U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

96–907PDF 2015

REVIEWING PRESIDENT XI’S STATE VISIT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 7, 2015

Serial No. 114–105

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Chen Guangcheng, founder, The Chen Guangcheng Foundation ................. 3

Jessica Chen Weiss, Ph.D., associate professor of government, Cornell University ......................................................................................................................... 6

Mr. Richard Bejtlich, chief security strategist, FireEye ....................................... 14

Scott Kennedy, Ph.D., director, Project on Chinese Business and Political 

Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies ............................... 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Chen Guangcheng: Prepared statement ......................................................... 5

Jessica Chen Weiss, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 9

Mr. Richard Bejtlich: Prepared statement ............................................................ 16

Scott Kennedy, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 40

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 41

(1)

REVIEWING PRESIDENT XI’S STATE VISIT 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:15 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Two weeks ago President Obama welcomed China’s Xi Jinping to 

the United States for his first state visit as President. It was an 

opportunity for the administration to make inroads with Mr. Xi on 

areas of mutual interest, as well as to address areas of serious concern. 

I, joined by the ranking member, members of the Foreign Affairs 

Committee, and the House at large, wrote President Obama a letter urging direct communication on a few especially troubling 

issues. As we review the state visit with our distinguished panel, 

I hope to learn more about how receptive the administration was 

to these concerns, and what challenges outside of these major obstacles remain. 

Since President Xi’s ascension, China’s new-found assertiveness 

has generated some distressing policy developments. For instance, 

over the years, China’s cyber economic espionage has become a significant irritant in U.S.-China relations. It was clear that progress 

on cyber security relations was a priority for our administration, 

and we are supportive, that neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property to benefit their economies. 

This agreement is a positive and necessary step, but it is not sufficient. China still refuses to acknowledge its role in these attacks, 

despite evidence that clearly points to the contrary. It is my hope 

that our administration holds guilty actors accountable through punitive actions such as cyber sanctions, takes steps to deter future 

incidents of malicious cyber espionage, and improves our own cyber 

defense against these kinds of threats. Congress, too, will be watching this very closely. 

In the months leading up to the visit, the business community 

expressed serious concerns about China’s growing protectionism. 

China’s national security reforms, some of which have already been 

codified into law, could force U.S. businesses and institutions out 

of China’s market through forced technology transfers while other 

2

provisions would block both trade associations and humanitarian 

NGOs on national security grounds. 

President Xi has promised to use the review only for bona fide 

security reasons, but China defines ‘‘national security’’ much more 

broadly than the U.S. does. And the process itself is fundamentally 

opaque, creating serious risk for abuse and few avenues to appeal 

harmful actions by the Chinese Government. 

Increased state intervention in the recent stock market troubles, 

and currency exchange rates also breaches China’s commitments to 

let market forces play a decisive role in its economy. 

China’s aggression in the South China Sea has been a longstanding concern for this subcommittee, one which is shared 

throughout the government and civil society. I appreciate that the 

administration continues to raise the issue with their Chinese 

counterparts, but President Xi’s position on China’s illegal maritime claims did not budge during the visit. President Xi mentioned 

that China does not intend to pursue militarization, and I know we 

will hold him accountable for this. 

There was no noticeable progress on worsening human rights 

conditions in China. President Xi noted that countries have different historical processes and realities to justify its poor record on 

human rights. That is not an excuse, and I will work to ensure that 

human rights play a larger role in foreign policy decisions. 

I understand what China is doing here. China, benefitting from 

decades of central planning geared toward economic growth, is 

slowing down. Laden with increasing demands from a new middle 

class, the country is at risk of political, economic, and even military 

unrest. China is trying to divert crises through assertive domestic 

and foreign policies, but often the actions that we see are not reflective of a responsible international player, if that is what China 

wants to be. 

The visit also yielded pledges that the U.S. and China would 

boost cooperation on various multilateral issues including nuclear 

security, wildlife trafficking and conservation, which are welcome 

developments. I am concerned about the climate deal, however, 

which signs U.S. businesses up to strictly adhere to environmental 

standards while China is not obligated to implement any reforms 

at all until 2030. 

Encouraging the use of responsible and clean energy technology 

is understandable and laudable, but I remain concerned and frustrated that the Obama administration continues to use climate politics to put U.S. businesses at a competitive disadvantage and impose burdensome costs on U.S. families all in the hopes that 15 

years from now China will live up to a non-binding agreement they 

make today. 

I hope to hear from our distinguished panel about their impressions of the visit and what it portends for the future on our bilateral relationship. I support China’s integration with the international community. China has a lot to offer, and their leadership 

on a number of quarrelsome issues facing the global community, 

like an unstable and belligerent North Korea, is welcome. I hope 

that our Government continues to engage China, but also holds it 

accountable to being the responsible actor it portrays itself to be. 

3

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record. And, without objection, 

the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow 

statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, 

subject to the length of limitation in the rules. 

And I now yield to Ms. Meng, the ranking member here today, 

for her opening statement. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, and thank you to our 

distinguished panel of witnesses for being here today. 

President Xi’s recent visit came at an important yet tense time 

for our two countries. U.S.-China ties have long been complex. But 

as the world’s two most powerful economies, it is essential that our 

countries work together and cooperate in areas on which we agree. 

While there were very few areas of new cooperation, the administration was able to expand and highlight existing cooperation and 

climate change, reining in North Korea’s nuclear programs and 

military confidence building. However, foremost in our minds is the 

new promise of cooperation in cyber security and on intellectual 

property. 

I know that my colleagues and I are interested to see if these 

new developments will lead to positive changes, and I look forward 

to hearing your thoughts today. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Perry, did you have an opening statement? 

Mr. PERRY. No. 

Mr. SALMON. I will introduce the panel. First of all, Mr. Chen 

Guangcheng, known to many as the Barefoot Lawyer, is the founder of the Chen Guangcheng Foundation and a visiting fellow at 

Catholic University. Welcome, Mr. Chen. 

Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor of government at Cornell 

University. Welcome. 

Mr. Richard Bejtlich is chief security strategist at FireEye and 

previously was chief security officer at Mandiant. 

And Dr. Scott Kennedy joins us from CSIS where he is deputy 

director of the Freedom Chair in China Studies and director of the 

Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy. 

And I am going to start with you, Mr. Chen, and we are just 

thrilled that you could be here today. 

STATEMENT OF MR. CHEN GUANGCHENG, FOUNDER, THE 

CHEN GUANGCHENG FOUNDATION 

[The following statement and answers were delivered through an 

interpreter.] 

Mr. CHEN. Dear Mr. Chairman and Members of Congress and all 

friends and people who care for human rights, I must say thank 

you. Human rights matter to everybody and should, therefore, be 

a core issue in U.S.-China relations. 

And during Mr. Xi Jinping’s visit here, everybody showed concern about the human rights issues on the agenda during his meeting with Mr. President Obama, the ongoing crackdown on human 

rights defenders, human rights lawyers, and democracy activists 

and religious freedom activists, and it is getting worse. And victims 

of such a crackdown since July 9 has amounted to 300. 

4

And such brutal things as forced abortion, forced demolition, and 

land grabbing, threatening and harassment on those human rights 

activists, and those who speak their mind is still going on. And a 

tragedy happened that is during the petition some petitioners were 

killed. And it was just last month that happened to a landowner 

burned alive in his own home during the forced abortion by the 

local government in Pingyin County, Shandong Province. 

United States is the globe leader in human rights defenders and 

democracy model and icon of freedom. Defending universal human 

rights should be a very important part of the international responsibility for the United States. We are still not sure how much that 

President Obama has talked about human rights during his meeting with Mr. Xi Jinping. 

Did the President talk about human rights issues as an individual person who really care about human rights or it is just a 

part of his job? But what we saw actually during Mr. Xi Jinping’s 

visit to the White House that the President used a kind of white 

curtain to block the view of those protesting outside the House. 

It is sad to see there are so many countries who, you know, just 

care about the money that—from the Communist regime who 

doesn’t really care about the living standards of its own people for 

the short term, and they just ignore the deteriorating human rights 

conditions in China. So, for that, I would recommend the following. 

And, therefore, the United States’ President, Congresspeople, and 

all those who should talk human rights issues openly and through 

media coverage and to let people know what exactly the human 

rights conditions are, and also, therefore, to let the world know 

that the United States really cares about human rights. 

We demand the Communist regime to release those prisoners of 

conscience like Mr. Gao Zhisheng, Xu Zhiyong, Mr. Liu Ping, and 

Ms. Li Heping, and Madam Gao Yu, who are still in custody, and 

under housing arrest is definitely not allowed. 

And, third, there should be a special law to deny the entries of 

those Chinese officials who are violators of human rights, and also 

fortify their personal wealth in the United States. 

And, number four, that a system to develop the cyber software 

to break down the burning—cyber burning wall in order to build 

a democratic alliance and international community. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Guangcheng follows:]

5


96907a.eps
6

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chen. 

Dr. Weiss. 

STATEMENT OF JESSICA CHEN WEISS, PH.D., ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 

Ms. WEISS. Chairman Salmon and distinguished members of the 

subcommittee, it is a pleasure and a privilege to share with you 

today my thoughts on Xi Jinping’s recent visit and my assessment 

of U.S.-China relations going forward. 

In my view, President Xi’s visit produced modest but measurable 

progress in managing the growing frictions in our relationship with 

China. The large number of business and industry leaders who participated underscores the continued importance of our economic relationship. 

President Xi’s speeches reflected his recognition of American concerns, particularly among the business community. The joint agreement to refrain from cyber theft marked an important step forward. It remains to be seen whether words will be followed by actions, as President Obama put it, but the pledge means that Chinese agencies can be held to account, for President Xi’s international credibility here is on the line. 

President Xi also used the weight of his words to reiterate China’s commitment to a market-based exchange rate and to curb 

greenhouse gases through a cap and trade system. No doubt, implementing these priorities will be fraught with challenges, but the direction underscores China’s desire to address international concerns in line with continued domestic reforms. 

The visit also produced progress in the area of the relationship 

that could lead to unwanted military escalation. The annex on airto-air encounters adds an important component to the memorandum of understanding on the rules of military engagement. 

The Chinese Government recognizes that an incident in the air 

could derail the relationship, given the strong patriotism and mutual suspicion on both sides. A repeat of the 2001 collision between 

a Chinese fighter jet and U.S. EP–3 reconnaissance plane could 

easily escalate and take on outsized significance in the public 

imagination. 

In 2001, the Chinese Government managed to mourn the Chinese pilot while repressing anti-American street demonstration. 

But today China, under Xi Jinping, may not be willing or able to 

show similar restraint, given the dramatic improvement in Chinese 

capabilities and the exponential growth of the internet and social 

media in China. 

The Chinese Government may have the ability to shut down conversation online, but it is increasingly costly for the government to 

do so, particularly when it is patriotism that the government is repressing. 

During his visit, President Xi also stated for the first time that 

China does not intend to militarize or pursue militarization of reclaimed islands and features in the South China Sea and committed to upholding and respecting the freedom of navigation. As 

with his commitment to fight cyber crime, President Xi’s remarks 

provide welcome reassurances, and we should continue to engage 

China to define what constitutes militarization. 

7

Over the past 3 years, China has kept a lid on many of the domestic pressures that might provoke or complicate a potential crisis. China has streamlined its maritime patrols under a consolidated and more professionalized coast guard, and under President 

Xi China has also largely restrained nationalist mobilization, preventing grassroots protests against Prime Minister Abe’s visit to 

Yasukuni Shrine in 2013, as well as his efforts to revise and reinterpret the Japanese constitution. 

Chinese authorities also stymied protests against Vietnam after 

Vietnamese anger spilled over into riots that killed Chinese workers. At the same time, Chinese activities have effectively changed 

the status quo in the East and South China Seas, ending Japan’s 

exclusive control of islands in the East China Sea and outpacing 

rival efforts to reclaim land and build infrastructure in the South 

China Sea. 

In response, some today are calling for a more muscular American approach. While not intended to ignite conflict, we must recognize that such measures are intrinsically risky, particularly if these 

operations involve highly public denials of Chinese claims. As such, 

we must determine in advance how far we are willing to go, or we 

might otherwise find ourselves in a contest where our actions are 

driven more by concern for American credibility than our underlying interests. 

Chinese restraint and adherence to international legal principles 

will be critical to lowering the temperature in the region, and we 

should link progress on this front to corresponding and conditional 

U.S. assurances. Threats to impose costs on China for undesirable 

behavior must, at the same time, be coupled with credible reassurances that the United States welcomes China’s contribution to global governance and multilateral leadership. 

As noted in the joint statements, the United States welcomes 

China’s playing a more active role in taking on due responsibility 

for the international financial architecture. 

In conclusion, how we talk about China matters as much as how 

we act toward China. Whether or not China is the intended audience, Chinese observers are listening to the tone as well as to the 

words we speak. Some campaign statements may be taken with a 

hefty dose of salt, but others will be regarded as credible indicators 

of future policy. 

U.S. pressure on China can be effective if it strengthens the hand 

of those inside China who are trying to push policy in the same direction for their own domestic reasons. But any U.S. policy or strategy based solely on beating China or a peaceful evolution is bound 

to be guarded with suspicion at best and hostility at worst. 

Thinly veiled or outright opposition to a stable and prosperous 

China will harm the ability of those inside China who advocate for 

international cooperation. If the United States abandons engagement, nationalists and conservatives in China will be vindicated in 

their belief that the United States seeks to keep China weak and 

divided. 

In sum, the future is not written, and acting as if conflict is preordained will only create a self-fulfilling prophecy. To manage our 

differences and build upon the modest but measurable progress we 

have already made requires the hard work of tough, sustained enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:38 Nov 12, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\100715\96907 SHIRL
8

gagement rather than the fiery posturing that it is all too easy for 

voices on both sides to indulge. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Weiss follows:]

9


96907b-1.eps
10


96907b-2.eps
11


96907b-3.eps
12


96907b-4.eps
13


96907b-5.eps
14

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Bejtlich. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RICHARD BEJTLICH, CHIEF SECURITY 

STRATEGIST, FIREEYE 

Mr. BEJTLICH. Chairman Salmon, Congresswoman Meng, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Richard Bejtlich, chief security strategist at 

FireEye. I am also pursuing a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s 

College London. And I began my security career as a military intelligence officer in 1997 at the Air Force Information Warfare Center. 

Has President Obama secured relief from Chinese hacking? On 

balance, the agreement is a step in the right direction. At best, I 

would expect it to result in a decrease in the digital intrusion pressure applied by Chinese military and intelligence forces against 

American companies. 

The Chinese would likely continue pursuing their strategic goals 

by changing tactics at the human level and operations at the merger and acquisition level. At worst, I expect the agreement to have 

no effect whatsoever. 

Let me briefly offer five issues for your consideration. First, consider President Xi’s posture prior to the December 25 press conference. In written answers to questions posed by The Wall Street 

Journal, President Xi claimed,

‘‘The Chinese Government does not engage in theft of commercial secrets in any form, nor does it encourage or support Chinese companies to engage in such practices in any way.’’

Combining this statement with his later declarations, it is possible that President Xi is saying that the Chinese Government does 

not hack, because he doesn’t consider the People’s Liberation Army, 

the Ministry of State Security, or other organizations conducting 

hacking operations to be part of his definition of Chinese Government. Therefore, PLA units, such as 61398, revealed by my 

Mandiant colleagues in 2013, will continue to raid American companies because President Xi does not count them as government 

forces. 

A second interpretation could be congruent with both U.S. and 

Chinese interests. The U.S. targets Chinese organizations, as well 

as others worldwide, to conduct economic espionage. Such economic 

espionage is designed to better understand foreign financial conditions and uncover bribery and corruption that harms American 

businesses. 

The U.S. has a longstanding policy of not passing what it learns 

from these spying missions to American companies for competitive 

gain. It is possible the U.S. administration believes its Chinese 

counterpart will now act in a reciprocal manner. American companies will still be targeted by Chinese hacking teams, but the Chinese Government will claim that it is working to collect economic 

data and uncover bribery and corruption. Whether the Chinese 

Government passes what it learns to Chinese companies for economic advantage remains an open question. 

15

A third interpretation can signal a tactical shift in Chinese commercial data acquisition. China has never been a one-trick pony 

when it comes to stealing business information. The Chinese conduct extensive and aggressive cyber operations, but they also employ equally comprehensive human campaigns as well. The Chinese 

may have decided to simply shift resources toward the physical collection of commercial data and wind down their cyber operations. 

A fourth interpretation could signal an operational shift in Chinese commercial data acquisition. President Xi’s words, combined 

with his meeting with American business leaders in Seattle, could 

mean that he wants to conduct more merger and acquisition activity, and he expects the Obama administration to permit it. 

Currently, sensitive technology deals, such as the rumored $23 

billion bid by China’s Tsinghua UniGroup, Ltd, for chipmaker Micron, are likely to be blocked by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. While some deals, such as 

the 2014 acquisition of IBM’s low-end server business, have cleared 

CFIUS approval, others remain problematic. 

Xi’s mention of many of his government’s strategic emerging industries when talking to President Obama indicates to me that 

these remain a strategic priority. As shown by Baidu’s investment 

in, and joint venture with, American content delivery network company CloudFlare, China will use traditional business methods to 

acquire intellectual property, market share, and service know-how 

in order to advance its strategic goals. 

A final consideration for this agreement is who left out. The focus 

on U.S. and Chinese companies ignores many other targets. These 

include civil society organizations, as well documented in the recent report by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab titled Communities at Risk. These civil society organizations include dissident 

groups inside and outside China, universities, think-tanks, media 

organizations, lawyers like Mr. Chen, and human rights watchers. 

Companies in other parts of the world are not covered by the 

U.S.-China agreement. And, honestly, I am surprised we haven’t 

seen the Brits or Germans going to China and saying, ‘‘Hey, we 

want the same agreement to cover us as well.’’

Those organizations continue to be held at risk. So, in conclusion, 

the Xi visit produced more positive statements than I expected, but 

now we must see if words are followed by decreased malicious activity in cyber space. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bejtlich follows:]

16


96907c-1.eps
17


96907c-2.eps
18


96907c-3.eps
19


96907c-4.eps
20


96907c-5.eps
21


96907c-6.eps
22

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Dr. Kennedy. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT KENNEDY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, PROJECT 

ON CHINESE BUSINESS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. KENNEDY. Chairman Salmon, members of the committee, I 

am honored by the opportunity to testify before you today and 

present my thoughts on the Chinese economy and U.S.-China commercial relations in the context of the recent state visit. 

The main point I want to convey today is one of caution. In broad 

historical terms, China’s economy is much more market-oriented 

than it was 30, 20, or even 10 years ago. And the United States—

business and consumers and workers—have largely benefitted from 

the commercial relationship and China’s growing role in the global 

economy. 

However, over the past few years, the pace of liberalization in 

China has slowed, and in some ways the state is expanding its 

intervention in the economy in ways that parallel developments in 

human rights and the internet that have already been discussed. 

At the same time, China’s economy is slowing. It is becoming 

much more volatile. As a result, doing business with China is more 

challenging, and the slowdown in volatility we see in China are 

creating new challenges and risks for foreign businesses and other 

economies. 

Ongoing efforts to engage China bilaterally and multilaterally, as 

well as adoption of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, are addressing 

many of these problems, but we should expect continued commercial frictions in the coming years. 

You have my full written statement. Let me briefly elaborate on 

this conclusion. There is broad consensus that the Chinese economy 

is slowing dramatically. There is no consensus as to exactly how 

much, why, or what the future trajectory of growth is. My own 

view is that growth is somewhere below the official figure of 

around 7 percent, but that China is not in a recession. 

Continued growth in services, consumption, and wages distinguish the current period from 2008 and ’09 when China did fall 

into a recession. The current slowdown is in part the product of a 

government-induced contraction brought about by much tighter 

credit conditions and a vast anti-corruption campaign that has 

made officials throughout the system far more hesitant to approve 

projects. 

Now, Xi Jinping came into power promising a much more aggressive reform agenda than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. And over the 

past 2 to 3 years there have been a series of individual reform policies announced and implemented, but they have not all been—they 

have been all-embracing or comprehensive. And within the last 18 

months, the trend has decidedly been in a statist direction. 

The government has chosen monetary and fiscal stimulus over 

liberalization in an effort to get the economy moving. It pushed up 

the stock market in 2014, and this past summer famously and unsuccessfully intervened to keep this bubble it created from bursting. 

23

The reform package for state-owned enterprises announced several weeks ago is anything but reformist. And China’s forthcoming 

5-year plan—yes, China still has 5-year plans—looks like it will include only incremental reforms to the economy and the country’s 

governance institutions. 

It is no surprise, then, that U.S.-China economic ties are under 

some significant stress. Commercial relations over the past 36 

years have broadly benefitted the American economy, our businesses, consumers, and even, on balance, workers. But American 

companies that do business in China and with China are understandably worried about the slowing pace of liberalization, the continued use of industrial policies to promote domestic firms, and the 

opacity of China’s policy process. 

Even in services, which are much less politically sensitive than 

high technology, the Chinese are not embracing liberalization despite the fact that there would be immediate benefits to economic 

growth and to the broader public if they opened up services in 

health care, education, and elsewhere. 

The most important emerging issue is the potential negative effect that China’s economic volatility and slowdown can have on the 

global economy. China’s economy is now so large, and financial 

flows so substantial, that develops in its economy ripple throughout 

the rest of the world very quickly. And as China’s capital markets 

open, the ripple effect could become a tidal wave traveling at the 

speed of light. We saw this occur in July in the wake of China’s 

intervention in the stock market, and in August following the revision of how the Renminbi’s rate is set. 

Now, there was some progress on these issues during the recent 

state visit. President Xi did repeatedly reaffirm the importance of 

continued economic reform and keeping the country’s doors open to 

foreign businesses, and he reaffirmed the importance of the Bretton 

Woods institutions and pledged collaboration between the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which China helped create, and The 

World Bank and other multilateral development institutions. 

But despite these commitments, it is appropriate to remain cautious about whether American companies will achieve greater access to the Chinese market or be treated more fairly going forward. 

In addition, I wasn’t convinced that President Xi fully appreciates 

the need to provide greater transparency about the economy and 

their economic policies. 

At the press conference that he had with President Obama on 

Friday, the 25th, President Xi did try to reassure markets by saying there is no reason for the Renminbi to depreciate over the long 

run. I think there is a good debate to be had on that statement. 

But even given that, this leaves unresolved whether the government may permit a devaluation of the Renminbi in the short term 

to support growth or stem capital outflows. 

The U.S. and China announced that their negotiators have made 

incremental progress on a bilateral investment treaty, but I don’t 

expect a U.S.-China BIT to be submitted to Congress any time 

soon. China is focused on its anti-corruption campaign and avoiding economic instability, while the number one economic policy priority toward the region for the United States is passage of TPP. It 

24

seems highly unlikely the U.S. will seek to conclude a BIT, let 

alone submit to Congress prior to passage and adoption of TPP. 

Finally, let me say something more about TPP. As you know, 

China is not a negotiating party, though it has expressed interest 

in potentially joining. It is possible China will react to Monday’s 

announcement by expanding its own regional arrangements, but 

being outside TPP would put Chinese companies at a competitive 

disadvantage in those sectors it needs to move into to have sustainable growth over the long term, including high technologies and advanced services. 

The U.S. would be wise to use TPP not as a tool just to compete 

with China, but as a lever to help induce greater economic reforms 

in China, which would not only be in China’s self-interest but 

would also benefit American companies, workers, and consumers, 

and likely contribute to reducing China’s carbon emissions and 

cleaning up its environment. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]

25


96907d-1.eps
26


96907d-2.eps
27


96907d-3.eps
28


96907d-4.eps
29


96907d-5.eps
30

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I will begin with questions, and then, 

Mr. Rohrabacher, I will turn to you, and maybe we can have a couple of rounds of questions. Does that sound good to you? 

Mr. Chen, I would like to start with you. Back in the ’90s when 

we were debating whether or not to grant China permanent normal 

trade relations and end the Jackson-Vanik debate every year, I believed at that time that by more constructively engaging economically with China and having a stronger U.S. presence in China that 

some day some of the things that vexed us the most would change, 

namely human rights, that they would get better, and that things 

like intellectual property rights would, if they were accepted into 

the WTO, would get better. 

I have been wrong. In fact, most of those things have never materialized. In fact, the human rights situation, it appears to me, 

while there have been times when I thought it was getting better, 

it seems to me that under this current President China has taken 

a big step backward. 

I believe Deng Xiaoping had a vision of economic openness, but 

I think that maybe even he believed that it would yield more personal freedoms as well. It doesn’t seem to be happening. 

First, can you tell me, what are the most egregious affronts to 

human rights that are happening in China right now? And what 

can we do to be more of a positive influence to get changes in those 

areas? 

Also, would you agree that with President Xi Jinping, this President, that the human rights situation has actually gotten worse? 

Mr. CHEN. During those days of debate, the people believed that 

economic integration or opening to China will help improve eventually the human rights conditions there. But, actually, we see the 

fact that during those years that American doing business in 

China, and those business—and they learn bad things from the 

Communist regime there actually. 

When I saw the game change is when we have a kind of software 

that could break down China’s—the cyber wall, the firewall, and 

then there are some cases of human rights violations in China has 

been exposed to the outside walls. 

Mr. SALMON. Dr. Kennedy, I would like to talk to you just a little 

bit about China’s economy, the stock market. You addressed a lot 

of the issues in your opening statement. On August 24, 2015, the 

Shanghai Stock Market Index fell 8.49 percent, followed by 7 percent on the following day. 

At that time, the Chinese Government took really controversial 

measures to try to minimize the damage. During his visit, President Xi defended his response to the stock market crash as needed 

to prevent mass panic. Some analysts predict additional China 

stock market falls in the future. 

Is their economy slowing faster than analysts predicted? I know 

that you said in your opening statement that 7 percent is probably 

robust, probably a little optimistic. But is it slowing faster than analysts predicted? And do you think that China will continue to manipulate their stock market, and do you think that is a good idea 

for China’s economy? Does it really stop panic, or does it actually 

stop future investment? And then, finally, what cost does the market manipulation impose on U.S. and global markets? 

31

Mr. KENNEDY. That is a terrific question. I think that growth has 

slowed more than people expected it would, because they didn’t realize how significant the anti-corruption campaign would have on 

growth. That is the biggest contractionary policy in China today, 

and it is more important than just simply having less credit into 

the system. Actually, this is much more important overall. And, in 

fact, if they announced an end to the anti-corruption campaign 

today, investment would pick up tomorrow. 

So it is not the weight of debt; it is really this politically induced 

contraction, because they feel that is the way to restructure their 

economy. So besides that, you know, because they cracked down on 

investment in real estate, all that money flooded into the stock 

market. 

So the problem with the intervention isn’t July; it is June 2014 

and since. What we saw was just the most obvious, because it was 

about stemming the collapse and the popping of the bubble. 

When President Xi was here, and in his statement in The Wall 

Street Journal and elsewhere, talked about the systemic risk, it is 

the first time they ever mentioned systemic risk as a justification 

for intervention. China’s stock market only accounts for about 5 

percent of total financing in China. You know, the Chinese stock 

market could disappear, and China would still have the same financial system essentially. 

So I think that is really a post hoc justification for an addiction 

to intervention that—because state-owned companies were losing 

money, and people were worried about—the Chinese Government 

was worried about their reputational hit that they would take by 

so many folks losing money, even though all they lost was the runup in the year before. 

The intervention that they had was poorly timed, executed, and 

has resulted in a loss of confidence from investors, domestic Chinese inventors and foreign investors. Combined with the bungled 

adjustment of the Renminbi’s setting and the depreciation, there is 

great concerns going forward. 

When you are managing an economy that is primarily a real 

economy where you have got investments made over months and 

years, investors will move much more slowly. But now that you are 

talking about securities markets and a somewhat open capital account, this loss of confidence actually can change the direction of 

the economy in seconds just simply by us pushing a button, by selling Renminbi or whatever, and that volatility will affect us more 

and more. 

So I was—the most disappointment I had from his visit, maybe 

the President talked about this with President Obama privately, is 

they didn’t explain really what that systemic risk supposedly was 

and why the way they decided to intervene was the best way. And 

they didn’t restore confidence among the investment community 

also. I still think they are in a much worse position than they were 

several months ago. 

Mr. SALMON. Thanks. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A couple of points. Sometimes impacts of 

these type of visits are not measurable in terms of the economy or 

in terms of events that happen within a small short framework 

32

after the visit. I would suggest that if we say this visit maybe at 

best had—at worst had no impact. No. The worst is having it seem 

to have no impact but having it demoralize the people in China 

who are trying to build a better China. 

And I would say having a President of China visit the United 

States and be treated with such respect and not being confronted, 

even—I am not sure privately or publicly with some of the many 

what I consider to be evil things that are going on, would have a 

dramatic impact in the long run, in that good people will be demoralized and then not move to make China a better place. So there 

can be a negative impact without anybody even seeing it. 

I was very honored to have led the floor fight, with Congressman 

Chris Cox at the time, opposing Most Favored Nation status for 

China. I remember the only reason they made that permanent was 

when I think it was Bill Clinton over a holiday decided to declare 

it a permanent state where they didn’t have to come back every 

year and put Most Favored Nation status before us, because when 

they had to come every year, at least there was some pressure that 

was on them through that year to correct their behavior, to correct 

bad behavior. 

We eliminated that, and we eliminated that with the promise 

that if we liberalized our—and I say ‘‘liberalization.’’ It is not just 

economics, but that is what we were saying. A liberalized economic 

relationship with China would lead to a much freer and a much—

and it would lead to progress in many other areas. 

That was about 25 years ago now, and maybe let me ask the 

panel as a whole, has there been—we were promised we would 

have things like an independent court system would emerge. Is 

there an independent court system that is a fair court system that 

has emerged now in China in the last 25 years? Has that happened? No. No. No. Is there anyone saying yes so that? Okay. No 

one is saying yes to that. 

We were told there would be opposition parties that would be 

permitted. Are there opposition parties now functioning in China to 

take the place of the ruling Communist Party? Anybody on the 

panel know about—no. Okay. What about we were told that there 

would be greater freedom of press and freedom of speech if we just 

had greater economic relationships. Is there greater freedom of 

speech and press now in China as compared to before Tiananmen 

Square? 

Mr. KENNEDY. Can I answer that? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There I think the answer is much more mixed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. KENNEDY. There is not a fully independent media that has 

the rights to ask any question on any issue and write about it without fear. But there is a more active media, particularly on economic 

issues and economic issues that touch upon civil society questions, 

that is more active. 

And the boundaries on which they can report has expanded 

some, and the growth of social media—Chinese versions of Twitter—you see much more discussion. But it is still highly constrained, and it is——

33

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chen testified to several incidences of 

people who are losing their property and corrupt officials, not necessarily these corrupt officials are being brought to justice, but that 

they are doing these corrupt acts. Are those corrupt acts—can they 

be printed in the paper when a government official, not being arrested but just a newsman thinking that there is corruption there 

and we should investigate it? Is that possible, for a newspaper to 

publish that in China? Mr. Chen? 

Mr. CHEN. I must say this, that as long as the common regime 

remains in power there will be no such a kind of thing as an independent judicial system or independent court. As Mr. Wang 

Qishan, the Chinese Communist Party Chief of Commission—Disciplinary Inspection Commission of the Communist Party told the 

visiting Stanford scholar, Francis Fukuyama, that no such a thing 

is possible as independent court in China. Never. Anything that we 

talk about China is on the fact that authoritarian regime is, by 

itself, by its nature, against freedom and democracy. 

As for the economy that we talk about, the Chinese GDP numbers, as everybody knows, it is fabricated. And even my village 

chief would know that for the next year GDP growth objective 

would be something at one number above the one that we have this 

year. It is nothing to do with the real economy. 

Well, as you can see, the Chinese economy collapse is inevitable 

as is the regime, because this group of people who supervise or regulate the stock market are themselves investors and brokers with 

those power brokers in a state-owned business. How could that prevent collapse of the Chinese economy? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. One last question. I have got to jump 

in here. And that is that the Chinese President promised or indicated when he was here that it wasn’t government that is doing 

this hacking and spying into our system. Does any one of our witnesses believe that? No. 

Let me suggest that when we are dealing with such a regime 

that we shouldn’t be playing these games. And if we have to deal 

with it because it is in our national security interest, or whatever, 

as we did during the Cold War, maybe we should just be up front 

about it. 

But it will—but if we aren’t, it will demoralize the people in trying to think—they think that—the people who will reform that system in China are greatest allies of the Chinese people. And if we 

demoralize them by them thinking that we believe this garbage, we 

have done a great disservice to future Chinese and future Americans as well. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. For the record, I would like to claim 

that I am not 1 hour late for this hearing. I am 1 hour early. That 

is to say, we were scheduled at 2 o’clock p.m. This is not the fault 

of our esteemed chairman by any means. You had to reschedule 

rather suddenly because of an important Republican conference, 

and, Mr. Chair, it is my understanding that you won’t be in a position to control the timing of the Republican conference until you 

are elected Speaker, which we eagerly await. 

34

I yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. SALMON. Don’t hold your breath on that one. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It could happen. I am running, too. 

Mr. Chen, thanks for being with us. Your story is inspirational. 

This has been a big week for Asia, a big week for U.S.-China relations, and a huge week of victories for the Chinese Government. 

The most notable part is something they didn’t have to lift a finger 

to do, and that was this trade agreement. You say, ‘‘Well, how is 

China affected?’’ It is affected by the rules of origin provisions, so 

that goods that are made perhaps 65 percent in China, 35 percent 

in Vietnam, have free access to the U.S. market. 

Now, we don’t know what the percentage is for various types of 

goods. We know for auto parts but nothing else. The legislators of 

the government of Brunei, they know. Chinese intelligence knows. 

We don’t know. We look forward to being treated with at least as 

much dignity as the legislators in Brunei or Vietnam. But until 

then, we can only look at prior agreements where we would expect 

that goods would only have to be 35 percent made in one of the 12 

contracting parties, so they could be 65 percent made in China. But 

that is de jure. Then, there is de facto. 

By the way, this is kind of my opening statement and I am going 

to ask questions. So I will go a little bit long. I was told I could 

make an opening statement, but I want to throw in a question. 

I will ask our witnesses, would China—the Chinese Government 

cooperate in making sure that goods that were 85 percent made in 

China, and 65 percent made in Vietnam, are not mislabeled to be 

35 percent made in Vietnam and only 65 percent made in China? 

Should we expect any cooperation from the Chinese Government in 

enforcing the rules of origin provisions? 

Dr. Kennedy? I think this is a one-word answer. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Actually, yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. You are saying the Chinese Government would 

rat out a Chinese-based company because goods were 80 percent 

made in China and 20 percent made in Vietnam, but they labeled—they claimed to U.S. authorities that it wasn’t just 20 percent made in Vietnam, it was 35 percent made in Vietnam. You are 

saying the Chinese Government would rat out that company. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I think it would be hard for them to, over a long 

period of time, maintain that fiction, since the Vietnamese Government is going to have a different interest with them and other——

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh, no. The Vietnamese Government will say, 

‘‘Here is an opportunity to export goods to the United States, a 

highly competitive market, in the most efficient way possible.’’ And 

if the goods can be produced most efficiently at the highest quality—85 percent made in China, 15 percent made in Vietnam—why 

would Vietnam want to crush that export or that company, that 

product, in order to see goods made in Mexico take their place on 

American shelves? 

So in any case, I will ask any of our witnesses, are you aware 

of any occasion where the Chinese Government has come forward 

and disclosed to American authorities that a Chinese company, not 

run by a dissident, was in violation of U.S. law? Got a lot of knowledge about China here. Can anybody come up with an example? I 

don’t see Dr. Kennedy raising his hand. I don’t see the next witness 

35

raising—Mr. Bejtlich raising his hand, not Dr. Weiss, and not Mr. 

Chen. 

Mr. KENNEDY. I will just—the only example that I could think 

of off the top of my head would have been to the extent in 2013 

and ’14 when the Chinese Government was focused on anti-corruption or unfair competition practices in their health care sector, and 

others, and they would have let the U.S. Department of Justice 

know about potential violations of foreign corrupt practices at——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. So that was attacking a U.S. company and 

depriving American workers and American companies of access to 

the Chinese market. You have illustrated my point. They will reveal that information only when it is in the interest of mercantilist 

objectives of Beijing. 

So we have one huge benefit, and that is they get—China gets 

free access to our market, and of course there is nothing in this 

agreement that gives us access to Chinese markets, because China 

isn’t even a signatory. But the other big win here was we were told 

that this deal would be a chance for the United States to establish 

that it is American trade rules that will govern the Pacific. 

Well, to a good extent, Wall Street’s rules are going to govern the 

Pacific. But there is one departure, and that is currency manipulation. This agreement sanctifies the view that countries are free to 

manipulate their currency and to have all the benefits of free trade 

agreements. And I don’t think that is a victory for American trade 

objectives. That is a victory for Chinese trade objectives. 

But I want to go on to the media, and here is where I may have 

some expertise given my home district. The day is gone when Hollywood is going to make a movie about Tibet. As a matter of fact, 

I don’t know if Richard Gere will get many parts in the future at 

all. 

We now have a situation where, whether it is Mars or anywhere 

else, there has to be a pro-Chinese Government hero message in 

the movie in order to be made in Hollywood. Not only do the Chinese control their own market, but a Chinese company controls, I 

believe it is AMC anyway, the second largest bit of screens in the 

United States. 

So if any of you—I hate to break this to you, Mr. Chen, you will 

not be the lead character in any major movie made in Hollywood, 

either yourself nor will you be played by a famous actor, because 

that movie will not be shown on a big chunk of American screens, 

and the Chinese only let—what is it? Thirty-five movies made in 

America into their country. 

So all of Hollywood is desperate to be one of those 35, and the 

only way to be sure that you are going to be one of those 35 is to 

make sure that the Chinese Government or its agencies or activities are one of the heroes of your movie, whether it is Mars or anywhere else. So those who think the Chinese Government only controls China don’t understand how interconnected the world is. 

We have an expert in human rights in China. Mr. Chen, what 

can we do to expand human rights in China? 

Mr. CHEN. As I recommended in my statement testimony, that 

if Congress makes laws to deny the entrance of those human rights 

violators in the Communist regime, that will help defend human 

rights in China. Another thing is about freedom of internet. 

36

As I said, if Congress budgets a little bit more assistance to develop the cyber software to break down the firewall of China, which 

would provide the information definitely needed for the Chinese 

people which will promote press freedom and democracy there. 

That would be a great contribution. 

And, actually, the Chinese regime knows this very well, and they 

tried to stop people invest—in developing such a kind of software. 

And, as a matter of fact, I observed that some of the shortwave radios have stopped broadcasting, which is a mistake. That is just 

what the Communist regime needs. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If I could——

Mr. SALMON. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. SHERMAN. It has more than expired. 

Mr. SALMON. Yes. We are going to vote in just a minute, but I 

did have one followup question, because it is such a pressing issue, 

with Mr. Bejtlich. 

This agreement that our two Presidents made regarding cyber 

hacking, what are the ramifications or implications if China doesn’t 

agree? Was there anything really tangible that can act as a deterrent for this happening? And, you know, what would be the likely 

outcome if something does occur? 

And then, the second thing is, with the People’s Liberation Army 

not being involved in any of this agreement, does China just have 

the ability to kind of do this now and blame them? Or not even 

blame them, but say our Government is not involved, like you said 

in your opening statement, and is there a way for us to continue 

to push forward to say, ‘‘Wait a minute. You know, we are asking 

that you make sure that the Army doesn’t do any of this hacking 

as well. And, anyway, what are the best ways for us to move in 

that direction?’’

Mr. BEJTLICH. Thank you for the question, sir. The last consequence that we appear to have available is sanctions. The President mentioned that in the event the Chinese don’t appear to be 

upholding their end of this agreement that the administration 

would pursue activities, possibly through U.S. Trade Rep or 

through the WTO or through some mechanism. The Executive 

Order that they signed earlier this year gives them the authority 

to impose sanctions as well. 

My personal opinion is we are not going to see sanctions anywhere within, say, a 6-month period. And, honestly, that starts to 

get toward the end of the Obama administration, and he may simply say, ‘‘I am going to hold off just for the rest of my time.’’

As far as the issue with the PLA, it is entirely possible that the 

Chinese Government could, rather than direct the PLA or the MSS 

to conduct these operations, they could sort of take a Thomas Becket approach and say, ‘‘Wouldn’t it be great if someone could get us 

this information,’’ or ‘‘There is a need—the government has a need 

for this sort of information.’’

And the military might pursue it on their own, or you may see 

a movement of people from those units into the Chinese private 

sector where suddenly they become security companies and contractors who carry out this activity. We have called that the decentralized scenario at FireEye. 

37

Honestly, until the Chinese Government changes its strategic decision to pursue Western technology and to abandon any sort of 

vulnerability or dependence on Western technology, they are going 

to continue to get this by any means necessary. 

Mr. SALMON. So it sounds like to me everybody is on their own. 

Everybody would be advised to beef up your security as much as 

you possibly can, because in the near future there probably isn’t 

going to be any real significant government action to make sure 

that it doesn’t keep happening. 

Mr. BEJTLICH. Yes. We are not worried about not being busy for 

the next many years in our industry. And, by the way, sir, there 

is nothing about this that is exclusively Chinese either. You could 

easily see a country like Nigeria or some other country say, ‘‘We 

are going to adopt a similar model.’’

Mr. SALMON. Or Iran or any number of countries, as you mentioned. 

Mr. BEJTLICH. Yes. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Sherman, I am going to give you one more 

question, and then we will go ahead and wrap up. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

China has a program against corruption. I think this is maybe 

just aimed at the opponents of whoever, President Xi. The United 

States has the capacity to identify assets owned by princelings and 

their children and relatives outside of China, and otherwise to 

paint a beautiful, clear, and embarrassing picture of unwarranted 

wealth of those in power. 

If we had this information and leaked it to various press organs, 

would that outrage the Chinese people at the party? And which 

publications would have both the courage to publish and the credibility with the Chinese people? I will go to any witness who wants 

to answer. 

Mr. CHEN. For those human rights violators of the Communist 

regime, we can tell who they are and what they did through the 

internet users in China who expose their violations. Well, we can 

tell by the normal calculation of the monthly salary or year salary 

of those Communist regime officials, and so we know that any 

number beyond that should be regarded as ill-gotten wealth, which 

is quite easy to recover, I think. 

And as you can tell that by the already reported wealth of those 

individual top Chinese officials whose household wealth could be—

amount to tens of thousands of—multi-millions of U.S. dollars, actually, and I can’t imagine how could that possible based on their 

basic income as an official in China. If we had this system of exposure in place, I think that we could find solutions to those issues 

in relating the two countries. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. This has been a very wonderful discussion. There is so much more to say and so many more 

things to learn. The goal is to improve the bilateral relationship. 

It is not just to cast aspersions but to build that relationship. 

We do have some very big concerns. Mr. Sherman has raised several, and has in the past, about currency manipulation issues and 

unfair trade practices. 

38

Mr. Chen, we are very honored that you would take the time to 

be here today. You have developed such a wonderful global reputation for fighting for freedom and for human rights, and we appreciate it. 

But all of our distinguished panelists have been extremely good, 

and we appreciate you being here today. 

And this committee will be adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(39)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

40

f


96907n.eps
41

Æ


96907m.eps