SOLDIERS IN CITIES:

MILITARY OPERATIONS

ON URBAN TERRAIN

Edited by

Michael C. Desch

October 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-062-1

ii
CONTENTS

 Foreword ......................

 Preface ........................

 Acknowledgments ..................

 1. Why MOUT Now?

 Michael C. Desch ................

 2. Stalingad and Berlin: Fighting

 in Urban Terrain

 Gerhard L. Weinberg ..............

 3. Military Operations in Urban

 Environments: The Case of Lebanon, 1982

 Dov Tamari ...................

 4. Lessons of the War in Chechnya,

 1994-96

 Anatol Lieven ..................

 5. The Battles of Saigon and Hue:

 Tet 1968

 James J. Wirtz ..................

 6. The Los Angeles Riots of 1992

 James D. Delk ..................

 7. Low-Intensity Operations

 in Northern Ireland

 David Pearson .................. 

 8. Military Operations in an Urban

 Environment: Beirut, 1982-84

 Bernard E. Trainor................ 

 9. Emerging Technologies and

 Military Operations in Urban

 Terrain

 Gerald Yonas and Timothy Moy ........ 

10. Urban Operations: Social Meaning,

 the Urban Built Form, and Economic

 Function

 Max Neiman................... 

11. Urban Operations: Tactical Realities

 and Strategic Ambiguities

 Barry R. Posen ................. 

12. About the Contributors ............. 

iii
FOREWORD

This compendium is the result of a conferen

“Military Operations in an Urban Environm

cosponsored by the Patterson School of Diplomac

International Commerce in conjunction with the Ken

Commission on Military Affairs, the U.S. Army 

College, and the Association of the United States Arm

the time of the conference, the concept of homeland d

was emerging as an increasingly important mission f

U.S. military. Now this mission has catapult

prominence with the attacks of September 11 an

appointment of a Director of Homeland Defen

Cabinet-level position.

The authors of the chapters examine the on

doctrinal thinking, draw historical comparisons

discuss the thoughts of those attending 

conference—experts from the military, government c

agencies, academia, think tanks, and the de

industry—regarding unconventional warfare. Collec

they provide a comprehensive report on critical factor

the U.S. military soon may face.

The Strategic Studies Institute commends 

collection to all who share a concern about m

operations in urban terrain.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
PREFACE

Soldiers in Cities is required reading for m

professionals and others interested in defense polic

issues. In the past half-century, the classic military con

armies maneuvering in the field has been replaced by co

that center on, rather than avoid, heavily populated 

Modern military conflict more frequently is not just a f

control villages or cities, but a variation on the timeless w

control populations and the hearts of nations. The har

and mass orientation of the levée en masse and industr

armies is being replaced by sophisticated terro

information warfare, and the politics of mass persuasio

is reshaping the face of warfare.

America’s own military history demonstrates the so

dilemma in fighting among populations. The U.S. A

experience is extensive but often forgotten. First called 

defend settlements against Indian attacks, it later laid s

or captured cities in Mexico and during the American 

War. During World War II, the Army liberated or 

thousands of towns and hundreds of cities on the Eu

continent. Fighting in or around village hamlets or cities 

frequent occurrence in Southeast Asia operations. Stra

our doctrine and cultural focus have remained preoc

with the classic “fight in the woods” or the seizure o

ground. Urban operations or operations among a f

populace were always considered “possible” but we

formally incorporated into regular annual training fo

combat units. That trend is ending.

The required change has been a long time coming. D

the 1970s the classic defense issues of the European G

Defense Plan became more and more affected by the 

sprawl” that changed the face of Europe. As post-Col

planners surveyed contingencies, it became apparent th

growing urbanization of man affected not just develop

also underdeveloped nations. True maneuver possib

sought by our technology-rich Army remained only in d

The emerging future would be different. The battlefield 

most likely be a populated area. Modern military force

vii
fight sophisticated armies and air forces, but citie

populations will no longer be innocent bystanders

complex terrain of urban centers will be critical in any m

operation, and their populations will become involved.

Our national policy to promote, defend, and, if need 

some circumstances, install democracy dema

multitasked force that will provide stability and pe

populations in the battle area. As the armed forces b

more involved in stability operations, and with the incr

likelihood that possible opponents will seek shelter in 

areas, it is imperative that our soldiers be skilled in 

array of urban-centered operations ranging from forced 

to peacekeeping. As such, our armed forces must be ex

the tactics and techniques of urban operations througho

spectrum of peace and war missions.

Soldiers in Cities clearly delineates the problems 

modern armed forces entering an urban environment. T

will enter that environment during future contingenci

given. That we are ready to adapt our techniques, techn

and training to that day is a decision we have already m

the positive.

The Association of the United States Army is proud t

been a co-sponsor of the conference that produced th

work and confidently recommends it to defense professio

General Gordon A. Sullivan

U.S. Army (Retired)

President

Association of the U.S. Army

viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This volume, and the conference that preceded it

made possible through the participation and generos

number of individuals. Brigadier General (Retired) 

Shane, the Executive Director of the Kentucky Comm

on Military Affairs, first conceived of the idea of a na

symposium, provided much of the financial support 

and played a key role in getting high-level Army offi

participate in it. Lieutenant General (Retired) Th

Stroup of the Association of the U.S. Army assisted u

financially and in helping us secure high-level partici

from the retired Army community. Lieutenant C

Lawrence Pappini of the U.S. Army War Colleg

provided very important financial and logistical su

Dr. John D. Stempel, the Director of the Patterson Sc

Diplomacy and International Commerce at the Univ

of Kentucky, put the School’s intellectua

organizational resources behind this project.

We are grateful to our hosts at Fort Knox, Ken

Major General B. B. Bell, USA; Brigadier General Te

Tucker, USA; and Colonel John Antal, USA, for 

hospitality. We also want to thank Major General 

LeMoyne, USA; Colonel Matthew Smith, USA; C

Robert E. Schmidle, USMC; Captain Dan Kostecka, U

Major General Mike Davidson, ARNG; and Bri

General John R. Batiste, USA, for superb briefin

current Army, Marine, Joint Civil Support Task Forc

Joint MOUT doctrine. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) 

Peters and General John N. Abrams gave very enligh

keynote speeches at the conference.

Dr. Michael Desch gratefully acknowledges the su

of the Smith Richardson Foundation in the writing 

chapter.

ix
CHAPTER 1

WHY MOUT NOW?

Michael C. Desch

For sieges are long and costly; assaults of doubtful issue and risky; a

conspiracies are unreliable. [The Romans] also realized that, if the enem

army was routed, they acquired a kingdom in a day; whereas, if t

besieged an obstinate city, it might take years to get it.

Niccólo Machia

The Discourses, II

Introduction.

Despite ambivalence about military operations on 

terrain (MOUT) among some senior military officer

high-level civilian policymakers, there is a gr

recognition that urban operations will be an imp

mission for the U.S. military in the future.

1

 One r

Army officer reminded his colleagues that

one way or another, we will go. Deployments often will be unpredicta

often surprising. And we frequently will be unprepared for the miss

partly because of the sudden force of circumstance but also because 

military is determined to be unprepared for missions it does not want, a

the lack of preparedness might prevent our going. We are like children w

refuse to get dressed for school.

2

Other articles in military professional journals s

Parameters and Military Review have cited the ne

more realistic training and planning for urban wa

pointing to the experience of the Russian army in Che

and Task Force Ranger’s fight in Somalia.

3

 Outside 

have also chided the U.S. Army for having to play ca

in this area.

4

 The armed forces’ ability to fight in 

combat has also come under scrutiny by the popular p

recent Newsweek story noted that Marines are train

1
urban operations in abandoned buildings at Fort 

California. In a story in the same issue covering the s

bloody battle for the Chechen capital, a De

Department official told a reporter, “I am not so sure w

a lot better than the Russians.”

5

What explains the renaissance in interest in m

operations in urban terrain (MOUT) within the Am

military? The conventional wisdom emphasizes two fa

First, current world demographic trends sugges

increasingly the population of the world will be urban. 

the likelihood of any military operation being conduc

urban areas is also likely to increase. Second, a num

recent catastrophic failures in MOUT—the costly U.S

in the Bakara market place in Mogudishu, Somalia, in 

and the Russian defeat in the first battle for G

Chechnya, in 1994-95—have refocused attention o

challenges of MOUT operations in general.

I agree that these two factors play an important 

renewed interest in MOUT within the U.S. milit

suggest, however, that there is another factor that 

prompting the U.S. military to think hard about M

This factor is the dramatically different internation

domestic security environment the United States face

that the Cold War is over. There are three particular a

to this new security environment that make MO

relatively more important mission today for the 

military than it was in the past.

6

First, the fact of U.S. primacy—there is no single 

or even likely coalition of nations that can challen

United States in conventional or nuclear combat—

that future challengers will seek to wage asym

warfare against us. As the following chapters will 

clear, fighting in urban areas has been, and will conti

be, a great equalizer and will likely be one of the asym

strategies of choice for future U.S. adversaries.

Second, with the end of the Cold War, the United 

finds itself facing a host of potential situations whic

2
require it to conduct military operations other tha

(MOOTW). These can include stability and su

operations (SASO) such as humanitarian interventio

peacekeeping/peace enforcement as well as antite

operations, narcotics interdiction, and noncomb

evacuation operations (NEO). Many of these MOOT

likely to take place in urban areas.

Finally, coincident with the end of the Cold Wa

likelihood of U.S. military operations in the conti

United States itself has also increased. To be sure, th

military has always had important domestic mission

as disaster relief and support for civilian law enforc

during major social unrest. However, there is a gr

concern among civilian policymakers that the thr

terrorism—especially involving weapons of mass 

(WME)—will require active component, reserv

National Guard support for civilian authorities in th

of a potential or actual WME event. Indeed, th

national strategy of Homeland Defense mandat

important role for the military in these areas. 

scenarios for a major natural disaster, widespread 

unrest, or WME consequence management focus, in 

or in part, on urban areas.

My bottom line is that, while demographic trend

recent failures explain part of the renewed inter

MOUT, the extremely complex international and do

post-Cold War security environments are also an imp

factor in today’s resurgence of interest in urban oper

by all branches of the U.S. military.

MOUT and Demography.

Asked why he continually robbed banks, Willy S

said, “That’s where the money is.” One could answ

question of “why fight in cities?” with the equi

answer: “That’s where the people are!” It is w

estimated that by the year 2010, nearly 75 percent 

world’s population will be living in urban areas.

3
pattern of increasing global urbanization is a funct

three dynamics: (1) “Natural increase” among 

dwellers; (2) increased migration into urban areas; a

the urbanization of rural areas.

8

 In the developed 

urbanization rates are already at this level.

9

While it is true that people have been living in cit

nearly 5,000 years, current trends in urbaniz

represent two fundamental changes: (1) the propor

the total population living in cities is unprecedented, a

the size of these urban areas far exceeds anything eve

in the past.

10

 As Kingsley Davis observes, prior to 190

one country—the United Kingdom—had a larger 

than rural population. Today, nearly the e

industrialized world does. Indeed, it was the Indu

Revolution that really brought about the U

Revolution.

11

Most demographers agree that we are seeing the 

levels of urbanization in the developed countries 

today. Some, in fact, suggest that future technologic

economic trends may result in some popul

“deconcentration” in the developed world.

12

 Howeve

suggest that such deconcentration will lead to an

other than suburban sprawl. Trends among other r

vary somewhat, but the aggregate trend for less dev

countries (LDCs) remains toward the same lev

urbanization as the DCs. Latin America and the Carib

for example, are already there. Asia, in contrast, is lik

have some of the world’s largest cities but will still h

larger rural population. Africa is also urbanizing 

significant rate, but much of that is occurring in sma

mid-sized urban areas.

13

While urbanization was a net benefit for the eco

development of the developed countries, there are 

reasons for thinking that among LDCs this urban boo

not contribute to economic development or po

stability. The pace of urbanization in the LDCs 

exceeding that of the DCs. Another key difference be

4
DC and LDC urbanization is that for the former, eco

growth drew people from rural areas, while for the 

economic misery is driving people from rural to 

areas.

14

Urbanization is both a geographical and a 

phenomenon. Urbanization changes the physical geog

of an area by increasing the density of settlemen

producing built-up areas of closely spaced building

tight networks of roads and rail lines. Urbanizatio

changes human beings socially, psychologically

behaviorally.

15

 Urbanization is therefore a double

sword. On the one hand, at least in the developed 

urban areas have become the economic and political c

of most countries. The same is likely to be true amo

LDCs. On the other hand, urbanization poses a num

serious problems for political leaders. These in

untrammeled growth, overcrowding, pressures on 

services, the growth of slums and other poor 

transportation bottle-necks, atomization of so

unemployment, racial and/or ethnic conflict, pollutio

of agricultural areas, and increased adverse consequ

of natural or man-made disasters.

16

 The fact of incr

global urbanization, along with the many pro

associated with it, have certainly focused much attent

MOUT.

Recent MOUT Failures.

In addition to the indisputable fact of the incr

urbanization of the planet, another important cau

renewed interest in MOUT is a series of high-profile fa

in urban operations. To be sure, urban operations 

traditionally been regarded by professionals as amo

most difficult of military operations. As military o

who study urban warfare conclude, urban wa

multiplies the number of possible dimensions of co

increases the density of terrain, disperses forces, re

the distance between combatants and noncomba

5
increases the demands for manpower, places a premi

low-technology warfare, increases the likeliho

casualties, complicates the military’s rules of engage

and challenges traditional indices of success and fail

For these and other reasons, very few militaries 

been satisfied with their combat performance in 

areas. It is true that some MOUT operations such 

Panama have gone fairly smoothly.

18

 However, 

“successes” such as the French in Algeria in 1958 

Russians in Grozny in 2000 do not really provide tem

that the U.S. military would want to adopt. The Frenc

the Battle of Algiers through ruthless violation of the 

of captured suspects and noncombatants.

19

 The Ru

succeeded in capturing Grozny with enormous casu

and only after literally depopulating and destroyin

The historical record, overall, suggests that M

operations are very hard to conduct successfully.

Two recent events have reinforced this lesson. Fi

October 3, 1993, an American Special Opera

force—Task Force Ranger—found itself in a running 

battle with thousands of Somali militiamen aft

unsuccessful raid to capture two key aids to Somali w

Mohamed Farrah Aidid. In the ensuing street fight

Mogudishu’s Bakara market place, the United Stat

19 soldiers killed, and nearly 90 wounded. While S

losses were undoubtedly much higher, the outcome 

battle represented a major political defeat for the U

States, spelling the beginning of the end of U.S. eff

stabilize the situation in Somalia.

21

Second, in December 1994, after failing to topp

anti-Russian regime in Chechnya through covert m

the Russians launched a major conventional effort t

Djokar Dudayev, the renegade former Soviet Air 

officer who headed that separatist movement. Whi

Russians initially had some success driving the Che

from the open areas of northern Chechnya, when the

to drive armored forces to the center of Grozny in or

6
capture the city’s key administrative centers, the 

tactics that seemed to have worked for them in Ka

1979 and Baku in 1990 failed catastrophically

Russians suffered thousands of casualties and were 

to withdraw. The U.S. debacle in Somalia and the R

catastrophe in Chechnya have led to much soul-search

the U.S. military over MOUT.

The New Security Environment and MOUT.

In addition to the demographic and opera

incentives for thinking anew about MOUT, the pos

War security environment has also played an imp

role in sparking renewed interest in urban operatio

the following two sequential charts make clear

military thinking about MOUT has signific

accelerated since the end of the Cold War.

22

7
Three particular aspects of this new sec

environment are key.

MOUT as Asymmetric Warfare. First, the most s

characteristic of the post-Cold War world is the fact o

primacy.

23

 The United States won the Cold War an

stands alone as perhaps the most dominant global heg

since ancient Rome. Ironically, while the United 

faces few, if any, conventional military threats 

security, the very fact of its overwhelming military 

will lead potential challengers to try to coun

asymmetrically.

24

 Terrorism certainly offers one me

asymmetric warfare; forcing the United States to co

operations on urban terrain represents another. In fa

two may be employed together by future U.S. adversa

try to negate U.S. preponderance.

MOUT and MOOTW. Second, the period since the 

the Cold War has seen the emergence of a very compl

international security environment. Genocide, wides

8
famine, and intractable political conflict have led the U

States to use its armed forces 39 times since 1990. 

from the Gulf War, all of these were MOOTW. In con

over the 46 years of the Cold War, the United 

conducted 48 military operations, many of which 

traditional warfighting missions.

25

Robert Kaplan’s influential book, The Coming An

starkly captured for many the chaos and uncertainty 

new international situation.

26

 The Clinton administ

confronted these new challenges by sending the Am

military into conflicts around the globe. Clinton’s Sec

of State Madeleine Albright famously quipped, “Wha

point of having this superb military that you’re a

talking about if we can’t use it?”

27

 The end of the Col

made possible this greater level of MOOTW for two re

First, it provided opportunity: the end of the Cold 

unleashed dozens of tribal and ethnic conflicts prev

held in check by the two rival superpowers. Seco

removed a powerful incentive for U.S. restraint: witho

overarching Soviet threat, the United States was rela

free to engage in such operations. Many of the uses to 

the Clinton administration put the military inv

operations other than war in urban areas from the v

of Bosnia and Kosovo to the streets of Port-au-Prince, 

MOUT Homeland and Defense.

28

 Since the end 

Cold War, American defense officials have increa

become concerned that nuclear, biological, chemica

large conventional weapons(WME)—once the str

monopoly of the superpowershave now become 

widely available. Third World countries such as Ind

Pakistan have them. Many rogue nations such as Iraq

and North Korea are making concentrated efforts to 

or develop them. To make matters more complicated

are also a handful of nonstate actors (foreign and do

terrorist organizations like the World Trade C

bombers and religious cults like Aum Shinrikyo), as w

deranged individuals (e.g., Timothy McVeigh), who 

demonstrated the ability to develop and employ W

9
commit acts of terror. Most of their targets have bee

will continue to be, in urban areas.

One of the primary MOUT components of “Hom

Defense” will be the staffing and support of the 5

National Guard WME Civil-Support Teams (CST).

29

mission is to offer “early assessment, initial detectio

technical advice to the incident commander” during a 

event. CST personnel also help to identify and coor

other Department of Defense (DoD) unit needs. These 

are composed of experts who have been highly traine

variety of disciplines and functional areas. The CSTs a

first military responders, and their goal is to be a

respond in 4 hours to the scene of a WME event to su

the civilian first responders (Federal Bure

Investigation (FBI), firefighters, police, etc.). Given its 

response and assessment mission, the CSTs are desig

assist civilian incident commanders with the 

detection and assessment of the nature of the emer

They then inform the local, state, and federal response 

of their assessment; recommend what equipment is n

and then facilitate deployment of state military un

support of civilian authorities. As with the other 

trained units of this nature, a CST can also be used as 

a federal response force to support National M

Strategy (NMS) requirements.

In sum, the changing international and dom

security environments have pushed MOUT operation

the forefront of U.S. military doctrine and planning. F

challengers are likely to try to force the United Sta

fight in urban areas as a means of equalizing 

preponderance; increasing numbers of MOOTW ar

forcing the U.S. military to conduct those sorts of oper

in urban areas; and concerns about the vulnerabi

urban areas in the United States itself to a WME even

led the U.S. military to think seriously about MO

American soil.

10
This Project.

The Patterson School of Diplomacy and Interna

Commerce—in conjunction with the Kentucky Comm

on Military Affairs, the U.S. Army War College, an

Association of the U.S. Army— organized a na

symposium on “Military Operations in an U

Environment.” The symposium was held at Fort 

Kentucky, during the period September 14-17, 2000, 

heralded Patton Museum of Armor.

The rationale for this symposium was that m

operations in cities and other urban concentrations 

become one of the hot issues for the American military 

next century. Already, the U.S. Army (at Fort Bennin

Fort Knox), the U.S. Marine Corps, the Joint Staff, a

National Guard Bureau are working to formulate doc

for how to operate in cities and other densely populate

built-up areas. What makes this mission even more co

is the growing realization that such operations will no

involve combat but also humanitarian suppor

peacekeeping/enforcement operations. These oper

may have to be undertaken simultaneously. Finall

new national strategy of Homeland Defense gives th

military a number of potential missions in cities and 

urban areas within the United States itself. Much 

doctrinal thinking is still in progress and will benefi

historical comparisons and discussion of current tho

by experts not only in the military but also in other c

agencies of government, academia, think tanks, an

defense industry.

The symposium focused on identifying the less

previous military operations—from comb

humanitarian operations—which will be of use to th

military in the future in conducting operations in 

areas abroad and at home. It had three parts.

Part 1 looked at current doctrinal thinking 

operations in an urban environment of the U.S. Arm

11
U.S. Marines, the National Guard, and the Joint 

Representatives of each delivered briefings based o

current state of doctrine in their respective services. 

briefings are summarized in a separate Rappor

Report by Daniel Kostecka.

30

Part 2 involved discussion of historical case s

chronicling the experiences of different mili

undertaking a wide variety of military operations in 

areas. Cases included, among others, German and 

operations in Stalingrad and Berlin during World W

(Gerhard Weinberg); U.S. operations in Hue durin

Vietnam War (James Wirtz); British operations in B

since 1969 (David Pearson); Israeli operations in Be

1982 (Brigadier General Dov Tamari); U.S. M

operations in Beirut in 1982 (Lieutenant General Be

Trainor); U.S. Marine and National Guard operati

Los Angeles in 1992 (Major General James Delk

Russian operations in Grozny in 1995 (Anatol Li

There were also three analytical presentations cover

an urban political specialist’s view of MOUT (Max Nie

(2) new technologies and MOUT (Gerald Yona

Timothy Moy); and (3) a general assessment of the bri

and cases (Barry Posen). Each of the memo

commissioned for these cases assesses the effectiven

military operations from a tactical and a doc

perspective. Each author also tells us what lesso

should draw from these cases for current U.S. doctrin

training. The objective is to frame the discuss

developing MOUT doctrine in the light of the lessons 

historical case studies and current technologica

demographic developments. These memoranda for

bulk of this anthology.

Part 3 of the conference was an orientation vi

conference participants to the new Mounted Urban C

Training (MUCT) site at Fort Knox, Kentucky

Zussman Village MUCT site is a state-of-the-art f

designed to train U.S. Army forces in all manner of 

environments. The site includes a wide variety of 

12
buildings and other urban features including an ext

sewer system, a U.S. embassy building, a large s

houses, apartments, a gas station, and a railroad ass

yard. Operations in this training environment are 

more realistic through a state-of-the-art special 

package based on technology utilized at Universal S

in California. Zussman Village is a national resour

training active, reserve, and civilian first responders 

MOUT challenges they may face in the coming year

abroad and at home.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military Fo

Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare,” Armed Forces J

International, October 1998, pp. 68-74. The Report of the last Quadrennia

Review (QDR) completed in May 1997 dealt lightly with the threat of urban 

specifically mentioning only the Marines’ Urban Warfare program. Repor

Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, Chapter VII, p. 16. The 

Defense Panel assessment of the May 1997 QDR also failed to deal directly 

question. The National Defense Panel: Assessment of the Ma

Quadrennial Defense Review, December 1, 1997. The General Account

recently released its report titled “Focused Attention Needed to Prepare U.

for Combat in Urban Areas” to Congress, citing the need for better training 

The U.S. Commission on National Security, co-chaired by former Senators 

Rudman in October 2000, expressed an ominous view of the threats to th

States and criticized DOD for its failure to take sufficient note that the battle

changed, and that so must doctrine and training, especially in the area of M

2. Ralph Peters, “Heavy Peace,” Parameters, Vol. 29, No. 1, Spring 

71-79.

3. One of the more influential articles in the Army’s professional l

advocating serious thinking about MOUT was Ralph Peters, “Our Soldie

Cities,” Parameters, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50.

4. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “W(H)ither the Army?” Backgrounde

for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, January 18, 2000.

5. Newsweek, February 13, 2000; Newsweek, February 21, 2000, p

Jonkers, “The Battle of Grozny,” AFIO@his.com, January 14, 2000. The 

paragraph draws heavily upon Patterson School National Security Researc

“Fort Knox’s Mounted Urban Combat Training Site: A Comparative Assessm

13
Recommendations, ”a report prepared for The Kentucky Commission on 

Affairs, April 2000.

6. To be sure, MOUT has always been a concern to the U.S. militar

low-intensity conflict and major conventional war. On the former, see Sa

Huntington, “The Bases of Accommodation,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, N

1968, pp. 642-656, for discussion of the role of the concentration of th

Vietnamese population in cities during the Vietnam War. For discussio

potential role of urban areas in a NATO-Warsaw Pact war, see Paul Bracken

Sprawl and NATO Defense,”Survival, Vol 18, No. 6, November/December 

254-267; and C. N. Donnelly, “Soviet Techniques for Combat in Built-up 

Military Review, Vol. 57, No. 11, November 1977, pp. 37-48.

7. Major General John LeMoyne, Briefing on “Military Operations in a

Environment,” Fort Knox, KY, September 15, 2000, Slide 3, ava

ftp://moutftp:out99tfp@192.153.150.25/moutftp.

8. United Nations,World Economic and Social Survey, 1996, N

United Nations, 1996, p. 218.

9. United Nations, p. 221.

10. Kingsley Davis, “The Urbanization of the Human Population,” Sc

American, Vol. 213, No. 3, September 1965, p. 41.

11. Williams and Brunn, p. 11.

12. United Nations, p. 221; and Jack F. Williams and Stanley D. Brun

Urban Development” in Brunn and Williams, eds., Cities of the World 

New York: HarperCollins, 1993, p. 1.

13. United Nations, pp. 223-233.

14. Davis, pp. 41, 49, 52.

15. Williams and Brunn, p. 3.

16. This list comes largely from Williams and Brunn.

17. Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” pp. 43-50; and Lieutenant Colo

Milton, “Urban Operations: Future War,”Military Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, F

1994, pp. 37-46.

18. On Panama, see Bob Woodward,The Commanders, New York: S

Schuster, 1991, pp. 156-196.

14
19. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria: 195

Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1985.

20. Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 200

Combat Lessons Learned,” Military Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, July/August 

50-59, available at http://www-cgsc.arm

milrev/English/JulAug00/thomas.htm.

21. The best book on the battle itself is Mark Bowden’s Blackhawk D

Story of Modern War, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999. Fo

discussion of lessons learned from this by the American military, see Kennet

Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Fort McNair: National 

University Press, January 1995.

22. Both of these charts are from LeMoyne, Slides 6 and 7.

23. Christopher Layne “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers W

International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51; Rober

“International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International S

Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 52-67; and Samuel P. Huntington, “Why Inte

Primacy Matters,”International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp

24. Wesley Clark, “How to Fight An Asymmetric War,Time, October 23

40; and Michael R. Gordon, “Military Analysis: Superpower Suddenly Fin

Threatened by Sophisticated Terrorists,” New York Times, October 14, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2000/ 10/14/world/14STRA.html.

25. See Federation of American Scientists, “United States MilitaryOp

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/index.html#post.

26. Robert Kaplan,The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dream

Post Cold War, New York: Random House, 2000.

27. Quoted in Colin Powell with Joseph Persico,My American Journ

York: Random House, 1995, p. 576.

28. This section draws upon The Patterson School National Security 

Group, “Weapons of Mass Destruction, Domestic Preparedness, and the K

National Guard,” a report prepared for The Kentucky Commission on Militar

April 1999.

29. For a skeptical view of the threat and this program, see Judith Miller

of Unconventional Terrorism Is Overstated, Study Says,” as reported in Ne

Times, October 26, 2000, p. A20.

15
CHAPTER 2

STALINGRAD AND BERLIN:

FIGHTING IN URBAN TERRAIN

Gerhard L. Weinberg

From August 1942 into February 1943, Germa

Soviet forces fought for, in, and around Stalingrad

February to early May 1945 they fought for, in, and a

Berlin. One aspect of these battles is not likely 

repeated in any situation that the forces of the U

States and its allies are likely to be involved in: the fa

strategic choice. In the case of Stalingrad, the G

attempt to seize the city (as opposed to the Red A

retaking of whatever the Germans controlled) wa

product of a deliberate choice. At both the politica

military levels, the Germans had decided to try to ta

city by assault rather than to bypass it or seize 

surrounding it and then starving it out. Their choice l

grinding high-intensity urban fight causing imm

casualties for both sides.

In 1945, the political and military leadership 

Soviet Union made a similar choice about Berlin. R

than bypass or envelop it with a subsequent siege f

relatively short distance, they chose to drive into the c

addition to surrounding it ). In this case, lengthy and 

urban combat with high casualties for both sides als

the predictable result. This is not the place to exami

reasons for and the wisdom of the choices made b

Germans and the Soviets;the point needing to be m

that the United States and any allies it has are 

unlikely to make such a choice in the future. If and 

American forces are ever engaged in high-intensity 

warfare, it is almost certainly going to be becau

political and military leadership see no other choice.

17
Certain features of the battles for Stalingrad and 

are, however, likely to be equally characteristic of any 

warfare in the foreseeable future, and it is to thes

attention must be directed. In both cases, it is quite o

that the conduct of operations rested on very small gro

fighting men. Squads, and even smaller groups, rare

by an officer but more frequently by a noncommis

officer or even an enlisted soldier, struggled for h

rooms, cellars, and unidentifiable piles of rubble. Dir

and control above the company level were extr

difficult and sometimes completely irrele

Furthermore, the intensity of combat, the unpredict

of developments, the multidimensional sources of d

and the enormous difficulties of supply and rel

combined to make this kind of fighting terribly drain

those in it. The war on the Eastern Front was certai

form of vacation for either side when combat occurred 

swamps and forests of the northern portion or the 

terrain of the southern portion of the theater of opera

but all the evidence indicates that fighting in large h

built-up urban areas was more draining and even 

terrifying than the alternation of waiting, moving

fighting on the broader expanses of the Union of 

Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1942-43 and inside Ge

in 1945.

The prospects for any military force engaged in th

of urban fighting that is recalled by the names of Stal

and Berlin will depend above all on the training and m

of those individual soldiers engaged in it. There is 

basic shift in warfare that has a historical analogy o

the shift from close-order fighting in the 18th century 

open-order fighting of the 20th. As fighting shifts fro

landscape to the cityscape, stamina, morale, leade

and initiative move from the company to the squad 

smaller groups of fighters.

The morale problem becomes critical. The soldie

only have to know what they are fighting for or again

what their direction has to be, they must also see si

18
support in their lonely terror. It is here that the Ge

and the Soviets received a mixed message about the 

air power. On the one hand, as the Western 

discovered in Cassino, Caen, Aachen, and elsew

dropping lots of bombs has the effect, among other thi

creating lovely rubble piles for the defenders to util

their positions. Subsequent bombing, as the Ge

discovered in Stalingrad, makes the rubble bounce b

little practical effect on the course of the fighting. Th

however, another side to this. The presence of the G

air force in strength over Stalingrad at repeated int

during the early part of the fighting and into Nove

clearly had a significant effect on the morale of very st

troops. Conversely, the ability of the Red Air Force to 

control of the skies over Stalingrad in December 194

January 1943 not only had the practical effect of inter

with the already hopelessly inadequate German air s

effort, but it also served to discourage the Germa

encourage the Red Army soldiers as they struggled 

ruined city.

A somewhat similar scenario was enacted over Be

1945. There most of the bombing had been done 

Western Allies as part of their general air offensive, n

part of a ground assault on the city. The physical eff

course, was essentially similar to that of the Ge

bombing of Stalingrad: lots of rubble for defenders to u

However, it was important that, for essentially the 

period of fighting for and in Berlin, the Red Air 

dominated the skies over the city. While this did not p

a few German planes from landing and taking off, ut

wide streets rather than airfields, the morale i

appears to have been considerable. The Red Army so

knew that the planes they could hear overhead 

“theirs,” while the German defenders were discoura

the knowledge that the noise was made by the planes 

enemy and that they risked being machine gunned fro

air as well as by the advancing Red Army.

19
Connecting the two themes of the key role of very 

groups of fighters and morale under enormous stress 

critical role of forward artillery, which was drama

illustrated in both urban battles. For the Germans in 

to move forward in Stalingrad and for the Red Ar

moving to retake the city and later to take Berlin, 

absolutely essential to have self-propelled artillery—

have it in large numbers. The Germans mainly u

what they called the “Sturmgeschütz” or assault gun

was essentially a 75mm, later l05mm, howitzer fitted 

Mark III medium tank instead of a standard turret. 

in many ways an ideal weapon for urban fighting s

was narrow enough to move through the streets (a sub

be taken up subsequently), carried a weapon of subst

power, and could be moved in direct support of adva

soldiers in an urban area. Direct fire from it was of o

utility in the struggle from house to house, a

conspicuous presence gave German soldiers a real se

having something of great practical effect on thei

under trying circumstances.

The problem for the Germans was that they nev

enough of these very useful weapons. This was not a m

of the usual cry for “more.” The Germans had diverte

continued throughout World War II to divert vast res

to artillery projects that belong in the category of l

The German army’s investment of artillery resour

such projects as the “Dora” super heavy-super h

needing double sets of railway tracks and hundreds o

and having the capability of firing only a few dozen 

the V-1 project; and the V-3 super cannon to shell Lo

all diverted resources in a constrained war economy 

from practical weapons like the assault gun.

The Red Army had a basically similar experie

urban fighting. Increasingly during the war they rel

self-propelled guns, and these were used espe

effectively in the battle of Berlin. Both rocke

shell-firing self-propelled guns proved essential. I

connection, something has to be said about one aspect 

20
films of German and of Soviet origin about World W

that are frequently shown. In these films, the hors

what might be called camera-shy; that is, they 

appear. In general, this is a deliberately misle

technique designed to obscure from the viewer the fa

both armies relied overwhelmingly on horse transp

the war. Both armies relied quite literally on milli

horses. The absence of the horses from those scene

deal with the fighting in Stalingrad and Berlin, howe

not a deception at all but reflects reality. The Red Ar

spite of its infusion with vast numbers of American t

still depended heavily on horses in 1945, but these 

hauling supplies, dragging ammunition and guns

carrying soldiers and wounded behind the lines. In 

itself, the Red Army relied on its self-propelled gun

rocket launchers to provide direct and immediate sup

the soldiers dashing from house to house and block to b

The enormous importance of self-propelled ar

providing direct fire support for troops in urban c

raises an important issue for both artillery and tan

issue to be discussed presently. If there is even the sli

interest in preserving anything of the urban enviro

itself for reconstruction when the fighting is ove

self-propelled artillery and the other armored fig

vehicles must be able to maneuver in a city’s stree

alleys, including those that are fairly narrow. 

ironically, the Germans had an advantage in World W

as a by-product of their prewar plans. They had antic

a short and easy war against Czechoslovakia, a har

against France and Britain, and a quick and eas

against the Soviet Union. They also expected an eas

against the United States, but one that required we

systems to handle the distance to the United State

cope with the American navy. They therefore concen

in their rearmament program in the early and mid-19

weapons for the war in the West, and that meant rela

small and narrow tanks for the roads and cities of W

Europe. No new weapons systems were thought need

21
the war against the Soviet Union (the Germans 

initiated development of those after June 1941)

therefore they turned to designing and producin

weapons systems for war against the United States in 

once the ones for the West were under way.

With this as background, it will be easier to unde

why the use of the Mark III tank chassis as a basis f

assault gun proved to be such an asset for the German

they became involved in high-intensity urban warfa

any city in Europe (or elsewhere), a self-propelled gu

low-profile, relatively narrow, medium tank is exactly 

is needed for close and direct support for sorely

infantry. Furthermore, such a vehicle can be configu

carry a flame thrower or a bank of rockets. This point 

to ignore other forms of self-propelled artillery utili

the Germans during the war—there were more than a 

types—but to call attention to a major issue that is lik

be considered important for U.S. forces in the future. 

the Red Army moved into Berlin in 1945, on the other 

concern about the future rebuilding of life in the cap

city was certainly the last thing on their minds. In 

view, self-propelled artillery and heavy tanks were 

wide and therefore crushed additional building

Germans should have thought about that before atta

their dear Soviet friends.

The issue of tank-infantry teams is closely related 

discussion of self-propelled artillery. Such operatio

difficult and require careful training unde

circumstances. In a close urban environment, such c

procedures are even harder to carry out. Both the Ge

and the Soviets on occasion tried to do this, the latte

frequently than the former. The critical issue here tur

to be that of communications. It is always difficu

infantry to coordinate with artillery and armor in com

arms fighting, but these difficulties are especially gr

an urban environment This is one area wher

technology available to both sides in World War II w

particularly useful and where post-war and cu

22
technological development can be expected to provide 

assistance. In the utilization of tanks in urban wa

there is also a certain similarity to the morale imp

self-propelled artillery. It certainly proved encourag

the soldiers trying to move forward to see their side’s 

helping them and, in the Soviet case, often carrying 

into battle. It goes without saying that the tanks prov

additional form of self-propelled artillery, but their 

the fighting in Stalingrad and Berlin raised communi

problems that were not easily solved with the techno

the time.

One of the most difficult combat environments tha

German and Soviet soldiers encountered in Stalingra

Berlin was the sewer system. In both cities, as in mos

urban areas, there was an extensive system of underg

sewers as well as utility tunnels. In addition, Berlin 

very extensive system of underground tunnels for 

mass transit and railways. Fighting underground gen

proved even more harrowing than fighting in the s

and buildings. Furthermore, the sewers in part

offered opportunities, on the one hand, for trapped gro

soldiers to escape to their own lines, and, on the other 

for inserting soldiers behind what appeared to b

enemy’s front lines. One of the reasons that urban fi

turned out both to be very costly in casualties and to r

a far larger commitment of troops than had been antic

was the extra dimension that the subterranean comba

provided. This issue is closely related to another on

has to be examined next.

Urban combat requires maps. Obviously map

needed for open-field fighting, but the urban enviro

carries with it some special mapping issues. There is a

some evidence to suggest that the Red Army was simp

prepared for the very extensive bodies of water pres

greater Berlin. This was hardly a novel feature of th

the lakes, ponds, and streams had been there for a long 

The point is that effective execution of any warfare 

urban area depends on accurate maps, to include dep

23
of bodies of surface water as well as underground tun

all sorts. Here is a possible task for technological adv

to what extent can satellite imagery provide subterr

sensing?

The Germans had for years sent special reconnais

planes, the squadron named after its leader, Th

Rowehl, over portions of the Soviet Union, and 

activities were, of course, continued by the Germans 

extent of their capacity after June 1941. But there 

major limitations to their range, frequency, and tec

capabilities. However good some of the products o

aerial photography actually were—and whatever be

the United States derived from capturing much of it 

end of World War II—the imaging technology of th

gave few clues to underground sewers, utility tunne

Here was an additional difficulty for the German

potential help for the Red Army in its defense of Stali

The situation was to some extent reversed when the S

advanced into Berlin.

One of the most conspicuous features of the fight

Stalingrad and Berlin was the high level of casualt

both sides. Even if the enormous forces engaged on 

sides in those battles may never be seen in high-int

urban battles again, the large numbers of kille

wounded underline the basic fact that such conf

extremely lethal. Unfortunately, there are not 

remotely reliable figures available for German casual

the actual fighting in the two battles. (The best G

study, Stalingrad by Manfred Kehrig [Stuttgart, 

does not provide any summary figures for Ge

casualties.) Also, questions can be raised about the acc

of the Soviet losses as tabulated in Krivosheev’s book, 

Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth C

(London, 1997), but the figures provided there, round

here, can be accepted as the baseline minimums. F

defensive phase of the Stalingrad battle, he shows 32

dead or irrecoverably lost, and 320,000 wounded an

producing an average of 5,100 casualties per day. F

24
Soviet Stalingrad offensive, he shows 155,000 dead 

and 330,000 wounded and sick, for an average of 6,4

day, though many of these casualties were incurred 

breakthrough operations north and south of the city, 

the city itself. For the Berlin operation, which Krivo

limits to the phase from April 16 to May 8, 1945, he 

78,000 dead or lost and 274,000 wounded and sick, 

average of 15,300 per day. It will be evident to a

familiar with the losses suffered by the United Sta

World War II that these 1,481,000 casualtie

substantially more numerous than the 1,100,000 Am

losses in the entire war in all theaters combined. Mor

there is no reason to believe that German casualties in 

battles were below a million. The percentage of casu

among the units engaged was by all accounts substa

higher than it was for both sides in other operations of 

duration but outside urban areas.

Fighting in cities, furthermore, proved enorm

costly for both sides in terms of supplies. There d

appear to be any serious studies of this subject, but 

evidence suggests an unmistakable pattern

expenditure of ammunition of all sorts, the l

equipment of all kinds, and the wearing out of wh

equipment is deployed tend to be at a consistently 

rapid rate in urban fighting than in other terrain

certainly true that artillery barrages before conven

offensive thrusts invariably consumed enormous qua

of ammunition in a short period of time. The distingu

characteristic of the battles at Stalingrad and Berli

the unremitting nature of the very high levels of re

firing throughout and the terrible handicap imposed o

units not adequately supplied with ammunition.

An issue certain to be of major importance in any 

urban conflict is that of collateral material damag

civilian casualties. The Germans were not the lea

interested in these matters. Major Soviet cities, accord

German planning, were to be levelled in any case, an

30 to 40 million people were to be starved to death. 

25
context of such planning, most of it predating the inv

the more civilians killed and the more physical destr

accomplished, the better in the eyes of those at the top

is not to suggest that German soldiers intentionally 

civilians in the fighting just to kill them; it is to poi

that this was simply not an issue for them. Similar

Red Army was not particularly interested in or conc

about civilian casualties. The assumption of the 

leadership that after the war there would be a Germ

part of Germany refashioned on the Soviet model 

that there was no special interest in killing as 

German civilians as possible, but there was on the 

hand no particular concern about holding down c

casualties. That they were not even higher in Berli

due to the evacuation of large numbers of people, esp

children, beforehand, a measure undertaken prima

order to escape the bombing campaign of the Western 

In the future, this conundrum will confront the U

States and any allies fighting alongside American 

The corresponding post facto debates in the United 

about the fire bombing of enemy cities will in the 

come a few days, not years, after the fighting, and ma

well begin even while the fighting is actually still goi

What at no time concerned the Germans or the Sov

quite likely to become a major issue for the United S

The likelihood that anyone in the future will develop 

bombs, infantry rounds, or artillery projectiles 

distinguish between combatants and noncombatants 

this writer’s opinion, very small.

While certain problems of urban warfare may we

themselves to technological remedies or at least 

amelioration, the experience of Stalingrad and Berli

points up the great danger of succumbing to the temp

of technology when it comes to the area of comman

control. Here the evidence currently available is far 

for the German side than the Soviet. Almo

higher-ranking German officers in World War I

participated in World War I. The dramatic improveme

26
technical means of communication—radio, telepr

telephones with scramblers, etc.in the interwar 

suggested to most higher German commanders that 

could now be controlled from a distance. Corps, army

group, and even general headquarters in East Prus

too often imagined that control over military operati

the tactical level could be exercised from afar with th

means of communication. This proved to be a ser

mistaken view. In urban warfare, both the Germans a

Red Army discovered, at times to their grief, the il

nature of the idea that street fighting could be cont

and directed from a substantial distance. General dire

can certainly be given by division and higher headqua

but once battle is engaged, it turned out that no one 

the battalion level—and sometimes not even there—

issue useful directives.

The current and future development of science

solutions is quite likely to heighten the temptat

technologists in this regard. Those looking at com

screens with all sorts of technologically gathere

collated details could easily imagine themselves 

position to control events from a distance. But the rea

the ground—and under it—is likely to make such att

useless and possibly even harmful. Moving from one f

a building to another is not readily subject to contro

afar. The urban environment, as both the Germans a

Soviets discovered, is certainly one where techno

developments helped them, but the training and expe

of the individuals in combat proved decisive. Techno

advances will certainly assist forces in the fighting 

but they are not likely to make it much easier to contr

fighting from a distance in space or rank.

The reality of fighting in a large city is to a consid

extent visible in two commercial cinemas. The sect

street fighting in Stalingrad in the German movie b

name appears to be reasonably close to what it mus

been like even if the last third of the film is nonse

Similarly, the footage of the fighting in Berlin in the 

27
movie, Battle of Berlin, provides a good introduction t

that must have been like, even if much of the rest of th

is similarly on the silly side. What one can see in both 

extent to which such fighting makes incredibly str

demands on the participants and requires eno

courage honed by training and experience.

28
CHAPTER 3

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN

ENVIRONMENTS:

THE CASE OF LEBANON, 1982

Dov Tamari

INTRODUCTION: THE “NEW WARS”

Any discussion of military operations in 

environments necessitates preliminary clarification

distinctions regarding wars of the present era. Ther

point in traveling back in time to the city of Suez in 19

should instead examine military operations in 

environments in the context of wars that differ 

anything we have encountered in the past

phenomenon of urban operations should be rev

through a description, however generalized, of t

wars—and possibly future wars as well. These 

include the wars that have taken place after the Vi

War such as the October War of 1973 and the Gulf W

1991. Moreover, it is appropriate to begin with the str

and operational aspects rather than the tactical.

Some people refer to the post-Vietnam wa

“low-intensity” as opposed to “high-intensity.” An

distinction regarding recent wars around the globe 

they are often referred to as “asymmetrical wars.” 

view, neither characterization is satisfactory, as the

toward a quantitative approach. I would, therefore, 

propose additional destinctions that lean more towa

qualitative dimensions, as outlined below.

• War is not an armed conflict of a state against a 

but a conflict where a state such as the United States, 

or some other country confronts the regime of another 

an opposing leader, the ruling faction, or a secess

29
faction. The conflict is characterized by involvemen

intervention in a civil war taking place in a remote co

According to this definition, the primary characteri

the conflict is that it is not a war in which the other co

is engaged as a whole. Rather, it involves only a p

element out of the total entity known as a state a

society. Consequently, a war effort must avoid eng

anyone and anything other than the specific opponen

• The strength—or magnitude—of the interven

determined, to a considerable extent, by the cha

presented by the opponent. This challenge may be reg

as a threat to world peace, to regional order, or 

stability of a country that has become the sce

oppression, bloodshed, or a risk to neighboring count

• The magnitude and “quality” of the threat a

determined solely by the direct damage it inflicts, bu

according to such qualitative criteria as humani

norms, human rights, the basic negation of and st

against dictatorial regimes, etc. These criteria are nor

the outcome of Western political and social culture

cannot ignore the view maintaining that the norm

criteria associated with intervention are subj

“dictatorship by democracy,” namely, that “the socia

right for me should be right for you as well.” The 

“stability” also derives from the Western political

order. It is doubtful whether this term is relevant to th

of the world, where many societies still possess no

cultural norms and are constantly and inherently 

move, though not necessarily in the physical sense.

• Yet another characteristic of the “new wars” is th

of clarity as to the question of who the aggressor is an

the victim really is. It is unclear—at the outset of such 

as well as during the fighting—who the “good guys” a

“bad guys” are. When one country’s forces cross the b

of another country and invade its territory, then 

bombard, shell, and demolish its cities and villages, le

behind mass destruction—even when this is done 

30
name of allegedly good and noble causes—the agg

may easily become, or appear to be, the victim. In thi

of ambiguity, the “swing effect” takes place: yeste

oppressed become, through our help, tomor

oppressors.

• Such wars inevitably raise the question of the ex

the military involvement one is willing to engage in

question was inconceivable during both world wars, o

during the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and past M

Eastern wars. Today, it is no longer our wish to dr

entire nation into a war, and we know in advance that 

opinion at home will determine to a considerable exte

magnitude and scope of our intervention. Moreover, 

opinion must be massaged in advance to suppo

intervention. This kind of support must not be tak

granted. For this reason, we seek external support 

form of coalitions with friendly countries, United N

backing, and international legitimacy.

• Interventions by superpowers or major countr

conflicts that do not threaten them directly d

necessarily make that determination based o

geographical remoteness of the conflict, but also consi

cultural and mental remoteness. Bloody wars and atr

in Africa or a bloodbath in Indonesia are not partic

interesting for the countries of North America or E

The prevalent approach is to allow these wars to 

themselves out.”

• In the context of the “new wars,” achieving a m

(operational) decision in the style of World War I and 

War II, or even in the manner of the regional wars tha

place as late as the 1970s, is very rare indeed. As thes

are not conflicts between similar entities, such as 

against state, a new political order should be establis

the end of the war—and this is extremely ha

accomplish. Consequently, an ongoing presence 

theater of operations is required as contributory 

gradual settlement of conflict. Examples are the U.S. 

31
presence over Iraq, the Israeli presence in Lebanon be

1982 and 2000, and the presence of peacekeeping forc

similar elements.

• Various types of combat elements are nor

involved in the “new wars.” These may range from r

military organizations, through paramilitary 

subversive groups that employ evasive terrorism 

guerrilla tactics, to armed civilians, who are a

impossible to distinguish from the innocent ci

population.

THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT IN THE “NEW WARS”

In the context of the “new wars,” the urban enviro

attains a crucial degree of importance for a num

excellent reasons.

• If the opponent does not consist of a “w

country—the leader/leadership, the regime, the mi

and the entire society—then an entity that could be a 

the regime, or even an adversary of that regime, will h

be confronted. As far as the adversary entity is conc

the most convenient environment will be an urban 

central regime, or its adversary entity, will find exc

camouflage and shelter in an urban environment behi

civilian population, where it is very difficult to distin

who is who, and where spotting and identifying legit

combat targets are practically impossible.

• The urban environment is likely to attra

attention of the international community, since the 

force there could damage or destroy cultural asset

historic landmarks and inflict casualties on the innoc

such an eventuality, the aggressor will emerge a

victim.

• It is very convenient for the political and m

leadership to hide in a big city and operate freely there

if the city is encircled or occupied by opposing 

Unrestricted and indiscriminate use of firepower 

32
types, as was the norm in past wars, would be inconce

in such cases.

For the purpose of this chapter, I have reviewed th

of knowledge regarding urban operations in the 

Defense Force (IDF) in connection with the series o

between Israel and her Arab neighbors between 194

1982. From this review, it became clear that almo

entire written records of the experience focus on the t

field of knowledge. Almost nothing is available rega

operations or strategy.

For this reason, I have chosen the campaign cond

by the IDF in Lebanon in 1982 as a vehicle for discussi

operational and strategic aspects of military operati

urban environments.

Operational Objectives Formulated by the Government in

1981-1982.

For more than a year in the early 1980s, the 

government, or more specifically the minister of defen

prime minister, sought ways to change the existing or

Lebanon. In their view, that order had allowed the Pal

Liberation Organization (PLO) and its armed branc

maintain in Lebanon a “state within a state” which e

a relatively safe base of operations as well as politic

military freedom to operate against Israel. For this r

the Israeli leaders strove to establish a new ord

Lebanon by means of a military operation.

The minister of defense outlined the new order 

IDF general staff using terminology derived from the 

of military concepts that was familiar to all. The obje

were as follows:

• To annihilate the PLO fighters, or terrorists, 

referred to them, and destroy the infrastructure 

terrorist organizations.

33
• To distance these fighters from the Israel-Le

border to a range that would deny them the opt

threatening Israeli settlements with the artillery ava

to them.

• To establish a “new political order” in Lebanon, 

the Maronite Christians, one of the many factions m

up the heterogeneous mosaic of the Lebanese popu

would become the dominant element in the Leb

regime, provide the new president, and man a

positions in the Lebanese government and military

new order necessitated an actual presence a

government centers in the capital, Beirut (this was 

explicitely stated, but implied quite clearly).

• To accomplish the above objectives by launch

quick, decisive military operation that was to last only 

days. To that end, massive force was to be employed, s

ensure that the outcome of the operation would be d

as quickly as possible. This was because the minis

defense was rather apprehensive about interna

intervention that would enforce a premature cea

before the objectives outlined above could be accompli

• To remain inside the Lebanese territory cap

during the operation, so as to enable the Maronite Chr

faction to assume control over the government and 

centers of Lebanon. This was a matter of some contro

Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin thought 

lengthy stay in Lebanon would not be necessary, wh

minister of defense believed that the IDF would h

remain there for several months, perhaps even longe

The presence of the IDF in Lebanon would enfor

cessation of the struggle among the political, ethni

religious factions in that country (a struggle tha

deteriorated into severe violence fairly often), th

implementing the new order through the domination 

Maronite Christian faction.

34
The entire operation was to involve a minimum n

of casualties on the Israeli side.

The Concepts Used by the IDF to Interpret and Understa

Reality in Lebanon and the Operation Assigned to Them.

Since the operation in Lebanon (which subseq

evolved into a campaign) had been deliberated in th

(the General Headquarters [GHQ], Northern Com

and the field formations) for more than a year, it is po

to follow the development of the concepts used by the 

interpret, understand, and plan this action. It sho

noted that intensive discussions regarding the w

Lebanon had taken place in the cabinet. The chief of th

general staff and the senior GHQ officers appeared 

these forums and participated in the discus

Discussions were also conducted among the minis

defense, the GHQ, the commanders of the service bra

and the divisions assigned to take part in the oper

This was the first time in Israeli history that such int

discussions and deliberations had been undertak

preparation for a war. The conclusions were as follow

• It was understood that the actual implementa

the objectives formulated by the minister of defens

prime minister would require the IDF to enter the 

centers of Lebanon, because this was where most 

Palestinian fighters, as well as the centers of the Leb

government, were concentrated. This was a r

departure from the combat doctrine for u

environments—cities or major towns—as it had 

formulated following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. 

then, the guidelines for such operations had be

general, based on two fundamental principles learne

bitter experience in the town of Suez close to the end 

Yom Kippur War. First, entering cities should be avoid

this offered no benefits whatsoever. Thus citie

population centers should be bypassed. Second, in a 

high-intensity war, the ultimate operational decisio

35
require that the IDF advance to an area located very c

an Arab capital and “threaten it,” as outlined 

operational plans and mission orders. The conc

“threatening" an Arab capital had never been 

elucidated. It was very clear how to advance to the vici

such capitals as Damascus, Amman, or Beirut, bu

were they to be threatened? Were they to be engage

artillery fire? Should they be attacked from the air

should an Arab government and her milita

overpowered by such a threat? These and other 

matters remained obscure. Prior to the war in Leb

which had been intended to establish a new political 

in that country, the IDF was familiar with the conc

“threatening Beirut,” and plans were prepared accord

• There were 20,000 Palestinian combatan

Lebanon. They were equipped with approximately 10

tanks, 100 artillery tubes of various types, a

rocket-launcher trucks as well as infantry weapo

quantities three times larger that anything the 

branches of the PLO could utilize or operate. They 

organized into territorial commands, brigades

battalions with military command posts, communica

and so forth. It was no wonder, then, that the ID

perceived the PLO as a military organization to all i

and purposes and that the operational planni

preparation for June 1982 had been undertaken muc

that for operations against regular military forces.

• Whereas the directive issued by the minister of d

was to annihilate the Palestinian organizations in Leb

the IDF interpreted this as an order to “destro

terrorists’ infrastructure.” This concept had a pro

effect on the military operations, as the term “terr

infrastructure” had been interpreted in its physical 

namely, personnel, military camps, command 

Palestinian refugee camps, tanks, artillery t

ammunition dumps, etc. In reality, it turned out th

“infrastructure” concept, as the IDF had interpreted 

completely erroneous. Consequently, the conce

36
“overpowering the PLO in Lebanon” was also percei

the physical sense, as was the norm with rega

high-intensity wars.

• The majority of the Palestinian combatants an

bulk of their “infrastructure” were located in the urba

along the coastal strip, from the Israeli bord

concentrations located to the north of Beirut itself, 

cities of Tyre, Sidon, and Damur and the smaller tow

between. It was understood, therefore, that the ope

would take place inside urban environments, includi

capital of Beirut, with its population of about one mil

would not be possible to bypass the coastal cities, a

was where the majority of the Palestinian combatan

the bulk of the Palestinian population were concentr

• In those days, the combat doctrine of the ID

based on four broad concepts. First, time is of the e

during operations and combat, as there is always the 

of international intervention or the intervention 

superpower such as the United States that would lea

cease-fire before the war objectives have been accomp

Consequently, the actual fighting must be conducte

quickly. This is achieved by a rapid breakthrough in

depth of the enemy defense layouts through the m

employment of firepower of all types from the groun

and sea. Second, in order to achieve speed, forces sho

landed in the rear of the enemy’s territory from air an

These forces should then isolate the theater of oper

and prevent the enemy forces from conducting ef

defensive operations. Third, should it become necess

pass cities en route to the interior of enemy territory

should be bypassed or traversed as quickly as po

using massive firepower, but not engaging in mopp

the entire city or parts thereof, which is totally undes

and should be avoided. Fourth, if the operational obje

are located in the cities, these cities should be enc

before anything else.

37
• The “depth” concept, vital in any military oper

had been interpreted in the operational plans of 1982 

rapid takeover of the urban coastal strip alon

Mediterranean coast of Lebanon. This was 

accomplished through a rapid offensive operation lau

from different directions, including the landing of a 

infantry division between Sidon and Beirut, which w

advance promptly to the north in the direction of the ca

• Two directives, emphasized as vital, were added 

combat doctrine outlined above. The first was to 

insofar as possible, casualties among the civilian popu

in Lebanon, be they Christian, Muslim, Dru

Palestinian, since a bloodbath would be detrimental 

establishment of a new political order in that co

Second, casualties among the IDF personnel shou

prevented at all costs, as Israeli society was still r

from the traumatic losses of the 1973 war.

The operational concept was understood by the ID

had been understood in previous wars between the ID

Arab military forces, namely, the physical overpowe

the opponent in both the military and political sense. 

minister of defense told the chief of the IDF genera

the objective was “to annihilate the terrorist organiz

as a political or military element that possesses a quie

base of operations in Lebanon.”

All of these principles were to be augmented 

additional, highly influential doctrinal layer: the 

formations of the IDF in those days were organize

manner that perfectly suited the concepts 

high-intensity war, and the bulk of the land power con

of armored formations.

During this period, several Syrian army formation

deployed in Lebanon: one armored division p

commando group were in the Lebanon Valley, defende

massive layout of surface-to-air missiles, and one S

tank brigade and one infantry brigade were in Beiru

question that had hovered in the air between early 

38
until the beginning of the operation and even duri

first few days of the actual fighting was whether it wo

desirable and/or necessary to attack these units. Beyo

political considerations of the Israeli governmen

minister of defense, and the chief of the IDF genera

one may point to the prevailing understanding amo

senior officer cadre of the IDF: prompt penetration in

depth of the Lebanese territory all the way to Beiru

cutting off the main highway between Beirut and Dam

by the armored formations, would result in a S

military response anyway. Consequently, the Syrian 

deployed in Lebanon should be attacked before they h

opportunity to attack the Israeli forces—and the soon

better.

39

Figure 1. 
A close examination of the conceptual system of th

as described above can point to rather complex te

between the concepts, even before they were ac

implemented in the combat zones (both open and u

These tensions will be elucidated in the subsequent se

of this chapter.

As far as the Palestinian paramilitary organizati

Lebanon were concerned, four concepts that had s

their consciousness and activities in 1982, prior to th

should be noted.

• The Palestinian paramilitary organizations had 

assembled and organized, in part, like a regular m

organization. They did, however, maintain a subve

militant character at all times, with a form of organi

that was rather amorphous, that could blend in

civilian population in no time, and that could conti

operate out of this population in a subversive, ev

terrorist manner, thereby avoiding a direct encounte

an immeasurably superior regular army.

• The metamorphosis from a regular mi

organization into a subversive underground unit co

accomplished very promptly at both the local and re

levels. The Palestinian terrorist organizations cons

urban areas to be the most suitable locations fo

metamorphosis.

• The PLO, being a state-within-a-state in Lebano

not feel in any way responsible for the Lebanese of any 

faction, nor did it feel committed in any way t

government regime there. Its only responsibility was 

Palestinian population in Lebanon, those in the r

camps and those that had blended into Lebanese soc

• Long before June 1982, the PLO had ascertaine

an all-out offensive by the IDF into Lebanon sho

expected. Consequently, the PLO had prepared for su

offensive with eight objectives in mind:

40
1. To inflict on the IDF the heaviest possible casual

view of the high degree of sensitivity to casualties a

the Israeli public.

2. To evade a military decision by assimilatin

organizations and combatants in urban areas, once th

had employed its massive power in Lebanon.

3. To change the regular military organization i

amorphous, subversive, and evasive structure in the 

and towns.

4. To recruit the potential for the subse

struggle/combat effort from the Palestinian populat

the cities and the refugee camps in those cities.

5. To attempt to drag Israel into a military confron

with Syria, thereby alleviating the pressure exerted 

PLO.

41

Figure 2. 
6. To invoke a response from the interna

community and the U.N. so as to press for a cease-fire 

earliest possible time.

7. To initiate and encourage a dispute within 

society itself by dragging out the struggle endless

inflicting as many casualties as possible on the 

forces.

8. To delegate the responsibility for the actual fi

among the commanders of the cities, towns, and re

each man to the best of his abilities.

The Concepts and Collapse of the Lebanon Campaign.

Having reviewed the conceptual systems of both 

players on the eve of the operation in Lebanon, let u

examine how these systems were reflected 

implemented in reality and what the practical results 

• The IDF had no real difficulty in overpowerin

regular forces of the PLO. The relative strength was c

and overwhelmingly in favor of the IDF. The r

Palestinian units disappeared, however, only to be re

by a pattern of subversive, terrorist activity, particul

the major cities, with the Palestinian comba

assimilated into the civilian population. As th

remained stationed in Lebanon, the social infrastr

and class structure in Lebanon gradually cha

Paramilitary organizations that had enthusiast

welcomed the IDF troops when they entered Leban

June 1982 now became openly hostile and began to 

the IDF as well as other elements. Car bombs beg

explode near military installations, and even the emb

of the United States and France did not escape som

blows. The IDF had no effective solution fo

phenomenon.

• The “infrastructure” concept turned out to be a f

as it was a concept involving physical military implica

In reality, it came to be understood that the terr

42
infrastructure was located elsewhere—in the Pales

welfare organizations throughout Lebanon and 

refugee camps, their schools, their employment age

the health services they had established, their m

financial support organization, and their mosques. Th

a social infrastructure, a welfare infrastructure, 

which the combatants had grown and on which 

families relied. How do you “annihilate” an infrastruc

this type, most of which was located in the major cit

• The fighting along the urban coastal stri

necessary, despite the fact that traditional combat do

had maintained that entering cities should be avoide

that such populated centers should be bypassed. The 

of Tyre and Sidon were captured, Beirut was encircled 

sides, and the threat on the capital was clearly impose

Lebanese government, nonetheless, continued to ope

the capital, almost without any evident cha

Government services carried on, public transport se

operated, and even the port remained active. In Leban

country long accustomed to civil wars—economic, po

and social life went on even with battles raging nearb

with the capital under siege and clearly threatened

all, the Lebanese government understood that Israel s

to settle a score with Arafat and his organization, the 

Their approach, therefore, was to straddle the fence a

how the situation would develop.

• The concept of “urban warfare depth,” which ha

realized during the first day of the war through the la

(from the air and sea) of an IDF light infantry d

between Sidon and Beirut, turned out to be unsatisf

as far as the urban environment of Lebanon was conc

“Depth,” in this case, was the ability of the Pales

organizations to change their shape and tran

themselves from a regular military organization 

subversive, amorphous terrorist group operating insi

major cities and smaller towns.

43
• The directive calling for the lives of IDF servicem

be preserved at all costs led, as early as during th

hours of the operation, to an intensive employm

firepower, from both the ground and air. A major part 

firepower was delivered, as expected, on the built-up 

of the Lebanese cities, where the Palestinian m

organizations operated much more effectively than th

in the open areas. The immediate result was that casu

among the civilian population were more extensive 

among the Palestinian combatants. Eventually, all 

various elements of the Lebanese population grew 

and frustrated about the damage and destruction cau

the IDF fire and about the number of killed and wo

among the population that had not been involved 

conflict to begin with.

Since the 1920s, and more acutely since 1975, the h

environment in Lebanon has abounded with con

disputes, antagonisms, and severe tensions. 

environment consists of a complex religious and 

mosaic characterized by extreme social and eco

polarization. Struggles for political domination amo

various communities and factions have been fairly com

with each faction maintaining its own parami

organization. Several subversive organizations confo

to extreme political beliefs operated in Lebanon, and 

all these warring factions loomed the massive Pales

political and military presence, which began to inten

September 1970, when the Palestinian mi

organizations had been driven out of Jordan by fo

arms. 

When the IDF attacked Lebanon on June 6, 198

mosaic described above was not particularly evident d

the first week of massive fighting. Following the capt

almost half of Lebanon’s territory, installation of the s

Beirut, and the attempt to mop up PLO combatant

the coastal cities, however, it became apparent th

simmering cauldron of Lebanon was beginning to 

against the IDF. This was not a coordinated, con

44
effort, but a fairly annoying and troublesome phenom

nevertheless. In an environment of this type, even th

intelligence organization would have found it diffic

understand who is acting against whom and why. A p

political and intelligence reorganization, both civ

military, was required in order to gain an understand

the internal Lebanese chaos and function withi

environment in order to accomplish the political obje

of the operation.

It was soon realized that this kind of effort take

and lags behind the military operations taking place 

ground. This phenomenon was evident throu

Lebanon, but was particularly acute in the coastal citi

Beirut.

• During the first week of the operation, th

captured thousands of Palestinian men in Tyr

Sidon—and subsequently in the Beirut area—who 

suspected of belonging to Palestinian mil

organizations. These men were taken to temporary pr

of war (POW) concentration camps, interrogated b

and then sent to a central POW camp establish

southern Lebanon. There they were sorted 

interrogated, and kept imprisoned for many months, 

humane conditions, as was the norm for prisoners o

Over time, it was realized that internal social dyn

developed among the Palestinian prisoners in this c

POW camp that led to a profound process of 

integration and subsequently to a solid social, politica

military coherence. In short, anyone wishing to vie

“products” or the “alumni” of the Ansar Prison Camp 

was called) will find them as the hard core of today’s m

organizations of the Palestinian Authority in the 

Strip, Judea, and Samaria. If I may, I will allow my

take credit for the statement that was made public th

the news media in late 1982: “At Ansar, we establish

military of the future Palestinian state.”

45
• The structure and organization of the IDF and wh

they were compatible, or possibly incompatible

operations in urban environments were another ma

concern. The IDF of 1982 was optimally structure

organized to engage in conventional warfare agains

military forces in the Middle East. This was the result 

power buildup and improvements that had 

implemented since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Th

was excellent at operations involving armored forma

combined with and supported by aerial and naval elem

These combat units possessed extensive armored m

and massive firepower, even as confined withi

assaulting echelon itself. The IDF of those day

excellent at fighting within the environmen

boundaries of a state apparatus, opposite regular m

organizations employed by indisputable “

apparatuses.” This was a military organization tha

perfectly suited to the old world of war—it was cer

capable of taking on the regular Syrian Army units de

in the Lebanon Valley as well as the Syrian Air Forc

IDF of those days, however, was not structure

organized for a kind of warfare where evasiveness, la

physical presence, and absence of a clear physical form 

the main characteristics of the opponent, and wher

amorphous opponent had primarily established itself 

cities.

Moreover, the abundance of amorphous pol

military, and organizational apparatuses in Leban

not “match” the combat methods and norms of a m

regular military. It would seem that the maneu

modes of the IDF, more than anything else, determin

manner of fighting and the nature of the campa

Lebanon, which did not match the Lebanese pheno

where a clearly defined state apparatus did not exi

where the old rules of war did not apply. In this st

affairs, each incident, whether combat or operat

attained its own significance, without any lo

regulating order.

46
• As for the meaning of the “operational dec

concept with regard to the incursion into Lebano

“decision” concept was acceptable and essential in I

past wars—the War of Independence, the Sinai opera

1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Yom Kippur W

1973. But the “decision” in those wars w

military/operational rather than a political one, a

military outcome did not lead to an end of the c

between Israel and her neighbors. The question 

involves the meaning of “decision” in a limited

low-intensity war, such as the Lebanon campaign of 1

came to be understood that the military achieve

against the Palestinian organizations and Syrian 

units in Lebanon apparently resulted in a military de

(a decisive military victory), but failed to resolve an

concerned with the Lebanese entanglement, a

entanglement could not be settled by capturing ter

annihilating military forces, making military decision

establishing a new political order. The urban territo

the task of overpowering the enemy forces deployed 

turned out to be problematic in the context of this new 

of war. This was in contrast to the capturing of a city d

World War II, or even during the wars of the 1950

1960s, where destruction was an effective measur

siege toppled governments. In the past, if a dec

superior strength could be amassed, it could ach

decisive military victory—an operational decision. 

Lebanese reality of 1982, even when the IDF had ac

an overwhelming superiority of strength, the enem

had the option of evading a decisive confrontation, th

avoiding an operational decision.

• Finally, and this is possibly the most imp

observation, the IDF had planned to conduct the sh

possible operation in Lebanon, following which the 

order” would be implemented. In reality, several oper

were conducted. The first was the operation again

PLO, in the course of which IDF troops reached Beir

attempted to hand over control to the Maronite Chr

47
militia. The second, conducted at the same time as th

was the operation against the Syrian Army in the Le

Valley. The third operation involved the fighting i

around Beirut until the PLO was expelled, includi

tragic massacre at the Palestinian refugee camps o

outskirts of Beirut. The fourth involved the prepara

the IDF for a long-term stay to the south of Beirut, w

clear objective. The last operation, which lasted unt

2000—17 years—involved the deployment of the I

southern Lebanon. From a single, short-term m

operation, the situation became a full-scale campaig

was it really a campaign? A campaign is a logical seq

of operations, each one evolving out of the previous on

paving the way for the accomplishment of war objecti

the basis of previous achievements. In Lebanon, since 

the situation has been an “unregulated sequen

operations” or “an operation dragged into several oper

that were not sufficiently clarified.” Thus, as Fig

makes clear, it was not a campaign in the logical o

sense of the word.

CONCLUSION

Pursuant to this fairly trenchant criticism, we s

attempt to draw up a scheme of how issues associate

urban operations should be approached. We must d

based on our understanding of the phenomena of the w

today and tomorrow. If we find ourselves engaged 

all-out war in the style of 30, 40, or 50 years ago, w

once again destroy entire cities like we did then. This f

urban warfare is difficult but ultimately tractable.

However, limited-scale, low-intensity conflicts 

come to characterize our reality over the last few year

possibly in the foreseeable future as well. Unfortunat

far as operations in urban environments are concer

would seem that our interpretive conceptual system

still rooted in the realm of high-intensity conflicts, an

they are unsuitable for low-intensity conflicts 

48
operations are conducted in urban environments. W

new conceptual systems, and the question is whe

what fields of knowledge—we should seek thes

systems.

I believe that the tactical field of knowledge do

have much to offer. I do not think that we can develop 

kind of tank warfare or attack helicopter tactics for 

operations that would give us any substantial advan

when we are once again compelled to engage in com

built-up areas. Likewise, even if we provided the in

and/or other combat or support service branches 

improved, more effective equipment, this would still 

provide an adequate solution to the problem at hand

the concept—based on solid, successful experien

49

Figure 3. 
hitting targets located in built-up areas by mea

precision-guided munitions, in the manner of a sur

scalpel, would not advance solutions to or resolv

problems associated with operations in u

environments in the context of limited-scale, low-int

wars.

Instead, we must develop new concepts i

operational and strategic fields. Once we have done th

may be enlightened regarding the structure 

organization of the forces we would have to employ in 

environments. I believe that we have not made 

progress in these areas. We may be clinging to the re

tactical concepts. This is because they are more tan

and we possess extensive experience in this realm

question here is whether these concepts are relevant

At this point, then, I would like to present 

preliminary ideas regarding the required concepts.

• We should attempt to free ourselves from 

interpretive conceptual systems that have charact

wars of the past. Most of these wars were high-int

wars between one sovereign state and another. It m

understood that crossing the border of a country, 

adversary entity, with massive military forces car

clear and undisputable mark of aggression that w

difficult to remove even with the most justifiable cau

may fare better by adopting the “power proje

approach, i.e., projecting power on the opponent lead

his regime, and on the ruling faction and centers of po

the most direct way. Efforts in this regard should be fo

not only directly on the government organs, but also o

interests, upon which they consolidate their rule 

economically and politically.

• A sympathetic—or neutral—population is an as

any case of intervention. Efforts to win the support 

population, to please it, or to keep it neutral are just a

as the main military effort. Moreover, the plannin

actual conduct of the military operation must be profo

50
influenced by these efforts to maintain and perpetua

sympathy of the population.

• If the majority of the population or all of it ide

with the opponent, then exerting massive pressure 

should be avoided, due to the negative results this 

yield in the long run.

• In the past, it was customary to think and opera

“sequential” manner. First, we intervened using m

force, did our best to quell any relevant military oppo

and only then attempted to establish a civilian regim

reinstate stability. The damage we caused by our m

operation was very difficult to repair or make up for d

the next phase. It is imperative that we distinguish, 

maximum extent possible, the opponent—be it the re

the military leadership, or the military forces—fro

civilian population. This process of separation mu

initiated as soon as the first aggressive military mov

launched. I believe that medical forces, medical su

medical personnel, and medicines should be availa

the civilian population just as they are for one’s own 

Convoys carrying food and aid for the civilian popu

may have to advance along with those carrying ammu

and fuel for the combat elements, so that, at the 

earliest moment, we are able to prevent a shortage o

food and supplies among the civilian population.

• Any military operation should be accompan

immediate negotiations, rather than sticking wit

traditional aim of “achieving a military decision first

engaging in negotiations.” Even if there is no d

negotiating partner in sight, a real effort should be in

in order to find such partner.

• We must assign the highest degree of importan

priority to the task of isolating the opponent regim

adversary leadership, and military forces from the c

population, from the outside world, and even fro

another. We should shut down and neutralize all in

and external communications, including even those 

51
media that are sympathetic to our cause. Interna

external isolation are very beneficial, and only car

selected information should be released for publicat

this regard, we may follow the example of how the 

media campaign was managed by U.S. forces and 

allies during the Gulf War). In all probability, tech

may offer an extensive range of capabilities to h

accomplish this task.

• On numerous occasions, we attacked and des

physical infrastructure elements within the ar

influence in order to exert pressure on the opponent a

interests. Such infrastructure elements included br

transportation, power stations, etc. In the short term

course of action may have been beneficial. In the lon

however, its benefits are doubtful, as the purpose 

intervention was to make peace and restore stability

it is very difficult to accomplish this in a country or a

whose infrastructure we have destroyed.

• Intervention in a remote country where a cr

under way such as Lebanon, Bosnia, or Kosovo tempt

examine whether we may be assisted and supporte

faction of the local population, a faction that resis

regime, the government, and the leader, or that 

adversary of some or most of the population. Sup

arms to a faction of this type, as well as the establishm

a new militia, integrating it in our operational effor

providing it with freedom of operation, may be ben

during the initial stages of intervention. In the lon

however, this course of action is likely to lead to atr

(as was the case in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee cam

the outskirts of Beirut in September 1982, as well 

Kosovo). Moreover, we will leave the country eventual

only after having generated a strong sense of ho

among the civilian population—hostility that may w

worse than that we had come to pacify. The worst fai

the IDF in Lebanon was the massacre by the Ma

Christian militia in the Palestinian refugee cam

Beirut. These atrocities led to the loss of legitimacy 

52
entire campaign, to direct intervention by the United 

and the U.N., and to the beginning of the Israeli withd

from Lebanon. The major lesson that may be learne

this affair is this: in urban operations in the cont

low-intensity conflicts, beware of your friends just a

would of your enemies.

• Much has been said and done about the employm

Special Forces in urban operations. These forces nor

consist of first-rate military units, possessing combat 

of the highest order. The question is, do we need S

Forces of a different type, in addition to those w

familiar with and used to? I believe we should ser

consider the employment of Special Forces capa

assimilating into or mixing with the local population, 

overtly or covertly. These elements should be able to 

the local language and know the local culture and cu

They should serve as barometers regarding the attit

trends among the civilian population, moving in ah

the regular combat elements and sometimes behind 

They should provide advance warning of imminent m

atrocities among the local population and identi

practical options for drawing the local population nea

our cause.

In urban operations, as attackers, we must be cons

on the move. This refers not only to the tactical, ph

movement toward our objective or to the mov

initiated in order to hit the targets, whatever they m

but also to other types of movements—political and 

in other words, constant political and social prop

throughout the space where the opponent doe

constitute a tangible, definite, homogeneous e

Political and social maneuvering are just as import

tactical and operative maneuvering. Any break i

continuous movement and propulsion process will e

the opponent to consolidate his defenses and sta

effective resistance, and could lead to an increa

international pressures, if such pressures exist in th

place.

53
If the opponent enjoys the ability to change for

shape, thereby evading a decisive encounter an

traditional “decision,” should we not acquire a capab

different one, admittedly) to change form and shape, i

the military and political sense? Can only regular m

forces, fighter aircraft, helicopters, and artillery accom

the task at hand? It is possible, and it is about time, to 

a new way of thinking regarding forces that are 

suitable for urban operations and that do not appea

“regular” in nature.

Finally, possibly the most important conclusion 

with the question of the state of our urban oper

doctrine and how our troops should be trained for this 

have already noted that the main problem involv

mapping of the state of our knowledge, followed b

development of this knowledge. This applies in partic

the operative and strategic fields of knowledge th

more vital than the tactical and/or technological field

main problem with the phenomenon of limited-sc

low-intensity wars is the fact that each is singula

unique. It is doubtful whether a conflict that may bre

in the future and in which we may be involved will be s

to any of our past conflicts. This phenomenon casts s

doubt on present urban operations doctrines. On the 

hand, we must have a doctrine, as otherwise we will 

with nothing and will not be able to educate and 

commanders and troops for combat operations in 

environments.

The doctrine we develop will almost always be dev

or detached from, a specific context. The context w

revealed and understood only when the crisis has b

imminent or has actually taken place. There mu

tension among the doctrine, the context, and the 

reality. While we may find it difficult to clarify this 

reality, we are currently experiencing this tension.

The national supreme command, the general staff

the services must understand that, once we have rea

54
crisis situation and have intervened in that crisis, w

most likely realize that our doctrine may be t

unsuitable, and that no all-embracing theory in the f

urban operations will help. When the next crisis occu

will need a different set of concepts and a completely r

process of conceptualization in which the commande

senior staff officers will be constantly engaged. This s

affairs and a process of this type may better prepare 

whatever the future may hold.

55
CHAPTER 4

LESSONS OF THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

1994-96 

Anatol Lieven

In this chapter, I shall examine certain less well-k

aspects of the Chechnyan war, especially from a po

social, and cultural perspective. And there are indee

reasons for such an approach. For it has been gen

recognized that for the foreseeable future urban b

involving the United States and her allies are very un

to be of the traditional military type such as Staling

1942-43 or Manila in 1945, where the task at hand w

straightforward capture of an urban area from 

organized military forces of a clearly defined na

enemy.

Instead, future urban operations are much more li

be against local forces including a strong element 

partisan force (as in Mogadishu), strongly-rooted 

local population, and often practically indistingui

from the “civilians.” Far from being simply milit

nature, such wars will therefore have an importan

complicated political element. In the past, we have 

been bad indeed at appreciating this aspect of m

endeavor, and the future holds some real risks for u

despite globalization, societies around the world still 

enormously and so in consequence do the kinds of p

military struggle they are capable of generating. This 

severe limits on the usefulness of any general doctr

urban warfare, beyond the narrowly military one of 

capture a house on a city block.

In Grozny in 1994, the Russians initially used the 

tactics they had used in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 1990, 

they were cut to pieces mainly because the Chechen

57
Azeris are such utterly different peoples when it com

their capacity for armed resistance. The U.S. militar

drawn into a much smaller debacle in Somalia 

because U.S. planners had failed to understan

workings of Somali clan society. If the United State

(God forbid!) tried to use the same tactics again

Chechens it had used successfully in Panama, it too 

have suffered severe reverses.

Of course, militaries are capable of learning as t

along, but after fighting commences, it may be a bi

especially in operations where the willingness of th

public to tolerate casualties is limited. When I made s

these comparisons 2 years ago to a friend who had for

served with the Central Intelligence Agency (C

Vietnam, he brushed them aside: “You’re exaggerati

ignorance of Vietnam. By 1966, we knew perfectly we

the Viet Cong were about Vietnamese nationalism a

as communism.”

This leads me to a provocative point. The ver

teachers of U.S. soldiers concerning urban warfare a

always journalists or academics, or even other U.S. so

They are people who can teach from within the men

and tactics of the kind of forces against which the U

States may be fighting in future. For a suitable fee, f

Viet Cong, Somali, and Chechen fighters would be 

than happy to impart to the American Army 

knowledge and skill—which they learned the hard w

Planning and Numbers.

The first thing to recognize about the Russian inva

Chechnya in December 1994 is that it was not the pre

Russian solution to the Chechnyan problem. Accord

documents I have seen and interviewees whom I trus

option was examined in the summer of 1994 and 

rejected because of the vehement opposition of the G

Staff, the command of the North Caucasus Military D

and Russian military intelligence. They all argued 

58
Russian invasion would face fierce opposition and 

demand numbers of Russian troops which were simp

available. Instead, a strategy was adopted of removi

anti-Russian Chechen regime by supportin

“clan-based” Chechen opposition, which had been in 

against President Dudayev during the previous year (

show later that this strategy rested upon an appa

sophisticated, but in fact largely mistaken analy

Chechen society).

What happened then was essentially that the Y

administration, and in particular a group of senior off

got their fingers caught in a wringer. The oppositio

supplied with arms and advisers, tried to capture G

and failed miserably. Instead of pulling back, M

increased the supply of arms and also sent several 

“volunteer” soldiers from the Russian armored for

operate the opposition’s armor and fire their gun

opposition tried again on November 26, 1994, and 

soundly beaten. Several of the Russian “volunteers

captured and confessed that they had been orde

Chechnya not by their own commanders, but by 

Defense Ministry officials.

At this point, the Yeltsin regime, and more impor

the officials directly responsible for the debacle (inc

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev), were faced wit

choice either of pulling back and accepting their humi

(with dire consequences for their own careers and Ru

prestige) or of escalating Russia’s intervention 

full-scale invasion. They chose the latter, wh

consequence was “planned” (or rather botched) 

fortnight after November 26. Because of their obje

the General Staff and the North Caucasus were l

excluded from the planning process.

A supreme commander for the operation (Ge

Eduard Vorobyev) was appointed only 2 days after 

actually began. He refused the command, pre

because—as he later publicly stated—when he arri

59
Chechnya, he found that there was no plan fo

operation, and the numbers of troops available were u

inadequate. He and several other generals were dism

from the service for their opposition.

This debacle, of course, reflects the utter irrespons

and incompetence of senior figures in the Yeltsin r

However, it is also a reminder to soldiers of their d

oppose foolish and irresponsible military decisio

political leaders, even when necessary at the price o

own careers. The awareness among Russian soldier

their own commanders did not support the war but al

not opposed it was a contributory factor in the disa

state of Russian morale throughout the war, which, in 

was the greatest single reason for the Russian defea

The lack of a plan for the operation led the Russi

adopt the same strategy they had in Baku in 1990 or 

in 1979 (though without the use of airborne forces): dr

armored column into the center of town and captu

main administrative buildings, on the assumption 

serious resistance would then cease. The resulting m

disaster has become a classic case study of the folly of 

massed armor without close infantry support in an 

setting.

One aspect of both the lack of planning and the g

state of the Russian army was lack of numbers. This 

aspect we would do well to pay close attention to, giv

small numbers of Western infantry. The initial R

force that invaded Chechnya was around 20,000 

hopelessly inadequate for the task. Even when the 

rose to 50,000 or so in the following weeks, the Ru

never had enough troops to isolate and besiege Gro

sprawling city built for 400,000 people covering almo

square miles. As a result, the Chechen fighters, 

fighting a long, heroic defense of the city, were a

withdraw to continue the battle in the mountains

Grozny is not a big city by contemporary world standa

60
megalopolis like Karachi could swallow the entire 

Army.

Equally important, lack of numbers meant th

Russians did not have the troops to hold Grozny afte

had finally captured it. Indeed, one could almost say t

soon as they won the city, they began to lose i

relatively good troops who had captured the city in th

were either rotated back to Russia to recover or sent so

the fighting in the mountains. Grozny was left garr

by inadequate numbers of second-rank troops, mainl

the Interior Ministry.

These troops tended to huddle in their comp

behind barbed wire and concrete, to such an extent 

became difficult to decide who was besieging who

night they would rarely venture out except for brief 

and the town largely reverted to the control of the Ch

fighters. The Russians were repeatedly sniped at, to 

they replied with massive volleys which only killed 

civilians and alienated still further the local popu

This de facto loss of control of the city allowed the Che

to launch a massive raid on the Russian positions in 

1996, and finally to recapture the whole of the c

August, capturing or killing hundreds of Russian tro

The lack of numbers needed to capture and con

major urban area in the face of massive hostility fr

population is a Western dilemma for which I can see n

solution, given the constraints on our own num

Technology provides certain substitutes for numbers

as yet nowhere near the point that it could compens

actual soldiers, above all in policing operations.

The Russian experience in Grozny raises two 

uncomfortable issues. The first is wh

politically-mandated cease-fires during the occupatio

city are necessarily always a good thing from a m

point of view. The cease-fire that lasted from J

December 1995, and for 2 months in the early sum

1996, contributed to the demoralization of the R

61
forces in Grozny. On the one hand, they were spar

prospect of imminent mass attack, and their watchf

declined in consequence. On the other, they could not 

rest, because they were kept continually on edge by s

and small-scale raids to which they were not allow

respond with massive force.

Finally, there is the question of civilian casualt

frequently given figure for dead in the war of 1994

100,000. This, in turn, is based on a figure of 25,000 c

dead for the capture of Grozny in December 19

February 1995, a figure originally proclaimed by R

human rights campaigner Sergei Kovalyov. These f

are nonsense. During the battle for Grozny, hospitals 

city had obviously closed, but those to the south of th

were in operation, receiving wounded from the city

doctors were still keeping orderly records of all thos

treated. I visited those hospitals, and on the basis 

standard ratio of two or three wounded for every one d

cannot find any basis for more than a fraction of the f

given by Kovalyov. I later counted 812 bodies in mass g

in Grozny. Even assuming that many wounded 

reached the hospitals, and that many of the dead 

buried in the ruins, as few as 5,000 would be a high est

for the number of civilian dead in Grozny during this p

How can such a relatively small figure be accurate

the massive destruction of the center of the city? The r

of course is that by the time the Russian assault and 

massive bombardment began on December 21, only 

fraction of the city’s population remained in Grozny. A 

part of the population had been Russian, and most of 

left in 1991-94 to escape Chechen harassment. Th

great majority of the Chechen population left because 

sporadic Russian bombing in December, which kil

wounded several hundred Chechens and was accomp

by leaflets warning the population to flee. I was in Gro

late December and early January, and I can say that 

very most, one-tenth of the city’s previous popu

remained. This is why such a high proportion 

62
casualties were Russian pensioners, because unlik

Chechens they had no local relatives with whom they 

seek refuge.

Such considerations, of course, raise an acutely d

moral issue. For if the mass of the population as of 

December 1994 had remained in the city, without qu

the civilian death toll would have been vastly highe

would leaflets and radio broadcasts on their own hav

enough to persuade the others to flee? Or did the bom

in December indirectly and unintentionally help t

many lives? This is a desperately uncomfortable que

but one we cannot afford to duck if we assume that a

stage we ourselves may have to fight really serious b

in cities. For as retired Marine Lieutenant General Be

L. Trainor has warned, and as the example of Moga

makes clear, the use of massive firepower in the midd

civilian population will inevitably have horrendous r

On the other hand, to forego firepower on humani

grounds may well lead to the annihilation or surren

your own forces, which is also not an acceptable optio

obvious answer is not to fight in cities at all, but our en

may not give us that option.

Despise Not Your Enemy.

In judging the fighting capacity of the Chechens 

the Russian invasion of 1994, I made an absolutely c

mistake, a type that has been characteristic of 

professional Western military analyses in the past an

led to many disasters for Western forces. Outward

Chechen fighters looked like a scruffy bunch of civ

armed only with kalashnikovs, light machine gun

rocket-propelled grenades. They had no formal m

discipline or hierarchy, and I knew for a fact that sev

the groups and their commanders doubled as cr

gangs. 

I had seen such groups before, fighting on the Ge

and Azeri sides of wars in the southern Caucasus, and 

63
seen how they had broken and run in the face of vast

firepower than the Russians would be able to bring t

in Chechnya. Finally, I had seen how in the low-leve

war in Chechnya in 1993-94 between the supporte

opponents of President Dudayev, the two sides had 

reluctant to get to serious grips with each other. O

basis of such factors, I expected the Chechens to pu

weak and above all disorganized, undisciplined resista

I was, of course, completely wrong (and so, 

importantly, was Russian intelligence). Our m

reflected our own cultural prejudices and ignorance, 

led the Russians to make the fatal mista

underestimating their enemy. This is also a continuou

for Western military analysts, leading us into disaste

disaster over the years, with Vietnam the most o

example and Somalia the most recent. This tendency 

course, a very old one. A favorite British cartoon of 

from 1879 shows a feathered Zulu warrior standing be

blackboard, with John Bull as a schoolboy sitting on a 

The Zulu is writing on the blackboard with his 

“Despise Not Your Enemy.” This cartoon was publish

after a British column armed with rifles, cannon

rockets had been wiped out by Zulus armed only with s

at Isandhlwana.

In my case, this mistake occurred despite or 

because of the fact that I had spent long periods in 

parts of the Caucasus. For Chechens are not Azeris, t

they live within 200 miles of each other and though bo

Muslim peoples who spent 70 years under Soviet rule

because fighters have no uniforms or modern m

structures does not mean that they cannot fight 

brilliant effectiveness on their own soil; discipline can 

as well from deeply rooted social patterns and cu

traditions as from formal military rules or hierar

Moreover, all wars are not the same, even when the

place on the same soil.

64
Concerning the Chechen civil war prior to the R

invasion, the point to be drawn from the unwillingne

restraint shown in the struggle was an unwillingness 

other Chechens. For reasons both historica

anthropological (the blood feud) there are extremely 

inhibitions against Chechen killing Chechen. In the 

of Professor A. Vachargayev in September 1994, “N

side wants to fire first, because whichever is the first t

Chechen blood will lose prestige and support.”

1

 The re

to invasion by the hated Russians was, of course, comp

different.

On the surprising military capacity of compara

primitive and anarchic peoples, there have been num

anthropological studies, some of them written by W

colonial officers, for example the Frenchman R

Montagne, who wrote as follows on the Berber 

alliances of Morocco:

Even if the confederation has, strictly speaking, no specific instituti

other than a uniform body of customary law by which all members 

bound, its solidarity is assured by the strength of the powerful feeling

unity and mutual obligation which emerge in times of conflict. Our [i.e., 

French] military officers in the Middle Atlas have recognized this for a l

time past. “When you wish to pacify them,” Maurice Le Glay makes on

his heroes say in a novel, “You will find before you a scatter of human

You have to chase after each tent in order to talk to the head of each sm

family, and to establish any sort of control over them takes years. If 

face them in battle though they fall upon you all at once and in v

numbers, and you wonder how you can possibly extricate yourself.

2

The Russian anthropologist Sergei Arutiuno

something similar to say about the Chechens:

Chechnya was and is a society of military democracy. Chechnya never 

any kings, emirs, princes, or barons. Unlike other Caucasian natio

there was never feudalism in Chechnya. Traditionally, it was governed 

a council of elders on the basis of consensus, but like all milit

democracies—like the Iroquois in America or the Zulu in south

Africa—Chechens retain the institution of military chief. In peaceti

they recognize no sovereign authority and may be fragmented int

hundred rival clans. However, in time of danger, when faced w

65
aggression, the rival clans unite and elect a military leader. This leader 

be known to everyone as an unpleasant personality, but is ele

nonetheless for being a good general. While the war is on, this lead

obeyed.

3

Know Your Enemy’s Society.

An awareness of the need to understand the work

different societies is now widely present in We

militaries. However, all too often this comes do

practice to a series of stereotypes which can be alm

dangerous as sheer ignorance. The approach of R

intelligence to Chechnya is a classic example. The Ru

saw correctly that Chechnya is not a modern society, 

is highly divided internally, and that traditional cla

Chechen, teip) play an important social role. From 

however, they deduced that clan loyalty is the 

important element in Chechen political beh

something which does indeed appear to be the case in 

parts of Central Asia and Africa, including Somalia. O

basis of this, they assumed that they could easily 

game of divide and rule, setting up a pro-Russian allia

clans excluded from power by the Dudayev regime.

This plan was based on a whole set of mistakes. 

first place, as already noted, apparently deeply d

societies have a way of uniting against alien interven

especially by a power against whom the people hav

historical grievances. The United States, too, s

remember this before intervening anywhere in the M

world. Secondly, thanks to the effects of Soviet ru

especially the deportation of 1944-57, Chechen trad

society was greatly shaken, and the role of the clans 

reduced. 

It must be noted, too, that even in the trad

Chechen order, the dominance of the teip as a fo

hereditary allegiance was qualified by other loyalties

tukum, or territorial grouping of several different te

the extended family, to the lineage group, and to th

66
brotherhood or vird, itself an increasingly here

institution. In the time of Shamil, his religious war a

military institutions it generated (the first sta

quasi-state structures Chechnya had ever known) 

Chechens across teip lines, as nationalism does today. 

words of Professor Vachargayev, “You can’t reduce Ch

society to the teips or any other simple formula, wh

some so-called ‘experts’ in Moscow may think.” Even 

height, therefore, the teip may never have enjoye

unqualified loyalty owed (at least according to legen

Scottish clan, for example. The extended family has b

particular importance as an alternative, and in some c

rival, source of identity and focus of loyalty. For s

centuries at least, Chechen teip members have m

married outside their own tieps.

Broadly speaking, the present situation appears t

follows: as a matter of personal identity and f

tradition, the teip has a varying degree of importan

Chechens, depending on the degree of 

“modernization,” urbanization, education, pla

habitation (the mountains being much more traditio

in this regard than the plains), and, indeed, ideo

nationalism or religious commitment. I have heard 

Chechen nationalists, especially ones of a religious 

declare that the teip tradition should really be done 

with because all that matters is the nation and God

are at best a distraction in this view, at worst a sou

division. In the words of a Chechen religious elder:

The teip is much too large a unit, and much too dispersed, to exercise a

control over individuals any more. What matters is the family group, inclu

mother’s family. That is the unit which is going to decide whether a youth goe

or not, unless he’s already decided for himself, of course. If his father, or 

respected adult in the wider family, says fight, the young men will fight. And 

“Don’t fight,” they will at least listen attentively.

4

But while the teip may be to a great extent poli

moribund, the clan, in a much looser political 

continues to characterize Chechen politics as it does 

much of the world. Closely linked to this has been the 

67
clan connections in forming a basis for particular Ch

criminal groups. Several months before the war be

Chechen mafia leader in Moscow gave me some insigh

how Chechen society works today. I asked him if Ch

mafia groups were recruited on the basis of particula

or virds. He replied that the system is not so formal:

What matters is that someone has to be recommended to us by people w

we know and respect. They may be our relatives, or they may be connect

us in some other way. We Chechens are a small people—we all know 

other, we know who is respected and who isn’t. The point is that w

someone joins us, then his family and his backers, the men 

recommended him, are also responsible for his behavior. If he were to be

us or let us down—and that happens very rarely—then they woul

ashamed, they would lose respect. They themselves would bring him to t

and make him apologize or make things good in some way. We wouldn’t h

to do anything. That is why you very rarely find Chechens killing each ot

unlike the Russians and other groups. We don’t need to. We have 

traditions, and they are very strong.

5

What the Russian experience in Chechnya brings 

that even a largely pre-modern society may, in fa

extremely complex. The equivalent of Anthropology 

not an adequate basis for drawing up a political-m

strategy for dealing with such societies. Simplistic for

like “clan loyalties” may be actively misleading, pointi

way to faulty and even dangerous strategies. The onl

in these circumstances is really detailed local know

Since it is impossible for the U.S. military to have in

information about many different parts of the wo

should be prepared to obtain such help from outside 

required: obviously from the State Department an

CIA, but also from the worlds of academia and journ

The U.S. commanders in Somalia could have done 

more anthropologists and less artillery; and 

commanders in Vietnam would have done better to lis

the French-American soldier, journalist, and his

Bernard Fall, author of Street Without Joy, than t

endless papers by analysts with no serious experience 

country.

68
Local Allies: The Necessary Nightmare.

The issue of understanding the society in which y

operating leads me to my final point, the vexed ques

local allies and auxiliaries. These are vital from two 

of view. The first is intelligence. The difficulties c

formidable. For just as U.S. scouts would have dif

blending into the population of Burundi, Russian sco

Grozny were similarly spotted, and in consequence 

way of returning to their units in two neatly sepa

pieces, which had a discouraging effect on their com

Moreover, on at least one occasion, when a scouting 

got into difficulty, the attempt to rescue it led to a 

battle of a kind the Russians particularly did not w

fight. Obviously, a vastly preferable alternative is 

local scouts with local knowledge, who can blend in

local population. Such scouts may simply be mercen

but much more likely they will be some form of local po

and/or ethnic ally.

The second reason for employing local allies is, of c

that they provide political cover. They give prot

against the accusation, whether from foreign count

the domestic news media, that the intervening forc

some form “colonial” or “imperialist,” imposing its wi

nation united in opposition. Indeed, it may well be th

local opposition force is the reason why you got involv

place to start with.

So local allies are necessary, but they can b

described as a necessary evil. This matter can be su

up in the observation that they tend to be eith

enthusiastic or not nearly enthusiastic enough. If they 

from a local ethnic or ethno-religious group with it

agenda, they may use the umbrella provided by 

military protection to massacre and expel their local 

rivals, deeply embarrassing and compromising you 

process. The Israelis experienced this to their cost wi

Lebanese Christian militia, and we are learning the 

lesson with the Kosovar Albanians.

69
On the other hand, if you are operating in an ethn

homogenous environment (like Chechnya), you will 

be entirely sure that your supposed allies are not 

working for the other side. The United States ha

experience again and again in Vietnam, and the Fre

both Vietnam and Algeria. This may not be becaus

“allies” are ideologically committed to the enemy. The

be intimidated, or blood links may win out over 

allegiances. Again and again in Chechnya, I heard of 

where the families of leading pro-Russian figures 

shelter and protection to relatives who were fighting 

other side.

Finally, in many societies, you may find that a key 

of your battle with the enemy takes place in the cr

world, and your allies are drawn from local criminal g

with all the political and moral problems this brings 

wake. A classic example of this was the French ba

keep control of Algiers, where the most effective te

leader on the side of the Algerian rebels, Ali La Poin

the Knife), was a leading pimp and enforcer, who b

with the leading pro-French informer and hoodlum, S

Pur (Safy the Clean).

The morally and politically complicated world into 

Western forces can be drawn is summed up in a pass

Jacques Dalloz about the French war in Indochina:

The Hoa Hao broke their uneasy alliance with the Viet Minh in April 1

after the Mad Bonze had been lured into a trap and liquidated. The prin

military leader of the sect, Nam Lua, was an illiterate former bus d

whose wife, a former ticket collector, had formed a corps of fears

amazons. The French made this colorful character Commander in Ch

the Hoa Hao army, and gave him the rank of general and a decoration

was allowed to reap the benefits of their patronage and to become very 

The allegiance of Nam Lua did not however entail the allegiance of the w

sect. The agents of the Deuxieme Bureau had to deal with the com

rivalries of these petty warlords. Some liquidated their rivals, using 

arms and military advisers they had received from the French, and 

went off to fight on their own account. Making a record numbe

recantations, one of them, Ba Cut, signed an oath of allegiance five times 

70
Originally members of the Viet Minh front, the Binh Xuyen were a

persuaded to change sides in 1948. The organization could best be terme

gang rather than a sect. Its leader, Bai Vien, had escaped from prison 

[He] made a sort of pact with the colonial authorities in which 

guaranteed the security of metropolitan Saigon in return for finan

advantages. The Binh Xuyen dealt in opium and prostitution and so 

and they soon ousted the Chinese and took control of the underworld.

As Dalloz remarks with delicious understate

“Handling all these sects was hardly an easy task.”

7

In Chechnya, this facet of urban partisan warf

summed up in the figure of the Russian ally B

Gantemirov. He started as a police officer, minor hoo

dealer in stolen cars in Moscow (in Russia

elsewhere!—a very useful combination of day and 

jobs). He rose to be a second-rank Chechen mafia l

and in 1990-91 he and his men returned to Chechnya

other criminal groups, they played a part in the na

revolution which overthrew Communist rule. When 

met him at the start of 1992, he was heading the “I

Renaissance Party” of Chechnya. And so help me, I too

title seriously and interviewed him solemnly abo

spread of Islamic politics to the Caucasus, when wh

presence really demonstrated was an expansion 

used-car market.

Gantemirov became mayor of Grozny, but brok

General Dudayev and his supporters in 1993. Allege

key reason for this was a dispute over the proce

various criminal operations in Russia. He joined the 

Chechen opposition, and in 1994 sided with the R

invaders, who restored him to the mayoralty of G

Then in early 1996, a very remarkable 

happened—remarkable for Yeltsin’s Russia as a who

alone Chechnya. So outrageous and damaging 

Gantemirov’s corruption (he embezzled the greater p

the Russian funds for the reconstruction of Grozny) t

was actually dismissed and imprisoned (an addi

reason for this may have been the hostility of Russia’s 

71
ally in Chechnya, former Communist Party boss 

Zavgayev).

Gantemirov spent several years in jail before 

pardoned and released in 1999 when the Russians d

on a renewed intervention in Chechnya. Once 

Gantemirov was given a senior post on the Russian 

and his men became an auxiliary police force fighti

Russia. And since then, Gantemirov has given really 

help to Russia on a number of occasions.

On the other hand, he is also a major headache. 

first place, the presence of this notorious criminal 

Russian side undermines Russian claims to be fight

law and order and against banditry in Chechnya. Sec

Gantemirov is bitterly at odds with the Russians’ mai

ally in Chechnya, the religious leader and provisiona

of government, Akhmed Kadyrov. On a numb

occasions, their men have come to the edge of serious 

conflict, forcing the Russians to offer bribe after br

keep the peace.

Finally, Gantemirov and his men have deep cr

links with leading figures on the side of the Chechen 

resistance. In part, this is precisely what m

Gantemirov useful to the Russians; he can use his co

both to penetrate enemy groups, and to persuade 

leaders to cut a deal and surrender. This abilit

demonstrated in his brokerage of the peaceful surren

Chechnya’s third biggest city, Urus Martan, in Nov

1999.

This was a major coup for the Russians, and saved 

lives. On the other hand, it appears to have included 

passage out of Urus Martan, and possibly a guaran

future immunity, for leading gangsters/gue

commanders on the Chechen side—some of whom pro

launched attacks on Russian forces elsewhere in Chec

These men appear to include some of the leaders of th

worst kidnapping gangs, whose attacks on Russia

Western citizens between 1996 and 1999 helped bring 

72
the present war. The arrangement at Urus Martan 

on top of several years of murky dealings betwee

Russian security forces and the Chechen gangs, bo

political reasons and to procure the release of R

military and official hostages.

Such deals have allowed anti-war (or at least anti-

sections of the Russian news media to claim th

Russian security forces themselves are involved 

kidnapping trade and have been taking rake-offs fro

kidnappers in return for granting immunity from a

Such allegations are then worked into a baroque cons

theory of the kind beloved by Russians (and all too 

Western journalists, alas) whereby the war is 

artificially continued by the Russian authorities in or

profit senior Russian officials, and that this—not R

incompetence, Chechen skill, or local geography—ex

the failure so far to capture the main Chechen and r

Islamist resistance leaders. During the war of 1994-9

kind of conspiracy theory was very widely believ

Russian soldiers, having a disastrous effect on their m

I do not know the exact nature of the dealings be

the different Russian security services and the kidna

gangs. Probably, given the murky nature of that 

nobody has a complete picture. This borderline be

criminality and secret service activity is often a blurre

and the possibilities of corruption are immense, above 

a place as corrupt and demoralized as Russia. Of c

even if the Russian security services had employe

straightest arrows in the world, men motivated pur

patriotism and a desire for victory at the least cost in 

they might well have ended with much the same resu

know this is so, because in Indochina and elsewher

forces started with the straightest arrows in the world

ended with much the same result.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Interview with the author, September 23, 1994.

73
2. Robert Montague, The Berbers: Their Political and 

Organization, David Seldon, trans., London: Frank Cass, 1973, p. 35.

3. Sergei Arutiunov, “Ethnicity and Conflict in the Caucasus,” in 

Conflict and Russian Intervention in the Caucasus, Fred Wehling

Diego: Institute for the Study of Global Conflict and Cooperation, Univ

California, p. 17.

4. Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, New 

Yale University Press, 1998, p. 345.

5. Ibid.

6. Jacques Dalloz,The War In Indochina, 1945-54, Josephine Baco

New York: Macmillan, 1987, p. 110.

7. Ibid.

74
CHAPTER 5

THE BATTLES FOR SAIGON AND HUE

TET 1968

James J. Wirtz

On January 30-31, 1968, the Viet Cong (VC) and 

North Vietnamese allies launched a series of a

against dozens of cities and villages throughout 

Vietnam. Timed to coincide with the celebration 

Chinese lunar New Year, the Tet Offensive was inten

spark a “general offensive-general uprising,” leading 

disintegration of the Army of the Republic of Vi

(ARVN) and a revolt against the Saigon government. 

also ordered its forces to engage isolated U.S. military 

stationed along the Demilitarized Zone (especially a

Sanh) and units operating in the Central Highlands t

up the pressure as rebellion and mutiny swept urban 

The Tet Offensive was an effort to re-create the past s

against the French at Diem Bien Phu by delive

devastating military and political setback to the U

States and its allies. The collapse of ARVN and open 

in southern cities would create the appropriate cont

negotiations that would lead to U.S. withdrawal 

Indochina and unification of Vietnam under Comm

rule.

1

Vietnamese communists remain proud of the “g

offensive-general uprising.” They view the effort to cr

“spontaneous” urban rebellion, combined with an 

offensive using every military and diplomatic resou

hand, as a major innovation in the Chinese strat

People’s War. Urban warfare constituted the culmi

point of the Vietnamese concept of People’s War, al

their armed politicians (i.e., soldiers) to undertake 

“action among the enemy.”

2

 For the VC and their al

Hanoi, urban warfare was politics, which made the b

75
of Saigon and Hue the most important battles o

Fighting in Saigon, the seat of government power, an

the old imperial capital and an ancient symbol of aut

for the Vietnamese, sent a clear message to south

about the communists’ political aspirations. Thirty 

later, there is even more reason to treat urban operati

the ultimate expression of Clausewitz’s dictum that w

continuation of politics by other means.

Today’s joint doctrine recognizes that cities ofte

both the symbolic and substantive center of a nat

situation that military operations can exploit to pr

significant political consequences.

3

 Yet, joint doctrin

little to say about a paradox produced by urban fi

during the Tet Offensive. Even though urban oper

against the VC in Saigon and the People’s Army of Vi

(PAVN) in Hue were militarily successful, they 

produced negative political consequences for the U

States and its allies. What produced this paradox and 

other lessons do the battles of Saigon and Hue have t

today’s warfighter and planner?

To answer these questions, this chapter briefly des

the battles of Hue and Saigon. It identifies several l

from these two urban battles that might again be re

on future urban battlefields. It then conclud

suggesting that the quest for military victory alone s

not govern the conduct of urban operations.

Getting Down to Cases.

Although the motives behind Hanoi’s plan to atta

gain control of Saigon and Hue were similar, the cou

the battles differed significantly from one another. T

inflicted many casualties and caused great disrupt

Saigon, but they never really threatened to gain con

the capital. The battle for Saigon is best characterize

simultaneous eruption of scores of small-unit actions 

urban setting. In Hue, a division-sized PAVN force ac

gained control of the city before U.S. and ARVN units 

76
respond. Allied forces had the military situation in S

under control by about February 5. By contrast, the ef

retake Hue deteriorated into an urban siege that des

Vietnam’s old imperial capital over a period of weeks

Saigon. The battle for Saigon actually started 

before the Tet attacks. In the weeks leading up 

offensive, the VC had moved supplies and small ba

sappers into Saigon, relying on a network of covert ca

the city to provide shelter and intelligence. Because 

numbers of South Vietnamese had access to even th

important U.S. facilities, VC commanders often ha

opportunity to conduct a personal reconnaissance 

targets they would strike during Tet. Colonel Nam T

the commander of the 9th VC Division who plann

attack on the U.S. airbase at Tan Son Nhut, ac

entered the airbase during the 1967 Christmas cea

using forged identity papers.

4

 Intelligence about the 

battlefield was critical to VC commanders becaus

generally operated in the countryside. Local guides 

employed to lead VC units through Saigon and the n

city of Cholon, which was populated mostly by 

Chinese. By the start of Tet, the communists had m

the equivalent of about 35 battalions around the capit

about 4,000 sappers within Saigon for the attack. The 

Military Police Battalion, the 527th Military 

Company, a company from the 52nd Infantry, and th

Military Police Detachment were the only organize

forces within the city. Although they were on alert

expected only isolated terrorist attacks.

5

Starting at about 0300 on the morning of Janua

1968, the VC units attacked in and around Saigon. T

conducted three types of operations. First, they carrie

series of commando (sapper) attacks against the 

Embassy, Independence Palace, the Vietnamese Join

compound, Bachelor Officer Quarters, the Vietn

Naval Headquarters, the Saigon radio station, the Na

Police Headquarters, and other government and m

facilities in the heart of Saigon. A report drawn fro

77
command J-2 log describes the chaos that reigned in S

in the first days of the attack:

Embassy Hotel in SAIGON near [Republic of Korea] Embassy ha

estimated VC company using it as a strong point. Have machine gun

roof. Approximately 20 U.S. and local police and ROK MPs pinned dow

enemy. Doubt that they can hold out after dark. RACE TRACK AR

Capital Military District forces driving VC in direction of PX wareho

Warehouse lightly held by civilians and unarmed American personn

platoon (U.S.) on way to warehouse for reinforcement. [Bachelor Of

Quarters] #3: U.S. relief force still fighting a company size enemy f

enemy holding out in houses near BOQ. Wounded (U.S.) removed 

street. Dead in street. Town situation not getting better. Sporadic shoo

all over city.

6

In terms of military operations, the attacks were sign

because they greatly disrupted allied command and co

Instead of directing the overall response to the at

headquarters personnel became embroiled in the defe

various installations and billets.

Second, VC units attacked U.S. military facilities 

Son Nhut Airport (headquarters for the Military Assi

Command, Vietnam [MACV], was a tenant at the 

Bien Hoa air base, and U.S. command and logistics fac

at Long Binh. For awhile, the situation at all of 

facilities was in doubt as VC sappers penetrated d

perimeters, blew up aircraft in revetments, and deto

the ammo dump at Long Binh. General Frederick We

Commander of II Field Forces, Vietnam, who direct

defense of Saigon from his headquarters at Long Bin

only meters away from the defense perimeter at Long 

Third, when VC units were able to gain cont

neighborhoods in Saigon and its suburbs, they 

conducted political operations to win over the “hear

minds” of their fellow Vietnamese. According to V

Pohle, the techniques they employed closely resembl

tactics employed by VC armed propaganda team

operated in the countryside: (1) underming confide

the government by creating fear of the VC; (2) elimi

78
government officials and police; and (3) identifyin

eliminating government supporters.

8

 The VC 

especially intent on killing, kidnapping, and arr

government officials and soldiers, often going door t

looking for individuals or evidence that family me

were in ARVN or employed by the governmen

inhabitant of Saigon’s 6th district gave this descripti

VC sweep:

It was on the third day of Tet when the VC came to our area. They guar

the street, checked houses and ID cards, and forbade us to leave. [ARV

soldiers on leave were arrested and shot on the spot . . . they would sea

the people, and they would shoot at any secret police, capture a

[Government of Vietnam] soldiers. Ordinary people weren’t arrested, 

weren’t allowed to leave the area. Veterans and disabled veterans w

tied up and kept prisoners.

9

Because the VC controlled portions of Saigon for only 

time, their reign of terror was short-lived. Gover

officials caught inside Hue would not be so lucky.

Saigon itself was saved by the quick response o

units that had been moved closer to the capital in the 

leading up to the offensive.

10

 The sappers that att

various government installations within Saigon 

slowly surrounded and isolated. They could not hold 

positions without reinforcements from outside the cit

VC reinforcements would never reach cadre and sa

now heavily engaged inside Saigon. Mechanized unit

to relieve the beleaguered defenders of U.S. bases 

outskirts of Saigon in effect served to block follow-on a

against Saigon. For example, Troop C of the 3rd Squ

4th Calvary sent to relieve the defenders of Tan Son 

ran through the VC 271st Main Force Regiment tha

attacking the base, apparently cutting off the VC insi

base from reinforcements. Troop C suffered heavily in 

ambush, but it served as a first important barrier to e

movement toward Saigon. Assisted by additional c

troops throughout the day, those conducting the bat

Tan Son Nhut helped to create a mobile defense 

79
northwestern approaches to Saigon itself. Sim

mechanized units sent to help in the defense of Long 

soon began to sweep the northeast approaches to S

preventing VC reinforcements from entering the cap

The good-news defeat of the VC assaults against 

American bases, however, paled in significance 

compared to the bad-news public uproar generated 

sapper attacks that occurred in downtown Sa

especially the VC assault against the American em

For most journalists, the opportunity to witness comb

a rare event; even with assistance from MACV, rep

often arrived at the scene too late to witness m

significance. The international press corps, however, 

ringside seat at the Tet attacks in Saigon, with the ba

the U.S. Embassy being the main event. After Em

security personnel succeeded in killing the last of the 

sappers that had penetrated the Embassy grounds, G

William C. Westmoreland, Commander of MACV, a

on the scene and held an impromptu press conferen

reporters, already aghast at the Embassy scene an

firefights raging across the city, Westmorel

assurances that allied forces would go on to victory an

the Embassy attack was a publicity stunt appeared 

touch with current events. The reports they 

eventually file focused not only on the fighting, but 

unwillingness of senior officers to admit that th

offensive represented an important failure of intellige

command.

12

Hue. At the heart of Hue stood the Citadel, the ce

Vietnamese culture. Patterned after the Forbidden C

Beijing, the Citadel contained the old Imperial Pala

Palace of Perfect Peace, and other historic structure

walls of the Citadel were surrounded on three side

moat and on the south side by the Perfume River, wh

across the heart of Hue City. Hue had been vir

untouched by the war until the Tet offensive.

13

80
The defense of Hue was largely the responsibility 

1st ARVN Division, commanded by Brigadier Gener

Quang Truong, who was highly respected by his Am

allies. Truong had responded to indications that an e

attack was imminent by placing his division on alert a

positioning his units to repel an NVA effort to cut High

south of Hue. General Truong, whose headquarter

located inside the Citadel, did not expect that Hue 

would be the enemy’s objective.

14

During the early morning hours of January 31, ele

of the 4th and 6th PAVN regiments, the 810th 

Battalion, and two sapper companies infiltrated 

virtually undetected. By the time local comma

realized what had happened, only a few installations 

city remained in Allied hands, these being the 1st 

Headquarters in the north corner of the Citadel; the M

compound across the Perfume river in Hue City; the T

airfield; and an armory guarded by the U.S. Army

Ordnance Company. On February 1, PAVN units 

about 500 VC cadre released from the Hue jail and b

systematic search of the city in an effort to rou

Catholics, ARVN troops on holiday leave, Ame

personnel, or anyone having anything to do with the 

Vietnamese government. “At dawn,” a F

correspondent reported,

the new masters of the city went through the streets in groups of ten

each group, there was a leader who spoke to the people through a bullho

. . . The other members of the team . . . knocked on doors and passed 

pamphlets and leaflets. Joking and laughing, the soldiers walk in 

streets and gardens without showing any fear.

15

The discovery of about 3,000 bodies in mass graves o

Hue suggests that the solders’ mission was no j

matter.

16

The North Vietnamese also were digging in, prepa

use a walled fortress as the center of their def

position. North Vietnamese defenses were fundame

weakened, however, when a sapper company fai

81
destroy the An Cuu bridge south of Hue, thus allowin

forces to move up Highway 1 to relieve the Hue defe

Marine Alpha Company 1/1, which had picked up 

Marine tanks on its way to Hue, reached the M

compound on January 31 and prevented it from 

overrun by the North Vietnamese. The Marines also 

a boat dock and helicopter-landing pad on the Perfum

and the approach to the Nguyen Hoang bridge whi

directly across the Perfume River to the Citadel.

17

In contrast to the battle of Saigon, where 

mechanized units quickly stopped reinforcements 

reaching heavily engaged units inside the city, it took 

deal of time for allied units to isolate Hue. As a resu

PAVN was able to move additional units from the 

Division and supplies from its operating bases in the A 

Valley into the city. By about February 10, Marine uni

secured the city south of the Perfume River while ele

of the 1st Air Calvary Division in Operation JEB ST

slowly cut off PAVN’s resupply routes from the A 

Valley.

The PAVN defenses were generally oriented to d

against an external assault, but allied forces made use 

enclaves within Hue (e.g., the ARVN HQ compound an

Loc airfield) to launch counterattacks. Initially, the ef

retake Hue was intended to fall on ARVN’s shoulde

after several days of intense fighting, in which bad w

prevented the use of artillery or air support, the M

were called in to retake the Citadel on February 13. In 

house-to-house fighting the Marines, with the 

airstrikes, artillery, and fire support from Navy destr

finally regained control of Hue on February 23. The c

the siege, however, were high.

18

Toward the Future.

Although there is much about the Tet attacks a

Saigon and Hue that is indeed unique, the battles 

several lessons that planners and warfighters s

82
consider in thinking about future Military Operati

Urban Terrain (MOUT). A clear lesson is that MOUT 

in intensity. Everything from crowd control to sma

actions to high-intensity conventional combat can oc

an urban setting. Planners should thus make an ef

ensure that planning and training reflect these vari

in urban operations. Armored units that practice 

assaults using all of the firepower at their dispos

instance, should recognize that their training is appro

to only one form of urban warfare. Using heavy weap

dislodge a small guerrilla unit that has seiz

installation might work, but it would also prove 

politically counterproductive. But as the Battle fo

demonstrates, if a large or well-armed enemy unit in

to use a city as a field fortification, urban warfare q

degenerates into siege warfare, involving heavy we

and enormous casualties and destruction.

Cities that are descending into chaos quickly m

isolated from the surrounding countryside. Whatev

source of urban turmoil—insurrection, terrorist atta

simple anarchy—outside reinforcements, suppli

sympathizers must be prevented from reaching the c

of urban disturbances. If reinforcements can be kep

urban centers, units eventually will run out of ammu

supplies, and personnel as security forces systema

isolate and neutralize pockets of resistance. In S

sappers and cadre enjoyed some initial success, bu

quickly killed or rounded up when their pla

reinforcements were prevented from entering the 

capitalize on the turmoil they had created or the foo

they had gained. By contrast, PAVN in Hue had s

days to resupply, build defenses, and carry out 

house-to-house search for government officials. P

however, made the mistake of not eliminating pock

allied resistance in Hue, which allowed Allied un

mount simultaneous assaults on PAVN positions from 

inside and outside Hue.

83
Additionally, the Tet attacks suggest that, alm

definition, urban warfare can emerge as a surprise t

inhabitants and friendly forces alike. Initially, the b

for Saigon and Hue were fought by military and base 

headquarters personnel, and logistic troops who 

thought they would be called upon to defend 

installations in cities that were considered rela

secure, even in the midst of a guerrilla war and insur

Clearly, the mood in urban areas can change quickly. 

cities considered friendly to U.S. forces could burs

violence sparked by some external event, local incid

opposition cadre. In other words, it is difficult to p

when latent hostility towards U.S. policy or a m

presence will produce attacks on isolated American u

installations. This raises an important question. S

planners expect to have regular infantry or mecha

units positioned to respond to urban unrest? O

armored and infantry units—which are in increa

short supply—be confronting similar units “at the f

Will commanders be willing or able to task their 

capable units (measured in terms of their organic firep

to guard against street disturbances?

Finally, the Tet attacks demonstrate that urban w

is fought before an extremely attentive audience, na

the inhabitants of the city under attack. Indeed, the de

to undertake urban operations is grave in itself

desperate opponents are unlikely to threaten civilian

the centers and symbols of national authority unles

believe the potential political gains outweigh the risk

way U.S. forces respond to urban disturbances is c

because their operations will send a political message 

concerned about the credibility of American commit

and the nature of American policy toward a specific co

issue, or area. In other words, it might be possible tha

forces could win an urban engagement, but lose po

support for American objectives because of negative 

perceptions concerning the conduct of U.S. mi

operations. Today, given the density of communi

84
networks in urban areas, U.S. commanders must r

that MOUT will be conducted before a global audienc

to observe events in real time. Given the prospects for 

news coverage, urban operations will have widesprea

immediate political ramifications.

Conclusion.

The battles of Saigon and Hue validate today’s do

for MOUT. Isolating urban disturbances from o

support is a key factor in determining the cours

outcome of urban turmoil and combat. Indeed, if PAV

further reinforced its occupation of Hue with one 

10,000-man divisions that were moving toward Khe 

the siege could have lasted months.

19

 In contemp

MOUT doctrine, planners might consider holding 

infantry and mechanized units in reserve to seal off 

areas experiencing disturbances. Of course, this ra

question about which units will be available to resp

the scene of urban disturbances or attacks, a question 

to be more difficult to answer as U.S. forces increasing

on technology as a force multiplier.

Although allied forces won the battles of Saigon an

military victory did not translate into political adva

The shock of the urban attacks against Hue and esp

Saigon, reported to the American public and members 

Johnson administration by news media that l

real-time and interactive communication, change

course of the Vietnam War. In that sense, the urban a

during Tet constituted a watershed event because 

produced an immediate response in U.S. domestic p

and policy. Today, with modern communications likel

found in cities everywhere, a global audience will w

images of urban warfare. Tet leaves this final lesson fo

officers and policymakers. As they contemplate 

operations, planners and warfighters should not onl

the enemy, but also their audience, in mind.

85
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. On the origins and course of the offensive, see James J. Wirtz, T

Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War, Ithaca: Cornell University Pre

and Don Oberdorfer,Tet! Garden City: Doubleday, 1971.

2. Douglas Pike,PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, Novato: Presid

1986, pp. 218-219; and William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to P

Vietnam, Boulder: Westview, 1981.

3. Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, Washington, DC: Jo

May 17, 2000, pp. I-5 to I-7.

4. Keith William Nolan,The Battle for Saigon: Tet 1968, New Yor

Books, 1996, pp. 20-21.

5. The 716th Military Police Battalion History 

http://www.campbell.army.mil/716mp/716history.htm.

6. Item 87 1445 3q January 1968,Daily Journal, Files, MACV J-2 C

Center, Record Group 334, accession number 70A0738, box number S1

National Records Center, Suitland, MD. Some of the item’s abbreviation 

removed. 

7. Nolan,The Battle for Saigon, p. 206.

8. In the 5th and 6th Saigon districts, VC cadre also encouraged local res

join in the uprising, but these exhortations met with little success. See Victor

The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During 

Offensive, Memorandum RM-5799-ISA/ARPA, Santa Monica: Rand Cor

January 1969, p. 10.

9. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

10. General Weyand and his staff detected the movement of Viet Cong an

units toward Saigon in the first weeks of January 1968 and had prepositione

strengthen the defense of the capital. These could not stop VC sappers an

disguised as holiday travelers, from entering Saigon. See Wirtz, Tet Offe

200.

11. Donn A. Starry, Armored Combat in Vietnam, India

Bobbs-Merrill, Co., 1980, pp. 116-127.

86
12. William M. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media and Mil

War, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998, pp. 109-125.

13. For spectacular “before and after” pictures of Hue clearly dep

destruction, see Richard L. Brown,Palace Gate Under Siege in Hue Ci

January 1968, Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1995.

14. Keith William Nolan, Battle For Hue: Tet 1968, Novato, CA

Press, 1983, p. 3. Even though it was placed on alert, the ARVN 1st Division w

percent strength due to Tet holiday leaves.

15. Le Monde dispatch, February 2, 1968, quoted in Marvin E. Gettl

al., Vietnam And America, New York: Grove Press, 1995, p. 366.

16. Nolan, Battle for Hue, p. 184.

17. John Prados,The Hidden History of the Vietnam War, Chic

R. Dee, 1995, pp. 155-160; and Nolan,Battle for Hue, pp. 10-14. Sappers ev

destroyed the bridge on February 6.

18. According to Prados,The Hidden History, pp. 163-164,

Figures used for determining relief payments for Hue residents list 4,

housing units destroyed, another 3,360 as more than 50 percent damag

and 2,757 additional homes as damaged to some degree. Some 116,

refugees were left from the former population, while ARVN estimated t

944 civilians had been killed and 784 wounded as a result of military act

in the battle. American marine losses were 147 killed and 857 wound

army casualties included 74 dead and 507 wounded. South Vietnam

losses totaled 384 killed and 1,830 wounded. Claimed North Vietnam

casualties were 5,113 dead, and there were 89 prisoners.

19. When asked about this possibility in January 1969, General C

Abrams told a reporter that if one of these large PAVN divisons had moved 

“We’d still be fighting there.” Quoted in Nolan, Battle for Hue, p. 29.

87
CHAPTER 6

THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS OF 1992

James D. Delk

Late at night the soldiers advanced slowly, careful

tactical squad column, with the squad leader only a 

of short paces behind the point. The pucker factor wa

as they moved up the street. It was dark, there be

electricity in the area, with the only illumination furn

by fires flickering in some spots and burning fierc

others. Even though the temperature was comfortabl

spring night, they could feel themselves sweat. Typ

soldiers everywhere, they preferred to blame that 

flak vests and combat gear rather than stress. The 

was surreal as they observed dark shadows of f

dashing between houses and into alleys as they adv

They heard the occasional beat of helicopter b

overhead and sirens on the streets. Shots, both sing

automatic, were heard mostly in the distance

occasionally too close for comfort. The temptatio

strong to ready their weapons for action, but the 

leader quietly urged, “Easy, take it easy!”

This was South Central Los Angeles in the spr

1992, shortly after the troops were called in to c

rioting in the streets. Los Angeles had been ripe fo

unrest since the 1965 Watts riots. There had been littl

improvement in the area over the years, with ver

larger commercial firms choosing that area to rebu

establish new businesses. Unemployment was 

poverty was spreading, school truancy was rampant, 

rates were exploding, and traditional family values 

waning. 

Lacking supermarkets in their area, many people 

on “Mom and Pop” stores in their neighborhoods. 

89
were often owned by Koreans who lived elsewhere, 

adding to the antipathy felt by locals. In addition, te

were higher than normal because a judge had recently 

a Korean shopkeeper what was perceived as a slap 

wrist after she shot a young African-American girl 

store. 

The tension was heightened by three unre

accidental killings of babies by gangs in drive-by sho

that spring. There followed a series of meetings by 

gang leaders in churches and celebrities’ homes, an

that could be considered neutral territory. Represent

of both the Crips and the Bloods discussed a truce to st

killing of their babies. More ominous were a ser

meetings that occurred during the last week in April. 

involving gangs with longstanding feuds, the meeting

intended to establish a truce so gang members could 

their efforts towards “killing a police officer.”

The atmosphere was highly charged, and all it n

was a spark. That spark was provided following the t

four police officers accused of brutally beating Rodney 

an unemployed construction worker on parole for 

robbery, after a lengthy high-speed chase throug

freeways and streets of Los Angeles. There was 

interest in the trial, which had been moved t

mostly-white community of Simi Valley af

change-of-venue motion following heavy pretrial pub

Tension had risen to a fever pitch after repeated TV a

of an amateur videoclip that clearly showed the beat

Though it is easy in retrospect to say trouble shoul

been expected in the event of a “not guilty” verdict, 

(perhaps most) community leaders felt otherwise. 

church leaders and others believed there would 

violence, even those who anticipated violence believe

law enforcement agencies in the county could handle 

spite of such confidence, the judge in Simi Valley n

law enforcement officials well in advance of the verdic

was wasted effort, as much of the Los Angeles 

90
Department (LAPD) leadership was out of the count

training seminar.

The jury found the defendants not guilty on all 

except in the case of Officer Laurence Powell, in be

whom a mistrial was declared on the single charge of 

excessive force “under color of authority.” Reaction w

long in coming. Violence was localized at first, inv

what turned out to be Crips, reportedly from the Eigh

(or Trey) Gangsters.

Most agree that the genesis of the riots occurred 

intersection of Florence and Normandie. An alter

unrelated to the trial took place near that intersection

the police responding. A crowd gathered, and more 

units responded. As the crowd grew and the sit

became more threatening, the LAPD lieutenant o

scene decided to call off the police, who quickly lef

lights flashing and sirens blaring. The void they left q

escalated into serious violence. Any driver enterin

intersection who was not African-American was sub

beating. Helicopters overhead captured scenes on tele

of people pulled from their cars and trucks and sa

beaten. Some scenes, such as those involving the bea

truck driver Reginald Denny, and the preacher sta

protectively over an unconscious Fidel Lopez (who h

face and genitals sprayed black and one ear partia

off), will be seared in some people’s memories foreve

As light started to fade, the mayor was heard o

radio describing the police defendants as “renegade 

who should be fired; “I do not seek to explain the 

decision,” he declared, “because frankly no expla

makes sense.” It was thus no coincidence that incide

violence then quickly spread throughout the county.

Law enforcement reaction to the violence was pa

slow in coming. The Mutual Aid system bringing 

enforcement reinforcements from nearby communiti

not immediately implemented. In fact, as late as mid

law enforcement officials were discussing the “Mard

91
atmosphere” even as violence and burning of building

spreading over the city. Law enforcement’s intell

system had clearly broken down.

The next day both the California Highway Patrol a

National Guard were deployed. This followed a m

that ended at about 3:00 p.m., at which the divis

responsibilities and flow of taskings were finally (alm

hours after the verdict was announced) agreed to. E

that meeting was still in session, some platoons of th

Infantry Division’s Military Police Company were de

into South Central Los Angeles under control of th

Angeles County Sheriff’s Office (LASO).

The National Guardsmen had good reason 

apprehensive, as many of them were from the Los A

metropolitan area and knew just how dangerous some 

of the city could be. How dangerous was it? In th

calendar year prior to the riots, there were 771 d

directly attributed to gang members. This 

approximately half of the homicides in the county in 

where death by gunfire per 100,000 inhabitants was 

than triple the national average. The streets are s

dangerous, in fact, that for many years there have b

“beat cops” patrolling the sidewalks of Los Angeles. T

gunfire every night of the year in some parts of Los A

county, most of it initiated by gang members.

In their briefing, the troops had been told that they 

about 102,000 gang members. Unfortunately, the ga

Los Angeles had grown more violent over the years. D

the Vietnam-related riots in the 1960s, gangs ten

settle their differences with bats, bottles, rocks

occasionally, knives. By the 1990s, gangs retaliated 

gunfire, often spraying bullets indiscriminately 

endangering innocent bystanders. Already armed 

sophisticated firearms, no sooner had the riots erupte

the gangs broke into gun stores and warehouses, st

more weapons and ammunition.

92
The gangs were widely scattered throughout the c

but were particularly dangerous in such areas of the 

Watts and in the adjoining city of Compton. The three 

housing projects, Imperial Courts, Jordan Downs

Nickerson Gardens, were notoriously dangerous cen

gang activity. The troops knew this, and most nor

avoided those areas when they could. Now, however

had no choice. Their mission was to assist law enforc

in restoring and maintaining peace. This required th

enter those areas controlled by the gangs.

The 40th Infantry Division was fortunate in still h

senior officers and noncommissioned officers 

remembered the lessons of the Watts riots of 1965. O

the most vivid memories of those riots was the “fre

atmosphere, including the use of machine guns, an

resultant killing of innocent people. There was a s

commitment in 1992 that this would not be allow

happen again. As a consequence, restraint wa

watchword, with the rules of engagement and a

orders carefully prepared and disseminated. 

instructions were terse and to the point, so soldiers 

quickly grasp the full intent and rehearse their use. R

of ammunition were counted out while it was made 

that expenditure of those rounds would be accountab

The troops were deployed in formations ranging 

platoon through battalion in strength to help the poli

sheriff’s deputies wrest control from the gangs. As c

was established, the deployments were thinned 

maintain that control over a huge area that end

totaling over 100 square miles. In many parts of th

troops were deployed two by two, with two soldiers a

intersection. Some shopping centers were mann

formations as small as a squad fire team, with five so

assuming responsibility for maintaining security 

24-hour-a-day basis.

Soldiers had to quickly acclimatize themselves to 

culture in Los Angeles. Their noncommissioned of

93
many of whom were police in civilian life, briefed th

what to expect. They described how gang members e

in “mad-dogging,” the taunting practice including s

contests that too often could result in killings. The 

were told how to avoid that, and how to drive defensiv

as to keep from being penned in with no escape route

were told about the gang practice of “car trains,” whe

short convoy of cars loaded with gang members 

follow each other bumper-to-bumper through 

neighborhood to demonstrate strength and thumb 

noses at the law. Most disconcerting was the prac

gang members (usually four) driving by in a car and th

signal, all simultaneously raising their weapons up s

could be seen. Troops were told that such activit

routine and to ignore it. On the other hand, as on

sergeant told his troops, if they aim their weapons a

“cancel their Christmas.”

During the first day and night on the streets, the 

were shot at over two dozen times, according to 

records, and that did not include those troops assig

LAPD. From that point on, the troops carefully kept tr

such incidents. Gang members usually shot at the 

from a distance, either from buildings off in the dista

from freeway overpasses as they sped off. In such inst

troops were unable to return fire for fear of endan

private citizens. Rocks and bottles were thrown, bu

was usually not particularly disturbing to the troo

exception was the occasion a large rock was dropped 

freeway overpass and severely damaged a t

fortunately without personnel injuries.

The two incidents in which civilians were shot by 

involved vehicular assaults. One of these ass

continued until the driver, a Playboy Gangster, wa

and killed when he refused to stop, trying to run 

troopers even when his tires were shot out. The 

individual, a felon on probation (from Florida) for veh

manslaughter, was wounded after he ran over a 

officer and tried the same with two soldiers.

94
The riots ended within 2 days. A total of 22 round

been fired during the time the troops were deploye

restraint was obvious, receiving favorabe comment 

observers. Federal troops were called in and deployed 

the riots ended. Some of them found it hard to believ

were just “maintaining law and order” when they hea

gunfire each night. However, as previously noted

gunfire describes parts of Los Angeles county every n

the year.

After the streets quieted down, it was difficult 

permission to remove the troops. They had been w

welcomed by the people of Los Angeles. They blew 

horns at troop convoys, and gave the soldiers “thumbs 

they went by. They fed the troops in many ways

ranged from free meals at restaurants to people 

soldiers everything from pies to “pogey bait” (snacks). 

the crime rate decreased from riots to normal to much 

than normal, the whole atmosphere changed. Peo

their children play in the streets, and some older fol

for the first time in years that it was safe enough to w

the store. It was understandable why people a

pressure on their elected officials to keep the 

deployed.

When the dust settled, it was obvious that the riot

the most deadly in our history. After careful analy

screen out deaths not connected to the rioting, 53 

were confirmed dead as a consequence of the riots, alt

the originally reported figure was much higher. In ad

2,302 were injured seriously enough to require emer

treatment. There were 71 police officers injured, a

firemen. Fortunately, the only military casualty 

young soldier who accidentally injured himsel

seriously) when clearing his pistol. There were 5,38

attributed to the riots, causing many hundreds of mill

dollars in damage. Arrests totaled 18,807, prim

Latin-Americans (many of whom were illegal immigr

including 2,628 for felonies. The jails and prisons 

95
over-taxed, so many lawbreakers who would normall

been retained under arrest were set free.

What were the lessons learned? Both law enforc

and the military write contingency plans for the 

based on past experience. Unfortunately, these riots 

the first in decades that continued both night an

Previously, riots were exclusively nighttime pheno

wherein both rioters and law enforcement/mi

personnel rested during daylight hours. Based on 

experience, both law enforcement backup on the firs

and the military to follow, were told they would not h

report until just prior to dark. But daylight riotin

already well under way by that time. Other specific l

learned: 

• Communications. Military radios did not net wi

enforcement radios. This required extensive liaison 

counterparts to maintain communications, comman

control. In addition, military radios work poorly in an 

setting, requiring widespread use of repeaters. 

commands used cell phones extensively. Fortunate

Los Angeles area is well covered with cellular phone 

that are hardened to prevent damage from earthq

The other serious communications issue was the diff

in interpretation of terms used by law enforcement a

military. The term “platoon” can mean anything from 

20 individuals to as many as 60, depending on w

talking. Some differences in interpretation of terms 

much more significant. For instance, to law enforc

and Army troops, “Cover me!” was interpreted the s

be prepared to shoot if needed. To the Marines, howe

meant immediately lay down a heavy base of fire to p

cover. When the Compton police officer issued 

command when responding to a domestic abuse com

the base of fire provided by an accompanying squ

Marines narrowly missed children in a home. Those 

Marines were merely responding exactly as trained. 

are important.

96
• Training. Typical riot control training req

practice in formations, use of riot batons and face sh

and use of tear gas has merit when facing students or 

armed citizens. It is not only useless but can be dang

when facing an opponent who shoots at you. In situ

such as those faced in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, it is 

important to have troops who are well-trained in n

soldier skills and knowledgeable in individual prot

techniques. The most important attribute is s

discipline. We were thankful that rigid discipline ha

enforced in the division for some years prior to the r

• Equipment. As indicated above, face shields an

batons are a detriment in action against a well-

opponent. They tend to get in the way, and the face s

reflect light at night. Besides, thrown rocks were 

hazardous to the troops. Gas was on hand but neve

and has not been used in California since shifting 

blew gas into a hospital during the Berkeley riots 

years ago. Night vision devices were especially valuab

extensively used. Maps are a special consideration in 

terrain. Military maps just don’t provide the req

detail. In many American cities, law enforcement ag

use Thomas Guides which we procured in great quan

that all were speaking the same language as to locat

• Logistics. Logisticians are particularly challeng

urban terrain. Troops were widely scattered, equi

and supply needs differed from those for open terrai

transportation was a particular challenge. The 

Division, as a mechanized organization, moves on t

We wanted to appear citizen-friendly, an image that 

have suffered had we rolled into the city with our tan

armored personnel carriers, which would have c

considerable damage to the streets. Logisticians solve

problem by contracting for buses.

• Medical. We anticipated and successfully handl

normal medical requirements of a large body of 

operating in a high-tempo environment. But what ha

97
anticipated by our medical support but not by t

commanders was the requirement for psychiatric se

Soldiers required by circumstances to fire at 

sometimes kill) citizens of their own country face dif

psychiatric stresses than those normally anticipa

high-intensity military operations in urban te

(MOUT). Having the appropriate teams at hand to q

counsel affected troops prevented serious problems l

• Legal. For those incidents with possible 

consequences, like application of deadly force, we h

own 170th Criminal Investigation Detachment co

collateral investigations along with the norma

enforcement investigators. This gave senior leadersh

facts rather than conjecture, and provided such facts 

faster than would normally have been expected. I’m no

that it was absolutely necessary to do colla

investigations, but we didn’t have any legal issues s

at the time or later. Certainly it was good training f

military investigators to work closely with h

experienced police investigators.

• Rules of Engagement/Arming Orders. These w

clear and concise as possible, and the troops were give

to rehearse them in various scenarios. They were pub

in a convenient format to fit the soldier’s battle 

uniform (BDU) pocket, and are now stockpiled in 

format. They are also specially printed on Kimdur

Olefin plasticized stock to resist water and hold up 

repeated handling. Noteworthy was the gradation 

arming orders issued. Military leaders at all levels re

their law enforcement counterparts’ recommendation

which level of arming order was appropriate. 

recognized that the local police officer knew best wh

level of risk was in a particular area.

• Deployment Strategies. The 40th Division, augm

by elements of the 49th Military Police Brigade, u

controversial deployment strategy. The safest strateg

deploy troops in larger formations with commiss

98
leadership. Obviously, larger formations plus highe

and greater experience on the part of commanders m

safer for the troops involved. But that is not ho

approached the problem. After a careful risk analysis 

necessity to take the streets back from gang membe

blanketed the target area by placing pairs of soldi

street corners after the area had been pacified

two-soldier teams were widely scattered, but never 

sight of other soldiers “wearing the patch.” Some s

shopping centers had as few as a fire team of five so

while larger shopping centers had one or more compan

was necessary to scatter the troops more thinly than 

felt prudent in order to provide the coverage needed ov

vast geography involved.

 • Public Affairs. Public Affairs was poorly ha

There was too much talk in the news media about so

being deployed without ammunition, even though 

never occurred. Such reportage encouraged some 

members to be more aggressive than they might hav

otherwise, thus putting soldiers unnecessarily at ris

riots were quickly and thoroughly covered by the elec

media, with helicopters overhead capturing the situa

it deteriorated. It was obvious during the initial hour

people could riot and loot with impunity. Even nor

law-abiding people were impacted by the intense emo

the situation and took to the streets to get their share 

loot before it was all gone. When an amnesty was de

later, many of those people sheepishly returned 

ill-gotten gains.

• Planning and Execution. There were many simil

between the situation faced by deployed soldiers 

Angeles and that faced during traditional MOUT. O

was the centralized planning and decentralized exe

so typical of MOUT. Troops were so widely scattere

leadership devolved most often down to 

noncommissioned officer level. Senior commanders 

their guidance and then had to rely on sergeant

corporals to make it happen.

99
• Discipline. Discipline was, and always w

extremely important in decentralized operations, esp

in the presence of noncombatants. The division had 

emphasizing discipline for years, everything from 

wear of protective headgear to enforcement of a no-

policy in the field. This paid huge dividends during the 

• Information Operations. Information operation

a challenge. This included everything from radio oper

to public affairs, both of which have been disc

previously. With the equipment we are presently i

information operations are always a challenge in bu

areas. Public Affairs has a direct impact on the sit

faced by the troops, and can either improve or wors

operational environment.

• Stress Management. Finally, stress managemen

important ingredient during MOUT operations and 

every commander in similar situations. The Los A

riots of 1992 can hardly be compared to high-int

MOUT, but the impact of soldiers shooting at United 

citizens added unique psychological stresses that m

anticipated.

The foregoing survey is not all-inclusive, but it ser

illustrate some of the many similarities bet

high-intensity MOUT and some domestic su

operations. There are some key differences, howeve

also must be considered.

Though restraint is nearly always an impo

consideration, it becomes an all-encompassing issue d

domestic manifestations of MOUT. Rules of engag

and arming orders are always carefully crafte

disseminated. We like to think that restra

all-important any time we place innocent people in h

way. Implementation of urban operations is never 

important than when our own women and children 

risk. True, National Guard men and women must p

their uniforms and make the metamorphosis from c

to soldier, but they need not make the com

100
metamorphosis to trained “killer.” On the other 

federal troops are expected to maintain a combat 

always ready to meet the enemy in deadly comba

difference between the two tendencies can be crucial

Legal considerations differed. Most MOUT situ

are fought under the legal umbrella of the Rules of 

Warfare, based on the Geneva Conventions. In Los An

however, soldiers were guided by civil ordinances and 

comitatus. The differences are significant, particula

the limitations placed upon federal troops in any do

policing situation and must be understood by all 

involved.

Often MOUT involves coalition warfare and w

with allies. In Los Angeles there were subtle bu

important differences from that concept. We 

subordinate to and in support of civilian law enforc

agencies. We established our military boundar

coincide with law enforcement jurisdictions, and to

missions from them. It was not an equal partnership

though the law enforcement agencies always treat

military with respect. We were clearly in support of 

not vice versa, as it should have been.

The “enemy,” in our case the gangs, were h

equivalent to professional soldiers or well-trained m

Their marksmanship thankfully was very poor. In ad

their tactics were poorly planned and predictable.

Finally, the military was not seen as the primary e

of the gangs, looters, and other lawbreakers in Los An

the police were. It was only the occasional gang memb

wanted to take on the military. The proof is in the 

results, with 71 police officers injured versus none 

military.

The California National Guard was extraordi

successful in combating the Los Angeles riots. If there 

secret to that success, many senior officers who served 

will tell you that the secret lay in the strength 

101
noncommissioned officers. We had been decentralizi

years in an effort to improve battle focus and redunda

requirement implemented without domestic su

operations in mind. When mobilized for the Los A

riots of 1992, the urban setting and scattered deplo

forced us to rely on our sergeants and corporals. They 

let us down.

102
CHAPTER 7

LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS

IN NORTHERN IRELAND

David Pearson

It might be argued that the British response to terr

in Northern Ireland from 1969 to the present, 

involved the introduction of reforms and the mak

concessions to disaffected groups, could be seen as giv

to violence—an attempt to “win” by actually “losing

Pat Coogan describes this strategy as “letting the air 

the tyres gently.”

1

 But while it is true that cont

political change and adjustment attempt to all

minority grievance and concern, this argument miss

essential characteristic of the British response to viole

the Province, namely, that of flexibility. This flexibili

manifested in British attempts to adapt to and capita

new ideas and conditions, reinvent and apply old 

tactics, and lessons, and absorb and channel pressu

change in a desired direction. The result in No

Ireland, in both urban and rural areas, has b

successful counterinsurgency strategy that move

Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) from a tradi

employing terror and military force to a willingness to 

a purely political solution to the perceived problems.

In August 1969, Catholic civil rights movement

anti-establishment protests and demonstrations coa

in Northern Ireland to challenge the legitimacy 

Protestant-dominated home rule Parliament sitt

Stormont. As tension escalated, civilian rioting resul

among others, the major cities of Londonderry (prod

the battle of the Bogside) and Belfast, prompting the 

Ulster Constabulary (RUC) to deploy Shorland ar

cars onto the city streets. Equipped with .30 c

Browning machine guns, these vehicles proved lethal 

103
confusion of the riots, killing at least three demons

innocent bystanders but failing to restore order. Inca

of firing single shots, the Browning was hardly a su

weapon for crowd control. As the rioting intensifie

barricades went up, the RUC lost control of the sit

and requested military assistance, which was gran

British Home Secretary James Callaghan, foll

consultations with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. 

was no exit strategy planned, and all sides reco

potential long-term political and military implicati

deploying soldiers onto the city streets, namel

probable demise of the Stormont government and 

confrontation with resurgent Republican gunmen.

2

 I

Callaghan realized that it would be much easier to g

army in than get it out.

3

 Nevertheless, there was no ch

civil war between Protestants and Catholics on the s

of Northern Ireland was to be avoided.

In preventing outright civil war, the infantry sold

General Ian Freeland’s 39th Infantry Brigade 

remarkably successful. Unaware of the deep rel

divides running through Belfast and Londonder

sectarianism imported from rural Ulster as the 

expanded in the 19th century under the imp

industrialization—the soldiers relied on their conven

military training, orders to use minimum force, and 

discipline to calm the immediate situation.

4

 They s

lined themselves up on the main streets, which a

isolated and burned out Catholic and Protestant fam

safely relocate themselves back to their own commu

thus resulting in some semblance of normality.

Although the army was initially welcomed b

Catholic community in Northern Ireland as an indica

the Westminster parliament’s determination to rig

injustices of the majority Unionist Stormont governm

soon became crystal clear that the deep-seated antago

within Ulster could not be solved merely by the prese

soldiers on the streets. General Freeland presc

warned that “the honeymoon period cannot obv

104
continue forever . . . but unless there is a solution or 

hope for the future—and this is where the politician

got to come in—the soldiers are not going to be welcom

the streets forever.”

5

 The politicians did come in, but 

than stressing the need for reform and that “every cit

Northern Ireland is entitled to the same equal

treatment and freedom from discrimination as obta

the rest of the United Kingdom irrespective of po

views or religion,”

6

 there was no apparent political so

in the near term. The Hunt Committee investigat

organization and structure of the RUC, the Sca

Committee scrutinized the recent disorders necessi

the deployment of troops, and Westminster relearned 

history, while the existing political power structure 

Province was left intact, with the army “piggy 

middle.” The inevitable result for the army was 

“standing, both literally and metaphorically in no

land, it was only a matter of time before the troops b

the object of both sides’ frustrations while trying to up

status quo which failed to reassure Loyalists or off

chance of reform to Catholics.”

7

By 1970, the strategy of a resurgent PIRA had 

seamlessly forward from defense to retaliation t

armed struggle aimed at the full “nat

demand”—British withdrawal from Ireland. The B

army now found itself in a new low-inte

counterinsurgency campaign in which the majority 

people lived in urban areas. The British response buil

experience in previous struggles, principally Pale

Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. Britain discovered the ne

specialized training in a small professional army, 

undertook as well an updating of doctrine, here quo

part:

The response [to the threat of insurgency] should be based on clear a

supported by a range of social, economic, legal, and administra

measures as well as military activity. This is usually in support o

combined with police action. The task of developing the response a

coordinating its supporting overall plan will be complex. Milit

105
measures should only form part of the plan since by themselves they 

unlikely to defeat insurgency. The military contribution therefore wi

designed to defeat violent activity and provide security so that the poli

process can take place.

8

This is not to argue that the British knew exactly w

do in Northern Ireland because clearly every conflict 

own unique characteristics and conditions, and th

always going to be a learning curve. There was, howev

awareness from the beginning of the need for min

force in accordance with the rule of law, close coopera

every level between all branches of the civil administr

military, and police, and the adoption of area deploym

under a clear political aim.

This is much easier said than done, how

Identification of root causes of unrest, and appro

responses can take a long time, and governments s

plan for a long struggle rather than a quick-fix so

Politicians, especially in democratic countries with 

and unfettered news media, will inevitably be 

pressure to show early results but must be alert fo

resist ill-conceived schemes, which might compromi

overall long-term aim. Large cordon and sweep oper

with grandiose titles may give the impression of de

action but often prove counterproductive by alienati

civilian population whose cooperation is necessa

government success. The July 1970 searches of the Ca

Falls Road in Belfast are a case in point. The 

uncovered numerous terrorist weapons, but the wreck

homes by overzealous young soldiers with no formal s

training, together with the use of tear gas, 

particularly radicalizing effect on the community. A c

compounded this effect by evoking greater tribal solid

After five civilian fatalities in the ensuing riot, one ru

by an armored personnel carrier, Gerry Adams summ

the result: “Thousands of people who had never 

republicans now gave their active support to the IRA; 

who had never had any time for physical force now ac

it as a practical necessity.”

9

 Undertaken against 

106
advice and aimed primarily at the republican comm

internment of suspects without trial in August 

(Operation DEMETRIUS) was similarly disastr

Adding to difficulties, details of deep interrogation me

against some internees leaked out, resulting in the B

government being found guilty of inhuman and deg

treatment of prisoners in the Strasbourg Court of H

Rights, despite a majority report under Sir Ed

Compton exonerating security force methods.

11

 Bri

Frank Kitson, then commanding the 39th Infantry B

with responsibility for Belfast, believed internmen

done in the wrong way, at the wrong time, and for the 

reasons.

12

 Intelligence simply was not up to the job. 

Steel, an MI6 operative seconded to the United Kin

Representatives Office, summed up the situation on a

in the Province in October 1971:

The place was a shambles. Areas like Belfast and Derry were almost 

state of anarchy and civil war. There were sometimes around a thousa

security incidents of one sort or another each month. The army had

learned how to cope with civil unrest in the UK and how to use minim

and not maximum force. Many nationalists believed that HMG [H

Majesty’s Government] had lent the British army to the union

government to keep them in power and keep the nationalists un

control. There was very little coordination of whatever intelligence w

being produced by the RUC, the army, and MI5. Internment had bee

disaster. It had barely damaged the IRA’s command structure and led 

flood of recruits, money, and weapons. . . . The unionist governm

seemed to be just soldiering on and incapable of solving the proble

facing Northern Ireland.

13

Further mistakes followed, the worst when sold

the 1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, claim

have come under nail bomb and sniper fire, shot de

catholic men during an arrest operation against the 

Derry Hooligan Element of an illegal civil rights ma

Londonderry on January 30, 1972, in what came to be 

“Bloody Sunday.” The findings of a subsequent 

inquiry under Lord Chief Justice Widgery p

inconclusive but suggested that some of the soldier

fired recklessly, while none of those killed and wo

107
were proven to be handling weapons and bombs.

consequences and emotions generated by the events 

day testify to the adverse impact individual soldie

have on proceedings, an impact that reverberates a

the province for years. Bloody Sunday led ultimately 

royal suspension of the Stormont Parliament and dire

from London on March 24, 1972. This cleared up 

command and control ambiguities and opened u

possibility of a political solution based on the conc

power-sharing, of which the Sunningdale Agreement

Anglo-Irish talks, ultimatly all-party talks, a

Mitchell-brokered agreement were the re

Simultaneously, industrial investment and diversifi

attempted to make Ulster economically viable, raise 

standards, and improve job opportunities—thus g

youths off street corners, which was always an 

objective.

From a standing start, this initial “defensive” pha

mistakes by both politicians and young soldiers bu

nevertheless essential in building up knowl

developing organizations, and deciding and implem

policies, whether military, economic, social, or politica

subsequent enormous Operation MOTORMAN on Ju

1972, validated the learning process as long ar

columns of troops entered and cleared the “No-Go” ar

Belfast, Londonderry, Lurgan, Armagh, Newry

Coalisland that PIRA had been allowed to de

unmolested during government attempts at negot

and consensus-building. Linked to a public rel

campaign that warned of the operation and coming af

failure of talks and a particularly callous PIRA bo

spree on July 21—“Bloody Friday”—the operation 

smoothly. PIRA withdrew rather than face overwhe

numbers of soldiers. The army thus began to reest

government writ. With the construction of perm

fortified bases manned by the same units throughou

tour of duty, city streets and blocks assumed an

pro-security force characteristics as saturation pat

108
collected masses of low-grade, but nevertheless 

information through daily contact with the people. St

in Belfast, this area deployment spread like ink on b

paper from the cities to the countryside throughout B

Ulster.

While it was initially necessary for the security 

and the army in particular, to take the lead in No

Ireland while the British government experimented 

variety of political initiatives, once a comprehe

political agenda developed, it became possible to est

greater balance between the military and civilian 

with increasing coordination in all fields. The need fo

coordination was necessary for the establishme

priorities; coordination of intelligence and sec

coordination between operational and civil a

activities; joint consultation and, as far as se

permitted, joint planning; joint direction of opera

arrangements for public safety and protection of 

installations; scientific advice; and direction of inform

and counterpropaganda policy—both within the Pr

and throughout the world where governmen

individuals might be persuaded to give moral or ma

support to the enemy.

Like other principles, that of coordination is extr

easy to enunciate, but difficult to put into practice

complex society like Northern Ireland, the difficulty 

securing all-party acceptance because of the political 

elaborate and close control. More specifically, 

complications, interdepartmental rivalries, pride, m

distrust, fear of loss of status, and simple dislike of c

stood in the way of cooperation. In Northern Irelan

practical solution was compromise. Despite 

reorganization—for instance, the provision of 

secretariats necessary for the increased bureaucracy

decisionmaking, and rapid implementatio

ideas—maximum use was made of existing administ

structures, which saved resources, ensured a deg

continuity, and thereby reduced institutional resista

109
change. Other important steps included matching m

operating boundaries to those of the police and establ

joint headquarters and operations rooms at each le

command in order to provide an interface betwee

various government organizations serving as a c

information point, a meeting place for the various mi

police, and civil officials, and a means of dissemi

information and orders which had wide application.

The result of growing coordination at all administ

levels was a committee approach to decisionmak

which planning and command remained the preroga

the appropriate military, police, or civil official wh

required to consult his colleagues before undertakin

actions that involved departure from previously-a

plans or policy. This approach helped prevent disput

accidental engagements between components o

security forces, built mutual confidence, and ensure

the actual conduct of operations could draw on all ava

civilian and military resources in the implementat

government policy. At the top in Northern Ireland 

Province Executive Committee (PEC), chaired b

Deputy Chief Constable, with the Commander Land 

representing the General Officer Commanding

decides strategic operational direction supported b

Security Policy Meeting Committee and the Se

Coordinating Meeting Committee. PEC policy is 

disseminated through a series of committees do

Divisional Action Committees (DACs). Started in Bel

1973 by Brigadier Kitson, the purpose of the DAC

“meet once a week and . . . bring together the military, 

and intelligence to achieve unified planning and c

control.”

15

 This is the level at which government im

directly on the population, and the effectiven

government strategy is judged. However good the pla

intentions at national and district level, if they fai

accepted and work at street level, the entire gover

strategy is likely to fail. Conversely, if successful

110
provided there is adequate security—more people are 

to side openly with government policy.

Together with a political aim and coordin

machinery, a government must also ensure that 

deployed agencies act within the rule of law. This is 

say that government forces must work within exact

same set of laws during an insurgency as ex

beforehand, because it is the function of governm

make new laws when necessary. The 1974 Prevent

Terrorism Temporary Provisions Act (PTA) gave the B

government considerable latitude in dealing with 

terrorism, including the exclusion of terrorist suspect

the mainland and the holding of suspects for 48 

without charge or up to 7 days on higher authority.

Home Secretary at the time, Roy Jenkins, describ

PTA thus: “These powers are draconian. In combin

they are unprecedented in peacetime. I believe th

fully justified to meet the clear and present dangers

The PTA was revised and expanded in 1975, 1978

1989, and 1991.

18

 Similarly, the way in which the 

administered should be modified if it is consi

necessary for the well-being of the people. Lord Dip

adjustment of Northern Ireland’s legal procedure

designed to prevent witness and jury intimidation 

preserving the rights of those accused of terrorist off

The law ought not to be viewed as too cumbersome a

impediment to effective counterinsurgency, but an in

part of the process. There should be no reason or temp

to step outside the law. To do so would provide a 

propaganda coup to the enemy, suggest govern

discord, and raise the question of government legitima

such circumstances, there would be the real dange

conflict assuming the character of a civil war, thus imp

guerrilla status to dissidents rather than the sta

insurgents acting against the legitimate and ri

authority of government.

111
Part of acting within the law is minimum forc

self-restraint by individual soldiers. The agen

government policy must be careful not to destr

over-reacting, the very institutions and kind of societ

seek to protect. The Yellow Card rules of engagement 

to every soldier in Northern Ireland are explicit as 

circumstances when a soldier can legitimately ope

Government representatives cannot be seen as 

control or as a danger to the civil population. The m

role in counterinsurgency is essentially the sel

application of force to a political situation. In a cor

orchestrated campaign, innocents need not hide in f

the approach of government troops or the sig

government aircraft. In part, civilian control is a safe

in this respect, but ultimately it remains the duty 

commanders to ensure that they are not required or as

undertake operations which are incompatible with ex

law. Soldiers must take particular care that when 

deploy, they never use more force than is necessar

reasonable to achieve the immediate military aim. A

Duke of Wellington remarked just prior to the Ba

Waterloo while pointing at a soldier in a Brussels pa

all depends on that article.”

19

 Man was, is, and alwa

be the crucial element in war, but especially 

low-intensity operations.

A critical component in ensuring that mi

operations do meet the principle of minimum force 

surprisingly, reliance on accurate intelligence. Establ

an effective intelligence organization is a matter of th

importance. Not only is the right sort of information n

at a high level to enable the government to work 

sensible policy for countering the insurgents, but at a 

level operational commanders need reliable and de

intelligence from which to plan precise and sel

operations. This will minimize the chances of alienati

local population. Indeed, in Northern Ireland, in cont

conventional operations, the search for and the exploi

of intelligence often drove the operational plan, rathe

112
the other way round. This necessitates a single centr

and integrated intelligence organization whose 

objective is to prevent the proliferation of agencies 

allegiance to different organizations, departmen

masters. Before the creation of the intelligence board k

as the “Department” by Sir Maurice Oldfield, 

proliferation obtained in Northern Ireland with the 

RUC, MI5, and MI6 conducting their own indepe

intelligence operations with little trust or coordinatio

start made by Oldfield was continued by his success

Brooks Richards, former Cabinet Office intelli

coordinator.

20

 By the mid-1980s military and 

intelligence agencies were not only sharing informati

also running some agents jointly. Eventually, intell

coordination was extended to include both the Provin

the United Kingdom mainland under MI5 leadership

A practical method for centralized control is throu

establishment of intelligence committees in paralle

the other government committees. Each intelli

committee owes allegiance to the next higher level, 

those at the higher levels are responsible fo

effectiveness and activities of those below. Informatio

intelligence pass both ways, with a Director of Intell

at the top of the intelligence committee pyrami

committees should have, with due regard to securit

power to co-opt local experts in any particular depart

such as Forestry, Posts and Telegraphs, or I

Waterways, should the need arise. The functions 

committees are to keep the next higher intelli

committee and the parallel operations committee inf

of relevant intelligence and security matters; to p

intelligence on which to base operational planni

allocate tasks, targets, and priorities to the intell

organization; to establish common intelligence and se

staff procedures; and to ensure maximum coope

between intelligence and security agencies. As a ch

possible abuse, especially in a democratic countr

intelligence committees should not have exec

113
command over the intelligence organization itself o

the detailed direction of activities, once the task

priorities have been decided in committee.

The actual composition of the intelligence organi

should be designed to meet the needs arising from th

situation. Individuals may well come from a ran

intelligence organizations including civilian, police

army, but support staff will normally be drawn fro

army’s own Intelligence Corps. Once the intell

organization is established, its actions will follo

normal intelligence cycle. Commanders will pr

direction through intelligence requirements. A sea

available information will follow in order to identify 

additional information, if any, is necessary to me

commander’s requirement. Once the inform

requirement is clearly defined, a collection plan w

made, and sources and agencies tasked. Sourc

Northern Ireland included conventional mi

surveillance, the local population, informers and a

Special Forces, prisoner interrogations, and open s

such as insurgent pamphlets or broadcasts tha

indicate trends and intentions. When Gerry Adam

appointed Vice President of PIRA’s political 

Provisional Sinn Fein, in the autumn of 1978, it was c

those watching that politics had assumed a new impo

within Sinn Fein’s strategy. Sure enough, in Octobe

at the Provisional Sinn Fein Ard Fheis (conference

organization’s publicity officer, Danny Morrison, outl

“new” double strategy: “Who here really believes th

can win the war through the ballot box? But will a

here object if with the ballot box in this hand a

Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?”

22

Information once gained is then processed and con

into intelligence. This process involves collation

routine office work of registering and recording all inc

information; evaluation—determining the reliability 

source and credibility of the informa

analysis—identifying significant facts, comparing 

114
with existing data, and drawing conclusions from 

integration—putting all the analyzed information to

to form a pattern of events or to build up a picture 

subject being studied; and interpretation—deciding 

the collated, evaluated, analyzed, and integ

information means in terms of what is likely to hap

the future. Finally, the intelligence will be dissemina

an appropriate form and by suitable means to thos

need it.

Disseminated intelligence does not normally mea

regular army units deployed on the ground are 

provided with the pinpoint information required to 

them in a position to engage and kill or captur

insurgents. The necessity of protecting sources may m

difficult for the intelligence organization to act by 

other than through the deployment of Special Forces

at short notice, such as the ambush at Loughgall, C

Armagh, on May 8, 1987, when, following a bomb att

the RUC station, a Special Air Service team killed 

heavily armed terrorists from PIRA’s East Tyrone 

service unit (ASU). Even then, this type of operat

infrequent. While the army should almost certain

warned if information becomes available indicati

attack on them, the only way for regular soldiers to ta

battle to the insurgents is for commanders at all leve

particularly battalion and company, to obtain and d

contact information as part of their own opera

program. The tactical commander first analyzes a

information he can obtain from the intelli

organization at his level and discusses the problem 

anyone who can help, for example collocated local poli

then mounts offensive patrols to acquire more inform

and develop his own intelligence picture. This proc

repeated until the commander is confident that h

enough information to place his troops in areas of 

enemy activity.

This process of turning background informatio

contact intelligence has worked extremely well in th

115
deployment of units in Northern Ireland. Once th

allocated individual tactical areas of operat

responsibility (TAOR), commanders can “farm their p

whether urban or rural, for a sustained period of tim

dispersal of the South Armagh Roulement Battalion 

into company patrol bases in the towns of Fo

Newtownhamiliton, and Crossmaglen, with bat

headquarters at Bessbrook Mill, is a prime example 

approach. With some units in the Province rotating e

months, the intelligence continuity is maintain

selected personnel, normally Intelligence Corps N

remaining in one TAOR for up to 2 years.

As army tactics evolved in Northern Ireland, so t

recognition of the need for thorough and appro

training. In the 1960s counterinsurgency was viewe

specialist subject outside the scope of regimental so

As late as 1971, training was still far from adequ

Indeed, Brigadier Peter Morton states that, as a com

commander in 1973, some of the deaths of his men 

have been avoided through better training, and tha

arrived in Ulster with “little idea of what to expect

1976, his men were receiving 3 months of training 

4-month tour. In a small professional army, soldiers 

not simply be thrown at the problem to learn on the j

view reinforced by the need to train a variety of unit

engineers to artillery, given the shortage of in

battalions and recognition of the power of the news me

intrude into every aspect of operations in the provin

report instantly any mistakes. First established in En

and the British Army of the Rhine, the Northern I

Training Advisory Teams (NITAT) were designed t

together counterinsurgency principles, opera

experience and research, and basic infantry skills 

Northern Ireland context before units deployed 

Province. Units were instructed on how to pat

mutually supporting small teams; deal with “agg

full-blown riot, sniper attack, or bomb explosion; a

“come-on” or ambush, cordon, and search an area; an

116
and check vehicles. The structural organization 

various paramilitaries was covered, as were rul

opening fire and the Yellow Card. Specific inform

pertinent to where a unit was going in the Provinc

passed more often than not by officers and soldiers 

unit to be relieved. All this culminated in compan

battalion test exercises, based on either an urban or 

setting as appropriate.

With experience and self-evaluation, the tra

package has continued to improve. It became longe

more comprehensive, to include better facilities fea

whole training villages populated by serviceme

women role-playing gunmen and the civil populat

which soldiers can practice dealing with any ty

incident. Throughout, minimum force was emphasi

was community relations. Reinforced by of

publications developed during the troubles that range 

from Standing Instructions for Northern Ireland 

pocket aide memoire of a commander, this conc

pre-deployment training is a vital component of B

success in Ireland and has now become accepted 

practice for any sustained theater of operations. Indee

Northern Ireland training package format provide

foundation for training undertaken by British so

deploying to Bosnia in the former Yugoslavia as part 

first United Nations Protection Force and late

NATO-led Implementation Force.

The British response in Northern Ireland clearly e

over time going through a number of distinct phase

initial defensive stage (1969-1972) attempted to conta

problem while the government organized its respons

subsequent build-up phase (1972-1979), spreading ou

the cities, put those measures decided earlier into pr

and forced PIRA to restructure into small ASU

acknowledge that military victory for them wa

possible. This resulted in Sinn Fein elevating the po

approach to parity with the physical force tradition

consolidation phase (1979-1990) saw a continuat

117
earlier policies and ironing out of identified proble

government influence returned throughout the Pro

The final attrition phase started in 1990 and is ongoi

the elements of British strategy are in place, wo

effectively, and with controlled rotation of pers

capable of continuing indefinitely. In the words of a 

briefing to politicians:

We face groups of terrorists, who to a greater or lesser degree are ex

highly effective, and capable of atrocities right across the spectrum 

violence. They provide an enormous challenge to our soldiers who hav

operate within the law in support of the RUC, working among

community, the vast majority of whom want peace and to be able to ge

with their lives. Increased force levels, better coordination and direc

more effective exploitation of intelligence and a training system prop

tuned to the task, provide us with the tools we need to do the job.

25

Self-evidently, warfare is too complex an issue f

British approach to low-intensity operations in the 

(and rural) areas of Northern Ireland to be viewed as a 

template. Nevertheless, it should be apparent fro

foregoing discussion that the principle of minimum fo

accordance with the rule of law; close cooperation at 

level between all branches of the civil administr

military, and police; and the use of area deploymen

small unit operations based on accurate intelligen

encompassed under a clear political aim, can be adap

meet a variety of circumstances, providing the uniqu

of each conflict is taken into account. It should also b

that there are no off-the-shelf solutions, and th

effective counterinsurgency campaign in an 

environment takes time and patience to develop an

through to a successful conclusion.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. T. P. Coogan,The IRA: A History, Colorado: Roberts Rinehart, 199

2. P. Taylor, The Provos: The IRA and Sein Fein, London: Bloo

1997, p. 54.

118
3. BBC Timewatch,The Sparks That Lit the Bonfire, January 27

4. J. Bardon, A History of Ulster, Belfast: Blackstaff, 1992, p. 671.

5. The Troubles: The Background to the Question of N

Ireland, T. Downing, ed., London: Macdonald Press, 1989, p. 155.

6. M. Farrell,Northern Ireland: The Orange State, London: 1976, 

7. M. Fielder,Soldiering on in Northern Ireland: 21 Years of S

and Law Enforcement, RUSI and Brassey’s Defence Yearbook: 1990, p

8. “Design for Military Operations,” The British Military Doctrin

Code No. 71451, 1989, p. 28.

9. G. Adams, Before the Dawn, An Autobiography, William H

1996, p. 142.

10. M. L. A. Smith, Fighting for Ireland: The Military Strateg

Irish Republican Movement, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 101.

11. Report of the Enquiry into the Allegations against the Security 

Physical Brutality in Northern Ireland, Arising out of Events on August 9, 19

4823, November 1971, London.

12. D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern I

1969-1984, London: Methuen, 1985, p. 64.

13. Taylor, pp. 129-130.

14. Report of the Tribunal appointed into the events on Sunday, Jan

1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderr

day, London: HMSO, H.L. 101/H.C.22, April 1972, pp. 35-37.

15. P. Graham, Low-level Civil/Military Coordination, 

1970-73, RUSI: September 1974, p.80.

16. Hamill, p. 176.

17. J. Bowyer Bell, The Irish Troubles: A Generation of V

1967-1992, Ireland: Gill and MacMillan, 1993, p. 432.

18. Northern Ireland, Emergency Provisions Act 1991, Lon

Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1991.

119
19. “The Fundamentals: Part 1: The Application of Force,” The Arm

Manual Volume 1, Army Code No 71344(Pt.1) D/DAT/13/34/25, 1985, p

20. P. Arthur and K. Jeffery, Northern Ireland since 1968, 

Blackwell, 1988, p. 48.

21. M. Dewar, “Northern Ireland: Carry a Big Stick and Talk Quie

Officer Magazine, March/April 1997, p. 16.

22. P. Bishop and E. Mallie, The Provisional IRA, London: 

Heineman, 1987, p. 378.

23. F. Kitson,Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgen

Peacekeeping, London: Faber and Faber, 1971, pp. 169-180.

24. P. Morton, Emergency Tour: 3 PARA in South A

Wellingborough: William Kimber, 1989, p. 11.

25. 3rd Infantry Brigade G2/G3 Briefing Notes, dated August 17, 1994

120
CHAPTER 8

MILITARY OPERATIONS

IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMENT:

BEIRUT, 1982-84

Bernard E. Trainor

The U.S. Marine experience in Beirut from 1982 t

is more appropriately a case of military operation

suburban environment. By choice the Joint Chiefs o

(JCS) opted to keep the Marines out of downtown Beir

locate them in the vicinity of the Beirut Interna

Airport, just south of the city. This decision was ma

both political and logistical reasons. Politically, the 

did not want the Marines tied down in the con

environment of downtown Beirut. Additionally

occupying Israelis wanted the Americans, and n

French or Italian members of the intervention force

contiguous to their positions. Logistically, the airpo

landing beaches facilitated support of the Marine la

force. From a tactical point of view, however, the lo

was about the worst imaginable. The airport was o

ground in a potentially hostile environment domina

the Chouf Mountains.

But the story does not begin with the encampment 

Marines. Throughout the Cold War, both the United 

and the Soviet Union eschewed “peacekeeping” mis

There were too many chances that uncontrolled 

could lead to confrontation between the two superp

better that peacekeeping be done under the aegis 

United Nations by smaller and nominally una

nations (e.g., Ireland, Pakistan, Fiji). The exception 

rule occurred in August 1982 when, at Israeli insis

Americans were included in a multinational force 

with French and Italian) requested by the Leb

government to supervise the evacuation of the Pal

121
Liberation Organizatin (PLO) “fighters” from Beirut, 

they had been battling the Israelis.

The Secretary of Defense and JCS were unhappy 

the White House’s agreement to do so, but carried o

president’s wishes. The intervention force landed in 

on August 25 and completed the evacuation without s

incident on September 10. The Marines of the 32d M

Amphibious Unit (MAU) then set sail for Italian p

call, only to be ordered back to Lebanon before they 

reach them. Two fatal events had taken place. Leb

president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated, a

dependents of the PLO fighters were massacred 2 day

in the west Beirut shanty towns of Sabra and Shatill

Marines relanded in Lebanon where they would rema

failed peacekeeping mission until February 1984

French, Italians, and later the British also put forces a

at Beirut.

One of the first problems faced in this unusual m

arose from the object of the exercise itself. At best it co

described as a mission of “presence,” which was inter

to mean providing a stabilizing force, a security blan

the locals, like a cop on the beat. But that was a 

mission. This made simple and coherent ru

engagement difficult to articulate. Essentially, M

were prohibited from using their weapons wi

command authorization except in extreme situati

self-defense, after allowing a hostile party to fire firs

problem was further exacerbated by the multisec

composition of the population, all of whom were fighti

another. In addition to stay-behind PLOs and the 

military force, there were the indigenous Moslems, D

and Christians who had been fighting a civil war for 

The Lebanese government was one in name only and

professing to be multisectarian, was, in fact, an instr

of the Christian Phalange Party. The Lebanese A

Forces (LAF), also ostensibly multisectarian, was 

ineffective and had remained in barracks througho

civil war.

122
The Marines also interpreted their role as keepi

contending factions from attacking each other a

imputing legitimacy to the titular government. If al

acknowledged the Good Samaritan role, the ex

tactical disposition of the Marines was irrelevant. Bu

Marines became involved in the fighting, or were per

as taking sides in support of one of the sectarian sides

encampment on the low ground around the airpor

vulnerable. 

Initially, the locals of all persuasions as well 

Israelis welcomed the American and allied presence a

stability it brought. For a short period of time, goodw

widespread. During the unusually harsh winter of 19

the Marines endeared themselves to the Lebanese 

they undertook aid and rescue missions in the mou

villages cut off and isolated by heavy snows. Marine p

freely trekked the souks and warrens of the surrou

neighborhoods without loaded weapons. The pop

smiled and offered them tea. The children crowded a

them. If there was any problem, it was with the Israeli

constantly tested the forbearance of the Marines 

simultaneously trying to create the illusion that th

and IDF forces were coordinating their activitie

cooperating with one another. The Marines succes

discredited the ploy, and when a Marine officer arme

only a pistol prevented an Israeli armor column from 

into an unauthorized Lebanese occupied area, the M

immediately became heroes to all Lebanese.

On-scene and national intelligence focused o

tactical situation with great success, primarily th

dedicated signals intelligence (SIGINT) assets. Po

intelligence, however, was poor. The Marines dep

upon the U.S. Embassy, the Lebanese government, a

French (who were credited with having excellent sou

All proved inadequate, misleading, or downright dece

It was this lack of knowledge about the nature and cu

aspects of the Lebanese melange which led to fatal mi

on the part of both the Marines and the U.S. Govern

123
The most egregious error was to mistake the LAF 

multisectarian entity respected by all factions. The 

ever anxious to untangle the U.S. forces from Lebanon 

peacekeeping role, reasoned that, if the central gover

was ineffective, perhaps the LAF could become an ac

symbol and instrument of national unity and sover

for all Lebanese. Hopefully, the people of all sec

groups would rally round their army, allowing it to do 

things: (1) stabilize the nation, thus providin

foundation for a functioning multisectarian governme

provide the necessary guarantees to permit the Israel

to withdraw to its own borders; and (3) prevent the S

from exercising undue influence over internal Leb

matters. Ultimately, it was hoped that a reinvigorate

would emerge as Lebanon’s savior, allowing the 

withdrawal of the multinational intervention forc

concerned recognized that this was a bit of wishful thi

but at the time it appeared to be the best (if not the onl

to untangle the web. As it turned out, it produced disas

Marines began to train the LAF in weaponry, off

and defensive tactics, with attendant local and na

publicity. The Department of Defense (DoD) began a 

program of providing large quantities of light and 

weapons and other significant military equipmen

military advisors to the LAF. The LAF and the Leb

government were most grateful. The U.S. Governme

delighted with the prospects of early solution to wh

been an intractable political problem, securing an 

agreement to withdraw, and keeping the Syrians 

meddling in Lebanese affairs.

But all this was a chimera. The antigovernment 

suspected that the Americans were preparing the L

offensive operations against them. The Leb

government and the LAF were multisectarian in nam

In fact, they were basically Phalangist and seen as s

Moslems and Druze. Additionally, anti-Israeli Middl

factions outside Lebanon believed the United States 

cahoots with the Israelis and was forcing the Leb

124
government to recognize Israel as the price of a

withdrawal. By the spring of 1983, strange and hostil

began to appear on the streets now well-known to M

patrols. Children no longer marched beside the troop

the formerly friendly neighbors avoided the eyes 

Marines and no longer offered tea. Tension was in t

Then anti-American graffiti and posters of the Aya

Khomeni began to appear on the walls. In March 1

grenade was thrown at a Marine patrol and at an I

checkpoint. The Americans were assured by the Leb

government that the attacks were aberrat

Reconstitution of the LAF proceeded apace as hosti

the multinational force was clearly mounting. Conv

downtown Beirut were targets of ambush attempts. In 

1983, a terrorist with an explosive-laden van blew h

up along with part of the American Embassy, kill

occupants. 

It was clear that the peacekeepers had become en

to all but the Phalangists. Antiterrorist warnings 

issued and security measures were implemented, t

severely circumscribed so as not to endanger civ

While tactical intelligence on military factions i

around Beirut remained good, intelligence on te

groups was abysmal. It was with dismay that M

commanders learned that the French, who had a 

relationship with Lebanon, knew as little as the

Periodic sniping attacks began against the dug-in M

positions around the airfield. Rules of Engagement (

were modified, giving greater freedom of action 

beleaguered troops, but the rules always seemed 

behind current circumstances. Marines were author

use lethal force against snipers, but only when they 

positively identify the source of the sniping and onl

weapons of like caliber, only for as long as the host

persisted, and only in such a way that innocent civ

would not be hit by any return fire.

The Marines were facing an increasingly dang

situation. Open warfare was breaking out be

125
sectarian groups and against the LAF, which was now 

barracks but proving to be singularly ineffective re

consumers. Ill-positioned for active operations, the M

were vulnerable to anyone who wished to shoot at th

was almost impossible to distinguish friend from fo

terrorist attacks on patrols and convoys were a co

threat. Yet for all of this, there was still no redefinition 

Marines’ mission. The fiction of a benign “presence

was maintained in the face of a situation that was dev

into armed chaos.

The Marine command in Beirut received very littl

and guidance from either their military or civilian ma

The convoluted command arrangements in Beirut we

only grossly inadequate to the task, but were detrim

On the civilian side, the American ambassador as h

the country team was ostensibly the prin

decisionmaker on site, but he had to check with the 

Department on just about every move, and additiona

also was receiving directions from the National Se

Council (NSC). Moreover, a State Department s

envoy, authorized to deal not only with Lebanon bu

Syria and Israel, complicated the ambassador’s exer

authority. On top of all that, he was apply

political-diplomatic template to a situation whic

already erupted into open warfare.

On the military side, the command line was e

confusing. On an organization chart it looked logica

MAU was an element of the Sixth Fleet, belong

Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR) in Stu

Germany, who in turn answered only to the Secret

Defense, but in practice went through the JCS. The

also a naval componency command line through the 

headquarters in Naples, Italy, and the Commander in 

Navy Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR) in London. Additio

the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) exercised inf

authority over deployed naval forces (including emb

Marines). On top of this, the Chairman of the JC

dispatched a “trusted agent” to Lebanon to ov

126
activities (primarily relating to LAF support) a

recommend courses of action. Back in the Washi

there was also a running dispute among the D

Secretary, the JCS (who never wanted to be in Beirut 

first place), and the White House National Security Ad

who was determined to make the intervention a su

This only added to the perception that the Marines 

supporting Israel and the Phalange.

Needless to say, the spaghetti-like com

arrangements led to countermanding directions, con

tasks, lack of timeliness, and contradictory policie

hapless victim of these arrangements was the M

colonel, the commander on the scene faced 

life-and-death demands regarding a mission that 

summer of 1983 bore no resemblance to objective r

From his point of view, everybody was either giving 

or telling him what to do, but nobody seemed to be in c

or providing much help.

Early in May of 1983, fighting among Christian m

the Phalangists, Moslems, and Druze erupted with 

artillery and rocket fire landing inside the M

perimeter. Things then quieted down until July, wh

Druze in the Chouf began to pound LAF positions ad

to the Marines. Concurrently Marine patrols 

harassed, and small arms fire was increasingly aim

Marine positions. By mid-July all-out war had brok

among the sectarian groups and the LAF, whi

multinational forces found themselves in the mid

things. By August some battles were lasting for alm

week. Artillery and rocket fire increased on the M

position, and there were indications that some of it 

from the LAF, presumably to involve the Americans 

fighting. At long last the ROEs caught up with the sit

on the ground, and the Marines began to respond vigo

to both sniper incoming fire with mortars, artiller

naval gunfire. It had a beneficial effect but mad

American force a participant in the conflict.

127
On September 4 the IDF suddenly pulled out, leavi

Chouf to be contested among the Druze, Phalange m

and the LAF. The fat was now in the fire. By the mid

the month, a LAF attempt to oust the Druze from the 

was a disaster, and it appeared to the JCS Chair

trusted agent on the scene that the LAF were abou

overun. He requested naval gunfire support fo

government forces. The MAU commander vigo

objected to the assessment and the idea of taking si

the war. His recommendations were ignored in the 

House. After all, the administration had based its Leb

policy on the viability of the LAF. On September 19

U.S. warships opened devastating fire on the Druz

broke up their attack. Unfortunately, when the roun

the naval guns, the perception of American neutrality 

with them.

The Marines were now viewed as enemies b

antigovernment forces. Hunkered down in their tre

and bunkers under the guns of all the combatant

Marines did their best to protect themselves. Su

personnel had earlier been moved into the Leb

aviation agency building adjacent to the airport termi

was a huge steel-reinforced concrete building, whic

withstood direct tank and artillery fire in 1982 wh

Israelis were battling for control of Beirut. The move 

sense as protection against artillery, but it made a tem

terrorist target. However, at this point the Marines 

less worried about terrorists than they were about th

raging about them. They had unintentionally become 

the belligerents. The Marine commander rem

uninstructed as diplomats made a futile attempt to e

fighting. A cease-fire of sorts took place at the end 

month, only to have fighting break out again in Octo

On October 23, a suicidal terrorist behind the whee

explosive-laden truck drove from the air terminal pa

lot into the atrium of the Marine barracks. It ma

fateful journey unhindered by Marine sentries faci

parking lot. Their orders had been modified to pr

128
rounds in their weapons out of fear that an acci

discharge might hit an innocent civilian in the vicinity 

airport. When the smoke of the ensuing explosion cl

the building was in ruins, and 241 American servicem

dead in the debris.

Thus ended America’s first modern peaceke

intervention. The administration’s Lebanese polic

been knocked into a cocked hat. While Marines an

other peacekeepers of the multinational force hun

defied the combatants, and continued to support the 

for all practical purposes, they were taken out of the 

The Marines remained in Beirut, hunkered down b

massive obstacles, until the following February wh

MAU withdrew and reembarked aboard amphibious 

standing off the coast. Throughout the intervening p

between the suicide bombing and the MAU’s withdra

was primarily concerned with “force protection.”

Beirut was a sobering and expensive experience fo

the Marine Corps and the nation. Failure to understa

nature of the civil war and the cultural imperatives at 

and failure to develop plans and intelligence based on 

factors left the Marines vulnerable from the start. 

was clearly a need for a more clearly defined missio

vague purpose of the intervention and the conse

unrealistic rules of engagement contributed to the tr

as did failure to heed the warnings and admonition

the on-scene commander. The abysmally confused c

and military chain of command and authority, which 

best be described as pious well-intentioned meddlin

led to the catastrophe of October 23, 1983. As f

Marines, they took their eye off the ball. Sensitive 

terrorist threat at the outset of their commitment, ove

this concern was replaced by the immediate conce

active combat. They failed to provide adequate secur

the building housing their support perso

notwithstanding the commander’s commendable purp

preventing unintentional civilian casualties at Beiru

terminal. The principle of an all-around defense agai

129
threats was violated to their peril. Experience is a 

teacher. In light of the Khobar Tower bombing aim

American airmen in Saudi Arabia and the recent succ

terrorist attack against the USS Cole in Yemen

wonders whether the American military has be

attentive student.

130
CHAPTER 9

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN URBAN TERR

Gerald Yonas and Timothy Moy

Operating in a potentially hostile city is every so

nightmare. The staggering complexity of the 

environment means that deadly threat

noncombatants—may lurk behind every corner, doo

or window. Urban operations present an a

unparalleled challenge to the modern professional mi

The complexity of urban operations is further amplif

the diversity of missions that the military will be 

upon to conduct in urban terrain. Peacemakin

peacekeeping missions, urban raids to seize airpo

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites or to 

hostages, and extended urban combat operatio

present different sorts of challenges for planners and 

on the ground.

Technology almost never serves as a magic bulle

past predictions of technological miracles pile high 

ash heap of history. At the same time, it is a vital elem

planning in the modern age to consider and, if possibl

advantage of emerging technologies. We believe 

technologies can assist military operations in urba

terrain (MOUT) in three primary areas: pre

information, smart robots, and nonlethal weapon

restraints. Let’s discuss each in turn.

Precision Information.

The intricacy of the urban environment couples w

complexity of urban operations (especially operations 

than war) to create an enormous demand for pre

awareness. This exquisitely high level of situa

131
awareness will be necessary on several levels. Opera

success may hinge upon knowing the precise locatio

disposition of time-critical targets (like WMD stor

example), or upon having an extremely detailed m

friendly forces, hostile forces, and noncombatants in a 

city block.

In almost all of these cases, we can enhance the pre

of our situational awareness through the use of elec

sensors. Acoustic, seismic, electro-magnetic, and 

sensors are now small and sufficiently rugged that th

be deployed by various methods in large number

operate for extended periods with no human mainte

The Steel Rattler, for example, is a hand-emp

acoustic-seismic sensor with a thermal imager tha

detect, classify, and identify time-critical mobile targ

their acoustic-seismic-thermal signatures. Steel Eagl

air-dropped version of the same package, and has a

been fitted for deployment by the F-15, F-16, and F

Multifunction sensor packages of this sort could p

MOUT planners with precise data on the movem

forces and materiel, even in an environment as compl

modern city.

Further precision is on the horizon. Sandia Na

Laboratories conducted a multi-year initiative to dev

micro “chemlab on a chip.” By applying a combinat

detection methods in a single electronics package, S

has built a fully self-contained, pocket-sized devic

could be useful in MOUT for detecting explosives or 

substances that have identifiable chemical signature

Figure 1). Similar devices for local-area detect

biological weapons are in development, though th

harder technical challenge; nevertheless, hand

bio-weapon detectors should be available in the n

years. Eventually, MOUT forces will be able to 

advantage of sensor fusion: the large-scale combina

varying sensor inputs to produce a single, coheren

precise picture of the operational environment (see F

2).

132
133

Figure 1.

Figure 2.
One important technical challenge to pre

awareness still remains. Complex sensor suites can a

a large amount of precise data, but data is not the 

thing as knowledge. MOUT planners will benefit littl

these sensor packages if they are not accompan

improved techniques for processing the large amou

data. This is a difficult problem, but one that we ar

trying to address. Technology and technique

transforming data into useful knowledge span the spe

from analyzing complex models of human decisionm

to designing relatively simple graphic interfaces tha

allow human operators to interpret data more quick

accurately.

Smart Robots.

One further twist on sensor technology leads in

second area of technological application: mobile se

The sensor suites described above could be combined 

global positioning system (GPS) locator or radar ta

then air-dropped or otherwise deployed in large numb

roam and reconnoiter an urban environment.

By this point, however, we are essentially talking 

robots. Sandia has developed an array of mobile robo

can perform a variety of functions, many of which wo

useful in urban operations. Relatively smal

inexpensive robots can already carry sensor packa

even weapons. As these machines inexorably b

smaller and less expensive, it will be possible to e

them in large numbers for clandestine reconnaissan

other operations in urban facilities (see Figure 3). This 

be a particularly useful alternative to endang

personnel in high-risk situations, like scouting a po

chemical/biological weapons release site.

The prospect of smaller, cheaper, and increa

multifunction mobile robots raises yet another poss

that may be useful for MOUT planning. Com

simulations employing so-called genetic algorithm

134
agent-based modeling demonstrate that relatively s

machines can be engineered to learn from their exper

and evolve a surprisingly complex set of behaviors.

For example, researchers at Sandia have found 

very simple, virtual machines are programmed to per

simple task (like, for example, finding an object in a 

and are also given some ability to alter thei

programming, they will eventually begin cooperatin

learning from each other even though they have no

programmed to do so. Large numbers of such v

machines will thus exhibit something akin to swa

behavior, in which one machine’s knowledge is q

transmitted to and used by others in the group.

Consequently, it will almost certainly be possi

engineer large numbers of mobile robots to e

swarming behavior. This opens up a host of opera

possibilities, the most obvious being for M

reconnaissance; large numbers of swarming robots 

scout an area and sniff out a chemical weapons sour

135

Figure 3.
example. As swarming intelligence improves, it may e

possible for robot swarms to identify positions and po

targets with little or no human intervention. This is c

a technology still in development, but one that is 

considering for future MOUT doctrine.

Nonlethal Weapons and Restraints.

Just about all discussions of MOUT doctrin

procedures seem to turn eventually to the iss

noncombatant casualties. The conventional wisdom 

significant numbers of noncombatant casualties can 

severe and deleterious consequences for American 

support of a military campaign—an assessment that 

very plausible. While it will not serve as a pa

emerging technologies may help address this probl

well.

Nonlethal weapons technologies are an obvious an

Currently, many sublethal systems suffer from the fa

a weapon that is not lethal for a healthy adult male m

quite lethal for an older person or a child. Sandia ha

experimenting for many years with technologies 

should not be lethal under any circumstances—“

foams,” for example, that can immobilize machin

people without causing injury. In the near future, 

very likely be possible to design radio, acoustic, or o

weapons that incapacitate without injury (see Figu

Such technologies may not even require line-of-si

target, and could thus be very useful for clearing r

buildings, and, eventually, entire city blocks. If it 

deemed appropriate, such technologies could a

robot-deployed.

One difficulty with nonlethal technologies is tha

must obviously conform to the international treatie

conventions to which the United States subscribes. 

conventions strictly regulate the use of nonconven

weapons and conduct regarding noncombatants. Par

cally, nonlethal technologies, even ones specif

136
designed and employed to reduce noncombatant casu

may be restricted under these conventions.

General.

Whether or not the three areas of technol

development discussed above turn out to be of use in M

planning and execution, they highlight three overa

points that relate to technology, doctrine, and pla

First, it will always be important to tailor the applica

technology to specific missions by keeping the full spe

of technological possibilities in mind. Differing m

parameters, rules of engagement, target sets, and so o

require the application of different sorts of techno

systems. In this sense, there will be no single 

technologies for MOUT. Rather, there will be a h

technological systems that can be selectively tailo

various sorts of MOUT missions.

Second, our experience indicates that we s

examine ways to streamline the pathway from develo

137

Figure 4. 
to deployment. Several of the technologies discussed 

chapter were evaluated and approved for deplo

several years ago, but have apparently not been emplo

situations where they might have been extremely u

For example, our video clip of a mobile robot ant

weapon has received considerable enthusiastic fee

from defense and military audiences, but this 

technology that has been available for some time. A

temporal window of technological superiority grow

smaller, it will be increasingly important to bring em

technologies to deployment as efficiently as possible.

Finally, while we need to guard against unc

technological enthusiasm, we also need to be aware 

potentially revolutionary effects of new technologies

rare, but every once in a while a technology emerges th

only allows us to do better what we used to do, bu

enables us to do things we formerly could not do at 

operational doctrine is modified only with an eye t

revising previous doctrine, there will be times, alm

definition, when our forces will not be benefiting as f

possible from the transforming capabilities of 

technologies. Technology alone can never guar

victory, but it can sometimes change the rules of the 

We should be ready to change along with it.

138
CHAPTER 10

URBAN OPERATIONS: SOCIAL MEANIN

THE URBAN BUILT FORM,

AND ECONOMIC FUNCTION

Max Neiman

Military operations in urban terrain are an increa

important focus in discussions regarding the nat

contemporary military doctrine. The explanations fo

growing concern can be quickly summarized as fo

First, increasing proportions of the world are found i

settings, with approximately 50 percent of the w

people residing in urban places presently, and wi

proportion reaching perhaps 70 percent in the ne

years. Second, key national administrative, econ

technological, and coordinating assets are 

concentrated in urban places, especially in third 

nations. Third, opponents and potential adversaries 

United States are likely to retreat to urban settings in 

to minimize the apparently overwhelming superio

U.S. military forces in every phase of “heav

conventional warfare.

It is not likely that a single or even small set of m

can embrace all of the challenges that urban combat is 

to pose in the urban contexts of today’s world, becau

range of differing urban environments is so varied

consequence, it is equally unclear what range of skil

resources are required to implement successful

panoply of operations that might be required both 

urban settings and within given cities.

Thus the problem of military planning, from the p

view of an urbanist, has its analogue in the fi

mainstream urban policymaking and policy analysi

similar, for example, to the burdens associated wi

139
high cost of maintaining service infrastructure in area

pose high cost, fairly daunting worst-case scenario

control, flood control, tornado/hurricane manage

traffic congestion, public disorder, lethal epide

Governments, particularly states and localities 

United States, are charged with ensuring public h

safety, and welfare, and this obligation must be carri

in a world in which threats to well-being are 

unpredictable and potentially extraordinarily damag

The worst-case fire, cataclysmic hurricane, titanic 

jam, large-scale riot, deadly epidemic, or major e

supply disruption are, thankfully, relatively rare with

United States. Nevertheless, despite their uncommo

the public fully expects that the resources

infrastructure, and the necessary skilled and tr

personnel will be available to deal with these ep

threats when they occur. For example, even though 

fires in cities require fairly simple equipment, there 

occasional conflagration involving hazardous mat

high-rise buildings, or other highly complex and d

environments. In such instances the fire-fig

equipment is much more expensive and the skills re

much more demanding. As a result, governmen

required to maintain expensive and specialized equi

and to train individuals to use it, even though equi

and personnel might be used only rarely. Similarly, fo

hours of the day, streets and transportation equi

must manage only off-peak traffic, but yet hav

infrastructure necessary to manage the massive 

during rush hours. Moreover, while for much of the 

energy and power demand by homes and business

below capacity, the energy distribution system must b

to handle the episodic peak demand levels. Althou

most periods energy demand might remain consid

below peak demand, the system must secure and su

additional but more expensive marginal supplies in o

satisfy anticipated maximum demands.

140
In short, the kinds of calamitous circumstances in 

places are many and varied, but the fundamental prob

the same: to be prepared for the maximum dema

services or the most dangerous scenario, even while m

the time things are fairly quiescent. This must be done

if it is impossible to know always when the se

challenges might occur. Even on the domestic level, t

is often absolutely necessary to have the capabi

manage quite different, extreme, or even un

situations. The burdens of supporting such capabilitie

and usually do, drive up substantially the costs o

services. It might not always be apparent to citizen

these costs are necessary if public health, safety

welfare are to be ensured.

This aspect of domestic policy has its analog

military planning. Developing appropriate strateg

supporting a military capability that can succes

implement any kind of military operation in urban ter

not conceptually different from the challenge of confr

the different kinds of threats that can undermine 

health and safety at the domestic level. It is not g

different from deciding what potential fire threat, 

congestion, domestic disturbance, or natural disaster

to be considered in trying to plan for the protection 

public’s general welfare and safety.

Obviously we cannot hope to manage every conce

sort of urban military operation anywhere on the pla

any time. It is also true that military doctrine will 

able, perhaps should not try, to encompass every k

urban or city setting that the security analysts 

imagine. Indeed, the levels of uncertainty always r

high, and having a doctrine for every contingency 

engender a sense of preparedness that is unwarrante

that might even incite interventions when the r

unanticipated adverse consequences is high.

In the world of military operations in urban terra

must think in terms of the categories and variables to 

141
in decisions regarding the sorts of challenges that ar

likely. For example, what kinds of variables pr

different urban contexts that, in turn, affect the cond

military operations? Each of these challenges and 

they are more or less likely to occur will require assess

of their relationship to national objectives and inte

followed by appraisals of what we can do about 

challenges and the associated costs of meeting them

Urban terrain has both social and physical dimen

which by their interaction give form to urban place

mix of these dimensions and the specific component

are important within the social and physical profile 

urban area will often dictate the sort of threat that is 

to occur and the manner and probability of interven

deal with such a threat. In the most abstract way, th

urban terrain has a pattern of social relationship

networks that can be described and which have effect

social dimension is an expression of the pres

characteristics, and interaction of human being

example, the size, density, and heterogeneity 

population within some specified area, the cohes

conflict among various social groups (e.g., religious, e

economic, and racial), the degree of terri

clustering/segregation of the population, the le

education prevailing in the population, critical featu

the legal system, the power structure, and the po

system, as well as the relationships of these factors to 

components of a given urban area’s socio-po

environment. 

The physical dimension of cities includes topograp

geographical, and geological factors that are manifes

such things as the location of the urban terrain, climat

such traits as mountains, rivers, precipitation lev

contiguity to large bodies of water. The interact

physical and social factors also shapes such matters 

built form of urban terrain, which includes not on

area’s buildings and other structures, but also 

142
distribution elements such as sewers, transport sy

communications, and economic facilities.

Gathering relevant information about all citie

urban places throughout the planet is neither possib

desirable. The assumption here is that the most d

military operations in urban terrain are less lik

advanced, large, complex urban centers. The more 

challenge will be among larger third world urban 

Some data can be gathered for the full range of urban p

advanced or third world, including information su

descriptions of streets, highways, and other transpor

arteries and resources (e.g., airports and railroad sta

For the “most likely” military operations in third 

urban terrain, however, the data must be exhaustiv

include a wider range of variables, since it is in such 

that urban military threats are likely to arise.

As indicated above, it is critical that we be system

the framework used to organize the data-gathering 

and to ensure that we are appropriately sensitive 

critical variables that need to be described. In the disc

below, I describe the specific categories found 

important regarding urban places and for which da

cities should be systematically gathered for as many 

more likely sites at which military operations in 

terrain are likely to occur. The categories believed 

critical in describing urban places are (1) social meani

built form; and (3) economic role.

The social meaning of urban places refers to 

cultural features of cities and urban places that refle

values, social perceptions, and interactions of inhab

with regard both to the city and to one another. 

places that hold special religious or historical meani

likely to affect combatants in ways that cities withou

intensely held symbolic or nationalistic implicatio

not. Additionally, the levels of social harmony or d

with respect to class conflict, ethnic antagonism

religious strife can affect the unity and capac

143
inhabitants to work together effectively. Ju

importantly, these characteristics might greatly comp

the post-combat, pacification, and occupation pe

Beirut, Belfast, and the cities in Bosnia or Kosov

examples of how these issues can affect combat missi

unique ways.

Related to the factor of social harmony is the perc

of inhabitants of what is referred to as “the natural ar

the city. These are often neighborhood dimension

boundaries that are defined socially, although th

usually a street, bridge, river, or other “border” that d

these areas. These natural areas might delimit areas 

on religious, ethnic, or social class. Knowledge of su

areas in places where there are sharp divisions along 

lines is very helpful, even critical, in many place

dividing lines of Catholic and Protestant neighborho

Belfast or the differentiation of clans by areas in Moga

are examples of places where natural areas play imp

roles in current and previous combat operations.

The urban built form refers to the housing stoc

other structures that mark an urban landscape

topography and natural surroundings (rivers, moun

or beaches, for example) are included in the built fo

individual cities and urban settings since they establi

contours on which and within which structural forms 

The utility systems, including water and p

distribution, waste management, transportation node

communications networks are also critical features 

built form. Where these are located and how advan

primitive they are might determine the nature of har

imposed on the local population by combat. Urban 

with large “squatter” settlements might pose unique 

and physical challenges in military operations

knowing their location and magnitude would be imp

information in planning combat operations. For exam

might be the case that people residing in places with 

primitive built forms are, ironically, less affected by c

damage, at least in terms of having a disruption in se

144
It is not being suggested, of course, that third 

populations are less sensitive to the horrors of war or 

less when they are situated in the midst of combat. It 

that third world populations might be less likely to 

sense of added deprivation for services that they 

receive in any case. As for U.S. troops involved in c

operations in urban terrain within less developed na

they might find that combat in these areas pose u

health hazards, even in the earliest stages of combat, 

already poor quality in the area’s utility infrastructu

The urban built form in advanced societies is more 

to be varied and complex. The densities of structure

quality of building materials, the elaborate syste

sewers, bridges, subways, etc., are likely to make the n

of combat operations far more complicated fro

operational and cost points of view.

Finally, the built form also includes the range and 

of the urban footprint, in terms of extent of 

settlement, total population, and population density

might be particularly interested in the movement of 

and the densities of circulating people and other tra

particular times (e.g., the rush hours or market set

The planning of military operations might benefit 

knowledge about the “timing” of population and veh

movements within a given urban area. The rhyth

urban places vary, however, and must be described pl

place.

The economic role of urban places includes que

regarding the centrality of a particular area to the na

region. Will occupation of a city or urban area be deci

will it merely shift combat to another area? 

self-contained with respect to goods and services is 

Will the city be able to sustain itself for an extended p

or is it a place that is likely to be out of critical reso

services, or goods within a short time? Finally, is the g

of the city or urban area due to recent eco

transformations in the nation? Has growth occurre

145
rapidly? Has economic activity produced large clus

newly urbanized peasants who have been pushed fro

countryside? Indeed, the economic development of a 

is likely to accentuate the difficulties that are posed 

social discord issues raised earlier.

The variety of cities makes the development of a s

grand urban warfare doctrine problematic. The v

natures of the city or urban terrain are likely to c

different kinds of combat tactics. These tactics ma

well demand different rules of engagement, u

deployments of troops, and a bewildering array of arm

personal combat gear. It is possible, even likely

different combinations among the factors discussed 

will affect military operations in urban terrain in a v

of ways. It seems that more systematic thinking is re

to enumerate what those effects and relationships ar

A particular mix or interaction among these v

“urban” components can complicate, impede, or fac

military operations. Indeed, the nature of the m

problem can vary as a consequence of the interaction a

these social and physical factors. Whether the m

problem requires a heavy and sustained military ope

(such as might be required by an opponent with wides

support in the population), or some intermediate categ

military activity (such as restoring civil order a

assisting in the case of a severe natural calamity), or li

quicker actions (such as rescues or retaliations), c

dictated by how the elements of social meaning, built 

and economic function interact.

Military operations in Mogadishu and in Beirut c

were affected by the interactions among the physic

social structure of the respective regions. The ki

military operations dictated by each setting produce

different challenges. A number of times, for examp

have heard about the need to decentralize mi

operations within the context of an urban te

environment. There is considerable appeal to implem

146
an operational structure that emphasizes flexi

decentralization, and creative innovation at the stree

by small teams of soldiers, connected to one anoth

high-tech means in a variety of different conn

networks. 

But the nature of this devolution to small clust

troops might also be shaped, for example, by how c

certain key areas are, since these are more likely 

defended energetically by larger numbers of e

Advanced, populous, and industrialized localities are 

likely than urban areas in less developed nations to 

concentrated key facilities. In turn, the quick destruc

seizure of control of such facilities might require 

numbers of combat units than are anticipated by adv

of decentralization. Assuming that there is success in 

urban military operations, defending the successes 

also produce new challenges that require some analy

The kind of analysis discussed here requires ongoin

repeated work to update data over time, and this migh

entail utilization of civilian specialists to produce th

for the categories of variables that have been disc

above. These descriptions should be managed in way

also permit an examination of the interplay between 

form and structure and how such linkages are asso

with particular sorts of urban military opera

Naturally, there will always be the risk of terrorist a

and hostage-taking nearly anywhere on the plane

precise circumstances associated with each of 

terrorist acts are nearly impossible to anticipate and t

would seem, require individually tailored responses.

Let us summarize the issues surrounding the anal

social meaning, built form, and economic function. 

there should be a concerted effort to develop a list of 

and urban areas that are likely to involve major m

operations. Second, using the categories discussed 

data-gathering for this list of cities and urban pla

initiated. Each of these categories has a host of var

147
and there needs to be some assessment of which 

factors can be feasibly described in systematic fa

Third, it might be possible, using the information gat

to develop meaningful categories of city/urban place

the application of statistical tools such as cluster and 

analysis). Fourth, examine the relationship between 

of urban places and the needs required respecting lan

skills, combat training, equipment, arms, ta

communications, and field organization. Fifth

data-gathering must be ongoing, since the dynam

urban growth, especially in the third world, change ra

The result of such data-gathering and analysis s

contribute to more cost-effective judgments about the 

where military challenges in urban places are lik

occur. That, in turn, should permit at least more disci

decisions about the kinds of preparatory investme

equipment and training that will be required, as w

provide some outlines of the boundaries to our do

governing military operations in urban terrain.

148
CHAPTER 11

URBAN OPERTIONS: TACTICAL REALIT

AND STRATEGIC AMBIGUITIES

Barry R. Posen

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S

have become much more interested than previously 

problem of operations in urban areas; hence the occas

this book. The chapters herein speak to two broad 

issues. They speak directly to the fundamental t

problems of combat in urban areas, tactical problem

must be understood not only by the soldiers who mus

them, but by civilian policymakers and policy adv

who might choose missions that require the milit

confront these problems. These chapters also spe

sometimes obliquely, to a second set of issues, name

strategic questions. What are the main political miss

urban environments that should influence the 

structure, and training of the military forces that one 

deploy? How do these missions differ one from the othe

how would the forces necessary to their success diffe

strategic issues, while not absent from recent discuss

urban warfare, have not been squarely faced.

WHY TACTICS FIRST?

Most military analysts would begin a discussion o

military preparedness with the strategic questions. W

our national strategy, what are the key threats to ou

security, what are our key interests overseas, what mi

do we need to perform to have any chance of succ

implementing that strategy. In recent years, the 

Government and the Pentagon have offered f

statements on these matters. But the mantra of “two 

149
theater wars,” some number of “small scale continge

and “shape, respond, prepare” provides insuff

guidance to force planners on the relative prior

possible missions (as this book goes to press, it appear

the Bush administration will discard the two-majo

principle). These strategic statements have been 

general, reflecting compromises among pol

constituencies too numerous to list. U.S. force leve

force structure have more often in recent years reflect

political compromises of the diverse views of the se

and their various warfare communities rather than 

choices guided by strategic priorities. The United Stat

currently afford the luxury of strategic indolence, beca

the near term it faces no significant threats to its 

security or to its overseas interests. Moreove

government’s coffers are relatively full. Threats the

but they pale in comparison to those faced during th

War or during the World War II. Practically spe

however, the military may not receive clearer str

guidance anytime soon.

Current U.S. national strategy provides little gu

for how much and what kind of preparations the 

military should make for operations in urban areas. It 

little advice on how high a priority should be assigned 

urban combat problem. The United States has, of c

engaged in military operations in urban areas of v

types during the last decade: Panama, Somalia, and 

And we have viewed on our TV screens even more te

military operations by others in the cities of Grozn

Sarajevo. Military documents on urban operations u

begin from the facts of these recent experiences an

general observation that population trends the worl

point to more people in more cities, which will be larg

more difficult environments than in the past.

Because the United States is currently very stron

secure, it has been in a position to undertake m

operations that are not essential to U.S. security or 

preservation of its power. The easy assumption o

150
military superiority has made politicians somewha

guarded about the commitment of force than they ma

been in past years. While American military forc

certainly the most capable in the world, they do bes

they have practiced longest: the defeat of conven

forces in open combat. Unspoken assumptions of de

U.S. military superiority are unwarranted in the 

combat environment. As the previous chapters attes

environment is the great equalizer. But U.S. exper

both actual and vicarious, has not yet produced a 

spread familiarity with the great difficulties of m

activity in urban areas, especially urban combat

military is somewhat ahead of the civilian policymak

remedying this deficiency, but we all suffer from it. 

strategic objectives in the “nice to have” category 

appear less interesting if policymakers first unde

something about costs and difficulties.

TACTICAL REALITIES

Urban environments are very favorable to the def

Buildings provide high levels of protection and concea

for infantry soldiers. Multi-storied buildings, 

basements, permit defenders to maneuver in a 

dimension. Modern cities also have elaborate 

systems, and often have underground tunnels for t

systems. Thus defenders may maneuver laterally, en

out of sight of the attacker. Buildings provide sign

obstacles to the movement of heavy equipment, limiti

ability of advanced militaries to exploit fully 

superiority in armored warfare. Long fields of fi

scarce, so technological advantages in accurate long

fire are neutralized. The majority of engagements 

place at very close range. Indeed, gun battles often oc

such close range that rifle bullets still retain suf

energy to penetrate flak jackets. Multi-story building

also permit defenders to shoot antitank weapons at 

that permit light antitank rounds to penetrate the gen

thinner top armor of tanks and infantry fighting ve

151
Urban roads channel heavy mechanized forces into k

avenues of approach; they often are not wide unobst

boulevards, but include underpasses, overpasses

center-dividers, which make even local maneuvers dif

Open space is scarce, so defenders may even have a 

idea where an advanced attacker might attem

helicopter landing.

Another advantage accruing to the defend

information. In general, it can be predicted that th

actor will enjoy superior knowledge of the 

environment. This superior knowledge has both a 

and a micro quality. At the macro level, the defend

have a better understanding of the city or town than w

outsider. Such knowledge has traditionally benefit

tactical defender. In open warfare, this tradi

advantage has been somewhat attenuated by techno

developments. Overhead reconnaissance assets can p

excellent maps, as well as real-time situational awar

Global positioning systems (GPS) may permit strang

be as well oriented in the terrain as the local defender. 

is not clear that modern technology offers this k

leverage in urban situations.

Max Neiman, in his chapter, suggests some wa

which Western powers might endeavor to overcom

local actors’ home court advantage. Essential

recommends that Western intelligence agencies p

detailed social-economic-geographic studies of most 

cities where operations might occur. He points out t

urban environment can be truly understood only th

such detailed studies. Given the kinds of projecti

urban growth that have driven the new interest in 

military operations, we are talking about a lot of citie

given the projected rate of urbanization and conse

growth rates, the studies will, of necessity, require r

updating. This seems a rather tall order. It would be le

if the military and the intelligence services had 

guidance about which cities were the most critical, a ta

strategy. Even if such studies can be done, given Ne

152
rich description of the complex urban environment, it 

clear that military organizations can effectively assi

and exploit this information were it collected.

At the micro level, the fact that combat occurs at ve

levels of aggregation among elusive infantry forces an

terrifically complex physical environment, may s

present more intelligence problems than technolog

solve. As noted above, the urban environment pr

many types of cover and concealment. Simply looking 

streets and allies from above will not likely give the at

the information he needs. Gerald Yonas and Timoth

suggest some possible new technologies that might al

attacker to seed an area with sensors of various types

dispatch robots into places where one would not w

send a man. But these solutions will have thei

problems. The sheer volume of space to be surveilled is 

daunting. Moderately clever adversaries will surel

ways to disable or trick such distributed sensors. A de

rich in manpower can afford to allocate large numb

people to this task. And our opponents very likely w

rich in manpower.

For all of the reasons discussed above, urban com

the domain of old-fashioned infantry. But it is not a 

domain. Though current technology can allow m

infantry to be trained to a peak of efficiency and can g

foot soldier an edge in the ability to see and commun

and even to shoot small arms, it has yet to provide adv

armies with anything like the tactical leverage tha

enjoy when facing older generation armored forces, s

those of Iraq. Historical experience suggests that 

company (100-200 individuals) can take a defende

block in about 12 hours, with 30-45 percent casu

Recent simulated attacks with highly trained 

well-prepared U.S. units apparently produce s

outcomes. Those who survive the fight are us

exhausted, physically and emotionally (see als

chapters by Gerhard Weinberg and James Wirtz i

book). Given that Western armies usually do not 

153
without a significant superiority in combat power, it m

assumed that defending forces one-half or even one

the size of the attacking force can produce these 

losses. Historically, losses of 30-45 percent are cons

disproportionately damaging to the combat power 

infantry unit. Because this level of casualties breaks 

the cohesion and integrity of trained infantry team

plausible to argue that the rifle company loses nearly 

its offensive potential.

1

 A short period of res

reorganization may permit recovery, but the unit w

likely regain its full combat power. A second engagem

these casualty levels will probably leave the unit dam

beyond short-term repair. Given that virtually all W

armies have abandoned conscription, no pipeline of in

replacements exists to replenish these units in any c

Overall, though successful attackers require 

trained infantry, this infantry will need to employ com

arms tactics with a very high level of skill if it is to con

own losses. Both Weinberg’s chapter on Stalingra

Berlin and Wirtz’s analysis of the Battle of Hue show c

what armies on the offense have had to do to try to ove

the advantages enjoyed by the tactical defender. The

chapters provide the “worst case” depiction of pure 

combat—committed, well-trained, well-equipped, m

conventional forces fighting full tilt in an u

environment without regard to collateral da

Essentially, they employ massive firepower. The Ru

and Germans often dragged heavy artillery forwar

employed it in a direct-fire mode to batter whole build

pieces. 

Even this is not a perfect solution, since turni

urban area into rubble can create new obstacles f

attacker and new assets for the defense. Attacker

defenders will try to bring armor into the city in spite 

difficulties noted above in order to provide heav

support. But to maneuver that armor, close coope

with engineers is essential, and still more explosives m

necessary to facilitate the movement of tanks. This pr

154
of bringing armor into cities is exacerbated today, 

tanks are nearly twice as heavy as they were in Worl

II. But antitank weapons, even shoulder-fired one

more capable now than then, so a heavy tank m

necessary nevertheless.

The infantry companies necessary for sustained 

combat are scarce and precious assets in the U.S. mi

In total, the active Army today has only perhaps 18

companies; the Marines may add another 60-70. An A

Marine infantry division has 27 rifle companies; an 

mechanized division, a dozen. Urban combat aga

determined, well-armed foe would quickly erod

strength of deployed forces.

Potential opponents around the world are unlik

find it difficult to muster significant numbe

infantrymen. Though their training and armamen

obviously vary, they will likely find the necessary wea

It is worth noting that the Serb ground force in Kosovo 

had perhaps 40 organized, well-armed, regular, in

companies, plus miscellaneous “auxiliaries.” The 

Iraqi Republican Guard Infantry divisions that escap

theater largely undamaged before the U.S. Army coul

with them may have had over 80 infantry companie

fact that Western militaries did not have to fight 

villages of Kosovo, or in Pristina, Kuwait City, Bas

Baghdad seems quite fortuitous in light of these nu

and the realities of urban combat.

In many parts of the world where the United 

might find itself involved in urban operations, ther

likely be a surplus of young men available for m

recruitment by the enemy. It is sobering to note that 

are many more North Vietnamese young people now 

there were in the 1960s, when their fathers gave the U

States such a difficult time. Given current projecti

global population growth, the “infantry problem

continue to grow.

155
Finally, there is no reason to believe that weapon

be in short supply for those who wish to fight Western 

Anyone who has looked at photographs of the Cheche

cannot help noticing how well-armed the Ch

guerrillas are. Brigadier General (IDF Ret.) Dov T

notes in his chapter that the Palestine Liber

Organization (PLO) in Lebanon had “infantry we

stores in quantities that were three times larger 

anything the armed branches of the PLO could uti

operate.” At least 50 divisions have fallen out of the R

army’s order of battle since the early 1990s. Much 

military equipment associated with these units (esp

the rifles, machine guns, antitank weapons, and mo

has surely found its way onto the international mar

will. Meanwhile, factories the world over continue to 

out new equipment.

STRATEGIC AMBIGUITIES

Let us turn now to strategic consideratio

contemplating urban warfare, particularly those 

indications are contradictory and signals are mixed. W

such ambiguity most frequently in evaluating the occ

for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). 

discussions of urban military operations suffer from 

of definition of the occasion for the operation. Much 

interest in urban combat arises from recent low-int

contingencies, but it is important to remembe

Clausewitzian dictum that the political purposes of 

influence almost every aspect of its conduct. Urban m

operations may be divided into three categories: ful

urban warfare, counterinsurgency or peace enforcem

an urban environment, and military operations to ass

civil power.

2

156
Full-scale Urban Warfare: An Unavoidable Means to a Str

End?

In the past, armies have found themselves enga

full-scale urban warfare for strategic reasons. The S

and Germans converged at a battle at Stalingrad i

because the leaders of both countries believed that s

there would have important effects on the other’s na

morale or their own. These ideas were probably stup

the decision to engage in battle was made at the h

political levels. Similarly, the North Vietnamese an

Cong decided to take and hold Hue, while the United 

and its South Vietnamese allies decided they had to 

back quickly for high-level political reasons. Again, 

reasons may seem stupid in retrospect, but a repeti

such thinking is not impossible. The Soviet attack on 

was also mounted for strategic reasons; it had to be d

elicit unconditional German surrender. When urban b

occur for high-level strategic reasons, whether those 

are right or wrong, they are very likely to take o

maximalist character demonstrated in these case stu

Could the United States find itself in such battles 

This cannot be ruled out, though the tactical reali

urban fighting recommend that they be avoided

policymakers often identify particular regimes as the 

of an adversary country’s threat to our interests. On

imagine that under extreme pressure such regimes 

take refuge anywhere they think they have thei

chance of survival. If there are jungles and mountain

is where they may go. But large cities may prove e

attractive. War termination, or at least speed

termination, may be impossible without a bitter city 

for national armed forces incapable of standing agains

forces in open country may take refuge in cities. Thou

option of starving out such defenders may be preferre

could prove time-consuming and perhaps even costly

adversary army in question has pre-stocked cities wit

fuel, and munitions, it may take a very long while t

them out. Moreover, they are clever, and they may be 

157
use the city as a base from which to find ways to 

persistent casualties on besieging American forces.

As the U.S. Marine Corps likes to point out, more p

reasons may also force some urban operations upo

United States. It has global interests; it fights abroad

forces need to get into the theater of operations, so the

ports and airfields. These are usually close to urban 

Some urban fighting may be necessary to seize an

these assets. That said, the tactical description of 

combat developed above suggests that one ought to b

careful about the choice of port of entry. A strategic “in

approach” commends itself. An inferior port or ai

away from a large urban environment, which can be 

and held with moderate casualties, and improved 

engineering, may be preferable to theoretically 

facilities that can be had only through hard fightin

which would be badly damaged by such fighting in an

The effort by U.S. forces in August-September 19

capture the Brittany ports was probably not worth it. S

U.S. forces and munitions were drawn into bruta

combat. The ports were not quickly seized, an

combination of tremendous allied firepower and G

demolitions rendered them unusable. Allied 

managed, albeit with some difficulty, to continue to s

themselves reasonably well across the Normandy be

even as they raced across France.

Urban Counterinsurgency, Urban Peace Enforcement. 

Three chapters in this book address what may b

called “counterinsurgency in an urban environm

Tamari describes the Israeli operation in Lebanon in 

Anatol Lieven recounts the Russian operation in G

and David Pearson discusses British counter

operations in Northern Ireland (the discussion 

Grozny battle spans the category of full-scale warfa

counterinsurgency). Lieutenant General (USMC, 

Bernard Trainor discusses the U.S. Marine operati

158
Lebanon, 1982-84, which probably deserve classificat

“urban peace enforcement.” The recent increase in 

military attention to operations in urban areas is pro

driven mostly by the problem of urban peace enforce

Nevertheless, urban peace enforcement has mu

common with urban counterinsurgency in terms 

multifaceted, political-military character. Prospectiv

peace enforcers can learn much from the experience o

who have been involved in urban counterinsurgency

Urban counterinsurgency (COIN) and urban 

enforcement differ in the expected probability and int

of combat. Under COIN conditions, the deployed r

military force knows from the outset that it is the en

the insurgent military force. Even if the COIN force do

go looking for the insurgents, the insurgents will 

come looking for the COIN force. The intervening 

expects combat from the outset, and may even seek 

Whether its posture is offensive or defensive, it expec

contact with the insurgents will be deadly. In urban 

enforcement, several mutually hostile armed factio

present, any one of which could become hostile to the 

enforcers, but which nevertheless are presumed 

cooperative until they demonstrate otherwise (

peacekeeping missions seem unlikely for U.S. forces i

as they assume a relatively benign environment, 

seems unlikely to elicit a commitment of U.S. troops). 

enforcers do not go looking to engage an elusive enemy

mission is more defensive. They must be present in fo

close proximity to warring factions. But their purpos

dissuade. Actual combat will more often be reactive 

proactive, rules of engagement will likely be stric

combat will often be accompanied by intensive effo

deescalate the fighting.

As the four chapters just alluded to demonstrate

requirement for success in either mission is 

intelligence. Some of this intelligence can be gleane

technical assets. As Trainor points out, U.S. communi

intelligence provided a very good picture of the 

159
combatants in Beirut. But intelligence on the attitu

the local factions to one another and to the outside forc

more precise information on their intentions, pro

cannot come entirely, if at all, from technical means

intelligence can only come from sources in the 

population. If the mission is in a country that ha

figured prominently in U.S. defense planning in the 

then basic background information on the local factio

be poor, as will understanding of the local cu

Linguistic skills will be in short supply. If the outside f

in any way heavy-handed, and, in particular, if i

firepower indiscriminately, or in a peace enforc

mission seems to tilt to one side or the other, the 

population will clam up. It is even worse if the loyalty 

local population to the insurgents, or to a local fa

intensifies. The population then becomes the intell

network of the insurgents or the local belligerents.

The intelligence problem dictates that practition

both urban COIN and urban peace enforcement 

develop great political sensitivity. This sensitivity m

down to the lowest-level troops, as these will be the pri

contacts with the local population and thus key sou

important intelligence. Similarly, the intelligence pr

dictates that firepower should be used in a discrim

fashion in both cases. The indiscriminate use of fire

can make open-minded people think that the outside f

the real enemy. Even in a counterinsurgency sit

where the local population is considered to be b

unfriendly, it is wisest to view their political commitm

the guerrillas as contestable. It has long been a centra

of counterinsurgency that the population’s loyalty 

principal military objective. Winning the loyalty of so

all of the local population depends not only on atmosph

however. The military force will need to coordina

activities with political and economic actors who ha

core competencies necessary to win the loyalty, or a

the neutrality, of the local population. These same 

also become a key source of political intelligence.

160
Military Operations to Assist the Civil Power. 

The U.S. military has often been called upon to ass

civil power, though under strict legal constraints. In 

years, the military, both active and reserve, has assis

the interdiction of drug smugglers, in disaster relief, a

the case of the Los Angeles riots of 1992, in an ef

restore calm and order to the streets.

Major General (ARNG Ret.) James Delk’s case 

illustrates one striking similarity between assistance 

enforcement and urban peace enforcement 

counterinsurgency operations. The great res

exercised in the actual use of weaponry by the Cali

National Guard’s 40th Infantry Division in Los A

tracks nicely with the advice provided in the other ch

for mid-intensity scenarios. This restraint was by no 

preordained; firepower was used rather liberally duri

Guard’s participation in the suppression of the 196

Angeles riots, but senior Guard veterans of that ex

mindful that innocent people—American citizens

been inadvertently killed, resolved to exercise far g

care. While we cannot know how important this res

was in the level of public support that Guard units 

Angeles ultimately received, it does nevertheless 

important. That said, the Guard units could probably 

the very strict rules of engagement under which 

operated. Though the criminal elements of th

possessed many firearms and regularly used th

commit murder, unlike urban counterinsurgency or 

enforcement, these elements were not organiz

individually prepared for a stand-up fight with m

units and seem to have understood it. This level of res

would be difficult to sustain against a more compete

combative adversary.

One difference between typical urban combat situ

and the Los Angeles riots helps hammer home a key 

warfare problem. In Los Angeles the criminal elemen

not quite have the home court advantage that one 

161
usually expect in urban conflicts overseas. The G

mission was to work very closely with the local police

law enforcement had plenty of detailed knowledge abo

normal practices and customs of the criminal eleme

the city. They also knew their way around. Many 

personnel were from the Los Angeles area, and some w

law enforcement. This local knowledge probably allow

Guard to avoid many pitfalls, in particular over-reac

certain typical, provocative, but largely symbolic 

practices that could easily have elicited a burst fr

M-16. Local knowledge also permitted the Guard to c

its vulnerability.

Occasions for the employment of the U.S. military 

with large-scale criminal violence have been few, and 

hope that our society can keep it that way. As Delk sug

however, well-trained and stable Guard units compr

citizen soldiers from the local area seem the ideal m

units for this mission, so long as their leaders have th

through the unique situation they confront.

CONCLUSIONS

As the chapters in this book show, combat of any k

an urban environment is very difficult. A skilled, reaso

well armed, adversary with a few thousand goo

committed infantry can probably impose very sign

costs on even a very competent Western military 

Military operations in urban areas should thus be av

to the extent possible.

Both full-scale military operations and u

counterinsurgency or peace enforcement are di

projects, but they are very different projects and r

different skills and organization (assistance to domes

enforcement agencies is even more peculiar). Good r

military units can be trained up for full-scale urban w

in several weeks. They may not possess exactly the 

equipment mix, but combined arms teams, more o

appropriate to the task at hand, can probably be form

162
of available assets. Mission orders can be simple, and 

accustomed to using plenty of firepower to solve batt

problems can continue to do so. That said, a s

adversary in a big city can probably impose very s

costs on this kind of force. The United States shou

enter into this kind of combat if any alternative pr

itself. And it seems likely that creative minds can fin

alternatives.

Urban COIN and urban peace enforcemen

however, a very different kind of project. At any 

moment, the tactical situation can produce typically h

patterns of urban combat. The military units i

situation require quite a bit more training before th

have much hope of success in these missions. Sta

responses such as the use of a lot of firepower probabl

to be avoided. David Pearson’s discussion of No

Ireland tells the tale. By 1976, regular British army 

“were receiving 3 months training for a 4-month tour

is extraordinary, but it seems about right. It is obviou

U.S. military units designed primarily for high-int

combat will not be training for their primary bu

during such a period. Moreover, skills and att

appropriate to their primary business, for all inten

purposes, will need to be trained out of them. T

patently absurd unless one is pretty sure they will 

needed in the short term for the primary mission 

justifies their high cost to the taxpayer.

Instead, the appropriate technical answer is to or

and train standing units for these types of missions

units have to be accustomed to employing limited firep

They need to be trained to fight accordingly. The

require more conventional infantry than one would 

to find in heavy units. They need extra trainin

indoctrination on relations with local populations, rel

with civilian institutions, and relations with the 

media. Intelligence units need to gather a very dif

type of intelligence from the normal battlefield, an

entire organization needs to be involved in that effort

163
need to operate in a dispersed fashion; NCOs will hav

greater responsibilities, including quasi-diplo

responsibilities. In the event that the United States 

itself in a situation where it must commit these speci

troops to high-intensity warfare, then they mu

reoriented to that mission with a brief retraining pro

not the reverse. The U.S. Army seems to be organizin

forces with the new interim brigade combat team

notion of permanent, dedicated forces for the kin

interventions associated with peace enforcement 

politically controversial that the Army has rheto

attached these units to its larger project of transformi

entire Army to a more strategically mobile for

high-intensity warfare. But that transition lies well in

future, and the structure, training, and armament 

interim brigades suggests peace enforcement missio

STRATEGIC RATIONALE

As noted at the outset of this chapter, the str

rationale for turning the U.S. military to a new empha

military operations in urban terrain, especially 

enforcement operations, has not been fully deve

Though it is certainly consistent with the diffuse no

shaping the international environment, the str

priority that intervention in civil conflicts should en

U.S. defense planning is far from clear. The mil

interest in these issues seems driven more by the fac

the United States has done these kinds of missions, al

a small scale, over the last decade, than by any 

guidance to prepare for them on a large scale in the f

Full-scale urban combat is very costly in terms of liv

under the best of circumstances. Yet the United 

would pay those costs to achieve important intermed

ultimate objectives.

Peace enforcement is also costly. The occasional c

that can arise in urban peace enforcement, or the fre

but small-scale combat that can arise in u

164
counterinsurgency, can cause short sharp spikes in 

casualties. These may be organizationally sustainab

it is not clear that they are politically sustainable. Sta

regular units, appropriately equipped, structured

permanently ready for these complex missions are 

The retraining of heavy units, though clearly doable, 

costly. Given the scarcity of defense resources, the Pen

needs to be very explicit about why it is building 

forces.

Finally, it is critically important to retain the an

distinction between full-scale urban combat and 

peace enforcement, or counterinsurgency. Blurring of 

distinctions may lead to some very tragic err

under-reaction or over-reaction. The new interim br

list urban warfare as one of their key missions. Bu

patently obvious that they are under-equippe

high-intensity, full-scale urban combat. This is approp

given what I believe to be their real mission. Po

decisionmakers and senior commanders must unde

the actual limitations of these units. Similarly, thos

argue that any competent professional unit can do 

enforcement, while correct, need to finish the sentenc

with significant additional training, and at consid

cost to preparedness for their primary mission.”

The U.S. military’s current interest in urban m

operations is understandable. This interest will pro

better understanding of the problem and, ultimately

better trained for combat in urban environments. But 

progress reports are made to Pentagon bureau

congressmen, and senators, great care must be ta

remind them that urban operations of any kin

unusually difficult, complex, and risky.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. I speak in general terms on this matter, because there are no hard 

rules. Actual graphs depicting the probability that a unit would “break,” depe

casualty rate, once appeared in army war gaming manuals. See, for 

165
Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Maneuver Control,” Field 

105-5, December 1973, pp. D16-D20, which has probability curves f

divisions, and which were meant to be employed in assessing the results of wa

See also James G. Taylor, Force-on-Force Attrition Modelling, 

Operations Research Society, January 1980, pp. 63-69: “. . . most military pla

the United States assume that a ground-combat unit will break off an engagem

try to disengage from the enemy when it has suffered a certain perce

casualties (e.g., 30 percent casualties for a company-sized unit in the attac

percent in the defense,” pp. 63-64).

2. For a similar categorization, see Daryl G. Press, “Urban Warfare: 

Problems, and the Future,” Conference Summary, MIT Security Studies P

January 1999. Press divides the operations into “Policing, Raids, and S

Urban Combat.” He provides a useful first order “strategic” analysis of the di

each type of mission, and possible alternative ways of achieving goals while 

actual urban fighting.

3. Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, Washington, DC: Jo

May 17, 2000. This is a very useful and comprehensive discussion, but its ove

context is not full-scale urban warfare. For example, Lieutenant Gener

Fulford, Director of the Joint Staff, introduces the document by noting th

urban operations involve a variety of unique operational considerations 

extensive man-made construction, large noncombatant populations, and 

sociological, political, economic, and cultural interaction within those popu

This does not sound much like the Battle of Hue. The rest of the doc

dominated by discussions of the “complex” interactions.

4. See Scott Gourley, “US Army Refines Urban Combat Training,

Defence Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 21, November 22, 2000, pp. 27-28.

166
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

JAMES D. DELK, a retired major general in the U.S. 

national Guard, is the former Adjutant General 

California Army National Guard, during which time h

the Military Field Commander for the Los Angeles r

1992. A career National Guardsman, he enlisted 

private and rose through the ranks. He holds a m

degree from Shippensburg State University and is au

a number of books including an account of the riots en

Fires and Furies.

MICHAEL C. DESCH is the Associate Director 

Patterson School of Diplomacy and Internat

Commerce and a member of the Department of Po

Science at the University of Kentucky. A gradu

Marquette University, he holds master’s and Ph.D. d

from the University of Chicago. Dr. Desch has w

numerous scholarly and policy articles on interna

relations and national security affairs and is the aut

two books: When the Third World Matters and C

Control of the Military.

ANATOL LIEVEN is a Senior Associate for Foreig

Security Policy in the Russia and Eurasia Center 

Carnegie Endowment for International Pea

Washington, DC. A graduate of Jesus Colle

Cambridge, he began his career as a journalist fo

Times. Since then, Mr. Lieven has written a num

books, most recently Chechnya: Tombstone of R

Power, as well as many articles in scholarly and 

journals.

TIMOTHY MOY is on the faculty of the Departm

History at the University of New Mexico and is 

member of the Advanced Concepts group at S

National Laboratories. A Harvard graduate, Dr

received his Ph.D. from the University of Califor

Berkeley. He is the author of the forthcoming book

Machines.

167
MAX NEIMAN is currently Professor and Director 

Center for Social and Behavioral Science and a mem

the Department of Political Science at the Univer

California, Riverside. A graduate of the Univers

Illinois, Chicago, he holds a Ph.D. from the Univer

Wisconsin, Milwaukee. An expert on urban public 

Dr. Neiman has published five books, most re

Defending the Idea of Governing, and numerous arti

DAVID PEARSON is a retired captain in the British 

with operational experience in Cyprus and three to

Northern Ireland. A graduate of Sandhurs

Abertsytwyth, he holds master’s degrees from Chelte

and Gloucester College and Aberdeen University. C

Pearson is currently teaching history at a private sch

Maine.

BARRY R. POSEN is Professor of Political Science a

and a member of the Executive Committee of Semina

A graduate of Occidental College, he holds a Ph.D. fro

University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Posen is the a

of numerous articles in scholarly and policy journa

has published two books: The Sources of Military Do

and Inadvertent Escalation.

DOV TAMARI, a retired brigadier general in the 

Defense Force, is currently a Senior Researcher wi

Israeli Defense Forces Doctrine Research Grou

graduate of Tel Aviv University, he also holds a m

degree in history. Brigadier General Tamari saw com

the Suez Campaign, the Six Day War, the War of Att

the Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanon campaign. H

published over 50 articles in professional publication

the press in Israel.

BERNARD E. TRAINOR, a retired lieutenant gene

the U.S. Marine Corps, is Senior Fellow for Na

Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relation

served in combat in Korea and Vietman and held num

other positions including Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Policies, and Operations, and Marine Corps Deputy 

168
Joint Chiefs of Staff, before retiring in 1985. From 

through 1990 he was the New York Times mi

correspondent before becoming director of the Har

National Security Program. He is the author of num

articles and coauthor of the The General’s War.

GERHARD L. WEINBERG recently retired as Pro

Emeritus from the Department of History at the Univ

of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A 1948 graduate o

York State Teacher’s College, he holds a master’s and 

in history from the University of Chicago. Dr. Weinbe

written 12 books, the most recent being A World At 

and 88 articles in scholarly and other journals.

JAMES J. WIRTZ is Associate Professor and Ass

Chairman for Research, Department of National Se

Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author 

Tet Offensive and coauthor of The Absolute W

Revisited. A graduate of the University of Delawar

Wirtz earned a master’s and Ph.D. in political scienc

Columbia University.

GERALD YONAS is Vice President and Principal Sc

at Sandia National Laboratories. A graduate of C

University, he received his Ph.D. in engineering scien

physics at California Technical. Dr. Yonas has spent m

his career in defense research either at Sandia or 

private sector. In the mid-1980s, he was Chief Scient

the Strategic Defense Organization.

169
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Editor

Michael C. Desch

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams