EUROPEAN SECURITY:

 WASHINGTON’S SHAPING STRATEGY

 IN ACTION

Stephen J. Blank

William T. Johnsen

Thomas-Durell Young

March 2000
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Governmen

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and sh

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of thi

may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by 

commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Inte

rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

*****

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institut

monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for ele

dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.a

/usassi/welcome.htm

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly 

newsletter to update the national security community on the res

our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and up

conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also pro

strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If y

interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e

outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-017-6

ii
Notwithstanding the claims of some in the United S

European affairs continue to dominate U.S. foreign poli

strategic thinking. The end of the Cold War has not see

blurring of the focus of U.S. officials on European a

Managing the implications of the break-up of the Soviet 

and the Warsaw Pact, the seemingly never-ending conflicts 

Balkans, encouraging the growth of Western norm

institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and expandi

reforming the North Atlantic Alliance are just some of the 

that require firm and consistent U.S. leadership.

How the United States has, and should continue, to de

these issues is the subject of this collective effort. In addi

assessing past and present challenges to U.S. and W

security interests and objectives in Europe, the author

analyze the strategies and policies of the Department of D

in this crucial region of the world. Recommendatio

consideration by officials include the need for a lighter lead

“touch” in some areas and for stronger encouragement in o

However, let there be no doubt that a U.S. policy toward Eu

stasis or benign neglect should be rejected. The United Sta

European power by virtue of its history, current commit

and strategic and political exigencies. Finding the 

efficacious means of achieving these national objectives

working to effect a “Europe whole and free,” is the da

long-term task to be faced.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this es

a contribution to the debate on the future direction of U.S

toward Europe.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
 OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN J. BLANK has served as the Strategic St

Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-S

world since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Profes

Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doc

Research, and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base

taught at the University of Texas, San Antonio, and 

University of California, Riverside. Dr. Blank is the ed

Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Position in 

coeditor of Soviet Military and the Future, and author 

Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissar

Nationalities, 1917-1924. He has also written many a

and conference papers on Russian, Commonwea

Independent States, and Eastern European security i

Dr. Blank’s current research deals with proliferatio

the revolution in military affairs, and energy and secu

Eurasia. He holds a B.A. in History from the Univers

Pennsylvania, and a M.A. and Ph.D. in History fro

University of Chicago.

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN currently is the Associate De

Academic Policy at the U.S. Army War College. Prev

he served for 7 years in the Strategic Studies Inst

where he specialized in U.S. and European security i

He also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies 

U.S. Army War College from 1994-97. A former Inf

officer, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop lea

command, and staff assignments. He also served 

Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Mi

Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst at the Sup

Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. Beside

numerous SSI studies, Dr. Johnsen contributed to B

East-West Confrontation; Searching for a New Secu

Europe and has published journal articles on Europea

U.S. security affairs. He holds a B.S. degree from th

iv
Duke University. Dr. Johnsen also is a graduate 

Armed Forces Staff College and the U.S. Army War Co

THOMAS DURELL-YOUNG was Research Profes

National Security Affairs with the Strategic St

Institute from 1992 until 2000. He is currently a

Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgra

School, Monterey, CA.

v
WASHINGTON’S SHAPING STRATEGY

 IN ACTION

Whether the already close links between the U

States and Europe will draw tighter in the 21st century 

open question. Indeed, some observers argue tha

relationship may weaken somewhat over time.

1

 But 

has argued persuasively that the trans-Atlantic link w

broken. Anticipated conditions, moreover, indicate 

while the strength of the relationship may wax and 

ties will remain close. Information-age technologie

entwine U.S. and European economies more inextr

than in the past. Despite increasing extra-European e

diversity, many Americans will still trace their ro

Europe, and American culture and norms will re

predominantly European-based.

In the security arena, the Atlantic Ocean long ago c

to provide a protective moat. No longer menta

physically isolated, events in Europe almost immed

affect the United States. Furthermore, the United S

also has learned from experience that remaining aloo

European security issues or merely reacting to even

be extremely costly. The articulation of preventive de

and engagement strategies in the last few years augu

continued, albeit different, close cooperation betwee

United States and its European allies, partners, and fr

to shape the future security environment to their m

benefit.

2

This confluence of U.S. and European econ

cultural, and security ties ensures that the cont

security and stability of Europe will remain a vita

national interest, as demonstrated during the r

conflict in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. This conc

should not be surprising. Successive U.S. administra

have remained consistently engaged in European se

1
made engagement with Europe a keystone of U.S. p

Such policies can be expected to extend and deepen in

future.

This monograph offers observations on how the U

States can positively shape the European sec

environment of the next century. It first outlines a pre

U.S. vision of a future Europe. The discussion 

identifies potential obstacles to that goal, and then ass

risks to U.S. national interests if these obstacles can

overcome. Political, economic, and military initiativ

achieving the U.S. vision for a future Europe then follo

part of the military initiatives, the discussion speci

assesses the current Commander-in-Chief (CINC) 

European Command’s (USEUCOM) Strategy of Read

and Engagement. Conclusions and recommendations 

the monograph.

DEFINING EUROPE

Before outlining a future vision of Europe, develop

common understanding of what constitutes Euro

important. This is not a straightforward propos

however, as even Europeans do not always agree on 

constitutes the “common European house.”

4

 Withi

monograph, we define Europe broadly and inclusively

the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, from the 

Ocean to the Mediterranean, Black, and Caspian 

That having been said, discussion of Russia, Be

Ukraine, and the Transcaucasus focuses on the effe

those nations on the overall security of Europe.

Arguing where the dividing lines fall between Ce

Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, an

clarity of those lines varies considerably depending 

one’s nationality or worldview.

6

 The fact that 

countries fall under more than one grouping (e.g

Balkans, the Baltics, Iberia, and Transcaucasia) 

complicates matters. Rather than getting bogged do

2
region, therefore, our definitions will be encompassin

overlapping.

7

A FUTURE VISION OF EUROPE

As the British statesman, Lord Palmerston, note

years ago: “. . . interests are enduring and perpetual 

Thus, the underlying durability of U.S. national int

identified in A National Security Strategy for a New C

can offer insights into U.S. national interests in Euro

years hence.

9

 European stability will remain forem

vital U.S. national interest.

10

 This includes cont

stability in Western, Central, and Southern Europe, a

as the more difficult objective of increasing governm

and economic stability in Southeastern Europe, Ea

Europe, and Transcaucasia. Two strategic 

predominate. First, to assist in the building of a Europ

is democratic, prosperous and at peace, i.e., 

integrated. Second, to work with allies and partners to 

future challenges to collective interests that no natio

confront alone. Of particular import are the N

Independent States (NIS) of Eastern Europe, wher

United States has vital security interests. Specificall

United States wishes Russia, Ukraine, and the other N

evolve peacefully into democratic market economie

become prosperously integrated into the world comm

This also includes democratic and economic reform 

NIS, as well as the other maturing democracies in C

and Eastern Europe, that will contribute to cont

independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 

states. The means by which the United States meets 

challenges is through a robust and reformed NATO, th

providing “the anchor of American engageme

Europe.”

11

Maintaining stability in Europe does not con

however, an intent to sustain the existing status quo. T

contrary, the United States seeks continued transform

3
market-based economies, founded on the rule of law 

respect for human rights.

12

 Such major changes in 

fragile states can generate considerable instability

United States seeks to dampen instability and 

transitions within peaceful bounds.

Extending these interests into the future, we prop

desired U.S. vision of a future Europe 20 years henc

includes:

1) A politically pluralistic Europe whole and fre

governed by the rule of law.

2) Individual human rights and the rights of e

minorities protected through international norms an

of law.

3) The free movement of peoples, ideas, capita

goods.

4) Expanded and more sophisticated institu

mechanisms to prevent conflict, and, if conflict should 

resolution through peaceful means.

5) Increased economic liberalization and integrat

Europe through, inter alia, expansion of the Eur

Union (EU).

6) Expanded European role and responsibili

leadership in European security matters.

7) Increased military integration within NATO 

participation in the Partnership for Peace program (

8) Full control and accountability of materials fro

former Soviet Union and prevention of proliferat

weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

4
VISION OF EUROPE

To shape successfully conditions to the mutual ben

the United States and Europe first requires identifyin

overcoming potential obstacles to achieving our com

vision. In this manner, the United States, in conjun

with its European allies, partners, and friends can 

active steps to produce desired outcomes rather than s

reacting to events as they occur. This also should be a 

effective and efficient means of using constrained reso

to attain mutual goals. Potential obstacles to the vis

the future Europe fall under the general categ

economic, political, and security issues.

Economic Obstacles.

Within the economic arena, the failu

Europe—whether as a whole or several major powe

adjust to changing economic conditions poses the gr

potential problem. For European Union (EU) countrie

the remainder of Northern, Western, and Central Eu

this could result from a failure to transition to wha

current vernacular describes as information-b

economies. This is not a call for wholesale overturning 

existing European industrial base. That portion o

economy will remain essential for prolonged eco

health, but it probably should not continue at the cu

scale or in its present form. Greater emphasis will hav

placed on preparing for the demands of g

competitiveness by making economics more flexibl

dynamic.

13

For example, if European national and pan-Eur

economies are to remain competitive on a global scale

must address a number of structural issues. Thes

include significant changes in labor laws and employ

practices, especially reducing the high degrees of rigid

labor markets. This will be particularly true in Franc

Germany which must confront workplace reform if th

5
indeed sometimes incestuous, relationship among bus

labor unions, churches, and political parties also wil

to be loosened if Europeans are to achieve the higher 

of productivity necessary to compete globally. Rela

among businesses, banks, and government also 

undergo similar reform. Increasingly burdensome 

welfare and state pension systems, let alone intra

structural unemployment, also will have to be addres

Europeans cannot address these critical issues, the

being left behind globally, at best. At worst, eco

stagnation or relative decline could lead to dom

political instability in some key countries in Europe.

The emerging democracies in Central, Eas

Southern, and Southeastern Europe will have to com

the transition from centrally controlled to m

economies.

15

 This will be a difficult transition. Many of 

countries have limited, if any, recent experience 

market-based economies, and have great difficulty de

with normal market cycles.

16

 Frequently, they lack 

rudimentary tax, property, or business laws. Bank

credit institutions are limited in number, and ofte

viewed with suspicion. There is also considerable pot

for organized crime to flourish or less than legit

organizations to move into the gaps in laws 

governmental regulations. Finally, many of these cou

will have to shake off the 50 years of experience 

state-controlled, centralized planning and financin

effect policies that encourage market forces to shap

economic environment.

This transition to greater reliance on the private m

place will not be easy. Many countries have little hist

practice with developed market economies, and some 

hardly any relevant experience at all.

17

 This la

experience leaves them vulnerable to modern 

carpetbaggers, to corruption within government, t

potential for robber barons (à la the U.S. experience 

late 19th and early 20th centuries), and to criminal

6
matured. This may require a more incremental appro

the privatization of industry and transition to market-

economics than some outsiders originally may 

believed desirable.

18

 The vulnerability of Europe’s 

states to criminality and corruption could, in 

instances (notably Romania and Bulgaria), become a t

to their internal security, especially if internal crimi

links up with foreign networks, e.g., the Russian M

international crime links.

19

Many of these states also face the daunting challe

moving from an obsolescent, if not antiquated, indu

base that focused for over five decades on mi

production to an information age economy that can com

in the global market place. They must do all this 

providing levels of consumer goods and services suffici

satisfy their populations, while coping with m

fluctuations. Under the best of circumstances

transition period could lead to short-term econ

contraction in many countries.

20

 If not handled car

severe economic dislocation could occur, leadi

considerable political backlash. Faced with da

expectations, severely reduced buying power, bare sh

and unemployment, many publics may long for retu

authoritarian rule and controlled economies that 

provided minimum levels of support (food, housing, m

care, and pensions) and for times when disparities in w

and treatment were not as well-known. This chi

however, will only lead to further deterioration in eco

conditions.

On the other hand, some evolving countries and soc

may learn from past successes or failures to take th

and avoid the worst of the transition. They may we

some intense short-term pain for long-term eco

payoff.

21

 If they can make this significant leap, they m

able to move more directly into the global, informatio

economy.

7
European and global economies is perhaps the gr

potential economic obstacle to realizing the proposed 

of Europe. The remainder of Europe and the United S

can try to fulfill the twin requirements of absorbing 

from these countries and providing investment capita

unfortunately there is only so much they can do. Mor

there is only so much expertise and capital these cou

can effectively absorb.

This will be no easy task. Russia, especially, will h

revolutionize itself all over again. The government 

enact and enforce laws and policies that foster eco

growth and protect property. It will have to demilitari

economy and allow prices and values to seek their na

levels. Support for public sector investment will be k

will the creation of a fair, equitable, and enforceab

system that supports public and private sector 

Support for private enterprise will have to be greater 

heretofore has been the case. This especially may be t

agriculture and land ownership. Last, but not least, R

must foster an economic climate that provides an ince

for foreign investment.

Western initiatives will necessarily depend on Ru

policies and their implementation. But even before R

makes these decisive transformations, there are 

opportunities for successful public and private progra

Russia. For example, U.S., European, and Ru

initiatives need to confront Russia’s ecological and 

health crises. This would include long-term initiatives

as building hospitals, training medical personnel

providing modern diagnostic and treatment equip

But, it also could include rudimentary, but impo

short-term programs: furnishing disposable hypod

needles, offering vaccines and medicines, ensuring 

water for hospitals, and preventing malnutrition. 

programs not only can win enormous public support

can help prevent or mitigate future health crises. Th

8
undertaken now.

Beyond economic conditions in Russia and the 

three additional and interrelated issues stand in the w

realizing the desired European economic end state: ch

un/underemployment, bloated state welfare sys

(coupled with declining populations in some cases)

immigration. These problems are due largely to the 

costs inherent in the deeply ingrained social w

mindset and bureaucracy within many European s

especially expectations of “cradle to grave” state su

Anticipated immigration trends will only further cha

many already stressed social welfare systems. Mor

because publics often view newcomers, refugees or e

minorities as the source of much unemployment and 

on social welfare systems, this may create or exace

ethnic, cultural, or religious animosities in many soc

The United States may be able to offer only li

assistance in these matters. In most countries, these 

are entangled with internal political issues, and any 

influence is likely to be limited. Indeed, most nation

likely to view U.S. actions as interference in their sove

affairs. The best the United States can do is to serve 

example of how economic progress through m

economics eventually offers a way out of such dilem

occasionally offer government funds, and, if asked, pr

advice. The U.S. Government also could encourage p

investment which may appear less intrusive and, ther

more acceptable. Moreover, the demands o

marketplace and profit motives may make pr

investment more effective over the longer term.

Although remote, one cannot ignore the potentia

EU-U.S. trade war that could sidetrack the preferred 

of a future Europe. Such an outcome would require a 

of blunders on both sides of the Atlantic, but U.S

European leaders cannot afford to dismiss su

possibility. The perception of fewer and less impo

9
European economic integration, contraction of econ

on either side of the Atlantic, an oil crisis with Europ

the United States on opposite sides (especia

conjunction with other economic declines), or in

competition for information-age markets could lead 

trade war.

22

 Undoubtedly, cooler heads would ultim

prevail, but damage could be extensive, hinderin

attainment of desired outcomes for Europe.

Political Hurdles.

The greatest political hurdles to achieving our vis

the future Europe stem from the reversal of represen

government in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., a

happened in Belarus). The most obvious case is Russi

Ukraine follows in close order. Moderate-sized state

Bulgaria and Romania also could hinder Euro

integration if their countries reverted to authoritarian 

As the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans demons

authoritarian regimes in even small countrie

adversely influence the entire European security cli

Should this occur in Central or Southeastern Europe 

Czech Republic or Hungary, and Bulgaria or Rom

respectively), the shock waves would reverb

throughout most of the Continent.

23

Another potential political problem concerns the e

of state sovereignty, which could emerge from se

causes. Multinational organizations, such as the 

NATO, and the Organization for Security and Coope

in Europe (OSCE) could take on aspects of traditiona

responsibilities for economics, political representation

security. Concomitantly, the rise of regional organiza

particularly economic or trade groups, could fu

undermine the power of the state.

24

 Thus, in pu

increased integration, the United States and its Eur

partners must tread the fine line between yielding too 

or too little power to these organizations.

10
to adverse consequences. Regional trade part

consortia, and complementary business organization

work to the advantage of the regional organizations an

countries involved. The danger is that regional grou

could undermine state unity leading to dissoluti

current states.

25

 Again, this is not deleterious in a

itself. The devolution of state authority could be mana

avoid adverse outcomes, even to promote economic gr

But it is a delicate process, especially ensuring that i

not lead to political instability or a security vacuum.

A rise in nationalism or ethnic separatism also 

inhibit the political portions of the desired end state. 

issues continue to hold considerable appeal, especia

Eastern and Southern Europe where young democ

may not yet possess the maturity to weather s

economic or political stress. Even within well-estab

democracies in Western and Central Europe, ther

sizable nationalist or ethnically driven parties that 

exerted considerable influence in recent election

severe economic downturn could further increas

influence of such groups.

Erosion of the key Franco-German relationship 

could upset European political integration. This s

association was the catalyst and has been the glue th

facilitated much of West Europe’s successful politica

economic integration.

27

 A substantial lessening of 

bonds could fracture the consensus that has d

ever-increasing pan-European integration.

28

 Su

erosion could occur in two general ways. Over tim

Germans and the French (or other Europeans) may pe

that conditions have improved to the point tha

relationship no longer holds the same level of importan

this case, there would be little cause for alarm, as a u

Germany would be firmly anchored into European pol

economic, and security institutions.

11
partnership and how that leadership will be exerted

the last 50 years, Germany has deferred not only to F

but to most of its transatlantic partners. Recovery 

German sovereignty, coupled with Germany’s eco

power and the passing of the torch to the post-World W

generation of political leaders, may result in gr

German assertiveness in foreign affairs.

29

 This do

argue that Germany will be less cooperative, bu

relationship will be different than it has been in the 

and France and the remainder of Europe will ha

accommodate themselves to these new conditions.

More ominous would be Central and Eastern Eur

issues drawing German attention and aspirations 

from Western and Central European institutions. 

could stem from a collapse within Russia, ethnic co

within Ukraine or the Baltic states, or an economic co

that overwhelms Central European institutions. In 

cases, the United States and other European allie

partners would have to take steps to ensure that Ger

remained firmly tied to the EU and NATO. Such an ad

outcome is unlikely, however. The Franco-Ge

relationship has endured despite perennial contre

and crises. At this point, it appears to be functioning, 

as strongly as during the 1980s. The intent here simpl

acknowledge that less than optimistic outcome

possible, and to ensure that such possibilities are fac

into efforts to shape the future security environment

Security Obstacles.

A broad range of security issues could hinder ach

the overarching goals of peaceful European integr

Conflict within the Balkans is one obvious hu

Long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions over a 

spectrum of issues could seriously disrupt the entire f

European security environment.

30

 A wide range of pot

trouble spots along the Mediterranean (due to cul

12
migration; proliferation of sophisticated conven

weapons and WMD, as well as the means to d

them—especially, ballistic and cruise missiles) 

overturn a peaceful European security environ

Continuing conflict in the Transcaucasus region alre

troublesome and tensions over control of oil in the r

could exacerbate pressures. Individually, each issue 

generate considerable repercussions; collectively they 

have devastating effects on European stability. The U

States must work with its European allies, partners

friends to preclude such a detrimental confluence.

The road to a Common Security and Foreign 

(CSFP) and the European Security and Defense Id

(ESDI) contains a number of potential potholes. On th

hand, Europeans could fail to create the nece

consensus to forge and sustain a CSFP.

31

 Present

example, many European states are preoccupied 

internal economic and political issues. This could res

differing perceptions of threats, with the potenti

divisive debates over whether a CSFP is needed. 

should a CSFP emerge, considerable interpretation ov

implementation might occur. Again, differing t

perceptions could lead to dissonance over sec

burdensharing. Such outcomes could lead to nation

regional rifts. Under worst-case conditions (e.g., s

economic or political setbacks), this might even preci

the renationalization of defense structures by 

countries. One should recall that the integrati

European defense forces within NATO has ha

important result of acting as an effective confidence

security-building measure, i.e., providing reassuran

benign national military intentions. Obviously, w

renationalization might occur would make conside

differences, but the consequences could be significan

A strong, cohesive CSFP and ESDI also could 

consequences that would require careful managemen

United States might reduce its presence in Europ

13
to U.S. national interests, the United States and E

will have to manage carefully the level of U.S. res

presence, as well as reexamine current stati

arrangements (i.e., permanently shifting U.S. Army 

from Germany to the Balkans?) to preclude a Eur

perception that the United States no longer judg

interests in Europe as being vital. Similarly, U.S. le

must ensure that reduced presence does not le

disengagement from Europe, or some form of 

isolationism. 

A robust ESDI might have a number of addi

consequences. Calling upon Europeans to become g

partners also means that the United States must a

Europe’s larger decisionmaking role in the partne

There may be times when it would be judicious of the U

States to temper the predominant leadership role t

practiced during the Cold War. Concomitantly, this als

require Europeans to assume greater responsibilities 

they have been willing to take on in the past.

Shared leadership also will complicate cons

development. The United States frequently arrives 

internal decisions through the long, convoluted

arduous inter-agency process. Other governments de

their own policies using similar mechanisms, as v

demonstrated during the build-up to the Kosovo conf

is unrealistic to expect allies and partners to react 

quickly than can the United States. This will require 

adjustment, at times considerable, to the U.S. pencha

deciding first and seeking consensus later. As seen d

the NATO response to the crisis in the Balkans in the 

1990s, difficulties in forging consensus prolong dec

making, especially when there may be disagreemen

interests, objectives, and the ways and means to ac

them. This does not argue against the United S

encouraging a strong European defense pillar; it s

means that the United States will have to ada

leadership methods to accommodate change.

14
could considerably upset the European sec

environment. While proliferation within Eu

undoubtedly would be highly detrimental, cu

conditions argue against such an outcome. That h

been said, Russia and other NIS states have many scie

with great expertise in WMD who are inadequ

employed and could be a source of expertise for a n

embarked upon a WMD program, as a result of resu

nationalism and denationalization of defense

instance.

32

The development of WMD outside of Europe, but 

could be used in Europe or against European inte

however, is a cause for alarm. A number of natio

Europe’s periphery may have nascent WMD program

may be working on the sophisticated means to deliver 

Additional states could acquire such capabilities with

next 20 years.

33

 Moreover, technological advances a

certainly will permit nations currently out of ran

effective delivery to perfect adequate means for rea

European targets. Such conditions undoubtedly w

influence security matters in Europe, and affect 

national interests.

Nor is it necessary for states or groups to deve

weapons-grade device and delivery system. Atta

chemical or nuclear materials to a simple car bomb wo

sufficient to cause considerable short-term physical, a

as significant longer-term casualties. The treme

potential for cascading effects of WMD on economi

political conditions is obvious. Increased efforts to su

nonproliferation of WMD, and to safeguard existing nu

materials, therefore, should be a matter of high prior

REDUCING RISKS TO U.S. NATIONAL INTER

If the United States and Europe in partnership c

overcome these obstacles, prospects are dim for ach

our preferred vision of a future Europe. We prop

15
therefore, to help turn our proposed vision into realit

do not present these policy options as stark ch

implement these initiatives or face failure. No on

forecast the outcomes with a high degree of detail. In

even if all initiatives were partially or fully impleme

circumstances could lead to outcomes detrimental to 

national interests. Our thrust is that these initiatives o

reasonable opportunity for success. The analysis poin

the possible (and in some instances, worst case) out

that the United States seeks to avoid by taking active 

now to shape the future European security environm

the mutual benefit of Europe and the United States.

Political Initiatives.

Perhaps the most significant political initiativ

more to do with the United States than it does with E

per se. As indicated earlier, the United States may h

adopt a new leadership style for dealing with its Eur

counterparts. This will be most apparent within NAT

will extend to other arenas as well. The United States 

examine whether it routinely will seek to build consen

generally will rely on unilateral action. It must exa

whether it seeks to remain primus or is more will

share greater power in decisionmaking. Obviously

ultimate outcome will depend heavily on how 

responsibility Europeans are willing to assume, and 

consensus builds within Europe for CSFP, ESDI, an

political integration. An important indicator of “Eur

ability to assume such a position will be how these cou

accept the lessons of the Kosovo conflict in modern

their militaries to enable them to have the nece

capabilities to project and sustain military p

independent of U.S. assistance.

34

 But, the decisive 

will depend upon the role that the United States se

itself in Europe, and how it fulfills its vision of a f

Europe. There will be growing pains in this 

relationship, on both sides of the Atlantic. But, if Eur

16
support of mutual interests around the globe—the

United States at some point will have to relinquish 

power.

In some cases, the United States may have to pre

reluctant Europe to assume that power and 

responsibility that goes with it. This may be especiall

for regions outside of Europe.

35

 But, as the world eco

becomes more interdependent, European businesse

governments will find that stability in key regions w

key to continued economic health in Europe. This ma

bring about a greater convergence of U.S. and Eur

interests in promoting stability around the globe.

At the same time, Europeans must wean them

from overdependence upon the United States and 

greater responsibility for the course of events in Eu

This will require building European consensus on long

structures and policies (e.g., CSFP, ESDI), as well a

ability to reach agreement during short-term crises w

relying on the United States to be the ultimate arb

European squabbles.

36

 Equally, this will require Eur

nations to reconcile national interests to solve la

European problems (e.g., violence in the Bal

Greek-Turkish issues, or conflicts in Transcaucasia)

also will require the United States to exercise patienc

allow Europe the time necessary to forge such consen

In this regard, the United States should con

support for the evolving European CSFP. While thi

natural consequence of increased political and eco

integration, a CSFP also would simplify (theoretically

dealings with Europe. Because of the diverse na

interests within the EU, much less within Europe 

whole, the development of such a policy is likely to pr

with fits and starts, will frustrate Europeans, 

occasionally, aggravate the United States which will 

to deal with a more cohesive partner. At the same tim

17
always coincide with U.S. policy.

Less contentious is continued U.S. support for fu

political, as well as economic, evolution of the EU

includes increased integration, as well as suppo

further enlargement. The EU must ensure, however

membership is available to all that qualify. To cre

Europe, united and whole, the EU will have to ensur

the door to the “common European home” remains op

all that qualify. The United States must encourage 

openness, and, when necessary, coax the EU to e

opportunities for accession.

Support for individual human rights should rem

key pillar of a future vision of Europe. States emerging 

decades, even centuries, of authoritarian rule may n

have grasped fully the principle that safegua

individual human rights is a fundamental responsibi

democratic governments. Monitoring human r

providing economic and political rewards and incen

and, if necessary, punishing human rights abuses mus

joint U.S.-European responsibility and a high priorit

the moment, the United States should support effo

give the Council of Europe more teeth in dealing 

human rights issues within its member states.

Similarly, minority rights must be protected if ther

be long-term stability and security in Europe. Althoug

Balkans and the Transcaucasus are the current hot 

other regions of Europe are not immune from 

debilitating crises.

37

 Migration, economic dislocation

unemployment oftentimes are perceived throu

majority-minority lens that all too frequently gene

animosity that spills over into violence. In many Eur

countries, this will be an extremely sensitive, even div

issue. Some states will view outside concern for mi

rights as unnecessary and unwanted interference in 

internal affairs. Other European states may hesit

criticize or counteract minority discrimination in 

18
own borders. U.S. and European governments, how

must respond quickly and vigorously to any abuses. 

they risk highly destabilizing ethnic conflicts.

Lastly, the United States, within the OSCE frame

should energize all aspects of the Helsinki Final Act of 

Successes within the so-called “security basket

well-known.

38

 That success may allow the OSCE a

constituents to devote more time, effort, and resour

the other two “baskets”: human rights and cooperat

economics, science and technology and the environm

This will not require new initiatives, necessarily, bu

United States could use the OSCE forum to focus atte

on key political initiatives that support desired U.S. 

for Europe.

Economic Initiatives.

While the United States also should pursue initiati

the economic arena, most of the impetus for these e

will have to come from within Europe. Similar to po

efforts, much of the economic work will occur within th

or will result from EU efforts. U.S. support fo

enlargement will contribute to the economic well-be

Europe, as a whole, with consequent effects on the 

and U.S. economies.

The United States also should continue to ass

reforming and facilitating the integration of the Ru

and Ukrainian and European economies. Here, the U

States can lend direct assistance to Russia by assist

the development of basic property and fiscal la

conjunction with EU expertise, U.S., Russian

Ukrainian interlocutors can ensure legal compatibility 

EU regulations, national laws, and international l

shape an environment that supports prolonged eco

development. These same groups could help develop 

procedures and organizations to combat criminal activ

the economic arena. Contingent upon the success of 

19
investment in Russia and Ukraine that sup

integration efforts. This also would be contingent 

greater confidence that such funds would not fall in

hands of corrupt or criminal elements.

Some may argue that, given the current sta

economic reform in Russia and Ukraine, there are no 

policies to reward and that the United States has do

that it can. There may be merit to this conclus

However, the stakes are simply too high to let matte

their course. The United States, in conjunction with 

European economic powers, will have to undertake e

to develop an economic climate within Russia th

capable of at least minimal integration with Eu

Without such integration, Russia, and perhaps Uk

could slip into economic chaos that would have 

repercussions for Europe and beyond.

While assisting the Russian and Ukrainian econom

a top priority, the United States also must provide su

to the other NIS, as well as emerging democracies in C

and Eastern Europe. While support need not necessar

on a scale equal to the two major powers, relatively li

investment could result in significant economic and po

pay-offs. This could be done unilaterally, but prefe

should be accomplished in conjunction with our Eur

allies and partners. At the very least, the United S

should support International Monetary Fund (IMF

World Bank efforts in Central and Eastern Europe

may require the United States to increase its contribu

(both relatively and absolutely) to achieve the desired 

This may be a difficult sell to some elements of Congres

the U.S. public, but it is a short-term investment 

considerable potential for long-term gain.

41

The United States also should consider incentive

continue to encourage greater private investment in 

nations, as well as their neighbors. This could be in the 

of tax credits, subsidies or partial loan guarantees. A

20
energy and discipline of the marketplace, vice s

practices. For instance, largely through private invest

the United States may be able to directly assist i

development of Caspian and Central Asian oil res

This could have several consequences beyond private 

profit or loss. First, it may make the nations in Centra

Eastern Europe depend less on Russian petroleum pro

(and preclude potential economic coercion). Second, it 

produce considerable revenues for poorer countries 

region that desperately need it. Third, the prospec

economic generation hold the potential to da

long-standing animosities in the region, although this 

optimistic hope.

42

 Fourth, significant production 

reduce European (and perhaps global) dependence 

Middle Eastern oil.

Security Initiatives.

The United States has significant interests 

responsibilities around the globe. This leads to 

demands on U.S. armed forces in Europe and be

Moreover, U.S. forces possess unique capabilities 

satellites, intelligence, and command, control

communications) or have capabilities that greatly e

others (e.g., power projection and logistics support)

combination of wider interests and greater mi

capabilities translates into increased demands for 

forces around the globe.

To ensure that demands do not strain the U.S. a

forces or the U.S. Treasury, Washington must contin

encourage our European allies to assume gr

responsibility for maintaining stability and secur

Europe. An agreed ESDI would be a first step in prov

the capabilities necessary for Europe to assume a large

in providing for its own security.

43

 It also is a prerequis

more effectively modernizing and transforming Eur

forces from their Cold War preoccupation with terr

21
Such changes also could better prepare European mi

forces for increased participation in shaping activities

importantly, ESDI offers the opportunity for creatin

power projection capabilities needed to ha

smaller-scale contingencies within Europe, as well as 

its periphery. Certainly, when interests dictate, the U

States must be prepared to assist its allies and partn

these matters. But, Europe must progressively as

greater responsibility for its own security.

An effective ESDI can be a two-edged sword fo

United States, however. Beyond the benefits ou

above, an effective ESDI coupled with impr

conventional capabilities could translate into incr

European independence in foreign and military policy

may offer Europeans greater latitude of policy and mi

operations than has previously been the case. With

military sphere—as in the political arena—therefor

United States may have to adapt its leadership st

reflect shifting power relations within NATO, as w

between Europe and the United States.

At the same time, the capabilities needed for ESD

could serve European interests beyond the Cont

should that be necessary. These same capabilities also 

support common European-U.S. interests in othe

regions of the globe. This could permit a rationalizat

defense responsibilities and liabilities that keeps the 

defense burden within manageable limits, avoiding 

historian Paul Kennedy refers to as “imp

overstretch.”

44

 Thus, while leadership “costs” m

inherent in the formulation of an effective ESD

cost-benefit analysis is favorable.

Even with a developing ESDI, the United State

have to maintain an adequate military presence in E

for the first decades of the 21st century. This doe

contradict the need for supporting ESDI. The fact re

that building an effective ESDI will not occur overnigh

22
and to transform military organizations shaped by 

decades of the Cold War. The United States will ha

sustain its presence over this period of transition. 

while the United States should wean Europe fro

strong a dependence upon U.S. military pow

precipitous U.S. withdrawal at this time could le

leadership vacuum that Europeans are not yet prepa

fill. How quickly and to what degree this should 

undoubtedly will be the subject of considerable deb

Washington and European capitals.

One point of that debate may depend on how N

nations respond to the integration of the armed forces 

Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and any f

invitees. The United States may have to ensure tha

addition of these forces is not used as an excuse for ex

NATO members to decrease their own respective f

Moreover, as these forces are integrated into the Alli

military structure, the United States and its NATO 

must ensure that current capabilities are sui

restructured and modernized to meet the demands 

anticipated future security environment.

45

The size and focus of the U.S. presence in E

undoubtedly will change. Force size, structures

organizations will adapt to accommodate evolving se

conditions. Most important may be the shift from the 

War focus on Central Europe to greater attenti

smaller-scale contingencies along Europe’s souther

southeastern borders. Increased levels of peac

engagement activities to shape the European se

environment will be important, as well. This will re

different capabilities, or at least a different proport

capabilities, than was case during the Cold War.

That having been said, forces remaining in Europ

have to retain credible combat capability. To contrib

deterrence and reassurance roles in Europe, these 

still will need adequate levels of combat power. Despi

23
environment, these forces undoubtedly will be called 

to respond to smaller-scale contingencies in Europe or 

its periphery. They also must remain capable of respo

rapidly to a major conflict in another theater of opera

beyond Europe. To maintain an adequate balance be

shaping and responding missions will require 

restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe.

The United States also can use support for ESD

means of improving modernization and interopera

with its Europeans allies and partners. This could 

avoid unnecessary and debilitating intra-Alliance de

over standardization, rationalization, and interopera

that have plagued the Alliance in the past.

46

 Used pro

ESDI could lead to pooled research and development e

that conceivably could save the United States and E

time and resources. Obviously, increased mi

integration should accompany these overarching se

changes. While it is still too early to say when and whe

North Atlantic Council might invite other European 

to join the Alliance, prudence dictates that Al

structures and practices must continue to evolve to pr

NATO for such eventualities.

U.S. support for further enlarging NATO will re

further adaptation of the Alliance’s integrated m

structure. In the near term, this will require integrati

declared forces of the several armed forces from th

accessions to the Alliance (Czech Republic, Hungary

Poland). To assist this effort, the U.S. Government wil

to convince a somewhat skeptical Congress to con

supporting infrastructure spending in NATO to assis

members.

47

 The U.S. Government also will have to e

that European allies shoulder a fair share of that bu

Perhaps more difficult will be U.S. efforts to ada

military command and control structure of the All

Such efforts, to date, have borne limited fruit.

48

 The c

future adaptation hinges on determining how best to r

24
debilitating military planning and execution capabi

As the recent brouhaha over command of Allied F

Southern Europe demonstrates, this will be no 

task.

49For the moment, this may mean impleme

current initiatives, and letting the French grasp in 

own time the advantages of halting their obstruct

behavior. Over the longer term, especially if ESDI be

a reality, the United States may have to soften its cu

hard-line stance on who occupies key command pos

within the integrated military structure.

Further enhancements of the existing PfP program 

will benefit the European security climate. On the one 

new initiatives may assist nations in preparing for ult

NATO membership (should they desire). On the other 

should a nation not opt for NATO membership, 

program enhancements could increase cooperation be

NATO and nonmembers. Some potential initiatives in

1) Designation of PfP “deployable forces” and some 

undefined relationship with existing NATO-dec

multinational headquarters;

2) Greater detail in the current “Planning and R

Process” to make it more similar to the Alliance’s 

planning process;

3) Increased “Partner Staff Elements” participation 

the International Military Staff and the top two levels 

integrated command structure;

4) Increased numbers of international posts in the 

nership Coordination Cell; and,

5) Additional partner diplomatic missions accredi

NATO Headquarters.

In addition to the highly successful PfP Program

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council provides the edu

and experience necessary for potential members to 

how to work inside NATO. It also enhances multina

25
Moscow participate in it. The program also allows f

integration of Ukraine and the Baltic States int

European security agenda and provides reassuranc

some form of tangible or visible concern for their secu

Most of these initiatives hold the promise of he

meet U.S. objectives not only in Europe but a

responding to future crises outside Europe. Using P

ensure that partner states are compatible with ESD

help ensure that Europeans will be better prepar

cooperate with the United States when mutual int

will benefit. This will not only reduce the U.S. de

burdens in Europe, but also globally, while increasin

effectiveness of potential coalitions.

At the very least, these programs singly 

combination should increase transparency in se

affairs. Within NATO, they will help preven

renationalization of members’ defense policies. Ou

NATO, these measures should reduce the incentiv

individual nations to pursue unilateral security po

that might cause anxiety among their neighbors. At 

they can contribute to increased defense integration w

NATO, as well as Europe as a whole.

CINC USEUCOM’s Strategy of Readiness and

Engagement.

Support of CSFP, ESDI, NATO enlargemen

adaptation, and PfP are longer-term initiatives. To su

U.S. interests and policies in Europe in the near 

USEUCOM has outlined a number of strategic objecti

CINC USEUCOM’s Strategy of Readiness and Engag

(1998). The intent here is not to examine each object

detail. On their face, these objectives support U.S. inte

goals, and policies. The task here is to assess their abi

contribute to the vision of a future Europe.

26
shaping Europe’s 21st century security environment

1) Maintain, support, and contribute to the integri

adaptation of NATO.

2) Help prepare the militaries of invited nations to 

grate with NATO.

3) Promote stability, democratization, military p

sionalism, and closer relationships with NATO i

nations of Central Europe and the NIS.

4) Support U.S. efforts to ensure self-sustaining pro

for the Dayton process; develop military institutions 

former Yugoslavia adapted to civilian control.

5) Ensure freedom of maritime and aeronautic li

communication.

6) Provide prompt response to humanitarian crise

7) Maintain a high state of readiness in EUCOM for

Within the USEUCOM strategy, NATO remain

centerpiece of U.S. engagement in Europe. The Allia

uniquely positioned to meet the continued deman

collective defense of its members, and through N

enlargement, chartered relationships with Russia 

Ukraine, and PfP activities to support inclusive m

security arrangements throughout Europe

51

. USEU

efforts to support the Alliance, therefore, are conside

Within NATO, USEUCOM helps fulfill the military as

of enlargement. It contributes to further evoluti

command and control arrangements and pro

substantial forces and capabilities—especially intellig

communications, and power projection—to All

military authorities.

External to the Alliance, USEUCOM support

activities and uses bilateral activities to assist in

nations to prepare for NATO membership.

52These act

also foster increased professionalism within Centra

27
those forces.

5 3

 USEUCOM also promotes c

relationships with friendly democratic neutrals 

support NATO efforts to increase stability 

transparency in defense matters in the rest of Eu

Moreover, USEUCOM uses bilateral contacts with R

and Ukraine to bolster the chartered relationships be

those two countries and NATO.

54

 Four particular initi

deserve special note: the George C. Marshall Cent

European Security Studies, the Joint Contact 

Program, the State Partnership Program, an

Department of Defense’s security assistance prog

These efforts build trust and confidence that contrib

increased understanding and stability in Europe.

USEUCOM also plays a major role in supporting 

efforts to ensure self-sustaining progress for the D

peace process. Providing the bulk of the U.S. 

contribution to the Implementation Force (IFOR

Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations and the Na

Support Element in Hungary, alone, is a signi

achievement. Adding to these challenging deploymen

been the U.S. contribution to the NATO-led Allied 

campaign against Yugoslavia and the subseq

contribution of U.S. forces to the Kosovo Implemen

Force (KFOR). U.S. forces (largely drawn from USEU

units) participating in IFOR, SFOR and KFOR have 

signal contributions beyond the requirements laid out 

various peace implementation agreements. These in

assistance in infrastructure restoration, econ

restructuring, serving as role models for professional a

forces that are subject to civilian control, and assist

elections at all levels of government over the course 

past 3 years.

56

 These initiatives have directly contri

not only to the restoration of a safe and secure environ

in Bosnia, but also have directly assisted in that na

recovery from the depths of a vicious civil war.

In addition to its work inside Bosnia, USEUCOM 

has launched peacetime engagement and shaping act

28
Europe that have contributed further to the prospect

self-sustaining peace in the region. USEUCOM 

supported the U.N Preventive Deployment 

(Operation ABLE SENTRY in U.S. parlance) alon

border between the Federal Republic of Yugos

Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace

(FYROM). The success of this deployment has been 

nearly universally.

57

 Moreover, USEUCOM units are 

forefront of combined U.S.-international efforts to sta

the post-conflict situation in Kosovo. Together, 

actions not only have contributed significant

short-term stability in the former Yugoslavia, but als

serve as the foundation for longer-term stability with

Balkans, as a whole.

Some observers may view “ensure freedom of ma

and aeronautic lines of communication” as being m

response than a shaping activity. Such an interpre

may be unnecessarily narrow, however. Responding 

particular crisis occasionally may overlap with long-

shaping activities. Thus, responding and shaping can 

complementary purposes. Creating the conditions 

allow for the free and unfettered use of lin

communication within USEUCOM’s area of responsi

for example, certainly contributes to a positive f

security environment. Thus, a freedom of navig

exercise in the Gulf of Sidra or exercises in the Blac

establish precedents that will shape future action

security conditions.

Providing prompt response to humanitarian crise

would appear to fall more under responding than sha

But there is still a portion of such missions that su

engagement. First, rapid response helps shape cond

for peaceful resolution of an ongoing crisis, or pre

humanitarian conditions from expanding into a co

whether internal or external. Second, by mitigatin

economic consequences, such humanitarian response

eliminate or mitigate conditions that might contrib

29
responses contribute to a well of goodwill that the U

States may find useful some day. Lastly, the U.S. posit

a world leader demands that the United States take th

in many humanitarian efforts. Indeed, in some case

United States may be the only nation that possesse

requisite capabilities needed to conduct such opera

(e.g., long-range transportation, global communica

and logistics).

None of these initiatives will bear fruit, however, u

USEUCOM forces maintain a high state of readiness

applies to combat and noncombat roles. Readiness pro

the sine qua non for maintaining USEUCOM’s abi

fight and win a major theater war, and to respond effec

to the full range of potential crises. These capabilitie

undergird USEUCOM’s contribution to deterrence, a

as its ability to support operations in other theat

operation. In short, without adequate attenti

readiness, USEUCOM will have great difficulty car

out the initiatives, planned or potential, that will 

Europe’s 21st century security environment to the m

benefit of Europe and the United States.

58

To help ensure readiness, while fulfilling the Na

Military Strategy, CINCEUR recognized the need to 

theater-wide peacetime activities. As a result, EU

developed a unique process for planning and executing 

has become known as “shaping” activities, conducted 

the strategy of engagement. The Theater Security Pla

System produced strategy documents at all levels (th

region, and country). The purpose of this process was 

the objectives that support strategies. Usin

USEUCOM’s Theater Security Planning System 

model, the Joint Staff developed the Theater Engage

Planning System, which is currently used througho

combatant commands to develop shaping strategic con

and shaping activities.

59

 Currently, EUCOM con

approximately 3,000 engagement activities ann

within some 30 different categories of “activities.”

60

30
has assigned to EUCOM the following new countri

planning and shaping responsibilities: Moldova, Uk

Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well 

Black Sea.

61

 This has increased significantly the comm

responsibilities, particularly for planning and exec

shaping activities. Ukraine now becomes USEUC

largest shaping program.

62

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The importance of U.S. national interests in Eur

unlikely to abate in the period under examina

Increased cooperation between the United State

evolving European political, economic, and sec

organizations could lead to even greater trans-At

bonds. The United States, therefore, has a conside

stake in bringing to fruition the vision outlined abo

one similar to it). Despite the obvious fact that p

conditions will benefit the United States, Europe a

citizens also would garner tremendous advantages. 

Europe, too, has a stake in such a positive outcome.

But such an outcome is not guaranteed. U.S.-Eur

cultural affinities may diminish. In the absence of a ma

external threat, perceived mutual U.S.-European int

may lessen. Economic competition between the U

States and Europe or among large regional trading blo

global or regional markets could be intense, fu

magnifying the divergence of interests. For this vis

become reality, therefore, will require mutual efforts 

sometimes, substantial changes on both sides o

Atlantic. 

Nonetheless, we generally do not see any nee

dramatic changes in the ongoing economic, politica

security evolution of Europe. Certainly, we would we

any acceleration of positive trends that will increas

number of market democracies that seek to resolve dis

through peaceful means. But this does not call for who

31
create instability that the United States and Europe h

avoid. Thus, we support evolutionary initiatives 

continued progress along foreseeable lines.

On the economic front, Europe must continue to 

and deepen its economic institutions. Accession to th

particularly, must remain a viable option for all e

countries. The important decision made at the EU He

summit in December 1999 to open membership acce

negotiations to expand the community from 15 to 28 or 

countries is noteworthy for European security.

63

 Tha

economic integration does not have to occur strictly th

the EU. The EU and nonmembers should be free to pu

“variable geometry” that accommodates nationa

regional differences within the larger organization

intent, rather, is to pursue options that make na

economies more open and to preclude a catastr

economic failure that affects large portions of the Eur

and global economies.

This last point underscores the importance of ens

that Russia, especially, but also Ukraine and the othe

states merge their economies into the European eco

system. The inability to effect such integration 

creating a tiered system of “haves” and “have-nots,” w

the latter group may perceive that it has no sta

supporting European stability. Indeed, such “have

may conclude that they have tremendous incent

overturn existing European economic, political

security institutions, architectures, and systems.

European economic integration should occur in 

partnership with the United States. Much more c

accomplished, for example in integrating Russian an

economies into European and global economies, 

United States and key European nations and institu

cooperate. Equally, hostile trade competition or, w

debilitating U.S.-EU trade wars could significantly da

32
the economic sphere, but also in security matters.

Recommended changes in European political in

tions generally parallel the economic transforma

outlined above. Increased political integration that inc

all European nation-states is a desirable and achie

goal. More important, perhaps, than incre

pan-European institutions is a greater focus on ens

individual and minority rights. Redressing real or perc

inequities in minority rights, in particular, will g

improve the potential for long-term stability within Eu

In the security arena, Europe should strive to crea

effective European Security and Defense Initiative

United States should support such efforts. This shou

require, however, creating new mechanisms or erectin

“institutions,” if they are at the expense of creating n

military capabilities. Europe should evolve its ro

security affairs within existing structures, such as O

EU/Western European Union (WEU), NATO, PfP, an

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), for exa

These organizations, if properly adapted, can re

impending conflicts or, if violence breaks out, tak

necessary steps to halt conflict and achieve a la

political settlement. An excellent example of this capa

and potential results is the ongoing significant in

adaptation of NATO.

This adaptation will have to include changed role

participation in security institutions. European state

have to take a larger role in ensuring their own sec

This will mean, as well, taking the steps necessary to e

that they possess the military capabilities needed to 

the potential challenges of the 21st century sec

environment. This also will mean less reliance on th

political leadership within European sec

organizations, as well as during crises. A stronger Eur

security role also should lead to improvements in mi

capabilities, which many European states have let lan

33
require the United States to alter how it cooperates 

Europe, relying more heavily on prior consultation 

developing consensus prior to rather than after the f

also may mean that the United States must let go of so

its authority and leadership positions. While ps

logically difficult, these changes can occur wi

damaging U.S. or European national interests.

A continued U.S. military presence in Europ

remain an essential element of the European se

environment for the foreseeable future. Partially, thi

reassure allies and partners of the continued 

commitment to Europe, which will be especially impo

during this period of transition. These forces also will 

key role in shaping the future European and global se

environments through a broad range of peac

engagement and shaping activities. Especially impo

may be helping former communist militaries tran

themselves into defense establishments that conform 

norms of democratic civil-military relations. Should a 

arise in Europe, U.S. military units also would be posit

to respond quickly. They also could foster compatible, 

common, doctrine and operational procedures a

potential coalition partners to facilitate com

operations within or outside Europe. Lastly, f

stationed in Europe will be positioned to respond quic

crises that may erupt in other areas of the world 

support operations in other theaters.

While all elements of the U.S. armed forces 

contribute to a future presence in Europe, land force

play the more dominant role. Land forces are less tran

than sea or air forces, and, therefore, provide g

reassurance to allies and partners. Equally, land forc

most appropriate for performing the broad ran

missions that fall under peacetime engagemen

shaping activities. Because most emerging democ

depend most heavily on land forces, moreover, U.S. 

units and personnel offer the better role mod

34
offer the best means for facilitating the developm

common doctrine and operational procedures. L

because of the nature of probable crises in Europe

forces may predominate in any responses.

Achieving desired political, economic, and se

conditions in Europe that benefit both Europe an

United States will not happen on its own. As ind

above, a number of obstacles will have to be overcom

the least of which will be the integration of Russia, Uk

and the NIS into Europe’s political, security, 

especially, economic systems. But while difficult, 

challenges are not overwhelming. Progress may come 

and starts, and occasional strains in trans-At

relations will occur. But none of these difficulties w

insurmountable. With perseverance and close coope

the United States and Europe can turn the vision 

reality.

ENDNOTES

1. See, for example, Stephen Walt, “The Ties That Fra

National Interest, Winter 1998/1999, pp. 3-11.

2. Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry intr

preventive defense at a speech at Harvard University (Remark

John F. Kennedy School of Government, May 13, 1996). Th

complete articulation of the concept is found in William J. 

“Defense in an Age of Hope,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, 

November/December 1996, pp. 64-79. Preventive defense evolv

the concept of shaping outlined in William S. Cohen, Secre

Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], May 1997, pp

3. As a review of the published national security strategie

Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations clearly indicates.

4. For example, conservative West Europeans may draw the 

borderline along the Oder-Neisse, while more liberal viewpoint

include Poland and even the Republic of Georgia! Debate c

boisterous over the inclusion of Ukraine and Russia. Turkey’s r

rejection by the EU is an example of where others might draw t

35
membership to their relationship within the former Soviet Uni

do not always see themselves as “European.” For information 

OSCE, see http://www.osce.org. Responsibilities assigned 

CINCs illustrate this problem, as USEUCOM includes most of A

well as portions of the Middle East, but excludes Russia. Pr

associated with the Unifed Command Plan (UCP) are discussed b

5. Currently, the OSCE has 55 members, although the 

Republic of Yugoslavia has been suspended since July 1992.

6. The Cold War division between “East” and “West” 

exacerbates this difficulty.

7. For instance, Germany could fall within Western or 

Europe or could be grouped with the Baltic states depending u

context.

8. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., ed., The Diplomat’s Dict

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, p. 1

9. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for 

Century, [hereafter NSS], Washington, DC: GPO, December 19

29-32. See also, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, United 

Security Strategy for Europe and NATO, Washington, DC: Depa

of Defense, Office of International Security A

http://www.defenselink/pubs/europe/index.html, parts 1 and 

Department of State, United States Strategic Plan for Intern

Affairs, Washington, DC: Department of State, September 199

10. NSS, p. 29. The NSS defines U.S. national interests a

important, humanitarian and other. See ibid., pp. 1-2. 

explanation of the varying degrees of national interest, see Do

Nuechterlein, America Overcommitted: United States N

Interests in the 1980s, Lexington: University of Kentucky Pres

Chapter 1. For a slightly different view, see Robert D. Black

Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Interests in the 199

Beyond,” in Verner Veidenfeld and Josef Janning, eds., Eu

Global Change, Gutersloh, Germany: Publisher Bertelsmann, 1

100-119.

11. NSS, pp. 29-32.

12. Ibid.

36
growth rates in 1999. See The Economist (London), August 14, 

41.

14. See, for example, Lowell Turner, Fighting a Partnership

and Politics in Unified Germany, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Universit

1998.

15. This especially will be true of labor laws, which need re

allow greater flexibility.

16. Russia, for example is struggling with how to handle 

forces after 70 years of state controlled economy. See, e.g., Mic

Gordon, “One Patch of Russia’s Economic Crazy Quilt,” The Ne

Times, Internet version, September 23, 1998, at http://

nytimes.com/library/world/europe/092398russia-lebed.html.

17. This lack of knowledge can be compounded by outside a

who do not have an adequate grasp of the neophytes’ le

understanding. Thus, advisors occasionally may assume a 

understanding that while rudimentary for them is beyond the 

their interlocutors.

18. See, for example, the discussion in Janine R. Wedel, C

and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern 

1989-1998, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998, pp. 21-22. Wede

should be required reading for anyone involved in economic ass

and advice in other countries.

19. See, for instance, Robert D. Kaplan, “The Fulcrum of E

The Atlantic Monthly, September 1998, pp. 28-36; and idem, 

Against Democrats,” The Atlantic Monthly, December 1998, pp

20. For example, after nearly a decade of transition Russ

percent), Ukraine (-9.9 percent), Bulgaria (-9.2 percent), and M

(-10 percent) still are experiencing negative growth. In

http://www.worldbank.org/data/pdfs/tab1_1.pdf.

21. See Elizabeth Pond, “Miracle on the Vistula,” Was

Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 209-230.

22. One need only look as far as European reaction 

Helms-Burton Amendment, competition between Europe’s 

consortium and U.S. airplane manufacturers, or U.S. resentm

European industrial espionage. Or, the recent case (Decembe

where the United States slapped trade sanctions on the E

37
New York Times, http:\\www.nytimes.com\aponline\

BananaTrade-War.html, December 21, 1998.

23. Regressive political trends, even in smaller European 

such as Slovakia, could have considerable effects on overall Eu

stability.

24. See, for example, the discussion in William Drozdiak, “

on the Rise,” The Washington Post, October 22, 1995, p. A22. For 

general discussion of this global phenomenon, see Kenichi Ohma

Rise of the Region State,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 2, Sprin

pp. 78-87.

25. For instance, the Flemish and Walloon regions of B

Catalonia and Andalusia in Spain, or the Lombard League in 

name but a few in Western Europe alone.

26. See, e.g., the series of articles on right-wing politics in A

France, Germany, and Italy in The Christian Science Monitor

23-24, and 26-27, 1998; and New Politics of the Right: Neo-P

Parties and Movements in Established Democracies, Hans-Geo

and Stefan Immerfall, eds., New York: St. Martins Press, 1998

27. Beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community 

the EC, EU, WEU, and NATO.

28. The election of Gerhard Schroeder as Federal Chanc

Germany, for example, sent shudders through French policy

who fear a lessening of the Franco-German relationship. S

example, Craig R. Whitney, “France Worries as New German 

Stresses Ties to Britain,” The New York Times, Intern

http:/www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/093098german

.html, September 30, 1998; Christopher Noble, “Schroeder Visits 

to Reassure Anxious Paris,” The Washington Post, http:/

pointcast.com, September 30, 1998.

29. Such an approach is advocated by Michael J. Inacker, 

and Morality: On a New German Security Policy,” Daniel Wei

trans., in Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle t

Institutions and Practices, Thomas-Durell Young, ed., C

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996, pp. 101-114.

30. Cyprus is the obvious Greek-Turkish flashpoint, but 

include control of the air and sea space in the Aegean, 

relationships, and Turkish membership in the EU.

38
internal economic and political issues. This could result in d

perceptions of threats and the consequent issue of whether a C

needed to address them.

32. See, for instance, Walter Pincus, “Funds to Scrap Ex

Arms Boosted,” The Washington Post, September 25, 1998, p. A

33. See Table 1 in Strategic Survey, 1996/97, London: 

University Press for the International Institute for Strategic S

April 1997, pp. 23-25.

34. See “The Future of Kosovo: An Indefinite NATO Presenc

Strategic Comments, Vol. 6, Issue 1, January 2000.

35. This stems from the reality that Europeans have come 

heavily on U.S. defense capabilities, especially power pro

capabilities, to safeguard mutual national interests in, for exam

Middle East.

36. For an excellent assessment of the challenges facing the 

“A Work in Progress,” The Economist: A Survey of Europe (L

October 23, 1999.

37. For example, tensions within France over (largely) M

immigrants. Or the strain placed on welfare systems thro

Europe, but most pronounced, perhaps, in Germany that has ge

a nationalist backlash against foreigners.

38. For instance, The Treaty of Paris (1990), the Tre

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) (1990), and the 

Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) regimes.

39.A copy of the Helsinki Final Act can be fou

http://www.mygale.org/04/fogazzid/politics/padania/helsin

40. See, for example, “The Cash Don’t Work,” The Eco

December 19, 1998, pp. 98-100.

41. While current conditions differ from the immediate pos

War II period, one cannot help but draw the analogy to the Eu

Recovery (Marshall) Plan. Costs then were significant, but th

reaped have been uncountable.

42. Indeed, unless deftly handled, perhaps with assistance f

United States, increased disproportionate wealth among state

region may exacerbate existing tensions.

39
the second pillar: an obstructed path?” in WEU at Fifty, Guido 

ed., Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European 

1998, pp. 35-50.

44. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: E

Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000, New York: R

House, 1987, pp. 514-515. These arguments are not new. 

Lippman made similar ones in The Cold War: A Study in U.S. 

Policy, New York: Harper, 1947.

45. Two key capabilities are the ability to project power 

national and regional areas to reinforce against risks in other 

and the combat support and combat service support capabilities 

to sustain such deployments over time. Command, C

Communications, Computers and Intelligence, Surveillanc

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities also will need improveme

46. See Simon Duke, The Burdensharing Debate: A Reasse

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.

47. Thomas-Durell Young, Reforming NATO’s Military Str

The Long-Term Study and its Implications for Land Forces, C

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 15, 1998.

48. Ibid., pp. 14-16.

49. See, for example, Craig R. Whitney, “At Odds with U.S., 

Says No to NATO Role,” The New York Times, October 2, 1997

Joseph Fitchett, “France and U.S. Sidestep Friction,” Intern

Herald Tribune, October 7, 1997, p. 1; Giovanni de Briganti, 

Reiterates Demands to Alter NATO’s Structure,” Defense 

September 8-14, 1997, p. 12; Young, Reforming NATO’s Milita

50. USEUCOM, Strategy of Readiness and Engagemen

Internet at http://www.eucom.mil/strategy/98strategy.pdf, pp

51. USEUCOM, Strategy of Readiness and Engagement, p. 

52. USEUCOM, “USEUCOM 1998 Posture Statement

Internet at http://www.eucom.mil/posture/engagement.htm, 

53. For details, see “Elements of the EUCOM Strategy,” Int

http://www.eucom.mil/strategy/elements.htm, pp. 3, 5-7.

54. Specific events and programs are outlined in “USEUCO

Posture Statement,” Engagement Section; USEUCOM, Elemen

40
Background Paper,” August 31, 1998, http://www.euc

/programs/jctp/backgrnd.htm.

55. For specific information on these initiative

http://www.marshall.adsn.int/Marshall.html; USEUCOM, 

Contact Team Program Background Paper”; USEUCOM, “USE

1998 Posture Statement,” pp. 6-7; and USEUCOM, “USEUCO

Posture Statement,” pp.9-10, respectively.

56. For the military requirements, see General Fram

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1A (Agr

on the Military Aspects of the Agreement).

57. For a description of Operation ABLE SENTR

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unpred_b.ht

assessments of the success of UNPREDEP, see, e.g., Intern

Crisis Group, “Macedonia: The Politics of Ethnicity and C

http://www.intl-crisis-roup.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/m

.htm#2c; Council on Foreign Relations, “Toward Comprehensiv

in Southeast Europe, Conflict Prevention in the South Ba

Executive Summary, http://www.foreignrelations.org/s

transcripts/recommend.html.; Sophia Clement, Conflict Preve

the Balkans: Case Studies of Kosovo and the FYR of Macedonia, C

Papers No. 30, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, De

1997, pp. 25-26. Examples of PfP activities in the remainde

Balkans can be found in, for instance, “USEUCOM 1998 

Statement,” pp. 3-4; and the many PfP documents loca

http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm.

58. It is interesting to note that the revision of the manual go

the Theater Engagement Planning process now stresses that s

should not be carried out at the expense of sacrificing warf

capability. See, “Theater Engagement Planning,” Chairman of th

Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01, Final Coordinatin

Revision, August 1999, p. A-1.

59. Ibid.

60. Information provided by J-5 Strategy, U.S. Eu

Command, September 1998.

61. See Dennis C. Blair, Memorandum to the Service Chi

CINCs, Subject: Implementation of the Unified Command Plan 

24-98), Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Febr

1998, para. 18.

41
October 1, 2000, increases CINCEUR’s AOR in the At

particularly the South Atlantic out into the Indian Ocean. Se

Chiefs of Staff, J-5, Unified Command Plan (U), Washingto

September 29, 1999, para. 18.

63. The Economist (London), January 15, 2000, pp. 51-52.

 

42
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Stephen J. Blank

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Dr. Thomas-Durell Young

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler