STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: POST-SOVIET STATES

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

March 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-116-4

ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq will signal the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alter strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq. In each, the author

has been asked to analyze four issues: the position that key

states in their region are taking on U.S. military action

against Iraq; the role of America in the region after the war

with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the region

after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with Iraq

will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic Studies

Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet

world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, and

taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and at the

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the editor of

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in Asia,

coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author of The

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of

Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many articles

and conference papers on Russian, the Commonwealth of

Independent States, and Eastern European security issues.

Dr. Blank’s current research deals with weapons

proliferation and the revolution in military affairs, and

energy and security in Eurasia. His most recent SSI

publications include “The Foundations of Russian Strategic

Power and Capabilities,” in Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing

the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from

Russia, edited by Henry D. Sokolski and Thomas Riisager,

April 2002, and The Transatlantic Security Agenda: A

Conference Report and Analysis, December 2001. Dr. Blank

holds a B.A. in History from the University of Pennsylvania,

and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of

Chicago.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: POST-SOVIET STATES

An American-led war with Iraq will affect the international state system profoundly, particularly the

potentially volatile set of regions that comprise the Former

Soviet Union (FSU). Because the war with Iraq is not

directly related to prevailing security conditions in the FSU,

we can make the following predictions with reasonable

certainty. Some, if not all, currently existing strategic

factors in the FSU will continue, whether or not the United

States goes to war with Iraq, and whether or not the war is

short or long, conventional or one that witnesses the use of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other forms of

unconventional warfare. They also will require the

continuing presence of U.S. forces at the level of their

current deployments there. While the trigger for more

violence in the FSU is not directly connected to Iraq or the

Gulf, the possibility of serious military repercussions does

exist, but they would have to be triggered initially from

outside and then evoke a major reaction within the FSU.

1

Conclusions:

A short war with rapid decisive victory minimizes future

risks connected with Iraq to our force stationed in the

former Soviet Union. However, it does not eliminate

existing threats or allow for reduction in force unless we

prosecute the war in Afghanistan much more intensively

and accelerate the rebuilding of that state.

No feasible scenario allows for immediate reduction of

troops in the Transcaucasus or Central Asia, but many

conceivable scenarios of a war gone wrong in Iraq could

lead to the need to send more forces into these theaters.
The strategic trends that make for volatility within the

FSU are located in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus

where both the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) already have forces

deployed and important U.S. interests are at stake. The war

against Iraq, no matter what its course may be, will not

terminate the war against global terrorism that emanates

at least in part from Central Asia and which has at least

some presence in or around Georgia beyond Tbilisi’s ability

to face that threat. Indeed, the recent discovery of ricin in

Georgia underscores the potential for very serious threats

in this part of the world.1

Neither will the course and outcome of the war with Iraq

immediately resolve the domestic “security deficits” in the

FSU that raise the possibility for violence attendant upon a

war with Iraq. Therefore the war against Iraq will not and

cannot directly enhance the security of either Georgia or

Azerbaijan or allow the United States to remove forces from

those states. The same conclusions apply as well for U.S.

Central Asian deployments. On the other hand, if things go

badly for the United States in Iraq or the war significantly

confounds U.S. plans, the situation could deteriorate quite

visibly and rapidly in the FSU. American forces there may

be called upon to play a role in the war against Iraq should

unforeseen contingencies ensue. While arguably the United

States cannot reduce forces in those theaters, if anything,

and depending on the course and outcome of the war with

Iraq, the United States may have to put in more. This

assessment stems from the following facts:

The war against global terrorism is by no means over,

nor is any end in sight.

Afghanistan is nowhere close to a level of stability and

security from revived warlordism and terrorist

penetration (perhaps abetted by rogue elements in

Pakistan) that can allow the United States to

withdraw forces from there. And without stability in

2
Afghanistan, Central Asia comes under immediate

and direct risk.

The “non-terrorist” or indigenous threats to the

security of states in the former Soviet Union will not

have been lessened by the course of war in Iraq. If

anything, a long war or one featuring either WMD or

other forms of unconventional warfare could lead to

more threats against American and allied forces in

those areas. The reasons behind this argument are

given below.

Those regional and adjacent sources of potential violence

in the FSU comprise the following phenomena whose

presence has little or nothing to do with Iraq and even

Al-Qa’ida, but which could be exploited by them or others to

attack U.S. forces, assets, allies, and interests. Those

phenomena are both structural and the result of deliberate

policies by local governments that interact with those

structural characteristics. They comprise:

Insecure borders and thus ethnic and territorial

conflicts;

Great and grinding poverty alongside of spiraling

wealth for a few, and massive official corruption;

Very high degrees of environmental degradation

leading to rivalries over water and energy;

Ethnic and/or religious tensions that are manipulated

easily by the local authoritarian governments;

Repressive authoritarian regimes;

Weak militaries and weak civilian democratic

controls over the means of violence—a factor that

entails weak states, weak governments, and can

easily spawn paramilitary, insurgent, or terrorist

formations;

3
Enormous state corruption and deeply-rooted

transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) whose

main source of profits is the drug trade, but who also

are involved in WMD smuggling across borders. In

addition, many signs, including recent ones, indicate

that the Chechens or other terrorists linked to

Al-Qa’ida are searching for WMD.2

Some analysts and commentators believe there are

links between many of these groups to states and

various insurgent and terrorist formations, in

particular but not only to Pakistan’s ISI (InterService Institution) are well-known.

The willingness of foreign regimes to subvert local

governments, wage or threaten economic warfare

against them, launch coups, incite terrorism, or

actually threaten or use force against them, and to

threaten the use of force due to rivalries for energy

assets that can become pretexts for violence (e.g., Iran

and Azerbaijan in 2001). Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and

China have engaged in one or more of these behaviors

in the past decade and could do so again.

The belief in Moscow that the United States should

only stay in Central Asia for the duration of

Afghanistan operation. Moreover, China and Iran

have frequently publicly voiced opposition to the U.S.

position in Central Asia and are clearly cooperating

with each other.3

A prolonged war in Iraq plus protracted presence in

Central Asia could lead to a revival of the strong ties

between and/or among Russia, China, and Iran that would

be based on the common aim of forcing the United States out

of the area. Admittedly this is something of a worst case

scenario, but Iran alone or any of the other two could, with

the passive support of the others, undertake such actions.

4
One way to do so would be support, both overt and covert, for

attacks upon U.S. Central Asian positions.

These external rivalries in the Commonwealth of

Independent States (CIS) and around Central Asia are so

intense in some cases that they have spawned classical

alliances for war, e.g., the new Indo-Iranian alliance that

gives India “the right to use Iranian military bases in the

event of a war with neighboring Pakistan, in exchange for

India providing Tehran with military hardware, training,

maintenance, and modernization support.”4 Thus the

possibility of outbreak of conflicts in and around Central

Asia is real and not necessarily tied to conditions in Iraq.

But a war with Iraq could be exploited by third parties to

attack U.S. interests, allies, and assets in the FSU. Indeed,

U.S. naval forces are in Azerbaijan and ground forces in

Georgia precisely to ward off threats from Iran against

Azeri oil and coastal assets, from Russia and/or Chechen

terrorists against Georgia, and to help train and modernize

those states’ armies and navies and to guard Azerbaijan’s

coastal assets.

Possibilities also exist for more cooperative military

relations with other actors who might be willing under

certain circumstances to upgrade their contribution to a

cooperative security regime in these places. NATO and the

European Union have shown a rising interest in the

Caucasus and to a lesser degree Central Asia, especially as

expressed at the November 2002 Prague summit. Those

regions are no longer “out of area,” and both NATO and

Central Asian states seek deeper and broader contacts

among their armed forces.5 Russia has already accepted the

potential benefit of this presence and raised the possibility

for cooperation with NATO in Central Asia.6

On the other hand, Russia’s military is resisting this

cooperation. Complications in Iraq would fortify this

resistance and increase the voice of the obstructionists

within Russian policymaking. Similarly China, alarmed at

NATO’s rising profile in Central Asia, has initiated regular

5
consultations with the Alliance.7 While the possibility for

future conflicts in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus

remains reasonably high, there also are real grounds for

working towards a more cooperative multilateral security

regime in these areas.

Nonetheless, the positive trends are embryonic. If

subjected to strain, they may fall apart. Putin and the

Russian military are striving to create a CIS military

modeled after the Warsaw Pact.8 Such an organization

might liaise with NATO but would preclude effective

bilateral cooperation with the armed forces of member

states. Meanwhile existing rivalries continue and, as in the

Indo-Iranian deal, may be growing. So the United States

cannot assume either a conflict-free environment there or

that the great powers will happily cooperate with each other

in these zones.

Exchanges and exercises involving U.S. troops to help

train local forces to defend against invasion from outside or

from domestic insurgencies are two of the most effective

ways of cementing partnerships.9 It is vital to continue this.

U.S. forces involved in this effort must include a significant

Army presence to train and advise, as well as to help secure

American installations. But a vital issue is the extent to

which U.S. forces will directly or indirectly help protect

friendly regimes. The new Russian deployment at the air

base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, is widely suspected of having a

mission of defense of the government against domestic

unrest, i.e., counterinsurgency or something close to it.10

U.S. allies in Central Asia undoubtedly expect a similar or

analogous response or at least training of their own forces

whose first mission is defense of the regime.

If the war with Iraq drags on or WMD are used, Saddam

Hussein or those sympathetic to him may attempt to open a

second and even third front, much as the terrorists did by

striking at Kashmir in late 2001 to relieve the pressure on

Al-Qa’ida. Except for Chechnya, the regions of the former

Soviet Union have not evinced the rabid anti-Americanism

6
seen elsewhere, but groups inclined this way do exist and

are connected either to Al-Qa’ida or state sponsors—

Chechens to Saudi Arabia, and Hizbollah and other groups

to Iran. Rogue elements within Pakistan probably can

provide significant assistance to them as well. Under such

circumstances, American forces stationed in the FSU could

become targets. Attacks could include terrorism and

guerrilla operations that might threaten the logistical bases

and communications of U.S. and allied forces. Terrorists

and other enemies will believe that an America embroiled in

protracted war in Iraq is weak elsewhere and vulnerable to

attack. This would be true particularly if the conflict with

Iraq leaves the United States diplomatically isolated.

Escalating terrorism against the United States could deter

the FSU states from preserving their partnerships with

Washington. Even in lieu of this, the United States might

have to inject more troops into the theater to counter the

terrorist challenge.

Economic Considerations.

However the war goes, it will have a significant and

discernible impact on the global economy. First, the advent

of war, whether prolonged or rapid, means rising U.S.

Government deficits. Those will force an increase in both

the interest rate here and abroad as well as in domestic

taxes. It will further slow worldwide growth while forcing

global interest rates up and crowding other governments

out of the capital market. Those former Soviet states

without energy resources will be affected adversely by those

trends in the short and middle term. But a prolonged war

means even more distress for them since it will bring about

international energy shortages, heightened fears of even

more shortages, greatly increased prices for energy,

possible boycotts of the United States by the Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) or some of its

members, and thus a chain of events that will worsen

domestic conditions and possibly provoke instability in

their countries.

7
Oil producers may, on the other hand, enjoy a windfall

from a long war. Nevertheless, it should be remembered

that, despite being major producers of oil and gas, many of

these states can neither produce nor distribute enough to

meet their own needs and are thus importers who must

compete in the world markets. Kazakstan may be an

exception but not by much. Since they must buy oil and gas

on the markets, their foreign revenues and economies will

not escape the expected impact of this war. Further

economic distress, especially if it is protracted and severe

and part of a larger progression of political and socioeconomic breakdown or anomie, often generates a causal

chain with discernible political outcomes that point toward

enhanced instability or at least the potential for it.

Therefore, a very short or short war followed by rapid

reconstruction of Iraqi energy infrastructures is the only or

most beneficial outcome for these countries from the

standpoint of global economics. Otherwise the economic,

strategic, and political outcomes of the war could easily

interact with their domestic conditions to generate a spiral

of political unrest and possibly violence against the United

States or friendly regimes. Any scenario other than this also

means much greater middle and long-term chances for

unrest and even violence. That violence could threaten U.S.

forces abroad and force the United States to defend what

have become important, and possibly in some places vital,

interests by finding reinforcements who can perform

stabilization and/or counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist missions in the FSU.

Even if the war with Iraq leads to a rapid, decisive

victory, many officials and insiders hold that the United

States will still need to maintain at least the present

number of forces in the former Soviet Union. However,

should events deviate significantly from that scenario, the

United States may have to add to the existing troop levels in

the FSU.

8
Russia.

The United States has no troops inside Russia or the

western former Soviet republics like Belarus, Ukraine, and

Moldova, and no plans exist for deploying forces to those

states. Still, different courses and outcomes of a war against

Iraq could substantially affect Russia’s calculus to support

or withhold support from other FSU nations and thus oblige

the United States to redeploy forces.

Specifically, if the war appears to threaten important or

vital Russian interests, Moscow might consider providing

intelligence support or other forms of assistance to

America’s enemies. The United States would then

encounter even more adamant political and diplomatic

resistance to any unilateral action it might take. Moscow’s

continuing (and, in its own mind, principled) support for the

United Nations (U.N.), which is designed to restrict

American use of force, would increase. Moscow would then

use its membership in the Security Council to support

hostile forces and obstruct the unhampered use of American

power. If that worked, Moscow might modulate its

opposition and refrain from supporting enemies of the

United States.

Assessing Moscow’s likely response to a U.S. war with

Iraq requires an understanding of Russian national

interests. These include:

Accessing the Iraqi energy market, and recovering

debts.

Developing and sustaining a balanced partnership

with the United States. For Russia, this partnership

entails regular joint consultation, compromises that

meet both sides’ interests, and a balanced relationship, not a surrender of Moscow’s standpoint to Washington’s.11

9
Constraining the use of force by the United States and

NATO, preferably via the U.N.12

Restoring influence in the Middle East. As the

enjoyment of such a role in the Soviet era also entailed

a large volume of arms sales, and proliferation to Iran

is continuing and may be resumed with Syria, this

possibility should not be overlooked in U.S. calculations.

Protecting the partnership with Iran. Moscow and

surely some in Tehran might fear that a successful

and especially a fast campaign against Iraq could

embolden Washington to start putting political

pressure on Iran. The United States also could apply

much more pressure on Russia to abandon Iran,

which it considers, not without reservations (mainly

about Tehran’s ambitions in the Caspian Sea), an ally.

Russia’s economic interests point in many directions at

the same time. First, as virtually all official pronouncements state, the purpose of foreign policy is to create

conditions that are auspicious for the reconstruction of

Russia’s economy.13 Moreover, the oil and gas sector is

crucial, providing almost 40 percent of Russia’s hardcurrency earnings and most of the foreign trade surplus.

This makes members of the energy lobby, who do not have

uniform interests all the time, the most powerful and

important lobby in Russian politics, domestic or foreign.

Regarding Iraq, Moscow certainly wants to recover the $7

billion owed to it by Baghdad and claims to have lost $30

billion there since 1990. But equally importantly, its oil

firms see the potential to earn billions more in revenues if

they can work in unhampered fashion in Iraq.14

Russian observers fully understand that, despite the

lucrative profits Russian firms have made by circumventing

the U.N. embargos, if Iraq remains under Saddam

Hussein’s control, this debt is probably unrecoverable.

Moreover, a Russia that is too close to him will not enjoy

10
much popularity with a successor regime preoccupied with

rebuilding Iraq and beholden to the United States. So

unless Moscow can dance at two weddings at the same time

and convince Iraq and Saddam’s rivals that it is defending

their interests, recovery of this debt (much of it owed to

energy companies) is a hopeless quest. At the same time,

Moscow and its oilmen are exquisitely sensitive to the

possibilities offered them by the American market.

In the event of a short, victorious war, the United States

will have leverage over reconstruction of the Iraqi energy

industry and thus hold a major card in determining global

output and price levels. Moreover, reconstruction of the

Iraqi system would then be a less costly and more rapid

affair. The United States and the new Iraqi regime could

then bring more oil online quickly, pushing down global

petroleum prices. This would increase U.S. leverage over

Russia which could, in turn, be used to prevent Moscow from

balancing or constraining American actions. The United

States also could use market access and investment so that

Russian energy receipts are not affected adversely (and

along with them the entire economy of Russia). The United

States would also then be able to encourage and regulate the

degree to which Russian oil firms participate in Iraq’s

reconstruction and perhaps devise creative ways for

Moscow to recover the Iraqi debts.

As it is, the United States has encouraged Russian firms

to support the Iraqi dissidents, painting this as a way to

recover debts and enjoy good relations with America.15 This

temporarily cost them access in Saddam’s Iraq.16 In a short,

victorious, and purely conventional war where the political

heat upon America is minimal, those industries would lobby

for support for America in order to get in on postwar

reconstruction contracts, recovery of debts, new markets to

the West (including the United States), and investment in

their infrastructure.

However, a long war, especially one that generates

intense hostility in Europe, Russia, and in Islamic

11
communities, will affect the economics of the situation. It

will raise the costs of reconstructing Iraq afterwards,

thereby delaying its return to the market, create probable

shortages or sharp price rises, and create immense domestic

pressures upon the government in Moscow to oppose

Washington regardless of the energy lobby’s interests. The

anti-American elites would be strengthened.

Although it does not always acquiesce to American

policy and Washington’s demands, Russia has served as

America’s strategic partner since September 11. This has

led to expanded American military access to the FSU and

Afghanistan, with Moscow’s support, intelligence sharing,

and a diminution of opposition to NATO’s expansion and to

withdrawal from the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty.

This policy is known to be highly unpopular among military

and foreign policy elites. They have constantly sought to

erode, undermine, limit, and obstruct it. The worse the war

with Iraq goes, in other words, the greater the pressure on

the Russian government to support America’s enemies,

whether covertly or overtly.

Russia itself might become a second front for the

terrorists using assets in Chechnya or elsewhere. The

recent discovery of ricin in Georgia underscores the

possibility for chemical or biological attacks either in the

former Soviet republics or in Russia itself. It is all too

possible that Al-Qa’ida, the Chechens, or other associated

parties might attack Russia to force it to abandon Washington. As the United States cannot predict the nature and

scope of such attacks, it cannot predict their effects. But this

possibility must not be neglected in any assessment of

wartime or postwar contingencies.

A cardinal point of this partnership and of Russian

foreign policy in general is opposition to any use of American

forces (other than self-defense) outside of the U.N. Russia

will not accord the U.N. a role in Chechnya, but it has

steadfastly maintained that the United States cannot use

force in Iraq or elsewhere under any auspices other than

12
that of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Its intention is to

obtain, thereby, a veto over U.S. defense policy. Accordingly,

any military action against Iraq that is not sanctioned by

the UNSC will cause an enormous spike in Russian political

opposition. Elements within the Russian elite could solicit

and perhaps even obtain support for actions explicitly

intended to prevent the United States from attaining its

objectives in Iraq and in the war on terrorism. Again a short,

conventional war will curtail that explosion although the

resentment will last. But if a long war or the use of WMD

takes place, and even more if the ensuing likely “second

front” is one where Moscow perceives its vital interests to be

engaged, the United States then runs the risk of rupturing

the coalition with Russia. Russian spokesmen have

repeatedly warned that this would happen if we went to war

unless the UNSC sanctioned it.17 Indeed, according to their

General Staff, they were trying to organize a military coup

against Saddam to avert a war and thus exclude the United

States from Iraq.18

If the war with Iraq goes badly, especially if Russia’s

vital interests are threatened, one result would be

opposition to U.S. presence in Central Asia and the

Transcaucasus along with an upsurge of gun running and

intelligence cooperation with various anti-American forces

in the area, including even some of the anti-regime elements

in Central Asia or Afghanistan. Certainly, in the past,

Russian intelligence agencies have had some rather

interesting relationships with many of these groups and the

use of such groups has been a centuries old tactic of Russian

policy.19 The war with Iraq may not lead to direct Russian

military threats against U.S. forces in neighboring states,

but may spark indirect opposition, particularly support for

anti-American movements in Central Asia and the

Transcaucasus.

13
Concluding Remarks.

The upshot of the previous analysis is that a fast,

decisive, exclusively conventional war followed by a

successful and rapid reconstruction of Iraq’s overall

economy and polity will allow the United States to minimize

the risks and costs associated with the possible rise of a

“second front,” presumably terrorist attacks on American

and/or allied assets, forces, or interests. The United States

probably cannot escape some of these attacks, but victory of

this kind can reduce the cost and allow the United States to

maintain other troop deployments in the FSU and

elsewhere at current levels. Conversely a long, unconventional, and/or highly destructive war magnifies the costs

and risks the United States runs not only in Iraq but in

other “theaters,” including the FSU, and could easily oblige

the United States to send more troops. The United States

need not undergo the full range of those contingencies for

this conclusion to hold. Any one of the three conditions of

prolonged or highly destructive war could require greater

force deployments. Many of those forces, given the nature of

U.S. vulnerabilities, assets, and threats to them in those

theaters, would necessarily be ground forces.

Regardless of how the United States wages war with

Iraq, the war on terrorism is not and will not end soon.

Hence opportunities and incentives for striking at U.S.

interests will not immediately decline subsequent to victory

over Iraq. But they may well increase if the war does not

follow the “rosy scenario” offered by many. War with Iraq

will almost certainly intensify the terrorists’ desire to strike

at American interests and targets. A short, decisive war,

followed by Iraqi public rejoicing at liberation, will give

some people second thoughts about doing so. But a long,

unconventional, and highly destructive war will only

confirm existing predispositions and encourage others who

might have been dissuaded by the more optimistic scenario

to join in that cause.

14
Recommendations.

Saturate Iraq with forces to achieve rapid, decisive,

overwhelming victory and then rapidly scale back to

involve allies in subsequent peace operations.

Intensify and accelerate peacebuilding operations

and the war in Afghanistan.

Intensify and deepen bilateral and multilateral forms

of military cooperation with former Soviet states.

ENDNOTES

1. Mikhail Vigansky, “Pankisi File for the United States,” Vremya

Novostei, January 22, 2003, p. 3, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Sergei

Dyupin, “Plot of Chechen Chemists Exposed,” Kommersant, January

14, 2003, p. 6, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

2. David Filipov, “New Fears Chechens May Seek Nukes,

Suspicious Events Concern Russians,” Boston Globe, December 1, 2002,

p. A1, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; “Terrorism Fears Grow for Central

Asia’s Nuclear Waste Dumping Ground,” Insurance Day, January 10,

2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

3. Bob Woodward, Bush At War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002,

pp. 118-120; Alec Rasizade, “Entering the Old ‘Great Game’ in Central

Asia,” Orbis, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, Winter, 2003, pp. 55-57.

4. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India, Iran Sign Strategic Accord,” Defense

News, January 23, 2003, pp. 1, 4.

5. For example, Tashkent, Uzbek Television First Channel, in

Russian, January 13, 2003, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Central Eurasia (henceforth FBIS-SOV), January 14, 2003.

6. Moscow, NTV Mir, in Russian, May 14, 2002, FBIS-SOV, May 14,

2002.

7. Jonathan Eyal, “Why China is Making Overtures to NATO,” The

Straits Times, November 25, 2002, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis;

Jonathan Marcus, “China Seeks Dialogue With NATO,” BBC News,

November 18, 2002.

15
8. Simon Petermann and Stanislav Tkachenko, The Military

Cooperation of the CIS Countries and NATO, Final Report, June 2001

NATO Institutional Research Fellowship, pp. 72-87; Stephen Blank and

Theodore Karasik, “Reforms That Hark Back to Stalinist Times,” Los

Angeles Times, July 20, 2000; Moscow, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, in

Russian, August 1, 2001, FBIS-SOV, August 1, 2001; “Putin Plans CIS

Military Bloc,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, November 13, 2002; “Russia,

the CIS, and Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest, January 10 and 17,

2003.

9. Sami G. Hajjar, U.S. Military Presence in the Gulf: Challenges

and Prospects, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.

Army War College, 2002, pp. 19-29; Thomas E. Ricks, “An Unprecedented Coalition,” Washington Post Weekly, October 1-7, 2001, p. 19;

Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Operated Covert Alliance

With Uzbekistan,” Washington Post, October 24, 2001, pp. A1, 24.

10. Igor Torbakov, “Moscow Aims to Restore Its Influence on

Central Asia,” www.eurasianet.org, December 5, 2002; Justin Burke,

“Russian Deployment in Kyrgyzstan Could Prompt Growing Domestic

Turmoil,” www.eurasianet.org, December 11, 2002.

11. Kiev, Interfax-Ukraine, in Russian, January 28, 2003,

FBIS-SOV, January 28, 2003.

12. Moscow, Izvestiya, in Russian, September 8, 2001, FBIS-SOV,

September 10, 2001; Moscow, Channel One TV, in Russian, January 21,

2003, FBIS-SOV, January 21, 2003.

13. Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy, Foreword, Henry

Kissinger, Washington, DC: Nixon Center and Brookings Institution,

2002.

14. Michael Wines, “Tempted by Oil, Russia Draws Ever Closer to

Iraq,” New York Times, February 3, 2002, www.nytimes.clm/2002/02/

03/international/middleeast/03/RUSS.

15. Jacques Sapir, “Oil, Foreign Policy, and Handguns,”

Worldoil.com, Vol. CCXXIV, No. 1, January, 2003.

16. Ibid.

17. FBIS-SOV, January 21, 2003, for example.

18. “Coup Postponed To Serve U.S. Interests,” www.Stratfor.com,

January 9, 2003.

16
19. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central

Asia, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 178, 196-199;

Ahmed Rashid, “Central Asia Crisis Talks over Islamic ‘Invasion’” Daily

Telegraph, Internet Version, January 11, 2001.

17
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby