Technical Report 1178 

Wargaming Effectiveness: Its Conceptualization and 

Assessment 

Anna T. Cianciolo 

Global Information Systems Technology, Inc. 

William R. Sanders 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

 March 2006 

 United States Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
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 and Combat Development

Robert E. Solick, U.S. Army Research Institute 

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i 

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Wargaming Effectiveness: Its Conceptualization and 

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): 

Wargaming arguably is the most important collective activity occurring during operational planning. The need to 

understand, develop, and support battle staff wargaming has never been greater than it is now. The purpose of the 

present research was to determine the constructs that comprise effective wargaming and to explore methods for 

assessing these constructs. Cognitive task analysis was used to develop a conceptual framework for 

understanding the knowledge, skills, and other attributes that comprise the individual and team-related 

determinants, processes, and outcomes of effective wargaming. This framework was used as the basis for 

designing and implementing assessments. This initial exploration indicates that assessments derived from the 

wargaming conceptual framework can be feasible to administer and be reliable and valid assessments of their 

related psychological constructs. If extended and applied, this work could escort operations command and control 

teams into the future through a better understanding of how to develop and support their collective mission planning 

competence. 

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Wargaming Distributed Planning Future Force 

Performance Measures Planning Skills Collaborative Planning 

 

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 ii 
Technical Report 1178 

Wargaming Effectiveness: Its Conceptualization and 

Assessment 

Anna T. Cianciolo 

Global Information Systems Technology, Inc. 

William R. Sanders 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

Armored Forces Research Unit 

Barbara A. Black, Chief 

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926 

March 2006 

 

Army Project Number Personnel Performance and 

622785A790 Training Technology

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

We gratefully acknowledge Dr. Kathleen Quinkert and MG (Ret.) Bert Maggart for their 

initial direction and LTC (Ret.) Jim Harrison for his generous assistance, mentorship, and 

patience throughout this project. We also gratefully acknowledge LTC (Ret.) Glen DeWillie, 

BG (Ret.) Bill Mullen, III, and LTC (Ret.) George Hodge for their assistance in the development 

and review of our assessments. We are indebted to the officers who volunteered their time to 

assist us as we conducted interviews and observations, especially those officers on the 

Sidewinder and Scorpion teams at the U.S. Army National Training Center, MAJ John T. 

Selman, Jr., and the students of the Armor Captain’s Career Course. 

 

iv 
WARGAMING EFFECTIVENESS: ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Research Requirement: 

Battalions and brigades are experiencing substantial change in structure and identity as 

they transform to modular units of action. Among other things, this change has implications for 

how to apply the military decision-making process to planning unconventional missions using 

new types of units. Wargaming arguably is the most important collective activity occurring 

during operational planning. The need to understand, develop, and support battle staff 

wargaming has never been greater than it is now, when innovative problem solving is absolutely 

critical to success. 

Developing and supporting the collective activity involved in wargaming requires that the 

outcomes of wargaming be well defined, that the processes by which successful wargaming 

occurs be well understood, and that the causes for ineffective wargaming be recognized. 

Assessment lies at the intersection of understanding wargaming and actually improving it 

through training or command and control system design. Without assessment, understanding 

wargaming cannot be linked to performance enhancement. 

The collective activity involved in effective wargaming, however, is not well understood, 

and its assessment is largely unexplored. The understanding of wargaming effectiveness must go 

beyond current conceptualizations to illuminate the constructs that comprise effective 

wargaming. Assessment of wargaming effectiveness must go beyond current state-of-the-art to 

capture these constructs in a reliable, valid manner. 

The purpose of the present research was to determine the constructs that comprise 

effective wargaming and to explore methods for assessing these constructs. The focus of the 

research was wargaming as conducted by the staffs of combined arms battalion task forces. The 

goal was to provide direction for conducting wargaming assessment for the purposes of tracking 

training progress and/or evaluating the effects of technological intervention on wargaming 

effectiveness.

Procedure: 

Cognitive task analysis was used to develop a conceptual framework for understanding 

the knowledge, skills, and other attributes that comprise the individual and team-related 

determinants, processes, and outcomes of effective wargaming. This framework was used as the 

basis for designing and implementing assessments of individual and team wargaming 

competence. The validity and feasibility of these assessments was explored by administering the 

assessments during Armor Captain’s Career Course (AC3) training between November 2004 and 

September 2005. Six independent groups of students participated in the research. 

v 
Findings: 

This initial exploration of wargaming assessment methods indicates that assessments 

derived from the wargaming conceptual framework can be feasible to administer and be reliable 

and valid assessments of their related psychological constructs. In addition, these assessments 

are informative regarding the possible situational factors that influence wargaming performance, 

including the number of officers involved, the ease of communications, and the adequacy of 

supporting equipment. Further validation of wargaming effectiveness assessments requires a 

combined approach in which assessments are designed based on an understanding of wargaming, 

tested in a controlled experimental environment where specific conditions can be manipulated, 

and validated in an operational setting. 

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings: 

The present research produces a more in-depth understanding of wargaming and its 

effectiveness assessment than previously has been accomplished. Several psychological 

constructs comprising wargaming determinants (individual and team-related), processes, and 

outcomes have been identified. This work therefore sets the stage for more systematic 

assessment of wargaming effectiveness and diagnosis of shortfalls in wargaming performance. 

If extended and applied, this work could escort operations command and control teams into the 

future through a better understanding of how to develop and support their collective mission 

planning competence. 

vi 
 WARGAMING EFFECTIVENESS: ITS CONCEPTUALIZATION AND ASSESSMENT 

CONTENTS

 Page 

Introduction........................................................................................................................... 1 

A Cognitive Task Analysis of Wargaming........................................................................... 2 

 Literature Review............................................................................................................... 3 

 Interviews with Subject Matter Experts............................................................................. 3 

 Observations ...................................................................................................................... 3 

A Framework for Conceptualizing Wargaming Effectiveness............................................. 4 

 The Wargaming Process.................................................................................................... 4 

 Determinants of Wargaming Effectiveness....................................................................... 7 

 Critical Thinking/Analogical Reasoning ...................................................................... 7 

 Knowledge of Own Roles and Roles of Others............................................................ 7 

 Tacit Knowledge for Wargaming ................................................................................. 7 

 Team-Related Motivation ............................................................................................. 8 

Effective Wargaming Processes ........................................................................................... 8 

 Team Communication................................................................................................... 8 

 Adaptivity of Team Thought ........................................................................................ 8 

Effective Wargaming Outcomes........................................................................................... 9 

 Shared Battlefield Visualization ................................................................................... 9

 Integrated Mission Plan ................................................................................................ 9 

Assessments of Wargaming Effectiveness ........................................................................... 9 

 Critical Thinking/Analogical Reasoning ........................................................................... 10 

 Knowledge of Own Roles and Roles of Others................................................................. 10 

 Tacit Knowledge for Wargaming ...................................................................................... 11 

 Team-Related Motivation .................................................................................................. 11 

 Team Communication........................................................................................................ 12 

 Adaptivity of Team Thought ............................................................................................. 13 

 Shared Battlefield Visualization ........................................................................................ 14

 Integrated Mission Plan ..................................................................................................... 14 

Evaluation of Selected Wargaming Effectiveness Assessments .......................................... 15 

 Method ............................................................................................................................... 15 

 Participants.................................................................................................................... 15 

 Materials ....................................................................................................................... 15 

 Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 16 

 Findings.............................................................................................................................. 18

vii 
CONTENTS (Continued) 

 

 Page 

 Assessment Properties .................................................................................................. 18 

 Mission Analysis Briefing Exercise (MABE) .................................................................. 18 

 Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment ................................................................................. 19 

 Wargaming Tacit Knowledge ........................................................................................... 20 

 Team-Related Motivation ................................................................................................. 20 

 Team Communication Checklist....................................................................................... 22 

 Think Like a Commander (TLAC) Checklist................................................................... 23 

 Situation Awareness (SA) Exercise .................................................................................. 24 

 Instructor Ratings.............................................................................................................. 25 

 Assessment Validity...................................................................................................... 25 

 Relationships among Individual and Team-Related Wargaming Determinants............... 25 

 Wargaming Determinants–Relation to Wargaming Process Effectiveness...................... 29 

 Wargaming Determinants and Process Effectiveness–Relation to Wargaming 

 Outcome Effectiveness .................................................................................................. 32 

Discussion............................................................................................................................. 34 

 Strengths ............................................................................................................................ 35 

 Limitations......................................................................................................................... 35 

Conclusions and Future Directions....................................................................................... 36 

References............................................................................................................................. 39 

Appendix A List of Acronyms.............................................................................................A-1 

Appendix B Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment................................................................B-1 

Appendix C Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment......................................................C-1 

Appendix D Team-Related Motivation Survey ...................................................................D-1 

Appendix E Team Communication Checklist .....................................................................E-1 

Appendix F Think Like a Commander (TLAC) Checklist..................................................F-1 

Appendix G Situation Awareness Exercise .........................................................................G-1 

Appendix H Integrated Overlay Exercise Items and Rationale ...........................................H-1 

Appendix I Demographic Survey ........................................................................................ I-1 

Appendix J General Design Guidelines for Scenario-Specific Assessments ...................... J-1 

List of Tables 

Table 1 Example Item from a Team Communication Checklist .......................................... 12 

Table 2 Example Think Like A Commander Checklist Item ............................................... 13 

Table 3 Example Situational Awareness Exercise Questions............................................... 14 

Table 4 Example Integrated Overlay Checklist Item and Rationale..................................... 15 

Table 5 Overview of the Armor Captain’s Career Course (Distance Learning) .................. 16

viii 
Table 6 Overall Administration of Wargaming Effectiveness Assessments........................ 17 

CONTENTS (Continued) 

 

 Page 

Table 7 Percentage of Students Positively Endorsing Motivation Survey Items ................ 21 

Table 8 Wargaming Determinants Scores and Officer Rank................................................ 26 

Table 9 Wargaming Determinants and Company Command Experience ............................ 27 

Table 10 Wargaming Determinants and Staff Experience ................................................... 27 

Table 11 Wargaming Determinants and Regular Army Experience .................................... 28 

Table 12 Wargaming Determinants Relation to One Another.............................................. 28 

Table 13 Staff Roles Knowledge and Wargaming Process Effectiveness............................ 29 

Table 14 Wargaming Tacit Knowledge and Wargaming Process Effectiveness ................. 30 

Table 15 Team-Related Motivation and Wargaming Process Effectiveness........................ 31 

Table 16 Wargaming Processes and Wargaming Outcomes................................................ 33 

Table 17 Wargaming Determinants and Wargaming Outcomes.......................................... 34 

List of Figures 

Figure 1. The Process of Wargaming a Single Course of Action........................................ 5 

Figure 2. Determinants, Processes, and Outcomes of Effective Wargaming ...................... 6 

ix 
x 
Introduction 

As the U.S. Army goes through its greatest transformation since the 1960’s (Smith, 2005) 

(a transformation necessitated by shifts in the nature of warfare and the fundamental mission of 

the Army) change over the next several years will effect every echelon in the organization. 

Battalions and brigades are experiencing the greatest change in structure and identity as they 

transform to modular units of action. Among other things, transformation has implications for 

unit employment tactics and therefore the “art” of mission command [FM 6-0; U.S. Department 

of the Army (DA), 2003]. Battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs must learn how to 

apply doctrinal concepts, such as the military decision-making process in new ways to plan 

unconventional missions and counter asymmetric enemies. Moreover, they must apply these 

concepts using new technology, specifically networked digital command and control systems. 

The need to understand, develop, and support the collective activity that comprises effective 

operational (i.e., battalion- and brigade-level) planning and decision-making has never been 

greater than it is in the contemporary operating environment, where innovative problem solving 

is absolutely critical to success. 

Wargaming, the analysis of potential courses of action for their feasibility, risk, and 

likelihood of success (FM 5-0; DA, 2002), arguably is the most important collective activity 

occurring during operational planning. Effective wargaming not only accomplishes a systematic 

evaluation of candidate mission plans, but also serves to align the battalion or brigade 

commander’s visualization of an upcoming engagement with that of his staff. This shared 

visualization is what enables staff officers to anticipate the commander’s decision-making needs 

in the midst of an engagement and therefore provide him timely, relevant information or even 

make decisions in his absence. In addition, effective wargaming enables staff officers to develop 

integrated mission plans that synchronize their functional areas to achieve decisive effects. 

Mission plans do not apply fully after the enemy makes his first unpredicted action, but it is 

through the wargaming process that the commander and his staff internalize the overall purpose 

and goals of the mission as well as explore the implications of the operational environment for 

action. 

Developing and supporting the collective activity involved in wargaming requires that the 

outcomes of wargaming be well defined, that the processes by which successful wargaming 

occurs be well understood, and that the causes for ineffective wargaming be recognized. 

Understanding the determinants (individual and team-related), processes, and outcomes of 

wargaming focuses the determination of training objectives or identification of behavioral targets 

for technological support. Assessment lies at the intersection of understanding wargaming and 

actually improving it through training or command and control system design. It is through 

assessment that progress toward training objectives can be tracked and facilitated. It is also 

through assessment that the effects of technology or other intervention on collective activity are 

revealed and evaluated. Without assessment, understanding wargaming cannot be linked to 

performance enhancement. 

The purpose of the present research was to design, develop, and evaluate the reliability 

and feasibility of techniques for assessing wargaming effectiveness. The focus of this research 

was wargaming as conducted by the staffs of combined arms battalion task forces (CABTFs). 

1
The goal was to provide direction for conducting wargaming assessment for the purposes of 

tracking training progress and/or evaluating the effects of technological intervention on 

wargaming effectiveness. The following quote from Messick (1994), as cited in Mislevy, 

Steinberg, Breyer, Almond, and Johnson (1999) precisely summarizes the overall approach used. 

“[We] would begin by asking what complex of knowledge, skills, or other 

attributes should be assessed, presumably because they are tied to explicit or 

implicit objectives of instruction or are otherwise valued by society. Next, what 

behaviors or performances should reveal those constructs and what tasks or 

situations should elicit those behaviors? Thus, the nature of the construct guides 

the selection or construction of relevant [assessment] tasks as well as the rational 

development of scoring criteria and rubrics. (p. 17)” 

The knowledge skills, or other attributes comprising the collective activity involved in 

effective wargaming, however, are not well understood. Doctrine (FM 5-0; DA, 2002) and other 

sources (Ford & Campbell, 1997; Mullen, Kemper, Harrison, & Bartkoski, 1997) state the tasks 

that must be accomplished for wargaming to be considered successful, but do not identify the 

determinants (individual and team-related), processes, and outcomes of wargaming. If the tasks 

required for successful wargaming are accomplished, it is still unknown whether the desired 

outcome of wargaming has actually been achieved (e.g., a person may successfully hammer three 

nails into the wall and set a shelf upon them, but the shelf may be crooked, may not coordinate 

with the other décor in the room, etc.). If these tasks are not accomplished, it is unknown as to 

why there was a shortfall in performance. 

For this reason, the present research also focused on developing a conceptual framework 

for understanding knowledge, skills, and other attributes that comprise the determinants, 

processes, and outcomes of effective wargaming. This framework served as the basis for 

designing, implementing, and evaluating assessments of individual and team wargaming 

competence. The reliability and feasibility of these assessments was evaluated through 

administration during Armor Captain’s Career Course (AC3) training occurring between 

November 2004 and September 2005. This final report presents the research approach in detail, 

the assessments developed, and the findings of their evaluation. For the convenience of the 

reader, a list of all acronyms is provided in Appendix A. 

A Cognitive Task Analysis of Wargaming 

In order to identify the knowledge, skills, and other attributes that should be assessed to 

capture the wargaming effectiveness of CABTF staffs, a cognitive task analysis of wargaming 

was conducted. The objective was to identify not only the cognitive activities involved in 

effective wargaming, but also the behavioral indicators of effective performance of these 

activities. For this reason, the approach used combined applied cognitive task analysis 

(described in Militello & Hutton, 1998) with evidence-centered cognitive task analysis 

(described in Mislevy et al., 1999). This approach allowed the present assessment research to be 

based on a conceptualization of effective operational behavior in terms of psychological 

constructs, rather than on an a priori selection of psychological constructs that were force-fit to a 

poorly understood notion of operational behavior. Unlike either Militello, and Hutton (1998) or 

2
Mislevy et al. (1999), the present task analysis focused on collective as well as individual 

cognitive activities. The task analysis was conducted in three phases: literature review, 

discussion with subject matter experts (SMEs), and observation of ongoing wargaming. 

Literature Review 

The task analysis began with a review of several unclassified Army field manuals on 

mission planning and tactics [e.g., FM 5-0; DA, 2002] such that a general understanding of the 

wargaming process could be accomplished. The documentation reviewed described the purpose 

of the wargaming process, its procedural steps, and the key people involved and their role in the 

process. Articles in the Army professional literature [e.g., Center for Army Lessons Learned 

(CALL), 1998], as well as a variety of publicly accessible Government-sponsored technical and 

reports (e.g., Mullen et al., 1997), monographs (e.g., Glenn, 1996), and military student thesis 

(e.g., Crain, 1989), helped with identifying the particularly challenging aspects of wargaming. 

These aspects are successfully conducted by expert teams of wargamers and unsuccessfully by 

others. These aspects are also those of greatest importance to ensuring that the wargame 

achieves its purpose. A general understanding of the wargaming process and its challenging 

aspects prepared the principal investigator to interview SMEs for more in-depth information not 

readily available in the literature. 

Interviews with Subject Matter Experts 

Interviews with 17 SMEs were conducted to better understand why aspects of the 

wargaming process are difficult for CABTF staffs and to determine the individual and team

activities that comprise effective wargaming. Interviewees included current and former

observer/controllers at the U.S. Army National Training Center, active and retired lieutenant 

colonels with battalion command experience, instructors at the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College and at the U.S. Army Armor School, and two retired generals. All of these 

SMEs had experience as staff officers and as members and/or commanders of a combined arms

unit. The interviews conducted were not structured around the probe questions presented in 

Militello and Hutton (1998) or Mislevy et al. (1999); the probes used by these researchers to 

capture decision-making activity were not relevant to analyzing an information-gathering task 

such as wargaming. Rather, the interviews in the present research started from the following 

general questions: (1) What makes [a particular aspect of wargaming] difficult? (2) What do 

staff officers have to know and/or do to [perform this particular aspect] successfully? (3) What 

mistakes do less experienced staffs typically make [when performing this aspect]? (4) What do 

these mistakes look like? (5) What does it look like when [this particular aspect] is performed 

effectively?

Observations

As a supplement to SME interviews in determining the indicators of wargaming 

effectiveness, observations were conducted of ongoing wargaming instruction and of wargaming 

conducted during a high-fidelity field training exercise. The wargaming instruction observed 

was conducted at the Armor School. Students were National Guard officers and regular Army

officers participating in AC3. Regular Army students in the resident version of AC3 wargamed 

3
together in a classroom using acetate overlays and paper maps. National Guard students in the 

distance-learning version of AC3 (AC3DL) wargamed while geographically distributed using a 

virtual tactical operations center (VTOC; see Sanders, 2002). The field exercise observed was 

conducted at the U.S. Army National Training Center. Brigade and armor task force planning 

was observed as these units went through stability and security operations training. All 

observations were conducted in collaboration with SMEs who provided explanation and insights 

in real time. 

A Framework for Conceptualizing Wargaming Effectiveness 

This section presents the findings of the cognitive task analysis in the form of a 

conceptual framework of wargaming. This framework served as the basis for the selection, 

design, and development of the wargaming assessments explored in the present research. The 

wargaming process is described briefly and a proposed set of knowledge, skills, and other 

attributes that comprise effective wargaming is featured. The task analysis revealed that 

essentially the same general competencies underlie both co-located and distributed wargaming, 

although technical skills become more important when communications are digitally mediated. 

Reference to wargaming throughout this report therefore refers both to co-located and distributed 

wargaming. 

The Wargaming Process 

Wargaming is a key component of Army mission planning. According to Army doctrine, 

it is the analysis of multiple courses of action in order to collect information on their feasibility 

and likelihood of success. After wargaming, the courses of action analyzed are compared and 

the superior course of action is chosen as the mission plan. The following description of the 

wargaming process is focused on wargaming as applied to planning in a time-constrained 

environment because interviews with SMEs indicated that this is the environment in which 

wargaming is commonly done. In a time-constrained environment, only a single course of action 

is analyzed.

The purpose of wargaming a single course of action is to synchronize the functional areas 

on the battlefield, or battlefield operating systems (BOS), for accomplishing the mission and to 

identify any weaknesses in the course of action that must be addressed. It is an interactive 

information-gathering exercise through which the staff and commander calibrate their image of

the battlefield (a dynamic mental model of the battlefield and its contextual surroundings; Kahan, 

Worley, & Stasz, 1989) and determine the means for allocating resources to accomplish the 

course of action and its associated branches/sequels. The overarching goal of wargaming a 

single course of action is to develop a shared image of the battlefield among the commander and 

staff to produce detailed orders and to allow maximum flexibility in responding to enemy action 

during execution. 

Figure 1 below depicts the input, process, and outcomes of wargaming. Wargaming is 

situated near the end of the military decision-making process (MDMP), so the figure represents 

wargaming in isolation of the MDMP steps that precede it and follow it. The present research 

4
focused on wargaming, although the other steps of the MDMP--particularly mission analysis--are 

worthy subjects of similar study. 

The cognitive task analysis revealed that staffs experience difficulty with multiple aspects 

of wargaming, which often precludes their ability to accomplish an accurate, shared, and flexible 

image of the battlefield. First, staffs have difficulty considering the implications of friendly and 

enemy action for the use/availability of personnel (e.g., casualties), resources (e.g., medical 

supplies, ammunition) and combat support (e.g., maintenance and fueling, retransmission). 

Neglect of these implications results in a plan that fails because it is not robust to the actual 

conditions of the battlefield. Second, staffs have difficulty considering the multiple possible 

enemy reactions to friendly actions. Plans based on the most likely or most deadly enemy course 

of action fail when the enemy follows an unexpected course of action. Third, staffs have 

difficulty recognizing decision points on the battlefield and their indicators. Neglect of decision 

points reduces the commander’s ability to react to mission events in a way that is consistent with 

his overall intent and the mission plan. Fourth, staffs have tremendous difficulty synchronizing 

the BOSs such that the capability of each BOS is leveraged to achieve a decisive result. Poorly 

synchronized BOSs fail to achieve coordinated, overwhelming combat power and increase the 

risk of fratricide. 

Shared Battlefield 

Image

Commander’s

Intent and Course

of Action (COA)

INPUT PROCESS

(WAR GAME)

OUTPUT

Accurate Battlefield

Image 

Consider the implications of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain 

& Weather, Timing, and Civil Factors (METT-TC) for each 

friendly action

Consider the implications of each friendly action, given 

METT-TC, for resources (combat support, combat service 

support) and risk

Identify all possible enemy reactions, given enemy capability

relative to METT-TC factors

Consider the implications of each enemy reaction for each 

friendly counteraction and resultant implications for resources

and risk

Determine indicators of enemy reaction and their associated

decision points

Develop synchronization plan for the battlefield operating 

systems in time and space to make decisive use of friendly

capability in response to a range of enemy actions

Flexible Battlefield 

Image

Shared Battlefield 

Image

Commander’s

Intent and Course

of Action (COA)

INPUT PROCESS

(WAR GAME)

OUTPUT

Accurate Battlefield

Image 

Consider the implications of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain 

& Weather, Timing, and Civil Factors (METT-TC) for each 

friendly action

Consider the implications of each friendly action, given 

METT-TC, for resources (combat support, combat service 

support) and risk

Identify all possible enemy reactions, given enemy capability

relative to METT-TC factors

Consider the implications of each enemy reaction for each 

friendly counteraction and resultant implications for resources

and risk

Determine indicators of enemy reaction and their associated

decision points

Develop synchronization plan for the battlefield operating 

systems in time and space to make decisive use of friendly

capability in response to a range of enemy actions

Flexible Battlefield 

Image

Figure 1. The Process of Wargaming a Single Course of Action. 

The individual and collective competencies comprising effective wargaming process and 

outcomes are not well understood (though see Olmstead, 1992). That is, the tasks that should be 

completed for a war game to be considered successful are understood (Mullen et al., 1997), and 

the difficulty that staffs have with completing these tasks is well recognized (e.g., CALL, 1998, 

5
2003), but it is less well known what the sources of difficulty are. The team training literature 

(e.g., Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995) was explored to gain an 

understanding of the individual and collective competencies that determine the effectiveness of 

the wargaming process and that reflect the execution of effective wargaming tasks. 

Figure 2 shows the conceptual framework developed to characterize the competencies

that comprise wargaming effectiveness. It is proposed here that these individual and collective 

competencies differentiate successful from unsuccessful wargamers as defined by the quality of 

their mission plan. This framework is not meant to present an exhaustive list of competencies. 

Rather, this selection of competencies reflects the belief in their importance relative to other 

competencies and a focus on competencies that can be modified through instruction or 

experience (i.e., organizational influences on wargaming effectiveness are excluded). The 

bolded competencies in the figure are those competencies selected for detailed study in this 

research. Each of these competencies is described below. 

War-Game Effectiveness - Outcome

- Accurate Battlefield Image

situation awareness regarding

available information

- Shared Battlefield Image

integrated plan

- Flexible Battlefield Image

multiple enemy COAs and decision

points identified and planned for

Team-Related Knowledge, Skills, & Attitudes

- Knowledge of Own Role and Roles of Others

- Tacit Knowledge for Wargaming

- Wargaming Procedural Knowledge

- Knowledge of Command and Control Standing 

Operating Procedures (if applicable)

- Team-related Motivation

War-Game Effectiveness - Process

- Adaptivity of Team Thought

- Team Communication

Individual Knowledge, Skills, & Attitudes

- Technical and Doctrinal Knowledge for Area of Interest

- Digital Skills

- Analytical Skills/Critical Thinking

- Job-related or Achievement Motivation

War-Game Effectiveness - Outcome

- Accurate Battlefield Image

situation awareness regarding

available information

- Shared Battlefield Image

integrated plan

- Flexible Battlefield Image

multiple enemy COAs and decision

points identified and planned for

Team-Related Knowledge, Skills, & Attitudes

- Knowledge of Own Role and Roles of Others

- Tacit Knowledge for Wargaming

- Wargaming Procedural Knowledge

- Knowledge of Command and Control Standing 

Operating Procedures (if applicable)

- Team-related Motivation

War-Game Effectiveness - Process

- Adaptivity of Team Thought

- Team Communication

Individual Knowledge, Skills, & Attitudes

- Technical and Doctrinal Knowledge for Area of Interest

- Digital Skills

- Analytical Skills/Critical Thinking

- Job-related or Achievement Motivation

Figure 2. Determinants, Processes, and Outcomes of Effective Wargaming. 

Note: Only bolded competencies were subjected to detailed study in the present research. 

6
Determinants of Wargaming Effectiveness

Determinants of wargaming effectiveness are those individual and team-related 

knowledge, skills, and other attributes that serve as a foundation for effective wargaming 

process. Without sufficient development of wargaming determinants, wargaming process cannot 

be effective. In addition, determinants of wargaming effectiveness may contribute directly to 

effective wargaming outcomes. Some determinants, such as tacit knowledge for wargaming and 

wargaming procedural knowledge, may be developed through practice of wargaming. Other 

determinants, such as team-related motivation and analytical skills/critical thinking may be 

developed outside of wargaming experience. Described below are four determinants that were 

selected for further exploration in the present research. 

Critical Thinking/Analogical Reasoning. The purpose of the staff during mission 

planning and execution is to gather and process information that the unit commander will use as 

the basis for his decision-making. The critical analysis of incoming information is challenging 

for staff officers (White, 2001). With the introduction of digital command and control systems, 

it is now more difficult and more important that they effectively analyze the volumes of 

incoming data and identify the specific implications of information for mission success (Langley, 

2004). The ability to think critically/reason analytically enables staff officers to sift through 

incoming data with the commander’s information requirements in mind, select relevant data for 

further analysis, and communicate information to the commander in a directed, timely manner. 

During wargaming, staff officers must think critically/reason analytically in order to 

communicate efficiently and effectively with one another and to keep wargaming activity 

focused on the commander’s intent.

Knowledge of Own Roles and Roles of Others. During wargaming, the workflow of the 

staff is reciprocally interdependent (Tesluk, Mathieu, Zaccaro & Marks, 1997). That is, the staff 

officers involved each represent a different functional area (e.g., intelligence, air defense, etc.) 

and must work closely with one another to produce a refined mission plan that maximally 

leverages the capabilities in their area of interest. Staff officers contribute to refining the plan by 

reporting the implications of the current situation in their area of interest for how mission events 

will play out. Knowledge of one’s own role and the roles of others on the staff enables staff

officers to understand each other’s information needs and to effectively meet those needs 

(Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995; Olmstead, 1992). 

Tacit Knowledge for Wargaming. The procedure for conducting a wargame, and its 

desired outcome, is explicitly described in doctrine (FM 5-0; DA, 2002). However, conducting 

an effective wargame requires an understanding of the process that goes beyond knowing 

explicit procedure. Staff officers must understand the purpose of wargaming in order to engage 

in many of the tasks that are required for an effective war game. Specifically, they must 

understand that producing doctrinal wargaming products, such as the synchronization matrix, is 

not the goal of wargaming but a record of its results and that the quality of the results is 

dependent upon an integrated staff effort. 

 Tacit, or experience-based knowledge for wargaming provides staff officers with a more 

nuanced understanding of the wargaming process than is explicitly stated in doctrine, and 

7
enables them to translate this understanding into action through more in-depth analysis during 

the war game. For example, a less experienced staff may estimate combat losses without further 

analysis because the estimate is enough to fill out a cell in the synchronization matrix. A more 

experienced staff would analyze what implications combat losses have for the commander’s 

decision-making. 

 Team-Related Motivation. The ability of the staff to wargame effectively--to form a 

cohesive team and synchronize their efforts--is in part a function of the motivation of the 

individual team members to collaborate with one another and to create a team product of which 

everyone can be proud. Individual motivation to invest resources into team cohesion and 

synchronization stems from perceptions of the utility of performing well as a team, the utility of 

investing effort in improving team performance, and the relation between one’s own effort 

allocation and team performance (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). 

Motivation becomes an important determinant of performance when the application of

additional effort to a task can produce performance gains (i.e., performance is resource-limited – 

it is not at ceiling or constrained by external forces; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Wargaming is 

one task where performance is generally not at ceiling and motivation is required to work around 

the numerous external pressures against effective performance (e.g., turnover, command climate, 

battlefield chaos, etc.). 

Effective Wargaming Processes 

Effective wargaming processes are enabled when staff officers possess critical/analytical 

skills, recognize each other’s information needs, understand the purpose of wargaming and are 

motivated to work together on a group product. Staff officers prepared in this manner will 

communicate better with one another and think more adaptively during the wargaming process. 

These wargaming processes are described in more detail below. 

Team Communication 

Because wargaming involves a reciprocally interdependent workflow (Tesluk et al., 

1997), effective information sharing among staff officers is critical for producing a refined 

course of action. For each task that must be completed during a war game, staff officers must 

share specific information about their area of interest such that all functional areas are integrated 

into the refined plan. Effective information sharing eludes many staffs, with some staff officers 

(e.g., the Logistics Officer [S4]) routinely left out of the wargaming process. 

Adaptivity of Team Thought 

Automatized adaptive-thinking skills have been recognized as a critical aspect of expert 

command decision-making (Lussier, Shadrick & Prevou, 2003). Expert commanders are tuned 

into their environment and recognize the implications of particular environmental conditions for 

making rapid decisions in response to unforeseen events. Staff officers must anticipate 

unforeseen events during mission execution by evaluating during wargaming the same factors 

that the commander must consider when he makes decisions. In this way, wargaming supports 

8
the commander’s decision making by ensuring that the manpower and resources can be available 

when decisions must be made. Adaptivity of team thought among staff officers enables them to 

consider “What if?” on the basis of conditions present in the battle situation and to make 

contingency plans to address possible events during execution. This creates a flexible plan that 

is responsive to a range of mission events. 

Effective Wargaming Outcomes 

As stated previously, the desired outcome of wargaming is a refined plan and a shared 

visualization of the intended flow of battle and the triggers for the execution of contingency 

plans. This outcome stems directly from effective communication and adaptive thinking among 

the staff officers and indirectly from individual and team-related knowledge, skills, and attitudes. 

Evaluation of the quality of a particular wargaming outcome therefore involves assessing shared 

battle visualization and the degree to which the mission plan has integrated the capabilities of

each staff officer’s functional area. 

Shared Battlefield Visualization 

Shared battlefield visualization can be characterized as shared situation awareness ([SA], 

e.g., Endsley & Smolensky, 1998). It is (a) awareness of the mission plan elements and their 

locations (Level 1 SA); (b) understanding of how plan elements are synchronized in time and 

space and the implications of their success/failure for one another (Level 2 SA); and (c) 

projection of how these elements will function as the plan is executed and where key decisions 

will need to be made (Level 3 SA). Shared SA is a critical outcome of wargaming because it is 

the means by which the command and control team anticipate each other’s actions during 

mission execution. 

Integrated Mission Plan 

The integrated mission plan maximally leverages the capabilities of each staff officer’s

functional area by synchronizing the efforts of each area in time and space. The integrated 

mission plan is a critical outcome of wargaming because its development requires careful 

consideration of the status and constraints of each functional area and the implications of these 

factors for how mission events can play out. This consideration enhances shared SA and reduces 

the risk of fratricide resulting from uncoordinated mission events. 

Assessments of Wargaming Effectiveness 

This section presents the assessments that were designed to capture all three aspects of

wargaming performance (determinants, processes, outcomes). All assessments were designed in 

close collaboration with SMEs who provided input on the nature of the “test items” required to 

capture the psychological constructs of interest, shared insights regarding scoring rubrics and 

algorithms, and offered their opinions regarding the ability of the completed assessments to 

capture the construct they were intended to assess. All of the assessments were designed for 

administration either via computer or via paper-and-pencil administration. 

9
Critical Thinking/Analogical Reasoning 

To assess staff officers’ ability to identify and communicate relevant information, an 

assessment was designed based on a classroom exercise developed by an instructor at the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The exercise is used as an introduction to 

the Critical Reasoning/Creative Thinking course taught at CGSC. It is intended to stimulate 

students’ understanding of their own ability to think critically and creatively under pressure. In 

this exercise, students are asked to review a set of 36 PowerPoint slides comprising a 

hypothetical mission analysis briefing. They are told that the briefing is too long and that they 

have 5 minutes to reduce the slides to 10 in order to communicate the most important 

information in the briefing. 

This instructional exercise was adapted for assessment [and called the Mission Analysis 

Briefing Exercise (MABE)] by developing criteria for scoring students’ abbreviated briefings. 

The score for this exercise is the number of slides in the abbreviated briefing containing relevant 

information divided by the total (reduced) number of slides (possible range = 0-1). Slides 

containing relevant information were determined in collaboration with the instructor who 

designed the exercise. 

In the computer-based version of the MABE, students are told they must shorten the 

briefing to 15 slides and are given 15 minutes to complete the exercise. The computer-based 

version of the MABE was made slightly easier so that (a) individual differences in examinee 

familiarity with PowerPoint did not create differences in scores on the exercise; and (b) the 

exercise would not be so challenging for examinees that they disengaged from completing it. 

The CGSC instructor who created the exercise stated that students initially balk at the 

challenging exercise instructions and must be encouraged to continue. Because an instructor is 

not involved in the computer-based administration of the MABE, simplifying the exercise 

seemed a satisfactory alternative. 

Knowledge of Own Roles and Roles of Others 

The Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment was designed to capture examinee understanding 

of the information needs of core CABTF staff officers. The Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment 

has 42 items, each of which presents a key wargaming task that must be accomplished for the 

war game to be successful (see Mullen et al., 1997). Examinees are asked to indicate which of 

nine staff officers must share information in order to perform the task effectively. Some example 

items are shown below. The complete assessment is provided in Appendix B with correct 

answers indicated. 

Determine the command and control requirements for minimizing the effect of 

destruction of friendly command posts (CPs). 

□ XO □ S1 □ S2 □ S3 □ S4 □ SIGO □ FSO □ ADO □ ENG 

10
Determine optimal employment of intelligence collection assets. 

□ XO □ S1 □ S2 □ S3 □ S4 □ SIGO □ FSO □ ADO □ ENG 

Identify triggers for the initiation of direct and indirect fires. 

□ XO □ S1 □ S2 □ S3 □ S4 □ SIGO □ FSO □ ADO □ ENG 

For each item, the score is the number of staff officers correctly identified minus the 

number of staff officers incorrectly identified (i.e., “false alarms”). The total score is the average 

of the z-scores for each of the 42 items (z-scores were used to ensure that all items comprising 

the total score were on the same scale). Answers to each item were determined by review of 

doctrine and SME input. The SME who provided input was among those who identified the key 

wargaming tasks on which the assessment is based. 

Tacit Knowledge for Wargaming 

To capture the level of development of examinees’ understanding of the purpose of 

wargaming a short, five-question multiple-choice quiz was designed. Each question asks about 

the purpose of some aspect of wargaming. For example, one question asks: 

The wargaming process is conducted using multiple iterations of an actionreaction-counteraction (ARC) cycle. Why?

a. The iterative ARC cycle involves a logical sequence of action. 

b. The iterative ARC cycle reveals the impact of timing on friendly and enemy action. 

c. The iterative ARC cycle supports wargaming both offensive and defensive battles. 

d. The iterative ARC cycle simulates how the mission will play out if the enemy follows 

a particular (e.g., most probable) COA. 

 

To answer questions correctly, examinees must have an understanding of the purpose of 

wargaming that goes beyond what is explicitly stated in doctrine. Correct answers and 

distracters were determined by SME input. Distracters were designed to represent either 

common misconception regarding the purpose of wargaming or generic but not entirely relevant 

statements that can be found in doctrine. The score for this assessment is the number correct 

minus .25 times the number incorrect (possible range = -1.25 – 5.00). The entire Wargaming 

Tacit Knowledge assessment is shown in Appendix C with correct answers indicated.

Team-Related Motivation 

To assess team-related motivation, a 12-item survey was designed in which examinees 

are asked to rate the truth of each item as Definitely True, Largely True, Depends, Largely False, 

Definitely False. Eight items were designed to capture examinees’ perceptions of the utility of 

staff performance (e.g., “Staff positions provide experiences that are important for developing 

command skills.”). One item was designed to capture examinees’ perceptions of the utility of

investing effort in improving team performance (“Staff performance can only be so good; 

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External factors (e.g., rapid staff turnover) exert a strong limiting influence.”). Three items were 

designed to capture examinees’ perceptions of the relation between individual investment of 

effort and the improvement of team performance (e.g., “Improved team cohesion is worth the 

effort involved in developing it.”). The complete listing of the items in the Team-Motivation 

Survey is shown in Appendix D. 

Team Communication 

To assess team information sharing, two wargaming observation checklists were 

designed based roughly on the targeted acceptable responses to generated events or tasks 

(TARGETS) method (Fowlkes, Lane, Salas, Franz & Oser, 1994). Each checklist features a 

subset of tasks from the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment, selected based on the likelihood of 

their occurring during the ongoing classroom wargaming that would be observed as part of the 

present research. Because two different wargaming mission scenarios were to be observed, the 

tasks in each checklist differ slightly depending on the nature of the scenario (offensive 

maneuver versus cavalry operations). Doctrine and SME review were used to identify the 

information that must be shared in order for each of the selected tasks to be completed 

effectively. An example wargaming task and its associated information-sharing requirements is 

shown below in Table 1 (for the complete checklists, see Appendix E). 

Table 1 

Example Item from a Team Communication Checklist 

Task Information Shared Rating Comments

Templated location of the enemy 

and key enemy assets (e.g., 

artillery, C2 nodes) 

Concept of maneuver 

Determine High 

Priority Targets 

Re-supply rates for select 

munitions 

A key difference between the present checklists and a TARGETS checklist is that the 

occurrence of tasks to be observed using the present checklists is dependent on the team’s 

effectiveness, rather than on the design of the team-performance situation (i.e., more effective 

teams would attempt more tasks). That is, in the TARGETS method, team-performance 

scenarios are carefully designed to present tasks that require team communication (e.g., an 

equipment malfunction). Raters then indicate whether the desired communication occurred. 

Because validation of the checklists involved observing ongoing classroom wargaming, specialpurpose scenarios that would specifically elicit certain communication behaviors could not be 

used. Carefully selecting tasks that were likely to occur during student wargaming (routine 

targets) seemed a suitable alternative. This design allows capture of the completion of 

wargaming tasks independently from the effectiveness of team communication and provides a 

means for focusing observer attention--the primary advantage of using the TARGETS method. 

12
A second difference is that the Team Communication checklists require a greater degree 

of observer judgment because ratings of information sharing were not binary (i.e., information 

shared/not shared). Raters use 0, .5 or 1 to indicate the degree to which information was shared. 

Similarly, each task is rated 0, .5 or 1 for its level of completion. A non-binary rating scale was 

used because teams can address a wargaming task (e.g., integrate maneuver with fire support) 

without necessarily completing it. In addition, teams could share some of the required 

information, but not all of it. 

The Team Communications Checklists have three scores: a task score, an informationsharing score, and a total score. The task score is the average task rating for all tasks in the 

checklist (possible range = 0-1). The information-sharing score is the average sum of the 

average item ratings within each of task (possible range = 0-1). The total score is the sum of the 

task score and the information-sharing score divided by two (possible range = 0-1), representing 

a combined assessment of the accomplishment of wargaming tasks and team communication. 

Adaptivity of Team Thought 

To assess examinees’ adaptive-thinking skills during the war game, two interactive 

observer checklists were created based on the Think Like a Commander (TLAC) training method 

(Lussier et al., 2003). Using the mission scenarios to be wargamed in the course sessions that 

would be observed, “What if?” questions about the mission were identified. Because two 

different wargaming mission scenarios were to be observed, the “What if?” questions in each 

checklist differ slightly depending on the nature of the scenario (obstacle breaching versus 

cavalry operations). Observers using a TLAC Checklist ask students these “What if?” questions 

during the war game. As examinees answer a question posed by the observer, the observer rates 

the quality of the examinee response on a scale of 0-2. Anchors for the rating scale were 

determined by SME input, with example “0-” and “2-quality” answers for each question 

provided to the observer. The score for the TLAC Checklist is the average of the question scores 

earned by the students (possible range = 0-2). An example question and its rating scale anchors 

are shown below in Table 2 (for the complete TLAC Checklists, see Appendix F). 

Table 2 

Example Think Like a Commander Checklist Item 

Question Example “0 Quality” Example “2 Quality” 

Solutions that do not include 

consideration of local populace 

Use the civilian population to blend into the 

terrain 

Solutions that do not consider the 

effects of urban terrain 

Maximize the use of forces within urban 

areas where intelligence collection and 

communication capabilities are weakened for 

U.S. forces 

What cover and 

concealment can 

the enemy take 

advantage of in 

order to deceive 

1-22 CAV 

regarding the 

size/strength of 

threat forces? 

Solutions that are not based on 

fighting an asymmetric enemy

(e.g., students think in terms of 

large units, heavy equipment, etc.) 

Disperse widely, remain in small teams, and 

move frequently such that effective estimates 

require an integrated intelligence effort 

13
Shared Battlefield Visualization 

To assess shared SA as a wargaming outcome, an exercise based on an Army doctrinal 

wargaming product called a decision support matrix (DSM) was devised. The DSM requires 

staffs to consider where on the battlefield the commander will have to make a decision during 

mission execution, what information he needs to make those decisions, and the options available 

to the commander at the time of decision-making. As shown in Table 3, the SA Exercise 

requires examinees to answer questions associated with elements of the DSM, which correspond 

to each level of SA. 

Table 3 

Example Situational Awareness Exercise Questions 

SA Level Question 

1 What is the center of mass for Named Area of Interest (NAI) 3? 

2 If the enemy strongpoint is located forward on high ground at NAI 3, what would 

this reveal about what the enemy intends to do?

3 What should Task Force (TF) 1-93 do if the eastern enemy strongpoint is located 

forward on high ground?

Only one of the wargaming mission scenarios used in the courses to be observed was 

selected as the basis for the SA exercise questions. With the help of subject matter experts, an 

exercise “key” was developed to score student wargaming outcomes. The entire set of questions 

comprising the exercise and the scoring key are shown in Appendix G. The individual score for 

this exercise is the sum of correct answers, weighted according to the level of SA required to 

answer the question correctly (possible range = 0-30). The team score for this exercise is the 

percent agreement on correct answers for each question (possible range = 0-15). 

Integrated Mission Plan 

To assess the level of integration of the mission plan, an Integrated Overlay Exercise was 

designed based on one of the wargaming mission scenarios used in the courses to be observed. 

In this exercise examinees are asked after they complete the war game to create a graphical 

overlay of each phase of the refined mission plan. The overlay is to contain the key elements of 

friendly activity not represented in the course of action sketch used as input for the war game

(i.e., the activity determined during wargaming), including logistical assets and control measures. 

Upon completing the overlay, examinees are asked to brief the overlay to an observer, providing 

a rationale for the placement of each element. 

Examinees earn one point for each element they include in the overlay (max = 21), 

compared to a “key” created by an SME. The observer rates examinee rationale for each 

element using a checklist in which the components of rationale for each element are listed. An 

example element and its rationale components are shown in Table 4. The score for each element 

is the proportion of the total number of rationale components provided by the student (possible 

range = 0-1). The score for the exercise is the number of elements included in the overlay 

14
divided by the sum of the element rationale scores (possible range = 0-1). The complete list of 

elements and rationale components is provided in Appendix H. 

 

Table 4 

Example Integrated Overlay Checklist Item and Rationale 

Element Rationale Component

Smoke at this location will mask TF 1-93 maneuver and protect movement to 

attack positions 

Smoke 

Smoke location is coordinated with S2 projections for weather/wind direction 

Evaluation of Selected Wargaming Effectiveness Assessments 

The above-described assessments of wargaming effectiveness can be considered valid if 

they reliably capture the constructs they are intended to capture. That is, the assessments must 

(a) demonstrate, where applicable, psychometric soundness; and (b) differentiate between more 

and less capable wargamers as identified by independent criteria. This section presents the 

approach used in the present research for exploring the validity of the assessments. Findings are 

also presented and discussed. 

Method 

 Participants. Participants were 49 students in the AC3DL, taught through the U.S. Army

Armor School at Fort Knox, KY. These students were first lieutenants (LT) (approximately1

37%), captains (CPT) (approximately 55%), and one major (MAJ) in the U.S. Army National 

Guard. In addition, two AC3DL students were civilians with prior Army experience who were 

taking the course as part of a job requirement. Slightly older than their counterparts in the 

regular Army, the AC3DL students were, on average, approximately 35 years old. Ninety-seven 

percent (37/38 – see footnote #1) of them were male. Approximately 75% of the National Guard 

officers in the course were armor officers, the rest were air defense artillerymen, engineers, 

infantrymen, military intelligence officers, and signal officers. Participation in the research 

occurred as part of the students’ ongoing coursework. 

 Materials. Of the wargaming effectiveness assessments developed, all but the Integrated 

Overlay Exercise were administered to participants. The technical development required to 

implement this exercise was beyond the scope of the present research. A short demographic 

survey was also administered (see Appendix I). All materials that were not observer checklists 

(i.e., the demographic survey, MABE, Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment, Wargaming Tacit 

Knowledge Assessment, Team-Related Motivation, SA Exercise) were administered via the 

computer either as a Microsoft Word or PowerPoint file sent via email or as a web-based form.

 

1

 Eleven students did not fill out a demographic survey so overall participant data are approximate. 

15
 Procedure. All materials were administered as part of the students’ ongoing coursework 

in the AC3DL. The purpose of AC3DL is to teach junior National Guard officers the 

fundamentals of the MDMP and basic company command skills. As shown in Table 5 below, 

the AC3DL is taught in multiple phases (see Sanders, 2002 for a complete description of this 

course). 

Table 5 

Overview of the Armor Captain’s Career Course (Distance Learning) 

Phase I - Distributed 

Distributed/Self-Study Distributed/Collaborative Phase II – Co-located 

24 Internet-based modules 

covering brigade and battalion 

staff skills and company team

operations 

7 sessions to practice the steps 

of the MDMP as a battalion 

staff using instructorgenerated materials (e.g., 

brigade operations order, 

commander’s intent, etc.) 

Two-weeks practice using the 

MDMP in the context of a 

fast-paced plan-prepareexecute cycle, using different 

instructor-generated materials 

The present research involved assessment of student wargaming during Phase I – 

Distributed/Collaborative and Phase II of the course. Phase I – Distributed/Collaborative is 

comprised of seven sessions conducted in the VTOC. The VTOC allows geographically 

distributed students to work collaboratively using text chat, voiceover Internet protocol, and 

document sharing. During the seven distributed/collaborative sessions, students are each 

assigned a CABTF staff duty position, and practice developing a mission plan and troop leading 

procedures using the MDMP. Mission plans generated by students are based on instructorgenerated materials that include a brigade operations order and commander’s intent, graphical 

overlays, etc. Students who pass Phase I of the course continue on to Phase II, spending two 

weeks at Fort Knox to complete their training as a co-located group. Phase II involves further 

practice using the MDMP in the context of a fast-paced plan-prepare-execute cycle of activity. 

Students conduct wargaming during the fourth session of the distributed/collaborative 

phase of training and during the co-located resident phase. Each of the two wargaming events 

involves a different mission scenario. The scenario used during the distributed/collaborative 

phase involves a mechanized infantry task force (TF 1-93), whose mission is to draw an enemy 

combined-arms reserve element away from an adjacent friendly task force as it attempts to seize 

a key objective. The scenario used during the co-located phase involves a reconnaissance, 

surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron (1-22 CAV), whose mission was to 

perform reconnaissance to assist a Stryker brigade combat team commander in determining 

which of three courses of action to pursue. Because the distributed/collaborative and co-located 

phases of instruction involve the use of different mission scenarios, the administration of

scenario-based assessments was determined in part by the phase of instruction students were in at 

the time of data collection. 

Assessments of wargaming determinants (MABE, Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment, 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment, Team-Related Motivation) and the demographic 

16
survey were administered prior to student wargaming. Assessment of wargaming process 

effectiveness (Team Communication Checklist, TLAC Checklist) was conducted during student 

wargaming. Assessment of wargaming outcome effectiveness (SA Exercise) was administered 

after student wargaming was completed. As an independent assessment of wargaming 

effectiveness, instructors were asked after wargaming was over to rate each group of students on 

the quality of their wargaming performance relative to doctrinal standards 

(Poor/Fair/Good/Excellent) and relative to other student groups (Below Average/Average/Above 

Average). 

Approximately five classes of the AC3DL are taught per year by two instructors. The 49 

students who participated in the present research were members of six independent groups of 

students who were enrolled in AC3DL between November 2004 and September 2005 (see Table 

6 below). Three of these groups went through both the distributed/collaborative and resident 

phases of the AC3DL during the time data were collected. The composition of these groups 

changed slightly between the distributed/collaborative and resident phases of instruction, with 

students who missed their assigned resident phase (e.g., due to deployment) attending a later 

resident phase. The remaining groups of students went through either the distributed/ 

collaborative or the resident phase of AC3DL during the time data were collected. 

Table 6 below shows the assessments that were administered to each student group. Due 

to time constraints, none of the three student groups who went through both the 

distributed/collaborative and resident phases of the AC3DL during the present research was 

given the same assessment twice. Due to technical and other constraints some assessments were 

administered only to some groups. A complete explanation of why some groups did not receive 

particular assessments is provided in the next section. 

Table 6 

Overall Administration of Wargaming Effectiveness Assessments 

Group Instructor Learning Environment Assessments Administered

1 A VTOC (TF 1-93) Not Applicable (N/A) 

1 A Classroom (1-22 CAV) Demographic Survey, Staff Roles, Wargaming Tacit

Knowledge, Team Communication Checklist (1-22 CAV) 

2 B VTOC (TF 1-93)

Demographic Survey, MABE, Staff Roles, Wargaming 

Tacit Knowledge, Team Communication Checklist (TF 1-

93) 

2 A Classroom (1-22 CAV) TLAC Checklist (1-22 CAV) 

3 A Classroom (1-22 CAV) Demographic Survey, Staff Roles, TLAC Checklist (1-22

CAV) 

4 A VTOC (TF 1-93)

Demographic Survey, MABE, Staff Roles, Wargaming 

Tacit Knowledge, Team Communication Checklist (TF 1-

93), SA Exercise 

4 A Classroom (1-22 CAV) TLAC Checklist (1-22 CAV) 

5 B VTOC (TF 1-93)

Demographic Survey, MABE, Staff Roles, Wargaming 

Tacit Knowledge, Team Communication Checklist (TF 1-

93), SA Exercise 

6 A VTOC (TF 1-93)

Demographic Survey, Staff Roles, Wargaming Tacit

Knowledge, Team Communication Checklist (TF 1-93), 

SA Exercise 

17
Findings 

 Assessment Properties. This section summarizes, where applicable, the psychometric 

and other properties of each assessment administered as part of the present research, including 

the feasibility of its administration.

Mission Analysis Briefing Exercise (MABE)

The MABE was administered only to distributed/collaborative phase student groups in 

order to minimize the course interruption caused by research data collection. Administration of 

the MABE in the classroom setting would have required the students to do the exercise as a 

group, proctored and timed by the instructor or an experimenter. This was determined to be too 

disruptive to the flow of classroom activities and likely to reduce student motivation to perform

well during the exercise. Web administration of the MABE using the VTOC allowed students to 

do the exercise individually with the instructions and timing accomplished by the computer. 

Group 1 was not administered the MABE or any other assessments due to the high level of 

difficulty this group of students had with the course materials. 

The MABE therefore was administered to three student groups totaling 16 participants. 

However, only five students completed the MABE. The MABE proved difficult to administer 

due to limitations in the Internet speed available to most students in the distributed/collaborative 

phase of instruction. That is, to complete the exercise using the VTOC, students had to 

download the PowerPoint briefing onto their personal computers in order to modify, save it, and 

upload it in the time allowed. The 15-minute exercise timer starts when the download of the 

briefing is initiated and ends when the upload of the modified briefing is completed. Students 

with slow Internet speeds were unable to complete this process in the time allowed and became 

frustrated with their lack of control in successfully completing the exercise. For this reason, the 

MABE was not administered to Group 6, the final distributed/collaborative student group 

observed in this research. 

Among the five students who completed the MABE, scores ranged from .52 to .64, with 

three students earning a .64. These findings, albeit limited in scope, suggest that range 

restriction may be a problem when administering the MABE to larger groups. This problem

could be solved in one of two ways. First, the scoring method could be changed. That is, rather 

than simply summing the number of slides in the abbreviated briefing containing relevant 

information and dividing by the total (reduced) number of slides, a weighted sum of the slides 

containing relevant information could be derived and divided by the total (reduced) number of 

slides. The weighting scheme could be determined by the relative importance of the relevantinformation slides present in the reduced briefing. Such a change to the scoring method could be 

effective because although students tended to reduce the briefing to roughly the same number of 

relevant slides (8-11), they often selected different slides to include. 

Second, the content of the slides in the unabbreviated briefing could be modified to 

reflect more systematic design of the assessment itself. The learning exercise on which the 

MABE was based was not intended as an assessment. For this reason, it was not designed 

specifically to reveal individual differences in critical thinking/analytical reasoning, but simply 

18
to raise awareness about what critical thinking/analytical reasoning “feels like.” Redesign of the 

MABE would require identifying the indicators of different levels of critical thinking/analytical 

reasoning as they relate to the information that could be present in a mission analysis briefing. 

For example, students with less well-developed levels of critical thinking/analytical reasoning 

might know to include slides containing such relevant information as risks or recommendations 

but might not know to exclude slides that present weather/illumination data without 

interpretation. 

Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment 

The Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment was administered to all six student groups, with 

37 of 49 students completing it. Distributed/collaborative phase student groups took the 

assessment using a web-based form available in the VTOC. One student did not complete the 

assessment due to technical difficulties with the VTOC. Co-located student groups who had not 

already taken the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment in the VTOC filled out a Microsoft Word 

file emailed to them by their instructor. Eleven students who were not present in a distributed/ 

collaborative wargaming session observed during data collection but were present for residentphase wargaming did not complete the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment. The Staff Roles 

Knowledge Assessment was easy to administer and took relatively little student time to 

complete. 

In initial pilot testing, the split-half reliability of the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment 

was quite high (rxx = .94), so the assessment was reduced by half in order to ease the workload 

on students. The internal-consistency reliability of the reduced assessment is also high, at .85. 

The range in total scores on the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment was -.82 to .87, with a mean 

and standard deviation of .00 and .51, respectively. This range in scores suggests that the Staff 

Roles Knowledge Assessment is capturing individual differences, and is not subject to a floor or 

ceiling effect. 

Response-accuracy patterns in the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment mirrored those 

patterns expected on the basis of known deficiencies in staff information sharing. That is, on 

average, students most accurately identified the information needs of the operations officer and 

the intelligence officer, who are a central focus of the wargaming process (mean percent correct 

for these officers was, respectively, 35 and 13 percentage points above the mean percent correct 

for all officers, which was 35). The information needs of other staff officers, i.e., those 

representing functional areas that deal with combat support and combat service support, were 

poorly understood by the students who participated in the present research, just as they are not 

well understood by many combat arms officers in general (CALL, 1998). The mean percent 

correct for these officers was, on average, nine percentage points below the mean percent correct 

for all staff officers. 

An additional, seemingly counterintuitive finding is that students were least accurate in 

identifying the information needs of various staff officers during the wargaming of maneuver 

and intelligence tasks (mean percent correct was 32 and 35, respectively) and most accurate in 

identifying the information needs of various staff officers when wargaming combat support tasks 

(mean percent correct for fire support, maneuverability/survivability, and combat service support 

19
tasks was 47, 44, and 44, respectively). This pattern of accuracy actually is expected when one 

assumes that students were more likely to neglect the information needs of other staff officers 

when completing wargaming tasks in their area of expertise. Most of the students in the AC3DL 

were armor officers, those officers who, when inexperienced, are more likely to underestimate 

the information needs of staff officers not directly involved with maneuver. In addition, the 

combat support wargaming tasks included in the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment generally 

involved fewer staff officers whose role in wargaming the task was more obvious. This 

condition made it easier to correctly identify most or all of the staff officers involved in the task. 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge 

The Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment was administered to five of the six student 

groups, with 26 of 38 students completing the assessment. As with the Staff Roles Knowledge 

Assessment, distributed/collaborative-phase student groups took the Wargaming Tacit 

Knowledge Assessment using a Web-based form available in the VTOC. One student did not 

complete the assessment due to technical difficulties with the VTOC. Co-located student groups 

who had not already taken the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment in the VTOC filled out a 

Microsoft Word file emailed to them by their instructor. Eleven students who were not present 

for a distributed/collaborative wargaming session observed during data collection but were 

present for resident-phase wargaming did not complete the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge 

Assessment. Group 3, which wargamed before this assessment was completed, was not 

administered the assessment. This assessment, like the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment, was 

easy to administer and took little student time to complete. 

Scores on the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment ranged from -1.25 to 5.00, the 

widest range possible, with a mean and standard deviation of 1.63 and 1.53, respectively. The 

internal consistency reliability of this assessment was .36. This estimate is quite low given the 

quiz is intended to assess a single construct. However, the quiz is only five questions long and 

the length of an assessment has implications for its reliability. When the Spearman-Brown 

formula is used to determine what the reliability of the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment 

would be if it was as long as the abbreviated Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment (21 items), the 

reliability is satisfactory at .70. 

Team-Related Motivation 

The Team-Motivation Survey was administered to all six student groups, with 32 of 49 

students completing it. Distributed/collaborative phase student groups took the survey using a 

Web-based form available in the VTOC. One student did not complete the survey due to 

technical difficulties with the VTOC; three students did not complete the survey for unknown 

reasons. Co-located student groups who had not already taken the Team-Motivation Survey in 

the VTOC filled out a Microsoft Word file emailed to them by their instructor. Eleven students 

who were not present for a distributed/collaborative wargaming session observed during data 

collection but were present for resident-phase wargaming did not complete the Team-Motivation 

Survey. Two students did not fill out the survey for unknown reasons. It is possible that these 

two students overlooked the survey, as it was appended to the end of the demographic survey in 

20
the MS Word file sent by the instructor. The Team-Motivation Survey was easy to administer 

and took relatively little student time to complete. 

Table 7 below shows the percent of responses to each survey item that indicate positive 

levels of motivation. That is, for items 1, 2, 4, and 7-10, the percentage in the right hand column

of the table indicates the proportion of students selecting “Largely True” or “Definitely True” as 

their response to the item. For the remaining items, the percentage indicates the proportion of 

students selecting “Largely False” or “Definitely False.” As can be seen in the table, several 

items are positively endorsed by all or nearly all of the students participating in the present 

research. One exception is Item 12, which a large majority of students (81%) endorsed 

negatively. At a general level, these results suggest that students are motivated to perform well 

as staff officers and feel that staff officers are important in aiding the commander. However, the 

students also appear to feel some lack of control over the quality of staff performance, that 

efforts devoted to team cohesion are not as important as efforts devoted technical selfdevelopment, and that staff positions carry less prestige than command positions. 

Table 7 

Percentage of Students Positively Endorsing Motivation Survey Items 

Item Positive Endorsement

1. Staff positions provide experiences that are important for 

developing command skills. 88% 

2. Good performance in a staff position is required for promotion to 

command. 66% 

3. Great staff members don’t make history; Great commanders do. 34% 

4. Superior staff performance is a source of pride for individual staff 

members. 91% 

5. Good commanders don’t need a staff to aid in planning; They can 

already visualize the battlefield and act decisively. 94% 

6. Staff performance is not a major factor in determining battle 

outcomes. 

94% 

7. Technical knowledge (including doctrine and digital skills) is 

critical for superior staff performance. 

94% 

8. Improved technical knowledge is worth the effort involved in 

acquiring it. 100% 

9. Team cohesion is a critical characteristic of superior staffs. 100% 

10. Improved team cohesion is worth the effort involved in 

developing it. 100% 

11. There is higher payoff for investing effort to acquiring technical 

knowledge than for investing effort in developing team cohesion. 47% 

12. Staff performance can only be so good; External factors (e.g., 

rapid staff turnover) exert a strong limiting influence. 19% 

To examine individual differences in team-related motivation, students’ item 

endorsements were recoded to a numerical, 0-4 scale in which 4 indicates the highest level of 

21
motivation and 0 the lowest. The highest level of motivation could be a “Definitely True” or 

“Definitely False” selection, depending on the question. Team-related motivation “scores” 

derived in this manner ranged from 28 to 45 (possible range is 0-48), with a mean of 36.47 and a 

standard deviation of 4.02. In general, it appears that students had moderate to high levels of 

motivation as captured by the survey, and that there was relatively limited variance among 

individuals in level of motivation. 

The internal-consistency reliability of the Team-Motivation Survey was .68. When the 

four items referring to the prestige of staff positions (Items 2 and 3), the utility of investing in 

team cohesion (Item 11), and the relation between effort investment and staff performance (Item

12) are removed, the internal-consistency reliability is .79. This increase in reliability suggests 

that although the survey is not capturing two distinct aspects of team-related motivation, it is 

perhaps capturing a distinction that respondents make between the importance of staff function 

and expertise and the reality of its development, recognition, and payoff. 

Team Communication Checklist 

Five student groups (four distributed/collaborative and one co-located) were observed for 

the quality of their information sharing using one of two Team Communication Checklists. The 

total communication score (the combined average of task scores and information sharing scores) 

can range from 0 to 1, reflecting both the degree to which information is shared, and also the 

level of wargaming task completion. In the present research, group total scores ranged from .28 

to .53, with a mean of .36 and a standard deviation of .11. Task scores, which reflect only the 

level of task completion, ranged from .41 to .67 (possible range is 0-1), with a mean of .50 and a 

standard deviation of .11. Information sharing scores, which reflect the degree to which essential 

task information is shared, ranged from .09 to .38 (possible range is 0-1), with a mean of .22 and 

a standard deviation of .12. These scores indicate that there was some limitation in range of 

student group performance (3 of 5 total scores were .28-.29; 3 of 5 task scores was .41-.46), but 

that performance was neither at floor or ceiling. Performance was generally low and information 

sharing (i.e., information sharing scores) tended to be quite spare, albeit variable. 

Where two raters used the Team Communication checklist, they agreed on 67% of the 

judgments that a wargaming task had been attempted. The correlation of the scores they 

assigned to each task was .54. Similarly, these same two raters agreed on 77% of the judgments 

that an attempt to share a particular piece of information occurred. The correlation between the 

scores they assigned to information sharing was .69. Differences among the two raters appear to 

come from differing levels of experience observing AC3DL wargaming and differing levels of 

familiarity with the doctrinal information requirements for each wargaming task. 

Notably, task scores were substantially higher than information scores, indicating that 

students were attempting wargaming tasks, but generally not sharing sufficient information to 

complete the tasks according to doctrinal and expert standards. This appears to have occurred 

for two reasons. First, students, particularly those in the distributed/collaborative phase of 

instruction, tended to conduct wargaming with the goal of filling out the synchronization matrix 

used to record wargaming results, rather than the goal of refining the plan. This focus on 

recording results as opposed to refining the plan appears to have occurred in part because the 

22
course instructors use a completed portion of the synch matrix to introduce students to the 

wargaming process. They brief the initial, completed portion of the matrix (Phase I of the 

operation), but do not model how that portion is derived. The consequence is that students

perform several of the tasks listed in the Team Communication Checklist, but only to the extent 

required to fill in the synchronization matrix. This can be accomplished without thinking more 

broadly about refining the plan and to a large extent without communication. 

Second, students do not have the technical means (i.e., through simulation) or experience 

to really visualize the mission, to think in detail. For example, they will determine the priority of 

air defense coverage as “area coverage,” but generally do not get more specific than that (i.e., 

what the basis for that determination is, other than that “area coverage” is specified in the 

brigade operations order that is part of the mission scenario). Students would decide air defense 

coverage without ever discussing what units, specifically, were going to be covered and how to 

use coverage to mass combat power. 

Support for these ideas comes from the fact that co-located student wargaming, in which 

the recording technique was less central and there was better simulation of actual operational 

conditions, earned a substantially higher task and information sharing score than all of the 

distributed wargaming observed. Yet, even co-located wargaming was not optimal (task score = 

.67, information sharing score = .38). It is possible that co-location generated or at least 

contributed to better performance. However, observation of student behavior in both conditions 

suggests that communication differences were most likely due to a greater ability to 

conceptualize the purpose of wargaming through greater focus on refining the plan and better 

simulation of operational conditions. The relative veracity of these two explanations remains to 

be tested. In any case, these findings suggest that the Team Communication Checklists are 

useful for understanding more fully what was happening during wargaming. In the present 

research, they were sensitive to limitations in the technical and experiential support that students 

needed to wargame optimally. 

The Team Communication Checklists were equally unobtrusive during distributed and 

co-located observation. One challenge encountered when using the checklist was identifying 

who was sharing information. During distributed observation, it was often difficult to tell who 

was speaking and, consequently, what staff role they were playing during the war game. In both 

distributed and co-located wargaming, students often played more than one staff role or staff 

roles went unfilled due to lack of students (e.g., one group had only three students). For these 

reasons, it turned out to be unproductive to attempt tracking who was communicating relative to 

who should be communicating according to doctrinal standards. 

Think Like a Commander (TLAC) Checklist 

Three student groups, all co-located, were observed using the TLAC Checklist. 

Distributed/collaborative student groups were not observed using the TLAC Checklist because 

students during this phase of instruction experienced great difficulty with the wargaming process 

due to inexperience and technical difficulties with the VTOC. It was determined that it would be 

too disruptive to the students to ask them probe questions during wargaming, especially since 

23
they seemed highly unlikely to be able to answer the questions effectively, given their lack of 

experience. 

Scores on the TLAC Checklist, derived by averaging the quality of student responses to 

checklist probe questions during wargaming, could range from 0-2. Group scores on the TLAC 

Checklist in the present research ranged from 1.17 to 1.71, suggesting a possible restriction of 

range. However, the wargaming of all student groups observed was rated as “above average” by 

their instructor (Instructor A for all three groups), which suggests that the range restriction on the 

TLAC Checklist may accurately reflect range restriction in student achievement. Inter-rater 

reliability for the TLAC Checklist was not assessed, due to the lack of secondary raters present 

during the observation of co-located wargaming sessions. 

As with the Team Communication Checklists, the TLAC Checklist was largely 

unobtrusive during co-located observation. Students found the probe questions interesting and 

were more than willing to answer them during wargaming. However, concerns about disrupting 

the class led to the decision not to ask the probe questions to the student groups as a whole but to 

individuals in the group, one at the time. Although this approach bears greater similarity to the 

adaptive-thinking training approach described in Lussier et al. (2003), it does not truly capture 

the collective adaptivity of team thought, even though individual student scores are averaged to 

create a group score. 

Situation Awareness (SA) Exercise 

The SA Exercise was administered to three student groups, all distributed/collaborative, 

with 12 of 15 students completing the exercise. Three students did not complete the exercise due

to technical difficulties with the VTOC. The SA Exercise was not administered to co-located 

groups because the course of action statement/sketch to be used during wargaming was 

necessary to design the SA Exercise and one was not available for the 1-22 CAV mission 

scenario. That is, student groups in the distributed/collaborative phase of instruction each tended 

to derive the same course of action from the TF 1-93 scenario, but students in the co-located 

phase of instruction did not (there was more detailed commander’s guidance in the TF 1-93 

scenario than the 1-22 CAV scenario). The SA Exercise was derived from a course of action 

created by distributed/collaborative students who were observed early in data collection and who 

were rated as good wargamers by their instructor. For this reason, the first two groups of 

distributed/collaborative wargamers observed were not administered the SA Exercise.

The average individual score on the SA Exercise was 4.00, with a range of 0.00 to 7.00. 

The average team score was 1.50, with a range of .67 to 2.01. Given the possible range in both 

individual and team scores of 0 to 30, the present scores hover close to floor. This is not 

surprising, given that (a) even experienced staffs have trouble deriving a decision support matrix 

(on which the SA Exercise is based) from the wargame; and (b) the students in the present 

research were very inexperienced. As an illustration, every student group observed was 

collectively confused about the basic doctrinal distinction between a decisive point (a point on 

the battlefield where decisive results must be achieved) and a decision point (a point on the 

battlefield where a decision must be made). 

24
Simplifications of the SA Exercise could involve reducing the questions to include only 

Level 1 SA (i.e., questions that require students to identify elements of the present situation). 

The assumption behind this approach is that Level 1 SA is not dependent on Level 2 and Level 3 

SA, which is an untested and possibly faulty assumption in the case of wargaming. That is, in 

order to determine the elements of a mission plan, wargamers must already know their 

implications and associated future activities. A second possibility would be to conduct the 

assessment interactively with the level of interactivity decreasing as the effectiveness of student 

responding increases. Recall that the SA Exercise has five clusters of three questions with each 

question in a cluster corresponding to one of the three levels of SA. In this situation, the 

instructor would begin by asking the student(s) the Level 1 SA question featured in the first 

cluster, probe students to think collaboratively until a shared, accurate solution is reached, 

facilitate student identification of the causes of inaccuracies, then move on to the next level of 

SA in that cluster. As students demonstrate improved collaborative thinking processes and SA, 

the instructor would gradually remove himself from the process, letting the students answer the 

remaining questions on their own. The assessment conducted in this manner initially would 

show low levels of responding, but could serve as a useful educational tool that would improve 

levels of responding on later portions of the assessment. 

Instructor Ratings 

Two instructors assigned quality ratings to student wargaming, however, no student 

group was rated by both instructors. Collectively, the instructors used the entire scale of ratings 

(i.e., Poor to Excellent, Below Average to Above Average) to characterize student performance. 

Although it could not be evaluated formally, Instructor B appears to have been slightly harsher in 

his ratings than Instructor A. In addition, instructors rated student wargaming during the resident 

phase of instruction higher than they rated student wargaming during the 

distributed/collaborative phase. Student groups during the resident phase were rated either as 

“good” or “excellent” and “average” or “above average,” whereas groups during the 

distributed/collaborative phase were rated as either “good,” “fair,” or “poor” (4 of 5 “fair” or 

“poor”) and “average” or “below average.” 

 Assessment Validity. This section summarizes the relation of each assessment to one 

another, together with the implications of these relations for assessment validity and the validity 

of the wargaming framework more generally. 

Relationships among Individual and Team-Related Wargaming Determinants 

The wargaming framework posits several possible individual and team-related 

determinants of wargaming process and outcome effectiveness. The relative importance of these 

determinants in accounting for individual or group differences in wargaming effectiveness is a 

function of the degree of overlap among these determinants. That is, if the determinants are 

highly related to one another, any one determinant is less useful for accounting for performance. 

Therefore, the relation among wargaming determinants presented in the framework is expected 

to be low to moderate. 

25
Of the determinants presented in the framework, four were selected for the development 

of assessments, and three of these assessments (the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment, the 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge, Assessment, and the Team-Motivation Survey) were completed 

by 10 or more students. In addition, several demographic variables were assessed. Evaluating 

the relation between the wargaming determinant assessments and demographic variables sheds 

light on the construct validity of the assessment scores. The following four tables summarize the 

scores on the assessments of wargaming determinants as a function of four demographic 

variables: rank, company command experience, staff experience, and years in the regular 

Army. 

As shown in Table 8, rank does not have an apparent relation to staff roles 

knowledge [tlieutenants,captains(32) = .205, p = .839, d = .07], but may be associated with wargaming 

tacit knowledge and team-related motivation. Lieutenants showed higher levels of wargaming 

tacit knowledge than captains. This difference was statistically non-significant [t(24) = 1.186, p

= .247], however, the effect size of this difference approached moderate (d = .46). The size of 

this effect suggests that lieutenants, on average, should appear to an educated observer (i.e., 

without special-purpose assessment) to have a more nuanced understanding of wargaming than 

captains. Moreover, this effect size is especially large for a new area of research inquiry in a 

relatively uncontrolled experimental setting (see Cohen, 1988, pp. 25-27). Team-related 

motivation shows an increasing trend with rank, which may correspond to increased investment 

in the Army, but this trend should be interpreted with great caution as it is not statistically 

significant and only one major is included in the sample. 

Table 8 

Wargaming Determinants Scores and Officer Rank

LT CPT MAJ

Staff Roles Knowledge .07 (N =14) .03 (N =20) .01 (N =1) 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge 2.05 (N =11) 1.33 (N =15) N/A 

Team-Related Motivation 35.92 (N =12) 36.68 (N =19) 41 (N =1) 

It may seem surprising that increases in rank are not associated with corresponding 

increases in staff roles knowledge, but it should be remembered that the students in the course 

were similarly inexperienced with regard to staff structure and function. In part, the purpose of 

the AC3DL is to address this knowledge gap. For this reason, it is unknown why lieutenants on 

average scored higher than captains on the Wargaming Tacit-Knowledge Assessment. Prior to 

enrolling in AC3DL, neither lieutenants nor captains would be expected to have a great deal of 

experience with wargaming, explicit or otherwise. 

As shown in Table 9, company command experience does not appear to be associated 

with higher scores on the Team-Related Motivation Survey. Company command experience, 

however, appears associated with slightly higher scores on the Staff Roles Knowledge 

Assessment and the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment [t(34) = -.868 and t(23) = -.370, 

respectively]. The differences are not significant but the relatively small effect sizes (d = .31 and 

.15, respectively), may be expected for new areas of research inquiry in an uncontrolled research 

setting (Cohen, 1988). In addition, one would not expect great differences in levels of 

26
knowledge because the students in the course were similarly inexperienced with regard to staff 

structure and function and wargaming. 

Table 9 

Wargaming Determinants and Company Command Experience 

Company Command 

(CO Cmd) Experience - Yes 

CO Cmd Experience - No

Staff Roles Knowledge .07 (N =14) -.08 (N =22)

Wargaming Tacit 

Knowledge 1.73 (N =10) 1.52 (N =15) 

Team-Related Motivation 36.58 (N =12) 36.53 (N =19) 

The data in Table 10 suggest that staff experience is associated with increased staff roles 

knowledge and wargaming tacit knowledge, as would be expected. The difference in staff roles 

knowledge between students with and without staff experience is non-significant [t(34) = -.993, 

p = .328], but the effect size for this difference (d = .34) is noteworthy given the uncontrolled 

experimental conditions. The difference in wargaming tacit knowledge between students with 

and without staff experience is non-significant [t(23) = -.410, p = .686], but the effect size for 

this difference is also small (d = .17). Staff experience appears more strongly associated with 

higher levels of team-related motivation [t(29) = -1.246, p = .223, d = .46]. This effect size is 

substantial in light of the relatively uncontrolled experimental setting, suggesting that officers 

with staff experience should appear to the educated observer (i.e., without using a specialpurpose assessment) to have higher levels team-related motivation. 

Table 10 

Wargaming Determinants and Staff Experience 

Staff Experience - Yes Staff Experience - No 

Staff Roles Knowledge .04 (N =22) -.12 (N =14) 

Wargaming Tacit 

Knowledge 1.71 (N =14) 1.45 (N =11) 

Team-Related Motivation 37.26 (N =19) 35.42 (N =12) 

Table 11 shows that regular Army experience is not associated with greater levels of staff 

roles knowledge [t(35) = -.205, p = .839, d = .07]. However, regular Army experience does 

appear associated with wargaming tacit knowledge and team-related motivation. The difference 

in wargaming tacit knowledge between students with and without regular Army experience, 

however, is non-significant [t(24) = -.123, p = .903] and the effect size for this difference is quite

small (d = .05). The difference in team-related motivation between students with and without 

regular Army experience is non-significant [t(30) = -1.691, p = .100], however the effect size is 

moderate-large (d = .60) especially given the uncontrolled nature of the experimental setting. It 

is unclear why regular Army experience would be so strongly related to team-related motivation, 

but perhaps the association reflects greater investment in the Army in general. 

27
Table 11 

Wargaming Determinants and Regular Army Experience 

Reg. Army Experience - Yes Reg. Army Experience - 

No 

Staff Roles Knowledge .01 (N = 22) -.02 (N = 15) 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge 1.67 (N = 15) 1.59 (N = 11) 

Team-Related Motivation 37.50 (N = 18) 35.14 (N = 14) 

In summary, as one might expect, rank and regular Army experience are not strongly 

associated with staff roles knowledge and wargaming tacit knowledge. However, where a trend 

(albeit non-significant) exists, it goes in the direction one might expect--greater experience in 

general is associated with higher knowledge scores--and the size of the effects found generally 

correspond to those that would be expected for new research in a relatively uncontrolled setting. 

One exception is the association between rank and scores on the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge 

Assessment, where for unknown reasons higher rank is associated with lower scores. Staff 

experience and company command experience show similar trends, with experience associated 

with higher scores on the knowledge assessments. These trends show stronger effect sizes than 

those generally associated with rank or regular Army experience, even though it is likely that 

students in AC3DL with staff experience have not had a great deal of formal training in staff 

function (Thompson, Thompson, Pleban & Valentine, 1991). 

Staff experience and regular Army experience do appear associated with team-related 

motivation, however, there is no reason to expect that they should be. It is possible that greater 

investment in the Army (as reflected in having greater experience) engenders higher levels of 

motivation. The above findings suggest that the assessments of wargaming determinants 

developed in the present research are sensitive to experiential variables yet also reflect the lack 

of variability in staff and wargaming experience present among AC3DL students. 

A final test of the assessments of wargaming determinants is their relation to one another. 

It is expected that scores on these assessments will show a weak relation to one another as they 

are posited to contribute uniquely to wargaming process and outcome effectiveness. The results 

of this test are shown in Table 12 below. 

Table 12 

Wargaming Determinants Relation to One Another 

1. 2. 3.

1. Staff Roles Knowledge 1.00 (N =37) 

2. Wargaming Tacit Knowledge .07 (N =26) 1.00 (N =26) 

3. Team-Related Motivation -.01 (N =32) -.24 (N =23) 1.00 (N =32) 

Somewhat surprisingly, the correlation matrix shown in Table 12 does not show positive 

manifold as is regularly demonstrated among ability test correlations. Instead, two of the three 

28
correlation coefficients among the three assessments of wargaming determinants are negative, 

albeit weak and non-significant. It is unknown why these correlations are negative, but the 

correlations are weak, as expected, despite the satisfactory reliabilities of these assessments. 

 

Wargaming Determinants – Relation to Wargaming Process Effectiveness 

The wargaming framework posits two wargaming processes: team communication and 

adaptivity of team thought. It is expected that wargaming determinants will show a positive 

relation to these processes but that these processes will have a low to moderate correlation with 

one another. Both of the wargaming processes posited in the wargaming framework were 

assessed in the present research. However, they were not assessed at the same time, which 

means that they were also not assessed during wargaming that involved the same mission 

scenario. Moreover, only two groups of students were observed using both the Team

Communication and TLAC Checklists. For these reasons, the relation between team

communication and adaptivity of team thought was not explored in the present research. The 

relation between wargaming determinants and processes was explored and the findings of this 

exploration are shown in the following three tables. 

Table 13 below shows the average Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment score for each 

group of students, the same score for each group’s executive officer (XO), or team lead, and the 

corresponding wargaming process scores. Where a particular group was not observed using one 

of the checklists, “N/A” is indicated in the corresponding cell. Where a group was observed 

using both checklists (i.e., the group was observed in both the distributed/collaborative and 

resident phases of AC3DL, groups 2 and 4), there are two Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment 

scores representing differences in the group composition between the distributed/collaborative 

and resident phases of instruction. For ease of review, groups are listed in ascending order 

according to their Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment Score. 

Table 13 

Staff Roles Knowledge and Wargaming Process Effectiveness 

Individual Determinant Process Effectiveness 

Group Staff Roles Knowledge Team Communication 

Group Avg. XO Score Total Task Info Share 

TLAC Checklist 

1 -.24 -.04 .53 .67 .38 N/A

4a -.17 -.63 .28 .46 .15 N/A

6 -.04 .32 .29 .41 .17 N/A

4b .03a -.63 N/A N/A N/A 1.71

3 .01 .01 N/A N/A N/A 1.56 

2a .10 .40 .42 .55 .29 N/A

5 .20 -.04 .28 .46 .09 N/A

2b .24b .40 N/A N/A N/A 1.17 a

Four of 7 group members completed the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment. This average should be interpreted

with caution. b

Only 3 of 12 group members completed the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment. Eight students did not complete

the assessment as they were not present in a distributed/collaborative session that was observed during data 

collection. One student did not complete the assessment for unknown reasons. This average should not be

considered representative of the group as a whole. 

29
Average scores on the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment do not appear clearly linked to 

wargaming process effectiveness scores. Where wargaming process effectiveness is assessed via 

the TLAC Checklist, there are too few groups assessed to begin looking for a pattern. Where 

wargaming process effectiveness is assessed via the Team Communication Checklist, a clear 

pattern linking Team Communication total scores and staff roles knowledge is not apparent. The 

same is true when the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment score for each group’s executive 

officer (i.e., team lead) is compared to Team Communication total scores. A pattern is more 

readily seen when each team leader’s Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment score is compared to 

the Team Communication information sharing score. Here, higher levels of staff roles 

knowledge generally are associated with higher information sharing scores. When examining 

these patterns, however, it should be recalled that Group 1 was observed for Team

Communication during co-located wargaming with a less central recording technique and better 

simulation of the operational environment (see pp. 23-24). In addition, the restriction in range 

in Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment scores may reduce the meaningfulness of the associations 

reviewed here. The sample size (i.e., number of groups) is too small to compute a reliable 

correlation. 

Table 14 below shows the average Wargaming Tacit Knowledge (TK) Assessment score 

for each group of students, the same score for each group’s XO, and the corresponding 

wargaming process scores. Where a particular group was not observed using one of the 

checklists, “N/A” is indicated in the corresponding cell. Where a group was observed using both 

checklists (i.e., the group was observed in both the distributed/collaborative and resident phases 

of AC3DL, groups 2 and 4), there are two Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment scores 

representing differences in the group composition between the distributed/collaborative and 

resident phases of instruction. For ease of review, groups are listed in ascending order according

to their Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment Score. 

Table 14 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge and Wargaming Process Effectiveness 

Individual Determinant Process Effectiveness 

Group Wargaming TK Team Communication 

Group Avg. XO Score Total Task Info Share TLAC Checklist 

4a .33 1.00 .28 .46 .15 N/A

4b 1.19a 1.00 N/A N/A N/A 1.71

5 1.88 2.50 .28 .46 .09 N/A

6 1.25 .00 .29 .41 .17 1.71 

1 2.00 .00 .53 .67 .38 N/A 

2a 2.13 2.50 .42 .55 .29 N/A

2b 1.33b 2.50 N/A N/A N/A 1.17

3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.56 a

Four of 7 group members completed the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment. This average should be

interpreted with caution. 

b

Only 3 of 12 group members completed the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment. Eight students did not

complete the assessment as they were not present in a distributed/collaborative session that was observed during

data collection. One student did not complete the assessment for unknown reasons. This average should not be

considered representative of the group as a whole. 

30
Table 14 shows a generally increasing trend in both average group wargaming tacit 

knowledge scores and Team Communication total scores. The average wargaming tacit 

knowledge score for student groups scoring lowest in team communication is 1.15, whereas it is 

2.07 for groups scoring highest in team communication. There appears to be no association 

between the tacit-knowledge score of the student group team lead (XO) and wargaming process 

effectiveness as captured by either checklist. The sample size (i.e., number of groups) is too 

small to compute a reliable correlation. 

Table 15 below shows the average Team-Related Motivation Survey score for each group 

of students and their corresponding wargaming process scores. As with the previous two tables, 

where a particular group was not observed using one of the checklists, “N/A” is indicated in the 

corresponding cell. Where a group was observed using both checklists (i.e., the group was 

observed in both the distributed/collaborative and resident phases of AC3DL), there are two 

Team-Related Motivation Survey scores representing differences in the group composition 

between the distributed/collaborative and resident phases of instruction. Also similar to the 

previous two tables, groups are listed in ascending order according to their Team-Related 

Motivation Survey score. 

Table 15 

Team-Related Motivation and Wargaming Process Effectiveness 

Individual Determinant Process Effectiveness 

Group Team-Related Motivation Team Communication 

Group Avg. Total Task Info Share TLAC Checklist 

5 33.20 .28 .46 .09 N/A

3 35.33 N/A N/A N/A 1.56

6 36.33 .29 .41 .17 N/A

2a 37.25 .42 .55 .29 N/A

2b 40.00a N/A N/A N/A 1.17

1 38.20 .53 .67 .38 N/A

4a 41.67 .28 .46 .15 N/A

4b 39.25b N/A N/A N/A 1.71 a

Only 1 of 12 group members completed the Team-Related Motivation Survey. Eight students did not complete the 

assessment as they were not present in a distributed/collaborative session that was observed during data collection. 

Three students did not complete the assessment for unknown reasons. This average should not be considered

representative of the group as a whole. 

b

Four of 7 group members completed the Team-Related Motivation Survey. This average should be interpreted with

caution.

It is difficult to discern a pattern in the results this table. The student groups with the 

highest and lowest motivation scores performed similarly with regard to team communication. 

One possible explanation for the lack of a clear pattern (aside from the small sample size) is 

range restriction in the motivation survey scores. Because the possible range in scores on the 

survey is 0-48, the observed range of 33.20-41.67 may not represent meaningful variation (i.e., a 

score of 33.20 represents an average endorsement of 2.67 using a scale of 0-4 and a score of 

41.67 represents an average endorsement of 3.47). 

31
In summary, the results are mixed regarding the relation between the wargaming 

determinants identified in the conceptual framework and wargaming process effectiveness. The 

staff roles knowledge score earned by the student group team lead (XO) and the average group 

wargaming tacit-knowledge score appear associated with the quality of team communication, 

although further exploration with a larger number of student groups is required to draw firm

conclusions. Team-related motivation was consistently high across groups, and thus did not 

appear associated with the quality of team communication. Unfortunately, there were too few 

administrations of the TLAC Checklist (given its requirement for student expertise and dedicated 

class time) to reliably evaluate the relation between wargaming determinants and adaptivity of 

team thought. 

When reviewing the above tables, one should bear in mind several possible explanations 

for why a clearer pattern of results was not observed. The first reason is that the number of 

groups observed was relatively small. Although all of the AC3DL student groups that could 

have been observed were observed, six is too small a number to reliably identify a pattern in the 

data. Moreover, no more than five groups was observed with any one checklist. Second, 5 of 

the 6 groups was comprised of six or fewer students, making average scores unstable. Third, 

there were differences in the conditions under which team communication was observed. These 

differences include the wargaming environment (co-located or distributed), the number of 

students wargaming, the extent of technical problems experienced during the war game, etc. 

These situational differences compete with individual/group differences in determining the 

effectiveness of wargaming processes. 

Wargaming Determinants and Process Effectiveness – Relation to Wargaming Outcome 

Effectiveness 

The wargaming framework posits two wargaming outcomes: shared battlefield 

visualization and an integrated mission plan. It is expected that wargaming processes will show 

a positive relation to these outcomes but that these outcomes will be moderately associated with 

one another. Only one of the wargaming outcomes posited in the wargaming framework was 

assessed in the present research. Therefore, the relation between shared battlefield visualization 

and the level of integration in the mission plan could not be explored. The relation between 

wargaming determinants, processes, and outcomes was explored and the findings of this 

exploration are shown in the following three tables. In addition, instructor ratings were used as 

outcome assessments to explore external validity. 

Table 16 below shows the wargaming process scores for each group of students and their 

corresponding wargaming outcome score and instructor ratings. Where a particular group was 

not observed or did not complete the SA Exercise, “N/A” is indicated in the corresponding cell. 

The ratings in the instructor rating columns should be interpreted as “distributed wargaming/colocated wargaming.” Where wargaming was observed in only one environment, that 

environment is listed in parentheses next to the instructor rating, with “(d)” indicating distributed 

and “(c)” indicating co-located. For ease of review, groups are listed in ascending order 

according to their Team Communication score. 

32
Table 16 

Wargaming Processes and Wargaming Outcomes

Wargaming Process Effectiveness Wargaming Outcome Effectiveness 

Team Communication SA Exercise Group 

Total Task Info

Share 

TLAC 

Checklist Average

Individual

Team

Score 

Instructor Rating

- Doctrine 

Instructor 

Rating -

Others 

5 .28 .46 .09 N/A 3.26 3.33 Poor (d) Below Avg. 

(d) 

6 .29 .41 .17 N/A 4.00 1.50 Fair (d) Avg. (d) 

4 .28 .46 .15 1.71 2.00 .67 Fair/Good Avg./Above 

Avg. 

2 .42 .55 .29 1.17 N/A N/A Good/Excellent Avg./Above 

Avg. 

1 .53 .67 .38 N/A N/A N/A Good (c)

a Average (c)

3 N/A N/A N/A 1.56 N/A N/A Good (c) Above Avg.

(c) a

This group was also observed during distributed wargaming, but no wargaming process observations were 

conducted at that time, so the ratings are left out to aid in interpretation. 

Table 16 generally shows that as Team Communication scores increase, instructor ratings 

also increase. On average, student groups rated “fair” or “poor” earned Team Communication 

scores of .28 (Total), .44 (Task), and .14 (Info Share), whereas student groups rated “good” or 

“good/excellent” earned average Team Communication scores of .48 (Total), .61 (Task), and .34 

(Info Share). Unfortunately, there are too few data points for the SA Exercise to reliably 

evaluate the relation between this wargaming outcome and wargaming processes. 

Table 17 below shows the average individual and team-related wargaming determinants 

scores for each group of students and their corresponding wargaming outcome score and 

instructor ratings. Where a particular group did not complete an assessment, “N/A” is indicated 

in the corresponding cell. Where wargaming was observed in only one environment, that 

environment is listed in parentheses next to the instructor rating, with “(d)” indicating distributed 

and “(c)” indicating co-located. For groups who wargamed in both distributed and co-located 

environments (Groups 1, 2, and 4), there are two sets of wargaming determinant scores 

representing differences in the group composition between the distributed/collaborative and 

resident phases of instruction2

. For ease of review, student groups are listed in ascending order 

according to their instructor ratings. 

Table 17 generally shows that as instructor ratings increase, scores on the wargaming 

determinants assessments roughly increase as well. For student groups rated “fair” or “poor” by 

instructors, the average Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment score was .00, whereas for student 

groups rated “good” of “excellent” by instructors, this was, on average, .03. The average Staff 

Roles Knowledge Assessment score of the team leads (XOs) for groups rated “fair” or “poor” 

was -.34 in contrast to .03 for groups rated “good” or “excellent.” Similarly, the average 

wargaming tacit knowledge score for lower-rated (“poor” or “fair”) student groups was 1.15, 

whereas the score earned by the higher-rated (“good” or “excellent”) groups was 1.66. Once 

 

2

 Recall, however, that Group 1 did not receive wargaming determinant assessments before distributed wargaming. 

Therefore, no scores are available and N/A is shown in the table. 

33
again, team-related motivation does not bear a clear relationship to instructor ratings of 

wargaming effectiveness (37.07 for lower-rated groups vs. 38.01 for higher-rated groups). All 

of these differences obviously should be interpreted with caution, however, given the limited 

number of groups. Unfortunately, there are too few data points for the SA Exercise to reliably 

evaluate the relation between this wargaming outcome and wargaming determinants. 

In summary, it appears the assessments of wargaming determinants and processes may be 

related to wargaming effectiveness as rated by instructors. This result supports hopeful 

conclusions about the validity of the wargaming assessments, of the wargaming conceptual 

framework, and of the very endeavor to assess wargaming performance. Although the findings 

presented in this section must be greeted with the caution appropriate when very small sample 

sizes and an uncontrolled assessment situation are involved, the several lines of converging 

evidence just described suggest that similar results might be found with larger sample sizes. 

This, of course, remains to be tested. 

Table 17 

Wargaming Determinants and Wargaming Outcomes 

Wargaming Determinant Scores Wargaming Outcome Effectiveness 

Staff Roles 

Knowledge 

Wargaming 

TK SA Exercise Group 

Group 

Avg. 

XO Group 

Avg. 

XO 

TeamRelated

Motivation

Avg 

Individual

Team

Score 

Instructor 

Rating -

Doctrine 

Instructor 

Rating -

Others 

5 .47 .21 1.88 2.50 33.20 3.26 3.33 Poor (d) Below Avg. 

(d) 

1a N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Poor Average

1b .39 .36 2.00 .00 38.20 N/A N/A Good Average

6 .41 .48 1.25 .00 36.33 4.00 1.50 Fair (d) Average (d) 

4a .42 .30 .33 1.00 41.67 2.00 .67 Fair Average

4b .43 .30 1.19 1.00 39.25 N/A N/A Gooda Above Avg.

3 .42 .39 N/A N/A 35.33 N/A N/A Good (c) Above 

Average (c)

2a .45 .52 2.13 2.50 37.25 N/A N/A Good Average

2b .46 .52 1.33 2.50 40.00 N/A N/A Excellentb Above Avg. a

Wargaming determinant scores do not correspond exactly to observations during co-located wargaming. Three 

participants in the co-located wargaming did not complete the wargaming determinants assessments. 

b

Eight participants in the co-located wargaming did not complete the wargaming determinants assessments. 

Discussion 

The present research provides a more in-depth understanding of wargaming and its 

effectiveness assessment than previously has been accomplished. Several psychological 

constructs comprising wargaming determinants, processes, and outcomes have been identified. 

In addition, the feasibility and (where applicable) the psychometric soundness of assessments of 

several of these constructs when administered to groups of wargamers in an uncontrolled 

environment have been demonstrated. This work therefore sets the stage for more systematic 

assessment of wargaming effectiveness and diagnosis of shortfalls in wargaming performance. 

Understanding the true implications of the present research and designing its thoughtful 

extension, however, requires consideration of its strengths and limitations, summarized below. 

34
Strengths 

The fundamental strength of the present research is its contribution to understanding and 

assessing wargaming effectiveness. The framework for conceptualizing wargaming is based on 

the application of psychological theory to understanding operational behavior, thus making the 

framework relatively general across wargaming situations, acceptable to SMEs, and 

understandable to psychologists tasked with assessment development. In addition, the 

assessments developed are flexible. They are portable across wargaming environments, 

including co-located and distributed, traditional and digitally supported wargaming 

environments. They also can be implemented in either paper-and-pencil format or in 

computerized format with automatic data recording and tabulation. 

Importantly, the assessments also are portable across wargaming situations involving 

different mission scenarios. The assessments of wargaming determinants (individual and teamrelated)--the MABE, the Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment, the Wargaming Tacit Knowledge 

Assessment, and the Team-Related Motivation Survey--may be reused without modification 

regardless of mission scenario. The wargaming process and outcomes assessments--the Team

Communication Checklists, the TLAC Checklists, the SA Exercise, and the Integrated Overlay 

Exercise--are partially portable across wargaming situations. Because these assessments are 

scenario-specific, their portability is constrained by the degree of similarity among the mission 

scenarios used in each wargaming situation. However, because a well-documented and 

principled approach was used to design the assessments, the modification of scenario-specific 

assessments is a straightforward, if effortful endeavor. Appendix J provides detailed design 

guidelines for modifying the scenario-specific assessments developed in the present research. 

Limitations 

Although the present research provides a framework for conceptualizing wargaming 

determinants (individual and team-related), process, and outcomes, this framework has not been 

formally validated through large-scale correlational study and external validation. Such a formal

validation effort was beyond the scope and resources of the present research project, but 

nevertheless such a validation should be conducted before the framework is considered 

“official.” The primary threat to the validity of the framework is the lack of representativeness of 

the wargaming environment studied. That is, the research was conducted using officers who 

were simulating staff operations as part of a learning exercise. These officers were not staff 

officers and had very little experience with combined arms military planning. More importantly, 

the wargaming observed as part of the present research had been stripped of much of its 

operational context in order to generate a feasible learning exercise. Missing context, such as 

(among others) vertical coordination with brigade staff elements, use of operational command 

and control technology, and the presence of a commander, may have resulted in an overly 

simplified framework. The framework was designed with the intent that it be robust across the 

range of wargaming situations (e.g., experienced vs. inexperienced staffs, conventional vs. 

unconventional mission planning, etc.), but the actual stability of the framework remains to be 

tested. 

35
A second limitation of the present research concerns the validation of the assessments 

that were developed and administered. Here too, a formal validation effort was beyond the scope 

and resources of the present research project. The assessments could be administered neither to a 

large number of student groups, nor to research participants with a range of experience with 

wargaming and military planning. Although the initial results are promising, a more controlled 

validation study is required to formally validate the assessments. 

Conclusions and Future Directions 

In the present research, the wargaming process was explored to gain a more in-depth 

understanding than has previously been accomplished, an understanding necessary to design 

reliable and valid wargaming performance assessments. This exploration supported the main 

research objective of identifying, developing, and validating techniques for assessing the 

determinants (individual and team-related), processes, and outcomes of effective wargaming. 

An important lesson learned from the present research is that wargaming assessment 

validation efforts must involve an integrated approach in which assessment design is based on a 

thorough understanding of the activity to be assessed, assessment implementation is based on a 

thorough understanding of the environment in which assessment will occur, and assessment 

validation is accomplished in a controlled setting in which specific hypotheses about the 

assessments can be tested. The integrated approach enables researchers to empirically validate 

performance assessments while at the same time evaluating the feasibility of the assessments and 

ensuring their relevance in the actual performance environment. 

The conditions under which the present research was conducted did not permit work with 

a large number of research participants in a controlled setting, as is recommended for 

assessment-validation studies. Moreover, because the research involved a small number of 

student groups from just one course (AC3DL), the ability to field-test certain hypotheses about 

the validity of the assessments was significantly limited. However, it was possible to determine 

what the nature of assessments for capturing wargaming performance should be (i.e., what 

competencies and behaviors should be assessed) and to evaluate the feasibility of implementing 

these assessments in multiple performance environments. 

Important technical factors to consider when implementing performance assessments in 

collaborative virtual environments include the speed of the Internet connection used by the 

examinees, the operating system and service packs in use on their personal computers, and the 

stability of the virtual environment. The reality of advanced collaboration platforms is that they 

are not similarly experienced by all collaborators and that difficulty with various elements of the 

technology--due to unforeseen and non-replicable conditions--is commonplace. These factors 

influence the feasibility of all types of assessments, including observer checklists and automated 

data collection. To ensure that assessments capture what they are intended to capture, designers 

and developers must make certain that the assessments will be accessible to the range of 

computer configurations available to examinees and robust in the face of technical difficulty. 

Important behavioral factors to consider when implementing performance assessments in 

collaborative virtual environments include the time required to administer/score the assessments, 

36
the usability of the assessments, the level of experience of the individuals taking the assessments, 

and the level of buy-in with which both examinees and other interested parties approach the 

assessment methods and results. These factors influence whether the assessments are actually 

administered and/or whether the results of the assessments will be valued. To ensure that 

assessments will be used, designers and developers must work closely with stakeholders to make 

certain the assessments (a) capture constructs or behaviors of interest; (b) feature an appropriate 

level of difficulty, given examinee experience levels; (c) require minimal learning to 

administer/take; and (d) produce scores and feedback that are meaningful to those involved. 

Future research exploring the assessment of collective staff activity during military 

planning should therefore focus on methods of integrating task and performance-environment 

analysis with controlled validation study. Controlled study would allow the identification of best 

practice in assessment design and implementation applied broadly across environments in which 

planning is conducted (e.g., different types of units, differing amounts of staff turnover or staff 

expertise, differing levels of digitization). Task analysis should guide the design and 

development of the assessments to be validated, and performance-environment analysis should 

illuminate the boundary conditions that constrain the generalizability of the validation results. 

Where wargaming is to remain the subject of future research, study exploring the 

implications of transformation for the integration and synchronization of the battlefield operating 

systems is most needed. That is, the transformation of brigades and battalions to modular units 

has implications for the composition of the brigade and battalion battle staffs, the roles of their 

members, and the nature of mission plans. One example of significant change in staff 

composition and roles is the advent of the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) now present 

in the brigade staff and closely linked to the field artillery battalion staff (FMI 3-09.42; DA, 

2005). The FECC differs from the traditional brigade fire support element in that it features an 

information operations component which aids in fires and effects targeting (Glenister, 2002). 

Yet, as the absence of specific doctrine reflects, the tactics for arranging assets in time and space 

to conduct effects-based operations against the asymmetric enemy are largely unknown, and the 

optimal staff composition for accomplishing effects-based mission planning is yet unachieved. 

Moreover, the nature of effects-based operations, which the FECC is designed to support, is not 

well understood by staff officers or their commanders. 

The approach developed in the present research, the conceptual framework for 

wargaming, and the guidelines for assessment development serve as a springboard for future 

assessment research in both field and controlled settings, and in some combination of the two. If 

extended and applied, this work could escort operations command and control teams into the 

future through a better understanding of how to develop and support their collective mission 

planning competence. 

37
38
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U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2000). U.S. Army Air Defense Operations (Field 

Manual 44-100). Washington, DC: Author. 

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2001). Operations (Field Manual 3-0). 

Washington, DC: Author. 

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2001). Tactics (Field Manual 3-90). Washington, 

DC: Author. 

41
U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2002). Army planning and orders production

(Final Draft) (Field Manual 5-0). Washington, DC: Author 

Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2002). Mission Training Plan for The Mounted 

Brigade Combat Team. (ARTEP 71-3). Fort Knox, KY. 

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2003). Mission command: Command and 

control of army forces. (Field Manual 6-0). Washington, DC: Author 

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2003). The tank and mechanized infantry 

battalion task force (Field Manual 3-90.2). Washington, DC: Author. 

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2003). Combined arms obstacle integration (Incl 

C-1) (Field Manual 90-7). Washington, DC: Author. 

U.S. Department of the Army, Headquarters. (2005). HBCT fires and effects operations (Field 

Manual 3-09.42). Washington, DC: Author. 

White, D. (2001, May). The air defense commander and CCIR: Rather than critical information 

requirements analysis to anchor their decisions, commanders are treated to a fire hose of 

data. ADA Magazine available on line at: http://airdefense.bliss.army.mil/adamag/May 

%202001/Brief.htm

42
Appendix A 

List of Acronyms

 ABF Assault by Fire 

 AC3 Armor Captain’s Career Course 

AC3DL Armor Captain’s Career Course – Distance Learning 

ACES Armored Combat Earthmovers 

ADA Air Defense Artillery 

ADO Air Defense Officer 

ALO Air Liaison Officer 

AO Area of Operations 

ARC Action-Reaction-Counteraction 

ASR Alternate Supply Route 

AT Anti-Tank 

ATK Attack 

AXP Ambulance Exchange Point 

BDE Brigade 

BHL Battle Handoff Line 

BN Battalion 

BOS Battlefield Operating Systems 

BPT Be Prepared To 

C2 Command and Control 

C4 Command Control Communications and Computers 

CABTF Combined Arms Battalion Task Force 

CALL Center for Army Lessons Learned 

CAS Close Air Support 

CASEVAC Casualty Evacuation 

CAT Civil Affairs Team 

CATK Counterattack 

CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

CDR Commander

CFL Coordinated Fire Line 

CGSC Command and General Staff College 

CHEMO Chemical Officer 

CL Class 

CL I Class I: Subsistence Items 

 CL II Class II: Individual Equipment, Clothing, Tool Sets, House 

 Keeping Supplies 

CL III Class III: Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants 

CL III (B) Class III (b): Bulk Petroleum

CL IV Class IV: Construction and Barrier Material 

CL V Class V: Ammunition 

CL VII Class VII: Major End Items 

A-1
CL VIII Class VIII: Medical Material 

CL IX Class IX: Repair Parts and Components 

CO CMD Company Command 

COA Course of Action 

COLT Combat Observation Lasing Team

CP Command Post 

CPT Captain 

CS Combat Support 

CSOP Combat Security Outpost 

CSS Combat Service Support 

CTCP Combat Trains Command Post 

DA Department of the Army

DP Decision Point 

DSM Decision Support Matrix 

DST Decision Support Template 

EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information 

ELINT Electronics Intelligence 

ENG Engineer 

 EW Electronic Warfare 

FA Field Artillery 

FARP Forward Arming and Refueling Point 

FASCAM Family of Scatterable Mines 

FECC Fires and Effects Coordination Cell 

FFIR Friendly Forces Information Requirements 

FFTLOK Fighters for the Liberation of Kentuckia 

FIST Fire Integration Support Team

FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops 

FM Field Manual 

FMI Field Manual - Interim 

FSC Forward Support Company 

FSO Fire Support Officer 

HE High Explosive 

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company 

HPT High Payoff Target 

HPTL High Payoff Target List 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

HVT High Value Target 

IB International Border 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

IFV Infantry Fighting Vehicle 

IMINT Imagery Intelligence 

A-2
IN Infantry 

IO Information Operations 

IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 

 ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force

LD Line of Departure 

LOC Lines of Communication 

LOG PAC Logistics Package 

LRP Logistics Release Point 

LT Lieutenant 

MABE Mission Analysis Briefing Exercise 

MAJ Major 

MDMP Military Decision-Making Process 

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 

MCOO Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay 

METT-TC Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain and Weather, Timing, and Civil 

 Factors 

MI Military Intelligence 

MIC Mechanized Infantry Company 

MICLIC Mine Clearing Line Charge 

MOPP Mission Oriented Protective Posture 

MSR X Main Supply Route X 

MTOE Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment 

N/A Not Applicable 

NAI Named Area of Interest 

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 

NW North West 

OBJ Objective 

OP Observation Post 

OPORD Operations Order 

OPSEC Operations Security 

PAA Position Area for Artillery

PIR Priority (or Primary) Intelligence Requirement 

PL Phase Line 

PLT Platoon 

POL Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants 

PSYOP Psychological Operations 

R3 Re-arm, Re-fuel, Re-supply 

R3P Re-arm, Re-fuel, Re-supply Point 

A-3
REMBASS Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System

RETRANS Retransmission 

ROE Rules of Engagement 

ROM Refuel on the Move

ROWPU Reserve Osmosis Water Purification Unit 

RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 

 

S1 Adjutant/Personnel Officer 

S2 Intelligence Officer 

S3 Operations and Training Officer 

S4 Supply/Logistics Officer 

SA Situation Awareness 

SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SBF Support by Fire 

SEE Small Emplacement Excavator

IGINT Signals Intelligence

SIGO Signal Officer 

SITTEMP Situation Template 

SME Subject Matter Expert 

SOP Standing Operating Procedure 

SOSO Stability Operations and Support Operations 

SOSR Suppress, Obscure, Secure, Reduce 

SP Start Point 

SPF Special Purpose Forces 

SPOTREP Spot Report 

TAC-P Tactical Air Control Party 

TAI Targeted Area of Interest

TARGETS Targeted Acceptable Responses to Generated Events or Tasks 

TF Task Force 

TK Tacit Knowledge 

TLAC Think Like a Commander 

TM Training Manual 

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

TPT Tactical PSYOP Team

TRP Target Reference Point 

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UMCP Unit Maintenance Collection Point 

VTOC Virtual Tactical Operations Center 

XO Executive Officer 

A-4
Appendix B 

Staff Roles Knowledge Assessment 

BOS #1 – COMMAND AND CONTROL 

1. Clearly identify the commander’s intent and vision of the battle. 

Task Definition: Clear identification of the commander’s intent and vision of the battle requires 

an in-depth familiarity with the purpose, key tasks, and end state of the mission, as well as the 

commander’s priorities for all combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) 

elements and how he envisions their support of his concept. 

Staff Officers Involved: Executive Officer (XO), Adjutant/Personnel Officer (S1), Intelligence 

Officer (S2), Operations and Training Officer (S3), Supply/Logistics Officer (S4), Signal Officer 

(SIGO), Fire Support Officer (FSO), Air Defense Officer (ADO), Engineer (ENG) 

Rationale: The effectiveness and timeliness of the war game depends on clear identification of

the commander’s intent and vision of the battle. This is because the commander and his staff use 

wargaming to, among other things, (a) determine how to maximize combat power against the 

enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage; (b) have as near an 

identical vision of the battle as possible; and (c) determine the conditions and resources required 

for success. Because all staff officers must participate actively for wargaming to be effective, all 

staff officers must be able to clearly identify the commander’s intent and vision of the battle. 

The commander also plays a key role in this task by communicating his intent and vision 

effectively. 

References: FM 5-0 (pp. 3-5, 3-33 to 3-34) 

 

2. Determine the command and control requirements for minimizing the effect of 

destruction of friendly Command Posts (CPs). 

Task Definition: Determination of the command and control (C2) requirements for minimizing 

the effect of destruction of friendly CPs requires identification of (a) succession of command; (b) 

provisions for redundancy in communications by having backup at key locations; (c) SOPs for 

subordinates to follow during interruptions in communications; and (d) alternative means of 

communication if main means are eliminated. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S3, SIGO 

Rationale: The XO is the task force’s “chief of staff” and second in command, and must be 

prepared to assume the duties of commander at any time. He is responsible for directly 

supervising the main CP and headquarters cell, including displacement, protection, security, and 

communications. The S3 makes recommendations for C2 requirements based on his knowledge 

of the flow of battle, how the CPs will move with the battle, and how the fight will be controlled. 

The SIGO advises on all communications and electronics matters including the positioning of C2 

elements. He is the point of contact for the issue of signal operating instruction during 

B-1
operations, as well as for communications troubleshooting. He is also responsible for providing 

retransmission capabilities to the task force. He ensures that communication resources and 

support are adequate to meet mission requirements. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 10, 56, 119 to 120); FM 3-90.2 (pp. 11-7 

to 1-8); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2) 

3. Determine or refine the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). 

Task Definition: The CCIR identify information needed by the commander to support his 

battlefield visualization and to make critical decisions during execution. This information 

represents what a commander needs to know in a specific situation to make a particular decision 

in a timely manner. Therefore, determining the CCIR involves identifying requirements for 

information and recognizing the importance of these requirements to the commander’s decisionmaking process (e.g., their importance to confirming or denying a particular enemy COA). 

Refinement of the CCIR requires the identification of changes in (or updates to) the situation, 

environment, or timeframe and their corresponding implications for what the commander needs 

to know. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: The XO is responsible for managing the commander’s CCIR. The S2 is responsible 

for coordinating with the entire staff and recommending PIR for the commander’s CCIR. Each 

staff officer provides technical assistance to the S2 in their areas of interest, while studying and 

evaluating the enemy capabilities in their areas of interest and supporting the battlefield 

surveillance plan. If assigned to the battalion/task force, the chemical officer (CHEMO) is an 

important contributor to CCIR recommendations. Note that staff officers nominate information 

requirements to become CCIR, but the commander alone decides what information is critical. 

References: FM 5-0 (pp. 3-18 to 3-19); FM 101-5 (pp. 4-2, 4-5, 4-10 to 4-17, 4-22 to 4-26)

4. Determine critical events and decision points. 

Task Definition: Critical events are those events that directly influence mission accomplishment, 

including events that trigger significant actions or decisions, complicated actions requiring 

detailed study, and essential tasks identified during mission analysis. Determination of critical

events therefore involves selecting from multiple events those events whose successful outcomes 

are required for mission accomplishment. Decision points are events or locations on the 

battlefield where tactical decisions are required during mission execution. They indicate when 

and where a decision must be made to have maximum impact on friendly or enemy COAs. 

Determination of decision points therefore requires selecting from multiple events or locations 

those events or locations where a decision is critical to tactical success. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

B-2
Rationale: Determination of critical events and decision points is addressed in the task force 

scheme of maneuver, which is developed by the S3 in collaboration with the S1, S2, S4, SIGO, 

FSO, ADO, and ENG such that the scheme of maneuver is integrated with enemy, CS, and CSS 

capabilities and limitations. The XO is ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing 

the warfighting plans. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 56); FM 5-0 (pp. 3-37 to 3-38); FM 101-5 

(p. 4-2) 

5. Determine command post locations and composition to support current and planned 

tactical operations. 

Task Definition: There are three CPs involved in task force command and control: the main CP, 

the combat trains CP (CTCP), and the forward support company CP (FSC CP). Determination 

of the CP locations requires consideration of CP survivability, communications, and 

accessibility. Determination of CP composition requires consideration of how to balance the 

need for rapid displacement with C2 effectiveness, and the need for 24-hour security and 

operations. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, ENG 

Rationale: Key considerations for positioning the CPs include space available, terrain, weather, 

and other environmental factors, enemy factors, and operational factors, requiring input from the 

S2, S3, SIGO, and ENG. The S3, in coordination with the SIGO, recommends general locations 

of CPs. He ensures that the CPs will not be in the way of friendly operations, deconflicting the 

terrain based on his knowledge of the flow of battle and other factors. The SIGO ensures that

selected areas afford the most in communications potential and the least in potential enemy 

electronic warfare (EW) interference. The S2, based on his knowledge of the enemy, assists in 

identifying security considerations. The TF XO is responsible for supervising all staff activities 

and functions within the main CP and headquarters cell, including displacement, protection, 

security, and communications, and so is positioned to make recommendations about main CP 

composition. Depending on the type of organization, the S4 or headquarters and headquarters 

company (HHC) commander (CDR) (or FSC CDR) is responsible for operations, movement, and 

security of the combat trains command post (CTCP). The S1 and S4 work closely in the CTCP, 

and so are positioned to make recommendations about CTCP composition. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 119, 121); FM 3-90.2 (pp. 3-8 to 3-

9, 11-2, 11-4); FM 101-5 (p. 4-13) 

6. Assess the potential effect of battle intensity on Soldier and leader will to fight.

Task Definition: Assessment of the potential effect of battle intensity on Soldier and leader will 

to fight requires determination of battle intensity via casualty estimates and via estimation of

personnel service support losses (e.g., postal services), both of which affect unit morale, and 

recognizing their implications for morale. 

B-3
Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1 

Rationale: The S1 is responsible for reporting the status of morale and esprit de corps, and any 

significant influences on the morale of units. The XO is responsible for monitoring the 

discipline, morale, and combat and mobilization readiness of the staff, which is also affected by 

battle intensity, and therefore can inform efforts to assess the potential effect of battle intensity 

on Soldier and leader will to fight. If assigned, the chaplain, surgeon, and command sergeant 

major are key assets of the battalion/task force S1 section who aid in this assessment. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 29 to 36); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-10, 4-21, 4-

30) 

BOS #2 – INTELLIGENCE 

7. Determine High Payoff Targets (HPTs). 

Task Definition: High-payoff targets are those targets whose loss to the enemy will contribute to 

the success of the friendly COA. Determining HPTs requires joint consideration of the enemy 

commander’s needs (high value targets [HVTs] – to include enemy combat, CS, and CSS 

elements) and the friendly concept of the operation. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: The S2, S3, and FSO form the core of the targeting team. The S2 develops the ISR 

plan/overlay to find high-payoff targets and participates in the targeting cell to help develop the 

HPT list. The S3 (or lethal effects cell, depending on the organization) plays a key role in 

selecting HPTs, collaborating with the FSO to integrate the tactical scheme of maneuver with 

fires. Normally, the XO oversees the routine activity and coordination of the targeting process. 

As required, other representatives within the tactical operations center may also be members of 

the targeting team, including the S4, ENG, and ADO. If assigned, the CHEMO also participates 

in the targeting cell. At the brigade level and above, the air liaison officer (ALO) participates in 

the targeting cell. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 56, 83 to 90); FM 6-20-10 (Chs. 1 and 2); 

FM 101-5 (p. 4-22 to 4-24) 

8. Determine optimal times and locations to maximize enemy casualties and force 

destruction. 

Task Definition: Determining optimal times and locations to maximize enemy casualties and 

force destruction requires that information regarding (a) anticipated enemy locations, strengths, 

and actions; and (b) potential enemy mission, intent, objectives, defensive locations, use of key 

terrain, avenues of approach and routes, engagement areas, and obstacles be incorporated with 

the friendly commander’s intent, mission, and integrated scheme of maneuver. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

B-4
Rationale: Incorporating threat analysis with the scheme of maneuver requires coordination and 

information sharing between the S2, S4, ENG, and S3. For maximum planning effectiveness, 

the scheme of maneuver must be resourced and integrated with fire support, obstacles, and air 

defense. The XO is ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing the warfighting 

plans. If assigned, the CHEMO is also an important contributor because he plans and 

recommends integration of smoke and obscurants into tactical operations. 

References: FM 3-90.2 (p. 5-26 to 5-29); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-6, 4-10 to 4-15, 4-23 to 4-25) 

9. Determine ways and means to separate attacking enemy echelons. 

Task Definition: Determining the ways and means to separate attacking enemy echelons 

requires that information regarding (a) anticipated enemy COAs; and (b) potential enemy 

mission, intent, objectives, use of key terrain, avenues of approach and routes, and engagement 

areas be incorporated with the friendly commander’s intent, mission, and integrated scheme of 

maneuver. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: Incorporating threat analysis with the scheme of maneuver requires coordination and 

information sharing between the S2, S4, ENG, and S3. For maximum planning effectiveness, 

the scheme of maneuver must be resourced and integrated with fire support, obstacles, and air 

defense. The XO is ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing the warfighting 

plans. If assigned, the CHEMO is also an important contributor because he plans and 

recommends the use of flame-field expedients to supplement unit defense and existing 

minefields and barriers. 

References: FM 3-90.2 (p. 5-26 to 5-29); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-6, 4-10 to 4-15, 4-23 to 4-25) 

10. Determine ways and means to force enemy elements into areas where the commander 

wants them.

Task Definition: Determining ways and means to force enemy elements into areas where the 

commander wants them requires that information regarding (a) anticipated enemy locations, 

strengths, and actions; and (b) potential enemy mission, intent, objectives, defensive locations, 

use of key terrain, avenues of approach and routes, engagement areas, and obstacles be 

incorporated with the friendly commander’s intent, mission, and integrated scheme of maneuver. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: Incorporating threat analysis with the scheme of maneuver primarily involves 

coordination and information sharing between the S2, ENG, and S3. For maximum planning 

effectiveness, the scheme of maneuver must be resourced and integrated with fire support, 

obstacles, and air defense. The XO is ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing 

the warfighting plans. If assigned, the CHEMO is also an important contributor because he plans 

and recommends integration of smoke and obscurants into tactical operations. 

B-5
References: FM 3-90.2 (p. 5-26 to 5-29); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-6, 4-10 to 4-15, 4-23 to 4-25) 

11. Identify expected enemy air or helicopter threats. 

Task Definition: The probability of a task force asset being targeted for enemy air must be 

assessed if economical allocation of ADA resources is to be achieved. Identification of assets 

requiring active air defense protection involves consideration of targeting information provided 

by intelligence estimates, past enemy attack methods, and enemy doctrine.

Staff Officers Involved: S2, ADO 

Rationale: The ADO should work closely with the S2 during the intelligence preparation on the 

battlefield (IPB) process and is best suited to prepare and brief the Air IPB. This continued 

coordination occurs during wargaming. At the brigade level and above, the ALO also assists in 

this task by supplying his experience and his knowledge of high-performance aircraft. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 109, 112); FM 3-90.2 (p. 9-50); FM 101-5 

(p. 4-22, 4-23) 

12. Determine optimal employment of intelligence collection assets. 

Task Definition: The intelligence collection management process involves, in part, defining 

what information is required, determining the best method to collect information, and allocating 

assets to gather information. Determining the optimal employment of intelligence collection 

assets therefore requires an understanding of what information should be collected and how this 

information should be collected. From this understanding, information requirements can be 

prioritized and intelligence assets can be assigned accordingly. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: Development of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan is a 

collaborative effort between the S3 and S2, supported by the remainder of the staff. Tasking of 

specific collection assets is determined based on the following factors: (a) availability; (b) 

capability; (c) vulnerability; and (d) performance history, which requires consideration of

personnel and equipment status, signal capability, threat capability, and environmental 

conditions. Moreover, intelligence resources include scouts, maneuver companies, patrols, 

observation post (OPs), fire integration support team (FISTs), field artillery (FA), military 

intelligence (MI), army aviation, close air support (CAS), air defense artillery, combat engineers, 

and various CSS units. For these reasons, staff officers involved in the ISR plan may include (in 

addition to the S2) the S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, and ENG. The TF XO supervises overall 

development and synchronization of the ISR plan. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 42 to 45); FM 3-90.2 (pp. 4-2 to 4-7, 4-

25) 

 

B-6
BOS #3 – MANEUVER 

13. Define branches and sequels to the maneuver scheme. 

Task Definition: A branch is a contingency plan or course of action (an option built into the 

basic plan or course of action) for changing the mission, disposition, orientation, or direction of 

movement of the force to aid success of the current operation, based on anticipated events, 

opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions. Sequels are operations that follow the 

current operation. They are future operations that anticipate the possible outcomes—success, 

failure, or stalemate of the current operation. Defining branches and sequels to the maneuver 

scheme involves identifying the need to change the decisive plan and execution criteria and 

developing an integrated plan for implementing the change. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: For maximum planning effectiveness, the scheme of maneuver must be resourced and 

integrated with fire support, obstacles, and air defense. The XO is ultimately responsible for 

integrating and synchronizing the warfighting plans. If assigned, the CHEMO is also an 

important contributor because he plans and recommends integration of smoke and obscurants 

into tactical operations. At the brigade level and above, the ALO also participates in defining 

branches and sequels, coordinating tactical air support missions with fire support and the 

appropriate airspace command and control element. 

References: FM 3-0 (pp. 4-25; 6-5); FM 3-90.2 (p. 5-26 to 5-29); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-6, 4-10 to 

4-15, 4-22 to 4-25) 

14. Identify triggers for the initiation of direct and indirect fires. 

Task Definition: Triggers are a physical point on the ground or an action or an event. During 

offensive operations, a trigger is often a maneuver action or event. In the defense, a trigger is 

more often a physical spot on the ground. Trigger development requires (a) determining the 

position on the ground where you want to impact on the enemy or to silhouette the enemy; (b) 

determine the enemy rate of movement; (c) determine the time of flight of the rounds from the 

weapon system firing the mission; (d) determine the processing time; (e) determine the total 

mission time; and (f) place the trigger point the required distance from a planned target location 

based on total mission time x speed of enemy. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, S4, FSO, SIGO, ENG 

Rationale: Each time the commander and the S3 discuss current or future plans, concepts, or 

courses of action, the FSO participates. The FSO develops the fire support tasks, 

responsibilities, and requirements. The S2 participates in the targeting cell to help develop the 

HPT list and to develop the observation plan and the fire support execution matrix. The ENG 

assists with direct/indirect fire integration with obstacles, priorities, and obstacle resourcing. 

Fire support planners must formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and to exploit 

logistics capabilities. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical 

support are all critical to sustaining fire support operations. Logistics sustainment is a central, 

B-7
potentially decisive aspect of operations, not an adjunct to them. The SIGO advises on all 

communications and electronics matters and is responsible for providing retransmission 

capabilities to the task force. He ensures that communication resources and support are adequate 

to meet mission requirements. If assigned, the CHEMO participates in the targeting cell. At the

brigade level and above, the ALO participates in identifying triggers, helping to plan the 

simultaneous employment of air and surface fires.

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 83, 98); FM 3-90.2 (Appendix G); FM 

101-5 (pp. 4-22 to 4-24) 

15. Determine route prioritization for movement. 

Task Definition: The objective of a successful move is for the unit to arrive at its destination in a 

condition suitable to its probable employment. The goal of all movement planning is to retain 

flexibility to execute a variety of plans to meet ever-changing conditions. Movement planning 

involves determination of the destination, routes, orders of march, rates of march, times that each 

serial or march element will arrive and clear its start point (SP), intervals, speeds, scheduled 

maintenance halts, communications, and location of the commander. An effective movement 

order requires the best available information on the enemy, terrain, weather, unit capabilities, and 

civil considerations. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, S4, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: The integration of and support from combat and CS, such as artillery, air defense, 

intelligence, military police, and engineers, are critical for a successful tactical movement. The 

S3 section develops the detailed movement order, with the assistance of the S4 section, in 

accordance with the commander’s established priorities. In coordination with the ENG, the S4 

ensures that routes are adequate to support the movement of the types and numbers of vehicles 

and supplies projected for movement. 

References: FM 3-90 (p. 14-12 to 14-13) 

16. Define the task organization requirements. 

Task Definition: Task organization is the process of allocating available assets to subordinate 

commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Determining task 

organization requirements during the war game involves identifying what combat power is 

needed, where, when, and how frequently it will be needed. Successful task organization 

requires understanding (a) the mission, including the higher commander’s intent and concept of 

operations; (b) Army doctrinal tenets and tactics; (c) the battlefield framework; (d) the roles and 

interrelations of operating systems; (e) the status of available forces, including morale, training, 

and capabilities of equipment; (f) specific unit capabilities, limitations, strengths, and 

weaknesses; (g) the risks inherent to the plan; and (h) subordinate commander’s abilities, 

especially the ability to apply combined arms doctrine. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

B-8
Rationale: Every staff officer is responsible for recommending the organization for combat, 

allocations to subordinate units, and command and support relationships between subordinate 

units and organic units in their area of interest. The XO ensures information flow between the 

staff and commander on staff recommendations and the commander’s decisions. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 10); FM 101-5 (p. 4-4, Appendix F) 

17. Define force protection criteria. 

Task Definition: Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile 

actions against personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical 

information. Defining force protection criteria requires the identification of threats and their 

associated hazards, determining the risk associated with each hazard, and balancing resource 

constraints against the risk. Resources allocated to force protection may be devoted to 

aggressive counterintelligence and threat assessments, operations security (OPSEC), troop 

dispersion, camouflage, local security, field fortifications, protection of electronic links and 

nodes (including combat troops with electronic devices), and army air and missile defense. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: The XO is responsible for supervising integration of risk management across the 

staff. Each staff officer helps the commander eliminate unnecessary risks, in part, by (a) 

analyzing his functional area and applying risk management during the MDMP; (b) identifying 

constraints in the higher commander’s risk guidance; (c) including risks and recommending ways 

to reduce their impact in the staff estimate; (d) determining the effectiveness of hazard/risk 

controls and continuously assessing their suitability, feasibility, and acceptability; and (e) 

continuously identifying hazards, assessing initial and residual risks for each hazard,

recommending control measures to reduce the risk to the force. The HHC (or FSC) CDR and the 

surgeon may help in identifying risk. If assigned, the CHEMO is a critical asset in assessing risk 

to the unit from enemy nuclear, biological, and/or chemical attacks. 

References: FM 3-0 (p. 4-8 to 4-9); FM 100-14 (pp. 1-6, 3-6); FM 101-5 (pp. 4-7, 4-23, 4-24) 

18. Determine effect of limited visibility on combat, combat support (CS), and combat 

service support (CSS) operations. 

Task Definition: Commanders plan for the effects of adverse or limited visibility on weapons 

systems and optical and thermal devices. A plan that succeeds in clear conditions may be less 

effective during bad weather. Branches to the basic plan should address necessary modifications 

during periods of reduced visibility. Defining branches to the basic plan to address limited 

visibility involves changing execution criteria to reflect limited-visibility effects on weapons 

systems and optical and thermal devices, and developing an integrated plan for implementing the 

change. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

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Rationale: For maximum planning effectiveness, the scheme of maneuver must be resourced and 

integrated with fire support, obstacles, and air defense. The XO is ultimately responsible for 

integrating and synchronizing the warfighting plans. The HHC (or FSC) CDR also aid in 

determining the effect of limited visibility on CSS operations. 

References: FM 3-0 (p. 8-14); FM 3-90.2 (p. 5-26 to 5-29); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-6, 4-10 to 4-15, 

4-25)

BOS #4 – FIRE SUPPORT 

19. Integrate fire support with maneuver and priorities. 

Task Definition: Integration of fire support with maneuver and priorities requires that fire 

support planning is performed concurrently with the development of the scheme of maneuver. 

Staff Officers Involved: S3, S4, FSO 

Rationale: Each time the commander and the S3 discuss current or future plans, concepts, or 

courses of action, the FSO participates. The FSO develops the fire support tasks, 

responsibilities, and requirements. The S3 recommends integrated schemes of tactical maneuver 

and/or dispositions and fires, including nuclear and chemical fires. Fire support planners must 

formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and to exploit logistics capabilities. 

Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all critical 

to sustaining fire support operations. Logistics sustainment is a central, potentially decisive 

aspect of operations, not an adjunct to them. If assigned, the ALO may also contribute to this 

task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 83 to 84); FM 6-20 (Ch. 3) 

20. Update High Payoff Target List (HPTL). 

Task Definition: The HPTL is a prioritized list of high-payoff targets (HPTs). The HPTs are 

those targets whose loss to the enemy will contribute to the success of the friendly COA. 

Updating the HPTL requires joint consideration of updates regarding the enemy commander’s 

needs (HVTs – to include enemy combat, CS, and CSS elements) and updates regarding the 

friendly concept of the operation. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: The S2, S3, and FSO form the core of the targeting team. The S2 develops the ISR 

plan/overlay to find high-payoff targets and participates in the targeting cell to help develop the 

HPT list. Normally, the XO oversees the routine activity and coordination of the targeting 

process. As required, other representatives within the TOC may also be members of the 

targeting team, including the ENG, and ADO. If assigned, the CHEMO participates in the 

targeting meeting. At the brigade level and above, the ALO also participates in the targeting 

meeting. 

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References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 83 to 90); FM 6-20-10 (Chs. 1 and 2); FM 

101-5 (pp. 4-22 to 4-24) 

21. Synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires to support task force Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations. 

Task Definition: The desired effects of fires are to (a) suppress enemy forces engaging task force 

ISR forces; (b) protect the movement and infiltration of ISR forces and target acquisition assets; 

(c) inflict casualties and force enemy units to deploy early and reveal his main attack; (d) reduce 

the enemy’s capability to gain information by eliminating enemy reconnaissance forces and 

intelligence-gathering assets; (e) deceive the enemy as to the location of task force units; (f) slow 

and canalize enemy movement to provide better targets for maneuver direct fire systems; and (g) 

suppress enemy direct and indirect fire weapons. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, S4, FSO 

Rationale: The FSO develops/synchronizes the fire support tasks, responsibilities, and 

requirements. The S3 has responsibility for developing the ISR plan with the FSO and S2. Fire 

support planners must formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and to exploit 

logistics capabilities. Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical 

support are all critical to sustaining fire support operations. Logistics sustainment is a central, 

potentially decisive aspect of operations, not an adjunct to them. At the division level and above, 

the electronic warfare officer also participates in this task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 59, 84); FM 6-20-40; FM 6-20-50; FM 

101-5 (p. 4-25) 

22. Synchronize lethal and non-lethal fires to support task force offensive operations. 

Task Definition: Fires in support of offensive operations are to be planned for (1) terrain that 

will be traversed by task force units; (2) protecting task force flanks; and (3) achieving task force 

objectives. For fires planned for terrain that will be traversed by task force units, the desired 

effects are to (a) suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy OPs and target acquisition systems; (b) 

suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy direct fire systems; (c) deny enemy attack helicopters use 

of potential attack positions; and (d) suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy elements that are to 

be bypassed. For fires planned to protect TF flanks, the desired effects are to protect TF units 

during movement and reduce the number of TF units committed to flank security. For fires 

planned on TF objectives, the desired effects are to (a) concentrate fires to suppress, neutralize, 

and destroy forward enemy elements; (b) create points of penetration into enemy defenses; (c) 

suppress enemy forces which will respond to penetrations or breakthrough of enemy positions; 

and (d) assist TF forces to maneuver to positions to provide direct fires against enemy forces in 

the defense. 

Staff Officers Involved: S3, S4, FSO 

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Rationale: Each time the commander and the S3 discuss current or future plans, concepts, or 

courses of action, the FSO participates. The FSO develops the fire support tasks, 

responsibilities, and requirements. The S3 recommends integrated schemes of tactical maneuver 

and/or dispositions and fires, including nuclear and chemical fires. Fire support planners must 

formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and to exploit logistics capabilities. 

Ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, transportation, and medical support are all critical 

to sustaining fire support operations. Logistics sustainment is a central, potentially decisive 

aspect of operations, not an adjunct to them. If assigned, the CHEMO is an important 

contributor because he plans and recommends integration of smoke and obscurants into tactical 

operations. At the division level and above, the electronic warfare officer and the psychological 

operations officer would also participate in this task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 83 to 84); FM 6-20 (Ch. 3); FM 6-

20-40; FM 6-20-50; FM 101-5 (pp. 4-25, 4-27, 4-28) 

23. Develop an observation plan that assigns (a) responsibilities to target acquisition 

systems; and (b) observers for the employment of indirect fires against designated targets 

and determination of damage assessments. 

Task Definition: The observation plan should address where observers need to be, security, 

communications, how the observer gets into position, what the observer is to accomplish, and 

disengagement criteria if necessary. The steps in developing an observation plan are (a) identify 

the requirements for an observation post (OP); (b) conduct terrain analysis to determine possible 

OP locations; (c) allocate the asset; (d) select the OP from among the possibilities; (e) plan for 

insertion and occupation of the OP; (f) coordinate the passage of the OP through friendly forces, 

if required; and (g) plan indirect fires, electronic warfare support, medical support, extraction, 

security, and re-supply to support the insertion and occupation plan. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, SIGO, FSO 

Rationale: The observation plan is developed collaboratively among the FSO, S2, and S3. The 

S3 develops a scheme that will optimize observation and fields of fire, based on terrain, visibility 

conditions, and weapon system capabilities (for both friendly and enemy forces). The SIGO 

ensures selected areas afford the most in communications potential and the least in potential 

enemy EW interference. At the brigade level, the scout platoon leader should also participate in 

this task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 28, 59, 65, 88, 121); FM 3-90.2 (p. 9-10 to 

9-11); FM 6-20 (Ch. 3) 

24. Verify sensor taskings to provide targetable intelligence in a timely manner for high 

payoff targets (HPTs).

Task Definition: Tasking the right sensor for a collection task at the right time is a critical

function in the targeting process. Clear and concise taskings must be given to each agency 

controlling sensors within the force or unit. Effective sensor tasking requires that staffs choose 

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small areas selectively on the basis of analysis of the IPB product most likely to produce the 

desired targets. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, FSO 

Rationale: Constant coordination is required among operations, intelligence, and fire support 

staff sections to ensure the effective employment of surveillance and target acquisition resources. 

References: FM 6-20 (Ch. 2) 

BOS #5 – MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY 

25. Assess potential enemy actions against the task force’s efforts to bypass or overcome 

obstacles. 

Task Definition: The assessment of potential enemy actions against TF efforts to bypass or 

overcome obstacles requires consideration of (a) the implications of enemy mission and intent 

for enemy obstacle placement and defensive action; (b) estimated enemy intelligence regarding 

friendly mission, intent, and capability; (c) estimated enemy capability and combat power 

relative to friendly capability and combat power; and (d) terrain and weather constraints on the 

enemy’s options for responding to TF efforts. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, FSO, ENG 

Rationale: The ENG, along with the S2, combines the doctrinal enemy template, the terrain 

analysis, and the other battlefield effects to gain an appreciation of how the enemy will use the 

terrain to fight. The S3 uses intelligence provided by the S2 to analyze the enemy’s most recent 

activities and intentions and evaluate possible enemy COAs. Each time the commander and the 

S3 discuss current or future plans, concepts, or courses of action, the FSO participates. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 59, 83); FM 5-71-2 (Appendix A) 

26. Define reconnaissance requirements to identify points of penetration into enemy 

obstacles and river crossing sites. 

Task Definition: Defining the reconnaissance requirements to identify points of penetration 

involves identifying gaps between what is known about how the enemy will employ obstacles, 

fortifications, and mobility assets during his defense and what needs to be known in order to 

support timely, critical maneuver decisions that must be made during the offensive operation. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, S4, FSO, ENG 

Rationale: The ENG identifies obstacle intelligence and nominates priority intelligence 

requirements for inclusion into the CCIR. The engineer, along with the S2, combines the 

doctrinal enemy template, the terrain analysis, and the other battlefield effects to gain an 

appreciation of how the enemy will use the terrain to fight. The ENG works with the S3, S4, and 

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FSO to develop the engineer plan, to provide resources to support the plan, and to coordinate 

fires with breaching and obstacles. 

References: FM 5-71-2 (Ch. 3, Appendix A) 

27. Integrate engineers into maneuver formations to maintain momentum, with the bulk of 

mobility assets with the breach force. 

Task Definition: A highly mobile engineer force, well forward and integrated into maneuver 

formations is critical to maintaining the momentum of the attack. Engineers assist in 

maintaining momentum by supporting combined arms breaching, land handover, forward 

passage of follow-on forces, and clearing and gap crossing. Integration of engineers into 

maneuver formations requires that specific arrangements be made for handing over obstacles 

from forward breaching units to engineers for lane improvement and obstacle clearance. The 

amount and type of engineer equipment needed in the offense must also be considered. 

Staff Officers Involved: S3, S4, FSO, ENG 

Rationale: The ENG works with the S3, S4, and FSO to develop the engineer plan, to provide 

resources to support the plan, and to coordinate fires with breaching and obstacles. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 98, 100 to 101); FM 5-71-2 (Ch. 3) 

28. Determine Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM) employment. 

Task Definition: Scatterable mine systems enable tactical commanders to emplace minefields in 

enemy held terrain, contaminated territory, or in other areas where it is not possible to emplace 

conventional minefields. The FASCAM is designed to be delivered or dispensed remotely by 

aircraft, artillery, or by ground dispenser, and may be delivered by itself or in conjunction with 

other munitions. Planning the employment FASCAM minefields requires consideration of 

delivery error, availability of tubes, competing demands for field artillery, and the duration of the 

mines. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, FSO, ENG 

Rationale: The effective employment of FASCAM assets requires careful coordination among 

the ENG, FSO, S3, and S2. The ENG is responsible for providing expertise on the employment 

of all types of FASCAM. He determines location, size, time and density of the minefields. He 

coordinates with the S3 and FSO to ensure systems are available at the time and location for 

placement. The FSO provides the technical expertise to the ENG concerning the employment of 

field artillery (FA)-delivered FASCAM. Normally, the FSO obtains the safety zone (size) of the 

minefield. Because FASCAM can be delivered by air, the ALO (at the battalion level or above) 

or the S3 Air (if assigned) should also participate in determining FASCAM employment. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 60, 96); FM 3-90.2 (p. 9-43); FM 6-20-30 

(Appendix C) 

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29. Define emplacement criteria for obstacles and mines to protect the task force flanks 

and block enemy counterattacks. 

Task Definition: Obstacles must support present and future tactical plans, be logistically 

supportable, and fully coordinated. Some important factors to be considered when defining 

emplacement criteria include (a) type of mission; (b) type of obstacle; (c) requirements of future 

plans; (d) enemy strengths and weaknesses; (e) terrain and weather; (f) available time, materials, 

manpower, and equipment; (g) and effects on the local population. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: These elements of the combined arms battalion/task force must be involved in the 

obstacle planning and employment process in order to extract the greatest cost from the enemy. 

Obstacles must be resourced, and integrated with the scheme of maneuver, fire support, and air 

defense. If assigned, the CHEMO is also an important contributor because he plans and 

recommends the use of flame-field expedients to supplement unit defense and existing 

minefields and barriers. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 85); FM 5-103 (Ch. 4); FM 101-5 (pp. 4-

23, 4-24) 

30. Determine requirements and priorities for force protection, to include survivability 

positions for vehicles, weapons, systems, and equipment.

Task Definition: The determination of requirements for force protection includes consideration 

of each asset’s (a) exposure to direct, indirect, and tactical air fire; (b) vulnerability to discovery 

and location; (c) capability to move to avoid detection, or to displace before counterfire arrives; 

(d) armor suitability to cover direct small caliber fire, indirect artillery and mortar fire, and direct 

fire antitank weapons; (e) distance from the forward line of own troops (FLOT) which affects the 

likelihood of acquisition as a target, vulnerability to artillery and air bombardment, and chance of 

direct contact with the enemy; (f) availability of natural cover; (g) any unique equipment item, 

the loss of which would make other equipment worthless; and (h) ability to establish positions

with organic equipment. The enemy's engagement priority, including which forces the threat 

most likely will engage first, should also be considered. Based on a vulnerability analysis of 

systems that need protecting in the tactical situation, the maneuver commander develops the 

priorities for protective activities. Setting survivability priorities is a maneuver commander's 

decision based on the engineer's advice. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ENG 

Rationale: Planning survivability missions requires staff input on the following considerations: 

military intelligence (enemy activity, terrain, weather, and weapon types), operations (tactical 

maneuver, fire support, and engineer support), and administration/logistics. The XO is 

ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing the warfighting plans. 

References: FM 5-103 (Ch. 2) 

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BOS #6 – AIR DEFENSE 

31. Determine air defense support and priorities. 

Task Definition: Air defense priorities are established to ensure effective and continuous support 

of offensive and defensive operations. Determining air defense support involves determining for 

each air defense asset (a) criticality – the degree to which the asset is essential to mission 

accomplishment; (b) vulnerability – the degree to which an asset is susceptible to attack or to 

damage if attacked; (c) recuperability – the degree to which the asset can recover from inflicted 

damage in terms of time, equipment, and available manpower to again perform its mission; and 

(d) threat – the probability of an asset being targeted for attack by enemy air must be assessed if 

economical allocation of air defense officer (ADA) resources is to be achieved. The criticality, 

vulnerability, recuperability, and threat of each asset must be weighed against its total 

contribution to the battle. Priorities for protection may include maneuver elements, fire support, 

engineer elements, C2 nodes, and logistics assets. The air defense plan must support the 

commander’s scheme of maneuver. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO 

Rationale: The ADO works with the S2 to determine air threat, and assists the S3 in planning the 

air defense portion of the operation. Tactical-level air and missile defense is primarily the 

responsibility of ADA, but maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements must 

participate directly. Logistics provides the means for all air and missile defense operations. 

Each participant has a specific role in tactical air and missile defense plans and operations. 

These integrated roles are mutually supporting. The ADO must work closely with the S3 to 

determine air defense asset allocation, positioning, and missions in accordance with the priorities 

established by the commander. In addition, the ADO coordinates with the S3 Air (if assigned), 

FSO, and forward air controller for the appropriate air defense posture and Army airspace C2. 

The XO is ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing the warfighting plans. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 60, 112); FM 3-90.2 (p. 9-50 to 9-51) 

32. Define early warning requirements. 

Task Definition: Early warning of enemy air attack is a passive air defense measure. It is vital if 

the principles of early engagement and defense in depth are to be achieved. Defining early 

warning requirements involves joint consideration of the possible air threat and the capability of 

available air defense assets. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, ADO 

Rationale: The ADO works with the S2 to determine air threat. The ADO evaluates and 

recommends passive measures for incorporation into the maneuver commander's plans and 

SOPs, including early warning systems. He advises the commander and staff on the impact of 

early warning on air defense operations and plans early warning operations within air defense. 

The ALO (at the brigade level or above) or the S3 Air (if assigned) contribute to this task. 

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References: FM 44-100 (Chs. 3 and 6); FM 101-5 (p. 4-22, 4-23) 

33. Determine air defense decision points. 

Task Definition: Decision points (DPs) are events or locations on the battlefield where tactical 

decisions are required during mission execution. They indicate when and where a decision must 

be made to have maximum impact on friendly or enemy COAs. Determination of decision 

points therefore requires selecting from multiple events or locations those events or locations 

where a decision is critical to tactical success. Air DPs are determined in the same manner as for 

ground operations. However, due to the high speeds of air systems, DPs must be placed 

significantly farther in advance of the targeted area of interest (TAI). 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: Tactical-level air and missile defense is primarily the responsibility of ADA, but 

maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements must participate directly. The ADO 

must work closely with the S3 to determine air defense asset allocation, positioning, and 

missions in accordance with the priorities established by the commander. In addition, the ADO 

coordinates with the S3 Air (if assigned) or ALO (at the brigade level and above), FSO, and 

forward air controller for the appropriate air defense posture and Army airspace C2. The XO is 

ultimately responsible for integrating and synchronizing the warfighting plans. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 60); FM 5-0 (p. 3-38); FM 44-100 

(Ch. 6, Appendix A); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-6, 4-22, 4-23) 

34. Determine air defense movements in support of task force operations. 

Task Definition: Tactical-level ADA units must have mobility equal to the mobility of the 

supported force. Movement ensures that tactical-level ADA forces can project their operation 

into any area required by the maneuver force or indicated by the threat. The ability to move also 

signifies that ADA weapons systems are not tied to a static support base. The first priority for 

mobility should be planning moves that support accomplishment of the mission. Tactical 

situations may dictate additional moves to enhance survivability. 

Staff Officers Involved: S3, ADO 

Rationale: The ADO must work closely with the S3 to determine air defense asset allocation, 

positioning, and missions in accordance with the priorities established by the commander. At the 

brigade level, the S4 and FSO may also be involved in determining air defense movements. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 110, 112); FM 3-90.2 (p. 9-48 to 9-51); 

FM 44-100 (Chs. 4 and 6) 

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35. Determine direct and indirect fire systems in an air defense role. 

Task Definition: Combined arms elements can provide vital self-protection from air threats and 

contribute to freedom of maneuver. Although they have a limited capability to engage fixedwing aircraft, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), combined arms elements can 

effectively engage hovering or slow-moving helicopters within their weapon systems' ranges. 

Tank main guns, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), antitank weapons, and other direct-fire systems 

must engage these threat air platforms when possible. Fire support enhances tactical-level air 

and missile defense. Indirect fire weapons can deny enemy helicopters the use of masked, 

standoff positions. Fire support systems can concentrate their fires on enemy landing zones, 

pickup zones, launch sites, command and control, assembly areas, and forward arming and 

refueling point (FARP). Considerations for determining direct and indirect fires systems in an 

air defense role include (a) the nature of the target; (b) the distance of the target; (c) target 

visibility; and (d) the desired effect of fires. 

Staff Officers Involved: S2, S3, FSO, ADO 

Rationale: The task force commander and his ADO integrate the firepower of all available fire 

systems to defeat the enemy air threat. The ADO works with the S2 to determine air threat. The 

ADO assists the S3 in planning and executing the air defense portion of the operation. He 

coordinates with the S3 Air (if assigned), ALO (at the brigade level and above), FSO, and 

forward air controller for the appropriate air defense posture and Army airspace C2. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (p. 60); FM 3-90.2 (pp. 9-49 to 9-50); FM 44-

100 (Ch. 6); FM 101-5 (pp. 4-22, 4-23) 

36. Define air defense fratricide prevention criteria. 

Task Definition: The lack of coordination between friendly forces is one of the major factors 

causing fratricide. Air defense must be continually synchronized with aviation operations to 

preclude fratricide of friendly aviation assets. Risk of fratricide is determined first by identifying 

hazards, then by assessing each hazard to determine the risk of potential loss based on the 

hazard’s probability and the severity. Developing controls that will eliminate or reduce the risk 

of the hazard requires consideration of the reason for the hazard and specifying the who, what, 

when, where, and how for each control. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S3, ADO 

Rationale: The ADO plans and coordinates airspace with the aviation liaison officer, the ALO 

(at the brigade level and above), the S3 Air officer (if assigned), and other airspace users. The 

S3 aids in deconfliction by providing input on the effects of operations for airspace. The XO is 

responsible for integrating fratricide countermeasures into the plan. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 55 to 61, 110); FM 101-5 (p. 4-2, 4-22, 4-

23, Appendix J) 

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BOS #7 – Combat Service Support (CSS) 

37. Determine the adequacy of the area for CSS operations. 

Task Definition: The six essential CSS functions are arm, fuel, fix, move, sustain, and man. 

Determination of the adequacy of the area for CSS operations therefore requires evaluation of the 

area’s capability to support the safe, secure, and rapid transportation and delivery of supplies (CL 

I, II, III, III (B), IV, V, VII, VIII, and IX [see Appendix A]), tools, equipment, and personnel 

between the battalion support area, the task force support area, and task force units. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, ENG 

Rationale: The XO, S1, and S4 are the principal CSS planners. Assurance of safe, secure, and 

rapid transportation and delivery of support requires that CSS planners know (a) the mission, 

task organization, and concept of operations for all subordinate units in the task force; (b) known 

and anticipated branch plans and sequels; (c) known and anticipated enemy situation and 

capabilities. The S3 and S2 assist in determining the adequacy of the area for CSS operations by 

providing the principal CSS planners this information. In addition, the S2 and/or ENG provide 

useful information regarding terrain and weather implications for CSS operations. The HHC (or 

FSC) CDR and the surgeon may also help with this task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 58, 74); FM 3-90.2 (pp. 10-13 to 10-

34) 

38. Determine transportation requirements and priorities. 

Task Definition: The determination of transportation requirements and priorities requires 

consideration of (a) movement of CL IV and V obstacle materials and engineer equipment to 

designated work sites or supply points by the required times; (b) the potential to evacuate enemy 

materiel and personnel; (c) the transportation necessary to support offensive operations with 

aerial re-supply, forward positioning of CL III and CL V, repositioning of other supplies 

forward, and refuel-on-the-move (ROM) operations; (d) the transportation necessary to support 

defensive operations with CL IV and CL V items and engineer equipment for defensive 

preparation, repositioning of CL IV and CL V items and engineer equipment to subsequent 

defensive positions, evacuation of supplies and equipment to planned fallback points, and 

evacuation of medical units with alternate means of transportation; (e) the transportation 

necessary to support anticipated surge requirements; (f) the need to position logistics facilities; 

(g) the impact of extended operations or line of communications (LOCs) on driver/operator rest 

factors; (h) the impact of terrain or extended operations on operators and readiness of 

transportation assets; (i) the need for route improvement; (j) movement distances, routes, and 

required delivery times to work sites/supply points; (k) the type and quantities of materials 

required to be moved; and (l) the availability of special equipment (e.g., heavy equipment and 

transport). 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S3, S4, ENG 

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Rationale: The XO and S4 are the principal CSS planners for materiel. Determination of

transportation requirements and priorities, as described above, requires that CSS planners know 

(a) the mission, task organization, and concept of operations for all subordinate units in the task 

force; (b) known and anticipated branch plans and sequels; (c) the engineer plan and material 

requirements for building obstacles; (d) terrain and weather implications for transportation; and 

(e) the integrated maneuver/fire support plan. The S3 and ENG assist in determining 

transportation requirements and priorities by providing the principal materiel planners this 

information. The battalion/task force maintenance officer is a critical asset in the S4 section 

supporting this task. 

References: ARTEP 63-216-MTP; ARTEP 71-3-MTP; CGSC ST 101-6 (pp. 1-11); 

Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 66 to 72); FM 3-90.2 (pp. 10-26 to 10-34); FM 90-7 

(Appendix C) 

39. Determine medical support requirements. 

Task Definition: Determining medical support requirements involves estimating casualties, 

including task force scouts and other forward reconnaissance elements, and defining medical 

evacuation (MEDEVAC) support. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S1, S4 

Rationale: The XO, S1, and S4 are the principal CSS planners, with the S1 having medical 

planning and casualty management as key staff responsibilities. The surgeon is an asset in the 

S1 section who helps to determine medical support requirements. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 28, 31-34); FM 3-90.2 (p. 10-26, 10-30) 

40. Identify points in the battle when surge requirements are likely to be generated. 

Task Definition: Surge requirements are likely to be generated at such points in the battle as (a) 

seizing an objective at the completion of an attack (e.g., surge to reposition critical supplies for 

consolidation and reorganization or surge in CL III and CL V to support unexpected 

success/pursuit of the enemy); (b) initiation of hasty defense or mission change from offense to 

defense (e.g., surge in CL IV, CL V, and engineer equipment to support defense preparation); 

and (c) attack of prepared defensive position with major obstacles (e.g., potential surge in 

medical personnel, supplies, and facilities to support a mass casualty situation). Identifying these 

or other points of likely surge requirements involves anticipating the implications of friendly and 

enemy actions (expected and unexpected) for personnel and supply requirements. The 

battalion/task force maintenance officer is a critical asset in the S4 section supporting this task. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S4 

Rationale: The XO and S4 are the principal CSS planners for materiel. The S4 section is 

responsible for, among other things, providing ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, and 

transportation services to companies, conducting emergency re-supply, and anticipating supply 

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requirements. Interaction with the S2 provides the intelligence required to forecast losses and 

subsequent re-supply. At higher echelons (DIV, CORPS), the S1 is involved in planning for 

surge requirements for personnel. The battalion/task force maintenance officer is a critical asset 

in the S4 section supporting this task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 65 to 77); FM 3-9.2 (p. 10-26) 

41. Determine tactical restrictions on Combat Service Support operations. 

Task Definition: Tactical restrictions include (a) terrain that cannot be used for logistics 

operations because it is being occupied by a tactical unit; (b) roads which are dedicated to a 

company’s movement to the LD during a specific period and not available for use by logistical 

vehicles; and (c) weather conditions that prevent logistics operations in specific areas due to 

trafficability.

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S3, S4, ENG 

Rationale: The XO and S4 are the principal CSS materiel planners. The S4 section is 

responsible for, among other things, providing ammunition, fuel, food, water, maintenance, and 

transportation services to companies, conducting emergency re-supply, and anticipating supply 

requirements. Determination of the tactical restrictions on CSS operations involves integration 

of the CSS plan with the maneuver plan, a shared responsibility of the CSS planners and the S3. 

The ENG can provide useful information regarding the effects of weather conditions on the 

trafficability of support vehicles. The battalion/task force maintenance officer is a critical asset 

in the S4 section supporting this task. 

References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 65 to 77); FM 3-9.2 (p. 10-26); LLCALL Newsletter No. 88-3 (p. 31) 

 

42. Compare required and available Combat Service Support capability to identify 

shortfalls and ways and means to mitigate the effect of these shortfalls. 

Task Definition: Comparison of required and available CSS capability requires integration of

the CSS plan with the integrated maneuver plan. 

Staff Officers Involved: XO, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

Rationale: The XO, S3, and S4 coordinate closely to ensure that tactical plans are logistically 

supportable. The S4 section is responsible for, among other things, providing ammunition, fuel, 

food, water, maintenance, and transportation services to companies, conducting emergency resupply, and anticipating supply requirements. Every staff member is responsible for identifying 

requirements for additional units, equipment, or support in their areas of interest, though the S1 

becomes more involved in planning personnel requirements at higher echelons (DIV, CORPS). 

The ENG and FSO provide information as to what support and transportation priority they may 

need during the operation. The battalion/task force maintenance officer is a critical asset in the 

S4 section supporting this task. 

B-21
References: Commander’s Battle Staff Handbook (pp. 56, 58, 65 to 77); FM 3-9.2 (p. 10-26); 

FM 101-5 (p. 4-6) 

B-22
Appendix C 

Wargaming Tacit Knowledge Assessment 

Note: Correct answers have been bolded. 

1. According to FM 5-0, wargaming is, in part, a tool to help staffs determine the strengths and 

weaknesses of multiple courses of action (COAs). Then, the multiple COAs are compared and a 

“best” COA selected. Time is often limited, however, and staffs are given only a single COA to 

war game. What is the purpose of wargaming a single COA? 

a. To update staff estimates, based on what is learned in the wargame. 

b. To rehearse the mission, testing assumptions about the enemy and terrain. 

c. To refine the plan and synchronize the battlefield operating systems. 

d. To ensure that the commander’s COA is the best way to accomplish the mission. 

2. The wargaming process is conducted using multiple iterations of an action-reactioncounteraction (ARC) cycle. Why?

a. The iterative ARC cycle involves a logical sequence of action. 

b. The iterative ARC cycle reveals the impact of timing on friendly and enemy action. 

c. The iterative ARC cycle supports wargaming both offensive and defensive battles. 

d. The iterative ARC cycle simulates how the mission will play out if the enemy follows a 

particular (e.g., most probable) COA. 

3. What is the purpose of estimating losses during the wargaming process?

a. To calculate relative combat power during each phase of the operation. 

b. To determine materiel shortages (e.g., breaching assets). 

c. To establish medical supply and transportation requirements. 

d. To visualize how losses will affect the commander’s decision-making.

4. Each of the seven BOSs are considered during the wargaming process. Why?

a. So every staff officer is aware of each other’s responsibilities. 

b. So the integrated contribution of each BOS to the fight can be determined. 

c. So each staff officer can determine what he has to track during the battle. 

d. So the BOSs can be deconflicted. 

C-1
5. What is a key difference between a synchronization matrix and a COA statement/sketch?

a. A synch matrix has more detail. 

b. A synch matrix includes all of the BOSs. 

c. A synch matrix reflects a refined COA. 

d. A synch matrix better illustrates how mission events will happen over time. 

C-2
D-1

Appendix D 

Team-Related Motivation Survey 

Item Motivation Aspecta

Staff positions provide experiences that are important for developing 

command skills. 

Utility of Performance 

Good performance in a staff position is required for promotion to 

command. 

Utility of Performance 

Great staff members don’t make history; Great commanders do. Utility of Performance 

Superior staff performance is a source of pride for individual staff 

members. 

Utility of Performance 

Good commanders don’t need a staff to aid in planning; They can 

already visualize the battlefield and act decisively. 

Utility of Performance 

Staff performance is not a major factor in determining battle 

outcomes. 

Utility of Performance 

Technical knowledge (including doctrine and digital skills) is critical 

for superior staff performance. 

Utility of Performance 

Improved technical knowledge is worth the effort involved in 

acquiring it. 

Perceived EffortPerformance Relation 

Team cohesion is a critical characteristic of superior staffs. Utility of Performance 

Improved team cohesion is worth the effort involved in developing it. Perceived EffortPerformance Relation 

There is higher payoff for investing effort to acquiring technical 

knowledge than for investing effort in developing team cohesion. 

Perceived EffortPerformance Relation 

Staff performance can only be so good; External factors (e.g., rapid 

staff turnover) exert a strong limiting influence. 

Utility of Effort 

a

Motivation aspect was not shown in the survey administered to research participants, but is 

shown here for reader reference. Rating scale was Definitely True, Largely True, Depends, 

Largely False, Definitely False. 
Appendix E 

Team Communication Checklist 

E-1
E-2
E-3
E-4
Co-located Wargaming, 1-22 Cavalry Scenario 

E-5
E-6
E-7
E-8
Appendix F 

Think Like a Commander (TLAC) Checklist 

F-1
F-2
F-3
F-4
F-5
F-6
F-7
F-8
F-9
F-10
F-11
F-12
F-13
F-14
F-15
F-16
F-17
F-18
F-19
Appendix G 

Situation Awareness Exercise

SA Level Question Answer 

1 What is the center of mass for NAI3? 719946 

2 

If the enemy strongpoint is located forward on 

high ground at NAI3, what would this reveal 

about the enemy intends to do?

Protect that key piece of terrain 

or die trying 

3 

What should TF 1-93 do if the eastern enemy 

strongpoint is located forward on high ground?

Establish two teams in SBF 

position to engage the 

strongpoint while directing fires 

into the western mechanized 

infantry company (MIC) 

1 What is the center of mass for NAI4? 702956 

2 

If there are any dismounted infantry forces 

forward in sector, spotted at NAI4, what would 

this reveal about what the enemy intends to do?

The enemy intends to fight the 

combat security outpost (CSOP) 

forward in sector, and to use the 

mechanized forces of the eastern 

MIC as reinforcements 

3 

What should TF 1-93 decide to do if this 

happens, and where should this decision be 

made (i.e., DP center of mass)?

Fix eastern MIC with lead TM 

and maneuver remaining teams 

toward the western end of the 

objective (DP center of mass = 

696893) 

1 

At what location (i.e., center of mass) should the 

disposition of the AT battery be observed?

New NAI, center of mass = 

694974 

2 

If the enemy begins displacing an AT platoon at 

this location, what would this reveal about what 

he intends to do?

Commit a counterattack; expect 

considerable flanking force 

activity from the North West 

(NW)

3 

What should TF 1-93 decide to do if this 

happens, and where should this decision be 

made (i.e., DP center of mass)?

Fix AT platoon with indirect 

fires; destroy with CAS (DP 

center of mass = 694961) 

1 At what location (i.e., center of mass) should the 

commitment of the eastern MIC be watched for?

New NAI, center of mass = 

725923 

2 

If the enemy holds mechanized forces from the 

eastern MIC in reserve and maneuvers around 

the eastern flank, what would this reveal about 

his intentions?

He is likely trying to assail a 

flank and run you against another 

stationary force to your west 

3 

What should TF 1-93 decide to do if this 

happens, and where should this decision be 

made (i.e., DP center of mass)?

Use one company team in SBF 

to respond (branch plan A) (DP 

center of mass = 716935) 

G-1
G-2

1 

At what location (i.e., center of mass) or 

locations should the commitment of the enemy 

reserve be watched for? 

New NAI, center of mass = 

666943 or 726978 or previous 

new NAI, center of mass = 

694974 

2 

If the enemy commits a reserve to the TF 1-93 

sector, what would this reveal about his 

intentions? 

He cannot fail in this sector (this 

is the last line of his organic 

forces/defense in depth) 

3 

What should TF 1-93 do if this happens, and 

where should this decision be made (i.e., DP 

center of mass)? 

Use assault force on PITBULL 

to fix the reserve; maneuver SBF 

teams to destroy it (DP center of 

mass = 710981) 
Appendix H 

Integrated Overlay Exercise Items and Rationale 

H-1
H-2
H-3
H-4
H-5
H-6
H-7
H-8
Appendix I 

Demographic Survey 

General Information (please fill out the table below by typing your response in the right-hand column) 

Question Answer

1. Age: 

2. Staff Position in AC3DL (e.g., XO): 

3. Basic Branch (e.g., AR, IN, FA, etc.): 

4. List Other Basic Branch Experience: 

 (indicate months of experience in each branch) 

5. Current Rank: 

6. Current Duty Position: 

7. Months in Current Duty Position: 

8. Years of Regular Army Experience: 

9. Highest Enlisted Rank Achieved: 

 (type “N/A” if question is not applicable to you)

Prior Company Command (please fill out the table below, where applicable; select Yes or No by italicizing it): 

COMPANY NAME Months as Commander 

CTC Rotation?

10a. Yes No 

10b. Yes No 

10c. Yes No 

Prior Staff Experience (please fill out table below, where applicable; select Yes or No by italicizing it): 

 Staff Position (e.g., Company XO) Months in Position CTC Rotation? Deployed?

11a. Yes No Yes No 

11b. Yes No Yes No 

11c. Yes No Yes No 

11d. Yes No Yes No 

 

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE 

I-1
If you have NOT had prior staff experience, please skip to Question 17. If you listed prior 

staff positions in the table above, please go on to Question 12.

12. While serving in the above-listed staff positions, did you participate in a COA Analysis (i.e., 

war game)? (please italicize your answer)

 Yes No 

13. Where have you conducted COA Analysis? [you may choose more than one - please italicize your 

selection(s)]

Home-Station TX CTC Rotation Deployment 

14. Have you used computer simulation to conduct COA Analysis? (please italicize your selection)

 Yes No 

15. Have you used digital displays during COA Analysis? (please italicize your selection)

 Yes No 

16. Have you participated in COA Analysis as part of an Abbreviated MDMP Process? 

Yes No (please italicize your selection)

17. Other Military Courses Taken (please italicize your selections): 

Air Borne/Air Assault 

Ranger/Special Forces 

BMOC/Other CSS 

SPLC 

TC3/NBC Defense/Other (please list “Other” Courses below) 

18. Have you had experience working with anyone else in the AC3DL course prior to taking the 

course?

Yes No (please italicize your selection)

GO ON TO THE NEXT PAGE

I-2
Appendix J 

General Design Guidelines for Scenario-Specific Assessments 

The wargaming process and outcome assessments developed in the present research are 

widely applicable, but their particular instantiation is scenario-specific, and must be so if the goal 

is to assess situated task performance (as opposed to abstract, general constructs, such as general 

intelligence or working memory). For this reason, general guidelines for designing wargaming 

process and outcome assessments for specific scenarios are outlined below. Assessments 

analogous to those used in the present research can, with some effort, be developed to assess the 

same elements of the wargaming framework (e.g., battlefield visualization) using different 

scenarios. 

General Guidelines

The development of scenario-specific assessments of wargaming effectiveness requires 

the joint participation of an assessment/measurement subject matter expert and one or more 

Army subject matter experts. The assessment/measurement expert must be capable of 

conceptualizing assessment tools that do not fit well with traditional psychometric models and 

able to communicate arcane assessment criteria to a non-expert. The Army expert(s) must have 

relatively recent Army experience and be current with new doctrine and relevant organizational 

changes in the Army. He (she) must also be capable of articulating the observable behaviors 

associated with effective/ineffective performance. A current Army professional is not ideal for 

assessment development due to the time demands involved, but recently retired Army officers 

are a great resource and often willing to help. Contractors working as Army instructors are also 

a very helpful resource as they have extensive experience with observing, thinking about, and 

evaluating performance. 

Developing an Integrated Plan/Overlay Exercise 

Assessing the degree of integration and synchronization in the mission plan refined by 

wargaming requires determining (a) the graphics must be present in the plan overlay in order to 

demonstrate that integration across BOSs has been accomplished and (b) the rationale criteria 

that should be used to position these graphics. 

Determining the graphics that must be present in the integrated overlay involves, 

essentially, mentally (or literally, if there is access to enough experts) wargaming the scenario for 

all aspects of the mission, including combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) 

battlefield operating systems (BOS). For assessing the staff integration of combined arms units, 

special attention must be paid to CS and CSS, such as obstacles, supply routes, decontamination 

points, etc., which tend to get left out of wargaming and are developed in a stove-piped manner 

to produce the task force operations order. Additional important graphics to consider include 

command posts, key terrain, and target reference points. Non-maneuver officers can be 

especially helpful in determining these critical graphics because they have considerable 

experience with CS or CSS aspects of operations 

J-1
Determining the rationale criteria used to position the graphics must come from

consultation with doctrine and Army experts. To a noteworthy degree, these criteria can be 

transferred across scenarios, provided the critical graphics present in the overlays are the same. 

Materials Required: 

1) Detailed brigade operations order 

2) Commander's planning guidance and intent 

3) Task force course-of-action statement and sketch 

4) Map of area 

5) Doctrinal materials (e.g., FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-90, Tactics) 

Developing a Situation Awareness Exercise 

Assessing battlefield visualization/situation awareness using a modified decision support 

matrix (DSM) requires determining ahead of time (again, either by mental or actual wargaming 

of the scenario) the number and map position of the critical (a) named areas of interest (NAI), (b) 

target areas of interest (TAI), (c) and decision points (DP) that should be included in the matrix, 

as well as (d) the indicators of enemy decisions, and (e) the friendly actions that must be taken if 

particular enemy decisions are made. (Included below is a blank representation of an example 

modified DSM that can be used as a template.) Maneuver officers are especially helpful making 

these determinations, as they have considerable experience developing maneuver schemes. 

Note, however, that a sampling of multiple experts, especially if they come from different 

branches, may produce a different selection of elements to include in the DSM. Justifiable 

decisions must be made as to what should serve as a “correct” answer in each cell of the matrix. 

Materials Required: 

 1) Situation Template 

2) Task force course-of-action statement and sketch 

3) Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay 

4) Map of area 

5) Doctrinal materials (e.g., FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-90, Tactics) 

Enemy 

Indicators 

NAI 

(Center of Mass) 

TAI 

(Center of Mass) 

DP 

(Center of Mass) Friendly Action 

Developing a Think Like a Commander (TLAC) Checklist 

Assessing adaptivity of team thought by evaluating examinee responses to TLAC probe 

questions requires creating the probe questions and determining effective and ineffective 

responses to these questions, to be used as anchors for an observer rating scale. 

J-2
The basis of the probe questions is the eight TLAC themes (listed below). The kind of thinking 

that questions based on each theme required is also listed below. The listing of these 

requirements provides guidance for how the scenario-specific probe questions should be 

designed via a combined effort of Army and assessment/measurement experts. 

Creating probe questions at an adequate difficulty level can be tricky. They should be 

difficult enough to challenge the examinee to think beyond what can be regurgitated from the 

brigade operations order, but not so difficult that they require significant time to generate a 

response. Examinees should be able to demonstrate flexibility of thought without getting bogged 

down in the weeds, otherwise the process will take too long. 

Determining effective and ineffective responses to the probe questions requires 

consultation with doctrine and subject matter experts. A combination of maneuver and nonmaneuver experts is the best arrangement, if possible. 

Materials Required: 

1) Detailed brigade operations order 

2) Task force course-of-action statement and sketch 

3) The eight TLAC themes (these themes and the nature of the questions associated with 

each are listed below) 

 4) Situation Template 

5) Map of area 

6) Doctrinal materials (e.g., FM 3-0, Operations; FM 3-90, Tactics) 

The Eight TLAC Themes and the Nature of their Probe Questions 

Keep a Focus on the Mission and Higher’s Intent 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to apply their understanding of 

mission and intent to address a change in events 

Model a Thinking Enemy 

 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to (a) apply their knowledge of 

the enemy to consider branches to the COA or alternative COAs; (b) describe how they would 

commit forces if they were the defending enemy (rather than attacking force); or (c) describe

how they would handle enemy deployment of NBC weapons. 

Consider Effects of Terrain 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to (a) apply their knowledge of 

the terrain to consider alternative actions to accomplish the mission if terrain changes (e.g., a 

new obstacle is discovered, concealment is destroyed by enemy countermobility, key pass is 

blocked, civilian demonstration takes place); (b) consider rates of movement for various types of

J-3
terrain under differing environmental conditions; and (c) apply their knowledge of terrain to 

justify maneuver COAs on the basis of terrain available to them/to the defender. 

Use All Assets Available 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to (a) apply their knowledge of 

the range of assets available to address a change in their expected level of resources; and (b) 

demonstrate general knowledge of the capabilities or functions/assets from other BOS’s, such as 

CS and CSS, so that these assets can be appropriately positioned/effects maximized. 

Consider Timing 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to apply their sense of timing to 

synchronize likely battlefield events (e.g., overlapping casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) with 

fires, how long to take care of CASEVAC before fires can be issued, passage of lines for a 

maneuver battalion through limited passage lanes) 

See the Big Picture 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to (a) apply their knowledge of 

the entire Bde mission to recognize what implications the success (or failure) of other TF units 

has for their own TF mission and vice versa; and (b) respond to the destruction of their own 

mobility reserve. 

Visualize the Battlefield

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to (a) describe the impacts of 

terrain (or the enemy) on friendly mobility/maneuver; (b) describe fields of fire for friendly or 

enemy weapons systems; (c) identify where secondary positions or alternate locations exist for 

someone defending in depth. NOTE – This list is not in any way exhaustive. Probe questions 

for the above 6 TLAC themes, and the below theme “Consider Contingencies and Remain 

Flexible” can all fall under the rubric of “Visualize the Battlefield.” 

 

Consider Contingencies and Remain Flexible 

Probe questions under this theme challenge the students to (a) respond effectively to 

unexpected events; (b) consider NAI/TAIs to flexibly assess and respond to where the enemy 

might go/what the enemy might do; and (c) consider seams/flanks in the formation as possible 

vulnerabilities. 

Developing a Team Communication Checklist 

Assessing team communication by evaluating staff information sharing during 

wargaming requires determining (a) which wargaming tasks to target for observation; (b) which 

staff officers should be sharing information during those tasks; and (c) what information must be 

shared in order for the task to be completed effectively. 

J-4
Determining the team communication target tasks can be tricky. Although a 

comprehensive list of tasks to be completed during brigade-level wargaming has been developed 

(Mullen et al., 1997), staffs often do not complete many of these tasks during wargaming (if, in 

operational environments, they war game at all). That said, this list, modified for task-forcelevel planning, can serve as the basis for selecting the team communication target tasks. A 

subset of this list of 42 wargaming tasks can make useful points of observation (routine-event 

targets) for staff information sharing. Wargaming tasks of special interest are those identified as 

needing emphasis in the Center of Army Lessons Learned analyses of trends in Combat Training 

Center command and control team performance (e.g., integrate fire support with maneuver and 

priorities). In addition, tasks that have some likelihood of being completed during the war game

should also be selected. For example, some of the 42 wargaming tasks are best used for 

defensive operations (e.g., determine ways and means to separate attacking enemy echelons) and 

so should not be used when the staff is wargaming an offensive operation. Determining the 

likelihood that a task will be attempted during wargaming can be aided by comparing the 

synchronization matrices of previous wargame s using the same scenario, if available, to the 

brigade operations order (additional elements in the synch matrix were tasks completed during 

wargaming), or by observing the tasks accomplished in other war games, or consulting with 

subject matter experts. Note that doctrine is not helpful in determining the likelihood that a task 

will be attempted. This is because doctrine represents what should ideally be done, rather than 

what is actually done. 

Determining the staff officers who should share information for each wargaming task is 

made easy by the research conducted in the present research. The necessary staff officers for 

each task are listed below, along with the 42 task-force-level wargaming tasks themselves. Note 

that this list focuses on core staff officers, as is therefore not exhaustive. It also may require 

some modification for different kinds of units. This list is, however, doctrine based and 

verifiable. 

Determining the information shared for each task involves exploration of doctrine and 

consultation with subject matter experts. A combination of maneuver and non-maneuver experts 

is the best arrangement, if possible. The information shared is somewhat portable across 

scenarios, provided the wargaming tasks identified for each scenario are the same. 

Materials Required: 

1) Detailed brigade operations order 

2) Task force course-of-action statement and sketch 

3) List of the 42 wargaming tasks to be accomplished at the task force level (included

below) 

4) Map of area 

5) Modified Table of Organization & Equipment or a SMARTBOOK reference of critical 

BOS systems and their capabilities 

6) Recent Center of Army Lessons Learned trends analyses 

J-5
The 42 Wargaming Tasks to be Accomplished at the Task Force Level (see Mullen et al., 1997)

1. Clearly identify the commander’s intent and vision of the battle. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

2. Determine the command and control requirements for minimizing the effect of destruction of 

friendly CPs. 

XO, S3, SIGO 

3. Determine or refine the CCIR. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

4. Determine critical events and decision points. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

5. Determine command post locations and composition to support current and planned tactical 

operations. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, ENG 

6. Assess the potential effect of battle intensity on Soldier and leader will to fight. 

 XO, S1 

7. Determine HPTs. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

8. Determine optimal times and locations to maximize enemy casualties and force destruction. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

9. Determine ways and means to separate attacking enemy echelons. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

10. Determine ways and means to force enemy elements into areas where the commander wants 

them. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

11. Identify expected enemy air or helicopter threats. 

 S2, ADO 

12. Determine optimal employment of intelligence collection assets. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

13. Define branches and sequels to the maneuver scheme. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

14. Identify triggers for the initiation of direct and indirect fires. 

S2, S3, S4, FSO, SIGO, ENG 

15. Determine route prioritization for movement. 

S2, S3, S4, ADO, ENG 

16. Define task organization requirements. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

17. Define force protection criteria. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

18. Determine effect of limited visibility on combat, CS, and CSS operations. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

19. Integrate fire support with maneuver and priorities. 

S3, S4, FSO 

20. Update HPTL. 

XO, S2, S3, FSO, ADO, ENG 

J-6
21. Synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires to support task force ISR operations. 

S2, S3, S4, FSO 

22. Synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires to support task force offensive operations. 

S3, S4, FSO 

23. Develop an observation plan that assigns (a) responsibilities to target acquisition systems; 

and (b) observers for the employment of indirect fires against designated targets and 

determination of damage assessments. 

S2, S3, SIGO, FSO 

24. Verify sensor taskings to provide targetable intelligence in a timely manner for HPTs. 

S2, S3, FSO 

25. Assess potential enemy actions against the task force’s efforts to bypass or overcome 

obstacles. 

S2, S3, FSO, ENG 

26. Define reconnaissance requirements to identify points of penetration into enemy obstacles 

and river crossing sites. 

S2, S3, S4, FSO, ENG 

27. Integrate engineers into maneuver formations to maintain momentum, with the bulk of 

mobility assets with the breach force.

S3, S4, FSO, ENG 

28. Determine FASCAM employment. 

S2, S3, FSO, ENG 

29. Define emplacement criteria for obstacles and mines to protect the task force flanks and 

block enemy counterattacks. 

S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO, ENG 

30. Determine requirements and priorities for force protection, to include survivability positions

for vehicles, weapons, systems, and equipment. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ENG 

31. Determine air defense support and priorities. 

XO, S2, S3, S4, FSO, ADO 

32. Define early warning requirements. 

S2, S3, ADO 

33. Determine air defense decision points. 

XO, S2, S3, FSO, ADO, ENG 

34. Determine air defense movements in support of task force operations. 

 S3, ADO 

35. Determine direct and indirect fire systems in an air defense role. 

S2, S3, FSO, ADO 

36. Define air defense fratricide prevention criteria. 

XO, S3, ADO 

37. Determine the adequacy of the area for CSS operations. 

XO, S1, S2, S3, S4, ENG 

38. Determine transportation requirements and priorities. 

XO, S3, S4, ENG 

39. Determine medical support requirements. 

XO, S1, S4 

40. Identify points in the battle when surge requirements are likely to be generated. 

J-7
XO, S2, S4 

41. Determine tactical restrictions on CSS operations. 

XO, S3, S4, ENG 

42. Compare required and available CSS capability to identify shortfalls and ways and means to 

mitigate the effect of these shortfalls.

XO, S2, S3, S4, SIGO, FSO, ADO, ENG 

J-8