U.S. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR:

A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT

William T. Johnsen

June 20, 1996
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution unlimited.

*******

The author wishes to thank Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II,

Lieutenant Colonel James O. Kievet, Colonel Jeffrey D.

McCausland, Ph.D., and Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon for their

helpful comments on previous drafts of this report. The author,

alone, remains responsible for the opinions expressed herein.

*******

Information contained in this report is current as of May

31, 1996.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also

be conveyed directly to the author by telephone: commercial (717)

245-4076 or DSN: 242-4076, or by Internet: johnsenw@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

*******

Information about the Strategic Studies Institute and a

downloadable version of this and other studies are available on

the Internet at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/<D>. Copies

of this report may be obtained from the Publications and

Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-

4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at

rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.
iii

FOREWORD

The U.S. decision to join the Implementation Force (IFOR)

for the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and

Hercegovina (familiarly known as the Dayton Accords) marked a

crucial milestone toward achieving the U.S. national objective of

a lasting political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. Equally

critical will be determining whether the United States will

continue participating in IFOR beyond the currently established

12-month deadline.

Decisions of great import rarely entail simple cause and

effect judgments. Thinking through the likely second and third

order consequences of contemplated actions often defines success

or failure as much as dealing with the issue of the moment. Such

is the case for U.S. policy in Bosnia. In examining what form

U.S. involvement in IFOR beyond the current deadline will take,

we should recall that, while events inside Bosnia influenced the

introduction of U.S. ground troops, wider U.S. interests in the

Balkans, in Europe, and throughout the world proved more pivotal

in the decisionmaking calculus. Likewise, a decision on whether

to withdraw from or to extend IFOR also must encompass a

similarly broad geo-strategic context. To that end, Dr. William

Johnsen examines in this monograph the potential for creating

suitable conditions for a lasting political settlement in Bosnia

by December 1996, identifies possible outcomes of a U.S.

withdrawal from IFOR, and assesses potential consequences for

U.S. national objectives and interests within the Balkans, and

beyond.

Dr. Johnsen's conclusions will not sit well with most in the

United States and abroad who are weary of the Bosnian "problem"

and would like to see it "wrapped up" by December. That it

appears intractable on the civil side despite IFOR's quieting of

the guns heightens the frustration. Yet, as this study

illustrates, one has only to turn back the clock a year to

realize the distance traveled to date toward not only ending the

bloodshed in Bosnia, but also reducing the risks to broader U.S.

interests. The issue today is not so much about following a time

line for December withdrawal, but where that would leave us and

our interests another year hence.

It is in that context that the Strategic Studies Institute

offers this contribution to the upcoming national dialog

concerning the future U.S. role in Bosnia.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army
iv

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

in 1991 and is currently the Elihu Root Professor of Military

Studies at the U.S. Army War College. An infantry officer before

retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of

troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry

Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as

Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and

as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied

Powers Europe. Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S.

Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke

University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. His

most recent SSI study is Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: Using

History to Inform Policy (revised edition).
vi

KEY JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the cogent reasons behind the current

December 1996 deadline for withdrawing U.S. ground forces from

Bosnia, that policy must be reexamined in light of existing

strategic conditions. A decision on whether to extend

participation in the IFOR or to join in a successor organization

will be neither easy nor insignificant. Nonetheless, it will have

to be made, and in the not too distant future. Now, therefore, is

the time to examine the issues that will determine whether the

United States will continue to lead efforts to ensure a lasting

political settlement in Bosnia.

While NATO forces and their partners in IFOR have played a

critical and successful role in halting conflict in Bosnia and

bringing stability to the region, military success in the short

term does not necessarily lead to a long-term political

settlement. Such a resolution depends primarily on resolving

internal political, economic, and societal issues within BosniaHercegovina. That having been said, establishing those conditions

will depend to a significant degree on the ability of an outside

military presence to sustain conditions that support the other

elements of the process.

IFOR has created the basis for a secure environment, but

that foundation is fragile, and much remains to be accomplished:

arbitrate control of Brcko, resettle refugees, build political

institutions, hold elections, restore the Bosnian economy,

negotiate and implement arms control and confidence-building

regimes, and implement the U.S. equip and train program. Whether

this complex and demanding agenda can be completed prior to

December 1996 is questionable.

If IFOR withdraws before conditions for a lasting political

settlement are established, three general outcomes are possible:

peaceful resolution, limited violence, and a return to war. Only

a peaceful resolution is in U.S. national interests, but it is

the least likely result. Indeed, if prevailing conditions are not

sustained, the current hiatus in Bosnia-Hercegovina may represent

little more than an operational pause before the factions resume

fighting.

While damage to U.S. objectives in Bosnia from renewed

conflict could be considerable, much more is at stake. NATO's

credibility could be irrevocably damaged, and U.S. leadership in

the Alliance could be called into question. Surrendering

leadership in the Bosnian crisis also may be construed as another

example of U.S. disengagement from Europe, leading perhaps to

reduced European public support of NATO or a U.S. presence in

Europe. Concomitantly, a perceived failure may diminish U.S.

public support of NATO, of a U.S. forward military presence in
vii

Europe, or for substantial U.S. engagement in international

affairs, leading to an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S.

attitude that further constrains U.S. foreign policy. At the same

time, potential opponents may be emboldened to challenge the

United States. The cumulative effect of these issues may result

in a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad.

These conclusions argue for a continued outside military

presence to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Agreement. But

the United States and NATO continue to adhere publicly to roughly

a one-year time limit for IFOR's deployment. When examining

potential options for a follow-on organization to oversee further

implementation of the Dayton Agreement (e.g., U.N. Protection

Force ("UNPROFOR II") or a coalition of European states under the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the

Western European Union (WEU)), only a credible NATO-led force

with a substantial U.S. ground component offers a significant

likelihood of success.

The United States, therefore, cannot simply engage for 12

months and then withdraw from Bosnia. How long U.S. military

forces should assist in implementing the peace agreement cannot

be answered with certainty at this point. But one year will not

be sufficient to establish the requisite conditions for a longterm political settlement. Instead, U.S. forces should be

prepared to remain in IFOR or its successor until such time that

U.S. national objectives are achieved or have been adapted to

changed strategic conditions.

The time has come to examine whether the United States will

continue to lead efforts to ensure a long-term political

settlement in Bosnia that will further contribute to U.S.

national objectives in Europe and globally. During these

deliberations, participants must keep in mind that achieving U.S.

objectives in Bosnia is more akin to running a marathon than a

sprint. And, like a successful marathon runner, the United States

must demonstrate determination, endurance, and the ability to

withstand temporary pain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United States should base its decision on continued

participation in the IFOR on whether U.S. national objectives and

interests have been achieved, not on a rigid timetable.

• Should current trends continue, the United States should

participate in IFOR, or some residual military mission, beyond

December 1996.

• NATO must remain the regional security organization

responsible for overseeing the military aspects of the peace
viii

agreement. IFOR, or a residual force, must continue to operate

through the NATO chain of command.

• The size and composition of IFOR should be adapted to the

pace of compliance with the peace accords and conditions in

Bosnia-Hercegovina. Given the anticipated size of an overall

residual force (roughly two divisions) and assuming that the

United States desires to retain a leadership role in that force:

-- The U.S. ground contribution should consist of one

maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and appropriate combat

support and combat service support units.

-- The United States may also wish to consider

providing the core of a division headquarters.

-- Additionally, the United States should be prepared

to contribute unique capabilities (e.g., intelligence and

surveillance, communications, aviation, civil affairs, and

psychological operations), as required.

• Should the United States decide to extend its

participation in IFOR, or alternative residual force, the U.S.

Government must:

-- Begin building now a bipartisan consensus in

Congress to support operations beyond December 1996.

-- Build consensus with NATO allies and partners

currently participating in IFOR to reapportion responsibilities,

as required.

-- Ensure international and European organizations

shoulder their responsibilities<R>under the peace agreement.
1

U.S. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR:

A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT

INTRODUCTION

Even before the main body of U.S. forces began moving into

Bosnia-Hercegovina on December 20, 1995, as part of the

Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Framework Agreement

for Peace in Bosnia and Hercegovina (familiarly known as the

Dayton Accords),1 U.S. policymakers had fixed a one-year time

limit for U.S. participation in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR.2 For a

number of important reasons, setting such a constraint initially

was a good idea. Foremost, the firm deadline avoided the

impression of an openended NATO and IFOR commitment, and it

quickly set a benchmark, forcing the factions to resolve issues

rather than allowing IFOR and international organizations to

carry the burden of implementing the peace. This approach also

compelled the entities to collaborate quickly, establishing

precedents for future cooperation. It additionally pressured the

parties to establish government institutions and processes that

will contribute to a sense of normalcy that, hopefully, will

accelerate the healing process. Finally, a strict time limit

required the international community to act rapidly to assist in

restoring Bosnian society.

These cogent reasons notwithstanding, the original December

1996 deadline for withdrawing U.S. ground forces from Bosnia must

be reexamined in light of existing and emerging strategic

conditions.3 Granted, implementing the military provisions of the

accords is proceeding more smoothly than anticipated. But, shortterm compliance with the military aspects of the agreement--while

essential for overall success--does not ensure achievement by

year's end of the overarching U.S. national objectives outlined

in the President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement:

• Sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves

the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future

for all its peoples;

• Preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader

Balkan war that could threaten both allies and the stability of

new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;

• Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the

conflict;

• Halting the slaughter of innocents;

• Helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while

maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.4
2

Attaining these objectives hinges, to a large degree, on

successfully implementing the civil elements of the peace

agreement. But, as will be discussed below, fulfilling the civil

provisions of the accords is not going as smoothly as the

military effort. Whether the varied and difficult tasks of the

civil portions of the agreement can be achieved before the

existing deadline is an open question. But, even at this date,

the general consensus is that one year is inadequate.5

Furthermore, current and anticipated trends indicate that an

outside military presence capable of ensuring compliance with the

military elements of the accords likely will be required if civil

implementation efforts are to succeed. Thus, while only roughly

halfway through IFOR's mandate, it is time to reassess the

current deadline.

This conclusion does not imply that an immediate decision on

extending U.S. participation in IFOR, or joining a successor

organization, is required.6 Indeed, it may be counter-productive

to make public such discussions, or even their consideration, at

this time.7 But, because the requisite analysis and assessment of

the implications of such a determination must occur prior to the

decision, now is the time to examine the issues surrounding U.S.

participation in military efforts to oversee the Dayton Accords

beyond December 1996.

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to identify and

analyze the salient issues inherent in the current U.S. intention

to withdraw from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR and assess potential

consequences for the United States. To this end, the study first

identifies key provisions of the accords that must be

accomplished if a durable political agreement is to emerge and

briefly assesses if they can be accomplished before December

1996. It then identifies potential outcomes resulting from a

scheduled U.S. departure and assesses their consequences for U.S.

Bosnian policy. Repercussions beyond the immediate scope of

Bosnia-Hercegovina are then assessed. The report then examines

possible successors to IFOR, followed by an analysis of the

potential military role in promoting an enduring political

settlement in Bosnia should the United States continue its

military effort to oversee the peace accords. The report closes

with conclusions and recommendations.

WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

Military Requirements. In the military sphere, IFOR has

accomplished much in a short period. But enforcing the elements

of the agreement is not a singular event. IFOR must continue the

considerable requirements inherent in ensuring sustained

compliance with the military provisions of the peace agreement:
3

supervising the zone of separation, monitoring the Inter-Entity

Boundary Line, disarming armed civilian groups, monitoring and

confirming the withdrawal of foreign forces,8 monitoring heavy

weapons, supervising movement of forces and weapons to cantonment

areas, monitoring holdings in those areas, overseeing the

demobilization of "excess" personnel, monitoring mine removal,

and ensuring freedom of movement.9

Only in this manner can IFOR sustain a safe, secure

atmosphere in which the other elements of the peace process can

function. Without such an environment, progress toward a durable

political arrangement will be slow and difficult, at best,

prolonging the requirement for an outside military presence. At

worst, the country can slide back into war.

Implementing the Civil Provisions of the General Framework

Agreement. Success in implementing the military elements of the

peace agreement has not been matched on the civil side.10 This

conclusion is not intended to denigrate the efforts made or the

progress that has occurred to date. But it is a recognition that,

as the brief survey of the civil tasks that follows illustrates,

much remains to be accomplished if stable political conditions

are to be established prior to IFOR's scheduled departure.

Arbitrate control of Brcko and the Posavina Corridor.11 The

city of Brcko and the Posavina Corridor lie astride vital lines

of communication between the eastern and western portions of the

Republika Srpska. Thus, Bosniac-Croatian Federation control of

the area holds the potential to cleave Republika Srpska in two.

Conversely, Brcko sits on the key north-south lines of

communication that connect the heartland of Bosnia-Hercegovina

with Central Europe and the lower Danube basin. Serb control of

the areas could result in an economic stranglehold over the

Bosniac-Croatian Confederation.12

The area, then, represents vital strategic terrain for all

sides, and none of the factions can be expected to give up

control of the region without some safeguards. But these

safeguards have not yet been identified because the arbitration

process has not yet commenced. Moreover, negotiations promise to

be long and complicated. Until an agreement is reached and

results of the arbitration have been implemented, an outside

military presence will be required to ensure that all factions

abide by the interim provisions of the Dayton Agreement.

Thereafter, an outside military presence may be needed to ensure

compliance with the arbitration agreement until such time that

conditions warrant a withdrawal from the area.

Return of refugees and displaced persons. Four years of war

have dislocated Bosnian society and turned nearly half the pre-
4

war population of 4.4 million into refugees or displaced

persons.13 To return and resettle such a volume of people will

take time. How much time cannot be calculated with certitude, but

one year seems inadequate, given the widespread destruction of

housing, an absence of temporary shelter, and a shattered economy

that offers few employment opportunities for returning citizens.14

Granted, international and state economic efforts are making

headway in restoring Bosnia's economy, but those efforts are

suffering fits and starts and are not likely to bear adequate

fruit by December 1996.15

The return and resettlement of refugees and displaced

persons also depends on freedom of movement. Indeed, the longterm viability of the Dayton process may depend most upon the

ability of families to return to and remain at peace in their

homes. Despite IFOR's efforts, however, freedom of movement for

ordinary citizens is not yet a reality. Nor, given current

trends, is it likely to emerge in the near term.16 Neither is it

possible to forecast with any accuracy how long it will take to

establish the trust and confidence necessary to make freedom of

movement possible.

These conditions do not argue for IFOR to escort or

safeguard returnees--IFOR should not. The Dayton Agreement

rightfully assigns responsibility for freedom of movement to the

entities. That having been said, without some form of outside,

more neutral presence for the foreseeable future to provide a

generally safe environment that permits freedom of movement, a

lasting political settlement will be difficult to construct.

Indeed, absent such a force, one or more parties may revert to a

policy of limiting movement within Bosnia. Such restrictions are

likely to lead to de facto partition of the country, which is

antithetical to U.S. objectives.

Build political institutions.17 A primary cause of this

conflict was the fact that one ethnic entity was unwilling to

live under the political control of another. These attitudes have

hardened over the course of 4 years of vicious fighting. To build

functioning political institutions will be a complex and

potentially explosive task. It will require implementing

constitutional provisions; registering voters, holding elections,

and installing governments at the local, regional, entity,

confederation, and federal levels; and establishing the necessary

cooperation across entity boundaries that will lead to sufficient

trust and confidence.18

Consensus exists within military as well as civil bodies

overseeing IFOR that an outside military presence will be

required to ensure a secure environment for political campaigning

and balloting.19 But, the timetable for holding the elections is

already under strain. Elections have been pushed back to
5

September, and issues surrounding freedom of movement, return of

refugees, the many details concerning registering voters,

campaign funding, media access, and adequate time to campaign may

lead to further delays.20 If deferred much longer, winter will

intervene, perhaps precluding elections until Spring 1997.

While an important milestone toward a political arrangement,

elections alone are not sufficient to provide a durable solution.

Additional, perhaps considerable, time will be required to turn

election results into viable governmental institutions that can

handle normal day-to-day problems associated with running a

country. But little in Bosnia is normal, and the various

governmental institutions will have to struggle with an array of

complex and daunting issues that could reignite conflict and will

take considerable time to resolve. To provide the stable and

secure environment for new government institutions to take root,

grow, and assume competent responsibility may require an extended

outside military presence.

Restore and develop Bosnia's economic system. No one

disputes that the Bosnia economy is in dire straits, and that

much outside support will be necessary to restore it. How long it

will take to establish local economies, provide jobs, and rebuild

the economic infrastructure, much less root out the bad habits of

50 years of a centralized, command economy cannot be forecast at

this moment. Unquestionably, it will not be accomplished by

December 1996.21 But at least a modicum of economic recovery must

occur to provide opportunities for demobilized soldiers, to

stimulate local and eventually regional economies that will help

to integrate the country, and to engender a perception of hope

that will cumulatively provide a disincentive to a return to

conflict.

Equally certain is that restoring the economy is not IFOR's

responsibility. That having been said, IFOR or a successor can

provide critical support to Bosnia's economic recovery. While a

number of infrastructure restoration projects are helpful (e.g.,

bridges and roads), economic recovery hinges to a large degree on

freedom of movement within a safe environment. Without such

freedom of movement, people cannot return home or migrate to

employment; commerce cannot flow; and a downward cycle of poverty

is likely to sow the seeds of future conflict.

Negotiate and implement arms control and confidence building

regimes. Under the terms of the Framework Agreement, the parties

agreed to a program to promote regional stability. This regime,

to be carried out under the auspices of the OSCE, laid down a

number of confidence and security building measures within

Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as within the former Yugoslavia, as a

whole.22 The agreement also contained provisions for an arms

control and reductions regime modeled on the Treaty on
6

Conventional Armed Forces In Europe (CFE) that limits specific

types of equipment.23 Together, these complementary initiatives

would promote increased transparency in security matters and

foster a stable regional balance that would contribute to a

durable political settlement.24

Remarkably, the parties quickly agreed to confidence and

security building measures, and practice inspections have already

taken place.25 Unfortunately, little progress has been observed in

the arms control reductions portion of the agreement, and the

180-day deadline (June 11, 1996) for an agreement looms. Granted,

the agreement contains provisions that automatically enter into

force should the parties fail to reach agreement. But, as Colonel

Jeffrey D. McCausland, arms control expert at the U.S. Army War

College, points out, these provisions may be difficult to

enforce.26 Absent an outside military force to provide leverage,

the likelihood of a successful arms reductions regime that

contributes to regional stability is doubtful. The consequences

of such a failure could be significant: the factions may engage

in an arms race that could turn Bosnia, as well as the entire

former Yugoslavia, into a tinderbox.

Implement the U.S. Equip and Train Program. While outside

the Dayton Accords, the United States sees its initiative to

equip and train the Bosniac-Croatian Federation military forces

as a complement to the OSCE regional stabilization program.27

Designed to promote a regional balance of power (as well as

satisfy domestic U.S. political pressure to arm the Muslims), the

regime has run into considerable hurdles.28 European allies and

partners are opposed to the program.29 Second, U.S. funding and

assistance have been held up because of concerns about the

presence of individual mujahideen fighters, as well as growing

Iranian influence in Bosnia.30 Additionally, international

funding--largely from Islamic nations--has stalled over fear that

the Croatian portion of the Federation might eventually use their

share of arms and equipment against their current partners.31

Indications are that, despite recent pledges, funding issues will

not be resolved in the near term.32

Nor is funding the only issue. Once resources are available,

additional time will be required for civilian contractors that

will conduct the training to survey requirements, develop

training programs, and establish operations in Bosnia. Equipment

and materiel will have to be transported to Bosnia, and

Confederation soldiers trained on its use.33 This process will

take considerable time, if adequate training is to occur.34 Time

also will be needed to build the requisite trust between Bosniac

and Croatian factions of the armed forces that will yield a

military that contributes to, rather than detracts from, regional

stability.35
7

In light of the level of conflict and the extent of damage

wrought by 4 years of war, efforts to implement the civil

portions of Dayton have accomplished much in a short time. But,

as the discussion above highlights, much remains to be done in an

equally short time. Given the number and scope of outstanding

issues, it is unlikely that the conditions for a durable

settlement can be created, much less sustained, prior to the

scheduled U.S. departure. Moreover, even if current trends

continue, it is apparent that an outside presence will be

required for the foreseeable future to oversee the military

elements of the Agreement and to provide the general security

needed for implementing the civil aspects of the Accords.36

But the possibility of extending IFOR's current mandate or

establishing a replacement force still is very much in doubt. In

deliberating this issue, it is instructive to explore what may

happen to the Dayton process absent an outside military force

capable of overseeing the Accords. Obviously, a number of

potential outcomes, each with considerable consequences for U.S.

national policy objectives and interests, are possible.

POTENTIAL OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR U.S. BOSNIAN POLICY

IF THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS FROM BOSNIA

Peaceful Resolution and a Lasting Political Settlement. On

the one hand, the entities could take responsibility for

implementing the Accords, their subsequent actions could largely

conform to the provisions of the Agreement, and the peace process

would remain on track. Under this outcome, the United States and

its allies and partners could continue to use the current

"carrot" approach that largely stresses incentives (mainly

economic) to foster cooperation between the factions. At the same

time, "sticks" (coercive measures, mostly in the form of

withholding aid or economic assistance) may have to be applied.

But, in the end, the parties fashion a long-term political

arrangement, and a viable Bosnian state emerges. Obviously, such

an outcome would meet current U.S. policy objectives.

Unfortunately, this scenario is unlikely. Despite successes

in implementing the military provisions of the peace agreement,

the underlying causes of war have not been redressed. Given the

current levels of mistrust within Bosnia, the factions would

hedge on continued compliance with the military provisions of the

Agreement. Without an outside military presence to enforce these

conditions, an increasing spiral of non-compliance could occur.

At that point, any one or combination of friction points could

spark a return to fighting.37 In brief, an optimistic outcome is

very doubtful. Far more likely is that the peace process would

unravel in Spring or Summer 1997.
8

Limited Violence. In this case, implementation of the

military and civil portions of the Agreement proceeds, but at a

slow pace and with considerable fits and starts. Violence may

recur, but at relatively low levels that the factions can survive

and the international community can "tolerate." Such an outcome

is likely to obstruct reconstruction of Bosnia's war-torn economy

and economic infrastructure. More importantly, even limited

violence will inhibit, if not preclude, freedom of movement and

return of refugees, leading to de facto ethnic partition of the

country. Such a result could lead, in turn, to a major

confrontation among irredentist factions.

Absent major confrontations among the factions, the United

States and its partners and allies may be able to continue to use

"carrots" and occasional "sticks" to move the process along. Such

sticks would be limited and would fall short of the use of force,

and would rely largely on economic (e.g., denial or delay of aid

packages, withdrawal from reconstruction efforts, or sanctions)

and diplomatic (e.g., denial of active membership or

participation in international and regional organizations)

initiatives.

Occasional major flare-ups of violence might require a

limited military response. Given a withdrawal of ground forces,

such a reaction would have to rely on air power to bring the

recalcitrant party(ies) into line. Given the past NATO experience

with the use of air power--particularly the air strikes of

August-September 1995--this option appears appealing. But the

efficacy of this example may be overplayed.38 The rise of the

Croatian Army and the growing proficiency of Bosniac forces that

culminated in the Bosniac-Croatian summer offensives (1995) which

overturned the existing strategic status quo in Bosnia,39 Serbia's

refusal to intervene under pressure from international sanctions,

deployment of the French and British Rapid Reaction Forces, and

evidence of a NATO consensus to take decisive action may have

been more compelling reasons that drove the factions to the

bargaining table.

Moreover, resort to air power faces considerable hurdles.

For example, European allies have long opposed reliance on the

air power option.40 And, despite the apparent success of the

August-September 1995 air strikes, intra-Alliance tensions were

rising over the scope and duration of the bombing effort.41 Such

frictions may reemerge, especially if the United States withdraws

from IFOR against the wishes of allies and partners.42 Further,

allies in the region might not grant the United States basing

rights to conduct such operations.43 The sum of these obstacles

may leave the United States unable to mount air operations in

sufficient force to deter or terminate another round of

fighting.44
9

Finally, a return to even limited violence among the

factions is not in U.S. national interests. Given existing

animosities that likely would be fed by irredentist pressures in

the event of de facto partition, the potential for conflict to

escalate rapidly to large-scale violence will remain high for the

foreseeable future. To halt any resulting violence may require

the application of military force, which is likely to prove

contentious within the Alliance. The better option, therefore,

would be to prevent the return of violence in the first place by

extending the IFOR deployment or establishing a credible

successor force.

A Return To War. Should the factions resort to large-scale

violence to achieve their objectives, the United States and its

allies and partners would possess a number of policy options.

These alternatives could be used individually, but more likely

two or more of them would be combined to increase their efficacy.

Thus, while the discussion below examines each option singly,

policymakers would implement a comprehensive collection of

actions.45

Containment. The United States and its allies and partners

undoubtedly would attempt to resume a policy of "containing" the

conflict to prevent its spread beyond Bosnia-Hercegovina. This

minimalist approach seeks to preclude spillover into a wider

Balkan war. U.S. allies and partners are likely to support such a

policy because it is in keeping with the long-standing objectives

of countries in the region.46

Even should further fighting remain within the borders of

Bosnia-Hercegovina, consequences of a renewed conflict could

extend well beyond. For example, containing the conflict may not

prevent another massive flow of refugees from fleeing the country

and stressing an already taxed refugee assistance system in

Europe.47 This would likely rankle U.S. allies and partners

already struggling to cope with the existing refugee problem--

particularly should European states blame the United States for

the latest influx. Nor would containing the conflict prevent the

probable "slaughter of innocents" any better than it did in the 4

years preceding Dayton.48

Even if successful in the short term, a policy of

containment alone may not succeed in the long term. Any number of

scenarios could lead to a wider conflict within the former

Yugoslavia, or within the Balkans as a whole.49 Thus, while

containment is superficially attractive, a more preferable option

is to pursue policies that inhibit a return to conflict in the

first place.
10

Sanctions and Embargo. In conjunction with a policy of

containment, the United States might seek to reimpose diplomatic

and economic sanctions as a means of applying leverage to halt

the fighting. Constructing such a regime might be difficult,

particularly if NATO allies and IFOR partners perceive that U.S.

actions contributed to the resumed fighting. Further, a number of

difficult questions would have to be addressed:

• Would Europe or the international community be willing to

impose sanctions on Croatia or Serbia if those states are

perceived to be complying with provisions of the Agreement?

• Will the international community impose sanctions on the

Bosniacs--who are widely perceived as the victims of this war?

• How does the international community impose sanctions on

one or more violators of the Accords without punishing those

acting only in self-defense?

• Should the June 1996 elections in Russia result in a more

nationalistic, hard-line government, would Moscow support

sanctions?

• Given recent U.S. policy disputes with the People's

Republic of China, would Beijing continue to cooperate in the

U.N. Security Council?

Even if the United States successfully resolves these issues

and reconstructs a sanctions regime, there is no guarantee that

such a regime would be effective in a timely fashion. Indeed, in

light of past experience in this conflict, the likelihood is

small that sanctions would succeed in terminating a war before

the belligerents suffered considerable casualties, generated a

new and potentially massive flow of refugees, or the conflict

expanded beyond Bosnia.

Limited Application of Military Force. Should diplomatic and

economic initiatives fail to halt the fighting or there is

significant potential of the conflict spreading, the United

States may feel compelled to undertake limited military action.

This option perforce would rely primarily on the use of air

strikes against the offending party(ies). As the earlier

discussion indicated, however, such an option may not be executed

without considerable political cost and limited prospects for

decisive results.

Permit a Military Solution. This option would allow the

factions to pursue a military conclusion to the conflict that

leads to the defeat of one or more entities. This course of

action presents a high degree of risk. First, there is no

guarantee that the conflict could be contained within the borders
11

of the former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Second, the U.S.-sponsored equip and train program for the

Bosniac-Croatian Confederation Army is not yet underway and is

unlikely to produce an effective force by December 1996.50 Thus,

an eventual "victor" acceptable to the United States and its

allies cannot be assured. Third, there is no assurance that a

viable Bosnian state would emerge from the fighting.51

A supposedly "successful" military outcome might require the

United States and Europe to endure a protracted conflict with its

attendant casualties. Even in the event of a rapid military

conclusion, the United States and Europe would have to

countenance the retribution and resulting carnage that would

likely result. They also would have to be willing to allow a

precedent for the use of force, not only in international

relations, but, more dangerously, for resolving ethnic issues.

Reintroduction of Ground Forces. If the United States

concludes that containment will not be effective, or if fighting

becomes too severe, national leaders may feel compelled to

reintroduce ground troops. At best, such an option is highly

problematic. In the first instance, generating support for it

would be difficult, as policymakers may encounter significant

domestic reaction.52 At the same time, gaining external support

may be equally challenging. NATO allies may have been

sufficiently disenchanted that they will be unwilling to

reintroduce forces. Non-NATO partners may not be willing to

provide forces or funds to support future operations. In short,

if perceived as having precipitated the crisis by withdrawing

from Bosnia, the United States may be unable to build a consensus

to return.

Should the United States be able to achieve sufficient

domestic and international consensus to reintroduce ground

troops, redeploying those forces will be no easy task. Even if

fighting has subsided, conditions are likely to be much less

favorable than at present. And, if forces are required to

intervene between combatants or on behalf of one or more

factions, they may have to undertake full-scale air and ground

combat operations and to suffer the casualties that will result.

While those casualties may be relatively low, they may still be

higher than those experienced to date in the ongoing IFOR

operations or that could be expected under current trends.

As the discussion outlined above underscores, the more

probable results of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR or the absence of

a credible replacement force would lead to resumed fighting, with

a high potential for significant violence. Further, the outcomes

clearly run counter to stated U.S. national objectives and

interests and should be avoided.53 The best means to preclude such

results may require an extended outside military presence in
12

Bosnia.

REPERCUSSIONS BEYOND BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

The United States became involved in the conflict in the

Balkans not only because of events in Bosnia, but because broader

geo-strategic conditions impelled the United States to intervene.

Without a lasting political settlement in Bosnia and stability in

the region, those underlying circumstances will not have been

eliminated. Indeed, a U.S. withdrawal is likely to exacerbate

frictions within NATO and undercut U.S. influence in Europe and

around the world. Such a decline cannot but have an adverse

effect on U.S. global leadership and security policy, which will

make it difficult, at best, and impossible, at worst, to achieve

long-standing U.S. national interests and objectives. Thus, the

repercussions of a U.S. withdrawal from IFOR would reverberate

far beyond the borders of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Consequences for the United States and NATO. By intervening

in Bosnia, NATO has placed its future credibility as the leading

security organization in Europe at stake.54 A U.S. decision to

withdraw from IFOR or its successor that resulted in renewed

violence undoubtedly would diminish NATO's credibility. A failed

peace may fatally undermine NATO's ability to remain the

centerpiece of Europe's emerging security architecture.55

U.S. standing within NATO also might be weakened. Even

before U.S. intervention in the conflict, many allies within NATO

criticized weak or absent U.S. leadership in the crisis.56 A U.S.

withdrawal would likely spark further criticism, driving a wedge

deeper between trans-Atlantic partners.57 Moreover, if an

unraveling of the Dayton political agreement follows close on the

heels of an IFOR withdrawal, the United States runs the risk of

being blamed for "losing the peace."58 Thus, long-term U.S.

political leadership in NATO could hinge directly on the U.S.

decision to continue IFOR or to participate in a successor.

A reduced U.S. role in NATO, in turn, could affect adversely

a number of significant U.S. initiatives that presently do not

enjoy universal support within the Alliance. For example, the

concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), for which IFOR

serves as a prototype, could be dealt a death blow if the United

States is perceived to lack sufficient commitment to support

difficult operations.59 An expanded role for Partnership for Peace

(PfP) beyond its current programs could suffer if NATO allies are

unwilling to underwrite the costs (political and economic)

because of doubts about a U.S. commitment to NATO. Moreover,

misgivings could reduce already hesitant support within NATO for

enlargement.60
13

The outcome of NATO's role in Bosnia also could affect the

evolving relationship between the Alliance and France that has

resulted from cooperative efforts in IFOR. As Christopher Bellamy

of the Independent (London) noted, as a result of collaboration

in NATO Bosnia policy and within IFOR, " . . . for the first time

in 30 years the French now work in harmony with the Atlantic

Alliance."61 This is no small accomplishment. Increased French

cooperation within NATO, especially in the military structures of

the Alliance, could hinge on the outcome of NATO's Bosnia

mission. Undoubtedly, if the French perceive the peace agreement

collapsed because of a U.S. withdrawal, the pace of French

cooperation with the Alliance would be adversely affected. Paris

also might accelerate its demands for "a restructuring of the

Alliance" that would diminish U.S. influence within NATO.62

Cumulatively, these issues could result in a decreasing spiral of

U.S. influence within the Alliance as a whole.

More broadly, a perceived "failure" in Bosnia because of a

U.S. withdrawal could have consequences for European public

support of NATO. In short, why pay for the expense of NATO if the

United States is not prepared to support its allies? Why should

Europeans not throw their support behind the WEU or another

aspect of the "European Defense Pillar"? Similarly, will European

publics continue to support a U.S. military presence? At the same

time, U.S. public support of NATO or for a U.S. forward military

presence in Europe might decline. A backlash also could diminish

domestic backing for future vigorous foreign policy initiatives,

as well as lead to reduced support for emerging democracies and

purely humanitarian relief operations. Finally, the combined

effect of an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude with

weakened support for NATO could fragment the Atlantic Alliance,

leading to the renationalization of European security agendas.

Taken together, these outcomes might result in a reduced

U.S. military presence in Europe that would have a number of

adverse consequences. On the one hand, past history indicates

that forces removed from Europe tend to be eliminated from the

force structure, as well.63 Moreover, the loss of forward

stationed units and their logistics infrastructure undoubtedly

would affect the U.S. ability to project power into Europe, the

Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East. More importantly, a

reduced U.S. presence in Europe or a complete withdrawal of

forward stationed U.S. forces would adversely affect U.S.

economic, diplomatic, and military influence on the continent.

None of these outcomes serves the long-term interests of the

United States, either in Europe or world-wide.

Broader Consequences in Europe. A U.S. withdrawal from IFOR,

or a failure to participate in a successor force, may give the

impression that the United States is uninterested in, or at least
14

gives a low priority to, ensuring a Balkan security order. Such

an impression sends mixed signals to states in the region, as

well as throughout Europe, about a prolonged U.S. commitment to

security and stability. This puzzlement about U.S. intentions

could greatly affect other, ongoing U.S. efforts in the region

(e.g., Kosovo, mediation of tensions between Greece and Albania,

ameliorating strained relations between Greece and the Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ensuring good relations between

Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and

efforts to defuse crises between Greece and Turkey) that have

been successful, to date, in promoting stability.

Confusion about U.S. security aims has tremendous

implications for Central and Eastern Europe as well, where a

number of nations already perceive themselves caught in a

security vacuum between Western Europe and Russia. U.S. actions

in the Balkans may cause them draw their own conclusions on a

U.S. commitment to a security arrangement for Central and Eastern

Europe.64 As a result, states may undertake policies (e.g., hardline positions with neighboring governments that harbor ethnic

brethren, renationalization of defense policies, increased

spending on defense at the expense of domestic requirements,

predominance of military over civil authorities, threats, or use

of force, etc.) that undercut overarching U.S. objectives or

interests.

Should war return to Bosnia-Hercegovina and conflict spill

over into the rest of the Balkans, the consequences could be

significant. For example, while the potential for the conflict to

spread into Central Europe (via Hungary, perhaps because of the

Hungarian minorities in the former Yugoslavia) is unlikely, it

cannot be dismissed. More likely is the high potential for

renewed conflict placing the stability and security of

Southeastern Europe at risk.65 Plausible scenarios abound, ranging

from ethnic strife in Kosovo to a worst case scenario, expansion

of the fighting that brings Greece and Turkey--two NATO allies--

into the conflict on opposite sides.

On a broader, pan-European level, resumed fighting could

establish a precedent for using force to resolve political

problems or change intra- or inter-state boundaries. Moreover,

renewed conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina runs the risk of setting a

precedent for establishing ethnically pure states. This model

could have significant repercussions for states within Central,

Eastern, and Southeastern Europe that confront their own ethnic

issues.66

Consequences for U.S. Global Security Interests. The

inability of the United States to shape an enduring political

arrangement in Bosnia and a resultant return to violence is
15

likely to have indirect consequences for U.S. global security

interests, as well. Should nations question the depth of U.S.

commitment to security and stability or its willingness to

confront aggression, for example, U.S. influence might be

diminished in key areas of the world.67 At the same time,

potential opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S.

interests at low levels without fear of penalty. At the very

least, subnational and transnational groups may draw the lesson

that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their agendas in this

new security order. In combination, these phenomena could

contribute to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad.

Eventually, the United States might find its deterrent capability

eroded to the point that adversaries might directly confront

major U.S. interests.68

The potential damage that may be done to evolving NATORussian and U.S.-Russian relations is also significant, for

Russian participation in IFOR has global implications. Throughout

the IFOR deployment, relations with Russian forces have been

excellent.69 But more critical is the growing trust being built

between NATO, the United States, and Russia after 50 years of

intense confrontation. How that trust might be affected by a U.S.

withdrawal from Bosnia and a subsequent collapse of the Dayton

Accords is not known. On the one hand, nationalist elements

within the Duma, the government, and the military who have

opposed Moscow's participation in IFOR might use a U.S.

withdrawal to their political advantage at home.70 On the other

hand, the absence of a strong U.S. presence in Bosnia might

entice a more nationalist leadership, if one emerges, to

intervene on the Serbian side of the crisis. In the event of

renewed violence, U.S. support of the Bosniacs against Bosnian

Serbs would set back gains made to date. At the very least,

Russia could hamstring future efforts within the Contact Group to

mediate a crisis.71

Policymakers also must factor into their decisions the wider

consequences of an IFOR withdrawal that creates a power vacuum in

Bosnia. As the old saw goes, "power abhors a vacuum," and the

most likely candidate to fill that void offers the United States

little comfort. A U.S. withdrawal before the conditions for a

more permanent political compromise have been achieved may give

Sarajevo the impression that it has no choice but to turn to Iran

for further assistance. An increased Iranian presence in the

Balkans could destabilize the region, and certainly is not in the

interests of either the United States or its European allies and

partners who already oppose the limited Iranian presence in

Bosnia.72 Moreover, such an increase in Iranian influence

undoubtedly would have significant consequences for U.S. policy

and interests not only in Europe, but throughout the Maghreb, the

Middle East, and Southwest Asia.
16

The consequences of an IFOR withdrawal before the conditions

for a durable political solution have been established could be

severe, with U.S. policies (whether for Bosnia, the Balkans,

NATO, Europe, or globally) suffering serious setbacks. Moreover,

most potential outcomes of such an IFOR departure run counter to

U.S. national interests. These conditions argue, therefore,

either for extending IFOR's mission and adapting its structure to

changed conditions or creating a follow-on force capable of

implementing the Dayton Accords under anticipated circumstances.

In developing either option, it would be prudent to begin by

exploring potential alternatives for a force beyond December

1996.

OPTIONS FOR A FOLLOW-ON FORCE

While an eventual force obviously will depend upon the

course of events over the coming months, it is possible to

sketch, in broad terms, a number of alternatives.73 First,

although the United States and other major coalition members

continue to adhere to roughly a 12-month limit for participating

in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR,74 continuing IFOR should not be

dismissed out of hand. Much can happen before December. Should

tensions rise over such issues as freedom of movement, return of

refugees and displaced persons, collapse of the Bosniac-Croat

Confederation (e.g., over Mostar), or hotly contested or

postponed elections, compliance with the military aspects of

Dayton could stall or be reversed, and violence could once again

flare. Even if unlikely, this potential must be taken into

account during deliberations.

A second option would be a peacekeeping effort under the

United Nations. But, as Stanley Sloan of the Congressional

Research Office points out, "There is absolutely no European

desire to return to an UNPROFOR-type force that was limited by

its military capabilities, its peacekeeping mandate, and U.N.

operational control."75 Furthermore, given the perceived

reputation of the United Nations in Bosnia, it is highly unlikely

that some form of U.N. military mission would be welcome or

successful in overseeing the peace agreement.76 In sum, a "U.N.

solution" is not viable.

Another option cautiously being touted is for "Europe" to

take on the responsibility for a follow-on force.77 This

alternative faces significant obstacles. No European power or

group of states has expressed a willingness to take on the

formidable challenge of leading a European coalition. Nor do

European security institutions represent a credible alternative

to IFOR. The OSCE, for instance, lacks a military capability. The

European Union (EU) with its military arm, the WEU, is the sole

remaining organization remotely capable of mounting a similar

operation. But earlier EU political efforts to defuse the Bosnian
17

crisis failed and may have fatally tainted the organization in

the eyes of the factions. Moreover, the WEU has neither

undertaken nor exercised such a major endeavor, and many

Europeans express little confidence in the WEU's ability to

manage an operation of such scope.78 And Jose Cutileiro, the WEU's

Secretary General, has stated publicly that the WEU will not

replace NATO in Bosnia.79

The practical aspects of crafting a "coalition of the

willing" under WEU leadership also present a number of daunting

obstacles. First, the three major members of the WEU (France,

Germany, and Britain) have stated repeatedly that they will not

remain in Bosnia if the United States departs.80 Second, would PfP

partners currently in IFOR contribute to a follow-on force absent

a NATO imprimatur?81 Third, how would such a WEU-led coalition

include Russian forces, which currently serve with the U.S.

division under carefully crafted conditions? Fourth, how would

the United States, which could be expected to provide key

supporting elements (e.g., theater level commu- nications,

intelligence gathering and dissemination, strategic lift, and,

possibly, a rapid reaction force), interface at the political

level with a WEU-led force?

Even if the WEU could construct a coalition, several

significant difficulties remain. For example, nations that could

be expected to be major contributors to a WEU-led force also

participated in UNPROFOR.82 Would the factions give a WEU

coalition the same deference granted to IFOR, or would they see

it merely as a new UNPROFOR? If the factions conclude the latter,

then compliance with the military provisions of the Accords may

slow or reverse. Factions might increasingly challenge the

residual force, leading to new outbreaks of violence and a

breakdown of the Dayton Agreement.

Finally, there is the question of whether a WEU-led

coalition in Bosnia is in U.S. national interests. The United

States has a considerable stake in the outcome of the Bosnian

peace process, and relinquishing leadership of overseeing the

Dayton Accords to the WEU undoubtedly would result in a loss of

significant U.S. influence over what happens in Bosnia. Is the

United States willing to surrender its ability to guide the

course of operational events in Bosnia? If dissatisfied with

conditions, will U.S. pressure to influence day-to-day operations

create frictions similar to those that severely strained NATO in

November-December 1994?83 More importantly, is the United States

willing to relinquish its capacity to shape the overall political

outcome in Bosnia, especially if conditions lead to outcomes

(e.g., de facto partition) that are antithetical to U.S.

policies?

On a broader scale, what effects might such an option have
18

on NATO? If a WEU-led effort fails, would NATO be blamed? If a

WEU effort succeeds, what are the ramifications for NATO's longterm viability? In either event, the repercussions could

adversely affect the stated U.S. goal of maintaining NATO's

central role in Europe's security architecture? And, should NATO

be undermined, will the United States be able to shape the

European security environment?84 While answers to these questions

are debatable, they are not likely to lead to the conclusion that

a WEU-led coalition will best serve U.S. objectives and

interests.

A final alternative is variously referred to as "NATOminus," "IFOR Lite," or, more generally, "IFOR II."85 Essentially

a pared down version of the current force, IFOR II would continue

to operate under NATO control, but the size, structure, and

composition of the residual force would be adapted to changed

strategic and operational conditions. In tailoring the residual

force, IFOR II could follow two branches: without or with

substantial participation of U.S. ground troops.

The first instance suffers from drawbacks similar to the

WEU-led coalition. For example, in light of the absence of

significant U.S. combat troops (and potentially a number of other

nations), would the factions in Bosnia view the residual force as

IFOR II or UNPROFOR II? Granted, the expected environment would

differ from the conditions under which UNPROFOR operated, but

would circum- stances be sufficiently changed to alter the

perceptions of those who viewed UNPROFOR with disdain and

generally ignored it? Moreover, should factions begin to

challenge implementation, would the residual force have the

requisite power to enforce the many and varied military

provisions of the Dayton Accords? Or, might forces be reduced to

the point that one or more factions perceive that they could

cease compliance without fear of severe penalty?86 Should fighting

resume, would a residual force have to resort to air strikes--

while their forces are on the ground and U.S. troops are not--to

quell the violence?87

Answers to these questions are not possible at this time.

But the number and complexity of these issues do not suggest a

significant likelihood of a successful outcome. This judgment,

therefore, argues for a more substantial IFOR II that includes a

U.S. ground component of sufficient size and power to deter

breaches of and, if required, to enforce the military provisions

of the Dayton Agreement. In designing such a residual force, the

critical first step is to examine the potential roles that it

might be called upon to perform.

THE MILITARY ROLE IN UNDERWRITING A LASTING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Near universal agreement exists that a long-term resolution
19

of the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina lies in the factions,

assisted by the international community, implementing the civil

portions of the peace agreement.88 The most difficult challenge

may be in repairing the damage done by the war to the social

fabric of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the individual and collective

psyches of its populace. Fracture lines existed in Yugoslav

society long before the outbreak of the conflict. In the 4 years

of war, these cracks have become chasms, and full healing may

require generations. Whether the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina can

learn to live together in relative peace after these events is

arguable under any circumstances.89 But absent successful

implementation of the civil portions of the agreement, the final

result is all too apparent.

These daunting challenges, for the most part, fall to civil

authorities to implement. But that fact should not obscure the

reality that, for the foreseeable future, IFOR or a successor

ultimately holds the key to implementing effectively the civil

elements of the Accords. Without NATO military forces and their

partners to monitor the myriad and important provisions of the

peace agreement, conflict will likely recur. Equally important,

IFOR has established and continues to oversee a stable and secure

environment that allows the civil government and international

organizations to perform their missions. IFOR also provides

opportunities for factions to work together, building the tenuous

bonds of trust that over time may heal societal wounds. In short,

with an outside military presence, there is a chance for an

enduring political accommodation. Without such a force, little

optimism exists for such an outcome.

The natural question that follows is what specific roles

should IFOR (or its successor) perform? First, and foremost,

military forces must continue the considerable and critical

requirement to oversee enforcement of the military provisions of

the peace agreement. As discussed earlier, each provision must be

continuously monitored, reexamined, assessed, and enforced. Only

in this manner can IFOR sustain a safe, secure environment in

which the other elements of the peace process can function.

IFOR or a residual force also can play an important role

beyond the strict enforcement of the military provisions of the

Accords. IFOR currently provides a key deterrent to violence.

Prolonged peace creates an inertia that inhibits the drive to

return to war. IFOR additionally provides a clear example of how

professional military forces execute their duties and sets the

tone for military forces in the region. They highlight the

subordination of military force to civil control. Use of Joint

Military Commissions and military contacts also fosters military

cooperation among the factions and contributes to the habit of

using negotiation rather than force to resolve issues.90 IFOR also

acts as an honest (or at least is perceived as the most honest)
20

broker in negotiations between the parties.91 IFOR has played and

can continue to perform, therefore, a key role in building trust

and confidence among the factions.

As part of building trust and confidence, IFOR can assist

the OSCE in monitoring the regional stabilization portion of the

framework agreement.92 While under the aegis of OSCE to negotiate

and implement, most IFOR members have considerable experience in

this arena as a result of their participation in OSCE's extensive

confidence and security-building measures and the CFE Treaty.93

Further, as part of their responsibilities under the Dayton

Accords, IFOR has already overseen the factions' withdrawal from

the zone of separation, the establishment of the Inter-Entity

Boundary Line, the creation and enforcement of heavy weapons

exclusion zones, the storage of air defense systems, the movement

to and monitoring of forces in cantonment areas, and supervision

of the demobilizations process. These skills and experiences

naturally lend themselves to assisting the OSCE in data

collection and confirmation, supervising destruction procedures,

and monitoring overall verification of the provisions of an

eventual arms control regime. A continued military presence also

provides a strong incentive for the factions to comply with the

agreements--particularly reduction and destruction provisions.

IFOR also can perform a number of actions beyond the scope

of overseeing the military and arms control portions of the peace

agreement. As envisaged at Dayton, IFOR is and can continue to:

. . . fulfill its [IFOR] supporting tasks, within the

limits of its assigned principal tasks and available

resources, and on request, which include the following:

(a) to help create secure conditions for the conduct by

others of other tasks associated with the peace

settlement, including free and fair elections;

(b) to assist the movement of organizations in the

accomplishment of humanitarian missions;

(c) to assist the UNHCR and other international

organizations in their humanitarian missions;

(d) to observe and prevent interference with the

movement of civilian populations, refugees, and

displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to

deliberate violence to life and person; and,

(e) to monitor the clearing of minefields and

obstacles.94

While some observers and policymakers might object to IFOR
21

performing these support tasks,95 civil and military leaders must

understand that strict adherence solely to overseeing the

military provisions of the peace agreement is short-sighted and

actually could prolong the need for an outside military presence.

This duality of military and civil support actions will

require IFOR to hew to a fine line between its primary and

secondary military functions. In this vein, a number of cautions

deserve comment. In the short term, IFOR must ensure that support

to civil operations does not detract from the ability to conduct

military operations in support of the Accords. As indicated

earlier, oversight of the military provisions of the agreement is

a continuous and important process. But, as implementation

proceeds, demands on military forces should be reduced, and IFOR

(or its successor) should be able to shift safely to other

issues.96

In providing support to civil authorities, military and

civil leaders must ensure that civil organizations, not military

forces, take the lead in implementing the civil portions of the

agreement and in conducting humanitarian operations. The

underlying problems in Bosnia are essentially political,

economic, and social in nature; military power alone cannot lead

to an enduring political solution. Civil issues must be resolved

by civil acts. Military forces can support the process, but civil

organizations, particularly organs of the Bosnian government,

must begin functioning and take on the difficult task of running

their country and bringing peace to their land.

Policymakers need to devise, therefore, a comple- mentary

dual-track program that makes use of the special capabilities

that the military can bring to conflict resolution, but which

does not make a stable political understanding in Bosnia depend

upon an outside military presence. In short, as designed in the

Dayton Agreement, the factions are and must remain ultimately

responsible for a peaceful resolution of the underlying causes of

the conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

NATO military forces and their partners in IFOR have played

a critical and successful role in halting conflict in Bosnia and

bringing stability to the region. But, short-term military

success does not lead necessarily to a long-term political

arrangement. That having been said, the basis of a lasting

settlement will depend to a significant degree on the ability of

an outside military presence to sustain a secure environment that

supports the other elements of the peace process.

While IFOR has established such conditions, that foundation

is fragile. If prevailing circumstances are not sustained, the
22

current hiatus in Bosnia-Hercegovina may represent little more

than an operational pause before the factions return to using

force to achieve their goals. Such an outcome obviously would

stymie U.S. national objectives in Bosnia.

But more than U.S. objectives in Bosnia are at stake. A

failed U.S.-brokered and led agreement in Bosnia will have

considerable repercussions for U.S. policy and national interests

well beyond the Balkans. NATO's credibility could be irrevocably

damaged. Certainly, U.S. leadership in the Alliance would be

called into question. And, surrendering leadership in the Bosnian

crisis may be construed as another example of U.S. disengagement

from European, as well as global, security issues. Worse yet, a

perceived foreign policy failure is likely to reduce U.S. public

support for substantial engagement in international affairs,

leading to an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude that

further constrains U.S. foreign policy. The cumulative effect of

these phenomena could contribute to a downward spiral of U.S.

influence abroad.

The United States, therefore, cannot simply engage 12 months

and then withdraw from Bosnia, leaving no adequate residual force

to oversee the military provisions of the Dayton Accords.

Instead, the United States must begin now to review its position

on participating in IFOR or a successor beyond the scheduled

December 1996 deadline. During this reexamination, policymakers

should focus less on the narrow application of military power

within a constrained time limit and more broadly on achieving

U.S. policy objectives in Bosnia, the Balkans, Europe, and

globally.

In their deliberations, policymakers should take into

account a number of factors. If current trends hold, a smaller

residual force may be adequate. While the exact size and

composition of a such a force will be dictated by future events,

the force must possess sufficient military capability to ensure

continued adherence to the provisions of the various agreements.

This would include the ability to inhibit violations of the

agreement, to deter factions from violence, to provide rapid and

violent response to any breaches of the ceasefire, to ensure

force protection, and to provide sufficient reconnaissance and

information acquisition capabilities to support operations.97

These requirements argue for a coalition force that contains

roughly 5-7 maneuver brigades (or, approximately one-half of the

current IFOR commitment) attack helicopters, transport

helicopters, intelligence collection, communications, and

logistical support. At the same time, a need for Civil Affairs

units, Psychological Operations personnel, Military Police, and

Engineers that can perform dual tasks for military and civil

operations may alter the proportion of combat versus combat
23

support and combat service support units required for a residual

force.98

U.S. national interests, the course of events in the

Balkans, and the absence of a viable alternative force, argue for

continued NATO and, especially, U.S. leadership in further

efforts to resolve the Bosnian crisis. The ability to lead

subsequent efforts will, to a degree, be determined by the level

of forces the United States is willing to provide. Given the size

of an overall residual force, the U.S. ground contribution could

consist of one maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and

appropriate combat support and combat service support units.99

Additionally, the United States should provide unique

capabilities essential for conduct of the mission (e.g., attack

helicopters, intelligence, theater communications, civil affairs

and psychological operations). The United States may also wish to

offer the core of a division headquarters.

How long U.S. military forces should continue to assist in

implementing the peace agreement cannot be forecast with

confidence at this point. But it is apparent at the moment that

one year will not be sufficient to establish conditions conducive

to a long-range political solution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. At the

same time, factions must be made aware that an extension of U.S.

participation is not an openended commitment. In sum, U.S. forces

should be prepared to remain in IFOR or its successor until such

time that U.S. national objectives are achieved or have been

adapted to changed strategic conditions.

Decisions surrounding continued U.S. participation in

overseeing the peace agreement in Bosnia will be neither easy nor

insignificant. Nonetheless, they will have to be made, and in the

not too distant future. Now, therefore, is the time to examine

the issues that will determine whether the United States will

continue to lead efforts to ensure a long-term political

settlement in Bosnia that will further contribute to U.S.

national objectives and interests in Europe and globally. In

these deliberations participants must keep in mind that achieving

U.S. objectives in Bosnia is more akin to running a marathon than

a sprint. And, like a successful marathon runner, the United

States must demonstrate determination, endurance, and the ability

to withstand temporary pain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• The United States should base its decision on continued

participation in IFOR on whether U.S. national objectives and

interests have been achieved, not on a rigid timetable.

• Should current trends continue, the United States should

participate in IFOR, or some residual military mission, beyond
24

December 1996.

• NATO must remain the regional security organization

responsible for overseeing the military aspects of the peace

agreement.

• The size and composition of a follow-on force should be

adapted to the pace of compliance with the peace accords and

conditions in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Given the anticipated size of

an overall residual force (roughly two divisions) and assuming

that the United States desires to retain a leadership role in

that force:

-- The U.S. ground contribution should consist of one

maneuver brigade, an aviation brigade, and appropriate combat

support and combat service support units.

-- The United States may also wish to consider

providing the core of a division headquarters.

-- Additionally, the United States should be prepared

to contribute unique capabilities (e.g., attack helicopters,

intelligence and surveillance, communications, aviation, civil

affairs and PSYOP), as required.

-- The United States should offer Russia the

opportunity for continued association with U.S. forces.

• Should the United States decide to extend its

participation in IFOR, or an alternative residual force, the U.S.

Government must:

-- Begin building now a bipartisan consensus in

Congress to support operations beyond December 1996.

-- Build consensus with NATO allies and partners

currently participating in IFOR to reapportion responsibilities,

as required.

-- Ensure international and European organizations

shoulder their responsibilities<R>under the peace agreement.

ENDNOTES

1. Versions of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in

Bosnia and Hercegovina [hereafter GFAP] may be found at a number

of INTERNET sites. See, for example, Department of State--

http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/www/current/bosnia/bosagre e.html; NATO

Gopher--gopher://coa.shape.nato.int:70/11/bosnia or IFOR home

page--http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-home.html.
25

2. See, for example, statements from President Clinton (Ann

Devroy and Helen Dewar, "U.S. Troops Vital to Bosnia Peace,

Clinton Says," The Washington Post, November 28, 1995, p. 1.);

Secretary of State Christopher (Michael Dobbs, "Congress Raising

Questions About Bosnia Exit Strategy," The Washington Post,

November 30, 1995, p. 1, 32); and Secretary of Defense Perry

(Rowan Scarborough, "If Bosnian Serbs Renege, Mission is Off,

Says Perry," The Washington Times, November 27, 1995, p. 1)

setting roughly a 1-year duration of U.S. participation. For

official U.N. and NATO mandates, see U.N. Security Council

Resolution 1031, December 15, 1995; and "Statement by Acting

Secretary General at the Press Briefing following North Atlantic

Council Final Approval of OPLAN 10405 and of SACEUR's ACTORD

Request," December 16, 1995, respectively, which are archived at

NATO Gopher--gopher://coa.shape.nato.int:70/11/bosnia.

3. How the deadline is interpreted may be open to question.

For example, one might conclude that the deadline meant that all

forces would have to leave Bosnia before December 20, 1996. On

the other hand, Secretary of Defense Perry recently indicated

that redeployment might commence about that time. See Thomas L.

Friedman, "Exit Strategy," The New York Times, April 24, 1996, p.

21. Impediments to such a reassessment are considerable. The

potential political risks of extending the deployment of U.S.

forces are high. Key members of the Executive Branch have

repeatedly reaffirmed a December withdrawal date, and a retreat

from the current policy could have considerable domestic

backlash. (See, for example, Jack Kelley, "Defense Chief Stands

By Bosnia Plan," USA Today, April 1, 1996, pp. 1, 11; Bradley

Graham, "Shalikashvili Again Endorses Bosnia Withdrawal

Schedule," The Washington Post, April 3, 1996, p. 16; and

Friedman, "Exit Strategy," p. 21.) Moreover, congressional

support for an extension is questionable and increases political

risks. Congressional support for the original deployment was

tepid, at best, and often couched in terms of supporting the

troops but not the decision to send them. (See, for example,

Katharine Q. Seelye, "Some G.O.P. Senators Refusing to Back Dole

on Bosnia Mission," The New York Times, December 7, 1995, p. 5;

Ray Gugliotta, "House Freshmen Remain Skeptical of Bosnia Plan,"

The Washington Post, December 13, 1995, p. 35; and "Senate

Proposal on Bosnia," The Washington Post, December 14, 1995, p.

39.) Nor is current support overwhelming. See, for instance,

"Reports of Delay in Return of Troops Upset Rep. Gilman"

[Chairman, House International Relations Committee], Baltimore

Sun, April 27, 1996, p. 10; and Senator Arlen Spector's comment:

"The American people and Congress are not going to be disposed to

leaving our forces there beyond a year," in The Washington Times, March 28, 1996, p. 4.) That having been said, the strategic risks

of a premature withdrawal of U.S. ground troops from Bosnia

outweigh the potential domestic consequences.
26

4. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO],

February 1996, p. 35. Nor have these goals changed appreciably

over the course of the Clinton administration. Cf., A National

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC:

GPO, February 1995, p. 35; and A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: GPO, July 1994, p.

21. Moreover, as Edward Mortimer points out, military success

alone can lead to partition, which runs counter to U.S.

objectives and interests. Edward Mortimer, "Bosnia's Fault

Lines," Financial Times (London), May 22, 1996, p. 12.

5. See, for example, Martin Sieff, "NATO Sees U.S. Staying

in Bosnia," The Washington Times, May 8, 1996, p. 1; Carl Bildt,

"Keeping Bosnia in One Peace," The Washington Post, March 31,

1996, p. C2; "The Long Haul in Bosnia," Economist (London), March

28, 1996, p. 20; "Bosnian Economy Called Peace Threat," The

Washington Times, March 28, 1996, p. 4; and Craig R. Whitney,

"NATO Urged to Keep Force in Bosnia After Pullout Date," The New

York Times, March 21, 1996, p. 1. Carl Bildt, the High

Representative for Bosnia, has remarked that the civil side of

implementation is on a 2-year schedule. Bradley Graham,

"Shalikashvili Again Endorses Bosnia Withdrawal Schedule," The

Washington Post, April 3, 1996, p. A16. Early in the IFOR

deployment, Lieutenant General (UK) Michael Walker, Commander of

the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),

acknowledged that, "I quite clearly see there is going to be a

requirement for a follow-on organization." Rick Atkinson, "‘The

Big Question Mark' in Bosnia," The Washington Post, January 8,

1996, p. 11.

6. While it may seem early for such a discussion, the

decision point is fast approaching. Leaders from the Executive

Branch, Congress, and DOD adamantly reaffirm a U.S. departure

will start in mid-December 1996. (See Friedman, "Exit Strategy,"

p. 21.) It took 65 days to complete deployment of U.S. forces

into Bosnia-Hercegovina. Removing the personnel and materiel of a

year-long build up will likely be more difficult and time

consuming. (See Rick Atkinson, "Next Topic: Getting Out of

Bosnia," The Washington Post, March 22, 1996, pp. 1, 27.)

Considerable planning for a withdrawal would have to precede

actual movement of forces and will have to commence in the not

too distant future. Policy decisions necessary to guide those

deliberations will have to be taken in advance of the actual

military planning. Indeed, Carl Bildt, the High Representative,

has indicated that such a decision must be made by June (Laura

Silber and Bruce Clarke, "West Fearful For Post-IFOR Bosnia," The

Financial Times, London, April 1, 1996, p. 3).

7. A public decision to remain may result in factions

dragging their feet, and diminishing the impetus to work toward a
27

lasting political solution before IFOR departs. Conversely, a

public announcement might provide more incentive to turn to the

long-term demands of a settlement and a disincentive to prepare

for resumed conflict if IFOR departs before the basis for a

lasting settlement can be established.

8. While current focus has been on the presence of

mujahideen forces, the provisions apply equally to ethnic Serbian

and Croatian personnel that were required to leave BosniaHercegovina. Given the proximity of these personnel and their

ease of return to Bosnia, IFOR presence plays a role in

monitoring this potential violation of the Accords should

relations within Bosnia deteriorate.

9. GFAP, Annex 1-A, Agreement on the Military Aspects of the

Peace Settlement.

10. See critiques contained in, for example, Richard

Holbrooke, "Backsliding in Bosnia," Time, May 20, 1996, p. 38;

Elizabeth Neuffer, "In Bosnia, US Troops Fear Losing Race Against

Time," Boston Globe, May 3, 1996, p. 1; and Silber and Clarke,

"West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia."

11. For details of the arbitration provisions, see GFAP,

Annex 2, Article V.

12. Raymond Bonner, "To G.I.'s, Disputed Corridor Will Test

Path to Peace," The New York Times, December 18, 1995, p. A3.

13. According to the 1991 census, Bosnia's pre-war

population was 4.364 million. The World Fact Book, Washington,

DC: GPO, 1992, p. 43. IFOR estimates indicate that 600,000

refugees are currently living in areas bordering Bosnia, another

700,000 are temporarily living in the remainder of Europe, and

that 1.2 million people are displaced within Bosnia. IFOR Press

Briefing, April 25, 1996, http://www.nato.int/ifor/

afsouth/960425a.htm. The General Accounting Office (GAO)

estimates 2.3 million displaced. GAO, Briefing, "Peace Operations

in Bosnia: Challenges to a Sustainable Peace," n.d., p. 11.

14. GAO, Briefing, "Peace Operations in Bosnia: Challenges

to Sustainable Peace," n.d., p. 11, notes the following: 80

percent of the population relies on humanitarian food aid; annual

per capita income of $500; industrial output at 5 percent of 1990

levels; and one-third of health facilities, one-half of school

buildings, 80 percent of homes, and 40 percent of roads and

bridges were damaged or destroyed during the war.

15. See, for instance, Christine Spolar, "Skimping By on the

Wages of Peace," The Washington Post, April 26, 1996, p. 27;

Edith M. Lederer, "'Urgency' Reported in Bosnia Aid Effort,"
28

Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3, 1996, p. 3; "Bosnian Economy

Called Peace Threat," The Washington Times, March 28, 1996, p. 4;

and Philip Shenon, "Pentagon Report Predicts Bosnia Will Fragment

Without Vast Aid," The New York Times, March 20, 1996, p. A1.

16. For instance, despite the increasing number of shortterm trips across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, violent

reactions to such visits have prevented return of refugees and

displaced persons to their homes. Examples of other difficulties

are manifold. See, for example, "U.N. Sees Few Reclaiming Bosnia

Homes," The New York Times, May 13, 1996, p. 8; Mike O'Connor,

"New Refugee Conflict Points Up Flaw in Bosnia Pact," The New

York Times, April 29, 1996, p. A3; Christine Spolar, "Bosnia

Refugees Put Dayton to the Test," The Washington Post, April 29,

1996, p. A13; and transcripts from recent IFOR press conferences

archived at: gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int:70/11/yugo.

17. While the focus of this section is on the elections and

creation of government institutions, one cannot overlook

additional and important efforts, such as establishing a

functioning judicial system, creating police forces that the

public perceives as legitimate, implementing constitutional

procedures, and creating an environment that supports human

rights. Each of these issues is complex and challenging in its

own right, but when added together and combined with elections,

they offer a formidable test.

18. For specific details, see Annexes 3-11 of GFAP.

19. Indeed, recognizing the importance of this issue,

military leaders recommended and political leaders agreed that no

reductions or changes in force composition would occur until

after the Bosnian elections. Walter Pincus, "Strength of U.S.-

NATO Peacekeeping Force Tied to Bosnia's Fall Elections," The

Washington Post, May 2, 1996, p. 13.

20. See, for example, Alison Smale, "Human Rights Group Says

Bosnia Isn't Ready to Hold Free Elections," The Washington Times,

May 24, 1996, p. 13; Barbara Crossette, "Cost of Holding Bosnian

Vote Is Estimated at $153 Million," The New York Times, April 21,

1996, p. A5; Michael Dobbs, "Plan for Bosnia Elections Reflect

Test of Dayton Pact," The Washington Post, April 2, 1996, pp. A1,

A9; Michael Binyon, "Obstacles to Bosnia Peace Put Election Plan

in Peril," The Times (London), March 27, 1996, p. 14; and Craig

R. Whitney, "In Bosnia, Securing a Peaceful Future Now Depends on

Roads, Refugees, and Elections," The New York Times, March 26,

1996, p. A10. The OSCE did promulgate registration and election

procedures on April 25, 1996 (USEUCOM Operation Joint Endeavor

Weekly Report, May 1, 1996,

http://199.56.154.3/info_center/organizations/pa/paw0105.ht ml).

Conversely, the United States continues to push for elections in
29

mid-September 1996. See, Harriet Martin, "Bosnia Polls Will Not

Be Free and Fair Says OSCE," Financial Times, London, May 13,

1996, p. 2. For a discussion of competing pressures on whether to

certify the election process and associated problems, see John

Pomfret, "Planning for Bosnian Vote Disrupted," The Washington

Post, May 15, 1996, p. 26.

21. For a survey of Bosnia's economic woes and the inability

to generate international funding, see, for example, GAO,

Briefing, "Peace Operations in Bosnia," pp. 11-12; Raymond

Bonner, "To G.I.'s in Bosnia, the Devastation Is a Shock," The

New York Times, January 26, 1996, p. A3; Thomas C. Linn, "No

Prosperity, No Peace," The Wall Street Journal, December 21,

1995, p. 32; Christine Spolar, "Skimping By On the Wages of

Peace," The Washington Post, April 26, 1996, p. 27; Michael

Dobbs, "Delays Cloud Bosnian Pact Aid Programs," The Washington

Post, March 5, 1996, p. 9; and Edith M. Lederer, "‘Urgency'

Reported in Bosnia Aid Effort," Philadelphia Inquirer, April 3,

1996, p. 3.

22. For specific provisions, see GFAP, Annex 1B, Agreement

on Regional Stabilization.

23. Ibid. An assessment is contained in Jeffrey D.

McCausland, Conventional Arms Control and European Security,

Adelphi Paper No. 301, Oxford: Oxford University Press,

forthcoming. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990. Items limited are:

tanks, artillery (>>75mm), armored combat vehicles, combat

aircraft, and attack helicopters.

24. GFAP, Annex 1B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization,

Article I.

25. McCausland, Conventional Arms Control and European

Security, forthcoming.

26. For example, relative proportions of reductions, the

verification of data, reductions, transfer of excess equipment,

destruction mechanisms, inspection provisions, and enforcement

provisions. For details, see ibid.

27. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, pp. 36-37.

28. For a brief description of the program, see John

Pomfret, "Arming the Bosnians," The Washington Post, January 26,

1996, p. 25; Eric Schmitt, "Retired American Troops to Aid

Bosnian Army Combat Skills," The New York Times, January 16,

1996, p. A1; and Rick Atkinson, "Perry Sets Deadline for Arming

Bosnia," The Washington Post, November 30, 1995, pp. 1, 31.
30

Additional examples of congressional pressure may be found in

Senator Jesse Helms, "Don't Send Troops; Send Arms," The Los

Angeles Times, December 13, 1995, p. 11; and Katharine Q. Seelye,

"Clinton Gives Republicans Pledge on Arming Bosnians," The New

York Times, December 13, 1995, p. 16. Moreover, the program may

have been the key to getting the Bosniac faction to accept the

Dayton Accords. See, for example, Srecko Latal, "U.S., Others

Rearm Muslim-Croat Army; British, French Oppose Move,"

Philadelphia Inquirer, May 24, 1996, p. 6.

29. See, for example, Latal, "U.S., Others Rearm MuslimCroat Army; British, French Oppose Move;" Philip Smucker,

"Sarajevo Assures Washington Nine Iranians Will Be Expelled, The

Washington Times, May 24, 1996, p. 13; Kelly Couturier, "BosnianCroat Army Has Few Backers," The Washington Post, March 16, 1996,

p. 24; Barbara Starr, "USA Considers $100 Million Arms Transfer

to Bosnia," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 7, 1996, p. 3; and

Philip Smucker, "Conference in Turkey Further Threatens Peace in

Bosnia," The Washington Times, March 15, 1996, p. 15. A worst

case scenario is where the United States is arming the Muslims,

while an "IFOR II" without the United States is trying to

implement the Dayton Accords in a neutral manner. Such an outcome

could generate considerable friction within NATO.

30. See, for example, "Philip Smucker, "Disputes Delay Aid

to Bosnia's Military," The Washington Times, May 2, 1996, p. 11;

and Chris Hedge, "U.S-Led Aid for Bosnian Army is in Jeopardy,"

The New York Times, March 22, 1996, pp. A1, 3.

31. Thomas W. Lippman, "Arab Nations Pledge $100 Million for

U.S.-Led Effort to Build Up Bosnian Army," The Washington Post,

April 18, 1996, p. 11; and Jonathan S. Landay, "US Plan for a

Balance of Power in Bosnia is Left Out of Kilter," The Christian

Science Monitor, April 15, 1996, p. 6.

32. For pledges, see Lippman, "Arab Nations Pledge $100

Million for U.S.-Led Effort to Build Up Bosnian Army," p. 11; and

Starr, "USA Considers $100 Million Arms Transfer to Bosnia," p.

3. For recent reports of stalled funding, see Philip Smucker,

"Bosnians Blast NATO's Timidity, ‘False Promises,'" The

Washington Times, May 12, 1996, p. 1.

33. The contract award was announced on May 30, 1996.

Michael Dobbs, "Alexandria Firm Selected to Train Bosnia

Military," The Washington Post, May 30, 1996, p. 24.

34. A contingent of 200 Bosnian soldiers departed to begin

training on NATO standard equipment in Turkey on May 14, 1996.

"First Bosnian Soldiers Begin Weapons Training," The Baltimore

Sun, May 15, 1996, p. 14.
31

35. For examples of the gap in Bosniac-Croat cooperation,

see "Croats Warn Against Bosnian Arms Buildup," Stars and Stripes

(Europe), February 25, 1996, p. 5; and Landay, "US Plan for a

Balance of Power in Bosnia is Left Out of Kilter," p. 6. A recent

agreement to establish a joint defense ministry may be the first

step to closing this gap. Michael Dobbs, "Muslim-Croat Federation

Agrees to Form Joint Defense Ministry," The Washington Post, May

15, 1996, p. 26.

36. There is a growing consensus among European nations that

a residual military presence will be required. See, for example,

Stanley R. Sloan with the assistance of Rosan Hollak, "Bosnia

After IFOR," Congressional Research Service Report Number 96-

344F, April 16, 1996, p. 4; Rick Atkinson, "NATO Already Eying

Exits," The Washington Post, March 2, 1996, p. 14; Michael

Inacker, Welt am Sontag, April 28, 1996, in "NATO, Bonn Consider

Extending IFOR Mission," Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

West Europe (FBIS-WEU)-96-083, April 29, 1996, p. 1; Christopher

Lockwood, "Atlantic Rift Over ‘Chaos' Fear After NATO Quits

Bosnia," Daily Telegraph, London, April 2, 1996, p. 6.

37. The list of potential flashpoints is substantial. For

example, problems within the Bosniac-Croat Federation threaten to

collapse one half of the government. (See, for example, John

Pomfret, "Bosnian Muslims, Croats Agree on Steps to Bolster

Federation," The Washington Post, April 1, 1996, p. 14; and Kit

R. Roane, "Muslims and Croats Sign Contract to Aid Federation in

Bosnia," The New York Times, April 1, 1996, p. 6.) Nor is

cooperation from the Republika Srpska forthcoming. (See, for

example, Christine Spolar, "Indicted Serb Leaders Endanger Peace,

The Washington Post, April 21, 1996, p. 28; and Julian Berger and

John Palmer, "Bosnian Serbs Snub Peace Move," Guardian (UK),

April 11, 1996, p. 2.)

38. See, for example, Rick Atkinson, "NATO Tailors Bombing

Information," The Washington Post, September 16, 1995, p. 20;

Mark Yost, "The Misuse of Airpower," The Wall Street Journal,

September 15, 1995, p. 14; and Daniel Williams and Rick Atkinson,

"Limits on Targets Hamper NATO, U.N. Officers Say," The

Washington Post, September 13, 1995, p. 1. Cf. General Ronald R.

Fogelman, "What Air Power Can Do in Bosnia," The Wall Street

Journal, October 11, 1995, p. 15.

39. John Pomfret and Christine Spolar, "Croatian Drive Turns

Tables on Serbs," The Washington Post, August 22, 1995, p. 1;

David Rhode, "Land Grab in Bosnia Turns Tables," The Christian

Science Monitor, September 18, 1995, p. 1; and "Dole Credits Use

of Force in Bosnia," The Washington Post, September 19, 1995, p.

10.

40. For earlier difficulties over use of air strikes, see,
32

for instance, John Darnton, "Dole in London, Urges Air Strikes

Against Serbs," The New York Times, December 1, 1994, p. A1;

Williams, "In Policy Switch, U.S. Puts Bosnia Aside to Preserve

Alliance;" and Gordon, "U.S., In Shift, Gives Up Its Talk of

Tough Action Against Serbs."

41. See, for example, Eric Schmitt, "NATO Raids on Serbs

Expose Rift in Alliance," The New York Times, September 12, 1995,

p. A1; and Rick Atkinson and Daniel Williams, "NATO Rejects

Demands to End Bombing," The Washington Post, September 13, 1995,

pp. A1, A14.

42. The possible tenor of such tensions is reflected in the

comments of an unnamed west European diplomat: "'We were killed

and humiliated, while Washington, which had no soldiers on the

ground could afford to be nice to the Bosnian Moslems and

criticise Europe . . . We will not repeat this.'" Silber and

Clarke, "West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia." If, however, no

allied or partner forces remain in Bosnia- Hercegovina, it may

ease the use of the air power option. That having been said,

generating the consensus necessary to resume NATO air strikes

would be a formidable task. For European desires on a continued

U.S. ground presence see, for example, Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia

After IFOR," p. 4.

43. For a description of U.S.-Italian difficulties in

previous bombing efforts, see John Phillips, "Rome Using Stealth

Bases as Pawn in Power Game," The Times, London, September 14,

1995, p. 14.

44. Unless the United States is willing to employ a

considerable portion of its naval air power.

45. For example, using the containment option in conjunction

with the limited application of military force to halt the

fighting may have dramatically different consequences then using

containment and allowing a military solution to the conflict.

46. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p. 35; and NATO Press Communique M-NAC-2(94)116,

December 11, 1994, para 20. NATO containment is also evidenced by

NATO Operations SHARP GUARD (enforcing the arms embargo of the

former Yugoslavia) and DENY FLIGHT (enforcing the "no-fly" zone

over Bosnia).

47. See, for example, Craig R. Whitney, "Germany Relents on

Expulsion of 100,000 Croatian Refugees," The New York Times, February 11, 1994, p. A6; Justin Burke, "Hungary Tries to Stem

Burgeoning Tide of Refugees," Christian Science Monitor, May 27,

1994, p. 3; Pamela Ferdinand, "Austrians, New and Old, Keep a

Fragile Truce," Boston Globe, November 20, 1995, p. 2; and Ruth
33

Walker, "Bosnian Refugees May Have to Exit Germany," Christian

Science Monitor, January 11, 1996, p. 6.

48. Both of these outcomes run counter to stated U.S.

objectives in the Bosnian conflict. See A National Security

Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 35.

49. Numerous scenarios outlining how events could spin out

of control are possible. Renewed fighting could lead to a Bosnian

Serb defeat, triggering a wider reaction. Croatia and Serbia

could turn on the Bosniac portion of the Federation leading to a

broader Balkan war. Spread of violence into Kosovo would

undoubtedly draw Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey

into conflict. Failure to resolve peacefully the return of

Eastern Slavonia to Croatia could result in a Croat military

operation that has the potential to draw Serbia into the

conflict.

50. The U.S.-sponsored program suffers from a lack of

support from U.S. NATO allies, as well as financial support from

outside parties. See, for example, Landay, "US Plan for a Balance

of Power in Bosnia Is Left Out of Kilter"; Chris Hedges, "U.S.-

Led Aid for Bosnian Army in Jeopardy," The New York Times, March

22, 1996, p. 1, 3; and Couturier, "Bosnian-Croat Army Has Few

Backers." Moreover, U.S. concerns over a residual Iranian

presence in Bosnia has further slowed the program. See, for

example, Smucker, "Disputes Delay Aid to Bosnia's Military."

51. For example, should the Bosniac-Croatian Federation

defeat the forces of the Republika Srpska, Croatia could turn on

Bosnia. Or, the ethnic Croatian minority could cleave off from

Bosnia while Croatian military power denied an effective Bosniac

response. Or, in a worst case scenario, Croatia and Serbia could

be drawn into the conflict, leading to a division of Bosnia

between those two states. While these outcomes are pessimistic,

they are nonetheless possible. President Franjo Tudjman of

Croatia has already indicated such a potential division of

spoils. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Whose Balkan Menu?," The New

York Times, September 27, 1995, p. 23.

52. Given congressional and public reaction to the initial

deployment, it may be very difficult to garner support to

reintroduce forces if the factions are perceived to have "lost

the peace." For congressional and public attitudes toward the

initial deployment of U.S. ground troops, see, for example, R.W.

Apple, Jr., "Flimsy Bosnia Mandate," The New York Times, December

14, 1995, p. A1; Helen Dewar and Guy Gugliotta, "Senate Backs

Troops to Bosnia; House Fails to Block Funding;" The Washington

Post, December 14, 1995, p.1; and Guy Gugliotta, "House Freshmen

Remain Skeptical on Bosnia Plan," The Washington Post, December

13, 1995, p. 35; and John E. Yang, "House Votes to Limit Role of
34

U.S. Troops in Balkans," The Washington Post, October 31, 1995,

p. 9. For the public's hesitancy, see, for example, CNN, Gallop,

USA Today Poll, USA Today, November 28, 1995, p. 7; and Michael

Dobbs, "Dayton, Like the Nation, Is Split Over Sending Troops to

Bosnia," The Washington Post, November 3, 1995, p. 27.

53. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, February 1996, pp. 1-3, and 35.

54. See the comments from German officials contained in

Michael Inacker, Welt Am Sontag, April 28, 1996, p.6, in "NATO,

Bonn Consider Extending IFOR Mission," FBIS-WEU-96-083, p. 1.

55. Which is a stated U.S. policy objective. A National

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 35.

56. See, for instance, William Drozdiak, "Allies Set to Prod

U.S. Into Role in Bosnia," The Washington Post, July 19, 1995,

pp. 1, 17; Elaine Sciolino, "Allies Still Resist Arms for

Bosnia," The New York Times, May 4, 1993, p. A18; Elaine

Sciolino, "Christopher Fails to Win Consensus," The New York

Times, May 7, 1993, p. A12; Jim Hoagland, "Bosnia: Atlantic

Rift," The Washington Post, May 20, 1993, p. A23; Daniel

Williams, "Grim Balkans Outlook Affected U.S. Position," The

Washington Post, August 19, 1993, p. A1; Ruth Marcus and John F.

Harris, "U.S. Policy Shifted in Face of NATO Resolve," The

Washington Post, December 5, 1994, p. A1.

57. As French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette recently

remarked: "It is important not to be obsessed with leaving as

early as possible. The fundamental situation is more important

than the timetable." Baudoin Bollaert, Le Figaro, March 25, 1996,

p.5, in FBIS-WEU-96-059, March 26, 1996, p. 28. For reported

splits within the Alliance over the withdrawal deadline, see

Christopher Lockwood, "Atlantic Rift Over ‘Chaos' Fear After NATO

Quits Bosnia," The Daily Telegraph, London, April 2, 1996, p. 25;

Silber and Clarke, "West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia;" and

Atkinson, "NATO Already Eyeing Exits."

58. Granted, other allies may be equally willing to depart

in December, but the United States will not be able to escape

criticism because, by declaring first, the others will be able to

claim they were forced to withdraw because of the United States.

59. On the other hand, if the United States offers adequate

support to a follow-on missions, CJTF may receive a considerable

boost. See, Martin Sieff, "U.S.-British Exercises Mark Start of

New NATO Structure," The Washington Times, May 14, 1996, p. 9.

60. Internal NATO concerns about enlargement stem largely

from fear of antagonizing Russia, and anxieties that enlargement
35

could lead to a "cold peace." Despite over 2 years of attempting

to assuage Russian concerns, Moscow continues vehemently to

oppose NATO expansion. See, for example, Deborah Seward, "U.S.,

Russia Remain Apart on NATO's Expansion Plans," The Washington

Times, March 22, 1996. For an example of extreme Russian rhetoric

which fuels such concerns, see Lee Hockstader, "Russian Warns of

Attack If NATO Expands East," The Washington Post, February 16,

1996, p. A29. Secondary concerns focus on costs (fiscal and

opportunity) associated with expanding the Alliance. See, for

example, Theresa Hitchens, "Voices Rise for Slow NATO Growth,"

Defense News, April 22-28, 1996, p. 46. The larger issue is

whether allies, potential allies, and partners will accept U.S.

rhetoric supporting enlargement if the United States prematurely

withdraws from Bosnia.

61. Bellamy, "NATO Likely to Extend Its Stay in Bosnia," p.

10.

 62. For examples of French statements on restructuring

NATO, see, for example, Pierre-Marie Giraud, AFP (Paris), April

23, 1996, in "France Wants Overhauled NATO with ‘European

Identity'," FBIS-WEU-96-080, April 24, 1996, p. 21; Stephen W.

Young, "France Seeks New NATO," BASIC Reports, No. 50, February

21, 1996, pp. 6-8; William Drozdiak, "Chirac Seeks to Equalize

U.S., European Security Roles," The Washington Post, January 31,

1996, p. 11; and AFP (Paris), January 17, 1996, in "Paris Seeks

‘Real Renovation' of NATO," FBIS-WEU-96-012, pp. 9-10.

63. For example, the 3d Armored Division, 8th Infantry

Division (Mechanized), VII Corps, and the considerable number of

associated corps and theater support units.

64. See, for instance, Czech President Havel's remarks in

Martin Sieff and Ben Barber, "NATO in No Hurry to Grow, Britain's

Defense Chief Says," The Washington Times, January 24, 1996, p.

13; Christoph Bertram, "An Opening to the East," The Washington

Post, November 29, 1995, p. 25; Jane Perlez, "Poland's Premier Is

Seeking NATO Membership During 1996," The New York Times, April

6, 1995, p. 9; Craig R. Whitney, "NATO Plight: Coping With

Applicants," The New York Times, January 4, 1994, p. A4; Janusz

Onyszkiewicz, "Why NATO Should Expand to the East," The

Washington Post, January 6, 1994, p. A27; and Jane Perlez, "4

Countries Audition for NATO," The New York Times, January 11,

1994, p. A8.

65. For example, Croatian and Bosniac successes could bring

in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. A number of scenarios that

lead to a wider Balkan war long have been articulated.

66. For example, Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Serbia,

and Romania. For other examples see William T. Johnsen, Pandora's
36

Box Reopened: Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 23,

1994, especially Appendix A.

67. For instance, key allies within NATO might question the

level of U.S. commitment to Europe. Or, ongoing peace efforts

between Israel and Syria that may hinge on a U.S. military

presence on the Golan Heights could go awry.

68. For a discussion of the continued import of credibility

in the post-Cold War era, see David Jablonsky, "The Persistence

of Credibility: Interests, Threats, and Planning for the Use of

American Military Power," Strategic Review, Spring 1996, pp. 1-

10.

69. See, for example, General George A. Joulwan (SACEUR),

"When Ivan Meets GI Joe," The Washington Post, April 28, 1996, p.

C3; Ruth Walker, "US and Russian Soldiers Salute ‘Trench

Peacefare,'" The Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1996, p.

1; and Tim Weiner, "Out of the Cold: U.S. and Russian Spies Share

Cloaks in Bosnia," The New York Times, January 19, 1996, p. 9.

70. For descriptions of animosity, see Rick Atkinson,

"Bosnia Force Testing New Russian-U.S. Ties," The Washington

Post, January 18, 1996, p. A1; and Stephen S. Rosenfeld,

"Russians in Bosnia--A Test of New Ties," The Washington Post,

January 12, 1996, p. A15.

71. The Contact Group consists of France, Germany, Russia,

the United Kingdom and the United States. Relations within the

Contact Group have not always been smooth. See, for example, the

issue over NATO air strikes in July 1995 reflected in Julie Wolf

and Charles Goldsmith, "Russia Warns West on Moves in Bosnian

War," The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 1995, pp. 1, 11; "U.S.

Seeks Vigorous Bosnian Air Strikes," The Wall Street Journal,

July 18, 1995, pp. 1, 2; and Michael Dobbs and John F. Harris,

"U.S. Favors ‘Aggressive' NATO Airstrikes in Bosnia," The

Washington Post, July 19, 1995, p. 1.

72. For concerns over the Iranian presence and influence in

Bosnia, see, for example, Doyle McManus and James Risen, "U.S.

Didn't Foresee Iran's Wider Role in Bosnia Conflict," The Los

Angeles Times (Washington ed.), April 23, 1996, p. 1; Bill Gertz,

"Iranian Military, Intelligence Remain at Work in Bosnia," The

Washington Times, April 19, 1996, p. 15; Philip Smucker,

"Iranians Hard at Work for Bosnia Support," The Washington Times, April 23, 1996, p. 1; and Harriet Martin, "Bosnia Yields to U.S.

Over Ties to Iran," Financial Times, London, April 4, 1996, p. 3.

73. A number of alternatives have been posited in recent

months. See, for example, Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR;"
37

Charles Barry, "After IFOR: Maintaining a Fragile Peace in the

Balkans," Strategic Forum, No. 62, Washington, DC: Institute for

National Strategic Studies, February 1996.

74. See, for example, Bollaert, FBIS-WEU-96-059, March 26,

1996, p. 28; and Christopher Bellamy, "NATO Likely to Extend Its

Stay in Bosnia," Independent, London, April 16, 1996, p. 10; and

Philip Smucker, "Allies Divided on Prospects in Bosnia After U.S.

Departs," The Washington Times, May 18, 1996, p. 7.

75. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 3.

76. For an example of local attitudes toward the United

Nations, see, for instance, Tom Squitieri, "U.N. Departs with

Weight of Irony, Frustration," USA Today, December 21, 1995, pp.

1, 6; and John Pomfret, "Serbs Bid U.N. Commander a Brusque

Farewell," The Washington Post, December 21, 1995, p. 36.

77. See, for example, "The Long Haul in Bosnia," The

Economist, London, March 29, 1996, p. 20; AFP (Paris), May 3,

1996, in "EU: European Force Suggested for Bosnia After IFOR

Pullout," FBIS-WEU-96-088, May 6, 1996, p. 4; Smucker, "Allies

Divided on Prospects in Bosnia After U.S. Departs," p. 7; and

"U.S., European Allies to Begin Debate on Whether to Extend

Bosnia Mission," The Baltimore Sun, March 29, 1996, p. 4.

78. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 3.

79. AFP (Paris), May 2, 1996, in "WEU: Chief Rules Out

Replacing NATO in Bosnia," FBIS-WEU-96-087, May 3, 1996, p. 1.

80. For a sampling of allies' and partners' positions, see

Smucker, "Allies Divided on Prospects in Bosnia After U.S.

Departs," and Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 3. A

number of smaller powers participating in Operation JOINT

ENDEAVOUR have indicated a willingness to stay, if the United

States remains in Bosnia. Rick Atkinson, "NATO Already Eying

Exits," The Washington Post, March 2, 1996, p. 14.

81. Perhaps they would remain because many also desire EU

membership, but the question still deserves reflection.

82. For example, France, Britain, the Netherlands.

83. For examples of tensions within the Alliance and their

sources, see Daniel Williams, "In Policy Shift, U.S. Puts Bosnia

Aside to Preserve Alliance," The Washington Post, November 30,

1994, p. A32; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S., in Shift, Gives Up Talk

of Tough Action Against Serbs," The New York Times, November 29,

1995, p. A1; and Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," The

Washington Post, December 19, 1994, p. A27.
38

84. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and

Enlargement, p. 35.

85. Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR,", p. 4; Barry,

"After IFOR," p. 4; Lockwood, "Atlantic Rift Over ‘Chaos' Fear

After NATO Quits Bosnia."

86. Europeans have expressed concern over these issues.

Sloan with Hollak, "Bosnia After IFOR," p. 4.

87. Indications are that Britain and French, at least, are

not willing to sanction such circumstances: "‘We were killed and

humiliated, while Washington, which had no soldiers on the ground

could afford to be nice to the Bosnian Moslems and criticise

Europe,' said one west European diplomat. ‘We will not repeat

this.'" Silber and Clarke, "West Fearful for Post-IFOR Bosnia."

88. See examples contained in Ron Jensen, "IFOR Studies Some

Civilian Work," Stars and Stripes (Europe), April 20, 1996, p. 3;

Philip Shenon, "Pentagon Report Predicts Bosnia Will Fragment

Without Vast Aid," The New York Times, March 20, 1996, p. A1;

Carl Bildt, "Keeping Bosnia in One Peace," The Washington Post,

March 31, 1996, p. C2; "Bosnian Economy Called Threat to Peace,"

The Washington Times, March 28, 1996, p. 4; and Whitney, "In

Bosnia, a Peaceful Future Depends on Roads, Refugees, and

Elections."

89. This is not as far fetched as it appears at first

glance. France and Germany have enjoyed 50 years of peace after a

thousand years of conflict. Israel and the PLO are making slow,

but steady progress. Reconciliation, therefore, is within the

realm of the possible.

90. See, for example, Carlos Bongioanni, "Sowing the Seeds

of Cooperation," Stars and Stripes (Europe), March 25, 1996, p.

5. Whether this habit will hold after an eventual IFOR withdrawal

remains to be seen. Only the factions can determine whether the

seed of cooperation falls on fertile ground.

91. The example of IFOR facilitating changes in the InterEntity Boundary Line is but one important example. For results of

such negotiations, see, for example, IFOR Press Conference, May

9, 1996, gopher://marvin.stc.nato.int/70/00/yugo/iftr/0905.96.

92. GFAP, Annex 1B, Agreement on Regional Stabilization.

93. For example, NATO nations and partners have been

involved in confidence and security building measures since

Stockholm in 1986. This experience has greatly increased since

the Vienna Document of 1990. More importantly, NATO members and
39

many PfP partners have extensive experience in the CFE Treaty,

which served as the model of the arms control portions of the

regional stabilization provisions.

94. GFAP, Annex 1-A, Agreement on the Military Aspects of

the Peace Settlement, Article VI, paragraph 3.

95. See, for example, comments contained in Harry Summers,

"Mission Creeps," The Washington Times, April 11, 1996, p. 15;

Graham, "Shalikashvili Again Endorses Bosnia Withdrawal

Schedule," p. A16; Rick Atkinson, "NATO, U.S. Army at Odds Over

War Crimes Mission in Bosnia," The Washington Post, March 11,

1996, p. A15; Philip Shenon, "G.I.s in Bosnia Shun Hunt for WarCrime Suspects," The New York Times, March 2, 1996, p. A3;

Moreover, discussion of IFOR not becoming involved in hunting war

crimes suspects, crowd control, or police activities has been an

issue at nearly every IFOR press conference in recent weeks. See

various conferences archived at gopher://

marvin.stc.nato.int:70/11/yugo.

96. NATO and IFOR have indicated that such shifts will

commence shortly. See, for example, Karen Blakeman, "IFOR Now

Turns to Helping Rebuild," Stars and Stripes (Europe), April 23,

1996, p. 4; Edith M. Lederer, "Rebuilding Bosnia Is Now a Mission

for NATO Troops," The Washington Times, March 26, 1996, p. 11;

IFOR AFSOUTH Transcript March 25, 1996, p. 2; and NATO Press

Release (96) 60, April 29, 1996.

97. Specific tasks might include:

@ENDNOTESPACING = a. Continue to enforce the military

elements of the GFAP (ZOS, IEBL, etc.).

@ENDNOTESPACING = b. Provide general secure environment.

@ENDNOTESPACING = c. Promote freedom of movement.

@ENDNOTESPACING = d. Provide reaction forces, "sticks" if

necessary to ensure compliance.

@ENDNOTESPACING = e. Provide support (not take the lead) to

civil agencies in implementing the civil portions of the GFAP.

Civil and military efforts must proceed in tandem if the basis

for a lasting political settlement is to be achieved, and U.S.

national objectives are to be attained.

@ENDNOTESPACING = f. Assist in confidence building measures,

overseeing the implementation of the arms control provisions as

they are worked out.

@ENDNOTESPACING = g. Perhaps most importantly continue to
40

act as the (most) honest broker in arbitrating military, and, if

necessary, civil issues concerning the implementation of the

agreement.

@ENDNOTESPACING = h. Continue to serve as a deterrent force

that prevents the factions from resuming the war.

98. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of

Staff has indicated the United States may reapportion its force

mix. Karen Blakeman, "NATO Won't Cut Bosnia Troops, but May Alter

Mix, General Says," Stars and Stripes (Europe), April 24, 1996,

p. 1.

99. In the post-Cold War era, a maneuver brigade has become

the "coin of the realm" for participation and leadership in

multinational formations.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler