entire

umma. Additionally, Jerusalem, which contains Islam’s

third holiest site, is not the exclusive concern of the

Palestinians, but its liberation from Israeli occupation is the

responsibility of all Muslims. “Thus, it is the martyrdom,

imprisonment, displacement, and overall struggle of the

oppressed Palestinian nation to liberate its land from the

oppressor, Israel, which earns it Hizbu’llah’s utmost respect

and camaraderie.”26 To provide aid and comfort to the

Palestinians becomes an article of faith—a religious duty to

12
come to the assistance of fellow Muslims. As a matter of

principle, Hizballah’s leadership was loath to sit idly by

during the Israeli incursion into Palestinian-controlled

areas in April 2002. Israeli threats of massive retaliation

against Syria and Lebanon, however, constrained

Hizballah’s military activities against Israel along the

border. Hizballah was pragmatic enough to confine its

across-the-border muscle-flexing largely to the disputed

Shab’a Farms region that it regards part of its “Lebanese

national” duty to liberate, as will be explained below.

How Hizballah views the West and its civilization at the

ideological and pragmatic levels is of special interest to this

inquiry. Ghorayeb’s analysis of these points reveals the

complexity and sophistication of Hizballah’s views

especially about the United States.27 Samuel Huntington’s

theory of “clash of civilizations” appears valid insofar as

Hizballah believes in a cultural conflict between Islam and

the West. It is a conflict far deeper than any political or

ideological conflicts that separate them as two distinct

civilizations. Ever since the rise of Islam and its contact

with the West through the centuries, including contacts

with the Crusaders and later with European colonists,

relations have been a “civilisational struggle” in which each

side believes in the superiority of its culture. Leading the

Western charge in this struggle is the United States that

Hizballah regards, as the Islamic Republic of Iran had, as

the “Great Satan.” Other Western countries such as Britain

and France are considered simply “evil.” Operationally,

Hizballah believes that the struggle takes the form of

Western conspiracies against the Muslim World. In the

Middle East, the United States and Israel are the main

conspirators. In this symbiotic relationship,

According to Fadlu’llah and Hizbu’llah, the US’ regional policy

is not based on real US interests but on Israeli interests.

Therefore, the US does not have an American policy in the

Middle East, but an “Israeli policy,” which stems from the US’

ideological commitment to Israel. So closely intertwined are

Israel’s and the US’ interests that the two states are deemed

13
identical and are alternately cast as being the other’s

instrument. On the one hand, Israel is depicted as the US’

“spearhead” in the region, while on the other, the US is

portrayed as Israel’s “tool.”28

More recently, Fadlallah, not unexpectedly, accused the

U.S. administration of being a full partner in Sharon’s

incursion into Palestine in April 2002. Fadlallah believes

the entire episode of the Israeli incursion was based on a

pre-agreed upon U.S.-Israeli plan, and Secretary of State

Colin Powell’s visit to the region was part of this plan to give

political support to Sharon’s campaign.29

Given this perception of the United States and its

pro-Israeli policies in the region, Hizballah believes that the

United States is in fact the lead terrorist state in the world.

On the basis of these deeply-held convictions, Hizballah

justifies acts of violence, including suicide bombing, against

the oppressor enemy. In an interview with CBS anchor Dan

Rather, Hizballah’s Deputy Secretary General Sheikh

Naim Qasim referred to suicide bombing as “martyrdom

operations”:

We don’t call them suicide operations because suicide comes out

of a loss of hope in life, while martyrdom is a love of life...

[These] operations are the only power the Palestinians have

against the sophisticated Israeli military machine. Balance

cannot be reached unless these operations are carried out in the

heartland of the enemy.30

Also in this interview, Qasim declared that Hizballah

does not believe in the legitimacy of the state of Israel for it

was established at the expense of Palestinians, and that the

current party’s plans “have nothing to do with Americans”

because of their support of Israel. But in a veiled warning,

“. . . what happens in the future has to be decided in the

future.”31

Interestingly, however, and despite its negative image of

the West, Hizballah does not reject everything Western as

evil. Hizballah, it appears, places high value on western and

14
especially American education in the fields of science and

technology. Many of its members are graduates of Western

schools and use their knowledge in the service of the party’s

social, medical, and information activities.

From this general sketch of Hizballah’s organizational

structure and ideological constructs, it is possible to

conclude that the party is a sophisticated movement deeply

rooted in its environment. Its appeal and popularity are

enhanced by regional developments whereby the United

States and Israel increasingly appear as enemies of Islam

and the Arabs. And despite the fact that Hizballah was

created as a reaction to Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon,

the party is now far from being an “issue party” likely to fade

as political circumstances change. Hizballah has managed

to adapt successfully and accommodate evolving

circumstances, becoming in the process an active player in

Lebanon’s political system, and an admired symbol of

anti-Israeli resistance throughout the Arab and Muslim

world.

The ability of Hizballah to adapt successfully and

accommodate—read moderate—and still retain its

legitimacy with its constituency is because of its link to Iran.

It was primarily the struggle between the moderate and

hardliner leadership in Iran following the death of

Khomeini in 1989 and the emergence in the same year of the

moderate regime of President Ali Akbar Hashimi

Rafsanjani that caused a shift in Hizballah’s

orientation.Rafsanjani, interested in rebuilding the Iranian

economy, began to chart a course based on normal

international behavior. Influenced by the new Iranian

orientation of openness, Sheikh Fadlallah urged Hizballah

to become more open and involved in the Lebanese political

system. The ideological implication was that the notion of

an Islamic Republic in Lebanon had to be abandoned, if only

for tactical political reasons.32 Fadlallah’s push for the

“Lebanonisation” of Hizballah, as Nizar Hamzah explained,

was reflected in 1991 in the election of Sayyid Abbas

Musawi, considered a member of the party’s moderate

15
faction, as Secretary General. After Musawi’s assassination

in February 1992 by the Israelis, his successor, Sayyid

Hasan Nasrallah, continued the policy of rapprochement by

positioning the party to participate in the Lebanese

parliamentary elections and to close the “western hostages”

file by completing the release of all hostages in 1992.

Hizballah members won eight parliamentary seats in the

1992 elections, with four additional seats won by

nonmembers affiliated with its electoral list. As a result,

Hizballah constituted the largest single party bloc in

Parliament. In the 1996 elections, the party did not fare as

well and was represented by seven members and three

affiliates. But in the 2000 elections, it improved its showing

and won nine seats and three affiliates due to its popularity

even with Christian voters who credited it with forcing the

Israeli withdrawal in May. By its active participation in the

electoral process, the party

was clearly admitting not only the realities of the Lebanese

system but also that the road to the Islamic state could be a

model of participation in elections rather than the revolutionary

approach. Thus, evolutionary and not revolutionary approach

has become the main feature of Hizballah’s new policy.33

Under Nasrallah’s leadership, Hizballah continues to

pursue a strategy of pragmatism, accommodation, and

engagement in the Lebanese political system and causes.

The one cause that propelled Hizballah into prominence

regionally and internationally was the liberation of south

Lebanon from Israeli occupation. The party’s early history

of attacks against U.S. and western targets in Lebanon,34

military operations against Israeli forces and their South

Lebanese Army (SLA) ally, and continued efforts to liberate

the Shab’a Farms enclave, have earned the party the scorn

of the United States and Israel as a “terrorist” organization,

but the admiration of most Lebanese and Arabs as heroes of

national resistance fighting for a legitimate and just cause.

And even the “understandings” that Israel reached with

Hizballah, which will be detailed below, added to the

16
legitimacy of Hizballah’s cause and image as a pragmatic

and responsible actor.35

The discussion thus far suggests that the enigmatic

Hizballah was born of insurgency, reared in violent

circumstances, and matured with seemingly greater sense

of realism and pragmatism. The next section discusses the

issue of the Shab’a Farms that is the current focus of

Hizballah’s military operations. These operations and the

Lebanese claim that the Shab’a Farms enclave is occupied

Lebanese territory are feared to be by the United Nations

(U.N.), the United States and other western nations a

flashpoint that could trigger a major war engulfing the

entire region.36

Shab’a Farms Dispute.

The Shab’a Farms dispute is the last major remaining

territorial dispute between Israel and Lebanon—a dispute

that began with the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in

1978 (Operation LITANI) and the subsequent

establishment of a “security zone” in a border enclave

controlled jointly with its SLA allied militia. The Shab’a

issue is more than a legal question involving the right of

sovereignty over the disputed area; it is the hook used by

Lebanon and Syria to link the Lebanon-Israel track to the

Syrian-Israel track in the Middle East peace process. It

involves the larger question of a peace settlement to end the

Israeli occupation of Lebanese and Syrian lands leading to a

comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Hizballah is the tactical instrument contributing to that

end. Understanding the complexities of these relationships

is critical to finding a resolution of what the United States

and Israel regard as Hizballah’s terrorism.

During his second term of office, President William J.

Clinton became personally involved in the Middle East

peace process. As U.S. diplomatic efforts intensified to move

the process forward, Syrian President Hafez al-Asad

became apprehensive about the possibilities of separate

17
“deals” between Israel and the Palestinians and Israel and

the Lebanese, leaving Syria isolated. The late President

Asad had always preferred a comprehensive approach to the

peace process whereby all of the tracks would be settled

simultaneously rather than individually.37 This approach,

he reasoned, would give the Arab side greater bargaining

weight in negotiations with Israel. Consequently, when the

Palestinians signed the Oslo Agreement with Israel in May

1994, which appeared to have paved the way for a separate

Palestinian-Israeli deal, the coupling of the Lebanon and

Syrian tracks became that much more important for the

Syrians. The disproportionate political influences that

Syria had over a wide-spectrum of Lebanese institutions,

groups, and personalities, not to mention the reportedly

35,000 troops deployed there, ensured that Lebanon had

little room to maneuver on the issue of coupling the two

tracks. From a Syrian perspective, furthermore, the linkage

serves its interest in the peace process and prevents its

being isolated. Syria gains an important card—the

“Lebanon card,” which includes Hizballah and potentially

the Palestinian refugees—to play at the negotiation table

with Israel that possesses overwhelming advantages in

economic, technological, and military terms, not to mention

U.S. support. Without the “Lebanon card,” Israel could not

be induced to give away much in negotiations with the

Syrians.38

Specifically, the coupling of the tracks meant that

negotiating peace with Israel involved the issues of

simultaneous Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese

and Syrian lands. Hence, when Prime Minister Ehud Barak

declared his intention to unilaterally withdraw from

Lebanon by July 2000, President Lahhoud of Lebanon

complained:

[I]t is no longer a secret that Israeli maneuver including the

proposal for unilateral withdrawal without a comprehensive

and just peace, is a proposal that does not seek peace but a

security arrangement for Israel at our expense and is designed

18
to shift all other burdens on us, foremost of which is the

Palestinian problem.39

What was interesting about Lebanon’s position on

Israel’s unilateral withdrawal, which took place in May

2000, was the fact that U.N. Security Council (UNSC)

Resolution 425 called for such a withdrawal; i.e. unilateral

and unconditional, which was what Lebanon had been

calling for all along. On the other hand, by agreeing to link

its track with Syria, Lebanon involves itself in the peace

process based on UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 adopted in

the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war that called on the

parties to exchange “land for peace.” All along, the Lebanese

have considered that these U.N. resolutions, and hence the

“land for peace” formula, do not apply to them since no

Lebanese lands were occupied in the 1967 war. For the

Lebanese, Israel was to comply with UNSC resolution 425

and withdraw unconditionally to the international border.

But herein lies the problem; how to define the international

border?

The recognized border between Lebanon and Israel is

the international boundary line agreed upon by France and

Great Britain in 1923 when Lebanon and Palestine were

under their respective mandates. This exact line was

recognized in 1949 by independent Lebanon and the newly

created State of Israel in Palestine as the Armistice

Demarcation Line that remained undisputed and

uncontested by either country until Israeli incursions into

south Lebanon beginning 1978. During Israel’s prolonged

occupation of south Lebanon, border issues began to

surface, and when Israel withdrew unilaterally, a new

dimension to the border definition was added to the debate,

namely the border line between Lebanon and Syria in an

area in the Golan Heights that is under Israeli occupation.

This is the area known as the Shab’a Farms.40(See Map 1.)

19
20

Map 1.
One issue of concern to the Lebanese was that Israel had

shifted the international border to the west (in an area along

the Armistice Line separating the Lebanese village of Kafr

Killa and the Israeli town of Metulla in the north and

running south to the vicinity of the Lebanese town of Mays

al-Jabal) in order to control eight high-ground strategic

positions or outposts. The border “adjustments” at

Lebanon’s expense were for security considerations; Israel

moved the 1923 line “away from cities and villages

contiguous to the border” in order “to make up for that which

British and French surveyors did not attach importance in

the 1920s: the military defense of the border with

Lebanon.”41 Ultimately, Israel withdrew to a line set by the

U.N. in 1978 that, from an Israeli viewpoint, left no outposts

on Lebanese lands. The 1978 line, in the estimation of the

U.N., corresponded as closely as possible to the 1923-49 line

based on available cartographic documentation. Hizballah,

however, took issue with this view, arguing that there are

Israeli border positions that remain on Lebanese soil.42

Another border issue was the question of the Lebanese

“seven villages,” known collectively as the Hounine villages,

which were incorporated into Palestine as a result of the

French-British 1923 compromise that delineated the border

between the two countries. In 1999, Lebanon’s Prime

Minister Salim al-Huss acknowledged that U.N. Resolution

425 did not apply to the seven villages since they were not

part of the area occupied by Israel in 1978, but that their

recovery was a Lebanese objective. Probably Lebanon’s

raising of the issue of the “seven villages” was to signal that

the entire Lebanese-Israeli border demarcation can become

the subject of entangled legalistic debate in future peace

negotiations if, as they suspected, the Israelis were seeking

“land swap” and border adjustments.43

The Lebanese-Syrian border along the western edge of

the Golan Heights, known as the Shab’a Farms region, is

the subject of dispute between Lebanon and Israel as to

whether Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon in

compliance with U.N. Resolution 425. It is the flashpoint

21
region where Hizballah concentrates its military operations

against Israeli occupation forces.

The disputed area lies on the western slopes of Mount

Hermon that has been under Israeli occupation since June

1967. The exact size of the area is not clear; western sources

designate it as being “approximately 25 square kilometers,”

while Lebanese sources believe it to be “over 100 square

kilometers.” Both sources agree that the Shab’a Farms

enclave begins at a point north on the slopes of Mount

Hermon facing the village of Shab’a and runs in a

south-western direction for about 16 kilometers to near the

farms of Al-Noukhaylah and Mughr Shab’a in the vicinity of

the Lebanese-Syrian-Israeli border line. The discrepancy in

estimating the size is apparently due to disagreement on

how far eastward the farms extend along various points on

the north-southwestern line. Essentially, the exact size of

the area is unknown.44 Furthermore, the Lebanese claim

that the area in question consists of 14 farms, 13 of which

are Lebanese while one, Mughr Shab’a, is Syrian, and the

enclave is home to some 1,200 families. Also, since

occupying the area, Israel has established four settlements

and expropriated vineyards to supply a winery that the

settlers built there (by some accounts, there are no

vineyards in the Shab’a Farms), erected military

observation and listening posts, benefited from the ground

water of the area, and developed a ski resort that “yields a

billion dollars per annum from tourism.”45The dispute is

centered on the question: Should Israel vacate this area

according to the terms of Resolution 425 or is this area

subject to a final settlement based on Resolution 242?

Maps of the tri-border region between Lebanon, Syria,

and Israel place the Shab’a Farms enclave in Syria, but the

village of Shab’a (also Che’baa’ on some maps) that gave its

name to the farms is clearly in Lebanon. Still, the exact

demarcation line of the Lebanese-Syrian border in that area

is unclear. According to Dr. Issam Khalifeh, Lebanese

University professor of modern history, there was a

French-British agreement on February 4, 1935, which

22
considered the Lebanese and Syrian border to follow the

watershed running down the side of Mount Hermon so that

the western slopes of Mount Hermon are Lebanese while

the eastern slopes are Syrian.46 On the other hand, Prados

notes that “with regard to Lebanon and Syria, France,

which had mandates for both countries, did not define a

formal boundary between the two, although it did separate

them by administrative divisions.”47 This viewpoint was

subscribed to by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who

noted that “with respect to Israeli withdrawal from a

segment of joint Lebanese-Syrian border area, there seems

to be no official record of a formal international boundary

agreement between Lebanon and Syria on the basis of

which the border could be easily delineated to ascertain the

withdrawal.”48

U.N. Resolution 425 (1978) called on Israel “immediately

to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial

integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all

Lebanese territory.” It established a “United Nations

Interim Force for Southern Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the

purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces . . .,”

and requested the “Secretary General to report to the

Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of

the present resolution.” The withdrawal requirement did

not come into play until 22 years later, following the

completion of Israeli forces’ pullout on May 24, 2000. In

pursuing the mission of certifying Israel’s withdrawal, a

U.N. survey team, in consultation with appropriate

Lebanese and Israeli officials, determined a “virtual

Lebanese-Israel border line—or a line of withdrawal”

commonly referred to as the “Blue Line.” (See Map 2.) The

Secretary General

emphasized that the U.N. was not establishing a border, but

rather was drawing a line for the purpose of confirming Israeli

withdrawal in compliance with Resolution 425. It was the

intent of the Secretary General, however, that the line should

conform as closely as possible to the recognized international

border.49

23
24

Map 2.
The “Blue Line” was largely based on the 1949

Lebanese-Israeli Armistice line with minor “adjustments”

to accommodate terrain and other features. However, the

portion of the Blue Line along the Syrian occupied Golan

Heights and Lebanon was based on the line separating the

areas of operations of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon

(UNIFIL) and U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (the

U.N. force in Golan). The result was to place the Shab’a

Farms in Syria. The U.N. decision was based on Syrian and

Israeli maps submitted in connection with the 1974 Golan

Heights disengagement agreement (which created a

UNDOF Zone) that placed the Shab’a Farms within

UNDOF’s area of operations, and hence within Syria. The

Lebanese rejected this conclusion, and their official position

was summed up by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Hammoud

who said, “the Blue Line, or withdrawal line or with any

other name, should not impede our right to take back

occupied lands, especially the Shabaa Farms.”50

Lebanon argues that the Lebanon-Syria border along

the Golan Heights was demarcated and agreed to by both

countries in 1943, and in 1951 the Shab’a Farms were

transferred to Lebanon. There does not seem to be proof on

whether this agreement was in a form of a written

pact—copies of which are alleged to be found in the U.N.

archives—or an oral agreement. Perhaps a stronger

evidence is deeds showing ownership of the land belonging

to Lebanese citizens. Interestingly, Syria supports

Lebanon’s claim. Finally, and more recently, the Israeli

scholar, Dr. Asher Kaufman of the Truman Institute at the

Hebrew University, reported on the basis of his research at

the Cartographic Institute in Paris, that documents dating

to the French Mandate period support Lebanon’s claim to

the land.51 Still, the U.N. rejected the Lebanese claim but

without prejudicing any future border agreement between

Syria and Lebanon.52

The ambiguity of the Shab’a Farms’ identity impacts the

implementation of U.N. Resolutions 426 (1978) adopted

tangentially with Resolution 425. UNIFIL, established by

25
Resolution 426, had the mission, in addition to confirming

the withdrawal of Israeli forces, of “restoring international

peace and security and assisting the Government of

Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in

the area. . . .” Because Lebanon does not regard that Israel

has completed its withdrawal, it has thus far refused to

deploy the Lebanese Army to the south to bring the area

under its control. Consequently, the entire Lebanon-Israel

border remains a potential flashpoint—a “Red Line” as is

often referred to in the Lebanese press.

We should note that a segment of the Lebanese

population, which follows the political line of General

Michel Aoun, the exiled former Army Commander and head

of state, subscribes to his argument that the Shab’a Farms

are not Lebanese, the “issue is a lie . . . let Syria give us a

documentation that the farms are Lebanese lands and we

will liberate them. . . . ”53 This viewpoint is propagated in the

United States by a pro-Israeli lobby organization known as

“United States Committee for a Free Lebanon” (USCFL).

An article in the organization’s monthly bulletin stated,

“The Shabaa Farms ‘dispute’ is a figment of no one’s

imagination, but a deliberately-crafted Syria pretext for

sponsoring paramilitary attacks against Israel and a

justification for its continuing occupation of Lebanon.”54

Issues surrounding the Lebanon-Israel border boil down

to the following: an internationally recognized border line

based on the 1923 French-British agreement; an Armistice

line that largely corresponds to the 1923 line; a

Lebanon-Syria line along the Golan Heights whose legal

status is questioned by the U.N.; a Blue line drawn by the

U.N. that the Lebanese dispute; and an imaginary Red line

corresponding to the Blue line, which, if violated, could lead

to acts of violence with serious implications to the peace

process. Actors directly involved in these issues are, of

course, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, the U.N., and Hizballah.

Indirectly involved actors are the countries and entities

(Palestinians) with interest in the wider Middle East peace

process including the United States, some European

26
countries, and Iran. Hizballah, then, is a unique bead in a

string of beads—easily identifiable but difficult to separate

without consequences. How should the United States deal

with the challenge of Hizballah? The answer to this

question, as should be obvious by now, is not simple, for the

issues surrounding the challenge are complex and their

underlying concepts are elastic and subjective. The

following section will address these points.

Issues: Heads and Tails.

The 2001 Department of State report on terrorism noted

that although,

Hizballah has not attacked US interests in Lebanon since

1991, it continued to maintain the capability to target US

personnel and facilities there and abroad. During 2001,

Hizballah provided training to HAMAS and the Palestine

Islamic Jihad at training facilities in the Beka’a Valley.55

The report goes on to accuse Hizballah of exporting

weaponry to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza for

use against Israeli targets. Addionally, the report notes that

the Lebanese government condones Hizballah’s actions

against Israel considering them “resistance activities”; it

failed to hand over to U.S. authorities three senior

Hizballah operatives wanted for terrorist activities, refused

to freeze the organization’s assets, and concluded that “The

United States and Lebanon did not agree on a definition of

terrorism....”56

Hizballah’s reaction to the report was swift, coming a

day after its release by the State Department. It issued a

statement in which it referred to the United States as

“organizer and manager of evil in the world,” rejected the

accusations levied on it, and declared that the United States

seeks the surrender of the “citadels of rejection and

opposition” to its and its Zionist ally’s schemes to subject the

region to their security, economic, and political interests.

The statement concluded, “we clearly state that American

27
threats will not deter our legitimate efforts to regain [our]

rights and to free our lands from the shackles of occupation,

hegemony and dependency.”57 In a nutshell, Hizballah

believes that its portrayal as a “terrorist” organization is

because of U.S.

persistent attempts to de-legitimize Hizballah’s right to resist

the Israeli occupation . . . the US’ criteria for terrorism are the

rejection of its domination and the refusal to succumb to Israel. .

. . In this way, ‘the brute is made to appear innocent and the

victim is made to appear brutal’, a perversion of the truth which

constitutes an act of ‘political and intellectual terrorism’.... 58

Lebanon did not comment immediately on the State

Department’s report, but Syria, which the report listed as a

state-sponsor of terrorism and accused of providing

“safehaven and logistical support to a number of terrorist

groups” including Hizballah, reacted through its foreign

minister. He rejected the accusation and claimed “if we are

to be fair about the issue of terrorism, then Israel should be

placed on top of the list.”59

The difference between the United States and the Arabs

on the subject of terrorism in the Middle East is like the

popularized difference between the sexes—they come from

different planets. The core of the problem is the lack of a

universally agreed upon definition. The endeavor to delimit

the concept inevitably leads to related discussion of

legitimate and illegitimate acts of violence, war crimes,

terrorist organizations, terrorist states, state-sponsored

terrorism, and so on. As a conference on the topic

summarized:

Terrorism is a term of elastic definition that historically has

been applied to a wide variety of phenomena. Key debates

center on who qualifies as a terrorist, what methods terrorists

employ, what their motives are, and who their victims are.

Particularly contentious is the question of whether state actors

can be considered terrorists, and whether terrorism should be

viewed as personally motivated crime or politically motivated

28
war. We are unlikely to reach a consensus because the

ambiguity of the term is politically useful.60

Despite the improbability of a widely accepted definition of

terrorism, the concept, to have any meaning whatsoever,

must include violence inflicted on innocent people for

political objectives. To the extent that Hizballah inflicted

violence on innocent people for political ends, it did engage

in terrorism (as have a host of other actors in the region).

Also, to the extent that Hizballah conducted (conducts)

military activities against Israeli forces occupying Lebanon,

it did (does) engage in national liberation. More important

than what label to sew on Hizballah—terrorism or national

liberation—is how to assess objectively its threat and

constructively to contain and, eventually, end it. A

prerequisite of such an objective, however, is a clear

understanding of the threats and their ramifications.

Threats Analyses.

One way to theoretically analyze the issues and threats

emanating from Hizballah is to utilize a geographic context.

The applicable levels of analyses include the local (Lebanon

and the immediate border area involving Israel and Syria),

regional (Middle East countries and entities involved in the

peace process), and international (other nations especially

the United States and European countries involved in the

peace process). It should be emphasized that, in reality, the

threats and related issues at the three levels are

intertwined and directly impact one another.

At the local level, the primary threat is the potential for

escalating violence between Hizballah and Israel that could

lead to a wider conflict involving Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and

possibly other states in the region. Since its founding in

1982, Hizballah, as already noted, had engaged in acts of

violence against a variety of targets, but mainly against

Israeli forces in Lebanon and their surrogate, the now

defunct South Lebanon Army. The exchanges between

Hizballah and Israel often led to civilian causalities and to

29
accusations and counter accusations of terrorism. In April

1996, and in response to an increasingly intolerable

situation involving repeated attacks on northern Israel by

Hizballah Katyusha rockets, the Israeli government, facing

upcoming elections, launched Operation GRAPES OF

WRATH. The operation involved heavy bombardment of

south Lebanon and resulted in an attack on April 18 on the

UNIFIL compound near the village of Qana where

Lebanese civilians had taken refuge. The outcome was a

massacre in which over 100 Lebanese civilians, including

women and children, were killed.61 A U.N. report stated

that the Israeli attack on Qana was deliberate, a claim that

Israel rejected, arguing that stray rounds were responsible

for the hit.62

Concerned about the rise in civilian casualties on both

sides of the border, then U.S. Secretary of State Warren

Christopher brokered an “understanding” on April 26, 1996,

between Israel, Lebanon, Hizballah, and Syria that

effectively ended the Israeli “Grapes of Wrath Operation.”

The key item of what has become known as the “April

Understanding” was that “the two parties (Lebanon and

Israel) commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will

civilians be the target of attack, and that civilian populated

areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be

used as launching ground for attacks.”63 The application of

this understanding was the responsibility of a Monitoring

Group consisting of the United States, France, Syria,

Lebanon, and Israel.

Strictly speaking, Hizballah was not a party to the “April

Understanding” since the Israeli official position was

refusal to negotiate, and hence enter into an agreement,

with terrorists. In reality, however, Hizballah was the

intended party to the agreement, albeit indirectly. The

reference to Lebanon in the “April Understanding” was pro

forma, and the inclusion of Syria was in recognition that it

exercised a measure of control over Hizballah and the

Lebanese government. The implication of these facts meant

that Hizballah was gradually acquiring recognition as a

30
legitimate resistance movement and an organization that

could be counted on to uphold its end of the deal. Since then,

Hizballah leaders, and especially the party’s Secretary

General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, have gained a measure

of international respectability and credibility. Nassrallah

has met with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, European

officials, and with other party leaders, and granted

numerous press interviews, including ones to major U.S.

networks.64 The meeting in July 2000 with Kofi Annan

prompted a pro-Israel Lebanese-American group to

complain that the meeting “justified and legalized the

political entity of Hizballah in Lebanon to the international

community,”65 while the more sympathetic American Arab

Anti-Discrimination Committee viewed the meeting as

reinforcing “Hizballah’s status as a legitimate political

movement and genuine liberation force, universally

recognized outside the US and Israel.”66

Despite the United States having sponsored the “April

Understanding,” the distinction between terrorism and

resistance is what separates it from its European allies with

regard to Hizballah. This was clearly evident following the

events of September 11, 2001, when the United States

pressured European countries to include Hizballah on the

European Union’s list of terrorist organizations.

Ultimately, however, Hizballah was kept off that list,

largely because of the role played by France insisting that

Hizballah was not a terrorist organization.67 Still, while

Hizballah remains on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations,

Bush’s national security advisor recognized the social and

political roles of Hizballah but suggested that it cleanse

itself of its “terrorist wing that is largely responsible for the

problems we face in regions such as the Middle East.”68

Reading between the lines, the United States is seemingly

willing to live with a rehabilitated Hizballah perhaps in

recognition of the organization’s position in the delicate

balance in Lebanon’s body politic. This is a sobering

approach to the challenge of Hizballah that minimizes the

31
potential threat of renewed civil war in Lebanon, which

would destabilize the region further.69

Hizballah, like most Muslim political organizations, has

been supportive of the Palestinian intifada more by word

than deed. Its television station, Al-Manar, broadcasting

anti-Israeli rhetoric and pro-Islamic and Arab themes, is a

popular station with Palestinians as it reinforces their path

of resistance to occupation. In his speeches, Nassrallah

often reminds his Arab and Muslim audiences that

resistance is a “spirit” that cannot be annihilated and calls

for supporting the Palestinians.70 The party’s spiritual

guide, Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah, had even

issued a fatwa (religious opinion) that condoned martyrdom

operations (suicide missions) equally by men and women.71

As Palestinian-Israeli relations deteriorated and tensions

rose due to increased incidents of suicide bombing,

Hizballah showed willingness to provide material support

to the Palestinians. It provided weapons to the Palestinians

and declared that it assists the Palestinian fighters in

“obvious and not so obvious a manner.”72 When Israel

invaded the West Bank in March 2002, Hizballah offered to

release an Israeli captive it holds in exchange for the release

of Palestinian fighters besieged in Jenin. Israel, however,

ignored the offer.73 Hizballah also attempted to respond to

the Israeli siege of Ramallah where Palestinian Authority

President Yasser Arafat was holed up in his compound by

increasing its shelling of the Shab’a Farms and attacking

seven Israeli posts in the region.74 Those actions, however,

had no military impact on Israel’s operations in the West

Bank, although they bolstered Hizballah’s image in the

region as true to its ideological commitments.

Still, and since the Israeli invasion of the West Bank,

there has been a trend of escalating tension on the

Lebanon-Israel border.75 Israeli intelligence sources

anticipate that Hizballah is preparing to carry out “quality

attacks,” thus causing an escalation.76 Possibly in

anticipation of such an attack, Israeli troops were reported

to be reinforcing their positions along the western side of the

32
Shab’a Farms enclave while Hizballah was constructing

new positions in the front-line area.These activities gave

rise to two conflicting speculations. One was that the

Israelis were planning on evacuating the occupied Shab’a

Farms and their construction activities were for the purpose

of establishing a new line of defense. The withdrawal would

be part of a deal sponsored by the United States in

coordination with Germany in exchange for which Syria and

Lebanon would secure the border area, disarm Hizballah,

and transform it into a regular political party.77 Adding

credence to this interpretation is that Israel-Hizballah

contacts through German mediators over prisoner

exchange issues have been on-going for some time. Evidence

of this was the release in June 2002 of a Hizballah prisoner

held by Israel in exchange for information about Israeli

prisoners held by Hizballah.78

The opposite interpretation was that the construction

activities on both sides of the border are in anticipation of a

major showdown between the two sides. And with Hizballah

reportedly in possession of long-range rockets that could

reach Israel’s industrial complex in Haifa, flare-ups in the

Shab’a Farms area could have serious consequences if Israel

decides to respond with a major military assault.79 A

showdown has been made possible for Syria’s “President

Bashar al-Asad does not understand the strategic

significance of his actions vis-à-vis Hizballah. . . . He is

giving free rein to Hizballah, and in the end a flare-up will

be inevitable.”80 The threat at this level would be Syria

permitting Hizballah to cross the ‘Red Line,’ and “thus

propelling a chain reaction that could result in a general

war between Syria and Israel.”81 An otherwise low intensity

conflict could spiral out of control if the brinkmanship game

played by Hizballah, Syria, and Israel is not managed

cautiously.

At the international level, the main concern centers

around Hizballah having a “global reach” to conduct

“terrorist” acts against U.S., Israeli, and other Western

targets on its own or in consort with other groups such as

33
al-Qa’ida. While there is in the open literature clear

evidence linking Hizballah to acts of terrorism in the past

(kidnappings of Westerners, attack on U.S. Marines in

Lebanon, hijacking of TWA flight in 1980s, and attacks on

Jewish targets in Argentina in 1990s), no credible and

convincing evidence has been published connecting it to

contemporary acts of international terrorism.

The most serious accusation is an alleged link to

al-Qa’ida. Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eli’ezer

stated at the United Nations that “al-Qaeda is entering

Hizballah in Lebanon, and if they work together, this is not

a great thing for the free world.”82 The Lebanese have

dismissed such statements as “lies” and “malicious

allegations” coming from a single source, namely Israel.83

Lebanon’s Information Minister Ghazi al-Uraydi also

denied an ABC News report of al-Qa’ida presence in

Lebanon, and Hizballah asserted that it has no links to

al-Qa’ida.84 Most knowledgeable observers would seriously

doubt any such links, if not for ideological reasons, then

because Hizballah’s current leadership is more

sophisticated strategically than to venture down such a

volatile and losing path.

There have also been reports of Hizballah ties to North

America. Hizballah cells were suspected of being active in

Canada and the United States primarily to raise funds

through sympathizers, and possibly through links to

mafia-style groups engaged in illegal trafficking such as

money laundering and cigarette smuggling.85 It should not

come as a surprise that among North America’s Muslim

communities, some groups sympathize and provide

financial support to Hizballah, nor that some individuals

are engaged in illicit money-making ventures. No open

convincing evidence exists that these groups are cells

organized and controlled by Hizballah in Lebanon. The

post-September 11 security environment naturally leads to

zealous speculations and open willingness to err on the side

of extreme caution. These and similar reports such as

Hizballah’s attempt to set up a terror cell in the 1990s in

34
Singapore to blow up American and Israeli ships86 were

strongly denied by Hizballah.87 On the other hand, the party

has not been shy to confirm its support of the Palestinians.

The preponderance of evidence is that Hizballah’s focus is

primarily centered on Lebanese occupied lands and

secondarily on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It has no

operational interests, other than diplomatic, beyond these

spheres.88 The party may indeed have a global reach, but for

almost 2 decades that reach has not produced credible

threats outside the Lebanon-Israel theater linked to it. In

the concluding section that follows, I will offer some

additional general observations and policy recommendations.

Conclusions and Recommendations.

This monograph examined at length the origin,

structure, and goals of Hizballah. To a degree, it also

alluded to Hizballah’s modus operandi involving the use of

political, diplomatic, and military means to achieve its

goals. What is critical in this concluding section is to

speculate on the future and its implications for U.S.

policymakers as they fashion an antiterrorism strategy.

It is my contention that a U.S. strategy premised on the

simplistic assumption that there is no difference between a

good terrorist and a bad terrorist, and no distinction should

be made between terrorist organizations, is highly risky.

Using the analogy of a disease, the object is to correct the

abnormality—not to destroy the disease by destroying the

patient. Lebanon’s stability, and potentially that of the

whole region, hinges on how the United States decides to

execute the war on terrorism beyond the effort in

Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida.

An initial observation is that Hizballah is a complex

party that is firmly grounded in the culture and the political

experience of its Lebanese Shiite constituency. It is not a

one-issue party that will wither away once that issue is

resolved. Nor is it likely to disappear once its current goals

35
of liberating Lebanese occupied territories, seeing

Palestinians achieve their aspiration of independence, and

the return of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem to Arab

sovereignty are reached. It is a powerful voice for the Shiites

in Lebanese affairs and their link to the larger Shiite

community in the region, especially Iran.

What this observation implies, furthermore, is that,

while Hizballah is a religious-based organization like

Al-Qa’ida and other Islamic groups in the area, it differs

from Al-Qa’ida in a very fundamental way. Al-Qai’da, with

its Wahhabi heritage, adheres to a messianic vision that

would make the “world safe for Islam,” so to speak. In

seeking to please Allah, al-Qa’ida takes anti-Western,

anti-Jewish and anti-Christian stances, and its foremost

mission is to rid the land of Islam of nonbelievers. Also, it

views itself as a Jihad movement fighting external enemies

of Islam who must be dealt with more urgently than local

enemies.

By contrast, Hizballah is part of Islamic national

liberation movements, like Hamas, that come about

because of circumstances affecting their countries. They

have little interest in operations outside their immediate

environment. Additionally, Hizballah, grounded in the

history of repressed Shi’ism (Shiites having been a

repressed and often despised minority in the Sunnidominated Islamic world), pursues a less lofty vision that

would “make Shiites safe in the world.” In seeking to please

Allah, Hizballah does so by pragmatically attending to the

political, social, and economic needs of its constituency.

Such pragmatism to satisfy the immediate needs of the

community has also been manifested on many occasions by

Iran’s Ayatollahs as they attempted to steer the ship of

state. Khomeini’s accepting a ceasefire in 1988 to end the

Iran-Iraq war that began in 1980 when continuation of

hostilities would have threatened the Islamic Revolution,

Rafsanjani’s attempts at liberalization in the 1990s, and

current President Khatami’s attempts to institute social

and political reforms—all indicate flexibility in response to

36
changing circumstances. This is a strategic culture that is in

stark contrast to the Taliban or the al-Qa’ida who would

rather perish than modify their rigidly held beliefs.

The second pertinent observation is that the exact

location of the Lebanon’s borders with its neighbors, and

especially in the Shab’a Farms region, is uncertain. Certain,

however, is that the Shab’a Farms enclave is a territory

occupied by Israel. Hizballah’s paramilitary operations

against Israeli occupation forces in the area cannot be

labeled terrorism. In this regard, Hizballah could be said to

be engaged in guerrilla warfare, not terrorism. This,

however, does not mean that Hizballah is not tainted by acts

of terror, either unprovoked or in response to specific Israeli

activities such as assassinations or abductions of Hizballah

leaders. Therefore, pinning the exclusive label of

“resistance” or “terrorist” organization on it is not possible

with any degree of objectivity.

The third general observation is that Hizballah is a

“fluid” or umbrella organization. Although it has

identifiable leadership structure, it is sufficiently

decentralized and dispersed, enabling its mission-oriented

military units to generate command and control structures

to accomplish their goals. The experiences Hizballah has

had battling the Israelis and their allied SLA militia, their

access to Syrian supply lines, and ties to Iran’s Pasdaran

and their weapons caches, make Hizballah a risky military

target. Its center of gravity is mercurial, and its patrons are

state actors capable of triggering a serious regional conflict.

In his June 24, 2002, speech on peace in the Middle East,

Bush minced no words in labeling Hizballah a terrorist

organization, along with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, for it

seeks the destruction of Israel. This and the

administration’s doctrine of preemptive action may lead to a

U.S. precipitous military action against Hizballah with

counterproductive results. My policy recommendations

follow:

37
1. The United States should not engage Hizballah

militarily. The option of either sending the Marines or

Special Forces to tackle Hizballah is unrealistic. Its end

result will not amount to more than a “feel-good” mission. If

there was a military solution to Hizballah, then Israel,

experienced in dealing with it and knowledgeable about its

area of operations, would have exercised it. Furthermore,

U.S. military intervention would be opposed by a majority of

Lebanese, convinced that Hizballah is struggling to liberate

occupied Lebanese lands.

2. The United States should encourage Israel to vacate

the Shab’a Farms. This strip of land has limited tactical and

strategic value to Israel, which will eventually withdraw

from it as part of a peace deal involving the Golan Heights.

The argument against this suggestion is that unilateral

withdrawal under pressure from Hizballah would give hope

to Palestinian groups that pressure works against the

Israelis. This argument, however, is fallacious since Israel

had withdrawn unilaterally from south Lebanon while

Palestinian resistance was already underway.

More important, ceding the Shab’a enclave to Lebanese

sovereignty would deny Hizballah its principal justification

to be involved in guerrilla war operations against Israel. It

will eliminate the major catalyst for border fighting. To be

sure, Hizballah will continue to argue that Israel has not

fully withdrawn from Lebanon as there remain other

disputed areas along the Israel-Lebanon border, but these

are small swathes of land that Lebanon would want to

resolve diplomatically with Israel as part of a final peace

settlement. Israeli withdrawal from the Shab’a Farms

enclave would place the Lebanese government under

intense international pressure, as well as domestic pressure

from several quarters, to rein in Hizballah and deploy the

Lebanese Army to the border region.

3. The United States should give priority to the

Syria-Israel track in the peace process. The old adage

concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, “there can be no

38
Arab-Israeli war without Egypt, and there can be no

Arab-Israeli peace without Syria” remains true today. A

settlement between Syria and Israel will lead to a

simultaneous peace between Israel and Lebanon. Syria

would no longer have any cause to use the “Lebanon and

Hizballah cards” against Israel. Hizballah would lose its

ability to operate militarily against Israel without Syria’s

assistance and will be transformed into a regular Lebanese

political party.

None of the above policy recommendations address

Hizballah’s rejection of the legitimacy of Israel and the

desire to seek its destruction. In this ideological stance,

Hizballah seems to parallel the Iranian position. The

Iranian Ayatollahs, and Hizballah likewise, have often

acted more Palestinian than the Palestinians with respect

to the peace process and Israel. At the same time, the

Iranian leadership is on record as supporting a final

peaceful settlement that is agreeable to the Palestinians.

Should there be a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian

issue, the wind of Palestine will no longer fan Hizballah’s

ideological wings. In short, once all these political issues

have been resolved, Hizballah’s national liberation,

terrorist, or menacing activities will cease.

It should be evident that these policy recommendations

correspond to the local, regional, and international levels of

analyses. As such, they are linked to one another, so that an

Israeli withdrawal from the Shab’a Farms enclave without

the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan

Heights would lead Hizballah and Syria to raise other

issues to perpetuate the conflict. This built-in dynamic of

the situation gives Hizballah a seat at the table of the

strategic game played by regional state actors. These actors

hold the bigger stakes, and they decide if and how Hizballah

plays the game. However, and because of the complexities of

the Iranian-Syrian axis, Hizballah may succeed on occasion

in manipulating these actors for its own purposes.

39
In closing, I see no military solution to the menace of

Hizballah. Certain countermeasures to foil known planned

operations, disrupt funding, and destroy training camps are

indeed possible, and in some instances, even necessary. In

the final analysis, however, such tactical measures will not

resolve what is fundamentally a strategic problem and

challenge to U.S. Middle East policy.

ENDNOTES

1. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “The President’s

State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002.

2. See Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Fact Sheet,”

October 5, 2001.

3. These reports are compiled every 2 years, and to date the State

Department has issued the 1997, 1999, and 2001 reports. They are

available on the web at www.state.state.gov/www/global/terrorism.

4. For a detailed discussion of events leading to the confrontation

between King Hussein and the Palestinians, see “Black September in

Jordan 1970-1971” available on the web from www.onwar.com/

aced/data/bravo/blacksept1970.htm.

5. For a detailed discussion of the Lebanese civil war, see Walid

Khalidi, Conflict And Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle

East, Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, 1979; also,

Dilip Hiro, Lebanon Fire And Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil

War, New York: St. Martin Press, 1992.

6. For detailed discussion of the Lebanese political system, see

Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in

Lebanon, New York: Random House, 1968; and Enver M. Khoury, The

Operational Capability of the Lebanese Political System, Beirut:

Catholic Press for the Institute of Middle Eastern and North African

Affairs, 1972, especially chapter 4 devoted to the characteristics and

functions of the confessional system.

7. While no official census has been taken, on several occasions there

has been a number of credible accountings of Lebanon’s population by

nongovernment sources that clearly showed the Shiites becoming the

country’s largest group. See the population table in Majed Halawi, A

Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi’a Community, Boulder:

40
Westview Press, 1992, p. 50. Parenthetically, Halawi’s book must rank

among the best scholarly works on the Shiite community in Lebanon.

8. See Ibid, pp. 60-68, in which Halawi clearly demonstrates the

economic plight of the Shiite community relative to the Christians and

the Sunnis that led to their mobilization as a political force. Also see

Enver M. Khoury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System: Confessionalism

and Chaos, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public

Policy Research, 1976, pp. 35-38. Seeking to explain the causes for the

civil war in Lebanon, Khoury discusses the economic disparities

between the few rich and many poor, the mountain region and the south

as one of the causes that translates into the gap between the largely

Christian and Shiite communities.

9. For a detailed biography of al-Sadr, see Fouad Ajami, The

Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, Ithaca, NY:

Cornell University Press, 1986.

10. Halawy, p. 165.

11. Ajami, pp. 168-169.

12. For a detailed discussion of Islamic groups in Lebanon, see A.

Nizar Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide,” Middle East Review of

International Affairs, Issue 3, September 1997. Available from CIAO

(columbia international online) at www.cianet.org/olj/

meria_Sept97.html.

13. Ibid. p. 2. For a detailed biography of Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr,

see T. M. Aziz, “The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shi’a Political

Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980,” available from Al-Da’wa’s web page

at http://dawaparty.freeyellow.com/sadr/8613.html, accessed March

8, 2002.

14. Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’Allah in Lebanon, New York: St. Martin

Press, 1997, pp. 34-40. My discussion of the three phases will rely on this

source unless noted otherwise.

15. Ibid, pp. 34-35.

16. Ibid., pp.36-37

17. Ibid., p. 39

18. Ibid., p. 41

41
19. Ibid., p. 42-44. Most writers on Hizballah have assumed that

Ayatollah Fadlallah is the party’s spiritual guide or that it was his

brainchild. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, however, notes that Fadlallah is not

affiliated with the party in an organizational sense, and further, he and

Hizballah have denied such an association and have rejected reference

to him as the party’s spiritual mentor or guide. On the other hand,

Fadlallah is an eminent religious scholar who may be regarded as a

source of inspiration rather than a spiritual mentor. See Amal

Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, London: Pluto Press,

2002, p. 6.

20. For a detailed discussion of Hizballah’s organizational chart, see

A. Nizr Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to

parliamentary accommodation,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2,

1993, pp. 325-328. My discussion is based on this source.

21. Ibid. p. 328. Note that Hamzeh’s discussion varies from that of

Ranstorp who refers to an additional unit called Majlis Shura al-Karar

(Deciding Assembly) made up of 12 clerics under the leadership of

Sheikh Fadlallah and which is responsible for all strategic matters.

(Ranstorp, p. 45) But if we accept that Fadlallah has no organizational

link to the party, then a Deciding Assembly could not be an integral part

of Hozballah’s organizational chart.

22. Saad-Ghorayeb deals extensively with these and related

concepts. I shall rely on her work in presenting an abbreviated summary

of the concepts relevant to this study.

23. The concept of “Hidden Imam” is what defines the Twelve sects

of Shiism and is adhered to by the overwhelming majority of Iranian and

Arab Shiites. The reference is to the 12th Imam, direct descendent of the

first Imam, Ali bin Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet

Mohammad, who mysteriously disappeared and who is believed to

return one day to establish justice on earth.

24. Quoted in Eyal Zisser, “Hizbullah in Lebanon: At the

Crossroads,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Issue 3,

September 1979. The term “Mahdi” means the “guided One” and is a

reference to the Hidden Imam.

25. See Saad-Ghorayeb, p. 69 ff. I have labeled this a “complex”

vision because in this black-and-white division, the place of non-Muslim

believers (specifically the Jews and Christians) is precarious. A detailed

discussion of this point is beyond our scope.

26. Ibid., p. 74.

42
27. See Ibid., Chapter 5. I will essentially summarize some of her

main points on this issue.

28. Ibid., p. 91.

29. “Fadlu’llah: Powell’s Visit to Support Sharon’s Campaign,”

Beirut As Safir, (Arabic Internet Edition), April 18, 2002.

30. CBS Evening News, April 17, 2002. Full text available on line

from www.CBSNEWS.com.

31. Ibid. Also, Ghorayeb points out that in the Qasim (and

Hizballah) view, the party’s hostility towards Israel is not only because

it occupies south Lebanon, but also because of its occupation of Palestine

and Jerusalem. The implication is that the conflict with Israel cannot be

resolved politically. See Ghorayeb, p. 134.

32. Interestingly, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, the first secretary

general of the party, was one who supported the Iranian moderates.

However, he ended leading the “revolution of the hungry” in the

Lebanese Biqa’ which led the Lebanese government to issue an arrest

warrant against him. During the Israeli incursion into Palestine in

April 2002, Tufayli made statements to the press supporting

Palestinian resistance, but also stated his total rejection of the

Lebanese political system and the legitimacy of the Lebanese

government and all of its institutions. See Beirut Assafir, in Arabic,

Internet Edition, April 18, 2002.

33. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizballah: from Islamic revolution to

parliamentary accommodation,” p. 325. It should be noted here that

Hizballah was opposed to the Taif agreement (October 1989) that

reconstituted the Lebanese policy along more equitable distribution of

political power and government positions among the major religious

sects, but the party’s participation in the 1992 elections signaled an

implied and a de facto acceptance of that agreement. Also see Augustus

Richard Norton, “Hizballah: From radicalism to pragmatism?” Middle

East Policy, Vol. V, No. 4, January 1998, pp. 147-158; and Graham

Usher, “Hizballah, Syria, and the Lebanese Elections,” Journal of

Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 59-67.

34. These involved the suicide car bombing of the U.S. Embassy in

Beirut in April 1983 that killed 63 people, including 17 Americans; a

suicide bombing attack at the headquarters of the U.S. peacekeeping

force in October 1983 that killed 241 U.S. servicemen and a

simultaneous attack on a French base in Beirut that killed 58 people,

and an attack in November 1983 on the Israeli Army headquarters in

43
the then occupied Lebanese city of Tyre that killed 29 Israeli military

personnel.

35. See Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon—At the Crossroads,”

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Issue 3, September 1997, p.

92. Human Rights Watch issued a detailed report on the Grapes of

Wrath Operation that killed 154 and injured 351 Lebanese civilians

that the Lebanese call the “Qana Massacre” and alluded as well to

“Operation Accountability.” See Human Rights Watch/Middle East,

“Operation GRAPES OF WRATH,” Vol. 9, No. 8(E), September 1997.

36. The visit of Secretary of State Powell to Israel in April 2002 to

bring an end to the Israeli incursion into the Palestinian Authority’s

autonomous areas and an end to Palestinian violence was, by most

accounts, regarded as a failure. The Bush administration, however,

played up one positive and immediate result from his visit, namely, his

1-day trip to Beirut and Damascus to diffuse the tense situation on

Israel’s northern border that led to greater involvement of Lebanese

security forces in the southern region and a marked reduction in

Hizballah’s military operations. Also Terje Roed-Larsen, the U.N.

Middle East Special Envoy, warned the Lebanese government that any

violations and provocations along the “Blue Line” (The Israeli-Lebanese

border line as defined by the U.N. to certify complete Israeli withdrawal

in July 2000) could destablize the entire region. See Beirut Assafir

(Internet edition in Arabic), April 23, 2002.

37. This Syrian strategy towards the peace process has not changed

during the administration of Bashar al-Asad. As the United States

signaled its willingness to be actively involved in the peace process to

bring about a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem along the lines

of the “Saudi Vision” as proposed by Prince Abdullah, Syria publicly

stated its concern that the Arab peace initiative was being

“Americanized” and set on a path of separate tracks. See UAE

Al-Khaleej (Arabic Internet Edition), April 30, 2002.

38. See Sami Hajjar, “The Israel-Syria Track,” Middle East Policy,

Vol. VI, No. 3, February 1999, p. 124.

39. Abu Dhabi Al-Ittihad (Arabic Internet Edition), November 23,

1999.

40. For a full and detailed analysis of the border issues between

Lebanon and Israel, see Frederic C. Hof, “Defining Full Withdrawal:

Re-Making the Lebanese-Israeli Border,” Middle East Insight,

May-June 2000, pp. 29-36.

44
41. Ibid. p. 34.

42. Ibid. p. 35.

43. For detailed discussion of the border issue, see “Al-Huss:

Lebanon to Drop Claim on 7 Israeli Villages,” Beirut The Daily Star

(English Internet Edition), December 22, 1999; also “The Seven

Villages: The Most Dangerous Lebanese Negotiations File,” Abu Dhabi

Al-Ittihad (Arabic Internet Edition), December 2, 1999. On the Israeli

interest in border adjustments, see French Press Agency report in Abu

Dhabi Al-Ittiad (Arabic Internet Edition), October 12. 1999.

44. See Hof, p. 33; and Yammut Bassem, “The Strategic and

Economic Significance of Shaba’a Farms,” Beirut As Safir (Arabic

Internet Edition), March 7, 2001. Also see Alfred B. Prados, “The Shib’a

Farms Dispute and Its Implications,” CRS Report for Congress, August

7, 2001. Prados observed that “there are no precise boundaries to the

Shib’a Farms area.”

45. Bassem, Ibid. A complicating factor is the issue of water rights in

the vicinity of the south western region of Shab’a Farms involving the

Hasbani river and its tributary, the al-Wazzani. See, for example, Arieh

O’Sullivan and Herb Keinon, “Lebanon warned not to divert river,” The

Internet Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2001; Mohammad al-Mashnouq,

“The Riparian Strategic Framework of the Lebanese-Israeli

Confrontation,” Beirut An Nahar (Arabic Internet Edition), March 26,

2001; “Israel diverting Lebanese and Golan waters through the

Dhahran oil pipeline,” Abu Dhabi Al-Ittihad, (Arabic Internet Edition)

January 1, 2000.

46. Beirut The Daily Star, May 5, 2001.

47. Prados.

48. U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the

implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426

(1978), S/2000/460, May 22, 2000, paragraph 14; full text available in

Beirut As Safir, (Arabic Internet Edition), May 23, 2000. [author’s

translation of text].

49. Prados, p. 2.

50. XINHUA News Agency, (Internet English Edition), May 24,

2001.

45
51. “During the French Mandate, Shaba was Lebanese,” Tel Aviv

Haaretz (English Internet Edition), June 26, 2002.

52. Lebanon’s position is detailed by Prados, pp. 6-7; and Hof, p. 33.

53. Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), April 10, 2002.

54. Gary C. Cambill, “Syria and the Shebaa Farms Dispute,” Middle

East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 2001, p. 1. The influence of

USCFL was demonstrated in conjunction with H.R. 4483, the Syria

Accountability Act of 2002 in which the USCFL Task Force joined with

some members of Congress (Dick Army, Eliot Engel, Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen, Howard Berman, Eric Cantor, and Alcee Hastings) in

urging co-sponsorship of the bill, which imposes a variety of penalties on

Syria for its support of terrorism, occupation of Lebanon, development

of weapons of mass destruction, and violations of U.N. oil sanctions

against Iraq. Those on the mailing list of USCFL received this

solicitation via e-mail on May 9, 2002.

55. United States Department of State, Patterns of Global

Terrorism 2001, May 2002, p. 57.

56. Ibid.

57. Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), May 23, 2002.

58. Saad-Ghorayeb, p. 94. The view that Hizballah, (also Hamas,

and Islamic Jihad) is a national liberation movement and not terrorist

organization is widely accepted in the Islamic world. For example, the

Mufti (chief Muslim cleric) of Russia Sheikh Nafi’ullah Ashyroff made

statements supporting this viewpoint and also accused the United

States of practicing terrorism against Muslims. See his interview in

Beirut An Nahar (Arabic Internet Editions), January 9, 2002.

59. Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), May 23, 2002.

60. “Terrorism: Threat and Response,” in Conference Brief compiled

by Carolyn Pumphrey, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College and Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Duke University,

February 2002. For a detailed academic discussion of terrorism, its

definition, utility, types, and uses in the Middle East, see Gary C.

Gambill, “The Balance of Terror: War By Other Means In The

Contemporary Middle East,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXVIII,

No. 1, Autumn 1998, pp. 51-66.

61. See “Road-mending in Lebanon,” The Economist, August 3,

2000.

46
62. U.N., “Report of the Secretary General’s Military Advisor

Concerning the Shelling of the U.N. Compound at Qana on 18 April

1996,” S/1966/337, May 7, 1996.

63. State of Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel-Lebanon

Ceasefire Understanding” available from www.israel-mfa.gov.il/

mfa/go.asp?MEAH00qj0.

64. For example, British ambassador to Lebanon Richard Kinchen

met in December 2001 with Hizballah’s Secretary-General Sayyed

Hassan Nasrallah to initiate dialogue with the group that “was involved

in legitimate political and social activity . . .,” Beirut The Daily Star,

December 13, 2001. See also “Hizballah Official Interviewed on Party

Issues, Meeting with UK Envoy” in London Al-Arab al-Alamiyah (in

Arabic), December 18, 2001, p. 6. Also, there were press reports that

Israel was negotiating, through a high-ranking German intermediary

with Hizballah, a deal involving information about captured Israeli

Brigadier General (res.) Elhanan Tannenbaum in exchange for maps of

minefields in southern Lebanon. Beirut An Nahar (Arabic Internet

Edition), February 25, 2002. The prisoner exchange negotiations have

apparently expanded to include Marwan Barghouti, head of the Fatah

Tanzim, captured by Israel during its invasion of the West Bank in April

2002. See “General: Israel assassinated non-Jew in hunt for missing

Arad,” Tel Aviv Haaretz (English Internet Edition), June 26, 2002.

Nassrallah has also met with other Europeans such as the Austrian

ambassador to Lebanon and with the European Parliament member

Hans Svoboda in conjunction with alleged U.S. attempts to foil

Hizballah-European dialogue; see Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet

Edition), February 13, 2002.

65. Nagi Najjar, “The Reality of fighting Terror,” United States

Committee for a Free Lebanon, May 2002. Available at http://

freelebanon.org/articles/a254.htm.

66. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Action Alert,

“ADC Takes Strong Stance Against coverage of NC cigarette Smuggling

Case,” July 31, 2000. Available at http://www.adc.org/action/

200/31july2000.htm.

67. See “Three Countries Resist U.S. Pressure,” Beirut As Safir

(Arabic Internet Edition), January 4, 2002; and Khalil Fleihanb,

“France Credited With Keeping Hizbullah Off EU ‘Terror List’,” Beirut

The Daily Star, December 31, 2001.

68. Hisham Milhem, “Acknowledging Its Social and Political Role,

Rice Renews Demand that the Lebanese Government Abolish the

47
Terrorist Wing of Hizballah,” Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition),

December 12, 2001. Likewise, Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross

stated that Hizballah’s resistance to Israeli occupation is not terrorism,

but that past acts of terrorism that the party engaged in is why it is

included on the U.S. terrorism list. He noted the important social

activities of the party in several regions of Lebanon. See “Ross: The

Resistance of Hizballah Is Not Terrorism,” Beirut As Safir (Arabic

Internet Edition), March 23, 2002.

69. Mr. Karim Baqradouni, president-elect of the Christian and

pro-western Kata’eb (Phalange) Lebanese party told U.S. Embassy

official that targeting Hizballah would lead to a civil war in Lebanon,

and that all Lebanese support the resistance regarding it as a legitimate

right. See Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), December 20, 2001.

70. See Sayyed Hassan Nassrallah’s speech to the General Arab

Conference for the Defense of the Resistance and the Intifada held in

Beirut, Lebanon on December 20, 2001, as reported in Beirut An Nahar

(Arabic Internet Edition), December 21, 2001. He has openly called on

Arab leaders during the Arab League summit in Beirut in March 2002 to

provide weapons to the Palestinians. See Beirut The Daily Star, March

18, 2002; and Abu Dhabi Al Khaleej (Arabic Internet Edition), March 25,

2002.

71. See Ibrahim Mousawi, “Faddlallah explains religious basis for

suicide attackes,” Beirut The Daily Star (Internet Edition), June 8,

2002; also see Beirut, As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), April 2, 2002.

This fatwa was issued in the wake of a suicide bombing in Israel carried

out by a Palestinian young woman.

72. A statement made by Shaikh Na’im al-Qassim, Deputy

Secretary General of Hizballah, Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet

Edition), March 22, 2002. Earlier Nassrallah announced that three

party members arrested in Jordan were attempting to smuggle

Katyusha rockets to the Palestinians (the detainees were later freed by

the Jordanians at the request of the Lebanese government), Beirut As

Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), March 9, 2002. Also the Palestinian

weapons ship seized by Israel in January 2002 had some link to

Hizballah as Israel and the United States alleged. See State of Israel,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Seizing of the Palestinian weapons ship

Karine A, January 4, 2002” available at http://www.mfa.

gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH010k0, and Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet

Edition), January 11, 2002. Hizballah rejected accusations of

involvement in arms shipment, Beirut An Nahar (Arabic Internet

Edition), January 11, 2002. And yet another fishing vessel carrying

weapons to the Palestinians was sunk off the Lebanese coast by Israel

48
alleging that its weapons and military equipment cargo were purchased

with the help of Hizballah, Tel Aviv Yedi’ot Aharonot (in Hebrew), May

13, 2002, p. 6, FBIS Document ID: GMP20020513000093. Lastly, there

was a report that a Hizballah operative managed to slip into the

occupied territories to help organize attacks on Israel, see Tel Aviv,

Ha’aretz in English, March 6, 2002, p. 1.

73. Cilina Nasser, “Hizballah’s captive-for-fighters swap offer to

Israel still firm,” Beirut The Daily Star, April 12, 2002.

74. “Hizballah Shells the Farms and Israel Targets Civilians,”

Beirut An Nahar (Arabic Internet Edition), March 31, 2002.

75. See Sami Kaleib, “Paris is Concerned About Rising Tension on

Lebanon’s Border: A Regional War is Possible,” Beirut As Safir (Arabic

Internet Edition), April 4, 2002.

76. Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Post (English Internet Edition), June

5, 2002. See also Nicholas Blanford, “Hizballah Prepares to Open Up

Front Along the Israeli Border,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2002,

pp. 26-28. Also see Karen DeYoung, “Hezbollah Buildup in Lebanon

cited,” The Washington Post, June 15, 2002, p. 17.

77. Abu Dhabi Al Khaleej (Arabic Internet Edition), June 6, 2002.

78. Daniel Sobelman, “Israel Eyes Prisoner Swap, Frees Hizballah

Man,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (English Internet Edition), June 11, 2002;

“Stirring the Prisoners File: Release of Mohammad al-Barzawi,” Beirut

As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), June 11, 2002.

79. See Nicholas Blanford, “Hizballah and Israeli Army Set for

‘Serious Clash’,” BeirutThe Daily Star (Internet Edition), June 8, 2002.

80. Amos Har’el, “Senior Officers Warn of New Wave of Hizballah

Infiltrations,” Tel Aviv Ha’aretz (English Internet Edition) June 4,

2002.

81. Tel Aviv University, The Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies,

Bulletin, No. 27, November 2001, p. 3. Also see article by Ehud Ya’ari,

“While Syria Sleeps,” The Jerusalem Post (Internet Edition), February

25, 2002, in which he referred to the U.S. warning that Hizballah has

the ability and perhaps the intention of sparking a regional war.

Additionally, Ya’ari noted that Hizballah possesses at least 7,000

Katyusha rockets that threaten all the Galilee up to the outskirts of

Haifa, constructing a second line of defense deep in South Lebanon as a

barrier against Israeli armored advance, and that Syria, under the

49
leadership of a young president, is being manipulated by Hizballah

under Iranian guidance.

82. Xinhau News Agency, February 6, 2002. Also see Beirut As Safir

(Arabic Internet Edition), February 7, 2002.

83. Maurice Kaldawy, “Lahoud Flays Israeli Media’s ‘Aggression’,”

Beirut The Daily Star (Internet Edition), February 8, 2002. Israeli press

sources, in addition to accusing Hizballah of providing training to

al-Qa’ida, alleged that Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, who is close to

the Saudi royal family, is providing financial support to al-Qa’ida. See

“Israeli Press Allegations,” Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition),

June 14, 2002.

84. Ibrahim Awad, “Al-Uraydi: Suspect Report; There is No

Al-Qa’ida Organization in Lebanon,” London Al-Sharq al-Awsat, in

Arabic, May 22, 2002, p. 3; and Beirut The Daily State (Internet

Edition), March 23, 2002. See also “Hizballah Official Denies US

‘Accusation” on Protecting al-Qaida Member,” FBIS Document ID:

GMP20020617000208, Entry Date June 17, 2002.

85. See Stewart Bell report on supporting Hizballah in Toronto

National Post (Internet Edition), February 13, 2002; and “Washington

Raises Specter of Hizballah ‘Cells’ in US,” Beirut The Daily Star

(Internet Edition), February 15, 2002. On the cigarette smuggling story,

see on line Detroit Free Press report, “Smuggled Smokes Linked to

Hizballah,” www.freep.com, July 22, 2000; and ”Smuggling Case Trial

Begins,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2002, p. A03. Hizballah has

denied any involvement with the people charged in the case, and

Hizballah Member of Parliament Abdullah Qasir stated that U.S.

accusations are “not based on facts and realities, but rather on political

motives.” Beirut The Daily Star (Internet Edition), June 14, 2002.

86. Boston Globe, June 9, 2002, p. 26.

87. Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), June 11, 2002.

88. Hizballah Members of Parliament have conducted in the Spring

of 2002 an extensive tour of European, Arab, and African nations to

bolster the image of the party and to deflect what they claim are

concentrated efforts by the United States to constrain and isolate it. See

Beirut As Safir (Arabic Internet Edition), June 14, 2002.

50
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Sami G. Hajjar

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell