TRANSNATIONAL THREATS:

BLENDING LAW ENFORCEMENT

AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

Edited by

Carolyn W. Pumphrey

November 2000
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Governmen

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

I would like to acknowledge a special debt to the following p

Richard H. Kohn and Peter D. Feaver, the outgoing and in

Executive Secretaries of Triangle Institute for Strategic 

(1999-2000); Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Director of the Strategic 

Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, who conceived this con

and assisted every step of the way; Colonel Bernard F. Zipp of S

whom I worked closely in organizing the conference and who bor

shortcomings with great patience; Rye Barcott (conference rapp

and Jonathan Phillips (transcriber), both of the University o

Carolina at Chapel Hill, without whose excellent and timely ass

my own task as editor would have been so much harder; and 

Caddell of North Carolina State University who, as always, p

invaluable critical input when it was most needed.

*****

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forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of thi

may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by 

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rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

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monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for ele

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ISBN 1-58487-037-0

ii
CONTENTS

Foreword ...................

1. Introduction

 Carolyn W. Pumphrey ..........

2. An Overview from Law Enforcement’s

 Perspective

 Spike Bowman ..............

3. Transnational Threats: U.S. Military

 Strategy

 Daniel S. Roper..............

4. Information and Terroristic Use of Mass

 Weapons: The Larger Context

 Kenneth A. Minihan ...........

5. Intelligence Problems as They Relate to

 International Crime Organizations and

 Drug Trafficking

 William J. Olson .............

6. Transnational Threats Vis-`a-Vis Law

 Enforcement and Military Intelligence:

 Lessons on the Emerging Relationship

 Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker .......

7. Terrorism by Weapons of Mass

 Destruction: A Reassessment

 of the Threat

 Bruce Hoffman..............

iii
8. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass

 Destruction: A Review and New

 Paradigm

 Jeffrey F. Addicott ............ 

9. Bruce Hoffman’s View of Terrorism

 by Weapons of Mass Destruction:

 Another Perspective

 Victor Utgoff................ 

10. The National Information

 Infrastructure: The Role of the

 Department of Defense in Defending It

 Daniel T. Kuehl ............. 

11. Daniel T. Kuehl’s View of DOD’s Role in

 Defending the National Information

 Infrastructure: Another Perspective

 Phillip E. Lacombe ............ 

12. Daniel Kuehl’s View of Information

 Warfare and the Defense of U.S.

 Information Systems: Another

 Perspective

 Richard Marshall ............ 

13. Combating Transnational Organized

 Crime

 Phil Williams .............. 

14. Phil Williams’ View of Criminal

 Organizations and Drug Trafficking:

 Another Perspective

 Thomas V. Fuentes ........... 

iv
15. Phil Williams’ Views on Combating

 International Organized Crime:

 Another Perspective

 James R. McDonough .......... 

16. Preparing for War in the Fourth

 Dimension: A Reality Check

 David M. Crane ............. 

17. Terrorism and National Defense:

 The Congressional Perspective

 William Natter ............. 

18. New Institutions and New Ways

 of Operating

 Jeffrey A. Hunker ............ 

 About the Authors ............... 

v
FOREWORD

On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War Colleg

Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the 

University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Se

co-sponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Ca

The conference examined transnational threats, inc

terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, 

threats to the national infrastructure, and interna

organized crime. The goal was to evaluate the seriousn

such threats and discuss strategies for dealing with 

In particular, the conference sought to address the qu

of how military and law enforcement could blend 

strategies to better counter transnational threa

secondary purpose was to clarify the role of the milit

meeting challenges that transcend national border

threaten our national interests.

This book highlights some of the main issues and t

that ran through the conference. After looking a

various threats and undertaking a risk assessmen

book considers the unique aspects of transnational th

and then identifies the key challenges facing the U

States, paying particular attention to the role 

military. To conclude, the book discusses some of the 

that should be taken to secure ourselves ag

transnational threats. The Strategic Studies Instit

pleased to publish this volume as a contribution 

debate on important national security issues.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vii
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Carolyn W. Pumphrey

On February 2-3, 2000, the U.S. Army War Colleg

Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and the 

University Center for Law, Ethics, and National Se

cosponsored a conference in Chapel Hill, North Ca

The conference examined transnational threats, inc

terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (W

cyber threats to the national infrastructure

international organized crime. The goal was to evalua

seriousness of such threats and discuss strategi

dealing with them. In particular, the conference sou

address the question of how military and law enforc

could blend their strategies to better counter transna

threats. A secondary purpose, as noted by Major G

Robert H. Scales, Jr., at the start of the meeting, w

clarify the role of the military in meeting challenge

transcend national borders and threaten our na

interests. 

Transnational threats are major security threats 

21st century. They are characterized by their global n

which means, by definition, that these threats straddl

the domestic and foreign spheres. Whereas respons

for U.S. national security threats in the past c

belonged to the military and responsibility for do

security belonged to law enforcement, these cle

divisions no longer exist. This poses some pro

constitutional and security challenges. On the one 

institutions that have developed separately must now 

to work closely together and to blend their strateg

order to ensure our nation’s security. On the other han

division of military and law enforcement functions is c

linked to the preservation of our liberties, and the t

1
merging them is fraught with hazards. In the very 

preserving our security, we run the risk of forfeiting s

our liberties. Blending law enforcement and the mili

thus a vital but dangerous balancing act.

This introduction will synthesize some of the 

findings of the conference participants and attendees

looking at the various threats and undertaking 

assessment, we will consider the unique aspe

transnational threats. We will then identify th

challenges facing the United States, paying part

attention to the role of the military. To conclude, w

discuss some of the steps that should be taken to 

ourselves against transnational threats.

A Threat Assessment.

Our starting point must be to evaluate the nature 

threats we face. Only when we understand what is at 

can we determine what we can put at risk.

Terrorism entails the use of psychological warf

achieve political goals. The perpetrator of an 

terrorism lacks the legitimacy of a nation-state or 

recognized political entity. Terrorism is thus u

(though not inevitably) classified as a crime. Contemp

terrorist networks typically are not state-sponsor

number of terrorist acts have been perpetrated by sub

groups, and individual terrorism is also a potential pro

The aims and objectives of contemporary terrorists ar

unclear. In part, this is the result of deliberate pol

their part; anonymity enables them to capitalize on th

and alarm generated by their violence. Their organiz

are also far more amorphous than was typical of trad

terrorist groups, making them harder to retaliate a

than in the past.

Terrorists today have a frightening capability i

they can now get access to (or manufacture) nu

biological, and chemical WMD. In the estimation of 

2
Hoffman, they are not likely to resort to the use o

weapons for a variety of reasons. In part, it is becaus

weapons cost a lot to acquire, test, and manage. In pa

because terrorists can achieve their goals just as effec

by using more traditional weapons. They must also co

the possibility that they will alienate public sympa

they inflict massive casualties. Hoffman argues th

more likely threat may come from an unconven

chemical, biological, or radiological weapon built 

deliberately small scale. Such an attack would genera

the right amount of alarm and fear to serve the purp

the terrorists.

Given these realities, the threat of terrorism inv

WMD is, in Hoffman’s view, less than generally ass

While rapid technological innovation and opposit

perceived U.S. hegemony suggest that future terror

of WMD cannot be precluded, his estimate is that the 

is currently somewhat exaggerated. His assessment 

it should be noted, fully shared by commentators J

Addicott and Victor Utgoff. In their estimation, r

though it may be, the mere chance that such a catast

incident might take place, makes terrorism by W

threat of considerable magnitude.

Cyber threats come in two varieties: inform

warfare and cyber-crime. Both threats are directed a

the U.S. information infrastructure. The distin

between the two types derives from the intent 

perpetrator. If the attacks are carried out with the in

disrupt or undermine the government, they constitut

If, by contrast, they are carried out for reasons of perso

organizational gain, they are crimes. 

Dan Kuehl and commentators Richard Marsha

Phillip Lacombe all stressed the seriousness of 

threats. The national information infrastructure 

critical and growing importance to American eco

strength, political vitality, national will, and m

power. Cyber attacks, especially if they take place 

3
context of more conventional military hostilities di

against the United States, have the potential 

enormous damage. Cyber crimes, too, can be imm

costly. Even if a hacker is penetrating system

amusement rather than out of deliberate malic

damage can be considerable. Our increasing depende

cyberspace makes the United States vulnerable, esp

as the private sector owns and controls much of the me

We are also at risk because we awoke to the threat rela

late, because technology is changing at a pace unmatc

earlier times, and because the environment is a new 

The revolutionary new environment obliges the U

States to revise many of our traditional paradigms 

we can develop effective strategies. As a result, w

ourselves less well prepared to deal with these threat

with many others.

Organized crime is defined by Phil Williams a

continuation of business by criminal means. 

characterized by association for criminal pur

corruption, and violence. The international cri

organizations of today are larger in size, scope, and 

than those of earlier times. Their composit

increasingly multi-ethnic, and the criminals are show

growing ability to cooperate among themselves. 

organizations have tremendous resources. They 

tapped into the new opportunities presented b

internationalization of trade, finance, and communic

They are adaptable and flexible. They show an abi

exploit states in direct relationship to their vulnerab

and have a flair for minimizing the risks to themselv

From the standpoint of the United States, we are 

Phil Williams’ estimate, in direct danger. Organized 

thrives best where the state is weak and corrupt; the U

States serves rather as a host-state, i.e., a state which 

good markets. Inasmuch as the intention of orga

criminals is to exploit and manipulate the United 

rather than destroy it, the threat is limited. As Tom Fu

puts it, it is not in the interest of a leech to kill the 

4
donor. But the threat is certainly not one that c

ignored. Organized crime threatens the stabil

strategically important states by instigating corruptio

eroding, if not supplanting, legitimate governments. T

no mean threat when we are dealing with states like th

the former Soviet Union that have a nuclear capabilit

the profits from organized crime can also be used to ba

other dangerous groups, including terrorists. Fina

both James McDonough and William Olson emph

drug trafficking in this country exacts an immense h

and financial toll.

Two features shared by all of these threats signifi

add to the risk they pose. On the one hand, the

transnational and, on the other hand, they are prod

the information age. These characteristics enhance 

capabilities, obscure their intentions, and increas

vulnerabilities. 

Information age technologies provide orga

criminals, hackers, and other enemies with a

advantages that the rest of us also enjoy, including g

organizational flexibility and the ability to hide

transnational nature of the threat creates jurisdic

complications which play into the hands of our en

permitting them to escape from justice, put their mo

safekeeping, and minimize the risk to themselves 

variety of ways. The intentions of the perpetrat

transnational threats are also harder to determine th

typically been true. While the reasons for this are com

one explanation lies in the anonymity offered b

Internet. This complicates our task because until we 

what harm is intended us, it is hard for us to accu

measure the threat or choose the appropriate res

Open access to information provided by the new elec

environment has eroded some of the relative advantag

United States once enjoyed as a result of our ef

intelligence-gathering capabilities. We also find our

handicapped because we are currently organized t

with threats that clearly emanate from foreign or do

5
enemies. We are also conceptually oriented towa

different kind of operational environment.

If the peculiar nature of transnational threats em

clearly from conference discussions, so, too, did the ab

of real consensus as to which pose the most serious 

This in and of itself is something of a problem since we 

have infinite resources to apply to the problem. As 

Hoffman noted, we are in danger of miscalculating d

We risk either needlessly eroding our liberties or w

valuable resources.

Challenges.

Balancing Security and Liberty. The heart 

challenge that faces us is how to deal with transna

threats and still preserve our liberties. Transna

threats are characterized by their global nature. The

both unique security problems and profound constitu

challenges. A variety of protections exist in the U

States that have historically prevented the grow

“tyranny.” Protection of privacy and clear limits to m

authority are among the most cherished of our lib

However, in the face of transnational threats, these lib

sometimes seem to tie our hands. Were we less protec

our privacy, we might be better able to track our en

we might, for example, be able to conduct surveillance 

electronic means. This, however, would bring us clos

world dominated by an Orwellian Big Brother. Aga

fear to use the military to counter the terrorist 

because we fear that this might lead to the loss of c

control of the military. And yet the military is perhap

equipped financially, organizationally, and strategic

minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. W

that is, a twofold threat. If we underestimate the threa

run the risk of serious, even catastrophic danger. 

overestimate them, we run the risk of sacrificin

liberties. If we are anything less than rational and obj

6
in our cost/benefit analysis, we may end up doing 

harm than good.

This is not to say that preservation of libertie

maintenance of our security are incompatible. As Eliz

Rindskopf-Parker stresses, the historical record ma

clear that it is possible to find a balance between the n

security and the need for protection. Not all of the 

that constrain us, moreover, are writ in stone. Som

products of recent times and specific circumstances, a

be circumvented. Provided that we understan

purposes behind our laws and remain true to them, w

adapt ourselves to the new circumstances.

Coming to Terms with a New Environment. The s

major challenge of our time is how to cope with 

operational environment. We must move swiftly to 

our institutions to the needs of the day. We are not 

organized to deal with transnational threats. Nor 

have a doctrine that reflects the realities of today’s th

U.S. national defense bears the imprint of the indu

era, when technologies were far less complex and 

nation-states and clearly defined national boundarie

the hallmark of political life. The speed with which we 

develop technologies, formulate plans, or anything e

geared to slower times. Mechanisms that once ser

resolve conflict, gather information, or use force ar

outdated. One might think here of diplomatic framew

procedures, and protocols developed in an era of sov

states, of intelligence-gathering organizations structu

meet the needs of the Cold War, or of education and tr

designed to equip leaders for warfare in the industrial 

The very way we conceptualize is out of date. W

culturally unprepared to see attacks on inform

systems as problems in the same league as attacks inv

the pulsation of violence. Much of our vocabulary is ob

Traditional definitions do not fit the realities of conf

the information age. War, for example, traditional

been understood as armed and violent conflict be

7
political entities. An essential ingredient is believed 

force or the pulsation of violence. Under internationa

war is legitimate only if it is fought defensively, tha

response to an attack. In the information age, howev

may suffer catastrophic damage from “attacks” that 

involve the use of force. If we do not know and ha

clearly articulated what does or not constitute an a

how can we respond in an appropriate fashion? At th

least, an absence of clear doctrine and definitions pr

us from acting with assurance and consistency.

Uncomfortable Partnerships. This point c

correlates to the previous one. The changing nat

transnational threats has made it imperative th

achieve greater cooperation at many levels—nation

local, national and international, military an

enforcement, private and public. Central to the the

this conference is the need to blend law enforcemen

military strategies. The control of our communi

networks by the private sector means that it mus

partner in our national defense. Similarly, coope

between nations is vital if we are to cope with threat

by definition, cross borders.

The challenge stems from the fact that, for a var

reasons, such cooperation is fraught with difficultie

one thing, it goes against the grain. Business is wary 

alliance with government, fearing that it will le

regulation or to loss of profits. The American pu

traditionally mistrustful of government; as Ri

Marshall points out, the average citizen would rather 

American company intrude into its computer system

any of the Federal agencies, even though the latter a

more carefully monitored. Intelligence and law enforc

agencies have a history of rivalry and very distinct cu

Their processes do not work the same way, makin

development of joint strategies quite difficult. In part

they answer to different authorities and use 

information in different ways. Law enforceme

primarily interested in prosecution, whereas the g

8
intelligence is to collect information in order to pr

threats. Additionally, many of the barriers that 

between agencies are the result of carefully thoug

legal considerations and should be dismantled only 

caution. As for international cooperation, this is 

tricky by the fact that our bedfellows are not a

long-standing friends. Moreover, international law is 

its infancy, and working with an infinite number of law

jurisdictions at the least complicates the task of 

operations.

While these are certainly challenging problems, th

not insurmountable. The uneasy nature of the partne

stems in part from the fact that different communit

not understand one another very well; as Eliz

Rindskopf-Parker points out, they are sometimes 

suspicious of one another than is warranted. Fami

may breed respect. On a slightly different note, we s

not forget that culture is formed and what has been f

can be reformed or unformed. If we examine our instit

and work out why things are the way they are, we can 

modify those aspects that are not logical. When dealin

the business world the government has leverage; the 

of our networks is clearly of critical importance to 

well-being. And we should never forget that for 

companies, government is their biggest consumer. 

working with the international community, it sho

noted that if there are obstacles in our way, there are 

number of factors which should facilitate our task. Fir

foremost is the fact that almost all stand to benefit 

elimination of transnational threats.

Resources. Resource limits pose yet another cha

Our armed services, as Jeffrey Addicott emphasize

already stretched thin by their existing missions

United States must deal with transnational threats, 

are widely dispersed. We also face a rather different k

shortage. Our national security very much depen

getting access to the finest technological minds of th

but competition with the business sector has led to a 

9
drain from the public to the private sector. Our fin

resources are similarly strained. Some organized cr

groups in particular are extraordinarily wealthy. W

Olson notes that drug traffickers earn more every yea

the United States spends on all of its counter drug e

The annual income of these and other crim

organizations is frequently greater than that of 

governments around the world.

Our challenge is to find ways to use our ex

resources wisely, minimizing waste and duplicat

effort, and balancing all our disparate needs. The Am

public, ironically, may complicate this task. William N

and Bruce Hoffman both address this issue

government is responsive to public demands. The pu

however, often reactive and emotional. It seems to 

overreacted to the terrorist threat and quite po

under-reacted to the cyber threat. When suffic

aroused, public opinion can put pressure on the gover

to allocate resources in ways that are not neces

balanced. We must find ways both to evaluate threa

sober and logical manner and to accommodate, b

manipulate, the public fears.

The Role of the Military.

One of the goals of the conference was to consider 

role the military should play in the struggle a

transnational threats. As already noted, the ambigui

the situation stem from the fact that transnational t

are neither uniquely foreign nor domestic. Terr

always treads a fine line between crime and 

International organized crime is still largely a law and 

problem as far as the United States is concerne

indirectly touches on issues of national sec

Information warfare and cyber terrorism are even 

nebulous since they do not involve the use of force a

term is classically understood. But because of what a 

attack can do to our national security, it often seems 

10
like an act of war than a crime. In all cases, mor

jurisdictional and geographic boundaries are cross

perpetrators of the threats, and networks operate 

within and outside the United States.

How extensive the role of the military should be is c

a matter of debate. For a number of reasons, many fe

the responsibilities for transnational threats shou

rest primarily with our armed forces. Phil Williams 

the point that force is often “a blunt instrument”—too 

to use against criminal organizations which are busi

and which should be hit where businesses can be hur

(in their purses). Military organizations, moreove

organized hierarchically and, as such, are not well su

dealing with networks. Spike Bowman makes the poin

the use of force (as for example the launching of m

against Afghanistan) is a narrow way to respond 

problem and not particularly useful against such disp

threats. He also points out that the use of force is not 

to be universally acceptable in the international comm

and thus is not going to carry the weight of other solu

Jeffrey Addicott raises a quite different concer

military forces of the United States are currently ove

and, even if they are well equipped to deal with 

threats in principle, in practice they will not be of muc

These rather pragmatic arguments are reinforced by 

considerations. Since Reconstruction and the enactm

the Posse Comitatus Act, the active duty military ha

prohibited from performing police duties in the U

States. 

This does not mean, however, that the military h

role to play. Dan Roper distinguishes between a leadin

and a supporting role for the Department of Defense 

The leading role must be taken only where national se

is at stake. Most transnational threats do not fall in

category. An exception may prove to be inform

warfare. At the moment cyber threats fall into a shad

between crime and war, and our definitional ambig

cloud our ability to assign clear responsibility to the 

11
But, as Dan Kuehl stresses, cyberspace is criti

America’s security and well-being. In his view, at lea

DoD has both a role and a responsibility, alb

conjunction and cooperation with law enforcement a

private sector, to protect this environment from all en

foreign and domestic. If we do conclude that this t

transnational threat is a mission for the DoD, one 

tasks will be to develop suitable new strategies. G

Kenneth Minihan, for example, notes that the m

might think about defending U.S. strategic sanctuar

asynchronous means, developing an equivalent of ou

War deterrent strategies.

For the most part, the military is likely to p

supporting role only, where the primary initiativ

responsibility lies elsewhere. How this might work in 

is well illustrated by Addicott, who notes current pl

use the military in counter-terrorism. In these plans

and local authorities still have primary responsibi

respond to emergencies within their jurisdiction, but c

extensive assistance from DoD in the event of a 

attack. Addicott also discusses plans for the use 

National Guard and Army Reserves as primary res

forces to a WMD episode. As he points out, the r

components are not subject to the same legal constra

the regular military.

In general, conference participants agreed tha

military has much to contribute. It can pr

transportation, emergency medical care, and translat

can assist in large-scale disaster relief and humani

operations. It can play a constructive part in the interd

of drugs and criminal products and make u

contributions in the area of intelligence. It can p

training to other agencies; the 1996 Defense A

Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also known a

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici [NLD] Act), which envisions t

of DoD personnel to help local metropolitan auth

respond to a WMD event, is an example of this k

thinking. Finally, the DoD has developed useful co

12
and functional strategic approaches. It has deve

models for jointness which could provide very 

insights to other groups as they seek to learn how to 

together. It already has provided a model whic

modified the way law enforcement unders

intelligence. 

Overall, however, there was considerable agre

among conference participants that the role of the m

in dealing with transnational threats should be a l

one. In their view, the experience of the military is it

valuable asset. And, except when dealing with inform

warfare, it should play a supporting rather than a le

role.

Agenda.

The purpose of the conference was to define the na

transnational threats and to consider how best to 

these threats. The conference participants offered a n

of general principles as guidelines for action as we

number of concrete proposals. These, interesting

rather well with some of the programs and strategie

are already being implemented by the governmen

chapters by Jeffrey Hunker, David Crane, and J

Addicott, in particular, reflect this.

As far as principles are concerned, six stand out.

1. Widespread agreement exists that speed is vita

hallmark of the information age is an extraordinarily 

rate of change. To maintain our current edge, we mus

faster than we have in the past in addressing a ra

tasks, from fiscal planning to technological retooling

2. Adaptability is another key requirement

relates to the previous point; situations evolve so q

that we do not have time to undertake ma

restructuring of existing bureaucracies. Rather, we s

develop flexible plans and make use of assets alre

existence.

13
3. Jointness. Existing barriers between agencie

between the public and private sectors must be redu

4. Clear thinking is another essential ingredie

success. Until we gain a clear conceptual grasp of the n

of conflict in the information age, we will not be a

develop clear strategies, and our responses are doome

fragmented, indecisive, and even contradictory.

5. Creativity. Given the new operational enviro

in which we move, it is imperative that we do 

Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker calls out-of-the-box thin

6. Finally, it is essential that we keep withi

bounds of the law, whatever the temptations migh

cut corners for security’s sake.

Proposals for Action.

Suggestions as to how to improve our abilities t

with transnational threats are too numerous to list in 

entirety, but a few deserve mention because they 

frequently reiterated in the course of the meeting.

Interestingly enough, one of the points to emerge 

strongly and from a variety of sources was the need 

respectful of the law. This is significant, because as d

looms large, it is easy to betray this principle. Th

remains, however, that remaining true to our constitu

principles at home and fostering democratic principl

the rule of law abroad are likely to serve us well; they g

respect for agencies like the Federal Bure

Investigation and will ultimately help address th

causes of international violence and crime. Corrupt

was noted, is the soil in which crime grows, and terror

rarely, if ever, the tool used by democratic states.

Along similar lines, it was noted that internation

and diplomacy promise to offer some real advantage

the use of force as a means of countering transna

threats. At the moment, however, many ex

14
mechanisms for conflict resolution are geared t

existence of sovereign states. As a result, in the bord

environment that characterizes transnational threat

often extremely difficult to know with whom, or in 

manner, to carry on negotiations. It is clearly impe

that we develop avenues of conflict resolution that 

reflect current realities.

A number of recommendations were made as to h

make better use of our limited financial resources. 

top of the list was the call for improved financial pla

The government lacks a clear plan outlining how t

with transnational threats and establishing l

priorities. As a result, spending by Congress tends 

reactive, directed against whatever threat is i

headlines rather than to the best programs. Researc

Development tends to be market-driven. Steps sho

taken to ensure that resources are applied in such a w

to address specific weaknesses. Special attention sho

paid to meeting our technology needs. On a slightly dif

note, international financial controls should be estab

to make it harder for criminals to transfer money

would make their activities less lucrative and not on

them where it hurts—in their purses—but would un

some of the resource advantages they currently enjo

Another theme to emerge with clarity was the ne

rather substantial organizational reform. Confe

participants here targeted the U.S. intelligence comm

There was considerable agreement that its cu

structure prevents it from dealing with transna

threats in anything other than a fragmented and patc

way. There was less agreement as to what to do abou

Some participants suggested a massive restructuring 

the lines of the National Security Act of 1947. Othe

that this would not be feasible, given the entrenched n

of the existing bureaucracy. They recommended a 

remedial approach such as opening up lin

communication between the different government age

15
The need for planning and vision was another the

emerge with frequency. Congress needs to be given 

for how to deal with transnational threats. This sho

clear, comprehensive, and well crafted. This will m

less susceptible to pressure groups and be proactive 

than reactive in how it handles threats. The gover

also needs to be able to present to industry a vision 

national security needs. And the military must conti

its efforts to develop flexible plans capable of m

rapidly evolving threats. These plans must be based o

and more fitting paradigms of war. On a rather dif

note, James McDonough raised an important point w

spoke of the need to develop an operational approac

would integrate regional and local efforts into a 

strategic effort.

The importance of education and training wa

recognized. Several initiatives were identified as be

value and in need of further development. Jeffrey H

noted the existence of several pilot programs desig

bring into the federal government a cadre of highly s

information technology security professionals, inc

the creative scholarship for service program whose pu

is to attract young people to careers in this area. 

Bowman noted some interesting programs that are 

undertaken to train other nations in investig

techniques so that they may be better able to assist us 

common efforts to combat international organized 

The conference participants also stressed the va

education. Federal authorities, it was agreed, need 

educated so that they more fully understand the nat

the threats with which they are dealing. And for 

participants public education was also a priority; sug

initiatives included introducing courses on Transna

Threats to university curriculums.

Last, but not least, was the call for cooperation

indeed may be viewed as the keynote of the conference

are to deal effectively with the problem of coun

transnational threats, we must find ways to bring 

16
more effective cooperation among a whole host of dif

entities: cooperation between state and local govern

between business and government, between fe

agencies, and among nations.

Strongly emphasized was the need to forge an eff

partnership between the public and private sectors. T

crucial because the private sector now controls a ver

percentage of our communications networks and be

business often has cutting-edge skills which we need 

are to maintain our technological superiority. 

cooperation should be based on an understanding 

mutual benefits that will accrue from a secure Intern

might come about as a result of the development o

types of institutions combining public and private gro

innovative ways.

Cooperation among defense, intelligence, an

enforcement must be improved. Threat analysis, wa

incident response, and investigation would all benefi

serious efforts in this area. Preliminary steps have 

taken; the National Infrastructure Protection C

(NIPC), intrusion detection monitoring systems

information sharing and analysis centers referred 

Jeffrey Hunker, are examples of programs that are 

discussed or have been initiated. All could be improv

ensure a better understanding between different age

other steps were recommended. These included man

rotational jobs for persons in intelligence an

enforcement communities.

There is also much legal work to be done tha

enhance the ability of law enforcement to work to

with other agencies. Among the recurrent themes 

conference was the need for new laws. These coul

bridge the gaps between the traditional use of intellige

prosecute criminal cases and strategic intelligence, 

is used to predict, preempt, and defend against atta

the United States and its citizens. With such new la

place, one of the major frustrations of today wou

17
alleviated: information would flow more freel

criminals would find it more difficult to escape dete

Also addressed was the need to develop interna

investigative and evidentiary standards as w

electronic access protocols. These steps would go som

to assist law enforcement in tracking down crimina

bringing them to justice.

Conclusion.

In sum, international organized crime, terrorism

information warfare all pose serious threats to our na

security. Because they constitute a threat th

simultaneously both foreign and domestic and becaus

are able to take advantage of the new high-tech opera

environment, they pose rather unique challenges 

security and to our civil liberties. Dealing with 

transnational threats calls for a joint effort on the part 

law enforcement and the military. It is of para

importance that we learn how to do this and how t

while remaining within the limits of the law.

18
CHAPTER 2

AN OVERVIEW FROM LAW ENFORCEME

PERSPECTIVE

Spike Bowman

This is an introduction to the problem of m

transnational threats and the role of law enforcem

meeting them. Some clarification, first, is in 

Transnational threats of many kinds have been with 

years. Some of these threats are truly significant, b

ones with which this introduction will not be conc

Espionage, for example, is a traditional transna

threat, but not one on which these introductory com

will focus. Nor will this overview be directly concerne

traditional intelligence threats, like efforts made by 

countries to ferret out the secrets of our defense prog

or even such nontraditional threats as economic espio

Indirectly, however, all of these threats interse

subjects of primary concern, making the fundam

problems encountered that much more difficult.

The focus for this introduction to transnational t

is fourfold: terrorism, international organized 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and cyber crim

purpose is to define the nature of these threats and 

discuss the remedies available to deal with those th

Finally, with a singular and, some might argue, par

focus I will address the increasingly appropriat

necessary role of one traditional remedy

enforcement—to meet and deter these threats.

Terrorism.

Terrorism, though not a new phenomenon, fortuna

still foreign to the experience of most Americans. D

our relative insularity from terrorism, however, we 

19
had a few wake-up calls in the last few decades. Th

time we faced a threat that significantly affected 

interests was in 1983 with the Beirut bombings 

Embassy and the Marine barracks.

2

While Beirut spawned our first real challenge rega

terrorism, one that persisted throughout the 1980s

challenge was really quite different from today’s t

Then, terrorism was still at a distance from our shore

the state-sponsors were more easily identified. At the 

much of the collective attention of the U.S. Governme

focused on merely trying to figure out who the actors 

how states were supporting them, and, occasionally, 

states. We devoted a lot of energy to the iss

state-sponsored terrorism, and our anti-terrorism 

were focused more on states than on individuals.

In the ensuing years, however, the nature of the te

threat changed dramatically. Nations quickly reco

that state-sponsored terrorism was an unhealthy a

and one that would make them international pariahs.

an evolution born of necessity, the responsibili

terrorism devolved to large, hierarchical, and gen

well-organized groups of terrorists—which received 

rather than overt funding from sponsor states. 

concerned with threat analysis concentrated their att

on the activities of large terrorist groups such a

Hezbollah, the Hamas, and others. They focus

particular, on locating the whereabouts of the lead

and the members. To a large extent, concern remaine

states who funded these organizations.

Today, with evolutionary logic, those engag

terrorism represent a further devolution of respons

and organization. Hamas, Hezbollah, and other 

groups associated with terrorism have taken on roles 

commonly associated with states. They are ene

fundraisers; they organize people, build hospital

schools, provide social welfare, etc. For the same re

that states could no longer afford to be associated 

20
terrorism, the large, organized groups usually se

distance themselves from overt acts of terrorism, alt

they do claim responsibility for terrorist acts from t

time.

4

The result is that terrorist actors today are more l

organized than they have tended to be in the past. Som

true, do retain a degree of homogeneity. Osama Bin L

organization is a case in point. Though loosely structu

nevertheless is held together by a rudimentary hie

and a lot of money.

5

 Many groups around the wo

contrast, organize on an ad hoc basis. They m

homogenous, or they may be drawn from a vari

different terrorist groups; the Palestinian Islamic 

(PIJ), the Hezbollah, the Hamas, and others may cont

the occasional “pick-up” terrorist. When they do or

like this, it is often so they may work together for a s

purpose and to engage in a specific operation.

6

devolution of authority makes them particularly diffi

deal with because the terrorists become harder to id

More than ever, it is hard to determine who the ter

are, where they are, where the hierarchy is located, an

is in charge.

International Organized Crime.

Organized crime is nothing new to Americans. Th

us who grew up on the East coast were raised on sto

the Mafia. We all saw the Godfather movies, which 

largely based on fact. But organized crime is no longe

the same as it was 50 years ago. Protection rackets 

longer the bread and butter of organized crime, w

smuggling is an arcane memory, and computer

replacing guns. Perhaps more significantly, how

whereas terrorist organizations have tended to b

smaller over time, criminal organizations, aping the g

of large international corporations, have tended to b

larger. 

21
Organized crime has become so ubiquitous 

impossible to define the scope of it for any but l

purposes. For this primer on transnational threat

focus will remain on a small number of very large orga

crime groups. Six of them stand out—the Italian Ma

Russian mobs, the Mexican and Colombian carte

Japanese Yakuza, and the Chinese Triads.

7

 Though 

are others, these six are especially noteworthy in th

groups are large enough and have a suffici

well-structured hierarchy to be able to organize 

logistical networks and even to work together for 

They can trade knowledge and expertise, offer each 

protection, and even trade drug routes with one anoth

give just one example, during the early 1990s, at the 

the Cold War, we observed numerous Italian orga

crime figures at work in Eastern Europe. They 

teaching the Eastern Europeans how to become orga

and make crime a business.

9

International organized crime is frightening. It p

serious potential threat to both political and eco

institutions throughout the entire community of na

The Russian mobs offer an illustration of the extent 

problem. Organized crime in Russia and Eastern E

has expanded to an alarming degree. According to 

from Eastern Europe and Russia (with whom the F

Bureau of Investigation [FBI] works on a daily bas

percent of their banks are controlled by organized cr

Where the rot has set in, countries must deal 

entrenched corruption—the corruption of elected of

of leaders, of the military, corruption, in fact, of all 

institutions.

11

 In the case of Russia and Eastern E

this could eventually lead to the creation of a se

oligarchic criminal states. Russia alone could develop 

criminal-syndicalism state that spans no less than 1

zones. The consequence for economic relations worldw

obvious. Moreover, the already fragile control mecha

for an increasingly unstable nuclear arsenal repre

frightening concern for the entire free world.

22
Weapons of Mass Destruction.

WMDs are increasingly a concern for Americans

hard to pick up a newspaper today without finding a

one story involving a WMD threat. One of the best k

incidents took place in Japan where members of the 

Shinri Kyo cult unleashed a nerve gas attack in the s

on March 20, 1995.

12

 This event demonstrate

frightening ease with which WMDs can be employ

terrorist groups or even disgruntled citizens. The on

drama in Iraq has highlighted another aspect 

problem, which is the difficulty of locating and iden

the exact nature and scope of highly portable WMD th

The weapons inspections teams assigned the ta

locating and destroying Saddam Hussein’s WMDs 

been seriously frustrated in their efforts.

13

Nor is America itself immune from WMD threats. O

home front, the explosion in Oklahoma City made i

that putting together a weapon of mass destructio

relatively simple matter.

14

Just recently, the FBI caug

men in Miami with ricin, a very deadly poison.

material has no legitimate uses, which should, in t

make it very hard to obtain. Yet the FBI has had s

cases concerning it in the past few years. An Ohi

recently ordered three vials of bubonic plague bacteri

a pharmaceutical company and was able to get them

FBI responds weekly to anthrax threats. Although th

far, have turned out to be hoaxes, the number of thes

and of itself, indicative of the extent to which the re

WMD threats is being contemplated.

Cyber Crime.

The cyber age is demolishing paradigms. Traditio

counterterrorism operations have been directed to

physical threats. Similarly, criminal enterpris

normally occupied a physical dimension. Today, howe

new reality is dawning. Many of the harms that onc

wholly physical in nature can now be visited 

23
electronically and anonymously. Financial transactio

now be instantaneous and anonymous. Informatio

basis for commerce, can be transferred instantaneous

without leaving a trail, even innocently, as by aca

exchange. Computer technology has made our s

sectors vulnerable.

17

 Cyber threats pose a danger 

power grids, our air traffic control systems, pipe

emergency services, and a host of other communic

systems.

18

 Moreover, the incidence of identity theft ha

on a spectacular rise.

19

The cyber threat has been driven by our own d

Commercial industry needed to find effective wa

transfer money and information, thereby taking 

advantage of world markets.

20This led to the dramat

rapid mastery of cyber space. As the cyber highways b

busier, however, economic and industrial espionag

increased to the point that they virtually became indu

of their own. The threat from espionage of this so

become so acute, indeed, that in 1996 a new federal s

was enacted to address the problem.

21The statute h

different applications as regards those engag

espionage. It applies, on the one hand, to the indi

working on his own for a commercial purpose or 

company, and, on the other hand, to a person work

behalf of a foreign power. The statute calls for dif

penalties depending upon whether the person invol

espionage falls into the first or the second category

person working for a foreign power is punished much 

substantially than the person working solely for the p

sector.

Dealing with Transnational Threats.

Terrorism, organized crime, WMD, and cyber t

have much in common. None of the threats are confi

borders—hence the fact that we speak of the

transnational threats. In fact, organizations engag

such activities have every incentive to spread out as 

24
they can, extending across borders to diffuse na

responsibility and capability to keep them in check.

The transnational threat poses a unique set of pro

In the first place, it is hard to enforce any kind o

mechanism across borders. Nations tend to guard 

sovereignty fiercely and dislike it when foreign n

intervene in their affairs, even if it is to deal with a pr

that afflicts both parties alike. In the second pla

permits the members of such organizations to e

responsibility for their actions. Since the nerve cent

group like the Russian mobs or the Hezbollah can

found, one cannot target it with sufficient certainty to 

the criminal members believe there is a probabilit

they will have to pay for their actions.

Taking this as a given, what are our options w

comes to dealing with transnational threats? Our firs

always preferred, option is to use diplomacy. Since th

Middle Ages, this has been the traditional starting po

solving problems between nations. In 1648 the Pe

Westphalia set the pattern for future conflict resolut

establishing the idea of national sovereignty defin

large measure by physical borders.

22

 The treaties a

from that event determined that nations would be sov

within borders; that nations would deal with each ot

physical entities; that they would exchange diploma

negotiate with each other as equals, regardless of s

stature.

Unfortunately, when nations deal with transna

threats of the sort we have been discussing here, dipl

proves to be largely inoperative. There 

sovereign-to-sovereign contact. There are no opportu

to do business with or negotiate with members of the 

party. There is no framework, no procedure, and no pr

with which to work.

Other state-to-state persuasive tools are eq

ineffective when it comes to dealing with transna

threats. For example, a second option normally availa

25
resolve international issues is to encourag

international community to bring political pressures t

in order to bring about change. Like diplomacy, how

political persuasion holds no utility whatsoever 

dealing with amorphous, dislocated, and disp

transnational threats.

Economic sanctions are a third frequently used o

Economic sanctions, even in the best of circumstances

rarely proved to be a highly effective tool. Nations h

way of belt-tightening that withstands this recourse 

often than not.

23 For the transnational threats w

today, however, it is virtually useless as a means of co

organizations, which lack a vital nerve center.

A fourth method of responding to transnational t

is, of course, the use of force. Launching missile

Afghanistan in response to an act of terrorism is, in th

of this author, a legitimate way of responding 

problem.

24

 Legitimate or not, however, it is also a 

narrow way of responding to any problem. It offers 

limited solution and one which has proved to be eff

more often when followed by political reconciliation, w

of course, presumes a polity with which to reco

Because the threats we view in this forum a

decentralized and physically dispersed, military for

have minimal deterrent effect and likely will be usefu

when it can be used to physically stop the terrorist or 

event. It is far less likely to be effective in com

organized crime or cyber intrusion.

This brings me to the fifth traditional option to r

the international threat—law enforcement. The exi

of defined borders has serious implications fo

enforcement. They make it difficult for law enforc

agencies to deal with transnational threats. Just li

military or the private person, the police officer has t

at the border. He has no jurisdiction beyond hi

territory. As a result, law enforcement has always be

least favored means of dealing with transnational th

26
It is what we might call the poor stepchild of the trad

responses to international problems.

The Role of Law Enforcement.

The Limitations of Law Enforcement. The const

faced by law enforcement in dealing with transna

threats should be fleshed out here in a little more 

First, to some degree, domestic law, foreign law

international law will inevitably be somewhat misma

Our domestic laws in the United States do not alway

into account international law and, in fact, some 

domestic laws, or their implementation, deliberately 

traditional international law.

25

 All domestic laws a

for the unique needs of each nation. The result is that 

country in the world will find it difficult to apply do

laws when the causes and/or actors are transnationa

Naturally enough, this characteristic of Westp

politics means that a continuing problem w

jurisdiction. When U.S. law enforcement agents 

abroad, their guns and their badges stay at home be

they are not, by international or foreign laws, author

exercise the trappings of sovereignty within the boun

of another sovereign nation. Jurisdiction, by definit

consigned by a sovereign, and even if it is extended b

the sovereign’s borders by domestic law, foreign n

need not, and virtually never will, recognize that pres

authority within their own sovereign territory.

26

Another problem is venue. How does one dete

where to hold the trial of a member of an interna

organization? If, for example, we look at the organized 

entities that blanket all of Eastern Europe, we f

remarkably difficult to answer very basic questions. W

is the crime taking place? (Usually it is occurring in a 

of places.) Who is responsible? Choosing the v

moreover, proves to be a major problem because, once 

venue is tied to the sovereign border.

27
Another obstacle in the way of law enforcement ag

is their limited access to information. It is vital tha

know what is happening. Yet, to get a clear pict

transnational threats, they must rely on external reso

both foreign and domestic. A federal agency seeking t

the criminal activities of drug traffickers, for example

know where the players are. Law enforcement officer

to know what methods are being used to control p

They have to know how and when the money of 

organizations is being transferred. They have to know 

the drug routes are. Vexingly, such information is ofte

hard to obtain when it must be obtained from s

located beyond one’s own sovereign borders.

27

The collection and use of evidence pose another pro

It is extremely difficult to bring international crimin

justice in the United States, in part becaus

requirements for criminal evidence are so strict. If th

wants to use information it has obtained from an

country, first the Bureau and then the courts 

ascertain that it is reliable. If the FBI does not kno

source of its information, it often cannot use it in 

Calling on foreign witnesses also poses difficulties. E

willing and available, they must come to the United 

in order to testify and present evidence.

Finally, extradition is always a challenge. Extra

from one country to another is a technique that, once 

is tied to the Peace of Westphalia. It is a very cumbe

process.To some extent, the United States has been a

deal with this and several of the other problem

executing mutual legal assistance treaties (ML

MLATS harmonize U.S. laws with those of other cou

to the extent possible. Such bilateral arrangements d

facilitate the transfer of witnesses, extradition of sus

and collection of evidence.

28

The Utility of Law Enforcement. The reality is that 

are many reasons why law enforcement is not alwa

effective tool to use against transnational th

28
Nonetheless, for all of the limitations, and there are m

is a tool that we ought to take very seriously. Why?

First of all, the threats we are examining he

universal threats. All of the civilized countries in the 

are faced by the same problems we are. Most nations, i

are threatened to a far greater extent than we 

Organized crime, for example, is a much bigger prob

Eastern Europe than it is in the United States. Rega

of the size of the problem, nations share transna

threats in common, giving them a common purp

working together to eradicate or at least diminis

threats. 

In addition, despite the fact that all nations 

different laws, most of the countries of the wo

criminalize the same type of activity. Murder, burglar

crimes of that nature are widely condemned and for

criminalized. Hence we at least have some basis in l

cooperation. Similarly, police, for the most part, h

common purpose worldwide. For most of our lifetime

great enemy of the United States was the Soviet Unio

today, the FBI works on a daily basis with the Mini

the Interior (MVD) in Russia, assisting them in 

struggle with organized crime.

30

 This type of coopera

increasingly common throughout the world. The

honest law enforcement officers all over the world, an

are fighting for the same thing—preserving the instit

of government, law, and civilization of their country.

Additionally, other remedies are simply not p

effective. Some remedies, such as military forc

effective for a brief moment. They provide a temp

solution for a particular problem. If, however, we w

find a way systematically to control transnational th

we must do so on a legal basis. Law provides the foun

for human society, and criminal law is internati

acceptable. A solution rooted in international law w

much more acceptable to the international communit

any other type of remedy we may attempt. Laun

29
missiles into Afghanistan was certainly permis

certainly lawful, and certainly, whatever the critic

say, a morally responsible thing to do. It was not, how

universally accepted. On the other hand, when we 

terrorists or international criminals and try them, t

accepted.

31

Finally, law enforcement promotes the rule of law

significance of this cannot be overestimated. In the 

analysis, the rule of law offers the best chance for al

This is what the developing countries of the wor

looking for. They are trying to find a stable basis on wh

build their society. Promoting the rule of law plays a k

in assuring them that they will eventually achieve sta

Proposals for Action?

It is useful to consider some brief suggestions as t

law enforcement may be used to deal with transna

threats.

Develop international financial controls and 

standards. One of the serious problems confronting 

the moment is that criminals have the ability to tr

money all around the world with total anon

International financial controls need to be establis

deal with this problem.

32 Our national laws mu

harmonized with standards acceptable to the interna

community.

33

We need to develop investigative and evide

standards that will transfer from one country to an

One way to accomplish these goals is through educatio

training. We have, in fact, already founded 

enforcement academy in Budapest and are building an

one in Thailand. We also bring foreign nationals enga

law enforcement activities to study at the FBI faci

Quantico, Virginia. These initiatives serve a dual pu

On the one hand, they help build relationships. On the 

hand, they help law enforcement agents develo

30
necessary expertise in carrying out criminal investiga

teaching them how to preserve evidence on a day-

basis. 

We also need to deal with cyber crime. Her

enforcement can play an important role by deve

electronic access protocols. We simply must find a w

determine more effectively, more efficiently, and 

quickly the origin of cyber threats. This is quite di

Once again, it the transnational nature of the threa

world defined by national borders that compound

problem. While law enforcement agents can rela

easily determine the immediate source of an attack

rare that they can determine its ultimate source. The

be hot on the scent of a trail only to find themselves st

at the border. By the time they have negotiated the r

proceed, the trail is cold. We need, therefore, to find 

way of getting countries to work together so tha

enforcement agents can follow the thread of a crime 

way to a resolution.

Education and training. Worldwide training i

needed in the fight against cyber crime. We are m

some progress in that direction. The FBI, as note

developed some educational programs. So ha

Department of Defense (DoD). Worthy of mention he

the efforts made by the Marshall Center in Eur

develop social programs that will foster democracy.

34

however, can and should be done.

Here in the United States further educatio

training are likewise needed in a variety of areas. Mor

and energy should be devoted to helping Federal agen

state and local authorities understand the nature 

threats facing them and how to handle them.

Interagency cooperation. Law enforcement agenci

other agencies need to learn how to work together t

solutions to the transnational threats. We nee

example, to have a coordinated surge capability. The 

cannot handle all existing problems. In the United S

31
the FBI has the authority and (at least within this co

the venue to deal with threats. However, we do not ha

logistical ability to move everything where we need 

need, therefore, the assistance of all the different bra

of the U.S. Government. Many of them have a lot to 

The DoD may be something of a 600-pound gorilla, but 

provide the logistical support needed in a time of crisis

need the expertise of the Environmental Protection A

and Department of Health and Human Services. W

the help of FEMA whenever there is a disaster.

Of course, this is not a new concept. Federal ag

already work together to deal with transna

threats—the task is to improve the synergy. Memb

different agencies practice and run exercises togeth

example. However, such coordination efforts are s

their infancy. We need a lot more practice; we need 

more joint exercises; we need to have far 

determination. 

Fiscal Planning.

Of course, we must find a way to fund such coord

efforts. When we respond to an Oklahoma City bomb

indeed any terrorist attack, it is vital that we have 

backing. We need to give some thought ahead of t

what our needs will be. We need to develop legislatio

will determine how the Economy Act will hand

multiplicity of agencies responding to a single threa

date this area has been badly neglected; the police a

very good at exploiting the entire U.S. Governmen

crisis solution, even if they were funded for it, an

National Security Council has focused its primary att

on how to deal with overseas threats.

Conclusion.

In sum, terrorism, international organized crime, 

and cyber crime, all pose real threats to the United S

They are tricky to deal with, in part because the

32
transnational in nature and because we must overc

worldwide preoccupation with national sovereignty 

we can effectively begin to counter the threats. Trad

remedies ranging from the use of diplomacy to the 

force prove to be of limited utility in dealing with this k

threat. So, too, is law enforcement. Yet, thou

traditionally has been the least favored of all remedie

enforcement does offer some unique advantages. Ab

else, it promotes a resort to the rule of law. The spread 

rule of the law is in the best interest of all nation

should, therefore, give considered thought to how w

government as a whole, can enhance and increase the 

law enforcement in dealing with transnational threa

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Because economic espionage relates only tangentially 

issues with which this work is concerned, no direct discussion is 

to this subject. Nonetheless, it is clearly an area of concern, part

as it relates to cyber crime. The threat from economic espionage i

increase, and the technologies that we share with other count

now be used against us. Also, the number of joint ventures 

occurring today in commercial industry is significant. The 

national ownership is virtually anachronistic today, a

transnational dispersal of proprietary information and tec

simply increases their vulnerability.

2. In October 1983 some six tons of explosives were detona

suicide bombing that killed 241 Marines. The Marines had been 

a mission intended to help stabilize the region; but as politica

unfolded they came to be viewed by warring factions as partis

result was a series of sniping attacks on Marines, with the fina

this suicide mission. Often forgotten is the fact that a simul

bombing of the French military encampment killed 58 

paratroopers.

3. There has been a proliferation of international agre

providing that every signatory nation shall have jurisdictio

specified terrorist offenses, e.g., the Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1

USC 32 (1984) (applies to anyone who destroys a civil aircraft reg

in a country other than the United States); and the Hostage Tak

18 USC 1203 (1984) (resting on a universal crime principle, it 

trial whenever the offender is found in the United States). Addit

33
unlike the unaffiliated terrorist actors, a state is subject to p

pressure. The G-7 nations (before Russia’s entry into the 

effectively threatened South Africa with the cancellation of ai

because of a failure to punish terrorists.

4. The larger the group, however, the harder it is for the 

activities to escape detection. In consequence, the 

terrorist-oriented groups have not escaped designation by the Se

of State as terrorist organizations. See Department of State 

Notice No. 3031, October 8, 1999, 64 FR 55112. Most of the cl

responsibility that come from the larger, well-organized groups 

actions directed at Israeli interests, for which they claim a m

right.

5. See Bruce Austen, “An inside look at Terror Inc.,”U.S. Ne

World Report, October 19, 1998, pp. 34-37.

6. A case in point may be the millennial conspiracy th

frustrated when a would-be terrorist attempted to cross into the 

States in the state of Washington and was apprehended b

Customs agents. Although we may never know for sure, a 

supposition has been that Algerian militants were engaged by 

bin Laden to carry out an unspecified terrorist action in the 

States. The forthcoming trials of those charged may yet shed mo

on that event.

7. See “Mafia,” Encarta Learning Zone, http://en

Msn.com/index/cenciseindex/4F/04fb5000.htm.For the R

speaking mobs, see, generally, J. Michael Waller and Victor J

“Russia’s Great Criminal Revolution:The Role of the Security Se

originally published in the Journal of Contemporary Criminal 

Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1995. Russian law enforcement ag

security organs, and intelligence services are institutionally pa

problem. Posted on American Foreign Policy Council we

www.afpc.org/issues/crime.htm. For the drug cartels, se

Department of Justice web sites, www.usdoj.gov/dea/traf

colombia.htm and www.usdoj.gov/dea/traffickers/mexic

Colombia-based drug traffickers are responsible for most of the 

cocaine. For the Japanese Yakuza, see Adam Johnson, “Histor

Yakuza,” posted at http://members.tripod.com/~org

yakuzahistory.htm. The Yakuza, tracing its origins to as early a

were folk heroes, organized into crime families. As Japan mode

so did the Yakuza, moving into construction, dock working, and e

rickshaw business. For the Chinese Triads, see Sin-Ming 

“Dealing With the Godfather,” http://members.tripod

~orgcrime/dealgodfather.htm. Triad origins are deeply ro

34
Chinese history. Chiang Kai-shek used warlords to take over Sh

and to slaughter communists. Today, a former justice min

Taiwan reports that one-fifth to one-quarter of Taiwan’s elected 

are known to have criminal records or links to the mob.

8. See “Russian Organized Crime: Global Organized Crime P

Center for Strategic and International Studies Task Force Repo

(hereinafter “ROC Report”), pp. 42-43.

9. This observation is based on the author’s experience. Fro

to 1994, the author was assigned as an active duty U.S. Navy Ca

the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Italy.

10. This number may be too low. The Center for Strate

International Studies pegs the figure at between 50 and 85 

(“ROC Report,” p. 2).

11. See, generally, “ROC Report” (describing corruption 

aspects of Russian life).

12.The terrorist attack by Aum Shinri Kyo, a Japanese-ori

cult that was prepared to bring about catastrophic damage, h

described as follows:

They released the deadly sarin gas in Tokyo’s subways . . 

Although the leaders were captured and have been or a

being tried, and the cult outlawed, recent reporting by Ra

Free Europe indicates the possibility that Aum Shinri K

members may have acquired classified data on nucle

facilities world-wide “on behalf of” the Japanese Fore

Ministry, ostensibly to offer assistance to other authorities

See “Could Japanese Sect Sabotage Russian, Ukrainian N

Systems?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www

rferl.org/-results-en.asp, March 30, 1998.

13. See, e.g., “U.N. vows to resume Iraq weapons inspe

October 31, 1997; “Iraq bans U.S. weapons inspectorsWhite 

calls action ‘unacceptable,’” October 29, 1997; “Iraq moves to s

ties with U.N. inspectors,” October 27, 1997; “U.N. to v

scaled-back Iraq resolution,” October 23, 1997; “U.N. workers a

by attacks in Iraq,” October 9, 1997, World News, CNN Intera

http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ 9710/31/un.iraq.htm.

14. See David Kaplan and Mike Tharp, “Terrorism threats at 

U.S. News & World Report, December 29, 1997/January 5, 199

35
15. See David Kaplan, “Terrorism’s next wave,” U.S. News & 

Report, November 17, 1997, p. 28. Ricin is 6,000 times more dead

cyanide. It has no legitimate use, and there is no antidote.

16. Ibid.

17. Science Applications International Corporation 

“Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organiz

Considerations for Assurance,” A Research Report for the 

Information Warfare Division (J6K), Command, Co

Communications and Computer Systems Directorate, Joint St

Pentagon, July 4, 1995, pp. 206-208.

18. Ibid.

19. Jack McCarthy, “National Fraud Center: Internet is 

identity theft,” posted at CNN.com/2000/TECH/comp...g/

net.identiy.theft.idg/index.html, March 20, 2000.

20. See M.E. Bowman, “Is International Law Ready 

Information Age?” Fordham Int’l L.J., Vol. 19, No. 5, June 19

1938-1939.

21. Economic Espionage Act, 18 USC 1831 (1996).

22. On October 24, 1648, the Peace of Westphalia readjus

religious and political affairs of Europe. By terms of the trea

sovereignty and independence of each state of the Holy Roman 

were fully recognized, making the Holy Roman Emperor v

powerless and raising to the highest pinnacle of independen

sovereign nation. See Germot Sydow, “1648—Peace of Wes

Turning Point in German History, German News: The Ma

October 1998, cited at http://www.germanembassy-india.org

GN98Okt/gn08.htm.

23. Economic sanctions have been in existence against Ira

North Korea, Cuba, and others for decades. Certainly there ha

demonstrable effects, but none of which forced the desired resu

24. International law recognizes the right of self-defense, in

anticipatory self-defense. For a contemporary review of the sit

one of the few which actually got the argument right, See Ro

Turner, “In self-defense, U.S. has right to kill terrorist bin Laden

Today, October 26, 1998, p. 17A.

25. In 1980, the Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion t

FBI has no authority under 28 USC 533 to apprehend and a

36
fugitive residing in a foreign state when those actions would be c

to customary international law. 4B Op. OL.C. 543 (1980). On J

1989, the Office of Legal Counsel formally reversed the 1980 o

concluding that 28 USC 533 (1) and 18 USC 3052 do authorize th

of activity, notwithstanding customary international law, to 

Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter.

26. The basic principle is that any exercise of law enforcem

one state on the territory of another is a violation of the 

sovereignty. See, generally, F.A. Mann, “Reflection on the Pros

of Person Abducted in Breach of International Law,” Internation

at a Time of Perplexity, p. 407, Dinstein, ed., 1989, reprinted in 

Further Studies in International Law, p. 339, 1990.

27. In our system of government, that information is diff

obtain without foreign cooperation. Our intelligence servi

capable of obtaining much of that information, but th

appropriated for foreign policy purposes, not law enforcement pu

In many cases, those purposes are coincident, as with intern

terrorism and international organized crime. Still, the primary p

of the collection effort must be for intelligence purpose, not 

enforcement. Additionally, the sources and methods of inte

acquisition must be protected, often making use of intel

information problematic for discovery and evidentiary purpose

28. Extradition is carried on primarily under bilateral 

which enumerate a list of extraditable crimes that are mutually 

on, but which virtually always exclude political offenses (esp

treason, etc.). William W. Bishop, International Law, 1971, pp. 5

The process is formalistic, slow, and cumbersome, and many 

exclude their own citizens from the process. All of this is a re

distant era. Today, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLA

widely being used to streamline the increasingly arcane prac

extradition.

29. Consider the problems facing Russia. A massive, eth

diverse nation even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Rus

spans 12 time zones, has no history of democracy but a long cultu

social tradition of black markets. The people mistrust author

public servants are underpaid. It is only natural that organize

found a fertile petri dish in which to germinate in Russia. T

extant question is whether Russia will be able to survive as a dem

experience in the face of massive corruption and capital flig

all-too-possible alternatives are a criminal-syndicalist sta

reversion to authoritarianism.

37
30. Director of the FBI Louis J. Freeh emphasized the coop

between the FBI and the MVD during a speech given at th

Academy in Moscow, Russia, on November 19, 

Http://www.fbi.gov/pressrm/ dirspch/dirspch97/moscow97.h

31. To give just one example, even the pariah state of Lib

many years later, yielded to political pressure in surrender

accused bombers of Pan Am Flight 103. Although specific pro

were required, the resort to an instrument of international law t

the issue is significant evidence that there is a forum in which 

can find common ground.

32. Presently there are no legal standards to control the m

which money can be electronically transferred. Until such 

electronic transfers of money consistently carry with 

transactional data, the who, when, and where, informatio

identifies the senders and recipients, money launderin

surreptitious payments will be a fact of life.

33. Will Knight, “G-8 to clamp down on cybercrime: 

strongest nations take Net crime seriously,” ZDNet News S

October 14, 1999, at http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/199

ns-10668.html. The world’s most powerful countries met in Mo

October 19, 1999, to discuss ways to coordinate the fight 

organized international cybercrime.

34.The Marshall Center is an innovative German-Am

partnership specializing in the resolution of Atlantic-Eurasian s

issues. It offers postgraduate studies, conferences, research pro

foreign area studies, and language courses to civilian and m

professionals from more than 40 countries. The Center’s p

mission is to develop shared values reinforcing respect for 

rights, individual dignity and integrity, and democratic institu

35. DoD has, for example, airlift, mobile hospitals and mor

engineers, food and medical stocks, and manpower that can be 

to bear rapidly.

36. PDD-39 assigns lead agency responsibility for the c

domestic terrorism events to the FBI. A terrorist event, howeve

will require the expertise of various agencies of government a

transition from crisis to consequence management. The responsi

FEMA will also require government-wide resources. The result 

most agencies of the federal government will have a role to play 

will have to be coordinated with state and local authorities 

primary responsibility for many crisis and consequence mana

38
issues reside. Great care has gone into constructing a framework 

which all these organizations can work together, but no congre

attention has been paid to funding. Without legislative intervent

Economy Act poses a significant problem. Neither lead agency, F

the FBI, is funded in a way to pay for all the logistics neces

respond to significant crisis events. For example, without Congre

intervention, it is difficult for DoD, which expends the equivalen

FBI budget every 2 1/2 days, to forgive the expense incurred from 

support, etc., supplied at the request of either FBI or FEMA.

39
CHAPTER 3

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS:

U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY

Daniel S. Roper

Introduction.

Transnational threats pose an increasingly s

threat to the United States, one that calls for a s

collaborative effort on the part of those concerned wi

national security. This chapter will discuss U.S. m

strategy as regards transnational threats. It will p

the readers with the perspective of, though not neces

the official position of, the Joint Staff. The Global Div

Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, of 

this author is a member, was established in 19

response to the challenges presented by eme

transnational issues.

This chapter will focus on how the Departm

Defense (DoD) responds to transnational threats. 

include three topics of special relevance to our goals. 

the chapter will provide an overview of the Na

Security and National Military Strategies. It will d

what these strategies tell us about the transna

environment in which we operate. Second, this chapt

review the derived imperatives of the Chairman of the 

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the conceptual framewor

by the U.S. military to address these imperatives

third, this chapter will consider what role DoD should 

What support can DoD provide to civil authorities? 

inherent challenges does it face and under what const

does it operate? What are the specific support criter

imperatives that all departments and agencies s

consider as they tackle these problems? This chap

short, will not seek to offer any specific solutions. Rath

41
purpose is to help illuminate the issues and chal

before us.

The National Security Strategy and the Nation

Military Strategy.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), most re

updated in December 1999, identifies six strategic pri

of the United States. For our purposes here, 

particularly the last two:

1. To promote peace and security in key regions 

world;

2. To create an open and competitive trading syste

benefits Americans and the world;

3. To strengthen international arms contro

nonproliferation regimes;

4. To protect the environment and health of 

citizens;

5. To increase cooperation in confronting se

threats to critical infrastructures and U.S. citizens tha

borders and unilateral solutions; and,

6. To strengthen intelligence and military, diplo

and law enforcement tools.

The NSS establishes how the elements of na

power—diplomatic, informational, military

economic—may best be used to protect American int

in the new century. The reader should note that the la

strategic priorities clearly relate to the issue at hand

is, how to deal with transnational threats and h

maximize the effectiveness of military and law enforc

strategies. 

The objectives and priorities outlined in the NSS 

the basis for the National Military Strategy (NMS

NMS is an unclassified public document that commun

to other government officials, U.S. citizens, and 

42
nations how the U.S. military supports the NSS. It pr

military advice to the president, National Security Co

and Secretary of Defense, and offers broad str

direction for the services and combatant command

looks ahead about 5 years, basing its calculations on c

or programmed forces. The NMS of Flexible and Se

Engagement was derived from the NSS. It is update

published on an as-needed basis.

Revisions are in part driven by a continuous asses

process called the Joint Strategy Review. The 

Strategy Review 1999 upheld the major components 

NMS through the year 2010 and beyond. The three 

components of the NMS are to (1) shape the interna

environment through engagement, (2) respond to th

spectrum of crises in a dangerous and uncertain worl

(3) prepare now for an uncertain future through fo

modernization and improved business practices

national military objectives are to promote peac

stability by encouraging the just, political resolut

international disputes, and to defeat adversarie

threaten the United States, our vital interests, or our a

The NMS characterizes our current stra

environment as one that includes transnational da

asymmetric challenges, regional dangers, and wild 

Transnational dangers are defined as challenge

transcend national borders and threaten our na

interests. Asymmetric challenges are defin

unconventional approaches or inexpensive mean

circumvent our strengths, exploit our vulnerabilit

confront us in ways we cannot match in kind. As wi

NSS, our NMS clearly reflects our growing concern 

transnational threats.

Transnational Environment.

So what does this environment of transnational t

and asymmetric challenges look like? To borrow a p

from the distinguished politico-military analyst Yogi 

43
the future ain’t what it used to be. Analysis reveals a c

of diverse and complex missions, showing what k

military operations may be needed to meet national se

needs in the coming decades. A list of potential oper

makes clear the diverse and often noncompleme

functions that the armed forces may be called up

perform. In some cases, the military will naturally 

leading role. National missile defense and joint 

operations are obvious examples. In most cases, how

the military will play a supporting role only. The m

may be called upon to engage in such activit

counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, and di

relief. These functions combine domestic 

extra-territorial requirements. American constitu

law makes a military lead inappropriate in 

circumstances. 

A variety of government agencies, includin

military, will be involved in all of these missions. Thi

not mean that these agencies will have to undergo r

institutional change or even adapt themselves drama

in order to face these challenges. But what is nee

flexibility. The government agencies must develop a 

sense of how their existing expertise and resources 

used to help carry out these missions. This includ

military. 

Transnational Perspective.

Legality becomes a significant issue when our 

forces engage in operations that do not fall unambig

within the military sphere of authority. These in

operations undertaken to deal with transnational t

such as critical infrastructure protection, counte

international organized crime, counterterrorism

information operations. For the military, these are, in 

more respects, unconventional issues.

1

 The Joint S

well aware of the complications that can arise whe

military participates in such missions. Rather than w

44
to deal with such challenges as they arise, the military 

the initiative. By taking a dynamic approach, it en

that the legal ramifications of such joint mission

considered in advance, that potential issues are q

identified, and that the security implications of legal 

are clearly articulated. It sees to it that these concer

addressed with minimum delay in the National Se

Council (NSC) and interagency councils. It also ma

vigorous effort to see that persons both within and w

the military are educated on these questions

Department of Defense (DoD) is, perforce, limited in w

can do to counter transnational threats by constitu

parameters. The kinds of proactive measures outlined 

however, minimize the impact of these restraints. 

permit DoD to make the most of its capabilities and se

opportunities for action available to it, while still w

within these legal constraints.

A Proactive, Forward-Looking Process.

These, then, are the challenges imposed b

transnational threat environment. What has DoD don

what does it plan to do to meet these challenges? Th

military is not taking an ad hoc approach. Military pla

in DoD and JCS are systematically studying and ana

the future. Assessment and evaluation are accomp

through annual and biannual updates of the NSS and 

A thorough analysis of these challenges has produced 

results. DoD (with the assistance of the JCS) has draw

list of what it calls derived imperatives. These a

crucial steps which must be taken in order to deal wi

threats we face in this new environment. It ha

identified three corresponding areas on which the 

should focus: information operations, homeland d

and support to civil authority, and joint force trainin

exercises. A number of external studies, includin

Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense 

the Rumsfeld Commission, and several Presid

Decision Directives, have validated the conclusions 

45
DoD/JCS analysis. Recent Joint Strategy Reviews 

focused their attention on addressing asymm

challenges. They have noted that this emerging str

dimension impacts national security and has many 

ramifications. Military planners have, in short, deter

important priorities.

How does the military codify the actions and pro

which must be taken in support of these priorities? T

the most significant mechanisms are the Joint Str

Planning System (JSPS) and the Unified Command 

(UCP). They are proactive, forward-looking processes

enable U.S. armed forces to shape, respond, and prep

required by the NMS. The JSPS links the 

strategy-related documents together, thereby consoli

military advice and giving it a clear and disciplined fo

This advice can then be given to our civilian superior

are ultimately responsible for making strategic dec

The NMS, which we have mentioned earlier, plays a c

role in this process. It provides, in summary form, gu

to the president and Secretary of Defense, considers r

of ongoing strategic assessments, and provides 

military advice. This advice permeates all of our oth

documents. 

Unified Command Plan—A Conceptual Framew

for Future Strategy and Policy.

The UCP offers an adaptable conceptual fram

designed to meet rapidly changing challenges on the 

scene. The plan is evolutionary in nature, thereby ma

possible for the U.S. military to fulfil its global engag

responsibilities in the face of constant change. It lays 

flexible plan for moving forward in the direction 

strategic imperatives are headed. It plans for a joint 

organization, a space and information com

organization, and a joint task force concerned wi

provision of military support to civilian authority f

purpose of homeland protection. As CJSC General 

46
Shelton testified to the House Armed Service Commit

March 3, 1999,

Joint Vision 2010 (the conceptual template for how Americ

Armed Forces will achieve new levels of effectiveness in jo

warfighting) . . . must also have an accompanying vision 

how to best organize. . . . That conceptual framework . 

Unified Command Plan (UCP) 21 . . . will be included as 

annex to the 1999 Unified Command Plan recommendati

UCP 21 will lay out a flexible plan to establish a Joint For

Command, a Space and Information Command, and a jo

task force to deal with the complex issues of homeland defen

Military Support to Civil Authority.

The U.S. military is often viewed as the agenc

equipped to deal with certain transnational threats. 

not, however, have the constitutional authority to play 

than a supporting role domestically. It can offer its su

to civil authority in the areas of logistics, tra

information and intelligence, communications

planning. The National Guard also provides leadersh

has developed Regional Response Centers. In accor

with DoD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to 

Authorities, all requests by civil authorities for 

military assistance are evaluated for legality, let

risk, cost, appropriateness, and impact on readiness

Challenges.

Over the past decade increased demands have 

placed upon DoD to bring resources to bear in supp

civil authorities. At the same time, increasing diplo

environmental, legal, commercial, and moral const

have been placed on the actions of the military. 

constraints are especially confining. Before mi

resources can be employed in support of civil autho

various laws must be taken into account. These in

Posse Comitatus, the Stafford Act, the Economy Ac

Intelligence Oversight legislation. These constraints 

47
the potential to limit or degrade the ability of th

military to execute the NMS. The U.S. military also f

challenge in that it needs access to critical skil

especially when it has to deal with threats that eme

the scene without warning. For the most part, these 

be found in the reserve components. This simulta

increase in both demands and constraints po

complicated challenge to U.S. armed forces and the 

they support and protect.

Military Obligation.

The most recent UCP (October 1, 1999) establis

civil support role for Joint Forces Command. This 

evolving. According to this plan, Joint Forces Com

becomes involved in civil support when civil (fe

authorities ask for our assistance. At all times

document stresses, the military must remain subordin

the civil authorities. At no time is the support offered 

Joint Forces Command to become a military operat

the classic sense. This plan, to be sure, does not g

universal support. Some would prefer that the U.S. m

play no domestic role whatsoever. This is, howe

minority view. We cannot let it prevent us from fulfilli

obligation to the nation and its civilian leaders. As D

Secretary of Defense John Hamre said in December 

We may never completely assuage the fears of that 10 percen

Americans who fundamentally mistrust their government 

matter what the issue. . . . But we owe it to the rest—with

causing undue alarm—to explain why it is better to have b

military structures and planning processes in place to supp

the first-line civil responder to a major domestic destruc

incident. 

Imperatives.

It is widely recognized that better interagenc

civil-military cooperation is needed. This will call for a 

deal of effort, as we know from studying the experie

48
the U.S. military itself as it attempted to integra

capabilities of the various armed services. Nonethe

the effort is great, the payoff is even greater. To e

increased cooperation several requirements must b

First, some general criteria are needed for evalu

proposed interagency responses to transnational th

Second, the diplomatic, informational, military

economic elements of national power (known as D-I

need to be synchronized. The doctrinal principles of th

military—Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Res

Perseverance, and Legitimacy—would prove valuable 

These principles are enumerated in Joint Publication 

Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than W

Summary.

The fact that non-military issues have become so 

entangled with the question of military legitimacy pr

a complex challenge to both the U.S. military and the s

it serves. It is clear that factors other than security as 

been traditionally defined are becoming relatively 

important in the calculus of national policy. This ch

has outlined the NSS and NMS and what they tell us 

the transnational environment in which we operate. 

reviewed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s d

imperatives and the conceptual framework used by th

military to address these imperatives. Finally, 

discussed what support DoD can provide to civil autho

This discussion made reference to challenge

constraints, support criteria, and imperatives f

departments and agencies. Now that the groundwo

been laid for understanding the problems, we may t

the search for solutions.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 3

1. The Global Division of the Joint Staff focuses much of its at

on these issues, which appear to be non-Title 10 and yet ma

unforeseen collateral or second-order Title 10 effects.

49
CHAPTER 4

INFORMATION AND TERRORISTIC US

OF MASS WEAPONS:

THE LARGER CONTEXT

Kenneth A. Minihan

Introduction.

For the foreseeable future into the 21st centur

United States will be the preeminent military power 

world. This means that if we do face a radical ph

threat to national security, it will likely arrive not 

form of a traditional military attack by a peer comp

state, but rather in the form of a terrorist attack 

sub-state entity, based upon the covert deployment o

weapons of mass slaughter and destruction as che

biological, or nuclear agents. In such a case, certain

would want to identify and punish the attacker, b

more important, we would want to deter or preve

attack in the first place.

To have any hope for successful preemption of su

attack, we shall require prior knowledge of its mobiliz

meaning we must possess a highly efficient syste

gathering and interpreting the necessary information

is, operational intelligence. Fortunately, the United 

is also the preeminent information power of the world

that should give us some optimism in our quest to a

the necessary intelligence capability. Unfortun

however, as we learn at length in reading the other ch

in the present book, the total national security enviro

in the United States today is not coherently and effic

adapted to the task of ferreting out and respond

transnational threats. And almost certainly, of cou

serious weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack 

this country would be transnational in character.

51
In this chapter, rather than discussing intelligen

se, I shall discuss certain aspects of the total na

security environment that tend to militate again

adequate intelligence capability for preempting a 

attack on U.S. territory. In passing, I shall also com

upon impediments to national security in general, as w

steps for their resolution.

Our generation is faced by some urgent task

presented with some vital opportunities. We are livin

moment of fundamental and revolutionary change

industrial era has given way to the era of information. 

that the United States is, at the moment, one of the le

in the technological revolution, it ought to be able to fo

operating environment that will help assure its na

security. However, it has not performed some vita

necessary tasks. It has not, in particular, come to term

what conflict is today. It lacks a clear sense of the 

conflict in the information age. Until it develo

understanding of the principles of war, defines key 

and lays down clear areas of responsibility, the milita

not be able to act with decisiveness in response to thre

the United States fails to grasp the opportunities ava

it runs the danger of relinquishing what could 

dominant role within the new operating environment 

information age. The technological playing field w

leveled, to the detriment of our national interest.

A Revolutionary Change in Conflict.

Any discussion of current threats must factor 

changing nature of conflict at the start of the 

millennium. The strategic coin of the 21st century 

longer just the industrial base, but now include

knowledge assets. This fundamental shift in what cou

war has profound implications for how we condu

national defense. What are some of the key changes of 

we should be aware?

52
Key Changes in the Nature of Conflict.

We have and will continue to have enormous pow

technological capabilities. Even the technolo

difficulties that still beset us will likely be s

eventually. It does not appear as if the shorta

bandwidth, for example, will long remain a problem. B

now have to contend with a profoundly different ope

environment. 

The new environment is far more complex than an

we have experienced to date. It is a global environmen

by the commercial sector rather than by the na

security apparatus. It is also characterized by a p

change quite unmatched in earlier eras. All of these ch

are, in turn, radically transforming the nature of c

and affecting how we must respond to future threats

The ramifications of the new environment are 

Future conflicts will be played out not on a conven

battlefield but on a turf comprised of technologie

infrastructures. In the new operating environ

government, citizens, adversaries, and resourcess al

within the same operating space. We no longer liv

world in which the soldier fights on the battlefield, wh

innocent citizens remain elsewhere. Threats, to

changing; whether we are looking at hackers 

terrorists, we find that power tends to be more diffuse

attacks more random. Traditional means of identifyi

opponents are disappearing. The new global enviro

leaves no smoking gun, making anyone who can o

within our space a potential threat. At the same ti

find that existing paradigms for war and conflict a

longer appropriate. Take for example a concept piv

the laws of conflict, that of the nation-state. Such a c

becomes obsolete in the new global environment, 

recognizes no boundaries. The new environment also 

challenges to existing legal norms, forcing us to reev

many of our rules and priorities.

53
As the nature of conflict changes, so too do the dem

placed upon us. Who defends us and how are subj

change. Among other things, some defense initiative

once belonged to DoD must now fall to others. Eve

responsibilities of command shift; leadership need

change. We must now find people who are knowled

when it comes to operating within the techn

environment. And DoD must prove able to change a

more rapid rate than ever before. Whereas in the pas

made annual plans, it now must emulate the many m

businesses which plan continually and expect to reen

their companies every 2 or 3 years.

Responding to the Changes.

In short, we are now dealing with a whole battlesp

physical and virtual, lethal and nonlethal, and disp

operations. In order to deal with future WMD threa

must seize the opportunities presented us and also me

new challenges. In many ways, we are in a fort

position. After all, in the past the United States in

heavily in information technologies. It contributed 

than any other nation to their research and develo

and also was heavily involved in the planned tech

expansion. As a result, we have largely shaped the c

operating environment. As long as we continue to inv

information technology and infrastructure, we sho

able to hold our lead. The Cold War, we should reme

was won with steady investments, not as a resul

wrenching somersault in force structure. We must app

the new challenges in a similarly patient and pers

manner.

Need for a New Analytical Model.

Among those things we need to do in order to en

relevant defense is to develop a new analytical mode

industrial age model, built around organizational box

analogues, is not appropriate. A more useful model 

54
take the shape of a rich technology grid. Such a grid 

enable us to do the following:

1. Understand the physical network and transpor

layer. 

2. Decide on the investments that should be m

global technologies. (These should be those that h

shape the operating environment in such a way as to e

us to achieve our national security goals.)

3. Determine the legal ramifications.

We must also revise our understanding of confli

the laws that govern it. As mentioned earlier, conflict 

information age transcends geographic boundaries, b

have not changed doctrine to meet the cha

circumstances. We have not reallocated autho

Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), for example, continu

geographically defined.

We must develop clear guidelines permitting us to 

to threats. One of the most vital issues is to determi

difference between a crime and an attack. Only wh

have decided what an attack is can we discuss what 

be the appropriate responses to an attack. The U

States misguidedly spends more time on identifying 

who have damaged us than on deterring them in th

place. We might rather borrow concepts drawn from 

War deterrent theories to develop a strategy of 

defense. We might, for example, defend certain parts 

strategic sanctuary within the global infrastru

asynchronously. That is, we would give warning 

certain types of virtual and physical attacks might 

met in kind. But obviously, so long as the distin

between crime and attack remain hazy, this k

discussion cannot even begin.

The United States must also make a more con

effort to retain its technological advantage. At the m

it is hindered in two ways. First, DoD has failed t

adequate steps to ensure that its leadership ha

55
necessary technological knowledge. Second, it still f

an annual planning cycle. It must learn to think in te

“web years,” i.e., exponentially accelerated timeline

reorganize with the same alacrity as in the business 

Only then can it avoid the danger of falling behind. If 

not seize the day and keep up with the cha

environment, it may find its advantages whittled awa

possible that in the future our enemies will achieve 

playing field. This will deprive our children of the k

trust in their future enjoyed by the children of the 

War II generation during the growth of the industria

Conclusion.

For an instructive perspective, let us think back 

early years of World War II, long before the disaster at 

Harbor in 1941 drew the United States into war. Pr

generations had prepared, at least conceptually, f

national defense. The keels of most of the battleship

fought in the war had already been laid. Elaborate 

had been written. Responsibilities were clearly delin

The generation that went to war understoo

responsibilities and the law of armed conflict. Are we 

a similar position? Were we to experience an elec

Pearl Harbor today, could we meet it with the same de

justified confidence as displayed by our father

grandfathers on the eve of our entry into World Wa

fear that we could not. We must begin to repai

deficiency. We must begin now to lay down the se

keels for the 21st century.

56
CHAPTER 5

INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AS THEY

RELATE TO INTERNATIONAL

CRIME ORGANIZATIONS

AND DRUG TRAFFICKING

William J. Olson

This chapter will address the issue of interna

organized crime. Attention will be paid to the nature 

threat in general, and to the challenges faced by intell

in particular. Mark Twain once described himself 

optimist who never arrived. In evaluating the proble

face and our ability to handle them, this author 

confess that he finds himself in a similarly pessi

frame of mind.

The Threat.

Why this pessimism? To understand why interna

organized crime poses a serious national security thr

is important to recognize how such institutions opera

how they are changing. Until recently, major cr

organizations were largely confined to individual cou

or regions. They were not viewed as transnational th

nor did they pose any perceptible national security t

to us or anyone else. But what we are seeing, increasin

an internationalization of the activities of cri

organizations. This goes hand-in-hand wit

internationalization of legitimate commerce be

organized criminals are nestled inside of it, perfo

illegal acts under cover of legal operations. This is t

both business and banking. Unfortunatel

communication and commercial barriers break dow

environment becomes more favorable for interna

criminal organizations. It is both easier for them to o

and harder for authorities to pursue them and curb 

57
activities. Thus, ironically, one of the most po

developments of modern times brings with it a ser

increased threat to our national security.

International organized crime exacts an imm

human toll. It undermines our financial institution

compromises our trade processes. It is immensely cos

the past 5 years, in the United States alone, the co

paying out of pocket for illicit drugs and for their healt

and other social consequences are somewhere in the a

one and two trillion dollars. That is not counting the 

human misery and life. In the last 10 years, interna

terrorists have killed a small number of American

overall, about 11,000 people. But we lose at leas

number every year to the drug trafficking carried 

criminal organizations. In the United States today w

drugs on virtually every street corner, in many 

schools, and in thousands of our homes. Most of these 

originated as a product (usually an agricultural pr

somewhere overseas, and were smuggled into the U

States by a variety of different means.

Those in the drug drade do not merely wreak ha

destroying lives and wasting resources. In the proc

introducing the drugs to the United States and 

nations, these criminals also undermine local governm

either through threat and intimidation or th

corruption. There are many governments around the 

today that are wholly owned subsidiaries of cri

organizations. Other governments find their ability t

with criminal organizations seriously compromised be

their police institutions are either inadequate or a

corrupt to act. This, in turn, leads to a growing lack o

in government. Eventually resorting to crime comes 

seen as the only way an individual can get ahead. And 

problem continues to escalate. This is not a distant co

or a remote problem.

1

At this time, Colombia is very much on the m

Congress, which is trying to introduce some 

58
legislation that will help deal with the problem. Col

shows signs of approaching social and political collap

problems are largely caused by drug trafficking fed 

American appetite for drugs. What makes the situat

dangerous is that drug trafficking is no longer exclusiv

the hands of drug trafficking organizations. A num

other groups have become involved. These in

insurgents, paramilitary organizations, and others

use the proceeds of the drug traffic to fund thei

activities. A variety of threats have thus become l

Even though international organized crimina

themselves mainly just interested in money, their act

have profoundly serious repercussions and do indeed 

major threat to our security.

2

International organized crime poses further pro

for us inasmuch as the criminals are both organize

cunning. It is important to bear in mind that one 

principal characteristics of international organized 

as opposed to opportunistic crime or criminal conspi

is precisely that it is organized. Such organizations 

some kind of hierarchical structure, even if loosely de

It still offers significant advantages such as durabili

staying power. A comparison with the business comm

will help explain this. If, for example, the head of G

Motors were to be removed, a replacement would a

certainly be found somewhere in the corporate structu

the case of criminal organizations, the same thing ha

which means that it is impossible to get rid of the b

chopping off the head, so to speak.

Organizations have another advantage. They 

institutional memory, which makes possible growt

learning. The former leader of a Colombian drug 

operating in Mexico was recently interviewed. We le

from him that every time there was a drug bust, the 

sent a team to Mexico to find out what had gone wrong

the cartel had found out how an operation 

compromised, it made sure never to make that m

again. Other cartels have learned how to manipula

59
judicial discovery process used in American courts. 

one of their members is brought up on trial, these c

legitimately use discovery to find out everythin

prosecution knows. This includes the techniques us

the law enforcement authorities to penetrat

organization and arrest the perpetrators. C

representatives then take that information back and 

it. The next time around, authorities will not be able 

the same techniques again successfully.

International criminal organizations also 

considerable business acumen, which makes 

formidable opponents. They are fundamentally bu

enterprises. They are organized to make money. An

do it extremely well. As a business organization, they 

many characteristics with other business organiza

They are product-oriented. The Colombian cartels p

an excellent example here. They have proved themse

be quite versatile in the way they market different k

products. The cocaine cartels learned from those enga

the marijuana trade. These, in turn, had learned (a

some instances also got their seed money) from em

smugglers. 

The Colombian cartels also show a sophist

understanding of how markets evolve. For example

quickly recognized that there would be a market for 

because (1) it was a depressant whereas cocaine 

stimulant; and (2) most drug consumers are dra

multiple addictive substances. They therefore g

Colombians into the business of heroin production (m

and selling it). The criminal organizations of Mexico s

similar aptitude. They are now the major suppli

methamphetamine in the United States. They 

achieved this prominence as a result of careful st

market trends. They keep the supplie

methamphetamine as plentiful and as cheap as poss

necessary, they even hand drugs out for free in or

develop a market. They also try to diversify; they s

dominate a market and seek alliances.

60
International criminal organizations have found w

minimize their risks. This they do in part by coope

among themselves. For example, the Italian Mafia 

works with the Colombians. The Colombian cartels w

to penetrate European markets, but it was hard to est

networks since Colombians are so few in Europe, m

them conspicuous. They decided it would be better to 

Italians or Albanians market their goods for them

provided the Mafia with cocaine; in return, they ac

either heroin or money. The international cri

organizations also look for the most suitable venue fo

activities. In other words, they select the environ

particularly a law enforcement environment, that is 

likely to cause problems for them, one where local law

lax, corruption rampant, or enforcement incompeten

The threat posed by these organizations is mag

because of their enormous wealth. Their busin

growing. Drug traffickers earn more every year tha

United States spends on all of its counterdrug effort

annual income of these and other criminal organizat

frequently greater than that of many governments a

the world, and it is more dependable. So far, there i

little we have been able to do internationally that has 

a dent in their ability to generate large sums of m

Moreover, they are expanding their capabilities. Th

rich, powerful, and ruthless; and they threate

sovereignty of many of the countries we call allies o

which we have to deal.

Response to the Threat.

In short, international organized crime and 

trafficking clearly pose a serious threat to our interest

threat is one that we cannot afford to ignore, but it 

one that we are not in particularly good shape to dea

Why not? First, we are only now beginning to tak

problem seriously. It was not until the mid 1960s th

awoke to the existence of a criminal threat to the U

61
States. The Lyndon B. Johnson administration 

admitted that there were crime families and operati

the United States and promised to pursue 

particularly the Mafia. Thirty-five years later we ar

position to say that we more or less have the Mafia 

control. But we have not succeeded in eliminating it. 

exists; it still operates.

But today we are faced by a threat of a more s

nature. International organized crime poses far 

significant threats than the Mafia and si

organizations of the past. If we, as a superpower with 

enormous resources at our disposal, have not been a

eliminate the operations of a criminal organization w

our own borders, how much harder will it be for us t

with criminals operating both within and beyon

borders? We are, in fact, only just beginning to devel

kinds of institutions we need to take effective action. A

cannot look for relief in this regard to other nations 

the world. In most instances, they are more out-ma

out-gunned, and out-dollared by international cr

organizations than we are.

There are many factors that make it difficult f

United States to meet the challenge of interna

organized crime. In the balance of this chapter, howev

will focus for the most part on the problems rela

intelligence-gathering, analysis, and dissemination.

First, there are major structural, organizationa

institutional obstacles that handicap us as we attem

deal with the threat of international organized crime

is particularly true in the area of intelligence. “Intelli

in this context means both law enforcement inform

and information collected by the intelligence comm

Because international organized crime is internation

have to work with the international community wh

attempt to deal with the threat. We cannot enforce ou

laws internationally, thus we have to work through 

countries. Yet they have different legal and administ

62
structures and different ways of doing busines

compound the problem, many of the institutions with 

we have to deal are corrupt or compromised—when th

not incompetent, incapable, or both. Another organiza

weakness is a lack of clarity when it comes to the allo

of responsibility. Who collects the information? 

analyses it? Who acts on it? Law enforcement operate

very different set of motives and authorities than do

intelligence community. This leads, on one hand, 

wasting of what are already limited resources. On the 

hand, it means that, at times, important issues fall th

the cracks in the system.

Second, international criminal organizations ar

adept at camouflaging their activities. As noted e

criminal organizations have taken advantage of the g

in banks without borders. They are taking advant

these markets in order to to disguise their activity

extremely difficult to uncover criminal activity on

associated money has fled to in the international fin

system. 

Third, our ability to deal effectively with the c

threat is handicapped by the fact that interna

organized criminals belong to what are, in effect, bu

communities. Those tasked with pursuing them 

thwarting their activities are not trained and organ

operate against this kind of institution. They are u

dealing with other countries and with organization

themselves. They are not businessmen and do not thin

businessmen. Yet, unless they can think like busines

they will find it very difficult to anticipate the moves o

criminals and get the better of them.

Fourth, the best way to penetrate such organizat

by human intelligence (HUMINT). The United Stat

tended to rely too much on technical means instead

result, it has neglected to find better ways to 

intelligence by HUMINT. And it is clear that this wil

easy task. Criminal organizations are largely ethn

63
based and use family networks to protect their em

This means that they are very adept at avoiding penet

by outsiders.

Conclusion. 

Clearly, then, international organized crime p

threat both in terms of the damage it can inflict and in 

of our relative incapacity to defend against it. The p

looks rather bleak. However, at least there is a da

awareness that there is a problem. A philosophe

observed that, in dreaming, we all inhabit our se

worlds, but on waking we all share the same world. An

in waking from our separate dreams that we learn th

have a common problem or set of problems. We have a

to an appreciation of the threat and are perhaps at the 

where we will be able to work together with other n

across the world to reduce it. It is to be hoped that we w

quote an observation by Winston Churchill, “America

always do the right thing—after they have tried ever

else.” 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. See U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Te

Publication 10687, annually. In 1999, international terror

accounted for 233 deaths and 706 wounded worldwide. Only f

Citizens lost their lives in such incidents in 1999. Between 19

1999, 68 Americans died in terrorist attacks internationally, a

were injured.

2. The most comprehensive source on interna

narcotics-related issues is the U.S. Department of State’s Intern

Narcotics Control Strategy Report. This is an annual report o

production, trends, government activities, and the threat from c

organizations.

64
CHAPTER 6

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS VIS-À-VIS L

ENFORCEMENT

AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:

LESSONS ON THE EMERGING

RELATIONSHIP

Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker

Introduction.

1

If we are ever to successfully contain transna

threats, whether chemical, biological, nuclear, cyb

criminal, it is vital that we find some way to im

coordination between law enforcement and intell

services. This, in turn, will require us to understan

differences in mission, legal authority, and institu

cultures that separate those responsible for na

security and those who tend to domestic security. Fo

these as much as anything which give rise to the te

between the services. The role of law enforcemen

traditionally been confined to domestic matters, a

mission has been to engage in criminal prosecutio

contrast, the role of military intelligence has traditi

been confined to dealing with strategic threats 

nation’s security. Because their activities do not nor

involve citizens nor entail prosecutions, the n

protections of the Bill of Rights do not apply. Bo

committed in their own way to protecting U.S. securi

the differences are often profound. Our challenge is 

the tension created by their differences in a creativ

constructive, rather than limiting, manner.

The need for coordination between law enforceme

defense intelligence capabilities has reached a crisis 

in the last decade. Geographic boundaries and jurisd

are becoming less relevant, especially where transna

65
threats are concerned. As a result, law enforcemen

military intelligence find their roles overlappi

untraditional ways. Yet a crisis can be an opportun

both law enforcement and intelligence are need

confront transnational threats, new ways to surmou

problem of coordination are needed; we must “think 

the box” to discover new paradigms for cooperation an

responses to the national security threats of th

millennium. Yet while bold solutions are called f

changes in the relationship of law enforcement and d

intelligence must observe constitutional limits with 

Entrenched ideas can and do change. In my own 

over the course of my long career in service to U.S. na

security organizations, my understanding o

relationship between intelligence and law enforc

gradually evolved, and my views often took surp

turns. It took time, to be sure, but many of my 

assumptions did change. The facts I observed gra

forced me to challenge many of the fundamental 

precepts that I had first learned in law school in the 

and which were, as a result, deeply ingrained. It take

for an individual to change his or her basic assumpti

takes still longer when large agencies and whole natio

involved. But it does happen.

Moreover, I have observed others considering wh

we should change the way we handle law enforceme

military intelligence. Progress in understandin

complicated issues involved has clearly been made. In 

for example, the understanding of intelligence with

Department of Justice was minimal.

2

 Today, however

is considerable understanding of both law enforceme

intelligence capabilities among the affected agencies

So we certainly are capable of change. But shou

My belief as to the importance of coordination does 

must say, go unchallenged. Some analysts, in fact, dou

seriousness of transnational security threats. Many 

worry about what might happen to citizen right

66
protections if military intelligence and law enforc

work together too closely. Thus we should not seek to c

the way things are before we have evaluated the threa

determined our priorities.

How can we do this? History can provide us with 

guidance here. R. James Woolsey, former Direc

Central Intelligence, for example, has commented th

deceptively peaceful and prosperous time is cor

understood only when compared to the 1920s—a

which, in hindsight, appears to be “the calm befo

storm.” Such historical reference is useful in determ

where we are now, where we should go, and how to 

safely. This is just as true for grand strategic question

is for tactical legal considerations. So in this chapter

resort to history of a very personal kind to try to she

on these important questions. I will share with yo

lessons that I learned through my own per

experiences. I will take you on a journey through my 

dwelling on those key moments when my consciousne

shaped by events. Along the way, I will broach some 

solutions that have suggested themselves to me.

Lessons.

Experience has helped me identify several problem

need to be dealt with if we are to create better coordi

between law enforcement and intelligence agenci

begin with, each of these two communities occu

different part of the constitutional landscape, and n

knows the other’s territory well. At the beginning 

tenure as General Counsel of the National Security A

(NSA), I thought I understood the best way to prote

constitutional rights of citizens. My confidence was ba

16 years in civil rights, civil liberties, and ant

litigation. I thought I understood the Bill of Rights a

protection of the civil rights of citizens. With the arro

that sometimes characterizes lawyers, I was sure the

little I could learn about protecting the rights o

67
persons from my new NSA colleagues. I was e

convinced, having represented draft resisters durin

Vietnam War, that the military—one in five of my new 

colleagues—could not help me. I erred on both count

I learned that while my NSA colleagues might 

something from my experience, the reverse was more 

true. And the most important thing I learned from m

colleagues was that there had been effective respon

problems uncovered in the Watergate period—resp

not only unknown to me but to most other inf

Americans. Two new rules, in particular, had 

developed in response to the Watergate scandal. 

rules, I found out, were simple and comprehensive. 

U.S. intelligence may “not collect on U.S. persons.” S

U.S. intelligence “does not do law enforcement work

entire NSA work force was indoctrinated with thes

rules. As a result, the legal decisions being made by th

Office of General Counsel were far more careful than 

would have been. Both predecessors and successors a

General Counsel have told me that they experien

similar change of heart.

In later years, this early impression—that few la

understood the rudiments of intelligence opera

law—was repeatedly reinforced as I talked to dif

groups about the law of intelligence. It was inesca

confirmed as a result of the financial crisis involvi

Atlantic branch of the Banca Nazionale de L

(BNL)—the so-called “Pizza Connection Case.”

4

Early on, I was asked by a senior federal official wh

intelligence had failed to note a fraudulent wire tr

scheme involving movement of millions of dollars a

accounts in American branches of an Italian ban

question revealed ignorance of a significant Wat

reform: it is unlawful for U.S. intelligence to colle

enforcement information about U.S. persons 

investigate law enforcement concerns in the United S

Here was a major gap in understanding about 

68
intelligence. I was stunned. If senior federal officials d

understand NSA’s governing principles, how could 

decisions about the relationship between law enforc

and intelligence be made?

My surprise was colored by the fact that I had 

greatly influenced by the opinions of Justice Lewis Pow

cases considering the legal role of intelligence und

U.S. Constitution. I had assumed that Justice Po

understanding of the constitutional role of intelligen

widely shared throughout all branche

government—Congress, the executive branch, an

judiciary. In fact, I now saw that Justice Powell’s sens

was something of an anomaly. It was produced by h

unique experiences during World War II as an Army 

responsible for handling sensitive intelligence inform

garnered from coded German communications.

It was this experience that had enabled Justice Pow

readily to balance the demands of national security w

Constitutional requirements of the Bill of Rights a

design approaches to protect at one and the same 

classified information, individual rights, and na

security. 

Of course there are others who, with Justice Powel

recognized that our Constitution has two distinct hal

domestic internal half, focused on the relationship 

government to its citizens, is embodied in the Bill of R

An external half, focused on the relationship 

government to its citizens protects the nation fro

external enemies. Judge William H. Webster was 

questioned about how he, a former federal circuit 

judge, could comfortably lead first the Federal Bur

Investigation (FBI) and later the Central Intell

Agency (CIA). He showed a clear recognition of this di

when he said in response, “Domestically, I follow all 

law; abroad, I support the Constitution.”

In its external role, our government is responsibl

for the protection of its citizens, not for the preserva

69
their rights. I had not considered this role and so had 

little thought to constitutional authorities outside of t

of Rights. I had had cause to reflect on the auth

enjoyed by the president in his capacity as comman

chief. When he fulfills this function and is entruste

the duty of protecting American citizens, he enjo

greatest power. And for the intelligence services

precisely these considerable authorities that are 

greatest significance. For they derive their 

responsibilities and functions from the needs and dem

placed on them by the president in his national se

capacity. 

Like the majority of lawyers, I did not apprecia

entire set of rights and obligations that our consti

imposes upon the president and upon those who “st

the shoes” of his national security authority—lik

intelligence community. Not understanding 

authorities or being unaware of them, I assumed th

not exist. “Intelligence law” was an oxymoron because 

understood one half of the constitutional picture.

This gap in understanding continues to grow. Tod

many of those under 30 know about intelligence onl

movies or TV—questionable sources for acc

information. For many years, a shared World W

experience gave our national leadership a co

understanding about the importance of intelligence a

proper, but limited role in a democratic governm

structure. Now that consensus has been lost.

We must bridge this gap. We must relearn how

why—our two national responsibilities (nationa

domestic security) are organized as they are. From 

shared understanding, we can rebuild an understand

the requirements of our national security. W

determine what are the legal requirements of na

security, whether domestic or foreign. We can decide 

the balance should be between individual libert

national security under our constitution in thi

70
century. If we do not do so, we will be, I am afraid, a 

divided between national security and personal l

between intelligence and law enforcement. Transna

threats will surely endanger this balance and may r

us to consider new ways of doing business. But we will 

well-prepared to make these changes unless we 

understand the current structure and the reasons fo

At a slightly later stage in my career, my sense 

gaping divide between the various communities dee

In particular I was alerted to the fact that, if few la

understood the rudiments of intelligence operation

there was equally much that intelligence di

understand about law enforcement. The painful deb

encryption export policy that has raged for over 10 yea

much to crystallize this consciousness.

5

The encryption debate revolves around the ques

whether the government should intervene in order t

the strength of encryption products. Some of these ar

so powerful that law enforcement officials cannot de

them, and this deprives them of the traditional abi

eavesdrop electronically. U.S. firms have been proh

from exporting their best products. These measur

strongly supported by law enforcement officers, wh

worried about the protection encryption offers to crim

But privacy advocates and U.S. software makers w

keep government out of the way. I myself participa

several rounds of the struggle to formulate policy o

issue while I was at NSA.

During the second round of policy discussi

suggested to a new NSA director that the encryption d

was less about foreign intelligence-gathering tha

enforcement. The problem of unreadable encryption 

be most serious for law enforcement. In contrast

would find the free export of encryption more manag

Therefore, the law enforcement community, partic

the FBI, should take the lead in designing a ba

71
encryption export policy. The director encouraged 

bring this idea to the attention of the FBI.

The FBI representatives were surprised on learnin

NSA could not immediately decode and read all enc

communications—that some encryption might b

powerful even for NSA to handle in real time. This ne

not inspire grave concern, however, because 

attending the meeting were locally focused and d

consider wiretaps to be the critical law enforc

technique for the post-Cold War world.

This view changed dramatically with the arrival of 

FBI Director, Judge Louis Freeh, whose own pe

experience with wire tap information in the so-called 

Connection Case” seemed to have convinced him th

future of law enforcement would be both globa

technology-driven. This new FBI Director intui

grasped the significance of the need to contro

encryption exports.

6

 He needed no explanation o

national security and even more so, domestic se

needed protection against the proliferation of unrea

encryption then beginning to flood the comm

marketplace. Here again, personal experience was t

to his understanding.

Yet despite Judge Freeh’s deeply held personal co

influencing a major national security policy involvi

need to coordinate several large bureaucracies p

exceedingly difficult. Neither he nor the FBI 

sufficiently knowledgeable about encryption technol

fashion an effective policy for many years. In

motivated by fear of the unknown, they prevente

change in policy. In so doing, they quite possibly dam

for years to come any productive relationships wi

technology community. In contrast, while NSA unde

encryption technology and was prepared to accommo

changing world, it did not understand the needs 

enforcement or the process of policy formulatio

consequence, its actions further confused and enrag

72
“high-tech” community and made it still harder to 

about constructive change.

Later, when the Department of Commerce was as

the role of implementing a succession of new encr

policies, matters became even more confused

Department of Commerce did not understan

underlying technology of encryption. It had to desig

implement regulations which would be flexible and fa

at the same time distinguish among highly tec

products whose national security characteristics cou

always be predicted prior to government review

proved to be a very difficult policy dilemma.

As the evolution of a new encryption policy prog

from 1984 to 1999, various approaches were considere

early Clipper Chip initiative offered the public high-q

cryptographic protection embedded in hardwa

exchange for the government’s ability to rea

underlying text, but presumably only under approp

legally authorized circumstances.

7

 The idea was so se

criticized that it was eventually discarded. As a poli

Clipper Chip failed.

8

 Although the Clipper Chi

technically innovative, those supporting it ha

considered the public’s mistrust of intelligence. How 

so fundamental a mistake have been made? Those 

professional life is spent working on intelligence gain 

understanding of policy formulation. They may not a

see themselves as others do. Experience again wa

deciding factor. It explains why the Clipper Chip see

good idea to some within the intelligence comm

particularly those from a military background, accus

as they were to positive public relations, but a very b

to the rest of the world.

Interestingly, not everyone in the intelli

community reacted positively when the Clipper 

program was first proposed. Some career 

cryptographers recalled the price that NSA had earlie

for its involvement with the communications o

73
citizens. One senior official reacted with great concern 

proposal. It was his view that NSA should not cr

readable encryption system for public use because it 

enable NSA technically to read the mail of U.S. citiz

was, in some ways, encouraging to find this intense co

from so senior a member of NSA. At the same time, 

less comforting in that it revealed a lack of understa

about how the law controls government capabilities 

citizens’ rights are involved. We bar government 

misusing its technical capabilities, not by prevent

eliminating these capabilities but by regulating the

under a rule of law. It is this distinction that separ

domestic wire tap from foreign signals intelligence. La

experience in the world of domestic law enforcement 

the only protection a citizen has against intr

governmental conduct is the law, this NSA official fou

idea underlying the Clipper Chip very disturbing. 

private citizens agreed with him.

As the encryption policy debate progressed, con

among the affected agencies and their personnel 

Coordination became problematic because agencies s

not to understand their own role in encryption 

development and implementation, much less that of o

An interdependent policy addressing simultaneous

needs of national security, law enforcement

commercial regulation proved exceedingly difficult w

one player understood all parts of this policy puzzle.

Such confusion can be expected to reoccur in the 

as effective yet constitutional responses to transna

threats are explored, unless all agencies involved in d

with transnational threats understand one an

Studies and commissions on this topic have been incr

in number since the early 1990s, when several failu

coordination produced mini-scandals sensationalized 

press to prod Congress. Eventually the earlier-noted 

matter became public, convincing many that the CIA 

in denying that it had information about the banks’ a

criminal wrongdoing. In fact, closer examination 

74
something quite different. The CIA Office of the G

Counsel was asked by the Department of Justice w

there were any reports showing “criminal conduct” 

Bank. The General Counsel’s Office responded that 

was no such information. It failed to mention, howeve

other reports existed which were relevant to the Ban

which in the view of the General Counsel’s Office d

suggest criminal wrongdoing. When these other r

came to light, the reaction, as is almost always true 

the CIA allegedly missteps, was that the Agency had 

engaged in an effort to mislead the Department of J

This exchange had the misfortune of occurring in the 

of a presidential election; it quickly became imposs

engage in any sensible analysis as charges 

countercharges of increasing intensity reverbe

between the three branches of government.

In the aftermath of both the presidential election a

BNL scandal, an effort was launched to learn what ha

wrong in this matter and what could be done to avoi

failures in coordination between law enforcemen

intelligence in the future when once again they nee

work together. As co-chair of this effort, I spent 

amounts of time considering the issues that 

preventing law enforcement and intelligence from w

together. My understanding of the issues deepened. It 

became clear that even the most sophisticated memb

the Department of Justice, who had for years worke

legal issues relevant to intelligence, still did not 

understand the process of gathering and dissemi

intelligence. Nor were there formally establ

procedures or other points of contact to guid

relationship of these two large bureaucracies 

intelligence reporting was concerned.

9

 This was becau

Department of Justice was not seen as an imp

“consumer” by the intelligence community.

Thus, when the Department of Justice posed a qu

to the CIA General Counsel’s Office about ava

intelligence, the question did not fit well with the o

75
legal mission. Indeed, as it turns out, the question cou

properly have been answered either by that office or 

CIA as a whole.

Intelligence reporting has highly structured “cha

for its analysis, reporting, and dissemination, unde

by personnel on both the consumer and collection sid

have been trained in the proper handling of intell

reporting. Intelligence is often fragmentary 

inconclusive, very different from the investigative r

created by law enforcement investigators. The CIA G

Counsel’s Office manages the Agency’s legal issues bu

not perform an intelligence collection or dissemi

function. It was thus not an appropriate entity to 

provide intelligence.

For its part, no part of the intelligence coll

community is trained to make judgments on w

“criminal” and what is not. Its job, instead, is to 

information relevant to topics required, not to charac

what has been collected. Thus Department of Justic

asked the wrong part of the agency for intelli

information and placed a characterization on 

intelligence which collectors were not competent to pr

It did so because it was comfortable dealing wit

General Counsel’s Office and did not have an estab

relationship with the intelligence collection and an

portions in the CIA.

Under normal circumstances the Agency’s la

should have recognized this problem, recast the requ

information to exclude legal conclusions, and referre

the proper part of the Agency for direct handling wi

Department of Justice. However, this exchange hap

in a highly charged situation, amidst intense 

pressure, on the eve of a holiday week-end, m

thoughtful analysis of a novel situation difficult. N

took the time to analyze the situation.

In retrospect, we also learned that the Departm

Justice was poorly equipped to work with even 

76
intelligence information which it had been rece

Reports on apparent topics of general interest t

enforcement went unread for want of staff train

understand its potential value.

As a result of this debacle, at the beginning of the C

administration, a new CIA Director and Attorney G

pledged to coordinate more effectively. To do so

initiated studies on the working relationship o

enforcement to intelligence. I was assigned to this 

along with a Department of Justice colleague, and h

opportunity to analyze the relationship, identify pro

and recommend changes. We were mutually astoun

what we did not understand about one ano

responsibilities, although we had worked together c

over many years. Importantly, our relationship had 

focused on law enforcement prosecutions and 

litigation, where the intelligence agencies wer

governmental client of the Department of Justice. In 

the roles were reversed. The Department of Justice b

the client of the intelligence community, se

information relevant to its mission. This had not 

before, and structures and trained personnel were 

place to work effectively with one another.

At the conclusion of this study in 1994, a repor

issued touching on many of the issues in the present 

Still we did not anticipate that the world of law enforc

would so alter that today, not only senior officials 

Department of Justice but even local law enforc

would need to understand how to work with intelli

The study required 2 years to complete. The issues 

conceptually difficult. Often we lacked a common lan

to explore our concerns. The same words had dif

meanings depending on which community was inv

For example, the two communities had very dif

reactions to the concept and rules for handling a “sou

information. For intelligence, a source’s identity (whe

person or technical means) is something to be perma

protected. Not to do so would subject the source, whe

77
person in a foreign environment or a valuable technol

permanent compromise. In contrast, a law enforc

source typically is designed for a specific, short-ter

and is expected to become public when used in prose

and trial. These differences produced legen

misunderstandings. 

Complicating this was misunderstanding abou

authorities of each and the lack of a shared understa

of the constitutional conceptual framework into whic

fitted. So, too, the authorities governing collecti

various topics differed. Finally, for want of understa

the two communities were intensely suspicious o

another. In sum, what members of the two communit

not know about one another vastly outdistanced wha

did know.

If the intelligence and law enforcement agencies 

coordinate with maximum effectiveness while obs

constitutional limits, and if the relevant agencies w

these communities are to work together, com

experience and a better exchange of ideas are needed

coordination problem also characterizes many 

historical relationships within each of thes

communities. Until recently, the CIA’s problems wi

FBI were mild compared to those with NSA.) In our ef

protect citizens against governmental abuse of pow

have segregated power into pieces, hoping to contai

power by compartmentalizing it. The negative aspect 

approach is that it creates different systems and dif

cultures which are unfamiliar and often suspicious 

another. There is more than a separation of rule

authorities. In the end an “anthropological divide” a

inability to communicate separate these two commu

preventing their cooperation.

This legal, functional, and cultural separation re

forceful corrective action, not wishful thinking. Fro

perspective, Congress would be wise to explore legisla

personnel system where rotational assignments for a

78
seeking a mid-level management position in these ag

are mandatory. Specific—and positive—career ince

are needed to overcome the natural disinclination to 

one’s “mother agency” for a rotational tour at a sister a

when such a move may prove harmful to c

advancement. Without such incentives, it will be diffi

overcome the disinclination that all people have for ch

Another point is relevant here. Law enforcemen

intelligence organizations are consciously structured 

model of a “fighting force.” The creation of esprit de co

building cohesion, discipline, and the ability to 

effectively together is widely regarded as importan

this very esprit de corps can lead to an “us against the 

psychology which can be both a strength and a wea

Where coordination is concerned, it can be partic

problematic. The isolation it promotes and the asso

provincial lack of world experience also make difficul

efforts as understanding others, setting a strategic ag

and problem-solving that is “out of the box.”

Thus, besides improving coordination, man

rotational assignments promise to offer a second b

The shared experiences and enhanced mutual go

would perhaps foster more creative thinking. Cu

personnel systems do not make this easy. To be sure, 

change in personnel structure would generate con

The fact that the various agencies have different 

structures would cause some complications. Pro

would likely arise also over the sharing of clas

information with those not cleared for access to all le

classified information through different agency proc

For many years, insistence by the intelligence comm

that no one be provided full access to the comm

without meeting the community’s comprehe

background checks, including a polygraph examin

was a major barrier to the type of personnel exchang

recommending here. Gradually that has begun to ch

particularly in certain “joint” activities such as th

centers designed to confront terrorism 

79
nonproliferation. Consistent pressure is need

guarantee that this progress continues. These issu

numerous and difficult. They require a concerte

continuous effort to ensure that both the intelligenc

the law enforcement communities actively enga

practices that will loosen their respective bureau

structures and make possible greater exchange. W

coordinate activities as appropriate, even with peo

different clearance levels.

Nonetheless, personal experience teaches me 

increased personnel exchanges can foster more cr

thinking about the problems of transnational th

among even the most knowledgeable leaders in our m

intelligence and law enforcement communities. In 

chanced to meet two of the most senior and res

leaders of the national security community at a semi

the future of post-Cold War intelligence. A paper circ

for review had said nothing about the emerging relatio

between law enforcement and intelligence. Surpri

questioned this omission and for my trouble received 

looks. In 1996, the experience was repeated with yet a 

highly regarded senior expert in the field of m

intelligence. These same views, when offered t

professors at several highly ranked national law sch

1994 and 1995, were no more warmly received.

These experiences are offered not to highlight m

insight, but rather to suggest that I had enjoye

advantage of coming from one culture into anothe

with that, had been stimulated to ask fundam

questions. My point here is that even very experience

knowledgeable people cannot understand what they 

not experienced. It is their very expertise in one discip

area, gained from a lifetime of intense and circums

focus, that makes coming up with new paradigm

out-of-the-box solutions difficult. The cross fertiliza

two cultures as similar, yet different, as law enforc

and intelligence can be profoundly enriching. It can i

new ways of attacking common problems, even as the

80
communities continue to perform their tasks accord

different constitutional and legal requirements. N

short of this type of mind-expanding experience is re

if we want to identify the most creative responses 

problems. I think of this as stepping outside oursel

that we can see ourselves and our problems “in the r

This is the only perspective that will be good enough 

confront transnational threats in the post-Cold War w

The private sector is another area we might exp

our search for creative new ideas. One of the most imp

changes in the recent past is the realization that the p

sector is now a crucial part of our national sec

Government will be able to realize national se

objectives such as protecting the nation’s infrastr

only if it talks with private industry. Yet industry no 

is comfortable talking to the government. Why? A

other reasons, they fear that threat information share

the government will become embarrassingly pub

competitively valuable information, or that trademar

be lost. Combined with this is a mistrust of gover

motives in the national security arena. Once again

mistrust is born of a lack of understanding.

Correspondingly, the government cannot now sh

classified information with the private sector. Sen

information, whether produced in the public or p

sector, cannot go back and forth readily without car

devised regulations and procedures to protect imp

interests on both sides. But solutions are being exp

One of the results of President Clinton’s cr

infrastructure protection initiative is the notion of 

public and private centers where both sides can exc

information with the other in a protected environ

Perhaps this approach—creating mixed-use entities—

work in other areas as well. At a minimum, as the C

Chip story shows, the private sector increasingly mu

part of the discussion.

81
Such exchanges promise do more than just fac

coordination. The opportunity to change places and s

world from different perspectives provides us wit

means to challenge our existing assumptions and th

new ways. This is vital. If we ever hope to find ef

approaches to transnational threats, it is necessary t

become more creative in our thinking.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. The substance of these comments was originally presented 

a banquet speech at the Conference on Transnational Threats: B

Law Enforcement and Military Strategies, February 2-3, 200

editor chose to retain the informal style because of the personal 

of the approach.

2. At the time, even establishing points of contact 

intelligence agencies at selected U.S. attorneys’ offices was probl

if only because of the different standards imposed on ac

intelligence information by both communities. The understan

intelligence within the Department of Justice was minimal. In co

questions asked today even by local law enforcement represen

are quite sophisticated.

3. One law enforcement representative noted that he had f

difficult to use military intelligence to assist him in drug tra

investigations. He asked how he could use this information in a 

trial if it had to remain classified. The answer, of course, is th

possible for law enforcement to use military intelligence wh

observing the important legal and practical requirements un

each. With careful coordination, military intelligence can po

areas of concern. Law enforcement can then follow these leads, u

own investigative techniques. This solves the problem, as only th

becomes evidence for courtroom use.

4. This episode, in fact, eventually led to a public examinatio

problem. The Pizza Connection case was an internationa

trafficking case that was broken through the effective 

wiretapping. 

5. For background on the encryption debate, see Dan Fro

www.washingtonpost.com (Staff); and Amy Branson, LEGI-

News Service, “Deciphering Encryption,” updated May 8, 1

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/enc

/encryption.htm. Encryption is data-scrambling technology. The 

82
centered on whether or not the government should step in and l

strength of encryption products to maintain law enforce

historical ability to eavesdrop electronically on anyone it 

Current policy has totally relaxed controls.

6. FBI Director Louis Freeh is an outspoken advocate of enc

restrictions. He argues that the ability to conduct court-aut

electronic surveillance should be built into any technology, in

powerful encryption software. He fears, for example, that were 

and local police to lose the ability to tap telephones because 

widespread use of strong cryptography, the “country [would] be 

to protect itself against terrorism, violent crime, foreign threa

trafficking, espionage, kidnapping, and other crimes.”

7. For a thorough discussion of the Clipper Chip, see M

Froomkin, “The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clippe

and the Constitution,” 1995. The article, which is posted on the i

at http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/clipp

addresses three issues. First, it outlines some of the promis

dangers of encryption. Second, it analyzes the constit

implications of a major government proposal premised on the 

that it is reasonable for the government to request (and p

someday to require) private persons to communicate in a mann

makes governmental interception practical and preferably easy

it speculates on how the legal vacuum regarding encryp

cyberspace shortly will be, or should be, filled.

8. Regarding the Clipper Chip and related produc

government proposes that, in exchange for providing the privat

with an encryption technology certified as unbreakable for y

come by NSA, the government would keep a copy of the keys—th

belonging to each chip. The government hopes that this would al

retain the ability to intercept messages sent by the chip’s user. 

9. In contrast, clear procedures had existed for some time t

the relationship where the Department of Justice was acting 

CIA’s lawyer.

83
CHAPTER 7

TERRORISM BY WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION: 

A REASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT

Bruce Hoffman

Terrorism today reflects both enormous chang

remarkable continuity. New adversaries with 

motivations and new rationales have indeed appea

recent years to challenge some of our most 

assumptions about terrorists and terrorism. 

emergence, however, has not produced the antic

changes in either terrorist weaponry or tactics tha

predicted to follow in the wake of the Aum Shinri Kyo’

nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway. Instead, as ha

the case for more than a century, the gun and the 

remain the terrorist’s main weapons of choice. Th

fanatical or irrational as even this new breed of ter

may seem, like their more traditional counterpart

have also remained operationally conservative: adhe

the same familiar and narrow tactical repertoire the

mastered and believe maximizes their likelihood of su

For this reason, future terrorist use of chemical, biol

radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons may be fa

certain than is now commonly assumed.

The New Terrorism and Its Putative Implicatio

In the past, terrorism was practiced by a gro

individuals belonging to an identifiable organization 

clear command and control apparatus who had a defin

of political, social, or economic objectives. Radical 

organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, Germ

Red Army Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades, as w

ethno-nationalist terrorist movements like the Abu 

organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), an

85
Basque separatist group, Basque Fatherland and L

(ETA), reflected this stereotype of the traditional te

group. They issued communiqués taking credit for

explaining—their actions. However disagreeab

distasteful their aims and motivations were, their id

and intentions were at least comprehensible.

Most significantly, however, these familiar te

groups engaged in highly selective acts of violence

bombed various “symbolic” targets representing the 

of their animus—embassies, banks, or national a

carriers—or they kidnapped and assassinated s

persons whom they blamed for economic exploitat

political repression. Their purpose was generally to a

attention to themselves and their causes.

Finally, these groups were often numer

constrained. They mostly comprised relatively 

numbers of persons. Neither the Japanese Red Arm

the Red Army Faction, for example, ever numbered 

than 20 to 30 hard-core members. The Red Brigade

hardly larger, with a total of fewer when 50 to 75 ded

terrorists. Even the IRA and ETA could call on the v

services of only some 200-400 activists, while the feare

Nidal organization was limited to some 500 men-at-a

any given time.

In contrast to the stereotypical terrorist group 

past, the new generation of terrorists shows signs of h

undergone several important organizational cha

These, in turn, have affected their operat

decisionmaking, and targeting. Rather than belong

the pyramidal, hierarchical organizational structure

were dominant among terrorist organizations durin

1970s and 1980s, terrorists are now increasingly par

more amorphous, indistinct, and broader movem

These movements also tend to operate on a linear 

than hierarchical basis. Hence, instead of the c

cellular structure that was common to previous gener

of terrorist organizations, some contemporary grou

86
more loosely connected or indirectly linked th

networks. These networks are comprised of 

professional members (for example, full-time terrorist

amateurs (hangers-on, supporters, sympathizers

would-be terrorists who may lack the expert

experience of their more established counterparts).

The absence of any existing, publicly identified c

command authority is significant. First, it means 

state that has fallen victim to a terrorist attack may 

able to find a useful target to hit in retaliation. This 

serve to remove any inhibitions on the terrorists

against inflicting widespread, indiscriminate casu

Individual networks thus could have greater freedo

independence in tactical decisions than traditional te

cells. Accordingly, this particular type of loosely stru

terrorist group may pose a very different and potentia

more lethal threat than that posed by more fam

traditional, terrorist adversaries. Second, the anon

intrinsic to this type of operation, coupled with the la

discernible organizational structure with a distingui

command chain behind the attackers, is delibe

designed to prevent easy identification and also fac

the perpetrators’ escape and evasion.

Finally, many terrorist movements today hav

easily defined aims or identified objectives. Some app

be motivated by unswerving hostility towards the W

general, and the United States in particular, or a des

revenge and retaliation that is frequently fuell

compelling religious imperatives and justifications 

than abstract political ideologies. In the past, the fam

predominantly secular terrorist groups mostly cl

credit for and explained their violent acts. In contra

most heinous and lethal attacks perpetrated by ter

over the past decade—which have usually been di

against civilians—have gone unclaimed.

1

 By maint

their anonymity, terrorists may believe that they are 

capitalize further on the fear and alarm intrins

generated by their violence.

87
This array of changes has, in turn, raised s

concerns about the continued relevance of much 

conventional wisdom on terrorism—particularly 

pertains to potential future terrorist use of CBRN we

In the past, most analyses of the possibility of 

indiscriminate killing involving CBRN terrorism ten

discount it. Few terrorists, it was argued, know any

about the technical intricacies of either develop

deploying such weapons. Political, moral, and pr

considerations were also perceived as important rest

on terrorist use of such weapons of mass destr

(WMD). Finally, and most significantly, we as

ourselves that terrorists wanted mass spectators 

than mass casualties. We believed, therefore, that ter

had little interest in and little to gain from killing wa

and indiscriminately.

A number of terrorist incidents in the 1990s fo

reevaluation of the terrorist threat. We may po

particular to the 1993 bombing of New York City’s 

Trade Center by Islamic extremists, the 1995 nerv

attack on the Tokyo subway by an apocalyptic Jap

religious sect mentioned earier, and the bombing 

government office building in Oklahoma City 

American white supremacist just a month after the 

incident. These events, coupled with other at

perpetrated by religious-inspired terrorists througho

world during the 1990s, appeared to have ren

traditional analysis dangerously anachronistic.

2

 

closer examination, however, this has not proven 

so—despite fears, arguments and spending to the cont

First, this new era of terrorism has yet to mater

Terrorism, as reported by such authoritative sources 

U.S. State Department’s annual Global Patter

Terrorism publications, has indeed become increa

lethal.

3

 Yet only a total of 84 Americans were killed 

attacks perpetrated against U.S. targets overseas d

the 1990s. Approximately six times as many Ame

(571), however, were killed by terrorists in the 69 a

88
that occurred the previous decade.

4

 These figures 

seem to reflect an upward trend. It is, of co

incontestably tragic that any Americans should lose 

lives to violence or be wantonly harmed and injured s

because of the nationality of the passport they carr

uniform they wear, or the job they perform. And ter

remains a threat to Americans travelling or wo

abroad. Nonetheless, the fact remains that despi

appearance of the “new face terrorism,” the streets 

world hardly run red with American blood.

Nor is the situation terribly different in the U

States itself. Admittedly, a total of 176 persons were 

by terrorists in this country during the 1990s—mor

twice the international figure. We must be careful, how

how we interpret these figures. According to the F

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), only 25 terrorist inc

occurred in the United States between 1990 and 199

last year for which figures have been published). The 

death toll is the result of only three incidents. And 

three incidents, it was one especially heinous act—th

bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal office build

Oklahoma City—that accounts for the overwhe

majority of fatalities (168 deaths).

5

 Again, there is no 

that terrorism remains a threat to the lives and well

of Americans in our own country. The actual num

terrorist incidents (as opposed to the hundreds of 

hoaxes that the FBI and other law enforcement and 

safety agencies now routinely respond to), rem

however, remarkably low, and those that cause fat

still lower.

6

None of the above considerations, it shou

emphasized, is meant to suggest that the United 

should become complacent about the threat of ter

(domestic or international) or in any way relax our vig

either at home or abroad. Terrorism poses, and will 

continue to pose, a serious threat to American

American interests both in this country and ove

Nonetheless, it is equally clear that there has b

89
tendency to exaggerate the dimensions of the threat a

strategic impact that terrorist violence has ac

wrought. And by overreacting and falling prey to a se

acute fear and intimidation, we inflate the terrorists’ 

in ways that are both counterproductive and often div

from reality.

7

Terrorism is fundamentally a form of psycho

warfare, and fomenting widespread fear and intimida

essential to terrorists’ purposes. Accordingl

succumbing to their threats and braggadocio, and by 

to distinguish their inflated rhetoric from ge

intentions and actual capabilities, we play into their h

We risk making hard policy choices and budg

allocations based mostly on misperception 

misunderstanding rather than on hard analysis bu

empirical evidence. Indeed, the incorrect lessons d

from the Aum Shinri Kyo experience in general an

1995 nerve gas attack in particular illustrate the dan

responding emotionally and viscerally rather than s

and calmly to such terrorist threats.

8

The Misunderstood Lessons of Aum Shinri Kyo

Let us grant, for the sake of argument, the poss

that the motives of terrorists are changing, and tha

may come to contemplate ever more bloody and heinou

including the use of CBRN weapons. Even if we suppo

is an accurate reading of events (although the em

evidence cited above seems to belie this), these trends 

necessarily imply that terrorists currently possess (a

frequently portrayed) either the requisite scie

knowledge or technical capabilities to implement 

violent ambitions. In this respect, even if it is as ea

some say, for terrorists to culture anthrax spores or br

a concoction of deadly nerve gas, there are other diffic

that stand in their way. The effective dissemination o

viruses and poisons still presents serious technical h

that greatly inhibit their effective use. Indeed, the 

90
Japanese religious sect that is most directly responsi

precipitating our current obsession with terrorism 

CBRN weapons is precisely a case in point.

The Aum Shinri Kyo, it must be said, was by no m

typical terrorist group. The archetypal ter

organization is composed of a handful of men and w

with limited training, technical capabilities, and reso

Aum defies this pattern. It was a religious movemen

upwards of 50,000 members and offices in New 

Germany, Australia, Russia, and Sri Lanka, in addi

Japan. Aum had assets estimated to be in the neighbo

of $1 billion—and at least certainly in the hundr

millions. It specifically recruited graduates with sci

and engineering degrees from Japan’s leading unive

and provided them with state-of-the-art laboratorie

lavish budgets with which to fund the group’s varie

weapons research and development (R&D) programs. 

its biological weapons research was compara

modest—its research never employed more than perh

persons at most

9—as many as 80 scientific personne

specifically detailed to work on the group’s che

weapons programs.

When police raided the sect’s laboratories followi

nerve gas attack, for example, they found enough sa

kill an estimated 4.2 million persons.

10

 In addition

had either already produced or planned to develop 

powerful nerve agents such as VX, tabun, and s

chemical weapons such as mustard gas and sodium cy

and deadly biological warfare pathogens that inc

anthrax, the highly contagious disease known as Q-f

and possibly the deadly Ebola virus as well.

12

 Aum’s 

ambitious project, however, was doubtless its effo

develop a nuclear capability. To this end, the grou

purchased a 500,000-acre sheep station in a remote p

Western Australia. There, they hoped to mine uraniu

was to be shipped back to Aum’s laboratories in 

where scientists using laser enrichment technology 

convert it into weapons-grade nuclear material.

13

91
The group had also assembled an impressive pan

conventional weaponry. Aum is believed to have purc

large quantities of small arms from Russian sources 

have been in the market for advanced weaponry su

tanks, jet fighters, surface-to-surface rocket launcher

even a tactical nuclear weapon. Aum succeeded in obt

a surplus twin-turbine Mi-117 helicopter—complet

chemical spray dispersal devices. The group 

planned—and had gone as far as to acquire sophist

robotic manufacturing devices—to produce at le

thousand knock-off versions of Russia’s world-fa

AK-47 assault rifle along with one million cartr

Finally, the sect had determined how to manufactur

and the central component of plastic explosives, RDX

However, despite Aum’s considerable financial w

the technical expertise that it could call upon fro

well-educated members and the vast resource

state-of-the-art equipment at their disposal, the group 

not effect even a single truly successful chemi

biological attack. On at least nine occasions, the 

attempted to disseminate botulinum toxin (Clostr

botulinum) or anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) using a

means. Each time they failed, either because the botu

agents they grew and enriched were not toxic o

mechanical sprayers used to disseminate the an

spores became clogged and hence inoperative.

15

Even the comparatively more successful sarin att

the Tokyo subway would be laughable if not for the 

deaths of 12 persons and the physical and psycho

harm caused to many more victims. For all its sophist

research and development, the best means the group 

find to disseminate the nerve gas was in plastic tras

that had to be poked open with sharpened umbrella 

order to release the noxious mixture.

16

 And for all th

generated by this attack, it was far from achieving 

destruction or inflicting mass casualties. New resear

revealed that the number of persons physically inju

affected by the attack is much lower than prev

92
reported.

17

 Of the 5,000 persons who received m

treatment in the aftermath of the subway attack, th

majority (73.9 percent) were suffering from s

emotional upset, or some psychosomatic symptom.

1

the Aum, with all its unique advantages, could do no 

harm than this speaks volumes about the challenges 

any less well endowed terrorist organization.

In sum, upon further examination and analysis, 

experience suggests—however counterintuitive

contrary to popular belief—the immense technol

difficulties faced by any nonstate entity in attempt

weaponize and effectively disseminate chemica

biological weapons.

19

 It also provides striking refuta

the argument voiced with increasing frequency in 

years of the ease with which such weapons can be fabr

and made operational. Public officials, journalists

analysts, for example, have repeatedly alleged 

biological attacks in particular are relatively ea

terrorists to undertake. According to one state emer

management official, biological weapons

are available—and easy to make . . . . One does not need 

degree in microbiology to make this work, being able to read 

enough . . . . It’s not like enriching uranium.

20

Similarly, both the White House and senior FBI of

have argued that the information needed to de

chemical and biological weapons can be readily ob

from the Internet and other open sources.

21

 Such cla

not square with the facts. Both the Aum experience 

considerable body of subsequent research and an

make it clear that fabrication and dissemination o

weapons is not easy.

22

 John Lauder, the na

intelligence officer responsible for non-prolifer

elaborates:

While popular culture can explore the potential BW thre

actually developing and using an effective biological weap

poses certain technological challenges.

23

93
Policy Implications Regarding Future Possible

CBRN Terrorism.

The analysis above is not to suggest, however, 

that there is no threat of terrorist use of CBRN or tha

a threat should be dismissed or discounted. Indee

difficulties now facing a terrorist who seeks to use a 

weapon to achieve mass effects could diminish drama

because of new discoveries, further advances in techn

or other material factors.

What this chapter has argued is that by exagge

the ability of terrorists to wreak genuine mass destr

or inflict widespread casualties, we are in danger of m

sight of where the real threats lie. A limited terrorist 

might, for example, involve not a WMD per se, b

unconventional chemical, biological, or radiological w

built on a deliberately small scale. It might be used 

alone or as part of a series of smaller incidents, which 

occur either simultaneously or sequentially, in a 

location. Such an attack could have disproportio

serious consequences, generating unprecedented fea

alarm, and thus serving the terrorists’ purpose just a

as a larger weapon or more ambitious attack with m

casualties. The most salient terrorist threat involv

unconventional weapon will likely not involve (or 

attempt) the destruction of an entire city (as 

proclaimed by fictional thriller writers and 

government officials). Rather it will involve the far 

deliberate and delicately planned use of a che

biological, or radiological agent for more discrete purp

Yet despite the empirical evidence regarding ter

trends and patterns of activity (both domesti

international), including the correct lessons that sho

drawn from the case of Aum, the United States re

singularly preoccupied with the threat of mass-ca

terrorism. It continues to plan for worst case scenario

is largely a result of a mindset that took root 

immediate aftermath of the near simultaneous Tokyo 

94
gas attack and the Oklahoma City bombing in 199

thinking and perceptions of the terrorist threat 

remained fundamentally unchanged since this ep

New evidence regarding Aum and the overall patt

terrorist activity in the 5 years since the 1995 subway 

suggest that many of our current assumptions m

wrong. 

Nonetheless, no significant reassessm

reconsideration, or revision of the CBRN terrorism 

profile established during the 1995-96 time frame h

been undertaken.

24

 Thus, a critical first step in ass

the threat as it exists today and is likely to evolve 

future should be to undertake a broad new net asses

of the terrorist threat not only internationall

domestically as well. Such an assessment—addr

conditions, circumstances, and vulnerabilities of 

rather than those of 5 years ago—will permit 

determine whether the worst-case scenario asses

approach that has dominated current domestic pla

and preparedness for potential acts of CBRN terror

still appropriate, much less relevant.

25

The current narrow policy focus 

lower-probability/higher-consequence threats, wh

turn posits virtually limitless vulnerabilities, doe

reflect the realities of contemporary terrorist behavi

operations. “This kind of analysis,” Brian Jenkins re

warned in testimony before Congress, “can degenera

a fact-free scaffold of anxieties and arguments—dra

emotionally powerful, but analytically feeble.”

26

 A

same congressional hearing, another expert, 

Parachini, had similar advice to give. The “app

over-reliance," he noted,

on worst-case scenarios shaped primarily by vulnerabil

assessment rather than an assessment that factors in t

technical complexities, motivations of terrorists, and th

patterns of behavior seems to be precisely the sort of approa

we should avoid.

27

95
The main weakness in such an approach is 

axiomatic assumption that any less serious incident 

addressed equally well by planning for the 

catastrophic threat. This ignores the fact tha

higher-probability/lower-consequence attacks 

present unique challenges of their own.

28

Finally, this approach may lead to less efficacious 

of setting budgetary priorities and allocating reso

thus leading to less rather than more security fo

country. This was precisely the point made by He

Hinton, Jr., the Assistant Comptroller General, Na

Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. G

Accounting Office, when he testified before Congr

March 1999. “The [most] daunting task before the na

he argued,

is to assess—to the best of its ability—the emerging threat w

the best available knowledge and expertise across the m

disciplines involved. The United States cannot fund all 

possibilities that have dire consequences. By focus

investments on worst-case possibilities, the government ma

missing the more likely threats the country will face. With 

right threat and risk assessment process, participants, inp

and methodology, the nation can have greater confidence tha

is investing in the right items in the right amounts. Even wit

the lower end of the threat spectrum—where the biological 

chemical terrorist threat currently lies—the threats can stil

ranked and prioritized in terms of their likelihood and seve

of consequences. A sound threat and risk assessment co

provide a cohesive roadmap to justify and target spending.

Moreover, at a time when the United States is esp

preoccupied with these “high-end” terrorist th

involving mass-destruction CBRN weapons, the se

apartment building bombings that occurred in Russ

Dagestan during August and September 1999 is a sa

reminder of how terrorists can still achieve their dual 

fear and intimidation through entirely conventional 

and traditional methods: using bombs to blow things 

96
This fact has important implications for America’s

indeed also other countries’—counterterr

preparedness. Given the limited resources and const

capabilities typical of most terrorists, they pe

reflexively shun weapons and tactics either that can

relied upon completely or that pose such enor

complexities in terms of their employment (e.g., ach

effective dissemination) as to border on the unappea

not useless. For this reason, it can be said that ter

remain essentially content with the limited killing pot

of their handguns and machine-guns and the slightly 

rates that their bombs can achieve. In other words

seem to prefer the assurance of the modest success pr

by their more conventional weapons and traditional 

to the risk of failure inherent in more comple

complicated operations involving CBNR weapons.

Indeed, of the more than 9,000 incidents recorded 

RAND Chronology of International Terrorism since 

fewer than 100 evidence any indication of terrorists pl

to use chemical, biological, or radiological weapons 

obtain nuclear devices—much less actually to car

such attacks. As one critic has observed in connectio

the current concern over terrorist use of biological a

“Nasty people and the ingredients for bioterrorism w

in place over a decade ago. Why now the drumbeati

Indeed, since the beginning of the century, little more 

dozen terrorist incidents in fact have occurred that re

in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at one time. T

an arguably infinitesimal number given the total volu

terrorism that has occurred worldwide within past q

century, much less 100 years.

31

There is another relevant paradox affecting te

behavior. Terrorists have long been seen as far 

imitative than they are innovative. However, to da

similar or copycat act of terrorism, which at the tim

thought might likely follow in the wake of the sarin 

gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, has materi

In this respect, the Tokyo incident has been the exc

97
rather than the rule in terms of terrorist behavior. “Th

gains significance,” Brian Jenkins observed,

when we note that past terrorist and crimi

innovations—airline hijackings, political kidnappin

malicious product tampering—were promptly imitated. A

terrorist attacks involving chemical and biological agents

they do occur, are likely to remain rare events—they will 

become the truck bomb of the next decade.

32

Finally, as serious and potentially catastrophic 

terrorist CBRN attack might prove, it is highly un

that it could ever completely undermine the na

security, much less threaten the survival of a nation li

United States or indeed most other Western countrie

point should be self-evident, but given the rhetor

hyperbole with which the threat of CBRN terror

frequently couched, it requires reiteration. Even Is

comparatively small country in terms of populatio

landmass, who throughout its existence has often 

isolated and surrounded by enemy states and subjec

unrelenting terrorist attack and provocation, has 

regarded terrorism as a paramount threat to its na

security and longevity. Israel has never construed ter

as worthy of profligate budgets or the divers

disproportionate resources and attention.

Moreover, we should recall that even in the wake 

intense fear and concern following the 1995 Tokyo ner

attack, the Japanese government did not fall, wides

disorder did not ensue throughout the country, n

society collapse. There is no reason to assume th

outcome would be any different in the United State

any other Western democratic state in the event of a s

terrorist attack involving a chemical or biological we

To take any other position risks surrendering to the fe

intimidation that are precisely the terrorists’ tim

stock-in-trade. There is a thin line between prudenc

panic. The challenge, therefore, in responding to the 

of potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons is to c

98
defense that is not only both cost-effective and approp

but also sober and practical.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. These include, among other incidents, the series of car bo

that convulsed Bombay in 1993, killing 317 persons; the hug

bomb that destroyed a Jewish community center in Buenos A

1994, killing 96; the 1995 bomb that demolished the Alfred P. 

Federal Building in Oklahoma City, leaving 168 dead; th

bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 

series of bombings of apartment buildings in Dagestan and Mo

August and September 1999. Indeed, the 1988 in-flight bombing 

Am Flight 103 is an especially notorious example. Althou

know—as a result of what has been described as the “most ex

criminal investigation in history”—that the two Libyan gove

airline employees, who are currently being tried in The Hagu

identified and accused of placing the suitcase containing the bo

eventually found its way onto the flight, no believable c

responsibility has ever been issued. Hence, we still do not know w

aircraft was targeted or who ordered or commissioned the attac

more detailed study of this issue, see Bruce Hoffman, “Why Te

Don’t Claim Credit,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9

Spring 1997, pp. 1-6.

2. Several such incidents may be noted here. In February 

series of 13 near-simultaneous car and truck bombings shook B

India, killing 400 persons and injuring more than 1,000 other

reprisal for the destruction of an Islamic shrine in that coun

December 1994 an Air France passenger jet was hijacked by 

terrorists belonging to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GI

terrorists’ plot (mercifully foiled) was to blow up themselv

aircraft, and the 283 passengers on board precisely when the pla

over Paris, thus causing the flaming wreckage to plunge i

crowded city below. Between July and October 1995, a wave of bo

was unleashed in France by the GIA. The attacks targeted metro 

outdoor markets, cafes, schools, and popular tourist spots, killin

persons and wounding more than 180 others. Note also the fo

episodes: the assassination in November 1995 of Israeli Prime M

Itzhak Rabin by a Jewish religious extremist, the assassinatio

the first step in a campaign of mass murder designed to disr

peace process; the Hamas suicide bombers who turned the 

Israel’s national elections with a string of bloody attacks that k

persons between February and March 1996; the Egyptian 

militants who carried out a brutal machine-gun and hand g

99
attack on a group of Western tourists outside their Cairo hotel 

1996 that killed 18; the June 1996 truck bombing of a U.S. A

barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, where 19 persons peris

religious militants opposed to the reigning al-Saud regim

massacre in November 1997 of 58 foreign tourists and four Egyp

terrorists belonging to the Gamat al-Islamiya (Islamic Group

Temple of Queen Hatsheput in Luxor, Egypt; and the bombing

U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 that ki

and injured some 5,000 others.

3. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns o

Terrorism 1997, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State Pub

10535, April 1998, pp. iii, 1.

4. Statistics compiled by the Bureau of Diplomatic Securi

State Department. See also Office of the Coordina

Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, Washingt

U.S. Department of State Publication 10687, April 2000, p. 1.

5. Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning 

National Security Division, Terrorism in the United State

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bu

Investigation, 1998, pp. 22-23.

6. See Statement for the Record before the Senate Select Com

on Intelligence, January 28, 1998, http://www.fbi.gov/co

98archives/threats.htm, of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, p. 6; Sta

of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section before t

House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oversigh

Investigations, May 19, 1999, p. 1, at http://www.fbi.gov/pr

congress/bioleg3.htm; Statement for the Record of Mrs. Bar

Martinez, Deputy Director, National Domestic Preparedness 

before the U.S. House of Representatives Transportati

Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investig

and Emergency Management, June 9, 1999, p. 1, at http/

fbi.gov/pressrm/congress/counterr.htm.

7. Our preoccupation with Osama bin Lade

attendant—however inadvertent—lionization of his stature an

is perhaps such a case in point. Despite his vast wealth and 

legions of minions, it is hardly likely that bin Laden could ever 

vanquish the U.S. military, overthrow our government, or achi

fundamental political changes in American foreign or domestic 

Yet, this single individual arguably is held in fear and acco

stature far in excess of what logic would seem to dictate.

100
8. Among the first and most important works to incisively 

the true implications of Aum and the 1995 nerve gas attack ar

Rapoport, “Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” Geor

National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1999, pp. 49-67

Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” Foreign Policy, N

Fall 1998, pp. 110-125; Milton Leitenberg, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Ef

Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propag

Misinformation,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, 

Winter 1999, forthcoming.

9. Telephone interview of RAND research staff member P

Anthony Tu, July 21, 1999; and of Milton Leitenberg, July 16, 

10. Richard Lloyd Parry, “Sect’s poisons ‘could kill 4.2m

Independent on Sunday (London), March 26, 1995; Andrew P

“Japanese Police Say They Found Germ-War Material at Cu

New York Times, March 29, 1995.

11. Reuters, “Aum Cult Gas Cache,” International Herald T

(Paris), December 13, 1996. See also National (Japanese) Police A

“Aum Shinrikyo: An Alarming Report on the Terrorist G

Organization and Activities,” Shoten (Tokyo), No. 252 (1195), pp

and David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the En

World, London: Hutchinson, 1996, pp. 10, 95-97, 121-125, 151, 2

232.

12. Following an outbreak of Ebola in Zaire in 1992, Asahara 

followers traveled to that country ostensibly on a humanitar

mission. Associated Press and Agence France-Presse, “Cult 

deadly Ebola virus,’” New York Times, April 25, 1995. See also 

and Marshall, pp. 96-97.

13. Kaplan and Marshall, pp. 85, 126-133; 190-192, 208; Sopk

Changing Proliferation Threat,” p. 13.

14. See Kaplan and Marshall, pp. 76, 88, 107-112, 151, 1

James K. Campbell, “Excerpts From Research Study ‘Weapons 

Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State A

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 1997, pp

Ron Purver, “Chemical Terrorism In Japan,” unpublished pape

Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Ottawa, Canada, June 

15; National Police Agency,Shoten (252), “Aum Shinrikyo: An Al

Report on the Terrorist Group’s Organization and Activities,” 1

10.

101
15. Two attempts were made with anthrax and seve

botulinum toxin. W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: Th

Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, Washington, DC: 

for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University

1999, p. 62.

16. D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo, Ne

Weatherhill, 1996, pp. 126, 129.

17. Leitenberg, “The Experience of the Japanese Aum Sh

Group and Biological Agents,” forthcoming.

18. Anthony G. Macintyre, et al., “Weapons of Mass Dest

Events with Contaminated Casualties—Planning For Healt

Facilities,” Journal of the American Medical Association, N

January 2000, pp. 242-249.

19. Indeed, this same point can also be made regard

formidable hurdles faced by many established states in developi

own effective weapons programs in the same areas of ch

biological, and nuclear warfare.

20. Quoted in Grant Sasek, “Officials in State Warn of Bi

Terrorism,”Helena Independent Record, http://billinsgazet

region.990125_reg009.html.

21. See, for example, the White House, “Fact Sheet on Com

Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62,” May 22, 1968, a

at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/pdd-62.htm, which state

easier access to sophisticated technology means that 

destructive power available to terrorists is greater than e

Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional to

such as weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities 

disrupt the operations of our government.

Statement for the record before the Senate Select Commi

Intelligence, January 28, 1998, http://www.fbi.gov/con

98archives/threats.htm, of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh:

The ease of manufacturing or obtaining biological and chem

agents is disturbing. Available public source material ma

our law enforcement mission a continuous challenge.

Statement of Robert J. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism 

before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Ov

102
and Investigations, May 19, 1999. Http://www.fb

pressrm/congress/bioleg3.htm;: “Literature containing recip

modes of dissemination are available through ‘how to’ literatu

over the Internet.”

22. See, for example, the more detailed analysis summar

First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the A

Panel To Assess Domestic Response Capabilities For Ter

Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing the 

December 15, 1999, at http://www.rand.org/organiz

nsrd/terrpanel, pp. 20-34.

23. In this capacity, he is the nation’s senior intelligence 

concerned with this issue. U.S. Congress, “Statement by 

Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation John A. Lauder 

Worldwide Biological Warfare Threat,” House Permanent 

Committee on Intelligence, March 3, 1999, http://www.cia.g

public_affairs/speeches/lauder_speech_030399.html.

24. Discussion with a senior national intelligence officer resp

for this issue, Washington, DC, January 10, 2000.

25. This same argument has been made repeatedly by H

Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Secur

International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office

the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affai

International Relations, Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives in (1) “Combating Terrorism: Observa

Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism,” March 11, 1999; 

“Combating Terrorism: Observation on the Threat of Chemi

Biological Terrorism,” October 20, 1999; as well as by John Para

“Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat,” and Brian M

Jenkins in their respective testimony before the same 

subcommittee on 20 October 1999; the Hinton testimony “Com

Terrorism: Observation on Biological Terrorism and Public 

Initiatives,” before the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affa

Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related A

Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Appropria

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-12, U.S. General Accounting Office Wash

DC, March 16, 1999.

26. Jenkins, “Testimony,” October 20, 1999, p. 4.

27. Parachini, “Combating Terrorism: Assessing the T

October 20, 1999, p. 17.

103
28. A higher-probability/lower-consequence event is consid

involve the limited, rather than massive, use of a chemical, bio

radiological, or conventional weapon whose effects wo

geographically confined in both scope and actual ph

destructiveness and that would most likely be aimed at in

fatalities numbering in the tens or twenties rather than the tho

(even though the number of injured requiring medical treatmen

number in the thousands).

29. Hinton, “Combating Terrorism: Observations on Bi

Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives,” GAO/T-NSIAD-

March 16, 1999, pp. 4–5.

30. Daniel S. Greenberg. “The Bioterrorism Panic,” Was

Post, March 16, 1999.

31. These include a bombing in Bessarabia in 1921; a 1925 b

of a crowded cathedral in Sofia, Bulgaria; a largely unrecorded a

to poison imprisoned German SS concentration camp guards 

after World War II; the crash of a hijacked Malaysian passenger p

1977; the arson attack at a Teheran movie theater in 1979 tha

more than 400; the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barr

Lebanon that killed 241; the 1985 in-flight bombing of an A

passenger jet that killed all 328 persons on board; the simul

explosions that rocked an ammunition dump in Islamabad, Pak

1988; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 that killed 278 p

the 1989 in-flight bombing of a French UTA flight that killed 1

1989 in-flight bombing of a Colombian Avianca aircraft on wh

persons perished; and the aforementioned 1993 series of bomb

Bombay, the 1995 explosion at the Murrah Building in Oklahom

and the two American embassy bombings in East Africa in 1

Brian Jenkins noted concerning such episodes:

Lowering the criterion to 50 deaths produces a dozen or m

additional incidents. To get even a meaningful sample, 

criterion has to be lowered to 25. This in itself suggests that 

either very hard to kill large numbers of persons or very ra

tried.

See Brian M. Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism

Monica, CA: RAND, P-7119, July 1985, p. 7.

32. Jenkins, “Testimony,” October 20, 1999, pp. 2-3.

104
CHAPTER 8

TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION:

A REVIEW AND NEW PARADIGM

Jeffrey F. Addicott

Introduction.

A fundamental obligation of any state is to prot

citizens from external as well as internal threats to p

and property. Nowhere is this obligation more diffi

perform than in the realm of terrorism, particularly 

one considers the apocalyptic horrors that mig

unleashed through the terrorist use of weapons of 

destruction (WMD). In the case of the government 

United States, it is concerned not only with those ren

states that might commit or sponsor various WMD te

activities against U.S. citizens, but also with interna

or domestic terrorist groups, and even individuals. 

one considers that terrorists have targeted the U

States more often than any other country in the wor

specter of WMD terrorism demands top priority 

thinking and planning.

1

Many solutions have been suggested. Among the

the institution of new security and intelligence-gat

methodologies to help prevent a WMD terrorist ac

development of streamlined plans for a rapid federal, 

and local response to the aftermath of a WMD event; a

increase in the role of the Department of Defen

counterterrorism. These solutions are focused, as it w

the pressure points of the problem. However, the th

WMD makes it critical for our national strate

appreciate as well that since democracies do not eng

terrorism, we must do more to promote demo

institutions throughout the community of nations

105
democracy-building initiative must be the basis for 

and dynamic paradigm whose application might p

more effective way to WMD terrorist avoidance, esp

in regard to state-sponsored terrorism.

Terrorism.

There is no universally accepted definition of terr

either in the international community or in the U

States. As the root word terror implies, terrorism in

the use of fear to attain certain goals. Notwithstandin

terrorism is the antithesis of the rule of law

postmodernist adage that “one man’s terrorist is an

man’s freedom fighter” further contributes to the in

to carve out a clear definition. Certainly, however, civ

nations have come to associate certain specific a

terrorism per se. Hostage-taking, public bombings, an

directed against civilians are easily defined as terro

nature, regardless of the ideological, religious, or 

goals of the perpetrators.

For those who follow the trends, the lethal

terrorism continues to grow, particularly agains

interests. Although the number of terrorist attack

fallen from 484 in 1991 to 250 in 1996, both the 

Department and the RAND-St. Andrews Chronol

International Terrorism agree that 1996 (the las

records have been updated) was one of the bloodiest ye

record. A RAND study found that a “total of 510 p

were killed, 223 more than in 1995, and 91 more th

1994.”

2

 These studies are, of course, rather inconsequ

when one considers the aftermath of a terrorist di

nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological attack 

urban area of the United States. To the mass casualti

devastating economic disruption, one must ad

troubling impact this event might have on futur

liberties and freedoms that Americans now enjoy.

106
Sources of WMD Terrorism.

Apart from the normal modus operandi of terroris

must now add WMD as a special definitional subs

Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization A

fiscal year 1997, a WMD is defined as

any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability

cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number 

people through the release of toxic or poisonous chemicals 

their precursors, a disease organism, or radiation 

radioactivity.

3

Thus WMD includes the full range of biological, che

and radioactive agents.

There are three general sources from which a 

terrorist attack can emanate—state, sub-sta

individual. Tragically, all three categories have flirte

the use of WMD in the past decade.

State-Sponsored Terrorism.

Perhaps the most easily identifiable catego

terrorism is the state-sponsored terrorist attack. In 

times, the international community has been shoc

learn that certain renegade states such as Iraq have 

an unabashed willingness to use deadly nerve gas 

thousands of men, women, and children (the K

Indeed, it can be argued that all totalitarian states p

ever-present threat for the use of WMD at any 

time—both against their own people and against 

nations. The U.S. State Department now designates 

countries as sponsors of terrorism against other na

Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,North Korea, Sudan, and Syr

fact, the number is larger. John A. Lauder, director 

Central Intelligence Agency’s Nonproliferation Cente

testified before Congress that a dozen countries

107
now either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biolog

weapons capabilities for use against their perceived enem

whether internal or external.

5

In the context of a state use of WMD in a terrorist a

several commentators seek to distinguish a state-spon

terrorist act from a state-supported terroris

State-sponsored terrorism exists when a state direct

secretly uses its own government apparatus and res

to perform acts of terrorism against another country

accountability for such acts is always denied, the agg

state seeks to avoid responsibility. On the other 

state-supported terrorism refers to the practice of a 

providing resources to a terrorist group for tra

logistics, or financing as is currently the ca

Afghanistan, where the Islamic terrorist group head

Osama bin Laden (the inner core group is know

Al-Qaeda) takes refuge. Under the state-supp

scenario, the terrorist group generally ope

independently from the state.

6

In the final analysis, it is difficult to make a pra

distinction between state-sponsored and state-sup

terrorism. The terms really speak only to the deg

culpability. If the rule of law has any force, states who 

terrorist groups to operate with impunity on the

should never be able to escape the attendant 

consequences.

7

The early days of concern regarding terrorism a

use of WMD saw most of the emphasis focused o

actions of the totalitarian state. Because many believe

ready access to WMD material was limited, sub

terrorist groups or individual terrorists were gen

given less attention. For these latter categories of terr

the international community generally concentrat

making specific overt acts international crimes, e.g., a

hijacking or hostage-taking. For renegade states, how

the major issue turned on the proper applicat

108
appropriate sanctions against the state that sponso

supported a terrorist incident.

A considerable debate rages regarding how to deal 

WMD terrorist event vis-à-vis international legal san

A particularly interesting concern centers on the use 

diplomatic pouch to import and export, with imp

assorted prohibited and illegal items into receivin

transit states.

8

 (The diplomatic pouch issue contin

cause great consternation.) Modern international pr

has witnessed the use or attempted use of the diplo

pouch to transport illegal foreign currency, illegal 

weapons, and even people. While all manifestly ev

committed under the cover of this diplomatic shie

sorely objectionable, the most insidious and disconc

activities are those in which the diplomatic pouch mi

used as a vehicle to commit clearly defined acts of terr

especially those related to WMD.

Currently, the diplomatic privileges and immu

accorded to the diplomatic pouch under treat

customary international law are set out in Article 27 

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

9

 In sho

diplomatic pouch is deemed by international law 

inviolable and not subject to detention or search

central thrust of those who periodically argue for a c

to the Vienna Convention is that the protected status 

to the diplomatic pouch must be significantly revi

account for the legitimate security interests of the rec

state. Again, the major concern is that the diplomatic 

could be used to commit a WMD terrorist act. For exa

responding to public fears that diplomatic privileges 

be used as a vehicle to commit state-sponsored ter

related to WMD,

10

 then Secretary of Defense C

Weinberger publicly indicated in 1986 that the 

doctrine of diplomatic immunity should be greatly lim

Arguing that state-sponsored terrorists were abusi

doctrine, Weinberger called upon “diplomats wit

assistance of the legal profession” to define new limit

would help solve the problem of diplomatic privileges 

109
extended to those states that were connected 

terrorists.

12

True, in the context of the large-scale destructio

would result from even a single WMD event, the dem

for security safeguards would apparently far outwei

advantages of maintaining the present internationa

intact. Otherwise, if ordinary weapons can be neat

easily sent into the receiving state via the diplomatic 

why not WMD? A hostile country, for instance, 

smuggle in a vial of lethal biological materi

contaminating a city water supply. Fortunately, alt

these emotion-driven arguments come to the forefron

time to time, the privileged status of the diplomatic 

has never been successfully curtailed. This is true for 

reasons. 

First, most people understand that if the diplo

pouch privilege is limited, then the determined terrori

find yet another way to smuggle WMD materials in

United States. In an open society such as the United S

the state-sponsored terrorist can obtain much, if not 

of the needed materials on the domestic open marke

more importantly, do so without leaving a signa

Second, since nations have an inherent right of self-d

to search out and otherwise protect themselves a

viable threats to their national security, the state 

sponsored such blatant aggressive behavior tak

inordinate risk by using the diplomatic pouch in s

manner. 

Third, the Vienna Convention can never ho

maintain any form of functional integrity unless it is s

adhered to. Nations who demand inspection of eve

most suspicious diplomatic pouches must do so only 

risk of having their own bags subjected to the same p

by the sending state.

14

 And that practice would q

undermine the entire process of free diplomatic interc

The only real guarantee that other nations, frien

otherwise, will generally follow international rules r

110
this reciprocity analysis—the red thread of interna

law.

The way to deal with a state-sponsored terrorist a

if linkage is established, is to seek redress under the 

law—financially, judicially, or militarily.

15

 Historical

state sponsors a terrorist act, the United State

generally demonstrated that it has the capabilit

willingness to retaliate under the well-recog

justification of self-defense. Unlike other interna

disputes between nations, terrorist attacks should ne

handled by some third party in the context of a d

resolution. The renegade state is punished in a legit

manner and forum. Ultimately, the aggrieved state ca

to the classical forms of self-defense, depending o

severity of the terrorist incident. Realistically, if the U

States had hard evidence that a state was behind a te

attack, it would likely respond under the traditional n

of self-defense and forcible self-help. The United 

would certainly do what was necessary to protect itse

acts of violence.

16

 In this context, the classical ri

engage in self-defense under Article 51 of the U

Nations’ Charter would be entirely appropriate.

17

Finally, reflecting the seriousness of WMD, there 

number of scholars who believe that the threat of W

national survival is so great that a new internationa

regime should allow for a threatened nation to eng

“preventive or preemptive use of force to either 

acquisition plans, eliminate acquisition program

destroy illicit WMD sites at any stage in the prolife

acquisition efforts.”

18

 The 1981 Israeli attack on the 

nuclear reactor at Osiraq, is certainly an exampl

nation exercising preemptive self-help in the face of a 

nation engaged in the production of WMD materials

Sub-state Terrorism.

In early 2000, U.S. and Israeli intelligence s

reported that Hamas, the militant Islamic terrorist 

111
was experimenting with chemical weapons in their 

attacks against Israeli targets.

20

 With the incre

availability of high-tech weapons and nuclear ma

from former Communist countries and the ease with 

some chemical and biological agents can no

manufactured, there is growing concern that sub

groups will now actively cross over into the WMD do

Sub-state terrorist groups can be either domes

international terrorist organizations and are gen

categorized by either religious or political ideologi

1995, for example, “25 of 58, or 42 percent of known, 

international terrorist groups, had a predomin

religious component or motivation.”

21

The first use of a WMD by a sub-state group occur

March 20, 1995, when members of the Aum Shinri Ky

in Japan released a lethal nerve agent, sarin, in the 

underground subway. This WMD attack killed 12 

and reportedly injured 3,000 others.

While attacks by sub-state groups against U.S. int

have not yet used WMD (as of this writing), many g

have shown a viciousness and disregard for human li

clearly points to a willingness to use such weapons 

future. For instance, Osama bin Laden’s Is

fundamentalist terrorist group conducted bombings 

U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 199

killed 257 people and injured almost 5,000.

22

 An

Islamic radical group headed by Ramzi Ahmad Y

conducted the 1993 bombing of New York City’s 

Trade Center in an attempt to topple one of the twin t

onto the other to kill thousands, an act clearly in the sp

a WMD event.

23

The United States has taken unilateral steps to e

that the individual perpetrators of international ter

are brought to justice in a court of law. In the United S

the Omnibus Terrorism Act of 1986 made terrorist a

on U.S. citizens overseas a Federal crime and auth

the extraterritorial arrest and trial in U.S. courts 

112
suspected perpetrators. The most famous case in this r

was the arrest and prosecution by U.S. authorities of 

Yunis, an Arab terrorist involved in the hijacking 

aircraft aboard which were two U.S. citizens. 

24

Individual Terrorism.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of WMD terror

the prospect of an individual setting off a WMD in a 

urban area. Because they operate on their own, w

affiliation to any known group or state, individual

engage in terrorism are far harder to track or predict

are a new breed of terrorist.

To demonstrate our vulnerability to indiv

terrorism, on March 3, 1999, William C. Patrick 

leading U.S. expert on biological warfare, walked th

the security check system at the Rayburn House 

Building in downtown Washington, DC, carrying 

grams of powdered anthrax (enough to kill everyone 

building) in a small plastic bottle.

25

 This action drama

illustrated the ease with which a single deter

terrorist could breach security systems and target, 

case, a major federal government installation. I

provided a wake-up call to U.S. government officials a

public at large.

26

Patrick told a Congressional committee that h

trying to show how a hostile or aggressor state 

smuggle powdered anthrax into the United State

secure diplomatic pouch.

27

 What Patrick was 

demonstrating, however, was the ease with whic

individual terrorist—domestic or international—

unleash untold WMD horror, almost at will. I

testimony, Patrick related that he had also carried 

similar deadly materials through all the major airport

the security systems of the State Departmen

Pentagon, and even the CIA, without anyone sto

him.

28

113
The most notorious example of an individual te

attack in the United states occurred in April 1995 wi

bombing of the Murrah Federal building in Oklahom

by Timothy McVeigh (an accomplice, Terry Nichols wa

convicted). Although McVeigh did not employ WM

actions clearly raised the issue of individual do

terrorism in the context of WMD.

29

 While one can p

the far-fetched “anti-government” sentiments 

motivated McVeigh, the greater issue really re

around individual access to WMD materials.

Finally, not all individual terrorism can be asso

with hard-core political or religious ideologues. Indi

terrorism can be committed by persons seeking pe

rather than political gain, or even by individuals w

mentally ill. Indeed, considering the number of “Ti

McVeighs” in any given society, the prospect of indiv

having easy access to WMD is chilling. The threat wi

grow with time.

Current Methodology for Dealing with a WMD

Terrorist Event.

By definition, the traditional approach to com

terrorism is encompassed in two terms—antiterroris

counterterrorism.

30

 Antiterrorism involves all those 

and actions taken by authorities to decrease the prob

of a terrorist act occurring. It is the proactive, preven

stage to stopping terrorism. It includes techniques de

to harden potential high profile targets, e.g., gover

buildings or military installations, as well as actions 

to detect a planned terrorist attack before it occurs

example, the Pentagon is currently looking a

image-recognition technology through the De

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to as

the battle against future terrorist attacks.

32

 DAR

experimenting with video surveillance, mod

techniques, and commercial technologies such as thos

114
to identify automatic teller machine customers by sca

their faces.

One of the most innovative antiterrorism techno

projects is found in Britain. In the East London Boro

Newham, more than 200 outdoor cameras keep watc

pedestrians and passersby, employing a facial-recognit

system that can automatically pick out known criminals a

alert local authorities to their presence.

33

Another innovative antiterrorism program is de

to ease tensions between the Federal Bure

Investigation (FBI) and anti-government militias

approach has FBI agents talking directly with m

leaders. From Montana to Indiana, federal agents 

opened dialogues with leaders of several m

organizations to provide a forum for discussion in th

that these channels of communication will help p

violence.

34

Counterterrorism measures are those tactical a

taken by authorities in response to a terrorist inc

Proper prior planning and training will obviously h

great impact on the success or failure of real 

counterterrorist actions. In most areas of manage

reorganizations are the product of some form of 

Counterterrorism initiatives are no exception. Sin

1980s there have been numerous legislative initiative

address terrorist activities, most enacted on the he

some terrorist attack. The central existing legis

dealing with WMD terrorism is the “Defense A

Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,”

35

 commonly refer

as the NLD Act after its sponsors’ names—Senators 

Lugar, and Domenici.

The 1996 NLD Act envisions the creation of a do

preparedness program which is intended to en

federal, state, and local emergency response capabili

better deal with a domestic terrorist incident inv

WMD. The central thrust of this umbrella security pr

115
involves the coordinated efforts of key U.S. depart

and agencies focused on protecting U.S. personne

property.

36

While the Department of Justice, through the F

still the lead agency in the event of a WMD terrorist a

the expected mass casualties, physical damage

potential for civil disorder resulting from a WMD in

have necessitated a gradual shift to DoD as the de fac

Federal agency for many counterterrorism issues. How

on April 1, 2000, President William J. Clinton directe

neither the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy n

Secretary of the Army, under executive agency p

regarding military support to civil authorities

responsibility for “incidents involving chemical, biol

radiological, nuclear, and explosive conseq

management.”

37

 Instead, should a large-scale WMD 

occur in the United States, the Assistant to the Secre

Defense for Civil Support will coordinate all do

actions, although the Secretary of the Army woul

provide the actual domestic civil assistance throug

Army’s Director of Military Assistance. Thus, whi

individual state and local authorities still have the pr

responsibility to respond to any emergency within 

jurisdiction, when requested, DoD can provide ext

assistance should a WMD detonation overwhelm the 

and local authorities.

The use of DoD personnel to help local metrop

authorities quickly respond to a WMD event is the c

vision of the NLD legislation. Accordingly, under NL

Secretary of Defense works in close cooperation wi

FBI, the Department of Energy, the Environm

Protection Agency, the Department of Health and H

Services, and the Federal Emergency Management A

(FEMA) to provide direct support response to major ci

order to help local providers better deal with 

terrorism. 

116
A primary initiative of NLD includes the establis

of a nationwide training support plan with an initia

on 27 cities in the United States, to be expanded to t

largest cities over the next several years.

38

 In this pro

DoD stands as the interagency lead for a new 

responder” training program, i.e., training the 

resources of the affected urban area.

With a stated goal of providing WMD training sup

U.S. major cities, the training is conducted primarily 

U.S. Army Chemical-Biological Defense Comman

consists of 8-to-12-person training teams dispatched t

individual city. The team trainers are both activ

reserve military personnel, DoD civilians, and contr

with extensive experience in emergency proce

associated with WMD. Actual training focus

integrating metropolitan actions—by firefighters, 

and emergency medical technicians—to be taken a

WMD terrorist incident occurs. Specifically tailored 

needs of each city, six separate courses are taught: Nu

Biological, and Chemical Awareness; Operations Dur

Incident; Technician Hazardous Material (HAZ

Technician Emergency Medical Service; Hospital Pro

and Actions for the On-the-Scene Commanders. I

fashion, local first responders are provided wit

expertise to deal with decontamination, crowd contro

search and rescue. With $300,000 set aside for each ci

program is scheduled for completion and final evaluat

2002. By the end of 1999, over 84 cities had received 

training from the military.

Initial evaluations of the NLD training program 

been mixed. Richard Davis, a senior analyst with th

General Accounting Office, reported that the progra

fragmented and wasteful, adding little to a real 

solution for responding in a unified way to a terrorist 

using WMD.

39

 Others, however, continue to suppo

initiative, but recognize that the military role mu

balanced against the reality of available resources. I

light, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announ

117
April 1999 the creation of a 3-year advisory panel, hea

Virginia’s Governor James Gilmore, to “assess do

response capabilities for terrorism involving weap

mass destruction.”

40

 The panel will report to Congre

the President on the challenge of WMD and the fe

state, and local response mechanisms which could h

the ensuing crisis.

Furthermore, in a July 1999 speech, Secretary 

listed five cautionary aspects of the NLD legis

regarding military support in the wake of a WMD ev

• Any military assistance must be in support 

appropriate authorities.

• A clear chain of command and responsibility m

established for any type of support rendered by the mi

• Military assistance should not come at the expe

the primary mission of the U.S. military—to fight an

the nation’s wars.

• The military response efforts will be gro

primarily in the National Guard and Reserve. The 

and Reserve forces are the “forward-deployed forces h

home.”

• The U.S. Government must not “trample on Am

lives and liberties in the name of preserving them

military will not exceed legal authorities when perform

counterterrorism mission.

The U.S. Military—Active, Reserve, and Nation

Guard.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, “U

states Policy on Counterterrorism,” signed in June 

directed a number of measures to reduce the cou

vulnerability to terrorism and to better manag

consequence of terrorist use of WMD. This PDD 

revalidated in May 1998 by PDD-62, “Protection A

Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Ame

118
Overseas.” Both PDDs affirm that the FBI is the lead a

for crisis management and operations. Public Law 9

“The Federal Response Plan,” provides the authority 

federal government to respond to disasters and emerg

as defined in the Stafford Disaster Relief and Eme

Act.

42

 The plan describes the government’s role in pro

immediate action to save lives and mitigate pro

damage. FEMA is the lead agency for conseq

management, i.e., care of casualties, decontaminatio

clean up, and DoD is one of the supporting agencies f

FBI and FEMA, with the Army serving as the lead a

within the DoD.

Notwithstanding the chain of command w

designates the Army as supporting other Federal age

the prevailing understanding is that the military w

called on to lead the “on the ground” emergency respo

the aftermath of a significant WMD terrorist a

However, those familiar with the facts know that be

today’s U.S. armed forces face serious problems m

even the basic national defense requirements, the

inevitably encounter serious difficulties respond

requests for adequate and responsible support follow

WMD event. In short, the stark reality of a scaled

military suggests that the U.S. active duty milit

simply not prepared to meet the demands associated 

major WMD terrorist event.

This state of affairs exists for two basic reasons. 

the continued downsizing of active duty Army per

from 770,000 soldiers 10 years ago (total active 

personnel from all forces in 1990 was 2,043,705) to 

470,000 today has hollowed the military strength 

United States.

43

 This reduction in the Army has fo

decrease from 18 to 10 divisions. Similarly, the Nav

had to cut by nearly half its number of ships, and t

Force has cut its fighter wings from 36 to 20. S

coupled with the downsizing of the active duty Arm

last decade has witnessed an increase in a wide var

nontraditional missions which have siphoned off for

119
such places as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, K

Macedonia, Somalia, and Haiti.

Recognizing the overtaxed condition of the activ

military, Secretary Cohen has tagged the National 

and Army Reserve forces as the primary response for

WMD episode.

44

 Accordingly, the Army Reserve’s Re

Support Commands have realigned themselves 

FEMA boundaries for ease of command and control d

an actual WMD incident. An Army Reserve emer

operations center is available in each FEMA region th

support a WMD response. In addition, the Reserves 

also provided several hundred emergency prepare

liaison officers to the 1st and 5th Armies (Reserve).

The announced rationale for having the National 

and Army Reserve out front hinges on several factors

the National Guard and Army Reserves are supposed 

fully trained in how to function in a nuclear, biologica

chemical environment. Second, the Army Reserv

nearly 60 percent of the total Army’s chemical defen

medical assets. Third, the National Guard and 

Reserve units can respond quickly because they 

community-based force.

Unfortunately, the picture of the National Guar

Army Reserve forces serving effectively in the conte

WMD event is not as rosy as painted by Secretary 

and others. First, the overall record of performa

today’s National Guard and Army Reserve in trad

support roles has been troubled, particularly in rega

large-scale deployments. And this mixed perform

makes problematic expectation that they will do 

better in handling a full-blown WMD terrorist event

Although the active Army has increasingly relied 

Army Reserve (208,000 personnel) and National 

(357,000 personnel) to fulfill its critical missions in ov

operations, it has not come to grips with the prob

improving Guard and Reserve readiness. The Pent

so-called Total Force policy, which envisions a sea

120
bond between the active and nonactive military for

still yet to be developed or fulfilled.

45

 For examp

preparing for Operation DESERT STORM against I

1991, a tank brigade from the Georgia National Guar

slated for combat duty in the Gulf. However, even aft

Guard spent more than 2 months of intensive training 

National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Californi

Army believed the brigade was still not ready and refu

send it into combat. This is but one of numerous exam

problems associated with large-scale, stand-

deployments of National Guard and Army Re

personnel. While they are effective when used in 

numbers and folded in with active duty soldiers, th

performance in independent military actions re

unproven. 

The problem of readiness rests in part with th

nature of the force structure of these dedicated c

soldiers. National Guard soldiers spend most of thei

in their civilian jobs, officially training in military 

only 39 days a year, usually a weekend a month 

2-week annual training exercise. While they are act

for duty in times of crisis, they rarely, if ever, are af

the opportunities to rehearse large-unit operation

alone train for a massive response to a WMD terrorist 

Although Secretary of Defense Cohen’s 1999 A

Report to the President and the Congress recogniz

threat from WMD, there exists little sense of urgency 

anything other than have the National Guard study 

services it might provide in the future:

The National Guard will also complete its work in examin

the roles, missions, and responsibilities that the Natio

Guard may appropriately fulfill in responding to terror

attacks involving WMD.

46

It is not enough that the public be told that the Na

Guard and Army Reserve will coordinate with FE

WMD terrorism strikes. If the leadership in the U

121
States is serious about the issue of WMD terrorism, d

and immediate steps need to be taken. At a minimum

means creating a dedicated, trained, and effective 

Rapid Response Force (RRF) in each of the 50 states

Creating a WMD Rapid Response Force (RRF).

Studies have shown that hardening potentia

profile targets such as federal buildings or mi

installations reduces the frequency of terrorist atta

those types of facilities.

47

 As an effective antite

measure these types of preventive activities can and 

be continued at key civilian and military facilities acro

nation. In fact, a special emergency funding sourc

exists for the U.S. military to “react to unantic

requirements from changes in terrorist threat level o

protection doctrine/standards.”

48

 This flexible fu

source was created in 1997, providing a powerful t

each commander-in-chief of a unified command to f

emergency high-priority antiterrorism requirem

These funds have been used to construct concrete ba

clear vegetation, purchase equipment, hire personn

up security checkpoints, etc.

Tragically, despite such limited preventative mov

federal government has done almost next to noth

better prepare for the catastrophic aftermath of a 

event in an urban area. The paltry sum authorized 

NLD legislation to provide one-shot training courses t

first responders is a far cry from what needs to be do

short, a frightened municipality will require a larg

capable WMD RRF to provide order, treat casualtie

restore confidence. To be sure, the logical choi

developing this force should be the U.S. military.

Ever since the end of Reconstruction in the sou

states, there has been a distinct aversion to expandi

role of the armed forces in the domestic arena. This is c

reflected in the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohib

active duty military from performing police duties 

122
United States.

49

 Accordingly, the idea of creat

centralized homeland defense force under a 

command to handle the issues associated with a 

terrorist attack has met with strong opposition from 

libertarian groups.

50

 Paradoxically, the very organi

that is most capable of responding to a WMD event 

given the task.

Nevertheless, in December 1999, the Secreta

Defense established a separate command called the 

Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). The command is h

by Major General Bruce Lawlor (United States Na

Guard), with a budget of four million dollars and a sta

personnel. The purpose of JTF-CS is to coordinate c

and military responses to a WMD event in the U

States. Once the President issues a federal emer

declaration and approves the use of the JTF-CS, 

support the designated lead federal agency with 

consequence management instruments in respon

civilian and military WMD events.

Pending the real world use of the JTF-CS, Law

tasked to work on integrated contingency plans for 

access to appropriate military assets that are oth

unavailable to the civilian first-line responders. I

longer run, his role will expand, with the Task Force 

given direct oversight of the 15 Reserve/National 

Regional Response Centers that will be activated by 

In commenting on the mission of his new command, L

said, 

We don’t do law enforcement or arrests. We will save liv

prevent human suffering, and restore as fast as possi

critical life support systems in the community.

51

The only alternative to the use of a centralized 

duty military force would be the use of the National 

and Army Reserve to create a WMD RRF for each stat

the attendant funding to develop and train the nec

personnel. Following the 1991 war with Iraq, this ide

123
quickly put into full force in Israel, where a Home D

Command was set up. Building the command w

percent reservists, Israel set up 67 stations througho

nation in order to better deal with the aftermath of a 

event. In contrast, this same idea has not taken hol

policymakers in the United states.

The biggest obstacle to a WMD RRF in each state 

massive amount of funding and training required. I

as the three most important considerations in buy

house are location, location, location, the three 

important factors in building a WMD RRF wou

training, training, training. And training requires m

One way to help reduce costs for developing a WMD 

is provided by the state defense forces model. USC, Ti

Section 109, provides:

In addition to its National Guard, if any, a state or territory 

may, as provided by its laws, organize and maintain defe

forces.

52

State legislatures in 24 states and Puerto Rico have c

state Defense Forces to perform a wide variety of fun

ranging from light infantry duties (the Virginia D

Force) to military police functions (Ohio Military Rese

Of particular interest in looking at the mechan

creating a WMD RRF is the example set by the Texa

Guard. During 1998, units of the Texas state G

“participated in 122 events, which involved 1,865 me

who contributed 24,663 man-hours and saved the 

cities $490,860.”

53

 These events included crowd co

traffic control, and search and rescue operations, ent

just the type of capabilities sorely needed in the afte

of a WMD terrorist attack.

Unfortunately, until policymakers and the public 

to understand that the number one civil defense 

confronting the United States is the threat of a WMD 

it is unlikely that steps will be taken to create se

124
WMD-specific forces from the National Guard

Reserves, or state Defense Forces. On the brighter s

and when a WMD RRF is created, this force could r

valuable collateral training by assisting loca

enforcement authorities during “normal” emergencie

the case with the Texas state Guard.

“Democracies Don’t Engage in Terrorism.”

Apart from all that can be said for the st

preparedness in the United States itself for respondin

WMD terrorist attack, there is comfort in the fact 

window of opportunity exists for the United States to 

a new paradigm for reducing the likelihood of terrori

least on the international level. With the collapse 

Soviet Union, the addition of new democracies 

community of nations makes us more secure because, 

words of Anthony Lake,

democracies tend not to wage war on each other and they te

not to support terrorism—in fact, they don’t. They are m

trustworthy in diplomacy and they do a better job of respect

the environment and human rights of their people.

54

Recognizing a nexus between the nation that mis

its own citizens and the nation that fosters aggr

against its neighbors, both the preamble and Article 1 

U.N. Charter make crystal clear that the framers be

that the unleashing of aggressive war occurred at the 

of those states in which the denial of the value 

individual human being was most evident.

55

 Further

with the research of former University of Hawaii Pro

R. J. Rummel, it is now possible to demonstrate nume

the validity of the proposition that totalitarian regim

the chief abusers of internationally recognized h

rights and the most likely candidates for state-spon

terrorism:

War is not the most deadly form of violence. Indeed, I ha

found that while about 37,000,000 people have been killed 

125
battle by all foreign and domestic wars in our centu

government democide [genocide and mass murder] have ki

over 148,074,000 million more. Plus, I am still counting. Ove

percent of these people were killed by totalitar

governments.

56

Thus, the new paradigm is a very simple mo

democracies make better neighbors, then it is certa

the best interests of the United States to do all it 

foster these emerging nations and to thereby e

respect for the rule of law in international relations. 

words of Professor B. Russett,

Democracies have almost never fought each other. . . . By 

reasoning, the more democracies there are in the world, 

fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will h

and the wider the zone of peace.

57

The simplicity of Russett’s argument should be c

all. In fact, as Professor John Norton Moore o

University of Virginia School of Law explains, this s

fact represents a “new and more accurate paradigm 

war, peace, and democide.”

58

 It replaces the old th

and highlights the fact that democratic growth alon

hope to reduce the threat of WMD terrorism in the lon

A recent RAND study seals the point:

The failure of regimes to provide for peaceful political cha

and the phenomenon of economies unable to keep pace w

population growth and demands for more evenly distribu

benefits can provide fertile ground for extremism and polit

violence affecting U.S. interests. For this reason, the Un

states has a stake in promoting political and economic reform 

a means of reducing the potential for terrorism, some of wh

as in Latin America, the Middle East, and the Gulf, may 

directed at us.

59

Conclusion.

Dealing with a WMD terrorist event require

avenues of consideration, one short term, the othe

term. In the short term, the United states must form

126
contingency plans that include the imme

establishment of a large and trained WMD RRF loca

each of the 50 states. This cannot be a crisis-driven a

As pointed out earlier, the WMD RRF force would nee

trained from the ground up and dedicated to dealin

every aspect of a WMD event. In tandem wit

establishment of this force, antiterrorism efforts mu

be expanded. At a minimum, likely civilian and m

targets need to be hardened as much as practicable.

In the long term, the United states needs to int

efforts to assist the full development of fled

democracies on the principle that democracies do no

war or terror on each other. If the RAND study quoted 

is correct, this strategy will go far in reducing th

causes of terrorism.

If necessary and appropriate actions are not take

it is certain that the effects of a WMD terrorist event 

far more devastating than necessary. The question 

whether there will be a WMD terrorist attack in the f

it is simply a matter of where.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. The RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terr

a database of international terrorist incidents from 1968.

2. Ian O. Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism

Monica, CA: RAND, 1999, p. 12.

3. “Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Ca

Prioritize and Target Program Investments,” Report to Congre

Requesters, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accounting 

April 1998.

4. Libya has not hesitated to finance, support, and even 

several acts of terrorism against various Western powers, to incl

in-flight bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland which ki

persons. 

127
5. Vernon Loeb, “Anthrax Vial Smuggled In To Make A Poi

Hill Hearing,” Washington Post, March 4, 1999, p. 1. Lauder’

includes Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.

6. Under international law, a receiving state is one that r

diplomatic materials from a sending state. A transit state can 

state through which diplomatic materials might pass. See 

Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature A

1961, 23 UST. 3227, T.I A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.

7. Jeffrey F. Addicott, “The United States of America: Cham

the Rule of Law or the New World Order?” Florida Jou

International Law, Vol. 6, No. 63, 1990.

8. See Report of the International Law Commission on the W

its Thirty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/41/10, 1986.

9. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was ente

force for the United States on December 13, 1972. The U.S. rati

appears at 111 Cong. Rec. 23, 733, 1965.

10. Perhaps the most widely publicized abuse of the dip

pouch to date, and one which clearly illustrates the controversy o

status of the bag, was committed by the Libyan government of 

Qaddafi. In April 1984, two Libyans gunned down 11 demonstrat

one British constable as they stood outside of the Libyan Emb

London. Despite substantial suspicions that the weapons an

evidence connected with this heinous act of terrorism were disp

through outgoing Libyan diplomatic pouches, the British aut

allowed the Libyans to carry them out of the country without se

or scanning them.

11. Address by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Wein

American Bar Association National Conference on Law in Rel

Terrorism, June 5, 1986.

12. Ibid.

13. See, e.g., FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, Statement bef

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 28, 1998:

The ease of manufacturing or obtaining biological and chem

agents is disturbing. Available public source material ma

our law enforcement mission a continuous challenge.

128
14. William Nelson, “Opening Pandora’s Box: The Status 

Diplomatic pouch in International Relations,” Fordham Int. L. 

12, 1989, p. 494.

15. An early pattern was set regarding the use of force to 

state-sponsored terrorism under the Reagan administration. O

14, 1986, the United States conducted bombing strikes on 

targets in Libya. This was in response to the Libyan-ordered bom

a discotheque in West Berlin on April 5, l986. The C

administration has followed a similar pattern of U.S. air str

suspected terrorist camps.

16. The right of a country to engage in acts of self-defense 

known in international law. The famous Caroline Doctrine

defines the circumstances that permit forcible self-help, grew o

1837 raid by Canadian troops into New York. In response, Secr

State Daniel Webster set down the rules for such acts of self-defe

indicated that a nation may resort to necessary and proportiona

self-defense if such acts arise out of an instant and overwh

necessity, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberat

William McHugh, “Forcible Self-help In International Law,” Na

College Review, No. 25, 1972, p. 61.

17. Article 51, U.N. Charter.

18. See, e.g., Guy B. Roberts, “The Counterproliferation Se

Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibit

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Denver Jou

International Law & Policy, Summer 1999, p. 485.

19. See Louis Rene ́ Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-C

“Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear R

Aggression or Self-Defense?” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnation

No. 75, 1982, p. 417.

20. Paul Bedard, “Danger Zone,” U.S. News & World Report

6, 2000, p. 10.

21. Lesser et al., p. 17.

22. David B. Ottaway, “U.S. Considers Slugging it Ou

International Terrorism,” Washington Post, October 17, 1996, p

23. It has been reported that those behind the 1993 World 

Center bombing were also gathering the ingredients for a c

weapon that could have killed thousands. Some reports indicat

the bomb might have been laced with cyanide, but the poison bu

129
in the detonation. William S. Cohen, “Preparing for a Grav

World,” Washington Post, July 26, 1999, p. A19.

24. U.S. vs. Yunis, 924 Fed 2nd 1086, D.C. Cir. 1991.

25. Loeb.

26. The most recent “real world” scare came in May 1995

Larry Wayne Harris was arrested in his home for illegally o

bubonic plague vials from a biological repository in Maryland.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Tim Kelsey, “The Oklahoma Suspect Awaits Day of Reck

The Sunday Times (London), April 21, 1996.

30. U.S. Army Training Circular 19-16, Countering Terro

U.S. Army Installations, April 1983, pp. 1-2.

31. Neil King, Jr., and David S. Cloud, “Casting a Global N

Security Survived a Rash of Millennial Plots,” Wall Street J

March 8, 2000.

32. “Seen Before,” Scientific American, December 1999, p. 5

33. Ibid.

34. Kevin Johnson, “FBI’s Uneasy Alliance,” USA Today, No

29, 1999, p. 1.

35. “Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act” co

in the National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Title 

Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996.

36. See Raymond E. Heddings, U.S. Roles in Pro

Humanitarian Assistance Following NBC Accidents/Inciden

Legal Considerations, Colorado Springs, CO: Institute for N

Security Studies, 1999.

37. William J. Clinton, Memorandum for Secretaries of the M

Departments et al., Subject: Consequence Manag

Responsibilities within the DoD for Incidents Involving Ch

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives, 

2000. 

130
38. “Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense A

Weapons of Mass Destruction, Department of Defense Re

Congress, May 1, 1997.

39. Bradley Graham, “Anti-Terrorism Plans Termed Inade

Washington Post, October 3, 1998, p. 9.

40. “DoD Establishes A Weapons Of Mass Destruction A

Panel,” News Release No. 148-99, Office of Assistant Secre

Defense for Public Affairs, Washington, DC, April 5, 1999.

41. Cohen, “Preparing For A Grave New World,” p. A19.

42. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act, 42 USC 51

43. See Annual Report to the President and Congress, Wi

Cohen, Secretary of Defense, 1999.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., p. 100.

47. Lesser et al., p. vii.

48. “Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund,” Ch

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5261.01, March 1, 1997.

49. Posse Comitatus Act, 10 USC 375 and 18 USC 1385. Th

Comitatus Act prohibits use of the military to execute the civil 

the United States “except in cases under circumstances ex

authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress.” The p

prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act is against direct m

involvement in law enforcement activities. Generally

interpretations have held that military support short of actual 

seizure, arrest, or similar confrontation with civilians is not a v

of the Act. Examples of permitted support include traffic direct

the provision of information, equipment, and facilities. The 

Comitatus Act does not apply to a member of the Reserve com

when not on active duty, nor to a member of the National Guar

not in federal service.

50. Elizabeth Becker, “Military Terrorism Operation Has C

Focus,” New York Times, January 9, 2000, p. 17.

51. Ibid.

131
52. 32 USC 109.

53. Captain Valentine J. Belfiglio, “State Defense Forces: Pa

Total Force,” Officer Review, September 1999, p. 12.

54. Address by Anthony Lake, Special Assistant to the Presi

National Security Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, Sc

Advanced International Studies, October 21, 1993.

55. See Frank C. Newman and David Weissbrodt, Intern

Human Rights, Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co., 1990

56. R. J. Rummel, Death By Government: Genocide an

Murder in the Twentieth Century, New Brunswick, NJ: Tran

1994, p. 12.

57. Bruce B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Princ

a Post-Cold War World, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

4.

58. John Norton Moore, “Enhanced Effectiveness in United 

Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance,” Unpu

manuscript, 1997, p. 12.

59. Lesser et al., p. 128.

132
CHAPTER 9

BRUCE HOFFMAN’S VIEW OF TERRORI

BY WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Victor Utgoff

In his chapter titled “Terrorism by Weapons of 

Destruction,” Bruce Hoffman makes a number of 

points. His central thesis, in particular, is, in the view 

author, correct. The threat of terrorism by weapons o

destruction (WMD) is clearly not as great as some 

sensationalized media presentations on the subject 

suggest. Moreover, we can surely join Dr. Hoffman in 

comfort from the failure of the Aum Shinri Kyo to 

mass destruction using chemical and biological we

This having been said, terrorism by WMD remains a s

threat. It is the purpose of this brief commentary to 

slightly different perspective from Dr. Hoffman’s a

suggest why we should continue to invest substanti

defense against an event of this sort.

There are three general points that need to be 

First, it is not logical to conclude that just because one 

terrorist organization with deep pockets failed in its 

to carry out large-scale chemical/biological (CB) at

others therefore will also fail. In fact, there is evidence 

contrary. Probably the best example of a successful at

the one made on the population of Dalles, Oregon in 

That attack was made by a local cult using culture

Typhimurium, a bacterium that causes salmone

These cultures were prepared in the cult’s lab

clandestinely inserted in the salad bars of at least te

restaurants. These attacks caused approximatel

people to get seriously ill. Furthermore, had killing b

purpose, the cult could have used a lethal agent, and i

have attacked many more targets.

133
Second, Dr. Hoffman is undoubtedly correct in his 

that the difficulties of making and using CB weapon

been exaggerated. This is not, however, the same as 

that they are impossible to make and will never be us

rightly observed that we have not, to date, accu

assessed how hard it is to make biological weapons su

for large-scale terrorist attacks. The subject clearly ca

more investigation. What can we deduce at this poin

Some of my colleagues and I have under

preliminary analysis of this sort. Our research su

that creating such a BW capability would take 1-2 

require perhaps a half dozen people, and cost no more 

few million dollars. The project would require some c

cut-and-try engineering development and testing, no

science. The offensive BW programs once pursued 

United States, and apparently still continuing in R

and elsewhere, have demonstrated that it is poss

make biological weapons capable of inflicting 

casualties. A great deal of information is available 

open literature on how to build such weapons. Legi

industry employs machinery and processes that solve 

of the problems involved in making practical bio

weapons. And one cannot dismiss the possibility 

terrorists might hire experts from foreign BW progra

This suggests that a more careful and painstaking 

by the Aum Shinri Kyo or others should bear fruit and 

in the production of effective biological weapons. I

however, bears out Dr. Hoffman’s contention that the 

might be more trouble than it is worth to most te

groups. The effort required to create a capabili

large-scale BW attacks would be far greater than 

required to blow tens or hundreds of people away 

automatic weapons and truck bombs. Thus, Dr. Hoffm

right in arguing that nearly all of the terrorism w

expect to see in the foreseeable future will probably i

the use of conventional rather than CB weapons.

134
But nearly all is not the same as all. And the nec

components for successful CB attacks are alrea

existence. Certainly the necessary motives are pr

Some terrorists are now driven not so much by the de

use fear to bring about clearly definable objectives as 

desire to cause as much damage as possible. Then t

necessary means are there. Some private group

individuals have already created and used biological a

to cause substantial numbers of casualties. Further

are groups that have the money, engineering exp

managerial capabilities, and patience for the k

development and operational test activity that is nee

my opinion, these necessary components should n

expected to come together often, but by the same toke

be expected to come together sometimes. And this 

comfort.

My third general point is that the possibil

large-scale CB attacks on the United States is alread

enough to deserve serious and well-funded attention 

government. Currently the federal governme

attempting to create some initial capabilities speci

oriented toward reducing the consequences of CB atta

terrorists against the public. To this end, it is spe

something on the order of $100 million a year. B

standards of federal programs, this is not a great s

money.

At the present time, the government does not a

ready to define what a full-blown defense against st

nonstate BW attacks might look like. Howeve

colleagues and I have done some preliminary analy

assess the nature and costs of such a defense program

figures suggest that on the order of $5 billion per year 

provide a respectable defense. The kind of defen

envision could drive down the losses from a very b

attack to a 10th or less of what they could be with

Clearly this level of expenditure is not prohibitively h

also does not rule out taking serious measures a

smaller-scale conventional terrorism.

135
To conclude, Bruce Hoffman is surely right to not

the threat from terrorists using WMD is probably 

great as the news media suggest. But the governm

surely right to take the possibility of large-sca

terrorism seriously and to begin preliminary steps t

defending the public against it. To fail to do so woul

dereliction of its duty.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 9

1. Thomas J. Torok et al., “A Large Community Outb

Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination of Res

Salad Bars,” in Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, 

Lederberg, ed., Cambridge, MA, and London, England: BCSIA 

in International Security, MIT Press, 1999, pp. 167-184.

136
CHAPTER 10

THE NATIONAL INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE:

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE IN DEFENDING IT

1

Daniel T. Kuehl

Introduction.

Cyberspace is that place where electronic system

as computer networks, telecommunications system

devices that exert their influence through or i

electromagnetic spectrum connect and interact 

telematic medium.

2

 It is, from a military point of vie

newest operational environment. Threats, intrusion

attacks are likely to be mounted against the United 

in the future using this environment.

It is the thesis of this chapter that the Departm

Defense (DoD) does have both a role and a responsib

helping defend against this threat. To make the poi

will start by looking at an imaginary scenario in w

fictional state mounts an attack against this nation 

cyberspace as its chief operating environment

scenario will set the scene for a discussion of the se

problems posed by the advent of the age of cyberspac

chapter will (1) explain what we mean by cyberspac

why it must be understood as a new operat

environment, (2) discuss the security implicatio

cyberspace, (3) discuss what “war” is in the context 

information age, and (4) conclude by considerin

appropriate role of the DoD in combating cyberwa

cyber terrorism.

137
A Fictional Scenario.

The date: December, 200X; the place: the new oper

complex for Triangle Telematics, the critical no

virtually all digital and electronic traffic in the 

eastern half of the United States; the problem: someon

inside the system, exploiting its connections to, and in 

cases control of, computer and telecommunications sy

that crisscrossed almost every key infrastructure

BIGGER problem: this “someone” was causing sign

disruption to the efficient and effective functioning of 

infrastructural elements. Because of the overal

strategic situation, this caused a crisis. The disrup

Triangle Telematics coincided with one of the wors

spells the Northeast had faced in recent memory

sputtering of energy management systems thus c

acute hardship for millions. The attack also coincide

the height of the pre-Christmas shopping season, a 

critical to the economic stability of thousands of busin

Financial management and transfer systems were 

adversely affected, raising the specters of both theft a

revenue. Telematic networks—the marria

telecommunications systems and computer netwo

were behaving mysteriously; phone service to selected 

was collapsing for no apparent reason. Transpor

systems, including air and rail networks, were una

operate normally. Movement slowed, delaying ever

from tangerines to tanks.

From a national security perspective, the transpor

problem was especially crippling. The United State

also in the midst of a politico-military crisis in a partic

troublesome part of the world. It had just agreed to de

significant emergency force to Ruritania in order to a

country in its resistance to aggression from its 

neighbor, Zenda. Now, as a result of the disrupt

Triangle Telematic’s networks, the machine

deployment was grinding to a near standstill

telecommunications network around Scott Air Force 

138
(headquarters for the U.S. Transportation Comma

Air Force element, the Air Mobility Command, a

Tanker-Airlift Coordination Center) was seem

connecting to everyplace except where it was suppos

Thanks to the collapse of the civilian communic

network, U.S. ability to direct the global flow of air

and airmobile forces was “significantly degraded

initial deployment of several fighter wings had 

because of inexplicable errors in arrangements ma

their rendezvous with the aerial tankers. Now fighte

tankers were scattered all over the globe betwee

United States and Ruritania. The transportation ne

around East Coast ports had diverted tens of thousa

tons of military equipment urgently needed in Rur

onto railroad sidings. When the Army brigade in

slated for rapid movement to the crisis area 

preparations to move, the shocked commander rece

report from his frantic chief medical officer that 77 p

of the troops were HIV positive. That, at least, is wha

medical records indicated.

In short, the United States had been subjecte

successful cyber attack on its critical infrastructu

high-level Presidential Commission was formed to 

the causes of what could only be described as a str

debacle and to suggest some solutions.

A year later, the Commission issued its long-aw

report. Even the sanitized version released to the pre

public over the DoD’s website could not minimize the d

of damage that had been done by what was now 

dubbed the “Christmas Catastrophe.” The national po

the United States had been dealt a serious blo

exploitation of its infrastructural vulnerabilities. The 

losses to U.S. business were being measured in the bi

The death toll from mid-winter energy interruption

tallied in the low hundreds. The shock to public conf

was severe, and the administration saw no way to reco

time for the pending national elections. As to the mis

139
aid Ruritania, this failed. Ruritania ra

accommodated—some would say capitulated—

aggressive neighbor Zenda, a country intent on establ

itself as the anti-U.S. hegemon in the region.

The event was branded as this country’s worst f

policy disaster in a quarter century. Althoug

investigatory reports and nodal analysis of the inc

were not publicly released, there was no doubt that Tr

Telematics had been the key target of the attack. It o

massive connectivity to American businesses and thos

depended on the businesses—including the U.S. 

forces. This connectivity proved to be both its gr

strength and its greatest weakness. It offered a ga

into America’s infrastructures, a gateway tha

strategically exploited, leading to a societal crisi

resounding strategic defeat.

A Revolution in Warfare: The Lessons of the

Scenario.

The purpose of this brief glimpse into a possible fu

to help us grasp some of the fundamental issues at 

about warfare in the information age. This, in turn, wi

us answer the question lying at the heart of this ch

“What role should the DoD play in defending our na

information infrastructure?”

The scenario highlights a couple of major poin

makes clear that potential attacks on our infrastr

pose a serious threat to our national security, an issu

has been termed a “vital national interest” in the 

version of the President’s National Security Strateg

our fictional scenario, Triangle Telematics constituted 

Clausewitz would have called a “center of gravi

strategic point critical to our military strength, so

well-being, and national will. By attacking Tr

Telematics, Zenda was able to penetrate a wide ra

infrastructures. It degraded a diverse set of our na

functions and capabilities, some purely societal, 

140
clearly military, but most serving both the society a

military. The attack on Triangle Telematics was, in 

responsible for the social crisis in the United States a

its strategic defeat.

At the same time, the scenario sheds light on why 

even bothering to ask the question of whether the 

should be involved in protecting our information syste

this scenario, Triangle Telematics was not attacked 

force as it is normally understood, nor was it attack

traditional environments—land, air, sea, or space. 

been, there would have been little or no problem de

who had the responsibility for defending Tri

Telematics; the role would have fallen to the Arm

Force, Navy and Marines. But Zenda did not use 

these traditional warfighting environments wh

attacked Triangle Telematics. It used cyberspace. 

then, should defend cyberspace? Because it is a 

environment, and because, as we will see, cyber atta

not comfortably fit into our traditional constructs of w

answer is not immediately obvious.

In short, we are experiencing an era of revolut

change in warfare and we need to be aware of thre

points: (1) cyberspace is a new operational environme

it is of immense strategic importance to us, and it is 

same time a source of our vulnerability because w

increasingly dependent upon it and on the private 

which owns and controls much of it; and (3) trad

paradigms of warfare may not be applicable in thi

environment. All these points must be taken 

consideration as we seek to answer the question of th

and responsibility of the DoD in defending our inform

infrastructure. Let’s discuss each in turn.

Cyberspace: DoD’s Newest Operational Environ

Our starting point must be to define what we me

cyberspace and explain why it must be understood as 

operational environment. To begin with, it is import

understand that information has exploded to the 

141
where it can no longer be encompassed by trad

concepts alone. Almost everyone understands inform

as a tool, a process, a target, even a weapon, to assist 

application of traditional force elements: blast, hea

fragmentation.

5

 While these concepts remain valid, t

not in isolation convey the import of what informatio

become in the world today. The synergistic interact

electronic digital technology with an informa

dependent society have, in fact, transmuted inform

into a virtual environment, with cyberspace as its ph

manifestation.

It must also be recognized how very revolutionary 

At first sight, this may not seem to be borne out 

evidence. Cyberspace was defined at the start o

chapter as that place where electronic systems su

computer networks, telecommunications systems

devices that exert their influence through or i

electromagnetic spectrum connect and interact 

telematic medium. Understood in this way, it is clea

cyberspace has always existed. It must be rea

however, that it was not until very recent time

cyberspace became visible and usable.

6

A useful analogy is outer space—it has always 

there, but not until mankind developed technologie

enabled us to extend our affairs into it and use it to co

terrestrial affairs did we fully comprehend that it 

another physical and operational environment beyo

land, sea, and air. Outer space does not have the 

physical presence or properties of land or water

cannot weigh or measure it in a useful sense—

nonetheless exists because we can see the physical res

things that happen there.

7

 The physical laws and prin

that govern how systems function in these environ

are the borders that fix the environmental bound

Submarines function very well in an environment gov

by the laws of hydrodynamics, but they cannot fly; the 

Shuttle works in an environment governed by the l

orbital mechanics, but it cannot function submerged 

142
the water. All of these environments interact with 

other and have synergistic effects, but they are distin

unique. 

The same holds true for cyberspace. Those device

systems that operate in cyberspace function becaus

were designed to conform to and exploit the laws gov

radiated and electronic energy. We can date our use 

environment to the mid-19th century and the inven

the telegraph, the first telecommunication syst

operate in accordance with the laws of this medium

next 100 years saw steady and evermore technolo

sophisticated advances in the ability to exploit and d

this medium—undersea telegraph cables, telephone, 

television, microwave relay, even communica

satellites—that extended the reach of communicati

continental and eventually intercontinental distance

We have enormously increased the volu

information that can be stored, manipulated

transfered. But it has only been in the past 2 decade

closing quarter of the 20th century, that the fort

marriage of these technologies with the microchip has 

attainment of “critical mass” and the emergen

cyberspace as a full-fledged environment. Cyber

therefore, is something very new, an environment in 

military forces and society in general are onl

beginning to learn how to operate.

Cyberspace: Strategic Importance and Strateg

Vulnerability.

Cyberspace, then, is a new environment. But mor

that, it is of immense strategic importance to us

imaginary scenario has already illustrated this. Let

at another example. Every year, students from the dif

service war colleges meet in April at the Air Forc

Gaming Center at Maxwell Air Force Base and engag

week-long exercise called the Joint Land Air an

Simulation (JLASS). Blue team fights Red team

143
wargame is set in an Asian context. National D

University (NDU) students specializing in inform

warfare are always the Red team, and every year they 

serious problems for the Blue team because of their m

of information operations. In 1998 these NDU stu

developed a very interesting information operation

plan that targeted a whole series of information system

the very first day, the Blue team found, to its surpri

consternation, that certain of its system capabilitie

been degraded by 25 percent. The Blue team studen

not realized how much their military effectiv

depended on these systems. This anecdote v

illustrates just how crucial information and inform

systems are to our military capability.

Cyberspace is also an environment in which th

armed forces and the private sector are inextr

interconnected. The dependence, for example, of the D

civilian telecommunications networks is well know

principle of dependency is not itself new. The military

for reliable civilian communications dates back at le

World War I as demonstrated by the fact that the Pre

exercised his legal power to take control of commercia

and telephone systems. But the degree of dependency 

and growing rapidly.

DoD itself estimates that somewhere in excess 

percent of its daily communications are carri

commercially owned and operated communica

systems.

10

 The problem grew so acute that the Na

Security Telecommunications Advisory Council (NS

was formed in the 1980s to provide a critical and 

high-level interface between the telecommunic

industry and the national security community.

11

 Duri

Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, DoD drew upon comm

communications networks to assist in the deploy

support, and employment of American forces. This led 

ongoing debate about the legal restrictions on the 

some multinational communications systems su

Intelsat or Inmarsat.

12

 As available bandwidth grow

144
demand for it seems to grow even more rapidly, as the 

air campaign in Kosovo clearly demonstrated.

Future warfare as conceived by American m

planners in Joint Vision (JV) 2010 (an

soon-to-be-published follow-on, JV 2020) will be 

information-dependent. Attaining and mainta

information superiority are increasingly regard

indispensable parts of how Americans will fight. Bu

trend entails problems. Take, for example, the conc

focused logistics, which depends on the development o

is called a “reachback” capability. This connects gl

deployed forces to critical nodes and bases far to the r

far back in some cases as the United States. Reac

capability reduces the size and scale of forces that nee

sent to any operational area. This improves the spee

which forces can be deployed and reduces the amo

support needed to sustain them.

But this speed comes at a price. The military’s 

recent instruction on Defensive Information Warfare 

that “use breeds dependence, and dependence b

vulnerability.”

13

 While this might seem to be obviou

implications for the future effectiveness of U.S. m

operations are profound, because the incre

dependence of DoD on telematic systems that it n

owns nor controls confronts those forces with a pot

vulnerability that may be difficult to counter. Sin

linkage between commercial telematic network

military capability is becoming ever more import

national security, the need for an effective partn

between those communities becomes increas

important. This is a truth recognized in the latest Na

Security Strategy, which places great emphasis o

ability to attain information superiority.

The Role and the Responsibility of the DoD.

DoD clearly recognizes these realities. It is taking 

to ensure that it will, in fact, be able to operate in th

145
environment. It is making efforts to reduc

vulnerability of which we have spoken, and recogniz

need for an adequate defense of that part of the na

information infrastructure under the control of the p

sector, even if the question of who conducts that defe

under debate. DoD is also working to develop new re

technologies and keep apace of the rapid changes 

Information Age. Perhaps more importantly still

developing new concepts to suit the changing environ

The development of new technologies calls fo

organizations and doctrines. It is these, not techno

superiority alone, which lead to victory in war. H

makes this abundantly clear; during World War 

example, what enabled the German victory in Fra

May 1940 was not their technologies per se, which we

unique to them, but the way in which they were a

exploit them.

14

 The American military does, in 

recognize its need to make organizational and doc

change in the area of information warfare to bring 

information superiority.

15

 Cyberspace is indeed a 

environment which is of great—and recogni

significance to the military.

Information War: A New Paradigm.

Ironically, however, despite the obvious importa

cyberspace to our military efforts and our national p

threats directed against us via cyberspace are not v

acts of war as traditionally understood. The prob

partly definitional. The Clausewitzian paradigm 

which most of us are familiar is one where warfare is “

of physical force, a pulsation of violence.”

16

 Its purpos

“impose our will” on our opponents. It is waged by a s

class of actors, called “warriors,” who fight (using arm

violent means) on behalf of a special kind of political 

called states. The information age is renderin

definition less relevant, and perhaps obsolete. T

because cyberspace may permit us to impose our po

will without the use of physical force, without the pul

146
of violence. Under the circumstances, can cyberw

classified as war? What is an attack in the informatio

Who are the combatants? And what is an appro

response to an attack that does not involve the pulsa

violence by a recognizable enemy?

17

What is an attack? If we think back to the scenari

which we started, in no way, shape, or form is it clea

what happened via cyberspace amounted to an “a

Certainly there were no kinetic actions like 

explosions, nor were there any violations of na

sovereign territory: no tanks or airfleets crosse

borders. Suppose, however, that in a slight variation 

scenario, the nation of Zenda were to target o

Ruritania’s key communications networks. Sup

furthermore, that it wreaked havoc on that cou

military capability, degraded its key so

infrastructures, and created great disorder in po

systems and economic affairs. Suppose it did all o

without the use of kinetic force and violence. Might n

Ruritanians argue that they had been “attacked”? 

they be wrong to claim that they were “at war” and en

to exercise their “inherent right of self defense"? Duri

student exercise mentioned earlier in this paper th

team developed a war plan against the Blue team 

included information warfare attacks against such t

as the air traffic control system, financial centers, e

distribution network, and telecommunica

infrastructure. The intent of these attacks was to de

and disrupt the Blue team’s political, social, and m

cohesion.

18

 Would these actions equate to “force,” “

attack,” or “armed aggression,” to use the terminology 

U.N. Charter? Does war between states, in short, re

physical violence, kinetic energy, and human casualt

it to be termed war?

19

There is a whole host of other questions that em

What is a combatant? According to the Clausew

paradigm, the warriors are the unifo

military—armies, navies, and, in more recent tim

147
forces. In the student exercise just described, wh

“combatant”? What role is played by intent? How mig

law itself change in response to the information age

will long-established legal principles such as na

sovereignty and the inviolability of national boundar

affected by the ability of cyberspace to transcend 

concepts? Will the technologies of the information a

bringing atrocities and violations of the law of war in

intense and immediate glare of global public awar

increase the observance of the legal norms of a

conflict?

20

 These questions merely hint at the treme

uncertainties that surround the evolving discipl

information warfare and the concepts of national and 

information power.

We must search for a new and more satisf

paradigm for warfare if we are to resolve such issues

paradigm should remain true, as far as possible, 

traditional notions of war. If cyberwar, in other w

equates to warfare conducted via the environment 

cyberspace, then it must meet constructively the c

usually associated with warfare. It must be waged 

political entity that is an acknowledged actor i

international community, normally a nation-state. I

include military operations. It must involve overt ho

and the use of force, which normally entails ph

destruction. This is where, however, cyberwar c

distinguished from other types of war. For, while most 

operations mounted by Zenda did not cause dea

physical destruction, their intent was to comp

Ruritanians to do their will. Zenda, in other words, did 

form of force.

These definitional issues are of obvious relevance 

question at hand. It seems clear that if (and the ver

not yet final) these activities can be called war, then th

must be in the forefront of our defense against them. I

lead any efforts to “protect and defend”—to use lan

from national policy on information assurance an

latest version of the National Security Strategy

148
“national cyberspace” and national infrastructures th

critical to military, economic, and societal security.

21

Information War.

It must be clear by now that we are in need of 

paradigm that will permit us to deal with thi

phenomenon of war in cyberspace. What is inform

warfare?

The earliest use of the term seems to have origina

the DoD’s Office of Net Assessment, where Dr. Tom 

was exploring the relationships among control syste

field known as cybernetics. Dr. Rona describe

competition between adversarial control syste

“information warfare,” in the sense that control system

be described as the means for gathering, processin

disseminating information, processes which c

diagrammed and described with flow and feedback ch

mind-numbing dryness and complexity.

22

 Later, wi

publication of DoD Directive 3600.1 in 1993, we arri

an official definition for the term. To add confusion, 

were actually several definitions, at differing lev

classification.

23

 Perhaps not surprisingly, this defi

underwent frequent revision, with the current defi

the longest-lived, in effect since promulgation of the c

version of DoD Directive 3600.1 on December 9, 1996

Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Inform

Operations, published in 1998, incorporated the 

language, probably ensuring that this definitio

remain in effect for some time longer.

24

 Let’s glance 

current definition of information warfare (IW), alon

the closely associated terms information assurance (IA

information operations (IO), starting with the latter

• Information Operations. Actions taken to 

adversary information and information systems 

defending one’s own information and information syst

149
• Information Warfare. Information opera

conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achi

promote specific objectives over a specific adversa

adversaries.

• Information Assurance. Information oper

that protect and defend information and inform

systems by ensuring their availability, inte

authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation

includes providing for restoration of information syste

incorporating protection, detection, and rea

capabilities.

These definitions leave much to be desired in the a

who, why, when, etc. Under the DoD definition, IW 

activity that only the military undertakes, and even 

only under specific circumstances, while IO is a 

broader and more inclusive field in which the 

government is engaged, in peacetime as well as wartim

example of IO was the activity of Radio Free Europe, 

operated during peacetime under governmental contr

on the other hand, is an activity that goes on constant

engages all elements of national information p

including specific aspects of the private sector.

25

Most U.S. service concepts of IW rest in part o

concept of the “information environment.” Whethe

described as an environment, realm, domain, or wha

there is a clear sense that information has become 

kind of location where crucial operations are conducte

Army’s pathfinding doctrinal publication, Field M

100-6, Information Operations, even speaks of a “

information environment [and] battlespace” in 

conflict is waged. The latest version of the U.S. Air F

basic doctrinal publication explicitly addresses the n

dominate the information realm, describing inform

superiority as

the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend informa

while denying an adversary the ability to do the same. 

includes gaining control over the information realm.

26

150
IW/IO thus emerge as the struggle to control and e

the information environment. Needless to say, this st

extends across the conflict spectrum from “peace” to 

and involves all the government’s agencies and instru

of power. One advantage of this approach is that 

replaces “information” with “aerospace” or “maritime

have defined air and naval warfare, or, more appropr

our purposes, airpower and seapower. Thus inform

operations can be described as those activities 

governments undertake to control and explo

information environment via the use of the inform

component of national power.

DoD and Cyber Terrorism.

A strong case can be made that the DoD 

responsible role in the defense of our national cybersp

the event of IW (cyberwar). There is far less consensus 

it comes to how to deal with its lesser cousin, 

terrorism. Cyber terrorism may be defined as the 

cyberspace by individuals or non-state/transna

groups to cause human injury or physical damag

induce fear for political purposes.

There is, first of all, quite a lively debate over whe

should be a civil law enforcement or a national se

community responsibility. Cyber terrorism differs 

cyberwar in the same way that the non-cyber va

differ: the political status of the actors. While 

terrorism is conducted in order to achieve some t

political objective, the actor lacks the legitimacy 

nation-state or other recognized political entity

therefore usually viewed as a crime, and the task of d

with criminals traditionally belongs to the U.S

enforcement community rather than the military.

27

Can the military do nothing? It is certainly const

to a degree. The Posse Comitatus Act, for example, en

in 1878 in response to the unrest of the Reconstructio

essentially prohibits the uniformed military from acti

151
civilian law enforcement role. However, the prohibi

not absolute. The DoD can assist the civil law enforc

authorities under the proper conditions and safegua

Indeed, over the past several years the military has p

an important role in assisting and cooperating wit

authorities in their war on drugs. According to 

analysts, it could and should assist in the fight a

terrorism and cyber terrorism.

There is also a debate over the role that should be p

by the private sector. This added twist stems fro

pervasive involvement of the private sector in cyber

The private sector owns and operates many o

information systems and networks that would be af

by the terrorists. It would thus seem to have a stake 

defense of our information infrastructures. But coope

with the private sector is by no means easy to achi

universally desired.

The effort to defend against cyber terrori

complicated by the very different interests and perspe

brought to bear on the problem by the DoD

law-enforcement community, and the private secto

private sector sees the information revolution as a 

for expanding business opportunities and expl

organizational changes to create a global econom

concern quite naturally is whether a partnership 

government would affect their business. Would 

example, lower their profits? Undermine cons

confidence? Lead to restrictive regulation?

29

 It tends 

government involvement as an unnecessary impedim

swift progress.

The law enforcement community, trying to fight th

scourges of organized crime and political terrorism, se

information revolution as a frightening collect

capabilities that their adversaries can exploit to o

inside of law enforcement’s OODA Loop, the famous 

cycle of “observe-orient-decide-act.” The growing relia

cyberspace also makes it an objective in and of itself

152
As to the national security community, in particu

DoD, it faces a very real dilemma. Its ability to o

globally has become increasingly dependent on thi

environment, yet, at the same time, its ability and aut

to protect and defend cyberspace is limited.

31

None of this would matter so much if it were no

cyber terrorism appears to be a serious and growing 

around the world. A number of political groups arou

world have come to see cyberspace as an invitin

medium in which to commit terrorist acts. More t

decade ago, for example, the Italian Red Brig

operational manifesto specified the destruction of I

computer systems and facilities as a means of “strik

the head of the state.” Similarly, the Sinn Fein arm 

Irish Republican Army attempted to bomb compute

telecommunications systems supporting the B

financial network.

32

 In the past few years, groups s

the Tamil Tigers from Sri Lanka, the East Tim

resistance movement, and the Maxican Zapitistas ha

employed Internet-based efforts to exploit cyberspa

revolutionary purposes.

Cyberspace presents some obvious advantages t

groups. The entry costs are negligible. Often, no m

needed than a computer and Internet access. Yet the 

of an attack can be rapid and intercontinental. Th

almost no physical risk to the attacker, while a 

forceful impact can be directed against large fa

entities such as corporations or government age

These, rather than innocent individuals, compris

enemy. Attacks of this sort are less likely to resul

hostile popular reaction.

33

 The use of cyberspace for 

purposes is not likely to diminish.

International Strategies.

In this new environment, so vital to both busine

national security, an effective defense against d

threats in cyberspace can come only from a partn

153
among all the interested parties, private sector as w

government. While the United States has been descri

the most information-dependent nation in the world, 

no means the only nation whose society and military 

rely heavily on the new technologies of the informatio

Many, if not most, of the world’s more technolog

advanced countries have become aware that inform

and the infrastructures that depend on digital inform

are critical to societal stability and national security

In 1998 the Australian Parliament received a rep

the high-tech threat to that country’s cr

infrastructures. The collapse of the electric power g

Auckland, New Zealand, the following year, alt

caused by a mechanical failure, not by terrorists, p

out the economic and social costs of such infrastru

degradations.

3 4

 The Norwegian governmen

established a commission to study the vulnerabilities 

country’s infrastructures, and the Swedish governme

undertaken a similar effort. Many of the NATO cou

have had discussions with American authorities, at le

the level of protecting military systems and networks. 

is at a higher level that some very interesting develop

are underway.

In the summer of 1998 the President of the R

Federation sent a draft resolution to the United N

Secretary General. The key portion of the resolution 

at 

developing international legal regimes to provide security 

global information and telecommunication systems and com

terrorism and criminality in the field of information.

Particularly interesting about this proposal w

organizational path of entry: it was introduced via th

Committee, which deals with issues of disarmam

After consultations with other delegations, includin

United States, the draft was rewritten. In its new for

resolution aimed to develop

154
international principles [to] enhance the security of glo

information and telecommunication systems and help 

combat information terrorism and criminality.

This resolution passed the General Assembly by cons

on December 4, 1998. While it does not, of course, ha

force of international or domestic law, it establish

basis for further work, which continues.

While the Russian proposal was primarily conc

with military information warfare, there are other 

underway more tightly focused on the civil or cr

aspects of the issue. In March 1999, a committee of e

on crime in cyberspace, a subgroup of the Coun

Europe’s Committee on Crime Problems, issued a w

draft of a position on cyber crime.

36

 The draft focus

such issues as extradition, mutual legal assistanc

trans-border computer searches. These are thorny 

that will not easily be resolved. The draft did not app

define cyberspace, although the draft was clearly focu

computer systems and the interactions between sy

linked across national borders.

In October 1999, a G-8 Ministerial Conferen

combating transnational organized crime met in M

and issued a communiqué. It made multiple referen

computer crime, stressing the need to continue work 

action plan to deal with high-tech and computer crim

weeks later, Stanford University’s Hoover Insti

hosted a symposium to explore ways to de

international cooperation to combat cyber crim

terrorism. The symposium’s closing session focused 

proposal for an international convention, drafted b

Center for International Security and Cooperati

CISAC, to combat cyber crime and terrorism. The C

considered some of the same issues as those covered 

Council of Europe draft, also providing specific explan

of offenses. Members of CISAC are currently in the p

of gathering comments and inputs before revising the 

155
In short, the seriousness of the threat is well recogniz

only within the boundaries of the United States, but be

Conclusion.

We return to the question with which we opene

discussion: “Does the DoD have both a role in 

responsibility for defending American cyberspace?” C

the National Information Infrastructure is of critic

growing importance to American economic stre

political vitality, national will, and military pow

growing number of government publications, dire

and policies relating to information and its role in na

security provide evidence that this issue will incre

importance. The newly issued government policy 

“Defending America’s Cyberspace: National Pla

Information Systems Protection,” is a detaile

comprehensive approach to this issue. There seems 

little question that cyberspace is an operat

environment crucial to military capability, but th

much less consensus that this is an environment in 

the DoD has a role outside of the confines of purely m

systems and infrastractures. But the mission of Am

armed forces is quite clear: to provide for the co

defense. The growth of cyberspace as an enviro

critical to America’s security and well-being means th

DoD has both a role and a responsibility, alb

conjunction and cooperation with law enforcement a

private sector, to protect this environment from 

enemies, foreign and domestic.” To do less would 

endanger national security and abdicate the respons

assigned it by the American Constitution.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1.The views and opinions contained in this paper are thos

author and should not be construed as the official position of t

Government, the Department of Defense, or the National D

University. 

156
2. The term “telematics” probably originated in the United K

in the 1980s. It refers to an evolving disciplinary area that incor

telecommunications and communication networks. In today’s 

which is massively interconnected and becoming more so eve

those worlds are now inextricably bound together.

3. These infrastructures are described and the potential 

outlined in a 1999 publication issued by the White House’s O

Scientific and Technology Policy (OSTP), “Cybernation: The Am

Infrastructure in the Information Age,” available on

http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/html/cyber2.ht

4. See A National Security Strategy for a New Century, publi

the White House in December 1999 and available on

http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/document

1299.pdf. 

5. I am indebted to the Director of the National Security A

Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, for the terminology used he

6. While it’s impossible to say when the term “cyberspace” w

used, several authors stand out as being among the leaders. W

Gibson’s classic work of science fiction, Neuromancer (New Yo

1984), first broached the concept of humans seamlessly op

within a cybernetic, virtual reality environment, while N

Negroponte’s book, Being Digital (New York: Knopf, 1995)

exploration of the impact of cyberspace on our daily lives. Th

movie hit, The Matrix, is yet another exanple. The term itself h

recently come into widespread use. A search of several aut

databases, for example, covering the years 1986-89 and 1

contained only 17 “hits” on the term; the same databases fo

contained 754!

7. Of course outer space can be measured in a scientific sen

not in terms useful in a lay sense.

8. The question of where the borders of cyberspace li

intriguing one. Michael Benedikt has written perceptively on 

book, Cyberspace: First Steps (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1991), whi

Wells Branscomb in a recent monograph Cybercommunit

Cybercommerce: Can We Learn to Cope? (Harvard University, P

on Information Resources Policy), suggests that the bor

cyberspace are discernible at the interconnection points b

segments of the Internet, with network managers and s

administrators acting as the border guards, in a sense. A s

graphical representation of this is available at www.peacockma

157
The technology of cyberspace makes “virtual” organizations ev

plausible and perhaps in some scenarios even desirable. Four 

physically located on the Greenland icecap, in the Australian o

in the Amazon rainforest, and halfway up Mount Everest will be 

meet in cyberspace, discuss a problem, develop a solution, and 

the corrective actions via information technologies. Already, 

global voice communication is possible via satellite-based te

systems such as Iridium (see their website at www.iridium.

Globalstar (at www.globalstar.com), and within a few yea

planned to have the same capability for heavy bandwidt

transmission. See, for example, the Teledesic p

www.teledesic.com. Regardless of the financial difficulties 

Iridium has encountered, the movement of telematic architectu

space is a trend which can only continue.

9. This construct omits communication methods such as 

flags, smoke signals, drums, or even heliograph because they 

require manipulation of the electronic environment. The interes

national security community in cyberspace thus dates to the Civ

in which the national, political, and military leadership of b

North and South depended on the telegraph for strategic dire

their respective war efforts.

10. See the “Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Tas

on Information Warfare-Defense,” January 8, 1997, available o

http://cryptome.org/iwd.htm. 

11. By “high-level,” we mean interface between CEOs a

President of the United States. See www.nstac.org for details. N

this was not the only reason for the formation of this institution

was certainly an influential factor.

12. Richard A. Morgan, “Military Use of Comm

Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Space Tre

‘Peaceful Purposes,’” in Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 

1, September-October 1994.

13. CJCSI 6510.1, Defensive Information Warfare, 1998.

14. The Germans were not superior in any one category. Th

tanks, to be sure. But so did the French and British. They h

airpower. But so did the French and British. They had rad

effective command and control. So did their enemies. Then why w

Germans able to take their tanks through the French and Briti

in May 1940 like a hot knife through butter? The answer is t

human element made all the difference. The Germans 

158
organizational changes (Panzer divisions and even Panzer cor

developed an operational concept, a doctrine (we like to call it “li

war”) to employ the technology in a novel way.

15. We are evolving the necessary new concepts like “do

battlespace knowledge” or “network centric warfare.”

16. See On War, Book One, Chapter 1, for Clausewitz’s co

analysis of these relationships.

17. In early 1999, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John 

testified before Congress concerning recent intrusions into U.S. m

computer systems, intrusions apparently originating in Russia. 

said that a “cyberwar” was underway. This mischaracterizatio

incident is an example of the murkiness of the terminology, 

while the incident could certainly have been called cyber-espio

was hardly war.

 18. While this example could be dismissed as an American e

of mirror-imaging, a recent book published in China by two col

the Chinese Liberation Army, Unrestricted Warfare, suggests th

concepts are gaining wider acceptance among other military fo

19. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and 

of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Fram

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1999); 

Gary Sharp, Sr., Cyberspace and the Use of Force, Falls Chur

AEGIS Research Corp, 1999; and Lawrence T. Greenberg, Seym

Goodman, and Kevin J. Soo Hoo, Information Warfa

International Law, Washington, DC: National Defense Un

Press, 1997, available online at www.dodccrp.org. 

20. Information warfare also raises specific legal issues re

computer crime: what is a crime, who commits it, and what does 

say about it?

21. A National Security Strategy for a New Century, De

1999.

22. This author first heard Dr. Rona’s ideas during a presenta

June 13, 1994, at the Information Resources Management C

National Defense University, in Washington, DC. He defined I

the sequence of actions undertaken by all sides in a conflict 

destroy, degrade, and exploit the information systems of th

adversaries. Conversely, information warfare also compri

159
all the actions aimed at protecting information systems aga

hostile attempts at destruction, degradation, and exploitat

Information warfare actions take place in all phases of con

evolution: peace, crisis, escalation, war, de-escalation, 

post-conflict periods.

23. During the initial classroom meeting of the Sc

Information Warfare and Strategy’s first class in August 1994

students reacted with dismay to the plethora of official and un

definitions of IW. While some believe that any attempt to fix a de

of IW at the present time is premature and counterproductive

believe that some degree of imposed consensus is essential, a

unless the different organizations involved in the issue hav

common terminology, any attempt to plan is doomed to frustrat

failure. While this author agrees that trying to fix terms for all 

futile because the discipline is still evolving, some kind of termin

commonality is vital.

24. One of the reasons for the creation of the term “infor

warfare” is the visceral dislike and mistrust of the word “war” b

of the agencies and people who are beginning to find th

information age envelops their activities and mission. Thus the c

of a term that points at the larger arena in which information “

conducted, but does not tie those operations so visibly to the m

25. See the author’s “Defining Information Power,” publishe

National Defense University Press as Strategic Forum #115

available online at www.ndu.edu. 

26. See Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, U.S

Training and Doctrine Command, August 1996; also see Ai

Doctrine Document–1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, USAF Doctrine 

September 1997, pp. 31-32. FM 100-6 is currently under revisio

would suggest that it is under attack rather than revis

traditionalists who see IO solely in terms of an enabler o

multiplier rather than as something that could be the central or d

element of a campaign. While not so pronounced, similar curre

detectable within the Air Force as well.

27. This oversimplifies. There is still a lively debate o

question of whether counterterrorism is primarily a ci

enforcement or national security community responsibility.

28. A detailed exploration of this issue can be found in Gre

Grove, The U.S. Military and Civil Infrastructure Prot

Restrictions and Discretion Under the Posse Comitatus Act, Pa

160
CA: Stanford University, Center for International Securi

Cooperation, 1999.

29. A symposium was held at the Supreme Court in the Sum

1998, after issuance of PDD-63. During one discussion a lawyer 

private sector firm asked quite pointedly of the gover

representatives, “What’s in it for me?” This is, of course, an 

valid question for the private sector to ask. Fearful of in

governmental regulation and bureaucracy, they view “hel

Washington” with a jaundiced eye. If the government cannot eff

make the case that IA is a shared need, the partnership calle

both PDD-63 and the Report of the President’s Commission on 

Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), published in 1997, will be dif

not impossible to attain. The PCCIP Report is available on

www.ciao.gov.

30. This was one of the key issues addressed by the Pre

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.

31. Efforts are underway in academia as well as governm

study the problem. The Carnegie Endowment for Internationa

for example, has launched a study on the information revolut

world politics, with cyber terrorism as one of its key issues. S

website at www.ceip.org. 

32. See Andrew Rathmell, “Assessing the IW Threa

Sub-State Groups,” in Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reali

Campen and Douglas Dearth, eds., Fairfax, VA: AFCEA Intern

Press, 1998, pp. 295-312.

33. Devost, Pollard, and Houghton, “How Safe is Your Toas

Sun Tzu and Information Warfare, Robert E. Neilson, ed., N

Defense University Press, 1996.

34. See Adam Cobb, Thinking About the Unthinkable: Aus

Vulnerabilities to High-Tech Risks, Parliamentary Research S

June 29, 1998; available online at www.aph.gov.au/library/pu

1997-98/98rp18.htm. 

35. Diplomatic historians and scholars familiar with th

history of the Law of War and other international agreements 

that at the Hague Conference of 1899 may recognize the moti

behind Russian sponsorship of that meeting a little more than 

ago. Russian fears of advanced German and Austro-Hungarian m

technology had led to an understandable effort to restra

development and deployment of such technology.

161
36. This draft, issued on March 11, 1999, was the 14th a

prepared by the Directorate of Legal Affairs.

162
CHAPTER 11

DANIEL T. KUEHL’S VIEW OF

DOD’S ROLE IN DEFENDING THE

NATIONAL INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE:

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Phillip E. Lacombe

The previous chapter by Dr. Daniel Kuehl has m

commend it. Broadly speaking, I share his understand

the problem and his evaluation of what needs to be do

have any reservations, it is that Kuehl has not go

enough in stressing the urgency of the problem and th

to deal with this important challenge.

This brief chapter will therefore not so much mod

underline, the points made by Kuehl. It will draw 

experience as a member of President William J. Cli

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (19

a member of the Transition Office that followed, a

work at a company whose business is closely linked 

very problem. The chief purpose of this discussion wi

argue for some profound changes in the way we thin

The Nature of the Threat.

The first point to make is that the cyber threa

developed with quite extraordinary rapidity. In 1996

I was considering whether or not to join the Pres

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PC

I was advised against the move by a very senior d

official. His words of caution were, “Don’t go, ther

threat, it’s a flash in the pan, and will be gone in a hear

You won’t be doing anything important.” And at tha

date there was reason to believe he might be right. W

the information warfare arena, there were people wh

163
seriously concerned with the issue. But they were l

alone. No one else seemed to be paying attention 

problem, not operational commanders, not th

enforcement agencies of the United States, not busin

and not the press. Two and a half years later, aft

commission issued its report, and in particular 

February 1998 when the solar sunrise woke people 

danger, the level of concern is enormously higher. It i

that our information infrastructure is at risk, an

attacks on it cannot be taken lightly.

2

The suddenness with which the threat develope

considerable implications. The seriousness of any th

related to the amount of damage it can inflict and 

ability to defend against it. Cyber threats pose some u

challenges to us in part because they are so very new

means that not only must we find ways to deal wit

complexities, but we must also draw upon our imagi

resources to come to terms with a phenomenon outs

our traditional experience. In doing so, we must ove

deeply rooted cultural assumptions. We must do 

radical rethinking.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: A Neglected

Effort.

One of the most strikingly obvious features 

attacks on our information infrastructure is our fail

accept it as the threat it is. Clearly such attacks ha

potential to do enormous damage to our nation. 

illustrated this very effectively in his chapter. It is 

that all of our infrastructures rely on communication

information systems. The water system in Los Ang

controlled by a phone and computer system. It open

closes gates in the water system using computer co

over the phone. All the electrical power in the United 

is delivered by way of the computer systems that con

In the near future, electrical power will be delivered u

new system called Oasis. Electrical power will be auc

164
in real time. This has clear advantages; the Am

people will get the best rate in their homes, businesse

agencies. At the same time, however, this system w

controlled by computer and communication sys

enabling the systems to run without the intervent

individuals. This will create a new vulnerability. We

of mass disruption, as cyber attacks have been dubbe

indeed a serious problem. Yet, as we have already 

recognition of the full scope of the problem has bee

slow in coming. What explanations are there fo

reluctance to accept reality? And what can be done 

this? 

First, we have had relatively little historical expe

of attacks on our infrastructures; the last time Am

information infrastructures were attacked was duri

War of 1812. This means that we must call 

considerable powers of imagination to grasp what su

event would entail. We must ask ourselves basic ques

How would we be affected by an attack on our inform

infrastructure? What do we mean when we say that 

that institution is “at risk”? Let us consider he

example of a library. Many American children toda

the library by computer. Rather than going to the ph

building, they access the data base using their ho

school computers. If their internet service is cut off, 

will be their ability to access the library. When we s

think through some of these realities, we will begin to 

understand the profound ways in which our daily 

would be affected in the event of a cyber attack.

Another explanation for the failure of many to gra

serious nature of the threat to the inform

infrastructure lies in the complexity associated wi

information system itself. We do not fully grasp the no

cascading effects. We do not remember that the ele

power system affects water supply, that the lack of ele

power or the lack of telephone availability in turn af

whole host of other vital services. Once again, we 

165
expand our powers of imagination and improv

thinking. 

Cultural assumptions are also to blame for our m

when it comes to the information threat. There is 

adage that runs, “Sticks and stones may break my bon

words will never hurt me.” We have grown up wi

notion (rightly or wrongly) that we cannot be hurt or d

by words (read “information”). We minimize 

misunderstand the nature of the threat. This can a

illustrated by thinking about the reaction of t

American parents when they catch their children ha

into computer systems. Most parents do not seem to 

the fact that this is not only a crime, but dangerous. In 

minds, their children are merely gaining acce

information. 

We must rethink what we mean by informatio

come to recognize that, contrary to our comfo

assumptions, the state of communications can hur

Bits and bytes do now contain the ability to harm 

nation.

3

 We must also recognize that information 

longer “just” information. It is property.

4

 It has 

independent of anything else, and we need to start to 

about it in these terms. If and when parents be

appreciate the act of hacking as a property crime, th

come to have a better appreciation of its seriousness

New Paradigms for Dealing with Cyber Threat

The newness of the cyber threat also increas

challenge by rendering obsolete many of our trad

paradigms. How, for example, should we defen

infrastructure? As a nation, we are accustomed 

particular way of defending against threats. In the pa

have followed a model whereby we sought to identi

enemies, understand their motives, and anticipate 

potential targets.

166
This paradigm simply does not work in the cas

cyber attack. When something happens in the 

dimension, when a computer system is broken into, w

telephone system goes down, when an internet s

provider’s capabilities are saturated or spammed

5

 o

do not necessarily know who is responsible for the pro

nor why that person is doing what he or she is doing. 

are no explosions, gunfire, or blood in the streets to g

an indication or warning of a pending threat. A cyber 

can be perpetrated using nothing more than 

computer, a telephone line, and a modem. How 

intelligence agent to anticipate such a threat? Even af

attack, it is hard to identify the perpetrator, as Kue

clearly pointed out.

Given the extreme difficulty of actually determini

“who” or “why” of an attack, our conventional 

becomes dysfunctional. But from the standpoint of h

are affected, the distinctions are in any event irrel

Consider a major retail company that finds itself una

conduct business because its information network is 

and it cannot process a transaction. It really does not m

whether the problem was caused by some 14-year-

Stockholm playing around on the internet, or 

competitor or foreign country intending harm. The 

that the business will suffer and is vulnerable, regard

who the “actor” was or what his or her motives were

This is why we must rethink how we deal with th

The President’s Commission concluded that we s

think about the threat in terms of capability 

vulnerability rather than in terms of acto

motivation. We must, in other words, start to th

terms of what our vulnerabilities are and whether or n

capabilities exist to exploit them. It is clear that our sy

are vulnerable. It is also clear that the capabi

disrupting our information infrastructure does exist. 

in doubt should read up on the modus opera

well-publicized hackers. It will become clear in very 

order that all their tools are extraordinarily modest.

167
Another important point to register about “targe

this new environment is that public confidence it

today a target. This is not in and of itself really new; 

Hoffman, for example, has drawn attention in his cha

the crucial role played by public confidence in terrorism

it is important to recognize the way in which cyber a

can erode public confidence and thereby disrupt our n

A hypothetical example here will illustrate the 

Suppose a hacker were to intrude into the computer sy

of Citibank, causing some 100,000 people to lose $20 e

their bank accounts. Suppose the hacker quit after a 

two but also published an advertisement in the New 

Times and told everyone what he had done. Suppose h

threatened to do the same thing again if his demand

not met. What do you suppose this would do to 

confidence? It is not difficult to appreciate that it wou

only erode trust in the banking system, but migh

undermine public trust in the U.S. Government a

ability to defend its people.

Who Is Responsible For Defense?

I shall conclude by taking a brief look at the ques

responsibility, a theme lying very much at the heart 

anthology and clearly addressed by Kuehl. W

responsible for protecting those infrastructures that 

risk? Here again, it seems that we shall need to think 

this issue in far from traditional ways. We must fin

ways to approach defense, law enforcement, intelli

and other activities as they relate to cyber threats.

Consider the question of the role of the military. S

the military be involved in the defense against 

attacks? While the U.S. military has no pro

understanding that its job might be to protect Joe’s C

Market from a missile strike, it has a harder 

understanding that its job might be to protect Joe’s C

Market from a cyber attack. Either type of a

nonetheless, is likely to cause Joe’s Corner Market to 

168
of business. Kuehl is no doubt correct when he says th

Department of Defense (DoD) should be involved 

protection of our information infrastructures. Yet, as l

we continue to think of attacks as confined to a

physical violence, this function will seem to be unna

We thus must rethink our conventional notions of 

constitutes an attack.

We must at the same time redraw the boun

between public and private spheres. Where informa

concerned, every improvement in defense capability 

private sector is tantamount to increasing our na

security. We must do more to bring about an eff

partnership between the government and business. S

partnership would entail, among other things, the sh

of information among these groups. Both governmen

the private sector have shown themselves to be profo

hesitant to do so, as this author, whose career has stra

both sides of the dividing line, is very much aware. An

hesitation is perhaps understandable.

From the perspective of a private company, enterin

a partnership with government may entail some s

risks. The government clearly needs to know when A

Citibank, or Joe’s Corner Market is hacked into in or

defend the nation better. Private companies ar

insensitive to this need. Yet if they were to 

information about system vulnerabilities and succ

penetrations, they fear that these would become 

knowledge and adversely affect the competitiveness o

businesses. Given that it is so difficult to protect sen

information in the era of the Freedom of Information 

in the era of the public’s right to knowthese fears a

unfounded.

6

But it is equally difficult, if not more so, to g

government to share information with the private 

Consider, for example, just how difficult it is to g

Federal Bureau of Investigation to share the informa

which it has access, even with those it trusts. Again, w

169
understand the reluctance: the information is 

sensitive and tied to criminal investigations. We 

however, find ways to reduce the present impedime

information-sharing among the parts of both the pub

private sectors.

It is vital, in short, that we come of age in the cyb

and start thinking seriously about how to achieve a ge

public-private partnership. This may call for a com

redefinition of its meaning. It may also call for the cr

of entirely new types of institutions. To deal with the 

threat, we may need to rely on an institution that is n

enforcement, not intelligence, and not defense, but a l

each, that is not private sector nor public sector, but 

of both. Such a concept has been discussed. A gr

analysts at the National War College is, in 

investigating the possibility of developing an insti

called a Triune, which would house an intersection a

the private sector and federal, state, and 

governments.

7

 This idea is one which the Presi

Commission considered in 1996-1998, but rejected 

impractical. It is an indication of how much thin

changed that this idea is now being taken far 

seriously.

8

 Four years ago we were just beginn

understand the cyber threat, and the idea of crea

triune was a pipe dream. Today, it is not. It may be th

really do need to start thinking about something u

something, to quote Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, far 

the box.”

Conclusion.

Kuehl is right to stress the growth of cyber space 

environment critical to America’s security. He is also 

to stress that the DoD does have both a role 

responsibility, in cooperation with law enforcement a

private sector, to protect this environment. What I w

emphasize still more, however, is the degree to 

Americans need to rethink the meaning of such conce

170
“information,” “threats,” and “public/private” rela

Only if they do, can we hope to maintain an ade

defense of our information infrastructure in coming ye

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. The members of the commission were asked by Clinton to 

eight critical infrastructures to determine whether or not the

vulnerable to both physical and cyber attack. They chose to conc

on the cyber arena because the physical arena was alrea

documented. 

2. This delay in recognition makes the problem all the more 

because we have not adequately anticipated the problem a

therefore forced to play a game of catch-up.

3. This was one of the conclusions reached by the Pre

Commission. 

4. As a matter of fact, we are beginning to think this way 

United States.

5. To spam is computer lingo for disrupting or clogging e-

computer traffic with commercial mesages.

6. As things stand at the moment, the tendency is for 

companies to work against, rather than with, the public sector

illustrated rather strikingly by an episode which took pla

recently at a meeting between this author and some of his ma

personnel at Veridian (a company which primarily contracts 

government but is starting to move into the private sector). W

discussing how best to market a new capability in the private 

One of the marketing personnel suggested that the way to do thi

offer to protect potential commercial clients from the gover

Clearly, the mistrust is huge.

7. Randy Larson, Bart O’Neal, and Ms. Andreazi. State an

governments have a huge responsibility because they regulate 

our infrastructure.

8. Jeff Smith (a former general counsel at the CIA) sugge

think about defining a new type of institutionsomething 

defense, law enforcement, and private sector intelligence respon

171
CHAPTER 12

DANIEL KUEHL’S VIEW OF

INFORMATION WARFARE AND THE

DEFENSE OF U.S. INFORMATION SYSTE

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Richard Marshall

Introduction.

1

The purpose of this chapter is to comment on the ch

by Dr. Daniel Kuehl and raise some further que

concerning the role of information warfare and the d

of U.S. information systems. We are all captives 

environment, and the environment and training o

author are that of a lawyer. I am therefore going to 

lawyerly approach to this task. I shall commen

describing the problem and offering an analy

somewhat subjective one, to be sure. Then, I will offe

possible solutions for the readers’ consideration.

Framing the Issue.

Kuehl has argued, in no uncertain terms, th

Department of Defense (DoD) does have a responsibi

this area. He is undoubtedly correct that DoD (and, fo

matter, the National Security Agency [NSA], whic

somewhat schizophrenic fashion can be considered a 

DoD) has a mission to defend against all enemies, f

and domestic. At first sight, it would appear as if the 

could be resolved with beautiful simplicity; let the F

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) take care of cyber a

when they are crimes, and let the DoD take care of 

when they are acts of war, that is, when the

perpetrated by our enemies. Close inspection makes it 

however, that this is less than easy to do. It is very h

173
determine who is behind a cyber attack. Action 

normally be taken long before it is clear whether the 

is a crime or worse. So we must approach the questio

a different standpoint. We need first answer some 

questions, specifically, (1) who can be trusted wi

important business of defending our information high

(2) who has the technological capability to do this, a

who has the constitutional responsibility to do this? 

answers in hand, we shall conclude by arguing th

defense of cyber space is indeed important enough to i

the DoD, but that it needs to involve the bus

community as allies in the fight.

Preliminaries.

Before we proceed further, a couple of really basic 

need to be clarified. The first relates to the fundam

seriousness of the threat, which should n

underestimated. The second relates to the nature of 

space, which in the view of this author is 

misrepresented, to ill effect.

As Kuehl indicated, the cyber threat has not l

large on our threat horizons until fairly recently

unquestionably taken much more seriously now, since 

the potential to cause us serious military headaches. L

illustrate this by drawing attention to a real life ex

that was played out in 1997.

Eligible Receiver is a periodic exercise sponsored 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its purpose is to te

responsiveness and effectiveness of our military forc

1997, for the first time ever, a cyber attack scenar

incorporated, and, again for the first time, the aggr

won. They a won in a matter of hours rather than a ma

days. So rapid was the victory that the exercise had 

halted. Afterward, the person who was acting as th

Chair reported to the National Security Council (NSC

cyber warfare did indeed pose a military threat. He 

that in the scenario just played, U.S. forces in the P

174
had found themselves facing a shooting war. They 

however, without any means of communicating 

stateside headquarters except carrier pigeon

semaphore flags! These would quite clearly not be up 

task of sending messages between Washington an

Pacific! The lessons of this scenario were obvious. I

the newly awakened consciousness of the seriousness 

problem led to the formation of the President’s Comm

on Critical Infrastructure Protection in 1996. It is a m

of crucial importance, in short, that we apply our k

intellectual energies to this issue.

My other point relates to the popular understand

cyber space. One of the obstacles we face in our atte

deal rationally with questions of responsibility 

tendency to make it more abstract than it actually is. C

depicting cyber space are generally depicted by clouds

cyber space is not a bunch of clouds. Cyber space is ba

the public switch network. It is a tangible, physical 

Behind all the abstractions, fascinating though the

be, are physical things. There are switches, router

telecommunication hard devices. This is true even 

wireless society. When you incorporate a computer 

cellular telephone, the signals go through a public 

network. There is a choke point that can be accessed

can be utilized to determine a number of things

electrons go through an area which can be gra

Thinking of cyber space in this way will help redu

confusion and perhaps make the business of defense o

space seem less remote and more manageable.

The Challenge of Cyber Warfare.

Let us revert at this point to the questi

responsibility and the ambiguities we spoke of ear

bears some elaboration. First, let us imagine a fic

scenario. It takes place in what Kuehl would ca

traditional dimensions of war. If an enemy aircraft 

somewhere in our airspace were to drop a nuclear bo

175
the White House, our initial reaction would be that t

Force should respond to this threat. This reaction wo

right, however, only if the aircraft were state-spon

Suppose that the aircraft was piloted by a slightly 

member of a fringe group from within the United S

someone, for example, from Wyoming or Utah. In thi

the bombing would be better classified as a crime than 

act of war. And it would surely be the task of the FBI t

with this threat. The point of this scenario is to eluci

very important reality. It is extremely difficult in 

space to determine the status of the perpetrator 

“attack.” 

A series of real life cyber attacks that took place in 

suggests more fully the extent of this problem and its 

ramifications. At that time, some 3 months afte

military exercise Eligible Receiver, attacks on Air 

logistics-related computers were reported at a num

installations. In and of themselves, these incidents we

terribly exciting. They seemed to be random, is

events. Taken individually, they had all the appeara

criminal acts. However, seen in the broader str

context, they provided indications of a more serious t

For at the very time of these cyber attacks on gover

computers, U.S. forces were preparing for another M

East test range exercise in Iraq. U.S. military force

preparing for deployment, and a military buildup w

progress. This pointed to the possibility that it might 

enemy nation—Iraq—who was behind these attacks

Suppose for a moment that this possibility had 

been rapidly confirmed. This still does not ma

altogether clear what the appropriate reaction shou

Ask yourself what you would you do if you we

President of the United States, or Secretary of Defen

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Could one just

launching of military forces against another nat

retaliation for the extraction of information 

government computers?

176
The fact is, however, that it is rare indeed fo

clear-cut blame to be assigned in short order. In the c

question, it took some time. Air Force computers 

sensors that make it possible to detect whethe

anomalous activity has taken place. This kind of acti

not detected at the time of an attack, but some hours a

occurs. The sensors point the way like Tonto for the 

Ranger. The FBI, with the assistance of the 

determined that two adolescents in California 

responsible for all of this activity. Everyone involved h

a big sigh of relief. But was this premature? Were the 

Americans really acting on their own? According to 

reports, their mentor lived in Israel. Did he work f

Israeli government? Did he work on his own? Perhaps

all, the attacks were state-sponsored.

There is a still more recent example. For some tim

Air Force computer systems have been afflict

intrusions. The intrusions come in via educational sit

then go out via industrial sites. They extract uncla

data associated with advanced weapons technology. N

knows for sure who is behind these intrusions. Accord

press reports, they may be coming from countries in E

But there is no definitive way to tell whether the intr

are sponsored by states, by non-states, or simply by a 

of cyber-happy kids. If you are part of the decisionm

authority in the United States, how do you react to a 

of such uncertain origin? Do you go to the State Depar

and have it issue a strongly-worded statement calling 

perpetrators to stop their illegal activities? Do you l

your Air Force bombers? Or your submarine-borne ba

missiles? Whom do you call upon to help you deal wi

threat? Do you call in the FBI? All of the above sugge

have been considered. But framing the appropriate re

to an event is very difficult indeed.

177
Analysis: Who Should Defend Our Critical

Infrastructures?

Dividing responsibility for the defense of cybe

between law enforcement agents and the military, ba

an evaluation of whether an act is a crime or an act o

does not appear to be very practical. Rather than do th

should approach the whole question from a different 

simply asking ourselves who should be entrusted wi

task of defending something so essential to our na

well-being, and why. We will also extend our conside

to include the private sector. The reader is now inv

ask himself or herself, some fundamental questions.

• Whom do Americans trust? First of all, we 

consider who it is that can be trusted to protect thi

resource. A brief survey was taken at the time 

conference presentation on which the present chap

based. Members of the audience were asked whethe

would permit NSA to examine their home computer a

what kind of programs they were using and with whom 

were communicating. The same question was 

concerning the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) a

FBI. Only a handful (some five or six people out of abo

people) indicated that they would. When asked how 

would permit Microsoft to come in and take a look a

computer system, rather more indicated that they w

Far more have given their tacit consent simply by o

computers and running Microsoft products like a Wi

95 or 98 or Microsoft Office 2000 product. In so doing

people have in effect given Bill Gates permission to co

and see what type of programs they are using. The p

that someone is looking into our computers. Americ

not seem to mind if this someone is American busine

The question might be framed in a different 

Suppose we were to poll Americans to see if they 

permit NSA or CIA or FBI to come into their compute

modify the functionality of their programs? The ev

suggests that most of them would be adamantly oppo

178
such a notion. Yet, these same individuals permit AO

other Internet service providers to do that very 

Merely by using an Internet service provider to conn

the Internet, they have allowed these companies to co

and modify the functionality of their computer.

2

• Whom should they trust? Americans trust bu

to do intrusive things even though they do not tru

federal government. Is this logical? Perhaps. It is cer

surprising in some ways. In the first place, Am

business is uncontrolled. The federal government is s

to federal law and the Fourth Amendment. In the s

place, our trust is in large measure based on the 

assumption that the businesses in question are Am

businesses. In fact, we are living in the age of interna

business, and much of the software that Microsoft and 

companies sell is written outside of the United States

Because it is much cheaper. It might surprise you to fi

where a lot of the software is written—India, Pak

Israel, Russia, and China, for example. We shou

ourselves whether or not we should, under 

circumstances, feel warm and trusting.

• Who is best equipped to defend us against 

threats? Both government and the private sector 

technological capabilities which they do not always 

with one another. The private sector tends to be som

advantaged in that it is not quite as constrained 

government when it comes to invading privacy f

purposes of defense.

• Who bears the constitutional responsibil

defend us against cyber threats? What is the prop

of the government in dealing with these threats? Ca

defend us against crime and still keep with

constitutional bounds? Do we let the military defen

cyber space, even if those they are defending it fro

criminals rather than enemies of the state? One could 

that there is a historical analogy for this. The early m

period witnessed a commercial revolution in Great B

179
Britain’s budding prosperity was threatened by pirat

other miscreants who preyed upon British shipping

led the commercial sector to ask for intervention 

government and to the foundation of the Royal Navy

we now reached a similar moment? Should we call up

DoD to protect our information highways?

At the same time, the legal authority of anyone 

government to take appropriate action against thre

our critical information infrastructure is limited. 

regard to NSA, Executive Order 12333 says that i

provide signals intelligence and national security f

U.S. Government. That gives NSA the authority t

with threats to federal systems but not with threats 

private sector. Another document, National Se

Directive 42, refines the role of NSA to that of prot

national security systems. That affords some legal sa

for guarding DoD telecommunications systems. T

some small comfort. But even in this case, NSA is limi

the Electronic Systems Privacy Act, the Computer 

and Abuse Act, and also the Fourth Amendment. Th

in effect, rather little that NSA can do to help p

national systems.

One of the documents that came out of the Pres

Commission is Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)

reached some interesting conclusions. It recognized 

threat to our information systems does indeed ex

recommended that various areas in the government 

individually and together to try to resolve it. A basic p

remember is that no one is in charge. No single aut

has undivided responsibility to ensure that the system

protected. A variety of groups such as National Inst

for Standards and Technology and the Off

Management and Budget is involved. They have a 

play and do have some responsibilities. But none of 

has the authority or the technical capability to rea

and work with the private sector. And it is the private 

which is most vulnerable. A joint task force for civil su

180
was established, but this too was just a pathway to a f

a fix in itself.

Solutions.

Thus far, this chapter has sounded a note of a

unmitigated gloom. Some suggested solutions 

promised, however. Let’s consider a few ideas that 

point the way to solutions.

In my opinion, the defense of U.S. information sy

must, in the final analysis, rely in large part on p

industry and businesses. I will attempt to explain th

behind the conclusion.

In January 2000, I traveled to a conference attende

group of professionals who, broadly speaking, 

interested in communications and information se

The conference was also attended by Internet s

providers, computer developers, and soft

manufacturers. Significantly, their main concern w

find ways to develop Internet security. In the past, wh

guaranteed a good profit margin was to 

telecommunication and computer systems that w

Now, Internet security was the dominating concern. 

the conference recognized that if e-commerce is to 

ordinary Americans have to have confidence that 

communications are safe and secure from hacker

hopefully from state-sponsored terrorist activity as 

Recent events had contributed to the awareness 

conference participants. When, for example, a major 

was hit by hackers in January 2000, it lost money, a

American public promptly fled in large numbers t

bank’s competitors.

4

 The bank lost over 3,000 accoun

24-hour period. It is in the enlightened self-inter

businesses to improve their security. What is more

know this.

This leaves room for some optimism. In the 

analysis, for all the mutual suspicions, governmen

181
private industry are all in the same boat together. Bo

a considerable threat, and both stand to gain by inc

cooperation.

The government is, as we have seen, handicap

ways that business is not; the Fourth Amendmen

Federal regulations, while serving a vital purpose, 

obstacles in the way of government’s ability to h

threats to the private sector. The private sector would 

stand to gain if it could work more closely wit

government. The government has some experien

identifying adverse activity coming into its communic

systems. The Army, Air Force, and Navy, to a degree

all had some success using the computer sensors we sp

earlier in this chapter. The key to national securit

concern of government) and prosperity (the conc

business) hinges on the development of an adequate d

of U.S. information systems. It is, as we have str

extraordinarily difficult to take effective action agai

attack once it has taken place. So prevention becom

paramount importance. This is where we should devo

intellectual energies and our capital. And that is wh

necessary to build a strong defense system, in larg

managed and funded by the private sector.

Conclusion.

There are no easy solutions to complex problem

Kuehl is absolutely correct to stress the seriousness 

threat of information warfare. He is also surely cor

arguing that the DoD has both a role and responsibi

defending the United States from threats, intrusion

attacks mounted via this environment. To this end, we 

avoid the danger of functional paralysis. This come

number of flavors. When Spike Bowman from the FB

about its role in dealing with transnational threats

very FBI-centered. That is the result of his training. 

Dan Roper from the DoD makes a presentation o

problem, he offers the DoD as a solution, aga

182
outgrowth of his training. These are all he

perspectives, but alone they do not resolve the issue

necessary to realize our roles and missions, but it 

important to realize and accept that there is another 

doing business. And that is going to require a treme

amount of cooperation. That must include not 

cooperation among the government branches, wh

something that has been much discussed, but it mu

include cooperation with the private sector. Tog

and surely only together, government and the private 

can find a common solution to a difficult threat.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. The views expressed in this chapter are strictly the auth

do not reflect the official position of NSA. At the same ti

comments and observations have been shaped by my enviro

including my current position at NSA. The basic charter of Ex

Order 12333 says that NSA provides signals intelligen

communications security for the U.S. Government. There are b

two teams at NSA—the offense and the defense. I work on the de

side. My views have been enriched by Lieutenant General Ken

Minihan, my former boss as the Director of the National S

Agency, and by a professional colleague, Elizabeth Rindskopf-

based on discussions over the last several years. I also w

acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Jeffrey Hunker, who is 

director for critical infrastructure for the National Security Cou

who worked with me on the President’s Commission; to my co

Phil Williams; and to a an acquaintance made at the conferen

Roland. 

2. As mentioned earlier, cyber space has a very physical fa

this physical face can be controlled and exploited. Who is in contr

public switch network? Is it the government or is it private entiti

the telephone communication companies, AT&T, Ma Bell, Bell A

etc? Is it the Internet service providers? AOL? Do they 

responsibility for detecting and reporting criminal activity? D

have a role and responsibility in detecting activity that could be h

to our national infrastructure?

3. It would be possible in today’s environment for an 

nation-state to jeopardize the U.S. economy by attacking Wall 

183
4. In order to avoid precisely the kind of loss of confidence o

we have been speaking, we will not mention this bank by name

184
CHAPTER 13

COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL ORGANI

CRIME

Phil Williams

Introduction.

U.S. security is currently threatened by a vari

transnational threats. Of these, one of the most mena

international organized crime and drug trafficking

chapter will define and evaluate the nature of the t

identify some important trends in transnational orga

crime, and then consider how these threats should b

Three levels of response will be considered: multil

responses, the law enforcement response, and the m

response. The chapter will conclude with 

recommendations.

Assumptions and Concepts.

This chapter rests on several assumptions, which s

be clarified from the start. First, not all security threa

military in nature. Second, not all security threats req

military response. And third, threats depen

vulnerabilities.

1

 This last is a particularly key point to 

in a discussion of this sort. Vulnerabilities to orga

crime, as we will see, vary enormously from one st

another. This having been said, let us turn to a discus

some of the basic concepts which need to be grasped if 

to understand the threat posed by international orga

crime. 

First of all, what is organized crime? No one defi

exists, with academics differing considerably ov

meaning. I follow a Clausewitzian paradigm, de

organized crime as a continuation of business by cr

185
means. Given the name “organized crime,” one might 

a high level of organization to be a defining feature. T

some analysts say that organized crime is 

disorganized, I disagree. Organized crime is network-

and networks may sometimes have a somewhat c

appearance but are in fact a very sophisti

organizational form. Setting aside organization p

however, I would contend that organized crime is mar

three distinctive traits: association for criminal pur

corruption, and violence.

When we say that organized crime involves assoc

for criminal purposes, we are not implying tha

organization must be large. The crime unit can b

small, but the minimum number of persons involved is 

or more persons.

2

 Organized crime, moreover, m

systematic use of corruption. This is of param

importance, but has not always been suffic

emphasized in the literature on the subject. Orga

crime also makes occasional use of violence. Ru

contract killings, to suggest the scope of the pro

number about 500-600 a year. This figure is high eno

warrant the claim that organized crime challeng

state’s claim to a monopoly on the use of organized viol

The focus of this chapter is not on organized cr

general, but rather on international organized 

Organized crime has moved a long way from its root

local problem threatening domestic law and order. To

has a “transnational” dimension, involving cri

business enterprises on a global scale. If we comp

Capone and company with the drug scene in Colomb

point becomes clear. Whereas Al Capone was a sma

hood with a local fiefdom in Chicago, the drug traff

organization based in Cali, Colombia, was for a lon

the developing world’s most successful transna

“corporation.”

4

 It developed a global marketing strate

even at one point had application forms.

5

 The decapit

first, of the Medellin organization and then the Cali, 

186
the Colombian drug business to adapt itself to ch

circumstances. 

Now, if anything, it is even more mena

Colombian-based criminal groups are more num

(there are about 200 of them) and smaller (but still effe

than before. These groups have shown themselves 

adroit at answering challenges to their business. The

started to grow coca leaves themselves to reduce 

dependency on imports from Peru and Boliva. They 

diversified their products, now distributing heroin a

as cocaine. They send their products to market using 

variety of routes and employing a wide variety of 

groups. They continue to use Mexicans, although o

they have come to rely more on Caribbeans, esp

Dominicans, who demand only 25 to 30 percent of the 

(in contrast to the Mexicans, who want 50 percent

employment of Sicilians and Russians, in particula

added to the global dimension.

In what way is organized crime transnationa

rather, to phrase it differently, who or what crosses bo

First of all, there are those who perpetrate crimes, 

example the hit man who flies from Moscow to New Y

do a contract killing and then flies back. Second, the

profits. Today’s global financial system is a m

launderer’s dream. Access to financial systems is eas

movement of money is instantaneous, trading c

performed anonymously, and, best of all, profits c

placed in safe havens.

6

 Many of these are offshor

offshore financial systems of the Pacific islands offer 

interesting insights to what is going on. Their web sit

bilingual—English and Russian. Clearly, they are try

get a share of dirty money from Russia or capital 

processed via the Bank of New York.

Third, people as commodities cross borders. In 

instances, they are illegal immigrants, as for examp

Chinese who were smuggled into the United States on 

freighters.

7

 A lively traffic also exists in women and ch

187
who are being sold for commercial sex. Products ar

moved across borders. Goods range from drugs, arm

nuclear materials, to stolen arts and antiquities. Most 

flow from south to north, in other words from the deve

world to the developed world. The automobile move

north to south. Arms move in both directions. So, wh

worry about drugs coming north to us across the borde

Mexico, the Mexicans worry about guns going 

towards them from the United States. Finally, one ma

the fact that digital signals also cross borders 

directions. 

What accounts for this transformation of cri

organizations to international criminal organizatio

part it is a response to the pressures and opportuni

globalization. It is the dark side of the modern 

towards interdependence. All businesses have benef

a degree by globalization, and criminal businesses 

benefited more than most. They have benefited fro

internationalization of trade, finance, and communic

and also from the spread and proliferation of 

networks. The last is a point of particular impo

because organized crime tends, for a variety of reaso

flourish within the immigrant communities or diaspo

fascinating example of criminal cosmopolitanism is 

found in a small criminal group once operating out of 

Janiero; it was run by a Russian, the gang me

themselves were a mix of Nigerians and Ghanians, a

group was trafficking drugs to the United State

western Europe.

Criminal-friendly asymmetries also encourage m

this transnational activity. Criminals cross borders t

advantage of the legal, administrative, or m

opportunities afforded by the different coun

Criminals, for example, migrate to countries with cr

justice systems which pose little risk to them. They e

administrative asymmetries. When taxes are increa

cigarettes in Canada, for example, smuggling acro

Canadian border increases. Criminals engaged in fin

188
fraud seek out the profitable markets. South Afri

example, has become an important host state for 

criminal groups because it is the richest state 

southern part of Africa. The Nigerians now control th

trade in general as well as the cocaine tra

Johannesburg in particular. Over the last 5 year

Nigerians truly transformed the South African drug 

Five years ago, marijuana and mandrax were the dr

choice. Today it is cocaine and, to some extent, heroi

Transnational organized crime also flourishes beca

brings economic benefits. This is a disturbing notio

one that must be acknowledged if we are ever to get a h

on the problem. Organized crime is a supplie

multiplier of jobs and other trickle-down benefits. P

from organized crime are, to some extent, put back in

local economies. It is impossible to understand why so 

peasants have become heavily involved in the drug tr

South America if we do not recognize this. Cocaine is a 

profitable product than anything else they can grow; 

do not make much from it, they still make more tha

would growing the crop substitutes that have 

proposed. Moreover, black markets often sprin

existence because legal markets do not work effectiv

Finally, it is worth noting that, common opinion 

contrary, organized crime is not a direct threat to the 

financial system. Though it does do indirect dama

challenging its legitimacy, it is much too dependent 

system to do anything directly to destroy it. The 

scandal involving the Bank of New York elucidat

love-hate relationship that exists between organized 

and the global financial system. The Bank of New 

developed relations with a large number of Russian b

Despite the American CEO’s disclaimer, it is clear th

two were engaged in what can figuratively be descri

consensual sex in which the Bank of New York 

vigorous partner indeed. The Bank of New York ig

evidence that over 40 percent of Russian banks 

189
controlled by organized crime.

12

 Organized crim

financial institutions, in short, make good bedfellows

The Nature of the Threat.

International organized crime today poses a mixt

traditional and new threats. Both a Cold War 

post-Cold War paradigm are at work. This increas

complexity of the environment. World politics, as so as

forecast by James Rosenau, will in the future involv

worlds: the state-centric world, which is the trad

diplomatic world; and the multi-centric world, 

there is a multiplicity of non-state actors.

13

 The form

world that we are all used to and within which we 

developed some competence. States are very good at d

with threats from other states. Institutions such 

State Department and the Department of Defense 

been created in order to deal with this kind of state t

The other world is a new phenomenon. It is not 

whether this world presents us with a greater or 

challenge than the state-centric world.

14

 But it is clea

the interplay of the state-centric and multi-centric w

will shape our ability to respond to threats in both wor

Any evaluation of the threat must also tak

consideration that threats to us vary, depending up

vulnerabilities. The threat from transnational orga

crime constitutes a direct security threat to vuln

states, but only an indirect threat to less vulnerable s

Transnational crime does not for the most part d

threaten the United States; an exception might b

smuggling of nuclear materials from the former 

Union by criminal organizations.

At the same time, it should be recognized that the 

is multi-level. It may be a threat to good governan

institutions, and to individuals. As such, interna

organized crime is not just a traditional national se

threat. There are three aspects of organized crime th

impinge on the security of states. First, illegal ma

190
while impacting largely on individual security, can 

the trafficking of arms) directly affect national se

Second, the concentration of illegal power can unde

the democratic process and democratic governments. 

organized crime processes can undermine the rule o

This is tragically visible in Russia where “cleptocrac

“mafiocracy” have prevailed, effectively underminin

hoped-for transition to democracy. This important r

explains why corruption must be seen as one of the de

features of international organized crime. Orga

crime-related corruption is the HIV of the modern 

because it breaks down the defense of the body p

Corruption is not just a condition, moreover. It 

instrument of transnational organized crime.

15

 Orga

crime uses corruption for a variety of purposes, 

essentially aims to neutralize and, in some cases, ca

the state.

Criminal Organizations and States.

States, as we have already indicated, offer cr

organizations different kinds and degrees of opportu

depending upon how vulnerable they are. Organized 

thrives best where the state is weak and corrupt. Cr

organizations use such states as home states. Sta

transition are often especially vulnerable; example

include Russia, South Africa, and Cambodia. Cr

organizations do their best to perpetuate corruption i

states, because it is this which makes them effectiv

havens. Host states, from the perspective of cr

organizations, are states where the good markets are. 

Sutton, the famous bank robber, was once asked w

robbed banks. He said, “That’s where the money is.” T

why many organized crime groups use states lik

United States or South Africa as host states. These a

states where they can make enormous pr

Transshipment states neighbor home states an

affected by incidental corruption along the way. In 

America, for example, drug trafficking corruption sta

191
home states like Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, but exte

transshipment states like Venezuela, Argentina

Brazil. Finally, there are also what might be called se

states which serve as financial havens.

Attitudes of States.

Attitudes of states toward organized crime differ w

Some do their best to control crime. At the other end 

spectrum, some states are actually controlled by 

Nigeria, under its military dictatorship, offers us a 

example of this kind of state.

16

 States do not neces

remain constant in their attitude towards crime, e

Colombia, for a long time, certainly acquiesced i

perhaps even accepted organized crime, but unde

pressure it has adopted a confrontational attitude.

States in transition show a tendency to acquiesce 

activities of criminal organizations. There are s

reasons for this. First, if we look at such states as the f

Soviet Union, we find that prior to the collapse of c

authority and control, organized crime did exist 

circumscribed and controlled form. When the control

suddenly removed, crime proliferated enormously. S

states in transition often suffer from massive eco

dislocation. This causes people to migrate from the 

economy to the illegal economy. Third, social norms 

down in states in transition. This open up the local soc

foreign values; in Kurdistan, for example, U.S. 

movie-style gangsters live again.

Openness to the world is also a result of what c

called capacity gaps and functional holes. Bas

states in transition—that is, weak states—do not pe

all the acts of governance that we associate with s

Organized crime can do two things—it can exploit th

or it can fill the hole. For example, in Russia, there ha

very little government. Borders are no longer as car

monitored as they used to be, so that organized 

exploits the hole and crosses them. Because the gover

192
has not done much by way of legal arbitration of bu

disputes or of debt collection, organized crime fills th

and takes on those tasks.

Corruption plays a critical role in all of this. Corr

is used to neutralize the state or even capture it. Th

happened, at least arguably, in Mexico, Russia, Turke

South Africa. In contested states, the results are still 

decided. In criminal states, the issue has been decide

the side of crime.

Trends in Transnational Organized Crime.

Several trends should be noted in transna

organized crime:

• It is becoming more widespread, more prevalen

more diverse. Fifteen or twenty years ago, organized 

was largely restricted to the Italian community

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was able to dea

crime by focusing on this ethnic group. This is no 

true. We are now dealing with what might be calle

new ethnic mobs.”

• Organized crime is increasingly gaining contro

property and, partly as a result of this, has much g

economic influence than in the past.

17

• Organized crime is becoming increas

sophisticated and using increasingly sophisti

weapons. A few years ago, in a classic conflict be

criminal organizations, the Hells Angels and 

Bandidos, in Norway and Denmark, used antitank we

and grenade launchers against each other.

• Crime groups are trafficking in an increasing v

of goods. The Global Survival Network in Washingt

example, discovered that the same group tha

trafficking in Siberian tigers was trafficking in w

Similarly, the groups involved in antiquities trafficki

now involved in the trafficking of nuclear materials.

193
• Cooperation among criminal organizations is gr

with such growth taking many shapes. While there 

clear connection to terrorists, we are seeing some blur

boundaries between criminals and terrorists, especi

countries such as Colombia, Kurdistan, Tajikistan

often difficult to tell who is who. Sometimes a terrori

once had a political cause becomes a criminal becaus

cause has been taken away.

• Criminal organizations are becoming increa

adroit at the exploitation of information technologies

use it in much the same way as do other firms, nota

increase their managerial efficiency.

• Criminal organizations have largely abandoned 

traditional hierarchical organization and instea

increasingly coming to rely on highly flexible networ

loose coupling. This gives them the advantage of bein

to cross boundaries and borders with ease, and cros

the illegal sector to the legal world. It also means that 

part of their network is destroyed, criminal organiz

will continue to be able to function. The networks 

them resilient and the battle space complex.

Responses.

Responses come in various forms: multila

responses, law enforcement responses, and mi

responses. 

Multilateral Responses. The response to interna

organized crime comes from many quarters. On th

hand, the international community has taken some a

though of varying degrees of effectiveness. Conventio

useful inasmuch as they do set norms. The United N

(U.N.), most notably, held a World Ministerial Conf

in 1994, and this year will adopt a convention agreem

transnational organized crime. A financial action tas

(FATF) was also established. It is, in essence, a peer r

body which checks out its members and encourages 

194
to join. The objective is to stop such criminal activi

money laundering. For example, the Federal Emer

Management Agency (FEMA) reports transaction

$10,000 and writes reports on suspicious activity. FA

not very effective, however; participation is time-cons

and requires a lot of work while not accomplishing mu

the other hand, there are some relatively effective re

initiatives. Bilateral-multilateral task forces, su

Europol, have met with some success; the task 

approach in general seems to be one that works, at lea

of the time.

Multilateral responses, however, have inh

shortcomings. This is especially true when it com

efforts to regulate international behavior. Some me

lack commitment; some even defect. Others simply la

capacity to implement convention agreements. Mor

measures tend to become diluted when enacted 

multilateral forum. For example, efforts have been m

create a global money-laundering regime. First the

regulated states. These include the United States a

European countries (which continue, despite regulat

be the biggest money launderers). Then there a

offshore banks. These are regulated to some degree

then there is the rest of the world. Here very few regul

apply. 

Cooperation between nations is also not very e

achieve. Some progress has been made on extra

treaties, which make it possible to catch fugitive

mutual assistance treaties, which make possib

collection of evidence. But problems remain. The fac

different legal traditions prevail in different parts 

world is a perpetual stumbling block. How, for exa

does a country know that its partner is reliable? U.

enforcement, at the federal level, hesitates to work 

Mexicans because they know the information is a

inevitably going to be passed on immediately to crim

From the Mexican perspective, they have reason to be 

of the United States, which is capable of acti

195
heavy-handed fashion. Customs, for example, put to

a very good sting operation, called Casablanca. I

however, a unilateral action, which was suffic

aggravating to the Mexicans to oblige Secretary of 

Albright to offer them an apology.

Law Enforcement Response. Law enforcement ag

across the world have a mixed record. They have enga

some productive efforts, with the FBI, for example, h

met with considerable success, notably in dealing w

Cosa Nostra. The kingpin strategy of the Drug Enforc

Agency (DEA) and the Italian use of Pantiti (defector

agree to cooperate in return for leniency) have also pro

be effective. But the law enforcement response has 

real limitations.

First, it focuses its efforts at a low level. Most of t

enforcement communities fail to target the real source 

problem: profits, organizational integrity, and leade

Instead they try to seize products, picks up low 

personnel, and recover some money. The FBI and the 

are, perhaps, exceptions to this rule. Second

enforcement ultimately has no choice but to be preocc

with cases. This makes it, for the most part, reactiv

consequence of this is that it has failed to deve

comprehensive strategy for combating organized 

Third, the efforts made by law enforcement are fragm

There are Federal, regional, state, and local agencies, 

do not always cooperate. The problem is compound

interagency rivalries, which afflict law enforcement 

as they afflict the military. Recent efforts to a

jointness have been only moderately successful. Final

of the most serious difficulties comes from the fac

criminals operate in a borderless world. Law enforcem

bordered. Criminals have learned to use bo

defensively. This has proven to be a major obstacle 

effective containment of the threat.

Military Response. The military does have a usef

to play in dealing with international organized crime. 

196
played a constructive part in the interdiction of drug

other criminal products. It has made useful contribut

the area of intelligence. It provided a model, whic

modified the way law enforcement unders

intelligence. Thanks to the military, we now hav

National Drug Intelligence Center, focused on str

intelligence. And even though law enforcement do

always understand how to make use of that intelligenc

clearly a step in the right direction.

18

 The militar

provides short-term surge capability in regard to 

inspections. 

The U.S. military has become involved in com

criminal organizations during the course of peaceke

operations. In places where there are black markets

the only powers at hand are criminal figures. The sit

can be confusing, with no obvious “good guys” and 

guys.” Different factions work together at times and k

another at times; sometimes they work together in or

get the money to kill one another! The military has 

navigate through these tricky waters, gaining some 

experience dealing with criminal organizations in so d

Yet, there are some serious limits to the usefulness 

military in dealing with this particular transna

threat. First of all, when we deal with organized crim

are dealing with a continuation of business by cr

means. We are, in effect, dealing with business ma

The military provides a very blunt instrument 

refined tools are needed. Second, we are dealing 

organizations that have safe havens. Where the crim

go, the military cannot always follow.

When considering the appropriate role of the mi

we must also remember that the threat differs from co

to country. For the United States, the organized 

problem is essentially a law-and-order problem. For 

in transition, the problem is much more serious. S

their militaries become involved? What of Russ

example, where you have an iron triangle of polit

197
businessmen, and criminals, and where the military 

has been corroded by the environment?

Again, does the U.S. military have a role to p

assisting these other countries deal with the problem

to a limited degree. There are limits to U.S. powe

influence. Intervention in weak states does not seem 

good idea; the lessons of Vietnam should remind us o

There is a further problem. When the United 

intervenes in a weak state, it undermines the authori

legitimacy of that state. And yet it is that very l

authority and legitimacy that has made the weak 

vulnerable to organized crime in the first place. Colom

a case in point. One thing we can do is to be more c

where we give our aid and encourage the interna

institutions to be the same. In short, the multil

response is flawed, the law enforcement respo

fragmented, and the military response has li

applicability. 

Developing a Comprehensive Strategy.

A comprehensive strategy needs to be developed

United States is attempting to do this, although more 

to be done. What does this entail? First, we must do w

can to build viable states so that criminals no longer 

so easy to shelter in weak states. This will increase th

for criminals and distribute the problems more evenl

United States has taken steps to do this, and, interes

its legislation has inspired similar legislation in 

Africa. 

Second, we must recognize that international orga

crime is a national security threat. This will serve s

purposes. It will ensure that more resources will be d

to the task of combating this threat. It will enco

intelligence agencies to become more fully involved. 

will encourage the adoption of military concepts. M

concepts and strategic approaches are often very func

The military stresses, for one thing, the importa

198
defining objectives, which is something that could us

be emulated by law enforcement. Target harden

another concept that might usefully be applied 

civilian sector.

19

 The military model for jointness co

used to help foster interagency cooperation.

Third, we need to build international law enforc

networks. It takes a network to defeat a network; this 

the Hungary training academy is so important. To 

international organized crime, it is important, as ha

stressed earlier, to attack what really matters 

criminals—their networks, their leaders, and their w

This is done, first, by identifying the critical nod

criminal organization, followed by attacking this nod

its connections. Then the crossover figures, the 

protectors, must be removed. Criminal markets m

targeted. The risks for criminals must be increase

their profits reduced. The demand must be decrease

the supply cut off. Sanctuaries for both criminal

criminal proceeds must be eliminated.

20

 Efforts mus

be made to undermine the structures which su

criminal organizations. These include the criminal 

with politicians and business. Finally, the enviro

should be modified. For example, Russia’s perver

system plays into the hands of members of organized 

It provides incentives for people to avoid paying taxe

since the criminals have access to banking records

have the means to blackmail a large percentage 

Russian population. This makes it hard for anyone to 

against them.

Conclusion.

Organized crime, defined as a continuation of bu

by criminal means, has recently attained a transna

dimension. This transnational extension is a response 

pressures and opportunities of globalization. It has re

in a type of criminal organization that is highly ada

and very slippery to deal with. While clearly harm

199
many ways, organized crime does benefit some, a fact 

makes it all the harder to uproot. Responses to the 

have come from many quarters; none has proved to b

effective. The threat is certainly serious enough to w

a concerted effort on the part of the United States (and 

nations) to develop and implement a comprehe

strategy to counter the threat. This strategy should 

the values that truly matter to the criminals. And it s

learn from the experience of both the military and th

enforcement communities.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. Lawrence Friedman made this point about strategic 

power.

2. Two’s company; three’s an organized crime syndicate.

3. The Ridgway Center at the University of Pittsburgh 

database on Russian contract killings, which number about 50

year. It is an interesting list because it enables one see wha

Russian organized crime is influencing. For example, in 1993-9

were numerous contract killings in the banking sector. It was cle

Russian organized crime was becoming entrenched in the R

banking system. In 1995-96, there were numerous killings 

aluminum industry surrounding Lev Churney and the C

brothers, who were linked to some important people in Moscow

been suggested that Churney was involved in laundering 

through the Bank of New York, along with a long line of other peo

was involved in various forms of corruption and also resorted to v

occasionally. In a 6-month period, close to ten people associated 

fashion with the aluminum industry were killed. It was not clear 

some cases, the killings appear to have been linked to a desire 

tracks. 

4. Though often referred to as a cartel, it never really was o

5. One interesting dimension of these application forms was 

applicant was asked to include next-of-kin so that there was som

exact retribution against in the event that he stepped out of lin

6. For example, there are walk-in accounts where you can pu

in one jurisdiction and then move it on immediately to another

have bank secrecy restrictions such that if the FBI or some ot

200
enforcement agency asks for and receives information, th

employee who supplies the information is in some cases then su

criminal prosecution in that jurisdiction.

7. In fact, about 90 percent of the illegal Chinese immigrants 

by air and only about ten percent by sea.

8. Nicholas Passus, at Temple University, developed this 

Transnational organized crime is deeply imbedded in ethnic ne

This is not to say that all immigrants are criminals. More often th

they are the victims rather than perpetrators of crime.

9. As additional examples, the turn to the growing of coca som

20 years ago, and the turn to opium in Southeast Asia, we

market-driven.

10. It seems to this author that the Bank of New York d

actionable intelligence. Even if it did not know specifically whic

were controlled by the mobs, it certainly could have shown at 

much diligence as it showed in checking up on its partners, whic

not.

11. He wrote a book in 1989 calledTurbulence in World Politi

was written before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the en

Cold War. It was one of the few academic studies that predicted 

of the Cold War and had a clear sense of the way in which world 

would change.

12. The problem is that many states defect. Defection is on

decisive factors shaping international relations, and, increasing

future, bilateral relations. We do not have to expect the c

civilizations so much as a clash between those states that are ess

law-abiding and those states that represent criminal interests.

13. Headly Bull once raised the questions in relation to 

deterrence, “Who is trying to deter whom, from what actions, b

means?” An analogous question can be asked regarding corr

“Who is trying to corrupt whom, for what purposes, using what m

14. David Kaplan published a wonderful story in U.S. Ne

World Report, calling North Korea a wise-guy state representin

case of organized crime taking over the state, but of the state tak

organized crime.

15. David Kaplan did another wonderful piece, again in U.S

and World Report, on the Yakuza’s role in the financial crisis in J

201
16. The center has several problems, one of which is its e

location in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, dictated by pork barrel p

17. For example, major oil companies have coordination un

work with law enforcement to try to keep mischievous intruder

their industry. Some of their employees have been sent as stud

the Ridgway Center.

18. At the moment, the off-shore world is a major sanctuar

we are currently attempting to eliminate.

202
CHAPTER 14

PHIL WILLIAMS’ VIEW OF

CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DRU

TRAFFICKING:

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Thomas V. Fuentes

Dr. Phil Williams’ chapter provides a compreh

and valuable assessment of the threat pos

international organized crime and drug trafficking a

interesting discussion of the measures taken to deal w

The purpose of this brief chapter is to respond to Wi

views from the perspective of the Federal Bure

Investigation (FBI). I am writing from my expe

running the FBI office concerned with organized crim

office deals with all international organized crime 

except those concerned with specific Mexican/

American drug cartels.

1

 Besides monitoring 

developments around the world, this office also 

investigations worldwide.

2

 For the most par

disagreement with Williams is minor, centering up

contention that the FBI is not doing all that it can 

combat organized crime.

Points of Agreement.

Williams’ analysis of how criminal organiza

operate is, in general, borne out by this author’

experience. Several points deserve to be emphasized

indeed true that organized crime can bring “benefit

interesting example of this can be found in the U

States, where we may point to the marriage of orga

crime and the federal government during World War 

American La Cosa Nostra and Lucky Luciano str

bargain with the U.S. Navy, agreeing to use 

203
organizations to protect the docks, particularly o

eastern seaboard, from Nazi sabotage.

Also key is Williams’ observation that organized cr

not a threat to the United States in the same way tha

terrorists are. Criminals are not, in fact, interes

attacking us or defeating us for political purpo

through some kind of ideological imperative. They 

want to take us over. As a matter of fact, it is in the

interest not to do us too much damage. If you imagi

United States as a blood donor, and organized crim

leech, you will understand the point. It is not in th

interest of the leech to kill the donor. Interna

criminals want to bring their money to the United S

They want to bring their operations here or at leas

advantage of our protective measures. They want to o

within our structures and within our economy.

The famous movie, The Godfather, is revealing i

regard. It portrays how criminal groups started 

Italian community and then expanded. They gradual

over key labor organizations and the re

industries—from trucking to longshoremen and 

workers. The actual La Cosa Nostra operated, in fac

much in this way, particularly in New York and some 

major northeastern cities. This is the sort of agenda 

minds of criminal organizations. We should not min

the problems created for us by organized crime, b

should also keep the threat in perspective. In the 

analysis, these groups are anxious to continuing feed

the golden trough, and this offers us some safeguard

Williams is also right to stress that organized cr

groups are becoming globalized. The traditional Am

crime organizations are, to be sure, a bit of an excep

this regard. They are well entrenched, satisfied with 

situation, and reluctant to change. The Italian mo

structured on the model of the Roman army and not, 

much interested in networking. They have become in

204
in technology and off-shore organizations only to a l

extent. 

Nonetheless, globalization is indeed a trend to be 

It is certainly very true of Eurasian-Russian organiza

These do indeed rely on networking and have becom

international. They now operate on every inha

continent, even on the South Sea Islands! Russian 

groups have infiltrated the countries of Eastern E

turning Budapest, Hungary, for example, into a kin

Moscow south. Also bothersome, given the volatile na

the Middle East, is that 18 percent of emigrés to Israe

from the former Soviet Union. Probably seven of t

nine crime bosses in Russia have dual citizenship in 

“Specter,” that sinister group of global criminals of 

Bond fame does have some real world equivalents. Th

becoming dominant on a number of continents an

taking advantage of what Dr. Williams calle

“vulnerable” states.

Transnational organized crime groups, notably 

from the former Soviet Union, are also invading ou

They are interested in exploiting our bank and inves

system in order to more freely access the global fin

network—something they find difficult to do from M

Williams quite correctly highlighted that the cri

organizations to emerge in Russia today are groups th

already learned to operate successfully unde

communist regime. They are used to operating a sur

economy, regardless of official boundaries. Though 

are no indications that they want to take over eith

United States or any other Western country, there is a

question that under certain circumstances they do 

serious threat to national security. It is, for exam

matter of considerable concern that organized crime g

are able to compromise a country like Russia, whic

among other dangerous assets, a nuclear capability.

205
Points of Disagreement.

In most regards, I find myself in cordial agreemen

Williams. There are, however, a couple of exceptions. 

these concerns the Bank of New York (BONY) scanda

Bank of New York has been sharply criticized for deve

banking relations with a large number of Russian ba

spite of the fact that over 40 percent of the Russian ba

system was known to be controlled by organized crim

It is not clear to me, however, that what happene

quite as nefarious or damaging as has been suggest

the first place, we are not necessarily looking at an ef

the part of the Russians to use BONY for money laun

purposes. For this to be true, it has to be shown th

money sent to New York was gained illegally in Russia

has not been proven.

4

 Second, Russia was not self-evi

a loser from these transactions. The problem is th

Russians do not have a functional consumer ba

system. In order to expand the economy, all the foreig

including loans from the IMF, had to be put in f

banks. It was logical enough to rely on American b

given the stability of the dollar.

5

 A lot of the money th

sent to the United States was returned to Russia. Wha

place, in other words, was not so much the one-way l

of the vast resources of the Russian economy as it w

exercise in fund management.

Are we perhaps exaggerating the significance o

episode? If we look at the sorts of things that migh

happened over the last 10 years and have not, we migh

a clearer perspective. After all, we have not had to re

military action since the Berlin Wall came down. No

we faced a military coup or a communist takeover 

former Soviet Union. For that matter, we have 

witnessed approximately 10 years without a revolut

change in regime. For all the entrenched prese

organized crime, disaster has not struck. We need to 

closer and less emotional look at the role played 

criminal element in Russia.

206
The second point of contention that I have with Wi

concerns the role of the FBI. Williams’ view is that th

tends to be reactive and has not as yet develo

comprehensive strategy. It thus fails, in his view, to 

some of the more important problems. The FBI al

charges, fails to cooperate with other branch

government to the extent it might.

Whether the FBI has what can be cal

comprehensive strategy may perhaps be quest

although it certainly does have a strategy, here outli

brief:

• Identify the organized crime groups posin

greatest threat to the United States or our sign

partners throughout the world;

• Determine the structure of the group and the sc

its criminal activities;

• Develop prosecutable cases against priority g

using the criminal and civil provisions of the RICO s

in order to disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprise; 

• Establish working relationships with domest

foreign law enforcement and intelligence comm

agencies to accomplish this mission.

The other charge—regarding failure to cooperate—

for a more detailed rebuttal. Many critics claim 

intelligence and law enforcement agencies do not 

information because they do not like each other, do no

to work together, and are protecting their turf. The

argue that it is the culture of law enforcement an

culture of the intelligence community that create te

This is to trivialize what is going on. These organizati

recognize the advantages to be gained by cooperatio

do, in fact, work together with other agencies. Th

section that I run, for example, is in touch with bo

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Na

Security Agency (NSA).

6

 If these organization

reluctant to share information, it is for quite legit

207
reasons: the sharing of information carries with it 

serious hazards. Moreover, not just cultural, but als

barriers exist between the intelligence and law enforc

communities.

To understand the reluctance to share informatio

important to appreciate one of the fundamental re

about the prosecution of cases by the FBI. This organi

must litigate its cases in the public sector. As is well k

in U.S. criminal prosecutions, the defendant has a r

face his accusers in court and challenge the man

which evidence was obtained by the prosecution. A se

pre-trial hearings is held to determine what ite

evidence are admissible. The main focus of every t

proving facts to a jury in order for that jury to con

beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty 

offenses charged.

7

 In prosecution cases based upo

investigations, it is imperative that the FBI e

constitutionally permissible means to obtain the ev

used, both to build its case and to present it in cour

government must explain how the evidence was ob

and who provided the information used to further the c

The discovery process, as this is called, creates a s

dilemma for both law enforcement and intelligenc

intelligence agency that provides law enforcement wi

information must disclose the sources and the meth

used to obtain that information. Clearly this 

problems. If the intelligence community has a highly-

source reporting on sensitive espionage matte

naturally does not want to risk having that penetrat

capability exposed in a U.S. courtroom. It also ne

protect the sources and methods of its overseas partn

the same time, the law enforcement agency runs the 

being ordered by the judge to either identify the sou

drop the entire prosecution. To be put into this qua

after spending 3-4 years, not to speak of thousands o

hours and other resources, on a case is no small risk

208
The lack of smooth communication betwee

enforcement and intelligence, moreover, is due to c

legal barriers. These, it should be stressed, did not h

accidentally, but deliberately. The National Security 

1947, which created the intelligence community as we 

it, put up walls between the different agencies. The fe

that if intelligence and law enforcement were to 

completely, an Orwellian type of government would 

and “Big Brother” would watch the American peop

closely. 

The concern for the preservation of the liberties a

privacy of the public is not unique to our country. M

office is currently directly and indirectly involved wi

working groups of some 30 countries. They are a

sensitive to this issue, particularly those who come 

countries like Germany and Italy, which suffered und

fascist yoke during World War II. They have been 

extremely limited police powers. It took about 10 

(1984-1994) for the FBI, for example, to persuad

Italians to allow the use of a “Pantiti”— a confid

informant or a cooperative witness.

8

 The Italian polic

not allowed to collect intelligence and conduct opera

even in their capacity as members of a law enforc

agency. They were certainly not allowed to cooperat

the intelligence community and take advantage 

assets, sources, and methods. The foreign partners 

United States, in short, share our concern fo

preservation of liberties.

Does this mean that cooperation between the v

agencies is an impossible task? Clearly not. Indeed, h

the United States some changes have been made ov

last couple of years. The National Security Ac

amended and several useful presidential directive

example, PD-42) were issued. These directives state

the FBI did have the right to use information collec

the intelligence community for intelligence purposes, 

information could be of benefit for law enforc

purposes. These measures have not brought an end 

209
the difficulties, however. The FBI has had to set 

protocol establishing how intelligence information ge

its hands from the intelligence community and the

disseminated to its agents in the field. This is an ar

task. It is also a challenging one, since the intell

community is still not exempt from the discovery pro

One final point should be made. The insistence 

need to subject criminal investigations to careful 

scrutiny and to maintain the barriers betwee

enforcement and intelligence should not be seen 

entirely negative light. The FBI enjoys an excep

reputation with its overseas counterparts. Its oper

during criminal prosecutions are held up as role m

Thanks to this reputation, the FBI can play a r

extending the rule of law overseas. Through its w

groups, joint investigations, training programs, and 

efforts, the FBI promotes support for tough, but fair

and constitutional safeguards to ensure the proper b

between protection of the people and individual lib

These are concepts that are regrettably absent in 

parts of the world. In the long run, promotion of these 

will do as much as anything to reduce international 

Thus, while it is true that investigations and prosec

are to a degree handicapped by legal requirements, 

safeguards are the very things that give the United 

credibility. They should not lightly be cast aside.

In short, the FBI recognizes the need to o

information to prosecute its cases. And it is certainly 

steps to improve communication with other intell

agencies. Yet, whether it is tactical intelligence, as th

calls it, or actionable intelligence, as the intell

community calls it, the bottom line is that information 

be obtained in a usable fashion, and has to stand up to 

scrutiny and the jurisprudential process.

210
Conclusion.

In conclusion, Williams offers a valuable assessm

the threats posed by transnational organized crim

indeed makes many valuable suggestions as to how 

threats should be addressed. In weighing his discuss

the role of law enforcement, however, all readers nee

fully cognizant of the realities that govern the opera

the FBI.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. When Russian and Italian organized crime are involv

South American drug-trafficking organizations, Mr. Fuentes’ se

involved. His section at FBI headquarters covers organized c

Asia, Eurasia, Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and South Afric

2. The FBI has close to 1,000 investigations in process over

virtually every country with the possible exception of North Kore

couple of Middle Eastern countries, where the United States is 

very popular.

3. An article in the New York Times, August 18, 1999, claim

billions of dollars of IMF loans were stolen or diverted by R

organized crime, and that much of this was transferred to the 

New York. Similar media accusations followed.

4. If the money concerned had originated as direct U.S. aid a

been stolen before it arrived in Russia’s Central Bank, the FB

have been given jurisdiction in the case. However, the funds con

were IMF loans and did reach Moscow. Hence the responsibility 

billions of dollars transferred out of Moscow is Russian. Fo

transactions to be defined as “money laundering,” they must 

money that was obtained illegally. Since the FBI has no jurisdi

Russia, only the Russian authorities can obtain and turn o

evidence concerning how the money transfers were initiated, an

responsible. In the BONY case, we have identified 165,000 ind

transactions totaling $7 billion. The transfers occurred over the 

of an 18-month period. The funds moved from Moscow throu

banks in over 50 countries to accounts at BONY. Russian auth

including the MVD, FSB, Tax Police, and officials of the Centra

are still investigating the matter.

5. This was especially true up to 1988 when the ruble was dev

211
6. The author has a group in his section working full time 

matter. An operations officer has been assigned to him from t

and he maintains dual contacts with the NSA.

7. The O. J. Simpson trial, for example, clearly centered on 

investigators secured the evidence. Who got the DNA? Should th

gotten it? How was the evidence processed? Where did the inves

go?

8. A “Pantiti” is someone who is caught up in an investigat

agrees to cooperate instead of going to jail.

212
CHAPTER 15

PHIL WILLIAMS’ VIEWS ON

COMBATING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZ

CRIME:

ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

James R. McDonough

My chapter derives from my experiences as Dire

the Florida Office of Drug Control Policy, and prior to t

Director of Strategy for the Office of National Drug Co

These jobs have put me in a position to apprecia

complexity of the drug control problem. I have been in

in developing national and state strategies to dea

transnational threats as they pertain to the illega

threat. At the same time, I have experienced first-ha

difficulties that follow in trying to implement 

strategies at a local level. Incidentally, one thing I le

very early in the game is that there is a danger in class

drug trafficking in the same way as other typ

international organized crime. Drug trafficking 

constitute a unique category, and for this reason it m

be possible to apply the same sorts of solutions as to 

types of organized crime.

Let me begin by endorsing the effort being m

understand transnational threats and to find ways t

with them. As one who participated in writing the 

National Defense Panel report calling for hom

defense, I am very sympathetic to the goals of Tr

Institute for Security Studies (TISS) and the Arm

College (AWC). Nonetheless, I urge caution in ap

general solutions to what constitute com

multi-dimensional problems.

To put this chapter in context, two points must be 

First, I cannot agree with Dr. Williams’ contention, if 

what he meant to imply, that there might be some ben

213
some criminal organizations. While the theor

foundation of this view can be appreciated, in practi

position is quite untenable. There are about 1.2 millio

users in the state of Florida. About 700,000 of the

addicted or on their way to addiction. Last year, the 

rate from drug overdoses in Florida surpassed our m

rate. Our heroin overdose rate is now growing at som

like 50 percent a year. About 250,000 of the addic

Florida Office of Drug Control seeks to assist are ch

Of these, many are children of the middle class. No 

immune from the threat of illegal drugs, regardl

geographic location, economic status, educat

background, or ethnicity. Drugs underlie a great prop

of the crime, ill health, social malaise, child abuse, eco

waste, and family disintegration in America today. W

a massive problem on our hands, and it does not seem 

that we can claim that much good comes out of 

trafficking.

Second, we have a drug problem in the United 

because we have a high demand for drugs. We ask f

drugs and pay top dollar for them. A strategic appro

the business of drug trafficking must logically, the

start with a reduction in demand. The Florida Drug C

Office, and the Office of National Drug Control Po

well, puts most of its effort not in the reduction of the s

and not towards undermining the organizations that s

the drugs. It focuses most of all on a reduction in dem

does so by discouraging the onset of drug abuse by thos

have not yet begun to use them, and by treating thos

are addicted to drugs so that they can once again b

productive citizens. And this is as it should be. If som

we could reduce demand for drugs to zero, our s

problems would go away.

Observations.

I offer a number of observations and suggestions a

relate to the problem of drug trafficking.

214
• We should not underrate our ability to deal wi

threat. To be sure, at times it looks as if we have ma

progress. But we also have not made the kind of con

effort of which we as a nation are capable. While it 

that the organizations that traffic in drugs are ric

powerful, hiring good communicators, bankers

lawyers, we are the United States of America. We 

taken on capable foes before and vanquished them. W

defeat this threat if we make the effort, and it is of c

importance that we do.

• Law enforcement and intelligence must improv

ability to cooperate with one another. While both hav

successes to their credit, they have not combined effor

shared their capabilities in an intelligent fashio

February 2, 1997, in the White House, I was called u

brief the Mexican government’s drug czar. He had jus

checked out by the Drug Enforcement Administ

(DEA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the F

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and others. Less than a 

later, he was found hanging by his ankles in a M

prison in the northern part of the country, corrupt up 

eyeballs. This was news to me. The Customs ope

Casablanca, mentioned by Williams in Chapter 13

beautifully conceived and, in many ways, well execu

did not help, however, that my boss Barry McCaffrey, 

in charge of the Office of National Drug Control in the 

House, first found out about the operation when he rea

the newspaper! Nor did it help that the Attorney G

was kept in the dark. Joint operations hold great prom

countering such unilateralism. Not only do they te

keep all the critical players informed, they prom

produce a whole greater than the sum of their parts.

• By and large, the military should be kept out 

fight against drugs. There are only limited thing

military can do to combat international organized 

and many of the things it can do, it should not. The 

War College solicited some advice from us: my advice 

stay away from a direct operational role. That is not 

215
that the military has no role at all to play. Williams 

very good job outlining the ways in which the armed 

can make a useful contribution. They do an excelle

training people; they can (and do) train other age

including law enforcement personnel; they can train 

nations in a variety of ways, including the use of techn

They are good at handling equipment. They are g

communication, and no better group of translators i

found anywhere.

They also can do some things that they would be 

off not doing. They can, for instance, work the po

glimpse of the soldiers put to work manning the do

Florida will shed light on my argument. Soldiers stan

large sea-land container, unload boxes, put them th

an X-ray machine, and then stick them back i

container. That is what they do all day, 7 days a 

indefinitely. While their performance of duty is adm

and the work crucial, this is probably not the best 

precious military manpower.

Soldiers also are entrusted with reconnaissance 

along the borders. Here the problem is a little diff

There is a real danger that they will react unwise

precipitate a crisis. Imagine to yourself a group of 

tough guys, rather gung-ho, who have been told to kee

for crossers. They see somebody moving and assume 

trying to flank them. They get nervous and fire. An

shoot a boy dead. In this instance, the problem is no

they cannot (legally) do the job, but that they may not 

personnel who have the training and disposition to h

the threat in the optimum way.

Williams also rightly stressed that the militar

learned a lot about organization and working jointl

others. Lending that expertise to other organizations 

probably be very helpful. Barry McCaffrey has, in 

taken note of this. He has gathered a bank of milit

former military people around him to help organiz

coordinate the national counterdrug efforts of the m

216
federal, state, and local agencies that contribute 

endeavor. I have taken a page out of his book, trying to 

the lessons of organizing to solve complex problems 

learned during a long career in the military.

• We would do better to approach the drug-traff

problem from an operational level as well a

oft-discussed strategic level. We should move, in 

words, from preoccupation with solutions at the str

level to what could be applied at the operational leve

chapters in this book are largely devoted to a conside

of transnational threats as seen from a nat

perspective. They have discussed what can be done b

national agencies as the FBI, CIA, NSA, U.S. Custom

others. That is all well and good, and must be done if 

to develop a comprehensive strategy. But America is 

country, and drug trafficking is a major issue. Focus

an operational approach that would integrate region

local efforts into the larger strategic effort promi

improve the return on our investments.

This calls for some explanation. Let us consider 

happens in a real war. First of all, a strategic pla

commits resources is developed at the national 

Theaters of war are identified. In World War II, Europ

Central Pacific, and China-Burma-India were instan

theaters of war. But in each of these theaters, se

geographical and functional campaigns were deve

Consider an intelligence campaign. First of all, str

intelligence is obtained (e.g., satellite pictures) 

national sources. Then strategic communica

intelligence is added to flesh out the strategic picture. 

the same time reconnaissance patrols are sent out 

ground so as to obtain a clear picture at the tactical l

what is going on. The strategic view and the tactica

are then merged at the operational level. Geograph

different lines of operation are developed. The

constructed to support major objectives in the thea

war. They define theaters of operation. It is the fus

217
such efforts at the operational level that allow

translation of tactical events into strategic outcomes

In countering the drug threat, we should rememb

criticality of an operational approach. That means we 

be prepared to focus, perhaps functionally, pe

regionally. We must mount a strategic effort and m

local effort, and then fuse the two. We are trying to d

right now in Florida. For example, we invite colleag

the DEA, the Counter Narcotics Center of the CIA, th

and the National Drug Intelligence Center to co

Florida and provide us with critical analyses on what 

doing. We add to that input the information received 

the El Paso Intelligence Center. At the same time, we 

involve Florida’s sheriffs and policemen. We enco

them to meet one another and work together. In this w

will be able to develop an improved operational intell

picture that fuses perspectives from both the strateg

local levels.

Then we try to move from intelligence to opera

That is the purpose of developing an intelligence pictu

act on it. There are, it must be conceded, some diffic

involved. Intelligence is defined in at least two distinc

in the drug control business. First, there is evide

intelligence wherein the purpose is to gather inform

for the prosecution of cases. In this sort of intelli

interest focuses on finding out what happened, and wh

the evidence collected is sound and untainted. Second

is predictive intelligence. This is the type of intell

with which we are largely concerned. Its purpose 

develop the kind of information that will permit 

anticipate and react to threats. The process starts 

national level. For example, to find out who is traff

internationally, Florida must turn to its friends 

federal level. The process continues with a progr

effort to focus ever more narrowly on the problems n

home. What have the drug traffickers targeted, and 

are they coming? What ports will they use? What aven

218
As these questions are answered, they must 

operations. That means that law enforcement mu

capable of receiving and acting on fused intell

analysis on short notice. That means organizations m

in a position to receive information, plan, and react. S

should these steps be unilateral, that is, by a single a

Better to have in place standard operating procedu

joint efforts across agencies and across jurisdic

boundaries that maximize the unique skills and advan

of all involved.

My remarks have focused on only one pa

transnational organized crime, i.e., the organization

traffic in illegal drugs. I have tried to bring to the disc

both strategic insights (that derive from my having be

national counterdrug strategist) and operat

considerations (that ensue from my responsibilit

connection with Florida’s drug problem, fusing thes

perspectives in a pragmatic way.

We have a vast amount of resources commit

address illegal drug trafficking. And while I grant th

criminal organizations we oppose are wealthy, ru

and determined, I believe that if we organize appropr

if we make better use of available intelligence, and 

better integrate strategic, operational, and tactical e

we have the advantage.

219
CHAPTER 16

PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE FOURT

DIMENSION: A REALITY CHECK

David M. Crane

You can never plan the future by the past.

1

Introduction.

The revolution in military affairs (RMA) has not ye

fully accomplished. There is still room for an h

assessment of how Department of Defense (DoD) will 

to fight the wars of the 21st century. A reality ch

needed. As a global power, the United States is not 

enviable position. The United States will have 

prepared to engage in armed conflict in all environ

and dimensions.

2

 Until the recent Balkan crisis, c

occurred in only three dimensions—air/space, land, an

To these must now be added a fourth, that of cyber

Future conflict will range from tribal scuffles to com

network attacks.

3

 Planners will have to field a traine

ready force that can deal with a warlord, an industri

tyrant, and a cyber terrorist or cyboteur.

4

 Force pla

will have to conceptualize, train, and equip this forc

hard part in all of this will be to strike a balance that 

the United States to fight and win in all four dimensio

may not be ready to do this, yet.

The information age has arrived and has almost l

military establishment behind.

5

 Five years ago inform

warfare was a concept new to the Pentagon, a fasci

idea tossed about in seminars and conferences alike.

6

 

little more than this, however. The concern at that tim

fighting and winning a two-theater war consist

industrial-age struggles fought in the tradit

three-dimensional manner. This is still a valid str

221
issue. But now, as the fourth dimension reveals itse

information warfare becomes a reality, the defense pr

becomes more complicated. We must now find a w

balance our needs. How do we fight the cyber war 

future while facing the traditional military threats 

industrial age? Throw in the asymmetric challen

terrorism, international criminal cartels, and weap

mass destruction (WMD), and the balancing act be

even more delicate.

7

 But to defend the national secu

the United States and its interests around the worl

armed forces must update its thinking and capabilitie

soon. In a practical sense, how can this be done?

There are two general (but certainly not all-incl

needs that should be considered. First, thought sho

given to reform of the Planning, Programing, and Bud

System (PPBS) within DoD. Second, we need to co

bolstering our intelligence community’s ability to p

timely, all-source intelligence to face any threat, an

anywhere. Let us consider these two needs in greater d

Reform PPBS.

The current 5-year budget cycle, created in the 

has served the needs of a three-dimensional industri

armed force.

8

 With the advent of the information ag

the fast pace of technological development, as w

changing missions and threats, this time-teste

cumbersome process is not moving fast enough to all

armed forces to meet these new challenges.

9

Weapon systems and programs coming online we

are developed and fielded using technologies tha

already be dated or outmoded.

10

 Costly modification

changes become necessary during the development 

system and afterwards during the fielding of that sy

The relevant technology is simply changing too fast fo

to handle.

11

 Reform may be needed.

222
Congress and DoD have undertaken several initi

to streamline this process through the Quadrennial D

Review, the Joint Requirements Oversight Committe

Unified Command Plan, acquisition reform, better bu

practices, and increased use of off-the-shelf techno

There appears to be an understanding, however, th

process could and should be more efficient. Yet the 

department is so linked to the current three-dimen

process that wholesale functional and organiza

changes may be needed in order to rectify the pro

Unfortunately, this may be just too hard to do.

Preparing the Defense Intelligence Communit

Four-dimensional Warfare.

The defense intelligence community face

challenges to its ability to provide timely all-s

intelligence to the combatant commands in al

dimensions of warfare.

13

 These challenges relate to th

the community is organized and to its ability to mana

disseminate the information it obtains from num

collection sources and methods.

The intelligence community of the United States, l

nonexistent until World War II, was organized to fig

Cold War.

14

 It owes its birth mainly to President 

Truman, who realized early in his presidency th

needed information on the many world events happ

around him, particularly as they related to the aggr

policies of the Soviet Union.

15

 In signing the Na

Security Act of 1947, Truman created the national se

structure that still exists today.

16

 The concept of centr

intelligence was no longer a theory but reality. Ov

years the intelligence community has served this 

well, in the shadows and out of the public eye, facin

and unheard-of challenges. There were many success

some failures.

17

As technology evolved, the collection capabilities 

intelligence community increased manyfold, providin

223
information to policymakers and warfighters a

Technology elevated the intelligence community’s r

our nation’s defense against the Soviet threat. Befo

advent of the information age, which has given rela

easy access to information to everyone, researc

development in imagery and cryptology moved the U

States into the forefront of information sys

technology.

19

 New agencies evolved to handle thes

collection methods.

20

 All of these agencies became a p

the vast defense intelligence community. Designed t

the evil empire through functional organization

community is now facing serious organizationa

philosophical challenges as it tries to meet the asym

threats and cyber wars of the future. It is a dau

challenge. 

Roughly centered on the Director of Central Intell

(DCI) and the intelligence community management 

each of the intelligence agencies operates separ

answering to either the DCI, the Secretary of Defen

both.

21

 Though the DCI heads the intelligence comm

the reality of it all is that the Secretary of Defense ma

and controls most of the intelligence assets.

2

organizational shortcomings of the intelligence comm

posed substantial problems even when we faced the 

Soviet threat; it is still more of a problem today. Essen

the intelligence community is too large

compartmentalized, and unable to share the vast amo

data it collects on a daily basis in a collaborative ma

The DCI, moreover, continues to be head o

community in name only. This hampers the ability 

community to develop the kind of strong central fo

needs as it faces the transnational, multi-dimensiona

asymmetric threats of tomorrow. Driven by this his

and still very real dichotomy, the community is approa

these various asymmetric challenges in a fragmente

patchwork manner, causing duplication of effor

expense. Congress, through the Intelligence Committ

all too aware of this predicment and is beco

224
increasingly frustrated. Is it time for a who

reorganization of the intelligence community? This 

has been studied, yet there have been no execut

legislative remedies forthcoming.

23

 Reorganizin

intelligence community, it has been said, is like tu

around an aircraft carrier. It cannot be done quickly o

a great deal of precision without assistance. It may b

what is called for is something on the scale o

Goldwater-Nichols Act (DoD Reorganization Act of 19

move the intelligence community into the 21st centu

Another challenge is the intelligence commu

inability to manage and disseminate the vast amo

information funneling into its receiving systems. To 

the effort has been piecemeal. Attempts have been m

secure collaboration in the development of va

collection and analytical tools, but they have not 

consistently managed or monitored.

25

Technology is starting to become a threat as we

benefit.

26

 On the one hand, increasing technol

sophistication means that our ability to access and g

information is increasingly being matched by our ab

manage and disseminate it. This development wil

time, reduce the problem alluded to in the prec

paragraph.

27

 On the other hand, the increasing ope

and availability of information made possible b

Internet have created new threats by reducing the re

advantage once held by the U.S. intelligence comm

The information systems are also increasingly vulner

penetration by state or non-state actors. Computer ne

defense is becoming a key operational concern th

policymakers and commanders must consider in 

planning.

28

Conclusion.

There is no reason to regard these challeng

insurmountable. Historically the nation’s armed 

have succeeded in overcoming an endless success

225
problems. New political, social, cultural, doctrina

technical challenges have confronted our armed force

Valley Forge to Kosovo. What is needed now are new 

and initiatives enabling our nation to better deal wi

transnational threats and asymmetric challenges th

assuredly face us in the years to come. It is to be hope

this chapter will generate creative thought and f

dialogue to assist DoD in its efforts to achieve such g

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16

1. Edmund Burke, Letter to a member of the National As

1791. Burke goes on to state,

To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the pres

possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravag

hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the grea

part of mankind.

Quoted in Robin B. Wright and Doyle McManus, Flashpoin

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991, p. 15.

2. John Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC

Chiefs of Staff, July 1996 (hereinafter JV 2010). See also, U.S

Warfighting Center, Concept for Future Joint Operations, Fort M

VA: Joint Warfighting Center, May 1997, p. i.

3. James Adams, The Next World War, New York: Si

Schuster, 1998, p. 4. See, generally, Heidi and Alvin Toffler, W

Anti-War, New York: Warner, 1993; Robert W. Chandler, The N

of War, McLean, VA: Amcoda Press, 1998; and Wright and McM

4. See Daniel Verton, Federal Computer Week, April 23

excerpted in the Joint Staff Information Assurance Digest, ed. 8

15, 1999, p. 5. The author surveys a recent study by the 

Corporation titled “The New Terrorism,” highlighting the 

technology and the Internet by terrorists in a form of conflic

“netwar.” Verton discusses the report, declaring: “Netwar relies 

hierarchical command and control organizations and more on di

Information Age network designs.” The report predicts tha

terrorists will put more effort into building “arrays of transna

internetted groups” than into developing stand-alone organizat

226
5. Heidi and Alvin Toffler as early as 1993, in their ground-b

and thought-provoking book, War and Anti-war, discuss this su

length. See particularly p. 29. See also their book titled Pow

1990.

6. Five years ago the author designed and taught the fi

course on the legal aspects of future war, using as course text D

Crane, ed., Legal Aspects of Future War, The Judge Advocate G

School, U.S. Army, 1996. In Chapter 5, “The Impact o

Technologies on Armed Conflict,” Lieutenant Colonel Alan 

discusses the concept of information operations, highlighting th

efforts of DoD in coming to grips with this new concept.

7. See, generally, The Report from the Commission to As

Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Prolifer

Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1999; The United States Commis

National Security/21st Century, “New World Coming: Am

Security in the 21st Century,” The Phase I Report on the Em

Global Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st C

September 15, 1999 (hereinafter, The Phase I Report).

8. See, generally, Department of Defense Regulation 700

Financial Management, Vol. 2A, “Budget Formulation.”

9. See The Phase I Report, p. 4. See also Peter F. Drucker, “T

of Social Transformation,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1994, p

10. Tofflers, p. 79.

11. Peter Drucker discusses this concept of informati

technology outstripping organizations’ ability to reconfigu

enough inPost-Capitalist Society, New York: HarperBusiness, 1

19-97. Also, see his article, “The Age of Social Transformation

12. See Concept for Future Joint Operations, Chap. 8.

13. See comment in The Phase I Report, supra, p. 6

Intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, and even e

intelligence will not prevent all surprises.”

14. Christopher M. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes On

York: HarperCollins, 1995 p. 149. See also G. J. A. O’Toole, Ho

Treachery, New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1991; John P. Finneg

Military Intelligence Story, 2d. ed., Fort Belvoir, VA: History 

Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Intelligence and S

Command [1997?]; David M. Crane, “The History of the 

Intelligence in the United States,” Cases and Materials on Inte

227
Law, Charlottesville, VA: Judge Advocate Generals School, 1996

1.

15. Andrew, p. 163.

16. 50 USC 401, and following. The National Security Act 

created the Central Intelligence Agency, DoD, the United Sta

Force, and the National Security Council, among others.

17. For an excellent general discussion of the history of inte

in the United States, see Andrew.

18. Finnegan, p. 54.

19. Ibid., p. 114.

20. Director of Central Intelligence, A Consumer’s G

Intelligence, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 199

21. Ibid., pp. 28-29. The intelligence community of the United 

consists generally of the Central Intelligence Agency; Bu

Intelligence and Research, Department of State; Departmen

Treasury, Department of Energy; and the various inteligence a

and offices associated with DoD (see note 22).

22. See Executive Order 12333, United States Intel

Activities, 46 F.R. 59941, December 4, 1981. See also 50 USC 4

following. The defense intelligence community consists of the D

Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping Agency, N

Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency, along w

service intelligence components and the unified commands, 

other organizations.

23. Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilitie

U.S. Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st Centu

Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, 1996 (also known as the Aspin

Commission). In the 1995 time frame, the House Permanen

Committee on Intelligence considered a restructuring of th

intelligence community called IC 21.

24. 10 USC 161 and following.

25. See, generally, Robert K. Ackerman, “Intelligence Arch

Augments Area Expertise with Data Access,” SIGNAL Magazin

January 2000, extracted from the Joint Staff Information Digest

January 15, 2000, p. 37.

228
26. See The Phase I Report, p. 6. The report states:

Micro-sensors and electronic communications will continue 

expand intelligence collection capabilities around the wor

As a result of the proliferation of other technologies, howev

many countries and disaffected groups will devel

techniques of denial and deception in an attempt to thw

U.S. intelligence efforts—despite U.S. technologi

superiority.

27. The Tofflers declare in War and Anti-War, p. 160:

. . . the Third Wave explosion of information a

communication means that more and more of what decis

makers need to know can be found in open sources.

28. See Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Infor

Operations, October 9, 1998, Chapter III. See also Concept for 

Joint Operations, p. 41; and excerpt from Joint Chiefs of Staff Br

Information Operations: A Strategy for Peace and the Decisive 

War, March 1999, p. 14:

Computer Network Defense (CND) is emerging as a uniq

[information assurance] discipline. It consists of all measu

to defend computers and other components that a

interconnected in electronic telecommunications networ

against [computer network attack] by an adversary. Su

measures include access controls, detection of malicio

computer code and programs, and tools to detect intrusion

In the forward to this brochure, p. 1, Chairman of the Joint C

Staff General Henry H. Shelton declares:

Our reliance on technology makes protecting critical 

infrastructure against hostile IO [information operations

paramount mission.

229
CHAPTER 17

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL DEFENS

THE CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE

William Natter

I have spent a number of years workin

Representative Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority Mem

the House Armed Services Committee, during the cou

which I have had the chance to observe firsthan

workings of Congress and think seriously about the 

that concern us in the present book.

1

 I do not consider 

an expert in the field of national security. Howeve

have a working knowledge of the matters at hand. I 

even firmer ground when I speak about my pl

employment—Congress—and its inner workings. An

to this dimension of the problem that I will reser

comments.

I would like to present a perspective which both 

from Congress and sheds light on it. To grapple wi

more important issues raised in this book, we s

understand the role and viewpoint of Congress. 

understanding brings to light the pressure

motivations that result in congressional action wh

turn, affects national security, for better or for worse. 

all other relevant observations, it is important to rem

that Congress is accountable—accountable for e

accountable for explanations, accountable for the 

actions and decisions pursued by the various agencies 

federal government. If any readers are skeptical o

point, I would encourage you to join your congressma

town meeting so you can hear for yourself the var

questions, comments, and criticisms he or she is requ

address in 30-second responses. In terms of accounta

this means that every 2 years elected representatives 

stand before their electorates and renegotiate 

231
contract. For senators, it is, of course, every 6 year

each must stand in the shoes of his or her constit

represent their respective values, and judge the wort

of particular ideas or proposals—both proposals of res

and proposals of prevention.

For our present purposes, it is most importa

remember that congressional accountability includes 

I refer to as “accountability to the unreasonable.” M

the American public is extremely passionate 

protecting the homeland from terrorist attack or prot

their sons and daughters from random acts of vi

abroad—and they demand answers. They demand 

and demand results. Members know this and re

accordingly. American citizens often ask, what is 

done? What assurances do we have? How much mon

been spent? And, perhaps the most significant que

have we as a nation done everything possible? To a m

of Congress, they ask, “Have you done every

conceivably possible?” This last question l

representatives and senators vulnerable if, heaven 

something catastrophic occurs. Consider for yourse

difficulty of responding to such a question.

All of these questions require members of Congr

seek results. Understanding these pressures goes 

way towards understanding particular spending pri

and congressional directives. Why are new initi

undertaken? Because they provide “answers.” Add

money is given for research in chemical and bio

defense programs because it is an answer. The M

Corps’ Chemical/Biological Incident Response 

(CBIRF) is created because it, too, is an answer

creation of the National Guard Rapid Assessmen

Initial Detection (RAID) team concept is an answer, 

proposal for additional spending for the Health and H

Services’ Medical Strike Teams. All of these initiativ

answers, as is the existence of more than 43 depart

and agencies claiming an interest in responding 

potential terrorist threat or incident. All are respons

232
sort. And, although I must admit that they ma

necessarily represent appropriate or effective resp

they are something.

So what does this mean for actions that Congress 

take? In short, Congress needs a plan, and the 

comprehensive, the better. It needs to be a plan pref

provided by a non-congressional source, such as 

members of the various federal departments or agenc

from business, academia, or the executive branch as 

the President’s annual budget submission to Congres

more comprehensive the plan submitted, the 

favorably it will be received. If such a plan is not subm

mark my words, Congress will enact a version of its o

has been known to do this from time to time. Yet, 

historical experience is any indication, I susp

congressionally-initiated response to terrorism would 

prove to be a hodgepodge, inefficient, driv

parochialism and partisanship at the expense 

national interest, and thus ineffective. This wou

unfortunate. 

Although I do not want to get in the posit

prescribing the response, let me mention a few point

should be considered as part of any policy that is pro

First, there should be a greater awareness o

problem at hand, and this awareness shou

institutionalized. For instance, Chairman of the 

Chiefs of Staff General Henry Shelton, wit

anti-terrorism initiative, is a case in point. Known as 

the Joint Staff’s Deputy Director for Combating Ter

oversees the preparation of worldwide vulnera

assessments for U.S. forces and installations. This o

responsible for performing more than 90 assessm

year, in addition to those performed by the indi

services. I would argue that this initiative has a

improved DoD’s force protection measures and com

awareness. It should continue, and General Shelton s

receive additional support from the highest levels 

administration. 

233
Interagency training exercises represent an

method for improving our state of awareness. Such 

exercises should continue, and be repeated over an

again. The participants in these exercises should 

congressional representatives and staff in order to im

executive-legislative branch relations. I had the ben

serving as an observer at such an exercise more than 

ago in Norfolk, Virginia, one that proved to be a 

rewarding experience. However, readers may be sur

to learn (at least I was) of the initial resistance I re

from officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

The top participating FBI official said he did not w

congressional staff member to be present. He partic

did not want congressional staff at the standard c

critique where discussion would invariably incl

discussion of “lessons learned.” Fortunately, the S

Operations community recognized the potential value 

participation and urged my involvement. The expe

has served me well in my official duties. If we belie

service axiom, “We must train the way we fight,” t

order to facilitate the availability of necessary reso

the legislative branch must fully understan

inseparable concerns of resource needs and res

employment requirements.

Second, the president needs to take a gr

interest in this subject, and not just for spe

engagements. I am talking about day-to-day opera

The national coordinator for transnational threat

Dick CLarke, sits on the National Security Council 

staff in accordance with Presidential Decision Dire

(PDD) 62 and 63. Clarke and his assistant, Ms

Gordon-Hagerty, should be commended for their good 

However, the NSC staff is advisory in nature

influence, true power—at least in the budg

process—and therefore true results must derive d

from the president and not from an advisor. F

presidents must be cognizant of this point. They s

make a habit of asking all cabinet secretaries for r

234
progress reports on the effort to address transna

threats.

Third, we need to rethink legislative 

regulatory oversight, modifying and updatin

existing statutes, if necessary. Again, I do not pret

be an expert in this area, but would implore 

individuals as Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, Ri

Marshall, Spike Bowman, and those with comp

experience to assist with the exploration of neede

feasible improvements. It is easy to sit in one’s offic

make a policy determination based on the facts at han

a little more difficult, however, to anticipate the subse

interpretation and implementation of statutory fixe

such a complicated issue involving the converge

national security, law enforcement, and intelli

involvement, it is important for us to examine legal 

with great care. If the information age has brought w

need for updated laws, then let us examine the prop

But, again, Congress will need to receive conv

testimony from noncongressional sources prior to ap

of any far-reaching statutory revision.

My fourth and final point concerns the purs

structural reforms. Structural reforms are ne

perhaps on the scale of the DoD reforms of 1986

is, perhaps we need a “Goldwater-Nichols Reform 

equivalent for the defense, intelligence, an

enforcement communities. As we have heard, ther

need for a “cross-pollination” of expertise. Perha

should establish programs whereby mid-level profess

from intelligence, DoD, FBI, the Federal Emer

Management Agency (FEMA), the State Departmen

are required to spend 2- to 3-year stints in positions o

their agency of origin, further mandating that such 

criterion be a prerequisite for promotion. S

requirement would certainly get the attention 

national security and law enforcement communitie

moreover, elevate the issue of transnational threats w

their respective departments or agencies.

235
Perhaps we could open further the DoD senior s

schools to these same individuals, and establish exc

programs for mid-level U.S. Government professiona

members of the business world as well. It may well be t

this juncture such ideas are a bit premature and tha

time is needed for the prerequisite bureaucrati

cultural “percolation.” But the idea of cross-polli

certainly has gained a greater audience since 

discussed it with National Defense University pro

Bard O’Neill a few years ago. I suspect the idea will co

to gain support. Perhaps it and the other proposals wi

receive the necessary consideration. In any event, I 

not delay for a universal consensus to coalesce 

executive branch, thus causing Congress itself to ta

lead. 

In conclusion, I will echo earlier sentiments: “So 

questions, so few answers.” Still, the four poin

consideration mentioned above must be addressed 

we embrace any proposed solution.

ENDNOTE - CHAPTER 17

1. The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of this 

and do not necessarily reflect the views of the House Armed S

Committe or any other individual.

236
CHAPTER 18

NEW INSTITUTIONS AND NEW WAYS

OF OPERATING

Jeffrey A. Hunker

Introduction.

The U.S. economy is now an information econom

Commerce Department reports that during the mid

over one-third of U.S. economic growth origina

information technology fields; no doubt that percent

already much higher. Along with the benefits o

development come some costs in the form of inc

dependency on secure and reliable cyber systems. Bu

and government, including the military, have 

increasingly to depend on these networked sys

Unfortunately, these systems are subject to deli

disruptions, theft, and outright attack. The perpet

can be pranksters, but they can also be terrorists, orga

criminal cartels, and hostile nation-states. Most bre

have been mere inconveniences, albeit costly; bu

potential for truly serious disruption is gro

exponentially. 

President William J. Clinton has acted to prote

cyber networks. In 1998 he called for a national 

defense strategy. Then in January 2000, he released v

1.0 of the National Plan for Information Systems Prot

(the National Plan).

1

 A month later he met with lead

the Internet industry to plan additional actions for 

security. In March 2000, he ordered federal departme

take extraordinary steps to provide protection a

distributed denial of service attacks.

2

 Two fundam

factors shape this program. First, cyber security 

component of an overall redefinition of national se

Second, cyber security poses an agenda that c

237
managed, but never solved. The program underway is 

partial solution to the challenges, and much remain

done. These two factors shape not only those efforts th

currently underway, but also the next generatio

initiatives for information systems protection.

Fundamental Rethinking of National Security.

Our agenda for cyber security represents a fundam

rethinking of what we mean by national security, an

we act to protect it. This rethinking is the consequen

complex shift of our enemies, our priorities, an

vulnerabilities. In the past, national security has 

strictly a government responsibility. Military, diplo

and intelligence assets protected the United States a

overseas threats. Law enforcement—carefully exc

from playing any role in national defense—was emplo

defend the United States against domestic threat

threats were usually well defined—they emanated 

country X or group Y. U.S. business had almost no 

role.

The emerging threat of cyber attack turns this par

upside down. The private sector—U.S. corporations—

solve this problem in partnership with the fe

government. Like the Internet itself, no single organi

is responsible for the security of our cyber sys

However, since most of the critical information system

owned and operated by the private sector, they must 

in the responsibility for defending them. This respons

cannot be regulated. The fast pace of Internet develop

precludes such a traditional approach. Furthermor

anonymity afforded by networks, and their interna

reach, complicates the task of making a clear, a 

identification of emerging threats. As in the r

distributed denial of service attacks, it may be som

before we know the source or intent o

disruptions—foreign or domestic.

238
One thing stands clear—the nature of threats 

nation, in the domestic sphere in particular, has cha

This is forcing the United States to reexami

traditional views of national security and the way 

organized to face threats. As the chief law enforc

organization, the Justice Department will play a le

role in facing the security challenges of cr

infrastructure protection, terrorism, and the threa

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The private sect

a major role to play in working with the Departme

these issues. With its special role as the voice of bus

the Commerce Department serves as a central po

contact and coordination with the private sector

supported by other departments and agencies which 

special relationships with individual sectors, as for ex

the Department of Energy does with the energy sec

the nation.

The Emerging Agenda.

The National Plan lays out ten program

initiatives.

3

 New institutions, and new ways of oper

are being developed by both the federal governmen

leading industries to address the new responsibilitie

challenges. The ten initiatives can be condensed in

following five broad areas: building an effe

public-private partnership; government as a mo

information security; education and training; researc

development; effective law enforcement and na

security capabilities. Let’s look at each.

Building an Effective Public-Private Partnership. 

characteristics of the Internet dictate th

federally-centered national program will fail: (1) most 

Internet and networked information systems are in p

sector hands;

4

 (2) only the loosest structures ov

Internet activity; and (3) the pace of Internet investme

outstrips the established Federal regulatory pace. 

factors dictate a shared approach—a voluntary partn

239
between the federal government (in particular, the f

national security community) and the private sector. 

drives the success of this partnership will be self-in

the recognition that the Internet needs to be secur

reliable if it is to succeed as an e-commerce medium

Core to this emerging partnership is the newly f

Partnership for Critical Information Security, which 

together over 130 Fortune 500 companies for joint act

cyber security. Sectoral dialogue and cooperatio

fostered by a system of Federal “sector liaison

appropriate departments (e.g., the Treasury Depar

working with the banking and finance industries)

ways in which trusted partners in business and gover

can share threat and vulnerability information are 

developed—e.g., the Financial Services Inform

Sharing and Analysis Center (FS/ISAC), which prov

mechanism by which participating companies 

anonymously share incident and vulnerability data.

Government as a Model of Information Security. 

the private sector must take responsibility, the f

government can provide models and leadership. The f

government can exemplify cutting-edge best practic

drive the deployment of new technologies. This a

includes the following topics:

• Building a Trained Organization reflec

desperate shortage of trained Federal cyber se

experts. 

• Developing a Framework of Best Practice

federal agencies and departments (and those outsi

federal government) can apply. Unfortunately, there 

commonly accepted framework now.

• Vigilance against Vulnerabilities is a dom

goal as large and complex organizations proceed to id

and prioritize their information security needs. For th

time, Federal civilian agencies are being directed

generally inadequate resources, to improve cyber se

240
Again, there exists no accepted and fully ade

methodology for accomplishing this.

• Sharing Information across federal agencies

non-Federal security organizations (e.g.

Carnegie-Mellon CERT), and with the private sector

• Warning, Response, and Recovery

Government Civilian Agency Computer Emer

Response Center depends heavily on the capabili

Carnegie-Mellon, and is still developing an eff

protocol for alerting and sharing information a

Federal agencies.

• Resources and Accountability remain 

challenges, which may require fundamental refor

address. Federal budgeting, on both the executiv

congressional sides, does a poor job of addre

cross-cutting needs that are not directly link

organizational mission. To address Y2K reprogram

requirements, for example, both Congress and the exe

branch created new exclusively dedicated mechanism

Education and Training. The United States fa

desperate nationwide shortage of workers skilled in 

information technology in general and cyber secur

particular. The National Plan seeks to address this pr

by creating a series of educational and training initia

These aim to bring into the federal government a ca

highly skilled information technology (IT) se

professionals and to upgrade the existing skills 

professionals within the federal government. How

these Federal initiatives will not in themselves addre

nationwide shortages, and should be viewed only a

programs for a much more extensive national commi

involving substantial business participation.

Central to the educational iniatives of the Nationa

is the Federal Cyber Service “scholarship for se

program. The concept is based closely on the 1958 Na

Defense Education Act. In both NDEA and the c

241
proposal, the government pays for the education and 

expenses of persons earning a bachelor’s or master’s d

from an accredited university in the requisite fiel

exchange for a commitment to serve with the f

government for a stipulated period of time. Prelim

discussions with a number of universities are underw

Research and Development. To preserve U.S. 

security, it is vital that we retain our technological 

hence the need to foster Research and Development (

Two major R&D actions are underway or proposed. 

Federal R&D spending for cyber security is being inc

35 percent in the 2001 FY Federal budget—to $606 m

Most of this will be directed to Defense Advanced Res

Projects Agency (DARPA)

6

 and the National Se

Agency. Proposals have also been made to increase su

for certain civilian R&D programs, such as the Na

Institute of Standards and Technology at the Com

Department. The increases proposed are substa

although they would be added to a very small base.

Second, industry and government are working to

to design a new Institute for Information Infrastr

Protection (IIIP). The IIIP is necessary because ex

federal and private R&D programs still leave gaps 

national cyber security research portfolio. The Y2K e

amply illustrates this problem. A concern arising fro

widespread remediation of computer systems was 

malicious code might also be inserted into the syste

would have been very useful had some automated p

for detecting such a malicious code been available. How

neither government agencies nor private sector s

engaged in R&D were developing such tools. Research

the private sector had neglected this area of investi

because there was no market demand for such a pr

The public agencies had neglected it because they cou

see how such a product would help them fulfil 

missions. Yet everyone agreed that such a product 

have been extremely useful. Clearly there is need to d

a new kind of R&D institution that focuses on 

242
neglected by existing federal programs and market-d

R&D. 

IIIP would concentrate primarily upon fun

coordinating, and integrating research on advanced s

and technology areas that are not being addressed th

existing industry or government programs. It wou

compete with industry. It would fund top-quality 

research. It would also fund and/or conduct more a

activities such as modeling and identifying vulnerab

in U.S. information infrastructure systems and pro

testbeds for information assurance technologies. To 

these needs, the Institute would:

• Have only a small expert staff. The Institute 

carry out its missions by funding and tasking ex

organizations or groups, operating in a manner sim

DARPA. 

• Supplement, not absorb, existing resear

would coordinate its information infrastructure prot

activities closely with ongoing efforts in the 

Government, the private sector, and academia

Institute would also provide demonstration 

development support for key foundations of cyber assu

such as benchmarks and standards, provision of tes

and curriculum development.

• Have close working ties to both industry 

concerned Federal agencies. To ensure coordi

and relevance to Federal priorities, the Institute 

report to a federal Coordinating Council consist

principal science and technology leaders. The Ins

would also seek industry guidance from the Na

Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) and S

Coordinators. Private corporations and Federal ag

would be encouraged to fund and support projects or t

in-kind support.

Effective Law Enforcement and National Se

Capabilities. Unlike earlier national security i

243
domestic law enforcement and overseas de

responsibilities may be difficult to disentangle

requires coordination and information-sharing be

previously separate organizations. It also require

structures and capabilities. These include:

• The National Infrastructure Protection Ce

This is designed to fuse defense, intelligence, an

enforcement capabilities for threat analysis and wa

and incident response and investigation. Though part 

FBI organization, the NIPC has substantial staff fro

defense, intelligence, and other law enforcement age

The eventual goal also includes a close oper

relationship with local and international resource

with the private sector.

• Intrusion detection monitoring systems. 

are intended to provide additional warning and no

illicit system activity. The Department of Defense (Do

already invested significant effort in creating a se

systems, integrated through the Joint 

Force-Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND). F

civilian agencies would be protected under a pro

parallel system, the Federal Intrusion Detection Ne

(FIDNET). However, the technological currenc

functionality of these systems need to be improved

National Plan proposes to undertake new resea

improve on the existing DoD technology. The ultimat

is for a proven intrusion detection system to migrate 

private sector where it can protect key corporations.

• Information Sharing and Analysis Ce

(ISACs) or Computer Security Centers. In netw

environments, it is critical that information 

vulnerabilities and threats be shared among key ne

players. Historically, both legal and administ

concerns have largely prevented such interchange. 

are mechanisms to facilitate such information exch

whether among corporate members only, or betwee

private sector and the federal government. The Fin

244
Services Information Sharing and Analysis C

(FS/ISAC) mentioned earlier is one model—prov

anonymous information exchange among particip

banks and financial institutions. Computer security c

for telecommunications, the Internet community, e

power, and oil and gas companies are also either in 

stage launch, or under development.

Challenges of the Future.

Ongoing initiatives in the five areas described ab

public-private partnership, government as a m

research and development, education and training

enhanced law enforcement and intelli

capabilities—capture most of the activity now underw

part of the National Plan. This work, however, is on

beginning. Major challenges remain in our efforts t

with transnational threats. Among the prin

outstanding unresolved issues are the following:

An Agenda for the Federal Government. Gover

organization is in need of fundamental restructur

several areas.

• Government Decisionmaking that Ma

Internet Speed. Budget cycles and technological cyc

not coincide. Internet “years” run from 2 to 3 ca

months. Sometimes, the actual level of funding re

uncertain until well into the current fiscal year—w

final budget deal between Congress and the presiden

last agreed to. Moreover, there is no assurance that fu

from fiscal year to fiscal year will be sufficiently predi

to support consistent program planning 

implementation. 

• Reorganizing and Clarifying Responsibi

Interagency cooperation and coordination re

inconsistent at best. National defense, intelligence, a

enforcement must find common ground. The found

President Clinton of the National Infrastructure Prot

245
Center was an important step on the way to pro

operational coordination. Unfortunately, it has n

generated the intended result. In the area of 

coordination, there still is no single official accounta

cyber security within the federal government, or 

within the civilian Federal agencies. A vigorous disc

of this deficiency is underway within Congress an

executive branch. To date, however, no solution is in p

• Increasing Effective Effort. The presiden

requested over two billion dollars in support of the Na

Plan for fiscal year 2001, which would double the a

spent 3 years earlier. In addition to increased reso

spending is proportionately shifting towards ci

agencies. In FY 2000, 90 percent of the cyber se

budget was in national security accounts; for FY 20

corresponding proportion is 75 percent. These propo

are moving in the right direction. However, many F

agencies still do not receive adequate funding. Nor is t

system in place to make sure that funds will be alloca

the best uses.

• Articulating Clear Goals to Shape Techn

and Commercial Market Development. The f

government has not yet presented to industry a u

vision of our national security needs. The potent

government leadership through procurement and the 

pulpit is large but untapped. While the govern

constitutes only a small part of the overall market, it 

the largest single customer. In a network environ

particularly in defense procurement, the fe

government has an extraordinary ability to shap

eventual development of standards or interopera

protocols

7

 that will eventually be adopted by the rest 

economy and, arguably, by the rest of the world

example, government research and procurement pla

roles in shaping the ongoing evolution of intr

protection systems and public key infrastructure 

systems. An interoperability standard for different v

offerings is needed in both these technologies. We

246
federal government better organized, it might be a

assert a leadership role.

• Intelligence Collection and Analysi

Ambiguous and Asymmetric Threats. National se

threats to the United States will change. The

increasingly come to share several common character

First, the means used by those threatening the U

States will not be conventional nation-state force proj

(missiles, bombers), but forms that are both chea

develop and whose sources are harder to identify (

chemical, biological). Second, the targets will lik

homeland assets, in particular commercial and eco

infrastructures. Third, the threats will come from a fa

diverse group of enemies, be they terrorists, orga

criminals, or isolated individuals of whatever men

political persuasion.

The expanding range of these ambiguou

asymmetric national security threats challenges th

War intelligence system—which was adept at cou

missiles and tanks, but was not designed for 

amorphous, low-profile, and shifting threats. Ther

fundamental need for a thorough review of our intell

and law enforcement information-gathering, an

assessment, and distribution systems.

An Agenda for Industry. We must a

risk-management techniques to cyber security. Insu

and audit tools are well-established mechanisms by 

companies and organizations assess and manage 

exposure to various risks—financial, legal, natura

commercial. Legal and management practices dictat

these concerns rise to the Board of Directors and 

management. To date, only very limited progress ha

made in extending these techniques to the managem

cyber security threats. A number of factors slow the 

risk-management techniques—the absence of a w

accepted benchmark of cyber security practices de

“due diligence,” the need for management educatio

247
the absence of a compelling legal or liability r

addressing cyber security risks.

Arguably, however, the widespread extens

insurance, audit, and other commercial risk-manag

techniques to cyber security is the single most po

force for improving network security. The National Se

Council and others in the federal governmen

aggressively working with these risk-manage

communities to help extend the use of these techn

Difficult issues emerge in regard to cyber se

insurance. For example, most insurance is void unde

of war.

8

 Yet what is war in an information sy

environment? Such issues, spanning legal, policy

economic concerns, may have significant ramificatio

the eventual form of the market for cyber se

insurance. 

Joint Federal-Private Sector Concerns. Several re

concerns are unique neither to the federal nor to the p

sector, but rather are shared between the two.

• A System for Cyber Reconstitution. 

addressing Y2K concerns helped to illustrate 

widespread or system-wide computer failures would 

devastating effects on the nation. Such work also conc

that effective computer system reconstitution 

rebuilding will require coordinated responses acros

Federal and private sector communities, with the p

sector having to contribute much of the expertis

resources. Unfortunately, the nationwide system re

for such a coordinated response does not exist. Wh

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) h

authority and capability to coordinate non-cyber di

relief, there is no agreement or system in place 

corresponding cyber incident. Nor are the 

underpinnings for coordinated national 

reconstitution in place. Federal decisionmakers are 

the moment, clear as to how key statutory mea

especially the Defense Production Act and the Staffor

248
should be applied to address the consequences of a 

attack. 

• Expanding the Educational Agenda. 

security needs to become a factor in corporate, lega

government decisionmaking—reflecting the reality 

secure and reliable information systems have now bec

fundamental necessity of U.S. commerce and gover

Law and business schools should include cours

transnational threats in their curriculums. Ame

future decisionmakers must be educated on such i

irrespective of whether their careers are in the pu

private sector. Transnational threats are not a ma

concern for the government alone, nor are they me

technical concern.

• Creating a Legal Framework for Cyber sec

How we deal with information that resides on 

networked systems and prepare for and react to s

failures raises complex legal and policy issues. One c

and contentious area is how both public and private 

activities affect privacy interests. Other issues include

will courts determine and apply standards for lia

What levels of due diligence exist for information se

challenges? How should lawmakers generate new 

options in this highly technical environment

Electronic Communications Privacy Act and othe

statutes need to be carefully reexamined in light of th

of more sophisticated cyber threats and the developm

new technology. There are even more basic and unans

legal issues affecting privacy, security, and liability 

environment of growing cyber security threats.

• Who is “us”? The cyber security agenda is man

international in scope. Yet, while government and in

must work together to deal with cyber security threat

not clear which corporate citizens should be conside

part of the U.S. security establishment. To en

security, information of a sensitive nature (classif

unclassified) may have to be passed on. But to w

249
Should we base our decision on whether or not pot

recipient companies are U.S.-chartered? What if th

multinational in nature? This issue is of long standin

no good framework for addressing it appears to exist

Conclusion.

The agenda for cyber security is still under constru

New organizational structures must be developed, th

framework for further public-private partnership m

built, challenging international issues must be addr

The National Plan is subtitled “An Invitation to a Dia

for the very good reason that significant work remain

done in building the framework for a new national se

partnership. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 18

1. The National Plan for Information Systems Protection, 

1.0: An Invitation to a Dialogue, Washington, DC: The White 

January 2000. Available at www.ciao.gov. 

2. A “denial-of-service” attack is an attempt by attackers to 

legitimate users of a service from using that servic

http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/denial_of_service.html#1

3. These are (1) identify critical infrastructure assets and 

interdependencies, and address vulnerabilities; (2) detect atta

unauthorized intrusions; (3) develop robust intelligence a

enforcement capabilities to protect critical information sy

consistent with law; (4) share attack warnings and informati

timely manner; (5) create capabilities for response, reconstituti

recovery; (6) enhance research and development in support of pr

1-5; (7) train and employ adequate numbers of information s

specialists; (8) conduct outreach to make Americans aware of t

for improved cyber security; (9) adopt legislation and appropria

support of programs 1-8; and (10) ensure the full protection of Am

citizens’ civil liberties, their rights to privacy, and their right

protection of proprietary data.

4. A frequently cited statistic is that 90 percent of net

information systems are non-federal; the factual basis f

statement is unclear, but it is probably not a bad guess.

250
5. These included the Special Assistant to the President f

(John Koskinan), with responsibilities for coordinating Fede

national Y2K preparedness, and the special Senate Y2K approp

subcommittee chaired by Senator Bennett. Both institutions cu

the preexisting divisions of responsibility.

6. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA

central research and development organization for DoD. It m

and directs selected basic and applied research and devel

projects, and pursues research and technology where risk and pa

both very high and where success may provide dramatic adva

traditional military roles and missions and dual-use applicatio

7. Common protocols are currently being developed in o

promote the evolution of the Web and ensure its interoperabil

challenge is to make the Web accessible to all by promoting techn

that take into account the vast differences in culture, education, 

material resources, and physical limitations of users on all contin

8. This is a requirement of many reinsurers.

251
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT is currently a Visiting Profe

Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law, San An

Texas. In 2000, he retired from the U.S. Army 

Advocate General’s Corps after 20 years of se

specializing in international law. Dr. Addicott h

Doctor of Juridical Science degree (1994) and a Ma

Laws degree (1992) from the University of Virginia Sc

Law. He received his Juris Doctor degree fro

University of Alabama School of Law in 1979. 

SPIKE BOWMAN is Associate General Counsel, F

Bureau of Investigation. He holds a Juris Doctor d

from the University of Idaho and a Master of Laws d

from George Washington University.

DAVID M. CRANE is Director, Office of Intell

Review, Office of the Inspector General, Departm

Defense. Prior to appointment to his current positi

was the Assistant General Counsel, Defense Intell

Agency. Mr. Crane holds a Juris Doctor degree 

Syracuse University and is currently completing his 

of Juridical Science degree at the University of Vi

School of Law.

THOMAS V. FUENTES is Chief of the Organized 

Section, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bur

Investigation. 

BRUCE HOFFMAN is presently Director of the 

Corporation office in Washington, DC, and heads R

terrorism research. He is the author of Inside Ter

(Columbia University Press, 1998).

JEFFREY A. HUNKER is Senior Director for C

Infrastructure on the staff of the National Security Co

In this role, he is responsible for bringing togeth

integrated national plan for protecting U.S. comput

information systems from organized threats. He has a

in Engineering and Applied Physics from Harvard C

253
and a D.B.A. from Harvard Business School. He has w

several articles and one book on topics of public poli

corporate strategy.

DANIEL T. KUEHL is Director, Information Stra

Concentration Program, Information Reso

Management College, National Defense University

McNair, Washington DC. He holds a Ph.D. from 

University and is writing a book on the early hist

electronic warfare. His most recent publicat

“Information IN War or Information Warfare—

Distinction Meaningful?” published in The Canadia

1998.

PHILLIP E. LACOMBE is the Senior Vice Preside

Policy and Communications of the Veridian Corpora

leading provider of information and network prote

information operations capabilities, informatio

technology-based solutions, and test and evalu

capabilities. In 1996 he was Staff Director fo

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastru

Protection. Prior to assuming his current position, h

Executive Director for the Critical Infrastru

Transition Office.

RICHARD MARSHALL is Associate General Coun

Information Systems and Security at the National Se

Agency. 

JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, a retired U.S. Army colo

the Director of the Florida Office of Drug Control. 

responsible for the coordination of all state effo

decrease drug abuse and its consequences in Florida

1996 to 1999, he was Director of Strategy for the Of

National Drug Control Policy. He served a full caree

U.S. Army officer, holding a number of key assignme

include command at every level through brigade, dir

the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies

producing the 1993 edition of the Army’s Field M

100-5, Operations Doctrine. 

254
KENNETH A. MINIHAN, a retired lieutenant gene

the U.S. Air Force, served as Director of the Na

Security Agency/Central Security Service from 19

1999. Prior to this, Lieutenant General Miniha

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washi

DC (1994-96). He holds an M.A. in National Security A

from the Naval Postgraduate School.

WILLIAM NATTER has spent a number of years w

for Representative Ike Skelton, Ranking Minority M

on the House Armed Services Committee.

WILLIAM J. OLSON is the Staff Director for th

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Contro

holds a doctorate from the University of Texas at A

Dr. Olson is the coauthor of the study series Interna

Organized Crime and is the cocreator and coeditor of T

in Organized Crime, an international journal that f

on ways to disrupt criminal organizations.

CAROLYN W. PUMPHREY is the Program Coordina

the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) a

Duke University Program in Asian Security Studies 

Visiting Assistant Professor of History at North Ca

State University. She holds a B.A. in Literatur

History from the University of York, England, and a 

in History from Duke University, North Carolina (

She has taught a wide variety of courses at a college 

including “War and Society in Ancient and Medieval T

and the “History of Restraints on War.” She served 

Triangle Institute for Security Studies Post-Doctoral F

between 1997 and 2000 and is currently co-editin

conference proceedings from the TISS Study o

Summary Conference and a book on “Conflict in Afri

ELIZABETH RINDSKOPF-PARKER is General Cou

the University of Washington system. She holds a 

Doctor degree from the University of Michigan Sch

Law. Ms. Rindskopf-Parker was formerly General C

for the Central Intelligence Agency and the senior 

adviser to the U.S. Intelligence Community.

255
DANIEL S. ROPER, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. 

is Politico-Military Planner, Global Division, Joint

Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5). Commis

in the field artillery from the U.S. Military Acade

1982, he holds an M.S. in Nuclear Physics from the 

Postgraduate School, and a Master of Military Ar

Science degree from the U.S. Army Command and G

Staff College.

VICTOR UTGOFF is Deputy Director of the Str

Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for D

Analyses. He holds an M.S./Ph.D in Electrical Engin

from Purdue University, and is the author of num

papers, reports, and books, including The Challe

Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective (Macm

1990). His latest book is an edition titled The Coming 

Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests and World Orde

PHIL WILLIAMS is Director of the Univers

Pittsburgh’s Ridgway Center for International Se

Studies, and is also a professor in the Graduate Sch

Public and International Affairs at the University. He 

a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Univers

Southampton, England. He is currently completin

books, one on transnational organized crim

international security, the other on human comm

trafficking.

256
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor

Dr. Carolyn W. Pumphrey

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler