[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-10012

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 7:17-cr-00079-LSC-JHE-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CEDRICK LAMAR COLLINS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(November 7, 2019)

Before TJOFLAT, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Cedrick Lamar Collins appeals his above-guideline 240-month total 

sentence, imposed upon resentencing -- after pleading guilty to bank robbery, 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a), and hostage taking during a robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (e). 

We previously vacated Collins’s sentences and remanded to the district court 

for resentencing because the district court plainly erred by requiring Collins to 

register as a sex offender. See United States v. Collins, 753 F. App’x 863, 866 

(11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished). We stated, however, that Collins’s other 

arguments on appeal -- that his sentence was procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable because (1) the district court failed to explain sufficiently the reasons 

for the 120-month upward variance and (2) failed to consider properly the 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including that Collins was 18 years’ old when he 

committed the robbery -- lacked merit and that we would not address the

arguments in detail. Id. at 864, n. 1. At resentencing, the district court sentenced 

Collins again to a 240-month total sentence for the same reasons. Collins now 

argues that the district court failed to explain adequately his sentences following 

remand. He further argues that his above-guideline, 240-month total sentence was 

substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to give a sufficiently 

significant justification for its 120-month upward variance. 

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Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, district and appellate courts are bound 

by findings of fact and conclusions of law made by an appellate court in a prior 

appeal in the same case, unless the case fits within one of the narrow exceptions to 

the law-of-the-case doctrine. United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 662, 668 (11th 

Cir. 2014). Those exceptions occur where there is new evidence, where the 

appellate decision is clearly erroneous and would cause manifest injustice, or 

where an intervening change in controlling case law dictates a different result. Id. 

at 668-69. “The law of the case doctrine, self-imposed by the courts, operates to 

create efficiency, finality, and obedience within the judicial system so that an 

appellate decision binds all subsequent proceedings in the same case.” United 

States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations and alterations

omitted).

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard of review. United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th 

Cir. 2018). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden to show that 

the sentence is unreasonable in the light of the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We review 

de novo whether a district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a 

non-guideline sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2), even if the defendant 

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did not object to the explanation below. See United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 

995 (11th Cir. 2016). 

The first question we address to determine whether a sentence is reasonable 

is whether the district court committed a significant procedural error. United 

States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court must

state in open court the specific reason for imposing a sentence outside the guideline 

range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2); Parks, 823 F.3d at 993. “The sentencing judge 

should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the 

parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal 

decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). “The 

statement of reasons also serves to focus a sentencing court’s analysis of the 

defendant’s offense conduct and assists appellate courts’ review of whether the 

guidelines were properly applied.” United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1572 

(11th Cir. 1990). The needed “length and amount of detail describing the district 

court’s reasoning depends on the circumstances.” United States v. Ghertler, 605 

F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Second, we must determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances. Overstreet, 713 F.3d at 636. The district 

court must impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply 

with the factors listed in § 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the 

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offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need to promote 

respect for the law and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal 

conduct; and the sentencing guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

We have said that a district court abuses its discretion if it, for example, 

(1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an 

improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of 

judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The district court’s unjustified 

reliance on one § 3553(a) factor may be indicative of an unreasonable sentence. 

United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006). The weight given to 

any specific factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. 

United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). For example, district 

courts have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give a defendant’s 

criminal history. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1261, 1263–64 

(11th Cir. 2015). Moreover, although the district court must consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, it need not state on the record that it has considered each one of the factors 

or discuss each of them. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1204 (11th 

Cir. 2011). 

In reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed outside 

the guideline range, we may take the degree of variance into account and consider 

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the extent of a deviation from the guidelines. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 47 (2007). Although no proportionality principle exists for sentencing, a major 

variance from the advisory sentencing guideline range requires a more significant 

justification than a minor one; and the justification must be sufficiently compelling 

to support the degree of the variance. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1196. The district court 

may vary upward based on conduct that was already considered in calculating the 

guideline range. United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). 

The Guidelines generally permit consideration of juvenile criminal history. See

United States v. Chanel, 3 F.3d 372, 373 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that U.S.S.G. 

§ 4A1.2(d) applies to juvenile adjudications of guilt). Finally, a sentence imposed 

well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence. 

United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Collins’s arguments on appeal are barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, 

insofar as we rejected them as meritless in his previous appeal. See Anderson, 772 

F.3d at 668-89.

Furthermore, Collins’s sentences were reasonable. The district court 

sufficiently explained its reasons for the sentences, including expressly adopting 

the reasoning from his previous resentencing hearing. In addition, Collins’s 240-

month total sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court 

provided a sufficiently compelling justification for the 120-month upward 

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variance. The district court considered the nature and circumstances of the bank 

robbery and hostage taking, Collins’s impact on his victims, Collins’s criminal 

history, and the need to promote respect for the law and to protect the public. 

AFFIRMED.

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