EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF PLAN

COLOMBIA:

A VIRTUAL CONTRIBUTION

TO A VIRTUAL WAR AND PEACE PLAN?

Joaquin Roy

May 2001
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This monograph was presented at the conference “Implementi

Colombia: Strategic and Operational Dimensions for the U.S. M

organized by the Army War College and the North-South Center, J

31–February 2, 2001, in Miami, Florida. My gratitude is extended to 

H. Moss, Director of the North-South Center, for his support in de

the scope of this research, and my Research Assistant Anna Krift for 

and the compilation of bibliographical data. Numerous officers 

governments of France, Germany, and Spain, and several membe

staff of the European Commission have contributed with commenta

documents. All of them elected to remain anonymous and should no

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ii
FOREWORD

This is another in the special series of monog

emanating from the February 2001 conference on 

Colombia co-sponsored by the Strategic Studies Insti

the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. F

North-South Center of the University of Miami. I

monograph, Joaquin Roy provides a European view o

Colombia.

Professor Roy, a Spaniard with valuable so

throughout Europe, notes that Europeans apparen

not approve of the seeming U.S. emphasis on pro

military equipment and training to Colombia 

counternarcotics effort in what they see as a larger str

political conflict. At the same time, he reports 

Europeans are not only concerned with the counterna

violence in Colombia, but also with the economic, se

and political spillover effects for neighboring cou

Finally and logically, Roy reflects the European co

that whatever contribution might be made to 

Colombia will likely be lost in the violence of a U

counternarcotics campaign.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to join w

North-South Center in offering this monograph 

contribution to the international security deba

Colombia. It is of critical importance to the vital inter

the United States, Colombia, the hemisphere, an

global community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
PREFACE

A necessary part of the study of Plan Colombia 

U.S. Army War College and the Dante B. F

North-South Center is the presentation of the Eur

viewpoint concerning the Colombian dilemma. Pro

Joaquin Roy of the University of Miami has synthesiz

us the many facets of this complicated topic. In pre

this monograph, he combed through his excellent co

in Brussels and in the major foreign ministries of the 

well as in hundreds of pages written on the subject. Th

in this valuable essay, a great deal of background an

the record” opinion he has gleaned from Eur

policymakers.

It is often said that there is not just one Plan Col

but, like the elephant to the blind men in the fable, 

several versions. I do not necessarily agree with this 

but different actors certainly have different poi

emphasis. Of the $7.5 billion which Colombia has as

to the plan, the $1.3 billion to be provided by the U

States certainly emphasizes military equipmen

training and counternarcotics, though not exclus

Europe does not buy into that policy and is pessimisti

the plan’s potential success.

The European Union is committed to provide $1 

for economic and social programs, but the money 

flowing and there is considerable ambivalence amo

member states in the European Parliament (whic

taken an outright anti-Plan Colombia stance) and a

different European politicians. In fact, Roy tells us

Europeans do not like to express support for a 

Colombia at all, seeing it as a U.S. military program

prefer to say they are helping the “Peace Process.”

Even that sort of help is not without its skeptics, 

the subtitle to this monograph. Europe’s “v

v
contribution,” many there feel, means that its aid w

dissipated in the violent solutions which come out o

policy, perhaps devolving to mere humanitarian he

wrecked country.

What does Europe favor? Roy says that pr

emphasis is on negotiation generally, but in Europe

the United States, there is a “struggle to design a 

[European] policy.” Some countries are more interes

Colombia than others, clearly. Spain, in particular, 

huge economic stake in the region because 

investments; they are not much in Colombia but at 

countries to which the Colombian violence could spil

France, on the other hand, is a major investor in Col

itself.

Where is the European Union’s position headed

Europe continue to dither and debate within itsel

believes that will be determined by the United S

Europe’s role, he predicts, “could be enhanced and acc

more impetus” if the new Bush Administration adopt

Europeans see as “a more cautious policy” a

reorientation of the U.S. policy mix away from what th

as only a militaristic thrust. That could ultimately lea

more productive U.S.-European partnership.

Ambler H. Moss, Jr., Director

The Dante B. Fascell North-So

 Center

University of Miami

vi
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTH

JOAQUIN ROY is a professor at the School of Interna

Studies and senior research associate at the North-

Center of the University of Miami. He received h

degree from the University of Barcelona and his doc

from Georgetown University. He was previously o

faculty of the School of International Studies of the 

Hopkins University and of Emory University. His res

and teaching areas are the history of political ideas, 

American thought, intellectual history and liter

contemporary ideologies, regional integration, trans

to democracy, and human rights policies. His regiona

is on Cuba, Argentina, Spain, Central Americ

European Union, and European-Latin American rela

His articles and reviews have been published in R

Iberoamericana, Journal of Interamerican Studies, R

Espanola de Derecho Comunitario, Revista de Es

Internacionales, Politica Exterior, and The European 

Review. Among his 25 books are Cuba y Espana: Rela

y Percepciones (Madrid BCC, 1988); The Reconstruc

Central America: The Role of the European Comm

(North-South Center, 1991); The Ibero-American Spa

Espacio Iberoamericano (University of Miami/Univer

Barcelona, 1996); Memorias de mi Juventud en 

durante la Guerra Separatista (Barcelona: Peni

1999); La Siempre Fiel: Un Siglo de Relac

Hispano-Cubanas, 1898-1998 (University of Madrid, 

and Cuba, the U.S. and the Helms-Burton Do

(University of Florida Press, 2000).

vii
EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF PLAN

COLOMBIA:

A VIRTUAL CONTRIBUTION

TO A VIRTUAL WAR AND PEACE PLAN

Introduction.

With the deadline of January 31, 2001, approa

Colombian President Andres Pastrana agonized ov

painful choice between negotiating with the Revolut

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and unleashing the 

against the FARC-controlled demilitarized zone 

after months of obtaining few concessions in r

Simultaneously, the Colombian government agreed 

details of a safe zone to be awarded to the Ejérc

Liberación Nacional (ELN) under the pressur

mediation of the international community. Also durin

period, the European Parliament (und

Conservative-Christian Democratic majority) pas

resolution with 474 votes in favor and only one agains

33 abstentions) opposing Plan Colombia, which 

perceived in Europe as inspired by the United State

“militaristic” and counterinsurgency purposes, a

having the dangerous potential for spillover to 

Andean neighbors. In contrast, in order to demon

European support for the Colombian people, a Eur

Union (EU)-sponsored team of experts arrived in Bog

evaluate social and economic assistance projects 

funded by the EU and member states. The ambassad

the 15 member states accredited in Bogotá sent an ene

appeal to all parties in the Colombian crisis to resum

negotiations towards a lasting peace.

This cloudy and contradictory scenario shows us th

prospects for a positive European involvement in res

a fraction of the endemic Colombian conflict are 

problematic. In spite of the heartening declarations 

1
by the EU and key state actors and the commitment m

the Colombian government, the deterioration o

situation in 2000 contributed to an increasingly pessi

view. This negative assessment applies equally 

domestic evolution of the conflict and to the prospec

European contribution to remedy the damage and ob

lasting peace, either through Plan Colombia or thro

separate aid package. European and U.S. perceptions 

Colombian problems and their causes have been too 

apart. A give-and-take approach between Europe a

United States and mutual negotiation in identifyin

priorities are the keys for still possible (but dif

trans-Atlantic cooperation. 

Although an early 2000 diagnosis might have been 

optimistic based on the favorable predisposit

European actors to help Colombia, by the time th

came to an end, the panorama had clouded. The long-s

European involvement in Colombia seems to os

between two extremes. On the optimistic side, Eur

committed to supply the necessary political support f

task of bringing a lasting peace to Colombia by contri

some $1 billion for social and economic programs. O

pessimistic side, off-the-record voices warn that E

“will deliver a virtual contribution to a virtual peace 

unless the United States refurbishes certain controv

parts of the plan. Several factors have contributed 

contradictory stance.

Plan Colombia from the European Perspective

The negative European perception became more e

once certain details regarding a potential mi

involvement by the United States were announce

disseminated to the general public in August 2000 d

President William Clinton’s unprecedented short v

Cartagena de Indias. Publicized analysis o

anti-drug-trafficking efforts in the absence of suf

attention to social matters further damaged the a

2
critical popular evaluation in Europe of what, unt

moment, was almost the exclusive domain of govern

and specialists.

Ironically, U.S. foreign policy is the factor that very 

provokes cohesiveness in the European view. All it ta

for the United States to offer the Europeans an easy 

to serve as an excuse. In this case, it was Plan Colom

speedily triggered an impressive show of cohere

demonstrate an independent view. Two other conditio

necessary to evoke this phenomenon. The first is th

policy selected to become an occasion for disco

contestable at little cost to European governme

organizations. The second is that European resi

coincide with some measure of U.S. domestic opposi

the policy proposed or implemented. The American 

front then becomes a European ally.

In other words, the agenda items that are the sub

disagreement are not to be of a highly threatenin

global nature. They must not constitute a serious th

any of the new fundamental European security con

(energy, migration, radical nationalism) or the s

issues affecting any of the member states. In this sce

an ad hoc European opposition platform would fall ap

the first instant when the national interest of one 

European partners was seen at risk. Europeans also n

have allies in the U.S. home front, either in public op

partisan politics, think tanks, or the academic comm

Plan Colombia fits perfectly. Regarding politica

economic cost, it’s quite innocuous. The site is regi

localized. It is already opposed in important parts 

U.S. home front, especially the columns of conser

writers. If Colombia’s Latin American neighbors are 

disagreement with the U.S. policy, that is an add

bonus. 

However, it is also understandable that an iss

complex as the Colombian crisis is the subject of in

debate among the leadership of the EU institutions a

3
core of tactical disagreements between some m

states. The negative perception in Europe is not mono

Some European sectors and governments are more pr

express unconditional support than others. These 

are freer to vent their concern and irritation over some 

most controversial aspects of the plan or its v

interpretations. As a general rule, most of the m

states are skeptical concerning a proposal they perce

U.S.-inspired. At the same time, they experience dif

warming to a proposal that borders on intruding 

internal affairs of another country. Although Eur

officials are usually guarded in their public declar

concerning responsibility, in the privacy of their own m

they feel the conflict could best be resolved sole

Colombians themselves. Government corruption, 

injustice, and the abandonment of state obligation

perceived as the causes of the crisis. Thus, while o

hand they oppose the rationale of the military-se

strategy pursued by the United States, on the othe

struggle to design a joint policy. 

Once the details of U.S. backing were more exp

known, the reaction in Europe could be described 

one-two movement of arms and hands, a sort of wa

exercise. First the Europeans lifted their arms and sh

their heads in disbelief and fear. Second, they posi

their hands in their pockets trying to secure their p

and wallets. They felt they were being asked to pay fo

could be described as big “incidentals,” with some bec

even larger than the core projects, for example, so

those constructions projects where the original m

budget balloons to stratospheric heights. Mor

additional European financial help would be needed o

the Colombian military hardware and munitions 

exhausted and the last drop of blood of the last Colo

soldier was expended.

In sum, Europeans perceived that they were being 

upon to pay the expenses of a war they did not perpe

did not expand, and did not mess up. For decades

4
involvement in some parts of the world, most especi

some regions of Latin America, has been aptly descri

resembling that of a well-intentioned elephant. Li

elephant, the United States tries to maintain an impo

low profile, anchors itself to the terrain with slow, c

movements, and inadvertently knocks down the circu

pole with tragic consequences. In European eyes

Colombia seemed to fit this scenario.

Contributing to this European perception has be

many successive versions and interpretations of 

Colombia officially announced by the Colom

government.

1

 Apparently not happy with th

complementary approaches developed by Bogot

Washington to sell the same product to two dif

audiences (basically, the Colombian population an

U.S. Congress), Colombian authorities eagerly respon

European concerns over the original plan by in

Brussels to propose a “special plan for Colombi

invitation the Europeans were ready to take. Thi

exactly what happened on May 19, 2000, when Colo

Foreign Minister Fernández de Soto met with EU Ex

Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten, who pointed ou

the Commission’s concerns centered on the mi

component, the lack of involvement of all the part

dispute, the failure to properly address human 

issues, and land reform and taxation problems.

2

 Avo

of the label Plan Colombia became part of the Eur

tack, with use of the term “Peace Process” becomin

preferred alternative.

Having expressed these concerns, however, Patt

take the lead in pursuing a constructive European res

to Colombian needs. Furthermore, he spok

candidly—even bluntly—when some of the member 

dragged their feet in offering contributions and supp

I am . . . concerned that some member states want 

disassociate European support from Plan Colombia. I fu

understand, and even share to some extent, the criticisms 

5
Plan Colombia. But it would send a worrisome political sign

we granted the EU aid to projects which did not fit under 

Plan.

3

Patten stated to Fernández de Soto that the Comm

intended “to do everything in its power to continu

process” and proposed to the “member states t

European aid programme for Colombia be set up

offered the services of the Commission to coordinat

joint effort. The record shows that this task 

accomplished. 

The governments of the several influential memb

the EU (because of their historical linkages with Colo

or because of the volume of their aid programs to 

America, or both), and also the governments of cou

outside the Union (e.g., Norway, Switzerland) 

expressed considerable concern over the Colombian 

They have also, under varying terms and cond

pledged considerable resources. Not since Vietnam a

bloody clashes in Central America has Europe pon

involvment in a conflict that erupted after the Cold 

end. The sense of urgency in cooperating to solv

pressing problems of Colombia has been felt by a

influential European governments and multi

organizations, virtually without exception

narco-trafficking dimensions have doubtless contr

greatly to this interest. Europe is suffering as much 

United States from the consequences of the trad

consumption of drugs. We should note that not a

member countries have been equally stalwart on Colo

behalf. Spain, with its obvious historical, cultura

language affinities with South America, has 

qualifiedly supportive, while such member countr

France and Germany have shown distinct sig

ambivalence. Still others have remained va

noncommittal.

6
The Attitude of the European Commission.

Colombia has been of priority concern t

Commission. Patten has played a difficult ro

entertaining complaints of the critical member state

the European Parliament) over Plan Colombia, welc

the cooperation of others, especially the Sp

government, and at the same time refraining from irri

the U.S. Government unnecessarily. The Eur

Commission’s view concerning Colombia an

justification for European involvement have been l

stated by Patten himself. 

Despite the typical disclaimers disassociatin

publicly stated views from those of the Commission 

are the same), Patten pledged maximum support f

main protagonists of the peace process: Colombia a

Andean states. The process, in his view, needs a re

focus, to be originated in the region in a balance

integrated fashion, because the problems are large

more complex than the domains defined by na

borders. The main challenges are the violations of h

rights, the lack of respect for the rule of law, an

deterioration of the role of the state caused by 

trafficking. Europe not only has an interest at stak

also a responsibility. However, in spite of some si

progress, Patten is realistic concerning the en

conditions that require a deeper structural res

Violence is not only a cause of problems, it is al

consequence of the prevalent situation of the country

is why the EU Commission has to denounce the violat

human rights, demanding punishment of the vio

whoever they are.

Trying to match words with deeds, Patten pled

concrete financial contribution toward the peace proc

addition to standard humanitarian aid, wit

contribution amounting to about U.S. $300 million. 

areas will receive priority in apportioning aid

7
promotion and defense of human rights, the reduction 

socio-economic disparities, and institutional reinforce

When European observers of the new situation 

precedents of European involvement in Latin Am

along with corresponding disagreement with the U

States, the clash over Plan Colombia may remind th

how they dealt with a problematic Cuba after the Cold 

especially as regarded U.S. extraterritorial laws su

Helms-Burton. However, the European approach i

case seems much better paralleled by Europe’s ba

analytical treatment of the Central Ame

confrontations in the 1980s, an approach the Euro

view as having been a success. The San José process, 

on the conviction that the conflict was caused by 

inequality and not by Soviet-Cuban involvement, 

model that seems to be at the heart of Plan Colombia 

European view). Peace in Colombia is thus to be regar

an enterprise calling for regional Latin Ame

dimensions in need of contributions “by many peo

many countries,” which former Costa Rican president 

Arias called for in his 1987 Nobel Peace Prize s

regarding his efforts to bring peace to Central Amer

any event, such considerations are reflected in the o

declarations of the European Commission.

4

In an effort to build a base for identifying fe

concrete lines of EU-sponsored projects, the Latin Am

group of the permanent representatives of the m

states (REPER) agreed on a series of “principles”:

• recognition of the Colombian civil society and 

communities as fundamental actors;

• an understanding that the Colombian gover

needs to contribute financially to the projects;

• non-intervention of armed groups in the r

identified for EU activity;

8
• neutrality and transparency in all EU-spon

programs; 

• a close relationship with national programs; an

• an expectation that the success of programs w

be possible without an impeccable respect for h

rights and the liberalization of the redistri

scheme for wealth and resources.

EU activities should occur in a wider cont

international assistance, most especially in the 

against drug production and trafficking. Ma

utilization of the crop eradicator fusarium axysp

should be banned. The EU should use its diplomacy 

fight against chemical products used as a base for 

production. It should strive for the intensificat

inter-regional cooperation in drug trafficking control, 

should assist in the fight against money laundering. 

specific regions of Colombia are identified as a priori

Choco, the Macizo colombiano, the South (Putu

Caqueta, Narino), the Magdalena medio, an

Cartagena del Caira.

5

However, there remains the worrisome Janus-face

between what Europe says publicly and what it says 

record. On one hand, governments maintaining a c

relationship with the Colombian government are c

not to portray in public what in private they conside

an alarming picture. In private they describe the sit

as structurally endemic. They do not consider it sim

conflict between government and guerrillas—a cop

robbers scenario in the tropics—but rather the convu

of a society which is terminally fractured. This d

discourse also applies to commentaries on an app

agreement between the United States and Europe.

When engaged in informal, off-the-record conversa

European officials tend to be forthcoming and 

European governments and organizations hav

9
impression that on their side of the ocean they are 

called on to underwrite solutions for social and eco

problems, while on the other side of the ocean the prob

reduced rather to one of drug-trafficking and security

commentary on the section of Plan Colombia dealin

the financial contribution of the international commu

one senior diplomat characterized it as “poner la 

(shell the dough). In crude terms never prese

documents or veiled declarations, there is the prev

European impression that the Colombians will cont

the dead, the Americans will supply the military hard

and the Europeans will contribute the money to defr

cost of the social and environmental damage caused 

other two parties. That is to say, European assista

perceived in different European circles as a sort of r

once the implementation of the U.S.-led military p

terminated. An alert observer detects this feeling sha

many European diplomats in Madrid, Paris, and Brus

corridors and after-hours meetings.

The Specificity of Spain.

The perception of Spain with regard to the Colo

crisis reflects a mix of two contrasting attitudes. O

hand, Plan Colombia generated a very critical react

Spanish public opinion, in the nongovernment organi

(NGO) network, and in the think-tank and aca

communities. While ideological lines might have 

expected to appear in the analysis of conflict 

Marxist-leaning guerrillas were involved, especia

regards the critical view of the Spanish conservative 

no such division has occurred in the case of Plan Colo

On the other hand, one notes the publicly exp

enthusiasm of the Spanish government for the plan, 

with political support and funds. This app

contradiction would make Spain an exception to the 

general disapproval of Plan Colombia in Europe. How

this can be explained on two grounds. First, as far 

Spanish government is concerned, the double discour

10
activated because it permitted an effective public rel

campaign vis-à-vis the Colombian and the 

governments simultaneously. However, while 

declarations are respectful of the Colombian gover

and all sides in conflict, in private the view is as harsh 

one shown by the rest of the Europeans. 

The second explanation for the apparent genero

the Spanish government’s pledge lies in the historic

cultural commitment of Spain towards the develo

and democratization of Latin American. Of less m

but worthy of mention, witty observers also po

apuntarse a todo (the syndrome of signing u

everything). This syndrome still affects Spain after de

(if not centuries) of isolation. It works in a way sim

that of the European gut reaction to grab an issue to o

the United States in order to register independence fro

overwhelming presence of the one and only superpow

search for issues to show its international pre

membership, and involvement, Spain is the opposite 

isolationist middle power. Colombia is an ideal issue f

purpose. The novelty in the last part of the 20th cen

that Spain returned to the Americas in a fashion sim

the one epitomized by the galleons in the times of co

conquest. 

Spain has become the leader of European investm

Latin America. Although Spanish investment in Col

is not as high as in Argentina or Chile, the spillover ef

the Colombian crisis has alarmed Spanish investor

consequently has propelled the Spanish government 

accordingly. Damaged by its political crisis, Colombia 

as the second worst Latin American economy in a sur

Spanish firms, based on efficiency of public administr

economic and business prospects, business comm

efficiency, and environment for business. 

It is broadly recognized that the diplo

establishment of Spain has several ideological profile

conservative view that dominated the ranks of the Sp

11
foreign service in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s has 

pushed aside by a more liberal and left-leaning at

towards the world’s problems, one seen as a better w

protect the national interests of Spain. In contras

some European countries, a critical view of U.S. f

policy is not the monopoly of the Spanish left, but 

natural attitude of the right since the defeat in 1898 ov

American intervention in Cuba. When it comes to th

policy in Latin America and its link with react

governments in the area, the Spanish diplomatic s

today is very critical. The Colombian crisis has ser

consolidate both lines of thought.

In general terms, the view of a notable num

Spanish diplomats, matching the perception of N

academics, and news media, includes a picture of a b

Colombian state, lacking legitimacy and territorial co

unrecognized by a society that demands justice. Amo

urgent structural problems that need to be address

the culture of discrimination and social exclus

persistent armed conflict that equals a civil war, a s

plagued by common crime, a will to modernize w

democracy, an endemic absence of justice and respect 

law, and the overwhelming presence of narco-traff

culture. The result of all this is that politics are rejec

an undesirable activity. Plan Colombia, in this view, f

answer a central question: is it exclusively gea

terminate the drug-trafficking activity, or is it propo

address other issues? 

The future of the Colombia crisis would seem to em

three possibilities: an improbable victory of one 

parties; the very plausible continuation of the conflict

process of political negotiation, a course that seems 

hopeful in the medium term. However, the Colo

government should be warned that it would have 

careful in negotiating with the guerrillas; accompl

peace necessitates that the opponents come out under 

guaranteeing their peaceable and constru

reintegration into society. Harsh terms of surrende

12
sudden demobilization are to be avoided if the objecti

solid negotiation between the government and all sec

the society on one side, and the insurgent groups 

other. This negotiation should include all the pending 

plaguing Colombian society: the agrarian problem

management of energy resources, political represent

social policy, regional powers, the role of the polic

military, and protection of the population.

The diplomatic view as summarized above is al

most realistic. A short-term solution is not pos

Construction of a truly democratic government will 

feasible if important sectors of society are exclude

sides have to cooperate to counteract historical i

where a government is floundering, lacking credibili

territorial control. The challenge is to create nothin

than a new state.

In answer to President Pastrana’s petitio

international cooperation, Spain’s diplomats are d

concerned. On one hand they take note of the c

approach of their colleagues from the EU’s member 

who have a different sensibility for Latin American i

On the other, they see that Spain may appear isolate

the critical sectors manage to swing the general att

Plan Colombia is perceived as imprecise, militaristi

dictated by the United States. Spain’s diplomats s

that the Colombian government should be persua

delay the selling and implementation of the plan, de

all items that have to do with the fight against drugs 

eradication of illegal crops. As a substitute, Colom

invited to present another plan composed a

exclusively of projects for social and economic develop

agrarian reform, improvement of justice, and the 

against corruption.

7

When focussed on economic support, howeve

picture becomes murkier. Observers are well advi

scrutinize the details of the Spanish pledge in ter

funding the projects to be backed. As in other ca

13
Spain’s development assistance programs (not an exc

in the overall European picture), the pitching of 

Colombia becomes the selling of the contribution of re

virtual programs and projects. In the absence of de

documentation, the total package (announced betwee

$100 and $124 million) may ultimately be a compo

current projects with the addition of commercial li

credit. Months after the frenzy of Spanish declaration

diplomatic activities, when pressed for details of the s

package to be presented in coordination with 

European donors, Spanish officials stated that dat

documentation were not yet available.

8

 

The European Parliament Intervenes.

With the end of January 2001 approaching, the de

for preserving the sanctuary area set aside for the FA

an inducement for peace negotiations was looming ov

heads of all protagonists. Dramatizing even furth

seriousness of the moment, President Pastrana cut sh

trip to Europe and returned to Bogotá under rum

military pressure to intervene in the FARC-controlled 

At the same time, the Colombian government deci

give final approval to the details of another despeje 

zone for the benefit of the ELN. With the changing 

guard in Washington, speculation about a change of 

towards Colombia abounded. Not by coincidenc

Committee of Development and Cooperation o

European Parliament took the lead and exacted a p

session resolution from the European parliamentary 

The content of the declaration was construed in dif

ways according to the inclinations of the readers, and 

be the subject of study in view of the course of events 

future.

The Commission reaffirmed its position thro

statement by Commissioner Poul Nielson, a D

Social-Democrat who holds the portfolio of coope

relations. This is a significant detail because its show

14
that the EU’s interest is wider than the na

preoccupations of one commissioner’s portfolio. It 

second that the international assistance focus of the 

now far sharper since it reflects the impact of the 

countries’ views, marked by a stricter attitude t

accountability, self-reliance, transparency, human 

and democratization. Reminding the audience of the 

political and financial support for the Colombian 

initiative, Nielson expressed again the Commis

concern over the “military component” of the 

confirmed the endorsement of the 1998 United N

approach to the drug problem, and pledged the supp

the EU institution for positive measures in drug de

reduction and the strengthening of the rule of la

committed 115 million Euros for the period 2000-200

announced the arrival of EU experts to study projects 

Magdalena medio region to be underwritten with an

20 million Euros. He also confirmed the political supp

the EU through the Grupo de Paises Amigos (Gr

Friends) in promoting the negotiations regardin

despeje zones and in regional efforts to avoid the spillo

the conflict to other countries.

The Resolution of the Parliament was prompted 

strong stance by Portuguese Joaquim Miranda, a U

Left member of the parliamentary body and presiden

Cooperation and Development Committee. He first st

that the EU could not remain indifferent to the Colo

crisis or assume “ambiguous positions.” In his view

heart of the matter was Plan Colombia itself. He 

upon the Commission and the Council to “dist

themselves from it because of (1) its “militaristic char

(2) its lack of a “linkage process” to the Colombian s

(3) its lack of recognition of the “paramilitary phenom

and (4) the fact that the plan “endangers the negot

process.” He pointed out that the Council on Septem

2000, called for a specifically European plan, and he in

on the need to differentiate it from Plan Colombia, 

veiled sneer at the “only European government” (i.e., S

15
publicly and financially committed to its support. Fina

stressed the need for drastic social and economic refo

Colombia to redress the historical causes of the c

problems.

In this context, the plenary session of the Eur

Parliament approved by practically a unanimous m

one of the strongest declaratios ever made on the sit

of a Latin American country. Besides repeatin

elaborating upon the Miranda reservations and port

the declarations made by other dissatisfied commiss

and parliamentarians, the text mandates that th

support a peace process with the objective of reinf

democratic institutions, alternative development

humanitarian and social aid. NGOs and civil society s

be empowered for this task. Wealth redistributio

necessity in a system where peasants do not own the 

In sum, the EU must implement its 

“non-militaristic” strategy with “neutrality 

transparency,” and with the participation of civil soc

the negotiation process. The Commission is urged to c

the necessary financial resources. The plan of the Cou

evaluate the situation every 6 months is warmly end

International cooperation against the trafficking o

precursors and money laundering are to be part of th

package. All armed parties are enjoined to cooperat

the neighboring countries are asked to contribute 

comprehensive regional solution. Most especially, th

of the parliamentary declaration expressed alarm ov

fact that since the opening of the peace negotiations, 

violence and terrorism (assassinations, kidnap

massacres) had increased. According to the declar

such acts, all undertaken with apparent impunity, ac

the impotence of the population and increased 

frustration. International observers (such a

representative Mary Robinson) have certifie

inadequacy of measures against the paramilitary g

calling for a EU commitment on behalf of protectin

financing human rights organizations.

9

16
Other European Institutions and Partners.

As in any other political family, there are member

inclined to show radical attitudes than others. With r

to Plan Colombia, some EU member states hav

themselves apart by expressing sharp antagonistic 

Belgium and Germany have been leaders in insistin

the EU should distance itself from Plan Colombia, an

European assistance should be conditioned on certain 

acts by parties to the crisis.

10

 Belgium, Italy, Sw

Germany, Austria, and Denmark have been at the for

of those insisting on program funding for the protec

human rights and the involvement of civil society. How

perhaps inconsistently, some members (Germany, Au

have expressed concern over the fact that s

declarations and politically-imposed limitations 

hinder the effectiveness of existing projects in Colo

making the fresh contribution of some states proble

because they are not willing to throw good money 

bad.

11

 This tendency reveals the weakness of EU pro

that are based upon individual national programs. 

The Group of Friends is at at the center o

international involvement contributing to agreemen

contacts between the Colombian factions. The gr

designed with a clear strategy to reflect that it has the 

a nucleus (Spain and France), but it also includes n

states that have a reputation either for being n

(Switzerland) or for having considerable experien

serving as a bridge (Norway). Cuba is the Latin Am

representative, reflecting its sincere commitment to r

the crisis since it has more to lose if problems become 

Most of the important agreements between the Colo

government and the FARC have been crafted wi

support and diplomacy offered by the Group. Memb

the Group are quite critical of the attitude of the EL

they did make efforts to engage them in the negotiat

The development of Plan Colombia involved Par

triple capacity. First, France was holding the preside

17
the EU during the second semester of 2000. France is 

member of the Group of Friends. Finally, France wa

continues to be an influential voice in Latin Am

cultural and economic affairs, in which it has imp

interests. (French investment is the leader in Colo

The French government could hardly afford to mi

opportunity to strengthen its somewhat weakened po

in the world after the end of the Cold War. While in 

dimensions of domestic policy the influence of conser

President Jacques Chirac is present, in most aven

foreign policy France still seems to reflect the li

François Mitterrand. This becomes most obvio

France’s attitude toward sensitive Latin American a

of U.S. foreign policy. For example, the case of Cuba 

opposition to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws s

Helms-Burton as well as the case of Colombia itsel

France opportunities for involvement similar to 

afforded when it led Europe in designing the C

American policies of cooperation assistance durin

1980s. 

The French government was backed by its 

pro-leftist and liberal press, led by the influential Le M

and by the traditional leaning of its academics towar

causes of the marginalized. While holding the preside

the EU, Ambassador Renaud Vignal, director 

Americas Department of the Quai D’Orsay, c

endorsed the overall assessment of the Eur

Commission and noted the consensus of the most 

member states. The Peace Process, as Europe prefers 

it, emphasizes that the search for peace is the only hop

Colombia has. This is a process that needs time, pat

and a dose of compromise by all parties in the co

According to Vignal, there is no alternative. Echoing 

European voices, he says there is no military solutio

would guarantee general agreement and consequent l

peace. He then pledged a complete package to be carri

with the cooperation of other organizations, based 

following points: support of the rule of law, defe

18
human rights, opposition to the causes of vio

environmental protection, and consolidation of re

cooperation. European integration was offered 

example for gathering the contributions of neigh

states.

As a member of the Group of Friends, and 

especially as a guardian of the Geneva Conventio

Swiss government has been instrumental in pro

added credibility to European efforts to facilitate the 

process. In successive declarations, Switzerlan

stressed the need for obtaining a lasting peace, ap

whatever efforts are required. Reaffirming the views 

other European partners, Switzerland expresses amo

priority concerns the observance of international h

rights agreements, obtaining a general consensus am

sectors of the Colombian people, and careful attent

environmental damage. Consequently, S

representatives find it difficult to accept the m

component of the plan and the sweeping crop eradi

program. With a pledge of $12 million to be disperse

years, the Swiss say they will apply it in the following 

assisting displaced people, protection of human r

negotiations with the ELN, establishment of the office 

Defender of the People, and diverse support for NGO

Few observers can deny the important influe

Germany not only in EU affairs but in the overall 

scene. Since its near total devastation in World War 

Federal Republic of Germany has, in a quite syste

way, regained its central place in world affairs. G

leadership understood the message of Robert Sch

and, as a western federal republic and as a reu

country, it has been at the forefront of the EU prese

the world. In view of the huge German investment in 

America and the generosity of its development assi

programs (30 percent of such EU programs), it 

surprising that the Colombian crisis has caugh

attention of the German government. To sum up Germ

attitude toward Plan Colombia, it can be stated t

19
supports the efforts of the Colombian governmen

people to obtain peace in the country within the fram

of bilateral agreements. Germany does not wa

contribution to be identified with Plan Colomb

supports the peace process along with other Europe

their own European program.

12

 In the record of offic

meetings, Germany “insisted on making very clear 

text that the EU distance itself from Plan Colom

Negotiations, in this view, are the only way to obtain 

Germany backed its words with a 50 percent increa

million DM) in its financial commitment to Colombia, 

today totals 1.57 billion DM (almost $800 million). 

One of the more vocal opponents of the U.S.-in

version of the plan, Belgium has been a leading Eur

exponent of the view that the causes for the Colo

crisis lie beyond guerrilla activities and drug traffi

Pointing out the “inequality, low living standards

failure of government to meet the [Colombian pe

legitimate] demands,” Brussels “diametrically oppose

plan, proposing instead a more “integral solution

pledging support for social programs through 

distributed by Belgian NGOs. Figures have amoun

100 million Belgian francs in recent years, the pledg

BF 23 million loan for conflict prevention programs, 

supplement of BF 50 million for 2001. Moreover, the

similar expectations for 2002. 

Conclusion: The Needs and Prospects of Europ

Support.

The European commitment will not falter, at least 

political and humanitarian sectors. The pressu

participate will continue for a variety of reasons. Fir

above all, European participation has always been we

in Latin America, and especially in a unique crisis s

Colombia’s. European contributions are seldom per

as cases of intrusion, interference, or meddling. In fa

precedent of European involvement in Central Am

20
argues just the opposite. The EU’s blue emblem with 

stars (though membership has been expanded to 15 na

very often functions as a shield of excellence 

guarantee, in clear contrast with the ambivalence stir

programs identified with the Stars and Stripes. 

ambivalence may be unfair, given the overall his

contribution of U.S. actors, but it simply reflects the da

inflicted by past mistakes. The mediating, facilitatin

monitoring services of the European states and ag

still comprise considerable political capital to be used 

future. 

It is not surprising then that U.S. Government s

and other informed observers agree with the Colo

government that Europe is an indispensable actor. I

of the complexity of the Colombian crisis, it needs 

addressed by a multiplicity of contributor

commentator questions the pivotal role to be play

European actors regarding international assista

Colombia, either through their humanitarian act

delegated to NGO networks under the umbrella of th

or through programs directly implemented by the m

states.

The role to be played by European actors would pro

be enhanced and accorded more impetus if, as predic

more cautious U.S. policy in Colombia ensues from a r

by the new Bush Administration. A more flexibl

nuanced implementation of Plan Colombia may give 

breathing space to European participation, freeing i

damaging preoccupations with the military compone

It may well be that the precedent of the C

American experience allows us to have hope. Grante

end of the Cold War might have contributed more 

present Peace Process than was contributed by Eur

pressures along the tortuous road traveled by the Sa

process. It is also true that the negotiations endin

bloody civil wars in Central America did not eradicat

socio-economic causes. The complexity of the Colo

21
crisis and its subsequent spillover effect in the A

region may present an insurmountable obstacle, too la

be solved by the assistance given by European-led ai

at least an end to the mutual massacres may be an obj

reasonably within reach.

Successful negotiation between the United State

its European partners growing out of an attenuation 

most irritating aspects of the original Plan Colombia 

provide both parties a sense of accomplishment. F

U.S. Government, this might be obtained at the c

blaming the projects of the previous administration. F

Europeans, the reduction of the military aspects of th

may be the base for selling a more generous package 

A common strategy developed by the U.S. Governme

the EU on pressuring the Colombian government for 

effective control of the paramilitary forces may h

greater surge of European activism backed by develo

assistance funds and investment nurtured by a 

Colombian economic climate would provide a much n

pressure base to persuade the guerrilla factions to co

the table for real negotiations beyond ceasefires and n

zones.

The matter may look differently as events followi

talks between President Pastrana and FARC 

Manuel Marulanda play themselves out. Po

developments may ultimately occur as a res

Colombian officials meeting with the Europeans in Br

to iron out details of the European contributio

recommended by the team of European experts who 

Colombia to identify and evaluate projects to be fu

Nonetheless, despite such promises of substanc

Colombian scenario and its agenda are still shadow

this candid caveat offered by a high representativ

European government: “We will make a vi

contribution to a virtual peace plan.”

14

 His estimat

reinforced by the declarations that led to the Resolu

the European Parliament. At the same time, howeve

22
pessimistic message will serve as a spur to all partie

down and negotiate.

ENDNOTES

1. See official web site: http://www.presidencia.gov.co/pl

index.htm.

2. Communications and interviews with EU staff.

3. Letter to Joseph Pique, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 

September 19, 2000.

4. See website at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ex

relations/colombia/intro/sec 1647 3.htm.

5. Group AMLAT, “Appui de l’Union Europeenne au Proce

Paix Colombien," September 7, 2000.

6. For a complete listing of the projects presented for intern

financing, see http://www.presidencia.gov.co/plancolo/volumen2/do

7. The comments and recommendations are a summary of 

conversations conducted during the months of July and Septe

2000 with Spanish diplomats having direct knowledge and dutie

area, as supplemented with pertinent documentation. All arg

included were proposed, circulated, and discussed several 

before the official dissemination of Plan Colombia and the 

President Clinton to Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) in August 2

8. Information derived from European Union sources, J

2001.

9. Resolution, February 1, 2001.

10. COLAT meeting, September 26, 2000.

11. COLAT meeting, October 2, 2000.

12. Explicit declaration by German official to the author 

consulate in Miami, January 12, 2001.

13. Internal communications of the Commission, October 13, 

14. From European Union sources.

23
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Joaquin Roy

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler