ADVANCING 

STRATEGIC THOUGHT 

SERIES

DUFFER’S SHOAL: 

A STRATEGIC DREAM 

OF THE PACIFIC 

COMMAND AREA OF 

RESPONSIBILTY

Colonel Russ Bailey

Colonel (NZ) Chris Parsons

Colonel Elizabeth Smith

Lieutenant Colonel Derek O’ Malley

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Dixon

Ms. Laura McAleer

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

DUFFER’S SHOAL: 

A STRATEGIC DREAM 

OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND 

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Colonel Russ Bailey

Colonel (NZ) Chris Parsons

Colonel Elizabeth Smith

Lieutenant Colonel Derek O’Malley

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Dixon

Ms. Laura McAleer

August 2015

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The Carlisle Scholars Program is structured to provide students with entrepreneurial opportunity and empower critical 

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ISBN 1-58487-690-5

vii

FOREWORD

There is much discussion throughout the U.S. 

national security and foreign policy communities 

about the complexities and challenges of the IndoAsia-Pacific as our Nation increases its strategic focus on this important region. In fact, there is already 

an abundance of think-tank generated forecasts and 

strategic net assessments focusing on China’s military 

modernization, its competitive territorial and power 

pursuits, and the strategies and technologies that 

will be necessary to counter its growing anti-access/

area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. While China is the 

prominent player in the region, it is only one piece of 

a highly complex and dynamic strategic puzzle. There 

are a myriad of regional and global dynamics at play. 

These formidable forces—piracy, human trafficking, 

terrorism, natural disasters, territorial disputes, and a 

growing dissatisfaction with the current world order, 

among others—present distinct and often overlapping challenges to regional and global security and 

stability. Yet, they also provide unique opportunities 

for enhanced collaboration and understanding.

The following strategic assessment seeks to go 

beyond a traditional comparative analysis of the military, technological, political, cultural, and economic 

factors governing the relationships and capabilities of 

the Asia Pacific environment. To truly make sense of 

the intrinsic complexities unique to this region, the authors endeavor to broaden our view and rely on a tool 

often overlooked in government studies: imagination. 

Moreover, they aim to offer a strategic document that 

is readable, instructive, and provocative. Pulling from 

a well-referenced piece of military teaching, this as-
sessment borrows a learning concept first employed 

in 1904 by Major General Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton 

in The Defence of Duffer’s Drift. Widely read today 

among our military’s ground forces, this fictional story describes the plight of young Lieutenant Backsight 

Forethought as he commands a 50-man platoon tasked 

to hold a tactically critical piece of land called Duffer’s Drift. The story unfolds in a series of six dreams, 

where the blunders of the unwitting lieutenant lead 

to disaster. As the dreams progress, he harnesses the 

lessons of each of his failures, and by applying these 

lessons, his platoon ultimately defends Duffer’s Drift.

While Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton’s book was originally penned to instruct tactical concepts, the piece is 

a powerful primer for strategic and operational thinking. The successful defense of Duffer’s Drift required 

the nuanced application of hard-earned knowledge; 

ignoring even one tactical lesson guaranteed certain 

defeat. Applying this narrative concept to a contemporary and strategic setting, the authors borrow a page 

from this tactical playbook, and offer a 21st century 

account of “Duffer’s Shoal: A Strategic Dream of the 

Pacific Command (PACOM) Area of Responsibility 

(AOR).” Employing a series of fictional “dreams” that 

explore many of the competing forces and dynamics pertinent to the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, our 21st 

century protagonist will take us through six distinct 

misadventures to illustrate and consider key strategic 

level lessons and insights.

To account for the prevailing challenges and the 

complex nature of modern strategic conflict, the central character in our narrative is a colonel newly assigned to the Commander’s Action Group (CAG), at 

U.S. PACOM. A recent U.S. Army War College graduviii
ix

ate, Colonel Carlisle “Maestro” Prudence begins his 

fictional plight on his way to report to PACOM’s 

Headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Fatigued by 

the last few days of household goods pack-out and 

garrison out-processing, he succumbs to slumber as 

his plane’s doors are secured for departure. Anxious 

to begin his new assignment, Colonel Prudence’s 

dreams instinctively race through the diverse strategic and operational level planning efforts he could 

be tasked with for supporting such a vast and vital 

region. Beginning with his first dream about steady 

state planning and continuing through escalating levels of conflict intensity, Colonel Prudence’s “success” 

will require the judicious application of the strategic 

lessons he has learned—and will yet learn. Similar to 

Lieutenant Foresight’s tactical progression, Colonel 

Prudence’s ultimate strategic “success” will hinge on 

his ability to appreciate and leverage all of the instruments of national power, recognizing and anticipating 

both desired and undesired consequences, and perhaps most importantly—having the strategic patience 

to understand and appreciate the region’s complex 

and dynamic environment. 

While the structure of this analysis is inspired by 

Sir Ernest Dunlop Swinton’s work, the tactical defense 

of a drift is infinitely less complex than the strategic 

environment of the PACOM AOR. Thus, Colonel 

Prudence’s dreams are strategically diverse, and by 

necessity, more imaginative. By crafting these hypothetical narratives—by harnessing the power of the 

story—the authors seek to advance a deeper appreciation of the complexities in the region and illustrate 

the convergence of these complexities with our own 

national interests. Significantly, these six U.S. Army 

War College scholars hope to incite a richer dialogue 
about our Nation’s strategic approach to this vital region and challenge our definitions of strategic success. 

By sharing these pragmatic stories, they endeavor to 

inspire a better way.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

x
xi

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

RUSSELL N. BAILEY is a 2015 U.S. Army War College 

graduate and Carlisle Scholar. He is a Foreign Area 

Officer specializing in Southeast Asia. He has served 

in policy and intelligence positions at the Joint Staff, 

U.S. Pacific Command, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, and the National Security Council Staff. He 

served as the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, from 

2010 to 2014. Colonel Bailey is a graduate of California 

State Polytechnic Institute, Pomona, the University of 

Michigan, the Singapore Command and Staff College, 

and the U.S. Army War College. 

ROBERT G. DIXON is a 2015 U.S. Army War College 

graduate and Carlisle Scholar. He is a Corps of Engineers officer who has commanded at the company 

and battalion levels. He has served as a strategist 

and planner at the Combined Joint Task Force; Division; and Combatant Command levels. Lieutenant 

Colonel Dixon is a graduate of the Florida Institute of 

Technology, American Public University, the School 

of Advanced Military Studies, and the U.S. Army 

War College.

LAURA MCALEER currently serves as a Visiting 

Scholar at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. 

Army War College, supporting the establishment and 

execution of the Carlisle Scholars Program in its inaugural year. She has extensive civilian and military 

experience at all levels of government, including service as a military strategist, defense policy analyst, 

intelligence officer, and congressional staffer. She is a 

graduate of the University of Notre Dame and the U.S. 

Naval War College. 
xii

DEREK J. O’MALLEY is a 2015 U.S. Army War College graduate and Carlisle Scholar. He is an Air Force 

fighter pilot with more than 2,100 hours of operational 

flying time in the F-16C and the F-35A. Lieutenant 

Colonel O’Malley commanded an Operational Test 

and Evaluation Squadron, where he led operational 

test efforts for the F-16C, F-15C, F-15E, A-10C, F-22A, 

and F-35A. He is a graduate of Brigham Young University, the U.S. Air Force Weapons School, the Naval 

Post Graduate School, and the U.S. Army War College.

CHRISTOPHER J. PARSONS is a New Zealand Army 

officer and 2015 Carlisle Scholar at the U.S. Army War 

College. His assignments have included command at 

unit and brigade levels. Colonel Parsons is a Member 

of the New Zealand Order of Merit, a recipient of the 

New Zealand Distinguished Service Decoration and 

the U.S. Defense Meritiorious Service Medal. He is a 

graduate of Canberra University, Massey University, 

the Australian Command and Staff College, and the 

U.S. Army War College.

ELIZABETH R. SMITH is a 2015 U.S. Army War College graduate and Carlisle Scholar. She is an Air Defense Officer, specializing in patriot missile operations. 

She has commanded at battery and battalion levels, 

served as a Joint Staff Intern working Iraq Strategic 

policy and the International Criminal Court, and held 

numerous positions on Joint and Multi-National staffs 

such as Chief of Operations at Joint Task Force-North 

and the Knowledge Manager for the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization Training Mission/Combined Security Transition Command in Afghanistan. She is a 

1993 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. Colonel 

Smith holds a certification in Knowledge Management 
xiii

from the KM Institute and master’s degrees from the 

University of Phoenix, Marine Corps University, and 

the U.S. Army War College.

xv

Source: USPACOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) available from 

www.dmzhawaii.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/AOR_map700x446.

jpg, accessed December 20, 2014.

Map 1. PACOM AOR.

1

DUFFER’S SHOAL:

A STRATEGIC DREAM

OF THE PACIFIC COMMAND

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

FIRST DREAM

An Early Appreciation.

Weary from the preceding days of out-processing 

and hectic pack out from Carlisle Barracks, I surrendered to a deep sleep as soon as the plane’s doors were 

secured for departure. The soft whine of the aircraft’s 

engines was like a gentle lullaby, beckoning me to a 

long slumber.

Suddenly, I found myself seated at a large rectangular conference table, encircled by the familiar black, 

high-backed rolling chairs ubiquitous to U.S. military 

conference rooms around the globe. I silently wondered if these widely distributed U.S. Government furniture staples had been produced in Chinese factories. 

A quick survey of the Pacific Command (PACOM)-

logoed coffee cup clutched in my right hand confirmed 

the anticipated “Made In China” stamping.

Picture 1. “Made in China.”
2

My thoughts abruptly returned to the task at hand, 

as the PACOM Commander entered the room. After retaking my seat, I began to brief the Commander on the 

initial operational design we recently produced within the Command Action Group (CAG) here at Camp 

Smith, Hawaii. Our focus was on PACOM’s Area of 

Responsibility (AOR) and U.S. national interests in the 

region. This morning’s out-brief marked the culmination of 3 weeks of dedicated design and (optimistically) 

the transition from the Iraq/Afghanistan focus of the 

previous decade to the more conventional planning 

process inherent to our steady state military operations, 

exercises, and security cooperation assistance programs 

throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

As I progressed through my well-rehearsed PowerPoint slides, I outlined key findings of our design work 

and highlighted the shared logic that shaped our emerging viewpoints. At its core, our framing of the PACOM 

AOR had revealed a very complex geopolitical system 

with numerous internal and external dynamics and 

actors at play. The primary drivers of this system appeared to be the ongoing strategic competition between 

the United States and China, and the continued bifurcation of regional and global actors between the two 

national powers. Notably, our group had deduced that 

respective nation-states and actors in the Indo-Asia-Pacific “system” would predictably dance between both 

camps, seemingly siding with a respective power when 

it benefited their individual interests. The United States 

typically emerged as the desired partner when it came 

to security interests; China was the preferred choice 

when the stakes were financial. The dynamic interplay 

of these changing alliances and partnerships could be 

likened to a basic weighing scale, with the balance of 

power shifting by issue and interest. Conspicuously, 
3

the scale of influence had tipped decidedly in China’s 

favor in recent years.

I paused to take a sip of my coffee, allowing the 

Commander an opportunity to provide feedback. She 

seemed intrigued by our initial understanding of the 

environment. After a brief moment, the Commander 

inquired about the current U.S. strategic approach 

to the region, and the impact our recent policy pivot 

was having on this delicate competitive balance. The 

Commander wondered aloud if this strategic orientation came with undesired consequences, and if this approach furthered a detrimental, Cold War-like power 

struggle in the region. Did our current national strategy mistakenly advance a zero sum game with China? 

What was the optimal U.S. approach?

Before I could respond, my CAG colleague jumped 

in with a passionate reply. These very questions had 

dominated a good portion of our group discussion 

throughout the design, and represented our chief takeaways from 3 weeks of effort. As my colleague relayed, 

our review had suggested that the pursuit of equal influence—or worse, yet—a balance decidedly favored 

toward the United States was, in fact, undesirable. Such 

pursuits by the United States would inevitably provoke 

a counterbalance by China, leading to greater instability and bifurcation in the region. China’s predictable 

response to the U.S. provocative pursuit of exclusionary trade agreements, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership 

(TPP), and development of the U.S. military’s Air-Sea 

Battle are cases in point. In short, the competitive balance being played out between the United States and 

China did not lend itself well to Cold War thinking.
4

“What about multilateral organizations, like the 

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC]?” asked 

the Commander. “Is it possible for the United States 

to more effectively engage with China and our regional partners through these forums? What about the 

progress recently made at the November 2014 APEC 

Summit?”1

These were particularly vexing questions to answer. 

From our review, it was apparent that China preferred 

interacting with regional nations on a bilateral, one-onone basis. We surmised that this preference stemmed 

from China’s ability to control more effectively such 

engagements. If China meaningfully participated in 

multilateral settings, it was typically in alliances that 

China itself had spearheaded and in which the United 

States was not a member. China’s aggressive promotion of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 

(the BRICS countries) collaboration and the Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization (SCO) were examples of two 

such multilateral partnerships aimed at challenging 

U.S. global leadership.2

Further, we determined that China’s underlying 

distrust of the existing international order—and its 

belief that the current order unfairly favors the United 

States—would make China’s substantive participation 

in any organizations advanced by the United States unlikely. This would particularly be the case as long as 

China perceived the United States as a deliberate competitor, directly challenging its national interests. At 

best, the United States could try to incentivize China 

to play by existing international norms and rules, and 

attempt to make the costs of not playing by the rules 

undesirable. This optimal course of action would only 

be attainable if existing organizations were modified to 

acknowledge and account for China’s interests.
5

The Commander reflected on our assessment, and 

then questioned the impact of China’s recent overtures to Russia. “Despite a history of rivalry,” the 

Commander explained, “the last few years have seen 

a marked improvement in Russian-Chinese relations, 

culminating in the historic 30-year, $456 billion energy 

deal reached between the two nations in May 2014.3

How would you characterize the current relationship 

between these two powers, and what is the potential impact of this emerging strategic partnership on 

U.S. interests? What leverage does the United States 

have with China, given the continued development 

and influence of these alternate alliances and 

organizations?”

I felt my cheeks turning pink. Naively, we had assumed Russia was principally a European Command 

(EUCOM), vice PACOM, concern. Sheepishly admitting our error to the Commander, I confessed: “Ma’am, 

we did not consider China’s bilateral relationship with 

Russia in our assessment. We will go back to the white 

board and reframe our understanding.” Silence. I hated 

uncomfortable silence in a briefing with the Commander. After a curt nod, the Commander proceeded by asking our assessment of the September 2014 agreement 

by SCO members to increase their membership by four 

nations. Momentously, China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan had agreed to 

add India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia to their group.4

Did these SCO additions signal an expansion of the organization’s focus? Moreover, with inclusion of these 

formidable nations, was the SCO emerging as a viable 

regional security and economic counterweight?5

My colleague hastily handed me an article from 

yesterday’s news clips. Quickly skimming the highlighted portions, my eyes jumped to recent remarks 
6

attributed to Russian professor Aleksey Maslov, chair 

of the Department of Asian Studies at the Higher School 

of Economics in Moscow. “At present,” Maslov surmised, “the SCO has started to counterbalance NATO’s 

role in Asia.”6 The article proceeded with an account 

of how “the aggressive nature of Western actions towards Russia has certainly united the SCO members,” 

and that “[t]he SCO, like the BRICS with their Development Bank, sees itself as a forum against the Western 

dominated global order.”7

Trying to summarize expeditiously the article’s key 

insights, I attributed the recent SCO expansion to China’s larger pursuit of global influence and the creation 

of an alternate world order. Internally, I also wondered 

about the broader implications of these growing alliances and the criticality of our adding a robust understanding of Russia—and China’s pursuit globally—into our 

strategic thinking. Could U.S. and European attempts 

to isolate Russia, through economic sanctions and diplomatic rebukes, ultimately push Russia closer toward 

China? Would such an outcome prove more perilous in 

the long run than Russia’s bellicose actions in Eastern 

Europe? Specifically, would a growing China-Russia 

partnership lead to the sale of more advanced Russian weaponry to Chinese forces? Equally troubling, 

what would the addition of a country like Iran to the 

SCO partnership mean to our efforts in the Middle 

East? The dangers of overlooking and misunderstanding the complex factors and relationships at play were 

undeniably profound.

After receiving the signal from the Chief of Staff 

to wrap up my brief, I promptly advanced to my final 

slide and awkwardly asked the Commander if she had 

any remaining questions or concerns. After another 

pause, the Commander looked around the room and 

asked me to list the specific participants of our de-
7

sign effort. I dutifully named each and every member 

of our team, breathing a sigh of relief for a seemingly 

simple inquiry.

The Commander’s follow-up question caught me 

completely by surprise. With audible frustration in her 

voice, she asked what interagency and international 

partners we included in our design. I stumbled to come 

up with a suitable response. Certainly, the Commander 

understood that we only had access to PACOM staff for 

this design effort, and the limited number of interagency civilians assigned to the headquarters precluded 

their meaningful participation. The inclusion of any international representation would have proven further 

futile, given geographic realities, funding constraints, 

and security clearance concerns. Even the 45-minute 

video teleconference we had conducted with the U.S. 

State Department desk officers back at Foggy Bottom 

had proven to be a logistical nightmare due to time 

differences and incompatible agency network links.

As I searched for reasonable justifications, it struck 

me that our understanding was perilously incomplete 

without having the right expertise in the room. Similar 

to the mistaken exclusion of Russia as a key external 

actor in our regional assessment, our analysis lacked 

critical civilian and global perspective. Perspectives 

that would arguably have enabled a more complete 

understanding of the complex adaptive system that 

is the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. A renewed look at our 

polished slides quickly reinforced that our efforts were 

understandably biased toward a U.S. military, and 

specifically PACOM, viewpoint.

I closed my eyes, briefly, wishing a do-over with 

the Commander. Many of the valuable insights our 

CAG had advanced were obscured by our avoidable stumbles. Replaying the lessons learned, I 
8

prioritized the following strategic takeaways for follow 

on planning.

Reflections.

1. Apply systemic thinking to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the environment. This can help 

identify potential consequences of our action (or inaction) and is vital for both steady state and contingency 

planning.

2. Collaborate early and often with interagency, 

international, and nongovernmental partners, particularly when seeking to understand and engage in a 

complex, adaptive environment like the PACOM AOR. 

While the costs and hurdles of securing such cooperation may be challenging, the price of incomplete and 

erroneous understandings is far greater.

3. Pursue complementary solutions. Zero sum, 

competitive approaches to U.S. foreign policy in the 

PACOM AOR have unintended and perilous consequences, both within the region and worldwide. Such 

approaches often educe undesirable military escalation and bring about unproductive competition in 

the region.

SECOND DREAM

Of Fish and Pirates.

At once, I noticed a change around me. The distinct 

smell of the sea and the sound of the tide lapping slowly 

against wood jerked me back into consciousness. As I 

surveyed the area, I was not sure exactly where I stood, 

but I did realize I was standing on an old wooden dock. 

The smell of rotting wood and dead fish quickly overcame the fragrance of the salt air. As I struggled to gain 
9

my bearings, I began to look at the markings of the 

boats in the harbor, and listened to the locals speaking 

to each other as they conducted their routine business. 

After a few minutes, I concluded that I stood on the 

dock of Hai Phong Harbor in Vietnam.

The workday seemed to be ending as I watched 

fishing boats return to the harbor with conspicuously 

empty nets. The captains and crews were noticeably 

disheartened as they unloaded their gear, pointing at 

the nets, heads bowed in disappointment, while speaking to each other in hushed tones. I thought back to my 

understanding of the importance of fishing in this part 

of the world, and immediately realized the predicament around me.

Picture by Lucas Jans.

Picture 2. Vietnamese Fishing Boat.

Overfishing, the exploitation of the fishing areas 

by industrial fishing companies, and decades of dynamite and cyanide fishing practices by countries in the 

region finally took the predicted toll on the maricul-
10

ture industry.8 With the destruction of so many of the 

coral reefs and the over-exploitation of the viable fishing areas, the fishing industry in the South China Sea 

(SCS) ceased to be economically sustainable. With the 

fish previously available annually to local fishermen 

decimated and surviving schools migrating to new 

areas with abundant coral reefs, an economic collapse 

became imminent. Even in the disputed waters, China 

had pursued aggressive fishing for many years, leaving 

nothing in the area untouched. This loss of income and 

food source for the countries in the area took a heavy 

toll, leaving fishermen without an income to provide 

for their families.9

I sought out my local colleague, eager to gain a 

more thorough understanding of the problem and possible backlash. Duong Pham requested I return to our 

hotel while he spoke to the local fisherman. My presence would surely prevent them from telling the whole 

story. I returned to my lodging and awaited Duong’s 

report. 

When he showed up at the hotel, his face betrayed 

the desperation of the situation. He wove a story, increasingly despondent, about the plight of the fishermen in the SCS. The men we saw returning to the harbor earlier were but a few that still had faith they could 

earn an honorable living. Most, Duong explained, had 

turned to a life of crime to provide for their families. 

Needing expertise on the waters, criminal organizations offered any fisherman an opportunity to join 

them for a reasonable sum. These recruits became pirates through the Strait of Malacca and the SCS. The 

older ones became thieves within the ports, stealing 

equipment and anything of value from the anchored 

boats. The younger ones trained to become hijackers. 

They not only took over boats as teams for ransom from 
11

large companies or countries, but they also learned 

to remove identification marks on the boat to create 

phantom ships. Duong continued the back brief as he 

explained how these actions raised insurance rates, began restricting free trade, and increased already high 

tensions between littoral states, their neighbors and 

the countries whose flagged ships were attacked or 

hijacked.10

Figure 1. Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 

in SCS (1995-2013).11

Duong sat back and asked for a moment before continuing. I could see the anxiety in his face as he prepared 

to finish telling me the situation. He sighed as he relayed the increasing popularity of human trafficking as 

a secondary effect of this economic loss. Piracy and the 

creation of phantom ships provided more opportunities 

for transnational criminal organizations (TCO) to move 

human cargo freely through the Strait of Malacca and 

the SCS. The increase in activity was dynamic in countries already heavily involved in these practices.12 The 

unending poverty started an avalanche of individuals 

willing to find and sell women and children to traffickers to provide for the most basic needs. Due to the over-
12

whelming increased supply of human capital, TCOs 

paid next to nothing for the victims, while their customers, brothel keepers, business owners, home owners, insurgents, would-be parents, and sellers on the medical 

black market, now heavily vested in human trafficking, 

made enormous profits, further increasing demands.13

Once again, the use of phantom ships became prevalent 

in order to move the increasing number of slaves, skyrocketing current conditions to crisis. Countries in the 

region, frantic to keep the populace from uprising due 

to economic distress, no longer adhered to anti-piracy or 

human trafficking regulations.14

I took a deep breath and tried to comprehend all 

of the complexities of this situation across the whole 

region. Recalling the number of errors outlined by the 

PACOM commander in the briefing, I was determined 

not to make the same critical mistakes in my assessment of this situation. I pulled out my laptop to review 

my previous mishaps. The first thing I considered was 

whether I had a good understanding of the situation. 

Duong provided me information from the sources at 

ground zero, thus I felt I knew everything I needed to 

begin planning.

I navigated to the Joint Interagency Center for Strategic Lessons Learned (JICSLL) webpage to see if there 

was any information pertinent to the situation.15 After 

about 2 hours of clicking broken links, I finally found 

information on piracy. Opening the report, I realized 

it was all information on handling piracy in the Gulf of 

Aden. I bookmarked the report. Efforts in that area of 

operations had shown success, so I was confident that 

the United States could use the Gulf of Aden operations as templates for this situation. At least there was 

a model for me to refer to, and there was no time to 

reinvent the wheel.
13

Photo by U.S. Navy.

Picture 3. U.S. Forces Arresting Suspected Pirates.

Remembering the need for interagency coordination and planning, I attempted to contact the State 

Department liaison to discuss previous and ongoing 

anti-piracy efforts and any political considerations 

or sensitivities to U.S. intervention. I also sent emails 

and left messages for the military attaches within the 

affected countries to ensure we discussed, in a multinational forum, the issues with territorial waters and 

incidents crossing those lines. I left word at the embassies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, and the 

Philippines to set up conference calls about our territorial questions. Issues with secure communications and 

the time differences prevented our interaction with the 

State Department and the attaches. I resolved to continue my analysis without their input, noting the attempt 

at collaboration.

After a few hours of poring over the issues, the articles downloaded from the JICSLL, and some hasty 
14

planning, I arrived at a plan of operation for the region’s 

current problems. Duong and I reviewed the plan and 

agreed it was an aggressive course of action ready for 

immediate implementation.

• Aggressive patrols throughout the Strait of Malacca and SCS to deter or defeat pirates before 

they board vessels.

• Immediate turnover of all captured pirates by 

partners or affected countries to the International Criminal Court for prosecution.16

• Searches conducted on all vessels to look for 

contraband or slave movement.

• Increased presence in areas known to be involved with human trafficking to provide local 

officials with actionable information.

I smiled to myself, proud of the decisions and quick 

planning I was able to complete. I forwarded the plan to 

higher headquarters, and, since I was the subject matter expert on the ground, actions on my directives were 

immediate. Orders given and execution underway, 

I returned to my lodging to await progress updates. 

The plan delivered immediate noticeable results. The 

increased maritime patrols, searches, and aggressive 

pursuit produced a surge in the capture of pirates now 

facing adjudication by the International Criminal Court 

(ICC). Patrols interdicted multiple phantom ships transporting trafficking victims to new locations. Traffickers 

noticed PACOM personnel in their establishments, and 

local authorities noted reports on these businesses. I 

took 30 days of leave, and upon my return, met with 

Duong, anticipating great success stories and a phone 

call from the boss lauding my accomplishments.

Duong told me to sit down and ordered us both a 

drink, which was unusual for him, but I took a long 

sip of the cool beverage and anxiously awaited his 
15

report. Instead of praise, the information I received was 

unexpected, lapsing me into silence and deep thought. 

Although initial estimates flaunted great success in decreasing both piracy and trafficking incidents, Duong’s 

informants and research revealed higher incidents of 

both, as well as new issues throughout the area of operations. The rapid capture and removal of pirates left 

a greater number of families lacking their primary provider; economic stress in the region increased. There 

were more women and children homeless, without 

food, and unable to sustain themselves. The great rise 

in such poverty began riots and uprisings in the cities. 

Citizens quickly lost confidence in their government’s 

ability to provide, and anti-U.S. sentiments rose. The 

lack of food and shelter overwhelmed the abilities of 

underfunded and immature social programs leading 

to the desperate undertaking of low-level crime by 

displaced families.

Although patrols interdicted phantom ships with 

thousands of human slaves, the lower supply across 

the network increased both demand and cost for new 

slaves. TCOs noticed the presence of our personnel in 

trafficking establishments and began preying on those 

lacking proper training or unfamiliar with routine human trafficking practices. Promises of dances, “fun 

nights,” and cold drinks created an additional increase 

in demand for slaves in the dance clubs and brothels 

as personnel unwittingly involved themselves in trafficking as customers. Although we forwarded reports 

on such establishments, the owners had the majority of 

the authorities on their payroll. The reports from our 

personnel to the authorities caused backlash within the 

clubs. Owners lashed out at their workers for talking to 

U.S. personnel about their “contracts” and incidents of 

severe violence increased.
16

Photo by Alyssa L. Miller.

Picture 4. Sex Trafficking Victim.

I dropped my head into my hands and could hear 

the Commander’s voice in my head, ticking off the 

problems with my plan. “As you can see, Maestro, your 

plan was incomplete. There are key considerations 

missing which resulted in these second order effects 

and further destabilization.” My shoulders slumped as 

I imagined her ticking off some of the most important 

strategic lessons we learned at the U.S. Army War College. What was I thinking? These were rookie mistakes. 

I raised my head, looked at Duong, and we spoke at 

length about our next steps. We hoped to somehow 

reverse the additional damage my first plan caused. I 

annotated the previous observations, added the new 

considerations and my second planning session began.
17

Reflections.

1. Develop means and methods that enhance collaboration with interagency and international organizations. Failing to include partners in the planning 

process makes it extremely difficult to include them 

in the execution. Methods must look at problems holistically: A purely tactical or “ground zero” viewpoint 

limits thinking and does not incorporate operational or 

strategic considerations.

2. Find relevant examples to learn from. Strategic 

lessons from past operations are valuable, but we must 

understand the differences in the new context. One size 

does not fit all.

3. Conduct in-depth wargaming. A robust strategic 

wargame can reveal predictable unintended consequences—such as the impact of our actions on poverty 

and crime. Knowing this could allow us to develop 

mitigating strategies.

4. Do everything possible to understand the whole 

system before acting. Our injection into existing international systems without knowing how they operated 

was disruptive and caused unintended consequences. 

Personnel not understanding the human trafficking 

problem became consumers, while our misunderstanding of the authorities’ relationship with traffickers led 

to worsening human security conditions.
18

THIRD DREAM

The Specter of Terrorism.

I opened my eyes and found myself sitting alone 

in a darkened movie theater. I heard the familiar rattle 

and click of a film projector, as images began to flash on 

the screen. A solemn voiceover with a thick Indonesian 

accent began speaking.

The war against heretics and infidels continues. It has 

inspired martyrs from all over the world. They have 

fought in Syria and Iraq to build the Islamic caliphate and terrorize unbelievers and apostates into submission. As more brothers replace them, the veterans 

progressively return to their homes to light the world 

ablaze with jihad.17 Soon caliphs will rule the world. 

Soon the heretic Shias will be expunged. Soon the hated 

infidels will be put to flight.

The screen was filled with the face of a young soldier from Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS). His name 

was Yuda, and it was his voice that narrated the scene. 

The screen faded and cut to Yuda crouched in a shadowed doorway, while the throng of Jakarta’s street 

bustled by. His heart thumping, the minutes ticked 

on. Then it was time. He sent the cellphone signal. Almost immediately, there were flames, a shock wave, 

and an ear-shattering eruption as the world was freed 

of the Shia blasphemies from the Islamic Cultural 

Center. Exultant, Yuda melted into the now-panicked 

crowd and disappeared. As instructed, he had dealt a 

blow to the heart of Jakarta’s Shia population; it was 

the start of a more pure jihad. Across Indonesia, other 

brothers would be attacking the corrupt Polri (police)18

and Western companies that were raping the Indone-
19

sian resources. It might take many martyrs but it was 

inevitable: Indonesia would be a Sunni State under 

shari’a law.19

Photo by Zoriah.

Picture 5. JAS Terrorist.

In August 2014, JAS broke away from Abu Bakar 

Ba’asyir’s Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) when Abu 

Bakar declared allegiance to Daish, the Islamic State.20

Abu Bakar was the longtime ideological leader of JAT 

and prior to that, of Jemaah Islamiya (JI).21 Yuda, like 

many previous JAT fighters, was a Syrian combat veteran with the al-Qaeda linked Jabhat al-Nusra (JN).22

He had gone to Syria to learn the ways of jihad and 

to bring new knowledge home. But when Abu Bakar 

declared allegiance to the Islamic State, it was clear that 
20

JAT had lost its way. Yuda thought the Islamic State 

were narcissists, always taking films of themselves.23

They committed atrocities against Sunni Muslims and 

even fought al-Nusra; such was their lust for power. 

As Yuda slipped deeper into the city, he knew it was 

imperative to act with strength now, so those who had 

sworn allegiance to the Islamic State would not have a 

chance to usurp the righteous Indonesian jihadis.24

A smile curled on Yuda’s lips. JAS would prove 

themselves more powerful and more pure than JI or 

JAT! They had learned many lessons and made many 

comrades from all over the world, including some 

Australian brothers who had now joined them to 

fight for Indonesia. It was these things that would be 

the seeds of victory. JAS would exploit corrupt officials 

and the weakness of the apostates, heretics, and infidels. It would build a shadow economy to fund its war, 

based on piracy, protection taxes, and trafficking Shia 

and Christian women and children to the fleshpots of 

Bangkok. They would train male children for jihad in 

jungle schools, and they would strike the symbols of 

Western imperialism. Perhaps most importantly, they 

had learned to coordinate their effects using social media,25 cyberattack,26 and martyrdom. They had even 

learned from the Free Aceh Movement27 and the Arabs 

from the Islamic State how to build a shadow state. 

They had learned from Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL) 

how to build a social movement that converted and 

cared for its followers.28 Using these tactics, they would 

force the secular Government of Indonesia to declare 

itself a Sunni State under shari’a law. Today was the 

glorious beginning.

As I watched the images unfold on the screen and 

heard Yuda’s thoughts, I realized I had a rare glimpse 

into the mind of my adversary. Abruptly, the theater 
21

darkened, and the scene shifted. Now I found myself 

in the PACOM operations center and a “flash” signal 

had just arrived from the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia. The Shia Islamic Center had been bombed, 

and at least 200 people had been killed and wounded. 

As I was digesting this, there was a call over satellite 

phone saying that the Jakarta cellphone network had 

crashed under the combined weight of a cyberattack 

that had degraded services, just as there was a spike 

in demand following the bombing. Then came another report. This time one of Chevron’s offshore oil 

platforms in East Kalimantan’s Kutei Basin had been 

captured. Chevron Pacific Indonesia was the largest producer of crude oil in Indonesia and a major 

contributor to the Indonesian economy.

This was going to be a major disruption. It also 

showed that the perpetrators had some form of maritime capacity. I took a deep breath and remembered 

Yuda’s thoughts. I knew that, although these events 

were both tragic and dramatic, they were only the 

opening salvos in a new campaign of terror. Clearly, 

we needed a strong response. The first thing to do 

would be to send the special operations boys from 

Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) to assess the situation 

and take back our oil platform.29 I congratulated myself on being a step ahead. Just then the Commander 

walked in. “Maestro,” she boomed. “The Indonesian Government is dealing with this one, but I want 

to know that our people are safe, and then I want to 

know how PACOM can support a smart approach.” 

With belated clarity, I realized that I had focused too 

quickly on the military element of power and not considered the full range of national and international 

options. In fact, an overtly military response might be

counterproductive.
22

What else had I learned from Yuda? As the operations center hummed and buzzed around me, I tried 

to make coherent sense of his thoughts. The terrorists 

were trying to ignite underlying sectarian tensions between the majority Sunnis and the minority Shia and 

Christian populations. They must have a safe base or 

bases in the jungle. He was from JAS, which had links 

to the Island of Sulawesi, an outlying Island within easy 

travelling distance to Malaysia and the Philippines. I 

also knew that there were Australian and Arabic jihadi 

links, so it was clear that this had an international dimension. JAS had a social movement to provide dawah 

(outreach) and possibly a political element. Therefore, 

this was not just a straight fight, it would demand, as 

the Admiral said, a smart approach.

With deeper consideration, I realized we needed 

to start with the ends in mind and tailor PACOM’s 

response to address both the short- and long-term issues. We needed to focus on the transnational aspects 

of the growing terror threat in South East Asia and 

undermine the sometime fractious links between the 

mosaic of militias that run between the Middle East 

and the Pacific. We required cross-jurisdictional efforts and, potentially, an interagency task force to 

protect borders, trade, and maritime assets. All of 

this had to be nuanced carefully with respect to the 

sovereignty of the nations and international organizations concerned. Ultimately, our enemy was terrorism rather than individual terrorist groups.30 To win, 

we must take a comprehensive approach to mitigate 

the international drivers and enablers of terrorism: 

including extremism and abuse, poor education, shadow economies, and corruption, as well as weak and 

illegitimate governance.
23

We should promote the rule of law and thereby increase normalcy as a means to reduce extremism. At the 

national level, our efforts should strengthen our security partners, rather than trying to solve their problems 

our way. We needed to provide a more compelling and 

transparent future than the austere and dogmatic one 

offered by the extremists.

As I walked into the Commander’s office to brief her 

on my analysis, she handed me a photo. I was shocked 

to see Yuda’s face. He was a ringleader, and his details 

had just been transmitted to Special Detachment 88, 

the Indonesian counterterrorist police, courtesy of the 

Turkish Security Directorate. Globalization works both 

for and against the terrorists, I thought. While looking 

at the photo, I stole a moment to gather my thoughts.

Photo by Sam 193746.

Picture 6. Indonesian Security Forces.
24

Reflections.

1. Develop strategies that focus on terrorism first, 

not terrorists. Strategies focused exclusively on countering terrorists rarely achieve long-term success.

2. Counter the terrorists’ use of the global system. 

Transnational terrorists are enabled by globalization as 

much as they violently reject it. Efforts to reduce terrorist freedom of action (funding, movement, reinforcement, and resupply), divide rival factions and unite 

moderates, and deter retention and recruitment.

3. Employ a smart approach that applies multipartner efforts. Combining both soft and hard power 

together achieves more comprehensive results. In a 

globalized world, “civil-military cooperation” needs to 

increasingly replace “joint operations” as the byword 

for teamwork.

4. Redefine success to mean stability or nonviolent 

change. Since World War II, nonstate and intrastate conflict has become the most prevalent form of armed conflict. In this context, civil stability rather than military 

victory is the definition of success. Therefore, militaries 

need to reconsider their doctrines of decisive battle and 

the now trite cliché of “hearts and minds” to focus on 

building confidence in civil governance. In this context, 

the military will often be the essential enabler. Militaries should craft their efforts to reinforce legitimacy and 

build normalcy.

FOURTH DREAM

Dhaka’s Despair.

Standing on the second floor of an old office building, I looked around at the wreckage. The ceiling tiles 

were stained with water damage, and the florescent 
25

lights flickered randomly. Through the thin-pained 

windows, I heard the sounds of dense city traffic and a 

bustling city. Suddenly a deep rumble echoed through 

the building. The floor beneath my feet began to shake 

violently with an aftershock, and windows shattered 

and walls cracked. I could barely maintain my balance 

as I frantically tried to escape the building before it 

collapsed.

It was nearing 3 a.m. in Dhaka, Bangladesh, when 

the earthquake struck. They so often seem to come in 

the middle of the night. The Bangladeshis must have 

known it was coming—they had predicted that a magnitude 8 earthquake would occur soon as this seemed 

to be a centennial event around the three fault lines running under Dhaka. The locals expect a big earthquake 

every 80 years or so, and it had been over 120 years 

since the last one. They were overdue.

The office building I had been visiting belonged to 

the city’s engineer—at least it did before it collapsed. 

Thankfully, he was not inside when it fell. So many 

buildings were damaged beyond repair during the 

earthquake, and the loss of life was horrific. A combination of poor building material and widespread 

violations of building codes and basic engineering 

principles led to a level of destruction none of the official estimates predicted. It is hard to say how many 

buildings were destroyed, but it was obvious that 

it was far more than the 70,000 we thought it would 

be. Unregulated growth over the past decade made it 

impossible to know how many buildings were standing before the earthquake, or how many people might 

actually have been in the city.

The destruction of the buildings was only part of 

the problem. The bigger problems were the fires from 

the unmapped gas lines that crisscross the city. That 
26

was why we were visiting the engineer’s office: hoping 

that maybe he had some insight as to how to turn off 

the flow of natural gas. Nobody seemed to know where 

the central switches to the gas lines might be, if they 

existed at all.31

The Fire Service and Civil Defense (FSCD) had not 

been able to coordinate much more than local responses: Their buildings were among the first to collapse, 

and very few response vehicles were still in operation. 

Even if they were operational, few people knew how 

to operate the equipment. The shiny new fire trucks 

donated by friendly nations (like the United States 

and China) were showpieces and not used for training or operations. Barring these challenges, the streets 

were largely nontrafficable for anything larger than a 

rickshaw. Help from neighboring firehouses was not 

forthcoming: With the landlines and cell towers down, 

there was no way to contact the other stations to see 

what condition they were in or to coordinate a larger 

response effort.

Local survivors scrambled over piles of rubble, risking their lives to find survivors in the wreckage. Reminiscent of the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, untrained locals 

climbed into the tight spaces looking for their families 

and friends, often creating new problems as they added 

weight to already precarious structures. You could not 

blame them for wanting to help, but a little training or 

supervision might have prevented more loss of life. I 

wondered why this was not covered in our last few 

exercises. Earthquakes were the focus of our partnership emergency response program, but we somehow 

missed a few key items.
27

Photo by Demotix.

Picture 7. Rana Plaza, 2013.

Thankfully, Bangladeshi Army units were not in the 

parts of Dhaka most affected by the earthquake. The 

Army was the most professional and competent organization in Bangladesh, and this time it did not wait 

for official orders before responding.32 Soldiers quickly 

began opening key routes for aid to arrive. Their first 

priority was clearing Chittagong Highway, which connected the city to the country’s only port. This would 

prove to be the vital lifeline for the city.

Relief supplies coming from the Regional Office of 

Foreign Disaster Assistance—part of the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID)—were to come 

from warehouses in Dubai, but had to be transloaded 

in Singapore, because the ships coming out of Dubai 

were too large for Bangladesh’s shallow port, and even 

military over-the-shore logistics capabilities were not 

as useful as we thought they would be.
28

Photo by Bob Dixon.

Picture 8. Dhaka’s River Port Only 

Handles Shallow Barges.

The biggest shortfall in local response was in medical and search and rescue. We simply did not have 

enough responders to go around, and the assets that 

were arriving from all the different nations were poorly 

coordinated. We would have set up more field hospitals closer to the city center, but there was no room 

anywhere in the city for them: All the green space in 

the city was used up by makeshift slums and unauthorized construction. We had to set up outside the city, but 

there was no way for people to get to us. Emergency 

vehicles could not get through the city quickly even 

before the earthquake—it was impossible now. Surely, 

we could have planned for this.

How could the devastation be so much worse than 

we anticipated? Why were we so unprepared to help? 

Why was the response so slow as thousands of re-
29

sponders sat waiting to help? In my mind, I reviewed 

our prior planning. We based many of our plans on the 

U.S. response in Haiti.33 We rehearsed earthquake response with the Bangladeshis at the last two disaster 

response exercise and exchanges.34 We front-loaded 

engineering units in our force flow, but it would take 

weeks before they would be on the ground to help in 

a meaningful way. Indian Army units started arriving 

right away, but coordination was extremely difficult, 

because we had never included them in our exercises.

Photo by U.S. Army Pacific.

Picture 9. U.S. Military Training 

Bangladeshi Responders.

We did many things right. We learned from our 

past experiences and applied the best practices, to include early alert of engineer, logistics, medical, and 

signal units. We mobilized dozens of contracting officers and established liaison with USAID, international 

governmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We established a Joint 
30

Task force (JTF) and put a well-trained commander 

in charge.

As I reflected on the difference between the plan 

and the execution, a few ideas emerged. First, those 

partners we have been conducting exercises with were 

in the earthquake zone. Most of them were among 

the victims and were not much help. At any rate, our 

exercises never anticipated a disaster this size. We 

were overconfident about our ability to respond and 

their ability to operate. The Center of Excellence for 

Disaster Management folks told me that we kept 

making the same mistakes over and over.35

Our exercises over the past few years had been 

great political events, but had done little to prepare our 

partners for a real disaster. If we were serious about 

building partner capacity, we had a lot of work to do in 

presenting realistic scenarios that challenged capabilities. It was too late to build capacity after the crisis has 

started. Also, our exercises should have included the 

most likely external responders if they were going to be 

of any use for planning. You do not want to meet a new 

partner in the middle of a crisis like we did this time.

The differences in our exercises and what happened 

on the ground was foreseeable. Dhaka was a fragile 

city, with obvious potential for a large-scale natural 

disaster that dwarfed the 2011 Haiti Earthquake. Lack 

of elected city government and widespread corruption 

led to a capability vacuum between the neighborhood 

and national level. Unregulated construction resulted 

in a large proportion of the multistory buildings in 

the city being vulnerable to collapse. USAID and the 

Bangladesh Department of Disaster Management estimated that a minimum of 76,000 buildings would likely 

collapse during an earthquake of 7.0 or higher.36 Other 

estimates were much higher (one study suggests that 

200-300,000 buildings would collapse).37 The immedi-
31

ate search and rescue problem was only the beginning. 

It looks like around 400,000 buildings were damaged 

beyond repair, including nearly all of the 850 hospitals.38 Disease, dehydration, and starvation are the next 

threats. Our exercises surely did not prepare us for this!

Second, using lessons from our past operations was 

not necessarily the best way to approach planning for 

this event. While past experience can be useful, it was 

important to know what was different about our current context. While we based much of our planning on 

the U.S. response to Haiti, Dhaka is not Port-au-Prince. 

Besides the fact that Dhaka has more than 10 times the 

population, its physical layout is also very different. 

Looking at the map, I observed the differences in the 

geography: The ports and the coastline, in particular, 

were a real issue. It was a long ways from Chittagong 

to Dhaka, and that road was nearly useless between the 

flooding and the traffic. The coastline was nearly all 

delta, which made over-the-shore logistics very difficult, and overland travel from there nearly impossible. 

We should have seen that coming.

Figure 2. Earthquakes in Bangladesh. 

Note the Distance from Dhaka to Chittagong, 

the Nation’s Only Port.39
32

One of the biggest lessons from Haiti was the use of 

contracting officers to procure food and water quickly 

for the population. While PACOM stood ready with 

contracting officers, the bigger challenge was finding 

suppliers who could actually deliver food and water to 

the population. Making room to operate was a bigger 

problem here, too. There was little to no room to establish refugee camps or operating bases in Dhaka. Undocumented and informal urban growth over the last 

decade has consumed nearly every inch of open space 

in the city. Our maps were relatively useless in helping 

us understand the city and the actual whereabouts of 

the people. Unregulated growth also meant that we really could not know how many victims there were, or 

where they would try to go.

Third, we were not really sure what the Chinese, Indians, or other regional responders would do. While we 

conducted exercises with the Bangladeshi Army and 

the FSCD, we did not include other potential partners. 

Coordinating the efforts would have been much easier 

if we had exercised together before the event. We were 

playing a pick-up game when it counted the most. We 

typically get great political benefits from conducting 

exercises bilaterally, but the loss of goodwill we experienced because of the muddled response was entirely 

counterproductive.

In Haiti, 26 countries provided significant military 

assets to earthquake response. We should have expected close to that in Dhaka, but we had not worked 

with most of these potential partners. The challenges 

of geography, logistics, and sustainment frustrated 

potential partners, as it was difficult to move and sustain response forces in this environment. We must 

manage this closely at the highest levels, as the political implications of frustrating partners will have 
33

resounding effects. USAID lacks sufficient staffing to 

integrate representatives from United Nations (UN) 

and NGO relief activities. PACOM has to augment 

USAID in this capacity. We also have to be sensitive 

to sovereignty issues: As the government of Bangladesh (GOB) recovers, they will be in charge of the operations. Augmentation to the GOB may be another 

significant requirement for us.

The Indian military was prepared to contribute 

the most to the effort. They may, in fact, be the lead 

response nation as their ability to respond is greater 

than anyone else’s. We are not always good at letting 

other nations take the lead, but we should be prepared 

to take a secondary role if India steps up. It would have 

been nice if we had included them in exercises prior to 

this, where we could have sorted all of this out. Perhaps 

the example of the Multinational Coordination Center 

established in the Philippines after Super Typhoon 

Yolanda would be a model for future exercises.40

Fourth, I underestimated the friction between our 

sustainment supplies and the relief goods flowing in. 

We focused planning on getting our people and equipment here and sustaining them, but we seemed to have 

ignored the fact that every container that arrives for us 

was one less container for the population. Dhaka would 

be out of water in 2 days, and out of food in 3 days. This 

place was fragile before, and if we did not do this right, 

it was going to get a lot worse. Again, the earthquake 

was just the beginning.

In our rush to get our forces on the ground, we did 

not realize how much competition there would be for 

the strained flow systems. Our influx hindered the flow 

of other response nations and sustainment supplies 

for the millions of internally displaced persons that 

needed humanitarian assistance (HA). We dramati-
34

cally underestimated the number of victims (which 

drives how much HA needs to flow), and the number 

of other responders that needed to get to the city. Our 

poor planning unnecessarily contributed to the friction. 

In the future, our planners must find the balance between flowing forces in and bringing supplies to the 

city. We must not monopolize the flow systems for our 

own movement or sustainment, or we will make the 

situation worse.

Finally, we needed to figure out in advance how 

we were going to create a common operating picture 

(COP) for everyone. As we set up, we focused mostly 

on ourselves, establishing our networks but not including some of the other partners. Forget our classified 

systems. In fact, we probably needed to forget using 

military systems at all. One thing I did not find in any 

of our military “lessons learned” documents was the 

fact that social media was a better, faster, and more accurate means of getting a COP than anything we can do 

alone. Everyone from victims, NGOs, IGOs, and other 

interested parties can contribute, but only if we enable 

them. This was likely the most essential piece of our 

response: getting and distributing an accurate assessment of the problem.

The COP must truly be common. If we try to use 

our current software on unclassified systems, we will 

also create large challenges for our partner responders, both military and civilian. Additionally, we do not 

have enough collection assets or mapping capability 

to truly understand where help is most needed. The 

situation changes continuously and quickly, and our 

ability to understand and share is extremely limited. 

There will be huge competition for bandwidth, both by 

responders and survivors.
35

We must divorce ourselves from our understanding of a COP. In Haiti, CrisisMappers, a volunteer 

group formed on the Internet, developed real time 

mapping and situational understanding remotely using social media.41 U.S. Marine units were essentially 

being directed by volunteers in Syracuse, New York, 

who were monitoring, translating, and mapping disaster response needs in real time. None of the military lessons-learned documents actually captured 

this, and none of the military or government systems 

came close to replicating it. Most of our “lessons 

learned” were U.S. Government-centric, and failed 

to capture the amazing power of social media and 

crowd sourcing.

Creating a venue, downloadable applications, and 

real-time data-basing that not only enabled crowd 

sourcing and wiki mapping, but also exploited the 

power of social media for information sharing would 

have enabled all partners to understand simultaneously a true common operating picture. This will continue 

to be a huge challenge both to our signal and intelligence communities as they are stuck in 20th century 

procedures and capabilities, yet it is vital that responders learn how to use these powerful resources.
36

Source: ICCM crisismappers.net.

Picture 10. CrisisMappers Gathered and Shared 

Information about the Haiti Earthquate More 

Quickly and Accurately than Official Channels.

I paused for a moment, taking in the destruction 

and chaos. “We can do this better,” I said to my driver. 

“We couldn’t do much worse,” he replied, heading for 

the truck. As we pulled out and headed back to the embassy, it dawned on me that an earthquake in Dhaka 

was really just one of the many challenges we could 

face in the Pacific. Climate change, massive urbanization, and unregulated growth in many Asian cities are 

creating similar dynamics in dozens of countries. If the 

United States wishes to remain the security partner of 

choice to the Asian nations, we are going to have to 

take a hard look at how we prepare to respond. After 

all, armed conflict is only one type of security concern. 

The prevention or easing of human suffering is something everyone understands, and doing it well gives 

the United States more credibility in the region than a 

dozen armed incursions. As we drove past the rubble 

and fires on our way back to the embassy, I jotted down 

a few notes to pass back to the team at PACOM.
37

Reflections.

1. Be realistic about “Building Partner Capacity.” It 

does not happen overnight and cannot happen during 

a crisis.

2. Find relevant examples. Not every lesson translates to your current situation. Context matters.

3. Be prepared to work with nontraditional partners. Not everyone you play with on game day went to 

the practices. By the way, one of the new players may 

be in charge.

4. Avoid self-centered planning. If your plan focuses 

on your forces more than the problem, you will hinder 

success. Keep the big picture in mind.

5. Make sure your “common operating picture” is 

truly common. Figure out the best way to create and 

maintain the picture for all partners.

FIFTH DREAM

A Nightmare with China.

I found myself in a large command and control facility, seated at a large table nestled beneath a colossal 

digital map of the world. The map was surrounded by 

large monitors, displaying various news reports and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) video 

feeds. It was sprinkled with icons from a broad spectrum of naval forces, which were conveniently color 

coded to discern between enemy and friendly forces. I 

quickly recognized that a large force on force engagement between U.S. and Chinese naval forces was already underway in the SCS. The number of red Chinese icons dramatically outnumbered and surrounded 

the blue U.S. icons, and this caused great distress for 

an admiral seated at the head of the table. Like a scene 
38

from Dr. Strangelove, he angrily pounded his fist on 

the table and cursed at the big board. The rest of the 

players surrounding the table recognized they were 

powerless to influence the contest, as it unfolded on 

the screen before them. The admiral shook his head in 

disbelief, “How did this happen—how did we not see 

this coming?” His question was rhetorical, but a young 

analyst seated next to me leaned in and quietly offered 

a detailed explanation.

China’s economic growth was both astonishing and 

alarming to rest of the world. It was also unsustainable. 

The prosperity of its economy hinged on exports and 

aggressive currency manipulation, thus the Western 

economic crisis of 2008 also stunted China’s economic 

progress.42 To mask the slower growth, China accumulated a massive amount of debt and invested most of 

the money in state-owned enterprises. This practice resembled the U.S. housing bubble, and it created a similar debt bomb. When the bubble burst, the debt bomb 

ravaged the Chinese economy.

The collapse of North Korea further strained the 

Chinese economy, as hordes of refugees flooded China’s border. The conditions within North Korea were 

far worse than anyone had imagined, and the world 

was ill-prepared to deal with the scale of the calamity. 

Collaboration between South Korea, the United States, 

and China was imperative to plot a productive future 

for North Korea, yet distrust and lack of transparency 

dominated these engagements; cooperation was steadily replaced with competition and suspicion. The Chinese government was furious with U.S. interventions 

in North Korea—this was a problem on China’s borders that should be handled by China alone. Western 

meddling was completely unwelcome. There were also 

frequent clashes between U.S. and Chinese military 

forces, as both sought to stabilize and control North 
39

Korea on their terms. These confrontations had not yet 

escalated beyond a few warning shots, but it was only 

a matter of time before blood would be shed. China’s 

own economic struggles, coupled with the strain of the 

influx of North Korean refugees caused mass uprisings 

against Communist Party officials.43

Desperate to squash the rebellion and distract the 

masses, China’s rulers saw an opportunity in the SCS. 

China’s claims to Taiwan were a matter of national 

pride. Reclaiming the island would fuel the fire of Chinese nationalism, and the people would quickly forget their own selfish economic struggles.44 While the 

United States maintained a hardline with China on the 

sovereignty of Taiwan, there was no cause to believe 

that China would violently enforce its claims. Thus, the 

United States was caught completely off guard when 

the invasion began.

China began the assault with a barrage of ballistic 

and cruise missiles to weaken Taiwan’s defensive systems. In the next salvo, she launched a wave of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons, and cyberattacks to blind 

the U.S. response forces. A U.S. Carrier Strike Group 

(CSG) led by the USS Eisenhower launched from Japan 

and sped towards the Taiwan Strait. In an instant, I was 

in the tower of the Eisenhower. Flights of F-35Cs vaulted 

from the deck of the carrier, as the white glow of their 

afterburner plumes illuminated the night sky. Alerts 

sounded, as rapidly moving blips on the ship’s radar 

screens warned of the hoard of inbound DF-21D carrier killer missiles. The missile launches were perfectly 

coordinated with crippling cyber and satellite attacks, 

disorienting and blinding the CSG’s defense forces. The 

carrier killing missiles rained down from the skies at 

speeds exceeding MACH 10, and I braced for impact 

as the first wave of missiles met their mark. The explosions shook the carrier violently, as a massive fireball 
40

engulfed the deck of the carrier, and destroyed two F35Cs taxiing to the catapults. I sprinted down the stairs 

from the tower to assist with fire suppression, as a second salvo of missiles struck the carrier. The force of the 

explosion swept me off the deck like a rag doll, and I 

plunged into the cold water below. Choking on saltwater, I fought to keep my head above water. The deck 

of the carrier was now completely engulfed in flames, 

filling the air with a suffocating thick black smoke. 

Seconds later, a blinding flash filled the sky as a final 

salvo of missiles ravaged the ship. I desperately clung 

to a floating piece of wreckage. A loudspeaker boomed 

over the sounds of claxons and fire alarms with an unmistakable call for all hands to abandon ship. There, 

in the depths of the SCS, the unthinkable became a reality, and the mighty Eisenhower slowly sank beneath 

the waves.

With the blink of an eye, I was back in the Operations Center, watching the data link feed of four Air 

Force B-3 next generation bombers scrambling from 

Guam to make the 6-hour flight to strike military targets within China. China’s sophisticated air defenses, 

consisting of land and ship mounted S-400 missile systems, could target nonstealth aircraft out to 400 kilometers (km).45 These defense systems made air-to-air 

refueling over the SCS impractical, at least until the air 

defenses were rolled back. Thus, the bombers entered 

Chinese airspace without any fighter or airborne jamming escort. In support of the strikes, U.S. submarines 

exhausted their arsenals of Tomahawk land attack missiles against Chinese air defense systems, but these attacks barely left a dent in her formidable surface-to-air 

arsenal. Chinese J-20 fighters shot down two of the $550 

million stealth aircraft, while the other bombers successfully hit their targets and returned to Guam. Short of 

intercontinental ballistic missile strikes and long-range 
41

cruise missiles, the rest of the U.S. military’s weapons 

lacked the range to target China. It would take at least 

a day for the United States to position forces to mount a 

coordinated response.

Twenty-four hours after the campaign began, 

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) captured Taiwan, and U.S. forces entered the Pacific theater en 

mass, postured for retaliation. The losses of the battle 

were difficult to comprehend: a carrier strike group 

decimated, two 5th generation bombers destroyed, 

and Taiwan lost to the PLA. The entire conflict was 

so unexpected that the complex coordination to execute Air-Sea Battle tactics successfully never had the 

opportunity to manifest.

The young analyst stretched his hands behind his 

head and leaned back in his chair. Together we gazed 

at the debacle on the big board. I interrupted his train 

of thought and asked him to give me more background 

on China’s military capabilities. On cue, he pulled out 

a binder filled with slides and continued his detailed 

discourse.

In 2014, China projected a military budget of 

$132 billion.46 While this figure may seem dramatic, 

China’s increase in military spending is largely a reflection of her thriving economy.47 In reality, the proportion of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) 

allotted to defense spending has remained stagnate 

at 2 percent. In contrast, the United States spends 3.8 

percent of its GDP on defense (See Figure 3).48 However, when compared to other defense budgets in the 

region, the PLA is clearly amassing formidable military 

strength, more than doubling the expenditures of other 

regional competitors (See Figure 4).49
42

Figure 3. U.S.-China Defense Budgets GDP 

Percentage Comparison.50

Figure 4. Asia Major Regional Powers 

2013 Defense Budgets.51
43

The much-hyped DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile 

(ASBM) is central to China’s anti-access/area-denial 

(A2/AD) strategy. The weapon depends upon a series 

of networked systems, and sophisticated sensors to 

enable its terminal guidance against moving targets. 

Disrupting this system of systems will likely be the 

most productive approach to breaking the DF-21Ds 

kill-chain,52 and this is precisely the intent of tactics derived from the Air-Sea Battle concept.53 Regardless, the 

emergence of ASBMs, like the DF-21D, present a point 

of inflection for the U.S. Navy, which in recent history has enjoyed sanctuaries of operation, free from 

any credible threats of enemy fire. This will clearly 

not be the case in the SCS. Current estimates place the 

DF-21Ds maximum effective range at over 2,000-km,54

which would allow China to target aircraft carriers or 

support vessels at distances reaching the second island 

chain (see Map 2 on page 44).55

Photo by Auaaimoer.

Picture 11. China’s DF21D ABM.
44

The PLA has also invested in large numbers of highly accurate anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Virtually 

every modern surface ship in the People’s Liberation 

Army Navy (PLAN) is capable of employing ASCMs.56

These weapons have small radar signatures, fly at low 

altitude at supersonic speeds, and can be employed in 

salvos. These flight profiles may saturate CSG air defense systems, increasing the probability that the weapons will reach their targets.57 For these reasons, military 

analysts have labeled these weapons as the true carrier 

killers.58

Map 2. Depiction of the First and 

Second Island Chain.59

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is 

also in the process of fielding two 5th Generation fighters, the J-20 and the J-31. While information on these 

aircraft is obviously limited, they are clearly born from 

the same DNA as the U.S. F-22 and F-35. Both aircraft 

will likely employ the PLAAF PL-12 and PL-13 air-toair missiles. These missiles are postulated to be capable 
45

of destroying aircraft in a heavy electronic attack environment at extended range.60 No doubt, the air supremacy the United States has taken for granted in previous 

conflicts, will be difficult, if not impossible to sustain 

in a war with China. Unescorted bombers will also be 

acutely vulnerable to this 5th Generation air threat.

Finally, China seeks to exploit U.S. dependence 

upon command, control, communication, computer, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 

systems. These systems are the lifeblood that will allow 

the United States to create the cross-domain synergy 

necessary to thrive in the A2/AD environment. China’s 

ASAT systems are capable of kinematic strikes against 

global positioning systems, surveillance, and communications satellites.61 In 2007, China demonstrated this 

capability, as it used an ASAT system to target one of 

its aging satellites in orbit.62

As the young analyst concluded, he excused himself and wandered down a darkened corridor at the 

base of the big board. I remained in my chair and silently reflected on the scene before me. This was a command and control facility, but command and control 

were illusions. The big board was a portal that allowed 

us to witness the events completely detached from the 

violence, yet we were nothing more than powerless bystanders. Our ability to influence the events had long 

since passed, and in that moment our mistakes were 

brutally clear to me. All the destabilizing forces in the 

region—piracy, human trafficking, terrorism, the threat 

of natural disasters, and the collapse of North Korea—

these were critical opportunities for collaboration. Addressing these issues clearly served the interests of both 

the United States and China, yet our continued parallel noncollaborative efforts and our persistent lack of 

transparency locked us onto a violent collision course.
46

Reflections.

1. Be realistic about military capabilities. A military conflict with China is a scenario that even the best 

equipped U.S. military will be challenged to handle.

2. Invest in the right kinds of future technologies. 

Our most coveted weapons systems may be acutely 

vulnerable to emerging threats in the region. Consider 

that our current weapons paradigms (stealth fighters 

and bombers, aircraft carriers, etc.) may be rendered 

obsolete.

3. Do not count on “on call” capabilities defeating 

every threat. The promises of Air-Sea Battle can only 

be realized if military forces have sufficient warning to 

coordinate and synergize effects.

4. Invest in relationships and trust. The path to 

peace in the Indo-Asia-Pacific is one of collaboration 

with China, leveraging our common interests to build 

fruitful relationships.

SIXTH DREAM

A Better Way.

The tension and volume in the voice of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) Director snapped me out of my 

uncomfortable slumber. He was in the face of his information technology (IT) contractor, pointing vigorously 

at the wall of big screens, demanding the latest in a 

series of “computer glitches” be resolved immediately. 

“The Admiral will be down here in 20 minutes for her 

update. We can’t very well update her if we don’t have 

the COP!” he said, referring to the common operational 

picture that remained the centerpiece of PACOM’s 

increasingly frequent Battle Updates to the PACOM 
47

Commander. Now occurring every 4 hours, I could see 

the so-called “battle rhythm” was increasing to a point 

that it was affecting the staff. The staffing cuts forced by 

sequestration and budget cuts less than a decade ago 

had yet to be overcome—”more with less.” The pace 

of the current multiple crises was already affecting the 

endurance of the PACOM headquarters staff. This was 

compounded by the “pull” from the operational level, 

which had resulted in about one-fifth of the staff being 

“farmed out” to the JTF staffs. A quick glance around 

the JOC confirmed my concerns: Drawn faces and 

sunken eyes stared back at me—or past me. And civilian staff members (GS civilians and contractors) nearly 

equaled the uniformed members of this, the staff of the 

largest regional combatant command in the U.S. military. Core responsibilities were, of course, covered by 

military officers, but it was a thin veneer between the 

military directors and division chiefs and the civilian/

contractor “worker bees.”

The buzzing from one of those “worker bees” was 

close by and familiar. It was the same analyst from my 

earlier dream. He was droning on and on with his analysis. I was amazed at (and a little bit intimidated by) the 

intellect of this young 20- something. A series of questions swirled in my head: How did he get his Ph.D. so 

young? How much should I rely upon his assessments? 

How does education and intellect compare to operational experience? Could he maneuver a “Ten-Oh” Bear 

Randy Rarick surf board on the North Shore? I shook 

my head to break out of this useless loop of rhetorical 

questions. “Hold that thought for a minute,” I said to 

the analyst. “I need some coffee.” I briefly stepped out 

to the small food court attached to the headquarters 

building and grabbed a quick dark roast. Returning to 

the JOC, I was met as I was coming through the door by 
48

a bright-eyed Air Force staff sergeant. “Sir, the Senior 

Enlisted Adviser has instituted a policy of no food or 

drink in the JOC. . . . I guess we’re too sloppy.” I flashed 

him my best “ornery O-6” glare, moving past him to my 

seat next to the JOC Director’s perch. The screens had 

miraculously returned to their normal state—a confusing mosaic of multi-colored icons depicting “friendly,” 

“enemy,” “partner,” and a multitude of other designations. “Okay, where were we?” I said to the analyst as 

I felt the first hit of hot caffeine, “Run it down from the 

beginning, again . . . if you don’t mind.”

China’s economic engine had faltered. Actually, 

it was failing. Unsustainable growth, domestic demographic and political factors, and external influences converged to create a deteriorating state that 

challenged the Chinese regime’s hold on legitimate 

power. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) had 

over-reached. Extending its economic appetite worldwide had satisfied immediate needs to continue to fuel 

the Chinese engine, but it had come at a cost. China 

had become embroiled in messy stability problems 

that impinged upon its activities and investments in 

Africa.63

As the United States had become less and less embroiled in the Middle East, China had been forced to 

become more involved in that region, attempting to 

ensure the necessary flow of oil demanded by the voracious Chinese machine. The consequences of China’s 

“One Child” policy had come home to roost. Chinese 

parents were none too happy as their only children 

came home in body bags from what were increasingly 

viewed as expeditions of choice versus conflicts of necessity. As Chinese economic power receded, its once 

formidable ability to pry acquiescence from weaker 

neighbors dropped precipitously. Money follows the 
49

path of least resistance, and that flow had been diverted 

as economies sought more stable markets. See Figures 

5 and 6.

Figure 5. China’s Worldwide Reach.64
50

Figure 6. China Is Getting Older Before 

It Gets Rich.65

Other consequences surfaced as well, of course. The 

massive Chinese population, more than half of which 

was now urbanized, created a commensurate demand 

for everything from energy to food. These urban masses presented an entirely new set of security issues for 

the PRC . . . issues the central government seemed illprepared to tackle.66 The seas off the shores of the PRC 

were more and more prone to friction and flashpoints 

over sources for fish as well as oil and gas. As economic 

security became more of an issue for the Chinese people, increases in illicit and illegal activities spiked. Proliferation of technologies and weapons occurred more 

often and were more visible, revealing troubling links 

to terrorist organizations throughout the region. Desperate for opportunities that were increasingly scarce 

in China, human trafficking dramatically increased, 
51

impacting the European and North American economies as well as those of Southeast Asia, as Chinese 

sought opportunities that alluded them at home.

With China focused on domestic stability, North 

Korea was further weakened. The PRC, patron to the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime, 

had been unable to sustain its historical levels of support to the rogue nation. The North Korean leader, ever 

suspicious of internal threats to his hold on power, 

had fallen back on a tried-and-true strategy: development through coercion. North Korean brinksmanship 

had increased along with bellicose statements against 

the South Koreans and the United States. Revealing 

the depth of North Korean despair, the frequency and 

degree of the regime’s famous provocations also increased. Although the development of North Korea’s 

ballistic missile program had slowed corresponding 

with the decrease in Chinese financial support, the regime had actually augmented its “test program,” firing 

almost a dozen missiles into neighboring seas and in 

the direction of Japan and the United States in the past 

12 months. Brinksmanship was no longer the effective 

tool it had once been. Unable to leverage bad behavior 

for financial, economic, and social support, the North 

Korean regime began to fracture and instability (and 

collapse) loomed.

North Korean proliferation networks, previously 

all but dormant, were reenergized and links had been 

discovered with at least two Southeast Asian terrorist groups. But the collapse of North Korea was most 

attributable to the dire food shortages exacerbated by 

last year’s severe winter and multiple hits by typhoons 

later. Crops were decimated, and famine reached into 

the higher levels of the North Korean regime and the 

military. Even elite units, charged with protecting the 
52

regime’s most privileged, were impacted—suffering 

resource deficits that lesser units had lived with for 

generations.

Source: frontpagemag.com.

Picture 12. Much of the North Korean Population

Suffers from Malnutrition.

Civil unrest, once unheard of, began sporadically. 

These uprisings were quickly followed by limited insurrections within the military. The response was immediate. Crushed by the regime, the population was 

left no choice, and the mass exodus via the Chinese 

border began. The regime was powerless to prevent 

the flight of an estimated 30 percent to 50 percent of 

its population, especially since the regime itself had 

begun to disintegrate. Factions emerged, challenging 

regime leaders and backed by military leaders turned 

warlords.
53

With North Korean refugees swarming their border, the Chinese were faced with yet another security 

challenge that they could ill-afford. Domestic stability was at an all-time low in the PRC, mostly due to 

the economic downturn and the effect on livelihoods 

at nearly every level—not to mention Central Government budgets. Strikes and social uprisings throughout 

the country became more common and impossible to 

conceal. The intractable security crises the PLA had 

engaged in abroad had soured the Chinese people on 

the use of force and diminished their confidence in its 

capabilities.

The grab for Taiwan was a gambit the new Chinese 

president was using to divert domestic attention, occupy a restless and perennially recalcitrant PLA, and provide an opportunity (should things go “well south”) for 

a run at disputed oil and gas rich territories in the South 

and East China Seas. But it wasn’t going as well as the 

PRC leadership had planned—or needed.

I had been Director of the PACOM Commander’s 

Action Group for just less than a year, being plucked 

from my rather comfortable office on the third deck. I 

had just become accustomed to my previous job as the 

Southeast Asia Policy Division Chief in the J5. It had 

been a bit painful (my first joint assignment) but I had 

eventually adjusted, thanks to an extremely competent 

crew of military and civilian country directors. I had 

been CAG Director long enough to recognize the look 

I got from the admiral over her reading glasses as she 

strode past me and to the head of the briefing table with 

her Foreign Policy Advisor (FPA) Ambassador Glazer 

right on her heels. I glanced at the JOC Director and 

said, “Giddy up, John. Let’s get this thing going.” I 

walked up behind the J3, the Marine two-star with his 

ever-present smile, who was just taking his seat: “Sir, 
54

her first question will be ‘Are we closing in on our desired state?’” He nodded briefly and went back to his 

green notebook.

The JOC Director had the update slides posted to 

the big screens and then indicated to the J2 that he could 

begin the briefing. “The Deuce” ran through the confusing COP picture that had been frozen for the briefing just moments ago. He summarized that, while they 

were able to push some forces ashore on Taiwan, the 

PLA effort appeared to have stalled. Despite their formidable A2/AD capabilities, the PLA had been unprepared for recent technology leaps the United States had 

developed that significantly reduced the effectiveness 

of Chinese efforts. Two U.S. CSGs stood on the edge of 

Chinese range, but close enough to allow U.S. capabilities to influence the advance of the PLA invasion force.

The flow of North Korean refugees had diminished 

somewhat, but the PLA was having a devil of a time 

contending with the massive influx of helpless humanity. Dozens of refugee camps had been established on 

both sides of the border. All were overwhelmed, and 

some swelled with hundreds of thousands of North 

Koreans.

Militarily, the North Koreans were still quite active—especially at missile sites and recently revealed 

bases heretofore undetected. These newly discovered 

bases were of particular concern to the PACOM Commander as we had yet to determine what exactly was 

going on—known unknowns. The North Korean regime appeared to be gasping its last breath of air just 

as the PRC made its move for Taiwan—both the DPRK 

and the PRC taking advantage of the strategic distraction the other nation provided.
55

The J3 moved forward in his chair and began his 

portion of the briefing. 

“Ma’am, I’d like to change things up a bit for this 

update. Ambassador Glazer and I have discussed the 

situation extensively and think we are approaching a 

point where, if trends can be reinforced, we will be 

able to begin the turn from Phase III to Phase IV of 

operations. That is to say, Admiral, that we believe 

our desired state may be in site.” Removing her reading glasses and looking up from the briefing notebook 

on the table in front of her, the PACOM Commander 

asked, “And remind me, what is our desired state?” 

Expecting the rhetorical question, the general replied: 

“As approved by the [National Security Council], our 

desired state is: The territorial integrity of democratic 

Taiwan is preserved, North Korean offensive capabilities are destroyed and the DPRK regime is removed, 

human suffering on the Korean peninsula is mitigated, 

conditions are set for a return to regional stability with 

the PRC assuming a primary, productive role.” Halfjokingly, the Commander said to her Deputy, “Not so 

long ago, the military would have tried to do this on its 

own.” Returning her attention to the update briefing, 

the J3 continued, aided by the well-timed comments of 

the FPA.

In the back of my mind, I heard the analyst’s voice 

from a recent “deep dive” on Sino-U.S. relations . . . :

The U.S. “One China Policy” is hardly monolithic. 

Its pillars are the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the 

Three Communiques, and the Six Assurances.67 Together, these three pillars confined how the United 

States could and would engage in its relationship with 

the rise of China. Chinese and American perspectives 

on the path relations have taken differ, of course. 

What has resulted, however, are well-worn “ruts” 
56

from which departure is difficult (if not impossible) to 

achieve. The arc of Sino-U.S. relations has gone from 

one of promised stability to one of increased tension. 

Suspicion and lack of transparency have cloaked the 

relationship with a sense of inevitable conflict. The 

Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (TRA) is both prescriptive and proscriptive. At once, it recognizes the People’s Republic as the sole legal government of China 

and requires U.S. support for the territorial integrity 

of democratic Taiwan.68

Ambassador Glazer’s professorial tone brought me 

back to the discussion at the briefing table . . . : 

Developing productive, stable relations with the 

PRC had been nearly impossible. Decades of mistrust 

and skepticism, anchored in Cold War thinking, had 

fostered an environment in which every problem was 

a security problem and the (predetermined) solution 

of choice involved the use of force. In late 2017, the 

new U.S. and Chinese presidents met on the margins 

of the East Asia Summit in Singapore.

What began as a pro forma, pre-scripted meeting 

changed dramatically when the two leaders excused 

their respective delegations. Retaining only personal 

translators, the Chinese and American leaders spent 

2 1/2 hours in a one-on-one discussion that yielded 

the Singapore Communique. Modest as the steps it 

enumerated were, the Singapore Communique represented a tectonic shift in Sino-U.S. relations. The 

two sides agreed to pursue enhanced engagements, 

setting aside for the moment the most vexing issues 

between the two powers (e.g., Taiwan). Initial steps 

included officer exchanges allowing PLA officers to 

attend U.S. Senior Service Colleges and U.S. officers 

to attend counterpart Chinese institutions. Diplomatically, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
57

(S&ED) was modified. It would move beyond its annual meeting in alternating capitals and now included 

more frequent meetings at various levels. These additional forums served to broaden and deepen the SinoU.S. conversation and, significantly, began to erode 

layers of distrust. Perhaps most significant, however, 

was the agreement to develop cooperative approaches 

to security issues of concern to both parties. Specifically, the American and Chinese leaders acknowledge 

the dire implications of the deteriorating security situation on the Korean peninsula. While U.S. and Chinese concerns did not match exactly, both presidents 

agreed that the trajectory was unacceptable and that 

cooperation would be required in order to avoid another military conflict on the peninsula.

The J3 interjected the fact that the convening of the 

“High Level Committee on Korean Stability” in the first 

place was remarkable. Even more, the fact that it had 

been kept behind closed doors and its deliberations 

and decisions largely secret would have been unfathomable just a few years ago. The General opined that 

the fact that we were not engaged with the PLA on the 

peninsula simultaneous with the current Taiwan engagement was directly attributable to the High Level 

Committee’s success.
58

Figure 7. North Korean Missile Threats Are a Global 

Problem, Not Just Regional.69

“Weren’t you and your PLA Committee counterpart classmates at Carlisle Barracks?” the Admiral 

interrupted. “Yes, ma’am,” the J3 responded. “Lieutenant General Liu and I were in different seminars, 

but we took two electives together— including Great 

Books. He was forever complaining there were no 

Chinese books on the reading list! That interaction 

was invaluable, ma’am. It framed my understanding 

of the relationship and, from an operational perspective, my friendship with Liu has not only established a 

communications link but has allowed me to see things 

from the Chinese perspective . . . to some degree.”70

“Please continue, gentlemen,” the Commander directed, realizing time was wasting. The J3 continued 

with a short discussion of the developing standoff in 

the East and South China Seas. Losses on both sides had 

been significant in the early stages, but both sides dem-
59

onstrated restraint as the situation evolved rapidly. The 

FPA and the J3 then described how we had successfully 

leveraged new and emerging partnerships with regional nations to create an environment that would not tolerate a Chinese hegemon. Vietnam and Malaysia, perhaps the most advanced of South China Sea claimants 

had tilted toward the United States as the PRC flexed 

its muscles and attempted to pick off the Association 

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant nations 

one by one. While neither had been willing to become 

treaty allies of the United States, tentative partnerships had grown strong, resulting in access agreements 

and increasingly frequent exercises—which meant increased interoperability. Indonesia, maintaining its beloved nonaligned status and its mantra of “a thousand 

friends and no enemies,” had nevertheless developed 

into a net security contributor. U.S. efforts to support 

the development of Indonesian disaster response and 

peacekeeping capabilities were now paying dividends. 

Indonesia had been named to lead the UN peacekeeping and transitional authority efforts in North Korea. 

Moreover, the Indonesian military was now heading 

the ASEAN Response Force managing refugee camps 

on the North Korean side of the PRC-DPRK border.
60

Graphic by economyincrisis.org.

Picture 13. The United States and China May be the 

Best Fit for Each Other . . . 

If They Would Only Act Like It.

Source: unrefugees.org.au.

Picture 14. UN Refugee Camps 

Are Only a Temporary Solution.
61

Careful to avoid entanglement in the current crisis, 

India had acknowledged its stake in the broader region 

and stepped forward to secure commercial shipping 

through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and on 

through the southern stretches of the SCS.

The J3 and the FPA, nearing the end of their update, 

were painting a complex picture that, although not yet 

certain, provided a view toward the so-called “desired 

state”:

• Taiwan—status quo ante

• North Korea—regime change and protracted 

international assistance/development efforts 

initiated

• Stable Asia-Pacific region—China a productive leader, fully integrated into an evolving 

international order that accommodates Chinese 

aspirations.

Ambassador Glazer reminded the PACOM Commander that none of this would have been possible 

without integrated regional decisionmaking facilitated 

by empowered interagency representatives at PACOM. 

Glazer noted his appointment in the PACOM headquarters as the first Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Coordination was a huge step 

forward for State/Department of Defense coordination 

and cooperation. The authority the FPA had been given 

by the PACOM Commander, directive authority equivalent to a Deputy Commander, had been instrumental 

in this success. It had resulted in common procedures 

and a truly integrated strategy across the region which 

had, in turn, facilitated what appeared to be a viable 

solution to multiple, converging security dilemmas.
62

Source: militaryimages.net.

Picture 15. The Indian Navy Is Among the Most 

Powerful and Professional in the World.

As the update briefing broke up, the analyst followed me into the headquarters’ expansive foyer. 

Stopping in front of the many displays that depicted 

the histories of the headquarter’s namesakes (Admiral 

Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur), I 

had said to the young Ph.D.: “About the time you were 

starting grad school, a series of controversial but crucial changes were being initiated. Those changes, in 

both policy and legislation, were necessary for us to 

be able to walk out of that briefing with some sense of 

accomplishment. We all knew the issues that were in 

our way. The funny thing about human beings is we 

rarely make obvious changes until we are forced to 

do so. And more often than not, we make the changes 

after the fact.” 
63

As I turned to step out the front door for my first 

breath of fresh Hawaiian air in 36 hours, I reviewed in 

my head how we had come to work together better, 

break down some of the opacity with our adversaries, 

and, in some cases, work with them. . . .

Reflections.

1. Facilitate (or force) interagency coordination 

and collaboration in both planning and execution. 

Interagency representatives at the combatant command headquarters must have a mandate (and authority) from their home agency. They also need the 

training, experience, and the full understanding of the 

commander’s plans and decision criteria.

2. Develop, at every level possible, linkages and 

personal interactions with allies, partners, and even potential adversaries. Address the “trust deficit” through 

increased transparency in formal/official interactions, 

professional military education venues, and informal 

opportunities.

3. Move beyond “unsolvable” problems and focus on more benign areas of common concern where 

trust and collaborative approaches can foster greater 

understanding and develop habits of productive interaction. These can yield great results when the tougher 

problems arise.

EPILOGUE

The Indo-Asia-Pacific region encompasses over half 

the world’s population and global trade,71 the majority of its current and future mega cities, seven of the 

world’s 10 largest armies,72 most of the world’s nuclear 

powers, three of the largest economies,73 and accounts 
64

for 80 percent of the world’s natural disasters.74 As the 

United States increases its strategic focus on this vital 

region, it would be all too easy to become fixated on 

the burgeoning competition between great powers and 

overlook or misunderstand the myriad, interconnected 

complexities that enrich the region and are the real force 

majeure. Simplistic or ill-fitting policy options may be 

equally enticing.

The fictional narratives or “dreams” outlined in the 

preceding sections seek to depict these interrelated dynamics in a palpable way and provide a comprehensive 

strategic document that is readable, instructive, and 

provocative. The series of six distinct dreams explore 

a progression of steadily escalating planning and contingency scenarios—from steady state security cooperation activities, to piracy, human security, terrorism, 

environmental disaster, and major combat. The narratives challenge the reader to consider several regional 

dynamics, reflect on a multitude of intended (and unintended) consequences of U.S. action, and share in the 

many strategic observations our protagonist makes 

during his hypothetical sleep-induced journey. The 

sixth and final dream weaves these themes and lessons 

together to comprehensively highlight the unique opportunities for “collective assurance” borne through 

enhanced collaboration and understanding. Most significantly, the closing dream challenges our traditional 

definition of strategic “success” and encourages the 

development of a “better way.” Building on the specific observations outlined by our protagonist along his 

journey, we offer the following synthesis of strategic 

insights for further consideration by policymakers and 

strategists.
65

Insight 1: Understand the Environment.

At its core, the PACOM AOR is a very complex 

geopolitical system with numerous internal and external dynamics and actors at play. The primary drivers 

of this system appear to be the ongoing strategic competition between the United States and China, and the 

perceived insecurity of other nations that may feel compelled to choose one over the other. The United States 

typically emerges as the desired partner for security 

interests, and China is the preferred choice when the 

stakes are financial. The dynamic interplay of these 

changing alliances and partnerships could be likened to 

a basic weighing scale, with the balance of power shifting by issue and interest. However, to view this environment as a zero sum game for influence between the 

great powers is a perilous and ill-fitting generalization. 

Policymakers require a comprehensive, systemic, and 

more accurate understanding of the PACOM AOR due 

to the sheer scope and scale of the region. The complexity of the region is further increased by the presence of 

multiple global and regional powers, and the multitude 

of small nation states whose UN voting power is disproportionate to their size. In this context, understanding the potential consequences of our actions (or inactions) is vital for effective steady state and contingency 

planning.

Insight 2: The Cost of Collaboration 

Is Lower than the Price of Failure.

Substantive interagency, international, and nongovernmental collaboration is essential throughout the 

entire policymaking and planning process. This is particularly true when seeking to understand and engage 
66

in a complex, adaptive environment like the PACOM 

AOR. While the costs and hurdles of securing cooperation may be challenging, the price of incomplete and 

erroneous understanding is far greater. This is particularly apparent in an environment like the PACOM 

AOR, where the military tool set—and, arguably, any 

government face—may be insufficient in dealing with 

and understanding the challenges at hand. Having the 

right expertise, credibility, and viewpoints in the room 

is essential to strategic success.

Insight 3: Expect Unintended Effects.

Simplistic solutions or strategies that may have 

worked in other areas are unlikely to work the same 

way if applied without careful consideration. Insufficient understanding of the differences in context is likely to lead to unintended effects. These may exacerbate 

and transform the original problem into something different or worse.

Strategists and policymakers need to systematically understand the problem, comprehensively plan, 

and contingency plan, and then execute with flexibility—cognizant that any action will result in a reaction that is not necessarily equal (in proportion) or 

opposite (as it may be asymmetric).

Insight 4: Smart Power is Smart Strategy.

Terrorists and criminal elements challenge the legitimacy and sovereignty of the current order through 

violent extremism and other destabilizing means. Since 

the advent of al-Qaeda, Islamist extremists have become increasingly transnational and, in many cases, indistinguishable from local and regional criminal orga-
67

nizations. As much as they reject it, they are a product 

of globalization and will continue to exploit the many 

benefits brought by these profitable synergies. It is almost certain that a diaspora from the Middle East conflicts will reignite jihadist fires in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, 

and they will be more sophisticated than ever.

In dealing with this burgeoning threat, it will be 

important to distinguish between terrorism and terrorists and employ “smart power.” Strategically, it is 

more important to counter terrorism and mitigate its 

root causes than to defeat individual terrorists. Policy and decisionmakers are quick to declare that “we 

never negotiate with terrorists.”75 A recent RAND 

study shows that, in fact, we do negotiate with terrorist leadership, and in most cases, we must—it is 

an important part of reducing the incidence (and the 

scale) of conflict—which is often achieved through a 

negotiated political solution.76 The rub is finding the 

right blend of offensive and defensive (but not necessarily military) actions, which weaken terrorism and 

draw the terrorists into nonviolent engagement within 

legitimate political processes.

 Smart power is the combined use of hard and soft 

power.77 Smart power is conceptually elegant, but admittedly difficult to achieve. It is also a key aspect of 

America’s Global Strategy.78 To defeat violent extremists and transnational criminal organizations, the intelligent application of smart power is required. Undermining such adversaries demands the employment of 

smart strategies which demonstrate strategic patience, 

build partner capacity, and defeat specific threats with 

agility and precision while supporting civilian governance, legitimate law enforcement, and national 

sovereignty. Deterrence must be matched with robust 

collective assurance. To achieve this, “civil-military 
68

cooperation” needs to replace “joint operations” as the 

bywords for teamwork.

Insight 5: It Pays to be Prepared.

The disaster in Dhaka is a glimpse of the scale of 

human adversity coming to the PACOM AOR. While 

the region currently experiences widespread disasters, 

the magnitude of human suffering will dramatically 

increase. In 2025, there are likely to be 23 megacities,79

with over 430 million Asian city dwellers at risk of 

coastal flooding and 350 million urban Asians at risk of 

inland flooding.80 The urbanization of the population 

and insufficient infrastructure in areas prone to devastating natural disasters, and the increasing impact of 

climate change are a recipe for humanitarian crises on 

an unprecedented scale. Eradicating the threat of disaster is not possible. A comprehensive strategy to mitigate and manage disasters as they occur is required. To 

have a better chance of achieving this, governments, 

international organizations, NGOs, and other partners 

must plan ahead collaboratively. Only by paying a prudent premium for preparedness (collaboration, coordination, training, infrastructure research, and design) up 

front, will the downstream costs of chaos, governance 

upheaval, counterproductive responses, and human 

tragedy be reduced.81

Insight 6: “Mistrust” Causes the 

Nightmare Scenario.

Full-scale Sino-U.S. conflict is the Pacific nightmare, 

ultimately borne of mistrust and misunderstanding 

between the two great powers. “Trust is important for 

international cooperative endeavors, but the neglect 
69

of distrust is not appropriate when national security 

or global peace are at stake.”82 In this context, “mistrust” describes a miscalculation in the trust/distrust 

balance. To avoid the Pacific nightmare, it is important to increasingly advance trust-related behavior 

between China and the United States. This includes 

consistent cooperation (working together on “smaller” 

issues makes it easier to collaborate on larger ones 

later), informal agreements, accepting influence, and 

transacting transparent business.

The Air-Sea Battle Concept is not intended to be 

viewed through the lens of a particular scenario or adversary, such as the defense of Taiwan against China.83

Rather, it is designed to “set the conditions at the operational level to sustain a stable, favorable conventional military balance throughout the Western Pacific 

region.”84 Yet, despite any rhetoric to the contrary, the 

United States is executing a significant strategic pivot 

to the PACOM AOR and is aggressively resourcing its 

military to counter capabilities that are primarily possessed or being pursued by China. Through the eyes 

of the Chinese, recent U.S. actions may be viewed as a 

revival of a Cold War strategy of containment, a perception that undermines our desire to foster a climate 

of stability and trust with China.85 To help offset the 

negative effects of this military concept (arms races and 

mistrust), our approach must be complemented and 

reinforced with a strategy of assurance and collaboration (partnerships on human security, building resilient 

livable cities, empowering people and economies, reinforcing people-to-people linkages, and the cooperative 

use of security forces).
70

Air-Sea Battle is also designed to “deter China from 

acts of aggression or coercion in that region and, if necessary, to respond effectively in the event deterrence 

fails.”86 While weapons systems such as aircraft carriers 

and stealth bombers are the backbone of our Naval and 

Air Forces, the United States must continually scrutinize strategies to reveal and overcome their vulnerabilities. A thinking and constantly evolving adversary may 

compel us to seek entirely different approaches, which 

may not include our most coveted weapons systems. 

We must be open to the possibility that the weapons, 

which define our strengths in one scenario, become our 

weaknesses in another.

CONCLUSION: A BETTER WAY—SECURITY 

THROUGH COLLECTIVE ASSURANCE AND 

UNDERSTANDING

Given the scale, complexity, and geographical attributes of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, the stakes of 

“getting it right” are unprecedentedly high. The strategic observations presented in the sixth and final dream 

suggest: (1) understanding the complexity of the PACOM AOR; (2) institutionalizing a culture of collaboration between agencies, organizations and nations; (3) 

planning for second order and unintended effects; (4) 

building meaningful trust; and (5) employing smart 

power and civil military cooperation. Considering 

and responding to these observations will best enable 

regional stability and equip Indo-Asia-Pacific nations 

to manage effectively emerging crises. Similarly, while 

sovereign power politics are undoubtedly a significant influence, human security is increasingly important and will become more so in the coming decades. 

The meaningful pursuit of smart power and collective 
71

assurance to address human security and mitigate human suffering is imperative. We also must take a hard 

look at whether current U.S. policies and strategies in 

the region will achieve their desired effects. Military 

concepts like Air-Sea Battle certainly have their value, 

but the consequences of such actions must be understood in the broader context. Deterrence, alone, is arguably counterproductive in this environment. For 

the majority of the world’s humanity who live in the 

PACOM AOR, success will likely be measured by the 

stability and prosperity obtained under legitimate civil 

governance, not military victory. True success will require a better way—regional security through collective assurance and understanding. See Picture 16.

Picture 16. Collective Assurance.

Fundamentally, there are four major systemic pressures that need to be stabilized. State competition seeks 

to reorder the system, violent extremists seek to over 

throw the system, illegal competitors seek to subvert
72

the system for pecuniary advantage, and, finally, natural forces have the potential to overwhelm the system. 

To manage these threats, security partners need to act 

collectively across a broad spectrum to provide collective assurance to the peoples, nations, and environment of the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

ENDNOTES 

1. Patrick Smith, “How Russia and China Out-Maneuvered 

Obama in Asia,” The Fiscal Times, November 17, 2014, available 

from www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/11/17/How-China-andRussia-Out-Maneuvered-Obama-Asia, accessed December 22, 2014.

2. Asad Ismi, “BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Challenge U.S. Global Dominance,” Global Research, 

Montreal, Canada: Centre for Research on Globalization, November 24, 2014, available from www.globalresearch.ca/brics-andthe-shanghai-cooperation-organization-sco-challenge-u-s-global-dominance/5415550, accessed December 2, 2014.

3. Dina Gusovsky, “Should America Worry about a ChinaRussia Axis?” October 22, 2014, available from www.cnbc.com/

id/102106704#, accessed November 15, 2014.

4. Ibid.

5. Ismi.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Graham Blackmore, “Fisheries’ Problems in the South China Seas,” Global Underwater Explorers, 2002, available from www.

globalunderwaterexplorers.org/fisheries-problems-south-china-sea, 

accessed November 11, 2014. 

9. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the average daily seafood consumption per person 
73

among the littoral states was almost double the global average. 

Further, three of the top five fishery commodity exporters also 

hail from the region, with China at U.S.$10.2 billion in 2009, 

Thailand at U.S.$6.2 billion, and Vietnam at U.S.$4.3 billion. See 

“The Fisheries-Food Security Nexus in the Indian Ocean and 

South China Sea: Impacts on Selected States and US Security Interests Out to 2020 and 2040,” Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council Report, November 12, 2012, available from www.

stimson.org/images/uploads/Fisheries_Food_Security_Nexus.pdf, 

accessed November 11, 2014. 

10. Stanley Weeks, “Piracy and Regional Security,” Combating 

Piracy and Ship Robbery: Charting the Future in the Asia Pacific Waters,

Tokyo, Japan: Okazaki Institute, 2001, p. 100. 

11. Philippe Leymarie, Philippe Rekacewicz, and Agnes Stienne, “UNOSAT Global Report on Maritime Piracy: A Geospatial 

Analysis 1995-2013,” United Nations Institute for Training and Research Online, 2014, available from www.unitar.org/unosat/piracy, 

accessed October 8, 2014. Note that piracy in the South China Sea 

accounts for over 50 percent of all piracy events across the globe. 

12. Based on the 2013 Global Slavery Index, human trafficking across the PACOM Area of Responsibility is 65 percent of 

the world total and it is the most lucrative region. See Profits and 

Poverty: The Economics of Forced Labour, Geneva, Switzerland: International Labour Office, p. 4. However, India and China make 

up the bulk of that percentage with an estimated 18 million slaves, 

the largest number of any area in the world. See “Slavery Index 2013,” Dalkeith, Western Australia: Walk Free Foundation, 

2013, p. 7. The South China Sea area represents approximately 4 

percent of the global total with an estimated 1.2 million slaves. 

Ibid., pp. 118-120. 

13. “Trafficking for Organ Trade,” Global Initiative to Fight 

Human Trafficking, New York: United Nations, October 13, 2010, 

available from www.ungift.org/knowledgehub/en/about/trafficking-fororgan-trade.html, accessed October 22, 2014. Various human traffickers include brothel keepers for sex slaves, business owners 

for forced labor, homeowners for enforced servitude, insurgents 

for child soldiers, would-be parents trafficking babies, and organ 

sellers on the medical black market. 
74

14. Human trafficking is caused by systemic underlying issues. See Robert B. Smith, “Why Human Development Varies by 

Region: Exploring Correlates and Causes,” Cambridge, MA: Social 

Structural Research Inc, August 2003, p. 1; Dr. Kevin Bales, “Testing a Theory of Modern Slavery,” Washington, DC: Free the Slaves, 

February 2006, p. 13, available from https://www.freetheslaves.net/

wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Testing-a-Theory-of-Modern-Slavery.pdf, 

accessed May 8, 2015; Alexis A. Aronowitz, Human Trafficking, Human Misery: the Global Trade in Human Beings, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2009, p. 61; Leslie Holmes, ed., Trafficking and Human Rights: European and Asia-Pacific Perspectives, Cheltenham, UK: 

Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010, p. 181; Krista Clement, “Stateless in Their Own Home,” VOICES UNSECO in the Asia-Pacific, 

No. 25, January-March 2011, available from www.unescobkk.org/

fileadmin/user_upload/culture/Trafficking/resource/Clement_VOICES_

Article.pdf, accessed May 8, 2015.

15. The Joint Interagency Center for Strategic Lessons Learned 

(JICSLL) does not currently exist. This has been identified by 

the authors as a necessary tool for the strategic decisionmaking 

community. 

16. To date, pirates across the globe have not been brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) for adjudication. The 

offenders are turned over to their home country for punishment. 

Incorporating the ICC as the judicial authority creates a harder, 

international stance on the problem. Since the United States is not 

a signatory to the ICC, turning over the pirates would become the 

responsibility of partners or affected countries. 

17. James B. Comey, Director, FBI, “There will come a terrorist 

diaspora out of places like Syria and Iraq,” Speeches: International 

Association of Chiefs of Police 121st Annual Conference, Orlando, FL: 

October 27, 2014, available from www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbiand-the-iacp-facing-challenges-together, accessed November 17, 2014. 

18. Bayu Setiono, “We planned to kill policemen and create 

a situation like Ambon and Poso, for the sake of upholding Islamic Sharia and the establishment of a caliphate in Indonesia,” 

Setiono, 22, admitted in a nationally televised video he made for 

the police after his arrest. “Our targets, since 2007 until now, are 

infidels and policemen.” See Martin Sieff, “Indonesia Focuses on 
75

Stopping Terror Threat,” Asia Pacific Defense Forum, USPACOM, 

September 12, 2012, apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2012/09/25/indonesia-terror-threat, accessed November 

18, 2014. 

19. The majority (99 percent of Indonesians) adhere to the 

Sunni Muslim tradition mainly of the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence. See Pew Research, “Sunni and Shia Muslims,” Religion & 

Public Life Project, January 27, 2011, available from www.pewforum.

org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-sunni-andshia/, accessed January 4, 2015. The tension between Sunni and 

Shia in Indonesia will certainly lead to more violence as majority Sunni religious leaders continue to call for jihad against the 

Shi’ites. See Robert Spencer, “Indonesia: Thousands at ‘Anti-Shia 

Alliance’ Event Call for Jihad against Shi’ites,” Jihad Watch, April 

20, 2014, available from www.jihadwatch.org/2014/04/indonesia-thousands-at-anti-shia-alliance-event-call-for-jihad-against-shiites, accessed 

January 4, 2015. 

20. Rendi A. Witular, “Sons, Top Aides Abandon Ba’asyir 

over ISIL, Form New Jihadist Group,” Jakarta Post, August 13, 

2014, available from www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/13/sonstop-aides-abandon-ba-asyir-over-isil-form-new-jihadist-group.html, accessed January 4, 2015. 

21. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid ( JAT) is a U.S. Department of 

State designated terrorist organization and a splinter cell of the 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The latter is most known for perpetrating 

the 2002 Bali bombings. In 2012, the group was thought to have 

approximately 1,500-2,000 members. The group remained very active in Indonesia in 2012, and it publicly maintained a website as 

of January 2013. 

22. Witular. 

23. “Me, Myself and ISIS: The Islamic State’s Extreme Narcissism,” The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2014, available from 

www.wsj.com/video/me-myself-and-isis-the-islamic-state-extreme-narcissism/A0FA5BA4-0006-4D77-96E1-6E516F706945.html, accessed 

November 17, 2014. 
76

24. “Terror Officials: ISIS, Al-Qaeda One-Upmanship of 

Concern,” NBC News, September 17, 2014, NBC News video 

file, available from www.nbcnews.com/watch/nbc-news/terrorofficials-isis-al-qaeda-one-upmanship-of-concern-330297923687, accessed December 16, 2014. 

25. James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Speeches: International Association of Chiefs of Police 121st Annual Conference, Orlando, FL: 

October 27, 2014. 

In ISIL, we see a confluence of those two trends. We see a 

group of savages with a safe haven . . . who are also exploiting the Internet in very slick ways to try to radicalize and inspire people to engage in acts of violence, especially directed 

against those in uniform.

Available from www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbi-and-the-iacp-facing-challenges-together, accessed November 17, 2014. 

26. JAT, and presumably JAS, have a cyber capability as 

reported in the Asia Pacific Defense Forum: 

Rizki Gunawan, a JAT activist skilled in information technology, and two of his agents had successfully raised billions 

of rupiah [Indonesia’s currency] by hacking into an online 

marketing web site. The group then channeled hundreds of 

millions of rupiah to the JAT’s terror training camp in Poso 

on the northwest coast of the island of Central Sulawesi. 

Sieff, “Indonesia Focuses on Stopping Terror Threat.” 

27. Aceh was a historically independent nation on the northern end of what is now Indonesia’s Sumatran Island. Since 1949, 

two insurgencies were fought for Acehnese independence and 

against Indonesia’s secular State; the first between 1951 and 1959 

and the second fought by the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from 

1976 to 2004. See Kirsten E. Schulze, “The Free Aceh Movement 

(GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization,” Policy Studies 2, 

Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2004, pp. 1-2. 

28. Aaron Y. Zelin, “When Jihadists Learn to Help,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2014, available from www.washingtonpost.com/
77

blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/07/when-jihadists-learn-how-to-help/, 

accessed November 17, 2014. 

29. JTF 510 was a standing Special Operations Task Force 

(SOTF) used in the PACOM AOR in the 1990s. It was inactivated 

in 2002, and elements from the Task Force formed the nucleus of 

Joint SOTF-Philippines. See “Joint Task Force 510,” Global Security.

org, available from www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jtf510.htm, accessed November 17, 2014. 

30. Turkish National Police, “Terrorism,” 2012, available 

from www.egm.gov.tr/EN/Pages/terrorism.aspx, accessed November 

18, 2014.

Turkey has had long standing experiences with counter-terrorism. Turkey had a security-oriented approach from 1970 to 

2000. In this approach, the fight against terrorism is the same as 

the fight against terrorists. Turkey also had a reactive and reflective approach: a terrorist-enemy approach and military-criminal 

measures in the fight against terrorism. Since 2000, Turkey has 

changed her counter-terrorism approach into a multisided organizational approach. In this approach, the fight against terrorism is discussed as a fight against both terrorism and terrorists, 

a democratic and judicial approach: A terrorist=criminal oriented 

approach and multisided organizational approach are the basics 

of the fight against terrorism.

31. This is a very real and very significant problem. Emergency 

response planners at Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) stated that, in 

all likelihood, the entire city would burn to the ground since nobody would be able to shut off the gas. Personal notes, March 24, 

2014, interview with DCC official. 

32. In the 2013 Rana Plaza disaster, the army stood ready to 

help but waited 9 days for authorization to do so. It is difficult to 

say how many people died in the time it took to recognize the need 

for a military response. As of 2014, many key posts in the city government, including public works, fire and police, are now held by 

Bangladeshi Army officers who are “deputized” to serve in these 

institutions for a few years and then return to the Army. 

33. Gary Cecchine et al., The US Military Response to the 2010 

Haiti Earthquake: Considerations for Army Leaders, Santa Monica, 
78

CA: RAND, 2013, available from www.rand.org/pubs/research_

reports/RR304.html, accessed November 18, 2014. 

34. The 2013 Pacific Resilience Disaster Response Exercise & 

Exchange (DREE) focused on just such a disaster. The joint training event consisted of table-top exercises, a review of plans and a 

4-day field exercise that pulled together over 450 participants and 

focused on command and control, search and rescue, engineering, and debris management. PACOM conducted an After Action 

Review where participants shared “what they thought went well 

and what can be improved in future exchanges.” PACOM did the 

same thing at the 2014 DREE, this time incorporating utility companies and more international governmental organizations (IGOs) 

and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the exercise. 

PACOM still used the same earthquake estimates as the previous 

year, 70,000 buildings, presumably to let the training units show 

improvement from the year before. In 2014, the exercise emphasized logistics and communications. 

35. “PACOM Disaster Response Lessons Learned and Trends 

1991-2013,” PACOM: Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, March 2014, available from 

www.coe-dmha.org/shared/ppt/PLN_20140314_Disaster_Management_LL_Trends_PRS_Hallett.pptx, accessed November 18, 2014. 

One important finding, lack of political-military integration, 

showed up in nearly every after action report since 2006. 

36. “CSA Strategic Studies Group Dhaka Field Study EXSUM,” 

Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Group, April 2014. 

37. Sadrul Ameen, “The Earthquake Scenario in Bangladesh,” 

report produced for Dhaka City Corporation, April 2003. 

38. “Bangladesh Capital Ill-Prepared for Earthquakes,” New 

Delhi, India: OneWorld South Asia, February 23, 2012, available 

from southasia.oneworld.net/news/bangladesh-not-prepared-for-earthquakes#.VGukcPnF9-4, accessed November 18, 2014. 

39. “Recent Earthquake near Dhaka, Bangladesh,” Earthquake 

Track, available from earthquaketrack.com/p/bangladesh/dhaka/recent, 

accessed December 16, 2014. 
79

40. Alexis Romero, “AFP Activates Multinational Coordination Center,” The Philippine Star, November 20, 2013, available 

from www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/11/20/1258740/afp-activatesmultinational-coordination-center, accessed January 20, 2015. 

41. CrisisMappers: The Humanitarian Technology Network, CrisisMappers, 2014, available from crisismappers.net/, accessed April 

10, 2014. 

42. Jack Kelly, “Beware Another Pearl Harbor: China May 

Start a War When Its Economy Falters,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 

January 20, 2013, available from www.post-gazette.com/opinion/

jack-kelly/2013/01/20/Beware-another-Pearl-Harbor-China-maystart-a-war-when-its-economy-falters/stories/201301200142, accessed 

October 22, 2014. 

43. Ibid.

44. Eugene Chow, “What Would a US-China War Look Like?” 

The Week, January 1, 2014, available from theweek.com/article/index/254400/what-would-a-us-china-war-look-like, accessed October 

22, 2014. 

45. John Gordon IV and John Matsumura, The Army’s Role in 

Overcoming Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges, Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, June 19, 2013, pp. 15-16. 

46. Edward Wong, “China Announces 12.2% Increase in 

Military Budget,” The New York Times, March 5, 2014, available 

from www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/asia/china-military-budget.

html?ref=edwardwong&_r=0, accessed March 12, 2014. 

47. “China’s Military Rise: The Dragon’s New Teeth,” The 

Economist, April 7, 2012, www.economist.com/node/21552193/print, 

accessed October 20, 2014. 

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid., p. 11.

50. Military Expenditure Database, 1988-2012, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available 

from milexdata.sipri.org/, accessed October 22, 2014. 
80

51. Ibid.

52. Robert Farley, “Should America Fear China’s Carrier Killer 

Missile?” The National Interest, September 22, 2014, available from 

nationalinterest.org/feature/should-america-fear-chinas-carrier-killermissile-11321, accessed January 4, 2015. 

53. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to 

Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2013. 

54. Gordon and Matsumura, p. 1. 

55. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress 

on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

2013, pp. 5-6. 

56. Dennis Gormley, Andrew Erickson, and Jingdong 

Yuan, “A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s 

Cruise Missile Ambitions,” Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2014, p. xvii. 

57. Ibid., p. xviii. 

58. Zackary Keck, “Cruise Missiles: China’s Real Carrier Killer,” The Diplomat, June 5, 2014, available from 

thediplomat.com/2014/06/cruise-missiles-chinas-real-carrier-killer/,

accessed October 22, 2014. 

59. Image of first and second island chains, available from 

www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/images/island-chainsimage1.gif, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plan-doctrineoffshore.htm, accessed October 22, 2014. 

60. “PLA Air to Air Missiles,” last modified January 27, 2014, 

available from www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AAM.html, accessed 

October 22, 2014. 

61. Brian Weeden, “Time for Obama to Go Public on China’s 

ASAT Program,” DefenseNews, June 2, 2013, available from www.
81

defensenews.com/article/20130602/DEFREG/306020009/Time-ObamaGo-Public-China-s-ASAT-Program, accessed October 22, 2014. 

62. Marc Kaufman and Dafna Linzer, “China Criticized for 

Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” The Washington Post, January 19, 

2007, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html, accessed October 22, 2014. 

63. China’s increasing economic presence overseas is likely 

to create future security dilemmas as the PRC attempts to protect 

those interests and investments. For more on the growing security 

dimension to China’s involvement in Africa, see China’s Growing 

Role in African Peace and Security, available from www.saferworld.

org.uk/resources/view-resource/500-chinas-growing-role-in-africanpeace-and-security, accessed January 5, 2015. 

64. China’s Worldwide Reach, Washington, DC: The Heritage 

Foundation, July 2013, available from www.heritage.org/~/media/

images/reports/2013/07/ib3990_map1_825.ashx, accessed January 

5, 2015. 

65. “China’s Population: The Most Surprising Demographic Crisis,” Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, available from Economist, www.economist.com/node/18651512, accessed 

January 5, 2015. 

66. “China’s Population: The Most Surprising Demographic Crisis,” Economist, available from www.economist.com/

node/18651512; as well as China’s Predicament: Getting Old Before 

Getting Rich, available from www.economist.com/node/13888069, 

accessed January 5, 2015. 

67. Full texts of the Three Communiqués and the Six Assurances are available from www.taiwandocuments.org/doc_com.htm, 

accessed January 5, 2015. 

68. Public Law 96-8: The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 96th U.S. 

Congress, Washington, DC, available from photos.state.gov/libraries/

ait-taiwan/171414/ait-pages/tra_e.pdf, accessed November 28, 2014. 

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is explicit in “the expectation that 

the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” Furthermore, the TRA requires the United States “to resist any resort 
82

to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan and “provide 

Taiwan with arms of a defensive character.” However, the TRA 

is not the only legislative or policy tool that impacts Sino-US relations. “The Three Communiqués refers to separate bilateral declarations made by three different U.S. presidents (Richard Nixon, 

Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan) and two Chinese premiers, 

Zhou and Deng. The communiqués effectively establish parameters for Sino-U.S. relations by defining each nation’s strategic vision—the Shanghai Communiqué; establishing formal diplomatic 

relations—the Normalization Communiqué; and declaring in the 

August 17 Communiqué, U.S. intent “to reduce gradually its sales 

of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to an ultimate 

resolution” contingent upon China undertaking peaceful reunification with Taiwan. The Six Assurances, on the other hand, were 

deliberate, specific declarations made by President Reagan to Taiwanese President Chiang intended to clarify the U.S. position: The 

United States had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales 

to Taiwan; the United States had not agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; the United States 

would not play any mediation role between Taiwan and Beijing; 

the United States had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations 

Act; the United States had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and the United States would not exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the Chinese. 

69. The DPRK Missile Ranges Graphic is available from 

i1.mirror.co.uk/incoming/article1812004.ece/alternates/s615/NORTHKOREA-map.jpg. 

70. U.S. policy currently prohibits any Chinese military officer 

from attending U.S. professional military education or training. 

71. “The Pacific Age,” The Economist, November 15, 2014, 

available from www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631795-under-american-leadership-pacific-has-become-engine-room-world-trade#, 

accessed December 12, 2014. 

72. Claudette Roulo, “PACOM Area of Responsibility Defined 

by Superlatives,” American Forces Press Service, Washington, DC: 

January 16, 2014, available from www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.

aspx?id=121499, accessed December 13, 2014. 
83

73. The three economies are those of the United States, China, 

and Japan.

74. Roulo. 

75. Peter R. Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” Foreign 

Affairs, December 2014, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62276/peter-r-neumann/negotiating-with-terrorists, accessed 

December 11, 2014. 

76. Colin Clarke and Christopher Paul, From Stalemate to Settlement: Lessons for Afghanistan from Historical Insurgencies that Have 

Been Resolved through Negotiation, Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 1. 

77. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft 

Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009 Issue, available from 

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65163/joseph-s-nye-jr/get-smart, accessed January 4, 2015. 

78. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

State, 2010, p. ii, available from www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/, accessed 

December 12, 2014. 

79. Asia and Africa are urbanizing faster than any other region, 

and are projected to be 64 percent urban by 2050. See World Urbanization Prospects 2014, New York: United Nations, 2014, p. 1, available from esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf, 

accessed December 12, 2014. By 2030, Asia will have 21 megacities (Tokyo, Delhi, Shanghai, Mumbai, Bombay, Beijing, Dhaka, 

Karachi, Kinki M.M.A., Osaka, Kolkata, Calcutta, Guangzhou, 

Chongqing, Manila, Bangalore, Chennai, Madras, Jakarta, Lahore, 

Hyderabad, Shenzhen, Krung Thep, Bangkok, Los Angles, and 

Chengdu) and two cities (Seoul and Nanjing) will be on the verge 

of megacity status. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 

Population Division, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM Ed., New York, United Nations, File 12: Population of Urban Agglomerations with 300,000 Inhabitants or More in 

2014, by Country, 1950-2030, thousands. 
84

80. An estimated 54 percent of the Asian and Pacific urban population lives in low-lying coastal zones. See UN-HABITAT, State of the World’s Cities 2008/2009: Harmonious Cities, 

HS/1031/08E, Nairobi, Kenya, and New York: United Nations, 

2008, p. 142, available from sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/

documents/11192562_alt-1.pdf, accessed December 12, 2014; Deborah Balk, Mark R. Montgomery, and Zhen Liu, “Urbanization and 

Climate Change Hazards in Asia,” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, September 22, 2012, p. 4, available from paa2013.princeton.

edu/papers/132194, accessed December 13, 2014. 

81. In seeking to do the right thing, international efforts are all 

too often counterproductive. They often have polarizing impacts 

through cultural insensitivity. They often overwhelm local capacities such as wharf space, airports, hospitals, and key real-estate, 

driving inflation and creating winners and losers among the local populous. This, in turn, increases illegal markets such as trafficking, prostitutes, and underpaid or slave laborers; undermines 

stability; and creates an incentive for some to extend the crisis so 

that they can continue to profit from it or agitate for constitutional 

change. 

82. D. Harrison McKnight and Norman L. Chervany, Trust and 

Distrust Definitions: One Bite at a Time, East Lansing, MI: Michigan 

State University, undated, p. 47, available from https://www.msu.

edu/~mcknig26/Trust%20and%20Distrust%20Definitions.pdf, accessed December 12, 2014. 

83. Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and 

Jim Thomas, “AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational 

Concept,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, 2010, p. xi. 

84. Ibid.

85. Robert A. Manning, “Beware the Great Clash in Asia: China vs. America is Getting Dangerous,” The National Interest, July 

30, 2014, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/beware-the-greatclash-asia-china-vs-america-getting-10977, accessed October 22, 2014. 

86. Tol et al. 
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