alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Robert J. Mullen, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and facts and a new trial granted. Memorandum: There is little doubt of the guilt of the defendant. The crime of assault and his extremely offensive conduct leading up to it were well established. However, because of serious errors we conclude that the defendant did not receive a fair trial and we are compelled to reverse the judgment of conviction and order a new trial. The defendant was convicted of assault in the second degree, committed upon a police officer with intent to prevent and resist his lawful apprehension and detention. The defense was that the arrest was unlawful and that therefore he was entitled to use reasonable force in its resistance. The question, therefore, as to whether the arrest was lawful or unlawful was highly important. The District Attorney took the position that defendant’s arrest without a warrant was proper because the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a citizen arrest had previously been made. (Code Crim. Pro., § 177, subd. 5.) This theory was urged throughout the trial and was submitted to the jury, although there was no citizen’s arrest and this was admitted by the young lady who it was claimed had made such an arrest. The District Attorney also argued this question in his summation and the Judge charged it fully. Thus, the Judge charged a theory which was unsupported by evidence. All of this was adequately objected to. It ma.y well have been, therefore, that the case was decided on the basis of the validity of the arrest by the police officer solely because he had reasonable grounds to believe there had been a prior citizen arrest. That being so, the verdict cannot stand. There was ample evidence from which the jury could have found that the arrest was made because of a felonious assault upon the police officer, but we cannot speculate as to which theory the jury adopted. The record is unclear as to why and when the arrest took place, or on what acts it was based, and the trial was confused generally. There must be a new trial. (Appeal from judgment of Genesee County Court convicting defendant of assault, second degree.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman and Del Vecchio, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS


Exhibit 27 - Financial Data Schedule




<CAPTION>


<S>                           <C>         <C>         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 YEAR        YEAR        YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1996 DEC-31-1995 DEC-31-1994
<PERIOD-END>                  DEC-31-1996 DEC-31-1995 DEC-31-1994
<EXCHANGE-RATE>               1           1           1
<CASH>                        38,433      42,477      9,925
<SECURITIES>                  0           0           0
<RECEIVABLES>                 39,546      55,173      39,642
<ALLOWANCES>                  1,081       1,346       870
<INVENTORY>                   49,570      47,852      40,092
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              153,528     196,243     92,172
<PP&E>                        151,497     127,449     113,968
<DEPRECIATION>                83,967      76,075      68,072
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                261,588     252,249     143,008
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         55,614      66,335      46,549
<BONDS>                       0           0           0
<COMMON>                      166         165         97
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0           0           0
<PREFERRED>                   0           0           0
<OTHER-SE>                    199,240     178,980     87,525
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  261,588     252,249     143,008
<SALES>                       219,997     269,162     194,196
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              219,997     269,162     194,196
<CGS>                         109,228     138,257     106,242
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 109,228     138,257     106,242
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              80,654      90,370      77,427
<LOSS-PROVISION>              45          797         690
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            700         1,131       1,725
<INCOME-PRETAX>               39,844      40,017      8,291
<INCOME-TAX>                  10,160      10,805      1,826
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           29,684      29,212      6,465
<DISCONTINUED>                0           0           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0           0           0
<CHANGES>                     0           0           0
<NET-INCOME>                  29,684      29,212      6,465
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 1.78        1.86        .45
<EPS-DILUTED>                 1.77        1.86        .44


</TABLE>
#### 53.242-1 Novation and change-of-name agreements (SF 30).

*SF 30, Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract.* SF 30, prescribed in 53.243, shall be used in connection with novation and change of name agreements, as specified in 42.1203(h).

[48 FR 42637, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 62 FR 64935, Dec. 9, 1997]
##### 



Exhibit 31-4
  CERTIFICATION
    PURSUANT TO
    RULE 13a-14(a)
    AND
    15d-14(a) OF
    THE SECURITIES
    AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
    1.
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on
    Form 10-Q
    of Exelon Generation Company, LLC;2.
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
    statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
    necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
    circumstances under which such statements were made, not
    misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
    financial information included in this report, fairly present in
    all material respects the financial condition, results of
    operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the
    periods presented in this report;4.
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are
    responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
    and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
    Rules 13a-15(e)
    and
    15d-15(e))
    for the registrant and have:  (a)
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
    disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
    supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
    registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
    known to us by others within those entities, particularly during
    the period in which this report is being prepared;(b)
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure
    controls and procedures and presented in this report our
    conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
    and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
    report based on such evaluation; and(c)
    Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants
    internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
    the registrants first fiscal quarter that has materially
    affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the
    registrants internal control over financial
    reporting; and  5.
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have
    disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
    control over financial reporting, to the registrants
    auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board
    of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  (a)
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the
    design or operation of internal control over financial reporting
    which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
    registrants ability to record, process, summarize and
    report financial information; and(b)
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
    other employees who have a significant role in the
    registrants internal control over financial reporting.  
       135
#### ASKL Enterprises, Inc., Appellant, v NYNEX Long Distance Company, Doing Business as Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Respondent. 467 Pronto, Inc., Appellant, v NYNEX Long Distance Company, Doing Business as Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Respondent.

[777 NYS2d 430]

*425Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered March 3, 2003, which dismissed the complaints for failure to state a cause of action, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiffs’ allegations of performance—an essential element of their claims for breach of contract *(Grant Entertainment v Lee,*186 AD2d 66 [1992])—were contradicted beyond substantial question by the affidavits and evidentiary matter submitted, thus negating any viable cause of action as a matter of law *(see Biondi v Beekman Hill House Apt. Corp.,*94 NY2d 659 [2000]). The unrefuted evidence, including plaintiffs’ own admissions, established breach of their agreements with defendant, ab initio, as a result of failure to abide by their inherent obligation to deal honestly and in good faith. Plaintiffs applied to defendant’s retail (rather than wholesale) division by misrepresenting themselves as pizza parlor operators while concealing their true status as unlicensed resellers of communications services. This deception put plaintiffs in breach of the agreements from the start, negating any offer of proof of the essential element of performance. Defendant’s conduct did not constitute a private party’s unauthorized enforcement of telecommunications policy, which is reserved to the Federal Communications Commission. Rather, defendant merely exercised the right of a contracting party to terminate its own performance in view of plaintiffs’ breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing. Concur— Tom, J.P., Sullivan, Williams, Lerner and Gonzalez, JJ.
#### Jacob Rassner, Appellant, v. City of New York et al., Respondents.

— Order, entered on February 14, 1964, granting motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, unanimously reversed, on the law, on the. facts and in the exercise of discretion, with $30 costs and disbursements to the appellant, and the motion denied. In this action plaintiff claims that he fell in the street because of the negligent manner in which a defective condition was left guarded. Plaintiff received no co-operation and was actually hindered by the city in his efforts to discover the parties responsible for creating the condition. Since service of the city’s answer plaintiff has been almost continuously occupied by his pretrial activities and those of the various defendants who have been brought into the action by the plaintiff and the city. Those activities rebut any inference arising merely from the time elapsed that plaintiff intended to or did abandon the action. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Valente, McNally, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
#### § 1030.1 General provisions.

The terms, definitions, and provisions in part 1000 of this chapter apply to this part 1030. In this part 1030, all references to sections in part 1000 refer to part 1000 of this chapter.
#### Grzegorz Smerda, Plaintiff, v City of New York et al., Defendants. Denis C. Guerin, Nonparty Appellant; Edelman & Edelman, P.C., Nonparty Respondent.

[776 NYS2d 86]

*512In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, Denis C. Guerin, the plaintiffs former attorney, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kangs County (Belen, J.), dated February 5, 2003, which granted the motion of Edelman & Edelman, EC., the plaintiffs current attorney, for a determination that he was not entitled to a charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 or to any counsel fees.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and facts, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination as to the amount of the appellant’s proportionate share of the contingent percentage fee.

After this action to recover damages for personal injuries was settled, current counsel for the plaintiff, Edelman & Edelman, EC. (hereinafter Edelman & Edelman), made a motion for a determination that the plaintiffs former counsel, Denis C. Guerin, was not entitled to a charging lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 or to any counsel fees. The Supreme Court granted the motion. We reverse and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination as to the amount of Guerin’s proportionate share of the contingent percentage fee.

Guerin, who commenced this action and initially appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, has a statutory lien pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 for legal services rendered (see *Gurvitsch v Gurvitsch,*239 AD2d 465 [1997]). Contrary to the contentions of Edelman & Edelman, the record does not support a finding that Guerin was discharged for cause, or provide any other basis for denying a fee (see *generally Erez v Aigon Taxi,*255 AD2d 118 [1998]; *Hae Sook Moon v City of New York,*255 AD2d 292 [1998]; *De Luccia v Village of Monroe,*180 AD2d 897 [1992]; *Artache v Goldin,*173 AD2d 667 [1991]). Accordingly, Guerin is entitled to enforce the lien. Further, because the fee dispute is between attorneys, Guerin had the option, as he seeks here, of receiving a contingent percentage fee based upon the proportionate share of the work he performed on the whole case *(see Matter of Cohen v Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell,*81 NY2d 655 [1993]; *Lai Ling Cheng v Modansky Leasing Co.,*73 NY2d 454 [1989]; *Kats v Missry,*272 AD2d 378 [2000]). Thus, the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a determination as to *513Guerin’s proportionate share of the contingent percentage fee *(see Matter of Schwartz,*235 AD2d 482 [1997]; *Greenfield, Eisenberg, Stein & Senior v Tattering,*200 AD2d 609 [1994]). Ritter, J.P., S. Miller, Adams and Cozier, JJ., concur.
118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1105 

AN ACT 

To amend the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 

2000 to reauthorize the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog 

Grant Program, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 1105 EH

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Debbie Smith Act of 

3 2023’’. 

4 SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION. 

5 Section 2(j) of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimi6 nation Act of 2000 (34 U.S.C. 40701(j)) is amended by 

7 striking ‘‘fiscal years 2019 through 2024’’ and inserting 

8 ‘‘fiscal years 2024 through 2029’’. 

9 SEC. 3. AUDITS TO PROTECT INTEGRITY OF GRANT 

10 AWARDS. 

11 Section 2(c)(4) of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimi12 nation Act of 2000 (34 U.S.C. 40701(c)(4)) is amended 

13 by striking ‘‘2022’’ and inserting ‘‘2029’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives November 13, 

2023. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

118TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1105 

AN ACT 

To amend the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination 

purposes. DNA Backlog Grant Program, and for other Act of 2000 to reauthorize the Debbie Smith
1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1420

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Daniel Lugo-Sanchez, * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Appellant. * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

___________

Submitted: January 18, 2006

Filed: January 20, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, FAGG, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Daniel Lugo-Sanchez challenges the 120-month statutory minimum sentence

the district court1

 imposed after he pleaded guilty to a drug charge. His counsel has

moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

arguing that Lugo-Sanchez’s plea was involuntary because he was led to believe he

would be eligible for safety-valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). LugoSanchez has filed a pro se supplemental brief arguing that his plea was “coerced”
2

In any event, Lugo-Sanchez’s plea is not rendered involuntary based merely

on an alleged mistaken belief that he would be eligible for safety-valve relief. See

United States v. Granados, 168 F.3d 343, 345 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)

(defendant’s reliance on attorney’s mistaken impression about length of sentence

insufficient to render plea involuntary as long as court informed defendant of

maximum possible sentence).

-2-

because his attorney told him that he would receive a 5-year sentence, and he did not

understand the legal terms used in the proceedings; that he should have been given

a more lenient sentence under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 due to his mental deficiencies; that

his criminal record does not justify the severity of his sentence; and that his sentence

was affected by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We reject each of these arguments and affirm.

Initially, we note that the involuntary-guilty-plea claim is not properly before

us, as Lugo-Sanchez did not present the claim to the district court, and in fact his

attorney specifically confirmed that Lugo-Sanchez was prepared to proceed with

sentencing after being informed of his ineligibility for safety-valve relief. See United

States v. Murphy, 899 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1990) (claim of involuntary guilty plea

must first be presented to district court, and is not cognizable on direct appeal).2

Further, Lugo-Sanchez’s intellectual functioning is not a basis for a sentence

below the mandatory minimum, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), (f); any ineffectiveassistance claim should be raised in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings, see United States

v. Hughes, 330 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003); and there was no error under Blakely

or Booker, as Lugo-Sanchez was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum,

see United States v. Torres, 409 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005).
-3-

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________
#### 852.228-70 Bond Premium Adjustment.

As prescribed in 828.106-70, insert the following clause:

# Bond Premium Adjustment (JAN 2008)

When net changes in original contract price affect the premium of a Corporate Surety Bond by $5 or more, the Government, in determining the basis for final settlement, will provide for bond premium adjustment computed at the rate shown in the bond.

(End of clause)
<PAGE>

                                                                   Page 25 of 25

                                                                   EXHIBIT 99(h)


Key Bank USA, National Association      Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas
127 Public Square                        formally known as Bankers Trust Company
Cleveland, Ohio 44114-1306               as Indenture Trustee
                                        280 Park Avenue, 9th Floor
                                        New York, New York 10017

Bank One, National Association          MBIA Insurance Corporation
 as Eligible Lender Trustee              as Surety Provider
One First National Plaza Suite 0126     113 King Street
Chicago, Illinois 60670                 Armonk, New York 10504


                         INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT
                      FOR KEYCORP STUDENT LOAN TRUST 2000-B

We have examined management's assertion, included in its representation letter
dated March 19, 2003 that Key Bank USA, National Association (KBUSA), a wholly
owned subsidiary of KeyCorp, complied with sections 4.04, 4.08(a), 4.08(b),
4.08(c), 5.05, 5.06, 5.07 and 5.08 of the KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2000-B Sale
and Servicing Agreement and sections 1.(a)(xx), 1.(b)(iii), 2 and 3 of the
KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2000-B Administration Agreement (collectively, the
"Agreements") as of December 31, 2002 and the year then ended. Management is
responsible for KBUSA's compliance with those requirements. Our responsibility
is to express an opinion on management's assertion about KBUSA's compliance
based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,
accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about KBUSA's
compliance with those requirements and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances, except that in accordance with
Section 5.05 of the Sale and Servicing Agreement, our examination assumed the
accuracy of reports prepared by KBUSA's student loan processor. We believe that
our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination
does not provide a legal determination on KBUSA's compliance with the specified
requirements.

In our opinion, assuming the accuracy of reports prepared by KBUSA's student
loan processor, management's assertion that KBUSA complied with the
aforementioned requirements as of December 31, 2002 and for the year then ended
is fairly stated, in all material respects.

This report is intended solely for the information and use of KBUSA, Deutsche
Bank Trust Company Americas, Bank One, National Association and MBIA Insurance
Corporation and is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other
than for these specified parties.


                                                     /s/ Ernst & Young


Cleveland, Ohio
March 19, 2003
|Household Finance Corporation             |             |              
|----------------------------------------- | ----------- | -------------
|Household Automotive Trust VI    (2000-3) |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|Original Principal Class A                |             |              
|Class A-1                                 | 136,000,000 |              
|Class A-2                                 | 158,000,000 |              
|Class A-3                                 | 175,000,000 |              
|Class A-4                                 | 193,000,000 |              
|Number of Class A Bonds (000's)           |             |              
|Class A-1                                 | 136,000     |              
|Class A-2                                 | 158,000     |              
|Class A-3                                 | 175,000     |              
|Class A-4                                 | 193,000     |              
|                                          |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|Distribution Date                         |             | 2000 Totals  
|Days                                      |             |              
|                                          |             |              
|CLASS A                                   |             |              
|Class A-1 Principal Distribution          |             | 52,534,589.03
|Class A-1 Interest Distribution           |             | 2,359,294.36 
|                                          |             |              
|Class A-2 Principal Distribution          |             | 0.00         
|Class A-2 Interest Distribution           |             | 3,054,666.67 
|                                          |             |              
|Class A-3 Principal Distribution          |             | 0.00         
|Class A-3 Interest Distribution           |             | 3,427,083.33 
|                                          |             |              
|Class A-4 Principal Distribution          |             | 0.00         
|Class A-4 Interest Distribution           |             | 3,838,555.56
#### § 1206.16 Producer.

*Producer* means any person who is engaged in the production and sale of mangos in the United States and who owns, or shares the ownership and risk of loss of, the crop or a person who is engaged in the business of producing, or causing to be produced, mangos beyond the person's own family use and having value at first point of sale.