NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 23-1473

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

YERALDY STEPHANY MARTINEZ SALGADO,

 Appellant

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Criminal No. 2-22-cr-00193-001)

District Judge: Honorable Julien X. Neals

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on March 7, 2024

Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 28, 2024)

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OPINION*

__________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

Yeraldy Martinez Salgado pleaded guilty to two drug trafficking offenses and was 

sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. She appeals, arguing that her sentence was

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We will affirm.

I.1

Martinez Salgado is a thirty-three-year-old mother from Mexico. In June 2020, 

her husband was murdered by drug traffickers after amassing gambling debts. Following 

his death, the traffickers turned their attention to her, demanding that she travel to the

United States and assist in their trafficking operation to pay the remaining debt. Fearful 

for her and her children’s lives, she complied.

In November 2020, police in New Jersey saw Martinez Salgado receive fentanyl. 

They arrested her, and she consented to a search of her apartment, where police found 

cash and additional drugs. She spent seven days in jail and was released to home 

confinement. Two years later, she pleaded guilty to (1) conspiracy to distribute more 

than 400 grams of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (2) possession with 

intent to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).

At sentencing in March 2023, Martinez Salgado asked for a time-served sentence, 

arguing that she was coerced into trafficking drugs. The District Court calculated an 

advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. It then 

1 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the important 

facts.
3

weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and concluded that a downward variance was 

warranted but a custodial sentence was still necessary. It sentenced Martinez Salgado to 

24 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. She timely 

appealed.

II.

The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

Appellate review of a criminal sentence proceeds in two steps. First, we “ensure 

that the district court committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If the “district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally 

sound,” we “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Id. We 

review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a criminal sentence for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 2014).

A.

Martinez Salgado first argues that her sentence was procedurally unreasonable 

because the District Court failed to adequately explain its reasoning. A failure to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence, including any deviation from the guidelines 

range, is a procedural error. United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195–96 (3d Cir. 

2008); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The record must contain “an explanation from the district 

court sufficient for us to see that the particular circumstances of the case have been given 

meaningful consideration within the parameters of § 3553(a).” Levinson, 543 F.3d at 

196.
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But Martinez Salgado failed to preserve this argument. “[W]hen a party wishes to 

take an appeal based on a procedural error at sentencing . . . that party must object to the 

procedural error complained of after sentence is imposed in order to avoid plain error 

review on appeal.” United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). After the District Court imposed Martinez Salgado’s sentence, her lawyer

“object[ed] to the sentence as being unreasonable and in violation of the mandate in 

[§] 3553 and otherwise in violation of the law.” App. 126. This objection did not put the 

District Court on notice of any procedural error. Therefore, it must be construed as an 

objection to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, not the adequacy of the 

Court’s explanation. See Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 258 (emphasizing that a sentencing 

court must have “contemporaneous notice of [the] error[] and of the opportunity to 

correct [it]”).

An unpreserved issue is subject to plain-error review. Id. at 259. “An error is 

plain if it is clear or obvious, affects substantial rights, and affects the fairness, integrity[,]

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The District Court provided a thorough explanation for its sentence. It found “that 

there was some coercive element” to Martinez Salgado’s crimes, App. 120, but it 

reasoned that coercion often plays a role in criminal activity and that general deterrence 

was “a very significant factor” supporting an additional period of incarceration, App. 

121. It weighed the nature of the conduct, including the dangerousness of fentanyl and 

the fact that Martinez Salgado participated in “many pickups and drop-offs of money and 

drugs.” App. 120. It also considered Martinez Salgado’s period of home detention, her 
5

probable deportation, and her unlikely recidivism. It then synthesized these factors to 

conclude that “the activities that were engaged in here, the need for general deterrence 

and the seriousness of the crime . . . outweigh the factors that . . . warrant a noncustodial 

sentence.” App. 122. The Court’s discussion does not evince any error, let alone a clear 

or obvious one.

2

B.

Finding no procedural error in the sentence, we next “consider if it is substantively 

reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 

897, 912 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence is substantively 

reasonable if it “falls within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered 

reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 

(3d Cir. 2008). Under this deferential standard, “we will affirm . . . unless no reasonable 

sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 

the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (en banc).

2 Even if Martinez Salgado’s procedural unreasonableness claim were not subject to 

plain-error review, the District Court’s explanation was not an abuse of discretion. This 

case bears little resemblance to those in which we found a district court’s explanation 

inadequate. Here, the Court did not offer reasoning that contradicted its sentencing 

decision. See Levinson, 543 F.3d at 200 (holding that a district court’s explanation was 

inadequate where it described how the defendant was typical of other defendants but then 

varied downward significantly). Nor did it “le[ave] the realm of weighing the particulars 

of this case and enter[] into a consideration of general penal policy,” id., or ignore 

arguments emphasized by the parties or the § 3553(a) factors, United States v. Goff, 501 

F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2012); 

United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 222 (3d Cir. 2010).
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Martinez Salgado argues that her sentence was unreasonably high because she was 

coerced into committing the offenses. But, as discussed above, “the record as a whole 

reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the [§ 3553(a) factors].” Id. The 

District Court credited Martinez Salgado’s mitigating evidence—that she was coerced 

into drug trafficking, that she feared for her life and the lives of her family members, and 

that she felt she had no other option but to comply with the traffickers’ demands—and 

considered it alongside the other sentencing factors. Its “failure to give mitigating factors 

the weight a defendant contends they deserve does not make [the] sentence substantively 

unreasonable.” United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We cannot say that no reasonable sentencing court would have 

imposed a 24-month sentence on Martinez Salgado for the reasons provided.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.