T.C. Memo. 1997-478

 

 UNITED STATES TAX COURT

SHERRY P. AUDE, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket Nos. 45011-85, 18375-86. Filed October 21, 1997.

Gordon B. Cutler, for petitioner.

Glorianne Gooding-Jones, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

WRIGHT, Judge: Respondent determined the following

deficiencies in and additions to petitioner’s Federal income

taxes:
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1 In April of 1988, petitioner and respondent entered into

two Stipulations of Agreed Issues providing that if petitioner

did not prevail in her innocent spouse claim, she would be

entitled to take advantage of the settlement offer extended to

petitioner’s former husband (Mr. Aude). 

Petitioner has conceded that she is not allowed the claimed

interest expense deductions of $1,725 in 1981 and $2,875 in 1982. 

Therefore, petitioner is liable for the portion of the 1981 and

1982 income tax understatements relating thereto. 

2 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code

in effect for the years in issue, unless otherwise indicated. 

All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure.

Additions to Tax 

Year Deficiency Sec. 6653(a)(1) Sec. 6653(a)(2) Sec. 6659 Sec. 6661

1980 $28,885 $1,444.25 --- --- ---

1981 37,414 1,870.70 1 $11,224.20 

1982 57,560 2,878.00 2 $5,756.00

1 50% of the interest due on $37,414

2 50% of the interest due on $57,560

After concessions,1 the issue for decision is whether

petitioner qualifies for innocent spouse relief under section2

6013(e), for taxable years 1980, 1981, and 1982. We hold that

she qualifies for innocent spouse relief. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. 

The stipulation of facts and attached exhibits are incorporated

herein. Petitioner resided in Northridge, California, when the

petition was filed.

Background

During the years at issue, petitioner was married to Peter

F. Aude (Mr. Aude). Petitioner and Mr. Aude were divorced in
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3 In 1980 and 1981, petitioner had a part-time job selling

books for World Book--Childcraft International, Inc. However,

petitioner only earned $37.68 in 1980 and $144.17 in 1981 from

this part-time job. 

September of 1983. The Audes filed joint Federal income tax

returns for each taxable year at issue. 

Petitioner was born on August 10, 1951. In 1969, she

graduated from high school with approximately a 2.0 grade point

average. After graduating from high school, petitioner worked

primarily as a receptionist in the Los Angeles area. 

In August of 1969, petitioner married for the first time. 

She had a son, Michael, in January of 1972. Petitioner divorced

in 1973; however, in August of 1974, petitioner and her first

husband had a second child, who was later given up for adoption. 

In 1975, petitioner worked as a receptionist for the

Landsberg Company (Landsberg). There, she met Mr. Aude, who

worked as a salesperson for Landsberg. At the time, Mr. Aude was

divorced with two children from a prior marriage. In February

1976, petitioner and Mr. Aude, who was then 33 years old, were

married. Petitioner and Mr. Aude had two sons: Peter, born in

December 1978, and Erik, born in April 1980.

During her marriage to Mr. Aude, petitioner worked as a

housewife and mother.3 She had the role of taking care of five

children: Michael, Peter, Erik, and Mr. Aude’s two sons from his

prior marriage (who lived part of the time with petitioner and

Mr. Aude).
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During the years at issue, petitioner did not buy any

jewelry or expensive clothes. She drove a 1980 station wagon. 

During this period, the Audes took one vacation to Hawaii in

December of 1982. Until their divorce, petitioner and Mr. Aude

lived in the same house, which they purchased in 1976. They had

built an addition to that house in 1978-79.

Throughout their marriage, petitioner and Mr. Aude

maintained a joint bank account. Initially, Mr. Aude handled all

the finances. In 1978, Mr. Aude gave petitioner a monthly

allowance of $3,000 to pay the household bills. This monthly

allowance was used to pay Mr. Aude's alimony and child support to

his ex-wife, household bills, food, and medical expenditures. 

While the allowances at times decreased during the years at

issue, they never increased. Using her monthly allowance,

petitioner wrote checks out of the joint bank account, and

recorded the checks in her register; however, the Audes

maintained separate check registers. Petitioner never saw the

checks Mr. Aude wrote or his check register. Petitioner never

examined the bank statements because it was Mr. Aude's job to

review the bank statements.

Petitioner was uninvolved in the business affairs of Mr.

Aude. Occasionally, petitioner would accompany Mr. Aude to

business meetings, but after introductions she would stay in the

lobby or in the car during the actual meeting. She was unaware

of Mr. Aude's salary and his investment income. If petitioner
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4 To Mr. Gruys, an inappropriate investment meant that they

might lose their capital investment.

5 Mr. Aude paid the purchase price through installments: 

$23,000 in July 1980; $23,000 in March 1981; $23,000 in March

1982; and $17,250 in March 1983.

questioned Mr. Aude about the financial affairs, Mr. Aude would

respond that it was his money, and therefore it was not her

concern.

Magnum Oil and Gas

In late 1979 or early 1980, Mr. Aude met with Mr. Saranni, a

sales representative, to discuss a potential investment in Magnum

Oil and Gas (Magnum), a limited partnership. Magnum was

organized to acquire and develop oil and gas properties. While

the record is unclear regarding this meeting, infra, we determine

at a minimum that this meeting was attended by Mr. Aude, Mr.

Saranni, petitioner, and Mr. Gruys, the Audes' certified public

accountant and attorney. After the meeting, Mr. Gruys discussed

the investment with Mr. Aude and petitioner. In this discussion,

Mr. Gruys did not tell the Audes that it was a sham investment,

nor did he advise the Audes of the audit risk. He recommended

that the Audes not purchase an interest in Magnum because it was

"an inappropriate investment."4

In July 1980, Mr. Aude purchased 2.3 units in Magnum for

$86,250.5 Only Mr. Aude executed the investment papers and he

alone made the required capital contribution payments. At a

later date, petitioner discovered that Mr. Aude invested in
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Magnum, but Mr. Aude did not disclose the tax shelter nature of

the investment to petitioner. She never saw the investment

papers concerning Magnum, and she was unaware of Mr. Aude's

capital contribution in Magnum.

1980, 1981, 1982 Joint Income Tax Returns

For the years at issue, Mr. Gruys prepared the Audes'

Federal income tax returns. He only occasionally talked with

petitioner, generally around the tax preparation time. Instead,

he generally saw Mr. Aude. Petitioner's main involvement in

completing the returns was to compile a list of household

expenditures for Mr. Gruys. She would accompany her husband to

deliver the list to Mr. Gruys. After preparation, Mr. Aude would

present the returns, folded to the signature page, for

petitioner's signature. At these times, both Mr. Aude and Mr. 

Gruys had already signed the return. Prior to signing the

returns, petitioner did not review them. 

In regard to the Magnum investment, Mr. Gruys never reviewed

any papers regarding the investment. In preparation of the tax

returns for the years at issue, Mr. Gruys relied on the Schedules

K-1 prepared by Magnum. In advising the Audes, Mr. Gruys did

speak with Mr. Aude in passing regarding the validity of the

deductions for the investment, but he did not talk with

petitioner about the deduction. 

The joint returns for 1980, 1981, and 1982, as originally

filed, reflect income, Magnum deductions, adjusted gross income,
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6 Respondent disallowed the following Magnum deductions: 

$90,626 in 1980; $105,103 in 1981; and $114,731 in 1982. 

itemized deductions, and taxable income as follows:

Year Income Magnum Adjusted Itemized Taxable

from Wages, Deduction Gross Income Deductions Income

Interest

1980 $137,219 $ 99,015 $38,204 $44,311 (6,107)

1981 145,168 105,103 40,065 44,962 (11,897)

1982 124,958 114,731 10,227 39,553 (36,326)

Respondent disallowed in part the Magnum loss deductions,6

medical and dental expenses, and interest expense deductions. 

The understatement for the years at issue was primarily created

by the disallowance of the Magnum loss deduction.

The Audes' Marriage and Divorce

Petitioner and Mr. Aude had a rocky marriage, filled with

arguments, separations, reconciliations, and professional

therapy. Prior to and during the years at issue, Mr. Aude

physically abused petitioner. The abuse resulted in petitioner's

sustaining cracked ribs, bruised lungs, and concussions, which at

times required medical treatment and hospitalization. As a

result of the abuse, petitioner called the police several times,

and also obtained a restraining order against Mr. Aude. A

pattern of violence developed in their marriage, especially when

petitioner questioned Mr. Aude's decisions or behavior. As a

result of this pattern of abuse, petitioner avoided questioning

Mr. Aude on any issue.
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In December 1979, petitioner, prompted by Mr. Aude's

physical abuse, filed for a divorce. The action was later

dismissed in early 1983. During this period, petitioner and Mr.

Aude were sometimes separated, and they attended counseling for a

period of time. 

In March 1983, petitioner filed a second divorce action. 

As with the first divorce action, this action was based on Mr.

Aude's physical abuse. The divorce was granted in September of

1983. Pursuant to the divorce proceedings, petitioner received

the following distribution of community assets: personal effects,

the family home, household furniture, a 1980 station wagon, and

an interest in Mr. Aude's profit sharing fund. Tax refunds were

not apportioned to petitioner. In the divorce settlement, Mr.

Aude received the Magnum investment.

Mr. Aude was ordered to pay alimony to petitioner for 6

years. The amount of alimony ranged from $3,000 per month in

1983 to $2,000 per month in 1986. Following the divorce,

petitioner was granted custody of Peter and Erik. Due to an

accident in 1989, Erik sustained severe injuries, which require

substantial medical care and attention. This has prevented

petitioner from working. Currently, petitioner has full custody

of Erik, while Mr. Aude has full custody of Peter. Mr. Aude was

also ordered to pay child support, which ranged from $1,000 per

month in 1983 to $1,500 per month in 1986 to $2,650 per month in

1989 to $1,600 per month currently. At times, Mr. Aude was in
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arrears in the alimony and child support payments.

Events Subsequent to the Audes' Divorce 

After the marriage ended, petitioner learned information

regarding the financial affairs for the years at issue. She

discovered that Mr. Aude had written checks to supermarkets,

which were hundreds of dollars over the actual purchase price. 

She also learned the financial worth of the household during the

years at issue.

In 1988, petitioner sold the family home, which she received

in the divorce, and used the proceeds to purchase a home in

Palmdale, California (Palmdale home). The Palmdale house was

later refinanced to pay Erik's medical bills. Currently, the

Palmdale home is held as a rental property, but the rental income

derived from the property does not cover the mortgage on the

property. After withdrawing funds for attorney fees for the

divorce and for medical expenses for Erik, petitioner rolled over

the balance of the profit-sharing fund into an individual

retirement account. 

After her divorce from Mr. Aude, petitioner worked part-time 

for a university. She attended college on a part-time basis from

1983 through 1985, but she had to quit when Mr. Aude became

delinquent in his alimony payments. In 1990, petitioner enrolled

in a junior college to study computers. Petitioner remarried in

1990. At the time of trial, petitioner and her current husband

were unemployed. 
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7 The current “innocent spouse” provisions were enacted as

part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (the Act), Pub. L. 98-

369, 98 Stat. 494, 801. Sec. 424(c) of the Act rendered the

amendments to sec. 6013(e) applicable to all taxable years to

Currently, Mr. Aude is financially stable. Through a

bankruptcy proceeding, he has been discharged of his obligation

on his tax liability.

OPINION

As a general rule, a husband and wife who file joint tax

returns are jointly and severally liable for Federal income tax

due on their combined incomes. Sec. 6013(d)(3); Guth v.

Commissioner, 897 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1990), affg. T.C. Memo.

1987-522; Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959, 961 n.3 (9th Cir.

1989), revg. an Oral Opinion of this Court. However, section

6013(e)(3) mitigates this general rule to some extent. Guth v.

Commissioner, supra at 442-443; Price v. Commissioner, supra at

961.

For petitioner to qualify as an innocent spouse, she must

establish: (1) That a joint return was filed for each year in

issue; (2) that there were substantial understatements of tax

attributable to grossly erroneous items of the other spouse on

the return; (3) that, in signing the returns, she did not know or

have reason to know of the substantial understatements; and (4)

that taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it

would be inequitable to hold her liable for the deficiencies and

additions to tax. Sec. 6013(e)(1)(A) through (D)7; Guth v.
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which the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applies. Therefore, sec.

6013(e), as so amended, governs the tax years at issue in the

instant proceeding.

Commissioner, supra at 443; Price v. Commissioner, supra at 961-

962. Petitioner has the burden of proving each element of

section 6013(e) by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 142(a);

Price v. Commissioner, supra at 962; Bokum v. Commissioner, 94

T.C. 126, 138 (1990), affd. 992 F.2d 1132 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Since the elements are conjunctive, the failure to prove any one

of the elements will preclude petitioner from relief. Stevens v.

Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1988-63.

Respondent and petitioner stipulated that joint returns were

filed for the years in issue and that the returns contain

substantial understatements of tax attributable to grossly 

erroneous items of Mr. Aude. Therefore, the controversy, arising

from the erroneous deduction of the Magnum loss, focuses on the

third and fourth requirements: (1) Whether the petitioner, in

signing the return, knew or had reason to know of the substantial

understatement and (2) whether it would be inequitable to hold

petitioner liable for the deficiency.

Section 6013(e)(1)(C) Knowledge or Reason To Know

Section 6013(e)(1)(C) requires that the petitioner establish

"that in signing the return he or she did not know, and had no

reason to know, that there was such substantial understatement". 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's test for knowledge

in erroneous deduction cases is applicable to this case. Golsen

v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th

Cir. 1971). Under this test, mere knowledge of the transaction

will not cause denial of relief; rather, the test is whether

petitioner had knowledge that the deduction would give rise to a

substantial understatement. Price v. Commissioner, supra at 963.

Respondent contends that the evidence clearly shows that

petitioner had actual knowledge of the underlying facts of the

investment. Respondent primarily relies on petitioner's

participation in the late 1979 or early 1980 meeting where the

Magnum investment was discussed. 

While the meeting regarding the Magnum investment occurred,

the record provides conflicting evidence concerning who attended

this meeting. Mr. Gruys clearly stated that he and petitioner

attended the meeting along with Mr. Aude and Mr. Saranni. 

However, petitioner's recollection is that Mr. Gruys did not

attend the meeting; that she met with Mr. Saranni briefly; and

that she sat in the lobby of the hotel while the meeting between

Mr. Saranni and Mr. Aude occurred in another room. In light of

petitioner's burden, we cannot find that petitioner did not

attend the meeting.

While petitioner had knowledge of the underlying transaction

by attending the meeting, knowledge of the transaction alone will

not cause denial of relief to petitioner, unless petitioner knew
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that the deductions attributable to Mr. Aude's investment in the

transaction would give rise to a substantial understatement. Id.

In regard to the meeting, Mr. Gruys could not recall the

specifics of the tax discussion, such as whether tax writeoff

ratios were discussed or not. At this time, while explaining the

investment, Mr. Saranni did not say that the investment was a

sham, and Mr. Saranni did not say that the claimed losses would

be disallowed if the returns were audited. Furthermore, Mr.

Gruys did not tell the Audes that it was a sham investment, nor

did he advise the Audes of the audit risk. He merely recommended

that the Audes not purchase an interest in Magnum because it was

"an inappropriate investment." 

An examination of the record reveals that Mr. Aude alone

executed the investment papers, and he made the required capital

contribution payments. Petitioner never saw the investment

papers, and was unaware of the amount of money that Mr. Aude

invested in Magnum. Further, Mr. Aude did not tell her that the

investment would save taxes or that it was a tax shelter. 

Further, petitioner's lack of knowledge regarding the

transaction is corroborated by Mr. Gruys' responses. Mr. Gruys

only occasionally talked with petitioner; instead, he generally

saw only Mr. Aude. Never reviewing any papers regarding the

investment, Mr. Gruys relied on the Schedules K-1 prepared by

Magnum in his preparation of the Audes' returns. In advising the

Audes, Mr. Gruys did not speak to petitioner regarding the
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8 Respondent contends that it is obvious that petitioner

"had previously asked questions concerning the Magnum investment,

that she knew a substantial number of facts pertaining to the

investment, and that she possessed both the ability and the

opportunity to have asked more questions of those knowledgeable

about the shelter, namely the Magnum salesman as well as her own

CPA, Mr. Gruys." In making this assertion, respondent relies on

petitioner's following response: "It was after being educated by

Mr. Cutler [petitioner's attorney], that we should have been

advised that this was not a good investment, that I was angry

that I had been such a fool, and not asked more questions." 

While respondent asserts that petitioner obviously knew of the

investment, we do not find that this statement shows that

petitioner had the ability or opportunity to ask about the

investment. The response indicates that petitioner did not know

the nature of the investment until years after the tax years at

issue; thus, the statement by petitioner does not obviously lead

to respondent's conclusion.

validity of the deductions for the investment, but Mr. Gruys did

talk to Mr. Aude, in passing, about this. 

Considering the evidence and finding petitioner to be a

credible witness, we find that petitioner was uninformed about

the nature of the Magnum investment.8 We find that petitioner

did not have actual knowledge that the deductions attributable to

the Magnum investment would result in the substantial

understatements of tax on petitioner's income tax returns for the

years at issue.

Section 6013(e)(1)(C) also requires that the petitioner

establish that she did not have reason to know that there was

such substantial understatement. Whether an alleged innocent

spouse had reason to know of a substantial understatement is a

question of fact that must be determined based upon the entire

record. Guth v. Commissioner, 897 F.2d at 442; Terzian v.
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Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164, 1170-1172 (1979). A taxpayer has

reason to know of a substantial understatement of tax if a

reasonably prudent taxpayer under the circumstances of the spouse

at the time of signing the return could be expected to know that

the tax liability stated was erroneous or that further

investigation was warranted. Stevens v. Commissioner, supra at

1505. We must place the reasonably prudent person in the

particular circumstances of the taxpayer. Pietromonaco v.

Commissioner, 3 F.3d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1993), revg. T.C. Memo.

1991-472. "[T]he more a spouse knows about a transaction,

ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that she will know or have

reason to know that the deduction arising from that transaction

may not be valid." Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d at 963, n.9. 

When deciding whether an alleged innocent spouse had reason

to know of a substantial understatement in both omission and

deduction cases, the following factors are considered: (a) The

spouse's level of education; (b) the spouse's involvement in the

family's business and financial affairs; (c) the presence of

expenditures that appear lavish or unusual when compared to the

family's past levels of income, standard of living, and spending

patterns; and (d) the culpable spouse's evasiveness and deceit

concerning the couple's finances. Price v. Commissioner, supra

at 965; see also Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505

(11th Cir. 1989). In making our determination, we must consider

the interplay or balance of the factors, instead of merely
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counting the factors in a spouse's favor. Guth v. Commissioner,

supra at 444.

We first consider petitioner's level of education. At the

time petitioner signed the returns, her highest level of

education was a high school diploma, which she earned with a 2.0

grade point average. She did not have any education or work

experience in tax, financial or accounting matters. Respondent

contends that petitioner "possesses considerable common sense and

life experience", but we find nothing in the record regarding her

education and experiences that would or should have alerted her

to the pitfalls of this situation.

We next consider petitioner's involvement in her family's

financial and business affairs. Mr. Aude dominated the financial

side of the marriage with petitioner playing a minor role in the

family's finances. While petitioner was introduced to Mr. Aude's

business contacts, she did not attend the meetings (except for

the initial Magnum meeting). She was not informed of the

specifics of Mr. Aude's investments. If petitioner questioned

Mr. Aude about the financial affairs, Mr. Aude would respond that

it was his money, and therefore it was not her concern.

Petitioner's only job with regard to the family's finances

was to pay the household bills from the monthly allowance. She

wrote checks out of a joint account and recorded the checks in

her own check register. However, petitioner never saw the checks

Mr. Aude wrote or his check register. Additionally, petitioner
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never examined the bank statements because it was Mr. Aude's job

to review the bank statements.

Petitioner played a minimal role in the tax preparation of

her and Mr. Aude's returns. While petitioner prepared a summary

of the household expenditures for Mr. Gruys, she was generally

not present when Mr. Aude furnished his information to Mr. Gruys. 

Mr. Gruys primarily talked with Mr. Aude, and only occasionally

talked with petitioner, usually when petitioner submitted her

list of expenditures. 

The third factor we consider is the presence of lavish or

unusual expenditures by the family. Examining the record, there

were no major differences in the Audes' standard of living

before, during, or after the period in which these deductions

were claimed. First, petitioner received a monthly allowance,

which was used to care for five children and the other household

expenses. While the allowances at times decreased during the

years at issue, they never increased. Petitioner did not buy any

jewelry or expensive clothes during this period, and she drove a

1980 station wagon. During the 3 years at issue, the Audes only

took one vacation in December of 1982. Further, during the years

at issue, petitioner and Mr. Aude lived in the same house, which

they purchased in 1978. They had built an addition to that house

in 1978-79. Taken together, these expenditures do not amount to

unusual, lavish, or extravagant expenditures. 

The fourth factor is whether Mr. Aude was evasive or
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deceitful about the couple's finances. Under case law, this

factor is to be viewed in a broader context by looking at the

totality of the circumstances. As such, this factor can include

a taxpayer's refusal to be forthright about the couple's income

or a taxpayer's refusal to discuss investments. Sanders v.

United States, 509 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1975).

Besides the monthly allowance, Mr. Aude dominated all

aspects of the financial situation. There is no evidence that

Mr. Aude was deceitful regarding the finances. However, if

petitioner asked Mr. Aude any question regarding their finances,

Mr. Aude would say it was his money and thus not her concern. It

was only after the marriage ended that petitioner learned more

details regarding the financial affairs for the years at issue,

including the financial worth of the household. By keeping

petitioner uninformed about "his money," Mr. Aude was not open

about the couple's finances. His refusal to discuss the family

finances and investment impeded petitioner's "reason to know"

about the understatement.

Considering all of the circumstances concerning these

returns, we conclude that a reasonably prudent person under

petitioner's circumstances--living a modest life, uninvolved in

the financial affairs of the family, and without any financial

background -- at the time of signing could not be expected to

know that Mr. Aude's deductions would give rise to an

understatement of tax.
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Respondent asserts that a cursory review of the return would

have alerted petitioner to the erroneous loss deduction.

Respondent alleges that a casual glance by petitioner would have

revealed that the deductions substantially reduced gross income

to arrive at adjusted gross income. In addition, respondent

relies on the fact that petitioner knew the amount of her monthly

household expenditures, so that petitioner should have been aware

that "they were living tax free" in light of the differential

between those expenditures and the negative taxable income

reported on their returns for the years at issue. In light of

these factors, respondent contends that petitioner had a reason

to investigate. 

Even if a spouse has no "reason to know" of the substantial

understatement, the spouse may know facts that put her "on

notice" of the understatement. Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d

at 965; Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d at 1505. With a duty

to inquire, the spouse seeking relief cannot turn a blind eye to

facts within his or her reach that would have put a reasonably

prudent taxpayer on notice to inquire further. McCoy v.

Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732, 734 (1972). Petitioner would not

qualify for section 6013(e) relief merely because she relied on

others, such as her husband or a tax preparer, to complete the

return properly. Hayman v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d

Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-228; Park v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1993-252, affd. 25 F.3d 1289 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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In order for a spouse's duty of inquiry to arise, she must

first harbor doubts about the accuracy of the return. Stevens v.

Commissioner, supra at 1507. A spouse may be put on notice of

the understatement if a reasonably prudent person "in her

position would be led to question the legitimacy of the

deduction." Price v. Commissioner, supra at 965. One relevant

factor looks at the extent to which family expenditures, about

which the spouse had knowledge, exceed reported income. Hammond

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-22, affd. 938 F.2d 185 (8th Cir.

1991). Other factors include a spouse's specific and detailed

knowledge of the transaction giving rise to the deduction and the

spouse's involvement in the family's financial affairs. Shea v.

Commissioner, 780 F.2d 561, 567 (6th Cir. 1986), affg. in part,

revg. in part, and remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1984-310. 

Physical or mental abuse may be a factor in considering innocent

spouse relief. Kistner v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th

Cir. 1994), revg. and remanding T.C. Memo. 1991-463; Makalintal

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-9.

"Tax returns setting forth large deduction, such as tax

shelter losses offsetting income from other sources and

substantially reducing or eliminating the couple's tax liability,

generally put a taxpayer on notice that there may be an

understatement of tax liability." Hayman v. Commissioner, supra

at 1262. The Audes claimed the following loss deductions arising

from Magnum: $99,015 in 1980; $105,103 in 1981, and $114,731 in
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1982. If petitioner had made a examination of the returns, she

would have noticed the deductions, but we need to determine

whether a reasonably prudent taxpayer in petitioner's position

would have inquired further.

In the instant case, besides writing checks for the

household expense, she was uninvolved in the family's finances. 

She was unaware of Mr. Aude's salary during the years at issue. 

When petitioner signed the returns, she was aware of the

existence of the Magnum transaction, but she never saw the

investment papers or knew the amount of Mr. Aude's capital

contributions in Magnum. Further, she was unaware of its tax

shelter nature. There were also no unexplained lavish or unusual

expenditures around this time which should have aroused

petitioner's curiosity. In sum, there were no facts present

which would have caused petitioner to harbor doubts about the

accuracy of the returns. 

In signing the returns, petitioner neither reviewed the

returns nor questioned Mr. Gruys or Mr. Aude regarding the

returns. While petitioner's duty cannot be relieved based solely

on petitioner's reliance on her preparer, it is a factor to be

considered in light of the other circumstances. See Hayman v.

Commissioner, supra at 1262. In the preparation of the tax

returns, petitioner would submit her information regarding the

household expenses to Mr. Gruys, but she was not present when Mr.

Aude furnished his information to Mr. Gruys. Further, Mr. Gruys
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rarely talked with petitioner. Instead he primarily discussed

matters with Mr. Aude. Relying on Mr. Gruys as the professional

preparer, petitioner signed the returns without questioning the

return, in light of the fact that Mr. Gruys had already signed

the return. Under the circumstances, petitioner was entitled to

rely upon the legitimacy that Mr. Gruys lent to the joint

returns. 

Complete deference to the husband's judgment concerning the

couple's business affairs alone is not enough to grant innocent

spouse relief. Stevens v. Commissioner, supra at 1505-1506. 

"Nevertheless, where physical or mental abuse is shown, even when

the abuse does not rise to the level of coercion, a basis may

exist for allowing innocent spouse relief." Kistner v.

Commissioner, supra at 1526 (treating the taxpayer's professed

fear of physical violence as one of the factors to determine if

she could be expected to know of the deduction or whether further

inquiry was necessary). 

Stipulating that joint returns were filed for the years at

issue, petitioner raises the argument that Mr. Aude's physical

abuse of petitioner is a factor to be considered when determining

petitioner's duty to inquire. See Wiksell v. Commissioner, 90

F.3d 1459, 1462 (9th Cir. 1996), revg. on other grounds T.C.

Memo. 1994-99.

In Wiksell, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

rejected the taxpayer's argument that tragedy and duress clouded
- 23 -

9 In Wiksell v. Commissioner, 90 F.3d 1459, 1463 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1996), revg. T.C. Memo. 1994-99, the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit noted the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Kistner

v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d 1521 (11th Cir. 1994), revg. and

remanding T.C. Memo. 1994-463, that spousal abuse could reach a

point so as to provide an adequate explanation for deference to

offending spouse. However, under the facts, the Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayer could not hide from

the overwhelming evidence and that any abuse did not provide an

explanation. Id. 

her perception. In reaching this decision, the court noted that

the taxpayer had asked her husband "why there was no income on

the returns reflecting the money that * * * [they] had been

living off". Id. at 1462. She stated that he gave her a bizarre

explanation that did not make sense to her. Id. at 1462-1463. 

Prior to signing the return, the taxpayer had learned of a

restraining order preventing her husband from soliciting

investments, and she read an article that purportedly explained

the sham her husband was involved in. Id. at 1461. At the very

least, the court stated that the taxpayer "knew something was

awry, but refused to go further." Id. at 1463. In light of

extremely small sums of income reported, the evidence of

excessive spending, and the large sums of money on hand, the

court held the evidence of an understatement was overwhelming and

the taxpayer could not hide from it. Id. In light of this

overwhelming evidence, any abuse did not provide an adequate

explanation for her behavior. Id. at 1463 n.2 (citing Kistner v.

Commissioner, 18 F.3d at 15269. 

Petitioner's situation is distinguishable from the
- 24 -

taxpayer's situation in Wiksell. We find that petitioner did not

have reason to know about the understatement. Petitioner did not

have substantial cash on hand, did not report small sums, and did

not have unusual expenditures for the years at issue. In our

case, the evidence does not show that petitioner knew or had

reason to know that something was awry on the joint returns. As

a result, we find that the physical abuse by Mr. Aude is one of

the factors for us to consider in explaining her deference to Mr.

Aude. See Makalintal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-9.

In Estate of Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-297,

spousal abuse was considered as a factor. In that case,

taxpayer's husband repeatedly physically abused his wife. Id.

When he needed taxpayer's signature on a document, he would

merely present the document and did not give her an opportunity

to read it. Id. Taxpayer "always complied with his demands, for

fear that she would be beaten if she refused." Id. In that

case, the following was emphasized: That taxpayer's husband was

primarily responsible for the operations of the business; that he

told his wife almost nothing about the company's affairs; and

furthermore that she was forced to sign documents in fear that

she would be beaten if she did not comply with her husband's

demands. Id. Brown concluded that the taxpayer did not know or

have reason to know of the income omitted from the joint returns. 

Id. 

While petitioner was not coerced or physically threatened
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into signing the returns, she was intimidated by Mr. Aude because

she feared being physically abused if she refused. Petitioner

testified that she didn't have "any right" to question Mr. Aude,

and if she did, she feared she "would be physically attacked." 

From this, she learned that she had to skirt issues with Mr.

Aude, or face his wrath. Petitioner testified that if she "had

not felt intimidated by [Mr. Aude], [she] might have had the

option of going through" the returns. We find this to be a

factor explaining why petitioner did not review or inquire about

the returns. 

Considering all of the circumstances, we conclude that

petitioner did not know facts that put her "on notice" of the

understatement. We find that a reasonably prudent person under

petitioner's circumstances, at the time of signing the returns,

could not be expected to know that Mr. Aude's deductions would

give rise to a substantial understatement of tax or that further

investigation was warranted. Petitioner has satisfied the

section 6013(e)(1)(C) requirement. 

Section 6013(e)(1)(D) Equitable Considerations 

The final question is whether, taking into account the facts

and circumstances, it would be inequitable to hold petitioner

liable for deficiencies attributable to the substantial

understatements. Sec. 6013(e)(1)(D); see sec. 1.6013-5(b),

Income Tax Regs. Relevant factors include significant benefits

received as a result of the understatement of the spouse claiming
- 26 -

relief, any participation in the wrongdoing on the part of the

innocent spouse, and the effect of a subsequent divorce or

separation. See S. Rept. 91-1537 (1970), 1971-1 C.B. 606, 607-

608. 

While the text of section 6013(e) no longer requires us to

determine whether a spouse significantly benefited from the

erroneous item, this factor is still considered to determine

whether it is inequitable to hold a spouse liable. Belk v.

Commissioner, 93 T.C. 434, 440 (1989); Purcell v. Commissioner,

86 T.C. 228, 241-242 (1986), affd. 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987). 

In making this determination, normal support, measured by the

circumstances of the parties, is not a significant benefit. 

Estate of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 678 (1989); Terzian

v. Commissioner, T.C. at 1172; see sec. 1.6013-5(b), Income Tax

Regs. Unusual support and receipt of property, however, would

constitute a significant benefit. Terzian v. Commissioner, supra

at 1172; see sec. 1.6013-5(b), Income Tax Regs. During the years

at issue, petitioner received a $3,000 monthly allowance to take

care of the household expenses, which included taking care of

five children. This amount did not increase during this time,

but at times, it decreased. This normal support for household

expenditures is not considered to be a significant benefit. 

Also, during the same period of time, petitioner's standard of

living did not increase in comparison to her standard of living

in prior years. She lived in the same house since 1978. 
- 27 -

Petitioner and Mr. Aude only went on one vacation during the 3

years at issue. Their lifestyle was not lavish. We find that

these expenditures amounted to normal support and did not rise to

the level of unusual support.

Respondent relies on the fact that even though petitioner

did not control the family wealth, she benefited by having

additional funds available to help support her and her children

and also benefited in the divorce settlement. In the divorce

decree, tax refunds were not apportioned to petitioner, and Mr.

Aude acquired the Magnum investment. Petitioner received her

share of the marital assets, which included the family home,

household furniture, personal effects, a station wagon, and an

interest in Mr. Aude's retirement account. Also, while Mr. Aude

was ordered to pay alimony to petitioner, Mr. Aude was at times

in arrears. The amount of alimony, which ranged from $3,000 per

month in 1983 to $2,000 per month in 1986, was not extraordinary

in terms of her standard of living during the Audes' marriage. 

Also, the increase in child support, which ranged from $1,000 per

month in 1983 to $1,500 per month in 1986 to $2,650 per month in

1989 to $1,600 per month currently, was due in part to Erik's

medical costs. We do not find that petitioner significantly

benefited from the tax savings attributable to the losses claimed

from the Magnum investment.

In assessing the equity in holding a spouse liable under

section 6013(e), we also consider the probable future hardships
- 28 -

that would be imposed on the spouse seeking the relief if such

relief were denied. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d at 171

n.16; Peterson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-18; Edmondson v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-393; Petitioner offered evidence of

future probable hardship if relief were denied. Since the

divorce, petitioner's standard of living has decreased. A major

factor to petitioner's hardship is the financial drain of medical

costs, which arose from Erik's accident. After selling the

family home in 1988 and reinvesting in the Palmdale home, she had

to refinance the home to pay Erik's medical bills. Currently,

while the Palmdale home is held as a rental property, the rental

income derived from the property does not cover the mortgage on

the property. The profit-sharing fund was rolled over into an

individual retirement account for the benefit of petitioner;

however, this was after withdrawing funds for attorney's fees for

the divorce and for medical expenses for Erik.

Since the divorce in 1983, petitioner has worked part-time. 

She attended college on a part-time basis from 1983 through 1985,

but had to quit when Mr. Aude did not pay alimony to petitioner. 

In 1990, petitioner enrolled in a junior college to study

computers. Presently, petitioner and her current husband are

unemployed. 

Currently, Mr. Aude is financially stable, but through a

bankruptcy proceeding he has been discharged of his obligation on

his tax liability. If relief were not afforded to petitioner,
- 29 -

she would bear the entire burden of the tax liabilities resulting

from the understatement attributable to the Magnum deductions.

Considering that petitioner did not receive significant

benefit from the understatements and the future probable hardship

that would be imposed if relief were denied, we find that it

would be inequitable to hold petitioner liable for the resulting

deficiencies. Therefore, petitioner has satisfied section

6013(e)(1)(D). In summary, we find that petitioner has

established (1) that she did not know and did not have reason to

know that there was a substantial understatement relating to the

Magnum deductions and (2) that it is inequitable to hold her

liable for the resulting deficiencies. Taking into account the

parties' stipulations, supra, we, therefore, hold that petitioner

has met all of the requirements of section 6013(e), and she is

entitled to relief as an innocent spouse for any income tax

liability attributable to the understatements for the years in

issue arising from the Magnum investment.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decisions will be entered

under Rule 155.