PREVAILING IN A WELL

ARMED WORLD

DEVISING COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

AGAINST WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

Henry D. Sokolski

Executive Director

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

Editor

March 2000
The chapters of this book were commissioned by the Nonp

ation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit educational organ

based in Washington, DC. 

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ii
Foreword............................

Preface

Andrew Marshall......................

Acknowledgements ......................

Introduction

Strategy, The Missing Link in Our Fight

against Proliferation

 Henry D. Sokolski .....................

Part I

How Might Competitive Strategies Help against

Proliferation? ........................

1. Competitive Strategies: An Approach against

Proliferation

 David J. Andre.......................

2. Competitive Strategies as a Teaching Tool

 Bernard I. Finel ......................

Part II

How Competitive Are U.S. Efforts against Proliferation?. 

3. Nonproliferation: Strategies for Winning, Losing,

and Coping

 Henry D. Sokolski .....................

4. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Where Has the

United StatesWon—and Why?

 Zachary S. Davis

 Mitchell B. Reiss ......................

5. Counterproliferation: Shy of Winning

 Thomas G. Mahnken ....................

Part III

Iran: Two Competitive Strategies .............

6. Fighting Proliferation through Democracy:

A Competitive Strategies Approach toward Iran

Kenneth R. Timmerman .................

7. Dual Containment as an Effective Competitive Strategy

Patrick Clawson......................

About the Authors ......................

iii
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to p

Prevailing In A Well-Armed World: Devising Comp

Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation. This work pr

insights into the competitive strategies methodology. A

Marshall notes that policymakers and analysts can ben

using an analytical tool that stimulates their thinking—

directly—about strategy in terms of long-term comp

between nations with conflicting values, policies, and obje

Part I of this work suggests that the competitive stra

approach has value for both the practitioner and the scho

The book also demonstrates the strengths of the comp

strategies approach as an instrument for examining U.S. 

The method in this book focuses on policies regardin

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In “shapin

international environment in the next millennium, no 

national security issue seems as complex or importan

imperative here is to look to competitive strategies to as

asking critical questions and thinking broadly and pr

about alternatives for pitting U.S. strengths against oppo

weaknesses. Part II uses the framework to examine and ev

U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies for

the final years of the 20th century. In Part III, the comp

strategies method is used to analyze a regional case, that of 

The insights contained in this book provide an opportu

pause and consider alternative and innovative approac

strategic thinking and proliferation policy. The Strategic S

Institute is pleased to offer this book to assist practitione

scholars in thinking strategically about U.S. defense polici

priorities. 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
Andrew Marshall

The United States has a long-standing commitm

efforts to limit, delay, or stop, and even revers

proliferation of a variety of weapons and weapon sys

The several papers contained in this volume are drawn 

a conference that explored the merits of, and va

methods of applying, a competitive strategies approa

the pursuit of U.S. goals in nonproliferation. This app

requires thinking through how to improve one’s re

position in any long-term competition.

Of course, a great deal of thought has gone 

appropriate policies and approaches to nonprolifer

but the idea of applying competitive strategies t

problem of proliferation is an interesting one. The rea

is interesting is that starting from a competitive stra

perspective may succeed in reconceptualizing the pr

in such a way that new insights and new pot

strategies emerge.

It has had this effect in some other cases. Its intell

history goes back to 1969 when at RAND I took ov

direction of the strategic warfare studies area. In revi

the existing program I found that it was not a very coh

overall program of studies.

When I thought about the question of how you s

look at the area of strategic warfare it occurred to m

already more than 20 years had elapsed in a conti

political-military-economic competition with the S

Union in the development and fielding of strategic nu

forces, and defenses against such forces. Moreover

competition would extend, in all likelihood, well in

future. Indeed for all practical purposes it needed 

treated almost as an endless competition that evolve

time as technology changed, as the resources availab

investment by either side changed, as arms co

vii
only in part, each side’s forces represented a react

earlier or anticipated actions by the other competitor

When I looked at how studies of particular progra

policy choices were conducted, it seemed to me tha

criteria used in deciding what decision to make were f

narrow. Very often they focused entirely on 

effectiveness of some proposed system in destroying ta

in case of war. While this is not wrong in itself, it seem

me that the first question one ought to be addressin

that of what is our strategy for competing effectively i

extended competition. In that case, each individual de

about a particular acquisition or change in the force po

ought to be seen as a move in the implementation o

broader strategy; and that the goals of the strategy 

likely to be much more complex than were reflected in 

of the studies.

Reconceptualizing the problem in this way was, at 

for me, very useful. New kinds of questions and issues 

raised. A new light was cast on older, more usual que

and issues. And once the problem was framed in this 

there were new insights into how the risks in 

competition were changing and ought to be managed 

period of the 1970s as contrasted with the period 

1950s. 

Therefore, it seems to me that the approach tha

papers in this volume are proposing could be usef

addressing the long-term security concerns rais

proliferation. Indeed the original terminology develop

the late 1960s and early 1970s—strategies for long

competitions—may more easily evoke for readers 

might be different than the term that was applied 

competitive strategies. The notion that what one is en

in is a very extended process—an extended effo

influence and shape the course of this competition, to 

it toward your goals, to build over time a sup

position—may give one new ideas about how to impa

viii
particular, this way of thinking leads one much 

naturally to look for weaknesses of others to exploit r

than reacting to strengths. When looking at the prob

how to limit and even reverse proliferation of weapon

make the world a more dangerous place, I believe that 

a reasonable place to begin.

ix
Inaugurals of any sort generally involve far more p

than one would initially think. This edited volume, th

to explore the utility of applying competitive strateg

proliferation problems, is no exception.

In addition to the volume’s featured authors, Prev

in A Well-Armed World is the result of insight

assistance of at least five others. Principal among th

Andrew Marshall who first suggested the need to de

competitive strategies against key proliferators w

worked in his office in l989. His continued kind word

counsel have helped maintain the Nonproliferation 

Education Center’s (NPEC’s) efforts in this arena. M

Strmecki of the Smith Richardson Foundation also des

mention. Mr. Strmecki received his first bri

competitive strategies as an approach to proliferat

l995. Ever since then he has been a quiet but pers

champion of applying competitive strategies method

against a variety of proliferation problems.

Fortunately, this volume and the conferences that 

to its publication received additional operational su

from Dr. James Smith, Director of the U.S. Air F

Institute of International Studies, and Colonel J

Cerami, Chairman of the U.S. Army War Col

Department of National Security and Strategy. Both h

fund this volume, hosted the conferences wher

volume’s chapters were first presented (and recr

participants), and are currently working with NPEC 

follow-on concerning North Korea. Also, critical in ke

these co-hosted events on track was Dr. Robin 

professor of Political Science at the U.S. Army War Col

It should be noted that the overwhelming major

funds for this volume and related events came fro

William H. Donner Foundation and the Smith Richa

xi
the United States Institute of Peace.

Finally, as for the actual production of the book

Marianne Oliva, NPEC’s research coordinator, and Ms

Rummel, Ms. Marianne Cowling, and Dr. Max Manw

of the U.S. Army War College deserve more praise tha

book acknowledgement, including this one, could del

xii
STRATEGY, THE MISSING LINK

IN OUR FIGHT AGAINST PROLIFERATI

Henry D. Sokolski

On July 14, l999, the Congressionally-man

Commission to Assess the Organization of the Fe

Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapo

Mass Destruction determined that although 

proliferation of strategic weapons capabilities w

“paramount national security concern” to the United S

our government lacked the long-term country-sp

strategies to check this threat. In particular, wha

government required were “strategies which capital

America’s enduring military, economic, political

diplomatic strengths to . . . leverage against prolifer

clear vulnerabilities in these areas.”

The commission identified what these leve

strategies’ general goals should be: dissuading nations 

proliferating, encouraging hostile regimes to give w

more peaceable ones, keeping our friends secure

strengthening international support of strict standa

nonproliferation. What it did not do was discuss 

devising such strategies would entail.

This edited volume is designed to prompt s

discussion. Although it is modest in size (it contain

seven chapters), Prevailing is the first book to focus on 

issues. It is divided into three parts.

Part I consists of two chapters. The first, “Compe

Strategies: An Approach against Proliferation,” is w

by David J. Andre, who helped implement the Compe

Strategies Initiative in the Pentagon. He reviews how 

methodology was used for military planning pur

xiii
key questions one needs to answer to devise a compe

strategy and considers what difficulties one m

encounter in trying to apply such a methodology to sp

proliferation threats. The second chapter, “Compe

Strategies as a Teaching Tool,” by Bernard I. 

examines why and how such planning techniques sho

taught. 

Part II uses competitive strategies analysis to eva

how well U.S. nonproliferation and counterprolife

policies have performed and how they might be enha

Chapter 3, “Nonproliferation: Strategies for Win

Losing, and Coping,” by Henry D. Sokolski, examin

most recent nonproliferation successes and failure

uses competitive strategies analysis to devise a 

simplified criteria for distinguishing between the 

Zachary S. Davis and Mitchell B. Reiss, meanwhile, t

longer-term look at the same set of issues in Chap

“Nuclear Nonproliferation: Where Has The United S

Won—and Why.” Finally, Thomas G. Mahnken ex

why the Defense Department’s Counterprolifer

Initiative may be necessary but is far short of be

competitive strategy in Chapter 5, “Counterprolifer

Shy of Winning.”

The volume’s concluding part takes the process on

further by using competitive strategies analys

articulate two specific alternative strategies for de

with the case example of Iran. Chapter 6 by Kenne

Timmerman is “Fighting Proliferation through Demo

A Competitive Strategies Approach toward Iran.” Ch

7, “Dual Containment as an Effective Compe

Strategy,” was written by Patrick Clawson.

The book was designed to challenge conven

thinking not only about nonproliferation but also 

strategy. Indeed, when one thinks of strategy, compe

strategies analysis rarely comes to mind. Instead, the 

is usually on classical works by Clausewitz, Jomini, 

xiv
Mckinder. Or, if one is more contemporary, the focus 

be on systems analysis planning tools and their varia

used by budgeters, decisionmakers, and program man

in the Pentagon;

1

 and the ever growing self-help liter

for successful managers. Finally, one might simply foc

the growing list of bad things most planners do (e.g., 

case analysis, linear planning, and mirror imaging).

Competitive strategies planning is none of these t

Unlike systems analysis and its variations, it is n

engineering or resource allocation tool designed to pr

optimal solutions under conditions where the num

variables are limited.

2

 Nor is it a set of managemen

useful for personal improvement. And, unlike the cl

on warfare, competitive strategies planning an

principles are neither bound to specific historical se

nor open to endless debates about their meaning.

First devised at the Harvard Business Scho

business managers by Professor Michael Po

competitive strategies is, as David Andre writes in Ch

1, “both a process and a product.”

3

 As a prod

competitive strategy is a plan of action that assur

owner a long-term advantage in a particular compe

As a process, competitive strategies planning require

one identify and align his enduring strengths again

competitor’s enduring weaknesses (enduring in the c

national competitions being the next 10 to 20 years). A

other things, competitive strategies planning req

thinking through at least a three-step, chess-matc

process over a given period of time. This entails proj

one’s first move, the competitor’s most likely respons

then one’s best countermove against this response. Th

is always to be able to get one’s competitor to spend far 

time and money (or other key resources) to respond to 

moves than you need to respond to his.

Given these attributes, competitive strategies pla

affords several clear benefits for anyone who is try

xv
and who is anxious to avoid the worst tendencies of cu

policy planners. First, the methodology discourages 

officials from mirror-imaging proliferators either as e

who want what we want or as combatants who will s

pursue the opposite of any course we choose. In

competitive strategies planning requires policymak

consider proliferators as distinct competitors with di

goals, weaknesses, strategies, and dispositions. Ident

these is necessary for planners to detail how to levera

proliferator’s behavior over time. Second, unlike 

military and foreign policy planning efforts, w

emphasize bilateral relationships or conflict, compe

strategies requires planners to factor in the strategie

actions of other, key third parties. Third, the method

places a premium on anticipating rather than react

threats—something sorely missing in most no

liferation efforts. And finally, unlike nonproliferatio

counterproliferation (whose premises are rarely quest

and whose progress is only measured in money spe

agreements reached), competitive strategies pla

requires setting clear goals. This includes setting 

deadlines and routine reviews and updating of the 

strategy.

What exactly are the questions that must be answe

succeed at competitive strategies planning? Durin

l980s the Pentagon devised 14 questions described in 

in Chapter 1 to guide its military activities against Mo

This was done by the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessm

help identify the kinds of military investments 

operations that might channel Soviet military invest

away from offensive capabilities that could further thr

the United States.

Rather than try to shore up U.S. vulnerabiliti

investing more U.S. dollars into building more 

shelters or trying to match every new Soviet offe

weapon by building more vulnerable ships or planes 

own, competitive strategies analyses focused on how to 

xvi
inclination to worry about their ability to maintain po

and military control, these operations encourage

Soviets to spend billions on inoffensive (and m

ineffective) anti-submarine and air and missile de

capabilities. In conjunction with a variety of other 

competitive actions being shepherded by other govern

offices—support of freedom fighters in Afghanistan 

Nicaragua, a cut-off of Russian access to U.S. fin

markets, support of dissident organizations througho

Warsaw Pact, massive U.S. research (vice deploym

space-based weaponry)—these military operations no

helped contain Soviet aggression, but ultimately assis

making the Communist government collapse and giv

to a far less hostile regime.

4

The 14 questions that helped the Pentagon guid

competition are also relevant to long-term compe

planning more generally. In fact, last June, at a confe

held at the Army War College, these questions were ad

to begin work on devising a long-term strategy for de

with North Korea. That project is still underway

continue through the year 2000, and will result 

follow-on volume. The aim of this project, like that o

volume, will be to help assure that the strategic gap 

planning against proliferation is filled.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. See, e.g., Glenn.A. Kent, A Framework for Defense P

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, l989, R-3721 AF/OSD).

2. For more detailed critiques see E. S. Quade, “Pitfalls of S

Analysis,” in Quade, ed., Analysis for Military Decisions: The 

Lectures on Systems Analysis, New York: American Elsevier, 19

Paul Davis, New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinki

Much is Enough, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, l994, MR-400-RC, 

3. See Michael E. Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniq

Analyzing Industries and Competitors, New York: Free Press, l9

The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Free Press, 

xvii
J. Andre, New Competitive Strategies: Tools and Methodologie

Review of the Department of Defense Competitive Strategies In

l986-l990, Final Technical Report, McLean, VA: Science Appl

International Corporation, November 30, l990; and J. J. Martin

The U.S.-Soviet Long-term Military Competition, Final Te

Report prepared for the Director, Defense Nuclear Agenc

Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Vo

San Diego, CA: Science Applications International Corporation, 

l990.

xviii
PART I

HOW MIGHT COMPETITIVE STRATEGI

HELP AGAINST PROLIFERATION?

1
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES:

AN APPROACH AGAINST PROLIFERATI

David J. Andre

International peace and stability and other 

interests are potentially threatened by the proliferat

strategic weapons—both advanced conventional sy

and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), incl

nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons

missile-delivery systems. Policymakers have 

responding to this difficult and complex challenge w

broad range of initiatives aimed at curbing bot

incentive to obtain these capabilities (i.e., the “de

side”) and the availability of enabling component

associated technology (i.e., the “supply side”).

1

Based on such matters as the experience gained 

Gulf War with Iraq, the related assumption 

nonproliferation approaches may not succeed entirely

the concern over limitations in U.S. force capabilitie

Department of Defense (DoD) has been pur

counterproliferation, mainly by developing sys

capabilities and exploring military response options a

of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DC

growing body of technical assessments, studies

analyses indicates that implementing these measure

be operationally challenging, technically complex, c

and—in some instances—not entirely feasible. In

from war games are revealing here. For example, 

nonmilitary actions fail to defuse a hypothetica

realistic crisis, experienced military planners and 

participants typically see few to no good alternativ

high-risk military operations that offer the prospect 

best, modest—and thus commonly politi

unacceptable—chances of success. This has prom

3
begin to act now so we never have to deal with this pr

militarily.”

The authors of other chapters in this volume, as w

other commentators, have lamented the lack of ade

progress in dealing with the proliferation of str

weapons through current nonproliferation 

counterproliferation policies and programs.

3

 Alt

necessary and even useful in most cases—

acknowledging occasional, if grudging, progress—

initiatives collectively have proven insufficient in ach

meaningful results.

4

 They likely will not signific

impede, much less prevent, proliferation, and mi

counterforce response options undoubtedly will contin

require acceptance of often disconcerting levels of ris

uncertainty. Moreover, the problem augurs to wors

only because countries determined to acquire 

capabilities have growing access to scientific, technolo

and economic means to develop or simply buy them

have won the (Cold) War yet are at risk of losing what 

pass for peace in the new world (dis)order.

Perhaps it is time to try other approaches

necessarily in lieu of but at least along with cu

pursuits:

• We could try to get ahead of the proliferation pr

through more forward-looking, proactive stra

planning, instead of just reacting to it by (1) making 

demands on the defense acquisition system 

near-leakproof, active theater and strategic def

against ballistic and cruise missiles); (2) relying on pr

instead of results-oriented negotiations (e.g., the ev

nuclear deal between North Korea, the United S

South Korea, and Japan, and indefinite extension 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]); and (3) ado

individual initiatives piecemeal (e.g., item-

technology-control measures).

4
efforts from failing in the face of concerted exertio

proliferators determined to succeed and generally se

to diagnose and ameliorate our assorted shortcomings 

we could develop strategies aimed at exploitin

strengths in leveraging proliferators’ weaknesse

vulnerabilities.

• Instead of pursuing broadly formulated, 

indeterminate, ends—which may amount to little 

than just muddling through, buying time, and hopi

the best—we could seek to achieve more clearly define

actionable goals.

• Instead of thinking and acting almost solely in re

to current actors and events in the context of the short

best) medium-term future, we could adopt a longer-

view of the proliferation problem, including planni

relation to a set of not-implausible alternative futu

decade or more hence.

One candidate framework that meets these dema

criteria at least conceptually is “competitive strat

(CS). These strategies call for thinking and a

strategically in a manner consistent with the view th

United States is engaged in a long-term competition w

broad assortment of proliferators—both acquiring p

and suppliers. Treating proliferation as a probl

long-term competition requiring a CS approach b

United States is not unlike what DoD did during the 

War, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

5

By design, however, these past DoD efforts were la

military: military-operational, military-technical

military-economic. Looking ahead, we see a major ro

the military in deterring attacks against U.S. terr

military forces, and overseas interests, and in he

against and otherwise planning to prosecute a

operations against dangerous proliferation-re

threats.

6

 But we need to conceptualize much broader

multifaceted strategic approaches that will obviate—

5
view the military as but one of a range of possible ava

tools of statecraft. Perhaps CS has something to offer 

as well.

Background to Competitive Strategies.

In his Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announc

have decided to make competitive strategies a major t

of the Department of Defense during the remainder o

Administration.”

7

 Later that spring, he w

“Implementation of our overarching strategy of s

deterrence requires an array of strategies that capital

our advantages and exploit our adversaries’ weaknes

So it was that Competitive Strategies for the Long

Competition with the Soviet Union—more simply, 

Competitive Strategies Initiative—first came to p

attention in 1986. But it has much deeper roots.

At the broadest level of national policy, discussi

U.S. strategy for competing with the Soviet Union beg

the late 1940s, when our relations with the Soviets be

change fundamentally for the worse and there was li

no prospect of a favorable turn of events in the forese

future. Studied interest in systematic plannin

competing with the Soviets over the long term waned 

1968, when Andrew W. Marshall replaced J

Schlesinger as director of strategic studies at RA

Marshall’s quest for a framework for structuring and g

direction to RAND’s program of strategic studies led 

report, Long Term Competition with the Sovi

Framework for Strategic Analysis, published in 1972.

document was a seminal contribution to U.S. str

thinking in the post–World War II era. It reflects the s

influence of Marshall’s interest, beginning in the 

1960s, in the subject of organizational behavior and 

efforts at the Harvard Business School to develop the f

business policy and strategy.

11

6
thinking about U.S. relations with the Soviets w

continuing, essentially endless, military-economic-po

competition. Consciously or not, we and the Soviet

implicit strategies for guiding our actions in 

competition, within which each side tended to emph

different things based on its respective appreciatio

relative strengths and weaknesses. Moreover

competition would proceed in the face of res

constraints on both sides. So our strategy for conducti

competition had to involve more than just tryi

outspend the Soviets. We needed to be efficient in atta

our goals at less cost than the Soviets would inc

pursuing theirs. In addition, before deciding to acq

particular weapon system in a given mission area, we 

raise a more important question: What is an appro

and advantageous strategy overall, as well as fo

particular area of the continuing competition? This in

led logically to a consideration of overarching, long

U.S. interests and goals as to how the competition s

evolve—its pace, scope, degree of stability, and ult

outcome.

In context of the history of American strategic cu

this kind of thinking by Marshall and his colleagues ra

whole series of first-order questions that, although h

relevant, were seldom addressed by DoD and by the de

analytic community at large, which tended to emph

relatively narrow, technical, systems-analysis kin

studies. This, then, was the rich, pioneering intell

tradition that Secretary Weinberger attempted to ex

advance, and institutionalize when he launched 

Competitive Strategies Initiative in 1986.

Competitive Strategies: Concept and Methodol

Worth considering in greater detail are the bas

concept and the methodology devised to give it an

utility.

12

 As implemented in DoD, CS is both a process 

7
thinking that allows for developing and evaluating 

defense strategy in terms of a long-term competition

product, it is a plan of action (or a set of such plans) or s

a guide for helping the nation gain and maint

long-term advantage in a particular competition.

The goal of CS was, through systematic, long-r

strategic-competition planning, to make the U.S. app

to the competition with the Soviets more efficien

effective to enhance deterrence and the security o

United States and its friends and allies. At bottom, Do

seeking to contain the threat until, one hoped, t

improved politically.

Methodologically, CS called for identifying and ali

enduring U.S. strengths against enduring S

weaknesses (the particulars here depended upon 

part of the competition was of immediate interest and 

goals established for the competition). This necess

employing a three-step, chess match-like method

(three was considered the minimum) 

move/response/counter-response sequence in ord

create a new or improved military capabili

high-leverage areas, thereby gaining and maintainin

initiative, shaping the competition, and achi

particular competition goals. All of this was to be done 

context of a planning horizon that extended 15–20 or 

years into the future. The notion of “enduring” stre

and weaknesses involved dealing with things that, by 

very nature, were hard to change, at least in the near 

to mid-term—thus the need to look out 15–20 years or 

A “new or improved military capability” comprise

or more of the following:

• Policies and plans.

• Strategy (deterrent, force development, and/or 

employment). 

• Military doctrine, operational concepts, and tac

8
• Training (individual-, unit-, and force-level).

• Hardware systems (platforms, munitions

supporting systems).

• Technology (improvements to existing system

research and development [R&D] programs).

Given this robust list of options, including combina

CS should not focus exclusively—or even mainl

weapon systems or technologies. Indeed, a part

competitive strategy might not require any new resour

be effective in competing with the Soviets. It migh

involve conceiving smarter ways of using capabilitie

assets already in hand or programmed.

Developing “leverage” in the long-term compe

involved finding ways to:

• encourage the Soviets to divert resources t

threatening forces or doctrine (e.g., defensive rather 

offensive capabilities);

• get them to preserve forces we could defeat rela

easily (e.g., fixed-site air defenses);

• make existing Soviet capabilities obsolescent 

impose costs; for example, by regularly modernizing o

forces); 

• establish areas of enduring military competence 

use our doctrine, operational concepts, technology, e

shape the competition);

• present unanticipated military capabilities 

potentially significant impacts on the Soviets (i.e., ta

initiative, shift the focus of the competition, and chan

rules of the game);

13

 and,

• make the Soviets uncertain about the effectiven

major components of their military capability (e.g., doc

plans, existing equipment, Research and Develop

9
confidence in the expected outcome of their plan

programs.

Whether with regard to the former Soviet Union o

other competitor, CS planning and analysis 

accommodate several important conceptual guideline

CS assumes that, like it or not, the compe

phenomenon is essentially omnipresent an

virtually all cases that matter, is ongoing and 

will continue—perhaps indefinitely. The only qu

is whether to acknowledge that we are already involve

competitive dynamic of actions and reactions with o

more competitors and seek to shape future beha

events, trends, and the overall state of compe

consciously, rather than unconsciously.

14

 For example

though the U.S. Army did not necessarily have CS

Soviet reactions in mind when it adopted AirLand B

doctrine and when it joined with the U.S. Air Force 

“Assault Breaker” program, the Soviets re

nonetheless. They reacted, as well, to NATO’s foll

forces attack (FOFA) concept and to various aspects 

U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy.

CS requires identifying a specific competit

several competitors. In general, this was la

self-defining during the Cold War. However, right up 

time of the debunking of Soviet communism an

collapse of the empire it had dominated for much of th

century, Western experts were still debating wheth

Soviet hierarchy was essentially monolithic or, 

pluralistic democracies, it comprised competing fa

representing divergent points of view that our stra

could exploit.

The best competitor is reasonably predictab

all of the dangers and other difficulties the So

presented as competitors, American policy elites w

believed and acted as though the Kremlin was la

inhabited by “rational actors” who would act respo

10
could anticipate. This notion was generally confirmed 

course of successfully defusing several major crises. Sh

that, however, the history of Western intelligenc

national security policy in the Cold War is replete 

instances of the Soviets doing the unexpected—some

with major consequences.

15

The most effective competitive strategy 

advantage of the competitor’s endu

predispositions. This guideline requires understan

competitor well enough to elicit a desired response t

also compatible with his basic values, interests

objectives. To do otherwise is to work counter to h

nature and thus to limit the predictability of the oppo

reaction. Insights into possible behavior of the Soviets 

gleaned from their own extensive writings—incl

voluminous codifications of immutable “laws of war

the like—as well as from the ever-expan

multidisciplinary corpus of knowledge and inform

generated by the massive Western intelligence effor

almost half a century. In addition, American strat

could always count on a seemingly conge

predisposition of the Soviets to paranoia and to a mu

reinforcing national inferiority complex when it ca

their perceived need and ability to defend the homela

Time is a critical factor that must be made a p

any competitive strategy. All advantages are trans

their duration depends on the advantage sought an

opponent’s willingness and ability to react. In addition

is a matter of relative scale. Even as we seemingly 

prepared to compete with the Soviets indefinitely, sh

time lines had to be carefully managed within the o

competition. The complex dynamics of the va

subsidiary military-balance areas (e.g., artillery v

artillery, air versus air defense) testify to this pra

reality.

11
alternatives in planning and managing the long

military competition with the Soviet Union:

• The United States had the lead and needed to re

(e.g., advanced technology in general; modern naval a

forces). 

• At any given time, one side or the other enjoye

lead, but the United States had to hold its own (e.g.

technology; the overall armor/antiarmor balance).

• We had to cope with the Soviets’ compar

advantage in a particular area by determining h

compete from a position of relative weakness (e.g., fig

outnumbered in the event of a war in Europe).

• Lastly, we could decide not to compete (e.g., large

Soviet investments in civil defense that we chose 

match). These basic but important ideas, as well as o

that emerged as we gained experience, provide

essential basis in theory for understanding and condu

CS planning and analysis as it was formally undertak

DoD in 1986.

Aside from the defining early contributions of An

Marshall and others to the theoretical and practical u

standing of CS, these strategies were neither revoluti

(as some were suggesting) nor even new. Senior memb

DoD and their closest advisors had pursued this k

thinking over the years in several areas, even though 

time no one characterized it as CS. For example, Secr

Weinberger’s Defense Guidance documents for 198

1982—the first two years of the Re

administration—made reference to “competing wit

Soviet Union in peacetime.”

17

 They stressed the id

imposing costs on the Soviets, along with other goal

were to be pursued through CS. In his annual repo

Congress for FY 1987 and FY 1988, the secretary 

several historical examples of what were judged succ

CS. Both the ability of U.S. bombers to penetrate S

12
figured prominently among the cases mentioned.

18

As a basic concept in strategic planning, then, a

both Secretary Weinberger and Andrew Marshall a

were quick to point out, CS itself was not new. Wha

new about CS as DoD began to practice it in 198

Secretary Weinberger’s decision to formally institutio

the process by involving people at many different leve

by attempting to develop and implement CS in a delib

systematic, and thus more effective way than hithert

been the case. He hoped that such an approach migh

ultimately to a fundamental change for the better in ho

department thought about and developed the mi

component of U.S. national security strategy, structur

research, development, and acquisition (RDA) prog

and, more generally, arrived at key decisions as p

DoD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting S

(PPBS).

Adopting and Adapting Competitive Strategies

to Current Needs.

What, if anything, might all of this theory and 

formal and informal historical practice have to of

contemplating the post-Cold War future? In particula

much—if any—of the original CS concept and method

is suitable for use in waging an effective fight again

proliferation of strategic weapons? At first glance, 

appears to be some good news. But there is some poten

bad news as well—or at least a few things that merit a 

look and probably some hard work to rationalize i

current context.

Competitive Strategies Past and Future:

Commonalities.

On the positive side of the ledger, policyma

planners, and analysts do not need to begin with a 

slate. There are some important, immediately transfe

13
as: 

• certain basic definitions and planning concepts, 

already mentioned, and analysis tools and technique

• the natural complementarity that exists be

long-term competition planning and more tradi

planning and management systems, such as—in the c

DoD—the PPBS and the Joint Staff’s Joint Str

Planning System (JSPS); and,

• the value of planning backward from not-impla

alternative futures that involve one or more prolife

fielding and even employing strategic capabilities ag

the United States or one of its allies or friends (of part

importance here for dealing with the proliferati

strategic weapons; this includes assessing the full ra

military operational implications of such potential thr

In seeking to draw on lessons from past practic

must at the outset take good account of what may be im

by the conceptual guidelines introduced earlier.

CS assumes that, like it or not, the compe

phenomenon is essentially omnipresent an

virtually all cases that matter, is ongoing and 

will continue—perhaps indefinitely. As formerly

respect to the Soviets, the question is whether w

acknowledge that we are already involved in a compe

dynamic of actions and reactions with va

competitors—in this case proliferators—and seek to 

future behaviors, events, trends, and the overall state 

competition consciously, rather than unconsciously

Israeli air strike against the Osirak reactor, the coal

war against Iraq, and the U.S.-sponsored multilatera

with North Korea involving its nuclear program are a

that we might reasonably expect to influence the f

behavior of proliferators. The problem, to date, is that 

some of our actions may be inducing competitor rea

that we might favor, all too often our approach to contr

14
stated aims of current policies are generally support

our long-term security interests, in practice they ofte

subordinated to more short-term domestic and fo

political and economic goals whose pursuit works coun

the basic notion of competing consciously and effec

over the long term.

CS requires identifying a specific competit

several competitors. Although we acknowledge the 

of common policy guidelines, a one-size-fits-all strat

counter proliferation would have to be so general as 

virtually useless in particular instances. Each ca

unique—sometimes in nontrivial ways. Conside

example, the fundamental differences in the chall

posed to U.S. interests and policy on proliferation by 

Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, France, Israel, and ra

Islamic fundamentalism.

The best competitor is reasonably predic

Given the broad range of national and elite psycho

represented by the full spectrum of current and pot

future proliferators, this guideline appears to pose 

real challenges. At the least, it would seem to su

limiting expectations about what we can gain 

subtleties in plans aimed at influencing the behav

assorted “crazies” and others whose reactions may be 

to anticipate. We must remember, however, that We

policymakers only gradually came to believe tha

Soviets were rational and, within limits, predictab

Winston Churchill once said with characteristic insigh

eloquence, Russian policy “is a riddle wrapped in a my

inside an enigma.” He then proffered what turned ou

akin to the Rosetta stone in deciphering the Soviets

well enough to deal with them effectively during the 

War: “But perhaps there is a key. That key is Ru

national interest.”

20

 One suspects that this conclus

well as all that derives from it retain

applicability—again, within limits—when dealing 

proliferators.

21

 Very importantly, we need not as

15
to reasonably anticipate his reactions because h

displayed fairly consistent preferences for certain mo

action.

22

The most effective competitive strategy 

advantage of the competitor’s enduring pred

sitions. This guideline argues for focusing on compe

about whom we already are reasonably knowledg

while gathering more intelligence and developing a 

working understanding of the others. It also sug

exploiting opportunities where we now have leverage 

generate it quickly, such as those cases in w

proliferators depend upon us for something th

important to them.

Time is a critical factor that must be made a p

any competitive strategy. Because competitor

unique, each may have a different perspective o

concept of time that we need to factor into our own str

calculus. For example, the Soviets often were credited 

taking the long view—seeing the “inevitable” victo

Marxism-Leninism as requiring perhaps decades or m

achieve. But what of those competitors whose opera

time horizon includes the afterlife and glory achieved 

through martyrdom in this life? Less teleologically—a

take competition goals as an example—in the short t

may be necessary as a practical matter to seek (with 

urgency) to prevent certain dangerous proliferators 

gaining access to nuclear weapons. Over the longer 

however, it may be sufficient just to contain them—

did with the Soviet Union.

Competitive Strategies Past and Future:

Dissimilarities.

On the other side of the ledger, some key differ

exist between military CS against the former Soviet U

and a broadened formulation of competition pla

involving assorted proliferators—differences that 

16
perspectives and methods. These dissimilarities stem 

the greatly increased uncertainty, complexity

sensitivity that result from the following.

Expanding, perhaps substantially, the num

competitors. This includes both suppliers and recipie

strategic capabilities—both state and nonstate a

starting now and extending into the future.

Increasing the number of instruments of pol

least theoretically available for prosecut

competition. Even when it was largely confined 

military domain, CS planning and analysis proved 

challenging. Taking account of political, diplom

economic, psychological, and other factors, as well, por

to greatly increase the complexity of the task.

Competing in areas of interest for nat

security—not just with enemies but also with fr

and perhaps even traditional formal military al

is a long way conceptually and analytically—as w

politically—from Iraq to, say, Taiwan and Germany.

Having to coordinate with a greater numb

contributing and interested offices and age

within the U.S. government and, as necessary

selected non-U.S. players. Among other things, thi

for participatory arrangements that are inclusive an

facilitate close cooperation, coordination, and shar

intelligence, yet allow for safeguarding sensitive na

security information.

Having to choose from a much larger unive

possible competition goals, as well as havi

manage the inevitable resulting increased frequ

of inconsistencies and even conflicts among 

Developing and implementing effective strategie

fighting proliferation requires that everyone inv

achieve a congruence of goals—seldom an easy task

example, throughout the Cold War, there existe

17
within the U.S. Government as to whether the over

aim of policy should be to compete effectively wit

Soviets or to seek stability in our relations with them

Having to adapt and improve existing an

tools and methods and create entirely new 

Path-type, political-military simulation exercises 

operational war games have proven helpful—w

limits—in exploring alternative security environmen

the future, including the possible nature of future wa

associated implications for policy. On the technical 

however, the suite of computer-based models tha

evolved over the last several decades remains inadequ

helping military planners (as opposed to a few tec

experts) understand the nature and implicatio

integrated (i.e., conventional and NBC) warfare.

23

In sum, if seeking to employ the CS approach in pla

against the proliferation of strategic capabilities, on

build on some important continuities with past pra

But one must also take into account many impo

differences.

Planning Competition Strategies.

The object of strategy in general is to bring about 

preferred end or state of being, including conditions th

most favorable to one’s own side. But the crafting of str

involves more art than science, so there is no gen

accepted best way to do it.

Elements of Strategy.

At the same time, one can approach the task usefu

applying time-tested principles and techniques

example, any true strategy—including a compe

strategy—involves the pursuit of particular ends (i.e., 

goals, or objectives) in relation to one or more iden

competitors, threats, or a more general set of str

18
(e.g., instruments of policy, including associated hu

materiel, and financial resources) through a time-p

plan of some kind that rationalizes and integrates 

various strategic elements in the manner in wh

answers the question “How?”

In other words, a competitive strategy—like any 

strategy—should provide a realistic, actionable explan

of how, over a given period of time, a particular set of 

will accomplish clearly stated, measurable goals for a 

competition.

Experience in DoD with planning for long-term m

competition with the Soviet Union reveals that hav

focus on goals and on the How? question—the esse

strategy—causes one to think differently. It also raise

different issues and questions than might otherwise 

case, particularly when one contemplates long

competitive futures. Among other things, it encou

taking charge of the future. That is, it helps offse

tendency to focus almost solely on current problem

identifying opportunities, exploiting them from a posit

established strength, moving in chosen directions

proactively shaping the competitive environment.

Key Questions in Competition Planning.

People who participate in long-range stra

competition planning and analysis—whether with re

to competitors who are threats, friends, or allies—

profitably organize their thinking around certai

questions.

24

1. What is the abiding context of U.S. strategy tha

current strategy must comport with, and what 

assumptions underlie and thus condition our str

thinking about the future?

19
environment? What alternative futures are possible 

the next 15–20 years?

3. Which alternative futures do we prefer? Which 

wish to avoid?

4. Who are our current and likely future compet

Who are the key third parties?

5. What are our competitors’ and key third parties

and their strategies for achieving them?

6. What is the current state of the competition(s)? 

future states are possible, and which do we prefer?

7. What major problems, enduring weaknesses

other constraints face our competitor(s)? What are 

strengths?

8. In any and all cases, what are our time-phased 

for the competition—both overall and supporting?

9. What are our areas of advantage or leve

including our enduring strengths, relative to the part

challenge(s) the competition poses? What ar

limitations or weaknesses?

10. What basic capacities or core competencies 

need to develop, sustain, adapt, protect, and pl

leverage?

11. What strategies can we employ that will permi

influence—or even dominate—key competitions and f

trends and events?

12. What is the likely range of competitor and third 

countermoves? How might we respond?

13. What are the implications for resource alloc

including priorities, trade-offs, and divestment?

20
opportunities that accrue to various alternative se

futures and competitive strategies?

The perspective afforded and the mental disc

imposed simply by asking such questions not only enri

planning process but also enhance the chances of deve

an effective strategy.

Where from Here?

All of the aforementioned history, theory, and ass

basics of strategy and strategic planning may be we

good, as far as it goes, if only by analogy. But how mig

proceed from here?

For all of the potential dangers and uncertainties th

ahead (and we must not underestimate them), the pr

situation offers an opportunity to make a real differe

how we fight against proliferation—both preventing 

least modulating it, as well as countering it. We stil

time to do it right—or at least to greater practical long

effect. But we need to get on with it—and in a serious 

Competitive strategies may have value to add here

just militarily, as was the case in DoD during the Cold 

but more broadly. To determine with greater spec

what that value might be, we should do several thing

• Go back to the beginning and think through the is

strategic weapons proliferation from first princ

including basic definitions (e.g., nonproliferation 

counterproliferation).

25

• Ask what constitutes a strategic capability (incl

related technology), both now and as time unfolds

why. 

• Examine the existing body of literature on long-

strategic planning, including CS, and consider ho

concepts, methods, and techniques discussed might h

be adapted to render them more relevant to the prolife

21
well. 

• Build on existing trend analyses and t

assessments and add to the current catalog, looking 

near-term, mid-term, and long-term future.

• Select one or a few current and possible f

proliferators (Iran and North Korea [or even a united K

might be good candidates), and begin to plan against 

employing the list of key questions provided earlie

adjusting the methodology as needed.

• Adopt the dynamic approach to planning. For exa

give the proliferator credit for being at least as perce

resourceful, and adaptive as we are, and think in ter

action and reaction sequences—over the long term.

DoD experience in planning for long-term peac

military competition with the former Soviet Union con

that all of this is far easier said than done—much less 

well. We must anticipate and plan for various for

institutional resistance. Because we will find critica

lacking, we will need more and better intelligence. A

will require all manner of tough philosophical, tech

analytic, management, and policy judgments—incl

even the defining fundamentals (such as the 

assumptions and the specific competition goals to pu

Lack of an overarching strategic approach th

unambiguously goal oriented, forward looking, proa

and anchored on a foundation of national strength m

the ongoing fight against the proliferation of str

weapons more difficult than it otherwise might be. Vi

proliferation as a problem of long-term competitio

adapting the traditional CS concept and methodolo

strategic planning and analysis may offer a u

beginning in meeting this need. It is at least w

trying—and there is no time like the present.

22
1. For a summary of the proliferation issue, including curre

policy responses, see Robert G. Joseph, “WMD: A Prolif

Overview,” in William H. Lewis and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Wea

Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterprolife

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp. 

2. See Mitchel B. Wallerstein, “Concepts to Capabilities: Th

Year of Counterproliferation,” in Lewis and Johnson, eds., Wea

Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation pp, 

The current official definition of the term counterproliferation is 

to WMD.

3. See especially Chris Williams “DoD’s Counterprolif

Initiative: A Critical Assessment,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., F

Proliferation: New Concerns for the 1990s, Maxwell Air Force Ba

Air University Press, 1996; and Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “Building 

Secure Asia through Missile Defense,” Backgrounder, N

Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, Asian Studies Center, 

24, 1995.

4. Problems with traditional approaches to nonproliferat

alternatives to them are examined by Lewis A. Dunn, “Prolif

Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism,” in Lewis and Johnson, pp. 2

5. A thoughtful treatment of the U.S.-Soviet military comp

including suggested means and methods for competing effect

presented in J. J. Martin, et al., The U.S.-Soviet Long-Term 

Competition, Final Technical Report prepared for the Director, D

Nuclear Agency, and Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Se

of Defense, Vols. 1–3, San Diego, CA: Science Applications Intern

Corporation, June 5, 1990. Volume 1, Concepts, describes the n

the peacetime military competition, including concepts use

understanding what was important in this competition a

developing strategies to compete effectively. Volume 2, Plann

Analysis, proposes a structured process for devising and implem

strategies for the long-term military competition, evaluates 

analysis tools in terms of their adequacy to support competitive s

development, and recommends improvements. Volume 3, App

contains case studies and other background papers that supp

Volumes 1 and 2.

6. See, for example, Dunn, pp. 36–37.

7. Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress

Year 1987, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

February 5, 1986, p. 87.

23
Spring 1986, p. 694.

9. Since the mid-1970s, Marshall has been the first and only 

of the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of De

10. A. W. Marshall, Long-Term Competition with the So

Framework for Strategic Analysis (U), RAND Report R-862-PR

Monica, CA: RAND, April 1972. (Confidential; subsequently r

and declassified)

11. See, for example, the many works on business com

strategies by Harvard’s Michael E. Porter, including Com

Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competito

York: Free Press, 1980; and The Competitive Advantage of Natio

York: Free Press, 1990.

12. The discussion in this section is adapted from David J. 

New Competitive Strategies: Tools and Methodologies, Vol. 1, R

the Department of Defense Competitive Strategies Initiative, 198

Final Technical Report, McLean, VA: Science Applic

International Corporation, November 30, 1990.

13. Whatever one may believe regarding the technical fea

and the economic affordability of the Reagan administration’s S

Defense Initiative (SDI), announced in 1982, former Soviet 

have said in recent meetings with U.S. analysts that they viewed 

a compelling competitive strategy. They were at least as conce

not more so, with unknowable but—in their view—inev

pathbreaking technical spin-offs from the massive SDI r

program as they were with the United States achieving its stated 

14. Even as Secretary Weinberger was attempt

institutionalize competition planning in DoD in the mid-1980

officials and staff members in other departments and agencie

federal government questioned the basic wisdom of characteriz

Soviets as competitors, much less planning accordingly.

15. Examples include the Soviet decisions to m

independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) their strategic 

missiles, invade Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, remove the 

Wall, and dissolve the Soviet Union itself.

16. As Pravda often exhorted, “Defense of the Fatherland 

supreme law of life.”

17. Department of Defense, Defense Guidance, Fiscal Year 1

and Defense Guidance, Fiscal Year 1982 (U). (Secret) Infor

extracted is unclassified.

24
86; idem, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988, pp. 

Refer also to Randall A. Greenwalt, David J. Andre, et al., Hi

Examples of Competitive Strategies, Final Technical Report sp

by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Offic

Secretary of Defense (OSD), and prepared for Director, Com

Strategies Office, OSD, Denver, CO: Science Applications Intern

Corporation, March 23, 1991.

19. Analysis tools to support competition planning, inclu

evaluation of current tools and techniques, are discussed in Ma

al., Vol. 2, Planning and Analysis. For an assessment of the app

of particular tools in the DoD Competitive Strategies Initiat

Andre, New Competitive Strategies.

20. Radio broadcast of October 1, 1939.

21. Stephen Peter Rosen of Harvard University has 

persuasively in private conversation that we can better understa

deal with even “crazy” actors by broadening our knowledge 

actual strategic—including noncrisis—behavior. Even as 

“noncrazies,” Rosen notes that the rational-actor model is limite

ability to understand how others “calculate”—when they calcu

all. (Anyone may occasionally act on impulse.) In any and al

however, in Rosen’s view the key question reduces to: What are 

actor’s interests, what does he want, and what is the ass

cost-benefit or ends-means logic?

22. Stephen Rosen brought this insight to my attention.

23. Tools to support counterproliferation planning and anal

discussed briefly in Wallerstein, p. 21.

24. Adapted from Martin, et al.

25. Limiting the official definition of counterprolifera

weapons of mass destruction ignores the reality that, even if the 

of WMD were somehow controlled, advanced conven

weapons—some with WMD-like effects—and supporting capa

will continue to present an even more rapidly growing threat 

interests and military forces worldwide. Moreover, many of the m

capabilities whose development now falls under the D

Counterproliferation Initiative both predate the DCI and we

remain fungible across a range of conventiona

nonconvenional—including WMD—threats.

25
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES

AS A TEACHING TOOL

Bernard I. Finel

Teaching Students about Policy.

One of the most difficult challenges facing fa

members in policy relevant disciplines is teaching stu

how to think about making policy. Certainly, professo

adept at explaining the ins and outs of the policy proc

is also easy enough to teach students about past policie

point out successes and failures. However, it is diffic

teach students how to devise policies which are 

politically plausible and likely to succeed.

As a general rule, students at both the graduat

undergraduate levels fall into two traps in terms of thi

about policy. First, some students do not fully under

the context in which policy is made. They do not under

the cross-cutting pressures on decisionmakers, and 

trouble assessing how given policy options affect inter

parties. Second, many students are unalterably tied 

conventional wisdom. They confuse thinking about 

themselves with research on what people 

recommended in the past. This reliance on conven

wisdom is pernicious and difficult to solve. Profe

hoping to prepare their students for positions in the 

community must be able to communicate the conven

wisdom to their students. Analysts hoping to be succ

must know what people are thinking and what ar

bounds of acceptable opinion.

The proliferation issue provides a good example 

difficulty of teaching students about policy. On one 

many students have difficulty understandin

constraints on proliferation policy. Although academic

27
that the United States should either ignore or 

encourage nuclear proliferation, advocating such poli

a sure way to be marginalized or worse in the 

community.

1

 An academic program that allows its stu

to go out into the “real world” making such argume

doing the student a fundamental disservice. More s

however, many students come out of policy prog

believing that proliferation should be dealt with by 

pre-emptive military strikes. This is a more accep

option publicly, but is ultimately implausible for the U

States simply because the American people are unlik

accept a policy of unprovoked military attacks for 

reasons, especially when such attacks risk contamin

the vicinity of the target with radiation or chemi

biological toxins.

2

By contrast, students whose professors and resear

closer to the policy community often miss the forest f

trees. They are so focused on the details of the 

counterproliferation initiative of the Department of De

(DoD), for instance, that they are unwilling to think 

the problem of proliferation more broadly. These stu

believe that proliferation policy options are limited to 

officially promulgated by the government or prom

research institutes.

Unfortunately, this division of would-be policym

into those who are unaware of context and those wh

completely tied to conventional wisdom hinders U.S. a

to develop effective and comprehensive policies to dea

proliferation. The key to dealing with policymaking 

complex world is to have a process for assessin

constraints and generating options. The compe

strategy (CS) framework is useful in generating 

insights into policy options, and as a result is a va

teaching tool for professors hoping to help students de

their ability to think about policy.

3

28
One of the great debates in the study of polit

whether policymaking is art or science. Do succ

policymakers have some sort of special insight? Or ar

simply more organized and supported by better staff?

Although many observers see a particular genius 

actions of statesmen like Metternich, Bismarc

Kissinger, it is difficult to derive pedagogical implica

from this position. If successful policymaking is an a

skill concentrated in few gifted individuals, then how 

teach about policy and strategy? Does it even make se

have academic programs in both government 

universities to try to teach the policymaking art?

Art education is, of course, an important part of a l

arts background. However, advanced study in the a

only usually open to those of great talent. Prosp

students to film schools and music conservatories 

present evidence of their talent before admission. S

policy programs require applicants to demonstrate 

strategic skills before being admitted? The sugg

seems bizarre, in part because although we may on occ

argue that strategy is an art, we accept that it i

something which can be taught.

In addition, policy, unlike art, can be assess

examining the process of its creation. A policy c

successful, but still be bad policy if it is based on f

assumptions and an incomplete assessment of op

Under these conditions, we might argue tha

policymaker was lucky rather than good, and not wor

emulation. True art, by contrast, is mysterious. It 

from within, and we are more concerned with the 

product than with the process of its production.

Teaching policy as art also raises the problem that 

is no good way to assess competing positions. Do you 

the Impressionists or the Grand Masters? Is that e

coherent question? How would one begin to answer i

29
Proponents of competing positions will appear on Su

morning talk shows and go at each other for half an ho

the end of which everyone still believes what they be

going in. There is no good process for assessing policy a

Finally, the problem with thinking about polic

strategy as art rather than science is that art is 

difficult to teach than science. The core of science 

scientific method of gathering evidence, positing and t

relationships, and then trying to expand the res

insights to encompass broader empirical domains. S

relies on developing testable and comparable proposi

This forces analysts to make their assumptions 

procedures explicit. As a result, a scientific approach 

itself both to teaching and assessment.

That said, there is no one answer to a policy problem

only are outcomes dependent on the interaction of dif

actors’ choices, but there is often the problem of incom

or inaccurate information. Even if decisionmakers 

clear process for assessing their environment 

developing options, they risk policy failure d

unforeseen circumstances. Just because it is possi

think of the policy process as a science of sorts, doe

mean that policy can be precise or always successful.

Carl von Clausewitz’s writings deal with this part

problem. For him the key problem in war is m

decisions under conditions of stress and uncertain

response, he argued for a synthesis between art and sc

For Clausewitz there is a sort of military genius, but it 

something people are necessarily born with. He argue

one can learn about military affairs, how to ass

dangerous situation, how to make decisions, and h

persevere in the face of the fog of war. The succ

military leader, for Clausewitz, is one who is able to ha

his natural abilities and bolster them through experien

Clausewitz’s writings suggest the importan

experiential learning. Unfortunately, experiential lea

30
schools and programs use simulations and gaming to 

extent to teach students. Many business schools use 

studies as a central teaching tool, and some interna

affairs programs integrate political-military games 

their curriculum at the margins. Ultimately, howeve

and resource limitations mean that most teaching will 

within the classroom and outside the realm of experi

learning.

The alternative to experiential learning is to 

students a process for thinking about strategy and p

The competitive strategy methodology is very useful t

students think through policy options.

Competitive Strategy Methodology.

In contrast to traditional strategic planning, wh

usually done on an ad hoc basis, and hence is susceptib

variety of miscalculations and bad assumpt

competitive strategy is a systematic methodology des

to aid in planning for the future. Competitive strateg

developed to help corporations understand 

environment, their own position, and the options they 

to modify these two factors to improve their position

approach has now become common in business school

has been applied to international politics largely by a 

group of analysts affiliated with the Office o

Assessment in the Pentagon.

6

In his original formulation of the approach, Mich

Porter stressed the importance of firms understanding 

comparative position in the marketplace. His app

rests on the assumption that market conditions 

considerably from sector to sector. What represents 

performance in one sector, say a mature retail sector w

2-3 percent revenue growth per year is quite good, wo

considered poor in the internet sector where the le

firms see revenue increases of 200-300 percent ann

Porter’s main concern, however, was not with ab

31
market and competitors. For him, a market strateg

not geared toward either the market or competitors 

but rather a successful strategy would examine the i

of actions on both. Furthermore, Porter stresse

importance of considering the strengths and weaknes

both one’s own firm and one’s rivals, as well as the stra

and options available to each.

The competitive strategy approach was developed 

situation in which two or more firms compete in a 

market. A market contains its own logic. Firm

long-term profit-maximizers. They compete for m

share and returns on investment. Certainly, there m

some firms which fail to follow these goals, but the

likely to be eliminated from the competition rapidly

result, a marketplace is both self-regulating 

self-reinforcing. In short, in a market, the goals of firm

inherently competitive. Certainly, there are 

nonzero-sum outcomes, as with oligopolistic competi

such as situations where firms collude to keep prices 

but even then, firms have little stake in the success of 

since the collapse of other firms usually strengthens 

own position.

The competitive strategy approach was appli

international politics most successfully in assessin

managing the long-term competition with the former S

Union. To make the jump from market strate

international politics, however, requires severa

assumptions. The first assumption is that there is som

of an overarching system or international environm

which all the relevant states exist. This is the equivale

given market or market sector. Second, using compe

strategy to plan for international politics assumes 

there is some sort of on-going competition as 

inherently with firms in a marketplace. Third, compe

strategy makes fundamental assumptions about the n

of incentives and rewards in the international sy

32
states can also benefit from gaining at each other’s exp

Scholars of international affairs will note tha

competitive strategy framework, therefore, makes m

the same key assumptions as neorealism.

7

 Howeve

framework does not assume that the constraint

structural, but rather that the competitive syst

fundamentally actor-generated as in some construc

accounts of international politics. As a result

competitive strategy framework for policy analy

complementary to much of the existing theory 

international politics. This is consistent with Po

original intention of blending traditional, case study

business analysis with more conceptual and rig

findings of industrial economics.

The CS framework clearly differentiates bet

industry or system structure, and the unit level attribu

states and firms. The causal links between the tw

bi-directional, and strategy mediates the effects o

behavior on industry structure and of industry structu

state options. Strategy, in this context, is therefor

reducible to a simple set of rules. Strategy, in th

framework, is dynamic and changing.

These points can best be explained by app

competitive strategy to international politics as disc

by David Andre in his important article on this su

Andre has derived fourteen sets of questions.

8

 The

roughly be divided into three groups: questions abou

international system, questions about the individu

unit-level attributes of the competitors, and questions 

strategic choice and strategic interaction.

Without a methodology for providing answers, CS 

a useful tool for strategic planning or for teaching 

policy. Students need to be taught precisely how to a

the relevant factors in each of the three levels of ana

Ultimately, the single greatest limitation on using C

teaching tool in the foreign policy area is the la

33
particularly problematic because many of the key ter

CS as applied to international politics are vagu

requires analysts to examine the nature of the 

strategic environment as well as the proclivities, stren

and weakness of states. Experienced analysts may b

to address such issues effectively, but most student

need more guidance to use CS effectively.

The following sections build on Andre’s wo

addressing methods for answering his questions. 

strategic planners and academics hoping to use CS 

teaching tool must consider systemic ways of answ

questions about competition and strategy. Askin

questions is merely an important first step. However, 

the CS framework does suggest certain key questio

also allows us to think systematically about h

approach planning for an on-going competition. An

should also draw upon the vast body of scholarsh

international politics to help structure their answers 

CS framework. The following sections suggest some 

relevant literature.

Understanding the International System.

When we speak about industry structure, there ar

of easily definable variables to examine. The fou

questions firms face in assessing their environment a

How many firms are competing in a given industry?; (

the barriers to entry for new firms high or low?; (3

significant economies of scale possible?; and, (4) How s

is the threat of substitute products or services?

9

If there are many firms, low barriers to entry

economies of scale, and a significant threat of subs

products, we can expect the market to approach p

competition, and profit margins to be relatively 

Industries with few firms, high barriers, large econom

scale, and no substitute products often lead to oligopo

monopolies and high profit margins.

34
international politics with the same degree of prec

Furthermore, since there is no common goal of n

equivalent to the role of profits for firms, it is more di

to provided generalizable linkages between interna

structure and policy outcomes. That said, however

possible to discuss some basic variables in the interna

system and how they affect specific policy options.

When we speak about international structure 

structural variables, we are discussing factors which p

and are not immediately changeable by state deci

System structure does change, and states can, through 

choices, modify the international system. However

takes a long time, usually 10-15 years at a minimum

In trying to define the international environmen

can specify a few key variables. The first variable to con

is the number of important actors active on a given 

When speaking of the international system as a whol

variable is usually referred to as polarity. Schola

international affairs have suggested that polarity is l

to alliance behavior, the likelihood of war, and bala

behavior.

10

 In addition, scholars have suggested th

number of actors affects the possibility of cooper

although the effects are conceptually ambiguous.

11

 

observers have identified the bipolar nature of the Col

as being an important variable in explaining bo

substance and persistence over nearly 45 years.

1

second variable is the presence or absence of functi

international institutions.

13

 Although some scholars 

argued that institutions are largely irrelevant, or at 

that they are likely to fail under any sort of major s

most issues in the world today are governed by some s

international institutions. Institutions can be f

organizations such as the United Nations, or impl

explicit rules of behavior such as the Non-Prolife

Treaty (NPT) regime. International institutions can 

as a significant source of power in the international sy

and states need to assess whether and under 

35
resources. The United States, for instance, has long 

the formal institution of the North Atlantic T

Organization (NATO) as a way to increase its powe

influence in Europe.

The third variable, particularly in security relatio

the utility of force in the international system. 

structural level the utility of force is constrained b

offense-defense balance, which is the perceived o

advantage of either offensive uses of force or defensiv

of force.

14

 When defense is dominant or seen as such, f

less usable. When offense is dominant, not only is war 

likely, but such secondary effects as arms race

pressures for preemption also occur. The utility of 

however, is also affected by the existence of norms, th

definitions of appropriate behavior defined in ter

rights and obligations. Norms are important in determ

whether states will be able to legitimize uses of 

Saddam Hussein’s failure to heed the global norm ag

unprovoked aggression allowed the United States to 

the coalition against Iraq during the Gulf War.

The fourth variable is the existence of a dom

understanding of strategy. Like norms, strategic think

an ideational variable, but unlike norms it doe

necessarily contain a definition of rights and obliga

Rather, strategic ideas often reflect shared beliefs 

states’ definition of interests. The general acceptan

mercantilism in the 17th century is an example of s

strategic thinking functioning as a structural var

Mercantilism posited that economic relations 

zero-sum; this is distinct from the currently dom

school of neo-classical economics which sees tra

positive-sum by definition.

These four variables largely define the interna

system. By examining these variables, strategic pla

can begin to assess three sets of issues. First, the stru

of the international systems helps planners assess 

36
planners need to worry about the threat of attack more 

when defense is dominant. Hence in an offense-dom

world, “hard” security concerns take precedence 

“softer” issues such as economics and individual we

Second, similarly, the international system helps pla

understand the interests of other states. Third

structure of the international system helps pla

understand some of the factors which either he

constrain specific policy instruments. When fo

perceived as being less legitimate, for instance, it beh

planners to consider the political ramifications of 

force as well as the military effects. Ultimately, stu

and analysts must determine for themselves w

variables they consider important in determining s

structure, but it is imperative that they do so explicit

with a clear understanding of how their variables inter

create constraints or incentives for states.

Unit-Level Variables.

When looking at unit-level variables in firms, P

suggests the importance of examining sustainable ar

competitive advantage. Porter observed that profitabi

related directly to cost and price issues: How cheaply ca

firm produce a given good or service, and how much 

charge for that good or service? To be profitable, firms 

develop a strategy that either allows them to produce 

and services less expensively than their competito

allows them to distinguish their goods and services 

their competitors’. This differentiation allows fir

charge a premium for their unique products. Porte

stresses the importance of thinking strategically abou

a firm can improve its position over the long term.

For states, the analytical framework is much 

complex. Not only are goals varied, but it is difficult 

impossible to specify strategies fruitfully a p

Nevertheless, the CS framework does suggest a ser

37
position and goals.

The first variable is the nature of the state’s 

Ideally, a strategic planner should be able to deve

hierarchy of goals for the state. The difficulty occurs be

states have goals across a wide range of issues and vi

a large number of other actors. It may be possi

harmonize preferences, although this is rarely done in 

in part due to the diffuse nature of policy formulat

modern, bureaucratic states. Furthermore, if each issu

a fall-back position, then the situation becomes 

complex. CS requires a consideration of the full comp

of competing primary and secondary goals.

For instance, in the case of the U.S. intervent

Kosovo, American leaders decided that given a tr

between good short-term relations with Russia 

stopping Serb aggression, it was more important to s

the latter than the former. However, this decision rel

two important assumptions: (1) U.S. intervention 

stop Serb aggression, and (2) relations with Russia co

repaired at some point in the future. But what if th

intervention was incapable of restraining, or unlik

stop, the Serbs? What if intervening against Serbia le

long-term rupture in U.S.-Russian relations? In both 

areas, it is easy to specify a set of transitively or

preferences, but developing contingent preferences

then weighing the likelihood of various outcomes to pr

an expected utility based preference ordering is extr

difficult. Nevertheless, sound strategic planning 

begin by trying to define goals on issues and toward 

which interact as a first step to developing a comprehe

matrix of preferences.

The second variable is the state’s resources. Tradit

realist analyses of international relations focus o

concept of “power” as an important variable. This app

sees power as a commodity or basket of commoditie

instance, military power or economic power. This app

38
extent that power has demonstrable effects on behavio

concept must be thought of in terms of social relation

The raw resources which support power are only effect

specific political contexts over a limited range of i

Second, since power has a contextual element, it is pro

less fungible than the commodity approach suggests. T

since power has a social aspect, the concept of power c

expanded into the realm of soft power, that is, infl

flowing from cultural or social attraction, leadersh

example, and the power of persuasion.

15

 This more co

notion of power ultimately provides leverage 

understanding the sorts of strengths a state brings to 

on a particular competitive relationship. Ken

Timmerman’s interesting recommendations on 

toward Iran are a good example of the sort of co

thinking the notion of power suggests.

16

 He points 

importance of democracy as a tool in the U.S. foreign 

arsenal. Not only is democracy a persisting sou

strength for the United States socially, it is also a sou

power vis-à-vis nondemocratic states through the po

cultural attraction. Democracy sells, and to the exten

supporting democracy allows the United Stat

undermine hostile elites, it becomes a lasting sou

power.

This notion of power is also related to Porter’s foc

enduring sources of strategic advantage and 

competencies. What is a strategic advantage or 

competency other than power? Clearly the concep

linked. As a result, it would be fruitful for stude

international politics interested in applying the compe

strategy approach to delve into the rich literature o

sources of power between states. The goal of this r

would be to consider how different types of power in

with one another. Ultimately, strategic thinking mus

to develop a typology of power resources organized by u

in different strategic contexts and across diff

substantive issues. Although branding is a pow

39
determined by such issues as whether product

differentiable, substitutable, and fungible. Some

branding is the wrong approach. Similarly, in interna

politics, military power is a useful tool, but will 

virtually no role in international trade negotia

between close allies. To be useful, however, this s

assessment of the utility of various resources mu

systematic rather than idiosyncratic. Knowing that 

is context specific is a basic requirement of a CS app

but it is not sufficient.

Developing a typology of the utility of va

instruments of influence allows analysts to begin to 

about how states can change their competitive posi

Focusing on core competencies can have the unint

consequence of inhibiting effective planning. 

competencies are not just extant capabilities bu

potential ones. Therefore, analysts and policymakers 

think not only in terms of existing strengths but a

terms of potential strengths. But the desirability of 

potential strengths is itself a function of the prev

described assessment of the utility of various p

resources in different contexts and vis-à-vis the resou

competing actors.

The notion of developing new core compete

suggests the importance of time as a key eleme

strategy. The question for strategists is whether the

develop dominant resources faster than opponent

develop countermeasures. The U.S. military already t

in these terms. Speeding up the observation, orient

decision, action (OODA) loop is a central factor in mi

strategy and rests at the core of the current revolut

military affairs (RMA). OODA loops also exist in bu

planning, and at the national strategic level. Th

approach to international politics is useful in orie

analysts to think about time as an element of str

Unfortunately, there is virtually no existing liter

about how states’ core competencies change over 

40
decisions, or the factors which either speed or slo

OODA loop at the national strategic level.

This lack of conceptual work on core competencies 

national level makes CS difficult to use as a prescr

tool, but its utility can be demonstrated through its u

an explanatory framework. For instance, the Ge

decision to develop a sea-going fleet prior to World Wa

be seen as an attempt to shift Germany’s core compe

from land power to naval power in the hopes to mod

the balance of power toward Great Britain. Howeve

British had both the resources and expertise to stay 

ahead of the Germans in the naval race, first by deve

the Dreadnought class battleship and then by accele

their own construction programs in the face of the Ge

challenge. For Germany, hemmed in by British naval 

but desiring a larger role in the world, shiftin

competition was potentially a reasonable policy. How

Britain’s existing strength in the naval arena and 

strategic OODA loop made the German p

counterproductive.

17

Germany’s failure resulted, in part, from her le

misunderstandings about Britain. Britain, for 

historical and ideological reasons, was particularly lik

respond strongly to a challenge to her naval domin

Although British leaders were willing throughout the 

part of the 19th century to make concessions to pot

rivals, they never made important concessions on any 

which threatened British naval supremacy. In shor

British had an existing propensity to try to ap

potential rivals, but not in the naval arena.

The understanding and manipulation of propensi

at the core of CS. The goal of CS is to leverage your stre

against an opponent’s weaknesses, and force them 

costly competition. This was precisely the notion behin

development of SDI as a competitive tool against the f

Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union had a la

41
in arms competitions. This propensity was a result of S

lessons of the past (particularly the Cuban Missile C

ideology (the importance placed on being seen as a “lea

power), and bureaucratic politics (the strength o

military-industrial complex within the upper echelo

the Soviet state). Pushing the Soviets into a high-tech 

race forced the former Soviet Union to compete in ar

weakness compared to the United States. Not only d

United States have a more advanced and r

technological base, it had a much larger economy an

better able to bear the strains of a costly military build

There is an extensive developing literature on na

propensities. Many scholars are currently examinin

topic of “strategic culture.”

18

 The work in this area i

positioned to inform students using CS about how to a

and study the strategic propensities of states.

Strategic Choice and Strategic Interaction.

Having discussed international or systemic const

and the domestic attributes which bound long

competition, it is important to consider the lin

between the two. In this regard it is useful to remembe

the key insight of strategic thinking is that policy c

interact to create outcomes which none of the a

individually preferred or expected. The notion of str

interaction makes clear that outcomes are a function o

preferences interact rather than individual choices.

This insight is perhaps most keenly illustrated 

work of Thomas Schelling.

19

 Schelling has been ma

unjustly for the role his notions of signaling played 

development of strategy during the Vietnam War. Alth

it is quite easy to misuse game theoretic approach

politics, Schelling’s work and those of other analysts 

similar methods remain an important contributi

thinking about strategy. His work highlights the r

42
communicative issues on strategic outcomes.

In many ways, the CS approach requires a th

process similar to the game theory and rational 

approaches to politics. In both cases, analysts must 

specify preferences and strategic options. Game t

pushes the logic further by demonstrating how dif

patterns of preferences and choices lead to diff

outcomes, some of which are individually rationa

collectively irrational. A properly done CS analysi

resemble a game theory model even if it is written in 

rather than formalized with mathematics.

In particular, CS required the development, at 

implicitly, of decision trees listing options and exp

countermoves. Certainly, CS does not require form

utility functions, and mathematically derived equi

but a decision tree would help clarify expected outcom

Competitive Strategy as a Pedagogical Tool.

The competitive strategy approach is clearly a pow

tool of analysis. It provides a comprehensive set of que

to consider in policy planning and, when appli

international politics, is suggestive about method

issues to consider in answering these questions.

Teaching students about policy is extremely dif

Students, as a general rule, prefer to think about pol

either a process with clearly definable steps and rule

instance, the federal budget process, or in terms of 

policy preferences. The problem in teaching about po

to makes students aware of how the possible affec

desirable. Students and other observers are ofte

critical of existing policy. Being outside the process

have difficulty conceiving of the cross-cutting constrai

decisionmakers at each stage of the policy pro

However, students are also too prone to accep

43
nor textured enough to incorporate complex value trad

The CS framework, because it is a forma

methodology, forces students to think through the br

pressures and opportunities on policy. It ultimately s

an integrative purpose. This is particularly useful for 

in which stakes in a given policy area are scattered a

different groups. For instance in the proliferation are

counterproliferation community around the DoD ten

focus almost exclusively on either mil

counterproliferation (the use of force) or on mitigatin

effects of proliferation through passive and active de

measures. By contrast, the arms control community 

the proliferation problem as one of international law 

verification. Given the existence of two competing c

with different core assumptions about preferred out

and policy instruments, it is easy to see why non

counter-proliferation policy is so difficult to mak

understand, and why courses on this topic tend to 

unsatisfactory.

By applying a CS framework, professors can 

students to engage in a rigorous considerati

constraints, options, and strategic interaction ef

Although students may object that the CS framework 

them to examine issues which seem to be outside the 

of their interests, the method of inquiry is as importa

the ultimate findings.

The CS framework also suggests the importan

thinking about constraints, options, and stra

interaction in a conceptually and empirically valid ma

Providing a check list of questions is merely a first 

Unless there exists some sort of process to answe

questions in a generalizable way, the questions them

are unlikely to serve as a fruitful prompt to cre

thinking. Michael Porter’s goal in developing CS was t

existing thinking about business strategy to the findi

rigorous academic economists. Similarly, in the po

44
policy concerns.

Ultimately, a course using CS to examine a policy 

might be organized around a methodological discuss

CS, followed by case studies, country briefings, 

exercises, and presentations. The methodolo

discussion would seek to examine CS as an analytica

and introduce students to the key concepts and ques

The case studies in CS would present students with a 

of policy recommendations and ask them to use th

framework to critique the policies. The country bri

would be designed to help students work throug

assessment of a country’s goals, strengths and weakn

and propensities. The team exercises would serv

purpose of having students “red team” each o

analyses.

Conclusions.

CS is a useful tool for teaching students about polic

strategy. Although the existing materials are more g

toward professionals than students, it is possible to b

the existing literature with classroom discussion

exercises and with the large body of scholarship on rel

international issues. CS holds promise in helping stu

to think about developing plausible policy options w

falling into the trap of uncritically accepting conven

wisdom.

CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES

1. Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More 

Better, Adelphi Paper 171, London: International Institute for S

Studies, 1980; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian N

Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 5

2. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Charles A. 

and Barry R. Schneider, “Counterforce,” in Peter L. Hays, et a

Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Des

New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998, pp. 239-252.

45
politics, see David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Ap

Against Proliferation,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Fighting Prolif

New Concerns for the Nineties, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air Un

Press, 1996, pp. 257-276.

4. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Pete

eds. and trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19

100-112. 

5. The application of competitive strategies in the business 

most closely associated with the work of Michael E. Porter. Mic

Porter, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Indust

Competitors, New York: Free Press, 1980.

6. Andre, pp. 259-260.

7. The classic text of neorealism is Kenneth N. Waltz, Th

International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. For cri

see Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, New 

Columbia University Press, 1986; David A. Baldwin, Neoreali

Neoliberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

8. Andre, pp. 271-272.

9. Porter, pp. 3-33.

10. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 102-128.

11. Some scholars suggest that the more actors in a given 

the more difficult it is to achieve cooperation simply because 

incremental difficulty of getting each additional actor to acced

proposed agreement. Other scholars, however, have suggest

with more actors, the relative gains problem becomes less d

because states are less able and less likely to measure their p

against that of any one other state. See Duncan Snidal, “Relativ

and the Pattern of International Cooperation,” American P

Science Review, Vol. 85, September 1991, pp. 701-726.

12. John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, New York: 

University Press, 1987, pp. 216-223.

13. For an extensive debate on this topic, see the articles by 

Mearsheimer, Robert O. Keohane, Lisa L. Martin, Charles A. Ku

Clifford A. Kupchan, John Gerald Ruggie, and Alexander W

International Security, Winter 1994-95.

14. Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes o

International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4, Spring 1998, pp. 5-43.

46
work of Joseph S. Nye, Jr. See, for instance, Bound to Lea

Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1

29-35.

16. Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Opportunities for Change in I

Sokolski, ed., Fighting Proliferation, pp. 229-238.

17. For an extended discussion, see Paul M. Kennedy,The Ri

Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, London: Ashfield Pres

pp. 410-431.

18. For a good review of the existing literature, see Mic

Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in S

Studies,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1, Summer 19

141-170. 

19. See, in particular, Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of C

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 83-118.

47
PART II

HOW COMPETITIVE ARE U. S. EFFORT

AGAINST PROLIFERATION?

49
NONPROLIFERATION:

STRATEGIES FOR WINNING, LOSING

AND COPING

Henry D. Sokolski

Nonproliferation.

It is difficult to engage in a serious debate 

nonproliferation. In fact, most people, even officials 

nations that proliferate, claim they support it. They 

disagree about whether or not a specific case (i.e., 

nation’s activities) constitutes a serious proliferation t

but will insist that any effort to achieve nonproliferati

good thing. There are, of course, those who might 

exception to these views, particularly academics 

contend that proliferation might actually be good, bu

view is generally dismissed by practitioners as being

academic.

This chapter will take on this set of views directly. 

challenge the notion that any initiative aim

nonproliferation is good per se but will do so without ar

that proliferation itself is good. It will do 

distinguishing between winning, losing, and copi

nonproliferation and by arguing that only wi

strategies are capable of securing nonproliferation suc

Winning.

Not all national nonproliferation initiatives are cr

equal. Some actually help curb strategic wea

proliferation or roll it back where it once existed. Othe

to achieve their goals, and others still actually comp

the proliferation problems they were intended to cur

51
get Ukraine to surrender its nuclear arsenal and to 

South Africa and Argentina terminate their indig

rocket programs are good examples.

These successes were no accident. Attributes comm

each included (1) setting high goals (nothing less tha

abandonment and renunciation of the proliferation ac

targeted), (2) early planning, and (3) leveraging U.S

allied economic, political, and military strengths ag

the enduring weaknesses of the parties proliferating

In none of these cases was any proliferation activ

project grandfathered. Instead, South Africa was ask

terminate its rocket program. Argentina destroyed th

components of Condor II along with the program’s re

manufacturing equipment and the United States 

that Ukraine surrender all of its nuclear weapons.

Early planning also was clearly present. With Uk

the Bush administration began analyzing what mig

done with the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal m

before the Ukraine even voted for its own nat

independence. Just as important, the United S

initiated and completed talks with Russian and Ukra

officials on denuclearization before Ukraine’s militar

gained full control over the former Soviet Union’s we

systems.

1

In the case of South Africa’s civilian rocket program

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) commissioned a R

Corporation study on the unprofitability and prolife

risks of such a space launch program 2 years befo

South African project became known to Ame

intelligence. Because RAND began briefing its study 

before the United States sanctioned South Africa

analysis was not only able to shape America’s respo

South Africa’s rocket program (which was at the time 

more than a paper study), but South African policy as w

52
acted on the very earliest intelligence reports in l983

before it had irrefutable proof—e.g., photographs or r

tests of the program. The U.S. military understood t

Argentina successfully cooperated with Egypt and Ira

Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member

allied expeditionary forces would all be threatened w

missile they had no effective defenses against. Effo

block the Condor II project commenced almost immedi

The United States worked with Germany and France 

off the supply of key components. Others conducted 

operations against the project’s European organ

Beyond this, the U.S. Customs agents caught Egyp

trying to spirit illicit missile components for the Con

program out of the United States. High-level U.S. of

confronted Egyptian President Mubarak with 

information and got him to promise to end Egy

participation in the project in l989.

3

Finally, in all of these cases, the United States a

friends leveraged their comparative economic, politica

military strengths against the key weaknesses of tar

proliferators.

In Ukraine’s case, the United States and the 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations exp

Ukraine’s eagerness to receive U.S. and Western fin

and political support as a hedge against Russian po

and economic intimidation. The United States and R

also made it clear that Ukraine lacked the wherewit

make their strategic nuclear forces anything more t

provocative, vulnerable target. As such, Ukraine wil

bargained for generous Western aid and indirect se

assurances in exchange for giving its weapons u

dismantlement. Both the transmission of Western ai

information on Ukrainian force’s vulnerability 

actively orchestrated by the United States.

4

With Argentina’s Condor II rocket program, the U

States leveraged its ability to supply Menem’s democ

53
rule in exchange for the program’s termination. 

Menem was anxious to gain respectability after Argen

military dictatorship, the Falklands fiasco, and the Alf

government’s embarrassing obsequiousness befor

Argentine military. What Menem needed was to sho

Argentine military (who had secretly launched the C

II missile effort with Iraq) that his civilian governmen

their only hope to reestablish needed military-to-mi

contacts with the United States and critical U.S

aircraft and parts. He also was keen to gain acc

Western financial markets in order to privatize Argen

faltering economy. The Bush administration sided 

Menem and supplied him with what he needed (incl

detailed intelligence on the Condor II program, whi

own military had kept from him). The leverage work

Finally, in South Africa, both whites and b

mistakenly assumed that the government could 

money launching other countries’ satellites if it deve

an intercontinental-ballistic-missile-capable rocket 

own. Cash-strapped to upgrade the black majority’s 

standards and eager to expand markets for its arm

aero industries, South Africa could hardly afford the m

technology sanctions that the United States had imp

Rather than lift the sanctions for South Africa’s impor

of Israeli rocket technology though, U.S. officials pres

their own analysis (prepared by RAND several years b

of how South Africa would lose money if it persisted 

project. More important, the U.S. officials encourage

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—an organization 

which South Africa would soon have to borrow billi

dollars—to reinforce this point, by threatening to redu

extensions of credits if Pretoria persisted in fundin

rocket program. Finally, U.S. officials suggested 

Pretoria try to finance the project privately. Corn

South Africa officials took up this challenge and after 

of fruitless efforts to find private financial backers, 

the project.

5

54
In contrast to these successes—which entailed 

goals, early planning, and effective leverage—na

nonproliferation policy failures are far less consid

Indeed, they can be so ill-conceived that they can ac

compound the proliferation threats they are suppos

curb. Here, perhaps the best example is Eisenho

Atoms for Peace Program. Launched in l953, the pro

was designed to help cap Soviet nuclear weapons ma

production and steer other nations from ever acq

enough weapons to wipe out 100 or more U.S. m

industrial centers. Unfortunately, the threat Atom

Peace was designed to address rested on an antiq

World War II premise that what the United States n

most to prevail in war was its military-indu

mobilization base. Preoccupied with this obsolete W

War II concern, the Atoms for Peace Program fai

consider the relative vulnerability of our defen

air-atomic forces or to anticipate the kinds of catalyt

accidental wars that would become more likely if 

nations merely acquired a handful of nuclear weapon

Egregiously focused on the past, the program’s nu

safeguards goals were also set dangerously low (the

objective was to prevent the diversion of large stockp

nuclear material, stockpiles large enough to field force

could decimate 100 American cities). More impo

rather than leverage smaller nations’ interest in rec

nuclear aid to secure truly effective nuclear safeguard

program was too casual about what it shared (mark

not just nuclear science, but plutonium produ

technology and equipment). It also was inattentive 

whom it shared this technology with (not just with 

European military allies, but too with smaller cou

who were far less certain about their security, e.g., 

Pakistan, Algeria, Israel, Libya, South Korea, Taiwan

and Iraq).

7

55
Eisenhower’s Space for Peace Program, which fol

Atoms for Peace), it is not without recent coroll

Consider America’s current nonproliferation efforts 

China, Russia, North Korea, and India. Here again, b

in space and nuclear cooperation have been offered (

very government-sponsored entities U.S. intelligenc

identified as the worst proliferators), all in exchan

promises of better behavior. Past proliferation act

(e.g., the Indian and North Korean “peaceful” nu

programs, questionable Chinese and Russian nuclea

rocket exports, etc.) are grandfathered, and in each cas

United States and its friends have pleaded with 

proliferator to join or adhere to the Nu

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Techn

Control Regime, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treat

Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Military F

Production Cut Off, only to discover that the value o

pledges is, at best, nominal.

8

Thus, in contrast to winning strategies ag

proliferators, the first attribute of failing is the pove

one’s goals. Indeed, implementing failing strategies ag

proliferation only produces more disappointment or d

Bad proliferation behavior is grandfathered or rew

with strategic technological transfers for 

nonproliferation pledges that are rarely, if ever, uphe

 Second, unlike winning, losing strategies consis

fail to gauge or anticipate the threats they are design

address. Instead, they almost always react to comp

evidence of proliferation activity well after it has occu

This is true whether it concerns the production of nu

weapons material in North Korea and Iraq

development of missiles (e.g., Chinese and North K

help to Pakistan’s rocket programs and Russian, 

Korean and Chinese missile assistance to Iran), or the 

violation of previous nonproliferation promises (as 

Russia on missile assistance to Iran, Chinese nuclea

56
nuclear pledges under the NPT).

Finally, losing strategies, unlike winning 

fecklessly pit U.S. and allied weaknesses ag

proliferators’ enduring strengths.

9 The United State

its friends might threaten to sanction proliferato

violating their nonproliferation pledges, but the

unlikely to follow through. Indeed, commercial, l

democracies are more inclined to make money and fr

than to jeopardize either by imposing penalties ag

others. Proliferators, unfortunately, know this and a

too willing make demands against the United States a

friends for money (IMF and other international loan

with Russia and India), strategic technology (adv

computers, satellite launches, nuclear cooperation—a

Russia, India, North Korea, China and, in the l970s

and Iraq), relief from current sanctions (e.g., Iran, 

India, and Pakistan today), or greater pol

consideration (North Korea, India, and Pakistan).

Winning strategies, in contrast, get those supp

nonproliferation to leverage their compar

strengths—e.g., their financial prowess, superior abi

project military force, the attractive qualities of their l

democratic forms of government and market eco

etc.—against proliferators’ enduring weaknesses—

deficiencies in hard currency reserves and popular dom

support, dysfunctional economic systems, lack of s

alliance partners, etc).

Coping.

Given the popularity of losing and the rarity of wi

against proliferation, a series of efforts c

counterproliferation has been developed within the D

help cope.

10

 The presumption of this approach is 

despite our best efforts, nonproliferation will fail to cu

proliferation activities of the most determined prolifer

Although counterproliferation is willing to counte

57
controls, sanctions, and diplomacy, its main focus 

militarily deterring, preempting, and defending ag

proliferators and their threats to use chemical, biolo

and nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them

Putting aside the considerable financial, politica

legal challenges that counterproliferation’s promotio

faced,

12

 this approach has several clear advantages 

losing. First, if its goal is low—limiting the damage th

military forces might suffer from what strategic 

proliferation that has already occurred—it is nonethe

necessary and useful military mission that comple

what the military already does. Certainly, the U

States and its allies must be prepared militarily to cop

a number of nations that have acquired chemical, biolo

or nuclear weapons and long-range missiles (e.g., Iran

North Korea, Libya, and others) with active and p

defenses and, in war, with the ability to strike offensiv

threatening weapons facilities and arsenals.

The notion that the United States could en

preemptively to eliminate proliferation threats, howe

morally and politically complicated and, in most key 

unlikely.

13

 Increased use of deep tunneling equipme

North Korea, Libya, and Iran all but eliminates the su

raid option of the sort conducted by Israel in l981 ag

Iraq. And U.S. concerns about the military fallout res

from striking such militarily prepared proliferato

North Korea suggest how difficult preemptive s

against the hardest cases would be. Still, unlike stra

for losing, counterproliferation and other coping stra

do have the advantage of allowing extensive perio

planning. Indeed, planning can begin just as soon as s

officials anticipate possible proliferation threats—mo

years, or even decades before they are realized.

Finally, unlike losing strategies, which leverag

comparative weaknesses against proliferators’ compa

strengths, counterproliferation attempts to lev

58
overseas. Unfortunately, this strength is pitted ag

something even stronger—the willingness of prolife

to threaten to use strategic arms against U.S. or 

forces. By definition these strategic weapons—w

include missiles, nuclear, biological and che

weapons

14—are ones against which neither the U

States nor its allies have adequate mil

countermeasures.

15 As such, counterproliferation ma

necessary strategy to limit the damage proliferation 

inflict, but it can hardly serve as a winning strategy.

Applications.

One, of course, could disagree about whether a 

nonproliferation policy or initiative was a winning, l

or coping strategy.

16

 Some might argue, for example

America’s current effort to stop Russia from transfe

rocket technology to Iran is a winning strategy. Cert

its stated aim seems high: A complete cutoff of Russia r

assistance to the Shehab-4 missile. Nor does the init

appear to be anchored in the past—the Shehab-4 it

still 1 or more years away from completion. In talks wi

Russians, moreover, U.S. diplomats have been a

negotiate from the strength that comes from knowin

critical American economic assistance is to Ru

desperately cash-strapped economy and space progra

Yet, for all this, a much stronger case can be mad

America’s strategy cannot possibly win. First, this app

has already essentially grandfathered Russia’s he

Iran’s Shehab-3 missile program. This missile was 

tested in July l998 even though Washington was 

confronted with Israeli intelligence about the proj

February l997. Second, although the White H

threatened to sanction Russia’s help to Iran, it only im

limited trade sanctions (i.e., only against Russian m

entities that the United States has no commercial ti

Moreover, such reluctant sanctions, which exem

59
Russia’s Space Agency (an entity that has helped Ira

that still receives U.S. National Aeronautics and 

Administration [NASA] money and space coopera

were only imposed after (1) Washington had succes

backed a $22 billion IMF bailout for Russia, (2

Shehab-3 had been flight tested and Russia was c

red-handed helping the project, and (3) Congress was 

to pass mandatory sanctions legislation. The messa

this conveys, then, is quite different than impe

success: The White House might say it is working to 

completion of the Shehab-4, but its efforts are unlik

succeed. In fact, U.S. officials have already surrendere

serious attempt to use the financial leverage they 

against Russia and were only likely to talk about pl

60

Winning Competitive

strategies

Swift, complete

elimination of

proliferation

activity or

dismantlement of

proliferated

systems

Anticipate

proliferation

threats early as

possible; before

compelling proof

Our milit

political,

economic

cultural

strengths 

proliferat

comparat

weakness

these are

Losing Traditional

nonproliferation

Get proliferator

to pledge better

future behavior

in exchange for

increased access

to strategic

technology;

failing this,

threaten

sanctions

React to

indisputable

evidence of

proliferation

activity

Our weak 

to sanctio

against

proliferat

strong

inclinatio

make us 

their pled

improve t

proliferat

behavior

Coping Counterproliferation

Limit damage or

harm nonproliferation failure

might otherwise

pose to U.S.

forces

Plan to act to

cope with

nonproliferation

failure

Our stron

projection

capabiliti

against

proliferat

equal or s

will to th

to use we

capable o

destructio

against t

Figure 1. Nonproliferation Strategies.
it.

17

Who is right? Those that claim the U.S. strategy ag

Russian missile proliferation to Iran is a loser, or thos

insist it is a winning strategy? Honest minds can 

What should not be in dispute, however, is that the

significant, recognizable criteria for winning, losing

coping. Does America’s current nonproliferation init

regarding Russia set its sights too low? Is it too react

the problem (e.g., an ad hoc response to pres

Congressional pressures) or truly anticipatory; the res

long-range planning? Does America’s current app

leverage America’s enduring comparative strengths ag

those proliferating in Russia or ignore or squander 

leverage? Will America’s current strategy allow 

dominate Russian proliferators’ likely counterm

Finally, and most important, if there is some case to be 

that America’s strategy is merely coping or actually l

what can be done to make this strategy accord more to

the criteria for winning?

Conclusion.

The last question, of course, is the most impo

Certainly, policymakers and analysts should no l

assume that any nonproliferation initiative is suffici

that good intentions are good enough. To win ag

proliferators, we must have strategies that 

recognizable, wining criteria. And just as clearly, of

must be able to recognize when they are only cop

actually losing against specific proliferators. It m

difficult to get enough analysts and policymakers to 

on such matters in a timely fashion. But not trying is 

prescription for both political and analytic failure.

61
1. See Brian Chow, Emerging National Space Launch Pr

Economics and Safeguards,Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporatio

1992.

2. See Henry Sokolski, “South Africa Rethinks Space Goals

News, July 26, 1993, p. 15.

3. See Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough,Tracking 

Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998, Washingt

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998, p. 225; Ric

Speier, “The Missile Technology Regime: Case Study of a Mult

Negotiation,” Washington, DC: USKP, grant SG-31-95, No

1995.

 4. See Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Co

Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: The Woodrow 

Center Press, 1995, pp. 89-129.

5. See Wyn Q. Bowen, “U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Prolif

the MTCR’s First Decade (1987-1997),” The Nonproliferation 

Fall 1997, p. 29; Henry Sokolski, “Ending South Africa’s 

Program: A Nonproliferation Success,” Washington

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 1996.

6. See Joseph F. Pilat, et al., Atoms for Peace: An Analys

Thirty Years, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985, pp. 17-50 and 1

Henry Sokolski, “Atoms for Peace: A Nonproliferation Primer?

Control, September 1980, pp. 199-230.

7. See Albert Wohlstetter, et al., Swords From Plowshares, C

IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1976, pp. x-xi, 48, 63, 86, 

citations in endnote 6 above.

8. For a generalized discussion of these points, see Victor G

Nuclear Blackmail: The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework o

Korea’s Nuclear Program, Stanford, CA: The Hoover Institution

Scott Parrish, The Russian Connection, Washington, DC: The Am

Jewish Committee, 1998; Roberta Wohlstetter, “U.S. Peaceful A

the Indian Bomb,” in Nuclear Policies: Fuel Without the 

Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978, pp. 57-72

Sokolski, “Nonproliferation: Faking It and Making It,” The N

Interest, Spring 1998, pp. 67-74; and “A Tale of Three Firm

Weekly Standard, February 24, 1997.

9. See David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Ap

Against Proliferation in Henry Sokolski, ed., Fighting Prolif

62
University Press, September 1996, pp. 257-276.

10. See Remarks by the Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of D

delivered at the National Academy of Sciences, Washingto

December 7, 1993; and Mitchell B. Wallerstein, “The Origi

Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative,” in P

Hays, ed., Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons 

Destruction, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1998, pp. 21-35.

11. See Remarks by the Honorable Les Aspin, Secretary of D

National Academy of Sciences, December 7, 1993; Robert D. B

and Ashton B. Carter, “The Role of Intelligence” in Robert D. B

and Albert Carnesale, eds., New Nuclear Nations: Consequences 

Policy, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 19

234, 239-240.

12. On these points, see Chris Williams, “DoD’s Co

proliferation Initiative,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Fighting Prolif

New Concerns for the Nineties, pp. 249-256.

13. See Frank Gibson Goldman, The Internationa

Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation S

Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, April 1997.

14. On what other high-leverage arms may also be includ

James Digby, “Precision-Guided Weapons,” Adelphi Paper N

London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975

Sokolski, “Nonapocalyptic Proliferation: A New Strategic T

Washington Quarterly, Spring 1994, pp. 115-125; David Blair, “

Defeat the United States: The Operational Military Effects 

Proliferation of Weapons of Precise Destruction,” in Henry Sokol

Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, pp. 

Thomas G. Mahnken, “America’s Next War,” The Wash

Quarterly, Summer 1993, pp. 171-184; Patrick J. Garrity, “Impl

of the Persian Gulf War for Regional Powers,” The Was

Quarterly, Summer 1993.

15. See Henry Sokolski, “Fighting Proliferation With Intell

reprinted in Fighting Proliferation, pp. 277-298.

16. Some nonproliferation initiatives, such as the U.S. appr

the North Korean nuclear threat, may actually go through mo

one strategic phase. Thus, at first, the United States explicitl

with coping strategies, including counterproliferation military 

in 1994. The White House then argues that it would leverage the 

behavior by offering it nuclear reactors, fuel oil, and ev

normalization of relations in exchange for Pyongyang’s p

63
clear that the North did not need the reactors or good relations w

United States as much as the United States needed to keep Nort

from resuming production of weapons plutonium, though, C

began to openly criticize the deal for being a losing approach tha

allow the North to leverage concessions from the United States

17. As for coping, no one has yet argued this, but the case c

made that the U.S. effort is only designed to delay theShehab-4 u

United States deploys effective missile defenses. The problem w

argument, though, is that it is excessively theoretical. In fa

current White House would hardly be comfortable claiming 

strategy is not intended to win and, even if it did argue that its s

was only designed to cope, its critics would contest that it 

aggressive schedule for deploying missile defenses.

64
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION:

WHERE HAS THE UNITED STATES

WON—AND WHY?

Zachary S. Davis

Mitchell B. Reiss

Introduction.

Only a few short years ago, nonproliferation ex

were congratulating themselves on a job well do

number of actual and potential nuclear weapons state

renounced, or at least tempered, their nuclear ambi

Argentina and Brazil asserted civilian control 

military-run nuclear weapons programs, agreed to 

United Nations (U.N.) International Atomic Energy A

(IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear activities, an

the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Uk

Kazakhstan, and Belarus decided to return to Russ

nuclear warheads they inherited with the demise 

Soviet Union. India and Pakistan had shown some si

muting their nuclear competition, with each preferr

strike an undeclared nuclear posture. Iraq’s nu

aspirations appeared to have been dealt a fatal bl

Operation DESERT STORM and the rigorous verifi

measures undertaken by the United Nations S

Commission (UNSCOM). South Africa revealed that 

assembled six nuclear bombs, but then had disasse

them before the transition to majority rule. North 

had signed the Agreed Framework, which, while less 

perfect, held out the promise over time of bri

Pyongyang into full compliance with its IAEA and 

obligations.

At the normative level, the nuclear weapons 

agreed to join a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (C

65
United States pushed the idea of a fissile material 

treaty (FMCT) to try to cap the growth of nuclear ars

worldwide. The IAEA promoted a more intr

safeguards regime called 93+2 that promised bette

earlier detection of countries violating their safeg

commitments. The capstone to these efforts wa

indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. With the end 

Cold War, it was clear that nonproliferation had becom

hot new topic, with arms control experts retooling 

resumes to change career focus and with nonprolife

projects getting high-level government attention 

funding. Nonproliferation was on a roll. It was, dare w

sexy.

All the more surprising, then, that the last few 

have been ones of setbacks and great disappointment f

international nonproliferation regime, marked by 

chances and unsettling developments. In May 1998, 

and then Pakistan engaged in muscle-flexing by 

detonating nuclear devices. Iraq has play

catch-me-if-you-can game with UNSCOM, which ha

momentum and political support in the Security Co

although the United States believes that Baghdad ma

be hiding nuclear-related assets (as well as chemica

biological weapons and ballistic missile technology). R

has emerged as the main supplier for Iran’s civilian nu

program, but many observers believe that this relatio

also serves as a conduit for the transfer of technolog

other assistance useful for nuclear weapons. North 

has refused to cooperate with the IAEA in preservi

nuclear history for the day when Pyongyang will com

full compliance, thereby increasing the possibility th

IAEA will be unable to give the North a clean bill of h

and that the Agreed Framework nuclear deal will com

halt.

At the international level, the United States, R

and China have not ratified the CTBT. The F

languishes in Geneva, being nibbled to death b

66
safeguards program got off to a good start, but req

additional resources and political support to beco

reality. And the NPT is under strain by non-nu

weapons states that believe the nuclear weapons 

have largely failed to fulfill their 1995 pledge to 

tangible steps towards halting the vertical spread of nu

weapons.

A Glass Half Full or Half Empty?

So where do U.S. efforts to halt the spread of n

weapons stand today? Is the glass half full or half e

The traditional way of measuring nonproliferation su

has been to tally the number of states party to the NPT

more the better. This bean-counting approa

misleading, and both more and less impressive th

seems. It is more impressive because the notion of 

countries party to the NPT is wildly at odds with the 

prevalent during the early years of the nuclear age, w

was thought by many sober observers that every co

that could acquire nuclear weapons would not only 

but would do so as quickly as possible. President Kenn

famous nightmare vision of a world with 30-35 nu

weapons states by the 1970s is the best example o

apocalyptic thinking. But counting the number of 

parties is also less impressive than it seems beca

overstates the importance of raw numbers of cou

acceding to non-nuclear status. Expressed differentl

all countries count the same. Some states, like Van

have neither the capability nor the desire. Others 

desire but no capability; they may be termed the “V

states. Some, like Japan, have the capability but exhi

desire. Only a handful have both the capability an

desire, and even among this relatively small group n

give full expression to their aspirations by demonst

nuclear prowess through testing, developing and dep

a nuclear arsenal. Consequently, a pure bean-cou

67
important nonproliferation victories.

How, then, do we determine nonproliferation su

Specifically, where has the United States been success

halting or retarding the spread of nuclear weapons

what tactics and strategies has it employed to do so?

Defining Nonproliferation Success:

The Rules of the Game.

Defining success and recognizing failure are ess

ingredients of a competitive strategy. What constitu

win for nonproliferation? Proliferation, after all, com

many shapes and sizes, not all of which are eq

threatening to U.S. security. One definition of winn

the complete elimination of proliferation activi

dismantlement of proliferated systems.

1

 Although w

(and losing) can be difficult to distinguish when po

rhetoric is used to claim success where none has occurr

to put a positive spin on ambiguous situations

definition has the merit of providing a clear standa

judgment. So what makes winning possible?

Nonproliferation is played on the field of interna

politics, in which states use power—in all its 

forms—to pursue their interests. A winning str

combines political, military, and economic power to pr

or rollback proliferation. It identifies potential aven

influence and applies American strengths where the

most effectively alter proliferation behavior. A firs

toward a winning strategy, therefore, is to identif

major factors that may shape the decision to acquire nu

weapons, as well as the major constraints working ag

such a decision. This type of taxonomy, in turn, sug

avenues of possible nonproliferation influence fo

United States.

Domestic Political Incentives. Former Speaker 

House of Representatives Tip O’Neill’s observation tha

68
Countries contemplate the acquisition of nuclear bom

reasons that are, to varying degrees, domestic in n

Domestic politics, history, culture, and other factors su

geography and economics are major influences on na

decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. India, for exa

puts a high value on its self-perception as a great n

nuclear weapons are enshrined by nationalistic polit

as symbols of national greatness. Japan, on the other 

holds close to its pacifist constitution. Other countries

as Iraq, probably view nuclear weapons as importan

of national self-aggrandizement consonant wit

(inflated) historical view of the country’s (or the lea

destiny. Still others may be tempted to satisfy impo

domestic constituencies, such as the military o

scientific community, that often exercise political infl

on nuclear decisionmaking.

These domestic factors influence how far a stat

go—part way (Taiwan, Sweden, South Korea), approa

or up to the line (Iraq, North Korea), or all the way li

five de jure weapon states plus India and Pakistan.

Regional Power Dynamics. A major motivation 

country to consider a nuclear option is the neighborh

which it lives. Aggressive neighbors inspire defe

measures to deter or repel attack. Some countries 

acquire a nuclear arsenal to conquer or dom

neighboring states and achieve regional hegemony. Ira

example, may view nuclear weapons as a means to esta

a predominant position in the Persian Gulf and C

Asia. India clearly sees itself as the dominant pow

South Asia. Although regional dynamics can be a root 

for states to acquire nuclear weapons, such change

region’s power dynamics seldom go unansw

Perceptions of a neighbor’s intentions and capabilitie

spur a counterreaction leading to a nuclear we

program, as illustrated in the Middle East and South A

69
international nonproliferation regime consists of tre

laws, organizations, and institutions that establish 

uphold norms of international behavior. The rules are 

lightly policed and weakly implemented, but rema

important barrier against casual, as opposed to dedi

proliferators. The centerpiece of the regime, the NPT

inducements such as access to civil nuclear technolog

verification to deter and detect cheating by the nonwe

states on their pledge not to use civil nuclear technolo

military purposes. Technology control regimes (Nu

Suppliers Group, Australia Group, Missile Techn

Control Regime) and arms control agreements such 

CTBT and nuclear weapon-free zone treaties bolste

international nonproliferation norm.

While these constraints are insufficient to bl

dedicated proliferator, they help cull out the c

proliferators who might be tempted to harbor nu

options if it would not be viewed as a challen

international order, or if they could carry out s

program at little or no political cost. When cheat

discovered, however, the global regime depends o

Great Powers to enforce the norms and pu

noncompliance.

Expected U.S. Response To Proliferation. A prolifer

perception about how the United States will respond 

nuclear weapons program remains a pow

consideration for nearly all governments. The U.S. res

to new nuclear states has ranged from resignation, as 

the four other declared weapons states, to acceptan

with Israel, to alarm, as in South Asia and Ira

accommodation leading (hopefully) to long-

compliance, as in the case of North Korea. Obviously

of these examples would satisfy our definition of win

Notwithstanding frequent rhetoric about nonprolife

being a top priority of the United States, in practice 

priorities often take precedence over nonproliferatio

70
victories.

Competing priorities, such as trade (China, 

Pakistan), domestic constituencies (Israel, and to a 

extent, India), and bilateral relations (Russia, Europe) 

determine whether the United States will oppo

accommodate new nuclear nations. The costs of opp

proliferation, most significantly the risk of starting 

(as in North Korea), have also been an unarticulate

compelling reason for U.S. policymakers to retreat 

enforcing U.S. nonproliferation policies through mi

means.

In theory, the level of effort the United States devo

stopping a particular nuclear weapons program is ro

commensurate with the threat that such weapons p

the United States and its allies. Thus, instead of purs

winning strategy, the United States learned to live w

“bomb in the basement” in New Delhi, Tel Aviv

Islamabad because those programs did not di

threaten the United States. Some bomb programs, how

could radically alter the global security architecture

decisions were made to halt these nuclear wea

programs at all costs, perhaps even including the r

war. For example, a nuclear-armed Germany or J

would have produced a global balance of power 

different from the one that exists today. In these two 

the United States was willing to back up its no

liferation policy with the full weight of its militar

economic influence.

Multilateral Diplomacy. In some, perhaps most, 

the United States cannot unilaterally impose its wishe

potential proliferator, but seeks to enlist the supp

coalitions of countries or multilateral mechanisms to 

or roll back nuclear weapons programs. Such interna

diplomacy is possible when enough countrie

sufficiently threatened by a particular nuclear progr

engage in collective action. Unilateral military act

71
1981 Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, is rare

other collective security endeavors, United Na

Security Council enforcement of nonproliferation n

depends on coalitions (as well as unanimous consent 

five permanent members). The United States led a s

coalition against Iraq, a weaker coalition to restrain 

Korea, and a yet weaker one still to restrain Iran. S

coalitions increase the likelihood of success, while 

coalitions put more of the burden on their most moti

members.

Matching Ends and Means: Playing the Game.

A winning competitive strategy matches resource

goals, selecting actions that have a high probabil

achieving specific nonproliferation objectives withi

context of other, sometimes competing U.S. objec

Possible options cover a wide range from cooperatio

engagement to war. Between the extremes of embr

proliferation and using force against it, however, diplo

in its various manifestations has been, and will contin

be, the primary tool for realizing U.S. nonprolife

success.

Unilateral Influence on the Internal Arrangemen

Proliferator. Understanding the internal politics 

proliferator provides insights into the leverage point

can make or break a foreign nuclear program. Lev

makes use of comparative advantages to reverse, de

otherwise rescind decisions to acquire nuclear wea

Examples of positive leverage include economic 

military assistance, prestigious meetings with top off

military exchanges, technology transfers, developme

projects, inclusion in regimes, and more generally, 

relations with the United States, which can bolste

status and enhance the legitimacy of a government.

Examples of negative leverage short of war in

economic sanctions, nonrecognition, targeted e

72
with adversaries, military assistance to adversaries, 

actions, and poor relations with the United States

worth noting that military equities are key to most po

and negative incentives.

Regional Dynamics. The United States can infl

regional dynamics in many ways. Foremost, of cou

through defensive alliances. For example, NATO has 

arguably the most effective nonproliferation tool 

employed by codifying the American commitment to co

the defense of Western Europe. Arms transfers can 

shift a regional balance of power in ways that either r

or accentuate the motivation for nuclear weapons

important to note that collective defense arrangemen

encompass a wide range of military-political-eco

relations, and are not limited to strictly military opera

Joint research, development, production and deploym

weapon systems, such as missile defenses, involve a 

array of civilian and military relationships. Statio

training, and funding troops and supplies to suppo

alliance normally have socio-political consequences 

extend beyond the military sphere. Economic ties, o

provision of access to high-technology items, have also 

used effectively by Washington to persuade countrie

they have more to gain by abstaining from nuclear we

than by possessing them.

Multilateral Influences: Regimes and Institutions. 

optimistic expectations that international institu

especially the U.N., could control proliferation hav

been met, the U.N. and other international bodies can 

a difference. Proliferation, like conflict, has its ro

problems that defy purely legalistic or mora

pronouncements.

The U.N. began its involvement in nu

nonproliferation efforts with the Baruch Plan, in 194

sustained a role through the establishment of the IA

1957, entry into force of the NPT in 1970, and creation 

73
1991. These American-inspired initiatives have help

shape global preferences against nuclear weapons. 

important multilateral institutions include the Che

Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Conve

and the export control regimes such as the Nu

Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the M

Technology Control Regime, and the Wass

Arrangement. 

To varying degrees, these regimes limit acce

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology 

reinforce international standards for transfe

technology that can be used to make WMD. Th

contribute to a norm that ostracizes the develop

possession and use of WMD. Despite the limitation

liabilities inherent in international institutions, the

make critical contributions to a winning nonprolife

policy. The U.N. and the IAEA, for example, lend legit

to verification and enforcement of nonprolifer

obligations—even if they are not capable of enforcing 

obligations without Great Power consent and suppo

other words, they are analogous to fire alarms, not fir

Institutions such as the IAEA and KEDO provide a m

to influence the nuclear policies of sovereign state

must be part of a more comprehensive strategy 

effective. Technology control regimes can force prolife

to resort to smuggling to get what they want, th

increasing time and cost, and they, too, are a useful pa

more comprehensive winning strategy.

Deterrence, Defense, and Counterprolifer

Deterrence, of course, is a key component of compe

strategy. Credible deterrence capabilities, 

conventional and unconventional, inform ho

proliferators that attacks against the United States 

allies would be self-defeating. Extended deterrenc

reduce threats to allies, thereby obviating the nee

independent nuclear forces. Defensive measures, 

active and passive, enhance deterrence and mi

74
capabilities enable the United States to conduct mi

operations against WMD-wielding adversaries.

2

Where the United States Has Won:

The Importance of Security Commitments.

Under the definition of winning used to des

nonproliferation successes in this chapter—the com

elimination of proliferation activity or dismantlem

proliferated systems—where has the United States, 

by acting unilaterally or in conjunction with others, s

victories?

There are several examples that stand o

nonproliferation success stories. The common denom

for each of the countries in this first category i

establishment of a de facto or de jure security allianc

the United States.

The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO. Alt

ultimately unsuccessful, Germany’s wartime nuclear 

project had advanced far enough to give credence 

possibility that it would someday reemerge. Having w

rejected the post-World War I model of subjugatin

punishing Germany, the Allies were faced with two o

for dealing with a divided Germany: allow it to drift tow

closer ties with the East, or expend the resourc

integrate Bonn with the West. The second option he

best prospects for consolidating a democr

market-driven Western Europe, and not least, preven

revival of Germany’s atomic bomb program.

Over the next 4 decades, Washington used th

weight of its military, economic, and political influe

shape West Germany’s domestic, regional, 

international environment. By the early 1950s, a num

West European countries had emerged from the as

World War II and were already developing nascent nu

programs. Although the primary purpose of NATO w

75
aphorism went, to “keep the Americans in” an

Germans down. Keeping the Germans down meant, a

other things, ensuring that Bonn never develope

independent nuclear weapons capability. The 

international legal barrier to Bonn’s acquisition of nu

weapons was the 1954 London and Paris accords, 

which the Federal Republic of Germany pledged:

not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons 

defined as any weapon which contains . . . nuclear fuel . . . 

which, by . . . uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuc

fuel . . . is capable of mass destruction...[or] any part, dev

assembly, or material especially designed for . . . any [su

weapon.

3

In May 1955, the occupation regime ended, an

Federal Republic became a full member of NATO.

But this “first nonproliferation promise,” as 

characterized it, was actually less than airtight; Ger

could import nuclear weapons, it could engage in bilate

multilateral control of these weapons, and it could de

these weapons extraterritorially.

4

Even without these potential loopholes, the quest

Germany’s nuclear future at this time remained p

given the country’s history and essential role in a po

European recovery; in Catherine Kelleher’s phras

dilemma for the Atlantic Alliance was how to han

country “with a suspect past and a major mortgage 

uncertain political future.”

5

 The larger challeng

Washington was how to reassure its European allies t

was committed to Europe’s defense, including, if nece

the use of nuclear weapons.

The creation of NATO in 1949 went some way to

reassuring Germany and the other members of the At

Alliance that they could rely on collective sec

buttressed by the direct and visible involvement o

forces in their defense. (This factor was cruc

76
Switzerland, from proceeding very far down a path tow

nuclear weapons acquisition. Although Sweden was 

formal member of NATO, Stockholm understood t

nonetheless received the security benefi

membership—the NATO overhang—because 

geographical proximity to the likely military thea

which war would be waged with the Soviet Union.) 6

Economic recovery and greater political self-confi

under Konrad Adenauer during the latter part of the 

and early 1960s brought with it a greater assertiven

Bonn on nuclear issues. For many Germans, a chron

of abandonment and the desire for full pol

rehabilitation (to avoid “second-class” status) mean

the country needed the same degree of control over nu

weapons in Europe as its allies in planning, decisionm

and most sensitively, on operational con

Independently, influential U.S. policymakers believe

if Bonn was not fully integrated into NATO’s nu

command, Germany would inevitably decide to bu

national nuclear force, thereby creating per

irreparable tensions in NATO as well as underm

Washington’s broader nonproliferation goals. Bonn w

averse to playing on these fears to gain diplo

advantage.

7

 These trends, German anxiety over the 

security guarantee exacerbated by the Ken

administration’s handling of the 1961-62 B

negotiations, and U.S. fears of a nuclear-armed Fe

Republic, culminated in Washington starting discussi

1960 with Bonn over the possibility of some form o

control over a NATO strategic nuclear force. The attra

to Bonn of this multilateral force (MLF) option were se

it would further solidify the American commitme

European defense, it would acknowledge B

contribution to NATO, it would permit German acc

some form of shared nuclear control (with details 

worked out later), and it would minimize chanc

discrimination against Germany within the alliance 

77
an MLF became more thinkable, it became less 

falling victim to its internal contradictions (what, ex

did shared nuclear control mean?), clashing with B

other foreign policy objectives of eventual Ge

reunification and the preservation of close relations 

France, and coming up against the opposition of a 

American president, Lyndon Johnson, who was focus

prosecuting the war in Vietnam, a policy that ha

unintended effect of reassuring Bonn of U.S. credibil

an ally.

In the aftermath of the MLF drama, any residual c

that the Federal Republic would acquire nuclear wea

or even keep open its nuclear option, terminated wi

U.S.-led diplomatic offensive concerning the 

Questions of American credibility, while never t

absent from Bonn’s considerations, faded int

background and the Federal Republic concentrat

domestic issues and Ostpolitik.

9

 Bonn signed the N

November 1969 and with little fanfare formally ratifie

May 1975.

Japan. A central U.S. objective following the e

World War II was to ensure that Japan would never 

threaten peace and stability in the Pacific. Japan, to

had a wartime nuclear weapons development program 

the U.S. and Japan’s neighbors did not want revived.

cornerstone of this policy was Japan’s peace constit

drafted by the U.S. occupation forces, and Ame

willingness to shoulder the burden of Japan’s defens

The understandable Japanese abhorrence of n

weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki was rein

further by a security treaty with the United States in 

1952. Under the terms of the agreement, Washi

conditionally pledged its forces to contribute to the se

of Japan against armed attack from without. 

relationship was strengthened in 1960 by the Tre

Mutual Cooperation and Security, which eliminated so

78
extension of a U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan, initi

protect the country against the former Soviet Unio

after 1964 to protect it against a nuclear-armed Chin

undoubtedly played a major role in preserving Ja

non-nuclear status.

11

In the wake of the U.S. retreat from Vietnam 

1970s, Tokyo and Washington recognized the ne

reinforce their security ties. The Guideline

Japan-United States Defense Cooperation outlined a 

for comprehensive military cooperation between th

countries. In the past few years, an uncertain re

security environment has again compelled Tokyo 

Washington to strengthen defense planning under a 

and invigorated set of defense guidelines.

12

In addition to the security alliance, the United S

promoted Japan’s economic prosperity and it

integration into the full range of international institu

With U.S. help, Japan became a world leader in n

energy as a means to cope with its lack of indigenous e

resources. NPT membership and full integration in

IAEA safeguards system have eased, but not elimin

suspicions that Japan has preserved a nuclear o

Tokyo’s interest in using plutonium fuel for civil re

has, nevertheless, raised eyebrows.

13

At important times in its postwar history, whe

Japan has felt itself threatened by external forces, 

moved closer to the United States rather than adop

more independent defense posture through the acqui

of nuclear weapons. The U.S.-Japan defense relatio

however, is being tested by North Korean missiles a

the growing power of China.

South Korea. Few countries in the world are loca

tougher neighborhoods than South Korea, yet the U

States has successfully dissuaded Seoul from pursui

independent nuclear force.

14

 As with Japan, Wash

structured a bilateral security alliance which include

79
weapons, to face the serious military threat posed b

belligerent and aggressive North.

In the mid-1970s, when the U.S. commitment to 

was being questioned in the wake of its retreat 

Vietnam, Washington addressed Seoul’s anxie

stepping up the level of military assistance and even

reversing plans to draw down U.S. forces. The United S

has also demonstrated its ongoing commitment to 

Korea by generous economic assistance programs and 

of trade for South Korean-made goods. Like German

Japan, South Korea was encouraged to pursue nu

energy and gained access to advanced nuclear re

technology so long as Seoul remained fully faithful 

NPT-IAEA obligations. Unlike Germany and Japan, 

Korea appeared at times to hedge on its non-we

pledge, but stopped all suspicious activity when faced 

U.S. pressure.

In the early 1990s, when North Korea’s nuclear we

program threatened the South, the United States w

closely with South Korea to bolster defense cooperatio

to craft a regional and multilateral approa

denuclearize the North through the October 1994 A

Framework. The status of nuclear programs in a reu

Korea, like the status of U.S. military commitm

remains unknown.

Taiwan. A complete accounting of Taiwan’s inter

acquiring nuclear weapons and the U.S. role in preve

that from happening has yet to be told, but the ge

contours are well-known.

15

 As a small country threa

by a much larger nuclear-armed neighbor, and du

about U.S. commitments after Nixon’s rapproachmen

Beijing and the U.S. retreat from Vietnam, Taipei 

mid-1970s demonstrated an interest in devel

clandestine means to separate plutonium from spent 

In this case, a full-blown bilateral security arrange

was out of the question for fear of upsetting Washin

80
assistance was unnecessary for a prosperous Taiwa

preserving Taipei’s access to international markets wa

to its survival. A mix of arms sales, good relations wi

United States, inclusion in international regimes su

the IAEA and the Asia-Pacific Economic Council (A

and support for Taiwan’s international economic ven

enabled Washington to insist that the plutonium sepa

plant be dismantled and shipped to the United State

Success Without Alliances: Case Studies.

There is a second category of states where the U

States, working with or supporting other countries, ha

scored nonproliferation success. In these cases, se

alliances were not offered. Here, economic, developm

and regional factors helped tip the balance away 

nuclear weapons.

South Africa. In March 1993, South African Pre

F.W. de Klerk announced to a surprised world South A

had constructed six nuclear bombs during the 1

moreover, Pretoria had voluntarily dismantled a

weapons in 1990-91.

16

 Reasons for Pretoria’s a

volte-face are many, but must include the recognition 

Klerk first, and only later by other members o

government, that the country’s nuclear arsena

unnecessary to meet the imagined threat of a 

onslaught by world communism. Further, it 

inconsistent with the country’s larger foreign 

objectives of reintegrating itself into the global comm

(and especially the United States) and of norma

relations with its African neighbors. The American rol

is less direct than in other cases. During the latter half 

1980s, Pretoria’s security situation improved marked

August 1988, a cease-fire on the country’s northern b

with Namibia was signed; and a tripartite agreemen

South Africa, Angola, and Cuba was initialed in Dece

1988 that called for the phased withdrawal of all C

81
of the Soviet Union and its regional proxies had les

considerably, a fact brought home concretely by the 

the Berlin Wall in October 1989. American victory 

Cold War eliminated the threat of onslaught to 

Africa, which paved the way for de Klerk’s denucleariz

decision.

In addition, many South African officials unde

that the country’s nuclear stance prevented imp

relations with the West generally and the United Sta

particular. It stood as a barrier to joining the NPT, 

would legitimize Pretoria’s access to peaceful nu

technology and open the door to international coope

on nuclear matters. South Africa realized that it cou

gain access to sensitive technologies and fully inte

itself into the economic mainstream of the developed w

For Pretoria, the United States barred the door 

international political and economic rehabilitation un

eliminated its nuclear weapons program.

Ukraine. With the disintegration of the Soviet U

managing the far-flung nuclear inheritance becam

immediate foreign policy priority for the United S

Washington initially calculated that persuading Ukra

return the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons bas

its territory would be fairly easy to achieve.

17

 The Apri

Chernobyl disaster had created a widespread nu

allergy that grew only more virulent when the neg

engineering, haphazard evacuation, and shoddy cle

gradually became known. In July 1990, the Rada

Ukrainian parliament, had passed a declaration of 

sovereignty that stated, inter alia, that the cou

position was not to accept, not to produce, and not to ac

nuclear weapons. The Rada reiterated this non-nu

pledge 2 months later, after the August coup attem

Moscow.

This non-nuclear momentum continued after Uk

voted for independence in December 1991. On Decemb

82
States (CIS), which Ukraine had joined, declared 

Ukraine (along with Belarus and Kazakhstan) would 

withdraw the tactical nuclear weapons from its territ

July 1, 1992. The momentum, however, slowed c

erably, and new efforts were required to keep Ukrai

the road to nuclear disarmament.

In March 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kra

announced that Kiev was suspending the withdrawal 

tactical nuclear weapons. This prompted an angry 

Secretary of State James Baker to warn Ukraine tha

aid would be cut off and Kravchuk’s upcoming meeting 

President Bush canceled if Kiev did not fulfi

commitment on the tactical nuclear weapons. Uk

immediately changed its course and re-pledged its su

for complete withdrawal. Kravchuk visited Washing

May as planned.The United States also needed Ukr

full cooperation before it could move forward wit

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotia

The demise of the Soviet Union had thrown a legal m

wrench into the strategic arms reduction talks, be

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus had not 

signatories to START. In late April 1992, the United S

formally accepted that these countries succeeded the S

Union for START purposes. Washington drafted a 

protocol recognizing this legal fact. One of the pro

provisions obligated Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Bela

join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states “in the sh

possible time.” In addition, because not all of the str

nuclear weapons located in Ukraine were cover

START, Washington drafted side letters under w

Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus would return a

nuclear weapons of their territories to Russia. D

Kravchuk’s May 1992 visit to Washington, President 

finalized the details with the Ukrainian leader.

The stage was set for the formal signing of what be

known as the Lisbon Protocol. But at the last m

Ukraine balked at setting a firm deadline for returni

83
realized that it could hold hostage important arms c

agreements and that the nuclear material in the war

might have some commercial value. This sent

manifested itself in calls for financial compensatio

returning the nuclear weapons.

In late 1991, the U.S. Congress passed the S

Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, also known a

Nunn-Lugar Act after its two Senate champions. 

legislation authorized the Defense Department to tra

$400 million from other programs to assist in the 

dismantlement and storage of nuclear weapons i

former Soviet Union; Congress has allocated addi

funds in subsequent years.

18

 It was made clear to Kie

it would receive some of these funds if it cooperated, bu

much? Ukrainian demands escalated, topping out 

billion.

The Clinton administration initially continued the 

administration approach towards Ukraine: diplo

pressure and isolation until Kiev fulfilled its disarma

pledges. Facing Ukranian obstinance the administ

stressed cooperative threat reduction as a mea

persuade Ukraine that its security would be enhance

combination of denuclearization and closer ties wit

West. The “three pillars” of this policy were dismantle

assistance, economic aid, and security assurances.

Despite this U.S. diplomatic effort, the Rada still re

to formalize the Lisbon Protocol. This led to anothe

push, with Washington deciding to play a much more 

role in mediating the dispute between Ukraine and R

on divisive security issues, such as the future of the 

Sea Fleet and Russian energy supplies. Kravchuk wa

informed that Clinton would not visit Kiev durin

scheduled January trip to the region unless there was 

progress in the nuclear sphere.

The breakthrough came with the signing o

Trilateral Agreement which included security assur

84
force and Ukraine became a non-nuclear weapon state 

to the NPT, Washington and Moscow would reaffirm 

support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, their oblig

not to use or threaten to use military force or eco

coercion against Ukraine, their commitment to 

immediate U.N. Security Council action if Ukraine be

subject to a nuclear threat, and their promise not t

nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Under the U.S.-bro

agreement, Russia agreed to forgive the cost of the o

gas supplies previously shipped from Russia to Ukrain

to provide Ukraine with 100 tons of low-enriched ura

fuel rods for its nuclear power reactors.

The following month, in February 1994, the 

approved ratification of START and the Lisbon Proto

late January, the United States promised to doub

financial assistance to $310 million if the Rada endors

Trilateral Agreement. After the United States pro

that Ukraine would soon receive $700 milli

Nunn-Lugar funding, in November 1994, the 

overwhelmingly approved Ukraine’s joining the NPT 

non-nuclear weapon state. At each step, economic aid

relations with the United States, and security assur

moved Ukraine in the direction of denuclearization. Ag

great odds, the Clinton administration achiev

momentous nonproliferation success, one that re

largely underappreciated.

Belarus. Washington played an important supp

role to Moscow’s lead in persuading Belarus to retur

tactical and strategic nuclear warheads on its territ

Russia.

19

 As the country that suffered most from 

Chernobyl nuclear disaster, strong sentiment al

existed that the country should be non-nuclear. Beloru

leaders understood that maintaining these weapon

expensive, that they required 35,000 members o

Strategic Rocket Forces (who were overwhelm

Russian) on their territory to maintain and safeguard

their presence made the country less, not more, secur

85
was demanding their return.

Here, the United States provided additional ince

for Belarus to return these weapons to Russia, rati

START I agreement and join the NPT. Adding the c

other technical assistance programs, by January 

Washington had committed over $7.5 million to den

arization efforts and defense conversion in Belarus. 

rather limited sums nonetheless whetted Minsk’s ap

for additional aid pending ratification of START, the L

Protocol and the NPT. The following month

Belorussian Supreme Soviet ratified all three docum

Following through on its earlier promise, and want

send a signal to Ukraine and Kazakhstan 

denuclearization would bring tangible benefits, the U

States pledged an additional $65 millio

denuclearization assistance and offered a formal me

between the Belorussian president and President Cl

Here again, economic aid, security assurances, and 

relations were sufficient to produce an op

nonproliferation outcome.

Kazakhstan. With the end of the Soviet U

Kazakhstan inherited 104 SS-18 intercontinental ba

missiles (ICBMs), each carrying ten 550-kiloton warh

40 nuclear-capable “Bear” H long-range bombers, a

unspecified number of tactical nuclear weapons. U

Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan had not suffered 

the Chernobyl disaster. But it had developed its 

sensitivity to nuclear weapons due to the estimate

nuclear tests, 200 of them above ground, that Moscow 

conducted at the Semipalatinsk testing site i

northeastern part of the country. Still, Alma Ata was 

rush to send these weapons back to Russia. Kazak

President Nursultan Nazarbayev wanted to craft a s

relationship with the United States, and astutely s

upon the nuclear issue as the best way to do so. The K

leader wanted to ensure that Washington understoo

86
China.

20

Secretary of State James Baker invested signi

diplomatic capital in 1991 and 1992 trying to win 

Ata’s commitment to denuclearization, and althou

received numerous private assurances, Nazarbayev re

to commit himself in public. By the beginning of May 

it appeared as if Kazakhstan intended to retain str

nuclear weapons on its territory for some time. Yet less 

3 weeks later, Nazarbayev stood by President Bush’s s

the White House and pledged, for the first time, to rati

START agreement, join the NPT in the shortest po

time, and eliminate all nuclear weapons on Ka

territory within 7 years. In Lisbon 4 days later, Kazak

formalized these pledges.

U.S. policy played a large role in this turnar

Secretary Baker repeatedly conveyed the sec

assurances the United States would extend to Kazak

if it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state

indeed, the two countries signed a host of economi

trade agreements during the May Bush-Nazar

meeting at the White House. Six weeks after the L

summit, in July 1992, Kazakhstan quickly ratifie

START agreement to demonstrate its good faith t

United States.

Getting Alma Ata to ratify the NPT proved 

difficult. A main culprit was U.S. domestic politics. Wi

change of American administrations in 1993, Kazak

seized the opportunity to try to parlay NPT membe

into further concessions, especially additional se

commitments. Consequently, during Secretary of 

Christopher’s visit to Kazakhstan in October 1993, h

surprised by Nazarbayev’s refusal to coopera

denuclearization efforts and his insistence on me

personally with President Clinton.

In the weeks and months after the Christopher 

Washington told Alma Ata that Nazarbayev would 

87
Kazakhstan would also receive $84 millio

dismantlement and other nuclear-related assistance

$200 million in economic assistance in Kazakhsta

other central Asian countries.

As in the other former Soviet states, the form

limited economic assistance, cooperative threat redu

programs, security assurances, and good relations wi

United States, proved to be a winner.

Argentina. During the 1970s, Argentina was w

thought to harbor aspirations as a nuclear weapons 

Motivations included its desire to win status and pre

to justify its self-appointed notion of exceptionalis

maintain a technological and scientific lead ov

neighbors; and hedge against the possibility of a Bra

bomb. A number of influences weaned Buenos Aires 

from this path. The military’s poor showing in the 

Falklands/Malvinas war discredited its leadership 

paved the way for its return to the barracks, which, in 

made possible the country’s first popular election in 

Newly elected President Raul Alfonsin slashed the b

for the nuclear program by 40 percent and placed it 

civilian control.

But Argentina still balked at signing the NPT 

accepting full-scope safeguards on its nuclear acti

These steps came later, under the leadership of C

Menem, who was determined to chart a new pa

Argentina that would improve relations with the U

States, and allow Argentina to become more fully integ

into the First World’s financial mainstream an

international community. Menem’s approach 

summarized by his famously saying, “I’d rather gove

last country in the First World than the first country 

Third World.” To reorient Argentina’s foreign p

Menem withdrew from the Non-Aligned Move

reestablished ties with Britain, and in 1990 announce

suspension of the Condor II ballistic missile program, 

88
impediment to better relations was the country’s nu

program. In exchange for Argentina and Brazil signi

agreement to allow full-scope IAEA safeguards on 

countries’ nuclear programs, the Quadripartite Agree

Washington rewarded Buenos Aires in December 199

a technology cooperation agreement that permitted B

Aires to purchase advanced computer equipment, nu

technology, and aeronautical guidance systems; the 

itself symbolized American confidence in Argentina

months later, the United States approved the sa

Argentina of 36 A-4M Skyhawk jets with advanced 

technology, over British objections. Argentina was 

invited to join the Missile Technology Control Regi

November 1993 and to become a full member of the Nu

Suppliers Group in 1994. Argentina was the lone 

American and Third World country to belong to both of 

nonproliferation arrangements. In January 

Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which call

a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, and a 

over a year later joined the NPT.

Brazil. Brazil was also thought by many to asp

nuclear weapons status. Its anti-NPT rhetoric, 

nuclear development program (the “parallel program

by different branches of the armed services, inter

developing nuclear-powered submarines, and desi

international status commensurate with its le

position in the region all reinforced these suspicions.

Also like Argentina, a change in the direction 

country’s nuclear program awaited a change in po

leadership. In March 1990, Fernando Collor be

Brazil’s president. Staunchly anti-nuclear, (his fathe

been invited by the United States to witness a nuclea

in the Pacific and was horrified by what he saw) he mo

retake the nuclear program from the military and to h

nuclear weapons-related research. Like Menem, 

wanted to improve relations with the internat

community, especially the United States, to help 

89
into the international community was allo

international inspections of its nuclear facilities. But 

Brasilia signed the Quadripartite Agreement in Dece

1991, the Brazilian Senate refused to ratify it. It did no

matters that Collor was forced from office in December 

because of a bribery scandal, but cooperation 

transparency with Argentina and the IAEA cont

nonetheless. Diplomatic pressure from Germany, B

main supplier of nuclear technology, augme

Washington’s strictures that Brazil would remain o

margins of global economic, political and technol

advancements so long as it remained outside of the 

With Argentina already reaping the benefi

nonproliferation, Brazil agreed to join. Ironically

Brazilian legislature refused ratification until 1998. B

time, however, questions about Brazil’s nuclear inten

had been laid to rest.

Conclusion.

What do these case studies suggest for compe

nonproliferation strategy? First, the spread of nu

weapons around the globe does not equally threaten 

national security. By and large, this has been recogniz

U.S. policymakers, who have crafted different

strategies to deal with varying circumstances. It is str

however, that during the past 50 years, in onl

case—Iraq—did the United States employ military 

(i.e., counterproliferation) to forcibly denuclear

country. And it was Baghdad’s invasion of Kuwait, n

well-known nuclear weapon program, that trig

military action. Although it may be useful to keep nu

wannabees guessing as to U.S. intentions, it is i

difficult to construct a scenario in which the United S

would preemptively and unilaterally attempt to d

another country’s nuclear weapons facilities.

90
nonproliferation policy for countries facing external th

was to address the root cause of their insecurity throu

alliance with the United States. NATO is the pr

example of a collective defense arrangement; U.S. se

guarantees to Japan and South Korea are also notew

In all of these cases, the U.S. commitment was mani

by the physical presence of U.S. troops and back

nuclear weapons stationed on that country’s terr

These formal security guarantees have been the 

effective and the most costly. Security assurances have 

less costly, but also useful, as witnessed in Ukraine. Fi

at the end of this continuum is the importance cou

have attached to good relations with the United State

importance whose stock has risen with the mag

American role after the end of the Cold War.

Third, what might be termed dollar diplomacy ha

been used very successfully by Washington to per

countries that they have more to gain by rema

non-nuclear than by acquiring the bomb. The end 

Cold War created new opportunities for Washington to 

this policy further, both because of its economic str

and because of the reduced rationale for turning a blin

on proliferation to maintain Cold War relation

Financial inducements played an important role in ke

Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan from 

nuclear. Similarly, economic factors helped tip the ba

toward denuclearization in Ukraine, Kazakhstan

Belarus. The United States pledged to Ukraine a to

$900 million in Nunn-Lugar funding and other 

assistance. Kazahkstan and Belarus received lesse

nonetheless substantial, sums from Washington to r

the strategic nuclear weapons stationed on their territ

Fourth, bilateral economic incentives were not di

offered by Washington to influence the nuclear decisi

South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. At best, there w

these countries the generalized belief that temperi

eliminating their nuclear programs would accelerat

91
Western industrialized powers. They also hoped 

changes in their nuclear programs would attract U.S

Western investment and lift multilateral restrictio

sensitive technologies that could be used for eco

development. In short, they hoped that 

nonproliferation credentials would enable the

participate in multilateral trading arrangements and 

access to dual-use technologies useful for growing 

increasingly technology-dependent economies.

Fifth, the U.S. role in promoting and subsidizin

peaceful uses of atomic energy by other countries migh

be seen as a subset of dollar diplomacy. On a selective 

the Atoms for Peace approach played a useful r

channeling interest in nuclear power technology to

legitimate purposes. Expectations were high that nu

energy would satisfy the energy requirements of ra

industrializing countries such as Germany, Japan, 

Korea, and Taiwan. Bilateral safeguards and 

inspections provided assurances that nuclear p

programs would not be used as a cover for nuclear wea

However, it should be noted that this approach 

proliferation in India, Iraq, and Iran, to name a few fai

Technology inducements, if not integrated into a 

competitive strategy, can backfire.

Finally, sometimes it is not possible for the U

States (or the international community) to score com

and unambiguous nonproliferation wins. In these case

best Washington can do is to develop and implem

patient coping strategy that offers the best chance of v

not immediately, but over time. These cases are frustr

they are subject to easy criticism by media pundit

political opponents. But some of the cases identified i

paper formerly fell into this category—Argentina and 

in particular. Any competitive strategy that aims at v

must recognize that patience is a tool that can be j

important as security arrangements, economic assis

92
an appropriate strategy.

Winning requires positive and negative induce

that leverage U.S. political, military, and econ

strengths against the vulnerabilities of a proliferator. 

the United States has had the will to win, the scorec

impressive. Some of the losses might have been win

other priorities took precedence. And there will alwa

intractable or ambiguous cases that can only be hand

a coping approach.

Looking ahead, the ingredients are available t

future proliferation challenges, but they will re

disconnected pieces unless policymakers integrate 

into competitive strategies. Without such strategie

United States may find itself relying more on luck 

brains to avoid proliferation that could have 

prevented.

CHAPTER 4 - ENDNOTES

1. We have adopted the definition of success elaborated by 

Sokolski in Chapter 3.

2. William Perry, “US Counterproliferation Efforts: Prevent

Defend,” in Barry Schneider and William Dowdy, eds., Pullin

From the Brink: Reducing and Countering Nuclear Threats Po, 

OR: Frank Cass, 1998.

3. Quoted in Catherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the 

of Nuclear Weapons, New York: Columbia University Press, 19

Kelleher’s book remains the best treatment of this subject.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 5. See also, John D. Steinbruner,The Cybernetic T

Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis, Princeto

Princeton University Press, 1974.

6. On Sweden’s nuclear program see Mitchell Reiss, With

Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, New York: Co

University Press, 1988, pp. 37-87.

7. See Kelleher.

93
Dilemmas, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983, pp. 

and Steinbruner, pp. 153-326.

9. Kelleher, pp. 300-301.

10. Deborah Shapley, “Nuclear Weapons History: Japan’s W

Bomb Projects Revealed,” Science, Vol. 199, No. 4325, January 1

Leslie Groves, Now It Can Be Told, London: Andre Deutsch, 19

367-372; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Ne

Simon and Schuster, 1986, pp. 457-459; and Reiss, Without the 

pp. 109-137.

11. For recent scholarship on the history of the U.S.-Japan 

alliance, see Morton Halperin, The Nuclear Dimension of the US

Alliance, and Hans Kristensen, Japan Under the Nuclear Um

both papers written for the Nautilus Institute, 1999, avail

http://nautilus.org.

12. Joint Statement on U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, U.S

Security Consultative Committee (SCC), September 23, 1997. T

approved the initial guidelines in 1978. Presidents Clint

Hashimoto agreed to review the guidelines in 1996. The new gu

were announced September 23, 1997.

13. Selig Harrison, ed., Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plu

Debate and East Asian Security, Washington DC: Carnegie Endo

for International Peace, 1996.

14. “South Korea Planned Nuclear Weapons,” Jane’s 

Weekly, February 27, 1993, p. 6; “South Korea’s Emerging N

Potential,” in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 

Memorandum, (henceforth FB-SM)-96-10002, February 22, 19

15. David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nig

Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, 

January/February 1998, p. 54.

16. On South Africa’s nuclear program see Mitchell Reiss, 

Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capa

Washington DC: Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins Universit

1995, pp. 7-43; David Albright, South Africa’s Secret Nuclear W

Institute for Science and International Security, Washington D

1994, available on the ISIS web site at www.isis-online.org.

17. On Ukraine’s nuclear stance see Reiss, Bridled Ambit

90-129.

94
Woolf, The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative for the Forme

Union: Administration Proposals for FY2000, CRS Report RS

May 20, 1999.

19. On Belarus, see Reiss, p. 129.

20. On Kazakhstan, see Reiss, pp. 138-150.

21. On U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy toward Argenti

Brazil, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, chapter 3, pp. 45-88; and L

Spector, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Washington, DC: C

Endowment for International Peace, 1995, chapter 9, “Latin Am

pp. 147-158.

95
COUNTERPROLIFERATION:

SHY OF WINNING

Thomas G. Mahnken

Hostile nations with nuclear, biological, and che

weapons and the ability to deliver them over long dist

pose a growing threat to the United States. In recent 

the U.S. Government has invested a substantial amo

capital—both diplomatic and financial—to hal

proliferation of such technology. While current effo

stem the spread of strategic weapons and limit the da

they cause are both necessary and useful, ne

individually nor in combination do they constit

winning formula for combating proliferation. The rea

simple: neither consciously leverage the compar

strengths of the United States and its allies again

enduring weaknesses of specific proliferators. To d

requires the development of more competitive stra

that would encourage proliferators to spend more tim

effort shoring up their weaknesses and less acqu

capabilities that can threaten the United States, our fr

and allies.

From Nonproliferation to Counterproliferatio

The United States has historically pursued 

approaches to combating the proliferation of str

weapon technology. Until the late 1980s, the 

Government focused upon nonproliferation policies a

at halting the spread of nuclear, biological, and che

(NBC) weapons and missiles. Nonproliferation p

formulated largely by the State Department, attem

prevent states from acquiring strategic weapons techn

by promising them rewards and threatening them 

97
at establishing a norm against the possession of WMD

an approach is embodied in the Nuclear Nonprolife

Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, an

Biological Weapons Convention, as well as export c

regimes such as the Nuclear Supplies Group, Aus

Group for chemical weapons, and the Missile Techn

Control Regime.

There are several problems with looking to diplom

halt the spread of WMD. First, diplomatic measures 

limited utility for dealing with those states that a

greatest concern to the United States. Many of 

regimes are unlikely to limit their strategic we

capabilities, and even less likely to adhere to any tr

they sign. Determined states can and will che

agreements that restrict their access to strategic w

technology, as Iraq’s record of violating the NPT. 

North Korea agreed in 1994 to halt its nuclear we

program in exchange for a massive infusion of U.S

South Korean economic aid, there have been pers

reports that Pyongyang’s nuclear activities continue.

Beginning in the late 1980s, the U.S. Government 

to augment its efforts to prevent the proliferati

strategic weapon technology with measures to lim

damage they could cause if used. While cu

nonproliferation policy seeks to create a norm again

possession of WMD, counterproliferation accepts the s

of such weapons as inevitable. Indeed, counterprolife

policy represents a tacit acknowledgment of the lim

current nonproliferation policies. While nonproliferat

primarily a diplomatic approach, counterproliferation 

strictly military focus. It seeks to augment preve

efforts with measures to protect U.S. forces, friends

allies by acquiring passive chemical and biological defe

deploying theater missile defenses; and improvin

ability to attack nuclear, biological, and che

production and storage facilities and missile launc

Some have even argued that current and projected effo

98
proliferation affairs.”

2

Why Counterproliferation is Uncompetitive.

The main difficulty with counterproliferation 

stems from the fact that defense against WMD and m

is extremely difficult. The United States currently lac

ability to destroy the deeply buried facilities that 

states use to produce and store WMD and missiles. No

the U.S. armed forces developed the capability to fin

attack mobile missile launchers or reliably destroy m

in flight.

3

 By focusing on defense against WMD 

missiles, the United States is operating from a posit

considerable weakness. Indeed, we may be playing a 

that we cannot win.

Indeed, in a number of cases, counterprolifer

policies divorced from a larger strategic context may 

counterproductive. For example, one way to reduc

threat to U.S. forces from WMD and missiles is to im

passive defense measures. Some argue that becaus

spread of WMD and missiles increases the vulnerabi

American forward bases, U.S. armed forces s

increasingly operate “off-shore” or from the contin

United States. While measures to protect U.S. forces a

against an expanding range of threats are laudable, th

bear a cost. The forward deployment of U.S. forces a

the globe deters aggression, bolsters alliance commitm

ensures access to natural resources, and ultimately f

regional stability. Were the United States to remo

forces and forward bases from allied territory, we 

render our friends and allies more susceptible to coerc

regional aggressors and might tempt them to acquire 

of their own.

One can imagine situations in which the cl

deployment of active defenses would undermine 

national security as well. Improvements to China and 

Korea’s missile arsenals are increasing interest in ba

99
ballistic missile defense can play an important r

allowing these states to resist coercion and protecting 

against WMD. Yet we must be careful how we d

theater ballistic missile defenses in Asia. An ill-conc

approach could easily spur China to expand and impro

arsenal in a way that would decrease the security 

United States, its friends and allies in the long run.

Ill-considered efforts to deter the use of WMD ma

prove counterproductive. U.S. threats to respond to th

of chemical and biological weapons with nuclear we

could, conceivably, accelerate efforts by pote

adversaries to acquire their own nuclear weapons.

The point here is not that we should not attem

protect U.S. forces, friends, and allies against WMD 

missiles. Such measures are both necessary and desi

We must, however, pay close attention to how we imple

such policies.

More Competitive Strategies Needed.

Neither nonproliferation nor counterproliferation 

a formula for halting and rolling back WMD and mi

What is needed is a new approach to weapon prolifer

one built upon a reasoned assessment of the re

strengths and weaknesses of each individual prolife

Such an approach requires a detailed case-by

assessment of those states that are interested in acq

strategic weapons, one that yields an appreciation of 

political objectives and value structure. It also requ

net assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 

United States and potential proliferators. Suc

assessment should yield a strategy to leverage 

strengths against the proliferators’ weaknesses in s

way as to reduce the threat they pose to the United S

and our friends and allies.

100
should proceed from the recognition that the United S

is engaged in a long-term competition with a num

states that are seeking WMD. It is a competition be

proliferators have goals—including the acquisition of 

and missiles—that conflict with the objectives of the U

States. Indeed, the spread of these weapons, among o

threatens to constrain the ability of the U.S. armed for

project power across the globe in defense of U.S. na

interests.

4

 Without the capability to intervene at the 

and place of our choosing, we will face a dimin

capability to protect our interests, either unilaterally 

concert with friends and allies. Such an approach to 

would attempt to steer the competition in direction

allow us to reduce the danger these weapons pose 

United States by building on our strengths and expl

our competitors’ weaknesses. While commonsense, su

approach stands in stark contrast to current efforts t

with proliferation, which attempt to redress 

weaknesses in the areas of passive chemical and biol

defense and missile defense.

5

Missile Defense: Counterproliferation

or Competitive Strategy?

A central feature of any competition is interaction

that between the United States and those seeking W

no exception. The competition is interactive, in tha

United States has the ability—to a certain exten

influence the behavior of proliferators, just as they ha

ability—to a certain extent—to influence ours. The a

of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative an

increased urgency of deploying theater missile defen

response to the spread of nuclear, biological, and che

weapons and missiles is but one of the most obvious ca

interaction. The key to developing a winning strateg

identify those political, military, and economic instrum

that give us the greatest leverage over a part

proliferator.

101
long-term. Attempts by potential proliferators to ac

strategic weapons technology often unfold over yea

decades, as do our efforts to deny them that technolo

strategic approach must therefore rigorously assess 

options and adversarial responses over years or decad

take the above example a step further, the spread of th

ballistic missiles represents the first move in 

competition, with the deployment of theater ballistic m

defenses the U.S. response. For our policies to be effe

however, we must also consider an adversary’s pot

counters to our response. While the United States h

recent years devoted increased attention to theater ba

missile defense, it is unclear whether we have fully th

through the competition. If currently planned m

defense programs are successful, then the United S

will possess by 2010 the ability to limit the amou

damage an adversary will be able to inflict upon our f

friends, and allies. If we continue down this path, we s

expect states with ballistic missiles to respond t

deployment of missile defenses. They may, for exa

expand their missile arsenals in an attempt to overw

our defenses. They may also develop countermea

against our defensive systems, such as separ

warheads and decoys. Indeed, a recent assessment b

National Intelligence Council concluded that a num

states with ballistic missiles will develop or pur

missile defense countermeasures over the next 15 y

They may also attempt to change the terms o

competition by shifting from ballistic missiles to ste

land-attack cruise missiles. Some of these moves 

weaken our competitive position drastically. For the U

States, the key challenge is to determine which m

strengthen our competitive position and which weak

We should then take actions that drive our comp

toward those actions we desire and away from those 

not. 

102
whether or not the efforts to deploy them are part of a 

strategy to dominate the long-term competition aga

specific proliferator. If U.S. missile defense efforts a

part of a larger strategy, they may succeed in be

counterproliferation move that limits possible damag

short time, but a move with little chance of succeedin

the long term.

Toward A Competitive Strategies Approach

to Proliferation.

History offers a number of compelling examp

competitive strategies, including the competition be

the U.S. strategic bomber force and Soviet air def

throughout the Cold War and U.S. Navy’s adoption 

Maritime Strategy in the late 1970s and early 198

course, the American victory over the Soviet Union inv

far more than military competition. Indeed, during the 

1980s, the U.S. Government developed a comprehe

strategy to contain and reverse Soviet expansio

competing effectively with the Soviet Union 

international arenas, to promote political and eco

change within the Soviet Union toward a more plur

system, and to engage the Soviet Union in negotiati

resolve outstanding disagreements. Moreover

government used military, economic, political, ideolo

and cultural levers to exploit weaknesses in the S

system.

7

 This more comprehensive competitive str

played a central role in the U.S. victory over the S

Union in the Cold War.

What is needed now is a similarly comprehensive 

competitive strategies against proliferation. At the 

basic level, our objective should be to reduce the threa

WMD and missiles pose to the United States, our fr

and allies. In the military realm, we may achieve th

number of ways.

8

 First, we might seek to force a prolif

to divert resources away from WMD and missile

103
example, attempt to convince him to shift assets away 

systems that allow him to strike his neighbors. Secon

might seek to force proliferators to retain weapons th

relatively easy for us to defeat, rather than moving to

systems that are more difficult for us to counter. Rega

of the difficulty the United States is currently experie

in developing an effective defense against WMD, it ma

well be that it is easier to shoot down ballistic missiles 

stealthy cruise missiles. If so, we should take step

encourage proliferators to retain their ballistic m

forces rather than shift toward cruise missiles. Thi

might seek to render his investments in WMD and m

obsolete as a way of imposing costs upon his regime. A 

effective theater ballistic missile defense system wou

precisely this to ballistic missile arsenals. The best th

be hoped for from current and programmed missile de

systems is that they might reduce an adversary’s fa

the combat effectiveness of his forces.

What is needed beyond purely military measure

more general effort to convince proliferators that 

cannot achieve their political objectives through the 

WMD. Such a strategy should be the result 

comprehensive net assessment of the enduring stre

and weaknesses of the United States, the proliferato

other key players.

9

 A net assessment must inclu

in-depth understanding of why a particular state 

WMD. What, in other words, are its motives and objec

Both theorists and practitioners often assume that 

seek WMD as a means of countering the mi

capabilities of regional rivals. While such motives 

exist, in many—if not most—cases, internal politic

play a role. An understanding of these incentives 

reveal levers that we can use to force proliferators 

from WMD and missiles.

It is important to understand the value a particular 

attaches to WMD. It is often assumed that states se

WMD will mindlessly pursue their course no matter 

104
states differ in the value they attach to the acquisit

strategic weapons. In some cases, a state’s leadership 

the possession of nuclear, biological, or chemical weap

an issue of national survival; in others it is not. Indeed

states, such as Sweden, have eschewed WMD, even 

the acquisition of such systems was clearly within 

reach. In Sweden’s case, the decreasing popular

nuclear weapons, the prohibitive cost of acquirin

arsenal, the remote possibility of U.S. assistance

divisions within the Swedish political leadersh

contributed to the decision to forego nuclear weapons.

case illustrates the variety of factors that influenc

decision to acquire WMD.

An understanding of the reasons that states ren

WMD can shed light upon levers that the United Stat

use to influence their behavior. The United States 

South Korea to halt its ballistic missile program bo

exerting political pressure on Seoul and offering it acc

a wide range of military technology. Indeed, the fac

allies look to the United States for political support a

as economic and military aid offers us a variety of 

that we can use to restrain their WMD and m

programs. The white government of South Africa deci

dismantle its nuclear stockpile when it became clear t

would cede power to a government representing the na

black majority. The Argentine government of C

Menem shut down the Condor II ballistic missile pro

when it found out that the armed forces were developi

missile without the government’s knowledge. The U

States assisted Menem by providing him with de

intelligence on the missile program, information th

own military had hidden from him. It also held ou

prospect of access to Western financial markets 

renewed military-to-military contacts if Arge

scrapped the Condor II.

11

 In both South Africa 

Argentina, regime change offered an opportunity to 

state to roll back proliferation. In some cases, the best 

105
may want to actively assist the process.

Any effective strategy must take interaction 

account. In many cases, proliferation may attem

circumvent our leverage. A thoughtful strategy s

anticipate these moves. What options does the prolife

have to counter our strategy? What path would we mo

to see him follow? What can we do to ensure that he 

follow that path? What paths would we least like to se

follow? What can we do to ensure that he does not 

these paths?

Seen in this light, current counterproliferation 

suffers from some significant shortcomings. It does no

us the means to reduce the threat those weapons pose 

United States, our friends, and allies over the long 

The best it can do is limit the damage that an adversa

inflict upon our forces. While this is both necessar

desirable, it is by itself insufficient. Nor do current effo

deal with WMD pit our strengths against the weaknes

potential adversaries. Rather, too often we do the opp

Passive defenses against WMD, active defenses ag

ballistic missiles, and attack operations against nu

biological, chemical, and missile production and st

facilities are insufficient to render an adversary’s 

obsolete. Nor can they shift the terms of the compe

appreciably. Rather, they force us to compete 

proliferators on terms that are highly unfavorable 

United States. It is, for example, even unclear whet

protracted competition between third-world ba

missiles and U.S. ballistic missile defenses will lea

better off.

More, of course, can be done to upgrade 

counterproliferation efforts. We must develop a mi

strategy that pits our enduring strengths agains

enduring weaknesses of potential adversaries. We s

radically reconfigure our armed forces to reduce 

vulnerability to WMD and missiles. The services shou

106
vulnerable fixed infrastructure such as ports and air

Rather than closing with an adversary, they should ex

options to allow them to strike an adversary from a dis

Similarly, they should develop concepts to reduce 

vulnerability to WMD through dispersion and mobili

In the end, however, there are inherent limits to 

any counterproliferation initiative can accomplish by 

The key to ultimate success lies in exploiting nonmi

levers against potential adversaries. Certainly for 

proliferators key weaknesses may be political, econ

and social, not military. We should think seriously 

how to mobilize social and political forces within count

concern to oppose the acquisition of WMD and mi

Indeed, whatever military counterproliferation effor

United States and its allies make should be design

complement rather than undermine such efforts.

CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES

1. See Thomas G. Mahnken, “A Critical Appraisal of the D

Counterproliferation Initiative,” National Security Studies Qu

Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1999.

2. Ashton B. Carter and L. Celeste Johnson, “Beyo

Counterproliferation Initiative to a ‘Revolution in Counterprolif

Affairs’,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3, S

1999.

3. Dennis M. Gormley and Thomas G. Mahnken, “Facing N

and Conventional Reality,” Orbis, Winter 2000.

4. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Deny U.S. Access?,” U.S. Naval I

Proceedings, Vol. 124, No. 9, September 1998.

5. David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Approach A

Proliferation” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Fighting Proliferatio

Concerns for the Nineties, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Un

Press, 1996; Henry Sokolski, “Faking It and Making It,” The N

Interest, No. 51, Spring 1998, pp. 67-74.

107
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Throug

Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 1999, p. 8.

7. See National Security Decision Directive Number 75, repr

Robert C. McFarlane and Zofia Smardz, Special Trust, New 

Caddell and Davies, 1994, pp. 372-380.

8. Andre, “Competitive Strategies.”

9. See Eliot A. Cohen, Net Assessment: An American Ap

JCSS Memorandum No. 29, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for S

Studies, April 1990; A.W. Marshall, Problems of Estimating M

Power, P-3417, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 

1966; and the chapters by George Pickett, James Roche, Barry 

and Stephen Peter Rosen in Andrew W. Marshall, J.J. Mart

Henry S. Rowen, eds., On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on N

Security Strategy in Honor of Albert & Roberta Wohlstetter B, 

CO: Westview Press, 1991.

10. Paul M. Cole, Sweden Without the Bomb: The Cond

Nuclear-Capable Nation without Nuclear Weapons, Santa Mon

RAND, 1995, Chapter 5.

11. See Chapter 3. See also Daniel Santoro, Operation Co

The Secret History of the Missile Menem Dismantled Buenos , 

Ediciones Letra Buena, 1992.

108
PART III

IRAN: TWO COMPETITIVE STRATEGIE

109
FIGHTING PROLIFERATION THROUG

DEMOCRACY: A COMPETITIVE STRATEG

APPROACH TOWARD IRAN

Kenneth R. Timmerman

Overview.

Current U.S. policy toward Iran has made impo

strides toward limiting the freedom of action of the T

regime, but it has not won support from key U.S. al

Europe and the Middle East. The U.S. secondary bo

has alienated many European countries and 

businesses, who are angry with the administratio

seeking to interfere with free trade. It has also c

concern among our allies in the Persian Gulf, who fe

U.S. Government has not taken the full measure of Teh

anger over sanctions aimed at impeding the developm

Iran’s oil and gas resources, the regime’s primary sou

the hard currency it needs to pursue its proliferation 

In the end, these allies argue, Tehran will strike out ag

the United States by hitting those targets closest at 

many of which are vulnerable to terrorism a

foreign-backed subversion.

If the United States retaliates militarily against Ir

Dhahran,

2

 these allies fear, Iran will strike back at 

Arabia. This paper argues that the United Sta

misguided in limiting its policy objectives to changin

behavior of the Islamic regime in Tehran. This is be

the very behavior we seek to change—Iran’s v

opposition to the peace process, its predilection to c

terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, its nuclear we

program, inter alia—constitute core beliefs of the cu

regime, even with the advent of a superficially 

“moderate” President, Hojjat-ol eslam Moham

111
pleading with a heroin addict to kick the habit. Instea

should seek to encourage Iranian democrats to chang

regime. This emphasis on the nature of the regime it

the basic difference between containment and a compe

strategies approach toward Iran.

Advocates of reconciliation with Tehran argue 

factions exist within the current ruling elite who wou

prepared to abandon the behavior the United States 

objectionable if the price were right. Instead of 

pressure, they argue, the United States should be of

sweeteners and should treat the regime as a reaso

interlocutor, not an outlaw.

3

So far, however, the virtues of accommodation 

failed to materialize. Europe’s example comes first to 

For most of the past 18 years, European nations 

pursued a quietist approach toward the Islamic revol

in pursuit of their own mercantile interests. When 

issues came up, such as the death edict against B

writer Salman Rushdie, the Europeans found that 

commercial engagement afforded them no leverage wi

regime. Accordingly, they adopted a somewhat to

policy in 1992, known as “critical dialogue,” which 

intended to couple economic carrots with open critic

the regime on human rights issues.

The European Union (EU) suspended this approa

April 1997, when a German court convicted Ir

intelligence agents for the September 1992 assassinat

four Kurdish opposition leaders in Berlin’s My

restaurant, and accused the senior leadership of the Is

Republic of having ordered the killings. When Eur

ambassadors returned to Tehran a few months lat

pretense of criticizing the regime was dropped. Since 

1998, the Europeans have greatly expanded comm

ties with Iran, without resolving any of the outsta

political issues between the European countries and Ir

112
“moderates” in Tehran, hoping they would be able to c

the regime’s behavior. But under the leadership of the 

“moderate,” pro-Western faction, led by President Ali A

Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the Islamic Republic actually st

up its terrorist attacks overseas in the late 1980s and 

1990s, and accelerated its nuclear weapons and ba

missile programs. Neither has his “moderate” succ

Hojjat-ol eslam Mohammad Khatami even attemp

reign in the type of behavior the United States and its 

find threatening.

5

Instead, the regime has used so-called “moderates

ploy to gain concessions from the West, much as the S

Union used détente during the Cold War. Rather 

trying to patch up the current policy, this paper outl

bottoms-up review of U.S.-Iranian relations by ask

series of basic questions to better define the nature an

goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of the U

States. It will then examine the vulnerabilities o

Islamic regime to identify points of leverage the U

States can exploit to further its interests, us

competitive strategies approach similar to that appl

the Pentagon to the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the 198

Proliferation Concerns.

In the proliferation arena, it should be underscore

while any regime in Tehran might seek weapons of 

destruction (WMD) as part of a defensive strategy

current Islamic regime is unique in seeking these we

for offensive purposes. This distinction has far rea

implications for long-term U.S. policy decisions

outcome the United States must avoid at any c

therefore an Iranian regime that maintains its cu

aggressive behavior and that is also equipped with W

Our analysis will show that this is the most likely ou

of the current U.S. containment policy as well as of Eu

policy of accommodation.

113
of ILSA sanctions against the French oil com

CFP-Total on May 18, 1998. Waiving the sanctions flas

green light to other international oil companies to inv

Iran, thereby helping the Islamic Republic overcom

economic difficulties. The preferable outcome of U.S. 

would be to see the emergence of a democratic Iran 

foregoes WMD. But there is nothing in current adm

tration policy—or Europe’s policy of accommodation—

would lead to this goal.

While some argue that conventional too

nonproliferation (export controls, treaty obliga

international standards of behavior) have slowed 

WMD development, U.S. influence has been limited be

the administration has been unwilling to exert po

pressure on Iran’s primary suppliers, Russia and C

Furthermore, the international nonproliferation norm

structured to tolerate “threshold” behavior, allow

determined proliferator to build dual-use programs 

time, reserving the political decision to declare 

military purpose at a moment of their own choosin

India and Pakistan did in the spring of 1998. If t

traditional nonproliferation alone becomes a dang

exercise in political brinkmanship, as the North K

case shows; when coupled to economic engagement, a

the case with Iraq in the late 1980s, such an approac

lead to war.

Even if the current policy succeeded in containin

expansion of Iran’s military capabilities and preven

from going nuclear—a best case scenario—the U

States would still find it faced a major threat fro

Islamic Republic of Iran. An aggressive regime will a

seek ways of striking against U.S. interests, using wha

means are at hand, whether they be nuclear-tipped m

or individual terrorists planting barometric bom

commercial airliners. Because the threat emanates 

the regime, more than from any specific weapon, the U

114
promote a basic change of orientation.

Context and Timing of U.S. Policy.

Any competitive strategy toward Iran will ne

evaluate the impact of U.S. policies on U.S. allies 

region. At the very least, any strategy toward Iran m

no harm to these alliances or to the strategic intere

these allies. For example, if promoting democracy in 

discomfits U.S. allies in the Gulf, who will feel their re

are also at risk, we must demonstrate to those allie

any alternative policy toward Iran would bring even 

consequences for them, such as a war of aggression by 

nuclear blackmail, or active subversion of their reg

Instead of alienating our Persian Gulf allies, we s

actively enlist their support through intelligence sh

and other means, and support them where possible in 

efforts to find reasonable solutions to their own dom

problems. We should also exhibit a certain tolerance f

needs of our allies in the region to seek imme

accommodation with the Tehran regime, if by so doin

enhance their own security and do not harm the overa

goals of promoting democracy in Iran.

7

Any strategy toward Iran must be plotted in time

three different clocks influencing our decisions.

1. Iranian progress in developing WMD.

2. Timeliness of developing the energy reserves 

Caspian Sea basin, and specifically, of determining e

routes.

3. Growth of political unrest in Saudi Arabia, an

inevitable passing of power in other Gulf Coope

Council (GCC) countries from the current generation 

next.

Without a more determined U.S. policy toward 

these timelines will converge at some time over the n

115
policy whose goal is to promote a change of regime in T

(or a change in the very nature of the regime, 

amounts to the same thing), the current Islamic reg

likely to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and 

astride vast new oil reserves, at a time when a new 

untested generation of rulers comes to power on the Ar

peninsula. This favorable convergence will give the Is

regime in Tehran extraordinary power and influence 

it lacks today, and make it much less vulnerable to o

pressure. Another factor is the post-Cold War str

environment. 

On the one hand, the United States has emerged 

unchallenged military power of the world, giving us g

latitude for unilateral action. But this is tempered b

increased emphasis in the United States on domestic

primarily, economic—concerns, and by the gro

preference in Washington for multilateral inste

unilateral action. Barring an aggressive act by the Is

Republic comparable to Iraq’s August 1990 invas

Kuwait, it is unlikely that U.S. public opinion would su

major military action against Iran. However, public op

would be more likely to support military retaliatio

terrorist attacks.

U.S. goals in Iran face potential competition from 

parties, including Russia, China, and the EU, all of 

are aggressively pursuing economic (and in the ca

Russia and China) military relations with 

Furthermore, the April-May 1998 campaign of nuclea

by India and Pakistan, and the lack of a vigorous res

by the United States or the world community

undoubtedly encourage Iran to put its nuclear program 

high gear.

Without significant progress toward democracy in 

within the next 2-3 years (i.e., by the year 2000-2001

trend lines become all negative. Already the U.S. bu

community has begun lobbying the administration 

116
1998, decision to waive the ILSA sanctions ag

European oil firms investing in Iran.

8

 Through it

actions, the administration has squandered an impo

policy tool that had succeeded for more than 2 yea

preventing new oil and gas investment in Iran

administration’s failure to enforce ILSA was taken as 

of weakness by Tehran. If past behavior is any guide

will only embolden the regime in its aggressive beh

Therefore, if the United States is to have any impact o

future of Iran, the time for new measures is very lim

Defining the Threat.

The nature of the threat from the Islamic Republic 

much in its intentions as in its capabilities. Until 

however, U.S. policy toward Iran has focused uniqu

containing Iran’s capabilities. But even here, the U

States has fewer tools of containment than during the 

War. With the demise of a multilateral export c

regime in March 1994, the United States can no longe

sales by others of dual-use technology to Iran 

strengthens Iran’s growing military-industrial com

Iran is buying machine-tools from Germany, computer

scientific instruments from France, and entire m

factories (not to mention major weapons systems) 

Russia and China.

International inspections, such as those carried 

Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency (I

are cooperative in nature, making it unlikely insp

would discover a covert nuclear weapons program. Ev

the only event that would eventually trigger some fo

international punishment of Iran under the cu

nonproliferation norms would be the discovery of an a

bomb plant. The IAEA has long had evidence that Ira

acquiring an indigenous uranium enrichment capa

with help from Russia and China, and has been una

protest, since these are permitted activities unde

117
Iran is not just proliferation; it is systemic.

In some ways, it parallels the Soviet threat durin

Cold War, although on a vastly smaller scale. The Is

Republic leaders view their system as an alternative 

for Third World development, just as Soviet leaders d

seeking to export their revolution, the Islamic Republ

chosen to use Islam as a political weapon, not as a rel

force, to undermine regional competitors such as Ba

and Saudi Arabia. In their effort to convince 

international oil companies to build pipelines across 

instead of neighboring countries, they have repea

resorted to terrorist attacks to destabilize neighbors su

Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan.

9

Until now, U.S. policy has focused on specific th

posed by the Islamic Republic’s nuclear weapons pro

its use of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, its 

attempts to subvert neighboring regimes that are fr

to the United States, its violent opposition to the M

East peace process, its conventional rearmamen

especially its naval buildup. But while containment po

may temporarily diminish these threats, they c

eliminate them because unilateral containment cann

sustained over time and because the regime 

demonstrated a high tolerance for pain. Even if co

ment succeeded in eliminating a specific threat, new th

would emerge for as long as the current aggres

anti-American regime remains in power. Tradi

nonproliferation tools are treating the symptom, n

root cause of the problem, which is the regime.

Iran’s Goals.

A competitive strategies approach toward Iran ne

examine the goals and the nature of the Islamic regi

Iran, and then examine how we can leverage our stre

against their enduring vulnerabilities. In this case, ga

leverage means pressing U.S. advantages in ways 

118
motivate the regime to dig its own grave deeper. 

American and European analysts argue that th

behavior the U.S. objects to in Iran is the work of a 

faction. Sideline this faction by supporting its rivals

most of the bad behavior will become moot, this argu

goes. There is a keen political debate inside Iran on 

issues. Factional disputes have made it impossibl

instance, for the Parliament (Majlis) to pass a fo

investment law, despite numerous attempts since 

One faction argues that allowing foreign companies t

assets in Iran amounts to inviting a neocolonial inv

while others contend that without foreign capital Ira

be incapable of development. Similar disputes have er

over many social and cultural issues, such as s

segregation at Iran’s universities.

But these disputes occur solely among select memb

Iran’s body politic, who have demonstrated their loya

the regime. On issues of national security and r

survival, no significant divergence separates the dif

ruling factions. A social and political “moderate” su

President Mohammad Khatami, has been closely all

the past with foreign terrorist organizations.

10

 An eco

“liberal” such as Hashemi-Rafsanjani has been the gr

supporter of Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Ther

never been parliamentary debate on the wisdom of pur

ballistic missile programs, or nuclear weapons resear

even of pursuing a civilian nuclear power program. On 

issues, the regime speaks as one.

Five goals unite the ruling clerical elite:

• Maintenance of the Islamic Republic at all 

including the system of Velayat-e faghih (absolute c

rule). The harsh treatment meted out to intellectuals 

as Abdolkarim Soroush or writers such as Faraj Sa

who dared challenge clerical rule, shows that r

survival is an existential concern and far outweigh

119
to this;

• Aggressive expansion of Iran’s influence in the Pe

Gulf region to become the predominant power, mili

politically, and eventually economically. While 

nationalist government will also seek to enhance 

regional standing (as did the former Shah), the Is

Republic has used much more aggressive means, incl

terrorism and the subversion of neighboring regim

achieve its goals;

• An end to the U.S. military presence in the Pe

Gulf, which the Islamic Republic views as a direct cha

to its predominance;

• Active subversion of the Middle East peace pr

The Islamic Republic views Israel as a competitor, and 

that if the peace process succeeds, Israel will becom

predominant economic power in the region and the pa

of choice for the Arab world, Turkey, and Central 

instead of Iran;

• Determination to develop a broad spectrum of W

including nuclear and biological weapons, as relative

cost force multipliers.

Only the last of these goals is likely to be shared 

nationalist or democratic regime. However, such a reg

also far more likely to respond to tradit

nonproliferation tools and regional confidence-bu

measures, making the threat that a democra

nationalist Iran will actually use WMD far less likely t

is today.

Through all the ups and downs of U.S. policy towar

since the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, U.S. policym

have consistently acted as if they believed it was poss

play one faction off of another. The same searc

“moderates” that drove the Iran-Contra fiasco can be 

today in the Clinton Administration’s campaign of fr

gestures toward President Khatami. The United Stat

120
the two countries to its advantage; however, it s

abandon efforts currently underway to cut a secret dea

Tehran that would leave the Islamic regime unchallen

Leveraging Iran’s Vulnerabilities.

While the Islamic Republic, as a system, ap

extremely cohesive, it has maintained its grasp on 

through a large and often brutal repressive appa

Numerous points of fracture exist within Iranian s

than can be leveraged through careful policies. D

major efforts in recent years, Iran remains an oil-

economy, and thus is extremely vulnerable to oil 

fluctuations. To expand capacity beyond the January 

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O

production ceiling of 3.9 million b/d, Iran’s oil ind

requires a massive infusion of foreign capital and adv

technology, to compensate for a near total la

maintenance and exploration since the Revolution. An

in 1997 the National Iranian Oil Company drilled 

exploratory wells in Iran in a year than were drilled 

state of Texas in a single month. Clearly, this is an 

where the U.S. policy of unilateral economic sanction

been successful, by preventing capital and techn

inflows. U.S. opposition to World Bank loans to 

compounded the impact.

Economic mismanagement has weakened the Ir

economy across the board. The standard of living in 

was a fraction of what it was in 1978, the last year befo

fall of the Shah, and most Iranians are aware of wha

have lost. High unemployment, rampant inflation

failure of the regime to make good on its promises 

“dispossessed” have generated resentment among ord

Iranians and potential instability. Widespread corru

among the ruling elite has exacerbated the problem, le

to a general impression, noted by most analysts of Ir

121
Here, too, the regime is vulnerable.

The May 1997 presidential election campaign an

massive vote against the regime’s hand-picked cand

Majlis-speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, demonstrate

discontent with the regime is broad-based and deep. Y

people have had enough of the repressive social atmos

and are turning toward the West, especially the U

States. There is abundant anecdotal evidence of this

reports by visiting U.S. journalists who are told at 

encounter with ordinary Iranians that they harbor 

intentions toward the United States, to the rousing we

given a team of U.S. wrestlers who visited Tehr

February 1998 and were cheered when they parade

American flag around the stadium to the tune o

American national anthem. Iran’s traditional Shiite 

has opposed the regime quietly since the death of Aya

Khomeini in 1989, because they reject the reli

credentials of the new absolute religious leader, Ho

eslam Ali Khamene’i. Most of the Grand Ayatollah

alive in Iran have been under house arrest for more th

years. 

In addition, there is the intense and often 

disaffection of Iran’s minority Sunni Muslim comm

variously estimated at 25-30 percent of the total popul

Because Sunni Muslim tradition rejects the dogm

Velayat-e faghih, Iran’s Sunnis find themselves barred 

government employment. Sunnis are a majority in 

Iran’s border areas, touching Iraq, Pakistan, Afghan

the Central Asian republics and most of the Persian 

coast. Both of these factors constitute major weakness

a so-called “religious” regime, and can be exploited th

skillful efforts. Iranian leaders speak often about “We

cultural invasion,” a term they have coined to express 

problem and their frustration at being unable to solv

Half of Iran’s population has been born since the 

revolution. To the minds of Iran’s clerical leaders, 

122
education system—should have become sta

supporters of the regime. Instead, they listen to We

music, buy bootleg Western video cassettes, and 

“Baywatch” and other Hollywood shows on satellit

Attempts in 1995 and 1996 to crack down on satellite d

failed miserably; in February 1997, the autho

launched raids on clothing shops, seizing T-shirts be

pictures of the American flag, the Statue of Liberty

other Western symbols, setting them on fire in 

ceremonies reminiscent of book-burning.

12

 T

Western-style clothing has become the norm on Ir

university campuses. The regime’s attempts to i

Iranians from outside influence have not only failed

have generated greater interest in things Western a

Iranians. 

Promoting Democracy.

The areas where the United States has greatest lev

over the regime in Tehran are mainly cultural. Eco

pressure worked for a time to choke off investment in t

and gas sector; but once again, this amounts to treatin

symptom, not the cause of the U.S. problem with the re

Unless it is coupled with other, cultural measure

economic and military containment policy will ultim

fail. Indeed, critics of the current “dual contain

strategy argue that the failure of economic and m

containment to bring about changes in the behavior 

regime should cause the United States to aba

containment and seek accommodation with the reg

believe, on the contrary, that the current policy does 

far enough, and fails to recognize that accommodatio

only strengthen the regime and, as a result, the 

behavior we seek to change.

The United States has shown throughout the worl

it can “compete” head to head with dictatorships and 

Freedom and democracy are extremely attra

123
under a repressive, inward-driven system. In comp

with the Islamic regime for the attention of this aud

the United States has powerful tools the regime lacks. 

most basic form, a competitive strategy amounts 

successful marketing campaign. The most powerful t

any marketing campaign is advertising. Since the U

States has no access to the Iranian media, this leave

option: creating our own. In November 1997, Con

appropriated $4 million to create a surrogate Radio 

Iran under the banner of Radio Free Europe/Radio Li

It is no coincidence that the Iranian regime has tar

this radio as a threat, and has made offers th

back-channel discussions with American intermediar

open a secret political dialogue with the United Sta

exchange for killing the new radio. These efforts 

eventually blocked in mid-April 1998 by intense pressu

the administration from Congress.

13

The audience the United States needs to reach via 

Free Iran are the 30 million young Iranians born sin

revolution. Programming should not be overtly politica

Iranian media is full of hyperventilating pol

commentary), but should focus on the stuff of freedom

choice, free expression, freedom to travel, freedom 

government repression, and respect for human r

While the United States can only get involved 

opposition groups inside Iran at great risk, it can nu

opposition to the regime through broadcasting an

distribution of guides to political defiance and o

zation.

14

 The freedom radios had a tremendous i

during the Cold War throughout Eastern Europe in ke

alive a defiant spirit among captive peoples. C

President Vaclav Havel, who spent many years 

Communist jail, expressed his country’s gratitude for 

Free Europe by turning over the former Parlia

building in Prague to the RFE/RL to use as a new worl

broadcasting center, for a token one dollar yearly ren

124
on-the-ground reporting capability, that can be deplo

times of crisis inside Iran to provide breaking news th

regime is eager to suppress, and to report on human 

abuses. Such a capability was sorely lacking during 

that broke out in a variety of cities (Qazvin, Tabriz, Isf

Zahedan, as well as the Tehran suburbs) in recent 

The lack of information allowed the regime to succes

isolate these disturbances and keep them from taki

national significance. How the regime reacts to Radio 

Iran will depend to a large extent on the content 

broadcasts. If they are strident in tone, or become the 

Iranian exiles, the regime is likely to jam them as 

throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to Ce

Intelligence Agency (CIA)-sponsored broadcasts run b

Manoucher Ganji, an exile based in Paris.

15

 However

broadcasts remain factual and strike the right tone

could gain a wide audience inside Iran, making mov

the regime to jam them or to punish Iranians c

listening to them politically risky.

Repression of this sort could in turn increas

audience for the broadcasts and further encourag

nascent pro-democracy movement inside Iran, just a

regime’s ban on satellite dishes only increased the ap

of Iranians to watch banned Western television progra

In addition to broadcasting, the United States needs to 

a clear message to the Iranian people about U.S. 

While the Clinton administration has subtly and cor

altered the official U.S. policy line since Pres

Khatami’s election, stressing the friendship betwee

U.S. and Iranian peoples, we still need to dispe

lingering suspicion in the minds of many Iranians th

United States is somehow conspiring with the ruling c

to keep the Islamic regime in power. Instead of the 

statements that the United States is “not opposed to Is

government” in Iran, or that it sees the regime 

permanent feature of the Middle East,” U.S. policym

should state publicly that the United States suppor

125
government by democratic means. The United S

should also make it clear that economic sanctions are t

the regime’s behavior, and do not result from any e

toward the Iranian people—a message that is al

getting across.

The administration should also try to coordina

policy approach toward Iran with nongovernmental a

The perceived lack of any U.S. commitment, for or ag

sanctions, has encouraged a wide variety of actors 

sides of the issue to get involved, pretending to expre

underlying intentions of the Clinton administration

notable example was the April 15, 1998, speech befo

Council on Foreign Relations in New York by out

Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat, Indiana

ranking Minority member of the House Interna

Relations Committee who has announced his retire

from the House. Hamilton called for an end to U.S. san

and encouraged the Clinton Administration to o

dialogue with the Iranian regime.

17

 If the United 

seeks to promote democracy in Iran, it should c

indicate that such statements do not square with U.S. 

or U.S. goals.

Iranian exiles would like to see the United States 

this or that political faction in Iran, but direct involve

in Iranian politics is a mine field that promises no pr

the risks of being crossed. Given the advanced state of 

of the regime, exposure of U.S. covert operations in su

of opposition groups could give regime leaders a we

boost in popularity that far outweighed any potential 

The United States should encourage other countries 

region to support opposition Shiite religious leader

Iranian Sunnis in Balouchistan, along the Gulf coas

along the border with Azerbaijan.

18

In the public policy arena, the United States shoul

up President Khatami’s call for a “dialogue of civiliza

with care. While on the surface, greater exchang

126
appealing, Tehran’s goal is to create a lobby in the U

States that can put pressure on Congress to lift eco

sanctions on Iran. For such exchanges to be meaningfu

United States should insist that American “emissari

Tehran be granted direct access to the Iranian med

Iranian students, and to local groups, so they can ma

case for democracy and freedom directly to the Ir

people. This is clearly not what President Khatami h

mind. 

Monitoring Democratic Change.

The United States can have only very limited infl

on events inside Iran, and should have no illusion abo

type of government that will emerge even in a bes

scenario from the ashes of the Islamic Republic. It is lik

remain Islamic—at least, in name; and it is likely to in

some of the historic figures of the 1978-79 revolutio

should not expect or even hope for a pro-American p

regime. U.S. public policy statements should make 

that it is in America’s interests to see a strong, free

democratic Iran, whatever its political coloration. B

should also monitor the shift from dictatorship to demo

carefully, because how it happens will affect what hap

Signs of positive change will include:

• authorization of political parties, with the rig

organize and unimpeded access to the domestic m

including those that do not accept clerical rule;

• authorization of labor unions and the right of wo

to organize freely and engage in contract negotiation

• dismantling of the repressive apparatus, especia

“vice squads” and secret police;

• an end to the assassination of Iranian dissidents 

in exile and to the harassment of the Iranian 

community;

127
Civil and Political Rights, a binding internat

agreement signed by the Islamic Republic w

guarantees the rights of minorities and of pol

representation for all citizens. (President Khatami’s v

respect the “rule of law” is a fig leaf for repression, in th

refers to the laws of the Islamic Republic which ens

discrimination against women, minorities, and po

opponents);

• an end to press censorship and ownership law

restrict press freedom, and free access to the interna

media for all Iranians;

• prosecution of individuals and groups responsib

mob violence;

• an end to the training and support of foreign ter

groups.

Some analysts see in the tremendous changes occu

within Iranian society today real signs of a chan

heart—if not yet behavior—of the regime. Such a conc

underestimates the import of the May 1997 presid

elections, which were a resounding defeat for the re

and overestimates the regime’s ability to keep the 

popular dissent. Iran’s continued support for terroris

dramatic recent successes in developing long-range ba

missiles, and its continued rejection of the Middle 

peace process have demonstrated that the current reg

incapable of reform in any meaningful way. Inde

President Khatami were to attempt to implemen

reforms listed above, the Tehran rumor mills sugge

would be removed by the Supreme Leader, Aya

Khamene’i. The advent of a real democracy in Iran

open debate and empowerment of minority groups, 

spell the end of the Islamic Republic as we know it.

Democracy would have a dramatic impact on 

WMD programs as well. For instance, it is hard to b

that a truly open debate in an Iranian parliament com

128
of the majority of clerical supporters of the regime w

see today) would approve the massive expenditures 

made to build nuclear power plants along the Persian 

coast at Busheir. If nothing else, a democratic debate 

lead Parliament to consider the economic 

environmental impact of pursuing the Busheir nu

plants. 

Similarly, while a democratic Iran might want to 

missiles capable of hitting Baghdad, it would see 

interest in longer-range missiles that would bring Te

into reach, knowing that such a capability calls 

response. The regime itself has boasted that 

capitulation by the United States, whether a relaxat

economic sanctions or the recognition of the po

legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, is tantamount to a 

of support for the regime. In this context, negotiating 

Tehran only reinforces the current regime, 

discouraging Iranian reformers whose influence is gr

on a daily basis. Instead, a competitive strategy would 

to drive a wedge between the regime and the Iranian p

to encourage Iranian democrats to organize themselve

an effective opposition capable of using the tools of po

defiance to bring about real change in Iran.

CHAPTER 6 - ENDNOTES

1. The Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), signed into law by Pr

Clinton on August 5, 1996, requires the President to impose thre

possible sanctions against foreign companies investing more th

million dollars in Iran’s oil and gas industry, with the inve

trigger reduced to $20 million after the first year of the Act. The p

sanctions are: a prohibition on the importation of goods into the 

States from a sanctioned foreign person or company; a prohib

Export-Import Bank assistance for exports to the foreign person

on export licenses for dual-use technology; a ban on U.S. fi

institutions from making loans or credits to the sanctioned pe

company; and for foreign financial institutions, the loss o

designation as a “primary dealer” in U.S. securities or as a repos

129
it was waiving sanctions against the French company CFP-Tota

more significantly, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright s

United States would issue future waivers for European com

because of unspecified cooperation from the EU on preventing Ir

acquiring WMD technologies. These U.S. waivers were greet

“great victory” by Iran and a defeat for U.S. policy.

2. While Saudi Arabia has never accused Iran publicly

officials say privately there is “no doubt” that Iran was beh

bombing of the Khobar Towers barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Ara

June 26, 1996, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen. (Source: 

conversation with Saudi officials, Washington, DC, March 

However, Saudi dissidents encountered by the author in Lon

February 1998 insisted that Saudi Sunnis tied to renegade 

financier Ossama Bin Ladin were behind the blast (see Ken

Timmerman, “This Man Wants You Dead,” Reader’s Digest, Ju

p. 56).

3. The most well-known presentation of this approach result

a Council on Foreign Relations study prompted by the U.S. oil i

and others, authored by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Murp

Brent Scowcroft, “Differentiated Containment,” Foreign 

May/June 1997.

4. In January, the Iranian Foreign Minister traveled to R

examine new export credits with the Italian government; in 

Italy’s largest energy group, ENI, said it was expecting new cont

Iran; in late April, several British oil and gas firms announced th

preparing to tender for new Iranian oil and gas field devel

projects, and in May a French commercial delegatio

representatives of more than 30 major French exporters trav

Iran. Commercial news exploded after the May 18 announcemen

United States to waive the ILSA sanctions against Total, wit

than a half dozen European companies announcing they pla

open offices in Tehran. (Source: Middle East Data Project chro

The Iran Brief, various issues).

5. One of Khatami’s first acts as President, in early Septembe

was to meet with representatives of Lebanon’s Hezbollah mili

pledge continued Iranian government support to their struggle 

Israel. See “Khatami supports Hezbollah,” The Iran Brief, Septe

1997. On May 2, 1998, Khatami publicly acclaimed Hamas 

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who was visiting Tehran, and vowed 

government support to Hamas in its struggle against “Zionist fa

“Hamas leader visits Tehran,” The Iran Brief, May 4, 1998.

130
Pentagon strategist David Andre, in “Competitive Strateg

Approach Against Proliferation,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., F

Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties, Maxwell Air Forc

AL: Air University Press, September 1996, pp. 257-276.

7. The Saudi rapprochement with Iran, which began dur

December 1997 Tehran summit meeting of the Organization 

Islamic Conference, should be seen in this light. More than for

alliance with Tehran, the Saudis seem intent on limiting Iran’s a

undermine the Saudi regime by supporting Shiite oppositionist

Eastern Province. See “Gulf Arab leaders welcome Khatami,” T

Brief, January 12, 1998.

8. Leading the charge to lift the trade embargo is USA*Eng

oil-industry lobbying group. See “U.S. waives ILSA sanctions,” T

Brief, June 1, 1998.

9. The President of Azerbaijan accused Tehran of funding a 

Islamic opposition movement in his country in 1996, and 

Pakistan officials told the author in interviews in Islamabad in 

1998 that Iran was arming the Northern Alliance in Afghan

fight the Pakistani-backed Taliban, in order to maintain insta

Afghanistan and thus prevent UNOCAL from building a $2.5 bil

pipeline across the country to Pakistan from Turkmenistan. 

hoping to convince BHP of Australia to build an alternate route

Iran. See “The Great Game in Afghanistan,” The Iran Brief, 

1998; Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Conflict Intensifies over Asian P

Routes,” Washington Times, April 11, 1998.

10. See “Khatami tied to mid-80s terror,” The Iran Brief, 

1997, which details Khatami’s role in orchestrating a w

anti-Western violence in Lebanon in 1984 while he was ser

Minister of Islamic Guidance. Since Khatami assumed the presid

August 1997, the U.S. intelligence community has detected 

intelligence agents “stalking” U.S. diplomats in Bosnia and Taj

See Bill Gertz, “Intelligence agency highlights threat of anti-Am

terror,” Washington Times, December 9, 1997.

11. See “The Public Policy Dance . . . and the Secret Track,” T

Brief, April 4, 1998.

12. See “Authorities Seize T-shirts,”The Iran Brief, March 3, 

13. See Elaine Sciolino, “White House Agrees to Radio Broad

Iran,” New York Times, April 15, 1998; and “Radio Free Iran: Do

Not Out,” The Iran Brief, April 4, 1998.

131
pamphlet written by Gene Sharp, a scholar at the Albert E

Institution (Printed in 1994 by the Committee for the Restor

Democracy in Burma, and available from the Albert E

Institution in Boston, MA). Sharp’s writings on the use of non

political defiance as “weapons systems” to defeat dictatorship 

useful references for Iranian opposition groups seeking to con

plan of action for undermining the current regime. Sharp is the 

of a landmark three-volume study, The Politics of Nonviolen

(Porter Sergent, Boston, 1973) that has inspired the B

pro-democracy movement.

15. “Confused Signals from Washington,” The Iran Brief, Fe

6, 1995.

16. Former Tehran University professor Azar Nafisi 

Iranians with satellite dishes in the poor suburbs south of 

selling tickets to their neighbors to watch weekly broadc

“Baywatch.” (Conversation with the author, April 1998).

17. Ben Barber, “Democrat calls for policy change on 

Washington Times, April 16, 1998.

18. This writer would also support preventive measures a

containing any hostile military moves by Iran. These would 

deploying theater ballistic missile defenses, and maintaining t

naval presence in the Persian Gulf.

132
DUAL CONTAINMENT AS AN EFFECTIV

COMPETITIVE STRATEGY

Patrick Clawson

I wish to demonstrate that the dual contain

strategy in the Persian Gulf plays to enduring 

strengths and exploits the vulnerabilities of 

competitors. As an economist, I am at a conside

disadvantage in making such an argument in fron

distinguished group of political scientists, because I 

never taken a political science course in my life. Ther

my method will be to make use of a competitive strat

will make use of my enduring strengths by using the t

economics, while I will avoid my weakness, which 

ignorance of political science. I will also focus the argu

on Iran, both because I know that case better and beca

has been the more controversial.

My thesis is that dual containment has been an eff

competitive strategy because it has aligned the end

U.S. strengths in the realms of military power proj

and of economic power against enduring Ira

weaknesses, especially socio-economic discontent a

troubled oil industry. In the jargon of economists

containment has been the least cost approach for ach

U.S. aims, with its benefits substantially exceedin

costs. 

This chapter is structured to follow a set of que

posed by the organizers. I am afraid that make

presentation rather disjointed, but it has the advant

facilitating comparison between this case and other 

examined with the same methodology.

133
Formulating an effective U.S. competitive strate

the Persian Gulf is a challenge because of the pe

strategic situation. The United States has vital intere

the Persian Gulf: ensuring the steady supply of oi

reasonable price and preventing implacably anti-We

governments from acquiring the modern armaments 

which to pose an intolerable threat to the United State

its allies. The problem for the United States in sec

those interests is that the Gulf has two large powers 

and Iran), both of which are hostile to the United State

one medium-sized power (Saudi Arabia), which 

political and social system alien to U.S. values and wh

uncomfortable with too close an association with the U

States. 

Evolving Nature of the Strategic Environment

The strategic environment in which U.S. policy tow

Iran is being shaped includes five major trends w

starting with the most favorable, are:

• The Iranian regime faces popular discontent an

indifference of the senior clergy. To be sure, the Is

Republic is unlikely to fall, in part because it ada

domestic pressure, expressed through hotly cont

elections fought between candidates carefully screen

ensure their loyalty to the revolution. However, dra

changes in Iran’s hostility to the West could well occu

• Oil is in ample supply, which reduces U.S. co

about an Iranian-induced oil shock. Crude oil prices 

about the same as in the mid 1980s, while the average 

level for other goods has risen about 35 percent. Pric

likely to be kept low by the drop in the cost of produci

thanks to rapidly advancing technology. As costs drop

output is coming from less attractive oil fields in cou

outside the Gulf, e.g., Venezuela is on track to increase 

134
mbd by 2002.

• The United States has had some limited succ

generating support for its campaign against I

unacceptable behavior. European Union (EU) membe

Japan enforce their bans on sales to Iran of arm

dual-use technology, but they reject U.S. argumen

economic pressure on Iran. China has suspended deli

to Iran of the most destabilizing arms it 

selling—namely, advanced anti-ship missiles—due b

U.S. pressure and $900 million in Iranian arrea

payments for arms. Russia cooperates some on blo

dual-use technology, but it is building a nuclear power 

and continues arms deliveries; President Boris Ye

agreement not to enter into new arms contracts ha

little practical effect, since so much remains undeli

under a 1989 agreement, which Iran had to stretch out 

finances deteriorated.

• The United States is losing the propaganda war 

Iran. Washington is seen as the barrier to dialogue, wh

in fact Ayatollah Khamenei and the other senior c

categorically refuse to talk. U.S. sanctions are se

ineffective, whereas in fact Iran has been unable to a

the foreign financing it needs to remain an oil exporte

the long run.

• Iran’s pursuit of unconventional weapons cont

Its nuclear weapons program appears to be adva

slower than had been feared in the early 1990s, a

adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention sug

an avenue to eliminate its chemical weapons over th

decade. On the other hand, after years of little progre

missile program is finally moving ahead. And i

criticism of the government of President Moham

Khatemi, the new commander of the Islamic Repu

Guard Corps (IRGC), Yahya Rahim Safavi, signale

military’s continuing interest in unconventional wea

saying, “Can we withstand American threats 

135
able to protect the Islamic Republic from interna

Zionism by signing conventions to ban proliferat

chemical and nuclear weapons?”

1

Futures the United States Prefers and Futures 

Wishes to Avoid.

The United States would prefer continued acc

ample Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices and 

non-aggressive governments friendly to the West in e

the major Gulf powers—Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia

first of those goals seem eminently attainable, both f

short run and the long run. The second goal is implau

For the near future, Iran and Iraq are likely to re

hostile to the West and at least Iraq will be probing to 

it can get away with external aggression. For the me

term, Iran and Iraq may become less problematic f

West—Iranian politics may evolve and Saddam m

replaced—but it is possible that Saudi Arabia will be

more of a problem, if succession to the next generat

leaders goes poorly or if structural economic reform

delayed so long that socio-economic discontent feed

ever-present religio-cultural hostility to the West.

The future of the Gulf could become unpleasant f

United States in several ways, most likely of which a

• Violent bid for domination of the Gulf. There is 

reason to worry about Iraq’s intentions. As Na

Security Council Near East and South Asian Director 

Reidel told The Washington Institute,

We all know it is not over. Saddam Hussein’s track record is 

too clear. He will continue to challenge the internatio

community because his goals remain regional domination 

revenge for past defeats. That is why he started two wars 

tried to assassinate President Bush and the Amir of Kuwa

• Loss of a key ally. Saudi Arabia could become dist

less friendly to the United States, either under a more 

136
religious forces opposed to a close relationship wit

West.

• Loss of prestige from mishandled initiatives to im

relations. The last U.S. initiative towards Iran

clandestinely selling Iran arms during the Iran-C

affair, was not a success. It hurt the prestige of a po

U.S. president.

• Oil price rise. Were the world economy to beco

heavily dependent on Gulf oil as it was in the early 1

the Gulf producers might be able to reform the carte

drove up prices in 1973 and 1979. Those price incr

reduced world economic output by approximately 2 pe

for a period of 2 to 4 years. For the United States

translates into a loss of national income of $150 bill

$300 billion.

The focus of U.S. efforts has been on avoiding the f

that list, namely a violent bid for domination of the 

The U.S. approach is to deter external aggres

Deterrence in the Gulf is quite different from deterre

Cold War Europe. In the Gulf, unlike Europe, there 

doubt that the United States could bring into the r

sufficient force to reverse any aggression. It is obviou

the United States could, if it so wished, prevail in the G

a conflict were to erupt: its national power vastly ex

that of its potential opponents. But the U.S. aim is 

ambitious than prevailing in a conflict were o

occur—its aim is to deter any conflict from ever occurri

The Gulf deterrence problem is demonstrating th

United States has the will to bring sufficient force to be

as to prevent aggression rather than reversing it aft

fact. It can be argued that Saddam would never 

attacked Kuwait had he known how far the United S

would go in opposing his invasion, and a larger 

presence in the Gulf might well have shown Saddam 

how seriously the United States would oppose aggre

there. Deterrence in the Gulf requires a level and ty

137
war, by demonstrating the degree of U.S. commitment

may well be a level of presence greater than wou

suggested by the method of war planning developed f

European Cold War theater, based on measuring the 

of the potential adversaries and calculating how m

needed to hold the line until reinforcements from the U

States arrive.

Competitors and Key Third Parties.

Iran is the competitor that is the focus of this ana

Iran is obviously not competitive with the United Sta

a global scale; the most it can achieve is to raise the c

the United States of pursuing certain U.S. objectives

the hope that these costs will induce the United Sta

decide the game is not worth the candle.

The question of third parties is quite complex. The 

important third party for U.S. policy towards Iran is R

Iran places great store on its relation with Russia

which it proclaims it has a strategic alliance again

West and which is its principal arms supplier. It is not 

to what extent Russia shares these sentiments. How

Iran and Russia have important common interests. Bo

large producers of oil and gas, whose interests are ill s

if Caspian Basin oil and gas reach markets that they 

themselves serve. Under these circumstances, it is h

surprising that Iran has cooperated closely with Rus

regional issues, such as establishing peace in Tajikis

The next most important third parties are U.S. 

both in the Gulf and in Europe. As discussed bel

principal Iranian strategy has been to play those all

against the United States.

The final important third party is Israel. The Is

Republic has a strong ideological objection to the exis

of the state of Israel, which it has backed up with fin

and material support to those who would disrupt the 

138
developing missiles with sufficient range to reach I

Not surprisingly, Israel’s response has been to regar

Islamic Republic as an implacable foe, increasin

military budget to offset the Iranian threat and encour

its friends in the United States to point out the danger

the Islamic Republic.

In theory, Iraq could be an important third 

because Iranian-Iraqi cooperation could represent a 

serious threat than either could pose alone. In practic

two sides have been unable to cooperate much, d

historical rivalries, residual hostilities from their 7

war, and the arrogance of each side towards the othe

Goals and Strategies of Competitors and Third

Parties.

There is a broad consensus in Iran in favor of 

assertion of Iranian interests in its neighborhood, incl

the Persian Gulf, the Caspian basin, and the Levant. 

of the reasons are based on Iranian national interest

would not change irrespective of who held power in Te

At the same time, some of the Iranian behavior to 

Washington most objects—its use of terrorism

destabilization of neighboring governments, an

opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process—are la

specific to the Islamic Republic. Indeed, they are so int

to that regime’s self-conception that is difficult to fo

them being changed as long as the Islamic Rep

continues in its present form.

The major motives for Iran’s policy toward

neighborhood are seeking economic advantage, realiz

self-conception as a great power, asserting leadership 

world’s Muslims, forestalling unrest among I

minorities, and preventing attack. In general, the Is

Republic of Iran behaves less assertively in its imme

neighborhood than in far distant areas, like Israel 

Balkans, where it is quite adventurous. In the Gulf

139
supporting subversion, than in open aggression.

That said, the Islamic Republic is doing an effecti

at persuading the United States that Tehran is in 

conventional military threat to vital U.S. interests 

Gulf. Iran has concentrated on buying every ship-si

system it can get its hands on, while doing little to im

its ability to defend against a land attack from Iraq

apparent strategy is not to permanently close the Stra

instead to raise the cost to the United States of any 

projection in a conflict. Specifically, Iran could p

considerable danger to shipping which could affect wo

markets—the potential for damage to U.S. econ

interests could conceivably deter U.S. intervention. 

threats to shipping could also complicate mi

operations. Civilian ships would be less willing to m

supplies vital to U.S. forces. It is even conceivable tha

could be lucky enough to sink a U.S. Navy ship, allowin

claim a propaganda victory irrespective of what its 

then suffered.

Iran seems to have in mind a repetition of the disas

strategy of the tanker war of 1987-88. That is, if Iran 

under attack, its response could be to impede shipping 

Straits, to raise the stakes. When done last time, the 

was to unite the industrial world against Iran, to brin

navies of eight countries into the Gulf to sweep for Ir

mines. And the tanker war brought the United Sta

support Iraq more actively—in Iranian eyes, to ent

war on Iraq’s side (their interpretation of the A

downing). Despite this demonstrated record of failur

strategy of impeding shipping seems to be what I

planning to do once again if attacked.

Statements by IRGC leaders suggest that Iran’s str

might also be horizontal escalation, that is, terr

elsewhere in the region. Mohsen Rezai, IRGC comm

from 1980 to 1997, warned that if the

140
war which might spill over to other places, with the America

losing the game. If the slightest pressure is exerted on us, 

will disregard all restrictions and become engaged in conf

with the United States throughout the Persian Gulf up to t

Sea of Oman.

3

Iran’s leaders seem to take a sanguine view of 

prospects against the United States. They frequently 

to the ease with which the United States was forced 

Lebanon by terrorist attacks against U.S. forces. Eve

risk of all-out war seems to be accepted. Rezai expla

strategy that could be used against U.S. forces: “If a wa

that of the U.S. with Iraq were to be waged against Ir

least 20,000 American troops would be captured befo

United States had even launched its first attack. An

while the United States would be prepared to sit a

negotiation table even with the first thousand prison

Asked about what would happen if the United S

attacked Iran with military force, then-Foreign Mi

Velayati replied, “Iran is not weaker than Vietnam

America is not stronger than it was at that time.”

5

As for the goals and strategies of third parties rega

U.S.-Iran relations, there is a widespread vie

Washington that Europe is interested primar

commercial advantage, the Gulf Cooperation Council (

countries wish to avoid confrontation with a pow

neighbor, and Russian hardliners see Iran as a 

source of revenue and as a way to annoy the United S

There is a large element of truth in each of 

characterizations, but it is also the case that each of 

third parties sees engagement with Iran as the 

effective means to encourage more moderate element

particularly worth noting that to date, there is 

indication Russia wants a strategic partnership with 

for Moscow, the relationship is tactical, based o

political inferiority complex in both countries and on 

role as a potentially attractive arms customer.

141
It is obvious that the United States has vastly 

national power in every realm than does Iran. Indee

question can be posed whether Iran represents in 

meaningful sense a threat to the United States. In 

there is one area in which there is some degr

competition, and that is for the control of the Str

Hormuz. Iran has been acquiring a potent set of asset

which to dominate the Strait of Hormuz area, to h

shipping and threaten Gulf islands, including:

• three Russian Kilo-class submarines;

• 100 older model antiship HY2 missiles (based o

Soviet Styx) on 8-10 mobile launchers near the Strai

• more than 100 C801 antiship missiles, with a 4

range and a 165 kg payload, including some modified 

launched from planes;

• on Qeshm Island near the Strait, batteries of 

antiship missiles, each with a 165 kg payload and a tu

engine giving a 95-135 km range;

• 10 Hudong fast attack craft, each with 4 C802 an

missiles;

• 10 Combattante patrol boats, which are being ou

to carry C802 antiship missiles;

• 2,000 modern mines;

• 51 Swedish Boghammer boats capable of hara

shipping;

• 3 frigates and 3 light frigates;

• 6 landing ships of more than 2,000 tons each.

In view of these assets, it would be inappropri

assume that a conflict in the Strait would be as one-sid

the U.S. victory over Iraq in DESERT STORM.

142
has relied on a light approach with assets that can be 

either against Iran or Iraq. There is no need for 

permanent bases of the sort America has in Europ

East Asia. Instead, the United States relies 

combination of modern technologies that allow p

strikes from a long distance plus pre-positioned equip

allowing a surge into the area. Extensive use is also m

rotated units. In Kuwait, there has been a near-conti

presence of a battalion, with frequent presence of a br

often engaged in live-fire exercises. Air Expediti

Forces (AEF), which are deployments for some month

squadron or more along with all support equipmen

personnel, have been sent to Bahrain, Qatar, and Jo

Along similar lines, intensive use has been ma

commercial ports, including about 200 calls a year 

Jebel Ali port in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Se

thousand airmen have been located in Saudi Arabia 

Operation DESERT STORM, but the United States h

constructed any permanent facilities, so as to demon

that its presence is strictly a function of the conti

threats. Indeed, most U.S. forces in Saudi Arabi

located in the middle of the desert, at Prince Sulta

Base, far out of sight from ordinary Saudis, to min

local sensitivities about the U.S. presence.

Enduring Weaknesses of U.S. Competitors.

A major enduring Iranian weakness is its eco

problems. Living standards are now no more than ha

pre-revolution level. And the future looks bleak. Oil in

will be stagnant while population is growing quickly

post-revolution baby boom, encouraged by conserv

mullahs, is now graduating high school and lookin

work. Iran has only been able to create 350,000 jobs a 

for the 800,000 young men joining the labor force each 

(setting aside the employment aspirations of Iran’s 

women). At the same time as the need for revenue is r

the country’s oil exports are falling. Iran is caught be

143
aging fields; its official forecast is that the country will 

exporting oil in between 15 and 25 years. Foreign fina

and technology could extend oil exports, but Iran ha

offered particularly good terms to investors. Withou

technology and without funding from international c

markets, Iran will be hard pressed to increase oil ou

While Iran has the world’s second largest gas reserves 

Russia, the potential for finding markets in the next d

is rapidly shrinking. By targeting investment in Ira

and gas industry, the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILS

Iran at its most vulnerable spot, while exploiting th

major role in oil industry technology and in world c

markets. 

Iran’s economic problems have been an important 

in the widespread popular dissatisfaction with rule b

politicized clergy, which is the second and more impo

enduring weakness. The politicized clergy, it shou

emphasized, are only a small part of the clergy as a 

and do not include those most respected for their 

Many Iranians look forward to the end of the Is

Republic as it has functioned until now, with its exte

social restrictions and blatant corruption. It is diffic

foresee the Islamic Republic surviving another decade 

present form: either it will evolve towards a more 

society or it will abandon its claims to be based on po

will. 

The third enduring Iranian weakness has bee

inability to field a modern military. Its economic pro

and its inability to persuade Iranians to sacrifice fo

revolution have prevented Iran’s government 

developing its military as it had hoped. In the p

1989-96, Iran announced agreements with va

suppliers to purchase many more weapons that it ac

acquired, e.g., 1,000-1,500 tanks agreed to but onl

acquired; 100-200 aircraft agreed to but only 57 acq

and 200-300 artillery pieces agreed to but only 

acquired.

6

 The reason for the shortfall was generally l

144
arms have dropped from a high of $2.5 billion in 1991 

than one billion dollars last year.”

7

 That shortfall in Ir

arms spending has had a significant impact on the ba

of power in the Gulf. With an extra one billion to two b

dollars a year, Iran would have been able to add 

weapons with which to threaten stability in the Str

Hormuz. For instance, Chinese officials relate priv

that the reason China stopped deliveries of adv

anti-ship missiles to Iran was that Tehran was beh

payments by most of a billion dollars.

Iran’s inability to field a modern military has, 

recently, extended to its unconventional wea

programs. In every field of activity, Iran has great diff

with large-scale projects, especially those requ

integration of different technologies, e.g., the Tehran 

is 15 years behind schedule, the Tehran airport is at l

years late, the Isfahan steel complex took twice as lo

build as the Soviets had expected, and the Bushehr nu

power complex is proceeding at a fraction the pac

Russians predicted. The missile program long fi

pattern: for the first 10 years that the project beca

national priority during the war of the cities of 1987, 

was little progress. However, the recent test firing 

Shahab-3 intermediate-range missile suggests Ir

mastering the art of utilizing advanced foreign techn

for missiles, which raises the possibility that the 

systems integration skills will be used for other mi

projects, such as nuclear weapons.

That said, unconventional weapons would be of du

value to Iran. The two most important cases are nu

weapons and missiles. Thanks to years of U.S. warning

pressure on other governments to limit export to Iran 

technologies useful for nuclear weapons, a b

international consensus has formed that an Iranian nu

weapon would be unacceptable, both on its own and 

implications for the global Treaty on Nonproliferat

Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Were Iran to openly de

145
would be politically isolated from Europe and the Ara

states, and it might well face multilateral eco

sanctions. The case of missiles is quite different in 

ways, except the most important, namely, the missiles 

little advantage to Iran. Because the United States wa

to pressure various governments around the world 

especially North Korea) not to assist Iran as much a

been planned, Iran’s development of medium-

missiles was retarded from 1994, when Iran expec

have access to North Korea’s No Dong technology, to 

That delay provided the window of opportunity for I

with U.S. funding, to develop the Arrow the

missile-defense system. The Arrow, which will be dep

at least a year before the Shahab-3, is optimized again

Shahab-3. Furthermore, now that three batteries of A

are funded, the Arrow will be deployed in numbers 

sufficient to counter the Shahab-3 threat for the ne

years. And Israel is on track for enhancements to the A

which will make that system effective against the Sha

well before the Iranians are able to deploy that missi

Enduring U.S. Strengths and Weaknesses.

The main U.S. strength vis-à-vis Iran is its eco

might. One form that it takes is the preeminent U.S. r

the global oil and gas industry. Not only do U.S. firms h

technological lead, but the sheer weight of the U.S. m

and of the U.S. firms means that the U.S. Governmen

leverage over the entire industry. Important as 

instrument of power may be, even more important 

U.S. dominance of world financial markets. The 

Government is well positioned to pressure banks, fo

governments, and international financial institution

the World Bank not to lend to Iran. To be sure, the U

States cannot expect to cut off the flow of funds, but 

restrict the flow and raise the cost to Iran. Ir

particularly vulnerable because it needs long

investment in large-scale infrastructure projects

146
participation by broad consortium of investors; the ina

to include U.S. banks and U.S. capital markets in 

consortia is a serious impediment for Iran.

The United States is well positioned to provide the 

needed to defeat aggression in the Gulf, because of th

features of U.S. forces, particularly:

• Power projection—forces designed to deploy qu

lift to get them there, and logistics to sustain them.

• Strike power into even the most hostile battle

with an abundant arsenal of accurate weapons.

• Robust forces, imposing in quality as much as s

An enduring problem for the United States is th

Gulf allies are nervous about U.S. presence and re

GCC elite opinion is worried about how lasting the 

commitment is, recalling that Britain left the Gulf in 

despite Gulf rulers’ desire for it to stay. It is also conc

about the U.S. departure from Beirut in 1983 

Mogadishu in 1993 after taking casualties. At the 

time, GCC elite opinion is worried that the United S

presence may overwhelm the area. Cultural or rel

conservatives, already concerned about what they see 

corrosive effect of American mass culture, may worry 

the impact of thousands of young Americans, incl

working women. Also, too prominent a presence 

inflame nationalist or religious sensibilities. The M

East has a history of such reactions to Western milit

For instance, the creation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 

the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, and 

status-of-forces agreement with the United States w

important factor in the bloody rioting that shook Ir

1963. The most important example was the Ir

Revolution, which was fueled by the presence of 50,00

military contractors and trainers, as well as the po

Iranian perception that the Shah had become a U.S. pu

U.S. interests would be ill served were the presence 

147
to be a problem for the United States in mainta

sufficient presence in the region to deter Iran.

Core Competencies the United States Needs

to Maintain and Develop.

The core military competencies that the United S

needs to maintain with respect to Iran include 

projection and long-distance strike power. The U

States has an overwhelming lead in these areas, bu

lead could be threatened were the U.S. military budge

reduced or were the U.S. military to be reoriented mo

Bosnia- and Haiti-style peace enforcement operation

The main core competency that the United States 

to develop is a means to exercise economic pres

Economic sanctions have not been a popular instru

with the U.S. business community. In some cases, eco

engagement may be an appropriate economic 

instrument for modifying the behavior of 

governments, but it is also desirable to have a mea

apply pressure. Despite intense efforts in the think

and lobbyist communities, no effective alternative eco

instruments have been developed to pressure hostile s

Strategies the United States Can Employ.

The West has tried a wide variety of approaches, n

which has worked well:

• Reliance on a regional power to sustain peace, as 

by the United States under the Nixon Doctrine, beca

disaster when the chosen government, imperial 

proved to be unstable, revealing the powerful anti-We

currents that lurk below the surface of each of the re

states.

• Promotion of a balance of power among wa

countries by providing first arms to Iran (by both Isra

the United States) and then intelligence to Iraq beca

148
army for aggression against weak neighbors.

• Engagement with Iranian technocrats, as do

Europe and Japan after Hashemi Rafsanjani be

president in 1989, required a high price ($30 billion in 

over 4 years) and produced little. Indeed, Iran respond

stepping up the killing of dissidents abroad, cont

threats against Salman Rushdie, and vigorous sponso

of violent opponents of the Arab-Israeli peace process

• Armed overthrow of Saddam’s regime by supp

the opposition, as the United States attem

half-heartedly to do in 1991-95, proved beyond U.S. m

to accomplish, partly because the opposition has be

fractious and partly because of U.S. discomfor

clumsiness with providing vigorous support for s

covert operation.

Against this backdrop of failed past policy, the C

administration formulated the policy of dual contain

which has as its core a U.S. commitment to guarant

security of the Gulf. The principal means to that end 

U.S. military presence in the Gulf. The other 

component of the policy has been to use economic me

pressure both Iraq and Iran—to reduce their abil

engage in external aggression and to show the heavy 

paid for the confrontational policies with the West 

hope that either the policies will change or the regime

be replaced by a fundamentally different ki

government (almost assuredly by violence in the c

Iraq; most likely by peaceful means in Iran).

Competitor and Third Party Countermoves

and U.S. Responses.

One Iranian countermove to the U.S. dual contain

policy has been the naval build-up noted above. Bu

main countermove has been horizontal escalatio

149
and European allies over how to deal with Iran.

Despite U.S. wishes to the contrary, Iran has bee

to improve its relations with GCC countries, with a s

combination of implied threats (drawing upo

perception that Iran was responsible for the 1996 K

Towers bombing) and sweet words (building upon Pres

Khatemi’s reputation as a moderate and 

consensus-building approach Khatemi’s governmen

at the December 1997 Tehran summit of the Organiza

the Islamic Conference). On the other hand, it is ea

exaggerate the price containing Iran has exact

complicating U.S. relations with GCC countries. To be 

dual containment is not particularly popular in the 

states. To some extent, the policy has been the victim 

own success: the demonstrated U.S. will and ability to 

external aggression has led to complacency abou

threats. On the other hand, the GCC government

generally more aware than is popular opinion that th

presence is what keeps Iran from carrying out aggre

At the same time, the U.S. umbrella over the Gu

encouraged some GCC governments to explore an op

with Iran, secure in knowing that were there to be 

security threat, the United States would come to 

rescue. This is hardly surprising behavior from a 

neighbor to a large nearby threatening country. In

much the same pattern was seen in Europe during the 

War. Cold strategic calculation, not Arab deviou

suggests the GCC states may publicly call for reconcil

with Iran while urging the United States to be vi

against the dangers of its aggression.

More troubling has been the impact of containing Ir

U.S. relations with Europe. To some extent, the pro

have been independent of Iranian action, being 

instead on:

• European and U.S. differences about how to dea

difficult regimes. Europe prefers engagement, whi

150
necessary. The two sides distrust the other’s explanati

this difference in approach. The failure to secure br

support for containment of Iran has often been interp

in Washington as a product of European interest in s

to Iran irrespective of that government’s misdeed

Europe, the usual explanations for the differences a

the Atlantic on Iran policy are, first, that Washin

exaggerated hostility to Iran is based on domestic p

rather than strategic interests, and, second, that eng

Iran and encouraging Iranian moderates will be the 

effective route to change unacceptable Iranian behav

• European anger over trade issues. The 

controversial issue in the sanctions strategy has been 

Europeans complain that the secondary boycott prov

of ILSA—which they regard as the extraterri

application of U.S. law—are unacceptable in prin

irrespective of the purpose to which it is put. In the 

view, ILSA is marginally extraterritorial since it a

only to those wishing to sell in the United States m

and this kind of extraterritoriality is not unusual

governments also argue that ILSA-style measure

contrary to the provisions of the World Trade Organiz

(WTO).

• European anger at what is seen as U.S. bullying. 

combined with the Helms-Burton Act and noneco

issues like the vetoing of a second term for 

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, have been 

as evidence that the United States insists on dictat

Europe on those issues where the two disagree

perception of unfair U.S. pressure has hurt the o

relationship, which is arguably the most important fo

tie the United States has, and has impeded agreeme

the specific issues of disagreement.

However, Iran has also been skillful at exacerb

U.S.-European differences. In particular, Iran dramat

shifted its earlier rigid opposition to foreign involvem

151
projects to foreign investors. That move brought to a 

U.S. and European differences over whether to engag

Iran or to contain it. The Iranian proffer of inves

opportunities greatly complicated Washington’s ho

negotiations with Europe about measures against Ir

terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 

measures could provide the means to grant EU count

general waiver of ILSA, under its Section 4c.

The French government has been particu

uninterested in reaching agreement on how to respo

problems with Iran. In September 1997, when the F

firm Total announced a two billion dollar deal with I

develop the South Pars gas field, in partnership 

Gazprom of Russia and of Malaysia, Total went out 

way to spit in the eye of the United States. Its cha

Thierry Desmarest proclaimed, “Under any hypot

they (U.S. sanctions) would have only very m

consequences for Total. Our U.S. presence is very 

(accounting for 3-4 percent of the group’s FF180 b

annual sales). It is more important for an oil company 

in the Middle East than the United States.”

9

In May 1998, the United States clarified a chan

policy that had been forming since October 1997, na

the retreat from the threat of a secondary boycott ov

South Pars deal. This decision had little to do with Ir

was overwhelmingly a product of European pressu

secondary factor was the U.S. business commu

lobbying against sanctions as a whole, which serv

reduce Congressional willingness to take a strong sta

Iran sanctions. A third factor, definitely less than the 

two, was the perception that Iran may be changing

therefore some gesture should be made to Pres

Khatemi. 

The Clinton administration has handled poor

reaction to the Total deal. The deal was a poor case f

United States to push hard on—Total sold most of it

152
French government could gain on the domestic po

scene by standing up to U.S. pressure. ILSA was craf

provide great flexibility for such cases, but the C

administration did not make use of the act’s possibi

For instance, the U.S. Government could have q

applied to Total limited sanctions. The law req

choosing two of six specific measures, and tw

them—denial of credits from the Export-Import Ban

refusal of permission to be a primary dealer in 

Government securities—are entirely outside the dom

the WTO. Had Washington applied such sanctions ag

Total, France would have had no basis for a WTO comp

And Washington could have sustained the deterrent 

of ILSA by darkly hinting that it would react more sev

against other firms more vulnerable than Total.

It could be argued that a general waiver of ILSA w

the U.S. interest, because the strong EU reaction sh

that ILSA does not work or that its cost is too high. If s

time to proclaim such a waiver would have been just 

Khatemi’s inaugural in August 1997, the month befo

Total deal was announced. Had that been done, the w

could have been presented as a U.S. olive branch to th

government, which would have put the ball in Iran’s co

respond. 

By waiting instead to waive ILSA, the Cl

administration has given the impression that it wi

stand up to Iran despite the past strong words, which 

create problems for the credibility of U.S. policy glo

The risk is that a rogue government may decide that 

ignore strong declarations from Washington, o

grounds that similar statements about Iran led to no a

At some point, the United States may find that a rogue

could have been deterred had Washington’s word not 

doubted, engages in aggression that must be revers

use of force.

153
The military deployments to deter Iran have 

relatively uncontroversial in part because they are o

low cost. So long as the United States maintains subst

assets in the Gulf to deter Saddam Hussein, there is 

additional cost associated with the small extra m

needed to deter Iran.

Criticism of U.S. policy towards Iran has focused o

cost of sanctions. Much of that criticism has concentra

the cost to U.S. business, which loses opportunities o

foreign business. That is not an appropriate criticism

rule of thumb, achieving a foreign policy objective req

paying a price, financial or otherwise. It is the un

situation when the U.S. Government is able to achie

interest without having to make some tradeoff or sac

If sanctions had not been imposed on Iran, then 

alternative means would have to have been fou

accomplish the same purpose of promoting change in 

unacceptable behavior. It is inappropriate to con

sanctions with no sanctions: sanctions must be contr

with other policy instruments. Sanctions on Iran m

expensive, but they could still be the least-cost appro

all the alternatives cost more. The more comp

complaint against sanctions would be if it cou

demonstrated that sanctions impose a heavier burd

the economy than do other foreign policy tools, or 

sanctions cost more for what they achieve than do 

foreign policy instruments.

Sanctions have had two major benefits from 

perspective of U.S. interests. The first and most impo

has been on Iran’s domestic political scene. Iran’s eco

problems have been an important factor in the wides

popular dissatisfaction with rule by the politicized c

There are certainly those in Iran who realize tha

country’s economic prospects are poor unless it is a

raise large amounts of foreign capital and that the onl

to do so is to improve relations with the West. That has 

154
know exactly how important for Khatemi’s victory w

sanctions-induced economic pain. Probably it was a r

small factor; domestic issues predominated in that co

as in nearly all elections. Still, the sanctions had 

positive impact, and perhaps that is about all the 

Government can achieve.

In addition to their impact on the Iranian political 

sanctions have made an important contribution to 

security by depriving Iran of the resources it 

otherwise have used for a military buildup. Had the U

States not gone down the route of sanctions to contain 

then the United States would have needed to imple

other policies to respond to what would be a larger Ir

military—larger because an unsanctioned Iran would 

more access to international capital and therefore bee

to afford more weaponry. The usual estimate of the c

present U.S. military preparedness in the Persian 

against both Iran and Iraq, is $50 billion a year.

10

 A g

Iranian threat would require an increase in that am

For instance, a larger and more modern Iranian navy 

require more antisubmarine and antimine ship

aircraft; more Iranian missiles would require a 

theater missile defense network; more Iranian fighte

attack planes would require the presence of more 

planes, probably including more frequent visits by ai

carriers; and there would have to be a general incre

reconnaissance and intelligence assets. Plus there 

have to be a variety of equipment and personnel h

reserve earmarked for a conflict involving Iran. It wou

be a stretch to say that this could add 10 percent to th

billion estimate for defense of the Gulf, i.e., $5 billion a 

That is a hefty cost which more than counterbalanc

costs Iran sanctions have imposed on the U.S. econom

To say that the alternative to Iran sanctions is an 

$5 billion military cost per year is to understate the 

The real cost of using military preparedness to co

Iranian unacceptable behavior is that the risk of war 

155
might fear attack and become jumpy. An accidental inc

could escalate out of control, given the mutual susp

and a high state of readiness by both sides’ forces. Th

sides could find themselves in a shooting match, 

would inflame passions in both countries. Besides its 

implications, a serious conflict would cost real mone

U.S. portion of Operation DESERT STORM/DE

SHIELD cost $61 billion, and Iran is three times the s

Iraq.

11 To calculate the cost of the war risk, the econo

approach would be to estimate the probability of confli

then multiply that by the cost of a conflict, to get a no

cost; think of this as the annual cost of an insurance 

that would pay for a conflict were it to occur. Even if th

of conflict is as low as 5 percent and the cost of the conf

low as the $61 billion for DESERT STORM/DE

SHIELD, the annual risk premium would still be $3 bi

year. 

While the Iran sanctions have been the 

cost-effective way to achieve U.S. goals vis-à-vis Iran

have a price. Their costs fall into two large categorie

economic costs and the complications for other 

objectives. The economic costs have been small, be

Iran is a small market and because there are a

opportunities elsewhere for investment in oil develop

The complications for other policy objectives have 

more important. The main problem with dual contain

comes from the difficulties with European and Arab 

states over how to deal with Iran.

Overall, the U.S. containment policy towards 

appears to have been successful at limiting I

conventional weapons buildup, slowing its W

development, and raising the price Iran has to pay 

hostility to the United States to the point that Iranian 

are seriously considering changing their basic 

orientation on this issue. This considerable success 

open the door to a future policy making more use of dé

with Iran, if Iran decides to accept dialogue with the 

156
outstanding issues.

CHAPTER 7 - ENDNOTES

1. In a speech to IRGC commanders meant to have been 

cited in Abrar, April 30, 1998, as printed in Akhbaar Ruz of th

date. In subsequent IRGC statements and Safavi interviews, th

no retraction of this view.

2. Bruce O. Riedel, Special Assistant to the President and N

Security Council Senior Director for Near East and South Asian 

“U.S. Policy in the Gulf: Five Years of Dual Containmen

Washington Institute for Near East Policy Soref Symposium, 

1998. 

3. Tehran Times, September 24, 1996, pp. 1, 10, as transm

Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (hereafter FBIS), Sep

24, 1996. It is not clear from the FBIS transmission if these wo

direct quotes from Rezai or the newspaper’s paraphrase.

4. Resalaat, September 24, 1995, as printed in Akhbaa

September 24, 1995.

5. Interview in Al-Hayat, August 8, 1996, reprinted in M

Mirror, August 8, 1996, p 15.

6. Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power, Washingt

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, pp. 36-7.

7. Reidel.

8. As noted in the Wall Street Journal editorial of October 6, 

A22.

France doesn’t let foreign firms do as they will in Fran

either, if their activities are in some way contrary to Fren

law or policy. In fact, a lot of laws all over the globe a

extraterritorial. 

9. Financial Times, September 30, 1997, p. 9.

10. Cf. Scott Peterson, “US Stakes Out a Sentinel’s Role,” Ch

Science Monitor, August 6, 1997, pp. 7, 9.

11. The U.S. war cost is from “Operation Desert Shield/Storm

and Funding Requirements,” Washington: U.S. Gover

157
contribution towards those costs as $54 billion.

158
DR. DAVID J. ANDRE, a retired U.S. Army colone

consultant and a former operational and strategic an

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and chairman 

Department of Military Strategy at the National 

College. He writes, lectures, designs war games

conducts analyses on the changing global sec

environment, the possible nature of future war

“revolution in military affairs,” and the proliferat

weapons of mass destruction and other stra

capabilities. Dr. Andre was involved with compe

strategies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

military assistant to the Director of the Office o

Assessment from 1980 to 1984 and as special assista

analysis to the Deputy Undersecretary of Defens

Planning and Resources from 1987 to 1990.

DR. PATRICK CLAWSON is Director for Research 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 

through 1997, Dr. Clawson was a senior research pro

at the Institute for National Strategic Studies o

National Defense University in Washington, DC, wh

was the editor of the Institute’s flagship annual public

Strategic Assessment. From 1981 through 1992, he 

research economist for 4 years each at the Interna

Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Foreign 

Research Institute, where he was also the editor of O

quarterly review of foreign affairs. Dr. Clawson 

author of more than thirty scholarly articles on the M

East, which have appeared in Foreign Affairs, Interna

Economy, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statisti

Middle East Journal, among other journals. His most 

publication is Dollars and Diplomacy: The Impact o

Economic Initiatives on Arab-Israeli Negotiations 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999

Clawson is senior editor of Middle East Quarter

159
Research and a B.A. from Oberlin College. He s

Persian (Farsi), French, Spanish, German, and Hebr

DR. ZACHARY S. DAVIS is a specialist in interna

nuclear policy at the Congressional Research Service (

the research branch of the Library of Congress that re

directly to members of Congress. Dr. Davis has pub

and lectured extensively on national security issues, t

courses on U.S. foreign policy, and served as a consulta

arms control and nonproliferation policy. In 1996 he s

on the staff of Senator Sam Nunn, where he work

Cooperative Threat Reduction and counter-terr

legislation. In 1998 he was detailed to the office 

Deputy Secretary of State to assist with the U.S. respo

the nuclear tests in South Asia. Dr. Davis holds doc

and masters degrees in international relations fro

University of Virginia. He earned his B.A. in politics 

the University of California, Santa Cruz.

DR. BERNARD I. FINEL is Associate Director 

National Security Studies Program at George

University. His main research has focused on the 

between changes in relative power, domestic coa

structure, and foreign policy choices. He has also w

extensively on democratic peace theory, escalation, an

revolution in military affairs (RMA). His work has 

published in International Security, Harvard Interna

Review, SAIS Review, Perspective on Political Scienc

National Security Studies Quarterly. Dr. Finel has s

on the editorial boards of Politica and the SAIS Revie

is currently editorial consultant for the National Se

Studies Quarterly. Dr. Finel teaches courses on Am

Defense Policy, Military Instruments of Foreign P

Political Analysis, and Development of American Str

He earned his doctorate in Government from Georg

University.

DR. THOMAS G. MAHNKEN is Associate Profes

Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and Ad

160
Georgetown University. Prior to coming to the War Co

he was the Lynde and Harry Bradley Fellow at The 

Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Adv

International Studies (SAIS) and a National Se

Fellow at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Stud

Harvard University. He served in the De

Department’s Office of Net Assessment and i

Non-Proliferation Directorate of the Office of the Secr

of Defense (OSD). He also served as a member of the 

War Air Power Survey, commissioned by the Secret

the Air Force to examine the performance of U.S. 

during the war with Iraq.

DR. MITCHELL B. REISS is the Dean of Interna

Affairs and the Director of the Wendy and Emery 

Center for International Studies at the College of Will

Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia. Prior to his appointm

the College, Dr. Reiss helped start and manage the K

Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO

international organization dealing with North Kore

most recent book is Bridled Ambition: Why Cou

Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities.

MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI is the Executive Dire

the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He 

teaches graduate school courses on proliferation issu

Boston University’s Institute of World Politi

Washington, DC, and served on the U.S. Commiss

Assess the Organization of the Federal Governme

Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destru

From 1989 to early 1993, Mr. Sokolski was a po

appointee of the Bush administration and served as d

for nonproliferation policy in the Office of the Secret

Defense. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Sokolski work

the secretary’s Office of Net Assessment as a ful

consultant on advanced proliferation issues, serv

senior military legislative aide to Senator Dan Q

(R.-Ind.), and was special assistant on nuclear e

matters to Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.). He has w

161
been published widely. In addition to this volume

Sokolski edited Fighting Proliferation: New Concer

the Nineties (1996) and Next Century Weapons Prolife

Are We Ready? (2000). He also is completing a hist

nonproliferation for Praeger Press entitled Ame

Campaigns Agains Proliferation 1945-2000 (forthcom

MR. KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN is Presiden

Director of the Middle East Data Project, Inc., a str

consulting group that publishes the Iran Brief, a m

newsletter devoted to strategy, policy, and trade. A f

staff member of the House Foreign Affairs Comm

(1993), he has written on strategic issues and e

controls for the editorial page of the Wall Street Jour

the past 10 years and also appears in the New Republ

American Spectator, Time Magazine, and 

publications. Mr. Timmerman has frequently address

Iranian-American community and internat

conferences on U.S. policy toward Iran and has testif

Congress on Iran sanctions legislation and other issue

books include Fanning the Flames: Guns, Greed

Geopolitics in the Gulf War (1987), The Death Lobby

the West Armed Iraq (1991), and Weapons of 

Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya (199

has reported extensively from the Middle East for 

Today (1982-83), the Atlanta Constitution (198

Defense and Armament (1985-87), and Newsweek (198

he published Middle East Defense News (Mednew

confidential newsletter based in Paris, from 1987 to 1

162
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler