United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Observations on Planning 

and Project Management 

Processes for the Civil 

Works Program 

Statement of Anu Mittal, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 15, 2006

 

GAO-06-529T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 15, 2006

CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

Observations on Planning and Project 

Management Processes for the Civil 

Works Program 

Highlights of GAO-06-529T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Resources, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

Through the Civil Works Program,

the Corps of Engineers (Corps) 

constructs, operates, and maintains 

thousands of civil works projects 

across the United States. The 

Corps uses a two-phase study 

process to help inform 

congressional decision makers 

about civil works projects and 

determine if they warrant federal 

investment. As part of the process 

for deciding to proceed with a 

project, the Corps analyzes and 

documents that the costs of 

constructing a project are 

outweighed by the benefits. To 

conduct activities within its civil 

works portfolio, the Corps received 

over $5 billion annually for fiscal

years 2005 and 2006. 

During the last 4 years, GAO has 

issued five reports relating to the 

Corps’ Civil Works Program. Four

of these reports focused on the 

planning studies for specific Corps’ 

projects or actions, which included

a review of the cost and benefit 

analyses used to support the 

project decisions. The fifth report 

focused on the Corps management 

of its civil works appropriation 

accounts. For this statement, GAO 

was asked to summarize the key 

themes from these five studies. 

GAO made recommendations in the 

five reports cited in this testimony. 

The Corps generally agreed with 

and has taken or is taking 

corrective action to respond to 

these recommendations. GAO is

not making new recommendations

in this testimony. 

GAO’s recent reviews of four Corps civil works projects and actions found 

that the planning studies conducted by the Corps to support these activities 

were fraught with errors, mistakes, and miscalculations, and used invalid 

assumptions and outdated data. Generally, GAO found that the Corps’ 

studies understated costs and overstated benefits, and therefore did not 

provide a reasonable basis for decision-making. For example:

• For the Delaware Deepening Project, GAO found credible support 

for only about $13.3 million a year in project benefits compared with 

the $40.1 million a year claimed in the Corps’ analysis. 

• For the Oregon Inlet Jetty Project, GAO’s analysis determined that if 

the Corps had incorporated more current data into its analysis,

benefits would have been reduced by about 90 percent. 

• Similarly, for the Sacramento Flood Control Project, GAO 

determined that the Corps overstated the number of properties 

protected by about 20 percent and used an inappropriate 

methodology to calculate the value of these protected properties. 

In addition, the Corps’ three-tiered internal review process did not detect the 

problems GAO uncovered during its reviews of these analyses, raising 

concerns about the adequacy of the Corps’ internal reviews. The agency 

agreed with GAO’s findings in each of the four reviews. For three projects 

the Corps has completed a reanalysis to correct errors or is in the process of 

doing so; it decided not to proceed with the fourth project. 

 

GAO’s review of how the Corps manages its appropriations for the civil

works program found that instead of an effective and fiscally prudent 

financial planning, management, and priority-setting system, the Corps relies

on reprogramming funds as needed. While this just-in-time reprogramming

approach can provide funds rapidly to projects that have unexpected needs, 

it has also resulted in many unnecessary and uncoordinated movements of 

funds, sometimes for reasons that were inconsistent with the Corps’ own 

guidance. Because reprogramming has become the normal way of doing 

business at the Corps, it has increased the Corps’ administrative burden for 

processing and tracking such a large number of fund movements. For 

example, in fiscal years 2003 through 2004 the Corps moved over $2.1 billion 

through over 7,000 reprogramming actions. In response to GAO’s findings, 

the Congress directed the Corps to revise its procedures for managing its 

civil works appropriations, starting in fiscal year 2006, to reduce the number 

of reprogramming actions and institute more rational financial discipline for 

the program. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-529T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Anu Mittal at 

(202) 512-3841or mittala@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers’ (Corps) civil works planning and project management 

processes. My testimony is based on five reports issued by GAO over the 

last 4 years;1 it focuses on the economic, or cost benefit, analyses used to 

support decisions on specific civil works projects and actions and the 

Corps lack of effective planning and project management processes for its 

civil works appropriations. As you know, the Corps is the federal agency 

responsible for designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining 

thousands of civil works projects across the United States. These projects 

historically involved navigation and flood control activities but have more 

recently been expanded to include ecosystem restoration efforts. The 

Corps follows a two-phase study process to help inform congressional 

decision makers about civil works projects and determine if they warrant 

federal investment. As part of the process of deciding to proceed with a 

project, the Corps analyzes and documents that the costs of constructing a 

project are outweighed by the benefits provided by the project. Although 

there has been an overall decline in federal funding for water resource 

development projects during the last three decades, over $5 billion was 

appropriated for the Corps’ civil works program in both fiscal years 2005 

and 2006. 

In summary we found that 

• the cost and benefit analyses performed by the Corps to support decisions 

on Civil Works projects or actions were generally inadequate to provide a 

reasonable basis for deciding whether to proceed with the project or 

action, and

• the Corps’ practice of conducting thousands of reprogrammings resulted 

in movements of project funds that were not necessary and that reflected 

 1

GAO, Delaware River Deepening Project: Comprehensive Reanalysis Needed, 

GAO-02-604 (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002); GAO, Oregon Inlet Jetty Project: 

Environmental and Economic Concerns Still Need to Be Resolved, GAO-02-803 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2002);, GAO, Corps of Engineers: Improved Analysis of Costs

and Benefits Needed for Sacramento Flood Protection Project, GAO-04-30 (Washington,

D.C.: Oct. 27, 2003); GAO, Corps of Engineers: Effects of Restrictions on Corps’ Hopper 

Dredges Should Be Comprehensively Analyzed, GAO-03-382 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31,

2003); and GAO Army Corps of Engineers: Improved Planning and Financial

Management Should Replace Reliance on Reprogramming Actions to Manage Funds,

GAO-05-946 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2005) 

Page 1 GAO-06-529T 
poor planning and an absence of Corps-wide priorities for its Civil Works 

portfolio. 

The Corps’ Civil Works program is responsible for investigating, 

developing, and maintaining the nation’s water and related environmental 

resources. In addition, the Civil Works program provides disaster response 

as well as engineering and technical services. The Corps’ headquarters is 

located in Washington, D.C., with eight regional divisions and 38 districts 

that carry out its domestic civil works responsibilities. 

Each year, the Corps’ Civil Works program receives funding through the 

Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The act normally 

specifies a total sum for several different appropriation accounts, 

including investigations, construction, and operation and maintenance, to

fund projects related to the nation’s water resources. The funds 

appropriated to the Corps are “no year” funds, which means that they 

remain available to the Corps until spent. The conference report 

accompanying the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act 

specifically lists individual investigations, construction, and operation and

maintenance projects and the amount of funds designated for each 

project. In effect, the conference report provides the Corps with its 

priorities for accomplishing its water resource projects. 

In general, the Corps becomes involved in water resource projects when a 

local community perceives a need and contacts the Corps for assistance. If 

the Corps does not have the statutory authority required for the project, 

the Congress must provide authorization. After receiving authorization, 

generally through a committee resolution or legislation and an

appropriation, a Corps district office conducts a preliminary study on how 

the problem could be addressed and whether further study is warranted. 

When further study is warranted, the Corps typically seeks agreement 

from the local sponsor to share costs for a feasibility study. The Congress 

may appropriate funds for the feasibility study, which includes an 

economic analysis that examines the costs and benefits of the project or

action. The local Corps district office conducts the feasibility study that is 

subject to review by the Corps’ division and headquarters offices. The 

feasibility study makes recommendations on whether the project is worth 

pursuing and how the problem should be addressed. The Corps also 

conducts needed environmental studies and obtains public comment on 

them. After those are considered, the Chief of Engineers transmits the 

Background 

Corps’ Process for 

Developing Water 

Resource Projects 

Page 2 GAO-06-529T 
final feasibility and environmental studies to the Congress through the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and the Office of 

Management and Budget. The Congress may authorize the project’s 

construction in a Water Resources Development Act or other legislation. 

Once the project has been authorized and after the Congress appropriates 

funds, construction can begin. Figure 1 shows the major steps in 

developing a civil works project. 

Page 3 GAO-06-529T 
Figure 1: Major Steps in Developing a Civil Works Project 

Reprogramming is the shifting of funds from one project or program to 

another within an appropriation or fund account for purposes other than 

Local perception of water resources 

problem

Locals contact Corps District Office for 

help

Corps has, or obtains, 

study authority and 

funding from Congress

Reconnaissance Phase (12-18 months): 

Defines problems, identifies potential 

solutions

Feasibility Phase (2-3 years): 

Federal and local sponsors agree on 

study cost-sharing

Further evaluation of alternative 

solutions 

Federal and local officials review 

Feasibility Report and Environmental 

Impact Study

Congress authorizes 

project and 

appropriates funds

Project Implementation

Preconstruction Engineering and 

Design Phase (2 years)

Corps and non-Federal sponsors agree 

on project implementation & costsharing

Construction Phase (varies by project)

Construction is generally managed 

by the Corps, but done by private 

contractors

Operation & Maintenance Phase (as 

long as project remains authorized)

Typically done by non-Federal 

sponsors

Step 1:

Step 2:

Step 3:

Step 4:

Step 5:

Step 6:

Source: GAO presentation of Corps data.

Reprogramming Authority 

Page 4 GAO-06-529T 
those contemplated at the time of appropriation. A reprogramming 

transaction changes the amount of funds provided to at least two projects–

the donor project and the recipient project. However, more than two 

projects are often involved in a single reprogramming action. For example, 

in an effort to make effective use of available funding, the Corps may move 

funds from a construction project that has slipped due to inclement 

weather and reprogram the funds to one or more construction projects 

that are ahead of schedule or experiencing cost overruns. 

The authority to reprogram funds is implicit in an agency’s responsibility 

to manage its funds; no specific additional statutory authority is necessary.

While there are no government-wide reprogramming guidelines, the 

Congress exercises control over an agency’s spending flexibility by 

providing guidelines, or non-statutory instructions, on reprogramming in a 

variety of ways. For example, some reprogramming and reporting 

guidelines have evolved from informal agreements between various 

agencies and their congressional oversight committees. 

Our review of four Civil Works projects or actions found that the cost and

benefit analyses the Corps used to support these actions were fraught with 

errors, mistakes, and miscalculations, and used invalid assumptions and 

outdated data. The Corps’ analyses often understated costs and overstated

benefits. As such, we concluded that they did not provide a reasonable 

basis for decision-making. In two instances, we also found that the Corps’ 

three-tiered review process, consisting of district, division, and 

headquarter reviews, did not detect the problems we uncovered. These 

instances raised concerns about the adequacy of the Corps’ internal 

reviews. 

Our review of the Corps’ cost and benefit analysis of the Delaware River 

channel-deepening project found that it contained a number of material 

errors. For example, the Corps misapplied commodity rate projections, 

miscalculated trade route distances, and included benefits for some import 

and export traffic that had seriously declined over the last decade. As a 

result, the Corps’ estimate of project benefits was substantially overstated. 

We found that project benefits for which there was credible support were 

about $13.3 million a year compared with the $40.1 million a year claimed 

by the Corps’ 1998 report. Specifically, we found that the Corps 

significantly overestimated the growth in oil import traffic for 1992

through 2005 because it used an incorrect commodity growth rate for part 

of the period. Use of this rate resulted in the Corps overestimating benefits 

The Corps’ Cost and 

Benefit Analyses Were 

Inadequate to Support 

Decision-Making 

Delaware River Deepening 

Project 

Page 5 GAO-06-529T 
by about $4.4 million. Additionally, the Corps’ estimate contained a 

computer error that overestimated this same benefit by another $4.7

million. Finally, the Corps’ project benefits attributed to the import and 

export of commodities such as scrap metal, iron ore, and coal were 

overstated by about $2.7 million. 

Conversely, the Corps’ cost estimate for the project contained a number of 

positive and negative errors that in aggregate would have reduced project 

costs slightly but not enough to make up for the significant decrease in 

project benefits. 

We found that the Corps’ three-tiered quality control process of the Corps, 

consisting of district, division, and headquarters offices, was ineffective in

detecting or correcting the significant miscalculations, invalid 

assumptions, and outdated information in the cost and benefit analysis 

that our review revealed.

In response to our report, the Corps conducted a reanalysis of the project

with updated, more complete information. This reanalysis asserted that 

the project could be built for $56 million less than the Corps had 

previously estimated. As we recommended, the Corps also had its 

reanalysis reviewed by an external party. 

Our review of the Oregon Inlet Jetty project found that the Corps’ most 

recent cost benefit analysis of the project, issued in 2001, had several 

limitations, and as a result did not provide a reliable basis for deciding 

whether to proceed with the project. The Corps’ analysis did not consider 

all alternatives to the project, used outdated data to estimate benefits to 

fishing trawlers, did not account for the effects on smaller fishing vessels,

and used some incorrect and outdated data to estimate damage and losses 

to fishing vessels. For example, the Corps did not evaluate alternatives to 

the jetty project and 20-foot deep channel that it proposed, although many 

vessels that currently use the inlet could have benefited from a shallower 

and less costly channel-deepening project. Further, the Corps used 

outdated data to estimate benefits of the project to larger (75-foot long) 

fishing trawlers that resulted in a significant overestimate of benefits. 

We determined that if the Corps had incorporated more current data on 

the actual number of trawlers that used the inlet in its analysis, benefits 

would have been reduced by about 90 percent, from over $2 million 

annually to less than $300,000. Conversely, the Corps did not estimate the 

benefit to the smaller fishing vessels that use the inlet. However, since 

Oregon Inlet Jetty Project 

Page 6 GAO-06-529T 
these vessels could have a shallower draft than the large vessels they 

might not have benefited from the deeper channel and jetty that was 

proposed to benefit larger vessels. Additionally, the Corps miscalculated 

benefits due to a reduction in the damages that would occur to trawlers 

because of accidents that occur due to the conditions in the inlet. The 

Corps overestimated these benefits because it assumed, based on 

anecdotal evidence, that all of the 56 commercial fishing vessels regularly 

using the inlet would be damaged during the year and would incur about 

$7,000 each in damages. Our review of Coast Guard data showed that only 

about 10 commercial fishing vessels actually reported damages during the 

time frame the Corps considered, these damages averaged about $1,700 

per year. Because of the concerns raised by our report, the Corps, the 

Council on Environmental Quality, and the Departments of Interior and 

Commerce mutually agreed not to proceed with this project.

Our review of the Corps’ Common Features project, which is intended to 

provide flood protection to the Sacramento area, found that the Corps did 

not fully analyze likely cost increases or report them to the Congress in a 

timely manner. The Corps also incorrectly calculated project benefits 

because it overstated the number of properties protected by about 20 

percent and used an inappropriate methodology to calculate the value of 

protected properties. 

After a 1997 storm demonstrated vulnerabilities in the project, the Corps 

substantially changed the design of the project but did not analyze likely 

cost increases. Some of the design changes led to substantial cost 

increases. For example, in some areas the Corps tripled the depth from 

almost 20 to almost 60 feet of cutoff walls designed to prevent seepage

beneath the levees. The Corps also decided to close gaps in the cutoff 

walls in areas where bridges or other factors caused gaps. These changes 

added $24 million and $52 million, respectively, to a project that was 

originally, in 1996, estimated to cost $44 million. By the time the Corps 

reported these cost increases to the Congress in 2002, it had already spent 

or planned to spend more than double its original estimated cost of the 

project. 

The Corps also made mistakes in estimating the benefits from this project 

because in 1996 it incorrectly counted the number of properties protected

by the project by almost 20 percent and incorrectly valued these protected

properties. Although the Corps updated its benefit estimate in 2002 to 

reflect new levee improvements authorized in 1999, we found that even 

this reanalysis contained mistakes in estimating the number of properties 

Sacramento Flood 

Protection Project 

Page 7 GAO-06-529T 
that would be protected and therefore continued to estimate higher 

benefits from the project than would be warranted. 

As with the Delaware River Deepening study, we found that all three 

organizational review levels within the Corps reviewed and approved the 

benefit analyses for this project, but these reviews did not identify the 

mistakes that we found. 

The Corps concurred with our report’s recommendations and is working 

on a General Reevaluation Report for the uncompleted portions of the 

project that is due in the spring of 2007. 

In a 2000 report to the Congress, the Corps recommended that one of its 

dredges remain in a reserve status and that another be added to that 

status. However, we found that the Corps could not provide support for 

these conclusions and that its cost and benefit analyses supporting these 

conclusions had analytical shortcomings. 

We also found that the Corps did not perform a comprehensive analysis of 

the ready reserve program and in fact could not provide any 

documentation of what analysis, if any, it had done. In addition, the Corps’ 

recommendation that the reserve program be continued because it was 

beneficial was contradicted by evidence in the report showing that the 

price the government paid for dredging was higher after a Corps dredge 

was placed in reserve than before. We also questioned whether it was 

prudent to add another dredge to the reserve fleet without a 

comprehensive analysis in light of the fact that the dredge needed 

significant repairs to remain in service, even in reserve. 

We also determined that the Corps had used outdated data and used an 

expired policy that could raise the government’s cost estimate for hopper

dredging work. This cost estimate is pivotal in determining the 

reasonableness of private contractor bids. If all bids exceed the 

government estimate by more than 25 percent, the Corps may elect to

perform the work itself. Moreover, in making its estimate, the Corps had 

not obtained comprehensive industry data since 1988 although it had 

obtained some updated data for some cost items. In addition, the Corps 

used a policy on estimating transit costs that had expired in 1994. Use of 

this policy could significantly raise the estimate of transit costs for 

dredging contracts. For example, in one case, using the Corps’ policy 

resulted in a transit cost estimate of about $480,000 as opposed to about 

$100,000 if the expired policy was not used. 

Restrictions on the Corps’ 

Hopper Dredges 

Page 8 GAO-06-529T 
As a result of our review, a conference committee report directed the 

Corps to report to the Appropriations Committees a detailed plan of how it 

intended to rectify the issues raised in our report. On June 3, 2005, the 

Corps issued a revised report to the Congress on its plans for the hopper 

dredge fleet.

The Corps’ reprogramming guidance states that only funds surplus to 

current year requirements should be a source for reprogramming and that 

temporary borrowing or loaning is inconsistent with sound project 

management practices and increases the Corps’ administrative burden. 

However, we recently reported that, over a two year period (fiscal years 

2003 through 2004), the Corps moved over $2.1 billion through over 7,000 

reprogramming actions. This movement of funds occurred because during 

these two years the Corps managed its civil works project funds using a 

“just-in-time” reprogramming strategy. The purpose of this strategy was to

allow for the movement of funds from projects that did not have urgent 

funding needs to projects that need funds immediately. While the just-intime approach may have moved funds rapidly, its implementation 

sometimes resulted in uncoordinated and unnecessary movements of 

funds from project to project. 

In our review of projects from fiscal years 2003 and 2004, we found that 

funds were moved into projects, only to be subsequently revoked because 

they were excess to the project’s funding needs. For example, in fiscal 

year 2004, 7 percent of the funds (totaling almost $154.6 million) from 

every non-earmarked construction project were revoked in order to 

provide funding to projects designated as “national requirements” by the 

Corps. The national requirements projects were a group of projects for 

which Corps headquarters management had promised to restore funding 

that had been revoked in previous years. However, after the Corps moved 

funds into the national requirements projects, the Corps revoked over a 

quarter of the funds, $38.8 million, from these projects because they 

actually did not need the funds. For example, one national requirements 

construction project, New York and New Jersey Harbor, received $24.9

million. All of these funds, plus an additional $10.3 million, were excess to 

the needs of the project at the time and were subsequently reprogrammed 

to other projects. Corps officials in the New York District told us that, 

prior to receiving the national requirements funds they had informed 

Corps headquarters that they could not use these funds. 

We also found that the use of the just-in-time strategy resulted in funds 

being removed from projects without considering their near-term funding 

The Corps’ 

Reprogramming 

Activities Resulted in 

Inefficient 

Management of Civil 

Works Program Funds 

Page 9 GAO-06-529T 
requirements, such as projects with impending studies. For example, on 

August 1, 2003, the Corps revoked $85,000 from the Saw Mill River and 

Tributaries investigation project in New York because the funds were 

excess to the project’s needs in the current year. Six weeks later, however, 

on September 15, 2003, $60,000 of funding was reprogrammed into the 

project because they were needed to initiate a feasibility study. Corps 

documents explaining the revocation of funds from the Saw Mill River and 

Tributaries project indicate that the Corps was aware of the project’s 

impending needs, and knew that the project would need funds again in 

September 2003 to execute a feasibility study. 

Further, under the just-in-time reprogramming strategy, funds were moved 

into and out of the same project on the same day as well as numerous 

times within a fiscal year. Overall, 3 percent of investigations and 

construction projects in fiscal year 2003 and 2 percent of investigations 

and construction projects in fiscal year 2004 moved funds into and out of

the same project on the same day. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the 

Corps used 18 separate actions to reprogram approximately $25 million 

into, and about $10.5 million out of, the Central and Southern Florida 

construction project, including three separate occasions when funds were 

both moved into and out of the project on the same day. 

The just-in-time reprogramming strategy also moved money into and out of 

projects without regard to the relative priorities of the projects. During the 

period of our study, the Corps lacked a set of formal, Corps-wide priorities 

for use when deciding to reprogram funds from one project to another. 

Instead, according to the Chief of the Civil Works Programs’ Integration 

Division, during fiscal years 2003 and 2004, reprogramming decisions were 

left up to the intuition of program and project managers at the district 

level. While this decentralized system might have allowed for prioritized 

decision-making at the district level, when reprogramming actions 

occurred across districts or across divisions, the Corps lacked any formal

system of evaluation as to whether funds were moving into or out of highpriority projects. The lack of a Corps-wide priority system limits the Corps 

ability to effectively manage its appropriations, especially in an era of 

scarce funding resources when choices have to be made between 

competing needs of donor and recipient projects.

Finally, the Corps’ practice of allocating all funds to projects as soon as 

the funds are allotted to the Corps, coupled with the reprogramming 

flexibility provided to the districts, may result in an elevated number of 

reprogramming actions. Typically, once the Corps receives appropriated 

funds from the Congress, the Corps disperses all of these funds directly 

Page 10 GAO-06-529T 
into project accounts at the district level. Allocating funding in this 

manner could result in some projects receiving more money than they are 

able to spend. In some cases that we reviewed, the Corps dispersed an 

entire fiscal year’s worth of funding to a project even though they knew 

that the project manager could not spend all of the funding. The flexibility 

provided to district managers once they receive their funding may also 

increase the number of reprogramming transactions. According to some 

Corps program managers, the relative ease of conducting reprogramming

actions at the district level, without the need to obtain division or 

headquarters approval, creates incentives for project managers to transfer 

funds among projects within the district even if it creates a greater number 

of reprogramming actions. For example, when project managers have an

immediate need for funds, they may be more likely to reprogram funds 

between projects within their own district, even if the donor project has a 

need for funds in a few weeks or months, because Corps guidance allows 

them to do so. 

The Corps’ reprogramming practices place a large demand on the 

administrative resources of the agency. In fiscal year 2003, after receiving

their appropriated funds from the Congress, the Corps conducted at least 

one reprogramming action every business day of the fiscal year except for 

4 days; after receiving its funds in fiscal year 2004, the Corps conducted at

least one reprogramming action on every business day of the fiscal year 

except for 14 days. Each reprogramming action conducted requires the 

Corps to expend time and personnel resources to locate donor projects, 

file necessary paperwork, and in some cases obtain the approval of 

appropriate Corps staff and, possibly, the Congress. In particular, locating 

sources of donor funding is often a time-consuming process, as the project 

manager seeking funding must wait for other project managers to 

acknowledge excess funds and offer them for use on other projects. 

In response to the findings in our report, the Congress directed the Corps 

to revise its procedures for reprogramming of funds starting in fiscal year 

2006 to reduce the amount of reprogramming actions that occur and 

would institute a more rationale financial discipline for the Corps Civil 

Works appropriations accounts. 

In all five of the reports discussed here, the Army or the Department of 

Defense essentially agreed with our findings and conclusions and agreed 

to take actions to address our recommendations. In some cases, the Corps 

has completed the actions and in others they are underway or planned. Of 

note, in 2005, the Corps amended its policy on external review of its Civil 

Corps’ Response to 

GAO’s Findings and 

Recommendations 

Page 11 GAO-06-529T 
Works decision-making documents, including cost and benefit analyses to

allow for outside review in certain cases. Specifically, according to the 

Corps’ revised policy, external peer review of such documents will take 

place where the “risk and magnitude of the proposed project are such that

a critical examination by a qualified person or team outside of the Corps 

and not involved in the day-to-day production of a technical product is 

necessary.” In addition, the Corps has reported that it has undertaken a 

number of other improvements, including (1) updating and clarifying its 

project study planning guidance, (2) establishing communities of practice 

to foster technical competence and share knowledge among individuals 

who have a common functional skill, and (3) reorganizing to foster 

integrated teamwork and streamline the project review and approval 

process. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, we have found that the Corps’ track record for 

providing reliable information that can be used by decision makers to 

assess the merits of specific Civil Works projects and for managing its 

appropriations for approved projects is spotty, at best. The recurring 

themes throughout the five studies that are highlighted in our testimony 

clearly indicate that the Corps’ planning and project management 

processes cannot ensure that national priorities are appropriately 

established across the hundreds of civil works projects that are competing 

for scarce federal resources. While we are encouraged that the Corps 

and/or the Congress have addressed or are in the process of addressing 

many of the issues we have identified relating to these individual projects,

we remain concerned about the extent to which these problems are 

systemic in nature and therefore prevalent throughout the Corps’ Civil 

Works portfolio. Effectively addressing these issues may therefore require 

a more global and comprehensive revamping of the Corps’ planning and 

project management processes rather than a piecemeal approach. 

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to 

respond to any question that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at 

(202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Individuals making contributions to 

this testimony included Ed Zadjura, Assistant Director. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Page 12 GAO-06-529T (360685) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER