PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AFTER NEX

Edited by

Susan M. Puska

August 2000
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ii
CONTENTS

1. Introduction

 James R. Lilley ................

2. Going Places or Running in Place? China’s

 Efforts to Leverage Advanced Technologies

 for Military Use

 Richard A. Bitzinger .............

3. PLA Logistics And Doctrine Reform, 1999-2009

 Lonnie Henley ................

4. Potential Applications of PLA Information

 Warfare Capabilities to Critical Infrastructures

 William C. Triplett II ............ 

5. China’s Military Space and Conventional

 Theater Missile Development: Implications for

 Security in the Taiwan Strait

 Mark A. Stokes ............... 

6. PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization

 Kenneth W. Allen .............. 

7. The Kosovo War: Implications for Taiwan

 Arthur C. Waldron .............. 

8. China’s Maritime Strategy

 Bernard D. Cole ................ 

About the Authors ................. 

Index ........................ 

iii
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

James R. Lilley

An analytical schism has developed over diff

assessments of China’s military modernization. Unde

this debate are at least two key questions. First, w

ongoing China’s People’s Liberation Army (

modernization provide China with significant offe

power projection and/or preemptive capability? If 

when? Second, does the pace and success of China’s mi

modernization constitute a threat to the United S

and/or its friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region

At the source of these differing views on the pac

likely success of the PLA modernization is a lack of 

evidence, aggravated by a Chinese tendency to concea

strengths and weaknesses. There are also analysts w

locked into positions on the PLA that the evidence 

unable to alter. Lack of information is often muddi

anecdotal knowledge, sometimes provided by Ch

interlocutors, that may be impossible to confirm or refu

addition, a large body of conventional wisdom abou

PLA has built up over time, which may inhibit 

reassessment. Finally, peer comparisons of the PLA 

U.S. military, which is without equal in the post-Cold 

period, may shape analysis of the PLA’s capabilitie

shortfalls. As a result, conclusions about China’s mi

modernization often leave considerable room for int

tation on any side of an argument.

The policy decisions made today based in part o

absence of hard analysis will likely haunt U.S. and 

policy and interests well into the 21st century, as C

comprehensive strength and historic aspirations matu

order to minimize miscalculations about the 

1
modernization, debate is essential, for it can help redu

twin analytical evils of overestimation and unde

mation. Debate can reduce wishful thinkin

demonization about China’s strategic capability 

intentions. It may also preclude counterprodu

self-imposed constraints on U.S. policy options bas

fear of self-fulfilling prophecies of a China threat. A

debate, finally, can lead to a reevaluation of old, well

assumptions, and spur greater exploitation of pu

available information about the PLA and China’s na

security. All of this would potentially help to deve

clearer picture of China’s People’s Liberation Army 

Next into the 21st century.

The 1999 PLA Conference, which was hosted join

the American Enterprise Institute and the U.S. Arm

College’s Strategic Studies Institute, convened Septe

10-12, 1999, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The g

this conference was to comprehensively examine Ch

military modernization efforts. The meeting drew tog

leading experts on the PLA army, navy, air force, m

forces, and national defense industries and included 

experts with opposing views on the pace and likely su

of Chinese military modernization. Lively d

continually probed analytical differences and prejudic

well as the sources of information upon which conclu

were based. The conference also included a prelimina

timely examination of the PLA’s potential applicat

information warfare. An initial discussion of the 

Kosovo implications for China’s Taiwan strategy 

China’s foreign military relations also took place.

“Going Places or Running in Place? China’s Effo

Leverage Advanced Technologies for Military Use

Richard Bitzinger, opened the conference, and is Cha

in this volume. Bitzinger finds that China’s mil

industrial complex has achieved some success in techn

leveraging over the past 20 years, and as a result, 

improved its production capabilities to develop and d

some relatively modern weapon systems. In particu

2
has made real progress in the areas of ballistic and 

missiles. 

Overall, however, these accomplishments tend to 

exceptions that prove the rule. Particularly when it com

fighter aircraft, surface combatants, and gr

equipment, the Chinese still confront severe problems 

moving from prototypes to production, including draw

development times, program slippage, and small and 

production runs. Bitzinger argues that China’s de

industries fail mainly due to endemic technical, struc

and cultural problems. A shortage of technical 

overcapacity, underfunding, and a bureaucratic, 

archical and risk-averse work environment hav

impeded technology leveraging. Moreover, he contend

current defense industry reforms do little to remo

overcome these impediments. As a result, he conclud

PLA will find it difficult to rely on its domestic de

industry to meet many of its more ambitious, near

military modernization goals.

Chapter 3, “PLA Logistics and Doctrine Re

1999-2009,” by Lonnie Henley, discusses opera

changes, as well as the 10-year effort announced by Ge

Wang Ke, Chief of the General Logistics Departme

November 1998, to restructure and reform PLA logis

support mobile warfare. Henley argues that log

reforms address critical weaknesses in the PLA’s abi

fight a modern war in or near Chinese territory, 

operational changes seek to combine restructuri

ground forces with improved doctrine. Together 

changes will help the PLA to “progress toward comp

combined-arms operations” with effective joint opera

as the ultimate goal. Henley assesses that these cha

even if successful, may not significantly increase C

power projection capability. He does argue, however

changes in logistics and operations will improve the 

ability to move and sustain its forces within Chin

around its periphery.

3
In Chapter 4, “Potential Applications of 

Information Warfare Capabilities to Critical I

structures,” William C. Triplett II discusses the pot

for the PLA to conduct offensive information wa

operations against critical civilian infrastructures i

United States, and how such an operation might u

Triplett’s discussion is particularly timely in the wake 

May 2000 “I Love You” software virus that cri

hundreds of thousands of computer systems througho

world,

1

 reportedly penetrating even into clas

Pentagon systems.

2

 Triplett notes the PLA has s

intense interest in information warfare with top 

support of PLA leaders, such as General Fu Quanyou, 

of the General Staff, PLA, and generous fundin

observes that PLA Informational Warfare theorists 

the need for a preemptive strike capability, which S

and others in this volume note has become a fundam

underpinning of the PLA’s overall military strate

“active defense.” Triplett argues that the United S

Taiwan, and Japan (a key ally in the Asia-Pacific regio

vulnerable to cyber-attack on critical transport

communications, and financial networks. Tr

concludes with a warning that the “gap between 

information warfare is capable of accomplishing an

non-action by the defenders” is growing daily, w

demands greater attention and action in the United S

Japan, and Taiwan.

“China’s Military Space and Conventional Th

Missile Development: Implications for Security i

Taiwan Strait,” by Mark A. Stokes is Chapter 5. S

asserts that China is establishing “one of the most dau

conventional theater missile challenges in the world,” 

the PLA views as an asymmetrical “trump card” aga

superior force. He argues that theater convent

missiles, supported by spaced-based reconnaissanc

combined with a preemptive strategy, provide Beijing 

a keen psychological tool and possible military advan

particularly in the Taiwan Strait. China’s th

4
conventional missiles and space reconnaissance arc

ture are emerging as the cornerstone of Ch

warfighting strategy. They form a relatively chea

expeditious compensation for shortcomings in China’s 

and air force (see Chapters 6 and 8 in this volume), an

are being developed based on the PLA’s assessment o

military weaknesses—reliance on space systems, ai

carrier battle groups, and expeditionary air forces.

Stokes also asserts that a disturbing convergenc

occurred between Chinese leaders and American po

and sympathetic academic circles who argue tha

missile defense against the PLA’s growing arsen

increasingly accurate and lethal missiles wou

destabilizing and lead to an arms race. Stokes counter

argument by noting that, if the PLA achieve

overwhelming offensive missile advantage, this w

intensify the already existing arms race and 

destabilize the cross strait balance, causing Taiwan to 

toward a tactically offensive doctrine,” including a nu

weapon, to deter the PLA’s overwhelming missile thr

In Chapter 6, “PLA Air Force Operations and Mo

zation,” Kenneth W. Allen argues that the PLA Air 

(PLAAF) is undergoing a “crucial transition” fro

obsolete giant with short operational legs and li

all-weather capability to an “offensive-oriented force 

extended range and greater lethality,” able to fight 

limited wars under high-tech conditions. To achiev

transformation, the PLAAF has expanded its defe

doctrine to include both offensive and defensive opera

Allen points out that with the modernization 

equipment, the PLAAF has been able to moderni

tactics, extend its combat range, and practice prov

support to naval and ground operations. In addition, 

describes the transformation of the 15th Airborne 

into a formidable rapid reaction force with three divisi

one of the most important changes in recent P

campaign strategy.

5
Despite improvements across the board, however, 

argues that the PLAAF still lags far behin

modernization goals. It retains a mixed fleet of m

aircraft, such as the J-11 (SU-27), alongside 1950s vi

aircraft, while its ability to conduct all-weather flyin

extended operations—essential to support an offe

strategy—are questionable. Further, China’s abil

exploit foreign advanced technologies and equipme

production and utilization of advanced aircraft 

Bitzinger has also observed) a limitation. Still, 

concludes that PLAAF shortfalls will not inhib

dedication to completing its assigned missions, nor 

shortfalls reassure regional powers of China’s long

regional capabilities and intentions. As Allen point

based on recent research throughout the region, 

countries watch the PLA very closely and with gr

concern that it could develop sustained combat capab

within the next 10-15 years.

In Chapter 7, “The Kosovo War: Implication

Taiwan,” Arthur C. Waldron addresses the lesso

Operation ALLIED FORCE on China’s calculus to use 

against Taiwan, if necessary, to quickly and deci

impose reunification as a fait accompli before the U

States has time to intervene. Beneath China’s f

rhetoric, which was feverishly fanned by the accid

bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, i

recognition that time is running out for China. The co

of sovereignty is less sacrosanct now among the in

tional community, which has demonstrated that it w

to stop genocide and other atrocities within a cou

borders. Waldron asserts Operation ALLIED FORCE 

demonstrated the limitations of military force to r

issues. Its lessons suggest that the application of force 

longer a viable option for China to resolve the T

problem. Further, Taiwan’s indigenous demo

increasingly is recognized by the international comm

as legitimate, which makes the possibility of the use o

even more complicated and risky for China. 

6
Chapter 8, “China’s Maritime Strategy,” by Berna

Cole, examines the development of China’s mar

strategic thinking and its recent attempts to transfor

PLA Navy (PLAN) from a coastal, “brown water” (out 

nautical miles) to an open ocean “blue water” force t

capable of reaching the “second island chain,” define

line from Japan through the Bonin, Marianas, and Ca

Islands by 2020. The PLAN faces daunting limitations 

efforts to develop into a power projection force, accord

Cole. The most serious shortfall for the PLAN is a lack 

power at sea, but it also lacks in virtually all cate

affecting modern naval operations—training 

education; naval systems and platforms; naval w

technology and systems; doctrine and tactics; comman

control; intelligence; strategic planning; leadership

influence within the national strategy-making stru

Cole observes that the PLAN’s stated goal to achieve a 

water” navy, which presently targets U.S. naval capa

serves as an impetus to protect and expand the P

share of the military budget. Cole notes that, despite r

purchases from the Russians and overall improveme

the navy, there is no evidence to support that the PLA

initiated the major modernization effort that wou

required to actually transform the largely coastal nav

a power projection force by 2020.

In summary, Cole and Allen raise important que

and considerable doubt about the likely success of P

and PLAAF modernization, respectively, over the 

10-20 years. Bitzinger also seriously questions the ef

of China’s national defense industries to su

modernization, while Henley raises skepticism 

whether China’s military logistics support, an ess

underpinning of power projection, can reach its goals

Nonetheless, all agree that China actively se

strong, modern military force, with power proje

capability to protect and promote China’s national int

within the region and beyond, and that it has openly 

“preemptive strike” to its operational strategy. Since 

7
clearly recognizes its own shortcomings, and th

between its military capabilities and those of the U

States, as well as against a regional power such as Jap

seeks ways to compensate for these deficiencies 

surprise and asymmetrical operations, perhaps incl

information warfare and conventional missile strikes

PLA’s ongoing military modernization and emphas

surprise and preemption combine with China’s refu

renounce the use of force against a democratic Taiwa

its territorial claims over the South China Sea to hei

concern about China’s intentions and capabilities w

the region.

CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES

1. John Markoff, “A Rogue Software Program Attacks Com

Worldwide,” New York Times, May 5, 2000, p. 1.

2. Associated Press, “Virus Infects Classified Pentagon Sy

Colorado Springs Gazette, May 6, 2000, Early Bird, May 8, 200

8
CHAPTER 2

GOING PLACES OR RUNNING

IN PLACE?

CHINA’S EFFORTS TO LEVERAG

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES

FOR MILITARY USE

Richard A. Bitzinger

China’s current efforts to modernize its armed 

have been the subject of considerable foreign inquir

assessment.

1

 As part of this modernization process, B

has gone to considerable lengths to find and ac

advanced defense and defense-related (i.e., dua

technologies—both through indigenous research 

development (R&D) activities and via foreign in

Beyond the mere acquisition of potentially u

technologies, however, China must also be ab

effectively leverage—that is, to absorb, assimilate

exploit—these technologies for military purposes.

This chapter specifically addresses China’s r

efforts to leverage advanced technologies for militar

The conclusion reached here is that the Chinese mil

industrial complex continues to experience conside

difficulties in assimilating and exploiting adva

technologies for military purposes, particularly imp

technologies. Admittedly, China’s military-indu

complex has experienced some genuine success

technology leveraging over the past 20 years, and 

result, it has made incremental improvements both 

military products and production capabilities. Beij

certainly building some better weapons, and its de

factories are considerably improved. On the w

however, Chinese success with leveraging adv

9
technologies has been—and will likely remain—nar

constrained, fitful, and slow. In some areas, Ch

military-industrial complex has extracted a few ta

benefits from advanced technologies inputs, while in 

areas developments have been insufficient to close c

technological gaps with likely military compet

Moreover, this chapter finds that these failures ar

mainly to technical, structural, and cultural impedi

inherent in the country’s defense industrial base, an

current efforts to reform China’s defense industry are 

little to remove or overcome these impediments. As a r

Beijing will continue to find it difficult to rely pre

nantly on its indigenous defense industry in order to ac

advanced conventional weapons necessary to me

military modernization goals.

At the same time, it is acknowledged here that va

gaps and limitations exist in this chapter. By foc

mainly on the “kinetic” aspects of military power—th

lethal items like missiles, combat aircraft, warships

ground ordnance, along with their main subsystem

components (like radar and defense electronics)—o

obviously omitting much of the field of information-

systems, an admittedly embryonic area of warfig

where the Chinese may be making more progre

technology assimilation and application than is im

ately evident. This is an area that demands c

investigation. In addition, there are limits to empir

analyzing and assessing Chinese success and failure 

technology absorption and leveraging, at least whe

military-industry complex is concerned. One is bound

what evidence one can find in the public record, wh

often less than satisfactory in terms of detail or amou

information. In addition, what one sees is open to dif

interpretations. Finally, much of this information is se

hand and filtered through someone else’s percep

creating even more subjectivity. Despite these draw

and limitations, the inductive approach used here ca

10
be useful in providing insights into China’s exper

with leveraging technologies for military purposes.

Chinese Technology Acquisition Activities.

Several Western analysts have meticul

documented Chinese efforts to develop adva

technologies for actual or projected military uses. 

writings indicate a particular interest on the part 

Chinese military in such technology areas as long-

precision-strike, command, control, communica

computing, and intelligence (C

4

I), information warfar

area denial.

2

 For example, China is working on many 

requisite technologies necessary to producing an indig

land-attack cruise missile (LACM), including air

design (perhaps adapting its C-802 antiship cruise m

to a LACM profile), propulsion systems (such as 

turbojet engines and ramjets/scramjets), and gui

technologies (such as GPS for in-flight navigation 

terrain contour matching guidance[TERCOM], im

infrared, or synthetic aperature radar [SAR] for ter

homing).

3

 In addition, it is developing laser-, I

TV-guided precision-guided munitions, railgun 

microwave weapons, and antisatellite (ASATs) 

weapons, global positioning system (GPS) guidan

ballistic missiles, multiple rocket launchers armed 

smart submunitions, sea mines, and a seeker f

active-radar-homing air-to-air missile.

4

 China ha

demonstrated at least some low observability 

technological capabilities for reduced radar cross-se

and heat signatures. At the 1998 China Airshow in Zh

for example, a Chinese company, Seek Optics, claime

it had developed a number of radar-absorbent materia

coatings, which could be applied to aircraft, cruise mi

or warships.

5

Much of China’s recent technology develop

activities are civilian in nature and in origin, albeit 

considerable potential for commercial-to-military sp

11
Beijing is conducting a wide variety of basic and a

R&D, designed to raise the general level of the cou

science and technology (S&T) base, including solid

phased-array radar, ultra-wide band radar technolog

photoreconnaissance, and remote sensing.

6

 The m

also stands to gain by piggybacking on techn

breakthroughs initiated via the country’s “863

“Super-863” programs. The 863 Program was initia

March 1986 as an essentially civilian/commercial 

development program, but with considerable potent

military spin-on—signified by the fact that it 

co-managed by the Commission on Science, Technolog

Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), China’s 

defense R&D oversight organization. The 863 Pro

concentrated on seven main areas for long-term 

development: astronautics, information technol

biotechnology, lasers, automation, energy, and 

materials. The Super-863 Program, which succeede

863 Program in 1996, focused subsequent long

Chinese S&T development in such key areas as ma

tools and computerized manufacturing syst

microelectronics and telecommunications, bioengine

exotic materials, and nuclear, aviation, space, and m

technologies.

7

 For example, China is working on form

national information infrastructure for improve

interconnectivity, including a high-speed fiber

computer network and a satellite communications sys

In addition to indigenous S&T developments, Chin

greatly increased its imports of military technolog

know-how. According to research done by Richard Fi

Bates Gill and Taeho Kim,

10

 and others, China has acq

a broad array of defense technologies from fo

sources—primarily Russia, but also Israel and We

Europe—including:

• Cruise missiles. Several Russian insti

reportedly have sold cruise missile technology and 

provided Russian advisors and technicians to wo

Chinese cruise missile programs. For example, China 

12
be receiving Russian stealth technology applicab

fielding a low-observable cruise missile. In addition, 

reportedly has supplied China with technology relatin

jet-powered drone, which could conceivably be adap

attack.

11

• Reconnaissance satellites. China and Brazil p

orbit a series of earth observation satellites, called CB

the first CBERS satellite will likely be operational by 

At the same time, Canada and Russia reportedl

providing China with SAR sensor technologie

earth-observation satellites that could also be appl

military imaging satellites.

12

• Electronic intelligence (ELINT). Israel and R

reportedly have supplied ELINT equipment to the Pe

Liberation Army (PLA), which is being incorporate

special, missionized aircraft.

13

• Medium-range surface-to-air missiles (S

China reportedly has received Patriot SAM technolo

Israel, as well as acquiring several hundred SA-10 

from Russia; according to Fisher and others, techn

from these missiles could be exploited for Ch

indigenous HQ-9 medium-range SAM program.

14

• Fighter aircraft. China is currently producing 

license up to 200 Russian-designed fourth-generation 

fighters. In addition, China’s developmental J-10 

fighter reportedly is heavily based on technology de

from Israel’s cancelled Lavi fighter jet program.

15

• Combat radar and other avionics. Russia, 

and Western Europe are providing radar and avionic

number of Chinese development combat air

programs—including the FC-1 and the J-8IIM fig

Although most of these programs are for re-export

cooperation may provide China with opportunitie

technology exploitation that could advance China’s 

indigenous R&D bases.

16

13
• Air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and precision-g

munitions (PGMs). Israel reportedly has granted C

license to produce its short-range Python-3 AA

addition, China has reportedly purchased laser-g

artillery projectiles and bombs, and TV-guided PGMs 

Russia.

17

• Submarines. The Russian submarine-design b

Rubin reportedly is assisting China in developin

next-generation nuclear attack submarine (SSN), 

could also aid Chinese efforts to build a new nu

powered, ballistic-missile-carrying submarine (SSBN

In addition to providing direct technology assista

China’s military-industrial complex, foreign supplier

be inadvertently advancing Beijing’s military mo

zation efforts by selling it equipment that the Chinese 

either reverse-engineer or use for the purpos

technology exploitation. The Chinese have al

reverse-engineered several pieces of military equip

including France’s AS-350 helicopter (produced by Ch

the Z-11

19

), the Italian Aspide AAM/SAM (built by Ch

the PL-11 AAM and the LY-60 SAM

20

) and the F

Crotale short-range surface-to-air missile (produc

China as the FM-80). The Chinese PL-9 short-

air-to-air missile reportedly is a reverse-engineered ve

of the Israeli-supplied Python-3 AAM.

21

 In add

according to the Cox Report, in the early 1980s the Ch

purchased two CFM-56 turbofan engines (us

commercial and military transport aircraft) and attem

to reverse-engineer the engine, ostensibly for military 

In particular, foreign commercial techn

transfers—particularly those implemented unde

auspices of defense conversion—have provided Beijing 

opportunities to acquire advanced dual-use techno

that could be redirected to the arms industry. The We

been a critical supplier of investments and technologie

are helping China develop civilian high-tech sectors w

its defense industry, which in turn could help unde

14
the design and manufacture of sophisticated we

systems. Such dual-use technology transfers includ

only “hardware”—such as technical specification

licenses (e.g., for the local production of advanced mate

metallurgy, propulsion, computers, microelectronics

electro-optics) and production and process technology 

as sophisticated machine tools and workforce trai

and, above all, money (to support the modernizat

Chinese factories and product lines)—but 

“software”—more intangible but nevertheless cr

elements such as quality assurance and We

management and marketing skills, which could indi

aid defense production.

22

For nearly 20 years, Western aerospace companies 

been involved in extensive technology transfers to C

commercial aviation industry. For example, the McDo

Douglas Corporation (now part of the Boeing Ai

Company), as part of its so-called Trunkliner program 

China, established a production and assembly li

Shanghai to build its series of MD-80 and MD-90 pass

jets. As part of this arrangement, the Chinese purc

from McDonnell Douglas a number of large compute

numerically controlled machine tools, including mult

milling and profiling machines, that the company had 

unused in a closed aircraft plant.

23

 Boeing an

European Airbus consortium have also helped est

production facilities in China for subassemblies and 

production. In addition, Eurocopter, Sikorsky Helic

Pratt & Whitney jet engines, Bombardier of Ca

Hexcell, ATR (a Franco-Italian regional air

consortium), and Allied Signal have all established 

ventures in China for coproducing aerospace syste

components.

24

 The Cox Report also asserts that B

attempted to use a joint venture with Pratt & Wh

Canada, to help it develop a military jet engine.

25

China’s shipbuilding industry has also benefited g

from both commercialization and foreign technology in

According to Evan Medeiros, beginning in the 1

15
Chinese shipyards successfully converted much of 

production to profitable civilian products, such as 

carriers and general cargo ships. Moving into comm

shipbuilding both demanded and permitted the exte

modernization and expansion of Chinese shipyards

the past 15-20 years, these yards have added greatly to 

productive capacity, building huge dry-docks and hea

cranes. At the same time, they entered into a num

technical cooperation agreements and joint ventures 

shipbuilding firms in Japan, South Korea, Germany

other countries, providing the Chinese with adv

shipbuilding design and manufacturing technologie

particular, computer-assisted design and manufact

hull construction integration systems, propulsion sys

and numerically controlled processing and te

equipment—training, capital, and other know

Medeiros adds that commercialization and internat

ization has led to important changes in the way Ch

shipbuilding enterprises are run, resulting in a 

market-oriented and decentralized management. 

result, military shipbuilding programs collocated at 

yards theoretically should be able to take advantage of 

infrastructure and software improvements to d

develop, and construct improved warships. Some Ch

shipbuilding facilities can build ships of 150,000-20

tons—large enough to permit construction of an ai

carrier.

26

Another critical civil/commercial technology area 

far-reaching implications for spin-on is microelectr

The development of a world-class microelectronics 

has been a government industrial development sinc

early 1990s.

27

 Particular attention has been paid to cre

an indigenous semiconductor manufacturing capa

The most significant manifestation of this effort has 

the 909 Project, which entailed the establishment 

$1.2 billion Huahong Company near Shanghai—buil

technology and funding provided by Japan’s 

Corporation—which this year began producti

16
64-megabit memory chips with 0.30 micron w

Huahong-NEC is currently turning out 5,000 20

(8-inch) wafers a month, and production will eventual

to 20,000 wafers a month.

28

The United States has also been an important supp

dual-use information technologies that could be redir

towards China’s military-industrial complex, incl

computers, encryption technology, and fiber-opti

microprocessor manufacturing equipment.

29

 Than

these and other foreign investments, China is beco

increasingly proficient in the areas of telecommunica

semiconductors, software, and information-processin

of which provide China with growing opportuniti

spin-on, particularly when it comes to developing too

harnessing the information revolution in warfare.

Technology Leveraging: An Empirical Assessm

China has clearly gained access to considerable am

of militarily useful technologies and know-how. The 

step is to assess how well China’s defense industry is 

in effectively leveraging (i.e., absorbing and explo

these technologies. In this regard, at least two emp

approaches are possible. First, one can attempt to 

Chinese progress in technology absorption and lever

by examining its success in getting positive results fr

military-industrial complex in the form of new adv

weapon systems. In particular, such a “results-b

approach should look not only at what the Chines

capable of developing, but also their progress in trans

R&D developments into the timely, serial product

sophisticated weaponry. Second, at the level of arma

production, there is a growing body of anecdotal evide

permit at least a partial assessment of Chinese capab

in leveraging advanced manufacturing technol

particularly in the aviation and shipbuilding industr

Technology Leveraging at the Product Lev

“Results-Based” Analysis. China, of course, has ma

17
most significant production breakthroughs in the a

missile systems, especially surface-to-surface ba

missiles (SSMs) and antiship cruise missiles (ASCM

fact, it has become almost de rigueur to refer to C

missile industry as an “island [or pocket] of excellen

the country’s military-industrial complex. Beijin

indigenously developed a full range of surface-to-su

missiles—from short-range artillery rockets to me

range, road-mobile systems to intercontinenta

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs 

SLBMs). Moreover, China has demonstrated the abi

produce solid-fueled and/or multistage missile sys

including space-launch vehicles.

With regard to tactical missile systems, th

km-range DF-15 (M-9) and the 300 km-range DF-11 (

SSMs are perhaps the most well-known. Accordi

Wendy Frieman, the DF-15 and DF-11 mis

“represent[s] another class of weapon that China d

have in the early 1980s—solid-fuel rocket motors— la

based on indigenous R&D.”

30

 Moreover, Ch

expected to incorporate satellite-assisted navig

(probably GPS or the Russian GLONASS system) into 

missiles to improve their accuracy.

31

 Production of 

two missile systems appears to be already well-unde

Press reports indicate that the number of DF-15 and D

SSMs deployed along Taiwan Strait has grown from 

around the time of the 1995/1996 Straits crisis to 160-

early 1999, and that this figure could rise to 650 by 2

indicating the Chinese could be producing around 50-

these missiles annually.

32

Another bright spot in the country’s military-indu

complex is the antiship cruise missile sector. Again, fo

technology inputs have been critical to Chinese we

development. The Silkworm family of ASCMs, of cou

based on the Soviet SS-N-2 Styx, while the more m

C-801 and C-802 ASCMs are reportedly derived fro

French Exocet.

33

 Moreover, France reportedly supp

small turbojet engine to power the C-802.

34

 More rec

18
China has unveiled an entirely indigenous and a

ASCM: the short-range, TV-guided C-701, disp

publicly for the first time at the 1998 China Airsh

Zhuhai.

35

 China’s success with developing and prod

reasonably advanced ASCMs suggests “an abil

integrate relatively modern Western technology 

existing Chinese designs.”

36

Directly drawing upon its successes in prod

antiship cruise missiles, China is reportedly progress

the development of a land-attack cruise missile. A Ja

2000 article in Jane’s Defense Weekly asserts that C

main ASCM academies have been working 

LACM—known as the X-600 or HN-1—since the 

1970s.

37

 The missile is similar in appearance to the Ru

Kh-55/AS-15 strategic cruise missile, although w

shorter range (600 kilometers), fueling speculation th

X-600 could be a derivative of the Kh-65 missile (it

short-range version of the Kh-55), which Russi

reportedly transferred to China.

38

Jane’s states th

X-600/HN-1 entered service with the PLA in 1992, bu

has not been confirmed officially. At the very least, how

China could deploy a rudimentary land-attack c

missile by the middle of the next decade.

39

Other areas of missile development and produ

where China is apparently demonstrating some succ

exploiting imported technologies are air-t

missiles—such as the PL-9 (a modified Python-3) a

PL-7 (believed to be a reverse-engineered versio

French-designed R550 Magic AAM

40

)—and surface

systems—such as the QW-1 shoulder-launched SAM (

reportedly incorporates Stinger technology

41

), an

FM-90 SAM (an upgraded version of Crotale-d

FM-80, featuring a faster missile and a longer range

A few other sectors outside of the missile industr

show promise. One of these is the diesel submarine 

shipbuilding industry: China has developed a m

indigenous SSK—the Song-class—featuring a 

19
hydrodynamically efficient design and an asymme

seven-bladed propeller, for quieter running.

43

With regard to other programs, however—espe

combat aircraft, surface combatants, and gr

equipment—the Chinese would still appear to con

severe problems when it comes to moving prototype

production. These difficulties, in turn, would su

continuing problems with mastering the m

technologies that go into such military equipment

indicator is the long development times and pro

slippage that many weapons experience before f

entering production—a problem the Chinese re

concede.

44

 The JH-7 fighter-bomber, for example

initiated over 20 years ago and first flew in the late 1

however, it did not enter even low-rate production 

1997 or 1998.

45

 The J-10 fighter did not fly until 

1998—nearly 15 years after its program start.

46

 Acc

to open sources, the J-10 is unlikely to enter produ

before the middle of the next decade—approximate

years after the program began!

47

After the Chinese begin building a weapon sy

production runs are often small and fitful. Accord

estimates made by PLAAF analyst Ken Allen, the Ch

are probably manufacturing only around 36 fighter ai

a year—12 J-8IIs and 24 J-7s.

48

 In addition, alt

Beijing acquired a license in the early 1980s to produ

French-designed AS-365N utility helicopter (called th

in China), the Chinese have reportedly built no more 

50 to 80 Z-9s over the past two decades—and in sp

batches, at that.

49

 With regard to naval shipbuilding

1991 China has launched only three destroyers and 

frigates—barely 1.5 major surface combatants per y

Production of the Song-class submarine has been e

sporadic, with only one boat commissioned so far (in 

after being launched in 1994). As a result, the Ch

continue to produce the near-obsolete Ming

submarine (a copy of the Soviet Romeo design, dating 

the late 1950s).

51

20
These program stretchouts and small production 

are all the more significant given that much of wha

Chinese are currently building is not particu

cutting-edge. The J-7 (MiG-21) fighter is essentiall

1960s/early 1970s technology, while the J-8II is ro

equivalent to a late-generation F-4 fighter (approxim

late 1970s technology). China’s 20-year teething pro

with the JH-7 fighter-bomber involve an aircraft of r

unremarkable design—i.e., no fly-by-wire flight c

system or exotic materials in its construction. Eve

J-10—admittedly, a full-up fourth-generation fight

basically 1980s technology that will not be deployed 

around 2005.

52

 For its part, the first Song-class 

submarine has been described as a “patchwork of sy

and technologies,” “very noisy with a lot of equip

problems,” and “effectively shown to be a failure.”

53

Even the defense industry’s “island of excellence

shown some less-than-impressive results. Many of C

newest missile systems remain at least one o

generations behind that of the West—basically compa

to 1960s- or 1970s-era technology—such as the 

antitank guided weapon (reportedly derived from 

Soviet-designed AT-4 Spigot), the PL-11 semi-

radar-homing AAM (based on the Italian Aspide), an

the C-802 ASCM (roughly equivalent to the 1970

Exocet).

54

 And even if China were to field a fully 

radar-homing (ARH) AAM by 2005, it would still be n

25 years after the United States first began product

the AMRAAM missile; moreover, most Western natio

already working on the next generation of ARH A

employing ramjet propulsion and improved s

technologies. Finally, it says much about the likely 

capabilities of two highly touted (and widely mark

Chinese ASCMs—the supersonic C-101 and C

missiles—that no military—not even the PLA

purchased these weapons.

Oft times, too, “progress” turns out to be superfic

illusory. While China is clearly advancing its space-

21
capabilities for reconnaissance, communication

navigation, it is still years away from acquiring e

rudimentary military capability. The first China-

Earth Reconnaissance Satellite (CBERS), launch

October 1999, has only a 20-meter resolution (compa

one meter or less found on most military reconnais

satellites), while it and other planned Chinese e

observation satellites will continue to lack real

surveillance or quick revisit capabilities. Meanw

China’s efforts to expand its microelectronics ind

continue to suffer setbacks. In particular, semicond

produced at its showcase Project 909/Huahong-NEC fa

in Shanghai experienced a 50 percent failure rate in it

year of operation, and sales have been poor.

55

Moreover, despite years of arduous R&D efforts, C

defense industry continues to rely heavily—and pe

increasingly—upon foreign technologies. These de

encies are especially acute when it comes to jet en

marine diesel engines, and fire-control radar and 

avionics. The J-10 fighter, for example, is repo

powered by the Russian-built AL-31F engine, which i

used in the Su-27.

56

 At the same time, endemic “tec

difficulties” surrounding the JH-7 fighter-bom

indigenous engine have resulted in significant pro

delays and ultimately forced the Chinese to approac

British about buying additional Speys in order to con

aircraft production.

57

 The new Song-class submarine 

German-supplied diesel engine,

58

 while both the Min

Han-class submarines reportedly have been upgraded 

a French sonar and combat system.

59

 China’s 

Luhai-class destroyer incorporates a number of fo

supplied systems, including a Ukrainian gas tu

engine, a German electrical system, Italian torpedoe

Russian helicopters.

60

 Finally, the Chinese have 

develop an indigenous turbine engine transmi

(considered only “mid-level” technology) for its arm

vehicles; consequently, they have turned to the Euro

for help.

61

22
To an extent, it makes sense for Beijing to i

advanced technologies, rather than waste time 

resources duplicating the same capabilities indigenou

addition, by integrating these technologies into dom

systems, the Chinese are demonstrating some capabi

leverage foreign technologies. Nevertheless, a gr

dependency on imported systems and technologies is 

strong indicator of likely deficiencies within the cou

military-industrial complex. For example, China’s cu

export-oriented fighter programs—the FC-1 an

J-8IIM—respectively incorporate a West Europe

Russian radar and avionics suite; in addition, the F

powered by a Russian engine. Finally, the PLA’s pen

for off-the-shelf arms imports could be interpreted 

indicator of growing frustration on the part of the Ch

military with the defense industry’s inability or de

development and producing advanced weapon system

PLA, for example, has recently concluded a numb

foreign weapons buys, including purchases of 

fighter-bombers, medium-range SA-15 SAMs, Sovrem

class destroyers, and Israeli AWACs systems, in addit

the recent startup of Su-27 licensed-production.

62

Reverse-engineering has its own limitations: Whi

Chinese often have been able to “indigenize” several ty

foreign missile systems, they have had much less su

with fighter aircraft (such as the MiG-23

63

), helic

(such as the French SA-321G Super Frelon heli

[Z-8]

64

), or jet engines (such as the Spey, which powe

new JH-7 fighter-bomber

65

). In other cases, the Ch

must turn to the original manufacturer for cr

components in order to successfully produce the c

system. Larry Wortzel, for example, points out that B

reverse-engineered the U.S.-designed AN/TP

artillery-locating radar, which China produces a

Type-704; at the same time, the Chinese have attemp

order a large number of spare parts for the AN/TP

indicating an inability to copy these components.

66

when successful, reverse engineering is often a time

23
resource-consuming chore—sometimes to the po

starving other, more cutting-edge R&D. As a result, b

time the Chinese have perfected a reverse-engin

system, the “state-of-the-art” has progressed to the 

level, leaving the PLA with to a weapon that, althou

improvement to its current arsenal, does little to narro

technological gap with its competitors.

67

Technology Leveraging at the Level of Arms Produ

The Anecdotal Evidence. Besides problems with techn

leveraging at the product level, large parts of China’s 

industry are experiencing frustrations with lever

advanced manufacturing technologies at the lev

armaments production. In the case of the av

industry, deficiencies in aircraft design capabi

metallurgy, avionics, and engine technology “have 

common and have prevented mass production.”

68

 Acc

to a U.S. aviation industry representative, Chinese ai

factories were “less than optimum for the tas

cooperative manufacturing.

69

 Jonathan Pollack and J

Mulvenon argue that the Chinese aviation industry, 

able to perform most of the tasks necessary to the ass

of large commercial aircraft, was still deficient in se

areas of aircraft design, development, and production

while their assessments were largely directed at C

civil aircraft sector, these points appear applica

China’s advanced military aircraft programs as well.

The Chinese are already experiencing problem

delays with their Su-27 co-production program—

though it currently entails the relatively simple ta

assembling knock-down kits imported from Russia. 

the first two locally assembled Su-27 fighters achieve

flight in December 1998, press reports indicate tha

aircraft immediately had to be taken apart and rebui

to “sub-standard work.” This same report states that, 

problems with absorbing advanced manufact

technologies and processes, it will be at least 2 years 

the Chinese aircraft factory building the Su-27 will 

full-rate production; as a result, China will be a

24
produce only six or seven Su-27s annually over the n

years.

71

 Consequently, at least 100 Russians will re

on-site at the Su-27 plant to oversee production 

guarantee quality control.

72

Even China’s shipbuilding industry, after nea

decades of modernization and expansion, is hardly 

globally competitive level, technologically spea

According to a Chinese study of its shipbuilding ind

while most advanced shipbuilding countries are at a le

integrated hull construction and outfitting, uti

equipment- and information-intensive modular produ

techniques (Grade 4 capabilities) and are moving to

Grade 5 capabilities (“agile shipbuilding”), Ch

shipyards are largely stuck at Grade 2 (basic 

construction and pre-outfitting of metal ships), m

toward Grade 3 capabilities (limited modular constru

involving hull block construction and zone outfitt

Chinese yards still make only limited use of comput

ship design and for nesting, interference checking

outfitting; consequently Chinese shipbuilders spend 

as long on design efforts as in the West. In gene

Chinese shipyard takes two to six times longer 

advanced shipbuilding countries to construct a compa

ship. In addition, Chinese yards are deficient in se

areas of ship construction, including mechanizatio

advanced welding technologies.

74

In fact, the acquisition of advanced manufact

technologies does not guarantee that they will be exp

to their full potential. For example, while the Chinese 

invested heavily in acquiring sophisticated, numer

controlled and multiaxis machine tools, they are 

underutilized. According to Pollack and Mulvenon, 

large pieces of equipment—such as five-axis m

machines, stretchform presses, and autoclaves—are u

infrequently as to hardly justify their maintenance co

An eyewitness account of a visit to a Chinese arm

vehicle factory mentioned an instance of workers m

25
engine parts by hand, even as several multi-axis ma

tools lay fallow.

76

At the same time, much of the Chinese defense ind

continues to labor, with little success, to overcom

long-standing problems with quality control.

77

 Accord

representatives of Western companies involved in 

ventures with the Chinese, quality assurance is still 

much an “alien concept” to the Chinese.

78

 Aviation fac

are frequently described as dirty, poorly lit, heate

cooled, and generally disorganized.

79

 Documentatio

standardization—critical elements of quality assura

are often lacking in aircraft production.

80

 Withi

shipbuilding industry, Chinese surface combatants 

“poor welding with signs of premature failure, inope

equipment, and overall poor hull workmanship.”

8

Luhu-class destroyer contains limited damage-co

facilities and basic design flaws in the weapons c

room, exacerbated by poor construction.

82

 Chinese

frigates delivered to Thailand in the early 1990s fea

hulls that buckled after firing trials of their on-board 5

gun, compartments without access, and doors and la

that led nowhere;

83

 in fact, upon arrival these ships 

be put into dry-dock for repairs and to improve 

damage-control capabilities.

84

It would also appear that commercial-to-mi

spin-on is considerably less than meets the eye. Accord

Wendy Frieman, despite years of official support of du

technology development, there is still little direct evi

of strong links between commercial S&T breakthr

and the defense industrial base; in addition, it appear

the best people are not being diverted to mi

production, nor are current commercial techn

acquisition efforts being executed so that the de

industry can benefit.

85

 Most of the modern ship

aircraft plants, ground vehicle factories, and perhaps 

missile facilities (i.e., those involved in bui

space-launch vehicles) appear to do little, if any, mi

production.

26
In addition, with few exceptions, spin-on is not a s

matter of “plug and play.” In certain areas—partic

communications and information networking—the mi

can rather easily piggyback off of commercial off-the

technologies (COTS). However, for most other 

cations—such as sensors, electronic warfare, and navig

guidance—it can require a considerable systems integ

effort to adapt a piece of commercial technology to m

use.

86

With regard to spin-on in the shipbuilding ind

Evan Medeiros has stated that “the conversion proce

had little impact on improving China’s ability to pr

modern warships equipped with advanced n

technologies.”

87

 He adds that the opportunities for d

spin-on of civilian design and construction are limite

shipbuilding industry’s low technology base, 

sufficient for cargo ship construction, offers 

value-added to warship production. In particular, adv

naval designs require technologies and expertise, su

damage control and survivability, not accessible th

civilian products.

88

 These limitations, Medeiros a

“will persist for years.”

89

Just as important, while defense conversion may l

the acquisition of technologies that could be redi

toward military uses, the conversion process often act

distraction from defense production. China’s ship

have become so successful at commercial production 

warship construction (measured in gross tonnage) 

more than perhaps 5 percent of all shipbuilding produ

sector output. As a result, low-profit naval construct

likely finding it increasingly difficult to compete wit

more lucrative, export-oriented commercial shipbu

sector.

90

 It is likely that aircraft factories that 

converted to civil aviation or ground ordnance plant

now build automobiles and motorcycles—especially fo

joint ventures that earn these enterprises hard curre

may also oppose efforts to divert assets to mi

production.

27
Finally, there is no assurance that defense conv

will even be a successful medium for spinning-on adv

technologies into China’s commercial industrial bas

alone the country’s military-industrial complex. In a 

of 1,000 cases of civilian technology transfer to Chin

example, only 200 came to any fruition; and of these

half (100 cases) were deemed successful.

91

Impediments to Technology Absorption

and Exploitation.

All in all, China has experienced considerabl

enduring problems “translating theory and design 

reliable weapon systems.”

92

 Several factors contrib

the problems that the Chinese defense industry faces 

it comes to expanding its ability to absorb and leverag

advanced technologies for armaments production. 

barriers can essentially be broken down into three gr

technical, structural, and cultural.

Technical Deficiencies. China’s defense industria

lacks many of the basic technical skills necessary to 

exploit acquired technologies. One of the most criti

these is the defense industry’s apparently enduring 

systems integration capabilities—the abil

envision, design, and develop a finished weapon syste

of hundreds or even thousands of disparate componen

subsystems and get it to function to its fullest potentia

single unit. According to a U.S. aviation ind

representative, the Chinese “are especially deficie

systems integration” when it comes to air

manufacturing; he adds that “Chinese engineer

technicians are normally grounded in the basic discipl

aircraft production], however, practical applica

manufacturing technologies, and overall experience 

short supply.”

93

 Pollack and Mulvenon assert that w

comes to the systems integration and engineering pr

“the Chinese do not have a master plan that builds ai

from the bottom up. Instead, they try to take parts o

28
shelf that were never designed to be part of any part

end product and try to make them fit.”

94

 Even th

Report concedes that China “lacks the ability to inte

the contributions of many disciplines that are requi

utilize the rapidly emerging new technologies. The 

system is unable to keep up with these basically 

approaches.”

95

Ironically, some of this deficiency in sys

integration/systems engineering on the part of the Ch

arms industry appears to be related to its “excessive 

on technology acquisition over technology absor

According to Mark Stokes, Chinese defense enter

have traditionally purchased foreign equipment “w

much thought as to how to integrate various compon

into a single, workable system.

96

 As such, arms prod

may acquire the “know-how” but not necessaril

“know-why” of advanced weapons developmen

manufacturing.

97

 As one European aviation ind

representative put it, “Technology transfer is not an 

it is a process.”

98

Closely linked to the problem of poor systems integ

and systems engineering skills is limited work

expertise on the part of industry. According to one We

analyst, the Chinese traditionally have paid insuff

attention to training and workforce development.

99

 H

advanced machine tools often go underused (or 

unused), due to a lack of skilled operators.

100

 In ad

factories often have so little actual contract work that 

skilled workers gain only very limited experience 

advanced manufacturing techniques; at the same 

many young bright and enthusiastic engineers 

technicians have limited opportunities to apply 

knowledge to actual programs.

101

 For their 

state-owned enterprises (SOE) executives typically la

managerial and entrepreneurial skills and exper

necessary to make market-oriented investmen

production decisions.

102

29
Structural Impediments. Another factor impedin

Chinese defense industry’s ability to absorb and explo

technologies is overcapacity. Quite simply, the co

possesses too many workers, too many factories, an

much productive capacity for what few weapons it prod

resulting in redundancy and duplication of effort, ineff

production, and wasted resources.

103

 For example, 

Chinese aircraft production is estimated to require 

about 200,000 workers, the aviation industry posse

workforce nearly three times as large.

104

 Withi

shipbuilding industry, output is only 17 tons per perso

year; in a comparable shipyard in a more advanced cou

this figure is 700 tons per person per year.

105

 And whi

sector has enjoyed considerable commercial and fin

success, it is beginning to fall victim to the consequen

rapid and uncoordinated overexpansion: as new ship o

have dropped and production has stagnated, yard

underbidding each other in an effort to win new contra

Nevertheless, China continues to add new dry-d

heavy-lift cranes, and even a whole new shipbu

facility (the ultra-modern Waigaoqiao yard, near Sha

due to open by 2000), which will nearly double the cou

current shipbuilding capacity.

This overcapacity is exacerbated by an endemic la

sufficient capital. The government often does not 

enough money to put prototype projects into 

production.

107

 In addition, most defense enterprise

starved of funds to underwrite plant modernization a

retain skilled workers; a newly hired university gra

entering the aviation industry, for example, earns less 

500 yuan a month—much less than he or she can 

working in the coastal cities or for a foreign-run 

venture.

108

 Low salaries are partly the reason for the e

of skilled workers from China’s new semi-conductor pl

Huahong.

109

 Moreover, at least 70 percent of C

state-owned enterprises are operating at a loss—an

arms industries reportedly are among bi

money-losers.

110

 As a result, most SOEs are burdened 

30
considerable debt, much of which is triangular—th

money owed to them by other unprofitable SOE

therefore nearly uncollectable.

111

 At the same time

SOEs are still saddled with their danwei (work 

obligations to pay for their workers’ housing, health 

childcare, and retirement.

112

The highly compartmentalized, verti

integrated, and secretive nature of the Chinese 

industry makes it difficult for arms producers to d

advanced technologies, share learning experiences

collaborate on advanced weapons projects.

113

 Accord

Pollack and Mulvenon, Chinese aviation enterp

typically find it difficult to communicate with each 

horizontally, hampering “effective coordination;” 

result, firms will often not share information, even on 

programs.

114

 This “stovepiping” has exacerbated the e

competitiveness and redundancy in manufact

capability, since each defense enterprise often tries to 

all,” resulting in its acquisition of expensive machine 

that it then hardly uses (instead of subcontracting the 

out to another firm).

115

 Compartmentalization, 

interfirm linkages, and the lack of financial compens

particularly affects dialogue and exchange betwee

R&D institutes which design the weapons and the 

factories that produce these systems and keep a

profits. This process often results, according to one Ch

observer, in poor morale and motivation, the loss of tal

workers, program delays, and poor quality assurance 

part of the design institutes, who “bear the heavy bur

continually breaking new ground but have nothing 

with the subsequent harvest.”

116

 Lines of communi

between consumers of armaments (the PLA) and sup

(the defense industry) are equally poor.

117

Cultural Impediments . Finally, the he

centralized, hierarchical, bureaucratic, and 

averse corporate culture typically found withi

defense industry makes it difficult to extract gr

benefits from technology acquisitions.

118

 In their 

31
study on Chinese capacities for innovation, Yuko Ara

and Panos Mourdoukoutas assert that “Chinese man

do not have either the will, the expertise, or the freed

take the risks and make the adjustment associated 

innovations.”

119

 Production management is often h

centralized and “personality-centric,” with most c

project decisions being made by a single chief engine

the same time, lower-level managers “tend to be confo

adhering to standard rules and procedures rather th

personal judgments based on their profess

experiences.”

120

 Hence, they are usually reluctant to 

their own to deal with problems that might arise o

factory floor, inhibiting innovation and experimentat

For example, Chinese technicians in the aviation ind

lack practical experience in handling modern techn

because of their “hesitancy of making a mistake 

failing.”

122

The “SOE mindset” within the defense industry 

undermines competitiveness and rationalization of 

production. For example, senior executives in C

military-industrial complex will often award contra

order to preserve jobs and keep factories open, rather 

on the basis of merit and competency.

123

 For its pa

central government has traditionally been forgiving 

performance within the SOE sector.

124

Larry Wortzel, citing a U.S. aerospace ind

representative, perhaps best sums up the impedime

innovation and technology exploitation arising from 

defense industry’s corporate culture:

Part of the problem with Chinese [aircraft] manufacturing . 

that industrial management in China still relies on 19

Soviet styles. This involves “batch-building” a full orde

aircraft in advance based on state-planned and dictated or

for parts and materials. As a consequence of this system, th

are no direct lines of accountability for quality control, and 

cost-cutting discussions or steps available to mid-le

management. There is no competitive bidding for contra

workers are redundant, and schedules continually slip beca

32
state planning doesn’t have a fixed required-delivery date 

products . . . Young managers stay risk-averse and a

reluctant to change or improve the system.

125

Reforming the Defense Industry: Reorganizati

Restructuring, and Rationalization.

China’s current system, according to Arayama 

Mourdoukoutas, “has yet to develop the entreprene

managerial, and governmental regimes needed to m

foreign technology and turn it into innovations that l

sustainable competitive advantages.”

126

 The w

although aimed at the country’s technologica

industrial base in general, ring particularly true for C

defense industry. To be fair, the Chinese are cer

aware of the deficiencies in their defense industry an

undertaking efforts to improve their defense R&D 

production processes. The current reform initiatives 

their origins in the Fifteenth Communist Party Con

held in September 1997 and in legislation approved b

Ninth National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 

The 1997 Party Congress laid out a radical agend

restructuring and downsizing the SOE sector (includ

course, the defense industries) and for opening up SO

free-market forces—i.e., supply-and-demand dyna

competition, and fiscal responsibility. The 1998 

refined this agenda by announcing plans to reorgani

government’s defense industry oversight and co

apparatus and establish new defense enterprise grou

the same time, the NPC established a 3-year timetab

full implementation of these reforms.

127

Reorganization. One of the most important acti

come out of the 1998 NPC was the dissolution of th

COSTIND. COSTIND was created in 1982 to cen

manage the process of research, development, testing

production in the Chinese defense industry. In addit

was intended to act as a bridge between the PLA an

civilian defense industries in order to ensure that the 

of the “consumer” were being heard and heeded; as 

33
COSTIND was partly staffed by the military and head

a PLA general. The self-evident failure of this organiz

however, led to the spin-off of the military half of COS

into a new PLA General Armaments Department (

and the creation of a “new,” civilian-only COSTIND

GAD will act as the purchasing agent for the 

overseeing defense procurement and watchdogging 

weapons programs. Meanwhile, the new COSTIND 

oversee defense-related S&T research, direct military 

and production, and formulate and implement de

industry reform plans.

128

Restructuring. Another key element of current de

reforms is the creation of ten new defense ind

enterprise groups (see Table 1).

129

 These enterprise g

replace the five old administerial-level pse

corporations—such as the Aviation Industries of 

(AVIC), the China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), an

China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO)—

were essentially ministerial-level bodies dir

answerable to the State Council. These new de

enterprises will be established as “genuine conglomer

integrating research, production, and marketing.

130

 

same time, the government role in the daily operati

the defense industry will be greatly reduced,

131

 and 

new enterprise groups will have the authority to m

their own operations as well as the responsibility for 

own profits and losses.

132

 Current reforms incl

significant downsizing of the defense industrial 

including worker layoffs and factory mergers 

closures.

133

 Both AVIC and the China State Shipbu

Corporation (CSSC), for example, have announced pl

eliminate roughly one-third of their workforce by late 

NORINCO and the China National Nuclear Corpo

(CNNC) have detailed lesser (although pro

preliminary) layoffs in their industries (see Table 2)

the same time, rationalization of the defense industr

likely include some factory closures as a result of go

ment-encouraged mergers, as part of the po

34
enunciated at the 15th Party Congress in Septe

1997—of “letting the strong annex the weak.”

135

Defense Industry Reforms: Old Wine in New

Bottles, or Rearranging the Deck Chairs

on the Titanic?

So far, however, these reforms have been la

disappointing. For one thing, if the intention of cre

these new industrial enterprise groups was to inject g

35

Old Corporate Entity New Enterprise Group Major Products

Aviation Industries of China

(AVIC)

China Aviation Industry

Corp. I

Fighter aircraft, bom

transports, advanced

trainers, commercial

airliners

China Aviation Industry

Corp. II

Helicopters, attack a

light trainers, UAVs

China Aerospace Corp.

(CASC)

China Aerospace Science &

Technology Corp.

Space launch vehicle

satellites, missiles

China Aerospace Machinery

& Electronics Corp.

Missiles, electronics, 

equipment

China Ordnance Industry

Corp. (COIC)/NORINCO

China North Industries

Group Corp.

Tanks, armored vehi

artillery, ordnance

China South Industries

Group Corp.

Miscellaneous ordnan

automobiles, motorcy

China State Shipbuilding

Corp. (CSSC)

China State Shipbuilding

Corp. (Southern shipyards,

based in Shanghai)

Frigates, smaller sur

combatants, commer

ships

China State Shipbuilding

Industry Corp. (Northern

shipyards, based in Dalian)

Destroyers, commerc

China National Nuclear Corp

(CNNC)

China National Nuclear

Corp.

Nuclear energy devel

nuclear fuel and equi

China Nuclear Engineering

& Construction Group Corp.

Construction of nucle

power plants, other h

construction

Sources: China Daily, January 31, 1999; China Daily, February 5, 1999; Do

International News Service, March 23, 1999; China Daily Business 

Supplement, May 9, 1999; China Space News, May 26, 1999; AFP, May 27

Xinhua, May 28, 1999; China Daily, July 2, 1999; China Aero Information, 

1999; NORINCO website (www.norincogroup.com.cn); private conversatio

Harlan Jencks and Mark Stokes.

Table 1. China Defense Industry Restructuring, 1
competition into China’s military-industrial complex

therefore spur innovation and greater responsiven

customer, i.e., PLA, demands—then these restructuring 

have largely been a failure. At one time, it was expected th

Chinese would create large trans-sectoral, cross-com

defense conglomerates, similar to the South Korean ch

or, more specifically, to horizontally integrated de

companies like Lockheed Martin or British Aerospace.

13

a strategy would have entailed a much more compl

restructuring of the defense industry, crafting ente

groups that would have competed with each other to pro

broad array of weaponry. Instead, all Beijing did was bre

each of its former defense corporations into two new group

Even then, with few exceptions these new enterprise g

do not compete with each other directly. Of the tw

corporations replacing AVIC, for example, all fighter a

and commercial jetliner production will be concentrated w

one enterprise group, while all helicopter production w

centered in the other.

138

 The nuclear industry will be sp

separate enterprises for either construction or nuclear e

development.

139

 NORINCO appears to be subdivided in

enterprise group mostly concerned with building 

armored vehicles, and other ground ordnance, whi

other has been almost entirely civilianized, specializ

36

Current Corporate

Entity

Estimated Workforce,

1997

Projected Lay

1998-2000

AVIC 560,000 150,000-200,000

CASC 270,000 None Accounced

NORINCO 800,000 90,000*

CSSC 270,000 60,000-120,000

CNNC 280,000 30,000*

* announced so far; further layoffs aniticpated

Sources: Harlan Jencks, COSTIND is Dead, Long Live COSTIND!; CNNC br

Airshow China ‘96 website; China Daily, October 3, 1997; China Daily B

Weekly Supplement, December 7, 1997; Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong), Decem

1997; Xinhua, January 7, 1998; Journal of Commerce, December 19, 1998.

Table 2. Projected Layoffs in the Chinese Defense Indu
automobile and motorcycle production.

140

 Even 

shipbuilding will see little direct competition betwee

two new corporations replacing the old CSSC: the 

northern group will build destroyers, while the sou

group will concentrate on frigates.

141

 In fact, the C

appear to have intended that the new defense industri

vie directly with each other. For example, the two ente

groups arising out of the CASC breakup “will not comp

terms of products,” but rather, “in terms of their syste

organization and their operational mechanisms.”

addition, the new aviation groups were purposely “d

into conglomerates with different responsibilities.”

14

Rationalization of the defense industry has also 

much slower than expected. AVIC, for example

expected to lay off 60,000 workers in 1998; in reality

34,000 workers were let go.

144

 At the same time, m

these layoffs have been illusory—often, displaced wo

are transferred to “alternative” employment withi

same corporation or other SOEs are forced to accept 

or they are simply paid to stay home.

145

 At the same 

there have been no public announcements of any de

factories being closed or merged. In fact, it is increa

likely—particularly as the Chinese economy continu

perform poorly—that the 3-year timetable fo

implementation of these reforms will slip by several 

and that many of the more drastic aspects of SOE r

(i.e., workforce layoffs and enterprise bankruptcies) w

mitigated for the sake of social stability.

146

It is unclear how independent these new de

enterprises will be of government control or how respo

they will ultimately be for their own financial well-

According to one Chinese publication, the two new av

enterprise groups remain under the “direct leadership 

central government,” and will be “operated as state ho

companies.”

147

 Beijing has made it clear from the begi

of the reform effort that arms production is a str

industry too critical to national security to be privatiz

The central government will keep the new de

37
enterprises under much stricter supervision than 

types of reformed SOEs; these same rules, however, w

favor of the arms industries: Beijing will be pressu

continue subsidizing them in order to preserve key 

programs.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the r

initiatives announced so far do not directly address m

the impediments affecting technology absorption 

leveraging—that is, the defense industry’s weak sy

integration/systems engineering capabilities, the dea

workforce expertise, compartmentalization and r

dancy, and corporate culture. As a result, it is doubtfu

these reforms as they currently stand will go very 

injecting market forces that would, in turn, drive innov

and technology exploitation. Indeed, despite cu

defense industry restructuring, Beijing has already 

for additional initiatives to “introduce administrativ

management reforms to meet the demands of the so

market economy.”

149

Conclusions.

China’s military-industrial complex arguably has 

some impressive gains when it comes to producing h

capable weapon systems. Beijing has a proven track r

in the area of reasonably sophisticated tactical m

systems, particularly with regard to ballistic and an

cruise missiles, and, to a lesser extent, surface-

missiles. From this, one could infer that China’s m

industry does not suffer as much from the ki

deficiencies—weak systems integration skills, overc

ity, corporate culture, etc.—that retard techn

absorption and exploitation in other defense indu

sectors. (It is perhaps revealing that, of all the de

sectors, only the missile industry has not announce

plans to lay off workers.) The shipbuilding industr

demonstrated some success in leveraging comm

technologies, particularly “soft” technologies like We

38
management techniques.

150

 The military is almost cer

benefiting from the acquisition of dual-use technolog

such areas as telecommunications and informa

processing, including fiber optics, cellular and wi

communications, computers, and the Internet. And d

delays, the country is progressing in the developmen

modern, fourth-generation fighter aircraft.

One also should not rule out the potential long

impact of direct foreign assistance on Chinese capab

to leverage advanced technologies. In particular

presence and involvement of Russian and Israeli ad

and technicians in Chinese arms factories and o

weapons programs have considerable potential to a

Chinese in overcoming long-standing deficiencies in 

areas as design, engineering, and systems integrati

addition, the growing use of foreign military technol

through licensing and other types of technology tra

offers considerable potential for advancing Chinese 

production. According to Arayama and Mourdouk

given China’s poor capacities for innovation, “the 

rational choice for Chinese managers is imitation . . . t

mass production of products invented and inno

elsewhere around the globe.”

151

At the same time, this progress must be qualifie

one thing, much of success within the missile sec

directly due to the fact that it, along with nuclear we

and satellites, has been a national priority since th

1950s.

152

 As a result, the missile industry has bee

beneficiary of considerable high-level support—in ter

both money and manpower—held constant over se

decades; for example, two recent directors of COSTI

Ding Henggao and Cao Gangchuan (who currently 

the GAD)—are both graduates of Russian m

academies.

153

 Given its limited resources, it will be di

for Beijing give equal time and attention to many 

weapons programs.

39
Secondly, Chinese success in missile development 

be a result of the fact that it is technologically n

challenging as other types of weapon systems. M

production is not exactly rocket science any mo

requires the mastery of a relative handful of techno

that, although not easy to master, are nonetheless m

and increasingly proliferated: aerostructures, propu

guidance, and warhead (witness the fact that at le

dozen other developing countries have also developed 

own ballistic missile systems

154

). Missile systems d

require the more complicated technologies typically 

in combat aircraft, armored vehicles, and warships, su

life-support systems, communications and inform

processing, self-defense and damage control, lon

propulsion, and exotic materials. As a result, m

systems may be less a pocket of excellence than an “isl

adequacy” surrounded by a sea of mediocrity.

155

With regard to other defense sectors, Chinese pro

in technology leveraging will continue to be less 

optimal, resulting in a haphazard, piecemeal

drawn-out military modernization process. At pr

China’s defense industry is still ill- suited to takin

advantage of many military, dual-use, and produ

related technologies being made available to it. At the 

time, current efforts to improve the environmen

technology leveraging are inadequate. In short, the de

industry is broken, and the Chinese are not fixi

Barring dramatic reforms, the future of Ch

military-industrial complex will most likely resemb

present: a handful of promising technology developm

impeded by delays, small and fitful production runs, 

steep learning curve. As a result, while China 

experience some modest absolute gains in mi

capabilities, it appears to be achieving little by w

relative gains—that is, closing gaps in its military-tech

position vis-à-vis its likely regional competitors, wh

likewise striving to add new high-tech capabilities to 

defense postures.

156

40
Admittedly, adequacy may be sufficient for Ch

extract an impressive degree of asymmetric m

capability from its missile industry. Beijing can 

probably will attempt to leverage militarily its streng

missile technology and production to compensa

weaknesses elsewhere. Nevertheless, a reaso

proficient missile industry is hardly an indicator 

overall advancing defense industrial base. Missiles ca

add so much to Chinese military capabilities, and in 

other areas—especially aviation, surface ships, and g

equipment—the PLA is still not getting much bang 

buck. Even in the missile sector, there remains conside

uncertainty as to its ability to extract much mi

capability from current technical inputs—particu

when it comes to radar-guided air-to-air mis

land-attack cruise missiles, and other air-to-su

precision-guided missiles (PGMs).

This is not to say that China does not or c

constitute a significant military challenge to the r

Even if perhaps 90 percent of the PLA remains a “jun

army,” size still matters, and the sheer mass of brute fo

something Beijing still has in abundance. A large, rela

backwards armed force, combined with a limited num

indigenous military-technological breakthroughs an

particular, a few well-targeted arms imports, can stil

a significant impact on the balance of power in East 

Nevertheless, if China succeeds in becoming a 

conventional military power, it will more likely be in s

its defense industry than because of it.

CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES

1. The author is grateful to several China security and 

industry experts who, in private discussions, e-mail, and oth

have offered considerable insights and commentary on Chinese 

industrial modernization efforts, in particular, Dennis Blasko, S

Arthur Ding, John Frankenstein, Bates Gill, Harlan Jencks

Medeiros, James Mulvenon, and Larry Wortzel.

41
2. In particular, see Mark A. Stokes, China’s St

Modernization: Implications for U.S. National Security, Carli

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Septembe

3. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Controlling the 

of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles, Marina Del Rey, CA: Am

Institute for Strategic Cooperation, January 1995, pp. 22, 25, 

David Fulgham, “Cheap Cruise Missiles a Potent New Threat,” A

Week & Space Technology, September 6, 1993, pp. 54-55; John J. 

“Poor Man’s Cruise,” Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1993, p. 1

Raghuvanshi, “India Adds Stealth to Top Fighters,” Defense 

October 23, 1995, pp. 1, 44; Shirley Kan, China: Ballistic and 

Missiles (CRS), p. 18; U.S. Department of Defense, Report to C

Pursuant to the FY 99 National Defense Authorization Act; 

Missile Makers Proliferate,” Flight International, July 28, 1999

4. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Purs

Section 1305 of the FY 97 National Defense Authorization Act; W

“Chinese Military Aviation” (http://www.fortunecity.com/tat

vonnegut/172/gallery.com); Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 2

David Silverberg, “Emerging Nations Hunger for Precision We

Defense News, February 8, 1993, pp. 9, 44.

5. “Beijing Develops New Radar-Absorbing Materials,” 

Defense Weekly, February 24, 1999; Fulgham, “Cheap Cruise M

Potent New Threat,” p. 55.

6. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 14-19, 1

“Panel Says Spying Aided Conventional Weaponry,” Aviation 

Space Technology, May 31, 1999.

7. Cox Report, part 2 (Internet version).

8. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 42-51; Solo

Karmel, “The Maoist Drag on China’s Military,” Orbis, Summe

pp. 378-379.

9. Richard Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition an

Modernization: Appendix,” in James R. Lilley and David Sham

eds., China’s Military Faces the Future, Armonk, NY: M.E. 

1999.

10. Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisition

Abroad: A Quest for “Superb and Secret Weapons,” Oxford: 

University Press, 1995.

42
11. Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modern

Appendix,” pp. 131-135; Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernizat

79-86; Duncan Lennox, “China’s New Cruise Missile Program 

Ahead,’” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 12, 2000, p. 12; “Cont

the Aerospace and Military-Technical Sphere Between Russia 

PRC,” Yadernyy Kontrol, Moscow, July-August 1998, transla

reprinted in FBIS, September 23, 1998; Fulgham, “Cheap 

Missiles a Potent New Threat,” p. 55.

12. Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modern

Appendix,” pp. 135-137.

13. Ibid., p. 140.

14. Ibid., pp. 140-143; “Contracts in the Aerospace and M

Technical Sphere Between Russia and the PRC.”

15. “Russia, China Military Cooperation Viewed,” ITAR

Moscow, August 25, 1999, translated and reprinted in FBIS, Au

1999; Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modern

Appendix,” pp. 144-146, 149-151; “China-Assembled Su-27s Mak

First Flights,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 24, 1999, p. 

Mann, “U.S. Says Israel Gave Combat Jet Plans to China,” Los 

Times, January 8, 1995; David Fulghum, “New Chinese Fighte

Prototyping,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 13, 19

and Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions From Abroad, pp. 84-85.

16. Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modern

Appendix,” pp. 151-154; “Russian Radar First for China,” Jane’s 

Weekly, August 4, 1999.

17. Ibid., pp. 161-164.

18. “Russia Helps China Take New SSNs into Silent Era,

Defense Weekly, August 13, 1997, p. 14; Fisher, “Foreign 

Acquisition and PLA Modernization: Appendix,” pp. 165-166

Fighting Ships, 1999-2000, Coulsdon, UK: Jane’s Information 

1999, p. 116; “Contracts in the Aerospace and Military-Te

Sphere Between Russia and the PRC.”

19. Website: “Chinese Military Aviation,” http://www.con

net/~Jetfight/Z-8_Z-9_Z-11.htm.

20. “Chinese AAM Aspirations May Build on Alenia Aspide,

International, November 27, 1996, p. 22; “China Displays Exp

Defense Missile,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 

p. 61.

43
21. Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modern

Appendix,” pp. 161-162.

22. Wendy Frieman, “The Understated Revolution in C

Science and Technology: Implications for the PLA in the 21st Ce

in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Militar

the Future, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999, pp. 247-267; Jo

Pollack and James Mulvenon, Assembled in China: Sin

Collaboration and the Chinese Civilian Aviation Industry, ms

Monica, CA: RAND, August 1998, pp. 28-36.

23. U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: S

Machine Tool Exports to China, GAO/NSIAD-97-4, Washingt

U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1996.

24. Briefing by the consulting group DFI International, Apr

news release by Bombardier Aerospace, November 20, 1998

Ventures Star in Beijing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 

16, 1995, pp. 22-23.

25. Cox Report, Parts 2 and 13, internet version; Nigel Ho

“Cruise Control,” Far Eastern Economic Review, August 14, 19

14-16.

26. Evan S. Medeiros, Linking Defense Conversion and M

Modernization in China: A Case Study of China’s Shipb

Industry, ms., February 1998, pp. 2-12.

27. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, pp. 29-31.

28. Frieman, “Understated Revolution,” p. 10; “NEC 

semiconductor production in Shanghai,” Reuters, February 23

“NEC begins production at joint chip firm in Shanghai,” Ass

Press, February 23, 1999.

29. James Cox, “Siphoning U.S. Companies’ Knowledge

Today, February 16, 1996; Kenneth Timmerman, “China 

American Spectator, March 1995; “China’s Gates Swing 

Business Week, June 13, 1994.

30. Wendy Frieman, “Arms Procurement in China: 

Understood Processes and Unclear Results,” in Eric Arne

Military Capacity and The Risk of War: China, India, Pakist

Iran, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 82, emphasis added.

31. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursua

FY 99 National Defense Authorization Act.

44
32. “Chinese Missiles Basic to New Strategy,” Aviation W

Space Technology, March 8, 1999, p. 59-60; Reuters, February 9

33. Wei-Chin Lee, “The Birth of a Salesman: China as a

Supplier,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Winter 1987-88

34. Bates Gill, “Chinese Military Hardware and Tech

Acquisitions of Concern to Taiwan,” in James Lilly and Chuck 

eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1

118-119.

35. “China Displays New, Old? Fighter,” Aviation Week & 

Technology, November 23, 1998, p. 22; Richard Fisher, “Heritage 

on China’s 1998 Zhuhai Air Show,” http://www.herita

exclusive/zhuhai/part2.html; Xiandai Bingqui, January 3, 199

36. Frieman, “Arms Procurement in China,” p. 82.

37. Lennox, “China’s New Cruise Missile Program ‘Racing Ah

38. Fisher, “Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modern

Appendix,” p. 131.

39. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress Pursua

FY 99 National Defense Authorization Act; “Cruise Missile 

Proliferate.”

40. “PL-7,” and “R550 Magic,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons

Today: Aviation Industry, compiled by the editorial board of th

Today Series, Beijing: Tri-Service Press, 1989, pp. 303-305.

41. “New Chinese Surface-to-Air QW-2 System to Enter Pro

Soon,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 23, 1998.

42. “China Develops FM-90 SAM,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, De

23, 1998, p. 8.

43. Website: “Chinese Navy,” http://www.fortu

com/tattooine/vonnegut/172/han_xia_kilo_song.htm; Jane’s F

Ships, 1999-2000, p. 117; Antony Preston, “The Submarine Th

Asian Navies,” Asian Defense Journal, October 1995, p. 18; 

Sae-Liu, “Submarine Force Priority for China’s Modernization 

Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 13, 1995, p. 18.

44. Huang Qiang, “Will China’s Aviation Industry Be Able 

Out of the Doldrums Soon?” Keji Ribao, Beijing, July 8, 199

translated and reprinted in FBIS, August 12, 1999.

45
45. Ken Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in 

Lilly and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, Wash

DC: NDU Press, 1997, pp. 240, 243; “China Displays New

Fighter,” p. 22; “Engineer Arrested for J-10 Leak,” Jane’s 

Weekly, August 4, 1999.

46. “First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production,” Jane’s 

Weekly, May 27, 1998, p. 17; “China Start to Flight Test Ne

Fighter,” Flight International, May 20, 1998, p. 5.

47. “Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s 

Weekly, December 10, 1997, p. 28; Allen, “PLAAF Modernizat

Assessment,” p. 244.

48. Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” p. 244; 

John Frankenstein and Bates Gill, “Current and Future Cha

Facing Chinese Defense Industries,” China Quarterly, June 19

411-415.

49. Frankenstein and Gill, p. 414; Gill and Kim, p. 45, 93, 142

50. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1999-2000, pp. 119-120, 124-125

51. Ibid., pp. 117-118; website: “Chinese Navy,” http:/

fortunecity.com./tattooine/vonnegut/172/ han_xia_kilo_song.htm

52. “First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production.”

53. Robert Sae-Liu, “Second Song Submarine Vital to China

Program,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 18, 1999, p. 17.

54. “Aspide,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons; “9K111 

Antitank Guided Missile System” and “HJ-8,” Jane’s Infantry W

1999-2000.

55. Gong Shang Shi Bao, Commercial Times, Taipei, Aug

1999. I am grateful to Shuhfan Arthur Ding for bringing this a

my attention.

56. “First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production;” 

“Heritage Report on China’s 1998 Zhuhai Air Show,” http:/

heritage.org/exclusive/zhuhai/part2.html, Chuan-Chiu Fa

Tsa-Chih, Taipei, March 15, 1999; “Chinese Military Av

http://www.concentric.net/~Jetfight/J-10_J-11_FC-1.htm.

57. “China Considers Plans to Extend Fighter-Bo

Capabilities,” International Defense Review, January 1999, 

46
Douglas Barrie, “Chinese Turn to UK Firms to Fill Strike-Fighte

Defense News, February 1, 1999, p. 6; Fisher, “Heritage Re

China’s 1998 Zhuhai Air Show,” http://www.heritag

exclusive/zhuhai/part2.html.

58. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1999-2000, pp. 117, 119-120.

59. Rupert Pengelley, “Grappling for Submarine Supre

International Defense Review, July 1996, p. 53; Robert S

“Submarine Force Priority for China’s Modernization Plan,” 

Defense Weekly, May 13, 1995, p. 18; Gill, “Chinese Military Ha

and Technology Acquisitions of Concern to Taiwan,” p. 113.

60. “China Launches a Powerful New Super Warship,” 

Defense Weekly, February 3, 1999, p. 16.

61. Larry M. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, Carlisle, P

Army War College, October 1998, p. 18.

62. “Russia, China Conclude Deal to Produce Fighter Jets,” I

Moscow, in English, August 6, 1999.

63. During the 1970s, the Chinese reportedly acquired 

MiG-23s from Egypt, but a Chinese copy of the aircraft ha

appeared in public. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Arms to Go: Chines

Sales to the Third World,” International Security, Fall 1992, p. 

64. Production of the Z-8 was delayed for several years dur

early 1980s, probably because of engineering problems, and ult

the Chinese never produced more than a handful of these heli

China Today: Aviation Industry, pp. 179-180. See also “C

Military Aviation,” http://www.concentric.net/~Jet

Z-8_Z-9_Z-11.htm.

65. In the mid-1970s, China actually purchased a lic

manufacture the Rolls-Royce Mk.202 Spey turbofan engine, wh

designated the WS-9; in the end, however, even after 20 y

effort—and the import of hundreds of specialized tools and consi

technical assistance on the part of the British—only a handful 

engines were ever built. China Today: Aviation Industry, pp. 2

Wendy Frieman, “Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernizat

Charles D. Lovejoy, Jr., and Bruce W. Watson, eds., China’s M

Reforms: International and Domestic Implications, Boulder: W

Press, 1986, p. 59; “China Considers Plans to Extend Fighter-B

Capabilities,” p. 63; Barrie, “Chinese Turn to UK Firms 

Strike-Fighter Gap.”

47
66. Larry Wortzel, remarks made at the RAND/CAPS confer

the Chinese military, July 1999.

67. Frieman, “Foreign Technology and Chinese Modernizati

56-58; Norman Friedman, “Chinese Military Capacity: Industr

Operational Weaknesses,” in Eric Arnett, ed., Military Capac

The Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran, Oxford: 

University Press, pp. 66-69; “China: Back to the Future,” Far 

Economic Review, March 11, 1999, pp. 10-14.

68. Frankenstein and Gill, p. 414; see also Huang, “Will 

Aviation Industry be Able to Get Out of the Doldrums Soon?”

69. Quoted in Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessm

241.

70. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, pp. 9-12.

71. “China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” 

Defense Weekly, February 24, 1999.

72. “PRC Plant to Start Su-27 Assembly in Two Years,” ITAR

February 23, 1999; “China-Assembled Su-27s Make Thei

Flights.”

73. Rao Gangcan, Development and Outlook in Newb

Technology in China, ms., 1998, pp. 14-17.

74. Ibid., p. 9-14.

75. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, p. 28.

76. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, p. 19.

77. Bates Gill, “The Impact of Economic Reform Upon C

Defense Production,” in C. Dennison Lane, Mark Weisenbloo

Dimon Liu, eds., Chinese Military Modernization, London: Keg

International, 1996, pp. 148-149.

78. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, pp. 49-51; W

China’s Military Potential, p. 18.

79. Ibid., p. 29.

80. Ibid., p. 40.

48
81. Medeiros, Linking Defense Conversion and M

Modernization in China, p. 13.

82. Ibid., p. 14.

83. Friedman, “Chinese Military Capability: Industr

Operational Weaknesses,” p. 72.

84. Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1999-2000, p. 698.

85. Frieman, “Understated Revolution,” pp. 262-264.

86. Personal communication with a U.S. defense electronics 

August 1999.

87. Medeiros, Linking Defense Conversion and M

Modernization in China, p. 20.

88. Ibid., pp. 14-15, 19.

89. Ibid., p. 20.

90. Ibid., p. 19.

91. Dean Cheng, Civil-Military Integration in the Chinese A

Industry, ms., April 1999, p. 6.

92. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 136.

93. Quoted in Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessm

241.

94. Ibid., p. 236.

95. Cox Report, Part 13, Internet version.

96. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization, p. 136.

97. Cheng, Civil-Military Integration in the Chinese A

Industry, p. 6.

98. “Time Out in Asia,” Flight International, November 5, 

39.

99. Cheng, Civil-Military Integration in the Chinese A

Industry, p. 6.

49
100. Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” p. 235

101. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, pp. 37, 47

102. Yuko Arayama and Panos Mourdoukoutas, China 

Herself: Innovation or Imitation in Global Business?, Westpo

Quorum, 1999, pp. 69-82; “China: Back to the Future,” p. 12; “Th

of State-owned Enterprises in Mainland China Worsens,” Chen

Hong Kong, November 1, 1996, pp. 54-57.

103. “Time for a Reality Check in Asia,” Business Week, Dece

1996, pp. 60, 66.

104. China Daily, October 3, 1997.

105. Rao, Development and Outlook in Newbuilding Techn

China, p. 17.

106. Shen Bin, “Shipbuilding Giant Faces Division Plan,” 

Daily Business Weekly Supplement, May 9, 1999, pp. 3-5.

107. “China: Back to the Future,” p. 11.

108. Huang, “Will China’s Aviation Industry Be Able to Ge

the Doldrums Soon?”

109. Gong Shang Shi Bao, Commercial Times, Taipei, Aug

1999.

110. John Frankenstein, “China’s Defense Industries: 

Course?” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The 

Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: 

1999, pp. 197-199; Frankenstein and Gill, pp. 419-420; “I

Embraces Market Forces,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 16, 

28.

111. Harlan Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead, Long Live CO

Restructuring China’s Defense Scientific, Technical, and Ind

Sector,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., The 

Liberation Army in the Information Age, Santa Monica, CA: 

1999, p. 61; “The Crisis of State-Owned Enterprises in Mainlan

Worsens,” Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, November 1, 1996, pp. 54-

112. “China: Out of Business,” Far Eastern Economic 

February 18, 1999, p. 14.

50
113. Roger Cliff, “China’s Potential for Developing Ad

Military Technology,” in Anthony Lanyi and Kimberly Bricke

Institutional, Economic, and Organizational Basis of M

Capability, College Park, MD: Center for Institutional Reform 

Informal Sector, University of Maryland at College Park, 19

227-228.

114. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, pp. 43-44

115. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

116. Huang, “Will China’s Aviation Industry Be Able to Ge

the Doldrums Soon?”

117. Cheng, Civil-Military Integration in the Chinese A

Industry, p. 6.

118. Huang, “Will China’s Aviation Industry be Able to Ge

the Doldrums Soon?”; Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead,” p. 6; W

China’s Military Potential, pp. 19-20; Pollack and Mulvenon, Ass

in China, pp. 17-20, 39-42; Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernizat

135-136; Gill, “The Impact of Economic Reform Upon Chinese D

Production,” pp. 156-158.

119. Arayama and Mourdoukoutas, China Against Herself, 

120. Ibid., p. 73.

121. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, pp. 45-46

122. Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” p. 242

123. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, p. 19.

124. “China: Out of Business,” p. 15.

125. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, p. 20.

126. Arayama and Mourdoukoutas, China Against Herself, 

127. “State Enterprises Ordered to Reform by Millennium,” R

March 18, 1999; Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead,” pp. 65-69; “Over

China Inc.?” Business Week, August 25, 1997.

128. Beijing Central People’s Radio Network, March 30

Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead,” pp. 65-66.

51
129. “Defense Industry Crucial,” China Daily, July 2, 199

Some defense electronics production, which used to be conducte

the auspices the Ministry of Electronic Industries, has been su

into the new Ministry of Information Industries; consequently, 

the country’s electronics production will likely remain directly m

by the central government; personal communication with 

Mulvenon.

130. Kuang Chiao Ching, Hong Kong, April 16, 1998; Jingji 

April 5, 1999; Beijing Central People’s Radio Network, March 3

Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead,” pp. 68-69.

131. Beijing Central People’s Radio Network, March 30, 19

132. “Defense Industry Crucial,” China Daily, July 2, 199

“Chinese to Restructure Shipyard Department,” Journal of Com

December 19, 1998; Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead,” p. 69.

133. Jencks, “COSTIND is Dead,” p. 69.

134. Kuang Tung-Chou, “Zhu Rongji Says Joint Stock Syste

Panacea for Rescuing State-Owned Enterprises,” Sing Tao J

Hong Kong, December 23, 1997, p. A2.

135. “Mergers Sharpen Firms for Market,” China Daily B

Weekly Supplement, January 4, 1998, p. 1.

136. Ibid. In fact, such broadbased defense firms—pro

everything from fighter aircraft to missile systems to d

electronics—are fast becoming the norm in the West, as firms 

their range of business activities, both to reduce their vulnerabi

market downturns in any one defense sector and to take advan

synergies in new weapons development.

137. “Five Major Military Industry Corporations to be R

ized,” Wen Wei Po, Hong Kong, May 4, 1999, translated and repr

FBIS, May 9, 1999.

138. China Aero Information, July 5, 1999.

139. “Nuclear Sector to Undergo ‘Largest Ever’ Restructure,

Daily, February 5, 1999.

140. NORINCO website, www.norincogroup.com.cn.

141. “Shipbuilding Corporation to Split Into Two Groups,” X

May 28, 1999.

52
142. “Applying Technology to National Defense,” China 

News, May 26, 1999, p. 1.

143. “China’s Aviation Industry to be Split in Two Group

Jones International News Service, March 23, 1999.

144. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, p. 16; Chin

January 31, 1999. These less-than-anticipated layoffs in the 

industry mirror similar developments occurring throughout the 

the state-owned enterprise sector. According to official sou

Beijing, China expects to eliminate only three million jobs in t

sector in 1999—less than half of the earlier target of seven 

“Shanghai Slump Forces Retailers to Shut Up Shop,” Financial 

July 12, 1999, p. 14.

145. Pollack and Mulvenon, Assembled in China, p. 16; 

“COSTIND is Dead,” p. 69.

146. “Jiang Zemin Presides Over Strategic Readjustm

State-Owned Enterprise Reforms,” Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, Aug

1999, p. 26, translated and reprinted in FBIS, August 22, 1999; 

Out of Business,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 18, 

11; “China: What’s Going Wrong?” Business Week, February 22, 

49-50.

147. China Aero Information, July 5, 1999.

148. “Government Not to Interfere in Enterprise Me

Zhongguo Tongxun She, Hong Kong, September 18, 1999, tra

and reprinted inFBIS, September 19, 1999; “Jiang Zemin Presid

Strategic Readjustment of State-Owned Enterprise Reforms

Kong Standard, September 15, 1997.

149. “Jiang Urges Military Scientists to Contribute to D

Xinhua, July 1, 1999.

150. Medeiros, Linking Defense Conversion and Military M

zation in China, p. 12.

151. Arayama and Mourdoukoutas, China Against Hersel

Emphasis added.

152. “CAS Reveals Past Role in China WMD Programs,

Shibao, Beijing, May 6, 1999, translated and reprinted inFBIS, J

1999.

153. I am grateful to John Frankenstein for pointing this o

53
154. Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq

North Korea, South Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa, accordin

Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Insti

International Studies.

155. Wortzel, China’s Military Potential, citing a U.S. 

corporation representative, p. 20. A similar observation was m

Dennis Blasko, personal communications with the author.

156. See, for example, Richard A. Bitzinger and Bates Gill, G

Up for High-Tech Warfare? Chinese and Taiwanese D

Modernization and Implications for Military Confrontation Ac

Taiwan Strait, 1995-2005, Washington, DC: Center for Strate

Budgetary Assessments, 1996.

54
CHAPTER 3

PLA LOGISTICS AND DOCTRIN

REFORM, 1999-2009

Lonnie Henley

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army

1

 (PLA

implemented a number of reforms in the past 2 

intended to improve its ability to conduct mobile wa

The main impetus is the realization that the PLA is no

enough to cope with a fast-moving, modern opponent 

on its own home turf. In order to address these weakn

the PLA is seeking to improve both its logistics su

structure and its operational doctrine. Even if succe

these reforms may not significantly increase China’s 

projection capability, but they will improve its abil

move and sustain forces within China and aroun

periphery.

Two recent programs seem particularly importan

encompasses a group of decisions aimed at standar

military operations and training. Chief among thes

the issuance in January 1999 of new “combat regulatio

“operational ordinance” designed to standardize 

doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for co

operations.

2

 The second is a 10-year effort to restructu

logistical system of the entire PLA announced b

General Logistics Department director, General Wan

in November 1998. If it is successful, logistics reform 

have a significant impact on China’s military capabi

as the inability to sustain large forces in int

fast-moving combat operations is among the PLA’s gr

weaknesses. 

55
Logistics Reforms.

Wang Ke announced the logistics reform program 

“Forum on the Features and Rules of Logistic

November 1998, and it was officially enacted a

expanded meeting of the Central Military Commiss

December 1998. It was widely publicized in foll

months, including special expanded meetings o

General Logistics Department (GLD) in Beijing 

logistics departments in the military regions and S

headquarters.

3

The logistics program was also encompassed i

major reform document of the late 1990s, PLA Co

Order No. 13, “PLA Joint Campaign Program,” Janua

1999, which is discussed in more detail below. The 

issued an All-Army Joint Logistics Implementation 

shortly thereafter, and the organization and planning 

of the reforms got underway in the spring of 1999.

phase was to continue into early 2000.

GLD Chief Wang Ke listed the following objective

• integrate logistics for the three services;

• supply work for units should be standardized;

• convert officers’ perquisites into cash allowance

• “socialize” logistics services [in other w

out-source support functions to civilian contr

and society at large]; and,

• make management more professional 

“scientific.”

5

Although not included on this list, another ce

objective cited elsewhere is to improve mobile log

support for units operating away from their home ar

Trial Programs. As has been PLA practice in the 1

the GLD first set up large-scale trial programs in se

different regions to develop the details and wor

56
practical considerations before the final decision was 

Wang cited experimental programs in Shenyang, J

and Hainan beginning in 1998, and also pointed to 1

massive flood relief efforts as contributing greatly 

understanding of joint service logistical operations

experimental programs did not include reorganizat

restructuring, but focused on single-Service fac

providing vehicle repair, communications equip

repair, medical service, and supply to other Services.

Experimentation has continued since the fo

decision in December, as the regions work out how b

implement the new approach. Beijing Military Region 

instituted a pilot program contracting out support fun

for four hospitals, one group army, and five division

units.

7

 Nanjing MR has begun relying on civilian s

sources for vehicle parts.

8

Joint Service Logistics. At both the national and th

level, the separate Services of the PLA—Navy, Air 

and Second Artillery (the strategic missile forces)—

maintained separate logistical infrastructures since 

were created in the 1950s. (There is no separate g

component headquarters in the PLA. The four Ge

Departments serve as both army staff and joint staff

military regions’ logistics departments supported the 

ground forces, as well as the organizations o

“institutional” PLA—academies and schools, think t

military region, district, and sub-district headquarter

The MRs exercised nominal control over the other Ser

logistics structures in the region, but actual co

centered in the Service headquarters in Beijing.

This system has become increasingly unsatisfacto

both operational and economic reasons. Lieutenant Ge

Jiang Jiesheng, commander of the GLD’s Wuhan 

Base, outlined the operational imperatives in a Feb

article in Jiefangjun Bao: 

Joint operations have become a principal form, and war 

manifested as confrontation between systems. T

57
operational system has to be very much complete and 

harmony as a whole, and the logistics support system ha

work as an entity. Hence, implementing a joint logistics supp

system among the three armed services has become a histor

necessity.

9

Wang Ke characterized the old system as a relic 

centrally planned economy, now woefully inefficient an

of step with the rapid transition to market-based struc

in the past 2 decades:

The present logistics and supply system in the army w

established in the early 1950’s, with the Army, Navy, and 

Force operating their own vertical supply systems under 

leadership of the General Logistics Department. This matc

China’s highly centralized planned economic setup and 

rather low level of army modernization at that time. As Chi

socialist market economy and the army’s modernization h

developed, the defects of this logistics and supply system h

become more and more evident; for instance, for the Ar

Navy, and Air Force to independently organize their own sup

does not match the demand of combined operations usin

variety of weapons in modern war; there is a serious degre

duplicate construction, and supply efficiency is low and fail

meet the demand of building the army’s quality; a

decentralization of powers with too many heads facing 

market cannot produce efficiency in scale.

10

Under provisions of the reform program, those su

functions that are common to all Services are being m

into new Joint Logistics [Sub-] Departments (JLD) in 

of the military regions’ logistics departments. The se

will retain separate logistics structures for supplie

support unique to their own systems. Under the rub

“network-style zoned supply work,” the service

surrendering hospitals, medical supply and mainte

units, fuel stocks and distribution networks, general s

warehouses, vehicle supply and maintenance units

some general transportation units to the control of th

JLD. The reorganization is to be completed by ea

2000.

11

58
Role of the Military Regions. Some Western obs

think the demands of modern, high technology w

make the MR structure obsolete, and have speculate

they may be abolished in the near future. The log

reform program, however, explicitly calls for strength

rather than reducing the role of the MRs and m

districts. With regard to joint logistics structures, Wa

said,

We should build a logistical system based on the milita

districts [jun qu] with joint supply for the Army, Navy, and A

Force. . . . In instituting joint logistics for the three servic

proceeding from the current reality of the armed forces, it 

necessary to establish a new-style logistics system based 

the military district . . . .

12

(Jun qu, “military district,” is probably understo

include da jun qu, which we translate as “military reg

Wide Angle quoted General Wang, and added,

This means that the country’s military regions will rema

structurally unchanged for a long time to come and t

implementation of a new-type logistic support system capa

of simultaneously catering to the needs of the three servi

will raise the position of the country’s military regions.

13

Xinhua’s (New China News Agency) report o

reforms said,

The ongoing reform of linking the logistics work of the th

services is based on major military regions, which coordin

the reform and take charge of the logistics supply of t

materials commonly used by the three services in the releva

theater, thereby changing the independent and decentraliz

support system in the past.... Some Navy and Air fo

hospitals as well as fuel and military supply warehouses w

handed over to major military regions.

14

“Socialized Logistics.” In a major departure fro

PLA’s tradition of self-reliance, the reform calls fo

military to turn to the civilian market economy as mu

possible for support functions, in an approach d

59
“socialized logistics.” (“Socialized” referring to societ

socialism.) In part, this is an economic move, seek

capitalize on the efficiency of the market and reduc

overall cost of support functions. But the main thrus

relieve military units of unnecessary overhead and 

them to focus on their operational responsibilities. Th

major departure from the Maoist tradition of minim

the Army’s burden on the civilian society, dating back 

Eight Points of Attention and the Yan’an Spirit o

anti-Japanese and Civil War era. Apparently anticip

resistance to this change, the leadership has devoted 

effort to explaining and popularizing the new app

From Xinhua in June 1999:

In the past, the armed forces undertook too heavy a burden 

running their own kindergartens, schools, shops, restaura

laundry shops, bathhouses, canteens, heat supply centers, 

cleaning business, taking much of their military and civi

personnel’s time and effort.

15

From Wide Angle in March 1999:

After shaking off a heavy burden of logistic support, 

country’s military regions and the locally stationed grou

naval, and air units will be able to devote more resources to b

military training and equipment management and this 

definitely help enhance the army’s capability of fighting 

winning a hi-tech war.

16

From Jiefangjun Bao in February 1999:

[A]n open equipment and technical support system takes 

military self-support system as the system border, and ta

society’s resources as the system environment. It all

extensive exchange of information, material, energy and cap

between the system and the environment, making full us

society’s material, human and technical resourc

strengthening the armed forces equipment and techn

support ability and economically, reliably and efficien

fulfilling the military’s weapons, equipment, and techn

service requirements. . . . An open equipment technical supp

system is the effective measure to “contain the army in 

60
people, unite in peace and war.” Once indicators based 

market information of various kinds of essential elements 

support power latent in society are understood, then it 

possible to reduce unnecessary storage and maintenan

ability in the system, and decrease the expenditure of t

system. An open system can raise equipment techni

support “resilience,” which is good for lowering peaceti

expenditures and can satisfy great needs in time of emergen

adapting better to “both fields.”

17

Socialized logistics will contract out most o

day-to-day service functions that sustain the PL

garrison. Besides the items listed by Xinhua, other a

have mentioned fuel supply, vehicle spare parts, ga

collection, tree planting, child care, and managem

officers’ housing. Outsourcing of support functions wil

with garrison units and PLA institutes in major citie

gradually expand to include the entire force.

18

It appears that this shift does not include agric

and light manufacturing, the so-called “sideline produ

which occupies another large part of PLA manpower. 

are frequent references to Jiang Zemin’s 1990 state

that the PLA must “eat imperial grain” and not follo

path of feeding itself, but always in a context that is cle

metaphorical reference to the divestiture of comm

activities supplementing the PLA budget, not to actua

supplies. Similarly, Wang Ke’s December article sa

part, 

With regard to the question of army engagement in product

operations, comrade Deng Xiaoping pointed out back in 19

that units below army level must absolutely not run factori

and this road must be cut off. Those run for profit must all 

shut down, no matter what reason is given.

Again, however, Wang focuses on for-profit opera

and not on factories that make uniforms, boots, etc., f

PLA’s own use.

CMC Vice Chairman General Zhang Wannian cla

the issue in a speech in April 1999. Although he ma

61
reference to the socialized logistics program, which wa

underway by then, he quoted explicit statements by 

Zemin and emphasized that PLA agriculture and 

manufacturing are not affected by the ban on PLA bu

enterprises:

Chairman Jiang pointed out: “The agricultural and side

production of the armed forces is an old tradition and is 

Nanniwan spirit, which we must carry forward, consolid

and improve. . . . It is necessary for the armed forces to run so

agricultural farms, pigsties, and chicken farms to improve 

living standard of the soldiers. We have all along been do

this. In the future, we shall continue to do so and should do 

even better job in this respect.”

19

One might argue that food is the most fungible of 

which the civilian market in China is well able to su

and that agricultural production is one of the activities 

disruptive of military readiness and training. Obvi

those are secondary considerations against the 

deep-rooted, almost sacred tradition of self-reliance.

Mobile Logistics. As the PLA has come to grips wi

requirements of Modern Local War under High

Conditions, it has become clear that the static, fixed-

structure of its logistical system is one of its gr

weaknesses. In order to cope with a fast-moving, m

military opponent, the PLA needs to be able to rapidly 

its elite units across China to the site of the conflic

sustain them in combat without making them pull b

the nearest depot for repair or resupply. Throughou

1990s, the ground forces and the PLA Air Force (PL

have designated rapid response or “fist” units, and the

the Second Artillery have practiced rapid deployment 

distance away from their home base for field tra

exercises. Only a few units have done such deploym

and with the possible exception of Second Artillery 

seldom cross MR boundaries. But this is a major fo

PLA modernization, and the logistics reform program 

to restructure tactical and operational level log

62
elements to provide better support for out-of

deployments. The goal is that “military provisions s

arrive before the combat units arrive, and this is a nece

condition for unfolding a combat operation.”

20

 T

certainly a minimum requirement if the PLA is to de

any serious mobile warfare capability.

The PLA is not abandoning its fixed-site log

structure, but it is seeking to graft on a mobile struct

provide forward support to the maneuver u

Components of the mobile logistics effort include rep

forward positions, without evacuating equipment t

depot or factory level; more responsive and more m

resupply arrangements; new organizations to su

out-of-MR air and ground units; and underway reple

ment for naval forces. All these concepts have been th

of logistics work in the PLA for several years, an

10-year reform program will build on previous efforts

The MRs have experimented with a varie

organizational structures in recent years to provide m

support, with Beijing MR reportedly in the vanguard.

current focus is on two types of organizations: emer

support brigades, consisting of a medical battalion, a s

battalion, a fuel battalion, and a transportation batt

and emergency military depots, encompassing ammu

depots, fuel depots, general supply warehouses, field c

and transportation units.

22

 Experimentation 

emergency support brigades began as early as 1994, 

such a unit was formed by a logistics sub-departme

Guangzhou MR.

23

 There has been a spate of ar

praising support units that are able to conduct rapid re

on the battlefield or during convoy movements, w

evacuating systems to depot level.

24

 The PLA Navy (P

has experimented with emergency support detach

(fendui) to repair warships at sea rather than sending 

to factories for repair.

25

 The PLAAF has experimente

composite mobile support detachments, assembl

elements from several different organization

63
accompany fighter units deploying to airfields alon

southeast coast.

26

Standardization of Supply Procedures. The far

PLA unit deploys from its home base, the more difficul

likely to have interacting with the support infrastruct

its deployed location. Stock numbers, requis

procedures, inventory standards, and other deta

supply operations vary from region to region, creat

major hindrance to the PLA’s ability to deploy units a

China. This may account in part for the rar

cross-region mobility exercises. Although there ar

details on how GLD intends to address the problem, 

Ke cited standardization as a major priority of the r

program:

[W]e must gradually establish a set of supply standard syste

and corresponding rules and regulations that are compl

dovetail with each other, and are scientific, rational, simple, 

easy to implement, and implement scientific management 

adherence to law in army logistical work.

27

Monetization of the Officer Compensation Sy

Another theme of logistics reform is the conversion of o

perquisites into cash allowances, reflecting broader t

in the economy as a whole. The daily life of ordinary Ch

has changed dramatically in the past 20 years. In M

China, both rural and urban residents received most o

daily needs from their work unit, directly in the fo

locally produced products, or indirectly in the form of 

coupons to exchange at state-owned stores and distrib

points. Housing, education, health care, rail tickets, co

fuel, and most other goods and services were either pro

in kind, or heavily subsidized by the state. The transit

a market economy is converting almost all of 

exchanges to cash transactions.

28

 Cash in the pocket, 

choice of things to spend it on, creates a great d

personal freedom and encourages more efficient alloc

of goods, but the change also places a major stra

employers including the PLA. Military personnel costs 

64
skyrocketed, as the PLA has to provide its pers

especially officers, with ever-increasing volumes of ca

pay for goods and services. Chinese officers assert, th

detailed figures are hard to obtain, that the PLA’s b

increases over the past 10 years have been la

consumed by this one requirement.

29

 The moneti

process will continue under the logistics reform pro

with particular emphasis on housing and veh

Construction and maintenance of officer housing 

meanwhile be transferred to civilian government prog

as part of the “socialization” of logistics.

30

 If succ

officers will buy or rent their housing on the privat

estate market. Success depends to a great extent o

broader effort to privatize urban housing throughout C

however, and that is a huge program with unce

prospects.

31

Housing is not the only part of the compensation s

that the PLA is trying to off-load onto civilian govern

Wang Ke cites an August 1998 “insurance decisio

military personnel,” under which responsibility for m

and pension costs for veterans killed or injured in the 

duty is being shifted to the state insurance system—in 

words, to local governments. The March 1999 arti

Wide Angle discusses the intent to shift most of the “

insurance” and “social support” burden for mi

personnel to local authorities. The article confid

predicts that the PLA can “mobilize the enthusiasm 

local governments” for accepting this burden, becau

divestiture of PLA commercial operations will leave 

now-private enterprises highly “transparent,” and 

local government enterprises to compete more effec

against them. One needn’t be a hardened skeptic to qu

whether localities will be quite so enthusiastic abou

shift. The author also characterizes the change as an 

of equity within the PLA; the benefits derived from 

enterprises went to the small number of officers invol

those activities, while this reform will benefit “the 

masses of officers and men.”

65
The primary advantage of providing officer bene

cash rather than in kind, besides shifting some of it 

the military budget, is that the PLA can shed some 

manpower and overhead associated with ho

construction and maintenance, medical care, and per

services such as drivers and household servants.

Not directly related to the monetization of o

perquisites, but in pursuit of similar objectives, 

establishment of new ranks and pay scales for 

commissioned officers in the July 1999 revision o

Soldiers’ Service Regulation. The regulation creates si

grades, NCO 1 through 6, with a pay scale that increa

line with rank and term of service.

32

Other Logistics Changes. There have been several 

aspects of logistics reform mentioned in the press 

recent months.

• Funding for logistics. One article cites the divestit

PLA commercial enterprises as being directly ti

increased funding for maintenance within the PLA:

In the past, some army units carried out commercial activi

on the pretext of raising maintenance funds for the grassro

military units. However, only a small part of the funds raised 

the units concerned had actually gone to the grassroots units 

[the CMC] came up with a decision in the second half of 1998 

banning the army and the armed police from commer

activities within a short period of time and increasing 

army’s maintenance funds in a timely fashion and adop

resolute measures to this end . . . .

33

• Skip-echelon logistics. Several articles me

streamlining logistics operations within the MR, all

direct links between the MR Joint Logistics Depar

and regional level support units, on the one hand

division, brigade, or regiment level units on the othe

• Food service reforms. These include increasin

standard dietary allowance for soldiers, with more 

and greater variety (but no increase in per-so

66
budgetary allowance for food); improved field kitche

better support mobile operations; issuing combat rati

toasted rice and hard tack instead of uncooked ri

improve survivability on the battlefield by reducin

need to light fires in order to eat; and developing froze

packaged foods for the destroyer Qingdao and trainin

Shichang for their foreign port visits last year, 

increased “freshness” so that sailors would not ha

subsist for weeks on the standard PLAN at-sea rati

instant noodles and canned food.

35

• Emphasis on faster throughput by the transpor

system. Again, the PLA press cites the 1998 flood 

operations as having provided valuable real-w

experience in rapid resupply operations. An inter

application of these efforts is a focus on faster inter

transfer of materiel (from land and air, to sea mod

support of joint service operations offshore and alon

coast near Xiamen.

36

• Improvement of logistics structures in the re

forces. Fujian MD recently created a reserve force log

brigade. Hubei MD is restructuring its reserve bri

units, in part to provide better support in future civi

relief operations, while arguing with local government

who should pay for such operations. Xinjiang M

increasing its investment in dual-use transport

infrastructure, especially roads and service stations 

the Tarim Desert Highway.

37

The logistics reform program seems to repres

wide-ranging change in the structure and philosop

PLA logistical support, based on 5 years of plannin

experimentation. The official program has just begun, 

will be several years before we can assess whethe

achieving much progress.

67
Standardization.

Most of the other reforms instituted over the past y

two can be understood as an effort to create 

standardization within the PLA. Obviously, no 

military can be completely standardized. Units will a

be tailored to their mission and local terrain, or diffe

because that’s how they developed over the year

equipment inventory will always vary from unit to 

because no large military can modernize all its equip

at once, and older systems retain some utility for 

missions; commanders and staff will always inte

training standards and operational doctrine in thei

way. 

Within these inevitable limits, however, those unit

deploy and fight away from their home region need to 

key operational approaches and concepts with the 

fighting alongside them. Standardization of supply 

support procedures is important in this regard, as disc

above. Equally important is some uniformity in how of

are trained, and the development of the profess

military education system over the past 20 year

contributed significantly to this goal.

38

 In a military 

most officers spend their entire career in one divis

even one regiment, it is useful to bring them togethe

regional or national level a few times in their career to 

concepts and techniques of operation. But the 

important consideration is that units from different pa

China must share the same understanding of how to 

and how to operate on the battlefield if they are to m

seamlessly when brought together for combat.

Operational Doctrine. In January 1999, CMC Cha

Jiang Zemin signed an order implementing the first 

revision to PLA operational doctrine since the mid-19

The old regulations, now referred to as the “first-g

ation” effort to standardize PLA operational procedure

not address joint service operations or warfare 

high-technology conditions, did not cover the full range 

68
national- and campaign-level down to unit-level opera

and obviously did not incorporate the lessons of the 

War and other 1990s campaigns or evolving con

referred to as the “revolution in military affairs.”

40

 T

new combat regulations, known collectively as the “Ch

People’s Liberation Army Joint Campaign Program

designed to rectify these omissions.

The new regulations, also called “operational 

nances,” are the embodiment of 7 years of experimen

and reform in the PLA. From 1992 to 1995, the 

conducted a series of what Americans call warfig

experiments. A number of units throughout the PLA 

assigned to work on different aspects of mo

warfare—night fighting, electronic warfare, battl

mobility, strategic mobility, counter-reconnaissanc

counter-surveillance, etc. Since 1995, we have seen se

large-scale field-training exercises and numerous sm

exercises that attempted to pull together these sep

components into coherent “methods of operations.

development of these methods has been a constant the

the Chinese military press in the late 1990s.

Now we are told that during this same period, 19

late 1998, a body called the PLA Combat Regula

Compilation Committee has been coordinating a PLA

effort to codify the doctrinal concepts developed in thes

phases of field experimentation. This committee inc

staff officers from all Services and all echelons, as w

researchers from PLA academies and think tanks. 

extensive coordination and four meetings with the Ge

Departments, the committee submitted the regulati

the CMC for approval late last year.

41

There has been no explicit statement yet of the co

or even titles of the 13 regulations, but one report say

are grouped into two categories: campaign regula

further grouped into joint service campaigns and s

Service campaigns; and combat regulations, incl

“general regulations, the regulations for the co

69
operations conducted jointly by the units of diff

services, and the regulations for the combat oper

conducted jointly by the units of different arms and dif

specialties.” (The latter seems to refer to what the 

Army calls combined arms operations—infantry, 

artillery, etc., working together—rather than joint-s

operations.) The report later lists areas the regul

focus on, which may correspond to the 13 sep

regulations. These areas are campaign principles; co

principles; campaign modes; combat modes; basic ta

command system; logistics support; equipment su

political work; information warfare; electronic warfa

defense; and countermeasures against the enemy’s 

tech arms.

More information and time are required before w

judge the impact of these new regulations on 

operational capabilities. At a minimum the regul

embody nearly a decade’s worth of PLA thought on h

implement the general concept of “modern local war 

high-tech conditions.” They will certainly focus on the 

concepts we have seen in PLA exercises over the last 4 

progress toward joint operations; the expectation 

high-tech enemy, a focus on innovative tactics to neut

the opponent’s advantage; and efforts to create a 

realistic training environment.

It is also likely, however, that except for those 

tagged for a potential conflict with Taiwan, the regula

will display the same muddle concerning stra

objectives that have characterized PLA moderniz

efforts in recent years. China has no major ground t

since the end of the Soviet Union and the collapse of Ru

economy, yet it retains one of the world’s largest armo

mechanized force structures. Much of the PLA’s exper

tation since 1992 has focused on a large ground fight ag

a sophisticated opponent. Yet the likelihood of the 

Army invading China, or of anyone else being able to 

contemplate such an attack, must seem vanishingly r

even to the PLA. China already possesses an enor

70
military advantage over its land neighbors, at least 

conflict within reach of its MR-based logistical net

Training to confront a high-tech opponent does 

China’s ground forces better, but without a ground thr

the homeland, it does not increase China’s useable mi

capability, unless the PLA builds a logistics structu

project and sustain those forces outside China—and th

no evidence Beijing wants or intends to build s

structure.

Military Terminology. Standard doctrine requ

standard vocabulary. A new edition of Chinese PLA M

Terminology, China’s equivalent of the U.S. Diction

Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02

issued in 1998, replacing the previous 1982 edition. M

the jargon associated with high-tech warfare has com

use in China since 1982, and the need for standardiza

clear to anyone trying to make sense of exactly what a 

publication is talking about. The Jinan MR newspape

the new dictionary, disseminated down to company lev

laying down standards for PLA units in the same man

do the Common Regulations.

42

Training Procedures and Evaluation Stand

Another effort at standardization focuses on the cont

field and garrison training and on the criteria for evalu

such training. The PLA General Staff Department 

Training Department has been issuing army-wide M

Training Plans for the past several years. New evalu

standards for both unit and individual training 

promulgated by GSD at an army-wide training r

meeting in late 1997, under the title of “Provis

Stipulations for Grading Military Training.” The dir

applied to regimental and lower level unit training 

year, and to division level training starting in 1998.

43

has been no detailed reporting, however, on the cont

the training program or on the evaluation standards

71
Reorganization.

As of mid-1999, the PLA is engaged in a wides

restructuring of combat units and noncombat organiza

and institutions. As the PLA leadership warned in 

1998, this phase of reorganization involves the “ab

ment, merger, downgrading and reorganization of uni

the departure of individuals.”

44

 Only the broad outli

this reorganization are yet available, but some basic th

are apparent. One is a straight manpower reduction

the focus on reducing the proportion of light infantry a

the regular PLA forces. So far, some 14 light inf

divisions have been transferred to the People’s A

Police, and a number of other units have been reorgani

concentrate available major systems—tanks, inf

fighting vehicles, artillery, etc.—into smaller units. 

maneuver divisions are being reorganized as brigade

some artillery regiments have been upgraded to bri

with the transfer of equipment from other, disba

units.

45

Another theme of structural reorganization i

streamlining of the “institutional” PLA: military r

headquarters, garrison units, academies and sc

research institutions, etc. The reorganization started 

issuance of revised “Common and Garrison Regulatio

October 1997. Streamlining of military region-level o

began in August 1998.

46

 The U.S. Army in the early 

managed to cut combat units, but had less succe

reducing headquarters staffs and the institutional Ar

will be interesting to see whether the Chinese are any 

successful than we were.

Assessment of the Effect of These Reforms.

The most important issue raised by the reform prog

is whether they constitute the kernel of a significant 

projection capability for the PLA. The short answer, i

analyst’s judgement, is no. The logistics refor

successful, will improve the PLA’s ability to susta

72
forces in high-intensity combat in or very nea

homeland, but it strengthens rather than mitigates 

dependence on a geographically fixed logistics 

structure. Organizations to provide mobile logistics o

battlefield are one precondition for power projection, b

other components required to sustain large man

forces in combat outside of China remain absent 

Chinese force structure, support concepts, and r

plans. These include logistics elements organic to 

maneuver units, making them more self-sufficie

transportation, first- and second-line mainten

evacuating and repairing battlefield equipment casu

and maintaining and transporting mobile fuel and s

stockpiles. They include port-opening and airfield-op

packages, capable of creating the far end of a logistica

structure with minimal reliance on local infrastru

They include vastly greater airlift and sealift capab

than the PLA has chosen to buy, and the combatant e

and refueling units to get the lift to its destination. 

include construction engineers to build the land-

transportation infrastructure at the far end o

operation. 

The logistics reform program addresses cr

weaknesses in the PLA’s operational capabiliti

successful, it will improve the PLA’s ability to fi

modern high-tech conflict on or near Chinese territor

it does not contribute significantly to regional, muc

global, power projection.

At the operational level, the restructuring of the g

forces and the development of improved doctrine con

the PLA’s progress toward competent combined

operations. The PLA still has a long way to go to

effective joint service operations, but the new co

regulations firmly establish joint operations as a go

continued doctrinal development.

More broadly, the reforms represent a major 

forward in the regularization of PLA operations

73
“first-generation” combat regulations of the 1980s we

too general in their scope to constitute operational do

in the Western sense. If the 1999 ordinances prove to 

detailed and comprehensive as initial reporting indi

they, together with the comprehensive restructuring 

force and the 10-year logistics reform program

represent a major milestone in the professionalization 

PLA and its slow maturation as a military institution

CHAPTER 3 - ENDNOTES

1. This term includes all Services of the Chinese armed for

2. “Jiang Signs Order on Military Establishment Regul

Xinhua, June 24, 1999, Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

SK2506020299.

3. Li Xin and Zhang Dongbo, “Wang Ke Calls for Standardiz

Logistics Work,” Xinhua, November 4, 1998, FBIS OW0204

Wang Ke, “Adapt to Market Economy, Adapt to Future Combat,” 

(Beijing), No. 23, December 1, 1998, pp. 24-28, FBIS OW23120

Pei Fang, “Major Operation To Be Performed on Military Lo

System”, Kuang Chiao Ching (Wide Angle), Hong Kong, No. 318

16, 1999, pp. 50-52, FBIS OW0204103499; Commen

“Unswervingly Implement Central Military Commission’s 

Decision,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), January 26, 

1, FBIS OW0302120499; Zhang Dongbo, “Wang Ke, At the Ex

Meeting of Party Committee of the General Logistics Depa

Emphasized Doing a Good Job in Reforming Army Logistics,” 

Domestic Service, December 30, 1998, FBIS SK0901031699; 

Navy, January 10, 1999; Rocket Force News, April 2, 1999; 

Qianxian, Nanjing MR, April 13, 1999. Unless otherwise indica

citations to Chinese military publications are excerpted from 

editions of the monthly “PLA Activities Reports” complied by SE

Hawaii Inc.

4. Pei Fang; Rocket Force News, April 2, 1999; Renmin Qi

April 13, 1999; Chen Hui, “PRC Armed Forces Carry Out Thre

Reforms,” Xinhua, June 14, 1999, FBIS OW1606021799.

5. Wang Ke, note 2.

6. Wang Ke; Jiefangjun Bao, March 22, 1998.

7. Chen Hui, note 6.

74
8. Wang Ke.

9. Jiang Jiesheng, “Change effected in strategic logistics su

Jiefangjun Bao, February 9, 1999, p. 6, FBIS OW2402103499; D

of People’s Republic of China Military Personalities, Jun

Honolulu, HI: SEROLD Hawaii Inc., 1998, p. 26.

10. Wang Ke.

11. Chen Hui; Rocket Force News, April 2, 1999.

12. Wang Ke.

13. Pei Fang.

14. Chen Hui.

15. Chen Hui.

16. Pei Fang.

17. Li Zuozhi, “Comprehensively Promote Socialization of G

Equipment Supply”, Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) Fe

9, 1999, p. 6, FBIS OW0503001799.

18. “PRC Military Moving Logistics To Civilian Sector,” 

Beijing English service, April 2, 1999, FBIS OW2204082199.

19. Luo Yuwen, “Zhang Wannian on All-Army Farm Prod

Xinhua, April 13, 1999, FBIS OW2004104299. For an ex

discussion of the self-sufficiency efforts of Red Army 359th Bri

Nanniwan, 1940-45, see James Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: T

of the Military-Business Complex in the Chinese People’s Lib

Army, 1978-98, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, forthcoming 2000.

20. Pei Fang.

21. Wang Zhilei and Zhang Haiping, “Reform and Opening P

Support Might—A Summary of PLA Logistics Develop

Jiefangjun Bao, December 20, 1998, pp. 1-2, FBIS OW2601053

22. Chen Hui.

23. Zhanshi Bao (Guangzhou MR), May 15, 1998.

24. Zhanyou Bao (Beijing MR), April 24, 1999; Jiefangjun Ba

6, 1999.

75
25. Jiefangjun Bao, June 29, 1998; People’s Navy, April 13, 

26. Air Force News, April 3, 1999.

27. Wang Ke.

28. Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Rev

Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998, pp. 11-12.

29. Various PLA officers in personal communication w

author.

30. Wang Ke.

31. Lardy.

32. Xu Yang, “Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji Issue New 

Regulation,” China Daily (Internet version), July 13, 1999

OW1307033099.

33. Pei Fang.

34. Rocket Force News, April 2, 1999.

35. Qianwei Bao (Jinan MR), April 7, 1999; Zhanyou Bao 

MR), February 10, 1998; Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Dail

29, 1998; Renmin Jundui (People’s Military)(Lanzhou MR), A

1999; PAP News, August 4, 1998; Jiefangjun Bao, June 6, 1999;Z

Bao (Guangzhou MR), May 11, 1998; Jiefangjun Bao, June 8

Jiefangjun Bao, June 26, 1998.

36. Jiefangjun Bao, (Liberation Army Daily), June 13

Jiefangjun Bao, June 5, 1998.

37. Guo Fang, June 1999; Chinese Militia, June 1999; 

National Defense News, May 3, 1999.

38. Lonnie Henley, “Officer Education in the Chinese 

Problems of Communism, May-June 1987, pp. 55-71.

39. Editorial, “Basic Guideline for Our Army’s Combat Dri

New Period—Written on the Promulgation of Operational Ordin

a New Generation,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 25, 1999

OW0102104099.

40. Interview With General Chief of Staff Fu Quanyou, “Ea

Implement Operation Decrees and Continue To Enhance Capa

76
‘Win Wars’,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), Febru

1999, FBIS OW1903042299; Chang Hung, “To Fight a Moder

War, the PLA Joint Services Put New Operating Regulatio

Effect,” Kuang Chiao Ching,(Wide Angle), Hong Kong, May 16

No. 320, pp. 46-47, FBIS OW0406004299.

41. Ren Xiangdong, “PLA Ground, Naval, and Air Units Imp

New-Generation Combat Regulations,” Liaowang, (View

(Beijing), June 7, 1999, FBIS OW290608521999.

42. Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), March 22

Qianwei Bao (Jinan MR), April 10, 1998.

43. Zhanshi Bao (Guangzhou MR), January 23, 1998, May 

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 13, 1998.

44. Zhanyou Bao (Beijing MR), December 18, 1997.

45. “Country Briefing: People’s Republic of China,” Jane’s 

Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 24, December 16, 1998; Commentator, “Dee

Study of the Basic Experience of a Certain Artillery Reg

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), January 26, 1999

OW0302121499; Yang Zhenwu, et al., “Jiang Visits Troops i

Mongolia,” Xinhua, February 3, 1999, FBIS OW05020

Jiefangjun Bao, September 11, 1998; Dennis J. Blasko, intervie

PLA officers 1998-99, conversation with author, July 1999.

46. Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), February 6

Zhanyou Bao (Beijing MR), August 22, 1998.

77
CHAPTER 4

POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS

OF PLA INFORMATION WARFAR

CAPABILITIES

TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

William C. Triplett II

Introduction.

There is a consensus among specialists that the U

States is the world leader in Information Warfare 

Nevertheless, if the United States were to have a signi

offensive IW targeting the critical civilian infrastruc

foreign countries, details of such a program would not 

be public information. In fact, the phrase, “com

network attack” (CNA) was classified until about 2 

ago.

2

 The financial resources devoted to such a hypoth

program, as well as some of the locations

3

 where the 

sensitive offensive IW Research and Development (R&

operations could be carried out, would similar

restricted information. The capabilities of su

hypothetical program would be closely held to the po

approximating stealth 2 decades ago.

4

An extensive look at the U.S. official unclas

publications on IW indicates they are mostly devo

military-on-military applications [Command and C

Warfare], particularly within the Revolution in Mi

Affairs (RMA) context. There is also a heavy empha

defensive measures and only a rare mention of U.S. off

capabilities. Roger Molander of RAND candidly outlin

aspect of the problem:

The sensitivities of our friends and allies and t

political-military capital that might accrue to possi

79
adversaries from increasingly open emphasis on U.S. offens

SIW [Strategic Information Warfare] initiatives has larg

kept the more definitive information on these capabilities in 

back room. Some SIW offensive capability clearly exists (

some has been demonstrated) but the full potential is politic

and militarily sensitive.

5

Added to the issue of a possible propaganda black 

the question of countermeasures. There is no ph

defense against a nuclear-armed missile except a pr

tive strike,

6

 something of a high-risk operation. As a r

the declared nuclear powers have adopted a policy of h

publicized and credible deterrent.

7

 IW, on the other ha

subject to effective countermeasures to the point 

Electronic Warfare,

8

 for example, is subject to a con

offense/defense battle of counter-counter-counter

measures. If it were known, for example, that the U

States was successfully targeting foreign power gri

CNA, then a prospective opponent should be able to 

the resources necessary to frustrate that capability.

9

In short, simply because a certain military capabi

not announced does not necessarily mean it does not ex

Definitions and Scope.

Definitions. IW is in a state of becoming, and defin

are not universally agreed upon.

11

 In some cases ther

aversion to using the word “warfare” so that “Inform

Operations” is the politically correct term o

Additionally, IW or IO can have an expansive meanin

even includes Civil Affairs. For the purpose of this exe

IW will principally mean CNA with the inclusi

Precision Strike, Denial and Deception, Special Opera

and Psychological Operations, as appropriate.

12

Scope. The object of warfare is to make an opp

accept your goals, not his. Your goals may be terr

conquest, hegemony without territorial absorption, o

deterrence of offensive operations. For example, one 

wish to exercise deterrence against a third party 

80
engaging in operations against a second opponent. Be

IW is relatively cheap, it lends itself to sudden as

Because modern societies are increasingly vulnera

could be an effective military tool for reaching your goa

This exercise is designed to look rather narrowly a

the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) IW capab

might be applied against foreign critical infrastructur

political/military purposes. A broader study would con

other PRC institutions with IW capability, such a

Ministry of State Security

14

 and other IW applications

as espionage. Such a study is recommended.

A Summary of PLA IW Capabilities and Doctri

If the Liberation Army Daily (LAD) should ann

that the PLA has the capability to change Japan Na

Railways (JNR) switches at will using CNA from outs

the country, it would cause a sensation. Any respo

Japanese Government would immediately move to he

this obvious threat to public safety. There would pro

also be an intense examination in Japan of other parts 

Japanese critical infrastructure of the potential 

Repercussions would spread to other countries as w

short order, whatever offensive IW capability the PL

would be countered both at the JNR and other 

structure nodes. The Japanese and others in the r

would have their alert level raised considerably.

The LAD has not, so far, made such a claim and 

unlikely to do so but arguing from the U.S. analogy, ab

of publicity does not necessarily mean absence of capa

From the externalities, however, what can we summ

about the PLA’s IW capabilities or even the 

opportunity to have an IW capability, if it so chooses?

An IW Program. It is fairly well-established th

PLA has some kind of IW program. The U.S. Departm

Defense writes, “the PLA has shown an exceptional in

81
in information warfare.”

16

 Others rank the PLA pr

right behind the United States and Russia.

17

Leadership Support. In a 1998 think piece on 

warfare, PLA Chief of Staff General Fu Quanyou 

“information warfare” to a list of new forms of comba

also included air strike, missile and electronic warfare

a Commission on Science, Technology, and Indust

National Defense (COSTIND) meeting in 1995 Gener

Huaqing is alleged to have said:

Information warfare and electronic warfare are of 

importance, while fighting on the ground can only serve 

exploit the victory. Hence, China is more convinced (than ev

that as far as the PLA is concerned, a military revolution w

information warfare as the core has reached the stage wh

efforts must be made to catch up with and overtake rivals.

1

There is some indication that IW has the supp

rocket scientist-emeritus Qian Xuesen,

20

 and, accord

one observer, there is “a push toward establishmen

high level leading group” on IW.

21

One also has to a

that having repeated access to the pages of the 

indicates some measure of political support for IW, sin

LAD is published by the PLA’s General Pol

Department. 

Financial Resources. There is no unclassified ans

how much money the PLA is prepared spend o

According to one unconfirmed report, the PRC is inte

to pour “billions” of Australian-dollar equivalents in

PLA’s IW program.

22

However, it would seem that there is an opportun

fund an IW program if they wish. At the end of 199

PRC claimed approximately 155 billion U.S. dolla

foreign exchange reserves. Billions of U.S. dollars 

already gone into a series of very expensive mi

purchases from Russia, Israel, and other sources. I

spring of 1999, the Republic of China on Taiwan (henc

Taiwan) found that the PLA had re-created an 

82
one-for-one, duplicate of CCK Air Base in central Ta

CCK was designed in the 1950s by the U.S. Strateg

Command with very long runways and ultra-wide tax

to handle B-52s. Even considering the relatively low co

construction labor in China and the location in the des

Gansu Province, creating this duplicate must have 

very expensive. It would have required approval a

high levels, and the leadership must have been convin

its importance. Given how inexpensive a reasonab

program would look against the re-creation of a SAC b

Western China, it would seem the funds shou

available. 

IW Theorists. We have a list of the names of the 

theorists whose work appears in LAD or si

publications.

23

 Whether these are real persons in all 

or pen names, or committees are unknown.

IW Research and Development Centers. There is a 

IW R&D Centers to which we must add the new Scienc

Engineering University and the new PLA Inform

Engineering University at Zhenzhou.

24

 However, c

ering again the American example, some of the 

sensitive centers may well be elsewhere.

Tools: SIGINT. The PLA “maintains by far the 

extensive signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities 

the countries in the Asia/Pacific region.”

25

 Just this 

according to one unconfirmed report, they expanded 

SIGINT facilities to include Cuba, where they m

intercepting telephone calls along the East Coast 

United States.

26

Tools: Electronics and Telecommunica

Infrastructure. Without doubt Beijing is developin

domestic infrastructure that could support a seriou

program. This includes microelectronics, computers

fiber-optics-based telecommunications.

27

Tools: High Performance Computers . The 

Committee noted that between January 1996 and the 

83
1998, over 600 American-origin high perform

computers (HPCs) were delivered to China. The num

undoubtedly higher today. The Committee believes 

such HPCs could prove valuable for offensive IW by g

the PLA the tools to explore “U.S. information network

their vulnerabilities.” Such computers, the Committee 

are also useful for the development of IW assoc

technologies such as jammers, microwave weapons

anti-satellite weapons. The Committee notes that the 

does not permit end-user checks and therefore it can

determined with precision where the HPCs are or to 

purposes they might be put. There have been a num

recent cases where HPCs made their way to mi

end-users, creating a sense of uneasiness, at the leas

Tools: Technical Personnel. The Cox-Dicks Comm

estimated that “at any given time there are over 10

PRC nationals who are either attending U.S. universi

have remained in the United States after graduating f

U.S. university.” They noted, correctly, that these stu

are “a ready target for PRC intelligence officers and 

Government-controlled organizations, both while the

in the United States and when they return to the PRC

National Counterintelligence Center report claims th

is recruiting ethnic Chinese students around the worl

have expertise in certain weapons and weapons-re

skills including computers.

30

As early as the fall of 1994 the PLA was tellin

domestic Chinese press that it was recruiting “ret

students” who have experience in “supercomputers

“artificial intelligence,” both building blocks for IW.

31

summer of 1999, President Jiang announced 

establishment of a cash awards fund designed to 

Chinese students with science and technology skills b

China.

32

There is definitely a domestic training program as 

In July 1999 the LAD discussed the need for “In

warriors” who could take part in “Internet combat.”

84
PLA is also offering scholarships for Information Wa

students at Beijing and Qinghua Universities.

34

Tools: High-powered Microwave Weapons . A

Cox-Dicks Committee noted, high-powered micro

weapons (HPMs), sometimes known as radio freq

weapons, have a particularly important role to play i

serious IW program. The report also accused the P

illegally obtaining U.S. R&D informatio

“electromagnetic weapons technology.”

35

 This appa

occurred in the late 1990s.

China has a national HPM program as does the U

States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. C

foremost expert on HPMs is Dr. Lin Weigan (Univers

California, Berkeley, 1950) and there are institutes de

to this research.

36 

PLA writings make a clear connection between H

and IW. For example, in 1995, a COSTIND resea

praised HPMs’ ability to “destroy the opponent’s elec

equipment and electronic telecommunications sys

This is a special kind of information-intensified weap

waging information warfare.”

37

Russia is considered to be the world’s leader in H

with research concentrated at the Institute of Ap

Physics and Lebedev Physics Institute.

38

 Some 

Russian HPMs are suitcase-size and have been sold o

open market to at least Sweden and Australia.

39

 If th

could be further reduced, they might be deliverab

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). There are no 

source indications that the PLA has purchased Ru

HPMs of any size or that Russian HPM specialis

assisting the Chinese program, but under the cu

circumstances it is certainly worrisome.

40

Tools: Precision Strike. U.S. doctrine for offe

Information Operations include “physical at

destruction,” i.e., long-range precision strike.

41

theorists have no difficulty making the link bet

85
“precision attacks” and “information warfare.” 

abundantly clear that serious PLA resources are goin

offensive missile strike capability, and that these effor

seeing some success.

42

The connection between IW and air power is also n

on the PLA, as two authors pointed out in China M

Science: “Air power’s exclusive strength in inform

warfare has made it a key factor for armies 

countries.”

43

Tools: Special Operations. U.S. doctrine for Inform

Operations also includes Special Operations.

44 In 

years there has been considerable public attention p

PLA special forces/special operations, including air

troops, perhaps indicating that they are receiving 

resources. In the summer of 1999, Wen Wei Pao publi

report on “Special Forces: Emergency Mobilizatio

Long-Range Assault.” The report discusses the 

equipment available to Chinese Special Forces, incl

motorized hang gliders, and asserts that their m

includes “going deep into the enemy heartland.”

45

Doctrine: Reading American Literature. PLA the

are clearly reading the U.S. open-source literature

example, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-6, “Inform

Operations,” has been translated by the PLA’s M

Science Publishing House.

47

 As another example, in the summer of 1999 there w

article on a Beijing-based Internet site discussing the 

3, 1995, National Defense University exercise, “Th

After...in Cyberspace,” which appears as Appendix C 

RAND publication Strategic Information Warfare pub

in 1996.

48

 PLA writers tend to use virtually the 

definitions of IW that the United States does: “elec

warfare, tactical deception, strategic deterr

propaganda warfare, psychological warfare, com

warfare, and command and control warfare.”

49

From t

time, there is talk of an IW with Chinese characteristic

there is no evidence that such a creature exists as yet

86
theorists speak of IW as a new form of “People’s 

meaning civilian technicians in uniform at the keyb

but that would be the case under any Western progr

well. 

Doctrine: Writing Their Own Literature. The the

are certainly talking about it. Articles have appear

LAD on the subject since 1987, and in the first 9 mon

1999 the words “information warfare” appeared in L

least 10 times.

50

 They began publishing books on the s

as early 1985, and there are important symposia cov

IW sponsored by COSTIND.

51

Arguably the most significant article appeared in 

on November 11, 1999. The three authors argued th

PLA should create a “net force” equal to the PLA A

Navy, and Air Force. They also argued for an “off

technology” capability.

Doctrine: Preemptive Strike. One might argue th

PLA has a long association with surprise attack

preemptive strike. Certainly the Vietnamese would 

It is, therefore, not surprising that PLA IW theorists 

been quick to see IW as a preemptive strike weapon. 

often-quoted 1996 LAD article, Lu Linzhi pointed out 

“In military affairs, launching a preemptive strik

always been an effective way in which the party 

disadvantage may overpower its stronger opponen

calls for zeroing in on “enemy troops as well a

war-making machine.”

52

Training and Exercises. There has been a 

discussion going back several years about training fo

For example, in February 1999 the LAD ran a story 

“Train Talented People at Different Levels for Inform

Warfare.”

5 3

 According to a COSTIND-contr

publication, the PLA’s Communications Com

Academy is offering a cross-disciplinary course on IW 

on textbooks prepared by experts from the PLA Engine

Institute, the General Staff Department, the Acade

Military Sciences and the National Defense University

87
Annual Harvard Senior Military Officers program fo

officers includes IW training.

54

By one account, IW was included in the spring 

exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

55

 Two years later She

Military Region was boasting of its IW exercises in 

“Accept a New Challenge, Exercise in New Topics—

than 20 Achievements Tested by Shenyang Military R

Live Information Warfare Exercise.” Just recently La

Military Region was conducting “Red Team-Blue T

Information Warfare exercises that opened with a su

network attack by the “Blue Team.”

56

In summary, the Chinese have an IW program

have a reasonable level of leadership support, suff

available resources, the necessary tools (or are acq

them), and they are working on doctrine in the 

direction and conducting military exercises that featu

prominently. Their level of competence is as yet unk

perhaps to themselves as well.

The next question is “What’s the most likely 

cation?”

Potential Applications I—The United States.

Today there exists a level of concern bordering on 

in official Washington over U.S. vulnerability to 

against critical infrastructures. A former Director of 

called the United States the most vulnerable country 

world to CNA and in 1996 then-CIA Director John D

expressed similar concerns to the Senate.

57

The is

being studied in the public policy institutes. Some two 

commissions have convened on the matter, and the De

Science Board has reported on it. Even the Senate 

Committee drew attention to it. A series of usefu

General Accounting Office reports on the threats to c

infrastructures have been written.

58 

The Public Policy Institutes. The Center for Str

and International Studies (CSIS) recently comple

88
major IW study subtitled Averting an Electronic Wa

The opening paragraph reads:

The United States is now exposed to a host of new threats 

the economy, indeed to the whole of society. It has erec

immensely complex information systems on insecu

foundations. The ability to network has far outpaced t

ability to protect networks. The economy is totally depende

on these systems. America’s adversaries and enem

recognize this dependency and are developing weapons 

mass disruption and destruction.

59

[Emphasis added]

Nor is CSIS alone. RAND’s Strategic Inform

WarfareA New Face of War contains the foll

assessment: 

U.S. homeland is vulnerable

• Cyberspace efficiencies-use-dependence-vulnera

 cycle especially acute in U.S.

• U.S. info-based infrastructures present lucrativ

 strategic targets.

• IW weapons less physically destructive than

 Russian ICBMs, but much cheaper to field, and

 probability of use in conflict is much higher.

You lose U.S. as sanctuary.

60

The Commissions. In 1997, the President’s Comm

on Critical Infrastructure Protection released its r

“Critical Foundations—Protecting America’s Infra

tures.” The Commission was created in response t

Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. It began looki

physical threats but moved fairly quickly into cyber th

It examined five sectors—information 

communications; banking and finance; energy, incl

electrical power, oil and gas; physical distribution; and 

human services. The Commission was very alarmed at 

it found.

89
1. There is an increasing dependence on cr

infrastructures.

2. There is an increasing vulnerability to 

infrastructures from a wide range of threats, partic

IW.

3. There is a lack of public awareness to the threa

4. There is no national focus for protection of c

infrastructures. 

As the Commission findings noted,

Potentially serious cyber attacks can be conceived and plan

without detectable logistic preparation. They can be invis

reconnoitered, clandestinely rehearsed, and then mounted 

matter of minutes or even seconds without revealing 

identity and location of the attacker.

61

In the fall of 1999, the United States Commissi

National Security/21st Century released its report, 

World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century

Commission, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D

and Warren Rudman (R-NH), notes that “the United S

and its allies are particularly vulnerable” to IW attac

the critical infrastructure because “the health, welfar

prosperity of the citizens of the developed world depe

this infrastructure.” The Commission asked its read

“Imagine, for example, a well-planned attack against t

traffic control network on the east coast of the United S

as more than 200 commercial aircraft are trying to la

rain and fog on any given weekday morning.”

62

The Defense Science Board Report. In the fall of 199

Defense Science Board presented its report on thre

DOD systems. The Board concluded,

Because of its ever-increasing dependence on information 

information technology, the United States is one of the m

vulnerable nations to information warfare attacks.

Further, 

90
We conclude that there is a need for extraordinary action 

deal with the present and emerging challenges of defend

against possible information warfare attacks on faciliti

information systems, and networks of the United States wh

would seriously affect the ability of the Department of Defen

to carry about its assigned missions and functions.

Finally, the Board warned that,

increasing reliance on information systems to opera

maintain and monitor infrastructures . . . creates a tunne

vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict

Vulnerabilities. To what extent are the con

expressed above valid? Consider the following:

On June 16, 1999, the sanitation department o

Nuys, California ran a Y2K compliance check. At mid

they were testing a backup electrical system when 

received a frantic call from a park ranger. Raw, untr

sewage was pouring out of a manhole cover and spillin

a park. Later it was estimated that four million gall

sewage had been released. A computer had mista

closed a gate that should have remained open to c

transfer of the sewage. A programmer’s error in 1985 s

to have been the culprit. It cost the taxpayers 

$100,000 to clean up the mess.

64

That was one line of code, sending one message 

computer-controlled gate. And it was an accide

competent, motivated, hostile force might be able to d

following:

• Change the dose levels in prescription medici

pharmaceutical plants so that thousands of p

would be poisoned.

65

• Infiltrate the manufacturing process for baby f

that the standard components would be increas

400 percent (to toxic levels).

66

91
• In a similar manner, taint the processed food ind

for adults: restaurants, hotels, hospitals

retirement homes.

• Subtly change the radar signals picked up at ai

so that air traffic controllers would unknowing

passenger planes on the same flight path.

• Stage a surprise attack on many of the autom

gasoline refineries in the nation, causing enor

out-of-control fires that would inundate emer

officials and lead to immediate gasoline rationi

• Contaminate the city water systems, turn the v

backwards at the sewer systems, shut dow

electric power grid, overload the natural gas pi

system.

• Loot the bank accounts of selected per

transferring all their funds overseas and wipin

records of their existence.

68 

• Attack the identities of selected persons, elimin

their social security records, Veterans Depar

records, driver’s license numbers, bank and 

card numbers and accounts and so on.

69

All of these examples have either been tried or 

concern to competent officials.

Example: SCADAs and Related Systems . “SCADA” 

acronym for “Supervisory Control and Data Acquis

the computer-controlled gates which control an incre

percentage of American infrastructures. The SC

systems are composed of three parts—a master statio

or more remotes, and the custom software that co

them. In a public water system, for example, they 

control when the pumps start and stop, how much ch

is injected into the system, which valves are open and 

are shut, and so forth. According to the Presid

Commission, “Cyber vulnerabilities include the incre

92
reliance on SCADA systems for the flow and press

water supplies.”

Related systems called “Distributed Control Sys

are routinely used in food processing, pharmaceutica

chemical facilities. Other SCADA-related systems c

railways and trucking operations.

Consider the electrical grid. It might have thousa

SCADAs or SCADA related computer-controlled sw

that are hundreds of miles apart all tied to the c

computer. Communications from the center to the re

is by radio, and typically the radio communications lin

not encrypted. The SCADAs may also be maintain

outside contractors whose personnel may or may not 

received background checks. According to the Presi

Commission, the systems rely on “dial-back modem

can be bypassed,” which means that an outside team 

gain access to them either by capturing and overridin

radio signals to the remotes, or by using the tele

system and the dial-back modems to gain control ov

entire network. Once inside, a hostile force could 

havoc on the system.

Pharmaceutical plants, processed-food fact

wastewater treatment plants, refineries, chemical p

electrical grids, oil and gas pipeline systems—a

susceptible to manipulation and destruction.

70

Further Example: The Refineries. The refinerie

probably the most vulnerable. As of this writing, the U

States has 160 active refineries. Some are single

others are clustered, often with associated chemical p

As the President’s Commission noted, “Large refi

(greater than 250,000 barrel capacity) in California, T

and Louisiana would be attractive targets for physi

cyber attack.”

71

An attack might look like this: The CNA team ope

either abroad or from a clandestine U.S. location 

access the system through the dial-back modems

93
system would be mapped thoroughly and a “back

would be left in place so it could be monitored easily fo

changes in the system. CNAs would be rehearsed un

leadership had a high level of confidence. Using some 

story such as seeking employment or maintenance, a s

operations individual or team would gain physical acc

the command building. It, too, would be mapped looki

doors, windows, or other entranceways that give a 

line-of-sight from the outside into the area wher

central computer and backups are located.

The attack would be in two phases. First, the CNA 

would deliver false messages to the SCADAs, setti

cascading fires and explosions. Next, at the proper mo

the special operations team would set off an H

disintegrating the electronics. This would ma

impossible for the refinery’s Information Technology 

to recover, isolate the fires, or regain control ove

system. If a number of refineries and chemical plants 

same area were attacked simultaneously, the effects 

be catastrophic—the emergency response teams wou

overwhelmed, thousands of people would be kill

injured, and gasoline rationing would be at World W

levels for months.

Potential Applications II.

Taiwan. In 1995, a decade after the PLA started o

Taiwan’s military establishment was complacent: “As 

our side is concerned, the defense of the Taiwan Strai

is mainly a matter of resisting landing operations.”

73

 A

as the fall of 1998, two well-respected researchers 

Taiwan would write that Taiwan’s military restruct

program is “not designed to counter possible electron

information warfare waged by the PLA.”

74

All that is different now. At a March 1999 confe

Defense Minister Tang Fei surprised his audien

claiming that Taiwan may be powerless against a

attack from the mainland. Chief of the General Staff 

94
Yaoming told a seminar, “A massive information a

may lead to chaos here.” Dr. Lin Chong-pin of the Mai

Affairs Council has gone out with a public warn

Taiwan’s increasing vulnerability to an IW attack. 

ignoring the issue, Taipei’s newspapers have been 

articles about IW, particularly as political figures 

begun to take notice.

75

The response is a bit late, but it is on the mark. Ta

like the United States, is an industrial society tied mor

more to computer systems. Whatever applies to Ame

infrastructure vulnerabilities applies to Taiwan as 

The five sectors examined by the American Presi

Commission—finance, telecommunications, en

physical distribution, and public services—have the 

risk in Taipei as they do in Washington.

Taipei may have some additional exposure 

Washington has escaped. PLA theorist Wang Baocun 

about the idea of “virtual warfare” where:

One is using virtual reality and computer imaging technolo

during the course of war to construct images of the enem

supreme commander and have him issue statements that a

not conducive to the conduct of the war, such as having h

declare though his homeland’s television system that, 

various reasons, hostilities with the enemy have ceased a

all military forces are being withdrawn.

76

Considering how often President Lee has appear

television, and how relatively easy it would be to captu

likeness and manipulate it, Taipei should take warn

Taipei has other concerns as well. In the event of wa

early warning network would be the first to be attacke

unlikely that every radar on Taiwan would be taken 

the first wave. If the surviving radar shows an a

coming from the south, is this a true image, or a “v

fleet” created by Colonel Wang and his comrades? Cou

real attack be coming from the north? If your troops 

that the Other Side has been inside your system, even 

95
how much trust will they place in orders coming 

Central Command, particularly maneuver orders 

would require them to leave a prepared and presu

secure position?

Taipei’s vulnerabilities to IW are only limited by h

imagination. Clean out the bank accounts of the po

and economic elite and transfer the proceeds overseas

not let them have their money and then publicize th

that they are running for cover? Close down all the ci

airports? Why not let people think one is open in or

increase the panic and chaos as the elite tries to 

presumed safety? As Dr. Lin pointed out this year, 

psychological defense is almost nil.”

77

Japan. Raisuke Miyawaki, senior advisor t

Japanese Commission on Critical Infrastru

Protection, told a CSIS conference in June 1999, 

elements of Japan’s information infrastructure re

fragile and open to cyberattack.” He claims there 

“leadership void” in Japan because of “a lack of techn

understanding” at the top. Japan is only going throug

motions of infrastructure protection, he says, becau

United States is pressuring it to do something abou

problem.

78

Whereas the refineries are probably the most luc

U.S. target, the railways and subways are probab

most problematic in Japan.

79 Japanese hackers 

already successfully attacked the computer control sy

of commuter trains, paralyzing major cities for hours.

1995 NDU exercise considered a “new high-s

Metro-Superliner traveling at 300 km/hr” slams i

misrouted freight train somewhere in Maryland.

8

team estimated 60 deaths, but in the Japanese cont

would be much higher. A surprise attack on the Jap

national railways would aim at multiple accidents d

the height of the rush hour, followed by a total shutdo

the emergency response team. Those who did not p

immediately from the shock of the collisions wou

96
lingering, painful deaths because no one could ca

them. 

Instrument of Choice.

If there is to be armed conflict in the Strait, the 

instrument of choice could be IW applied to Taiwa

United States, and Japan. Taiwan would receive th

brunt of the campaign: preemptive precision st

massive CNAs, aggressive deception, and psychol

warfare on a grand and imaginative scale. If a well-k

political figure could be coopted, one option might be 

Special Forces to take over a military facility, install h

her there, and rescind any calls for outside assistanc

Since the aim would be to keep the United State

Japan out of the fray, CNA could be applied here 

reduced level as part of a diplomatic campaign. How

the threat of major destruction to critical infrastruc

would always hover in the background.

The primary attractiveness of such a program wo

power projection. As the RAND report demonstrates, 

is no other way to reach the U.S. homeland short of nu

Armageddon. The U.S. mainland has not seen war o

home turf since Appomattox, and no one could dete

the psychological effects a serious attack would prod

On Taiwan and Japan, probably no one under 60 ha

real memory of World War II.

At the same time, it is the perfect match of vulnera

against capability. Responsible officials in the U

States, Taiwan, and Japan are practically announc

the world how at-risk their most critical infrastructure

At the same time, as industrial societies become ever

more and more interconnected, they become even 

vulnerable. 

Used cleverly, IW can be a very useful diplomat

because it is the consummate political/military rheost

the U.S. context, an opponent could go from causing 

97
inconvenience by turning all the stop-signals of a majo

to blinking red, or creating massive civilian casualtie

every gradation in between.

There can be no question that PLA theorists are aw

the opportunity IW presents to the Taiwan context

very RAND publication that includes the information 

on the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland was discus

an LAD article in 1998

83 and an Internet article in 

1999.

84 The RAND publications are all available online

the CSIS report. “Critical Foundations” also ca

downloaded from the Internet. From a straight m

point of view, the PLA is unlikely, it seems, to mak

mistakes Britain and France did in allowing mi

innovation to pass them by during the interwar perio

Responses.

The Administration. While the GAO, RAND, and 

have been pointing to U.S. vulnerabilities to IW for 

the U.S. Government has been slow off the mark. In 

1998 President Clinton issued Presidential De

Directive (PDD) 63 “Critical Infrastructure Protec

which set goals and established administrative m

nisms. In keeping with many government project

program is over budget and behind schedule as o

writing.

Congress. Congress has been equally slow in respon

but it has a very large trump card. Saying that IW 

PLA’s best option in the Taiwan context does not mea

without risk. The real danger to the PRC wou

escalation led by Congress. Since 1985, Congres

imposed economic sanctions on South Africa, Iraq, 

Libya, Cuba, and Burma. It threw Toshiba Machine 

the United States for 3 years and ultimately cost the p

corporation half a billion dollars in lost business. Con

also passed sanctions on foreign corporations who e

nuclear technology, chemical or biological wea

technology, missiles, or advanced conventional weap

98
certain countries. With the exception of sanctions on 

and Cuba, all of these actions were taken over the stre

objections of the Executive Branch.

Given congressional hostility to Beijing now, an

move toward Taiwan is very likely to trigger a s

response. Congress, if it so chooses, has great leverage 

and including a full economic embargo against the PRC

confiscation of all property held in the United States by 

citizens. As it demonstrated in the South Africa 

Congress is not afraid of engaging in a secondary b

and, given the size of the U.S. economy, can 

considerable weight around. It is worth pointing out 

Democrat-controlled Congress with a veto-proof m

passed the Taiwan Relations Act while a Democrat w

the White House. By the same token, the South 

sanctions legislation was drafted by a Republican S

and passed over a Republican President’s veto

democratic Taiwan passes to a communist regime by 

and violence (with substantial civilian casualties), Con

can turn the lights out, and there will be little the 

House can do about it.

87

Beijing is clearly aware of this. In a recent inte

Senior Colonel Wang Baoqing of the Academy of Mi

Sciences listed “economic sanctions against the main

as his first estimate of U.S. response in the event 

attempt by the PRC to take over Taiwan.

88

In conclusion, the United States, the PRC, Taiwan

even Japan are entering a dangerous period. Th

between what offensive IW is capable of accomplishin

the nonaction by the defenders grows every day. In fac

defenders are advertising their vulnerability in ho

generating public support to do something about it. A

RAND study notes, “the probability of use [of IW] in co

is much higher” than the nuclear exchange which for

dominated official concerns.

89

For those with the capa

to use IW against critical infrastructures, the tempta

to apply it.

99
CHAPTER 4 - ENDNOTES

1. For example, see The Changing Role of Information W

Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White, eds., Santa Monica: 

1999, p. 275.

2. Guidance concerning CNA in Joint Publication 3-13

Doctrine for Information Operations,” leads to Annex A, w

classified. See pp. II5-6.

3. On October 1, 1999, the U.S. Space Command took 

responsibility for U.S. IW activities. See “Pentagon Sets Up New 

for Waging Cyberwarfare," The New York Times, October 8

However, this does not preclude other nonpublic sites of signific

this field.

4. This does not mean that there is no public information on 

Government IW plans and programs, certainly in the broad s

surprising amount of information is freely available on the Inter

example, one can download Joint Publication 3-05, “Doctrine f

Special Operations,” Joint Publication 3-13, “Joint Doctr

Information Operations,” Joint Publication 3-13.1, “Joint Doct

Command and Control Warfare,” Joint Publication 3-58, 

Doctrine for Military Deception,” and U.S. Army Field Manua

“Information Operations.” The National Defense University 

has a number of useful documents, and the reports of 

governmental commissions are mostly available. Those reports t

classified often have an extensive unclassified annex wh

specialist can glean important insights. Outside of offici

Government publications, in recent years there have been a nu

books, including several by RAND, which seem to be based, at 

part, on U.S. Government sources. The popular press has also p

a number of books, the most widely known of which is James Ada

Next World War, which may have been inspired by unoffici

Government assistance.

5. Roger Molander, et al., Strategic Information Warfare 

Santa Monica: RAND, 1998, p. 27.

6. This is called “Attacking the archer, not the arrow.” For ex

an SSBN could be sunk before it can launch its missile load, but o

missiles have cleared the surface of the water, the only hope 

defense is a major malfunction.

7. i.e., Mutually Assured Destruction.

100
8. In U.S. doctrine, EW is part of Information Operations, an

is contained in EW. See Joint Publication 3-13.

9. For example, the United States has been very reluctant to 

American IW operations in Kosovo other than to acknowledge th

occurred. See “US Opened Cyber-War During Kosovo 

Scripps-Howard, in The Washington Times, October 25, 1999.

10. When Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich) asked CIA Director 

Tenet at a closed Senate meeting whether the United States 

significant offensive IW capability, Tenet is alleged to have an

cryptically, “We are not asleep at the switch in this regar

Jerusalem Post, May 20, 1999.

11. Group Captain Peter Layton of the Air Power Studies 

(Australia) uses the term “Network-Centric Warfare.” See APSC 

Number 74 for 1999.

12. Joint Publication 3-13.

13. A useful study is Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree, “M

Theory and Information Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1998, pa

Also recommended is Edward Waltz, “The US Transition to Infor

Warfare,” The Journal of Electronic Defense, December 1998, p

14. See Reuters, December 16, 1999, for a complaint by 

Kong-based human rights organization that the MSS was using 

weapon.

15. The following summary of PLA IW capabilities and d

draws heavily from U.S. Air Force Major Mark Stokes, China’s S

Modernization: Implications for the United States, Carlisle: U.S

War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999 (hereafter CS

James Mulvenon, “The PLA and Information Warfare” in CAPS

Conference Proceedings, 1998; and “US National Securi

Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of 

(hereafter Cox-Dicks report).

16. Report to Congress Pursuant to section 1226 of th

National Defense Authorization Act.

17. Mulvenon, p. 175.

18. Qiushi, March 16, 1998, p. 2-6. Fu is also alleged 

endorsed a new book on IW.

101
19. “Latest Trends in China’s Military Revolution,”in Hon

Hsin Pao, In Chinese, February 9, 1996, p.17, FBIS-CHI-96-04

20. Stokes, CSM, p. 16.

21. Ibid., p. 27.

22. “China Gears Army for Cyber-War,” The Australian, No

10, 1999.

23. See Mulvenon, Table 1.

24. See Ibid., Table 2; Xinhau, domestic service, in Chinese

1999; Xinhua in English, November 17, 1999, respectively.

25. Desmond Ball, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1995. 

CSM, in agreement, p. 20.

26. El Nuevo Herald, Miami, in Spanish, June 24, 1999.

27. See Stokes, CSM, especially Chapters II and III. See also 

announcement of December 28, 1999, on the rapid growth 

“information industry” in 1999.

28. AUH, “U.S. National Security and Military/Com

Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” Vol. 1, May 19

xxx, 116, 134, 137-140.

29. Ibid., p. 41.

30. The Washington Times, October 11, 1999.

31. Xinhua, domestic service in Chinese, October 5, 1994.

32. The Hong Kong Standard, August 24, 1999.

33. Shen Weili, ”Stressing the Study of Internet Co

Liberation Army Daily, July 27, 1999, p. 6.

34. The Hong Kong Standard, November 19, 1999.

35. Cox, Vol. I, p. xiii. It is not clear from the reference whet

refers to HPMs or electromagnetic pulse devices. Both have p

ABM and AST applications. HPMs and EMPs tend to be relate

R&D arena. See Stokes, CSM, p. 103. See also Stanley T. Hosm

Information Revolution and Psychological Effects,” in The Ch

Role of Information in Warfare, Khalilzad and White, eds., footno

102
36. Stokes, CSM, pp. 102, 104.

37. Guoji Hangkong, in FBIS-CHI-95-114, March 5, 1995.

38. Stokes, CSM, p. 105.

39. Sevenska Dagblat, January 21, 1998.

40. Chinese officials have, however, attended arms shows 

Russian firms were demonstrating HPMs. See Nezavisimoe V

Obozrenie, No. 23, 1998, p. 6.

41. Joint Publication 3-13, p. viii.

42. Jiefangjun Bao, August 10, 1999, p. 6; Mark Stokes, Ch

this volume.

43. Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, February 20, 1996.

44. Joint Publication 3-13, p. viii. Joint Publication 3-05, “D

for Joint Special Operations,” April 17, 1998, p. II-4, lists “Infor

Operations” as one of “Special Operations Principal Missions.”

45. Liberation Army Daily, September 25, 1996; Wen Wei P

15, 1999, p. A5.

 46. Mulvenon, p. 176.

47. Noted in Political Commissars Qiao Liang and Wang Xi

Unrestricted Warfare, FBIS, trans., Chapter 1.

48. Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi, in Chinese, June 30, 1999.

49. Jiefangjun Bao, June 11, 1996. 

50. Ibid.; Ibid., February 2, 1999.

51. Ibid.; Stokes, CSM, p. 15; Mulvenon, footnote 3.

52. Jiefangjun Bao, February 14, 1996.

53. Ibid., February 2, 1999, p. 6.

54. Beijing Keji Ribao, April 27, 1999; Xinhua, in English, J

1998.

55. Kuang Chiao Ching, in Chinese, April 16, 1996.

103
56. Jiefangjun Bao, March 30, 1998; Ibid., July 22, 1999, p

57. Statement by Admiral John M. McConnell, Director 

National Security Agency, 1995, quoted in John Fialka, War b

Means, Norton, 1997, p. 105; De Morgen, in Dutch, Brussels, J

1996.

58. Senator Robert F. Bennett, Chairman, “Investigating t

2000 Problem: The 100 Day Report,” the U.S. Senate Special Com

on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, p. 191. For a list through 

1999, see Appendix II of the GAO October 1999 report, “

Infrastructure Protection,” GAO/AIMD-00-01.

59. The CSIS study was supported by a number of gove

agencies, Capitol Hill, the Intelligence Community, law enforc

the national laboratories, national security contractors, and tw

universities; “Cybercrime . . . Cyberterrorism . . . Cyberwarfare

1998, p. xii.

60. Strategic Information Warfare—A New Face of War

Monica: RAND, 1996, p. 33.

 61. “Critical Foundations—Protecting America’s Infrastru

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

Summary, Washington, DC, October 1997, p. 6.

62. “New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Ce

Report Supporting Research and Analysis, United States Com

on National Security/21st Century, 1999, p. 52.

63. “Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Infor

Warfare-Defense,” Report presented to Undersecretary of Defe

Acquisition and Technology, November 1996.

64. Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1999.

65. Russian specialists have raised this concer

Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow, in Russian, December 16, 199

66. This has already been done by someone who broke in th

vendor’s computer system that was integrated into the ba

manufacturer’s network. Fortunately, the manufacturer found 

time. Christian Science Monitor, June 24, 1999.

67. Modern gasoline refineries are controlled by a ve

employees opening and shutting valves by computer. R

104
specialists have also raised this possibility. See Komsom

Pravda.

68. In 1995 a Russian biochemistry student broke into a maj

York bank’s computer and transferred $12 million ov

Parameters, Winter 1996-97, pp. 81-91.

69. A frightening amount of personal information rela

person’s identity is available on the Internet. Armed with the 

account numbers, a hostile force should be able to wreck havoc 

major computer system.

70. Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi in Chinese, June 30, 1999, pp. 1

71. Ibid., repeated warning in Chapter III as well.

72. Possibly by using a UAV.

73. Taipei Fengweita Taiwan, November 1, 1995, pp. 342-3

74. See Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chieh-cheng 

“Taiwan’s Military in the 21st Century: Redefinition and Re

zation” in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., The Chinese Armed Forces in 

Century, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies In

December 1999, p. 282.

75. Taipei Hsin Hsin Wen, in Chinese, March 18, 1995; China 

May 13, 1999; Taiwan, Central News Agency, May 31, 1999, 

tively.

 76. Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 4, in Chinese, No

20, 1997, p. 102.

77. Taipei Hsin Hsin Wen, in Chinese, March 31, 1999 (FB

78. Mr. Miyawaki is a senior Japanese civil servant who has 

as press spokesman for at least one Prime Minister.

79. A 1998 RAND report prepared for the Office of the Secr

Defense (Molander, et al., Strategic Information Warfare Risin

Taiwan Strait scenario and notes the Japanese rail syst

particularly vulnerable, p. 53.

80. Matthew Devost, Brian Houghton and Neal P

“Information Terrorism: Can You Trust Your Toaster?,” in Sun T

the Art of War in Information Warfare, Bob Neilson, ed., Paper p

105
for the National Defense University, available on the NDU we

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/siws/ch3.html.

81. Strategic Information Warfare, p. 65.

82. The only other hostile action against American territo

Pearl Harbor for about 2 hours, and the takeover of some A

islands for a year.

83. Jiefangjun Bao, July 7, 1998, p. 6.

84. Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi, in Chinese, June 30, 1999.

85. See, generally, Williamson Murry and Allan R. Mille

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge, 1996. 

indication of PLA understanding of military innovation, see Jie

Bao, July 7, 1998, p. 6.

86. The South Africa Sanctions legislation of 1986 was prod

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chaired by Sen. Richar

[R-Ind] and was accepted verbatim by the House.

87. There is no question that China’s economy is much larg

Iraq or Libya, and taking China out of the world economy would 

painful.

88. Zhongguo Xinshe, September 7, 1999.

89. Lieutenant General William Donahue, Commander of 

Force Communications and Information Center, told a fa

conference that hackers had attempted to “take down NATO ne

during the recent military operation in Kosovo. A number o

hackers were traced back to Chinese Internet addresses altho

declined to indicate whether they came from government-con

networks. 

106
CHAPTER 5

CHINA’S MILITARY SPACE AND

CONVENTIONAL THEATER MISSI

DEVELOPMENT: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY

IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Mark A. Stokes

INTRODUCTION

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is developin

of the most daunting conventional theater m

challenges in the world. Theater missiles and supp

space assets are emerging as one of the most impo

political and operational tools of the People’s Libe

Army (PLA). A large arsenal of highly accurate and 

theater missiles serves as a “trump card” ( shashouj

revolutionary departure from the PLA of the past

PLA’s theater missiles and a supporting space-

surveillance network are emerging not only as a t

psychological warfare but as a potentially devas

weapon of military utility.

1

Theater ballistic and land attack cruise mis

supported by space-based reconnaissance, appear lik

emerge as a cornerstone of PLA warfighting early 

21st century. A growing sector of the PLA believes str

attack through theater missile strikes is the best w

even out the playing field when fighting agai

technologically superior force. The concept of str

attack involves pitting one’s strengths against an en

weakness, waging an asymmetrical strategy 

overwhelming offensive capabilities. Theater missiles 

a lethal means of striking targets that most directly re

107
the opponent’s ability to sustain operations. Accord

PLA National Defense University officials, “the gu

strategic principle of China’s new era military is 

defense (jiji fangyu), of which the required esse

offensive operations against theater targets.”

2

 

Beijing’s move toward a force dominated by offe

theater missiles could have significant implication

regional stability, creating the first theater in which h

accurate conventional ballistic missiles dominat

strategic landscape. Oddly enough, PRC officials, echo

many within U.S. Government and academic circles, 

that defenses against the growing PLA conven

theater missile threat would be destabilizing since 

would spark an arms race. The misplaced focus on m

defenses within academic and policy communities 

United States has resulted in neglect of the da

presented by Beijing’s growing arsenal of increa

accurate and lethal theater missiles. This arsenal, tog

with a preemptive doctrine, could give Beijing a de

edge in any future conflict with Taiwan. An overwhe

offensive advantage could intensify the existing cross-

arms race, reduce Beijing’s willingness to comprom

cross-Strait issues, increase the chances that force co

used short of an outright Taiwan declaration of d

independence, and naturally prompt Taiwan to shift to

a tactically offensive doctrine. At the extreme, an 

whelming PLA offensive advantage could force Taiw

pursue a punitive deterrent option.

In this chapter, the author will first address driver

are influencing the PLA force planners who view 

assets and theater missiles as integral to 21st ce

operations. He next outlines Chinese efforts to f

space-based reconnaissance architecture that w

support theater missile targeting; then he reviews res

and development aimed at fielding a large arsen

ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. Next, the a

details operational concepts associated with a PLA th

missile campaign, to include organizational is

108
information denial, and the Second Artillery’s p

approach to theater warfighting. He concludes w

discussion of the operational and political implications 

offense-dominated force structure, as well as pot

countermeasures.

DRIVERS

A number of drivers are propelling Beijing to

reliance on theater missiles and supporting space a

These include: (1) lessons from the Gulf War 

subsequent U.S. and Russian literature on the revolut

military affairs (RMA); (2) a doctrinal shift toward offe

preemption, surprise, and deep strikes against str

and operational targets; (3) use of Taiwan as a preem

force planning scenario; and (4) prevention of fo

intervention in a Taiwan scenario through an area d

strategy. 

Lessons from the Gulf War. China’s interest in 

attack was sparked in large part by lessons from the 

War and subsequent U.S. and Russian literature o

revolution in military affairs (RMA). The U.S. perform

in the Gulf War demonstrated to the Central M

Commission (CMC) the preeminence of the offe

especially airpower and long-range precision strike

December 1995 meeting, the CMC concluded that “g

fighting can only enhance the results of battle.” Le

from the Gulf War have been reinforced by calls to m

challenges of 21st century warfare through sel

exploitation of the RMA.

3

 Chinese commentators note ar

exploitation include precision strike, strategic maneuver, an

combat.

4

Emerging Operational Concepts. The Gulf War a

RMA have sparked a fundamental reassessment o

PLA’s approach to warfare. Operational con

articulated in a wide range of PLA publications serve 

important driver propelling the PLA toward th

missiles and supporting space assets. Key to f

109
conflicts around the PRC’s periphery will be achiev

political resolution through rapid establishme

information dominance (zhixinxiquan) and air supe

(zhikongquan) in the opening phases of a conflict.

5

concept of “rapid war, rapid resolution” ( suzhan, 

requires a series of crippling strikes directed agains

points (dianxue) of the enemy’s defense infrastruc

These critical nodes include civilian and military com

and control facilities; intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance nodes; and important airfields an

defense sites. This does not require annihilation o

enemy or occupation of his territory, only a para

“mortal blow” (zhiming daji), “winning victory wit

strike” (yizhan, ersheng).

6

 From the Chinese perspe

“gaining the initiative by striking first” ( xianfa zhir

one of most effective means of offsetting the technol

and logistical advantages that a more advanced mi

power would bring to the fight. The emerging do

requires a high degree of secrecy, mobility, an acc

concentration of firepower, and surprise.

7

Use of Taiwan as a Primary Force Planning Sce

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Taiwan appe

have become a primary testing grounds for the 

emerging operational concepts. Military force pla

around the world generally rely on illustrative pla

scenarios to guide the development of doctrine, res

and development (R&D), and acquisition. Until the ea

mid-1990s, China did not appear to be fostering an abi

take Taiwan by force. Nor did the PRC deploy more t

symbolic land, sea, or air force presence within 300 m

Taiwan. Now, however, PLA modernization—and th

missile development in particular—is motivated in 

part by the desire to use decisive military force as a me

deter Taiwan independence sentiment and strengthe

PRC’s hand in a reestablished cross-Strait dialogue

focus on Taiwan may reflect a view within the PLA 

force may eventually have to be used.

110
With Taiwan as the primary driver, the PLA has 

general operational requirements. First is the capac

bring Taiwan to its knees quickly through paraly

Taipei’s ability to conduct military operations. Crit

this effort is establishment of information dominan

neutralizing Taiwan’s intelligence, surveillance

reconnaissance assets and paralyzing its command 

control network. Information dominance enhance

conditions necessary to control the airspace over Ta

Theater ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, us

parallel with electronic warfare, special operations

offensive counterair operations, can play a crucial role 

rapid establishment of information and air superi

Control of the information environment and the skies 

the Taiwan Strait—if not enough to force a resolut

itself—could create the conditions necessary for domi

of seas and facilitate an amphibious invasion, if neces

The PLA must also hedge against strikes against it

critical assets and facilities.

Prevention of Foreign Intervention. At the same tim

PLA must deny foreign forces the ability to intervene 

through a quick resolution of the conflict or th

complicating their ability to enter the area of opera

Since the U.S. deployment of two aircraft carrier 

groups off the coast of Taiwan in March 1996, PLA pla

probably assume the United States would interven

future Taiwan scenario. PLA writings indicate Beij

pursuing the kinds of capabilities intended to de

prevent intervention by outside powers such as the U

States. The PLA has carefully studied U.S. mi

weaknesses and has identified vulnerabilities in U.S

projection, including reliance on space systems, weakn

in aircraft carrier battle groups, and expeditiona

forces.

9

The most fundamental requirement for denyin

United States the ability to intervene in a Taiwan co

would be an expanded capacity for intellig

surveillance, and reconnaissance. Monitoring 

111
deployments could enable PLA targeting of critical no

the Western Pacific in order to complicate or delay 

intervention in a Taiwan scenario. Successful u

overwhelming force through preemptive strikes to q

resolve the Taiwan issue could preclude U.S. interve

by presenting Washington and the international 

munity with a fait accompli. 

SPACE SUPPORT FOR THEATER MISSILE

OPERATIONS

Under CMC guidance, China’s space and m

industry intends to field a constellation of reconnais

systems that could support the PLA with near-rea

intelligence early in the 21st century. PLA observers 

exploitation of space assets as crucial for 21st ce

warfare. Theater operations must be support

surveillance architecture for strategic intellig

targeting, and battle damage assessment (BDA). Eff

theater missile operations need to see deep. Befor

targets can be struck, they must be identified as ta

precisely located, and defenses accurately assessed s

they can be hit without prohibitive losses. This req

information from a variety of space-based, airborne

ground-based sensors. Through its existing air

ground-based reconnaissance network, the PLA cur

has the ability to monitor activities within line of sigh

borders—approximately 200 nautical miles.

10

 Howe

expand its battlespace awareness, the PLA must de

the means to monitor activities in the Western P

South China Sea, and Indian Ocean. Space assets 

enable the monitoring of naval activities in the Pacif

Indian Oceans and the South China Sea and track U.

Force expeditionary air force deployments into the r

Space-based reconnaissance systems also provid

images necessary for mission planning functions, su

navigation and terminal guidance for land attack 

missiles. 

112
China Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC) is devel

at least four space-based systems that would expand 

battlespace awareness and support strike opera

further from Chinese shores.

11

 Space operations a

responsibility of the PLA General Armaments Depar

(GAD) China Launch and Tracking Control Ge

(CLTC).

12

 While only a small percentage of space-de

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) a

will be near real time, the number and diversity of se

could provide frequent revisit times and compleme

data on significant military targets on Taiwan and 

Western Pacific.

13

By the 2005-2010 timeframe, China’s space-

surveillance architecture could have at least 

components: 1) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satelli

all weather, day/night monitoring of military activit

electronic reconnaissance satellites to detect elec

emissions in the Western Pacific; 3) mid-high reso

electro-optical satellites for early warning, targeting

mission planning; and 4) a new generation of 

resolution recoverable satellites for intelligence 

analysis. According to Chinese sources, SAR and elec

reconnaissance satellites would serve as impo

components of an ocean monitoring (haiyang jia

network for detecting and tracking naval activiti

include carrier battle groups and submari

Development of space-based surveillance architectur

in large part been funded under the special 863-pro

budget.

14

Radar Imaging Satellites. Work on an indig

synthetic radar (SAR) satellite (hecheng kongjing 

weixing) began in the 1980s. Under the 863 Pro

China’s space industry and oceanographic res

organizations began preliminary research on a 

satellite in 1987. The program moved into the applied 

phase in 1991. After successful fielding of an airborn

system,

1 5

 China’s State Science and Techn

Commission (SSTC) and the PLA’s Commission on Sc

113
Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COST

approved the finalized design and associated high 

data transmission system in May 1995. 

Production of the first generation SAR satell

included in the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). C

first radar imaging satellite, designated the Haiy

(HY-1), is slated for launch in 2001. The HY-1 will be 

on a small satellite bus that will serve as a common bu

range of future satellite constellations, to includ

integrated SAR/Electro-optical (EO) small sat

constellation. The HY-1 and major subsystems pas

design finalization review recently and a test mo

supposed to be delivered by end of this year. Prelim

research has already begun on a more sophisti

second-generation SAR satellite system.

16

While SAR satellites have civilian applications, Ch

journals note their principal purpose is to support na

defense. The PLA and other parts of the state appa

view radar satellite imagery as a critical moderniz

program. Unlike electro-optical systems, GSD S

Department advocates note that space-based SAR sy

can see through clouds, rain, and fog in order to detec

track ships and submarines in shallow waters.

17

China has arranged to receive downlinked 

satellite imagery to help establish a foundation for 

satellite imagery exploitation. The PRC has en

contractual agreements to obtain commercial 

satellite data from a number of foreign vendors. 

began receiving SAR data from ERS-1 and JE

satellites in 1994 and from Canada’s RADARSAT in 

Included in the arrangement was training of im

analysts.

18

Electronic Reconnaissance Satellites. Elec

reconnaissance satellites (dianzi zhencha weixing) a

to be the second component of an ocean-monit

network. Strong indications exist that China 

resurrected an electronic reconnaissance satellite pro

114
that has been dormant for over 20 years. The 

experimented with electronic reconnaissance sate

euphemistically called “technical experimental sate

(jishu shiyan weixing), in the mid-1970s unde

Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics’ 701 Program. Tec

writings indicate the Shanghai Academy of Space

Technology (SAST), the successor of the Shanghai B

of Astronautics, has resurrected the program and inte

field a space-based electronic reconnaissance syste

least one SAST design under evaluation is a constellat

small electronic reconnaissance satellites that can e

precise location data and survivability.

19

 

Electro-optical Reconnaissance Systems. In addit

its ocean reconnaissance systems, China’s remote se

community is working feverishly to deploy space-

electro-optical (EO) remote sensing platforms. CAS

China’s electronics industries have made notable pro

in charged couple devices (CCDs), a technology wh

essential to the development of real-time EO im

systems.

20

 Fielding of EO satellites would enable Beij

beam images back to ground stations directly from spa

The Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), a joint venture between the 

and Brazil, will serve as China’s first EO reconnais

satellite. Launched in October 1999, the ZY-1 has a 2

lifespan and incorporates a data transmission syst

beam images back to earth. The ZY-1, operating 

altitude of 778 kilometers, is expected to have o

20-meter resolution but will add to China’s experienc

in EO imaging systems.

21

Building on the experience gained from the HY-

ZY-1 programs, CASC spokesmen have announced 

intention to field a tactical small satellite im

constellation and associated mobile ground rece

stations. The tactical imaging system, slated for laun

next two years, will consist of four EO and two 

satellites. The EO component likely will use the sam

115
as the HY-1 and is designed to have a five-meter reso

when operating in a 700-kilometer orbit.

22

Small satellite constellations are an important asp

China’s operational concept for space warfare. C

recognizing their military implications, Chinese de

officials advocate small satellite development in or

reduce vulnerability of fixed launch sites. Ch

engineers are examining the utility of using mobile

fueled launch vehicles, such as a modified DF-21 or DF

Reduced size and complexity allows for faster R&D 

manufacturing time, and production in signif

numbers. In a contingency situation, tactical im

satellites can be launched on demand, with mobile la

platforms increasing survivability. Multiple small sat

can be stacked on a single launch vehicle. Further

enemy attacks on small satellite constellations 

encounter greater targeting difficulties and be co

Destruction of one satellite will have minimal effect o

overall functioning of the architecture.

24

The FSW-3. China has launched more than a 

film-based recoverable satellites (fanhuishi weixi

FSW) since 1975. These systems stayed in orbit for up 

days and were used to obtain imagery of Taiwan and na

around China’s periphery, determine coordinat

facilities that were potential targets of Chinese mi

and map Chinese territory. China’s most recent gene

of reconnaissance satellite, the Fanhuishi-2 (FS

displayed an ability to maneuver in orbit. Reconnais

satellites generally have been launched from Ga

Jiuquan Space Launch Center.

25

 China’s next gene

recoverable satellite—the FSW-3—is expected to h

resolution of one meter. This satellite could be launch

early as later this year.

26

Ground Processing. China’s ground processing ca

is rapidly progressing. Chinese engineers are work

improve ultra high-speed data processing, storage

transmission systems, as well as computer, data com

116
sion, and networking technology to be able to handl

time, high-resolution imagery from multiple sate

Essential for the efficient transmission and process

satellite-derived imagery is data compression techn

which CAST is attempting to master.

27

 The PLA has f

a real time image storage system as well as an im

dissemination system that is linked to China’s na

integrated telecommunications network. The system 

allow subscribers to search and rapidly download ima

In 1996, the PLA installed a digitized high-reso

imagery processing system, the BGC-161.

29

China is receiving foreign assistance. In 1992, 

Telespazio signed an agreement worth U.S. $8 mill

provide Olivetti image processing computers and soft

Telespazio assigned technicians to train Chinese 

interpreters for up to three years. China’s procurem

foreign sources of imagery also includes option

training.

30

Despite significant investment in reconnais

systems, China may still have a limited near-rea

targeting capability. Reconnaissance satellites mu

within line of sight of a ground station to download 

imagery data. Targets on Taiwan could be image

immediately beamed back to a ground station o

mainland. However, satellites imaging targets furth

from China’s borders in the Western Pacific likely 

need to store their images and wait until they retu

within line of sight of the Chinese mainland. 

Future deployments of a sea-based imagery rec

station, a data relay satellite (DRS), or establishm

ground stations abroad would enhance China’s ext

range near-real-time targeting capability.

31

 A Chines

architecture under development is expected to inclu

least two geostationary satellites that could provi

percent coverage of the earth and support 5-10 satell

the same time.

32

117
R&D, production, and deployment of satellite sy

are expensive. However, much of the R&D budg

China’s space program comes from the State Co

science and technology budget, not from PLA coffers.

3

a price tag of between 5-12 million U.S. dollars per sat

the cost of satellite development in China is signific

less than in the United States or Western Europe.

addition to funding from the 863 Program, R&D of 

systems is subsidized by revenues from commercial 

launches and the sale of satellite systems abr

International cooperative efforts with Russia, Uk

Belarus, France, Germany, Italy, and Brazil cut costs 

more.

35

THEATER MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS

A space-based reconnaissance system will be 

element of the PLA’s emerging theater missile strike 

In March 1996, the Central Military Commission repo

convened an enlarged meeting and developed a p

develop seven weapons on a priority basis. Four of 

weapons are directly related to building a deep 

capability. At least one of the objectives was fie

China’s first generation land attack cruise miss

2000.

36

Dependence on theater missiles reflects a failu

China’s aviation industry to provide the types of ai

that normally would carry out this mission.

37

 Althoug

can carry only one-sixth the payload of an air-to-g

strike fighter, ballistic missiles have a strong psychol

deterrent effect, and are increasingly accurate, mobil

stealthy. Advocates argue that ballistic and land a

cruise missiles are relatively cheap while avi

technology is increasingly sophisticated and expensiv

mobilization is time consuming and relatively ea

detect. Air strikes against targets in denied areas req

measure of air superiority. Theater ballistic mis

however, can be rapidly mobilized with a high deg

118
secrecy. They are much harder to counter due to the

reentry speeds and short flight times.

38

Theater Ballistic Missiles.

Ballistic missiles are emerging as the backbo

conventional PLA theater operations. Drawing pro

lessons from the Gulf War, the PLA views conven

ballistic missiles as a crucial aspect of China’s eme

deep attack (zongshen daji) strategy.

39

 The China 

space S&T Corporation (CASC) appears to be produ

substantial number of conventional theater ba

missiles with ranges stretching from 300 to 

kilometers. In fact, a 1998 Department of Defense 

asserted that China’s space and missile industry pro

will have the capacity to produce as many as 1000 ba

missiles in the next decade.

40

 At an estimated cost o

$500,000 or less per missile, CASC would be able to pr

up to 1000 ballistic missiles at a total cost of $500 mil

CASC’s key producers of ballistic missiles—China Aca

of Launch Technology and the 066 Base in H

province—are leveraging foreign technology in ord

achieve tremendous advances in accuracy. At the 

time, they are diversifying the payloads of their ba

missile to increase their lethality. CASC and the PL

also examining a wide range of countermeasures to e

their theater ballistic missile force remains viable as 

theater missile defenses are introduced into the Asia-P

region. The PRC is concentrating on three conven

theater ballistic missile systems: 1) the DF-15 short-

ballistic missile (SRBM); 2) the DF-11 SRBM; and 

DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).

42

DF-15 Short-Range Ballistic Missile System. The 

(CSS-6) is a solid-fueled, 600 kilometer S

manufactured by the China Academy of Launch Techn

(CALT). The DF-15’s payload reportedly has an at

control mechanism that permits steering corrections 

separation to impact.

43

 The detachable warhead of

119
much smaller target than a SCUD, and its pot

maneuverability would complicate missile defense 

tracking, computations, and interception. With a un

high explosive warhead, the DF-15 could create a cra

large as 30-50 meters in diameter.

44

 Assuming a no

trajectory at a range of 500 kilometers, the DF-15 

reach an altitude of about 120 kilometers, achieve a re

speed of about two kilometers per second, and have a 

time of only six or seven minutes.

45

 Some rep

indicates the DF-15 currently has a 100-meter circular 

of probability (CEP).

46

 To diversify its theater ba

missile inventory, a 1200-kilometer range version 

DF-15 is reportedly under development.

47

DF-11 Short Range Ballistic Missile System. 

DF-11—better known by its export designator, the 

(CSS-7) — also is a solid propellant, road-mobile S

with an estimated range of 300 km. This missile, how

has not yet entered the PLA’s inventory. An imp

longer-range version of the DF-11 may be u

development.

48

 The main advantage of the DF-11 ov

DF-15 is its ability to carry a larger payload. Some so

credit the 300-kilometer version with an 800-kilo

warhead and a 150-meter CEP.

49

 The DF-11 is m

factured by the CASC’s 066 Base, also known a

Sanjiang Space Corporation, based in Hubei province

DF-11’s 300-kilometer range presents challenges for 

missile defenses due to its brief flight time of three min

Because its flight would remain within the atmosp

upper tier systems would be unable to engag

300-kilometer DF-11.

50

 Details on the longer-range v

are unavailable.

DF-21 Medium Range Ballistic Missile System. 

other missile system which could be brought to bear ag

Taiwan is the solid-fueled 2000 kilometer DF-21 (C

equipped with a 600 kilogram warhead. Research 

development on the DF-21 began in 1967, had its 

successful test in 1985, and deployed into an experim

regiment as early as 1991. With a circular error pro

120
(CEP) of 700 meters, the DF-21 is currently equipp

nuclear missions only. However, there are indication

since 1995 a terminal guidance system has been 

development for the DF-21 that could permit h

accurate conventional strikes.

51

 The DF-21 reentry sp

fast enough to preclude successful intercepts by lowe

missile defense systems. Because of its warhead siz

the inability of lower tier missile defense systems to e

longer range MRBMs, incorporation of a terminal gui

system could have significant military implications.

Technical Trends. 

Several efforts are underway to increase the acc

and lethality of China’s theater ballistic missiles. 

include: 1) terminal guidance; 2) a diverse mix of co

tional payloads; and 3) missile defense countermeasu

Terminal Guidance. The most significant develop

in China’s theater ballistic missile program i

development of terminal guidance systems that, acco

to Chinese writings, meet a CEP requirement of 

meters.

52

 CASC engineers point to three options in ba

missile terminal guidance. First, terrain mat

terminal guidance (dixing pipei mozhidao) makes 

digitized stored images (electro-optical or radar

matches them against the images acquired in the se

CALT began preliminary research on terrain mat

terminal guidance as early as 1977.

53

 Radar matchin

used on the U.S. Pershing-II and optical match

currently used on a Russian variant of the SCU

Chinese engineers note that critical technologies for te

matching terminal guidance include large scale and 

large-scale integrated circuits (LSIC/VLSIC).

54

 

A second means for terminal guidance is a milli

wave seeker (maomibo xun). CALT engineers have c

out a number of feasibility studies on terminal gui

technologies, to include millimeter wave and infra

Millimeter wave seekers are compact, lightweight, 

121
high spatial resolution, a robust antijamming capa

and are all weather. Critical technologies include L

microcomputers, and digital information manage

systems for target discrimination and tracking. Ch

engineers, however, note that millimeter wave (M

seekers are relatively expensive.

56

 

A final option for terminal guidance is exploitation 

global positional system (GPS). GPS-assisted gui

systems usually include a GPS receiver, a ring lase

(huanxing jiguang tuoluo), and microcomputer. The

indications China has already mastered use of GP

mid-course corrections. At least two tests of an on-

GPS trajectory reference system had been conducted 

1995.

57

 Use of GPS for terminal guidance requires fre

and highly precise updates from navigation satel

Potentially in support of this effort, China is instal

differential GPS network (chafen quanqiu dingwei x

along its eastern seaboard that could enhance the acc

of the PLA’s SRBM force.

58

As a final note, CASC institutes have 

relations—some officially sanctioned and some not—

counterparts in the former Soviet Union. Chinese eng

have approached Russian institutes for ballistic m

guidance and control technology and have hired a num

Russian scientists as technical advisors.

59

 

Conventional Payloads. There is evidence that 

intends to design up to six different payloads for its th

ballistic missiles. Today, the PLA’s conventional th

ballistic missiles are armed only with unitary 

fragmentation warheads. To diversify its missile pay

CASC writings indicate prioritization of three catego

specialized warheads for use against air defense 

radar, airfields, semi-hardened C4I centers, and po

submunition (zimudan) payloads; 2) electromagnetic 

warheads (dianci chongzhong dantou); 3) penet

warheads (zuandi dantou); and 4) fuel-air exp

warheads (youqi or leibao dantou).

60

122
Submunitions. A submunition warhead conta

number of small devices or “bomblets” designe

specialized roles. These warheads usually detonate 

preset altitude of several hundred meters so as to spre

munitions out to an optimal pattern size. Submu

warheads are far more efficient against targets susce

to blast and fragmentation than unitary warheads 

same weight. As of 1996, CALT was testing a g

submunition (jiandan zimudan) package for blas

fragmentation effects; and penetrating submun

(qinche zimudan) for cratering runways. More adv

packages under development include terminally g

sensor fused submunition warheads.

61

 There ar

indications of CBU-78 GATOR-like mine la

submunition development.

62

Electromagnetic Pulse Warhead (EMP). PLA wr

indicate that fielding of an anti-radiation EMP warhea

high priority. An anti-radiation warhead, specific

high-powered microwave (HPM) device, is viewed 

“natural enemy” (tiandi) of more technologically adv

militaries and an “electronic trump card” ( d

shashou).

63

 Due to challenges related to weaponiz

device with enough power, HPM warheads would in

only be effective against radiating targets withi

immediate area of impact—radar and communica

centers would be the prime candidates. As the techn

progresses, HPM warheads could achieve wider eff

The developers of the DF-11—known as the 066 Base—

demonstrated the most interest in HPM warheads.

65

Penetration Warheads. Chinese engineers note th

increase in CEP to better than 50 meters would perm

use of penetration warheads (zuandi dantou) that wou

deep into semi-hardened facilities such as comman

control centers, intelligence collection facilities

weapons storage facilities which are housed in con

bunkers. CALT warhead engineers have tested a ra

high strength steels and other material and stru

123
technologies that would dig into critical hard

facilities.

66

Fuel-Air Explosive Warhead. There are also indic

that the DF-15 may carry a fuel-air explosive 

warhead. FAE warheads offer greater explosive powe

weight approximately 50 percent less than conven

explosives. Pound for pound, FAE weapons are three 

times as destructive as high explosive warheads. 

example, a 500kg FAE warhead would destroy most ai

and injure all personnel within 250 meters of the i

point. Chinese designers have studied the use of 

warheads since the 1970s and tested the effectiveness 

FAE as early as 1976 by detonating an U.S. device tha

been captured by the Vietnamese and transferr

Beijing.

67

Missile Defense Countermeasures.

The PLA places a premium on ensuring its ba

missile force would be able to penetrate future 

theater missile defenses. PLA and defense ind

analysts are examining a range of more sophisticated 

countermeasures that could reduce the effectiven

active missile defense systems.

Saturation. The simplest means of overcoming m

defense architecture is through saturating it with a 

number of missiles. Given enough ballistic and land a

cruise missiles, any system can be saturate

overwhelming a missile defense systems’ area of cove

Saturation generally requires a large number of mi

timed to arrive together in order to bunch effective

ground defense saturation. PLA General Arma

Department engineers have evaluated PAT

saturation rates and are confident that their th

ballistic missiles can reach their targets.

68

Maneuvering Re-Entry Vehicles. More sophist

countermeasures could reduce the effectiveness of 

124
missile defenses short of the brute force satur

approach. For example, the CASC is developin

capabilities that would permit conventional ballistic m

re-entry vehicles to maneuver in their terminal p

Missile designers believe maneuvering not only is ess

for terminal guidance packages but is also a mea

complicate ballistic missile defenses. Through mod

and simulation, CASC has determined that maneuver

a viable means to reduce land-based lower tier T

probability of kill rates.

69

 In support of this research 

China allegedly acquired PATRIOT technology to cal

an auxiliary propulsion system on the DF-15 re

vehicle to enable the payload to outmaneuver a PAT

system as it re-enters the atmosphere.

70

 Missile des

have also demonstrated a special interest in the 

control maneuver (sudu kongzhi jidong) used i

1800-kilometer Pershing-II.

71

Shaping, Stealth, Decoys, and On-Board Jam

CALT warhead designers have already lowered the D

and DF-11 signature through shaping of the warhea

warhead designer can lower the signature of a re

vehicle further by reducing the infrared signal 

incorporating stealth design technologies to reduc

radar cross-section. Use of balloons can also mask the 

of reentry vehicles and chaff (jinshu botiao) can be re

with the reentry vehicle in an attempt to hide the 

behind a cloud of radar reflecting metal strips. Ch

engineers have tested chaff packages. Other mea

under investigation include electronic and inf

countermeasures on board reentry vehicles, as w

carrying out hard kills against enemy TMD radar th

the use of anti-radiation missiles.

72

 CASC missile eng

have tested active jammers that can broadcast a 

designed to interfere with a radar’s ability to dete

target object or corrupt the signal in such a way as to 

the radar to receive a false echo.

73

 National Univer

Defense Technology analysts have examined elec

countermeasure packages on board theater ba

125
missiles as a means to counter millimeter wave and inf

seekers on missile defense interceptors.

74

 In 1995 and 

the Chinese allegedly tested DF-21 endo-atmosp

decoys.

75

Laser Cladding. Looking ahead to the pot

deployment of boost phase intercept systems such a

airborne laser (ABL), Chinese engineers are develop

coating for ballistic missiles that could complicate 

missile defense high power lasers. Using their 

indigenously developed high powered lasers, Ch

institutes have tested various coating materials to p

the outer shell of ballistic missiles, a process known as 

cladding (jiguang rongfu).

76

 Laser cladding, togethe

the spinning of theater ballistic missiles, may not 

ballistic missiles immune to boost phase missile de

systems but could increase required lasing time, 

reducing the number of laser shots available per 

mission. 

Multi-Axis Attacks. The Second Artillery and 

have conducted modeling exercises and simulations t

China’s ability to break though the wide range of pro

TMD deployments. Modeling has focused on large 

sizes, using combinations of surface-to-surface, a

surface, and sea-to-surface theater missile systems. 

computer simulations and modeling exercises, CA

confident that its theater ballistic missiles can neut

opposing land based lower tier systems.

77

Depressed Trajectories. Chinese missile analysts 

depressed trajectories (yadi guidao) as another opt

counter space-based and exo-atmospheric upper tier m

defense systems. A 1200-kilometer range ballistic m

on a nominal trajectory will normally reach an altitu

400 kilometers, rendering the missile vulnerable to 

tier missile defenses for a substantial portion of the f

However, launching a missile at a depressed traj

could allow the missile to achieve only a 100-kilo

altitude that limits the ability of exo-atmospheric 

126
systems to engage the missile. Testing and modelin

been done on the DF-3 (CSS-2), which normally has a 

of 2780 kilometers, with a maximum altitude of 55

With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 1550 kilom

at 100 kilometers altitude.

78

 

Land Attack Cruise Missiles.

To augment its theater ballistic missile arsenal, Ch

creating a new generation of cruise missiles ab

penetrate defenses and strike critical targets with pre

and increased firepower. Fielding of land attack 

missiles (LACMs) may prompt expansion of missions 

PLA’s Second Artillery and Navy. Increasing availabi

cheap navigation and guidance systems and d

mapping technology have increased the incentive

reduced the time required to field a LACM. 

Cheaper and more accurate than ballistic mis

LACMs appear to have a relatively high develop

priority. The size and flight profile of ground-, air

sea-launched cruise missiles can stress the capabilit

even the most modern air defense systems. Ch

research and development of LACMs is being aided 

aggressive effort to acquire foreign cruise m

technology and subsystems, particularly from Russia

first LACM to enter production probably wou

air-launched and could be operational early in the 

century.

79

The heart of China’s LACM missile developmen

within CASC’s Third Academy, headquartered 

southwest of Beijing. Over 14,500 technicians and wo

ply their trade in ten research institutes and two 

factories. The following discussion of China L

development focuses on: 1) the underlying rationa

LACM development; 2) specific LACM systems tha

come on line within the next 5 years; 3) the mission pla

process; and 4) general technical trends influencing C

LACM development.

80

127
Why Land Attack Cruise Missiles? Land attack 

missiles have a number of advantages over ballistic mi

or manned aircraft. China’s first generation LACM is 

to be up to twice as accurate as their theater ba

missiles. Successful exploitation of GPS, indigenous a

foreign procured remote sensing data, and digital ma

technology could permit the fielding of an LACM with a 

of 16 meters or better. LACMs are cheaper to prod

generally thought to be one-third the cost of ba

missiles. For example, if one assumes an SRBM unit c

$500,000, then the unit cost of an LACM could be as li

$175,000. Chinese defense industrial observers note 

developing an arsenal of cruise missiles could have 

ratio over the cost of defending against them. A

president of the Third Academy has pointed out, the c

producing cruise missiles is 20-30 percent less in 

than it is in other countries.

81

Cruise missiles offer other appealing features as 

Use of GPS allows launchers to forego pre-surveyed la

sites, permitting the missile to disperse to a greater ra

launch sites. Ground-launched LACMs can be 

survivable. With a low take-off weight, they tend to be 

easily transportable than theater ballistic missiles. 

infrared launch signature would be less than tha

ballistic missile, decreasing warning time and incre

survivability. Unlike ballistic missiles, land attack 

missiles could be loaded onto ships and fired at land ta

that may have not been anticipated.

82

Land attack cruise missiles pose serious challeng

air defenses. Due to the earth’s curvature, ground-

radar can detect a low flying cruise missile only abo

kilometers away. In comparison, an aircraft flying at 1

feet can be detected when it is about 240 kilometers 

Newer missiles are incorporating stealth features 

would make them even less visible to radar and inf

detectors.

128
PLA LACM Programs. In accordance with sta

Third Academy R&D practices, China’s future fam

land attack cruise missiles likely will be based on airfr

which have already been fielded.

83

 Chinese and W

sources indicate at least three families of cruise m

may be under evaluation for a land attack mission: 

Silkworm; 2) the multipurpose Yingji-8 missile; and 

anti-radiation missile that Western sources 

designated as the YJ-9.

84

The Land Attack Silkworm. China’s first LAC

expected to be a Silkworm derivative. This sy

designated the XY-41 as early as 1989, will be smaller

mobile, and more accurate than ballistic missiles su

the DF-15, but carry the same size warhead (500kg)

XY-41 is a variant of the HY-4 anti-ship cruise mis

The Silkworm-derivative could be air- or ground-lau

and reportedly will have a range of 300-400 kilom

indicating an upgrade to the HY-4’s turbojet engine.

86

Western reporting asserts that CASC is getting fo

assistance in development of an integrated INS/GPS s

and in warhead technology.

87

Ground-launched LACMs would be subordinated 

Second Artillery. Based on existing organizat

structures within the Second Artillery and in co

Silkworm units, a ground launched LACM brigade 

would be divided in four battalions, with each bat

having four company-sized fire units with one launch

fire unit. A first generation LACM brigade could ado

organization structure similar to today’s typical HY

unit—four towed launchers, a firing command veh

truck mounted microwave relay, and auxiliary power 

The HY-4 is launched via a solid rocket booster be

turbojet engine takes over for the duration of the fligh

missile cruises at about Mach 0.8 and maintains an al

between 70-200 meters.

88

The YJ-8. A second system reported by Western so

as being adapted for land attack use is the smaller Yi

129
(YJ-8). The Exocet-like YJ-8 series adopts a solid prop

that decreases the size and weight of the system to e

more diverse set of launching modes. With the solid m

however, the YJ-8’s range is limited to 42 kilometers o

A YJ-8 follow-on, designated the YJ-82, utilizes the 

basic airframe but uses a small turbojet engine instea

solid motor that extends the airframe’s range t

kilometers. The alleged land attack version o

YJ-8—reportedly the turbojet variant—would incorp

integrated GPS and TERCOM guidance. Western so

indicate the Third Academy may be extending its rang

least 300 kilometers and claim that GPS-aided 

gation—augmented by terrain contour matching—

result in cruise missiles like the YJ-8 to achieve an acc

of up to 10 meters. The YJ-8’s smaller warhead (1

however, would limit the missile’s utility.

89

A Chinese Anti-Radiation Missile. The PLA and C

space and missile community have also devo

significant degree of attention to development of 

missiles with passive seekers to counter enemy 

systems. Like ballistic and other cruise mis

anti-radiation missiles are considered as a shashouji

priority development. Western sources have desig

China’s new family of anti-radiation missiles as the Yi

(YJ-9), a system influenced by Russia’s Kh-31P a

Israel’s STAR-1 ARM systems. There are persistent ru

of PLA procurement or joint production arrangement 

Kh-31P, which Chinese engineers note was speci

developed to counter the U.S. AWACS, PATRIOT MP

radar, and AEGIS SPY-1D phased array radar. C

defense industrial complex, specifically the Third Aca

with support from the Harbin Institute of Technolo

aggressively pursuing deployment of a long-r

anti-radiation missile.

90

 Some Western sources alle

extended range version of the YJ-9 may have a range 

kilometers.

91

 Chinese research indicates China’s 

generation anti-radiation missile will be air-launched

130
Mission Planning. Mission planning exploits navig

aids and flight management computers to permit LAC

fly along precise, pre-programmed routes. This gen

involves use of a land attack navigation system, incl

exploitation of U.S. NAVSTAR GPS and Ru

GLONASS, a radar altimeter, an inertial measure

unit, and a sophisticated flight management com

Because mission planning requires a knowledge o

shape of the terrain and obstructions found along the 

missile’s intended flight path, satellite imagery 

geographic information systems (GIS) play an impo

supporting role.

93

Much of this technology is available commer

off-the-shelf.

94

 Commercial imagery is adequate to 

routes with relative positional accuracy on the order o

of meters. China’s indigenous remote sensing program 

future commercial sources will provide even more p

data. There are a number of commercially available m

planning software programs which can manipulate so

of imagery for robust mission planning for mi

purposes. 

There are two major mission planning processe

route and terminal. Both heavily rely on intelligenc

the enroute planning process, General Staff Depar

(GSD) intelligence and cartography/mapping o

probably would identify enemy air defenses to avoi

generate en route terrain data. Routes would be vali

and waypoints en route to the target loaded into the L

computer.

95

 Because of the requirement for large data

and computer operations, the mission planning p

likely would be centralized in Beijing and then transm

to the theater operations command center. 

An important en route mission planning techn

under development is terrain contour matc

(TERCOM). A prerequisite for TERCOM ( dixing 

zhidao) is generation of electronic maps from 

resolution satellite images. TERCOM uses a 

131
altimeter to measure terrain features along its flight 

and correlate these measurements with internally s

digital maps. The Third Academy has been condu

preliminary research into TERCOM since at least 1

There is some indication China is examining integ

combined GPS/GLONASS receivers on board their m

as well.

97

For terminal planning, the most advanced PLA s

under development is the digital scene matching 

correlation (DSMAC) system. DSMAC updates the po

of the missile by matching a stored image to a ser

images sensed in flight. The planning requir

substantial and complex. A PLA targeteer likely 

obtain a photograph of the targeted area and gen

DSMAC scenes for programming into the cruise mi

flight computer. The DSMAC images are prepared 

satellite photographs of the target. Higher reso

images allow for more accurate updates and a better 

PLA GSD intelligence analysts would identify targ

interest and then either pull the image from the libr

task China’s remote sensing community to procur

image. PLA GSD targeteers would then select aimpoi

exploit the most vulnerable aspect of a command 

control facility or airfield. The photograph would th

transformed into a digital image and loaded onto the L

computer. Third Academy engineers believe en rout

terminal mission planning systems can assure a CEP 

meters or less.

98

The mission planning process can take up to se

hours. The PLA’s deep attack strategy, however, do

necessarily require a rapid mission planning process 

most targets on Taiwan would be strategic and sta

nature. If indigenous near-real-time space remote se

systems were available, GSD would task the sa

operators for the imagery. The GSD could also 

quick-turnaround imagery from a foreign provider, su

Russia, Israel, or France. 

132
Deployment of a LACM capability likely will sp

shift in organizational responsibilities. As prev

mentioned, the Second Artillery appears to be a pr

procurement agent for ground launched LACMs.

99

 

launched Silkworm LACM will likely use PLA Air 

subordinated B-6s. If the YJ-8 were fielded as a L

tactical fighter-bombers such as the FB-7 would serve 

primary platform. There are indications the PLA Nav

be seeking to expand its mission to include conven

missile strikes against land-based targets from the s

Technical Trends.

China’s Third Academy intends to upgrade its 

missile production capacity, extend the range and sp

its cruise missiles, diversify its choices of terminal gui

systems, and lower their radar cross-section.

Production Trends. The Third Academy is upgrad

ability to design and manufacture highly complex 

missiles. They are integrating the use of virtual r

(xuni xianshi) in cruise missile development, and are 

increasingly sophisticated supercomputers to desig

missiles. Third Academy manufacturing centers 

imported some of the world’s most advanced engine

workstations, and three, four, and five-axis com

numerically controlled machine tools.

1 0 1

 CA

world-class simulation facility in western Beijing als

cruise missile development by theoretically red

testing requirements by 40-60 percent and short

overall development time by 30-40 percent.

102

 Acqu

of advanced Western systems could also reduce produ

time—Chinese engineers have reportedly had access 

intact Tomahawk that fell into Afghanistan territo

August 1998.

103

Propulsion Systems. Engineers are also worki

better propulsion systems that can increase the lethal 

and/or speed of the cruise missile. Faster cruise m

reduce an adversary’s reaction time. In one of China’s 

133
significant aerospace programs, the PLA Ge

Armament Department (GAD) and the Third Academ

designing a supersonic combustion ramjet engine (scra

or chaoran chongya fadongji) which can propel a mis

hypersonic speeds of between Mach 4-10.

104

 Enginee

also working toward more efficient turbojet and tur

engines and motors to significantly extend the ran

cruise missiles. The anticipated range of China’s 

generation of land attack cruise missiles would be limi

around 300-400 kilometers. However, to be able 

targets in Japan using a ground launched system, the 

Academy would have to produce a missile with a 1250

kilometer range (750 kilometers for Okinawa).

105

Radar Signature Reduction. With foreign assis

China’s defense industrial complex is also striving to r

the radar cross-section of their cruise missiles.

10

aerospace industry has produced radar absorbing ma

that targets the frequency range in which most acqui

radar operates (2-18 GHZ). While this material wou

provide complete protection from radar detection, it 

reduce the detection range of defensive radar. Eng

assert that radar-absorbing material, used in combin

with contour shaping, can reduce the effective ran

radar by 75 percent.

107

 Radar absorbent material

relatively high speed reduce warning time availa

defenders and compress their timeline for dete

tracking, identifying, and engaging the inbound miss

Infrared Signature Reduction. Third Academy of

are also working to increase the survivability of thei

attack cruise missiles by reducing their infrared 

signature. This could be achieved by the addition of 

reduction tail cone which is designed to mix cool air th

traveled down the length of the airframe with h

emitted from the jet exhaust. This would improv

survivability against IR sensors and IR homing mi

Engineers are attempting to reduce the signature on 

missile propellants, and conceal the location of mobil

attack cruise missiles.

108

134
Other Terminal Guidance Systems. Other ter

sensor technologies under development include pa

imaging infrared, CO2 laser radar, millimeter wave

synthetic aperture radar terminal sensors, as w

various composite systems. R&D into passive im

infrared sensors is focused on matching a s

computerized image with a real infrared image detec

the missile.

109

 Third Academy engineers have alread

the technical foundation for a CO2 laser guidance syst

include the target recognition components.

110

 Ch

aerospace engineers believe synthetic aperture r

millimeter wave radar, infrared imaging, and laser 

guidance could result in an accuracy of one to 

meters.

111

THE CONVENTIONAL SECOND ARTILLERY

The PLA entity most responsible for deep s

missions against vital strategic and operational targ

the Second Artillery (dierpaobing). Since its establish

in the 1960s, the Second Artillery’s mission has been li

to nuclear counterstrikes. Since the conclusion of th

War, however, Chinese planners have diversifie

Second Artillery’s mission to include conventional s

against high value strategic targets. The Second Arti

adoption of a conventional strike role marks one of the 

significant developments in PLA modernization. 

discussion of the conventional Second Artillery outlin

its organizational structure, 2) the vital role of inform

denial in Second Artillery operations, and 3

conventional theater missile campaign doctrine 

operations.

Organization.

The Second Artillery, with an estimated 9

personnel, consists of headquarters elements, six la

bases (jidi), one engineering design academy, four res

institutes, two command academies, and possibly an 

135
warning unit.

112

 As key operational strike units, bri

are likely only assigned one type of missile to fac

command and logistics. The Second Artillery headqu

and subordinate bases oversee warhead and missile st

facilities; maintenance units; and special warhead/m

transportation services.

113

 

 The 80302 Unit, headquartered in the mountain 

town of Huangshan, Jiangxi province, is the S

Artillery’s most important base for conventional long-

precision strikes against Taiwan.

114

 The Huangsha

includes both nuclear and conventionally armed th

missiles. During a wartime situation, mu

conventional brigades would be subsumed i

conventional theater missile corps (juntuan) consistin

corps command post, a corps logistics command post, 

number of subordinate theater missile brigades each 

different types of theater missiles. The corps comman

would largely consist of command authorities from B

and Huangshan.

115

The corps/base also oversees a set of “equip

assurance units” (zhuangbei baozhang budui) 

includes a missile/warhead storage unit ( zhuangbei 

qinwu budui), a transfer station (zhuanyunzhan), 

repair depot (tezhuang xiulicang). Other corps/base su

elements include a reconnaissance unit (jizhen dad

surveying/mapping unit (cehui dadui); a computer 

(jisuan zhongxin); a weather center (qixiang zhongx

communications regiment (tongxintuan); an ECM reg

(dianzi duikangtuan); and an engineering reg

(gongchengtuan). Additional engineering, air defens

anti-chemical units can be assigned as needed.

116

A typical conventional theater missile brigade has 

consisting of a headquarters, political, logistics

equipment technology (jizhuangbu) departments. B

elements include a mobile brigade command post, a c

depot (known as a “technical position” or jishu zhen

transfer point (zhuanzai changping), and an assigned 

136
pre-surveyed launch sites (fashe zhendi), as well as a 

reserve (daiji) launch sites. A conventional missile br

also has a set of “equipment assurance sub-u

(zhuangbei baozhang fendui).

117

 Brigades have at leas

firing battalions (fasheying), with each battalion ass

at least three-four companies.

118

 Companies subordin

the launch battalion likely would be assigned at lea

launcher, an electric power generation vehicle ( fadia

a surveying vehicle ( cekongche), a communica

command vehicle (tongxun zhihuiche), and a m

transport vehicle (daodan yunshuche). Battalion

companies would be assigned a zone within wh

operate.

119

Information Denial and the Theater Missile

Campaign.

Key to the success of a theater missile campa

concealing the forward deployment of brigade elem

Surprise can only be achieved through denial of fo

human and technical intelligence assets. To ensure a 

degree of concealment, the Second Artillery has appro

information denial in three ways: 1) communica

security; 2) passive and active counterspace measure

3) a supporting space tracking network.

Secure Communications. Denying a potential adve

the ability to monitor communications and 

electromagnetic emissions is a top priority. Beij

examining a wide range of technologies to reduc

vulnerabilities of its communications to intercepti

jamming. Beijing has issued directives to st

implement communications security (COM

measures.

120

 Introduction of fiber optics communic

significantly increases its communications secu

Engineers are studying the application of spread spe

and frequency hopping technology for Beijing’s sa

tracking and control network, as well as more s

satellite communications methodologies.

121

 China i

137
investing in more complex encryption ( mim

algorithms.

122

Passive Counterspace Measures. The doc

requirement for preemption and secrecy is also leadin

PRC toward development of passive and active cou

space measures. The PLA is stressing passive counter

operations in an attempt to deny foreign reconnais

satellites with information on its disposition of force

R&D programs. Writings from the Academy of Mi

Sciences (AMS) indicate the PLA has a concerted eff

defeat opto-electronic, infrared, and radar reconnais

systems. Specific measures include the exploitat

natural camouflage, and deception ( qipian), to in

distribution of false indicators and intelligence.

123

 C

R&D into camouflage, concealment, and decept

explicitly intended to counter air and space-

reconnaissance platforms.

124

 In 1992, COSTIND and 

established camouflage standards for missile develop

in order to counter foreign optical, infrared, and 

satellite systems.

125

 PLA engineers have also pub

technical papers on methods to reduce infrared signat

underground facilities.

126

Another approach to countering space syste

through electronic countermeasures. The GAD and C

electronics industry appear to be developing a jamm

counter radar satellites.

127

 PLA affiliated public

assert that China is capable of damaging optical 

naissance satellites through the use of high-pow

lasers.

128

 Such measures would deny an adversary u

satellite, but not destroy the platform itself, pe

avoiding escalation of the conflict. As a side note, GA

CASC are also moving toward fielding jammers inten

complicate use of communication satellites and NAV

GPS.

129

Active Counterspace Measures. The PRC is 

examining more lethal measures to negate foreign sat

if necessary. Open source literature strongly suggests 

138
Chinese direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) program m

in the model development stage in which the space ind

is identifying various design proposals for seeker

propulsion systems. Chinese writings indicate R&

ASAT systems is intended to discourage attacks on 

own space systems. Technical papers demonstrate so

the greatest obstacles in developing an active counter

capability are with development of a homing kill vehic

associated terminal guidance. Specific systems 

evaluation and simulation include infrared, radar

impulse radar terminal guidance.

130

 Chinese eng

have conducted studies to counter satellite decoys as w

Space Tracking Network. The key to passive and 

counterspace operations is a space-tracking network 

can monitor satellites passing overhead. China cur

can detect and track most satellites with sufficient acc

for targeting purposes.

132

 The PLA is modernizin

expanding its tracking network, which is operated b

PLA General Armament Department’s China Launc

Tracking Control General (CLTC). CLTC is a

overseas links in Chile and the South Pacific isla

Kiribati, and has contracted with France for access to 

from its space-tracking network.

133

 China Acade

Sciences’ astronomical observatories in Nanjing 

Kunming feed into the CLTC network, providing o

prediction data. CAS and CLTC are upgrading 

network of high-resolution telescopes, augmented by 

tracking devices. China’s space community claim

ability to detect objects in space down to 10 inches.

1

CLTC space tracking network likely supports the S

Artillery through alert messages indicating that fo

reconnaissance satellites are passing overhead.

135

The Phased Campaign.

A PLA theater missile campaign could take a num

forms. An initial option would be to use theater missile

show of force, similar to the missile exercises of 199

139
U.S. reaction to the last limited show of force, however

have demonstrated that this option is not viable. If th

indeed desires to deny U.S. intervention through 

accompli, a slow, gradual limited use option would pe

buildup of U.S. forces in the region. PLA opera

concepts call for large scale, preemptive opera

Preemptive theater missile strikes, carried o

conjunction with air strikes and special operation

intended to create favorable conditions for dominance 

dimensions of theater warfare.

A theater missile campaign would support achieve

of the “three superiorities” ( sanquan)—inform

dominance (zhixinxiquan); air superiority (zhikong

and sea superiority (zhihaiquan).

136

 Strikes supporti

quest for information dominance would target the ci

and military leadership, semi-hardened command 

control centers, weak links in Taiwan’s defense inform

infrastructure, key intelligence collection facilities

electronic warfare facilities. PLA conventional ballist

land attack cruise missiles would attempt to pa

(tanhuan) Taiwan’s command and control system by c

off fielded military forces from the civilian and mi

leadership in Taipei. Anti-radiation missiles wou

employed against key radar installations.

137

 

To achieve air superiority, the PLA would target k

defense sites and airfields. The PLA would seek to da

Taiwan Air Force runways, taxiways, weapons st

facilities, airfield command posts, and fuel depo

complicate generation of sorties. Strikes against a

runways and taxiways are referred to as an “ai

blockade” (fengsuo jichang). The objective would be to 

and paralyze air defense systems to allow a wind

opportunity for follow-on PLAAF strikes and 

achievement of air superiority. Air superiority is k

establishing a no fly zone; enabling freedom of action o

ocean for a blockade; or permitting greater freedom of a

for physical occupation of the island if necessary.

138

140
To achieve sea superiority, PLA writings ind

prioritization of strikes against naval ports. Th

objective will be to strike naval facilities in the op

phases of conflict as a means to prevent projection of 

power and resupply of strategic resources by sea. “S

opportunities” exist when ships are concentrated in p

when they are moving along known transit routes en 

to the theater of operations.

139

Unsubstantiated reports indicate that a ph

campaign could require at least 400 theater mi

distributed in as many as seven conventional m

brigades.

140

 To maximize firepower for the most 

scenario, they most probably would be based in the Na

Military Region or chopped to the Taiwan thea

operations joint command during a crisis. PLA wr

indicate that approximately 50 percent of its total th

missile inventory would be used in the initial strike p

Western sources believe the PLA may deploy as ma

650 SRBMs opposite Taiwan over the next several yea

The theater command center (zhanyi zuozhan zho

would direct the missile campaign as one componen

joint strike force that also would include air forces, g

force artillery and tactical missiles, electronic attack a

and special operations.

142

 Coordination will be carri

via a firepower coordination cell (huoli xietiaozu) with

theater command center.

143

 PLA officers envision 

phase theater missile campaign: 1) operat

preparations phase (zuozhan zhunbei jieduan); 2) cam

mobility phase (zhanyi jidong jieduan); 3) missile 

phase (daodan tuji jieduan); and 4) enemy countera

phase (kangdi fanji jieduan).

144

 Operational Preparations Phase.

After a CMC determination on the appropriate cou

action (juexin), the operational preparation phase 

would include development or review of a mobility 

increased security, and closer monitoring of fo

141
satellites and air/naval activity in the Western Pa

Working in conjunction with the theater command, m

reconnaissance officers and planners probably w

review or develop targeting folders. General 

Department and theater intelligence staff would e

existing intelligence and/or task space-based im

assets for updates to support targeting. The fire

coordination cell within the theater command center 

prioritize detected targets in keeping with the guida

higher command for the conduct of the theater cam

and determine the most effective method of dealing 

those targets. The theater command would de-co

strikes so that firepower is not wasted, a complicate

time-consuming process. Theater commanders also 

modify preplanned targeting of targets that have ch

over time.

145

 Campaign Mobility Phase.

During the campaign mobility phase, brigade ele

would deploy to the area of operations in a well-disg

fashion. Rail is the normal way of moving launcher

missiles from brigade garrison to a staging area or tra

assembly point (zhuanzai changping).

146

 The indi

launchers would then disperse to pre-surveyed launch 

(zhendi) within the battalion’s assigned area of opera

not far from rail lines or highways.

147

 A mobile com

and control center would coordinate launches. 

reaction (kuaisu fanying) is essential, requiring a 

calculation of position, orienting the missile, inpu

targeting data, and scattering in a very short period of 

Chinese writings indicate that units intend to launch w

40 minutes after arrival to the pre-surveyed launch si

To reduce reliance on pre-surveyed launch sites, how

the PLA appears to be integrating GPS onto their m

launchers.

149

Communication between firing units and u

echelons likely would be carried out through a mix of m

142
SATCOM, mobile digital microwave, and/or fiber o

Due to its high level of security and reliability, the S

Artillery is trying to hardwire as much of its opera

infrastructure as possible with fiber optics.

150

 For se

reasons, any wireless transmissions are to be limi

eight seconds or less. Operational orders wou

transmitted through an automated command and c

(C2) system due to the complexity and timel

requirements of conventional theater missile opera

PLA officers note the requirement to integrate the S

Artillery’s automated C2 system with that of the 

theater command’s automated C2 system.

151

Missile Strike Phase.

During the missile strike phase, Second Artillery 

would support joint theater operations by striking str

and operational centers of gravity. Missile firings wo

coordinated with other strike assets and directed ag

critical nodes (yaohai) within an enemy’s infrastru

Chinese writings indicate that after an initial 

launchers could move to new pre-surveyed launch 

within that brigade’s assigned area of operations.

15

least three raids are feasible if one assumes availabi

400 theater missiles for the phased campaign.

153

 Th

intends to carry out synchronized launches from a 

range of azimuths in order to stress active missile def

and associated battle management systems.

154

 A ra

space-based, airborne, and battlefield intelligence sy

are needed to adjust firepower.

155

 The PLA has indicated prioritization of three 

sets: 1) air and missile defense sites; 2) airfield

surface-to-surface missile sites; and 3) command, co

communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) faci

Neutralizing ground-based air defenses, airfields, an

facilities through multiple theater missile raids 

present a window of opportunity for follow-on air stri

consolidate air superiority over the island. PLA m

143
strikes against airfields could deny outside power

ability to rush additional military equipment or mi

supplies to the island.

156

 Some PLA-affiliated an

speculate that parallel strikes against airfields, air de

sites, and other critical targets could permit PL

superiority over the skies of Taiwan in as little 

minutes.

157

Ground Based Air and Missile Defense. PLA wr

identify ground-based air and missile defense un

primary targets. The critical node within an air or m

defense fire unit most likely would be its rada

command van. If no missile defenses existed, and CA

able to meet the PLA’s accuracy requirement of 

meters, then only three to five missiles would be nece

to cause significant damage to key nodes within a fir

with a high degree of confidence. To neutralize 

theater missile defense units, PLA writings indicate 

coordinated strikes from multiple directions, us

combination of ballistic missiles, decoy drones, land a

cruise missiles, and/or anti-radiation missiles.

158

 Rad

command vans could be subject to special opera

attacks and electronic countermeasures. Because 

re-entry speed precludes engagement by endo-atmosp

interceptors, conventional DF-21 MRBMs wou

especially effective in neutralizing lower tier m

defense fire units. Guided submunition or an FAE pa

likely would be the warheads of choice.

159

Airfields and Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) 

Another critical target for PLA ballistic and land a

cruise missile strikes in a Taiwan scenario wou

airfields and SSM sites. Senior Second Artillery o

write in internal journals that “attack opportunities

de shiji) will also exist against “intervening superp

forces as they build up airpower in the region.

160

 Ai

that could support offensive strike operations again

mainland would be the first priority. An “airfield bloc

would seek to damage runways, taxiway surfaces, and 

critical nodes within an airbase. The PLA would need 

144
numbers of theater missiles for a complete “ai

blockade.” However, the PLA would need only a hand

impede Taiwan’s ability to generate sorties. Strikes ag

runways likely would be particularly effecti

temporarily pinning down much of the Taiwan Air Fo

Any runway damage would slow aircraft operations, s

because it takes time to determine the location and ext

the damage. Destruction of key facilities, such as a

command centers, control towers, fuel depots, p

generation facilities, and maintenance hangars would 

a serious effect on air operations. Casualties to pilot

maintenance crews could be especially traumatic. U

runway mines and targeting of unprotected rapid ru

repair equipment would complicate recovery operatio

Warheads of choice for runway damage would in

penetrator submunitions.

163

To aid in its training, the PLA has constructed a mo

of one of Taiwan’s key airfields. The mock-

Chingchuankang (CCK) airfield near Taichung includ

exact replica of the runway layout, taxiways, fuel st

aircraft shelters, and revetments. The replica, locate

key training area in Gansu, 120 kilometers nor

Jiayuguan, is intended for both theater missile exe

and air strikes.

164

Leadership Facilities and C4I Centers. The PLA 

strike at the heart of Taiwan’s political and mi

leadership to impede the command and control of its f

Early warning and technical intelligence collection 

could be subject to ballistic and anti-radiation m

strikes and electronic countermeasures. Politica

military leadership facilities, such as the Presid

Palace and MND headquarters, are soft targets that 

require fewer than five missiles to destroy each with a 

degree of confidence. Fuel air explosive warhead

considered the optimal choice for strikes against 

political and military targets. Semi-hardened com

and control and intelligence centers would re

penetration warheads.

165

145
Foreign Intervention. The PLA has indica

willingness to use highly accurate SRBMs, MRBMs

LACMs against U.S. assets, to include key bases in J

and aircraft carriers operating in the Western Pa

Chinese researchers have conducted extensive feas

studies of the use of theater ballistic missiles ag

aircraft carriers. Analysts have noted how such a capa

would require four components: ocean surveil

(haiyang jianshi); mid-course guidance ( zhong

zhidao); terminal guidance ( moduan zhidao)

applicable control systems to maneuver the reentry v

to the target. PLA proponents have proposed the use o

for mid-course inertial corrections and the use 

millimeter wave seeker for terminal guidance.

166

 Aw

the vulnerability of millimeter wave seekers to jam

PLA engineers are surveying ECCM techniques to e

effectiveness of terminally guided ballistic missiles

addition to aircraft carriers, Chinese writings indicate 

targets would include regional airbases, naval faci

and key C4I and logistical nodes.

168

Counterstrike Phase.

For the counterstrike phase, PLA planners re

survivability as a critical aspect of their theater m

force. In ensuring their survivability, designers b

three systems in particular pose the greatest challen

the survivability of China’s theater missile force

F-117A, J-STARS, and AWACS. The most importan

to ensure survivability is counter-reconnaiss

(fanzhencha), that is, denying foreign air and space 

the ability to detect missile garrisons, storage facilitie

units in the field. Counter-reconnaissance mea

include decoy launchers and missiles that must matc

optical, infrared, and radar characteristics of real sys

The Second Artillery also intends to use natural ma

radiation reflectors, deception, and communica

security. Chinese camouflage is explicitly intend

146
counter U.S. air and space-based reconnaissance 

forms.

169

There are indications that each theater missile br

will have an organic electronic countermeasures reg

equipped with specially designed equipment w

automatically activates an integrated system of 

jammers, lasers, chaff, flash bombs, and smoke. Acco

to one report, the system was developed in large p

counter air-to-ground munitions delivered by aircraf

as the F-117A.

170

CONCLUSION

A space-based surveillance architecture, the tran

to a force structure dominated by theater missiles

adoption of operational principles that stress preem

and surprise have serious implications for reg

stability. An alleged arsenal of over 650 SRB

augmented by additional conventional MRBMs 

LACMs—could provide Beijing with a conclusive edg

future Taiwan Strait conflict. Such a force could als

U.S. forces in the western Pacific at risk should a decis

made to intervene.

China’s growing presence in space is intimately re

to the PLA’s emerging capacity for theater s

operations. Reconnaissance satellites are importa

strategic and operational intelligence, indication

warning, and targeting. Space imagery is also need

support battle damage assessments. Digitized sa

imagery is crucial for land attack cruise missile m

planning. In addition, space systems could enab

detection, tracking, and targeting of U.S. forward-dep

assets operating in the western Pacific Ocean. The 

space-tracking network that manages China’s space a

is crucial for operational security during a theater m

campaign. 

147
Operational Implications.

China’s emerging capacity for deep strike missions 

number of operational implications. First, theater m

serve as critical enablers for dominance in other sphe

warfare. Of most significance is the relationship be

theater missiles and the rapid achievement o

superiority. Consistent with emerging PLA doctr

“rapid war, rapid resolution,” a successful PLA th

missile campaign could strip Taiwan of its abil

effectively conduct air operations in a matter of hou

minutes, according to PLA propaganda). Strikes ag

key air defense units and airfields would result 

temporary suspension of Taiwan air operations, crea

more permissive environment for PLA Air Force opera

over the island. Air superiority, like the missile strik

not an end in itself. However, lessons absorbed fro

Gulf War and the air campaign in Yugoslavia 

demonstrated that air superiority enables other missi

take place with reduced costs and greater efficiency.

Furthermore, theater missile operations could 

quickly degrade Taiwan’s capacity for naval warfar

ground operations. Fifty percent of the PLA’s th

missile arsenal is to be dedicated toward the opening 

of conflict. Remaining missiles likely would be h

reserve to support naval and ground operations. Th

missile strikes against harbors and piers would comp

naval operations. Strikes against key bridges and st

areas would impede Taiwan Army counter-la

operations.

Also, China’s expanding network of space sensor

long-range strike assets could pose a fundam

challenge to the U.S. ability to project power int

western Pacific Ocean. Increasingly accurate and 

theater missiles could raise the costs of U.S. intervent

conflicts around the periphery of China. Space-

reconnaissance assets could facilitate detection of U

and naval deployments into the area of operations. Th

148
clearly understands U.S. vulnerabilities that arise 

dependence on in-theater ports, airfields, logistics faci

and C2 nodes. Successful fielding of terminally g

theater ballistic missiles could pose challenges to ai

carrier battle groups, especially if operating within ra

China’s large inventory of 600-kilometer range SRBM

Political Implications.

Developing a capacity for theater missile operation

political implications as well. Taiwan has enjo

defensive advantage over the mainland for many y

Adequate warning time and a robust defense has en

Taiwan to blunt PLA air, naval, and ground assault

enough to allow the international community to adj

the situation, decide on a course of action, take diplo

action, and/or flow forces to the region if neces

However, a successful theater missile campaign—com

with information operations and air strikes—could e

Beijing to quickly strip Taiwan of its warfighting capac

To maintain the political and military viability of it

“trump card,” Beijing has launched a coordinated fo

policy and propaganda campaign to shape the ex

debate within the United States on defensive mea

intended to counter theater missiles. Beijing gen

poses six arguments against missile defenses, includi

assertion that defenses will cause an arms race.

173

 Be

campaign against missile defenses exploits biases by 

within the United States against missile defense

mutually supporting dynamic exists between PRC of

and U.S. critics whose views on missile defenses are fou

on traditional nuclear stability paradigms.

However, the Taiwan Strait case may be unique i

it is the first theater in which highly accurate conven

ballistic missiles dominate the strategic landscape. 

officials, echoed by many within U.S. governmenta

academic circles, argue that defenses against the gr

PLA conventional theater missile threat wou

149
destabilizing since they would spark an arms ra

However, a number of studies have demonstrated t

the conventional context, defenses generally have no

the causes of arms races. Conventional arms race

sparked or intensified by a rapid buildup of offe

capabilities.

175

The misplaced focus on missile defenses w

academic and policy communities in the United State

resulted in neglect of at least three dangers present

Beijing’s growing arsenal of increasingly accurat

lethal theater missiles. First, the conventional wisd

that force would only be used against Taiwan in the 

the government legally declares the island a

independent political entity. However, overwhe

offensive capabilities increase the chances that force 

be used short of a de jure declaration of independ

Confidence in a quick military victory could lowe

perceived cost of conflict and thus increase Bei

incentives to use force. At a minimum, a decisive 

advantage in offensive capabilities would increase ri

greater PRC bellicose behavior in the cross-S

relationship. In addition, the ability to strip Taiwan 

capacity for military operations—in effect a first 

capability—raises dangers of preemptive war.

176

 Th

preemptive strike doctrine is also destabilizing si

decreases warning time that could allow for diplo

intervention. An overwhelming offensive advantage 

also reduce Beijing’s incentives for arms contro

confidence building measures, and reduce their willin

to compromise in future cross-Strait dialogue. 

Second, reduced costs for military action could le

another unintended consequence of the theater m

buildup—a Taiwan punitive deterrent to raise the co

PLA military action. At least one punitive deterr

Taiwan’s own theater missile capability. A Taiwan ba

or land attack cruise missile would serve as a political 

raise the costs of PRC military action. Even more om

is that a severe collapse in their sense of security 

150
prompt Taiwan to renew efforts to develop a nuclear d

Taiwan is considered by some to have the capac

develop nuclear weapons quickly if the need should 

Within the last 2 years, there has been an open deb

Taiwan regarding the utility of developing weapons of 

destruction.

177

Third, as Taiwan’s national security community de

the need for a deterrent, the magnitude of the th

missile challenge may increase domestic pressu

tactically offensive counterforce operations, to in

preemptive strikes. Theoretical studies have demonst

that maintenance of an exclusively defensive force po

against an overwhelming offensive force is prohibi

expensive.

178

 Tactical offenses in support of a strateg

defensive doctrine are more cost effective. As the 

theater missile threat evolves, Taiwan strategists 

adopt operational concepts outlined in U.S. Departm

Defense Joint Pub 3-01.5 that states “the preferred m

of countering enemy theater missile operations is to a

and destroy or disrupt theater missiles prior to 

launch.” This notion comes as no surprise to the PLA S

Artillery, an organization whose doctrine rests o

assumption that their phased campaign would be answ

with Taiwan or U.S. counterattacks.

Theater Missile Countermeasures.

A preemptive strategy that relies on an overwhe

offensive force is not only destabilizing, but may be 

from a warfighting perspective. The outlook desc

above is admittedly pessimistic and worst-case. The p

aim of a PLA air and missile campaign is strategic para

with the expectation being that “paralysis” must som

equate to “surrender.” It may not work that way. 

proper preparations, Taiwan, or any other adversary, 

recover from initial attacks. Observers have asserte

Taipei would fold after the impact of a single miss

Taiwan. However, lessons from World War II, the Vie

151
War, and elsewhere have shown that strategic attacks 

harden rather than diminish resolve.

179

 

A number of steps could be taken to reduc

operational effectiveness of the PLA theater missile

supporting surveillance assets. The theater missile pr

is already forcing the Taiwan military to modernize in 

that they would not have otherwise. The only w

effectively counter a large-scale theater missile thr

through jointness and innovative warfighting con

commonly associated with the RMA. Assuming req

changes and investments are made, the PLA’s abil

achieve a decisive victory over Taiwan is not assured

Perhaps the most important countermeasure 

survivable C4I architecture and robust passive def

Passive defense includes: 1) tactical warning; 2) red

the effectiveness of PLA targeting through opera

security, deception, and mobility; 3) reducing vulnera

through hardening, redundancy and robustness, disp

and effective civil defense; and 4) recovery 

reconstitution. In addition, the PLA’s successful field

sophisticated terminal guidance systems wou

accompanied by a new set of vulnerabilities. GPS

optical, radar, and millimeter wave seekers can be jam

as could the PLA’s future space reconnaissance asset

Furthermore, the complexity of a theater m

campaign presents opportunities for “induced friction

challenges presented by an overwhelming capaci

offensive operations would naturally prompt defend

prevent the launch of theater missiles. This wou

carried out by attacking elements of the overall sy

including such actions as destroying launch platf

reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting platf

command and control nodes, missile stocks, and tran

infrastructure. Strikes against selected nodes in a th

missile brigade could have significant systemic effect

could reduce the frequency or intensity of theater m

strikes. 

152
The effectiveness of theater ballistic and land a

cruise missiles strikes could also be reduced through 

missile defenses. Exclusive reliance on active def

however, would be cost prohibitive and only par

effective against the type of theater missile threa

Taiwan is expected to face. The most serious challe

active defenses may be the tyranny of geography—Ta

is situated close enough to the mainland to allow the P

launch from a wide range of azimuths. Multi-axis th

ballistic missile attacks could stress even the best 

management and command, control, and communi

systems, especially if combined with air and LACM st

electronic attack, and special operations.

181

 

In the end, however, the optimal solution lies in cre

incentives for Beijing to moderate its theater m

deployments. The first step is recognizing the destabi

nature of the PLA theater missile buildup. While u

PLA restraint in deploying theater missiles op

Taiwan is a worthwhile endeavor, one should not be o

sanguine about the chances for success. Theater m

are an integral part of the PLA’s overall moderniz

objectives. As long as the PLA seeks to develop the k

force that could give the PRC a decisive military adva

over Taiwan, then the ability to freeze or roll back th

missile deployments will be limited. Nevertheless, g

effort must be made to convince the civilian leaders

Beijing that the large-scale deployment of offe

weapons would adversely affect regional stability an

resolution of sovereignty disputes through other 

peaceful means is not a viable option. 

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES

1. According to Department of Defense Joint Publication 

“theater missile applies to ballistic missiles, cruise missil

air-to-surface missiles whose targets are within a given the

operation.” This term generally does not apply to shorter-range s

such as Maverick and Harpoon.

153
2. Wang Xuejin and Zhang Huaibi, “Didi changgui daoda

zuozhan zhidao sixiang fenxi,” (Analysis of Conven

Surface-to-Surface Missile Operations Guiding Thought) in 

zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan (Joint Theater and S

Operations), Beijing: National Defense University Press, 19

223-227.

3. Nan Shih-yin, “Inside Story of Enlarged Central Com

Meeting,” Hong Kong Kuang chiao ching, January 16, 1996, in 

Broadcast Information Service-China (FBIS-CHI)-96-027; also 

Hui-wen, “Latest Trends in China’s Military Revolution,” in Hon

Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Economic Journal), February 9, 1

FBIS-CHI-96-047; for other comments on lessons from the Gulf W

Ho Po-shih, “The Chinese Military Is Worried About Lagging Be

Armament,” Tangdai, March 9, 1991, pp. 17-18.

4. Liang Zhenxing, “New Military Revolution and Infor

Warfare,” Zhongguo dianzi bao (China Electronic News), Octo

1997, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-012.

5. According to Joint Pub 1-02, air superiority is that de

dominance in the air battle of one force over another which perm

conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, 

forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interferenc

opposing force.

6. For one of the best overviews of these doctrinal shifts, see 

“The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and T

1985-95: A Chinese Perspective,” in China Quarterly, July 19

443-463; and Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Campaign Doctr

Strategies,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, The 

Liberation Army in the Information Age, RAND: Washington, DC

pp. 146-172. For more detail, see Liu Mingtao and Yang Ch

Gaojishu zhanzhengzhong de daodanzhan, (Missile War 

High-Tech Conditions), Beijing: NDU Press, 1993, pp. 5-26; als

Qingshan, Xin junshi geming yu gaojishu zhanzheng (New M

Revolution and High Tech Warfare), Beijing: AMS Press, 19

Senshan and Jiang Fangran, Gaojishu jubu zhanzheng tiaojia

zuozhan (Operations Under High Tech Local War Conditions), 

AMS Press, 1994, pp. 13-33; and Senior Colonels Huang Xing a

Quandian, “Operational Doctrine for High Tech Conditions,” Zh

junshi kexue (China Military Science), November 20, 1996, pp. 4

FBIS-CHI-97-114.

7. Senior Colonel Jiang Lei, Xiandai yilie shengyou zhanlue (

Strategy of Pitting the Inferior Against the Superiority), Beijin

154
Press, pp. 6-49. Colonel Jiang is one of the few PLA officers aw

Ph.D. in Operations Research from AMS. He is currently assi

AMS Strategic Studies Department; on the pre-emptive strike c

see Lu Linzhi, “Pre-emptive Strikes Endorsed for Limited Hig

War,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-025. 

numerous references, see, for example, Wang Pufeng, Xinxi zha

yu junshi geming (Information Warfare and the Military Revo

Beijing: AMS Press, 1995.

8. With air and sea superiority, some of more seemingly out

scenarios for an amphibious invasion, such as the large-scale use 

commercial fishing vessels, become more feasible.

9. For a summary of Chinese writings on perceive

weaknesses, see Dr. Michael Pillsbury, Dangerous Chinese 

ceptions: The Implications for DoD, Prepared for Office 

Assessment, 1998.

10. See Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in China,” 

Intelligence Review, August 1, 1995, pp. 365-375; and Robert K

“China Sets Up Border SIGINT Bases In Laos,” Janes Defense 

November 19, 1994, p. 5.

11. China Aerospace S&T Corporation (CASC), directed b

Liheng, is an offshoot of the former China Aerospace Corporatio

new organization adopted the former’s CALT (1st Academy), 

Academy, CAST (5th Academy), SAST (8th Academy), 062 Ba

the 067 Base. The China Aerospace Electromechanical 

(Hangtian jidian jituan) includes the Second and Third Academ

the 61 and 66 Bases. 

12. There seems to be a debate within the PLA on control of 

future space architecture, pitting GAD against the Second Ar

See Senior Colonel Ping Fan and Captain Li Qi, “A The

Discussion of Several Matters Involved in the Development of M

Space Forces,” Zhongguo junshi kexue, May 20, 1997, pp. 127

FBIS-CHI-97-0302.

13. This conclusion is drawn from ONI’s 1994 study, “C

Space-Based Remote Sensing Programs and Ground Based Pro

Capabilities,” discussed in Jefferey Richelson, “”Navy Says 

Poised To Close Space-Intel Gap,” Defense Week, February 24, 19

14. Ibid. Weather satellites are also an important sensor 

beyond the scope of this study. 

155
15. Data collected by China’s airborne SAR remote sensing p

can be transmitted real time to a ground station that is wit

kilometers of the aircraft. A tactical ground processing system eq

with a VSAT terminal can then transmit the data to a command 

See “Remote Sensing Technical Systems for Reducing Flood Dis

Yaogan kexue xin jinzhan, April 1995, in FBIS-CST-96-002; 

Guanhua and Guo Huadong, “Progress, Mission of Remote S

Research,” Yaogan kexue xin jinzhan (New Progress of Remote 

Science), April 1995, in FBIS-CST-96-002.

16. The HY-1 is a small satellite which will based upon the CA

bus. The CAST986, an inexpensive common-use bus, will be us

range of other satellites to include the SJ-5 experimental sat

constellation of electro-optical satellites, a generation-aft

navigation satellite constellation, and a tactical sa

communications (SATCOM) system. The 863 Program inc

special budgeting mechanism for R&D in seven key technology 

The PLA is responsible for oversight of space and laser compon

the 863 Program. The specific designation of the national SAR 

the 863-308 program that also includes a near real-time electro

satellite system. The airborne system was tested on board a U.S

shuttle mission (SIR-C). See Wang Wei, “State S&T Organs A

Design of Spaceborne Synthetic Aperture Radar,” Zhongguo ke

(China Science News), May 3, 1995, in FBIS-CST-95-010; 

xingzai hecheng kongjing leida yingyong yanjiu qude zhongda 

(China’s Satellite SAR Applied Research Achieves Trem

Advances), Zhongguo hangtian, February 1996, p. 16; “Spacebor

Modern Information Technology Highlighted,” Zhongguo kex

September 20, 1996, p. 4, in FBIS-CST-96-020; Yuan Xiaokang

Speed Data Transmission of Satellite-borne SAR,” Zhidao yu 

(Guidance and Detonators), 1995 (4), pp. 8-14. 509th RI is summ

in China Astronautics and Missilery Abstracts (CAMA), Vol. 4

Also see Yuan Xiaokang, “Performance Parameters and 

Requirements of Satellite SAR,” in Shanghai hangtian, 1996 

12-18; and Long Zhihao. “Application of Radar Satellites,” Ae

China, November 1991, p. 29. Li Yudong, “Satellite-borne 

Reconnaissance,” New Electronic Warfare Technology and Inte

Reform Studies Abstracts, 1995, 10, pp. 126-133. Li is fr

Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). For com

on preliminary research on the second generation SAR satell

“China’s Microwave-Imaging Radar Systems Engineering 

lighted,” Zhongguo kexue bao, September 20, 1996, p

FBIS-CST-96-020. 

17. Long Zhihao, “Leida weixing de yingyong” (Applicat

Radar Satellites), Zhongguo hangtian, November 1991, pp. 

156
Zhang Wanzeng, “Weixing hecheng kongjing chengxiang leida d

jiqi zai junshi zhenchazhong de yingyong” (Applicatio

Characteristics of Satellite SAR for Military Reconnais

Zhongguo hangtian, November 1993, pp. 20-22. Zhang Wan

assigned to the PLA GSD Second Department’s Techology B

Huang Weigen, Zhou Changbao, and Wan Zhongling, “Woguo 

SAR haiyang yingyong de xianzhuang yu xuqiu,” (Current St

Requirements of China’s Satellite-borne SAR for Marc

Applications), in Zhongguo hangtian, December 1997, pp. 5-9. 

began exploration of space-based SAR systems for antisub

warfare purposes in the 8th Five-Year Program (1991-1996). A

note, a U.S. Los Alamos employee under contract for TRW was a

in May 1999 for providing the Chinese information on a cl

project he was working on with regards to SAR satellite ima

submarines. 

18. See Stokes, China Strategic Modernization, p. 38-39.

19. Ibid, p 22.

20. The United States and the Soviet Union attained a ne

time capability in 1976 and 1982, respectively.

21. Jean Etienne, “Les Nouveaux Projets de L’Asie Spati

Space News, No. 110, November 4, 1996, at http://www.sat-n

space-news. Also see Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconna

Satellites,” Kuang chiao ching, March 16, 1998, pp. 36

FBIS-CHI-98-098.

22. The 863 Program, specifically the 863-308 project, funds 

remote sensing program at least in part. Hong Mei, “T

Application Satellite Imagery System,” Hangtian fanhui yu 

(Spacecraft Recovery and Remote Sensing), Vol. 16, No. 1, 19

30-33, in CAMA, Vol. 2, No. 5. A 700-kilometer orbit optimizes c

at the expense of resolution—a lower orbit naturally will incre

resolution. See “China To Launch Ten More Satellites by 

Xinhua, February 22, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-053. 

23. These concepts have been closely examined and s

advocated by the space and missile industry. See Zhang D

“Guowai xiaoxing weixing de guti huojian tuijin xitong” (Solid 

Propulsion Systems for Foreign Small Satellites), in Hangtian q

yanjiu, HQ-93011, pp. 139-155; Wang Zheng, “Screening Stud

Technology for All-Solid Space Launch Vehicles,” Guti huojian f

sheji yu yanjiu (Solid Rocket Engine Design and Research), Apr

pp. 63-73, in CAMA, 1996, Vol. 3, No. 6; and Zhang Song, “Des

157
Optimization of Solid Launch Vehicle Trajectory,” Guti huojia

Vol. 20, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1-5; and Zhang Dexiong, “China’s Devel

Concept for Small Solid Launch Vehicles,” CASC Fourth A

Information Research Reports, the Fourth Edition, October 19

1-11, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 2. 

24. Mao Genwang and Wang Liang, “Weixing de junshi y

tedian, fazhan xianshi yu yingyong qianjing” (Military Satelli

their Prospects for Development), Zhongguo hangtian, May 19

33-53.

25. Jefferey Richelson, “Navy Says China Poised To 

Space-Intel Gap,” Defense Week, February 24, 1997, p. 9. 

26. Mei Lin, “PLA Methods of Operations Assessed,” Chun

yen chiu, November 15, 1997, No. 371, pp. 50-60, in FBIS-CHI

10, 1998.

27. Chang Jijun, “Remote Sensing Image Data Compression 

Performance Evaluation,” Kongjian jishu qingbao yanjiu, July 1

37-54.

28. ”Woguo jiang zengshou wuke weixing de guance shouju” 

Will Receive Five Sources of Surveying Data), China Space 

January 5, 1997, p. 1; Fan Xizhe, “Future Importance of Inform

Zhongguo kexue bao, December 16, 1996, in FBIS-CST-97-003. A

announcement by SSTC Vice Minister Xu Guanhua, Xinhu

Release, in FBIS-CHI-96-247. Twelve subscribers will be able 

into the stored images. Also see Chiu Fangying, “China’s 

Sensing Image Digitization Equipment Meets Advanced Intern

Standards,” Keji Ribao, October 26, 1995, p. 1, in FBIS-CST-96

29.”Wo weixing yaogan tuxiang shuzihua shebei shijie li

(Our Satellite Remote Sensing Digitized Imagery Equipment Le

World), Zhongguo hangtian, January 1996, p. 39; also see “

Satellite Remote Sensing Image Digitization Equipment 

Advanced International Standards,” Keji ribao, October 26, 1

FBIS-CST-96-002.

30. “China To Use Italian Software to Interpret Imagery,

News, March 2-8, 1992, p. 23. Two other Chinese organizations i

in the project include China’s Research Institute for Survey

Mapping and the National Laboratory of Resources and Environ

Information Systems. Peng Yiqi, a senior engineer at the N

Remote Sensing Center, led the Chinese negotiations.

158
31. China is working toward is the development of dat

satellites (shuju zhongji weixing). China signed agreemen

France (1993) and Chile (1994) for joint use of their ground st

Seeking to transmit imagery directly to theater and field comm

China’s remote sensing community has also begun to e

development of mobile remote sensing ground stations. On Chin

relay satellite program, see Zhang Wanbin, “Spaceflight Devel

Strategy: Mid-Long Term Development Strategy,” Zhongg

luntan (Forum on Science and Technology), November 1992, pp. 

JPRS-CST-93-002; and Cheng Yuejin, “Information Trans

System of Data Relay Satellites,” Space Technology Infor

Research, 1993 in CAMA, 1994, Vol. 1, No. 6. On China’s contrac

access to French, Kiribat, and Chilean ground stations, see 

Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Strategy of Intern

Cooperation, Stanford University, July 1996, p. 4. LTC Wang se

the senior staff of COSTIND’s foreign affairs bureau. On mobile 

station acquisition, see Wang Mingyuan, “Mobile Remote S

Ground Stations,” Kongjian dianzi jishu (Space Electronic Tech

1997 (2), pp. 32-37 in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 6. One of the fi

mobile imagery ground stations, EAGLE VISION, enter

inventory in 1995. China has expressed interest in acquiring a 

EAGLE VISION-like system from either U.S. or French vendor

32. Dragon in Space, July 24, 1999. Its data rate is 

150-300Mbps. SWIET is the major tracking and telemetry s

provider for the Chinese space program.

33. As of 1997, the State space budget was around $100 mi

0.035 percent of the overall GNP. 

34. “Luan Enjie fuzongjingli tan hangtian zhiliang” (Vice-G

Manager Luan Enjie Discusses Space Quality), Zhongguo hangt

(China Space News), March 21, 1994, p. 1.

35. China’s space community is assessed to have grossed mo

$500 million since the first commercial launch in 1990. China 

agreements with Russia for cooperative development in 10 

including surveillance systems, propulsion, joint design 

scientific personnel exchanges, space systems testing, and s

navigation systems. See “Wang liheng fujuzhang lutuan fangw

liangguo” (CASC Deputy Director Wang Liheng Leads Delega

Russian and Ukraine), Zhongguo hangtian bao, April 11, 199

Cooperation with France is focused on small satellite develo

space tracking, and attitude control systems. 

159
36. Ibid. Mei Lin, “New PLA Methods of Operations Ass

Chung Kung Yen Chiu, November 15, 1997, No. 371, pp. 50

FBIS-CHI, March 10, 1998.

37. PLAAF deficiencies are discussed at length in Kenneth W

Glenn Krumel, and Jonathon Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters 

Century, RAND Project Air Force study, 1995, pp. 112-113.

38. Yuan Jun, “Zhanshu dandao daodan weixie yu fangyu d

wenti,” (Fundamental Problems Associated With Tactical B

Missile Threats and Defense), Zhongguo hangtian, November 1

35-40.

39. Liu Mingtao and Yang Chengjun, Gaojishu zhanzhengz

daodanzhan (Missile War In High Tech Warfare), Beijing: N

Defense University Press, 1993, pp. 4-26; and Wang J

“Inspiration for Chinese Ballistic Missile Development From t

War,” Hangtian keji qingbao yanjiu baogao xilie wenzhai, Apr

pp. 49-56, in CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6. 

40. Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of th

National Defense Authorization Act, p. 4. The report states that 

these missiles are likely to be short- or medium-range systems

41. The $500,000 per missile figure is from Yuen Lin, “Prob

Capability of Taiwan’s Antiballistic Missiles,” Hong Kong Kuan

ching, August 16, 1998, pp. 54-61, in FBIS-CHI-98-252. In comp

the cost of three MADS batteries with 180 missiles amounts 

million. An AEGIS destroyer runs around $850 million-$1 

Taiwan’s FY98 defense budget totaled NT $275 billion (U.S

million), amounting to 22.43 percent of the national budget. 

important to note, however, that the value of a missile defense sy

judged on the basis of what is being defended rather than the cos

offensive missiles.

42. It should be noted that recent Beijing-affiliated publicat

of Hong Kong have resurrected the issue of the DF-25, a 2,000-ki

range system that is armed with a 1,700-kilogram conve

warhead. The DF-25 allegedly utilizes the first two stages of th

ICBM. However, author’s discussions in Beijing during the 1

timeframe indicated that the DF-25 program had been canc

favor of the conventional DF-21. The primary difference betw

two systems was the warhead size—the nuclear DF-21 only had 

weight of 600 kilograms while the DF-25 was designed to 

2,000-kilogram warhead. The DF-25 was first discussed in John 

Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs,” Intern

160
Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40. If based at Tonghua (80301 Un

DF-25’s 1700-kilometer range would have permitted strikes aga

main islands of Japan, but not Okinawa. Assigning the 1700-ki

system under the Luoyang base (80304 Unit) would have e

strikes against all of Taiwan. Lewis and Hua asserted that the 

was intended to defend claims in the South China Sea. How

range the Spratly Islands, the system would have had to be b

Hainan Island. Past PLA deployment practices indica

deployment of theater missiles on Hainan Island is not likely s

theater missile units are unlikely to stray too far from their esta

base headquarters; and b) basing on Hainan renders th

vulnerable to strikes. 

43. Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Is

May 1997, Surrey, England: Jane’s Information Group.

44. See Edward R. Harshberger, Long Range Conventional M

Issues for Near-Term Development, RAND: Santa Monica, 1991

For an upper range estimate of 60 meters, see Lin Chien-hua

Equipment Should Taiwan Use to Defense Itself,” Taipei 

Wan-pao, November 9, 1997, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI-97-364.

45. George Lindsey, The Information Requirements for Ae

Defense: Limits Imposed by Geometry and Technology, B

Memorandum 27, CDISS, Lancaster University, p. 18. If move

to the target, the DF-15 likely would be launched on a lofted tra

that would increase the flight time outside the atmospher

increasing the missile’s vulnerability to upper tier systems. 

other hand, a lofted trajectory could increase the missile’s 

speed, reducing the footprint, or defended area, of lower tier s

such as PATRIOT.

46. Zhao Yunshan, Zhongguo daodan jiqi zhanlue, jiefan

hexin wuqi (China’s Missiles and Strategy: The PLA’s Central W

Hong Kong: Mirror Books, p. 232. Other sources credit the DF-

only as good as a 150-meter CEP. See “Missiles! China Has The

Wen wei po, June 1, 1999, p. A5, in FBIS-CHI-00169, June 22, 

47. Ibid. Informed sources assert the Mirror (Mingjing) s

books have a mixed record of reliability. Zhao states that the ex

range DF-15 incorporates a more advanced propellant. There 

confusing reporting on an unidentified 1000 kilometer syste

M-18—that may in fact be the rumored extended range DF-15. W

extended range DF-15 can not be confirmed, there certainly cou

motive for developing a conventional theater ballistic missile 

1,200-kilometer range. First, a 1,200-kilometer range system 

161
significantly reduce the defended area or “footprint” of lan

sea-based lower tier missile defense systems due to its reentry 

Because of its existing infrastructure, one could speculate 

extended range DF-15 brigade could be established under the 

Artillery’s Huaihua Base (80305 Unit). Huaihua, situated in w

Hunan Province, is just over 1,200 kilometers from Taipei. Seco

1,200-kilometer DF-15 fired from a notional site in the area of N

in Fujian province could easily range Kadena AB, Okinawa, an

the Luzon Strait (Bashi Channel). 

48. See the 1999 DoD Report to Congress on the Security Situ

the Taiwan Strait. It should be noted, however, that foreign 

familiar with the PLA believe that the 300-kilometer DF-11 has 

been fielded by at least two PLA ground force group armies. In a

a March 29, 1999, edition of Jiefangjun bao discusses the conve

an unidentified Nanjing Military Region artillery unit to an 

brigade. The conversion began in early 1997. The author is inde

Ken Allen for this information.

49. Zhao, p. 234.

50. Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Option

Asia-Pacific Region, February 1999.

51. The 700-meter CEP is extracted from Jane’s Strategic W

Systems, 1998. The conversion of the DF-21 from a strictly 

mission to a conventional role was reported as early as 1994 

Chinese journal, Guoji Hangkong (International Aviation). 

indications of a terminally guided DF-21 are from discussions b

Richard Fisher, who was a Senior Policy Analyst at the H

Foundation, and an engineer from CALT’s Beijing Research Ins

Telemetry (704th Research Institute) at the 1996 Zhuhai Air 

Extensive CASC technical writings on terminally guided 

ballistic missiles tend to substantiate the engineer’s comments

sources indicate that the conventional DF-21 program ente

applied R&D phase in 1995 (xinghao yanzhi) and that the p

payload will be a penetrator warhead (zuandi dantou) for use 

semi-hardened facilities such as command centers. A radar te

guidance package will enable a 50-meter CEP. The conventiona

range could be extended to 2200 kilometers. See Will Young, “Sh

zhongguo daodan budui” (The Development of the Chinese 

Artillery), Shijie junshi luntan (World Military Forum), Internet 

(http//:www.wforum.com), January 2000, in Chinese.

162
52. Zhu Bao, “Di-di dandaoshi zhanshi daodan de fazhan qus

9-19. The CEP is the radius of a circle within which 50 percent of 

fired will impact.

53. John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic 

Programs: Technologies, Strategies, and Goals,” International S

Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992, p. 29.

54. Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19. Development of VLSIC and LSIC tec

is one of Beijing’s highest priorities. In one effort, China has i

RMB 1.39 in the Huajing Group’s Project 908 program, which s

miniaturize and mass-produce VLSIC/LSICs. China hopes to 

sub-micron VLSICs in the next few years. See Zhang Lon

“Huajing Group Builds ‘Project 908’ VSLIC Production Line,” J

shijie, January 8, 1996, No. 2, p.1, in FBIS-CHI, January 8, 199

the help of Project 908, CASC’s Ninth Academy would likely a

produce the application-specific integrated circuits. The S

payload known as the AEROFON uses an optical sensor dur

latter stages of flight to detect and home in on a target. 

55. Xie Lei, “Technical Research on Millimeter Wave Gui

Aerospace S&T Information Studies Series Abstracts (6), pp. 2

and Xie Lei, “Application of Millimeter Wave and Infrared Techn

in Weapons Systems,” Aerospace S&T Information Studies 

Abstracts (7), pp. 241-258.

56. Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19.

57. For a summary of test results, see Sun Mei, “GPS For Eva

Inertial Measurement Unit Errors,” Hangtian kongzhi (Ae

Control), 1995, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 69-75, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2

also see Wang Shuren, “Principles of Onboard GPS Nav

Transponders,” Hangkong dianzi jishu, undated, pp. 20-23. W

from the Second Artillery’s Academy of Engineering.

58. Li Yonghong, “Ballistic Trajectory Determination Us

Differential Global Positioning System,” Binggong xuebao, 1997

pp. 372-374. DGPS upgrades the civilian GPS signal though a p

located GPS station that broadcasts a correction signal on a d

frequency to other GPS receivers. In addition to military uses, a 

reference station is often used for surveying and maritime 

Reference updates can be transmitted to the missile via a data l

part of its Ninth 5-year Plan, China is constructing 20 DGPS s

along its eastern coast, each with a range of 300 kilometer

positioning accuracy is five meters, a marked improvement fr

original positioning system’s minimum error of 100 meters.

163
59. See, for example, Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Boston: Regnery P

249. 

60. Zhu Bao, “Di-di dandaoshi zhanshi daodan de fazhan 

(Developmental Prospects of Surface-to-Surface Tactical B

Missiles), pp. 9-19.

61. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan(PLA Second Artille

Campaign Operations), unpublished manuscript, 1996, p. 1

document is believed to be an internal PLA academic paper, 

authenticity has not been established. However, a number of 

have corroborated much of the paper’s content. For technical 

see Yang Xiaolong, Wan Chunxi, and Li Xingcheng, “General Te

Research on Use of Strategic Missile Terminal Submuniti

Blocking Airbases,” Space/Missile General Information N

Conference Paper (97021), October 1997; Yu Renshun, Qi Zha

Yang Xiaolong, “Guidance Law of Terminally Guided Submunit

Attacking Runways,” Zhanshu daodan jishu, February 1998, pp

Authors are from Bejing Ligong Daxue. For a study add

submunition dispersal problems, see Yan Dongsheng, “Te

Means for Reducing Dispersal of Mini-Warheads,” paper prese

the October 1995 Annual Conference on Flight Mechanics. Xu 

CALT’s 14th Research Institute, the entity responsible for w

development. For other studies on use of missiles against airfie

Yu Renshun, “Research on Terminally Guided Submunitio

Blocking Airfield Runways,” paper presented at Novembe

conference of National Missile Designers Network, in CAMA, Vo

3; Yang Bingwei, “Structural Design Problems and Test Met

Anti-Runway Penetrators,” in Aerospace S&T Intelligence 

Abstracts (5), 1995, pp. 288-303; and Liu Jiaqi, “Penetration Tec

for Tactical Missile Warheads,” Aerospace S&T Intelligence 

Abstracts (5), 1995, CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1996; Yang Bingwe

Methods of Antirunway Penetrators,” Aerospace S&T Inte

Studies Abstracts (6), pp. 213-234. Yang Bingwei, from CALT’s 

Institute of Special Electromachinery (Beijing Teshu Jidian Yan

is the most prolific technical analyst on runway penetrator

PLAAF is believed to have already fielded an anti-runway subm

cluster bomb.

62. See, for example, Li Xinyi, “On the Air Supremacy a

Defense of Taiwan and China: Is Taiwan An ‘Unsinkable A

Carrier’?,” Taiwan de Junbei (Taiwan Military Preparations), 

1996, pp. 11-18, in FBIS-CHI-97-323.

63. Gong Jinheng, “High Powered Microwave Weapons: 

Concept in Electronic Warfare,” Dianzi duikang jishu, Februar

164
pp. 1-9. Gong is from the Southwest Institute of Electronic Equ

(SWIEE), China’s premier electronic warfare research entity.

64. For a comprehensive overview of the technologies ass

with HPM weapons, see Carlo Kopp, “The E-Bomb—A We

Electrical Mass Destruction,” in Winn Schwartau, Infor

Warfare, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1994, pp. 296-297; 

J. Swegle and J. Benford, “State of the Art in High Power Micro

An Overview,” paper presented at the Lasers 1993 Intern

Conference on Lasers and Applications, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, De

6-10, 1993. Swegle and Benford point out that the United 

Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have HPM progr

addition to China. Zhu Youwen and Feng Yi, Gaojishu Tiaojia

Xinxizhan, (Information Warfare Under High Technology Cond

Academy of Military Science Press, 1994, pp. 308-310; ”Beam 

Weaponry: Powerful as Thunder and Lightening,” Jiefangju

December 25, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-039; “Outlook for 21st C

Information Warfare,” Guoji Hangkong, (International Av

March 5, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-114; “Microwave Pulse Gene

Qiang jiguang yu lizishu, May 1994, in JPRS-CST-94-014. 

Institute of Applied Electronics, University of Electronic Scien

Technology of China, and the Northwest Institute of N

Technology in Xian are three of the most important organ

engaged in the research, design, and testing of Chinese HPM d

The PRC appears to have mastered at least two HPM 

sources—the FCG and vircator. The greatest challenge 

weaponization process.

65. See Liu Shiquan, “A New Type of ‘Soft Kill’ Weapo

Electromagnetic Pulse Warhead,” Hubei hangtian jishu (Hube

Technology), May 1997, pp. 46-48. Liu is from the Sanjiang 

Industry.

66. Xu Licheng, “Research On Penetration Depth of Projec

Thick Concrete Targets,” Qiangdu yu huanjing, April 1996, 

CAMA, Vol. 3, No.1; and Zhu Bao. Xu is from the Beijing Inst

Special Electromechanics (14

th RI); for discussions on negating ha

targets, see Xu Xiaocheng, “Research on Penetration De

Projectiles Into Thick Concrete Targets,” Qiangdu yu huanjin

(4), pp. 1-7. Also see Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19.

67. For references to FAE warheads, see Lianhe zhanyi di erp

zuozhan, p. 11; Yuen Lin, “The Taiwan Strait Is No Longer a N

Barrier—PLA Strategies for Attacking Taiwan,” Kuang Chiao 

April 16, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-104; and Janes Strategic W

Systems 1998 section on the DF-15. Also see John Wilson Lew

165
Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Str

and Goals," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2, Fall 1992, p

FAE is a variation of the napalm bomb that hits the ground, 

open, and creates a mist of flammable liquid. A small delayed 

explosive then goes off, causing the cloud to ignite. The pressur

blast is sufficient to wreck aircraft, ships, and equipment as 

being fatal to personnel. The only other device to produce 

results is a nuclear weapon. Fortunately, FAE warheads are 

reliable as other types of bombs and weather conditions can se

degrade their effects. 

68. Zhu Yifan, Zhang Xuebin, and Wang Weiping, “ATBM In

Decision Modeling,” Guofang keji daxue xuebao, January 1, 19

29-32, in FBIS-CHI-1904, June 17, 1999.

69. Zhang Minde, “Simulation Research of Defenses A

Conventional Ballistic Missile Re-Entry Vehicles,” Xitong gongc

dianzi jishu, 1997, 19 (4), pp. 45-49. The simulation was condu

CASC’s Beijing Optoelectronic Engineering General 

Department. For general background on saturation, see Harsh

pp. 169-170.

70. David Fulghum, “China Exploiting U.S. Patriot S

Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 18, 1993, pp. 20

71. Gan Chuxiong and Liu Jixiang, Daodan yu yunzai 

zongti sheji (General Design of Missiles and Launch Vehicles), 

Defense Industry Press, January 1996, p. 42-43; and Wu Ga

“Guowai fanjichang wuqi,” (Foreign Antirunway Weapons)

Dazhe, ed., Guowai dandao daodan jishu yanjiu yu f

Astronautics Publishing House, 1998, pp. 65-76. The control ma

may be necessary to slow down the reentry speed to allow acquis

the target image in the ballistic missile’s seeker.

72. Gan and Liu, p. 45. Also see Zhang Demin, “St

Penetration Techniques on New Generation Ballistic Missi

Xinjunshi gemingzhong daodan wuqi fazhan qianjing, Novembe

pp. 18-24.

73. Gan and Liu, p. 45.

74. Wang Guobao, “Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic 

Electronic Warfare,” Hangtian dianzi duikang, April 1997, 

(CAMA).

75. Bill Gertz, Betrayal, Boston: Regnery Press, p. 254.

166
76. Li Qiang, “Current Status and Follow-On Development o

Cladding Wear-Resistance Coatings,” Yuhang cailiao gongyi, J

1997, pp. 13-18. At least one institute involved in the testing is 

Institute of Technology. Also see Ji Shifan, “Laser Resistant Pro

of Missiles,” Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu, May 1996, pp. 3

77. Jin Weixin, “Mathematical Modeling of Tactical Sur

Surface Missiles Against TMD,” in Systems Engineering and El

Technology, 1995, 17 (3), pp. 63-68. Zhang Demin and Hou S

“”Simulation Research of Offensive and Defensive Capab

Conventional Maneuvering Reentry Missile,” Xitong gongch

dianzi jishu, 1997, 19 (4), pp. 45-49. Full translation in 

CHI-97-272. Zhang is from the Beijing Electromechanical Engi

Design Department, also known as the CASC Fourth Systems 

Department. According to one evaluation, PAC-2+ has a proba

kill of 10-25 percent against an unidentified tactical ballistic m

See Zhao Yuping, “Probability of PAC-2 Intercepting a Certain T

Ballistic Missile,” paper presented at November 1997 confer

National Missile Designers Specialist Network in CAMA, Vol. 5, 

78. Du Xiangwan, “Ballistic Missile Defense and Space We

in Quanguo gaojishu zhongdian tushu, jiguang jishu linghuo, (N

High Technology Key Reference—Laser Technology Realm). 

79. DoD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait Security Si

February 1999.

80. For background on China’s cruise missile develo

including an organizational breakout of the Third Academy, se

A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the 

States, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999, pp

and John Downing, “China Develops Cruise Missiles, Jane’s 

Weekly, February 1998.

81. Wang Jianmin and Zhang Zuocheng, “Jiasu jibenxing x

jincheng nuli fazhan woguo feihang daodan shiye” (Rapid Prog

Series Development of China’s Cruise Missile Industry), Zh

hangtian, September 1996, pp. 12-17. Some have estimated 

developing country like China could acquire at least 100 land 

cruise missiles at a cost of $50 million (i.e., $500,000 apiece). See 

M. Gormley and K. Scott McMahon, “Proliferation of Land

Cruise Missiles: Prospects and Policy Implications,” in Henry S

ed., Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineti

University Press, 1996, pp. 131-167.

167
82. A land-attack Silkworm can readily fit within a 1

standard shipping container equipped with a small erector. See 

M. Gormley, “Cruise Missile Proliferation: Threat, Polic

Defenses” Proliferation Roundtable, Carnegie Endowm

International Peace, October 9, 1998.

83. Two principles in particular are “basic serialization

xingxiliehua) that calls upon reliance on a basic airframe from 

several upgraded variants can be derived. The second basic prin

“sanbuqi” that calls for having one system in production, one in 

R&D, and a generation-after-next in conceptual development. 

space and missile industry generally prefers to make incre

modifications to tried and trusted designs.

84. As a general rule, the Haiying series (HY-2, HY-3, H

surface-to-ship. The Yingji (YJ) designator is normally air-la

(i.e., YJ-6). There are exceptions—the YJ-8 can be ship or sub

launched (i.e., the YJ-82).

85. See “Zhongguo jingmi jixie jinchukou gongsi,” (CP

Xiandai junshi (CONMILIT), 25th anniversary edition, 1996, pp

The “XY” designation is likely a temporary one. Air-launched 

would be expected to have a “Yingji” designation. The initial Sil

the Haiying-2 (HY-2), utilized liquid propellant that limited its r

less than 100 kilometers. Variants incorporated radar or TV

terminal guidance systems. An air launched variant—th

(C-601)—utilized the basic HY-2 airframe. The YJ-6 is launch

the B-6D bomber that has an operating radius of 1800-2000 kilo

Like the HY-2, however, the YJ-6 range is less than 100 kilome

the 1980s, CASC’s Third Academy developed an extended 

Silkworm variant that integrated a turbojet engine (wopen fad

The turbojet variant has a range of up to 135 kilometers, is eq

with a 500-kilogram warhead, and can be launched from the 

from shore. See Wang Jianmin, “Jiasu jibenxiliehua jinche

fazhan woguo feihang daodan shiye,” Zhongguo hangtian, Sep

1996, pp. 12-17.

86. Teal Group Corporation, “Chinese Anti-Ship Missiles,

Missiles Briefing, Fairfax, Virginia: Teal Group Corporation, Ma

p. 2. One should not discount the possibility of extending th

through modest elongation of the fuselage that would provide s

addition fuel. There has been a recent flurry of reports of a d

generation of LACM designated the CF-2000 or Hong Niao, a 

based on the Russian Kh-55. See Duncan Lennox, “China’s New 

Missile Programme ‘Racing Ahead’,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, J

11, 2000.

168
87. Shirley Kan and Robert Shuey, “China: Ballistic and 

Missiles,” CRS Report for Congress, March 21, 1997 (97-391), p. 

the Israeli connection, see “Israel to Equip Chinese Cruise Miss

Penetrator Warhead,”Flight International, February 5-11, 1997

88. Undated China Precision Machinery Import and 

Corporation Marketing brochure, “C-201W Coast-to-Ship 

System.” The “W” probably stands for “wopen,” or turbojet 

According to Chinese aerospace publications, the U.S. Tomahaw

Attack Missile (TLAM)-B utilizes a turbojet engine and has a r

500 kilometers. The TLAM-C adopts a more efficient turbojet (w

engine that extends the range to 1200 kilometers. A turbofan 

(woshan fadongji) could significantly enhance the range of Chin

attack cruise missiles. China’s aviation industry has produced t

engines since the 1960s. The WS-7, a variant of the Rolls-Roy

Mk 202 engine, is used to power the H-7 fighter-bomber.

89. See Jason Glashow and Theresa Hitchens, “China 

Development of Missile With Taiwan Range,” Defense News, 

4-10, 1996, p. 1; and Duncan Lennox, “China: Offensive We

Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, Surrey, United Kingdom: 

Information Group, 1996. By contrast, the U.S. Standoff Land 

Munition (SLAM) is equipped with a 220kg warhead. Tomahaw

between a 320-480kg warhead. 

90. Si Xicai, “Research on Long Range Antiradiation Missile 

Radar Seeker Technology,” in Zhanshu daodan jishu (Tactical 

Technology), 1995, Vol. 2, pp. 42-52; other studies on specific app

to ARM technology include Yang Huayuan, “Study on Superwi

High Accuracy Microwave DF System,” in Daojian yu zhidao 

February 1995, pp. 7-12. There are also strong indications that 

system engineering organization, the Shanghai Insti

Electro-Mechanical Engineering, is carrying out preliminary R&

long-range air-to-air anti-radiation missile for targeting airborn

warning platforms, such as the U.S. E-3 AWACS or Taiwan’s 

Engineers note critical technologies for development of a lon

ARM include a passive seeker with a sensitivity of greater than 

as well as monolithic microwave (danpian weibo), gallium ar

very large scale, and very high speed integrated circuits (MMIC

VLSIC, VHSICs). The seeker makes up greater than 50 percen

R&D and production costs for an ARM. At least one Second A

entity that has conducted work on antiradiation missile 

technology is the Beijing Institute of Remote Sensing Equ

(probably the CASC 25th Research Institute). 

169
91. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, 1998, People’s Rep

China; Jane’s Air-To-Ground Missile Programs. There are 

systems that CASC appears to be studying to serve as the basi

indigenous version: The U.S. AGM-88 HARM utilizes a solid mo

has a range of 40 kilometers. The UK’s ALARM has a rang

kilometers; Israeli’s STAR-1 uses a small turbojet engine, has a r

100 kilometers and weighs only 182 kilograms. Chinese enginee

the Kh-31P has both long-range (i.e., 200km) air-to-a

air-to-ground variants.

92. Lu Xiaohong, “Launch Technology for Air-lau

Antiradiation Missiles,” Astronautics Information Research, HQ

Astronautics Publishing House, December 1997. Lu is from 

Academy’s Beijing Institute of Special Machinery, which is resp

cruise missile launching technology.

93. For one reference on land attack cruise missile and sup

GIS efforts, see Xu Haijiang, “Cruise Missile Mission Pl

Research,” Astronautics Information Research, HQ-97020, in 

Vol. 5, No.1, December 1997. The author is from the Beijing Inst

Electromechanical Engineering.

94. A GPS receiver is available in the United States for as 

$5,000; and radar altimeter for 2,500; and an IMU for $20-30

flight management computer could involve a miniaturized 

commercial system with software to permit flight control, a

functions, onboard system monitoring, and flight path and 

navigation. 

95. This process is described in Edward Harshberger, Long 

Conventional Missiles: Issues for Near Term Development, 

Monica: RAND, 1991, pp. 46-50. Also see Zhou Rui, “Image G

Aimpoint Selection System,” Zhanshu daodan jishu, January 1

32-36.

96. Zhong Longyi, “Zuhe daohang xitong he bingxing duoji xi

xunhang daodanzhong de yingyong,” (Application of Co

Navigation Systems on Cruise Missiles) in Hangtian qingbao 

(China Information Research), 1993 (3), pp. 432-445. Zhong is f

Third Academy’s 8357 Research Institute, responsible for cruise 

control systems. One of China’s first research projects on digita

processing, written by Sun Zhongkang and Shen Zhenkan

published by the PLA National Defense University in 1985. 

97. Guan Dexin, “The Investigation of Compatible Receiver F

and GLONASS,” Xitong gongcheng yu dianzi jishu, 1996, Vol. 18

170
pp. 69-74; and Sheng Jie, “Demonstration of Navigation Perform

GLONASS/GPS Composite Receivers,” Weixing yingyong, Fe

1994, pp. 56-59.

98. Zheng Wanqian, p. 43; The PLA likely has been develo

imagery library that could support DSMAC targeting for severa

TERCOM requires highly sophisticated digital mapping syste

powerful computers. COSTIND and the Second Artillery hav

significant achievements in both areas. See Wang Yon

“Introduction to Military Electronic Maps,” Xiaoxing weixing j

xitong, (Mini-Micro Computer Systems), August 1995, pp. 12

FBIS-CST-96-001. Wuhan Technical University of Surveyi

Mapping is one institute involved in digital mapping. Also s

Shaoguang, “GPS/SINS Integrated Navigation System for 

Missiles,” Xibei gongye daxue xuebao, 1997, 15 (1), pp. 79-83. A

one State Laboratory is dedicated to R&D on scene ma

technology—the Image Information Processing and Intel

Control Laboratory, Imaging Institute, under Huazhong Unive

Wuhan. 

99. One Taiwan source explicitly asserts land attack cruise m

will be assigned to the Second Artillery. See “Mainland Acquis

Russian Weapons Viewed,” Lien-ho pao, April 29, 19

FBIS-CHI-96-086. In support of this new mission, the 

Artillery’s Fourth Research Institute has been modeling the a

cruise missiles to penetrate air defense systems. See Sun Xia

and Qin Xiaobo, “Operational Efficiency Analysis of Cruise M

Against SAMs,” in Xitong gongcheng yu dianzi jishu (S

Engineering and Electronics), October 1996, pp. 59

FBIS-CST-97-013. Sun and Qin are from the Second Artillery’s 

Research Institute.

100. Liu Kejun, “Information Warfare Challenge Faced By 

Zhongguo dianzi bao, October 24, 1997, p. 8, in FBIS-CHI-98-0

101. Tian Baolong and Li Wengang, “Feihang daodan CAM 

danyuan xitong” (Cruise Missile CAM Workshop Unit S

Zhongguo hangtian, April 1993, pp. 44-46; Xu Haijiang, “Virtual 

and Its Application in Development of Cruise Missiles,” in F

daodan, 1996 (8), pp. 1-9; Wang Zhenhua, “Parallel Computa

Supercomputers for Axisymmetric Interaction Flow,” Yuhang 

(Journal of Astronautics), January 1995, pp. 43-45, in 

CST-95-005.

102. Li Weiliang, “Jiang Zemin dao Beijing fangzhen zh

zhouyan” (Jiang Zemin Inspects Beijing Simulation Center), Zh

171
hangtian bao, January 17, 1994, p.1; Li Li, “Chinese Sim

Technology Among Leaders Worldwide,” Liaowang zhoukan, 

16, 1993, pp. 4-5, in JPRS-CST-93-017. American aer

representatives who have been allowed access have remarked t

CASC Beijing Simulation Center is very close in capabilities to W

simulation facilities.

103. London Quds Press, February 9, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1

104. Stokes, p. 82-83.

105. If the Chinese are looking to develop a 1,500-kilometer 

the Russian 1,500-kilometer range AS-15 could be used as a 

Some modifications would have to be made to enable it to laun

the ground. The Tomahawk has a 450-kilometer range, while t

AGM-86B has a 3,000-kilometer range. 

106. Russia’s Raduga Design Bureau has reportedly assis

Third Academy in application of stealth technology to an unid

air launched cruise missile. See “Russian Missile Assistance to 

Flight International, August 31, 1995. 

107. In other words, radar that can pick up an airborne targe

kilometers will now only be able to detect the target at 50 kilo

resulting in less reaction time. Undated brochure, “Xikai (Zho

guangxue jishu youxian gongsi,” (See China Optical Tech

Company). The brochure notes that the radar absorbing m

designated BD-21/SF-18, can reduce a target such as a cruise m

an RCS of 0.1 square meters (-10 dB). The absorbing mater

structural modifications can reduce the RCS to -30 dB.

108. Zhang Haixiong, “ADN: Oxidizer for A Low Sig

Propellant,” in Feihang daodan, July 1996, pp. 35-38, in CAMA

Vol. 3, No. 6; and Lu Xiaohong, “Camouflage and Conce

Technology of Mobile Missile Launchers and Ground Equipm

Harbin Institute of Technology Journal, December 1996, pp. 2

Lu is from the Third Academy’s Beijing Institute of Special Mac

responsible for cruise missile launchers.

109. See Wang Jianmin, “Work Hard to Develop Cruise 

Industry,” Zhongguo hangtian, September 1996, pp. 12-1

Qingguang, “Study on Laser Imaging Guidance,” Feihang d

March 1995, pp. 46-50, in CAMA, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3; Liu Yon

“Infrared Imaging Precision Seeker Technology,” Hongwai yu 

jishu (Infrared and Laser Technology), 1996, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 4

CAMA, Vol. 3, No. 6; Zhao Jun, “Applied Research Into Laser I

172
Guidance Technology Development,” Hangtian qingbao 

HQ-96039, in CAMA, 1997, Vol. 4, No. 2; and Li Jin, Develop

Infrared Focal Plane Array Imaging Technology,” in Feihang 

qingbao yanjiu baogao wenzhai (Cruise Missile Information R

Reports), December 1996, pp. 190-209, in CAMA, Vol. 4, No. 6. L

the infrared imaging effort is the Third Academy’s Tianjin J

Technical Physics Institute.

110. Sun Qingguang, “Jiguang chengxiang zhidao ji ganrao 

de yanjiu” (Research Into Laser Imaging Guidance and Jam

Hangtian qingbao yanjiu, HQ-93017, pp. 228-241.

111. Zheng Wanqian, p. 43. 

112. Bases are located at Shenyang (80301 Unit); Hua

(80302 Unit); Kunming (80303 Unit); Luoyang (80304 Unit); H

(80305 Unit); and Xining (80306 Unit). The Second Artillery 

engineering design academy and four research institutes t

problems associated with operations, TELs, and logistics 

Institute), command automation, targeting, and mapping 

Institute), and missile and warhead engineering design (Acad

Engineering Design). The Second Artillery’s Command Co

Wuhan prepares officers for leadership positions within headq

elements and launch brigades. The Engineering College i

educates technicians associated with equipment and tech

departments at various headquarters and field units. General 

Artillery organizational information is drawn from numerous s

to include open and internal (junnei) Chinese publications an

discussions while assigned as the assistant air attaché in Beijing

from 1992-1995. Also see PLA Directory of Personalities, USDL

Kong, 1996, pp. 48-51; Bill Gertz, “New Chinese Missiles Targe

East Asia,” Washington Times, July 10, 1997, p. 1; Hisashi Fujii

Concerning China’s Nuclear Forces,” Gunji Kenkyu, November 

FBIS-CHI-96-036; “Guangrong bang” (Outstanding Units), 

Eagle (Changying), November 3, 1993; “Guangrong bang” (Outs

Units), Flying Eagle, May 1992; Lewis and Xue, p. 213, footno

Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 5, pp. 324-335. Among sources

Eagle, one of a handful of Second Artillery-associated publicat

most useful in piecing together the organizational structure. 

Artillery organizational issues are also discussed in author’s S

Modernization monograph. 

113. “The Strategic Nuclear Force Organization,” in 

junzhixue (The Science of the State Military System), undated, 

173
114. Stokes, pp. 94-95. The 80302 Unit’s first conventiona

SRBM brigade is said to be garrisoned in Leping, Jiangxi p

Taiwan sources indicate that the first extended range DF-11 br

being formed in the Yong’an/Nanping area. See “Military O

Discuss PRC’s Fujian Missile Positions,” Chung-yang j

December 1, 1999, p. 10, in FBIS-CHI-0322, December 1, 199

Gertz from the Washington Times also reports that the second 

Artillery brigade in being formed near the city of Yong’an, 

province. A third brigade consisting of the DF-11/CSS-7 is 

construction in Fujian province near the town of Xianyou. S

Gertz, “China Targets Taiwan with 2nd Missile Base, ” Was

Times, December 8, 1999, p. 1. According to an unsubsta

Washington Times article, the 80302 Unit is replacing its olde

missiles with the DF-21. Whether or not these DF-21s will eve

have a conventional mission is unknown. See Bill Gertz, “New C

Missiles Target All of East Asia,” Washington Times, July 10, 199

115. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 4. Another 

supports the assertion that conventional Second Artillery unit

be subsumed into the theater command structure, but notes that 

may direct operations though the Second Artillery chain-of-com

See Li Junsheng, “Lianhe zhanyi didi changgui daodan budui z

zhihui wenti tantao” (Inquiry Into Joint Conventional T

Surface-to-Surface Missile Unit Operational Command Proble

Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan (Joint Theater and 

Operations) Beijing: National Defense University Press, 19

228-231. Li is from an unidentified (probably Second Artillery

Research Institute.

116. Ibid, p. 5. During peacetime, these units are subordinat

base headquarters. 

117. Ibid, p. 4. The equipment assurance sub-units, the t

point, and the transport may be the responsibility of a battali

“technical unit” (jishu ying). A nuclear brigade’s technical ba

manages a warhead station (dantizhan), an inspection 

(zhuangjianzhan), and a technical service station (jishu qinwu

See “Guangrong bang,” Flying Eagle, undated (probably 1993), 

118. For reference to a fourth battalion within a Second A

brigade structure, see “Guangrong bang” (Glorious Honor Roll)

Eagle, November 2, 1993, p. 10.

119. Senior Colonel Wang Benzhi, “Didi changui daoda

yunyong de jige wenti,” (Some Questions Related to the 

Conventional Surface-to-Surface Missile Firepower), in Lianhe 

174
yu junbingzhong zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Oper

Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 236-241. 

Wang is the Chief of Staff of the Second Artillery Huaihua Base 

Unit). One source states that an operational zone could be 20-40 

kilometers. It is unclear what echelon would operate in this siz

See Lu Xiaohong, “Daodan jidong fashe zhuangbei ji dimian 

weizhuang yu yinshen jishu Fenxi” (Analysis of Mobile Missile 

and Ground Equipment Camouflage and Stealth Technology)

Dazhe, Guowai dandao daodan jishu yanjiu yu fazhan (Stu

Development of Foreign Ballistic Missile Technology), B

Astronautics Press, October 1998, pp. 193-202.

120. Mao Guanghong, “On Electromagnetic Management 

Modern Battlefield,” Jiefangjun bao, May 21, 1996, p

FBIS-CHI-96-134.

121. Zhang Jian, “Analysis of ECCM Principles of Spread Sp

Unified Satellite Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Network,” H

dianzi duikang, April 1997, pp. 26-30. Zhang is from the 

Academy of Engineering Physics’ Electronic Engineering Ins

Also see Wei Chenxi, “ECCM Measures for Military Commun

Satellites,” in Hangtian dianzi duikang, March 1997, pp. 31-34

122. Qin Zhongping and Zhang Huanguo, “ALT: Algorit

Attacking Cryptosystems,” Jisuanji Xuebao, Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 5

in FBIS-CHI-97-311; and Zhou Hong and Ling Xieting, “Encryp

Inverse Chaotic Systems,” Fudan xuebao, June 1997, Vol. 36, N

301-308, in FBIS-CHI-97-281.

123. Gan and Liu, pp. 42-45.

124. Lu Xiaohong, “Camouflage and Concealment Techno

Mobile Launchers and Ground Equipment of Strategic and T

Missiles,” Aerospace Industry Press, HQ-96034, 1996. The key in

for CCD technology related to missile launchers is the Beijing In

of Special Machinery. Wen Longzhi, “Evaluation of the Strategic 

Survivability,” in Aerospace Science Intelligence Studies 

Abstracts, No. 5, 1995, pp. 353-368.

125. Li Chunshan, “Introduction and Explanation of the N

Military Standard ‘Camouflage Requirements for Surface-to-

Missile Weapon Systems’,” in Hangtian biaozhunhua 

Standardization), 1994, Vol. 5, pp. 12-15. Li is from the Beijin

Systems Engineering Design Department.

175
126. Kang Qing, “IR Stealth of Buried Targets,” Hongwa

1996, 18 (6), pp. 21-24. Kang is from the PLA Academy of L

Engineering.

127. R&D of synthetic aperture radar satellite jammers 

specialty of Southwest Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIE

Chen Ning, “Jamming Technology Against Synthetic Aperture 

Satellites,” Hangtian Dianzi Duikang, 1997 (4), pp. 45-48.

128. Chou Kuan-wu, “China’s Reconnaissance Satellites,” 

chiao ching, March 16, 1998, pp. 36-40, in FBIS-CHI-98-098. 

chiao ching, or Wide Angle, is a Hong Kong-based publication wi

ties to the PRC military establishment. Official U.S. Gove

reports are consistent with this assessment. The 1998 Re

Congress on PRC Military Capabilities (pursuant to Section 122

FY98 National Defense Authorization Act) states China alrea

possess the capability to damage, under specific conditions, 

sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to damage by 

However, given China’s current interest in laser technolog

reasonable to assume that Beijing would develop a weapon tha

destroy satellites in the future.

129. Wu Jinliang, “Range Testing of Satellite Commun

Countermeasures,” in Electronic Countermeasure Technolo

Intelligence Reform Abstracts, November 1995, pp. 96-101. Refe

a Chinese study on GPS jammer is included in author’s unpu

report, China’s Space and Missile Industry, June 1995.

130. Stokes, pp. 118-119. One should note that in the 198

United States considered modification of the Pershing-2 for 

missions, a system similar to the DF-21.

131. Xu Hui and Sun Zhongkang, “Temperature Diff

Between Satellites and Satellite Decoys,” NUDT Journal, 1994, 

no. 3; also see Li Hong, “Identification of Satellites and Its Decoy

Multisensor Data Fusion,” Xiandai fangyu jishu, June 1997, pp

Li is from the NUDT Electronic Technology Department.

132. DoD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait Security Si

February 1999.

133. Wang Chunyuan, China’s Space Industry and Its Str

International Cooperation, Stanford University, Cen

International Security and Arms Control, July 1996, p. 4; 

Building Satellite Tracking Station on Tarawa,” Asian Defense J

176
March 1997, p. 66; and “Satellite Command Station Operati

Kiribati,” Zhongguo xinwenshe, October 14, 1997, inFBIS-CHI-9

134. Trip report, NASA visit to China, June 12-22, 199

example, China plans to develop a 500-meter aperture radi

telescope for deep space exploration. With a price of approxima

million dollars, the system, which will be based in Guizhou P

will primarily support civilian academic research, but could also 

to supplement China’s space surveillance network. CAST a

China Academy of Sciences are involved. See “Beijing Plans to D

500 Meter Radio Telescope,” Xinhua, April 9, 1998, in 

CHI-98-099. 

135. A 1993 edition of the Second Artillery journal Flyin

discussed a “comprehensive satellite early warning infor

management system” (erpaobing weixing linkong yubao zongh

chuli xitong) that began operations in as early as 1991. 

136. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 17. 

137. Ibid, p. 10; and Guan Lin’gen, “Brief Analysis of Combin

Assault,” Jiefangjun Bao, April 21, 1998, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-0

Some Western observers have asserted the initial phase would 

strikes against the general population and infrastructural targe

as power plants, fuel, industry, and transportation hubs as a m

weaken overall national resolve. However, the effects from 

targets would take awhile to materialize. The PRC objective wou

achieve military dominance over Taiwan within two weeks to a 

before negative international economic and political developme

occur. For comments on the importance of strikes against 

intelligence and electronic attack facilities in support of infor

dominance, see Yang Zhiguo, “Didi changgui daodan budui 

chutan” (Initial Discussion of Surface-to-Surface Missil

Doctrine), in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan, (Joint 

and Service Operations), Beijing: National Defense University 

1998, pp. 242-245. Senior Colonel Yang is Chief of Staff of the 

Artillery’s Luoyang Base (80304 Unit). 

138. The PLAAF appears to be placing more emphasis on dev

a deep strike capability. In 1995, the PLAAF conducted a majo

exercise in the Lanzhou Military Region. The exercise involve

force strike package that conducted a night mission from a dis

1,000 kilometers to strike the Blue force’s air base. In October 

conference, chaired by GSD DCS LTG Wu Quanxu was held at L

to review the exercise and associated doctrinal development iss

more complex strike exercise was carried out in northwest C

177
September 1996 (Exercise 96-9) when the PLAAF used multiple 

aircraft (i.e. A-5s, B-6s, F-7s, F-8IIs, and SU-27s) organiz

composite formations. The strike package included ele

countermeasures, strikes against enemy missiles, airfields, and 

This is an initial indication that the PLAAF could be shifting f

exclusively air defense mission to one including long-range 

missions. Like the USAF, the PLA views offensive counterair m

as an integral aspect of air defense. Lanzhou MR exercise areas 

to serve as the primary test bed for evolving doctrinal developme

Mei Lin, “PLA Methods of Operations Assessed,” and Zhang 

“‘96-9’ Yanxi,” Zhongguo kongjun, May 1998.

139. Senior Colonel Wang Benzhi, pp. 236-241.

140. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 10. One 

indicates that during annual meetings at Beidaihe in Augus

China’s senior leadership decided to accelerate the producti

deployment of enough ballistic missiles to outfit four SRBM brig

2002. As of January 2000, four batches of DF-15 SRBMs ha

completed. Each production batch (piliang shengchan) consis

missiles, indicating that 240 DF-15 missiles have been produc

Will Young, “Shenmi de zhongguo daodan budui,” (The Develop

the Chinese Second Artillery), Shijie junshi luntan (World M

Forum), Internet edition in Chinese (http//:www.wforum

January 2000. The rapid growth in the Second Artillery’s conve

force has prompted the outsourcing of training. In 1999, the No

China Engineering University and the Second Artillery agreed to 

foster more high quality personnel for China’s missile forces.

141. Guan Lingen, “Brief Analysis of Combined Fire A

Jiefangjun bao, April 21, 1998, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-0519-

comparison, allied forces in the Gulf War used 137 theater m

(TLAMs/CALCMs) during the first 24 hours of the conflict. Eac

consisted of around 50 missiles. Western reporting indicates t

currently has only one brigade consisting of 150-200 SRBMs. S

Walker and Stephen Fidler, “China Builds Up Missile T

Financial Times, February 10, 1999, p. 1.

142. Guan Lingen, “Brief Analysis of Combined Fire A

Jiefangjun bao, April 21, 1998, p. 6, in FBIS-CHI-0519-98. 

143. See Sun Xiaohe, “Jiaqiang huoli xietiao, fahui zhengt

(Strengthen Firepower Coordination, Give Play to Compre

Power), in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan, (Joint Thea

Service Operations), Beijing: National Defense University Pres

178
pp. 281-285. Senior Colonel Sun is Deputy Director of the Gua

Military Region Service Arms Department.

144. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 10. Also se

Xuejin and Zhang Huaibi, “Didi changgui daodan budui zuozhan 

sixiang fenxi,” (Analysis of Conventional Surface-to-Surface 

Operations Guiding Thought) in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbin

zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Operations), Beijing: N

Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 223-227. Wang and Zhang 

strike phase the “operations implementation phase” (zuozhan 

jieduan). 

145. Most of the critical targets in a Taiwan scenario are sta

would not change significantly over time. Therefore, a satellite 

rate of a few days, or even weeks, could be sufficient. 

commercially acquired imagery could meet its strategic ta

requirements. However, with the possible exception of Russia, 

could not rely on foreign sources of imagery after initiation of hos

For follow-on tactical strike missions, domestic imaging satellite

be needed for theater reconnaissance and warning. The pr

five-meter spatial resolution of China’s EO/SAR satellite const

would support most PLA targeting requirements.

146. Open sources indicate the DF-15s are likely transpo

assembly areas to via rail. While the DF-15 TELs are road mob

DF-15 MAZ-543-like TEL is limited to a maximum of 63 kilome

hour on an open highway. Barring major infrastructure inves

road conditions and traffic in this area, however, are not ideal fo

and distant deployment of 20-ton TELs and a quiver of 3-ton miss

addition, road travel significantly increases the chances of de

There is a major 15-year project underway to expand the rail net

Fujian and Jiangxi provinces that will increase the number of av

launch sites and complicate the tracking of the missiles on the g

Highest priority is being given to linking Nanping to He

Shangrao, creating a racetrack bounded by Yingtan, Shaowu, N

Shangrao/Hengtian, and back to Yingtan. Funding in part i

provided by Japan. See “Fujian Seeks Foreign Funds for R

Construction,” Xinhua, February 12, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-0

“Fujian Governor Announces Plans For Six New Railways,” X

August 1, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-213. For comments on 

garrison, Yong’an launch site, and use of rails, see “Defense M

Analyzes 4th Missile Launch,” China Broadcasting Corporatio

Network, March 13, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-051. 

147. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 17. Theater co

authorities would determine a deployment pattern that wo

179
centered on the brigade’s mobile command center. Also see Ric

Fisher, “China’s Missiles Over the Taiwan Strait: A Politi

Military Assessment,” paper presented at September 96 C

Conference on the PLA, pp. 1-30. For reference to a unit ha

assigned operating area, see Senior Colonel Wang Benzhi, pp. 23

148. Zhu Bao, pp. 9-19.

149. Zhang Hu, “Application of GPS in Missile Mane

Positioning,” Zhongguo yuhang xuehui fashe gongcheng yu 

shebei wenzhai (China Astronautics Society Launch Engineer

Ground Equipment Abstracts), November 1993.

150. Ge Xinqing, Mao Guanghong, and Yu Bo, “Xinxizhan 

daodan budui mianlin de wenti yu duice,” (Question

Countermeasures Facing Missile Units in Information Warf

Wojun xinxizhan wenti yanjiu (Studies on Chinese Information W

Issues), Beijing: National Defense University, pp. 189-192. The 

are from the Second Artillery’s Command Academy in Wuhan. It 

be noted that Fujian province by itself has 16,000 kilometers 

optic cable.

151.Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, “Guowai jidong dandao 

dimian shengcun nengli yanjiu,” (Study on Survivability of 

Mobile Ballistic Missiles), in Xu Dazhe, Guowai dandao daoda

yanjiu yu fazhan (Study and Development of Foreign Ballistic 

Technology), Beijing: Astronautics Press, October 1998, pp. 9

Wang and Chang are from CALT’s systems integration depar

The article describes foreign capabilities but concludes with 

recommendations for China. Chinese defense industrie

developed a range of tactical communications systems, including 

1-3 meter very small aperture terminal (VSAT) satellite commun

dishes and highly directional tactical digital microwave system

dishes are optimized for Ku- or L-Band satellite communications

on author’s discussions in Beijing with foreign diplomats in 19

Second Artillery has been particularly interested in steerable sp

satellites. According to its brochure, the tactical microwave 

produced by Shenyang Huitong Electronic Research Institute

50-kilometer range. At the end of 1997, culminating a 3-year eff

Second Artillery’s Communications Department complet

acceptance testing of a new digital microwave communications 

VSAT systems are produced by a wide range of manufacture

tactical VSAT system, outlined in another brochure, is a mobile 

dish produced by the Nanjing Research Institute of Elec

Technology. Use of digital microwave at the company leve

indicate that launchers could be limited to an operating area of 

180
50 kilometers of the battalion command center. It is not clear, h

if such a communications mode would be assigned to such a low e

For reference to the automated C2 system, see Han Tiejun 

Qinsuo, “Didi changui daodan budui zuozhan de jiben y

(Fundamental Principles of Conventional Surface-to-Surface 

Unit Operations), in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan

Theater and Service Operations) Beijing: National Defense Un

Press, 1998, pp. 232-235.

152. See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, pp. 96-108. Pre-G

estimates assessed that it would take approximately one half 

move a transporter erector launcher after it launched its miss

reality was that the Iraqis were able to do this in 4 to 5 minute

153. A brigade consists of at least four battalions probab

three to four companies. Each company likely is responsible for 

one launcher. If one assumes a notional structure of four battal

brigade with four companies/launchers each—then a brigade w

able to execute a raid size of at least 16 SRBMs at one time. 

Second Artillery brigades, equipped with a mix of SRBMs, LAC

MRBMs, could notionally achieve a raid size of at least 112 

missiles. Three salvos would utilize 336 missiles. Remaining 

missiles in the PLA arsenal would likely be kept in reserve fo

contingencies and/or to support naval operations and amp

landings. The Chief of Staff of the 80305 Unit in Huaihua, 

province refers to only two salvos in the opening phases of a conf

next footnote). See Senior Colonel Wang Benzhi, pp. 236-241.

154. Lianhe zhanyi di erpaobing zuozhan, p. 17. The con

synchronized, multi-axis strikes is a fundamental principle of 

Artillery conventional doctrine (duodian, duofangxiang, tongs

Other important operational concepts discussed by Senior 

Wang from Huaihua include “xushi bingyong, shengdong xiji,” (l

“use reality, make a noise in the east, but strike to the wes

“xiaojiange, duoboci tuji” (literally “cut time and strike in m

waves”). The first calls for integration of simultaneous launch

different launch azimuths and use of infrared radiation “disrup

confuse enemy satellite early warning systems and complicate 

attack operations. The second includes use of two strike waves, 

“screening” the second by exploiting “time lags” (shijiancha) in 

defenses. See Senior Col Wang’s “Didi changgui daodan huoli y

de jige wenti.”

155. Ibid.

181
156. ”The U.S. Military’s Three Choices on Intervention,” in 

de Junbei, July 1, 1996, pp. 76-79, in FBIS-CHI-97-302. 

157. See Li Xinyi, “On the Air Supremacy and Air Defense of 

and China: Is Taiwan An ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’?,” Tai

Junbei (Taiwan Military Preparations), July 1, 1996, pp. 11

FBIS-CHI-97-323. For a general discussion on the combined 

ballistic and land attack cruise missiles, electronic warfare, 

strikes, see Yuan Lin, “The Taiwan Strait is No Longer A Barrie

Strategies for Attacking Taiwan,” Kuang chiao ching (Wide 

April 16, 1996, No. 283, pp. 14-19. Wide Angle is a Hong Kon

publication with close association with the PLA.

158. The PRC has closely studied the effectiveness of missile 

systems and is investing in developing the capacity to jam T

PATRIOT-like Modified Air Defense System radar. See for ex

Xiao Shunping, Wang Guoyu, and Ma Jianwu, “Detection Sim

Modeling for PATRIOT Radar Networks,” Guofang keji daxue 

(Journal of the National University of Defense Technology), Jan

1999, pp. 33-36, in FBIS-CHI-1924, June 17, 1999.

159. Estimated missile requirements are drawn from Edw

Harshberger, Long Range Conventional Missiles: Issues for Nea

Development, RAND: Santa Monica, 1991, p. 183.

160. Senior Colonel Wang Benzhi, “Didi changui daoda

yunyong de jige wenti,” (Some Questions Related to the 

Conventional Surface-to-Surface Missile Firepower), in Lianhe 

yu junbingzhong zuozhan, (Joint Theater and Service Oper

Beijing: National Defense University Press, 1998, pp. 236-241. 

Wang is the Chief of Staff of the Huaihua Base (80305 Unit) in 

Province.

161. The PLA could attempt to limit the useable segme

runway to less than the minimum takeoff distance for the aircra

them. Generally, for example, an attack on a standard 10,0

runway would attempt to cut the runway into three seg

permitting only 3,000-3,500 feet per segment. One source assert

would take 15-48 missiles to close a base, assuming a 50-meter C

increase in CEP would reduce the number of required missile

David Blair, “How To Defeat the United States: The Oper

Military Effects of the Proliferation of Weapons of Precise Destr

in Henry Sokolski, Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns 

Nineties, Air University Press, pp. 75-94. Also see Senior Colone

Benzhi, “Didi changui daodan huoli yunyong de jige wenti,” 

Questions Related to the Use of Conventional Surface-to-

182
Missile Firepower), in Lianhe zhanyi yu junbingzhong zuozhan

Theater and Service Operations), Beijing: National Defense Un

Press, 1998, pp. 236-241.

162. For a superb discussion of airbase attacks, see Christo

Center, “Ignorance is Risk: The Big Lesson From Desert Storm A

Attacks,” in Airpower Journal, Winter 1992, pp. 25-35; and C

Peter C. Bahm and Captain Kenneth W. Polasek, “Tactical Aircr

Airfield Recovery, Airpower Journal, Summer 1991, pp. 32-4

worthy to note that during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli Wa

repair teams restored runways in just 9-12 hours. The Iraqis w

to repair runways in as little as 4 to 6 hours.

163. See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, p. 107.

164. Lu Ting-hua, “Simulated Attack on Taiwan?,” Tsu-li W

April 28, 1999, p. 1, in FBIS-CHI-639-99, April 29, 1999.

165. Harshberger, p. 183.

166. Xu Minfei, Zhu Zili, and Li Yong, “Feasibility of Techn

for Use of Ballistic Missiles to Counter Aircraft Carriers,” Guofa

Cankao, 1997, 18(4), pp. 126-130, summarized in CAMA. 

167. Wang Guobao, “Initial Discussion on Tactical Ballistic 

Electronic Warfare,” Hangtian dianzi duikang, April 1997, 

summarized in CAMA.

168. See Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, p. 107. Most vul

would be Kadena AB and Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan. 

169. For a good summary of Second Artillery CCD practices, 

et al., “Xinxizhan zhong daodan budui mianlin de wenti yu du

189-192. Also see Wang Jixiang and Chang Lan, pp. 96-108. Wa

Chang are from the Beijing Institute of Astronautical S

Engineering. See also Lu Xiaohong, “Camouflage and Conce

Technology for Mobile Launchers and Ground Equipment of S

and Tactical Missiles,” Aerospace Industry Press, HQ-96034, 19

key institute for camouflage, concealment, and deception 

technology related to missile launchers is the Beijing Institute of 

Machinery (CALT 15th Research Institute).

170. The system is probably known as the “Bodyguard,” unv

IDEX ’97 Arms Show. The brochure notes that the Bodygua

mobile system consisting of four vehicles. The Bodyguard can d

10-square kilometer area. The ECM system was developed 

183
Northeast China Research Institute of Electronic Technology. 

Hsiao-chun, “Combat Effectiveness of China’s Electronic Techn

Perspective—Causing the F-117 Stealth Fighters To Malfu

Kuang chiao ching, July 16, 1998, pp. 96-98, in FBIS-CHI-2875-

organic Second Artillery ECM system is discussed in 

comprehensive account of developments within the PLA 

Chong-Bin (Chong-Pin Lin), entitled Heba (Nuclear Hegemony

171. For one of the best Taiwan assessments of the cha

presented by the PLA’s growing arsenal of theater missiles, se

Hsin-yun, “Another TMD Episode—The PRC Missile Threat a

Countermeasures As Well As Blind Spots in Taiwan’s D

Thinking,” Chien-tuan k’o chi, May 1, 1999, pp. 100-107, in FBI

0872-99, June 6, 1999.

172. This “area denial” concept is discussed in Thomas G. Ma

“Deny U.S. Access?,” Proceedings, September 1998, pp. 36-3

another evaluation of the implications of increasingly accura

lethal theater missiles, see Paul Bracken, “America’s Magino

Atlantic Monthly, December 1998.

173. The six specious arguments are: (1) TMD will cause a

race; (2) TMD will contradict the ABM Treaty; (3) TMD will en

Taiwan independence sentiment; (4) TMD can be used offensiv

TMD will lead to the militarization of space; and (6) TMD “viola

Three Communiqués. All are based on oversimplificatio

half-truths as seen in the following paragraphs:

(1) Arms races generally are caused by one side’s rapid bu

offensive capabilities. One could argue that an accelerated ar

has been underway in the Taiwan Strait since the early 

Undercutting Beijing’s overwhelming offensive advantage t

viable defenses could enhance cross-Strait stability by raising t

of using force.

(2) Questions surrounding the ABM Treaty only apply to up

systems—U.S. upper tier systems now being tested have been c

as ABM Treaty compliant.

(3) The argument that TMD will encourage Taiwan indepe

sentiment is also misleading. There are more important factors 

defenses that fan the flames of Taiwan independence. PRC polic

alienate Taiwan are most relevant. Besides, active missile d

would not encourage independence sentiment any more tha

weapon systems, such as fighters, surface-to-air missiles, or shi

could also argue that Taiwan’s indigenous capacity for defense i

184
minor factor influencing public sentiment regarding greater au

since, according to some sources, Taiwan’s domestic polity is 

uninterested in defense issues.

(4) The argument that active missile defenses can b

offensively is also based on a half-truth. Converting upp

interceptors to surface-to-surface missiles could enable strikes 

targets at long ranges. However, such a means is not cost efficien

payload limitations. Development of a cost effective theater b

missile is well within Taiwan’s technical capabilities. The ar

that missile defense systems incorporate technologies useful to b

missiles (i.e. gyroscopes and accelerometers) assumes that Tai

does not have the indigenous capacity to develop viable 

measurement units; b) would be willing to violate MTCR ass

granted to the United States; and c) would take the trouble to 

engineer the guidance technology.

(5) The argument that TMD could lead to a militarization of 

partially true. If supported by a robust search, acquisition, and t

network, upper tier systems could be used to strike some satellite

earth orbit.

(6) Finally, active missile defenses would not “violate” th

Communiqués. First, the Three Communiqués are parallel stat

of policy that have little standing in international law. Secon

argument that U.S. provision of active missile defenses would re

U.S.-Taiwan defense alliance, undermining the foundation of U

relations as spelled out in the 1979 Communiqué, is based 

assumption that TMD would require operational connectiv

satellite early warning) with the United States. This is not nec

true. While satellite early warning could enhance the effective

missile defense systems, such as PATRIOT and THAAD, a

operate autonomously against SRBMs, early warning rad

supplant satellite early warning. The idea that satellite early w

necessarily equates to an alliance is also fallacious. The United 

has several early warning arrangements with foreign governme

are not considered allies. Furthermore, missile defenses do not “

the 1982 Communiqué any more than other weapon system

Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge pointed out in his 

1982 Congressional testimony, the U.S. agreement to reduce arm

to Taiwan was contingent upon Beijing’s peaceful approach to re

the Taiwan issue, generally characterized by its military 

directed against Taiwan. As Holdridge pointed out, a rise in the m

threat to Taiwan theoretically would be accompanied by a rise 

security assistance, in accordance with U.S. domestic law un

Taiwan Relations Act. 

185
174. Among numerous references, see Tom Plate, “Eas

Infected By a New Arms Race, Risks Deadly Miscalculatio

Times, July 7, 1999; and Vanessa Guest, “Missile Defense Is Wro

on Taiwan,” LA Times, May 3, 1999.

175. Among numerous references, see Robert Jervis, “O

Defense, and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30

January 1978, pp. 186-214; and Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, D

and the Causes of War, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, 

1998, pp. 5-43.

176. See Stephen Van Evera’s Spring 1998 International S

article for a comprehensive argument on the dangers of an 

dominated security environment. In line with this reasoning, on

argue that Taiwan’s newly procured F-16s are to bla

intensification of the cross-Strait arms race. However, Taiwan

fleet is optimized for air-to-air operations, not long-range strik

177. Hou Xiaoyan, “Taiwan zhongkeyuan de yanjiu ling

chanpin jieshao” (Introduction to Taiwan’s Zhongshan Inst

Science and Technology Fields of Research and Products), F

daodan (Cruise Missiles), December 1998, p 39. This CASC 

asserts that CSIST is converting the TK-II into a surface-to-

ballistic missile. The ballistic missile, called Sky Halberd (

allegedly has a design range of 320 kilometers and a 150-k

warhead. CSIST is integrating GPS with their inertial nav

systems in order to achieve a CEP of less than 100 meters. P

targets would be airfields, military ports, and industrial area

CASC author also asserts that a second stage addition to the 

missile would significantly expand the range. As an exampl

nuclear weapons development debate, see Liao Hung-hsiang: 

Taiwan Develop Strategic Nuclear Weapons?” Ch’uan-ch’iu f

tsa-chi, March 15, 1999, pp. 18-21, in FBIS-CHI-0018-99, A

1999; and Liu Chien-hua, “What Equipment Should Taiwan 

Defend Itself, ”Tzu-li wan-pao, November 9, 1997, p. 2, in FB

97-364, December 30, 1999. For background on Taiwan’s p

nuclear weapons development program, see David Albright an

Gay, “Taiwan: A Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” The Bulletin of 

Scientists,, Vol. 54, No. 1, January/February 1998. Also see 

Segal, “Taiwan’s Nuclear Card,” Asian Wall Street Journal, Au

1998.

178. Robert Jervis, “Offense, Defense, and the Security Dil

World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978, pp. 186-214.

186
179. For an outstanding discussion on shortcomings of 

missile campaign theory, see Colonel Richard Szafranski, “Para

and Hyperwar: Is Every Want a Weakness?” in Barry Schnei

Lawrence Grinter, ed., Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Iss

War College Studies in National Security No.3, Air University, 1

125-148. 

180. See Teng Hsin-yun for a realistic Taiwan assessm

countermeasures.

181. Theoretically, assuming two interceptors are emplo

every ballistic missile and a 100 percent probability of kill, a 

battalion could engage a near simultaneous salvo of 48 SRBMs d

against targets within its area of coverage. For backgro

countering theater missile threats, see Joint Pub 3-01.5, Doct

Joint Theater Missile Defense, February 22, 1996. DoD’s Re

Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options 

Asia-Pacific Region notes there are multiple options for active 

defenses. Twelve land-based lower-tier fire units could prov

partial coverage of Taiwan’s most crucial assets. Eleven se

lower systems could cover the entire island. Neither lower tier 

however, can counter longer-range threats such as the DF-

addition, a maneuvering reentry vehicle that complicates low

engagements would drive Taiwan toward upper tier solutions. A 

THAAD-like unit could engage all known missile threats

exo-atmosphere Navy Theater Wide-like system can cover the 

island but would not be able to engage shorter range threats suc

300-kilometer DF-11 since it would not leave the atmosphere.

187
CHAPTER 6

PLA AIR FORCE OPERATIONS

AND MODERNIZATION

Kenneth W. Allen

Introduction. 

The Central Military Commission has called for the urge

upgrading of the country’s Air Force to neutralize grow

threats from regional neighbors and other countries. . . . O

country now faces a serious challenge. . . . China needs 

develop airborne early warning systems and foster research 

the development of high-tech electronic combat systems. . . 

threatened from the air, China must have the ability to ca

its defense strike capability to targets outside its o

airspace.

Jiefangjun Bao, April 7, 1996

1

The Chinese Air Force plans to acquire state-of-the-

weapons systems by early next century, including ea

warning planes, electronic warfare warplanes, and surfa

to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able to fight bo

defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions

Liu Shunyao, PLA Air Force Commander,

April 1997

2

 

China’s Air Force has significantly improved its comb

readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per cap

flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy summ

flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pil

paid particular attention to improving basic flying techniqu

The fact that 66 percent of air units conducted high

successful long-distance mobile maneuvers under har

weather conditions indicated that China’s Air Force has grea

189
enhanced its combat readiness.

Wu Guangyu,

PLA Air Force Deputy Commander,

January 1998

3

 

We should build an Air Force capable of both offensive 

defensive operations with Chinese characteristics.

Jiang Zemin, March 1999

4

China’s Air Force, known as the People’s Libe

Army Air Force (PLAAF), is in a crucial transition peri

it changes from an obsolescent giant to a modern 

prepared to fight local, limited wars under high

conditions. The PLAAF is slowly moving from a defe

force dominated by 1950s vintage combat aircraft with 

legs and limited all-weather intercept capabilities 

offensive-oriented force with extended range and g

lethality. While new aircraft like the J-10, J-11 (Su-27

Su-30 are gradually introduced into the force, older ai

like the J-7 and J-8 are being modified with better av

and air-to-air missiles to bridge the gap. The new co

aircraft force of the 21st century will be controll

airborne early warning aircraft, refueled by tankers

supported by electronic countermeasure and intelli

collection aircraft. The PLAAF is forging ahead 

advanced tactics and logistics techniques for its 

aircraft, while sustaining the operational capabilities 

older inventory. In addition to its combat aircraf

PLAAF is improving its surface-to-air missile forc

mobility for its elite airborne corps. In 10 years the P

will be a much smaller force, but will have greater ran

lethality than the PLAAF of the 1990s.

5

PLAAF writings indicate that it has an impr

history defending China. The PLAAF establishe

credibility during the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan 

Crisis, and the Vietnam War, but it has not conducte

large-scale air battles since then. The official P

history states that it has shot down 1,474 and dam

190
2,344 aircraft of all types. Analysis of these figures 

that PLAAF aircraft have shot down or damaged only 

200 aircraft during air-to-air combat, most of w

occurred during the Korean War. The PLAAF’s antiai

artillery (AAA) and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) shot 

or damaged the remaining 3,600 aircraft. The PL

SAM forces are particularly proud of shooting dow

Nationalist Air Force U-2 reconnaissance planes be

1963 and 1967.

6

 The last PLAAF combat took pla

October 1987, when a SAM shot down a Vietnamese M

that had crossed the border.

The PLAAF readily admits that its equipme

backwards, but modernization is taking place acros

board, including equipment, tactics, training, logistic

maintenance. Unlike the 1980s, there are very few P

leaders left who fought in the Korean War. Today

Force leaders have put forth an optimistic vision 

future. Unfortunately, the PLAAF does not provide 

solid clues as to how it plans to reach that vision. One 

biggest problems foreigners have researching the PL

is the lack of open source information. Even 

information is available, it focuses on the vision, not o

process. Most Western writings on the PLAAF tend to 

on the acquisition of hardware, such as the Russian S

Su-30s, Il-76s, and S-300s.

7

 These articles pay 

attention to the “software” issues, including leade

missions and organization, strategy and doc

personnel, support equipment, operations, trai

logistics, maintenance, and C4I (command, co

communications, computers, and intelligence).

8

This chapter will address the PLAAF’s opera

capabilities and modernization. The first part will pr

statements by the PLAAF’s commander, Lieut

General Liu Shunyao, describing the PLAAF’s 

present, and future. The next part will look at the PL

missions and organizational structure, includin

aviation, air defense, and airborne forces. The third 

will assess the air activity that has occurred ove

191
Taiwan Strait in reaction to President Lee Teng-hui’

9, 1999, statements about “state-to-state” relations be

Taiwan and the mainland. The chapter will also ad

China’s neighbors’ perceptions of the PLAAF. The fina

will provide conclusions.

PLAAF Commander’s Assessment.

Lieutenant General Liu Shunyao has had se

interviews with Chinese reporters since he became P

commander in December 1996.

9

 The first of 

interviews coincided with Taiwan’s receipt of the first 

of 150 F-16 fighters from the United States and 60 M

2000-5s from France. The interviews also came afte

PLAAF had already received several Russian 

fighters, Il-76 transports, and S-300 SAMs. The PLAA

also deployed its first indigenous B-6 airborne refu

aircraft for its J-8II fighters, and had ordered the firs

airborne early warning platform from Russia and Isr

During the interviews, Commander Liu stressed 

the aviation troops formed the Air Force’s backbone

PLAAF culture has always focused on the role of aircr

the core of the force, even though the air defense (SAM 

AAA) forces have shot down more aircraft. He 

emphasized that the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army, 

has also become more integrated into the PLA’s 

operations, has established “fist” units that are now 

mobile and have longer range as a result of acq

several Russian Il-76 transports.

10

While discussing the PLAAF’s current capabi

Commander Liu has focused on the ability to fight defe

and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The 

from strictly defensive to offensive capabilities derived 

the PLAAF’s post-Gulf War realization that pre

guided missiles (PGMs) and long-range cruise missile

changed the rules of warfare. This realization was one 

driving forces for the PLAAF to acquire modern w

systems from Russia. As a result of modernizing its w

192
systems, the Air Force has been able to changes its ta

extend its combat range, and practice providing suppo

ground and naval operations.

Liu and other PLAAF officials continue to emph

that three-quarters of its pilots are now able to 

all-weather conditions; the percentage of categor

combat regiments, an indicator of the Air Force’s co

effectiveness, has reached 95.5 percent; and that th

Force has a 16-year flight safety record.

11

 As for fly

all-weather conditions, there is some question as to e

what types of flying the pilots conduct under visual 

regulations (VFR) and night flying conditions. Are 

types of flights flown only on cloudless, moonlit nigh

during cloudy, pitch-black conditions over long dist

while engaged in air intercept training? Since the Ch

media rarely reports aircraft accidents, there is no w

verify the accuracy of the flight safety record, but this 

also, is questionable. For example, there are cr

reports that Cao Shuangming, the PLAAF commande

1992-94, was relieved of duty partly due to a ser

aircraft accidents that took place under his comm

Furthermore, since the PLAAF rarely trains using 

aircraft turn around sorties and most engines can o

used from 100 to 300 hours before they are overhaule

maintenance record would probably be red

considerably during periods of sustained use, su

during a conflict.

Given the PLAAF’s current limitations, Command

and other Air Force leaders have expressed an opti

vision of the future. As the Air Force upgrade

capabilities of its current inventory with foreign techn

begins producing the J-10 and J-11 (Su-27) aircraf

acquires new fighters (Su-30) and airborne early wa

aircraft and SAMs, the PLAAF will be able to exte

range, increase its firepower, and change its tactics th

the use of improved electronic warfare, night training

joint campaign training. The PLAAF will also foc

193
efforts on research and development, while importing 

high-tech weapons.

The debate in China about importing weapon sy

versus domestically producing them continues

example, a July 1999 report in Science and Tech

Daily complained that China’s achievements in many 

over the past 20 years have attracted world attentio

the aviation industry has increasingly lagged behind

aviation industry continues to have a spraw

organization with weak facilities and low standards

the gap between it and the aviation industries o

developed western countries is widening. The a

lamented that this is cause for anxiety, because with

strong defense there can be no genuine overall streng

There is also a debate among foreign analysts abou

much China’s aviation industry has been able to learn 

foreign aircraft manufacturers and transfer the know

to producing combat aircraft. Foreign air

manufacturers have routinely complained for alm

decades that they have spent time and money tra

Chinese technicians to work on a specific comm

aircraft project, only to have those technicians disapp

some unknown project and be replaced by a new ba

trainees.

While some observers see China’s aviation indus

large and stagnant, other observers cite some cent

excellence. Facilities such as the Chengdu Ai

Company, Xian Aircraft Company, and Shenyang Ai

Company have made significant progress through 

ventures with Western companies and assistance 

Russia and Israel. For example, Boeing 737 tail sectio

produced in China with no U.S. backup. These ven

have provided both access to Western manufact

processes and valuable technical and managerial tra

While these are derived from commercial air

manufacturing, the processes are generally the same 

mostly metal fighter aircraft like the J-10 and the S

194
Only time will tell how these aircraft production prog

will turn out. Because of the size of China’s air f

however, any modernization plan will require Ch

production to be economically feasible.

As the PLAAF upgrades its weapons systems, it 

also modernize its organizational structure, ta

training, and support capabilities. One problem asso

with analyzing the PLAAF is determining which ch

are being tested and which changes are being impleme

PLA journals often discuss research or changes that 

taken place at the unit level. Some analysts, how

assume that these changes have been, or wi

implemented throughout the force. This is not neces

the case. The PLAAF, like the PLA as a whole, 

complex method of introducing new ideas, weapon sys

and tactics into the force. The General Armam

Department has attempted to streamline this proces

only time will tell whether or not it is successful.

After identifying a problem, the PLAAF systemat

seeks a solution. First, the appropriate research ins

and/or the PLAAF Command College studies the pr

from a theoretical perspective and makes recomm

tions.

1 3

 Next, PLAAF Headquarters approve

recommendations. After this, the theories are tested 

unit level. Occasionally, separate units test diff

alternatives simultaneously. Based upon evalua

competing theories may be accepted, modified, or rej

After the competing theories are tested and accepted 

unit level, they are tested at the next level, and so for

the organizational structure. At some point, the P

selects one of the theories and begins implement

force-wide, starting again at the unit level.

This is a time-consuming process and invol

tremendous amount of coordination. The problem be

even more complex if the theory being tested involves 

than one PLAAF branch or PLA service. Whereas a c

in flying tactics involves only the PLAAF’s aviation br

195
changes in the logistics system to support joint s

operations involves the entire PLA. For example, the 

and 1996 exercises opposite Taiwan were intended 

show of force, but they also provided the PLA wit

opportunity to test joint training that had been ev

since the end of the Gulf War.

Doctrine and Strategy.

The PLAAF’s evolution of operational capabilities 

to the evolution of the PLA’s overall doctrine and str

China’s communist leaders have long seen themselv

encircled by real or potentially hostile forces threat

the regime’s security. They have also long sought to de

doctrine and strategy to deal with this situation. The 

doctrine has evolved from Mao Zedong’s basic doctr

people’s war, which still retains a measure of influe

Chinese thinking, at least in broad conceptual term

1985, the CMC radically revised China’s doctrin

strategic defense policy by directing the armed for

change from preparation for an “early, major, and nu

war” to preparing for “local limited wars around C

borders, including its maritime territories and cla

Following the Gulf War, this doctrine was amended to 

local wars under modern, high-technology condit

Thus, people’s war has evolved as a blend of defens

offense, and has been modified to incorporate va

strategies, including active defense and the rapid-re

strategy.

14

In its essence, the people’s war doctrine refle

strategy of weakness. Since the PLA was founded in 1

has had to develop strategies for defeating adversarie

had superior weapons and equipment. That this dile

should continue into the 21st century is no doubt frustr

to members of the current military hierarchy.

While people’s war places special emphasis on defe

strategy and on the factor of manpower over weapon

PLA has never ignored the need for an offensive str

196
The PLA’s involvement in the Korean and Vietnam 

plus its attacks against India in 1962 and Vietna

1979—which were followed by quick, unila

withdrawals—were all described as defensive opera

At the same time, Mao long recognized the value of uti

superior force to overwhelm China’s adversaries. W

the people’s war doctrine, the basic military strategy 

formulated, known as active defense, was one 

protracted, defensive war.

In a recent paper, Dr. Paul Godwin states that,

the PLA has been shifting over the past 20 years fr

continental defense in depth to peripheral defense a

maritime force projection, and from a ground-force domina

approach to war, to a multi-service joint operations doctri

In conceptualizing the battlefield, the PLA has shifted from 

two-dimensional concept, where the ground war was t

central focus, to a multidimensional battlespace, where spa

and cyberspace play roles as important as the traditio

air-land-sea dimensions. The PLA has faced the ma

difficulty of the absence of any period of stability in which 

could complete the organizational, training, and logist

changes required to implement a revised strategy a

operational doctrine.

15

Although PLAAF writings mention the broader 

doctrine and strategic concepts of people’s war, people

under modern conditions, and people’s war under mo

high-tech conditions, they tend to focus more on cam

strategy, campaign tactics, and tactical training.

As an arm of the PLA, the PLAAF traditionall

conducted its combat operations as a series of subord

campaigns within the PLA’s overall campaign. The P

describes a campaign as “using from one to many avi

air defense, or airborne units to carry out a ser

combined battles according to a general battle pl

achieve a specified strategic or campaign objective 

specified time.”

16

 During March 1997, Commande

stated the PLAAF must improve its capabilities in a

197
combat by highlighting campaign and tactical trainin

emphasized that campaign training involves air deter

air interdiction, air strikes, and participation in 

exercises.

17

Although the PLA has always had an active de

strategy, one of the PLAAF’s most significant developm

in the past couple of years has been the public empha

Chinese leaders, including CMC Chairman Jiang Zem

the PLAAF’s capability to fight offensive battles. Wha

means is that the PLAAF is beginning to acquire the ty

weapon systems, such as the Su-27 and Il-76, that will 

the PLAAF to change its doctrine appropriately and 

away from its purely defensive missions.

PLAAF Rapid-Reaction Force.

The PLAAF’s Airborne Troops. One of the PLAAF’

important changes in campaign strategy took place in 

when the Air Force’s 15th Airborne Army began cha

into a rapid-reaction force (RRF). Although PL

airpower discussions in the late 1980s included ideas 

fist units, these discussions centered on the airborne 

and not the aviation units. While the airborne forces 

clearly included in plans for the RRF, it appears th

airborne forces did not actually form any operational 

until around 1992.

18

According to an October 1993 Jane’s Defence W

report, China was in the process of changing the 

Airborne Army’s three brigades into divisions, in or

boost their rapid-response power. The 43rd Brigade, 

in Kaifeng, was the first brigade to undergo expansio

division. The other two brigades, the 44th at Yingsha

45th at Huangpi, followed suit shortly thereafter. Mi

planners had apparently decided that brigade-size 

were too small for their assigned combat missions. Ch

brigades normally have about 3,000 to 4,000 troops

ground force divisions have about 15,000 troops.

1

airborne units are composed of eight types of troops: s

198
infantry, artillerymen, signalmen, engineers, antiche

warfare corps, and automobile corps.

The 1999 Department of Defense’s (DoD) assessm

the PLA describes the 15th Airborne Army as consist

three airborne divisions, each with about 10,000 troop

15th Airborne Army is China’s primary quick reaction 

and has been designated as a strategic rapid reaction 

but the airborne units remain handicapped by insuff

airlift. Acquisition of additional aircraft and m

equipment, together with the increased emphas

utilizing airborne forces during training exercises, 

marginally improve the airborne army’s combat 

bilities.

20

According to Commander Liu, however, sinc

PLAAF began receiving several Russian Il-76 transpo

1992, the airborne troops now have all-terrain, all-we

omni-directional combat capabilities.

21

 In order to ad

various adverse operational conditions, the airborne 

have conducted exercises in the snowfields of the G

Khingan Mountains (Da Xinganling), the hot jungles 

Shiwan Mountains in Guangxi, and the Kunlun Pla

located 4,600 meters above sea level where the air is th

Airborne troop training over the past few years ap

to have focused primarily in and around Tibet. At the 

time, however, some airborne training has 

concentrated on a Taiwan scenario. By reporting this t

activity, the government is apparently trying to s

signal to inhabitants of Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang th

airborne forces are preparing for internal continge

should the need arise.

23

 Reporting of these types of exe

also points out some of the airborne forces’ limitation

example, during the 1996 military exercise opp

Taiwan, the PLAAF inserted a small contingent of air

troops onto Haitan island, but this portion of the ex

was scaled down due to inclement weather, again calli

reliability of Liu’s statement into question.

24

199
Aviation Rapid Reaction Force Units . Se

discussions about establishing aviation RRF units d

occur until around the early 1990s, which coincided 

China’s purchase of the first Russian Su-27s and I

According to interviews with foreign air force offic

Asia, the PLAAF’s rapid-reaction aviation unit

currently composed of J-7, J-8, and Su-27 fighters and 

transports. Although the bulk of the PLAAF consists 

fighters, the RRF does not include any of these aircra

The PLA’s rapid-reaction strategy is based o

premise that China will only be engaged in local wars f

foreseeable future, and that the PLA must strike quic

end the war and meet Beijing’s political objec

Furthermore, cost is a big factor, since equipme

becoming more expensive and the cost of maintaining 

weapon systems is rising.

26

PLAAF Missions and Organizational Structure

Over the past 50 years, the PLAAF has endeavo

undertake an exceptionally broad range of opera

missions. The first mission the CMC assigned to the P

in 1949 was the air defense of Beijing and Shanghai ag

Nationalist air raids. This mission expanded to in

northeast China during the Korean War and t

southeast provinces during the 1958 Taiwan Strait 

Although Western writings normally refer to air defe

including aircraft, AAA, and SAMs, the PLAAF ma

clear distinction between its aviation troops (aircraf

air defense (AAA/SAM) troops.

Today, the PLAAF still describes its primary miss

defending China’s territorial airspace. However

mission can best be described as defending China’s 

cities and industrial areas, which can clearly be se

looking at the location of the PLAAF’s airfields, co

aircraft, SAMs, and AAA. As the PLAAF acquires ai

and SAMs with longer ranges, these envelopes 

gradually expand. Although the PLAAF states th

200
secondary mission is supporting ground and naval for

has never successfully carried out direct support t

ground troops and officially states that it can only su

them indirectly. The PLAAF still describes a joint ex

as having aircraft airborne at the same time that it

SAM and AAA units or that some ground force uni

active in a different area. It is also questionable jus

much the PLAAF can actually support the ground and 

forces in the future. The PLAAF lacks the proper ai

and joint experience to accomplish close air supp

interdiction and has only recently made nascent in

into the overwater training necessary for naval air su

Support for the naval forces is left up primarily to the 

air force.

Published PLAAF sources also refer to informal, te

missions, such as assisting socialist construction, prov

air services for disaster relief and air rescues, and art

rainmaking support for farmers.

27

 The PLAAF 

supports other maritime activities. For example, acco

to a May 1998 Xinhua report from Guangzhou, the P

was to conduct inspection flights in the coastal wate

Guangdong Province, as well as the Zhujiang River 

area, in order to enforce the May to September fishin

Guangdong Province and the South China Sea Bran

the National Bureau of Oceanography had requeste

inspections in order to counter serious problem

excessive, unpaid, and disorderly utilization of ma

resources.

28

In the absence of broader PLAAF mission statem

one must look at the PLAAF’s organizational stru

operational branch functions, force locations, we

systems, and planned weapons acquisitions, in ord

analyze the PLAAF’s full range of missions.

Administratively, the PLAAF’s chain-of-comma

organized into four levels: headquarters air force; 

military region air force (MRAF) headquarters; air 

and command posts; and operational units.

29

 Headqu

201
Air Force is equivalent to the U.S. Air Force’s Air Sta

is organized administratively into four first level or 

departments—headquarters, political, logistics

armament—and their subordinate elements (second 

departments, bureaus, divisions, offices, and sectio

The PLA’s military region (MR) headquarters is respo

for combined operations, and the MRAF commander, w

also an MR deputy commander, is responsible for 

operations within the MR. The seven military region

Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Nanjing, Guangzhou, J

and Chengdu. Each echelon below Headquarters Air 

from the MRAF headquarters to the lowest level i

chain-of-command basically mirrors this administ

structure.

In order to perform its operational missions, the P

is organized into branches—aviation, AAA, SAM, 

and communications. The PLA’s airborne troops belo

the Air Force, and sometimes, but not always, are no

the PLAAF’s sixth branch. The PLAAF also has sc

logistics units, repair facilities, research insti

hospitals, and sanitoriums as part of its organiza

structure. The Air Force’s Logistics Department has it

water transport craft and boat troops to ship fuel to P

units along the Yangtze River and coast. The PL

political structure ensures Party control at all levels

looking at modernization of the PLAAF’s six branche

possible to understand more fully the scope of th

Force’s operations and capabilities.

The PLAAF’s Aviation Branch. The PLAAF was f

around its aviation troops (hangkongbing), which r

the Air Force’s main arm. The aviation troops are orga

into fighters, ground attack aircraft, bombers, trans

and reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft are orga

into air divisions, regiments, groups, squadrons

associated maintenance, logistics, and support units

support units are organized into regiments, battalion

companies. There are also independent air regiment

groups, which conduct specialized missions, su

202
operational test and evaluation of equipment, recon

sance and surveying, troop transport, and reforestatio

the most part, these special mission aircraft in

reconnaissance fighters and Il-14 and Yun-5 transpor

divisions can be directly subordinate to Headquarte

Force, an MRAF headquarters, an air corps, or a com

post.

A typical air division headquarters consists o

command staff and administrative organization. 

organizations are responsible for combat training, po

training, supply, and maintenance support for the div

Each division and regiment has a Party committee 

standing committee, of which the political commissar s

as the secretary for both committees. The division’s 

committee consists of the standing committee, w

includes the division’s command staff, plus the comma

and political commissars of each subordinate regime

Because the PLAAF has historically been synony

with the aviation troops, the Headquarters Departm

second level Operations Department has bas

functioned as the “Aviation Troop Department.

Operations Department also is responsible for the air

troops. This is in contrast to the separate second 

departments that have been established for the 

communications, and AAA/SAM branches.

32

separation of aviation and air defense permeates the 

chain-of-command, keeping administrative fire

between the aviators and the rest of the PLAAF.

Origins of the Aviation Branch. When the PLAA

established, its aviation troops were organized into se

brigades with three to four regiments each. For exa

the 4th Combined Brigade was established at Nanj

June 1950 and became the PLAAF’s first aviation 

unit. It consisted of 10th and 11th Pursuit Regiment

12th Bomber Regiment, and the 13th Attack Regime

the end of 1950, these brigades reduced the num

203
regiments to two, dropped the type of unit (Pursuit/A

Bomber) from the name, and became air divisions.

33

Since 1951, the number for regiments per divisio

fluctuated between two and three, depending upo

number of aircraft available and the changing mis

Some flying academies have up to four regiments. B

end of May 1951, the PLAAF had 17 air divisions, each 

two regiments, including 12 pursuit divisions, 2 a

divisions, 2 bomber divisions, and 1 transport division

expanded rapidly, so that by March 1953, a total of 

divisions and 56 air regiments were formed. At the 

time, each division began changing from two regi

back to three. By early 1954, the PLAAF had 28 air div

and 70 air regiments, with 3,000 aircraft.

From 1960-65, more air divisions were created to 

the coast. From 1966-76, aviation troop units 

expanded to cover the rest of China. Although the P

had 50 air divisions by the mid-1980s, the numbe

reduced to around 45 by 1990 as older aircraft 

gradually taken out of the inventory.

34

According to the 1999 DoD report, the PLAAF cur

numbers over 400,000 personnel with approximately 

combat aircraft organized in some 30 air divisions

PLAAF also maintains about 150 transport aircraft i

air divisions.

35

 A PLAAF air division can have one or 

air regiments per airfield, with each airfield assigned 

station for logistics support. Although a division can 

more than one type of aircraft (i.e., J-7s and J-8s)

regiment typically has the same type of aircraft. The ta

organization and equipment (TO&E) for a typic

regiment consists of from 25-32 aircraft, but may ac

have more or less assigned. The regiment is the 

organization for training and operations. Each reg

has three flying groups and one aircraft maintenance g

Each flying group is further divided into three squad

The division has about one and one-half to two pilo

aircraft. Although the pilots are assigned to squad

204
each with three to five pilots, the aircraft are assigned 

regiment as a whole, not just to the squadrons. Each 

however, normally only flies one to three airframes, s

become familiar with each aircraft’s handling capabi

The average pilot remains in the Air Force until he 

retires.

36

 The PLAAF established age limits for its pi

the 1980s: fighter and ground-attack pilots, 43–45 

bomber pilots, 48–50 years; transport pilots, 55 

helicopter pilots, 47–50 years; and female pilots, 48 

The average fighter and ground-attack pilot is 28 years 

Flight Training.

To help build esprit de corps, the PLAAF began awa

four pilot ratings in 1986—special, first, second, and 

grade—which are awarded after the pilots complete 

initial and upgrade training at an operational unit

criteria includes time-on-station, flying hours, “flyi

weather,” and special missions. In addition, the P

awards aircrew ratings to navigators, communication

gunnery personnel, and instructor pilots. According 

1989 PLAAF report, of the 10,000 pilots in the 

PLAAF at that time, 7 percent of the total and 15 

percent of the fighter pilots were special grade.

37

 The

differing reports about the educational backgrou

today’s PLAAF pilots. In April 1999, Commander Liu s

that all air division and regiment leaders are special-

or first grade pilots, and one-half of the pilots in the 

units are college-educated.

38

 This is in contrast 

interview in 1989 with then-PLAAF Political Comm

Zhu Guang, who stated that all the pilots had a c

education or above, and to a 1999 article by John Lew

Xue Litai that states,

In 1997, the PLAAF finished drafting its training programs 

high-tech wars, but in carrying them out, it has encountere

fundamental problem because only 20.7 percent of the 

officers are college graduates. Quick fixes or short-te

training classes cannot solve the lack of qualified techni

205
personnel to operate high-tech air weapons in an environm

that attracts the best to civilian occupations.

39

There are no ready explanations for this apparen

in college educated officers, especially since all P

officers must attend a PLAAF 4-year academy, ma

which now offer post-graduate degrees as well.

Based upon an analysis of Chinese literature 

interviews in China, it is evident that PLAAF pilots d

fly as many hours as their Western counterparts. Acco

to interviews with PLAAF and foreign air force officia

PLAAF’s flying hours have not changed appreciably 

the past 15 years, but they have changed their tra

techniques. Since the end of the 1970s, bomber pilots 

consistently flown an average of 80 hours per year; f

pilots 100 to 110 hours; and A-5 ground attack pilots 

150 hours.

40

 This compares to about 215 hours per ye

U.S. Air Force bomber, fighter, and attack crews. 

pilots also conduct numerous hours training on adv

simulators.

41

Based on interviews in Asia, it appears that P

pilots are flying the Su-27s between 60-100 hours per 

and supplementing this with flight time in J-7s. 

interviews also indicate that every country conside

PLAAF’s Su-27s as their primary concern, regardless o

many hours the pilots train. The acquisition of these ai

has definitely had a significant psychological impa

China’s neighbors.

Since 1996, PLAAF pilots have been noted flying in 

sophisticated simulated air-to-air combat with n

formed aggressor units, employing jamming, flying ov

Taiwan Strait, conducting live missile firings over the 

China Sea, dropping parachute-retarded bombs at a 

range. There are also Chinese writings that the P

conducts post-mission analysis of aerial combat 

information from flight data recorders that co

information from the air data computer and possibly 

fire control data. The Chinese are also seeking Air Co

206
Maneuvering Instrumentation (ACMI) pods simi

those used by Western forces. These pods send inform

to ground personnel so they can evaluate aerial en

ments on a real-time basis.

42

Although the PLAAF may not fly as many hours 

USAF, the PLAAF believes that its training is impr

and is adequate to conduct its missions. Some Air 

leaders firmly believe that their intelligence, mobility

attack capabilities will be sufficient to allow them to 

appropriately to any situation, including gainin

superiority, supporting the ground forces, and condu

counterattacks against targets inside the enemy’s bo

Furthermore, interviews with foreign air force of

indicate that they believe Western reporting does no

into account how the PLAAF matches up against C

neighbors. For example, Commander Liu noted 

aviation units during 1996 exceeded their annual tra

plan requirements by 1.8 percent. Highlights during 

time included night flying, live bombing and missile f

training over the ocean, low-altitude flights, and emer

mobility deployments to other airfields. This ty

training accounted for 45 percent of the planned a

training time.

43

 What the article failed to state wa

most of this training took place in a single exercise op

Taiwan, and that several portions of the exercise 

curtailed due to inclement weather.

To round out the PLAAF’s tactical training and 

make up for the limited number of flying hours per yea

PLAAF has increased its use of flight simulators

PLAAF now reportedly conducts more than 90 percen

tactical and technological training on simulators

PLAAF has developed a full-spectrum spherical s

simulator, three-dimensional flight simulator, and in

refueling plane simulator for pilots to train and de

special flight and air strike skills under simulated co

conditions. Simulation capabilities have evolved 

electromechanical simulation to laser, electronic

computer simulation; from technical simulation to ta

207
and campaign simulation; and from the simulation 

single armament or aircraft type to integrated simulat

the main battle arms combined with multiple aircraft 

and various forms of weaponry.

44

 If these typ

simulators have, in fact, become operational at all av

units, then they will definitely help supplement 

training, which is minimal at best. During the 1980

Air Force only had a few nonstandard simulators. M

the pilots trained on an instrument board—a mock c

with a wooden panel containing all of the coc

instrument dials on it.

In January 1999, PLAAF Deputy Commande

Guangyu emphasized the PLAAF’s increased readin

stating,

China’s Air Force has significantly improved its com

readiness. During 1998, pilots achieved a record of per ca

flying time, the highest since 1985, in spite of heavy sum

flooding and a program to restructure the Air Force. Pilots p

particular attention to improving basic flying techniques. 

fact that sixty-six percent of air units conducted hig

successful long-distance mobile maneuvers under ha

weather conditions indicated that China’s Air Force has gre

enhanced its combat readiness.

45

Commander Liu also discussed training reform

stating that several units have been selected to carry 

series of reforms on tactics. Those units have 

demonstrated, and refined a series of advanced co

theories and propositions in live-fire training exer

They have scored excellent initial results in m

operations, air strike, air superiority, air control, 

attacks, and defensive operations.

46

PLAAF Aggressor Unit. The statements above 

likely describe the PLAAF’s “Blue Army” aggressor u

According to several Jiefangjun Bao articles and inter

with PLA and non-Chinese air force officials, the P

has established an aggressor unit at its Flight Tes

Training Center at Cangxian to simulate offensiv

208
defensive operations against the “Red Army.”

48

 An 

1997 Jiefangjun Bao article reported that,

The Blue Army aggressor unit is equipped with advanc

equipment and flown by special-grade and first-grade pilo

This unit has fought numerous air battles with every PLA

combat aircraft unit, in order to help improve the PLAA

high-tech combat effectiveness and improve their knowled

of tactics. The specialized unit has emerged as a strong ene

force in simulated air battles, which has led the PLAAF 

make numerous changes in its tactical training. In light 

China’s training situation, the specialized unit has launch

no-notice preemptive strikes under real combat conditions

The air tactics concepts that the Cangxian tra

center has developed against the aggressor un

reportedly now being moved to the unit level, where se

units have begun to turn these concepts into liv

exercises. According to the April 1997 Jiefangju

article, the PLAAF has obtained some initial resu

important combat study areas, such as maneuve

combat, air attack, fighting for air supremacy, night a

and defense. As a result of this training, the PLAA

adopted a new training syllabus characterize

adaptability to combat situations under future high

conditions.

According to various interviews, similar aggressor 

have been established in each of the seven military re

The aggressor aircraft engage in exercises with local 

employing dissimilar aircraft air intercepts uti

evasive maneuvers.

50

 Although interviews indicated 

the aggressor unit consists primarily of J-7 an

interceptors and does not have any Su-27s assigned 

yet, this situation may have changed. A recent news a

from Hong Kong described an exercise where,

Four Blue Army Su-27s, simulating Taiwan Air Force F-1

flew from an undisclosed airfield in North China [proba

Cangxian] and conducted air-to-ground attacks again

enemy targets. The report noted that the aggressor Su-2

209
flew a total of 1,600 kilometers, with two SU-27s conduct

strikes on a Red Army missile position, a command post, 

two radar positions. The Su-27s also destroyed eighteen J

parked on the airfield. The remaining two Su-27s flew cover 

the other two aircraft and shot down several J-7s in air-to

combat.

51

If the aggressor squadron now has Su-27s perman

assigned, this is a significant step forward in ta

training for the PLAAF.

52

 The article also point

however, the J-7s weaknesses in conducting the

defense mission. Whereas the Su-27s radar system 

AAMs are capable of shooting down air

beyond-visual-range (BVR) in a head-on aerial engage

the J-7s and older J-8s do not have either capability

J-7s and J-8s must be within visual range and do not h

head-on intercept capability.

As a result of this more aggressive training pro

PLAAF pilots have intensified their training u

different weather conditions, at lower altitudes, and

significantly, over water.

53

 They have also practiced 

deployment to permanent and auxiliary airfields

PLAAF has also improved its navigation capabilities. 

is a density of radio navigation aids (Tactical Air Navig

[TACAN] for the J-7 and J-8 and Short Range 

Navigation System [RSBN] for the Su-27) available w

China. In addition, the Chinese have indicated tha

have retrofitted some of their aircraft with g

positioning systems (GPS). Furthermore, the Su-2

some J-8s have an inertial navigation system (INS) an

use their radar to navigate using islands and coastlin

In conjunction with these operational changes d

the 1990s, the Air Force has had to adjust its log

including spare parts acquisition, storage, and distrib

and maintenance practices to meet these new challe

These adjustments include computerizing indiv

logistics and maintenance operations, and then netwo

the computers within the unit and among different un

the same and higher levels. It has also meant establ

210
small logistics and maintenance teams capable of dep

by rail or air at a moment’s notice to accompany the 

aircraft deployment.

On several occasions, many PLAAF units have fo

offensive and defensive exercise teams with Navy, A

and Air Force AAA, radar, and SAM troops to co

exercises modeled on future warfare. One Xinhua 

stated that the PLAAF has generally considered 

low-altitude bombing raids over the ocean as dang

since the water and sky look almost the same to the 

According to the article, pilots have overcome this diff

and have now flown large bomber groups less tha

meters above the sea, hitting all the intended targets. 

pilots are now experimenting with new tactics, su

flying close to strategic points at sea, launching surgic

strikes against enemy troops, waging offensiv

campaigns, conducting over-the-horizon air combat

imposing air and sea blockades.

55

 These types of mi

are new for the PLAAF, since the PLA Naval Air 

previously was responsible for support to the Nav

overwater intercepts of hostile targets.

PLAAF’s Gobi Desert Training Center. In 195

PLAAF built a large center for testing its AAMs and 

in the Gobi Desert near Dingxin, Gansu Province.

56

 D

the mid-1990s, the Air Force began expanding this b

include a tactics training center, where multiple P

units could practice the tactics developed at Cangxia

tested in individual units throughout the force. An Oc

1996 Jiefangjun Bao article described the training cen

follows:

The Air Force recently established a modern, comprehens

air tactical training base marked by combat training und

actual combat conditions. The training base has air a

ground tactical training ranges, simulated runways built 

scale, a SAM base, AAA positions, radars, radar supp

vehicles, simulated enemy command posts, ammunit

depots, and oil depots, which look real. A large number 

simulated tanks are also deployed in combat positions.

57

211
The article also described the training base’s com

and control center.

Training directors and air division commanders receive 

combat reports, direct air battles, and communicate w

combat planes in the air. They monitor units in the exercise, 

direct unit deployment and movement in a timely fash

through use of the base’s advanced facilities. A monitor

control, and appraisal system installed in the base’s comm

center receives information in a timely manner on each pla

flight path, course, speed, altitude, and other parameters. 

system monitors the activity through video recording, rad

and flight orientation systems, so training directors will h

accurate information to evaluate the training results.

58

The training center probably includes the mock u

Taiwan Air Force airfield. According to an April 1999 

in Taiwan’s China Times Express, “China has b

military airfield near Dingxin airfield in northwe

Gansu Province, that is identical to the Taiwan Air F

Chingchuankang (CCK) airbase in central Taiwan, 

PLAAF can practice bombing the island.”

59

 Building 

enemy airfields is not an uncommon practice amon

forces of the world, and provides realistic tra

opportunities.

Following the PLAAF’s participation in the joint s

exercise near Taiwan in early 1996, the PLAAF condu

two-day, large-scale, offensive-defensive exercise uti

its aggressor unit at the Gobi Desert training center d

September 1996.

The exercise directors made it clear from the beginning that 

exercise was to be conducted under unknown conditions. Alm

all of the exercise’s contents were new to the PLA

participants, including using dissimilar aircraft in coordina

joint offensive-counteroffensive attacks against ground targ

and in air-to-air combat under electronic warfare conditio

The Air Force conducted the exercise under the principle t

none of the participants would receive prior information ab

the enemy’s deployments, combat tasks, battlefield targets

flight routes during different stages of the exercise. T

212
exercise, which was almost canceled because one of t

participating aircraft crashed en route, included aerial comb

to seize air superiority, bomber and ground attack aircr

strikes on targets after avoiding enemy intercepting plan

and airborne landing and anti-airborne landing operations.

This report provides a valuable glimpse at the PL

combat philosophy. Specifically, the directors assume

they would know very little about the enemy just bef

during the battle, due to the lack of real

reconnaissance capabilities. Therefore, the attack m

planned on insufficient data. Yet another Xinhua rep

1998 stated, “During an early 1997 live-fire ex

involving various types of planes, command posts of 

air divisions explored tactics and conducted training o

base’s advanced training systems and facilities.”

61

 Alt

the number of aircraft involved in these exercises wa

specified, the PLAAF’s philosophy has been to d

overwhelming numbers of aircraft to a theater

example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam

PLAAF deployed approximately 700 aircraft to the b

area. However, while air force officials in Taiwan spe

that the PLAAF would attack Taiwan with waves to

several hundred aircraft, there are no indications in P

writings that it routinely trains with more than 4-8 ai

in the air at a time.

Upgrading the Guangzhou MRAF. The PLAA

designated certain military regions for the most 

modernization and training. According to a July 22, 

Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao article, the Guan

MRAF has conducted advanced training with all 

PLAAF’s branches. The PLA apparently chose to hig

these types of activities in the Guangzhou MR as a wa

to Taiwan. This article appeared shortly after Tai

President Lee Teng-hui announced his “state-to-

theory on July 9.

Reportedly, all of the Su-27 and J-8II fighter pilots 

met the requirements for all-weather flights and for 

213
the lead plane of a four-aircraft formation; the B-6 bo

unit has had excellent results in long-range bombing 

the Il-76 and Y-8 transport unit has notably enhanc

long-range air transport and combat capability; an

SAM, AAA, and radar units enhanced their air de

net.

62

 The article further detailed the specific typ

training the fighter and bomber units conducted.

The fighter units successfully conducted tactical dr

including over-the-horizon air combat, multi-target atta

electronic countermeasure warfare, and offshore l

ammunition firing. The bomber unit conducted training for 

first time involving multi-wave, multi-target, all-weath

long-range, live ammunition bombing. Fully loaded with bom

cells with multiple aircraft [probably eight aircraft] took 

before dawn and flew over half of China to conduct timely 

accurate bombing at an unidentified range in northwest Ch

[probably the Gobi Desert training center]. From the de

range, they then flew to an island off the southeast coas

attack targets there. Upon completion of their bomb runs, t

returned home in a rainstorm, landing after dusk.

63

The Guangzhou report provided additional details 

the PLAAF’s airborne, SAM, and AAA training as fo

For the first time, the Guangzhou MRAF transport u

conducted a 6-hour training flight in complicated weat

conditions late at night. The aircraft also conducted airbo

exercises in an unfamiliar highland cold zone without gro

command, ground marks, and weather information. The S

unit became combat capable in less than one year after receiv

new [unidentified] equipment in 1998. In June 1999, the f

armed SAM unit deployed by vehicle to the Gobi Desert train

center in northwest China. The exercise involved mult

goals, including “dismantling, leaving, advancing, a

launching” as well as “food, shelter, management, and stora

While at the training range, the unit employed its new miss

to attack low-altitude, close-range targets in an electro

warfare environment for the first time, and hit every targe

Weapon Systems. The PLAAF’s weapons systems 

combination of old, modified, and new aviation (air

214
and air defense (SAM and AAA) systems. Since the 

1990s, the PLAAF has retired over 1,000 of its older co

aircraft, storing them at Rugao airfield in central Ch

According to the U.S. Department of Defense report o

Taiwan Strait balance,

The PLAAF inventory includes over 2,200 obsolete J-6/Farm

fighters (last produced in 1979), several hundred J-7/Fishb

and J-8/Finback fighters, and over 40 Su-27/Flankers. 

addition, the PLAAF has 500 A-5/Fantan (modified MiG-

ground attack aircraft and about 500 bombers, includ

B-6/Badger and obsolete B-5/Beagle. Both its aerial refuel

and airborne early warning (AEW) programs are behi

schedule, as are several of its indigenous aircraft developme

programs. By 2005, the PLAAF will possess nearly 2,2

tactical fighter aircraft, 500 ground attack aircraft, and 4

bombers, as older aircraft are retired. The majority of t

mainland’s air fleet still will be composed of second and th

generation aircraft augmented by a limited number of fou

generation platforms.

66

Fighters. By 2010, the PLAAF’s fighter force wil

likely consist of between 1,500 and 2,000 aircraft, 

almost the entire J-6s and early model J-7s retired

remaining force will consist of modified J-7s and J

These aircraft will initially be complemented by and 

replaced by the J-11 (Su-27), J-10, and Su-30. The J-1

developed to replace the J-6, J-7, and A-5. The Su-27 

air superiority aircraft, replacing the J-8 in this mi

The Su-30 is being purchased for deep strike/interd

and air superiority, much like the U.S. F-15E, an

replace the older B-5/Beagle bombers. All of these 

aircraft will have greater range and payload, and w

replace the older aircraft on a one-for-one basis.

There are differing opinions about the long

viability of various indigenous programs, such as th

J-8, and J-10 program, all of which have been consider

elimination at one time or another since the mid-1

During the 1970s and 1980s, China had no alternat

domestic production, these programs had a histo

215
important bureaucratic support, and hundreds of m

of dollars had already been spent on the prog

Therefore, they continued through the 1980s at a mod

pace, while China began searching for foreign air

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the aviation ministry op

provide significant upgrades to these aircraft 

domestic and foreign subsystems and foreign tech

assistance.

68

Over the past decade, some analysts have had d

whether the J-10, which is under development in Che

will eventually be operationally deployed, while others 

predicted that the J-10 will become one of the PLAAF’s 

important fighters in the next century.

69

 The J-10 pr

began in the late 1960s. After numerous tech

difficulties, the Chinese asked the Israelis in the 

1980s to assist them with a new design based on the I

Lavi (U.S. F-16 derivative) fighter, and full-

cooperation began officially by 1984. The J-10 projec

launched on a full scale in 1987 and began receiving Ru

assistance in the early 1990s.

70

 The J-10 conducted it

test flight in March 1998, at least 2 years behind sch

and is still undergoing testing and evaluation as 

prototypes are produced. Predictions for deployment 

operational base range from 2003 to 2010, depending 

problems encountered in the test and evaluation phas

J-10, which most likely will be armed with advanced b

visual range (BVR), active radar (AR) air-to-air m

(AAM) and may be air refuelable, is designed for count

and interdiction like the Lavi and F-16.

71

One of the PLAAF’s most significant events in th

50 years was China’s agreement with Russia in 19

purchase 48 SU-27 fighters and then to “produce” up 

of the aircraft in China over the next 10 to 15 years.

SU-27s produced in China will be known as the J-11

first batch of 26 aircraft arrived at the 3rd Air Divis

Wuhu (Nanjing Military Region) in 1992, followed 

second group of 22 more at Suixi airfield (Guangzhou M

1996. The first two domestically assembled S

216
reportedly made their initial flights in December 1

According to the DoD report, the Su-27s are the only f

aircraft in the PLAAF inventory with sufficient co

radius to allow extended operations beyond Ch

borders.

74

 Like the J-10 program, there are dif

opinions about the long-term viability of the Su-2

program.

75

 While some analysts focus on the ne

aspects of the program, such as Russia’s restrictio

allowing China to produce the avionics and engines, 

analysts note that China is moving ahead rapidly to de

its own engines and avionics for the aircraft and w

need the Russian systems.

Reports from Russia indicate that China is negot

to purchase an additional 20 Su-27UBK two-seat tr

aircraft at a price of $35 million dollars each. The P

originally received a total of four trainers along w

single-seat Su-27s for Wuhu and 22 single-seat Su-2

Suixi.

76

 Some analysts predict the PLAAF will purch

many as 40-60 Su-27UBK to complement the 

production run of approximately 200 J-11s. The P

typically has four to six trainers per regiment

Su-27UBK is fully combat capable and will likely be u

train pilots for both the Su-27SK and Su-30MKK. De

of the first trainers is expected within the next year, b

delivery schedule will probably match the produ

schedule of the J-11s at Shenyang, which will take th

of the decade to complete.

77

China is also negotiating with Russia to acquir

possibly co-produce the Su-30 multi-role aircraft th

PLAAF would use for deep strike/interdiction an

superiority. Although China is fully expected to r

some Su-30s, probably in 2001, there is still much conf

and speculation about the actual number and terms 

contract, including whether or not they will be co-pro

in China. The figures have ranged from purchase of 20 

aircraft and co-production of up to 250 aircraft.

78

 The

also questions about whether the PLA Navy’s Air Forc

also receive the Su-30. Information from the 1999 M

217
air show indicates the Su-30MKK version being offe

China is significantly less capable than the Su-30MK

to India.

79

Air-to-Air Missiles. The PLAAF has progressed fu

with its AAMs in the 1990s than any previous decad

only has the Air Force received advanced AAMs 

Russia, but also pilots have had more opportunities 

live missiles during training. According to the DoD rep

The PLAAF currently has a number of advanced AAMs in 

inventory, including the Russian-built AA-10a/Alamo 

AA-11/Archer infrared (IR) AAM carried on the Su-27. Chi

J-7 is capable of carrying the PL-2A and PL-5B IR AAMs, as w

as the all-aspect PL-8 IR AAMs, while its J-8IIs are capabl

carrying the PL-2A, PL-5B, PL-8, and the beyond visual ra

(BVR) semi-active radar (SAR) PL-4 and PL-10 AAMs. By 20

Beijing likely will have an active radar (AR) AAM in 

inventory and could adapt it for use on a larger numbe

platforms. The PLAAF also is developing BVR AAMs for 

aboard its J-10 fourth generation fighter aircraft.

80

Bombers. The PLAAF received its first S

Il-28/Beagles in 1950 and TU-16/Badgers in 

Thereafter, China modified the Il-28 design and produ

in Harbin as the B-5. China also modified the TU-1

produced it in Xian as the B-6.

81

 The first B-5 an

entered the PLAAF in 1967 and 1969, respectively. 

the B-5 is no longer in production, the B-6 has been mo

several times and is still produced primarily 

replacement for older airframes and for new missions

as standoff cruise missiles and jamming. According 

DoD report,

Today, China’s bombers include the B-6 and the B-5. The B

slow speed and lack of standoff capability make this platform 

extremely vulnerable target. The B-6 also is an aging aircr

but it is being produced in several versions. One varian

designed to carry an antiship cruise missile (ASCM), w

another is being developed to carry an air-launched cru

missile (ALCM). The B-5 is being phased out of the invent

218
but it is still used in training and would probably be employ

along with the B-6 bomber during a military conflict.

82

In addition, the Chinese have shown ECM varia

the B-5 and B-6. These aircraft were developed i

mid-1980s to provide standoff ECM support to their bo

fleet. While their effectiveness is unknown, inte

victims would be enemy air defense early warning sy

and their associated ground control intercept 

structures that would impede interceptors from 

vectored to an incoming bomber force.

Transports. One of the PLAAF’s combat mission

provide airlift in support of PLA operations. Unt

mid-1990s, however, the PLAAF was unable to tran

ground forces rapidly to distant parts of the coun

sustain ground operations for extended periods d

antiquated aircraft and the lack of large-capacity air

The PLAAF transport force is now capable of supporti

PLA at increased levels for a limited time and ra

deploying to internal trouble spots. According to the 

report,

The PLAAF’s current complement of large transport aircr

is limited to about a dozen Il-76/Candids and about 

Y-8/Cubs, the remainder of the transport force consists 

smaller aircraft like the An-24/Coke, An-26/Curl, a

Y-5/Colt. Beijing can be expected to purchase a few additio

Russian Il-76s or similarly sized foreign aircraft. The ongo

expansion of China’s civil aircraft fleet will also allow t

PLAAF to use the country’s civil airlines to supplement 

transport capability during crises.

83

Use of civil aircraft is not new to the PLAAF. Durin

1989 Tiananmen situation, civil aircraft were us

transport PLA troops to Beijing. In addition, mi

officials in New Delhi reported that the PLA used 

aircraft to ferry troops to Tibet during a recent exer

There are limits, however, to using civil aircraft to 

troops into a hostile environment.

219
Airborne Early Warning. The PLAAF is also m

forward rapidly with its AEW program:

In 1996, China signed a $250 million contract with Isr

Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Russia’s Beriev to have IA

subsidiary Elta install its Phalcon AEW radar in an Il-76 ba

Beriev A-50/Mainstay airframe. The aircraft will have a fi

radome housing a triangular phased array radar antenna 

give the system 360-degree coverage, rather than usin

rotating radome. The Il-76 will be equipped with electro

surveillance/electronic intelligence (ESM/ELINT) a

communications intelligence (COMINT) systems. The f

airframe was delivered to Israel in October 1999 and sho

arrive in China sometime in 2000. While the PLAAF reporte

has a requirement for 15-20 AEW aircraft, they currently h

an option for only four airframes worth about $1 bill

Meanwhile, China has been negotiating with GEC-Marcon

an Argus radar system, which is also intended for an Il-76 

has not yet been mated to the airframe, and may still be fl

tested against the Phalcon system before a final decisio

made.

85

The PLAAF has been searching for an AEW aircr

about 15 years, including the unsuccessful modificatio

Soviet-built TU-4 in the 1980s. Although the PLAAF s

receive its first Il-76/Phalcon platform in the near f

some analysts have doubts whether the PLAAF 

actually acquire all four aircraft. China has a hist

trying to acquire one or two foreign systems and then h

the aviation ministry try to copy them. There is a 

possibility China might try to do the same with this 

aircraft. Meanwhile, other analysts believe tha

Il-76/Phalcon system will move forward rapidly.

86

Intelligence Collection Aircraft. China maintain

most extensive signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabili

all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The SI

systems include several dozen ground stations, half a 

ships, truck-mounted systems, airborne systems, a

limited satellite collection capability. These capab

have been significantly enhanced over the past de

particularly with respect to electronic warfare 

220
operations. Aerial reconnaissance includes photogr

and electronics intelligence (ELINT) activities

principal Chinese airborne ELINT platform is the 

engine turboprop EY-8, an indigenous development 

Soviet An-12/Cub. The system is designed to d

identify, analyze and locate land-based or shipborne 

emitters with a high probability of intercept. Israe

reportedly assisted development of China’s air

ELINT/EW capability, whereby several Chinese sy

are derived from Israeli systems.

87

Based on a Jane’s Defence Weekly article, the PLAA

also operationally deployed its first generation of l

developed long-range ELINT aircraft in early 

According to the report,

Four modified TU-154 aircraft, fitted with radomes, have be

deployed in the Nanjing MR opposite Taiwan, and at le

eight more are on order. Although specifications of the aircr

are not known, some of the TU-154s may have limited airbor

control and electronic warfare capabilities. Development 

the aircraft was done at the PLAAF’s Nanyuan airfie

located just south of Beijing.

88

People’s Liberation Army Naval Air Force . The 

Naval air force was established in August 1950 

separate administrative department within 

Headquarters and as a separate PLA Navy opera

branch. There are differing opinions concerning whet

not the Naval air force’s modernization is keeping pac

the PLAAF. Although Naval air force has received the 

and its bombers are equipped with air-to-surface 

missiles, the PLAAF has received all of the Su-27s and 

of the J-8II fighters so far. In addition, the PLAA

begun flying over water, which heretofore was a Nav

force mission only. Naval air force’s missions in

protecting China’s coastal airspace, providing air su

for naval forces at sea, and conducting maritime searc

rescue operations. The DoD report states,

221
The PLANAF has only a limited maritime strike capability w

some 150 non-standoff B-6s, A-5/Fantans, and B-5s. Th

aircraft would be only marginally effective against most mod

navies. Some of the approximately 30 B-6Ds provide 

PLANAF with a cruise missile ship interdiction str

capability, utilizing the C-601/Kraken ASCM. T

standoff-capable FB-7 fighter-bomber, equipped with 

C-801/ASCM, will become operational in the next 2 to 3 year

likely will augment the B-6 and eventually replace some of 

B-5s and A-5s in the PLANAF’s inventory.

89

According to interviews in Asia, the FB-7 is i

operational test and evaluation (OT&E) phase know

production finalization. The PLANAF already has 12 

in its inventory, although they may not be consi

operational. Several of the aircraft overflew Beijing d

the PRC’s 50th anniversary on October 1, 1999. Va

problems associated with the aircraft were revealed 

June 18, 1998, article in People’s Navy, but these ch

were minor modifications that took place during the O

phase:

The PLANAF had to improve the FB-7 after receiving th

When the aircraft first arrived, it was still being tes

manufactured, and improved. The transceivers easily bur

out, and the fuel tanks had to be replaced periodically. A

result, the regiment added a protector to the transceiver, 

devised an easier way to replace the fuel tank. More innovati

followed, including checking the fueling procedure with

starting the engine; checking the fueling valve with

increasing pressure; a faster way to hang, connect, and te

model of a missile; and a device to prevent engine cough cau

by exhaust from missile launching that led to engine shutdo

in mid-air. The regiment also found ways to protect the n

equipment against heat, humidity, corrosion, rat infestat

and typhoons.

90

The PLANAF has also secured the purchase of the

AEW aircraft, the SkyMaster AEW system from the U

Kingdom. According to Defense News they have purc

up to eight AEW systems for installation on the Y-8

SkyMaster includes both AEW and maritime p

222
functions, which fits well with PLANAF plans. Wh

would be of marginal use against a dedicated fighter a

it is well suited to direct intercept of long-range ma

patrol aircraft.

91

Air Defense Troops.

During the 1990s, the PLAAF has upgraded i

defense (nonaircraft) capabilities. This involves three 

PLAAF’s branches: SAM, AAA, and radar troops. Wh

PLAAF has modernized its SAMs significantly in ter

quality, if not quantity, the overall air defense netw

quite weak. According to the DoD assessment,

Beijing is expending tremendous effort establishing 

Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) at both the strate

and tactical levels. China’s air defense technology curren

lags behind western standards and its current IA

capability lacks many crucial components. Beijing proba

could establish a fully operational national IADS within t

next twenty years, but clearly not by 2005. China has 

rudimentary tactical IADS capability in the form of its mob

Tactical Air Defense System (TADS).

92

The PLA readily admits that it has problems with 

defense network. For example, a July 14, 1998, arti

Jiefangjun Bao provided insight into this problem

article stated that,

Air battles in the 21st century will be a form of combat wh

shows information warfare at its highest. In order to se

superiority in information, the attacking side will ado

electronic suppression, electronic deception, and rou

selection to prevent the defensive side from reacting on tim

Stealth planes, in particular, will greatly reduce the detect

range. The PLAAF will have to advance its air defense ea

warning equipment in order to be able to detect invad

targets early, extend the early warning range, and seize t

necessary time and space for fighting air defense battles.

93

The article further stated that,

223
As precision guidance technology develops, the launch dista

of different types of air-to-ground missiles and aerial gui

bombs will increase. These advancements will result in com

aircraft changing their methods of launching surprise atta

against ground targets. Instead of overhead bombing, 

aircraft can now launch munitions from outside the enem

range of fire or even from outside the air defense area. If 

PLAAF continues to use the method of air defense at key po

or key areas, attacking aircraft will have already comple

their bombing and safely returned home before the PLAAF’s 

defense system could even react. Therefore, the PLAAF m

enlarge its effective air defense area and shoot down ene

aircraft before they can even launch their air-to-grou

weapons. The PLAAF must persist in a dynamic air defe

system by moving forces rapidly and concentrating firepowe

order to enlarge the effective air defense area. The PLA m

also organize all of its air defense forces under centralized 

unified operational command.

94

Given the PLAAF’s acknowledged weakness in 

areas, Commander Liu has stated the Air Force’s SAM 

are engaged in an evolution from single-type air de

missiles and equipment to new integrated air de

systems, combining high, medium, and low-altitude

and short-range missiles.

95

Since the early 1990s, the PLAAF has purchase

regiments of S-300 (SA-10) and one regiment of T

(SA-15) SAMs from Russia. During late 1998, Beijin

reportedly negotiating with Moscow to acquire 

additional S-300 regiments and one Tor-M1 regim

Although most of the S-300s are currently based 

Beijing, some of them were reportedly deployed 

Fuzhou during the 1996 Taiwan Strait exercise for ex

play and as a precautionary measure.

97

China has also developed the FT-2000 mobile SAM

SAM is based on the S-300 and is designed to e

radiating aircraft, such as airborne jammers and air

warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Chin

tested the FT-2000 in September 1998, then conducte

first field trials during a series of exercises in 1999.

9

224
Air Activity Over the Taiwan Strait: A Case Stu

On July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui in T

declared that relations between Taiwan and mai

China should be conducted on a “state-to-state” 

Shortly thereafter, the PLAAF increased the num

sorties over the Taiwan Strait, including crossing ov

centerline of the Strait several times.

99

 This issue gen

a lot of interest and speculation about the possibility 

aircraft incident occurring, either by accident or on pu

by either side, that could start a war across the Strai

On August 10, a Taiwan Ministry of National De

(MND) spokesperson stated that:

eight J-8 fighters have deployed to Fuzhou airbase and a

conducting flights over the Taiwan Strait. There are about 1

aircraft permanently stationed in Fujian’s coastal areas. 

addition, Su-27 fighters stationed in Guangdong Provin

have begun training activities in areas close to the cen

line.

100

Although not stated, the Su-27s were probably flying 

missions to and from the Strait from their home ba

Suixi. The Su-27s stationed at Wuhu were probabl

involved. 

Although the number of PLAAF sorties incr

following President Lee’s statement, this was not reall

activity. The PLAAF was actively involved during the 

large-scale exercises opposite Taiwan during March 

According to available open source material,

The exercise included 12,000 Air Force and 3,000 naval 

force servicemen. More than 280 aircraft deployed to t

exercise area and conducted 680 sorties, including eighty-t

transport sorties. Over 800 combat aircraft were within 

combat readiness of 550 miles or were on the alert.

101

Another report stated the PLA deployed fewer tha

additional aircraft to the thirteen Fujian airfields 

other bases, raising the total to only 226 aircraft. Base

225
briefing by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the 

conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the exerc

Further press reporting stated that the PLAAF dep

aircraft from its second and third-line airfields to firs

airfields, where they conducted their exercise activ

took about 3.5 hours for the PLAAF fighters to prepa

takeoff, compared to the 10 hours they had n

previously. In addition, the PLAAF demonstrated 

aircraft sortie regeneration of 40 minutes, which 

considerably quicker than in the past.

103

In November 1998, the commander of a Taiwa

Force Mirage-2000 fighter group stated,

Following the air battles that took place over the Taiwan St

in 1958, our fighters have kept a distance of 35 miles from 

mainland’s coast, while the Chinese Communist fight

usually carry out their duties close to their own coast line. If 

Communist jet fighters took off, the Taiwan Air Force wo

dispatch four planes to watch them. Maintaining a t

agreement on an invisible centerline of the Strait, neither s

has conducted any provocative flights. In the past, there wa

tacit agreement that “we leave when you come, and we co

when you leave.” Recently, however, the Chinese Commu

fighters have conducted frequent intentional flights across 

central line of the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan Air Force F-16 

Mirage 2000 aircraft could detect Chinese Communist figh

on their radar screens. The Communist aircraft were proba

attempting to collect information about the training of 

new-generation fighters.

104

There are several explanations for the incr

activity, in addition to reacting to President 

statement. Since its founding in 1949, the PLAA

consistently tried to carry out its mission of contr

China’s airspace. During the early 1950s, the PLAAF 

fledgling service and focused all of its efforts i

northeast and on the Korean War. During that p

Taiwan’s Air Force controlled the skies over sout

China as far north as Shanghai. Therefore, be

defending the border with Korea, the PLAAF’s imme

226
task was to provide air defense for the major cities, su

Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin. It was not until aft

1958 Taiwan Strait crisis that the PLAAF had a perm

presence in the provinces opposite Taiwan. Even 

Taiwan continued to fly U-2 reconnaissance flights ov

mainland until the late 1960s. Since 1958, there hav

been any serious air engagements over the Strait.

According to a Taiwan Ministry of National De

(MND) spokesman in August 1999, “Following Be

1996 military exercise, Communist Chinese aircraft 

been flying more often in the Taiwan Strait.”

105

 Alt

the media began focusing on the PLAAF’s increase

activity after President Lee’s statement, a knowledg

source in Taiwan indicated that the PLAAF b

increasing its flight activity near the centerline in 

1998.

106

There are several probable reasons why the PLAA

stepped up its flight activity over the Strait since 199

near the centerline in 1998. First, the CMC want

challenge the fact that Taiwan’s Air Force has bas

owned the entire airspace over the Taiwan Strait sin

1950s and the PLAAF could not effectively challeng

control. Taiwan’s fighter and reconnaissance aircraft 

routinely crossed the centerline, and transport ai

ferry supplies to troops on Jinmen and Mazu. The P

had little choice but to have a tacit agreement o

centerline, so that it could at least have the facade of 

control over the Strait. Even so, the mainland off

refutes the idea of a centerline, stating that Taiwan is 

of China, so there cannot be a centerline over a body of 

that belongs to China.

107

The PLAAF also probably felt compelled to re

significant changes in Taiwan’s Air Force or los

opportunity to have any presence at all over the S

These changes included Taiwan’s Air Force commissi

its first indigenous defensive fighter (IDF) squadr

December 1994, and the first French Mirage 2000-

227
U.S. F-16 squadrons in October 1997.

108

 Liu Shunya

became the new PLAAF commander in December 

began emphasizing the PLAAF’s offensive capab

when Taiwan received the first Mirages and F-16s in 

1997. 

During July and August 1999, only 12 PLAAF ai

were airborne at any time, not all of which were ov

Strait, and the PLAAF flew only about 30 total sorti

day.

109

 However, these sorties were a significant chan

both air forces. Over 1,000 civil air flights fly th

Taiwan’s airspace daily. Most of the airspace immed

north and south of Taiwan, flying to/from Taipe

Kaohsiung, is dedicated to civil air routes, which mean

Taiwan’s Air Force is forced to conduct its training 

Strait and to the east of the island. These sorties, an

future such activity, force Taiwan’s Air Force to 

aircraft from their regular training regimen to co

patrol duties (punching holes in the sky) in the S

Although the PLAAF did not fly that many sorties 

Strait, Beijing sent a clear message that the PLAAF 

fly in the Strait if it wanted to.

The PLAAF’s Force Opposite Taiwan. Much of the 

modernization efforts over the past decade have focus

Taiwan. While the PLA has had a sizeable force i

Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan since the 

Strait crisis, the biggest change during the 1990s inv

improving the quality of the PLAAF’s equipment. Acco

to the Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Rep

The PLAAF can station 1,200 combat aircraft and maneuve

air transports to carry two airborne regiments for operatio

missions out of the thirteen military-civilian airports within 

miles of Taiwan proper. The PLAAF stations and deploys 

aircraft into three areas based on their distance from Taiw

first line (270 miles), second line (550 miles), and third 

(beyond 550 miles). At present, the PLAAF has 1,300 airc

stationed on the air bases within 550 miles from Taiwan

which 600 have a radius of operation over Taiwan proper. 

Su-27s, with a combat radius of just less than 900 miles, can a

228
cover Taiwan from their bases at Wuhu, Anhui Province, a

Suixi, Guangdong Province.

110

Under current circumstances, once the PLAA

deployed several hundred aircraft near Taiwan, it 

then coordinate an air attack. Although the PLAA

been practicing this, it is not there yet. The chief diffic

simply exercising strict ground control intercept (GCI

large numbers of aircraft simultaneously. Accordin

U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence briefing, during the 

exercises, PLAAF and PLA Naval Air Force fighter

bombers engaged in simulated and live bombing, f

escort for bombers, air-to-air combat training, and 

routine training. The PLAAF’s airborne forces wer

involved in airdrop activity.

111

The key to any conflict for the PLAAF is sust

combat, and the PLAAF has not yet demonstrate

capability to conduct sustained, high intensity opera

The PLAAF does not have any real-world experien

planning and executing the kind of high intensi

campaign that has proven so successful in recent U.S

NATO operations. For example, during the early sta

the conflict in Kosovo, allied air forces dep

approximately 400 aircraft to the area. On the third 

operations alone, allied aircraft flew 249 sorties in on

By the end of the conflict, the number of U.S. and N

combat aircraft participating in strike delivery rose 

214 to 590 aircraft. According to Pentagon inform

23,000 bombs and missiles were used. The max

intensity of operations of Allied Air Forces was reach

May 21 when 1,000 sorties were flown, 800 of which 

combat missions. These figures demonstrate the capa

needed to ramp up and maintain high intensity opera

orchestrate operations through a unified daily air ta

order (ATO), and the need to sustain intense air opera

when faced with a determined adversary.

112

Interviews with Taiwan and Japanese officials in 

1999 indicate that the PLAAF has been rotating J-7 a

229
aircraft from designated rapid reaction units in and 

Fujian Province on 6-month rotations since the 1996 

in order to conduct area familiarization training. Fu

more, aircraft from Fujian Province have been deploy

and from airbases outside Fujian during the same 

providing them with the ability to move out of the 

rapidly if the need arose. In addition, all PLAAF 

within the Nanjing Military Region have been condu

live air-to-air missile firing over water since 1996. 

aircraft have probably been designated as part o

PLAAF’s rapid-reaction force for action against Taiw

One would expect these aircraft to be deployed 

area en masse if the PLAAF were going to attack Ta

For example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vie

the PLAAF deployed almost 20,000 aviation, SAM and 

troops and 700 aircraft to the border area opposite Vie

over a 45-day period leading up to the start of the co

Yet none of these aircraft engaged in any activity acro

border so as not to escalate the conflict based on the 

rules-of-engagement (ROE) for both sides at the time

There is always the possibility of an accidental 

down occurring, but there is a low probability, unles

pre-planned. The reason for this is that each sid

established unilateral ROEs. For example, Taiwan

Force is under the guidance to “neither avoi

Communist planes nor provoke them. The order to atta

intruder must come from Taiwan’s Chief of the Ge

Staff.”

114

 On the mainland side, the PLAAF probab

specific ROEs as well. For example, during the 1958 

Crisis, the PRC’s Central Military Commission estab

the following three ROEs: (1) the Air Force could not 

the high seas to conduct operations; (2) if the National

Force did not bomb the mainland, the PLAAF cou

bomb Quemoy and Matsu; and, (3) the Air Force wa

allowed to attack the U.S. military, but could defend ag

any U.S. aircraft entering Chinese territory.

115

230
The current aerial cat and mouse game over the 

actually helps each side prepare for potential conflict, 

at the same time helping to avoid conflict. Each side h

opportunity to determine how long it takes for the othe

to scramble its aircraft upon detection of an intrud

reach a specific spot over the Strait, and to determine 

altitude and speed these aircraft conduct their mis

Each side can also test the limits by intruding in

other’s airspace to see what type of a reaction they get

also have the opportunity to employ their air intercept 

to detect, track, monitor and shadow opposing air

significantly enhancing their confidence in their defe

capability. Concurrently, these defensive reactions ag

the probes by intruder aircraft demonstrate and reinf

vigilant air defense posture to the opposing force.

These types of exercises also afford each sid

opportunity to coordinate their flight activity wit

ground-based air defense systems, including their 

antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missile unit

example, one of the biggest problems the PLAAF, an

PLA as a whole, will face if China engages in a conflic

Taiwan is coordination between aircraft and ground-

air defense forces. Ever since the Korean War, the PL

Force and Army have had to agree on some basic RO

that the Army’s and PLAAF’s AAA and SAMs do not 

down the PLAAF’s aircraft. This is even further compl

if they must also coordinate with the Navy.

Today, the primary means of coordination be

PLAAF aircraft and ground-based air defense un

airspace differentiation. The PLA’s air defense s

relies heavily on airspace control measures and proce

control (essentially flying air corridors, adhering to 

altitudes and in-area time limits, or speed con

Although most, if not all of the PLAAF’s aircraft have 

type of an identification friend or foe (IFF) system, th

method for coordinating aircraft movement with the g

forces or a ground controller is through the use of a s

and reliable electronic identification (EID), which util

231
reliable IFF or other means. Moreover, it is not 

whether the older J-6 and J-7 aircraft have ade

navigation equipment (inertial navigation system/I

desirable because it is an on-board system) to main

reasonable adherence to air corridors during flights 

water. The FB-7 has an INS and doppler navigation

most likely has TACAN. The PLAAF recognizes 

weaknesses and recent PLA news reports have highli

the PLAAF’s efforts to conduct training over water for 

pilots. 

In the situation over the Taiwan Strait, just becau

aircraft “locks on” to another aircraft with its radar, do

necessarily mean that it is going to fire a missile. Most 

or ground controllers do not have the authority to 

missile unless told to do so by much higher authority. I

case, the intruder will most likely have already peel

and returned to his airspace. This time provide

opportunity for each side to take a deep breath an

down. In the current situation, I would say tha

probability of an accidental firing is fairly minimal.

If war does break out, there will be more tha

aircraft involved. The mainland will most likely beg

attack on Taiwan with ballistic missiles in order to de

Taiwan’s command and control capability, as well as 

to destroy aircraft on the ground before they can tak

Although PLA writers have advocated a quick stri

Taiwan to achieve victory within 2 weeks so that the U

States cannot come to Taiwan’s aid, this is easier said 

done. There will be definite political, as well as m

signals, coming from the mainland that should p

enough time for all parties, including the United Sta

try to achieve some type of political settlement a

pre-position military resources in the region befor

breaks out.

232
Conclusion.

There is no simple description of the PLA

operational capabilities. The PLAAF is in the proc

modernizing, but it still has a long way to go. Parts 

PLAAF are clearly obsolete, yet other parts have the 

modern, sophisticated aircraft, SAMs, and software

key to the PLAAF’s modernization is integrating all 

different components, including its branches and new 

old weapon systems, into a single operational unit w

the PLAAF and with the rest of the PLA as a whole. A

China watcher recently stated, “It is not just a matter 

glass being half empty or half full, because the gl

getting bigger.”

During discussions of the PLAAF, a former U.S

Force Chief of Staff identified the following question

he would want to know about China’s airpower:

•What is their battle doctrine?

•Is their organizational direction defensive or offen

•Which classic air missions do they cover effectiv

air defense, counter-air, conventional strike?

•What is their basic employment concept for the

missions—manned aircraft, ground or air laun

missiles?

•What kind of support packages do they have—de

suppression, air escort, tanker support?

•What kind of power projection capability does 

equipment represent—range, payload?

•How modern is the capability—precision g

weapons, battlespace surveillance?

•What is their equipment and personnel read

status?

•What size, duration, and location of operations ca

sustain with logistics support?

233
As discussed in this chapter, the PLAAF clearly com

lacking in most of these categories. However, d

interviews in Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and 

defense officials repeatedly said that the United S

cannot just look at the PLAAF through Western 

Everyone in these countries agreed that the PLAAF 

necessarily capable of sustained combat today, bu

moving in the direction of a more modern offensive 

over the next 15 to 20 years. Each of these countr

looking carefully at China’s intentions and takin

long-term view of China’s potential capabilities.

At the same time, however, it is my opinion bas

interviews in the region that most of the coun

surrounding China do not have a thorough understa

of the PLAAF. For example, other than Taiwan and J

there are very few assets or analysts dedicated to ju

PLAAF. The majority of the countries in Asia have on

military attaché in Beijing, most of whom do not 

Chinese, and who concentrate primarily on the macro

PLA strategic issues, rather than on operat

capabilities. In addition, most of the countries in Asia 

only on the PLAAF forces in their immediate border r

rather than on the PLAAF as a whole. They also te

focus on hardware issues only (i.e., how many Su-27

China have), rather than on the software issues.

The PLAAF is still primarily a defensive force

through the acquisition of systems with longer range

more lethal bombs and missiles, it is moving grad

toward having an offensive capability. Although the P

is acquiring some systems to support the air de

mission, such as refueling, ECM, and airborne 

warning platforms, it will be several years before 

systems can be fully integrated into the force, and 

then, only in limited numbers. The PLAAF still 

precision guided munitions and a battlespace survei

capability, but China is working on these capabilitie

PLAAF is beginning to train its forces in mobile opera

but is still hindered by institutional, organizationa

234
equipment limitations that hinder mobile opera

Furthermore, the PLAAF is not yet capable of roun

clock or sustained operations.

There is little doubt that what the PLAAF has don

the past decade is impressive. The Air Force has acq

limited numbers of Russia’s most sophisticated w

systems, but still must rely on Russia for long-term log

support. The PLAAF will continue to rely on imp

weapons systems to modernize its force, but is m

toward developing and producing better domestic en

avionics, and missiles. Air combat training has b

more realistic, including more live air-to-air missile la

training, but the pilots still lack sufficient flying hour

to engine and airframe limitations. While the PLAAF’

Force aggressor program has obviously been success

has pointed out even more starkly the limitations of ai

like the J-6, J-7, and J-8.

With the acquisition of several Russian Il-76 trans

the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army has been able to tr

more locations around China, but the focus is still on u

domestic situations rather than situations outside C

borders.

Although Commander Liu Shunyao states tha

PLAAF has the capability to support ground and 

operations, the Air Force’s ability to do this is questio

The PLA as a whole is just beginning to address 

operations and logistics. Very little information is ava

in open source material about PLAAF support fo

PLAN, which would entail joint exercises and some t

joint command and control structure. As for supportin

ground forces, the PLAAF has consistently stated t

cannot provide direct support for the ground forces. No

has occurred over the past decade to change this philos

Su-30 will not replace the A-5. While the Su-30 will re

the B-5 in the interdiction and deep strike mission, the

not ready replacements for the A-5, whose miss

battlefield interdiction and ground attack.

235
While the PLAAF can look proudly at its accom

ments in equipment acquisition and training over th

decade, the bulk of the aviation force still consists of 

J-6, J-7, and J-8 interceptors, only some of which ha

all-weather capability. China’s aviation industry is wo

toward designing and producing a modern aircraft to 

the PLAAF’s needs in 15 years, but will still need fo

assistance from Russia and Israel along the way. Ther

the PLAAF will still be relying on Russian support f

near term. Once China’s next generation of domest

produced aircraft, such as the J-10, improved FB-7

XXJ, are operationally deployed, we will have a 

understanding of how far China’s aviation industr

come.

The PLAAF will continue to analyze its need

implement changes as it can, but there will also conti

be resource and system limitations that will hinde

PLAAF’s overall modernization drive and opera

capabilities. China will eventually have to face the fac

there are limitations on how many foreign aircraft 

buy. If the PLAAF is going to replace its current fl

aircraft, it will have to rely on China’s aviation indus

provide much of the necessary components or the Air 

will not be able to afford it. The PLAAF simply cannot 

to continue purchasing Russian aircraft at $35-40 m

apiece, plus rely on the Russian supply line. Finall

PLAAF’s leadership must also accept aircraft losses a

of a more vigorous, realistic training program.

In closing, a clear distinction must be made betwee

PLAAF’s capabilities and intentions. Even if the PLA

not the most modern force, the PLAAF’s leaders will s

smartly and use every means available to achieve vic

the CMC tasks them to go into battle.

236
CHAPTER 6 - ENDNOTES

1. “Jiefangjun Bao Calls For Stronger Air Force,” Hong Kon

April 7, 1996, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

(FBIS-CHI)-96-068, April 7, 1996.

2. “China: PRC Air Force Plans Weapons Advances,” Xinhu

14, 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-104, April 14, 1997.

3. “Deputy Commander Says Air Force Improves C

Readiness,” Xinhua, January 20, 1999, FBIS-CHI-99-020, Janu

1999. These comments were made during a work conference 

Force training.

4. Oliver Chou, “President calls for hi-tech push by Air Force

China Morning Post, March 3, 1999.

5. While researching this paper, the author reviewed nu

articles written about the PLAAF from within and outside of 

hosted a series of meetings on airpower in Asia, and visited T

Japan, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and India, to 

interviews about the PLAAF.

6. Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (China Today: Air Force), 

China Social Sciences Press, 1989. PLAAF Headquarters Ed

and Research Office, Kongjun Shi (History of the Air Force), 

PLA Press, November 1989. The PLAAF describes these air ba

occurring during involvement in “liberating Tibet,” the “War to 

America and Aid Korea,” numerous engagements with Nationa

U.S. aircraft over the Taiwan Strait, the “War to Aid Vietnam an

U.S. Aggression,” and the 1979 “self-defensive counterattack” 

Vietnam. During the Korean War, the Chinese Air Force reporte

down 330 American planes and damaged 95. During the 1958 

Strait crisis, PLAAF data indicates the air force and naval a

aircraft shot down 14 and damaged 9 aircraft. During the Vietna

the PLAAF states that its AAA units were involved in 558 

shooting down 597 U.S. aircraft and damaging 479. Like the 

cited during the Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crisis, they m

agree with Western figures. In addition to aircraft that its AA

down over Vietnam, the PLAAF history describes in detail how i

shot down three U.S. Air Force aircraft (one F-4B and two A-4

two Navy (one A-3B and one A-6) aircraft and 17 unm

reconnaissance drones over or near Chinese territory. The offic

Naval Air Force history also identifies two U.S. drones and four 

(F-4B, F-104C, F-4C, and A-1) that naval air force pilots shot do

Hainan Island. No air combat took place during the 1979 border 

237
with Vietnam. The August 1998 issue of Xiandai Junshi is dev

the 70th anniversary of the PLA and carries additional infor

about aircraft the PLAAF shot down during the 1950s and 196

7. Over the past 15 years, China has improved its ma

techniques for aviation equipment and has hosted an annual air

Zhuhai. One of the problems associated with this, however, is th

analysts assume that the aviation ministry and PLAA

incorporated or are going to incorporate the systems being mark

Chinese research institutes and companies into PLAAF aircraft

not necessarily the case. Many of the systems are marketed 

abroad only and are not for domestic use. Furthermore, some a

assume that just because Russian salesmen appear at Zhuhai 

the Chinese are interested in their systems, that China is g

purchase them.

8. For an overview of the PLAAF’s logistics and main

capabilities, see Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Logist

Maintenance: What Has Changed?,” in The People’s Liberation A

the Information Age, James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yan

RAND, 1999, pp. 79-97.

9. Sun Maoqing, “PLA Commander on Modernizing Air 

Liaowang, FBIS, No. 15, April 14, 1997, pp. 20-21. Hua Chun

Tun-Hua, and Kuo Kai, “Air Force Trains Crack Units Tro

Offensive, Defensive Operations,” “Interviewing Lieutenant G

Liu Shunyao, PLA Air Force Commander,” Hong Kong Min

August 2, 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-226, August 2, 1997. Speech 

Shunyao, “Comprehensively Push Forward PLA Modern

Building,” Jiefangjun Bao, FBIS, December 24, 1998.

10. Ibid. The whole issue of the PLA’s rapid reaction 

fanying), or fist (quantou), units is rather murky, especially 

pertain to the Air Force. According to Mel Gurtov and Byo

Hwang, China’s Security: The New Roles of the Military, Bould

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998, pp. 107-108, the PLA ha

and rapid deployment forces, (RDFs), which comprise around 11 

of the total ground forces. The RRF is composed of airborne un

light infantry units. They are equipped with light weapons and 

entirely upon air transportation, including transports and heli

They are expected to react rapidly to border disputes, m

rebellions, and political violence; the airborne forces were uti

Tiananmen during June 1989. The RDFs are equipped with 

weapons and will quickly deploy to deal with any contingenci

after its RRF reacts. Gurtov and Hwang do not mention anythin

aviation RRF units.

238
11. The PLAAF’s definition of flying in “weather condit

divided into “three weather conditions”, i.e., day and night visu

rules (VFR), and day instrument flight rules (IFR)), and “all-wea

“four weather conditions” which adds night IFR flights. Althou

particular reference does not mean being able to fly in poor w

conditions, some reference to flying in weather conditions doe

exactly that. The exact meaning is usually clear. The act

1998-1999 compares to information from 1991, where 70 per

PLAAF pilots at that time were qualified as all-weather pilots. T

in 1991 also included low-altitude flying, minimum-altitude fly

combat, high-altitude air acrobatics, and transregional mov

Eighty percent of the PLAAF’s air combat regiments had rep

taken part in multi-service and multi-arm tactical exercises i

Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, Chi

Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, p. 1

12. Huang Qiang, “Will China’s Aviation Industry Be Able 

Out of the Doldrums Soon?,” Keji Ribao (Science and Technology 

July 8, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0811, July 8, 1999.

13. The PLAAF has about 20 research institutes. Eig

subordinate to the Scientific Research Department with

Headquarters Department; each has about 180-200 person

addition, the Logistics Department also has at least eight subo

institutes. Other departments also have specialized research ins

Kenneth W. Allen, People’s Republic of China, People’s Liberatio

Air Force, Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, Ma

Section 17.

14. For a detailed analysis of this revised national military st

see Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strate

Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese View,” and Paul H.B. Godwin, 

Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy, and Capa

Toward 2000,” both in David S. Shambaugh and Richard H. Yan

China’s Military in Transition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19

284-312. See also James Harris, et. al., “Chinese Defense Pol

Military Strategy in the 1990s,” China’s Economic Dilemma

1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdepe

Washington DC: Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the 

States, April 1991, pp. 648-649. The concept of active defense 

taking tactically offensive action within a basically defensive st

The defending forces undertake offensive operations to wear do

adversary while he is strategically on the offensive and attacki

the opposite of passive defense, which means the defending 

simply resist without attempting to weaken the adversary 

prepares to attack or is actually on the offensive. The active 

239
strategy consists of three phases: strategic defense, strategic sta

and strategic counterattack.

15. Paul H.B. Godwin, “Compensating for Deficiencies: D

Evolution in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” presented 

1999 CAPS-RAND PLA Conference, pp. 7, 43.

16. Hua Renjie, Cao Yifeng, and Chen Huixiu, editors, K

Xueshu Sixiang Shi, Jiefangjun Publishers, Beijing, 1991, pp. 31

17. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Modernized Peop

Force: Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant Gene

Shunyao,” Beijing Liaowang, April 14, 1997, No. 15, pp. 20-21.

18. “Junshi Jingji Yanjiu (Military Economics Studies),” 

1995.

19. “PLA Airborne Brigades Become Divisions,” Jane’s 

Weekly, Vol. 20, No. 14, October 2, 1993, p. 12.

20. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

21. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Modernized Peop

Force: Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant Gene

Shunyao,” Beijing Liaowang, FBIS, April 14, 1997, No. 15, pp. 

22. “China Employs Hi-Tech Equipment in Training To Impr

Force Fighting Capacity,” Hong Kong Sing Tao Jih Pao, July 1

The PLAAF has written several articles emphasizing that a

forces have been training with a new type of parachute.

23. “Airborne Units Conduct Training Exercise in Tibet,” 

Xinhua, FBIS, June 29, 1999.

24. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996,” b

presented by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence at a conferenc

PRC’s military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocq

Institute, March 11, 1997. Although Commander Liu has tou

airborne army’s all-weather capabilities, they are limited by the 

capabilities to get them there.

25. Interviews during April-June with air force officers i

Although interviews during April through June 1999 indicate t

PLAAF has established certain aviation units as RRF 

particularly those with J-7, J-8, and Su-27 fighters, no open 

240
material was found to corroborate their analysis. Even so, the 

probably has organized certain aviation units as RRF units.

26. Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, St

and Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese View,” in David S. Shambau

Richard H. Yang, eds., China’s Military in Transition, O

Clarendon Press, 1997.

27.Shijie Junshi Nianjian (World Military Yearbook

published by PLA Press, Beijing, in 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 19

1992. Each yearbook provided progressively greater detail ab

PLA’s organizational structure.

28. “Air Force, Navy To Enforce Fishing Ban in South Chin

Beijing Xinhua, May 7, 1998.

29. The term kongjun means the Air Force as a whole, bu

means Headquarters Air Force. Subordinate elements 

chain-of-command include the seven military region air forces/M

(junqu kongjun), air corps (jun/kongjun jun), command 

(zhihuisuo), and operational units (budui), which include air d

(shi/kongiun shi/hangkong bing shi), brigades (lu), regiments 

groups (dadui), squadrons (zhongdui), battalions (ying), com

(lian), platoons (pai), and squads (ban). The Air Force, which is a 

(junzhong), is composed of five branches (bingzhong).

30. The four first level departments are headqu

(silingbu/kongsi), political (zhengzhibu/kongzheng), lo

(houqinbu/konghou), and armament (zhuangbeibu/kongzh

When the PLAAF was founded in November 1949, an Ai

Engineering Department (kongjun gongchengbu) was establi

manage aircraft maintenance, and the PLAAF’s Engineering Co

Xian was established in September 1964. Maintenance for a

PLAAF equipment, vehicles, SAMs, AAA, etc., was the responsi

the Logistics Department. In September 1969, the Engin

Department was abolished, and its Field Maintenance Depa

(waichangbu) was subordinated to the Headquarters Departm

the Maintenance Department (jiwubu). On May 1, 197

Aeronautical Engineering Department (hangkong gongch

konggong) was established as a first level department. In Octobe

the Aeronautical Engineering Department was reorganized to 

the PLAAF Armament Department (zhuangbeibu/kongzhuan

order to be in alignment with the PLA’s new fourth g

department—the General Armament Department (zongzhuang

241
31. In order to exercise the Party’s absolute leadership o

military, a Party Committee and Standing Committee is establ

each regiment (and equivalent) and above. The political comm

normally the secretary of the Party Committee at these 

Grassroots Party Committees are established at each battal

equivalent. Grassroots Party Branches are set up at the compan

Besides the Party Committee, political organizations hav

established in each regiment and higher, and their equivale

General Political Department (GPD) is the highest leading b

political work in the PLA. While divisions and brigades have a P

Department, regiments have a Political Division.

32. The official term for the PLAAF’s AAA troops is gao

bing/gaopaobing, and for the SAM troops dikong daodan bing

bing/daodan bing. However, the PLAAF occasionally refers to 

troops as first artillery (yipao), and SAM troops as second a

(erpao), which is often confused with China’s Second Artillery 

(erpao).

33. Unless otherwise specified, this section describing the hi

organizations of the PLAAF come from interviews with PLAAF 

plus Kenneth W. Allen, People’s Republic of China, People’s Lib

Army Air Force, Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agenc

1991, Section 13.

34. Interview with PLAAF officials.

35. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999, p. 6. Discussio

PLAAF officials indicate that this number (32 divisions) is too l

they did not specify the total number. In addition, the number 

aircraft is probably too high. According to a March 1997 Hon

report, U.S. reconnaissance satellites discovered in June 19

China had gathered over 1,000 combat aircraft at an airfield (Ru

central China, which turned out to be an exceptionally large 

depot to accommodate retired planes. Japan’s Research for Pe

Security (RIPS), Asian Security: 1998-1999, p. 108, provides a f

3,740 warplanes, which is a reduction of 1,230 from 1997. The m

of the aircraft taken out of the inventory are the older J-6s, whi

last produced in 1979. The actual figure is probably somewhere 

3,500 aircraft in the active inventory today.

36. There are no female fighter pilots in the PLAAF, but th

several female transport pilots.

242
37. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. P

China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica: RAND

p. 130.

38. Upon graduating from a basic flying academy, pilots m

transition-training base, where training lasts for one year, 100 

flying hours. The pilots begin flying the F-5 for basic airmansh

transition to the F-6 or F-7. Upon graduation, the pilots are exp

be capable of flying in “three weather conditions”, i.e., day an

visual flight rules (VFR), and day instrument flight rules (IFR

weather conditions” adds night IFR flights. Thereafter annua

hours vary according to the type of aircraft: bombers (80 hours), 

(100–110 hours) and the A-5 ground attack aircraft (150 

Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (China Today: Air Force), Beijing

Social Sciences Press, 1989, pp. 503–504.

39. Cai Shanwu, “Build a Strong Air Force: An Interview w

Air Force Commander Wang Hai and Political Commissar Zhu G

Renmin Ribao, FBIS, November 10, 1989, p. 5. From “It is Hard 

Full Play to Advanced Fighters,” Shijie Ribao, August 22, 1997, 

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai,“China’s Search for a Mod

Force,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, MIT

This figure of 20.7 percent includes all officers, not just pilo

difficult to track the number or percentage of pilots in each c

because the PLAAF does not routinely report these figures, or 

them in different forms, i.e., total pilots, not just fighter pilots.

40. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. P

China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica: RAND

p. 130.

41. Robert S. Dudney, “Fifteen in a Row,” Air Force Magazin

1999, p. 25. Unfortunately, figures are not readily available fo

Asian air forces.

42. Interview with a Department of Defense analyst.

43. Sun Maoqing, “Training Improves Air Force C

Effectiveness,” Xinhua, March 26, 1996. Sun Maoqing an

Dongyan, “Air Force Flight Units Fulfill Training Mission,” X

December 23, 1996. Neither of these articles attributed the 

training to the exercise conducted opposite Taiwan during Mar

and the large exercise in the Gobi desert in September, but th

most likely cause. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Mod

People’s Air Force,” Beijing Liaowang, No. 15, April 14, 1997, pp

Zhang Nongke and Zhang Jinyu, “Air Force Builds M

243
Comprehensive Tactical Training Base,” Jiefangjun Bao, Octo

1996. There are quite often conflicting stories that tell the am

training that PLAAF flying units receive. For example, an article 

5 of the 1995 Zhongguo Kongjun (Air Force) magazine discus

number of sorties flown (54,506) over the 8-year period of 1987 t

1994 by an unidentified air division on the Leizhou Peninsula. H

assuming the division has at least 72 aircraft, this equates t

sorties per year, or 94 sorties per aircraft per year, and less th

sorties per week.

44. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Modernized Peop

Force: Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant Gene

Shunyao,” Beijing Liaowang, FBIS, No. 15, April 14, 1997, pp. 

45. “Deputy Commander Says Air Force Improves C

Readiness,” Xinhua, January 20, 1999, FBIS-CHI-99-020, Janu

1999. These comments were made during a work conference 

Force training.

46. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Modernized Peop

Force: Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant Gene

Shunyao,” Beijing Liaowang, FBIS, April 14, 1997, No. 15, pp. 

47. This unit has been identified as the Blue Army (Lan J

Blue Skies (Lan Tian) unit. The PLAAF visited Nellis Air Force 

Nevada during the late 1980s and received briefings on the U

Force’s Red Flag exercise.

48. In February 1987, the PLAAF Flight Test and Training 

(kongjun feixing shiyan xunlian zhongxin) was established in Ca

(also known as Cangzhou), Hebei Province, replacing the 11th A

School.

49. Zhang Nongke and Zhang Jinyu, “‘Grindstone’ Confron

Wings’ in Blue Sky: Air Force Forms Unified ‘Blue Army’ Unit f

Time To Confront Airmen Units in Rotation,” Jiefangjun Bao, A

1997, FBIS-CHI-97-102, April 28, 1998.

50. Interviews.

51. Zhang Nongke, Niu Ruili, Liu Guojiang, and Guo Ka

Hypothetical Enemy of the Chinese Air Force,” Hong Kong Tzu 

No. 106, FBIS-CHI-99-0824, August 5, 1999, pp. 19-23.

52. Interviews in Asia during May and June 1999 indicat

there were no Su-27s assigned to the aggressor squadrons. It is d

that any of the Su-27s assigned to the regiments at Wuhu or Su

244
permanently assigned to the aggressor unit. The only 

explanation is that some of the first aircraft assembled at Sh

have been assigned there. The first aircraft assembled at Shenya

in December 1998. An interview with a USAF F-15 pilot abo

article indicated his concern about discrepancies in the article r

to the types of intercepts that were conducted. He cited a healthy 

skepticism about the article’s claims.

53. Historically, the PLAAF has not flown over water very 

This mission has been reserved for the Naval Air Force.

54. Department of Defense analyst.

55. Sun Maoqing, “Training Improves Air Force C

Effectiveness,” Xinhua, March 26, 1996, FBIS-CHI-99-018, Janu

1999.

56. Dangdai Zhongguo Kongjun (China Today: Air Force), 

China Social Sciences Press, 1989, p. 311.

57. Zhang Nongke and Zhang Jinyu, “Air Force Builds M

Comprehensive Tactical Training Base,” Jiefangjun Bao, Octo

1996, FBIS-CHI-96-228, November 26, 1996.

58. Ibid.

59. “China Builds Airport Copy,” Associated Press, April 28

60. Zhang Nongke and Zhang Jinyu, “Summary of the Air 

Pioneering Offensive-Defensive Confrontation Exercis

Participation of Varied Types of Aircraft (Arms of the Service) 

Unknown Conditions,” Jiefangjun Bao, September 25, 

FBIS-CHI-96-205, September 25, 1996.

61. “PRC Air Force Upgrades Weather Forecast Equip

Xinhua, January 13, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-012, January 12, 199

62. Zhao Zhongwei and Fan Haisong, “Overall Combat Stre

the Air Force of the Guangzhou Military Region Crosses 

Threshold; First-Rate Equipment Builds An Aerial Great Wall o

Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao, FBIS, July 22, 1999.

63. Ibid. This exercise appears to be an annual event for this 

unit. According to Zhongguo Kongjun (China’s Air Force), J

1989, Vol. 18, pp. 41–43, in September 1986 eight B-6 bombers 

air division in the Guangzhou MRAF participated in a 

inter-MRAF long-range attack training exercise. The bombe

245
dropped bombs at a bomb range in Hunan Province, then flew ov

hours through five provinces to drop bombs at a bomb range 

northwest. Although the bombing results were good in Huna

were unsatisfactory in the northwest. The pilots were not famil

the target, the sun was in their eyes, the target was difficult to fi

they did not arrive at the target on time, so they had to retur

without dropping their bombs. As a result, they only received a r

two for this portion of the exercise. In August 1987, another cell 

bombers conducted a long-range attack based on a tactical scena

first target was hit during low level bombing, which was follow

high altitude, long distance navigation route with a direct ru

target range on another lake. Before entering a simulated enem

net, they rapidly descended to quietly close on the target. Followi

they used maximum climbing speed to conduct their bombing

entering the bombing starting point, they met an unpredictabl

They were not able to see the number one target on an island 

middle of the lake because the water had risen. By the time the f

aircraft discovered this, it was too late to switch to another targ

third aircraft quickly switched to target number six on a penin

the lake. The bombs were dropped and hit 15 meters from the c

the target, resulting in a rating of five.

64. Zhao Zhongwei and Fan Haisong, “Overall Combat Stre

the Air Force of the Guangzhou Military Region Crosses 

Threshold; First-Rate Equipment Builds An Aerial Great Wall o

Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao in Chinese, FBIS-CHI-99-072

22, 1999.

65. “Storage Center for Fighters, Transport Planes, Bomber

Force,” Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, March 17, 1997. The U.S. A

hosted a small PLAAF delegation in the United States in 1988 to 

maintenance and logistics. The delegation visited Hill Air Forc

Davis Monthan airbase, and the Smithsonian’s aircraft refurbi

center in Washington, DC. One of the leaders of the delegation re

to Beijing and became the head of the Air Force’s new aviation m

at Shahezhen airbase located just north of Beijing. During the v

delegation made known that they were planning to build a huge 

storage facility similar to Davis Monthan, but were having pr

finding a place with the proper climate and necessary space

reconnaissance satellites discovered in June 1993 that Chi

gathered over 1,000 combat aircraft at Rugao airfield in central 

The storage center has three purposes: taking over and storing 

aircraft from all Air Force units nationwide; routine maintena

those planes still functioning well; and renovating old and 

aircraft.

246
66. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999. Although n

here, there is an excellent paper by Michael Richard Danis 

“China’s Air Force in the Twenty-First Century: Chinese Acq

and Production of Advanced Aerospace Technology,” that appe

The China Strategic Institute, Vol. III, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 122

67. According to a Department of Defense analyst, the J-8B 

and J-8D have a forward hemisphere BVR engagement capabil

the PL-4/PL-11 (Aspide/Aspide copy) AAM. The J-8D has a f

hemisphere self-protection jammer. The J-8IIM development p

with Russia will be completed in 2000. It includes the ZhUK-8

doppler radar and AA-10A and AA-X-12 active AAM. The J-8I

better BVR capability than the Su-27SK in the Chinese invento

upgrade also includes the ability to fire KH-31A antiship missi

Chinese could produce the J-8IIM or upgrade the J-8B/D, or bo

Chinese currently have approximately 100 J-8B/D deployed. W

J-8IIM is an export program, the PLAAF is weighing its options 

program.

68. According a Department of Defense engineer with over 1

experience analyzing Chinese aircraft, the J-7 and J-8 have 

variants with modern subsystems. For example, Chinese prom

brochures describe the J-7C/D as having a monopulse fire contr

capable of off-boresight engagements and can accept data link 

The J-7E, with its larger cranked wing with leading edge flaps is 

of withstanding 8 Gs, and is therefore quite maneuverable and 

The J-7D, J-7E, and J-8D all have an upgraded radar warning r

that would allow them to better detect Western aircraft. Combin

improved electronic countermeasures (ECM), they could close to 

visual range (WVR) for air-to-air combat. The Chinese are w

several simple upgrade programs that could further improv

near-term capabilities. The J-7MG is nearing completion, an

pulse doppler radar called the Super SkyRanger. It is still WVR

has ACM modes and look-down capability. At the Zhuhai airsh

Chinese claimed that all aircraft would be upgraded with a 

mounted sight (HMS). The Russians have proven the value o

They cut typical lock-on time from 5-15 seconds, to 1-2 seconds, 

high off-boresight angles. They also claimed that the KG-300 j

pod was tested on a J-7. If you upgrade J-7MG with the 

SkyRanger, and HMS, and the KG-300 jammer pod, J-7E wou

very capable aircraft.

247
69. Kenneth Allen, “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessm

Crisis in the Taiwan Strait,, Washington, DC: National D

University Press, September 1997, pp. 218-245.

70. Hsiao Yu-sheng, “China’s New Generation Main M

Aircraft,” Kuang Chiao Ching, Hong Kong, November 16, 1995

71. “First Flight for F-10 Paves Way for Production,” Jane’s 

Weekly, May 27, 1998, p. 17.

72. This agreement was important psychologically to China 

China’s neighbors. Not only was China going to receive a 

aircraft with offensive capabilities, but also it meant that Russi

be willing to sell China other modern weapons.

73. “China-assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” 

Defence Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 8, February 24, 1999.

74. Based on interviews in Asia, the PLAAF has config

handful of B-6 bombers as tankers and is currently using them t

J-8II interceptors in the Guangzhou Military Region.

75. According to several reports, the current contract stipula

the Chinese share of components will only reach 70 percent. The 

turbofan engine and various avionics are not among the items t

be license produced by China. The contract also prohibits any c

ever to the Su-27s or any exports without Russian authori

Nikolay Novichkov, “China To Begin Licensed Production of S

Fighters,” Itar-Tass, in English, November 13, 1997. “Licensed B

of Russian Fighters about to Begin in China,” Itar-Tass, Oct

1998. Although the first report identifies the Su-27 variant for C

the Su-27CK, the second report identifies it as the Su-27SK. Wh

sources who have toured the Shenyang factory stat

manufacturing capabilities and procedures are generally poor an

take several years before successfully assimilating R

manufacturing technologies, other sources have stated that the S

not an advanced aircraft from a manufacturing standpoint. It i

metal airframe with only limited exotic materials/manufa

processes, such as titanium components, which might caus

difficulties. Each is hand built and is not significantly more ad

than the J-8 airframe built at Shenyang. A clause in the SU-27 c

stipulates that if Shenyang fails to meet the annual production t

10 to 15 aircraft, then Russia’s facility at Komsomolsk will prov

substitute aircraft. Even though China is not allowed to prod

AL-31F engine, which is also being used for the J-10, China is t

purchase an engine repair maintenance facility, so that they do n

248
to continue sending the engines back to Russia for repair, “L

Building of Russian Fighters about to Begin in China,” Ita

October 2, 1998. According to some analysts, the Chinese have no

for licensed production yet of the AL-31F engine and existing a

incorporated in the Su-27 because they are waiting to see 

indigenous engine and avionics programs will be successful. 

domestic development programs in these areas are based on pu

of or negotiations for some engine and avionics technology that 

advanced than what is in the Su-27, according to a Departm

Defense analyst.

76. “‘Made in China’ deal is forged for Su-27s,” Jane’s 

Weekly, Vol. 23, No. 18, May 6, 1995, p. 3.

77. Department of Defense engineer.

78. According to an August 19, 1998, Jane’s Defence Weekly 

China and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding 

formal negotiations on China’s proposed purchase of more t

SU-30s from Russia and is discussing the transfer of pro

technology. The latest report from the Central News Agency out 

Kong on June 21, 1999, and Defense News says that Moscow has 

to sell 50 to 72 of its front-line SU-30 jet fighter-bombers to Beiji

cost of the aircraft will be $37 million a copy. In addition, the 

News Agency reported that negotiations for Moscow to grant a 

for the production of another 250 SU-30 fighters in China have b

well. Like the wide range of reporting over the past 9 years 

Su-27s, it will still take some time before the actual terms of the c

are available.

79. Department of Defense engineer. The Su-30MKK d

include thrust vectoring or the Su-30s distinctive canard. Infor

from the air show suggests that the Su-30MKK has an upgrad

Back2 to allow air-to-ground operations and air-to-ground mu

The only other big difference over the Su-27SK is that it does 

aerial refueling. Therefore, this aircraft will be able to perfor

strike missions normally performed by B-5 Beagle bombers, y

retain air superiority capabilities, making it similar to the F-15

80. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

81. In 1956, the Soviets and Chinese signed a contract to 

medium bomber factory at Xian, and in September 1957, the 

gave China the rights to produce the TU-16. In February 19

249
Soviets turned over the plans for the TU-16, as well as two aircr

one unassembled aircraft to Harbin, where the first flight took 

September 1959. The Xian production facility was completed i

and the TU-16 production capability was transferred there from 

between 1962-1964. Strength tests of the first indigenously pr

B-6 were completed in October 1966, and the first test flight too

on December 24, 1968. The B-6 entered series production i

Development of the B-6D began in 1975, and the first flight took p

August 29, 1981. On December 6, 1981, it conducted telemete

tests at a bomb range, and conducted live testing at the end of 

82. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

83. Ibid.

84. Interview with Ministry of Defense officials in New Del

85. “Delivery of China’s upgraded Il-76 AEW system is de

Flight International, August 19-25, 1998, p. 21.

86. According to one Department of Defense analyst, the pro

of success for the Il-76/Phalcon program will be quite good, espe

the Israelis provide support as in the J-10 program. The Phalcon 

makes extensive use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) pr

which gives easy access to the basic building blocks of the syste

system is extremely capable and has DOD officials concern

Phalcon system was a competitor in the recent Australian We

AEW competition. The system is much more than an AEW and 

AWACS capabilities. In addition, the Wedgetail proposal i

Australian industrial participation. Therefore, it is not unreaso

believe that the Israelis offered the Chinese industrial particip

seal this high dollar deal.

87. Desmond Ball, “Signals Intelligence in China,” 

Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 8, August 1, 1995, p. 365.

88. “Elint aircraft put into service,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 

No. 12, March 24, 1999. Based on discussions with various a

there are indications that the information about the Tu-154s de

to the Nanjing Military Region may be an attempt at disinform

89. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

250
90. “NAF regt improves new aircraft,” People’s Navy, June 18

91. Department of Defense analyst.

92. “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report su

by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the U.S. Senate as dire

the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

93. Min Zengfu and Han Jibing, “Air Defense Pattern of t

Century: Large-Area Dynamic Joint Air Defense,” Jiefangjun B

14, 1998.

94. Ibid.

95. Sun Maoqing, “Make Efforts To Build Modernized Peop

Force: Interview With Air Force Commander Lieutenant Gene

Shunyao,” Beijing Liaowang, FBIS, April 14, 1997, No. 15, pp. 

96. “China seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 systems,” Jane’s 

Weekly, September 2, 1998, p. 16. The PLA’s S-300MU1 can in

aircraft-sized targets at ranges up to 150 kilometers and ballis

targets at ranges up to 40 kilometers. The Tor-M1 is a low-to-m

altitude self-propelled SAM which entered Russian service in 1

97. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996,” b

presented by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence at a conferenc

PRC’s military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocq

Institute, March 11, 1997.

98. “China shows new AWACS-killer missile,” Jane’s 

Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 11, September 16, 1998. Paul Beaver, “Chin

muscles in missile exercise,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 32

August 4, 1999.

99. “PLAAF aircraft target Taiwan Aircraft,” United Daily 

August 5, 1999. “Taiwan Air Force Monitoring China Ai

Movements,” Taipei Chung-Yang Jih-Pao in Chinese, FBIS, Au

1999, p. 10. These reports stated: (1) Two PLAAF J-8 fighters 

the centerline of the Strait on July 25 and two J-7 fighters cros

centerline on July 30. Shortly after the planes crossed the lin

corrected their routes and returned to the west side of the center 

The J-7s and J-8s from Fuzhou and Longxi airbases were flying o

Strait on a daily basis; (3) Su-27 fighters stationed at Suixi air

Guangdong Province began training activities in areas close 

center line. (The Su-27s from Wuhu airbase in Anhui Provin

probably also involved); (4) There was no truth to reports that 

Su-27s locked on with their fire control radar to two Taiwan 

251
2000 fighters over the Taiwan Strait on August 2; and 5) Ab

international flights and 730 domestic flights fly over the Taiwa

daily.

100. Victor Lai, “PRC Jet Fighters Twice Cross Taiwan 

Center Line,” Central News Agency, Taipei, August 10, 1999.

101. Lo Ping, “It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Sho

Military Strength,” Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, April 15, 1996.

102. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: March 8-25, 1996,” 

presented by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence at a conferenc

PRC’s military modernization sponsored by the Alexis de Tocq

Institute, March 11, 1997.

103. Ping, “It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Show 

Military Strength”; Steven Mufson, “China Masses Troops O

Near Taiwan,” The Washington Post, February 14, 1996.

104. “Mainland Fighters Said To Appear Above Taiwan S

Taipei Tzu-Li Wan-Pao, November 26, 1998, FBIS-CHI-

November 29, 1998.

105. State Department Briefing with James Rubin, F

Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, Au

1999.

106. Interview with government official.

107. Lu Xingsheng, “Taiwan Haixia Cong Wei Cun Zaiguo S

‘Zhong Xian′” (The Taiwan Strait has Never Had a Center 

Shanghai Xinmin Weekly, No. 34, August 23-29, 1999, p. 8.

108. Taiwan’s Air Force has now received all of its 130 

Mirage, and 150 F-16 fighters.

109. State Department Briefing with James Rubin, F

Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, Au

1999.

110. Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report, Ta

Ming Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd. 1998, pp. 184-185. Almost 

these aircraft have any standoff weapons launch capability. Th

they would not be that effective in reaching Taiwan unless Chin

to take out most of Taiwan’s air defense capability with ballis

cruise missiles first.

252
111. “Chinese Exercise Strait 961: March 8-25, 1996,” 

presented by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence at a conferenc

PRC’s military modernization, sponsored by the Alexis de Tocq

Institute, March 11, 1997.

112. Sergey Sokut and Ilya Kedrov, “War in Europe: Yugosl

Days Under Missile and Bombing Attacks: NATO’s Limited W

Uncompromising,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye

No. 25, July 2-8, 1999, p. 2.

113. Kenneth W. Allen, People’s Republic of China, P

Liberation Army Air Force, Washington, DC: Defense Inte

Agency, May 1991, Section 2.

114. “Taiwan Air Force Monitoring China Air Force Move

Taipei Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, Internet, August 4, 1999.

115. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. P

China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century, Santa Monica: RAND

p. 64.

253
CHAPTER 7

THE KOSOVO WAR:

IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN

Arthur Waldron

Kosovo will not be remembered as one of NATO’s 

successes. That is bad news, for the long-standing Pe

Republic of China (PRC) plans to use force in a s

manner to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control. Ne

year after North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N

sorties ceased, the Serbian government of Slob

Milosevic remains in power, and the situation on the g

in Kosovo is as volatile as ever. More troops may b

there, but no solution is in sight.

The lessons of NATO’s Kosovo campaign, 

diplomatic and military, throw into doubt the fundam

strategy that Beijing has long employed against Ta

The strategy is pure realpolitik of the type familiar d

most of the 20th century. Diplomatically, the goal w

isolate and delegitimize the island globally by sec

recognition of China’s absolute sovereignty from the le

powers, and to pressure the government in Taipei wi

assistance of the United States, in particular. H

reserve was a military threat, including nuclear wea

not only against the people of the island, but also ag

any country that might have considered aiding it. 

recently, this strategy worked quite well.

But, as Beijing realizes, the Kosovo campaign t

these calculations into question. From the diplomatic 

of view, Kosovo suggests that the concept of ab

sovereignty is weakening. No one doubted, after all

Kosovo was part of Serbia. Increasingly, it seems

Canadian diplomat put it, “Sovereignty is no excu

255
human rights abuses.”

1

 As for the military, the pr

that a few well-placed missiles might bring Taipei t

faded dramatically when the flurry of Tomahawk m

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright hoped 

nudge Milosevic to talks had no such effect. Instead, 

ensued an inconclusive 78-day bombing campaign, in 

the full might of NATO, stronger by any measure 

China, was hard put to dominate little Serbia an

dictators’ dictator—a smaller and far weaker target, b

measure, than democratic Taiwan.

Not surprisingly, the rhetoric from Beijing be

almost frantic as the story unfolded. The attack pub

in the People’s Daily of June 22, 1999, perhaps tak

prize—its (unfavorable) comparison of the United Sta

Hitler is as scurrilous as anything to come out of B

since the Korean War:

. . . Hitler not only used in war what were considered to be 

most advanced weapons of the time, such as airplanes, tan

and long-range artillery, to massacre peaceful citizens 

anti-fascist countries, but also built concentration camps 

Auschwitz and in other areas to slaughter Jews and prisoner

war with “advanced” technology. Executioners drove hundr

and thousands of people into gas chambers and poured cyan

through air holes in the roof, killing them all. Today, the U

hegemonists use high-tech weapons to attack the FR

[Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] civilian facilities, seve

hundred miles away from the battlefield or with laser and glo

positioning system several thousand meters in the sky, treat

innocent and peaceful citizens as live targets. The flagrant 

of missiles by the U.S.-led NATO to attack the Chinese emba

in Yugoslavia was a barbaric atrocity that the then N

Germany had not dared to commit.

2

But Beijing’s response has been confused: pr

Milosevic (but not really helping him, even in the 

attempting a speedy reconciliation with Russia (whic

China, has no desire to alienate the West), adding 

layers of theatricality and menace to quite jus

indignation at the mistaken U.S. bombing of the Ch

256
embassy, playing hard to get over World T

Organization (WTO) accession, and other issues.

China senses that Kosovo is an indication o

thoroughly the post-Cold War world is failing to fulf

hopes. Given that China draws strength from eff

operations in the international environment, this po

serious problem—and one to which there is no solut

the current framework of Chinese strategic thinking

Diplomacy.

China is deeply concerned by the way the interna

law of sovereignty, on which Chinese governm

throughout this century have staked so much, is begi

to incorporate troublesome notions such as self-dete

ation and human rights.

The first line of defense is to deny that human 

abuses exist. “Remarks and reports on Yugosl

so-called ‘ethnic cleansing’ have different interpretat

said Zhu Bangzao, foreign ministry spokesman.

3

 The 

has been spouting “misleading and demagogic propag

about the FRY’s ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘oppression of h

rights’ in Kosovo.” The International Court of Justic

even declared Milosevic a war criminal and “o

appealed to the FRY people to overthrow the 

government”—and, as final twist of the knife, threate

withhold financial aid from Serbia until Milose

replaced.

4

 But acknowledgment of the truth had app

as early as April 20, 1999, in the China Economic Tim

the road to exile, the Serbs believe everything is perm

They are raping women, killing and robbing refuge

one can stop them”—it quoted a refugee as saying.

5

China today engages in appalling repression again

own people, minorities included, and threatens the sa

Taiwan, all under the rubric of sovereignty. But if Kos

a precedent, the world community could concei

condemn Beijing for this. They might even indict 

257
Chinese officials, or call upon the Chinese peop

overthrow their designated leaders—or (perhaps the 

realistic worry)—refuse money (as they are refusing 

the Three Gorges Dam) out of some cockamamie conc

freedom.

The prospect is particularly worrying bec

throughout this century, China, when weak, has d

strength from international law, which it has attemp

use to unify itself. Thus in the 1920s, the provisions 

Washington treaties were distorted into a foreign guar

of Chinese unity. In the 1930s, international law was 

powerfully against Japan, and since the 1970s, Chin

used the U.N. and its legal structures to stifle and i

Taiwan, just as Taiwan used them against China until 

the organization in 1971. China in the past has 

international law to leverage its own claims. Now tha

system is starting to be used to leverage other so

claims.

Most important here are “so-called ‘democracy

‘human rights’” and the advocacy of “fighting for v

[instead of territory]” to which “the United States a

allies now give wide publicity.” This is directed ag

socialist countries as well as developing countries th

not socialist but that do not obey the United S

Moreover, the United States uses “common values

bonding agent for consolidating its relations with its al

We have an odd blend here. Note the reaffirmat

socialism, jarring in a China that is supposed 

reforming. And the sense that the socialist cam

beleaguered. But there is also an odd sort of caric

“realism” here, odd given the ideological definition

used. Countries are supposed to fight over territor

resources, not “values” (though socialism is presuma

value). And there is a recognition that, despite a

rhetoric about U.S. military power being the source 

hegemony, actually “common values” have something 

with it.

258
The threat, moreover, is spreading. The U.N. used t

reliable bastion for third world dictators and commu

but now a lot of democrats have turned up there, so m

that the U.N. itself ended up endorsing the K

operation. And the “heads of NATO countries have 

claimed that if the United Nations does not allow itsel

manipulated, they will separately form a so-called ‘Al

of Democratic Countries’”—in which China presu

would not even have a seat, let alone a veto.

7

The U.N. used to insist on absolute sovereignt

noninterference, as a series of declarations in 1949 and 

made clear. Now it is abandoning that. On June 10, 

the Security Council passed a resolution legitimizin

bombing campaign and the occupation of Kosovo

China only abstained. Rhetoric, obviously, and prett

at that—but not without a kernel of truth, which is th

post-Cold War world has developed in a way en

different from what China expected, and that is 

unwelcome. China expected NATO to dissolve, 

replaced by a series of power centers—Europe, R

Japan, and so forth—among which China could wo

usual diplomatic stratagems of ever shifting orienta

But instead, NATO not only survived, it expanded—

found as its new mission something to do with h

rights. Its ambitions became global. Conquest o

“strategically important Balkans” (strategically impo

for what?) would permit NATO to move east, “even

gaining control of the whole Europe, including Ru

That Western pincer would be matched by the Allianc

its “important accomplice, Japan” and culmina

dominating the world.

8

This led to the position taken by China early i

conflict that Serbia was the “red fortress of Europe,” w

the red flag heroically against the “so-called ‘We

democratic community’;” Milosevic was a doughty wo

hero, a “second Tito,” and “A man of iron who does not 

to the West, and a folk hero who can make his nation 

259
him with a single call or raise of an arm” (better than 

Zemin?)

9—characterizations that were sadly disappoi

But in practical terms, China did very little to he

Serbs. Pro-Serbian rallies in Beijing were halted, and 

it came to the crunch in the U.N., the dreaded Chines

shrank into an abstention. “The Chinese are ready to d

Serbia down to the last Russian,” one diplomat observe

Implications for Taiwan.

In Switzerland, Jiang Zemin referred to NATO’s a

as “new gunboat policy,” and the Chinese Communist 

(CCP) issued internal circulars on the “hegemonic ac

the United States in the Balkans. Revising the so-

pro-U.S. foreign policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping, s

Politburo members drew comparisons between Koso

one hand, and Taiwan and Tibet on the other, in closed

sessions. 

If U.S.-led foreign powers could wantonly interfere 

Yugoslavia in support of a pro-independence movement, 

precedent could conceivably be used one day with referenc

Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjiang.

11

The intervention demonstrated that in the world 

moral and humanitarian considerations fav

self-determination and opposing terror and e

cleansing clearly trump old-fashioned absolute sovere

of the sort that China claims over, say, Tibet (where 

certainly committed appalling atrocities) or Taiwan.

This suggests that Taiwan’s claims to demo

legitimacy will have an impact even on a world tha

largely acquiesced in China’s claims of sovereignty, 

extent that China could scarcely expect support 

anyone if it were actually to attack Taiwan, while 

states would cooperate with the few who might ac

support the island.

260
In other words, even given sovereignty, a mi

solution would be sufficiently unwelcome to the rest 

world that it might not work at all or, even if it d

accepted. We see signs of this sort of attitude i

international reaction to Taipei’s “liang guo lun” [two 

theory] of Republic of China (ROC)-PRC relations—i.e

the former two Germanys, they are two states withi

nation. Condemnation has come from China, predi

enough, from the U.S. State Department, and from 

American China watchers. But the fact that Taiwa

democracy enters into it increasingly, as in a letter 

New York Times:

. . . you correctly point out that the Taiwanese exerc

democracy; on the other hand you fail to consider t

possibility that President Lee Teng-hui’s proclamation o

“state-to-state” relationship to China reflects longtime pub

opinion in Taiwan.

12

This can only be worrying to China. In the past, B

has managed to avoid condemnation on the groun

human rights by blurring the issues, baiting foreigner

the prospect of financial gain, and issuing threats. It w

the latter that China seemed to move most actively aft

Kosovo war. But here again, the lessons wer

encouraging.

The Use of Force.

Force would seem to have become a more attr

option for China’s leaders in the years since the Tiana

Massacre and Deng Xiaoping’s incapacitation and d

Deng was strong enough at home to recognize C

weakness abroad and to understand that her true long

interests would be served by peace and econ

development. This did not stop him from promoting nu

and missile programs, or even from invading sove

Vietnam, but it did give him immunity to the app

xenophobia, nationalism, and the “splendid little w

tools of domestic statecraft.

261
His successors are quite different. They are wea

divided at home. They could seek legitimacy through r

but understand that would mean abolishing their own 

So, not surprisingly perhaps, they have turn

nationalistic slogans at home and saber rattling abro

One lesson of Kosovo (and of the collapse of the Un

Soviet Socialist Republics) is that, according to 

Yizhou of the World Economics and Politics Res

Institute, “We cannot be soft-hearted or tolerant towar

separatist groups, including those in Tibet, Taiwan

Xinjiang.”

13

Undergirding this has been an assessment o

international community and of the utility of force. 

recently, the Chinese view has been that the post-Col

international community was resolving itself into a gr

competing blocs, among which China could play its gam

triangulation. Until recently as well, the Chinese vie

been that ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons could 

the foundation of a military force that would a

guarantee a form of hegemony in Asia.

These two big facts would permit the regime to not

some important achievements in the years ahead. Ta

would be intimidated into settling or be conquered; J

would be nobbled militarily and forced to acknow

Chinese primacy; and Korea would become a close f

the South China Sea a Chinese lake, and the United S

a presence offstage somewhere around Hawaii. K

turned all these calculations upside down.

The PRC government faces a plate full of proble

which Taiwan is rather minor. (Indeed, given all the m

Taiwan pours into China and the market it provid

independent Taiwan is actually a net plus). A “spl

little war” with Taiwan might look like just the tic

soothe some of these problems, by diverting attention 

from the undemocratic system, the corrupt leadership

so forth, toward foreign issues. But as will be seen, s

war would be neither splendid nor little.

262
In this respect, if China launched such an atta

Taiwan, it would be in a similar position to NATO, w

most of its people cared not at all about what was going 

Kosovo. That fact meant that NATO had to fight a ver

war and ask for no sacrifices. Its leadership was mor

undermined by President Clinton’s well-known evas

military service. Had Milosevic been able to follow-up 

successful downing of an F-117 plane or inflict 

dramatic damage on NATO, the Alliance would most 

have called off the war.

The same sort of dynamic would apply in China

levels of pilot and other losses one can reaso

anticipate, not to mention some strong counterstrikes 

Taiwan, would probably convince most Chinese tha

island was not worth the bones of a single “Shandon

Han.” Furthermore, as happened in NATO, as soon 

Taiwan crisis protracted, political authority wou

stretched to the limit, all the more so because in China 

are no legitimating mechanisms for authority. A 

victory would win laurels for the central governmen

setbacks would translate into defections of all sorts

leaders would tilt away and withhold funds; political 

would make hay; and insurgents in Xinjiang migh

something. The whole Chinese dominance hierarchy 

begin to collapse into anarchy. (War would hav

opposite effect in Taiwan, where public opinion wou

solidified).

Remember there is an asymmetry in interests. 

has NO vital interest in Taiwan: the island poses no t

whatsoever to her, unless we consider the exam

democracy to be a threat to a dictatorial regime, and t

not a military threat. Far more serious challenges to C

military position are posed currently by India’s acceler

development of nuclear forces and a blue water navy

South Korea’s growing submarine force and incre

numbers of missiles, and in the future by a possible Ru

turn against China and Japan’s shift to military 

power status (which looks likely to be accelerated by cu

263
Chinese moves). To be sure, the current Beijing leade

places great emphasis on Taiwan as terra irredenta, 

the motherland not yet redeemed (though it makes no 

claims on Mongolia (whose independence C

recognizes), even though Mongolia is arguably at le

important strategically and was part of the Qing Ch

empire far longer than was Taiwan. Without dismissi

national unification concerns entirely, it can perha

noted that neither Mao nor Deng, both nationalists

anywhere near so insistent as is the current leade

Indeed, one may suspect that the rather weak Jiang Z

leadership sees truculence over Taiwan as a way to 

nationalistic opinion and—who knows?—possibly 

persuade the United States to lean even harder on Ta

come to terms. And surely they understand that a war 

Taiwan would be popular only if it was easy and succ

quickly. To expend substantial blood and treasure 

would be unpopular. Abandonment of such a ventu

contrast, would cost little and be accepted easily. Ta

however, would have no less than a SURVIVAL int

defeat would mean enslavement and loss of indepe

existence. What a Finnish student once remarked a

Naval War College also applies to Taiwan: “Our co

does not have the concept of limited war.”

In this respect, the issue of force against Taiwan 

Jiang Zemin not unlike what the issue of force ag

Kosovo was for Clinton. Arguably, Clinton’s lack of mi

experience and consequent need to prove himself mad

more likely to use force against Kosovo, particularly 

NATO painted itself into a corner over the negotia

Neither Mao nor Deng had any such need to 

themselves, but Jiang, who lacks any military expe

but relies on the military as the ultimate prop of his 

may feel one. Like Clinton, however, he will be attr

only to what looks to be an easy, short, and rela

bloodless conflict. Some in the Chinese military spe

winning a war over Taiwan in 24 hours (the plan for K

was 48). Hence all the more reason for Beijing, above 

264
take note of what really happened: how badly the war 

compared to expectations, and how much damage it 

the credibility of both NATO leaders and forces.

The Allied Operation.

Although it would be stretching things to call the K

operation a success, what the Chinese saw operatio

was undoubtedly troubling. By Chinese standard

Serbian military is by no means obsolete, yet it p

powerless to interfere with the allied air campaign, 

mention incapable of striking back against their atta

in any way. True, things might have been differen

NATO moved in on the ground, attacking entre

positions, but that proved unnecessary.

The U.S. Army would probably have proved too “h

to be brought into the operation, had that been neces

But the new weapons that will form the core of the 

military in a decade’s time, moreover, did very wel

problem was not enough of them. Boeing’s Joint 

Attack Munitions (JDAM), Raytheon’s AGM-154 

Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and the Lockheed Martin 

Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM)—all so-

“smart weapons”—did well enough that Pentagon pla

intend to give them a primary role in U.S. forces. The 

Spirit also performed unexpectedly well.

14

One problem was the NATO shortage of so-called 

quantity—high utilization” weapons, such as the Air

Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Survei

Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and U.S. Nav

U.S. Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler jamming airc

Compared to China, NATO’s order of battle contains 

numbers of these elements, but scarcely enough to dea

the challenges posed by little Serbia even with units p

in from all over the globe, including Asia. Even so, r

rudimentary Serb deception proved highly effe

Alliance pilots may have destroyed far fewer tank

265
example, than previously thought, because so many 

targets were decoys and were also difficult to hit.

15

What would all this mean for a potential Ta

operation? The island would be an incomparably to

target than was Serbia. NATO has far greater elec

warfare capabilities than China, and the Republic of 

(Taiwan) countermeasures are far better than what S

possesses. Yet NATO was unable to completely suppr

adversary. That bodes ill for any Chinese operation.

Furthermore, Serbia had no ability to strike N

bases and anti-aircraft capabilities that are far infer

the ROC. Yet the Serbian air threat environmen

sufficient to force NATO aircraft to fly too high for op

operations. What NATO was unable to do against Ser

78 days, China is unlikely to be able to do against Taiw

Second, the style of military intervention that 

increasingly envisions proved highly ineffective i

Kosovo war, even when carried out by NATO’s expert

against a state far smaller and weaker and isolated t

Taiwan.

Secretary of State Albright, it will be recalled, sou

the Kosovo case to nudge Milosevic back to the negot

table at Rambouillet by means of a whiff of Toma

missiles. These were of course duly fired, but, inste

scurrying back to France, Milosevic sat tight, and the N

campaign grew steadily for 77 days, until more tha

aircraft were involved. A great deal of damage 

done—but still, Milosevic yielded only when he was o

far better terms than the Rambouillet deal.

This experience merely confirms again what we 

learned repeatedly from World War II to Vietnam 

Gulf War—bombing alone is not enough to win, let 

win quickly. This is particularly true when conven

warheads are used: they are relatively weak compa

the cost of the missiles. Hitler’s V-2s were a technol

marvel, but they no effect on Britain.

266
If we apply the Balkan parallel almost exactly 

Taiwan Strait, the scenario would be something like 

China and Taiwan reach an impasse in negotiations

Taiwan goes home. PRC warns and then begins 

missiles at the island. After 78 days, PRC then backs 

and compromises with Taiwan.

That would be bad enough given the Tiananmen S

standard for obedience that still prevails in China. Bu

that outcome is unlikely. For as Clausewitz reminds 

warfare, reaction is correlated to action—not in 

mathematical fashion as in physics, but rather “act

which is to say, unpredictably.

China could not deliver the kind of sust

punishment to Taiwan that NATO did to Yugoslavia 

furthermore, even if no other states intervened, T

would be unlikely simply to accept 77 days of pound

Yugoslavia did. It would react by striking back at 

with great destructiveness.

Defense.

NATO was unable to effectively cripple 

Yugoslavia’s relatively simple air defenses; for a 

weaker China to destroy the air defenses of a much str

Taiwan would be far more difficult. Certainly 

numbers of pilots would be lost, and, even then, v

would be most uncertain. The same is true for ma

operations.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 

intensifies this reality. A first-hand observer report

damage by NATO’s precision guided munitions to Yug

targets was comparable in many cases to what could 

have been achieved by nuclear weapons in the pas

almost without collateral damage. Key nodes of ever

were effectively disabled at relatively low cost.

Waging an offensive like NATO’s requires larg

vulnerable bases, logistical trains, communications, a

267
forth. Had Yugoslavia possessed some cruise missil

other RMA sorts of capabilities, it could have wreaked 

on NATO bases in Italy and elsewhere.

Massing troops and aircraft for an operation ag

Taiwan would be a protracted and difficult busines

could be crippled by precision strikes against transpor

and other infrastructure. What was intended to 

lightning strike could bog down and protract. A wors

for the PRC would be a repeat of the Guningtou battl

destroyed a Chinese expeditionary force attacking Ji

in October 1949.

16

 The difference being that, where

years ago the PRC forces were trapped on the beac

Jinmen and annihilated by ground fire after their la

craft had all been sunk, in this scenario the expediti

forces trapped in Fujian Province would be cut off fro

rest of China and then destroyed from the air.

Theater Missile Defense.

China wants great-power-style influence, but it c

afford great-power-style forces, nor is it willing to ado

cooperative diplomatic norms that give the United Sta

Great Britain their real influence. So it has fixed on ba

missiles and nuclear weapons as shortcuts to 

influence, massively investing in such systems

problem is that, even in the best of times, the ba

missile with nuclear warhead is useful chiefly 

deterrent, to keep someone else from attacking you, r

than as an instrument of coercion—given that the thr

drop atomic bombs on someone with whom you s

disagree seems far too risky to be at all plausible.

Those limitations are now compounded by two o

First is that of countervailing moves and retaliation

sort of missile and precision guided munitions threat 

discussed here is not Taiwan-specific. It poten

threatens any state within China’s range, and such 

will behave accordingly. It is hard to imagine that J

Korea, Taiwan, and other states will simply stand 

268
China deploys its DF-31s. They will certainly spe

development of their own missile forces.

Add to this is the dawning U.S. recognition that m

defense is essential, and progress is being made i

example, the Navy theater-wide system. This system 

be deployed on ships to threatened areas and dest

respectable percentage of missiles in flight. That fact 

greatly reduce both the psychological and the mi

impact of a missile barrage. Not surprisingly, PRC op

it. But the lesson of Kosovo is that you need such a sy

otherwise you are naked to your adversary, and this 

is not lost on the other Asian states. China’s ren

threats early in 2000 to use missiles only remind the r

of the threat, and make defensive action even more l

Collateral Aspects.

Even in the Yugoslav case where civilian deaths 

relatively limited, NATO public opinion was d

troubled by innocent deaths. In a Taiwan Strait sce

collateral damage would be far greater and also 

documented. PRC would be attacking a Taiwan full o

and foreign journalists, as well as diplomatic repr

atives from all over the world, most of them d

sympathetic (as was not the case in Belgrade) wit

plight of the locals, whatever their governments 

think. Large amounts of foreign property and inves

would also be at stake. A great deal would be covered i

time by CNN and other such outlets. Not only would t

a public relations disaster for China, it would a

certainly move the rest of the world to act—as it 

Yugoslavia—for humanitarian reasons, in spite o

considerations of sovereignty. This would be partic

true if the conflict became protracted. The likelihood o

protraction, underlined by the Kosovo experien

perhaps the single most worrying aspect of the whole 

for China.

269
Financial markets would also be harmed. It goes w

saying that Taiwan would suffer severe losses, but s

would China. When President Lee gave his July 

interview regarding statehood, Taipei markets fell—

did Hong Kong’s and Shanghai’s, and the same happe

early 2000 when Beijing again turned up the temper

China’s economy is already on a downward trajector

needs all the foreign investment it can get. Host

around Taiwan would almost certainly stop the flow

only from Taiwan itself, but also from Japan and Eu

and probably from Hong Kong as well, because, as ma

there fell and trade stopped, few would be in the m

invest.

Furthermore, and this should be stressed, a K

style attack on Taiwan would undoubtedly close 

markets completely to Chinese exports. Nothing 

China would be permitted into the country. Given C

great dependence on foreign sales and foreign currenc

would be a disaster.

International Aspects.

If one envisions a PRC attack on Taiwan as lookin

Kosovo, then it is hard to imagine any way that the r

the world would stay out. We are talking about the he

maritime Asia, as well as major sea-lanes, where billi

dollars of commerce pass daily. The immediate pre

would be on China to stop—and once stopped, the Ch

attack, like the NATO bombing, would be difficult to re

Having initiated war and then been forced to back 

China would be in a weaker negotiating position than 

outset. An attack on Taiwan would click the lock on a 

of alliances that would effectively contain China, 

Japan almost certainly joining.

What of the doomsday scenarios: Chinese nu

threats against Japan or the United States, cruise m

attacks on U.S. carriers, neutron bomb “ethnic cleansi

270
Taiwan that would leave the valuable infrastructure 

to be inhabited by a new, more tractable population?

War does, of course, bring disaster. But disasters 

from desperation, not calculation, and the operation w

hypothesizing would be, like Secretary Albright’s 

intended to be strictly limited. When such a li

operation failed in Kosovo, NATO escalated, but again

adversary that was itself incapable of escalating and 

had no ally willing to run the risk on its behalf. To es

against Taiwan, however, would invite desp

retaliation from the island, while to attack U.S. forces 

guarantee a U.S. response.

The states most likely to use weapons of 

destruction are not the great powers who stand to 

great deal in any war, but rather those countries or re

for whom defeat can mean destruction or collapse—I

North Korea, Iraq, Pakistan, and so forth—to whic

could add Taiwan and South Korea, were they n

powers. RMA, however, may render nuclear explo

obsolete, given the kind of damage that new

conventional weapons can do.

Taiwan in particular is developing non-nuclear we

systems that can nevertheless do substantial dama

China. Given the political weakness of the Chinese r

and the need it would have for a quick and costless vi

the complications such weapons would introduce coul

undo the entire strategy—even if the rest of the wor

nothing.

Chinese Responses.

China should have learned a great deal about it

diplomatic and military weakness in the course o

Kosovo war. Traditional Chinese strategy stresses spl

alliances and playing one power off against another. B

spite of Chinese efforts to lobby “soft” NATO countries 

as Italy, the Western alliance stayed united to the end 

271
campaign. Nor did the hope China placed on R

materialize. Moscow stood aside even though it could 

easily have disrupted NATO’s plans. Finally, the rest 

world, as represented in the United Nations, proved a 

reed for China as well. On May 13, 1999, China failed 

the Security Council to “deplore” the bombing.

17

 

results must have been disappointing, given the 

China lays on her influence in international institu

and the power of her veto.

Rhetoric at the time suggested that frustration 

failed diplomacy turned into anti-Americanism in C

The United States emerged as the spider spinning th

in which China itself feels increasingly entangled—a w

economic dependence, of international norms

increasingly of sanctions, utterly at odds with the Ch

government’s policies—though perhaps not unwelcom

lot of China’s people. But almost a year later an

explanation is also beginning to emerge. This is tha

debate over Kosovo fits into and exacerbates an al

existing struggle within the Chinese government in 

domestic hard-liners such as Jiang Zemin are increa

positioning themselves beside the international hard-

in the military to attempt to master the ever more vo

domestic situation.

Certainly some of the rhetoric sounded as if i

intended for domestic political consumption, no

analytical purposes. One article predicted that N

would spread into Asia, and that “the first Asian state 

NATO could be Taiwan” to be followed by Xinjiang, 

urging of Turkey.

18

 But who can doubt that the Tu

Xinjiang are increasingly restive, well-armed, and in 

with the rest of the Islamic and Turkish world of C

Asia, and that Chinese attempts to woo Kazakhstan 

not proved entirely successful? The problem is a rea

and at the moment Beijing has no answer for it e

threats and repression—which failed in the past whe

Turks were weaker, the Chinese stronger, an

international community in the dark.

272
Likewise with Taiwan. It probably will not join N

But if one were asked to choose the more probable cou

events, given China’s escalating threats: do the U

States and Japan cut Taiwan off and force it to sign o

dotted line? Or do they gradually increase their 

providing key diplomatic support and missile defe

with the effect of frustrating China’s efforts—then I 

the second is far more likely, as China understands.

The problem with Tibet is similar. It cann

suppressed. The Chinese plan to choose and educa

next Dalai Lama was unworkable even before the cu

Dalai Lama dispatched it by stating that he would n

reincarnated as a Tibetan under Chinese control

kidnapping by China of the Panchen Lama and the fli

India of the Karmapa Lama further underlin

impossibility of Chinese plans. India is less strong mili

than China but also less overextended, and its prese

the south and sympathy for Tibet guarantees that this 

will not disappear.

Nor can China be certain that the United States 

attempt to coerce China as it did Kosovo with 

technology weaponry. North Korea certainly fears t

may be a target. Pyongyang watched the war far 

closely than it did the Gulf War, and has evid

expressed fear to Beijing that it could be the 

Yugoslavia—and it could be.

19

In fact, Western use of force against China proper 

probably be as ineffective as the Kosovo operation 

good deal messier. China is not good at force projection

not only because she lacks the hardware. Force proj

goes against traditional approaches to war, which lay 

on using the opponent’s own weight to bring him 

Western force can halt Chinese attacks outward anyw

in Asia—but it cannot bring Beijing to terms. If it d

escalate to the nuclear level, a possibility not to be excl

a Kosovo-style operation against China would most 

simply go on and on, as China absorbed the punishmen

273
occasionally struck back, hoping to get lucky one da

kill enough Americans to force an agonizing reapprai

Washington. That was how China dealt with Japan 

century ago.

Still the question arises for Beijing, Pyongyang, an

others of how the United States is to be kept out? Nu

threats seem one possibility. Wang Xiaodong, autho

recent article on nationalism and democracy, believe

building precision weapons (as some in the 

undoubtedly want) makes no sense. He says:

We must strengthen our nuclear capability . . . We need m

more weapons of mass destruction which can reach citie

North America. It is important to remember that the 

difference between China and Serbia . . . is that we have 

nuclear bomb.

20

That sounds plausible until one considers that the S

Union had many more bombs than the United State

that didn’t save it. Furthermore, the sort of build

nuclear weapons in which China is currently involve

certainly elicit a countervailing response, even 

immediately. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and 

Asian countries will join India in the recognition tha

their own deterrent can ultimately deter a threat

China. American attempts to discourage them 

developing such capabilities will only make the situ

worse. But an Asia containing several nuclear powers 

advanced missiles and other forces comparable to 

China is developing now can only hurt China’s inte

The United States operates with other powers by a

with them. China at present seems to prefer to thr

them.

Conclusion.

The trends that have so worried China look lik

continue. Democratization is a risky process, but it pro

apace in Asia, where Indonesia most recently has c

274
that pathway—and not coincidentally, gra

independence to East Timor, a major step toward e

conflict and restoring peace in the area. In China 

problems are now of such complexity that it is ha

imagine the autocratic government will be able to dea

them. Few of these problems have anything to do 

foreign policy: the genuinely big issues in China in

such things as unemployment, environmental degrad

the need for law and democracy, and the rights of cit

Nor can the government any longer simply pretend, as 

in the past, to have solved these problems. Penetrat

international news and the rising educational level 

decisively undermined the effectiveness of ce

propaganda. Meanwhile the willingness of hundre

members of the China Democratic Party to go to p

rather than recant, and the continued failure of Be

much-ballyhooed campaign to “crush” the Falun 

organization, further demonstrate the steady erosion 

center’s power. Xinjiang shows no sign of calming 

despite a massive military presence, and Tibet is sim

deadlocked. These problems show how the great curre

contemporary history are affecting China. Nor is mi

might an answer. It cannot solve domestic problems, a

Kosovo shows, it is almost equally helpless against ex

problems.

Beijing continues to talk about a decisive conqu

Taiwan by means of missiles and smart bombs, so rapi

Washington would have no time to act even if it chose t

the reality, as China must realize, is that such an onsl

would be indecisive and quickly escalate.

Kosovo shows just how appealing such fant

continue to be to states that should know better. That 

is rarely as effective as hoped for and often escalates 

control is a lesson that Europe and the United States s

have learned in the 20th century. Far better that 

should learn it by studying Kosovo than by experime

with Taiwan.

275
CHAPTER 7 - ENDNOTES

1. “China Slams NATO Strikes in Yugoslavia, Calls for 

Action,” AFP Beijing, April 15, 1999.

2. People’s Daily, June 22, 1999, p. 6.

3. “China Reiterates Stand on Kosovo Issue,” Xinhua Beijin

6, 1999.

4. “‘Ethnic Cleansing’ Conceded,” South China Morning Pos

22, 1999.

5. China Economic Times, April 20, 1999.

6. Ibid.

7. “Milosevic Hailed for Battling ‘Hitler’ Clinton,” South 

Morning Post, April 5, 1999.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. “Mainland’s Flip-flop Over the Balkans,” South China M

Post, April 1999.

11. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Party Warns of US Expansionism,

China Morning Post, March 18, 1999.

12. “Evolving Democracy,” New York Times, July 19, 1999.

13. “The Heart of Chinese Sovereignty,” South China Morni

June 12, 1999.

14. Bryan Bender, “Kosovo Lessons Won’t Mean Big Cha

USA,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 14, 1999, p. 3.

15. Ibid.

16. Ainslee T. Embree, ed., Encyclopedia of Asian History

New York: Charles Scribners’ Sons, 1988, p. 223.

17. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Beijing Targets ‘Soft’ NATO Nations

China Morning Post, May 14, 1997.

276
18. Article by Wei Mufu and other researchers at the Asia 

Council, “The Kosovo Affair and Asia-Pacific Security,” quoted 

Heart of Chinese Sovereignty,” South China Morning Post, J

1999.

19. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Fears North Korea NATO’s Next T

South China Morning Post, May 28, 1999; “N. Korea Active in Re

Kosovo Conflict: Defense Min.” Korea Times, April 12, 1999.

20. Mufu.

277
CHAPTER 8

CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY

Bernard D. Cole

Introduction.

The Asia-Pacific is an overwhelmingly maritime r

defined by the Pacific and Indian Oceans; and by the Y

East China, and South China Seas, which border the n

for which they are named. The state of maritime str

thought in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) toda

the likely development of that thought over the course 

next decade, are open questions. Their answer req

first, a review of the geo-political context facing Ch

maritime strategists. Second, a discussion o

development of maritime strategy in the PRC w

followed by a brief review of specific maritime str

missions and capabilities of the People’s Liberation 

Navy (PLAN). Finally, future prospects for the n

strategic role will be surveyed.

In 1953, Mao Zedong wrote “we must build a strong 

for the purpose of fighting against imperialist aggres

In 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for “a strong navy 

modern combat capability,” and in 1997, Jiang Zemin 

the navy to “build up the nation’s maritime Great W

China is clearly expanding and modernizing its navy, 

to celebrate its fiftieth year, by focusing both o

hardware and strategy required for a modern fleet.

The PRC has not been reluctant to use military 

including warships, to resolve international dispu

more than 16 times, in fact, since 1949.

2

 A major g

China’s naval modernization is to change the PLAN f

coastal, “brown-water” force to an open ocean “blue w

force.

3

 “Blue water” is part of a maritime strategy para

279
that includes “brown” and “green” water. Brown 

refers to littoral ocean areas, within about 100 na

miles (nm)

4

 of the coastline; green water is less de

referring to ocean areas from about 100 nm to the 

significant land formation. For China, green water ex

from brown water to Okinawa or from brown 

throughout the South China Sea (SCS). “Blue wat

represented by General Liu Huaqing’s “second i

chain,” delineated by a line from Japan through the 

Islands, the Mariana Islands, and the Caroline Islan

“blue-water” PLAN, then, will have to be capa

controlling events to a distance of at least 1,500 nm 

China’s coast, including the Yellow, East China, and 

China Seas.

The classic maritime strategic phrase for such con

“Command of the Sea,” most simply defined as the abi

use the sea while denying its use to an adversary

Control” is a lesser but nonetheless powerful co

defined as a nation’s ability to “command” a discrete 

area for a limited period of time—sufficient to ac

limited strategic goals.

The counterpoint to sea control is “Sea Denial”: de

an adversary use of a discrete maritime area without 

it oneself. All of these concepts require a nation 

effective in the air, as well as on and beneath the 

surface. Sea denial in littoral waters is a partic

attractive and inexpensive option for even a small 

power, if it has access to mines, missiles, small surface 

and submarines, and shore-based aircraft—as does Ch

China is learning that modern navies are techn

dependent and resource-intensive; they cannot be bu

even bought) quickly.

6

 Indeed, as the noted B

strategist Julian Corbett implied, “modern naval str

may be the application of professional experience 

solution of technical problems.”

7

Several factors influence modern naval str

making. These include:

280
1. Training and education programs; profess

specialization of the officer corps;

2. naval systems and platforms costs, capabilitie

sustainability;

3. the national scientific and industrial infrastru

for research, development, and production of naval wa

technology and systems;

4. the ability to derive doctrine and tactics;

5. the ability to administer, operate, and comman

control tactical units beyond individual ships;

6. sources of intelligence, and its production, ana

and dissemination;

7. service-wide naval strategic planning;

8. national naval leadership; and,

9. the place held by naval strategists in the na

strategy-making structure.

8

We will return to these points to evaluate Ch

development of a maritime strategy.

Maritime strategy should reflect Colin Gray’s d

that “man lives on the land, not on the sea, and conf

sea has strategic meaning only with reference to wh

outcome enables, or implies, for the course of even

land.”

9

 Gray cautions, however, that in all the hist

war, “the enemy who is confined to a land strategy is 

end defeated.”

10

 China historically has viewed the sea 

invasion route by foreign aggressors, rather than 

medium for achieving national goals. This attitude ap

to have changed during the past decade and a ha

China’s view of post-Cold War East Asia has focus

off-shore sovereignty, economic, and resource issues.

Adopting a maritime strategy requires naval leade

with a strong voice in the always-contentious nationa

military resource allocation process. Also relevant 

281
recent development in maritime strategy, epitomiz

U.S. adoption of the “From the Sea . . .” Series of str

documents, that sea control, per se, while still import

being matched in significance by the ability to project 

power ashore, to directly affect events on the land

development will heighten, not lessen, the importance 

power. 

Strategy, Politics, and Geography.

China historically has been a continental rather t

maritime power, despite possessing over 11,000 mi

coastline and more than 6,000 islands. China has 

episodically built and employed a strong navy, 

recently over a century ago, during the late 19th ce

“Self-Strengthening Movement.”

The Chinese currently view the international se

situation in Asia as peaceful but dangerous. President 

Zemin was recently quoted as stating that the wor

moving deeper towards . . . . the relaxation o

international situation and world peace,” but that “the 

War mentality still lingers on as hegemonism and 

politics manifest themselves . . . . New forms of ‘gu

policy’ are rampant.”

11

From Beijing’s point of view, U.S. naval domina

East Asia seems assured in the near term. In the l

term, however, the American presence is unclear and J

is a military threat. The maritime environment also di

impacts China’s most serious resource problems: e

and food, both of which depend on the sea.

12

Since the U.S.-led NATO war against Serbia

Chinese press has been marked by strong condemnat

the “new gunboat policy” the United States is accu

pursuing, “under the cover of . . . so-called sec

globalization,” a plan “to dominate the world.”

13

 

Asia-Pacific region, the United States is charged with 

the new defense agreement with Japan and theater m

282
defense (TMD) “to prepare the ground for future mi

intervention,” and with a “Eurasian strategy” to po

the United States for a “one superpower-dominated 

century’.”

14

China insists it is a developing country still 

injustice and unfair treatment on the international sc

General Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of the C

Military Commission (CMC), reportedly has stated 

China is “threatened by hegemonism and power polit

militarism, and by foreign military intervention in Ta

. . . [We] must absolutely not lower our guard.”

16

 He a

the United States of seeking the collapse of the B

regime during a “full-fledged civil war,” as a result of 

China “will disintegrate.”

17

This is a strategic picture of China besieged by a h

world in which the United States pushes the west 

militaristic Japan to contain China and prevent it 

attaining its rightful stature as a world power. 

maritime strategy will serve China’s national se

concerns—especially in view of U.S. determination to 

“humanitarian rights” above national boundaries?

18

The Navy and China’s Defense Modernization.

The current Chinese campaign to modernize its mi

follows the “sea change” in strategic thinking that occ

in 1985, when expectations of global nuclear w

large-scale conflict with the Soviet Union gave way 

focus on small, local wars on China’s periphery. The 

limited wars envisioned include (1) small-scale confl

disputed border areas; (2) conflicts over disputed isla

ocean areas; (3) surprise air attacks; (4) delib

incursions into China; and (5) counterattacks by 

against an aggressor or “to uphold justice and 

threats.”

19

This was an extremely important shift for Ch

maritime strategic thought. It moved the navy from 

283
acolyte to prominent participant in possible opera

scenarios, including threats from Japan, Taiwan, Indi

contentious maritime claims.

Following this strategic change, China reduce

number of military personnel, but to increase rathe

decrease military power, as the nation seeks to 

state-of-the-art technology at the cost of low-skilled g

troops. The PLAN particularly benefits from 

phenomenon, since compared to much army equipmen

systems required by naval forces are technolog

intense, require long periods of research and develop

and demand operating personnel who are intellec

capable and the product of extensive training. Further

advanced naval systems require large investmen

maintenance and logistical support.

The PLAN was also able to continue older prog

including the development of nuclear-powered subma

and the expansion of aviation forces to gain control of t

over ocean areas. The marine corps, first formed in 195

disestablished in 1957, was reorganized in 1980 for 

tional amphibious assault capability.

The Evolution of Maritime Strategy in China.

China has always focused on continental sec

concerns, but has not ignored its maritime bound

Witness the early 15th century voyages of Zheng He 

east coast of Africa and the Persian Gulf. These c

represented a standard of Chinese shipbuilding, v

management, and navigation ability well beyond Eur

capabilities. Zheng He led a large fleet of ships, the la

displacing over 400 tons, half-way around the world 

time when Portuguese explorers were still feeling the

down the west coast of Africa in 50-ton caravels.

The Ming rulers deliberately ended these voyag

domestic financial and policy reasons, just at the time 

the European nations were seizing upon them as a me

284
achieve economic wealth and to proselytize. By the lat

century, the Europeans were the maritime powers 

world, and China their victim.

20

China under much of the Qing Dynasty was an 

maritime power, in terms of oceanic trade and fishin

did not build a navy capable of defending the nation ag

maritime interlopers. Late 19th century efforts to c

this shortcoming lacked both a coherent strategic rat

and adequate support from the national governmen

nascent Chinese fleet came to grief in defeats by Fra

1884 and Japan in 1895.

The regimes of the first half of the 20th ce

developed a navy almost entirely through seizing f

Qing warships or obtaining them from foreign nation

distinct maritime strategy was developed.

The Early Years: 1949-1954. The communist vict

1949 was an army victory; there was no navy arm 

PLA. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did be

however, that China’s 19th and 20th century humil

had been greatly facilitated by the imperialists’ abi

invade from the sea. The new government in B

understood the need to defend its coastline and 

territories, and considered itself threatened by 

would-be aggressors: the truncated Kuomintang 

regime that had fled to Taiwan, and the United State

The PLA was unable to project power across eve

relatively narrow (90-110 nm) Taiwan Strait in 19

complete the defeat of the KMT forces. Although ex

from the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek still possessed a 

effective enough to stop the PLA at the water’s edge. H

the new Chinese regime in 1949 immediately mov

create a navy to continue the fight against Chiang’s 

and to defend the nation against “imperialist aggre

from the sea.”

21

 A new Chinese navy was also need

establish law and order on coastal and riverine wate

combat the KMT blockade, to help the army captu

off-shore islands still occupied by the KMT, and to pr

285
for the capture of Taiwan. The “East China Navy

organized in 1949, and the PLAN was officially estab

in May 1950.

22

The Taiwan government continued to conduct h

operations against the mainland, raiding co

installations, landing agents, attacking main

merchant craft and fishing vessels, and threat

invasion on a larger scale. China needed a defensive 

one that would be relatively inexpensive to build, and 

be quickly manned and trained.

23

The new PLAN, established with Soviet assistanc

guidance, consisted for the most part of small patro

suitable to combat the coastal threat from Taiwan

Soviet military assistance obtained by Mao Zedong d

his 1949-50 visit to Moscow included naval equipmen

advisors, who instilled the Soviet “Young Scho

maritime strategy. The Young School, developed i

Soviet Union shortly after World War I, was bas

conditions particular to post-revolutionary Russia:

1. a new regime that was under military and po

attack by several capitalist countries and ha

completely quelled domestic fighting;

2. furthermore, a regime that expected to be besiege

attacked by capitalist nations, with amphibious inva

current fact and future threat, especially from “the ult

bastion of imperialism, the United States.”

24

3. a navy that was in disarray;

4. budgetary shortages that limited the am

available to spend on expensive naval systems;

5. lack of an industrial infrastructure to indigen

produce modern naval armaments; and,

6. a maritime frontier that was hemmed 

adversarial fleets and bases.

286
These conditions applied to China in 1949, as well, 

the additional problems of no recent maritime tradit

trained naval force.

The Soviet Union sent an initial cadre of 500 

advisors to China in 1950, which grew to between 1,50

2,000 by 1953. These advisors paralleled the Ch

chain-of-command from Beijing headquarters to indiv

ships and squadrons, thus inculcating Soviet naval do

in the new navy. “Large numbers” of Chinese of

including the new head of the PLAN, General 

Jingguang, received training in the Soviet Union.

25

 

assistance included four old submarines, two destr

and a large number of patrol boats. This unimpressive 

also included about 10 corvettes, 40 ex-U.S. landing 

and several dozen miscellaneous river gunboats, 

sweepers, and yard craft, all seized from the Nationalis

A large shore-based infrastructure, including shipy

naval colleges, and extensive coastal fortifications, wa

built with Soviet help.

27

 The high point of the coope

period with the Soviets was the February 1959 

Technology Agreement,” which provided for the s

China of additional conventionally powered subma

torpedo boats, and missile boats.

28

 Although its ma

strategy in the early 1950s was primarily defensive, B

worked to develop the offensive capability to recove

many offshore islands still occupied by the KMT, whic

to culminate in the conquest of Taiwan in August 19

When President Harry Truman ordered the 

Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait in June 1950 

outset of the Korean War, he explained America’s re

into the Chinese civil war as a means of preventing 

side from attacking the other. Actually, he was comm

the United States to the defense of Taiwan—after h

refused to do so for many months.

30

President Dwight Eisenhower announced in Feb

1953 that the U.S. fleet would no longer interfere 

strait, thus in theory “unleashing” Nationalist forc

287
Taiwan to attack China. In December 1953, Mao Z

assigned the PLAN three priority missions: (1) elim

KMT naval interference and ensure safe navigatio

prepare to recover Taiwan; and (3) oppose aggression 

the sea.

The Chinese and Taiwanese forces resumed amph

attacks and counter-attacks, which ended in Ch

possession of all the significant offshore islands e

Quemoy, Matsu, and, of course, Taiwan. The PLA 

succeeded in stopping most of the attacks on merchan

fishing vessels, as well as the Taiwanese raids o

mainland. The PLAN had been organized, sent to sea

proven effective as a Soviet-style coastal defense 

while adhering to the rubric of “People’s War.”

The Years of 1955-1959. The Korean War expe

must have presented mixed lessons to the Chinese 

The amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950 

major turning point of the war, while allied command 

sea allowed free employment of aircraft carrier

battleships to bombard Chinese and North Korean for

was not significantly a maritime conflict, however, an

PLA may have thought in 1954 it had demonstrate

ability to campaign successfully without maritime sup

Beijing thought the American invasion threat cou

countered by relatively short-range defensive sea forc

ocean-going Chinese navy was planned after 1954. D

the latter part of the decade, after China’s commander

witnessed first hand in Korea the effects of m

weaponry, and had been threatened with nuclear wa

some PLA leaders wanted to modify Mao’s theo

“People’s War” to one of “People’s War Under M

Conditions.” Their ability to build a PLA on this prin

however, was limited by the necessity to con

conforming to Maoist ideology.

The heart of China’s national security str

continued to be one of “active defense”: the enemy wo

lured inside China’s borders while the nation mobiliz

288
strategic offensive would then be launched to driv

invader from China. The navy tried to modernize, w

emphasis on technology and technical training, 

adhering to a brown water defensive strategy.

Attempts in the 1950s to develop a specific and pe

independent strategic role for the PLA fell victim 

triumph of politics over technology. One prominent v

was Minister of Defense Marshal Peng Dehuai

stressed the importance of scientific and technol

progress and supposedly opined, with respect to the 

that “People’s War and such stuff are outdated [at s

Throughout the ideological turmoil of the late 1950s an

1960s, Beijing did invest heavily in a determined eff

develop nuclear weapons, missiles, and the nu

powered submarines from which they could be launc

A New Situation: 1960-1976. By 1960, the PLAN 

considerably larger than in 1955, but it had made li

strides towards modernization. The force centered a

eight ex-Soviet destroyers, two dozen old Soviet su

rines, and a motley collection of foreign-built patrol 

landing craft, and yard craft. The only vessels built in 

were some of the patrol boats.

33

The 1960s were marked by major foreign and dom

events that further constrained Chinese intere

developing a sea-going navy and attendant strategy. 

important was the split with the Soviet Union, sig

during Nikita Krushchev’s October 1959 meeting wit

Zedong in Beijing, and dramatically executed in mid

when Krushchev withdrew Soviet advisors (and their 

from China. Beijing’s massive civilian and mi

development projects were left in turmoil. Other signi

events in the early 1960s included war with Indi

reemerging Vietnam conflict, turmoil in the newly eme

African states, and would-be revolutionary movem

throughout Southeast Asia.

These factors continued to limit PLAN modernizat

the 1960s. Marshal Lin Biao, as minister of de

289
attempted to follow a policy of technological develop

with “politics in command.” The decade ended, how

with Lin coming down solidly on the side of “pol

writing “long live the victory of people’s war.”

34

The massive Soviet threat and the PLA’s lack of mo

drove China’s national security strategy: very large g

forces were needed. Mao’s concept of People’s War rem

the guidance for the small navy as well as the 

branches of the PLA, as did continued adherence 

Young School—modified by the development of nu

powered ballistic missile submarines.

35

America’s involvement in Vietnam and Taiwan’s f

to act on the rhetoric of invading the mainland mean

China faced no overseas threat.

36

 By the end of the d

however, relations with the Soviet Union had deterio

to the point of armed conflict along the Amur River

former ally was now the enemy. Soon the erstwhile e

the United States, would be China’s strategic ally.

Internally, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revo

(GPCR) made impossible any shift from Maoist the

hence, the navy continued to follow a strategy of c

defense. This meant serving as an extension of the 

with little modernization: People’s War held 

technology and weaponry were insignificant compa

the effect of revolutionary soldiers imbued with 

ideology. In May 1975, however, at a meeting of the 

Mao Zedong reportedly directed the development 

modern navy.

3 7

 The GPCR seriously hamp

technological development, even in the relat

sacrosanct missile, submarine, and nuclear we

development programs. PLAN development was pro

retarded by a decade or more, because of the pro

restrictions and personnel losses that resulted from 

political maelstrom.

Even at the end of the GPCR, PLAN modernizatio

hamstrung by the “Gang of Four.” Mao’s widow, Jiang 

led the attack on naval missile development. An

290
member, Zhang Chunqiao, expressed the Gang’s anti

position and support for the “continentalist view.”

1970, however, the PLAN had moved into the missil

deploying a Soviet-designed ballistic missile submarin

10 Soviet-built patrol boats armed with cruise missil

After the GPCR. As the 1970s progressed PLAN str

missions still fell under the Young School: assistance 

army; off-shore patrol against criminal activities su

smuggling, piracy, and illegal immigration; life-savin

safety of navigation. Beijing also perceived its an

antagonist, Japan, reemerging as a military force 

reckoned with.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Navy in the 1960s and 1970

undergone a dramatic change under the leadersh

Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, partly from the impetus 

Cuban Missile Crisis’s demonstration of Soviet ma

weakness. Under Gorshkov’s guidance, the So

attempted to build a worldwide fleet to match that 

United States. This fleet’s missions in time of war we

1. defense of off-shore areas; countering an adver

strategic strike systems;

2. sea control in Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Subm

operating areas;

3. strategic nuclear strike;

4. disrupting an adversary’s sea lines of communica

(SLOCs); and,

5. protecting friendly SLOCs.

Gorshkov’s maritime strategy also included sp

peacetime tasks: (1) showing the flag; (2) ga

international respect; (3) supporting economic interes

managing crises; (5) limiting an adversary’s option

exercising local sea control; and, (7) use in local wars

A similar naval revolution did not occur in China 

1960s or 1970s, but when the Soviet Union demonstra

291
new global naval power in the 1975 Okean exercises, B

strategists moved the Soviets to the top of the list of C

maritime threats. The strategy of People’s War was de

insufficient. Maritime strategic thought was reinvigo

as Chinese planners thought about extending naval 

beyond the immediate coastal arena against pot

Soviet actions.

Concern about Soviet aggression rose in concert 

continued determination to ensure the viability of Be

territorial claims throughout East Asia. Taiwan wa

most important of these, but China also had claims 

East and South China Seas. In 1974 a brief but eff

action against South Vietnamese naval forces in the 

resulted in Chinese possession of the disputed P

Islands. 

Beijing ended the 1970s without a clear mar

strategy. Fear of the Soviet Union provided impetus 

development of a seaborne nuclear deterrent force

Mao declaring that the navy had to be built up “to m

dreadful to the enemy.”

41

 The PLAN for the first tim

led by Chinese-built warships: Luda-class guided-m

destroyers, frigates, and fast attack missile boats

submarine force included the first Chinese-

nuclear-powered attack submarine, as well as abo

conventionally powered boats. The 1970s saw 

deployment of the first PLAN that was prim

Chinese-built, although still heavily dependent on S

designs.

42

At the end of the decade, however, Deng Xia

reemphasized the navy’s role as a coastal defense fo

view retained throughout the first half of the 1980s. A

point, the navy came to be viewed as something more 

an adjunct to the ground forces. Maritime powe

emerging as an important instrument of national se

strategy. 

PLAN expansion and modernization were spurr

the coastal concentration of China’s burgeoning eco

292
and many military facilities. Furthermore, the reso

necessary for a modernized PLAN became available 

result of China’s dramatic economic developmen

increasing wealth. The navy’s strategy began deve

beyond coastal defense.

China’s widening maritime interests and incr

budget resources after 1979 did give rise to incr

interest in a strong navy of large modern warships, s

to that championed by Gorshkov. If built, the new 

would have to be capable of projecting power througho

area Beijing considered important to its nat

security—all of East Asia—and to execute the post

strategic rationale from massive continental war to reg

wars on China’s periphery.

Liu Huaqing’s Vision. The chief architect of C

emerging maritime strategy in the 1980s was Gener

Huaqing, commander of the PLAN from 1982 to 198

then Vice-Chairman of the CMC to September 199

advanced a maritime strategy designed to address C

national security concerns, and one that would thrive 

army-dominated PLA.

43

Liu wanted to change the PLAN’s national mission 

coastal defense to “offshore active defense.” This str

was described as including: (1) stubborn defense nea

shore; (2) mobile warfare at sea; and, (3) sur

guerrilla-like attacks at sea.

44

 He delineated two str

maritime areas the nation should be capable of contro

The first of these, under Stage One of Liu’s str

includes the Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan

western East China Sea (ECS), including Taiwan; an

SCS.

45

 These fall within China’s defined area of 

national interests: territorial claims, natural resource

coastal defense. The area is also delineated by the 

island chain,” a line north to south from the Aleu

through the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan

Philippines, and Indonesia. The goal for establi

Chinese control of this maritime area was 2000 .

293
The second strategic maritime area, under Stage T

Liu’s strategy, is delineated by the “second island ch

north-south line from the Kuriles through Japan

Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines, and would 

Beijing’s control of all of East Asia’s vast ocean 

nominally by 2020.

46

 China’s ability to control this 

would demand very significant national resources f

navy and air force. It would also require, first, tha

United States withdraw its military presence from 

region. Second, Japan would have to sit idly by in the f

U.S. withdrawal, and not engage in a maritime 

aerospace arms race.

Ironically, defining “stages” of maritime theate

fixed geographic boundaries reveals a strong continen

perspective, even in the mind of China’s most prom

post-1949 admiral. It violates the argument of we

maritime strategists that while the soldier thinks of te

and theaters, the sailor of necessity thinks in wider t

outside immediate physical limits—there is no “terra

sea.

47

The third stage of Liu’s maritime strategy describ

PLAN as a global force by 2050. A step towards thi

occurred in the spring of 1997, when within a 3-m

period China deployed multi-ship task groups compo

warships and logistics support vessels, one to Sout

Asia and a second to North, Central, and South Am

This was the widest-ranging Chinese naval deploy

since the voyages of Zheng He and was a signi

accomplishment. 

Scenarios. Liu’s strategy outlines a possible direct

future modernization and growth. It delineates cont

vast oceanic expanses; however, a very difficult task s

by virtue of the geography, not to mention other nation

would object to Chinese hegemony over such a large p

of the earth’s surface. Of course, the PLAN is cur

incapable of executing its missions within even the 

Island Chain,” although the target year will soon be 

294
Recent deployments to the Western Hemisphere wer

an initial step; there currently is no hard evidence 

China’s national leadership has decided to shift its b

priorities to the extent necessary for realization o

Huaqing’s Phase II by 2020.

48

Liu Huaqing is no fool and one suspects tha

three-phase strategic progression was designed prim

for domestic consumption, to win resources for the P

Liu would have been following a path not unlike 

pursued by naval expansionists in turn-of-the-ce

America and Germany as they built modern nav

conjunction with their nations’ rapidly expan

economies. Liu directed study and elaboration o

strategic concepts, which emphasized naval mission

to seaward of the coastal zone that has formed the ba

past PRC maritime strategy.

49

 PLAN modernization 

viable without a well-articulated offshore mis

supporting China as the strongest maritime power in 

Asia and as a major power in the Pacific.

The PLAN has not been tasked with all of the 

Soviet maritime strategic objectives of the 1970s. It h

“FBM operating areas” to control, for instance, an

“strategic nuclear strike” capability is almost non-exist

but both of these missions will require support if 

succeeds in building and deploying three or more new 

094) ballistic missile submarines.

50

The PLAN has, however, adopted peacetime str

missions almost identical to those outlined by Gorsh

who cited the American threat as his basic justificatio

strong navy. Writing in 1975, he accused the United S

of following an “oceanic strategy” of aggression again

Soviet Union.

51

 Chinese strategists today use similar w

the Soviet-Russian maritime strategic influence re

strong in China’s navy.

52

295
Maritime Strategic Interests.

Jiang Zemin has been quoted as pledging the PLA

safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territorial w

uphold the country’s unity and social stability and cr

safe and stable environment for the nation’s eco

development.”

53

 The PLAN’s primary mission is defe

the homeland, a formidable task, given China’s lon

frontier from Korea south to the Indochinese Peni

This great maritime sweep is marked by major off

island chains from Japan to the Philippines, New Gu

and Indonesia, as well as by numerous lesser islands

The PLAN’s ambition to play a central national se

role is evidenced in the 1991 statement by then 

vice-chief, Vice Admiral Cheng Mingshang, that the na

the tool of the state’s foreign policy . . . . an international n

can project its presence far away from home. It can even app

at the sea close to the coastal lines of the target countries . 

This has made the navy the most active strategic force 

peacetime, a pillar for the country’s foreign policy and 

embodiment of the country’s will and power.

54

Economic justification for a strong Chinese navy re

the concentration of modern economic interests and g

in the special development zones clustered along C

seaboard.

55

 Seabed minerals, especially pote

petroleum deposits in the SCS, are also important

there is evidence of significant deposits elsewhere o

continental shelf, including around the Diaoyutai be

Taiwan and Okinawa, also claimed by Japan a

Senkaku Islands.

China’s most urgent international sec

concerns—Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the South China Se

to seaward and have a strong maritime flavor. The na

civilian and military leadership must decide how to al

defense resources among the various services to dea

with these concerns—and the associated mar

sovereignty issues.

296
Additional missions for the Chinese Navy in

anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, fisheries protection

defense of SLOCs.

56

 This last mission is supported b

fact that as much as 50 percent of China’s economy de

on foreign trade, about 90 percent of which is transpor

maritime shipping. China’s large and growing mer

fleet calls at over 600 ports in more than 150 countri

Northeast Asia. China’s North Sea Fleet is respo

for the area from the Korean Border (the Yalu Riv

about 35°-10’N, corresponding to Shenyang, Beijing

Jinan Military Regions. Its primary bases are at Y

Chengshan, Weihai, Huludao, Lushun, an

headquarters, Qingdao. Its force structure include

submarine, three escort, one mine warfare, an

amphibious squadrons.

58

 This fleet faces a com

maritime situation: three other Northeast A

nations—Russia, South Korea, and Japan—already po

capable navies, although Russia’s fleet is only a shad

its former self.

Korea is particularly sensitive because North Kore

be armed with nuclear weapons. Beijing’s relationship 

the peninsula is also complicated by the ethnic K

population in China’s northeastern provinces.

Japan is not as pressing an issue, but in terms of C

national strategic concerns looms very large on the ho

of the next century. Ancient disputes and rancor com

with World War II grievances and suspicion of f

Japanese aggression create an edgy relationship. 

inherently a maritime relationship, given the seas th

between the two nations act as a natural barrier to an

seaborne or airborne interaction.

Taiwan. Taiwan of course is the essence of Be

strategic concerns. Despite concern about the U

States, China refuses to renounce the use of military fo

ensure the reunification of Taiwan. Beijing must cou

the PLAN for policy options ranging from intimidat

outright invasion.

59

297
The East Sea Fleet presumably has local pla

responsibility for contingency operations involving Ta

This fleet is responsible for the area from about 35 °-1

23°-30’N, which corresponds to the Nanjing Mi

Region. In addition to its headquarters at Ningbo, 

bases at Shanghai, Wusong, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xia

and Xiangshan. Its forces include two submarine

escort, one mine warfare, and one amphibious squadro

no doubt would be able to call on the resources of the 

PLAN, in the event of a crisis.

60

The South China Sea. The SCS is also a maritime 

for Beijing. This relatively small but contiguous oc

area embodies important economic and political str

issues. These include rich fisheries; possible 

petroleum, natural gas, and manganese reserves; 

SLOCS; and the issue of national pride, which d

Beijing to a rigid policy of strategic primacy in 

waters.

61

Liu Huaqing, when head of the PLAN, noted his ser

mission to secure the “vast resources” of the sea

February 1992, mid-way through his tenure as C

senior uniformed officer, the National People’s Con

passed the Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Z

which included essentially all of the SCS as sove

Chinese territory, ocean as well as land areas.

The PLAN’s South Sea Fleet, headquarter

Zhanjiang, would have to enforce this law. It is respo

for the area from about 23°-30’N to the Vietnamese b

corresponding roughly to the Guangzhou Mi

Region—and includes the Paracel and Spratly Islan

the South China Sea. The fleet has bases at Sha

Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai, Huangpu, as w

Zhanjiang—and mans outposts on several SCS island

forces include two submarine, two escort, one mine wa

and one amphibious squadrons, as well as China’s M

brigade.

63

 The SCS has been described as comprising 

298
than two-thirds of China’s territorial waters of more t

million square kilometers.”

64

The PLAN has limited resources for projecting sust

power throughout the SCS and China will likely contin

present, dual strategic approach in the area. First

pursuing discussions to resolve conflicting claims.

65

 S

however, is Beijing’s policy of establishing a presen

disputed reefs and islets by building facilities ranging 

navigation markers to structures capable of ho

personnel and berthing small ships.

66

 This pol

“creeping assertiveness” is certainly working in the c

the Philippines, as China builds military faciliti

Mischief Reef and other islets, while continuing diplo

talks with Manila.

67

India. Chinese strategic concerns about India in

the nuclear threat recently evidenced in the succ

testing of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of rea

targets throughout much of China, the Sino-Indian b

dispute, and India’s location astride the Indian O

SLOCs.

China may be establishing a maritime security pre

in Burma and nearby waters. Rationale for a P

presence in these waters includes two maritime con

arising from China’s dependence on trade and imp

petroleum. First, it would position Beijing to influen

vital SLOCs through the Indonesian straits. Secon

unfriendly India, with its large, relatively modern 

could control the Indian Ocean’s SLOCs on which 

depends.

68

 China’s activities in Burma indicate a ma

strategic goal of establishing a presence on the we

approaches to the SCS.

Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Cont

development of China’s economy into the 21st ce

depends on reliable sources of electrical power—from 

fuel now and for the foreseeable future. The n

currently imports up to 600,000 barrels of petro

products a day, an amount certain to grow.

69

 This im

299
petroleum, mostly from the Middle East, arrives ov

lanes that pass through the Indian Ocean, and the 

and East China Seas. These routes also pass th

several geographic “choke points,” including the Luzo

Taiwan Straits, the Strait of Malacca, and the Str

Hormuz. 

China can project almost no naval control over 

choke points, except for the Taiwan narrows, but the P

may be moving specifically to correct this deficiency, su

the previously noted steps to emplace PLAN presence 

western approaches to the SCS. Beijing believes a s

PLAN is vital to resolving all these (and many other) 

of national security concern.

70

A Blue-Water Navy?

The PLAN required to carry out Liu Huaqing’s str

would include task groups of missile-firing, p

projection capable ships supported by nuclear-pow

submarines and tactical air power,

71

 but its strategy 

still assume a philosophical base not far from People’s 

In other words, Liu and presumably the current gene

of senior PLAN strategists visualize a navy that is 

technologically advanced and politically dedicated

Maoist sense—both “red” and “expert.” This will be di

to accomplish.

Liu’s strategy focuses on Taiwan, asserting C

claims to offshore territories and natural resou

defending the homeland against invasion, stra

deterrence, and coast guard-type activities.

72

 Str

however, is a starting point of national security, n

consummation. 

The PLAN of the 1990s has grown in size and capa

but in a haphazard fashion, with its leaders forc

budgetary scarcity, a weak industrial infrastructure, 

lack of time, to pursue various paths to modernity, incl

building, purchasing, and reverse-engineering plat

300
and systems. Liu Huaqing has launched a modern mar

strategy, but the PLAN is still far from the mo

power-projecting force needed to carry it out.

Achieving the third stage of Liu Huaqing’s strat

global maritime power—would require China’s lead

adopt as a national goal construction of a very large 

during the next 50 years. This maritime strategic obje

if distant in accomplishment, or even chimerical, ma

serve the PLAN in domestic budget battles.

The navy is currently following three paths to mo

ization: buying, reverse engineering, and indigen

producing new ships, aircraft, and weapons syste

There are several reasons for these different paths. 

domestic military and political concerns limit reso

available to the PLAN. Second is what history indicate

be a fairly transitory friendship with Russia.

74

 Third 

questionable health of the Chinese economy.

75

 F

China’s military-industrial infrastructure has far to 

reach 21st century capabilities. Finally, naval planner

China’s lack of maritime tradition: voyages half a mill

ago do not constitute a useful heritage, whe

intervening centuries have been marked by introsp

nationalism. 

Building a navy in this incoherent fashion signific

increases the complexity of training, manning

maintaining the fleet. Just managing an effective 

supply system for a fleet of many small ship clas

difficult, as is outfitting and supporting it logist

Further, purchasing military equipment abroad 

questionable option in the long term. First, nations 

sell their most capable front-line weapons to others.

Second, not every nation can produce such weapo

matter how well-intentioned. For instance, modern ta

jet aircraft can be designed and produced by only ver

nations: the United States, Russia, Great Britain, F

Sweden, and perhaps Japan. Modern SSN design 

manufacture lie within the capability of even fewe

301
United States, Russia, and perhaps France.

76

 Third, b

a modern force takes investment that could otherw

devoted to building the indigenous infrastructure to 

which inherently limits a nation’s military potential.

PLAN Capabilities. With about 240,000 personne

navy is by far the smallest of the PLA services: the 

numbers about 1.5 million and the air force approxim

470,000. Yet the PLAN commands perhaps one-third 

military’s total budget. The navy has thus fared well w

the PLA, but has a large appetite. Modern naval sy

are technologically complex and expensive, and re

significant human as well as material resources. The 

will always be dominant in China’s military, but the n

relatively strong status during current PLA-wide mo

zation efforts attests to Beijing’s concern about ma

issues.

77

The head of the PLAN, Vice-Admiral Shi Yunshen

attributed several features to China’s 21st century na

an “’offshore defense’ strategy;” (2) “making the navy s

with science and technology, narrowing the gap betw

and other military powers;” (3) “more advanced wea

including “warships, submarines, fighters, mis

torpedoes, guns, and electronic equipment;” and, (4) tr

personnel and “more qualified people.”

78

 Notably a

from this list is mention of logistics or sustainment

ability to keep a fleet at sea for an extended period of t

but these goals illustrate the PLAN leader’s appreciati

how far his force has to go to “improve its capacity to 

war at sea.”

Doctrine. Defined in the United States as “fundam

principles by which the military forces or elements th

guide their actions in support of national objectives 

which] is authoritative but requires judgeme

application,”

80

 doctrine provides the crucial bridge be

strategic intent and operational effectiveness. Do

presumably is driven by anticipated employment, pic

in “illustrative scenarios” that in turn furnish m

302
planners with schema to frame their planning for f

operations. 

The United States figures as the bete noir in 

scenarios, and determination of doctrine, as w

operational planning, must be based on whether the 

Navy and Air Force are likely to be involved. Chinese 

strategists appear to understand the vast gu

capabilities between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy.

8

result, PLAN planners should be expected to try to sei

initiative in an operational situation where the U

States might be a participant. They will focus on gett

the first blow.

Did the PLAN “learn” lessons from Operation DE

STORM and again from Kosovo, where U.S. superior

military technology and operational power was graph

demonstrated? If it did, the chief lesson may well b

Chinese forces will for at least the next decade be inca

of successful direct confrontation with American f

Instead, the PLAN will have to rely on speed/mo

flexibility, and preemption in a contest with the U

States. These are generalities, however, not operat

doctrine, which is linked directly to capabilities. Ma

warfare is by nature multidimensional, a characte

becoming steadily more complex as informatio

developments are adapted for naval use. The PLA

aware of this increasing complexity, but has y

demonstrate the capability to operate in that environm

Beijing is trying to create a modern navy capa

carrying out a blue-water maritime strategy, but C

research and development still suffers from 50 ye

abrupt, violent political changes that rent the educa

and scientific fabric of the country. China curren

capable of building new ships, but ships built in 199

1969 technological base are obsolete when their hull

hit the water. They are not necessarily ineffective, but 

be employed conservatively and imaginatively.

303
Acquiring modern ships is relatively easy, if 

checkbook is big enough. But an effective navy req

sophisticated maintenance, supply, and training cap

ties that are expensive to develop, far more difficult to 

and, even more importantly, to institutionalize as a 

“way of life.” China has recently purchased naval we

and technology, especially from Russia, that demon

Beijing’s determination to speed the pace of 

modernization.

82

Post-GCPR naval expansion has emphasized m

toward a blue-water navy to “respond to the needs 

national strategy and the national defense strategy

ships and systems emerging from that period are cre

with giving “China a significant main naval fighting 

but inadequate “to have all-around (three-dimens

control of blue water.” The PLAN leadership see

understand what it needs to achieve its strategic goa

China’s ability to project power is key to its ma

strategy and is central to Shi’s vision. This capabilit

not a national security need before the 1985 strategic 

the Korean, Indian, and Vietnam excursions were ove

operations. Projecting power requires the ability to ex

not just sea denial, but the ability to control or signific

affect events ashore from sea-based units. A wide ra

activities may qualify, from a demonstration offshore 

aircraft carriers deployed to the vicinity of Taiwa

launching cruise missiles from submarines against 

targets (e.g., U.S. attacks on Iraq).

The PLAN must also be able to support forces at sea

time, and requires an amphibious assault capability. 

has never possessed a robust capability to transpor

land troops under combat conditions, and the PLAN 

not appear to be making a dramatic effort to correc

deficiency.

84

The heart of China’s navy is surface comba

described as the “vital” or “main” PLAN componen

Chinese class their warships “on a par with fo

304
warships of the 1980s,” but that is an optimistic estim

The PLAN surface forces suffers from ASW, AAW

ASUW deficiencies, and especially from a lack of eff

area defense—the ability to defend not just indiv

ships, but groups of lightly armed transports.

The PLAN has frequently demonstrated its abi

deploy and maintain ships in the South China Sea, alth

these exercises have not drawn as much attention as 

in the Taiwan Strait area. In mid-October 199

instance, the PLA reportedly conducted a 15-day ex

“seizing islands.”

86

 This exercise, as well as those cond

in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, is clear evi

of the PLAN exercising in support of national str

objectives. This linkage between training and/or exer

and maritime strategy is more significant tha

technological complexity of that training. A 21st ce

PLAN must possess both the technological sophisti

and personnel expertise required to accomplish its str

goals.

87

These shortfalls may be at least partially compen

for by innovative operational doctrine. This in turn is d

by the putative revolution in military affairs (RMA), 

was demonstrated in Operation DESERT STORM 

dramatically emphasized during the U.S. campai

Kosovo, and appears to offer such an opportunity to 

PLA strategists. One has written, for instance, that “

missiles are the vanguard, aerial strength is the 

power, and the ground, sea, air, space, and electroma

ism are integrated. This will become a basic mod

the recent and future high-technology regional 

the battlefield for which “will be a digitized battle

(emphasis added).

88

Nuclear Deterrence at Sea. The PLAN faces fina

industrial, and technological limitations integratin

RMA; nuclear deterrence may be the naval stra

mission to receive priority. China has built two str

missile submarines: a conventionally powered Golf-c

305
1950s Soviet design) and a nuclear-propelled Xia

neither of which is apparently operational. These shi

both capable of launching the CSS-N-3 1,500 nm-

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM).

China is reportedly building a follow-on class to th

the Project-094 boat. This effort may be receiving Ru

assistance and has the potential to alter radicall

strategic maritime picture in Asia: a Project-094 a

with the new JL-2 ICBM (a possibly MIRVed ma

version of the DF-31 nearing the end of development) 

for the first time enable China to put a strategic deterr

sea that would credibly threaten the United States. Th

FBM will likely go to sea during the next decade.

89

Air Power at Sea. Any effective offshore ma

strategy requires air power, and no aspect of P

modernization attracts more interest and generates 

concern than the possible acquisition of aircraft carri

carrier is seen as providing China with air cover fo

long-range power projection needed to seize and 

disputed territory such as the Spratly Islands. And a P

carrier force operating east of Taiwan would place 

island’s air defense forces in the middle of an attack 

two fronts, if the PLA were able to coordinate carrier-

attacks with shore-based attacks from the mainlan

successfully defend the carrier.

Aircraft carrier acquisition is potentially the P

most important modernization decision. Will the 

carrier be a small, 12,000- to 16,000-ton vessel with 

jump” bow to facilitate launching its fixed wing aircr

will it be a large conventional-takeoff-and-landing (C

40,000- to 60,000-ton ship with catapults and arr

wires? Building and operating a CTOL carrier would 

very ambitious undertaking that would impact PLA 

just PLAN) force structure in a basic way.

Thailand’s purchase of a carrier, coming on the he

U.S. carriers’ arrival in the Taiwan area in March 

must have further frustrated PLAN strategists.

90

 

306
was the effectiveness of aircraft carriers as po

instruments more directly felt by Beijing. Indeed, Ch

acquisition of a carrier in the near future, in conjun

with the purchase of anti-carrier Sovremennys, will in

that the United States’ 1996 action spurred China’s 

modernization on a scale similar to that followed b

Soviet Union after the embarrassment of the 1962 C

Missile Crisis. It will also be an indicator that 

Xiaoping’s four national priorities have changed.

In fact, PLAN strategists who favor large carrier

be forgetting that aircraft carriers are a means, not a

The “end” is correcting the PLAN’s most crucial shortcom

the lack of air power at sea. Solving this deficiency 

involve carriers, but it almost certainly does not re

large CTOL ships.

Prospects: Beijing’s Maritime Strategy.

China faces five major maritime security situatio

Asia: Japan, Taiwan, the South China Sea, India, and 

SLOCs. Maritime strategists in Beijing are remind

their navy’s shortcomings every day the U.S. Navy de

across East Asia—which no doubt helps fuel the cu

campaign to modernize the PLAN. The navy seeks g

support as a key player within the army-dominated 

and in the national security policy process. Castin

United States as the adversary facilitates these e

given the overwhelmingly maritime nature of U.S. pre

in East Asia.

The 14th CCP Congress in October 1992 elected 

admirals to its Central Committee, including Liu Hua

Liu retired at the September 1997 15th Party Congr

China’s senior uniformed officer, however, which has 

not helped the PLAN’s modernization program

admirals were named to the Central Committee a

congress. Additionally, the current PLAN comma

Vice-Admiral Shi Yunsheng, is relatively junior.

307
Although Shi has claimed that the “CPC leade

believes that “building a powerful People’s Navy” 

“major task of our Army building,” his ability to prev

budget contests is not likely to match that of Liu Huaq

The Chinese Navy remains much smaller than the 

and it is not clear that its disproportionate share 

defense budget has resulted in significantly greater 

within the senior ranks of Chinese strategists.

The PLAN offers China’s leaders a flexible, 

instrument of power projection, and Beijing ha

hesitated to use the PLAN to achieve strategic 

witness the 1974, 1988, 1995, and 1998-99 actions 

South China Sea. “Offshore Defense” is a maritime str

with clear offensive implications. Beijing is movin

strategic line seaward from the coast, demonstratin

the navy has a key role in China’s 21st century str

Insofar as the PLAN is concerned, a strategy of “off

defense” includes missions to (1) contain and resist fo

aggression from the seas, (2) defend China’s territor

sovereignty, and (3) safeguard the motherland’s unifi

and marine rights.

92

These strategic objectives translate into comple

difficult specific missions, including: (1) preparin

operations against Taiwan; (2) defending Chinese cla

the East and South China Seas; (3) maintaining a str

deterrent force against the United States (and po

India and Russia); (4) protecting vital SLOCS—some l

great distance from China;

93

 and, (5) serving as a diplo

force.

94

Beijing’s maritime strategy development see

include both modern technology and Maoist doctrine

“the use of strategy can reverse the balance of co

strength.”

95

 The ideal maritime strategy will ove

recognized shortcomings in doctrine, equipment

training.

96

 A strategy cannot, however, overcom

shortfalls in mobility and power projection that mar

PLAN.

308
The PLAN is a long way from being the dominant 

power in East Asia, even apart from the U.S. ma

presence. The JMSDF is certainly superior to the P

and the ROKN would be a very difficult opponent. Eve

Taiwan navy would not be a pushover for the P

Clearly, a wise maritime strategist in Beijing would n

the event of conflict, position the PLAN “one-on

against any of these modern naval forces.

A more thoughtful strategy would be required f

PLAN to achieve specific goals in the face of opposit

the USN, the JMSDF, the ROKN, or the Taiwan Navy

aspect of such a strategy would almost certain

employment of information warfare methods to count

advanced military technological superiority of 

fleets—a capability more discussed than demonstra

China.

Another strategic step in such a conflict would be t

the initiative through preemption. This does not neces

require a “bolt from the blue,”

97

 but could be achiev

seizing the initiative at a time of significant naval wea

on the part of the adversary.

The PLAN’s strategic responsibilities are challeng

does not have the resources to defend distant SLOC

the distances involved in securing the South China S

daunting to a navy weak in air power, amphibious lif

logistics sustainment. The opposition posed by T

makes any assault on that island a significant milita

well as political problem. And in the Japanese nav

PLAN would face a superior adversary. To be effe

China’s maritime strategy must compensate for the PL

material shortcomings and its lack of operat

experience. That said, the PLAN today is a formidable 

within littoral East Asia, and is viewed as a vehic

aggression.

98

Some analysts combine thoughts of the RMA 

China’s extensive maritime claims to conclude that 

needs to establish the maritime power necessary to d

309
its interests, including Taiwan and the SCS.

99

 One 

view from Beijing describes the sea as the “New 

Ground of Strategic Competition” and focuses P

attention on five areas of international rivalry, thos

ocean islands, sea-space jurisdiction, marine reso

maritime strategic advantage, and strategic sea-lane

seas are described as both “a protective screen” but als

marine invasion route.” Naval missions are seen as 

coastal defense; second, control of the “sea space,” wh

“four dimensional,” including air, surface, subsurface

the seabed. The Asia-Pacific region is defined as a “pr

region of maritime strategic competition.”

Control of the seas involves many areas, including politi

economic, diplomatic, science and technology, and milita

Military control of the seas means achieving and defend

national unification, defending national maritime territo

sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect

legitimate maritime economic activities and scientific resea

and ensuring a peaceful and stable climate for national refo

opening, and coastal economic development, by dealing w

possible maritime incidents, armed conflicts, and local wars

our Navy has an inescapable mission. . . . The 21st centur

going to be a maritime one. . . . we will have to make 

maritime strategy a key part.

100

Today and for the next decade, given the prese

peaceful borders to the north and west, Beijing’s na

security priorities lie to the maritime east and sout

The PLAN must be able to control East Asian se

facilitate accomplishment of Beijing’s strategic aim

China faces significant hurdles in the technologica

industrial infrastructure and resource availability n

to deploy a regionally dominant navy.

A strategist in Beijing faces several strategic priori

First may be a national imperative to establish an eff

nuclear deterrent force at sea as the core of a 21st ce

maritime strategy. Second will be maintenance of a 

presence throughout East Asia, using port visits t

310
nations of Northeast and Southeast Asia, with an occa

foray to Southwest Asia and the Western Hemisp

Within this general policy of presence, the PLAN w

focused, as part of a joint force with the PLAAF, on sp

objectives, starting with Taiwan. This in turn requ

credible power-projection force, with enough amph

and logistics capability to take and hold disputed ter

in the East and South China Seas. Fifth, SLOC defens

be pursued; likely avenues are expanding a presence w

Malacca and diplomatic efforts in Southwest Asia.

Finally, the question of Taiwan will dominate na

security strategy discussions. PLAN strategists will h

ensure that their force remains a key player in pla

coerce Taiwan’s reunification, but do so in a manne

will not consume all modernization efforts. Given pr

and probable future budget resources, it would not be 

PLAN’s interest, for example, to have to build a ma

amphibious force.

The first stage of Liu Huaqing’s reported strateg

control China’s adjacent seas out to the “first island c

is reasonable and attainable within the next 20 year

only if Beijing changes the national prioritizati

resource allocation necessary to build a modern ma

force. There is currently insufficient evidence—acqui

of technology and a few units of disparate ship classes 

qualify—to conclude that such a significant shift is 

made.

101

 Comparison to Germany’s late 19th century 

building “dash” to catch up to Great Britain’s navy is 

valid analogy of what China could do. Imperial Ger

already possessed in the late 1890s an indus

technological-scientific infrastructure equal and pe

superior to Britain’s: China fails completely to matc

status. Also, Germany built the wrong navy; it was u

to serve as more than a coastal defense force and, in th

analysis, served little more purpose than to absorb 

quantities of national resources while needlessly alien

Great Britain and other powers.

102

311
Conclusion.

Earlier, I posed a list of nine factors that affect a na

development of a maritime strategy. How does C

measure up? First, training and education program

receiving increasing attention as the profess

specialization of the officer corps increases. Pro

undeniably is being made to adopt modern trainin

education systems and methodology, but suffers from 

devoted to political education and resource limitation

Second, naval systems and platform costs, capabi

and sustainability are the focus of PLAN moderniz

efforts. As new systems and platforms are bought o

global market and produced in China, the PLAN s

from resource limitations, a relatively weak indig

infrastructure, and low starting point for modernizat

Third, the national scientific and indus

infrastructure for research, development, and product

naval warfare technology and systems is improvin

remains inadequate to support rapid design and build

state-of-the-art systems from drawing board to opera

force in a timely manner. Hence the continued relian

foreign purchases.

Fourth, the ability to derive doctrine and tact

uncertain, but clearly advancing, as evidenc

publications, military education and training

exercises, especially those focused on joint operations, 

information warfare (IW), and integrated sys

employment. 

Fifth, the ability to administer, operate, and com

and control tactical units beyond individual sh

improving, as demonstrated by current administ

streamlining and recent long-range deployments of 

flotillas, but is still a question mark on a fleet or th

level. Sixth, sources of intelligence, and its produ

analysis, and dissemination absorb major resource

may be a mainstay of PLAN modernization.

312
Seventh, service-wide naval strategic planning ap

to be ongoing, with apparent focus on trying to avoid r

than on matching a potential adversary’s (i.e., the U

States) strengths. Eighth, naval influence at the na

level is probably weaker following Lui Huaq

retirement. The awareness of maritime power is 

being increased, however, based on China’s incre

dependence on international trade and comm

shipping. 

Finally, there seems no evidence that naval strat

hold an enhanced position in the national strategy-m

structure. Their status is likely to rise, howev

proportion to the degree of crisis in maritime situa

such as Taiwan or the South China Sea.

China is pursuing a conscious maritime str

designed to achieve near-term national security obje

and longer-term regional maritime dominance th

both combatant and merchant fleets. In the near 

Beijing is building a navy capable of decisively influe

the operational aspects of the Taiwan and South Chin

situations, should diplomacy and other instrumen

statecraft fail. Establishing PLAN or PLAN-AF bases 

Spratlys (perhaps by artificially enlarging one of the 

forms) and on Burmese territory would provide a sta

point for a major Chinese role in controlling the Ma

and associated straits, key to the economic life of East A

Power-projection ashore, with its emphasis on li

warfare, also tends to lessen the traditional impor

placed on “blue-water operations,” ironically at the 

time when China seems focused on developing a 

specifically for that arena.

103

 Furthermore, in addit

the problem of pursuing multiple paths to moderniz

the PLAN is caught up in a web of ideology and dom

politics that complicates the inherently expensiv

complex process of building a navy. The shorthand 

“red versus expert” or “ideology versus technology” se

sum up the problem faced by Chinese strategists try

313
build a large, modern navy—be it in the 15th, 19th, o

20th centuries. It is a situation to be welcomed by C

maritime neighbors.

CHAPTER 8 - ENDNOTES

1. Quoted in Cha Chun-ming, “Chinese Navy Heads 

Modernization,” Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, April 11, 1999, p

Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (henceforth 

CHI)-1999-0418.

2. John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Rep

China, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993, pp. 250-252.

3. Nan Li, “The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strat

Tactics, 1985-95: A Chinese Perspective,” China Quarterly, N

June 1997, p. 402, notes that “Since the mid-1980s, China has 

sovereignty over three million square kilometers of maritime t

(China’s land territory is 9.6 million square kilometers), . 

territory covers 320 kilometers of continental shelves and ex

economic zones, and extends 1,600 kilometers to include the who

Nansha (Spratly) Islands.”

4. Maritime distances throughout this chapter are given in n

miles, one of which equals approximately 1.2 statute miles.

5. Although, as pointed out by RADM J.R. Hill, USN 

Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, Annapolis, MD: U.S

Institute Press, 1986, p. 85, if China were to employ this strategy

the case of Taiwan, “the penalties for getting it wrong may b

severe.” (p. 85). Hill also delineates five indicators of “sea depen

all of which apply to China: seagoing trade, fish catches, 

Merchant Marine, ship building and repairing, and the offshore z

229).

6. One can buy the ships and systems that make up a navy, b

are almost worthless without the infrastructure to mainta

support them, as well as the operational know how to emplo

effectively.

7. Cited in David Alan Rosenberg, “Process: The Real

Formulating Modern Naval Strategy,” conference pape

Corbett-Richmond Conference, Naval War College, Newpo

September 28-29, 1992, p. 3.

314
8. This list is a variation on the 17 points delineated in Ib

6-20.

9. Colin S. Gray, “Seapower and Landpower,” in Colin S. G

Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seapower and Landpower, Annapolis, M

Naval Institute, 1989, p. 4.

10. Ibid., p. 13.

11. Jiang Zemin, Speech at Geneva, March 26, 1999, qu

Xinhua, Beijing, March 26, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-0326. Jiang 

quoted in the Xinhua Domestic Service, Beijing, April 26, 1

FBIS-CHI-99-0406, as describing “the current international si

[as] relaxing, but . . . The world is not peaceful.”Also see Luo 

“What is New About the ‘New Gunboat Policy’,” Jiefangjun Bao, 

May 20, 1999, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI-99-0526, who attributes this Am

policy to a “Gulf War Syndrome” replacing the “Vietna

Syndrome.”

12. China is a net energy (and a net petroleum) importer; its 

to feed its still growing population is hampered by the low propo

its land (about 10 percent) that is arable.

13. Dong Guozheng, “Security Globalization is Not Tantam

Americanization,” Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, May 24, 1999, p

FBIS-CHI-99-0602.

14. Theater missile defense (to include coverage of Tai

described as another U.S. instrument for “actively push

‘neo-interventionism’ to dominate the world,” through a “tw

encirclement of Russia and China.” The United States is acc

wanting to control Taiwan since it is China’s “most direct door . 

Pacific,” and the Spratlys, since they offer China “a strateg

closest to the Strait of Malacca.” A variation on this theme is t

that the United States is “hatching Six Major Conspiracies 

China” by “creating trouble and stirring up unrest in China

Japan “to create disturbances in Asia [and] to intervene in 

occurring in areas surrounding China,” “attempting to drag Ch

the mire of the arms race” through pursuing TMD, “prepa

intervene in the war in the Taiwan Strait,” and “trying to und

China’s national policy of reform and opening up.”

The thread of continuity throughout these views is the 

States using TMD and a militaristic Japan to help enforce th

part of a policy of global hegemony, in part by containing China. 

instance, Li Donhang, “Dangerous Attempt to Resist Multipola

315
Process,” Jiefangjun Bao, May 26, 1999, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI-99-0

Li, “Monster of Dark Civilization and Conspiracy Stra

Commenting on Cox Report,” Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, May 29, 

4, in FBIS-CHI-99-0604; and Zhang Dezhen, “On U.S. E

Strategy,” Renmin Ribao, Beijing, June 4, 1999, p

FBIS-CHI-99-0605.

15. See Michael Krepon, ed., Chinese Perspectives on Con

building Measures, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson 

1997, for the sophistic arguments by four Chinese authors tha

should not be held to international norms of “transparency” in n

security matters, since the country is still a “developing nation

16. Jen Hui-wen, “Jiang Zemin Talks Again on Strengthen

Army Through Science and Technology,” Hsin Pao, Hong Kon

16, 1999, p. 16, FBIS-CHI-99-0417.

17. Li Dan, report of Zhang Wannian speech in Cheng Min

Kong, April 1, 1999, pp. 21-22, in FBIS-CHI-99-0414

characterizes this source as a magazine with a “tende

sensationalize.”

18. David M. Finkelstein, “China’s New Security Concept: R

Between the Lines,” Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Issue 

Alexandria, VA: CNA, April 1999, provides an interesting discu

why Beijing is unhappy with the present international environ

19. Paul H.B. Godwin, “Force Projection and China’s M

Strategy,” conference paper, Sixth Annual Conference on th

Coolfont, Virginia, June 1995, p. 4. Also see Godwin, “Ch

Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations in the P

Liberation Army 1978-87,” China Quarterly, No. 112, Decembe

pp. 573-590.

20. The Ming decision also reflected Chinese xenophobia, p

best expressed in the Qing Emperor Ch’ien-lung’s response to B

1793 attempt to establish relations with Beijing when he to

McCartney that “we possess all things. I set no value on objects 

or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures

For an interesting but Eurocentric interpretation of t

maritime mobility played in European imperialism, see 

Raudzens, “Military Revolution or Maritime Evolution? M

Superiorities or Transportation Advantages as Main Ca

European Colonial Conquests to 1788,” The Journal of Military 

Vol. 63, No. 3, July 1999, pp. 631-642.

316
21. PLAN Vice-Commander Zhou Xihan, 1957, quoted in D

Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power, Boulder, CO: Westview 

1983, p. 47.

22. Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China 

Korean War, 1950-1953, Lawrence, KS: University Press of K

1995, pp. 46-54, provides a useful description of the beginning

PLAN.

23. About 2,000 former Republic of China naval personn

defected to the communist regime in 1949 formed the core of the 

PLAN. See Muller, p. 13.

24. Vladimir Lenin, cited in Bruce W. Watson, “The Evol

Soviet Naval Strategy,” in Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dun

The Future of the Soviet Navy: An Assessment to the Year 2000, B

CO: Westview Press, 1986, p. 115.

25. Ibid., p. 15.

26. Raymond V.B. Blackman, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships: 1

London: Jane’s Fighting Ships Publishing Co., 1956, pp. 151ff p

these numbers, but they should be treated only as estimates.

27. Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A Hi

China’s Quest for Seapower, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 

1982, p. 196.

28. Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Se

Mentality and the South China Sea,” The Journal of Strategic S

Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1994, p. 187.

29. Muller, p. 16.

30. See Robert J. Donovan, Tumultuous Years: The Presid

Harry S. Truman, 1949-1953, New York: W.W. Norton, 1982, p. 

Truman’s decision to reposition the Seventh Fleet, and pp. 241

good account of administration thinking (Truman, Acheson, Bo

al.) about the implementation of NSC-68, which effectively re-ar

United States for the Cold War and potential global war with So

communist forces: “On the last day of July 1950, Truman and A

had a talk about grand strategy. The eyes of the American peop

glued to Korea. . . . The president and the secretary of state fix

gaze on the Rhine and the Elbe.” (Donovan, p. 244.)

31. Swanson, p. 206.

317
32. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s S

Seapower, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984, pp. 206ff

33. Blackman, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships: 1960-61, New 

McGraw-Hill, 1961, pp. 117ff.

34. This brief discussion of the early development of m

thought in the People’s Republic of China relies on Swans

187-236.

35. China built two Xia-class fleet ballistic missile subm

patterned on the U.S. George Washington-class/Soviet Hotel-cla

of the Xias apparently was so severely damaged in a fire that it 

completed; the second successfully launched a missile in 1985, b

have never made any patrols at sea. (See Richard Sharpe, ed.

Fighting Ships: 1995-96, London: Butler and Tanner, 1996, p. 

36. Presumably, the United States would have come to T

defense had the PRC tried to take advantage of the Am

preoccupation with Vietnam by attacking the island, but th

Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was even mor

preoccupation for Beijing.

37. FBIS reports, cited in Muller, p. 154.

38. Lewis and Xue, pp. 147-148, 223.

39. The PLAN also included more than 30 other subs, a colle

assorted foreign-built destroyers and escort vessels (Soviet, Ja

U.S., British, Canadian, and Italian), and more than 400 Chine

patrol craft, some of them hydrofoils and most armed with tor

See Blackman, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships: 1970-71, New York: M

Hill, 1971, pp. 61ff.

40. Quoted in Kenneth R. McGruther, The Evolving Sovie

Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1978, pp. 47-48, 66-67.

41. Muller, p. 171.

42. John E. Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships: 1976-77, Ne

Franklin Watts, 1977, pp. 100ff. The PLAN also included t

Chinese range instrument ships, for tracking guided missile fligh

the first Chinese-built amphibious transports.

43. As CMC Vice-Chairman, however, Liu maintained a b

view of PLA needs, apparently sacrificing a CV building plan to 

318
that research and development funds were spread evenly am

services. Alfred Wilhelm, conversation with author, September 

44. See Alexander C. Huang, “Chinese Maritime Modernizat

Its Security Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and B

unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington Uni

Washington, DC: 1994, pp. 225ff for this discussion. The dates g

achieving Liu’s three stages vary from source to source; no autho

source has been identified, as pointed out by Taeho Kim in dis

with the author, September 1999.

45. See John Downing, “China’s Evolving Maritime St

Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 1996, p. 130 and 

dissertation, p. 230.

46. Cited in Chen and Chai, FBIS-CHI-97-329. Also see Ale

Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense St

Conceptualization and Implications,” Naval War College Revie

47, No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 16ff, for a good discussion of the “Fi

“Second Island Chains.”

47. RADM J.C. Wylie, USN (Ret.), Military Strategy, 1967, 

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980, p. 49, is a classic work on 

naval strategy. Also see James A. Winnefeld, “Why Sail

Different,” U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings, Annapolis, MD: Ma

p. 66: “The soldier shapes and exploits his environment; the sail

adjust to it.”

 48. See Paul H.B. Godwin, “Technology, Strategy, and Ope

The PLA’s Continuing Dilemma,” article draft, for a discus

Chinese efforts to improve warship system capabilities, and G

“From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capa

Towards 2000,” China Quarterly, No. 146, June 1996, pp. 464-4

49. Godwin, “Technology, Strategy, and Operations,” p. 191

50. Three ships are normally required to maintain one on p

all times, although an FBM armed with a missile capable of hit

target without going very far to sea (e.g., the Russian Typhoon

not need this two ship “backup.”

51. Quoted in Watson, p. 120.

52. The Soviet influence is also reflected in the PLAN’s t

paradigm, which emphasizes inport training, whereas the U

other western (and Japanese) navies believe that training a

necessary for combat proficiency.

319
53. Cited in Huang, dissertation, p. 99.

54. Quoted in You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s Defence and 

Policies,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 4, March 

379.

55. Liu Huaqing has used this argument, stating that “the C

navy must live up to the historical responsibility to grow rapidly 

a major power in the Pacific area in order to secure the smooth p

of China’s economic modernization.” Quoted in Jun Zhan, “Chin

to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the Sout

Sea,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3, Septembe

p. 191.

56. See Ping Kuo Jih Pao, Hong Kong, March 7, 1997, p. 

FBIS-CHI-1997-114, for the State Oceanography Bureau’s esti

China’s maritime wealth as “three million square kilometers 

areas rich in fishing, petroleum, and mineral resources.” 

Province reported in 1998 that “more than 900 deep-sea trawl

been dispatched [around the world], bringing home a total c

600,000 tons” of fish—which was considered unsatisfactory. X

Beijing, June 23, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-0623.

57. See the very informative work by Navy Lieutenant Com

Wayne R. Hugar, “The Sea Dragon Network: Implications 

International Expansion of China’s Maritime Shipping Ind

unpublished thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monter

1998, pp. xvi, 70.

58. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IIS

Military Balance, 1998/99, London: Oxford University Press, 1

180.

59. Zhu Rongji reiterated this during his visit to Washingto

in April. See “Stratfor’s Global Intelligence Update,” http:

@stratfor.com, April 14, 1999, p. 2.

60.The Military Balance, p. 180.

61. The most optimistic estimate of SCS petroleum reser

billion tons, is in Xinhua, Beijing, September 5, 1994, in FB

1994-172.

62. South China Sea incidents are discussed, and Liu is qu

John W. Garver, “China’s Push Through the South China S

Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interest,” China Qu

No. 132, December 1992, pp. 1022-1023. Also see the compre

320
discussion of the South China Sea situation in Mark Valencia

and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 228, Londo

1995.

63. The Military Balance, p. 180. A second marine bri

reportedly being organized. Author’s conversations with PLA 

and American analysts.

64. Han Haibing and Li Xiangdong, “The 50th Anniversa

Heroic Fleet,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, Beijing, April 23, 1

FBIS-CHI-99-0428.

65. See Xinhua, Beijing, July 23, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-1996-

Foreign Secretary Qian Qichen’s conciliatory statement at the A

Regional Forum that the situation in the Spratlys was “stable.

66. Mischief Reef (Huanyidao in Chinese), located well wit

Philippines’ 200-nm economic zone (EEZ), is the prime example 

encroachment. Whether the facilities will survive the first sig

typhoon to blow through is another question. The United 

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Art. 121, specifies 

be considered to have an “exclusive economic zone or continenta

land must be able to “sustain human habitation or economic life 

own.” Hence, the efforts by various claimants to SCS rocks and 

construct facilities capable of “sustaining human habitation.”

67. A good discussion of the China-Philippines imbroglio is p

in Ian James Storey, “Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Phil

and the South China Sea Dispute,” Contemporary Southeast As

21, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 95ff. The best overall account of th

China Sea disputes remains Valencia.

68. Beijing is following at least three tracks regarding its s

maritime relationship with Rangoon. First are increased s

military equipment, accompanied by military technical and oper

guidance and advisors. This has ranged from small arms to ocea

warships, including ten Hainan-class coastal patrol craft, with 

ten of these boats and two much more capable Jianghu-class fri

the offing (Micool Brooke, “The Armed Forces of Myanmar

Defence Journal, January, 1998, p. 14). Second, China has estab

military presence in Burma, reportedly building/improving 

support facilities at Hainggyi, Akyab, and in the Mergui Isla

Burma’s isthmian coast. Rahul Ray-Choudhury, “Trends in 

Power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean During the Past 

SAPRA India Monthly Bulletin, January 1996, availa

http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/96jan/si019603. Third, 

321
has been active in an electronic monitoring facility in the C

Hangyi Islands in the Andaman Sea that may be able to 

Beijing’s naval commanders with valuable intelligence on Ind

other naval forces in the Indian Ocean. See Barbara Opal

“Chinese Moves Roil Region,” Defense News, February 8, 1999, 

69. Daniel Yergin, Dennis Eklof, and Jefferson Edwards, “

Asia’s Recovery,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2, March/April 199

estimate China will import “as much as 3 million” barrels of oil 

by 2010. This article also provides a useful survey of possible alte

Chinese energy sources, including oil fields in the Tarim Ba

Kazakstan, and investment in Venezuelan, Iraqi, Irania

Indonesian fields. Also see Hugar, pp. 22ff, for a discussion of Chi

imports.

70. See, for instance, Si Yanwne and Chen Wanjun, “N

Develop More High-Tech Equipment, Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, 

1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-0611, quoting General Cao Gangchuan, 

of the General Armaments Department that “it is necessary 

[Navy] armament development in a prominent position of army b

. . . . increase armaments’ scientific and technological conten

improve the quality and speed of armament development,” and X

Beijing, June 10, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-0609, quoting Cao th

navy’s rapid reaction capacity, emergency field repair abil

defense readiness must also be improved.”

71. See John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Searc

Modern Air Force,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summe

p. 10, for Deng Xiaoping’s statement that “The army and the na

need air cover . . . .Without air cover, winning a naval battle is als

the question.”

72. Xinhua, Beijing, June 18, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-0618, r

that Shanghai had established a “Maritime Safety Administrat

first of its kind in China’s coastal areas, . . . to superv

management of navigation marks, the surveying of sea-routes, 

inspection of ships and maritime facilities.”

 73. Christopher D. Yung, “People’s War at Sea: Chinese 

Power in the Twenty-First Century,” Center for Naval A

Alexandria, VA: 1995, contains detailed discussion of Chinese 

for acquiring a large modern navy through either overseas pu

reverse engineering, or indigenous development.

74. Sino-Russian relations since the 13th century have been 

adversarial. Even the post-1918 alliance lasted just half a deca

322
after 1949 barely a decade, and the present “strategic” relat

exists largely because of mutual resentment of the United States

than as a result of shared values or extensive mutual mat

ideological interests.

75. See Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Ec

Revolution, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1998, 

best current analysis of China’s economy. Lardy notes th

percentage of non-performing loans, social and political costs of p

reforms, the weak financial position of state-owned enterprises

marked decline in government revenues as evidence of the C

economy’s questionable health.

76. See Bernard D. Cole and Paul H. B. Godwin, “The P

Technology in the 21st Century,” conference paper, Wye 

Conference on the PLA, September 1998, for a discussion of 

current capabilities in technology applicable to military s

development. The point here is not so much the existence 

technology, as it is the ability of China’s military-ind

infrastructure to develop operational military systems fro

technology.

77. A recent U.S. Defense Attaché in Beijing has stated t

PLAN and PLAAF have been receiving most of the recen

modernization funding. Lewis and Xue, “China’s Search for a 

Air Force,” p. 11, claim that the 1985 strategic shift to non-nucl

scenarios gave the air force and the navy “pride of place” within t

Also see Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active D

Strategy,” p. 9 (Table 1), for the estimate that 32.7 percent of th

1993 budget was allocated to the PLAN.

78. Quoted in Xinhua, Beijing, April 21, 1999, inFBIS-CHI-99

79. Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-First Ce

in Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower: Theory and Practice, Portlan

Frank Cass, 1994, p. 193, points out that the United States was 

maintain a task force off the coast of West Africa for 7 mon

1990-91, before finally evacuating civilians from strife-torn Lib

80. The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, Armed Forces Staff 

Publication No. 1., Washington, DC: National Defense Un

Press, 1997, p. 0-16.

81. Finkelstein, p. 3, makes this point. Two examp

submarine-launched ICBMs and fleet air defense. In the fir

China may have once, in 1985, successfully launched a missile 

323
nominally operational FBM submarine; the United States in 

1999 conducted its 81st consecutive successful launch and f

target of an ICBM, in that case a Trident D-5. In the second cas

the PLAN’s newest warship, the Luhai-class destroyer, 

prospective Sovremenny-class ships purchased from Rus

equipped with only a limited-range air-defense missile syste

United States is already planning the follow-on to Aegis, even 

more capable than any other AAW system in the world.See U.S

Staff, Undersea Warfare, Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 1999, p. 

salvos of two missiles each were launched simultaneously in th

test. Also see Robert Holzer, “Study: U.S. Navy Must Go Beyon

Radar Era,” Defense News, June 7, 1999, pp. 3, 36.

82. Most notable are the Kilo-class submarine

Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with the potent SS-N-22 

missiles, but also important is the “softwear,” including the ser

Russian engineers, that has been acquired by the Chinese.

83. Vice-Admiral Shi Yunsheng, cited in Huang, Chen, and 

“China Enhances the Navy’s Comprehensive Strength—Intervi

Naval Commander vice Admiral Shi Yunsheng,” Liaowang, 

April 1999, pp. 13-15, in FBIS-CHI-99-0513. Also see Zhan

Jianchuan Zhishi, Beijing, January 1997, pp. 8-9, inFBIS-CST-

84. It appears that the defense budget allocation proces

friendlier to the “Gators” of the PLAN than it is in any other co

navy. Troop-carrying ships, no matter how vital to the power pr

mission, simply have neither the glamour nor the profit ma

nuclear-powered submarines or guided-missile destroyers. This 

one reason why the PLAN is only slowly strengthening its amp

warfare capability.

85. Chuan, FBIS-CHI-99-024.

86. Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, October 24, 1996, p

FBIS-CHI-1996-210, reported that this exercise include

operations among “the three armed services and the is

coordination and supplies,” and “involved sea-crossing, changin

and ship formations,” with the troops fighting “an integrated w

[attacking] the enemy from the three dimensions.” Also see 

Zenan’s interview with Senior Captain Lin Shuangqiao, “Dev

and Expanding Chinese Landing Ship Forces,” Jianchuan 

(Naval & Merchant Ships), Beijing, January 6, 1997, pp. 10

FBIS-CHI-1997-051: Lin is identified as the “army’s chief of s

naval operation” and an amphibious warfare expert. He descr

“vertical assault” aspect of amphibious landings and claims t

324
PLA demonstrated this capability in October 1995 and Marc

exercises near Taiwan.

87. VADM Shi Yunsheng, listed five attributes of a modern n

strengthened “research on naval strategies,” (2) “vigorous devel

of high-tech equipment,” (3) train PLAN personnel “with mode

scientific and technological qualities” to operate its “m

equipment," (4) effective “medium and long-term” plans, 

“modernization of the main equipment of the navy,” all of which 

new challenge” for the PLAN. Reported in Chen Wanjun and 

Chunting, “Shouldering the Important Task of a Century-Str

Voyage—Interviewing Newly Appointed Navy Commander Lieu

General Shi Yunsheng,” Liaowang, Beijing, February 24, 1997, 

in FBIS-CHI-1997.

88. Wang Zudian (identified as a Space Technology Infor

Research Institute researcher), “The Offensive and Defen

High-Technology Arms Equipment,” in Liaowang Weekly, 2

quoted in Xinhua, Hong Kong, May 24, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-

89. U.S. Navy, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 

Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, February 1996

Predicting the year in which the next PLAN FBM will actually g

on deterrent patrol is a risky proposition, given China’s poo

record in this area. Two PLA lieutenant-generals, conversatio

author, May 1996.

90. The flexibility of aircraft carriers is emphasized in this ca

the first to be sent to Taiwan, the USS Independence, is homep

Yokosuka, Japan and was already at sea. The second, USS Nim

en route to her West Coast homeport from a deployment to the 

Gulf and deviated from an intended port call in western Aust

steer for Taiwan. See “Jet Deal Should not Just Fly Through,” B

Post, July 2, 1999, in FBIS-EAS-1999-0702, for a report that du

reduced budget resulting from Thailand’s economic malaise, th

has been unable to maintain Chakri Naruebet’s aircraft and 

afford the fuel to send it to sea.

91. Chen Wanjun and Zhang Chunting, “Shouldering the Im

Task of a Century-Straddling Voyage—Interviewing Newly Ap

Navy Commander Lieutenant-General Shi Yunsheng,” Lia

Beijing, No. 8, February 24, 1997, p. 2, in FBIS-CHI-1997.

92. Chen and Zhang, p. 3. Shi also calls for a “scientifically fea

Navy development strategy” as part of the “defense devel

strategy . . . subject to the national development strategy” (p. 5

325
93. China ratified the UNCLOS in 1996, and some strateg

this pact as rationale for including “military control of the se

legitimate maritime economic activities.” Li Jie and Xu Shimin

UN Law of the Sea Treaty and the New Naval Mission,” Hs

Chun-Shih, Beijing, February 1997, quoted in Hugar, p. 73.

94. See Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionma

China, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 126ff, for an inte

description of the 1988 naval conflict with Vietnam when, acco

the author, PLAN forces exceeded and drove national strategy

95. The question of “red vs. expert” is a facet of civil-m

relations, a topic we only imperfectly understand; drawing too 

dichotomy between army loyalty (to state, government, or par

professionalism should be avoided. See works on this topic by 

Shambaugh, Michael Swaine, Harlan Jencks, Ellis Joffre, and 

Paltiel.

96. Senior Colonel Huang Xing and Senior Colonel Zuo Qu

“Holding the Initiative in Our Hands in Conducting Operations

Full Play to Our Own Advantages To Defeat Our Enemy—A S

the Core Idea of the Operational Doctrine of the PLA,” Zha

Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), No. 4, November 20, 19

49-56, in FBIS-CHI-1997. The authors, who both serve at the A

of Military Science, clearly identify the United States as “our ene

8), but display an imperfect knowledge of American weapons sy

97. “Bolt from the blue” was a concept that first appeared in 

maritime strategy in the early 20th century to describe a p

surprise German naval attack on Great Britain. See Arthur M. M

The Road to War, 1904-1914, vol. 1 of From the Dreadnought t

Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, London: Oxford Un

Press, 1961, p. 144, and S.W. Roskill, The Strategy of Seapo

Development and Application, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 

104, for discussion of this concept.

98. There is little question that this is the view from Man

Hanoi. Singapore expresses its distrust of China by urging a con

strong U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asia. Senior officers 

Singapore Joint Staff and the Singapore Armed Forces T

Institute, May 1999, discussions with author. Indonesia and T

are at least more comfortable with that presence than otherwis

Malaysia continues to maintain, at least in public, that China 

threat (and the U.S. naval presence unnecessary). Senior staff 

Royal Malaysian Defence College in May 1999, discussion with a

326
99. Zhang, FBIS-CHI-99-0510. 

100. Senior Captains Yan Youqiang (Director of a 

Headquarters Research Institute) and Chen Rongxing, “On M

Strategy and the Marine Environment,” Zhongguo Jushi 

Beijing, No. 2, May 20, 1997, pp. 81-92, in FBIS-CHI-97-197. T

be a good description of China’s maritime strategic thought.

101. See Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., China and Security in th

Pacific Region Through 2010, Alexandria, VA: Center for 

Analysis, 1996, p. 44, for the contention that long-range 

deployments would be a departure from Chinese military tradit

that PLAN arguments “have not convinced the CMC to alloc

resources” for a large blue-water navy.

102. See, for instance, Marder; Roskill; E.L. Woodward

Britain and the German Navy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19

Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birt

German Battle Fleet, London: Macmillan, 1965.

103. This argument is made by Till, p. 186.

327
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

KENNETH W. ALLEN is a Senior Associate at the He

Stimson Center in Washington, DC, where he dir

project promoting confidence-building measures for C

Prior to joining the Center, he was Executive Vice Pres

of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council (1992-1998)

served 21 years in the U.S. Air Force (1971-1992), incl

assignments in Taiwan; Berlin; Headquarters, 5t

Force in Japan; Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Chi

the Assistant Air Force Attaché, and the De

Intelligence Agency. He has written extensively on C

Air Force and China’s foreign military relations

received a B.A. from the University of California at Da

B.A. from the University of Maryland in Asian Studie

an M.A. from Boston University in International Relat

RICHARD A. BITZINGER is currently a Senior Fellow 

the Atlantic Council of the United States, where 

writing a book on the problems and prospects for the 

arms industry in the post-Cold War era. Prior to his pr

position, he worked for the U.S. Government, the R

Corporation, and the Defense Budget Project, specia

in issues relating to defense industries and the arms 

He is the author of several monographs, journal ar

and book chapters, including “Military Spending 

Foreign Military Acquisitions by the PRC and Taiwa

James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis 

Taiwan Strait, National Defense University Press, 

Gearing Up for High-Tech Warfare? Chinese and Taiw

Defense Modernization and Implications for Mi

Confrontation Across the Taiwan Strait (co-au

February 1996), and “Arms to Go: Chinese Arms Sa

the Third World,” International Security (Fall 1992). 

BERNARD (BUD) D. COLE is Professor of Interna

History at the National War College in Washington

His areas of expertise are Sino-American relation

maritime strategy. He has written one book ( Gunboa

329
Marines: The U.S. Navy in China) and many articles

reviews, and essays, the most recent of which are 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Twenty

Century Warfare,” and “China’s Maritime Strategy.

Cole earned an A.B. in History from the University of 

Carolina, an M.P.A. in National Security Affairs fro

University of Washington, and a Ph.D. in History 

Auburn University. Dr. Cole previously served 30 yea

surface warfare officer in the Navy. He commande

USS RATHBURNE (FF1057) and Destroyer Squadro

He also served as Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer wit

Third Marine Division in Vietnam, Plans and Po

Officer for Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Deputy Director for Expeditionary Warfare on the s

the Chief of Naval Operations. He has been on the Na

War College faculty since 1993.

LONNIE HENLEY is Defense Intelligence Officer fo

Asia and Pacific, in the Defense Intelligence Agency

was educated at West Point, Oxford, Columbia, an

Defense Intelligence College. He is a retired Army 

Foreign Area Officer, and has worked in a variety of 

and Korea-related positions. He is the author of C

Capacity for Achieving a Revolution in Military Affairs 

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (1996)

RMA After Next,” Parameters, Winter 1999-2000; and 

publications dealing with Chinese military capabi

Asian security issues, and the future of warfare.

JAMES R. LILLEY was born in China, educated at 

University, and served for a number of years in Sout

Asia. He was the Director of the American Institu

Taiwan from 1982-84, the U.S. Ambassador to the Pe

Republic of China from 1989-91 and to the Republic of 

from 1986-89. He served as Assistant Secretary of De

for International Security Affairs from 1991-93 a

presently Resident Fellow at the American Ente

Institute. Ambassador Lilley is the co-editor of B

MFN: Trade with China and American Interests 

Press, 1994), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (NDU Press, 

330
and China’s Military Faces the Future (M.E. Sharpe, 

He has written extensively on Asian issues.

SUSAN M. PUSKA, a colonel in the U.S. Army, 

Ordnance Officer and China Foreign Area Officer. C

Puska has served in logistics assignments in the Repu

Germany; the Republic of Korea; Guantanamo Bay, 

and the United States. She was an Assistant Army At

in Beijing between 1992 and 1994, and was the Asia-P

Branch Chief and China Desk Officer in the Reg

Integration and Assessment Division, Office of the D

Under Secretary of the Army, International Affairs be

1996 and 1999. During the 1999-2000 academic yea

served as Director of Asian Studies, Department of Na

Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. She h

graduate degree from The University of Michigan in 

Studies, and studied Mandarin Chinese at the De

Language Institute in Monterey, California, and The 

Hopkins University–Nanjing University Cente

American and Chinese Studies in Nanjing, Pe

Republic of China. She is the author of New Centur

Thinking: The Dangers of the Perceptual Gap in U.S.-

Relations published by the U.S. Army War College, St

Studies Institute, in 1998.

MARK A. STOKES is Country Director for the Pe

Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan within the Office 

Secretary of Defense, International Security A

(OSD/ISA). He is the author of China’s Str

Modernization: Implications for the United States pub

by the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Inst

in 1999. Major Stokes has served as a signal intelli

and electronic combat support officer in the Philippine

West Berlin. He served as an assistant air attaché 

U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Beijing, PRC, from 199

Before his assignment to OSD/ISA, he was the Asia-P

regional planner within the Headquarters U.S. Air 

Operations and Plans Directorate from 1995-97. He 

graduate degrees in International Relations and 

Studies from Boston University and the N

331
Postgraduate School. He received his formal Ch

Mandarin language training from the Defense Lan

Institute in Monterey, California, and the Diplo

Language Services in Rosslyn, Virginia. 

WILLIAM C. TRIPLETT II is the former chief Repu

counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. H

30 years of experience working on China and na

security. He is the co-author (with Edward Timperla

Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Thr

America and Year of the Rat: How Bill Cl

Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash. 

ARTHUR C. WALDRON is the Lauder Profess

International Relations, China and East Asia, Univer

Pennsylvania. He is the author of numerous artic

China’s military and national security. He is the aut

The Great Wall: From History to Myth (1990).

332
AA-10a/Alamo, 218

AA-11/Archer, 218

Academy of Military Sciences

(AMS), 87, 138

Active defense (jiji fangyu), 108,197,

288–289

AEGIS SPY-1D, 130

Aerospace systems/components,

15

Afghanistan, 133

A-5/Fantans, 215, 222

AGM-154, 265

Airbase blockage (fengsuo jichang),

140

Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS), 23, 130,

146, 265

Airborne laser (ABL), 126

Airbus, 15

Air Combat Maneuvering

Instrumentation (ACMI),

206–207

Aircraft industry, civil, 24

Airfield blockages, 144–145

Air power at sea, 306–307

Air superiority (zhikongquan), 110,

140

Air tasking order (ATO), 229

Air-to-air missiles (AAMs), 14,

19, 21, 218

Albright, Madeleine, 256, 266

Aleutians, 293

All-Army Joint Logistics

Implementation Plan

Allen, Ken, 20

Alliance of Democratic

Countries, 259

Allied Signal, 15

AL-31F, 22

American Enterprise Inst

Amur River, 290

AN-12/Cub, 221

AN-24/Coke, 219

AN-26/Curl, 219

Antiaircraft artillery (AA

Anti-Americanism, 256, 2

Anti-radiation missiles, 1

Antiship cruise missiles

(ASCMs), 11, 18–19

AN/TPQ-37 radar, 23

Arayama, Yuko, 32, 33, 3

Argus radar system, 220

Arms production, technol

leveraging and, 24–2

Ascent anti-satellite (ASA

program, 139

Aspide AAM/SAM, 14, 21

AS-350 helicopters, 14

AS-365N helicopters, 20

AT-4 Spigot, 21

ATR, 15

333

INDEX
Attack opportunities/sites,

144–145

Attack Regiment, 13

th

, 203

Averting an Electronic Waterloo, 89

Aviation Industries of China

(AVIC), 34, 35, 36, 37

Aviation industry

com mer cial, 15

de bate on im port ing ver sus

 pro duc ing weapon sys tems,

 194

Aviation troops/branch

(hangkongbing), 202–205

AWACS. See Airborne Warning and

Control System

B-2A Spirit, 265

B-5/Beagle, 215, 218, 222

B-6/Badger, 192, 218, 222

Ballistic missiles, theater,

119–127

Battle damage assessment

(BDA), 112

Beihai, 298

Beijing Military Region, 63, 202

Beijing University, 85

Belarus, 118

Beriev, 220

BGC-161, 117

Blue Army aggressor units,

208–211

Blue-Water navy, 279–280,

300–307

Boeing Aircraft Co., 15, 265

Bombardier, 15

Bomber Regiment, 12

th

, 203

Bombers, 218–219

Bonin Islands, 280, 294

Brazil, 13, 115, 118

British Aerospace, 36

C-101 ASCMs, 21

C-301 ASCMs, 21

C-601 ASCMs, 222

C-701 ASCMs, 19

C-801 ASCMs, 18, 222

C-802 ASCMs, 11, 18, 21

Campaign mobility phase (zh

jidong jieduan), 142–14

Canada, assistanced from

15, 114

Cangxian, Flight Test and

Training Center at,

208–209

Cao Gangchuan, 39

Caroline Islands, 280, 294

Cao Shuangming, 193

CBU-78, 123

CCK (Chingchuangkang)

Airbase, Taiwan, 83, 

Center for Strategic and

International Studie

(CSIS), 88–89, 98

Central Military Commis

(CMC), 56, 109, 112, 

189, 200, 230

CFM-56 turbofan engines

334
Charged couple devices (CCDs),

115

Chengdu Aircraft Co., 194

Chengdu Military Region, 202,

216

Cheng Mingshang, 296

Chengshan, 297

Chiang Kai-shek, 285

Chile, 139

China Academy of Launch

Technology (CALT), 119,

123, 125

China Aerospace Corp. (CASC),

34, 35, 36

China Aerospace S&T Corp.

(CASC), 113, 115, 122, 126,

127, 129, 133, 138

Sanjiang Space Corp. (066

 Base), 119, 120

China-Brazil Earth

Reconnaissance Satellite

(CBERS), 13, 22

China Democratic Party, 275

China Economic Times, 257

China Launch and Tracking

Control General (CLTC),

113, 139

China Military Science, 86

China National Nuclear Corp.

(CNNC), 34, 35, 36

China Ordinance Industry Corp.

(COIC/ NORINCO), 34, 35,

36

China State Shipbuilding 

(CSSC), 34, 35, 36, 3

China Times Express, 212

Chinese Communist Part

(CCP), 260

“Chinese People’s Liberat

Army Joint Campaig

Programs,” 69

Chinese PLA Military Termin

71

Chingchuankang (CCK) a

83, 145

Choke points, 300

Circular error of probabil

(CEP), 120, 128

Clausewitz, 267

Clinton, Bill, 98, 263, 264

Combat regulations, 69–7

Combat Regulations

Compilation Commit

Combined Brigade, 4

th

, 204

Command, control, communi

computer, and intelligen

(C

4

I), 11, 143, 145

im proved interconnectiv

Command and control (C

2

), 1

Commercial off-the-shelf 

technologies, 27

Commercial technology

transfers, 14–17

Commission on Science,

Technology, and Indu

for National Defense

335
(COSTIND), 12, 33–34, 39,

82, 87, 113–114, 138

“Common and Garrison

Regulations,” 72

Common Regulations, 71

Communications Command

Academy, 87

Communications command vehicle

(tongxun zhihuiche), 137

Communications regiment

(tongxintuan), 136

Communications security

(COMSEC), 137–138

Computer center (jisuan zhongxin),

136

Computer network attack

(CAN), 79

U.S. vulnerability to, 88–94

Computers, high performance,

83–84

Conventional-takeoff-and-landin

g (CTOL), 306

Corbett, Julian, 280

CO2 laser guidance system, 135

Counterattack phase (kangki fanji

jieduan), 146–147

Counter-reconnaissance

(fanzhencha), 146

Counterspace measures,

138–139

Cox-Dicks Committee, 83–84, 85

Cox Report, 14, 15, 29

Critical civilian infrastructure,

79

Critical infrastructure, U

89–90

Crotale short-range SAM, 14

Cruise missiles

See also The ater mis siles; u

 type of

ad vance ments in, 18–20

con clu sions, 40, 41

im ported tech nol ogy, 12

CSS-N-3 IRBMs, 306

Cuba, 83

Danwei, 31

Data relay satellite (DRS

Da Xinganling, 199

Deep attack strategy (zongshe

119

Defense industry

con clu sions, 38–41

cul tural im ped i ments, 3

en ter prise groups, 34–3

ra tio nal iza tion, 37

re form ing the, 33–38

re or ga ni za tion, 33–34

re struc tur ing, 34–37

struc tural im ped i ments

tech ni cal im ped i ments, 

Defense Science Board, 8

90–91

Deng Xiaoping, 61, 260, 2

264, 279, 292, 307

Depressed trajectories, 12

Desert Storm, 303, 305

Deutch, John, 88

DF-3 missile system, 127

336
DF-11 missile system, 18, 120,

123

DF-15 missile system, 18,

119–120, 124

DF-21 missile system, 116,

120–121, 126, 144

DF-25 missile system, 160–161

DF-31 missile system, 116

Diaoyutai, 296

Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms (Joint

Publication 1-02), 71

Digital scene matching area

correlation (DSMAC)

system, 132

Dinghai, 298

Ding Henggao, 39

Dingxin, 211

Distribute Control Systems, 93

EA-6B Prowler, 265

East China Sea, 279, 293

East Timor, 275

ECM regiment (dianzi duikangtuan),

136

80302 Unit, 136

863 Program, 12, 113, 118

Eight Points of Attention, 60

Eisenhower, Dwight, 287

Electric power generation vehicle

(fadianche), 137

Electromagnetic pulse warhead

(EMP), 123

Electronic countermeasures, 138

Electronic identification,

231–232

Electronic intelligence (E

13, 220, 221

Electronic reconnaissance

satellites, 113, 114–1

Electronic surveillance, 2

Electronic warfare, 80, 22

Electro-optical systems, 1

115–116

Elta, 220

Encryption technology (mima

138

Enemy counterattack phase (k

fanji jieduan), 146–147

Engineering Institute, 87

Engineering regiment

(gongchengtuan), 136

Equipment assurance units

(zhuangbei baozhang bu

136

sub units, 137

ERS-1 satellite, 114

Ethnic cleansing, 257, 26

Eurocopter, 15

Exocet, 18, 21

EY-8, 221

F-10 fighters, 13

F-16 fighters, 192

F-117A fighters, 146–147

Falun Gong, 275

Fanhuishi-2 (FSW-2), 116

FB-7, 221, 222, 232

337
FC-1 fighters, 13, 23

Fighter aircraft, 13, 20, 23–24

Film-based recoverable

satellites (FSW-3), 116

Financial markets, effects of war

on, 270

Financing defense market,

30–31

Firepower coordination cell (huoli

xietiaozu), 141

Firing battalions (fasheying), 137

Fisher, Richard, 12, 13

Five Year Plan, 114

Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM)

submarines, 291

Flight Test and Training Center

at Cangxian, 208–209

FM-80 SAM, 14, 19

FM-90 SAM, 19

Food service reforms, 66–67

Foreign intervention,

preventing, 111–112

France, 14, 18, 118, 139, 192

high-powered mi cro wave

 weap ons (HPMs), 85

Frieman, Wendy, 18, 26

FSW-2, 116

FSW-3, 116

FT-2000 mobile SAM, 224

Fujian MD, 67, 225, 230, 268

Fu Quanyou, 82

Fuzhou, 224

Gaining the initiative by strik

(xianfa zhiren), 110

Gang of Four, 290–291

Gansu province, 83, 145

Gobi Desert train ing ce

 211–213

Jiuquan Space Launch 

 116

GEC-Marconi, 220

General Armaments

Department (GAD), 

113, 134, 138, 139, 1

General Logistics Depart

(GLD), 55, 56–57

Wuhan Rear Base, 57

General Political Departm

82

General Staff Departmen

(GSD), 71, 87, 131

Geographic information s

(GIS), 131

Germany, joint ventures w

16, 118

Gill, Bates, 12

Global Navigation Satelli

System (GLONASS), 

131

Global positioning system 

satellites, 11, 18, 122

NAVSTAR, 131, 138

Gobi Desert training cent

211–213

Godwin, Paul, 197

Golf class submarine, 305–30

338
Gorshkov, Sergei, 291, 295

Gray, Colin, 281

Greater Khingan Mountains,

199

Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution (GPCR), 290

Ground control intercept (GCI),

219

Ground processing, 116–118

Guangdong province, 201

Guangxi, 199

Guangzhou Military Region, 63,

202, 216, 298

up grad ing MRAF, 213–214

Guangzhou Yangcheng Wanbao, 213

Gulf War, 69, 109, 148, 266

Gunboat policy, 260, 282

Guningtou battle, 268

Haikou, 298

Hainan, trial programs in,

57

Haitan Island, 199

Haiyang-1 (HY-1), 114

Han class submarine, 22

Hangzhou, 298

Harbin Institute of Technology,

130

Hart, Gary, 90

Hexcell, 15

High performance computers

(HPCs), 83–84

High-powered microwave

weapons (HPMs), 85, 123

HJ-8, 21

HN-1 LACMs, 19

Hong Kong, 270

HQ-9 medium-range SAM

program, 13

Huahong Co., 16–17, 22

Huangpi, 198

Huangpu, 298

Huangshan base, 136

Hubei province, 67

Sanjiang Space Corp. (0

 Base), 119, 120

Huludao, 297

Human rights, 257, 260, 2

HY-4, 129

Identification friend or fo

system, 231

IL-14 transports, 203

IL-28/Beagles, 218

IL-76 transports, 192, 200

219, 220

Imported technology, 12–

India, 197, 218, 273, 289

China’s mar i time strat e

 and, 299

Indian Ocean, 112, 279, 2

Indonesia, 274–275, 293

Inertial navigation system

(INS), 210

Information dominance

(zhixinxiquan), 110, 111

Information Engineering

University (Zhenzho

339
Information Warfare (IW)

ap pli ca tions of PLA, on the

 Un tied States, 88–94

def i ni tions and scope, 80–81

fi nan cial re sources, 82–83

sum mary of PLA ca pa bil i ties

 and doc trine, 81–88

United States, 79–80

United States re sponse to,

 98–99

Infrared signature reduction,

134

Institute of Applied Physics, 85

Integrated Air Defense System

(IADS), 223

Intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR), 113

Intercontinental cruise ballistic

missiles (ICBMs), 18

Intermediate Range Ballistic

Missiles (IRBMs), 306

Iraq, 271

Israel, 271

as sis tance from, 12, 13, 14, 23,

 130, 192, 194, 216, 221

Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI),

220

Italy, 14, 117, 118

J-6 fighters, 200, 215

J-7 fighters, 20, 21, 190, 200,

210, 215

J-8 fighters, 190, 200, 210, 215

J-8IIM fighters, 13, 20, 21, 23,

192

J-10 fighters, 13, 20, 21, 2

215, 216, 217

J-11 fighters, 190, 215, 21

Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19, 1

Japan

joint ven tures with, 16

re la tions with, 262, 263

 274, 293, 297

vul ner a bil ity to In for ma 

 War fare, 96–97

Japan Commission on Cr

Infrastructure Protec

96

Japan National Railways 

81

JERS-1 satellite, 114

JH-7 fighters, 20, 23

Jiang Jiesheng, 57–58

Jiang Qing, 290

Jiangxi province, 136

Jiang Zemin, 61, 62, 68, 8

198, 260, 264, 272, 2

282, 296

Jiayuguan, 145

Jiefangjun Bao, 57–58, 60–6

208, 209, 211–212, 223

Jinan, trial progra

57

Jinan Military Region, 71

297

Jinmen, 227, 268

Joint Air-to-Surface Stan

Missile (JASSM), 26

340
Joint Direct Attack Munitions

(JDAM), 265

Joint Logistics Departments

(JLDs), 58

Joint Publication 1-02 (Dictionary of

Military and Associated Terms),

71

Joint Publication 3-01.5, 151

Joint service logistics, 57–58

Joint Standoff Weapon (JDAM),

265

Joint Surveillance Target Attack

Radar System (J-STARS),

146, 265

Kaifeng, 198

Kaohsiung, 228

Kazakhstan, 272

Kh-31P, 130

Kh-55/AS-15 strategic cruise

missile, 19

Kh-55 strategic cruise missile,

19

Kim, Taeho, 12

Kiribati, 139

Korean War, 190, 191, 197, 200,

288–289

Kosovo War, 229

Allies/NATO, role of, 265–267

Chi nese re sponses to, 271–274

force, use of, 261–265

im pli ca tions of, for China,

 244–257

im pli ca tions of, for Tai wan,

 260–261

in ter na tional as pects, 2

pre ci sion guided mu ni ti

role of, 267–268

pub lic re la tions as pects

 269–270

sov er eignty, in ter na tion

 of, 257–260

the ater mis sile de fense

 268–269

Krushchev, Nikita, 289

Kunlun Plateau, 199

Kunming, 139

Kuomintang (KMT), 285

Kuriles, 293, 294

Land-attack cruise mis s

 (LACMs), 11, 19

anti-radiation, 130

guid ance sys tems, 135

in fra red sig na ture re du

 134

mis sion plan ning, 131–

pro duc tion trends, 133

pro grams, 129

pro pul sion sys tems, 133

ra dar sig na ture re duc ti

rea sons for, 128

role of, 127

Silk worm, 129

YJ-8, 129–130

YJ-9, 129, 130

Lanzhou Military Region

In for ma tion War fare, 8

Large-scale integrated cir

(LSICs), 121

Laser cladding, 126

341
Launch sites, pre-surveyed and

reserved, 137

Lavi fighter jet program, 13, 216

Law of the Territorial Sea and

Contiguous Zones, 298

Lebedev Physics Institute, 85

Lee Teng-hui, 192, 213, 225,

261, 270

Leveraging technology,

assessment of, 17–28

Lewis, John, 205–206

Liberation Army Daily (LAD), 81,

82, 87

Lin Biao, 289–290

Lin Chong-pin, 95, 96

Lin Weigan, 85

Liu Huaqing, 82, 280, 293–295,

298, 300, 301, 307

Liu Shunyao, 189, 191, 192, 193,

197–198, 199, 205, 207,

208, 224, 228, 235

Lockheed Martin, 36, 265

Logistics reform, PLA, 55

food ser vice re forms, 66–67

fund ing for, 66

joint ser vice lo gis tics, 57–58

mil i tary re gions, role of, 59

mo bile lo gis tics, 62–64

mon e ti za tion of of fi cer comp

 ensation sys tem, 64–66

ob jec tives of, 56

other changes, 66–67

skip-echelon lo gis tics, 66

so cial ized lo gis tics, 59–62

stan dard iza tion of sup p

 edures, 65

trial pro grams, 56–57

Low observability (LO)

technological capabil

11

Luda destroyers, 292

Luhai destroyers, 22, 26

Lu Linzhi, 87

Lushun, 297

Luzon Strait 300

LY-60 SAM, 14

M-9 missile system, 18

M-11 missile system, 18, 

Mao Zedong, 196, 197, 26

286, 288, 289, 290

Mariana Islands, 280, 29

Maritime strategy

back ground in for ma tion

 279–282

Blue-Water navy, 279–

 300–307

con clu sions, 312–314

evo lu tion of, 284–295

fac tors in flu enc ing, 281

In dia, 299

Liu Huaqing’s vi sion, 2

mod ern iza tion of navy,

 283–284

in north east Asia, 297

pol i tics, ge og ra phy and

 282–283

pros pects, 307–311

sea lines of com mu ni ca t

 (SLOCs), 291, 299–30

342
South China Sea, 298–299

 stra te gic in ter ests, 296–300

Tai wan and, 297–298

Matsu, 230, 288

Mazu, 227

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 15

MD-80 and MD-90 passenger

jets, 15

Medeiros, Evan, 15–16, 27

Microelectonics, 16–17, 22

Mid-course guidance (zhongduan

zhidao), 146

MiG-21, 191

MiG-23, 23

Military region air force

(MRAF), 201

Military Regions (MR), 57

mo bil ity and, 63

role of, 59, 202

Millimeter wave seeker (MMW),

121–122

Milosevic, Slobodan, 255, 256,

259–260, 266

Ming class submarine, 20, 22

Ming dynasty, 284–285

Ministry of State Security, 81

Mirage 2000-5s, 192, 226, 227

Mischief Reef, 299

Missiles. See under type of

Missile strike phase (daodan tuji

jieduan), 143–146

Missile transport vehicle (daodan

yunshuche), 137

Missile/warhead storage unit

(zhuangbei jishu qinwu 

136

Mission planning, 131–13

Miyawaki, Raisuke, 96

Mobile logistics, 62–64

Molander, Roger, 79–80

Mongolia, 264

Mortal blow (zhiming daji), 1

Mourdoukoutas, Panos, 3

39

Mulvenon, James, 24, 25, 

31

Nanjing Military Region, 

139, 141, 202, 203, 2

228, 230, 298

National Bureau of

Oceanography, 201

National Counterintellige

Center, 84

National Defense Univers

108

Nationalist Air Force, 191

National People’s Congre

(NPC), Ninth, 33, 29

National University of De

Technology, 125–126

NATO (North Atlantic Tr

Organization), 229, 2

259, 263, 265–268

Naval air force, 221–223

Naval War College (U.S.)

NAVSTAR GPS, 131, 138

NEC Corp., 16–17, 22

343
New High Ground of Strategic

Competition, 310

New York Times, 261

909 Project, 16–17, 22

Ningbo, 298

North Industries Corp.

(NORINCO), 34, 35, 36–37

North Korea, 271, 273, 297

Ocean monitoring/surveillance

(haiyang jianshi), 113, 146

Officer compensation system,

64–66

Okean exercises, 292

Okinawa, 134

Olivetti image processing, 117

Operational preparations phase

(zuozhan zhunbei jieduan),

141–142

Operational test and evaluation

(OT&E), 222

Overcapacity problems, 30

Pacific Ocean, 112, 279

Pakistan, 271

Paracel Islands, 292, 298

Patriot SAM technology, 13, 124,

125, 130

Payloads, 122

Peng Dehuai, 289

People’s Daily, 256

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

See also Lo gis tics re form, PLA

as sess ment of re forms, 72–74

Com bat Or der No. 13, 56

com bat reg u la tions/ope

 ional or di nance, new, 

de bate on the mod ern iz

 of, 1–2, 9

lo gis tics re form, 55, 56–

1999 Con fer ence, 2

re or ga ni za tion, 72

stan dard iza tion, 68–71

sum mary of In for ma tio

 are ca pa bil i ties and do

 81–88

People’s Liberation Army 

Force (PLAAF), 62, 6

140

ac tiv ity over the Tai wa

 Strait, case study, 225

air borne early warn ing

air borne troops, 198–19

air de fense troops, 223–

air-to-air mis siles, 218

avi a tion branch, 202–20

Blue Army ag gres sor un

 208–211

bomb ers, 218–219

Bri gade (43

rd ), 198

Bri gade (44

th ), 198

Bri gade (45

th ), 198

Com mand Col lege, 195

com mander’s as sess men

 192–196

doc trine and strat egy,

 196–198

15

th Air borne Army, 192, 19

fight ers, 215–218

flight train ing, 205–223

Gobi Desert train ing ce

 211–213

344
in tel li gence col lec tion air craft,

 220–221

mis sion and or ga ni za tion of,

 200–205

na val, 221–223

rapid-reaction force, 200

trans ports, 219

up grad ing of, 189–192

up grad ing the Guangzhou

 MRAF, 213–214

weap ons sys tems, 214–215

People’s Liberation Army Navy

(PLAN), 63

See also Mar i time strat egy

air power at sea, 306–307

ca pa bil i ties, 302

doc trine, 302–305

East Sea Fleet, role of, 298

for ma tion of, 286

Liu Huaqing’s vi sion, 293–295

mod ern iza tion of, 283–284,

 301

North Sea Fleet, role of, 297

nu clear de ter rence and,

 305–307

pros pects, 307–311

South Sea Fleet, role of,

 298–299

People’s Navy, 222

People’s war doctrine, 196, 288,

290

Pershing-II, 121, 125

Phalcon AEW radar, 220

Philippines, 293, 299

Photoreconnaissance, 12

PL-7 AAM, 19

PL-9 AAM, 14, 19

PL-11 AAM, 14, 21

Pollack, Jonathan, 24, 25

28–29, 31

Pratt & Whitney, 15

Precision-guided

munitions/missiles (P

14, 192, 267–268

Precision strikes, 85–86

Preemptive strikes, 87, 10

President Decision Direct

(PDD) 63 “Critical

Infrastructure Prote

98

President’s Commission o

Critical Infrastructu

Protection, 89–90, 92

95

Product level, technology

leveraging at the, 17

Project-094 boat, 306

“Provisional Stipulations 

Grading Military Tra

71

Pursuit Regiments, 10

th

 and 1

Pyongyang, 273

Python-3 AAM, 14

Qian Xuesen, 82

Qing dynasty, 285

Qinghua University, 85

Quality control issues, 26

Quemoy, 230, 288

Quingdao, 67, 297

345
QW-1 SAM, 19

Radar

-ab sor bent ma te ri als, 11, 134

im ag ing sat el lites, 113–114

im ported, 13

sig na ture re duc tion, 134

solid-state phased-array, 12

ul tra-wide band, 12

RADARSAT, 114

Radio frequency weapons, 85

RAND, 86, 89, 97, 98

Rapid reaction (kuaisu fanying), 142

Rapid-reaction force (RRF),

198–200

Rapid war, rapid resolution (suzhan,

sujue), 110, 148

Raytheon, 265

Reconnaissance satellites, 13, 22

Reconaissance unit (jizhen dadui),

136

Red Army, 209

Reentry vehicles, 124–125

Refineries, vulnerability of U.S.,

93–94

Remote sensing, 12

Reorganization, PLA, 72

Repair depot (tezhuang xiulicang),

136

Republic of China: 1998 National

Defense Report, 228–229

Research and development

(R&D)

In for ma tion War fare ce

 83

plans, 12

Reversed-engineered mili

equipment, 14, 23–2

Revolution in Military Af

(RMA), 79, 109, 267

R550 Magic AAM, 19

RSBN (radio navigation a

210

Rubin, 14

Rudman, Warren, 90

Rugao airfield, 215

Rules-of-engagement (RO

230

Russia, 130, 263, 272

as sis tance from, 12, 13, 

 19, 122, 192, 194, 216–

 220, 224, 306

co op er a tive ef forts, 118

high-powered mi cro wav

 weap ons (HPMs), 85

Ryukyus, 293

SA-10 SAMs, 13, 224

SA-15 SAMs, 23, 224

SA-321G Super Frelon helico

23

Sanjiang Space Corp. (06

Base), 119, 120

SATCOM, 143

Science and Engineering

University, 83

Science and Technology Dail

346
Science and technology (S&T)

plans, 12

Scramjet (supersonic

combustion ramjet engine),

134

SCUD-B, 121

Sea lines of communications

(SLOCs), 291, 299–300

Sea superiority (zhihaiquan), 140,

141

Second Artillery, 126

See also The ater mis sile cam paign

in for ma tion de nial, 137–139

or ga ni za tion of, 135–137

Seek Optics, 11

Self-Strengthening Movement,

282

Senkaku Islands, 296

Serbia. See Kosovo War

Shanghai, 270, 298

Shanghai Academy of

Spaceflight Technology

(SAST), 115

Shanghai Bureau of

Astronautics’ 701 Program,

115

Shantou, 298

Shenyang Aircraft Co., 194

Shenyang Military Region, 202,

297

In for ma tion War fare, 88

trial pro grams in, 57

Shichang, 67

Shipbuilding industry, 15

19–20, 25, 26, 27

Shiwan Mountains, 199

Shi Yunsheng, 302, 307–3

Signals intelligence (SIGI

83, 220

Sikorsky Helicopter, 15

Silkworm, 18, 129

Simulators, 207–208

SkyMaster AEW, 222–22

Soldiers’ Service Regulati

Socialized logistics, 59–62

Song class submarine, 19–20

South China Sea, 112, 26

280, 292, 293

China’s mar i time strat e

 298–299

South Korea, 16, 262, 263

274

South Vietnam, 292

Sovereignty, internationa

of, 257–260

Soviet Union

as sis tance from, 286–28

China’s split with, 289, 

col lapse of, 262

Navy in the 1960s and 

 291–292

Sovremenny destroyers, 23, 3

Space support, for theate

missiles, 112–118

Space tracking network, 1

Special Operations, 86

347
Speys, 22, 23

Spratly Islands, 298, 306

SSBN nuclear

ballistic-missile-carrying

submarines, 14

SSK diesel submarine, 19–20

SSN nuclear attack submarines,

14

SS-N-2 Styx, 18

Standardization, PLA, 68–71

STAR-1 ARM system, 130

State-owned enterprises (SOS),

29, 30–31, 32

State Science and Technology

Commission (SSTC),

113–114

S-300, 191, 192, 224

Stinger, 19

Strait of Hormuz, 300

Strait of Malacca, 300

Strategic Information Warfare—A

New Face of War (RAND), 86,

89

Stokes, Mark, 29

Submarine-launched ballistic

missiles (SLBMs), 18

Submarines

die sel, 19–20, 21, 22

Golf class, 305–306

Han class, 22

im ported, 14

Ming class sub ma rine, 20, 22

nu clear-powered at tack, 292

Song class, 19–20, 21, 22

Xia class, 306

Submunitions, 123

Suixi, 225

Super-863 Program, 12

Supervisory Control and 

Acquisition (SCADA)

92–93

Surface-to-air missiles (SA

13, 19, 191

Surface-to-surface missile

(SSMs), 18, 144–145

Surveying/mapping unit (ceh

dadui), 136

Surveying vehicle (cekongch

SU-27 fighters, 13, 22, 23

24–25, 190, 191, 192

210, 215, 216, 217

SU-27SK, 217

SU-27UBK, 217

SU-30 fighters, 23, 190, 1

SU-30MKI, 218

SU-30MKK, 217, 218

Synthetic aperture radar 

11, 13, 113–114, 135

Systems integration capa

28–29

Table of organization and

equipment (TO&E), 

Tactical Air Defense Syst

(TADS), 223

Tactical Air Navigation

(TACAN), 210, 232

Tactical imaging system,

115–116

348
Taichung, 145

Taipei, 140, 151, 228

two states theory, 261

vulnerability to Information

Warfare, 95–96

Taiwan, 70, 82, 136, 140, 288,

293

CCK (Chingchuangkang)

 Airbase, Tai wan, 83, 212

China’s mar i time strat egy

 and, 297–298

im pli ca tions for, 148–153

Kosovo War, im pli ca tions of,

 260–261, 262

as a pri mary force, 110–111

sim u lated at tacks on, 145, 212

vul ner a bil ity to In for ma tion

 War fare, 94–96, 97

Taiwan Air Force, 140, 145,227,

228, 230

Taiwan Ministry of National

Defense (MND), 225, 227

Taiwan Relations Act, 99

Taiwan Strait, 88, 94, 149, 300

Cri sis of 1958, 190, 200, 227

mil i tary ex er cises in, 199, 224,

 225–232

Tang Fei, 94

Tang Yaoming, 95–96

Tarim Desert Highway, 67

Technical position (jishu zhendi), 136

Technology 

See also un der type of

ac qui si tion ac tiv i ties, 11–17

ac qui si tion ver sus le ver 

 9

com mer cial trans fers, 1

con clu sions, 38–41

cul tural im ped i ments, 3

im ped i ments to ab sorp t

 and ex ploi ta tion, 28–3

im ported, 12–14

le ver ag ing, as sess ment 

 17–28

pro gram stretchouts an

 pro duc tion runs, 20–2

re versed-engineered, 14

 23–24

struc tural im ped i ments

tech ni cal de fi cien cies, 2

Telecommunications

infrastructure, 83

Telespazio, 117

Terminal guidance, 146

global po si tion ing sys te

mil li me ter wave seeker

 121–122

ter rain match ing, 121

Terrain contour matching

guidance (TERCOM)

131–132

Thailand, 306

Theater command center (zha

zuozhan zhongxin), 141

Theater missile campaign

con clu sions, 147–153

coun ter mea sures, 151–

coun ter strike phase, 14

mo bil ity phase, 142–14

349
op er a tional im pli ca tions,

 148–149

op er a tional prep a ra tions

 phase, 141–142

phased cam paign, 139–141

po lit i cal im pli ca tions, 149–151

strike phase, 143–146

Theater missile defense (TMD),

282–283

limitations of, 268–269

Theater missiles

coun ter mea sures, 124–127

de vel op ments, 118–135

elec tronic re con nais sance sate

 llites, 114–115

elec tro-optical re con nais sance

 sys tems, 115–116

film-based re cov er able satell

 ites (FSW-3), 116

ground pro cess ing, 116–118

land at tack cruise mis siles,

 127–135

ra dar im ag ing sat el lites,

 113–114

rea sons for Beijing’s re li ance

 on, 109–112

role of, 107–108

space sup port for, 112–118

Theater missiles, ballistic

countermeasures, 124–127

de pressed tra jec to ries,

 126–127

DF-3 mis sile sys tem, 127

DF-11 mis sile sys tem, 18, 120,

 123

DF-15 mis sile sys tem, 18,

 119–120, 124

DF-21 mis sile sys tem, 1

 120–121, 126

DF-25 mis sile sys tem,

 160–161

DF-31 mis sile sys tem, 1

la ser clad ding, 126

pay loads, 122

pro duc tion rates, 119

submunitions, 123

ter mi nal guid ance, 121–

war heads, 123–124

Third Academy, 127, 129

132–135

Three Gorges Dam, 258

Tiananmen, 219, 261, 267

Tianjin, 227

Tibet, 199, 260, 273

Tomahawk missiles, 133, 

266

Tor-M1 regiment, 224

Toshiba Machine, 98

Training

flight, 205–223

for In for ma tion War far

 87–88

stan dards, 71

Transfer point (zhuanzai chan

136, 142

Transfer station (zhuanyunzha

Transports, 219

Truman, Harry, 287

Trunkliner program, 15

TU-4, 220

TU-16/Badgers, 218

350
Turkey, 272

Two states theory, 261

Type-704, 23

Ukraine, 118

United Kingdom

as sis tance from, 222

high-powered mi cro wave

 weap ons (HPMs), 85

United Nations, 259

United States

dual-use in for ma tion

 tech nol o gies form, 17

high-powered mi cro wave

 weap ons (HPMs), 85

vul ner a bil ity to com puter

 network at tack, 88–94, 9899

U.S. Air Force, 112

U.S. Army, 265

U.S. Army Field Manual 100-6,

86

U.S. Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute,

2

U.S. Commission on National

Security/21

st

 Century, 90

U.S. Department of Defense,

151, 199, 204, 215, 217,

218–219, 221–222, 223

U.S. General Accounting Office

(GAO), 88, 98

U.S. Marine Corps, 265

U.S. Navy, 265

U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence,

226, 229

U.S. Seventh Fleet, 287

U.S. Strategic Air Comma

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

(UAV), 85

Very large-scale integrate

circuits (VLSICs), 12

Vietnam, 213, 261, 274, 2

Vietnam War, 151–152, 1

197, 266

Visual flight regulations 

193

Vital points (dianxue), 110

Waigaoqiao ship yard, 30

Wang Baocun, 95

Wang Baoqing, 99

Wang Ke, 55, 56, 58, 59, 6

65

Wang Xiaodong, 274

Wang Yizhou, 262

Warheads

CBU-78 GATOR-like, 1

de coys, 125–126

elec tro mag netic pulse (

 123

fuel-air ex plo sive (FAE)

high-powered mi cro wav

 (HPM), 123

pen e tra tion, 123–124

shap ing, 125

Weather center (qixiang zhon

136

Weihai, 297

Wen Wei Pao, 86

351
Western Europe, imported

technology from, 12

Wide Angle, 59, 60, 65

Winning victory with one strike

(yizhan, ersheng), 110

Workforce

down siz ing, 34

prob lems, 29–31

World Economics and Politics

Research Institute, 262

World Trade Organization

(WTO), 257

World War I, 286

World War II, 266

Wortzel, Larry, 23, 32–33

Wu Guangyu, 190, 208

Wuhu, 225

Wusong, 298

X-600 LACMs, 19

Xia class submarine, 306

Xiamen, 67, 298

Xian Aircraft Co., 194

Xiangshan, 298

Xiao Jingguang, 287

Xinhua, 59, 60, 61, 201, 211, 213

Xinjiang MD, 67, 199, 260, 263,

272, 275

Xue Litai, 205–206

XY-41 missile, 129

Y-5/Colt, 219

Y-8 transports, 214, 219

Yalu River, 297

Yan’an Spirit, 60

Yangtze River, 202

Yellow Sea, 279, 293

Yingji-8 missile (YJ-8), 12

Yingji-9 missile (YJ-9), 12

Yingshan, 198

Young School, 286, 291

Yuchi, 297

Yugoslavia, 148

See also Kosovo War

Yulin, 298

Yun-5 transports, 203

Z-8 helicopters, 23

Z-9 helicopters, 20

Z-11 helicopters, 14

Zhang Chunqiao, 291

Zhang Wannian, 61–62, 2

Zhanjiang, 298

Zheng He, 284

Zhu Bangzao, 257

Zhu Guang, 205

Zhujiang River delta area

Ziyuan-1 (ZY-1), 115

352
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Colonel Susan M. Puska

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler