J-A05038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL CLARK

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 187 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 30, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0005713-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED APRIL 12, 2024

Michael Clark (“Clark”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

following his convictions for rape of a child1 and related offenses. We affirm.

A detailed recitation of the underlying facts is not necessary for our 

disposition. Clark was charged with committing sexual offenses against his 

girlfriend’s eleven-year-old younger sister (“the victim.”) At the non-jury trial, 

the victim testified about specific instances of Clark’s conduct. Clark did not 

present any evidence. The trial court found Clark guilty of rape of a child, 

statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, 

sexual assault, indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age, 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c).
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indecent exposure, and corruption of minors.2 The trial court imposed an 

aggregate sentence of fourteen to thirty-two years’ imprisonment, to be 

followed by three years of probation.

Clark filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied. Clark then filed 

a timely notice of appeal, and in response to the trial court’s subsequent order, 

he timely filed a Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court then filed its 

opinion.

Clark raises the following issues for our review on appeal:

I. Was the evidence sufficient to convict . . . Clark, where the 

[victim’s] testimony contravened human experience and the laws 

of nature?

II. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by denying . . . 

Clark’s post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the 

evidence, where the [victim’s] equivocal and contradictory 

testimony rendered the evidence so unreliable that the verdict was 

based on pure conjecture?

Clark’s Brief at 7.

For ease of discussion, we review Clark’s arguments for both of his 

claims together. First, Clark avers that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his convictions. In support, he challenges the victim’s testimony — that while

her older sister (Clark’s girlfriend) went upstairs in their home, Clark exposed 

his penis to her, and later, when her sister briefly left the house, Clark forced 

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2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 3123(b), 3124.1, 3126(a)(7), 3127(a), 

6301(a)(1)(ii).
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his penis into the victim’s mouth and touched her breasts and buttocks. Clark 

contends that because the victim’s sister was upstairs “merely for moments,”

it “defies reality” that he had the time and opportunity to plan and commit a 

sexual assault. Clark’s Brief at 14. In addition, Clark avers that the victim 

did not tell investigators “anything about [him] putting his penis in her mouth, 

but then revised that story after” talking with her mother, who has “admitted 

to harboring animosity toward” him. Id. at 15. Clark concludes the victim’s 

testimony “contradicted human experience and the laws of nature[, a]nd was 

inconsistent on the most critical facts.” Id. Clark thus claims the trial court 

should not have credited it.

In his second issue, Clark avers that the trial court erred in “denying 

[his] post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence because 

the [victim’s] equivocal and contradictory testimony rendered the evidence so 

unreliable that the verdict was based on pure conjecture.” Id. In support, 

Clark contends that the direct and circumstantial evidence proved only that 

he was introduced to and exchanged texts with the victim and did not establish 

any “untoward relationship.” Id. He refers to his first issue and avers again 

that the victim’s testimony contravened human experience, was contradictory,

and was “so unreliable that the verdict was based on ‘pure conjecture.’” Id.

at 16.

This Court has addressed the distinction between claims challenging the 

weight of the evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence:
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A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict but claims that “notwithstanding 

all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to 

ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to 

deny justice.”

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, however, 

asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support at least one 

material element of the crime for which [the defendant] has been 

convicted.

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations

omitted and paragraph break added). Further, this Court has “explained that 

a sufficiency of the evidence review does not include an assessment of 

credibility of testimony offered by the Commonwealth,” and instead, such an 

argument goes to the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Juray, 

275 A.3d 1037, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). When an appellant 

phrases an issue as a sufficiency claim, but his argument instead goes to the 

weight of the evidence, the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must 

fail. Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. 1999).

All of Clark’s arguments, that the victim’s testimony “contravened 

human experience and the laws of nature,” was inconsistent, and was 

influenced by her mother, go to the victim’s credibility. See Juray, 275 A.3d 

at 1043. Thus, we conclude that Clark’s purported sufficiency claim in fact 
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goes to the weight of the evidence, and we review both his first and second 

claims as challenges to the weight of the evidence.3

However, before we address the merits of Clark’s weight of the evidence 

claims, we must determine whether he preserved them for our review. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607(A) provides: 

A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial:

(1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;

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3 Moreover, even if Clark had presented a proper sufficiency claim, we would 

conclude he has waived it for a deficient Rule 1925(b) statement. “If [an] 

appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was insufficient, then 

the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the element or elements upon which 

the evidence was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 

1957 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

Clark raised a sufficiency claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement as follows: 

. . . The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove each 

charge beyond a reasonable doubt because the [victim’s] 

testimony contravened human experience and the laws of nature. 

See Commonwealth v. Santana, 333 A.2d 876 (Pa. 1975) 

(“Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in 

contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human 

experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient 

as a matter of law.”).

Clark’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 2/23/23, at 1-2. 

Clark’s Rule 1925(b) statement states in boilerplate fashion that 

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Clark was convicted of 

seven offenses: rape of a child, statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse with a child, sexual assault, indecent assault of a person 

less than thirteen years of age, indecent exposure, and corruption of minors. 

However, his Rule 1925(b) statement failed to specify which offense, let alone 

which element of which offense, he wishes to challenge. See Williams, 959 

A.2d at 1957.
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(2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or 

(3) in a post sentence motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). “The purpose of this rule is to make it clear that 

a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge 

or it will be waived.” Pa.R.Crim.P.607, Comment. “Failure to properly 

preserve the claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the 

issue in its opinion.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 490 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

Clark did not preserve a weight of the evidence claim orally before or at 

his sentencing hearing. His post sentence motion challenged only the length

of his sentence. Therefore, Clark did not preserve a weight of the evidence 

claim, and we conclude it is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3); see 

also Thompson, 93 A.3d at 490.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Clark is not entitled to relief and 

we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Date: 4/12/2024