JIHADI GROUPS, NUCLEAR PAKISTAN,

AND THE NEW GREAT GAME

M. Ehsan Ahrari

August 2001
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ISBN 1-58487-060-5

ii
FOREWORD

Few nations are more central to the security of their region

yet more fraught with danger than Pakistan. It is a country

with deep internal schisms and with nuclear weapons,

attempting to simultaneously rebuild democracy and fend off

regional instability and avowed enemies. Of all the world’s

nuclear powers, Pakistan is the one most susceptible to some

form of armed conflict or internal disintegration.

For the United States and other nations concerned with

security in South and Central Asia, one of the most ominous

trends has been the growing influence of Jihadist groups in

Pakistan which feel obligated to wage “holy war” against

everything that they perceive as “non-Islamic.” Their objective

would be a Pakistani government similar to the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan. The danger this would pose to regional

stability and U.S. interests is clear.

In this monograph, Dr. Ehsan Ahrari, of the Armed Forces

Staff College, assesses Jihadi groups from the framework of a

new “Great Game” for influence in Central Asia involving an

array of states. He argues that, if this competition leads to

increased violence, outside states including the United States

could be drawn in. On the other hand, if the region stabilizes, it

could provide solid economic and political partners for the

United States. A well-designed American strategy, Ahrari

contends, might help avoid crises or catastrophe.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

study to further American understanding of Central and

South Asian security and provide a framework for an effective

U.S. strategy there.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

M. EHSAN AHRARI has been Professor of National

Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined

Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College in

Norfolk, Virginia, since 1994. He also served as Associate

Dean of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School from

1995-96. From 1990-94 he was Professor of Middle East and

Southwest Asian Studies at the U.S. Air War College at

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Prior to joining the

Department of Defense, Dr. Ahrari taught at universities in

Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, and Illinois. He

also served as Visiting Presidential Scholar at New York

University during the summer of 1979, Visiting Scholar at

University of California-Berkeley during the summer of

1984, and Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution during

the summer of 1992. Dr. Ahrari’s areas of specialization

include U.S. foreign and defense policy issues related to the

Middle East and Central Asia, nuclear proliferation in

Southern Asia, and information-based warfare, with a

special focus on the Peoples’ Republic of China. He is the

author of eight books and dozens of articles in professional

journals in the United States, United Kingdom, Norway,

and, India. Dr. Ahrari has also lectured, in addition to in the

United States, in a number of European, Asian and Middle

Eastern countries, and at the NATO headquarters in Mons,

Belgium. 

iv
JIHADI GROUPS, NUCLEAR PAKISTAN,

AND THE NEW GREAT GAME

The United States and the Western world have been

watching a number of developments involving Pakistan

over the past few years with considerable concern. These

include the emergence of Pakistan as a declared nuclear

power in 1998; Pakistan’s role in the continuing civil war in

Afghanistan that has enabled the Taliban (students of

religious schools) group to emerge as dominant ruler of that

country since 1996; and the growing power of a militant

Islamic group, the Jihadi, or Jihadist groups in Pakistan.

That term is used in this study to describe all Islamist

groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in Central

Asia that have been single-mindedly emphasizing the

primacy of jihad. 

Even though the term jihad literally means “struggle,”

various Islamic groups have been interpreting it to mean

“holy war” against everything that they perceive as

“non-Islamic.” It is well nigh impossible to spell out the

political agenda of these groups in its entirety. A systematic

study of their literature and activities indicates that these

entities are primarily motivated to establish Islamist

government in Pakistan and in other Central Asian

countries. Such a government may not be a carbon copy of

what currently exists in Afghanistan, but it will be quite

similar to that.

These groups initially did not have such an ambitious

political agenda. But the increasing dependence of the

Pakistani government on using the Jihadist groups in its

ongoing conflict with India over Kashmir, the growing

political power of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the

continued depressed economic conditions in Central Asian

countries seem to have created an environment of

increasing autocratic rule, whereby the Jihadist parties in

Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in at least three other

1
Central Asian countries—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and

Kyrgyzstan—are increasingly ambitious to transform the

shape of governments.

In this monograph, I examine the growing political clout

of the Jihadi groups in Pakistan and their increasingly

powerful alliance with the Taliban of Afghanistan. I argue

that this alliance is emerging as a catalytic force in its

attempt to bring about political change in such countries as

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and even in the

Xinjiang province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Of course, the Islamist parties of these Central Asian

countries are the vanguard for such a change. However,

they are reported to be receiving ample theological

education, as well as moral and material support, from the

Jihadi forces of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In the 19th century, the competition between Britain

and Russia for influence in Central Asia was called the

“great game.” Today, a new “great game” is underway.

1

 The

thesis of this monograph is that a number of regional

actors—such as Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, as well as

the aforementioned Central Asian states—and great

powers—like the United States, Russia, and China—will be

focused on the Jihadi groups as an integral part of their

respective strategic maneuvers in the new great game that

is being played in the area. The Jihadist groups are not only

bent on affecting the future dynamics of political stability of

West and Central Asia, but, in the process, they are equally

poised to harm the strategic interests of a number of

regional and great powers. Thus, the nature of this struggle

between the pro- and anti-status quo forces appears

foreboding not only for nuclear Pakistan but also for Central

Asia. If this disintegration continues, the result could be

crisis, violence, or, given the possession of nuclear arms by

India and Pakistan, unprecedented catastrophe. Any

escalation of conflict in this region is likely to involve other

regional states and the United States as well. On the other

hand, if the region stabilizes, it could provide solid economic

2
and political partners for the United States. The stakes of

this new “great game” are high indeed.

The Jihadi Phenomenon: Linkages

between the Past and the Future.

The Jihadi phenomenon in Pakistan—by which I mean

the emergence of Islamist groups that emphasize the

primacy of jihad in the very strict meaning of holy war to

bring about political and social changes both within and

outside Pakistan—was formalized during the dictatorship

of General Zia ul-Haq in the late 1970s and 1980s. I

emphasize the phrase “formalized” because the notion of

jihad is as old as Islam itself. All Muslims know the general

meaning of the term. In Pakistan, those who follow the

writings of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder of the

Jamat-e-Islami (Islamic party) of India, and then Pakistan,

are only too familiar with the emphasis he placed on the

necessity of carrying out jihad.

2

 Maududi was a highly

prolific writer, and his writing on Islamic theology is still

regarded as a standard reference all over the Muslim world.

But Maududi himself spent a lot of time practicing

conventional politics.

Prior to Zia’s military coup of 1977, Islamist parties of

Pakistan had to compete for attention and loyalty from the

population at large, along with other political parties. Even

though the raison d’etre of Pakistan was to provide a

homeland for Muslims of pre-partitioned India, secular

parties had a large following in that country until Zia’s

ouster of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. (He

was hanged on April 4, 1979.) After that, his Islamization

policies served as a source of unprecedented resuscitation of

Islamist parties, which saw little reason to practice the

politics of accommodation or compromise.

The credit for the ascendancy of the Jihadi phenomenon

does not belong solely to General Zia, however. One has to

recall that the Islamic revolution in Iran took place in

1978-79. That was the first successful attempt in modern

3
history to establish Islamic government in a major Middle

Eastern country through a revolutionary change. The new

government in Iran also provided an unprecedented

impetus for Islamist parties all over the Muslim world to

challenge existing governments in a number of countries of

the Middle East and North Africa.

Another major reason for the ascendancy of the Jihadi

phenomenon in Pakistan was the Soviet Union’s military

invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. The United

States entered the foray soon thereafter as an integral

aspect of the global application of the “Reagan doctrine,”

whereby the administration of President Ronald Reagan

was to defeat the Soviet-supported regimes in Asia, Africa,

and Latin America by injecting massive military assistance

and training for indigenous freedom fighters.

3

 The

government of General Zia envisioned that war and its

related American interest, presence, and military

assistance as a golden opportunity to achieve strategic

parity with India in conventional military arms, and also to

enhance Pakistan’s clout among Muslim countries. He was

equally determined to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the

influence of the Soviet Union and India from his immediate

neighborhood. And one way of materializing that objective

was to ensure that a friendly—even a puppet—regime in

Kabul was established. In a moment of candor, he

reportedly told journalist Selig Harrison:

We have earned the right to have a very friendly government in

Kabul. We won’t permit it to be like it was before, with Indian

and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be

a real Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival, that will one

day win over the Muslims in the Soviet Union, you will see.

4

The establishment of a friendly government in

Afghanistan, as the Pakistani ruling circles perceived it,

had several payoffs. First, at least in principle, such a

government enhanced the prospects of strategic depth for

Pakistan in a war with India. While considering this point,

it should be kept in mind that, given the absence of military

4
infrastructures in Afghanistan such as sophisticated army

and air force bases, Pakistan would have had to spend large

capital of its own. However, given the explosive nature of

Afghan politics, no Pakistani government would plunge into

massive investment of funds to develop military

infrastructures—funds that it would have to acquire from

friendly oil states of the Persian Gulf—unless it became

very certain about the long-term political stability of a

friendly regime in Afghanistan. Until then, having a

friendly government in Afghanistan still carried other

payoffs for Islamabad.

Second, the proximity of Afghanistan to other Central

Asian states makes the former a promising territory for

locating oil and gas pipelines from the latter countries.

Pakistan has been too cognizant of the promise of economic

bonanza that such plans hold. Third, as these Muslim states

of Central Asia enhance their own orientation and

knowledge of Islam, Pakistan may continue to serve as a

chief conduit of Saudi activities aimed at promoting Sunni

Islam. On this point, the role of Pakistani madrassas (plural

of madrassa or religious schools) became enormously

significant in the 1990s.

Even though Pakistani religious schools have a long

history of educating the Afghans, schools in the

northwestern province of Pakistan became very important

institutions in the formal religious orientation of the

Taliban. When the Taliban emerged as a dominant

politico-religious force in Afghanistan, the Jihadi aspect of

their education received in Pakistan not only became an

important factor in shaping their struggle in their own

homeland, but also was an important motivating force in

the Taliban’s cooperation with the Islamist groups of

Central Asia. The madrassas of the Jamiat-ul-Ulamae-Islam (JUI) of Pakistan underscored their special brand of

Islamic orthodoxy that is very similar to the salafiyya

tradition of Saudi Arabia.

5

 Another important Islamist

party was the previously mentioned Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI).

That party’s insistence on Islamic orthodoxy is more

5
long-standing than that of the JUI. But in politicizing the

Taliban, schools of the former Islamist party were very

crucial.

One can only guess how far General Zia would have gone

in his pursuit of Islamization of Pakistan, or whether he

would have been able to control Islamist parties had he lived

when the Soviet Union was ousted from Afghanistan. What

is important to note is that the Islamization of Pakistan

could not be stopped after his death in 1988. Pakistan’s

Army, as the real power behind the throne throughout the

façade of civilian rule in the 1990s, did not really want to

challenge the radical Islamist parties that were so

assiduously serving its political objectives in Afghanistan

and in Kashmir. However, since the radical Islamist

parties—such as the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) or

Lashkar-e-Tayba (LT)—played such a prominent role in the

Kargil skirmishes of 1999, the political clout of such parties

seems to know no bounds.

The process of Islamization of Pakistan experienced an

unprecedented boost as a result of the victory of the Taliban

in the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan in 1996. Now the

Jihadist forces of Pakistan found three frontiers to express

themselves. The first frontier is the domestic politics of

Pakistan itself, where they are increasing their attempts to

Islamize the country. The Jihadist groups appear resentful

of the fact that, unlike the Shiite clerics who successfully led

the Islamic revolution and established an Islamic republic

in Iran, they have not been able to do the same in Pakistan.

These groups have neither studied the Islamic revolution

next door in any systematic manner, nor are they informed

of the types of domestic and international challenges that

Iran has faced over the past 2 decades. It seems that for

these groups, establishing a purist Islamic theocracy in

Pakistan is an end in itself.

One of the main reasons underlying the growing

politico-religious influence of the Islamist/Jihadist groups

in Pakistan is the deterioration of the government6
sponsored modern educational system. In its place, children

of lower middle and lower class families are attending the

mushrooming religious schools that are providing free

education. Graduates of these Islamic schools, though

ignorant of the tools of modern education that would enable

them to participate in building a modern Pakistan, are

prime candidates to take up Kalashnikov rifles and become

mujahideen (religious fighters).

On the second frontier, the Jihadist groups have already

been heavily involved in the Kashmir conflict with India,

with active support and approval of the Pakistani

government. Given that Pakistan has decided to keep the

conflict on the front burner even after 1998—when both it

and India became declared nuclear powers—that decision

keeps the subcontinent on the precipice of a major war, in

which one cannot rule out the exchange of nuclear weapons.

On the third frontier, the Jihadis are busy supplying

theological education, military equipment, and training to

Islamist forces from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,

and even in the Xinjiang province of the PRC, thereby

attempting to facilitate their respective endeavors to

change the existing political order.

6

 On the first two

frontiers the Jihadist groups perceive themselves to be in

direct conflict with the United States, but on the third

frontier the scope of their confrontation also includes Russia

and China.

The United States as a Focal Point of Jihadi Wrath.

In its zeal to defeat the Soviet Union, the Reagan

Administration paid scant-to-no attention to the strategic

implications of using the Islamist regime of General Zia as a

conduit for military assistance to the Afghan mujahideen,

who were themselves driven by their religious fervor to oust

Godless communists from their Islamic homeland. It is a

well-established fact that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

functionaries trained the Afghan mujahideen to defeat

communism in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but from the

7
1990s and on, the very phrase “Afghan mujahid” (or its

alternate, “Arab Afghan”) became a generic description for

the perpetrators of transnational terrorism in which the

concept of jihad was the chief motivating force, and its

targets were U.S. military personnel and assets. What went

wrong?

The fact that the radical Islamists later turned against

the United States was not a surprise. The Islamic revolution

in Iran was taking place when the Reagan Administration

and the Zia regime were involved in using the Islamists in

defeating the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The highly

contentious rhetoric of Islamic Iran, condemning the United

States as the “great Satan,” was regularly being published

during the Afghan war. As a long-time strong supporter of

Israel in the Middle East, the United States had already

created for itself considerable resentment in the political

milieu of the Islamic and Arab world. Moreover, because it is

a worldwide promoter of secularism and Western liberal

democracy, the United States is perceived by Islamist

groups of all coloration as a force that will always promote a

political agenda that remains at stark variance with their

own.

Even the Gulf War of 1991—when the United States was

defending a weak Arab state (Kuwait) against the military

occupation of a strong Arab state (Iraq)—turned out to be an

event that created quite a bit of resentment toward

Washington. The United States took a major risk by

deciding to throw Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. There was no

guarantee that the war would turn out the way it did, with a

minimum number of American casualties. Even then the

United States did not become a popular entity in the Arab

and Islamic world.

To understand why the United States did not emerge as

a popular actor from the Gulf War of 1991, one has to recall

how divisive it really was from the very beginning, when

viewed from within the Middle East. It divided the Arabs

into two camps. Undoubtedly, a majority of Arab

8
governments supported the U.S. aim of unraveling Saddam

Hussein’s military occupation of Kuwait, and joined the

international coalition brilliantly put together by President

George H. W. Bush. However, a minority of Arab governments sided with Saddam, especially when he, as a shrewd

tactic, dragged the Arab-Israeli conflict into his fight with

the United States over Kuwait.

Then during the war, Saddam temporarily adopted the

radical Islamist rhetoric of the Khomeini era to condemn

U.S. military actions against his country. Within the radical

Arab and Islamic circles, that war was envisioned as a battle

between pan-Arabist or Muslim Iraq and a coalition of

“Western imperialists and their Arab and Muslim lackeys.”

Thus, the pan-Arabists (most notably, Yemen, even though

another foremost pan-Arabist nation, Syria, participated in

the anti-Saddam Arab coalition) as well as the Islamists

criticized the United States. But the opposition of radical

Islamist groups to the United States did not solidify until

much later, when the Bush administration decided to

station American forces in Saudi Arabia.

The foremost source of anti-Americanism related to the

Gulf War is the position that the Saudi billionaire-turned

terrorist, Usama Bin Ladin, took. He has depicted the

continued presence of American forces in his country since

that war as an insult to Islam. Apparently, his position has

found a large audience in Africa and the Middle East. On

November 13, 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, killing 5

Americans. Then in June 1996, an explosion in the Khobar

Towers killed 19 American military personnel. That was a

clear manifestation of the growing anti-Americanism in the

Islamic world in the post-Gulf War era.

Two years later in August 1998 came two more

explosions in the American embassies in East Africa, in

which Bin Ladin’s supporters or sympathizers were

allegedly involved. The third evidence emerged when, on

October 12, 2000, terrorists tried to blow up USS Cole off the

shores of Yemen, thereby causing the death of 12 American

9
sailors. It should also be recalled that Yemen strongly

supported Iraq during the Gulf War, and resentment

toward the United States in that country is reportedly still

high.

Even though U.S.-Pakistani ties deteriorated after the

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Jihadist groups of

Pakistan had no particular fight with the superpower until

later. The United States, despite its checkered record of

friendship with Pakistan, was generally viewed positively

in official circles as well as among the general populace. The

problem started in 1995, however, when the

Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) kidnapped four Western tourists

in Kashmir, including an American, and killed them.

Washington, in turn, declared the HUA a terrorist group in

October 1997, forcing it to change its name to

Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM).

7

The conflict only intensified following the attacks on the

U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998. In retaliation, the Clinton

administration launched several cruise missiles on Sudan

and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the targets were the

guerrilla camps that were organized under the auspices of

Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida, a terrorist organization that was

allegedly behind the African bombings. Bin Ladin himself

enjoys the protection and hospitality of the Taliban. They

refuse to extradite him despite sustained pressure from the

United States. The intent underlying the U.S. cruise missile

strike in Sudan was to destroy a plant where, according to

U.S. claims, chemical weapons were being produced. Bin

Ladin was also suspected of holding financial interests in

that plant. He survived unhurt in Afghanistan, but a

number of Pakistani Jihadis were killed, thereby making

the United States “the archenemy of the Jihadists and

Islam.”

President Clinton’s visit to South Asia in April 2000, if

anything, underscored the growing rift between the United

States and Pakistan. That trip was touted in India as the

onset of a new strategic relationship with the United States,

10
thereby creating deep resentment in Pakistan. The fact that

President Clinton applied no pressure on India to accept

him as a mediator on the Kashmir conflict was viewed by

Pakistan as proof that the Indo-U.S. ties would be

detrimental to the Pakistani interests.

President Clinton not only continued to express his

concern about the rising power of transnational terrorism,

but during his brief stopover in Pakistan, urged General

Musharraf, the Chief Executive of the Pakistani military

junta, to help the United States in extraditing Bin Ladin

from Afghanistan. The Jihadis of Pakistan were furious

over Clinton’s gall in coming to their country and insulting

one of their brethren (Bin Ladin), while refusing to put

pressure on India regarding Kashmir. Regardless of

whether the Jihadists’ conclusion about the changing role of

the United States in South Asia was correct, the battle lines

were drawn. The United States (or at least the Clinton

administration) was to be viewed as a friend of India, and

essentially anti-Pakistani in its regional predilections.

The USS Cole incident further implicated Bin Ladin.

The fact that General Pervez Musharraf’s military regime

refused to serve as an intermediary for the extradition of

Bin Ladin, and its rejection of the American request to allow

the use of its territory for a possible snatching of Bin Ladin,

created a chasm between Washington and Islamabad that

only promises to widen in coming years.

Since Pakistan’s emergence as a declared nuclear power

in 1998, it seems that the United States has decided to deal

with it largely through economic sanctions, cajoling for

cooperation regarding the extradition of Bin Ladin, and

publicly and privately lecturing Pakistani officials on

controlling the activities of Islamist parties and returning to

democracy. As the political distance between the United

States and Pakistan grows, the political clout of the

Islamist/Jihadi forces in that country is also escalating.

What is not clear at this point is how powerful the

present government of Pakistan really is in controlling the

11
Jihadist forces within its own territory, or in cooperating

with the United States in fighting transnational terrorism

in its immediate neighborhood. There have been reports

that the Pakistani Army is gradually and systematically

being Islamized. And Islamization among young officers is

growing. Because the United States has suspended the

international military education and training (IMET)

program for Pakistan for the past several years, the young

generation of officers from that country has no contact with

their Western counterpart officers as they come up through

the ranks. This does not bode well for the prospects of

having senior officers in the Pakistani armed forces with

sympathy or even understanding of Western perspectives in

coming years.

8

 The significance of having personal contacts

was never clearer than in the one that prevailed between

the former commander of U.S. Central Command

(USCENTCOM), General Anthony Zinni, and General

Musharraf, who is reported to have talked frequently with

the former on a number of sensitive issues after the military

coup in Pakistan. It is worth noting that contacts between

American and Pakistani civilian officials in the same period

were few and far between.

It seems that the Jihadi leaders are openly challenging

the authority of the military government in Pakistan. For

instance, Abdul Qayuum, who is a retired colonel and a

leader of the Islamist party, Tanzeemul Ikhwan, stated,

“We will besiege Islamabad and sit there until Islam is

implemented. We have decided to do or die for Islam.

Elections and democracy are no solution and Pervez

Musharraf should realize that this is not a secular, but an

Islamic army and state.” Other Islamist leaders in Pakistan

are going even further. Leader of Jamaat Islami, Qazi

Hussain Ahmad, publicly demanded Musharraf’s

resignation and urged other generals to replace him since he

(Musharraf), according to Ahmad, “failed on all fronts” and

“jeopardized the country’s security and honor.”

9

Another Islamist leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen,

Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil—who is reported to have personal

12
ties with Mulla Omar, leader of the Taliban

movement—said in an interview on the CBS show “60

Minutes” that if the Pakistani government tries to shut his

organization down, “it will not be in power for long.”

10

Leaders of the JUI have vowed to force the Army to defy the

United Nations (U.N.)-imposed sanctions against the

Taliban of Afghanistan. Lashkar-e-Taybah, the largest

Jihadist group fighting in the Indian-administered

Kashmir, announced its resolve to undermine all peace

endeavors between India and Pakistan, and it has

demanded that General Musharraf grow an Islamic

beard.

11

The Kargil conflict of 1999 between India and Pakistan

has demonstrated that the Pakistani government

increasingly depends on the Jihadist groups to put intense

pressure on India. These groups are also becoming powerful

in Pakistan because the government itself—even under

military rule—has yet to establish a credible record of

efficient governance. Ultimately, the proof of government’s

performance is in the improved status of the Pakistani

economy. Until it shows some results in this direction, the

government is likely to remain on the defensive vis-à-vis the

Islamist/Jihadist groups.

The irony of U.S.-Pakistan relations in the beginning of

the new century is that the latter badly needs U.S. economic

assistance if it is to resuscitate its very sick civil society.

What is more worrisome, in the meantime, is that the

continued deterioration of government-sponsored schools is

creating a serious lack of future nation-builders and

technocrats in Pakistan. A nuclear Pakistan should not be

left at the beck and call of an Islamist group that would want

to bring an end to its civil society, or to take it back several

centuries in the name of Islamic Puritanism. The United

States cannot long afford to continue to let the political

distance grow between it and nuclear Pakistan.

13
Regional Ambitions of the Jihadist Groups.

Religious schools of the northwestern frontier province

of Pakistan, where the Taliban received their education,

serve as the current manifestation of a very long tradition.

To comprehend the growing activism of the Jihadist groups

in Central Asia, one has to understand that the South Asian

Islamic schools and scholars have played a powerful role in

the development of the Islamic heritage of Central Asia for

the past 200 years. In Hanafi Islam—which prevails in

South and Central Asia—the traditional ulemas (religious

scholars) and Sufis have played a major role in shaping

Islamic beliefs. The ulemas of Central Asia were sent to the

religious schools of Bombay, Delhi, and Lahore during

Czarist Russia and even during Soviet days. Thus, the two

largest madrassas of Samarkand and Bukhara acquired

their religious education essentially from the Indian

subcontinent. Even when the mullahs of Central Asia were

cut off from their educational travel and contacts with

South Asian religious schools, literature from those schools

was used uninterruptedly, since it was available in libraries

and in the private collections of Central Asian mullahs.

It is important to keep in mind the tradition of Shah

Valiullah of Delhi, as one attempts to understand the

religious philosophy of the Taliban and their cohorts in

Central Asia. One overarching characteristic of Valiullah’s

writing is that it validated the coexistence of strict sharia

(Islamic law) and “spiritual sufism.” However, Valiullah

stripped Sufism of “practices involving the worship of saints

and belief in the real union with God.”

12

 The orthodoxy of

Shah Valiullah is also critical of the Shia sect, and it

explains the strong anti-Shia attitude of the Taliban that

resulted in a major conflict with Iran. It is important to

underscore that this tradition has been taken to an extreme

in the JUI-run madrassas—which, in turn, are extensions

of the religious school of Deoband (India) that was

considered the “beacon” of orthodoxy toward the end of the

14
19th century—of the northwestern province of Pakistan,

where the Taliban received their religious education.

The Jihadi groups are becoming increasingly active and

are gathering momentum in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and

Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are relatively

quiet, but no one knows for how long. The growing activism,

if not the popularity, of these groups is directly related to the

internal political dynamics of Central Asian countries.

All five countries of Central Asia are being ruled by

autocratic presidents, who have amassed enormous power

through “manipulated referendums” to extend their

mandate. Four of them are former communists, the fifth,

Askar Alyev of Kyrgyzstan, being the exception. As

authoritarian rulers, the presidents of all five republics

have been least tolerant of any type of opposition, which is

equated with sedition. Thus, there is no room to bring about

political change. That very reality leaves the opposition

groups with no choice but to resort to extra-constitutional

activities, including terrorism.

All five Central Asian countries have backward

economies and corrupt political leadership. One report

states, “Economic health has worsened inexorably over the

past 10 years. According to official statistics, production has

declined by 30-50 percent in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,

and Kyrgyzstan.” In Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, the

production fall has been 60 percent. The same source notes,

“Economic collapse on this scale is comparable with that of

countries wracked by war.”

13

But that is not the end of the worsening saga of the

Central Asian countries. “In education, health care, culture,

and science [these countries] have been set back 20 years

and more. In almost all of them, thousands of hospitals,

clinics, kindergartens, schools, libraries, scientific

institutions and arts institutions have been closed.”

Consequently, hundreds of thousands of teachers, doctors,

scientists, and specialists in art have become unemployed.

“Many of these losses are irreparable.”

14

15
Aside from being repressive, the political elites of all

Central Asian countries are accused of funneling “tens of

millions of dollars abroad to private bank accounts while

their populations become increasingly impoverished.”

Corruption and theft are reported to be running through the

bureaucracy and “eating away at state systems.” Political

repression in all the Central Asian countries has been high.

But in Uzbekistan, “the repression of opposition groups has

led the government to the brink of war against its own

people.” The overall reaction of Western democracies to the

worsening politico-economic situation in Central Asia is to

turn a blind eye toward the rampant injustice. “In

supporting the existing regimes, the West is not only

encouraging the prospects of future conflict but alienating

them from democratic sections of society in Central Asia.”

15

The cumulative effects of these conditions facilitated the

emergence of political extremism, including religious

extremism, as an expression of protest. As they are

predominantly Muslim states, Islam has had a powerful

presence in these countries—more in Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan than in the other three republics. The

involvement of Afghanistan’s Islamist forces in the civil war

of Tajikistan predates the Taliban rule in the former

country. In this sense, it should be clearly understood that

the nexus between the Pakistani Jihadist groups and the

Taliban is not directly responsible for initiating the activities

of Islamist groups in Central Asia.

The Islamist Parties of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

Kyrgyzstan: An Overview.

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are the hotbeds of Islamist

parties with close affiliation and political and military

support from Afghanistan. The Ferghana Valley—which

straddles Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—is an

area generally regarded as the most fertile ground for the

activism of the Jihadi groups. The two parties that are

16
known for their antigovernment activities are the Islamic

Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Perhaps the most active Islamist/Jihadist party in

Central Asia is the IMU. It was established in 1987—the

last few years of the existence of the Soviet Union—in the

Namangan Province of Uzbekistan. Participants, in

addition to the local clergy, in the premier meeting came

from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. It was

during that meeting that a decision was taken to establish

an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, ideally through

parliamentary methods, but, if that was not possible, even

by violent means. The IMU, under the political leadership of

Tahir Yuldeshev and the military commandership of Juma

Namangani, is interested in establishing an Islamic

republic in the Ferghana Valley first, and then, by

overthrowing the regime of Islam Karimov, in Uzbekistan.

16

At the first meeting of the IMU, Tahir Yuldashev, who

was only 20 then, emerged as the head. He was reportedly

behind organizing numerous antigovernment

demonstrations and violent acts. In 1992, Yuldashev,

fearing prosecution by the local authorities, fled to

Tajikistan along with a group of backers. While there, he is

reported to have directly participated in combat operations

in Kurgan-Tyne oblast as a member of the United Tajik

Opposition (UTO). In 1993, he moved to Afghanistan and

emerged as the leader of the Islamic Party of the Revival of

Uzbekistan, and deputy chairman of the Tajik Islamic

Revival Movement. Between 1993 and 1998, Yuldashev is

reported to have established a network of supporters. His

movement is reportedly receiving money through drug

trafficking in and around the Ferghana Valley, from Usama

Bin Ladin, and from the Taliban—who are also providing

his guerrillas with intensive military training. The Russian

mass media accuses Yuldashev of having contacts with two

Chechen guerrilla leaders, Khattab and Shamil Basayev.

Juma Namangani, leader of the military wing and

number two man of the IMU, started his career in the late

17
1980s in the Soviet paratroop regiment in Afghanistan. In

1991, he led the failed Islamic uprising in his hometown,

Namangan. Then he fled to Tajikistan, where civil war had

broken out. For most of 1992, he fought in the UTO forces in

Tajikistan, and then moved on to Afghanistan. During his

stay there, he underwent training in the mujahideen camp.

In 1998, he became one of the founding members of the IMU.

Namangani participated in the Tajik civil war in the early

1990s, and has made two abortive attempts (in 1999 and

2000) in the Ferghana Valley with the “Namangan

battalion” to take over political power. In 2000, Yuldashev

and Namangani were tried in absentia in Uzbekistan for

their alleged involvement in terrorist attacks in 1999 and

2000 in Uzbekistan and were sentenced to death.

17

Namagani’s band of armed guerrillas is described by

Ahmed Rashid—one of the foremost authorities on the

activities of Jihadi/Islamist forces in South and Central

Asia—as a “multinational force” of Uzbeks, Tajiks,

Chechens, Kyrgyz, Afghans, and Pakistanis.

18

 His

militia—whose numbers are reported by different sources

to be somewhere from 2,000 to even 7,000—is enjoying the

sanctuary of the Taliban government in northern

Afghanistan, and the financial backing of Usama Bin Ladin,

at least two Jihadist groups of Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sahaba

and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, and drug lords who control

smuggling routes in the three Central Asian countries.

The IMU intends to overthrow the Karimov regime in

Uzbekistan. Rashid also notes, “Although the IMU has

strategic aims to mobilize a Central Asian-Caucasus force of

Islamic rebels and tactically to set up bases in the Ferghana

Valley for a prolonged guerrilla war against President Islam

Karimov,” its “actions are also providing direct assistance to

the Taliban offensive inside Afghanistan.”

19

 Despite coming

under heavy pressure from security forces, it has gained

ground in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as in

Uzbekistan. 

18
Thus far, from the Taliban’s perspective, the most

impressive achievement of the IMU was to destabilize

southern Tajikistan, which had served as the lifeline for the

forces of the Taliban’s main opponent, the Northern

Alliance under the military leadership of Ahmad Shah

Masood. This destabilization enabled the Taliban to defeat

the Masood forces in September 2000. The IMU also

concentrated on preempting all attempts of President

Karimov to support another opponent of the Taliban,

General Rashid Dostum, an Afghan of Uzbek origin. Russia

was also counting on Karimov to help Dostum.

While the Taliban and IMU have demonstrated

considerable solidarity, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and

Kyrgyzstan have manifested deep distrust of each other’s

motives in dealing with the Islamist groups. Tajikistan

prefers an increased role of the Russian security forces

stationed within its borders. Uzbekistan, on the contrary,

continues to distrust Russia and has its own ambitions to

play a dominant role in the region. Kyrgyzstan, which has

its own border- and water-related dispute with Uzbekistan,

is also deeply suspicious of Uzbekistan.

Aside from the IMU, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the

Hizbollah (no ties with the Hizbollah party of

Lebanon)—both parties subscribing to the Saudi theological

orthodoxy—are spreading their Islamic message in the

Ferghana Valley. The Hizbollah is political in nature and its

“ideology is Islam.” It intends “to carry the Islamic message

in order to change the reality of the corrupt society which

currently prevails in the Muslim land and to transform it to

an Islamic society.”

20

 For the past several years, the

Hizbollah’s activities were reported to be in Uzbekistan and

in the Tajik (Soghd Region) and Kyrgyz (Osh Region, where

a large number of Uzbek Muslims have taken refuge as a

result of persecution by the Uzbek government) sections of

the Ferghana Valley. But reports of its activism are also

coming from Kazakhstan, where its leaflets appeared for

the first time in April 2000, and then again in October of the

same year. These leaflets called on the Kazakh Muslims to

19
join the jihad movement and topple the present

government.

21

How seriously the Central Asian republics are taking

the terrorist threat stemming from the activities of the IMU

becomes clear by the fact that when the news of

Namangani’s arrival broke in January 2001, leaders of four

republics—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and

Kyrgyzstan—secretly met and “pledged to coordinate

efforts to act collectively to stop the region from spiraling

into chaos and unrest and confront the Taliban.”

22

The New Great Game: Who Will Gain and Who Will

Lose?

Central Asian Countries. What is the general response of

Central Asian countries to the escalating activities of

Jihadist/Islamist forces? Any objective coverage of the

activities of Islamist parties in Central Asia is quite difficult

to obtain. Most reports from Central Asia, Russia, and even

the West have a uniformly alarmist tone to them—Russian

dispatches are more alarmist than the non-Russian ones.

There is that general portrayal of international conspiracies

of Islamist parties—akin to the “international communist

conspiracies” of the Cold War years—to take over Central

Asia, parts of Russia, and even the northwestern Chinese

province of Xinjiang. Innumerable descriptions claim the

ultimate objective of all these parties is to establish an

Islamic caliphate comprising the aforementioned areas.

The generally closed nature of these polities makes it

difficult to interview authoritative sources.

The Central Asian governments have fallen back on the

age-old demonizing rhetoric of the czarist/soviet era of

labeling the Islamist forces as “bandits” or even

“Wahabists.” “Wahabism,” so-called, is a phrase being used

by the Central Asian autocrats to describe the observance of

the Saudi puritanical tradition of Islam. There is a

remarkable similarity in the use of this phrase in Central

Asia as well as in South Asia, where it originated.

20
Originally, Muslims of the subcontinent used it in a

derogative sense to register their differences with those

puritans who condemned the Sufi tradition. Later on, the

British colonial rulers of India used it to describe radical

Muslim reformers who were opposed to their colonial rule.

As Olivier Roy notes, “It functioned as a pejorative label

which up until 1991 had nothing to do with Wahabism in the

strict sense—in other words with the puritan religious

doctrine preached in Saudi Arabia.” In the post-Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) years, the phrase was

used by the autocratic rulers of Central Asia to describe

“mullahs of young intellectuals with a modern education

who became the advocates of a more radical and political

Islam, on the model of Muslim Brotherhood or the Afghan

Mujahideen and, later on, of the Taliban.” However, in the

remainder of the 1990s and in this century, the phrase

“Wahabist” or “Wahabism” has basically been used to

dehumanize all Islamist/Jihadist forces that are also

getting more and more radicalized.

In their determination to suppress the Islamic

challenge, the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

Kyrgyzstan have been unable to make a distinction between

suppressing religious activities and opposing purely

political manifestations of Islam. For instance in

Kyrgyzstan—where the population has been traditionally

not very observant—one witnesses an outburst of religious

activities in recent years. And this rising religiosity is

making the government quite nervous. According to one

source, 1,700 mosques, 17 madrassas, and 3 Islamic

institutes have been built in that country. In the Ferghana

Valley at large, 677 mosques and 4 madrassas are built just

in the Osh Region, and 127 religious organizations—of

which 123 are mosques, and 200 unregistered madrassas

and mosques—are functioning in the Jalalabad Region of

Kyrgyzstan.

23

Similarly, the Kazakh authorities are keeping their

wary eyes on the rise in the number of unregistered

21
religious organizations, and are concerned that their

country is “on the brink of getting dragged into a conflict

with Islamist militants.” The Council for Relations with

Religious Associations reports that “half of the 2,252

organizations are unregistered. In Southern Kazakhstan

Oblast (SKO) alone, 328 of the 426 religious groups

operating in the area are unofficial.” The mountainous part

of SKO’s border with Uzbekistan is believed to be “the most

convenient location for IMU incursions.”

24

Islam Karimov’s regime is unanimously considered a

worst-case example of iron-fist clampdown. Civil rights

groups in Uzbekistan claim that the new act on controlling

information that the Uzbek parliament adopted in its last

session of the year 2000 “will provide the government with a

mechanism for imposing a virtual media blackout during

military operations.” The law is to be applied to foreign as

well as Uzbek reporters. Article 20 of the act, in the opinion

of experts, “is so far reaching that journalists will be obliged

to rely entirely on official versions of events.” Mikhail

Ardzinov, Chairman of the Independent Organization for

Human Rights, stated, “Any attempt to accurately report

the sequence of events could be interpreted as a description

of operational tactics,” “while the ban on the ‘so-called

propaganda’ meant that journalists would be unable to

present both sides of the story.”

25

The Kyrgyzstan government’s response to the activities

of the Islamist/Jihadist forces was no less drastic. Fearing

an invasion of Islamist guerrillas, that government

stationed practically its entire army on and began mining

the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. In addition, the security forces

forcibly removed civilians living on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border

“in order to facilitate government operations against the

insurgents.”

26

There is little doubt that the struggle between the

current regimes in Central Asia and Islamist/Jihadist

groups will continue. Political order in Uzbekistan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan is coming under increasing

22
challenge. For now, governments in Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan, though highly repressive, are not facing

serious challenge. Unless the Central Asian countries take

the twin steps of improving their economies and allowing a

gradual evolution of political pluralism, they will continue

to be threatened by forces of change. If they fail to manage

political change within their polities, they will increase the

likelihood of cataclysmic change, which, in turn, will create

more instability or even lead to the Talibanization of their

countries.

Pakistan. Of all the regional actors that are

encountering the growing influence of the Jihadist/Islamist

groups, Pakistan may turn out to be either one of the

significant winners or a major loser—depending upon how

it maneuvers its options and deals with various regional

actors—in this ongoing great game.

When Pakistan became involved in the power struggle in

Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Central Asia was not even a

factor, since it was then a part of the Soviet Union. One of

the reasons why Pakistan became a foremost party to

terminating the Soviet occupation of its neighboring state,

as previously noted, was that it wanted to establish a

friendly government in Afghanistan. In the process,

Pakistan also wanted to permanently remove the influence

of the Soviet Union/Russia and India from Afghanistan.

Pakistan succeeded in achieving this objective in 1996 when

the Taliban emerged as the new rulers of the neighboring

state.

But Pakistan did not plan on what the Jihadist

phenomenon became in the 1990s, and remains in the first

decade of this century. Surely, Zia could not have imagined

the power and clout that the Jihadist/Islamist groups have

acquired in his own country, and the way the Taliban

emerged as a ruling group in Afghanistan. Most important

of all, no one could have imagined that the Taliban would

use their Jihadist zeal to establish the kind of nexus they

have reportedly established with the Islamist/Jihadist

23
groups of Central Asia, and even Islamist forces of the

Xinjiang province and Chechnya.

Now the question is, will Pakistan be able to use the

Jihadist phenomenon that was created in its madrassas for

the fulfillment of its strategic objective, or will it become a

victim of the deleterious effects of this phenomenon? In the

first decade of the new century, it appears that Pakistan has

not reached a point where it can no longer control events,

but such a point of no return might not be too far off. There is

still opportunity for Pakistan to gradually establish control

over the Islamist/Jihadist groups within its own borders. At

the same time it also has to nudge the Taliban group either

to control the Jihadist activities of Bin Ladin affecting

Central Asia, or even arrest or try him in an Islamic country.

By so doing, it will do away with a major source of friction

with the United States. And as long as Bin Ladin is not

handed over to the United States, the Jihadist/Islamist

forces of Pakistan will not be terribly upset over his plight.

There is no doubt that Pakistan’s role as a kingmaker in

Afghanistan has been a source of considerable political clout

for it in Central Asia. Now the question is what measures

Pakistan should take to properly extract benefits from that

clout. One major prospect is the building of oil pipelines

from Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to India to

satisfy its escalating energy needs. There are two major

obstacles to the development of this prospect, however.

First is the resolution of the ongoing military conflict

between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance of Ahmed

Shah Masood. As powerful as the Taliban group has become

in controlling 90 plus percent of Afghanistan, the Northern

Alliance has the military support of Russia, Iran, and

Uzbekistan. Until the Taliban succeed in wiping out the

Northern Alliance, they will remain vulnerable to a sneak

attack from the Masood forces that may turn the tide.

Especially since the imposition of the new U.N. sanctions of

January 2001, there is a growing pressure on the Taliban to

either score a decisive military victory over the Masood

24
forces or seek a compromise. Thus, it behooves Pakistan to

arrange a political settlement between the two warring

parties while the Taliban still maintain their position of

power. Second, even if a political truce is negotiated in

Afghanistan, Pakistan faces yet another obstacle in the way

of materializing its desire to build oil pipelines to India,

namely the resolution of the obdurate Kashmir conflict with

India. In all likelihood, India will not agree to oil supplies

that pass through the Pakistani territory, as long as this

dispute continues to undergo periodic flare-ups.

Another potential payoff for Pakistan in Central Asia is

the prospect of its joining the “Shanghai Five” group. The

original members of the group are Russia, China,

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Its purpose is to

cooperate in fighting terrorism, religious extremism, and

drug trafficking in the members’ territories. The real

purpose of the group is to fight the growing influence of

Islamist/Jihadist groups in Central Asia, Chechnya, and

the Xinjiang province of China. Even though Uzbekistan is

not a member, it attended the July 2000 meeting of the

group as an observer. Unconfirmed reports suggest that

India was also interested in becoming a member. Given the

fact that it has been fighting the Islamist/Jihadist forces in

the region of Kashmir under its control, India’s interest in

joining the group is very similar to those of its present

members.

The Pakistani request to join the Shanghai Five received

mixed response from some of its current members. But its

close ties with the Taliban are a reality that will enable it to

acquire membership. The current members hope that by

letting Pakistan join the organization, they may be able to

persuade the Taliban to deescalate their support of

activities of the Islamist/Jihadist groups in their respective

borders. At least three current members of the Shanghai

Five—Russia, China, and Kazakhstan—are ready to

welcome Pakistan into the organization. Pakistan, on its

part, views joining the Shanghai Five group as a sure way of

formalizing its ties with Russia and Kazakhstan, and also

25
becoming a voice for extracting diplomatic recognition of the

Taliban government from its members. Undoubtedly, the

Shanghai Five group will not offer the Taliban government

diplomatic recognition unless the former acquires iron-clad

guarantees that the latter will forego its support of the

Jihadi forces in Central Asia.

Pakistan also aspires to serve as a transit route for

Kazakh oil in the near future. Its military ruler, General

Pervez Musharraf, during a visit to Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan in November 2000, made clear his country’s

objective of serving as a transit point for the Turkmen and

Kazakh oil.

27

 During that trip, Musharraf also paved the

way for direct negotiations between Kazakhstan and

Afghanistan. It is worth noting that a month prior to

Musharraf’s visit to Central Asia (October 2000), both

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan made a radical shift in their

long-standing criticism of the Taliban’s role in Central Asia.

President Karimov stated that the Taliban do not pose a

danger to Central Asian republics. Similarly, the Kyrgyz

government issued a statement that the Afghan

government “had the support of the majority of the Afghani

people.”

28

 There is no assurance that these Central Asian

republics will maintain their willingness to reach a

rapprochement with the Taliban government if it does not

lower its level of support for the Islamist/Jihadist forces

within their borders. There is some hope that Pakistani

diplomacy may be able to play an important role in softening

the Taliban attitude toward the Islamist/Jihadist parties.

Russia. As in the case of Pakistan, Russia’s stakes in

this great game are indeed high. Since Central Asia was a

part of the former Soviet Union, its successor state, Russia,

has been determined to keep countries of this region within

its sphere of influence. To this end, it has stationed its troops

in Tajikistan to keep the Islamist forces from capturing

power. Russian troops in Tajikistan also watch the borders

between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan with a definite view

to keeping the movement of Islamist/Jihadist forces and the

drug trade to a minimum. However, on both these issues

26
there have been frequent reports of connivance by the

Russian troops and even of their taking a role as

accomplices in return for financial payoffs.

Russia is also supplying arms to Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and

Uzbek forces in their fight against the Jihadist forces. The

chief purpose in this regard is not only to maintain a certain

level of Russian influence in Central Asia, but also to keep

the U.S. influence through the Partnership for Peace (PfP)

program at a minimum.

Another important purpose of Russia’s involvement in

Central Asia is to contain the activities of the Chechen

separatist forces. Afghanistan has officially recognized

Chechnya’s independence, opening several diplomatic

missions and consulates. Russia not only has couched its

fight against Chechnya’s attempt to break away from the

Russian Federation as a war against religious extremism

and international terrorism, but has claimed that “the

Central Asian ‘Wahabis’ aim at setting fire to the entire

Caucasus through their fellow believers in Chechnya and

Dagestan.”

29

Russia has also become obsessed with the Usama Bin

Ladin-related political instability in Chechnya—and

possibly in Dagestan—but especially in Central Asia.

According to Russian reports issued toward the end of 2000,

the Taliban leadership has intensified contacts with the

Chechnyan separatists. The Afghan government, claims

Russia, has established several Chechnyan guerrilla

training camps financed by Usama Bin Ladin. “Graduates”

of those training camps are being sent to the fight against

the Northern Alliance of Ahmed Shah Masood, and are also

reported to be present in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The

usual Russian fear, bordering paranoia, on this issue was

recently expressed in the words of Marshall Igor Sergeyev,

who identified Afghanistan as “the international terrorist

center of the world.” He went on to note that from

Afghanistan, mujahideen are “sent to many regions, from

Kosovo to Malaysia, and to the north Caucasus as well.”

30

27
After the success of the Russian forces in defeating the

Chechnyan separatists in a conventional military

confrontation, the conflict in Chechnya has become a

guerrilla war, whereby the guerrillas have been periodically

attacking Russian troops that are garrisoned in that

territory, and inflicting heavy casualties. For the past year

or so, Russia has been reiterating that the Chechnyan

guerrillas have been receiving politico-military support and

training in Afghanistan and are becoming an integral part

of a pan-Islamist/Jihadist movement to take over all of

Central Asia. That Russian position is in harmony with the

perceptions of the authoritarian rulers of Central Asia

regarding the Taliban government. Thus, a mutuality of

threat perception has become an important basis for

cooperation among members of the Shanghai Five, and an

important rationale for Russian military assistance to

Central Asian states.

Russia’s options in Central Asia are rather limited, but

the cost of failure is high. First and foremost, Russia has to

maintain its presence and its influence in Tajikistan.

However, in order to do both, it has to be careful about not

being overly assertive. The presence of Russian forces in

Tajikistan is an issue that incessantly challenges the

sovereignty of the Tajik government. Other Central Asian

states are keenly watching that development. The Russians

are often accused of exploiting the weakened nature of the

sovereignty of the Tajik government to ensure their

long-term presence, and thereby ensuring their role as

kingmakers. While that development gives Russia a

temporary advantage, it might be regarded as just another

example of continuing Russian imperialism in that country.

Besides, if Russia as a foreign power can justify its role as a

peacekeeper in Tajikistan, then on what grounds can it

criticize the Taliban for interference in Tajikistan by

cooperating with the Islamist/Jihadist forces?

Under the tenure of the young and vigorous Vladimir

Putin, Russia is becoming increasingly intent on enhancing

its sphere of influence in Central Asia. In addition, the

28
continued wariness of Central Asian autocratic rulers

regarding the growing activism of Islamist/Jihadist groups

within their borders is also helping Russia maintain its

influence. It should be noted, however, that even the rising

activism of Islamist forces is not enabling Russia to

maintain its influence uniformly in all Central Asian states.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have stayed out of Russia’s

sphere of influence. In fact, Uzbekistan under Islam

Karimov has its own designs for exercising its influence on

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. And Turkmenistan, as a

continued evidence of conducting a neutral and

independent foreign policy, has offered its good offices

building rapprochement between Afghanistan and

Tajikistan.

Russia is also concerned about the growing influence of

the United States in Central Asia and its implications for

Russia’s strategic interests. One of the major areas of

U.S.-Russian competition is the routing of the Caspian Sea

oil and gas pipelines as well as the routing of oil from

Kazakhstan. In the case of Kazakh oil, Russia enjoys a

certain advantage because of the decision of President

Nursultan Nazerbayev not to antagonize Russia. However,

Nazerbayev’s perspectives regarding oil are not that simple.

At times, he has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity to

keep both Russian and American interests, while on other

occasions he has kept both sides guessing about his next

move.

Russian and American interests clashed on the routing

of oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan. In November 1999,

under U.S. pressure, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia

signed a $2.4 billion agreement with American oil

companies to build a 1,000-mile-long pipeline from

Azerbaijan to Georgia, and then finally to Turkey’s

Mediterranean port at Ceyhan (thus its name: the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline). It was apparent from the

very beginning that the chief purpose of the involvement of

the U.S. Government was to exclude Russia and Iran from

the deal.

31

 However, since five countries bordering the

29
Caspian Sea—Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia,

and Azerbaijan—must be satisfied in order for any oil

production deal to last, the project had a dim future from the

start. Russia was under the administration of a sickly Boris

Yeltsin who protested, but it took the administration of

Vladimir Putin to declare that Russia had no intention of

being excluded from receiving economic payoffs emanating

from the Caspian Sea oil and gas. Similarly, Iran also

continued its endeavors to seek bilateral deals with

Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.

While Russia and the United States disagreed on the

Caspian Sea oil issue, they agreed to cooperate in applying

pressure on the Afghan government to extradite Usama Bin

Ladin. There were also several reports that Moscow and

Washington agreed to launch combined military operations

from the Tajik territory to capture Bin Ladin. Since Russian

troops are stationed in Tajikistan, it was not quite clear

whether such an action would have the approval of the Tajik

government, or Russia would make a unilateral decision to

use the Tajik territory, given the weakened nature of the

present Tajik government.

32

Then in December 2000, there were also reports that

Russia was going to introduce a 50,000-member military

corps into Tajikistan and would conduct “preventive

bombing strikes against the Taliban camps near the

Afghan-Tajik border.” That plan was reportedly prepared

under the direct guidance of Secretary of Russia’s Security

Council Sergey Ivanov and approved by President Putin.

For whatever reasons, Russia did not carry out that plan in

the spring of 2001.

33

In the ongoing new great game in Central Asia, the

Jihadist forces will also have a large say about how Russia’s

strategic interests will be shaped. In fact, given that the

fight over the future of Chechnya is far from over, the

Jihadists might become important players in determining

the future shape of the Russian Federation itself.

Considering one radical scenario, if the Taliban were to be

30
defeated in Afghanistan, the role of the Jihadist forces

would face a major setback, but those groups are not likely

to disappear from other countries of Central Asia. Their

military capacity to damage Russian interests would be

temporarily curtailed under that scenario, but might not be

wiped out. Considering yet another radical scenario, if the

Taliban are not ousted from Afghanistan, Russia is likely to

fight an uphill battle in dealing with these Central Asian

groups. Russian leadership might find it very difficult to

accept that it no longer plays a decisive role in Central Asia.

Even under the best of circumstances of economic progress

in Russia, it will remain a large but just another actor,

competing to influence the new great game with other large,

or not so large, but important regional and outside actors.

China. Chinese wariness over the growing activities of

the Islamist/Jihadist groups has risen significantly in the

past few years. The foremost Chinese concern is related to

growing ties between the separatist forces in its Xinjiang

province and the Taliban. There have been reports that

militant elements from Xinjiang are being trained in the

guerrilla camps of Afghanistan and even in Pakistan. Since

these camps are not closely monitored by Pakistani

intelligence, the government of Pakistan is coming under

suspicion in the views of Chinese authorities.

34

 Given the

fact that China is the chief strategic partner and a major

source of military supplies to Pakistan, that South Asian

nation can ill afford to antagonize China on the Jihadist

issue.

China has consistently maintained its distance on the

Jihadist issue related to Kashmir. At the peak of the Kargil

conflict, Beijing insisted that the best way to resolve the

conflict was through peaceful negotiations. The PRC did not

adopt that position because it suddenly started feeling soft

toward India. On the contrary, China and India remain

strategic competitors. There is little doubt that China draws

parallels between its rule over the Xinjiang province and

India’s control of Kashmir. Thus, it wants a political, not a

military, solution of that conflict. It should be recalled that

31
military clashes in the Kargil part of Kashmir were taking

place when NATO was conducting an air war against

Yugoslavia. That war had also resuscitated an

international debate over sovereignty. According to the

Chinese and Russian views, NATO’s use of force was a

blatant violation of national sovereignty.

Interestingly enough, India, China, and Russia were of

one mind on that issue. The Chinese leaders were only too

aware of the parallels between Milosovic’s handling of the

Kosovar minority and their own treatment of Buddhist and

Muslim minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, respectively. For

that reason alone, China felt that the resolution of the

Kashmir issue—which, according to the Pakistani version,

was an occupation of Muslim people by Hindu India—

should be accomplished through negotiations, not through

military actions.

Regarding the activities of Islamist/Jihadist forces,

China adopted a multi-tiered policy. The first tier was

China’s insistence that Pakistan take immediate measures

to bring an end to guerrilla training camps not only within

its borders but also in Afghanistan. As a second tier, China

sent half a million dollars’ worth of arms, sniper rifles, and

bulletproof vests to Uzbekistan to fight Islamist forces

there.

35

 The third tier combines carrots and sticks. The

carrots aspect of the policy involves Beijing’s decision to

open a direct link with the Taliban with a view to

persuading them to cease and desist all training programs

for the Xinjiang separatists. That is indeed an important

wrinkle to China’s approach to Afghanistan. Up until now,

it has largely been approaching the problem through

Pakistan. The “sticks” aspect of China’s policy is that it is

considering supplying military assistance to the Northern

Alliance. Such a move is likely to pose China against

Pakistan—since the latter is a strong supporter of the

Taliban and an equally strong opponent of the Northern

Alliance. 

32
But the question is whether China will indeed

implement the policy of supporting the Northern Alliance if

there is no rapprochement between Beijing and Kabul.

Even though China attaches a high emphasis to continued

peace and stability in the Xinjiang province, its stakes in

Central Asia are also quite high. It wants to keep on

increasing trade with its neighbors, and wants to acquire

energy supplies from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and

Azerbaijan. It has already settled border disputes with all

its Central Asian neighbors, save Tajikistan. Would China

jeopardize its multidimensional interests in Central Asia by

getting involved in a military conflict, albeit indirectly, with

Afghanistan by supporting the Northern Alliance? The

Chinese will determine answers to these questions by

examining how powerful the Taliban will remain as a

political force in Afghanistan in the coming years, and how

effective their Islamist/Jihadist cohorts will become in such

countries as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

If the Taliban were to remain a dominant force in

Afghanistan, then the PRC would consider adopting a

two-pronged policy of negotiating with them, and also

applying pressure on them through Pakistan. As long as

Pakistan maintains its influence with the Taliban, China’s

chances of moderating the Jihadist behavior of the Taliban

are greater than the ones available to Russia and even the

United States. Given the significance that Pakistan

attaches to its strategic ties with China, the former will not

want to antagonize the latter over the Taliban issue.

The United States. American stakes in Central Asia are

not as high as those of Pakistan and Russia. It is not the

variety of strategic interests but their intensity—rather the

intensity of one interest—that drives U.S. foreign policy

toward Central Asia. Washington has become highly

determined to capture Usama Bin Ladin and bring him to

justice since the bombing of its embassies in East Africa in

1998. In fact, the United States tried to kill him when it fired

cruise missiles on the guerrilla camps in Afghanistan in

August of that year.

33
As previously noted, the Clinton administration applied

ample pressure on Pakistan to get that country’s help in

extraditing Bin Ladin. However, it is largely because the

United States has been talking tough to Pakistan since that

country became a nuclear power in 1998, and has not spent

much of its efforts on gaining cooperation through quiet

diplomacy, that Pakistan has refused to serve as an

intermediary between Washington and Kabul on

extraditing Bin Ladin. The Taliban have steadfastly

refused to extradite Bin Ladin. However, a continued

involvement of Pakistan in such negotiations might have

improved the chances of finding a mutually acceptable

alternative, such as trying Bin Ladin in an Islamic country,

a proposal the Taliban have offered many times.

When the USS Cole was severely damaged as a result of

a terrorist attack in October of 2000, suspicion regarding

the possible involvement of Bin Ladin rose high. Toward the

end of that year, there were reports that the United States

would use the Tajik territory to launch a special operation to

snatch Bin Ladin. Russia reportedly gave full support to

such a U.S. option. The Clinton administration’s

consideration of the use of the Tajik territory was the result

of the categorical refusal of the military regime in Pakistan

to cooperate with the United States in capturing Bin Ladin.

Aside from a number of grievances that Pakistan has

toward the United States, the growing political clout of the

Jihadist forces—who consider Usama a “great

Mujahid”—also looms large in that country’s refusal to help

the United States. However, given the significance that

Moscow also attaches to capturing Bin Ladin, it is possible

that this option will remain very much alive on the policy

platters of Russia and the United States for quite some time.

The United States is also concerned over increased

activities of the Jihadist forces in Central Asia. But aside

from signing the PfP agreements with all countries of that

region save Tajikistan, Washington largely left the region to

Russian influence until the late 1990s. There is little doubt

that Russia envisions the participation of these countries in

34
the PfP with concern, even though the United States has

made clear that their participation in this arrangement is

not a precursor to membership in NATO. There is also no

doubt that the PfP remains a tool in the hands of the U.S.

decisionmakers to use to turn up the heat on the Russian

leadership. No country is more aware of this reality in

Central Asia than Uzbekistan. Since Islam Karimov has his

own ambitions to acquire a dominant role for his country in

the region, he has, on occasion, talked about supplying

bases to the United States. A general interpretation of such

statements from Karimov is that he uses them to extract

political concessions and military assistance from Russia.

36

Another focus of U.S. interests in Central Asia is oil.

Despite the efforts of the United States to exclude Russia

and Iran from the oil pipeline deals, both countries are

active players in oil-related matters. In fact, toward the end

of the year 2000, President Nursultan Nazerbayev was

negotiating to build oil pipelines through Iran, “regarded by

some specialists as one of the cheapest ways of getting

Kazakh oil to Western markets.”

37

 There were also reports

that Russia had successfully negotiated with Kazakhstan

an increase in the quotas of oil for transit across its territory.

Under President George W. Bush, the United States has

not articulated any changes in its foreign policy toward

Central Asia. One expectation is that, given a general

escalation of interests on the part of Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan to include Russia and Iran in future oil deals,

Washington will closely watch these developments for now.

It is apparent that the Bush administration would be

interested in creating a general environment of cooperation

so that Russia would soften its attitude toward America’s

growing interest in building the national missile defense

(NMD) system. Regarding Iran, the United States has also

adopted a policy of wait-and-see. Equally important, the

United States is watching the growing strategic cooperation

between Russia and Iran on nuclear and missile issues.

China is also a player in the growing Russo-Iranian nexus,

35
which is likely to become a major headache for the United

States in the coming years.

Even if the strategic environment of Central Asia were to

become less friendly from the American perspective, the

United States would still have an upper hand in the new

great game. It can always increase the leverage of military

partnership with the Central Asian countries through the

PfP program, and thereby enhance its presence and

attendant influence. It has already focused on closer

cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, two major

states of Central Asia. The United States also has the

options of using economic assistance and military weapons

as tools to enhance its clout in the area. Given the powerful

reputation for quality of U.S. arms worldwide, Central

Asian countries would gleefully welcome escalated military

assistance from Washington, if the current administration

were to make such a decision.

Regarding all these options in Central Asia, the United

States has to proceed from the assumption that the present

autocratic rulers will manage to stay in power. If one or

more presidents of these republics is assassinated or

overthrown, then it is anyone’s guess as to how much

deterioration in the strategic environment there would

follow, and how much worse this environment could get

before it became better from the perspective of the United

States.

Conclusions.

The Jihadi phenomenon that is escalating in the area

that covers Pakistan to Central Asia may best be handled by

simultaneously introducing programs of economic

development and managed political pluralism. But where

should one start such programs? More to the point, who is

going to persuade the autocrats of Central Asia to introduce

political pluralism on an incremental basis? All of them

want to be life-long rulers; only some are more blunt about it

than others. What about Afghanistan, whose rulers are

36
establishing, almost on a regular basis, their own

interpretations of Islamic state enlightenment (or the lack

thereof!), justice, treatment (or ill-treatment) of women, and

civility?

A good starting point for economic development ought to

be Pakistan. Large numbers of Pakistanis are not happy

with the rising tide of Jihadi tendencies and obscurantism

in their country. They will indeed welcome the

strengthening of civil society, under which half-educated

mullahs will not attempt to take over the government. The

growing conflict in Pakistan is the outcome of the failure of

the government to implement policies that will create a

modern, industrial country. The abysmal failure of the

modern education system has enabled the emergence of

religious schools, where extremism is being taught, as if it

were the flip side of Islam. The historical reality is quite the

contrary. Sadly, these mullahs are ignorant of their own

religious heritage that has so heavily emphasized tolerance

and moderation. For the sake of peace, civility, and regional

stability, the international community should do

everything to help modernize the civilian sectors of the

Pakistani economy and continue to engage that country in a

variety of international political and economic institutions.

An internationally engaged nuclear Pakistan will not

become a nuclear pariah.

A good way to fight religious extremism in Central Asia

is to persuade the autocratic rulers to lower the level of

political repression—which, in reality, is the exercise of

extremism by the government—that they are perpetrating

in the name of fighting “Wahabism.” The most difficult part

of this proposition is the question of who will persuade them

to do so. Even the United States—as much as it remains a

strong proselytizer for political moderation and

democracy—treads gingerly regarding its advocacy of

human rights in Central Asia. Therein lies the rub.

If the United States will not insist that the autocrats of

Central Asia lighten up on their people, no other country

37
will. Major European states have been uncritically

receptive to the propaganda emanating from the capitals of

Central Asian states about how Islamists/Jihadists will

take over their part of the world if they are not wiped out by

whatever measures these governments deem necessary.

Looking for moderate solutions from Russia and China will

be a fruitless exercise. Just look at how brutal they are with

their own religious and ethnic minorities. The rest of the

Muslim states have not shown any ability to lead on this

issue. They have largely stayed on the sidelines. Besides,

there are not many Muslim states that have established

trailblazing examples of political moderation. In the final

analysis, the burden of leadership in finding

politico-economic solutions to the growing religious

extremism in the South-Central Asia falls, once again, on

the United States.

Afghanistan has been proving itself to be sui generis.

Thus, the only way to deal with the Taliban is by using the

good offices of Pakistan. The latter is more than just a

neighbor. It has been very effective in enabling the Taliban

to maintain their military control of Afghanistan. If the

Pakistani support were gone, then the Taliban as a political

force might not last long. But, given that there is a powerful

religious base of support for the Taliban within Pakistan,

the approach of the international community (or more

specifically, the United States) should NOT be aimed at

destroying the Taliban as a ruling force. Rather, it should

act with a view to moderating their behavior. That may be

done only by creating sufficient incentives for Pakistan to

apply behind-the-scenes pressure on Afghanistan to

abandon its support of the Jihadist forces in Central Asia.

Recommendations for the United States.

As the administration of President George W. Bush is

busy creating or recreating its strategy toward different

regions of the world, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central

Asia deserve special attention. Even though the American

38
stakes in Central Asia are not as high as those of Pakistan

and Russia, the United States should not stand by and

watch political explosions in South and Central Asia which

are likely if the current economic and political deterioration

in the region continues.

During the Clinton presidency, the United States did not

assign a high priority to those regions. Regarding South

Asia, the last administration had a change of heart when

Clinton visited the region in the waning years of his

presidency. Then, without seriously considering the

implications of a major policy change on the region,

President Clinton decided to engage India at the expense of

“punishing” Pakistan for ousting democracy, for that

country’s support for Islamist radical forces during the

Kargil conflict in Kashmir, for its refusal to clamp down

Islamic hardliners within its borders, and for its support of

the Taliban. The result of that shortsighted approach to

South Asia has been a growing chasm between the United

States and Pakistan.

The Bush administration should develop a strategy

incorporating both South and Central Asia as those regions

become increasingly intertwined. That strategy should

abandon the zero-sum approach that the Clinton

administration had initiated during its last years in

office—preferring India at the expense of Pakistan. Instead,

the United States ought to explicitly state that it intends to

engage both countries. As declared nuclear powers, and

because of their proximity to Central Asia, they are very

important to America’s strategic approach toward South

and Central Asia. In addition, the significance of Pakistan

for the prospects of peace and stability in Central Asia will

only increase in the coming years, especially if the Taliban

regime stays in power in Afghanistan. Pakistan will

continue to serve as an intellectual center of Islamic

radicalism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Thus, if the

United States wants to diminish the violance associated

with such radicalism, it should engage Pakistan with a view

39
to persuading its government to reign in Islamic radicals

within its own borders.

The third element of U.S. strategy should be

approaching Afghanistan through the good offices of

Pakistan, since the Taliban consider the latter as their only

credible ally. But even before approaching Pakistan, the

United States has to make another difficult choice: to be

willing to have Usama Bin Ladin tried in an Islamic state on

charges of sponsoring transnational terrorism—including

terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa and on

the USS Cole. This will be highly controversial, but it is not

without precedent. After all, the United States has accepted

a similar option when the two Libyans accused of carrying

out the Lockerbee terrorist incident were tried in Holland.

Since Afghanistan has expressed its willingness to try Bin

Ladin in an Islamic country, the United States will break a

major impasse in its ties with Pakistan and Afghanistan by

agreeing to such a trial. Once this is done, the process of

engaging Pakistan and Afghanistan should evolve

incrementally and deliberately; and it would not encounter

many major hurdles. The ultimate objectives of U.S.-

Pakistan-Afghanistan rapprochement ought to be arresting

the growing spirals of Islamic radicalism, fighting the drug

trade, and controlling the spread of small arms that are

becoming so deadly in the intermittent outbreak of ethnic

clashes and anti-government violent incidents.

The fourth characteristic of the U.S. strategy toward

Central Asia ought to be a two-track emphasis on creating a

multilateral forum for providing economic assistance and

persuading the existing regimes to allow the evolution of

political pluralism. In pursuing those tracks of the U.S.

strategy, the Bush administration should actively seek the

support and involvement of Japan and Europe. Such an

emphasis would take that region a long way toward

economic prosperity and political moderation.

Even though in the Clinton era the United States paid

attention to Central Asia only sporadically—through its

40
involvement in the oil and gas pipeline issues and regarding

the capture or extradition of Usama Bin Ladin—the

priorities of the new administration toward South and

Central Asia must change. As Russia increasingly asserts

itself under the youthful leadership of President Vladimir

Putin in different regions of the world, Russo-American ties,

especially in Central Asia, are likely to become competitive.

The significance of that competition also increases when one

considers the growing strategic involvement of the PRC in

Central Asia. Since all indicators point toward

Sino-American relations remaining competitive, that

becomes one more reason why the United States should

develop a proactive strategy toward South and Central

Asia.

South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world

where a well-designed American strategy might help avoid

crises or catastrophe. The U.S. military would provide only

one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at

that, but has an important role to play through engagement

activities and regional confidence-building. Insecurity has

led the states of the region to seek weapons of mass

destruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also led

them toward policies which undercut the security of their

neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be

increased terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued

low-level conflict and potentially even major regional war or

a thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this pattern

could allow the states of the region to become solid economic

and political partners for the United States, thus

representing a gain for all concerned.

ENDNOTES

1. Use of the phrase “great game” to refer to the 19th century

strategic competition in Central Asia between Britain and Russia is

attributed to Rudyard Kipling. The analogy has again become useful

and has been used, inter alia, in M. E. Ahrari with James Beal, The New

Great Game in Muslim Central Asia, McNair Paper 47, Washington,

DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic

41
Studies, 1996; Dianne L. Smith, Central Asia: A New Great Game?

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996; Ariel Cohen,

“The New ‘Great Game’: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia,

Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, January 25, 1996; ”Central Asia:

And the Great Game Continues" (editorial), Asia Times, July 4, 2000;

Afzaal Mahmood, “Central Asia’s Great Game,” Globe, June-July 2000

(online version); Ian Cuthbertson, “The New ‘Great Game’,” World

Policy Journal, Vol. 11, No. 4, Winter 1994/95, pp 31-43; and so forth.

2. For a superb overview of Maududi’s writings, see Khurshid

Ahmad and Zafar Ishaq Ansari, eds., Islamic Perspectives, London, UK:

The Islamic Foundation, 1979.

3. Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Unintended Consequence of

Afghanistan,” World Policy Journal, Spring 1994, pp.76-87. For

application of the concept of the unintended consequences of U.S. policy

during the Cold War to Asia generally, see Chalmers Johnson,

Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, New York:

Henry Holt, 2000.

4. Carpenter, p. 80.

5. The JUI established these schools in the northwestern frontier

province of Pakistan in 1947 for purely religious education. However,

the outlook of this party changed when its leader, Maulana Ghulam

Ghaus Hazravi, turned it into a political party. The current leader of the

JUI is Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, whose Darul-Uloom Haqqaniya served as

a major educational institution for the Taliban leadership.

6. Based on author’s conversation with sources knowledegable on

the religious groups. Also see M. Ehsan Ahrari, “China, Pakistan, and

the Taliban Syndrome,” Asian Survey, July/August 2000, pp. 658-671;

and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism

in Central Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 82-94,

183-195.

7. HUA was founded in 1993 in Pakistan, and is led by Maulana

Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil. Its main sponsors are reported to be the

Pakistani intelligence service, ISI, JUI, Tableegh-ul-Islami, and

Hizb-ul-Islami, Yunus Khalis faction. The HUA is reported to have close

working relations with the Somalian Ittihad-e-Islami, and reported to

have several activists and supporters in the United Kingdom. For

details, see “Religious Leaders Hail Musharraf’s Views on Terrorism,

Jihad,” Ausaf, in Urdu, January 27, 2000.

42
8. Even though Pakistani military officers are coming to U.S.

military institutions under different funding sources, the IMET

remains suspended in the year 2001.

9. Ahmed Rashid, “Elite’s Loss, Islamists’ Gain,” Far Eastern

Economic Review, January 11, 2001, electronic version.

10. “America’s Worst Nightmare?: Whether or Not Pakistan Will

Use Its Nuclear Weapons,” 60 Minutes, October 15, 2000, Lexis-Nexis

transcript, electronic version.

11. Ibid.

12. Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia, New York: New York

University Press, 1997, p. 145.

13. Nurbolat Masanov, “Central Asia Faces Political Instability,”

electronic version, Institute for War and Peace, January 9, 2001.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Leonid Moskalev, “Drama Entitled ‘Jihad’: Fighters for Faith

With Assault Rifles in Their Hands and Knives Under Their Belts,”

Moscow Nezavisimaya Gezeta in Russian, Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS), electronic version, August 18, 2000.

17. Ibid.

18. Ahmed Rashid, “Juma Namangani Returns to Tajikistan for

Fresh Offensive,” Central Asia Analyst, electronic version,

www.cacianalyst.org/Headline_2.htm, January 17, 2001.

19. Ahmed Rashid, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Incursion

Assists the Taliban,” electronic version, www.afghanradio.com/2000/

september/sep18n2000.htm, September 2000.

20. From Hizb-ut-Tahrir website, www.hizb-ut-Tahrir.org.

21. “Kazakh Policy Probe” FBIS.

22. Rashid, “Juma Namangani.”

23. “Kyrgyzstan: Radical Islamic Groups Reportedly Set up Activity

in South,” Bishkek Kyrgyz Liberalnaya Gazeta in Russian, FBIS,

November 30, 2000.

43
24. Islakandar Amanjolov, “Astana IMU Fears,”electronic version,

www.iwpr.net, December 21, 2000.

25. “Uzbek’s New Terrorism Law gives the Government Absolute

Control,” Institute of War and Peace Newsletter, henceforth IWPR

Newsletter, electronic version, January 16, 2001.

26. Igor Rotar, “Will Central Asia Explode: Disunion is the Islamic

Radicals Main Problem,” Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian,

FBIS, electronic version, November 29, 2000; and Marat Mamadshovey,

“Central Asia Insurgency Raises Questions About Civilian Sympathies

and Military capabilities,” Eurasia Insight, electronic version,

www.ripnet.org, August 29, 2000.

27. Bruce Pannier, “Kazakhstan: Musharraf’s Visit Focuses on

Taliban,” electronic version, www.rferl.org, November 2000.

28. Ibid.

29. Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Uzbekistan: The Ferghana Valley—A

Breeding Ground for Extremism?,” electronic version, www.rferl.org,

December 2000.

30. “Russian Presidential Aid’s Claims Taliban Training Chechen

Fighters,” ITAR-TASS, FBIS, December 9, 2000.

31. For background, see David Johnson, “Projects in the Pipelines:

Current Pipeline Projects and Their Staggering Costs”; also Johnson,

“Politics and Pipelines: Political Problems, Huge Investments Confront

Major Oil Discovery,” www.infoplease.com, electronic version.

32. James Bone, Zahid Hussein, Michael Theodoulou, and Michael

Evans, “The Hunt for Osama Bin Ladin: Russia and American Allies in

Battle Against the Muslim Pimpernel,” The London Times, Internet

Version, November 25, 2000.

33. “Putin Responds to Political News Agency: The Second Afghan

War,” Internet version.

34. Afzaal Mahmood, “What Price Jihad Culture? Karachi Dawn,”

Electronic Version, January 1, 2001.

35. “Uzbekistan Profits from Sino-Russian Rivalry,” electronic

version, www.Uzbekistanerk.org.

44
36. Mekhman Gafarly, “The United States is Making Friends in

Central Asia,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 29, 1999, FBIS, electronic

version.

37. Dosym Satpaev, “U.S. Seeks to Strengthen Kazakh Relations,”

Institute for War and Peace Newsletter, electronic version,

www.iwpr.net.

45
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. M. Ehsan Ahrari

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams