i

ASIAN SECURITY TO THE YEAR 2000

William J. Taylor, Jr. and Abraham Kim

Paul H. B. Godwin

Robert J. Wirsing

Marc Jason Gilbert

Perry L. Wood

Dianne L. Smith

Editor

December 15, 1996
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

*******

All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute

Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is:

http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/

*******

Three additional studies from this conference are being

published independently. "Central Asia: A New Great Game?" by

Dianne L. Smith and "India's Security Environment: Towards the

Year 2000" by Raju G. C. Thomas are currently available. "Why

Russian Policy is Failing in Asia" by Stephen Blank is

forthcoming.

*******

Additionally, each year the Strategic Studies Institute

sponsors a Strategy Conference. The 1996 conference theme was

"China into the 21st Century: Strategic Partner and . . . or Peer

Competitor?" Many of the monographs produced from this conference

complement the essays in this volune. Titles are listed in the

catalog available through the SSI Publications and Production

Office or our Homepage.
iii

FOREWORD

In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic

Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and

International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian

Security to the Year 2000." No region of the world has greater

potential for expanded influence on American interests. This

compendium of papers from the conference examines the security

policies being pursued by many of the key Asian actors--China,

the Koreas, Pakistan, and the nations of Southeast Asia,

particularly those in ASEAN. The contrib-utors to this volume

paint the picture of a dynamic and diverse Asia on the verge of

the new century. Each author identifies the critical issues which

frame both challenges and opportunities for U.S. foreign,

economic, and security policies.

Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith of SSI has carefully edited

their works and provided the excellent introductory overview

which follows this foreword. SSI is pleased to publish this

volume as a contribution to the national security debate on this

important area of the world.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

OVERVIEW

Dianne L. Smith

The end of the Cold War transformed the global security

environment in Asia. Old security and military ties based on the

superpower rivalry underwent serious examination and

transformation, as regional issues gained greater importance.

With a shift away from military threats, national security

concerns have expanded beyond external threats to a state's

territorial integrity; states face economic threats, the

possibility of social cataclysm, ideological or religious

conflict, environmental problems, heightened violence and crime,

proliferation of conventional and nuclear weapons, and

transnational issues such as drugs, refugees, and international

terrorism.

Six authors examine the influence of these factors on Asian

security in the next decade. William J. Taylor, Jr., and Abraham

Kim first survey the new dynamics of Northeast Asian security,

focussing on the changed relationships between Russia, China,

Japan, and the United States. They then examine the Koreas in the

changing northeast region. The post-Cold War era has deepened the

isolation and economic deterioration of Pyongyang and,

conversely, permitted the gradual democratization, rapid economic

growth, and enhanced international stature of Seoul. However,

Northeast Asia has been left with ever-increasing uncertainties.

For both Koreas the rapid strengthening of China, the potential

for Japanese remilitarization, and the uncertain stability of

Russia are worrying. But, the greatest issue for both Koreas

remains the terms for the reunification both say they seek. The

Nuclear Agreed Framework has taken the nuclear crisis off

international agendas for the time being, but that agreement is a

frail framework on which to hang our hopes for peaceful

reunification. In the meantime, the political-military situation

along the Demilitarized Zone remains fragile.

Paul H. B. Godwin argues that Chinese foreign policy is

caught in the contradiction between domestic goals (which require

China to maintain a constructive relationship with the

international system) and Beijing's military security objectives

and modernization goals (which Asia and the United States view as

potentially threatening to regional security). China's response

to American criticism has been to charge Washington with trying

to start a new Cold War in Asia and drive a wedge between China

and its neighbors, and to detract attention from its own nuclear

weapons tests, weapons acquisitions, and modernization programs.

When these actions are combined with renewed claims over the

Spratly Islands and use of force to intimidate Taiwan, fear of an

ascending China has little to do with American policy or intent.
v

China's Asian neighbors prefer to accommodate China and let

America act as a balance. Beijing's perception of Washington

seeking to contain China may be rooted as much in its

understanding of its neighbors' security logic as in the

underlying intent of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific

region. Sino-American relations are potentially more critical and

hazardous for regional peace and security in the new millennium.

China's past willingness to confront Washington is a foreboding

precedent.

Robert Wirsing questions whether Pakistan's security in the

"New World Order" is going from bad to worse. It faces major

challenges to its security: its ties to major power wielders have

grown perilously thin, no major power seems willing to come its

rescue in a crisis, the arms gap with India widens, and its

internal stability and political unity are being seriously eroded

by ethnic and sectarian strife. Her options to solve these

problems are narrow. Turning her back on South Asia (or at least

the Hindu core of it) and embracing pan-Islam is too dangerous;

domestic liberalization tackles external security problems mainly

by trying to forget them. Regional cooperation, according to

Wirsing, is the most viable option, but there is no insurance

that Pakistan will be willing to implement it. Pakistan and India

both need to take initial steps to resolve the pivotal issue of

Kashmir, but neither seems convinced that the situation is

sufficiently urgent to warrant the prolonged and heavy

expenditure of political capital required to bring both sides

seriously to the bargaining table. Redefining Pakistan's security

in terms that the West might find acceptable will prove

difficult, if not impossible, but until this changes, the rest of

the world can help India and Pakistan with constant encouraging

dialogue and with concrete and evenhanded political, military,

and economic gestures toward the region that discourage fighting.

But, in the end, Wirsing argues, making South Asia more secure is

mainly a task that South Asians must perform.

Marc Jason Gilbert contends that the security architecture

of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is firmly

rooted in its experience as part of the so-called "shatterbelt,"

the region that stretches from Southeast Asia across the

Himalayas through Central Asia to the Caucasus and Anatolia and

onward to Southern Europe. Successive waves of disparate ethnic

groups have settled here without wholly displacing their

predecessors, thus ensuring that among them will be legacies of

both prolonged conflict and co-existence, coupled with dynamic

urban civilizations and traditionally weak geopolitical and 

economic structures. As a result, the art of survival has most

often depended upon artful compromise, accommodation,

multilateral approaches to common problems brokered between

internal factions, regional partners, and/or extra-regional

powers. States in the shatterbelt have experienced great
vi

achievement when they work together and terrible tragedy when

they do not, as the recent histories of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,

and Vietnam make clear. This heritage has shaped ASEAN's modus

operandi and explains the association's unwillingness to

transition to a European-style defense alliance. This pattern of

pacific, informal, and consensus-seeking strategic posture,

promoting economic growth as the best medicine for its security

problems, has its critics, but the ASEAN states have avoided

major confrontations and bid others to apply that strategy beyond

the confines of Southeast Asia.

Finally, Perry Wood argues that the transformation of

Southeast Asia into a center of economically vibrant states with

a claim to a political leadership role in Asian and world affairs

is being realized. The ASEAN states are working to extend their

"peace" to Indochina and usher in an unprecedented era of

regional cooperation and development. Unfortunately, contrary

trends are apparent; the end of superpower dominance has left

many states increasingly worried about external security and some

are assuming a higher regional military profile as a consequence,

which may increase the risk of limited conventional wars and

armed conflicts in the next century. The ASEAN states are

attempting to preserve strong security ties with Washington, but

the United States appears increasingly preoccupied with its

internal affairs and complacent regarding the region's role in

America's wider global interests. Regional security cannot rest

with America, but it can encourage the ASEAN nations to continue

to enhance their bilateral and trilateral security cooperation

and improve the transparency of their defense programs. The ASEAN

states will never be allied with Washington, but their common

concerns and shared interests form the basis for an independent,

but coordinated, approach to regional affairs which can work to

build a 21st century Asia congenial to both the United States and

the indigenous nations.

Russia, China, the ASEAN nations, India, Pakistan, the new

Central Asian republics, Japan, and North and South Korea all

seek to redefine their security strategy to the Year 2000. Their

success or failure will directly bear on the strategic interests

of the United States in a significant way.
vii
viii
ix
x
xi
1

CHAPTER I

THE KOREAS IN THE CHANGING NORTHEAST REGION

William J. Taylor, Jr.

and

Abraham Kim

Introduction.

The Cold War era was a period of "hostile peace and

stability"--hostile because of the constant struggle and tension

between the forces of democracy and communism exemplified by

Soviet-sponsored "wars of national liberation" and the "reign of

nuclear terror" and stable, in retrospect, because nations knew

friend from foe and could calculate their interests accordingly.

Cold War security interests subordinated all other concerns, and

points of potential tension were avoided among "Free World"

allies in order to sustain firm coalitions in the face of the

Communist threat in its various forms.

The end of the Cold War brought a mixed bag of challenges to

the Northeast Asia region. Although the Soviet threat to the

region was removed, residue from the Cold War remains. The

communist regimes of North Korea and China are still a reality,

and the Korean peninsula remains divided. At the same time, the

principles and relationships that once thrived and served as the

immovable foundation of political ties during the Cold War are

now open for reexamination and question. Uncertainty and

instability abound. The challenge now facing the countries of the

Asia-Pacific region is to adjust to this transforming

environment.

These global and regional changes have affected the two

Koreas, particularly in the area of security. The end of the

Soviet threat has not brought increased stability and peace to

the Korean peninsula; rather, increased uncertainty and multiple

challenges will prevail in the coming years.

End of the Cold War: Moscow's New Foreign Policy.

Without question, the most significant global change in

recent years was the demise of the Soviet Union. For decades,

American allies in the Asia-Pacific region lived under the

constant threat of Soviet military aggression. But, within a few

dramatic years, the Soviet empire collapsed, and the threat

evaporated. From the ashes, an ailing Russia, plagued by economic

chaos and political strife, emerged seeking economic assistance

from any country willing to help.
2

Within the Russian government a lack of consensus exists on

the overall foreign policy strategy to draw needed aid and

economic cooperation from other countries. Initially, President

Boris Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and other "proWestern" reformers focused on improving relations with the United

States, Western Europe, Japan, and other allies who were seen as

potential donors and investors.1 Their goal was to integrate

Russia into the group of industrialized countries as a political

and economic partner. But, they soon discovered that this was a

false hope. They failed to draw adequate support and acceptance

from these nations. Alexei Arbatov, a deputy of the Duma

legislature, explains the reason for Russia's lack of success:

"[The pro-Western Russian policy makers] underestimated the

uniqueness of the Russian state and its heritage, as well as

Western reservations about too rapid convergence."2

By mid-1992, a reorientation of Russian foreign policy had

taken place. The pro-Western leaders' control over foreign policy

gave way to more conservative groups, such as the Security

Council (a top policy-making body established in 1992) and the

legislature. The Russian government refocused its diplomatic

priorities toward improving relations with the former Soviet

Republics, Central Eastern Europe, and the developing Asian

countries.3 By the end of 1993, Moscow had adopted policies more

independent from the West; it now pursued two general foreign

policy aims: to defend Russia's "national interest" and to

achieve prominence in the international community.

The shift in Russia's foreign policy made tensions between

the industrialized world and Moscow inevitable, especially as the

Russian government pursued what it considered as its own vital

"national interests." For example, the Russian conflict in

Chechnya drew much criticism from the Western European nations.

On January 19, 1995, the European Parliament voted to postpone

the signing of an interim trade and economic agreement between

Russia and the European Union in response to Moscow's atrocities.

In the subsequent month, tensions between Washington and Moscow

grew as the U.S. Government sought to stop the Russians from

constructing a nuclear plant in Iran. The Russian government

refused to back down, arguing that Washington's aims were to

eliminate its competitors rather than protect international

security.4

Current political developments within Russia suggest that

the future of Moscow's ties with the West will be increasingly

turbulent. Most notable is the growing nationalist sentiment

among politicians and the populace to restore the "Great Power"

status of Russia. More people are accusing the West of hindering

Russia's attempt to take its rightful place in the world

community and for being the catalyst of the country's many social

and economic ills. Nationalist and Communist parties which
3

subscribe to these beliefs are becoming more vocal and popular

among the Russian people. The large victory for the Ultranationalist and Communist forces in the December 1995

parliamentary election attests to their growing strength. The

Russian Federation Communist Party alone succeeded in capturing a

third of the 450 legislative seats in the Duma. Combined with the

nationalist groups, the "red" party, along with its political

comrades, hold a majority in the Duma.5 Moreover, the recent

resignation of Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Deputy Prime

Minister Anatoly Chubais, and other like-minded reformers--and

their replacement with hardliners--marked the end of the proWestern faction within the Yeltsin Administration. The era of a

Russia compliant with the West is over. The question is, what

will the future of Moscow's relationship with the Western powers

be as Russia proceeds down a more hardline and nationalist path?

Russia's Ties to Northeast Asia: Sources of Instability.

 Moscow recognized clearly the important diplomatic

opportunities and vast economic resources available in the

Northeast Asia region. The Russian government actively sought to

establish ties with Northeast Asia's economic giants, but these

new-forming ties became a source of tension, resurrecting some

old problems and creating new ones in the region.

Among the dynamic Asian countries, Russia saw the importance

of Japan's growing regional and global role. To tap into the

resources of Asia, seeking better relations with Japan was an

important task. From the beginning, however, trouble plagued

Russia's attempts. Central to Russo-Japanese relations is the

Northern territories dispute. During the closing days of World

War II, Soviet forces occupied the Kurile Islands (or Northern

territories) as well as the southern part of Sakhalin Island. In

the mid-1950s, Moscow and Tokyo began talks over Soviet

occupation of the Kurile Islands. Under the banner of "peaceful

coexistence," Nikita Khrushchev made gestures over the islands

issue to win the favor of the newly-elected Japanese Prime

Minister, Ichiro Hatoyama, who promoted a more independent

foreign policy than the previous, pro-U.S. Yoshida

Administration. Khrushchev saw this as an opportunity to

undermine American influence in Japan and the U.S.-Japanese

mutual security pact, and to normalize relations with Japan.6

 In

1956, Moscow made an agreement with the Japanese government to

return the two smaller islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the

completion of a peace treaty between the two countries. However,

the promise was short-lived. Moscow unilaterally retracted its

pledge in 1960.7

Almost 30 years passed before discussions between Japan and

Russia on the Northern territory issue began again. New talks on
4

the islands started, following a visit to Tokyo by Edward

Shervardnaze in December 1988. Tokyo and Moscow agreed to

establish a joint working group to study the dispute and,

hopefully, bring about a resolution and conclude a peace treaty

between the two governments, but little was resolved.

President Boris Yeltsin and the new Russian government

continued the previous administration's endeavor to restore

Russo-Japanese relations. To do so, they understood that a more

flexible attitude toward the Northern Territories dispute was

paramount. The Russian government agreed to three concessions: to

support the demilitarization of the disputed islands; to

reconfirm the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration in which

Moscow agreed to return the smaller islands after the conclusion

of a peace treaty; and to discuss the disputed ownership of the

Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands (the two larger islands). By

demonstrating an open mind on the Kurile Islands issue, Yeltsin

hoped to win the favor of Tokyo and draw much needed economic

assistance into Russia.8

These concessions drew heavy criticism from conservative

groups within the Russian leadership and the military. Critics

argued that the islands were of extreme strategic importance.

First, they said, the islands served as a natural line of defense

for the Russian Far East, as well as the Sea of Okhostk, where

Soviet ballistic missile submarines were stationed. Moreover, the

islands were critical in safeguarding the passageway for ships

traveling from Russia's Vladivostok naval base to the Pacific

Ocean.9

Moderate groups in the government also joined the opposition

to Yeltsin's policies. Although not as extreme as conservative

groups in rejecting any form of territorial transfer, they saw

that the islands could be used as a bargaining chip in a grand

tension-reduction plan among Japan, the United States, and China

to ensure Russian security in the region.10

The strong opposition among Russian elites forced Yeltsin

and his supporters to reevaluate their policy for a quick

territorial transfer. Internal Russian opposition to the demands

of the Japanese government to return the islands led President

Yeltsin to postpone two trips to Tokyo, which angered the

Japanese government. Yeltsin finally traveled to Tokyo in July

1993, but refused to yield to the pressures of the Japanese

government to explicitly reaffirm the 1956 declaration. Instead,

he simply stated that he would uphold all international

agreements and treaties made between the Soviet Union and Japan.11

The two countries have yet to resolve this contentious issue.

Japanese public attitudes toward Russia have been negatively

affected, not only by the lack of significant progress on the
5

island issue and the postponement of Yeltsin's trips to Tokyo,

but also by reports that Russia has been dumping nuclear waste

into the Sea of Japan.12 Moreover, continuous reports from Japan's

Defense Agency that Russia may be a potential medium or long-term

military threat further harmed Japan's view of Russia. Following

Gorbachev's announcement of reductions in Soviet military forces

in May 1989, Russia's military presence in the Far East has

quantitatively declined, but qualitatively improved, with

continual military equipment modernization. Moscow shifted a

large portion of its state-of-the art military arsenal,

especially combat forces that were once stationed in Eastern

Europe, from west of the Urals to the eastern region. Twenty-six

army divisions supported by high-tech equipment, such as T-80

tanks, MI-24 Hind air-to-ground attack helicopters, and other

top-line vehicles, still remain positioned in the Far East

region. In addition, Russia has deployed approximately 1,000

combat aircraft comprised of fourth generation fighters and

strategic bombers, such as the Su-25 Frogfoot, MiG-29 Fulcrum,

MiG-31 Foxhound and Tu-22M Backfire. The powerful Pacific fleet

consists of 675 ships (65 major surface ships and 65 submarines)

with a total displacement of 1,680,000 tons.13

Russian military activities and exercises have decreased

since the end of the Cold War, and general military readiness, as

witnessed in Chechnya, has declined due to Russia's economic

crisis and low military morale. With the lack of internal

stability and resources, it is unlikely that Russia will be a

significant military player, let alone a security threat, in the

Asia-Pacific region for the foreseeable future. But Russia has

gone through periods like this before, when domestic

considerations and difficulties diverted its attention away from

the Pacific. In each case, the preoccupation passed, and Russia

returned to the region with new vigor. There is little reason to

expect that it will be different this time. The question is, how

long before Russia revives its strength in the region? No one can

know for sure, but 20 years would be a reasonable time frame,

assuming that no further disasters befall its transition.

Anticipating Russia's recovery, Japan, China, and the United

States are all attempting to establish normal relationships with

Moscow. However, with Russia's legacy of hostility and aggression

in the region and under current expectations, it is reasonable to

assume that the resurgence of Russia could be a destabilizing

factor.14 Japan's Defense Agency expressed these anxieties in a

recent White Paper:

The future developments of Russian forces are unclear

because of unstable domestic political and economic

conditions in Russia. Accordingly, the developments of

the Russian forces in the Far East become uncertain.

The existence of Russian forces in the Far East still
6

constitutes a destabilizing factor for the security of

this region.15

However, these sources of tension have not evolved into

major diplomatic crises between Russia and Japan. In fact, the

two countries often have put problematic issues such as the

Northern Territories dispute on hold and carried on cordial

cooperation. Japan has gone so far as to contribute aid to

Russia, although sometimes with reservations. The end of the Cold

War has removed Russian and Japanese ideological enmity, but the

seeds of tension remain between the two regional powers which

have a history of conflict. With a precarious Russian political

future and an Asia-Pacific region in transition, the future of

Russo-Japanese relations is uncertain.

China: A Central Player's Rapproachment with Russia.

Another significant development in the East Asia region has

been the rapprochement between China and Russia. Since the

establishment of official diplomatic ties in 1989, Beijing and

Moscow have cooperated in many areas that make it hard to believe

that little more than a decade ago, these two governments were

implacable foes. Of special note are the military ties that have

formed between Moscow and Beijing. Arms sales between the two

countries have been active. In December 1992, they signed a joint

communique agreeing to strengthen military cooperation through

the Chinese purchase of Russian military arms. Russia agreed to

supply China with Su-27 Flankers, Su-31 trainers, MiG-31

Foxhounds, Tu-22M Backfire medium-range bombers, T-72 tanks, S300

surface-to-air missiles, and IL-76M Candid transports. Moreover,

four Kilo class submarines have been delivered, and talks are

underway for Beijing to purchase 22 more.16 According to a recent

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report,

China's total purchase of Russian arms and equipment in 1991-1994

was estimated as between $4.5-6 billion.17

More alarming than military sales are technological

transfers and cooperation between the two countries. A Memorandum

of Understanding on Sino-Russian Military Equipment and

Technology Cooperation was signed in 1992. Since then, the

Chinese government has employed hundreds of Russian and Ukrainian

military scientists in its defense industries. Most of these

individuals work on developing high-tech armaments and nuclear

weapons.18 One military expert, Tai Ming Cheung, described the

situation:

Chinese military and military industrial delegations

visit Moscow and many other Russian cities on virtually

a continuous basis today. The Chinese Embassy in Moscow

has considerably expanded its military representation
7

to be able to handle this heavy volume of traffic.19

This active military tie is based on a marriage of

convenience. Russia, in need of hard currency, found China more

than willing to purchase Russian high-tech military equipment and

state-of-the-art military technology. For the Chinese government,

finding advanced arms sellers available among the world's

democracies has been more than difficult because of the Tiananmen

Square incident and because most other countries have important

commercial ties to Taiwan.

Moreover, both sides' flexibility in deals with each other

has made them even more attractive partners. For example, one

report described a deal made by Russia's Komsomolsk-na-Amure

Aviation Plant to sell Su-27 fighter aircraft to China. The plant

agreed to accept part of its payment in the form of canned meat

for its workers. Such a deal would have been absurd for British,

French, and American defense industries, but for two needy

countries such as China and Russia, the deal made sense.20

Why should Russo-Chinese military cooperation be viewed as a

threat? Chinese expansionism has been an area of concern for many

neighboring countries in Asia. China's active duty military, at

2.9 million personnel, is the largest military force in the

world. Numerically, the Chinese navy ranks third in the world.

According to one estimate, if all the ASEAN21 countries and Taiwan

were to combine their fleets, China would still possess a

slightly larger navy. Many Chinese warships are equipped with

outdated weapons systems, but some are known to be of "1980

vintage," equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air

missiles and reasonably capable defense systems. China has long

lacked military projection capabilities for its navy and air

force, but it is clear that Russia is slowly providing the

technology and modern equipment to advance Chinese power

projection.22

During the Cold War, China pursued an aggressive nuclear 

weapons program for deterrence and warfare. Today, China

possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world--14

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that, absent missile

defense systems, can hit virtually anywhere in the world, 60

intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), one nuclear-armed

submarine, and countless tactical nuclear warheads. While the

United States and Russia have worked to reduce their nuclear

forces, China has continued to modernize and develop its nuclear

weapons and delivery systems.23 It continues nuclear tests in the

face of a consensus for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Undoubtedly, China is one of the most dynamic countries in

the world. While the world reeled from a global recession during

1990-1993, China's economy expanded at an annual growth rate of
8

13 percent. In 1995, China's economic growth rate reached 9

percent, far above the average global growth rate of 2.7 percent,

and even the average Asian growth rate of 7.9 percent. Growth in

1996 is forecast to be 9.7 percent.24 In 1993, an estimated $90

billion poured into China, equaling the total aggregate foreign

investment of the previous 14 years. Moreover, economists

forecast that China's imports will reach $1 trillion by the year

2000.25

China's vast military capability is clearly a source of

anxiety for many neighboring countries, but what heightens this

fear is China's booming economy. Although China's current

military now may be considered obsolete, combined with its

astounding potential economic strength and the technological base

that accompanies industrialization, modernizing China's military

into a force with regional and global power projection will soon

become a reality.

The question is, once China achieves combined capabilities,

how will Beijing project "power" in its various forms and for

what purposes? The question is very much on the minds of Asians,

expressed well in Washington by the new Japanese Foreign

Minister. Noting that China's defense spending has been

increasing by about 20 percent annually, he said, "Japan is not

defining China as an enemy, a threat or a risk," adding that,

nevertheless, Beijing's military buildup must be taken into

account as "an objective fact."26

U.S. Engagement in Asia: Losing Ground?

The end of the Cold War has periodically called into

question the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific region. For more than

40 years, the United States had the major strategic objective of

containing the spreading influence of communism in the region. To

achieve this objective, America extended favorable aid and trade

to its Asian allies, attempting to nurture their economies,

establish stable governments, and station military forces in

strategic areas to offer security for these countries and U.S.

interests against threatening Communist forces.

The Soviet threat is gone, but the geo-political danger of

instability and conflict is not. There are internal

contradictions and latent regional problems that pose an

uncertain future which is recognized in U.S. policy. "It is [the

U.S. military] presence that the countries of the [Asia-Pacific]

region consider a critical variable in the East Asia security

equation . . . [and] the most important factor in guaranteeing

stability and peace."27

For at least the short term, Washington recognizes the

importance of the American presence in the Asia-Pacific region
9

and has described the security details of our strategy of

engagement in the United States Security Strategy for the East

Asia Pacific Region. This report expressed three basic

principles. The first is "reinforcing alliances to identify their

new basis after the Cold War." The second is to maintain a

forward-based troop presence. These forces would provide for

continuing deterrence against belligerent countries (e.g., North

Korea), ensure U.S. involvement in emerging Asian affairs, and

protect U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. The third is

the development of regional institutions, not to supplant

existing treaties and understandings with American allies, but to

build confidence among countries in the region.28

U.S. government policy statements have affirmed America's

commitment to Asia. Some in Asia may doubt the Clinton

administration's commitment, however, given the example of the

absence of President Clinton from the Asia-Pacific Economic

Council (APEC) meeting in Osaka, Japan, during November 1995.

Despite the understandable reason behind the President's

cancellation (the budget battle), some have called his failure to

attend this conference and to meet with Japanese Prime Minister

Tomiichi Murayama a blow to APEC and U.S.-Japan relations,

especially in light of the growing debate over U.S. troop

presence in Okinawa after the rape case of the Japanese school

girl.29

Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region foresee a "slow

but continuous" American withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific area,

continuing the process begun during the Nixon administration with

the 1969 Guam Doctrine, stipulating that Asian countries should

be more responsible for their own defense. This was followed by

subsequent military reductions in the region and even discussions

of pulling out U.S. troops--for example, President Carter's 1978

attempt to reduce ground troops in South Korea; the 1992 U.S.

East Asian Initiative to cut troops in South Korea by 6,500,

which was later postponed due to the North Korean nuclear threat;

closure of Philippine bases; and, reluctance to commit U.S.

troops to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. Asian countries

believe that the U.S. military presence will continue to

diminish, creating a power vacuum that China, Japan, or perhaps

even India or Russia may try to fill.30

The fears of the Asian governments have been exacerbated by

increasing domestic political concern in some quarters that U.S.

military strategy is outdated and that the costly U.S. military

presence abroad needs to be reduced in Asia. Critics complain

that American defense policies have not changed much from the

Cold War period, despite the absence of a Soviet threat and the

increased importance of economic cooperation and development:

[Current US defense policy] offers a military
10

substitute for the failure of the United States to

produce an effective trade and investment strategy

toward East Asia . . . [This defense policy is] a sign

of U.S. policy's bankruptcy in the new global economic

center of gravity, East Asia.31

Some scholars argue that although the United States may

maintain a military presence, its economic position and

importance in the region will decline, as exemplified by

America's losing economic battle with Japan in the 1980s and

early 1990s. U.S. aid, investment, and trade in Asia were

comparable to Japan in the 1980s, but over time Japan outstripped

the United States. "U.S. failure to adequately attend to its

economic interests in the Asian-Pacific region, coupled with

Washington's proclivity toward tactical, rather than strategic,

geo-economic thinking toward the region, looms as the next

‘crisis' in U.S. external economic relations."32

Critics blame a sense of "American complacency" that is

undercutting American economic presence in the region. They argue

that Americans have ignored the business opportunities that exist

in Asia and have disregarded the significant threat that Japan

and other Asian countries pose. U.S. businesses, rather than

establishing a long-term presence in the developing Asian

economies through investments in the manufacturing and

distribution sectors, focus on immediate, high profits from small

volume trade with Asian countries. These same scholars attribute

America's complacency to two assumptions: first, that countries

which suffered the atrocities of Japanese expansionism during

World War II, such as the ASEAN countries, would not permit the

Japanese to dominate the region economically, and second, that a

large and expensive U.S. military presence in the region would

provide adequate leverage to grant U.S. initiatives to gain

economic advantages.33

These assumptions, however, may be questionable. First of

all, time heals wounds. As generations pass, the atrocities of

World War II have become more distant psychologically. Secondly,

Japanese investments increasingly are attractive to Asian

governments and consumers. For example, leaders in Singapore,

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand all have urged Japan to

demonstrate greater regional leadership.34

The bottom line is that economic and security equations have

been switched.

Where once America's role as the security guarantor of

the region ensured certain derivative economic

benefits, now that the United States has become a

secondary economic presence in Asia, there is no reason

to believe that Americans will continue to support a
11

big security presence there unless the economic tide

can be stemmed.35

Inevitably, increasing economic tensions, over time, will

put pressure on the security relationship. The questions are:

how long will America's large and expensive security presence

last, given declining U.S. defense budgets and a relatively

declining economic presence; alternatively, can the United States

develop an effective strategy to shore up its economic presence?

The problem is that, while the United States is in the region, it

is not a part of the region. In 1995, the U.S. Department of

State talked about the American role as the "honest broker" in

the Asia-Pacific. But what Asians know is that brokers, no matter

how honest they may be, are not necessarily investors. New U.S.

strategy must place the United States as an in-place regional

power, both in political-military and economic terms.36

The Fear of Japanese Militarism.

The question of regional security and America's military

commitments in Northeast Asia raise the issue of "Japanese

militarism." Since 1945, the United States has guaranteed Japan's

external security, while Japan maintained a limited self-defense

force. Sometimes, however, there were apparently contradictory

U.S. pressures for Japan to protect sea lanes that were 1,000

miles beyond its coast. However, this unique security treaty

between the United States and Japan allayed the fears of Asian

countries of an expansionist Japan. But, given the changed

international environment and Japan's evolution toward regional

and global leader,

[Japan] can no longer be a passive follower of global

and regional developments and must become a major

shaker and mover of international affairs . . . . It is

clear that Japan has the potential to so change itself

and its policy.37

As the justification for the U.S. presence in Japan is

increasingly called into question, Asian countries increasingly

are suspicious of Japan's long-term outlook for its security. The

inability of Japan to come to terms fully with its activities

before and during World War II until recently contributed to

Asian countries' concerns. Moreover, the public outcry from the

recent case of American servicemen raping a young Japanese girl

in Okinawa has shaken U.S.-Japan security ties and has made U.S.

troop presence in Okinawa a major political issue in Japan. In a

recent speech to Japan's Diet, the newly-elected Prime Minister,

Ryutaro Hashimoto, stated that, although the U.S.-Japan military

alliance is essential, the 47,000 U.S. troops in Okinawa will be

reduced.38 The question is, by how much will U.S. troops be
12

reduced? How will this affect the strategic balance in the

region? And, will this reduction set a precedent as a solution

for future problems between Japan and the United States?

The defense policy announced in November 1995 suggests that,

at least for the foreseeable future, the Japanese government will

not expand its military. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces

will be reduced from 180,000 to 145,000 over the next 10 years.

The number of tanks will be cut from 1,200 to 940. The Japanese

Maritime Self-defense Force (JMSDF) will slash 20 percent of its

60 surface vessels and halve its minesweeping fleet. The

Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) will cut 10 percent of

its 350 fighters. Moreover, the military will be called to play a

greater role in disaster relief and anti-terrorism.39 Despite

these cuts and more defensive posturing, Asian countries still

eye suspiciously Japan's long-term military strategy. What causes

fear among these countries is that the great economic strength

that Japan has accumulated over the years can translate itself

into military prowess and expansionism if Tokyo chooses to do

so.40

Although Japan's military force is designed for defending

the Japanese islands, it possesses one of the most capable and

modern military establishments in the region. Japan could achieve

an imposing, modern warfare potential, as well as a highly

effective self-defense capacity. For example, the JASDF and JMSDF

are estimated to have one of the most competent high-tech warfare

capabilities in the world, possessing such systems as F-15 Eagle

fighters, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft

and Patriot Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs).41

The Japanese nuclear program has also drawn attention. It is

estimated that Japan's plutonium reprocessing program has enough

weapons-grade, reprocessed plutonium for over 300 nuclear weapons

by the year 2000. However, by 2010, some estimates predict that

Japan's supply of plutonium could reach 80-90 tons, enough

material to produce as much as 10,000 nuclear weapons. In

addition, Japan is expected to acquire Tomahawk missiles and have

long-range capabilities through the development of its space

program.42

There is considerable debate whether Japan will assert

itself as a major military power in the region. Given

uncertainties in Japan about the transition period in Asia, the

potential threat of Chinese military power, and the state of

U.S.-Japan relations, a more independent defense policy is

likely. A breakout of regional conflicts in such places as the

Korean peninsula or the South China Sea could push Japan into

remilitarization and military nuclearization. Given historical

animosities in Northeast Asia, such events could lead to an

extremely volatile region.
13

As dangerous as these trends may seem, recent developments

on the Korean peninsula present just as great a threat to

regional security. Secretary of State Warren Christopher recently

described the Korean crisis as "ended."43 This is a mischaracterization of the Agreed Framework signed in 1994. Other

regional crises have detracted attention from the emerging

instability on the peninsula.

Impact on the Korean Peninsula.

What do all these trends imply for the Korean peninsula? The

end of the Cold War certainly changed the balance between the

North and South. From 1945 through the 1980s, the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) -North Korea and the Republic

of Korea (ROK) -South Korea sustained a relatively even military

balance, with the Soviet Union and China supporting the DPRK and

the United States aligned with and supporting the ROK.

This rough balance began to change in the late 1980s. Soviet

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's agreement to participate in

the 1988 Seoul Olympics was an early sign of things to come. The

Soviets started to demand hard currency from the DPRK for

military equipment and support, and began to warm relations with

Seoul, seeking South Korea's capital, technology, and management

expertise. To ameliorate North Korea's objections, Moscow

promised Pyongyang in May 1988 that no diplomatic relations would

be established with Seoul. But soon after the Olympics, Moscow

and Seoul signed a preliminary trade agreement with the South

Korean Trade Promotion Corporation and invited South Korean

companies to invest in Moscow and Leningrad. Again, the Soviet

government assured Pyongyang that Moscow would not establish

formal political ties with Seoul. Pyongyang clearly did not

believe the Soviets and accelerated development of their nuclear

weapons program--despite Pyongyang's 1985 signing of the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT).44 In 1989, it was clear that formal

diplomatic ties between South Korea and the Soviet Union would

occur. Economic and political exchanges increased, which

culminated in the meeting of Gorbachev and ROK President Roh Tae

Woo in San Francisco where both governments agreed to eventual

formal diplomatic ties.45 On September 30, 1990, Moscow and Seoul

established formal diplomatic relations; in December, the South

Korean President made his first official trip to Moscow in which

South Korea offered a $3 billion credit for South Korean goods

and later extended an additional $3 billion credit. On April 20,

1991, President Roh Tae Woo hosted Gorbachev on Cheju Island,

where Gorbachev proposed to negotiate a treaty of friendship and

cooperation.46

The fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russian
14

President Boris Yeltsin did not bring any change to the growing

Russian preference of South Korea over the North. Russian Deputy

Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev visited Pyongyang in January 1992

as a special envoy of President Boris Yeltsin. His trip was not

to reaffirm Moscow's ties to Pyongyang, but the reverse; he was

there mainly to discuss a reinterpretation of the military clause

and weaken Moscow's commitment to the existing bilateral Treaty

of Friendship. Although the trip ended with no real consensus,

the treaty was essentially dead.47 In March 1992, Boris Yeltsin

sent Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev on a goodwill tour to China,

Japan, and South Korea. Blatantly, North Korea was left out of

the itinerary.48

 South Korea further strengthened its position with the

establishment of formal diplomatic relations with China in August

1992. President Roh Tae Woo's "Northern Policy" (establishing

relations with Moscow and Beijing to undermine North Korea)

worked, and the ROK won major diplomatic victories over the DPRK.

This, however, did not mean that unification would soon occur or

even that the Korean peninsula would stabilize. In fact, the

reward for these diplomatic victories is, in some ways, a more

unstable peninsula and possibly a precarious future. Winning over

the Russians and Chinese did not increase the leverage of Seoul

over Pyongyang. In fact, the cooling ties between Moscow and

Pyongyang quickly eliminated a major outside player who could

serve as a catalyst to prevent dangerous North Korean politicalmilitary posturing. Beijing remains the last significant force

beyond Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo which might induce Pyongyang

to accommodate the wishes of the international community. Beijing

in recent years urged North Korea to halt its nuclear weapons

program and continue discussions with South Korea. But, Chinese

officials report that their leverage with Pyongyang has decreased

significantly since the establishment of formal relations with

Seoul in August 1992.49

Clearly North Korea's isolation has created some major

problems for both North and South Korea, the paramount problem

being the North Korean nuclear weapons issue. With the loss of

support from Beijing and Moscow, Kim Il-sung confronted the

DPRK's decline in credibility in relations with the ROK and the

United States. North Korea could no longer depend on the Soviet

nuclear umbrella for defense against "the imperialists."50

Pyongyang perceived this new reality as a menacing threat to its

security, stability, and very survival. Thus, when Pyongyang

realized that the loyalty of the USSR was in question, it

accelerated its nuclear program. By the time Gorbachev met with

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco, Soviet

officials were well aware of the advanced nature of North Korea's

nuclear program and informed the American government of the

DPRK's progress.51
15

The North Korean government used its nuclear weapons

program, or the appearance of developing a nuclear weapons

program, as a bargaining tactic. This strategy proved to be a

great success for Pyongyang, while a source of grave

embarrassment for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. By

manipulating the international community's fear of its nuclear

program and relying on the DPRK's most common diplomatic tactic

of "brinkmanship," Pyongyang attracted more attention and

exercised more influence over the United States, South Korea, and

Japan than since the Korean War. Again and again, the North

Koreans have pushed the outside world--and in particular the

United States--to the brink of a major international crisis to

achieve their aims. It is a familiar pattern in their diplomatic

behavior to push an incident involving "the imperialists" as far

as they safely can to find out what kind of resistance they meet,

then back off, and gain whatever concessions and propaganda value

they can. Wagering bets that they cannot cover, Pyongyang has

often managed to win, gathering concessions for retreating from a

position that it could not cover, were the United States and its

South Korean and Japanese allies truly to call its bluff. Given

the calculus of political, military, economic, and social

"power," realistically North Korea should not have the ability to

coerce the United States, South Korea, and Japan in the way that

they often do. But through shrewd diplomacy and a stark military

lifestyle, the DPRK repeatedly convinces the West--and the United

States in particular--that it is better to buy off North Korea

than to challenge it.

Some Realities on the Korean Peninsula.

The end of the Cold War has not decreased the long-standing

DPRK threat to South Korea. North Korea has about 65 percent of

its 1.1 million, well-equipped armed forces deployed forward

along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in a posture that is akin to

"hugging Seoul." Under present military circumstances, the U.S.-

ROK Combined Forces Command, backed up by U.S. reinforcements,

would win any mid-to high-intensity conflict on the Korean

Peninsula in 120 days or less--but Seoul would be utterly

destroyed in the first few days.52 Given the broad extent of Seoul

after years of urban sprawl, that could mean devastation for

roughly 11 million people and over 25 percent of South Korea's

economy. Also affected would be the roughly 60,000 American

military and civilian personnel and their dependents living in

the South, mainly in the Seoul area. This is an awesome fact for

Seoul and Washington to contemplate. In addition, the DPRK's

chemical-and biological-(if not nuclear) capable Nodong 1 and

Nodong 2 missiles can reach Japan; a much longer-range missile is

under development.53

These military factors provide the backdrop for DPRK
16

brinkmanship. Those who argue that the DPRK would never attack

south, knowing that this would be a literal act of suicide, are

not supported by North Korean rhetoric:

Comrades: Today, our people's army has the heavy and

honorable task of reunifying the fatherland with guns

in the nineties without fail and completing the Juche

revolutionary cause, the socialist cause to the end. .

. . Only when we strengthen the people's army, can we

crush all challenges of the enemy with revolutionary

guns and firmly guarantee the honorable Kim Jong-il

era. . . . If the fatherland is not reunified, no

officer or man or soldier can say that they have

fulfilled their duty and they also do not have the

right to die. . . .54

There are even scenarios under which a North Korean attack

south would not equate with suicide. For example, with severe

domestic economic problems and massive hunger, the North

leadership seeks to divert the attention of its people by

magnifying the external threat from South Korea and its

imperialist allies. Additionally, they also question the

political resolve of South Korea and the United States. Pyongyang

senses the significant political instability and ongoing

constitutional crisis in the South. North Korea also assessed

that the United States was militarily overstretched by

deployments in Bosnia, Haiti, the Persian Gulf States, and

elsewhere, and was plagued by political gridlock in a

presidential election year.

What if Pyongyang launched a very short-warning attack and,

despite suffering massive losses to the high-tech systems of the

U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, quickly moved to encircle

Seoul in a limited attack, halted, made its case to the world

community concerning ROK military provocation born of its own

political instability, and sued for peace? With tens of thousands

of Americans and millions of South Koreans still trapped in the

Seoul area, what should be the U.S. response? Or Japan's

response? Russia or China? The United Nations Security Council?

Does the DPRK have one, two, or more deliverable nuclear weapons?

Would they use the chemical and biological weapons we know they

can deliver by multiple means? In such a scenario, would an

attack be irrational or suicidal?

North Korea's Economic Crisis.

With the fall of North Korea's East European communist

trading partners and the end of the "cordial and generous"

economic trade relations with China and the Soviet Union in 1991,

the North Korean economy became virtually paralyzed. Pyongyang
17

looked to these countries for machinery, advanced industrial

equipment, fuel, and other vital imports to sustain its economic

development.55 In 1990, Moscow ended its barter trade with North

Korea and demanded hard currency for its exports. Pyongyang,

unable to pay, reduced its trade with the former Soviet Union

from just over $1.7 billion (at official ruble-dollar exchange

rates) in 1990 to approximately $600 million in 1991--a drop of

more than 70 percent in Soviet imports. Imports from the former

Soviet Union continued to drop in 1992 and 1993, until import

levels sank to less than 10 percent of the average volume of

imports that were annually entering the DPRK between 1987-1990.56

 Among the traded goods, crude oil was dramatically affected.

Petroleum imports dropped from 800,000 tons to 30,000 tons in

1991 and 1992.57 China followed suit and ended its favorable trade

relations with North Korea. In 1992, Beijing raised its oil

prices close to international market prices and demanded that

exports from China be paid with hard currency--the DPRK's

scarcest resource.

The sudden demands by North Korea's "allies" and the drop of

fuel imports caused a severe energy crisis in North Korea,

further exacerbated by a reduction in DPRK coal production.58 This

decline in energy supplies produced devastating effects on the

economy. Due to the lack of energy and raw materials, "North

Korean watchers" estimated that many of Pyongyang's industries

were working at less than half-capacity.59 The economy contracted

by 3.7 percent (1990), 5.2 percent (1991), 7.6 percent (1992),

4.3 percent (1993), and 1.7 percent (1994) respectively.60

Food production also dropped sharply. Grain production fell

by 12.2 percent in 1990, 8.9 percent in 1991, 3.6 percent in

1992, and 9.0 percent in 1993.61 In 1994, North Korea finally

reversed this downward spiral and achieved a 6.2 percent growth;62

despite this improvement, North Korea's agricultural sector still

could not meet the demands of its populace. The gains of 1994

quickly vanished the following year as waves of unprecedented

floods and bad weather destroyed arable lands and exacerbated the

country's food problems; the Food and Agricultural Organization

and the World Food Programme estimated that North Korea's final

1995 grain production would only reach 4 million tons in 1995,

far below the 7 million tons North Korea needed.63 With the

average North Korean citizen eating only two meals a day and

receiving but one-fourth of the basic nutritional requirement,

United Nations relief officials fear that natural disasters may

cause mass starvation. A recent World Health Organization report

stated that more than 20 percent of children under 5 years may be

already suffering from malnutrition, potentially increasing

sharply the infant mortality rate.64 World relief organizations

and foreign governments--including South Korea--have responded to

the DPRK's distress call by offering food shipments, medicine,

and other humanitarian support, but Pyongyang claims foreign
18

assistance has been far from adequate.

Seoul, however, believes that the shortages in the north

have been exaggerated. South Korean officials argue that

Pyongyang could ease the suffering of its citizens if it were

willing to tap into the enormous stockpile of food stored to

supply the DPRK's massive armed forces in wartime.65 Moreover,

North Korea's crisis is a symptom of its economic isolation and

the inefficiencies of a socialist economy. The question is, how

much longer can the DPRK continue in a deteriorating state before

the country begins to unravel? Probably a lot longer than many

analysts think--if the United States, South Korea, and Japan

continue the present humanitarian program involving millions of

tons of oil and rice.

Under the growing pressures of a deteriorating economy,

Pyongyang has been forced to adopt policies that go beyond an

orthodox communist command economy, but only under controlled

conditions to prevent the disruption of the Communist Party's

control. The most notable such effort has been to establish a

Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the remote Rajin-Sonbong region,

where it hopes to attract foreign capital and technology. The

North Korean leadership is currently trying to sell the zone's

many attractive benefits--tax breaks, a cheap and highly skilled

labor force, and a potentially large consumer market. Although

many foreign countries have shown interest, few have actually

invested. An underdeveloped infrastructure, the lack of a banking

system, an unstable political environment, and a poor credit

history are among the many uninviting characteristics that

discourage international investment. South Korean companies have

traditionally been among the most enthusiastic investors into

North Korea, but Seoul has restricted new investments as long as

Pyongyang persists in its recalcitrant rhetoric, efforts to

destabilize Seoul, and foot-dragging on the full resolution of

the nuclear weapons issue. Without the lead of South Korean

companies, it is unlikely other foreign countries will risk

investing, particularly when there are other more secure and

lucrative markets available, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. The

prospects for the Rajin-Sonbong SEZ as a remedy to North Korea's

economic deterioration are slim.

South Korea's Economy.

Since the early 1960s, South Korea has experienced

extraordinary growth. South Korea's gross national product (GNP)

increased from $1.35 billion in 1953 to $376.9 billion in 1994.

Per capita annual income during the same period rose from $67 to

$8,483, an increase of more than 126-fold. In 1995, South Korea's

per capita GNP is expected to top $10,000. During the period

1970-1994, the ROK's annual economic growth averaged 8.1
19

percent.66 Estimates are that in 1992 South Korea's total GNP

stood 14 times greater than that of North Korea. South Korea's

phenomenal growth has been attributed to such factors as its

highly-skilled and educated labor force working at low wages; the

adoption of foreign technology and capital; an export-led growth

strategy; and close state-business relations, which have incurred

mammoth political problems.67

Seoul's warming relations with Moscow and Beijing opened new

economic opportunities for South Korea's economy. Bilateral trade

between Russia and South Korea has increased enormously; for the

period of 1988-1991, trade averaged an annual growth rate of 68.1

percent. In 1987, trade was a mere $151 million, but by 1994, it

had reached more than $2.2 billion.68 More impressive yet are

China-South Korea economic relations. Even before China opened

direct trade ties with the ROK, indirect trade grew rapidly in

the 1980s. The ROK-operated trade promotion organization (KOTRA)

and the Chinese Chamber of International Commerce, which had

established offices in each capital, reached a bilateral trade

volume of $5.8 billion for 1991.69 By 1995, the trade volume

increased to almost $17 billion. Today, South Korea is China's

fifth largest trading partner, and China is South Korea's third

largest.70 South Korean officials predict that the total trade

between the two countries could reach $50 billion by the year

2000.71

The Nuclear Issue.

The nuclear question on the Korean peninsula has provided

several occasions for the DPRK to use brinkmanship to push the

United States to accede to North Korean demands. Over the past

several years, Pyongyang has repeatedly violated its legal

obligations under the Nuclear NPT and stonewalled the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), taking relations with

the United States close to the brink of war in the summer of

1994. Tensions then were at one of the highest points since the

Korean War. Having sent a message to Seoul and Washington in

April that they would not extract the fuel rods from their 5-

megawatt nuclear reactor without IAEA inspection and supervision,

they did just that. In brief, they lied.72 Then, using a standing

invitation for Jimmy Carter to visit and offering an approach

which Jimmy Carter told the world on Cable News Network (CNN) was

"new" (the light water reactor offer), the North began backing

off to get from Washington the very concessions subsequently

granted in the Agreed Framework, signed in Geneva on October 21,

1994.73

The DPRK has reasons for this behavior. Even before the

death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, it was clear that the North's

leadership had concluded that the United States lacked the will
20

and staying power to manage a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

They decided to go on the offensive by playing their nuclear

card. They believed that the United States was unwilling to call

their bluff--especially because Seoul became very nervous about

the military threat brought on by sanctions. Major questions that

surround the nuclear issue remain, and Pyongyang now believes it

can play its trump card again when the need arises for

concessions from Washington, Seoul, or Tokyo.74

Pyongyang gave up very little in the Agreed Framework--only

the near-term capability to process more weapons-grade plutonium.

This "sacrifice" is minor, especially in light of what they

received from Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo: millions of tons of

free oil for many years to come; diplomatic equality in

negotiations with the United States which, despite U.S.-ROK

solidarity efforts, has tended to marginalize Seoul; progress

toward ending its external diplomatic isolation while giving up

none of the internal isolation upon which the Juche system

depends; retention of secrecy about its past and present nuclear

weapons program for at least another 5 years; and free

construction of the infrastructure for light water reactors, with

the potential to acquire later the start-up technology from a

non-U.S. source.

It is important to note that the political-military value of

nuclear weapons for North Korea does not come from possessing a

large number of nuclear devices, but from possessing, or being

believed to possess, a sufficient number of deliverable nuclear

weapons to make it a credible nuclear player.75 Whatever the

actual status of the North's nuclear weapons program, the Agreed

Framework permits Pyongyang to conceal details until it is ready

to reveal them--which it will probably do in the walkup to

another crisis to gain major concessions.

What kind of challenge does the North Korean nuclear weapons

program pose for South Korea and the region? First, if Pyongyang

does have one or more deliverable nuclear weapons, it can pose a

direct threat to its neighboring countries. Second, Pyongyang

extracts diplomatic leverage out of the strong suspicions that it

has (or is developing) deliverable nuclear weapons. Third, a

North Korean nuclear program may influence the decision of other

countries to adopt nuclear weapons.76

Collapse and Reunification.

The rapidly declining economic condition and uncertainties

about Kim Jong-il's hold on power lead many to ponder the

possibility of North Korea's collapse.

Seoul fears that a huge migration would occur after a
21

collapse of communist power as North Korean refugees sought to

escape hunger and poverty. As one South Korean economist

commented, "Imagine what would happen if even a thousand North

Korean refugees came and camped on the banks of the Han River. .

. . We couldn't handle it."77

A more pressing and even more problematic question is what

the North Korean military would do in a scenario of a imminent

collapse of the DPRK. The answer is that the military would obey

its orders. Would it attack the South if ordered to do so?

Certainly, it would. Isolated, paranoid, wracked by the "bunker

mentality" to take a last grasp at victory or go down buttressed

by possession of one or two deliverable nuclear weapons, the DPRK

government might order an attack south with conventional weapons,

take Seoul, halt, and sue for peace (in the belief that their

nuclear weapons would deter a counterattack). In an even worse

case scenario, it might use them as a final act of insanity.

Immediate reunification of the Korean peninsula also has its

downside. Although both North and South Korea purportedly want

reunification, such an act in the immediate future would have a

devastating effect on South Korea. Some reports estimate that

Seoul would have to invest somewhere between $200 billion to $1

trillion to rebuild and modernize North Korea, but no one really

knows the true cost. South Korea could not afford an immediate

reunification without suffering mass disruption of its society

and economy. After seeing the disruption of the rapid German

unification and the problems that ensued, many in Seoul's

political hierarchy now seek an alternative by which they

gradually close the large economic disparity between North and

South Korea before reunification takes place.78

But for now, Pyongyang determines when and if (and how)

reunification would take place--not Seoul, and certainly not

Washington.

The Road Ahead.

The two Koreas stand in stark contrast across the board. The

North is a rapidly decaying dictatorship with the military

capability to inflict severe damage to Seoul and Japan; it has no

allies. The South has advanced significantly as a democracy, has

a vibrant economy, and has a strong ally in the United States

dedicated to its security.

Unfortunately, for the near-term security of the Northeast

Asia region, the two Koreas share one thing--severe domestic

crises. For North Korea, the crisis is triggered by a crumbling

economy and a severe food shortage, approaching famine. For South

Korea, a severe political scandal and ruptured party politics
22

perhaps impel the nation toward constitutional crisis.

Pyongyang, eager to divert the attention of its people away

from their domestic problems and, perhaps, sensing political

weakness in South Korea, and military over-extension and

political gridlock in United States, has put its forward-deployed

forces along the DMZ on a high state of alert. The government in

Seoul, nervous about DPRK military capabilities and intentions

and perhaps itself hoping to divert the attention of its

population away from domestic political troubles, has placed its

forces on a higher level of alert as well. This mirror-imaging

has created high tensions along the DMZ. Wars begin in such

circumstances based on accident or miscalculation.

None of the major actors in the Northeast Asia region

coordinate their policies toward North Korea very well. The

fragile new coordination between the United States, South Korea,

and Japan in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

(KEDO) cannot mask important differences in other aspects of

policy toward North Korea among Russia, China, the United States,

South Korea and Japan. At least the United States, the ROK, and

Japan reached a trilateral cooperation agreement on November 17,

1995, in Osaka and met in Honolulu on January 24 and 25, 1996, to

discuss aid to North Korea. But, certainly, there is no crisis

consultative mechanism in place among the region's major actors.

Relations between the two Koreas are approaching a dangerous

crossroads.

Conclusion.

The post-Cold War era deepened the isolation and economic

deterioration of the DPRK and, conversely, permitted the gradual

democratization, rapid economic growth, and enhanced

international stature of the ROK. However, the Northeast Asia

region has been left with ever-increasing uncertainties. For both

Koreas, the rapid strengthening of China, the potential for

Japanese remilitarization, and the uncertain stability of Russia

are worrying. But the greatest cause for concern for both Koreas

remains the terms for the reunification both say they seek. The

nuclear Agreed Framework has taken the nuclear crisis off the

agendas of Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo for the time being, but

that agreement is a frail framework on which to hang our hopes

for peaceful reunification. In the meantime, the politicalmilitary situation at the DMZ remains fragile.

ENDNOTES

l. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia's Post-Cold War Security

Policy in Northeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4,

Winter 1994-1995, pp. 495, 496.
23

2. Alexei Arbatov, "Russian Foreign Policy Alternatives,"

International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, p. 496.

3. Ibid.

4. Stephen Foye, "Whither Moscow? Domestic Politics and

Russia's Assertive Diplomatic Posture," Post-Soviet Prospects,

Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1995, p. 1.

5. This was written before Yeltsin's reelection in June-July

1996. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones, "The Outlook for Russian

Foreign Policy: Great Power Restoration," Strategic Forum, No.

52, November 1995, pp. 2-3; Stefan Halper, "While We Weren't

Watching Russia," The Washington Times, January 25, 1996, p. 17.

6. Richard de Villafranca, "Japan and the Northern

Territories Dispute: Past, Present, Future," Asian Survey, Vol.

33, No. 6, June 1993, pp. 6-12; Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Soviet

Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global, Boston:

Little, Brown and Company, 1985, pp. 153-154.

7. Stephen Blank, "Diplomacy at an Impasse: Russia and

Japan in a New Asia," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis,

Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1993, p. 150.

8. Meyer, "Russia Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast

Asia," p. 496.

9. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Moscow's Relations with Tokyo:

Domestic Obstacles to a Territorial Agreement," Asian Survey,

Vol. 33, No. 10, October 1993, pp. 959-960.

l0. Arbatov, p. 37.

11. Meyer, "Russia' s Post-Cold War Security Policy," p.

498.

12. Ibid, p. 499.

13. Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1995, Tokyo:

Defense Agency, 1995, pp. 45-49.

14. Stephen Cambone, "Revised Draft of the House Wednesday

Group Report," unpublished manuscript, Washington, DC: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, January 1996, p. 29.

15. Japanese Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1995, p. 45.

16. General Accounting Office (GAO), National Security:

Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region,
24

GAO/NSIAD-95-84, June 1995, p. 19-21; Bates Gill and Taeho Kim,

China's Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest for Superb and

Secret Weapons, SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute) Research Report No. 11, Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford

University Press, 1995, p. 62; You Ji, "The Chinese Navy and

Regional Security," Asian Defense Journal, No. 9, September 1995,

pp. 12-13.

17. Gill and Kim, p. 55.

18. Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian

Security, 1993-94, London: Brassey's Press, 1994, p. 97.

19. Quoted in James Clay Moltz, "From Military Adversaries

to Economic Partners: Russia and China in the New Asia," The

Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter/Spring 1995,

p. 170.

20. Ibid, pp. 170-171.

21. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was

formed in 1967 by Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and

the Philippines. Newly-independent Brunei joined in 1984. In 1993

Cambodia and Vietnam were granted observer status; Vietnam became

a full member in 1995.

22. Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power

Status," Orbis, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1994, p. 164.

23. Daewon Ohn, "The US and Korean-ASEAN Security,"

unpublished conference paper, First International Conference on

"Korea and the Asia-Pacific Region: Political, Security and

Economic Strategies for Globalization and Modernization," Los

Angeles, CA, Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, December 1994, p.

12.

24. "Asian Nations Will Show the Highest Economic Growth in

1996," Deutsche Presses-Agentur, January 22, 1996.

25. John Hsiung, "China's Omni-directional Diplomacy," Asian

Survey, Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1995, pp. 581-582.

26. "Japanese Foreign Minister Delivers Message of

Commitment to U.S.," The Washington Post, January 21, 1996, p.

A26.

27. Defense Secretary William Perry, unpublished speech, The

Japan Society, New York, September 12, 1995.

28. Joseph Nye, "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, July/August 1995, pp. 94-95.
25

29. Barbara Wanner, "Clinton's No-show in Osaka May Strain

US-Japan Ties," Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 44, December

1, 1995; Willis Witter, "Clinton's Absence at Trading Forum

Worries Japanese; Some Fear US is ‘Losing Interest'," The

Washington Times, November 28, 1995, p. A13.

30. GAO, p. 37.

31. Chalmers Johnson and E. B. Keehan, "The Pentagon's

Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, July/August

1995, pp. 112, 114.

32. Bruce Stokes and C. Michael Aho, "Asian Regionalism and

US Interests," in Gerald Curtis, ed., The United States, Japan

and Asia: Challenges for US Policy, New York: W.W. Norton and

Company, 1994, pp. 123-124.

33. Ibid, p. 131.

34. Johnson and Keehan, p. 110.

35. Stokes and Aho, p. 131.

36. For an elaboration of this strategy, see Stephen

Cambone, pp. 23-30.

37. Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Security Agenda in the Post-Cold

War Era," The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1995, p. 47.

38. "Japan--Politics," Associated Press, January 22, 1996.

39. "Japan to Announce Defense Policy on Tuesday," Reuters,

November 27, 1995.

40. Thomas L. McNaugher, "U.S. Military Forces in East Asia:

The Case for Long-term Engagement," in Gerald Curtis, ed., The

United States, Japan and Asia: Challenges for US Policy, New

York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1994, pp. 190-192.

4l. Ohn, p. 13.

42. William Walker and Frans Berkhout, "Japan's Plutonium

Problem--and Europe's," Arms Control Today, Vol. 22, No. 7,

September 1992, p. 7.

43. Quoted in Robert A. Manning and James J. Przystup,

"North Korea: Who is minding the store?," The Washington Times, January 24, 1996.

44. The original 1968 NPT prevented the development,
26

production, and spread of nuclear weapons. North Korea did sign

the NPT in 1985, but delayed until 1992 its ratification--a

delay widely interpreted as an effort to stall so that it could

develop a nuclear industry for weapons production. See Robert

Blackwell and Albert Carnesale, eds., Nuclear Weapons

Consequences for U.S. Policy, New York: Council on Foreign

Relations Press, 1993, p. 70.

45. Alvin Rubenstein, "Russia and North Korea: The End of an

Alliance?," Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall 1994,

pp. 493-494.

46. Ibid., p. 494.

47. Yeo In Kon, "Russia's Policies Toward North Korea," East

Asian Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 67.

48. Rubenstein, "Russia and North Korea," p. 497.

49. Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Looking across the

Yalu: Chinese Assessment of North Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. 35,

No. 6, June 1995, p. 528.

50. Larry Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Program,"

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report No. 91141, July 1992,

pp. 4-5.

51. Rubenstein, "Russia and North Korea," p. 494.

52. Joint Military Net Assessment, Washington, DC: Office of

the Secretary of Defense, 1991, p. 9-2. Subsequent versions of

this publication dealing with Korea are classified, but, in the

author's view, the analysis in the 1991 version remains generally

valid.

53. "North Korea Said to Have Missiles Near South Korea

Border," Reuters, September 29, 1995.

54. Quoted from the Pyongyang Times, December 23, 1993.

Chief of the General Staff Vice Marshal Choe Kwang is a member of

the Central Committee and the current DPRK's Minister of Defense.

55. Eui-gak Hwang, The Korean Economies: A Comparison of

North and South, Oxford, Great Britain: Clarendon Press, 1993, p.

194.

56. Nicholas Eberstadt, Marc Rubin, and Albina Tretyakova,

"The Collapse of Soviet and Russian Trade with the DPRK, 1989-

1993: Impacts and Implications," The Korean Journal of National

Unification, Vol. 4, 1995, pp. 97-98.
27

57. Charles Vollmer (Vice President and Partner at Broz,

Allen and Hamilton) and I were surprised when, during a 3 1/2-

hour meeting with Kim Il-sung on June 28, 1992, he stated, "We

have been hurt badly by demands from the former Soviet Union for

hard currency."

58. Song-chul Kim, "The Present State and Prospects for

North Korea's Reform and Open Up," Vantage Point, January 1994,

p. 7.

59. Ibid., p. 15.

60. Economic Planning Board (Republic of Korea), Economic

Handbook on North Korea, Seoul: ROK Economic Planning Board,

September 1994, p. 38; "Is There Any Hope for the Slumping North

Korean Economy?," Vantage Point, November 1995, p. 9.

61. Economic Handbook on North Korea, p. 9.

62. "Pyongyang's Agricultural Policies Step Back," Vantage

Point, March 1995, p. 21.

63. "North Korea--Aid," Associated Press, January 12, 1996.

64. "North Korean Children Will Die If No More Aid--WHO,"

Reuters, January 4, 1996.

65. "Brief--North Korea," Associated Press, January 11,

1996.

66. Nam Koong Young, "A Comparative Study on North and South

Korean Economic Capability," The Journal of East Asian Affairs,

Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter/Spring 1995, p. 4.

67. "Quality-of-Life Standards Improve Over Past 50 Years,"

Newsreview (Republic of Korea), August 19, 1995, p. 14; Kim InJune, "Korean Economy 50 Years After Liberation," Korea Focus,

Vol. 3, No. 4, July/August 1995, p. 41.

68. Sang Hun Choe, Associated Press, September 28, 1995.

69. Ilpyong J. Kim, "China and the Two Koreas in the PostCold War World," Korea Observer, Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp.

3-5.

70. "South Korea Tops Germany in China Trade," United Press

International, January 19, 1996.

71. "Korea, China Still Far from Political Alliance,"

Newsreview, August 26, 1995, p. 10.
28

72. The author was the messenger. During my fourth and last

trip to North Korea in April 1994, this was one of three messages

that Kim Yong-sun said I should take back to Seoul and

Washington.

73. Kim Il-sung suggested the idea of the light water

reactors during our June 28, 1992, meeting.

74. The best estimates contend that the North already has

one to three nuclear fissionable devices. Pyongyang gets leverage

from uncertainties about whether it has nuclear devices. See

testimony by CIA Director James Woolsey, MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour

Transcript No. 4889, March 21, 1994.

75. Most analysts agree that only three deliverable nuclear

weapons are required to be a credible nuclear player. See Marc

Millot, Roger Molander, and Peter Wilson, "The Day After . . ."

Study: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World, Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993.

76. Charles Doran, "Security and Political Economy in U.S.-

Asian Relations," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 8, No.

2, Summer/Fall 1994, pp. 247-248.

77. Hwang, pp. 315-317.

78. Shim Jae Hoon, "The Price of Unity," Far Eastern

Economic Review, Vol. 155, No. 12, March 26, 1992, p. 55.
29

CHAPTER II

CHINA'S SECURITY POLICY ENTERS THE 21st CENTURY:

THE VIEW FROM BEIJING

Paul H. B. Godwin

. . . a strong and prosperous China is an irreversible

historical trend that no outside force can contain.

Introduction.

China's foreign policy is caught in a contradiction. On the

one hand, Beijing's domestic development goals require China to

maintain a constructive relationship with the international

system, especially Asia and the West, in order to sustain the

investment and trade essential for continued economic growth and

modernization. On the other, Beijing's military security

objectives are driving it to maintain defense modernization goals

which Asia and the United States increasingly view as potentially

threatening to the region in the long term.1

 China is, therefore,

creating fears within Asia and in the United States that could

undermine Beijing's fundamental domestic development goals.

For some years, Beijing has protested that its security

policy is defensive and that its military acquisitions and

defense expenditures are modest, designed only to enhance China's

ability to defend itself. Within Asia, these protestations are

viewed with considerable skepticism.2 Beijing's defense budgets

increase year after year. Its military capabilities improve with

the assistance of European, Israeli, and especially Russian

technology transfers, and a renewed sense of nationalism appears

to be the driving force behind Chinese security policy.3

This essay will explore Beijing's response to the growing

contradiction between a foreign policy devoted to managing, if

not resolving, conflicts and potential conflicts with the many

states on its borders, and defense programs and policies creating

serious apprehension across Asia.

The Origins of China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy.

Beijing's leaders suffered a series of profound shocks as

the Cold War came to its close. With the Sino-Soviet dispute

about to be publicly concluded at the May 1989 Gorbachev-Deng

summit in Beijing, television cameras from around the globe

recorded a city out of control. Thousands of students occupied

Tiananmen Square, and hundreds of thousands of their supporters

blocked the surrounding streets and avenues. Humiliated, Deng

Xiaoping faced a divided leadership as he sought to bring order
30

to the political heart of China. Failing to do so with the

moderate use of police and military forces, Deng compelled a

reluctant Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to use lethal

force. On the night of June 3-4, order was brutally restored.

Beijing's leaders then faced the sanctions and abhorrence of that

part of the world they needed most if Deng's goals for developing

China were to succeed--the West accompanied by a reluctant Japan.

Even as China was being viewed as a pariah state in the 

West--a repressive throwback to the darkest days of Mao or

Stalin--the people of Eastern and Central Europe cast off their

Marxist-Leninist regimes. Communism's retreat continued as

Gorbachev dissolved the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Ultimately, the USSR itself disintegrated and the Union Republics

became sovereign entities. China had become the sole remaining

communist state of any consequence. Its socialist counterparts in

Cuba, Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were

impoverished societies whose economic and political futures were

very much in doubt; even in the Mongolian People's Republic

communism was tossed aside.

As Marxist-Leninist regimes crumbled in Europe and the USSR,

many Western observers asked whether the agony of Tiananmen

signaled the beginning of the end for China's communism. It was

not only the death throes of European Marxism-Leninism that led

to this question. Authoritarian regimes in the Republic of Korea

and Taiwan had modified their political systems and moved toward

more open and participatory processes as economic development

progressed. Dictatorial regimes of whatever ideological bent were

seen in the West as polities that had outlived the value they

once had--primarily that of ensuring order and stability as their

societies passed through the political and societal instabilities

that must evidently accompany the complex processes of

modernization and the creation of market economies.

China's aging political elite could not but recognize the

exhilaration and sense of victory in the West as the Cold War

ended and the USSR crumbled. Nor could they miss the sense of

triumph as a coalition of Western and non-Western states,

organized and led by the United States, crushed the armed forces

of Iraq in a brief, brilliant military campaign that emphasized

American technological prowess. From the fall of 1989 to December

1991, China's leaders watched the West's jubilant course. What

they also saw was their own military security become more

certain. If the new Russia should seek in the future to become a

world military power, it would not be for decades. Around China's

periphery, no state, or any probable combination of states,

presented a significant military threat. There were definite

apprehensions in Beijing that focused on Japan and India, but

there was no major imminent or near-term military threat to

China's security--nor would there be for at least the next
31

decade.

This military security, nonetheless, came at a price. As

Soviet-American rapprochement was enhanced over the Gorbachev

years, so the perceived value of China to the United States

deteriorated. The use of lethal force to suppress political

expression brought about more than Western sanctions and the

status of pariah state to Beijing, it severed the only remaining

strong cord binding China to American public opinion--the promise

that economic development would lead to political reform. The

violence around Tiananmen Square violated that implied promise. 

China's belligerent response to Western, especially American,

sanctions was given further emphasis by the collapse of MarxistLeninist regimes and the ensuing commitments to democracy and

market economies. China's moves toward a mixed economy were now

seen as a charade masking an archetypal communist totalitarian

regime. To the West, the luster of Deng's reforms had faded.

Adding to China's isolation, Beijing's own "independent

foreign policy," pursued since the fall of 1982, ultimately found

China without friends or allies. Originally designed to provide

China maneuvering space between the two superpowers' global

confrontation, the USSR's fall from superpower status and

ultimate collapse removed the lever Beijing sought to manipulate

through its independence. Beijing's post-1982 security strategy

had been based on the assumption that a multipolar world would

gradually emerge as the two superpowers reduced themselves to

positions of only marginal influence through their mutually

deleterious competition. This gradual deterioration of superpower

influence would occur as China rebuilt its "comprehensive

national power" to a position where Beijing could play a major

role in the emerging multipolar international system.4

The unexpected and swift extinction of one of the two

superpowers did more than simply upset Beijing's strategic

timetable. The United States demonstrated diplomatic leadership

in its use of the United Nations Security Council to establish a

broad political coalition opposed to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait

and bind together a multinational military coalition that swiftly

and decisively defeated Iraq's seemingly powerful military

forces. China's post-1982 security strategy had assumed a

balanced erosion of the superpowers' global influence. The

emergence of the United States from the Cold War as the world's

sole military superpower invalidated China's strategic

assumptions, abrogating the underlying logic of Beijing's core

security strategy.

Beijing, therefore, entered the post-Cold War era militarily

more secure than at any time since the first Opium War of 1840-

43, but facing condemnation and punitive sanctions from the

Western powers and a reluctant Japan led by the United States.
32

Furthermore, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the Cold War

security value of China to the United States had evaporated.

China consequently faced an alienated United States that, as the

Cold War's victor, had become the single most influential actor

in the international system. Beijing's own certainty that its

relationship with Washington had been transformed from Cold War

cooperation to post-Cold War contention was confirmed by the U.S.

sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in the fall of 1992. The sale of

advanced fighter aircraft abrogated the 1982 agreement limiting

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and symbolized Washington's intent to

use its new status in the world to seek "hegemonism" through

"power politics."

Thwarting Isolation: China's Diplomatic Offensive.

Following China's post-Tiananmen diplomatic isolation,

Beijing established a strategy of zhoubian (circumference or

omnidirectional) diplomacy designed to break out of its political

quarantine.5

 Beijing essentially set out to overwhelm the United

States with a diplomatic offensive designed to offset any support

Washington might seek in its efforts to punish and isolate China.

The essence of this strategy was to establish "good neighbor"

relations with all of the states on China's periphery or

"circumference." With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

U.S. emergence as the world's sole remaining superpower, this

policy became central to China's strategy for responding to a

monopolar world. In one very important sense, this strategy was

extremely successful. China normalized relations with Singapore,

Malaysia, Vietnam, South Korea, and Israel, with a total of 15

countries establishing full diplomatic relations with Beijing in

1992 alone. Trade and commerce with Asia expanded, and Japan

restored the Official Development Aid (ODA) it had suspended

under American pressure in response to the Tiananmen tragedy.

Indeed, the most significant symbolic event of the year was a

state visit by Japan's Emperor Akahito in October--the first

visit of any Emperor of Japan to China.

Even as Beijing's good neighbor strategy was showing success

in Asia and elsewhere, relations with the United States were

entering yet another downswing. In 1993, the new Clinton

administration linked future extension of Most Favored Nation

(MFN) trading privileges directly to improvements in China's

human rights record. It charged Beijing with transporting poison

gas components to Iran; with violating its agreement to abide by

the parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);

and with illegally transporting chemical weapons precursors on

the vessel Yinhe. Finally, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution

calling on the International Olympic Committee to deny Beijing's

bid to host the 2000 Olympics. In response to what Beijing saw as

U.S. "hegemonism and power politics," the fall of 1993 saw China
33

essentially globalize its zhoubian diplomatic strategy. Beijing

set out to strengthen its ties throughout Asia, including

Central, Southwest and South Asia, and expand its trade linkages

with Latin America and Europe. To undermine the Clinton

administration's human rights MFN linkage, Beijing cultivated

contacts with U.S. corporations conducting extensive business in

China, seeing them as allies in gaining MFN extension. The

administration's 1994 de-linking of human rights with the

extension of China's MFN privilege confirmed in Beijing the

success of this latter strategy.

Persistent American attempts to limit China's missile and

nuclear technology sales and continuing friction over human

rights issues paralleled Beijing's success in undermining U.S.

efforts to isolate and punish it for the Tiananmen crackdown and

human rights violations. The most serious blow to Sino-American

relations came in the summer of 1995, when the United States

reversed its previous policy and allowed Taiwanese President Li

Teng-hui to make a private visit to the United States. China

responded to Li's visit by suspending the military contacts

reopened by the United States in the fall of 1993; shelving its

"unofficial" cross-Strait talks with Taipei; and launching a

series of military exercises designed to coerce Taiwan from

making further steps toward de jure independence from the

mainland. An October summit meeting between Presidents Jiang

Zemin and Clinton in New York defused the immediate crisis in

Sino-American relations, but failed to resolve the Taiwan dilemma

or any of the other issues driving China and the United States

apart. As 1995 drew to a close, the United States and China faced

each other with suspicion and no little hostility. In Beijing's

eyes, the United States was seeking to exploit its presumed postCold War status as the world's remaining superpower.

China, however, in the words of James C. Hsiung, sees itself

as "too big to punish and too important to isolate."6 Beijing's

violent response to President Li's visit intended to demonstrate

clearly that China was not to be deterred by American military

power and was willing to challenge Washington's implicit

commitment to Taiwan's defense. The military exercises around

Taiwan were blatant, coercive diplomacy designed to intimidate

Taipei. As such, they served to heighten Asia's apprehensions

over China's emergence as a great power, especially over

Beijing's military security strategy and defense programs.

Defense Policy and China's Post-Cold War Security Strategy.

The origins of China's current defense policy precede the

Cold War's end by a decade or more. In the early 1980s, Beijing's

strategists concluded that the vigorous security policy and

defense buildup pursued by the Reagan administration were
34

creating a shift in the balance of power between the United

States and the Soviet Union. The new balance, while giving the

United States an advantage, would result in a global stalemate

between the two superpowers that could continue into the 1990s,

and perhaps into the 21st century.7 This same shift in the global

power balance and ensuing superpower standoff would serve to

prevent the outbreak of a new world war and even further

discourage any potential Soviet attack on China. Beijing's

analysts interpreted the shifting global balance as central to an

ongoing transformation of the international system. With the USSR

and the United States deadlocked in a mutually debilitating

confrontation, the growing economic strength of Europe and Asia

would permit them greater independence from Moscow and

Washington. Thus, Chinese analysts concluded, the overall trend

in the international system was toward a multipolar world that

would continue to dilute superpower preeminence.

This emerging multipolarity was not viewed as entirely

favorable to China's security, even though it made global war

unlikely and further diminished the possibility of a Soviet

attack on China. Beijing's analysts concluded that reduced

superpower influence meant that there was increased probability

of small-scale wars flaring up along China's periphery,

especially where border and territorial disputes had once been

suppressed by the bipolar dynamic of Soviet-American

confrontation.8 The 1985 decision of the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP) Central Military Commission (Zhongyang Junshi Weiyuanhui--

CMC) to redirect China's defense policy and the PLA's

preparations for war (zhanbei) reflected this perception of the

potential military implications of a multipolar international

system. The Chinese armed forces were instructed that they were

no longer to prepare for an "early, major, and nuclear war."

Henceforth, they were to prepare for what the CMC declared to be

the most likely form of military confrontation in the future--

local, limited war (jubu zhanzheng) on China's periphery.9 With

this decision, Beijing's defense policy shifted from a strategy

designed primarily to deter the military menace from the USSR to

a strategy predicated on the potential for limited, localized

wars around China's borders and maritime territories.

Over the years since the 1985, redirection of China's

national military strategy, transition to the requirements of

local, limited wars, and maritime territorial defense required

the PLA to modify significantly the concepts of operations that

had become the core of its strategy and to expand the missions of

its navy. Modifying these concepts of operations and changing

naval missions highlighted the limitations inherent in much of

the PLA's obsolescent arms and equipment.

During the many years when Beijing's national military

strategy was based primarily on defending continental China
35

against a possible Soviet attack, the PLA could compensate for

its obsolescent arms by utilizing concepts of operations based

upon protraction, attrition, and the threat of nuclear

retaliation--the so-called "people's war under modern

conditions." The core strategy of continental defense, including

the capability to conduct offensive operations short distances

outside China's borders--fighting "outside the gate"--relied on

the sheer size of the PLA and its ultimate defense of falling

back into China's interior and exhausting the adversary through

protracted war. Even this strategy was not the preferred option

for China's military strategists, and in the late 1970s and early

1980s they sought to devise a strategy that would disrupt and

blunt the attack closer to the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian

borders.10 Nevertheless, this adaptation of "people's war under

modern conditions" still used the PLA's overwhelming numbers to

blunt an assault, with attrition grinding down the attacking

forces to the point that the attack had to be terminated.

The distinguishing characteristic of the new strategy was

its intent to defeat the adversary close to China's borders,

avoiding an endless retreat into the interior. A national

military strategy focused on the defense of China's periphery

and maritime territories, however, raised new demands on the PLA

that numbers alone could not resolve. If, as China's military

strategists assumed, these wars would be short and intense, then

the PLA's concepts of operations had to change from principles

based on protraction and attrition to operations based upon

speed, mobility, and lethality. Similarly, weapons fielded by

China's armed forces had to be capable of greater range and

accuracy under all-weather, day and night conditions in order to

ensure success in the critical early engagements of a limited

war.11 People's war, where the enemy was drawn into China and

ultimately defeated by a society fully mobilized for protracted

conflict, was no longer a feasible strategy. In future limited

wars, it was essential that standing forces trained and equipped

for quick, effective responses to crises involving the threat or

application of military force be ready at all times.12

 As part of the military adjustment to the CMC's new defense

guidance, in the summer of 1985, Yang Dezhi, then the PLA Chief

of Staff, announced plans to reorganize the armed forces and

drastically reduce them by one million men. He expressed the view

that "the strength of an army is not determined by the number of

troops, but by the quality of its commanders and fighters, the

quality of its arms, and the degree of rationality of its systems

and foundations."13

As the Cold War drew to its close in the late 1980s, the

organizational and doctrinal changes required by the PLA to

implement the new military strategy were well underway. China

reduced the 11 military regions to 7; restructured the PLA's 36
36

army corps into 24 combined arms "group armies" (jituanjun);

transformed the headquarters of the Artillery and Armored Corps

into sub-departments of the PLA General Staff Department; and

reduced the staffing of headquarters organizations.

These organizational changes complemented the force

reduction that had cut the PLA from 4.238 million to 3.235

million personnel, including civilian positions. Beijing

eliminated large amounts of obsolescent equipment; it took 10,000

artillery pieces, over 1,100 tanks, 610 naval vessels, and some

2,500 aircraft out of service.14 Yang Dezhi's "leaner and meaner"

PLA was beginning to emerge, accompanied by a new system of

recruitment, promotion, and professional military education

designed to build a younger, more educated officer corps

competent in modern combined arms joint service warfare.

China conducted exercises in 1988 to test the PLA's

capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to "border

clashes, accidents and local warfare."15 These maneuvers

introduced forces that were to attract considerable attention as

the years passed. "Special forces" or "fist" (quantou) units

undertook commando-like operations during the exercises, and

"rapid-reaction" (kuaisu) units appeared for the first time. The

PLA designated the 15th Group Army (Airborne) as a rapid-reaction

unit,16 as was the newly reestablished [1980] PLA Navy (PLAN)

Marine Corps, headquartered with the South Sea Fleet in

Zhanjiang, Guangzhou province.17 Their deployment with the South

Sea Fleet clearly identified PLAN Marines as the "fist" or rapidreaction unit for operations in the South China Sea. Soon, each

military region was reported developing fast and rapid reaction

units.

The CMC revised naval missions in 1985 to focus on Taiwan

and the South China Sea, both of which were seen as containing

the seeds of military conflict. Beyond these requirements,

however, China's 18,000 kilometers (km) of coastline and some

3,000,000 square km of territorial waters containing numerous

islands to defend led to a systematic review of China's naval

defense requirements.18 Liu Huaqing, the navy's commander from

1982 to 1988, instructed the PLAN to prepare a report by the end

of the 1980s, laying out the principles and requirements for

successful fulfillment of these missions. As a result, in the

late 1980s, PLAN's missions were to safeguard China's territorial

integrity; to prevent a sea-based invasion of China; and, over

the long term, to build a survivable sea-based nuclear

retaliatory force. Naval analysts called for a change in strategy

from coastal defense (jinhai fangyu) to offshore defense (jinyang

fangyu). In essence, they wanted the navy's defense perimeter to

be extended from coastal waters out to between 200 and 400

nautical miles, and even further in defense of territorial claims

in the South China Sea. PLAN strategists sought an offshore-
37

capable navy by 2000, and a "blue water" navy (yuanyang haijun)

by 2050. These missions would require increased fleet

replenishment capabilities, improved amphibious warfare

capabilities, and air cover to protect patrols and sea actions

extending some 600 miles from China, and even further for

potential blue water operations.

Defense Policy and Military Technology.

Revising defense policy underscored the PLA's recognition

that its obsolescent weapons and equipment simply were incapable

of supporting the military operations envisioned by the new

strategy. Even prior to the Gulf War, deficiencies in the PLA's

armaments had led Beijing to open a military technology

relationship with the United States, Israel, and Western Europe.

Sanctions applied to China following the Tiananmen tragedy

suspended most of the ongoing programs at a time when the

obsolescence of the PLA's arms was highlighted by the 1985

defense guidance. Normalization of relations with Moscow in 1989,

however, enabled Beijing to initiate a defense technology linkage

with the Soviet Union in 1990 that continued after the USSR's

1991 disintegration.19 Severe financial needs within the former

Soviet Union's defense industrial base, combined with Moscow's

desire to affirm a cordial relationship with China, led to what

has become Beijing's most fruitful military partnership. Russian

cooperation came at a time when the military operations fought by

American forces in the Desert Storm campaign were seen by Chinese

 military analysts as demonstrating technology's supreme

importance in contemporary and future warfare. Following that

war, the rubric under which the PLA trained for war changed from

preparation for local, limited war to "limited war under hightech conditions" (gaojushi tiaojian xia jubuzhan).

Liu Huaqing, promoted to senior vice chairman of the CMC and

for many years the military official most responsible for

directing the technological renovation of China's armed forces,

expressed his doubts about the PLA's capabilities to conduct

modern warfare in 1993. Liu observed in the pages of the Chinese

Communist Party's (CCP) journal, Quishi, that the PLA "fails to

meet the needs of modern warfare and this is the principal

problem with army-building;"20 his model for modern warfare and

the reference point for China's capabilities was specifically the

Persian Gulf conflict.21 Liu Huaqing's concerns covered both

training and equipment, contending that in neither case was the

PLA prepared to conduct combat operations in the manner now

required for success in war.

His commentary underlined the fact that negotiations with

Moscow begun in 1990 had resulted in the sale of considerable

weaponry to China. Initially, Beijing purchased a regiment of 26
38

Su-27 Flanker interceptors, 10 IL-76 Candid heavy-lift transport

aircraft, some 24 Mi-17 Hip helicopters, and perhaps 100 to 150

S300 (SA-10 Grumble) air defense missiles (with U.S. Patriot

capabilities). In 1995, China bought two additional regiments of

Su-27s and four Kilo-class (type 636) diesel-electric submarines

(SSK). Reports that China is considering a variety of Russian

weapons and equipment, including airborne warning and control

system (AWACS) equipment or complete aircraft, aerial refueling

aircraft, MiG-29 Fulcrum/MiG-31 Foxhound combat aircraft,

licensed production of advanced jet engines for combat aircraft,

licensed production of Su-27s, and a variety of other types of

equipment, accompanied these known purchases.

Speculation about future purchases stems from President

Boris Yeltsin's declaration during his December 1992 visit to

Beijing that Russia was willing to sell China "the most

sophisticated armaments and weapons," and Moscow's acknowledged

sales that year of US$1.2 billion.22 A 5-year military cooperation

accord signed in Beijing by Russian Defense Minister Pavel

Grachev in 1993, and yet another Sino-Russian defense technology

agreement signed in December 1995, followed Yeltsin's public

commitment. Over the years since 1991, both China and Russia have

become sensitive to the concerns raised in Asia and the United

States over what is clearly an expanding defense technology

partnership. Prior to the military relationship with Moscow,

Beijing's defense modernization program was viewed as severely

constrained by the known weaknesses inherent in China's defense

S&T (science and technology) and industrial base. The Russian

linkage is viewed as supplying Beijing with far more than

advanced weapons and equipment. Licensed production of advanced

military systems accompanied by technical assistance to China's

defense industries is already believed to be underway. A Chinese

foreign ministry spokesman reflected these widely spread

apprehensions when he observed that the 1993 agreement did "not

relate, in any way, to the subject of cooperation in military

production and arms sales."23

These Russian transfers have been accompanied by an

expanding defense technology relationship with Israel, most

particularly with the F-10 advanced fighter program under

development with the Chengdu Aviation Industrial Corporation in

Szechuan province.24 The Chengdu plant also produces China's F-7

fighter, a variant of the MiG-21 Fishbed, that has undergone

considerable updating with European assistance since the 1980s.

It is generally assumed that Israeli assistance to the F-10

includes technology from Israel's cancelled Lavi advanced fighter

program, and that China is seeking a Russian engine to power the

aircraft.

Naval forces are also undergoing modernization programs

utilizing extensive technologies from France, the United Kingdom,
39

Italy, and the United States, with much of the imports occurring

before the 1989 sanctions were applied. Production of two new

classes of surface combatants, the Luhu-class guided missile

destroyer (DDG) and the Jiangwei-class guided missile frigate

(FFG), has begun, and the first of a new series of dieselelectric submarines--the Song-class--is undergoing sea-trials.

These combatants are being joined by the production of underway

replenishment vessels and new amphibious warfare ships.

Improvements in strategic and short-range ballistic missiles

complement modernization programs focused on enhancing the PLA's

conventional general purpose forces.25 Three new solid-fueled

strategic missiles have been developed. The road or rail-mobile

Dongfeng (East Wind--DF)-41 with an anticipated initial

operational capability (IOC) around the year 2010 has a range of

12,000 km and an 800 kilogram (kg) payload. It will replace the

current DF-5A liquid-fueled, 13,000 km-range intercontinental

ballistic missile (ICBM). A second strategic system, the DF-31

and its derivative Julang (Big Wave--JL)-2, will be both groundand submarine-based. The DF-31 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile

system with a 700 kg payload and a range of 8,000 km. Its offshoot, the JL-2, with an identical range and payload, will arm

the follow-on to China's single Xia-class nuclear-powered

ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Two tactical, solid-fueled,

mobile, short-range ballistic missiles (M9 and M11), designed for

battlefield use with conventional warheads, parallel development

of these strategic systems. Both systems were developed for the

export market. The M-9, known as the DF-15 when deployed by the

PLA, has a range of 600 km and a 500 kg warhead. The M-11 reaches

out 300 km with a 500 kg payload.

Discussions within China's military academies and research 

centers of the possible need to modify Beijing's nuclear weapons

doctrine accompanied development of new strategic systems.26 Their

analyses indicate that some military strategists wish to change

from a strategy of "minimum deterrence," where a relatively small

number of single-warhead systems capable of inflicting

considerable countervalue damage are viewed as sufficient for

effective nuclear deterrence, to a strategy of "limited nuclear

deterrence." A strategy of limited nuclear deterrence requires a

far larger number of increasingly accurate strategic weapons than

China currently deploys because both counterforce and

countervalue targets must be threatened, and theater nuclear

weapons (TNW) must be available to strike battlefield targets to

ensure escalation control. China's current deployment of some 17

ICBMs, 70 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), and one

SSBN with 12 weapons27 is insufficient to support any strategy

beyond minimum deterrence. Nonetheless, the fact that military

strategists are reconsidering Beijing's basic approach to nuclear

deterrence demonstrates a lack of confidence in China's current

strategy and nuclear force structure, especially as theater and
40

ballistic missile defenses (TMD/BMD) become more plausible as the

21st century approaches. Deployment of defensive systems would

seriously erode China's confidence in its nuclear deterrent.

Despite the weaknesses present in China's military

capabilities, as Beijing looks to the next century, there is now

a focus and purpose to current defense programs not so clearly

evident a decade ago. More importantly for China's near-term

concerns, limitations inherent in the obsolescent arms and

equipment of the PLA's conventional general purpose forces

combine with logistical support and command and control

weaknesses to hinder severely Beijing's ability to project and

sustain military forces in the Asian region for any length of

time--the problem of "short arms and slow legs."28 Patterns of

acquisition and modernization underway for the past decade now

clearly demonstrate the intent to develop a regional force

projection capability sometime in the early part of the 21st

century. Military exercises, technology, and weapons procurement

all point to an intent to deploy forces capable of sustained

military operations some distance from the mainland. These slowly

emerging capabilities have been observed in the context of what

is seen as assertive, if not aggressive, policies toward all

issues involving Chinese sovereignty.29

Beijing's use of belligerent military exercises around

Taiwan following President Li Teng-hui's private visit to the

United States in June 1995, designed to warn Taipei that a claim

of de jure independence would result in war, is viewed as but the

most recent example of China's deliberate use of force to achieve

its foreign policy objectives. Earlier, Beijing's occupation of

Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands (claimed by both China and

the Philippines) led to a sharp, potentially military

confrontation between Beijing and Manila in February 1995. This

encounter served as a reminder of the small March 1988 SinoVietnamese naval engagement over yet another Spratly reef.

It is this pattern of military modernization and perceived

assertiveness that has raised concerns across Asia and in the

United States, especially when Beijing declares that China no

longer faces a significant military threat from any major power.

For the past several years, Beijing has adamantly denied that its

military modernization programs are anything but "defensive," but

has been eminently unsuccessful in easing these apprehensions

despite the well-known weaknesses within China's armed forces and

defense industrial base.

Facing the Paradox--China's Defense of Its New Policies.

Beijing recognizes that its economic development and defense

modernization programs, combined with its assertive sovereignty
41

claims, have led to profound misgivings about China's future

course as its economic and military strength increase.30 Not the

least of the criticism directed against Beijing was the lack of

transparency in all of its defense programs. Most major states

now publish a defense White Paper in one form or another, but

China had not done so until very recently. Finally, after several

years of unremitting criticism from several Asian states and the

United States, Beijing did publish a White Paper in November 1995

entitled China: Arms Control and Disarmament.31 While not

containing the detail found in white papers from countries such

as Australia or Japan, Beijing's response is considered a

reasonable first step toward a more transparent defense policy.

Publication at this time, however, was prompted by Assistant

Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye's November 14-18, 1995, visit,

and to counter the pervasive image of a China "threat,"

intensified by Beijing's attempts to intimidate Taiwan and the

clash with Manila over Mischief Reef earlier in the year. The

document was undoubtedly a gesture to Nye, demonstrating a desire

to develop closer military-to-military ties with the United

States through its support for "arms control" and "transparency,"

and to portray Beijing as a responsible partner in international

security affairs--a portrayal much of Asia finds difficult to

accept.

China rejects the argument that resurgent nationalism,

combined with its evident willingness to use force, has sharpened

speculation that the rise of China could have the same disastrous

consequences for the 21st century as did the rise of Germany and

Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries. Beijing has its own

explanation for these new policies. Expansion and conquest are

not simply functions of increasing power, the Chinese assert, but

of the nexus formed by power, national interests, security

environments, and cultural traditions. China's history and

Beijing's current policies demonstrate that China has no such

expansionist proclivities.32 These protestations will do little,

however, to ease the concerns of those who fear Beijing.

 Whereas national survival drove Beijing's defense policy

and military strategy in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, with the

disappearance of this threat to China's survival, argue some

analysts, Beijing's security strategy seeks to preserve an

international environment where China can pursue its domestic

development objectives. In pursuit of these goals, Beijing's

defense policy seeks to prevent "wars of aggression" from

threatening the nation's economic achievements and to preserve

China's territorial integrity. Within this environment, threats

to China's security consist of territorial disputes and

secessionist movements stirred up by ultra-nationalism.33

This virulent form of nationalism, which emerged with the

end of the Cold War, has made inroads into Taiwan and "a number
42

of minority regions."34 Especially in Taiwan, the new leadership

that has taken over from the old-generation Kuomintang (KMT)

members is not committed to reunifying China. Li Teng-hui

represents this new generation that actively seeks separation

from China, beginning with Taipei's quest for "dual recognition"

in 1989. The Spratly Islands represent yet but another border

problem, but the dispute itself is depicted as "overblown" by the

Western media.35 Facing these and other localized territorial

disputes, Beijing's fundamental defense policy is designed to

deter potential wars along China's borders, protect its economic

interests, and maintain its land, sea, and air territorial

integrity. Because improving scientific and technological

capabilities will allow China to better exploit its marine and

sea-bed resources, Beijing needs a strong navy to protect its

maritime resources and sea lanes.36

Beijing's military strategy to achieve these ends is defined

in terms that are in accord with analyses found in China's

military journals over the past decade. In the 1950s, 1960s, and

1970s, the need to defeat a superior adversary threatening

China's survival required a strategy of protracted "people's

war." Future conflicts will not be for survival, but are more

likely to be high-tech, limited wars not fought directly on

China's soil. Under these conditions, China must have sufficient

military strength to deter such wars and to defeat an adversary

at its borders should deterrence fail.37 Because of these military

requirements, despite the absence of a major military power

threatening China, defense modernization is still considered to

be a cornerstone of Beijing's security policy.

The disappearance of any immediate major military threat,

however, has reduced the pressure for urgent military investment.

As with the official explanations of China's defense budget over

recent years, Beijing's military expenditures are interpreted by

comparing annual percentage increases with the declining amount

they take from China's gross national product (GNP). Thus, while

annual defense expenditures from 1991 through 1995 increased 12.7

percent, 12.6 percent, 12.6 percent, 21.5 percent, and 12.3

percent respectively, the expansion of China's economy over these

 same years reduced the actual defense burden to the point where

it now absorbs only 1.7 percent of the GNP.38

Beijing's diplomatic efforts are tailored to complement its

defensive security policy and to demonstrate China's peaceful

intentions. To ease concern over China's military modernization

programs and allay regional apprehensions, Beijing has

intensified a program of military-to-military contacts. In 1994

alone, CMC Vice-chairman Liu Huaqing visited Thailand, Indonesia,

and Singapore; Chief of Staff Zhang Wannian visited Malaysia; and

Defense Minister Chi Haotian visited Russia, Pakistan, and India.

China's confidence-building policy included hosting the United
43

States' Secretary of Defense, Russia's Chief of Staff, the

Commander-in Chief of Thailand's armed forces, the Laotian

Defense Minister, and Pyongyang's Chief of Staff.39

This diplomacy has been accompanied by what the Chinese

depict as systematic efforts to resolve peacefully the border

disputes and tensions China has with its neighbors. Beijing's

sovereignty disagreement with Japan over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku

Islands in the East China Sea has been shelved without prejudice.

China seeks to follow the same approach with claimants to the

South China Sea territories, who, together with Beijing, have

convened regular expert working conferences to determine just how

joint development should be undertaken without jeopardizing

sovereignty. This cooperative approach to border and territorial

disagreements is pursued around China's entire periphery. In

1993, Beijing and New Delhi signed an agreement to ensure mutual

security along their mutual border; both have reduced the forces

they deploy along their frontiers. Moscow and Beijing have

resolved 95 percent of their border dispute. In Central Asia,

diplomats and military representatives from Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and China have completed 14

rounds of discussions on border troop reductions.40 Chinese

analysts therefore insist that Beijing's policy is to seek

peaceful resolution of all its border disagreements, and that

charges to the contrary are unfounded. In particular, they

protest that the image of China as a "threat" to its neighbors is

not only unwarranted, but is fabricated by hostile powers,

especially the United States, as part of their strategy to

"contain" China.

"Containing" China.

Suspicion simmering in Beijing that U.S. policy seeks not to

engage (jie chu) but to contain (e zhi) China intensified

following Washington's granting of a visa to President Li Tenghui. Increasingly, Chinese analysts and official statements

suggest that there is a systematic attempt by the United States

and other unnamed "Western countries" to present willfully the

image of an aggressive China that will, as it grows more

powerful, threaten the stability of Asia. Chinese analysts

contend that Beijing's aspirations to sustain a peaceful

international environment, develop China economically, and build

a defense capability sufficiently strong to deter war and protect

its sovereignty are opposed by "a few Western countries" led by

the United States. Their goal is seen as preventing China from

becoming too strong too quickly.41 In obstructing China, these

countries support separatist movements in minority areas and

Taiwan; influence international public opinion to exaggerate the

differences between China's central government and the provinces;

overstate and embellish intra-party disputes; and magnify
44

differences between the government and society.42

Despite Washington's public commitment to a prosperous,

unified, and open China, these analysts view America's actual

policy objective as seeking to restrain Beijing's emergence as a

great power. They interpret U.S. actions as demonstrating this

ambition. Why does the United States commit to sustain

indefinitely 100,000 troops in the Asia-Pacific region and

enhance its security relationship with Japan? Why induce "some

countries" to make sovereignty claims against China? Why does the

United States sell "offensive" weapons to Taiwan while strictly

controlling military technology transfers to China? Why did

Washington permit Li Teng-hui to visit the United States and

allow the President to "drop in" and visit with the Dalai Lama,

both of whom are trying to split China? Why does the United

States insist that China enter the World Trade Organization (WTO)

as a developed country despite its clear status as a developing

country? Why does Washington attack Beijing's family planning

program when China already has too large a population? Why does

the United States use human rights as an issue to stir up trouble

within China? All of these efforts are viewed as clear indicators

that the U.S. true policy toward China is not "comprehensive

engagement," but, more accurately, "comprehensive containment."

Because the United States cannot gain international support for a

policy of containment, Washington is charged with adopting the

dual tactic of both engagement and containment, referred to by

some American observers as "soft containment" (ruan e zhi).43

China's belief that the United States is treating it as

potentially hostile, and therefore seeks to restrain Beijing's

power, originates in Washington's post-Tiananmen sanctions and

what Beijing saw as an American attempt, in effect, to isolate

China diplomatically. The U.S. aspiration to contain China is now

viewed as stemming from the American objective to maintain its

"hegemonistic" domination of world politics. Restraining China's

emergence as a great power will be frustrated, Beijing's analysts

insist, because China is already too strong to contain,

especially when the United States can gain so little support for

such a policy;44 "as long as we . . . make no mistakes, a strong

and prosperous China is an irreversible historical trend that no

outside force can contain."45

Conclusions.

Beijing's recognition of a contradiction in the core of its

foreign policy came from internal analyses and an expanding

chorus of troubled voices across Asia and in the United States.

A major component of Beijing's response has been to charge

Washington with trying to start a new Cold War in Asia, and with

seeking to drive a wedge between China and its neighbors.
45

Nonetheless, this attack on the United States is actually

designed to deflect concerns in Asia stemming from China's

nuclear weapons tests, equipment and military technology

acquisitions from Russia, and an endless series of essays in PLA

professional journals expressing pride in the success of the

China's military modernization programs and exercises. When these

actions are combined with the aggressive reassertion of China's

sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and blatant use of military

force to intimidate Taiwan, fear of an ascending China has little

to do with American policy or intent.

Defending its foreign policy by highlighting efforts to

build confidence and security building measures through border

agreements and high-level military exchanges has not compensated

for the concerns stemming from Beijing's assertive, if not

belligerent, approach to those issues it views as central to its

sovereignty. Indeed, Beijing's more accommodating attitude toward

contending claims to South China Sea territories seems to have

originated in ASEAN's46 uniformly troubled reaction to the

Mischief Reef affair, rather than any considered decision to be

more forthcoming in resolving the disputes. When placed in the

context of Beijing's proclamation of military modernization

successes, the image China presents is far more that of an

emerging regional power whose economic and military strength

permits it to choose when and where it will accommodate its

neighbors.

As China enters the 21st century, Beijing has clearly

defined its military security policy (to defend national

sovereignty and territories) and its defense strategy (to develop

military modernization programs to give it the capability to do

so). These capabilities are directed not only at counteracting

the current and future strengths of China's immediate neighbors,

but also those of major powers, particularly the United States,

who may seek to intervene in what Beijing defines as its

"internal affairs." Viewed in this light, China's nuclear weapons

programs are directed at deterring any attempt to intervene

through nuclear threats, such as those used by the United States

during the Korean War and during the Taiwan Strait crises of the

middle and late 1950s.

The extent to which Beijing will ameliorate in the 21st

century what now appears to be a Westphalian Realpolitik approach

to security with a strategy that accepts the principle that

national security can be realized within a multilateral security

community remains the region's outstanding question. For the

moment, at least, Beijing's ambition to play what it perceives as

China's rightful role in Asian international security affairs

appears to overcome any predisposition to resolve the paradox

between force and diplomacy in its foreign policy.
46

Nor does economic interdependence seem to dull the edge of 

China's military modernization programs or Beijing's use of force

to achieve paramount foreign policy objectives. Rather, Beijing

is using the attraction of its vibrant economy to induce

cooperation from its neighbors even as China's military

capabilities increase. In this sense, Asia's response to China's

ascending economic and military strength has been to assist in

Beijing's domestic development goals induced by profit and,

perhaps, the belief that as China grows stronger it will also be

more confident and therefore less suspicious of the world around

it. It is equally probable, however, that Asian capitals view

China's ascent to regional preeminence as inevitable; therefore,

prudence requires bandwagoning rather than balancing. To the

extent that China must be balanced, they see this role as best

reserved for the United States. Thus, Beijing's perception of the

United States as seeking to contain China may well be rooted as

much in its understanding its neighbors security logic as in the

underlying intent of American strategy in the Asia-Pacific

region. Should this, in fact, be the basis of Beijing's security

logic for the 21st century, Sino-American relations will become

both more critical and more hazardous for regional peace and

stability as that century unfolds. China's past willingness to

confront the United States is a foreboding precedent.

ENDNOTES

1. See Robert G. Sutter's discussion in China As A Security

Concern in Asia: Perceptions, Assessment, and U.S. Options,

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress 94-32 S,

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of

Congress, January 5, 1995.

2. For example, see Nayan Chanda, "Defense: Fear of the

Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 15, April 13,

1995, pp. 19-28.

3. For Asia's concern over China's rising nationalism, see

Nayan Chanda and Karl Huus, "China: The New Nationalism," Far

Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 45, November 9, 1995, pp.

20-28.

4. These trends were identified as early as 1983. See, for

example, Zong He, "Changes and Developmental Trends in the

International Situation," Shijie Zhishi, No. 11, 1983, in Foreign

Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-China (henceforth

FBIS-CHI)-83-141, July 21, 1983, pp. A1-A5.

5. Much of the following discussion is taken from James C.

Hsiung's insightful "China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy:

Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXV, No. 6, June 1995, pp. 573-586.
47

6. Ibid., p. 584.

7. Xing Shugang, Li Yunhua, and Liu Yingna, "Soviet-American

Balance of Power and Its Impact on the World Situation in the

1980s," Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, No. 1, January 1983, in FBIS-CHI-83-

078, April 21, 1983, pp. A1-A12.

8. Zong He, pp. A1-A5.

9. See Generals Zhang Zhen and Li Desheng's discussion of

the Central Military Commission's May-June 1985 guidance on

China's national military strategy at a meeting with the

Jiefangjun Bao editorial board reported in Ta Kung Pao (Hong

Kong), February 16, 1986, in FBIS-CHI-86-032, February 18, 1986,

pp. W11-W12.

10. Paul H. B. Godwin, "China's Defense Modernization: Of

Tortoise Shells and Tigers' Tails," Air University Review, Vol.

33, No. 1, November-December 1981, pp. 2-19.

11. Discussions covering all these demanding facets of the

requirements for limited, local war can be found in essays

published in Chinese military journals in the late 1980s. Two of

the more interesting analyses are Jia Wenxian, et al., "Tentative

Discussion of the Special Principles of a Future Chinese Limited

War," and Jiao Wu and Xiao Hui, "Modern Limited War Calls for

Reform of Traditional Military Principles," both in Guofang Daxue

Xuebao, No. 11, November 1, 1987, in Joint Publication Research

Service, China Report (henceforth JPRS-CHI)-88-039, July 12,

1988, pp. 47-51.

12. Jia Wenxian, et al., p. 48.

13. Yang Dezhi, "A Strategic Decision in Strengthening the

Building of Our Army in the New Period," Hong Qi, No. 15, August

1, 1985, in FBIS-CHI-85-153, August 8, 1985, p. K3.

14. China: Arms Control and Disarmament, Beijing: People's

Republic of China (PRC) Information Office of the State Council,

November 1995, p. 8.

15. Xu Jingyao, "1988: A Year of Reform for the Chinese

Army," Liaowang [overseas edition-Hong Kong], No. 3, January 16,

1989, in FBIS-CHI-89-014, January 24, 1989, p. 36.

16. Tan Jun and Hong Heping, " A ‘Fist Battalion' of a

Certain PLA Airborne Unit," Jiefangjun Bao, June 14, 1988, in

JPRS-CHI-88-153, August 9, 1988, pp. 59-60.

17. Deng Huaxu and Li Daoming, "A Visit to the PLA Marine
48

Corps," Renmin Ribao [overseas edition], August 2, 1988, in FBISChina-88-148, August 3, 1988, p. A2.

18. For an excellent review and summary of the evolution of

the PRC's naval strategy, see John W. Lewis and Xue Litai,

China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization

in the Nuclear Age, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,

1994, pp. 219-230.

19. Much of this discussion is taken from Tai Ming Cheung,

"Ties of Convenience: Sino-Russian Military Relations in the

1990s," in Richard H. Yang, ed., China's Military: The PLA in

1992/93, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 61-77.

20. Liu Huaqing, "Unswervingly March Along the Road to

Building a Modern Army with Chinese Characteristics," Jiefangjun

Bao, August 6, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-158, August 18, 1993, p. 18.

21. Ibid.

22. Lena Sun, "Russia, China Set Closest Ties in Years,"

The Washington Post, December 19, 1992, p. 10.

23. Quoted in Agence France Presse (AFP), Hong Kong,

November 11, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-217, November 12, 1993, p. 2.

24. For a discussion and analysis of Russian and Israeli

assistance to China's fighter programs, see Kenneth W. Allen,

Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan Pollack, China's Air Force Enters the

21st Century, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995, pp. 146-161.

25. For details of China's ballistic missile programs, see

John W. Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs:

Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Vol.

17, No. 2, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40.

26. For a detailed analysis of these discussions and

analyses over the past decade, see Alastair Iain Johnston,

"China's New ‘Old Thinking'," International Security, Vol. 20,

No. 3, Winter 1995, pp. 41-77. Much of my discussion is taken

from Johnston's work.

27. The Military Balance 1995-1996, London: Oxford

University Press, 1995, p. 176.

28. As late as May 1994, Jiefangjun Bao was using this

phrase to describe the PLA's weakness. See, for example, PLA

Activities Report (Hong Kong), May 1994, p. 17.

29. See, for example, Chen Jie, "China's Spratly Policy:

With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia," Asian
49

Survey, Vol. 34, No. 10, October 1995, pp. 893-903.

30. This growing fear of China is acknowledged in the United

States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of International

Security Affairs, February 1995, p. 15.

31. China: Arms Control and Disarmament, Beijing: PRC

Information Office of the State Council, November 1995.

32. Yan Xuetong, "Economic Security, Good Neighbor Policy

Emphasized in Post-Cold War Security Strategy," Xiandai Guoji

Guanxi, No. 8, August 20, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-199, October 16,

1995, pp. 8-13, contains the most detailed defense of China's

security policy, and much of my discussion is taken from this

essay.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 8.

35. Ibid., p. 9.

36. Ibid., p. 10.

37. Ibid., p. 11.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., p. 12, and Sun Baoyu, "1995 Witnesses Marked

Progress in China's Active Diplomacy Toward Neighbors," Beijing,

Xinhua Domestic Service, December 18, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-243,

December 19, 1995, pp. 1-2.

41. Yan Xuetong, "Forecasting International Politics at the

Beginning of the Next Century," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, No. 6, June

20, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-85-182, September 20, 1995, pp. 3-9.

42. Ibid., p. 9.

43. Wei Yang, "How We Should Understand and Face the World,"

Liaowang, No. 50, December 11, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-242, December

18, 1995, pp. 1-2.

44. Lu Shi, "A ‘Daydream' That Is Doomed To Be Shattered --

Refuting the ‘Theory of Containing China'," Guangming Ribao, August 25, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-194, October 6, 1995, pp. 3-6.

45. Wei Yang, p. 2.
50

46. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was formed in

1967 by Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, and

Thailand. Newly-independent Brunei joined in 1984. Vietnam and

Cambodia were granted observer status in 1992; Vietnam became a

full member in 1995.
51

CHAPTER III

PAKISTAN'S SECURITY IN THE "NEW WORLD ORDER":

GOING FROM BAD TO WORSE?

Robert Wirsing

Introduction.

Pakistan's security environment today bristles with

developments that are every bit as ominous as any in previous

decades. Pakistan's ties to major power wielders in the

international community have grown perilously thin, and no major

power seems likely to come to its rescue in the event of crisis.

The arms gap (conventional and nuclear) between Pakistan and

India is as wide as ever, and chances are it will grow wider yet.

Pakistan's internal stability and political unity are being

seriously eroded by intensifying ethnic and sectarian strife,

like that which is turning Karachi, the country's principal port

and industrial hub, into a global emblem of uncontrolled violence

and lawlessness. Pakistan's deepening involvement in (direct or

proxy) military hostilities with its neighbors, India and

Afghanistan, threatens to spiral into still more serious armed

conflict, thwarting all efforts to promote regional cooperation

and increasing doubts even about the integrity of the contested

stretches of its lengthy international borders.

In recent decades, Pakistan's leaders have displayed

considerable prudence in managing Pakistan's security policy.

They deserve commendation, in particular, not only for having

kept Pakistan out of a major war with its neighbors, especially

India, during the quarter century since defeat at New Delhi's

hands in 1971, but also for having resisted the temptation to

move further up the ladder of nuclear weapons development. But,

in the face of stunning recent reversals in Pakistan's

geostrategic fortunes, fundamental shifts in its security

environment (most importantly, the abrupt and nearly complete

rupture, upon the collapse of Soviet Communism, in Pakistan's

Cold War-motivated alliance with the United States) and the

swift, severe, and parallel deterioration in the first half of

the present decade in the country's relations with two of its

neighbors, India and Afghanistan, Pakistan will continue to be

excessively preoccupied with national security and, potentially,

a heightened risk of war.

 The subcontinent's nuclear peril obviously exists. In

neither Pakistan nor India, however, does one find in ruling

circles much interest in fighting (even less in funding!) an allout war, certainly not one fought with nuclear weapons. Indian

and Pakistani leaders have already gotten the message, even if
52

they do not accept all of its implications.

As Pakistan approaches the 50th anniversary of its founding

in 1947, its security predicament seems to have grown no less

severe (and maybe worse) than ever before. The costs of this for

Pakistanis--in almost any way that one might reckon them--have

been great in this century, and they will be just as great (or

greater) in the next, whether or not there is war. Hence, even if

we grant that Pakistan's security policies have been relatively

successful thus far, we should not hesitate to consider at least

some modification of them to meet the challenges of the next

century.

A review of Pakistan's options in this regard--identified

broadly here as the Pan-Islamic (transnational religious

identity) Option, the Domestic Liberalization (demilitarizing,

democratizing, or "decentering") Option, and the South Asian

Regional Cooperation (SARC) Option--reveals no simple answers.

Each entails considerable risk, and unqualified virtue (certainty

of payoff in terms of Pakistan's future security) is self-evident

in none of them. Quick, self-directed escape from its costly and

perilous circumstances, for the moment at least, thus appears

unlikely.

Time seems not to be on Pakistan's side, and however

unpalatable the policy alternatives may seem, its leaders'

willingness to risk applying them cannot be put off indefinitely.

The most promising immediate policies converge upon the third

(SARC) Option. The SARC Option stops well short of the

politically impractical, India-centered, and, not infrequently,

utopian regionalist projects that Pakistan has, understandably,

dismissed in the past. Measures that could set in motion a

process of accommodation with Pakistan's arch-rival, India,

particularly in relation to Kashmir, are recommended.

Pakistan's Security Situation, 1996.

Sandy Gordon recently argued that the end of the Cold War

had differential results in South Asia; India emerged the winner

and Pakistan the loser. He wrote:

Far from having lost out as a result of the end of the

Cold War, India is poised to emerge in the early 21st

century as a far more important and influential power

in the Indian Ocean region, and even globally, than it

was in the latter part of the 20th. Some of the

constraining factors in India's rise to power,

particularly domestic and regional South Asian

instability, are still present and will continue to

snap at India's heels for some years to come. But the
53

end of the Cold War has also enabled India to jettison

some of the more burdensome foreign and economic

policies that had constrained it in the past.1

In sharp contrast, Gordon concluded, "Pakistan, which has

long been India's only serious competitor in South Asia, has lost

out seriously as a result of the end of the Cold War. While India

suffers from internal instability, Pakistan's problems are

potentially far more serious."2

India's ability to take advantage of the potential benefits

to it of the Cold War's end may be exaggerated. The insurgencies

in its politically-disturbed periphery--Kashmir, the Punjab,

Assam and the tribal areas of the northeast--are proving

extremely expensive and difficult to eradicate. Enormous problems

of rural poverty, disease, environmental degradation, and

overpopulation remain largely unaddressed. Most authoritative

studies of contemporary India's political institutions speak more

of their frailty and decline than of their durability and

promise.3

Nevertheless, Gordon's placement of Pakistan on the losing

side in South Asia undoubtedly hits close to the mark. Being "on

the losing side" in the post-Cold War world is revealed in four

areas: loss of international support, a permanent arms gap,

ethnic and sectarian hostilities, and military confrontation with

India and Afghanistan.

Loss of International Support.

Surely the most obvious and unambiguous (and least

unexpected) sign of Pakistan's post-Cold War slippage in standing

was Washington's apparent decision, made very quickly following

the Soviet Union's unilateral and unconditional withdrawal from

Afghanistan in February 1989, to shed itself of its costly and

politically burdensome role as Pakistan's military and diplomatic

backer. This decision took its most massive material form in

October 1990, when President George Bush, after a year's warning,

declared his inability to meet presidential certification any

longer. This action, required annually by the 1985 Pressler

Amendment, to confirm that Pakistan "does not possess" a nuclear

explosive device, thus cut off the flow of economic and military

assistance for Pakistan inaugurated a decade earlier. That step,

which resulted in Pakistan's sudden free-fall from near topranking among a 100 or so recipients of U.S. security assistance

for much of the 1980s into full-fledged nuclear pariah status in

the 1990s, had been foreshadowed the preceding March by the

entirely symbolic, but--for Pakistan--equally shattering

revelation that the Bush Administration no longer considered

India and Pakistan bound by the provisions of the late 1940s
54

United Nations (UN) resolutions stipulating that a plebiscite be

held to settle the matter of Kashmir's territorial affiliation.4

The nearly complete Pressler Amendment-mandated aid-cutoff

has now entered its 6th year. Joint efforts by the Clinton White

House and Pakistan's (mainly Republican) sympathizers in the

Republican-controlled 104th Congress finally resulted in

agreement between both houses on October 24, 1995, on a tightly

worded amendment (the Brown Amendment) to Section 620E of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. It authorized a one-time delivery

to Pakistan of $368 million in U.S. military equipment contracted

for prior to October 1, 1990. The Brown Amendment explicitly

excluded from the exemption the 28 F-16 combat aircraft which

Pakistan had also ordered and for which it had already paid $658

million, though the amendment authorized the government to

reimburse Pakistan as much as it could from the sale of the

aircraft to third parties.5

These moves by Washington to put U.S.-Pakistan relations on

a more normal footing are certainly to be welcomed. They pave the

way for increased bilateral cooperation on a great many matters

of mutual interest; perhaps equally as important, they imply

America's recognition that its interests in South Asia do not

begin and end with nuclear nonproliferation. The Pressler

Amendment's passage may have made some sense in the middle of the

last decade. It was a compromise arrangement that at least kept

at bay Washington's army of energetic anti-proliferation gadflys,

who might otherwise have obstructed congressional support of the

executive branch's Afghanistan-driven security assistance program

for Pakistan. But it obviously did very little to ease the threat

of nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent, while having a

positively devastating impact on Pakistan's military capabilities

relative to India. Congress was mistaken in thinking that

Pakistan could be starved into nuclear abstention by conditioning

U.S. aid on termination of its nuclear weapons program.

Overlooked, apparently, were India's much older, more advanced,

and larger nuclear program, the relative immunity of that program

from Washington's pressure due to India's greater size and

military power, and--above all--Pakistan's natural dread of an

Indian nuclear monopoly.

Washington's decision to unclog the aid pipeline to Pakistan

scarcely begins to address Pakistan's security dilemma. After

all, the Brown Amendment, in authorizing a one-time lifting of

the ban on weapon sales, did not repeal the Pressler Amendment or

sanction reopening of major military sales. Neither did it

reverse Washington's earlier decision to force Pakistan's return

of eight leased U.S. frigates and destroyers, replacement of

which will be extremely costly for the Pakistani Navy. No one can

reasonably contend, moreover, that delivery of $368 million worth

of arms, including 24 M198 howitzers, 135 anti-tank TOW
55

launchers, 28 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, 3 Orion P-3C

reconnaissance aircraft, and assorted other spare parts and

items, will, by itself, seriously rattle the India-Pakistan arms

balance, when annual combined arms spending by these two

countries in recent years runs in the vicinity of $12 billion.6

No persuasive case, finally, can be made that there is a "hidden

agenda" of renewed alliance with Pakistan in the U.S. Department

of Defense's current plans for joint military exercises, military

education exchanges, or expanded "cooperation with Pakistani

military forces in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, and

peacekeeping activities."7 In the face of Washington's remarkable

recent upgrading of India's global importance, and the still more

impressive growth in U.S. economic ties with India, the existence

of any such Pakistan-led agenda strains credulity.

Beyond the immediate arms sale issue, in any event, lies the

greater security problem for Pakistan--the gradual drying up of

any promising alliance prospects to serve Pakistan's stock

requirement for great-power insurance against Indian military

might.8 An "Islamic bloc" solidly aligned behind Pakistan has

failed utterly to materialize. There are signs of slackening as

well in the fidelity to Pakistan even of China, the consistency

of whose support for Pakistan over the past 30-odd years has

been, at least by American standards, quite remarkable. In

China's case, at least, the signs are not all negative. Fairly

credible reports surfaced during the summer of 1995 that Beijing

had exported to Pakistan in late 1992 over 30 nuclear-capable M11 ballistic missiles.9

 China continues to maintain a very close

working relationship with Pakistan's avionics and other defense

industries.10 But, Beijing has retreated in recent years to a

conspicuously neutral position on Kashmir, unquestionably an

important litmus test of friendship from Islamabad's point of

view, and China's steadily expanding rapproachement with India,

as Sandy Gordon has observed, "has provided India with a

significant peace dividend in the context of its competition with

Pakistan."11

Permanent Arms Gap.

A second ominous feature of Islamabad's post-Cold War

security environment is the arms gap that exists between Pakistan

and India. What is particularly ominous about this gap, of

course, is not that it exists. After all, a large disparity in

both the size and equipment of their armed forces has been a

constant from the moment these forces were parceled out to the

two sides at the time of Partition. Use of the term "ominous"

does not mean to imply in any way that Pakistan's armed forces

deserve to be described as puny, pintsized--a mere David pitted

against the Indian Goliath. India and Pakistan are both

unquestionably formidable military powers; among the so-called
56

developing countries, there are very few militaries, in fact,

that deserve to stand in the same column with either of them.

India without any doubt possesses the capability on fairly short

order literally to devastate Pakistan--or at least a fair share

of it. But Pakistan, even if fighting was restricted to

conventional weapons, just as surely has the capability to

inflict terrible, and unacceptable, damage upon India. The

ominous part of the gap, from the Pakistani point of view, stems

rather from India's greater ability to widen it, at least over

the long haul, and to do so more autonomously of external

constraints than has ever been true for Pakistan. India, in

other words, with its vastly greater size, resources, population,

economy, technically-trained workforce, and defense industrial

infrastructure can set a harsher pace, if and when it chooses,

with regard to the acquisition of both conventional and nuclear

arms.

Tables 1-6 (see pages 92-95) indicate that in comparisons of

military expenditure, number of troops, arms imports, arms

production, defense industry employment, and size of defense

sector enterprises, India has generally ranked first or second

among developing countries in most categories, and never less

than third. Pakistan does not appear in all the tables, but when

it does, it ranks between 7th and 12th among developing

countries.12 When it comes to indigenization of arms production,

an indicator as much of security decision-making autonomy as of

military capability, the gap between India and Pakistan is

unmistakably--and irremediably--huge.

Nevertheless, there is nothing in these comparative figures

to dispute the contention, made most recently by Amit Gupta,

that, in its attempts to build military capability, India

encounters the same kinds of structural constraints, economic and

otherwise, facing Pakistan and other Third World states, and that

it will be no small matter for India to overcome these

constraints and to "make the jump to major power status."13

Substantial cutbacks in the rate of growth of defense

expenditures during the past decade by India and Pakistan testify

to the difficulties both sides had in sustaining major defense

outlays in the face of chronic weaknesses in their economies and

depressed social indicators, such as poor health conditions and

low rates of literacy.14 Should India and Pakistan not succeed

with present economic reform efforts, their budgetary

difficulties will surely deepen. Pakistan, at least, could take

comfort from the fact that over the past three decades it had

registered the region's fastest average annual growth in Gross

Domestic Product (GDP)--7 percent, while India's growth rate,

with the exception of 1995, which reached a remarkable 6.2

percent, had generally hovered at less than 5 percent. However,

Pakistan's more recent growth rates (3.9 percent in fiscal year

1993-1994 and 4.7 percent in fiscal year 1994-1995 in the face of
57

Pakistan's annual population growth (seemingly fixed at 3.1

percent)--contrasted with India's recent performance--left it

currently with little to cheer.15

None of this alters the fact that in the South Asian

regional context, Indian military supremacy is a permanent

fixture of life.16 While India's military achievements may seem

minor in comparison with the great military powers of the

advanced industrial world, in relation to Pakistan, where any

aspiration to major power status would have to be judged purely

fanciful, India's achievements in the military realm stand out

very sharply indeed. Only time will tell, of course, but

Pakistani security planners have little choice but to take

seriously the forecasts of two Australian defense experts, Paul

Dibbs and Sandy Gordon. Writing in Jane's Intelligence Review,

Dibbs predicted in May 1995 that the military capabilities of

Asia's three major indigenous powers, China, Japan, and India,

provided they managed to sustain economic growth, would all be

"substantially greater" by the year 2010;17 Gordon, in one of the

most solid studies of Indian defense capabilities yet authored,

offered the even more menacing opinion that Pakistan's ability to

act as a check on Indian power seemed to have eroded, and that

its "military competition with India may well become

unsustainable by the end of the century."18

Ethnic and Sectarian Hostilities.

Pakistan is a multi-ethnic, overwhelmingly (97 percent)

Muslim society with a fairly weak sense of national (Pakistani)

identity. This weakness already contributed to the loss of its

heavily-populated eastern province (East Bengal) in 1971. It has

contributed to separatist sentiments and violent secessionist

activities both before and since then in all of the three

"minority" provinces--Sindh, Baluchistan, and the North West

Frontier Province (NWFP).

Pakistan today contains five major ethnic groups: Punjabis,

Pashtuns, Sindhis, Mohajirs (refugees or refugee-descendents from

India), and Baluch--with the Punjabis, representing about 58

percent of the total (48 percent if speakers of the Siraiki

dialect are excluded), holding a clear numerical edge. Internal

migration has resulted in considerable mixing of these groups;

however, as a rule, Punjabi-speakers are centered in Punjab,

Sindhi-speakers in Sindh (especially rural Sindh), Pashtuspeakers in the NWFP, the Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in urban areas

of Sindh (Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur), and Baluchi-speakers (and

related Brahui-speakers) in Baluchistan.

Ethnic Punjabi numerical dominance, the country's

overwhelmingly Muslim character, plus the fact that Urdu (by
58

world standards an exceptionally successful lingua franca) is now

spoken by perhaps 90 percent of Pakistan's population, give

Pakistan a degree of ethnic, linguistic, and religious

homogeneity and "natural" unity enjoyed by very few countries of

the Afro-Asian world. On the other hand, the Punjabis' numerical

weight has been matched by their domination of the government,

armed forces, and the economy. Thus, they are, to an extent,

feared and resented by Pakistan's minority communities--a

structural impediment to the country's unity that defies easy

solution. Adding to the problem is the fact that Pakistan's

overwhelming Muslim majority is itself subdivided into numerous

competing sects; while the country's Muslims are approximately 80

percent Sunni, the Shia minority is highly mobilized politically.

Contributing further to the disunity problem is the fact

that practically all of Pakistan's ethnic groups share ethnic

identity with groups across the country's borders in Iran (the

Baluch), Afghanistan (the Pashtuns, the Baluch), and India (the

Mohajirs, Sindhis, and Punjabis, albeit in these cases their

Indian co-ethnics are more likely than not to be non-Muslims).

Thus, there is a serious problem of ethnic overhang or "transborder ethnicity" to complicate Pakistan's problem of national

integration. This would vastly complicate as well Pakistan's

national security by throwing into doubt the durability of at

least some of its international borders, while rendering its

ethnic unrest more vulnerable than it might otherwise be to

incitement from abroad.

At the moment, ethnic separatism is not a signficant threat

in the NWFP, where the Pashtunistan movement (the quest for a

separate Pashtun-led entity) is mainly moribund and, beyond that,

tends to be seen less as a product of grievances of indigenous

Pashtuns, whose integration into Pakistan's military,

bureaucratic, political, and business elites has, in fact, been

quite remarkable, than as a device exploited and fostered at

times by hostile governments in Afghanistan.19 Pashtun nationalism

is by no means a thing of the past, however, and seems bound to

become a more troublesome problem for Pakistan in the next

several years. Afghanistan, whose population is generally

estimated to be about 50-55 percent Pashtun, has experienced

almost unceasing and extremely disruptive civil strife ever since

the Soviets vacated the land in 1989.20 The warring factions have

very complex motivations and ethnic identities; but, underlying

the present struggle is a profoundly important macro-conflict

between the majority Pashtuns and non-Pashtun minorities for

control of the country's central governmental apparatus. The

eventual outcome of this struggle, which at least one author

believes may spell the end of Pashtun dominance in Afghanistan,21

will undoubtedly also affect severely, perhaps in violent ways,

the Pashtun population in Pakistan. The revolt of Islamic

extremists in the Malakand Division of the NWFP in late 199422 and
59

the spectacular car bombing that took over 40 lives in Peshawar

in late December 1995, may well be early indications of this.

The focal point of the worst current ethnic violence in

Pakistan is the southern province of Sindh, and in particular its

industrial center and port city of Karachi, where, during 1995,

an extremely lethal mix of inter-ethnic (primarily, but by no

means exclusively, Mohajir versus Sindhi), sectarian, and

political animosities resulted in 25 economically-ruinous

citywide strikes and a reported 1,950 killings.23 The Sindhis, who

number fewer than 10 percent of Karachi's population, and who

command, at most, only a bare majority of Sindh's provincial

population, resent domination by outsiders and point to their own

conspicuously prominent place at the bottom of Pakistan's socioeconomic hierarchy. The Mohajirs, on the other hand, recall

earlier decades, when Pakistan was new and they shared with the

Punjabis political and economic domination of the country's

fledgling political and economic institutions. Having lost in

more recent years some of their original importance, in part due

to deliberate government ethnic preference programs aimed at

boosting the indigenous Sindhis, the Mohajirs (who still

represent as much as 70 percent of Karachi's population) have

been attracted in recent decades to the radical and often violent

agendas of the Mohajir Quami Mahaz (MQM) Refugee National

Movement. Her own major political base being in the Sindh and

among Sindhis, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto faces extraordinary

political risks in attempting to resolve the problems of this

province.24 Responsibility for the Sindh's agony has been fixed in

various places, including the cynical divide-and-rule strategies

of Pakistan's own state authorities--not least among them the

military authorities.25 Inevitably, as in Pakistan Interior

Minister Naseerullah Babar's recent hint to the parliament in

Islamabad of Indian and Afghanistan involvement in the recent

spate of terrorist bombings in the country, the government

responded by alleging the sinister presence of a "foreign hand"

in Pakistan's internal ethnic crises.26 Whether or not the

allegations were true, they demonstrated the close and

unavoidable link between Pakistan's security and its ethnicity.

Of great importance in any consideration of Pakistan's

vulnerability to foreign interference is the fact that Pakistan's

ethnic transnationalism is overlapped by--and in some respects

dwarfed by--the religious (in South Asian parlance, communal)

transnationalism arising from the broad geographic distribution

of Islamic identity in the region. South Asia's three largest

countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) together contain over 350

million Muslims--by far the largest concentration of Muslims in

the world. Hindu-dominant India, with a Muslim minority of about

110 million (12 percent of the country's population), also

happens to be the fourth largest Muslim country in the world

(after Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh).27 The spread of
60

religious nationalism throughout South Asia in recent decades,

among both Muslims and Hindus, obviously poses a considerable

threat, not only to the survival of secular statehood in the

region, but to the future well-being and security of its minority

religious groups as well.28

From its start, the India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir has

been complicated by each side's implied threat to the legitimacy

not merely of the other's territorial claims, but of its national

identity as well. Possession of Kashmir represented, for each

side, vindication of the basic principle of identity--the one

(India) secular, the other (Pakistan) religious--upon which each

had been formally based. The increasing merger of religious with

national identity that has occurred in both countries in more

recent decades has considerably magnified and complicated this

problem. It has, for one thing, placed India's huge Muslim

minority under greater suspicion than ever of its divided

loyalties and potential for "fifth column" activity in the event

of renewed war with Pakistan, raising a serious doubt whether

"any government in Delhi could safeguard Muslims against

displacement and worse."29 For another, it has lent to the

struggle over Kashmir the aura of a religious crusade, complete

with foreign mercenaries, dogmatic intolerance, and merciless

reprisal killings--the savage beheading in August 1995 of a

Norwegian tourist by his Kashmiri abductors being but one of

countless such episodes. It has also placed the government of

Pakistan's own policies in regard to Kashmir under attack from

radicalized Islamic groups within Pakistan itself. The

government's vulnerability to extremist elements was highlighted

by the report of the September 1995 secret arrest in Pakistan of

40 army officers, apparently with links to Islamic fundamentalist

groups, accused of plotting a coup against Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto's government.30

Military Confrontation with India and Afghanistan.

No other major state in the world has a lengthier stretch of

contested international border than Pakistan. The approximately

750-mile long, British-drawn Durand Line, separating Pakistan's

NWFP from Afghanistan, has never been formally recognized as an

international boundary by any Afghan government. The Line of

Control (LOC), running nearly 500 miles in a rough arc from north

to south through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, was

negotiated explicitly as a temporary boundary between the Indianand Pakistani-controlled sectors of that territory in the Simla

Accord of 1972.31 The passage of time has not transformed either

of these two lines fully into de facto international borders. The

failure of the Durand Line to have much impact either on the gunand-drug smuggling traffic of border tribals or on the fixing of

their national loyalties has acquired nearly legendary
61

proportions over the past century. The kindred failure of the LOC

over the past 50 years or so appears well on its way toward

earning that line the same notoriety. Nor have these lines, least

of all the one in Kashmir (ironically, initially crafted as a

"cease-fire line"), served in the slightest to stabilize the

relations between Pakistan and these two neighbors. On the

contrary, both lines are noted far more as transit areas for the

passage of guerrilla forces and their arms, as staging areas for

cross-border terrorist attacks, and--on the LOC in Kashmir, at

least--for the frequent exchange of small arms, mortar and

artillery fire between the regular armed forces on either side

than for any pacifying effects they might have had in Pakistan's

frontier areas.

Pakistan claims that in Kashmir its involvement on the

Indian side of the LOC is limited to diplomatic and moral support

for the cause of Kashmiri self-determination--a cause for which,

Pakistan asserts, there is more than ample justification in

international law. As for Afghanistan, Pakistan contends that it

has no favorites among the warring Afghan factions currently

vying for power, that it is not at all materially involved in

Afghanistan's internal strife, and that it wishes only that the

government of Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, which it

claims has outlived its legitimacy, should step down. Both of

these countries reject Pakistani claims to innocence, insisting

that in both cases Pakistan's covert interference is, in fact, at

the root of their troubles. While the claim that Pakistan bears

sole (or at least most of the) responsibility for these

countries' present troubles has, in fact, yet to be convincingly

demonstrated, they are justified in rejecting Pakistan's claims

to innocence. It can be argued that Pakistan's involvement on the

Indian side of the LOC in the 1990s,

was far from insignificant; that Pakistan supplied

substantial political, diplomatic, and material support

to the Kashmiri uprising; that the material support

took various forms, including the training,

indoctrination, arming, and cross-border movement of

the infiltrating forces; that the exfiltration of

Kashmiri Muslims across the LOC into Pakistan or

Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and their covert

reinfiltration, following training in light arms and

guerrilla tactics, played a very important role in

maintaining the tempo of the insurgency; that the

support was planned and coordinated in large part by

Pakistan's ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence

Directorate]; and that all this was carried out with

the full knowledge and under the auspices of the

Pakistan army.32

Determining the actual scale and intensity of Pakistan's
62

current cross-border activities in Kashmir is, of course, another

matter. The report in a November 1995 issue of India's premier

news magazine that "1995 has seen the highest number of trained

militants coming into the [Kashmir] Valley from across the

border, and even conservative estimates put the figure at 1,000 a

month," probably inflates the rate of influx.33 Unfortunately,

verification of such reports is flatly impossible.

The intent here, in any event, is not to fix blame for the

tragic circumstances in which Kashmir presently finds itself (an

exercise that would probably lead to an indictment not just of

Pakistan but of all parties to the conflict). Neither is it to

imply that Pakistani actions on the Indian side of the LOC do not

have their counterparts in Indian actions on the Pakistani side

of the line. That, in the face of mountainous evidence to the

contrary, would be patently ridiculous.34 Rather, the intent is

simply to point out that the pattern of conflict sustained today

by Pakistan and India in Kashmir, whatever the justification for

it or lack thereof, is extremely provocative and, insofar as

Pakistan is concerned, presents an enormous challenge to the

country's security. For example, in November 1995, Pakistani

artillery fire flattened an Indian bunker located on the LOC at a

point from where Indian forces could, and allegedly frequently

did, direct heavy machine-gun fire at passing military and

civilian vehicles using the Neelam Valley road on the Pakistani

side of the line.35 That action apparently ended the Indian

forces' year-long blockade of the strategic road. Whether or not

these facts were reported fully or accurately, the evidence is

now overwhelming that armed conflict--and not just minor

skirmishing--has become a routine feature of India-Pakistan

relations in the contested area of Kashmir. While these two 

countries have displayed considerable prudence over the years, on

only a few occasions permitting their deep hostility to get out

of control and to develop into full-scale fighting, it is

impossible to assume, in the face of present developments, that

their hostility can be permanently contained.36

Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs has

been continuous from about 1974, when, under Prime Minister

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, it began supplying surreptitious military

support, including sanctuary within Pakistan, training, and arms

to groups of Afghan dissidents fighting the regime of Mohammad

Daoud Khan. This aid continued when the Nur Mohammad Taraki

regime replaced the Daoud Khan regime at the time of the Marxist

takeover in 1978, and it was given major impetus when that regime

fell to a Soviet-backed puppet government at the end of 1979.

Quite unlike its involvement in Kashmir, however, Pakistan's

prolonged activity in Afghanistan had considerable international

sanction and ultimately won it the gratitude of much of the

world. During the Afghanistan War, of course, it acted as the

main conduit for Western aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan
63

resistance. By the late 1980s, the level of this aid had reached

staggering dimensions: combined U.S. and Saudi assistance alone

at that time had climbed to about $1 billion per year.37

The level and exact nature of Pakistan's unabated

involvement in Afghanistan's civil strife since the Soviet

pullout can only be guessed. Many observers claim that Islamabad

continued to funnel military support to its favorites among the

mujahideen, especially to its longtime ally, Hizb-i-Islami

chieftan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In 1993, it seems, with the change

of government in Pakistan that brought Benazir Bhutto to power,

Pakistan's support to Hekmatyar, perhaps with the encouragement

of Washington, dried up. The sudden appearance on the Afghan

scene in October 1994 of the so-called Taleban ("student")

militia has prompted numerous reports that Pakistan is behind

that group's striking military success--including a victory, at

least momentary, over the forces of Hekmatyar.38

The current geopolitical situation in Afghanistan is, by any

standard, extremely confusing. Russia, the newly independent

states of Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan), Iran, and India,

along with Pakistan, all have a very large stake in the outcome

of the present free-for-all struggle for power and influence that

was unleashed with the collapse of the USSR.39 Pakistan, at least

as much as any of the other external contenders, considers

Afghanistan's pacification and the political orientation of its

leaders--factors bearing heavily not only upon Pakistan's own

future political stability and international political status,

but upon its acute concern for the opening of trade routes to

Muslim Central Asia--matters of the most vital state interest.40

Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby observe that "increasingly, the keys

to the resolution of the [Afghanistan] situation lie in Tashkent

and Islamabad."41 While that may very well be true, no one at the

moment can be sure that the ultimate resolution of this situation

will come very soon, that it will favor Pakistan's interests, or

that it will bring a century or more of conflict over the

Afghanistan-Pakistan border finally to a peaceful end.

Pakistan's Post-Cold War Options.

Pakistan has three post-Cold War options--potential

alternatives, in other words, to the Cold War policy choices that

led it to seek alliance with the United States and a major role

in Washington's anti-Communist containment strategy. They are the

Pan-Islamic Option, the Domestic Liberalization Option and the

Regional Cooperation Option.

Pan-Islamic Option. Pakistan has long thought that it could,

to some extent, compensate for both its vulnerable political

geography and its military-demographic-economic weakness relative
64

to India by expanding and deepening its ties to the many coreligionist states of the Islamic world. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's

hosting of an Islamic summit in Lahore in 1974, in the aftermath

of Pakistan's loss of East Bengal in the 1971 war, and his

daughter's proposal to convene an extraordinary summit of the

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Islamabad in

March 1997 to help celebrate the 50th anniversary of Pakistan's

birth testify equally to the persistence and strength of this

idea.42 Pakistan's stature as the Islamic world's sole nuclear

weapon power and as the main political voice of the South Asian

region's huge Muslim population reinforced this idea. The thesis,

voiced a few years ago in Foreign Affairs by Harvard professor

Samuel Huntington, that a fundamental realignment of strategic

forces was underway in the post-Cold War world, that this

realignment would turn the international relations of the 21st

century in its most basic respects into a "clash of

civilizations" (most conspicuously setting the West versus the

Rest), and that Islamic Civilization would be involved in the

bloodiest clashes of all, gave this idea at least symbolic

support.43 Huntington argued that on-going "kin-country rallying"-

-the mobilizing of interstate support systems or alliances on

religious or civilization grounds--empirically demonstrated this

thesis.

Huntington's concept was bold and provocative. However, in

part because it seemed to depend upon a more thorough and rapid

decline of the nation-state structure and the ideology of

nationalism than most political theorists were willing to

concede, it has received surprisingly little support from fellow

academics. Most of them, including Fouad Ajami, Olivier Roy,

Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, have argued that Islam's "bloody

borders," as Huntington had expressed it, were much more likely

to be found on the borders of neighboring Muslim states, or

between these states and the nascently nationalistic ethnic

communities or sects within them, than on those borders

separating Muslim from non-Muslim states. Moreover, they argued

that Huntington had read far more significance into the "kincountry rallying" occurring among the world's Muslims than its

actual magnitude warranted.44

Unquestionably Pakistan is now involved in a variety of panIslamic projects, such as the previously-mentioned OIC. Pakistan

is an important and the most populous member of the all-Muslim

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), a regional group formed

in early 1992 which also includes all of the five Muslim Central

Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Turkmenistan) plus Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan,

that is the largest economic bloc in the world. Then, too, there

is plenty of evidence that the rallying of Muslims to pan-Islamic

causes is a matter of some significance in Pakistan's South Asian

policy. Citing intelligence sources, the Indian news magazine
65

India Today reported in September 1995, for instance, that at

least 1,600 foreign Islamic militants had crossed the border into

Kashmir during that summer to fight on the side of the Kashmiri

Muslim insurgents. While this figure may not represent the actual

foreign hijacking of the insurgency, it certainly indicates a

major external influence upon it.45

Nevertheless, Pakistan's past (e.g., the secession of Muslim

East Bengal) and its present (e.g., Afghanistan) provide

sufficient examples to suggest that the trans-state Islamic bond

has very definite limits. In Afghanistan's case alone, Pakistan

finds itself presently at odds not only with numerous groups of

Muslim Afghans (the regime of President Rabbani, and the

Hekmatyar forces), but with those Muslim states with which it is

allied in the ECO (Shia-dominant Iran or secular Uzbekistan) with

which, for a variety of reasons, it does not see eye-to-eye in

regard to Afghanistan's political future.46 Additional examples

include the seeming preference of Muslim Kashmiris for

independence from both India and Pakistan rather than for union

with Pakistan; Pakistan's continuing refusal to take back the

roughly 240,000 stranded (Urdu-speaking) Muslim Pakistanis,

called "Biharis," who have been living in 60-odd squalid camps in

Dhaka and elsewhere in the fellow Muslim state of Bangladesh (in

what used to be East Pakistan) since 1971; and Pakistan's

parallel plan, reportedly announced by its Interior Minister in

November 1995, for the compulsory deportation or "push-back" to

Bangladesh of up to 1.6 million "illegal" Bangladeshi migrants

claimed currently to be in Pakistan--a gesture that oddly mimics

the anti-Bengali Muslim stance of the fiercely Hindu nationalist

leader of India's Shiv Sena party, Bal Thackeray.47 It might even

be argued that India's 110 million-strong Muslim minority is far

more a hostage today to Pakistan's foreign policy than a willing

ally of it. Tragic it may be, but the Islamic world that

surrounds Pakistan is a world of bloody feuds and clashing

factions, rather than one that is ready to launch "the clash of

civilizations," much less to take on the West.

In sum, Pakistan, under present circumstances in the Islamic

world, is very likely to come up short of reliable Islamic 

allies. The Pan-Islamic Option, for all its bluster and for all

its promise, is for most practical purposes (and certainly for

Pakistan's basic security requirements) a fiction.

Domestic Liberalization Option. A theme common to most

studies of Pakistan's post-independence political development,

especially the more recent ones, is that the very early

subordination of Islamabad's fledgling political institutions to

the supreme control and insatiable "corporate needs" of the

Pakistan Army both crippled them while it perverted the Army's

mission to provide for Pakistan's security against real or

potential external threats. The best of these studies allow that
66

the "military variable" is only one of several that sets Pakistan

on its early praetorian course, and that the real threat to

Pakistan's security that arose from Partition (and in particular

from India's resentment of Partition's territorial and other

consequences), at least in part precipitated the military's

almost immediate post-independence intervention in civil

government. Pakistan's insecurity today is far more the product

of its past internal political failures than of any threatening

force in its external security environment.48 A natural by-product

of this line of reasoning, obviously, is that determined and farreaching reform of Pakistan's domestic politics--the so-called

Domestic Liberalization Option, but which is just as well

described as the Demilitarizing, Democratizing or even

"Decentering" Option (if one is contemplating reform via the

devolution of power from the center to provincial or lower levels

of governance)--can have a remarkably positive impact on its

international relations. This simply echoes the claim, of course,

of those Kantian-inclined international relations theorists who

believe that the surest way to international peace is via the

spread domestically of liberal political institutions.49

It is questionable, of course, whether Pakistan's internal

governance enjoys the positive causal connection with external

relations that the theorists are claiming, and, given the

inevitable inertial propensities in Pakistan's present internal

political structure, ethno-cultural configuration, and

demographic and socio-economic circumstances, whether the

redistributive policies implicit in the Domestic Liberalization

Option would produce within a decent time period the predicted

enhancement in human well-being or simply sharpen the regional,

ethnic, sectarian, and class polarizations that are already

tearing at Pakistan's solidarity.

Nevertheless, in principle at least, it would be hard to

deny that Pakistan could profit from a redefinition of its

security requirements that endorsed a shift in public expenditure

from the military to social and economic welfare agencies. After

all, measured against most of the standard indices of human wellbeing, Pakistan does not fare very well, often not even in

comparisons with other low-income countries (including the other

states of South Asia). According to a World Bank assessment of

Pakistan completed in September 1995, Pakistan's "total fertility

rate"50 stands at 65 percent and its infant mortality rate at 30

percent above the average for all low-income countries.51 Pakistan

also ranks in the cellar (see Table 7, p. 96) in the category of

primary and secondary schooling. Especially marked is its poor

standing in the category of female school enrollment: only 5 of

the 132 countries displayed a lower percentage than Pakistan of

females in primary school in 1992, and only 18 of them showed a

lower percentage than Pakistan of females in secondary school.52

In other standard categories of human development, such as
67

literacy, life expectancy, and per capita share of Gross National

Produce (GNP) (see Table 8, p. 97), Pakistan's ranking is

similarly unenviable.

It would be even harder to deny that Pakistan has few assets

other than the military budget from which to secure the resources

needed to manage any such shift in public expenditure. Realistic

alternatives to the military budget simply do not exist.

Pakistan's Minister of Finance reportedly admitted in May 1991,

for instance, that in fiscal year 1991-92, debt servicing (53

percent) and defense expenditures (47 percent) would, between

them, consume virtually 100 percent of central revenue receipts,

and that ". . . expenditures on development programs, public

administration, and social sectors such as health and education

would have to be met from external sources."53 There are no

unusually genererous foreign donors on the horizon.

The presumed elasticity (and ready contractibility) of

defense budgets is, of course, the focus of great controversy,

and not only in Pakistan. In the United States, an end-of-Cold

War "peace dividend" worth boasting about has yet to appear, in

spite of the fact that no truly credible adversary remains. But,

Pakistan retains a principal adversary, India, on its very

doorstep.

Regional Cooperation Option. The South Asian Association for

Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which formally associates all seven

of the South Asian states (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri

Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives) in a large number of

common projects aimed primarily at stimulating regional economic

cooperation, has recorded a number of significant achievements

since its founding in 1985. One of the most recent--and possibly

the most momentous--of these achievements was the signing by all

seven countries in November 1995 of the South Asian Preferential

Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), a plan for immediate mutual cutting

of tariff barriers and eventual creation of a free trade zone.54

Symptomatic, however, of the distance which regional cooperation

has yet to go in South Asia before it achieves real

respectability was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's almost

immediate decision (allegedly reacting to criticism that SAPTA

threatened to compromise Pakistan's stand on Kashmir) to refuse

Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to India--a status

routinely granted to virtually all of a nation's regular trading

partners.55 That decision paralleled countless others, affecting

virtually every dimension of India-Pakistan relations, including

even sports activities, that account for the gloom in most

discussions of the South Asian region's prospects for heightened

cooperation.56 In brief, the SAPTA accord and other occasional

moves in the direction of cooperation are not reliable harbingers

of a rising tide of regionalism in South Asia. India-Pakistan

relations, in the face of persuasive arguments that the security
68

of both states would be substantially enhanced were they to

cooperate in such areas as energy and the environment,57 remain

predominantly and stubbornly hostile. Significant improvement in

their bilateral relations, even in their willingness or ability

to conduct serious and sustained talks on the matters that divide

them, faces stiff barriers. Both continue to view one another as

major threats rather than potential regional partners, and, thus,

both continue to engage relentlessly in acts of sabotage,

espionage, diplomatic one-upmanship, and sabre-rattling of the

sort once associated with the Cold War.

On top of an already existing array of counter-regionalist

properties, ranging from incommensurably huge differences in the

prospective partners' relative sizes to religio-cultural

differences having their roots deep in the subcontinent's

history,58 there are now political trends afoot in the region--a

drift, it seems, in the direction of cultural militancy and

nationalist extremism that threatens to wash away the political

center--that seem likely to add substantially to them. On the

Pakistan side, of course, exists its government's proclivity for

trumpeting its Islamic identity and its inevitable role in the

region as "guardian of the faith." While this identity has not

paid off electorally at all well for the country's rightwing

Islamist political parties, such as the strongly organized

Jama'at-i-Islami, their mass mobilizing talents and ability to

apply pressure effectively at strategic points of the

governmental apparatus make them a political factor to be

reckoned with. As for the Indian side, the noticeably rightward

drift in its politics--and of some of its worrisome consequences-

-have already been noted. Recent statements reportedly made by

leaders of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)

calling, for instance, for the "liberation" of (Pakistan-held)

Azad Kashmir and for the building of nuclear weapons, should not

be written off as mere pre-election campaign rhetoric.59 A BJP-led

government would not produce many substantive changes in India's

foreign policies, including its policies towards Pakistan;

neither would it usher in a new era in regional cooperation.

There are far too many anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan items on the

Hindu rightwing's current political agenda to offer much hope for

that.

In spite of the relatively heavy odds against its immediate

achievement, Pakistani leaders are well advised to place this

Regional Cooperation Option ahead of the others and, in fact, to

pursue it much more energetically than has been characteristic in

the past. The Regional Cooperation Option, for all of its

shortcomings, and unlike the other two options, addresses the

problem of Pakistan's external security head-on. It focuses the

issue directly on the regional military threat. In Pakistan's

present circumstances, that threat, in both its conventional and

nuclear forms, is simply too great to dismiss. The Regional
69

Cooperation Option does not dismiss it; on the contrary, it

encourages the search for ways to reduce it. It may eventually

enhance regional cooperation, but it will have accomplished its

mission if it does no more than to lessen the menace of war.

Numerous proposals for implementing this option have been

advanced. One proposal consists of so-called "conflict-avoidance"

and "confidence-building" measures (CAMs/CBMs), the breadth of

whose definitions is limited only by the human imagination. Many

such measures have been identified for application in South Asia;

the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, has been a

particularly fertile source of these.60 As Michael Krepon,

President of the Stimson Center, recently acknowledged, CAMs/CBMs

have unfortunately not succeeded in taking root in South Asia. In

fact, he argued,

the prospects for small steps to minimize tensions, let

alone to promote political reconciliation, are modest

at best over the near-term. Indeed, the greater

likelihood in the near-term is that Indo-Pakistani

relations will continue to worsen, . . . .61

At the present time CAMs/CBMs cannot on their own inspire

anything recognizably like "confidence" between India and

Pakistan. That "confidence" can only follow their successful

negotiation of a mutual stand-down from the very abrasive

military brinkmanship now being practiced in Kashmir, which only

the most determined and persistent diplomacy, convinced of the

utter futility of present behavior, could possibly achieve.

Diplomacy of that kind, unfortunately, is presently nowhere in

sight in South Asia.

Conclusion.

Pakistan faces demonstrably major challenges to its

security. For some of these challenges, Pakistan's own political

failings are unquestionably to blame. For others, however, blame

must be allocated more widely within the region and at the level

of global politics. Fashionable "post-modernist" arguments

maintaining that the Indian threat is largely contrived, that it

has been "socially constructed" by Pakistan's corrupt and selfserving ruling elite, and that the task of liberating Pakistan

from the bondage of insecurity can be accomplished mainly by

reform from within--by overturning the "meta-narrative" of

permanent India-Pakistan enmity, while at the same time

liberating the captive "subaltern" masses--are mere caricatures

of the actual circumstances in which Pakistan presently finds

itself. These circumstances, in fact, do not leave Pakistan much

room for maneuver; its options for overcoming or at least coping

with the challenges are severely limited. Turning Pakistan's back
70

on South Asia (at least the Hindu core of it), a major

implication of the Pan-Islamic Option, is too dangerous, too

self-defeating, and simply too unlikely of success to make it an

attractive prospect for Pakistan's security managers. The

Domestic Liberalization Option, in spite of its immense

ideological appeal and seeming potential to improve materially

the lot of Pakistanis, tackles the tenacious problem of

Pakistan's external security mainly by trying to forget it.

Pressing in upon Pakistani decisionmakers is the unsettling

possibility that time may be running out for Pakistan, that its

backwardness relative to other countries will severely damage its

prospects in the 21st century, and that, however unpalatable the

choices before it may be, running the risk of applying them

cannot be put off indefinitely. The Regional Cooperation Option

is the only viable option for Pakistanis to pursue. There is no

insurance, however, that they will be willing to implement it.

There are a number of initial steps that India and Pakistan

might take in regard to the pivotal issue of Kashmir.62 Kashmir is

not the only, or even the most important, obstacle to normalized

India-Pakistan relations, but without some sign of progress in

regard to Kashmir--which now symbolizes their enmity more than

anything else--progress anywhere else in their relationship will

be stifled. Unfortunately, however, the problem in South Asia is

not really one of imagining steps that India and Pakistan might

take towards peace. There is no doubt at all that Pakistanis and

Indians, properly motivated, could develop such steps on their

own.

The more likely is that the governments of these two

countries are not yet sufficiently convinced that the situation

is urgent enough to warrant the prolonged and heavy expenditure

of political capital that would certainly be required to bring

both sides seriously to the negotiating table. Indians, for their

part, face vast problems of political unrest, religious

nationalism, and economic backwardness. They feel compelled,

moreover, to maintain a powerful armed force against a still more

powerful neighbor, China. At the same time, Indians display

little interest in making concessions to Pakistan, which they

believe, not unnaturally, labors to undermine India's

international prestige while contributing significantly to its

political unrest. Pakistanis, in turn, are understandably

disturbed by the scale of economic, cultural, and military power

growing beyond their eastern border, by the standing threat to

their country's fragile Islamic identity represented by Indian

secularism, and, not least, by India's mounting attractiveness to

the world's great powers. Their leaders see little to be gained

from negotiations; they are terribly vulnerable, should they

enter into them, to charges of betraying their nation's

interests.
71

 Redefining Pakistan's security in terms that the West might

find more acceptable will certainly be difficult, and it may, for

the time being at least, prove impossible. Until this changes,

the rest of the world can help India and Pakistan with constant

encouraging dialogue and, most importantly, with concrete and

evenhanded political, military, and economic gestures towards the

region that discourage fighting. But, in the end, making South

Asia more secure is mainly a task that South Asians must perform.

If this is so, perhaps it is our own patience and perseverance,

oddly enough, that are most in need of cultivation.

Source: Tables 1-6 are compiled from multi-source data provided

in Remy Herrera's Statistics on Military Methodological Problems,

and Sources, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development, 1994.

 ____________________________________________________

 Rank Country Military World Rank

 (among DCs) Expenditures

 ____________________________________________________

 1 China 22,330 6

 2 Saudi Arabia 4,798 8

 3 India 9,588 10

 4 Iraq 9,268 11

 5 ROK* 8,168 12

 6 Taiwan 6,562 15

 7 Iran 5,306 17

 8 Brazil 4,900 18

 9 Republic of South 3,804 22

 Africa

 10 Israel 3,801 23

 11 Egypt 3,672 26

 12 Pakistan 2,906 31

 _____________________________________________________

* Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Table 1. 1990 Military Expenditure,

Selected Developing Countries (DCs)

(in million 1988 dollars)
72

______________________________________________________________

 Rank Country Number World Rank Population

(among DCs) of Troops (millions)

 (millions)

______________________________________________________________

 1 China 3,783 1 1,170.7

2 India 1,362 4 862.7

3 DPRK* 1,040 5 22.2

 4 Vietnam 1,000 6 68.1

 5 ROK 750 8 43.8

 6 Iran 573 9 59.9

7 Pakistan 5,20 12 121.5

8 Egypt 494 14 53.6

 9 Taiwan 425 15 20.3

10 Syria 412 16 12.8

______________________________________________________________

* Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Table 2. Number of Troops, Selected Developing Countries, 1991
73

 _______________________________________________________

Rank Country 1992 1988-92

 _______________________________________________________

1 India 3,709 12,235

2 Saudi Arabia 883 8,690

 3 Afghanistan 0 7,515

 4 Iraq 0 4,967

 5 Iran 877 3,632

 6 ROK 414 3,524

7 Pakistan 432 3,486

8 Egypt 621 3,295

 9 Thailand 869 3,270

10 DPRK 24 3,123

 _______________________________________________________

Table 3. Major Arms Importers, Developing Countries, 1988-92

(in million 1990 dollars)

_____________________________________________________

 Rank Country Percent of Cumulative

 Production Percent

_____________________________________________________

 1 India 31 31

 2 Israel 23 54

 3 Republic of

 South Africa 9 63

 4 Brazil 9 72

 5 Taiwan 8 80

 6 All other DCs 20 100

 ______________________________________________________

Table 4. Major Arms Producers, Developing Countries, 1950-85
74

___________________________________________________

 Rank Country Number of Defense Workers

___________________________________________________

 1 China 5,000,000

 2 India 280,000

 3 Egypt 100,000

 4 Israel 90,000

 5 Brazil 75,000

 6 DPRK 55,000

 7 Taiwan 50,000

 8 ROK 45,000

 9 Pakistan 40,000

 10 Indonesia 26,000

___________________________________________________

Table 5. Major Defense Industry Employers,

Developing Countries, c. 1990

 _____________________________________________________________

 World Enterprise Country SalesB Jobsc

 RankA

 _____________________________________________________________

 34 Israel Aircraft Ind. Israel 1,410 17,000

 45 Ordnance Factories India 1,120 173,000

 64 Armscor Republic 710 20,000

 of South

 Africa

 81 Israel Military Ind. Israel 490 8,500

 83 Rafael Israel 450 5,100

 99 Hindustan Aeronautics India 370 35,000

 ______________________________________________________________

a

 Enterprises ranked by turnover in military sector.

b

 Arms sales expressed in millions of dollars.

c

 Total number of people employed in the enterprise.

Table 6. Biggest Defense Enterprises, Developing Countries, 1991
75

 ___________________________________________________

 Country Primary Secondary

 Total Female Total Female

 ____________________________________________________

 Pakistan 46 31 21 13

 India 102 90 44 32

 Bangladesh 77 71 19 12

 Sri Lanka 107 105 74 77

 Kenya 95 93 29 25

 Iran 109 104 57 49

 Egypt 101 93 80 73

 Turkey 112 107 60 50

 ROK 105 106 90 91

 Canada 107 106 104 104

____________________________________________________

Source: World Bank, Human Development Report 1995, New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1995, Table 28, pp. 216-17.

Table 7. Primary and Secondary Education,

Percent Enrollment in 1992 (Showing Female Share)*

*Gross enrollment ratios may exceed 100 percent since the

definition of primary or secondary school age varies from country

to country.
76

_______________________________________________________________

 Region/ Life Exp. Illiteracy, GNP/Per Cap. World

 Country 1993 (Yrs) Adult 1990(%) 1993 (US$) Rank*

_______________________________________________________________

SOUTH ASIA 60 54 310 -

Pakistan 62 65 430 31*

India 61 52 300 20

Bangladesh 56 65 220 12

Nepal 54 74 190 8

Sri Lanka 72 12 600 39

LOW-INCOME 62 41 380 -

Vietnam 66 12 170 5

Kenya 58 31 270 15

Uganda 45 52 180 7

MIDDLE-INCOME 68 17 2,480 -

Colombia 70 13 1,400 67

Philippines 67 10 850 53

Algeria 67 43 1,780 73

Turkey 67 19 2,970 85

HIGH-INCOME 77 - 23,090 -

United States 76 >5 24,740 128

WORLD 66 33 4,420 -

______________________________________________________________

*GNP/Per capita: The lower the number, the lower the rank.

Table 8. Human Development, Basic Indicators

Source: Source: World Bank, Human Development Report 1995, New

York: Oxford University Press, 1995, Table 1, pp. 162-63.
77

ENDNOTES

1. Sandy Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War: Winners and

Losers," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 10, October 1995, p. 894. For

an extended discussion of the themes in this article, see

Gordon's recent study, India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth

Century and Beyond, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995. Gordon is

a Fellow at the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,

Australian National University.

2. Ibid. p. 895.

3. Gordon's own thoughtful observations in this regard are

themselves extremely revealing. See India's Rise to Power, pp.

155-244.

4. On this, see Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the

Kashmir Dispute, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 238-241.

The United Kingdom and Australia have apparently decided to

follow the U.S. lead in regard to the obsolescence of the

plebiscite provisions of the UN resolutions.

5. For details and illuminating Senate debate over the Brown

Amendment and the F-l6 arrangement negotiated with Pakistan by

the Clinton administration, see U. S. Congress, Congressional

Record and Debates of the 104th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 141,

Nos. 107 (June 28, 1995), 109 (June 30, 1995), 129 (August 4,

1995), 147 (September 20, 1995), 148 (September 21, 1995), 153

(September 28, 1995), and 154 (September 29, 1995), Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.

6. Senior Indian defense analyst P. R. Chari of the Center

for Policy Research in New Delhi was reported to have said, in

the face of official Indian claims to the contrary, that "the

military balance will change [as a result of the U.S. decision],

but not in any manner that tilts it against India." Ranjan Roy,

"India-Arms Race," Associated Press, September 22, 1995.

7. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International

Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Testimony of

Bruce O. Riedel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near

Eastern and South Asian Affairs, December 6, 1995, Washington,

DC, p. 7 (typescript).

8. Recent press reports that the French government was

reconsidering its proposed sale of 40 late-model Mirage 2000 jet

fighters to Pakistan were merely the latest manifestation of this

(from Pakistan's point of view) distasteful trend. "France says

no contract with Pakistan, Taiwan," Reuters, January 22, 1996.

9. R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway, "Spy Photos
78

Suggest China Missile Trade; Pressure for Sanctions Builds Over

Evidence That Pakistan Has M-11s," The Washington Post, July 3,

1995.

10. Among other major projects, China and Pakistan are

collaborating on joint development of a lightweight combat

fighter, the FC-1, apparently intended for export to the air

forces of developing countries. "Jane's-Fighter," Associated

Press, June 14, 1995; and "China plans combat fighter for

export," Reuters, December 31, 1995.

11. Gordon, "South Asia After the Cold War," p. 881.

12. Remy Herrera, Statistics on Military Expenditure in

Developing Countries: Concepts, Methodological Problems and

Sources, Appendices 2, 6, 7.1, 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3, Paris:

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1994, pp.

60-66. Most of Herrera's tables are abbreviated for space

considerations.

13. Amit Gupta, "Determining India's Force Structure and

Military Doctrine: I Want MiG," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 5, May

1995, pp. 441-458. For an earlier and more extended discussion

strongly supportive of at least the main elements of Gupta's

argument, see Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or

Drift in Defence Policy?, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,

1994.

14. On this topic, see (on Pakistan) Robert E. Looney,

"Budgetary Dilemmas in Pakistan: Costs and Benefits of Sustained

Defense Expenditures," Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1994,

pp. 417-429; and (on India) Gordon, India's Rise to Power, pp.

117-142.

15. Marcus W. Brauchli, "Pakistan Totters Near Financial

Crisis," The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1995, p. A10.

16. India's recent announcement that serial production of

its medium-range Prithvi missile was underway and that it would

soon deploy this missile, which is believed capable of delivering

nuclear warheads up to l50 miles, was one indicator of the

present state of affairs. Jawed Naqvi, "India to deploy Prithvi

missile, plans new test," Reuters, January l6, 1996.

17. Reported by Michael Perry, "Asian economic boom to fuel

region's mil," Reuters, April 20, 1995.

18. Gordon, India's Rise to Power, pp. 348-349.

19. For background, see Robert G. Wirsing, The Baluchis and

Pathans, Report No. 48, London: The Minority Rights Group, July
79

1987.

20. Two superb recent studies of Afghanistan's contemporary

political crises are Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of

Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, New York:

Oxford University Press, 1995; and Barnett R. Rubin, The

Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the

International System, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

21. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, "The Decline of the Pashtuns in

Afghanistan," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 7, July 1995, pp. 621-

634.

22. Tahir Amin, "Pakistan in 1994: The Politics of

Confrontation," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1995, p.

143.

23. "MQM protest strike paralyses violence-torn Karachi,"

Reuters, January 4, 1996; and "Four people killed in Karachi

gunfight," Reuters, January 2, 1996. The number killed in 1995

more than doubled the figure--about 800--for the preceding year.

24. For an overview, see Charles H. Kennedy, "The Politics

of Ethnicity in Sindh," Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10, October

1991, pp. 938-955.

25. See Samina Ahmed, "The Military and Ethnic Politics in

Sindh," in Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul B. Rais, eds., Pakistan

1995, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.

26. "Pakistan sees hand of Indians, Afghans in attacks,"

Reuters, December 27, 1995.

27. For a recent overview of India's Muslim minority, see

Omar Khalidi, Indian Muslims Since Independence, New Delhi,

India: Vikas Press, 1995.

28. For a recent comment on the electoral progress of Hindu

nationalism in India, see Robert G. Wirsing and Debolina

Mukherjee, "The Saffron Surge in Indian Politics: Hindu

Nationalism and the Future of Secularism," Asian Affairs, Vol.

22, No. 3, Fall 1995, pp. 181-206.

29. Quote taken from an unpublished letter sent to the

author by a former Indian diplomat.

30. John F. Burns, "Pakistan Holds 40 Officers Called

Militants," The New York Times, October 17, 1995, p. A5; and Raja

Asghar, "Pakistan begins closed trial of coup plotters," Reuters, December 31, 1995.
80

31. The LOC replaced the Cease-Fire Line established by the

Karachi Agreement of 1949.

32. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, p.

119.

 33. Harinder Baweja, "Resounding Rebuff," India Today,

November 30, 1995, p. 32.

34. For a sampling of the evidence, see Wirsing, India,

Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, pp. 150-152.

35. "Pakistan says it ends long Kashmir blockade," Reuters,

November 28, 1995.

36. For an even bleaker forecast, see U.S. Congress, House,

Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and

the Pacific, Testimony of Michael Krepon, Persident, Henry L.

Stimson Center, December 6, 1995, Washington, DC (typescript).

37. Rubin, p. 179.

38. Ahady, "The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan," pp.

628-629.

39. Adding a particularly ironic twist to developments in

Afghanistan, Russian military advisers have apparently returned

there recently for the first time since 1989 to assist the

tottering regime of President Burhannudin Rabbani with bridge,

road, and airport construction. "Russians boost support for

Rabbani," United Press International, January 23, 1996.

40. Ignoring the protests of the government of President

Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul, Pakistan announced in January 1996

its plans to go ahead with road repair, the opening of a railway

line, and the setting up of branches of the state-run National

Bank of Pakistan in those regions of Afghanistan not now

controlled by Kabul. Raja Asghar, "Pakistan plans links with

rebel-held Afghanistan," Reuters, January 23, 1996.

41. Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, "Afghanistan and Central

Asia: Mirrors and Models," Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 7, July

1995, p. 617. For additional commentary on the regional

geopolitics of the strife in Afghanistan, see Zalmay Khalilzad,

"Afghanistan in 1994: Civil War and Disintegration," Asian

Survey, Vol. 35, No. 2, February 1995, pp. 147-152; Anwar-ul-Haq

Ahady, "The Changing Interests of Regional Powers and the

Resolution of the Afghan Conflict," Asian Affairs, Vol. 21, No.

2, Summer 1994, pp. 80-93; and Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "Afghanistan

and the Regional Powers," Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 9, September

1993, pp. 905-922.
81

42. Ali Bouzerda, "Pakistan plans Islamic summit in 1997-

minister," Reuters, January 5, 1996.

43. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?,"

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

44. See, for example, Graham Fuller and Ian Lesser, A Sense

of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Boulder, CO:

Westview Press, 1995; Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political

Islam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994; and Fouad

Ajami, "The Summoning," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4,

September/October 1993, pp. 2-9.

45. Harinder Baweja, "The Hostage Crisis," India Today,

September 15, 1995, p. 20.

46. Iran differs with Pakistan, apparently, over the virtue

of supporting the upstart (almost entirely Pashtun and Sunni)

Taleban militia. Raja Asghar, "Afghan rebel militia rejects

Iranian mediation," Reuters, January 4, 1996.

47. Anis Ahmed, "Protesters decry forcible ‘push back' by

Pakistan," Reuters, November 23, 1995.

48. Among the best studies of Pakistan's militarist

foundations is Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The

Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge,

Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

49. On this topic, see James Lee Ray, Democracy and

International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace

Proposition, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995.

50. The total fertility rate is a World Bank indicator

representing the number of children that would be born to a woman

if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear

children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific

fertility rates.

51. Hugo Diaz, Pakistan Poverty Assessment Report, Washington, DC: World Bank, September 1995.

52. School enrollment data were not reported for all l32

countries in the survey.

53. Quoted in Lee L. Bean, "Growth Without Change: The

Demography of Pakistan," in J. Henry Korson, ed., Contemporary

Problems of Pakistan, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p. 37.

54. Lisa Vaughan, "South Asian nations agree to unfetter
82

trade fast," Reuters, November 17, 1995; idem, "South Asia edges

toward ambitious poverty goal," Reuters, January 4, 1996.

55. Pakistani reticence when it comes to expanding trade

with India owes a large part of its motivation to fear of India's

economic superiority. See, for instance, "Pakistan official sees

risks in trade with India," Reuters, January 14, 1996.

56. See, for instance, Narayanan Madhavan, "India-Pakistan

ties sour before World Cup cricket," Reuters, January 3, 1996.

57. See, for instance, Toufiq A. Siddiqi, "India-Pakistan

Cooperation on Energy and Environment: To Enhance Security,"

Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 3, March 1995, pp. 280-290.

58. Just how deep these differences lie in Indian history

is, of course, a focus today of immense controversy among

historians. For one argument that the roots of Hindu-Muslim

hostility are historically very deep indeed, see Gerald Larson,

India's Agony Over Religion, Albany: State University of New York

Press, 1995.

59. "Right-wing leader for a nuclear India," United Press

International, November 18, 1995; and "Kashmir a major poll plank

for India Hindu party," Reuters, November 13, 1995.

60. See, for instance, Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds.,

Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building, and Reconciliation in

South Asia, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995; Michael Krepon

and Jill R. Junnola, eds., Regional Confidence Building in 1995:

South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, Report No. 20,

Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1995; and

Samina Yasmeen and Aabha Dixit, Confidence-building in South

Asia, Occasional Paper No. 23, Washington, DC: The Henry L.

Stimson Center, September 1995. This last essay, which emphasizes

a nonmilitary, mainly psychological and perceptual understanding

of confidence-building, exhibits both the extraordinary breadth

of definition and part of the weakness of the CAM/CBM project.

61. Michael Krepon, "South Asia: A Time of Trouble, A Time

of Need," p. 2.

62. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute, pp.

255-263.
83

CHAPTER IV

TIGERS IN THE SHATTERBELT:

ASEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE TO THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND

Marc Jason Gilbert

Introduction.

The decade between 1986 and 1996 witnessed a sea change in

Southeast Asia's security posture. At the beginning of this era,

the Cold War still shaped the agenda of its most significant

regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN).1 ASEAN's primary security interests then were focused on

keeping the Cold War's great powers from enveloping the entire

region in war. Later, ASEAN was preoccupied with addressing the

Cold War's chief legacy in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam-Cambodian

debacle. Yet the Cold War provided ASEAN with a clear mandate to

develop an indigenous regional response to international

conflict. With the waning of the Cold War, ASEAN's mandate on

questions of security and regional defense remained clear, but it

became far more complex. ASEAN faced the daunting task of

encouraging intra-regional cooperation among nations long at odds

with each other, while at the same time preserving their

collective security interests--economic as well as military--in

the face of resurgent Asian powers, such as China and Japan.

Ultimately, ASEAN chose to address these new circumstances

in a manner consistent with traditional patterns of Southeast

Asian interstate politics derived from the region's status as the

Eastern anchor of what world historians often call the world's

"shatterbelt." The informality, flexibility, and gradualism that

currently characterize ASEAN's approach to security issues are,

in fact, typical of an indigenous security architecture that has

served the region well for centuries. However, while evidence

suggests that this architecture is well-designed to meet many of

the challenges posed by today's volatile Asian affairs, the

ability of Southeast Asia to maintain an independent course in

those affairs remains problematic. Only the extension of ASEAN's

approach to regional security to the whole of Asia offers much

hope to its member nations that they may play a significant role

in any Asian security regime. It is suggested here that this

development may well be Asia's best hope for peace and stability

to the year 2000 and beyond.

The Shatterbelt.

ASEAN's current security architecture is firmly rooted in

its experience as part of the so-called "shatterbelt." This is a

region of the earth that stretches from Southeast Asia across the
84

Himalayas and Hindu Kush to Afghanistan, then across Central Asia

to the Caucasus and Anatolia and onward to Southern Europe. The

human terrain of this belt is complex; it encompasses lands which

have long served both as a corridor for human migration and a

terminus. Successive waves of disparate ethnic groups have

settled there without wholly displacing their predecessors, thus

ensuring that, among them, there will be legacies of both

prolonged conflict and co-existence.

This pattern of settlement is complicated further by the

belt's positioning along fracture lines separating the world's

most powerful and dynamic urban civilizations. Each of the

shatterbelt's human populations owes much to these civilizations,

but their identities depend on defining themselves as unique from

them. Experience has shown that shatterbelt states are too

internally divided and too geo-politically or economically weak

to sustain their absolute independence at all times against the

hegemonic ambitions of these civilizations.

As a result, the art of survival in the shatterbelt has

depended most often not upon proud defiance, but artful

compromise, not upon bold initiatives, but measured small steps.

Peace has been sustained not by unilateral action, but by

bilateral or multilateral agreements brokered between internal

factions, regional partners, and/or extra-regional powers. States

in the shatterbelt have experienced periods of great achievement

when observing these imperatives and utter misery when they have

not, as the recent histories of former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,

and Vietnam make clear.

The Shaping of ASEAN's Modus Operandi.

ASEAN's birth was dictated by the Cold War global bipolarism

that divided the nations along the entire shatterbelt into camps

joined to opposing external powers. Locally, this division

stimulated rivalries within and between mainland and island

Southeast Asia and recast ancient enmities in terms of critiques

of the international economic order. Further, in the aftermath of

the Cold War, the region was rife with leadership structures that

favored authoritarian and/or militarist political orders that had

little use for transparency. These leadership structures were

naturally suspicious of their neighbors and doubly suspicious of

the loyalty of their own minority populations whose lands of

origin lay directly across disputed border lands and/or sea 

lanes. Yet, ASEAN actually benefitted from this turmoil as it

forced its member states to confront the immutability of the

region's common traditional shatterbelt security concerns: the

fear of the loss of national sovereignty (from command over

fractionated populations to command over vital economic

resources), the fear of bilateral interstate relations with
85

untrustworthy allies, and the fear of international alliances

that held out the promise of collective security but fomented

regional competition and led to subordinate relations with

neighboring great powers that could guarantee them only an

inferior place in the global division of labor.

With its Cold War experience as a base line, ASEAN was

disinclined to adopt a binding multilateral regional security

structure either of the tentative type broached by Soviet General

Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in the 1970s or the more inclusive plan

suggested later by Mikhail Gorbachev. Nor did ASEAN intend to

ride the coattails of a coalition of Asian powers either linked

to or independent of the United States. The drawdown of

Soviet/Russian and U.S. forces in Asia, China's unstable economic

condition and objections to multilateral alliances, and Japan's

history and its inability, at least in the short term, to deter

possible Chinese aggression, left ASEAN with no acceptable

partners in any Concert of Asia. The very weakness of the postCold War U.S. presence in Southeast Asia enhanced, in ASEAN's

view, America's role as a possible regional power broker and/or

balance wheel; but the propensity of the United States, China,

and Japan to juggle power among themselves and to relegate

Southeast Asia to the status of a junior partner in Asian-Pacific

economic and security arrangements thus far has deterred ASEAN

from hitching its star to American initiatives.

A powerful internal logic also has acted to forestall

ASEAN's rapid evolution into a formal defense community like the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO, like most

alliances, owes its existence to immediate and sustained external

threats. Yet ASEAN matured at a time when the chief challenge was

not to deter an invasion or force of arms, but to remove the

grounds for future aggression by eliminating conditions in which

threats to regional security could emerge. ASEAN's search for

appropriate preventative diplomacy led naturally to the

development of the confidence-building measures and patterns of

constructive engagement which now characterize its approach to

security issues. Determined to avoid the tendency of Cold War-era

diplomacy to employ multilateral defense umbrellas as a means to

define and separate nations rather than bring them together,

ASEAN sought to build regional consensus for peace upon a

foundation of trust arising from a multitude of successful

bilateral arrangements. These were expected to form an inclusive

security web, rather than a wall or line in the sand.

The benefits of ASEAN's defense posture were many. ASEAN was

able to stimulate friendly contacts between the region's 

political and military establishments and surround potential

enemies with a comforting cocoon of institutional contacts,

economic ties, and transparent low-level military accords. While

promoting inclusive and expandable strategic protocols (for
86

example, most recently the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free

Zone), ASEAN avoided formal defense agreements, preferring postministerial meetings, caucuses, and even state dinners to

treaties and official meetings. Many criticized this preference

as too tentative, but, as Michael Antolik has noted, "It

exemplifies what Singapore Ambassador Tommy Koh called the Asian

preference for the step-by-step, non-institutional approach."2

ASEAN in the 1990s.

ASEAN's current effort at facilitating Thai-Vietnamese

rapproachment, which has long been seen as the key to peace and

stability in the region, epitomizes the success of this approach.

Prior to 1986, only Indonesia's relations with China may have

been as dark as those between Thailand and Vietnam. Each saw the

other as an aggressive, hegemonic power with diametrically

opposed economic interests, to say nothing of ideological

orientation. Between 1986 and 1991, changes in the world economic

and political order, most particularly Vietnam's increasing need

to import capital and Thailand's need to export capital, favored

improved relations. However, differences over the role and

influence of China in the development of the Mekong Basin,

complicated by the legacy of Cold War antagonisms, helped keep

both nations apart, even as the chief issue driving ThaiVietnamese foreign policy discord--the Cambodian embroligo--wound

down. Vietnam hoped that with the success of doi moi (the

Vietnamese equivalent of Perestroika, or reconstruction) upon

which the survival of both the Vietnamese nation and its

leadership depended, the Cold War division between communist and

non-communist states in Southeast Asia would soon fade.

Therefore, with the waning of the old bipolar ideological

differences, the region's states came to realize that improved

relations among ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos would allow these states

to present a strong, united front in defense of the region's

interests.

The problem for Vietnam was an absence of trust between

itself and Thailand, sustained, in part, by the almost complete

lack of personal knowledge of each other's leadership. This lack

of knowledge prevented Vietnam and Thailand from recognizing that

a new wave of pragmatic outward-looking technocrats was coming to

the fore in both states. Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet

sought to break through these clouds of mistrust and ignorance by

making a tour of ASEAN member states in 1991. Had ASEAN not been

committed to developing consensus and bilateral relationships

among its members and neighbors as the foundation for

multilateral agreements, it is possible that Vo Van Kiet's 1991

tour (and those that were to follow in successive years) would

have achieved little.
87

ASEAN's policy of inclusion, however, turned Vietnam's

overture into a prelude for Vietnam's and Laos's 1992 signing of

ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The countries'

entry into this agreement qualified them for the admission to

observer status at ASEAN's Annual Ministerial Meeting.3 By 1994,

the foreign ministers of both nations were added to the newly

established ASEAN Regional Forum, a brief, informal, allinclusive post-Annual Ministerial Meeting gathering that is the

fullest expression to date of ASEAN's vision of a security

community. As a result of these confidence-building efforts,

Thailand joined other ASEAN states in sending high-level

delegations to Hanoi, breaking decades of estrangement. By this

gradual process, ASEAN not only helped provide the necessary

political space for improvements in Thai-Vietnamese relations and

paved the way for Vietnam's and Laos's admission to ASEAN, but it

did so without angering China, for that nation was simultaneously

wooed into the Regional Forum's fold. In fact, ASEAN's

receptivity to Vietnam's initial overtures may have played a role

in encouraging the ground-breaking Sino-Vietnamese dialogue that

culminated in ministerial and summit meetings between Vietnamese

and Chinese leaders in 1993.

ASEAN's successful effort to begin bridging the

communist/non-communist divide in Southeast Asia was merely one

of the more dramatic of ASEAN's achievements since 1990. Other

successes include reducing occasional Thai and Indonesian muscleflexing as regional kingpins and working with the United States

to steer Malaysian efforts at creating what has been

characterized by one scholar as "an East Asian Economic Zone

without Caucasians"4 to something less exclusive and more

productive, such as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). ASEAN

also has encouraged a variety of schemes to promote the interregional exchange of intelligence data and participation in joint

military training and exercises. ASEAN soon may develop a "coast

guard" capacity to address commonly the piracy, smuggling, and

illegal immigration issues that have long troubled the region.

Other plans include a regional center for security studies, a

regional register of arms holdings or transfers, and a code to

govern arms sales so as to reduce fears of an arms race raised by

the somewhat inevitable modernization and expansion of virtually

all armies and navies in the region.5

ASEAN's Security Architecture to the Year 2000.

ASEAN, however, remains reluctant to effect the transition

to a European-style defense alliance. In 1994, after signing a

defense accord with the Philippines, Malaysian Defense Minister

Njaib Abdul Razak declared that Southeastern Asian states were

working to form "a network of defense ties that will enable them

to act as military allies." Yet, at the same time he rejected the
88

idea that ASEAN might turn into a formal defense alliance,

arguing that this "would only heighten regional tension."6 ASEAN

seems determined to act on the principle that by not even

mentioning the word "security" in its Regional (Security) Forum,

this body is freer to promote it.

 The Clinton administration has noted how wide ASEAN and its

member states have spread their Taoist web of collective

bilateral threads. His administration has even facilitated this

development by the removal of its own traditional objection to

multilateral arrangements in Asia. At the urging of ASEAN leaders

to adopt a posture more in tune with Asian realities as they saw

it, President Clinton has expressed the hope that the ASEAN

technique of building multilateral agreements on the basis of

bilateral agreements "can function like overlapping plates of

armor, covering the full body of our common security concerns."7

The measure may be taken of ASEAN's ability to contribute to

the realization of such a goal, as well as the basic strengths

and weaknesses of ASEAN's approach, by ASEAN's recent response to

China's effort to increase its influence and military presence in

Myanmar. That state's leaders, as is so often the case in the

shatterbelt, have sought to strengthen themselves against

domestic turmoil and international isolation by opening their

doors to a stronger neighbor. China's base building and massive

military assistance to Myanmar's government over the past 3 years

have been viewed with great concern by the United States and

India. Both of these governments have urged ASEAN to join with

them to oppose China's seeming projection of its power into the

Indian Ocean and to condemn Myanmar's human rights record. For

its part, India also sought to advance its desiderata of a

military alliance among itself, ASEAN, and Japan, to contain

future Chinese expansionism or, at the very least, to discourage

China from arming insurgents on the India side of the old ChinaBurma-Indian frontier.

ASEAN member states did bridle when the Myanmar government,

buoyed by Chinese assistance, resumed the persecution and

deportation of its Muslim population, but ASEAN itself remained

true to its nature. Much to the chagrin of the United States and

(at least initially) India, ASEAN employed its tried and true

instrument of constructive engagement in an attempt to wean

Myanmar away from dependence on China and into the ASEAN fold.8

The accomplishment of this task would finally bring all the major

states of the region under the ASEAN umbrella. It would also send

a typically soft, but important, message to China: there is far

more profit to be made by respecting ASEAN's influence as a geopolitical balance wheel and its value as a friendly trading block

than by viewing it as a speedbump on the highway to a

confrontation with India. As economics, and not global military

reach, seems at present to be driving China's Myanmar policy,
89

ASEAN may once again be able to finesse its way toward a more

stable security environment. However, in the event of a Chinese

economic collapse or political crisis, the keepers of the Middle

Kingdom might exercise its traditional territorial ambitions in

this direction or, given its shifting position on the Spratly

Islands, in any direction. Whither then, ASEAN?

The inability of ASEAN to muster sufficient threat of force

to deter aggression is of paramount importance to those who 

doubt the viability of ASEAN as a guarantor of regional security

and stability. How, they ask, can ASEAN nations defend even their

own region adequately without becoming a part of a larger, more

formal defense scheme involving some combination of Asian and

Western Powers? Some admit that ASEAN's current security

architecture is well designed to sustain ASEAN interests in a

world fundamentally hostile to smaller or weak regional national

groupings, but they nonetheless argue that the ability of such

regional groupings to secure their place in the emerging New

World Order (and their viability within it) may be limited.

ASEAN might answer that the more formal arrangements its

critics favor offer no panacea. It could argue that the European

Community and NATO proved unable to apply an early saving salve

to the open wound that was Yugoslavia in crisis, and that only

now, when the mere gangrenous stumps of that nation remain, is

NATO adopting the type of "confidence building" approach ASEAN

has for so long favored. ASEAN also could argue that Operations

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM demonstrate that coalition-building

and force inter-operablity--further ASEAN strengths--are the wave

of the future.

Further, as Robert B. Oxnam has observed, ASEAN has

succeeded better at least than American foreign policy advisers

at meeting what he calls the "central challenge in the future of

America's Asia policy . . . treating headaches before they become

migraine crises."9 If Oxnam is correct in this judgment, it would

seem that in the post-Cold War era the ASEAN model for conflict

management bears close study and possesses no little utility as a

model for the region, particularly in view of the fact that the

area of greatest tension in Asia, the China-Korea-Japan triangle,

is also the area with the fewest ASEAN-style overlapping

bilateral and other confidence-building agreements.

U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry seems to have grasped

the value of ASEAN's approach to Northeast Asia, if Eurocentrically. Disturbed by the sabre-rattling between China and

Taiwan that has accompanied the run-up to the recent Taiwanese

elections, Perry called for the defense chiefs of China, Japan,

the United States, and other Asian and Pacific nations to create

a new forum for the discussion of regional security issues. Perry

declared that "the time has come for the defense leaders of the
90

Asia-Pacific region to begin forming our own web or security

ties," and suggested that Asian nations could use as a model the

Partnership for Peace Forum in Europe, whose goal is to "promote

western military cooperation with Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union without issuing formal security guarantees."10 An

inclusive, informal security forum for all of Asia that does not

even use the word "security" in its title would appear to be

ASEAN's Regional Forum writ large, with the added benefit of

providing a sturdier framework. Many observers believe that even

Southeast Asia's security problems can no longer be addressed

effectively by ASEAN's post-ministerial meetings on security

issues that seem all too quickly to adjourn to the golf course.

Some critics of Asia's lack of a single multinational

security forum would go farther than Perry. They seek a formal

alliance structure similar to NATO.11 Those who advocate any

course that does not reflect traditional regional verities,

however, may be under a misapprehension of what an Asian tiger

represents. Some Asian leaders and their Western colleagues

employ the term to mean a rising and worthy competitor. In the

shatterbelt, however, the tiger is often viewed as the vehicle

for a wandering spirit that defends its vision of dharma (moral

law) and preys upon the unrighteous. ASEAN has kept these tigers

at bay by seeking "acceptable understandings" with the great

powers, equitable relations among member states, and a gradual,

but increasingly equitable, global distribution of wealth. The

pacific, informal, and consensus-seeking strategic posture ASEAN

has thus far pursued has kept much of Southeast Asia safe from

predators, vengeful or otherwise; its successes--from avoiding

U.S-North Korea-type confrontations to promoting the region's

economic growth as the best medicine for its security problems--

bid others to apply that strategy beyond the confines of

Southeast Asia.

Conclusion.

This path may be the only one ASEAN can follow given its

relative weakness, but ASEAN's achievements to date, or more

accurately, the unpleasantness of available alternatives, are

also a warning to any who might be tempted to exploit their

military and economic advantage over the region. The sources and

pattern of ASEAN's security community remind us of what witnesses

to the history of Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chechnya, and Bosnia

already know: it profiteth little anyone who lets loose the tiger

in the shatterbelt.

ENDNOTES

1. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created in

1967 by Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
91

Philippines. Newly-independent Brunei joined in 1984. Cambodia

and Vietnam were granted observer status in 1993; in 1995 Vietnam

became a full-member.

2. Michael Antolik, "The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of

Constructive Engagement," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16,

No. 2, September 1994, p. 125.

3. See Surin Maisrikrod, "‘The Peace Dividend' in Southeast

Asia: The Political Economy of New Thai-Vietnamese Relations,"

Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 1, June 1994, pp. 46-

66.

4. N. Ganesan, "Rethinking ASEAN as a Security Community in

Southeast Asia," Asian Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 1995, p.

222.

5. See Bunn Nagara, "The Notion of an Arms Race in the AsiaPacific," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No. 2, September

1995, pp. 186-206; and Sheldon W. Simon, "U.S. Strategy and

Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility," Contemporary

Southeast Asia, Vol. 14, No. 4, March 1993, p. 312.

6. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 157, No. 40, October

6, 1994, p. 13.

7. These remarks were made by U. S. President William

Clinton during his 1993 visit to South Korea and noted by Frank

Ching, "Creation of a Security Forum is a Feather in ASEAN's

Cap," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 156, No. 32, August 12,

1993, p. 27.

8. J. Mohan Malik, "Sino-Indian Rivalry in Myanmar:

Implications for Regional Security," Contemporary Southeast Asia,

Vol. 16, No. 2, September 1994, pp. 137-155.

9. Robert B. Oxnam, "Asia/Pacific Challenges," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 1, 1992, p. 72.

10. "U.S. Seeking Forum to Calm Asia Tensions," The New York

Times, February 14, 1996, p. A6.

11. On January 12, 1996, Thai Defense Minister General

Chavalit Yongchaiyudh announced in Hanoi that Thailand and Hanoi

would discuss "proposals for a NATO-style regional defense block"

designed to "solve all disputes in the region" which the two

countries intended to present to other Southeast Asian nations at

a conference in March of that same year. The Minister further

remarked, "Of course, we don't expect any disputes in the region,

but if there are, we should have an organization to solve them.

An example for that is NATO, in Europe, which is the organization
92

to solve all such kind of disputes or disagreements." See The

Indochina Digest, Vol. 9, No. 3, January 19, 1996, p. 3. The

Indochina Digest is a weekly publication of the Indochina

Project, a nonprofit program of the Vietnam Veterans of America

Foundation in Washington, DC.
93

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA:

TOWARDS A NEW ERA

Perry Wood

Introduction.

The 1990s will be remembered as an age of transition in Asia

and the world. The old certainties of the Cold War are no longer

relevant, but the outlines of the new post-Cold War era remain

vague and uncertain. It is clear that we are headed toward a new

international system, but the nature of that system remains as

yet undetermined. It will be the leaders, policies, and events of

the next decade which will shape and define the Asian and world

environments of the 21st century.

Southeast Asia is going through its own historic transition.

For decades, the region was dominated by external powers--the

United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. In 1967, torn

by war, internal instability, and poverty, the non-communist

Southeast Asian states appeared weak and fragile; 1967, however,

was a watershed year. On August 8, 1967, the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established.1

 Its foundation

was really the first step towards the transformation of Southeast

Asia into a center of economically vibrant states with a valid

claim to a political leadership role in Asian and world affairs.

Today, that claim is being realized. The ASEAN states are

likely to be among the fastest growing economies in the world in

the next decade. Their economies are integrated into the rapidly

growing Asian regional economy and their importance as export

markets for American products has risen steadily, along with the

rapid rise in their peoples' standard of living. The increasing

integration of the Asia-Pacific economies parallels the

development of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

forum, which is establishing the political and institutional

structure for even broader economic integration--a process in

which the ASEAN states have played an important role. In

addition, the ASEAN states have extended their "peace" to their

former communist enemies in Indochina--working to bring these

states out of their isolation into the regional renaissance and

realize ASEAN's "historic mission" to become an association of

all Southeast Asian states.2

 Along with the end of the Cold War

and the end of superpower confrontation in Asia, these

developments have led many Asians to hope that the region is

entering upon an unprecedented era of peace, regional

cooperation, and development.
94

Unfortunately, contrary trends are also apparent.

Strategically, the end of superpower dominance has left many

Southeast Asians increasingly worried about external security

matters. Indeed, some Southeast Asians believe that the new

security environment could entail a much greater risk of regional

conflict than the old Cold War era. As the superpower era passes

from the scene, other extra-regional states are assuming a higher

regional military profile as they rapidly attempt to modernize

and expand their military equipment and capabilities. Regional

concerns have focused particularly upon China. With the end of

the Cold War, the Southeast Asians fear that the larger Asian

states' growing affluence and self-confidence may encourage them

to pursue their goals unilaterally. Past experience clearly

indicates that certain of these states may not be reluctant to

use force in pursuit of their goals. Consequently, many Southeast

Asian defense experts worry that the risk of limited conventional

wars and armed conflicts of varying intensity, duration, and

scale could very easily increase in the next century. The ASEAN

states, therefore, are investing in enhanced external military

capabilities, promoting greater ASEAN security cooperation, and

sponsoring an Asia-wide forum on security issues--the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF).

The ASEAN states are attempting also to preserve strong

security ties with the United States, which they believe provides

an indispensable stabilizing presence during this difficult

transition period. But the United States appears increasingly

preoccupied with its internal affairs. Many interpreted the

failure of President Clinton to attend the APEC forum in November

1995 due to the budget impasse in Washington as a sign of this

preoccupation.3 Asians have long recognized that American

foreign policy is "Eurocentric," despite the fact that American

trade with the Pacific has exceeded its trade with Europe for

some time. There are many reasons for this focus on Europe.

American political and cultural ties to the Continent remain

strong, and the top American foreign policymakers have typically

been drawn from the ranks of "Atlanticists" and/or

"Sovietologists" whose natural orientation has been toward

Europe. The Eurocentrism of American policy has, unfortunately,

led to a secondary and often derivative role for the Pacific in

American thinking.

Southeast Asia, in particular, has suffered in neglect since

the end of the Vietnam War. This neglect reflects an unwarranted

complacency regarding the region's role in America's wider global

interests. In addition, the continued neglect of the region

ignores the enormous changes that have occurred in Southeast Asia

in the last two decades, which have led to growing American

interests in the region and the increasing interdependence of

Northeast and Southeast Asian security.
95

The United States and Southeast Asia.

United States-ASEAN Economic Links. ASEAN economic

conditions affect American interests in three main ways. First,

economic progress in ASEAN is a major determinant of regional

stability. Second, commercial relations between the United States

and ASEAN have expanded sharply in recent years. Third, ASEAN has

become increasingly important to the Asian economy as a whole and

specifically to key American allies in Asia, such as Japan and

South Korea.

Economic health is a principal component of ASEAN's

definition of its own security. Economics supports security

through a variety of channels. Perhaps most importantly, economic

growth has been a central element of each member's nationbuilding strategy. The transition from colony to independent

state, particularly for countries as internally diverse as some

ASEAN members, presented a major imperative to create unifying

institutions and linkages; growing markets were a powerful force

to that end. Economic growth was also central to overcoming the

internal security threats faced by most of the ASEAN states in

the 1960s-1970s. Today, internal stability has been achieved

largely by the ASEAN states--a success due more to their economic

successes than any military operations.

The economic relationship between the United States and

ASEAN has grown dramatically over the years. The ASEAN countries

were historically important suppliers of such key commodities as

natural rubber, tin, copper, and petroleum, but have since

emerged as the locations for new and important processing,

manufacturing, and service industries. American and Japanese

investments have been important sources of stimulation for the

growth of these industries. The six ASEAN states have averaged 6

percent annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth since the

1970s. Today, the region is entering upon an economic boom

period. In 1993, the combined Gross National Products (GNPs) of

the ASEAN states topped $350 billion. U.S.-ASEAN trade is

growing at double-digit rates. From 1988-1993, American exports

to ASEAN rose 120 percent. In fact, ASEAN represents the United

States' third largest market, behind the European Union and

Japan. Total U.S. trade with ASEAN exceeded $75 billion in 1993.4

The trends suggest a continued expansion of U.S.-ASEAN links in

the future. These economies will be the "big emerging markets"

for U.S. companies in the next decade.

A similar description can be provided for the growing

importance of links to ASEAN for Japan, and to a lesser extent,

for Taiwan and South Korea. Although in some ways these countries

present competition for American firms, the main effects of their

growing links with ASEAN are beneficial. In particular, the
96

ASEAN-Japan economic relationship is becoming more balanced,

taking pressure off U.S. markets. Indeed, trade growth among

Pacific basin countries is increasingly independent of other

areas, thus greatly stabilizing the world economy and

representing an expanding market for American goods. This trend

has been accelerated by the expansion of regional economic

cooperation both within ASEAN and in the broader APEC forum.

A further benefit is the indirect regional, even global,

impact of ASEAN's success and growing regional role on badly

managed and nonmarket economies. The ASEAN states carry the

American market economy message far more powerfully than any

exhortation from an industrial power. For example, there can be

no doubt that ASEAN's example of economic success had an impact

on Vietnam and the other formerly communist Indochinese states as

they pondered whether and how to take the plunge into the world

economy.

Military Access and Freedom of Maneuver. Southeast Asia is

the gateway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. United States

Navy (USN) and United States Air Force (USAF) forces regularly

transit this strategic region en route to the Indian Ocean, the

Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea from their bases in Japan and the

continental United States (CONUS). American forward defense

strategy requires that the U.S. armed forces, especially the

navy, have relatively easy and rapid access to Southeast Asia and

freedom of movement throughout the region. The vast scope of the

Pacific makes it impossible for U.S. forces to respond in a

timely fashion to an overseas crisis in Asia or the Persian Gulf

without being deployed forward.

The freedom of unimpeded transit through the maritime

straits of Indonesia and Malaysia is central to American

strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Reduced forces and

expanding mission requirements have made shorter sea routes ever

more important to American military planners. The Indonesian

archipelago, stretching 3,000 miles from mainland Southeast Asia

to the Southwest Pacific, forms a natural bridge or barrier

(depending upon one's ability to transit it successfully) from

East Asia from the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. There are

only five major sea routes through this "Malay Barrier."

Transiting vessels which want to avoid entering Indonesian waters

must either use the relatively shallow Torres Strait between

Australia and Papua New Guinea or circumnavigate Australia--both

unappealing alternatives entailing considerably longer transit

times.

Any obstruction of the key straits through the Indonesian

archipelago, therefore, is a threat to the American interest in

free and rapid transit between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Several potential problem areas can be identified. First, a
97

failure to provide adequately for the safety of navigation

through the straits could result in restrictions on transit

either by leading to a major accident blocking the straits

temporarily or by causing the littoral states to restrict transit

rights. This is a particular problem in the Straits of Malacca

due to its narrow width and high traffic volume. Malaysian

officials have suggested frequently that safety requirements and

the protection of the littoral environment might require

restrictions on traffic through the straits. These risks are

increased by the numerous incidents of piracy in the Straits,

which might easily cause a major accident, especially if an oil

tanker is involved.

Second, freedom of transit through the straits could be

restricted by the ongoing legal arguments over the status of

archipelagic seas and the rights of free passage. The Straits of

Malacca lie between Indonesia and Malaysia and are recognized,

under the International Law of the Sea, as an international sea

lane with the right of innocent passage. The other straits,

however, all lie within Indonesia's archipelagic waters. The

extent of Indonesian authority over these sea lanes has been an

issue of contention between the United States and Indonesia. Some

Indonesian officials have claimed that Indonesia can close these

straits and/or establish its own transit regulations for them.

The United States consistently has maintained that these

international straits are archipelagic sea lanes under the Law of

the Sea and subject to the rules of archipelagic sea lanes

passage as stipulated in that international treaty. The number of

international straits through Indonesian waters has also been a

subject of disagreement, with Indonesia attempting to restrict

the number of archipelagic sea lanes through their waters and the

United States attempting to have all significant routes through

the archipelago designated archipelagic sea lanes to protect

freedom of maneuver through the area. The two countries continue

to discuss these matters and have to date avoided any

confrontation over the issue since this would serve neither

country's interests.

An American withdrawal from the region, however, could

threaten this informal understanding in the future. If USN forces

curtail their transits through these waters, they could

jeopardize their status as internationally recognized sea lanes,

especially for those routes not frequently used by commercial

shipping (which largely transits through either the Malacca

Straits or the Lombok-Makassar Straits). More importantly,

however, the withdrawal of any significant American military

presence in the region would force littoral states to reassess

their own security strategy. Restrictions on freedom of transit

through their waters is one action that would be quite likely.

For their own security, one of the littoral states--Indonesia,

Malaysia, or Singapore--might even attempt to deploy forces with
98

the ability to close militarily one or all of the straits during

periods of rising tension. Vessels transiting all of the straits

could readily be threatened by a combination of shore-based

weapons, missile-armed fast attack craft, and diesel submarines;

mines and underwater detection equipment could also be deployed.

Such a force could seriously threaten the ability of much larger

and better-equipped navies to transit the straits successfully.

If the United States does withdraw from Asia at some point in the

future, the USN may find it significantly more difficult to

transit through this region when the next emergency or crisis

occurs in the Persian Gulf/Middle East.

The effective attainment of the American global and regional

responsibilities requires forward deployments in Southeast Asia

via rotational deployments of both units based in CONUS and units

stationed in the Western Pacific. The U.S. ability to maintain

its presence in the Western Pacific and project its powers into

these other areas depends heavily upon possessing access rights

to those military supply, training, and repair facilities within

Southeast Asia which supplement its facilities in the North

Pacific and CONUS. The establishment of access agreements,

training arrangements, and joint facilities within Southeast

Asia, thus, is considered to have a high priority by the United

States Pacific Command (PACOM).

Since the end of the Cold War and the U.S. withdrawal from

the Philippines bases, the ASEAN states generally have been more

open regarding their existing security links with the United

States, more interested in expanding these links, and more

willing to consider various levels of access arrangements. This

shift has occurred primarily because these states desire to

preserve an American military presence in the region.

The most notable of these "post-Subic" access arrangements

is with Singapore. The facilities in Singapore fall considerably

short of constituting a "base," despite media tendencies to

characterize them as such. Actually, the USN has access to only

one berth at Sembawang Wharf, although it has been able to

coordinate its use of the facilities with Australia, the United

Kingdom, and New Zealand, and thereby gain access to two

additional berths. However, the United States has good storage

and office space available in Singapore. The availability of

office space in Singapore lies behind the USN decision to locate

the Navy Regional Contracting Center and relocate the Seventh

Fleet's Logistic Support Force there. The United States foresees

using Singapore as a regional center for coordinating repair,

deployment, etc., throughout the Southwest Pacific. In addition

to Singapore's facilities, the United States also has various

levels and forms of access arrangements in other ASEAN states.

Regional Stability. The prevention of war and the
99

preservation of regional stability in Southeast Asia are two of

the United States' primary interests in the region. Warfare in

Southeast Asia--particularly naval conflict--could threaten

American interests in several ways. A significant conflict would

damage U.S. economic interests, threaten merchant shipping,

potentially lead to the blockage of key sea lanes or straits, and

perhaps ultimately destabilize some of the ASEAN nations.

In addition, the interlocking structure of alliances in the

region might force American intervention in the conflict in some

capacity. Thailand and the Philippines both have bilateral

defense arrangements with the United States, while the United

States also has security ties with all the other ASEAN nations,

although no formal alliance commitments. Australia, an ANZUS5

ally of the United States, is also a member of the Five Power

Defense Arrangement (FPDA) with Singapore, Great Britain, New

Zealand, and Malaysia; Great Britain, another U.S. ally, has a

bilateral defense agreement with Brunei. Only Indonesia does not

belong to an alliance with some significant connection to the

United States. Nevertheless, Indonesia's strategic importance to

the United States, Japan, and Australia makes American inaction

in the event of external aggression against that nation unlikely.

The presence of American forces plays an important role in

preserving regional stability in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian

states perceive the United States as a relatively benign power

with no territorial ambitions in the region, but with clear

interests in preserving regional stability and peace. The ASEAN

countries universally support a continued American military

presence as a check on the ambitions of less benign extraregional powers whom they fear may have territorial or hegemonic

ambitions in the region.

Preservation of ASEAN. The American interest in regional

stability is also served by the preservation of ASEAN, which

reduces the risk of war and works to promote internal stability.

ASEAN is the most successful regional organization in the Third

World. Since ASEAN's founding in 1967, its members have achieved

a level of political and diplomatic cooperation unparalleled by

any other regional organization in the developing world. Although

economic integration and the development of intra-ASEAN trade

have progressed slowly, the nations of ASEAN, by working

cooperatively, have been able to enhance greatly their diplomatic

influence on international political and economic issues, and

create a stable environment that has promoted economic

development, reduced the risk of war, and enhanced domestic

internal stability within each of the member nations.

Officially, ASEAN is a regional economic grouping. In

reality, it is a regional security community. But it is not, 

like a traditional security grouping, concerned primarily with
100

the promotion of regional security against outside threats.

Rather, ASEAN was designed as an internally focused security

community, intended to reduce tensions and the risks of conflict

between its member states in order to allow them to concentrate

on their domestic economic development and internal security. The

goal of ASEAN is to establish a "zone of peace, friendship, and

neutrality." The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation sets forth the

basic principles of ASEAN: mutual respect for the independence,

sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national

identity of all nations; the right of every State to lead its

national existence free from external interference, subversion,

and coercion; noninterference in the internal affairs of one

another; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;

renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective

cooperation among themselves.6

ASEAN was established during the high point of the Vietnam

War in the aftermath of the Konfrontasi between Malaysia and

Indonesia. The founders of ASEAN recognized that the member

nations could not agree on an external defense strategy and, in

any case, lacked the military capabilities to give such an

approach any teeth. But they believed that if they could agree to

disagree, to accept one another's differences and commit to

resolving their differences peacefully, they could then

concentrate their resources on internal development. They

expected that as each nation pursued its own economic development

and internal political stability, and thereby enhanced its

national resilience, a widening pool of regional resilience would

be created, enhancing regional stability and reducing the risk of

war.7 They were correct.

ASEAN's success has been a central component in Southeast

Asia's rapid progression from war and poverty to peace and

economic dynamism. In 1967, few observers would have predicted

that success. ASEAN's continued success and development will

remain important to regional stability and growth in the future

as well.

Regional Trends in Southeast Asia.

Military-Security Developments. The defense establishments

within many of the ASEAN states are not sanguine about the

outlook for the future security environment. China (and its

activities in the South China Sea) has been the primary cause of

concern. These concerns, coupled with victories over their major

internal security threats and rising economic resources to devote

to defense, have led to a shift away from the Southeast Asian

states' traditional internal security focus. External security

concerns are now given increasing priority. Accordingly, the
101

Southeast Asian states have begun to strengthen their own

military capabilities, with their focus largely on expanding

their air and naval capabilities. This focus reflects the

maritime nature of the ASEAN states, which all have long

coastlines and large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) to protect;

the absence of land-based threats; and the conviction that the

long-term potential threat to regional security is posed by the

naval and air forces of powers from outside Southeast Asia.8

Arms purchases in the last few years by the ASEAN states all

reflect this emphasis on enhancing their maritime and air strike

capabilities: advanced fighter aircraft, maritime patrol

aircraft, missile-armed fast attack craft, larger ship types such

as corvettes and frigates, precision-guided missiles, diesel

submarines, and a helicopter carrier (purchased by Thailand from

Spain). The most spectacular acquisition was Indonesia's purchase

of the former East German Navy--39 naval vessels including 16

corvettes--for $120 million.9

There has been considerable concern expressed in some

quarters that these new defense acquisitions will fuel an arms

race in Southeast Asia.10 At this point, such fears are misplaced.

The Southeast Asian militaries for many years have lacked the

capability to meet their security needs. These purchases actually

represent very modest efforts to obtain some capability to patrol

adequately and protect their air and sea territory. There is no

evidence that Malaysian purchases are driven by Indonesian,

Singaporean, or other ASEAN states' acquisitions. Rather, all of

the states appear to be devoting a small part of their growing

economic wealth to remedying serious deficiencies in their

existing defense capabilities. Yet, such acquisitions could

certainly create an environment of tension and apprehension

within ASEAN, if member states perceive these purchases as a

threat to their own security.

For this reason, as the ASEAN states develop their naval and

air forces, greater emphasis on security cooperation is a

necessary component to preserving the ASEAN peace. Without

enhanced opportunities to discuss regional security trends and

national defense policies at the political level and interact

militarily at the operational level, it is possible that the

military procurement policies of certain ASEAN states could

generate tensions and misunderstandings within the organization.

Strengthened regional security dialogues and operational

cooperation reduce any such risks.

Public attention has centered primarily upon the ASEAN

Regional Security Forum (ARF) which was established in July 1994

at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bangkok. The ARF is

intended to serve as a forum for multinational dialogue on

political and security issues within Asia--not just Southeast
102

Asia. An outgrowth of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings, its

membership includes not only Southeast Asian states, but the

Northeast Asian states, the United States, Australia, and New

Zealand. The establishment of the ARF made ASEAN "the hub of the

Asia-Pacific confidence-building and preventive diplomacy

activities."11

Admittedly only a first, tentative step, ARF nevertheless

represents an unprecedented effort. Unlike Europe's long

tradition of security consultation, multilateral security 

cooperation--even dialogue--had never been an established

practice in Asia. Mutual suspicions, historical antagonisms, and

regional divisions had made bilateral security arrangements the

norm in Asia. ARF's establishment clearly reflects both the very

real security concerns of regional states and the increasing

integration of Southeast and Northeast Asian regional politics.

Operational cooperation also has been growing rapidly among

ASEAN states in recent years. Greater coordination and

cooperation through training with other ASEAN states, of course,

strengthen the capabilities and operational readiness of the

ASEAN navies and air forces. It also makes possible joint action

in the event of a real emergency in the region. Given the limited

military capabilities of the ASEAN states, cooperative

deployments with other ASEAN militaries and/or friendly extraregional states offers significant potential benefits.

When it was formed, ASEAN deliberately eschewed any status

as a military alliance. Nevertheless, military cooperation among

the member states evolved fairly rapidly--always outside the

ASEAN orbit and always on a bilateral, not a multilateral, basis.

Today, a network of bilateral military exercises and exchanges

exists within ASEAN. Not surprisingly, they typically conduct air

and naval exercises far more frequently and successfully than

land exercises. Domestic sensitivity to the presence of foreign

troops and lingering suspicions have discouraged land exercises.

Still, all of the ASEAN navies and most of the air forces have

conducted joint bilateral training together.

There is also a sense that some of the items on the new

security agenda demand cooperative efforts in order to deal with

them effectively. Anti-piracy, counter-narcotics, maritime

commercial traffic separation and safety measures, environmental

monitoring, EEZ surveillance, fishery protection, and illegal

immigration are all issues increasingly likely to preoccupy

regional military forces, especially naval and air forces, over

the next decade. All of these issues are trans-national and can

be handled more readily through a coordinated, cooperative,

multilateral approach. Such issues also offer greater potential

for initiating regional security cooperation since they do not

require the identification of a common external security threat.
103

Measures to coordinate anti-piracy operations in the straits

region between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia and

Singapore, exemplify this new approach. Malaysia and Indonesia

formed a joint mission to coordinate maritime enforcement

activities in their waters related to drug smuggling, piracy,

illegal immigrants, trespassing, maritime safety, and water

pollution.12 As part of this agreement, the two states initiated

joint patrol operations in the Straits of Malacca to deter piracy

and smuggling.13 In turn, Singapore and Indonesia agreed to

exchange information on piracy and to conduct coordinated patrols

in the Singapore Straits and the Philips Channel. Since the 

initiation of these patrols, the number of recorded piracy

incidents has fallen significantly.14

A revitalization of security links with Australia

accompanied the expansion of intra-ASEAN security cooperation.

Australia has gained a new prominence in Southeast Asian security

affairs by becoming a high profile advocate of enhanced regional

security cooperation and by reinvigorating its own security

activities in the region, largely through the FPDA.

The latest sign of Australia's new regional activism was the

announcement of a security agreement between Indonesia and

Australia at the ASEAN Summit Meeting in December 1995.15 The

agreement, an outgrowth of Australian-Indonesian security

relations' steady improvement over the last 6 years, stipulates

that the two nations will consult regularly on security affairs

at the ministerial level and will pursue cooperative military

activities. It also states that the two nations will consult "in

the case of adverse challenges to either party or to their common

security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which

might be taken either individually or jointly . . . ."16 While the

agreement is far from a military alliance, it constitutes the

first military pact Indonesia, a founding member of the NonAligned Movement, has signed with any nation. For the United

States, the agreement was welcome; in the words of an American

official, "It's a healthy development and good for U.S. security

interests."17 The statement reflects the American belief that

Australia's security activities in Southeast Asia generally

complement American actions, since the two countries basically

share the same strategic interests in the region.

Australia promotes multilateral and bilateral security

cooperation in all forms as a means of regional engagement (the

official term is "comprehensive engagement") and as an instrument

to shape Australia's regional security environment in a manner

favorable to Canberra. This policy, initiated under the Bob Hawke

government, has been continued by Prime Minister Paul Keating.

The basic goal of the policy is to gain acceptance of Australia

as a regional actor, or, as Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has
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stated, ". . . a confident and natural partner in a common

neighborhood of remarkable diversity, rather than as a cultural

misfit trapped by geography."18 Other Australian concerns focus on

the risks of a destabilizing regional arms race and potential

long-term threats to regional security posed by such larger Asian

powers as China. Australian defense officials recognize the ASEAN

states as the front-line of Australian defense. Enhanced security

cooperation and confidence-building measures with ASEAN are seen

as important means to preserve regional stability by reducing any

potential tensions among local states, while also creating the

initial "building blocks" of regional security cooperation as a

long-term counterweight to any potential intrusion by China or

other external powers.

 The main Australian defense activity within Southeast Asia

centers around the FPDA. In addition, the Royal Australian Navy

(RAN) exercises with every ASEAN nation and conducts joint

patrols with Indonesia in the Timor Gap Cooperation Zone lying

between the two nation's EEZs. Australia's ability to play a key

role in regional security, however, is restricted by its own

limited military resources and public unwillingness to support

firm military commitments in Southeast Asia. These weaknesses

will inhibit its ability to influence the regional security

debate in the long-term. Certainly, Australia cannot assume the

traditional role of the United States in regional security.

Economic Cooperation. Economic cooperation has long lagged

behind political and diplomatic cooperation in ASEAN. Although

the organization was explicitly established as a regional

economic grouping, visible progress towards economic integration

has been minimal. Similarly, intra-ASEAN trade has lagged behind

the expansion of ASEAN's trade with non-ASEAN members. The

signature of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) Agreement in

Singapore in January 1992, however, may signal a new commitment

to push forward real economic integration among member states.

Under the agreement, the ASEAN states are to reduce tariffs on

goods traded within the grouping to a minimum of 0-5 percent by

2003. At the most recent ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in December

1995, the association even agreed to push forward the date for

most of the major tariff cuts under AFTA to the year 2000. While

it is true that Indonesia insisted on exempting 15 different

agricultural products from tariff cuts under the plan, the

association also decided that all products (including those

exempted by Indonesia) must be incorporated into AFTA's tariff

framework by the year 2010.19

Past efforts to expand intra-ASEAN economic cooperation have

foundered upon competitive rather than complementary economic

structures; a lack of political support; and differing attitudes

towards free trade, for, historically, Singapore is generally

pro-free trade, Indonesia is usually more protectionist, with the
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other members located between these two states. There is reason

to believe the situation has changed. In 1994, trade among AFTA

members increased 41 percent to $111 billion, while their total

trade with the world rose 30 percent to $506 billion. This

suggests that intra-ASEAN trade is likely to play an increasingly

important role in member's economies in the future.20

The political leadership appears supportive, perceiving

expanded economic cooperation both as a rational economic policy

and as a hedge against the risk of rising protectionism in

ASEAN's traditional markets in the United States, Japan, and

Europe. The leaders also believe that expanding economic

cooperation offers an important means of strengthening the bonds

between members. This new political commitment was demonstrated

at the recent ASEAN Summit in Bangkok. In addition to moving

forward the date for the AFTA tariff cuts, the leadership agreed

to liberalize key service industries (including banking,

telecommunications, and tourism), making them more open to

intra-ASEAN investment. Leaders also discussed the creation of an

ASEAN Free Investment Area to harmonize all investment rules in

the region and the establishment of a single time zone within

ASEAN to allow regional stockmarkets to operate on the same

schedule.

The goal of these changes was summarized by Singapore's

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong: "Over time, our region's

interconnectedness will be as dense as Europe's. And we will grow

closer together as a community."21 Goh's prediction shows the

direction in which many Southeast Asians would like to see their

region move. Events will show whether their hopes are realized.

ASEAN and Indochina. Central to the effort to transform

Southeast Asia from an arena of conflict and confrontation into a

region of peace and cooperation is the effort to bring the

Indochinese states into ASEAN. ASEAN has always maintained that

its purpose is to establish a regional order, not merely be an

association of a few select states. The realities of the Cold War

prevented the realization of this dream. Today, the ASEAN states

are determined to reach out to their former communist adversaries

and assist their reintegration into the regional and world

economies by offering them membership in ASEAN.

In July 1992, Vietnam and Laos both signed the Treaty of

Amity and Cooperation, a clear commitment by both nations to

respect the tenets of the ASEAN "peace": strict non-interference

in the internal affairs of fellow members, peaceful settlement of

disputes, respect for each other's independence, and strict

respect for the territorial integrity of fellow members.22 ASEAN

immediately granted Laos and Vietnam observer status; both

attended the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings in 1993 and 1994.

Finally, in July 1995, Vietnam formally became a member of ASEAN.
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Burma and Cambodia attended the ASEAN Summit in December 1995 for

the first time, leading to expectations that they, plus Laos,

would also soon join ASEAN. Sarasin Viraphol, Deputy Permanent

Secretary at Thailand's Foreign Ministry, stated, "Hopefully, we

can have all ten Southeast Asian states in ASEAN by the end of

the century."23

The Indochinese states are unlikely to move rapidly to

integrate with the other ASEAN economies. The differences between

their economies--the differing level of economic development and

the remaining command economy elements in the economies of the

Indochinese states--and ASEAN's own commitment to move forward on

AFTA will likely relegate the Indochinese states to a special

status within the association for some years. The immediate

consequences of Vietnam and the other Indochinese states entering

ASEAN will be primarily political and diplomatic. First, it will

help to reduce tensions between the Indochinese states and their

ASEAN neighbors. Vietnam has a number of territorial disputes

with ASEAN states, including its claim to the Spratly Islands.

ASEAN has proven quite effective at managing such disputes among

its members in the past, and will likely work hard to achieve a

similar reduction in tensions for Vietnam and any other new

members. Second, membership in ASEAN will strengthen Vietnam

diplomatically in its conflicts with non-ASEAN members, such as

China. ASEAN's effectiveness at addressing regional and

international disputes has been improving in recent years;

ASEAN's diplomatic weight in world fora certainly is greater than

that of Vietnam. Finally, membership in ASEAN will clearly

indicate Indochina's reintegration into Southeast Asia and be a

major step in reducing the risk of future regional conflict. For

these reasons alone, the incorporation of Vietnam, Cambodia, and

Laos into ASEAN represents a very important step forward towards

a future of peace and cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Looking Ahead: The Great Unknowns.

The shape of 21st century Asia is being created today by the

policies of leaders on both sides of the Pacific, but the

outlines of the future remain obscure. Southeast Asia is indeed

headed towards an era of expanded cooperation, peace, and

development. Nevertheless, certain key factors with a fundamental

impact on the future of the region remain unpredictable. In

particular, two factors will play a critical role--the future of

the American military presence in Asia and Chinese policy on the

Spratly Islands.

The Future of the United States Presence. The American

military presence in Asia has been and remains an important

stabilizing force. Most countries in the region want the United

States to stay, at least during the transition to whatever New
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World Order is going to emerge. A precipitous (real or perceived)

U.S. withdrawal from the region would intensify regional

geostrategic competition and could well trigger a true regional

arms race.

U.S. forces in the Pacific fulfill a multifaceted role in

promoting regional stability and American interests. Their

objectives remain to defend U.S. territory and U.S. allies; to

preserve freedom of access to international waters and air space;

to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the region so as to deter

potential regional aggressors; to be ready to deploy rapidly to

respond to regional crises in Asia and regions outside the

Western Pacific, such as the Persian Gulf; to support and

encourage regional alliances and security cooperation efforts

which strengthen regional stability and regional military

preparedness; and to enhance the preparedness of allies and

friends to deter aggression and operate with U.S. forces.

Pressures for sharp reductions in the American presence come

from a variety of sources. The most important is within the

United States. Isolationist themes have found a resonance in the

U.S. body politic. Strong support exists for focusing primarily

upon the many domestic problems that plague the United States--

not the least of which are the seemingly unmanageable, corrosive

budget deficits. With the end of the Cold War, the level of U.S.

military forces and America's overall overseas presence must

necessarily decrease. The key questions are how far and from

where. Despite the adoption of reasonable military reduction

plans for the Pacific, as well as high-level political and

military assurances, many U.S. friends and allies in Asia fear

that domestic American political dynamics will lead to a rapid

wholesale withdrawal of American forces from the region.

It is clear that U.S. force posture in the Pacific will

continue to rely heavily on Japan. Therefore, domestic

developments in Japan could potentially also precipitate an

American withdrawal. The Japanese are increasingly nationalistic-

-rightly proud of their record of economic success, resentful of

what they see as continual and escalating harassment from the

United States, and increasingly willing to take policy positions

which diverge from those of the United States. At present,

nationalism does not seriously threaten relationships with the

United States or the American military presence. Still, all

relationships must not only be mutually beneficial, but adaptive

to new conditions, if they are to survive. With the end of the

Cold War, the United States must redefine its relationship with

Japan.

Basing and access issues will be at the forefront of this

process. The recent furor over the rape of a 12-year-old Japanese

school girl by U.S. service personnel stationed on Okinawa led to
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public demonstrations calling for the termination of American

bases on the island. The public displays of anger over the

presence of the bases reflected not just outrage at this one

incident, but long-standing Okinawan opposition to bearing the

overwhelming bulk of the burden of the U.S. military presence in

Japan. Much of the Okinawans' resentment, in fact, is not

directed at the United States, but at the central government in

Tokyo, which has neglected Okinawan concerns and failed to pursue

efforts to diversify U.S. facilities away from their heavy

concentration on Okinawa. In reality, Okinawan opposition to the

U.S. presence is not likely to force Tokyo to request the

withdrawal of American forces. The political power of the

Okinawan opposition remains limited. Nevertheless, politics are

changing rapidly in Japan, and Okinawan opposition may become

more significant in the future. It would be preferable if the

U.S. presence could be diversified to other areas in Japan.24 This

is obviously a matter that can only be addressed by Tokyo, but

Washington must be aware of these risks to the U.S.-Japan

Security Treaty and the U.S. presence in Japan.

A real threat to the United States-Japan relationship is not

likely in the short term, but if the relationships are

mismanaged, such an outcome could become less improbable in the

future. Both the United States and Japan need to expand popular

support for the defense relationship. While the leadership of

both countries is firmly committed to maintaining the United

States-Japan security relationship, without broader public

support it will remain vulnerable to political disputes over

trade, burden sharing, diplomatic incidents, or simple

isolationist sentiment.

In Southeast Asia, it is clear that there are no facilities

 available which will replace those lost in the Philippines. No

country is willing to offer home porting or to host the scale of

American presence once found in the Philippines. Nevertheless,

the changing strategic environment has led to some remarkable

shifts in attitudes in these traditionally nonaligned nations. It

is no longer unthinkable to accept U.S. forces openly, as long as

the terms and limits of that presence are clearly defined. 

Access to Southeast Asian facilities for purposes of training,

supply, repair, refueling, storage, shore leave, and other

similar activities is viable in many countries and can be useful

to U.S. planners. In addition, American security ties with

Australia will likely become increasingly important as Canberra

assumes a greater role in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and

the Indian Ocean. Australia remains a solid American ally and can

be counted upon to allow the United States access to almost any

facility short of home porting.

Overall, the minimal basing arrangements in place appear to

provide the practical requirements necessary for preserving an
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American presence in Asia. It remains to be seen, however,

whether the United States itself will preserve the political

commitment to stay in Asia. Certainly, any rational assessment

would suggest that the United States cannot afford to withdraw

from Asia. The future of the United States and its economic wellbeing is irrevocably linked with the future of the entire Pacific

Rim. The United States itself is a Pacific nation. American trade

with Asia exceeded that with Europe over a decade ago, and the

gap has continued to grow. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China,

and, increasingly, the nations of ASEAN have become centers for

American trade and investment, as well as sources of foreign

investment in the United States. Disengagement from the Pacific

is not a viable American option. Indeed, fundamental

international political and economic trends suggest a deepening

American involvement in the Pacific over the course of the next

decade. American political and economic interests, coupled with

rapid changes within the region, certainly suggest that the time

is not right for an American withdrawal from Asia. At this

moment, Asian regional security cooperation remains embryonic,

while many Asian countries fear the growth of new, regional

security threats. America has played an important role in

encouraging regional states to cooperate and build the foundation

for better relations; withdrawal of U.S. forces would rock that

foundation. An American withdrawal would definitely not promote

American interests.

China and the Spratly Islands. China remains an enigma. The

direction of Chinese foreign and military policy will have a

critical influence on the region, but will ultimately depend upon

the resolution of fundamental political conflicts in China,

including the succession to Deng Xiaoping and the evolution of a

viable post-Deng regime. The outcome of these conflicts is

impossible to predict at this time. Still, certain basic

characteristics of any post-Deng regime are already readily

apparent.

There will be no supreme leader. No future Chinese leader

will possess power comparable to that now held by Deng Xiaoping,

at least not for many years to come. None of the current

competitors for power in China has a political support network

comparable to that of Deng. Accordingly, the importance of

coalition politics within China will increase after Deng. The new

leader will be an individual skilled at putting together

coalitions, who is able to build a majority coalition within the

Party, provincial leadership, and military in support of his

programs.

Political power is bleeding away from Beijing. In the

future, real political power in China will increasingly rest with

the provinces. The central leadership coalition will consist

largely of representatives of provincial power bases led by local
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political bosses. This has important implications for Chinese

policy. Local interests will clearly have greater influence on

national policy. Furthermore, Beijing's ability to force

recalcitrant provinces to enforce central government edicts

and/or international agreements will be very limited. For

example, the government's ability to meet successfully its

commitments to prosecute Chinese violators of international

copyright, trademark, and patent rights will undoubtedly be

seriously compromised, even if the central government is genuine

in its commitment.

Younger Chinese officials also have relatively weak ties to

the military. When one of these younger leaders assumes paramount

power, he will have to rely on one or more top military leaders

to provide him with the support of the military. As a result, the

political influence of the top military leadership in post-Deng

China is almost certain to expand. This growth of military

influence is already apparent in the double-digit increases in

Chinese military spending since Tiananmen.

There are also certain basic tasks which will face any postDeng government, including the development of a stable mixture of

economic growth and reform policies that do not threaten the

fundamental political bases of the regime. Foremost among these

tasks will be the restoration of the government and party's

popular legitimacy. Any regime which fails to reverse

successfully the growing societal alienation from the regime and

restore popular support will ultimately collapse. Nationalism

offers one key instrument in this process. For this reason,

Chinese foreign policy may reasonably be expected to assume an

increasingly nationalistic emphasis. Already, China's sensitivity

towards its status as a world power is becoming apparent, with

many Chinese arguing that U.S. opposition to Beijing hosting the

Olympic games, the denial of China membership in the World Trade

Organization (WTO), and disagreements over human rights and arms

transfers reflect an American "containment" policy to belittle

China and prevent it from assuming its rightful leadership role

in world affairs.

In Asia, Chinese policy on a host of different issues will 

be watched closely in the next few years for indicators of the

direction China is likely to take. Chinese actions on Hong Kong,

cross-straits relations with Taiwan, arms transfers, naval and

air modernization, and territorial disputes are all likely to be

viewed as important indicators by many Asian states. Ironically,

the current perception of China in Southeast Asia is being

fundamentally shaped not by its attempts to play a world

leadership role, but by its policies with regard to a group of

tiny atolls, rocks, and islands in the South China Sea, once

largely unknown outside the region--the Spratly Islands. The

Spratlys are claimed to various extents by China, Taiwan,
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Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia. By themselves these

islands are largely worthless. But the Law of the Sea Convention

confers upon any state with a recognized title to islands the

right to the full complement of maritime zones, including a

territorial sea, contiguous zone, a 200-nautical mile EEZ, and

200-nautical mile Continental Shelf claim.25 This is quite a bit

of real estate to obtain from controlling an "island," which is

frequently underwater at high tide.

China is primarily responsible for the current climate of

tension and potential crisis in the South China Sea. Its military

might, coupled with its willingness to use it, has made China the

driving force in the current dispute. It has been China's actions

which have generally forced responses from the other claimants.26

Three factors can be discerned behind China's behavior:

nationalism, oil, and military/security concerns.

One of the reasons the Spratly issue has recently become

important is that certain senior officials want to assert China's

rights to the chain.27 China claims that the Spratlys "have been

part of China's territory since ancient times"28--"part and parcel

of the motherland."29 In reality, none of the claimants possesses

anything approaching a clear title to the Spratlys. China's claim

of long historical ties with the islands is not supported by the

historical record. A state cannot acquire title to an island

simply because some long dead persons of the same nationality

once happened to fish off its coast or had the misfortune of

being shipwrecked on its shores. The other states claims are on

equally shaky legal ground.30 Not surprisingly, not one of the

claimants has been willing to subject its claims to arbitration.

Nevertheless, the imperialist era, with its legacy of

unequal treaties, left all Chinese hyper-sensitive to any

infringement of China's sovereign rights, especially on any issue

involving Chinese territory. Most Chinese devoutly believe the

Spratlys to be part of China. One Chinese delegate to the 1991

South China Sea Conference in Bandung told reporters, "It is

Chinese territory. How can a country give up land that belongs to

it?"31

 Economically, the big question is oil. It is difficult to

judge the actual oil potential of the South China Sea island

region. Little is known of the geology of the area. But a lack of

information has not stopped the claimants from postulating a

great treasure of black gold waiting for the owner of these

islands. An internal Chinese government document's estimate that,

in terms of resources, the South China Sea holds reserves worth

US$1 trillion32 appears totally fanciful. But China has offered

similarly inflated estimates in other contexts, citing tens of

billions of barrels in some cases; one unofficial, pro-Chinese

Navy source even argued that the area had 45 billion tons of oil
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and natural gas reserves.33 In the absence of any solid data, such

extravagant expectations will likely drive the policies of China

and the other claimants.

China's oil situation is becoming serious. Rapid economic

growth, especially in the southern and coastal provinces, and

rapidly rising urbanization generally have caused a major

escalation in China's oil consumption. The Chinese oil industry

is in chaos, and efforts to restrict consumption have proven

ineffective. While China is believed to have significant oil

reserves in its interior, the area is extremely remote and would

be costly to develop. The islands, therefore, appear inviting--

promising potentially rich rewards at lower costs and with easier

transport to the dynamic coastal areas, which need the oil to

fuel their economic development.

Finally, elements within China's military, especially the

Chinese Navy (PLAN), are keenly interested in using the islands

as a justification to increase arms purchases and adopt a more

aggressive regional military posture. Persistent reports indicate

that the PLAN has opposed strongly Foreign Ministry efforts to

resolve the Spratly issue through diplomacy.34 Modernizers within

the PLAN, who have long argued that China's economic, strategic,

and national interests required a strong navy, use the Spratlys

as a prime example.35 PLAN analysts assert that the Spratlys are

strategically located along the Sea Lines of Communications

(SLOCs), part of China's sovereign territory, and vital to its

future economic development.

The PLAN apparently has allocated most of its new vessels

and equipment, as well as some of its best units, to the South

Sea Fleet, which is responsible for the South China Sea.

Furthermore, despite their late start, the Chinese have

established the largest and most capable force deployed on the

South China Sea islands. Overall, the Chinese military is clearly

the dominant force in the Spratlys. The PLAN is an enormous force

with a relatively small number of modern, capable combatants and

a large number of marginal vessels. Nevertheless, its best units

are as good as (and mostly better than) anything the other

claimants possess, while the sheer size of the fleet is simply

overwhelming to the tiny Southeast Asian navies.

The key question for the future is how China will pursue its

claims. Will China attempt to seize the islands by force or will

it pursue diplomacy? To date, China appears to be employing a

dual track policy, encompassing both diplomacy and a unilateral,

aggressive assertion of its claims. The Foreign Ministry has

consistently promoted a nonaggressive line, advocating joint

development and offering to postpone sovereignty considerations.

But China's actions on the ground have not tallied with this

approach. The dual character of China's strategy may be the
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result of internal bureaucratic disagreements within the

government, a deliberate strategy, or some combination of the

two. In 1992, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen pledged to the

ASEAN Foreign Ministers that China would not use force to assert

its claims.36 But Qian's statement apparently did not rule out the

possibility of Beijing occupying more islands; in 1995, China

occupied Mischief Reef and placed markers on several atolls

within waters claimed by the Philippines. Previously, China had

only occupied islands in areas claimed by Vietnam. China has

ignored ASEAN suggestions that it sign the Treaty of Amity and

Cooperation, which renounces the use of force in the settlement

of regional disputes, as the "basis for establishing a code of

international conduct over the South China Sea."37

The contradictory nature of Chinese policy on the Spratlys

has raised regional tensions, which have been further aggravated

by the vagueness of China's claims. Official Chinese maps only

serve to heighten concern over the issue. The meaning of the

demarcation line, keyed on the maps as the "national boundary"

line, is unexplained.38 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas

attempted to clarify the meaning of this claim line during a July

1995 meeting with Qian Qichen in Beijing. Qian told Alatas that

China made no claim on Indonesia's Natunas Islands, but refused

to explain the purpose of the line, telling Alatas "you draw your

own conclusions."39 Whatever the purpose of the line, the map has

certainly been a diplomatic disaster for China. According to one

analyst, the boundary line on the maps "looks like a large tongue

extending from the coast of southern China sweeping along the

western coast of the Philippine Palawan and the eastern coast of

Vietnam and reaching the northern coast of Malaysian Borneo."40

Sinophobic Southeast Asian strategists find in these maps the

confirmation of their fears and convictions that the Chinese are

bent on regional domination and conquest.

China's actions in the Spratlys have been a major factor

influencing the strategy and planning of the Southeast Asian

militaries as they move towards an external defense orientation.

While arms expenditures are still modest among ASEAN states, fear

of China remains a force which could generate much greater

spending, particularly if the United States withdraws from the

region as many fear. In this event, a real ASEAN arms race cannot

be dismissed as a impossibility.

The ASEAN states not only do not agree on how to deal with

China, but those with claims in the Spratlys remain suspicious of

each other. The Philippines and Vietnam would like ASEAN to

confront China over the Spratlys. Malaysia, while suspicious of

China, believes that this approach would not work. According to

one Malaysian diplomat, "The more pressure you put on China, the

more allergic it becomes."41 In turn, Thailand, which has no

claims in the South China Sea, has a very different view of
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China--as a potentially useful counterweight to other powers.

Indonesia, despite its own long-standing suspicions of China, has

attempted to broker a resolution of the dispute by adopting a

neutral stance and sponsoring several international conferences

on the South China Sea. If China were to exploit these

differences successfully, targeting one ASEAN member for an

aggressive approach, while adopting a conciliatory approach to

the other ASEAN claimants, it could lead to rising tensions in

the organization and weaken its ability to operate effectively.42

From the U.S perspective, the Spratly issue poses several

problems. It is certainly a definite hazard to regional stability

and may pose a long-term threat to ASEAN's unity and

effectiveness as well. The territorial disputes in the South

China Sea may also endanger both commercial and naval transit

through the region. The major sea lanes, while bypassing the

Spratlys themselves, would be included within any EEZ or

Continental Shelf claim made by a successful claimant. The main

perils would come from the establishment of air defense, military

exclusion, and/or some other form of security zone in areas which

cross the SLOCs. Nations would most likely establish such zones

if oil exploration and development became significant in the

area, since the zones would be designed to protect any oil

installations from rapid and unpredictable attacks. If military

conflict did occur, several additional threats are possible,

including illegal interdictions of merchant shipping by one or

more claimants or mining operations leading to mines drifting

into the sea lanes.

The United States does not judge the merits of any of the

disputants' claims; rather, it supports freedom of navigation and

a peaceful resolution of the dispute through regional (not U.S.)

mediation. America's low profile is clearly the only viable

approach. Unfortunately, many ASEAN officials believe that the

United States has not made its opposition to the use of force

sufficiently clear to China. They believe that the Chinese have

concluded that they can use force to resolve the dispute without

provoking an American reaction, as long as they exercise caution

and limit its use.

If their fears are valid, the United States may wish to

clarify its position, since a military resolution of the Spratly

dispute is not in America's interests. It could greatly extend

Chinese power in the region, potentially threaten freedom of

transit, and resurrect armed confrontation in Southeast Asia--

short-circuiting the current efforts to promote peace and

cooperation in the region.

Renewed tensions would also have important implications for

the security environment in Northeast Asia. Japanese defense

officials, for example, are highly suspicious of China. An
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aggressive Chinese solution to the Spratlys would certainly raise

Japanese threat perceptions of China. Japan and China already

have their own territorial dispute over the Senkaku Island chain.

Furthermore, Japan also has vital interests in freedom of transit

in the South China Sea, which China could threaten.

Resolution of the Spratlys dispute may well be one of the

keys towards shaping 21st century Asia, with one path leading

towards peace, development, and enhanced regional cooperation and

the other toward renewed conflict and confrontation among

competing regional powers (such as Japan, China, and Indonesia).

The Spratly issue is one more area where the preservation of a

strong American presence and a clear American commitment to

regional stability may be vital in the short term to realize the

long-term hopes of 21st century Asians and to meet America's own

security interests.

Conclusion.

In the 21st century, Southeast Asia will be a fundamentally

different region from the Cold War battleground of the latter

half of the 20th century. Southeast Asia will be a region of

growing wealth, dynamism, and economic opportunity. It will be a

region of increasingly capable militaries, with greatly enhanced

air and naval capabilities. The United States will have to shape

its policy carefully in this increasingly multipolar, strategic

arena, with an eye toward the activities and interests of the

ASEAN nations, as well as the outside powers active in the

region, such as Australia, Japan, and China, and perhaps Russia

and India. Whether it will be a region characterized by peace,

stability, and expanding regional cooperation or a region of

confrontation and conflict will depend heavily upon the policy

choices and events of the next 10 years.

The role of the United States during this period will remain

important. The United States is no longer the resident hegemonic

power in Southeast Asia as in the 1950s-1960s. Its relative

military and economic weight in the region have declined and will

continue to decline in the future. But the United States remains

primus inter pares, first among equals. Furthermore, intrinsic

American interests in Southeast Asia are increasing, while

Southeast Asia's importance for American global security

interests remains strong. To protect these interests and shape a

positive regional environment in the 21st century, the United

States cannot afford to turn its back on the region.

The preservation of a viable American military presence in

Asia will be critical during this period of transition. Regular

deployments through the area, bilateral exercises, and port

visits provide visible demonstrations of American engagement in
116

Asia and enhance regional stability. An American withdrawal would

have the opposite effect.

Regional security, however, cannot remain primarily the

responsibility of the United States. The ASEAN nations are

already engaged upon a significant military expansion program.

The United States should encourage their efforts through foreign

military sales, training, joint exercises, and other means to

assist in the reasonable development of their military

capabilities. At the same time, the United States should

encourage the ASEAN nations to continue to enhance their

bilateral and trilateral security cooperation, as well as their

efforts to improve the transparency of their defense programs.

The strengthening of the ASEAN militaries and enhanced mutual

cooperation and understanding among them would strengthen the

ASEAN nations' own ability to preserve regional stability, create

the basis for meaningful U.S.-ASEAN military cooperation in an

emergency, and reduce the burden on the U.S. military.

As the Southeast Asian states enhance their military

capabilities, the continued development of the ARF will help

promote regional understanding and reduce potential tensions.

More importantly, perhaps, the ARF will also play an important

role in promoting understanding and reducing tensions between the

ASEAN states and the Northeast Asian states. As Southeast and

Northeast Asia become increasingly integrated and interdependent,

this function of the ARF will become critical to regional

stability and confidence building.

Policy flexibility, a willingness and ability to deal with

all of the actors involved, and coordination with U.S. friends

and allies will be at a premium as Southeast Asia becomes a

multipolar theater integrated into the broader Asian

international environment. The decline in U.S. relative power and

growing Asian policy assertiveness will force the United States

to adopt a different foreign policy approach to the region. A

successful American regional policy will have to place primary

emphasis on cultivating regional support for its positions,

demonstrate greater understanding of the region, and devote more

attention to the area in the future. ARF, APEC and other less

formal institutions and exchanges will assume an increasingly

critical role in this process.

The development of an informal cooperative relationship with

ASEAN to enhance regional stability and economic growth is

strongly in America's interests. The United States and the ASEAN

states share many common interests and a commitment to regional

cooperation. The ASEAN states will never accept a dependent or

"allied" relationship with the United States. Rather, they will

remain determinedly independent. Still, their common concerns and

shared interests form the basis for an independent, but
117

coordinated, approach to regional affairs which can work to build

a 21st century Asia congenial to both the United States and the

indigenous states.

ENDNOTES

1. The original members were Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand,

Malaysia, and the Philippines. Newly-independent Brunei joined in

1984. In 1993 Cambodia and Vietnam were granted observer status;

Vietnam became a full member in 1995.

2. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten:

Issues and Prospects," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No.

3, December 1994, pp. 243-258.

 3. See, for example, Nigel Holloway, "Oh Say Can You See?,"

Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 51, December 21, 1995,

p. 23.

4. George Paine and Raphael Cung, "ASEAN Nations look to

Trade and Technology to Maintain High Growth," Business America,

Vol. 115, No. 11, November 1994, pp. 14-17. If Canada (generally

overlooked) is factored in, ASEAN trade falls to fourth after

Canada, the European Union, and Japan. U.S. Department of

Commerce International Trade Administration, US Global Trade

Outlook 1995-2000 Toward the 21st Century, Washington, DC: U. S.

Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 53.

5. ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, United States.

6. Dr. S. Bilveer, "ASEAN and the New Security framework in

the Asia-Pacific Region," Asian Defence Journal, December 1991,

p. 17.

7. The terms "national resilience" and "regional resilience"

are Indonesian in origin. Indonesian strategic thought has played

a critical role in the development of ASEAN strategic thinking. A

good overview of ASEAN's development is provided in Michael

Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia, London:

Routledge Press, 1989.

8. See J. N. Mak, ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975-1992: The

Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change, Canberra Papers

on Strategy and Defence No. 103, Canberra, Australia: Australian

National University, 1993. Mak provides the most comprehensive

discussion of the strategic reorientation in ASEAN available.

9. This last purchase was very controversial and reportedly

not desired by the Indonesian military; but, it was pushed

through by the Indonesian defense industry and technology guru,

B.J. Habibie. A good summary of these acquisitions is provided in
118

Amitav Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia?:

Prospects for Control, Pacific Strategic Paper No. 8, Singapore:

Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1994.

10. See, for example, Andrew Mack and Desmond Ball, The

Military Build-Up in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scope, Causes and

Implications for Security, Australian National University

Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 264,

Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, October

1992; Acharya, An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia?:

Prospects for Control, Pacific Strategic Paper No. 8.

11. Paribatra, p. 246.

12. Kuala Lumpur Voice of Malaysia, August 1, 1992, in

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report -East Asia

(hereafter FBIS-EAS)-92-149, August 3, 1992, p. 24.

13. Jakarta Radio Republik Indonesia Network, August 11,

1992, in FBIS-EAS-92-155, August 11, 1992, p. 26.

14. "Measures to Combat Piracy Set Up with Indonesia," in

FBIS-EAS-92-132, July 9, 1992, p. 22; Asia Week, September l8,

1992, p. 43.

15. Ironically, the same meeting passed the much-discussed

Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Pact, long

seen as a key element in efforts to establish a "neutral"

Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The United States opposed

this agreement since it applies to the signatories' EEZs, as well

as their land territory and could, therefore, be used to attempt

to restrict freedom of navigation. Its passage primarily

reflected concern over China and a desire to have an

accomplishment to demonstrate ASEAN solidarity, rather than an

effort targeted either at the United States or freedom of

navigation. One Indonesian said, "The treaty helps us regain our

confidence in terms of our cohesiveness." See Michael Vatikiotis

and Rodney Tasker, "Hang on Tight," Far Eastern Economic Review,

Vol. 159, No. 1, December 28, 1995, and January 4, 1996, p. 17.

The treaty's practical implications for regional security affairs

are likely to very limited.

16. John McBeth, Michael Vatikiotis, and Jacqueline Rees,

"Personal Pact," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 159, No. 1,

December 28, 1995, and January 4, 1996, p. l8.

17. Ibid., p. 19.

18. Senator Gareth Evans, "Australia's Regional Security,"

Speech to Parliament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and

Trade, Canberra, Australia, December 6, 1989, p. 4.
119

19. Michael Vatikiotis, "Advancing Sideways," Far Eastern

Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 51, December 21, 1995, p. 60;

Vatikiotis and Tasker, "Hang on Tight," pp. 16-17.

20. Vatikiotis, "Advancing Sideways," p. 60.

21. Quoted in Vatikiotis and Tasker, "Hang on Tight," p. 17.

22. Hoang Anh Tuan, "Vietnam's Membership in ASEAN:

Economic, Political, and Security Implications," Contemporary

Southeast Asia, Vol. 16, No. 3, December 1994, p. 261.

23. Quoted in Michael Vatikiotis, "Care to Join Us?," Far

Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 158, No. 49, December 7, 1995, p.

23.

24. It may be advisable to consider the Republic of Korea

(ROK) as a possible relocation site for some of the facilities in

Japan. Korea offers the potential for greatly expanded U.S. Navy

and U.S. Marine Corps access as the U.S. Army forces on the

peninsula are reduced. The Korean Navy is keen to expand ties

with the USN and the political dynamics within Korea suggest that

expanded access (short of home porting) would be available if the

United States wants it. There are some significant advantages to

diversifying USN facilities out of Japan, such as moving some to

Korea. Such a move would reduce the scale of the presence in

Japan, thereby reducing the social pressures that presence

creates on land. Furthermore, strengthening the navy-to-navy tie

with Korea, while the land forces are being reduced, would help

preserve U.S.-ROK ties and hence help stabilize ROK-Japan

relations over the next decade and beyond. U.S. planners must

consider the desirability of such facilities.

25. On a practical basis, an effort to claim a full suite of

maritime zones for all of the South China Sea islands, even if

only one state controlled all of the islands, would lead to a

large number of overlapping jurisdictional disputes. The

relatively narrow circumference of the South China Sea and the

wide dispersal of the islands would lead to the island zones

overlapping the EEZ and Continental Shelf claims of the littoral

states, especially Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and

Brunei. Effectively, there would be no "high seas" within the

South China Sea. These difficulties, however, seem unlikely to

deter the claimant states.

26. China occupied none of the Spratly Islands before March

1988, when it had a military clash with Vietnam in the Spratlys.

The March 1988 confrontation marked a turning point; China

occupied its first islands. The other claimants, greatly alarmed,

uniformly reinforced the occupation forces of their own islands
120

and began to consider significant enhancements of their military

capabilities to defend against China. Since March 1988, the

situation in the Spratlys has increasingly become an armed standoff. The other states have largely been reactive because they

lack the military capabilities to take offensive action in the

area. Only China has sufficient power to act offensively. The

other claimants necessarily have adopted a defensive posture,

garrisoning their islands and waiting.

27. Nayan Chanda, "Treacherous Shoals," Far Eastern Economic

Review, Vol. 153, No. 32, August 13, 1992, pp. 14, 16.

28. "Xisha and Nansha Islands belong to China," Beijing

Review, No. 21, May 25, 1979, p. 23.

29. Chang Yung-mei, Battle for the Hsisha Archipelago

(report in verse), Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1975,

reprinted in Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea,

New York: Methuen, 1982, p. vi.

30. For an overview of these claims, see R. Haller Trost,

"The Spratly Islands: A Study on the Limitations of International

Law," Occasional Paper No. 14, Canterbury, Great Britain:

University of Kent Centre of South-East Asian Studies, October

1990; J. R. V. Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in Southeast Asia:

A Commentary and a Map, Research Report No. 2, Honolulu, HI:

East-West Environment and Policy Institute, January 1981.

31. Quoted in "A Big Step over Little Islands," Asia Week,

August 2, 1991, p. 21.

32. Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Treacherous Shoals," p. 14.

33. Ai Hongren, Zhonggong Haijun Toushi: Maixiang Yuanyangde

Tiaozhan [An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy: -

Advancing towards the Blue Water Challenge], trans. in "China: An

Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy," Joint Publications

Research Service, China (henceforth JPRS-CAR)-90-052, July 16,

1990, p. 23.

34. The passage of a new territorial sea law by China in

1992 caused a furor in Japan and ASEAN due to its treatment of

China's claims in the Senkaku Islands (claimed by both Japan and

China) and the Spratlys. The PLAN and its allies in the coastal

provinces reportedly pushed through the law over the bitter

opposition of the Chinese Foreign Ministry which has been working

to improve China's regional image. See The Daily Japan Digest, Vol. II, No. 37, February 27, 1992, pp. 2-3. PLAN and Foreign

Ministry representatives have also consistently taken different

positions regarding China's policy in the Spratlys at

international conferences. Foreign Ministry representatives
121

parrot the official line that China is willing to pursue joint

development and leave sovereignty questions temporarily in

abeyance; PLAN officials maintain that China is only willing to

pursue joint development if other states first recognize Chinese

sovereignty over the islands.

35. Hongren, Zhonggong Haijun Toushi: Maixiang Yuanyangde

Tiaozhan [An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy

Advancing towards the Blue Water Challenge], p. 12 ff.

36. Raphael Pura, "ASEAN Directs Drive to Extend Security

Ties," Asian Wall Street Journal, July 26, 1993, p. 8.

37. "ASEAN Proposes Guidelines for the South China Sea,"

Asian Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1992, pp. 1, 7.

38. The line cannot be an archipelagic claim. First,

continental states are not allowed under the Law of the Sea to

make archipelagic claims. Second, the line does not run along the

islands' coasts as an archipelagic baseline must run. The line

can be a claim to an area of the ocean, like the Philippines'

claim in the South China Sea--but such a claim would also be

illegal under LOS, and the Chinese claims in the Spratlys are not

presented in this manner. The line could be an island demarcation

line, but the line fails to demarcate China's island claims,

leaves the Senkakus outside its orbit, and is open ended in

several critical areas.

39. Quoted in Nayan Chanda, "Long Shadow," Far Eastern

Economic Review, Vol. 159, No. 1, December 28, 1995, and January

4, 1996, p. 18.

40. Chi-Kin Lo, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes:

The Case of the South China Sea Islands, London: Routledge, 1989,

pp. 42-45.

41. Quoted in Vatikiotis and Tasker, "Hang on Tight," p. 17.

42. There are some indications that at least some elements

in China would like to adopt such a strategy. According to one

Chinese source,

It is said that Beijing's current attitude towards

those countries is to take advantage of mutual

conflicts and deal with each case on its merits. As for

when and how the recovery [of the islands] is going to

take place, Beijing will move in sequence, advancing

step by step. Beijing is not going to attack in all

directions. Beijing authorities estìmate that it

probably will take a long time to materialize the noble

ambition to recover the entire Nansha Islands [i.e.,
122

the Spratly Islands].

Hongren, Zhonggong Haijun Toushi: Maíxiang Yuanyangde Tiaozhan

[An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy: Advancing

towards the Blue Water Challenge], pp. 38-41. The discussion on

the Spratlys greatly amplifies this quote and suggests that

Chinese Navy strategists have decided that "Vietnam will be the

first to bear the brunt" and that the Philippines and Malaysia

could possibly be handled via negotiations.
123

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARC JASON GILBERT is Professor of History at North Georgia State

University. A specialist in South and Southeast Asian history who

received his doctorate in history from UCLA in 1978, Professor

Gilbert has edited or authored numerous books and journal

articles on modern South and Southeast Asian history. His

research has been supported by the National Endowment for the

Humanities and the Association for Asian Studies. He is the

editor and chief contributing author of The Vietnam War: Teaching

Approaches and Resources, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991;

and co-editor with William Head of an anthology of recent

scholarship on the decisive event of the Second Indochina War,

The Tet Offensive, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.

PAUL H. B. GODWIN is Professor of International Affairs at the

National War College, Washington, DC, where his research focuses

on Chinese security policy and defense modernization. He is a

graduate of Dartmouth College (1960) and received his M.A. in

Asian Studies (1963) and Ph.D. in Political Science (1967) from

the University of Minnesota. In the fall of 1987, Professor

Godwin was a visiting professor at the Chinese People's

Liberation Army National Defense University in Beijing. His most

recent publications are "China's Security: An Interpretation of

the Next Decade," in David M. Lampton and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr.,

eds., United States and China Relations at a Crossroads, Lanham,

MD: University Press of America, 1995; and "A New Pacific

Community: Adjusting to the Post-Cold War Era," in Howard J.

Wiarda, ed., U.S. Foreign and Strategic Policy in the Post-Cold

War Era, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996. Other essays have

appeared in Studies in Comparative Communism, Contemporary China,

The China Quarterly, and Armed Forces and Society.

ABRAHAM KIM is a research analyst for the Political-Military

Studies Program at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies, Washington, DC. He has written extensively on Northeast

Asian security, trade, and economic development issues. Mr. Kim

is currently working on a book entitled Rajin-Sonbong Special

Economic Zone: North Korea's Panacea, Placebo, or Poison? He

received his M.A. in Asian Studies at Harvard University.

DIANNE L. SMITH, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, joined

the Strategic Studies Institute in August 1995. Prior to that she

was Team Chief for Central Asia, National Military Intelligence

Collection Center, DIA, where she was responsible for setting up

Defense Attache Offices in Central Asia. A Military Intelligence

officer and Russian Foreign Area Officer, her previous

assignments include U.S. Army Exchange Officer to the United

Kingdom Defense Intelligence and Security School, Ashford, Kent,

United Kingdom; Chief of Strategic Intelligence Branch,

Intelligence Division, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT),
124

Brunssum, Netherlands; Counterintelligence Officer, Combined

Field Army (ROK/US), Uijongbu, Korea; and Assistant Professor of

Russian History at the U.S. Military Academy. Her most recent

works include "Muscovite Logistics, 1475-1598" and "From

Chattanooga to Durham Station, the Influence of Logistics Upon

Sherman's Strategy." She holds a B.A. in History and

International Relations from the University of Nebraska and an

M.A. and Ph.D. in Russian History from the University of

California at Davis. She is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

WILLIAM J. TAYLOR, JR., holds a Ph.D. in International Relations

from American University and completed post-doctoral studies at

the American University of Beirut. A former U.S. Army colonel,

elected to the Infantry Officer Candidate Hall of Fame, Dr.

Taylor served in tank and rifle battalions in Germany, Korea, and

Vietnam. He was a professor and director of national security

studies, director of debate, and course director for Middle East

studies at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. He has also

taught at the National War College and the School of Foreign

Service at Georgetown University. A member of the Council on

Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic

Studies, Taylor lectures and debates frequently before

government, academic, and corporate groups. He has appeared on

major television and radio networks worldwide more than 700

times. He is the author, coauthor, or coeditor of 16 books on

international security affairs. In addition, his more than 300

articles have appeared in major journals and in such publications

as the New York Times, Yomiuri Shimbun, Chosun Ilbo, The

Washington Post, The Washington Times, and National Review. He

was also the subject of a Washington Post Sunday Magazine cover

story and a Washington Times "Doers in Washington" feature.

ROBERT J. WIRSING is a member of the Department of Government and

International Studies at the University of South Carolina. A

specialist on the politics and international relations of South

Asia, his most recent book is India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir

Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1994.

PERRY L. WOOD earned a B.A. in Political Science from Boston

University in 1981 and did his graduate work at the Fletcher

School of Law and Diplomacy. Mr. Wood is currently employed by

Wood-Mizer Products, Inc., a wood-processing equipment

manufacturer based in Indianapolis, Indiana, where he is

responsible for marketing in the Asia-Pacific and Africa. He is

also a member of the political science faculty at Marian College,

where he teaches International Relations, Development, and

Southeast Asian History. Mr. Wood worked as a Research Fellow at

the Hudson Institute for 10 years, specializing in Asian politics

and economics. His Hudson Institute publications include ASEAN:
125

New Challenges, New Directions, coauthored with J. W. Wheeler,

1990; Beyond Recrimination: Perspectives on U.S.-Taiwan Trade

Tensions, coauthored with J. W. Wheeler, 1987; and Trial After

Triumph: East Asia After the Cold War, chief author, William E.

Odom, 1992. One of his articles was published in the collected

volume, Korea Under Roh Tae-woo: Democratisation, Northern Policy

and Inter-Korean Relations, edited by James Cotton, 1993. He also

wrote numerous Hudson Institute Research reports and contributed

articles on Asian politics and security issues to magazines and

newspapers.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Lieutenant Colonel Dianne L. Smith

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Devona A. Peck

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler