i

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

THE CHINA-JAPAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

Thomas L. Wilborn

March 21, 1996
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Copies of this

report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil.

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All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are loaded

on the Strategic Studies Institute Homepage for electronic

dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlislewww.army.mil/usassi/.

*******

An earlier version of this study was reviewed by four

colleagues at the U.S. Army War College. They are Colonel

(Retired) Donald W. Boose, Jr.; Professor Steven Metz; Colonel

Paul P. Peyton; and Professor Leif Rosenberger. They provided

valuable suggestions which improved the analysis and

presentation. All remaining errors of fact and judgment are the

sole responsibility of the author.
iii

FOREWORD

The United States has vital security and economic interests

in Northeast Asia, one of the most dynamic regions of the world.

This monograph focuses on the three bilateral relationships,

those connecting China, Japan, and the United States to each

other, which will dominate the future of the region.

Dr. Thomas Wilborn analyzes these relations, taking into

account key issues involving Taiwan and North Korea, and offers

insights regarding their future course. He also reviews U.S.

engagement policy and assesses the value of U.S. military

presence for regional stability.

Dr. Wilborn suggests that in the short range, Washington

should avoid significant changes of policy. However, in the long

range, the United States will have to establish machinery which

provides ways for the major states, especially China and Japan,

to assert greater initiative commensurate with their economic

power, yet within a stable political context. Multilateral

operational structures to supplement existing bilateral relations

in Northeast Asia may provide a means for the United States to

influence long-range trends and protect U.S. interests.

Long-term readers of these monographs are well familiar with

the distinctive quality of Tom Wilborn's work. For more than two

decades with the Strategic Studies Institute, the hallmarks of

his analyses have been clarity, thoroughness, and relevance for

the policymaker. This study is his final contribution prior to

retirement from Federal civil service. He leaves us with a rich,

abundant legacy of scholarship. We wish him and his wife, Sally,

great enjoyment of the years ahead.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

THOMAS L. WILBORN, a Research Professor of National Security

Affairs, is an Asian specialist with the Strategic Studies

Institute of the U.S. Army War College. His recent publications

include Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework

Agreement; Japan’s Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to

Northeast Asia?; and Stability, Security Structures, and U.S.

Policy for East Asia and the Pacific, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995, 1994, 1993, and 1992,

respectively. He is also author or coauthor of several other

studies and articles related to Asian security, nuclear doctrine,

and NATO. Before joining the Institute in 1975, Dr. Wilborn

taught international relations and political science at James

Madison University and Central Missouri University, and served on

a University of Kentucky educational assistance group working at

the Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia. He received

his Ph.D. degree in political science from the University of

Kentucky.
v

SUMMARY

The major powers of Northeast Asia--those nations which can

demand to be involved in all significant regional decisions--are

China, Japan, and the United States. Russia may be able to claim

that status in the future, but for a number of years Moscow will

not have the political, economic, or military capabilities

required.

The other actors in the region are North and South Korea and

Taiwan. Like Russia, they are not insignificant powers which can

be ignored. Indeed, if there is conflict in the region, it will

probably begin because of actions taken in Taipei or the two

Korean capitals. And the economies of South Korea and Taiwan make

them valuable trading partners for the three major powers of the

Northeast Asia Strategic Triangle.

The three bilateral relationships involving China, Japan,

and the United States are the critical factors of Northeast Asian

regional politics. They all are, and probably will remain into

the 21st century, in flux.

• The U.S.-Japanese relationship is the most stable.

-- Despite serious differences on trade issues, both

nations support the international trading system

and regional stability.

-- The mutual commitment to democracy and market

economics provides an ideological foundation for

the alliance.

-- The U.S.-Japan relationship is the most highly

institutionalized, and the two nations have the

highest degree of interdependence, of the three

bilateral ties.

-- Domestic political changes in either capital would

be the most likely factor to disrupt the alliance.

• The Japan-China relationship is potentially volatile in

the long term.

-- Beijing and Tokyo share objectives related to

trade and regional stability, especially in Korea.

-- Long-term interests diverge with respect to

Taiwan, the role of the United States, and Korea.

-- Historic animosities reinforce tensions and

complicate achieving accommodations.
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• The least stable bilateral relationship of the

Northeast Asian strategic triangle is between China and

the United States.

 -- Economic benefits and the desire to avoid conflict

are the strongest, but not necessarily sufficient,

incentives for Beijing and Washington to maintain

the relationship.

-- Differences over Taiwan are the major obstacle to

more comprehensive and beneficial cooperation.

-- Profound ideological differences and perceptions

of national interests will insure that there will

be strains in the relationship for the foreseeable

future.

• U.S. engagement is a necessary condition for regional

stability.

• Washington's high priority on economics complicates the

execution of foreign policy.

• U.S. domination of its bilateral relationships in

Northeast Asia is no longer possible.

• Abrupt changes of U.S. policy, especially reductions in

forward military presence, would undermine American

security interests in the region.

• Improved coordination among government agencies,

including military headquarters in the region, and

better recruitment and utilization of regional

specialists, will facilitate smooth execution of policy

in Northeast Asia.

• For the long range, the United States should place

greater emphasis on the creation of multilateral

structures to supplement U.S. bilateral ties.
1

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

THE CHINA-JAPAN-UNITED STATES STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

INTRODUCTION

Northeast Asia, as every other region of the world, has been

profoundly affected by the end of the Cold War and the implosion

and dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the region's politics

were never entirely subsumed by the bipolar global structure, the

existence of the Soviet Union as putative enemy of China, Japan,

and the United States was the single most important factor

determining regional alignments. Indeed, the two most critical

disputes in the region, the North-South confrontation on the

Korean peninsula and the status of Taiwan, are direct legacies of

the Cold War. With a weak and nonthreatening Russia succeeding

the Soviet Union, other factors--trade, investment, regional

security issues, and historical memories predating the Cold War--

now also influence Northeast Asian developments.

Japan and China are clearly the major regional actors in

Northeast Asia--indeed, all of East Asia--and can demand to be

considered on every significant regional decision. This puts them

in a category for which only one other nation, the United States,

can qualify. Yet North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan are not

small, insignificant powers which have no ability to influence

regional events. On the contrary, each of them have capabilities

that permit them to veto certain outcomes, and mobilize support

to achieve other outcomes. Moreover, they are directly involved

in the disputes more likely than any others to drag the regional

major powers into conflict. These governments are relatively

ineffective with respect to other issues, however. China, Japan,

and the United States have the capacity to be engaged in and

influence virtually all regional activities. Russia, the only

extra-regional nation other than the United States that might

play an important role in regional politics, also exerts

influence on some, but relatively few and relatively marginal,

issues.1 Russia's share in the region's economic activity is

minimal, and it does not have the capable regional military force

which its predecessor, the Soviet Union, could deploy in earlier

years. The potential for Moscow to assume a greater role in the

future--most non-Russians believe in a distant future--is the

main source of what influence it can mobilize to affect current

regional security affairs.

There are no Northeast Asian security organizations or

consultation fora--nothing even remotely similar to NATO or CSCE

in Europe. As a result, contemporary inter- national politics in

the region consist primarily of complex patterns of bilateral

relationships among all the actors.2

 From the perspective of

regional security, the most critical of these bilateral ties are

those between China and the United States, the United States and
2

Japan, and China and Japan. Yet, especially in the short range,

the adversarial relations of Pyongyang and Seoul and of Beijing

and Taipei, as well as the ambivalent ties between Taipei and

Washington and Tokyo, are also extremely important.

The purpose of this monograph is to examine these complex

bilateral relationships in order to develop conclusions

concerning the prospects for stability in the region, and present

recommendations for U.S. policy when appropriate. The analysis is

presented in three sections: overview; regional security

objectives and policies of the major powers (China, Japan, and

the United States), especially in their relations with each

other; and conclusions and implications for the United States.

The more salient aspects of bilateral relations of the other

actors are woven into the descriptions of relations among China,

Japan, and the United States.

OVERVIEW

During the 1970s and early 1980s, at the height of the Cold

War, Northeast Asia reflected the bipolar structure of the global

system, albeit imperfectly. The basic Cold War relationships

among Northeast Asian governments and with the superpowers are

depicted in Figure 1. U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea

were integral links in Washington's containment strategy, and the

United States and China collaborated to frustrate the expansion

of Soviet influence. Moscow's only ally in the region was

Pyongyang, indicating that Moscow's positive political influence

was relatively small even though the perception of the Soviet

Union as the enemy was behind most of these strategic alignments.

While there was no conflict in Northeast Asia, as the Cold War

paradigm suggests, the heavy lines indicating military

confrontation in Figure 1 connect China and the Soviet Union,

Japan and the Soviet Union, the United States and North Korea,

and North and South Korea. Of course, military confrontation

characterized U.S.-Soviet relations as well.

Northeast Asia was heavily armed: the Soviet Far East

contained 53 divisions and some 785 combat aircraft; China, with

some 4 million personnel in the People's Liberation Army (PLA),

deployed 78 divisions and many of its 5,300 combat aircraft

against the Soviets.3 The North Korean military contained some 31

divisions and 38 brigades, as well as approximately 800 combat

aircraft, opposing 21 divisions and 451 combat aircraft of South

Korea.4 Taiwan deployed 21 divisions (army and marine) and eight

separate army brigades, as well as some 400 combat aircraft.5

Japan's military was the least threatening, but nonetheless

contained 13 divisions and 270 combat aircraft.6 The smallest

armed force in the region (one infantry division, one Marine

Expeditionary Force, and 280 combat aircraft) belonged to the

United States.7 However, it had the ability, regularly exercised
3
4

in Korea, to reinforce with decisive force from the United

States. The United States, Soviet Union, and Japan also had

formidable naval capabilities in and around Northeast Asian

waters.

These bipolar patterns were criss-crossed by other

conflicts, allegiances, and historical memories, however. The PRC

and Taiwan, although both anti-Soviet, were locked in seemingly

irreconcilable confrontation over competing visions of China's

future. As reflected by the PRC-DPRK and USSR-DPRK alliances,

Beijing, Pyongyang, and Moscow shared a commitment to MarxismLeninism, although they were not united in the bipolar

geopolitical struggle. And although not apparent from Figure 1,

intense animosities embedded in still vivid memories of World War

II clouded relations between Chinese and Koreans, on the one

hand, and Japanese, on the other, while deeper historical

memories reinforced distrust of each national group toward all

others.

By the mid 1990s, as illustrated by Figure 2, significant

differences in the relationships in Northeast Asia have evolved.

Russia, principal successor to the Soviet Union, has diplomatic

relations with all governments of the region but Taiwan (and has

even established commercial relations with it), and military

confrontation with none. While former Soviet ballistic missile

submarines are still deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Russian

military, much smaller than the Soviet Far Eastern force before

1989, poses no near-term military threat to its neighbors in East

Asia. Seoul and Beijing have not only established diplomatic

relations, but developed a mutually profitable, rapidly expanding

interchange in trade. And while large military formations still

confront each other across the Taiwan Strait and tensions

sometimes become dangerously high, very important economic

relations and halting (if sometimes caustic and stormy)

"unofficial" political discourse about practical bilateral

relations also now take place. There is still military

confrontation on the Korean peninsula, of course, with even more

forces facing each other than a decade ago.8 A comparison of

Figures 1 and 2 does not indicate much change in U.S. relations

with Northeast Asian governments, but the inauguration of limited

diplomatic and economic contacts with the DPRK is a major

departure from earlier periods, and, in fact, U.S. roles in the

region have significantly changed in a number of ways.

Part of the explanation for the changes in the relations of

Northeast Asian governments is the phenomenal economic dynamism

of the region. While the Cold War was winding down, China, South

Korea, and Taiwan were setting records for economic development.

Their average rates of growth from 1980 to 1992 were 9.1 percent,

9.4 percent, and 10.6 percent, respectively.9 And, like Japan,
5
6

their prosperity--and particularly strong economic growth--highly

depends on foreign trade. Therefore, they all have--more than

before their economic take-offs--a strong incentive to foster

regional stability which allows trade and prosperity to expand.

North Korea is a startling exception, achieving less than 5

percent growth for the entire period, with a shrinking of its

economy in the last several years.10

The lines on Figure 2, like those on Figure 1, only portray

a simplified, formalistic version of regional relationships.

Historical memories still affect the patterns of interaction, and

each broad category of relationships includes significant

variations. Nonetheless, the differences suggested by these two

diagrams, even though they simplify and thus distort reality, are

substantial, and imply an evolving pattern of regional politics

very different from that of the Cold War. The new pattern is

complex, and that complexity itself implies greater

decentralization of authority and therefore fundamentally

different relationships among the actors in the region. Absent

the imperatives of the Cold War, the incentives for Japan to

assert more independent policies seem to be irresistible; the

influence of Russia, now economically destitute, politically

turbulent, and militarily weakened (compared to the military

forces once deployed by the Soviet Union), wanes to only marginal

significance; and U.S. military capabilities, while still

formidable, lose some of their former relevance. And without a

threat from the north, for decades the key factor in China's

security environment, Beijing has established new priorities and

different approaches to its neighbors in the region and, above

all, to the United States.

Compared to the Cold War, the present system is

characterized by great uncertainty and unpredictability. The

United States never actually exercised hegemonic authority in

Northeast Asia, although its influence with Japan and South Korea

was obviously very significant, but there was a degree of

discipline and restraint resulting from the general recognition

of a Soviet threat and determination not to permit Soviet

successes. Without those constraints, and with economic strength

that commands recognition and respect, Northeast Asian elites

appear to more frequently perceive that national interests must

be given priority over interests represented by alliances and

less formal coalitions. They are more likely than formerly to

revive historic grievances, and, at least in the case of China,

pursue them even at the risk of conflict.

NORTHEAST ASIA'S STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

The China Angle.
7

Beijing's relations with its neighbors in Northeast Asia, as

well as with the United States and Russia, have probably changed

more than those of any other government in the region; certainly

more than an examination of Figures 1 and 2 might indicate. Deng

Xiaoping's economic reforms and the nation's subsequent economic

growth, the opportunities to expand ties with Moscow presented by

Gorbachev's "new thinking," the massacre at Tiananmen Square, and

the collapse of the Soviet Union, among other things, complicated

relations with some governments and provided stronger ties with

others.

Chinese analysts see both positive and negative elements in

the current international and regional security environments. On

the one hand, they believe that the current security environment

in which foreign policy is executed is, as far as direct military

challenges are concerned, relatively benign. In the 1980s, the

official line in Beijing was that major nuclear war between the

superpowers involving China was inevitable, and serious regional

disputes (e.g., Cambodia, Vietnam, Afghanistan) also threatened

to involve the PRC. Chinese leaders feared a Soviet attack.

Today, in the eyes of Chinese analysts, there is almost no

possibility of major war, and also no regional disputes likely to

result in serious international conflict which would engage

China.11 Certainly they do not believe that conflict is likely

with a Northeast Asian neighbor. The only credible Northeast

Asian scenario of possible violence is with Taiwan, and then only

if its government attempts to formally and legally separate

itself from China or foreign powers intervene in the dispute. In

any case, Beijing considers this an internal, rather than an

international, issue. In other words, the PRC leadership believes

that the current external environment presents fewer overt

challenges to stability than the environment of the early 1980s.

On the other hand, the Chinese are troubled by the dominant

position of the remaining superpower, the United States, and what

they see as a U.S. scheme to impose bourgeois liberal democratic

values on Chinese society through "peaceful evolution" and

through a carefully engineered strategy of containment to prevent

China from assuming its rightful role in the international

system.12

The domestic political environment in which foreign policy

is determined and executed has also changed significantly. Deng

Xiaoping was at the height of his power in the early 1980s. While

there were factional disputes among the elite of the Party, the

political system was stable and Deng dominated virtually all

policy arenas. All significant foreign policy and strategic

initiatives certainly required his approval.13 Now the influence

that the aging Deng, and other surviving members of his

generation, can exercise is limited, and no other individual or

group has emerged which can dominate Chinese politics as he, and
8

Mao before him, did. Indeed, it is uncertain who actually

controls what aspects of China's policy, even though Jiang Zemin

is the de jure head of Party, state, and military. Whoever

ultimately succeeds Deng, he/they will represent a new generation

of Chinese leadership which did not lead the Revolution and help

create the socialist state, but matured under socialism and

achieved prominence within Party or state bureaucracies.

At the same time that this struggle for political control

over the central political apparatus is occurring in Beijing,

provincial and local authorities are vying with the national

capital for influence over the allocation of resources and

control of economic activity.14 Decisions made in Beijing are not

necessarily executed in Guangzhou or Shanghai.

The elites making foreign policy, then, are not likely to be

secure in their positions, and less able to sustain decisions

which may be opposed by others in the system. At a time when new

initiatives and approaches may be highly desirable, they will

find it difficult to assume the risks of innovation. In such an

uncertain milieu, it is also likely that contenders for power

will emphasize nationalistic symbols and causes.

Nationalism appears to be the primary ideological force

behind Beijing's foreign policy. Certainly the ideological

pronouncements of Marx, Lenin, Mao, or even Deng no longer affect

decisionmaking, except to provide the generally accepted

analytical framework used to examine and try to understand the

security environment and China's place in it.15 Whereas communism

always divided Chinese intellectuals to some degree, nationalism

is an effective unifying force.

Chinese intellectuals look with great disdain at their

country's confrontation with foreign powers during the "century

of humiliation and shame," when weak Qing and Nationalist

governments were forced to accept unequal treaties,

extraterritoriality, spheres of influence, degra-dation, and

foreign occupation. According to two American-educated Chinese

scholars, the fact of foreign domination and humiliation--and the

determination to rectify the indignity China suffered--is more

important than the notion of a Sinocentric (Middle Kingdom)

perception of the world (highly cultured Chinese v. foreign

barbarians) in understanding Chinese foreign policy. Moreover,

these attitudes are pervasive, affecting both the loyal

government analyst and the dissident expatriate.16 As economic

reform and development become more broadly established, the

importance of these historical experiences may become less

significant, but they are still operative and important now.17

The influence of this historical experience is obvious in

the "informal ideology" or world view which Steven I. Levine 
9

believes informs most Chinese policymakers and intellectuals. It

contains six propositions:

1. The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great

nation.

2. The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that

which it has experienced in the modern world.

3. China should be accorded compensatory treatment from

those powers which have insulted or injured it in the past.

4. As a great nation, China naturally occupies a central

position in world affairs and must be treated as a Great Power.

5. China's national sovereignty must be respected

absolutely, and such respect precludes any foreign criticism of

China's internal politics.

6. China's special virtue in international affairs consists

in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on expediency

but on immutable principles that express universal values such as

justice and equity.18

China's foreign policy expresses these attitudes in

Beijing's obsession with sovereignty. Noninterference in the

internal affairs of other states is a universally recognized

principle of international comity, but it is typically emphasized

most strongly by small powers who fear the intrusion of larger

states. Because Beijing purports to be a major power, and it

consciously seeks to attract foreign investment and expand

foreign trade, both activities which in important ways depend

upon and intensify the high degree of economic and communications

interpenetration in the world today, its extreme emphasis on

sovereignty and attacks on any criticism of Chinese policy as

infringements on sovereignty are unusual. But if Levine's

informal ideology is widely held, this position is at least

under-standable.

Nationalism interacts with the proposition, shared by almost

all governments, that foreign policy should support economic

development and enhance prosperity. For the Chinese elite, whose

actions can no longer be legitimized by a utopian ideology which

has been rejected by all strata of the society, success in

raising the standards of living of the population and expanding

the power of the state is not just a pragmatic objective.

Attaining development goals is necessary to validate the elite's

right to remain in power. According to China's strategy of

development, foreign investment and international trade are

absolutely critical components for success. Unfortunately for

Beijing, an overly broad conception of sovereignty and economic
10

development do not always reinforce each other as guides to

policy, forcing decisionmakers to make difficult choices and

causing discontinuities and inconsistencies in China's foreign

policy.

United States. China's most important and most troubling

bilateral relationship is with the United States. In terms of

foreign policy supporting economic growth, U.S. relations have

been critical. The United States was China's second or third

largest trading partner and the largest or third largest market,

depending on whose data is used, in 1994. According to figures

provided by Washington, but not Beijing, more than one-third of

all Chinese exports were purchased by U.S. consumers.19 U.S.

investment as of 1993 was $8.17 billion, which was third largest

but far behind Hong Kong and Taiwan.20 As Chinese officials and

analysts have acknowledged in private, the U.S. military presence

in East Asia contributes to stability in the region, a

supporting, if not necessary, condition for continued economic

development in China.

U.S. Human Rights Charges. Beijing has had its difficulties

dealing with Washington, and vice-versa, on more-or-less pure

economic issues. More serious problems arise when, from Beijing's

perspective, Washington tries to infringe on Chinese sovereignty

by linking trade with Chinese domestic issues such as human

rights or labor standards. Even dissident Chinese opposed

Washington's unsuccessful effort to link human rights with mostfavored-nation status, and supported Beijing's uncompromising

stand. Predictably, Chinese condemn Washington's attempts to

impose its own definitions of human rights and democracy. They

are likely to view the imposition of sanctions for arms transfers

which Washington considers impermissible also as an infringement

of sovereignty, not to mention an example of the United States

using double standards.21

However, on most Sino-American disputes over economic

issues, even when the Chinese believe that the United States is

imposing unacceptable conditions, at least partial accommodation

is achieved after each side issues appropriate condemnations of

the other's position. The pragmatic interests of each side

prevail, if only momentarily, over ideological considerations.

But these accommodations are often resented and opposed by

factions in each capital. In Beijing, the opponents tend to use

the language of assertive, and sometimes aggressive, nationalism,

and include powerful figures within the PLA.22

The Issue of Taiwan. The most divisive issue of U.S.-China

relations has been the status of Taiwan. Through prolonged

negotiations in 1978 and 1982, the two sides reached an

accommodation whereby the United States acknowledged the Chinese
11

position that Taiwan was a province of China, the United States

recognized that the PRC was the only government of China, China

recognized that the United States would continue to provide

Taiwan with presumably declining supplies of armaments, and each

implicitly agreed to repress their differences on this question

and pursue issues in which their interests might converge.23

However, the Chinese have never been happy with this compromise,

and commentaries frequently allege that Taiwan would already be

united with the mainland except for the United States.

Indeed, the Republic of China government on Taiwan was

protected from forcible reintegration with the mainland by the

deployment of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait after 1950

and the U.S.-Republic of China (ROC) Mutual Security Treaty of

1954. After normalization of U.S.-PRC relations and renunciation

of the U.S.-ROC treaty in 1979, continued unofficial relations

and economic contacts between Washington and Taipei (which

Beijing observers see as fostering continued unofficial relations

and economic contacts between Taipei and other nations),

contributed to Taiwan's economic success and ability to maintain

de facto independence from the PRC.

Relations between Beijing and Taipei since U.S.-PRC

normalization have been less bellicose than formerly-- Beijing no

longer calls for the "liberation" of Taiwan and neither side any

longer shells the other, although the PLA reportedly did fire

missiles over Taiwan into the Pacific Ocean in December 1995.24 In

fact, after far-reaching political changes on both sides of the

Strait, restrictions against travel have gradually been eased,

until the PRC will now admit almost any person from Taiwan, and

Taipei will permit a fairly broad--but not yet unrestricted--flow

of visitors from the mainland.25 It is economic contacts that are

most desired by Beijing and by Taiwan's business community.

Although Taipei has permitted indirect investment on the mainland

only since 1987, Taiwanese are already the second largest

"foreign" investors in China behind Hong Kong. As of 1993, they

had invested $13.2 billion in 20,612 enterprises, mostly in

Fujian Province, the area directly across the Strait from

Taiwan.26 Governmental contacts between Beijing and its erstwhile

province, increasingly required as more communications take

place, are conducted through two "unofficial" organizations, the

mainland Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait

(ARATS) and the island-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF).

Beijing's current policy is to encourage greater across-thestrait contacts in the context of Deng Xiaoping's concept of "one

country, two systems," whereby Taiwan, like Hong Kong and Macau,

would become a "special administrative region" within the Chinese

state while retaining its own distinct economic and political

systems. It would become a local government with broad, but

somewhat vague, autonomy.27 As the government of the one China,
12

only the PRC would be entitled to represent Taiwan

diplomatically, but Taiwan would still be permitted autonomous

economic and cultural contacts with other countries. Under "one

country, two systems," Beijing tolerates, and says it will

continue to tolerate when reunification occurs, separate Taiwan

membership in APEC, the Asian Development Bank, the International

Olympic Committee, and the World Trade Organization (after the

PRC is admitted) as long as it does not use the names Republic of

China or Taiwan. This policy was refined and expanded, with

emphasis on China's peaceful intentions, in President Jiang

Zemin's 1995 New Year's address.28 But while Beijing has

encouraged across-the-strait contacts, it has consistently

opposed efforts by Taipei to enlarge its international space by

gaining formal diplomatic relations with other countries or by

joining international organizations.

As Taipei has pushed for wider recognition under the

"pragmatic diplomacy" of President Lee Teng-hui, who succeeded

Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, Beijing has increased its efforts to

keep Taiwan diplomatically isolated. Against the background of

so-called unofficial visits by Lee to several Southeast Asian

countries and Taipei's campaign for membership in the United

Nations, Beijing launched unprecedented personal attacks against

Lee, using all of its propaganda assets, after he concluded his

now famous "private" visit to Cornell University in June 1995. He

was condemned as an enemy of the Chinese people determined to

prevent unity.29 The words were reinforced by an extensive

military exercise close to Taiwan which featured tests in the

South China Sea (150 kilometers north of Taipei) of surface-tosurface missiles with ranges adequate to strike the island. The

PLA also conducted other military exercises in the vicinity of

the island shortly before Taiwan's legislative elections in

December 1995. Tensions were undoubtedly higher than at any other

time since U.S.-PRC rapprochement. Even during the most tense

period, however, economic activities continued, including new

investments and arrangements.30

President Clinton's decision in May 1995 to reverse the

State Department, which had informed China that Lee would not be

granted a visa, and allow President Lee to accept an award from

Cornell University was the proximate cause of the downturn in

Taiwan-China relations. The decision, made under strong

congressional pressure, also led to what most observers called

the lowest point in U.S.-China relations since 1979. The

extraordinary vehemence of the Chinese reaction surprised many

American observers, including officials of both executive and

congressional branches of government. The reaction is less

difficult to understand in the context of the attitudes of some

Chinese policymakers.

To an influential segment of the Chinese elite, including
13

parts of the PLA, the United States had been pursuing deliberate

programs of containment and "peaceful evolution" directed against

China since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Three recent U.S.

actions had reconfirmed their beliefs and given credibility to

their arguments among other members of the elite. The first was

President Bush's decision, made during his reelection campaign,

that Taiwan could purchase 150 F-16 fighter aircraft from General

Dynamics, a company laying off personnel because of falling

Pentagon orders. While the official reaction in Beijing was

relatively restrained, Bush's decision was viewed as a gross

violation of the Shanghai Communique. The second was the Clinton

administration's review of policy toward Taiwan, which resulted

in the change of the name of the office handling Taiwan's affairs

in the United States from the "North American Coordination

Council" to the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative

Office in the United States" and the easing of restrictions on

the access of Taiwanese officials to U.S. officials. U.S. Cabinet

officers were also permitted to make "private visits" to Taipei.31

The third disturbing development was the publication by the U.S.

Department of Defense of the United States Security Strategy for

the East Asia-Pacific Region in February 1995. It seemed to imply

that China was a threat to the security of East Asia, and also

declared that the United States would keep military forces in the

region to assure stability indefinitely.32 The first two actions

were seen as support for the contention that the United States

wanted to keep China divided and weak, and the third appeared to

them as proof of a U.S. goal of hegemony over East Asia, and

therefore China.

The decision to permit Lee's visit seemed to be the

proverbial last straw and a totally unacceptable attack on

Chinese national integrity and sovereignty. In the context of the

struggle to succeed Deng, Jiang and Vice Premier/ Foreign

Minister Qian Qichen could not afford to appear soft in the face

of the U.S. action, although there is no evidence that they would

have reacted less forcefully had their positions been more

secure. In any case, the reaction was immediate and unprecedented

in its intensity.

As must have been expected, Beijing protested that Clinton's

decision represented a "two China" or "one China, one Taiwan"

policy, in clear violation of the Shanghai Communique and other

U.S.-China understandings, and canceled high-level visits. But

Beijing also recalled its ambassador in Washington for

consultations, suspended scheduled discussions on the missile

control regime with Washington, and launched a vituperative

propaganda campaign against the United States and, as previously

mentioned, Lee Teng-hui. The propaganda against Washington was

unusually extensive, pervasive, and prolonged.33 These latter

actions seem to have been more than President Clinton or the

congressional critics of U.S. policy anticipated.
14

That the crisis atmosphere in U.S.-China relations had begun

to subside by August, only 3 months after Lee received his visa,

reflects the belief of both governments that bilateral relations

are extremely important. The problem might not have reached such

dangerous proportions except for domestic political problems--a

new Republican majority in Congress with a anti-Beijing bias

harping at President Clinton, and hard liners in Beijing seeking

position for the more open succession struggle which will occur

when Deng dies. But it also reflects the reality that diverging

U.S. and Chinese interests and values limit bilateral cooperation

and present opportunities for conflict in the absence of a common

enemy. From Beijing's perspective, the factors underlying the

crisis of 1995 are still present: the U.S. "one China" policy is

still unacceptable to Beijing because it provides too much

latitude to Taipei, and U.S. human rights and trade policy

amounts to intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign

China. U.S.-China relations are likely to remain troubled.

Japan. From Beijing's perspective, ties with Washington and

Tokyo are clearly interrelated, and can be manipulated to its own

advantage.

Beijing has sought to use the prospect of improved political

and economic relations with Japan to induce Washington to be more

politically cooperative, to elicit more American investment in

China, and to encourage Washington to relax a variety of postTiananmen sanctions. Conversely, until Tokyo fully and

convincingly renounces its military history for the latter part

of the 19th century and the first 45 years of the 20th, China

will want the United States to act as a brake on any expanding

Japanese military role in the region. Also, Beijing will use

Tokyo's ceaseless quest for market share and the specter of

American penetration of the Chinese market as a means to extract

maximally favorable commercial, aid, investment, and technology

terms from Japan.34

Whether China has been successful in exploiting the BeijingWashington-Tokyo triangle, its ties with Japan seem orderly and

beneficial compared to those with the United States. But there

have been peaks and valleys. Tokyo imposed economic sanctions on

Beijing after the Tiananmen massacre, and reduced Official

Development Assistance (ODA) grants to China from $81.2 million

in 1994 to $5.2 million for 1995 as a protest to Beijing for its

nuclear tests in 1995.35 However, Tokyo rescinded the sanctions

sooner than any other nation, and its penalty for nuclear testing

may also not be long lasting. And Beijing, through diplomatic

protests and media blasts, has frequently called Tokyo to task

for misrepresenting its history or for claiming sovereignty over

Diaoyo Islands, a disputed uninhabited island group in the East
15

China Sea which the Japanese call Senkaku Islands. These have

been largely pro forma exercises, however, partly to exploit the

Japanese sense of guilt.36

Beijing's current criticism of Japan, which has exceeded the

level of negative commentary of the recent past, has centered on

two themes: Japan-Taiwan relations, which Beijing considers

unnecessarily close and unacceptably political, that resulted in

a Taiwan vice-premier attending the 1994 Asiad in Hiroshima and a

number of "unofficial" contacts between high officials of the two

governments,37 and Tokyo's decision to revoke ODA grants to China

because it resumed nuclear tests. Beijing has said, forcefully

and repeatedly, that the imposition of a political test for ODA

violates the principle of separating economics and politics,

which heretofore Tokyo had relatively faithfully followed. Rather

than criticize what it considers a wholly justifiable testing

program, Beijing has suggested that Tokyo would do better to

consider its own serious transgressions which resulted in

countless losses and unspeakable pain to China and other Asian

countries.

On the other hand, in the last several years there have been

reciprocal high level visits intended to symbolize a warm and

developing bilateral relationship. Beijing has sent its highest

officials, President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng to Tokyo,

while several Japanese Prime Ministers and even Emperor Akihito,

the first Emperor ever to enter China, have visited Beijing.

Economic concerns have dominated China's official relations

with Japan, and although Beijing may have preferred greater

Japanese investments and more favorable treatment on some

agreements, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship has served

both parties--certainly China--well. China was the number one or

two recipient of Japanese ODA from 1982 until 1994,38 and Japan

was China's largest trading partner and second or third largest

export market after Hong Kong.39 Sino-Japanese relations clearly

have supported China's modernization drive, especially as

Japanese businessmen have increased their investment in more

capital intensive industries during the late 1980s and 1990s.40

These are the current outward expressions of China's policy

toward Japan--the tatemae, to use the Japanese word, or surface

aspects of Sino-Japanese relations. There is also the underlying

reality, or honne.41 Chinese analysts and officials, as well as

the larger public, are much less benign about Japanese

motivations, or future Japanese action, than formal diplomatic

discourse may suggest. In short, based on a century of sporadic

conflict which included Japan's cruel occupation in the 1930s and

1940s, Chinese of all walks of life, including the elite, are

deeply suspicious and fearful of what a politically active and

militarily powerful Japan might do.42 This has been clear in
16

reactions to Japan's bid to become a permanent member of the U.N.

Security Council and the passage of the peacekeeping

authorization bill and subsequent deployment of Self-Defense

Forces on U.N. peacekeeping missions. Moreover, they simply do

not like most Japanese. At the same time, consensus among Chinese

analysts that Japan's economic ascendancy will continue, despite

current problems, eventually eclipsing the United States, is also

part of the honne of China's view of Japan.43 As a result, Beijing

strives to engage Japan for aid, investment, and trade, in

support of its modernization and development, but also harbors

great anxiety about future Japanese political roles.

The Japanese Angle.

Japan is gradually emerging from almost complete dependence

on the United States in the political and security aspects of

foreign policy. While Tokyo had pursued a vigorous independent

foreign economic policy for decades, it is not too great an

oversimplification to say that during the Cold War the primary

goal for the political and security aspects of Japan's foreign

policy was simply to sustain its alliance with the United

States.44 Washington provided security in the form of the nuclear

umbrella and forward deployed forces on Japanese soil, all

guaranteed by the Mutual Security Treaty (MST). In return, Japan

provided the United States with military bases and a formidable

barrier to Soviet expansion. Moreover, Japan was permitted to

avoid major expenditures for defense, focusing virtually its

entire energy and resources on economic recovery and economic

expansion. The primary cost to Japan: deference to the United

States in all major foreign policy decisions.

This division of labor and responsibility had broad support

among the business-oriented conservatives who ruled Japan after

1955.45 The alliance with the United States was a major factor in

the phenomenal economic achievements of Japanese business and

government. It also was compatible with the pervasive support for

pacifism among Japanese, who considered themselves--not the

populations of countries invaded by Japan--the most abused

victims of Japan's military-dominated governments and the great

Pacific War itself.46 Because of the alliance, Japan could enjoy

security and its pacifist constitution. While Tokyo did establish

armed forces--Self-Defense Forces (SDF)--because of U.S.

pressure, they remained small and very carefully controlled by

civilian authority. To a significant degree the alliance served

the interests of all Japanese political groups except extreme

nationalists on the right and communists on the left.

A combination of factors have forced Tokyo to reevaluate its

international posture. The most important undoubtedly centered on

the changes in the international system resulting from the end of
17

the Cold War and the economic advances of most Northeast Asian

nations. The disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the

fundamental purpose of the alliance with the United States.

Moreover, the United States had changed: the world's leading

creditor nation in 1980, it was the world's leading debtor nation

by 1990. Its economy seemed stagnant, and its citizens appeared

to be unwilling to continue to bear the burdens of international

leadership. Many Japanese questioned that Washington would remain

engaged in Northeast Asia, either formally or in practice

abandoning its Cold War alliances with Japan and the ROK.

Japan had also changed. By 1990, it was the world's largest

creditor nation, and, in neomercantilist fashion, it enjoyed a

massive current account surplus, especially with its major

customer, the United States. In fact, trade friction was becoming

more salient to many Japanese (and Americans) than security

cooperation in the U.S.-Japan relationship. To many Japanese,

this situation reinforced the belief that Japan could no longer

rely on the alliance with the United States as the fundamental

anchor of foreign policy. And no doubt many Japanese believed

that dependence on the United States had become unnecessary.

Japan was the nation that worked, the nation, many believed,

destined clearly to be number one, if it wasn't already. It must

be stressed that other members of the Japanese elite, probably

always a majority, resisted any significant change in Japan's

international posture which might require that Japan assume

greater responsibility, risks, or costs in international

politics. And this view that Japan should remain passive in

international politics had broad support in the electorate.

Discussions over Japan's proper international role,

previously mostly confined to intellectual journals and academic

meetings, became a prominent, public national debate during the

1990 Gulf War, when many Western observers, including government

officials, criticized Tokyo for not providing military personnel

and equipment in support of the coalition expelling Iraq from

Kuwait.47 Its large contribution of money without risking

personnel was not considered adequate. In agonizing interchanges

which reflected the Japanese people's abhorrence and fear of the

military and the pervasive pacifism which are legacies of the

Second World War, as well as voices for change, a partial,

tentative resolution was reached in 1992 with the passage of a

Peacekeeping Bill (PKO) by the Diet.48 It permits the

participation of SDF in limited U.N. peacekeeping operations, the

first time since 1945 that Japanese military forces were

authorized any security role but defense of the homeland. The

restrictions in the bill are severe, prohibiting any activities

which go beyond classic, neutral peacekeeping.49 However, the real

significance of the act transcends its particular provisions; the

PKO bill represented Japan's first formal recognition that it has

responsibilities for international security beyond rhetorical and
18

financial support for the United States and the United Nations,

and providing financial aid to poorer nations.

The debate about how Japan should attempt to meet these

responsibilities will continue well into the future, and will be

influenced not only by changes in Japan's environment, but also

by the shape of its domestic political system, now undergoing

substantial--perhaps profound-- structural change. But even in

the period since the passage of the PKO bill, when domestic

politics has been uncharacteristically unstable and politicians

have necessarily focused their energies on partisan issues, the

national consensus on security and Japan's international role has

been shifting. When the PKO bill was finally narrowly adopted

after extended legislative debate, the idea of deploying SelfDefense Forces outside Japan for peacekeeping purposes was

supported by less than a majority of the population.50 However, in

a short time it was accepted fairly generally, and SDF have

participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations in Cambodia,

Mozambique, Rwanda/Zaire, and the Golan Heights without

significant opposition at elite or electorate levels.51 Moreover,

the Japanese government has continued its efforts to increase its

influence in the United Nations and support multilateral security

dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, both activities which have

received emphasis only in the post-Cold War era. The inclusion of

two pacifist parties in the shaky governing coalition in 1994 did

cause the foreign ministry to soft-peddle, if not suspend, its

campaign for Japan to become a permanent member of the Security

Council, but the idea has support among a significant segment of

the elite.52 Japan has also continued to support the alliance with

the United States as the foundation of Japanese defense and

security policy.

 While the outcome of Japan's domestic political conflict is

uncertain, there is virtually no possibility that political power

will shift from mainstream groups unless there is some kind of

totally unexpected crisis. On the other hand, it does seem

probable that the younger politicians who will move into

positions of prominence will support pragmatic foreign policy

decisions which expand Japan's regional and global roles without

significantly weakening the alliance with the United States.53 The

confidence nurtured in decades of economic success, which might

have emboldened youthful nationalists, has been softened, if not

destroyed, by the current recession and the startling

inadequacies of Japanese social and technical institutions

revealed by the earthquake which destroyed much of Kobe, the

poisonous gas attacks on Tokyo subways, and the subsequent

discovery of the mysterious sect which had developed and

prospered within Japan's presumably well-ordered society.54

Japan's neighbors express concern about its potential

military capability.55 Japan does have modern military
19

organizations, the Self-Defense Forces. During the Cold War,

expenditures on the SDF, while rarely exceeding 1 percent of GNP,

increased about 5 percent every year, as Japan gradually deployed

state-of-the-art defensive weapons and equipment to meet the

requirements of its National Defense Program Outline, designed

solely for defense in conjunction with the United States. The

budget for the Defense Agency may now be the second largest in

the world, depending on how one calculates China's military

expenditures, a fact often cited to emphasize the potential

threat from Japan. Budgets are a notoriously poor measure of

military capability, however, and that is doubly so in the case

of the Self-Defense Forces because of the appreciation of the yen

and high personnel and equipment costs in Japan. More

significantly, the Defense Agency and the Self- Defense Forces

are not valued institutions in Japanese society, and their

activities are closely circumscribed by constitutional, legal,

political, and social limitations. Finally, they are constrained

and regulated by the alliance with the United States, a factor

reassuring to most East Asians.

United States. Much of the foreign policy debate in Tokyo

has focused on whether Japan should emphasize its alliance with

the United States as a global partnership, or focus on linking

Japan with the rest of Asia. The debate is ongoing, and its

eventual outcome may eventually establish the conceptual basis

for long-range Japanese foreign policy, but for the present, the

bureaucracy, with the acquiesce of Cabinet and Diet, have opted

for the emphasis on the alliance with the United States. This is

most clearly expressed in two official documents, the Defense of

Japan 1995, the Defense Agency's annual white paper, and the new

National Defense Program Outline, which replaces a 1976 version,

published in 1995.56 The latter especially develops the rationale

for the SDF and its modernization based on U.S. regional strategy

as expressed in United States Security Strategy for the East

Asia-Pacific Region. Japan has also increased its attention to

Asia, however, maintaining a supportive role in the ASEAN

Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

(APEC) organization and nurturing its bilateral relations with

most East Asian countries, including those (like Burma and, until

recently, Vietnam) with strained relations with the United

States. But Tokyo has declined to participate in the East Asian

Economic Caucus, a pet project of Malaysian Prime Minister

Mahathir, because it excludes Australia, Canada, and the United

States.

Even Japanese who believe that Tokyo is too subservient to

Washington recognize that Japan's relations with the United

States are more important than those with any other nation. The

United States is Japan's largest market for exports and the

largest source of imports.57 There is a high degree of
20

interdependency in the service and financial sectors of both

countries' economies. And Japan, as during the Cold War, still

consciously designs its defense on the basis of the Mutual

Security Treaty (MST) with the United States, even though the

putative enemy, the Soviet Union, no longer exists.

In the last few years, both governments seemed to have

focused more energy on the economic aspects of their relations,

where there is the greatest disagreement, than on political and

security affairs, where there is a high degree of harmony. The

Japanese press dwells on U.S. demands for greater access to

Japanese markets, frequently echoing government arguments about

the unfairness, and sometimes immorality and illegality, of U.S.

positions. Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International

Trade and Industry contentions that the cause of U.S. trade

deficits can be found in America's low saving rates, bad

management, and bad marketing rather than alleged Japanese trade

barriers resonate well among all Japanese. The rapid sequence of

one trade crisis after another and the frequently strident tone

of U.S. pronouncements clearly has affected public and elite

attitudes about the United States. But because relations with the

United States are critical, each crisis resulting from U.S.

demands for more open markets is partially solved, usually

through a last moment partial accommodation by Japan, which then

propels the two sides toward a new problem destined, in time, to

become another crisis.

Tokyo and Washington have both attempted to isolate security

issues from contentious economic ones, so far with reasonable

success. In spite of tensions over trade, the military

organizations of each nation have close relations with the other,

to include educational and high level exchanges and frequent

exercises.58 Japan provides greater financial support for U.S.

forces stationed within the country than any other government, so

that it is less expensive for the United States to station

military personnel in Japan than in the United States itself.59

While there have been problems related to respective defense

industries, virtually all military equipment for the SDF not

produced in Japan comes from the United States. Moreover, Tokyo

supports almost all U.S. security initiatives politically and

financially. For example, Japan is providing a significant

financial contribution in support of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed

Framework for the construction of light-water reactors in North

Korea.60 It has also aligned itself with U.S. policy toward Bosnia

and the peace process in the Middle East.

Japanese policy does diverge from U.S. positions with

respect to Russia. Rather than a potential partner in a structure

for global peace, Tokyo views Moscow more as an antagonist,

despite the end of the Cold War. Russia still occupies the

Northern Territories, the southernmost islands of the Kurile
21

chain which Japanese hold to be legally and historically an

integral part of Japan. The economic and strategic significance

of these islands is very limited, but they have become a symbol

of Japanese nationalism, and genuine rapprochement with Russia

seems unlikely as long as it occupies what Tokyo considers a

small part of Japan. Moreover, Russia's post-war deployments in

Japan's neighborhood are still substantial, although Russian

military activity in the region has been minimal in the last

several years. Indeed, Japan and Russia have not negotiated a

peace treaty since the end of World War II. And from Tokyo's

perspective, there is very limited potential economic benefit

from cooperation with Russia. The Maritime Provinces contain few

investment opportunities because of poor infrastructure, an

inflexible bureaucracy, and a generally unreformed political

elite. Since Russia's Far East is sparsely populated and

underdeveloped, it is also a poor market for Japanese goods. Any

support for integrating Moscow into the Western political orbit

is given without enthusiasm in response to U.S. pressure.

The rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl by three U.S.

servicemen in October 1995 focused attention on some of the

unpleasant consequences of basing U.S. forces in Japan. The

highly publicized crime also inflamed opposition to U.S. bases in

Okinawa and reinforced the widely held stereotype of the United

States as a violent society. These negative attitudes could be

aggregated with economic concerns to seriously undermine popular

support for the alliance, particularly the presence of U.S.

forces within Japan.61 Indeed, in the aftermath of the Okinawa

incident there have been many calls for the MST to be reviewed,

usually implying that U.S. forces should be reduced or withdrawn.

It can now be politically rewarding in Japan to attack

Washington. Officially, however, the Japanese government

commitment to the MST is firm, although it is seeking adjustments

to basing arrangements on Okinawa. Tokyo had not yet presented a

public argument to develop support in the Diet and the public for

retaining 47,000 U.S. forces in Japan at the beginning of 1996.

China. Japan's relations with China are more important than

ties with any other nation except the United States. The economic

significance of the relationship has increased with the growth of

the Chinese economy, the implementation of reforms in China, and

the appreciation of the yen.62 In 1994, China was Japan's second

largest trading partner, with slightly more than one fourth the

volume of Japan-U.S. trade, and sixth largest market.63 Japan not

only bought energy resources, which accounted for most of its

imports from China in 1980, but also a variety of manufactured

goods and foodstuffs.64

With the appreciation of the yen and the conclusion of

several steps to protect Japanese investors,65 Japanese private
22

investment has also increased, although it still accounts for a

very small portion of total Japanese private foreign investment.66

Japan ranks fourth among foreign investors in China. However,

small and medium sized Japanese businesses particularly have

found China an attractive market for investment. They must

confront problems of poor infrastructure, changing rules, rigid

bureaucracy, and corruption, as do all foreign investors in

China, but the potential rewards are nonetheless apparently more

than sufficient.

Like Beijing, Tokyo has sought to foster these economic

interactions, a major reason why it also has worked hard to

maintain friendly Japan-China relations overall. As noted in the

discussion of Chinese policy toward Japan, there have been

frequent consultations on all aspects of the bilateral

relationship and exchanges of the highest level officials, and

China has regularly been one of the major benefactors of Japanese

ODA. In its foreign and security policy deliberations, Japanese

officials are always solicitous about the impact decisions will

have on Asian neighbors, particularly South Korea and China.

Tokyo, which established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing

shortly after the Nixon shokku (shock) of 1971, has also acted as

its advocate, notably when Japan broke ranks with other G7

countries and suspended sanctions against China at the G7 meeting

in 1990.67 Informally, Tokyo also attempts to mediate between

Beijing and Washington, at least to the extent that it urges

caution and restraint on each side.

The two strains of present Japanese policy which seem to

most concern the Chinese--suspension of most grant ODA to Beijing

and alleged flirtation with a "two China" or "one China, one

Taiwan" policy--are based on two different influences on Japanese

policymaking. The former represents the Cabinet's and Ministry of

Foreign Affairs' response to the governing coalition's

indignation, as expressed by the parties' foreign affairs

coordination subcommittee, that Beijing ignored Tokyo's repeated

demand that China forgo any testing of nuclear devices, and the

pervasive significance of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. This

was an unusual development in Japanese decisionmaking, where

foreign policy is normally hammered out through bargaining among

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of

International Trade and Industry (MITI), other interested

ministries, and perhaps the Cabinet or groups within the Diet,

but almost never including political parties or agencies of

political parties. MOFA's response to the coalition was typically

limited and cautious. ODA grants to China have never been very

large. Denying all grants to China except those for humanitarian

and emergency purposes (estimated to be $4 million) reduced

China's potential by 95 percent from 1994 levels, but still

eliminated only $74 million.68 But with cabinet approval, MOFA

rejected the subcommittee request that ODA loans for China, which
23

totalled a much more significant $1.4 billion in 1994, also be

reviewed, arguing that the loan program was necessary for the

development of good long-term relations with China.69 Thus,

Tokyo's sanction was largely symbolic, although probably resented

as much by Beijing as more coercive economic sanctions would have

been, and in response to pressures which probably only would be

mobilized on nuclear weapons issues, always highly emotional in

Japan.

The issue of Taiwan is probably less disruptive of SinoJapanese relations than Sino-American relations, but it has been

a cause of much acrimony in the past and probably will be again

in the future. Japanese investment in Taiwan exceeds that in

China, and Taiwan is also a major Japanese trading partner.

Moreover, Taiwan occupies a special status for many in the

Japanese political elite because of the special relationship

developed during the long period of Japanese control (1895-1945),

and the ties of Japanese and Taiwanese businessmen forged in the

post-war period. Thus, there is likely to be continued support

for Japan's "unofficial" ties with Taiwan, especially among

business groups but also the bureaucracy. It would be surprising

if the resulting advocacy for Taiwan did not conflict with

Beijing's narrow perception of the proper role for its renegade

province in international affairs.

The U.S. Angle.

Unlike in the mid 1980s, when containing the Soviet Union

was still the central focus of U.S. foreign policy, Washington

today is likely to cite the economic dynamism of Northeast Asia

and the increasingly important trade between the United States

and the region to rationalize and justify U.S. activities there.70

Economics has been an important element of U.S. policy in the

region for decades, but as Northeast Asian economies continue to

grow and regional security concerns (with the important exception

of the DPRK) become less immediate, relatively greater attention,

in activities and rhetoric, is placed on economic relations.

Even a casual examination of data validates this emphasis.71

U.S. trade with Northeast Asia was $300 billion in 1994. That is,

the four economies of the region (International Monetary Fund

records do not indicate any U.S.-DPRK trade) accounted for 25

percent of all U.S. trade, including that with Canada, Mexico,

and the European Union! Moveover, while only China is expected to

have rates of growth in the near future as high as in Southeast

Asia, the rates of growth for the region as a whole are expected

to surpass those of most other U.S. trading partners. In other

words, Northeast Asia should account for an even larger and

growing share of total U.S. trade, when compared to developed

countries, for at least the balance of the century. Most of this
24

trade ($202 billion) took the form of imports, but Northeast Asia

was nonetheless also a good market for U.S. commodities. The four

economies absorbed $97.9 billion of U.S. exports in 1994, almost

as much as all of the members of the European Union ($101

billion).

Economics has only displaced security as a foreign policy

priority in a relative sense, however. U.S. security interests in

Northeast Asia are still extremely important also. Maintaining

regional stability is the overarching long-term security interest

of the United States in Northeast Asia, as it has been since the

end of the Cold War. It is interrelated with U.S. regional

economic objectives in that stability helps provide an

environment which fosters the economic dynamism of Northeast

Asia; and stability allows U.S. businesses, employing U.S.

workers, to participate in that economic prosperity. Stability is

also a necessary condition for the security of U.S. possessions

and territories in East Asia and the Pacific, as well as U.S.

allies in the region.

From the U.S. perspective, there are two sources of

challenges to regional stability. One is the very nature of an

evolving international system characterized by decentralization

and diffusion of power. Uncertainty has replaced the more-or-less

predictable patterns of behavior associated with the bipolar

structure of the Cold War. That uncertainty is not only derived

from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which once could act

as a restraint on North Korea, but more noticeably from the

widely held perception in Japan that the United States, fatigued

from carrying the burdens of world leadership and plagued by

unfavorable economic conditions at home, will disengage from the

region. If the United States disengages from Northeast Asia, many

regional leaders foresee the reemergence of old antagonisms and a

greatly enhanced possibility of conflict, probably involving

China and/or Japan.72 One of their responses to this perceived

uncertainly has been to modernize and enlarge their military

capabilities.

U.S. Strategic Concepts for Northeast Asia. The United

States continues to try to provide assurance that it will remain

engaged in Northeast Asia through its security cooperation

programs and forward military presence. Bilateral relationships

between the United States and nations in the region have been the

principal basis for U.S. security policy since the 1950s. These

include not only the formal mutual security alliances with Japan

and the R.O.K., but also the less formal security relationships

with China and Taiwan. During the Cold War they provided an

extremely effective way for the United States to optimally

mobilize the very diverse nations of East Asia to advance U.S.

security objectives, specifically the containment of the Soviet

Union. These bilateral relationships can still be mutually
25

beneficial and provide the United States with the ability to

influence regional events. Moreover, to precipitously eliminate

or undermine these ties would be very destabilizing, and clearly

not contribute to regional stability.

"Forward military presence," the second principal strategic

concept of U.S. security policy, is broader than "forward

deployed forces," the terminology of the Cold War, in that the

latter have a specific mission of deterrence and defense against

an identified enemy.73 On the other hand, personnel who make-up

forward military presence, which accounts for most U.S. forces in

the Pacific, may have more ambiguous military missions designed

to achieve the political objective of providing assurance of a

stable regional order for friends and allies. These include

contingency planning and training, often in combined exercises

with the military of regional states, and other military-tomilitary contacts. As in Korea, they may still have the

deterrence mission of forward deployed forces. At the same time,

if they are to remain credible, forward military presence forces

must have the capability to perform a variety of real combat

missions which might be required in the region in addition to

peace time, noncombat tasks.

If forward military presence in Northeast Asia provides

assurance that the region will remain relatively stable, then

providing that assurance satisfies the broad objectives of the

United States. As U.S. Government spokesmen frequently assert,

military presence not only allows the United States to influence

military balances and prevents resort to violence in some

disputes, but more importantly, it permits the United States to

be an "honest broker," mediating among contestants to find

acceptable solutions.74 Honest brokers will also be present to

defend their own interests and gain intimate knowledge about

regional developments which could influence their own objectives

in the future. And they have access to decisionmaking centers

within the region, also an objective of U.S. policy.

The U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. The second source of

potential instability is an overt challenge from the weakest

government in the region, the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (DPRK). It confronts the U.S.-ROK Alliance with the most

robust security threat left over from the Cold War, plus a

recently imposed regional and global threat to the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, whose preservation is a

high priority global interest of the United States.75

The traditional approaches of alliances and forward deployed

forces were, by themselves, inappropriate to deal with the North

Korean nuclear threat unless the United States and its allies

were to physically disarm Pyongyang, an option Washington never

seriously considered. Rightly or wrongly, the Clinton
26

administration also rejected, after first attempting to mobilize,

international political and economic sanctions. Instead, it

pursued, through tortuous negotiations, a "positive-sum" formula

which provided economic benefits for Pyongyang, curtailment of

North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons program for Washington and

allies, and the expectation of dialogue between the two rival

Korean governments for Seoul. This solution, enshrined in the

DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework of 1994, was probably unprecedented

for the resolution of a security issue, and would have been

literally unthinkable in the bipolar world of the Cold War.

The Agreed Framework and the processes of obtaining and

implementing it illustrate several characteristics of U.S.

relations with Northeast Asian nations. Without the Cold War

structure for assigning priorities, Washington continually had

difficulty reconciling its objectives of regional stability and

security of the ROK with the global objectives of stopping

Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and protecting the integrity

of the NPT. Tensions between Washington and Seoul also developed

frequently during the negotiations leading up to agreement, and

have continued during implementation of the complex terms of the

Agreed Framework.76 While some of these difficulties are inherent

in the general language of the Framework, some are also

inevitable because of the diffuse and decentralized character of

Northeast Asia's regional system which does not permit one

government to dictate terms to others.

The agreement with the DPRK, requiring as it did the

participation of at least South Korea and Japan and the

acquiescence of China, could only have been engineered by the

United States. No other government had the necessary stature and

capability. Moreover, its successful implementation will also be

impossible without the leadership of Washington. Therefore, in

order to attain important security objectives (which, in turn,

permit striving for economic objectives), the United States must

remain directly involved in the installation of light water

reactors in North Korea, destruction of the DPRK's existing

nuclear capability, determination of how much plutonium was

processed before 1994, and resumption of a substantive dialogue

by Seoul and Pyongyang, among other things. This will be a

demanding responsibility which may require more than a decade to

fulfill.77

New Emphases in U.S. Policy. In addition to placing primacy

on economics, there have been two other changes in Washington's

approach to Northeast Asia. First, Northeast Asia--actually the

entire Pacific Rim--has been awarded a higher priority than in

previous decades compared to the rest of the world, especially

Europe. There have been relatively more visits by high level

personnel, including the President, who have categorically

asserted the importance of Asia and the Pacific to the United
27

States. Moreover, in military terms it is no longer an "economy

of force" theater, as in the Cold War. U.S. Security Policy for

Asia and the Pacific prescribes that the United States will

deploy about 100,000 military personnel--approximately as many as

will be in Europe--for the foreseeable future.78 The attention to

the Middle East and the Balkans in 1995 may have diminished this

priority somewhat, but the Asia-Pacific region, especially

Northeast Asia, still retains a historically high focus in U.S.

policy.

The third change in U.S. policy toward the region is the

support for multilateralism as a means of dealing with East

Asia's security problems. In the Bush administration,

multilateralism was rejected in favor of reliance entirely on

existing bilateral alliances. The best security structure for the

region was said to consist of a fan "with its base in North

America and radiating west across the Pacific, to U.S. security

partners in Asia-Pacific."79 The Clinton administration has

reaffirmed existing security alliances, but also called for "new

machinery," multilateral in character, to supplement U.S.

bilateral arrangements in dealing with existing and, more

importantly, emerging security problems. Washington does not

advocate comprehensive agencies like a Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Asia or a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization.

Presumably the multilateral agencies are to be constructed for

specific problems and vary in membership and structure as

required. According to President Clinton:

The challenge for the Asian Pacific in this decade . .

. is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet

multiple threats and opportunities. These arrangements

can function like overlapping plates of armor,

individually providing protection and together covering

the full body of our common security concerns.80

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),

established under the Agreed Framework, may illustrate this

multilateral concept--it is the only new multilateral arrangement

to emerge in Northeast Asia. It was created to meet a special

need, the problem of providing North Korea with light water

reactors, and it includes a limited membership--only those

governments willing and able to contribute--and a structure which

recognizes special authority for members with especially heavy

contributions.81

The Clinton administration has rhetorically placed great

emphasis on the two Asia-Pacific fora, The Association of

Southeast Asian Nations-Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC)

and the new ASEAN Regional Forum. They include China, Japan,

South Korea, and the United States, but their membership is much

broader and, as creatures of ASEAN, they do not necessarily give
28

priority to Northeast Asian concerns. Washington is also

participating in a new forum for security dialogues among Japan,

South Korea, and the United States. It has also expressed

willingness to participate in security discussions or a security

structure related to Korea after the nonproliferation issue has

been resolved. And Washington has been a prime sponsor of "track

two" discussions which involve China, Japan, South Korea, Russia,

and the United States. North Korea has been invited, but so far

has declined to take part. China, of course, will not allow the

participation of Taiwan. On the other hand, Washington did not

support the Russian initiative of March 1994 to form a

multilateral forum to deal with the North Korea nuclear weapons

problem.82 In fact, although Washington consulted frequently with

Seoul and Tokyo, and to a lesser extent with Beijing and Moscow,

the format for consultations, as well as negotiations with the

DPRK, was bilateral.

China. If "China's...most troubling bilateral relationship

is with the United States" among its Northeast Asian ties, the

reverse is certainly also true.83 Most of the time since the end

of the Cold War, which more-or-less coincided with the massacre

at Tiananmen Square, U.S.-China relations have been rocky at

best. And while Beijing may not be relatively as important to

Washington as Washington is to Beijing, the United States

obviously does place great significance on China.

China necessarily affects U.S. economic and security

interests in all of the Asia-Pacific area, including Northeast

Asia. The reasons for China's importance are well known, and will

only be summarized here.84

Economically, China is a very large and growing market,

purchasing some $114.6 billion of items from foreign sources in

1994, up from $52.5 billion in 1990,85 and $42.5 billion in 1985.86

So far, the United States has not commanded a large share of that

market, particularly when compared to China's sales to the United

States. Overall, China was the sixth largest trading partner of

the United States in 1994 with bilateral trade totalling $50.6

billion, but 81.7 percent of the trade consisted of Chinese

exports to the United States.87 However, as China continues to

develop and modernize its economy, its demand for U.S. goods and

services should increase; China is potentially an exceedingly

profitable American market. With a more stable business regime,

China could also be a very attractive market for U.S. investment,

which only totalled $8.2 billion in 1993.88 The sometimes

aggressive activities of the Office of the U.S. Trade

Representative are designed to increase the access of U.S.

businesses (and in the process, other foreign businesses as

well), enticing, cajoling, or forcing China to lower trade

barriers and respect intellectual property rights. Progress has
29

been spotty, with occasional breakthroughs in the form of broad

agreements which are then inadequately or unevenly enforced by

Beijing. Undoubtedly, Washington desires smooth relations with

Beijing in order to increase the prospects of economic advantage

from that relationship.

In the security and political spheres, Beijing is also

important for the success of U.S. initiatives. For instance,

Washington sought and apparently obtained support from Beijing

during the negotiations with Pyongyang which resulted in the

Agreed Framework, and on other issues relating to the Korean

peninsula. The United States also needs, but less frequently

obtains, the compliance of China, a nuclear power and arms

exporter, to perfect the global nonproliferation regime it seeks

to establish.

China is also, in regional terms, a major military power.

Indeed, the PLA's order of battle contains more units with more

personnel, more tanks, and more airplanes, than any other

military organization anywhere.89 Most of its equipment is not

technologically advanced, however, and it has limited

capabilities to project power beyond its borders.90 But PLA

official budgets are on the rise, modernization efforts are

underway, and China clearly has the potential to develop and

deploy military capabilities which could threaten its neighbors

and U.S. interests. By installing structures with possible

military uses in disputed areas of the Spratly Islands and

explicitly leveling military threats against Taiwan, Beijing has

stimulated concern among its neighbors and many American

observers. Beijing's assertion that the PLA is not a threat to

any other nation would be more likely to be believed if there

were more reliable information about its budget, structure, and

doctrine. Such information is treated as military secrets now.

China's military posture and the secrecy about it are two factors

which trouble U.S. relations with China. The issues of human

rights and Taiwan are perhaps the most difficult.

After PLA units fired on the Tiananmen demonstrators on June

4, 1989, President Bush imposed commercial sanctions.91 Those

sanctions which did not involve strategic materials were eased in

the next several months, but U.S.-PRC military-to-military

contacts were not resumed until 1994. Through all of the period,

the United States regularly charged China with egregious human

rights violations through annual State Department reports, MFN

debates, and reactions to Beijing's behavior with respect to

dissidents and Tibet. Washington provided sanctuary for many

fugitives from Tiananmen, who became media celebrities for a

short time, and other dissidents. Human rights and labor

activists have been able to mobilize support in Congress to

maintain pressure on the administration to try to force Beijing

to adhere to international standards of human rights and labor
30

practices. As in the case of Wei Jingsheng, the "father of

Chinese democracy" who was first imprisoned by Chinese

authorities in 1979 and convicted on a separate offense in

December 1995, many Congressmen are eager to appear as defenders

of democracy in China, and the administration--any

administration--will have sympa- thy for Chinese supporters of

democracy.92

As previously noted, Beijing has strenuously rejected direct

confrontation on these issues in the strongest terms publicly,

although it has shown clemency to individual dissidents to

appease international, and especially U.S., criticism. In 1994,

after frequent discordant meetings with Beijing officials, the

Clinton administration determined that confrontation was

counterproductive as far as MFN was concerned, and de-linked that

issue from human rights. Human rights issues have not been

allowed to forestall U.S.-China trade discussions. China's MFN

status requires congressional action each year, however, and

members of Congress may maintain the linkage if they so choose.93

There are fundamental ideological differences between

Washington and Beijing on human rights and the degree to which

international scrutiny of domestic practices are protected by the

doctrine of sovereignty, differences which are likely to persist

even with political changes in either capital. It is likely,

therefore, that the human rights issue will be a restraint on,

although not necessarily a complete barrier to, U.S.-PRC

cooperation in many fields.

The Taiwan issue, discussed in some detail in the earlier

section on China's foreign policy,94 also remains a difficult

issue in U.S.-China relations. Because of a historic relationship

which goes back to World War II, widespread support of democratic

developments in Taiwan, long-standing business relationships, and

the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act,95 no U.S.

administration will abandon the people and government of Taiwan.

On the other hand, Washington will also want to maintain

relations with the world's largest nation with a large and

growing market. It is likely that the question of the status of

Taiwan will only be resolved between Taipei and Beijing, without

much direct U.S. participation. In the meantime, like the

question of human rights, Washington will need to manage the

disagreements on the issue without seriously under- mining

progress on other aspects of U.S.-China relations.

Japan. "There is no more important bilateral relationship

than the one we have with Japan, according to United States

Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.96 Moreover, in

the words of the same authoritative document, "our security

alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States policy in
31

Asia."97

The justification for such sweeping statements is wellknown, and accepted even by those who do not support U.S. policy.

Japan's economy is the second largest in the world, and it is

highly interdependent with the economy of the United States. Many

Japanese companies operate subsidiaries in the United States, and

while relatively few U.S. companies have been successful

penetrating Japan's market, U.S. private foreign investment in

Japan is high. It is normal for U.S. products to contain

components manufactured in Japan (and other countries also), and

vice-versa.

U.S.-Japanese trade was the second largest bilateral trade

relationship in the world in 1994, exceeded only by U.S.-Canada

trade.98 The United States bought more from Japan than from any

nation except Canada, and sold more to Japan than to any nation

except Canada. While the U.S. trade deficit with Japan approached

$70 billion (39.2 percent of total bilateral trade) in 1994--

clearly an unsustainable relationship--U.S. exports to Japan

nonetheless represented some 2.2 million American jobs.99

Moreover, Japan's surplus has been declining.

In the security arena, Washington views its alliance with

Japan as one of the most critical factors in East Asian

stability. This is partly because Japan is the host for 47,000

U.S. military personnel who might not be stationed in the region

without the U.S.-Japan alliance. It is also partly because

Japan's geo-strategic position provides the United States with a

valuable logistics and staging base in the case of conflict in

Korea or elsewhere in Northeast Asia.

The U.S.-Japan security relationship is perhaps most

important because it "binds Japan to a framework which enhances

the security of its neighbors."100 The alliance gives a degree of

predictability to Japanese behavior, which allows these countries

to interact with Japan with confidence, its history in the 1930s

and 1940s notwithstanding. Without the alliance and the U.S. role

in Japan's security, to again use the words of the editors of The

Straits Times of Singapore, "Tokyo will be forced to fend for

itself militarily, fueling an expensive and dangerous arms race

in the region."101 As the alliance limits Japan's freedom of

action so that it is accepted in East Asia, it also provides a

rationale and structure for Washington to merge its capabilities

and influence with Japan to balance or restrain the emerging

power of China.

Despite the importance to the United States of relations

with Japan, Washington's recent actions seem not to have focused

on cooperation with Tokyo, but on demands that Tokyo buy more

foreign--especially American--commodities. U.S. Trade
32

Representatives have bargained endlessly with their Japanese

counterparts, frequently threatening retaliatory actions if Tokyo

ignores U.S. demands. The Clinton administration has not only

sought the removal of barriers to imports, many of which are

alleged to be implicit in Japanese business practices rather than

the legal structure, although that continues to be a U.S. goal.

The new priority is for agreements which are results oriented;

i.e., which require that Japan purchase specific quantities of

U.S. products, initially automobile parts. Tokyo, which once

promoted an industrial policy which helped Japanese business

dominate many sectors of international trade, now ironically

argues on the basis of the principles of free trade to oppose

U.S. proposals. And Washington, usually the major defender of

unfettered trade, now seems to advocate management of the market

to reduce its staggering trade deficit with Japan. In Washington

(and in Tokyo), political leaders have proclaimed public

positions which seem as much directed to domestic constituencies

as to the Japanese government, often in undiplomatic, shrill

language. Not surprisingly, this approach has not led to a

mutually satisfactory formula, although crises have been avoided

through ambiguous compromises which each side can interpret as a

victory.

The ultimate resolution of the U.S.-Japan trade imbalance

will probably require domestic changes in each country rather

than foreign policy maneuvers.102 At the least, Washington must

adopt policies which encourage national savings, so that the

nation no longer consumes more than it produces, and Tokyo must

facilitate more consumption by, among other things, freeing its

domestic economy from overregulation.

In political and security affairs, U.S.-Japanese cooperation

is more harmonious. Washington consults closely and frequently

with Tokyo, and the latter usually supports the former's

initiative. There is a formal structure for security consultation

which ranges from Minister of Foreign Affairs/Secretary of State

and Defense Agency Director General/Secretary of Defense to U.S.

Forces Japan and agency officials in Tokyo. High-level exchanges

are supplemented by educational and functional exchanges. There

is a busy schedule of combined exercises which involve JSDF and

U.S. armed forces which takes place in Japan or in the waters and

sky close to Japan.103 Except for a combined military headquarters

and integrated command structure, the relations between the U.S.

military and the JSDF are as close and multifaceted as those

between the United States and any other ally. In response to U.S.

requests, Tokyo provides the most generous burden-sharing support

of all U.S. allies.104

This is not to say that there are no disagreements over

political and security questions between the two capitals. Japan,

more highly dependent on Persian Gulf petroleum than is the
33

United States, has frequently demurred from Washington's

positions on the Middle East. Washington and Tokyo have not

always seen eye-to-eye with respect to China, Russia, Korea, or

the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), among other

issues. Tokyo's response to international crises, most notably in

the Persian Gulf War, have often not met U.S. expectations.

Generally, however, both governments have attempted to downplay

differences and search for accommodations.

Together with Tokyo, Washington has tried to isolate the

trade conflict from U.S.-Japan security cooperation. That policy

was reasonably successful in the past, but may become

increasingly difficult, in Washington as in Tokyo, when the trade

issue surfaces as an item of domestic politics. Unemployment in

the manufacturing sector in the United States regularly

stimulates "Japan bashing" and disturbingly high ratios of

Americans indicate negative views of Japan and the MST.105 In the

absence of the common clear and present danger presumed to have

existed during the Cold War, critics of U.S. policy toward Japan,

from libertarian isolationists to revisionists, have found more

receptive audiences than in the past. The more sophisticated

critiques argue that the U.S.-Japan security alliance, especially

U.S. armed forces stationed in Japan, has outlived its

usefulness.106 They maintain that Japan has the resources and

maturity to provide for its own security and the stability of the

region, that continued U.S. tutelage is unnecessary and

counterproductive, and that Japan need not threaten its

neighbors.

CONCLUSIONS

The U.S.-Japan Relationship.

 All of the bilateral relationships of the Northeast Asian

strategic triangle probably will remain in flux during the

remainder of the 1990s and the first years of the 21st century.

The U.S.-Japan tie will probably be the most stable, even though

disputes over trade may frequently place the alliance under

strain. But, aside from economic competition, U.S. and Japanese

national interests tend to be compatible. Differences over trade

issues, as large and significant as they may be, are not as

fundamental as the underlying agreement on the international

trading system which has supported the prosperity of both

nations. Moreover, both Washington and Tokyo benefit from a

stable regional environment, and both would feel threatened by

the emergence of a hegemon on the Asian continent. Under current

and foreseeable conditions in Northeast Asia, Tokyo is likely to

support Washington's policy of forward presence and engagement in

the region. And while there are significant differences in the

political cultures of Japan and the United States, the commitment
34

of both to market economies, democracy, and human rights provides

an ideological foundation for the alliance.

The U.S.-Japan relationship is also the most highly

institutionalized of the strategic triangle. Washington and Tokyo

are partners in an alliance formed over 40 years ago with formal

and informal structures for decisionmaking, and tested patterns

of cooperation. In both private and public sectors there are

networks linking Japanese and Americans with similar interests

and concerns. The centrifugal forces in U.S.-Japanese relations,

which may be strong and involve stakes of great importance, will

be resisted by mature organizations and inertia grounded in years

of experience. These considerations should cause leaders in both

nations to defend the alliance to their respective

constituencies.

The unforeseeable conditions which would most likely

undermine the strong foundations of the alliance would involve

significant domestic political developments in one or both

nations. It is well beyond the scope of this analysis to

speculate on the future of Japanese or American politics, but it

is probable that the victory in Washington of isolationists who

would disengage from international responsibilities or the

emergence of nationalists with an agenda of international

aggrandizement in Tokyo would require a different U.S.-Japanese

relationship. It is also likely that the strongest stimulus for

the success of assertive nationalists in Japan would be the

perception of impending U.S. disengagement, which would create

widespread fears among Japanese for their security. Even a

government of moderates would have to review defense policy

should the United States disengage from Northeast Asia. Japanese

defense policy is anchored in the belief that the United States

will act as its protector. When that belief can no longer be

sustained, new defense policies likely to cause destabilizing

reactions from other governments in the region are almost

inevitable.

The China-Japan Relationship.

 The China-Japan relationship, the second most stable of the

three, is potentially quite volatile. Tokyo and Beijing currently

share objectives with respect to trade and investment, on the one

hand, and regional--particularly Korean--stability, on the other

hand. This should support viable bilateral ties in the short

range.

For the long term, however, their interests appear to

diverge with respect to some important issues. For example, the

Chinese and Japanese versions of the architecture of a stable

Northeast Asia are not necessarily compatible, particularly with
35

respect to the status of Taiwan and the role of the United

States. Despite public statements to the contrary, both Beijing

and Tokyo may prefer the status quo in Korea over a single,

strong Korean state, but each would energetically oppose an

arrangement which benefited--or appeared to benefit--the other on

this peninsula which historically has been the venue of SinoJapanese competition. Moreover, neither government is likely to

acquiesce in the domination of Northeast Asia, or Southeast Asia,

by the other. And elites of each nation are basically suspicious

of the other.

The mutual benefits of trade and investment which both

nations now enjoy, and are apparently increasing dramatically,

could sustain the bilateral relationship for an extended period

of time, despite serious political disagreements. However, the

quality of economic interactions between China and Japan is

different from those between the United States and Japan, and do

not form the same complex pattern of interdependency which makes

each economy highly dependent on the other and therefore provides

a structure for long-term comprehensive cooperation. In spite of

the remarkable economic growth which has occurred in China, the

two nations stand at different levels of economic development.

Japan is a prototype of a post-industrial, information-age

economy; China is still a developing economy depending on others

for sophisticated technology, with many sectors and areas in a

pre-industrial environment. As China's economy matures, so will

the foundation for more integrative interdepen- dencies. But this

is not likely to occur for decades, if ever.

The China-Japan relationship also obviously lacks an

ideological basis. Many aspects of the cultures of China and

Japan have common roots, but the dominant political attitudes and

values of the two societies have little in common.

As in the U.S.-Japan relationship, China-Japan relations

will be influenced by domestic political developments in each

country. While politics in both China and Japan is in transition,

the former's political system depends more on personal linkages

and is less stable than the latter's. Moreover, political change

in Japan is less likely to have a direct impact on foreign policy

as in China, where the ascendancy of assertive nationalists with

a low priority on reform could be immediately destabilizing in

the region.

The U.S.-China Relationship.

 The last bilateral relationship of the Northeast Asian

strategic triangle--that between the United States and China--is

presently weak, and potentially more fragile and unstable than

the other two. Each government has good reasons to maintain
36

comprehensive relations which include trade and investment and

dialogues on a wide range of political and security issues. These

have been sufficient to motivate Beijing and Washington to

advance from the very low point of their relationship after

President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan visited Cornell University. But

the Clinton administration and Jiang Zemin's regime have both

come under attack at home for the accommodations they arranged,

and neither is in a strong position to make additional

concessions, even if it wanted to. There is less ideological

compatibility, and probably less interdepen- dence, between China

and the United States than between China and Japan.

If there is a further devolution of power from Beijing to

local authorities, problems in U.S.-China relations may

deteriorate further. When local governments and enterprises do

not execute policy made in Beijing, which is apparently now the

case with respect to intellectual property agreements, bilateral

economic activities suffer. Moreover, except for prison

factories, the greatest alleged abuses of international labor

standards in China are probably committed by private

entrepreneurs and managers at the local level, not by state

enterprises.

It is likely that the fundamental differences between the

two governments will persist for some time. The chances of a

government in Washington which is more likely than the present

one to ignore the human rights situation in China, minimize the

U.S. security commitment to Taiwan, and allow unfair trading

practices by Beijing are extremely slim. And, at least in the

short range, it is even less likely that those governing China

will accept Western conceptions of human rights or what they

consider U.S. interference in China's domestic concerns,

particularly with respect to Taiwan and political freedoms.

Indeed, should the current succession struggle in Beijing result

in victory for assertive nationalists and/or opponents of

continued rapid economic reform, China's policy toward the United

States may become significantly more confrontational. If that

were the case, even the economic aspects of U.S.-China relations

would be difficult to sustain at present levels.

Regional Judgments.

There are at least four general conclusions which cut across

all bilateral relationships which are particularly salient for

the United States:

First, for the foreseeable future U.S. engagement in

Northeast Asia is likely to be one of the necessary conditions

for regional stability, which in turn is one of the necessary

conditions for expanding international trade and investment
37

opportunities. Execution of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and

easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula, acceptance of a more

active regional and international role by Japan, avoidance of

conflict over Taiwan, and inclusion of China into international

regimes which will restrain its behavior--all depend upon active

participation by the United States.

Second, the absence of a grand unifying concept for U.S.

foreign policy--a functional equivalent of containment during the

Cold War--makes it difficult for Washington to establish

priorities among foreign policy objectives, and difficult for

other governments to understand U.S. actions. It is much less

likely that Chinese officials and analysts could perceive a U.S.

strategy of containment or South Korean observers imagine that

Washington favored Pyongyang over Seoul, if U.S. policy could be

articulated on the basis of a grand conceptual scheme. One not

only does not exist, however, but none has been offered by

critics.

Third, Washington's high priority on economics, especially

export promotion, further complicates the execution of foreign

policy. The economic emphasis places prominence on segments of

the bureaucracy, and personnel with backgrounds and skills, which

differ from the traditional diplomat representing foreign affairs

and defense agencies. In the field, personnel of the Office of

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) seem to employ harsher rhetoric

and a more confrontational style than their counterparts from

State and Defense. In Washington, the inclusion of USTR, Commerce

and Treasury in the machinery of foreign policy coordination

complicates an already imperfect mechanism.

Fourth, the United States may be the only remaining

superpower, but without the discipline provided by a competing

superpower, it cannot expect automatic loyalty from allies and

acceptance of even high priority initiatives. In the contemporary

international system, unequal alliances and relationships which

were characteristic of the Cold War rarely can be maintained or

established. Certainly in Northeast Asia that is the case.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Since both of the other members of the Northeast Asian

strategic triangle place their highest priority on relations with

the United States, U.S. policy and behavior necessarily have

great impact in the region. Sharp reversals of policy would be

especially destabilizing, and threaten the conditions which

Washington, through many adminis- trations, has said it wanted to

preserve.

Abrupt U.S. Policy Changes Destabilizing.
38

While on specific questions Washington can introduce changes

which could be useful, in the short range the fundamental factors

of U.S. policy should remain constant. That is, the United States

should retain its alliances with Japan and South Korea, maintain

approximately the same military presence in the region, and

remain engaged in the affairs of Northeast Asia. It is

particularly important that the United States pursue

comprehensive engagement with China, and resolutely enforce the

Agreed Framework with the DPRK. These U.S. policies may not be

sufficient to insure regional stability, but they are necessary

conditions without which stability is highly unlikely.

Need for Better Interagency Cooperation. The U.S.

government could improve the execution of its policy in Northeast

Asia in at least two ways. First, it could perfect or develop

smoother coordination machinery among agencies operating in the

region. Given the nature of the U.S. system, some inconsistencies

may be unavoidable, but they could be reduced to a more

acceptable level. Together with relevant civilian agencies, the

Department of Defense, the separate services, and military

headquarters in the region should all be involved in the

coordination process.

Benefits of Regional Specialists. A second way to improve

execution of policy is to recruit and develop a cadre of

personnel with regional expertise, and provide incentives for

those personnel to remain in government. The greatest need for

regional specialists may be in those agencies which traditionally

have not been engaged in foreign affairs, such as Commerce,

Treasury, and USTR. But there is an apparent deficit or

underutilization of specialists within the State Department and

Department of Defense. Moreover, neither of these traditional

foreign affairs agencies seems to reward regional expertise.

Within the State Department, personnel are consciously moved from

region to region and function to function, emphasizing breath

over depth in career development. In the military services, those

skilled in combat operations receive preference for promotion and

senior educational opportunities over regional experts, Northeast

Asian or otherwise. This is even true in the U.S. Army, which

still maintains its effective Foreign Area Officer program but

fails to provide adequate opportunities for advancement within

it.

Within the existing environment, U.S. disengagement, or

actions which lead to a widespread perception that disengagement

is imminent, would lead to an unacceptable level of instability.

Unfortunately, Northeast Asian leaders tend to be extremely

suspicious of Washington's behavior in this regard. Seoul's

reaction to U.S. approaches to North Korea over the Agreed

Framework and Tokyo's peeve over President Clinton's decision not
39

to attend the APEC Summit in 1995 illustrate this tendency.

Long-Range Adjustments in U.S. Policy.

While the analysis supports official U.S. policy as outlined

in United States Security Strategy for the East Asian-Pacific

Region for the short range, it implies that the United States

should adopt some new approaches for the long range. Short range,

in this analysis, refers to the period of time, whether few or

many years, when the fundamental characteristics of international

politics within Northeast Asia and within the three bilateral

relationships of the strategic triangle remain more-or-less

unchanged. Long range implies that important variables have

changed, so much so that it is possible to say that a new system

of interaction has emerged. It is uncertain what that system's

characteristics will be, but very likely they will include

greater complexity and a further decline in the occasions when

military force is the optimum instrument of influence.

 Such a transformation could come about, probably gradually

but perhaps abruptly, because of a change in the number of

players (North-South Korean or China-Taiwan unification, return

to an active role by Russia) or significant domestic political

changes within one or all of the major powers. External events

might also lead to systemic transformation. In any case, such

changes are possible at almost any time, or, indeed, probably are

now taking place. Washington should be prepared to adapt without

abruptly changing its posture in the region.

As this author has argued in another publication,107 the

combination of bilateral security relationships, forward

presence, and engagement is adequate for the United States to

move from short- to long-range conditions if the ingredients of

U.S. security policy are supplemented by multilateral structures.

These should not only include fora for consultation, but also

organizations to foster confidence building measures and the

adjustment of regional disputes. As noted, KEDO may be considered

one of these structures. It is possible that agencies with

broader jurisdiction, such as APEC and ARF, offer a better venue

for Northeast Asian nations and the United States to explore

regional problems, precisely because other members might be

better able to mediate or provide neutral sites for discussion

than any of the relatively small number of Northeast Asian

actors. In any case, multilateral structures of the type

advocated by President Clinton but not yet established (except

for KEDO) would allow for flexibility in managing disputes. They

would also permit continued U.S. engagement with a lower profile

and perhaps lower costs.

ENDNOTES
40

1. In spite of its geographic position, Russia is not

considered a Northeast Asian nation because Northeast Asian

elites do not consider Russia an Asian nation. Neither do Russian

elites, for that matter.

2. Bilateral relations are not the sole basis for regional

politics because all of the actors belong to transregional

organizations such as the United Nations, APEC, and the ASEAN

Regional Forum. There is no transregional organization in which

all five governments participate, however. China, Japan, ROK, and

the United States belong to all of them.

3. The Military Balance 1985-1986, London: The International

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985, pp. 28-29 and 113-115,

respec- tively.

4. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

5. Ibid., pp. 134-135.

6. Ibid., pp. 125-126.

7. Ibid., p. 14.

8. North Korean forces are now estimated to be almost

200,000 larger than in 1985. South Korean armed forces are about

35,000 larger. Military Balance 1994-1995, 1994, pp. 178-180.

9. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook, 1995, p. 14.

Even Japan, by the beginning of the period already a mature

economy, grew at an average rate of 4.1 percent.

10. Estimates of North Korea's GDP all involve some

conjecture. This estimate is based on data from Asia Yearbook,

1982, pp. 8-9, and the CIA World Factbook 1994, on line

(http://www.ic.gov).

11. For example, see Renshi Luo, "Post-Cold War Strategic

Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region," pp. 5-6, and "Strategic

Change in China's Policy of Army Building and Its Post-Cold War

Strategy for Peace," p. 10, in International Strategic Studies

(Beijing), Numbers 3 and 4, 1994, respectively; and Yufan Liang,

"The Rise of China and Asian Regional Security," SIIS Journal

(Shanghai), Volume 1, Number 2, 1994, pp. 8-9. This position was

also asserted at virtually all research organizations visited by

the author in Beijing and Shanghai in March 1994.

12. For recent examples, see Wei Yang, "International

Commentary: Setbacks and Prospects for Sino-U.S. Relations,"

Liowang (Beijing), No. 27, July 3, 1995, p. 45, translated in
41

Daily Report: China, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBISCHI-95-140 (hereinafter referred to as FBIS-CHI-xx-xxx), July 3,

1995, pp. 4-5; and Jen Hui-wen, "Gradual Escalation of China's

Strategy Against the United States, Taiwan," Hsin (Hong Kong),

June 30, 1995, p.29, translated in FBIS-CHI-95-128, June 30,

1995, pp. 10-12; and Robert Sutter, "China's Sinister View of

U.S. Policy: Origins, Implications and Options," CRS Report for

Congress, June 26, 1995.

13. David Shambaugh, "Patterns of Interaction in SinoAmerican Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and

Practice, ed. by Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, New

York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 214. Shambaugh structures

his analysis around "levels of analysis: global, societal, and

governmental."

14. For a sophisticated analysis of this phenomenon, see

Gerald Segal, "China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign

Policy," Adelphi Paper 287, March 1994.

15. Ronald N. Monteparto, "The PLA: In Search of a Strategic

Focus," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 7, Spring 1995, p. 17.

16. Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, "Introduction: Chinese

Foreign Policy in Transition," in The Chinese View of the World,

ed. by Yufan Hao and Guocang Huan, New York: Pantheon Books,

1989, pp. xvi-xvii.

17. However, Allen Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign

Policy After Deng," The China Quarterly, Number 142, June 1995,

p. 316, argues that "the century of humiliation and shame" is

already a declining influence, since China no longer need worry

about foreign nations exploiting Chinese weakness because of its

economic success.

18. Steven I. Levine, "Perception and Ideology in Chinese

Foreign Policy," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice,

pp. 43-44. Levine refers to this mind-set as "informal ideology"

rather than world view.

19. Much of Hong Kong's imports from China was re-exported

to the United States, and was recorded in U.S. trade data

provided to the International Monetary Fund. However, China

reported the same transactions as exports to Hong Kong. By the

former reckoning, the United States was China's largest market;

by the latter, the United States was China's third largest market

behind Hong Kong and Japan. See Department of Trade Statistics

Yearbook 1995, pp. 123 and 436.

20. Jianren Lu, "Investment Opportunities in China:

Policies, Problems, and Prospects," The Journal of Contemporary
42

China, Number 9, Summer 1995, Table 4, p. 78. Hong Kong and

Taiwan were far ahead, with $103.94 billion and $13.23 billion

respectively.

21. For example, see Gu Ping, "Also Discussing ‘Double

Standards'," Renmin Ribao, March 8, 1995, p. 6; translated in

FBIS-EAS-95-089, May 9, 1995, pp. 3-4.

22. Whiting, p. 295, distinguishes between affirmative,

assertive, and aggressive nationalism.

@BLOCK QUOTE = Affirmative nationalism centers exclusively on

"us" as a positive in-group referent with pride in attributes and

achievements. Assertive nationalism adds "them" as a negative

out-group referent that challenges the in-group's interests and

possibly its identity. Aggressive nationalism identifies a

specific foreign enemy as a serious threat that requires action

to defend vital interests.

23. The negotiations of 1978 resulted in normalization of

relations, effective January 1, 1979. The later negotiations

followed a U.S. sale of armaments to Taiwan, and dealt primarily

with the issue of Taiwan. They resulted in the Shanghai

Communique of 1982. The three communiques are reprinted in Harry

Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China

Since 1972, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992.

24. Ho Yuen Hua, "China Fires Three Missiles Over Taiwan,

Says Report," The Straits Times Interactive, December 25, 1995,

at Internet site http://www.asia1.com.sg/straitstimes.

25. See Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait:

People-to-People Diplomacy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 1-

181, for a thorough discussion of the evolution of cross-strait

relations.

26. Lu, p. 78.

27. The PRC Constitution of 1982 included provisions for

"one country, two systems."

28. The Taiwan portion of the speech is summarized and

analyzed in Julian Baum, "Jiang Talks Strait," Far Eastern

Economic Review, Volume 158, Number 7, February 16, 1995, pp. 14-

15. The speech was held up as the definitive statement on

Beijing's policy toward Taiwan even after the propaganda barrage

concerning President Lee's visit to the United States. See "CPC

Spokesman Emphasizes Jiang's Taiwan Speech," Xinhua Domestic

Service, May 22, 1995, translated in FBIS-CHI-95-105, June 1,

1995, pp. 72-73.

29. Beijing's attacks on Lee and the United States were
43

intensive and extensive. For samples of the propaganda, see Hua

Xiazhi, "Li Denghui Must First Understand What is Called China,"

Xinhua Domestic Service, June 7, 1995, translated in FBIS-CHI-95-

110, June 8, 1995, pp. 85-87; Song Ming, "Li Denhui's Mentality

and the Welfare of People on Taiwan," Beijing Central Peoples

Radio, June 11, 1995, translated by FBIS-CHI-95-113, June 13,

1995, pp. 74-75; and Miu Qun, "Substance of ‘Pragmatic Diplomacy'

vs ‘Taiwan Independence'," Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, July

27, 1995, p. 5, translated in FBIS-CHI-95-152, pp. 79-80.

30. For instance, see, "Beijing Official on Cooperation to

Tap Spratlys," China News Agency (Taipei) in English, August 30,

1995, transcribed in FBIS-CHI-95-168, August 30, 1995, p. 75; and

"Fujian, Taiwan Intensify Economic Cooperation," Xinhua in

English, August 30, 1995, transcribed in FBIS-CHI-96-168, August

31, 1996, p. 71.

31. The changes also did not please many Taiwanese. See Jawling Joanne Chang, "Clinton's New Taiwan Policy--A Step Forward

or Backward?", unpublished paper, Institute of European and

American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, n.d.

32. China is discussed on pp. 14-15, and the intention to

retain U.S. military in the region appears on p. 32.

33. For example, see "Visit Serious ‘Retrogression',"

translated from Zhongguo Xinwen She radio (Beijing), May 26,

1995, by FBIS-CHI- 95-103, May 26, 1995, pp. 4-5.

34. David M. Lampton, "China and the Strategic Quadrangle,"

in The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United

States in East Asia, ed. by Michael Mandelbaum, New York: Council

of Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 92.

35. According to Cabinet Secretary Koken Nosaka, the

remaining grants will be for humanitarian purposes. Loans, which

involve much larger sums, were not affected. China News Digest,

Global, August 29, 1995, available at ftp://ftp.cnd.org/pub/cndglobal.

36. Robert A. Manning, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the

Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International

System," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 17, Number 1, December

1994, p. 47.

37. The 1994 Asiad organizing committee had invited Taiwan

President Lee Teng-hui to attend the games, which drew intensive

protests from Beijing. Tokyo did not invite Lee, but despite

persistent threats and protests from Beijing, it refused to

revoke the invitation to Vice Premier Hsu Li-teh. Later in 1994

there were a number of important unofficial exchanges between
44

officials of the two governments. See Michael Westlake, ed., Asia

Yearbook 1995, Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, p. 114-

115, for a brief summary of the events.

38. China was the largest recipient of Japan's ODA from 1982

to 1986; since 1987, it has been second to Indonesia. Qingxin Ken

Wang, "Recent Japanese Economic Diplomacy in China: Political

Alignment in a Changing World Order," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIII,

No. 5, June 1993, p. 637.

39. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995, New York:

International Monetary Fund, pp. 153-155, lists Hong Kong as

China's largest export market. U.S. data, which includes Chinese

goods initially exported to Hong Kong for reexport to the United

States, places the latter first. See U.S. Department of State,

Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, "China: 1994 Country

Report on Economic Policy and Trade Practices," np, available on

the internet at gopher://disfan.lib.uic. edu:70/OF1%3A22746%3AChina.

40. Wang, p. 630.

41. Manning, pp. 45 and 46, makes reference to these

Japanese terms which are frequently used to denote the levels of

understanding in Japanese social interaction.

42. On Chinese attitudes on Japan, see Allen S. Whiting,

China Eyes Japan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989,

and Thomas L. Wilborn, How Northeast Asians View Their Security,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War

College, 1991, pp. 15-17.

43. For an extended, positive analysis of the Japanese

economy, see A Collection of Papers Presented at the

International Symposium on Japan's Position and Role in the New

World Pattern, September 24-25, 1993, Shanghai, China, Shanghai:

Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of World Economy,

1994.

44. On Japanese security policy, see Peter J. Katzenstein

and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms

and Policy Responses in a Changing World, Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University East Asia Program, 1993; Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., The

Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External

Pressures, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1993; and Michael W.

Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics and

Strategy, McLean, VA: Brassey's (US), 1993.

45. Several conservative political parties merged to form

the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. It provided a stable

majority until 1990, when a number of groups in the Diet withdrew
45

and formed new parties. The rump LDP was the largest party after

the 1990 elections, but lacked a majority and could not form a

government. Since 1994, it has been the major party in a

coalition with its old nemesis, the Socialist Party or Social

Democratic Party of Japan, and one of the smaller splinter groups

which formerly was a part of the LDP.

46. On the Japanese conception of themselves as victims, see

David B. Bobrow, "Pursuing Military Security: Lessons from

Japan," The Ridgeway Papers in International Security Studies,

Number 91-1, December 1991, p. 8.

47. For careful analyses of the attitudes of Japanese

officials and intellectuals, see the works of Eugene Brown,

including The Debate Over Japan's International Role: Contending

Views of Opinion Leaders During the Persian Gulf Crisis, July 17,

1991; and Japan's Search for Strategic Vision: The Contemporary

Debate, February 15, 1993, both published at Carlisle Barracks,

PA: Strategic Studies Institute. For a summary of attitudes after

the first Peacekeeping Bill (PKO) debate in 1990, see Wilborn,

pp. 27-42.

48. Two pieces of legislation were adopted to authorize

participation in peacekeeping operations: the Bill Concerning

Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other

Operations and the Bill to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the

Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams. Japan Defense Agency,

Defense of Japan 1993, translated by the Japan Times, Tokyo: The

Japan Times, 1993, pp. 127-128.

49. The limitations on the Self-Defense Forces in

participating in peacekeeping operations is outlined in Thomas L.

Wilborn, Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast

Asia? Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, May 1,

1994, pp. 6-8.

50. Ibid., p. 7.

51. "Public Said To Back SDF's Peacekeeping Role," Kyodo in

English, December 8, 1995, transcribed in FBIS-EAS-95-237,

December 11, 1995, p. 4. There were civilian Japanese casualties

in the Cambodia operation, which did stimulate opposition to the

operation. It was short lived, however. See Richard Halloran,

"Japan's Military Force: Return of the Samurai?", Parameters, Fall-Winter 1995, pp. 28-40.

52. The cabinet empowered in June 1994 was a coalition of

the LDP, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, and the reformist

Sakigake Party. Historically, the Social Democratic or Socialist

Party opposed the Self-Defense Forces and the alliance with the

United States, although they have moved to a more centrist
46

position in recent years. Sakigake leader Masayoshi Takemura also

has pacifist tendencies.

53. For a discussion of attitudes of the emerging elite in

Japan, see Wilborn, Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to

Southeast Asia?, pp. 25-26; and John Endicott, "Japan's Military

Renaissance? Prognosis into the 1990s and Beyond," in Japan's

Military Renaissance, pp. 241-248.

54. Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times Service, downloaded

from @Times on America On Line, July 30, 1995, documents that the

Japanese self-image "is more like pathetic . . . "

55. See Wilborn, Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers

to Northeast Asia? on which this discussion of the SDF and

Japanese defense policy is based.

56. On the 1995 Defense White Paper, see "Defense White

Paper Becoming Assertive," Yomiuri Shimbun, July 2, 1995, Morning

Edition, p. 3, translated in FBIS-EAS-95-132, July 11, 1995, pp.

11-12; and "Government Urged to Set Guidelines for Moderate

Buildup of Defense Capability," Tokyo Shimbun, July 3, 1995,

Morning Edition, p. 5, and "Confidence Building Requires Long

Term Perspective," Sabkei Shimbun, July 1, 1995, Morning Edition,

p. 2, both translated in FBIS-EAS-95-133, July 12, 1995, pp. 29-

30. For the National Defense Program Outline, see Kyodo in

English, December 31, 1994, and June 30, 1995, transcribed in

FBIS-EAS-95-001, January 3, 1995, p. 9-10, and FBIS-EAS-95-126,

June 30, 1995, pp. 10-11, respectively.

57. Twenty-nine percent of Japanese exports were sold to the

United States, and 23 percent of Japanese imports came from the

United States. See Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995,

p. 261.

58. Ronald E. Dolan and Robert L. Worden, Japan: A Country

Study, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 454.

59. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1992, pp. 77-78.

60. There has been no public commitment by Japan for a

specific contribution. As a full member of the Korean Energy

Development Organization (together with the United States, which

is prohibited by law from paying for any part of the light-water

reactors, and South Korea), Japan will probably incur costs of

over $1 billion.

61. See Halloran for the argument that such developments

could possibly lead the Japanese to establish an independent

military force, no longer restrained by the United States.
47

62. See Wang, pp. 625-641, for an excellent discussion of

Japan's economic relations with China.

63. The value of U.S.-Japan trade was $181.8 billion, and

China-Japan trade was $46.3 billion. The United States, Hong

Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, in that order, were

larger markets than China for Japanese goods. See Direction of

Trade Yearbook: 1995, pp. 261-263.

64. Wang, p. 628.

65. The steps included a bilateral tax treaty to avoid

double taxation (1983), trade insurance provided by MITI (1985),

and a bilateral investment protection treaty (1988). Ibid., pp.

628-629.

66. Ibid., p. 629. Japanese private investment by 1990 was

only 1.1 percent of total overseas investment, and worth only

$2.8 billion.

67. Japan had refrained from establishing diplomatic

relations with the PRC, and continued to recognize the

Nationalist government on Taiwan as the government of all of

China, because of the U.S. policy of isolating China. Nixon's

trip to China in 1971, apparently made without consultation with

Tokyo, was called a "shokku" by the Tokyo press.

68. Foreign Minister Kono announced that ODA grants to China

for humanitarian and emergency purposes were not expected to

exceed 420 million yen, which at an exchange rate of 100 yen per

$l, would be $4.2 million. "Panel Urges Reconsideration of PRC

Yen Loans," Mainichi Shimbun, August 30, 1995, Morning Edition,

p. 3, translated in FBIS-EAS-95-169, August 31, 1995, p. 8. See

"Debates Yen Loan Review," Kyodo in English, August 29, 1995,

transcribed in FBIS-EAS-95-167, August 28, 1995, p. 6; and "‘Deep

Regret' Expressed Over Japanese Aid Cut," Hong Kong AFP in

English, August 21, 1995, transcribed in FBIS-CHI-95-161, August

21, 1995, p. 6, for 1994 grant and loan totals respectively.

69. "Panel Urges Reconsideration of PRC Yen Loans," p. 8.

70. Thomas L. Wilborn, "U.S. Security Policy for Northeast

Asia: Handmaiden for Export Promotion?", in Northeast Asia in a

Changing World, ed. by Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward A. Olsen,

Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming.

71. Trade data was extrapolated from Direction of Trade

Statistics 1995, pp. 436-438.

72. See Wilborn, How Northeast Asians View Their Security, especially pp. 63-82.
48

73. See Thomas L. Wilborn, Roles for the Army in a Peacetime

Engagement for the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, 1992, pp. 13-15, for a discussion of the

concept of forward presence.

74. The honest broker concept was stressed in James Baker,

"America in Asia: Emerging Architecture," Foreign Affairs, Vol.

70, No. 5, Winter 1991/92.

75. On North Korea's nuclear program and the U.S.-DPRK

Framework, see William E. Berry, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear

Program: The Clinton Administration's Response," INSS Occasional

Paper 3, Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air Force

Academy, March 1995; Young Whan Kihl, "Confrontation or

Compromise on the Korean Peninsula: The North Korean Nuclear

Issue," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1994, pp. 233-

252; and Thomas L. Wilborn, Strategic Implications of the U.S.-

DPRK Framework Agreement, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic

Studies Institute, 1995.

76. Author's interviews and discussions in Seoul, February

1995.

77. Wilborn, Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK

Framework Agreement, pp. 10-18.

78. United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region, Washington: Office of International Security

Affairs, Department of Defense, p. 24.

79. Baker, p. 5.

80. William J. Clinton, "Fundamentals of Security for a New

Pacific Community," address before the National Assembly of the

Republic of Korea, Seoul, South Korea, July 10, 1993, Dispatch,

Vol. 4, No. 29, July 19, 1993.

81. KEDO operating decisions reside in a three member Board

of Governors (United States, ROK, and Japan) which makes

decisions through consensus. Other members of the organization do

not have a veto on activities. Yonhap in English, transcribed in

FBIS-EAS-94-242, December 16, 1994, p. 42.

82. Russia proposed an international conference of both

Koreas, China, Japan, the United States, and itself, to deal with

North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors full access to a

reactor at Yongbyon. Assistant Secretary of State Lord, on PBS's

Weekend Edition on March 16, 1993, said that the United States

was studying the proposal, but it was clear that he had serious

objections.
49

83. P. 12, above.

84. For a more extended discussion, see Thomas L. Wilborn,

Security Cooperation With China: Analysis and a Proposal,

Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, pp. 12-15.

85. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995, pp. 153.

86. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1987, p. 136.

87. These calculations are based on Direction of Trade

Statistics Yearbook 1995, pp. 436-438.

88. Lu, p. 78.

89. See Military Balance 1994-1995, for comparisons.

90. On China's military capabilities, see Harlan W. Jencks,

"China's Defense Buildup: A Threat to the Region?" in China's

Military: The PLA in 1992/1993, ed. by Richard H. Yang, Taipei:

Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies, pp. 95-120; and Karl

W. Eikenberry, "Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional

Security?", Parameters, Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 82-103.

91. Wilborn, Security Relations With China: An Analysis and

A Proposal, p. 1.

92. See Christopher S. Wren, "No Action, But Rebuke From

U.S.," New York Times, December 14, 1995, p. A20.

93. Rep. Nancy Pelosi, who has been a leader in the effort

to withhold benefits from China because of its human rights

record, threatened to re-link human rights and MFN unless Beijing

reverses the decision against Wei Jingsheng. Ibid.

94. Pp. 13-18, above.

95. The Taiwan Relations Act declares that the United States

would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by

other than peaceful means, including by boycott or embargoes, a

threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and

of grave concern to the United States. For an interesting

perspective on the Act and the context in which it became law,

see Hungdah Chiu, "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American

Relations," in R.O.C.-U.S.A. Relations, 1979-1989, by Jaw-Ling

Joanne Chang, Taipei: Institute of American Culture, Academia

Sinica, 1991, pp. 23-58.

96. United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region, p. 10.
50

97. Ibid.

98. The data on U.S.-Japan trade is derived from Direction

of Trade Statistics 1995, pp. 436-438. In 1994, U.S. exports to

Mexico were $50.8 billion, about $3 billion less than exports to

Japan.

99. United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region estimates that U.S. trade with the entire East

Asia-Pacific area in 1993, which was valued at $375 billion,

accounted for 2.8 million American jobs. Using the same ratio,

1994 trade with Northeast Asia accounted for 2.2 million jobs.

100. "Remember the Big Picture," editorial, The Straits

Times, November 7, 1995, p. 28, transcribed in FBIS-EAS-95-235,

December 7, 1995, pp. 9-10.

101. Ibid.

102. For a careful examination of the macroeconomic factors

affecting the U.S.-Japan relationship, see Leif Rosenberger, A

Faltering Economy Frustrates Global Recovery, Carlisle Barracks,

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, especially pp. 19-20 and

25-26.

103. Defense of Japan 1993, Reference 14, pp. 247-249, lists

20 separate U.S-Japan combined exercises for all services.

104. Tokyo pays all yen costs associated with stationing

U.S. troops in Japan. For details, see Defense of Japan 1993.

105. The Harris Poll #71, November 20, 1995, pp. 3-4.

106. See recent essays by Chalmers Johnson, especially "The

Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4,

pp. 103-114, written with E.B. Keehn.

107. Thomas L. Wilborn, Stability, Security Structures, and

U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn

Director of Publications and Production

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler