EM 200-1-15

30 October 2015

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

TECHNICAL GUIDANCE

FOR

MILITARY MUNITIONS RESPONSE ACTIONS

ENGINEER MANUAL
AVAILABILITY

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This document is intended solely as guidance. The statutory 

provisions and promulgated regulations described in this document 

contain legally binding requirements. This document is not a legally 

enforceable regulation itself, nor does it alter or substitute for those 

legal provisions and regulations it describes. Thus, it does not impose 

any legally binding requirements. This guidance does not confer legal 

rights or impose legal obligations upon any member of the public.

While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the 

discussion in this document, the obligations of the regulated 

community are determined by statutes, regulations, or other legally 

binding requirements. In the event of a conflict between the 

discussion in this document and any applicable statute or regulation, 

this document would not be controlling.

This document may not apply to a particular situation based upon sitespecific circumstances. USACE retains the discretion to adopt 

approaches on a case-by-case basis that differ from those described 

in this guidance where appropriate and legally consistent.

This document may be revised periodically without public notice. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY EM 200-1-15 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

CEMP-CE Washington, DC 20314-1000 

Manual 

No. 200-1-15 30 October 2015 

Environmental Quality 


TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY MUNITIONS RESPONSE ACTIONS 


1. Purpose. This manual provides the United States Army Corps ofEngineers (USACE) 

Project Delivery Team with the processes for executing the technical aspects of munitions 

response (MR) projects. The foundation of Corps ofEngineers environmental work is the 

Environmental Operating Principles as specified in ER 200-1-5. These seven tenets serve as 

guides and must be applied in all Corps business lines as we strive to achieve a sustainable 

environment. 

2. Applicability. This manual applies to all Headquarters, USACE elements, USACE 

commands, and USA CE contractors having responsibility for performing MR activities. 

3. Distribution Statement. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

4. References. References are included in Appendix A. 

5. Explanation of Acronyms and Terms. Acronyms and special terms used in this manual are 

explained in the glossary. 

FOR THE COMMANDER: 

4 Appendices 

c~.PJ~ D. PETER HELMLINGER - (See Table of Contents) COL, EN 

Chief of Staff 

This manual supersedes EM 1110-1-4009, dated 15 June 2007. 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY EM 200-1-15 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

CEMP-CE Washington, DC 20314-1000 

Manual

No. 200-1-15 30 October 2015 

Environmental Quality 

TECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR MILITARY MUNITIONS RESPONSE ACTIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 Paragraph Page

Chapter 1. Introduction 

 Purpose 1.1 1-1 

Applicability 1.2 1-1 

Distribution Statement 1.3 1-1 

References 1.4 1-1 

General 1.5 1-1 

 EM 200-1-15 Overview 1.6 1-3 

Chapter 2. Project Planning and Execution 

Project Delivery Team 2.1 2-1 

Technical Project Planning 2.2 2-1 

Safety 2.3 2-9 

Sustainability 2.4 2-9 

Chapter 3. Site Visits

 Introduction 3.1 3-1 

Government Site Visits during Project Requirements

 Development 3.2 3-1 

Pre-Bid Contractor Site Visits 3.3 3-4 

Project Delivery Team Site Visits 3.4 3-5 

Chapter 4. Project Planning Documents 

 Introduction 4.1 4-1 

Project Management Plan 4.2 4-1 

Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan 4.3 4-2 

Uniform Federal Policy – Quality Assurance Project Plan 4.4 4-4 

 Accident Prevention Plan 4.5 4-11 

Property Management Plan 4.6 4-13 

 Environmental Protection Plan 4.7 4-13 

Interim Holding Facility Siting Plan / Physical Security Plan 4.8 4-23 
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Paragraph Page

Waste Management Plan 4.9 4-24 

Explosives Management Plan 4.10 4-25 

 Munitions Response Safety Submission and Site Plans 4.11 4-27 

Community Relations Plan 4.12 4-28 

 Risk/Hazard Assessment Planning 4.13 4-28 

Chapter 5. Geospatial Data and Systems 

 Introduction 5.1 5-1 

 Requirements for the Acquisition and Access of 

Geospatial Data 5.2 5-1 

Data Quality Objectives 5.3 5-1 

 Scope of Work 5.4 5-4 

 Planning Considerations 5.5 5-5 

 Munitions Response Site Delineation 5.6 5-8 

Chapter 6. Geophysical Investigation Methodologies 

 Introduction 6.1 6-1 

Geophysical Systems 6.2 6-1 

 Geophysical Tools 6.3 6-2 

 Positioning and Navigation Techniques 6.4 6-29 

Geophysical Systems Deployment Platforms 6.5 6-38 

Geophysical Data Analysis Work Flow 6.6 6-41 

Geophysical Systems Verification Planning Considerations 6.7 6-64 

 Special Considerations for Planning Geophysical 

 Investigations 6.8 6-72 

Chapter 7. Munitions Constituents Characteristics and Analytical Methodologies 

 Introduction 7.1 7-1 

 Sources of Munitions Constituents in Munitions 7.2 7-1 

 Overview of Munitions Constituents Analytical Laboratory 

Instrumentation 7.3 7-2 

Primary Explosives 7.4 7-3 

 Secondary Explosives 7.5 7-3 

 Propellants 7.6 7-9 

Metals 7.7 7-14 

 Chemical Agents and Agent Breakdown Products 7.8 7-20 

 Riot Control Agents 7.9 7-30 

Incendiaries 7.10 7-32 

 Smokes and Obscurants 7.11 7-34 

 Other Types of Munitions Constituents 7.12 7-38 

Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons 7.13 7-40 

 Identifying Munitions Constituents in Munitions 7.14 7-41 
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Paragraph Page

Chapter 8. Site Characterization Strategies

Site Characterization Overview, Goals, and Objectives 8.1 8-1 

 Site Characterization Planning Considerations 8.2 8-8 

Statistical Tools for Site Characterization 8.3 8-25 

 Locating Concentrated Munitions Use Areas 8.4 8-42 

 Characterizing Concentrated Munitions Use Areas 8.5 8-42 

Characterizing Non-Concentrated Use Areas 8.6 8-47 

Characterizing Small Arms Ranges 8.7 8-48 

 Munitions Constituents Sampling and Analysis 8.8 8-50 

 Munitions Response Site Delineation 8.9 8-65 

Chapter 9. Planning Strategies for Remedial or Removal Actions

Introduction 9.1 9-1 

Geophysical Planning Strategies for Remedial or

Removal Actions 9.2 9-2 

Mass Excavation Planning Strategies for Remedial or

 Removal Actions 9.3 9-9 

Chapter 10. Munitions Constituents Planning Considerations for Remedial or Removal Actions 

 Introduction 10.1 10-1 

 Regulatory Considerations 10.2 10-1 

Small Arms Range Cleanup 10.3 10-1 

Energetics and Perchlorate Treatment Considerations 10.4 10-5 

Chapter 11. Quality Control 

 Introduction 11.1 11-1 

 Munitions and Explosives of Concern Quality Management 11.2 11-2 

 Munitions Constituents Quality Management 11.3 11-19 

Geospatial Data and System Quality Control 11.4 11-22 

Chapter 12. Hazard and Risk Assessment

 Introduction 12.1 12-1 

 Conceptual Site Model Development 12.2 12-1 

 Munitions and Explosives of Concern Hazard Assessment 12.3 12-2 

 Munitions Constituents Risk Assessment 12.4 12-6 

Hazard and Risk Management Principles 12.5 12-12 

 Risk Communication 12.6 12-13 

Long-Term Management of Residual Hazards 12.7 12-14 
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Paragraph Page

Chapter 13. Project Reporting Documents

 Introduction 13.1 13-1 

 Cultural Resources Reporting 13.2 13-2 

 Ecological Resources Reporting 13.3 13-3 

 Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol 13.4 13-4 

Geospatial Data and System Data Deliverables 13.5 13-5 

Instrument Verification Strip / Geophysical Prove-Out

Letter Report 13.6 13-8 

Geophysics Data Deliverables 13.7 13-9 

Munitions Constituents Data Deliverables 13.8 13-11 

Appendix A – References A-1 

Appendix B – QASP Template B-1 

Appendix C – Sample Discipline-Specific Quality Assurance Reports C-1 

Appendix D – Physical Properties of Munitions Constituents D-1 

Glossary Glossary-1 

LIST OF FIGURES Page

Figure 4-1 Ecological Resources Planning Process 4-18 

Figure 4-2 Army Checklist for Important Ecological Places 4-19 

Figure 4-3 Cultural Resources Planning Process 4-21 

Figure 4-4 Checklist for Important Cultural Resource 4-22 

Figure 6-1 Schonstedt GA-52 (left) Fluxgate Magnetometer and Geometrics

G-858 (right) Optically Pumped Metal Detector 6-8 

Figure 6-2 Geometrics G-856 Proton Precision Magnetometer 6-8 

Figure 6-3 Vallon VMXC1 (left) and Geonics EM61-Mark 2 (MK2) (right)

TDEMI Sensors 6-9 

Figure 6-4 Geophex GEN-3 FDEMI Sensor 6-10 

Figure 6-5 Example of a Towed TDEMI Array 6-10 

Figure 6-6 Geometrics MetalMapperTM Advanced EMI Sensor 6-12 

Figure 6-7 Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) TEMTADS 6-12 

Figure 6-8 NRL TENTADS MP 2x2 Cart 6-13 

Figure 6-9 Lawrence Berkeley National Lab’s BUD 6-13 

Figure 6-10 Lawrence Berkeley National Lab’s Handheld BUD 6-14 

Figure 6-11 USG’s ALLTEM 6-14 

Figure 6-12 Sky Research’s MPV EMI 6-15 

Figure 6-13 Example of a Sonar Sensor 6-17 

Figure 6-14 Example of an MBES Sensor 6-18 

Figure 6-15 Example of an SSS Sensor 6-27 

Figure 6-16 Example of an SAS Sensor 6-27 
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Page

Figure 6-17 Example of a BOSS Sensor 6-28 

Figure 6-18 Example of an SBP 6-29 

Figure 6-19 Example of Positioning Precision 6-30 

Figure 6-20 Line and Fiducial Grid Setup 6-32 

Figure 6-21 EM61-MK2 Data Stream 6-33 

Figure 6-22 Example of RTS Single-Point Position Tracking 6-36 

Figure 6-23 Example of a Typical Laser Transmitter Layout 6-37 

Figure 6-24 Example of an RF Positioning System 6-38 

Figure 6-25 Example of an Acoustic Positioning System 6-39 

Figure 6-26 Example of a Man-Portable Geophysical System 6-39 

Figure 6-27 Example of a Multiple Instrument Array 6-40 

Figure 6-28 Example of an Airborne Geophysical System 6-40 

Figure 6-29 Example of an Underwater Geophysical System 6-41 

Figure 6-30 DGM Data Analysis Workflow 6-45 

Figure 6-31 Anomaly Selection Threshold Selection Example 6-49 

Figure 6-32 Estimating Measurement Variability and Error 6-51 

Figure 6-32 Estimating Measurement Variability and Error (continued) 6-52 

Figure 6-33 Example Classifier Decision Logic 6-60 

Figure 6-34 Example of the Variation in Actual EM61-MK2 Channel Responses 

From Small ISOs from Multiple Manufacturers Plotted as a Function

Of Depth (USAESH, 2011) 6-67 

Figure 6-35 Comparison of Blind Seed Response with Their Error Bars to the 

Theoretical Response Curves for the Most and Least Favorable 

Orientations (ESTCP, 2009) 6-69 

Figure 6-36 Comparison of the Offset Between the Known Location of Blind Seed 

Items and the Interpreted Target Location (ESTCP, 2009) 6-70 

Figure 7-1 Sources of MC in Munitions 7-1 

Figure 8-1 MEC Site Characterization Decision Logic 8-3 

Figure 8-2 Example of MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for CMUAs 8-4 

Figure 8-3 Example of MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for NCMUAs 8-5 

Figure 8-4 Example of MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for SARs 8-6 

Figure 8-4 Example of MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for SARs (continued) 8-7 

Figure 8-5 Meandering Path Surveying Within an MRS 8-10 

Figure 8-6 Example of Using Ground Based Transects to Locate CMUAs in an 

MRS (from Nelson et al, 2008) 8-11 

Figure 8-7 Grid Surveying Within an MRS 8-12 

Figure 8-8 Example Determination of Target Area Size and Shape Using the MFD,

RPE, and DPE (Modified from URS Group, Inc., 2009) 8-27 

Figure 8-9 Probability of Traversing and Detecting a CMUA as a Function of 

Transect Spacing for Three Differently Sized Impact Areas 8-28 

Figure 8-10 Probability of Traversing and Detecting a CMUA as a Function of 

Spacing for Three Different Transect Widths 8-29 
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Page

Figure 8-11 Probability of Traversing and Detecting a Circular DMUA as a Function

of Average Anomaly Density Background for Three Different Transect 

Spacings 8-30 

Figure 8-12 Example of a Geostatistical Analysis of the Anomaly Density of an MRS 8-31 

Figure 8-13 Example of an Evaluation of Anomaly Density Mapping Results Given 

Window Diameters of 200, 300, 400, and 500 ft 8-32 

Figure 8-14 Variation of Required Area of Investigation as a Function of Confidence 

Level for Three Example UXO Densities with a Constant Site Size 8-36 

Figure 8-15 Variation of Required Area of Investigation as a Function of Site Size 

For Three Example UXO Densities with a Constant Confidence Level 8-37 

Figure 8-16 Variation of the Required Area of Investigation as a Function of UXO 

Density for Three Specific Levels with a Constant Site Size 8-37 

Figure 8-17 Waste Disposal Procedures for CA-contaminated Media (DASA-ESOH

Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Material Responses, 

1 Apr 2009) 8-60 

Figure 9-1 Example DGM Removal Decision Logic 9-7 

Figure 9-2 Example DGM Removal Decision Logic Diagram 9-8 

Figure 9-3 Example Analog Geophysical Removal Decision Logic 9-9 

Figure 9-4 Example Analog Geophysical Removal Decision Diagram 9-10 

Figure 9-5 Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic 9-14 

Figure 9-6 Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic Diagram 9-15 

Figure 10-1 SAR Treatment Train Decision Tree 10-2 

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1-1 Changes to Document Numbers for Ems, EPs, and ERs 1-3 

Table 1-2 Information Locations by Topic Area 1-4 

Table 4-1 UFP-QAPP Worksheets 4-6 

Table 6-1 Land and Airborne Geophysical Detection Technologies (as of June 2011) 6-19 

Table 6-2 Marine Geophysical Detection Technologies (as of June 2011, modified 

From Schwartz and Brandenburg, 2009) 6-23 

Table 6-3 Production-Level DGM Parameters 6-46 

Table 6-4 Effect of Various Factors on TOI Detectability for EMI Sensors 6-53 

Table 6-5 Effect of Various Factors on TOI Detectability for Magnetamometers 6-53 

Table 6-6 Acceptance Sampling for Anomaly Resolution 6-63 

Table 7-1 Primary Explosives and Typical Uses 7-3 

Table 7-2 Secondary Explosives 7-4 

Table 7-3 Composition Explosive Makeup 7-5 

Table 7-4 Breakdown Products and Co-Contaminants of Common Secondary 

Explosives 7-6 

Table 7-5 Fixed Laboratory Tests for Nitrogen-Based Explosives, Co-Contaminants, 

and Breakdown Products 7-7 

Table 7-6 Field Tests for Nitrogen-Based Explosives 7-8 

Table 7-7 Compositions and Typical Use of Propellants 7-10 
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Page

Table 7-8 Fixed Laboratory Tests for Perchlorate 7-14 

Table 7-9 Metals Occurrence in Munitions, Regulatory Status, and Common 

Oxidation States 7-15 

Table 7-10 Fixed Laboratory Tests for Metals 7-18 

Table 7-11 Fixed Laboratory Tests for Uranium and Uranium Isotopes 7-19 

Table 7-12 Choking Agents 7-23 

Table 7-13 Nerve Agents and ABPs 7-24 

Table 7-14 Blood Agents 7-26 

Table 7-15 Blister Agents and ABPs 7-28 

Table 7-16 Incapacitating Agent 7-29 

Table 7-17 Vomiting Agents 7-30 

Table 7-18 Tear Agents 7-32 

Table 7-19 Smokes 7-35 

Table 7-20 Identification Tools-Advantages and Disadvantages 7-44 

Table 8-1 Site Characterization Hypothesis Testing 8-40 

Table 11-1 Common Geophysical Procedures and Their Related Failure Modes 11-4 

Table 11-2 Critical Process Quality Performance Requirements 11-9 

Table 11-3 Performance Requirements for RIs Using DGM Methods 11-23 

Table 11-4 Performance Requirements for RI/FS Using Analog Methods 11-27 

Table 11-5 Performance Requirements for RA Using DGM Methods 11-30 

Table 11-6 Performance Requirements for RA Using Analog Methods 11-34 

Table 12-1 ERA Technical Resources 12-10 

Table B-1 Evaluation Standards B-3 

Table B-2 Evaluation Standards Table (Key Milestones/Deliverables) B-8 

Table B-3 Surveillance Activities Table (Key Milestones/Deliverables B-9 

Table B-4 Surveillance Activities Table (Interim Milestones/Deliverables) B-10 

Table D-1 Chemical/Physical Properties of Primary Explosives D-1 

Table D-2 Chemical/Physical Properties of Secondary Explosives, 

Co-Contaminants, and Breakdown Products D-2 

Table D-3 Chemical/Physical Properties of Chemical Agents and Agent

Breakdown Products D-5 

Table D-4 Chemical/Physical Properties of Riot Agents and Smokes D-9 

See Navigation Pane for bookmarked information. 
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1-1 

CHAPTER 1

Introduction 

1.1. Purpose. This manual provides the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 

Project Delivery Team (PDT) with the processes for executing the technical aspects of munitions 

response (MR) projects. The foundation of Corps of Engineers environmental work is the 

Environmental Operating Principles as specified in ER 200-1-5. These seven tenets serve as 

guides and must be applied in all Corps business lines as we strive to achieve a sustainable 

environment. 

1.2. Applicability. This manual applies to all Headquarters, USACE (HQUSACE) elements, 

USACE commands, and USACE contractors having responsibility for performing MR activities. 

1.3. Distribution Statement. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

1.4. References. References are included in Appendix A.

1.5. General. 

1.5.1. It is the policy of USACE that USACE organizational elements execute Military 

Munitions Support Services (M2S2) work in accordance with (IAW) applicable laws, 

regulations, and policies. M2S2 Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) projects shall 

be performed IAW the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 

Act (CERCLA); Executive Order (EO) 12580, Superfund Implementation (23 January 1987); the 

Defense Environmental Restoration Act (DERA); and the National Oil and Hazardous 

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Where Resource Conservation and Recovery 

Act (RCRA) Corrective Actions have been implemented, RCRA may apply. 

1.5.2. The organizational structure and the roles and responsibilities of USACE for 

providing M2S2 are set forth in Engineer Regulation (ER) 1110-1-8153. 

1.5.3. The technical guidance provided in this Engineer Manual (EM) applies to all 

munitions projects, including those investigation and remedial activities conducted under 

CERCLA (i.e., site inspection [SI], remedial investigation [RI], feasibility study [FS], remedial 

design [RD], remedial action [RA] as well as removal action activities like engineering 

evaluation/cost analysis [EECA], removal design [RmD], time-critical removal action [TCRA], 

and non-time-critical removal action [NTCRA]). This technical manual also can be used as 

guidance for munitions-related actions under other regulatory frameworks and in support of other 

programs and projects. It is intended to support existing MR policy and guidance.

1.5.4. This manual provides the USACE PDT with the processes for executing the 

technical aspects of MR projects. The PDT includes the Project Manager (PM), technical 

experts within or outside the local USACE activity, specialists, consultants/contractors, the 

customer(s), stakeholders, representatives from other federal and state agencies, and vertical 
EM 200-1-15 

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1-2 

members from division and headquarters that are necessary to effectively develop and deliver the 

project.

1.5.5. This EM is divided into chapters representing the major components of an MR 

project that require PDT consideration. 

1.5.6. The engineering considerations presented in this EM address primarily the actions 

taken to reduce the explosives safety hazards associated with munitions and explosives of 

concern (MEC) and the human health and environmental risks associated with munitions 

constituents (MC). For additional information, review the USACE Web site for new guidance 

(http://www.publications.usace.army.mil/). Review also the USACE Environmental and 

Munitions Center of Expertise (EM CX) Web site and the M2S2 Web site on Engineering 

Knowledge Online for additional information. Other relevant guidance is contained in (but not 

limited to) the following documents: 

1.5.6.1. For Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM), see Engineer Pamphlet (EP) 75-1-3. 

1.5.6.2. Health and safety aspects of explosives safety and information on responsibilities 

and procedures for dealing with material potentially presenting an explosive hazard (MPPEH) are 

provided in EM 385-1-97. 

1.5.6.3. For Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and for guidance on obtaining rights of 

entry (ROEs), see ER 200-3-1. 

1.5.6.4. For information on Land Use Controls (LUCs), see EP 1110-1-24 and ER 200-3-

1. 

1.5.6.5. Guidance on stakeholder involvement under the Technical Project Planning (TPP) 

process is contained in EM 200-1-2, and guidance on public participation is contained in EP 200-

3-1. 

1.5.7. For projects that deal with depleted uranium munitions, the PDT should refer to the 

requirements contained in regulations codified at Title 10 of the CFR Part 20, Army Regulation 

385-10, and All Army Activities Message (ALARACT) 188/2011. 

1.5.8. Consult relevant Department of Defense (DoD), Army, and USACE Interim 

Guidance Documents (IGDs) and apply information to the appropriate aspects of project 

planning and/or execution. Guidance contained in IGDs may change as the guidance is 

finalized; therefore, project personnel (including the PDT and contractors) must keep abreast of 

all recent changes to Army policy and guidance that are relevant to their project.

1.5.9. Other resources are available that may provide information to assist PDTs. In 

instances where these resources conflict with this or other formal DoD or service guidance, the 

formal guidance should be followed. These resources are considered related (non-essential) and 

are not required. It is recommended that PDT members familiarize themselves with the available 

information to make salient technical recommendations specific to their project data quality 
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1-3 

objectives (DQOs), particularly in areas where the science is evolving. Some examples of 

related resource documents are presented in Appendix A. 

1.5.10. Commercially available equipment and software are referenced throughout this 

document. The government does not express nor imply preference for any of these mentioned 

systems but merely provides them as examples for informational purposes only. 

1.6. EM 200-1-15 Overview. 

1.6.1. Numbering Convention. Since the last revision of this manual in 2007, USACE is 

in the process of publishing updates to a number of the EMs, EPs, ERs, and other guidance cited 

in the 2007 version. These updates include content revisions as well as assigning new numbers 

to some of the guidance documents. A crosswalk between the old and new numbering 

conventions is provided in Table 1-1. This manual uses the new numbering convention. 

Table 1-1: Changes to Document Numbers for EMs, EPs, and ERs 

Prior Document 

No.

New Document 

No. Document Title

EP 75-1-4 EP 200-1-18 Environmental Quality: Five-year Reviews of Military 

Munitions Response Projects

EP 1110-1-24 EP 200-1-20 Land Use Controls

EP 1110-3-8 EP 200-3-1 

Environmental Quality: Public Participation 

Requirements for Defense Environmental Restoration 

Program

EM 1110-1-4007 EM 200-1-23 Safety and Health Aspects of Hazardous, Toxic, and 

Radioactive Waste Remediation Technologies

EM 1110-1-4009 EM 200-1-15 Military Munitions Response Actions

EM 1110-1-1200 EM 200-1-12 Conceptual Site Models for Environmental and 

Munitions Projects

EM 1110-1-4000 EM 200-1-17 

Monitoring Well Design, Installation, and 

Documentation at Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive 

Waste Sites

EM 1110-1-4014 EM 200-1-16 Environmental Quality: Environmental Statistics

ER 1110-1-263 ER 200-1-7 Chemical Data Quality Management for 

Environmental Cleanup 

1.6.2. Locating Information. This manual contains detailed technical guidance on a 

variety of topics related to MR actions. Table 1-2 is provided to help the user locate specific 

information of interest. First, identify the general topic area in the first column. Within each 

general topic area are a number of specific topics associated with that general topic area, which 

are shown in the second column. The specific topics are listed in alphabetical order. Once the 
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1-4 

specific topic is found, the relevant section(s), table(s), and figure(s) where guidance on the topic 

is located are shown in the third column of Table 1-2. 

Table 1-2: Information Locations by Topic Area 

General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

Geophysical 

investigation

Advanced EMI Sensors 6.3.7.3; Table 6-1

Advanced EMI Tools and Surveys 6.3.5

Analog Tools and Surveys 6.3.3

Anomaly Classification 6.6.1

Anomaly Classification – Anomaly 

Parameters

6.6.5

Anomaly Classification – Anomaly 

Resolution

6.6.9; Table 6-6

Anomaly Classification – Classifier Rules 6.6.7

Anomaly Classification – Cued Data 6.6.4

Anomaly Classification – Dig List 6.6.8

Anomaly Classification – Selection 6.6.2; Figure 6-31; Figure 

6-32

Anomaly Classification – Training Data 6.6.6

Data Analysis – Classification 6.6

Data Analysis – Overview 6.6.1

Deployment Platforms / Airborne 6.5.3; Figure 6-28

Deployment Platforms / Man Portable 6.5.1; Figure 6-26

Deployment Platforms / Multiple Instrument 

Arrays

6.5.2; Figure 6-27

Deployment Platforms / Underwater Systems 6.5.4; Figure 6-29

Digital Tools and Surveys 6.3.4

DQOs 6.7

EMI Sensors 6.3.7.2; Tables 6-1, and 6-2

Geophysical Systems 6.2

Geophysical Systems Verification 6.7; Figures 6-34, 6-35, and 

6-36

Geophysical Systems Verification –

Instrument Verification Strip

6.7.2.1

Geophysical Systems Verification – Blind 6.7.2.2
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1-5 

General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

Seeding

Magnetometers 6.3.7.1; Tables 6-1, 6-2, 6-

3, and 6-5

Marine Geophysical Sensors 6.3.7.5; Table 6-2

MEC Detectability 6.6.2.5

Penetration Depth Considerations 6.6.2.6

Positional Accuracy and Precision 6.4.1; 6.4.2; 6.4.3; Figure 6-

19

Positioning Options 6.4.4; Figure 6-20; Figure 

6-21; Figure 6-22; Figure 6-

23; Figure 6-24; Figure 6-

25

Special Considerations – False Positives 6.8.2

Special Considerations – Geology Contacts 6.8.2

Special Considerations – “Hot Rocks” 

Contacts

6.8.2

Special Considerations – No Contacts 6.8.2

Special Considerations – Survey Coverage 6.8.1

Underwater Tools and Surveys 6.3.6

Geospatial data Accuracy 5.3.7

Control Markers 5.3.6

Coordinate Reference System 5.3.3

Data Format/Database 5.3.2

Data Preservation 5.3.9

Data Standards 5.3.4 

DQOs 5.3

Equipment Procurement 5.1.2

Guidance 5.2

Measurement Units 5.3.5

PDT Responsibilities 5.1.1

Planning Considerations 5.5

Reliability 5.3.8

SOW Requirements 5.4
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1-6 

General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

Hazard/risk 

assessment

CSM Development 12.2

MC Risk Assessment – ERA 12.4.2

MC Risk Assessment – HHRA 12.4.1

MC Risk Assessment – Underwater MRSs 12.4.3

MC Risk Assessment Methodology 12.1.4

MEC Hazard Assessment – MEC HA 12.3.6

MEC Hazard Assessment – Receptor 

Interaction with MEC

12.3.5

MEC Hazard Assessment – Receptors 12.3.4

MEC Hazard Assessment – Sources of MEC 12.3.2

MEC Hazard Assessment Considerations 12.3.1

MEC Hazard Assessment Methodology 12.1.3

Purpose 12.1.1

Risk Communications 12.6

Risk Management 12.5

MC Analytical Instrumentation 7.3.2

Analytical Methods – Chemical Agents and 

Agent Breakdown Products

7.8.9

Analytical Methods – Metals 7.7.3; Table 7-10

Analytical Methods – Nitrogen-Based 

Explosives

7.5.4; 7.5.5; 7.5.6; Table 7-

5; Table 7-6

Analytical Methods – Propellants 7.6.9; Table 7-8

Chemical Agent Simulants 7.12.2

Chemical Agents – Blister Agents 7.8.7; Table 7-15

Chemical Agents – Blood Agents 7.8.6; Table 7-14

Chemical Agents – Choking Agents 7.8.4; Table 7-12

Chemical Agents – Incapacitating Agents 7.8.8; Table 7-16

Chemical Agents – Nerve Agents 7.8.5; Table 7-13

Chemical Agents and Agent Breakdown 

Products – Guidance

7.8.3

Chemical Agents and Agent Breakdown 

Products – Purpose and Types

7.8.1

CWM 7.8.2
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General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

Definition of MC 7.1; Glossary

Depleted Uranium 7.7.4

DQOs 7.3.1

Identification Resources 7.14; Table 7-20

Illumination Rounds 7.12.1

Incendiaries – Metal 7.10.3

Incendiaries – Oil 7.10.2

Incendiaries – Purpose and Types 7.10.1

Metals – Fate and Transport 7.7.2

Metals – Uses and Types 7.7.1; Table 7-9

Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons 7.13

Primary Explosives 7.4; Table 7-1

Propellants – Perchlorate 7.6.7

Propellants – Purpose and Types 7.6.1; 7.6.2; 7.6.3; Table 7-

7

Riot Control Agents – Tear Agents 7.9.2; Table 7-18

Riot Control Agents – Vomiting Agents 7.9.1; Table 7-17

Secondary Explosives 7.5; Table 7-2; Table 7-3; 

Secondary Explosives – Breakdown Products 7.5.3; Table 7-4

Smokes and Obscurants – Purpose and Types 7.11.1 – 7.11.3; Table 7-19

MC Sources in Munitions 7.2.1; 7.2.2; Figure 7-1

PDT CWM DC Responsibilities 2.1.3

MMDC Responsibilities 2.1.2

PDT Composition 2.1.1; 2.1.4

PDT Responsibilities 2.1.1

Planning documents APP Activity Hazard Analysis 4.5.2

APP Outline/Content 4.5.5

APP Purpose 4.5.1

APP/SSHP Content 4.5.6

CRP 4.12

Environmental Protection Plan 4.7

Explosives Management Plan 4.10
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General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

Interim Holding Facility Siting Plan / 

Physical Security Plan

4.8

PMP Guidance 4.2.2

PMP Purpose 4.2.1

Property Management Plan 4.6

QASP Development Responsibilities 4.3.2

QASP Overview 4.3.3

QASP Purpose 4.3.3.1

QASP Review Documentation 4.3.4

Required Explosives Safety Submissions 4.11

Risk/Hazard Assessment Planning 4.13

UFP-QAPP Elements 4.4.5

UFP-QAPP Purpose 4.4.2

UFP-QAPP Use of SOPs 4.4.4

UFP-QAPP Worksheet Development 4.4.3

UFP-QAPP Worksheets and Applicability Table 4-1

Waste Management Plan 4.9

Project reports Cultural Resources Reporting 13.2

Ecological Resources Reporting 13.3

GDS Deliverables 13.5

Geophysical Data Reports 13.7

IVS/GPO Reports 13.6

MC Data Reports 13.8

MRSPP 13.4

Preparation and Content Requirements 13.1

Quality control Geospatial Data and System QC 11.4

MC – Coordination with QA Laboratory 11.3.5

MC -- Data Quality 11.3.2

MC – Incremental Sampling 11.3.7

MEC Characteristics – Effect on QC 11.2.1

MEC Detection Variables – Effect on QC 11.2.2

MEC Process Quality Management 11.2.1; Table 11-1
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General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

MEC Process Quality Performance 

Requirements

11.2.2; Tables 11-2 through 

11.6 

MEC Product Quality Management –

Products

11.2.1

MEC QC Failures/Management 11.2.4

Remedial/removal 

planning actions 

Geophysical Investigation Planning – Goals 

of Investigation

9.2.2

Geophysical Investigation Planning –

Removal Decision Strategy

9.2.3; Figure 9-1; Figure 9-

2

MC Planning – Energetics and Perchlorate –

Groundwater Treatment

10.4.2

MC Planning – Energetics and Perchlorate –

Soil Treatment

10.4.1

MC Planning – Small Arms Ranges – Soil 

Treatment Technologies

10.3.4

MC Planning – Small Arms Ranges –

Treatment Options

10.3.2; Figure 10-1

MC Planning – Small Arms Ranges –

Treatment System Considerations

10.3.3

MC Planning – Small Arms 

Ranges/Common MC

10.3.1

Site characterization Characterizing Concentrated Munitions Use 

Areas – MC 

8.5.2; Figure 8-2

Characterizing Concentrated Munitions Use 

Areas – MEC

8.5.1; Figure 8-1

Characterizing Non-Concentrated Munitions 

Use Areas – MC

8.6.2; Figure 8-3

Characterizing Non-Concentrated Munitions 

Use Areas – MEC

8.6.1, Figure 8-1

Characterizing Small Arms Ranges 8.7, Figure 8-4a and Figure 

8-4b

Goals and Objectives 8.1.1

Goals and Objectives – EE/CA 8.1.5

Goals and Objectives – Remedial 

Investigation

8.1.4; Figure 8-1 Figure 8-

2; Figure 8-3; Figure 8-4a; 

Figure 8-4b
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General Topic Area Specific Topic Relevant Section(s)

Goals and Objectives – Removal and 

Remedial Design

8.1.6

Goals and Objectives – Site Inspection 8.1.3

Locating Concentrated Munitions Use Areas 8.4

MC Characterization – Required Elements 8.2.5

MC Sampling – Chemical Agent 

Considerations

8.8.4

MC Sampling – Data Interpretation 8.8.8.1

MC Sampling – Data Review 8.8.8.2

MC Sampling – Groundwater Sampling 8.8.3

MC Sampling – Groundwater Sampling 

Considerations

8.8.3.1 – 8.8.3.6

MC Sampling – Groundwater Sampling 

Methods

8.8.3.5

MC Sampling – MEC Operations 8.8.7

MC Sampling – Sediment Sampling 

Considerations

8.8.2.2

MC Sampling – Soil – Background 

Determination

8.8.1.5

MC Sampling – Soil – Sampling Methods 8.8.1.3

MC Sampling – Soil Sampling 

Considerations

8.8.1.1; 8.8.1.2

MC Sampling – Surface Water Sampling

Considerations

8.8.2.1

MC Sampling – Underwater MRS 

Considerations

8.8.6

MC Sampling/Analysis Considerations –

Background Concentrations

8.2.6.6

MC Sampling/Analysis Considerations –

MEC Composition/Condition

8.2.6.3; 8.2.6.4

MC Sampling/Analysis Considerations –

MEC Depth

8.2.6.2

MC Sampling/Analysis Considerations –

Regulatory Requirements and Screening 

Levels

8.2.6.7; 8.2.6.8
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CHAPTER 2

Project Planning and Execution 

1

2.1. Project Delivery Team. 

2.1.1. The PDT is empowered with the authority and responsibility for achieving the 

DoD’s environmental restoration objectives and delivering quality products and services. The 

PDT includes the PM, technical experts within or outside the local USACE activity, specialists, 

consultants/contractors, the customer(s), stakeholders, representatives from other federal and 

state agencies, and vertical members from division and headquarters who are necessary to 

effectively develop and deliver the project. Where PDT involvement is specified in this 

document, the PM will be responsible for determining specifically which members of the PDT 

should be involved in each particular part of the process. The PDT will implement the public 

involvement requirements specified in EP 200-3-1 during the planning phase. 

2.1.2. USACE Military Munitions Design Centers (MMDCs) are responsible for 

providing technical services to the PDT for addressing a site’s environmental and safety risks 

associated with the presence of MEC and MC, unless otherwise delegated, as specified in ER 

1110-1-8153. 

2.1.3. For CWM projects, the Ordnance and Explosives Chemical Warfare Materiel 

Design Center (CWM DC) provides specialized support to assist HQUSACE, USACE 

Commands, Field Operating Activities (FOAs), and laboratories by executing chemical warfare 

materiel responses and maintaining state-of-the-art technical expertise for all aspects of CWM 

DC response activities. The CWM DC is the only Design Center authorized to execute any 

phase of a CWM project.

2.1.4. The expertise and disciplines of the people on the PDT will depend on the nature 

and phase of the project. When assembling the PDT, the PM should consider including 

individuals with expertise in the following types of technical disciplines, depending on need: 

biology, chemistry, hydrology, hydrogeology, geology, risk assessment, environmental 

engineering, geophysics, geographical information systems (GIS) and mapping, and unexploded 

ordnance (UXO) safety and industrial hygiene. Other specialty areas may include contracting, 

office of counsel, public affairs, real estate, health physics, cost estimation, regulatory 

compliance, and archeology.

2.2. Technical Project Planning. 

2.2.1. TPP is a comprehensive planning process performed IAW EM 200-1-2. The TPP 

process, along with the associated planning documents, helps the PDT determine and document 

the project’s DQOs and the types, quantities, and quality of data that are required to meet the 

DQOs and aid in the preparation of an accurate and complete conceptual site model (CSM). The 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) DQO process is a seven-step process that 

begins with a problem statement, identifies a hypothesis and the decisions that need to be made 

(i.e., goals of the study), and then identifies information inputs, boundaries of the study area, 
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analytical approach, performance or acceptance criteria, and finally, a detailed plan for obtaining 

data. See Appendix E of EM 200-1-2 for a cross walk between the TPP process and the 

USEPA’s seven-step DQO process. The TPP process also can be used to develop and update the 

Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plan (UFP-QAPP) for the project. The 

PDT prepares various planning worksheets, as described in EM 200-1-2. The TPP process 

should be used iteratively; that is, it should be used as a data feedback loop that allows project 

objectives and data collection programs to be evaluated continually as site knowledge increases 

and project uncertainty decreases. 

2.2.2. The TPP process is an approach involving a series of meetings during which the 

project goals and objectives, the CSM, project data needs and data collection methods, and 

DQOs are discussed and agreed upon by project stakeholders. The project team can and should 

approach the various phases of the TPP process simultaneously when it makes sense. 

2.2.3. The TPP process is not a replacement for less formal regular or ad hoc meetings 

undertaken by the PDT that are necessary to achieve the objectives of the project. The following 

sections provide an overview on the four phases of the TPP process. 

2.2.3.1. Phase I – Define Project. 

2.2.3.1.1. The first phase of the TPP process defines the overall objective(s) for the 

project. Project objectives are those long-term and short-term issues that must be resolved, as 

well as other related project objectives that will need to be resolved to close the site or achieve

phase completion. Although TPP is an iterative process and project objectives may be refined, 

deleted or added as necessary, the PDT should clearly define the project objectives at the 

beginning of the process because all other elements of the TPP process are established based on 

this initial step and project objectives support subsequent project decisions. 

2.2.3.1.2. Available project property data are gathered during Phase I of the TPP process. 

EM 200-1-2 provides a worksheet for identifying the data that need to be gathered. These data 

are used to prepare the preliminary CSM, which is used to identify data needs during the second 

phase of the TPP process. The CSM is a written and/or pictorial representation of current site 

conditions and processes based on available information (e.g., contaminant migration, leaching 

to groundwater, potential receptor activities). USACE EM 200-1-12, Conceptual Site Models 

for Environmental and Munitions Projects is the USACE guide for developing CSMs. The 

necessary elements of a CSM describe all aspects of a munitions response site (MRS) and 

include the Facility Profile (e.g., type of range), Physical Profile (e.g., location and areal extent 

of UXO, depth of UXO), and Land Use and Exposure Profile (e.g., ecological and cultural 

resources profile, pathway analysis). For example, a complete MC CSM describes contaminant 

release mechanisms and locations, age of possible release, physical and chemical properties of 

MC, and physical transport processes that control migration and degradation of contaminants 

(which depend on soil type, topography, climate, vegetation, depth to groundwater, and other 

factors). 

2.2.3.1.2.1. The CSM evaluates whether a source-to-receptor pathway exists and is 

complete for a given MRS and media (e.g., soil and surface water for MEC and MC, 
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groundwater and air for MC). The CSM documents the complete source-to-receptor pathways, 

which include a source, release mechanisms, exposure potential, and receptors. The PDT should 

use the CSM as a communication tool to inform project stakeholders of the potential MEC 

hazards and MC risks at a given MRS. In addition, the CSM helps the PDT determine the 

project’s data needs. A well-developed CSM also shows the data gaps of the site 

characterization; however, it is important to note that the data gaps do not necessarily equate to 

the data needs necessary in order to characterize the MRS. For example, a data gap for a site 

with an anticipated RA within a target area may include not knowing an accurate number of 

anomalies and an approximate number of UXO present within the target area; however, for an RI 

at an MRS, the existing data may suffice to determine the nature and extent of the UXO within 

the target area such that cost estimates for an RA may be estimated to a +50%/-30% margin. 

The CSM should evolve throughout a project and throughout the project lifecycle as new data 

are collected and/or as site conditions or receptors change. If changes in site conditions or new 

data warrant at any point during site characterization activities, the PDT should re-evaluate the 

CSM for the MRS to determine if modifications to the site characterization approach are 

warranted. See EM 200-1-12 for more detailed guidance on developing CSMs. Several studies 

have evaluated the use of the following information sources that PDTs can use to assist with 

developing CSMs and site characterization approaches (ESTCP - Tinney et al., 2010; ESTCP - 

Nelson et al, 2008): 

• Historical aerial photographs 

• Common Operations Reports (see Section 7.14) 

• Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) and other remote sensing imaging

• Munitions usage data 

• Range design drawings and information 

• Results from previous investigations (see next section) 

2.2.3.1.2.2. Results from previous MC investigations may provide valuable information 

regarding site characteristics (e.g., soil type, geological stratigraphy, depth to groundwater, 

groundwater flow direction) as well as MC concentrations and distribution for CSM 

development. It is important to consider the quality of the analytical data to gauge whether it is 

of sufficient quality to use in site evaluations (e.g., risk assessments). Data quality 

considerations include the following:

• Consider background analytical data. Were background soil samples collected from 

soils derived from the same parent material and processes as soils of site samples? Are soil 

background data adequate for statistical comparison to the site data?

• Consider sample locations. For instance, were groundwater wells located and 

constructed to reflect aquifer conditions in areas and at depths likely to be impacted by MC 

releases? 
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• Consider sample collection and handling techniques. For instance, what methods were

used to collect samples? Were groundwater samples to be analyzed for metals filtered in the 

field? 

• Consider the analytical methods used and the resulting detection limits. Was an

appropriate analytical method selected for the MC analyses, and were appropriate quality 

assurance / quality control (QA/QC) procedures followed? Are the data reporting limits lower 

than the project screening or action levels?

2.2.3.1.3. Develop Phase I Planning Memo. In addition to the preliminary CSM, 

documentation produced during this phase of the TPP process includes a Phase I Project 

Planning Memo, which is prepared by the PDT to document the team's findings and decisions 

during Phase I. The Phase I Planning Memo should be used to update the Project Management 

Plan (PMP). Information from the Planning Memo may be used in development of Worksheet 

#9 of the UFP-QAPP (see Section 4.4 for information on the purpose and content of a UFPQAPP). The Phase I Planning Memo should clearly document the project and associated project 

objectives within the context of the overall site approach for the current executable stage of site 

activities, indicate the customer's goals (i.e., concept of site closeout, schedule requirements, and 

site budget), and identify site constraints and dependencies. 

2.2.3.1.4. Examples of project objectives include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• Determine the nature and extent of MEC at the MRS to include horizontal and vertical

extent, and determine density of MEC. 

• Determine if the remedial action objective (RAO), as outlined in the decision document

to remove all MEC to a depth of 2 feet below ground surface, has been accomplished. 

• Determine if MC contaminated soils above the cleanup level selected in the decision

document have been removed and treated successfully. 

• Determine if MC contamination evaluated in the baseline risk assessment (BRA)

indicates an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment. 

2.2.3.2. Phase II – Determine Data Needs. 

2.2.3.2.1. During TPP Phase II, the PDT determines the data needs that need to be met to 

adequately complete the site characterization; these will form the basis of later DQO 

development. Types of data that may be needed include determination of the types of UXO 

and/or discarded military munitions (DMM) present at the MRS, the regulatory requirements, the 

site’s land use, and the physical characteristics of the site. Data should be sufficient to support 

future decisions, for example, RI data should be sufficient to evaluate remedial alternatives in the 

FS, to conduct MC human health and ecological risk assessments for all media with a potentially 

complete source-receptor pathway, to conduct a MEC Hazard Assessment (MEC HA), and to 

design response actions. Documentation prepared at the end of Phase II should communicate the 

intended data uses and data needs such as the location/depth of MEC, degree of statistical 
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2-5 

confidence levels for UXO and geophysical investigation; or for MC the required number of 

samples, the contaminant concentrations of interest, and the necessary sampling areas or 

locations and depths. Appendix F of EM 200-1-2 contains tables that may be used to document 

data needs.

2.2.3.2.2. Examples of data needs may include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• Determine the horizontal and vertical extent of MEC in the MRS(s).

• Determine areas of concentrated munitions use and areas of non-concentrated munitions 

use.

• Determine if MC contamination evaluated in the BRA indicates an unacceptable risk to 

human health or the environment. For post remediation sampling of MEC, determine if the 

RAO, as outlined in the decision document to remove all MEC to a depth of 2 feet below ground 

surface, has been accomplished. 

• For post remediation sampling of MC, determine if MC contaminated soils above the 

cleanup level selected in the decision document have been removed and treated successfully. 

2.2.3.2.3. Data needs and the associated characterization strategies and DQOs developed 

during Phases III and IV may be different for various phases of an investigation. For example, 

the data needs and DQOs for collecting geophysical data to traverse and detect concentrated 

munitions use areas (CMUAs) are significantly different from those for characterizing the 

amount of UXO within a non-concentrated munitions use area (NCMUA). 

2.2.3.2.3.1. Example elements of data needs for finding and characterizing CMUAs 

include, but are not limited to: 

• investigation area;

• percentage of coverage;

• transect spacing;

• anomaly selection criteria; and

• equipment capabilities / validation process.

2.2.3.2.3.2. Example data needs for characterizing NCMUAs include, but are not limited 

to: 

• investigation area;

• amount of coverage; 
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• UXO density for which the PDT would like to evaluate;

• confidence level for the UXO density estimate;

• tolerable limits on acceptable error;

• anomaly selection criteria; and

• equipment capabilities / validation process.

2.2.3.2.4. Data needs for finding and characterizing MC center on but are not limited to: 

• defining sampling units and decision units;

• determining appropriate sampling units, decision units, and sampling density appropriate

for the end use of the data (e.g., finding the extent of contamination; exposure units for risk 

assessment);

• MC analytes attributable to MEC;

• determination of site mean background concentrations; and

• field QC sampling to determine uncertainty and confidence levels in estimates of MC

concentrations over sampled areas.

2.2.3.3. Phase III – Develop Data Collection Options. 

2.2.3.3.1. Phase III of the TPP process is designed for planning sampling and analysis 

approaches that will satisfy the data needs identified during Phase II. As described in EM 200-1-

2 an optimal sampling strategy will address data needs for both current and future executable 

phases, such as both the RI and the FS. The PDT should record the appropriate sampling and 

analysis methods and the data collection options using the worksheets provided in Appendix F of 

EM 200-1-2 and use those to develop sampling and analysis planning worksheets in the UFPQAPP. 

2.2.3.3.2. During TPP Phase III, the PDT develops the site characterization data collection 

options. Typical data collections for MR projects include: 

• historical documents (including Preliminary Assessment [PA], Historical Records

Review [HRR], Archive Search Report [ASR], SI);

• interviews;

• aerial photograph and/or LIDAR analysis (see ESTCP - Nelson et. al, 2008);
EM 200-1-15 

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• statistical software tools, such as Visual Sample Plan (VSP) and UXO Estimator (see

Section 8.3 for further guidance on the use of these statistical tools);

• field investigation techniques, such as geophysical surveys and intrusive investigation

(see Chapter 6 for more details); and

• sampling and analysis strategies to characterize MC.

2.2.3.4. Phase IV – Finalize Data Collection Program. 

2.2.3.4.1. The final phase in the TPP process is to finalize and document the selected data 

collection options. This process involves the development of site-specific statements that 

describe the intended data use(s), the data need requirements, and the means to achieve them. 

DQO steps documented as a result of the TPP process should be comprehensive and include each 

of the following data quality requirements. 

• Intended Data Use(s):

o Project objective(s) satisfied.

• Data Need Requirements:

o Data use (i.e., risk/hazard, compliance, remedy, or responsibility) satisfied;

o Contaminant, physical hazard, or characteristic of interest identified;

o Media of interest or location of MEC (e.g., sediment; surface or subsurface soil)

identified;

o Required areas for investigation and depths identified;

o Required amount of investigation (e.g., fixed or dynamic estimate of the number of

samples for HTRW sites, or acres of grids/transects and number of anomalies excavated for 

MRSs); and

o Reference concentration of interest or other performance criteria (e.g., action level,

compliance standard, decision level, design tolerance for HTRW sites, and confidence level, 

MEC density for MRSs) identified. 

• Appropriate Sampling and Analysis Methods:

o Sampling method (e.g., discrete, composite or multi-increment sample; sampling

equipment and technique; quality assurance/quality control samples; geophysical equipment and 

data collection; transects or grids; intrusive anomaly investigation) identified; and

o Analytical method (e.g., sample preparation, laboratory analysis method detection limit

and quantitation limit, laboratory quality assurance/quality control) identified. 
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2.2.3.4.2. See EM 200-1-2 and EPA 2006a for more details regarding development of 

DQO inputs associated with each of the DQO seven steps. Example DQO inputs include, but are 

not limited to:

• MEC: Digital geophysical mapping (DGM) transects designed in VSP will ensure an 

x% confidence level of traversing and detecting a target area with a circular radius of z feet.

• MEC: Random grid approach developed in UXO Estimator will ensure a y% 

confidence level that there are less than x UXO per acre within the buffer area outside of the 

target area. Collect sufficient transect data to bound all concentrated munitions use areas 

(CMUAs) (i.e., target areas).

• MEC: Ensure all QC checks are within performance metrics or measurement quality 

objectives (MQOs). 

• MEC, post remediation sampling: The decision document for MRS Alpha concluded 

that a potential explosive safety hazard to human receptors exists due to the past history of 

military munitions training. The RAOs required clearance to a depth of 2 feet below ground 

surface to current and future use of the property, which includes intrusive activities to a depth of 

2 feet below ground surface. 

• MC: Ensure laboratory quantitation limits for the selected methods and analytes are 

below the selected screening criteria (e.g., background levels, risk-based concentrations, action 

levels). 

• MC: Statistically based sampling design will ensure uncertainty can be evaluated for 

estimates of site-specific mean background concentrations and for concentrations over 

appropriate exposure areas for risk-based decisions. 

• MC: Collect sufficient number of samples to estimate 95% upper confidence of the 

mean concentrations of chemicals of potential concern to conduct a baseline human health risk 

assessment (HHRA) and an ecological risk assessment (ERA).

• MC: There is a small arms range backstop at MRS Bravo and visual evidence of lead 

bullets. The property is scheduled for redevelopment as an industrial park, mean concentrations 

of lead in the backstop soils will be characterized in a baseline risk assessment using the adult 

lead model.

• MC: Data will be used to determine whether there is a potential risk to humans that may 

live at the MRS. MC data from samples collected in the top 10 feet of soil will be used in the 

BRA.

• MC: The goal of this project is to characterize the soil near CWM items that are 

identified and removed to determine whether there is a potential risk to humans that may live at 

the MRS. Soil samples will be collected and analyzed for chemical agents (CA), associated 
EM 200-1-15 

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agent breakdown products (ABPs); the data will be used for waste disposal characterization, and 

if required, will be used in the BRA. 

2.2.3.4.3. When data collection is complete, the DQOs will be evaluated to assure that the 

data needs and, consequently, the related project objectives have been met. Documentation of 

DQOs will ensure efficient project execution and attainment of project property-closeout or 

phase completion in a timely fashion with minimal rework. DQOs are relevant to all aspects of 

the work performed on a project property. There are DQOs for location surveying and mapping 

(see Chapter 5), geospatial data systems (see Chapter 5), geophysical investigations (see Chapter 

8), MC sampling (see Chapter 8), and risk and hazard assessment (see Chapter 12). A completed 

UFP-QAPP can be an outcome of the TPP. See Appendix E in EM 200-1-2 for a cross walk 

between the TPP process and the UFP-QAPP.

2.3. Safety. 

2.3.1. Protection of the worker and the community from safety and health hazards is a 

critical component of all USACE activities and operations. The occupational health 

requirements for USACE are listed in ER 385-1-40. In certain instances where munitions 

constituents (other than MEC) are involved, ER 385-1-92 may also apply. 

2.3.2. Refer to EM 385-1-1 for general safety and health requirements and to ER 385-1-95 

and EM 385-1-97 for specific explosives safety requirements. In addition, all USACE MR 

projects must comply with DoD and Department of the Army (DA) explosives safety regulations 

and standards, such as DoD 6055.09-M and DA Pam 385-64. The staff within the EM CX also 

may be contacted for assistance. 

2.3.3. An Ordnance and Explosives Safety Specialist (OESS) should be involved during 

the planning and execution of all MEC or MC related munitions response projects. 

2.4. Sustainability. 

2.4.1. EO 13423 (Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation 

Management) requires the head of each federal agency to improve energy efficiency and reduce 

greenhouse gas emissions. EO 13515 (Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and 

Economic Performance) expands on the energy reduction and environmental performance 

requirements in EO 13423. 

2.4.2. In compliance with EO 13423, the DoD outlined its approach to green and 

sustainable remediation in the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) 

Management manual (DoDM 4715.20). The Army’s Environmental Cleanup Strategic Program

sets forth the Army’s approach to green remediation, which seeks to preserve natural resources, 

minimize energy use, minimize carbon dioxide emissions, maximize recycling and reuse of 

materials, and minimize the Army’s environmental footprint. The approach encourages PMs to 

seek opportunities to incorporate options for minimizing the impact on the environment of 

cleanup actions undertaken at Army installations. The Army’s goal is to consider and implement 

green and sustainable remediation opportunities when and where they make sense. Refer to the 
EM 200-1-15 

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EM CX Web Page for the latest guidance on green and sustainable practices related to 

environmental remediation projects. 
EM 200-1-15 

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3-1 

CHAPTER 3

Site Visits

3

3.1. Introduction. 

3.1.1. Site visits are made to gather information on the conditions of the project property 

and to help make informed decisions about project requirements and project technical approach. 

This chapter describes the elements that will be addressed when planning and conducting the 

following types of site visits: 1) by the government as part of developing project requirements 

during the pre-bid process; 2) by contractors when performing due diligence during the bid 

process; and 3) by the PDT when preparing project planning documents, such as the PMP and 

UFP-QAPP, after the project begins. 

3.1.2. All site visits will follow the provisions of an Abbreviated Accident Prevention 

Plan (AAPP). During site visits at sites with known or suspected MEC, Explosive Ordnance 

Disposal (EOD) or UXO personnel must be present so that contact with any potential surface 

MEC and any subsurface anomalies is prevented using anomaly avoidance techniques. The 

AAPP will be completed based on the format outlined in EM 385-1-97 for non-intrusive 

activities. See also EM 385-1-1. The AAPP is for performing non-intrusive activities on 

potential MMRP sites (e.g., during site visits) before the Accident Prevention Plan (APP) is 

approved as an appendix to the UFP-QAPP. 

3.2. Government Site Visits during Project Requirements Development. 

3.2.1. Objectives. The government will consider the following objectives when planning 

and executing a site visit to develop project requirements: 

a. Identify specific elements that should be addressed in the scope of work (SOW) for

contract award.

b. Identify and review existing information on past activities at the project property,

including site-specific reports, aerial photographs, maps, and geospatial data systems 

information. All or part of this information should be provided to contractors in advance of their 

pre-bid site visit.

c. Coordinate with local and/or state entities to discuss data sharing if data gaps have been

identified.

d. Determine the actions required to assist project execution at the project property.

e. Identify factors that could influence the cost estimate and project schedule.

3.2.2. Site Visit Attendees. The USACE PM will ensure that the appropriate 

organizations are represented at the site visit so that complete project requirements can be 

prepared. The site visit will not be conducted with less than two people. The primary USACE 

attendees for the site visit may include, but are not limited to:
EM 200-1-15 

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a. USACE PM;

b. installation PM;

c. MMDC representative(s);

d. project engineer(s);

e. geologist;

f. geophysicist; 

g. chemist;

h. GIS specialist;

i. cost estimator; and

j. OE Safety Specialist (OESS) or qualified UXO Safety Officer (UXOSO) (required to 

accompany the site visit team whenever MEC safety hazards are known or suspected). A 

Certificate of Risk Acceptance could be processed if the USACE PM wishes to reduce this 

number for a given project IAW DA Pamphlet (PAM) 385-30. 

3.2.3. Rights of Entry. As applicable, the USACE PM is responsible for contacting the 

property owner/operator to determine the need for and arrange for the preparation of an ROE 

agreement.

3.2.4. Safety. Two people must be qualified to administer first aid and cardiopulmonary 

resuscitation (CPR) when conditions set forth in EM 385-1-1 are present.

3.2.5. Information Collection. Site-specific information is reviewed and collected, as 

required, during the site visit to help the government prepare project requirements and to aid 

contractors in their proposal development. The USACE PM will collect previous investigation 

reports and data during the site visit with the intent of using this information to develop project 

requirements. 

3.2.6. Information Sources. The PM should collect and review all sources of project 

property data that are available, such as, but not limited to: 

a. previous MMRP investigation reports (i.e., PA Report, , HRR/ASR, SI Report, RI 

Report, EE/CA Report, and RA Report); 

b. data from databases of record;

c. historical aerial photographic analyses;

d. GIS data from previous district contractors that have worked on the project property 

(e.g., locations of previous investigations, MEC finds, site boundaries); 
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3-3 

e. Global Positioning System (GPS) data for MR area (MRA) and MRS boundaries; and 

f. other relevant reports on HTRW projects. 

3.2.7. Types of Information. The government will collect and disseminate to contractors 

the available information needed for contractors to prepare their proposal and technical approach 

for meeting project requirements and to develop a cost estimate. Potential information to be 

gathered by the government includes, but is not limited to: 

a. project property topography, soil type, and vegetation; 

b. preliminary identification of environmental concerns and environmental resources data 

(e.g., wetlands, endangered species, archaeological, cultural resources, known chemical 

contamination) ; 

c. accessibility to the project property; 

d. utility locations;

e. current and future land use; 

f. potential locations for staging areas, offices, etc.;

g. clear distances to inhabited buildings; 

h. potential concerns with coordination with local police / sheriff / military police to 

assess security and fencing requirements for explosives storage magazines;

i. locations of support zone and explosives storage magazines; 

j. locations of any potential MC sampling areas (targets, firing lines, etc.);

k. locations of any potential MC background/reference samples; 

l. logistical coordination for lodging, equipment and vehicle rental, office space, 

explosives dealers, etc.;

m. coordination with Range Control, Defense Reutilization Management Office, 

Ammunition Supply Point, and Post Provost Marshall, if applicable; and 

n. digital pictures and GPS survey points or project property maps that will be included in 

the SOW for clarification. This information is valuable for both the government and contractor 

prior to SOW writing and proposal development and helps document some of the information 

collected.
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3.3. Pre-Bid Contractor Site Visits. 

3.3.1. Objectives. Contractors should strive to conduct the site visit so that they collect 

sufficient information to make an independent assessment of the site characteristics and cost 

drivers when preparing proposals. The contractor must conduct an independent inspection of the 

site and gather the information necessary to understand the conditions they will encounter during 

execution of the work. The site visit will be conducted IAW the safety requirements described in 

EM 385-1-97. 

3.3.2. Site Visit Attendees. The personnel who conduct the due diligence site visit 

should be qualified to provide an independent assessment of site conditions as one element of 

due diligence.

3.3.2.1. A USACE representative will accompany contractor representatives performing 

site visits, unless otherwise specified by the USACE representative leading the site visit.

3.3.2.2. Contractors should not conduct their site visit with less than two contractor staff 

(not required to be from the same company), unless the site visit is strictly a windshield tour.

a. One person must meet the definition of UXO Qualified Personnel (Ref. DDESB

Technical Paper 18) and be experienced in UXO avoidance procedures

b. Two people must be qualified to administer first aid and CPR when conditions set forth

in EM 385-1-1 are present.

3.3.3. ROE. As applicable, the USACE PM is responsible for contacting the property 

owner/operator to determine the need for and arrange for the preparation of an ROE agreement. 

3.3.4. AAPP. Because site visits are conducted in anomaly avoidance mode, an AAPP is 

sufficient for site visits, when required. EM 385-1-1 discusses the AAPP in further detail. See 

also EM 385-1-97. 

3.3.5. Training. Anyone walking or visiting an area of the site that has uncontrolled or 

unknown hazardous waste is required to have training as required by CFR 1910.120. At a 

minimum there should be site training on typical site hazards and emergency response. 

3.3.6. Information Collection. During the site visit, the contractor performs due diligence 

to ensure that the information required to prepare a complete and responsive proposal is gathered 

and that they have obtained the information necessary to fully understand the conditions that they 

will encounter during project execution. Potential information to be gathered during the site visit 

depends on the type of work to be performed (e.g., RI, RA) and may include, but is not limited 

to: 

a. identification of features related to munitions use;

b. soil conditions, including presence or absence of interfering rock types (e.g., ferrous

rocks);
EM 200-1-15 

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3-5 

c. types and density of vegetation;

d. locations of surface water features, including streams, impoundments, and wetlands;

e. locations of buildings and obstacles, including fences;

f. coverage and locations of paved areas;

g. locations of aboveground and belowground utilities;

h. presence and locations of threatened or endangered species;

i. presence and locations of cultural resource areas; and

j. any other information required to meet the contractor’s due diligence requirements.

3.4. Project Delivery Team Site Visits. 

3.4.1. Contractors may require additional, post-contract award site reconnaissance visits 

to collect additional site-specific information and/or to engage project stakeholders before and 

during development of project planning documents. For cost effectiveness and convenience, a 

site visit may take place at the beginning of a project during the TPP process. This allows the 

PDT to meet with local leaders (e.g., stakeholders, government representatives, regulators), 

obtain relevant information, and then visit the project property, possibly being accompanied by 

local leaders and/or citizens. To enhance the effectiveness of the first TPP meeting, the PDT 

should engage government leaders, including regulators, in advance of the meeting to provide 

background information about the project. 

3.4.2. The OESS or UXOSO should not have responsibility for more than eight other 

team members. If more support is needed, an additional team should be established that would 

be supervised by another OESS or UXOSO. Where there is more than one team, a supervisory 

OESS or UXOSO should be designated. 

3.4.3. Two people must be qualified to administer first aid and CPR when conditions set 

forth in EM 385-1-1 are present.
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CHAPTER 4

Project Planning Documents 1

4.1. Introduction. 

4.1.1. This chapter presents guidance to the PDT for preparing key project planning 

documents. 

4.1.2. The project planning documents described within this chapter may not be applicable 

to all MR projects. The PDT should determine which of the project planning documents are 

required. Data Item Descriptions (DIDs) outlining project planning document requirements may 

be contained within contract documents. Where conflicts exist between these DIDs and any 

other guidance document or requirements (including those contained herein), the DIDs within 

the contract document take precedence. 

4.1.3. The following sections of this manual address planning documents: 

a. PMP (Section 4.2)

b. Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) (Section 4.3)

c. UFP-QAPP (Section 4.4)

d. Accident Prevention Plan/Site Safety and Health Plan (APP/SSHP) (Section 4.5)

e. Property Management Plan (Section 4.6)

f. Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) (Section 4.7)

g. Interim Holding Facility (IHF) Siting Plan / Physical Security Plan (PSP) (Section 4.8)

h. Waste Management Plan (WMP) (Section 4.9)

i. Explosives Management Plan (Section 4.10)

j. Munitions Response Safety submissions and Site Plans(Section 4.11)

k. Community Relations Plan (CRP) (Section 4.12)

4.2. Project Management Plan. 

4.2.1. ER 5-1-11 requires every project to have a PMP. 

4.2.2. A PMP is a formal, approved, living document used to define requirements and 

expected outcomes and guide project execution and control. Primary uses of the PMP are to 

facilitate communications among participants, assign responsibilities, define assumptions, and 

document decisions to establish baseline plans for scope, cost, schedule and quality objectives 
EM 200-1-15 

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4-2 

against which performance can be measured, and to adjust these plans as actual dictate. The 

PMP is developed by the project delivery team (PDT) (ER 5-1-11).

4.2.3. The USACE PM, with input from the PDT should prepare a PMP IAW the 

requirements of Project Delivery Process PROC 02000, PMP Development, which is available to 

USACE staff on the Quality Management System (QMS) Web site. The QMS was established 

under ER 5-1-14 and is a formalized system that defines the structure, authority, responsibilities, 

resources, planning, and documented procedures needed to implement USACE’s quality policy. 

The following subsections identify the key sections of the USACE PMP. Individual processes 

are identified within PROC 02000 for developing each section.

4.3. Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan. 

4.3.1. Purpose and Overview. 

4.3.1.1. This section describes the roles and responsibilities of the USACE PDT with 

regard to development and implementation of the project-specific QASP. A QASP that directly 

corresponds to a contract’s specified performance standards is used to measure contractor 

performance and to ensure that the government receives the quality of services called for under 

the contract and pays only for the acceptable levels of services received. Each USACE PDT 

member has an important part to play to ensure quality products are received from the contractor. 

4.3.1.2. Effective QA is comprehensive (i.e., it involves all aspects of the entire life cycle 

of projects) and: 

a. ensures people accomplish appropriate tasks at the appropriate time; 

b. ensures customer objectives and expectations are met or exceeded;

c. includes the use of a multidisciplinary team of trained personnel; 

d. includes using a comprehensive and systematic approach to project planning (e.g., 

TPP);

e. includes reviewing project documents and project status; and 

f. includes observing field operations. 

4.3.2. Responsibilities. 

4.3.2.1. Site PM.

a. Oversees the development and implementation of the QASP. 

b. Specific surveillance activities for PMs will vary depending upon the type of project. 

Common responsibilities for projects are provided in the QASP template provided in Appendix 

B.
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4-3 

4.3.2.2. PDT.

a. Provides technical input to the PM for information to be included in the QASP. 

b. Implements the project-specific QASP. Specific QASP responsibilities for the PDT 

team members will vary depending upon the type of project. Common responsibilities for 

various PDT members also are provided in the QASP template provided in Appendix B. 

c. Provides the KO any specifications for inspection, testing, and other contract quality 

requirements essential to ensure the integrity of the product or service. For service contracts, 

like most MMRP contracts, these quality requirements are documented in a QASP.

4.3.3. QASP Overview. 

4.3.3.1. All service contracts require the development and implementation of a QASP. A 

QASP describes how government personnel will evaluate and assess contractor performance. 

The purpose of the QASP is to describe how project performance will be measured and assessed 

against performance standards. It is based on the premise that the contractor is responsible for 

managing site-specific QC.

4.3.3.2. The QASP is intended to measure performance against the standards in the 

Performance Work Statement (PWS) or SOW. As such, these interdependent documents must 

be coordinated. Since the PWS/SOW and QASP are intertwined, it is effective and efficient to 

write them simultaneously.

4.3.3.3. The QASP is a requirement of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 

46.103(a) for service contracts. There are several considerations when developing a QASP. 

4.3.3.3.1. The QASP describes the contract technical quality requirements, including 

inspection and testing requirements. 

4.3.3.3.2. Preliminary QASPs should be developed for each project in conjunction with the 

development of the PWS/SOW. The QASP should be revised and modified to fit site-specific 

conditions and requirements and the contractor’s QC Plan. Effective use of the QASP, in 

conjunction with the contractor’s QC Plan, will allow the government to evaluate the 

contractor’s success in meeting the project objectives. The QASP may be required to be 

developed by the contractor or may be drafted by the government. 

4.3.3.3.3. The entire PDT should meet to discuss the project’s objectives and to have input 

on the final measures contained in the QASP. 

4.3.3.3.4. The majority of effort in developing the QASP is tailoring the QASP template to 

meet project-specific needs. 

4.3.3.4. The QASP identifies roles and responsibilities of Army QA personnel; methods 

for performance assessments and evaluation standards; the surveillance methodology, which 

includes the Surveillance Activities Table that identifies the work that will be done and how it 

will be documented; the Evaluation Standards, which identify the possible ratings that can be 
EM 200-1-15 

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4-4 

assigned when assessing how well the contractor’s work measures up to the contract 

requirements for the activities monitored in the Surveillance Activities Table; and the 

surveillance monitoring documentation, which includes the QA monitoring form, the Corrective 

Action Request (CAR) form that identifies how the government will communicate nonconformances it observes, and technical QA monitoring forms. A QASP template is provided in 

Appendix B. 

4.3.4. QASP Review Documentation. 

4.3.4.1. Various forms may be used to document review activities that can be incorporated 

as part of the QASP. The review documentation forms that are used should be tailored 

individually to the project, as circumstances warrant. 

4.3.4.2. The following are some examples of commonly used review documentation 

forms: 

a. Generic QA Checklist (see EM-200-1-6); 

b. QA Report (see Appendix C for sample discipline-specific QA reports); 

c. CAR; and

d. After Action or Final QA Report Content. 

4.4. Uniform Federal Policy – Quality Assurance Project Plan. 

4.4.1. Overview. The UFP-QAPP integrates all technical and quality aspects for the life 

cycle of the project, including planning, implementation, and assessment. It documents how QA 

and QC are applied to an environmental data collection operation to ensure that the results 

obtained will satisfy the stated performance criteria. Development of a UFP-QAPP is applicable 

to investigations, remediation activities or remedy solutions, and final cleanup and long-term 

management/stewardship activities.

4.4.2. Purpose and Available Guidance. The UFP-QAPP format provides project-level 

guidance for implementing the systematic planning process for environmental sampling. It was 

developed via collaboration between the USEPA, DoD, and Department of Energy (DOE). The 

PDT should use the UFP-QAPP format to plan, manage, and monitor all aspects of the MEC and 

MC components of MR actions. In addition, the UFP-QAPP helps the PDT manage a project’s 

communications and define roles and responsibilities. The USEPA Web site contains an 

electronic UFP-QAPP workbook, which will facilitate completion of the various worksheets that 

are part of the project-specific UFP-QAPP. 

4.4.2.1. The UFP-QAPP Manual is a key guidance document for preparing UFP-QAPPs. 

The UFP-QAPP Manual (Part 1 of a comprehensive set of guidance documents contained on the 

USEPA Web site provided in Section 4.4.2) is not program specific and is intended to be as 

comprehensive as possible. Project teams are encouraged to use a graded approach when 

developing QAPPs, giving appropriate consideration to the significance of the environmental 

problems to be investigated, the types of environmental decisions to be made, the impact on 
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4-5 

human health and the environment, and available resources. This graded approach may result in 

not all of the worksheets needing to be used, but only those that are relevant to the project. 

4.4.2.2. To assist in compiling critical UFP-QAPP information, several additional 

guidance manuals are available on the USEPA Web site, including Part 2A, the UFP-QAPP 

Workbook, which provides blank worksheets; Part 2B, the UFP-QAPP Compendium, which 

outlines QA/QC activities that should be included in a UFP-QAPP for all CERCLA projects; and 

Part 2C, Example QAPPs, which provides examples of completed worksheets and shows how to 

fulfill the requirements of the UFP-QAPP Manual.

4.4.3. UFP-QAPP Worksheet Development. The worksheets address all requirements of 

CIO 2106-G-05 (USEPA Guidance on Quality Assurance Project Plans). Users are free to 

modify the worksheets as necessary to suit project-specific requirements; however, all elements 

required by CIO 2106-G-05 must be addressed, or a satisfactory explanation must be provided 

for their exclusion. Selected UFP-QAPP worksheets can be taken to project scoping sessions 

(e.g., worksheets for the CSM, DQOs, Project Tasks and Schedule, Sampling Design and 

Rationale) and completed during the project planning stage. Some of the information used for 

these worksheets also may be applicable to the worksheets completed during the TPP process 

(see EM 200-1-2). Subsequently, the worksheet information can be presented in tabular format 

in the UFP-QAPP. The worksheets are designed to ensure consistent content and presentation of 

information in a project-specific UFP-QAPP. If the QAPP worksheets are not used, information 

required by the worksheets still must be presented in the UFP-QAPP, as appropriate to the 

project.

4.4.4. Use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). To simplify UFP-QAPP 

preparation, written SOPs should be included as an appendix. If procedures are documented in a 

separate document, that document should be cross-referenced and either attached for review and 

approval (if not already approved) or referenced with sufficient specificity that they can be found 

easily. SOPs should be reviewed so that they are applicable to site-specific conditions, and any 

variances to the SOP need to be documented. The PDT should develop SOPs for each definable 

feature of work. The following are the recommended minimum SOPs that should be included: 

a. Anomaly avoidance; 

b. Brush clearance; 

c. Civil surveying; 

d. Geospatial data management; 

e. Geophysical data collection (digital and analog); 

f. DGM data processing and interpretation, if needed; 

g. Target reacquisition, if needed; 

h. Intrusive operations; 

i. Explosives management; 
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4-6 

j. Geophysical QC;

k. MPPEH disposition;

l. Demolition operation;

m. MC sample collection procedures;

n. Hazardous material shipping, if needed (applies to certain MC samples, x-ray

fluorescence [XRF] sources, EXPRAYTM kits, etc.); 

o. Chemistry data management;

p. MC data review; and

q. Analytical laboratory SOPs.

4.4.5. UFP-QAPP Elements. There are four elements of a UFP-QAPP: Project 

Management and Objectives, Measurement and Data Acquisition, Assessment and Oversight, 

and Data Review. Table 2 in the UFP-QAPP Manual shows the sections of the UFP-QAPP 

required for each element. Table 4-1 shows the worksheet numbers and titles and a crosswalk 

with the sections in the CIO 2106-G-05 guidance. This table also provides general guidance on 

the applicability of the worksheets to MC and MEC projects and the section in this manual with 

information that may be helpful when filling out a worksheet. When developed for a project site 

where both MEC and MC are concerns, a single UFP-QAPP may be prepared. Many worksheets 

are applicable to both, while other worksheets may need to be divided into sections for the MEC 

and MC components of the project. 

Table 4-1: UFP- QAPP Worksheets

Worksheet

Number(s) Worksheet Title

CIO 2106-G-05 QAPP Guidance 

Sectiona

Potential 

Applicability

EM 200-

1-15 

Section Title MEC MC Section

1, 2 Title and 

Approval Page

2.2.1 Title, Version, and 

Approval/Sign-Off

● ● NA

3, 5 Project 

Organization and 

QAPP 

Distribution

2.2.3 Distribution List ● ● 2.1; 2.2

2.2.4 Project Organization 

and Schedule 

4, 7, 8 Personnel 

Qualifications 

and Sign-off 

Sheet

2.2.1 Title, Version, and 

Approval/Sign-Off

● ● 2.1.4; 

6.2.1, 

8.2.5.1 2.2.7 Special Training 

Requirements and 

Certification

6 Communication 

Pathways

2.2.4 Project Organization 

and Schedule

● ● 2.1; 2.2
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4-7 

Worksheet 

Number(s) Worksheet Title

CIO 2106-G-05 QAPP Guidance 

Sectiona

Potential 

Applicability

EM 200-

1-15 

Section Title MEC MC Section

9 Project Planning 

Session 

Summary

2.2.5 Project Background, 

Overview, and Intended 

Use of Data

● ● 2.2

10 Conceptual Site 

Model 

2.2.5 Project Background, 

Overview, and Intended 

Use of Data

● ● 2.2.3.1, 

12.2 

11 Project Data 

Quality 

Objectives

2.2.6 Data/Project Quality 

Objectives and 

Measurement 

Performance Criteria

● ● 2.2.3.2; 

5.3; 9.2; 

11.3 

12 Measurement 

Performance 

Criteria

2.2.6 Data/Project Quality 

Objectives and 

Measurement 

Performance Criteria

● ● 5.3.7; 

11.3; 

Tables 

11-3 

through 

11-6

13 Secondary Data 

Uses and 

Limitations Table

Chapter 

3 

QAPP Elements for 

Evaluating Existing 

Data

● ● NA

14, 16 Project Tasks and 

Schedule

2.2.4 Project Organization 

and Schedule

● ● 2.1; 2.2

15 Project Action 

Limits and 

LaboratorySpecific 

Detection / 

Quantitation 

Limits

2.2.6 Data/Project Quality 

Objectives and 

Measurement 

Performance Criteria

● 7; 

8.2.4.6; 

8.2.6.9 

17 Sampling Design 

and Rationale 

2.3.1 Sample Collection 

Procedure, 

Experimental Design, 

and Sampling Tasks

● ● 8.2.4; 

8.3.2; 

8.5; 8.6; 

8.7

18 Sampling 

Locations and 

Methods 

2.3.1 Sample Collection 

Procedure, 

Experimental Design, 

and Sampling Tasks

● ● 8.8

2.3.2 Sampling Procedures 

and Requirements
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Worksheet

Number(s) Worksheet Title

CIO 2106-G-05 QAPP Guidance 

Sectiona

Potential 

Applicability

EM 200-

1-15 

Section Title MEC MC Section

19, 30 Sample 

Containers, 

Preservation, and 

Hold Times

2.3.2 Sampling Procedures 

and Requirements 

● 7.5.4;

7.5.5;

7.5.6;

7.6.9;

7.7.3;

7.8.9

20 Field QC 2.3.5 Quality Control 

Requirements

● ● 11

21 Field SOPs 2.3.2 Sampling Procedures 

and Requirements 

● ● 4.4.4; 

8.8.1-

8.8.4

22b Field Equipment 

Calibration, 

Maintenance, 

Testing, and 

Inspection

2.3.6 Instrument/Equipment 

Testing, Calibration and 

Maintenance 

Requirements, Supplies 

and Consumables

● ● 6.7.2; 7

23 Analytical SOPs 2.3.4 Analytical Methods 

Requirements and Task 

Description

● ● 7.5.4; 

7.5.5; 

7.5.6; 

7.6.9; 

7.7.3; 

7.8.9

24b Analytical 

Instrument 

Calibration

2.3.6 Instrument/Equipment 

Testing, Calibration and 

Maintenance 

Requirements, Supplies 

and Consumables

● ● 7

25b Analytical 

Instrument and 

Equipment 

Maintenance, 

Testing, and 

Inspection

2.3.6 Instrument/Equipment 

Testing, Calibration and 

Maintenance 

Requirements, Supplies 

and Consumables 

● ● NA

26, 27 Sample 

Handling, 

Custody, and 

Disposal

2.3.3 Sample Handling, 

Custody Procedures, 

and Documentation 

● NA
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Worksheet 

Number(s) Worksheet Title

CIO 2106-G-05 QAPP Guidance 

Sectiona

Potential 

Applicability

EM 200-

1-15 

Section Title MEC MC Section

28 Analytical 

Quality Control 

and Corrective 

Action

2.3.5 Analytical Quality 

Control and Corrective 

Action

● ● 11

29 Project 

Documents and 

Records

2.3.8 Documentation and 

Records Requirements

● ● 13

31, 32, 33 Assessments and 

Corrective 

Action

2.4 Assessments and Data 

Review (Check)

● ● 4.3, 

Appendix 

B 2.5.5 Reports to Management

34 Data Verification 

and Validation 

Inputs

2.5.1 Data Verification and 

Validation Targets and 

Methods

● ● 8.2.4.7; 

8.8.8 

35 Data Verification 

Procedures

2.5.1 Data Verification and 

Validation Targets and 

Methods

● ● 8.2.4.7; 

8.8.8 

36 Data Validation 

Procedures

2.5.1 Data Verification and 

Validation Targets and 

Methods

● ● 8.8.8

37 Data Usability 

Assessment

2.5.2 Quantitative and 

Qualitative Evaluations 

of Usability

● ● 8.8.8

2.5.3 Potential Limitations on 

Data Interpretation

2.5.4 Reconciliation with 

Project Requirements

a See. http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/tribal-coordination-office-environmental-information-oei “Draft 

Guidance on QAPP (2106-G-05)” 

b These worksheets may be combined into one worksheet for geophysics components of MR projects in 

order to document testing and maintenance of geophysical equipment. 

4.4.5.1. Project Management and Objectives Elements. The project management and 

objectives elements of a UFP-QAPP ensure that the project has a defined purpose by 

documenting the environmental problem, the environmental questions being asked, and the 

environmental decisions that need to be made. The elements in this part of the UFP-QAPP 

identify the project quality objectives necessary to answer those questions and support those 

environmental decisions. They also address project management considerations, such as roles 

and responsibilities. The PDT also should consider including a narrative at the beginning of the 
EM 200-1-15 

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4-10 

UFP-QAPP that includes a brief description of the project’s purpose and scope, the authority for 

performing the work (including descriptions of the various government organizations that are 

involved and their responsibilities), and background information on the installation (if 

applicable) and project site(s), including a historical overview. 

4.4.5.2. Measurement and Data Acquisition Element. This UFP-QAPP element group 

covers how project data will be collected, measured, and documented. Proper implementation of 

these activities helps ensure that resulting data are scientifically sound, of known and 

documented quality, and suitable for their intended use. The worksheets associated with this 

element address the QC activities that will be performed during each phase of data collection and 

generation, from sampling to data reporting, evaluating QC acceptance limits and the 

performance of corrective actions for nonconformances. 

4.4.5.3. Assessment and Oversight Element. This UFP-QAPP element ensures that 

planned project activities are implemented as described in the UFP-QAPP and that reports are 

provided to apprise management of the project status and any QA issues that arise during 

implementation. Assessment activities help to ensure that the resultant data quality is adequate 

for its intended use and that appropriate responses are in place to address nonconformances and 

deviations from the UFP-QAPP. Frequently, project personnel identify deviations from the 

UFP-QAPP without the benefit of formal, scheduled assessments. This element also addresses 

those situations and describes the process by which the need for corrective action is documented, 

reported, and implemented and its effectiveness assessed.

4.4.5.4. Data Review Element. Data review is the process by which data are examined and 

evaluated to varying levels of detail and specificity by a variety of personnel who have different 

responsibilities within the data management process. It includes verification, validation, and 

usability assessments. This UFP-QAPP element encompasses the data review activities used to 

ensure that only scientifically sound data of known and documented quality are collected to meet 

project quality objectives. The approach used for data review of a project must be appropriate to 

the project requirements. Although data review takes place after the data have been generated, 

determination of the type of data review that is required to meet quality objectives begins during 

the planning phase of the project.

4.4.5.5. Appendices. The following is a listing of the possible appendices to the UFPQAPP, depending on the specific project needs, and the sections in this manual where they are 

discussed. Appendices that are not required for a specific project should be noted. 

a. APP (see Section 4.5); 

b. Property Management Plan (see Section 4.6); 

c. EPP (see Section 4.7); 

d. IHF Siting Plan (for CWM projects) (see Section 4.8); 

e. WMP (see Section 4.9); 
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f. Explosives Management Plan (see Section 4.10); 

g. Munitions Response Safety Submissions and Site Plans (see Section 4.11); and

h. CRP (see Section 4.12). 

4.4.6. UFP-QAPP Implementation. After field activities begin, any deviation from the 

specified requirements or procedures contained in the UFP-QAPP should be documented in a 

written document, such as a non-conformance report, and distributed as appropriate. 

4.5. Accident Prevention Plan/Site Safety and Health Plan (APP/SSHP). 

4.5.1. An APP is prepared as part of the safety and health policy program. The APP/SSHP

must interface with the executing organization’s existing overall safety and health program. The 

APP must be prepared in the format shown and address all the elements in EM 385-1-1. Where 

a specific element is not applicable, the element should be listed in the plan and a statement 

included that the element is not applicable with a brief justification for its omission. The 

APP/SSHP is an implementing document with emphasis on who will have each of the specific 

responsibilities and how and when each of the applicable requirements will be performed. If 

applicable, the prime contractor shall integrate all subcontractor work activities into the 

APP/SSHP, make the APP/SSHP available to all contractor and subcontractor employees, and 

ensure that all subcontractors integrate provisions of the APP/SSHP in their work activities. 

4.5.2. A key component of the APP is a detailed activity hazard analysis (AHA), which 

should provide a detailed analysis of the hazards for each task involved in the fieldwork, as well 

as the procedures to be employed to eliminate or minimize those hazards. Hazards and 

mitigation methods should be identified for each component of a particular task. For example, 

hazards for an intrusive investigation could include meteorological extremes (e.g., wind, 

precipitation, lightning), biological hazards (e.g., ticks, snakes), physical hazards (e.g., 

slip/trip/fall, lifting heavy munitions debris [MD]), explosives hazards, and radiological hazards 

(e.g., depleted uranium, XRF sources). Each hazard and its corresponding procedures for hazard 

mitigation should be identified for each task. For MR projects, the key components that should 

be analyzed in the AHA include, but are not limited to, the following (as applicable to the 

project):

a. surface clearance;

b. surveying; 

c. vegetation removal; 

d. geophysical survey; 

e. target reacquisition;

f. intrusive operations; 

g. airborne operations; 
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h. water investigation tasks (e.g., geophysical survey, reacquisition, anomaly 

investigation, sediment sampling);

i. MEC demolition operations; 

j. MPPEH handling; 

k. radiation screening;

l. surface soil sampling;

m. subsurface soil sampling; 

n. surface water sampling;

o. sediment sampling;

p. drilling; and

q. groundwater sampling. 

4.5.3. After the APP has been approved, it is critical that all employees involved in the 

project read and understand the hazards associated with the project and the procedures that each 

employee is to perform to mitigate those hazards. 

4.5.4. If new hazards are identified during the MR project, the PDT should update the APP 

to develop mitigation methods for those hazards and ensure the safety of the field team members. 

4.5.5. The following information, in addition to that specified in EM 385-1-1, is required 

for APPs prepared for MEC and RWCM projects. 

4.5.5.1. Background Information. List the phases of work and hazardous activities 

requiring an AHA. 

4.5.5.2. Subcontractors and Suppliers. Provide the means for controlling and coordinating 

subcontractors and suppliers. 

4.5.5.3. Safety and Health. Include a section on safety and health expectations, incentive 

programs, and compliance. The contractor must provide the following: 

a. The company’s written safety program goals and objectives and accident experience 

goals for the contract; 

b. A brief description of the company’s safety incentive programs (if any); 

c. Policies and procedures regarding noncompliance with safety requirements (to include 

disciplinary actions for violation of safety requirements); and 
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d. Written company procedures for holding managers and supervisors accountable for 

safety

4.5.5.4. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Outline procedures (who, when, how) for 

conducting HAs and written certifications for use of PPE. Outline procedures to be followed to 

assure the proper use, selection, and maintenance of personal protective and lifesaving 

equipment (e.g., protective footwear, protective gloves, hard hats, safety glasses, hearing 

protection, body harnesses, lanyards). 

4.5.5.5. Contractor Information. The contractor shall provide information on how they 

will meet the requirements of applicable sections of EM 385-1-1in the APP. As a minimum, 

excavations, scaffolding, medical and first aid requirements, sanitation, PPE, fire prevention, 

machinery and mechanized equipment, electrical safety, public safety requirements, and 

chemical, physical agent, and biological occupational exposure prevention requirements shall be 

addressed, as applicable.

4.5.5.6. Site-Specific Hazards and Controls. Detailed site-specific hazards and controls 

shall be provided in the AHA for each activity of the operation. 

4.5.6. The Contractor shall develop a Site Safety and Health Plan (SSHP) as an attachment 

to the APP. The SSHP shall address all occupational safety and health hazards associated with 

the site MEC removal operations. The SSHP shall address the applicable requirements of 29 

CFR 1910.120(b) (4) (ii), 29 CFR 1926.65(b) (4) (ii), EM 385-1-1, ER 385-1-95, and any other 

applicable federal, state, and local safety and health requirements. The level of detail provided 

shall be tailored to the type of work, complexity of operations to be accomplished, and the 

hazards anticipated. The SSHP shall address those elements that are specific to the site and have 

the potential for negative effects on the safety and health of workers. Where a specific element 

is not applicable, list the element in the plan and state that the element is not applicable with a 

brief justification for its omission. SSHP elements adequately covered elsewhere in the APP 

need not be duplicated. When a specific element is repeated, list the element in the plan and 

state that the element is addressed in the APP.

4.6. Property Management Plan. This plan details procedures for the management of 

government property IAW FAR Part 45.5 and its supplements. 

4.7. Environmental Protection Plan. The EPP details the operational procedures and methods 

to be implemented to conduct environmental protection, which is the prevention/control of 

pollution and habitat disruption that may occur to the environment during project execution. The 

control of environmental pollution and damage requires consideration of land, water, air, and 

biological and cultural resources and includes management of visual aesthetics; noise; solid, 

chemical, gaseous, and liquid waste; and radiant energy and radioactive material as well as other 

pollutants. 

4.7.1. On-site project activities conducted under CERCLA are required to meet the 

substantive requirements of all pertinent federal, state, and territorial environmental laws, 

regulations, and EOs. 
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4.7.2. This site-specific plan documents the intent and process to minimize and mitigate 

environmental pollution and damage that may occur as the result of project operations. The 

environmental resources within the project boundaries and those affected outside the limits of 

permanent work must be protected during the entire duration of the project. All parties involved 

in the project (government personnel and contractors) must comply with all applicable 

environmental laws and regulations. 

4.7.3. The purpose of the EPP is to present a comprehensive overview of known or likely 

issues that must be addressed during the current phase of project execution. Issues of concern 

must be defined within the EPP, as outlined in this section. Each topic should be addressed at a 

level of detail commensurate with the environmental issue and required project task(s). Topics 

or issues that are not identified in this section, but are considered necessary, must be identified 

and discussed after those items formally identified in this section.

4.7.4. The following are general requirements for the EPP.

4.7.4.1 Identify the name(s) of the person(s) within the contractor's organization who is 

(are) responsible for ensuring adherence to the EPP. 

4.7.4.2. Identify the name(s) and qualifications of the person(s) responsible for training the 

contractor's environmental protection personnel. 

4.7.4.3. Provide a description of the contractor's environmental protection personnel 

training program. 

4.7.4.4. Provide figure(s) showing locations of proposed temporary excavations or 

embankments for haul roads, stream crossings, material storage areas, structures, sanitary 

facilities, and stockpiles of excess or spoil materials, including methods to control runoff and to 

contain materials on the site. The figure(s) also should indicate access routes. If these are 

addressed in the UFP-QAPP, a reference to the appropriate figure will suffice.

4.7.4.5. Provide figure(s) showing the proposed activity in each portion of the area and 

identifying the areas of limited use or nonuse. The figure should include measures for marking 

the limits of use areas, including methods for protection of features to be preserved within 

authorized work areas. If these are addressed in the UFP-QAPP, a reference to the appropriate 

figure will suffice.

4.7.4.6. Identify and provide locations of trees and shrubs to be removed from within the 

project site.

4.7.4.7. Identify and provide locations of existing waste disposal sites within the project 

site and identify appropriate off-site facilities for recycling, transport of hazardous waste, and 

disposal of contaminated wastewater. 

4.7.4.8. Include a Spill Control Plan (provide relevant reference to APP.). 

4.7.4.9. Include a WMP (see Section 4.9.). 
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4.7.4.10. Include an Air Monitoring Plan (if applicable, provide relevant reference to 

APP.).

4.7.4.11. Include an Ecological Resources Plan. Ecological resources planning shall 

follow the process identified in Figure 4-1. This process begins with gathering readily available 

site data, which should include any information on threatened and endangered species that are 

federally or state listed as well as information on critical habitat or other sensitive environments 

(wetlands, coastal zones, etc.). This information can be gathered from existing documents (e.g., 

SI Report, an installation Integrated Natural Resource Management Plan), databases (e.g., the 

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and state protected occurrence databases), GIS, phone inquiries, 

etc. It must be sufficient to complete the Army Checklist for Important Ecological Places (see 

Figure 4-2).

4.7.4.11.1. If ecological concerns are not present at the site, a letter to the applicable 

regulatory agencies shall be completed and submitted with site information and the completed 

checklist (see Section 13.3 for ecological reporting guidance). The conclusion of the letter shall 

be that additional coordination is not intended with those agencies; however, if the agencies 

identify ecological concerns that the PDT did not, a meeting to address those concerns should be 

held. 

4.7.4.11.2. If ecological concerns are present at the site, a letter to the applicable 

regulatory program shall be completed and submitted with site information and the completed 

checklist. The outcome shall be a meeting with the appropriate agencies to clarify ecological 

concerns relevant to the project, particularly sensitive receptors, breeding seasons, areas 

impacted, etc. 

4.7.4.11.3. If there are ecological concerns present and the information obtained is 

insufficient for the PDT to determine that ecological resources can be protected appropriately to 

prevent a substantive impact, an ecological field survey should be conducted. The ecological 

field survey shall be confined to the footprint of the area to be disturbed during the work effort 

and other areas affected by activities conducted within the disturbed area and consist of 

documenting protected habitats or species that inhabit or utilize the project area. This should 

include documenting habitat types, limits, and quality. A plan describing the procedures and 

work areas should be prepared and submitted prior to survey execution. All surveys should be 

conducted using anomaly avoidance procedures or IAW an ESS. 

4.7.4.11.4. After initial coordination with the appropriate regulatory agencies has taken 

place and the survey is conducted (if necessary), an ecological resources plan shall be prepared 

to address biological resources and wetlands. This plan shall define procedures for identifying 

and protecting biological resources and wetlands known to be on the project site and/or identify 

procedures to be followed if biological resources and wetlands not previously known to be on 

site or in the area are discovered during project execution. Each species may have different 

requirements for avoidance, such as a buffer distance, time of year restriction, or active survey 

while work is being performed. The plan must include methods and SOPs to assure the 

protection and conservation of known or discovered listed threatened and endangered species 

and biological resources. It shall be developed to ensure that any action taken is not likely to 

jeopardize the continued existence of any threatened or endangered species or result in the 
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destruction or adverse modification of designated critical habitat. It shall clearly prohibit any 

action that results in a “take” of a threatened or endangered species without a determination that 

any “take” is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any threatened or endangered 

species.

4.7.4.11.5. The plan must identify lines of communication among contractor personnel, 

USACE personnel, and appropriate agency personnel. Unless specifically authorized and in 

compliance with procedures in this plan, project personnel may not enter, disturb, destroy, or 

allow discharge of contaminants into any wetlands. Project personnel must minimize 

interference with, disturbance to, and damage to fish, wildlife, and plants, including their habitat. 

The protection of threatened and endangered animal and plant species, including their habitat, is 

the PDT's responsibility IAW federal, state, regional, and local laws and regulations. 

4.7.4.11.6. A qualified biologist or ecologist is required to manage all ecological resource 

planning efforts and to participate in any field mitigation efforts. At a minimum, a qualified 

biologist or ecologist is a person with a degree in biology, marine biology, forestry, wildlife 

biology, ecology, or zoology or closely related field and who has a minimum of 4 years of 

experience that clearly demonstrates ability and understanding of the fundamental principles and 

techniques of biological analysis of one or more biological, ecological, marine science, physical 

science, or natural resources discipline. Depending on site-specific resources, additional 

qualifications may be required (e.g., focus on marine biology for water MRSs, focus on botany 

for endangered plant species). 

4.7.4.11.7. During biological avoidance, all results and findings shall be documented. 

Documentation should include specific information about biological resources associated with 

the MRS, such as species identified, populations, and avoidance efforts (e.g., transects 

relocated). Documentation also shall include field notes of the site biologist. After consultation 

with project counsel, all documentation shall be incorporated into the phase-specific report for 

the project, which is discussed further in Chapter 13. 

4.7.4.11.8. The results of the ecological resources survey and biological avoidance 

activities during project execution shall be reported IAW the procedures described in Section 

13.3. 

4.7.4.12. Include a Cultural Resources Plan. Cultural resources planning shall follow the 

process identified in Figure 4-3. 

4.7.4.12.1. The cultural resource planning process begins with gathering readily available 

site data. The objective of the initial review is to determine the likelihood of cultural resources 

being present and begins with identifying and reviewing documents on previously identified 

cultural resources on and near the site. This information can be gathered from existing 

documents (e.g., SI Report, an installation Integrated Cultural Resource Management Plan), 

databases, GIS, phone inquiries, etc. It must be sufficient to complete the Checklist for 

Important Cultural Places (Figure 4-4). 

4.7.4.12.2. Any documentation obtained by contractor or USACE personnel that includes 

actual locations of cultural resource must be marked and maintained as “For Official Use Only” 
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and kept separately from other publicly releasable information. This marking is based on 16 

United States Code (U.S.C.) 470w-3(a), Confidentiality of the location of sensitive historic 

resources. Unless specific written direction is given in contract documents or by Contracting 

Officer (KO) letter, these locations will only be provided to the relevant contractor personnel, 

State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPOs)/Tribal Historic Preservation Officers (THPOs), and 

USACE. 

4.7.4.12.3. If cultural concerns are not present at the site, a letter to applicable regulatory 

agencies shall be completed and submitted with site information and the completed checklist. 

The conclusion of the letter shall be that additional coordination is not intended with those 

agencies; however, if the agencies identify cultural concerns that the PDT did not, a meeting to 

address those concerns should be held. 

4.7.4.12.4. If cultural concerns are present at the site, a letter to the applicable regulatory 

agency shall be completed and submitted with site information and the completed checklist. The 

outcome shall be a meeting with the appropriate agencies to clarify cultural concerns relevant to 

the project, particularly areas impacted. 

4.7.4.12.5. If cultural resources are present at the site and the information obtained is 

insufficient for USACE to determine that cultural resources can be protected appropriately to 

prevent a substantive impact (such as excavation, injury, or destruction of any historic or 

prehistoric ruin or monument or object of antiquity situated on lands owned or controlled by the 

government of the United States), a cultural resources field survey should be conducted. The 

field survey shall be confined to the footprint of the area to be disturbed during the work effort. 

A plan describing the procedures and work areas should be prepared by an archeologist and 

submitted to the SHPO. The field survey should be planned to determine if potentially 

significant cultural resources are present on the property and may include subsurface testing, 

recording revealed stratigraphy, and processing and analyses of recovered artifacts.
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Figure 4-1: Ecological Resources Planning Process 

(1) Requires coordination with appropriate agencies 

(2) Evaluation can be conducted by the agency, USACE, or under contract. 

(3) Required to be submitted into project file and database of record (e.g., FRMD) 
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Figure 4-2: Army Checklist for Important Ecological Places 

1 Locally important ecological place identified by the Integrated Natural Resource 

Management Plan, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Cleanup Plan or 

Redevelopment Plan, or other official land management plans

2 Critical habitat for federally designated endangered or threatened species

3 Marine Sanctuary

4 National Park

5 Designated Federal Wilderness Area

6 Sensitive areas identified in Coastal Zone Management Plans created pursuant to the 

CZMA

7 Sensitive areas identified under the National Estuary Program or Near Coastal Waters 

Program

8 Critical areas identified under the Clean Lakes Program

9 National Monument

10 National Seashore Recreational Area

11 National Lakeshore Recreational Area

12 Habitat known to be used by federally designated or proposed endangered or threatened 

species

13 National Preserve

14 National or State Wildlife Refuge

15 Unit of Coastal Barrier Resources System

16 Coastal Barrier (undeveloped)

17 Federal land designated for protection of natural ecosystems

18 Administratively Proposed Federal Wilderness Area

19 Spawning areas critical for the maintenance of fish/shellfish species within river, lake, or 

coastal tidal waters

20 Migratory pathways and feeding areas critical for maintenance of anadromous fish species 

within river reaches or areas in lakes or coastal tidal waters in which fish spend 

extended periods of time

21 Terrestrial areas utilized for breeding by large or dense aggregations of animals

22 National river reach designated as Recreational

23 Habitat known to be used by state designated endangered or threatened species

24 Habitat known to be used by species under review as to its federally endangered or 

threatened status

25 Coastal Barrier (partially developed)

26 Federally designated Scenic or Wild River

27 State land designated for wildlife or game management

28 State-designated Scenic or Wild River

29 State-designated Natural Areas

30 Particular areas, relatively small in size, important to maintenance of unique biotic 

communities

31 State-designated areas for protection or maintenance of aquatic life

32 Wetlands

33 Fragile landscapes, land sensitive to degradation if vegetative habitat or cover diminishes
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4.7.4.12.6. The Cultural Resources Plan should include a Cultural Resources Monitoring 

Plan.

4.7.4.12.6.1. After the initial coordination with the appropriate agencies and the cultural 

resources field survey (if necessary), a cultural resources monitoring plan shall be prepared to 

address historical, archaeological, and other cultural resources. This plan shall define procedures 

for identifying and protecting historical, archaeological, and other cultural resources known to be 

on the project site and/or identify procedures to be followed if historical, archaeological, or 

cultural resources not previously known to be on site or in the area are discovered during project 

execution. The plan must include methods to assure the protection of known or discovered 

resources and identify lines of communication among contractor personnel, USACE personnel, 

and appropriate agency personnel. 

4.7.4.12.6.2. The plan shall include discussion on the project location, background history 

and environment, site type found in similar environmental ecosystems, and the proposal for 

performing the monitoring with minimal impact to the ongoing work. 

4.7.4.12.6.3. The plan shall address steps to be taken during excavation or other project 

execution activities, if any previously unidentified or unanticipated historical, archaeological, or 

cultural resources are discovered or found. It should be clear that all activities that may damage 

or alter such resources would be temporarily suspended. Resources covered by this paragraph 

include, but are not limited to, any human skeletal remains or burials; artifacts; shell, midden, 

bone, charcoal, or other deposits; rock or coral alignments, paving, wall, or other constructed 

features; and any indication of agricultural or other human activities. 

4.7.4.12.6.4. The plan shall clearly provide a reporting process upon such discovery or find 

to immediately notify the KO and the PM so that the appropriate authorities can be notified and a 

determination made as to the significance of the find and what, if any, special disposition of the 

finds should be made. All activities that might result in impact to or the destruction of these 

resources should cease and the area should be secured to prevent employees or other persons 

from trespassing on, removing, or otherwise disturbing such resources. The plan should clearly 

address provisions to continue work in un-impacted areas. 

4.7.4.12.7. A qualified archeologist is required to manage all cultural resource planning 

efforts and to participate in any field mitigation efforts. At a minimum, a qualified archeologist 

is a person with a graduate degree in archeology, anthropology, or closely related field and who 

has at least one year of full-time professional experience or equivalent specialized training in 

archeological research, administration, or management and at least four months of supervised 

field and analytic experience in general North American archeology. Depending on site-specific 

resources, additional qualifications may be required. 
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(1) Requires coordination with appropriate agencies 

(2) Evaluation can be conducted by the agency, USACE, or under contract. 

(3) Required to be submitted into project file and database of record (e.g., FRMD) 
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Note: This checklist should be used as a basis for the determination but may not be all-inclusive. For example, it 

does not address any state-specific designations that may be applicable or traditional cultural properties that may 

be eligible for inclusion on the NRHP. A qualified archeologist should perform completion of the determination.

Figure 4-4: Checklist for Important Cultural Resources 

4.7.4.12.8. During cultural resource avoidance, all results and findings shall be 

documented. Documentation should include specific information about cultural resources 

associated with the MRS, such as resources identified and avoidance efforts (e.g., transects 

relocated). Documentation also shall include the site archaeologist’s field notes. All 

documentation shall be incorporated into the phase-specific report for the project, which is 

discussed further in Chapter 13. 

4.7.4.12.9. The results of the cultural resources survey and cultural resources avoidance 

activities during project execution shall be reported IAW the procedures described in Section 

13.2. 

1) Historic property (any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object 

as defined by 36 CFR 800 - Protection of Historic Properties included in, or eligible for 

inclusion in, the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP), whether or not such 

eligibility has been determined formally), including artifacts, records, and material 

remains related to such a property or resource 

2) Cultural items as defined in the NAGPRA (25 USC 3001) 

3) American Indian, Native Alaskan, or Native Hawaiian sacred sites as required in 

American Indian Religious Freedom Act and defined in EO 13007, “Indian Sacred 

Sites”

4) Archaeological resources as defined in section 470 aa-mm of the Archeological 

Resources Protection Act of 1979 (16 U.S.C. 470cc(i)) 

5) Archaeological artifact collections and associated records as defined in 36 CFR 79 – 

Curation of Federally Owned and Administered Archaeological Collections 

6) National monuments as defined in the Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 USC 431-433) 

7) Significant scientific, prehistorical, or archaeological data, as defined by the 

Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act

8) Shipwrecks or aircraft on the bottoms of lakes, rivers, bays, and the ocean under U.S. 

territorial waters, as defined by the Abandoned Shipwrecks Act and regulated under the 

Sunken Military Craft Act

9) National Historic Landmarks, as defined in Historic Sites Act of 1935 (16 U.S.C. 461; 

36 CFR 65) 

10) Historic trails, trail sites, and trail segments, as defined in the National Trails System 

Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1241) 

11) Historic battlefields, as defined in the American Battlefield Protection Program Act of 

1996, as amended by the Civil War Battlefield Preservation Act of 2002 (16 U.S.C. 

469k-l)
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4.7.4.13. Include an Erosion and Sediment Control Plan. This plan identifies the type and 

location of the erosion and sediment controls to be provided. The plan must include monitoring 

and reporting requirements to assure that the control measures are in compliance with the erosion 

and sediment control plan and federal, state, and local laws and regulations. The focus of the 

plan should be to maintain erosion and sediment controls such that water quality standards are 

not violated as a result of project activities. The area of bare soil exposed at any one time by 

construction operations should be kept to a minimum. Temporary and permanent erosion and 

sediment control best management practices should be identified and may include, but not be 

limited to, vegetation cover, stream bank stabilization, slope stabilization, silt fences, 

construction of terraces, interceptor channels, sediment traps, inlet and outfall protection, 

diversion channels, and sedimentation basins. Procedures for the following, unless covered 

elsewhere, should be included in the erosion and sediment control plan: 

a. Controlling dust and emissions; 

b. Minimizing sound intrusions (provide relevant reference to the AAP); 

c. Minimizing areas of disturbance; 

d. Protecting and restoring trees and shrubs; and

e. Post-activity cleanup.

4.7.4.14. The contractor's personnel must be trained in relevant aspects of environmental 

protection and pollution control. The contractor must conduct environmental protection / 

pollution control meetings for all personnel prior to commencing project activities. Additional 

meetings must be conducted for new personnel and when site conditions change. Include in the 

training and meeting agenda relevant aspects of the EPP that are not already addressed in the 

daily safety and occupational health briefings (e.g., installation and care of devices, vegetative 

covers, and instruments required for monitoring purposes to ensure adequate and continuous 

environmental protection / pollution control; protection of archaeological sites, artifacts, 

wetlands, and endangered species and their habitat that are known to be in the area). This 

general site briefing is required in addition to any specialized training relevant to implementation

of the Ecological Resources Plan and the Cultural Resources Plan. 

4.8. Interim Holding Facility Siting Plan / Physical Security Plan. An IHF Plan and a PSP 

must be prepared for projects that involve CWM response actions. The two plans should be 

included as appendices to the UFP-QAPP. The IHF is constructed on site for the receipt and 

temporary storage of CWM, pending on site disposal or removal from the site. The IHF Plan 

provides information about the temporary storage of CWM in a safe, secure, and 

environmentally sound manner. EP 75-1-3 provides instructions for addressing the layout, 

explosive safety requirements, and security measures for the IHF at CWM projects as part of the 

IHF Plan. EP 75-1-3 also provides instructions for preparing the PSP, which describes the 

security criteria to be employed during CWM operations. 
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4.9. Waste Management Plan. 

4.9.1. MR project field activities can involve the generation, management, and disposal of 

various waste streams, which may include investigation-derived waste (IDW), such as soil 

cuttings, PPE, sampling equipment, purge water, decontamination water, solvents, MD, material 

contaminated with chemical agent, and the solutions used for decontaminating equipment 

contaminated with chemical agent. See EP 75-1-3 for specific guidance on managing chemicalagent-containing IDW. For sites where radiological contamination may exist (e.g., sites where 

depleted uranium has been used), refer to ALARACT 188/2011 for additional information for 

screening scrap for radioactive materials.

4.9.2. The purpose of the WMP is to present the waste management practices and 

procedures that will be followed for the types and quantities of waste expected to be generated 

during the field activities during MR projects. The WMP should identify the waste management 

activities conducted during the storage, preparation, and/or disposal of waste, including waste 

characterization, packaging, storage, and management while in storage. The WMP also should 

identify the organizations, and preferably the individuals, who will be responsible for signing 

hazardous material shipping papers and hazardous waste manifests. It is the responsibility of the 

PM to verify that all project personnel are aware of the requirements stipulated in the WMP. 

4.9.3. The WMP provides information on how wastes, including potentially hazardous 

wastes associated with MR project activities, will be managed and disposed of. In addition, a 

secondary goal of the WMP is to ensure that waste minimization practices are followed, to the 

extent practical, to reduce the volume of waste that will be generated, stored, and removed from 

the site for disposal. 

4.9.4. The WMP should address all applicable requirements, including USEPA’s 

hazardous waste regulations at 40 CFR Parts 260-268 and the National Contingency Plan at 40 

CFR Part 300. See USEPA/540/G-91/009 (Management of Investigation-Derived Waste During 

Site Inspections) for additional information. 

4.9.5. The WMP shall provide the name(s) and qualifications of the person(s) responsible 

for manifesting hazardous waste to be removed from the site, if applicable. 

4.9.6. The WMP shall identify any subcontractors responsible for the transportation or 

disposal of hazardous or solid waste. The licenses and permits of all solid waste disposal sites 

must be provided as part of the WMP. If the hazardous waste disposal facility must be identified 

after the waste is characterized, an addendum to the WMP shall be prepared and submitted with 

the relevant information.

4.9.7. For CERCLA responses involving off-site disposal of solid waste, the WMP shall 

identify disposal facilities meeting acceptability criteria IAW 40 CFR Part 300.440 (CERCLA 

Off-site Rule).

4.9.8. Evidence of the disposal facility's acceptance of any hazardous or solid waste must 

be attached to the phase-specific report. The report must document the total amount of each type 
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of waste generated (nonhazardous vs. hazardous) and indicate the total amount of waste diverted 

(in cubic meters), the percent that was diverted, and the means of diversion. 

4.9.9. A recycling and solid waste minimization section should be included for projects 

anticipated to yield hazardous waste that will be taken for off-site treatment, storage, and 

disposal. This section should include a list of measures to reduce consumption of energy and 

natural resources. The section also should detail the contractor's actions to comply with and 

participate in federal, state, regional, and local government-sponsored recycling programs to 

reduce the volume of solid waste at the source.

4.9.10 The WMP should address wastewater disposal. 

4.9.10.1. Non-Hazardous Wastewater. If wastewater will be disposed of on site, the 

following additional requirements apply: 

4.9.10.1.1. If land application is the method of disposal for the wastewater, the plan must 

include a sketch showing the location for land application along with a description of the 

pretreatment methods to be implemented. 

4.9.10.1.2. If surface water discharge is the method of disposal, include a copy of any 

permit, if required, and associated documents as an attachment prior to discharging the 

wastewater. It should be remembered that under CERCLA, the USACE has permit waiver 

provisions for on-site actions as well as ARAR0F

1

 identification and protection. 

4.9.10.1.3. If disposal is to a sanitary sewer, the plan must include documentation that the 

wastewater treatment plant operator has approved the flow rate, volume, and type of discharge. 

4.9.10.2. Hazardous Wastewater. For wastewater meeting the definition of hazardous 

waste under RCRA, RCRA requirements for disposal apply and typically require disposal at a 

RCRA-permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility. 

4.10. Explosives Management Plan. 

4.10.1. This plan describes how demolition explosives will be managed, planned, and 

implemented during MR operations using appropriately qualified personnel, equipment, and 

procedures. It also describes how recovered MEC will be managed. The Explosives 

Management Plan is required for all project sites where explosives will be used to perform 

demolition operations. If the project site is at an active military installation or other site and the 

installation’s EOD unit will perform all demolition, then the PDT may choose to state this within 

the Explosives Management Plan and attach a memorandum of agreement with the local EOD 

unit. The performing EOD unit will need to follow the requirements of the Explosives 

Management Plan.

4.10.2. The contractor should prepare a detailed plan for the management of explosives 

IAW FAR 45.5; local and state laws and regulations; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 

 

1 Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement 
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Explosives (ATF) Publication 5400.7; DA PAM 385-64; and Department of Transportation 

(DOT) regulations. 

4.10.3. At each project site, the responsible party shall have and, upon request, make 

available to any local, state, or federal authority a copy of any license/permit obtained 

authorizing the contractor to purchase, store, transport, and use explosives. 

4.10.4. The Explosives Management Plan will include the following:

4.10.4.1. Acquisition. 

a. A description and estimated quantity of explosives to be used 

b. The acquisition source and a statement addressing whether explosives will be 

government furnished or purchased from a commercial vendor 

c. If explosives are to be contractor acquired, identification of each explosive item in the 

equipment plan 

4.10.4.2. Storage.

a. Establishment of explosives storage facilities

b. Physical security of explosives storage facilities

4.10.4.3. Transportation. 

a. Procedures for transportation from storage facility to disposal locations at the project 

site

b. Requirements for vehicles transporting explosives at the project site 

4.10.4.4. Receipt Procedures.

a. Receipt procedures accounting for each item of explosives from initial delivery to the 

site (e.g., from an installation ammunition supply activity, commercial vendor, or a previous 

contractor at a site) until the item is expended or the KO relieves the contactor from 

accountability

b. Identification of individuals authorized to receive, issue, transport, and use explosives 

by contract position title and procedures for assumption of accountability by those individuals 

c. Procedures for reconciling receipt documents, proposed receipt intervals, and 

discrepancies in quantities shipped and quantities received 

4.10.4.5. Inventory. 

a. Procedures for physical inventory of explosives in storage facilities 
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b. Procedures for reconciling discrepancies resulting from inventories

4.10.4.6. Inspection of Magazines. 

a. The PDT must follow the criteria reiterated here from the ATF 5400 manual for ATF 

Type II magazines located on USACE project sites. Any person storing explosive materials shall 

inspect their magazines every 7 days or more frequently if required by installation-specific 

requirements. This inspection need not be an inventory but must be sufficient to determine 

whether there has been unauthorized entry or attempted entry into the magazines or unauthorized 

removal of the contents of the magazines. 

b. For those magazines that are used on installations, follow the local regulations and 

directives.

4.10.4.7. Procedures upon Discovery of Lost, Stolen, or Unauthorized Use of Explosives. 

Proper authorities shall be notified in writing within 24 hours of the event. Immediately notify 

the KO by telephone and follow up with a written report within 24 hours. 

4.10.4.8. Procedures for Return to Storage of any Daily Issued Explosives not Expended. 

4.10.4.9. Procedures for Disposing of any Remaining Explosives at the End of the 

Contractor’s Site Activities.

4.10.4.10. Economic Analysis of Different Alternatives for Explosives Management (e.g., 

just-in-time delivery versus storing explosives in a magazine on site). 

4.11. Munitions Response Safety Submissions and Site Plans. 

4.11.1. Munitions Response Safety Submissions and Site Plans are required for 

environmental restoration activities that involve intentional physical contact with MEC, or 

chemical agent (CA), regardless of CA configuration; or the conduct of ground-disturbing or 

other intrusive activities in areas known or suspected to contain MEC or CA. The nature and 

intent of site activities determines what type of document is required. See EM 385-1-97 for 

details.

4.11.2. Safety submissions and site plans ensure that all applicable DoD and DA 

explosives safety standards are applied to a military munitions response action. These 

submissions must be approved prior to MEC operations or the placement of explosives on site. 

The safety submission must have a Direct Reporting Unit (DRU) approval, an Army approval, as 

well as a DDESB approval.

4.11.3. A Munitions Response Explosives Site Plan (MRESP) or, when appropriate, a 

Munitions Response Chemical Site Plan (MRCSP) is required for MRS investigations or 

characterizations (i.e., SI, EE/CA or RI/FS) that involve the intentional physical contact with 

MEC or CA, regardless of configuration. Such site plans will address areas (e.g., magazines) 

used for the storage of commercial or military demolition explosives, MEC or CA, regardless of 

configuration; planned or established demolition or disposal areas; and the MRA, MRS, or 
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response area boundaries. MRS investigation and characterization are used to collect the 

information needed to design the required munitions response and to prepare, as appropriate, an 

Munitions Response Explosives Safety Submission (MRESS) or Munitions Response Chemical 

Safety Submission (MRCSS) for the selected response. 

4.12. Community Relations Plan. 

4.12.1. CRPs, formerly referred to as Public Involvement Plans, Community Involvement 

Plans, or Public Participation Plans, are required to establish and maintain programs and 

procedures for educating the public of the hazards associated with MEC and MC, as well as to 

inform the public of the fieldwork in the MR project that may have impacts to nearby residents 

and workers. 

4.12.2. A good CRP facilitates two-way communication by encouraging active 

involvement by the stakeholders, which better ensures eventual project success and stakeholder 

acceptance. CRPs are required upon initiation of the RI phase. They can be prepared in earlier 

phases, if needed to assist with planning and execution of public involvement activities. 

Guidance for developing and implementing the CRP is available in EP 200-3-1, ER 200-3-1, and 

The FUDS Public Involvement Toolkit.. 

4.13. Risk/Hazard Assessment Planning. 

4.13.1. The CERCLA process requires that a BRA be performed as part of the RI phase 

of a project; however, the level of effort should be commensurate with site complexity. Risks 

from MC contamination in environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater, sediment, surface 

water) should be based on environmental sampling data collected IAW the UFP-QAPP. 

Guidance for how to conduct risk assessments is contained in Section 12.4. 

4.13.2. The assessment of the hazards associated with MEC also is intended to be used as 

part of the CERCLA process to help project teams evaluate current or baseline explosive safety 

hazards to people, as well as the relative reduction hazards associated with CERCLA removal or 

remedial action alternatives. Guidance for how to conduct a MEC HA is contained in Section 

12.3. The data collection requirements to conduct a MEC HA should be described in the 

appropriate worksheets of the UFP-QAPP. A MEC HA is performed using a computer-based 

MEC HA spreadsheet.

4.13.3. The BRA is completed as part of the RI phase of a project for sites where the 

PA/SI indicates a potential risk to site receptors may be present. The level of planning for the 

risk assessment can vary significantly in level of complexity, depending upon various factors, 

such as the likelihood of chemical release to the environment, site complexity, regulatory 

context, and potential for public/stakeholder involvement. The CSM and the TPP process 

provide information necessary for the risk assessor to determine the level of effort required to 

achieve the project risk management objectives. EM 200-1-12 and Sections 2.2 and 12.2 of this 

EM provide guidance on CSM development. The initial conclusions of the CSM and the 

planning for the BRA should be documented in Worksheet 10 (Problem Definition) of the UFPQAPP. Worksheet 10 provides sections for text to state the problem, define environmental 
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questions to be answered, and present rationale for project decisions. The anticipated complexity 

of the BRA required to address the problem and the environmental questions should be stated 

clearly in Worksheet 10. Data collected during project implementation may change the 

anticipated complexity of the BRA. The decision process used to elevate the complexity of the 

BRA also should be documented in Worksheet 10. 

4.13.4. HHRA. The level of complexity for the HHRA is based on the CSM, which will 

be documented in Worksheet 10 of the UFP-QAPP.

4.13.4.1. Simple MRSs (e.g., ranges with minimal use) have the types and sources for 

risk-based screening criteria documented in the UFP-QAPP. Comparison to background 

concentrations and screening values, typically for selection of chemicals of potential concern 

(COPCs) / chemicals of potential ecological concern in the BRA, may be all that is necessary to 

address the potential for risks at such sites. If not, the risk assessment calculations are simple 

and straightforward. Worksheet 10 is used to document the level of complexity for the HHRA 

based on the initial CSM and TPP process. The DQOs required to make risk-based decisions for 

the site should be documented in Worksheet 11 (Project Quality Objectives / Systematic 

Planning Process Statements) and Worksheet 12 (Measurement Performance Criteria Table). 

The appropriate risk-based screening criteria and documentation of the source(s) of the screening 

criteria should be presented in footnotes to Worksheet 15 (Reference Limits and Evaluation 

Table). See Table 12-1 in this EM for some sources of risk-based criteria. Worksheet 15 of the 

UFP-QAPP must be used to provide the screening level and background concentrations based on 

natural and anthropogenic sources. Finally, Worksheet 15 of the UFP-QAPP is used to 

document quantitation limits and detection limits with respect to screening levels. 

4.13.4.2. More complex sites with MEC, multiple exposure media (soil, water, and 

groundwater), and fate and transport issues may require a detailed approach to define how the 

HHRA is structured and what investigation details are needed to determine the data collection 

needs to specifically support the risk assessment. The HHRA is conducted in four major tasks: 

1) Problem Formulation, 2) Exposure Assessment, 3) Toxicity Assessment, and 4) Risk 

Characterization, as described in Section 12.4.1. The PDT also needs to document sources of 

exposure assumptions and toxicity values used to develop the quantitative risk assessment. UFPQAPP Worksheet 14 (Summary of Project Tasks) is used to document the proposed approaches 

for HHRA tasks. MC generally are well represented in existing toxicity databases, including 

Integrated Risk Information System, Provisional Peer-Reviewed Toxicity Values (PPRTV), and 

Regional Screening Levels. The United States Army Institute of Public Health (USAIPH) can be 

consulted for toxicity information, if required. Documentation of the application and 

justification for any site-specific exposure assumptions or factors will be presented in the toxicity 

assessment task in Worksheet 14. 

4.13.5. ERA. Similar to the HHRA, the level of complexity for the ERA is based on the 

CSM, which is documented in Worksheet 10 of the UFP-QAPP.

4.13.5.1. Each potentially impacted exposure media (soil, air, and/or water) and 

potentially exposed receptor population is documented in Worksheet 10 as part of the initial 

CSM. Where deemed appropriate by the PDT, the UFP-QAPP (Worksheet 11) must identify 
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field activities required to characterize the environmental setting and determine appropriate 

assessment and measurement endpoints, such as threatened and endangered or biological 

surveys, habitat evaluations, wetland delineation, or water body classifications. See Section 

12.4.2 for more information. 

4.13.5.2. For simple MRSs, a Screening-Level Ecological Risk Assessment (SLERA) 

may determine that ecological risks are minimal, and no further evaluation is necessary. 

Worksheet 14 of the UFP-QAPP is used to document what information is necessary to 

characterize habitat, determine receptor species, establish site-specific exposure factors, and 

summarize the information and sources concerning the screening-level food chain analysis as 

part of the task description for the exposure assessment, if applicable. 

4.13.5.3. The UFP-QAPP for a project that includes a Baseline Ecological Risk 

Assessment (BERA) must define the types of site-specific field and laboratory investigations 

required to assess potential risk to ecological receptors. The site-specific field and laboratory 

investigations should be documented in Worksheet 11 of the UFP-QAPP. BERAs can vary 

significantly depending upon the size and complexity of the documented release. The UFPQAPP includes descriptions of the food web model, assumptions, and methodologies to quantify 

hazards as part of the task descriptions for the exposure assessment, toxicity assessment, and risk 

characterization in Worksheet 14. Information in the UFP-QAPP for a simple BERA may be 

limited to descriptions of field biota and habitat surveys, standard chemical data collection 

methods, DQOs, and statistical evaluations to calculate chemical- and media-specific exposure 

point concentrations (EPCs) as part of the problem formulation task in Worksheet 14. Sources of 

toxicity reference values also are defined for the BERA as part of the task description for the 

toxicity assessment task. As with the HHRA, MEC may have constituents that are not well 

represented in standard ecological toxicity databases. In these cases, the USAIPH can be 

contacted for toxicity information at: 

http://phc.amedd.army.mil/organization/institute/Pages/default.aspx. For more complex sites, 

the UFP-QAPP also should provide for collection of plant and animal tissue samples for sitespecific food web evaluations, toxicity testing in soil and sediment invertebrates and other 

aquatic species, and site-specific chemical uptake studies. In all cases, Worksheet 11 of the 

UFP-QAPP should be used to provide the justification for the recommended investigations, 

regulatory requirements, sample collection and handling requirements, and laboratory testing and 

analytical requirements, including DQOs. 
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CHAPTER 5

Geospatial Data and Systems 1

5.1. Introduction. 

5.1.1. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the geospatial data and system 

(GDS) considerations, including location surveying and mapping. The PDT should develop a 

project-specific GDS, location surveying, and mapping requirements for inclusion in the SOW 

for each MR project. Application of procedures required for surveying and mapping may vary 

depending on the type of contracting methodology being used to execute the work; however, 

they should be used to the extent practicable. 

5.1.2. USACE has various contract vehicles that may be used for obtaining location 

surveying and mapping services. Services may be supplied by the government as governmentfurnished information / government-furnished equipment or may be requested within the SOW 

of the MR. Some MR projects may not require any specialized capabilities, while others may 

require comprehensive capabilities. 

5.2. Requirements for the Acquisition and Access of Geospatial Data. 

5.2.1. This chapter presents guidance in developing GDS requirements associated with an 

MR, specific SOW requirements, and technical or management considerations. ER 1110-1-

8156, Engineering and Design - Policies, Guidance, and Requirements for Geospatial Data 

Systems establishes general criteria and presents guidance for the acquisition, processing, 

storage, distribution, and utilization of geospatial data. 

5.2.2. EM 1110-1-2909, Geospatial Data and Systems identifies standards for GDS

acquired, produced, and/or utilized in support of an MR. Many techniques may be used to 

acquire the geospatial data required in support of an MR. Requirements for obtaining these data 

should be results oriented and not overly prescriptive or process oriented IAW EM 1110-1-2909. 

Project requirements should set forth the end results to be achieved and not the means, or 

technical procedures, used to achieve those results. They should succinctly define GDS 

requirements as derived from the functional project requirements developed by the PDT and 

reference EM 1110-1-2909 and other applicable industry standards. 

5.3. Data Quality Objectives. 

5.3.1. Archive Review. The PDT will review the archival records of the project area or 

installation in which the project is located and inventory all existing GDS information prior to 

developing site-specific DQOs. EM 1110-1-2909 shall be used as guidance when no other 

standards or legacy system exists.

5.3.2. GDS. The PDT will review the extent of GDS currently utilized by the MMDC, 

district, customer, and stakeholders. Any automated system that employs or references data 

using absolute, relative, or assumed coordinates is considered a GDS. These include GIS, land 

information systems, remote sensing or image processing systems, computer aided design and 
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drafting (CADD) systems, and automated mapping / facilities management systems. The 

selected GDS should accomplish today’s mission but also allow for future reuse or use of the 

geospatial data by others without translation. Production of geospatial data in multiple formats 

for distribution or use should be avoided whenever possible. This means that the data formats 

selected should be open rather than proprietary. For example, Tagged Image File Format (TIFF 

or “.tif”) files should be used to store imagery rather than Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) 

(or “.jpg”) files or bitmap (BMP, or “.bmp”) files, as TIFF is considered an open standard. 

Compatible formats for spatial data also should be selected whenever possible (e.g., ArcGIS 

shapefiles, which usually can be shared among several software applications). Note that many of 

these file types contain auxiliary files that must also be provided when transferring files. For 

example, ArcView shapefiles (i.e., .shp files) require that the auxiliary files (.dbf, .prj, .sbn, .sbx, 

.shx, .xml files) be located within the same folder in order for the files to be displayed properly 

in ArcView. Project requirements may dictate the use of a particular proprietary software 

package and/or database format. In these cases, the final data product should be exported to an 

open format at the close of the project to ensure long-term data survivability and compatibility. 

For example, tabular databases should be exported to an American Standard Code for 

Information Interchange (ASCII) format, with appropriate documentation. Spatial data should 

be exported at the close of the project to an open format, such as Spatial Data Transfer Standard 

or Drawing Interchange File format.

5.3.3. Spatial Coordinate Reference System. All MR projects should be adequately 

connected to nationwide or worldwide geographic reference systems. All geospatial data should 

be indexed to existing local, state, or national control monuments and referenced to an 

appropriately recognized installation, local, state, or worldwide coordinate system, as specified 

by the PDT. The PDT should evaluate existing monuments to determine whether they are 

suitable for use during an MR action. This evaluation should include verification of the last 

recovery data, the shape of the monument during the last recovery and the type of the monument. 

The PDT should select a spatial coordinate reference system that is compatible with existing 

district or customer GDS activities. Unless otherwise indicated, it is recommend that all spatial 

data be stored using the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Coordinate System, using either 

North American Datum of 1983 or World Geodetic System of 1984 for horizontal control with 

the most current Geoid model (Geoid 09). Horizontal coordinates should be stored using metric 

units. Vertical control, if required, also should be based on metric units and referenced to North 

American Vertical Datum of 1988. Project-specific requirements may dictate the use of an 

alternate coordinate system, datum, and measurement units, but deviations from this standard 

should be made only after careful deliberation and with full recognition of the potential impacts. 

For projects located outside the continental United States, local conditions may warrant the use 

of an alternate vertical datum. Potential project impacts from using an alternate coordinate 

system include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Positional errors could get perpetuated into later projects. 

b. Local coordinate systems and relocated benchmarks, if not in UTM, need to fully 

define all input to the coordinate system (e.g., prime meridian, units, system). 
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c. Extra care needs to be taken to ensure that the correct units are used throughout the 

project (i.e., some software use the term feet to denote U.S. Survey Feet, while others use the 

term feet to denote International Feet).

5.3.4. Geospatial Data Standards. GDS users need geospatial data standards to manage 

data, reduce redundant data, make systems more efficient, and lower project costs. At this time, 

the DoD’s Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure, and the Environment (SDSFIE) 

should be specified for all deliverables of collected geospatial data, with the exception of DGM 

data, which have their own data requirements that are discussed further in Chapters 6 and 11. 

The SDSFIE data standard is the most recent requirement at the time of writing but may be 

superseded by new data standards and/or the requirements of the project’s PWS or SOW. The 

SDSFIE data standard is available online at http://www.sdsfieonline.org/default.aspx. The PDT 

should develop additional site-specific standards for the format, transfer, and storage of all 

geospatial data, including metadata, consistent with EM 1110-1-2909. Factors influencing 

formulation of project-specific standards include:

a. compatibility with selected GDS without modification or additional software;

b. format of existing digital data and geospatial-referenced mapping; and 

c. usability by all parties of concern, including stakeholders. 

5.3.5. Measurement Units. Geospatial data produced in support of an MR project should 

be recorded and plotted in the units prescribed for the project by the district or customer. The 

use of metric units is recommended unless superseded by project-specific requirements.

5.3.6. Control Markers. Project control markers may consist of markers and/or 

benchmarks established by any federal, state, local, or private agency with positional data within 

the minimum acceptable accuracy standards prescribed by the PDT. The PDT may require an 

increase in existing project control markers. Ties to local USACE or installation project control 

and/or boundary markers are absolutely essential and critical except when unfeasible or cost 

prohibitive. In order to minimize scale and orientation errors, at least two existing markers 

should be used as a baseline for the project geospatial coordinate reference system. Further 

guidance on survey markers and monumentation can be found in EM 1110-1-1002. 

5.3.7. Accuracy. Every observed or measured spatial data element contains errors of a 

certain magnitude due to a variety of causes. The PDT should evaluate data requirements and 

develop acceptable limits of error (accuracy and precision) based upon the nature and purpose of 

each location surveying and mapping activity or product. Accuracy requirements may vary 

between projects, as well as between separate tasks on an individual project. The PDT should 

evaluate the positional accuracy requirements for each data type and project task and outline QC 

procedures in the QC plan or UFP-QAPP to ensure the project’s positional accuracy 

requirements and DQOs are met. Engineering and construction surveys normally are specified 

and classified based on the minimum acceptable horizontal (linear) point closure ratio and 

vertical elevation difference standard. Standardization, or calibration, of equipment and 

instruments used in acquiring geospatial data and producing location survey and mapping 
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products is required to improve the accuracy of the integrated conclusions. See Section 6.4 for 

guidance on the use of geophysical survey positioning and navigation systems and their related 

accuracy and precision.

5.3.8. Reliability. The development of an effective GDS facilitates a systemized 

approach to an MR project using all digital data and life cycle management of all applicable 

geospatial data. GDS should be stored IAW Army security levels; the PDT also should consider 

project-specific security concerns. If security allows, provision should be made on larger-scale 

projects to facilitate the sharing and dissemination of data using Web-based tools and 

applications where possible (e.g., Web-based mapping services). This would avoid data 

duplication and serve to centralize and standardize database stewardship functions IAW the 

overall goal of improved life cycle data management. The project GDS should provide a full 

digital record of all on-site activities with a reproducible trail to support ongoing and future 

Administrative Record decisions. The GDS designated in the SOW by the PDT should provide 

reliable results, support greater overall productivity, and lower total project costs. 

5.3.9. Data Preservation. The closeout of a project should include steps to archive the 

data using open data formats as described above and using stable digital media to ensure longterm survivability. Data storage methods that preserve data after project closeout should be 

documented in the project’s UFP-QAPP. The specific media chosen will change as the 

technology changes; however, care should be taken to select only the most stable and widely 

used formats. These media will be refreshed on a regular 5- to 10-year cycle, and it is of utmost 

importance that the media be readable and accessible when the scheduled refresh occurs.

5.4. Scope of Work. 

5.4.1. General. PDT personnel with detailed knowledge of the project history, archival 

information, various GDS platforms, location survey and mapping methodologies, and projectspecific data requirements should prepare the GDS standards and requirements for each MR 

project SOW. The SOW requires consideration of the following in development of the UFPQAPP:

a. Project and property boundaries 

b. MEC types, hazard levels, and contamination levels

c. Potential sources of MC, including firing lines, targets, open burning / open detonation 

(OB/OD) areas, etc.

d. Project location, size, topography, and vegetative cover 

e. Extent of existing planimetric features

f. Density and accuracy of existing control markers 

g. Mission and objectives of the MR 
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h. Positioning requirements of proposed geophysical detection systems 

i. Data formatting, transfer, and storage 

5.4.2. Personnel Requirements. The PDT should ensure that the MR project SOW 

specifies that a qualified GIS manager should manage all GDS activities. The PDT will ensure 

that the SOW also discusses personnel requirements for a Registered Land Surveyor (RLS) or 

Professional Land Surveyor (PLS) and a qualified UXO technician for geodetic surveys. 

5.4.2.1. GIS Manager. The SOW should specify that the individual have a minimum of 3 

years of direct experience managing geospatial data systems within the specified system 

environment (i.e., ArcGIS, GeoMedia, or Modular GIS Environment). The GIS Manager also 

should have an understanding of Army and DoD GDS requirements, as specified in ER 1110-1-

8156. 

5.4.2.2. RLS or PLS. The PDT should ensure that the MR SOW specifies that boundary 

work, legal descriptions, and parcel closure information be completed under the responsible 

charge of an RLS/PLS. The RLS/PLS should be registered and/or licensed by the appropriate 

Board of Registration, or an acceptable equivalent, for the state in which this work will be 

conducted. The RLS/PLS is only required to sign drawings that contain boundaries, control 

monument locations, legal descriptions, or parcel closure information. An RLS/PLS is not 

required to oversee site characterization grid coordinates and ordnance location data. In addition, 

the Field Surveyor assigned to the MR project will have a minimum of 5 years’ experience as a 

Survey Party Chief. 

5.4.2.3. UXO Technician II. The PDT also should assure that the SOW requires a 

qualified UXO Technician II to accompany the Field Surveyor during all field surveying and 

mapping activities. The UXO Technician II should conduct visual surveys for surface MEC prior 

to the Field Surveyor entering a suspected MEC-impacted area. A survey with a geophysical 

instrument should be performed at each intrusive activity location to ensure that the location is 

anomaly-free prior to the installation of monuments, driving stakes, or performing any other 

intrusive activity. 

5.4.3. Safety. It is the responsibility of the PDT to assure that the contractor is informed 

in the SOW to follow all applicable safety requirements, for example EM 385-1-1, EM 385-1-97, 

ER 385-1-92, etc. 

5.4.4. Resources. For general guidance on the development of surveying and mapping 

requirements, the PDT may reference EM 1110-1-2909. GPS surveying services may be 

required as an integral part of the location surveying and mapping effort. EM 1110-1-1003 

provides technical requirements and procedural guidance for surveying with GPS and includes a 

guide specification for development of SOWs with GPS survey requirements. 

5.5. Planning Considerations. Each MR project requires selection of an appropriate GDS that 

will accomplish the end objective(s) without wasting manpower, time, and money. The PDT 
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should ensure that the following items are considered when planning for the location surveying 

and mapping task. 

5.5.1. Spatial Data Reference System. See Section 5.3.3. 

5.5.2. Project Control Markers. 

5.5.2.1. The requirements for new or additional project control markers should be based 

on the availability of existing control markers, the type of location surveying equipment proposed, 

and the level of accuracy required for the type of activities proposed under the specific MR 

project. Permanent concrete monuments typically are used for project control; however, 

temporary control markers also may be used for shorter duration or smaller projects. New project 

control markers should be established outside areas that could be disturbed by MMRP or other 

activities. A PLS in the state where the work will be performed shall certify all established 

project control markers. Requirements for permanent and temporary markers are set forth in EM 

1110-1-1002 and should be reviewed in consideration of the following: 

a. Located within the project limits with a minimum separation of 100 meters (m)

b. Set 10 m from the edge of any existing road inside the project limits

c. Constructed with the top set flush with the ground and the bottom at a minimum of 

0.6 m below frost depth 

d. Temporary markers should be defined in the same manner as permanent markers, 

though they may consist of a larger wooden hub with adjacent guard stakes, a copper nail and 

washer, P-K nail, or other temporary spike set in relatively stable in-situ material

5.5.2.2. The minimum accuracy standards for horizontal and vertical control are Class I, 

Third Order or better. See Section 5.3.3 as well as the PWS/SOW for guidance on the appropriate 

Spatial Coordinate Reference System. If aerial photographs or orthophotography is used to 

provide the survey, the aerial targets used for control points should meet the same horizontal and 

vertical accuracy requirements detailed.

5.5.2.2.1. Monument Caps. 

5.5.2.2.1.1. The caps for any new monuments established will be a 3-1/4- to 3-1/2-inch 

domed brass, bronze, or aluminum alloy and stamped in a consecutively numbered sequence. 

The proposed identification stamping for each monument will be provided in the Location 

Surveys and Mapping Plan consistent with the following: 

(Project Name) - (Numerical Sequence) - (Year) (Contracting MMDC)

5.5.2.2.1.2. The dies for stamping the numbers and letters into these caps will be 1/8 

inches to 3/16 inches in size. All coordinates and elevations will be shown to the closest onethousandth of a meter (0.001 m) and one-hundredth of a foot (0.01 feet). 
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5.5.2.2.2. Monument Descriptions. 

5.5.2.2.2.1. Monument descriptions are required for all control monuments established or 

used for the MR. These descriptions should be captured within the GIS database, in a standard 

relational database, or in a spreadsheet. Accompanying maps should show the location of the 

monument relative to other spatial features so that the monument could be recovered easily. 

5.5.2.2.2.2. The monument descriptions and map(s) should include the following: 

• Map showing location relative to reference marks, buildings, roads, railroads, towers, 

trees, etc. Map should include north arrow and scale. 

• A text description in the database or spreadsheet telling how to locate the monument 

from a well-known and easily identifiable point. 

• The monument’s name or number (stored in the database or spreadsheet). 

• The final adjusted coordinates and elevations in meters and feet (to the closest 0.001 m 

and 0.01 feet) stored in the database or spreadsheet.

5.5.3. Project Boundaries. 

5.5.3.1. The PDT should consider whether staking out or marking project boundaries is 

required for a particular project. A key reason to mark out project boundaries is to ensure field 

personnel know the extent of the investigation and perform field activities up to those boundaries. 

This goal often can be accomplished with GPSs that can provide highly accurate positioning in 

real time. The use of GPSs in place of staking out project boundaries may represent a significant 

cost savings; however, the project boundary may require marking if GPSs cannot operate at the 

site (e.g., the site is in a densely wooded area where GPS navigation is not feasible). 

5.5.3.2. If the PDT determines that marking out the project boundaries is required, the 

boundary should be marked out with permanent, semipermanent, or temporary markers. 

Permanent or semipermanent markers should consist of iron pipe or pins or other markers 

consistent with state or local subdivision requirements. Temporary markers may be used for 

shorter duration projects and may consist of wooden hubs or polyvinyl chloride pin flags. The 

accuracy standards for the location of project boundaries should be equal or greater than the 

minimum standards for property boundary surveys established by the state within which the 

project is located.

5.5.4. Local Control Points. 

5.5.4.1. Local control points (i.e., grid corners and aerial targets) should be established 

using plastic or wooden hubs unless otherwise specified by the PDT. 

5.5.4.2. The accuracy standards for aerial targets established as control points for aerial 

photographs or orthophotography should be the same as those prescribed for project control 
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monuments. Accuracy standards for grid corners should be consistent with the mission and 

objectives of the MR effort. 

5.5.5. Environmental Samples. All environmental samples should be located to an 

estimated or measured accuracy of approximately plus or minus 0.3 m (1 foot). 

5.5.6. Digital Data Format and Storage and Coordinate Reporting. 

5.5.6.1. There are two types of digital data typically generated during MR projects: 

geophysical mapping data and GIS data. Though geophysical data can be considered geographic 

information, it often is not practical to treat all geophysical mapping data as GIS data. 

Specifically, the databases used to store and interpret geophysical measurements are designed to 

work with specialized geophysical processing and interpretation software and often are not 

reformatted easily to meet GIS storage and reporting standards, and rarely does the need arise to 

do so. However, geophysical maps and anomaly databases produced as the result of geophysical 

data interpretations often are key components to the project GIS, and these often are produced 

according to the guidelines defined for the project GIS. 

5.6. Munitions Response Site Delineation. When there is a requirement to realign or delineate 

an MRS (see Section 8.9 of this manual for further details), geographic information specialists 

may need to restructure or revise the existing GDS data in the appropriate database of record 

(e.g., FUDSMIS for FUDS properties). The geographic information specialist should verify that 

the acreages match at the beginning and end of a project, that boundaries do not get shifted, and 

that changes in the project’s coordinate system do not introduce errors. The USACE FUDS 

Handbook on Realignment, Delineation, and MRS Prioritization Protocol Implementation 

provides guidance on both realignment and delineation procedures. While the handbook’s 

applicability is for FUDS projects, the guidance outlined within it may be extended to non-FUDS 

projects. For example, the rationale for MRS delineation may be based on anticipated response 

action for the MRS regardless of whether or not the MRS falls within the FUDS program. 
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CHAPTER 6

Geophysical Investigation Methodologies 1

6.1. Introduction. 

6.1.1. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth understanding of how 

geophysics is used to detect metallic objects (e.g., UXO, DMM, scrap metal). The chapter first

introduces the various systems used to collect and position geophysical data; then it explains, in 

general terms, the capabilities and limitations of geophysical and positioning systems. The 

various elements involved in planning and executing geophysical investigations then are 

described. Chapter 11 explains the different aspects of QC and QA of geophysical systems and 

presents various approaches for demonstrating and documenting QC of geophysical systems. 

6.1.2. In this chapter, the term “geophysical system” defines the entire package of tools 

and procedures used for a given project or used to meet a specific project goal. Therefore, 

geophysical system can be thought of as the collection of tools and procedures that are finally 

selected for use from the array of technologies and deployment options available. 

6.2. Geophysical Systems. 

6.2.1. Geophysical systems comprise geophysical tools, positioning and navigation tools, 

deployment platforms, and data management and interpretation techniques. Instrument operators 

also are considered components of the geophysical system when their tasks are essential to the 

system’s performance. 

6.2.2. Geophysical systems are broken down into the six fully integrated components, as 

follows. If any of these components are lacking, the overall geophysical system may not be able 

to locate effectively geophysical anomalies that may be TOIs. It is important to carefully plan 

and integrate all aspects of each component into the geophysical investigation and not to start 

fieldwork prematurely. The key components of a geophysical system are listed below. 

6.2.2.1. Experienced Personnel. Personnel should be experienced with the theoretical 

and practical aspects of detecting relatively small anomalies and selecting anomalies that are 

likely TOIs (e.g., anomalies due to UXO or DMM) from multiple non-TOI anomalies that also 

are likely to be present (i.e., anomalies due to sources that have no explosive hazard). The 

selection and utilization of geophysical equipment is complex and requires qualified, 

experienced individuals. A qualified geophysicist should manage all MMRP geophysical 

investigations. A qualified geophysicist is a person with a degree in geophysics, engineering 

geophysics, or closely related field and who has a minimum of 5 years of directly related UXO 

geophysical experience. While various members of the PDT are critical in the determination of 

the goals and objectives of any geophysical investigation, the qualified geophysicist is required 

to ensure that those goals and objectives are met. 

6.2.2.2. Site Preparation. Site preparation for geophysical investigations at MRAs 

includes making the ground surface safe for personnel to perform their tasks by removing 

vegetation and obstacles to meet equipment use needs. 
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6.2.2.3. Geophysical Systems Instrumentation. Geophysical instrumentation and related 

detection capabilities and limitations are discussed throughout this chapter. 

6.2.2.4. Deployment Platforms. Geophysical platforms are discussed in Section 6.5. 

6.2.2.5. Data Analysis. Geophysical data analysis includes accurately documenting the 

geophysical data collected, the steps used in analyzing the geophysical data, and different 

options available for interpreting the data. The geophysical data analysis work flow is discussed 

in Section 6.6. 

6.2.2.6. Anomaly Resolution Procedures. These procedures define how the PDT verifies

that each anomaly selected for intrusive excavation is resolved completely. The term anomaly 

resolution is used to describe all tasks and actions taken to verify or confirm that the dig results 

fully explain the source of the anomaly. Anomaly resolution is discussed in Section 6.6.9. 

6.3. Geophysical Tools. 

6.3.1. Introduction. Detection and location of geophysical anomalies that could be due to 

TOIs primarily depend on the ability of geophysical instruments to distinguish the physical 

characteristics of anomalies from those of the surrounding environment. The best currently 

available detection systems detect the metallic content of the TOIs not the explosive filler. There 

are several instruments that are not common that detect the explosive materials; however, they 

are designed to identify the content of recovered items and not to detect TOIs. This chapter 

focuses on the various geophysical detection systems currently available and widely used to 

detect geophysical anomalies associated with TOI, but it includes brief descriptions of some of 

the lesser-used systems and explains why their use is limited to specific missions within the 

UXO detection arena. This chapter does not address explosives “sniffers” or other technologies 

formulated around detecting the explosive components of munitions. 

6.3.2. Detector Families. These various geophysical technologies are packaged in many 

ways. For simplicity, geophysical detectors are grouped into two main families of detectors 

based on how their data are interpreted. Analog geophysical tools are defined in this document 

as instruments that produce an audible output, a meter deflection, and/or numeric output, which 

are interpreted in real time by the instrument operator. DGM tools are defined in this document 

as instruments that digitally record geophysical measurements and geo-reference data to where 

each measurement occurred. This family of tools can be interpreted in real time, near real time, 

or any later time after data collection work is complete. DGM instruments include advanced 

electromagnetic induction (EMI) sensors that can collect DGM data either in a production or in a 

static mode. These advanced EMI sensors collect data from multiple directions and enable the 

classification of anomalies as a TOI or non-TOI (see Section 6.3.5 for further discussion of 

TOIs). 

6.3.3. Analog Geophysical Tools. This family of detectors includes all handheld metal 

detectors and coin detectors and handheld ferrous locators. This family also includes those 

digital tools that can be operated as analog tools as defined above.

6.3.3.1. Analog Geophysical Surveys (“Mag & Flag” or “Mag & Dig”). Active EOD 

personnel and contractors use this approach to locate geophysical anomalies. Handheld metal 
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detectors, such as magnetometers and electromagnetometers, are used to screen an area. 

Whenever the operator detects an anomaly, the operator places a small flag in the ground. 

Advantages of analog geophysical surveys include the following: 

a. The geophysical operator can use real-time field observations. 

b. They provide a precise anomaly location. 

c. Anomalies can be excavated immediately following the survey. 

d. They can be conducted with fewer vegetation and topographic constraints. 

6.3.3.2. Analog Effectiveness. Analog geophysical surveys are effective in areas where 

vegetation and terrain limit the use of larger digital systems. For underwater surveys, analog 

approaches may be more effective than digital surveys in the surf zone if boats and digital 

systems cannot gain access. Limitations for both land and underwater analog surveys include the 

following: 

a. In general, they do not detect as deep as DGM instruments (ESTCP, ITRC, SERDP, 

2006). 

b. Quality depends on operator training and demonstrated performance. Quality also is 

affected by human factors, such as attentiveness/distraction and hearing ability. 

c. Developing rigorous QC measures that are capable of assessing the consistency of each 

operator’s effectiveness and performance for the duration of the survey is more challenging and 

less precise than for digital geophysical methods. 

d. A higher percentage of small, non-TOIs typically is detected during mag & flag 

surveys. This results in a higher number of intrusive investigations versus digital geophysical 

surveys. 

e. Unable to evaluate electronic data further.

f. There is no permanent electronic record, as required by the joint USEPA/DoD 

Management Principles (see http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/uxo_principles.htm). 

g. Handheld magnetometers can detect ferrous metallic objects and are less sensitive to 

small amplitude anomalies and anomalies with low horizontal gradients than their digital 

counterparts. 

h. EMI metal detectors can detect both ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects and have 

depth of detection capabilities that are related to the size of the coils and transmitter power. 

Handheld EMI metal detectors typically have smaller coils and less transmitter power than their 

digital counterparts and, therefore, typically have more shallow maximum depths of detection 

than their digital counterparts. 
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6.3.4. Digital Geophysical Tools. This family of detectors includes all geophysical tools 

capable of recording and geo-referencing geophysical measurements and includes all land-borne, 

airborne, and marine detectors.

6.3.4.1. Most magnetic and electromagnetic instruments have the capability to output a 

digital signal to a data logger that can be co-registered with positional information to develop a 

two-dimensional map of the characteristic that the instrument is measuring. Digital geophysical 

surveys are able to capitalize on the use of sensors with higher sensitivity, application of noise 

reduction techniques, and advanced data-analysis techniques. Advantages of digital geophysical 

surveys include the following: 

a. Uniform process for data collection and analysis. 

b. Geo-referenced location of data and anomalies. 

c. No operator subjectivity (to place or not to place a flag). 

d. Ability to further evaluate electronic data. 

e. A permanent electronic record, as required by the joint USEPA/DoD Management 

Principles (see http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/uxo_principles.htm). 

f. Ability to define rigorous QC measures capable of detecting all/most possible failure 

modes for the geophysical survey. 

g. Challenges for performing digital geophysical mapping include the following: 

h. Decreased effectiveness in high clutter areas. 

i. Vegetation and topographic constraints. 

j. Quality dependent on operator training and demonstrated performance. 

k. Defining anomaly selection criteria that meet the project team’s needs in terms of 

identifying all TOIs while not selecting large numbers of non-TOI anomalies. 

6.3.4.2. Additional challenges for digital geophysical systems in the underwater 

environment include the following: 

a. Performing digital geophysical surveys in the shallow surf-zone may not be possible if 

there is significant wave action.

b. Positioning of the sensor in the marine environment is more complex than for landbased DGM operations and often is neither as accurate nor as precise as for land-based surveys. 

c. The sensor often is “flown” above the sediment bottom, which increases the distance 

between the sensor and the potential TOI, thereby decreasing the depth below the sediment 

surface to which the sensor can reliably detect TOIs. 
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d. Defining rigorous QC procedures for underwater DGM surveys is more challenging 

than for land-borne DGM surveys. 

e. The sensor must be navigated so that it avoids objects protruding from the sediment 

surface.

f. The speed of the current may prohibit the effective use of some technologies. 

g. The depth of the water may preclude the use of some sensor configurations. 

6.3.5. Advanced EMI Tools. This family of sensors includes all geophysical tools 

capable of exciting and recording the full EM response pattern from an object and georeferencing geophysical measurements. Advanced EMI sensors offer the ability to evaluate 

anomaly selection criteria and to analyze the characteristics of detected anomalies to decide

whether they should be placed on dig lists. Using anomaly characteristics as the basis, anomalies 

can be classified as either TOIs or non-TOI. TOIs typically are anomalies caused by UXO or

DMM, while non-TOIs typically include MD and other metallic debris. At this time, only landborne advanced EMI sensors are available. 

6.3.5.1. Advanced EMI Surveys. Advanced EMI sensors designed specifically to 

classify anomalies as either TOIs or non-TOIs have been and are being developed and tested 

through the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) and the 

Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP). Live site demonstrations 

have shown these sensors to be significantly more successful at UXO classification than 

production-level DGM sensors, leading to a reduction in the number of anomalies that need to be 

dug at MRSs, while still removing the TOI. Advantages of advanced EMI sensors include those 

listed for DGM sensors, plus the following: 

a. Provide the ability to collect data for a longer duration through the response decay. 

b. Multiple axis target excitation and observation enable complete interrogation of the 

EMI response pattern from the subsurface metallic item. 

c. More data enable greater ability to classify targets as either TOI or non-TOI. 

d. Allow for less intrusive investigation, which lowers costs and results in less 

environmental and ecological impact.

6.3.5.2. Challenges. Challenges for performing investigations with advanced EMI 

technologies include those listed for DGM technologies. Additionally, most advanced EMI 

sensors are large and require the use of a vehicle to move the sensor from one target location to 

another, making them difficult to use within forested or high sloped areas; however, several manportable systems are under development that may be used more easily in these difficult terrains 

in the future. 

6.3.6. Underwater Geophysical Tools. Underwater geophysical sensors include EMI and 

magnetometers that have geophysical detection abilities similar to their land-based counterparts 
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and generally are covered under the above sections. Marine geophysical tools also include sound 

navigation and ranging (sonar) technologies, which may have the ability to detect UXO lying 

proud on the water bottom floor (and sometimes below the sediment surface). Sonar 

technologies are more commonly used for imaging the bottom surface of the water body (e.g., 

sediment surface, boulders, felled trees) prior to underwater DGM surveys. 

6.3.6.1. Bathymetric Technologies. 

6.3.6.1.1. Advantages of Bathymetric Technologies. 

• Are operated at a high altitude and are safe to operate as a reconnaissance method in 

uncertain bottom conditions. 

• Generally are an efficient, high productivity method requiring minimal data processing. 

• Are useful for developing detailed maps of bathymetry, sea bottom roughness and 

texture, and sediment type.

• Can be used to identify potential obstructions and hazards to underwater DGM and sidescan sonar (SSS) surveys where the instrument is towed at a low altitude. 

• May be able to detect accumulations of munitions or conditions favorable for 

accumulation of munitions. 

6.3.6.1.2. Challenges of Bathymetric Technologies. 

• Lack the ability to resolve individual UXO lying proud on the sea bottom. 

• Cannot penetrate the sediment bottom. 

• Optical technologies (e.g., LIDAR) are dependent on clarity of the water.

6.3.6.2. Sediment Bottom Imaging Technologies. 

6.3.6.2.1. Advantages of sediment bottom imaging technologies include the following: 

• Can provide images of both the sediment surface and the underlying sediments. 

• Can be used to identify potential obstructions and hazards to underwater UXO surveys. 

• May be able to detect individual objects lying proud. 

6.3.6.2.2. Challenges of sediment bottom imaging technologies include the following:

• Degree of bottom penetration and ability to resolve details are highly dependent upon 

the sediment type at the sea bottom.

• Sub-bottom Profiler (SBP) instruments trade off depth of penetration with ability to 

resolve details—lower frequencies penetrate more deeply, whereas higher frequencies are 

needed to resolve details.

• Require more data processing and interpretation than other sonic technologies. 
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• May lack ability to resolve individual UXO lying proud on the sea bottom in cluttered 

areas or where operating frequencies are too low.

• Only buried object scanning sonar (BOSS) has been shown to be able to image buried 

UXO under proper conditions. BOSS system is under development and is not commercially 

available.

6.3.7. Specific Types of Geophysical Instruments. Geophysical equipment also can be 

divided into two broad classes of instruments: passive and active. Passive instruments measure 

existing magnetic fields and the fluctuations within those fields. Passive instruments commonly 

used to detect anomalies potentially due to UXO include all types of magnetometers. Active 

instruments typically transmit an electromagnetic field and measure responses from the ground 

in the immediate vicinity of the detector. The active instruments most commonly used for UXO

detection include EMI metal detectors. Table 6-1 presents many commonly used geophysical 

instruments for land investigations. 

6.3.7.1. Magnetometers. Magnetometers were one of the first tools used for locating 

buried munitions. Most military munitions contain iron (ferromagnetic metal). When these 

types of UXO are in the presence of the Earth’s magnetic field, a disturbance in the field is 

generated, which magnetometers can detect. Some magnetometers use two magnetic sensors 

(called gradiometers) configured to measure the difference over a fixed distance of the magnetic 

field rather than the absolute magnetic field. This configuration allows the gradiometer to 

perform with greater tolerance to cultural interference and improves detectability of some small 

TOIs. Since magnetometers respond to ferromagnetic metals, they are not be used to try to 

detect UXO that does not have a significant ferromagnetic metallic content. In addition, 

magnetometers are sensitive to many iron-bearing minerals and "hot rocks," which significantly 

increase the number of anomalies that need to be dug. Currently, three types of magnetometers 

are used most often to detect buried munitions. 

a. Fluxgate Magnetometers. Fluxgate magnetometers are inexpensive, reliable, and 

rugged and have low energy consumption. Fluxgate magnetometers have long been a standard 

of EOD units as a quick, inexpensive field reconnaissance tool and are the least sensitive 

magnetometers in use in the MMRP (see Figure 6-1).

b. Optically Pumped Magnetometers. Optically pumped magnetometers (common 

commercial types include the cesium-vapor and potassium-vapor magnetometers) utilize digital 

technology and are more expensive to purchase than fluxgate instruments. However, their high 

sensitivity means they detect anomalies much deeper than fluxgate magnetometers (see Figure 6-

1).

c. Proton precession magnetometers often are used in conjunction with optically pumped 

magnetometers. They provide information on the time varying changes in the Earth’s magnetic 

field (diurnal variations) so that these changes can be removed from the magnetic field data. 

Proton precession magnetometers are less costly than optically pumped magnetometers and have 

less sensitivity and slower measurement rates but are suited for recording the relatively slow 

diurnal variations (see Figure 6-2) 
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Figure 6-1: Schonstedt GA-52 (left) Fluxgate Magnetometer and Geometrics G-858 

 (right) Optically Pumped Metal Detector

6.3.7.2. EMI Metal Detectors. EMI metal detectors work by either rapidly turning the 

current on and off or a sinusoidally varying current within a coil on the instrument. This varying 

current generates a changing primary magnetic field into the ground and induces electrical eddy 

currents in any nearby metallic objects. These currents then produce a secondary magnetic field 

that is measured by the instrument. They differ from magnetometers in that they are not limited 

to detecting ferrous items and can detect any conductive metal. In addition, EMI metal detectors 

usually are less affected by geologic sources than are magnetometers. There are two types: time 

domain electromagnetic detectors (TDEMI) and frequency domain electromagnetic detectors 

(FDEMI).

Figure 6-2: Geometrics G-856 Proton Precession Magnetometer
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6.3.7.2.1. TDEMI. TDEMI instruments work by pulsing an electrical signal in the 

transmitter coils, which produce a primary magnetic field that induces an eddy current in the 

ground. The transmitting coil is turned off, and the secondary magnetic field produced from the 

resulting eddy current decay is then measured at predefined times. The eddy current decays 

much more slowly in conductive targets (such as metallic items) than in resistive materials (most 

soils). Such instruments provide a capability to locate all types of metallic military munitions. 

Because the signal from the buried metallic objects is recorded during a time when the signal 

from the instrument is off and the signal from the geology is attenuated, TDEMI instruments are 

one of the more reliable methods of detecting buried metallic items. Figure 6-3 presents 

examples of two TDEMI sensors. While TDEMI sensors have been proven to be effective in the 

detection of UXO at MRSs during production-level DGM surveys, they have inherent limitations 

that may decrease their effectiveness when applied to advanced classification using inversion. 

These limitations include the following:

• Analog smoothing of the EMI response during data acquisition to increase signal-tonoise ratio (SNR), which distorts the signal shape 

• Limited measurement of the eddy decay cycle

• Positioning uncertainty on the order of centimeters degrades the parameter estimates 

(Bell, 2008) (see Section 6.6.5 for further discussion of anomaly parameters). 

Figure 6-3: Vallon VMXC1 (left) and Geonics EM61-Mark 2 (MK2) (right) TDEMI Sensors 

6.3.7.2.2. FDEMI. FDEMI instruments work by transmitting a sinusoidally varying 

electromagnetic (EM) signal at one or more frequencies through a transmitter coil. A separate 

receiver coil measures a signal that is a function of the primary signal and the induced currents in 

the subsurface. Depending on the size of the instrument and the frequencies generated, the 

system can detect metallic objects at varying depths and sizes. Because the signal from the 

buried metallic objects is recorded during a time when the primary signal is still on, these 

instruments measure the induced currents in the subsurface metallic objects differently than the 

TDEMI instruments. FDEMI instruments measure differences in the phase and amplitude 

between the received signal and the transmitted signal. The presence of subsurface metallic 

items results in changes in the measured parameters. The depth at which FDEMI instruments 
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can detect metallic objects is dependent on antenna loop size and transmitter power. However, if 

careful measurements are made at multiple frequencies, this information often can provide 

diagnostic information on the type of buried metallic objects as well as the size of the object. 

Most commercial coin detectors are FDEMI instruments. Figure 6-4 presents an example of an 

FDEMI sensor.

Figure 6-4: Geophex GEM-3 FDEMI Sensor

6.3.7.2.3. Towed EMI arrays. Towed EMI arrays can increase the positioning accuracy 

over man-portable systems because of the fixed location of the sensors relative to each other; 

however, they also have a limited ability to excite and record the full EM response field when the 

transmitters are operated simultaneously because the primary response fields merge together and 

do not excite the object from different directions. If towed EMI arrays are pulsed sequentially, 

they can record the EM response from multiple directions; however, this reduces the rate at 

which data are collected (Bell, 2008). Figure 6-5 shows an example of a towed EMI array. 

Figure 6-5: Example of a Towed TDEMI Array
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6.3.7.3. Advanced EMI Sensors. Advanced EMI sensors have been developed through 

the SERDP and ESTCP specifically to detect and classify anomalies as either TOIs or non-TOIs. 

The advanced EMI sensors increase the effectiveness of UXO classification by overcoming the 

challenges that production-level EMI sensors have in performing TOI classification. In general, 

they measure the complete eddy current decay cycle and the complete EM response pattern via 

multi-axis target excitation and observation. These sensors sample the complete EM response 

pattern of objects by exciting and observing the item’s EM response from all directions. The 

new sensors sample the full EM response pattern using multi-axis coil sensors (e.g., three 

orthogonal 1 m transmit coils and multiple receive coils) or via single axis coil arrays (e.g., 5x5 

array of 35-centimeter [cm] transmit/receive coils). The goal of the advanced EMI sensors is to 

excite and measure the response from the object from all directions in order to extract the 

fundamental response functions by inverting the EMI data using the dipole response model for 

complete interrogation of the principal axis responses, or polarizabilities (Bell, 2008). Most 

advanced EMI sensors are TDEMI sensors; however, several FDEMI sensors are under 

development. Example systems include the Geometrics MetalMapperTM, Time Domain 

Electromagnetic Multi-sensor Towed Array Detection System (TEMTADS), TEMTADS ManPortable (MP) 2x2 Cart, Berkeley UXO Discriminator (BUD), Handheld BUD, All-Time EMI 

System (ALLTEM), and Man-Portable Vector (MPV) EMI Sensor. Of these systems, only the 

MetalMapperTM currently is available commercially. The following subsections provide a brief 

description of each of these systems; additional information on these systems as well as other 

systems currently in development can be obtained from the SERDP and ESTCP Web site

(www.serdp-estcp.org). 

6.3.7.3.1. The Geometrics MetalMapperTM system is designed for production-level surveys 

and cued target interrogation (see Figure 6-6). The system consists of three 1 m square 

transmitters and seven three-component 10 cm square receiver coils placed within the horizontal 

transmitter coil. The MetalMapperTM can collect data in survey mode like commercially available 

EM systems. For classification purposes, the MetalMapperTM is used in static mode, where the 

system is placed over targets identified in a production-level DGM survey. All three transmit 

coils are pulsed sequentially in the cued mode, and data are collected over a longer time window 

(e.g., up to 25 milliseconds [ms]) than production-level EMI sensors. The system can be placed 

on a sled or operated in a wheeled configuration but must be towed or mounted to a front-end 

tractor or other tow vehicle. 
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Figure 6-6: Geometrics MetalMapperTM Advanced EMI Sensor 

6.3.7.3.2. The TEMTADS operates in a cued mode, with the system positioned over 

anomalies identified during production-level DGM surveys (see Figure 6-7). The system 

consists of a 5x5 array of 0.35 m x 0.35 m of transmitter/receiver coils oriented parallel to the 

ground surface. The transmitter coils are pulsed sequentially, with data collected at each receiver 

for each transmitted pulse. Data are collected up to 25 ms after the source current has been 

turned off. 

Figure 6-7: Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) TEMTADS

6.3.7.3.3. The TEMTADS MP 2x2 Cart consists of a 2x2 array of four 35 cm x 35 cm 

square transmitter coils instead of the 5x5 array of the TEMTADS (see Figure 6-8). The 

instrument contains 8 cm, 3-component “cube” receivers. The system is man portable and, due 

to its size, can access areas with dense vegetation and steep terrain similar to what productionlevel EMI sensors commonly can access (Kingdon et al., 2012). 
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Figure 6-8: NRL TEMTADS MP 2x2 Cart

6.3.7.3.4. The BUD consists of three orthogonal transmitter coils and eight pairs of 

differenced receivers placed on the top and bottom of the system (see Figure 6-9). The BUD 

records the decay response curve up to 1.2 ms after the transmitted pulse has been turned off. 

The BUD can be used in survey mode but more typically is used in the cued mode, similar to the 

MetalMapperTM. The BUD can be operated as a man-portable system; however, it is relatively 

large and the use of a tow vehicle greatly increases productivity.

Figure 6-9: Lawrence Berkeley National Lab’s BUD

6.3.7.3.5. The Handheld BUD is a lightweight, compact, portable version of the BUD that 

can be deployed under most site conditions, including areas of dense vegetation or steep terrain 

(where using the BUD or other large advanced EMI sensors that require a vehicle to move the 

sensor may be difficult) (see Figure 6-10). The Handheld BUD is a 14-inch cube that includes 

three orthogonal transmitters and 10 pairs of receivers and makes gradient measurements that 

significantly reduce the ambient and motions noise (Gasperikova, 2010). 
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Figure 6-10: Lawrence Berkeley National Lab’s Handheld BUD

6.3.7.3.6. The ALLTEM consists of three orthogonal 1 m transmit loops with 34 cm 

receiver loops located on the outside of the 1 m cube (see Figure 6-11). The system has 19 

transmitter/receiver coil configurations. Data are collected in survey mode every approximately 

15–20 cm at a vehicle speed of 0.5 m/second. The ALLTEM is unique among the advanced 

EMI instruments in that, instead of transmitting a signal that is recorded after the transmitted 

pulse is turned off, the ALLTEM transmits and receives at the same time. Like the TEMTADS 

and MetalMapperTM, the system needs to be towed by a vehicle.

Figure 6-11: USGS’s ALLTEM

6.3.7.3.7. The MPV EMI sensor is a handheld EMI sensor that consists of a transmitter, 

an array of three-dimensional receivers, a field-programmable control unit, and a portable local 

positioning system (see Figure 6-12). The MPV sensor is a 50 cm diameter circular loop 

transmitter and five multi-component receiver units, or cubes, consisting of 8 cm square coils. 

The MPV can be operated in a dynamic mode for target detection as well as in a static mode for 

target classification (Lhomme, 2011). 
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Figure 6-12: Sky Research’s MPV EMI

6.3.7.4. Airborne Geophysical Sensors. Airborne geophysical sensors that have been 

successfully used on MR projects include included orthophotography, magnetic, EM, and 

LIDAR surveys. Potential airborne techniques include infrared, multi-spectral imaging, 

hyperspectral imaging, and synthetic aperture radio detection and ranging (radar) but require 

further validation testing using both helicopter and fixed-wing platforms. Airborne EMI and 

magnetometer technologies are largely the same as those used for ground-based investigations; 

however, the airborne investigations present more challenges (e.g., maintaining a constant height 

above the ground surface). 

6.3.7.4.1. Aerial Photography. Historical and recent images taken from airborne cameras 

can be used to determine past and present conditions and identify range-related features at an 

MRS. Digital aerial photographs currently are more commonly used than film aerial 

photographs. Individual digital aerial photographs can be collected with an image density of 

approximately 4,000 x 4,000 pixels; merged into a mosaic image of the site; and orthorectified 

(ESTCP, 2008). The final size of image pixels depends on the number of camera-specific pixels 

and the flight altitude, but pixel sizes in the range of 10 cm to 20 cm can be achieved with 

reasonable combinations of flight speeds and elevations (ESTCP, 2008).Once the aerial 

photographic data type is collected, it is important to consider how processing will affect the 

accuracy. When performing digitization and/or orthorectification, the root mean square (RMS) 

error should be considered as a guide to determining the total accuracy of the layer. 

6.3.7.4.2. LIDAR. LIDAR uses a pulsed laser directed downward from a relatively highflying aircraft toward the ground surface. The ground surface elevation is determined by the 

two-way travel-time of the laser as well as the velocity in air. GPS and inertial navigation 
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systems are used to precisely measure the position and orientation of the laser on the aircraft to 

allow for a more accurate calculation of the point of reflection of the laser signal from the 

ground, man-made structures, or vegetation (ESTCP, 2008). LIDAR can record the travel-times 

of multiple reflections from a single laser pulse, which increases the chance of sampling the 

ground surface through vegetation gaps. The number of reflections per square meter (or point 

densities) depend on the altitude, flight speeds, and laser repetition rates; point densities up to 4 

to 6 per square meter can be achieved to allow for reliable detection of features on the order of 1 

m at a survey rate of thousands of acres per day (ESTCP, 2008). 

6.3.7.4.3. Multi-Spectral Imaging, Hyperspectral Imaging, and Infrared. These 

imaging techniques use wavelengths of light other than visible light to gather information about 

the ground. Multi-spectral and hyperspectral imaging use numerous different wavelengths, 

while Infrared uses the infrared spectrum. The data from each of the wavelengths can be plotted 

individually or in composite images to enhance ground features. Although not typically used in 

MR projects, they could be useful in detecting range-related features and metallic and nonmetallic objects; however, it is unlikely that they can detect any but the largest UXO. 

6.3.7.4.4. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). Radar systems transmit electromagnetic, or 

radio, waves and then detect the reflection of the pulse at a radar system receiver. SAR uses the 

forward motion of the small radar array that is fixed to an airplane to synthesize a much larger 

array. The larger synthetic array effectively increases the resolution in the down-line direction 

and the SNR. By modifying the aperture length of the signal, the down-line resolution remains 

constant and is independent of frequency and range. This enables lower operating frequencies to 

be used, which increases the range of the sonar signal without negatively affecting the 

performance. The down-line resolution for SARs is approximately equal to one-half the actual 

length of the antenna (i.e., not the synthesized antenna length) and is independent of the antenna 

altitude. SAR may be capable of detecting large surface metal; however, few people have 

applied it to UXO detection, and it is unlikely that it will detect any but the largest of UXO. 

6.3.7.5. Marine Geophysical Sensors. Underwater sensors that can be used on MR 

projects include geophysical sensors, bathymetric technologies, and sediment bottom imaging 

technologies. Underwater geophysical EMI and magnetometer technologies are largely the same 

as those used for land investigations; however, underwater investigations present more 

challenges, as discussed above. Geophysical sensors unique to the marine environment include 

bathymetric and sediment bottom imaging technologies. 

6.3.7.5.1. Sonar. Active sonar is the process of emitting a pulse of sound waves (a 

“ping”) into water and analyzing the time it takes for the sound waves to be reflected off the 

sediment surface or features lying on the sediment surface (e.g., logs, rocks, UXO lying proud) 

and return to a receiver (echo). The distance, or range, to the object is calculated using the 

measured time and the speed of sound in the water. The sound pulse can be either a narrow 

beam or a fan-shaped beam that covers the bottom as the vehicle moves through the water. 

Sonar recordings are used to create a raster image of the sediment bottom. Although some sonar 

technologies may have the capability to detect individual UXO lying proud on the sediment 

surface, in general, sonar systems cannot detect buried UXO. BOSS has been shown to have the 

capability to detect UXO below the sediment surface; however, the BOSS system is not 

commercially available and has not been validated at a standardized test site. It is likely that 
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individual UXO would need to be relatively large in size for any sonar technology to be able to 

detect it lying proud or buried beneath the sediment surface. However, sonar technologies may 

present a good tool to use in a wide area assessment (WAA) type of investigation to identify 

potential disposal areas. The principal current use of sonar technologies is to provide 

information regarding the depth of the marine environment and information about potential 

obstructions to underwater magnetometer and/or EMI sensor surveys prior to the productionlevel underwater DGM investigation. Table 6-2 presents some of the more commonly used 

types of underwater UXO detection and sonar detectors. Figure 6-13 shows one example of a 

sonar sensor. 

Figure 6-13: Example of a Sonar Sensor 

6.3.7.5.1.1. Multibeam echo sounder (MBES) systems are useful in mapping 

bathymetry (i.e., topographical variations of the sediment surface), identifying metallic debris, 

identifying obstructions that could interfere with low altitude geophysical sensors (Funk et al., 

2011), and dive operations (see Figure 6-14). The multibeam sonar’s acoustic pulses are 

transmitted in a fan-shaped pattern and reflect back from the seafloor or items on the seafloor. 

The multibeam echo sounder’s multiple transmitters and larger swath width cover significantly 

more area of the sediment surface than traditional simple echo sounders, which transmit only a 

single acoustic wave. The multibeam reflections are measured from different angles across the 

swath. The size, shape, and distance to features on the seafloor can be determined by analyzing 

the angles and two-way travel times of each beam. Factors that affect the multibeam bathymetric 

resolution include the speed of sound in water, sonar frequency, beam width and angle, water 

depth, ping rate, and vessel speed (Funk et al., 2011). Physical properties of the seafloor affect 

the strength of the return signal of the multibeam pulse and can assist in characterizing features 

identified in the multibeam soundings. Hard materials (e.g., metals, boulders, gravel, volcanic 

rock) are very efficient at reflecting the multibeam pulses, while fine-grained sediments (e.g., 

silts, clays) absorb more of the acoustic energy and, therefore, have much weaker reflected signal 

strength. Data analysis software can be used to delineate areas with similar seafloor physical and 

geologic properties (Funk et al., 2011). 
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Figure 6-14: Example of an MBES Sensor

6.3.7.5.1.2. SSS systems are a special type of sonar that is used to create an image of the 

sediment surface and any objects lying on top of it (see Figure 6-15). SSS transmits a narrow, 

fan-shaped acoustic pulse, or ping, perpendicular to the direction of travel. As the pulse radiates 

away from the sonar unit, some of the sound energy is reflected off the seafloor and other objects 

back toward the SSS system. The reflected energy is known as backscatter, which is the 

reflection of waves, particles, or signals back to the direction they came from. The travel time 

and signal strength, or amplitude, of the reflected acoustic wave are analyzed to create a raster 

image of the seafloor. The transmitted beams of the SSS have a low grazing angle (i.e., they are 

directed horizontally away from the sonar versus being directed beneath the sonar). This results 

in distinctive shadows being cast behind objects on the seafloor, which helps make smaller 

objects more visible and provides greater detail on larger objects. Although SSS doesn’t 

measure feature depths, the resulting images can provide reasonable size estimates for features. 

SSS often can provide high enough resolution to enable the identification of features on the 

sediment surface and within the water column and is efficient at finding small features. SSS data

resolution, like multibeam echo sounding, is a function of the operating frequency of the sonar, 

number of beams, beam width, pulse rate, beam angle, and vessel speed (Funk et al., 2011). SSS 

can provide detailed images of the seafloor and seafloor geomorphology and may detect UXO

that lay proud of the bottom; however, the ability to determine the nature of the source is highly 

dependent on the size of the target and its distance from the sonar. Previous studies indicate that 

bright spots (strong reflections) in SSS data may be used to identify the location of metallic 

objects; however, these bright spots are unlikely to be differentiated from other sonar bright 

spots without the aid of DGM data (Funk et al., 2011). 
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Table 6-1: Land and Airborne Geophysical Detection Technologies (as of June 2011)

Technology Effectivenessa Implementabilitya Cost Representative 

Systemsb Notes

TDEMI Metal 

Detectors: 

Production EMI

High:

Standard detector for EM. 

High industry familiarization. 

Detects ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects.

Medium to High:

Typically utilizes 1 m wide by 

0.5 m or 1 m for transmitter and 

receiver coils, but alternate sizes 

are available. Can be used in 

most traversable terrain. Most 

commonly used instrument is 

widely available. Processing and 

interpretation are relatively 

straightforward. Classification 

possibilities exist for multichannel systems.

Average 

Average in typical 

terrain. Below average 

when arrays of multiple 

detectors are used.

Geonics EM61

Geonics EM 61-hh

Geonics EM61-MK2

Geonics EM61-MK2 

HP

Geonics EM63

G-tek/GAP TM5-EMU

Schiebel AN PSS-12

Vallon VMH3 

Digital signal 

should be coregistered with 

positional data for 

best results. 

Detection depths 

are highly 

dependent on coil 

size (number of 

turns and wire 

resistance are 

important) and 

transmitter power.

TDEMI Metal 

Detectors: 

Advanced EMI

High:

Some may be used in 

production mode to detect 

subsurface metallic objects, 

and all can collect static 

measurements over a target 

location to record entire EMI 

response pattern. Greatest 

ability of all sensors for the 

classification of anomalies as 

either TOI or non-TOI. Detect 

both ferrous and non-ferrous 

metallic objects.

Low to Medium:

MetalMapperTM, TEMTADS, 

and ALLTEM require the use of 

a vehicle to tow the sensors to 

the location of an anomaly. 

Other sensors are man portable. 

One-meter-wide coil (or greater) 

limits accessibility in forested or 

steeply sloped areas; however, 

man-portable systems have the 

same accessibility as productionlevel EMI sensors.

Average 

Use of the advanced 

systems often represents 

additional surveying 

and processing costs, 

which may be largely 

offset by the decrease in 

the intrusive 

investigation costs.

ALLTEM

BUD

Handheld BUD

MetalMapperTM

MPV EMI

TEMTADS

TEMTADS MP 2x2 

Cart

Currently, only the 

MetalMapperTM is 

commercially 

available. All 

other systems are 

in development 

and testing.
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Technology Effectivenessa Implementabilitya Cost Representative 

Systemsb Notes

FDEMI Metal 

Detectors

Low-Medium:

These systems have not been 

the primary detector in any 

highly ranked UXO detection 

systems. However, experience 

demonstrates capability of 

detecting small items and 

potential for improved 

classification information with 

multi-frequency digital units. 

Not good for detecting deeply 

buried, single items. High 

industry familiarization. 

Detects both ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects.

High:

Handheld detectors are light and 

compact. Can be used in any 

traversable terrain. Widely 

available from a variety of 

sources. Classification 

possibilities exist among some 

multi-channel systems.

Lower than average 

cost in typical terrain, 

with the exception of 

the Geophex GEM3, 

which is average

Fisher 1266X

Foerster Minex

Garrett

Geophex GEM3

Minelabs Explorer II

White's All-Metals 

Detector

Analog output not 

usually coregistered with 

positional data. 

Digital output 

should be coregistered with 

positional data.

Flux-Gate 

Magnetometers

Medium:

Have been used as the primary 

detector in traditional magand-flag and mag-and-dig 

operations. High industry 

familiarization. Only detects 

ferrous objects.

High:

Light and compact. Can be used 

in any traversable terrain. 

Widely available from a variety 

of sources.

Lower than average on 

most terrain

Chicago Steel Tape 

(magna-trak 102)

Ebinger MAGNEX 120 

LW

Foerster FEREX 4.032

Foerster FEREX 4.032 

DLG Schonstedt 52-

CX

Schonstedt 72-CX

Vallon EL 1302D1 or 

1303D

Analog output not 

usually coregistered with 

positional data
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Technology Effectivenessa Implementabilitya Cost Representative 

Systemsb Notes

Optically Pumped 

Magnetometers

High:

Standard detector for digital 

magnetic data collection for 

UXO detection. High industry 

familiarization. Only detects 

ferrous objects.

Medium to High:

Relatively light and compact and 

can be used easily in open areas. 

Can be used in most traversable 

terrain. Widely available from a 

variety of sources. Processing 

and interpretation require trained 

specialists. Classification 

possibilities are limited to 

magnetic susceptibility / 

magnetic moment estimates and 

depth estimates. Detection 

capabilities are negatively 

influenced by iron-bearing soils.

Average in typical 

terrain. Much below 

average when arrays of 

multiple detectors are 

used.

Gem Systems GSMP40

Geometrics G-858

Geometrics G-822

Scintrex Smart Mag

Digital signal 

should be coregistered with 

positional data for 

best results. 

Cryogenic 

Magnetometers

High:

Research instrument that has 

promise for improving 

detection depth. Low industry 

familiarization. Detects 

ferrous objects only.

Low:

Research instrument currently 

undergoing testing and 

modifications and only useful in 

open, level terrain. Minimal 

availability and still requires 

validation testing before being 

implemented on UXO field 

surveys. 

Much Higher than 

average. Very low 

availability.

Limited 

commercial 

availability

Sub Audio 

Magnetics

Medium:

Detects both ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects. 

Capable tool for detection of 

deep UXO. Detects deepest 

UXO. Low industry 

familiarization.

Low:

High data processing 

requirements. Available from 

one source. High power 

requirements. Longer than 

average setup times.

Higher than average. 

Very low availability.

GAP Geophysics PTY 

- SAM

Not commercially 

available
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Technology Effectivenessa Implementabilitya Cost Representative 

Systemsb Notes

MagnetometerElectromagnetic 

Detection Dual 

Sensor Systems

Higher:

Detects both ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects. 

Medium industry 

familiarization. Higher 

potential for classification than 

individual EM or magnetic 

sensor.

Medium:

High data processing 

requirements. Available from 

few sources.

Higher than average. 

Lower costs using a 

towed array platform.

ERDC EM61HH & G822 

SAIC MSEMS (manportable)

SAIC STOLS / 

VSEMS (vehicular)

Commercially 

available

Airborne Multi- or 

Hyper-spectral 

Imagery and 

Infrared Sensors

Low to Medium:

Detects both metallic and nonmetallic objects. Only detects 

largest UXO. Requires line of 

sight. Low industry 

familiarization. Effectiveness 

increases when used for WAA 

in conjunction with other 

airborne technologies.

Medium:

Requires aircraft and an 

experienced pilot. Substantial 

data processing and management 

requirements. Available from 

few sources.

Low-Medium per acre

when surveying large 

areas (> 500 acres). 

Additional costs include 

aircraft rental/purchase 

and maintenance costs 

and processing costs.

Active area of 

growth for 

application to the 

UXO problem.

Airborne SAR Low:

Detects large surface metallic 

objects. Requires line of sight. 

Medium industry 

familiarization.

Low:

Requires a specialized aircraft 

and an experienced pilot. Unique 

and substantial data processing 

and management requirements. 

Available from very few sources.

Higher than average 

due to aircraft O&M 

costs and data 

processing and 

validation costs.

Few have applied 

these technologies 

to the UXO 

problem.

Airborne LIDAR Low to High:

Detects both metallic and nonmetallic large surface objects. 

High industry familiarization. 

Effectiveness increases when 

used for WAA in conjunction 

with other airborne 

technologies.

Medium:

Requires aircraft and an 

experienced pilot. Poor 

implementability when 

vegetation obscures ground 

features and it cannot image the 

ground surface. Not used to 

locate individual TOIs. 

Substantial data processing and 

management requirements. 

Available from increasing 

number of sources.

Low-Medium per acre

when surveying large 

areas (> 500 acres). 

Additional costs include 

aircraft rental/purchase 

and maintenance costs 

and processing costs. 

Active area of 

growth for 

application to the 

UXO problem.
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Technology Effectivenessa Implementabilitya Cost Representative 

Systemsb Notes

Ground Penetrating 

Radar (GPR)

Low:

Many mine detection systems 

use GPR as one detector; 

however, has very low success 

rates as a stand-alone UXO 

detection system. Detects both 

metallic and non-metallic 

objects. Susceptible to 

variable environmental/ 

geological conditions. 

Medium industry 

familiarization.

Low:

Large, bulky, requires trained 

operator, and is slow to operate. 

Difficult to use in any but the 

easiest terrain. Widely available 

from a variety of sources.

Higher than average. 

Systems are slow and 

required survey 

coverage is expensive.

GSSI SIR2, SIR3, 

SIR8, SIR10

RAMAC Software

Sensors & Software 

PulseEKKO Pro

Data output is 

usually viewed in 

transects not maps.

a Data positioning is a significant factor that can substantially affect the success of any geophysical technology. The effectiveness and implementability of data positioning 

technologies also must be considered when evaluating a geophysical technology.

b The government does not express nor imply preference for any of the mentioned systems but merely provides these examples for informational purposes only.

Table 6-2: Marine Geophysical Detection Technologies (as of June 2011; modified from Schwartz and Brandenburg, 2009) 

Technology Effectiveness/Special 

Considerations1 Implementabilitya Relative Cost Representative Systemsb 

Metal 

Detection

TDEMI High:

Typical commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 

TDEMI systems are well suited for use in 

shallow underwater environments. Array 

platforms may be hard to control. Depth 

of detection can be increased minimally 

by increasing power output of system. 

Can detect small and large items.

High: 

Detects both ferrous and 

non-ferrous metallic 

objects.

Low:

Relatively low compared 

to other systems.

Ebinger UWEX 700 series 

Geonics EM61S-MK2
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Technology Effectiveness/Special 

Considerations1 Implementabilitya Relative Cost Representative Systemsb 

FDEMI Medium: 

Requires divers that are trained in the use 

of FDEMI technology. Bottom time of 

diver must be taken into consideration. 

Can detect small and large items, but 

detection depth is limited by small coil 

sizes and low power transmitters. 

Prototype towed array detection of 

munitions has been demonstrated.

Medium: 

Detects both ferrous and 

non-ferrous metallic 

objects.

Medium to High: 

Higher costs derive from 

man-hours required for 

trained divers.

DetectorPro Headhunter 

Diver 

Fisher Pulse 8X

Fisher 1280-X Underwater

Garret Infinium LS

Garrett Sea Hunter Mark II

Minelab Excalibur 1000

Fluxgate

Magnetometer

Medium:

Fluxgate magnetometers are typically 

reliable, rugged, have low energy 

consumption, and are less susceptible to 

errors. Can detect small and large items.

High: 

Detects ferrous metallic 

objects

Low Ebinger MAGNEX 120 LW

Foerster FEREX 4.032

Foerster FEREX 4.032 DLG

Kokkola Dredging Co. mag 

array

Vallon-Etl303D2-

Metal 

Detection

Optically 

Pumped

(Atomic Vapor)

Magnetometer

High:

High level of industry familiarization for 

optically pumped magnetometers with 

COTS underwater units available. Can 

detect small and large items. Higher 

sensitivity (versus fluxgate) - 40% 

increase in detection range for given size 

magnetic target.

High: 

Detects ferrous metallic 

objects

Medium to High: 

Higher cost derives from 

autonomous vehicle 

(AUV)

or remotely operated 

vehicle (ROV) use

G880 Cesium Marine Deep 

Tow Magnetometer 

GTK UW mag array

Proton Precession

Magnetometer

Medium:

Low level of industry familiarization for 

proton magnetometer utilization for 

munitions work. Sampling rates must be 

factored into tow speed. Can detect small 

and large items.

High: 

Detects ferrous metallic 

objects.

Low Discover Underwater Proton 

Magnetometer

JW Fishers Proton 4 MX500 

Digital Magnetometer
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Technology Effectiveness/Special 

Considerations1 Implementabilitya Relative Cost Representative Systemsb 

MagnetometerElectromagnetic 

Detection Dual 

Sensor Systems

High (for detection):

System integration and timing of 

signals/readings need to be carefully 

maintained. Can detect small and large 

items. Prototype underwater system still 

in development. Currently limited to 

about 10 feet of water depth.

High: 

Detects both ferrous and 

non-ferrous metallic 

objects

Medium USEMS

Sonar SSS Low (for UXO detection), High (for 

visualization of water body floor 

surface):

Visualizes shapes of both metallic and 

non-metallic objects. Will not identify 

munitions covered by sediment, plant 

growth, or rock. Can detect large items, 

but actual capabilities and limitations for 

detecting and classifying munitions are 

unknown. Medium-low industry 

familiarization. 

Medium (for detection), 

High (for visualization):

Creates image of large 

areas of the sea floor, 

but munitions must be 

on surface or proud and 

uncluttered by nearby 

environmental factors

(such as coral, rocks, 

and vegetation). 

Requires boat, trained 

operator, experienced 

field driver crew, and 

low vegetation; calm 

water may be needed. 

Vegetation can hinder 

acoustic signal 

propagation.

Average for marine 

investigations

EdgeTech DF-1000

Fishers SSS-100k/l600K

GeoAcoustics

Klein 3000 Series SportScan

Klein 5500

Marine Sonic Technologies

Tritech SeaKing Towfish

Sonar MBES Low (for detection), High (for 

bathymetry):

Theoretically can provide enough detail 

to identify munitions on or proud of the 

water bottom, but capabilities, 

interferences, and limitations are untested 

and unknown.

High: 

Produces highresolution bathymetry 

data throughout the 

survey area.

Low to Medium Kongsberg EM 3002

Kongsberg EM 2000

RESON SeaBAT
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Technology Effectiveness/Special 

Considerations1 Implementabilitya Relative Cost Representative Systemsb 

High-resolution, 

portable SONAR 

systems

Low (for detection), High (for imaging 

seafloor):

Can assist ROV/ AUV and divers with 

identification of munitions in turbid 

waters. Specific models can be used up 

to 3000 m deep. Can detect small and 

large items depending on system used 

and distance from object. Object must be 

on or proud of the sea floor.

High: 

Produces highresolution sonar 

imagery even in areas of 

high turbidity.

Medium BlueView

Dual Frequency 

Identification Sonar

SBP Low (for detection), High (for sediment 

imaging):

High-resolution sub-bottom systems have 

been used to identify buried objects but 

not likely to detect munitions unless 

fairly large. Not economical because 

100% coverage would be needed; could 

be deployed with other 100% coverage 

mapping.

High: 

Allows for the 

identification and 

measurement of various 

sediment layers that 

exist below the 

sediment/water 

interface.

Medium to High Bathy 2010

Geo Chirp

Geo Chirp 3-D 

Imagenex OF 1030

Sonar Synthetic 

aperture sonar 

(SAS)

Medium (detection), High (imaging 

seafloor):

SAS technology is still relatively new. 

Munitions detection capability versus 

proud targets is promising, but limited 

demonstrations. Low-frequency 

prototype SAS has demonstrated 

detection of partially buried objects.

Medium to High:

Synthetic aperture sonar 

moves sonar along a 

line and illuminates the 

same spot on the 

seafloor with several 

pings.

Medium Kongsberg HISAS 1030

BOSS Medium (for detection):

Known systems are still experimental; 

currently demonstrated detection 

capabilities show very consistent 

detection through 30 cm of sand. 

Classification capabilities unknown

High: 

BOSS generates images 

of objects buried in 

underwater sediments.

Medium to High CHIRP Lab SAS 40 

Channel

CHIRP Lab 252 Channel

a Data positioning is a significant factor that can substantially affect the success of any geophysical technology. The effectiveness and implementability of data positioning 

technologies also must be considered when evaluating a geophysical technology.

b The government does not express nor imply preference for any of the mentioned systems, but merely provides these examples for informational purposes only.
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Figure 6-15: Example of an SSS Sensor 

6.3.7.5.1.3. SAS is similar to SSS except that it uses multiple pulses to create a large 

synthetic array or aperture (see Figure 6-16) (Hansen, 2011). SAS uses the forward motion of a 

small sonar array to synthesize a much larger array. The larger synthetic array effectively

increases the resolution in the down-line direction and the SNR. By modifying the aperture 

length of the signal, the down-line resolution remains constant and is independent of frequency 

and range. This enables lower operating frequencies to be used, which increases the range of the 

sonar signal without negatively affecting the performance. SAS systems also have the advantage 

of a wider field of view, which results in a larger angular response from objects on the seafloor. 

This reduces the possibility of missing potential targets on the seafloor (Fernandez et al., 2003). 

The increased resolution of SAS may make it suitable for detection of UXO that are lying proud 

on the sediment surface. Recent sensor response modeling research indicates that that SAS can 

indeed detect large metal objects; however, the simulated SAS was unable to detect an 81-

millimeter (mm) mortar (Lim, 2008). Other studies indicate that SAS can detect large munitions 

(e.g., 155 mm projectiles) lying proud on the sediment surface, but these studies didn’t include 

smaller munitions (Williams et. al., 2010).

Figure 6-16: Example of an SAS Sensor 
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6.3.7.5.1.4. BOSS is wideband sonar that generates three-dimensional imagery of 

buried, partially buried, and proud targets (see Figure 6-17). It is a type of SAS system that uses 

hydrophone receiver arrays to transmit an omnidirectional acoustic pulse and to record the 

energy backscatter from both the sediment surface and sediment layers. The recorded 

backscatter is focused via image processing to generate images of the top and side views of 

buried objects. Images of surface and subsurface objects are created using real apertures in the 

cross track direction and synthetic apertures in the along-track direction. Focusing of the sonar 

energy in the near field creates plan view and cross sectional images of partially and fully buried 

objects. BOSS systems have shown the ability to detect ordnance buried below the sediment 

surface (Kerry, 2010). No validation studies have been performed at this time, however, so the 

system’s UXO detection capabilities and limitations are unknown. Some studies indicate that 

determination of the burial depth is possible, although further testing with UXO is required. 

Figure 6-17: Example of a BOSS Sensor 

6.3.7.5.2. LIDAR. LIDAR is more commonly used in terrestrial investigations for WAA 

of range-related features but can be used in underwater investigations to map bathymetry of a 

water body. LIDAR systems transmit laser light pulses into the atmosphere and record the 

energy that is reflected off of objects, both on the surface (land and water surface) and from the 

bottom of the water body. Bathymetric LIDAR receives two frequency pulses, one frequency is 

reflected from the surface of the water body, and the other is reflected from the bottom of the 

water body. Variations in the travel time between the two pulses then are used to determine the 

depth of the water body. If the water body is clear, bathymetric LIDAR can reach up to 50 m of 

water depth (NOAA, 2011). Decreasing levels of water clarity decrease the effective depth of 

the bathymetric LIDAR system. Bathymetric LIDAR may be more expensive than MBES for 

many sites but is likely a better choice for determining bathymetry in areas with rugged 

shorelines that could prevent surface vessels from operating effectively and/or safely without 

prior, detailed knowledge of the water depths. 

6.3.7.5.3. SBP. Sub-bottom profilers function similarly to echo sounders in that they 

transmit a sound pulse, or ping, that is recorded after the sound pulse has reflected back to the 

sensor (see Figure 6-18). However, sub-bottom profilers transmit the sound pulse vertically 

downward and are seismic reflection, in principal. When the pulse encounters boundaries 
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between two layers that have different acoustic properties (i.e., acoustic impedance), a portion of 

the pulse is reflected and a portion is transmitted through the boundary and is reflected when it 

encounters another, deeper boundary. The thickness and density of sediment layers can be 

estimated using the travel time and reflected amplitude strength (Funk et al., 2011). Sub-bottom 

profilers can be used to determine the different sediment layers and areas with concentrated 

munitions; however, they are unlikely to detect individual UXO. Sub-bottom profiler signal 

frequency affects the ability to identify sediment layers. Higher frequency signals provide 

greater resolution than lower frequency signals; however, the higher frequency signals attenuate 

more rapidly and won’t penetrate as deep as the lower frequency signals.

Figure 6-18: Example of an SBP 

6.3.7.5.4. Optical Systems. There are two types of underwater optical systems that can 

be used for WAA in underwater environments: camera (video and still) and laser line-scan. 

Cameras use ambient or strobe light to capture a photograph of the water bottom, analogous to 

orthophotography. Laser line-scan systems record the time of return and reflected intensity from 

a laser pulse that is used to create raster images of the sediment bottom. Similar to LIDAR, laser 

line-scan systems measure range to the bottom, obtain a measure of reflectance from every laser 

pulse, and produce an image built up from thousands of successive laser pulses (ITRC, 2010). 

Like orthophotography, underwater optical sensors provide an image of the bottom surface. 

They have no ability to penetrate the bottom, and the usefulness for WAA can be degraded by 

vegetation and the turbidity of the water. Heavy vegetation or high turbidity levels may make it 

difficult to recognize targets of interest in an underwater photograph; the three-dimensional 

information available from a laser line-scan image may help with this problem. At present, laser 

line-scan systems are not common in the commercial market (ITRC, 2010). 

6.4. Positioning and Navigation Techniques. 

6.4.1. The precision, and often the accuracy, of measured geophysical data positions are 

critical components of the geophysics products. Because the ultimate goal of magnetometer and 

EM surveys is to reproduce the actual potential field that exists over a given site, the success of 
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the surveys relies heavily on how well the geophysical system can accurately and precisely 

locate where each measurement was actually taken. 

6.4.2. We define precision as how well a positioning system can register where one 

measurement was taken with respect to all other neighboring measurements that were taken (see 

Figure 6-19). We define accuracy as how well a positioning system can register where 

measurements were taken with respect to a geographic coordinate system. This term is used to 

define how close reported coordinates are to the actual, physical locations on the Earth where the 

measurements were taken. In most cases, the terms precision and accuracy need not be 

differentiated and only the term accuracy need be used. However, there could be some cases 

where the accuracy of a group of measurements is not critical to a project’s objectives but the 

precision is (for example, during site characterization or in advanced classification). 

Figure 6-19: Example of Positioning Precision

6.4.3. There are three levels of accuracy needed for geophysics to support the MMRP: 

6.4.3.1. Screening level to determine areas of interest as implemented by airborne sensors 

or characterization efforts by ground based sensors by corridors, transects, or meandering 

pathways. Typical accuracies will be sub-meter to tens of meters, and precision typically will be 

sub-meter.

6.4.3.2. Area mapping as performed by man-portable and towed arrays. Typical 

accuracies will be sub-meter to several decimeters, and precision will be centimeter to decimeter. 
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6.4.3.3. Interrogation, where highly accurate and dense data are acquired to interrogate 

and then, by post processing the accurate layered data, classify a previously located target. 

Typical accuracies and precisions will be centimeter to sub-decimeter. 

6.4.4. The remainder of this subchapter describes various positioning options for 

geophysical surveys. 

6.4.4.1. Line and fiducial positioning (also referred to as line and station, conventional 

positioning, or straight-line profiling) is the simplest form of geophysical data positioning and 

has been in use for the longest period of time. The premise of line and fiducial positioning is that 

the geophysical instruments are operated in straight lines between fixed, known locations. Often, 

a rectangular coordinate system is used to define a local Cartesian coordinate system over a 

given area. These areas usually are called grids, and each grid is uniquely identified. The 

normal convention is to assign Cartesian coordinates of zero east (or zero “x”) and zero north (or 

zero “y”) to the southwestern-most corner of a grid. Grid dimensions can be tens of meters to 

several hundred meters on a side. The geophysical measurement positions in the grid are 

calculated by collecting data in a straight line from one known location in the grid to another 

known location in the grid. Most often, fiberglass measuring tapes are stretched along either the 

southern and northern edges of the grid or the western and eastern edges of the grid, from one 

grid corner to the next. In this manner, the distance gradations on the fiberglass tapes provide 

the known locations along the grid boundaries, and the geophysical operator can traverse the grid 

from one known point to another with relative ease. As the operator traverses the grid to collect 

data, the geophysical instrumentation is set up to collect data either at regular intervals in time 

(time-based triggering) or at regular intervals in distance by use of an odometer trigger (distancebased triggering). Note that these are triggering mechanisms only and are used to cause the 

instruments to take and record a measurement. Common time-based triggering intervals are 0.1 

sec (10 hertz [Hz] measurement rate) and common distance triggering intervals are 20 cm. The 

data logging system is configured to capture the starting location, the direction of travel, the 

measurement triggering parameters, and any other instrument-specific information that is needed 

to calculate positions of individual geophysical measurements that are recorded. Since the 

distance traveled along each survey line is known, all measurements recorded along a linear 

segment can be equally spaced between the known points between which the data were 

collected. Often, intermediate known points, or fiducial marker lines, also will be established 

within a grid by stretching additional fiberglass measuring tapes parallel to, and at equal intervals 

between, the fiberglass tapes placed along the grid’s boundary. These intermediate markers are 

used by the operators to help maintain straight survey lines and to allow them to make fiducial 

marks at known points within the data stream. Data that are marked with a fiducial mark (often a 

special character appearing in a marker column within the data stream) signify the sensor was at 

a known location at the time that measurement was made. Figure 6-20 illustrates a grid setup 

over a 50 m by 50 m area. In this example, there is one intermediate fiducial line setup between 

the southern and northern grid boundaries, and data are to be collected along parallel north- and 

south-oriented lines. The arrows along the lines indicate the planned direction of travel along 

each line. Referring to Figure 6-20, data are collected in the following manner: 

a. The operator aligns the equipment along the line to be traversed and enters line-specific 

coordinate and triggering information into the data logger. 
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b. The operator places the sensor directly over the marker along the grid boundary and 

begins collecting data along the line immediately as he/she begins moving. Or the operator 

places the sensor outside of the area to be surveyed and begins moving along the line to be 

traversed. As the sensor crosses over the grid boundary, the operator immediately begins data 

collection. 

c. The operator maintains a straight-line traverse along the line to be surveyed and uses a 

toggle switch or other momentary switch to enter fiducial marks when the sensor moves directly 

over a fiducial line. If a time-based triggering system is being used, the operator must maintain a 

constant pace between all known locations (i.e., between the start of line location and the first 

fiducial mark, the first and next fiducial mark, etc., and the last fiducial mark and the end of line 

location). If distance-based triggering is being used, then the operator need not maintain a 

constant pace, but he/she must maintain forward travel at all times.

d. When the sensor passes over the boundary that defines the end of the line, the operator 

immediately ceases collecting data.

Figure 6-20: Line and Fiducial Grid Setup

6.4.4.2. Figure 6-21 illustrates a typical data stream of EM61-MK2 data collected using 

distance-based triggering. This figure is provided to help the reader understand how data are

collected and what the collected data look like when the line and fiducial method is used. In this 

example, the line number (e.g., Line 0) corresponds to the Easting, or x coordinate, along which 

data were collected. Data were collected in north-south directions. 
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6.4.4.3. Differential GPS (DGPS) and real-time kinematic (RTK) DGPS is now the 

primary navigational method in MMRP geophysical surveys. Software for most geophysical 

systems now includes a means of integrating GPS positions with geophysical data. GPS 

equipment varies drastically in price and quality; therefore, a minimum standard for equipment 

to be used in DGM surveys must be defined. The level of accuracy required for a specific 

project depends on the goals. For characterization surveys, accuracy within 10 m may be 

acceptable, while a more detailed investigation may have more demanding requirements. 

Figure 6-21: EM61-MK2 Data Stream

6.4.4.3.1. Small handheld units manufactured for recreational use are not acceptable for 

DGM surveys where reacquisition of anomalies is required. These units typically cost $150 to 

$400 and, while helpful for finding general locations, are not capable of the level of precision 

necessary for most DGM surveying. However, they may provide the needed accuracy for 

performing initial characterization work. When Selective Availability (SA) is not in use by the 

DoD, these GPS units can achieve accuracies of approximately 10 m. With SA activated, 

accuracy drops to approximately 100 m. Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is a system 

of satellites and ground stations originally developed for aviation, which provides GPS signal 

corrections. WAAS-enabled handheld GPS receivers are reported to have accuracy of 3–5 m. 

6.4.4.3.2. The use of DGPS allows for the correction of errors in positioning from SA and 

other sources, which include clock errors, atmospheric effects, and signal reflections. Sub-meter 

accuracy is possible using DGPS, given favorable conditions. Four types of DGPS are in use: 1) 

utilizing GPS base stations that transmit corrections via radio, commonly known as RTK; 2) 
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using U.S. Coast Guard or DOT beacons transmitting corrections; 3) using a satellite-based 

service, such as the OmniSTAR system; and 4) Web-based differential corrections. 

6.4.4.3.3. Post-collection processing of GPS data also is possible using data collected by a 

nearby base station whose data are made available to the public. 

• DGPS makes use of the Carrier Phase, which allows accuracies within 1–20 cm. 

Correction of bias factors may be accomplished in real time, using a RTK GPS system, or 

through post processing (PP). Both RTK and PP systems utilize a base station, set up on a 

known point, which then transmits corrections to a roving GPS unit via radio (RTK), or records 

base station data that are used to apply differential corrections to the recorded roving GPS data 

(PP). DGPS is the most accurate and common form of GPS surveying performed for UXO

detection.

• The U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center operates the most widely used real-time DGPS 

service, utilizing two control centers and a network of broadcast stations, or “beacons.” Realtime differential correction requires a GPS receiver that is tuned to the frequency of the 

broadcast real-time correction message. When a real-time correction message is present, the 

receiver applies the differential correction to GPS data concurrently with the collection of field 

data. An effort is underway to expand DGPS coverage through a seven-agency partnership for 

the Nationwide Differential GPS (NDGPS) program. The data can be accessed for free, and an 

accuracy of 1–10 m normally is possible using the transmitted corrections. Visit the U.S. Coast 

Guard Web site (http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/) to view current coverage for the NDGPS system. 

• Subscription-based correction methods, such as the OmniSTAR system, use a network 

of reference stations to measure atmospheric interference inherent in the GPS system. Reference 

data are transmitted to global network control centers where they are checked for integrity and 

reliability. The data are then up-linked to geostationary satellites that distribute the data over 

their respective footprints. Using satellite rebroadcast overcomes the range limitations of 

ground-based transmissions. Additionally, wide-area solutions, such as those provided by 

OmniSTAR, correct for errors associated with a single reference station solution. The result is 

consistently high quality differential corrections available anywhere within the continental 

United States plus much of Canada and Mexico. With the OmniSTAR system, two levels of 

service are available: OmniSTAR VBS and OmniSTAR HP. The VBS service provides submeter accuracy, while the HP offers improved accuracy but its capabilities have not been 

evaluated for the MMRP. 

6.4.4.3.4. The number and location of satellites visible to the antenna and the presence of 

obstructions influence the level of accuracy for a GPS reading. Depending on the projectspecific needs, different levels of GPS data quality may be acceptable. Improvements to GPS 

performance in obstructed view areas continue to improve, and the PDT should evaluate current 

systems to determine if handheld GPS units may meet project objectives. Handheld GPS units 

may only be able to consistently achieve a 2 m level of accuracy in wooded areas; however, that 

may be sufficient to show that a transect was collected along a straight line. Additional factors 

that affect GPS data quality are discussed below:

• A factor called DOP (dilution of precision) is a measure of the level of precision that can 

be expected for a particular arrangement of satellites. The DOP is computed from a number of 
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factors, including HDOP (horizontal), VDOP (vertical), and TDOP (time). Together, these 

factors are used to compute the PDOP (position dilution of precision). Lower DOP values 

indicate better accuracies are being achieved by the DGPS system. Although PDOP is 

commonly used, HDOP and TDOP may be more applicable to DGM work, in which the x, y 

coordinates are used to map anomalies. GPS accuracy in the vertical dimension is less than in 

the horizontal. Most GPS receivers can be programmed to output the calculated DOP values 

(HDOP, PDOP, etc.). For DGM surveys, DOP values should be below 6 when using code-only 

systems, and the DOP values should be below 12 when computing code and phase solution. 

These values are based on information provided by several DGPS vendors; alternative DOP 

maxima may be acceptable based upon the system’s published technical specifications.

• Although PDOP (or HDOP) gives some indication of data quality, an important 

indicator of data quality is the number of satellites used for determining position and the SNR of 

each that is being detected by the GPS receiver. It is possible to have a low PDOP and still have 

significant errors in positioning, especially with few satellites and/or low SNRs from one or 

more satellites. A minimum of four satellites is needed to determine a three-dimensional 

position; however, accuracy increases with additional satellites. For DGM surveys, a minimum 

of four satellites should be used at all times for GPS data collection.

6.4.4.3.5. If geophysical data is recorded in a separate device from the GPS data, all 

measurements in each data file must have an associated time stamp, which is used later to merge 

the position readings with the geophysical data. This introduces a potential source of error that 

can be difficult to detect and correct; therefore, data collection in this manner is not 

recommended. Rather, all data from geophysical and navigation instruments should be streamed 

into a single recording device (typically a field computer), which generates time stamps for all 

data streams using the same system clock. When navigation and geophysical data are collected 

independently, it is crucial that the times be synchronized to permit accurate location of the data. 

GPS satellites use atomic clocks capable of extremely accurate time keeping. Most code only 

and code and phase systems use the satellite clock information to continuously correct any drift 

in the time basis of the land-based receivers. Geophysical instruments use less sophisticated 

clocks, which may drift in relation to the GPS clocks. Prior to collecting data, the times between 

all instruments must be synchronized to within 0.25 seconds for surveys performed at normal 

walking speeds. Tighter synchronization will be required for surveys performed at greater 

speeds. When finishing a grid, transect, etc., check the synchronization of the data recorders 

again and record any difference noted. If the difference has increased by more than 0.25 seconds 

(for a total difference of more than 0.5 seconds), the time differences will require correcting. A 

linear clock drift usually can be assumed. 

6.4.4.4. A Robotic Total Station (RTS; example is the Leica 1200) operates under a 

different concept than the other positioning systems. The RTS essentially is an automated laser 

survey station that derives its position from traditional survey methodology by determining the 

station coordinate position and orientation based upon reference to two existing known points 

establishing a baseline. The RTS tracks a prism attached to the geophysical sensor and computes 

the location. See Figure 6-22. The robotic portion maintains track on the moving prism and 

records relative position and elevation in reference to the survey baseline. Dynamic positions 

may be recorded at several times a second. 
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Figure 6-22: Example of RTS Single-Point Position Tracking

6.4.4.4.1. The technology must have constant line-of-sight from the single point RTS 

station to the roving prism. Position gaps must be interpolated with loss of line-of-sight. With 

the use of the appropriate firmware and operation procedures, the RTS can maintain lock in 

moderate wooded areas by predicting the location of the sensor and then reacquiring it following 

the obstructions. The technology can provide sub-centimeter accuracy for static positioning in 

open areas; however, interpolations for areas with loss of line-of-sight, such as obstructions 

caused by tree trunks and branches, dilute this precision. 

6.4.4.4.2. For visibility, the prism is generally on an extended pole above the geophysical 

sensor. Error can be introduced by sloped terrain where the sensor lean provides a variable 

offset in relation to the actual sensor location. A position accuracy of 0.07–0.27 m has been 

demonstrated consistently in field trials. 

6.4.4.5. Laser fan systems (example is the ArcSecond UXO Constellation) use the 

precision of laser measurements in a different way than the RTS. Rather than taking a range and 

angle measurement to the rover from the RTS instrument as referenced from an established 

baseline, the laser transmitter system takes angular measurements in reference to multiple laser 

transmitters or beacons. A scale factor is applied during setup by the system hardware, by 

reference to a known distance or by known points to establish distances and known points, which 

are referenced to establish the coordinate reference. These angles are solved to the rover’s 

geometric location and scales applied for coordinate positional output. Three-dimensional 

position and, in some configurations, attitude and orientation are determined at up to 40 Hz. 

Generally, four transmitters are set up around the perimeter of the work area. See Figure 6-23. 

Since this system is laser based, it requires line-of-sight for the rover, but it is more accurate than 

the RTS in open and obstructed areas because of the high positional sampling rate and the 

redundancy of measurements from multiple transmitter locations. Like the RTS, threedimensional positions must be interpolated for times when the rover does not have visibility by 

two transmitters. Unlike the RTS, the rover is not affected by instrument lean. The system 

projects the position to the desired spatial instrument reference point. Some configurations also 

capture attitude and orientation to permit advanced geophysical sensor modeling, which provides 

local high three-dimensional accuracy for anomaly interrogation. A disadvantage is the 

additional hardware for the multiple transmitters and a maximum range with the external 

transmitter strobes of 100 m. A position accuracy of 0.01–0.18 m has been demonstrated 

consistently in field trials (average 0.01 m interrogations, 0.04 m area navigation, and 0.11 m as 

picked from the geophysics). 
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Figure 6-23: Example of a Typical Laser Transmitter Layout 

6.4.4.6. A radio frequency (RF) system (example is the ENSCO Ranger) exploits a unique 

direct sequence spread spectrum measuring system to provide precision geolocation and 

simultaneous data communications. Multiple base-station radios are used to measure their 

distance to one or more mobile radios. These multiple distance measurements then can be used 

to compute the coordinates of the mobile radios. Repeated, sequential distance measurements 

and coordinate computation enables tracking the mobile radio’s path. This navigation system is 

directly integrated with a data logger and geophysical instrumentation. See Figure 6-24. 

6.4.4.6.1. The RF system communications architecture is based on direct sequence spread 

spectrum (DSSS) in the 2.4-gigahertz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical band. This allows the 

system to operate as unlicensed transmitters under Federal Communications Commission rules 

with a 1-watt transmit power. Core circuitry takes advantage of widely available and 

inexpensive components commonly used in 802.11b wireless network products. The key 

element of the system is the ability to accurately measure distance. Methods for using a DSSS 

radio for semiprecise time-of-flight measurement are well understood for coarse measurement. 

This system differs in that a fine measurement is made to estimate more precisely the time-ofarrival (and, hence, the distance traveled) of a signal. It is this fine measurement that provides 

the sub-meter accuracy.

6.4.4.6.2. An improvement to this system is having the radio navigation system 

augmented with an inertial navigation system (INS). The INS systems use the Ranger position 

as a starting point and the INS to acquire a high accuracy relative position for three-dimensional 

instrument tracking. A position accuracy of 0.17–0.57 m, similar to dynamic DGPS, was 

demonstrated for Ranger. The INS enhancement for the interrogation areas has demonstrated a 

relative position accuracy of 0.03–0.05 m. 
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Figure 6-24: Example of an RF Positioning System

6.4.4.7. An acoustic navigation system (example is the Ultrasonic Ranging and Data 

System) utilizes ultrasonic techniques to determine the location of a geophysical instrument each 

second. It consists of three basic elements: a data pack, up to 15 stationary receivers (SRs), and 

a master receiver. The data pack is mounted on the geophysical sensor backpack with the 

ultrasonic transducer mounted approximately 1 m above the sensor. The data pack fires the 

transducer; by monitoring the time-of-flight, the location of the geophysical sensor can be 

determined. The SRs are placed throughout the survey area with about nine required per acre. A 

minimum of two is required to be on known points. The system software automatically 

determines the locations of the SRs by utilizing the time-of-flight information among all SRs. 

Finally, the master receiver and laptop computer act as the master timer between the 

components, as the data processor, and as the data collector. The computer computes the sensor 

position location and displays the survey data. Position accuracy of 0.15 m is expected with 

proper SRs distributed at up to a 150-foot spacing. Figure 6-25 shows an example of an acoustic 

positioning system.

6.4.4.8. Some geophysical systems incorporate additional equipment to improve 

positioning accuracies. These include digital tilt meters to record roll and pitch of sensor 

platforms and digital compasses or gyrocompasses to record platform bearing. 

6.5. Geophysical System Deployment Platforms. Geophysical instruments can be deployed 

using various platforms in order to collect data in the most efficient manner over a particular 

project property. 

6.5.1. Man-Portable Systems. Many geophysical instruments can be deployed using 

individuals to carry or pull the equipment across the survey area. See Figure 6-26. 
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Figure 6-25: Example of an Acoustic Positioning System

Figure 6-26: Example of a Man-Portable Geophysical System

6.5.2. Multiple Instrument Arrays. In cases where a particular geophysical instrument 

provides good detection results and the terrain permitting, several sensors can be joined in an 

array that is pulled behind a vehicle to achieve greater data density and greater production rates 
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than possible with a single sensor system. However, due to access and mobility limitations, such 

arrays generally are limited to large, open areas with relatively flat terrain. See Figure 6-27. 

Figure 6-27: Example of a Multiple Instrument Array

6.5.3. Airborne Systems. Recent developments in sensor technology, computers, and 

navigation techniques have led to the effective use of airborne techniques for geophysical 

surveys at MRAs. Successful airborne techniques have included magnetic, electromagnetic, and 

LIDAR surveys. Potential airborne techniques include infrared, hyperspectral imaging, and SAR

but require further validation testing using both helicopter and fixed-wing platforms. Airborne 

surveys have the potential to achieve greater data density and production rates than possible with 

ground-based systems. However, due to access and site-specific requirements, airborne surveys 

generally are limited to large open areas and relatively large anomalies because the increased 

distance from the targets to the sensor reduces the ability to detect smaller objects. At project 

properties where large areas exist that allow the platform to fly close to the ground (i.e., 

grasslands or agricultural areas), airborne systems can provide a method for footprint analysis to 

identify the high anomaly density areas or the location of large items. See Figure 6-28. 

Figure 6-28: Example of an Airborne Geophysical System
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Magnetometer Sensors Support Spars

Ballast

6.5.4. Underwater Systems. Recent developments in sensor technology, computers, and 

navigation techniques also have led to the effective use of geophysical surveying for UXO in 

shallow marine environments. The surveys have included magnetic, EM, and SSS methods. See 

Figure 6-29. 

Figure 6-29: Example of an Underwater Geophysical System

6.6. Geophysical Data Analysis Work Flow. 

6.6.1. Overview. Digital geophysical systems produce data that offer several advantages 

that geophysicists can use to determine what targets identified during a MR are most likely to be 

TOIs. Digital geophysical systems offer the ability to evaluate anomaly selection criteria and to 

analyze the characteristics of detected anomalies to decide whether or not they should be placed 

on dig lists. As discussed in Section 6.3.5 of this manual, advanced EMI sensors may be used to 

classify targets as either TOI or non-TOI. Based on how an anomaly is classified, a decision can 

be made as to whether the PDT should proceed and excavate that anomaly.

6.6.1.1. “Anomaly classification” is used in reference to determining whether anomaly 

characteristics indicate that a target is or is not a TOI. There is a range of meanings when using 

the term anomaly classification. Typically, it has been applied to the process of performing 

inversion of geophysical data to obtain dipole model polarizabilities; however, anomaly 

classification and inversion are not synonymous, and anomaly classification doesn’t always 

include the inversion process. Sometimes, the term may be applicable when anomalies are 

selected for investigation using peak anomaly response and other anomaly selection parameters 

(e.g., anomaly size, SNR). The inversion process extracts the dipole model polarizabilities, or 
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betas, which then can be used to calculate feature parameters (e.g., size, decay, shape 

parameters) that enable the classification of anomalies as either TOI or non-TOI. 

6.6.1.2. Anomaly classification methods may lead to significant cost savings during 

remedial and removal actions; however, classification methods may be less successful for TOI in 

a certain physical state (e.g., low-order rounds, asymmetrical rounds) or for some scenarios with 

low SNR. In addition, anomaly classification using production-level DGM sensors in survey 

mode is significantly less successful than when using data collected with advanced EMI sensors 

in a cued, static mode with the system situated over the buried metallic object (i.e., the sensor 

doesn’t move until all data have been collected over the target). Inversion and modeling of 

advanced EMI data produces more accurate parameter estimates than for production-level DGM 

data; however, the success of any anomaly classification method is dependent on the data 

analyst’s ability to use a computer model to accurately estimate anomaly parameters. The more 

accurate parameter estimates can lead to a much greater reduction in the number of non-TOIs 

that requires excavation to ensure that all TOIs have been removed from the site. Inversionbased classification using production-level DGM data may be possible given very specific site 

conditions, which include a limited number of TOI types at the MRS, the types of TOI at the 

MRS are large, and the non-TOIs at the site are much smaller than the TOI types. Classification 

attempts using data collected from production-level DGM surveys are more limited in their 

ability to accurately reproduce anomaly parameters than advanced EMI sensors due to the 

following limitations: 

a. Survey data are recorded over a relatively small time window within the decay curve.

b. Sensor positioning uncertainty degrades target parameter estimates.

c. Across-track and down-line spacing may not provide adequate sampling of the response 

of the subsurface metallic item.

d. Overlapping signals from multiple items cannot be distinguished with current 

processing (but they can with the advanced sensors). 

e. Strong SNR approaching 100 is required for classification (Keiswetter, 2010). 

f. The EM61-MK2 has a limited number of time gates.

g. The recorded signal shape is distorted by analog smoothing (i.e., averaging of the 

response within a time window). 

h. Towed arrays have limited target illumination with transmitters operated 

simultaneously. 

i. Averaging functions and stacking functions in the EM61 degrade true decay 

characteristics.

6.6.1.3. Figure 6-30 shows the classification process, or geophysical data analysis work 

flow, that geophysicists should use to determine which anomalies are TOIs (and, therefore, 

should be put on the dig list) and those anomalies that are not TOIs (and should not be put on the 

dig list). The anomaly classification process consists of a series of steps plus QC processes for 
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each of the steps (see Chapter 11 for discussion of anomaly classification QC). The steps within 

the anomaly classification process and the section in this chapter in which each step is discussed 

are listed below. 

a. Conduct production-level DGM surveys. 

b. Select anomalies from the DGM data (see Section 6.6.2).

c. Invert DGM targets for their location (optional; see Section 6.6.3). 

d. Acquire cued data using an advanced EMI sensor (optional; see Section 6.6.4). 

e. Extract anomaly parameters (see Section 6.6.5).

f. Collect training data (optional, see Section 6.6.6). 

g. Set classifier rules and apply classifier (see Section 6.6.7).

h. Populate dig lists (see Section 6.6.8). 

i. Conduct anomaly resolution (see Section 6.6.9). 

j. Evaluate dig results and classifier performance through a feedback process (see Section 

6.6.10). 

6.6.1.4. The primary goal of anomaly classification is to identify geophysical anomalies 

that cannot be caused by UXO or DMM (i.e., non-TOIs) so that the non-TOIs can be removed 

from the dig list and left in the ground. The process and decision rules that the qualified 

geophysicist uses to determine whether anomalies are TOIs or non-TOIs must be considered on a 

site-by-site basis, be based on knowledge of the anticipated UXO at the site, be documented, 

make logical sense, and be based on an assessment of the data from which the model parameters 

were extracted. When the geophysicist is uncertain whether feature parameters indicate an 

anomaly is a TOI or not a TOI, it is almost always better to include the anomaly on the dig list. 

This is especially true for removal actions that may be the final stage of investigation at the 

MRS. For earlier stages (such as the RI phase), it may be less critical to recover all selected 

anomalies; however, unsampled populations of UXO during the RI may lead to incorrect 

assumptions about the nature of UXO within the MRS during later MMRP phases. Throughout 

the intrusive process, a feedback loop should be employed to evaluate dig results to assess the 

effectiveness of the classifier. If TOIs are found at anomalies that were not classified as TOIs, 

the classification method should be modified. 

6.6.2. Selecting Anomalies. A geophysical anomaly is defined as geophysical 

measurement(s) that are distinguishable from nearby background measurements. Quantifiable 

anomaly characteristics are limited to digital geophysical mapping systems and some analog 

systems that provide a digital readout of the instrument’s measurements. Quantifiable 

characteristics are identified below. All other systems offer only the ability to use qualitative 

characteristics to detect and select anomalies. We use the terms “anomaly detection” and 

“anomaly selection” independently, though in some systems, particularly in analog systems, 

these two actions occur simultaneously. Anomaly detection is used in reference to how above-
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background measurements (anomalies) are identified. The anomaly selection process is how 

above-background measurements are selected for further evaluation through the anomaly 

classification process. Section 6.6.2.2 presents discussion of detecting and selecting anomalies 

for analog geophysical systems, while the remainder of this section discusses the individual 

components of the DGM data anomaly selection process. 

6.6.2.1. Pre-processing of Geophysical Data. Many software packages can be used to 

evaluate geophysical data. Often the geophysical equipment manufacturers provide specialized 

software for specific systems. This software is used primarily to transfer the data from the 

instrument to the computer and perform corrections to the data. Corrections such as navigation 

adjustments and rotation and translation of coordinate systems are necessary before analyzing the 

data. The corrected data then are transferred into a software package designed to facilitate 

contouring, mapping, and selection of anomalous data potentially representing UXO. 

6.6.2.1.1. Field editing of the data includes removal of data spikes, correcting for fiducial 

marks, and exporting ASCII data files. 

6.6.2.1.2. Initial processing (sometimes referred to as “pre-processing”) of the 

geophysical data includes incorporation of navigation and positional information, instrument 

drift and leveling, heading error corrections, and latency corrections. 

6.6.2.1.3. All processing needs to be well documented so that results can be checked and 

procedures verified. 

6.6.2.2. Detecting and Selecting Anomalies with Analog Systems. Analog systems 

used in audio mode or by monitoring meter deflections only offer the ability to discern relative 

size and relative signal strength. An experienced operator sometimes can use these 

characteristics to estimate source depth and source size, but such estimates are subjective in 

nature. Often the option for selecting or rejecting anomalies detected with these devices is 

limited to rejecting only those anomalies with very small spatial extent (small size) and high 

signal strength characteristics. Such anomalies are expected to be associated with small nearsurface metallic sources because the strength is high (if the small piece of metal were deep, the 

strength would be much less) and the spatial extent is small (if the source were a large piece of 

metal, the spatial extent would be large). If small UXO is a TOI, this approach would not be 

valid. Due to their inherent limitations, analog systems do not offer any additional options for 

differentiating TOIs from non-TOIs based on anomaly characteristics. All claims made by 

contractors or field personnel regarding their ability to classify TOIs from non-TOIs should be 

proven for each system (i.e., instrument and operator) via demonstration and continually verified 

in the field throughout project execution via blind seeding and post-dig verification. 
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Figure 6-30: DGM Data Analysis Workflow 
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6.6.2.3. Detecting Anomalies from DGM Data. DGM systems offer the ability to 

quantify numerous anomaly characteristics. One or more of these characteristics are used to 

distinguish whether the characteristic values for one measurement or a group of two or more 

contiguous measurements are distinguishable from background measurements. This process 

often is automated using software tools. Table 6-3 lists common anomaly characteristics that can 

be quantified using DGM systems, the reliability of the estimate of the feature, and the relative 

ease of feature extraction during inversion (note that this relative ease considers the amount of 

time to extract the parameter but does not factor in the amount of time required to refine 

polygons used to select data for inversion). These anomaly characteristics are used to provide 

justifications and explanations for not excavating all anomalies that may meet one or more noncritical characteristic criteria. Basically, when anomaly selection criteria are defined, certain 

assumptions are attached to those criteria because it is not technically feasible to unambiguously 

define each anomaly characteristic for each TOI type and scenario (item condition, item depth 

and orientation, local clutter, geology variations, etc.) on an individual project site. The solution 

is to define selection criteria that are conservative enough to reliably select geophysical

anomalies for analysis in the classification process. In addition, 5% to 20% of non-TOIs (i.e., 

anomalies that would not otherwise be placed onto dig lists) should be added to the dig list as a 

measure of continuously checking the assumptions used in developing the anomaly selection 

criteria. 

Table 6-3: Production-Level DGM Data Parameters

Feature Parameter

Reliability of DGM 

Anomaly Characteristics / 

Extracted Parameters 

Relative Ease of 

Obtaining from 

DGM Data

Anomaly peak response for all channels of data recorded High Medium

Spatial extent (area) of above-background measurements High Easy

Estimated target depth Low Easy

Estimated SNR based on all above-background 

measurements (also referred to as the anomaly power 

SNR)

High Medium

Estimated magnetic moment (for magnetometer systems) High Easy

Estimated time-constant and related decay-curve 

characteristics (for TDEMI systems) High Easy

Estimated polarizabilities Low Hard

Estimated conductivity and susceptibility (FDEMI) High Easy

Estimated shape Low Hard

Estimated size Medium Hard

Estimated location of item's center Low Hard

Estimated weight Low Hard

6.6.2.4. Selecting Anomalies using Response Curves. For a well-characterized sensor, 

such as the EM61-MK2 or magnetometers, the geophysicist should use sensor response curves to 

determine the peak anomaly response threshold to use in anomaly selection. NRL has calculated 

the theoretical sensor response curves for standard munitions items and industry standard objects 
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(ISOs) for the EM61-MK2; they are available in NRL Report NRL/MR/6110--08-9155: EM61-

MK2 Response of Standard Munitions Items and NRL Report NRL/MR/6110--09-9183: EM61-

MK2 Response of Three Munitions Surrogates, respectively. The above NRL Report on ISOs, 

as well as the ESTCP report on the Geophysical Systems Verification (GSV) process (ESTCP, 

2009), shows that ISO response is approximately equal to the EMI response for similar 

shaped/length munitions. The same is true for munitions for which curves do not yet exist but 

have similar shape/length as those that have curves. The above reports, as well as a response 

calculator to generate response curves for additional munitions types, can be downloaded from.

https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response. NRL also has calculated 

theoretical response curves for standard munitions items for magnetometers; they are available in 

NRL Report NRL/M/6110—12-9385 and can be downloaded from http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA557775. This report includes tabulated magnetometer response curves 

and scaling factors for changes in orientation and strength of the Earth’s magnetic field due to 

location, as well as discussion of the difficulties encountered due to remanent magnetization.

https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response/Geophysical-SystemVerification

6.6.2.4.1. The theoretical response curves can be used to determine an anomaly selection 

threshold using either of the following two methods: 

6.6.2.4.1.1. Anomaly Selection Based on Removal Depth. If the PDT needs to remove 

all munitions to a given depth, they can use the sensor response curves to determine the 

theoretical sensor response in the least favorable orientation for each anticipated munitions type 

at the site. The anomaly selection threshold should be adjusted from the theoretical response to 

account for errors encountered during DGM data collection (e.g., sensor bounce) and to add a 

conservative factor to account for the potential of other response factors associated with how 

systems are deployed. This anomaly selection method can be performed prior to mobilizing to 

the field and without the aid of Instrument Verification Strip (IVS) data evaluation.

6.6.2.4.1.2. Anomaly Selection Based on TOI Type and Background Noise. The 

theoretical sensor response curves also may be used to determine the anomaly selection threshold 

when the PDT wants to investigate all anomalies but doesn’t know the maximum depth to which 

the TOI will be removed. In this scenario, the anomaly selection threshold should be based on 

some multiple of the RMS background noise measured at the IVS (typically five to seven times 

the RMS noise) for the munitions with the smallest response in the least favorable orientation. 

As when basing anomaly selection on the removal depth, the anomaly selection threshold should 

be adjusted downward to account for inherent signal level variations encountered during 

dynamic DGM data collection. Figure 6-31 shows an example of determining an anomaly 

selection threshold based on the RMS noise. In this example, the RMS noise is approximately 

0.75 millivolts (mV); the geophysicist has chosen to base the anomaly selection threshold on a 

value of five times the RMS noise (or 3.75 mV). Without factoring for potential noise and error 

sources, the theoretical maximum detection depth for the most conservative munition in the least 

favorable orientation in this example is approximately 14 inches below ground surface (bgs) and 

approximately 26 inches bgs for the most favorable orientation. 

6.6.2.4.2. If seed item response curves don’t exist for a particular munition that will be 

used to develop the anomaly selection threshold at a site, the geophysicist should develop 
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response curves by measuring the response of the munition at multiple depths for the most (i.e., 

vertical) and least (i.e., horizontal along track) favorable orientations. Once the test 

measurements are made, the theoretical curves can be calculated using the response calculator 

available at https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response/GeophysicalSystem-Verification. 

6.6.2.4.3. Many selection criteria initially are based on the theoretical response curves. 

While the theoretical response curves for TOIs are well documented, variations in response due 

to orientations and offsets of the buried items, site-specific noise, and errors due to data 

collection variables (e.g., sensor speed, sensor bounce) could cause the measured response in the 

production-level DGM survey to fall outside the theoretical response curves. In addition, known 

errors in accurately measuring seed depth, orientation, bounce, etc. could lead to 50%+ 

difference from predicted value, which may or may not give the geophysicist confidence that the 

instrument is operational. In order to more tightly reproduce the response curve value, data 

should be collected in a static mode with an ISO on a jig or some fixed and easily measured 

offset from the coil as an initial test. Once this has proven that the instrument itself is 

functioning as expected, a project specific IVS value may be determined by averaging response 

over several initial runs and then requiring a tighter % reproducibility to this value to show 

repeatability and continued functioning of the instrument. Studies show that increasing the speed 

of data collection increases signal noise and decreases anomaly peak responses and SNR 

(USAESCH, 2004). It also is known that there is a high degree of variability in responses from 

different TOIs of the same model when buried in the same orientation and at the same depth 

(USAESCH, 2011). Therefore, anomaly selection criteria may require a degree of conservatism 

be included in their definitions. 

6.6.2.4.3.1. The theoretical response curves were developed for items centered 

underneath the sensor. Variations in offset and orientation of the anomaly source affect the 

measured response when the source is under the footprint of the sensor, and the anomaly dropoff is even greater when the anomaly source is outside the sensor footprint. Because the actual 

data line spacing varies from the designed line spacing (e.g., due to obstructions in the field, not 

walking a straight line), a worst-case scenario line spacing should be evaluated during the 

planning stages of a project to determine how the actual line spacing may alter the maximum 

detection depth for the site-specific TOI. The response calculator can be used to determine the 

predicted response at worst-case scenario offsets given planned line spacing.

6.6.2.4.3.2. In order to account for measurement variability during the DGM survey, the 

geophysicist should evaluate the different error sources that may affect the theoretical maximum 

detection depth capability of the DGM sensor. Error sources in the field may increase or 

decrease the measured DGM response relative to the theoretical sensor response curves. Errors 

that decrease measured responses decrease the depth to which the DGM sensor can reliably 

detect munitions. Failure to account for field variations in measured responses leads to 

inaccurate determinations of the depth to which TOIs have been removed from the site, as well 

as inaccurate estimates of the residual hazards remaining on the MRS after the investigation has 

been completed. Error sources may be evaluated at the IVS or by estimating the approximate 

variations that may be encountered during field activities. 
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Figure 6-31: Anomaly Selection Threshold Selection Example 

6.6.2.4.3.3. The estimation of error sources, or measurement variability, is required to 

account for process-specific effects that alter the ability of the geophysical system’s depth 

detection capabilities and must be quantified and accounted for to ensure the project’s DQOs are 

met. In order to quantify or estimate the potential effects on the depth detection and anomaly 

selection criteria, error ranges for each error type need to be quantified and then summed. The 

potential effects associated with each error type should be quantified or estimated. Once the 

individual errors are determined, the geophysicist should sum the individual errors to determine 

the total error for the project. Figure 6-32 presents an example of estimating the error in the IVS 

for three types of error. These errors are not the only types of errors that the geophysicist should 

consider but are three of the most common types of errors. The variation in response for each 

error type should be determined, and then their cumulative effect on the measured response 

should be calculated. The geophysicist should factor the total cumulative error bars into their 

anomaly selection threshold evaluation. 

6.6.2.4.3.4. It is critical that the manner in which anomaly characteristics are defined 

factor in slight variations in data quality, such as changes in instrument height, changes in survey 

speeds, variations in coverage densities, variations in background levels, and changes in 

filtering/leveling parameters that are used. The goal is to demonstrate the field data are of the 

same quality and were collected and processed using the same parameters as the data used to 
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define the anomaly selection criteria. Normally, the QC plan includes tests to confirm these 

parameters in field datasets do not vary significantly from those of the datasets used to define the 

anomaly selection criteria.

6.6.2.5. TOI Detectability. TOI detectability is dependent upon numerous factors; the 

general rule is “the larger the TOI, the deeper it can be detected.” The theoretical response 

curves, as discussed above, provide the basic detection abilities for a well-characterized sensor. 

Many factors must be considered when evaluating whether a given geophysical system or 

technique can detect a given TOI at a specified burial depth. Factors that are specific to TOIs

that affect how deep they can be detected include their length, diameter, surface area, volume, 

weight, and three-dimensional orientation with respect to the geophysical sensor when the sensor 

is passed over them. Factors of the geophysical systems that are relevant to TOI detection depths 

for EMI sensors and magnetometers are presented in Tables 6-4 and 6-5, respectively. 

6.6.2.6. Penetration Depth Considerations. The maximum possible depth of TOI at an 

MRS is an important consideration in the selection of an appropriate detection system. If 

munitions are buried intentionally (i.e., the munition is DMM), factors affecting burial depth 

may include type of soil, mechanical vs. hand excavation, and depth of water table, among 

others. If the munition was fired or dropped, then the depth of penetration can be estimated by 

considering soil type, munition type and weight, impact angle, and impact velocity. There are 

many cases where UXO can penetrate deeper than geophysical systems currently can detect 

reliably. At such locations, it is possible that undetected UXO remains deeper than it can be 

detected. Recent attempts to quantify the depth penetration range for specific munitions include 

the development of UXO-PenDepth software (ESTCP, 2010). Because UXO-PenDepth is still in 

development, it is not required to be used on projects; however, the calculations may enable the 

user to determine the approximate depth range of fired UXO at a particular range. If used, the 

software should be used with care since comparisons with actual sites indicate that UXO 

sometimes can be found at depths greater than those calculated using the software (ESTCP, 

2010). The topic of ordnance penetration is still under discussion in the MMRP community. For 

up-to-date information on this topic, contact the EM CX. 
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Figure 6-32: Estimating Measurement Variability and Error
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Figure 6-32: Estimating Measurement Variability and Error (continued) 
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Table 6-4: Effect of Various Factors on TOI Detectability for EMI Sensors

Factors that Affect TOI 

Detectability Effect on EMI Sensors

Physical size of the instrument 

sensor

Larger EMI sensors transmit a larger current and create a larger magnetic 

field, thereby increasing the TOI detection depth. 

Operating power of the transmitter 

coil

Increasing the operating power of the transmitter coil increases the TOI 

detection depth.

Sensitivity of the receivers Increasing sensor sensitivity increases the EMI sensor TOI detection 

capabilities.

Measurement/sampling densities Increased sampling densities increase the TOI detection depth ability of EMI 

sensor, particularly for small TOIs.

Speed of the survey platform Increased survey speed decreases the SNR and the data density, which may 

decrease the effective TOI detection depth.

Distance of the coils above the 

ground

Sensor response falls off as 1/r6, where r is the distance between the transmit 

coil and the object.

Geologic/cultural/environmental 

conditions

Geologic and other cultural features (e.g., electric power lines) can increase 

the noise and decrease the TOI detection depths for EMI sensors.

Table 6-5: Effect of Various Factors on TOI Detectability for Magnetometers

6.6.3. Invert for Location. As discussed above, anomalies typically are selected using 

automated target selection routines that place targets at the peak of an anomaly. The locations of 

these targets are dependent on the positioning system employed during the DGM data collection 

as well as the corrections applied to those locations during data processing. The geophysicist

should evaluate whether performing anomaly inversion and feature extraction of the DGM data 

(see Section 6.6.5 for further discussion of feature extraction) may aid in further refining the 

interpreted target locations. This extra step should be considered for production-level DGM data 

to refine the target location to help minimize anomaly and target reacquisition errors that could 

negatively impact cued data acquisition and the resulting feature parameter estimation. If the 

inversion is successful, the inverted locations may be better representations of the actual location 

of the buried metallic object than target locations derived from traditional anomaly “peakpicking.” There are multiple factors to consider in determining whether performing this extra 

Factors that Affect TOI 

Detectability Effect on Magnetometers

Sensitivity of the magnetometer Increased magnetometer sensitivity increases the TOI detection depth.

Measurement/sampling densities Increased sampling density increases the TOI detection depth.

Speed of the survey platform Increased survey speed decreases data density and may decrease the 

effective TOI detection depth.

Distance of the sensor above the 

ground

Sensor response falls off as 1/r3, where r is the distance between the 

magnetometer sensor and the metallic object.

Geologic/environmental conditions Magnetometers are greatly influenced by rocks/soil with viscous remanent 

magnetization. The increased geologic noise can significantly decrease 

the TOI detection depth of a magnetometer.
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data processing procedure on DGM data makes sense for a particular site. Successful inversion 

of DGM data is highly dependent on down-line data density, line spacing, the type of TOIs

present at the site, and SNR. In order for this additional step to be useful to the project team, the 

data analyst must be able to accurately determine when the inverted results are usable, and the 

time required to implement this step also must be considered against potential gains. For 

example, the inversion process can be very time consuming and not very effective for high 

anomaly density areas, but these may be the areas where it could be most beneficial in reducing 

reacquisition problems. 

6.6.4. Acquire Cued Data. After anomalies have been detected and selected for further 

interrogation from production-level DGM instruments or from advanced EMI sensors operating 

in survey mode, the geophysicist may collect cued data over the interpreted target location. 

Cued data are collected in static mode by placing an advanced EMI over the interpreted target 

location and collecting from the full EMI response. Cued data also can be collected using a grid 

template centered over the target location. It is critical that the advanced EMI be placed over the 

object to the extent practical. If later feature parameter estimation indicates that the sensor 

wasn’t placed within some distance from the target location (e.g., within 0.4 m), the resulting 

model inversion may not be sufficient to properly apply the classifier, and the cued data may 

require being collected again. 

6.6.5. Extract Anomaly Parameters. Advanced EMI systems offer the ability to perform 

an inversion of the cued data to classify anomalies identified during a DGM survey. The 

inversion extracts the dipole model polarizabilities, or betas, which then can be used to calculate 

feature parameters (e.g., size, decay, shape parameters) that enable the classification of 

anomalies as either TOI or non-TOI. There are three types of parameters that are obtained 

throughout the geophysical data analysis workflow: anomaly selection parameters, parameters 

extracted through anomaly inversion, and parameters calculated from the extracted parameters. 

These parameters are discussed below.

6.6.5.1. Anomaly Selection Parameters. Anomaly selection parameters are appropriate 

for use in identifying anomalies in DGM data and are discussed further in Section 6.6.2. 

Anomaly selection parameters also can be used to classify anomalies; however, their use is much 

less accurate than using the betas and calculated parameters discussed below.

6.6.5.2. Extracted Parameters. The dipole model polarizabilities are extracted from the 

advanced EMI sensor data during anomaly inversion. Polarizability is a tensor relating responses 

in x, y, and z directions to the primary magnetic field response in the x, y, and z directions 

(Pasion, 2011). After a suitable yaw, pitch, roll rotation aligns the magnetic field components 

with the target’s three orthogonal axes, the tensor is then diagonal and the remaining elements of 

the tensor are the principal axis betas (e.g., β1, β2, β3) that correspond to excitations in the three 

principal axis directions of the target. 

6.6.5.3. Calculated Parameters. Once extracted from the data, the primary axis 

polarizabilities can be used in equations to calculate additional anomaly characteristics (or 

feature parameters) to use in the classification of anomalies as either TOI or non-TOI. These 

parameters are project-specific and require third-party verification. Review the SERDP-ESTCP 

Web site for the latest information on current methodologies to evaluate polarizabilities, 
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determine size and shape parameters, and classify targets as either TOI or non-TOI. Common 

anomaly characteristics used in the classification process include, but are not limited to, the 

following: 

6.6.5.3.1. Size parameters correlate the net polarizability (i.e., a measure of the sum of 

polarizabilities) to the size of the anomaly source (Bell, 2007). 

6.6.5.3.2. Symmetry of an anomaly is a measure of the object’s shape. Most, but not all, 

TOI is axially symmetric, and β2 is approximately equal to β3 for these TOI.

6.6.5.3.3. Decay attributes measure the decay of the polarizability over time and can be 

calculated for any time gate or principle axis polarizability. The rate of polarizability decay 

relates to the thickness of the metal wall.

6.6.5.3.4. Aspect ratio of an anomaly is a measure of the object’s shape. 

6.6.5.3.5. Fit coherence is a measure of how well a model fits the measured data, which is 

equal to the square of the correlation coefficient between model fit and measured data (Pasion, 

2011; UX-Analyze).

6.6.5.3.6. If errors are encountered during the anomaly inversion process, a qualified 

geophysicist should evaluate each target that returns an error to determine whether additional 

processing of the data would fix the source of the error (e.g., larger windowing of the data 

returns a stable inversion). If additional data processing doesn’t fix the source of the error, the 

error may require re-collection of the data, placement of the target on the dig list, or further data 

analysis. Through further data analysis, the qualified geophysicist may be able to determine that

the anomaly data doesn’t need to be re-collected or the target dug (e.g., original response was not 

strong enough to fit because there was no anomaly in the original DGM data or make a decision 

based on the data available). 

6.6.6. Collect Training Data. Once feature parameters are extracted, the qualified 

geophysicist, or designee, should evaluate the features to determine if there are feature clusters 

that are indicative of TOIs. These feature clusters may be used to determine a preliminary set of 

classifier rules (see Section 6.6.7) upon which the target classification would be based. Prior to 

applying these preliminary classifier rules to the entire dataset, the geophysicist has the option to 

collect training data, which involves investigating a select number of anomalies to verify the 

anomaly classifier rules. Training data may not be needed depending on the project-specific TOI 

and the classification method (e.g., if applying library matching and the geophysicist is very 

confident that the TOIs are all known and represented in the library). If the geophysicist chooses 

to collect training data, the amount of training data required likely would vary on a projectspecific basis. However, the geophysicist should attempt to evaluate all feature clusters that 

could be TOIs in sufficient detail to determine the effectiveness of the proposed classifier. 

6.6.7. Set Classifier Rules and Classify Anomalies. The classification of targets 

requires a principled, data-driven approach to classify targets as either TOIs or non-TOIs by 

analyzing the feature parameters extracted from the data. Classification involves using the 

extracted feature parameters to identify those anomalies that cannot possibly be due to UXO 

(Keiswetter, 2010). The qualified geophysicist may use any of the feature parameters discussed 
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in Section 6.6.5 as a basis for a classifier, so long as the feature can differentiate between TOIs 

and non-TOIs. The below sections present a brief overview of the classification process. 

Consult the EM CX and the SERDP-ESTCP Web sites further guidance on classification in 

general and on selecting feature parameters for a given site and determining the classifier 

threshold. There are two basic approaches to developing classification decisions: statistical 

classifiers and library matching classifiers (Bell, 2011). Both types of classifiers are based on 

signal matching. Library-based classifiers compare anomaly features to features of known TOIs, 

while statistical classifiers compare against the dataset and create their own library. Recent 

demonstrations indicate inexperienced personnel have difficulty identifying unexpected 

munitions types or isolated occurrences of an individual munitions, and almost all personnel are 

challenged in correctly identifying between 2 and 5 percent of the TOI. 

6.6.7.1. Statistical classifiers are automated processes that use one or more feature 

parameters to make a quantitative decision as to whether an anomaly is or is not a TOI. The key 

attributes of statistical classifiers include one or more of the following:

a. Statistically characterize attributes and create group associations, or clusters.

b. Input features include all three primary axis polarizabilities x N time gates.

c. Include machine learning (e.g., support vector machines, neural networks). 

d. Are trained on prior target information to attach labels to the feature clusters.

e. Provide explicit probabilities that the anomaly is a target of interest.

f. Accommodate many attributes and data dimensions (Keiswetter, 2010; Bell, 2011). 

6.6.7.1.1. The key steps in developing classifier rules for a statistical classifier are to:

• locate expected munitions item signatures in feature space;

• sample the feature space (i.e., collect training data) for regions around features that are 

likely munitions (e.g., β1 is much larger than β2 and β3, and β2 is approximately equal to β3) and 

for other feature clusters; and

• train the classifier with labeled features in order to set the decision boundary to exclude 

targets that are not of interest (e.g., high confidence clutter) (Bell, 2011). See Section 6.6.6 for 

further discussion of training a classifier. 

6.6.7.1.2. The performance of statistical classifiers greatly depends on the feature 

parameters used in the classifier. The qualified geophysicist must determine which feature 

parameter(s) work best on a given site since no single classifier works best on all sites. After the 

geophysicist has selected the feature parameter(s) that will be used in the classifier, a boundary, 

or threshold, must be chosen to differentiate between those anomalies that the geophysicist has a 

high confidence are TOIs and the rest of the anomalies. For a statistical classifier, the threshold 

is based on the probability that the anomaly is a TOI, and the goal is to select all of the anomalies 

that cannot be due to TOIs. The initial threshold is selected such that it excludes the interpreted 

non-TOI, and the final threshold is selected after adjusting the threshold to account for 
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unexpected variability in the feature parameter estimates (Keiswetter, 2008). The final threshold 

should be re-evaluated and adjusted, as necessary, through a feedback process as the anomalies 

are excavated. 

6.6.7.2. Library matching classifiers compare the extracted features against a signature 

library for known munitions types and other TOIs (e.g., ISOs). The key attributes of library 

matching classifiers are that they compare polarizability against a library of signatures for 

expected munitions and other training objects.

6.6.7.2.1. The signature matching within library matching classifiers quantifies the degree 

to which the extracted features within the dataset match those for known targets of interest. One 

issue with using library matching classifiers is that the EMI signature for a single munitions type 

may be nominally different for different subtypes of the munitions, depending on inversion, 

errors due to noise, and whether the munition is damaged. To account for these variations, the 

library matching procedures should allow for some variability in the modeled features in order to 

maximize the effectiveness of the classifier.

6.6.7.3. Once the anomaly classifier has been refined via the evaluation of training data, 

the geophysicist should classify anomalies into one of three categories of anomalies. The PDT 

should excavate all anomalies that could be potential TOIs and should not excavate the 

anomalies that are not TOIs unless an unknown type of UXO is encountered during the intrusive 

investigation and the feedback loop analysis indicates some of these anomalies originally should 

have been classified as TOIs.

6.6.7.3.1. Category 1. The anomaly classifier indicates that the anomaly is a TOI. All 

anomalies within this category should be dug. 

6.6.7.3.2. Category 2. The anomaly classifier can’t determine whether these anomalies 

are or are not TOIs. Due to the uncertainty in the classifier results, anomalies within this 

category may or may not be excavated. Decisions to dig these anomalies will be based on one or 

more of the following parameters: 

• Fit error

• Distance from flag

• Distance from the array center

• Axial symmetry

• Library metric within defined range

• Weak signal

• Noisy polarizations 

• DGM anomaly parameters

6.6.7.3.3. Category 3. The anomaly classifier was successful, and the anomaly is 

identified as non-TOI. Because the geophysicist has a high confidence that these anomalies are 

not potential TOI, no Category 3 anomalies are required to be excavated. If, however, unknown 
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munitions types are identified during the intrusive investigation, the feedback loop analysis (as 

discussed in Section 6.6.10) should be performed to evaluate whether other potential anomalies 

have similar features to the newly identified UXO to determine if some of the Category 4 

anomalies should be placed on the dig list. 

6.6.8. Populate Dig Lists. Once the PDT has collected the training data to determine the 

nature of the anomalies within each of the feature clusters (i.e., once feature labels are obtained 

from the training data), the geophysicist should refine and finalize the classifier to ensure that all 

TOIs are recovered. All TOIs, which may include ISO QC blind seeds, are placed on the dig list. 

The order in which anomalies are placed on the dig list is important because the success of the 

classifier is assessed in part as a function of its predictive power. Dig lists are prioritized in the 

following manner: 1st, anomalies that cannot be analyzed as discussed in Section 6.6.7 are 

placed at the top of the dig list. Next, anomalies are sorted in order of the confidence the analyst 

has that the anomaly is a TOI, highest confidence first, lowest confidence last. Although TOIs 

are based on classifier rules, it is important to include as much information as is reasonable on 

the dig lists, to include any information needed to facility anomaly reacquisition, resolution and 

the feedback process. At a minimum the following information should be included: the detection 

peak response from the DGM survey, predicted depth from the inversion, and predicted anomaly 

parameters from the classification process (e.g., munitions type or anomaly group such as small, 

medium or large). Although TOIs will be based on the classifier rules, it is important to include 

DGM peak responses from the DGM survey and any other required parameters are placed on the 

dig list to aid in the anomaly resolution process. The classification methodology and rationale 

for inclusion of the anomaly on the dig list should be documented completely and reviewed by 

government geophysicists for compliance with geophysicist needs and project objectives. Figure 

6-33 presents an example of the classification rationale and decision logic for determining 

whether an anomaly should be placed on a dig list. 

6.6.9. Anomaly Resolution Process. The term anomaly resolution is used in reference to 

all activities related to reacquiring previously detected anomalies and/or excavating anomalies to 

the point they are unambiguously explained. There are three key aspects to anomaly resolution: 

anomaly reacquisition, anomaly excavation (including reporting dig results), and post-dig 

verification sampling. 

6.6.9.1. Anomaly reacquisition is a critical element of DGM systems because this task 

must physically match anomalies on dig lists with their sources. This is achieved by using a 

method to navigate to the selected location, reproducing a signal at that location and placing a 

plastic pin flag and/or painting the ground surface above the reacquired source. The challenge is 

in matching selected anomalies with their true sources because those sources often are buried or 

otherwise obscured from view. In cases where an anomaly being sought has no other nearby 

anomalies or other sources of interference and the anomaly has a high SNR, this task can be 

fairly straightforward and have little likelihood of reacquiring the wrong source. In other 

circumstances, reacquiring the originally interpreted anomaly could be difficult, and 

reacquisition procedures would need to be explained in great detail. The following are critical 

factors to consider in planning and performing anomaly reacquisition procedures. All 

procedures should be fully described in the UFP-QAPP or SOPs and have QC processes to 

ensure the project’s anomaly reacquisition performance metrics are met.
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6.6.9.1.1. In order to ensure that the correct anomaly was reacquired and excavated, the 

geophysicist must establish performance metrics to monitor the offsets between the interpreted 

and reacquired target locations (see Chapter 11 for more details on establishing performance 

metrics). Key questions that the geophysicist should ask include the following: 

• What is the accuracy of the reported dig list coordinates, and what is the accuracy of the 

navigation system used to reacquire those points? 

• What is the allowable distance between reacquired location and interpreted location? 

6.6.9.1.2. Often the sum of errors in the DGM positioning is less than 0.5 m and the 

accuracy of navigation tools used to reacquire anomalies typically is between 2 and 30 cm. The 

accuracy of the interpreted coordinates can be even greater when closely detected anomalies are 

aggregated together. Therefore, search radii for locating the true anomaly source must factor the 

sum of all potential positioning and reporting errors in interpreted anomaly locations. It has been 

observed that inversions from advanced sensors produce x, y, and z estimates that can have an 

accuracy of approximately 5 cm (Andrews et al., 2011). 
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Figure 6-33: Example Classifier Decision Logic
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6.6.9.1.3. If the reacquisition team will be able to reproduce the originally interpreted 

response, what are the tolerances for the reproduced response? Anomalies detected in dynamic 

DGM surveys often have detected amplitudes that are less than those observed during 

reacquisition. Further, if weaker signals are present in proximity to a selected anomaly location, 

criteria must be established to either flag all nearby anomalies regardless of reacquired amplitude 

or reacquire all anomalies meeting project-specific criteria, typically peak amplitude. Criteria 

also must be established for minimum and maximum allowed signal strength of reacquired 

anomalies; any location where a source cannot be located within those criteria should be labeled 

as an ambiguous reacquisition result. 

6.6.9.1.4. If the reacquisition team will not be able to reproduce the originally interpreted 

response, what measures are used to provide confidence the correct anomaly is actually 

reacquired? What constitutes an ambiguous reacquisition result and what procedures are in place 

to resolve such results? Reacquisition procedures that use geophysical systems not having the 

same detection capabilities as those used to collect the original data must have very specific 

procedures in place to prevent the wrong anomaly from being reacquired. Typical criteria to 

include in such procedures are limits on how far a suspect source location can be placed from the 

originally interpreted location, requiring all detectable anomalies within the total error radius be 

flagged for excavation, requiring that all dig results be reviewed by the interpreting geophysicist 

or other designated geophysical personnel, requiring a percentage of all anomalies be verified 

using the original geophysical system during post-excavation verification, and including the 

requirement to return to all ambiguous reacquisition results. 

6.6.9.2. In order to resolve all anomalies on the dig list and pass QA/QC, the UXO dig 

team must clear the entire footprint of the DGM anomaly. In the past, UXO technicians may 

have cleared only a 3-foot search radius around an anomaly; however, this could lead to leaving 

munitions in the ground. Many geophysical anomalies are due to multiple subsurface objects 

and can have a large footprint. Clearing only to the 3-foot radius may mean that all sources of 

the anomaly are not excavated. The anomaly resolution process should ensure that the anomaly 

size is removed to below the anomaly selection threshold for the entire anomaly footprint to 

avoid leaving behind potential munitions. 

6.6.9.3. Anomaly excavation routines are covered under the intrusive operations 

section(s) of the UFP-QAPP. This topic is included herein as it pertains to meeting project 

objectives of unambiguously resolving geophysical anomalies. The disposition and final 

location details of each anomaly normally are recorded on the final dig sheets, which should be 

submitted to all PDT members IAW project needs and/or SOW/PWS requirements. The 

reported dig results should be reviewed by the interpreting geophysicist or other designated 

geophysical personnel, and those personnel must have authority to require additional 

reacquisition and/or excavation activities be performed for all anomalies having characteristics 

that are not unambiguously explained by the reported dig results. These reviews can include 

automated searches to compare reported findings with predetermined threshold criteria. It is 

important that dig results are reported in sufficient detail so they can be compared to geophysical 

data in order to facilitate an evaluation of whether or not the anomaly was resolved. For 

example, the dig team can be required to report an anomaly source as large (greater than 5 

pounds or greater than 18 inches in length), medium (between 1 and 5 pounds or between 6 to 18 
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inches in length), or small (less than 1 pound or less than 6 inches in length). Automated 

routines then can be developed to compare those reported results to preset anomaly criteria of 

large, medium, or small items using predetermined ranges. Tests where a match is not made 

between reported finding and anomaly characteristics would be flagged for further review by 

qualified geophysicists. Any combination of anomaly characteristics can be developed into any 

number of tests to compare dig results with various anomaly characteristics. Software tools (e.g., 

relational databases, Geosoft’s UX-Process) can aid in simplifying these tests. 

6.6.9.4. Post-dig anomaly resolution sampling is conducted after intrusive investigations 

to verify that the source of the anomaly has been removed during the intrusive investigation. 

Anomaly resolution sampling should be completed after the intrusive investigation within a 

sector (or lot of data) has been completed. The original geophysical instrument used to identify 

anomalies, or one that performs better than it, should be used to verify that the anomalies have 

been resolved. 

6.6.9.4.1. Table 6-6 presents a summary of the number of anomalies that require post-dig 

anomaly resolution given a certain lot size (e.g., number of anomalies) and a desired confidence 

level that less than a certain percentage of anomalies remain unresolved after the investigation. 

The geophysicist must choose the confidence level that is most appropriate for the particular site; 

however, some general defaults are provided for RIs and RAs. Unresolved anomalies are 

anomalies for which a signal remains after the excavation without a complete rationale for the 

remaining anomaly presence. In addition to Table 6-6, the PDT can use VSP’s Anomaly 

Compliance Sampling module to calculate an exact number of anomalies that need to be reexamined for anomaly resolution verification for specific lot sizes. 

6.6.9.4.2. Post-Dig Anomaly Verification Resolution Example. The PDT is performing 

a removal action at MRS Zulu. UXO was found at MRS Zulu during the RI, and the PDT 

decided to use the default confidence level in Table 6-6 (90% confidence < 1% unresolved). 

Each lot represents 1 days’ worth of DGM data collection and anomalies. The number of 

anomalies and the number of anomalies that required post-dig verification sampling for the first 

4 days’ worth of data collected are listed below:

• Lot 1: 73 anomalies, 66 of which are verified post-dig Lot 2: 143 anomalies identified, 

115 of which are verified post-dig 

• Lot 3: 343 anomalies identified, 168 of which are verified post-dig 

• Lot 4: 111 anomalies identified, 98 of which are verified post-dig 

6.6.10. Feedback Process. The geophysicist should employ a feedback process 

throughout the intrusive investigation in order to verify the effectiveness of a classifier and to 

determine if additional types of targets of interest are present on a site that indicates revisions to 

the classifier may be required. If UXO is found at an anomaly that was thought not to have been 

a TOI, it is likely that the classifier needs to be modified to be more conservative. In addition, 

the feedback process should evaluate whether seed items and recovered UXO are within the 

sensor curves after factoring for noise. If the responses associated with recovered UXO or seed 

items are below the sensor response curves, this may indicate there was more noise in the DGM 

survey than anticipated and the anomaly selection threshold may require adjustment.
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Table 6-6: Acceptance Sampling \ for Anomaly Resolution 

Confidence Levels Lot Size (number of anomalies)

50 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000 10,000

70% Confidence < 10% unresolveda 11 11 12 12 12 12 12 12

80% Confidence < 10% unresolved 14 15 15 16 16 16 16 16

90% Confidence < 10% unresolved 18 20 21 22 22 22 22 22

95% Confidence < 10% unresolved 22 25 27 28 29 29 29 29

70% Confidence < 5% unresolved 17 21 23 23 24 24 24 24

80% Confidence < 5% unresolved 21 27 30 31 31 32 32 32

85% Confidence < 5% unresolved 23 31 34 36 37 37 37 37

90% Confidence < 5% unresolvedb 27 37 41 43 44 45 45 45

95% Confidence < 5% unresolved 31 45 51 56 57 58 59 59

80% Confidence < 1% unresolved 40 80 111 138 144 154 158 159

85% Confidence < 1% unresolved 43 85 123 158 172 181 186 187

90% Confidence < 1% unresolvedc 45 90 137 184 205 217 224 227

95% Confidence < 1% unresolved 48 95 155 225 258 277 290 294

Note: Values within the table show the number of anomaly locations chosen for intrusive investigation that require post-dig anomaly verification. All anomalies within the lot 

must be shown to be resolved to meet confidence levels (accept on zero). 

a Default for RIs where UXO or DMM have been recovered

b Default for RIs where no UXO or DMM have been recovered

c Default for RA

These default values have been used in the past; however, they may not be appropriate for all sites and land uses. The PDT must choose the confidence levels and % unresolved 

values that meet the project objectives.
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6.7. Geophysical Systems Verification Planning Considerations. 

6.7.1. Introduction. Verification of a geophysical system’s performance, both analog and 

digital, is a critical component for ensuring that data DQOs and data needs are met on MR 

projects. The GSV process, which consists of an IVS and a blind seeding program within the 

production site, should be implemented IAW the Final Report Geophysical System Verification 

(GSV): A Physics-Based Alternative to Geophysical Prove-Outs for Munitions Response (Final 

GSV Report, ESTCP, 2009) as well as with this EM. The Final GSV Report may be 

downloaded at https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/Munitions-ResponseInitiatives/Geophysical-System-Verification, and tutorials for the GSV process are provided at 

https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response/Geophysical-SystemVerification. GSV is only for DGM of well-characterized instruments; however, as discussed in 

Section 6.6.2.4, the Sensor Response Curve Calculator may be used to generate response curves 

for additional instruments or for munitions that were not included in the NRL Reports listed in 

Section 6.6.2.4. The qualified geophysicist is responsible for ensuring that the geophysical 

prove-out (GPO) or GSV meets the requirements of the project and that the implementation 

meets the standards set out within the project’s UFP-QAPP. 

6.7.1.1. The GSV is the preferred method for verification of digital geophysical systems. 

The geophysicist may determine there is a requirement for a GPO if the DGM or analog 

performance is unknown or responses cannot be predicted. Because of this fact, planning 

considerations for both the GPO and the GSV are presented in the following subsections. If a 

GPO is used instead of the GSV, the geophysicist still should implement a blind seeding program 

following GSV protocols in the production geophysical investigation area as an additional means 

to verify that geophysical data meet the project’s DQOs. 

6.7.1.2. A GPO is required when the DGM instrument is a black box, the sensor response 

can’t be predicted, or the geophysicist cannot determine how to select anomalies for a particular 

sensor. The anomaly characteristics for some digital geophysical instruments cannot be 

predicted. If the geophysicist selects such an instrument, then the instrument should be evaluated 

at a GPO to estimate the detection depth capabilities of the instrument prior to beginning the 

removal action. The GPO should be conducted IAW Section 6.7.3 and the Interstate Technology 

Regulatory Council’s (ITRC’s) Geophysical Prove-Outs for Munitions Response Projects 

(2004). In addition to the GPO, the geophysicist should implement the GSV process, including a 

limited IVS and blind seeding within the production area, to ensure that the geophysical system 

meets the project’s DQOs.

6.7.1.3. The verification of analog geophysical instrument should be performed on an 

instrument test strip similar to an IVS. The verification process should include using an 

audiometer to test the UXO technician’s ability to hear the response to objects within a known or 

constant magnetic field. Daily UXO technician instrument functionality tests must be 

implemented. These tests, however, are not considered part of the GSV process because they 

lack a recorded response and the rigorous evaluations made for digital systems. Blind seeding 

within the production area must be performed. 

6.7.1.4. The following paragraphs describe the PDT’s responsibilities during the GSV. 

The GSV consists of two components: the IVS and a blind seeding program within the 
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production site. The overarching goals of the GSV are to confirm system performance during 

data collection on the production site to ensure that performance metrics or MQOs are met. The 

following paragraphs discuss the planning considerations for the IVS and the blind seeding 

program. The GSV requires that the geophysicist plans to use a well-characterized sensor (i.e., 

one for which sensor response curves exist) or an instrument for which sensor response curves 

can be generated to demonstrate the DGM sensor is functioning IAW the expected response 

characteristics, well-characterized test objects (e.g., standard munitions items, ISOs). The GSV 

also requires that digital data collection be employed during the project (e.g., EM61-MK2, G858). Response curves for the EM61-MK2 for standard munitions items and ISOs are available 

in NRL Report NRL/MR/6110--08-9155: EM61-MK2 Response of Standard Munitions Items 

and NRL Report NRL/MR/6110--09-9183: EM61-MK2 Response of Three Munitions 

Surrogates, respectively. Both of these reports are available from the Internet link provided 

above for the Final GSV Report. NRL also has calculated theoretical response curves for 

standard munitions items for magnetometers; they are available in NRL Report NRL/M/6110--

12-9385 and can be downloaded from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA557775. 

This report includes tabulated magnetometer response curves and scaling factors for changes in 

orientation and strength of the Earth’s magnetic field due to location, as well as discussion of the 

difficulties encountered due to remanent magnetization.

6.7.2. GSV Planning Considerations. This section discusses some of the planning 

considerations associated with GSV. 

6.7.2.1. IVS. The purpose of the IVS is to ensure the DGM instrument functionality prior 

to collecting data within a production area. The IVS also may be used to determine the RMS 

background noise at the site to aid in anomaly selection, as discussed in Section 6.6.2. In 

addition, the IVS is used to quantify the expected errors in recorded response due to variations 

from several factors listed below. Blind seeding results within the production area also should be 

compared to the initial and daily IVS surveys to ensure instrument functionality. 

6.7.2.1.1. Various factors affect the recorded response of DGM instruments. Detailed 

discussions of the variations in response can be found in the Final GSV report (ESTCP, 2009). 

Variations due to individual factors should be quantified to the extent possible during the IVS to 

enable a determination of the approximate total error bars associated with the theoretical 

response curves. For example, several factors affecting the recorded response from seed items 

include, but are not limited to, the following: 

• Location and Depth

• Along-Track Offset

• Instrument Bounce 

• Seed item Orientation

• Remanent Magnetization

6.7.2.1.1.1. Although response curves for three sizes of ISOs have been documented by 

NRL, studies to evaluate the reproducibility of response from identical-sized ISOs from different 

manufacturers show that there is some variability in response. Figure 6-34 shows the stacked 
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EM61-MK2 response for small ISOs from multiple manufacturers buried at three different 

depths in the vertical, horizontal along-track (i.e., inline), and horizontal across-track (i.e., 

crossline) orientations. The solid lines on Figure 6-34 represent the theoretical responses for the 

most and least favorable orientations presented in NRL Report NRL/MR/6110--09-9183. Note 

that the variation in response within individual orientation and depth can be approximately a 

factor of 2. 

6.7.2.1.1.2. It is also important to note that the measured response for the horizontal 

across-track (i.e., crossline) orientation is less than the theoretical response. This is due to the 

averaging function intrinsic to the EM61-MK2. The findings represented in Figure 6-34 

emphasize the importance of measuring the variation of response for the seed item and 

accounting for the potential errors of the seed item since the responses measured in the IVS are 

one of the key variables factors in instrument function verification. See Inert Ordnance and 

Surrogate Item Anomaly Evaluation for detailed information regarding the variability of EM61 

sensor response to common seed items and select munitions (USAESCH, 2011). 

6.7.2.1.2. Selection of the IVS site(s) should be based upon the technical and site-specific 

considerations developed and finalized during the TPP process and/or PDT meetings. Factors to 

be considered include: 

• similarity of terrain, vegetation, and geologic conditions to the production site; 

• proximity to the project site; 

• isolation from overhead power lines, radio transmitters, underground utilities, etc.; 

• convenient access; 

• likelihood that area will remain undisturbed during period of use; 

• ROEs;

• possibility of pre-existing subsurface UXO; and

• need to excavate known and/or unknown anomalies. 

6.7.2.1.3. The following sections identify the key components of the IVS design. More 

detailed guidance on these factors can be found in the Final GSV Report (ESTCP, 2009). 

6.7.2.1.3.1. Pre-Seeding (Background) Geophysical Mapping. After a location has been 

selected and the surface prepared, a pre-seeding geophysical survey will be performed in order to 

determine and document baseline geophysical conditions at the location. The background survey 

also may be used to identify potential subsurface TOIs within the IVS footprint, which may or 

may not be cleared prior to seeding the IVS. 
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Figure 6-34: Example of the Variation in Actual EM61-MK2 Summed Channel Responses 

from Small ISOs from Multiple Manufacturers Plotted as a Function of Depth (USAESCH, 

2011). (Solid lines represent the theoretical responses for the most and least favorable orientations 

presented in NRL Report NRL/MR/6110-09-9183. Note that the significant variations in response 

seen for each orientation and that the actual measured response for the horizontal across track (e.g., 

cross-line) is often less than the theoretical response curve for the same orientation.) 

6.7.2.1.3.2. Size and Configuration. In general, the IVS is approximately 100 feet long 

and approximately 10–15 feet wide. The IVS consists of a centerline (under which the seed 

items will be placed), lines on either side of the centerline at the planned line spacing, one line at 

half of the planned line spacing, and one line to measure the site noise. The noise measurement 

line should be placed far enough away from the seed items to ensure the sensor does not detect 

the seed items. If the particular investigation contains numerous MRSs spread over a large 

distance and areas with potential variations in background response, it may be necessary to 

install more than one IVS. In this instance, the geophysicist may use either one IVS 

configuration that moves from MRS to MRS as the work progresses or multiple IVSs installed 
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and maintained at each site during the duration of the project. Multiple IVSs should be installed 

when there is significant difference between sites (e.g., varying noise regimes due to cultural 

and/or geologic noise) or to support logistics of IVS tasks on large sites or sites that use multiple 

instruments. 

6.7.2.1.3.3. Seeded Items. The geophysicist should develop a listing of ISOs to be seeded 

within the IVS during the TPP meetings and document them within the UFP-QAPP. A single 

ISO seed item is sufficient to demonstrate and document instrument functionality; however, 

more may be used if deemed necessary by the geophysicist. 

6.7.2.1.3.4. Depths and Orientation. The seed items should be buried at specified depths 

and orientations. The seed items must be buried at depths that ensure 100% detection. The 

recommended depth of seed item burial is five to seven times the diameter of the ISO, and the 

orientation should be horizontal and/or vertical to facilitate comparisons to the theoretical 

response curves. After the seed items are buried, care should be taken to blend excavation 

locations back to natural conditions. 

6.7.2.1.3.5. Cultural Interference. Because the IVS is a test of an instrument’s 

functionality, the IVS should be placed within an area that does not have significant cultural 

interference. If the production site has multiple noise regimes (e.g., one area with quiet 

background noise and one area with cultural noise from overhead power lines), the geophysicist

may place a background noise line in multiple areas to estimate the RMS noise for each noise 

regime on the site. This approach is particularly useful for varying the anomaly selection 

threshold across the site if the geophysicist is basing the anomaly selection criteria on some 

multiple of the RMS noise. 

6.7.2.2. Blind Seeding. The goal of blind seeding within the production area is to 

evaluate the dynamic detection repeatability (i.e., response) of the geophysical sensor and 

dynamic positioning repeatability (i.e., offset) and to test anomaly resolution. The blind seed 

items should be ISOs or inert munitions for which response curves exist to enable their measured 

responses in the field data to be compared to predicted response levels. In general, the seed item 

that will stress the geophysical system the most (i.e., the smallest ISO or munitions anticipated at 

a site) should be used as the blind seed item. Significant guidance on the blind seeding process 

is included in the Final GSV Report and not repeated here (ESTCP, 2009); however, some 

additional guidance is provided below. 

6.7.2.2.1. Blind Seeding Frequency. The geophysicist should determine during the TPP 

sessions and outline within the UFP-QAPP the frequency at which blind seeds will be placed 

within the production work site. Chapter 11 provides additional guidance on blind seeding 

frequency, evaluation, and pass/fail criteria. At a minimum, blind seeds should be placed in 

sufficient frequency to determine the quality of each production unit. The production unit could 

be either each grid or transect or each dataset. Placing blind seeds on transects that are not 

predetermined (i.e., not staked out by a surveyor) could be difficult to detect. Blind seeding on 

transects that are not dug (i.e., transects on which anomalies will be counted but not dug) is not 

required. Additional blind seed items should be placed in areas that may present a detection 

challenge (e.g., adjacent to trees, in rough terrain, within areas with high cultural noise). 
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6.7.2.2.2. Locating Blind Seeds. Blind seed item depths and locations need to be 

measured as precisely as possible to enable accurate evaluation of the dynamic response 

repeatability and dynamic positioning repeatability performance metrics, respectively. The most 

accurate depth measurement method is likely a simple measuring tape, which should be used to 

locate the center of the seed item as a depth below ground surface. For determining the 

horizontal location of the blind seed item, a RTK DGPS should be used to locate the centroid of 

the seed item where feasible. Where RTK DGPS is not feasible (e.g., within heavily forested 

areas), other positional methods should be employed (e.g., robotic total stations, distance from a 

known location). It is critical that the geophysicist develops an accurate approach to measuring 

the depth and location of the blind seed items to make sure they enable accurate assessments of 

DGM production data. Small errors in depths will result in relatively large variations in sensor 

response. 

6.7.2.2.3. Blind Seeding Performance Standards. Blind seed item detection MQOs are 

evaluated using the dynamic response repeatability and dynamic positioning repeatability 

performance metrics. The dynamic response repeatability test compares the response of the 

blind seed item and its associated error bar with the theoretical response curves for the seed item. 

Figure 6-35 shows an example of such a comparison (ESTCP, 2009). The measured response 

for each blind seed item should be plotted on the graph as the project progresses to document 

that blind seed items are meeting the project MQOs. For the dynamic positioning repeatability 

test, the interpreted target locations for blind seed items should be compared to the actual blind 

seed item location. The offset, or deviation, between these two locations should be plotted on a 

control plot diagram similar to Figure 6-36 to show the offsets for all blind seed items placed 

within the production site. Chapter 11 provides additional guidance on the standard metrics that 

should be applied for each of these tests. 

Figure 6-35: Comparison of Blind Seed Response with Their Error Bars to the Theoretical. 

 Response Curves for the Most and Least Favorable Orientations (ESTCP, 2009)
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Figure 6-36: Comparison of the Offset Between the Known Location of Blind Seed Items 

 and the Interpreted Target Location (ESTCP, 2009) 

6.7.2.3. Guidance. Refer to the following Web sites for further details and guidance on 

and examples of the GSV process:

a. https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response/GeophysicalSystem-Verification

b. http://symposiumarchive.serdp-estcp.org/symposium2009/sessions/sc-1.html

6.7.2.4. GPO Planning. As discussed above, a GPO should be used when a DGM sensor 

is not well characterized and sensor response curves can’t be generated. The following 

paragraphs describe the PDT’s responsibilities during the GPO process. The GPO can be a 

complex and time-consuming effort; the PDT must collaborate to confine the scope of the GPO 

to basic project needs. 

6.7.2.5. GPO Purpose. There can be many purposes for a GPO, as follows. In the GPO 

Plan, it is necessary to state the prove-out objectives and to describe how these objectives will be 

met. 

6.7.2.5.1. Determine if a particular geophysical system meets detection requirements.

6.7.2.5.2. Determine the optimum system configuration and SOPs. 

6.7.2.5.3. Demonstrate detection depth capabilities. This objective is not recommended 

because a large population of data from national test sites and other GPO sites are available. A 

more reasonable objective would be to demonstrate that the system is meeting typical detection 

performance capabilities for a given TOI and/or that the project objectives, as stated in the 

PWS/SOW, are technically feasible.
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6.7.2.5.4. Assure contractor compliance with the contract. Test plots provide a safe area 

for the geophysical investigation team to develop site-specific field and evaluation procedures 

necessary to demonstrate compliance with project requirements. 

6.7.2.5.5. Evaluate the data collection methods, data transfer method(s), and data transfer 

rates.

6.7.2.5.6. Establish site-specific geophysical data needs and site-specific data quality 

measures and protocols for all work tasks involving geophysics and all work tasks that use 

geophysical data. The GPO provides the geophysicist the opportunity to describe how they 

define “good data” for sensors that currently are undefined or not well defined. Elements that 

affect data usability often will focus on coverage, measurement densities (along-track and 

across-track measurement intervals), and accuracies or precisions of reported measurement 

locations. These elements often assume instrument function checks were successful. For 

example, GPO results for a specific project sensor line assume that spacing be 0.8 m (typical) 

and not exceed 1 m, that along-track measurement intervals be 25 cm (typical) and not exceed 80

cm, and that positioning accuracy is 20 cm (typical) to achieve detection requirements. 

6.7.2.5.7. Establish site-specific anomaly characteristics for selection criteria.

6.7.2.5.8. Demonstrate anomaly resolution procedures to assure contractor SOPs achieve 

both project requirements and QC and QA requirements. Many anomaly resolution procedures 

use geophysical systems with different detection capabilities, and the contractor must 

demonstrate their SOPs account for such differences. See Section 6.6.9 for more information on 

the topic of anomaly resolution. GPO sites located outside of project boundaries are best suited 

to demonstrate all anomaly resolution procedures, including excavation. 

6.7.2.6. Factors in GPO Site Selection. Selection of the GPO site(s) should be based on 

the technical and site-specific considerations developed and finalized during the TPP process 

and/or PDT meetings. Factors to be considered include: 

a. similarity of terrain, vegetation, and geologic conditions to actual field conditions; 

b. proximity to the project property; 

c. isolation from overhead power lines, radio transmitters, underground utilities, etc.; 

d. convenient access;

e. likelihood that area will remain undisturbed during period of use; 

f. ROEs;

g. possibility of pre-existing buried UXO; and 

h. need to excavate known and/or unknown anomalies. 

6.7.2.7. Factors in GPO design. The geophysicist should consider numerous variables 

when planning a GPO, which include, but are not limited to, pre-seeding geophysical mapping, 

the size and configuration of the GPO, and data collection variables (e.g., instrument height, 
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instrument orientation, measurement interval). Further guidance is available in the ITRC’s 

Geophysical Prove-Outs for Munitions Response Projects, which can be downloaded at 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/UXO-3.pdf. 

6.8. Special Considerations for Planning Geophysical Investigations. 

6.8.1. Survey Coverage Considerations. Survey coverage issues may arise when 

competing project objectives are defined within the framework of the project’s DQOs. As an 

example, survey coverage issues will arise in situations where a project objective to not disrupt 

protected or endangered species is stated, but complying with that objective restricts vegetation 

clearance and, therefore, limits or precludes geophysical mapping. Other situations may arise 

where accessibility is hindered by terrain conditions, cultural interferences, or other natural or 

manmade impediments. Another common conflict arises in resources required to meet some 

stated objectives, such as wanting all detected anomalies investigated during a characterization 

project. Often the resources required and costs associated with such an objective will be very 

high, but the value-added to the characterization outcome would be minimal in doing so. 

6.8.1.1. Sometimes compromises can be reached, such as using less sensitive detectors 

that require less vegetation removal and, therefore, minimize impact to native or listed species or 

using anomaly selection schemes that provide representative samples of each different anomaly 

type. Sometimes no compromise can be reached, and either the areas in question will be left 

unmapped or the requisite steps will be taken to make all areas accessible to the mapping and 

response technologies. 

6.8.1.2. Issues impacting survey coverage should be identified as early as possible during 

planning phases. If none are immediately identified during planning but the potential exists for 

such issues to arise, it may be beneficial for the project team to plan for such cases and include 

any such plans in the project UFP-QAPP. In the event compromise strategies are used, it is 

critical that all project team members completely understand the benefits and limitations of the 

compromise strategy in terms of what TOIs likely will be detected and what TOIs may go 

undetected. The characterization and excavation needs listed in geophysical investigation 

strategies can help in identifying and resolving survey coverage issues during project planning. 

6.8.2. Managing False Positives, No Contacts, “Hot Rock” Contacts, and Geology 

Contacts. Many geophysical instruments detect anomalies associated with geology and cultural 

features, such as power lines. When such anomalies are repeatable, they usually are associated 

with geologic sources, also referred to as “hot rocks.” When the sources are not repeatable or are 

detected with highly varying signal strengths, they usually are associated with cultural features 

(such as power lines) or vehicles passing by. In many cases, small TOIs near the surface or large 

TOIs buried deep can have anomaly characteristics similar to anomalies that could be associated 

with local geology. In other instances, TOIs will almost never have geophysical responses 

similar to local geology but may have interference from power lines present over or near a 

project site. Such anomalies usually can be interpreted as cultural interference; however, on 

occasion, these may manifest themselves in geophysical data with anomaly characteristics 

similar to those for TOIs. For any project where the field teams may encounter any of these 

situations, the contractor should develop and submit for government concurrence a plan for

accepting and/or rejecting the reported findings for anomalies that have characteristics of 
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geology/cultural features and UXO. Normally, such plans should be confined to managing lowamplitude and/or small spatial extent anomalies reported as false positives, no contacts, or 

geology (hot rock). These types of anomalies are more prone to have response characteristics 

that could be associated with either a metallic source or some other noise source. This plan 

should define specific metrics for accepting or rejecting anomalies in this category, and the plan 

should identify quantity thresholds that will trigger a re-evaluation of the project methodologies 

to address increased or unexpected high quantities of false positives and/or no contacts 
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CHAPTER 7

Munitions Constituents Characteristics and Analytical Methodologies

1

7.1. Introduction. MC are any materials originating from UXO, DMM, or other military 

munitions, including explosive and non-explosive materials, and emission, degradation, or 

breakdown elements of such ordnance or munitions (10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(3)). This chapter 

provides an overview of the environmental chemistry of MC and the approaches and techniques 

for their analysis. It should be used as background information in conjunction with the 

information on MC sampling considerations and approaches provided in Chapter 8. 

Chemical/physical properties of MC and major transformation products are provided in 

Appendix D. 

7.2. Sources of Munitions Constituents in Munitions. 

7.2.1. Figure 7-1 illustrates the typical components of high explosive (HE) munitions. The 

primary sources of MC, based upon the weight composition of typical munitions, are the 

projectile body, cartridge case, the filler, and the propellant. The minor sources of MC include 

the fuze, the primer, and the booster. 

Figure 7-1: Sources of MC in Munitions 

7.2.2. Munitions fillers may include a variety of MC, including secondary explosives (also 

found in boosters), chemical agents (including incapacitating agents and simulants), riot control 

agents, pyrotechnics (e.g., incendiaries, tracers, smokes, obscurants), and miscellaneous other 

fillers. Propellants include black powder, nitrocellulose (NC), nitroglycerine (NG), 

nitroguanadine (NQ), and perchlorate. Munitions cases and shells typically are composed of 

metals. Primers and fuzes contain primary explosives.
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7-2 

7.3. Overview of Munitions Constituents Analytical Laboratory Instrumentation. 

 7.3.1. Overview of MC Analyses. Samples collected for MC analyses typically are 

shipped to fixed laboratories. Field analytical methods may be used; however, for decision 

quality data, project teams should establish an appropriate percentage of these analyses to be 

confirmed by a fixed laboratory based on project-specific DQOs. 

 7.3.2. Analytical Instrumentation. The analytical methodologies that are used to detect 

MC in environmental samples require the use of one or more of the following types of analytical 

equipment: 

7.3.2.1. High performance liquid chromatography (HPLC or LC) 

a. Coupled with ultraviolet spectrometry (LC/UV)

b. Coupled with mass spectrometry (LC/MS)

c. Coupled with tandem mass spectrometry (LC/MS/MS)

7.3.2.2. Gas chromatography (GC)

a. Coupled with ultraviolet spectrometry (GC/MS)

b. Coupled with electron capture detector (GC/ECD) 

c. Coupled with nitrogen-phosphorus detector (GC/NPD) 

7.3.2.2. Inductively coupled plasma (ICP) 

a. Coupled with atomic emission spectrometry (ICP-AES)

b. Coupled with mass spectrometry (ICP-MS)

7.3.2.4. XRF spectrometry

7.3.2.5. Graphite furnace atomic absorption spectrophotometry (GFAA) 

7.3.2.6. Cold vapor atomic absorption spectrophotometry (CVAA) 

7.3.2.7. Ion chromatography (IC) 

7.3.2.8. Immunoassay 

7.3.2.9 Colorimetry (visible spectrophotometry)

 7.3.3. Analytical Methods. Later sections in this chapter describe the analytical methods 

that use the instrumentation listed above to detect specific classes of MC.
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7.4. Primary Explosives. 

7.4.1. Primary explosives are those extremely sensitive explosives (or mixtures thereof) 

that are used in primers, detonators, and blasting caps. Heat, sparks, impact, or friction easily 

detonates them. Primary explosives typically are present only in small quantities in munitions 

due to their sensitivity. Table 7-1 lists examples of primary explosives and their typical uses. 

Table 7-1: Primary Explosives and Typical Uses 

Primary Explosive Typical Use CAS Numbera

Lead azideb Initiator for HE 13424-46-9

Mercury fulminateb Initiator for HE 628-86-4

Diazodinitrophenol Priming compositions, commercial blasting caps 4682-03-5

Lead styphnateb Priming compositions, ignition of lead azide 15245-44-0

Tetracene Priming compositions, boosters 92-24-0

Potassium dinitrobenzofuroxane (KDNBF) Priming compositions Not available

Lead mononitroresorcinate Priming compositions, electric detonators 51317-24-9

a Chemical Abstracts Service registry number

b More common

7.4.2. Sampling based on release of primary explosives on testing or training ranges is not 

recommended because of the small amount present in any single munition (typically much 

smaller amount than the filler) and because the primary explosive is consumed if any part of the 

explosive train of a munition functions. This recommendation does not apply to primary 

explosives manufacturing facilities. Analytical methodology does not widely exist to detect 

primary explosives. For instance, analysis for lead measures the total lead and cannot be used to 

infer the presence or absence of lead-containing primary explosives due to the lack of specificity. 

Similarly, analysis for mercury cannot be used to infer the presence or absence of mercury 

fulminate.

7.4.3. Soil containing 2% or more by weight of any primary explosive or mixture of 

primary explosives presents an explosive hazard. Such mixtures are referred to as explosive 

soils as defined in DoD 6055.09-M, V7E4.4.1. 

7.5. Secondary Explosives. 

7.5.1. Secondary explosives are used as the main bursting charge or as the booster that sets 

off the main bursting charge. Secondary explosives are much less sensitive than primary 

explosives. They are less likely to detonate if struck or when exposed to friction or to electrical 

sparks. Secondary explosives also are used for the main fill in many munitions. Commonly 

used booster and secondary explosives are listed in Table 7-2. 
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Table 7-2: Secondary Explosives 

Explosives Compound Abbreviation or Acronym CAS Number

Aliphatic Nitrate Esters

1,2,4-Butanetriol trinitrate BTN 6659-60-5

Diethyleneglycol dinitrate DEGN 693-21-0

Nitrocellulosea NC 9004-70-0

Nitroglycerina NG 55-63-0

Nitrostarch NS 9056-38-6

Pentaerythritol tetranitrate PETN 78-11-5

Triethylene glycoldinitrate TEGN 111-22-8

1,1,1-Trimethylolethane trinitrate TMETN 3032-55-1

Nitramines

Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro 1,3,5,7-tetrazocine HMX 2691-41-0

Hexahydro-1,3,5 trinitro-1,3,5-triazine RDX 121-82-4

Ethylenediamine dinitrate EDDN 20829-66-7

Ethylenedinitramine Haleite 505-71-5

Nitroguanidinea NQ 556-88-7

2,4,6-Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine Tetryl 479-45-8

Nitroaromatics

Ammonium picrate AP 131-74-8

1,3-Diamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene DATB 1630-08-6

2,2’,4,4',6,6'-Hexanitroazobenzene HNAB 19159-68-3

1,3,5-Triamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene TATB 3058-38-6

2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene TNT 118-96-7

Other

Ammonium nitrate 6484-52-2

Source: TM 9-1300-214 Military Explosives

a NC, NG, and NQ also are used as propellants. Additional information regarding NC, NG, and NQ is provided in Section 7.6.

7.5.2. Secondary explosives are the main ingredients in composition explosive 

formulations. Composition explosives consist of one or more explosive compounds mixed with 

other ingredients to produce an explosive with more suitable characteristics for a particular 

application. Some typical examples of composition explosives are listed in Table 7-3. Exact 

compositions vary; they are documented in TM 9-1300-214. 
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Table 7-3: Composition Explosive Makeup 

Composition Explosive Explosive Compounds Other Ingredients a

Binary Mixtures

Amatols Ammonium nitrate and TNT

Composition A (A, A2, A3, 

A4, A5, A6)

RDX Beeswax, synthetic wax, 

desensitizing wax, stearic acid, or 

polyethylene

Composition B (Cyclotol, B, 

B2, B3)

RDX and TNT Wax, calcium silicate

Composition C (C, C2, C3, 

C4)

RDX, explosive plasticizer (C2 contained 

nitrotoluenes, dinitrotoluenes, TNT, NC, 

dimethylformamide; C3 contained 

nitrotoluenes, dinitrotoluenes, TNT, tetryl, 

and NC)

Nonexplosive oily plasticizer 

(included lecithin) or 

polyisobutylene; may also 

contain lead chromate and lamp 

black

Composition CH6 RDX Calcium stearate, graphite, 

polyisobutylene

Ednatols TNT and haleite (ethylene dinitramine)

Octols HMX and TNT

Pentolite PETN and TNT

Picratol AP and TNT

Tetrytol Tetryl and TNT

Tritonal TNT Flaked aluminum

Tertiary Mixtures

Amatex 20 RDX, TNT, ammonium nitrate

Ammonal Ammonium nitrate and TNT, DNT, or RDX Powdered aluminum

High Blast Explosives (HBX1, HBX-3, HBX-6)RDX, TNT b, nitrocellulose Calcium chloride, calcium 

silicate, aluminum, wax, and 

lecithin

HTA-3 HMX, TNT Aluminum and calcium silicate

Minol TNT and ammonium nitrate Aluminum

Torpex RDX and TNT Aluminum powder and wax

Quaternary Mixtures

Depth Bomb Explosive (DBX) TNT, RDX, ammonium nitrate Aluminum

Source: TM 9-1300-214 

a Varies by type, may contain any or all other ingredients listed.

b HBX-6 does not contain TNT.

7.5.3. Many secondary explosives are composed of organic compounds that can be 

transformed (degraded) in the environment. Transformation of explosive compounds may occur 

via abiotic processes (e.g., photolysis) or biotic transformation (e.g., aerobic or anaerobic 

biodegradation). Most of the research in the domain of energetics compounds transformation has 

focused on TNT, RDX, HMX, and DNTs; limited data are also available for tetryl, NG, picric 
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7-6 

acid, and PETN. Information regarding transformation of these secondary explosives 

compounds, as well as other fate and transport properties (e.g., sorption, dilution, advection, 

dispersion, diffusion), is provided in Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) / Cold 

Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) TR-06-18, Conceptual Model for the 

Transport of Energetic Residues from Surface Soil to Groundwater by Range Activities (2006) 

and in other publications listed in Appendix A of this manual. Table 7-4 lists breakdown 

products as well as co-contaminants for common secondary explosives. 

Table 7-4: Breakdown Products and Co-Contaminants of Common Secondary Explosives 

Compound Descriptiona Abbreviation CAS Number

Octahydro-1, 3, 5, 7-tetranitro1,3,5,7-tetrazocineNitramine explosive; also RDX cocontaminant HMX 2691-41-0

Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-

triazine

Nitramine explosive; also HMX cocontaminant RDX 121-82-4

1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene TNT co-contaminant and breakdown 

product 1,3,5-TNB 99-35-4

1,3-Dinitrobenzene DNT breakdown product and TNT 

co-contaminant 1,3-DNB 99-65-0

Nitrobenzene DNT co-contaminant NB 98-95-3

4-Amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene TNT breakdown product 4-Am-DNT 1946-51-0

2-Amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene TNT breakdown product 2-Am-DNT 355-72-78-2

2,4-Diamino-6-nitrotoluene TNT breakdown product 2,4-DANT 6629-29-4

2,6-Diamino-4-nitrotoluene TNT breakdown product 2,6-DANT 59229-75-3

2,4-Dinitrotoluene Nitroaromatic explosive/propellant; 

also TNT co-contaminant 2,4-DNT 121-14-2

2,6-Dinitrotoluene Nitroaromatic explosive/propellant; 

also TNT co-contaminant 2,6-DNT 606-20-2

2-Nitrotoluene (o-Nitrotoluene) DNT co-contaminant 2-NT 88-72-2

3-Nitrotoluene (mNitrotoluene) DNT co-contaminant 3-NT 99-08-1

4-Nitrotoluene (p-Nitrotoluene) DNT co-contaminant 4-NT 99-99-0

Hexahydro-1-nitroso-3,5-

dinitro-1,3,5-triazine RDX breakdown product MNX 5755-27-1

Hexahydro-1,3-dinitroso-5-

nitro-1,3,5-triazine RDX breakdown product DNX 80251-29-2

Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitroso1,3,5-triazine RDX breakdown product TNX 13980-04-6

3,5-Dinitroaniline TNB breakdown product 3,5-DNA 618-87-1

a Information gathered from TM 9-1300-214; Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) Toxicological 

Profiles for 2,4- and 2,6-Dinitrotoluene and for 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (located at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/index.asp) 

and the Hazardous Substances Data Bank (located at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/). 

7.5.4. Several analytical methods are used to analyze for nitroaromatic/nitramine

secondary explosives and their breakdown products. Currently available methods are provided 
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in Table 7-5. A version of SW8330 typically is used unless significant interferences are 

anticipated. Some laboratories are unable to perform quantitative second column confirmation 

for explosives per DoD Quality Systems Management (QSM) / SW8000C (i.e., five-point 

calibrations must be performed for each target analyte for the primary and confirmatory columns 

and quantitative results for each column must be reported). This requirement should not be 

waived for MR projects. Based upon review of chemical-specific DQOs through the TPP 

process, exceptions may be considered for the following co-eluting pairs: 2-AM-DNT/4-AMDNT, 2-NT/4-NT, and 2,4-DNT/2,6-DNT. SW8095 may be recommended if lower reporting 

limits are required, but it is not widely available commercially. SW8321 typically is used for 

complex matrices where there is concern regarding confirmation of positive results. 

Laboratories with coelution problems also may use it for SW8330; however, routine use of 

LC/MS confirmation to compensate for the laboratory’s failure to properly execute SW8330 

should not incur additional cost to the government. For all aqueous samples, sample preparation 

should be performed IAW SW3535A solid phase extraction (SPE) rather than by the SW8330 

salting out procedure unless a reasonable technical rationale (i.e., SPE disk clogging) is 

documented. Analytical method selection should be based on the DQOs determined during TPP 

conducted for the project. If previous data exist, it may be appropriate to use the same analytical 

methodology; however, meeting current DQOs is the more relevant requirement. 

Table 7-5: Fixed Laboratory Tests for Nitrogen-Based Explosives, Co-Contaminants, and 

Breakdown Products 

Method No. Title Advantagesa Disadvantagesa

SW8330A Nitroaromatics and Nitramines by 

High Performance Liquid 

Chromatography (HPLC)

Broad commercial 

availability; two column 

confirmation

LC is laboratory-dependent; 

many laboratories have second 

column resolution problems

SW8330Bb,c Nitroaromatics, Nitramines, and 

Nitrate Esters by High Performance 

Liquid Chromatography (HPLC)

SW8332d Nitroglycerine by HPLC Broad commercial 

availability

Chromatography is laboratory 

dependent

SW8095 Explosives by Gas Chromatography 

(GC) 

Low limit of 

quantitation (LOQ)

Limited commercial availability

Modified 

SW8321Ae

Explosives by 

HPLC/Thermospray/Mass 

Spectrometry (HPLC/TS/MS) or 

Ultraviolet detection 

Low LOQ; MS 

confirmation; 

commercial availability 

increasing; additional 

compounds available

No published method; 

certification based on laboratory 

SOPs; MS is a selected ion 

monitoring (SIM) scan, not full 

spectral confirmation; data 

review more difficult

USAPHC 

Methodf

GC; Isoamyl acetate extraction Low LOQ; two column 

confirmation

Limited commercial availability; 

certification based on laboratory 

SOPs

Note: USAPHC = United States Army Public Health Command

a Advantages and disadvantages are based strictly on analytical technique, not sample preparation technique.

b This method includes additional ultraviolet (UV) wavelengths to allow for detection of NG and PETN.
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7-8 

c Method states “ring puck mill or equivalent mechanical grinder” for soil analysis. The DoD QSM requires the laboratory to

demonstrate that the grinding procedure is capable of reducing the particle size to less than 75 micrometers (μm) by passing 

representative portions of ground sample through a 200 mesh sieve. To date, during program audits, EM CX has not recognized 

the equivalency of a ball mill due to concerns regarding potential analyte loss and effectiveness of propellant grain processing.

d Since the publication of method SW8330B, this method is rarely referenced.

e This method typically is cited for HPLC/MS of explosives. However, no published version includes explosives. An effort is 

underway to update SW8321 that would address explosives; however, no schedule is available as to the release of this update. 

f Hable et al., 1991 

7.5.5. Field tests for nitrogen-based explosives are shown in Table 7-6. Fate and transport 

properties (e.g., advection, adsorption, transformation, and volatilization) of the analytes should 

be considered prior to the use of field tests, particularly if the use of TNT or RDX as an indicator 

compound is intended. It is anticipated that for a range that has been out of use for a substantial 

period of time, most, if not all TNT, would have broken down due to photodegradation and 

biodegradation. RDX is less likely to have broken down but may not be an appropriate indicator 

compound at older sites, as RDX has been widely used only post-World War II (WWII).

Table 7-6: Field Tests for Nitrogen-Based Explosives 

Method No. Title

SW4050 TNT Explosives in Soil by Immunoassay 

SW4051 RDX in Soil by Immunoassay 

SW8515 Colorimetric Screening Method for TNT in Soil 

SW8510 Colorimetric Screening Procedure for RDX and HMX in Soil 

N/A DropEx Plus (Explosives Detection Field Test Kit)

N/A ExprayTM (Plexus Scientific)

Note: N/A = No method number

7.5.5.1. Immunoassays. Immunoassays have been developed for TNT and RDX in soil. 

Methods SW4050 for TNT and SW4051 for RDX may be used for screening soil to determine 

when TNT and RDX are present at concentrations above 0.5 milligrams per kilogram. 

Commercially available tests have little cross-reactivity with other nitroaromatic/nitramine 

explosives. Therefore, they may not be appropriate for use at older sites where these parent 

compounds may have been degraded or transformed. 

7.5.5.2. Quantitative Colorimetric Analysis. Methods SW8510 (for RDX and HMX in 

soil) and SW8515 (for TNT in soil) are colorimetric analyte-specific tests that can be performed 

using commercially available kits. The methods are performed using an extract of a soil sample. 

The sample extract is treated with color-change reagents and is analyzed in a portable 

spectrophoto-meter. These methods may be used to analyze for other analytes but require 

documentation of method modifications used to acquire the other analytes. For additional 

information regarding field analysis of analytes other than TNT, RDX, and HMX see Jenkins et 

al., 1995. 
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7.5.5.3. Qualitative Colorimetric Analysis. Two colorimetric test kits for general analyte 

classes are available (EXPRAYTM in aerosol form and DropEx Plus in liquid form). These 

products may be used in the field or in the laboratory to determine whether nitroaromatic 

explosives, nitramine and nitrate ester explosives, or inorganic nitrates are present. They 

typically are used qualitatively, although they can be used semi-quantitatively with sufficient 

expertise, as documented in SW8330B and in ERDC/CRREL TN-05-2, Pre-Screening for 

Explosives Residues in Soil Prior to HPLC Analysis Utilizing ExprayTM. The EXPRAYTM kit is 

shipped from the manufacturer as a DOT Hazardous Material, so logistics related to appropriate 

shipment considerations must be evaluated if the kit is used. 

 7.5.6. Analysis of AP, picric acid, less common TNT breakdown products (e.g., 

diaminonitrotoluenes [DANTs]), and RDX breakdown products (typically MNX, DNX, and 

TNX) may be required but are not part of current methods published by the USEPA. These 

analytes can be analyzed with published or modified SW8330 methods (nitroaromatics and 

nitramines by HPLC), SW8330B (PETN), and SW8095 (explosives by GC), SW8321A (solventextractable nonvolatile compounds by HPLC); however, AP typically is reported based on the 

analysis of picric acid. If analytes that are not part of methods published by the USEPA are 

included in the project, the PDT and stakeholders must accept any proposed analytical and 

documentation must be provided in the project UFP-QAPP regarding any method modifications 

or unpublished methods. 

 7.5.7. Although NC, NG, and NQ are secondary explosives, they are also commonly used 

as propellants. A detailed discussion regarding laboratory analysis of these compounds is 

provided in Section 7.6.9. 

7.6. Propellants. 

 7.6.1. Propellants are designed to provide energy to deliver a munition to its target. The 

key difference between explosives and propellants is their reaction rate. Explosives react 

rapidly, creating a high-pressure shock wave, and are designed to break apart a munitions casing 

and cause injury. Propellants react at a slower rate, creating a sustained lower pressure used to 

propel a munition. 

 7.6.2. Propellants are found in cartridge cases (small arms, medium caliber munitions, 

some artillery), external to the projectile (mortars, some artillery), in rocket motors, and in 

explosive charges in some munitions. 

 7.6.3. Propellants are divided into four classes: single-base, double-base, triple-base, and 

composite. Division of the propellants into these classes is on the basis of their composition and 

not their use. The following publications prepared by the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition 

Center (DAC) provide information on propellant identification and management: 

a. DAC Propellant Management Guide (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/9025261) 

b. DAC Propellant Identification Manual (https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/257916) 

(The Web sites referenced above are hosted on Army Knowledge Online [AKO]; a Common 

Access Card [CAC] or AKO account is required to download the documents from these 
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locations. Contractors should coordinate with their government points of contact to obtain the 

referenced documents.) 

7.6.4. Table 7-7 lists the composition and typical use of each propellant class. 

Table 7-7: Composition and Typical Use of Propellants 

Propellant Class Composition Typical Use

Single-base Primarily NC. In addition to a stabilizer, may also 

contain inorganic nitrates, nitrocompounds, metallic 

salts, metals, carbohydrates, or dyes.

Small arms, mortar shells, artillery 

shells up to 280 mm, as propelling 

charge in naval guns

Double-base Primarily NC and NG; stabilizer and additives similar 

to single-base

Cannons, small arms, mortars, 

artillery, rockets, jet propulsion 

units

Triple-base NQ (major ingredient) as well as NC and NG; 

stabilizer and additives similar to single-base

Gun propellants for mortar and 

artillery shells

Composite Fuel (e.g., metallic aluminum), binder (normally an 

organic polymer such as synthetic rubber, which is 

also a fuel), and an inorganic oxidizing agent (e.g., 

ammonium perchlorate)

Rocket assemblies and jet 

propulsion units

Source: TM 9-1300-214 Military Explosives, 1984

7.6.5. Formulations of propellants vary even within named propellant types (e.g., M1, a 

single-base propellant, has three compositions). Substitutes and additives used in propellant 

compositions include the following:

a. Diphyenylamine – stabilizer for single-base propellant

b. Ethyl centralite (EC) (Centralite I) – used for double- and triple-base propellants, which

use NG as the gelatinizing agent for the NC 

c. Methyl centralite (MC) (Centralite II) – less commonly used in place of EC

7.6.6. The majority of the material comprising a propellant is expected to be expended 

upon use. For an MC investigation, the focus is on the primary compounds comprising the 

propellant. The lesser compounds (e.g., stabilizer, additives) are found in very small quantities 

in the propellant composition, and some do not have standard commercially available analytical 

methods. Also, some of the lesser compounds are used for other purposes (e.g., phthalates), so 

their presence is not necessarily indicative of DoD use.

7.6.7. Perchlorate. Perchlorate (CAS Number 14797-73-0) is the anion of perchloric acid 

and is found in composite propellants. Perchlorate is of special concern due to its mobility and 

toxicity. Two salts of primary concern are ammonium perchlorate (CAS Number 7790-98-9, 

NH4ClO4) and potassium perchlorate (CAS Number 7778-74-7, KClO4). Current guidance and 

locations from which the guidance may be obtained on the Internet include the following: 

a. DoD Perchlorate Release Management Policy, April 22, 2009

http://www.denix.osd.mil/cmrmd/upload/dod_perchlorate_policy_04_20_09.pdf
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b. USEPA Revised Assessment Guidance for Perchlorate, January 8, 2009 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/cmrmd/upload/EPA-perchlorate_memo_01-08-09.pdf

c. USEPA Interim Drinking Water Health Advisory, December 2008

http://www.denix.osd.mil/cmrmd/upload/healthadvisory_perchlorate_interim.pdf

d. DoD Perchlorate Handbook, August 2007 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/edqw/Perchlorate.cfm

e. Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office Technical Fact Sheet - Perchlorate

7.6.7.1. The ITRC Perchlorate Team provides additional information, including 

Perchlorate: Overview of Issues, Status, and Remedial Options (2005) and Remediation 

Technologies for Perchlorate Contamination in Water and Soil (2008) available at 

http://www.itrcweb.org/teampublic_Perchlorate.asp and 

http://www.itrcweb.org/guidancedocument.asp?TID=32. 

7.6.7.2. The DoD Perchlorate Handbook (2007) provides assistance for development of a 

CSM for areas known or suspected to have had a perchlorate release. 

7.6.7.3. DoD munitions, munition components, and training devices that may have 

contained perchlorate, include the following (DoD Perchlorate Handbook, 2007): 

a. Solid fuel rockets 

b. Mines

c. Torpedo warheads 

d. Smoke-generating compounds

e. Signal flares

f. Parachute flares

g. Star rounds for pistols (illumination rounds) 

h. Thermite-type incendiaries

i. Tracer rounds 

j. Incendiary bombs 

k. Fuzes

l. Jet-assisted takeoff devices

m. Training simulators

7.6.7.4. For an MC investigation, it is important to identify potential naturally occurring 

background sources and non-DoD sources of perchlorate. Some known non-DoD sources of 

perchlorate include the following (DoD Perchlorate Handbook, 2007): 
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a. Commercial blasting (for construction) with perchlorate-containing explosives

b. Use of perchloric acid in manufacturing processes

c. Perchlorate-containing fertilizer

d. Perchlorate-containing sodium chlorate used as an herbicide 

e. Commercial manufacture of perchlorate salts of perchlorate-containing items (e.g., 

pyrotechnics, flares) 

7.6.7.5. If perchlorate is detected at fairly low concentrations in groundwater (e.g., < 20 

micrograms per liter [μg/L]), then forensic analysis to distinguish between synthetic and natural 

sources of perchlorate should be considered. Natural sources of perchlorate include fertilizers 

imported from Chile as well as natural sources indigenous to the United States. Chlorine and 

oxygen isotopic analyses of perchlorate provide the primary direct approach whereby different 

sources of perchlorate can be distinguished from each other. These techniques measure the 

relative abundances of the stable isotopes of chlorine (37Cl and 35Cl) and oxygen (18O, 17O, and 

16O) in perchlorate using isotope-ratio mass spectrometry. In addition, the relative abundance of 

the radioactive chlorine isotope 36Cl is measured using accelerator mass spectrometry. These 

measurements provide four independent quantities (isotope abundance ratios) for distinguishing 

perchlorate sources and potential transformations in the environment. Guidance for performing 

perchlorate forensics analyses is provided in Validation of Chlorine and Oxygen Isotope Ratio 

Analysis To Differentiate Between Perchlorate Sources and to Document Perchlorate 

Biodegradation, ESTCP Project ER-200509 (Hatzinger et al., 2011). 

7.6.7.6. Because of the high solubility and low sorption characteristics of perchlorate, the 

primary media of concern for perchlorate are typically groundwater and surface water. 

However, soil sampling may be considered at sites with the following conditions (DoD 

Perchlorate Handbook, 2007): 

a. Large quantities of perchlorate were used, disposed of, or burned at the site. 

b. A perchlorate source is likely to be present, and the soils and vadose zone matrix have 

an affinity to retain interstitial water.

c. The climatic conditions result in high evapotranspiration rates.

d. Perchlorate-laden groundwater or surface water can discharge to the ground surface and 

are subject to high evaporation rates.

e. A perchlorate source is ongoing because of on-site testing, use, or disposal. 

f. Groundwater contamination is elevated and suggests the presence of ongoing soil 

contamination emanating from an unknown source area.

 7.6.8. Black Powder. Black powder was used as a propellant prior to the development of 

smokeless propellants. It was used mostly prior to WWII in munitions and pyrotechnics. Black 
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powder typically contains mostly potassium or sodium nitrate (70% to 75% by weight), charcoal 

(14% to 16% by weight), and sulfur (10% to 16% by weight). When the composition is ignited, 

the sulfur and charcoal act as fuels, while the potassium nitrate or sodium nitrate works as an 

oxidizer. The components of black powder typically are not analyzed during an MC 

investigation. This should be addressed during TPP with stakeholders. The rationale for not 

sampling is as follows: the only potential analytes would be ions (e.g., potassium, sodium, 

nitrate), which would be difficult to attribute to DoD contamination, as they commonly are found 

as essential nutrients (potassium and sodium) and in widespread use as fertilizer (nitrate) In 

addition, the toxicity of these ions is very low. 

 7.6.9. Fixed Laboratory Tests for Propellants. 

7.6.9.1. NC. There is no widely used analytical method for NC, which is relatively 

nontoxic. U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (USATHAMA) / U.S. Army 

Environmental Hygiene Agency (USAEHA) methods LF03 and UF03, or variants based on 

them, still remain in use in some labs. However, their use is discouraged due to the documented 

issues with the methods, which include lack of specificity relative to other sources of 

nitrate/nitrite. These methods are indirect measurements. For soil samples, the NC is extracted 

with acetone, the nitrate/nitrate ions are separated from the extract, the nitrogroups on the NC are 

hydrolyzed to nitrite, and nitrite is measured colorimetrically. For accurate NC concentrations to 

be determined, the percent nitrogen in NC must be known (which generally is not realistic in 

most environmental samples). Data can be compromised by any of the processes being 

incomplete (i.e., separation of nitrate/nitrite ions from the extract [high bias], extraction of NC 

from soil [low bias], and hydrolysis of NC [low bias]). For water, the NC is filtered and the filter 

is washed to remove the nitrate/nitrite ions prior to a similar process as above for the soils. 

There is a new IC method that has been published in a journal article; however, it has not been 

recognized by the USEPA or any of the national method publication bodies at this time 

(Macmillan et al., 2008) 

7.6.9.2. NG. NG may be measured using the following methods: 

a. USEPA 8332 – NG by HPLC

b. LC/MS – Modified USEPA 8321A Solvent-Extractable Non-volatile Compounds by 

HPLC/Thermospray/MS or UV Detection 

c. USEPA 8330B, which includes NG 

7.6.9.3. NQ. NQ may be measured using the following methods: 

a. USATHAMA/USAEHA HPLC methods LW30 (soil) and UW29 (water)

b. Modified 8330 or 8321A (not published in methods) 

7.6.9.4. Perchlorate. Perchlorate is primarily measured using fixed laboratory tests; 

however, field laboratory methods are also in development. Filtration using a 0.2 μm filter is 

required by the DoD Perchlorate Handbook for preservation of perchlorate. 
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7.6.9.4.1. All fixed laboratory tests for perchlorate are based on ion chromatography or 

liquid chromatography. The DoD Perchlorate Handbook requires that detections of perchlorate 

above reporting levels be confirmed with mass spectrum confirmation. Fixed laboratory tests for 

perchlorate are shown in Table 7-8. 

Table 7-8: Fixed Laboratory Tests for Perchlorate 

Method No. Title DoD Perchlorate Handbook 

Status

USEPA 331.0 Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water by Liquid 

Chromatography Electrospray Ionization Mass Spectrometry

Recommended for drinking water

USEPA 332.0 Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water by Ion 

Chromatography with Suppressed Conductivity and 

Electrospray Ionization Mass Spectrometry

Recommended for drinking water

SW6850 Perchlorate in Water, Soils and Solid Wastes Using High 

Performance Liquid Chromatography / Electrospray 

Ionization / Mass Spectrometry

Recommended for drinking 

water, groundwater, soil, and 

wastewater

SW6860 Perchlorate In Water, Soils And Solid Wastes Using Ion 

Chromatography / Electrospray Ionization/Mass Spectrometry

Recommended for drinking 

water, groundwater, soil, and 

wastewater

USEPA 314.0 Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water by Ion 

Chromatography

Not recommended

Only allowed for existing 

NPDES permits.

USEPA 314.1 Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water Using Inline 

Column Concentration / Matrix Elimination Ion 

Chromatography with Suppressed Conductivity Detection

Not recommended

All results above the method 

reporting limit must be confirmed 

using MS.

Draft SW9058 Determination of Perchlorate Using Ion Chromatography with 

Chemical Suppression Conductivity Detection

Not recommended

All results above the method 

reporting limit must be confirmed 

using MS.

7.6.9.4.2. Field tests based on an ion-selective electrode (ISE), colorimetry, capillary 

electrophoresis, and ion mobility/MS exist for perchlorate, but they have not been widely used at 

this time. The ISE method is documented in Perchlorate Screening Study: Low Concentration 

Method for the Determination of Perchlorate in Aqueous Samples Using Ion Selective 

Electrodes: Letter Report of Findings for the Method Development Studies, Interference Studies, 

and Split Sample Studies, including Standard Operating Procedure, available at http://www.cluin.org/programs/21m2/letter_of_findings.pdf. The colorimetry test is documented in ERDC 

CRREL TR-04-8, Field Screening Method for Perchlorate in Water and Soil, available at 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA423276. 

7.7. Metals. 

7.7.1. Metals are found in nearly all military munitions and are used in munitions casings, 

bullets, projectile cases, projectiles, bomb bodies, and fillers. Certain munitions contain only 

metals (i.e., incendiaries). Table 7-9 lists metals that occur in munitions, their regulatory status, 

and their common oxidation states. 
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Table 7-9: Metals Occurrence in Munitions, Regulatory Status, and Common Oxidation States 

Metal Occurrence in Munitions

CERCLA 

Hazardous 

Substance in 

Elemental 

Form?a,b

Are 

Compounds 

Hazardous 

Substances?c

Common 

Oxidation States

More Commonly Occurring MC Metals

Aluminum (Al) Incendiaries, composition 

explosives, propellants, 

pyrotechnics (powdered Al), 

and rocket cases (alloys)

No Only certain 

compounds

Al(0); Al(III)

Antimony (Sb) Alloys with Pb in small arms 

bullets (99% Pb, 1% Sb) and in 

pyrotechnics

Yes Yes Sb(0); Sb(III); 

Sb(V)

Copper (Cu) Cartridge cases (brass), bullet 

jackets (e.g., gilding metal), 

pyrotechnics, and bronze gun 

barrels

Yes Yes Cu(0); Cu(I); 

Cu(II)

Iron (Fe) Present as steel in cases and 

projectiles, incendiaries, and 

pyrotechnics

No No Fe(0); Fe(II); 

Fe(III)

Lead (Pb) Small arms bullets, primary 

explosives, primer compositions 

Yes Yes Pb(0); Pb(II); 

Pb(IV)

Magnesium (Mg) Incendiaries, pyrotechnics 

(photoflash), tracers, and armor 

piercing bullets

No No Mg(0); Mg(II)

Zinc (Zn) Cartridge cases (brass) bullet 

jackets (e.g., gilding metal), HC 

smoke-filled munitions, and 

pyrotechnics

Yes Yes Zn(0); Zn(II)

Less Commonly Occurring MC Metals

Arsenic (As) Present in alloys with Pb in 

shotgun pellets (96.4% Pb, 3% 

Sb, 0.6% As), in yellow smoke, 

arsenical CWM, and in 

vomiting agents

Yes Yes As(0); As(III); 

As(V); occurs as 

anionic species 

in solution (e.g. 

HAsO4

2-)

Barium (Ba) Present as barium nitrate in 

some pyrotechnics, detonators, 

fuzes, primers, composition 

explosives

No Only barium 

cyanide

Ba(II)

Boron (B) Blasting caps, igniters, 

pyrotechnics

No No B(III)

Cadmium (Cd) Pyrotechnics Yes Yes Cd(0); Cd(II)

Calcium (Ca) Smoke formulations No Only certain 

compounds

Ca(0); Ca(II)

Chromium (Cr) Armor piercing bullets, 

pyrotechnics, present in some 

steel alloys

Yes Yes Cr(0); Cr(II); 

Cr(III); Cr(VI)

Cobalt (Co) Pyrotechnics, present in some 

steel alloys

No Yes Co(0); Co(II); 

Co(III)

Lithium (Li) Pyrotechnics No Only lithium 

chromate

Li(I)
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Metal Occurrence in Munitions

CERCLA 

Hazardous 

Substance in 

Elemental 

Form?a,b

Are 

Compounds 

Hazardous 

Substances?c

Common 

Oxidation States

Manganese (Mn) Pyrotechnics, delay powders, 

present in some steel alloys

No Yes Mn(0); Mn(II); 

Mn(III), Mn(IV); 

Mn (VII)

Mercury (Hg) Some primer mixtures (mercury 

fulminate; used prior to WWII)

Yes Yes Hg(0); Hg(II)

Molybdenum 

(Mo)

Armor piercing bullets, igniter 

compositions, propellant 

compositions, alloying agent in 

steel

No No Mo(VI)

Nickel (Ni) Pyrotechnics, delay powders, 

present in some steel alloys

Yes Yes Ni(0); Ni(II); 

Ni(III)

Potassium (K) Potassium nitrate in black 

powder (used in variety of 

munitions), potassium 

perchlorate in pyrotechnics and 

propellants

No Only certain 

compounds

K(0); K(I)

Selenium (Se) Delay and igniter compounds, 

pyrotechnics, additive in 

stainless steels

Yes Yes Se(0); Se(IV); 

Se(VI)

Silver (Ag) Present in igniter compounds 

and pyrotechnics 

Yes Yes Ag(I)

Strontium (Sr) Present in some pyrotechnics 

(e.g., tracer compositions, 

flares)

No Only strontium 

chromate

Sr(II)

Tin (Sn) Smokeless propellants as 

antifouling agent, smoke (tin 

tetrachloride)

No No Sn(0); Sn(II); 

Sn(IV)

Titanium (Ti) Pyrotechnics, M36 bomb 

clusters, smokes (in FM smoke 

as titanium tetrachloride)

No Only titanium 

tetrachloride

Ti(0); Ti(II); 

Ti(III); Ti(IV)

Tungsten (W) Armor piercing bullets, delay 

compositions, incendiary 

compositions for small arms, 

"green small arms" (does not 

apply to FUDS)

No No W(0); W(VI)

Uranium (U) Some armor penetrators contain 

depleted uranium; incendiaries

No No U(0); U(IV); 

U(VI)

Vanadium (V) Pyrotechnics, present in some 

steel alloys

No Only certain 

compounds

V(0); V(II); 

V(III); V(IV); 

V(V)

Zirconium (Zr) Armor piercing incendiary 

ammunition, incendiary cluster 

bombs, shaped-charges, 

pyrotechnics, alloying agent in 

steel

No Only certain 

compounds

Zr(IV)

a Elemental metals (other than Hg) are not hazardous substances unless their particle size diameter is less than or equal to 100 

μm (0.004 inches).

b Some metals, such as U, V, W, and Zr, may be hazardous substances when present as radioactive isotopes.

c See 40 CFR 302.4 for a complete list of hazardous substance compounds.
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7.7.2. The fate and transport of metals MC is highly complex and is governed by several 

major reaction types, including dissolution-precipitation as a function of pH and redox 

environment and sorption-desorption reactions as a function of soil composition, extent of soil 

saturation, and soil organic content. Fate and transport of lead has been studied extensively in 

relation to small arms ranges (SARs). ERDC/CRREL TR-07-11 (Environmental Assessment of 

Lead at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, Small Arms Ranges, 2007) has a detailed discussion 

regarding the chemistry of lead and processes that govern its fate and transport. ERDC/EL TR07-06 (Treatment and Management of Closed or Inactive Small Arms Firing Ranges, 2007) also 

provides a comprehensive discussion of the geochemistry of metals at SARs, including 

speciation effects and fate and transport considerations. Through the Green Ammunition 

Program at the U.S. Army Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center, the U.S. 

Army developed a 5.56 mm projectile with a tungsten core to replace the lead core in the mid1990s as an environmental benign replacement for the lead/antimony projectile. Tungsten metal 

was selected as a lead substitute because it was thought to be insoluble in water and nontoxic. 

Use of the tungsten rounds for training started in 1999 but was halted in early 2003 due to flight 

instability issues. Recent studies suggest that the material used in the Army’s tungsten 

projectiles dissolved in water and is mobile under some field conditions. As a result, ERDC 

conducted a study assessing the fate and transport properties of tungsten (ERDC TR-07-5, Fate 

and Transport of Tungsten at Camp Edwards Small Arms Ranges, 2007). Fate and transport 

information for the other MC metals may be gathered from USEPA databases and technical 

reports.

7.7.3. Metals analyses should be based on a limited list if the type(s) of ordnance are 

known or can be reasonably assumed. If the types of metals potentially present are not known, it 

is recommended to analyze for the Target Analyte List metals with the exception of beryllium, 

sodium, and thallium (as no known munitions contain these metals) or another relevant long list 

for metals analyses (e.g., a state-specific list). Depending upon munitions used on the site, 

tungsten, uranium, zirconium, titanium, and strontium also may be potential metals of concern. 

If metals are analyzed, the PDT and stakeholders should discuss establishing background 

conditions during TPP. For additional discussion of background considerations, see Chapter 8. 

7.7.3.1. Field Tests. There are two published field tests available for metals: SW4500, 

Mercury in Soil by Immunoassay and SW6200, Field Portable X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) 

Spectrometry for the Determination of Elemental Concentrations in Soil and Sediment. SW6200 

is appropriate for many but not all of the metals of interest. The method may be appropriate for 

iron, lead, copper, zinc, manganese, chromium, antimony, arsenic, mercury, barium, and 

strontium. Other field tests may be used on MR projects, if appropriate, but their use must be 

approved by the EM CX. Proper logistic planning must be in place if XRF is used. The lowlevel radioactive source does require appropriate shipping considerations and coordination if 

brought onto military installations.

7.7.3.2. Fixed Laboratory Tests. There are several published methods for metals other 

than mercury. Currently available tests for metals are shown in Table 7-10. Determination of 

the appropriate method should depend upon the established DQOs. For soil analysis, SW6010C 

is typically appropriate, although it may require the use of “ICP trace,” which is a newer version 
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of equipment that can be used for SW6010C to provide a lower LOQ. For lower reporting 

limits, SW6020A or SW7010 may be required. 

Table 7-10: Fixed Laboratory Tests for Metals

Method Number Title

SW6010C Inductively Coupled Plasma-Atomic Emission Spectrometry (ICP-AES) 

SW6020A Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) 

SW7010 Graphite Furnace Atomic Absorption (GFAA) Spectrophotometry 

SW7470A/ 

SW7471B 

Mercury by Cold Vapor Atomic Absorption (CVAA) 

7.7.3.3. Small Arms–Specific Considerations. One key aspect to characterizing metals in 

soils at a SAR is reaching consensus on whether to sieve the soil samples prior to analysis. One 

of the primary reasons to sieve is to remove bullet fragments (if bullet fragments are sieved, they 

should be weighed by the laboratory). Retaining bullet fragments would yield a higher 

concentration of lead; however, the lead in the fragments would not be readily available to 

receptors. Also, lead fragments in analytical soil samples are likely to greatly increase variability 

in analytical results. This subject is recommended for discussion at project TPP sessions. If 

additional sample preparation is planned, it should be described thoroughly in the appropriate 

project planning documents. This issue also will be very important if remediation is planned; a 

remediation contractor may need additional information on the mass of bullet fragments. 

7.7.3.4. Analytical Modifications for Tungsten. Because the geochemistry of tungsten 

differs from most trace metals, analytical modifications are required to successfully analyze for 

tungsten. Tungsten is not efficiently extracted from soil matrices using standard acid digestion 

procedures. Addition of phosphoric acid to the sample digestion process improves extraction of 

tungsten. Aqueous samples for tungsten analysis should be collected in plastic containers and 

should not be preserved with nitric acid (Bednar et al., 2010). 

7.7.4. Depleted Uranium (DU). DU is a byproduct of the process used to enrich natural 

uranium for use in nuclear reactors and in nuclear weapons. Natural uranium occurs as three 

isotopes with the following abundances (by weight): 99.28% U-238, 0.71% U-235, and 

0.0058% U-234. U-232, U-233, and U-236 are created from man-made processes. The natural 

uranium enrichment process concentrates both the U-235 and U-234 isotopes, resulting in a 

byproduct depleted in both U-235 and U-234. Because of the shorter half-life of U-235 and U234 compared to U-238, the radioactivity associated with DU is approximately 40% less than 

that of natural uranium (Depleted Uranium Technical Brief, USEPA, 2006). Because DU metal 

is 1.7 times more dense than lead, it is valuable for industrial and military uses. DU has been 

used in military munitions in several ways: as a kinetic energy penetrator to defeat armored 

targets, as ballast in the M101 spotting round, and in minute quantities as a catalyst in epoxy. 

Epoxy that contains trace amounts of DU is used only in the M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munitions 

and the Area Denial Artillery Munitions. DU also has other military applications, such as use in 

protective armor for tanks. The armed forces have tested or used military munitions that contain 

a DU penetrator at a relatively small number of ranges. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
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licenses these ranges, including former ranges. Additional information regarding the use of DU 

in military munitions is provided in the Final Army RI/FS Guidance (AEC, 2009) and in 

Properties, Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium (DU): A General Overview (Bleise et 

al., 2003). 

7.7.4.1. Field Tests. Uranium and DU can be detected by measuring emitted radiation, 

including alpha, beta, and/or gamma radiation. The Measurements Applications and 

Development Group at Oak Ridge National Laboratory compared the performance of several 

hand-held detectors commonly used to detect DU in soil (Coleman and Murray, 1999). For 

surface soils, scanning and fixed in situ measurements with gamma radiation scintillators have 

been effective. Due to the low-energy photon emission of DU, the Field Instrument for 

Detection of Low Energy Radiation (or FIDLER) is optimal. The detection of DU below surface 

using survey meters is inhibited by the absorption of alpha and beta particles in the soil. 

Handheld gamma ray spectrometers may detect DU below the surface, but the lack of a highenergy, high-yield gamma-ray emission by U-238 reduces the effectiveness of this technique for 

field identification and survey (Depleted Uranium Technical Brief, USEPA, 2006). 

7.7.4.2. Fixed Laboratory Tests. Several laboratory methods are available for quantitation 

of uranium. Some of these analytical methods provide isotopic information. The PDT should 

determine if quantitation of uranium isotopes is needed or whether quantitation of total uranium 

is sufficient. Chemical methods include kinetic phosphorescence analysis (KPA), fluorimetry, 

and ICP-MS. Radiological methods include alpha spectroscopy, gamma spectroscopy, delayed 

neutron counting, and instrumental neutron activation analysis. Information on sample 

preparation and analytical methods for uranium may be found in the Multi-Agency Radiological 

Laboratory Analytical Protocols Manual (http://www.epa.gov/radiation/marlap/manual.html). 

The most common instrumentation used commercially for the identification and quantification of 

uranium and uranium isotopes are KPA, alpha spectroscopy, and ICP-MS. Depending on the 

selected analytical method, uranium and uranium isotope concentrations may be reported in 

activity units (e.g., picocuries per liter) or mass units (e.g., microgram per kilogram). The PDT 

should consider applicable project action levels and decide during project planning how the 

results of uranium and uranium isotopes should be reported. The advantages and disadvantages 

of the primary analytical methods are summarized in Table 7-11. 

Table 7-11: Fixed Laboratory Tests for Uranium and Uranium Isotopes

Method Number Title Advantages Disadvantages

ASTM D5174 Standard Test Method for 

Trace Uranium in Water 

by Pulsed-Laser 

Phosphorimetry

• Rapid and inexpensive

determination of total

uranium

• Does not provide

isotopic information

SW6020A Analysis of Metals by 

Inductively Coupled 

Plasma-Mass 

Spectrometry (ICP-MS) 

• Direct mass measurement

with ability to detect and

separate U-233, U-234, U235, U-236, and U-238.

• Lowest detection limits

(other than for U-234) and

lowest uncertainty for

• Small (1 gram [g])

typical aliquot size

leads to replication

issues if sample

matrix is

heterogeneous.

ASTM C1345 Standard Test Method for 

Analysis of Total and 

Isotopic Uranium and 
EM 200-1-15 

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Method Number Title Advantages Disadvantages

Total Thorium in Soils by 

Inductively Coupled 

Plasma-Mass 

Spectrometry

percent U enrichment 

calculations

• Lowest costs compared to 

alpha and gamma 

spectroscopy methods

DOE HASL 300 A-01-

R/U-02-RC/G-03a 

Alpha Radioassay • Provides a direct activity 

measurement with spectral 

feedback that enables easy 

determination of whether 

the sample is enriched, 

natural, or depleted 

uranium.

• Offers the lowest detection 

limit for U-234.

• Small (1 to 10 g) 

typical aliquot size 

leads to replication 

issues if sample 

matrix is 

heterogeneous.

• Higher costs than 

other methods due to 

required chemical 

separation to isolate 

U from other 

elements

• Achievable resolution 

prevents 

differentiation of U233 from U-234 and 

U-235 from U-236

USEPA Method EMSL33bIsotopic Determination of 

Plutonium, Uranium, and 

Thorium in Water, Soil, 

Air, and Biological 

Tissue (via Alpha 

Spectrometry)

ORISE Method AP11c Sequential Determination 

of the Actinides in 

Environmental

Samples Using Total 

Sample Dissolution and 

Extraction 

Chromatography

• Alpha spectrometry 

variation for samples with 

matrix interference 

problems or where the 

sample is non-digestible or 

dissolvable after normal 

digestion methods.

a The DOE Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL) procedures are published in EML Procedures Manual, Section 4, Vol. I 

http://www.orau.org/ptp/PTP%20Library/library/DOE/eml/hasl300/HASL300TOC.htm

b USEPA method EMSL-33 may be found at the following Internet location:

http://www.epa.gov/sam/pdfs/EPA-EMSL-33.pdf

c Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) method AP11 may be found at the following Internet location:

http://www.epa.gov/sam/pdfs/ORISE-AP11.pdf

7.8. Chemical Agents and Agent Breakdown Products. 

 7.8.1. CAs are chemical compounds intended for use (to include experimental compounds) 

that, through their chemical properties, produce lethal or other damaging effects on human 

beings and are intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate 

persons through their physiological effects. Excluded are research, development, test, and 

evaluation of dilute solutions, riot control agents, chemical defoliants and herbicides, smoke and 

other obscuration materials, flame and incendiary materials, and industrial chemicals (DASAESOH Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses, 1 Apr 2009). ABPs are 

formed by decomposition, hydrolysis, microbial degradation, oxidation, photolysis, and 

decontamination of CAs. The term ABPs also has been used incorrectly to describe cocontaminant impurities formed during the manufacture of CAs. 

7.8.1.1. Earlier definitions of CAs differed from the current definition. TM 3-215, 

Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents defines CA as a solid, liquid, or gas, which, through its 

chemical properties, produces lethal or damaging effects on man, animals, plants, or materiel or 

produces a screening or signaling smoke. 
EM 200-1-15 

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7.8.1.2. Archival information on the historical use of CAs must be evaluated based on the 

definition of CAs in place at the time that the information was generated.

 7.8.2. CWM are items configured as munitions containing a chemical compound that is 

intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through its physiological effects. 

CWM includes V- and G-series nerve agents or H-series (mustard) and L-series (lewisite) blister 

agents in other-than-munition configurations and certain industrial chemicals (e.g., hydrogen 

cyanide [AC], cyanogen chloride [CK], or carbonyl dichloride [called phosgene or CG]) 

configured as military munitions (DASA-ESOH, 2009). 

 7.8.3. Although not intended as CWM, due to their hazards, prevalence, and militaryunique application, chemical agent identification sets (CAIS) that contain neat agent or dilute 

nerve agent are considered CWM. CWM does not include riot control devices, chemical 

defoliants, and herbicides; industrial chemicals (e.g., AC, CK, CG) not configured as a munition; 

smoke and other obscuration-producing items; flame- and incendiary-producing items; or soil, 

water, debris, or other media contaminated with low concentrations of CAs where no CA hazards 

exist (DASA-ESOH, 2009). Soil, water, debris, or other media contaminated with dispersed Vand G-series nerve agent, H- and HN-series blister agent, or L will be considered and managed 

IAW 40 CFR 266 Subpart M. 

7.8.3.1. The DoD produced CAIS between the 1930s and 1960s for use in training military 

personnel to safely identify, handle, and decontaminate CA. Varieties of CAIS included 

identification or sniff sets, detonation sets, and bulk agent sets. These sets contained a variety of 

dilute or neat CA (e.g., mustard, Lewisite) or industrial chemicals (e.g., phosgene). In the late 

1970s and early 1980s, the Army destroyed 21,458 CAIS that had not been issued for training. 

All nerve CAIS are believed to have been destroyed at that time. 

7.8.3.2. CAIS that are determined to contain dilute CA (mixed with chloroform [EPA 

Hazardous Waste Number D002]) or industrial chemicals (such as phosgene [EPA Hazardous 

Waste Number P095]) are managed as hazardous waste. CAIS components that contain neat CA 

(CAIS K941 and CAIS K942) and any CAIS found to contain dilute nerve agent remain CWM. 

Sampling to determine contamination due to CAIS use should only be conducted in areas where 

CAIS vials are known to have been found. CAIS typically are found either as loose glass vials 

that cannot be detected reliably via geophysics or within a “Pig” storage container that could be 

detected with geophysics (i.e., if it was made from metal or had metal components) but that 

would almost certainly retain any chemical release (see U.S. Army Program Manager for 

Chemical Demilitarization, Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS) Information Package, 

Nov 1995). Therefore, sampling to locate CAIS vials is not a viable strategy. 

 7.8.4. The following data sources provide guidance relevant to characterization of CAs and 

ABPs as MC:

a. DASA-ESOH Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) Responses and 

Related Activities, 1 April 2009

b. Army RI/FS Guidance, Nov 2009 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

7-22 

7.8.4.1. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Environmental, Safety, and 

Occupational Health also provides information for compliance with Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC) requirements (2009). For purposes of treaty issues, chemical weapons (CW) 

are defined as any munition or device containing or suspected of containing any chemical listed 

on one of three CWC schedules of chemicals. 

7.8.4.2. To comply with the CWC requirements, the U.S. Army established the NonStockpile Chemical Materiel Program (NSCMP). The NSCMP addresses the destruction of 

CWM that is not part of the U.S. CW stockpile. 

 7.8.5. Choking agents are designed to impede a victim’s ability to breath. They operate by 

causing a build-up of fluids in the lungs, which then leads to suffocation. Common choking 

agents include CG, diphosgene (DP), chlorine, and chloropicrin (PS). Table 7-12 lists the 

chemical names of the choking agents, their CAS registry numbers, and analytical methods that 

could be used for their detection. The following subsections summarize the primary fate and 

transport mechanisms for the choking agents and provide sampling recommendations. 

7.8.5.1. CG. Phosgene (carbonyl chloride) was used extensively in World War I (WWI). 

It was used as a filler for mortar shells, bombs, rockets, and cylinders. It has been documented in 

munitions and CAIS vials on FUDS. CG is a colorless, nonflammable gas that smells like newmown hay or grass. It condenses to a colorless liquid below 46 degrees Fahrenheit. CG is 

expected to hydrolyze in moist soil at a rapid rate. Hydrolysis products are hydrochloric acid 

and carbon dioxide (CO2). Any CG that does not hydrolyze is expected to have high mobility in 

soil. Volatilization of CG from moist soil surface is also an important fate and transport 

mechanism. Based on the lack of persistence in soil or water, sampling of environmental media 

other than air is not recommended. 

7.8.5.2. DP. Diphosgene (trichloromethyl chloroformate) was used by the British, 

Germans, and Japanese in WWI and WWII. It is unstable and converts to CG when catalyzed by 

metals. It is not documented as having been used on FUDS. Due to its instability, 

environmental sampling for DP is not recommended. 

7.8.5.3. Cl. Cl was used extensively in early WWI. It later was used as an ingredient in 

the manufacture of other agents. Cl was used in mortar shells and cylinders. Cl is not 

documented as having been used in FUDS munitions. Analytical methods are available for free 

or total Cl in water, wastewater, and air. However, given the common practice of chlorine-based 

processes for drinking water disinfection, it would be difficult to distinguish Cl from munition 

sources. Therefore, environmental sampling for Cl is not recommended. 

7.8.5.4. PS. Chloropicrin (trichloronitromethane) was used extensively in WWI. It was 

suitable for use in mortar shells, bombs, and airplane spray. It has been documented in CAIS 

vials on FUDS. Although the SAM Manual identifies analytical methods, sampling for PS at 

sites where it was used historically is not recommended due to its lack of persistence. This 

recommendation is reinforced by the potential presence of known non-DoD sources of PS, 

including fumigant and soil insecticide, as well as formation of PS as a disinfection byproduct by 

the addition of chlorine to water containing organic matter. 
EM 200-1-15 

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7-23 

Table 7-12: Choking Agents 

Compound Abbreviation CAS 

Number Determinative Methoda Analytical Technology

Phosgene (carbonyl 

chloride) CG 75-44-5 OSHA Method 61 (air monitoring) GC/NPD 

Diphosgene 

(trichloromethyl 

chloroformate)

DP 503-38-8 N/A N/A

Chlorine Cl 7782-50-5 

Method 4500-Cl G: DPD (Standard 

Methods for the Examination of 

Water and Wastewater. 21st Edition, 

APHA, AWWA, and WEF, 2005)

Colorimetric 

method

Chloropicrin 

(trichloronitromethane) PS 76-06-2 

SW8270D (solids analysis) GC/MS

USEPA 551.1 (water analysis)

GC/ECD with 

2nd column or 

GC/MS 

confirmation

OSHA Method PV2103 (air 

monitoring) GC/ECD

Note: 

N/A = not available

OSHA = Occupational Safety and Health Administration

a The SAM Manual (Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events, 

SAM 2012, EPA/600/R-12/555, July 2012) attributes the compounds to the analytical methods listed in the table; however, the 

compounds currently are not included explicitly in the methods. Limited commercial laboratory capacity is available for CA and 

ABP analyses. 

7.8.6. The primary nerve agents are Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), Cyclosarin 

(GF), and VX. Nerve agents became part of the U.S. munitions inventory after WWII. Due to 

the nature of these munitions, their inventory was tracked carefully. Live-fire testing / training 

activities were far more limited compared to conventional (or other CA) activities. Very few 

FUDS have documented use of nerve agents. Based on instability and volatility, as validated 

with modeling, nerve agents are not anticipated to contaminate groundwater (USACHPPM, 

1999). For sites with older releases (e.g., FUDS), nerve agent ABPs are more likely to be of 

environmental concern than the nerve agents themselves due to time elapsed since use, combined 

with the fate and transport properties of the nerve agents. Therefore, the primary focus for sites 

with suspected nerve agent use is for air monitoring for the nerve agent and media sampling for 

applicable ABPs. If analytical methodology is available for media sampling for the nerve agent 

and munitions containing the agent are found, then recommend sampling the media adjacent to 

where the nerve agent munitions are found. Table 7-13 lists the chemical names of the nerve 

agents and nerve agent ABPs, their CAS numbers, and analytical methods that could be used for 

their detection.
EM 200-1-15 

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7-24 

Table 7-13: Nerve Agents and ABPs

Compound Description Abbreviation CAS 

Number

Determinative 

Methoda

Analytical 

Technology

Nerve Agents

Tabun (dimethylamidoethoxyphosphoryl 

cyanide)

Nerve agent GA 77-81-6 SW8270D

TO-10A (air analysis) GC/MS

Sarin (isopropyl 

methylphosphonofluoridate)Nerve agent GB 107-44-8 SW8271/ ECBC SOP GC/MS

Soman (pinacolyl 

methylphosphono 

fluoridate)

Nerve agent GD 96-64-0 ECBC SOP GC/MS

Cyclosarin (cyclohexyl 

methylphosphonofluoridate)Nerve agent GF 329-99-7 ECBC SOP GC/MS

o-Ethyl S-(2-

diisopropylaminoethyl) 

methylphosphonothiolate

Nerve agent VX 50782-69-

9 SW8271/ ECBC SOP GC/MS

Nerve Agent Breakdown Products

Isopropyl methyl 

phosphonic acid GB ABP IMPA 1832-54-8 

SW8321B/ ASTM 

E2866-12 (solids 

analysis)/

D7597-09 (aqueous 

analysis)

HPLC /LCMS-MS

Methylphosphonic acid GB, GD, and 

VX ABP MPA 993-13-5 

SW8321B/ ASTM 

E2866-12 (solids 

analysis)/

D7597-09 (aqueous 

analysis)

HPLC/LC-MSMS

Dimethyl methyl 

phosphonate 

GB simulant 

and precursor DMMP 756-79-6 SW8321B HPLC 

Ethyl methylphosphonic 

acid VX ABP EMPA 1832-53-7 

SW8321B/ ASTM 

E2866-12 (solids 

analysis)/

D7597-09 (aqueous 

analysis)

HPLC/LC-MSMS 

Diisopropyl 

methylphosphonate GB ABP DIMP 1445-75-6 

SW8270D/ ASTM 

E2866-12 (solids 

analysis)/

D7597-09 (aqueous 

analysis)

GC/MS/ LCMS-MS
EM 200-1-15 

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7-25 

Compound Description Abbreviation CAS 

Number

Determinative 

Methoda

Analytical 

Technology

Pinacolyl 

methylphosphonic acid GD ABP PMPA 616-52-4 

SW8321B/ ASTM 

E2866-12 (solids 

analysis)/

D7597-09 (aqueous

analysis)

HPLC/ LCMS-MS

S-(2-

diisopropylaminoethyl)-

methylphosphonothioic 

acid 

VX ABP EA2192 73207-98-

4 SW8321B HPLC 

a The SAM Manual (Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events, 

SAM 2012, EPA/600/R-12/555, July 2012) attributes the compounds to the analytical methods listed in the table; however, the 

compounds currently are not included explicitly in the methods. Limited commercial laboratory capacity is available for CA and 

ABP analyses.

7.8.6.1. GA. Tabun (dimethylamidoethoxyphosphoryl cyanide) persists 1 to 2 days under 

average weather conditions. It is suitable for use in mortar shells, artillery shells, bombs, spray, 

and rockets. There is limited documented use of GA on FUDS. 

7.8.6.2. GB. Sarin (isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate) is nonpersistent. It is suitable 

for use in mortar shells, artillery shells, bombs, spray, and rockets. There is limited documented 

use of GB on FUDS. 

7.8.6.3. GD. Soman (pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate) persists 1 to 2 days under 

average weather conditions. It is suitable for use in mortar shells, artillery shells, bombs, spray, 

and rockets. GD is not part of the U.S. chemical inventory. 

7.8.6.4. GF. Cyclosarin (cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate) is more persistent than 

the other nerve agents but was not mass produced due to the higher expense of production. GF is 

not part of the U.S. chemical inventory. 

7.8.6.5. VX. VX (o-Ethyl S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothiolate) persists 

2 to 6 days. It is suitable for use in large caliber artillery shells, spray, rockets, and mines. There 

is limited documented use of VX on FUDS. 

7.8.6.6. Nerve agent ABPs. Nerve agent ABPs are listed in Table 7-13. 

 7.8.7. The primary blood agents are AC, CK, and arsine (SA). Table 7-14 lists the 

chemical names of the blood agents, their CAS numbers, and analytical methods that could be 

used for their detection. The following subsections summarize the primary fate and transport 

mechanisms for the blood agents and provide sampling recommendations. 

7.8.7.1. AC. Hydrogen cyanide is an industrial chemical that is considered CWM in a 

weaponized form. It is unstable unless in a very pure form. It is suitable for use in mortar shells, 

bombs, and rockets. There is limited documented use of AC-containing munitions on FUDS. 

AC is highly volatile and has high water solubility. It has a vapor-phase degradation half-life of 

530 days. Based on the lack of persistence in soil or water and lack of methodology / 
EM 200-1-15 

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7-26 

commercial laboratory support, sampling environmental media other than air is not 

recommended

7.8.7.2. CK. Cyanogen chloride has limited stability and polymerizes to cyanuric chloride 

(cyclic). It is suitable for use in mortar shells, bombs, rockets, and grenades. CK has been used 

at FUDS in munitions and in CAIS kits. Releases of CK would exist as a gas in atmospheric 

conditions. CK is extremely volatile and hydrolyzes rapidly in water. CK is formed during 

water treatment by chlorination and also is used as a fumigant. Based on its volatility, speed of 

hydrolysis, and lack of commercial laboratory support, sampling environmental media other than 

air is not recommended. 

Table 7-14: Blood Agents 

Compound Description Abbreviation CAS 

Number

Determinative 

Methoda

Analytical 

Technology

Hydrogen cyanide Blood agent AC 74-90-8 NIOSH 6010 (air 

monitoring) IC

Cyanogen chloride Blood agent CK 506-77-4 TO-15 (air monitoring)

GC/MS

Purge-andtrap

Arsine Blood agent SA 7784-42-1 

SW 6010C (soil) ICP/AES

SW 6020A (aqueous) ICP/MS

NIOSH 6001 (air 

monitoring) GFAA

Note: 

NIOSH = National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

a The SAM Manual (Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events, 

SAM 2012, EPA/600/R-12/555, July 2012) attributes the compounds to the analytical methods listed in the table; however, the 

compounds currently are not included explicitly in the methods. Limited commercial laboratory capacity is available for CA and 

ABP analyses. 

7.8.7.3. SA. Arsine is unstable in uncoated metal containers. It ignites easily and, thus, 

cannot be used in shells. Therefore, its use appears to have been limited to research. There are 

isolated cases of FUDS with documented use. Based on its volatility and the lack of specificity 

of the available analyses, which measure SA as total arsenic, sampling of environmental media is 

not recommended as a way to identify SA contamination. If SA is identified as a potential MC 

based on analysis of a neat compound in a container, then analysis of total arsenic may be the 

only way to determine if there is SA contamination.

7.8.8. Most blister agents fall into one of three groups: sulfur mustards, nitrogen mustards, 

and lewisite. Blister agent use began in WWI. Training with blister agents included CAIS 

familiarization training and decontamination training. Sampling locations for blister agents 

should be tied to MEC finds and/or based on aerial photograph interpretation to locate likely 

decontamination training areas. The analytical suite in decontamination areas used from the 

1930s onward also should include chlorinated solvents because several of the decontaminating 

agents (e.g., chlorinating compound 1 or decontaminating agent, non-corrosive [DANC] – used 

up until the 1970s) contained these compounds. Based on instability and volatility, as validated 
EM 200-1-15 

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7-27 

with modeling, blister agents are not anticipated to contaminate groundwater (see Appendix E, 

USACHPPM, 1999). Therefore, groundwater sampling is not recommended for blister agents. 

Table 7-15 lists the chemical names of the blister agents and blister agent ABPs, their CAS 

numbers, and analytical methods that could be used for their detection. 

7.8.8.1. H, HD. Sulfur mustard (bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide) was the only blister agent in 

major use in WWI. It persists 1 to 2 days in average weather conditions and may persist up to a 

week or more in very cold conditions. H is suitable for use in land mines, spray tanks, bombs, 

artillery shells, mortar shells, and rockets. Although often referred to as mustard “gas,” it is 

actually an oily liquid. If released to the air, sulfur mustard exists as a vapor. The vapor will be 

degraded by hydroxyl radicals with an estimated half-life of a one-half hour. If released to soil, 

H is expected to have high mobility. It can be highly persistent under conditions of low 

temperature and moisture. It is expected to volatilize from moist soil surfaces but not from dry 

surfaces. If released into water, H is not expected to adsorb to suspended solids and sediment; 

rather, it is expected to volatilize from water surfaces. Because H has limited solubility in water, 

hydrolysis is limited by its slow rate of solution. During the dissolution process, the outer 

surfaces of H droplets form stable polymerized hydrolysis product. Without agitation, this 

polymerized hydrolysis product creates a boundary layer that interferes with the dissolution of 

sulfur mustard in water. Without agitation, bulk H may persist in water for up to several years. 

The H ABPs 1,4-dithiane and 1,4-thioxane should be analyzed together with H. Analysis for 

thiodiglycol (TDG) is warranted only if sulfur mustard, 1,4-dithiane, or 1,4-thioxane are detected 

due to the numerous other sources of TDG (Munro et. al, 1999). If sampling for sulfur mustard 

and/or its ABPs is required, then laboratory limits of quantitation must be below the appropriate 

health-based environmental screening levels (HBESLs), as illustrated in Figure 8-17. 

7.8.8.2. HN-1, HN-2, HN-3. The three nitrogen mustards, HN-1 (bis(2-

chloroethyl)ethylamine), HN-2 (bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine), and HN-3 (tri(2-

chloroethyl)amine), were not manufactured in great quantities in the United States and were not 

stockpiled as part of the U.S. CW inventory. The only documented presence of nitrogen 

mustards on FUDS is in association with CAIS vials (HN-1 and HN-3 only). All three 

compounds are colorless, odorless, liquids when freshly distilled. Within days after distillation, 

HN-3 darkens and deposits crystalline solids. HN-1 is suitable for use in land mines, artillery 

shells, mortar shells, bombs, rockets, and spray tanks. It is slightly less persistent than sulfur 

mustard. HN-2 is highly unstable and is no longer considered to be viable for use as CWM. 

HN-3 is the most stable of the three compounds and is suitable for use as a bomb filling, even 

under tropical condition. It also is suitable for use in land mines, artillery shells, mortar shells, 

bombs, rockets, and spray tanks. The nitrogen mustards are unstable in the presence of light and 

heat. They are only slightly volatile and are only slightly soluble in water. The major fate 

process in soil and water is expected to be hydrolysis. Table 7-15 lists some of the major 

hydrolysis products for HN-1 and HN-3. 
EM 200-1-15 

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7-28 

Table 7-15: Blister Agents and ABPs

Compound Description Abbreviation CAS 

Number

Determinative 

Methoda

Analytical 

Technology

Blister Agents

Sulfur mustard 

(bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide) Blister agent H, HD 505-60-2 SW 8271 / ECBC SOP GC/MS

Lewisite 

(dichloro(2-

chlorovinyl)arsine)

Blister agent L 541-25-3 ECBC SOP GC/MSb

Nitrogen mustard (bis(2-

chloroethyl)ethylamine) Blister agent HN-1 538-07-8 SW 8270D/ ECBC SOP GC/MS

Nitrogen mustard 

(bis(2-

chloroethyl)methylamine)

Blister agent HN-2 51-75-2 SW 8270D/ ECBC 

SOP GC/MS

Nitrogen mustard 

(tri(2-chloroethyl)amine) Blister agent HN-3 555-77-1 SW 8270D/ ECBC SOP GC/MS

Blister ABPs

1,4-Dithiane HD ABP 505-29-3 SW 8270D GC/MS 

1,4-Thioxane HD ABP 15980-15-1 SW 8270D GC/MS 

Thiodiglycol HD ABP TDG 111-48-8 

SW 8321B or 

ECBC SOP/

ASTM E2787-11 

(solids analysis)/ 

D7598-09 

(aqueous analysis) 

LC-MS-MS 

2-Chlorovinyl arsenous 

acid L ABP CVAA 85090-33-1 ECBC SOP GC/MSb

2-Chlorovinyl arsenous 

oxide L ABP CVAO 3088-37-7 ECBC SOP GC/MSb

Triethanolamine HN-3 ABP TEA 102-71-6 

SW 8321B or 

ECBC SOP/ 

ASTM D7599-09 

(aqueous samples)

LC-MS-MS 

Diethanolamine HN-1 ABP DEA 111-42-2 SW 8321B or 

ECBC SOP LC-MS-MS 

N-ethyldiethanolamine HN-1 ABP EDEA 139-87-7 SW 8321B or 

ECBC SOP LC-MS-MS 

Note: 

CVAO = lewisite oxide

ECBC = Edgewood Chemical Biological Center

a The SAM Manual (Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events, 

SAM 2012, EPA/600/R-12/555, July 2012) attributes the compounds to the analytical methods listed in the table; however, the 

compounds currently are not included explicitly in the methods. Limited commercial laboratory capacity is available for CA and 

ABP analyses. b L, CVAA, and CVAO must be derivatized and form the same derivative. They are analyzed and reported together. 

7.8.8.3. L. Lewisite (dichloro(2-chlorovinyl)arsine) is an organic arsenical compound. 

The only documented presence of L on FUDS is in association with CAIS vials. L is suitable for 
EM 200-1-15 

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7-29 

use in land mines, spray tanks, bombs, artillery shells, mortar shells, and rockets. It is slightly 

less persistent than H and does not persist under humid conditions due to its rapid rate of 

hydrolysis, which results in the formation of CVAA. Formation of CVAO and lewisite polymer 

may also occur. L, CVAA, and CVAO are all derivatized in the same reaction as part of the 

analytical procedure and, thus, are reported together as a detection of L.

7.8.9. Incapacitating agents could have been used for situations where the military required 

control but did not desire harm to population and/or troops. They also could have been used for 

covert operations to confuse defense or retaliatory forces. Incapacitating agents may cause 

temporary physical disability, such as paralysis, blindness, or deafness. They may also produce 

“temporary mental aberrations” such as hallucinations or disorientation (TM 3-215). The only 

incapacitating agent successfully weaponized and stockpiled for potential use is 3-quinuclidinyl 

benzilate (BZ). BZ was produced primarily in the 1950s and 1960s. Demilitarization of BZ 

began in 1988 and is complete. BZ was distributed in generator clusters, grenades (also referred 

to as canisters), and cluster bombs. The environmental fate of BZ in soil, water, and on most 

surfaces is described as “extremely persistent,” but no quantitative description is available. If a 

site has documented use of munitions containing BZ, then analyses of environmental media may 

be appropriate. (See Table 7-16 for analytical methods). 

Table 7-16: Incapacitating Agent

Compound Abbrev

iation

CAS 

Number

Determinative 

Methoda

Analytical 

Technology

3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate BZ 6581-06-2 SW 8321B LC/MS

a The SAM Manual (Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security Events, 

SAM 2012, EPA/600/R-12/555, July 2012) attributes the compounds to the analytical methods listed in the table; however, the 

compounds currently are not included explicitly in the methods. Limited commercial laboratory capacity is available for CA and 

ABP analyses. 

7.8.10. The following data sources provide information on fixed laboratory chemical 

analysis tests of CAs and ABPs:

a. USEPA SW846 Manual (http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/testmethods/sw846/)

b. USEPA/600/R-10/122, Standardized Analytical Methods for Environmental

Restoration Following Homeland Security Events (SAM Manual), SAM 2012, EPA/600/R12/555 , July 2012 (http://www.epa.gov/sam/) 

7.8.10.1. To conduct CA analyses, a laboratory must participate in the Chemical Agent 

Standard Analytical Reference Material program to acquire reference standards and must be 

DoD Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program (ELAP) certified. These requirements 

apply to both field and fixed-base laboratories. Analysis of ABPs requires only DoD ELAP 

certification. However, samples being analyzed for ABPs may also contain CA; therefore, the 

same safety protocols as for CA analyses are recommended. 
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7.8.10.2. Few methods published by the USEPA exist for CAs or ABPs, other than 

SW8271 for nerve agents and sulfur mustard (for solid and aqueous samples by GC/MS electron 

impact). The SAM Manual attributes various CA and ABPs to USEPA methods (see Tables 7-

12 through 7-16); however, compounds attributed to methods other than SW8271 are not 

included explicitly in the published methods. Analytical methods for several ABPs have been 

developed by ECBC. Limited commercial laboratory capacity is available for CA and ABP 

analyses.

7.8.10.3. The CWM DC provides specialized support to assist HQUSACE, USACE 

Commands, FOA, and laboratories by executing CW activities and maintaining state-of-the-art 

technical expertise for all aspects of CWM DC response activities. The CWM DC is the only 

Design Center authorized to execute any phase of a CWM project.

7.9. Riot Control Agents. 

7.9.1. Riot control agents are characterized by very low toxicity (chronic or acute) and a 

short duration of action. There are two mechanisms of action for riot control agents: vomiting 

agents and tear agents. 

7.9.1.1. Vomiting Agents. Vomiting agents, known as sternutators, are solids that, when 

heated, vaporize and then condense to form toxic aerosols. These agents typically are used for 

mob and riot control but historically also have been used on battlefields. The three primary 

vomiting agents are adamsite (DM), diphenylchloroarsine (DA), and diphenylcyanoarsine (DC). 

Table 7-17 lists the chemical names and common names of the vomiting agents as well as their 

CAS numbers. 

Table 7-17: Vomiting Agents

Compound Description Abbreviation Common 

Name CAS Number

Phenarsazine chloride Vomiting agent DM Adamsite 578-94-9

Diphenylchloroarsine Vomiting agent DA Clark I 712-48-1

Diphenylcyanoarsine Vomiting agent DC Clark 2 23525-22-6

7.9.1.1.1. DM. Adamsite (phenarsazine chloride) was produced and stockpiled by the 

United States towards the end of WWI. DM is known to have been included in two CAIS: 

CAIS K955 and Navy X set X549. CAIS K955 was issued from the late 1930s through WWII 

and contained one glass bottle with 15 g DM. Navy X549 set contained two vials with 15 g each 

of DM and was issued from WWII through the Korean Conflict. DM also is known to have been 

used in irritant hand grenades, which contained 0.13 pounds of DM and 0.13 pounds of tear gas 

(CN). It also was used in gas candles (2 pounds), which were metals tubes containing a 

composition of DM that produced smoke by vaporizing a smoke-producing oil. If released to 

air, DM is anticipated to remain in the particulate phase without photolyzing (HSDB, 2012). If 

released to soil, it is expected to be neither mobile nor volatile (from moist or dry surfaces). It 

has been reported to hydrolyze slowly (HSDB, 2012). If released to water, it is expected to 
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adsorb to suspended solids and sediment but is not expected to be volatile from water surfaces. 

Potential for bioconcentration in aquatic organisms is high. If vials believed to contain DM are 

found with vials containing CA, the CA vials likely will drive any cleanup requirements. In the 

unlikely case that DM vials are found alone, it is recommended that sampling be performed for 

total arsenic as a means of determining whether any residual organo-arsenical residue remains, in 

lieu of conducting analytical research to confirm DM unless the circumstances warrant the time 

and expense associated with testing for DM. 

7.9.1.1.2. DA. Diphenylchloroarsine was used by the Germans in WWI and WWII. It is 

not likely to be encountered on former military sites in the United States.

7.9.1.1.3. DC. Diphenylcyanoarsine was used by the Germans in WWI and WWII; the 

Japanese used DC in WWII. It is not likely to be encountered on former military sites in the 

United States. 

7.9.1.1.4. Fixed Laboratory Tests for Vomiting Agents. Standards and published 

methods for the vomiting agents are not available. The following journal article documents 

successful analysis of DA and DC using GC-ECD and DM using HPLC: Rainer Haas, Torsten 

C. Schmidt, Klaus Steinbach, Eberhard von Löw, Chromatographic determination of 

phenylarsenic compounds, Fresenius J Anal Chem (1998) 361: 313-318. Consultation with 

ECBC is recommended if analysis is required.

7.9.1.2. Tear Agents. Tear agents, known as lachrymators, stimulate the corneal nerves in 

the eyes to cause tears to flow and also may cause skin irritation. The use of tear agents is 

limited to training and riot control. On battlefields, tear agents are of limited value due to the 

availability of protective equipment. Tear agents include chloroacetophenone (CN; also known 

as mace or tear gas), CN variants, bromobenzylcyanide (BBC or CA), bromoacetone (BA), 

oleoresin capsicum (OC; also known as pepper spray), o-chlorobenzalmalonitrile (CS), CS 

variants, and dibenzoxazepine (CR). BBC (CA) and BA have no documented historical use at 

FUDS; no data are available for active military installations. The Army approved CR for use in 

1974. Primarily military police units use OC at military installations. CN and CS, along with 

some of their variants, historically have been used most widely by the military. Table 7-18 lists 

the chemical names and common names of the tear agents as well as their CAS numbers.

7.9.1.2.1. CN. Mace (2-chloroacetophenone) is known to have been included in two 

CAIS: CAIS K955 and Navy X set X546. CAIS K955 was issued from the late 1930s through 

WWII and contained one glass bottle with 15 g CN. Navy X546 set contained two vials with 15 

g each of CN and was issued from WWII through the Korean Conflict. CN also is known to 

have been used in grenades, mortar shells, and candles. Three CN variants also were used: CNC 

(CN in chloroform), CNS (CN and PS mixed in chloroform), and CNB (CN in benzene and 

carbon tetrachloride). These three variants of CN were suitable for use in spray tanks, mortar 

shells, bombs, and grenades. CN exists solely in the vapor phase if released to the air. It has a 

photolysis reaction half-life of approximately 8 days. If released to the soil, CN is highly mobile 

and volatilizes from moist soil but not from dry soil. If released to water, CN tends not to adsorb 

to sediment or soil and volatilizes. Hydrolysis occurs, but slowly. If vials believed to contain 

CN are found with vials containing CA, the CA vials likely will drive any cleanup requirements. 
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In the unlikely case that CN vials are found alone or that CN munitions are found, use best 

judgment to determine the necessity of finding a means to confirm the presence or absence of 

CN in media. USAPHC or ECBC may be consulted for assistance. 

7.9.1.2.2. CS. The Army replaced the use of CN with o-chlorobenzalmalonitrile (also 

known as o-chlorobenzylidene malonitrile) in 1959. There are three CS variants: CS1, a powder, 

contains 95% CS and 5% silica aerogel; CS2, an aerosol, contains 94% CS formulated in a 

mixture of 5% Cab-0-Sil® colloidal silica and 1% hexamethyldisilizane; CSX, a liquid, contains 

1 g of CS per 99 g of trioctyl phosphate. Munitions containing CS include grenades, capsules, 

and projectiles. CS1 has been used in grenades and bulk dispensers. CS exists in both the vapor 

phase and as particulates if released to the air. It has a photochemical degradation reaction halflife of approximately 110 hours in the vapor phase. Particulates may be removed by wet and dry 

deposition. If released to the soil, CS has low mobility and does not volatilize. If released to 

water, CS tends to adsorb to sediment or soil and does not volatilize. Hydrolysis is the primary 

degradation pathway for soil and groundwater. Considering that environmental fate information 

indicates that past releases are likely to have undergone hydrolysis and that there is limited 

laboratory capacity for CS analyses, best judgment should be applied to determine the necessity 

of finding a means to determine the presence or absence of CS in media if CS munitions are 

found on a site. USAPHC or ECBC may be consulted for assistance. 

Table 7-18: Tear Agents

Compound Abbreviation Common Name CAS Number

o-Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile CS o-Chlorobenzalmalonitrile 2698-41-1

1-Bromo-2-Propanone BA Bromoacetone 598-31-2

alpha-Bromobenzene-acetonitrile, 

Camite BBC, CA Bromobenzylcyanide 5798-79-8 

2-Chloroaceto-phenone, Mace, 

2-Chloro-1-phenylethanone CN Chloroacetophenone 532-27-4 

Capsaicin (primary active ingredient) OC Oleoresin Capsicum 

"Pepper Spray" 404-86-4 

Dibenz(b,f)[1,4]

oxazepine CR Dibenzoxazepine 257-07-8 

7.9.1.2.3. Fixed Laboratory Tests for Tear Agents. NIOSH methods are available to 

analyze for CS (NIOSH P&CAM 291, GC-FID) and CN (NIOSH P&CAM 304, HPLC) in air, 

but there are no published methods for CS and CN in other media. There are no published 

analytical methods for the other tear agents. There is no commercial laboratory capability 

available at this time for any tear agents. 

7.10. Incendiaries. 

7.10.1. General. Incendiaries are munitions that are used to set fire to buildings, industrial 

installations, ammunitions, fuel dumps, or other items. There are three categories of 

incendiaries: oil, metal, and a combination of oil and metal.
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 7.10.2. Oil Incendiaries. Oil incendiaries are based upon gasoline and may contain either 

straight gasoline or blends of gasoline with fuel oil and kerosene. Fuel mixtures may be used in 

a normal liquid form or a thickened form. Unthickened fuel was used in flamethrowers or when 

thickened fuel was not available. Thickened fuel was used in flamethrowers and all oil 

incendiary bombs. Fuel thickeners include the following: 

a. M1 thickener (Napalm, Standard B) – Made up of 50% coconut oil, 25% napthenic 

acids, and 25% oleic acid; thickener added at 2% to 12% to fuel 

b. M2 thickener (Napalm, Standard for U.S. Air Force only) – Made up of 95% M1 

thickener and 5% devolatilized silica aerogel

c. M4 thickener – Made from di-acid aluminum soap of isooctanoic acids 

d. Isobutyl methacrylate (IM incendiary oil, type 1) – Made up of 5.0% isobutyl 

methacrylate, 3.0% stearic acid, 2.0% calcium oxide, 88.75% gasoline, 1.25% water 

e. Natural rubber

 7.10.2.1. Other additives to oil incendiaries include peptizers and igniters. Peptizers are 

substances added to improve the dispersal of the thickener in the fuel. Examples include water, 

octoic acid, and cresylic acid (mixtures of xylenols and cresols). Cresylic acid is the preferred 

peptizer, used at one part cresylic acid to four parts of thickener. Igniters include white 

phosphorus (WP; primary type), sodium (used for munitions dropped over water), and red 

phosphorus (RP)-tipped metal matches (used for flamethrowers).

 7.10.2.2. If an area is identified as having intact or leaking oil incendiary munitions, 

consider sampling based on state requirements for fuel releases. Consider the potential presence 

of other non-DoD fuel sources to maintain appropriate attribution of site contaminants.

 7.10.3. Metal Incendiaries. The primary metal incendiaries are magnesium, thermite 

(TH), and thermate (TH3 or TH4). 

 7.10.3.1. Magnesium. Magnesium is used in powdered and solid form or as an alloy. The 

alloy contains 4.45% aluminum, 1.24% zinc, and 94.31% magnesium. The combustion product 

of magnesium incendiaries is magnesium oxide. Magnesium incendiaries have been used in 

small arms, hand grenades, and bombs. 

 7.10.3.2. TH. Thermite is a mixture of approximately 73% iron oxide and approximately 

27% powdered or granular aluminum. TH has been used in hand grenades and bombs. 

 7.10.3.3. TH3 or TH4. Thermate contains thermite with various additives. TH3 contains 

68.7% thermite, 29.0% barium nitrate, 2.0% sulfur, and 0.3% oil (binder). TH4 contains 51% 

iron oxide, 22% barium nitrate, 19% aluminum (granular), 3% aluminum (grained), and 5% 

polyester resin (Laminac 4116). TH3 and TH4 have been used in hand grenades and bombs. 
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 7.10.3.4. Metals. The primary metals that comprise the metal incendiaries are aluminum, 

magnesium, iron, and barium; zinc is only a minor component. Sampling to determine whether 

the primary metals are present may be reasonable at a site where metal incendiary use is 

suspected or confirmed, particularly in environmentally sensitive areas. A background study to 

determine site-specific background metals concentrations would be recommended (see 

discussion in Chapter 8). 

 7.10.4. Oil and Metal Incendiaries. There are two main types of oil and metal 

incendiaries: PT1 and PTV. PT1 contains 49% type C “goop” (paste made of magnesium oxide, 

carbon, petroleum distillate, and asphalt), 3% isobutyl methacrylate polymer AE, 10% coarse 

magnesium, 3% petroleum oil extract, 30% gasoline, and 5% sodium nitrate. PTV is an 

improved version of PT1 composed of 5% polybutadiene, 60% gasoline, 28% magnesium, 6% 

sodium nitrate, and 0.1% p-aminophenol. PT1 and PTV are suitable for use in incendiary 

bombs. The PDT should consider using analytical methods for petroleum hydrocarbons and 

metals as discussed in the recommendations for oil incendiaries and metal incendiaries. For 

munitions containing PT1, an evaluation of polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) also may 

be appropriate given the asphalt content. 

7.11. Smokes and Obscurants. 

 7.11.1. Obscurants are anthropogenic or naturally occurring particles that are suspended in 

air and block or weaken transmission of a particular part or parts of the electromagnetic 

spectrum, such as visible and infrared radiation or microwaves. Smoke is an artificially created 

obscurant normally produced by burning or vaporizing a material and also can be used for 

signaling purposes. 

 7.11.2. Smoke may be delivered via projection or generation with reliance on steering 

winds to deliver the smoke to a target. Projected smoke is produced by artillery or mortar 

munitions, naval gunfire, helicopter-delivered rockets, bombs, and generator smoke from fixedwing aircraft. Generated smoke is produced by smoke pots, smoke grenades, and smoke 

generators.

 7.11.3. Screening smokes from WWI include sulfur trioxide, oleum, chlorosulfonic acid, 

sulfuryl chloride, titanium tetrachloride (FM), WP, RP, tin tetrachloride (KJ; stannic chloride), 

silicon tetrachloride / ammonium anhydride, and Berger Mixture (contains zinc dust, carbon 

tetrachloride, sodium chlorate, ammonium chloride, and magnesium carbonate). Screening 

smokes used from WWII through the Korean Conflict include sulfur trioxide-chlorosulfonic acid 

solution (FS), hexachloroethane and zinc oxide mixture (HC), oil smoke/fog oil, plasticized 

white phosphorus (PWP), and colored smoke. More recently used screening smokes include 

titanium dioxide, polyethylene glycol (a recently proposed alternative to HC), teraphthalic acid 

(used in the AN-M8 grenade), infrared smokes (EA-5763 and EA-5769, which are brass flakes 

used in XM76/M76 smoke grenades), and synthetic graphite flakes/powder (commercially 

known as Micro-260 and KS-2). Historically, the smokes that were used most commonly are FS, 

FM, WP, RP, HC, and oil smoke. Table 7-19 lists the chemical names and common names of 

the screening smokes as well as their CAS numbers.
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Table 7-19: Smokes 

Compound Description Abbreviation Common Name CAS Number

Chlorosulfonic acid, with Sulfur 

trioxide make up FS Smoke FS Chlorosulfonic acid 7790-94-5 

Hexachloroethane Smoke HC Hexachloroethane 67-72-1

Amorphous phosphorus Smoke RP Red phosphorus 7723-14-0

Silicon tetrachloride Smoke N/A Silicon tetrachloride 10026-04-7

Sulfur trioxide, with 

chlorosulfonic acid, makes up 

FS

Smoke N/A Sulfur trioxide 7446-11-9 

Stannic chloride Smoke KJ Tin tetrachloride 7646-78-8

Titanium tetrachloride Smoke FM Titanium tetrachloride 7550-45-0

WP aka Molecular Phosphorus; 

Elemental P (Valence State 0) - 

CAS# 7723-14-0

Smoke WP White phosphorus 12185-10-3 

Note: N/A = no abbreviation for this compound

7.11.3.1. FS. Chlorosulfonic acid (45%) together with sulfur trioxide (55%) makes up FS. 

FS was used in portable cylinders, airplane tanks, and projectiles. FS is corrosive in the presence 

of moisture, limiting its use. Chlorosulfonic acid reacts rapidly with water, yielding hydrochloric 

and sulfuric acids. Therefore, hydrolysis is expected to occur in moist soil or air releases. 

Similarly, sulfur trioxide reacts rapidly with water to yield sulfuric acid, and hydrolysis is 

expected in moist soil and air releases. Because there is no compound that could be isolated 

from environmental media as clearly sourced to FS, analysis of environmental media is not 

appropriate. Rounds filled with FS trigger liquid-filled UXO requirements. Due to the 

corrosivity of FS, rounds containing FS that are disposed of in a Controlled Detonation Chamber 

(CDC) may trigger additional waste disposal requirements (i.e., RCRA characteristic for 

corrosivity) as well as operational concerns for the CDC. 

7.11.3.2. FM. Titanium tetrachloride reacts immediately with water or water vapor 

(residence times in air or water are expected to be on the order of hours). All hydrolysis 

products eventually form titanium dioxide. Titanium dioxide is insoluble in water and may settle 

out in sediments. It is inert and is used in cosmetics and food products. Rounds with FM fill 

trigger liquid-filled UXO requirements. The only analytical methods available for FM analyze 

for total titanium (see SAM Manual and USACERL, TR 99/56). Detection of titanium is not 

definitive evidence of titanium tetrachloride release because titanium occurs naturally 

(approximately 0.6% of Earth’s crust). The lack of a direct analytical method for titanium 

tetrachloride, coupled with FM’s properties (i.e., high rate of hydrolysis and low toxicity of the 

ultimate hydrolysis product) support a recommendation to forego analysis for titanium unless a 

recent release is present.

7.11.3.3. WP. White phosphorus (elemental phosphorus, chemical formula P4) has been 

used as filler in artillery shells (105 mm and 155 mm), tank guns (75 mm, 90 mm, and 105 mm), 

mortars (60 mm, 81 mm, and 4.2-inch), grenades, and aerial smoke systems (bombs, bomblets, 
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and rockets). If released in water, WP reacts mainly with oxygen in the water to form 

phosphorous pentoxide (P4O10), the anhydride of phosphoric acid, which may persist for hours to 

days. Chunks of WP coated with protective layers may persist in water and soil for years if 

oxygen levels are low in the water or soil. In anoxic water, WP may react with water to form 

phosphine, which quickly moves from water to air before degrading to less harmful chemicals in 

less than 1 day. WP exhibits a slight bioaccumulation in fish. If released to soil or sediment, 

WP may persist for a few days before degrading to less harmful chemicals. It can develop crusts 

of protective coating and may be reactivated when the crust breaks, exposing WP to the 

atmosphere. If significant levels of WP are present in soil that is excavated, visible smoke may 

be observed. If visible smoke is observed, notify analytical laboratory and confirm willingness 

to accept for analysis. In deeper soil and the bottom deposits of surface water bodies, where 

little oxygen is present, WP may persist for centuries. 

 7.11.3.3.1. WP Regulatory Requirements. WP is regulated under several environmental 

laws. It is a hazardous substance under CERCLA and is reportable if more than 1 pound is 

released. WP is classified as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Water Act and is 

considered a RCRA reactive waste (USEPA Hazardous Waste Number D003). It is regulated 

under the CWA and may be subject to discharge limits. Because of these regulatory 

requirements, careful planning is required prior to conducting an investigation for WP. Planning 

considerations, to include disposal options, should be discussed in the appropriate project 

planning documents. 

 7.11.3.3.2. WP Sampling Considerations. If the PDT suspects that there may have been a 

WP release in an anoxic environment, environmental samples (especially sediment samples) 

should be collected. If any release would have been exposed to the air, it is unlikely that WP is 

still present, although it is not impossible due the potential formation of a crust that may prevent 

WP from reacting with oxygen. If samples emit smoke (e.g., samples are collected from an 

excavation of soil containing significant levels of WP or from residue after munitions have been 

detonated in place or in a contained detonation chamber), notify laboratory personnel and consult 

qualified DOT-trained personnel prior to sample shipment. There are specific considerations 

related to IS when collecting samples for WP analysis. Although IS has been proven successful 

with WP at Eagle River Flats, this situation was specific for sediments below the water column 

that were known to be contaminated and sediments that were heavily contaminated to determine 

particulate WP that would be available to dabbling ducks. If the project being evaluated has a 

similar CSM, it is recommended that the reader consult "Composite Sampling of Sediments 

Contaminated with White Phosphorus," Special Report 97-30 and consider contacting USACE 

CRREL for expert assistance related to WP. However, if sampling for WP where the site does 

not involve anoxic sediments, particularly if the site does not involve known contamination, IS 

sampling for WP is not recommended. This is primarily because sample processing that 

involves drying, grinding, or sieving should not be performed prior to analysis because of the 

potential hazard and loss of WP by sublimation and oxidation. Additionally, SW7580 

preservation requirements are that soil samples be collected with minimal headspace and kept in 

the dark, so the sample containers in use for most IS (clean polyethylene bags) are inappropriate 

for WP. If a project is conducting IS for other analytes and WP is a desired analyte, the PDT 

should discuss plans for sample collection during TPP and document them in the project UFPQAPP. There are several non-DoD uses and sources of WP. For instance, WP is used to 
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produce phosphoric acid as well as other industrial chemicals used to make fertilizers, food and 

drink additives, cleaning compounds, and other products. Small amounts of WP also have been 

used in rat and roach poisons as well as in fireworks and matches. 

 7.11.3.3.3. Field Tests for WP. No field tests have been developed for WP, although the 

fixed laboratory test has been used on a limited basis in the field, to include use of solid-phase 

micro-extraction as discussed in SW7580. 

 7.11.3.3.4. Fixed Laboratory Tests for WP. Fixed laboratory tests for WP are all based 

on GC. The only published method for WP is SW7580, a GC method with an NPD. A GC/MS 

method is also available but is not published. NIOSH Method 7905 is available for air samples. 

Due to increased regulation of WP by the Drug Enforcement Agency, WP standards currently 

are unavailable from standards distributors; therefore, analytical capabilities for this compound 

are very limited. Contact the EM CX for methodology recommendations and laboratory 

availability.

 7.11.3.4. PWP. PWP is a formulation of WP and other compounds (e.g., butyl rubber) to 

stabilize the smoke agent fill and slow the burning rate. WP and RP have been plasticized with a 

styrene-butadiene rubber for use in munitions. The styrene-butadiene rubber is inert; however, it 

is capable of supporting combustion when it is divided finely. It is very slowly degraded in the 

atmosphere through reaction with ozone or attack by microorganisms. Reaction products include 

lower molecular weight hydrocarbons and CO2. Production of PWP was halted in 1965. The 

sampling recommendations for PWP are the same as those for WP. However, with the addition 

of the plasticizer, the WP crust is more likely to form. 

 7.11.3.5. RP. Red phosphorus (amorphous phosphorus, chemical formula (P4)n) is not 

spontaneously flammable, requiring ignition to burn and make smoke. It is less incendiary than 

either WP or PWP, making it safer for use in smaller cartridges (e.g., 40 mm grenades). RP is 

combined with one of the following for distribution: felt, butyl rubber, or polymer epoxy 

binders. Under moist conditions, RP reacts to produce various phosphoric acids. In the 

environment, RP slowly degrades by disproportionation and hydrolysis to phosphorus acids and 

phosphine (PH3). Phosphine is very reactive and usually undergoes rapid oxidation. The final 

products, phosphates, are nontoxic. In wastewater, RP adsorbs to sewage sludge. RP is harmful 

to aquatic organisms. In TR 99/56, U.S. Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory 

recommends using the same method for RP as for WP (SW 7580). However, no commercial 

laboratory capability is known for this compound. Based on RP’s reaction products (phosphoric 

acids), which are mostly not distinguishable via laboratory analysis, and the lack of available 

laboratory capacity, characterization of sites for RP is not recommended.

 7.11.3.6. KJ. Americans and others used tin tetrachloride (stannic chloride) in WWI and 

WWII. The Americans used KJ less frequently than other tetrachlorides. KJ is a fluid that 

fumes in air and hydrolyzes into stannic hydroxide (visible smoke). It was used both alone and 

in combination with CA fills, such as agent NC (80% chloropicrin and 20% KJ). When added to 

CA fills, it increased the visibility of the CA cloud and increased the ability of the CA to 

penetrate the charcoal canister in protective masks. The sampling and analysis recommendations 

for KJ are the same as those for FM described above.
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 7.11.3.7. HC (Hexachloroethane) Mixture. The composition of HC changed over time. 

It was developed during WWI (though not used by Americans) as a composition containing 

carbon tetrachloride and zinc. At the beginning of WWII, the composition changed to HC, 

ammonium chloride, and perchlorate salt. In 1940, perchlorate was no longer available; 

chlorates were tested in its place but proved too hazardous. This led to the current day mixture, 

which contains HC, grained aluminum, and zinc oxide. A pyrotechnic starter mixture usually 

ignites the burning reaction. The mixture reacts with moisture in the air to form a zinc chloride 

(ZnCl2) solution in tiny droplets, which results in smoke. HC smoke was disseminated via 

smoke pots, grenades, 105 mm cartridges, and 155 mm projectiles. In the late 1990s, the 

USACHPPM determined that M5 HC smoke pots exhibit the RCRA toxicity characteristic for 

lead and possibly for cadmium depending on the individual pot tested (USACHPPM 

Memorandum, Subject: Hazardous Waste Study No. 37-7016-97/98, Feb 1998 [available from 

EM CX upon request]). The memorandum describing the study noted that potential sources for 

lead included lead solder and a small amount of lead thiocyanate in the flash charge. Potential 

cadmium sources were identified as impurities in the zinc oxide filler and cadmium used in 

electroplating some components. No methods exist to determine zinc chloride, and analysis for 

zinc does not accurately reflect zinc chloride concentrations due to background zinc levels in 

soil. If any HC smoke pots are found at a site, it is recommended that they be characterized for 

RCRA metals. The PDT should use professional judgment in deciding whether to sample for 

HC. Analyses for zinc should evaluate background concentrations carefully. 

7.11.3.8. Oil Smoke. Vaporizing fuel oils in mechanical smoke generators or engine 

exhausts may produce oil smoke. It was used widely in WWII, where the first means of 

production was the M1 mechanical smoke generator. Two commonly used oils are fog oil 

(standard grade fuel-2; a light-duty lubricating oil equivalent to a SAE 20-grade motor oil) and 

diesel fuel. If an area is identified as having intact or leaking oil smoke munitions, the PDT 

should consider sampling based on state requirements for fuel releases. Consider the potential 

presence of other non-DoD fuel sources to maintain appropriate attribution of site contaminants. 

7.12. Other Types of Munitions Constituents. 

7.12.1. Illumination Rounds. Illumination rounds are used to light up a battlefield and 

include flares and photoflash bombs and cartridges. 

7.12.1.1. Flares. Flares typically contain magnesium or aluminum as the fuel. Various 

colors are produced by different metals: red is produced by strontium, green by barium, yellow 

by sodium, and blue or green by copper. Refer to the metals MC subsection for 

recommendations for sampling and analysis for the metals found in flares. Color intensifiers that 

may be included in flares include hexachloroethane, hexachlorobenzene, dechlorane, and 

polyvinylchloride. Based on the small quantities of intensifiers in the flares and the expectation 

that these compounds will be expended during use of the flares, no chemical analyses typically 

are recommended.

7.12.1.2. Photoflash Bombs and Cartridges. Photoflash bombs and cartridges are used to 

generate lighting at altitude to obtain photographs. Type I photoflash powder used during WWII 

contained 34% magnesium, 26% aluminum, and 40% potassium perchlorate. Type III, class A 
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photoflash powder used in the 1950s contained 40% aluminum, 30% barium nitrate, and 30% 

potassium perchlorate. Photoflash powder is very sensitive to shock, friction, and electrostatic 

discharge. For sites suspected or known to have photoflash bombs or cartridges, refer to the 

sampling and analysis recommendations for perchlorate discussed above. 

7.12.2. Chemical Agent Simulants. Chemical agent simulants are chemicals that closely 

resemble CAs but are less toxic and, therefore, amenable to training and testing (both field 

testing and laboratory testing). Common chemical agent simulants include mustard simulants, G 

agent simulants, VX simulants, and triphosgene (phosgene simulant). 

7.12.2.1. Mustard Simulants. Mustard simulants include molasses residuum (MR), 

asbestine suspension (AS), diethyl adipate, methyl salicylate, and 2-chloroethyl ethyl sulfide 

(CEES). MR is a concentrate of stillage from fermentation of molasses, treated to prevent 

further fermentation. It was used for training as early as 1937 (its use has been documented on 

FUDS) and was used in tests of smoke tanks, thin case bombs, and chemical land mines. It 

contained cresol as a stabilizing agent. AS is a suspension of finely ground asbestos in water. It 

may or may not include butyric acid. It was dispersed by spray from aircraft during training 

exercises. Diethyl adipate was used in decontamination and dissemination studies. Methyl 

salicylate was used to perform entry/exit tests for shelters. CEES was used in decontamination, 

detection, contact hazards, and clothing protection studies. Analytical testing of environmental 

media is not recommended for any of the mustard simulants.

7.12.2.2. G-Agent Simulants. G-agent simulants include the following compounds: 

a. Diethyl hydrogen phosphonate – used to study spectroscopy behavior and ionic 

reactions of G-agents 

b. Diethyl malonate – used to simulate viscosity and elastic shear of G-agents and used as 

GA simulant in CAIS kits (documented use on FUDS) 

c. Diethyl p-nitrophenyl phosphate – used to simulate hydrolysis mechanisms

d. Dimethyl methylphosphonate – used to study vulnerability of military assets, 

decontamination, and dissemination 

e. Dipropylene glycol monomethyl ether – used to activate G-agent monitors and 

detection instruments due to similar ion mobility characteristics

f. Triethyl phosphate – used to simulate G-agents on painted surfaces for decontamination 

g. Trimethyl phosphate – used in decontamination studies 

Analytical testing of environmental media is not recommended for any G-agent simulants.

7.12.2.3. VX Simulants. VX simulants include the following compounds: 
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a. Bis(2-ethylhexyl)(2-ethylhexyl) phosphonate – used in decontamination studies 

b. Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phosphonate – used in decontamination studies and spray tank testing 

c. Dimethyl hydrogen phosphonate – used in studying spectroscopic behavior and ionic 

reactions

d. Parathion – used to verify mechanical systems

e. Diethyl phthalate – used in decontamination studies 

f. Diethyl pimelate – used in decontamination studies 

g. Dimethyl adipate – used in decontamination studies 

h. Malathion – used to verify mechanical systems

i. Trioctyl phosphate – used in spray tank testing 

Analytical testing of environmental media is not recommended for any VX simulants. 

7.12.2.4. Triphosgene. Triphosgene is a phosgene simulant used in CAIS kits. It has been 

documented as having been present at FUDS. No sampling or analysis is recommended for 

triphosgene. 

7.13. Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons. 

7.13.1. Training activities can result in site contamination by substances that are not 

classified as MC because they do not originate from UXO, DMM, or other military munitions or 

the breakdown of those munitions. Whether or not such substances pose an unacceptable risk 

needs to be answered or otherwise addressed in order to close out a site. Also, the MRS 

Prioritization Protocol (MRSPP) scoring protocol assesses MC as well as any incidental nonmunitions-related contaminants. Two examples of such substances are PAHs in clay targets at 

skeet ranges and various decontamination materials, such as DANC, used to decontaminate soil 

contaminated with certain types of blister agents (sampling and analysis considerations for 

DANC are discussed in Section 7.8.7). 

7.13.2. PAHs (from coal tar pitch), some of which are carcinogenic (e.g., benzo(a)pyrene), 

make up approximately 30% of clay pigeons used as skeet and trap range targets, especially 

during the 1940s. PAHs from skeet targets are not highly mobile; therefore, soil typically is the 

primary medium of concern. There are many potential non-DoD ambient sources of PAHs that 

should be considered in an investigation, including roadways, runoff from surface sealant, and 

fuel burning byproducts. 

7.13.3. If incremental sampling methodology (discussed in Chapter 8) is used at a site, and 

PAHs are analytes of interest, then during the TPP process, the PDT should consider soil sample 

handling procedures to be followed by the laboratory. For instance, heat generated during 

prolonged or aggressive grinding using a ball mill or puck mill could cause analyte loss, 
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particularly of the lighter molecular weight compounds. Additional considerations for PAH 

sample preparation for IS are discussed in Chapter 8. 

7.13.4. Field analytical methods for PAHs include USEPA 4035, which is a soil screening 

approach based on immunoassay, and USEPA 4425, which uses a reporter gene on a human cell 

line. 

7.13.5. There are several fixed laboratory analytical methods for PAHs. USEPA 8310 and 

USEPA 8270 SIM are recommended. USEPA 8100 and USEPA 8275A are also published 

methods. 

7.14. Identifying Munitions Constituents in Munitions. 

7.14.1. There are a variety of resources that can be used that provide information on the 

types of materials that make up various munitions types, including Common Operations Reports, 

Technical Manuals (TMs), other historical documentation, and munitions-related databases, 

including the Munition Items Disposition Action System (MIDAS). Accessing these information 

sources provides insight into what MC might be present at a site. Because some resources may 

have restricted use or be for official use only, it is important to consult with the appropriate 

USACE office of counsel if you have questions about the documents.

7.14.2. There are three types of Common Operations Reports that provide FUDS-era 

information: Installation Type reports, Range Operations reports, and Support Services reports. 

7.4.2.1. The Range Operations reports contain information that is useful in developing a 

CSM for FUDS-era ranges. The Range Operations reports have the following general structure:

a. Executive Summary

b. Introduction 

c. Description of Operations 

d. Authorized Munitions, Materials Use, and Storage Practices 

e. Disposal Management Practices 

f. Notable Variations from Typical Operations 

g. Closure and Range Clearance Procedures

h. Appendix A – Applicable Manuals and Directives

i. Appendix B – Weapons and Ammunition Data Sheets 

j. Appendix C – Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

k. Appendix D – Munitions Constituents Table
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l. Appendix E – Propellants, Explosives and Pyrotechnics 

7.14.2.2. Range Operations reports are available for 23 different range types:

a. RO-01 Small Arms Range 

b. RO-02 Multiple Weapons Type Ranges 

c. RO-03 Field Artillery Range

d. RO-04 Mortar Range 

e. RO-05 Shoulder-Launched Small Rocket Range

f. RO-06 Medium Caliber Rocket 

g. RO-07 Heavy Rocket and Guided Missile 

h. RO-08 Recoilless Rifle Range

i. RO-09 Davy Crockett Common Range 

j. RO-10 Tank Range 

k. RO-11 Anti-Tank Gun 

l. RO-12 Antitank Guided Missile 

m. RO-13 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Range

n. RO-14 Hand and Rifle Grenade Range 

o. RO-15 40 mm Grenade Launcher Range 

p. RO-16 Flame Thrower Range 

q. RO-17 Mine, Booby-trap, and Demolition Area 

r. RO-18 Chemical Warfare Training Area

s. RO-19 Helicopter Weapons 

t. RO-20 Fixed Wing Air-to-Air Weapons Range

u. RO-21 Fixed Wing Air-to-Ground 

v. RO-23 Coast Artillery Range 

w. RO-24 OB/OD Range
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Note: RO-22 was to be for Maneuver Ranges; however, the material was covered in the other 

Range Operations reports. 

7.14.2.3. Some of the Common Operations Reports are located on the Army’s Engineering 

Knowledge Online (EKO) Web site, and others are available on the FUDS Records Management 

Database under nonproject documents. Some Common Operations Reports may have restricted 

use status; contact the EM CX for assistance and access to the Common Operations Reports. 

7.14.3. Technical Manuals are designated as “TM” by the Army but also are available 

from the other services, which have their own designations. In addition, MC-related information 

also may be obtained from other manuals produced by the Army. The term “Technical Manual” 

as used herein refers to any service’s manuals or other available historical documentation that the 

PDT may reference for information on MC. Starting with the War Department era, each service 

had its own manuals (although some were authored jointly). These manuals were updated 

whenever doctrine, materiel, or other key factors required updates. Electronic copies of these 

manuals are available from the Internet in some cases; however, frequently they are poor 

reproductions and may not be searchable electronically. Some of the manuals are available on 

the FUDS Records Management Database. More recent manuals may have distribution 

restrictions. The ordnance/explosives safety community is typically a good source of technical 

manuals, and the PDT is advised to consult with ordnance and explosive safety personnel to 

assist with nomenclature.

7.14.4 MIDAS provides comprehensive information on the components that make up 

various munitions, and reports may be requested at varying levels of detail. The database allows 

searches by National Stock Number (NSN), DoD Identification Code (DoDIC), Family, 

Nomenclature, and Drawing Number (the NSN, DoDIC, and Nomenclature searches are most 

commonly used by PDTs). MIDAS may be accessed at the following Web site: 

https://midas.dac.army.mil/). Access to MIDAS requires registration for the database and a 

CAC. Contractors that require access should coordinate with their DoD point of contact to 

acquire a CAC and a sponsored account. 

7.14.5. Table 7-20 shows some of the advantages and disadvantages of these MC 

identification tools. 
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Table 7-20: MC Identification Tools – Advantages and Disadvantages

MC in UXO Tool Advantages Disadvantages

Common Operations 

Reports

• Focuses on FUDS-era ranges and

munitions

• No information on metals MC

• Generally, no information on amount

of MC

TMs • Specific to each munition

• Can have period-of-use information

• May not be readily available

• Can be difficult to find the required

information (not indexed and/or hardcopy only)

MIDAS • Comprehensive – both energetic and

metals by component of the

munition item

• Has some FUDS-era munitions

• Includes modern-era munitions

• Database format, so searchable

• Period of use not available

• Obsolete munitions may not be

covered.

• Searching can be difficult without

experience.
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CHAPTER 8

Site Characterization Strategies

1

8.1. Site Characterization Overview, Goals, and Objectives. 

8.1.1. Introduction. Characterization strategies may be performed during various project 

phases, including the SI, RI, EE/CA, RmD, and RD. However, the amount of data, the 

performance metrics, and/or the technologies required to collect the required site characterization 

data may vary. This chapter discusses site characterization approaches for RIs, and Chapters 9 

and 10 present more details on site characterization for MEC and MC, respectively. 

8.1.2. Scope of Chapter. Although the generalized site characterization approach 

presented within this chapter is focused on RIs, much of the guidance contained within this 

chapter can be extended to any site characterization phase of the MMRP. The PDT should 

develop the site characterization technical approach and project quality objectives (PQOs) with 

the involvement of project stakeholders through the use of the TPP process (see Chapter 2 and 

EM 200-1-2 for more details on the TPP process). It should be noted that the general site 

characterization goals for land and marine MRSs are equivalent for a particular MR project

phase; however, the PQOs and the methods and technologies required to meet the PQOs may be 

significantly different. 

8.1.3. SI Objectives. The fundamental objectives of an SI are to eliminate from further 

consideration MEC or MC releases that pose no significant threat to public health or the 

environment and to determine the potential need for removal action (USEPA, 1992). The SI 

phase is not intended to collect enough data to determine the nature and extent of the 

contamination but is focused on determining the presence or absence of contamination at a site. 

8.1.4. RI Objectives. The objectives of an RI are to characterize an MRS by determining 

the nature and extent of MEC and/or MC at the MRS, to determine the potential interactions 

between receptors and MEC and MC for the site-specific land use, and to complete the BRA and 

MEC HA. The RI objective is to gather sufficient information to determine the nature and extent 

of MEC and/or MC contamination. This objective does not require the unobtainable goal of 

removing all uncertainty but rather to gather information sufficient to support an informed risk 

management decision regarding which remedy appears to be most appropriate for a given site 

(USEPA, 1988). MMRP RIs should be MRS-specific and assess all munitions-related hazards 

(i.e., MEC and MC) across the entire MRS. MRS site characterization during the RI should 

determine the nature and extent of MEC and MC by obtaining the amount, type, and quality of 

data to:

a. bound and characterize the MEC and MC at an MRS;

b. enable comparison of remedial alternatives;

c. determine areas that are not impacted by concentrated munitions use; and
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d. establish baseline risks to human health and the environment and baseline explosive 

safety hazards.

8.1.4.1. RIs may use a multitude of data. These data may be existing data collected 

during previous investigations and cleanups. Typical data used in the determination of the nature 

and extent of MEC and MC include, but are not limited to: 

a. PA and/or other historical records analysis (e.g., ASR);

b. previous investigations (e.g., SI) or removal actions (e.g., TCRA, NTCRA); 

c. historical photographic analysis, including aerial photographic analysis; 

d. on-the-ground reconnaissance; 

e. geophysical investigations; 

f. excavation and identified geophysical anomalies; and

g. MC sampling.

8.1.4.2. Figure 8-1 shows an example of an RI site characterization decision logic diagram 

for MEC site characterization; Figures 8-2 and 8-3 show example RI site characterization 

decision logic diagrams for CMUAs and NCMUAs, respectively. CMUAs are MRSs or areas 

within MRSs where there is a high likelihood of finding MEC and that have a high amount of 

MD within them as a result of historical munitions use and fragmentation. CMUAs are most 

commonly target areas on ranges; however, they also include explosion sites, open burn / open 

detonation areas, and potentially even disposal sites where munitions have been disposed of over 

a relatively large area (i.e., not small, isolated burial pits). NCMUAs are areas within an MRS 

where there is a low amount of MD and UXO due to limited historical munitions use and 

fragmentation. NCMUAs may be entire MRSs (e.g., training or maneuver areas) or they may be 

a portion of an MRS outside of a CMUA (e.g., buffer areas). See Sections 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 for 

further guidance on locations of CMUAs, characterizing CMUAs, and characterizing NCMUAs, 

respectively. Figures 8-4a and 8-4b show an example RI site characterization decision logic 

diagram for SARs. Sections 8.2 through 8.8 provide additional guidance on each of the elements 

contained within these figures. 

8.1.5. EE/CA Objectives. Historically, site characterization under the MMRP was 

performed using the EE/CA process, not under an RI. EE/CAs typically were performed 

property-wide (i.e., EE/CAs were not confined to just MRAs and MRSs) and included limited to 

no MC sampling. Removal actions, including EE/CAs, according to CERCLA and the NCP, are 

limited actions that are only authorized as an exception to the normal remedial process to address 

urgent or immediate risks to human health and the environment. EE/CAs currently are required 

for NTCRAs, including: 

a. assessing the MEC hazards at a site and how site characteristics (e.g., erosion) and land 

use affect these hazards;
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Figure 8-1: MEC Site Characterization Decision Logic 
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8-4 

Figure 8-2: Example MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for CMUAs
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8-5 

Figure 8-3: Example MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for NCMUAs 
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8-6 

Figure 8-4: Example MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for SARs 
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8-7 

Figure 8-4: Example MC Site Characterization Decision Logic for SARs (continued) 
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8-8 

b. performing limited sampling of the site to characterize the source, nature, and extent of 

UXO and DMM;

c. identifying the removal action objectives;

d. identifying and comparing removal action alternatives;

e. recommending the removal action; and describing the interim monitoring program 

before the permanent remedy can be established. 

8.1.5.1. Current practice is to perform an RI to characterize the nature and extent of MEC 

and MC at an MRS; however, EE/CAs may still be used for the following purposes: 

a. NTCRAs (IAW the requirements of 40 CFR 300.415(b)(4)(i)) 

b. Characterizing a localized area

c. To alleviate an immediate hazard (i.e., sites with known MEC or MC where receptors 

have access)

d. Short-term action

8.1.6. RD and RmD Objectives. Following the selection of a particular remedy for a site, 

the RD or RmD is used to develop the detailed designs, plans, specifications, and bid documents 

as necessary to implement the selected RA or removal action, respectively (USEPA, 1995). In 

order to develop these documents, additional site characterization may be required to collect 

additional information to adequately complete the RD or RmD, as well as to scope the RA or 

removal action. 

8.2. Site Characterization Planning Considerations. 

8.2.1. MRS Boundary Verification. The first component of properly planning site 

characterization activities is for the PDT to identify the appropriate MRS in the database of 

record, which may be FUDSMIS or AEDB-R0F

1

 (to be replaced by HQAES in the future). Maps 

showing the currently submitted MRS boundaries also can be found in FUDSMIS for FUDS 

sites and in the Annual Report to Congress for all DoD MRSs. It is critical that the PDT 

determines the appropriate boundary and acreage for an MRS prior to planning and conducting 

site characterization to ensure that site characterization activities characterize the entire MRS in 

the database of record. Reliance on GIS files from previous investigations and/or site reports 

may not identically match the MRS boundary in the database of record and may, in a worst-case 

scenario, be in an incorrect geographic location. Failure to identify the appropriate boundary of 

record prior to beginning the project may lead to incomplete site characterization and result in 

having to remobilize to the MRS to complete the site characterization activities.

 

1 Army Environmental Database-Restoration
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8.2.2. Geophysical Survey Types. Different geophysical survey types can be used to 

locate and characterize UXO and DMM within MRSs. The decisions about the types and 

amounts of geophysical investigation are site specific, may depend on the MMRP phase of the 

project, and should incorporate the CSM and project DQOs established through the TPP process. 

Basically, there are two choices: investigate the entire MRS or sample a representative portion 

of the MRS (and subareas such as the CMUA) and infer the results across the whole MRS, the 

CMUA, or the NCMUA. On relatively small sites, it can be efficient in terms of cost, schedule, 

and environmental impact to geophysically map the entire area. On larger MRSs, statistically 

designed geophysical approaches are an appropriate method where a small geophysical sample 

can be interpolated between sampling locations. Two examples of statistically designed 

approaches are transects spaced evenly across a site to identify CMUAs and grids placed 

randomly across a site to identify an upper limit on the potential amount of MEC within a 

CMUA or an NCMUA. Statistically designed surveying methods are designed in VSP and UXO 

Estimator and are discussed further in Section 8.3. In many cases, historical information will 

provide general locations and usages of ranges and other training areas, and these historical 

locations can be used to locate geophysical sampling. MEC site characterization geophysical 

survey types include meandering path surveys, transect surveys, and grid surveys. Each of these 

geophysical survey techniques is discussed in greater detail below. 

8.2.2.1. Meandering Path Surveying. Meandering path surveys often are used in the SI 

phase to identify the potential presence/absence of MEC at a site, and the identified anomalies 

typically are not excavated. Meandering path surveying is a process where a geophysical 

instrument is integrated with a navigation instrument, usually GPS or DGPS, which links 

positional data with the geophysical readings. Meandering path surveys need to be designed to 

meet specific project DQOs that will be input into decisions to support SI objectives. Afterward, 

the geophysical data are analyzed and anomalies are located and then may be excavated and 

evaluated, if required. If the purpose of the meandering path survey is to estimate the number of 

anomalies in a given area, then the method can offer large cost savings on project properties with 

difficult vegetation and terrain since vegetation removal costs are virtually eliminated and 

surveying costs are reduced greatly. However, if the sampling plan requires that the anomalies 

be reacquired and intrusively investigated, then the method becomes much more expensive 

because of poor positional accuracy that often is associated with this method. The poor 

positional accuracy can significantly increase the cost of the reacquisition task of the project. An 

example of meandering path surveying is shown in Figure 8-5. 

8.2.2.2. Transects. Geophysical investigation transects are one approach used to 

characterize MRSs. Transect data generally are tied directly to project DQOs stemming from 

VSP planning in the TPP process and to decision rules developed to bound and characterize 

CMUAs. Geophysical transect DQOs may be defined to ensure a specific confidence level that 

the transect survey will traverse and detect target areas of a certain size; to determine the 

boundaries of CMUAs to a specific accuracy; to locate CMUAs of a given size to a certain 

confidence level; to map anomaly density and distribution across an MRS based on geophysical 

transect results; and/or to perform post-anomaly verification sampling to evaluate potential 

residual UXO left on an MRS after a removal action has occurred. 
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8.2.2.2.1. VSP, which is discussed further in Section 8.3.1, is a common software 

program used to generate geophysical transects. The orientation of transects relative to a 

potential CMUA or site should facilitate ease of surveying given topology and maximize the 

potential for CMUA traversal (i.e., transects were designed to ensure traversal and detection of 

the smaller axis of an ellipsoidal target area). DGM and mag-and-dig transects can be designed 

in the same manner using VSP. Transect surveys can be implemented as either analog or digital 

geophysical surveys. For both types of transects, the transects follow a semifixed path with 

defined start and end points. The transects are placed parallel to each other to meet statistical 

confidence levels needed to ensure traversing and detecting potential CMUAs. 

Figure 8-5: Meandering Path Surveying Within an MRS 

8.2.2.2.2. Figure 8-6 shows an example of the data analysis associated with ground-based 

geophysical transect surveys to identify CMUAs. In this example, the project DQOs are to 

traverse and detect a CMUA of a given size to a specific confidence. The geophysicist used VSP 

to determine the transect spacing required to meet this DQO. The upper left image shows 

traversed geophysical transects (green lines) based on the VSP calculations and the geophysical 

anomalies (blue circles) identified during the survey. The geophysicist then evaluated the 

geophysical transect and anomaly data in VSP to locate areas with elevated anomaly density 
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above the background anomaly density and to map the anomaly density across the MRS. The 

lower left corner shows areas with elevated anomaly densities (red squares) above the 

background anomaly density. The right side of the figure shows the calculated anomaly density 

across the entire MRS. Red-shaded areas are high anomaly density areas that potentially may be 

CMUAs. Tools for developing geophysical transect surveys and evaluating geophysical transect 

data are contained within VSP and are discussed further in Section 8.3.1 of this manual. 

Figure 8-6: Example of Using Ground Based Transects to Locate CMUAs in an MRS

(from Nelson et al., 2008) 

8.2.2.3. Grid Surveying. Geophysical grid surveys can be placed in random or biased 

locations during site characterization. Random grid surveys typically are designed using UXO 

Estimator to determine the upper limit on the UXO density within an NCMUA to a statistical 

confidence level (see Section 8.3.1 for further details on UXO Estimator). The PDT may place 

fixed, or biased, grids at firing points to identify potential DMM or burial points or within 

CMUAs to characterize the amount and type of MEC impact. Figure 8-7 shows an example of 

both random and biased grid sampling within an MRS. 

8.2.3. Geophysical Site Characterization Planning Considerations. 

8.2.3.1. Characterization Planning. This subsection first explains how project needs and 

project objectives are developed and then describes the various elements to be included in the 

project UFP-QAPP to document and explain the PDT’s decisions in developing the 

characterization strategy. This subsection also provides detailed considerations for such 

planning elements as survey coverage, geophysical system accessibility, UXO characteristics, 

terrain and vegetation characteristics, and cultural features. The contents of this chapter assume 

site characterization is designed in coordination with the needs and objectives of the MRS CSM. 
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8-12 

It should be noted that site characterization data needs do not necessarily equate to remedial 

design data needs. For example, a data gap for a site with an anticipated RA within a target area 

may include not knowing an accurate number of anomalies or an approximate number of UXO 

present within the target area; however, RI data may suffice to determine the nature and extent of 

the UXO within the target area such that cost estimates for an RA may be estimated to a +50%/-

30% margin. 

Figure 8-7: Grid Surveying Within an MRS. 

In this example, grids were placed randomly in areas outside the potential impact area (as defined from a 

previous investigation phase), one biased grid was placed at the firing point, and several biased grids were 

placed within an impact area to determine the MEC density.

8.2.3.2. Define Project Needs and Objectives. This subsection discusses the PDT’s role 

in developing specific geophysical data needs and objectives to characterize an MRS. Topics 

generally will be limited to statements describing strategies to characterize CMUAs or 

NCMUAs. The PDT will state the purpose of each planned survey type, how much surveying 

needs is required in each area, and what data and information are needed. This subsection also 

explains the need for all PDT data users to understand the reasoning in how geophysical systems 

and geophysical data will be used and how it will factor in subsequent site-characterization tasks 
EM 200-1-15 

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8-13 

such as HA and RA / removal action cost estimating. Most MEC characterization goals and 

decisions are based on geophysical investigations. PDT input in the design and implementation 

of geophysical fieldwork is strongly recommended. 

8.2.3.3. Tailoring. Key elements of the characterization objectives must be specified 

before undertaking geophysical planning because significant cost savings can be achieved by 

tailoring the geophysical investigation plan to the characterization needs. The following lists 

most characterization needs that affect geophysical investigation planning: 

8.2.3.3.1. Based on the CSM, what is the smallest semiminor axis or smallest footprint of 

the potential CMUA likely to be for each MRS? 

8.2.3.3.2. What is the required probability of traversing and detecting the smallest 

footprint CMUA area for each MRS? 

8.2.3.3.3. What is the minimum UXO diameter on a project-specific, site-specific, or even 

range-specific basis?

8.2.3.3.4. What are the accuracy requirements for determining the extent of CMUAs? 

8.2.3.3.5. How will the anomaly density be estimated across the site and how accurate 

will the density estimates be?

8.2.3.3.6. How will UXO and DMM density at the site be determined and how accurate 

will the density estimates be?

8.2.3.3.7. For a NCMUA, what is the required confidence level that the site has a UXO 

density less than x UXO/acre?

8.2.3.3.8. For CMUAs, what is the required confidence level in the determination of the 

total amount of UXO and DMM within the entire CMUA?

8.2.3.3.9. How critical is it that each anomaly be positively resolved?

• The HA requires each anomaly detected be positively resolved.

• The HA requires each anomaly having MEC characteristics (i.e., TOI) be positively 

resolved. 

• Each anomaly must be positively resolved in each production unit (e.g., grid, transect) 

until the first UXO is recovered.

• The HA requires certain percentages of each group/cluster/class of anomalies be 

positively resolved.

• Transect anomalies will not be resolved. All anomalies in grids must be positively 

resolved; grid locations will be determined based on transect anomaly densities.
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8-14 

8.2.3.3.10. To meet project DQOs and VSP needs and minimize project cost, what is the 

closest distance any two transects should have between them? (This distance requires supporting 

statistical calculations.) 

8.2.3.3.11. To meet project DQOs and VSP needs, what is the greatest distance any two 

transects should have between them? (This distance requires supporting statistical calculations.) 

8.2.3.3.12. To maximize field efficiency and minimize project cost, what are the 

minimum and maximum grid sizes that will support both the characterization needs and project 

budget constraints?

8.2.3.3.13. How accurate must grid centroids and/or transect control points be reported? 

• Grid centroids and/or transect control points must be reported to a high-order accuracy.

• Grid centroids and/or transect control points can be reported to a low-order accuracy; 

distances between grid corners and/or transect control points need to be known to a higher 

degree of accuracy.

8.2.3.3.14. Do decisions require all detected anomalies to be dug or will a subset of 

anomalies provide sufficient characterization data? (i.e., Can anomaly classification be used?) 

• All anomalies meeting anomaly selection criteria must be dug.

• Anomaly dig lists will be developed and various percentages of each group/cluster/class 

of anomalies, as defined by the geophysicist, must be dug. 

8.2.3.3.15. Do total numbers of anomalies need to be reported? If yes, will “binning” 

anomaly counts according to geophysical characteristics be needed?

• All detected anomalies must be reported.

• All detected anomalies, grouped by category or priority, must be reported. 

• Only those anomalies listed on dig sheets need be reported (this is rare).

8.2.3.3.16. Will high-precision position reporting suffice for project needs or will 

geophysical data require high-accuracy position reporting as well? 

• Measurement positions within grids or along transect must be reported with high 

precisions; high accuracies are not required because reacquisition procedures are not affected by 

position accuracy. 

• Measurement positions within grids or along transect must be reported with high 

accuracies to support the reacquisition procedures being used. 

8.2.3.3.17. Will the project schedule support a multiphase field effort (e.g., transect 

mapping/anomaly rate calculations followed by biased grid sampling)? 
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• Yes, a multiphase approach is supported so that digging resources can be tailored to 

maximize efficiency.

• No, all work must be performed concurrently to minimize disruption to the community. 

• No, all required work is defined, and no efficiencies will be gained through a phased 

approach. 

8.2.3.3.18. Will reacquisition procedures be affected by the passage of time after data 

collection?

• No. Digging will occur soon after data collection, and reacquisition procedures will not 

be affected.

• No. Digging will occur at some later time, and reacquisition procedures will not 

require recovery of grid markers and/or transect markers.

• Yes. Digging will occur at some later time, and reacquisition procedures require 

recovery of low-order accuracy grid markers and/or transect markers.

8.2.3.3.19. What are the vegetation conditions and are there constraints on vegetation 

removal (cost, habitat, endangered species, etc.)?

• Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. The locations and sizes of grids 

and/or transects needs to be flexible; some characterization objectives may not be met due to 

these constraints.

• Vegetation removal is not constrained but is costly. The locations and sizes of grids 

and/or transects needs to be flexible; some characterization objectives may not be met due to 

these constraints.

8.2.3.3.20. What are the cultural and/or access constraints?

• Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates; some characterization 

objectives may not be met due to these constraints. 

• There are no cultural and/or access constraints that will impede production rates and 

characterization objectives will not be affected.

8.2.4. MC Investigation Planning. 

8.2.4.1. Initial MC Investigation Planning. Planning for the MC investigation is closely 

intertwined with planning for the MEC investigation and follows the same TPP process 

described above. Site characterization of MC is based on identifying either a source or a release. 

In either case, the MC must, by definition, be from a military munition. Therefore, it is a 

recommended practice to focus characterization on areas where these munitions items currently 

are or historically were located (e.g., target areas) and areas from which munitions items were 

fired (e.g., SAR firing lines, artillery firing points). In many cases, the locations of MC samples 

cannot be determined at the outset of a project. Rather, MC sampling locations may be selected 
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based on geophysical results and/or field MEC findings. Therefore, it is important to plan for a 

phased approach for MC sampling (see Figures 8-2 and 8-3 for example decision logic for MC 

characterization). As part of the TPP, the PDT must decide what findings will constitute 

identifying an area as contaminated with MC and what findings will support a determination of 

“no contamination indicated.” Once such a determination is made, all subsequent data collected 

in that area should be focused to answer more specific questions about the types of MC present, 

the lateral extents and concentrations of contamination, and the vertical extents and 

concentrations of contamination. 

8.2.4.2. Objectives of Site Characterization. MC site characterization should be 

performed to meet the DQOs and data needs of the project. MC site characterization typically is 

performed to achieve the objectives discussed below. 

8.2.4.2.1. Determining Presence or Absence of MC Contamination. If MEC are present 

(or suspected) at a site and the presence of MC in environmental media is unknown, sampling is 

conducted to determine whether it exists. This type of investigation typically is biased, or nonprobabilistic, to look at areas where contamination is suspected to be the worst case (e.g., target 

areas, firing lines, OB/OD areas, areas with high MEC concentrations). Limited sampling to 

evaluate the presence or absence of MC contamination should be conducted during the SI phase 

of an MR project. Determination of presence of MC at a site is not sufficient to make a decision 

regarding its significance in terms of potential threat to human health and the environment. The 

potential threat to human and ecological receptors should be determined through a screeninglevel risk assessment in the SI. See http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/pasi.htm for SI 

guidance.

8.2.4.2.2. Defining the Nature and Extent of the MC. If MC contamination is 

determined to exist, further investigation may be required to determine the nature and extent of 

the contamination, as well as to define the risk to human health and the environment. This 

investigation typically would be conducted during the RI/FS phase of an MR project and should 

support preparation of a BRA and aid in the development of remedial alternatives. For 

additional information on RI/FS requirements, refer to the following guidance documents: 

USEPA’s Guidance for Conducting Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies under 

CERCLA (Oct 1998); EM 1110-1-502; and the U.S. Army Military Munitions Response 

Program, Munitions Response RI/FS Guidance (Nov 2009). 

8.2.4.2.3. Post-BIP Sampling. This type of sampling may be required on a site-specific 

basis during site characterization activities to determine if a release has occurred as a result of 

blow in place (BIP) detonation. If post-BIP samples are collected, specific DQOs should be 

established during the TPP process to define the specific uses of the data. Recommendations for 

performing BIP-related sampling are discussed in Section 8.8.7.3. 

8.2.4.2.4. Obtaining Data for an RD. In addition to MC concentration and distribution 

information, data for other parameters may be required to evaluate the feasibility of remedial 

alternatives during an RI/FS or pre-RD investigation. These data may be collected at any point 

during site characterization when certain remedial alternatives are determined to be potentially 

applicable. In many cases, it is useful to collect these data prior to the FS (e.g., during an RI) to 

aid in remedy evaluation and to more cost-effectively complete the MR project. Examples of 
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data needs for RD of soil include grain size distribution of soil, organic content, and soil pH for 

treatment of soils that contain MC. 

8.2.4.2.5. Long-Term Monitoring. Long-term monitoring (LTM) activities may be 

required for the MC portion of MR projects following the remedial action operation phase. If 

MC sampling and analysis is required during the LTM phase, many of the requirements and 

recommendations discussed in this section also would apply. 

8.2.4.3. Site Characterization Phases. MC site characterization should be performed in a 

phased approach, building on existing site knowledge, previously collected data, and new data as 

they are collected. As new data are collected, the PDT should continuously evaluate whether the 

data substantiate the CSM to determine if additional sampling is required to fully characterize the 

site. Figure 8-2 presents an example of a phased sampling approach for an RI. The phases of 

MC site characterization include the following: 

a. Initial CSM development (see EM 200-1-12) 

b. Systematic planning (See Sections 2.2) 

c. Evaluation of previous investigation MC sampling results (see Section 2.2) 

d. Site stratification (see Section 8.8.1.2) 

e. Evaluation of geophysical results (see Chapter 6 and Sections 8.3-8.7) 

f. Initial soil sampling to determine presence/absence of MC (see Section 8.8.1) 

g. Surface water, sediment, and groundwater sampling to determine presence/absence of 

MC (see Sections 8.8.2 and 8.8.3) 

h. Additional horizontal and vertical sampling to determine the extent of the 

contamination 

i. If applicable and necessary, sampling for additional parameters required to support RD 

8.2.4.4. Background Concentrations. Assessment of background concentrations is very 

important for parameters that may be present naturally (e.g., metals, perchlorate) or that may 

have non-DoD anthropogenic sources (e.g., PAHs). Recommendations for planning background 

assessments are provided in Section 8.8. 

8.2.4.5. Discovery of HTRW. Planning also should consider the approach to take if, 

during the investigation, unanticipated discovery of HTRW contamination is found. Generally, a 

scope of work does not provide for any additional work to address such contamination. In such 

cases, the PDT needs to either expand the existing scope or plan for a separately scoped activity.

8.2.4.6. Selection of Analytical Methods. An important aspect of MC investigation 

planning is the selection of analytical methods to detect and measure MC concentrations. 

Chapter 7 provides a discussion of typical analytical methodologies. The PDT also should 
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establish project-specific requirements for method sensitivity in terms of an LOQ for each 

analyte and matrix. The LOQ is the lowest concentration value that meets project requirements 

for reporting quantitative data with known precision and bias for a specific analyte in a specific 

matrix. Close coordination with the laboratory is required, as detection and quantitation limits 

are laboratory specific. For additional guidance, the PDT should refer to the DoD Environmental 

Data Quality Workgroup Fact Sheet: Detection and Quantitation – What Project Managers and 

Data Users Need to Know (Sep 2009), available at 

http://www.navylabs.navy.mil/Final%20DQ%20Fact%20Sheet%20091409.pdf. 

8.2.4.7. Planning for Chemical Data Quality Control (CDQC). An effective CDQC 

system must be established that meets the requirements for the chemical measurement DQOs 

developed for the project. The system must cover chemical measurements pertaining to and 

required for contractor- and subcontractor-produced chemical data. The contractor must control 

field screening, sampling, and testing in conjunction with remedial activities to meet all DQOs, 

minimize the amount of excavated material requiring temporary storage, prevent dilution of 

contaminated soils with clean soils, and ensure completion of work within the required time.

8.2.4.7.1. ER 200-1-7 is the umbrella USACE document that defines chemical data 

quality management activities and integrates all of the other USACE guidance on environmental 

data quality management. Its purpose is to assure that the analytical data meet project DQOs, 

which are documented along with the required QC criteria in the approved project UFP-QAPP. 

8.2.4.7.2. In addition to the QC requirements specified in Chapter 4, the Chemical Quality 

Control (CQC) Plan must incorporate the qualifications, authority, and responsibilities of all 

chemical quality management and support personnel. Chemical measurements including 

sampling and/or chemical parameter measurement are not permitted to begin until after 

production and acceptance of the CQC Plan and the government’s approval of the QAPP. To 

cover contract-related chemical measurements by the contractor and all subcontractors, the CQC 

Plan must include the following, as a minimum:

• Qualifications. Qualifications including the names, education, experience, authorities, 

and decision-making responsibilities of all chemical management and support staff. The CQC 

Plan must contain a copy of a letter from the project QC manager authorizing a Chemical QC 

Officer and chemical QC organization staff.

• Authority and Responsibility. A diagram, flow chart, or figure clearly depicting the 

chemical data quality management and support staff and the authority and responsibility of each 

for chemical sampling and analysis, procedures for corrective actions, deliverables and 

submittals, deviations and changes, chemical quality documentation, data validation, minimum 

data reporting requirements, and DQOs for chemical parameter measurement by the contractor 

and subcontractors. The contents of this section of the CQC Plan must be included in the 

applicable “Project Organization” elements of the QAPP.

8.2.4.7.3. The QAPP must be prepared IAW CDQC requirements, the UFP-QAPP 

Manual, and the relevant sections of Chapter 4. The QAPP must clearly identify the contractorobtained laboratories. The contractor must furnish copies of the government-approved QAPP to 

all laboratories and the contractor’s field sampling crew. The QAPP must address all levels of 
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the investigation with enough detail to become a document that may be used as an audit guide 

for field and laboratory work. The contractor must provide the laboratory quality manual and 

applicable SOPs as an electronic appendix to the QAPP.

8.2.4.7.4. The contractor’s CDQC must ensure that a QC program is in place that assures 

sampling and analytical activities and the resulting chemical parameter measurement data 

comply with the DQOs and the requirements of the QAPP. The contractor must utilize the threephase control system, which includes a preparatory, initial, and follow-up phase for each 

definable feature of the work. The contractor’s three-phase chemical data control process must 

ensure that data reporting requirements are achieved and must be implemented according to the 

CQC Plan and the QAPP. 

8.2.4.7.5. The contactor must propose the analytical laboratories to be used for the 

primary samples analysis. Laboratory accreditation requirements must be IAW the laboratory 

performance requirements, below. The contractor may utilize their own laboratory or utilize 

subcontract laboratories to achieve the primary required sample analyses. 

8.2.4.7.5.1. Laboratory Analytical Requirements. The contractor must provide the 

specified chemical analyses by the contractor’s laboratory. The contractor must provide 

chemical analyses to achieve the project DQO for all parameters specified by the methods. To 

give USACE programs the greatest flexibility in the execution of its projects, the SW-846 

methods generally are the methods employed for the analytical testing of environmental samples. 

These methods are flexible and must be adapted to individual project-specific requirements. 

Method performance must be IAW DoD QSM requirements unless variances are specifically 

approved in the QAPP. The requirement for the laboratory to provide quantitative second 

column confirmation for explosives per DoD QSM/USEPA 8330 (i.e., five-point calibrations 

must be performed for each target analyte for the primary and confirmatory columns and 

quantitative results for each column must be reported) will not be waived. Based upon project 

requirements, exceptions will be considered for the following co-eluting pairs: 2-Am-DNT/4-

Am-DNT; 2-NT/4-NT; and 2,4-DNT/2,6-DNT.

8.2.4.7.5.2. Laboratory Performance. The contractor must provide continued acceptable 

analytical performance and must establish a procedure to address data deficiencies noted by 

review and/or QA sample results. The contractor must provide and implement a mechanism for 

providing analytical labs with the QAPP, for monitoring the lab’s performance, and for 

performing corrective action procedures. The contractor must acquire analytical services with 

additional acceptable laboratories in the event that a project lab fails to perform acceptably 

during the project. 

8.2.4.8. CSM and Potential MC. A comprehensive CSM must be developed to help 

identify data gaps and uncertainties, as well as to serve as a communication tool to define site 

characterization approaches. EM 200-1-12 describes the steps required to develop a CSM. 

8.2.4.8.1. A list of potential MC may be developed based on the types of munitions 

documented historically to have been used at a site, as well as munitions found during the MEC 

investigation. If the type of munitions used at the site is fairly well defined for the project, then 

use of a short list of metals, as determined by the metals associated with the munitions list, is 
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recommended. However, use of short lists for explosives analytes is not particularly cost 

beneficial and is not recommended. Information sources that provide potential MC based on 

munitions types are discussed in Chapter 7. 

8.2.4.8.2. A list of target MC for laboratory analyses is developed based on the fate and 

transport properties of the MC (see Chapter 7).

8.2.4.9. Sampling Locations. Initial sampling locations may be planned based on the 

following information: 

a. Results from previous investigations, such as PAs, SIs, or other response actions 

b. Aerial photography analysis / WAA

c. Geophysical and MEC intrusive investigation results

8.2.5. Required Elements for MC Characterization. 

8.2.5.1. An MC investigation process that is capable of effectively identifying MC 

contamination must employ three fully integrated components, as follows: 

8.2.5.1.1. Experienced Personnel. Personnel involved with the MC investigation should 

be experienced with the theoretical and practical aspects of military munitions chemistry, field 

sampling, laboratory analyses, and risk assessment. Selecting laboratories and analytical 

methodologies, determining appropriate screening levels, and preparing screening-level or BRAs 

require qualified and experienced individuals. A qualified chemist, a qualified geologist, and a 

qualified risk assessor should participate actively in the management of all MC investigations 

beginning with the initial planning and formulation of project objectives. A qualified chemist is 

a person with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a closely related field and at 

least 5 years of directly related environmental chemistry experience, preferably involving 

military munitions. The qualified chemist also should be familiar with the DoD QSM and DoD 

ELAP. A qualified geologist is a person with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in geology or a 

closely related field and at least 5 years of experience directly related to environmental site 

characterization, preferably involving military munitions. A qualified risk assessor is a person 

with a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, biology, or toxicology (or a closely related 

field) and at least 5 years of directly related environmental risk assessment experience. 

Sampling personnel should be trained in appropriate sampling procedures and associated 

documentation requirements. If field analytical methods are used, personnel executing these 

methods should have documented training and experience performing the planned methodology. 

8.2.5.1.2. Experienced Laboratory. The laboratory used should have experience in 

handling MC samples. The analytical laboratory should be identified early in the project 

planning (preferably at the proposal stage). The laboratory must be identified in the UFP-QAPP 

and hold applicable state certifications to perform the analytical methods required (if available). 

Laboratories must demonstrate compliance with the latest version of the DoD QSM and be 

accredited through DoD’s ELAP for all project-required analytes. Selection of laboratories also 

should be made with knowledge of the latest provisions and requirements specified in DoD 
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Instruction 4715.15, Environmental Quality Systems (10 May 2011); ER 200-1-7, Chemical 

Data Quality Management for Environmental Cleanup; and DoD Policy and Guidelines for 

Acquisitions Involving Environmental Sampling or Testing (Nov 2007). For a list of current 

DoD ELAP-accredited labs, see 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/edqw/Accreditation/AccreditedLabs.cfm. Unless and until the DoD 

ELAP accredits IS preparation at the Field of Testing level (i.e., based on the analyte group) for 

analytes without published IS preparation methods, it is strongly recommended that any MMRP 

project acquisition that is anticipated to incorporate IS require submittal of laboratory preparation 

SOPs for government chemist review. This review should be completed as part of the proposal 

review so that if there are weaknesses, significant weaknesses, and/or deficiencies in the 

approach due to concerns with the laboratory processing, they can be identified during the 

technical approach rating and considered during the award process. If the award is made despite 

concerns identified during the government chemist review, the concerns must be addressed prior 

to the acceptance of the UFP-QAPP. If they cannot be addressed to the satisfaction of the KO, 

the contractor must find a laboratory that can successfully perform the requirements of the 

project. 

8.2.5.1.2.1. Any laboratory performing chemical analysis must provide a DoD ELAP 

certificate and supporting documentation to demonstrate the ability to meet project DQOs, 

including limits of detection (LODs) and LOQs for the selected analytical methods. The 

determination of qualifications of the laboratory should be at the discretion of the MMDC

Project Chemist. 

8.2.5.1.2.2. If the laboratory fails to meet project-specific requirements, appropriate 

corrective actions will be identified, implemented, and monitored for effectiveness. If the 

laboratory is still deficient in meeting project-specific requirements after implementation of 

corrective actions, the KO or Contracting Officer’s Representative may request use of the 

laboratory be discontinued and analytical services be procured from another qualified laboratory 

that can meet the requirements. Samples may not be subcontracted to another laboratory without 

the approval of the MMDC Technical Lead. The subcontracted laboratory must meet all 

requirements for the contract laboratory. If a QA laboratory is to be used, the same requirements 

apply to the QA laboratory as to the primary laboratory. 

8.2.5.1.3. Accuracy and Precision of Sample Locations. The personnel performing the 

MC investigation must have the ability to accurately and precisely identify a sample location in 

relation to other known points, preferably using a common survey grid and/or datum. Sample 

locations should be recorded according to the requirements described in Chapter 5. 

8.2.5.2. If any of the above three components is lacking, the overall MC characterization 

process may be unable to meet the project’s objectives. Therefore, it is important to carefully 

plan and integrate all aspects of an MC investigation and not to start fieldwork prematurely. 

8.2.6. Sampling and Analysis Considerations. 

8.2.6.1. MRS Layout. An understanding of the layout of the MRS, including target areas 

and firing point locations, as well as the former and/or current munitions usage (i.e., type of 

munitions, frequency of munitions use, and length of time that munitions were used), is crucial to 
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planning an MC investigation. Sampling should be focused at areas were MC are most likely to 

be concentrated. Energetics MC typically are found at target areas for medium- and large-caliber 

munitions (i.e., CMUAs), firing points (propellant residue only), OB/OD areas, hand grenade 

ranges, and munitions production facilities. Metals MC may be found at any type of MRS, but 

they tend to be concentrated at SARs (e.g., lead in berms). 

8.2.6.2. MEC Depth. If MEC are located on the surface, generally, initial sampling 

should be surficial (0 to 2 inches). The sample depth that constitutes surface soil should be 

defined during the TPP, taking into consideration the end use of the data and applicable 

regulatory criteria for surface soil. Alternate sampling depths would be appropriate in conditions 

of shifting sands, erosion, etc. If MEC also are found in the subsurface, initial samples also 

should be collected from subsurface soil near the identified MEC. 

8.2.6.3. MEC Item Composition. Analytical requirements for MC should be based on 

the anticipated MEC composition, if known (see Chapter 7). If unknown, some assumptions 

may be made regarding typical composition to establish the analytical requirements for MC. In 

either case, the anticipated MEC, along with fill information, if available, should be tabulated in 

the project planning documents. The environmental fate and transport properties of the MC 

composing the MEC should also be noted, if known. Certain types of MC (e.g., certain chemical 

agents and explosives compounds) degrade fairly quickly in the environment and, thus, are not 

recommended for analysis (see Chapter 7).

8.2.6.4. Condition of the MEC Item. During the MEC investigation, it is important to 

categorize the condition of each located munitions item to indicate whether it is an intact round 

(i.e., UXO or DMM), a cracked case (result of a low-order detonation), or MD. CRREL and 

ERDC-EL studies have shown that for contemporary medium- and large-caliber munitions that 

function as designed and for high-order detonations, minimal energetics residue is generated. 

Low-order detonations result in a higher likelihood of energetics residue. The likelihood of 

residue remaining from BIPs varies by round type and donor charge; typically mortars are more 

likely to leave energetic residue and artillery shells are less likely (Pennington et al., Explosive 

Residues from Low-Order Detonations of Heavy Artillery and Mortar Rounds, Soil and 

Sediment Contamination: An International Journal, 17:5, 533-546). If a medium- or largecaliber item malfunctioned (i.e., a dud item) and the case is intact in a noncorrosive environment, 

then there is a low potential for energetic residue. If the intact case is in a corrosive environment, 

then there is a potential for energetic residue. If the case was cracked (e.g., if it was hit by 

another round), then there is a higher likelihood of energetics residue. 

8.2.6.5. Timing for MC Sample Collection if MEC or MD are Present. A typical MR 

project (for non-SAR sites) includes digital geophysics, anomaly selection, anomaly 

reacquisition, and intrusive activities. Because MC characterization depends on understanding 

the location, composition, and condition of MEC at the site, the determination of where and 

when to collect samples for MC analysis should be coordinated with the MEC investigation. 

Planning for initial MC sample locations may be performed concurrently with the selection of 

MEC anomalies. Finalization of MC sample locations and actual sample collection may be 

performed concurrently with MEC intrusive activities. 
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8.2.6.6. Background Conditions. In some locations, either naturally occurring or 

anthropogenic background concentrations of metals, perchlorate, fuel oil, PAHs, or other 

compounds (see Chapter 7), unrelated to munitions, may exceed risk-based screening levels or 

regulatory limits. If an MC investigation includes these parameters and no appropriate 

background data are available for the project property, background samples should be collected 

and analyzed. Background values are used as a standard against which site data may be 

compared and, in many cases, can provide the basis for eliminating MC carried forward as 

contaminants of concern based on exceedance of screening levels. This is particularly true for 

background concentrations of metals that exceed ecological screening values. Therefore, the 

importance of adequate and defensible background determination cannot be overstated. Some 

available resources for background condition evaluation include the following: 

a. Guidance for Environmental Background Analysis Volume I: Soil 

(NAVFAC UG-2049-ENV, Apr 2002) 

b. Guidance for Environmental Background Analysis Volume II: Sediment 

(NAVFAC UG-2054-ENV, Apr 2003) 

c. Guidance for Environmental Background Analysis Volume III: Groundwater 

(NAVFAC UG-2059-ENV, Apr 2004) 

d. Guidance for Comparing Background and Chemical Concentrations in Soil for 

CERCLA Sites (USEPA 540-R-01-003 OSWER 9285.7-41, Sep 2002) 

http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/pdf/background.pdf

8.2.6.6.1. The use of published regional background data for evaluation of potential MCrelated contamination is not recommended. 

8.2.6.6.2. Regional values may be used for general reference at the SI stage or as one 

element in a weight-of-evidence approach, but comparison of site data to regional values should 

be done only with thorough understanding and explanation of the data behind the published 

values. Regional studies often include results from stream sediments, bedrock, or soils of 

various types derived from diverse parent materials without clear distinction. Such studies are 

not intended to represent conditions at any specific location in the region, and some (e.g., some 

U.S. Geological Survey [USGS] reports) are prefaced with cautionary statements to that effect. 

Published regional values should not be relied on as the only background values for decisions at 

the RI phase. Design and execution of adequate site-specific background investigation should be 

part of the site characterization scope. Additional discussion of background sampling is included 

in Sections 8.8.1, 8.8.2, and 8.8.3, which describe sample collection for each environmental 

medium. 

8.2.6.7. Regulatory Requirements. Various state and local requirements and requests for 

sampling and analysis may exist. These should be considered and addressed during TPP and the 

development stage of overall project objectives and DQOs. 

8.2.6.8. Chemical-Specific Screening Levels, ARARs, and TBCs. Chemical-specific 

screening levels, ARARs, and TBCs can impact the choices of the appropriate analytical 
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methodology as part of the DQO process. Anticipated criteria should be established during the 

planning process to ensure proper sampling procedures can be applied; appropriate analytical 

methodologies can be utilized; meaningful data can be collected; and DQOs can be achieved. 

These should be documented in planning documents along with the reporting limits / LODs

specific to the project laboratory to allow comparison/confirmation that methodology is 

adequate. 

8.2.6.9. Analytical Issues with Energetics. Although laboratories now have the 

capability to detect energetics MC at very low concentrations, the lowest levels of detection may 

not be desirable, especially if they are at the limits of the method/instrumentation sensitivity, 

because precision and bias may not meet project DQOs. For additional guidance, the PDT 

should refer to the DoD Environmental Data Quality Workgroup Fact Sheet: Detection and 

Quantitation – What Project Managers and Data Users Need to Know (Sep 2009), available at

http://www.navylabs.navy.mil/Final%20DQ%20Fact%20Sheet%20091409.pdf.

8.2.6.10. Site Hydrology and Hydrogeology. If surface water is located on or near the 

project property and receives runoff from suspected MC source areas, surface water / sediment 

sampling should be considered. If significant releases of MC are believed to have occurred and 

there is a complete source to groundwater pathway, groundwater sampling should be considered. 

The decision to sample groundwater should be made based on depth to groundwater and its 

susceptibility to contamination from surface releases based on site geology (e.g., soil type, karst), 

climate, potential receptors, the magnitude of the suspected MC release, and the physical and 

chemical properties of MC suspected at the site (e.g., perchlorate). 

8.2.6.11. MC Sampling Resources. Other resources are available that may provide 

information to assist project teams. In instances where these resources conflict with this or other 

formal DoD or service guidance, the formal guidance should be followed. These resources are 

considered related (non-essential) and are not required. It is recommended that PDT members 

familiarize themselves with the available information to make salient technical recommendations 

specific to their project DQOs, particularly in areas where the science is evolving. They include 

(but are not limited to) the following: 

a. USEPA Federal Facilities Forum Issue Paper, “Site Characterization for Munitions 

Constituents”, EPA-505-S-11-001, Jan 2012 

b. Incremental Sampling Methodology. ISM-1. Washington, D.C.: Interstate Technology 

& Regulatory Council, Incremental Sampling Methodology Team, Feb 2012. 

http://itrcweb.org/ism-1/

c. ERDC TR-12-1, "Evaluation of Sampling and Sample Preparation Modifications for 

Soil Containing Metallic Residues," Jan 2012. 

d. ERDC/CRREL TR-11-X, Metal Residue Deposition from Military Pyrotechnic Devices 

and Field Sampling Guidance, May 2012. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA563327

e. Explosives Dissolved from Unexploded Ordnance, May 2012. 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA562287
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8.3. Statistical Tools for Site Characterization. 

8.3.1. MEC. 

8.3.1.1. At present, there are two commonly used statistical software packages for 

developing geophysical approaches for MEC site characterization: VSP and UXO Estimator. 

Each of these statistical tools is based on statistical assumptions that are only applicable to some 

project sites and for specific purposes. This subsection provides more guidance on the specific 

application of these tools and how variations of input in the software affect the amount of 

resulting investigation that is required at a site. Varying input values within these software tools 

based on site-specific information and the DQOs for the project can create significant differences 

in the amount of required investigation. The qualified geophysicist, through the TPP process, 

must determine what the most appropriate software inputs are for the CSM to meet the project 

DQOs. These statistical tools must be used with care and consistent with the CSM and goals and 

objectives of the site characterization. Violating the statistical assumptions that underlie the 

software may result in developing a technical approach that: 

a. is inappropriate for a particular site; 

b. does not adequately define the nature and extent of contamination at a site; 

c. includes too much investigation for the data needs of the project; or 

d. includes too little investigation to meet the data needs of the project. 

8.3.1.2. Additional statistical tools may be developed in the future, so the geophysicist 

should review the EM CX Web site for the most up to date available tools. 

8.3.1.3. VSP is a software package developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

(PNNL) that provides simple, defensible tools for defining an optimal, technically defensible 

sampling scheme for site characterization and for post-remediation verification (PRV) sampling. 

VSP contains several tools for statistical site characterization protocols of sites potentially 

impacted by UXO. These site characterization protocols help identify and delineate potential 

target areas at a site using specified amounts of geophysical transect data. Tools within VSP that 

aid the geophysicist in locating and characterizing target areas include approaches for transect 

design, target area identification, boundary delineation, geophysical anomaly density mapping, 

and PRV sampling. Although data derived from VSP designed transects can be used to estimate 

MEC/acre, VSP tools currently are being added to explicitly determine transect survey 

requirements with the goal of achieving an upper confidence bound on the UXO density estimate 

that is no higher than some desired upper bound. These tools also provide an upper limit of the 

number of UXO that may be present throughout an area presumed not to be impacted by 

concentrated munitions use and support hypothesis testing that there is less than a certain UXO 

density within an area. VSP is freely available software and may be downloaded from 

http://vsp.pnnl.gov/. In order to be qualified to use VSP, a member of the PDT is required to 

attend VSP training. 
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8.3.1.3.1. Transect surveys can be generated within VSP to traverse and detect potential 

CMUAs. The inputs used for the transect design must be based on the site-specific CSM and 

agreed upon by all project stakeholders during the TPP process. The PDT must choose the 

desired probability that a particular transect design will both traverse and detect an impact area 

carefully; decreasing this probability will increase the transect spacing and potentially lead to 

transects being too widely spaced to detect an actual impact area. Although VSP transect 

designs are based on numerous inputs, the transect spacing output are largely driven by several 

key inputs, which include: 

• target area size and shape;

• transect width;

• background anomaly density; 

• anomaly density above background; and 

• probability of traversal and detection. 

8.3.1.3.1.1. Target area size and shape vary based on factors such as length of site usage, 

amount of munitions fired during site usage, the distribution of rounds relative to the target point 

based on the probable error associated with a weapon, the size and type of munitions used, how 

munitions were fired at the site, and how close the munitions landed to the target area. Because 

of the variability in each of these factors, no one size of target area is applicable to all sites. The 

PDT must determine the appropriately sized target area for the investigation. At present, the 

VSP user must define the size and shape of a target area in VSP. PNNL is working on 

incorporating default target area sizes in VSP; however, the geophysicist, UXO technician, and 

other members of the PDT must decide whether these defaults are applicable based on the sitespecific CSM. 

8.3.1.3.1.2. The size of a target area is dependent on the distance that fragments from 

munitions that operated as intended were dispersed from the impact location. Typically, most 

munitions operated as intended and dispersed fragments out to a distance equal to the maximum 

fragmentation distance (MFD) for the particular munition. The geophysicist should design the 

target size as a function of the MFD and may choose to factor for the range probable error (RPE) 

and the deflection probable error (DPE) for the particular type of munitions. The RPE is the 

probable error associated with munitions landing either short or long relative to the target point, 

while the DPE is the amount of error associated with the munition landing wide of the target 

point. Figure 8-8 shows an example of using the MFD, RPE, and DPE in determining the target 

area size inputs to VSP. At present, the RPE, and DPE are not currently available to the general 

public, and the PDT should contact the EM CX for the appropriate values to use. The 

geophysicist also may use a simple multiple of the MFD and assume that the target area is a 

circular target area. A conservative method to estimate the target area size would be to assume 

the target area is circular with a radius between 0.5 and 0.75 times the MFD and to not factor for 

RPE and DPE. 
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8.3.1.3.1.3. The average target area anomaly densities requested as input and provided as 

output in VSP are in terms of density above background. For example, if the background 

anomaly density were 10 anomalies per acre, then for a target area where the average density is 

80 anomalies per acre above background, the actual target area density would be assumed to be 

90 anomalies per acre. 

8.3.1.3.1.4. Figure 8-9 shows VSP-generated plots of the general variation of probability 

of traversal and detection of a circular CMUA as a function of the transect spacing for three 

different radii target areas. Note that smaller radius CMUAs require a smaller transect spacing to 

ensure the same probability of traversal and detection. Also note that increasing transect spacing 

decreases the probability of traversal and detection of the target area. The geophysicist should 

perform a similar site-specific evaluation within VSP of the effect of the target area radius on the 

probability of traversing and detecting the CMUA. 

Figure 8-8: Example Determination of Target Area Size and Shape Using the MFD, RPE, 

and DPE (Modified from URS Group, Inc, 2009.) 

8.3.1.3.1.5. Transect width typically is driven by the particular geophysical instrument 

and approach taken to investigate a site. Many times, the actual geophysical instrument footprint 

(e.g., 1 m wide for the EM61-MK2) may not be the actual detection footprint since the 
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instrument also detects anomalies that may be located outside the instrument footprint. In order 

to determine the detection footprint of the geophysical sensor, the geophysicist may use the IVS 

to determine the lateral extent to which the geophysical sensor can detect anomalies or the 

geophysicist may assume that the sensor detects to a certain distance outside of the instrument 

footprint (e.g., 0.1 m outside the EM61-MK2 for a total detection footprint of 1.2 m). In 

addition, stringing multiple instruments together in an array (e.g., two EM61-MK2 arranged 

adjacent to each other, two UXO technicians sweeping adjacent 3-foot-wide swaths) may be 

advantageous to collect more data per transect. Some project sites with dense vegetation or 

difficult terrain may preclude the use of larger instrument arrays.

Figure 8-9: Probability of Traversing and Detecting a CMUA as a Function of 

Transect Spacing for Three Differently Sized Impact Areas 

• Figure 8-10 shows VSP-generated plots of the general variation of probability of

traversal and detection of a circular target area as a function of transect spacing for three 

different instrument footprints. Note that widening the instrument footprint improves one’s 

chances of detecting a target area of a given size for any given transect spacing. Thus, to achieve 

the same probability of traversal and detection with a wider instrument footprint, the spacing 

between transects increases. Also note that increasing the transect spacing decreases the 

probability of traversal and detection of the target area. 
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• It should be noted that this is an example given very specific input and is not likely to

be directly applicable to any given site. The geophysicist should perform a similar site-specific 

evaluation of the effect of the instrument footprint on the probability of traversing and detecting 

the CMUA. 

Figure 8-10: Probability of Traversing and Detecting a CMUA as a Function of 

Transect Spacing for Three Different Transect Widths

8.3.1.3.1.6. The background and target area anomaly densities at a site play a critical role 

in the transect design developed in VSP. Actual anomaly densities from previous investigations 

or determined during site visits should be used when these data are available. If accurate 

background and target area anomaly densities are not known, the geophysicist should choose 

appropriate anomaly densities given the CSM. It is often prudent to be conservative in the 

selection of anomaly densities at a site to ensure that the transect design both traverses and 

detects a target area.

• Figure 8-11 shows VSP-generated plots of the variation of probability of traversal and

detection of a circular target area as a function of anomaly density within the target area above 

background for transects spaced 50 m, 75 m, and 100 m apart. Note that increasing the target 

area anomaly density above background increases the probability of traversal and detection of 

the target area. Also note that increasing the transect spacing decreases the probability of 

traversal and detection of the target area for a specific target area anomaly density above 

background. 
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• It should be noted that this is an example given very specific input and is not likely to

be directly applicable to any given site. The geophysicist should perform a similar site-specific 

evaluation of the effect of the average anomaly density above background on the probability of 

traversing and detecting the CMUA.

Figure 8-11: Probability of Traversing and Detecting a Circular CMUA as a Function of 

Average Anomaly Density Above Background for Three Different 

Transect Spacings 

8.3.1.3.2. The target area identification tool within VSP enables the geophysicist to 

analyze anomalies identified during geophysical transect surveys. The tool flags areas with 

elevated anomaly density relative to background that may be indicative of target areas. The 

transect paths investigated and the anomalies identified during the transect survey are used to 

determine the average anomaly density within a circular window around a segment of the 

transect and the critical anomaly density selected as an indicator of potential target area anomaly 

density. The window diameter and critical anomaly density greatly affect the amount of areas 

that are flagged. The qualified geophysicist, or designee, should evaluate multiple window

diameters and critical anomaly densities to see what is most appropriate given the data. Using 

too large of a window diameter may result in smoothing out of high anomaly density areas, while 

using too small of a window diameter may result in identifying a significant quantity of small, 

high anomaly density areas that aren’t necessarily associated with the impact area of interest.
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8.3.1.3.3. Anomaly density estimation and mapping is commonly performed on 

geophysical data collected along transects to determine the anomaly density and distribution 

across a project site, as well as to determine the locations of potential impact areas. Anomaly 

density mapping also may be critical in developing cost estimates for removal actions to be 

conducted in later phases after site characterization has been completed. Anomaly density 

mapping uses known locations of anomalies and traversed transects and uses this information in 

a geostatistical model to interpolate the anomaly density between data collection points. Figure 

8-12 shows an example of a geostatistical map of anomaly density derived from transect data 

collected at a project site. Maps such as this can be used to delineate areas that may be potential 

impact areas. 

Figure 8-12: Example of a Geostatistical Analysis of the Anomaly Density for an MRS

While the discussion in this section is focused on the use of VSP, the PDT may choose to use 

other geostatistical tools (e.g., ESRI’s ArcGIS software, Golden Software’s Surfer) to map 

anomaly density across a project site. The user must determine what appropriate input values are 

when using geostatistical tools to map anomaly density. These choices should be based on the 

design of the investigation. A critical factor in the successful use of the geostatistical tool is 

determining the appropriate window diameter over which anomalies should be averaged. The 

VSP user should evaluate multiple window diameters and ranges of anomaly density to 

determine what is appropriate given the project site. Figure 8-13 shows an example evaluation 

of anomaly density using 200, 300, 400, and 500 m window diameters. 
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Figure 8-13: Example of an Evaluation of Anomaly Density Mapping Results Given

Window Diameters of 200, 300, 400, and 500 ft 

The following are key questions the VSP user should evaluate and answer prior to applying 

VSP’s geostatistical tool to map the anomaly density across an MRS:

• What is the most appropriate averaging window size? The averaging window size in

VSP defines the size of a centered circular window in which an anomaly density determined. An 

appropriate window diameter is dependent on the size of the TOI and the spacing between 

transects. An optimum window diameter has sufficient traversed area within the window and 

does not include such a large area that potential elevated anomaly density areas are smoothed, or 

averaged, out by the surrounding background anomaly density areas. A common approach is to 

use the largest window diameter that only includes one transect and then evaluate how changing 

the window diameter affects the anomaly density results.

• What is the most appropriate variogram model? A variogram is a measure of the

spatial variation of the data. In general, a qualified geophysicist should use the variogram model 

(e.g., spherical, exponential, Gaussian) and variogram parameters (i.e., nugget, sill, and range) 

that minimizes the RMS error between the model and actual data. 

• What are visual differences when the density map color scale is changed? Changing

the color scale can change the shape and size of areas with elevated anomaly density areas.

8.3.1.3.4. The PRV sampling tool in VSP is designed to help develop post-remediation 

sampling approaches to determine whether the remediation process has been effective, such that 

few if any TOIs might remain. The tool is designed to help determine whether there is UXO 
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remaining on the site to a specific confidence level. The PRV sampling tool uses a compliance 

sampling approach to determine how much of the MRS should be geophysically surveyed and 

anomalies excavated and where the surveys should be placed. There are two sampling 

approaches that can be used:

• Anomaly compliance sampling 

• Transect compliance sampling

8.3.1.3.4.1.1 The PRV tool can aid in developing a sampling approach to determine to a 

statistical confidence level (e.g., 95%) that some percentage (e.g., 95%) of the anomalies are not 

UXO. Given that the actual number of UXO is typically very small prior to doing a removal 

action within a CMUA (typically less than 1%–5% of the total number of anomalies), the PDT is 

likely to have a high confidence that there are very few UXO on the MRS prior to conducting 

field activities. Because the odds of finding UXO are so minimal, PRV sampling should be 

applied to determine if anomalies meeting anomaly selection criteria (e.g., TOI) were missed 

during the removal action. Missing TOI during the removal action may indicate there was a 

problem with the process of developing the anomaly selection criteria. 

8.3.1.3.4.1.2 Both VSP PRV tools are highly dependent on the detection capability of the 

geophysical sensor (see Section 6.6.2) and the quality of the geophysical sensor used. It should 

be noted that only those anomalies with characteristics of UXO need to be excavated. In 

addition, both tools require that all excavated anomalies are not TOIs to meet the confidence 

level requirements. Both VSP PRV methods are checks on the anomaly selection process (i.e., 

they verify that the anomaly selection process employed on an MR project was the right anomaly 

selection process). The amount of intrusive investigation is based on the goal of the PRV and 

may require either:

• investigation of all anomalies to determine whether an anomaly was missed; or 

• investigation of only TOI anomalies to check whether all required anomalies were 

removed. 

8.3.1.3.4.1.3 Anomaly Compliance Sampling. The anomaly compliance sampling 

approach requires that all of the anomaly locations are used as input to the PRV sampling tools 

to determine a select number of anomalies that must be dug or classified and found not to be 

TOIs to ensure a specific confidence level on the effectiveness of remediation and the number of 

TOIs that may remain on the site. The anomaly compliance sampling approach is valid when the 

likelihood of finding UXO is the same throughout the NCMUA (i.e., there is a homogeneous 

distribution of UXO across the site). Post-anomaly resolution sampling approaches can be 

designed to answer the following questions: 

• How many digs are required to verify the intrusive investigation cleared each hole? 

• How are non-digs verified (i.e., test the anomaly classification process on an entire lot)? 

• What are the acceptance criteria for a dataset with no digs (e.g., if advanced EMI 

sensors and anomaly classification are used and no TOIs are identified within a dataset)? 
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• What are the failure criteria for digs?

8.3.1.3.4.1.4 Transect Compliance Sampling. The transect compliance sampling 

approach is a useful alternative to the anomaly compliance sampling approach when geophysical 

surveying costs are relatively high (e.g., the MRS is large). Transect compliance sampling is 

post-removal action verification that the PDT has met the decision document goals. It can be 

used to develop a sampling design that includes a limited transect survey of the site and requires 

100% of anomalies identified on the transects be dug or classified and found not to be TOIs to 

ensure a specific confidence level on the effectiveness of remediation and the TOIs that may 

remain on the site. All detected and excavated anomalies must be non-UXO to meet the original 

statistical confidence levels on the amount of UXO that may remain at the site. The transect 

compliance sampling approach is valid when the likelihood of finding UXO is the same 

throughout the NCMUA (i.e., there is a homogeneous distribution of UXO across the site). 

8.3.1.3.5. PNNL is working with ESTCP and USACE to develop new RI modules within 

VSP that will provide additional design and analysis functionality. The RI tools will augment 

the WAA options currently in VSP (e.g., transect design and geostatistical analysis tools) and 

will include transect survey design (updated from the current version), statistical estimate, tests 

of hypotheses, and spatial analyses for areas suspected to be CMUAs, NCMUAs, and 

presumptively munitions-free regions. A module is being developed to aid PDTs in developing 

transect designs and statistical evaluations to support decisions at sites that are presumptively 

clean. This module will include statistical methods similar to UXO Estimator to estimate the 

UXO density at an MRS, as well as other Bayesian options that have the potential of reducing 

the required survey acreage coverage. Review the PNNL Web page (http://vsp.pnnl.gov/) for the 

most up-to-date release and information on VSP. 

8.3.1.4. UXO Estimator is a statistical software package developed by USACE to test the 

null hypothesis that there is less than a certain UXO density within an area presumed not to be 

impacted by concentrated munitions use (i.e., an NCMUA) and to estimate the upper bound on 

the potential residual UXO remaining within an MRS. NCMUAs may consist of an entire MRS 

(e.g., training and maneuver areas) or portions of an MRS (e.g., buffer areas). The geophysicist

must determine the appropriate inputs to use in UXO Estimator through the TPP process to meet 

the project’s DQOs. After site characterization sampling has occurred based on the null 

hypothesis, UXO Estimator can be used to determine if the null hypothesis is confirmed or 

whether it should be rejected. In addition, evaluation of site characterization results in UXO 

Estimator enable the PDT to determine an upper limit on the UXO density and total number of 

UXO that may remain on an NCMUA after the site characterization is completed. The actual 

number of UXO that may remain on an NCMUA after site characterization may be any number 

of UXO between 0 and that upper bound. UXO Estimator is an appropriate statistical tool to use 

during site characterization to determine the upper bounds on the residual TOIs remaining on an 

MRS to a specific confidence level. UXO Estimator is freely available software and may be 

obtained from the USACE EM CX. See the following Web page for details on obtaining UXO 

Estimator: https://eko.usace.army.mil/usacecop/environmental/subcops/mmr/. 
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8.3.1.4.1. The underlying assumption of UXO Estimator is that there is an equal 

likelihood of finding a “failure” (i.e., UXO) anywhere in the NCMUA. Another way of stating 

this assumption is that UXO is distributed randomly throughout the NCMUA and there is a 

uniform probability or equal likelihood of UXO occurrence over the entire NCMUA. This 

assumption must not be violated. However, not all CSMs will fit this assumption. Many MRSs 

are unlikely to have a uniform probability of UXO occurrence across the entire MRS. If an MRS 

has areas within it that are likely to have different likelihoods of finding UXO, these areas must 

be treated separately. For example, a mortar range likely will have a higher UXO concentration 

within the CMUA (e.g., target area) than within the NCMUA (e.g., buffer area outside the target 

area). When an NCMUA has areas with varying UXO concentrations, the geophysicist should 

develop specific DQOs and null hypotheses through the TPP process for each of these areas. In 

addition, each of these areas should be evaluated separately after the PDT has collected site 

characterization data.

8.3.1.4.2. It should be remembered that mobilization/demobilization and other fixed costs 

can be relatively high when compared to total geophysical investigation costs at small project 

properties. Therefore, at small project properties, it is often more cost effective to geophysically 

investigate the entire location rather than use statistical surveying. 

8.3.1.4.3. UXO Estimator consists of three modules: 

• Module 1: Develops a field sampling plan for a geophysical investigation (see below) 

• Module 2: Analyzes field data after the investigation has been completed (see below) 

• Module 3: Unit Conversion 

8.3.1.4.4. Module 1 in UXO Estimator is designed to develop field sampling plans for 

sites to show that there is less than a certain UXO density on a site, given a desired confidence 

level. Given the three inputs to UXO Estimator (i.e., site size, UXO density per acre, and 

confidence level), the output is a minimum number of acres of geophysical investigation that 

needs to be conducted to confirm that the site has less than the specified UXO density at the 

specified confidence level if no UXO are found in the investigation. The geophysical 

investigation area may be implemented as randomly placed grids or transects within the project 

site. The output of UXO Estimator module 1 is the amount of acreage that must be covered; 

however, the software does not provide a basis for the size or location of the grids or transects. 

The geophysicist must determine the size and spatial distribution of the grids and/or transects to 

meet the site-specific DQOs. Only those anomalies with characteristics of UXO need to be 

excavated.

8.3.1.4.4.1. UXO Estimator is similar to the VSP PRV sampling tool in that they both test 

hypotheses about the residual UXO left on a site; however they differ in that UXO Estimator test 

to an x% confidence that the UXO density is less than a certain amount, while VSP test to an x% 

confidence that a percentage of the anomalies/transects are not UXO.

8.3.1.4.4.2. Variations in the UXO Estimator input can lead to significant variations in the 

output. Figure 8-14 shows UXO Estimator generated plots of the variation of required area of 
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investigation as a function of confidence level for three example UXO densities for a constant 

site size. Figure 8-15 shows UXO Estimator generated plots of the variation of required area of 

investigation as a function of site size for three example UXO densities with a constant 

confidence level. Figure 8-16 shows UXO Estimator generated plots of the variation of the 

required area of investigation as a function of UXO density for three specific confidence levels. 

Based on Figures 8-14 through 8-16, it is apparent that the required amount of investigation 

increases when:

• a higher confidence level is selected;

• a lower UXO density is selected; or

• the site size increases.

Figure 8-14: Variation of Required Area of Investigation as a Function of Confidence Level for 

Three Example UXO Densities with a Constant Site Size. 

Plots were generated in UXO Estimator.
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Figure 8-15: Variation of Required Area of Investigation as a Function of Site Size

for Three Example UXO Densities with a Constant Confidence Level

Figure 8-16: Variation of the Required Area of Investigation as a Function of UXO 

Density for Three Specific Confidence Levels with a Constant Site Size
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8.3.1.4.4.3. Increased confidence levels and lower UXO densities have a much greater 

affect than site size on the amount of investigation output by UXO Estimator. The PDT must 

make decisions on appropriate input values for the CSM and project DQOs. The UXO Estimator 

help menu provides general guidance on UXO density inputs; however, the PDT must choose the 

appropriate UXO density for the project DQOs to satisfy concerns of project stakeholders about 

the upper bound of the number of MEC potentially remaining at a site after an investigation and 

for other factors. Testing for lower UXO densities does not alter the actual number of UXO that 

may be present on a site after characterization activities are complete or remedial activities are 

complete. Nor does testing for lower densities suggest the actual number is closer to zero. 

Having a higher confidence in the upper bound (e.g., testing for a 95% confidence as opposed to 

an 85% confidence) or testing for a lower concentration (e.g., testing for an upper bound of one 

UXO per 10 acres as opposed to one UXO in 4 acres) is not expected to change the general 

response actions required for the MRS. Typical UXO density input for UXO Estimator will 

range between 0.1 and 1.0 UXO/acre for NCMUAs. Often, the key drivers for selection of the 

UXO density are the selection of the criteria for deciding whether the site is impacted by 

concentrated munitions use, stakeholder concerns, and costs. Lower UXO densities require 

greater investigation (and cost), and the PDT must decide whether the additional investigation 

would provide significant information to guide future project decisions and selection of the 

remedial action alternative. 

8.3.1.4.4.4. For a given UXO density, the theoretical number of UXO on the MRS 

increases with increasing MRS size. Thus, the odds of encountering a UXO during sampling 

quickly increases with the increased number of UXO on the site. Because of this, the amount of 

investigation required by UXO Estimator, as shown in Figure 8-15, reaches a point at which the 

amount of required investigation only increases slightly as the site size increases for larger sites. 

8.3.1.4.4.5. In considering the above UXO densities, the PDT should evaluate the 

potential residual hazards that are acceptable to stakeholders given the current and reasonably 

anticipated future land use. If the PDT performs an investigation of a 1,000-acre MRS and finds 

no UXO, the PDT would be confident (to whatever statistical confidence level was used and for 

the amount of investigation performed) that there were the following amounts of UXO remaining 

on the site: 

• If the investigation was developed using 0.1 UXO/acre: Between 0 and 100 UXO 

remain on the MRS after the investigation is completed.

• If the investigation was developed using 1.0 UXO/acre: Between 0 and 1,000 UXO 

remain on the MRS after the investigation is completed. 

8.3.1.4.4.6. Although the results indicate that there is a broad range of potential residual 

UXO remaining within the MRS, this set of data is likely only one piece of the entire dataset for 

an MRS. For example, additional site information may allow the PDT to qualitatively determine 

that the residual UXO on the MRS may be closer to zero. Additional data that the PDT may use 

in assessing the potential residual UXO include previous investigation results (e.g., SI, EE/CA 

investigation data), historical range information (e.g., range layout drawings, interviews with 

former site personnel), and historical aerial photography, which may show the MRS was never 
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heavily impacted (e.g., limited cratering during the years of use). When evaluating the dig 

results of previous investigations, the PDT should consider the source of anomalies that were 

dug (e.g., analog geophysical vs. DGM) and whether any of them were munitions-related. 

Identification of MD in this data indicates that the area may have UXO, while a lack of MD may 

add further weight that the number of residual UXO is closer to zero. 

8.3.1.4.4.7. Note that a key assumption in UXO Estimator is that the entire output acreage 

will be investigated (i.e., all anomalies with characteristics of UXO identified within areas of 

investigation should be excavated). The PDT may choose to investigate the resulting area with 

either grids or transects, so long as they are placed randomly within the NCMUA. VSP has tools 

that can be used to generate the random locations of grid center points (e.g., the “non-statistical 

sampling approach  predefined number of sample” tool) and transects (use the post-dig 

verification sampling). 

8.3.1.4.5. Module 2 in UXO Estimator is designed to analyze field data to determine 

whether site characterization results support the null hypothesis (i.e., there is less than a certain 

UXO density to a specific confidence level) or whether the null hypothesis should be rejected 

(i.e., one or more UXO were found during the investigation, which indicates the UXO density 

may be higher than originally assumed at the specified confidence level). If the PDT wishes to 

test for the null hypothesis and only investigates the amount of area calculated in UXO 

Estimator, that null hypothesis can only be confirmed if UXO are not found during the 

investigation. Identification of one or more UXO without additional sampling results in rejection 

of the null hypothesis unless additional or previous sampling results are included in the analysis. 

8.3.1.4.5.1. If one or more UXO is found during the initial survey, the PDT has the option 

to augment the investigation by surveying additional acreage or, using Module 2 in UXO 

Estimator, to calculate the upper confidence bound on the UXO density estimate and evaluate 

through the TPP process whether that result is acceptable. If additional acreage is surveyed, 

Module 2 in UXO Estimator can be used to determine how many more acres must be 

investigated, with no UXO found, to meet the DQOs provided. It should be noted that there is 

no guarantee that additional surveys would meet the original TPP DQOs since additional UXO 

could be encountered. If UXO is found during the investigation, the PDT decides to conduct 

additional investigation to test the original null hypothesis, and UXO are not found during 

subsequent investigation, then the null hypothesis can be confirmed. Module 2 inputs include 

the same input from Module 1 plus the number of acres investigated and the number of UXO 

found during the investigation. Using these inputs, the module calculates the confidence level 

that the entire site has less than the UXO density DQO that was established through the TPP 

process (e.g., 0.5 UXO/acre). 

8.3.1.4.5.2. Table 8-1 presents an example DQO hypothesis and test to determine the 

upper limit of UXO present within an NCMUA. If UXO is found during the investigation and 

the Module 2 calculations indicate that the desired statistical confidence level hasn’t been met, 

the PDT has at least three options: 
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Table 8-1: Site Characterization Hypothesis Testing

Area Hypothesis Hypothesis Test Results Evaluation

NCMUA No munitions 

were targeted 

within the area 

outside a CMUA 

and there is less 

than y UXO per 

acre across the 

site.

The PDT uses UXO 

Estimator to develop a 

sampling plan that 

consists of z acres of 

grids or transects to prove 

to a x% confidence level 

that there is less than y 

UXO/acre. 

The PDT performs geophysical surveys and 

excavation of anomalies within the z acres. If no 

UXO are found within the grids, then the PDT can 

be x% confident there is less than y UXO/acre. If 

UXO are found, the PDT can perform additional 

sampling and find no more UXO to be x% confident 

there is less than y UXO/acre or calculate a revised, 

larger upper bound on the number of UXO/acre and 

determine if that larger UXO density is acceptable.

8.3.1.4.5.2.1 Option 1. The PDT may determine that it is essential that the desired 

statistical confidence levels used to develop the field sampling plan must be met. In this option, 

the PDT can use the Module 2 output to determine the amount of additional investigation to 

conduct. If no additional UXO are found within the additional areas of investigation, then the 

PDT has determined that the UXO density is less than the initial desired confidence level. If 

additional UXO is found during the subsequent phases of investigation, the PDT eventually must 

reject the original assumptions of the UXO density at the site and accept that some higher density 

of UXO is present. 

8.3.1.4.5.2.2 Option 2. The PDT may determine that, although the original null 

hypothesis test was rejected due to finding UXO during the site characterization activities, a 

modified null hypothesis test based on the results of the investigation is sufficient to meet the 

project’s site characterization objectives. In this scenario, the PDT evaluates the site 

characterization results and calculates a decreased confidence level and/or an increased UXO 

density based on those results. 

8.3.1.4.5.2.3 Option 3. The PDT may determine that, although the desired confidence 

level wasn’t met, they may use a weight-of-evidence approach to evaluate if the project’s DQOs 

were met without recalculating new confidence levels or UXO density. The PDT may use the 

site characterization results plus previous investigation results or other lines of evidence (e.g.,

aerial photographs, no MD finds, public usage of MRS without UXO finds) indicate that the 

actual confidence level and the weight of all evidence for all available data is sufficient to meet 

the needs of the project DQOs and no additional data need to be collected.

8.3.1.4.6. Module 3 in UXO Estimator allows the user to perform linear unit conversions, 

perform area unit conversions, and calculate the number of grids required to meet the acreage 

requirements developed in Module 1. The linear unit conversion allows the user to input a 

distance in feet, meters, or miles, and then the software calculates the distance in the other two 

units. The area unit conversion allows the user to input an area in units of acres, square feet, or 

square meters, and the software calculates the area in the other two units. The grid calculation 

allows the user to input the total acres of investigation, the size of the grids in feet or meters, or 

the total number of grids to be investigated, and then the software calculates the remaining 

values.
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8.3.1.4.7. The following is an example. A PDT wants to determine the likelihood that a 

2,000-acre training and maneuver area has less than 0.1 UXO/acre (or less than 200 MEC across 

the entire site) to a 95% confidence level. Using UXO Estimator, the PDT calculates that they 

need to perform a minimum of 29.59 acres of investigation but increase the amount of 

investigation to 30.07 acres (or 131 100-foot x 100-foot grids). The geophysicist randomly 

places the grids throughout the NCMUA, performs geophysical surveys, and the dig team 

excavates all anomalies that could be TOIs within the grids. The dig team identifies one UXO 

within the NCMUA. Using UXO Estimator Module 2, the project geophysicist evaluates their 

data and determines the following: 

• They can be 80.64% confident there is less than or equal to 0.1 UXO/acre in the 

NCMUA. Therefore, sampling was inadequate to meet the target density at the 95% confidence 

level. 16.695 more acres must be sampled with no additional UXO found to meet the specified 

target density of 0.1 UXO/acre with 95% confidence. Although the PDT has not met the original 

assumptions, they have proven to a 95% confidence level that there is less than 0.157 UXO/acre 

(or 314 UXO) across the site. 

• The PDT has determined that the lower confidence level for the initial DQO of 0.1 

UXO/acre (or a slightly higher UXO density at the 95% confidence level) is acceptable because 

UXO wasn’t found in previous investigations, historical information indicates the site was used 

for a relatively short period of time, and there is no history of public exposure at the MRS. 

Although the PDT has not met the original assumptions, they have proven to a 95% confidence 

level that there is less than 0.157 UXO/acre (or 314 UXO) across the site; therefore, the PDT 

decides that no additional investigation is required to meet the project’s DQOs. 

8.3.2. MC. 

8.3.2.1. There are two main categories of sampling designs: probability-based designs 

and biased (non-probabilistic or judgmental) designs. Probability-based sampling designs apply 

sampling theory and involve unbiased selection of materials from throughout a sampling unit 

such that every particle within the sampling unit has an equal probability of being incorporated 

into the sample. Probability-based sampling allows for estimation of sampling error using 

statistical methods. Biased sampling designs involve the selection of samples on the basis of site 

understanding and professional judgment (e.g., targeted sampling at known impact areas). 

Sampling schemes that combine biased and probability-based sampling (e.g., ranked set 

sampling schemes) are often suited to MR projects. See Guidance on Choosing a Sampling 

Design for Environmental Data Collection Details for Use in Developing a Quality Assurance 

Project Plan (QAPP), USEPA QA/G-5S (2002) for details regarding probability-based and 

biased sampling designs. 

8.3.2.2. The statistical software package VSP discussed above initially was developed to 

support probability-based statistical sampling designs for discrete environmental sampling. The 

VSP Version 6.0 User’s Guide states that it is “a software tool for selecting the right number and 

location of environmental samples so that the results of statistical tests performed on the data 

collected via the sampling plan have the required confidence for decision making.” USEPA 

Guidance on Systematic Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process (EPA QA/G-4, 

USEPA, 2006a) (EPA/240/B-06/001)It was designed around the “USEPA Guidance on 
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Systematic Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process” (EPA/600/R-96/055) published 

by the USEPA in 2000 (updated in 2006). For projects with probability-based discrete sampling 

designs, VSP has been endorsed by a number of programs. Since its initial release, it has been 

updated to include options for UXO (as described above) and incremental sampling. IS recently 

was added as a statistical sampling option to estimate mean analyte concentrations in soils in 

predefined areas. Although the algorithms VSP uses are mathematically correct, there is concern 

regarding their unqualified application to develop sampling designs for environmental data. 

Caution must be used if VSP is to successfully support project objectives for IS sampling for 

MC. Users need to be aware of the underlying assumptions being made and ensure that they are 

reasonable for the intended applications. For example, the methods VSP uses to calculate the 

number of incremental samples required to satisfy tolerances for decision errors assume 

normality. However, a small number of increments (e.g., < 30) for each incremental sample may 

not adequately control distributional heterogeneity, resulting in non-normal distributions for the 

measured contaminant concentrations and inaccurate estimates of the sample sizes (i.e., numbers 

of data points) needed to satisfy tolerances for decision errors. 

8.4. Locating Concentrated Munitions Use Areas. 

8.4.1. CMUAs are MRSs or areas within MRSs where there is a high likelihood of finding 

UXO or DMM and that have a high amount of MD within them as a result of historical 

munitions use and fragmentation. CMUAs are most commonly target areas on ranges; however, 

they also include explosion sites, OB/OD areas, and potentially even disposal sites where 

munitions have been disposed of over a relatively large area (i.e., not small, isolated burial pits). 

The initial boundary of a CMUA is the line that differentiates between the elevated anomaly 

density area and the background anomaly density area. The CMUA boundary may be modified 

and further delineated throughout the intrusive investigations within the CMUA. Numerous 

sources of information may be used to aid in determining the general location of CMUAs. These 

include historical and current aerial photography, previous investigations (e.g., HRR, SI), and 

LIDAR data. These tools may be used to assist with locating range features (e.g., craters, target 

rings) associated with the CMUA; however, they are unable to fully delineate the boundaries of 

CMUAs since they are incapable of detecting the individual pieces of MD and UXO. 

8.4.2. A geophysical transect survey designed in VSP is the primary method to locate 

CMUAs. Section 8.3 provides further guidance on the use of VSP to locate CMUAs. 

8.5. Characterizing Concentrated Munitions Use Areas. 

8.5.1. MEC. Once transects within a potential CMUA have been surveyed using 

geophysical sensors, the PDT must select an approach to characterize the elevated anomaly 

density area and, if it is a CMUA, the nature of UXO within the CMUA. The anomaly 

reacquisition and resolution methods should support the DQOs established by the PDT. If 

geophysical data along the transects were collected using a positioning method that had 

sufficient accuracy to reacquire anomalies (e.g., RTK DGPS), then the PDT may choose to dig 

all anomalies on the geophysical transects. Digging all geophysical transect anomalies may not 

be practical if the anomaly count is very large. When anomaly counts are very large, the PDT 

can choose to excavate a selected number of anomalies to determine the nature and extent of 

UXO within the CMUA. The PDT should focus the sampling approach on collecting the data 
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needed to meet the DQO decisions that are required for the project. It should be noted that the 

site characterization data needs may not be the same as the remedial design cost estimating data 

needs. When designing the MEC sampling approach, the PDT should answer the following 

questions: 

a. How critical is it to find all UXO types?

b. Will identifying all MD types be sufficient?

c. Is there a need to estimate UXO distributions? 

d. What variables need quantifying in the cleanup cost estimates?

8.5.1.1. Typical decisions for characterizing CMUAs include, but are not limited to, the 

following: 

a. Estimate the number of anomalies within a CMUA.

b. Determine whether the potential elevated anomaly density area is a CMUA or a cultural 

feature.

c. Determine all of the types of UXO present within a CMUA.

d. Estimate the number of UXO within a CMUA. 

8.5.1.2. For many MRSs, and particularly for FUDS MRSs that have been developed 

since their last DoD use, it is possible that elevated anomaly density areas are present within the 

MRS that are not associated with concentrated munitions use. The PDT may be able to 

determine that these areas are not CMUAs based on site reconnaissance data collected during the 

transect investigation; however, the PDT should perform some amount of excavation to 

determine that the elevated anomaly density area is not a CMUA. If the PDT performs 

geophysical and intrusive sampling and finds no evidence of HE-fragments or practice bomb 

fragments, then the PDT can be confident that the elevated anomaly density area is not a CMUA. 

If, however, HE fragments, UXO, or practice munitions are found within the production area, 

then the PDT can conclude that the elevated anomaly density area is a CMUA and proceed to 

performing additional sampling, as needed, to characterize the CMUA. 

8.5.1.3. There are several methods available to characterize CMUAs, including those 

listed below. Regardless of the site characterization approach the PDT selects, the PDT must 

engage a qualified statistician to develop a site-specific approach to characterize the CMUA. 

Whatever approach is selected, the PDT should focus on looking for trends in the dig results. 

This includes statistical sampling of large populations of anomalies with the goal of digging until 

enough anomalies have been investigated to detect trends in the dig results. 

8.5.1.3.1. Trend Analysis Approach. Trend analysis is the process of collecting data and 

analyzing that data to identify patterns or trends in the data. As applied to characterizing a 

CMUA, trend analysis requires sampling until a trend is seen in the dig results. Trends should be 

defined on a site-specific basis; however, in general, a dig result trend indicates that further 
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intrusive investigation is unlikely to identify new types of TOIs or indications of TOIs (e.g., MD 

associated with a particular TOI). The PDT should develop a decision point to determine when 

enough anomalies have been investigated once trends are seen within dig results. The PDT 

should engage a qualified statistician to evaluate the dig results to determine when a statistically 

significant sample size has been obtained to characterize the entire population of samples (i.e., 

the estimated total number of anomalies within the CMUA). In this approach, the dig team may 

start digging a certain number of grids within the CMUA; however, the dig team would not need 

to dig all anomalies if a trend is seen in the dig results. If no trends are seen in the dig results 

(e.g., after digging 20 grids, the dig team is still finding new TOI types), then the PDT should 

evaluate whether further investigation is required to meet the objectives of the investigation. 

8.5.1.3.2. Population Sampling. Population sampling can be used to determine whether 

an elevated anomaly density area is a CMUA and to characterize an identified CMUA. The 

below sections describe each approach further. 

8.5.1.3.2.1. In order to determine whether an elevated anomaly density area is a CMUA, 

the PDT should investigate a statistical sample of the anomalies identified along the VSP 

transects to determine to a project-specific level of confidence that there are no munitions within 

the elevated anomaly density area. In an elevated anomaly density area where the number of 

anomalies in the area has been estimated (e.g., using VSP transects), the entire area can be 

viewed as a population of pieces of metal. Once the total population is determined (i.e., total 

number of anomalies within the elevated anomaly density area is estimated), the PDT then can 

use population sampling to determine whether the elevated anomaly density area is a CMUA. 

The VSP anomaly compliance sampling tool is one tool that can be used to determine the 

number of anomalies that require investigation to meet a specific statistical confidence level. 

Using the VSP anomaly compliance sampling tool can only be used to confirm or refute that an 

elevated anomaly density area is a CMUA; it can’t be used to determine the proportion of UXO 

within an anomaly population within the CMUA. 

8.5.1.3.2.2. Population sampling can be used to characterize a CMUA by of digging 100% 

of targets within grids within the CMUA and summarizing the findings to define the horizontal 

and vertical distributions. In a CMUA where the number of anomalies in the area has been 

estimated (e.g., using VSP transects), the entire CMUA can be viewed as a population of pieces 

of metal. Once the total population is determined (i.e., total number of anomalies within the 

CMUA is estimated), the PDT can use population sampling to determine the proportion of 

different types of metal within that population (e.g., the percentage that are 60 mm mortars and 

MD). The amount of investigation may include a biased number of grids (e.g., 1 acre of 50-foot 

x 50-foot grids), grids randomly located throughout the CMUA, or a combination of random and 

biased grids. If the goal of the investigation is strictly to determine the quantity of UXO within 

the CMUA, then the PDT may decide to only dig potential TOIs. If, however, an objective of 

the investigation is to identify all the different types of UXO within the CMUA, the investigation 

may want to include evaluation of the TOIs and non-TOIs (i.e., MD), since it is likely that the 

quantity of actual UXO within the CMUA is small relative to the total population and the 

investigation of the non-TOIs may aid in determining the different types of munitions 

historically used within the CMUA.
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8.5.1.3.3. Anomaly Classification Sampling. In anomaly classification sampling, the 

geophysicist selects a statistical sample of anomalies based on the geophysical characteristics of 

the anomaly. As discussed in Chapter 6, anomaly classification can mean using several DGM 

anomaly parameters to determine which anomalies are TOIs or it can mean collecting advanced 

EMI data and performing an inversion and classification. Either of these approaches may be 

applied to anomaly classification sampling. The goal of anomaly classification sampling is to 

identify feature clusters (or a group of anomalies with a similar range of feature parameters) that 

are indicative of a particular type of metal and digging within that feature cluster to determine 

the nature of the anomalies. The geophysicist also should look for potential individual anomalies 

that are not a feature cluster but could be potential TOIs. If the goal of the investigation is 

strictly to quantify the number of UXO, then it is possible to only dig potential TOIs. Using the 

anomaly classification approach and only digging TOIs within the relatively small sample size 

may not identify all types of UXO within the CMUA. If the goal of the investigation is to 

determine all the types of UXO within the CMUA, then the classification sampling approach 

should include digging a statistical sample of anomalies within non-TOI feature clusters. For 

example, if historical site information indicates that 105 mm projectiles were used at an MRS, 

but the classification results from advanced EMI data do not identify 105 mm projectiles, the 

project geophysicist could select a statistical sample of anomalies within non-TOI feature 

clusters to attempt to identify anomalies that may be due to fragments of 105 mm projectiles. If 

fragments of 105 mm projectiles are then found during intrusive investigation, the PDT has then 

confirmed the CSM. 

8.5.2. MC. MC originate from military munitions; therefore, MC characterization 

typically is focused in CMUA, as determined by historical document research, WAA, aerial 

photographs, or the results of a MEC investigation. Sampling and analysis requirements vary 

based upon site-specific conditions and must be addressed during TPP activities. The 

subsections below discuss general objectives for soil, surface water/sediment, and groundwater 

sampling within CMUAs. Figure 8-2 depicts an example decision logic for characterization of 

MC at CMUAs, and Section 8.8 provides a more detailed discussion regarding sampling of these 

environmental media. 

8.5.2.1. Soil. 

8.5.2.1.1. The purpose of collecting soil samples during an MC investigation is to provide 

a basis for inferring characteristics of the unsampled material within identified and explicitly 

delineated areas of a project site (i.e., a sampling unit or decision unit). Large portions of a 

project site may not need to be sampled, based on the CSM and other considerations. The area to 

be represented by samples must be specifically defined if the sample data are to be considered 

representative. The degree of this representativeness should be specified in the project’s DQOs 

developed during the TPP process and verified through QC replicate field sampling. An 

appropriate sampling design should include the physical CSM, size of sampling units, number of 

increments (if appropriate), and the number of samples. 

8.5.2.1.2. Soil analyses should be based on potential MC, if known (see Chapter 7). Close 

coordination with the MEC investigation team is required to assess locations for MC sample 

collection. Soil samples should be collected during MEC intrusive investigation at locations 
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where MEC or MD items are found (see Section 8.2.6.5). Besides analyzing for MC, additional 

soil parameters may be analyzed to assist in MC fate and transport evaluations for risk 

assessment and/or for evaluation of the feasibility of remedial alternatives for soil or 

groundwater treatment (see Chapter 10).

8.5.2.1.3. Soil samples should be collected from each area suspected to contain MC, such 

as known target impact areas, firing points, OB/OD areas, and hand grenade courts, as well as at 

known MEC/MD locations. 

8.5.2.1.4. Sample representativeness should be maximized to the extent practical. IS and 

sample processing IAW SW8330B, Appendix A, is a protocol that is designed to maximize 

sample representativeness for soil samples to be analyzed for secondary explosives. IS has the 

benefits of reducing the number of samples that require analysis, improving data reliability, 

allowing QC replicates to quantify the precision of estimates of mean concentrations with 

modest additional effort, and tending to decrease the number of nondetect results and the chances 

that certain contaminants might be missed at a site. Careful planning is required to implement 

IS, including establishment of decision units and/or sampling units, determination of sampling 

depths, and selecting an appropriate number of replicate samples. IS currently may not be 

accepted by certain state and local regulatory entities. If sampling is to be conducted in a high 

density MEC environment, MC sampling density must be evaluated relative to safety issues for 

sampling personnel. 

8.5.2.2. Surface Water and Sediment. 

8.5.2.2.1. When MC contamination of surface water and sediment is possible through 

direct deposition of munitions, from runoff, or based on other site conditions, the PDT should 

provide for sediment and surface water sampling. During project planning, the PDT should 

consider surface water features, such as flowing surface water bodies (e.g., rivers, streams, seeps, 

drainage ditches, storm water channels) and standing surface water bodies (e.g., lakes, wetlands, 

lagoons, surface impoundments). Each of these types of water bodies has underlying sediments 

that may be a “sink” for MC, slowly releasing substances to the overlying water through 

dissolution and adsorbed onto suspended particles (colloids). Intermittent drainages also may be 

considered if they are located in areas prone to flash flooding, which can mobilize sediment 

during high-energy precipitation events. 

8.5.2.2.2. The degree that sediment serves as a sink for MC depends on the physical and 

chemical characteristics of the MC and the sediment composition. For example, metals and 

inorganic MC compounds tend to adsorb onto smaller particles, especially clay. Organic MC 

compounds preferentially adsorb onto organic matter. 

8.5.2.2.3. As with soil sampling, the goal of sampling surface water and sediments for 

MC is to obtain a sample that is representative of the media being evaluated based on the 

intended use of the data. 

8.5.2.3. Groundwater. 

8.5.2.3.1. The PDT should consider the possibility of groundwater contamination from 

MC and the need for sampling during project planning based on regulatory requirements; the 
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types, amounts, and likely distribution of any MC that are released; the project site 

geology/hydrogeology (e.g., depth to groundwater, karst); climate weathering of MC sources; the 

susceptibility of groundwater to MC contamination from surface releases; and potential 

receptors.

8.5.2.3.2. Groundwater monitoring wells can provide essential information that is critical 

for determining depth to the water table from overlying MC sources; groundwater flow 

directions and gradients; the type of aquifer materials, which influences the characteristics of MC 

migration; and groundwater quality and the types and concentrations of MC in the groundwater. 

Refer to EM 1110-1-4000 for guidance on monitoring well installation. 

8.6. Characterizing Non-Concentrated Munitions Use Areas. 

8.6.1. MEC. 

8.6.1.1. NCMUAs. (e.g., non-target areas) may be either entire MRSs (e.g., training and 

maneuver areas) or areas outside of CMUAs (e.g., buffer areas). Whereas target areas generally 

will have an elevated geophysical anomaly and UXO density, areas outside target areas likely 

will have much lower anomaly and UXO density. The underlying assumption of MEC site 

characterization activities within NCMUAs is that there is an equal likelihood of finding MEC 

anywhere within the area. 

8.6.1.2. Tools to Characterize NCMUAs. The tools available for use in determining the 

amount of UXO within an area include statistical tools (such as UXO Estimator and VSP’s PRV 

sampling) and random geophysical grid and intrusive investigations. VSP’s PRV sampling 

modules and UXO Estimator are based on similar underlying statistical models; for small sample 

calculations, the results between the two software programs can vary slightly, although the 

difference has little practical effect. They both assume that anomalies within the surveyed area 

will be dug or classified as TOI or non-TOI (or alternatively, UXO or non-UXO). Section 8.3.1 

discusses the VSP PRV sampling module and UXO Estimator. 

8.6.1.3. Uncertainty in NCMUA Site Characterization. 

8.6.1.3.1. Given the large size and limitations of current technologies, it is impossible to 

say to 100% certainty that all UXO have been identified within an MRS. For NCMUAs, there is 

no way to determine whether there is zero UXO or DMM on the site. The PDT should build a 

body of evidence in the CSM to evaluate the uncertainty in the site characterization (i.e., whether 

UXO or DMM are present at the site after site characterization is completed) by assessing all 

available information, which should include: 

• previous investigation findings (e.g., HRR, ASR, SI); 

• historical photographic analysis;

• VSP results;

• UXO Estimator results;
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• dig results;

• visual observations during field activities; and 

• other sources (e.g., current orthophotos, LIDAR). 

8.6.1.3.2. Using a single source of information may lead to incorrect conclusions. For 

example, if a PDT designed a site characterization approach to determine if there are less than 

0.5 UXO per acre on a 1,000-acre site and they found no UXO during the investigation, then the 

result of the PDT’s hypothesis is that there are somewhere between 0 and 500 UXO items 

remaining on the site. Using additional information (e.g., no UXO found during field operations, 

no records/historical UXO finds, no craters or other evidence observed in LIDAR data or during 

field investigations), the PDT should have a greater certainty that the total amount remaining on 

the site after site characterization is closer to 0 UXO than it is to 500 UXO items. 

8.6.2. MC. 

8.6.2.1. For NCMUAs, the PDT should consider the types of munitions used, frequency 

of use, and area over which the munitions were used to decide whether MC characterization is 

necessary. In many cases, MC characterization is not required at NCMUAs because the number 

of munitions expended or discarded at the site is either zero or small and often dispersed over a 

large area (e.g., training and maneuver area), so that no concentrated sources of MC are present. 

The CSM should explain what the MC source is believed to be if sampling in NCMUAs is being 

considered. Figure 8-3 provides an example of decision logic for characterization of MC at 

NCMUAs.

8.6.2.2. Areas of an MRS confidently determined to not be impacted by munitions use 

may be useful for estimating non-munitions-related background concentrations of MC analytes 

(e.g., metals, PAHs, perchlorate). Areas within the same MRS are more likely to have similar 

soil type and physical characteristics than a more distant reference area.

8.6.2.3. Contingency plans that allow for MC sampling should be discussed in planning 

documents in the event that post-detonation sampling is required during intrusive operations or if 

a localized potential source of MC is discovered during the MEC investigation (e.g., remnants of 

a low-order detonation or a dud round that may have been breached). These results would be 

added to the site dataset for evaluation during the site risk assessment. 

8.7. Characterizing Small Arms Ranges. 

8.7.1. Introduction. There has been a considerable amount of study performed at SARs. 

These studies have focused on where the contamination is likely to be and on how best to 

measure it. Prior to conducting site characterization or remediation at SARs, review of the 

following publications is recommended. 

a. ITRC Guidance: Characterization and Remediation of Soils at Closed Small Arms 

Firing Ranges, available at http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/SMART-1.pdf
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b. USEPA Region 2 Guidance: Best Management Practices for Lead at Outdoor Shooting 

Ranges, available at http://www.epa.gov/region02/waste/leadshot/

c. Technical Review Workgroup (TRW) Recommendations for Performing Human 

Health Risk Analysis on Small Arms Shooting Ranges (OSWER #9285.7-37), available at 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/lead/products/firing.pdf

d. Treatment and Management of Closed or Inactive Small Arms Firing Ranges (ERDC / 

EL TR-07-06), available at http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel07-6.pdf

8.7.2. MEC. Site characterization goals for SARs typically are restricted to characterizing 

MC since small arms ammunition is not considered MEC. If, however, there is a potential to 

find MEC on the site, either from overlapping use or mixed use of the site over time, then the 

portions of the MRS that have a potential for MEC should be characterized using the approaches 

outlined in Sections 8.4 through 8.6. 

8.7.3. MC. The most prevalent MC at SARs include lead, antimony, copper, and zinc 

from bullets, bullet fragments, and bullet jackets. Pellets from shotgun shells contain mostly 

lead but also antimony, arsenic, and other minor constituents, including zinc, copper, nickel, and 

cadmium. Tungsten also may be an MC at certain SARs (see discussion of tungsten in Chapter 

7). Although not MC, PAHs may be present at skeet and trap ranges where clay targets have 

been used and may need to be addressed in order to close a SAR MRS. Lead, which accounts 

for more than 85% of the mass of a small arms projectile, is typically the risk driver for MC 

characterization at SARs due to its documented deleterious health effects on human and 

ecological receptors. 

8.7.3.1. The planning aspects for investigation of a SAR are similar to the planning steps 

discussed above for medium- and large-caliber MRSs. If the SAR is closed, it is important to 

obtain information regarding the former range, including the type of range, historical direction of 

fire, location of firing lines, and location of the target berm, if one was used. The PDT should 

refer to the Range Operations reports discussed in Chapter 7 for information on standard Army 

range designs. Figures 8-4a and 8-4b provide example decision logic flow-charts for 

characterization of SARs.

8.7.3.2. The most common types of military ranges are static ranges, where a stationary 

shooter fires at a known target, and shotgun ranges (e.g., skeet and trap ranges). 

8.7.3.2.1. Static SARs. In many instances, static SARs have impact berms located behind 

the targets, designed to absorb the impact of the bullets. If an impact berm is known to have 

been used at a SAR, but it is no longer present at the MRS, then inquiries should be made 

regarding the disposition of the berm soil. If the berm soil was removed from the MRS, the area 

that received the soil may need to be included in the site characterization. If the berm soil was 

spread and graded at the MRS, then the MC investigation design needs to account for a 

potentially larger area of investigation. Because impact berms may contain high enough lead 

concentrations to be classified as RCRA hazardous waste, soil from impact berms is often tested 

using the RCRA Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) in the event that future offsite disposal may be required (see Chapter 10). Leaching potential of soil to be left in place (i.e., 
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not characterized for disposal) may be more appropriately evaluated using the Synthetic 

Precipitation Leaching Potential (USEPA Method 1312). The PDT should consider the period of 

time during which a static SAR was in use and the estimated amount of shooting done during 

that time. If the SAR was heavily used, then there is a possibility that propellant residues may be 

present at the firing lines, and samples should be collected and analyzed for these residues (see 

Chapter 7 for a discussion of analytical methods for propellants). 

8.7.3.2.2. Shotgun Ranges. The primary characteristic of all shotgun ranges from an 

environmental perspective is the wide distribution of shot. This results in a relatively large area 

in which MC (particularly lead) might be distributed. Understanding the firing positions and 

angles of skeet release is important to be able to delineate the area of maximum shotfall. 

Vertical distribution of MC in soil typically is limited to the near surface unless the soil in the 

shotfall area and/or target accumulation area has been reworked. PAHs should be considered for 

the analytical suite for shotgun ranges if clay pigeons composed of coal tar pitch were utilized as 

skeet targets. If target fragments are observed, the target accumulation area should be 

demarcated and compared to the fragment distribution expected based on the specific range 

configuration. If the observed target fragment accumulation area is within the bounds of the 

anticipated target fragment accumulation area, then the distribution of target fragments provides 

initial boundaries for the areas requiring evaluation for PAH presence and, later, delineation, if 

needed. If the observed target fragment accumulation area is not within the anticipated area or if 

no target fragments are observed, then the soil in the area may have been reworked. In the case 

where target fragments are observed outside of the anticipated area, it is recommended that 

presence/absence sampling (and, later, delineation sampling, if needed) for PAHs be conducted 

where fragments are observed. During the TPP process, the PDT should consider the history of 

the MRS with regard to soil removal or other site work to decide whether to sample for PAHs in 

typical target accumulation areas, even if no clay targets or fragments are observed. 

8.7.3.2.3. Heterogeneity on SARs. The PDT should be aware that lead contamination at 

SARs may present unique challenges with respect to the collection and analysis of representative 

soil samples. These challenges are related to the distribution of metal contaminants, which can 

be present as discrete particles ranging in size from intact bullets or shot to bullet fragments. 

Soil samples from firing ranges are typically a heterogeneous mixture of matrix materials and 

contaminants. Individual granules of soil can be significant relative to the size of a subsample 

selected for analysis. Consequently, the analytical results can vary considerably depending on 

the particular group of granules selected in the subsample. Therefore, sample collection 

strategies should be site specific and a function of particular metal distribution and soil gradation 

(see ERDC TR-12-1, Evaluation of Sampling and Sample Preparation Modifications for Soil 

Containing Metallic Residues, January 2012). 

8.8. Munitions Constituents Sampling and Analysis. 

8.8.1. Soil Sampling. 

8.8.1.1. Representativeness of Soil Data. Fundamentally, soil sampling is performed to 

provide a basis for inference about characteristics of the unsampled material. The first 

requirement for representativeness is that the volume of soil (or population) to be represented 
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must be explicitly delineated; in IS, this is the sampling unit or decision unit. The selected soil 

sampling and processing methods should yield samples and results that are representative of the 

unsampled material within the delineated volume of soil. Soil data representativeness is a 

combined function of precision (i.e., reproducibility) and accuracy (i.e., closeness to the true 

value). Precision is measured by the difference between results from replicate samples from the 

same volume of soil. Accuracy cannot be measured because the true mean concentration of the 

volume of soil cannot be known. A result that is not reproducible within acceptable, specified 

limits cannot be deemed representative of the larger volume of soil. Replicate measurements and 

a statistical approach are needed to quantify precision. The required degree of precision should 

be specified in the DQOs. Non-probabilistic (i.e., judgmental or biased) samples may meet the 

DQOs but may not be representative. 

8.8.1.2. Site Stratification. Site stratification is the process of subdividing a site, study 

area, or MRS into smaller areas (strata) having similar characteristics that are logical for 

sampling and analysis. Stratification should be based on both the characteristics identified in the 

CSM and the project objectives. The purpose of site stratification is to differentiate and define 

specific, logical component areas of soil to be represented by sample results. Dividing the site 

into strata optimizes the sampling design by decreasing variability and improving the 

representativeness of the data within each stratum and by maximizing the relevance of the data to 

project objectives and the data end use. For instance, for a SAR, a sampling stratum could be 

defined as the areas where MC release is suspected, such as the target berm and the firing line. 

A third stratum could be all other areas on the SAR, where MC release is not expected. If the 

end use of the data is comparison to regulatory or risk-based soil screening levels, the relevance 

of the strata to the appropriate risk-based exposure units should be considered in sampling 

design. Site stratification is applicable to all sample collection methods and should be addressed 

during the systematic planning process and in project planning documents during sampling 

design. 

8.8.1.3. Sampling Methods. 

8.8.1.3.1. Discrete or “Grab” Samples. Discrete or grab samples are defined as an 

aliquot of soil individually collected from one sample location or from a single depth in one 

borehole, from which a subsample typically is analyzed individually. The reproducibility of 

results between individual discrete samples is often poor. There may be unacceptably large 

variability in results between field replicates. A result from a single grab sample should not be 

considered representative of the material from which it is collected. A set of discrete samples of 

uniform size and collected in the same manner from a defined area (volume) of soil can form a 

basis to calculate statistical parameters that provide representative estimates for that volume of 

soil. Results from a very small set of discrete samples may not be reliable. The number of 

discrete samples needed depends on the heterogeneity in the distribution of the MC of interest 

within the sampled area. The VSP software package described in Section 8.3 may be used to 

assist in planning how many discrete samples should be collected to achieve a certain level of 

statistical confidence in the results. Outlier sample results should not be discarded simply on the 

basis of the concentration value; rationale should be provided to defend or explain the decision to 

discard an outlier sample result. 
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8.8.1.3.2. Composite Samples. The greatest source of variability (error) in soil sample 

data results from heterogeneity. Composite sampling reduces sample variability that results from 

soil heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is present at all scales due to compositional differences 

between individual soil particles (compositional heterogeneity) and due to the nonuniform 

distribution of analytes across a site (distributional heterogeneity). Traditional composite 

sampling reduces distributional heterogeneity by physically averaging the spatial variability and 

providing an estimate of the mean concentration of an analyte within the sampled volume of soil. 

For this average to be most relevant to the project objectives and end use of the data, the volume 

(lateral and vertical extent) of the soil represented by each composite sample should be 

considered carefully. One characteristic of composite sampling is that information regarding the 

spatial distribution of analytes within the sampled area is not obtained. Therefore, the volume of 

soil represented by a composite sample should be small enough that variability (heterogeneity) 

within that volume is not of concern in the decision process. For instance, a relatively small 

mass of contaminant within a very small volume of soil (e.g., a discrete sample) can cause 

elevated MC concentrations (a “hot spot”). However, over an area relevant to the decision to be 

made, a very small area of elevated concentration may not be significant. 

8.8.1.3.2.1. IS uses composite sample collection and laboratory processing methods that 

address sources of sampling error and variability to obtain an individual aliquot for analysis that 

contains all constituents in exactly the same proportion as they are present in an explicitly

defined volume of soil in the field (i.e., a sampling unit) (ITRC, 2012). The analytical result is 

an estimate of the mean analyte concentration present in that field sampling unit.

8.8.1.3.2.1.1 Research in the area of secondary explosives contamination at ranges has 

supported the use of IS rather than discrete or “grab” sampling (see various CRREL technical 

report [TR] series publications). USEPA SW 846 Method 8330B, one of very few USEPA 

methods to recommend field sampling procedures, recommends the use of IS for field collection 

and laboratory processing of samples for explosives. As the familiarity and regulatory 

acceptance of SW8330B increase, this method is expected to become the standard for evaluating 

secondary explosives contamination at ranges. For many projects, IS provides the data quality 

needed to satisfy the project objectives more effectively than traditional grab sampling. When 

adapting IS for a specific site investigation, the PDT needs to ensure that all aspects of the 

sampling and processing design are defined to meet project goals for each chemical of concern

and sampling objective. 

8.8.1.3.2.1.2 The use of IS currently is not mandated at the guidance level. During the 

acquisition process, the USACE PDT should make an initial evaluation regarding its use, 

considering factors such as regulatory acceptance of IS, the lack of published IS laboratory 

sample processing methods for analytes other than explosives, and the availability of accredited 

commercial laboratory services, to determine if IS is the best method for the project. If the 

USACE PDT determines that IS is the best choice, the SOW/ PWS should specify its use. For 

performance-based contracts, the contractor may recommend an alternate approach during the 

proposal phase for government consideration. During TPP, as the project's DQOs are 

established, if it is concluded that the initial determination should be changed (i.e., IS is selected 

when discrete is in the SOW/PWS or vice versa), contracting personnel should be consulted for 

direction. If IS is determined to be required, the PDT should include personnel knowledgeable 
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and experienced in the design of IS. Sources of published guidance for IS include Technical 

Guidance Manual for the Implementation of the Hawai’i State Contingency Plan 

(http://www.hawaiidoh.org/tgm.aspx); Draft Guidance on Multi-Increment Soil Sampling, 

Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation 

(http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/csp/guidance/multi_increment.pdf); and the ITRC Incremental 

Sampling Methodology guidance document (http://www.itrcweb.org/teampublic_ISM.asp). 

8.8.1.3.2.1.3 A sampling unit (sometimes termed decision unit) is the area and depth of 

soil (i.e., the sampled population) to be represented by the sampling process. Sampling units 

must be delineated so that the mean analyte concentrations obtained are directly relevant to welldefined project objectives. Because IS provides an estimate of only the mean concentration of an 

analyte within a specific volume of soil that is represented by a single incremental sample (the 

sampling unit), the size and configuration of the sampling unit are critically important in 

determining the relevance of the data to its intended end use. Sampling unit size depends on the 

project’s objectives (i.e., the end use of the data and the DQOs) and the CSM (the release 

mechanism and extent of contamination as well as the possible redistribution of contaminants). 

Based on these considerations, the sampling unit should be no larger than the size at which 

heterogeneity (i.e., “hot spots”) within the unit is not a concern. 

8.8.1.3.2.1.4 For sampling during SIs, where the objective is to identify areas suspected or 

potentially having contaminants at levels of concern, the objectives may be met with a higher 

degree of confidence by using a hybrid sampling approach, combining probabilistic IS within 

appropriately sized sampling units located on the basis of non-probabilistic professional 

judgment. Because IS can cost-effectively provide more thorough coverage than discrete 

sampling of areas identified as most likely to contain contamination at levels of concern, the 

method is less likely than discrete sampling to miss any significant contamination within a 

sampling unit. When determining the locations of sampling units, consideration should be given 

not only to likely initial release mechanisms and contaminant distribution but also to how postrelease processes or disturbance may have changed the spatial distribution of analytes. 

8.8.1.3.2.1.5 For RI objectives, the nature and extent of contamination must be 

determined. Unless the site being studied has been sufficiently characterized or there is other 

evidence that indicates that the site is not contaminated, probabilistic sampling strategies in 

multiple sampling units may be required. Sampling objectives (e.g., based on current or future 

site use) will need to be considered to determine the required number, size, and geometry of 

sampling units to provide adequate coverage and spatial resolution. 

8.8.1.3.2.1.6 Field sampling procedures that distinguish IS from conventional composite 

sampling include the following: 

• Collecting increments from a single sampling unit (population) specifically delineated 

to meet a project objective. 

• Collecting a sufficiently large number of increments (typically 30 to 100) to address the 

distributional heterogeneity of analytes. 

• Ensuring that the increments are of equal mass. 
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• Ensuring that the increments are collected from throughout the entire sampling unit in 

an unbiased manner. 

• Collecting an adequate total sample mass (typically 1 to 2 kilograms dry weight) to 

overcome effects of compositional heterogeneity due to the inherent particulate nature of soil and 

sediment. 

8.8.1.3.2.1.7 Laboratory processing and subsampling procedures that enhance 

representativeness include (for non-volatile analytes):

• air drying of the entire field sample (for ease of handling);

• reducing particle size by grinding, depending on target analytes and DQOs; and

• multi-increment laboratory subsampling from the entire process sample to obtain an 

aliquot for analysis having sufficient mass to control variability due to compositional 

heterogeneity.

8.8.1.3.2.1.8 If a PAH is an analyte of interest at an MRS where IS will be used, then the 

following sample preparation procedure is recommended: 

• Dry the sample to constant weight. 

• Sieve the sample with a 2 mm sieve (#10 mesh). 

• Mortar and pestle any dirt clods / clay target chunks that do not pass the sieve. 

• Consider advantages and limitations of milling based on project-specific data and 

quality needs, the specific PAH compounds, and their form. 

• Using an incremental approach, collect at least 30 increments from the processed field 

sample to obtain a laboratory sub-sample of 10 to 30 g for extraction and analysis. 

8.8.1.3.2.1.9 Additional parameters to consider include the field sampling scheme, degree 

of sample processing, vegetation inclusion/exclusion, and sieve sizes (sieve sizes are of interest 

only if a particular particle size fraction is the population of interest). Refer to published IS 

guidance for details regarding these considerations. The PDT, contractor (if applicable), 

laboratory, and applicable regulatory agencies must discuss the selected field and laboratory 

procedures to ensure acceptance of data to the data users. The regulatory acceptance should be 

documented to ensure future acceptance of the data.

8.8.1.4. Considerations for Soil Sampling Method Variation Across Site Investigation 

Phases. The selected soil sampling method should be the most appropriate to meet the 

investigation objectives for each phase of site investigation (e.g., SI, RI). However, due to the 

fundamental differences in nature between discrete and IS sampling and their statistical 

properties, the different types of data generally should not be combined. Statistical integration or 

direct quantitative comparison of discrete and IS data is problematic. Use of a single sampling 

method would facilitate direct comparison of the data. 
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8.8.1.5. Soil Background Determination. 

8.8.1.5.1. If the PDT determines that background sampling is required, it should select 

sampling locations with care. The areas selected for background sampling should have a soil 

type and composition similar to that of site samples and be as close as reasonably possible to site 

samples but unaffected by munitions activities. Background sample locations also should be 

selected with consideration for nonmunitions-related activities that may have released analytes of 

interest in background sampling areas (e.g., lead or PAHs along roadways). 

8.8.1.5.2. Defining a single value as a background concentration for a particular analyte 

normally is not feasible, so background concentrations should be expressed as ranges based on a 

statistical analysis of the background sampling data. The range of uncertainty needs to be well 

defined, particularly when field sample concentrations from the project site are close to the 

background mean concentration values. The number of background samples collected should be 

sufficient to be statistically relevant. If IS is used, the site and background sampling units ideally 

should be of approximately the same size 

8.8.1.5.2.1. Site-to-background comparisons may use statistical methods, including 

parametric and nonparametric statistical tests (see EM 200-1-16, Environmental Statistics). VSP 

has modules that support these site-to-background comparisons using parametric, nonparametric, 

and IS sampling approaches. An experienced environmental statistician should be consulted 

regarding selection of appropriate statistical methods. 

8.8.1.5.2.2. A geochemical correlation may be performed to compare site-to-background 

concentrations. The basis of this technique is that soils tend to contain trace element metals and 

major element metals in relatively constant proportions in a given area. Comparisons of the 

concentrations or concentration ratios between reference metals (e.g., iron, aluminum, 

manganese) and metals MC (e.g., lead, copper, antimony) are performed. If the metals 

concentrations show a high degree of correlation, then samples having concentration that do not 

fit the observed strong correlation (i.e., higher ratio of MC metal to reference metal) are likely to 

represent MC contamination. Reference metals that are selected should be abundant, commonly 

present in soil, and not considered MC of interest at the project site. Secondary comparisons 

between MC metals constituents can also be a line of evidence indicating contamination. For 

example, copper/lead or zinc/lead ratios in uncontaminated samples would be different than in 

samples co-contaminated with these metals. 

8.8.1.5.2.3. Graphical representations may be useful for site-to-background comparison. 

Histograms, box plots, and correlation diagrams may be used to graphically analyze differences 

in background and site MC concentrations to determine if the site samples are contaminated.

8.8.1.5.3. IS is well suited to determine accurate, site-specific mean background 

concentrations. At least one of the sampling units should be sampled in triplicate, and the PDT 

should consider collecting triplicates for all background sampling units to provide a measure of 

uncertainty in the estimated background mean. Background sampling units should capture the 

natural variability of soil composition across the area of interest. More than one sampling unit 

may be required to capture this natural variability. The configuration and location of background 

sampling units and the number of replicate samples to be collected should be based upon the 
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DQOs established by the PDT as part of the TPP process. Ideally, background sampling units 

should be equal in size and increment density to field sampling units. However, background 

analytes may tend to have a more uniform spatial distribution than MC released from site 

activities. This may allow sufficiently accurate estimates from smaller sampling units or from 

fewer increments.

8.8.2. Sediment and Surface Water Sampling. 

8.8.2.1. Surface Water Sampling Considerations. 

8.8.2.1.1. MC contamination in surface water derives from surface water runoff from 

contaminated areas and leaching. Groundwater discharge to surface water as gaining streams, 

seeps, and springs also may introduce MC to surface water, particularly for sites with shallow 

groundwater or in particular types of geology (e.g., karst).

8.8.2.1.2. Surface water sampling for MC must be accompanied by a thorough 

documentation of the characteristics of the surface water body, such as size and shape, depth, 

flow rate (if applicable), pH, temperature, conductivity, dissolved oxygen, and turbidity. These 

characteristics affect the capacity of the water to carry MC contaminants, contaminant 

partitioning/speciation, and bioavailability.

8.8.2.1.3. Samples of surface water may be grab samples, which are discrete, 

instantaneous events, or composite samples. Composite samples may be time-weighted, flowproportional, or depth composites. If the data are to be used in a compliance program, the PDT 

should refer to state and/or federal regulations for definition and requirements of grab and 

composite samples (i.e., criteria maximum concentrations for brief exposures and criterion 

continuous concentrations for longer exposures). 

8.8.2.1.4. For MC characterization, surface water samples should be collected upstream of 

the inferred location of contaminant entry into the surface water body (i.e., reference or 

background location), at or just downstream of the inferred location or area of contaminant entry, 

and downstream of the point of contaminant entry to determine the extent of MC contamination. 

8.8.2.1.5. The timing of the sample collection may influence the MC concentration and 

should be considered carefully by the PDT. Low flow seasonal conditions, high flow seasonal 

conditions, and storm events may need to be included in the sampling design. Areas of tidal 

influence should consider time-composite samples and/or grab samples collected at varied tidal 

stages.

8.8.2.1.6. For storm water runoff sampling designed to obtain qualitative and quantitative 

data to assess episodic migration of contaminants, refer to USEPA 833-B92-001 for storm water 

sampling guidance http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/upload/owm0307.pdf. 

8.8.2.1.7. Freshwater metals criteria for certain metals (including lead, copper, and zinc) 

are hardness-dependent. The ecological risk screening criteria for these metals are relatively low 

and decrease with decreasing hardness of the water. Determining adequate reporting limits for 

metals in surface water requires an assessment of water hardness, the calculation of the 
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consequent hardness-dependent comparison criterion for each metal, and the derivation of the 

resulting ideal and acceptable detection limit for each metal. For surface waters with low 

hardness and resulting low ecological risk screening criteria, it may be necessary to use the 

“clean hands / dirty hands” sample collection method (refer to USEPA Method 1669, Sampling 

Ambient Water for Trace Metals at USEPA Water Quality Criteria Levels 

(http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=200034VZ.txt) and a trace metals laboratory 

analysis (e.g., USEPA Method 1638). 

8.8.2.1.8. A variety of equipment is available for surface water grab sampling depending 

on whether samples are to be collected from the surface (e.g., sample bottle submersion, 

dipper/pond sampler) or from within the water column (e.g., peristaltic pump, Kemmerer 

sampler, bomb sampler, semipermeable membrane device). Composite sampling using a 

programmable Isco-type sampler allows for adjusting the period of the sample and the increment 

frequency and volume. 

8.8.2.2. Sediment Sampling Considerations. 

8.8.2.2.1. When designing a sediment sampling plan for stream sediments, the PDT 

should consider collecting a set of samples (or an IS) from unbiased locations to provide the 

most representative results. A minimum “reach” or length of stream for sampling is considered 

to be five to seven times the stream width. Unbiased discrete point sampling or unbiased 

sampling along randomly spaced transects help to avoid bias. 

8.8.2.2.2. Sediment sampling poses challenges with respect to sample collection and 

analysis. Challenges associated with sample collection include cross contamination, ability to 

recover all particle size fractions, and excessive water in the sample. Analytical challenges 

include the low reporting limits required for comparison to ecological risk screening values and 

matrix interference. 

8.8.2.2.3. Sediment samples often are co-located with surface water samples. Surface 

water should be sampled before collecting a sediment sample. Sediment should be sampled from 

the downstream side of the surface water body. Liquid should not be decanted; however, excess 

water should be avoided. Prior to sampling and during TPP, the PDT should coordinate with the 

analytical laboratory to discuss protocols for analyzing sediment samples that have a high water 

content. Some considerations for watery samples include whether the water will be discarded or 

processed, whether the water will be decanted or evaporated, and whether the water removed 

will be considered part of a dry weight calculation. The impact of salinity on analytical methods 

should also be addressed, if applicable. 

8.8.2.2.4. Sediment grab samples may be collected with a variety of tools, including 

trowels and “clam shell” type samplers, which can introduce bias into the sampling for a variety 

of reasons, and vertical cylinder-type samplers, piston corers, and gravity corers, which are less 

prone to bias. Factors that influence sampling equipment selection include physical 

characteristics of the sediment bed; width, depth, and flow rate of the surface water; the need to 

minimize sample disturbance and washing; and the need for an undisturbed sample. 
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8.8.2.2.5. In addition to analyzing for MC, simple bulk chemistry parameters (e.g., total 

organic carbon) may be analyzed to assist with evaluation of MC fate and transport. The acid 

volatile sulfide (AVS) concentration in sediment is a key factor in evaluating metals 

bioavailability. Sulfide binds cationic metals, forming relatively insoluble complexes that are 

minimally bioavailable. USEPA guidance on assessing the toxicity of metals mixtures in 

sediment to benthic organisms indicates that when the sum (∑) of the molar concentrations of 

simultaneously extracted metals (SEM) minus the molar concentration of AVS is less than zero, 

no toxicity should occur. For additional guidance regarding the use of AVS-SEM data for 

evaluating metals toxicity in sediment, refer to Procedures for the Derivation of Equilibrium 

Partitioning Sediment Benchmarks (ESBs) for the Protection of Benthic Organisms: Metal 

Mixtures (Cadmium, Copper, Lead, Nickel, Silver and Zinc) EPA/600/R-02/011 January 2005 

(http://www.epa.gov/nheerl/download_files/publications/metalsESB_022405.pdf) 

8.8.3. Groundwater Sampling. 

8.8.3.1. Groundwater is potentially a major transport pathway for MC and migration of 

MC to groundwater can greatly expand the extent of MC contamination and lead to potential 

exposure risks to off-site receptors.

8.8.3.2. Generally, existing water wells are not suitable for characterizing groundwater 

because of nonoptimal location with respect to possible MC sources and because they are 

designed for water production not sampling and characterization of contaminant plumes. 

8.8.3.3. Dedicated groundwater monitoring wells are likely to be much more useful for 

site characterization purposes because of their design and location. Refer to EM 1110-1-4000, 

Monitoring Well Design, Installation, and Documentation at Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive 

Waste Sites. Monitoring wells can be installed using conventional drilling technology, including 

hollow-stem auger, rotary drilling (drilling fluid or air), and sonic methods. 

8.8.3.4. Direct push wells also can be used for groundwater sample collection and are 

installed by pushing or hammering rods to depth. This method is advantageous for cost reasons 

because it produces little waste material and because a borehole is not created; however, it is not 

applicable in certain situations (e.g., hard, consolidated formations or presence of cobbles). 

Refer to The Use of Direct-Push Well Technology for Long-Term Environmental Monitoring in 

Groundwater Investigations, ITRC (www.itrcweb.org). 

8.8.3.5. Groundwater sampling methods (both active and passive) are the same as those 

described in guidance for HTRW sites.

8.8.3.6. Groundwater is a dynamic system; however, concentrations of analytes in 

background (up gradient) wells should be stable over time. Trends, shifts, or cyclical patterns 

should be investigated. In order to determine mean background concentrations for groundwater 

analytes, it is recommended that a minimum of four sampling events be performed over 1 year; 8 

to 10 observations are preferable to increase statistical certainty. If well-documented 

background concentrations in groundwater are higher than MC screening levels, then it is 

recommended that alternate site-specific standards be developed. 
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8.8.4. CA Sampling Considerations. 

8.8.4.1. The initial planning and investigation steps for a CWM site are very similar to 

those described in this manual for conventional munitions. Therefore, this section focuses on the 

procedures and requirements that are unique to CWM characterization.

8.8.4.2. CWM DC provides specialized support to assist HQUSACE, USACE 

Commands, FOA, and laboratories by executing CW activities and maintaining state-of-the-art 

technical expertise for all aspects of CWM DC response activities. The CWM DC is the only 

DC authorized to execute any phase of a CWM project.

8.8.4.3. In general, CWM sites are comprised of disposal pits and test trenches and, to a 

lesser extent, impact ranges. The purpose of CWM site characterization is to obtain surface and 

subsurface sample data to adequately characterize the site IAW DQOs. 

8.8.4.4. Air monitoring for CA is required whenever there is a risk for worker or public 

exposure to CA during or due to site operations. An air monitoring plan must be developed and 

included as a supporting plan to establish the policies, objectives, procedures, and 

responsibilities for the execution of a site-specific monitoring program. DA PAM 385-61 

requires that a monitoring plan be developed in writing and implemented. DASA-ESOH Interim 

Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses, 1 Apr 2009, provides additional guidance 

for air monitoring at CWM sites.

8.8.4.5. Sampling and analysis for CA and associated ABPs are used to determine if 

residual CA contamination from a release, spill, or disposal operation is present and to determine 

if other hazardous chemicals or MC are mixed with the chemical agent of concern. Because 

some types of CA are not persistent in certain types of environments or after a certain amount of 

time, the PDT should take the persistence of the suspected chemical agent into consideration 

during site planning (see Chapter 7). 

8.8.4.6. Environmental samples may consist of soils and other solids, water, sludge, and 

vegetation. Each environmental sample collected is homogenized and then divided into a 

minimum of three split samples prior to monitoring or analysis. Prior to off-site shipment, the 

headspace of one of the split samples is screened for CA using airborne methods to ensure that 

concentrations are below the airborne exposure limit (AEL). If the headspace is over the AEL, 

the samples must be stored on site for decontamination and disposal without further analysis. If 

CA concentrations are determined to be below the AEL, then the second split sample may be 

shipped off site to a CA laboratory to perform total analyses for CA/ABP (see requirements for 

CA laboratories in Chapter 7). The results of the second split must be nondetect prior to release 

of the third split to a commercial laboratory for traditional environmental analyses. This 

procedure ensures that a non-CA lab is not contaminated accidentally with CA-containing 

samples. 

8.8.4.7. Environmental samples should be collected immediately beneath and/or adjacent 

to any CWM. Samples of surrounding media should also be collected whenever there are visual 

or airborne indicators of potential CA contamination. Historical information also should be used 

to determine sampling locations.
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8.8.4.8. All samples potentially containing CA must be sent to a government or contractor 

laboratory with a current bailment agreement for analysis or be cleared as having no detectable 

levels of agent by extraction-based analytical methods prior to being sent to an HTRW lab. 

8.8.4.9. It is not recommended that IS be conducted when collecting samples for agent 

and ABP analysis. Although in some projects, composite samples may be collected from test 

pits or trenches, sample processing methods typically associated with IS (drying, sieving, and 

milling/grinding) are not recommended. This recommendation is primarily due to the increased 

potential for exposure of laboratory personnel to CAs (particularly if they were to be air dried, 

unless all were air dried in an area where the air could be captured and scrubbed) as well as the 

potential for analyte loss. Additionally, air drying would likely make the process to quickly clear 

samples for release to traditional laboratories impossible and, thus, holding times for other 

analytes would not be met. 

8.8.4.10. IDW generated at a CWM site must be handled IAW the procedures described 

in DASA-ESOH Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses, 1 Apr 2009, 

which are summarized in Figure 8-17, below. Additional requirements may also apply (e.g., 

RCRA treatment standards).

Figure 8-17: Waste disposal procedures for CA-contaminated media (DASA-ESOH Interim 

Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses, 1 Apr 2009) 

Note: Laboratory limits of quantitation must be below appropriate HBESL. 

8.8.5. CAIS Kits. 

8.8.5.1. Numerous types of CAIS kits were produced and used by all branches of the 

military between the 1930s and 1960s to train military personnel on the identification of 

chemical agents (U.S. Army, 1995). Most of these kits are believed to have been used during 

Extraction Sample < appropriate HBESL

May be used or disposed of per federal, state, interstate, and local laws and regulations (e.g., returned to 

the hole or disposed of as non-contaminated, non-hazardous material)

Extraction Sample < HWCL but ≥ appropriate Health Based Environmental Screening Level (HBESL)

Disposed of as hazardous waste per federal, state, interstate, and local laws and regulations or treated by an approved, 

licensed treatment or disposal facility to the appropriate level.

Headspace Sample ≥ Short term Exposure Limit (STEL)

or Extraction Sample ≥ Hazardous Waste Control Limit (HWCL)

Decontaminate to below HWCL (unless other more stringent level applies), then package and ship to TSDF for appropriate 

treatment or disposal IAW applicable laws and regulations
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training exercises, and the known kits that were not used were destroyed during the 1970s and 

1980s. However, some may remain in the subsurface at some MRSs. 

8.8.5.2. In general, CAIS kits contained dilute amounts of CA stored in glass vials or 

ampules, which were in turn stored within metal or wood “pigs” used for storage and 

transportation of the CAIS kits. Some CAIS kits (K945) were contained within a plastic carrying 

case. Although the metal detectors discussed in Chapter 6 of this EM are not capable of 

detecting individual glass vials, glass ampules, wooden pigs, or plastic carrying cases, they can 

detect metal pigs and the metallic bands surrounding wooden pigs in which the glass vials were 

stored. GPR may be capable of detecting individual glass vials or tubes, as well as plastic 

carrying cases; however, a study performed by the USACE at the Former Spring Valley FUDS in 

2004 demonstrated that detection rates for simulated CAIS vials and ampoules ranged from 11% 

(at 2.5 to 3 feet deep) to 42% (0.5 to 1 feet deep). This study also reported false alarm rates 

(anomalies interpreted as potential glass items but known not to be) of between 9,000 and 15,280 

anomalies per acre. Note that GPR surveys designed to detect glass vials or ampoules across an 

entire MRS would be very expensive. The PDT should evaluate all data sources (e.g., historical 

documents and interviews, geophysical transect surveys) to determine the most likely type of 

CAIS used at a site, the packaging container types that were used for these kits, and the potential 

location(s) of CAIS training within the MRS. The PDT also must factor for variable detection 

rates and potentially high false positive rates of the various technologies available to detect CAIS 

kits and individual vials or ampoules. 

8.8.6. Characterization of Underwater MRSs. 

8.8.6.1. Underwater MRSs can be former live-fire testing and training ranges that used 

surface munitions (e.g., bombs, artillery projectiles) or subsurface munitions (e.g., mines, 

torpedoes); defensive sites (e.g., forts, coastal artillery batteries); accident sites; disposal sites; or 

sites where munitions were jettisoned (e.g., during an emergency). 

8.8.6.2. Underwater MRSs may pose either acute or chronic impacts. Acute impacts 

include explosion, fire, or chemical exposure resulting from functioning of a munition (e.g., 

detonation) or failure of a munitions’ component (e.g., a casing body) that released its contents 

(e.g., CA). Chronic impacts include adverse health effects resulting from long-term exposure to 

a substance (i.e., MC) or persistent adverse health effects from an acute exposure. 

8.8.6.3. The factors that influence MC release from munitions in a water environment 

include current speed; MC dissolution rate; MC saturation concentration; MC cavity radius 

inside the munitions; the hydrodynamic mixing coefficient; and the breach hole shape, size, and 

orientation. Corrosion of the munition, which generally is accelerated in salt water, may affect 

the timing and rate of release of MC from the munitions and the stability of the munition. It is 

important to understand that the period of maximum release of MC may not occur until decades 

after MEC were deposited in the water (i.e., after a long period of corrosive attack).

8.8.6.4. When sampling surface water at an underwater MRS, the PDT needs to consider 

possible upstream sources of contamination. The timing of sample collection must be considered 

based on wet versus dry weather, flood events, and other factors that may influence the ability to 

collect samples and the concentration of MC. The effects of salinity on the sampling and 
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analytical methodology should be considered if the underwater MRS is in a brackish or marine 

environment. If a munition is located underwater, surface water sampling proximate to the 

munition may be appropriate; however, if this is anticipated, procedures should be considered 

and sampling documented carefully in order to ensure that the sample that is collected is 

representative of the water concentration rather than cross contamination from the munition 

itself.

8.8.6.5. When sampling sediment, start downstream and move progressively closer to 

suspected MC source areas. Collect water samples before collecting sediment samples to avoid 

sediment resuspension. In tidal waters, although water and sediment may move in multiple 

directions, there typically is a predominant component to current direction, and it is 

recommended that sediment sampling be performed along the axis of predominant current 

direction. Sediment deposition and erosion rates and patterns must be considered in the 

sampling design; these parameters influence the depth of munitions items and potential MC 

transport and exposure pathways. Human and/or ecological receptors of interest should be 

identified, and the sampling design should be guided by the CSM for receptor interactions with 

potential MC in sediment. For instance, if benthic fauna are the only receptors of interest, then it 

may be acceptable to limit sample collection to shallow sediment. The effects of salinity on the 

analytical methodology should be considered if the underwater MRS is in a brackish or marine 

environment. 

8.8.6.6. If the ERA scenario leads to quantitative evaluation of biota, the PDT should 

proceed carefully. The quality of biota analyses typically is poor due to high levels of 

interference. Only MS methods should be used for biota analysis, and only experienced 

laboratories should be selected for biota analyses. Sampling strategies for biota should carefully 

consider whether to sample individuals vs. compositing within the species based upon the 

objectives of the sampling. Multiple species compositing is not recommended.

8.8.6.7. Characterization of underwater MRSs is a topic of active research. The 

Hawai‘i Undersea Military Munitions Assessment (HUMMA) project included a substantial 

research effort with the objectives of (a) developing a cost efficient and effective survey and 

assessment strategy for evaluating whether sea-disposed military munitions have had or have the 

potential to significantly impact human health and the environment and (b) testing the survey and 

assessment strategy at a single site. HUMMA project documents are available at

http://www.hummaproject.com/. Although sea-disposed munitions are not classified as MRSs, 

the technology developed may be applicable at underwater MRSs. This topic is also a research 

initiative for SERDP and ESTCP, which have published several reports available at 

https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/Munitions-Response-Initiatives (see Munitions 

in the Underwater Environment). Three issues of the Marine Technology Society Journal have 

also been devoted to the subject, "Legacy Underwater Munitions: Assessment, Evaluation of 

Impacts, and Potential Response Technologies" Part 1, November/December 2011, Vol. 45, No. 

6 and Part 2, January/February 2012, Vol. 46, No. 1 and "The Legacy of Underwater Munitions 

Worldwide: Policy and the Science of Assessment, Impacts and Potential Responses," Fall 2009, 

Vol. 43, No. 4. https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/Munitions-Response-Initiatives
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8.8.7. MC Considerations Related to MEC Operations. 

8.8.7.1. MC sampling representativeness, spatial data, and overall waste disposal 

requirements are influenced by the choice of MEC removal and disposal technologies. 

8.8.7.2. MEC removal technology options include hand excavation, mechanically assisted 

removal using excavating equipment, remotely operated equipment, armored excavation and 

transportation, and mechanized soil processing (screens/conveyors/magnets). 

8.8.7.2.1. Hand excavation of MEC is the industry standard and provides the best access 

to soil for sampling and for visibility of potential MC sources. Mechanically assisted removal 

using excavation equipment may be used in conjunction with hand excavation and offers no 

additional advantages for MC sampling. 

8.8.7.2.2. Armored excavation and transport focuses on larger excavations. Potential MC 

sources would lose some spatial identity, complicating selection of specific sample locations and 

depths. Similar issues would apply for MC sampling at sites where remotely operated removal 

equipment are selected (remotely operated equipment is limited to research and development at 

this time).

8.8.7.2.3. Mechanized soil processing equipment separates ordnance (or bullets being 

recovered for lead recycling) from soil. Soil that has been processed no longer has spatial 

identity because post-processed soil would be placed in piles generated during processing. The 

soil also is somewhat mixed by the process.

8.8.7.2.4. Intrusive MEC removal efforts frequently require engineering controls, which 

must be considered in sampling strategies. Barricades limit access to soil that might be available 

to sample, but their use is required to protect nearby activities from unintentional detonations. 

Spatial limitations may provide less bias than restricting samples to areas outside the exclusion 

zone (limiting samples to strictly those collected with anomaly avoidance). 

8.8.7.3. MEC disposal technology options include BIP, consolidated shot, laser initiation, 

and CDC. 

8.8.7.3.1. BIP detonations occasionally are required during site characterization efforts 

that require ordnance disposal (more likely at the RI/FS or EE/CA stage during intrusive 

operations than during an SI) and during RAs or removal actions. Intact rounds that are BIP 

typically leave less residue than rounds that experienced a low-order detonation but greater 

contamination than if the round had functioned as designed with high-order detonation (see 

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-13, Comparison of Explosives Residues from the Blow-in-Place 

Detonation of 155-mm High Explosive Projectiles). In addition, BIP of low-order detonated 

munitions may produce significant explosives residue (see Explosive Residues from Low-Order 

Detonations of Heavy Artillery and Mortar Rounds, Pennington et al., Soil and Sediment 

Contamination: An International Journal, 17:5, 533-546). 

8.8.7.3.2. The purpose of collecting samples at a demolition site is to assess whether the 

demolition activities are contributing MC contamination to the site. Sampling and analysis needs 

should be based on MEC fill, if known, along with composition of the donor charge. 
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8.8.7.3.3. Predetonation soil sampling is not recommended because the detonation itself 

unalterably destroys the predetonation site conditions. Post-detonation soil samples should be 

collected at the location of each specific type of MEC destroyed. Soil sample results should be 

added to the site dataset for evaluation during the site risk assessment. 

8.8.7.3.4. Post-detonation samples should be incremental samples unless there are state or 

local requirements to the contrary. The sample unit(s) size should be sufficient to determine the 

average concentration over the area affected by the detonation or the exposure unit of a potential 

receptor. 

8.8.7.3.5. Sand bags are a common means of controlling BIPs. If sand bags are required, 

the potential implications of ruptured sand bags on post-detonation MC sampling should be 

considered. For instance, dispersion of the sand from ruptured sand bags can assist in 

determination of where to sample post-detonation. 

8.8.7.4. Consolidated shots involve the detonation of multiple rounds of munitions that 

were deemed safe to move and detonate together. MC results at consolidated shot areas are 

analogous to those found at open detonation areas. 

8.8.7.5. Laser initiation involves portable, vehicle-mounted lasers that may be used to heat 

surface MEC and induce detonation. Laser initiation processes are still in the developmental 

stage. One advantage of laser systems is that they do not require donor charges. However, a 

study performed by the USACE, Huntsville District shows that MC release was higher from 

laser initiation than from C4 donor charge for low-order as well as many high-order detonations. 

Secondary waste stream and sampling needs are similar to those described for BIPs. 

8.8.7.6. CDCs are used to destroy MEC while containing both the blast effects and the 

secondary waste stream within the closed system. 

8.8.7.6.1. CDC use is limited to items that are within the NEW that the system is 

approved to destroy and that contain fill that the unit is approved to destroy. This includes 

conventional munitions that contain energetics, WP, riot agents, propellants, and smoke. PWP is 

not approved for disposal in a CDC. Single-site approval has been granted for chemical 

munitions. Air handling and filtration may be required depending on the munitions being 

detonated. 

8.8.7.6.2. Secondary waste streams must be characterized and disposed of properly. They 

typically include pea gravel, Torit® filter dust, and decontamination water. Appropriate plans 

need to be in place for the cost and schedule impacts associated with manifesting and disposal of 

secondary wastes. For instance, the pea gravel may be classified as hazardous waste (USEPA 

Hazardous Waste Codes D008 for lead, D006 for cadmium, and/or D003 for reactive waste, such 

as WP). Filters may be classified as D002 (corrosivity), and the decontamination water may 

contain lead at hazardous levels. 

8.8.8. MC Data Interpretation and Validation. 

8.8.8.1. Data Interpretation. After a project property undergoes sampling and analysis, it 

is necessary to carefully interpret all data and determine if project objectives have been met. 
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Project-related information, such as possible MEC composition (if available) and donor 

explosive composition, should be provided as part of data interpretation. If numeric project 

screening levels or action levels have been identified for the project, a comparison of the site 

data to those levels must take place. Environmental Data Management System software is 

available to USACE personnel and contractors to aid in this comparison. Data gaps may exist 

and should be identified and explained. Data gaps may require additional action as part of the 

remedial response. 

8.8.8.2. Data Review. The contractor should perform data review according to their 

approved UFP-QAPP requirements. Review procedures should be based on EM 200-1-10, 

Guidance for Evaluating Performance-Based Chemical Data; the latest versions of the USEPA 

Contract Laboratory Program (CLP) National Functional Guidelines (available at 

http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/programs/clp/guidance.htm); the latest version of the 

DoD QSM; and any applicable state or regional requirements. Although the USEPA National 

Functional Guidelines were developed for the Superfund CLP, outlier data resulting from SW 

846 methods analyses are qualified according to the protocols in the USEPA National Functional 

Guidelines as there are no comparable procedures published elsewhere. During TPP, the amount 

of review should be coordinated with regulatory agencies. The review should be documented in 

the draft and final engineering reports. Review documentation should address review of 

laboratory and field QC results. Any data validation “flags” must be captured in electronic data 

submittals. Electronic data should be labeled IAW EPA-540-R-08-005, Guidance for Labeling 

Externally Validated Laboratory Analytical Data for Superfund Use. Persons performing the 

data validation should have appropriate experience as determined by their contractual 

requirements.

8.9. Munitions Response Site Delineation. 

8.9.1. Once site characterization activities are completed, the PDT determines if there is a 

requirement to realign or delineate the MRA or MRS. Realignment is the process of 

restructuring the data in the appropriate database of record (e.g., FUDSMIS for FUDS 

properties) (USACE, 2011). Realignment ensures that each MRS is part of an MRA and is 

equivalent to a MR project. Delineation refers to the process of revising MR projects/MRSs by 

splitting or further defining MRSs at previously identified MRAs as necessary for more efficient 

project management (USACE, 2011). Reasons for undertaking delineation include, but are not 

limited to, the need to address issues such as the anticipated response scenarios, stakeholder 

input, risk management, and project complexity. 

8.9.2. The USACE FUDS Handbook on Realignment, Delineation, and MRS 

Prioritization Protocol Implementation (2011) provides guidance on realignment and delineation 

procedures, as well as MRSPP implementation. While the handbook’s applicability is for FUDS 

projects, the guidance outlined within it may be extended to non-FUDS projects. For example, 

the rationale for MRS delineation may be based on anticipated response action for the MRS 

regardless of whether or not the MRS falls within the FUDS program. 
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CHAPTER 9

Planning Strategies for Remedial or Removal Actions 

1

9.1. Introduction. 

9.1.1. Planning for MR actions requires that a strategy be developed to efficiently and 

effectively meet project needs. Developing the strategy is a collaborative effort of all PDT 

members. The strategy should define the goals and RAOs of the actions as well as the means 

(i.e. processes and technologies) to accomplish the goals and RAOs. Examples of RAOs for MR 

actions are: 1) “...based on the RI findings, UXO has been confirmed to a depth of 3 feet below 

ground surface. The RAO is to reduce the potential for human interaction with UXO during 

recreational activities which currently include surface use and subsurface use to a depth of 1 

foot”; 2) “...prevent human ingestion of groundwater with lead concentration exceeding 15 parts 

per billion...” 

9.1.2. The primary methods for accomplishing MR actions include mass excavation and 

sifting of soil to remove munitions from the MRS, geophysical investigations followed by 

intrusive investigation to remove the source of anomalies, or some combination of the two. The 

processes used for response actions that use geophysical investigations are very similar to those 

used for characterization, but the critical goals and needs are specific to detecting and removing 

UXO and DMM or just removing UXO and DMM (in the case of mass excavation and sifting 

operations). The project decisions for MR actions are focused on clearly demonstrating those 

goals and needs were met. 

9.1.3. This chapter focuses on planning strategies for geophysical and mass excavation 

planning strategies for MR actions. These discussions include site preparation considerations 

(e.g., vegetation removal, surface removal) and anomaly classification strategies. If new or 

innovative technologies or robotic technologies are used for a MR action, the PDT also must 

consider whether there are additional planning considerations that are specific to the 

implementation of these technologies that are not already contained herein. When considering 

new technologies, the PDT must determine the goals and objectives for the MR action as well as 

the best methods to obtain and verify that these objectives were met. PDTs can use the 

additional guidance found in the below documents to plan remedial or removal action. These 

guidance documents are mentioned to augment this guidance not to replace or to supersede the 

guidance that is presented herein. 

9.1.3.1. Survey of Munitions Response Technologies (SERDP/ESTCP/ITRC, 2006) 

provides a general survey on site preparation, geophysical, and excavation and removal 

technologies and can be downloaded from http://www.itrcweb.org/GuidanceDocuments/UXO4.pdf. In specific, Chapter 2 discusses vegetation and surface removal technologies; Chapter 3

discusses geophysical detection and positioning technologies; Chapter 9 reviews removal 

technologies; and Chapter 10 discusses detonation and decontamination technologies. 

9.1.3.2. Quality Considerations for Munitions Response Projects (ITRC, 2008) provides a 

general overview of factors that PDTs should consider as a part of their QC program and can be 
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downloaded from http://www.itrcweb.org/guidancedocument.asp?TID=19. Although the 

document focuses on QC considerations, Chapter 3 contains key planning considerations for 

vegetation removal, surface removal, geophysical investigations, anomaly resolution, and 

verification sampling.

9.2. Geophysical Planning Strategies for Remedial or Removal Actions. 

9.2.1. Introduction. 

9.2.1.1. Planning geophysical investigations for MR actions requires an investigation 

strategy be developed to efficiently and effectively meet project needs. Developing the 

investigation strategy is a collaborative effort of all PDT members. The strategy defines which 

geophysical system or combinations of systems are needed to meet project needs and objectives 

and how the systems are intended to be used to meet those needs and objectives. Geophysics 

used for response actions is very similar to that used for characterization, but the critical goals and 

needs are specific to detecting and removing UXO and DMM and project decisions are focused 

on clearly demonstrating those goals and needs have been met. 

9.2.1.2. While RAs and removal actions may be performed using either analog or DGM 

methods, studies have shown that analog geophysical methods underperform DGM methods on 

standardized test sites and have a greater number of false alarms (SERDP/ESTCP/ITRC, 2006). 

If the PDT decides to use analog methods, there is a greater likelihood that UXO and DMM will 

be left behind at a higher rate than DGM methods. A key advantage of DGM methods over 

analog geophysical methods is that DGM can show 100% performance, which can’t be shown for 

analog methods. A DGM system performing at 100% means that, through a rigorous QC 

program (including instrument functionality checks and blind seeding in production areas), the 

PDT can show that the digital geophysical system operated as intended and detected all munitions 

within the anomaly selection criteria. Because analog methods can’t show 100% performance, 

there is a greater likelihood that UXO is left behind on an MRS after an analog RA than there is 

with an RA that uses DGM methods. 

9.2.1.3. The likelihood that a dig team has positively resolved (i.e., removed the metallic 

source of an anomaly) for all the detected anomalies using traditional mag-and-flag or 

DGM/intrusive methods isn’t 100% (i.e., dig teams don’t typically clear all holes). If a PDT uses 

the classification process to determine anomalies that don’t require excavation, there is also a 

possibility that one to several UXO are left undug due to misclassification. However, there are at 

least a couple reasons why the classification process failure rate is less than with the more 

traditional mag-and-dig or DGM process. First, the classification process provides the dig team 

with a better dataset, which includes the likely item type and depth at which the item is located, 

that the dig team can use as a guide to determine when the anomaly source has been positively 

resolved. Second, the classification dig list requires a smaller number of targets be investigated 

and the dig team is only digging TOIs; therefore, the UXO team does not become fatigued from 

digging significant quantities of non-TOIs. Although one or a few UXO may be left behind due 

to misclassification, this can be minimized through a rigorous QC process. In addition, it should 

be noted that MRSs typically have very few UXO relative to the total number of anomalies, and 
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the classification process removes the TOIs where there is more likely to be interaction with 

receptors.

9.2.2. Specify Response Goals and Needs to be Addressed by Geophysical 

Investigations. Key elements of the response objectives must be specified before undertaking 

geophysical planning because significant cost savings can be achieved by tailoring the 

geophysical investigation plan to the response needs. The following are the most critical issues 

that affect geophysical investigation planning for RAs or removal actions. 

9.2.2.1. Considerations for Both DGM and Analog Systems. 

9.2.2.1.1. Based on the Decision Document or Record of Decision, what are the projectspecific TOI present and depths they must be recovered to? List all items and their expected 

detection depths (see Section 6.6.2.4 on using response curves for detection capabilities). 

9.2.2.1.2. Of the geophysical systems capable of detecting project-specific TOI, what is 

the effectiveness of each, and how easy or difficult is it to prove or demonstrate that 

effectiveness?

9.2.2.1.3. Will high-precision position reporting suffice for project needs or will 

geophysical data require high-accuracy position reporting as well? 

• Measurement positions must be reported with high precisions. High accuracies are not 

required because reacquisition procedures are not affected by coordinate accuracy. 

• Measurement positions must be reported with high accuracies to support the 

reacquisition procedures being used. 

9.2.2.1.4. Will the project schedule support a multiphase field effort (e.g., DGM mapping 

followed by anomaly classification and intrusive investigation)? 

• Yes, a multiphase approach is supported so that digging resources can be tailored to 

maximize efficiency.

• No, all work must be performed concurrently to minimize disruption to the community. 

• No, all required work is clearly defined and planned, and no efficiencies will be gained 

through a phased approach. 

9.2.2.1.5. Will reacquisition procedures be affected by the passage of time after data 

collection?

• No. Digging will occur soon after data collection, and reacquisition will be performed 

before temporary survey markers are lost or removed. 

• No. Digging will occur at some later time, and reacquisition procedures will not 

require recovery of survey markers used to collect geophysical data.
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• Yes. Digging will occur at some later time, and reacquisition procedures require 

recovery of low-order accuracy survey markers used to collect geophysical data.

9.2.2.1.6. What are the vegetation conditions and are there constraints on vegetation 

removal (e.g., cost, habitat, endangered species)?

• Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. Some response objectives may not be 

met due to these constraints. 

• Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. All response objectives must be met 

regardless of vegetation constraints or costs. 

• Vegetation removal is not constrained but is costly. Some response objectives may not 

be met due to these constraints. 

9.2.2.1.7. What are the cultural and/or access constraints?

• Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates; some response 

objectives may not be met due to these constraints. 

• Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates. All response 

objectives must be met regardless of cultural and/or access constraints or costs.

9.2.2.2. Considerations for Digital Geophysical Systems. 

9.2.2.2.1. Is the sensor that will be used for the remedial action well characterized?

• Yes. The sensor response curves will be used to determine an anomaly selection 

threshold, and the GSV process, including the IVS and blind seeding within the production area, 

will be used throughout the remedial action to verify sensor performance. 

• No, but sensor response curves can be calculated. After sensor response curves for the 

instrument have been calculated, the GSV process will be used throughout the remedial action to 

verify sensor performance.

• No, and sensor response curves can’t be calculated to determine the anomaly response 

characteristics. The geophysical instrument will be tested in a GPO to determine the site-specific 

detection capabilities of the instrument. In addition, an IVS will be used to demonstrate 

instrument functionality on a daily basis, and the production area will be blind seeded to ensure 

sensor performance throughout the remedial action. 

9.2.2.2.2. For well-characterized sensors, will the anomaly selection criteria be based 

upon detecting all munitions to a specific depth or removing all detectable munitions? 

• If all munitions must be removed to a specific depth, the anomaly selection criteria are 

based on the sensor response of the most conservative munition in its least favorable orientation.
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• If all detectable munitions must be removed, then the anomaly selection criteria are 

based on the intersection of a multiple of the background RMS noise (typically five to seven 

times the RMS noise level) and the sensor response curve for the most conservative munition in 

its least favorable orientation.

9.2.2.2.3. How will anomaly classification be implemented?

• The classification process will be defined up front and then applied globally to the 

remainder of the project site.

• The classification process will be defined up front and then tested on small subsets of 

anomalies periodically throughout the project’s duration. 

9.2.2.2.4. If anomaly classification is being applied at the site, how critical is it that ISOs 

be treated as TOIs?

• If all ISOs must be removed from the site because they have similar shapes, sizes, and 

responses to standard munitions, then the ISOs should be considered TOIs and performance 

metrics established for the anomaly classifier should include the removal of all ISOs.

• If ISOs may be treated as clutter, the anomaly classifier does not need to be tailored to 

include all potential ISOs as TOIs. The classification process must still properly classify ISOs in 

order to show, as part of the QC process or classification verification process, that the classifier 

is functioning properly. 

9.2.2.2.5. How critical is it to achieve a 90% confidence level that there is less than 1% 

unresolved anomalies remaining after intrusive investigation and post-dig anomaly resolution 

sampling?

• If a lesser confidence level and/or greater percent unresolved anomalies is acceptable, 

sample IAW Table 6-6 for the confidence level and percent unresolved anomalies values 

specified for the project.

• If this confidence level and percent unresolved anomalies are acceptable, perform postdig anomaly resolution sampling IAW Table 6-6. 

• If a greater confidence level is required, sample IAW Table 6-6 for the confidence 

levels and percent unresolved anomalies values specified for the project.

9.2.2.3. Considerations for Analog Geophysical Systems. How critical is it to achieve a 

90% confidence level that there is less than 1% unresolved anomalies remaining after intrusive 

investigation and post-dig anomaly resolution sampling? 

• If a lesser confidence level and/or greater percent unresolved anomalies is acceptable, 

sample IAW Table 6-6 for the confidence level and percent unresolved anomalies values 

specified for the project.
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-6 

• If this confidence level and percent unresolved anomalies are acceptable, perform postdig anomaly resolution sampling IAW Table 6-6. 

• If a greater confidence level is required, sample IAW Table 6-6 for the confidence 

levels and percent unresolved anomalies values specified for the project. Specify the Removal 

Decision Exit Strategy.

9.2.3. Geophysical Decision Logic Strategies. 

9.2.3.1. Strategies should be centered on exactly how much data are needed to support the 

decision that the removal is complete. 

9.2.3.2. The PDT must decide what findings constitute delineating an area as complete. A 

combination of statistical tools, geophysical anomaly patterns, excavation results, and QC testing 

results should be factored into the decision logic. The decision logic should include all 

reasonable sources of evidence, and the PDT must determine which are basic, optimal, and 

excessive sources of evidence. The sources of information the PDT should use include, but are 

not limited to, the following:

a. Dig results for all anomalies selected for excavation

b. Distribution patterns of recovered TOIs from throughout the site 

c. Detection depth capabilities for each TOI

d. Deepest depth from which each TOI type was recovered

e. Depth requirement 

f. Numbers of non-TOI anomalies investigated and their dig results

g. Geophysical anomaly densities (e.g., anomalies per acre)

h. Visual observations 

i. QC results

j. Findings from post-removal verification of anomaly locations and dig results 

k. Findings from post-removal verification using mapping techniques 

l. Previous work performed in the project area 

9.2.4. Decision Diagrams. 

9.2.4.1. Once all sources of information are defined, the PDT then must identify the 

assumptions for each source used, and this information must be conveyed to all team members. 

One tool for conveying this information is a decision diagram. 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15

9-7 

9.2.4.2. Figures 9-1 and 9-2, respectively, show example RA decision logic diagrams for 

DGM and analog removal actions. These diagrams present simplified decision logics that use 

geophysical anomaly characteristics, dig results, QC results, and QASP results to explain how 

decisions will be derived to declare areas cleared of detectable MEC hazards. See Chapter 6 for 

further details on anomaly detection, selection, and classification and Chapter 11 for further 

details on QA/QC and corrective action measures.

Figure 9-1: Example DGM Removal Decision Logic

Project Description

1 Project area is 100 acres

2 Access unimpeded, close to 100% mapping is

achievable.

3 Vegetation does not impede project needs/objectives.

4 Decision Document requires removal of all TOI

hazards to 3’ bgs. TOI types and their depths are well 

defined from previous site-specific work.

5 The project area is divided into 10 acre sub-sectors

for purposes of product delivery and progress payments.

Assumptions

1 Site is easy to access, brush clearing is allowed and 

unrestricted.

2 DGM will be used to detect all anomalies.

3 Concentrated metal contamination around target area

will be removed prior to DGM.

4 Advanced EMI sensor will be used for anomaly

classification of identified targets. Targets will

be classified as likely TOI (Cat. 1), can’t determine

if target is TOI or clutter (Cat. 2), unknown (Cat. 3), 

or target likely clutter (Cat. 4).

5 All anomalies within Categories 1-3 will be

intrusively investigated to confirm the anomaly 

classification. Additional types of TOI are 

not anticipated. 

6 QC and QA will include verifying all anomalies 

having TOI characteristics are placed on dig lists and 

checking excavated locations for 90% or more 

reduction in signal. Post-dig verification sampling 

will be conducted in accordance with Table 6-5 of 

EM 200-1-15.

7 All performance metrics listed on Table 11-5 of EM 

200-1-15 will be achieved.

List of MEC

Deepest 

Known 

(inches)

Deepest 

Estimated 

(inches)

Deepest 

Detectable 

Depth at 

Worst 

Orientation 

(inches)

57mm 12 12 25

75mm 17 17 36

155mm 27 27 50

Anomaly Characteristics Decision Logic

Anomaly 

Category Anomaly Characteristic Dig 

Decision

Category 

1

Classification algorithm can analyze 

anomaly characteristics - target likely 

MEC.

Dig all 

anomalies

Category 

2

Classification algorithm can analyze, but 

can't determine whether target is MEC 

or clutter

Dig all 

anomalies

Category 

3

Classification algorithm can't analyze 

anomaly characteristics (e.g., low SNR, 

overlapping signals)

Dig all 

anomalies

Category 

4

Classification algorithm can analyze 

anomaly characteristics - target likely 

clutter.

Do not dig

Example DGM Removal Decision Logic
EM 200-1-15 

30 OFW15 

9-8 

Figure 9-2: Example DGM Removal Decision Logic Diagram 

Example DGM Removal Decision Logic Diagram
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-9 

Example Analog Geophysical Removal Decision Logic

Project Description

1. Project area is 100 acres.

2. Access unimpeded, close to 100% mapping is

achievable.

3. Vegetation does not impede project needs/objectives.

4. Decision Document requires removal of all MEC

hazards to 3’ bgs. TOI types and their depths are well

defined from previous site-specific work.

5. The project area is divided into 10 acre sub-sectors for

purpose of product delivery and progress payments.

Assumptions

1. Site is easy to access, brush clearing is allowed and

unrestricted.

2. An analog mag and dig approach will be used to detect

and remove all anomalies.

3. All detected anomalies will be excavated.

4. QC and QA will verify all detectable anomalies are

flagged for excavation.

5. Post-dig verification sampling will be conducted in

accordance with Table 6-5 of EM 200-1-15.

6. All RA performance metrics listed on Table 11-6 of

EM 200-1-15 will be achieved

Figure 9-3: Example Analog Geophysical Removal Decision Logic 

9.3. Mass Excavation Planning Strategies for Remedial or Removal Actions. 

9.3.1. Introduction. 

9.3.1.1. Planning mass excavations for MR actions requires a strategy be developed to 

efficiently and effectively meet project needs. Developing the strategy is a collaborative effort of 

all PDT members. The strategy defines which excavation system or combinations of systems are 

needed to meet project needs and objectives and how the systems are intended to be used to meet 

those needs and objectives. Mass excavation is not likely to occur during other phases of an 

MMRP project (e.g., RI); therefore, the critical goals and needs are specific to removing UXO

and DMM and project decisions are focused on clearly demonstrating those goals and needs have 

been met.

9.3.1.2. Maintaining site worker safety is a critical component of all MR actions but is 

especially important during mass excavation removal and remedial actions due to the use of 

heavy machinery to excavate UXO. The PDT should evaluate key factors, such as armoring 

excavators, using physical barriers between site workers and the active excavation, and using 

robotics to allow site workers to remain at a safe distance from excavation activities. Technical 

guidance on excavators is discussed in Section 9.1 and UXO safety procedures are discussed in 

EM 385-1-97. 

List of MEC

Deepest

Known

(inches)

Deepest

Estimated

(inches)

Deepest

Detectable

Depth at

Worst

Orientation

(inches)

57mm 12 12 20

75mm 17 17 31

155mm 27 27 42
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-10 

Figure 9-4: Example Analog Geophysical Removal Decision Logic Diagram 

Did any QASP 

inspection reveal 

deficiencies in 

workmanship?

Were all anomalies

resolved 

unambiguously (e.g., 

false positives were 

confirmed)?

Resolve all

ambiguous dig results.

Resolve all 

outstanding QC 

problems and/or 

corrective actions.

Example Removal Decision Logic Diagram

Example Analog Removal Decision Logic (continued)

Review RootCause-Analysis

and Corrective 

Actions for 

completeness.

Did QA surveillance activities find 

any indication of deficiencies in 

workmanship which may cause 

concerns that quality failures are 

occurring but have not been detected 

by inspections? Is sufficient evidence produced to

conclude risk is reduced to the 

project agreed level?

Resolve outstanding quality 

deficiencies.

Declare

Production Unit 

cleared of 

detectable MEC 

hazards.

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Were all QC tests performed 

and all root-cause-analyses and 

corrective actions performed to 

project requirements?

Example Analog Geophysical Removal Decision Logic Diagram
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-11 

9.3.2. Specify Response Goals and Needs to be Addressed by Mass Excavation. 

9.3.2.1. Key elements of the response objectives must be specified before undertaking 

mass excavation planning because significant cost savings can be achieved by tailoring the MR 

action plan to the response needs. The following are the most critical issues that affect mass 

excavation planning for RAs or removal actions. 

9.3.2.1.1. Based on the Decision Document or Record of Decision, what are the projectspecific UXO or DMM present and depths they must be recovered to? List all items and their 

expected penetration depths.

9.3.2.1.2. Of the mass excavation systems capable of removing and screening projectspecific UXO, what is the effectiveness of each, and how easy or difficult is it to prove or 

demonstrate that effectiveness?

9.3.2.1.3. Will the project schedule support a multiphase field effort (e.g., excavation 

followed by sifting operations)? 

• Yes, a multiphase approach is supported so that excavation resources can be tailored to

maximize efficiency.

• No, all work must be performed concurrently to minimize disruption to the community.

• No, all required work is clearly defined and planned, and no efficiencies will be gained

through a phased approach. 

9.3.2.1.4. What are the vegetation conditions and are there constraints on vegetation 

removal (e.g., cost, habitat, endangered species)? 

• Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. Some response objectives may not be

met due to these constraints. 

• Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. All response objectives must be met

regardless of vegetation constraints or costs. 

• Vegetation removal is not constrained but is costly. Some response objectives may not

be met due to these constraints. 

9.3.2.1.5. What are the cultural and/or access constraints?

• Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates; some response

objectives may not be met due to these constraints. 

• Cultural and/or access constraints will not impede production rates. All response

objectives must be met regardless of cultural and/or access constraints or costs.

9.3.2.1.6. Are there areas within the MRS where the terrain is inaccessible to the 

excavation equipment? 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-12 

• No. Excavation will occur across the entire MRS.

• Yes. DGM or analog geophysical investigations will be performed in the areas that are 

inaccessible to the excavators.

9.3.2.1.7. Will the soil type (e.g., clay) affect the ability of the screen to segregate clumps 

of soil from metallic debris? 

• Yes. The type of soil will result in significant quantities of clumped soil, which will 

decrease the effectiveness of the sifting operation in segregating soil from metallic debris. 

Shakers and/or multiple screens will be used to minimize the effect on the effectiveness of the 

sifting operation. 

• No. Soil type will not have a significant effect on the production rate of the sifting 

operations. 

9.3.2.1.8. How will the completeness of the excavation be determined? 

• If the MRS must be clear of all UXO or DMM, perform post-excavation DGM 

surveying and excavation to verify there are no geophysical anomalies below the excavation.

• If mass excavation is to a specific depth, verify that the required depth of excavation 

has been achieved. 

9.3.2.1.9. How will the required excavation goals be verified in the field? 

• If the project requires all UXO or DMM be removed from the site, perform postexcavation DGM verification surveying to confirm that there are no anomalies below the total 

depth of the excavation. If anomalies exist, either perform further mass excavation or have UXO 

technicians excavate anomalies using hand tools. 

• If the project requires the excavation be performed to a specific depth, topographic 

surveying of the ground surface prior to excavation and after the excavation has reached the 

targeted depth will verify that the total depth has been met. Post-excavation DGM verification 

surveying also may be conducted to determine where anomalies exist below the required 

excavation depth. 

9.3.3. Strategies Should Be Centered on Exactly How Much Data Are Needed to 

Support the Decision that the Removal Is Complete. 

9.3.3.1. The PDT must decide what findings will constitute delineating an area as 

complete. A combination of the amount of excavated soils, process descriptions, excavation 

results, and QC testing results should be factored into the decision logic. The decision logic 

should include all reasonable sources of evidence, and the PDT must determine which are basic, 

optimal, and excessive sources of evidence. The sources of information the PDT should use 

include, but are not limited to, the following: 

a. Excavation results for all areas selected for excavation
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-13 

b. Distribution patterns of recovered TOI from throughout the site 

c. Deepest depth from which each TOI type was recovered

d. Depth requirement 

e. Amount of recovered non-TOI identified during the excavation 

f. Distribution of TOI densities (e.g., TOI per acre)

g. Visual observations 

h. QC results

i. Findings from post-removal verification DGM surveys (if performed) 

j. Findings from excavation of anomalies identified in post-removal DGM verification 

surveys 

k. Previous work performed in the project area

9.3.3.2. Once all sources of information are defined, the PDT then must identify the 

assumptions for each source used, and this information must be conveyed to all team members. 

One tool for conveying this information is a decision diagram. Figure 9-3 shows an example RA 

decision logic diagrams for mass excavation removal actions. This diagram presents simplified 

decision logics that use mass excavation and QASP results to explain how decisions will be 

derived to declare areas cleared of MEC hazards. 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-14 

Figure 9-5: Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic 

Project Description

1 Project area is 100 acres.

2 Access unimpeded, close to 100% evacuation is 

achievable.

3 Vegetation does not impede project needs/objectives.

4 Decision Document requires removal of all TOI

Hazards to 3’ bgs. TOI types and their depths are

well defined from previous site-specific work.

5 The project area is divided into 1 acre sub-sectors

for purposes of product delivery and progress 

payments.

Assumptions

List of MEC

Deepest 

Known 

(inches)

Deepest 

Estimated 

(inches)

57mm 12 12

75mm 17 17

155mm 27 27

Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic

1 Site is easy to access, brush clearing is allowed and

unrestricted.

2 Detector assisted surface removals will occur prior to 

excavation.

3 An excavator will be used to remove soil in 1-ft lifts.

Soil will be taken to a staging area to be processed 

following established MEC recovery SOPs.

4 Topographic surveys are conducted before and after

the excavation to verify that the excavation has reached

the target depth of 3 ft bgs.

5 QC and QA will verify all metallic fragments have been 

removed from the soil and that the target depth of 3 ft bgs 

 has been reached.

6 Post-excavation DM surveying will identify 

 geophysical anomalies remaining in the ground, but 

 will not be excavated if the target depth has been 

 reached.
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

9-15 

Figure 9-6: Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic Diagram

Did any QASP 

inspections reveal 

deficiencies in 

workmanship?

Was the soil removed 

to the target depth?

Continue excavating 

until the target depth

is reached.

Were all QC tests performed and 

all root-cause-analyses and 

corrective actions performed to 

project requirements?

Resolve all 

outstanding QC 

problems and/or 

corrective actions.

Example Removal Decision Logic Diagram

Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic (continued)

Review RootCause-Analysis 

and Corrective 

Actions for 

completeness.

Did QA surveillance activities find

any indication of deficiencies in 

workmanship which may cause 

concerns that quality failures are 

occurring but have not been detected

by inspections? Is sufficient evidence produced to 

conclude risk is reduced to the 

project agreed level?

Resolve outstanding quality deficiencies.

Declare

Production Unit 

cleared of MEC 

hazards.

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Example Mass Excavation Removal Decision Logic Diagram
EM 200-1-15 

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9-16 

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

10-1 

CHAPTER 10

Munitions Constituents Planning Considerations for 

Remedial or Removal Actions 

1

10.1. Introduction. 

10.1.1. Planning considerations for MC RAs or removal actions at MRSs are dependent 

on the medium that is to be addressed (typically soil and/or groundwater), as well as the 

technologies employed for remediation or removal. The technologies used for MRS RAs or 

removal actions are very similar to those developed for use at HTRW sites. 

10.1.2. This chapter provides an overview of the technologies applicable to soil and 

groundwater at various types of MRSs and discusses key considerations for the application of 

these technologies at MRSs. The PDT is encouraged to explore the following Web sites for 

guidance on applicability and implementation of various treatment technologies: 

a. Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable 

http://www.frtr.gov/matrix2/top_page.html

b. USEPA 

c. Contaminated Site Cleanup Information http://www.clu-in.org/techfocus/

10.2. Regulatory Considerations. 

10.2.1. MC can be subject to various environmental laws; thus, the regulatory status of 

MC must be considered during the planning process. 

10.2.2. ARARs must be identified for removal and remedial actions because they affect 

the decision making process. For example, under RCRA, actions involving hazardous waste 

may require selection of treatment technologies capable of meeting land disposal restriction 

treatment standards; treatment residues constituting solid waste may be subject to solid waste 

disposal standards; and certain metals may qualify for an exclusion from RCRA if properly 

recycled. 

10.3. Small Arms Range Cleanup. 

10.3.1. MC encountered at SARs are primarily metals-lead, antimony, copper, zinc, and 

arsenic—that leach from bullets, bullet jackets, bullet fragments, and shotgun pellets. PAHs that 

leach from clay targets also may be present at skeet and trap ranges. At rifle and pistol ranges, 

most training is done with fixed or stationary targets positioned in front of a soil berm. This soil 

berm typically receives a heavy accumulation of lead and may fail standard leachability tests, 

such as the RCRA TCLP and the Synthetic Precipitation Leaching Procedure. Remediation of 

these ranges involves a relatively small volume of soil that is heavily contaminated. Shotgun 

ranges (i.e., skeet and trap ranges), on the other hand, typically have widely dispersed lead 

particles. Remediation of these ranges involves large soil volumes with relatively low particulate 

lead concentrations. Prior to conducting remediation at SARs, review of the following 

publications is recommended. 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

10-2 

a. U.S. Army Environmental Command (USAEC) software/documentation for SARs,

available through USAEC: 

b. “REST” (Range Evaluation Software Tool)

c. “ASAP” (Army Sampling and Analysis Plan)

d. ITRC Guidance: Characterization and Remediation of Soils at Closed Small Arms

Firing Ranges http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/SMART-1.pdf

e. Treatment and Management of Closed or Inactive Small Arms Firing Ranges (ERDC /

EL TR-07-06) http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel07-6.pdf

f. USEPA Region 2 Guidance: Best Management Practices for Lead at Outdoor Shooting

Ranges http://www.epa.gov/region02/waste/leadshot/

g. USEPA Technical Review Workgroup (TRW) Recommendations for Performing

Human Health Risk Analysis on Small Arms Shooting Ranges (OSWER #9285.7-37) 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/lead/products/firing.pdf

Figure 10-1: SAR Treatment Train Decision Tree

Source: Michael Warminsky, “Adapting Remedial Technologies to Meet Site-Specific Risk-Based Cleanup Goals, A Case Study 

of the MCA/GCC 29 Palms Range Soil Remediation Project,” from Appendix A of Characterization and Remediation of Soils at 

Closed Small Arms Firing Ranges, Technical/Regulatory Guidelines, ITRC 2003 Characterization and Remediation of Soils at 

Closed Small Arms Firing Ranges, available at http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/SMART-1.pdf.

10.3.2. Considerations for selecting treatment options at SARs include volume of 

impacted media, characteristics of the impacted media (e.g., contaminant concentrations, soil 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

10-3 

type, and depth of contaminated media), costs, length of time allowed for remediation, and posttreatment site use considerations. Figure 10-1 shows a sample treatment train decision tree for 

SARs. The technologies listed on the decision tree are described below.

10.3.3. In addition to characterizing the nature and extent of MC and PAH 

contamination, the following parameters commonly are recommended to support the selection 

and design of soil treatment at SARs: 

a. Grain-size distribution of soil 

b. Clay content 

c. Organic content

d. Soil pH 

e. Contaminant form 

f. Contaminant distribution versus grain-size

10.3.4. Currently available soil treatment technologies are discussed in the following 

sections.

10.3.4.1. Soil Screening. Soil screening may be performed to remove bullets, lead slugs, 

and metal fragments, particularly from berm soil. The screening process involves an initial 

screening to remove large debris, and then a second, smaller screen is used to remove lead 

fragments. Screening does not remove the lead attached to fine soil particles and also may not 

reduce the lead levels below TCLP criteria. Once the lead fragments have been removed, they 

may be sent to a smelter for recycling. Under 40 CFR 261.6(a)(3)(ii) and 40 CFR 261.4(a)(13), 

recycled lead is not subject to the requirements for generators, transporters, and storage facilities 

of hazardous wastes. Therefore, the scrap metal reclaimed from a SAR does not need to be 

regulated or manifested as a hazardous waste during generation or transport to a smelter for 

recycling. However, transport of this material may require a bill of lading IAW Title 49 CFR 

Subchapter C DOT hazardous materials regulations. Screened soil may qualify for reuse on site 

with the SAR; however, restrictions may apply to soil regulated as hazardous waste (i.e., soil that 

exceeds TCLP criteria). 

10.3.4.2. Excavation and Disposal. Excavation and disposal (also termed (dig and 

haul”) may be a cost effective approach for small volumes of soil. Before this approach is 

selected, the PDT must confirm whether the soil would be classified as a RCRA hazardous by 

testing appropriate constituents using the TCLP method and applying the contained-in rule. The 

soil would be classified as a RCRA hazardous if the TCLP result exceeds 5.0 milligrams per liter 

(mg/L) for lead or 5.0 mg/L for arsenic or fails TCLP for any other constituents listed in 40 CFR 

261.24 and must be managed as a hazardous waste. If the soil contains lead or other constituents 

below the TCLP levels, it may still be regulated as a hazardous substance and must be disposed of 

IAW federal and state regulations. The PDT should consider technologies to reduce the volume 

of soil requiring off-site disposal (e.g., soil screening and soil washing). 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

10-4 

10.3.4.3. Soil Washing. Soil washing is primarily a particle separation process. Soil 

washing classifies soil fractions by both size and density. Particle size separation is performed 

via sequential screening steps. Wet screening generally is more effective than dry screening; 

however, for sandy soil, dry processing may be feasible and typically offers cost savings over wet 

screening. Sand screws and/or hydrocyclones are used to classify the soil through segregation of 

the contaminant-bearing fractions (i.e., fine fractions) from the cleaner sand and gravel fractions. 

Gravity separation then is used to remove heavy, metal particles from same-size but lighter 

sand/gravel particles. After soil washing or dry screening to remove bullet fragments, follow-on 

treatment (e.g., soil stabilization) may be necessary to achieve acceptable metals levels to allow 

the soil to be shipped to a nonhazardous waste landfill. The particulate lead that is separated from 

the soil may be sent to a smelter for recycling, as described in Section 10.3.4.1. Soil washing is 

most effective for sandy soil and is more difficult for soil with high silt and/or clay content. It 

may be performed in a relatively short timeframe. Costs for soil washing range from $30/ton to 

$80/ton. Guidance for implementing soil washing may be found in these publications: 

• Final Implementation Guidance Handbook: Physical Separation and Acid Leaching to 

Process Small-Arms Range Soils. 1997. NTIS: ADA341141. https://www.cluin.org/techfocus/default.focus/sec/Soil_Washing/cat/Guidance/

• Innovative Site Remediation Technologies: Design and Application, Vol. 3: Liquid 

Extraction Technologies Soil Washing, Soil Flushing, Solvent/Chemical. 1998. M.J. Mann, et 

al. American Academy of Environmental Engineers, Annapolis, MD. ISBN: 1-883767-19-9. 

http://clu-in.org/download/contaminantfocus/dnapl/treatment_technologies/soil-washing-soilflushing.pdf

• Soil Washing Through Separation/Solubilization: Guide Specification for Construction. 

2010. USACE. UFGS-02 54 23 

• Technical and Regulatory Guidelines for Soil Washing. 1997. ITRC Metals in Soils 

Team. http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/MIS-1.pdf

10.3.4.4. Solidification/Stabilization. The goal of solidification and stabilization 

techniques is to reduce the leachability of metals in soil so that the soil will not be classified as a 

RCRA hazardous waste. Solidification refers to a process that binds a contaminated media with a 

reagent, changing its physical properties. Stabilization refers to the process that involves a 

chemical reaction that reduces the leachability of contaminants within a material. 

Solidification/stabilization treatment typically involves mixing a binding agent into the 

contaminated media. This may be done in situ, by injecting the binder agent into the 

contaminated media, or ex situ, by excavating the contaminated media and machine mixing them 

with the agent. Ex situ mixing, typically using pug mills, allows for more uniform mixing and 

better contact between amendment and contaminant. Common types of solidifying/stabilizing 

agents include Portland cement, gypsum, modified sulfur cement, and grout. A bench-scale study 

typically is performed to determine a dosage rate and reagent mixture that meets the project 

performance standards. Post-treatment performance verification, typically including TCLP 

testing, is required at a frequency that optimally should match the daily operation throughput of 

the selected technology. Costs for solidification/stabilization range from $125/cubic yard (cy) to 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

10-5 

$185/cy for small-scale systems (less than 1000 cy) and from $70/cy to $145/cy for larger-scale 

systems (approximately 50,000 cy) (USEPA, 2009). Guidance for implementing 

solidification/stabilization may be found in these publications:

• Technology Performance Review: Selecting and Using Solidification/Stabilization 

Treatment for Site Remediation. 2009. EPA 600-R-09-148 

http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/pubs/600r09148.html 

• Solidification/Stabilization Resource Guide. 1999. EPA 542-B-99-002 

http://www.clu-in.org/download/remed/solidstab.pdf

• Recent Developments for In Situ Treatment of Metal Contaminated Soils. 1997. EPA 

542-R-97-004. http://www.clu-in.org/download/remed/metals2.pdf

10.3.4.5. Chemical Extraction. Chemical extraction involves the use of an acid solution 

to leach lead from contaminated soil after the bullets and bullet fragments have been removed via 

screening. Hydrochloric acid is used most often for chemical leaching and has been shown to be 

more effective than acetic acid. 

10.3.4.5.1. Chemical treatment is a continuous process with the following steps: 

• Acid and soil are mixed together in a leach tank.

• The leached soil is separated from the spent leachant.

• The spent leachant is regenerated by precipitating the dissolved metals. 

10.3.4.5.2. Chemical extraction may be combined with soil washing. Treated soil may 

be disposed of onsite if applicable ARARs are met. The metals recovered from the leachant 

solution may be recovered by a recycling facility. Guidance for implementing chemical 

extraction may be found in the following publication: Final Implementation Guidance 

Handbook: Physical Separation and Acid Leaching to Process Small-Arms Range Soils. 1997. 

NTIS: ADA341141 (http://clu-in.org/techfocus/default.focus/sec/Soil_Washing/cat/Guidance/) 

10.4. Energetics and Perchlorate Treatment Considerations. 

10.4.1. Soil Treatment. A variety of technologies is available to treat energetic 

compounds and perchlorate in soil. The selection of an appropriate technology is guided by the 

RAOs for soil and by the MRS characteristics. The discussion below focuses on technologies 

that have been used at full-scale sites to treat energetics and/or perchlorate.

10.4.1.1. In Situ Biological Treatment. In situ biological treatment technologies include 

gaseous amendment injection for vadose zone bioremediation and phytoremediation. 

10.4.1.1.1. Gaseous amendment injection involves the addition of a gas mixture to the 

vadose zone soil to displace oxygen and to produce conditions suitable for anaerobic bacteria to 

treat the target contaminant(s). Gas mixtures may include nitrogen, hydrogen, and hydrocarbon-
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containing gas (e.g., propane, natural gas). Gaseous amendment injection is not feasible for 

surface soils unless there is an impermeable cover to prevent atmospheric oxygen from seeping 

into the treatment area. Gaseous amendment injection has been demonstrated for perchlorate 

treatment under an ESTCP grant (Evans, 2010). This technology also has been demonstrated for 

RDX treatment at the DOE’s Pantex facility (Rainwater et al., 2002). Information regarding 

these studies may be found in the following references: 

• Evans, P.J. 2010. In Situ Bioremediation of Perchlorate and Nitrate in Vadose Zone 

Soil Using Gaseous Electron Donor Injection Technology (GEDIT). ESTCP Project ER-0511, 

Final Report. http://clu-in.org/download/contaminantfocus/perchlorate/ER-0511-FR-1.pdf. 

• Rainwater, K., C. Heintz, T. Mollhagen, and L. Hansen. 2002. In Situ Biodegradation 

of High Explosives in Soils: Field Demonstration. Bioremediation Journal 6(4):351-371. 

10.4.1.1.2. Phytoremediation uses plants to remediate various media impacted with 

different types of contaminants. While phytoremediation typically is applied in situ, hydroponics 

allows for ex-situ application. Phytoremediation may occur via a number of plant processes, 

termed phytotechnologies. These phytotechnologies include the following mechanisms: 

• Phytosequestration – The ability of the plant to sequester certain contaminants in the 

rhizosphere through exudation of phytochemicals and on the root through transport proteins and 

cellular processes. 

• Rhizodegradation – The ability of the plant to exude phytochemicals, which enhance 

microbial biodegradation of contaminants in the rhizosphere 

• Phytohydraulics – The ability of plants to capture and evaporate water off the plant and 

take up and transpire water through the plant. 

• Phytoextraction – The ability of plants to take up contaminants into the plant with the 

transpiration stream. 

• Phytodegradation – The ability of plants to take up and break down contaminants in the 

transpiration stream through internal enzymatic activity and photosynthetic. oxidation/reduction 

• Phytovolatilization – The ability of plants to take up, translocate, and subsequently 

transpire volatile contaminants in the transpiration stream. 

10.4.1.1.3. Phytotechnologies may be applied to explosive compounds as well as to 

heavy metals. Phytotechnologies potentially can treat soils, sludge, sediments, groundwater, and 

surface water. Energetics may be treated via various phytotechnologies. For instance, 

nitroreductases are produced in some plants that can reduce and breakdown TNT, RDX, and 

HMX. Although phytoremediation currently is being studied and applied to prevent migration of 

contaminants from areas with low levels of surface contamination, a potential future use is to 

prevent migration of contaminants from active training ranges. Genetically engineered plants are 
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being developed for use on training ranges. Additional information pertaining to the use of 

phytoremediation at training ranges is available from these references:

• Phytoremediation: Transformation and Control of Contaminants. 2003. S.C. 

McCutcheon and J.L. Schnoor. J. Wiley, New York. ISBN: 9780471273042, 987 pp. 

• Phytotechnology Technical and Regulatory Guidance and Decision Trees, Revised. 

ITRC Phytotechnologies Team. PHYTO-3, 187 pp. 2009. 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/PHYTO-3.pdf. 

• Identification of Metabolic Routes and Catabolic Enzymes Involved in 

Phytoremediation of the Nitro-Substituted Explosives TNT, RDX, and HMX. 2006. 

• SERDP Project CU 1317 Final Technical Report.

• A periodically updated database of plant species organized by contaminant can be 

accessed on the ITRC Web site: www.itrcweb.org/teampublic_Phytotechnologies.asp. 

10.4.1.2. Ex Situ Biological Treatment. Ex situ biological treatment technologies for 

soil include composting and landfarming. 

10.4.1.2.1. Composting. Composting is a controlled biological process by which organic 

contaminants (e.g., TNT, RDX, HMX) are converted by microorganisms to innocuous, stabilized 

byproducts. Typically, thermophilic conditions (54 to 65 degrees Celsius) must be maintained to 

properly compost soil contaminated with energetics. The increased temperatures result from 

heat produced by microorganisms during the degradation of the organic material in the waste. In 

most cases, this is achieved by the use of indigenous microorganisms. Soils are excavated and 

mixed with bulking agents and organic amendments, such as wood chips, animal, and vegetative 

wastes, to enhance the porosity of the mixture to be decomposed. The mixture typically results 

in approximately 30% soil and 70% amendments. Maximum degradation efficiency is achieved 

through maintaining oxygenation (e.g., daily windrow turning), irrigation as necessary, and 

closely monitoring moisture content and temperature. There are three process designs used in 

composting: aerated static pile composting (compost is formed into piles and aerated with 

blowers or vacuum pumps), mechanically agitated in-vessel composting (compost is placed in a 

reactor vessel where it is mixed and aerated), and windrow composting (compost is placed in 

long piles known as windrows and periodically mixed with mobile equipment). Windrow 

composting is the least expensive design since it requires only a simple liner or asphalt pad and 

no aeration manifold. The cost for composting is approximately $300/ton. If a temporary 

building is required, then the costs may increase. Typical treatment times range from 2 to 4 

weeks to reach cleanup goals, followed by a curing period. The following references provide 

guidance for composting of energetics-contaminated soil: 

• Soil Composting for Explosives Remediation: Case Studies and Lessons Learned. U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Public Works Technical Bulletin 200-1-95. 17 May 2011. 

http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/ARMYCOE/PWTB/pwtb_200_1_95.pdf.
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• Bioremediation of Soil Using Windrow Composting: Guide Specification for 

Construction. 2010. USACE. UFGS-02 54 21. 

• Innovative Uses of Compost Composting of Soils Contaminated by Explosives. 1997. 

EPA530-F-97-045. http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/conserve/composting/pubs/explos.pdf

10.4.1.2.2. Landfarming. Landfarming, also known as land treatment or land 

application, is an ex situ remediation technology for soils that reduces contaminant 

concentrations through biodegradation. Contaminants that are amenable to treatment via 

landfarming include petroleum products and PAHs. This technology usually involves spreading 

excavated contaminated soils in a thin layer on the ground surface and stimulating aerobic 

microbial activity within the soils through aeration and/or the addition of minerals, nutrients, and 

moisture. The enhanced microbial activity results in degradation of adsorbed contaminants 

through microbial respiration. If contaminated soils are shallow (i.e., less than 3 feet bgs), it may 

be possible to effectively stimulate microbial activity without excavating the soils. If 

contaminated soil is deeper than 5 feet, the soils should be excavated and reapplied on the 

ground surface. Typical times to reach cleanup goals are two to three seasons (climate and 

contaminant dependent). The cost typically ranges from $50 to $70 per cubic foot. 

• Bioremediation of Soil Using Landfarming Systems: Guide Specification for 

Construction. 2010. USACE. UFGS-02 54 20. 

• Bioremediation Using the Land Treatment Concept. 1993. EPA600-R-93-164 

http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=30002Y6E.txt.

10.4.1.3. Alkaline Hydrolysis. Alkaline hydrolysis has been studied extensively for the 

degradation of secondary explosives (primarily TNT and RDX) in aqueous and soil systems. 

Laboratory studies have determined that the end products of alkaline hydrolysis are mostly small 

compounds that are readily biodegradable in natural systems. Alkaline hydrolysis may be used to 

prevent migration of contaminants from active training ranges and for bulk soil treatment. Ex situ

treatment may be performed using a pug mill to mix hydrated lime or sodium hydroxide into soil 

to obtain a target pH of 12. Alternatively, lime or sodium hydroxide may be diced into soil for 

treatment. At a pH of 12, TNT and RDX are destroyed very rapidly. Soil may require posttreatment neutralization based on future uses. The amount of lime required for treatment depends 

on the soil’s buffering capacity. The cost for alkaline hydrolysis treatment is typically less than 

$2000/acre/year. 

• Jared L. Johnson, Deborah R. Felt, W. Andy Martin, Ronnie Britto, Catherine C. 

Nestler, and Steven L. Larson. 2011. Management of Munitions Constituents in Soil Using 

Alkaline Hydrolysis: A Guide for Practitioners. ERDC/EL TR-11-16 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel11-16.pdf.

• Jeffrey L. Davis, Catherine C. Nestler, Deborah R. Felt, and Steven L. Larson. 2007. 

Effect of Treatment pH on the End Products of the Alkaline Hydrolysis of TNT and RDX. 

ERDC/EL TR-07-4 http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel07-4.pdf.
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• Lance D. Hansen, Steven L. Larson, Jeffrey L. Davis, John M. Cullinane, Catherine C. 

Nestler, and Deborah R. Felt. 2003. Lime Treatment of 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene Contaminated 

Soils: Proof of Concept Study. ERDC/EL TR-03-15. 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel03-15.pdf. 

10.4.1.4. Leaching from Vadose Zone Soils. This technology entails flushing the 

vadose zone with water introduced via an infiltration gallery to leach MC from the soil. The 

leachate is then recovered using a network of wells and treated (see ex situ groundwater treatment 

options below) and disposed of or recycled for use in the leaching treatment. This technology is 

only applicable to mobile MC, such as perchlorate and RDX. This option may be feasible when 

perchlorate is present in a relatively thick vadose zone (e.g., southwestern United States) and 

there are few other viable options. However, there are several limitations associated with this 

option: 

• Uniform distribution of infiltration water becomes more difficult as the depth from the 

infiltration application point increases.

• Extracted water needs ex situ treatment before it can be reused for infiltration.

• The groundwater capture system needs to be very robust to prevent migration of 

contaminants from the treatment area.

10.4.1.4.1. A potential enhancement of this technology would be to amend the flush 

water with electron donor and/or nutrients to foster biodegradation of perchlorate (see Section 

10.4.2.1.1). Vadose zone flushing has been implemented at Edwards Air Force Base (Battey et 

al, 2007). 

10.4.2. Groundwater Treatment. A variety of groundwater treatment technologies are 

available to remediate energetic and perchlorate in groundwater. Treatment technologies may be 

applied in situ, or the groundwater may be extracted and then treated.

10.4.2.1. In Situ Treatment. 

10.4.2.1.1. Enhanced In Situ Anaerobic Bioremediation. Enhanced in situ anaerobic 

bioremediation involves the delivery of an organic substrate into the subsurface for the purpose 

of stimulating microbial growth and development, creating an anaerobic groundwater treatment 

zone, and generating hydrogen through fermentation reactions. This creates conditions 

conducive to anaerobic biodegradation of perchlorate and certain energetics dissolved in 

groundwater. In situ anaerobic bioremediation of other contaminants, such as chlorinated 

solvents, is well documented in the literature, and much of the information regarding types of 

organic substrates and substrate delivery applies to energetics and perchlorate remediation (see 

AFCEE, 2004). Organic substrates that are commonly used include lactic acid, molasses, corn 

syrup, and emulsified oil. Substrates may be injected using direct push points or permanent 

injection wells. Passive delivery relies on natural groundwater flow to distribute the organic 

substrate after the initial injection. Recirculation systems may be used to actively distribute the 

organic substrate throughout the treatment area using optimally located injection and extraction 
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wells. A monitoring well network typically is established to assess the effectiveness of the 

bioremediation treatment. Parameters that are monitored include MC concentrations, 

concentrations of bioremediation daughter products (if applicable), depletion of electron 

acceptors (dissolved oxygen, nitrate, perchlorate, sulfate), and other water quality parameters 

(pH, dissolved oxygen, oxidation/reduction potential). 

10.4.2.1.1.1. Perchlorate-reducing bacteria are nonfermenting microorganisms that use 

either chlorate or perchlorate as a terminal electron acceptor and a variety of different organic 

substrates (e.g., acetate, propionate, lactate) as electron donors (energy sources). Laboratory 

microcosm studies have shown that perchlorate-reducing bacteria are indigenous to many soils, 

sediments, surface waters, and groundwater. Moreover, these organisms often can be stimulated 

to degrade perchlorate to below detection by adding a microbial growth substrate (ITRC, 2008). 

At the most promising sites for perchlorate reduction, geochemical conditions appropriate for 

perchlorate-reducing bacteria and evidence of anaerobic biological reduction are already 

observed. Favorable geochemical conditions include a pH between 6.5 and 7.5, 

oxidation/reduction potential between 0 and 100 mV, low dissolved oxygen concentrations, and 

low nitrate levels.

10.4.2.1.1.2. Although biodegradation of TNT occurs under a wide range of 

environmental conditions, the rate is fairly slow. The transformation products 4-Am-DNT and 

2-Am-DNT often are observed in TNT-contaminated groundwater. Under strongly reducing 

conditions (i.e., conditions created with addition of a carbon substrate), these products are 

believed to become irreversibly bound to organics and to the aquifer matrix. RDX is more 

readily degraded than TNT, especially under anaerobic conditions. Final products may include 

methanol and hydrazines, and under methanogenic conditions, methane. RDX generally requires 

more highly anaerobic conditions than perchlorate to stimulate biodegradation. 

10.4.2.1.1.3. The following publications should be reviewed if enhanced in situ anaerobic 

bioremediation of perchlorate and/or energetics is being considered as a remedy at an MRS:

• Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Naval Facilities Engineering Service 

Center, and ESTCP. 2004. Principles and Practices of Enhanced Anaerobic Bioremediation of 

Chlorinated Solvents. ADA511850.

• Remediation Technologies for Perchlorate Contamination in Water and Soil. 2008. 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/PERC-2.pdf. 

• Altaf H. Wani, Deborah R. Felt, and Jeffrey L. Davis. Biologically Active Zone 

Enhancement (BAZE) Supplemental Study: Mass Balance of RDX Biotransformation and 

Influence of Aquifer Temperature on RDX Biodegradation in Groundwater. 2003. ERDC/EL 

TR-03-11. http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel03-11.pdf. 

• Denise K. MacMillan and David E. Splichal. 2005. A Review of Field Technologies 

for Long-Term Monitoring of Ordnance-Related Compounds in Groundwater. ERDC/EL TR05-14. http://www.clu-in.org/download/char/trel05-14.pdf.
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• James M. Brannon and Judith C. Pennington. 2002. Environmental Fate and Transport 

Process Descriptors for Explosives. ERDC/EL TR-02-10. 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel02-10.pdf. 

10.4.2.1.2. Phytoremediation. Phytoremediation for soil treatment is described in 

Section 10.4.1.1.2. The primary phytotechnology applicable to groundwater is phytohydraulics. 

The most significant limitation for groundwater is that phytoremediation is applicable only to 

shallow groundwater. Groundwater depths within 15 feet of the surface generally are accessible 

by most deep-planted applications. In some cases, phytoremediation may be applicable where 

groundwater transitions to surface water (e.g., daylighting seeps). 

10.4.2.2. Ex Situ Treatment. 

10.4.2.2.1. Ex situ treatment may be required when the selected remedy involves 

groundwater extraction and when the groundwater requires on-site treatment prior to discharge 

or reuse. 

10.4.2.2.2. The following are references that provide comprehensive information on the 

most commonly used ex situ treatment technologies for groundwater: 

• Presumptive Response Strategy and Ex-Situ Treatment Technologies for Contaminated 

Ground Water at CERCLA Sites. Directive 9283.1-12. USEPA 540/R-96/023. 1996. 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/conmedia/gwdocs/gwguide/gwfinal.pdf. 

• Remediation Technologies for Perchlorate Contamination in Water and Soil. 2008. 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/PERC-2.pdf. 

10.4.2.2.2.1. Granular Activated Carbon (GAC). A highly adsorbent material with very 

large surface-to-volume ratios, GAC commonly is used to remove contamination from water. 

Contaminated water is pumped through vessels filled with GAC. There are usually two vessels 

in series (i.e., lead-lag configuration), and sample ports typically are placed before and after each 

vessel to allow measurement of contaminant breakthrough. As water passes through the carbon, 

contaminants adsorb to the surface of the carbon particles. Most high molecular weight, organic 

contaminants (e.g., TNT, RDX) have a relatively strong affinity for GAC. RDX typically breaks 

through before TNT. The GAC medium is replaced when its adsorption capacity is reached. 

The spent GAC typically is returned to the GAC vendor for regeneration or destruction. 

Although standard GAC has not been found to efficiently remove perchlorate, the adsorptive 

capacity may be increased through coating the surface with a thin layer of a surface-active 

substance.

10.4.2.2.2.2. Ion Exchange. Ion exchange is a reversible chemical reaction caused when an 

ion from solution is exchanged with a similarly charged ion from an immobile solid. 

Contaminated water is pumped through vessels filled with ion exchange resin beads, and the 

targeted ions are removed from water through sorption onto solid resins. For instance, 

perchlorate ion may replace chloride on a resin. Perchlorate-selective ion exchange resins have 

been developed, and currently ion exchange is the most proven and widely accepted physical 
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process technology to meet existing perchlorate treatment goals. The ion exchange resin is 

replaced when the exchange capacity is exhausted. Spent resin media are usually sent off site for 

regeneration or destruction. 

10.4.2.2.2.3. Fluidized Bed Reactor. The fluidized bed reactor (FBR) is a reactor column 

that fosters the growth of microorganisms on a hydraulically fluidized bed of media, usually sand 

or activated carbon. The fluidized medium selected provides a large surface area on which a 

film of microorganisms can grow, thus producing a large inventory of biomass in a small reactor 

volume. The result is a system capable of high degradative performance for target contaminants 

in a relatively small and economical reactor volume. The FBR can be controlled to operate 

under aerobic, anaerobic, or anoxic conditions, depending upon the nature of the target 

compounds. For perchlorate and energetic, anaerobic conditions typically are targeted. FBRs 

are capable of achieving less than 4 μg/L of perchlorate in the effluent. RDX and TNT also have 

been successfully treated in FBRs. See the following publications for examples of FBR use for 

perchlorate and energetic:

• Fuller et al., Combined Treatment of Perchlorate and RDX in Ground Water Using a 

Fluidized Bed Reactor, Ground Water Monitoring & Remediation 27, no. 3. 2007. pages 59–64. 

http://info.ngwa.org/gwol/pdf/072082343.pdf. 

• Stephen W. Maloney and Robert L. Heine. 2005. Demonstration of the Anaerobic 

Fluidized Bed Reactor for Pinkwater Treatment at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. 

ERDC/CERL TR-05-8. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA433804.
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CHAPTER 11

Quality Control

1

11.1. Introduction. 

11.1.1. The general objective of MR actions is to efficiently locate buried UXO and 

DMM so it can be evaluated, recovered, and disposed of properly. The PDT must define projectspecific objectives and performance metrics for each definable feature of work that will be 

measurable and attainable. The PDT also must define project-specific QC and QA processes for 

each definable feature of work to ensure that performance metrics are attained and project 

objectives are met. 

11.1.2. On MR projects, there are two elements subject to QC/QA: processes and 

products. Processes are the project-specific planning and data collection / data analysis 

procedures and all related field activities performed. Products are the final project-specific 

deliverables and results that are achieved. QA primarily is a function of process oversight, while 

QC primarily is a function of checking measurable items (e.g., geophysical sensor velocity). QA 

and QC can be either government or contractor tasks. The PDT must define the products, which 

will vary depending on the type of task and project being performed. For example, the UXO RA

product of having a cleared parcel of land is more important than it is for a characterization 

project, which may only require a parcel be characterized as having UXO impact or not. 

Possible deliverable products include complete project reports, geophysical data deliverables 

(e.g., properly formatted raw and processed geophysical data, legible geophysical maps, 

complete interpretations), intrusive investigation results (e.g., complete dig sheets with all 

relevant geophysical data and intrusive results), MC data deliverables (e.g., MC analytical 

laboratory results, data validation reports), GDS deliverables (e.g., MC sample locations, 

geophysical anomaly locations), and complete QC documentation IAW the UFP-QAPP. 

11.1.3. When formulating the UFP-QAPP or QA activities, this chapter provides options 

that can be selected and tailored to the specific geophysical, MC, and GDS tasks that the PDT 

will perform. Details on required planning documents are provided in Chapter 4. The QC plans 

and tests that are designed as a function of the guidance in this chapter should be incorporated 

into the UFP-QAPP and may be reflected as elements of a project’s QASP.

11.1.4. Although this chapter presents only QC considerations for MEC, MC, and GDS 

processes, additional QC guidance for these topics and others not covered within this chapter 

may be found in the ITRC Quality Considerations for Munitions Response Projects (2008) and 

the U.S. Navy’s MEC UFP-QAPP template. Example topics not covered in this chapter include 

vegetation clearance, removal debris removal, and mass excavation. Guidance on the UFPQAPP and the UFP-QAPP workbook format can also be found at the USEPA Federal Facilities 

Restoration and Reuse Office. http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/qualityassurance.htm
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11.2. Munitions and Explosives of Concern Quality Management. 

11.2.1. General Munitions and Explosives of Concern Process Quality Management. 

11.2.1.1. Sections 11.2.1 through 11.2.5 discuss MEC quality in the context of the 

geophysical system as defined in the introduction to Chapter 6. Because geophysical systems 

make use of DGM and/or analog geophysical mapping (also referred to as mag and flag or mag 

and dig operations), this section often will highlight whether a particular topic is relevant to 

DGM systems, analog systems, or both. When a topic is specific to systems using digital 

techniques, “digital” or “DGM” will be in parentheses after the topic; for systems using analog 

tools, “analog” will be in parentheses. Topics relevant to both types of systems will have the 

words “analog and digital” in parentheses. The reader is referred to Chapter 6 of this document 

for more details on digital and analog geophysical systems.

11.2.1.2. The project processes and the project products will be part of a formal quality 

management process in order to demonstrate that project objectives are met. In most instances 

where geophysical systems are used, whether digital or analog, emphasis will be placed upon 

process quality management because the success, or failure, of geophysical products is highly 

dependent upon how the systems are used. The intent of this section is to provide a guide for the 

PDT in identifying the important aspects of geophysical systems that will require monitoring for 

quality. 

11.2.1.3. QC of the processes used to perform geophysical operations should focus on 

demonstrating data meet project needs and the data are used for their intended purpose. The 

PDT should explicitly define all data quality requirements. Statements such as “a clean site” or 

“a well characterized site” are ambiguous and cannot be used to develop rigorous QC or QA 

programs. Typically, the term “good data” is used to identify specific work products or specific 

definable features of work that are the result of specific work tasks or work functions. These 

tasks and functions can be viewed as key procedures in QC programs, and the individual 

components of the geophysical systems used in performing those procedures are referred to as 

subsystems. Breaking the work processes into key procedures and key subsystems helps the 

PDT identify how the work will be done as well as which tools will be used. Doing so helps the 

PDT develop QC functions for each and helps focus attention to those procedures or tools that 

may be prone to failure or degradation in the quality of their product(s). The following are key 

procedures requiring special attention when developing QC programs: 

a. Site preparation procedures

b. Data acquisition procedures 

c. Data processing procedures 

d. Anomaly selection processes 

e. Anomaly classification processes

f. Anomaly reacquisition and marking procedures 
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g. Anomaly excavation and resolution procedures 

11.2.1.4. Critical subsystems requiring specific monitoring and/or testing in QC 

programs include the following: 

a. Geophysical instruments

b. Operators

c. Positioning systems

d. Geodetic surveys

11.2.1.5. Once these critical components and their failure modes have been identified, 

the PDT technical personnel will develop QC methods and measures (or tests) to ensure or 

demonstrate that the processes, as used by the contractor, achieve project objectives and produce 

good data. The QC tests and their related failure criteria must be designed specifically to test one 

or more key procedures or subsystems. Rarely will a single QC test provide a thorough check of 

all possible failure modes for a given geophysical system. In many instances, two or more QC 

methods will be used to monitor critical procedures and subsystems. The PDT should verify all 

QC measures have been implemented and all QC tests meet their pass/fail criteria. Any test that 

fails should be fully addressed through root-cause analyses and corrective actions before being 

accepted by the government. Table 11-1 presents common geophysical procedures and their 

related failure modes.

11.2.1.6. Listed below are elements of critical procedures and subsystems that can be 

used to define what is meant by “good data.” These elements, if applicable, would be critical to 

the quality of all geophysical surveys performed to detect TOI. The PDT should determine the 

frequency any one QC test should be performed to monitor these procedures. Typical 

frequencies to be considered include beginning of project, daily, start and end of day, start and 

end of collecting a dataset, per parcel of land basis, and per operator basis (for analog systems).

11.2.1.6.1. Define Geophysical Systems Function Checks. Purpose is to verify the 

geophysical system has not malfunctioned. Checked by performing repeatability tests, standard 

response tests, evaluating background noise levels, evaluating positioning accuracies and 

precisions, and resweeping or digitally mapping sections of analog geophysics lanes. 

11.2.1.6.2. Define Survey Coverage Requirements. Purpose is to clearly define overall 

survey coverage needs for all possible terrain/vegetation/obstruction conditions on site. This 

topic also must address allowable gaps between adjacent DGM survey lines. Methods of 

checking coverage include reviewing track plots (non–line-and-fiducial methods), calculating 

sizes of data gaps, implementing a blind seeding program using small metallic objects, and visual 

observations of line-and-fiducial, odometer, and analog surveys. 
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Table 11-1: Common Geophysical Procedures and Their Related Failure Modes 

Procedure Failure Mode or Cause Valid QC Checks

Geophysical mapping, 

general

Field geophysicist using unauthorized and/or 

untested equipment and/or unauthorized field 

procedures

1. Visual observations

2. Verify the QC Plan is specific to the geophysical system(s) 

accepted/authorized for the project.

Instrument set-up Broken equipment or bad cable connections 1. Static background test

2. Static spike

3. Other system-specific function tests

4. Personnel tests

Geophysical mapping, 

general

Mapping coverage is not achieving required 

coverage goals

1. For analog methods and line and fiducial methods, visual observations

2. For digital methods, plot track-plots and review for coverage.

3. For digital methods, use automated tools to calculate actual coverage 

achieved.

Line-and-fiducial DGM, 

odometer trigger mode or 

time-based trigger mode

Insufficient or excessive measurements 

accrued along a segment

1. Check count of measurements at each end-of-line.

2. Check distance between along-line readings during post processing.

3. GSV blind positioning seeds are detected and included on the dig list.

Line-and-fiducial DGM, 

odometer trigger mode

Data gaps mispositioned (e.g., gaps due to 

trees or other common obstructions) due to 

poor procedure or incorrectly entered values 

during acquisition or post-processing

1. Measure actual location of gaps in the field and compare to those shown 

during processing. 

2. Check track-plot maps for inconsistent along-line measurement spacing 

on both sides of gaps.

3. GSV blind positioning seeds near potential data gaps and confirming 

seeds are not detected on lines too far from their placement location.

Line-and-fiducial DGM, 

time-based trigger mode

Fiducial marks and/or start or end locations 

were misplaced during acquisition or 

incorrectly entered during post-processing. 

1. Create a map showing survey speeds or track-plots to check for line 

segments with inconsistent velocities or inconsistent measurement 

spacing.

2. Placement of GSV blind positioning seeds and confirming seeds are 

detected within expected response range and are not positioned on lines 

too far (laterally) from where they were placed.

Line-and-fiducial DGM, 

odometer and time-based 

trigger mode

Operator deviates laterally from the planned 

path.

1. Visual observation during acquisition

2. Placement of GSV blind positioning seeds and confirming seeds are not 

detected on lines too far (laterally) from where they were placed.
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Procedure Failure Mode or Cause Valid QC Checks

Line-and-fiducial DGM, 

odometer and time-based 

trigger modes

Data mispositioned due to nonsquare grid 

setup and/or grid dimensions are not as 

reported

1. Measure diagonals across grid to confirm 90-degree grid corners. 

2. Measure lengths of grid boundaries

3. Placement of GSV blind positioning seeds and confirming seeds are not 

detected on lines too far (laterally) from where they were placed.

DGM field procedures using 

automated positioning 

system

Data mispositioned due to spikes or “erratic 

behavior” in the positioning solutions

1. Create a map showing survey speeds and check for areas with 

inconsistent velocities.

2. If available, check positioning solution quality, such as HDOP, number 

of reference stations or satellites used, signal strength.

3. Placement of GSV blind positioning seeds and confirming seeds are not 

detected on lines too far (laterally) from where they were placed.

DGM field procedures using 

automated positioning 

systems

Data mispositioned due to incorrectly entered 

sensor-to-positioning antenna offsets or 

incorrectly entered positioning system 

reference coordinates

1. Place blind seeds throughout survey area and check they are detected 

within expected accuracies. 

2. Perform the “clover-leaf” test over a known point(s) and verify the track 

plots cross at proper coordinates.

DGM field procedures using 

automated positioning 

systems

Data mispositioned due to incorrect base 

station coordinates or base station set-up over 

wrong location

1. Perform and record daily static positioning checks over known control 

points.

DGM, data processing Processing yields anomalies with atypical 

shape characteristics

1. Visual reviews of DGM maps for anomaly shape characteristics

2. Check interpreted locations of QC and/or QA blind seed items.

3. Verify sensor to positioning antenna offsets.

4. Check latency values used and check for changes in survey speed if 

simple “lag” corrections are used.

5. Collect twice daily IVS tests and confirm anomaly response and target 

location are within the project’s performance metrics.

DGM, anomaly selections Processing and anomaly selection methods 

produce excessive anomaly selections and/or 

anomalies are the result of gridding artifacts.

1. Visual review and/or automated verification of anomaly proximities

2. Overlay track-plots on gridded data to confirm all anomalies are real.

3. Check drift corrections or filtering results in high gradient areas.

Anomaly reacquisition, 

general

Low amplitude and/or small area anomalies 

reacquired beyond their footprint shown on 

DGM maps.

1. Define critical search radius (maximum not-to-exceed search radius) to 

encompass all possible anomaly size scenarios.

2. Provide anomaly-specific critical search radius (Rcrit) based on anomaly 

footprint size.
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Procedure Failure Mode or Cause Valid QC Checks

Anomaly reacquisition, 

general

Large and/or high amplitude anomalies 

reported as no-contact or false-positive.

1. Define threshold values above which additional reviews and/or field 

actions are required before being accepted. 

2. If the reacquisition procedure does not use the exact same instrument 

model used to detect and interpret anomalies, return to the location with 

the same model instrument.

Anomaly reacquisition, 

process uses a system with 

inferior detection 

capabilities compared to 

those of the original 

mapping survey

Wrong anomaly is reacquired. 1. Define limits for acceptable location offsets between interpreted location 

and flagged location, based on systems and processes used. 

2. Compare dig results for each anomaly with the associated geophysical 

anomaly characteristics

3. After excavations, return with original detection system, to original 

interpreted location, for a portion or all anomalies and confirm no 

anomalies remain.

Analog geophysics (mag and 

flag operations)

Geophysical anomaly remains after mapping 

and digging operations are complete; anomaly 

source is unknown.

1. Remap a portion or all of the area with a digital geophysical system 

and/or an analog system.

2. Place blind seed items at depths required to be cleared; place blind seed 

items at locations that are difficult to access.

Analog geophysics (mag and 

flag operations)

Large piece(s) of metal having MEC-like 

physical characteristics or that could be 

masking nearby MEC remains after mapping 

and digging operations are complete.

1. Remap a portion or all of the area and excavate anomalies to confirm 

they do not meet failure criteria or to confirm all large pieces of surface 

metal have no MEC buried beneath them.

2. Place blind seed items throughout project area.

Analog geophysics (mag and 

flag operations)

Operator not achieving proper coverage, not 

using good sweep techniques, or not properly 

interpreting instrument measurements. 

1. Visual observations

2. Resweeping by second party for presence of MEC-like anomalies

3. Blind seeding of ISOs to produce verify coverage and detection 

capabilities of operators.

QC tests Insufficient documentation or documentation 

not provided to USACE within required 

deliverable schedule.

1. Verify PWS/SOW and contract states that QC documentation will be 

submitted to USACE and the deliverable schedule. 

2. Ensure USACE has input into required QC documentation.

3. Ensure USACE is notified of all root-cause analyses and that USACE 

has authority to reject incomplete root-cause analyses and/or incomplete 

corrective actions.

Documenting excavation 

activities and dig results

Incomplete and/or inaccurate information 

recorded. 

1. Conduct visual observations.

2. Review information on recovered seed items.

3. Check for consistent nomenclature in reported information.
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11.2.1.6.3. Define Along-Track Measurement Interval Requirements. Purpose is to 

clearly define along-track data density needs. Methods of checking along-track data density 

include calculating along-track sampling intervals (digital), calculating instantaneous point-topoint velocities (digital), visual observations (analog), and logging time-in-lane (analog).

11.2.1.6.4. Define TOI Detection and Anomaly Selection Criteria. Purpose is to verify 

that anomaly selection criteria meet project needs. Criteria typically are defined during project 

planning. Tested by reviewing documentation of anomaly selection criteria used for each dataset 

interpreted (digital), blind seeding for TOI detection and anomaly selection using inert or 

simulated munitions, blind seeding using metallic objects that produce analog detection 

responses similar to, or identical to TOIs, digitally mapping sections of analog geophysics lanes 

to prove no TOIs remain, resweeping analog geophysics lanes using analog tools to prove no 

TOI anomalies remain.

11.2.1.6.5. Define Anomaly Classification Requirements. Purpose is to verify that the 

selected anomaly classifier puts all TOIs on the dig list. These requirements are checked by

setting pass/fail anomaly classification criteria, setting pass/fail criteria for detection and 

classification of blind seeds, setting pass/fail criteria for anomaly inversion results, setting 

pass/fail criteria for the inverted offset of the blind seed location, and evaluating the dig results 

against the anomaly classifier through the feedback process. 

11.2.1.6.6. Define Anomaly Reacquisition Requirements. Purpose is to verify detected 

and selected anomalies are marked for excavation. Anomaly reacquisition requirements are 

verified by setting pass/fail anomaly repeatability criteria, setting pass/fail maximum allowable 

offset distances, testing efficacy of procedures for marking all localized anomalies during project 

planning, and testing implementation of the false positives and no-contacts management plan.

11.2.1.6.7. Define Anomaly Resolution Requirements. Purpose is to verify the 

excavated item(s) adequately explain anomaly characteristics. This topic also must include 

criteria for accepting dig results reported as false positives, no-contacts, “geology,” or “hot 

rocks.” Methods for testing anomaly resolution procedures include defining size/depth/weight 

criteria for various categories of anomaly characteristics, post-excavation verifications using 

appropriate geophysical systems, and inspection of dig results and anomaly maps. 

11.2.1.6.8. Define PRV Requirements. Purpose is to verify that the remediation process 

has been effective, such that few if any TOIs might still remain. PRV requirements are 

established using either anomaly compliance sampling or transect compliance sampling methods 

and determining the amount of sampling required to meet the project-specific statistical 

confidence level. The failure criterion for PRV verification is finding TOIs in an area that is 

presumed to no longer contain TOIs. PRV includes most, if not all, of the processes described 

above; therefore, the PDT must establish pass/fail criteria for each of the geophysical procedures 

conducted during PRV, identify their related failure modes, and evaluate the geophysical data to 

determine if it meets the project’s DQOs.

11.2.1.6.9. Define Process Specific Requirements for Specialized or Unique Processes 

or Subsystems. Purpose is to verify that procedures specific to a particular system are 

performed to meet project needs. Examples include defining not-to-exceed survey speeds for 
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systems sensitive to survey velocity, defining specific setup procedures for specialized 

positioning systems, and defining specialized function check requirements for systems requiring 

specialized function-checks or calibration.

11.2.1.7. Table 11-1 presents possible failure modes for several key geophysical 

procedures and key subsystems that are commonly used. The table also includes suggested QC 

measures that can be implemented to monitor for possible failures.

11.2.2. Munitions and Explosives of Concern Process Quality Performance 

Requirements. 

11.2.2.1. Introduction. Quality standards for geophysical procedures and how they are 

used are provided in this section. Some typical quality pass/fail tests for geophysical operations 

are listed below. Each is identified as applicable to digital mapping, analog mapping, or both. In 

general, pass/fail criteria are quantified or defined for each test performed. A brief description of 

how each test is implemented also is provided. When a specific test is used, it normally it is 

tailored to site-specific and contract-specific needs and requirements. Where applicable, 

pass/fail criteria should be defined based upon the current knowledge of the project site(s). The 

pass/fail criteria typically would be revised in the event new information about a site is 

discovered over the course of the project. If the PDT uses the examples below, the example 

pass/fail criteria must be tailored to project objectives and the geophysical system(s) used.

11.2.2.1.1. Table 11-2 presents the critical performance requirements for RIs and RAs 

for both digital geophysical and analog systems. These performance requirements require QC 

processes that the PDT must employ during MR geophysical investigations. Some sites might 

require additional QC requirements for geophysical operations to ensure project DQOs are met. 

In addition, the PDT may have additional QC processes within their SOPs, which should be 

applied whenever applicable. 

11.2.2.1.2. Tables 11-3 through 11-6 (at the end of this chapter) present the specific 

performance requirements for RIs and RAs for both digital and analog systems. The tables also 

present the applicability, performance standard, frequency of testing, and consequence of failure 

of the requirement for each of the respective tests listed in Table 11-2, where applicable. 

Additional guidance for each requirement is included in the footnotes to each table. These 

performance requirements and their respective performance standards are applicable directly to 

geophysical investigations on land using commercially available geophysical instruments (see 

Chapter 6). These performance requirements can be tailored for underwater operations as well; 

however, some of the tolerances are less strict and the test often are less frequent. 

11.2.2.1.2.1. Advanced EMI Sensors and Anomaly Classification. When advanced 

EMI sensors are used to classify targets as either TOI or non-TOI, the PDT should consider 

whether additional performance requirements are required. In particular, in addition to blind 

seeding the production area with ISOs IAW the GSV process, the PDT should consider 

emplacing inert munitions as blind seeds within the production site as a QC check on the 

anomaly classification process. The frequency of the inert munition blind seeding should be 

commensurate with the frequency for the dynamic detection repeatability test (i.e., one inert 

munition blind seed per grid or dataset). The performance metric for the blind seed item must be 
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based on the feature parameters (e.g., principal polarizabilities, tau) that are used to classify the 

anomalies. Any failure to identify an inert munition blind seed will cause that data lot submittal 

to fail and require a CAR to determine why the classification process didn’t identify the target as 

a TOI and place it on the dig list. If the missed process causes a change in the parameters or 

decision logic used to determine whether the anomaly is or is not a TOI, all previously cleared 

portions of the site may require a reclassification to determine if additional potential TOIs have 

not been placed on the dig list. At present, research is being conducted to determine effective 

QC procedures for geophysical investigations that use advanced EMI sensors and classification 

methods. The following subsections briefly discuss the various QC considerations the PDT 

should evaluate prior to using an advanced EMI sensor. 

Table 11-2: Critical Process Quality Performance Requirements

Process

RI RA

DGM Analog DGM Analog

Static repeatability X X X X

Along line measurement spacing X X

Speed X X X X

Coverage X X X X

Dynamic detection repeatability X X X X

Dynamic positioning repeatability X X

Target selection (DGM) / detection and recovery (analog) X X X X

Anomaly resolution X X X X

Geodetic equipment functionality X X X X

Geodetic internal consistency X X X X

Geodetic accuracy X X X X

Geodetic repeatability X X X X

11.2.2.1.2.1.1 The PDT should consider how the GSV process, including the IVS and 

blind seeding approach, will be applied to the project site to perform QC on the anomaly 

classification process. The PDT should evaluate whether blind seeds will consist of ISOs, inert 

surrogates of known munitions at the site, and/or inert surrogates of unknown munitions at the 

site. The blind seeds should be emplaced in a frequency IAW the GSV process (e.g., one seed 

item per data set), and IVS data will be collected twice daily. The PDT should evaluate the IVS 

data on a daily basis to determine the RMS errors for each seed item placed in the IVS.

11.2.2.1.2.1.2 The PDT should evaluate the positioning of the advanced EMI sensor over 

the interpreted target location. Results from ESTCP live-site demonstrations indicate that 

sensors improperly placed over the target location (i.e., the buried metallic object is close to the 

edge of the advanced EMI sensor coil) can lead to poor data inversions and classifications 

(Harre, 2011). The PDT should determine the interpreted target location offset threshold above 

which the advanced EMI data is re-collected. For example, the PDT may determine that all 
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offsets between the inverted item location and the center of the sensor that are greater than 0.4 m 

will be re-collected or automatically placed on the dig list, whichever is more economical.

11.2.2.1.2.1.3 The PDT must assess that each transmitter and receiver coil was operating 

within tolerable limits during the advanced EMI data collection. Data from live-site 

demonstrations indicate that a single, poorly operating transmitter or receiver coil can have 

significant effect on the data inversion and classification results. The PDT should re-collect 

advance EMI data for all anomaly locations for which coils were not operating within limits or 

place the anomalies on the dig list, whichever is more economical. 

11.2.2.1.2.1.4 The PDT should visit the SERDP-ESTCP Web page 

(http://www.serdp.org/) frequently to keep abreast of advances in the QC methods for these 

sensors.

11.2.2.1.2.2. Underwater Investigations. Although the performance requirements in 

Tables 11-3 through 11-6 are designed for geophysical investigations on land, they may be 

applied to underwater investigations as well. However, various factors unique to the underwater 

environment (e.g., less accurate positioning, decreased ability to maintain a constant altitude 

above the sediment surface, greater distance between the sensor and the metallic item) make it 

difficult for the geophysical systems’ ability to meet the same performance standards defined for 

land-based investigations. Therefore, the PDT must determine the performance standards that 

are most applicable to the site given the site conditions, how the data will be used, how the 

investigation is performed, and what corrective measure should be implemented if the 

geophysical system fails to meet the performance standard. 

11.2.2.2. QC and QA Statements. This subsection presents common QC and/or QA 

statements that define additional performance standards not included in Tables 11-3 through 11-

6. These statements are not required on all projects; however, they likely will increase the 

QA/QC standard for the project. Therefore, the PDT should strongly consider adding these 

additional performance standards to the project QC plan. 

11.2.2.2.1. DGM maps shall represent as best as possible the actual potential field as it 

existed at the time of data collection. This statement is applicable to DGM. Tests associated 

with this statement are incorporated into the UFP-QAPP. This statement is intended to capture 

all typical field and processing steps needed to address known failure modes common to most 

geophysical systems. Tests include checking that all measurement positioning corrections 

(latency and sensor offset corrections) are implemented, diurnal corrections (for magnetics) are 

performed, repeatability tests are successful, sensor response tests (commonly referred to as the 

“spike” test) are within tolerance, personnel tests are successful, noise level tests are successful, 

drift corrections are properly applied, and cable tests are successful. Failure of any one test 

typically results in either reprocessing the data or recollecting the data. The reader is referred to 

the Ordnance and Explosives Digital Geophysical Mapping Guidance – Operational Procedures 

and Quality Control Manual (USAESCH, 2003) and Quality Assurance Made Easy: Working 

With Quantified, Site-Specific QC Metrics (Proceedings of the UXO/Countermine Forum, 2004) 

for more details and examples of how these individual QC tests are designed and implemented. 
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11.2.2.2.2. Discovery of undocumented or unresolved nonconformance or 

noncompliance as defined in the accepted QC plan. This performance standard is applicable to 

DGM and analog mapping. Tests associated with this statement typically are incorporated into 

the QA program. The purpose of this statement is to clearly assure that the contractor shall be 

responsible for performing and documenting all tasks required in the QC program. This test 

usually is performed by reviewing some or all of the contractor’s QC documentation for 

thoroughness and completeness. Failure of the contractor to detect a failed QC test or failure of 

the contractor to have initiated a root-cause analysis after detecting a QC failure normally results 

in the government’s rejecting all associated work products until all required QC tasks are 

complete. QC pass/fail criteria should be developed, as applicable, for each QC test specified in 

the QC plan. Table 11-1 presents examples of common QC tests currently used. 

11.2.2.3. Example Quality Standards for Anomaly Resolution Procedures and How 

They are Used. Anomaly resolution should be performed at all project sites to verify that the 

excavation of anomalies successfully removed the anomaly identified with the original sensor. 

The post-excavation anomaly resolution should be conducted with the same geophysical sensor 

as the original DGM or analog investigation. Anomaly resolution should be conducted IAW 

Tables 11-3 through 11-6, and the amount of anomaly resolution required for each dataset 

collected during a geophysical investigation should be based on Table 6-6. 

11.2.2.3.1. Typical quality pass/fail tests for anomaly resolution activities are listed 

below. Each is identified as applicable to digital mapping, analog mapping, or both. A brief 

description of how each is implemented also is provided. When any specific test is used, it 

normally would be tailored to site-specific and contract-specific needs and requirements. 

Applicable, pass/fail criteria should be defined using current knowledge of the project site(s). 

The pass/fail criteria typically would be revised in the event new information about a site is 

discovered over the course of the project. These tests would be designed around how the 

contractor performs their anomaly resolution processes. Those processes should be capable of 

successfully excavating or otherwise positively resolving all anomalies tabulated on dig lists or 

anomalies identified during analog mapping. The purpose of the contractor’s QC plan for 

anomaly resolution should be to define what is meant by “resolved anomaly” and verify each 

anomaly is unambiguously resolved. The contractor’s UFP-QAPP should include a detailed plan 

for managing anomalies reported as false positive, no contact, hot rock, or geology. If the PDT 

uses the examples below, the example pass/fail criteria must be tailored to project objectives and 

the procedures used. 

11.2.2.3.2. Note: For most analog mapping projects, the government’s QA tasks can be 

simplified by requiring the contractor to leave the lane markers in the grid until all field-level QA 

is complete. For all projects, the government’s QA tasks can be simplified by requiring the 

contractor to flag all excavated locations and to leave all flags in the excavated location until 

field-level QA is complete. Where appropriate, the flags should be labeled with the unique 

anomaly identifier.

11.2.2.3.2.1. Discovery of an unresolved anomaly listed on a dig list or at a location 

previously identified during analog mapping operations. This test is applicable to both DGM 

and analog geophysical systems. The term unresolved is defined as 1) a geophysical signature of 
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unknown source is still present at a location specified on a dig list or an excavated location after 

it has been declared complete and accepted through the project QC program or 2) an anomaly is 

reported as no contact, false positive, hot rock, or geology but does not meet the requirements for 

such under the management plan for reporting the false positives, no contact, hot rock, and 

geology. Tests associated with this statement normally are incorporated into the QA program. 

Tests for case (1) typically would be based on QA inspections at locations tabulated on dig lists. 

Anomalies at such locations having characteristics associated with MEC buried at depths where 

their response is at least five to seven times, or more, the background RMS, for which the source 

is not known, would result in failure. Tests for case (2) normally would involve reviewing some 

or all anomalies reported as false positive, no contact, hot rock, or geology for compliance with 

project-specific criteria. Failure of the contractor to unambiguously resolve anomalies likely

would result in the government’s rejecting all associated work products until all associated rootcause analyses are complete and all corrective actions have been performed. 

11.2.2.3.2.2. Discovery of undocumented or unresolved nonconformance or 

noncompliance as defined in the accepted QC plan. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. 

Tests associated with this statement typically are incorporated into the QA program. The 

purpose of this statement is to clearly assert the contractor shall be responsible for performing 

and documenting all tasks required in the QC program. This test usually is performed by 

reviewing some or all of the contractor’s QC documentation for thoroughness and completeness. 

Failure of the contractor to detect a failed QC test or failure of the contractor to have initiated a 

root-cause analysis after detecting a QC failure likely would result in the government’s rejecting 

all associated work products until all required QC tasks are complete. QC pass/fail criteria 

should be developed, as applicable, for each QC test specified in the QC Plan. Table 11-1 

presents QC tests currently required. 

11.2.2.3.2.3. Verification of excavated anomaly locations using geophysical sensors to 

confirm anomalies are resolved. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. This is similar to 

Section 11.2.2.3.2.2. Tests associated with this statement normally are incorporated into the QC 

and/or QA program. Tests normally would be based on finding unresolved anomalies during QC 

or QA inspections using geophysical sensors. For this test, unresolved is defined as a 

geophysical sensor still detects an above background signal over an excavated location and that 

signal has characteristics similar to those of MEC. Failure of the contractor to unambiguously 

resolve anomalies likely would result in the government’s rejecting all associated work products 

until all associated root-cause analyses are complete and all corrective actions have been 

performed.

11.2.2.3.2.4. Verify dig result findings are reviewed and approved by a qualified 

geophysicist. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. Tests associated with this statement 

normally are incorporated into the QC and/or QA program. Tests for this activity may be similar 

to those for Section 11.2.2.3.2.1, as these are related topics. Tests typically would focus on 

confirming the descriptions of items recovered during anomaly excavations adequately explain 

the anomaly characteristics observed in the geophysical data. Tests also would involve 

reviewing the reported excavation results for compliance with management plan for reporting 

findings of false positives, no contacts, hot rocks, and geology. Tests also may include 

reviewing reported information for compliance with standardized reporting nomenclature. 
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Failure of the contractor to verify reported dig findings likely would result in the government’s 

rejecting all associated work products until all associated root-cause analyses are complete and 

all corrective actions have been performed.

11.2.3. Munitions and Explosives of Concern Product Quality Management. 

11.2.3.1. Introduction. The PDT must define what the project-specific final products will 

be and what results must be achieved for each. The PDT then will need to determine how best to 

assess the quality of those products. There are two types of products produced from geophysical 

surveys for MEC projects: tangible products, such as reports and UFP-QAPPs, and intangible 

products, such as instrument interpretations and declarations that work in a parcel is complete. 

11.2.3.2. Common Tangible Geophysical Products and Related Standards. Listed 

below are common tangible products that can be included in the geophysical quality 

management programs: 

a. Complete MEC UFP-QAPP

b. Complete IVS reports 

c. Complete geophysical investigation reports

d. Fully completed dig sheets 

e. Properly formatted and documented geophysical data

f. Legible and complete maps showing the geophysical survey’s results and 

interpretations

g. Fully supported anomaly selection criteria and decisions 

h. Completed QC reporting 

11.2.3.2.1. Quality standards for the products listed above normally would include 

adherence to standard reporting formats, as specified by the base contract, and completeness 

requirements and may include requirements that documents be legible, concise, and accurate and 

use proper grammar. For completed dig lists, acceptance sampling using Table 6-6 or guidance 

from MILSTD-1916 can be used for verification purposes. This would require returning to a 

prescribed number of anomaly locations to confirm those anomalies are indeed resolved. The 

reader is referred to MILSTD-1916 for detailed guidance on acceptance sampling. For most 

cases, the government would not accept a tangible product that does not meet a quality standard 

(as defined by the PDT and/or in the SOW/PWS) until all deficiencies have been corrected. 

11.2.3.2.2. For removal or remedial actions, the PRV tool can be used to determine 

whether a parcel of land, or lot, has been remediated to an acceptable standard. If TOIs are 

identified during the PRV process, the original geophysical data would require review to 

determine why the TOI was missed during the initial investigation. 
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11.2.3.3. Common Intangible Geophysical Products and Related Standards. Listed 

below are intangible products from MEC projects that may be included in the geophysical 

quality management program: 

11.2.3.3.1. One or more parcels of land declared clean or declared as meeting project 

objectives, also referred to as “QC Complete, turned over to the Government for QA acceptance” 

11.2.3.3.2. Geophysical interpretations based on professional judgment, sometime also 

referred to as manual interpretations 

11.2.3.3.3. QC and QA of these products often take the form of verification/acceptance 

sampling. In this context, verification/acceptance sampling is defined as any procedure used to 

validate a product after it has been turned over for government acceptance. Typical procedures 

currently include digitally mapping or remapping (to include resweeping for analog approaches) 

a portion of an area after it is declared free of MEC contamination. These current 

verification/acceptance sampling methods are based on performing post-dig anomaly verification 

sampling as part of the anomaly resolution process. Table 6-6 shows the acceptance sampling 

criteria for anomaly resolution that PDTs should use to determine the amount of anomalies that 

must be resolved to achieve a specific confidence level that less than a certain amount of 

anomalies remain unresolved after investigation. The failure criteria must be the discovery of 

unresolved or undetected MEC-like geophysical anomalies. Remapping small subportions of a 

site without a statistically valid reason to do so does not provide statistically significant 

information regarding the success or failure of an intangible analog or digital geophysics 

product. Failure criteria must factor for unresolved or undetected MEC-like anomalies. If not, 

they provide little confidence in the product when such MEC-like anomalies are detected.

11.2.3.3.4. If the PDT chooses to use remapping as a verification/acceptance sampling 

tool for QC or QA, they should do so only when process QC has a reasonable expectation of 

delivering uniform products and the PDT agrees on the definitions of production units and lot 

sizes. The terms production units and lot sizes are terms defined in MILSTD-1916; however, the 

reader is cautioned that statistically valid definitions for production units or lot sizes of intangible 

geophysical products are under discussion within the MR community as of the date of this 

publication. The reader should contact the EM CX for up-to-date information on this topic. 

11.2.3.3.5. It is further emphasized that remapping of land parcels mapped using analog 

geophysical system should have failure criteria defined in terms of previously undiscovered or 

unidentified MEC-like geophysical anomalies and not in terms of physical sizes of excavated 

objects. The reason this type of failure criteria is required is that the presence of such anomalies 

indicates either the analog geophysical mapping interpretations or coverage do not meet project 

objectives or that instruments malfunctioned. If unexplained MEC-like anomalies are detected, a 

product failure exists. For properly designed QC plans of analog systems, a mechanism is 

needed within the UFP-QAPP for either removing all recovered MEC-like anomaly sources from 

the project site or identifying them as previously discovered. This can be achieved by leaving 

pin flags at each such location, painting each item recovered, or specifying that any item 

discovered shall be left on the ground surface. This latter approach would prove difficult to 

implement if the density of such items is high and may mask subsurface MEC still present or if 

digital mapping techniques are used for QC or QA and the density of surface metal is high. 
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11.2.4. Managing Munitions and Explosives of Concern Quality Control Failures. 

11.2.4.1. This subsection introduces the topic of managing QC failures and presents ideas 

of how to establish the meaning of QC failures. Because no geophysical system can guarantee 

all MEC are detected under all conditions, the PDT should agree upon specific understandings of 

what a given QC failure indicates upfront. Not all QC failures indicate a breakdown in field 

processes or that defective or nonconforming products will result; sometimes they simply 

indicate local site conditions are less amenable to detecting MEC than others. In all instances, 

the QC personnel should perform a root-cause analysis and determine to what degree the QC 

failure affects project decisions. QC failures that do not affect project decisions are less 

significant than those that directly impact project decisions. 

11.2.4.2. This subsection provides some examples of how some QC criteria can be 

managed under different conditions. The list below is not all-inclusive. The PDT should review 

each QC test included in the QC plan and outline a plan for managing failures in the event they 

occur. It may be beneficial to identify those types of failures that are minor in nature, those that 

are critical in nature, and those that could be either minor or critical depending on how they will 

affect project decisions.

11.2.4.2.1. Undocumented Survey Coverage Gap Too Large. For many 

characterizations, the important factor is acreage investigated. If some datasets have gaps larger 

than those acceptable to the PDT, simply surveying an extra grid or transect may suffice, rather 

than needing to reoccupy small gaps in multiple grids or transects, which can be costly and time 

consuming. For response actions, the gaps need to be surveyed properly. Root-cause analyses 

normally focus on the source of the gap to determine if it is due to instrumentation (which is 

often visible in the track-plot maps), due to a breakdown in following field procedures (the trackplots are accurate, the data were simply collected along the wrong lines), or due to 

undocumented obstacles. Gaps due to documented obstacles, such as trees or fences, should be 

addressed during project planning. 

11.2.4.2.2. Along-Track Data Density Does Not Meet a Project Objective or Metric. 

In circumstances where no anomalies are detected in the affected area, the project needs may not 

warrant spending the time to correct this failure, as it would not impact PDT decisions. If 

anomalies are present on the affected portions, these types of failures likely would not be 

allowed and appropriate actions would be required. Root-cause analyses would be similar to 

those described in Section 11.2.4.2.1. 

11.2.4.2.3. Contractor Fails to Detect a Seeded Anomaly. Some blind seed items may 

go undetected if they are buried at depths difficult for the geophysical system to detect. This 

should be avoided to the practical extent possible by placing the blind seeds at depths that ensure 

100% detection IAW the GSV process. If the blind seed item is still not detected and if all other 

data quality tests and system checks indicate the data are of high quality, it may not be possible 

to reliably detect that seed item under the conditions it is buried in. In this circumstance, the 

PDT should be notified of the failure, as it may affect the project’s detection capability 

objectives or PDT expectations. Root-cause analyses typically focus on reviewing the 

geophysical and related QC data and reviewing the anomaly detection and selection criteria. 

They may include re-collecting data over the location to confirm it indeed could not be detected. 
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11.2.4.2.4. Contractor Fails to Include a Seeded Inert Munition on their Anomaly 

Classification Dig List. If the anomaly classification feature parameters indicate that the 

anomaly is a likely non-MEC and the item is placed on the do-not-dig list, the contractor must 

perform a root-cause analysis to determine why the inert munition was not placed on the dig list. 

If the root-cause analysis determines that the inert munition has characteristics that are 

significantly different than the MEC for which it is a surrogate, then the classification decision 

logic should be adjusted to account for the actual feature parameters for the MEC. If the rootcause analysis determines that the inert munitions item has feature parameters that are close to 

the MEC of interest, the PDT should determine if modifications to the classification decision 

logic needs to be modified. If the goal of the investigation is to remove all MEC within the 

production area, then the classification parameters need to be modified to ensure that all MEC 

are identified and excavated. If the goal of the investigation is to determine whether MEC are 

present within a sector, the classification parameters may not need to be modified if all other QC 

parameters met the pass/fail criteria. 

11.2.4.2.5. Calculated Background Noise Levels for a Dataset Exceed a QC 

Threshold. It is common for background noise levels to change over a project site. Normally, 

this metric is used as an indicator that instrument platform integrity is degrading or that 

instrument failure may be occurring. The root-cause analyses typically focus on reviewing the 

affected dataset(s) and associated areas for abnormal measurement spikes (indicative of 

degrading instrument platform integrity or instrument failure), local terrain conditions, local 

geology conditions, or an increase in clutter due to proximity to a target area. If local terrain, 

geology, or clutter is suspected, the analyses normally include recollecting small amounts of data 

in one or more affected datasets to prove the increased noise levels are repeatable. If the 

increased noise levels are reproduced, adjusting the threshold upward for such areas may be 

warranted. If they are not reproduced, then either problems with the integrity of the instrument 

platform are the cause or instrument failures occurred.

11.2.4.2.6. Anomaly Reacquisition Team Reports a False Positive for a Large 

Amplitude Anomaly or Anomaly Resolution Team Reports a Small Piece of Metal for a 

Large Amplitude Anomaly. For site characterizations, a small number of such failures may be 

acceptable, particularly if returning to the anomaly location for more thorough excavations 

would not affect project decisions. Such a scenario would exist if the anomaly is located in an 

area already confirmed as being contaminated with MEC or if large numbers of surrounding 

anomalies are reported as unrelated to DoD activities and there is reasonable statistical 

justification that the missed anomaly is not MEC or MEC-related. In these circumstances, even 

though the failure indicates a possible significant process failure or possibly a significant 

instrument failure, returning to the actual anomaly would not affect decisions for that area. For 

response actions, these types of failures likely would not be allowed and appropriate actions 

would be required for each such anomaly. Root-cause analyses should focus on the procedures 

the contractor uses to document excavation results and how that information is provided, 

reviewed, and accepted by geophysical and QC personnel. 

11.2.4.2.7. QC Mapping. QC mapping (using either digital or analog systems) of an 

analog geophysics lane detects an undocumented or previously undiscovered MEC-like 

geophysical signal. Since analog systems benefit only from being able to differentiate between 
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very small and shallow anomaly sources from very large and deep sources, most signals must be 

excavated in order to determine if the source is MEC or not. If, during a QC resweep, a signal is 

detected that must be excavated to determine if it is MEC or not, the finding indicates a 

significant failure in how the analog geophysical system was used to detect MEC. For 

characterization surveys, this finding may not be significant for the same reasons explained in 

Section 11.2.4.2.5. Similarly, for response actions, this finding likely would constitute a 

significant failure requiring appropriate actions be taken. Root-cause analyses focus on why the 

operator’s interpretation of his or her geophysical instrument was in error, why their coverage of 

their lanes does not meet project objectives, or if their geophysical sensor failed. Typically, the 

analyses include reviewing field logs for discrepancies, interviewing the responsible team leader, 

and resweeping the affected area or all lanes mapped by the responsible individual(s).

11.2.4.2.8. A QC Function Check Exceeds a QC Threshold. Most QC function checks 

are designed to demonstrate whether the instruments are functioning properly or not. If all 

reviews of the associated data and all other function checks indicate proper instrument 

functionality, then the QC failure is not likely to affect project decisions. The root-cause 

analyses typically include reviewing all associated data for indications of instrument failure and 

all other QC function check results for evidence of instrument failure and how the field team 

implements the QC function check procedures. The analyses also may include recollecting data 

over small portions of associated areas to prove whether or not instrument failure occurred. 

11.2.5. Special Considerations for Munitions and Explosives of Concern Quality 

Control Programs. 

11.2.5.1. MEC Characteristics and Burial Characteristics that Affect QC. 

11.2.5.1.1. The characteristics of the target MEC and how it could be buried must be 

factored into the QC plan. For example, most MEC have shapes that are axially symmetric, 

similar to tear drops (mortars and bombs), elongated egg-like shapes (MK2 grenades), circular or 

dumbbell shaped (rockets), or bullet shaped (large caliber projectiles). These types of items 

produce responses with very different SNRs in most detectors when they are buried at different 

angles but at the same depths. For instance, most commonly used horizontal-loop TDEMI 

detectors can detect most projectiles at much greater depths when buried in a vertical orientation 

as opposed to a horizontal orientation. What this means is that a MEC item that may go 

undetected at one depth when buried in one orientation will produce a high SNR and be easily 

detected if buried in another orientation at the same depth. For this reason, QC inspections 

should focus not only on the physical size of items recovered but also should focus on the 

instrument measurements recorded or observed during the QC inspections. 

11.2.5.1.2. The UFP-QAPP must differentiate between detection capabilities and task 

results. The term “task results” refers to results from all field activities associated with the 

detection and removal of MEC and includes geophysical mapping, anomaly reacquisition, and 

anomaly resolution. Therefore, the UFP-QAPP must factor in the limitations of the geophysical 

system to effectively detect all MEC as stated in the project objectives. Essentially, the UFPQAPP must differentiate quality elements that define what is meant by “good data” from quality 

elements that are affected by technology limitations. As an example, the UFP-QAPP may need 

to differentiate MEC anomaly characteristics that must always be detected from those that may 
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sometimes go undetected or unselected. For the former, QC measures are developed to verify all 

such signatures are detected and selected. Finding such a signature during QC inspections would 

strongly suggest a major defect in work task products. For technology limitations, QC measures 

focus on how project decisions are made, and finding such signatures during QC inspections may 

or may not suggest defects in work task products. As an example, if a weak anomaly is detected 

that may be MEC or may be geologic noise turns out to be MEC, then finding such a signature 

during QC inspection suggests either a product defect or a limitation of the technology. It would 

be deemed a product defect if, during the root-cause analysis, it is found the quality of the 

underlying geophysical data does not meet project needs (such as having too many data gaps or 

the sensor noise levels are too high and could have been reduced). If, on the other hand, the 

quality of the data is good, then finding a MEC item suggests not all project objectives can be 

achieved using current technologies because the probability of detecting that MEC under those 

site-specific conditions is less than 1. Another possibility in this scenario is that the project 

decision criteria are not sufficiently stringent to meet all project objectives (i.e., the anomaly 

selection criteria were set too high) and more anomalies with lower signals must now be selected 

using adjusted criteria. Whatever the cause of quality failures, whether related to data quality or 

technology limitations, root-cause analyses will be system-specific and should be thorough. The 

government geophysicist should verify that all possible causes of the failure have been identified 

and, if appropriate, each is tested to confirm or refute each possibility. As an example, one 

common QC test used to monitor sensor performance is to quantify the variations in background 

measurements by calculating their standard deviation. This metric is used as one of several 

means to monitor for instrument malfunction, and QC pass/fail criteria typically are established 

using IVS data at a time when the sensor was proven to be functioning properly. However, as 

site conditions vary, often as the areas surveyed approach a target zone or the underlying geology 

changes, the calculated background variations increase to the point where the noise pass/fail test 

fails. The root-cause analysis likely include testing system cables for shorts and testing sensors 

for broken components or bad connections; if no obvious sources are found and geology or site 

conditions are suspected, the sensor likely would be redeployed over the area to confirm the 

increased noise levels are reproduced. If confirmed as such, the corrective actions likely would 

be limited to adjusting anomaly selection criteria to factor for increased noise levels in affected 

areas.

11.2.5.2. MEC Detection Variables that Affect QC. 

11.2.5.2.1. The types of issues presented in Section 11.2.5.1.1 stem from the fact that 

most production-level DGM detectors can only reliably classify large TOIs from small pieces of 

clutter. If small TOIs are anticipated on an MRS that also has similarly sized clutter, then these 

sensors are less reliable at differentiating between the small TOIs and clutter. This is not true of 

advanced EMI sensors, which have shown significant capability to distinguish small TOIs (e.g., 

37 mm projectiles, small ISOs) from small non-TOI items at several test sites (see: //www.serdpestcp.org for additional information on classification studies). If advanced EMI sensors are not 

used to classify anomalies and because production-level DGM surveys cannot differentiate 

between non-MEC geophysical signatures and MEC signatures, all such signatures must be 

investigated. More importantly, these are the types of anomalies that should not be present in 

any post-removal QC or QA inspection or post-removal verification data. https://www.serdpestcp.org/content/search?cqp=Standard&SearchText=non-toi&x=0&y=0
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11.2.5.2.2. For each type of MEC, the project team should define anomaly characteristics 

that always must be detected. Many MEC are sufficiently large that, under certain burial 

conditions, they always produce anomalies with unambiguous characteristics. Here the term 

unambiguous normally is associated with high SNR, high peak amplitude, and/or large spatial 

area of above-background measurements. Other clearly definable, instrument-specific 

characteristics also can be used. Anomalies having signatures with these characteristics 

represent buried target items that may or may not be MEC. MEC associated with such 

anomalies almost always are buried at depths shallower than the maximum detection depth the 

geophysical system is capable of detecting. The PDT must decide which anomaly characteristics 

constitute a process failure if they go undetected or unresolved and also must agree that 

anomalies with other characteristics may be present in QC, QA or post-verification data, even if 

those other characteristics sometimes can be associated with MEC. These latter characteristics 

usually are associated with MEC that are buried at depths or orientations that are difficult to 

detect with certainty and are commonly referred to as difficult to detect anomalies or anomalies 

near the LOD for a given geophysical system.

11.3. Munitions Constituents Quality Management. 

11.3.1. Uniform Federal Policy - Quality Assurance Project Plan. The contractor must 

ensure that adequate quality controls are performed for the various MC analytical tasks 

performed. The contractor is responsible for achieving data quality criteria to meet the project 

DQOs and should document these in the UFP-QAPP. The UFP-QAPP should document in 

detail the QA and QC and other technical activities to ensure that the environmental data 

collected are of the correct type and quality required for a specific decision. The government 

may reject analytical data that do not meet QC requirements. Additional guidance for UFPQAPPs is provided in Section 4.4. 

11.3.2. Data Quality. The contractor must provide data quality of a level sufficient to 

ensure the production of high quality chemical data that satisfy the project-specific DQOs. 

11.3.2.1. ER 200-1-7 is the umbrella USACE document that defines Chemical Data 

Quality Management activities and integrates all of the other USACE guidance on environmental 

data quality management. Its purpose is to assure that the analytical data meet project DQOs, 

which are documented along with the required QC criteria in the approved project UFP-QAPP. 

11.3.2.2. EM 200-1-2 provides guidance for designing data collection objectives, 

identifying data need and designing data collections programs. See Chapter 2 for further details 

on the TPP process applied to MR projects. 

11.3.2.3. USACE guidance for reviewing data packages and qualifying data for 

performance-based methods, such as SW-846 methods, is provided in EM 200-1-10, Guidance 

for Evaluating Performance-Based Chemical Data, 30 Jun 05. EM 200-1-10 provides guidance 

for the USACE and USACE contractors for evaluating instrumental chemical data using a 

performance-based approach. A performance-based method is defined as an analytical 

procedure for which data quality indicators are documented and evaluated with respect to 

acceptance criteria that are established from project data quality objectives. In particular, the 

PARCCS parameters (precision, accuracy, representativeness, completeness, comparability, and 
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sensitivity) are documented for the target analytes of concern at the levels of concern (i.e., at or 

below project action levels) in the environmental media of interest and are evaluated with respect 

to acceptance limits or MQOs that are designed to ensure that total measurement uncertainty is 

within the limits prescribed by project DQOs. The extent of data review is dependent upon the 

project’s DQOs and the type of data. For example, the reporting and evaluation requirements are 

different for definitive data and screening data. 

11.3.2.3.1. A performance-based review typically includes the evaluation of the 

following QC elements:

• Completeness

• Holding time and preservation 

• Initial calibration

• Initial calibration verification

• Continuing calibration certification

• Sensitivity (e.g., detection and quantitation limits)

• Blanks (e.g., field and method blanks) 

• Laboratory control samples (LCSs) 

• Post-digestion spikes (PDSs; for trace metal methods) 

• Matrix spikes (MSs)

• Matrix spike duplicates and matrix duplicates

• Surrogates (for organic chromatographic methods) 

11.3.2.3.2. See Section 13.8.3.1.1 and ER 200-3-1, Environmental Quality - Formerly 

Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Program Policy, 2004 for a discussion of Staged Electronic Data 

Deliverables (SEDD) and the requirements for electronic data deliverable review. The USEPA 

CLP National Functional Guidelines for Data Review and USEPA regional guidance for data 

validation also may be applicable to a specific project.

11.3.3. Quality Control. QC samples are designed to evaluate the PARCCS parameters 

and identify quality problems in laboratory analytical performance, matrix effects, and in field 

performance. For example, accuracy is assessed from calibration, LCSs, MSs, PDSs, and 

surrogate data. Precision is evaluated from duplicate laboratory control and MS samples. 

Sensitivity is evaluated using LODs and LOQs. Representativeness is evaluated via the review 

of holding time and blank data. A laboratory’s analytical performance is evaluated using 

calibration results (i.e., initial calibrations, initial calibration verifications, and continuing 

calibration verifications) and batch QC samples such as method blanks and LCSs. Matrix effects 

are evaluated using MS, surrogate spike, and PDS recoveries. Field duplicates, rinsate blanks, 
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and trip blanks are examples of QC samples that are employed to assess QC problems associated 

with sample collection activities. The QC samples should include all sample matrices and 

analytical parameters except disposal parameters (i.e., TCLP, reactivity, corrosivity, and 

ignitability). The contractor should administer all QC sample handling and custody requirements 

in a similar manner to that used for the environmental samples.

11.3.4. Laboratory QC. Laboratories selected to provide chemical data for USACE 

munitions environmental projects must have a quality system. The laboratory’s quality system is 

the process by which the laboratory conducts its activities so as to provide the client with data of 

known and documented quality with which to demonstrate regulatory compliance and for 

decision-making purposes. The laboratory must be accredited for the chemical analyses being 

performed through the DoD ELAP. The guidance for quality systems that environmental testing 

laboratories must follow can be found in the DoD QSM for Environmental Laboratories. This 

guidance is based on the National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Conferences Quality 

System requirements, which is consistent with ISO/IEC 17025 and provides implementation 

clarification and expectations for DoD environmental programs. It is designed to serve as a 

standard reference for DoD representatives, including contractors who design, implement, and 

oversee contracts with environmental testing laboratories. The DoD QSM includes detailed 

DoD-specific laboratory QC requirements and acceptance limits for USEPA SW-846 methods, 

which must be followed by the laboratory for munitions projects. Laboratory QC requirements 

should be discussed with laboratory personnel during project planning. 

11.3.5. Coordination with QA Laboratory. If contractual requirements specify the 

collection of QA split samples, the contractor is required to provide coordination of the 

collection and transportation of the QA samples to the QA laboratory acquired per the 

requirements specified in the SOW/PWS. The PDT should determine the rate per matrix per 

analysis per sampling event for the QA splits. QA samples should be taken as splits of the same 

samples as QC duplicates (i.e., sample should be homogenized and split in triplicate). If 

sampling and analysis of volatile organic compounds is required for an MC site, the QA split 

should be collocated. The QA split samples should include the same matrices and parameters as 

QC duplicate samples. The QA laboratory should be provided a list of the applicable MQOs. 

The MQOs should include, but should not be limited to, identification of extraction and analysis 

method numbers and a list of analytes with required limits. All QA sample handling and custody 

requirements should be administered by the contractor similar to the environmental samples. See 

EM 200-1-6, Chemical Quality Assurance for Hazardous, Toxic and Radioactive Waste Projects

for additional guidance. 

11.3.6. Performance Evaluation (PE) Samples. EM 200-1-7, Environmental Quality 

Performance Evaluation (PE) Program, 1 Feb 01, provides guidance for the use of PE samples as 

a tool for evaluating analytical laboratory performance. If PE samples will be employed for a 

project to validate laboratory performance, determine the use of the PE samples early in project 

planning to allow adequate time for selection and design of the samples. Clear goals for PE 

samples should be designed around the project’s analytical needs and DQOs. The use of projectspecific PE samples is ideal; however, they may not be cost effective, timely to produce, or 

available.
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11.3.7. Considerations during IS. 

11.3.7.1. Refer to published guidance for IS (see Section 8.8.1.3.2.1) for detailed 

information on the special QC requirements for IS. Field replicates provide a measure of the 

variability or total error of the data set (field sampling error + laboratory sample processing and 

subsampling error + laboratory analytical error). Field replicates for IS are not field splits; 

rather, they must be independently collected incremental samples from the same sampling unit. 

Reproducibility of IS results by replicate sampling is key to demonstrating that data are 

scientifically defensible and representative and the only means by which confidence can be 

quantified. Detailed laboratory QC requirements for IS samples for explosives by Method 

8330B can be found in DoD QSM Version 4.2. For soil samples, QC samples, including LCS 

and MS samples, must be ground and subsampled in the same manner as the field samples to 

ensure the accuracy of the data. 

11.3.7.2. Data from a poorly conceived or poorly executed IS sampling program may not 

be acceptable because project objectives and DQOs were not clearly defined and the data cannot 

properly inform the decision to be made. Some project team members or stakeholders may be 

concerned that the mean concentrations obtained by IS do not provide spatial information on the 

distribution of contaminants within a sampling unit. A project team needs to be prepared to 

address concerns regarding IS diluting out hotspot contamination, as well as not obtaining 

information about the spatial distribution of contaminants within a single sampling unit.

11.4. Geospatial Data and System Quality Control. 

11.4.1. The primary goal of data quality management is to ensure a consistent and 

measurable accuracy throughout the database. Consistency is achieved through the use of 

documented, approved production procedures. Data handling and management should be 

consistent with, and refer to, the project’s UFP-QAPP. Following production, an assessment of 

the quality of the data set should be conducted to measure the level of achievement of the 

expected results.

11.4.2. The PDT should establish the level of production control and rigor with which 

quality assessments should be made consistent with the project-specific GDS requirements. 

GDS with stringent accuracy and consistency requirements may need to have detailed procedural 

documentation, a completion signature for each production step, and a comprehensive 

assessment of accuracy. Conversely, smaller-scale GDS developed for production of 

background geospatial data may have much less stringent production documentation 

requirements and only a cursory accuracy assessment. 

11.4.3. The PDT should state in the SOW that the contractor should perform QC of the 

GDS activities and products and include independent tests, which may be reviewed periodically 

by the government. Therefore, USACE QA and testing functions will focus on whether the 

contractor meets the required project requirements. 
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Table 11-3: Performance Requirements for RIs Using DGM Methodsa

Requirement

Applicability (Specific 

to Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Static repeatability 

(instrument 

functionality)c

All Response (mean static spike minus 

mean static back ground) within 

+/- 10% 

Min 1 daily Day’s dataset fails unless seed item is 

mapped that day with repeatable 

anomaly characteristics (see dynamic 

detection repeatability).

Along-line 

measurement spacing

All 98% <= 25 cm along lined By dataset Dataset submittal fails.

Speed Transects e 95% within maximum project 

design speed or demonstrated speed

By dataset Dataset submittal fails unless new 

maximum speed successfully 

demonstrated at IVS.

Coverage * Grids > 90% coverage at project design 

line spacing and 98% coverage at 1 

meter line spacingf

By dataset or gridg Submittal fails unless gaps filled, 

additional data collected, or government 

refund for missing acreage.

Dynamic detection 

repeatability (IVS and 

GSV blind seeding)

IVS (applies to grids and 

transects)h 

Peak response repeatable to +/- 25% 

of expected responsei

Twice daily. Submittal fails.

Blind Seeds (applies to 

grids and to transects with 

intrusive) 

Peak response > 75% of minimum 

expected responsei 

1 per day per team

based on expected 

production rate

Submittal fails.

Dynamic positioning 

repeatability (IVS and 

GSV blind seeding)

IVS (applies to grids and 

transects)

Position offset of seed item targets 

<= 25 cm

Twice daily Submittal fails.

Blind seeds (applies to 

grids)

90% positioning offset is <=25 cm + 

1⁄2 line/sensor spacing and 100% is 

<=35cm + 1⁄2 line/sensor for digital 

positioning systems (<=50cm + 1/2 

line spacing for fiducially positioned 

data) 

OR 

the positioning DQO required for 

site specific tasksj 

1 per day per team

based on expected 

production rate

Submittal fails.
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Requirement

Applicability (Specific 

to Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Transects with 

reacquisition/digging

Position offset of seed item targets 

<= 1 meter

1 per day per team

based on expected 

production rate

Submittal fails.

Target selection All All dig list targets are selected 

according to project design 

By grid or datasetg Submittal fails.

Anomaly resolution*k Verification checking by 

DGM remappingl or 

verification checking with 

original instrument of 

anomaly footprint after 

excavation m

Second party checks open holes to 

determine:

90% confidence < 5% unresolved 

anomaliesn

 

Accept on zero.

Rate varies depending 

on lot sizeo. See Table 

6-6: Acceptance 

Sampling Table for 

Anomaly Resolution.p 

Lot submittal fails.

Geodetic equipment 

functionality*

All Position offset of known/temporary 

control point within expected range 

as described in the approved UFPQAPPq

Daily Redo affected work or reprocess 

affected data.

Geodetic internal 

consistency

Grids with line-andfiducial positioningGrid corners are internally 

consistent within 30 cm on any leg 

or diagonal.

Per grid Redo affected work (corner placement 

and data collection, or data processing).

Geodetic accuracy Points used for RTK or 

RTS base stations

Project network must be tied to 

HARN, CORS, OPUS or other 

recognized networkr

. Project 

control points that are used more 

than once must be repeatable to 

within 5 cm.

For points used more 

than once, repeat 

occupations of each 

point used, either 

monthly (for frequently 

used points) or before 

re-use (if used 

infrequentlyt).

Reset points not located at original 

locations or resurvey point following 

approved UFP-QAPP

Geodetic repeatability* Grid centroids or 

corners/transect points 

without anomaly 

reacquisitionu

Measured locations are reoccupied 

within 10 m.v 1 per lot Lot submittal fails.
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Note: Performance metrics marked with an * are default values that may be changed by the PDT to suit project needs, potentially as a result of TPP decisions. 

a

 These are the critical requirements for RI DGM methods. Contractors shall use additional methods/frequencies that they deem beneficial and as required in their SOPs. 

b

 All failures also require a root-cause analysis.

c

 Item should be placed on a jig that ensures consistent geometry between the sensor and item to ensure repeatability, response not to exceed 500 units, or optionally use the 

Geonics calibration coil. Duration of data collection needed to be determined by the contractor. Must compare to original to ensure instrument is consistent throughout the project. 

It is recognized that this QC requirement may be redundant and could contradict results from seeding QC; however, in the event of seed failure, information from this test may aid 

in determining cause of failure (i.e., instrument or processing).

d 25 cm based on institutional knowledge and common instrument physical dimensions. Assumes speed used achieves detection. This requirement can be relaxed if supporting 

documentation is provided to the government for concurrence.

e

 Needed because increase in speed can reduce SNR and increase number of false hits (alternatively, this test can be supplanted by repeatable anomaly characteristics of seed items 

within the dataset).

f

 Recommended default line spacing is 0.6 m for items of interest the size of 40 mm grenades and smaller, otherwise, 0.8 m.

g

 The terms grid and dataset refer to logical groupings of data or data collection event. Logical groupings of data are contiguous areas mapped by the same instrument and in the 

same relative timeframe. These can be grids, acres, or some other unit of area. A data collection event is similar to logical groupings of data but refers to data collected over a 

contiguous timeframe, such as morning, afternoon, battery life, or some other measure of contiguous time. It is recognized that physical marking of corners on the ground is not 

always beneficial to the government. Additionally, size and shape of the grid is not specified.

h

 It is recommended that IVS seeds items not be buried to a depth where the minimum IVS response is less than approximately 25 mV. Burial at depths that result in small 

responses (e.g., 5-15 mV) may result in failure to meet the performance standard due to relatively small variations in response that are part of the error budget (e.g., response 

variations due to sensor bounce).

i

 The expected response is the site-specific value determined in initial IVS testing through averaging several runs of the IVS.

j Site-specific DQOs may necessitate smaller positioning repeatability requirements or may allow the requirements to be relaxed . Smaller positioning repeatability may be 

required for advanced classification methods and for sites with smaller TOIs (e.g., 37mm projectiles). The requirement may be relaxed for sites with only larger TOI (e.g., 100-lb 

bombs), or other site-specific reasons.

k

 Resolved is defined as 1) there is no geophysical signal remaining at the flagged/selected location; 2) a signal remains but it is too low or too small to be associated with TOI; 3) 

a signal remains but is associated with surface material which when moved results in low, or no, signal at the interpreted location; or 4) a signal remains and a complete rationale 

for its presence exists.

l

 Mapping shall cover the required number of anomaly locations. This is used in lieu of checking individual anomalies for those instances where it is quicker to remap sections of 

land rather than return to individual anomalies. Only the data at the anomaly locations are reviewed for resolution.

m This may require leaving flags at excavated locations until QC is complete. It is up to the contractor to indicate which holes knowingly have metal left in them where the PDT 

has agreed such is acceptable. It is the contractor’s responsibility to not put hot material back in the hole before QC is complete. As part of this requirement, location accuracy 

also must be demonstrated (i.e., cleared location is within dynamic positioning error radius as described above). Contractor SOPs that incorporate post-excavation inspections 

using digital geophysical instruments can be used to meet the excavation verification need of this requirement provided appropriate QC protocols in place to monitor and document 

the SOPs are followed. Acceptance sampling or alternative QC protocols to monitor and document the reacquisition SOP would be required to demonstrate the correct locations 

are excavated.

n This is a statistical test number. These values have been used successfully on previous projects. The PDT may choose to modify the statistical confidence level or the number of 

unresolved anomalies that are allowable on a site-specific basis. The statistical test number does not imply there are 5% bad units. It tests that there are fewer than 5% bad units, 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

11-26 

including zero bad units. The PDT determines values for confidence levels, which are dependent on the information needed. Stopping rules take precedence over this standard 

(e.g., for high MEC density, decision could be made to stop because the team has enough data for characterization).

o Contractor shall propose the lot size and criteria for designation (i.e., woods vs. open).

p

 For example, if lot size is 500 anomalies, to achieve a 90% confidence that there are less than 5% unresolved anomalies, 43 anomalies must be rechecked. If any one of the 43 is 

unresolved, then the confidence level has not been met, the lot submittal fails, and all anomalies in that lot must be rechecked (i.e., accept on zero). The contractor shall propose 

the lot size for government concurrence. (The contractor determines the amount of risk they are willing to take. The larger the lot, the less sampling needs to be done, but the 

larger the risk of increased costs/rework if failure occurs.) For anomaly resolution, in order to use statistics/confidence levels, it is based on number of anomalies not grids. 

q Most high-accuracy systems should demonstrate repeatability between 5 cm and 10 cm. Typical accuracies achievable for some high-accuracy systems are 2 cm to 

subcentimeter for RTK DGPS and RTS units depending on manufacturer and site conditions. Less accurate systems should demonstrate repeatability within manufacturer 

published ranges. Typical accuracies for less accurate systems are 5 m to submeter for WAAS or satellite correction service DGPS units, depending on manufacturer, correction 

service, and site conditions; and 30 m to 1 m for U.S. Coast Guard beacon corrected units, depending on manufacturer and distance from beacon.

r

 The plan for tying the project network to a common reference network must be described in the approved UFP-QAPP. If monumentation is part of the plan, specific 

monumentation procedures and DQOs also need to be specified. 

s Repeat occupation means demonstrate the control points being used can be recovered and reoccupied and that they have not moved more than the requirement specification. This 

can be accomplished using the same methodology used to initially tie the local network to a HARN, CORS, OPUS, or other recognized network, or it can be accomplished by 

other means that achieve this requirement.

t

 An example of frequently used control points would be points used as RTK DGPS base stations. Infrequently used points could be those used during RTS operations where the 

control point was used during mapping and then again at some later time for reacquisition and QC statistical sampling. Infrequently used points also could include grid corners; 

they are used for line and fiducial positioning and then reused for reacquisition or QC statistical sampling.

u

 Geodetic repeatability metric referenced here is the accuracy required for the grid corners or transect endpoints required to place the grid or transect locations on project site map. 

This test is not the accuracy requirements for DGM target location and reacquisition.

v

 The exact location of a single transect/grid is not critical when the information is used only for characterization by interpolating over large areas (e.g., transect spacings are larger 

than geodetic accuracies). The PDT may tighten the acceptable accuracy if more exact positioning is needed (e.g., trying to characterize extents of small MRSs). If specific 

anomalies/locations must be recovered, this metric must be revised to meet project needs and likely will have the same accuracy needs as the geodetic accuracy requirement.
EM 200-1-15 

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11-27 

Table 11-4: Performance Requirements for RI/FS Using Analog Methodsa

Requirement

Limited Applicability 

(Specific to Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Repeatability 

(instrument 

functionality)

All All items in test strip detected (trains 

ear daily to items of interest)c Min 1 dailyd Remedial training and additional 

remedial measures as described in 

the approved UFP-QAPP if due to 

operator error, or replacement of 

faulty equipment.e

Dynamic repeatability Transects used only for 

density estimates

Repeat a segment of transect and show 

number of counts repeated within the 

greater of ±20% or ±8, or within range 

of adjacent segments.

Second party repeat of 2% 

per lot

Redo lot

Transects with digging Repeat a segment of transect and show 

extra flags/digs not greater than the 

greater of 20% or 8 flags/digs, or 

within range of adjacent segments.

Second party repeat of 2% 

per lot

Redo lot

Coverage, detection 

and recovery* 

Grids 95% of blind coverage seeds and blind 

detection seeds are recoveredf: 

Per operator per lotg: 

variable 1–2 large/deep and 

1–3 small/ shallowh.

Redo lot

Anomaly resolution*i Verification checking of 

excavated locations 

(analog or digital 

instrument)j 

Second party checks open holes to 

determine:

90% confidence < 5% anomalies 

unresolvedk

Accept on zero.l

Rate varies depending on 

lot sizeg. See Table 6-6: 

Acceptance Sampling Table 

for Anomaly Resolutionm.

Redo lot

Verification checking by 

DGM remappingn 90% confidence <5% unresolved 

anomaliesk

 

Accept on zero.

l 

Rate varies depending on 

lot sizeg. See Table 6-6: 

Acceptance Sampling Table 

for Anomaly Resolution.m 

Redo lot
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

11-28 

Requirement

Limited Applicability 

(Specific to Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Geodetic equipment 

functionality *

All Position offset of known/temporary 

control point within expected range as 

described in the approved UFP-QAPP.

o

Daily Redo affected work 

Geodetic accuracy Points used for RTK or 

RTS base stations

Project network must be tied to HARN, 

CORS, OPUS or other recognized 

networkp

. Project control points that 

are used more than once must be 

repeatable to within 5 cm.

For points used more than 

once, repeat occupationq of 

each point used, either 

monthly (for frequently 

used points) or before reuse 

(if used infrequently)

r

.

Reset points not located at original 

locations or resurvey point 

following approved UFP-QAPP. 

Geodetic repeatability 

* 

Grid corners/transect 

points without anomaly 

reacquisition

Measured locations are reoccupied 

within 10 m.s 1 per lot Redo affected work

Note: Performance metrics marked with an * are default values that may be changed by the PDT to suit project needs, potentially as a result of TPP decisions. 

a

 These are the critical requirements for RI analog methods. Contractors shall use additional methods/frequencies that they deem beneficial and as required in their SOPs.

b

 All failures also require a root-cause analysis.

c

 The requirement is that each operator demonstrates positive detection on a daily basis of the smallest and largest expected MEC of interest when placed at both their best and 

worst orientations and buried between 95% and 100% of their respective maximum consistent detection depth.

d

 Random blind reconfiguration of test strip also is required (i.e., moving/adding items) at a frequency determined by the contractor and approved in the UFP-QAPP, to address the 

potential for simply memorizing seed locations.

e

 Some examples of additional remedial measures are removal of operator from mapping for 1 day, retesting on new blind strip meeting the same requirements for seed items 

(could move location of items in same area), 100% QC reinspection of initial lanes by that operator, etc.

f

 Coverage seeds are small pieces of metal that will produce relatively large amplitude anomalies over small areas, such as small washers or ball bearings. Known location 

accuracy of placement is not critical. See table note g for description of blind detection seeds.

g Contractor shall propose the lot size and criteria for designation (i.e., woods vs. open).

h Detection and recovery must be demonstrated consistently for the hard to detect items; therefore, seed items (e.g., ISOs) that are representative of the largest expected MEC and 

the smallest expected MEC shall be placed between 95% and 100% of their respective maximum consistent detection depth.

i Resolved is defined as 1) there is no geophysical signal remaining at the flagged/selected location, or 2) a signal remains but it is too low or too small to be associated with TOI, 

or 3) a signal remains but is associated with surface material which when moved results in low, or no signal at the interpreted location, or 4) a signal remains and a complete 

rationale for its presence exists.
EM 200-1-15 

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11-29 

j This requires leaving flags at excavated locations until QC is complete. If shovel called to a flag during QC then the failure has already occurred—it is not important that 

something large or small comes out of the hole. Assumption here is mapping coverage is addressed through other means. It is up to the contractor to indicate which holes 

knowingly have metal left in them where the PDT has agreed such is acceptable. It is the contractor’s responsibility to not put hot material back in the hole before QC is complete. 

k This is a statistical test number. These values have been used successfully on previous projects. The PDT may choose to modify the statistical confidence level or the number of 

unresolved anomalies that are allowable on a site-specific basis. The statistical test number does not imply there are 5% bad units. It tests there are fewer than 5% bad units, 

including zero bad units. Values for confidence levels will be determined by the PDT and are dependent on the information needed. Stopping rules will take precedence over this 

standard (i.e., for high MEC density, decision could be made to stop because the team has enough data for characterization).

l Unresolved anomaly means a significant signal remains without a complete rationale for its presence. 

m For example, if lot size is 500, to achieve a 90% confidence that there are less than 5% unresolved anomalies, 43 anomalies must be rechecked. If any one of the 43 is 

unresolved, then the confidence level has not been met, the lot submittal fails, and all anomalies in that lot must be rechecked (i.e., accept on zero). The contractor shall propose 

the lot size for government concurrence (i.e., The contractor determines the amount of risk they are willing to take. The larger the lot, the less sampling needs to be done, but the 

larger the risk of increased costs/rework if failure occurs.). For anomaly resolution, in order to use statistics/confidence levels, it is based on number of anomalies not grids. 

n Mapping shall cover the required number of anomaly locations. This is used in lieu of checking individual anomalies for those instances where it is quicker to remap sections of 

land rather than return to individual anomalies. Only the data at the anomaly locations are reviewed for resolution.

o

 Most high-accuracy systems should demonstrate repeatability between 5 cm and 10 cm. Typical accuracies achievable for some high-accuracy systems are 2 cm to 

subcentimeter for RTK DGPS and RTS units, depending on manufacturer and site conditions. Less accurate systems should demonstrate repeatability within manufacturer 

published ranges. Typical accuracies for less accurate systems are 5 m to submeter for WAAS or satellite correction service DGPS units depending on manufacturer, correction 

service and site conditions, and 30 m to 1 m for U.S. Coast Guard beacon corrected units, depending on manufacturer.

p

 The plan for tying the project network to a common reference network must be described in the approved UFP-QAPP. If monumentation is part of the plan, specific 

monumentation procedures and DQOs also need to be specified.

q

 Repeat occupation means demonstrate the control points being used can be recovered and reoccupied and that they have not moved more than the requirement specification. 

This can be accomplished using the same methodology used to initially tie the local network to a HARN, CORS, OPUS, or other recognized network, or it can be accomplished by 

other means that achieve this requirement.

r

 An example of frequently used control points would be points used as RTK DGPS base stations. Infrequently used points could be those used during RTS operations where the 

control point was used during mapping and then again at some later time for reacquisition and QC statistical sampling. Infrequently used points could also include grid corners 

they are used for line and fiducial positioning and then subsequently re-used for reacquisition or QC statistical sampling.

s

 The exact location of a single transect/grid is not critical when the information is used only for characterization by interpolating over large areas (e.g., transect spacings are larger 

than geodetic accuracies). The PDT may tighten the acceptable accuracy if more exact positioning is needed (e.g., trying to characterize extents of small MRSs). If specific 

locations must be recovered this metric must be revised to meet project needs and likely will have the same accuracy needs as the Geodetic Accuracy requirement, which is 30 cm.
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11-30 

Table 11-5: Performance Requirements for RA Using DGM Methods a 

Requirement

Applicability 

(Specific to 

Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Static repeatability 

(instrument 

functionality)c

All Response (mean static spike minus 

mean static background) within error 

budget of predicted response.

Min 1 daily Day’s dataset fails unless seed 

item is mapped that day with 

repeatable anomaly 

characteristics (see dynamic 

detection repeatability).

Along line 

measurement spacing

All 98% <= 25cm along lined By dataset Dataset submittal fails.

Coverage * Data using electronic 

positioning equipment

>95% coverage at project design line 

spacing and 98% coverage at 1 meter 

line spacing.

e

By grid or datasetf Submittal fails.

Data using fiducial 

positioning

All blind coverage seedsg detected at 

their emplacement location within the 

dynamic positioning repeatability 

metric or lay down guidance ropes & 

perform random inspection

4 per system per grid or datasetf

Or

All have range markers (e.g., pin 

flags, painted ropes) at a 

maximum distance of 25 ft or 

ropes for individual lanes, and 

visual observation minimum once 

per day

Submittal fails.

Dynamic detection 

repeatability (IVS and 

GSV blind seeding)

IVS (applies to all) Peak response repeatable to +/-25% of 

expected response.h 

Twice daily. Submittal fails.

Blind seeds (applies 

to all)

Peak response >75% of minimum 

expected response.h

1 per day per team based on 

expected production rate

Submittal fails.

Dynamic positioning 

repeatability (IVS and 

GSV blind seeding)

IVS (applies to all) Position offset of seed item targets < 

25cm.

Twice daily. Submittal fails.

Blind seeds (applies 

to all) 

90% positioning offset is <=25 cm + 1⁄2 

line/sensor spacing and 100% is 

<=35cm + 1⁄2 line/sensor for digital 

positioning systems (<=50cm + 1/2 

1 per day per team based on 

expected production rate (same 

item as dynamic detection 

repeatability)

Submittal fails.
EM 200-1-15 

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11-31 

Requirement

Applicability 

(Specific to 

Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

line spacing for fiducially positioned 

data) 

OR 

the positioning DQO required for site 

specific tasksi

Target selection All All dig list targets are selected 

according to project design. 

By grid or dataset f Submittal fails.

Anomaly resolution *j

Verification checking 

by DGM remappingk

or verification 

checking with original 

instrument of 

anomaly footprint 

after excavation l

90% confidence < 1% unresolved 

anomaliesm

Accept on zero

Rate varies depending on lot 

size.n See Table 6-6: Acceptance 

Sampling Table for Anomaly 

Resolution.o 

Lot submittal fails.

Geodetic equipment 

functionality *

All Position offset of known/temporary 

control point within expected range as 

described in the approved UFP-QAPPp

Daily Redo affected work or reprocess 

affected data.

Geodetic internal 

consistency

Grids with line-andfiducial positioningGrid corners are internally consistent 

within 30 cm on any leg or diagonal.

Per grid Redo affected work (corner 

placement and data collection, 

or data processing).

Geodetic accuracy Points used for RTK 

or TS base stations

Project network must be tied to HARN, 

CORS, OPUS or other recognized 

network.q Project control points that 

are used more than once must be 

repeatable to within 5 cm

For points used more than once, 

repeat occupationrof each point 

used, either monthly (for 

frequently used points) or before 

re-use (if used infrequentlys).

Reset points not located at 

original locations or resurvey 

point following approved UFPQAPP. 

Note: Performance metrics marked with an * are default values that may be changed by the PDT to suit project needs, potentially as a result of TPP decisions. 

a These are the critical requirements for RA DGM methods. Contractors shall use additional methods/frequencies that they deem beneficial and as required in their SOPs. 

b All failures also require a root-cause analysis.
EM 200-1-15 

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11-32 

c Item should be placed on a jig that ensures consistent geometry between the sensor and item to ensure repeatability, response not to exceed 500 units, or optionally use the 

Geonics calibration coil. Duration of data collection needed TBD by the contractor. Must compare to original to ensure instrument is consistent throughout the project. It is 

recognized that this QC requirement may be redundant and could contradict results from seeding QC; however, in the event of seed failure, information from this test may aid in 

determining cause of failure (i.e., instrument or processing).

d 25 cm based on institutional knowledge and common instrument physical dimensions. Assumes speed used achieves detection. This requirement can be relaxed if supporting 

documentation is provided to the government for concurrence.

e Recommended default line spacing is 0.6 m for items of interest the size of 40 mm grenades and smaller, else 0.8 m.

f The terms grid and dataset refer to logical groupings of data or data collection event. Logical groupings of data are contiguous areas mapped by the same instrument and in the 

same relative timeframe. These can be grids, acres, or some other unit of area. A data collection event is similar to logical groupings of data but refers to data collected over a 

contiguous timeframe, such as morning, afternoon, battery life, or some other measure of contiguous time. It is recognized that physical marking of corners on the ground is not 

always beneficial to the government. Additionally, size and shape of the grid are not specified.

g Blind coverage seeds are in addition to Dynamic Positioning Repeatability blind seeds and do not need to be ISOs.

h The expected response is the site-specific value determined in initial IVS testing through averaging several runs of the IVS.

i Site-specific DQOs may necessitate smaller positioning repeatability requirements or may allow the requirements to be relaxed. Smaller positioning repeatability may be 

required for advanced classification methods and for sites with smaller TOIs (e.g., 37mm projectiles). The requirement may be relaxed for sites with only larger TOI (e.g., 100-lb 

bombs), or other site-specific reasons.

j Resolved is defined as 1) there is no geophysical signal remaining at the flagged/selected location; 2) a signal remains but it is too low or too small to be associated with TOI; 3) a 

signal remains but is associated with surface material which when moved results in low, or no, signal at the interpreted location; or 4) a signal remains and a complete rationale for 

its presence exists.

k Mapping shall cover the required number of anomaly locations. This is used in lieu of checking individual anomalies for those instances where it is quicker to remap sections of 

land rather than return to individual anomalies. Only the data at the anomaly locations are reviewed for resolution.

l This may require leaving flags at excavated locations until QC is complete. It is up to the contractor to indicate which holes knowingly have metal left in them where the PDT 

has agreed such is acceptable. It is the contractor’s responsibility to not put hot material back in the hole before QC is complete. As part of this requirement, location accuracy 

also must be demonstrated (i.e., cleared location is within dynamic positioning error radius as described above). Contractor SOPs that incorporate post-excavation inspections 

using digital geophysical instruments can be used to meet the excavation verification need of this requirement provided appropriate QC protocols are in place to monitor and 

document the SOPs are followed. Acceptance sampling or alternative QC protocols to monitor and document the reacquisition SOP would be required to demonstrate the correct 

locations are excavated.

m This is a statistical test number. These values have been used successfully on previous projects. The PDT may choose to modify the statistical confidence level or the number of 

unresolved anomalies that are allowable on a site-specific basis. The statistical test number does not imply there are 1% bad units. It tests that there are fewer than 1% bad units, 

including zero bad units. The PDT determines values for confidence levels, which are dependent on the information needed. Stopping rules take precedence over this standard

(e.g., for high MEC density, decision could be made to stop because the team has enough data for characterization). 

n Contractor shall propose the lot size and criteria for designation (i.e., woods vs. open).

o For example, if lot size is 500 anomalies, to achieve a 90% confidence that there are less than 5% unresolved anomalies, 43 anomalies must be rechecked. If any one of the 43 is 

unresolved, then the confidence level has not been met, the lot submittal fails and all anomalies in that lot must be rechecked or some other action or actions performed. The 

contractor shall propose the lot size for government concurrence (i.e., The contractor determines the amount of risk they are willing to take. The larger the lot, the less sampling 

needs to be done, but the larger the risk of increased costs/rework if failure occurs.) For anomaly resolution, in order to use statistics/confidence levels, numbers of anomalies is 

used and not numbers of grids. 
EM 200-1-15 

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11-33 

p Most high-accuracy systems should demonstrate repeatability between 5 cm and 10 cm. Typical accuracies achievable for some high-accuracy systems are 2 cm to subcentimeter for RTK DGPS and RTS units depending on manufacturer and site conditions. Less accurate systems should demonstrate repeatability within manufacturer published 

ranges. Typical accuracies for less accurate systems are 5 m to submeter for WAAS or satellite correction service DGPS units depending on manufacturer, correction service and 

site conditions, and 30 m to 1m for U.S. Coast Guard beacon corrected units depending on manufacturer.

q The plan for tying the project network to a common reference network must be described in the approved UFP-QAPP. If monumentation is part of the plan, specific 

monumentation procedures and DQOs will also need to be specified.

r Repeat occupation means demonstrate the control points being used can be recovered and reoccupied and that they have not moved more than the requirement specification. This 

can be accomplished using the same methodology used to initially tie the local network to a HARN, CORS, OPUS, or other recognized network, or it can be accomplished by 

other means that achieve this requirement.

s An example of frequently used control points would be points used as RTK DGPS base stations. Infrequently used points could be those used during RTS operations where the 

control point was used during mapping and then again at some later time for reacquisition and QC statistical sampling. Infrequently used points could also include grid corners 

they are used for line and fiducial positioning and then subsequently reused for reacquisition or QC statistical sampling.
EM 200-1-15 

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11-34 

Table 11-6: Performance Requirements for RA Using Analog Methodsa

Requirement

Limited Applicability 

(Specific to Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Repeatability (instrument 

functionality)

All All items in test strip detected 

(trains ear daily to items of 

interest)c

Min 1 dailyd Remedial training and 

additional remedial measures 

as described in the approved 

UFP-QAPP if due to operator 

error, or replacement of faulty 

equipment.e

Coverage, detection and 

recovery * 

All All blind coverage seeds and 

blind detection seeds 

recoveredf

Per operator per lotg: variable 

1-2 large/deep and 1-3 

small/shallowh 

Redo lot.

Anomaly resolution *i Verification checking of 

excavated locations (analog 

or digital instrument)j

2nd party checks open holes to 

determine:

90% confidence < 1%k

unresolved anomalies.l

 

Accept on zero.

Rate varies depending on lot 

sizeg. See Table 6-6: 

Acceptance Sampling Table 

for Anomaly Resolution.m

Redo lot.

Verification checking by 

DGM remappingn 90% confidence < 1%k

unresolved anomalies.l

 

Accept on zero.

Rate varies depending on lot 

sizeg. See Table 6-6: 

Acceptance Sampling Table 

for Anomaly Resolutionm.

Redo lot.

Geodetic equipment 

functionality *

All Position offset of 

known/temporary control point 

within expected range as 

described in the approved UFPQAPP.

o

Daily Redo affected work.
EM 200-1-15 

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11-35 

Requirement

Limited Applicability 

(Specific to Collection 

Method/Use)

Performance Standard Frequency Consequence of Failureb

Geodetic accuracy Points used for RTK or RTS 

base stations

Project network must be tied to 

HARN, CORS, OPUS or other 

recognized networkp

. Project 

control points that are used 

more than once must be 

repeatable to within 5 cm

For points used more than 

once, repeat occupationq of 

each point used, either 

monthly (for frequently used 

points) or before re-use (if 

used infrequentlyr).

Reset points not located at 

original locations or resurvey 

point following approved UFPQAPP. 

Note: Performance metrics marked with an * are default values that may be changed by the PDT to suit project needs, potentially as a result of TPP decisions. 

a

 These are the critical requirements for RA analog methods. Contractors shall use additional methods/frequencies that they deem beneficial and as required in their SOPs. 

b

 All failures also require a root-cause analysis.

c

 The requirement is that each operator demonstrates positive detection on a daily basis of the smallest and largest expected MEC of interest when it is placed at both its best and 

worst orientations and buried between 95% and 100% of their respective maximum consistent detection depth. Maximum consistent detection depth is defined as producing any 

above background response on a minimum of the first three time gates of the EM61-MK2 optimized for site conditions and having a 0.9 m2 size or more as calculated using the 

Geosoft Oasis Montaj UCEAnalyseTarget.gx or equivalent routine.

d

 Random blind reconfiguration of test strip is also required (i.e., moving/adding items) at a frequency determined by the contractor and approved in the UFP-QAPP, to address the 

potential for simply memorizing seed locations.

e

 Some examples of additional remedial measures are removal of operator from mapping for one day, retesting on new blind strip meeting the same requirements for seed items 

(could move location of items in same area), and 100% QC reinspection of initial lanes by that operator. 

f

 Coverage seeds are small pieces of metal that will produce relatively large amplitude anomalies over small areas, such as small nails or ball bearings. Known location accuracy 

of placement is not critical. See endnote #g for description of blind detection seeds.

g

 Contractor shall propose the lot size and criteria for designation (i.e., woods vs. open).

h Detection and recovery must be demonstrated consistently for the hard to detect items; therefore, seed items (e.g., ISOs) that are representative of the largest expected MEC and 

the smallest expected MEC shall be placed between 95% and 100% of their respective maximum consistent detection depth.

i Resolved is defined as 1) there is no geophysical signal remaining at the flagged/selected location, or 2) a signal remains but it is too low or too small to be associated with TOI, 

or 3) a signal remains but is associated with surface material which when moved results in low, or no signal at the interpreted location, or 4) a signal remains and a complete 

rationale for its presence exists.

j

 This requires leaving flags at excavated locations until QC is complete. If UXO technicians need to return to a flag during QC, then the failure has already occurred—it is not 

important that something large or small comes out of the hole. Assumption here is mapping coverage is addressed through other means. It is up to the contractor to indicate which 

holes knowingly have metal left in them where the PDT has agreed such is acceptable. It is the contractor’s responsibility to not put hot material back in the hole before QC is 

complete. 

k This is a statistical test number. These values have been used successfully on previous projects. The PDT may choose to modify the statistical confidence level or the number of 

unresolved anomalies that are allowable on a site-specific basis. The statistical test number does not imply there are 1% bad units. It tests there are fewer than 1% bad units, 

including zero bad units. Values for confidence levels will be determined by the PDT and are dependent on the information needed. Stopping rules will take precedence over this 

standard (i.e., for high MEC density, decision could be made to stop because the team has enough data for characterization).
EM 200-1-15 

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11-36 

l Unresolved anomaly means a significant signal remains without a complete rationale for its presence. 

m For example, if lot size is 500, to achieve a 90% confidence that there are less than 5% unresolved anomalies, 43 anomalies must be rechecked. If any one of the 43 is 

unresolved, then the confidence level has not been met, the lot submittal fails, and all anomalies in that lot must be rechecked (i.e., accept on zero). The contractor shall propose 

the lot size for government concurrence (i.e., The contractor determines the amount of risk they are willing to take. The larger the lot, the less sampling needs to be done, but the 

larger the risk of increased costs/rework if failure occurs.). For anomaly resolution, in order to use statistics/confidence levels, it is based on number of anomalies not grids. 

n Mapping shall cover the required number of anomaly locations. This is used in lieu of checking individual anomalies for those instances where it is quicker to remap sections of 

land rather than return to individual anomalies. Only the data at the anomaly locations are reviewed for resolution.

o

 Most high-accuracy systems should demonstrate repeatability between 5 cm and 10 cm. Typical accuracies achievable for some high-accuracy systems are 2 cm to subcentimeter for RTK DGPS and RTS units depending on manufacturer and site conditions. Less accurate systems should demonstrate repeatability within manufacturer published 

ranges. Typical accuracies for less accurate systems are 5 m to submeter for WAAS or satellite correction service DGPS units depending on manufacturer, correction service and 

site conditions, and 30 m to 1 m for U.S. Coast Guard beacon corrected units depending on manufacturer.

p

 The plan for tying the project network to a common reference network must be described in the approved UFP-QAPP. If monumentation is part of the plan, specific 

monumentation procedures and DQOs also need to be specified. 

q

 Repeat occupation means demonstrate the control points being used can be recovered and reoccupied and that they have not moved more than the requirement specification. 

This can be accomplished using the same methodology used to initially tie the local network to a HARN, CORS, OPUS, or other recognized network, or it can be accomplished by 

other means that achieve this requirement.

r

 An example of frequently used control points would be points used as RTK DGPS base stations. Infrequently used points could be those used during RTS operations where the 

control point was used during mapping and then again at some later time for reacquisition and QC statistical sampling. Infrequently used points could also include grid corners 

they are used for line and fiducial positioning and then subsequently reused for reacquisition or QC statistical sampling.
EM 200-1-15 

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12-1 

CHAPTER 12

Hazard and Risk Assessment 

1

12.1. Introduction. 

12.1.1. This chapter describes explosive safety hazard assessment and chemical risk 

assessment associated with MEC and MC during MR projects. A MEC HA is used to describe 

baseline explosive safety hazards to human receptors. It also can be used to evaluate relative 

hazard reductions associated with removal or remedial actions, including LUCs, surface removal, 

and subsurface removal of MEC. Likewise, an MC risk assessment evaluates the potential threat 

to human health and the environment from exposure to MC, where the degree of risk is usually 

proportional to the toxicity of the contaminants as well as the amount and duration of exposure. 

12.1.2. An explosives safety hazard is the probability that MEC might detonate and 

potentially cause harm as a result of human activities. An explosives safety hazard exists if a 

person can come near or into contact with MEC and then energy of some sort is applied to it to 

cause it to detonate. The person, external forces not associated with the person’s contact, or an 

internal mechanism within the MEC item itself could apply the energy. 

12.1.3. The Army has authorized and encouraged the use of the interim MEC HA as a 

tool in conducting hazard assessments related to MEC during a trial period. This trial period was 

scheduled to expire at the end of 2010 but was extended by 2 years. Refer to USEPA Interim 

Munitions and Explosives of Concern Hazard Assessment (MEC HA) Methodology Document. 

http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/mec_methodology_document.htm, which provides 

access to an automated MEC HA workbook. 

12.1.4. Risks posed by MC are assessed through a process that adheres to the 

requirements of CERCLA and the NCP. Refer to EM 200-1-4 Volume 1 for HHRA and Volume 

2 for ERA and http://www.epa.gov/risk_assessment/guidance.htm. 

12.1.5. An MC risk assessment characterizes the nature and magnitude of health risks to

humans (e.g., residents, workers, recreational visitors) and ecological receptors (e.g., birds, fish, 

wildlife) from exposure to MC. 

12.2. Conceptual Site Model Development. 

12.2.1. The CSM is an ongoing description of a site and its environment that is based on 

existing knowledge and is updated as the project progresses. It serves as the basis for developing 

a comprehensive approach for addressing MR actions. It describes sources of MEC and/or MC 

at a site; actual, potentially complete, or incomplete exposure pathways; current or reasonable 

proposed use of property; and potential receptors. The CSM serves as a planning instrument, a 

modeling and data interpretation aid, and a communication device among the PDT to 

communicate and describe the current state of knowledge and assumptions about the MEC 

hazard and MC risk at a project property. The CSM evolves as site work progresses and data 

gaps are filled. See EM 200-1-12, Conceptual Site Models for Environmental and Munitions 
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Projects for additional guidance. This document recommends categorizing information 

necessary to develop the CSM into five profiles:

a. Facility profile – describes man-made features and potential sources at or near the site

b. Physical profile – describes factors that may affect release, fate and transport, and 

access

c. Release profile – describes the movement and extent of contaminants in the 

environment 

d. Land use and exposure profile – provides information used to identify and evaluate the 

applicable exposure scenarios, receptors, and receptor locations 

e. Ecological profile – describes the natural habitats of the site and ecological receptors in 

those areas

12.2.2. A team uses a preliminary CSM as a simple model of the relationships between 

chemicals and/or MEC and MC potentially located at a site and access to them by site receptors. 

As more information is gained through data collection, the CSM is refined through the course of 

the project to reflect site knowledge and uncertainties. For example, the preliminary CSM is 

useful to identify data gaps to focus site data collection efforts, but a refined CSM in later project 

stages would document results of an RI and assist in finalizing a remedial strategy and long-term 

management actions. At the end of the project, the CSM should be updated with the latest 

information and finalized. 

12.3. Munitions and Explosives of Concern Hazard Assessment. 

12.3.1. The potential for an explosives safety hazard depends upon the presence of three 

critical elements to complete the risk pathway. If any one of these three elements is missing, 

there is no completed pathway and, therefore, no resulting MEC hazard. Each of the three 

elements also provides a basis for implementing effective hazard management response actions. 

The three critical elements include:

a. a source of MEC (the presence of MEC at the project site); 

b. a receptor or person (the presence of a person at the project site); and

c. the potential for interaction between the source and the receptor (such as the receptor 

picking up the item or disturbing the item during the implementation of site tasks). 

12.3.2. The potential for an explosives safety hazard also depends on the source of MEC. 

The factors affecting the degree of hazard associated with the MEC source are the quantity and 

type of MEC. The more MEC present at a project site, the greater the likelihood for an 

interaction between a receptor and MEC. For example, more MEC are likely to be present at a 

former target area than at a former function test range. If there are no MEC present, there is no 

completed pathway and, consequently, no explosives safety hazard. 
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12.3.2.1. At military training facilities/ranges, it was and is customary to conduct initial 

training exercises using practice munitions, including on those ranges designated for HE-filled 

munitions use. Only after troops have demonstrated proficiency in firing tactics are they allowed 

to use HE-filled munitions. As a result, some training ranges contain a preponderance of 

practice munitions. Practice munitions also may have tracers, spotting or marking charges 

associated with them that contain energetic material. Practice munitions that contain these 

charges present a potential explosive safety hazard.

12.3.2.2. The primary release mechanisms resulting in the occurrence of MEC are related 

to the type of military munition activity or result from the improper functioning of the military 

munition. For example, when an HE artillery shell is fired, it will do one of three things: 

• It will detonate completely. This is called a high-order detonation. 

• It will undergo incomplete detonation. This is called a low-order detonation. 

• It will fail to function. This results in UXO. 

12.3.2.3. Military munitions may be lost, abandoned, or buried, resulting in unfired 

munitions that could be fuzed or unfuzed. These are termed DMM.

12.3.2.4. In addition, there are military munitions that will have a delayed function and 

may be hidden by design resulting in a deployed, armed, and fuzed munition. 

12.3.3. Military munitions demilitarization through OB/OD is used to destroy excess, 

obsolete, or unserviceable munitions by combustion or by detonation. An OD operation can 

result in high- or low-order detonations. In addition, the munitions possibly may be spread 

beyond the immediate vicinity from the action of the detonation, which is described as kick-out. 

Incomplete combustion or low-/high-order detonation failure can leave unconsumed explosives 

on the project site. Because munitions, including DMM, that remain after being subjected to 

attempted demilitarization by OB or OD have experienced an abnormal environment according 

to 6055.09-M, they should be managed as UXO until assessed and determined otherwise by 

technically qualified personnel. 

12.3.4. Receptors are people who potentially may contact MEC items. The factors 

affecting the hazard associated with the receptor include the number of people that access the 

area containing MEC and the accessibility and ease of access of the property containing MEC. 

The more receptors that use the location and the easier it is to access the property, the greater the 

potential for contact with MEC. The converse is also true: the fewer people that are present and 

the harder it is to access the property due to man-made (e.g., fences) or natural (e.g., terrain 

features) barriers, the lower the potential for contact with MEC.

12.3.5. The factors affecting the hazard associated with the interaction with MEC include 

MEC contact potential, energy application, and MEC sensitivity and potential severity. 

12.3.5.1. MEC contact potential is a function of MEC location (surface or subsurface) 

and the type and frequency of receptor activities that can result in a complete exposure pathway 

on the surface or in the subsurface. Factors include the depth of the MEC, site stability (frost 
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heave, erosion), and the depth and type of receptor activity. For instance, if the project property 

is unstable, there is a greater likelihood for subsurface MEC to migrate closer to the surface with 

increased potential for interaction. Also, for subsurface MEC, as the depth of intrusion by the 

receptor increases, the likelihood that there will be receptor and MEC interaction may increase. 

12.3.5.2. The energy application factor affects the likelihood that a receptor will apply 

enough energy to a MEC item to cause it to function. The risk to the receptor increases greatly 

the more energy the receptor applies to a MEC item. Examples are an item is picked up, hit with 

a hammer, thrown in a fire, etc. However, there also may be the case where the type of MEC 

requires no force be applied to it by the receptor in order to function. MEC size can, in some 

cases, influence the ease with which a receptor can apply energy to a MEC item. For example, a 

very large MEC item (e.g., a large bomb) is not easily picked up, reducing the possibility that a 

receptor can impart enough energy to cause the item to detonate from dropping. 

12.3.5.3. The greater the sensitivity, the greater the likelihood for a MEC item to 

function. The type of MEC affects the likelihood and severity of injury if a MEC functions. The 

hazard from MEC typically results from a single interaction between a receptor and a MEC 

source and may have one of three outcomes: no effect, injury, or death. The consequence of a 

military munition detonating is associated with physical forces resulting from blast pressure, 

fragmentation hazards, thermal hazards, and shock hazards. The type of hazard threat and the 

severity of the hazard depend on the type of MEC and whether or not it is fuzed, for example. 

12.3.5.3.1. Different types of military munitions vary in their likelihood of detonation 

and their potential for harm. The classification of energetic materials used in military munitions 

can be divided by their primary uses: explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics. Explosives and 

propellants, if properly initiated, evolve into large volumes of gas over a short period of time. 

The key difference between explosives and propellants is the reaction rate. Explosives react 

rapidly, creating a high-pressure shock wave, and are designed to break apart a munitions casing 

and cause injury and death. Propellants react at a slower rate, creating a sustained lower 

pressure. Propellants are designed to provide energy to deliver a munition to its target. 

Pyrotechnics produce heat but less gas than explosives or propellants. Pyrotechnics are used to 

send signals, to illuminate areas, to simulate other weapons during training, and as ignition 

elements for certain weapons. When initiated, pyrotechnics produce heat, noise, smoke, light, or 

infrared radiation. Incendiaries are a class of pyrotechnics that are highly flammable and are 

used to destroy a target by fire.

12.3.5.3.2. Practice rounds contain an energetic (low explosive or pyrotechnic charge) 

and include a fully functional fuzing system, while training rounds are wholly inert. A practice 

round can, in some cases, pose a similar level of hazard to an HE-filled UXO item. The hazard 

from a practice round may result from a fuze or spotting charge contained in the munition in 

order to produce a flash or smoke upon impact. Unexpended spotting charges may cause a flesh 

burn. Wholly inert training rounds have no explosive parts, including fuze components, and do 

not pose an explosive safety hazard. 

12.3.6. The MEC HA is used to assess the hazards associated with MEC at land-based 

MRSs and complements the MRSPP (see Section 13.4). It is a qualitative tool with relative 

scoring values, with emphasis on EE/CA and RI/FS evaluations and analyses to support site-
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specific remedy selections. MEC HA does not set DQOs or replace HHRAs and ERAs for MC, 

nor is it used to make a cleanup decision. It utilizes inputs based on severity, accessibility, and 

sensitivity components.

a. Severity component: Input factors include energetic material type and location of 

additional human receptors. 

b. Accessibility component: Input factors include site accessibility, potential contact 

hours, amount of MEC, minimum MEC depth relative to maximum receptor intrusive depth, and 

migration potential.

c. Sensitivity component: Input factors include MEC classification and MEC size. 

12.3.6.1. Each input factor has a maximum score and weighting, with the input factors 

associated with the accessibility component carrying the highest combined weight compared to 

the other two factors. 

12.3.6.2. Each input factor has two or more categories that determine the score assigned 

to that input factor. These categories describe all reasonable MRS conditions, including the 

MRS at a baseline condition, the MRS after a surface cleanup, and the MRS after a subsurface 

cleanup. This approach allows an MRS to be assessed with different remedial or removal 

alternatives, including LUCs. For example, the energetic material type factor for the severity 

component assigns relative scores for each of the three MRS conditions, including the highest 

score of 100 for “high explosives and low explosive filler in fragmenting rounds” and the lowest 

score of 30 to “incendiary.” 

12.3.6.3. The MEC HA scoring of an MRS results in one of the following hazard levels 

being assigned to each remedial or removal alternative, which provides a way of evaluating the 

relative MEC hazard potential reductions provided by each alternative relative to the baseline 

(current) conditions at the MRS. 

• Hazard Level 1: Sites with the highest hazard potential

• Hazard Level 2: Sites with a high hazard potential

• Hazard Level 3: Sites with a moderate hazard potential

• Hazard Level 4: Sites with a low hazard potential

12.3.6.4. See http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/hazard_assess_wrkgrp.htm for 

complete information about the application and use of the MEC HA tool.
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12.4. Munitions Constituents Risk Assessment. 

12.4.1. HHRA. 

12.4.1.1. The HHRA evaluates the potential for adverse human health effects occurring 

that are attributable to site contamination, including contamination by MC. The CSM, which is 

revised as appropriate based on additional information about a site, is used to focus the HHRA. 

Screening-level HHRAs are performed at sites during the PA/SI stage to determine whether a 

site needs to be assessed further or can be eliminated from further concern. The conservative 

evaluation is based on comparing MC contamination levels with health-based screening levels. 

Baseline HHRAs are performed at sites during the RI/FS stage. This section focuses on the 

baseline HHRAs.

12.4.1.2. The process for characterizing risks to human health from exposure to MC is 

conducted in five phases during the baseline HHRA: 

a. Selecting MC COPCs

b. Exposure assessment

c. Toxicity assessment 

d. Risk characterization

e. Evaluation of uncertainties and limitations

12.4.1.2.1. Methodology. The methodology was largely developed from the USEPA’s 

Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS). Refer also to USACE’s guidance for 

performing HHRAs (Volume 1 of EM 200-1-4). Additionally, USEPA regional and state 

regulatory guidance should be used as required and deemed appropriate. 

12.4.1.2.2. Selecting COPCs. COPCs should be identified that represent chemicals 

detected at a site that could pose a potential health risk to exposed human receptors. The 

selection process is based on evaluation of useable site data using a number of criteria designed 

to screen out chemicals that are not appropriate to retain as COPCs. Key factors include 

determining the exposure area(s) and assessing the appropriateness of the site data. Chapter 7

provides information about the MC associated with different types of munitions. These MC 

should be considered when selecting COPCs during this phase, depending on the type or range, 

the munitions used, and the associated activities that have taken place. EM 200-1-4 Volume I 

provides guidance on the general considerations for selecting COPCs and specific COPC 

selection criteria. The conclusion of the chemical selection process is a subgroup of MC that are 

selected as COPCs, which are evaluated further in the baseline HHRA. Tables should be 

developed segregating the COPCs selected for each medium and/or exposure area. All MC that 

were removed from consideration should be identified, with an explanation of the reason for 

their exclusion. 

12.4.1.2.3. Exposure Assessment. During the BRA, the exposure assessment estimates 

the nature, extent, and magnitude of potential exposure of human receptors to the COPCs that are 
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present or migrating from the site, considering both current and plausible future use of the site. 

Several steps are required during this assessment, including: 

• characterizing the exposure setting (identifying the physical features of the site that 

may influence the exposures based on current use and those that may influence exposures based 

on reasonably anticipated future use); 

• identifying potential exposure pathways and exposure routes (with complete exposure 

pathways consisting of a source and mechanism of chemical release, an intermedia transport 

mechanism, a migration pathway, a receptor group who may come into contact with the 

chemical, and an exposure route through which chemical uptake by the receptor occurs [e.g.,

ingestion of soil]); 

• identifying potentially exposed receptor populations (based on current and anticipated 

future use of the site, and current and future activities of receptors on or near the site); and

• quantifying exposure (i.e., intake or dose) that could occur for complete exposure 

pathways for each receptor group, with respect to the magnitude, frequency, and duration of 

exposure. 

12.4.1.2.3.1. Consideration should be given to the spatial relationships of pathways and 

the need to segregate the site into smaller exposure units to properly evaluate risks to some 

receptor groups. The estimation of EPC (i.e., the chemical concentrations the receptor 

potentially will contact during the exposure period), whether from fate and transport modeling 

and/or site data, is a key component of the exposure assessment. Depending on the operational 

history of the site, the investigative approach, the available data, and the chemical, a number of 

EPCs (e.g., 95% upper confidence limit on the mean concentration, mean concentration, 

maximum concentration) could be used. 

12.4.1.2.3.2. EM 200-1-4 Volume I provides guidance on fate and transport modeling. 

Consideration should be given to estimating a range of potential exposures (e.g., reasonable 

maximum exposure scenario, average exposure scenario). At the conclusion of the exposure 

assessment, the uncertainties associated with chemical intake should be summarized.

12.4.1.2.4. Toxicity Assessment. The toxicity assessment results in the selection of the 

toxicity values that will be used to estimate the potential human health risks associated with 

exposure to the MC COPCs and forms the basis for developing summaries of the potential 

toxicity of the MC COPCs for inclusion in the risk assessment. This is an area of intense 

ongoing research and study for MC. Examples include toxicity of PAHs contained in the binder 

used for clay pigeon targets and the toxicity of lead. The USEPA is updating and expanding 

relative cancer potency factors for various PAHs using benzo(a)pyrene as a reference, which 

may impact toxicity assessment for these chemicals in the future. The USEPA and other 

jurisdictions are contemplating lowering the threshold for assessing exposure to lead, by factors 

of 2 or 10 or more. In addition, toxicity evaluations for energetic (e.g., technical grade DNT) 

and chemical agents and their breakdown products may result in changes that affect future 

toxicity assessments. A three-tier hierarchy of toxicity values must be used when selecting 

values for risk assessment purposes (see DoDI 4715.18 for more information): 
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• USEPA Integrated Risk Information System database 

(http://www.epa.gov/iris/index.html) 

• USEPA PPRTV for Superfund database (http://hhpprtv.ornl.gov/index.html) 

• Other toxicity values. EM 200-1-4 Volume I provides guidance on additional sources 

of toxicity information. This includes additional USEPA and non-USEPA sources of toxicity 

information. Priority should be given to sources of information that use sound science and are 

the most current, peer-reviewed, transparent, and publicly available. Example sources include 

the California Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Environmental Health Hazard 

Assessment Toxicity Criteria Database (http://www.oehha.ca.gov/risk/chemicalDB/index.asp), 

and the U.S. Department of Human and Health Services, ATSDR Minimal Risk Levels 

(http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/mrls/index.asp).

12.4.1.2.5. Risk Characterization. In the risk characterization, the chemical intakes 

estimated in the exposure assessment are combined with the appropriate critical toxicity values 

identified in the toxicity assessment. The results are the estimated incremental lifetime cancer 

risks and noncarcinogenic health hazards posed by the exposures. Along with the numerical 

estimates of potential health risks and hazards, a narrative describing the primary contributors to 

health risks and hazards and factors qualifying the results is presented. EM 200-1-4 Volume I 

provides information on methods for characterizing the risk associated with carcinogenic and 

noncarcinogenic chemicals. 

12.4.1.2.6. Uncertainty and Limitations Analysis. The risk assessment must include an 

objective and candid analysis of the uncertainties and limitations associated with the description 

of risks and associated conclusions. This provides the decision maker with a better 

understanding of the implications and limitations of the risk assessment. Sources of uncertainty 

may be related to variability in sampling and analysis of MC at the site (see Chapters 7 and 8) 

and in estimating the exposure to human receptors and from data gaps (e.g., using 

approximations for fate and transport, exposures, intakes, and toxicity). EM 200-1-4 Volume I

provides guidance for preparing the uncertainty analysis. 

12.4.2. ERA. 

12.4.2.1. Purpose. The purpose of an ERA is to evaluate whether potential adverse 

ecological effects are occurring or could occur from stressors in the environment, with the focus 

on contamination by MC. The process for characterizing the potential for adverse effects during 

an ERA is generally conducted in four phases (problem formulation, ecological effects 

characterization, exposure characterization, and risk characterization) and follows the process 

described in the USEPA’s Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (ERAGS). 

Refer also to USACE’s guidance for performing ecological risk assessments (Volume II of EM 

200-1-4). This process generally is followed for both SLERA and BERA. 

12.4.2.2. SLERA. Steps 1 and 2 of ERAGS are implemented through a SLERA, which 

includes screening-level problem formulation, effects evaluation, exposure estimation, and risk 

calculation (Refer to A Guide to Screening Level Ecological Risk Assessment at 

http://usaphcapps.amedd.army.mil/erawg/SLERA.pdf.) 
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12.4.2.3. During the screening-level problem formulation, an initial CSM is developed, 

which includes evaluation of the environmental setting, chemical fate and transport mechanisms, 

mechanisms of ecotoxicity, and complete exposure pathways. Assessment endpoints are 

considered any adverse effects on ecological receptors where exposure pathways are complete. 

The screening-level effects evaluation identifies conservative thresholds of ecotoxicity or 

screening ecotoxicity values protective of the ecological receptors being evaluated. Next, 

exposures are estimated under the conservative assumptions that chemicals are 100% 

bioavailable, 100% of an ecological receptor’s diet is contaminated, and the home range of all 

ecological receptors is within the contaminated area. Lastly, a screening-level risk calculation 

incorporates the estimated exposures with the screening ecotoxicity values into a quantitative 

estimate of the potential for adverse effects. The hazard quotient method (the ratio of the 

estimated exposure or medium exposure concentration to the screening ecotoxicity value) is used 

in the screening-level risk calculation. 

12.4.2.3.1. The SLERA results in a scientific/management decision point where: 

• there is adequate information to conclude that the risks are negligible and NFA is 

required; 

• the information is not adequate to conclude NFA and a BERA is required; and 

• the information points to the potential for adverse effects and a more thorough 

assessment is warranted.

12.4.2.3.2. When information is not adequate to conclude NFA and it seems a BERA 

may be required, it may be worthwhile to refine some exposure parameters from the SLERA 

with more realistic parameters if it is likely that reasonable / more realistic exposure parameters 

would help resolve the question of risk. The parameters that should be considered for refinement 

are discussed in A Guide to Screening Level Ecological Risk Assessment. The results of the 

refinement are used to determine whether or not the potential for adverse ecological risk is 

negligible such that an appropriate risk management decision may be made or great enough to 

warrant a BERA.

12.4.2.4. BERA. The BERA is implemented as steps 3 through 8 of ERAGS. Step 3 of 

ERAGS includes refinement of the problem formulation and identification of appropriate 

assessment endpoints. In the BERA problem formulation, additional site-specific information is 

used to refine the CSM, which helps define the scope and goals of the BERA. Steps 4, 5, and 6 

of ERAGs involve the planning and execution of a study designed to answer questions or test 

hypotheses concerning the potential for adverse effects on the assessment endpoints. 

Measurement endpoints (i.e., measurable ecological characteristics which are related to the 

values characteristic chosen as the assessment endpoint) are selected during this process. 

12.4.2.4.1. The BERA focuses on a lines-of-evidence approach for demonstrating 

adverse effects at the population and community levels and uses a reference area for comparison. 

Lines of evidence evaluated during the BERA may include: 

• comparison of estimate or measure ingested doses with toxicity reference values; 
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• comparison of on-site tissue residues with those from a reference area; 

• comparison of on-site toxicity test results with those from a reference area; 

• comparison of observed effects on-site receptors with those from a reference area; and

• comparison of measures of population or community health with those from a 

reference area.

12.4.2.4.2. Risk Characterization. Risk characterization involves risk estimation and 

risk description steps. Exposure and effects estimates are integrated into statements about the 

potential for adverse effects on assessment endpoints. Adverse effects are undesirable changes 

that alter valued structural or functional attributes of the ecological entities under consideration. 

The risk description includes a summary of ecological risk and an interpretation of ecological 

significance. Uncertainties and assumptions used in characterizing the potential for adverse 

effects posed by the MC are documented.

12.4.2.5. Resources for Conducting ERAs. In addition to the sources cited above, 

Table 12-1 provides references to tools for conducting ERAs and for data on toxicity values for 

various MC classes.

Table 12-1: ERA Technical Resources

Tools for Conducting BERAs 

• Adaptive Risk Assessment Modeling System (http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/arams) 

• Terrestrial Wildlife Exposure Model (http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/arams/) 

• Spatially Explicit Exposure Model and Habitat Suitability Database 

(http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/labsciences/tox/Pages/ARAMS.aspx) 

Toxicity (Energetics)

• USAPHC Wildlife Toxicity Assessments 

(http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/labsciences/tox/Pages/WTA.aspx) 

• USAPHC Terrestrial Toxicity Database 

(http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/labsciences/tox/Pages/ARAMS.aspx) 

• Risk Assessment Information System (RAIS) Ecological Benchmark Tool 

(http://rais.ornl.gov/tools/eco_search.php) 

Toxicity (Metals and Other MC)

• USEPA Ecological Soil Screening Levels (http://www.epa.gov/ecotox/ecossl/) 

• RAIS Ecological Benchmark Tool (http://rais.ornl.gov/tools/eco_search.php) 

• USEPA Ambient Water Quality Criteria 

(http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/criteria/wqcriteria.html) 
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12.4.3. Underwater MRSs. 

12.4.3.1. Risk assessment at underwater MRSs presents unique challenges because of 

environmental issues and the relative newness of the state of the science compared to land-based 

ranges (Refer to Munitions in the Underwater Environment: State of the Science and Knowledge 

Gaps; SERDP/ ESTCP White Paper -- http://www.serdp.org/Featured-Initiatives/MunitionsResponse-Initiatives/Munitions-in-the-Underwater-Environment). The Marine Technology 

Society recently has published several papers in their journal related to munitions in the 

underwater environment, including Legacy Underwater Munitions: Assessment, Evaluation of 

Impacts, and Potential Response Technologies and The Legacy of Underwater Munitions 

Worldwide: Policy and the Science of Assessment, Impacts and Potential Responses 

(https://www.mtsociety.org/publications/).

12.4.3.2. Underwater Munitions Sites. Munitions are found in all types of water 

environments, including in the ocean, both near shore and off shore, and in lakes, rivers, and 

swamps. These environments are complex and have varying characteristics, such as 

water/sediment depth, temperature, salinity, bathymetry, and sediment type, and are subject to a 

variety of water chemistries from oxidative to reductive in nature. Munitions types may include 

bombs, projectiles, mortars, grenades, and rockets and may lie on the surface of sediment, 

buried, or intact (e.g., UXO) or partially intact (e.g., low-order detonation). 

12.4.3.3. MC Release. Estimating the amount of MC released to the environment from 

individual munitions and all munitions at a site over time is a critical component of the CSM. 

The fate and transport of MC depends on several factors, including ambient current speed (if 

any), breach hole size, volume of cavity, dissolution rate of MC, and the hydrodynamic mixing 

coefficient. Recent research on models such as that undertaken through ESTCP may help in 

estimating munitions mobility and burial in the underwater environment (e.g., UXO Mobility 

Model). Mobility information can be used to support a risk assessment by identifying the areas 

and entombment depths likely to contain munitions, thus reducing costs associated with 

fieldwork. 

12.4.3.3.1. The release of MC from intact underwater munitions depends largely on the 

rate of corrosion. Understanding the condition of munitions casings helps to characterize the 

potential for energetic fill material to move into the environment. The UXO Corrosion 

Prediction Model developed under the Navy’s Environmental Sustainability Development to 

Integration Program addresses corrosion in the underwater environment. SERDP is undertaking 

research to develop a scientific basis for quantitatively estimating the source terms associated 

with breached or broken projectile casings along with the fate and transport of MC 

contamination in the aquatic environment. 

12.4.3.3.2. ERDC and others have investigated the ecotoxicity of TNT, RDX, and HMX, 

along with their uptake, biotransformation, and elimination in fish mollusks and various other 

underwater marine life and is assessing the toxicity of explosives in sediments. Refer to the 

Munitions in the Underwater Environment: State of the Science and Knowledge Gaps; 

SERDP/ESTCP White Paper cited above for more information. 

 
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12.5. Hazard and Risk Management Principles. 

12.5.1. Risk management consists of a two-part response: those MR actions that remove 

the hazard, such as physical removals, and those MR actions that manage the residual hazards, 

such as LUCs. 

12.5.1.1. Physical Removal. Physical removal involves reducing the quantity of MEC 

and associated MC at the property, which reduces the likelihood that contact with MEC or MC 

will occur. However, there frequently is residual hazard at MRSs since it is either technically or

financially impracticable to provide 100% removal of all MEC items or technically or financially 

impractical to prove 100% of the MEC have been removed. 

12.5.1.1.1. For example, where MEC depth exceeds the detection depth limitations of 

detection technology, a decision may be made to accept and manage the residual hazard. 

Alternatively, if the residual hazard in such cases is unacceptable, the PDT may decide to take 

steps to clear to the detection depth, remove soil from the cleared area, and resume detection and 

clearance activities in that same area until the desired level of residual risk is reached based on 

current and future land use considerations. 

12.5.1.1.2. Advanced EMI sensors allow for a greater level of classification of detected 

anomalies as either TOIs or non-TOIs. This allows the PDT additional flexibility during RAs 

and removal actions to leave anomalies in place that have been classified as nonhazardous using 

these sensors. Although there is the possibility that TOIs may be misclassified as non-TOIs, the 

residual risk is not different from leaving behind TOIs due to an analog process failure or 

limitations on the capability of analog or DGM systems. If a TOI is misclassified as non-TOI, it 

is likely that the MEC will not be included on the dig list and, therefore, will remain at the site 

after the investigation. The PDT must implement QC methods and procedures to help ensure the 

efficacy of the classification system so that the residual hazard is understood and adequately 

managed. Chapter 6 provides information on the advanced EMI sensors and associated 

procedures for their use, while Chapter 11 discusses the QC considerations for classification. 

12.5.1.2. LUCs. LUCs can be used to effectively manage the residual risk and are an 

important component of the overall risk management strategy. LUCs may consist of educational 

awareness programs, legal restrictions on land use, and physical access controls. The 

educational awareness program should be the cornerstone of the LUC program because of the 

paramount importance of effective risk communication. Controlling or altering the behavior of 

receptors can reduce the potential for interaction with MEC and MC and reduce the risks and 

hazards. Defense Environmental Network & Information Exchange provides an Internet Webbased Educational Program, available at http://www.denix.osd.mil/uxo/. LUCs, such as access 

and activity restrictions, also can be used to decrease the number of receptors and the potential 

for interaction with MEC and MC. If you reduce the number of receptors on site and the 

activities that cause interaction, the likelihood of interaction of MEC and MC is reduced. LUCs 

can only be part of a successful remedy if they are effectively implemented and maintained. A 

comprehensive LUC program should include periodic reviews (generally annually) for assuring 

the continued effectiveness of the program. 
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12.5.1.3. Safety. The U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES) 

and the DDESB help ensure explosives safety while an MR is being conducted by ensuring the 

adequacy of protective measures and compliance with DoD 6055.09-M (DDESB, 2008). The 

USATCES formally reviews, evaluates, and provides Army approval of measures to protect 

Army employees and the public from the potential hazards associated with MR. USATCES also 

ensures that the design of an MR addresses any residual explosive hazards potentially present at 

an MRS after completion of such responses, for example through the use of LUCs. 

12.5.2. In summary, if there is potential for a completed MEC or MC source-to-receptor 

pathway, the following hazard and risk mitigation measures can be applied: 

a. Reducing the quantity of MEC and MC on site lowers the risk. 

b. Reducing the number of potential receptors on site lowers the risk. 

c. Reducing the potential for interaction between receptors and MEC and MC lowers the 

risk (e.g., LUCs). 

d. Modifying or controlling the behavior of the receptors lowers the risk. 

12.6. Risk Communication. 

12.6.1. Effective communication is an integral part of hazard and risk management, 

collectively referred to as risk communication. Early, effective communication of hazards and

risk allows the public to have a stake in the decisions made and increase the likelihood of gaining 

community support. When the public perceives the government as being unresponsive and 

community relationships are poor, the public tends to judge the risk as being more serious. 

Without effective risk communication, the level of risk has little effect on the public’s perception 

of risk and increasing the amount of technical detail has no effect on the perceived risk. Section 

2.2 of this manual provides information on the TPP process, which guides risk communication to 

the project stakeholders.

12.6.2. Critical to effective risk communication is early stakeholder involvement. 

Restoration Advisory Boards (RABs) frequently are available as a means to facilitate public 

involvement and to implementing effective communication. RABs are advisory groups for the 

environmental restoration process and may involve representatives from the DoD, USEPA, state 

and local governments, tribal governments, and the affected local community. Although RABs 

are not decision-making bodies, the RAB members share community views and enable the 

continuous flow of information. The PDT should plan to have a risk assessment presentation to 

the RAB, if one is active at the installation. Assistance with this presentation can be provided by 

an expert from the EM CX, if required. Additional information on developing a public 

participation plan can be found in EP 200-3-1. 

12.6.3. There are many ways to effect risk communication; because of the differences in 

the education, interest level, and knowledge of the audience, more than one communication 

venue may be appropriate. The PDT should consider designating one person as a 

communications coordinator. This person could be from the public affairs office or a RAB 
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member and does not necessarily have to be a technical expert. The communications coordinator 

should become knowledgeable about MEC hazard and MC risk assessment issues and know 

when and where to go for additional expertise. At the beginning of a project, the PDT and 

communications coordinator should develop a site-specific risk communications plan. 

Components of the plan may utilize different methods of risk communication, including 

presentations, videos, partnering meetings, public information forums, and printed media. 

12.7. Long-Term Management of Residual Hazards. 

12.7.1. A CERCLA 5-year review is required for all MR projects where the final remedy 

does not allow for unlimited use and unrestricted exposure. 

12.7.2. The purpose of the 5-year review is to determine, on a periodic basis not to 

exceed 5 years, if the selected remedy remains protective of human health, safety, and the 

environment. Refer to EP 200-1-18 for procedural guidance on conducting 5-year reviews at 

MRSs.
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CHAPTER 13

Project Reporting Documents 

2

13.1. Introduction. 

13.1.1. This chapter provides guidance on the preparation and content of reports and 

deliverables developed during the execution of MR projects. See Chapter 4 for information 

about the requirements and content of key project planning documents. 

13.1.2. Some reports and deliverables have specific formatting requirements that will be 

specified in a contract’s data requirements.

13.1.2.1. RI and FS Reports. The Army RI/FS Guidance Document provides the 

content and format requirements for RI and FS Reports. 

13.1.2.2. After Action Report (AAR). An AAR is used to provide the results of MR RA 

and removal actions or other munitions-related operations and activities, as required. It 

documents all activities and operations that occurred and lists the MEC found during the RA or 

removal action and the MEC locations and the actions taken to address MC contamination. If an 

Emergency Action has been taken, the EOD unit conducting the removal action will have 

prepared an EOD Incident Report; if so, this incident report should be included in the AAR. 

13.1.2.3. Institutional Analysis. EP 200-1-20 (EP 1110-1-24) and ER 200-3-1 contain 

information on the requirements for conducting an institutional analysis to support development 

of proposed Land Use Controls as part of a removal or remedial response. 

13.1.2.4. Accident/Incident Reports. EM 385-1-1, EM 385-1-97, ER 385-1-99, and the 

applicable regulations at 29 CFR 1904 contain requirements for preparing reports of accidents or 

incidents that occur on the work site or in connection with the work conducted as part of the 

execution of a SOW/PWS.

13.1.2.5. Periodic Status Reports. Periodic status reports include weekly and monthly 

status reports. A monthly status report, consisting of a progress report and an exposure data 

report, is for reporting project status prior to and after completion of fieldwork. A weekly status 

report is for reporting project status from the beginning through completion of fieldwork. 

13.1.2.6. Minutes / Record of Meeting. Minutes / records of meetings record the 

proceedings of meetings and are used to provide a written record of attendees, questions and 

answers from public meetings, and other information and should be submitted within 5 days after 

the meeting. Sections should include a title page (meeting date, meeting title, project title, 

contract/task number, signatures), report minutes (purpose/objectives of meeting, and agenda), 

administrative data (date and location, sponsoring agency, name and title of chairperson, names 

and titles of attendees), covered information (description of material discussed), nature of 

discussion, and resulting actions. 
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13.1.2.7. Record of Conversation. Telephone conversations / correspondence records 

should be used to record the contents of substantive telephone conversations and written 

correspondence, including all calls to and from government personnel that require action by 

either the government or the contractor; all calls to or from government personnel that directly or 

indirectly affect contract terms and conditions; all calls to or from federal, state, or local 

regulatory agency personnel; and all calls to contractor personnel from outside sources that 

require the calling party to be referred to a USACE Public Affairs Office.

13.1.2.8. Personnel Qualifications Certification Letter. The requirements for a 

contractor-submitted letter certifying that key personnel and personnel filling core labor 

categories meet the training and experience requirements for the position held include a list, by 

name and position, of all individuals filling key personnel positions and core labor categories; 

the following certifying statement: “I certify that the personnel listed meet or exceed contract 

requirements for the functions they will perform”; and resumes to document the qualifications 

for the key personnel and personnel filling core labor categories. Resumes must document all 

required educational and experience requirements as listed in the contract. Resumes for UXO 

personnel shall be accompanied by the EOD school course graduation certificate or the UXO 

Tech 1 certification certificate.

13.1.2.9. Guidance. The following sections provide guidance on the content 

requirements for the following MR project reports, deliverables, and submissions prepared after 

the completion of project activities:

a. Reporting the results of cultural resources field survey (see Sections 13.2.1 and 13.2.2) 

b. Reporting the results of cultural resource monitoring activities (see Section 13.2.3) 

c. Reporting the results of biological field survey (see Sections 13.3.1 and 13.3.2) 

d. Reporting the results of biological avoidance activities (see Section 13.3.3) 

e. Reporting the results of applying the MRSPP (see Section 13.4) 

f. GDS data deliverables (see Section 13.5)

g. Instrument Verification Letter Report (see Section 13.6) 

h. Geophysics data deliverables (see Section 13.7)

i. MC data deliverables (see Section 13.8) 

13.2. Cultural Resources Reporting. 

13.2.1. Initial Survey Results. 

13.2.1.1. If cultural resource concerns are not present at the site after the initial cultural 

resources survey is completed (see Section 4.7.4.12), written communication to applicable 
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regulatory agencies shall be completed and submitted with site information and the completed 

checklist and stating further cultural resource investigations (i.e., a field survey) would not be 

necessary. The conclusion of the letter shall be that additional coordination is not intended with 

those agencies; however, if the agencies identify cultural resource concerns that the USACE 

team did not, a meeting to address those concerns should be held. In addition, the results of the 

initial cultural resources survey shall be documented in a survey report, which should include 

specific information about cultural resources associated with the MRS. 

13.2.1.2. If cultural resource concerns are present at the site based on the results of the 

initial cultural resources survey, written communication to applicable regulatory agencies shall 

be completed and submitted with site information and the completed checklist. The outcome 

shall be a meeting with the appropriate regulatory agencies to clarify cultural resource concerns 

relevant to the project, particularly areas impacted. 

13.2.2. Field Survey Results. 

13.2.2.1. The results of the cultural resources field survey, if performed, shall be 

documented in a field survey report, which should include specific information about cultural 

resources associated with the MRS. The reported information also shall include archaeological 

site forms, if appropriate, and field notes of the site archeologist. 

13.2.2.2. At a minimum, the cultural resources survey information shall include: 

a. cultural resource monitoring results, including any excavation results; 

b. a general description of cultural resources associated with the MRS (no specific 

location or figures may be included). This information shall be incorporated into the phasespecific report for the project; and

c. specific information about cultural resources associated with the MRS, to include GPS 

locations, figures, GIS data, etc. This shall include field notes of the site archeologist. This 

submittal shall be separate and considered “For Official Use Only” and provided on limited 

distribution to SHPO/THPO and USACE only. 

13.2.3. Monitoring Results. The results of cultural resources monitoring, performed 

IAW the Cultural Resources Monitoring Plan (Section 4.7.4.12.6), shall be documented in the 

associated phase-specific report.

13.3. Ecological Resources Reporting. 

13.3.1. Initial Survey Results. If ecological concerns are not present at the site based on 

the results of the initial Ecological Resources Survey (see Section 4.7.4.11.8), written 

communication to applicable regulatory agencies shall be completed and submitted with site 

information and the completed checklist. 
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13.3.1.1. The conclusion of the letter shall be that additional coordination is not intended 

with those agencies; however, if the agencies identify ecological concerns that the USACE team 

did not, a meeting to address those concerns should be held. 

13.3.1.2. If ecological concerns are present at the site, written communication to 

applicable regulatory agencies shall be completed and submitted with site information and the 

completed checklist. The outcome shall be a meeting with the appropriate regulatory agencies to 

clarify ecological concerns relevant to the project, particularly sensitive receptors, breeding 

seasons, areas impacted, etc. 

13.3.2. Field Survey Results. The results of the ecological resources field survey, if 

performed, shall be documented in a field survey report, which should include specific 

information about biological resources associated with the MRS. The report should include 

specific information about the biological resources associated with the MRS, such as species 

identified, populations, critical habitat, etc. The report also shall include field notes of the site 

biologist. 

13.3.3. Biological Avoidance Results. The results of biological avoidance activities 

performed during site activities shall be documented in the associated phase-specific report. 

13.4. Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol. 

13.4.1. In response to a 2002 National Defense Authorization Act requirement, DoD 

developed the MRSPP as the methodology for prioritizing sites known or suspected to contain 

MEC or MC for response actions. Each component must apply the protocol to determine a 

relative priority for MRSs located at active installations, BRAC installations, FUDS, or other 

properties no longer under DoD control. The priority assigned should be based on the overall 

conditions at each site, taking into consideration various factors relating to the potential 

environmental and safety hazards. 

13.4.2. The MRSPP consists of the following three modules to evaluate the unique 

characteristics of each hazard type:

a. The Explosive Hazard Evaluation Module addresses explosive hazards posed by MEC

and MC in high enough concentrations to pose an explosive hazard. 

b. The CWM Hazard Evaluation Module addresses hazards associated with the effects of 

CWM.

c. The Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) Module addresses chronic health and 

environmental hazards posed by MC and incidental nonmunitions-related contaminants.

13.4.3. Site prioritization of an MRS using MRSPP is applied as soon as the modules can 

be scored and would, for a new site, typically be done at the PA phase, although the HHE 

module may have the alternative rating of “evaluation pending” due to lack of MC data. The 

MRSPP for an MRS is further developed during the SI phase and updated during later phases, 

including the RI phase within the CERCLA process. The MRSPP results serve as the basis for 
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an installation’s or USACE District’s input to overall program planning, budget development, 

and execution decisions. The MRSPP for a site must be reviewed annually and updated, as 

needed. For FUDS sites, the MRSPP score sheets must be filled in using FUDSMIS. 

13.4.4. The MRSPP Wizard is an available tool that may be used to complete the 

MRSPP analysis. Its use may be a requirement on some contracts, including FUDS. The 

MRSPP Wizard is available at http://www.lab-data.com/MRSPP/Login.aspx?returnURL=default. 

The MRSPP Primer provides details about the MRSPP and should be consulted, along with other 

policy and guidance: http://denix.osd.mil/mmrp/upload/MRSPP_Primer.pdf. 

13.4.5. The USACE FUDS Handbook on Realignment, Delineation, and MRS 

Prioritization Protocol Implementation (2011) provides guidance on realignment and delineation 

procedures as well as MRSPP implementation. While the handbook’s applicability is for FUDS 

projects, the guidance outlined within it may be extended to non-FUDS projects.

13.4.6. Documentation of MRSPP results should be provided first in the PA report (if 

applicable) and maintained in the Administrative Record, which also should include any 

information provided by stakeholders that influence the relative priority assigned to an MRS or 

sequencing decisions concerning an MRS. The Administrative Record also should contain the 

following: 

a. Notification to USEPA, other federal agencies, state regulatory agencies, tribal 

governments, and local government organizations, as appropriate, seeking their involvement in 

MRSPP’s application and MRS sequencing 

b. Announcements in local community publications requesting information pertinent to 

prioritization or sequencing 

c. Any information provided to stakeholders that may influence the relative priority 

assigned to an MRS or sequencing decision concerning an MRS 

MRSPP scores also are required to be uploaded into the applicable database of record, including 

AEDB-R, HQAES, and FUDSMIS.

13.5. Geospatial Data and System Deliverables. 

13.5.1. All GDS deliverables and maps will be submitted IAW contract requirements. 

When applicable, maps and deliverables will be submitted in electronic format. The following 

sections provide guidance on the maps and deliverables that will be submitted. 

13.5.2. The following deliverables will be submitted to the PDT following the location 

survey and mapping task (the submittal dates should be specified for each delivery order).

13.5.2.1. Original copies of all field books, layout sheets, computation sheets, abstracts 

and computer printouts 
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13.5.2.2. Tabulated listing of all project control markers established and/or used in 

support of the MR showing adjusted horizontal and vertical positional values in meters and feet 

13.5.2.3. Tabulated listing of all MEC recovered and any specific anomalies not 

completely investigated

13.5.2.4. Tabulation of MC sample locations included in the project

13.5.2.5. Completed monument descriptions, stored in the GIS database, spreadsheet, etc. 

13.5.2.6. Unique items created and/or used to create the end products and the narrative 

and description required by the SOW 

13.5.2.7. Required location, project, and grid maps 

13.5.2.8. Image files of the aerial photographs taken for the project, if aerial photography 

is required in the SOW 

13.5.2.9. All maps will be prepared using industry standard sheet sizes and formats. 

Project-specific reporting requirements may dictate the use of a variety of sheet sizes to show 

relevant information. The PDT will determine the number of maps and copies of digital data to 

be delivered to the MMDC. 

13.5.2.10. No digital data will be acceptable until proven compatible with the GDS

designated in the SOW. All revisions required to achieve compatibility with the SOWdesignated GDS will be done at the contractor’s expense. 

13.5.2.11. Deliverables will be submitted to the PDT IAW contract requirements. 

Whenever appropriate, deliverables should be submitted electronically. Deliverables that should 

be submitted upon completion of the munitions response project include: 

13.5.2.12. Unique items created and/or used to create the end products and the narrative 

and description required by the SOW 

13.5.2.13. Digital data in the media as specified in the SOW (nonproprietary data file 

formats on stable digital media) along with all other supporting files and a data manual 

documenting all production and work files 

13.5.3. In all development of GDS data, consideration shall be made to address the life 

cycle data management aspects of the development, modification, storage, and reuse of 

geospatial data. Metadata shall be complete and thorough to allow publication of an individual 

dataset through any one of the following sources: 

13.5.3.1. National Geospatial Data Clearinghouse (Clearinghouse) – a distributed, 

electronic network of geospatial data producers, managers, and users operating on the Internet. 

The Clearinghouse is a key element of EO 12906 and allows its users to determine what 
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geospatial data exist, find the data they need, evaluate the usefulness of the data for their 

applications, and obtain or order the data as economically as possible. 

13.5.3.2. USACE Clearinghouse Node – HQUSACE established and maintains a 

computer network server on the National Geospatial Data Clearinghouse. This node functions as 

the primary point of public entry to the USACE geospatial data discovery path in the 

Clearinghouse. A separate electronic data page for each USACE Command has been established 

on the server. 

13.5.4. The PDT should review the extent of mapping requirements to be included in 

each MR project SOW. The PDT should assure that the SOW states that all maps and drawings 

to be provided under the task are sealed and signed by the RLS/PLS. The Tri-Service 

CADD/GIS Technology Center’s SDSFIE should be specified for all location survey and 

mapping deliverables of CADD, GIS, and other spatial and geospatial data IAW EM 1110-1-

2909. The PDT will ensure that the following maps are provided: 

a. Location Maps. A location map showing the project location and surrounding points of 

interest will be required. The map(s) should be produced at a scale no smaller than 1:2400 or 

1”:200’ (or 1:2500 for metric scale).

b. Hard copy project maps.

c. A map of all project-related points of interest should be produced and delivered at a 

scale specified by contract requirements. The project map should show the location and 

identification of all of the project control monuments recovered and/or established at the project 

property in support of the munitions response, local project controls, significant planimetric 

features, project boundaries, and property boundaries (if in close proximity to project 

boundaries). The location of recovered MEC also should be plotted and identified on the map 

unless individual grid maps also are required. 

d. Grid Maps. If required, individual maps for each grid should be prepared at a scale no 

smaller than 1:2,400 or 1”:200’ (or 1:2500 for metric scale). The Grid Maps will include the 

plotted location of each surface MEC and verified subsurface MEC recovered and each 

subsurface geophysical anomaly within the grid not completely investigated and any 

environmental samples. Other notable planimetric features within the grid will also be sketched 

on the individual Grid Maps. 

13.5.4.1. General Project Map requirements also should include grid, magnetic, and true 

north arrows with their angular differences; grid lines or tic marks at systematic intervals with 

values shown on the edges of the map; and a legend showing the standard symbols used for the 

mapping. Each sheet also will have a standard border, a revision block, and a complete index 

sheet layout. 

13.5.4.2. All production and work files, as well as all supporting data, will be fully 

documented into a concise data manual. This manual will include all specific information 

required for an outsider to be able to recreate all products and determine the location, names, 
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structures and association of the data. The manual will be included as an ASCII file titled 

READ.ME that is included with all distributed digital data.

13.6. Instrument Verification Strip / Geophysical Prove-Out Letter Report. 

13.6.1. After the completion of the IVS or GPO, the contractor must prepare an IVS 

letter report or GPO letter report, respectively. See Chapter 6 for information on when an IVS or 

GPO should be used and when each is applicable. The general requirements for these are the 

same. The letter report must contain all information required by the PDT to support anomaly 

selection decisions and include the following: 

a. As-built drawing of the IVS or GPO test plot 

b. Pictures of all seed items

c. Geophysical data maps

d. Average peak responses for IVS seeds

e. Blind QC seed minimum responses 

f. Static spike values

g. Summary of the IVS or GPO results 

h. Proposed geophysical equipment, techniques, and methodologies (for GPO only) 

i. Anomaly selection criteria 

j. Instrument specific and process specific criteria for defining the quality of the 

geophysical data (GPO only)

k. Any other pertinent data/information used in the decision making process 

13.6.2. A compact disk should be delivered to the USACE geophysicist with the letter 

report and containing the following files: 

a. IVS or GPO Letter Report in Microsoft Word format 

b. All raw and processed geophysical data

c. Geophysical maps in their native format (e.g., Surfur®, Geosoft Oasis MontajTM, 

Intergraph, or ESRI ArcView format) and as raster bit-map images such as BMP, JPEG, TIFF, or 

GIF

d. Seed item location table in Microsoft Excel or Access format
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e. Microsoft Access tables IAW USACE database table format that includes entries in the 

seed item table for target IDs per dataset

f. Table in Microsoft Access format of all control points, survey points, and benchmarks 

established or used during the location surveying task 

13.6.3. The IVS (or GPO) letter report should be included in future UFP-QAPPs and 

reports associated with the survey area. If the contractor proceeds with production geophysical 

mapping prior to the government’s acceptance of their IVS (or GPO) Letter Report, they proceed 

at their own risk. If the government rejects any portion of the contractor’s Letter Report 

pertaining to geophysical mapping procedures, QC or detection capabilities, all data collected by

the contractor at their own risk should be rejected and the contractor shall re-collect the data at 

zero cost to the government. 

13.7. Geophysics Data Deliverables. 

13.7.1. General. The geophysical data formats in the following sections are required to 

be followed, although additional data formats may be delivered to the PDT. The contractor must 

follow exactly the formats specified in this paragraph, although the contractor may choose to 

submit the data in additional formats as well. All geophysical data shall be accompanied by 

metadata in the form of a read-me file or a database or spreadsheet table documenting the field 

activities associated with the data, the processing performed, and correlation of data file names to 

grid names used by other project personnel. Metadata shall be generated for each logical 

grouping of data (e.g., names and contents of all files generated to map a grid, or names and 

contents of all files generated from a towed platform during a mapping session). Metadata shall 

fully describe all measurements recorded in each data file and shall include all information 

necessary to successfully associate all geophysical system measurements to their correct 

geographical location. At the discretion of the PDT, the metadata can be limited to provide 

references to where this information is located. 

13.7.2. Raw Geophysical Field Data Format and Storage. Raw field data will be stored 

in a logical file directory (folder) structure to facilitate its management and dissemination to PDT 

members. Raw field data are defined as all digital data generated from the geophysical system 

and includes geophysical, positioning, heading, tilt, and any other peripheral or instrument 

measurements collected or recorded during data acquisition. All raw field data shall have a time 

stamp associated with each measurement event. At the discretion of the PDT, raw field data may 

include geophysical system data that have been checked, corrected, and processed into ASCII 

files, either individually by instrument or merged with positioning data. Metadata for raw 

geophysical data shall include instructions for generating ASCII formatted data from all raw data 

for use in computer processing systems. 

13.7.3. Final Processed and Advanced Processed Data Format and Storage. Final and 

Advanced (as required) processed data shall be produced and presented in ASCII formatted files 

and native geophysical processing software formats (e.g., Geosoft GDB). Final processed data 

are defined as data that represent, to the best of the contractor’s ability, the true potential field 

that exists at each actual location measured by the geophysical system. Final processed data 
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shall have all corrections applied needed to correct for positioning offsets, instrument bias 

(including instrument latency), instrument drift, roll-pitch-yaw-angle offsets, and diurnal 

magnetic variations. Advanced processed data are defined as Final Processed data that have

been subjected to additional advanced processing (e.g., filtering) techniques and were used in the 

anomaly selection process. All corrections and processing steps will be documented. Metadata 

for final processed and advanced processed data shall include UTM zone and coordinate units 

(the PDT or PWS may require additional coordinate units and projections be included), and 

descriptions and units of all “z” values, which are the data associated with each measurement 

event. All measurement events shall have a time stamp. Unprocessed, interim-processed, final 

processed, and advanced processed (if used) “z” values shall be included in a single file. Data 

file size should be limited to 100 megabytes (Mb) or less, and the file length should be limited to 

600,000 lines or less. Each data file will be named logically and sequentially so that the file 

name can be correlated easily with the project-specific naming conventions used by the PDT. 

13.7.4. Anomaly Table, Dig Selection Table, Reacquisition Table and Intrusive 

Results Table Formats. The anomaly, dig selection, and intrusive results shall be submitted 

digitally in a Microsoft Access database IAW the PWS/SOW and appropriate data item 

descriptions. The current database template includes tables that document Project Start-up 

parameters (e.g., project location, contractor name, coordinate system), Daily/Dataset Quality 

Results (e.g., along line spacing, background noise, coverage), Dataset Tracking (e.g., filename, 

location, terrain, data processing parameters), and Anomaly/Dig Results (e.g., reacquisition 

parameters, intrusive results). 

13.7.5. Data Submittals. The contractor shall furnish for inspection all geophysical data, 

geophysical maps, and dig sheets via Internet using file transfer protocol, e-mail attachment for 

small files under 5 Mb, compact disk (CD) / digital video disk (DVD) or other approved method. 

All geophysical data shall be accompanied by metadata as described above. The delivery 

schedule shall be IAW contract-specific requirements unless otherwise established by the PDT. 

The contractor also shall provide a digital planimetric map in software that is capable of 

providing output in the approved format and coincident with the location of the geophysical 

survey, so that each day's geophysical data set can be registered within the original mission plan 

survey map. Each data submittal shall include the MS Access database tables to identify the 

quality of the data and whether it is meeting project objectives. Any QC failures shall be 

identified, and the corrective action that is being taken shall be described. The final report 

deliverable shall include two copies on CD/DVD of all project data. 

13.7.5.1. Geophysical data maps should be prepared for each grid or transect within the 

investigation in both an editable form (e.g., Geosoft .map file) and in a common image format 

(e.g., JPEG). Geophysical data maps should include all of general site features (excluding dig 

results), plus the following necessary site information: 

a. All selected targets and known features shall be marked with symbols on the map. 

b. Map scales should be even multiples of the base units presented in the maps. 

c. Map sizes should be designed to fit standard printer or plotter sizes. 
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13-11 

d. Grid ticks or grid lines should be visible and labeled. 

13.7.5.2. The title block of the geophysical map should include: 

a. figure number; 

b. the map title and subtitle (e.g., instrument and type/component); and 

c. the location of the information being presented (e.g., site/area name and property/grid 

identification);

13.7.5.3. The legend of the geophysical maps should include: 

a. all objects/symbols shown on the map; 

b. map scale bar, coordinate system, and north arrow; and 

c. color scale bars that use a color scheme that clearly differentiates between anomalies 

and background readings (e.g., white or gray background readings). A classic “cold to hot” color 

scale should be used with negative values plotted in blue and high positive values plotted in 

red/pink. The range of values should be fixed so that the same color scale is utilized across the 

site.

13.7.5.4. Additional project information on the geophysical map should include boxes 

for the following information: 

a. Client

b. Project

c. Contractor 

d. Map creator

e. Map approver 

f. Date created

13.8. Munitions Constituents Data Deliverables. 

13.8.1. Introduction. MC data are reported throughout a project’s life cycle. The 

following sub-sections further discuss the MC reporting requirements. 

13.8.2. Field Reporting. 

13.8.2.1. During field sampling, Data Quality Control Reports (DQCRs) must be 

prepared. At a minimum, copies must be sent daily electronically to the Contracting Agency (the 

PM, technical manager (TM), and project chemist) and the geographic district. 
EM 300-1-15 

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13-12 

13.8.2.2. DQCRs must include site activities, descriptions of samples collected, and 

instruments and equipment utilized. Any deviations from the approved UFP-QAPP should be 

documented in the DQCRs, including a description of the problems encountered, corrective 

action taken, and a summary of any verbal or written instructions received from government 

personnel. Any deviations that may affect DQOs must be conveyed to USACE personnel (TM, 

project chemist, etc.) immediately. 

13.8.2.3. The following should be attached to the DQCRs: QA sample tables that match 

up primary, replicate (QA/QC), and other field control samples (e.g., blanks), copies of chain-ofcustody forms, and any other environmental sampling-related project forms that are generated. 

DQCRs become part of the project file.

13.8.3. Reporting Analytical Results. 

13.8.3.1. Data Reporting Standards and Requirements. 

13.8.3.1.1. All laboratory data for samples analyzed by commercial laboratories must be 

submitted in the SEDD format unless the PWS/SOW states otherwise. Details on the SEDD 

format are provided in SEDD Version 5.2 (or most recent version) 

(http://www.epa.gov/fem/sedd.htm). SEDD Version 5.2 is the required submittal format for 

FUDS projects. Other project-specific electronic data deliverable (EDD) requirements should be 

documented in the project SOW/PWS. The following software can be made available as 

government furnished software if deemed required by the PDT as specified in the SOW/PWS: 

Environmental Data Management System, MRSPP Wizard, and Forms II Lite. Use of the 

MRSPP Wizard is mandatory if MRSPP preparation is part of the SOW/PWS. 

13.8.3.1.2. The SEDD-formatted deliverable should be evaluated by review software that 

meets minimum criteria (i.e., capability to maintain SEDD integrity through the review, to 

provide a reviewed SEDD file for archiving, and to maintain a project-specific library file (eQAPP) that can be managed with each deliverable). This software is not available as a 

government furnished item and contractors are not constrained to any proprietary system, as long 

as it meets those requirements. Such software is intended to automate certain data review 

functions that are strictly comparisons to numeric criteria (e.g., holding time compliance, 

comparison to recovery/relative percent difference limits). Use of automated review software 

requires that the contractor develop a comprehensive library file (e-QAPP) for all of the methods 

to be analyzed under the SOW/PWS. The library file should accurately reflect all of the 

analytical quality requirements as documented in the final sampling and analysis planning 

document for the project and should be provided to both MMDC and the subcontract lab for use 

in screening EDD submittals. The electronic deliverable must include appropriate data flags 

resulting from laboratory review and contractor’s data validation. All electronic data submitted 

by the contract laboratory is required to be error-free and in complete agreement with the 

hardcopy data. Data files are to be delivered IAW contract requirements. They should be 

submitted with a transmittal letter from the laboratory that certifies that the file is in agreement 

with hardcopy data reports and has been found to be free of errors using the latest version of 

corresponding evaluation software provided to the laboratory. The contract laboratory, at their 

cost, should correct any errors identified by MMDC. The contractor is responsible for the 
EM 200-1-15 

15 May 15 

13-13 

successful electronic transmission of field and laboratory data. The laboratory is responsible for 

archiving the electronic raw data, associated software, and sufficient associated hardcopy data 

(e.g., sample login sheets and sample preparation log sheets) to completely reconstruct the 

analyses that were performed for the period specified after completion of the applicable contract. 

If no period is specified, laboratories should keep data for 10 years. 

13.8.3.1.3. The following files shall be provided for a complete EDD: 

• Library file (must be project-specific)

• DTD file

• SEDD Stage 2A or 2B XML file (consistent with SEDD Version 5.2 valid values) 

• Post-review SEDD files

• Annotated error log 

• MRSPP Wizard export file (not required if MRSPP preparation is not part of the 

SOW/PWS

13.8.3.1.4. Acceptance of these files will be based on the following:

• The error log generated by the reviewer matches the error log provided by the 

contractor.

• The reviewed files shall be consistent with flagged data tables provided in the report. If 

there are manually derived data flags (from hard copy review), they must be documented in the 

reviewed data file.

• Where more than one analysis is submitted for a sample, it is clear which analytical 

result is being reported. The final electronic submittal must clearly indicate the single data point 

that is the "best" data point for each analysis. 

13.8.3.2. Final Report Requirements. 

13.8.3.2.1. Contractors should submit the complete data packages to the MMDC and 

reference them as part of the larger study report. Unless otherwise directed by the PDT 

regarding placement, the Chemical Data Final Report (CDFR) must be provided as an appendix 

to the final report. The items listed above are required to be submitted with the report. The 

CDFR must be produced, including a summary of QC practices employed and all chemical 

parameter measurement activities, after project completion. 

13.8.3.2.2. As a minimum, the CDFR must contain the following:

• Summary of project SOW
EM 300-1-15 

15 May 15 

13-14 

• Summary of any deviations from the design chemical parameter measurement 

specifications

• Summary of chemical parameter measurements performed as contingent measurements

• Summary of success or failure in achieving project-specific DQOs

• Presentation and evaluation of the data, to include an overall assessment on the quality 

of the data for each method and matrix. This should include, at a minimum, two types of data 

tables. The first shall include all analytical results for all samples collected. The second must 

include all analytical results greater than the LOD for all samples collected. Tables should be 

sorted by method and include appropriate data flags resulting from laboratory review and from 

the contractor’s data validation.

• Internal QC data generated during the project, including tabula summaries correlating 

sample identifiers with all blank, MSs, surrogates, duplicates, LCSs, and batch identifiers. 

• A list of the affected sample results for each analyte (indexed by method and matrix), 

including the appropriate data qualifier tag (J, B, R, etc.) where sample results are impacted 

negatively by adverse QC criteria.

• Summary of field and laboratory oversight activities, providing a discussion of the 

reliability of the data, QC problems encountered, and a summary of the evaluation of data quality 

for each analysis and matrix as indicated by the laboratory QC data and any other relevant 

findings 

• Comparison of results to any applicable project-specific numeric criteria

• Conclusions and recommendations 

• Appendices containing (1) chemistry data package and (2) DQCRs 

13.8.3.3. Documentation Records. 

13.8.3.3.1. Documentation records must be provided as factual evidence that required 

chemical data have been produced and chemical data quality has been achieved. 

13.8.3.3.2. The documentation must comply with the requirements specified in the 

discussions above on the QAPP, the DQCRs, the Chemistry Data Package, the EDD, and the 

CDFR.

13.8.3.4. Environmental Restoration Information System (ERIS). 

13.8.3.4.1. The ERIS is a Web-based database system for the storage of Army 

environmental restoration and range field data. It serves as a central repository for the Army 

installation chemical, geological, and geographical data. The ERIS is maintained by the 

USAEC, and all military installations that use Environmental Restoration, Army funds are 
EM 200-1-15 

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13-15 

required to upload their data to the system. ERIS is accessed through the USAEC Army 

Environmental Reporting Online portal using a CAC card at 

http://aec.army.mil/portals/3/reporting/index.html. 

13.8.3.4.2. If data collected as part of an MR action need to be uploaded to ERIS, the 

PDT should review the ERIS data specifications during the planning phases of the project and 

ensure that the laboratory will provide EDDs that are compatible with ERIS and that 

geographical and geological data are recorded in a format that is compatible with ERIS. 
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APPENDIX A

References

A.1. Required References. 

A.1.1. Public Laws and Statutes. 

PL 99-499, 100 Stat 1613, amending CERCLA, 42 USC § 9601 et seq., and miscellaneous 

other sections. Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986 

PL 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808. 

Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 

10 U.S.C. § 2687 

Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988 

10 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq. 

Defense Environmental Restoration Program 

16 U.S.C. § 431-433 

Antiquities Act of 1906 

16 U.S.C. § 461-470 

Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act

16 U.S.C. § 470aa-470mm 

Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979

16 U.S.C. § 470w-3(a)

Confidentiality of the Location of Sensitive Historic Resources 

25 U.S.C. § 3001-3013 

Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act

42 U.S.C. § 1996 

American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, as amended 

42 U.S.C. § 6901, et seq., as amended. 

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 

42 U.S.C. § 7401-7671q 

Clean Air Act

42 U.S.C. § 9601 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-2 

43 U.S.C. § 2101-2106 

Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 

A.1.2. Executive Orders. 

Executive Order 12580 

Superfund Implementation 

http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12580.html

Executive Order 13007 

American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or Native Hawaiian Sacred Sites 

http://www.nps.gov/history/local-law/eo13007.htm

Executive Order 13423 

Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management 

http://www.epa.gov/oaintrnt/practices/eo13423.htm

Executive Order 13514 

Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-10-08/pdf/E9-24518.pdf

A.1.3. Regulations. 

[Find CFRs at: http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?tpl=%2Findex.tpl] 

29 CFR 1910 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Hazardous Waste Operations and 

Emergency Response

29 CFR 1926 

Safety and Health Standards for Construction 

32 CFR 179 

Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol

36 CFR 79 

Curation of Federally Owned and Administered Archaeological Collections

36 CFR 800 

Protection of Historic Properties 

40 CFR 266.20 (b) 

Land Disposal Restriction Treatment Standards 

40 CFR 300 

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-3 

49 CFR Subchapter C 

Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations 

ATFP 5400.7 

Federal Explosives Law and Regulations 

FAR Part 37

Service Contracting 

http://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/FARTOCP37.html#wp223485

FAR Subpart 45.5 

Management of Government Property in the Possession of Contractors 

https://acquisition.gov/far/0219/html/Subpart_45_5.html

FAR Part 46.103 

Contracting Office Responsibilities

http://www.acquisition.gov/far/97/pdf/46.pdf

A.1.4. DoD Directives, Instructions, Regulations, Standards and Other Publications. 

DDESB TP-18 

Minimum Qualifications for Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Technicians and Personnel.

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (ATL), Interim Guidance on Perchlorate Sampling. 

23 September 2003 http://www.cpeo.org/pubs/Perchlorate_Sampling_Interim_Policy.pdf

DoDD 4715.11 

Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on Operational Ranges Within the United 

States. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471511p.pdf 

DoDD 4715.12 

Environmental and Explosives Safety Management on Operational Ranges Outside the 

United States. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471512p.pdf

DoDD 4715.14 

Operational Range Assessments

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471514p.pdf

DoDI 4140.62 

Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/414062p.pdf

DoDI 4161.02 

Accountability and Management of Government Contract Property 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/416102p.pdf
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-4 

DoDI 4715.15 

Environmental Quality Systems

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471515p.pdf

DoDI 4715.18 

Emerging Contaminants (ECs) 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471518p.pdf

DoD 4715.20-M 

Defense Environmental Restoration Program Management 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/471520m.pdf

DoD 6055.09-M 

Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/605509m/605509-M-V7.pdf 

DoD Environmental Data Quality Workgroup Fact Sheet: Detection and Quantitation – What 

Project Managers and Data Users Need to Know. September, 2009 

http://www.navylabs.navy.mil/Final%20DQ%20Fact%20Sheet%20091409.pdf

DoD Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department of 

Defense. December 2000. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/pbsaguide010201.pdf

DoD Perchlorate Handbook. August 2007

http://www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/Items/actions.cfm?action=Show&item_id=8172&destination=

ShowItem

DoD Perchlorate Release Management Policy. April 22, 2009 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/cmrmd/upload/dod_perchlorate_policy_04_20_09.pdf

DoD Policy and Guidelines for Acquisitions Involving Environmental Sampling or Testing. 

November 2007 https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=293497&lang=en-US

DoD Quality Systems Manual for Environmental Laboratories (DoD QSM)

http://www.denix.osd.mil/edqw/Documents.cfm

Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol

http://www.denix.osd.mil/mmrp/Prioritization/MRSPP.cfm

Performance-Based Acquisition of Environmental Restoration Services (Office of the 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, July 2007) 

http://denix.osd.mil/derp/upload/Performance_Based_Acquisition.pdf

Primer on Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol Development and Application 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/mmrp/Prioritization/MRSPP.cfm
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-5 

A.1.5. Army Publications. 

AR 200-1 

Environmental Protection and Enhancement 

AR 385-10 

The Army Safety Program

AR 405-90 

Disposal of Real Estate

Army Environmental Cleanup Strategic Plan (Army 2009) 

DA Pamphlet 385-61 

Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards

DA Pamphlet 385-63 

Range Safety

DA Pamphlet 385-64 

Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards 

DAC Propellant Management Guide 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/9530613.pdf

DAC Propellant Identification Manual 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/257916

DASA-ESOH, Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel Responses. April 1, 2009 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/doc/24225291

DoD-ESOH Information Exchange, Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol 

http://denix.osd.mil/mmrp/Prioritization/MRSPP.cfm

FM 3-11.9/MCRP 3-37.1B/NTRP 3-11.32/AFTTP(I) 3-2.55 

Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds 

TM 9-1300-214 

Military Explosives

U.S. Army Public Involvement Toolbox 

http://www.asaie.army.mil/Public/IE/Toolbox/default.html

U.S. Army Environmental Command, Final Army RI/FS Guidance, 2009 

http://aec.army.mil/Portals/3/restore/Guidance_%20MMRP_RIFS_2009.pdf
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-6 

A.1.6. Corps of Engineers Publications. 

Common Operations Reports 

(contact Environmental and Munitions (EM) Center of Expertise (CX) for further 

information) 

EM 200-1-2 

Technical Project Planning (TPP) Process

EM 200-1-4 (Volume I and II) 

Risk Assessment Handbook: Volume I - Human Health Evaluation

Risk Assessment Handbook: Volume II - Environmental Evaluation 

EM 200-1-6 

Chemical Quality Assurance for HTRW Projects 

EM 200-1-7 Chemical Data Quality Management for Hazardous, Toxic, Radioactive Waste 

Remedial Activities

EM 200-1-10 

Environmental Quality – Guidance for Evaluating Performance-Based Chemical Data

EM 200-1-12 

Conceptual Site Models for Environmental and Munitions Projects 

EM 200-1-16 

Environmental Quality: Environmental Statistics

EM 385-1-1 

Safety - Safety and Health Requirements

EM 385-1-97 

Explosives - Safety and Health Requirements Manual

EM 1110-1-502 

Technical Guidelines for Hazardous and Toxic Waste Treatment and Cleanup Activities

EM 1110-1-1002 

Survey Markers and Monumentation

EM 1110-1-1003 

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Surveying 

EM 1110-1-2909 

Geospatial Data and Systems 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-7 

EM 1110-1-4000 (under revision) 

Monitoring Well Design, Installation, and Documentation at Hazardous, Toxic, and 

Radioactive Waste Sites

EM 1110-1-4007 (under revision) 

Safety and Health Aspects of Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste Remediation 

Technologies 

EP 75-1-3 

Explosives - Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel Response

EP 200-1-18 

Environmental Quality: Five-year Reviews of Military Munitions Response Projects

EP 200-3-1 

Environmental Quality: Public Participation Requirements for Defense Environmental 

Restoration (DERP)

EP 1110-1-17 

Establishing a Temporary Open Burn and Open Detonation Site for Conventional Ordnance 

and Explosive Projects 

EP 1110-1-24 (under revision) 

Establishing and Maintaining Institutional Controls for Ordnance and Explosives (OE) 

Projects

ER 5-1-11 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Business Process 

ER 5-1-14 

Resource Management - USACE Quality Management System

ER 200-1-5 

Policy for Implementation and Integrated Application of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Environmental Operating Principles and Doctrine 

ER 200-1-7 

Chemical Data Quality Management for Environmental Restoration Activities

ER 200-3-1 

Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Program Policy

ER 385-1-40 

Occupational Health Program
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-8 

ER 385-1-92 

Safety and Occupational Health Requirements for Hazardous, Toxic and Radioactive Waste 

(HTRW) Activities

ER 385-1-95 

Safety and Health Requirements for Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC) 

Operations

ER 385-1-99 

USACE Accident Investigation and Reporting 

ER 1110-1-8153 

Military Munitions Support Services

ER 1110-1-8156 

Policies, Guidance, and Requirements for Geospatial Data and Systems

US Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville, Inert Ordnance and Surrogate Item 

Anomaly Evaluation Task 6 Final Report, (USAESCH 2011) 

USACE FUDS Handbook on Realignment, Delineation, and MRS Prioritization Protocol 

Implementation, https://eko.usace.army.mil/index.cfm?syspage=Documents&id=237183

USACE FUDS Public Involvement Toolkit 

https://eko.usace.army.mil/usacecop/environmental/ecoplibrary/fuds/. 

USACE Interim Guidance Documents 

https://eko.usace.army.mil/usacecop/environmental/subcops/htrw/munitions_response/

A.1.7. Other Federal Agency Publications. 

Contaminated Site Cleanup Information 

http://www.clu-in.org/techfocus/

DOE HASL-300, EML Procedures Manual, 28th Edition

http://www.orau.org/ptp/PTP%20Library/library/DOE/eml/hasl300/HASL300TOC.htm

ESTCP, 2009. Final Report Geophysical System Verification (GSV): A Physics-Based 

Alternative to Geophysical Prove-Outs for Munitions Response. https://www.serdpestcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response/Geophysical-System-Verification

Explosives Dissolved from Unexploded Ordnance. May 2012 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA562287
EM 200-1-15 

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A-9 

NAVFAC UG-2049-ENV (See Background) 

Guidance for Environmental Background Analysis Volume I: Soil, April 2002 

NAVFAC UG-2054-ENV

Guidance for Environmental Background Analysis Volume II: Sediment, April 2003 

NAVFAC UG-2059-ENV

Guidance for Environmental Background Analysis Volume III: Groundwater, April 2004 

Management Guidance for the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP)

http://www.denix.osd.mil/references/upload/DERP_Management_Guidance_2001.pdf

Munitions in the Underwater Environment: State of the Science and Knowledge Gaps; 

Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP)/Environmental 

Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP) White Paper. https://www.serdpestcp.org/Featured-Initiatives/Munitions-Response-Initiatives/Munitions-in-the-UnderwaterEnvironment

Naval Research Laboratory NRL/MR/6110-08-9155, EM61-MK2 Response of Standard 

Munitions Items. October 6, 2008 

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA489224

Naval Research Laboratory NRL/MR/6110-09-9183, EM61-MK2 Response of Three 

Munitions Surrogates. March 12, 2009 

http://updates.geosoft.com/downloads/files/tutorials/pdfs/MR-9183.pdf

A.1.8. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

EPA 240/B-06/001 

Guidance on Systematic Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process. February 

2006 http://www.epa.gov/quality/qs-docs/g4-final.pdf

EPA/240R-02/005 

Guidance on Choosing a Sampling Design for Environmental Data Collection Details for 

Use in Developing a Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP). 2002 

http://www.epa.gov/quality/qs-docs/g5s-final.pdf

EPA 402-04-001 

Multi-Agency Radiological Laboratory Analytical Protocols Manual 

http://www.epa.gov/radiation/marlap/manual.html

EPA-505-F-03-001 

Uniform Federal Policy for Implementing Environmental Quality Systems 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/ufp_v2_final.pdf
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-10 

EPA 505-B-04-900A 

Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plans (UFP-QAPP Manual Part 1) 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/ufp_qapp_v1_0305.pdf

USEPA, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office

http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/qualityassurance.htm

EPA 505-B-04-900C

Workbook for Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Plans, Part 2A. March 2005

EPA-505-S-11-001 

Site Characterization for Munitions Constituents. January 2012 

http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/pdf/site_characterization_for_munitions_constituents.pdf

EPA/540/G-89/004 

Guidance for Conducting Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies under CERCLA, 

Interim Final. October 1988 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/remedy/sfremedy/rifs/overview.htm

EPA/540/G-91/009 

Management of Investigation Derived Waste During Site Inspections 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/remedy/pdfs/93-45303fs-s.pdf

EPA 540-R-01-003 

Guidance for Comparing Background and Chemical Concentrations in Soil for CERCLA 

Sites. September 2002 

http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/pdf/background.pdf

EPA 540-R-08-005 

Guidance for Labeling Validated Laboratory Analytical Data for Superfund Use 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/clp/guidance.htm

EPA 540-R-96/023 

Presumptive Response Strategy and Ex-Situ Treatment Technologies for Contaminated 

Ground Water at CERCLA Sites 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/conmedia/gwdocs/gwguide/gwfinal.pdf

EPA 540-R-97-006 

Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (ERAGS) 

http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/ecorisk/ecorisk.htm

EPA/540/1-89/002 

Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS) (Parts A-E)

http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/ragsa/index.htm
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

A-11 

EPA-600-R-02-011 

Procedures for the Derivation of Equilibrium Partitioning Sediment Benchmarks (ESBs) for 

the Protection of Benthic Organisms: Metal Mixtures (Cadmium, Copper, Lead, Nickel, 

Silver and Zinc). January 2005 

http://www.epa.gov/nheerl/download_files/publications/metalsESB_022405.pdf

EPA/600/R-12/555

Selected Analytical Methods for Environmental Restoration Following Homeland Security 

Events, SAM 2012. July 2012 

EPA 833-B-92-001 

NPDES Stormwater Sampling Guidance Document

http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0093.pdf

EPA, CIO 2106-G-05 

QAPP Guidance on Quality Assurance Project Plans. January 2012 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/ufp_qapp_worksheets.pdf

EPA OSWER #9285.7-37 

Technical Review Workgroup Recommendations for Performing Human Health Risk 

Analysis on Small Arms Shooting Ranges. 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/lead/products/firing.pdf

EPA OSWER Directive 9345.1-05 

Guidance for Performing Site Inspections under CERCLA; Interim Final. September 1992 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/hrsres/si/siguidance.pdf

EPA Interim Drinking Water Health Advisory For Perchlorate. January 8, 2009 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/cmrmd/upload/dod_perchlorate_policy_04_20_09.pdf

EPA Method 1669 

Sampling Ambient Water for Trace Metals at EPA Water Quality Criteria Levels 

http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=200034VZ.txt

EPA Method EMSL-33 

Isotopic Determination of Plutonium, Uranium, and Thorium in Water, Soil, Air, and 

Biological Tissue http://www.epa.gov/sam/pdfs/EPA-EMSL-33.pdf

EPA Revised Assessment Guidance for Perchlorate. January 8, 2009 

http://www.denix.osd.mil/cmrmd/upload/EPA-perchlorate_memo_01-08-09.pdf

A.1.9. Other Publications. 

SERDP/ESTCP/ITRC, 2006, Survey of Munitions Response Technologies 

http://www.itrcweb.org/GuidanceDocuments/UXO-4.pdf
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TEMTADS Adjunct Sensor Systems Hand-held EMI Sensor for Cued UXO Discrimination 

(ESTCP MR-200807) and Man-Portable EMI Array for UXO Detection and Discrimination 

(ESTCP MR-200909) Final Report, April 5 2012. 

MR-200807/MR-200909

USEPA Contaminated Site Waste Clean-up Information 

http://www.clu-in.org/techfocus/

USEPA Interim Munitions and Explosives of Concern Hazard Assessment (MEC HA) 

Methodology Document. 

http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/mec_methodology_document.htm

USEPA, Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office

http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/qualityassurance.htm

A.1.10. Software/Analytical Tools, Databases. 

Adaptive Risk Assessment Modeling System (ARAMS) 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/arams

A Guide to Screening Level Ecological Risk Assessment 

http://usaphcapps.amedd.army.mil/erawg/SLERA.pdf

California Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Environmental Health Hazard 

Assessment Toxicity Criteria Database http://www.oehha.ca.gov/risk/chemicalDB/index.asp

EPA Ecological Soil Screening Levels

http://www.epa.gov/ecotox/ecossl/

EPA Federal Facilities Restoration and Reuse Office Technical Fact Sheet - Perchlorate

EPA Forum on Environmental Measurements

http://www.epa.gov/fem/sedd.htm

EPA Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) database 

http://www.epa.gov/iris/index.html

EPA National Recommended Water Quality Criteria 

http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/criteria/wqcriteria.html

Federal Remediation Technologies Roundtable 

http://www.frtr.gov/matrix2/top_page.html

Hazardous Substances Data Bank

http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/
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MEC Hazard Assessment (HA) 

http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/documents/hazard_assess_wrkgrp.htm

MIDAS 

https://midas.dac.army.mil/

MRSPP Wizard

http://www.lab-data.com/MRSPP/Login.aspx?returnURL=default

Provisional Peer Reviewed Toxicity Values for Superfund (PPRTV) database 

http://hhpprtv.ornl.gov/index.html

Spatially Explicit Exposure Model (SEEM) and Habitat Suitability Database (HS) 

http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/labsciences/tox/Pages/ARAMS.aspx

Staged Electronic Data Deliverable, Version 5.2 (or most recent version) 

http://epa.gov/fem/sedd.htm

Terrestrial Wildlife Exposure Model (TWEM)

http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/labsciences/tox/Pages/ResourceMaterials.aspx (zip file)

Risk Assessment Information System (RAIS) Ecological Benchmark Tool 

http://rais.ornl.gov/tools/eco_search.php

USAPHC Terrestrial Toxicity Database This is password protected 

http://phc.amedd.army.mil/Search/Pages/Results.aspx?k=terrestrial%20toxicity%20database

USAPHC Wildlife Toxicity Assessments 

http://phc.amedd.army.mil/topics/labsciences/tox/Pages/WTA.aspx

U.S. Department of Human and Health Services, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 

Registry Minimal Risk Levels. http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/mrls/index.asp

UX-Analyze, Geosoft. 2011 

http://www.geosoft.com/search-results/?q=ux-analyze

UXO Estimator 

https://eko.usace.army.mil/usacecop/environmental/subcops/mmr/

(see Reference Documents – Software)

Visual Sample Plan

http://vsp.pnnl.gov/
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A.2. Related Publications. 

A.2.1. Federal and State Publications. 

ADA511850, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Naval Facilities Engineering 

Service Center, and ESTCP. Principles and Practices of Enhanced Anaerobic 

Bioremediation of Chlorinated Solvents. 

ATSDR Toxicological Profiles for 2,4- and 2,6-Dinitrotoluene and for 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene. 

http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/index.asp

ASTM D5792 -02 

Standard Practice for Generation of Environmental Data Related to Waste Management 

Activities: Development of Data Quality Objectives. 2006 

http://www.astm.org/Standards/D5792.htm

Bioremediation of Soil Using Landfarming Systems: Guide Specification for Construction. 

February 2010. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. UFGS-02 54 20 

http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFGS/UFGS%2002%2054%2020.pdf

Bioremediation of Soil Using Windrow Composting: Guide Specification for Construction. 

February 2010. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. UFGS-02 54 21. 

http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFGS/UFGS%2002%2054%2021.pdf

Characterization and Remediation of Soils at Closed Small Arms Firing Ranges 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/SMART-1.pdf 

Defense Environmental Network & Information Exchange Educational Program 

https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/Explosives/UXOSafety/uxosafety.html

Draft Guidance on Multi-Increment Soil Sampling Alaska Department of Environmental 

Conservation. http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/csp/guidance/multi_increment.pdf

Environmental Management at Operating Outdoor Small Arms Firing Ranges 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/SMART-2.pdf

EPA-505-B-04-900A 

Uniform Federal Policy for Quality Assurance Project Plans, Final Version 1, March 2005 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/ufp_qapp_v1_0305.pdf

EPA 530-F-97-045 

Innovative Uses of Compost Composting of Soils Contaminated by Explosives. 1997. 

http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/conserve/composting/pubs/explos.pdf
EM 200-1-15 

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EPA 540/G-91/009 

Management of Investigation Derived Waste During Site Inspections 

EPA 540/R-96/023 

Presumptive Response Strategy and Ex-Situ Treatment Technologies for Contaminated 

Ground Water at CERCLA Sites. October 1996. 

http://www.epa.gov/superfund/health/conmedia/gwdocs/gwguide/gwfinal.pdf

EPA 542-B-99-002 

Solidification/Stabilization Resource Guide. 1999 

http://www.clu-in.org/download/remed/solidstab.pdf

EPA 542-R-97-004 

Recent Developments for In Situ Treatment of Metal Contaminated Soils. 1997. 

http://www.clu-in.org/download/remed/metals2.pdf

EPA 600-R-09-148 

Technology Performance Review: Selecting and Using Solidification/Stabilization Treatment 

for Site Remediation. 2009. http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/pubs/600r09148/600r09148.pdf

EPA 600-R-93-164 

Bioremediation Using the Land Treatment Concept. 1993. 

http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=30002Y6E.txt

EPA QA/R-5 

EPA Guidance for Quality Assurance Quality Project Plans, March 2001 

http://www.epa.gov/quality/qs-docs/r5-final.pdf

EPA Region 2. Best Management Practices for Lead at Outdoor Shooting Ranges 

http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/epa_bmp.pdf

EPA Analytical Method 8330B. Nitroaromatics, Nitramines, and Nitrate Esters by High 

Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC) 

http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/testmethods/pdfs/8330b.pdf

EPA Contract Laboratory Program, National Functional Guidelines for Superfund Data 

Review http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/programs/clp/guidance.htm

ERDC/CRREL SR 96-15

Assessment of Sampling Error Associated with Collection and Analysis of Soil Samples at 

Explosives-Contaminated Sites, 1996 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a318015.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TN-05-2 

Pre-Screening for Explosives Residues in Soil Prior to HPLC Analysis Utilizing ExprayTM 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a431646.pdf
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A-16 

ERDC/CRREL TR-02-1 

Guide for Characterization of Sites Contaminated with Energetic Materials, 2002 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a411800.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-04-8 

Field Screening Method for Perchlorate in Water and Soil, 2004 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a423276.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-11-X 

Metal Residue Deposition from Military Pyrotechnic Devices and Field Sampling Guidance, 

2012 http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA562327

ERDC/EL TR-06-1 

Demonstration Applications of ARAMS for Aquatic and Terrestrial Ecological Risk 

Assessment http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a442778.pdf

ERDC/EL TR-07-06 

Treatment and Management of Closed or Inactive Small Arms Firing Ranges 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a471052.pdf 

ERDC TR-12-1 

Evaluation of Sampling and Sample Preparation Modifications for Soil Containing Metallic 

Residues, January 2012 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a556161.pdf

ESTCP, Final Report Demonstration of UXO-PenDepth for the Estimation of Projectile 

Penetration Depth, Project MR-0806, August 2010 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a579034.pdf

ESTCP, Geophysical System Verification Response Calculator

https://www.serdp-estcp.org/Tools-and-Training/Munitions-Response/Geophysical-SystemVerification

ESTCP, Improved Processing, Analysis and use of Historical Photography, Project 

MM-0812, June 2010 

ESTCP, Pilot Program Classification Approaches in Munitions Response San Luis Obispo, 

California, May 2010

ESTCP , Pilot Project, Wide Area Assessment for Munitions Response, 2008 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA495702

ESTCP, Project ER-200509, Validation of Chlorine and Oxygen Isotope Ratio Analysis To 

Differentiate Between Perchlorate Sources and to Document Perchlorate Biodegradation, 

January 2012 
EM 200-1-15 

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A-17 

Explosive Residues from Low-Order Detonations of Heavy Artillery and Mortar Rounds, 

Pennington et al., Soil and Sediment Contamination: An International Journal, 17:5, 533-546 

Final Implementation Guidance Handbook: Physical Separation and Acid Leaching to 

Process Small-Arms Range Soils,1997, http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA341141

Identification of Metabolic Routes and Catabolic Enzymes Involved in Phytoremediation of 

the Nitro-Substituted Explosives TNT, RDX, and HMX. 2006. SERDP Project CU 1317, 

Final Technical Report. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a476324.pdf

Implementation of the Hawai’i State Contingency Plan

http://www.hawaiidoh.org/tgm.aspx

Incremental Sampling Methodology. ISM-1. Washington, D.C.: Interstate Technology & 

Regulatory Council, Incremental Sampling Methodology Team, February 2012, 

http://itrcweb.org/ism-1/

Innovative Site Remediation Technologies: Design and Application, Vol. 3: Liquid 

Extraction Technologies Soil Washing, Soil Flushing, Solvent/Chemical. 1998. M.J. Mann, 

et al. American Academy of Environmental Engineers, Annapolis, MD. ISBN: 1-883767-

19-9. http://clu-in.org/download/contaminantfocus/dnapl/treatment_technologies/soilwashing-soil-flushing.pdf

ITRC, The Use of Direct-Push Well Technology for Long-Term Environmental Monitoring 

in Groundwater Investigations http://www.itrcweb.org/Guidance/GetDocument?documentID=91

ITRC, 2010, Frequently Asked Questions about Wide-Area Assessment for Munitions 

Response Projects http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/UXO-6.pdf

ITRC, Geophysical Prove-Outs for Munitions Response Projects 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/UXO-3.pdf

ITRC, 2008, Quality Considerations for Munitions Response Projects. UXO-5. 

Washington, DC: Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council, Unexploded Ordnance Team 

http://www.itrcweb.org/GuidanceDocuments/UXO-5.pdf

ISO/IEC 17025 

https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:17025:ed-2:v1:en

Legacy Underwater Munitions: Assessment, Evaluation of Impacts, and Potential Response 

Technologies and The Legacy of Underwater Munitions Worldwide: Policy and the Science 

of Assessment, Impacts and Potential Responses, https://www.mtsociety.org/publications/

MILSTD-1916. DoD Preferred Methods for Acceptance of Product 
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A-18 

NFPA 780. Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems 

National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration Hydrographic Surveying webpage, 

http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/hsd/learn_survey.html

Ordnance and Explosives Digital Geophysical Mapping Guidance – Operational Procedures 

and Quality Control Manual, United States Army Engineering Support Center Huntsville 

(USAESCH 2003) 

ORISE Method AP11, http://www.epa.gov/sam/pdfs/ORISE-AP11.pdf

Perchlorate Screening Study: Low Concentration Method for the Determination of 

Perchlorate in Aqueous Samples Using Ion Selective Electrodes: Letter Report of Findings 

for the Method Development Studies, Interference Studies, and Split Sample Studies, 

including Standard Operating Procedure 

http://www.clu-in.org/programs/21m2/letter_of_findings.pdf

Perchlorate: Overview of Issues, Status, and Remedial Options (September 2005) 

http://www.itrcweb.org/teampublic_Perchlorate.asp

Phytoremediation: Transformation and Control of Contaminants. 2003. S.C. McCutcheon 

and J.L. Schnoor. J. Wiley, New York. ISBN: 9780471273042, 987 pp. 

Phytotechnology Technical and Regulatory Guidance and Decision Trees, Revised. 

Interstate Technology & Regulatory Council (ITRC) Phytotechnologies Team. PHYTO-3, 

187 pp, 2009 http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/PHYTO-3.pdf

Quality Assurance Made Easy: Working With Quantified, Site-Specific QC Metrics 

(Proceedings of the UXO/Countermine Forum, 2004) 

Remediation Technologies for Perchlorate Contamination in Water and Soil. March 2008 

http://www.itrcweb.org/GuidanceDocuments/PERC-2.pdf

Soil Composting for Explosives Remediation: Case Studies and Lessons Learned. U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Public Works Technical Bulletin 200-1-95. 17 May 2011. 

http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/ARMYCOE/PWTB/pwtb_200_1_95.pdf

Soil Washing Through Separation/Solubilization: Guide Specification for Construction. 

February 2010. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. CEGS-02 54 23. 

http://www.wbdg.org/ccb/DOD/UFGS/UFGS%2002%2054%2023.pdf

Technical and Regulatory Guidelines for Soil Washing. 1997. Interstate Technology 

Regulatory Council (ITRC) Metals in Soils Team. 

http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/MIS-1.pdf
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A-19 

USACERL, TR99/56. Methods for Field Studies of the Effects of Military Smokes, 

Obscurants, and Riot-control Agents on Threatened and Endangered Species. July 1999. 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA395028

A.2.2. Other Publications. 

Andrews, Anne, Katherine Kaye, ESTCP Pilot Program Classification Approaches in 

Munitions Response Camp Butner, North Carolina, 2011 

Battey et. al., 2007, Soil Flushing Through a Thick Vadose Zone: Perchlorate Removal 

Documented at Edwards AFB, California. American Geophysical Union, Fall Meeting 2007, 

abstract #H33E-1685. 

Bednar, A.J., W.T. Jones, M.A. Chappell, D.R. Johnson, D.B Ringelberg. A Modified Acid 

Digestion Procedure for Extraction of Tungsten from Soil. Talanta 80(3), 2010. 

Bell, Thomas, 2007. Electromagnetics (EM): Fundamentals and Parameter Extraction 

presented as part of Classification Short Course 1 presented at the 2007 SERDP-ESTCP 

Workshop. 

Bell, Thomas, 2008. Error Analysis of Attitude Measurement In Robotic Ground Vehicle 

Position Determination, NAVIGATION, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 289-296. 

Bell, Thomas, 2011. Magnetic Surface Modes and UXO/Clutter Classification and 

Discrimination, ESTCP Project MR-1658. 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a571874.pdf

Coleman R. and M. Murray, Detection of Depleted Uranium in Soil Using Portable HandHeld Instruments, IAEA-SM-359/P-5, IAEA Annual Meeting, Washington DC, November, 

1999 

ERDC/CERL TR-05-8 

Demonstration of the Anaerobic Fluidized Bed Reactor for Pinkwater Treatment at 

McAlester Army Ammunition Plant. 2005 http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA433804

ERDC/EL TR-02-10 

Environmental Fate and Transport Process Descriptors for Explosives. 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel02-10.pdf

ERDC/EL TR-03-11 

Biologically Active Zone Enhancement (BAZE) Supplemental Study: Mass Balance of RDX 

Biotransformation and Influence of Aquifer Temperature on RDX Biodegradation in 

Groundwater. 2003. http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel03-11.pdf
EM 200-1-15 

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ERDC/EL TR-03-15 

Lime Treatment of 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene Contaminated Soils: Proof of Concept Study. 2003 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel03-15.pdf. 

ERDC/EL TR-05-14 

A Review of Field Technologies for Long-Term Monitoring of Ordnance-Related 

Compounds in Groundwater . 2005 http://www.clu-in.org/download/char/trel05-14.pdf

ERDC/EL TR-07-4 

Effect of Treatment pH on the End Products of the Alkaline Hydrolysis of TNT and RDX. 

2007 http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel07-4.pdf

ERDC/EL TR-11-16 

Management of Munitions Constituents in Soil Using Alkaline Hydrolysis: A Guide for 

Practitioners. 2011 http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/trel11-16.pdf

Evans, P.J. 2010. In Situ Bioremediation of Perchlorate and Nitrate in Vadose Zone Soil 

Using Gaseous Electron Donor Injection Technology (GEDIT). ESTCP Project ER-0511, 

Final Report 

Fernandez, J.E., J.T. Christoff, D.A. Cook, Synthetic Aperature Sonar on AUV, Naval 

Surface Warfare Center Coastal Systems Station, Dahlgren Division, Oceans 2003 

MTS/IEEE Conference Proceedings

Fuller et al., Combined Treatment of Perchlorate and RDX in Ground Water Using a 

Fluidized Bed Reactor, Ground Water Monitoring & Remediation 27, no. 3/ Summer 

2007/pages 59–64 http://info.ngwa.org/gwol/pdf/072082343.pdf. 

Funk et al., 2011. Wide Area Assessment (WAA) for Marine Munitions and Explosives of 

Concern, National Technical Information Service

Gasperikova, 2010. Hand-held UXO Discriminator Design and Performance. Paper 

presented at the Partners in Environmental Technology Technical Symposium & Workshop, 

Washington DC. 

Hable, M., C. Stern, C. Asowata and K. Williams (1991). Determination of nitroaromatics 

and nitramines in ground and drinking water by wide-bore capillary gas chromatography. 

Journal of Chromatographic Science, 29: 131-135. 

Hansen, 2011. Challenges in Seafloor Imaging and Mapping with Synthetic Aperture Sonar, 

IEEE Transactions on Geoscience and Remote Sensing, vol. 49, no. 10, pp. 3677-3687. 

Jenkins, T.F, M. E. Walsh, P. W. Schumacher and P.G. Thorne. 1995. Development of 

Colorimetric Field Screening Methods for Munitions Compounds in Soil, Proc. SPIE 2504, 

324 doi:10.1117/12.224116 
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A-21 

Keiswetter, Dean, 2008. Classification (presented as part of the Introduction to 

Classification Methods for Military Munitions Response Projects) presented at 2008 

SERDP-ESTCP Symposium

Keiswetter , Dean, 2010. Classification with EM61 Data and Classification with Advance 

Sensor Data, presented at the 2010 SERDP-ESTCP Symposium 

http://symposium2010.serdp-estcp.org/Short-Courses/SC1

Lhomme, 2011. Demonstration of MPV Sensor at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. ESTCP 

Project MR-201005

Lim, 2008. Modeling for Sensor Evaluation in Underwater UXO Test Beds, SERDP Project 

MR-1329

Macmillan, D. K., Majerus, C. R., Laubscher, R. D., and Shannon, J. P. (2008). A 

reproducible method for determination of nitrocellulose in soil. Talanta 74, 1026-1031.)

Matzke BD, Wilson JE, Dowson ST, Hathaway JE, Hassig NL, Sego LH, Murray CJ, 

Pulsipher BA, Roberts B, McKenna S. 2010. Visual Sample Plan Version 6.0 User’s Guide. 

PNNL-199515, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland Washington. 

Munro, N. B., S. S. Talmage, G. D. Griffin, L. C. Waters, A. P. Watson, J. F. King, and V. 

Hauschild. 1999. The sources, fate, and toxicity of chemical warfare agent degradation 

products. Environ. Health Persp., 107: 933–974 

Pasion, 2011. UXO Discrimination Using Vehicle Towed and Man Portable Sensor Data 

Collected at Camp Beale, California, Technical Session 2B SERDP/ESTCP Conference

Rainer Haas, Torsten C. Schmidt, Klaus Steinbach, Eberhard von Löw, Chromatographic 

determination of phenylarsenic compounds, Fresenius J Anal Chem (1998) 361: 313-318 

Rainwater, K., C. Heintz, T. Mollhagen, and L. Hansen. 2002. In Situ Biodegradation of 

High Explosives in Soils: Field Demonstration. Bioremediation Journal 6(4):351-371. 

Roberts, B.L., S.A. McKenna, J. Hathaway, B. Pulsipher, Testing the Significance of 

Transect Design on Target Area Identification, presented at the 2009 UXO and Countermine 

Forum. 

Schwartz, A. and E. Brandenburg, An Overview of Underwater Technologies for Operations 

Involving Underwater Munitions, Marine Technology Society Journal Volume 43, Number 

4, Fall 

Williams, K.L., S.G. Kargl, T.M. Marston, J.L. Kennedy, and J.L. Lopes. Acoustic 

Response of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Cylindrical Targets. Proceedings of 

MTS/IEEE Oceans 2010, Seattle, WA, Sept 20-23, 2010. 
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URS Group, Inc., Wide Area Assessment Technology Demonstration to Characterize 

Munitions Density at the Closed Castner Firing Range, Fort Bliss, Texas, October 2009. 

A.2.2.1. Measurement of Detonation Residues: Results from staged munitions livefire and blow-in–place trials. 

ERDC/CRREL TR- 00-12 

Use of Surface Snow Sampling to Estimate the Quantity of Explosives Residues from 

Landmine Detonations. August 2000 http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA381594

ERDC/CRREL TR-00-15 

Evaluating of the Use of Snow Covered Ranges to Estimate the Explosives Residues that 

Result from Detonation of Army Munitions. August 2000 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA382526

ERDC/CRREL TR-03-16 

Estimates for Explosives Residue from the Detonation of Army Munitions. September 2003 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA417513

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-8 

An Examination of Protocols for the Collection of Munitions-Derived Residues on Snowcovered Ice. 2005 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434936.pdf 

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-14 

Residues from Live Fire Detonations of 155-mm Howitzer Rounds. 2005 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a436330.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-15 

Energetic Residues from Live-fire Detonations of 120-mm Mortar Rounds. 2005 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA441147

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-10 

Energetic Residues Deposition from 60-mm and 81-mm Mortars. 2006 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a449108.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-13 

Comparison of Explosives Residues from the Blow-in-place Detonation of 155-mm Highexplosive Projectiles. 2006 ADA450471

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-2 

Explosives Residues Resulting from the Detonation of Common Military Munitions: 2002-

2006. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA465866
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ERDC/CRREL TR-08-10 

Energetic Residues and Crater Geometries from the Firing of 120-mm High-explosive 

Mortar Projectiles into Eagle River Flats, June 2007. 2008 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA484240

Evaluation of the Use of Snow-covered Ranges to Estimate the Explosives Residues that 

Result from High Order Detonations of Army Munitions. T.F. Jenkins, M.E. Walsh, P.H. 

Miyares, A.D. Hewitt, N.H. Collins, and T.A. Ranney. Thermochimica Acta, 384:173-185 

(2002) 

Explosives Residues from Low-Order Detonation of Heavy Artillery and Mortar Rounds. 

Pennington et al. Soil and Sediment Contamination: An International Journal, 17:5, 533-546 

RDX and TNT Residues from Live-Fire and Blow-in-place Detonations. A.D. Hewitt, T.F. 

Jenkins, M.E. Walsh, M.R. Walsh, and S. Taylor, Chemosphere, 61:888-894 (2005) 

A.2.2.2. Measurement of Propellant Residues: Results from live-fire trials. 

A Reproducible Method for Determination of Nitrocellulose in Soil. Talanta 74, 1026-1031. 

Macmillan, D. K., Majerus, C. R., Laubscher, R. D., and Shannon, J. P. (2008). 

Energetic Residues from Field Disposal of Gun Propellants. M.R. Walsh, M.E. Walsh, A.D. 

Hewitt. Journal of Hazardous Materials. 173:115-122 (2010) 

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-15 

Energetic Residues from Live-fire Detonations of 120-mm Mortar Rounds. 2005 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441147.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-10 

Energetic Residues Deposition from 60-mm and 81-mm Mortars. 2006 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a449108.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-17 

Propellant Residues Deposition from Small Arms Munitions. 2007 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472269.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-09-8 

Energetic Residues from the Expedient Disposal of Artillery Propellants. 2009 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536510.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-09-13 

Propellant Residues Deposition from Firing of AT4 Rockets. 2009 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472269.pdf
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A.2.2.3. Military training ranges: General status. 

Contaminants on Military Ranges: A Case Study of Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, USA. 

J.L. Clausen, J. Robb, D. Curry, B. Gregson, and N. Korte. Environmental Pollution, 

129:13-21 (2004) 

Depleted Uranium in Hawaii, Army Installation Management Command-Pacific, January 

2008 http://www.garrison.hawaii.army.mil/du/reports/Info%20Booklet.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-01-05 

Characterization of Explosives Contamination at Military Firing Ranges. 2001 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a392827.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-01-15 

Sampling for Explosives Residues at Fort Greely, Alaska: Reconnaissance Visit July 2000. 

November 2001. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a398175.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-10 

Identity and Distribution of Residues of Energetic Compounds at Military Live-Fire Training 

Ranges. 2005 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a441160.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-18 

Conceptual Model for the Transport of Energetic Residues from Surface Soil to Groundwater 

by Range Activities. 2006 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472270.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-7. Development of environmental data for Navy, Air Force, and 

Marine munitions. 2007 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a470912.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-9 

Energetic Residues on Alaska Training Ranges: Studies for US Army Garrison Alaska 2005 

and 2006. 2007 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a471042.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-10 

Protocols for collection of surface soil samples at military training and testing ranges for the 

characterization of energetic munitions constituents. 2007 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a471045.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-08-10 

Energetic residues and crater geometries from the firing of 120-mm high-explosive mortar 

projectiles into Eagle River Flats. 2008 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a484240.pdf

ERDC TR-01-13 

Distribution and Fate of Energetics on DoD Test and Training Ranges: Interim Report 1. 

2001. Chapter 2. http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/tr01-13.pdf
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ERDC TR 02-8 

Distribution and Fate of Energetics on DoD Test and Training Ranges: Interim Report 2. 

2002. Chapters 2 & 3. http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/tr02-8.pdf

ERDC-TR-03-2 

Distribution and Fate of Energetics on DoD Test and Training Ranges, Interim Report 3. 

2003. Chapters 2 & 3. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA417819

ERDC-TR-04-4 

Distribution and Fate of Energetics on DoD Test and Training Ranges, Interim Report 4. 

2004. Chapters 2 - 5. http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/tr04-4.pdf

ERDC TR 05-2 

Distribution and Fate of Energetics on DoD Test and Training Ranges: Interim Report 5. 

2005. Chapters 2, 4 – 6. http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/tr05-2.pdf

ERDC TR-08-01

Characterization and Fate of Gun and Rocket Propellant Residues on Testing and Training 

Ranges; Final Report. 2008 

Properties, Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium (DU): A General Overview. Bleise 

et. al., 2003. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 64 (2003) 93-112). 

Range Assessment Lessons Learned. J.L. Clausen, Federal Facilities Environmental Journal, 

16(2):49-62 (2005) 

Sampling for Explosives-Residues at Ft. Greely. M.E. Walsh, C.M. Collins, T.F. Jenkins, 

A.D. Hewitt, J. Stark, K. Myers. Soil and Sediment Contamination, 12:631-645 (2003) 

SERDP Project UXO-1329

Modeling for Sensor Evaluation in Underwater UXO Test Beds: Final Report. Dr. Raymond 

Lim. . 1/11/2008 

Site Characterization for Explosives Contamination at a Military Firing Range Impact Area. 

T.F. Jenkins, M.E. Walsh, P.G. Thorne, P.H Miyares, T.A. Ranney, C.L. Grant, and J. 

Esparza. CRREL Special Report 98-9, August 1998. 

http://64.78.11.86/uxofiles/enclosures/Sitecontamination_CERRL.pdf

Technical Brief, Depleted Uranium. USEPA, 2006. 

http://epa.gov/radiation/docs/cleanup/402-r-06-011.pdf 

Workflow and Quality Control Products. Bryan Harre. 2011. Presented in the 

Implementing Classification on a Munitions Response Project short course at the 2011 

SERDP and ESTCP Partners in Environmental Technology Technical Symposium and 

Workshop 
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A.2.2.4. Military Training Ranges: Sampling Heterogeneity. 

Assessment of Sampling Error Associated with Collection and Analysis of Soil Samples at a 

Firing Range Contaminated with HMX. CRREL Special Report 97-22, September 1997 

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA330661

Coping with Spatial Heterogeneity Effects on Sampling and Analysis at an HMX - 

Contaminated Antitank Firing Range. T.F. Jenkins, C.L. Grant, M.E. Walsh, P.G. Thorne, S. 

Thiboutot, G. Ampleman, and T.A. Ranney. Field Analytical Chemistry and Technology 

3(1):19-28 (1999) 

Remediation Methods for White Phosphorus Contamination in a Coastal Salt Marsh. 

Michael R. Walsh, Marianne E. Walsh, and Charles M. Collins. Environmental 

Conservation. 26(2): 112-124 (1999) 

Sampling Error Associated with Collection and Analysis of Soil Samples at TNT 

Contaminated Sites. T.F. Jenkins, C.L. Grant, G.S. Brar, P.G. Thorne, P.W. Schumacher and 

T.A. Raney. Field Analytical Chemistry and Technology, 1:151-163 (1997) 

TNT Particle Size Distributions from Detonated 155-mm Howitzer Rounds. S. Taylor, A. 

Hewitt, J. Lever, C. Hayes, L. Perovich, P. Thorne and C. Daghlian, Chemosphere, 55:357-

367 (2004) 

A.2.2.5. Military Training Ranges: Incremental Sampling. 

A Methodology for Assessing Sample Representativeness. C.A. Ramsey and A.D. Hewitt, 

Journal of Environmental Forensics, 6:71-76 (2005) 

Composite Sampling of Sediments Contaminated with White Phosphorus. M.E. Walsh, C.I. 

Collins, R.N. Bailey, and C.L. Grant. CRREL Special Report 97-30, December 1997. 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a335137.pdf

Comment on “Data Representativeness for Risk Assessment by Rosemary Mattuck et al. 

2005. T. F. Jenkins, A.D. Hewitt, M.E. Walsh, C.L. Grant, and C.A. Ramsey. Journal of 

Environmental Forensics, 6:325 (2005) 

ERDC/CRREL TR 04-7 

Representative Sampling for Energetic Compounds at an Antitank Firing Range. 2004 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a423212.pdf4

ERDC/CRREL TR-04-14 

Sampling Strategies Near a Low-Order Detonation and a Target at an Artillery Impact Area. 

2004. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a428488.pdf
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ERDC/CRREL TR-05-6 

Collection Methods and Laboratory Processing of Samples from Donnelly Training Area 

Firing Points Alaska, 2003. March 2005. 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434240.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-7 

Estimating Energetic Residue Loading on Military Artillery Ranges: Large Decision Units. 

2005 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472953.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-05-8 

An Examination of Protocols for the Collection of Munitions-Derived Residues on Snowcovered Ice. 2005 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a434936.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-2 

Sampling Studies at an Air Force Live-Fire Bombing Range Impact Area. 2006 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a444642.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-10 

Energetic Residues Deposition from 60-mm and 81-mm Mortars. 2006 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a449108.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-19 

Measuring Energetics Residues on Snow. 2007 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472953.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-09-6 

Validation of Sampling Protocols and the Promulgation of Method Modifications for the 

Characterization of Energetic Residues on Military Testing and Training Ranges. 2009 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a517341.pdf

Identity and Distribution of Residues of Energetic Compounds at Army Live-Fire Training 

Ranges. T.F. Jenkins, A.D. Hewitt, C.L. Grant, S. Thiboutot, G. Ampleman, M.E. Walsh, 

T.A. Ranney, C.A. Ramsey, A. Palazzo, J.C. Pennington. Chemosphere, 63:1280-1290 

(2006) 

Representative Sampling for Energetic Compounds at Military Training Ranges, T.F. 

Jenkins, A.D. Hewitt, M.E. Walsh, T.A. Ranney, C.A. Ramsey, C.L. Grant, and K.L. Bjella, 

Journal of Environmental Forensics 6:45-55 (2005) 

A.2.2.6. Military Training Ranges: Small Arms Range Sampling. 

ERDC TR-07-1 

Characterization and Fate of Gun and Rocket Propellant Residues on Testing and Training 

Ranges: Interim Report 1. 2007 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a471046.pdf
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ERDC/CRREL TR-07-11 

Environmental Assessment of Lead at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, Small Arms Ranges. 

2007 http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA471626

Migration of Lead in Surface Water, Pore Water, and Groundwater With a Focus on Firing 

Ranges, Critical Reviews in Environmental Science and Technology, Clausen, J.L., Bostick, 

B., and Korte, N., 2011, 41:15, 1397-1448. 

A.2.2.7. Field Sample Processing. 

Development of Colorimetric Field Screening Methods for Munitions Compounds in Soil. 

Thomas F. Jenkins, Marianne E. Walsh, Patricia W. Schumacher and Philip G. Thorne. 

Proc. SPIE 2504, 324 (1995); doi:10.1117/12.224116 

ERDC/CRREL TR 03-14

On-site Processing and Subsampling of Surface Soil Samples for the Analysis of Explosives. 

2003. http://www.costperformance.org/monitoring/pdf/19_on-site_processing.pdf

A.2.2.8. Laboratory Sample Processing. 

Comparison of Environmental Chemical Results for Split Samples Analyzed in Different 

Laboratories. C.L. Grant, T.F. Jenkins and A.R. Mudambi. Journal AOAC, 80:1129-1138 

(1997) 

ERDC/CRREL TN-05-2

Pre-Screening for Explosives Residues in Soil Prior to HPLC Analysis Utilizing Expray. 

2005 

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-6 

Extraction Kinetics of Energetic Compounds from Training Range and Army Ammunition 

Plant Soils: Platform Shaker vs. Sonic Bath Methods. 2006 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a445225.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-07-15 

Processing of Training Range Soils for the Analysis of Energetic Compounds. 2007 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472096.pdf

Subsampling Variance for 2,4-DNT in Firing Point Soils, M.E. Walsh, C.A. Ramsey, 

S. Taylor, A.D. Hewitt, K. Bjella and C.M. Collins, Soil and Sediment Contamination, An 

International Journal, 16 (5):459 (2007) 

The Effect of Particle Size Reduction on Subsampling Variance for Explosives Residues in 

Soil. M.E. Walsh, C.A. Ramsey, and T.F. Jenkins. Chemosphere, 49:1265-1271 (2002) 
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A.2.2.9. Fate and Transport. 

A Time Series Investigation of the Stability of Nitramine and Nitroaromatic Explosives in 

Surface Water Samples at Ambient Temperature. T.A. Douglas, L. Johnson, M.E. Walsh, 

and C.M. Collins. Chemosphere. 76:1-8 (2009) 

Characteristics of Composition B Particles from Blow-in-place Detonations. S. Taylor, J. 

Lever, E. Campbell, L. Perovich and J. Pennington. Chemosphere (in prep) 

Dissolution Kinetics of High Explosives Particles in a Saturated Sandy Soil. M.C. Morley, 

H. Yamamoto, G. E. Speitel Jr., and J. L. Clausen. Journal of Contaminant Hydrology 

85:141-158 (2006) 

Dissolution of Composition B Detonation Residues. J.H. Lever, S. Taylor, L. Perovich, K. 

Bjella and B. Packer. Environmental Science and Technology 39:8803-8811 (2005) 

EPA-402-R-06-011 

Depleted Uranium Technical Brief, 2006 

http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/cleanup/402-r-06-011.pdf

ERDC TR-07-5 

Fate and Transport of Tungsten at Camp Edwards Small Arms Ranges. 2007 

http://el.erdc.usace.army.mil/elpubs/pdf/tr07-5.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-06-18 

Conceptual Model for the Transport of Energetic Residues from Surface Soil to Groundwater 

by Range Activities. 2006 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a472270.pdf

ERDC/CRREL TR-10-2 

Dissolution Rate, Weathering Mechanics and Friability of TNT, Comp B, Tritonal, and 

Octol. 2010 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518701.pdf

Fate and Transport of High Explosives in a Sandy Soil: Adsorption and Desorption. 

H. Yamamoto, M. C. Morley, G.E. Speitel Jr., and J. Clausen. Soil and Sediment 

Contamination: An International Journal 13(5):1-19 (2004) 

Properties, Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium (DU): A General Overview. Bleise 

et al., 2003. Journal of Environmental Radioactivity 64 (2003) 93-112 
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B-1 

APPENDIX B

QASP Template

1.0 Overview.

1.1 Introduction. This performance-based Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) sets forth the 

procedures and guidance that the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) will use in evaluating the technical 

and quality performance of the Contractor in accordance with the terms and conditions of the performance work 

statement (PWS). A copy of the signed final plan will be furnished to the Contractor so that the Contractor will be 

aware of the methods that the COR will use in evaluating performance of this contract.

1.2 Purpose. The purpose of the QASP is to assure that the performance of specific activities and the 

completion of project milestones are accomplished in accordance with all requirements set forth in the PWS and 

outlined in the Project Management Plan (PMP) strategy for Army Quality Assurance. This QASP describes the 

mechanism for documenting noteworthy accomplishments or discrepancies for work performed by the Contractor. 

Information generated from COR’s surveillance activities will directly feed into performance discussions with the 

Contractor. The intent is to ensure that the Contractor performs in accordance with performance metrics set forth in 

the contract documents, the Army receives the quality of services called for in the contract, and the Army only pays 

for acceptable services received.

The QASP is intended to accomplish the following: 

1. Define the role and responsibilities of participating Army officials.

2. Define the key milestones, deliverables, and standards that will be assessed.

3. Describe the surveillance methodology that will be employed by the Army in assessing the 

Contractor’s performance.

4. Describe the surveillance documentation process and provide copies of the forms that the Army will 

use in evaluating the Contractor’s performance.

5. Outline quality assurance procedures to be employed by the Government during performance of this 

task order to confirm that the site characterization is conducted utilizing proper procedures and in 

accordance with the approved work and safety plans.

6. Define Exceptional, Very Good, Satisfactory, Marginal, and Unsatisfactory performance standards for 

key milestones, deliverables, and standards

7. Outline corrective action procedures

8. Describe payment procedures.

2.0 Roles and Responsibilities of Quality Assurance Army Officials.

2.1 Contracting Officer. The Contracting Officer (KO) has overall responsibility for overseeing the 

Contractor’s performance. The KO is responsible for the day-to-day monitoring of the Contractor’s performance in 

the areas of contract compliance, and contract administration; reviewing the COR’s assessment of the Contractor’s 

performance; and resolving all differences between the COR’s assessment and the Contractor’s assessment of 

performance. It is the KO that assures the Contractor receives impartial, fair, and equitable treatment under the 

contract. The KO is ultimately responsible for the final determination of the adequacy of the Contractor’s 

performance. The KO for this contract is Steve N. McQueen at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), 

Huntsville District, [insert phone number], [insert e-mail]. Questions for the KO should be directed to the assigned 

USACE Contracting Specialist, Chester Copperpot at [insert phone number], [insert e-mail].

2.2 Contracting Officer Representative (COR). The Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) is responsible 

for technical administration of the project and assures proper Army surveillance of the Contractor’s performance. 

The COR is responsible for monitoring, assessing, recording, and reporting on the technical performance of the 

Contractor on a day-to-day basis. The COR for this contract is Marie B. Curie at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE), Huntsville District, [insert phone number], [insert e-mail]. Questions for the COR should be directed to 

the assigned USACE Project Manager, Stacy Q. Holcombe at [insert phone number], [insert e-mail].
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B-2 

2.3 Technical Expertise and Subject Matter Experts. The KO and COR may call upon the technical expertise 

of other Army Officials and subject matter experts (SME) as required. These Army Officials and SMEs may be 

called upon to review technical documents and products generated by the Contractor. For this contract, the 

following Army Officials and SMEs have been identified:

Army Environmental Command [Insert Name]

Camp Swampy [Insert Name]

Restoration Manager

Camp Swampy Safety Office [Insert Name]

Local Stakeholders [Insert Name]

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Project Manager

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Project Engineer

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Senior Geophysicist

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Industrial Hygienist

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Project Chemist

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Risk Assessment

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Program Manager

USACE, Huntsville District [Insert Name]

USACE Ordnance and Explosives Safety Manager 

USACE Environmental and Munitions Center of Expertise

US Army Technical Center for Explosive Safety (USATCES)

DoD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB).

If additional Army Officials and SMEs are identified as work progresses, the QASP will be modified to 

capture this information. 

3.0 Methods for Performance Assessment

3.1 Key Milestones/Deliverables to be Assessed. The following milestones and associated deliverables will be 

evaluated in accordance with this QASP:

3.1.1 Key Milestones.

• COR acceptance of the Final PMP

• COR acceptance of the Final RI UFP-QAPP for 1 MRS: Training Range Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA-001-

R-01)
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B-3 

• COR acceptance of Final Geophysical Data Submittal for 1 MRS: Training Range Areas 1 and 2 

(CASWA-001-R-01)

• COR acceptance of Final Dig Sheet Data Submission for 1 MRS: Training Range Areas 1 and 2 

(CASWA-001-R-1)

• COR acceptance of Final Munitions Constituents (MC) Data for 1 MRS: Training Range Areas 1 and 2 

(CASWA-001-R-1)

• COR acceptance of the Final RI Report for 1 MRS: Training Range Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA-001-R01)

• COR acceptance of the Final FS Report for 1 MRS: Training Range Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA-001-R01)

3.1.2 Key Deliverables.

• Project Management Plan (including Waste Minimization Plan)

• Site Safety and Health Plan

• Waste Management Plan

• Sampling and Analysis Plan

• Quality Control Plan

• MMRP Community Relations Plan

• Monthly Status Reports

• Milestone Presentations

• RI UFP-QAPP for Training Range Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA-001-R-01)

• RI Report for Training Range Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA -001-R-01)

3.2 Additional Surveillance Activities. Additional Government surveillance activities may include, but are not 

limited to, the following:

• Review and approval of meeting minutes from Kickoff Meetings, TPP Sessions, RAB (If required) or 

Public Involvement Meetings, etc.

• Review of Daily Reports

• Review of data deliverables.

• Oversight of field work activities.

• Review of uploaded electronic deliverables.

• Review of the Contractor’s quality control documentation. 

• Review of the Contractor’s safety records

3.3 Performance Standards. Since cost is fixed in this Delivery Order, the Contractor’s performance will be 

evaluated by assessing the key milestones and deliverables above according to the standards of Quality, Schedule, 

Management of Key Personnel and Resources, and Stakeholder Concurrence. In addition, the Contractor’s 

performance will be evaluated for the standard of Safety during any fieldwork. For each of these performance 

standards, the COR will assign one of five ratings of the Contractor’s performance: exceptional, very good, 

satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory, as shown in Table B-1.

Table B-1 - Evaluation Standards 

Performance 

Standard

Excellent Very Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory

Basic 

Definition

Contractor 

exceeds the 

performance 

requirements for 

the milestone, 

Contractor 

exceeds the 

performance 

requirements for 

the milestone, 

Contractor meets 

the performance 

requirements for 

the milestone, 

deliverable, or 

Contractor 

meets the 

performance 

requirements for 

the milestone, 

Contractor does 

not meet the 

performance 

requirements for 

the milestone, 
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B-4 

Performance 

Standard

Excellent Very Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory

deliverable, or 

standard, with no 

substantive input 

from the 

government. 

deliverable, or 

standard, with 

minimal input 

from the 

government. 

standard, with 

moderate input 

from the 

government. 

deliverable, or 

standard, with 

significant input 

from the 

government. 

deliverable, or 

standard, after 

significant input 

from the 

government.

Performance Category: Quality of Product or Service

Quality Draft Final and 

Final deliverables 

are of excellent 

quality, approved 

as submitted, or 

with no 

substantive 

comments limited 

to grammar, 

spelling, or 

terminology.

Army audit finds 

that the data 

collect and/or the 

work performed 

exceeds the 

requirement of the 

PWS. No 

deficiencies noted 

Draft Final 

deliverables are 

of high quality 

and comments 

are mostly 

minor. Final 

deliverables are 

approved after 

one (1) round of 

Army comments 

on the Draft 

Final through 

acceptance of 

response to 

comments table 

and backcheck 

of Final report 

against original 

comments. No 

further revisions 

are required.

Army audit of 

work does not 

identify any 

deficiencies that 

compromise the 

quality of the 

data collected or 

work performed.

Draft Final 

deliverables are 

of acceptable 

quality with 

only a few 

number of 

comments 

identifying 

major 

weaknesses. 

Final 

deliverables are 

approved after

two (2) rounds 

of Army 

comments on 

Draft Final . 

No further 

revisions are 

required. 

Army audit of 

work identifies 

deficiencies that 

do not 

compromise the 

quality of the 

data collected 

or work 

performed, and 

can be 

corrected.

Draft Final 

deliverables are 

of poor quality 

with a significant 

number of 

comments 

identifying major 

weaknesses or 

deficiencies. 

Final 

deliverables 

require more 

than two (2) 

rounds of Army 

comments on 

Draft Final 

before being 

approved. (e.g., 

changes are 

required to the 

Final document 

due to 

inadequate 

incorporation of 

comments). 

Army audit of 

work identifies 

deficiencies that 

compromise the 

quality of the 

data collected or 

work performed, 

but were 

corrected.

Draft Final 

deliverables are 

of very poor 

quality and are 

rejected for 

resubmittal 

without comment. 

Final deliverables 

did not comply 

with contract 

requirements, or 

one or more 

document 

versions required 

more than three

(3) rounds of 

Army comments 

before being 

approved. 

Army audit of 

work identifies 

deficiencies that 

compromise the 

quality of the data 

collected or work 

performed, and 

cannot be 

corrected.
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B-5 

Performance 

Standard

Excellent Very Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory

Performance Category: Schedule

Schedule Contractor 

Achieves 

milestone more 

than 90 days 

ahead of schedule 

(unless the COR 

waives this 

requirement), per 

criteria 

established in the 

PWS and this 

QASP.

For PMP, 

excellent rating is 

achievement of 

milestone 10 days 

ahead of 

schedule.

Contractor 

Achieves 

milestone less 

than 90 days but 

more than 30 

days ahead of 

schedule (unless 

the COR waives 

this 

requirement), per 

criteria 

established in the 

PWS and this 

QASP. 

For PMP very 

good rating is 

achievement of 

milestone 5 days 

ahead of 

schedule.

Contractor 

achieves 

milestone 

according to the 

schedule 

(unless the 

COR waives 

this 

requirement), 

per criteria 

established in 

the PWS and 

this QASP. 

For PMP 

satisfactory 

rating is 

achievement of 

milestone on 

schedule.

Contractor 

achieves 

milestone more 

than 30 days but 

less than 90 days 

behind schedule 

(unless the COR 

waives this 

requirement), per 

criteria 

established in the 

PWS and this 

QASP. 

For PMP 

marginal rating 

is achievement 

of milestone 10 

days behind 

schedule. 

Contractor 

achieves 

milestone more 

than 90 days 

behind schedule 

(unless the COR 

waives this 

requirement), per 

criteria 

established in the 

PWS and this 

QASP.

For PMP 

unsatisfactory 

rating is 

achievement of 

milestone 15 days 

behind schedule.

Performance Category: Management of Key Personnel and Resources

Management 

of Key 

Personnel 

and 

Resources

All personnel 

proposed by the 

contractor were 

assigned to the 

project. Some 

personnel were 

substituted by 

higher qualified 

individuals.

All personnel 

proposed by the 

contractor were 

assigned to the 

project. Some 

personnel were 

substituted by 

higher qualified 

individuals.

All personnel 

proposed by the 

contractor were 

assigned to the 

project. Some 

personnel were 

substituted by 

equally 

qualified 

individuals.

Informal poor 

performance 

feedback on 

conduct of 

personnel is 

provided by the 

COR but are 

corrected.

All personnel 

proposed by the 

contractor were 

assigned to the 

project. Some 

personnel were 

substituted by 

equally qualified 

individuals. 

Formal letter of 

poor 

performance 

feedback on 

conduct of 

personnel is 

provided by the 

COR but are 

All personnel 

proposed by the 

contractor were 

assigned to the 

project. Some 

personnel were 

substituted by 

lesser qualified 

individuals. 

Written request 

from USACE 

requesting 

removal of 

assigned 

personnel for 

poor performance 

or notification of 

poor performance 
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B-6 

Performance 

Standard

Excellent Very Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory

Zero (0) instances 

of resource 

management 

issues creating a 

negative impact to 

the activity.

No more than 

one (1) instances 

of resource 

management 

issues creating a 

negative impact 

to the activity.

No more than 

two (2) 

instances of 

resource 

management 

issues creating 

a negative 

impact to the 

activity.

corrected.

No more than 

three (3) 

instances of 

resource 

management 

issues creating a 

negative impact 

to the activity.

is provided by the 

COR and is not 

corrected.

More than three 

(3) instances of 

resource 

management 

issues creating a 

negative impact 

to the activity.

Performance Category: Stakeholder Involvement

Stakeholder 

Concurrence

Contractor applies 

innovative 

approaches 

regarding 

stakeholder and 

public 

involvement 

activities. 

Contractor 

applies 

approaches or a 

combination of 

approaches that 

enhances public 

involvement 

activities that 

benefit the 

project compared 

to basic required

activities. 

Contractor 

applies 

minimum 

requirements 

for stakeholder 

and public 

involvement. 

Contractor 

application or 

misapplication of 

stakeholder and 

public 

involvement 

activities 

potentially has a 

negative impact 

on project 

decisions. 

Contractor

application or 

misapplication of 

stakeholder and 

public 

involvement 

activities created 

a negative impact 

on project 

schedule, 

decisions, and or 

relationships. 

Performance Category: Safety

Safety No significant 

safety 

deficiencies are 

reported during 

QA inspection of 

fieldwork. No 

lost time 

accidents or 

injuries are 

recorded during 

the fieldwork.

No more than 

one (1) serious 

safety 

deficiencies are 

reported during 

QA inspection of 

fieldwork. If 

any serious 

safety deficiency 

is noted during 

the project, 

appropriate 

investigation, 

corrective action, 

implementation, 

and written 

verification of 

No more than 

two (2) serious 

safety 

deficiencies are 

reported during 

QA inspection 

of fieldwork. If 

any serious 

safety 

deficiency is 

noted during 

the project, 

appropriate 

investigation, 

corrective 

action, 

implementation, 

No more than 

three (3) serious 

safety 

deficiencies are 

reported during 

QA inspection of 

fieldwork. If any 

serious safety 

deficiency is 

noted during the 

project, 

appropriate 

investigation, 

corrective action, 

implementation, 

and written 

verification of 

More than three 

(3) serious safety 

deficiencies are 

reported during 

QA inspection of 

field activities, or 

a serious safety 

deficiency is 

reported but not 

properly 

investigated and 

corrected, or two 

or more lost time 

accidents or 

injuries is 

recorded during 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-7 

Performance 

Standard

Excellent Very Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory

the corrective 

action are 

provided to the 

Army. No lost 

time accidents or 

injuries are 

recorded during 

the fieldwork.

and written 

verification of 

the corrective 

action are 

provided to the 

Army. No lost 

time accidents 

or injuries are 

recorded during 

the fieldwork.

the corrective 

action are 

provided to the 

Army. No more 

than one lost 

time accident or 

injury is 

recorded during 

the fieldwork.

field activities

Performance Category: Cost Control (Not Applicable for Firm Fixed Price Contracts)

NA NA NA NA NA NA

The following guidelines are provided for issuing ratings that are subjective in nature, these ratings will be 

supported by the weight of evidence documented during the government's surveillance efforts:

Excellent: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds many to the Government's benefit. The 

contractual performance of the element or sub-element being assessed was accomplished with few minor problems 

for which corrective actions taken by the Contractor were highly effective.

Very Good: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds some to the Government's benefit. The 

contractual performance of the element or sub-element being assessed was accomplished with some minor problems 

for which corrective actions taken by the Contractor were effective.

Satisfactory: Performance meets contractual requirements. The contractual performance of the element or subelement contains some minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the Contractor appear or were 

satisfactory.

Marginal: Performance does not meet all contractual requirements. The contractual performance of the element or 

sub-element being assessed reflects a serious problem for which the Contractor has not yet identified corrective 

actions. The Contractor's proposed actions appear only marginally effective or were not fully implemented.

Unsatisfactory: Performance does not meet most contractual requirements and recovery is not likely in a timely 

manner. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element contains serious problems for which the 

Contractor's corrective actions appear or were ineffective. 

3.4 Performance Assessment Process. If a deliverable is rated as being unsatisfactory for quality or stakeholder 

concurrence at the time that the approved PWS deadline for the milestone expires, the Contractor will automatically 

receive an unsatisfactory rating for Schedule, unless there is an Army approved delay that extends the PWS 

performance objective. 

3.4.1 Army Approved Delays. At the discretion of the COR, the performance standard of Schedule may be 

waived in accordance with the criteria outlined in Table B-2. Army-Approved Delays will be tracked by the 

contractor and reported to the COR monthly. 

3.4.2 Stakeholder Concurrence Waiver. At the discretion of the COR, the performance standard of Stakeholder 

Concurrence may be waived in accordance with the criteria outlined in Table B-2. 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-8 

3.4.3 Overall Rating. 

- An Excellent rating will be achieved only if more than 50% of the 21 milestone ratings (as shown on 

Table B-2) for the task order are Excellent, with no unacceptable ratings allowed. 

- A Very Good rating will be achieved only if more than 50% of the 21 milestone ratings (as shown on 

Table B-2) for the task order are Very Good or Excellent, with no unacceptable ratings allowed. 

- An Acceptable rating will be achieved only if more than 50% of the 21 milestone ratings (as shown on 

Table B-2) for the task order are Acceptable or better, with no more than 1 of the 21 milestone ratings rated 

as unacceptable. 

- A Marginal rating will be achieved if the criteria for an overall Acceptable rating are not fully met and 

there are no more than 2 of the 21 milestones rated as unacceptable.

- An Unsatisfactory rating will be achieved if there are more than 2 of the 21 milestone rated as 

unacceptable.

Table B-2 - Evaluation Standards Table (Key Milestones/Deliverables)

Milestone/Deliverable* Quality Schedule Resource 

Management

Stakeholder 

Concurrence

Safety

1 FINAL Project Management Plan X X X

2 DRAFT FINAL RI UFP-QAPP for Training 

Range Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA-001-R-01)

X 

3 FINAL RI UFP-QAPP for Training Range 

Areas 20 and 21 (CASWA-001-R-01)

X X X 

4 Geophysical Data Submittal X X X

5 Dig Sheets Data Submittal X X X

6 MC Submission and Scrap Disposal Records 

Submission

X X X 

7 DRAFT FINAL RI Report for Training Range 

Areas 1 and 2 (CASWA-001-R-01)

X 

8 FINAL RI Report for Training Range Areas 1 

and 2 (CASWA-001-R-01)

X X X X 

TOTAL NUMBER OF RATINGS: 8 2 6 2 3

* Includes Key Milestones and Key Deliverables from PWS and Payment Milestones from Contractor PMP, June 2012. 

4.0 Surveillance Methodology. Table B-3 and Table B-4 summarize the surveillance activities planned for the 

QASP. The surveillance methods listed below will be used in the administration of this QASP. 

4.1 100% Inspection. All project milestones and deliverables will be evaluated through 100% inspection by 

onsite inspection or document review. The USACE Project Manager will document performance for each 

completed milestone or deliverable prior to payment, as described in Section 5.0. 

4.2 Periodic Inspection. At the USACE Project Manager’s discretion, periodic inspections will be conducted 

to evaluate progress toward key milestones and deliverables. This will include QA Safety Inspections by a 

government representative during any fieldwork. The USACE Project Manager may also complete a periodic 

progress inspection if he/she believes that deficiencies exist that must be addressed prior to milestone or deliverable 

completion. While corrective action or re-performance will be required if necessary, the Contractor will not be 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-9 

financially penalized for unacceptable performance recorded in periodic progress reports, provided that final 

performance evaluation of the milestone or deliverable is deemed acceptable.

4.3 Customer Feedback: Contractor performance feedback will be obtained through periodic inquiries by the 

USACE Project Manager with project stakeholders. The purpose of these inquiries would be to supplement the 

other forms of evaluation and to also provide the Contractor with constructive criticism and/or recognition for the 

project deliverables or milestones completed. Customer feedback received will be thoroughly validated to ensure it 

relates to the requirements of the PWS and will be used in a prudent manner by the COR. Customer feedback will 

also be solicited in the form of a concurrence letter by the Contractor from appropriate stakeholders (see Table B-2 

stakeholder footnotes) for key deliverables. 

Table B-3 - Surveillance Activities Table (Key Milestones/Deliverables)

Milestone Indicator Evaluation 

Standard Performance Measure Monitoring Method Documentation

COR 

acceptance of 

DRAFT

FINAL

deliverables.

COR 

acceptance of 

DRAFT 

FINAL 

Documents.

Quality Army Review of 

Deliverable

100% 

Inspection

USACE Project 

Manager 

completion of 

QAMF, email, 

letters, customer 

surveys

COR 

acceptance of 

FINAL 

deliverables.

COR 

acceptance of 

Final 

Documents.

Quality

Resource 

Management

Schedule

Stakeholder 

Concurrence

Army Review of 

Deliverable

Number of incidences 

regarding contractor 

personnel/qualifications 

and/or incidences of 

task management

Milestone per (where 

applicable) PWS 

Resolution of all 

stakeholder comments.

100% 

Inspection

Periodic 

Inspection

Compare to 

PWS Metric

Customer 

Feedback

USACE Project 

Manager 

completion of 

QAMF, email, 

letters, customer 

surveys

COR 

acceptance of 

Data 

Submittals.

COR 

acceptance of 

Data

Submittals.

Quality

Resource 

Management

Safety

Army Review of 

Deliverable

Number of incidences 

regarding contractor 

personnel/qualifications 

and/or incidences of 

task management

Number of Safety 

deficiencies or 

incidents

100% 

Inspection

Periodic

Inspection

Periodic 

Inspection

USACE Project 

Manager 

completion of 

QAMF, email, 

letters, customer 

surveys

Notes: 

These key milestones are identified/tied to payment milestones. The “Army” includes stakeholders from the Installation, AEC,

and USACE. 

* Includes Key Milestones and Key Deliverables from PWS and Payment Milestones from LATA-Matrix PMP, June 2010.
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-10 

Table B-4 - Surveillance Activities Table (Interim Milestones/Deliverables)

Milestone Indicator Evaluation 

Standard

Performance 

Measure

Monitoring 

Method

Documentation

Status Reports, 

Meeting Minute, 

Memos, 

Worksheets, and 

Annual Updates

COR 

Acceptance of 

Status Reports, 

Meeting 

Minutes, 

Memos, 

Worksheets & 

Annual Updates

NA Army Review of 

Deliverable

100% 

Inspection

COR 

Acceptance

Milestone 

Presentations

COR 

Acceptance of 

Status Report

NA Army Review of 

Deliverable

100% 

Inspection

COR 

Acceptance

5.0 Surveillance Documentation.

5.1 Quality Assurance Monitoring. The COR or designee will use a Quality Assurance Monitoring Form

(QAMF) (the PDT should include a sample QAMF as Attachment A) to record evaluation of the Contractor’s 

performance for each payment milestone or final deliverable in accordance with the methodology described in 

Section 3.0 and Section 4.0. The USACE Project Manager must substantiate, through narratives on the form, all 

superior and unacceptable ratings. Performance at the acceptable level is expected from the Contractor. At a 

minimum, the evaluation form will indicate actual and scheduled delivery times and number of reviews required to 

achieve the final product. The USACE Project Manager will forward copies of all completed QAMFs to the 

USACE COR within 7 days of performing the inspection. The USACE Project Manager will forward all completed 

quality assurance monitoring forms to the AEC ERM and Contractor within 14 days.

5.2 Technical Quality Assurance Monitoring. In general, all work will be evaluated in terms of how well the 

requirements of the task order are satisfied, the extent to which the work performed follows the approach found in 

the contractor’s technical proposal and/or implements the decision of Technical Project Planning, and clarity of 

documentation. At the discretion of the COR or the Contracting Officer or Specialist, other government officials 

approved by the Contracting Officer or Specialist may be asked to evaluate a particular deliverable or set of 

deliverables. The results of all Technical Quality Assurance Monitoring will be documented using a Technical 

Review Form. Technical Quality Assurance Monitoring Documentation will document technical criteria evaluated. 

The PDT should include example forms in Attachment B that will be updated as needed. Example Technical 

Quality Assurance Monitoring forms are included in Appendix C of EM 200-1-15.

5.3 Corrective Action Process. When a key milestone/deliverable receives a marginal or unacceptable rating, 

the Contractor will explain, within 15 days, in writing to both the USACE COR and USACE Project Manager why 

performance was marginal or unacceptable, how performance will be returned to acceptable levels, and how 

recurrence of the problem will be prevented in the future. The Contractor shall use the corrective action request 

(CAR) form as part of this process (the PDT should include a sample CAR as Attachment C). The USACE COR 

will review the proposed corrective action with the AEC ERM and USACE Project Manager, and Installation POC, 

as necessary, to determine if it will be accepted.

5.4 KO and COR Roles in Surveillance Process. The USACE Project Manager will provide the COR and KO 

with copies of all completed QAMFs. When appropriate, the COR and/or KO may investigate further to determine 

if all the facts and circumstances surrounding the event were considered in the USACE Project Manager opinions 

outlined on the form. The COR and/or KO will immediately discuss any unacceptable rating with the Contractor’s 

Program Manager to assure that corrective action is promptly initiated. At the end of the contract performance 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-11 

period, the USACE Project Manager will prepare a written report for the COR and KO summarizing the overall 

results of the surveillance of the Contractor’s performance during the contract. This report will become part of the 

formal QA documentation. The USACE Project Manager will maintain a complete QA file. This file will contain 

copies of all performance evaluation forms and any other related documentation. The USACE Project Manager will 

forward these records through the COR and to the KO at termination or completion of the contract.

6.0 Payment.

6.1 Acceptable Performance. The Contractor will also be required to perform a milestone presentation per the 

PWS. At the discretion of the COR, these milestone presentations may be conducted as part of the next regularly 

scheduled Project Meeting. Full payment for a milestone will be provided upon verification of overall acceptable 

performance as indicated on the QAMF. The contractor should provide an invoice to the USACE Project Manager 

after receipt of the QAMF from the USACE indicating acceptable performance. If a QAMF is not provided to the 

Contractor within 14 days of completion of the milestone the Contractor will submit an invoice. 

6.2 Unsatisfactory Performance. If a milestone or deliverable receives an unsatisfactory rating for either the 

quality or stakeholder concurrence performance standard, re-performance is required until the deliverable receives 

an acceptable rating. This re-performance is required regardless of cost or schedule constraints that may result from 

the unsatisfactory performance, unless the USACE Project Manager waives the timeliness or stakeholder 

concurrence requirement for that specific deliverable or the KO has opted to terminate the contract.

QASP Approval:

____________________________________________

Marie Curie, P.E. Date

Contracting Officer’s Representative
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-12 

ATTACHMENT A

EXAMPLE QUALITY ASSURANCE MONITORING FORM
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-13 

ATTACHMENT B 

Example Technical Quality Assurance Monitoring Forms are included in Appendix C of EM 

200-1-15. 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-14 

ATTACHMENT C1

EXAMPLE CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST FORM
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-15 

ATTACHMENT C2

EXAMPLE CORRECTION ACTION REQUEST FORM
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

B-16 

Instructions: 

Block 1: Name of USACE representative conducting the QA Activity. 

Block 2: Date QA Activity completed.

Block 3: Project Name and location, i.e., “Camp Swampy (MRS-02), Smithville, Alaska”. 

Block 4: Weather conditions, if applicable. 

Block 5: Contractor and/or subcontractor executing the work. 

Block 6: Contract number. 

Block 7: Task Order number. 

Block 8: List by name all official recipients of the QAR.

Block 9: Enter the date that the contractor is to respond, if applicable. 

Block 10: List all QA related activities, inspections, audits, operations observed, etc. 

Block 11: Denote whether or not additional discipline-specific checklists are attached and if so, 

which ones are attached.

Block 12: Describe results and observations of each QA activity conducted. Attach disciplinespecific checklists/documentation used. 

Block 13: Circle type of deficiency, if any, observed. Use contract specific definitions if available, 

or use the following general definitions: 

 -Critical; A nonconformance that is likely to result in hazardous or unsafe conditions for 

individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the supplies or services; or is likely to prevent 

performance of a vital agency mission. 

 -Major: A nonconformance, other than critical, that is likely to result in failure of the supplies 

or services, or to materially reduce the usability of the supplies or services for their intended purpose.

 -Minor: means a nonconformance that is not likely to materially reduce the usability of the 

supplies or services for their intended purpose, or is a departure from established standards having 

little bearing on the effective use or operation of the supplies or services. 

Block 14: QA representative signature. 

Block 15: Contractor representative signature. Signature does not indicate concurrence with stated 

findings, only that contractor has received the report. 

Block 16: Contractor indicates action(s) taken to determine cause of nonconformance, action taken to 

correct immediate nonconformance, and action taken to prevent a recurrence of the nonconformance. 

Include dates of actions taken and a schedule for completion of planned actions. 

Block 17: Contractor representative signature, title and date. 

Block 18: Indicate government acceptance of contractors actions to correct identified 

nonconformance. 

Block 19: Indicate negative government actions taken as a result of the nonconformance. 

Block 20: Signature of contractor, PDT representative and contracting officer or COR indicating 

close out for all nonconformances indicated. 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-1 

APPENDIX C 

Sample Discipline-Specific Quality Assurance Reports 

DGM Data Submittals
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-2 

Anomaly Resolution
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-3 

Field Oversight Checklist – General Procedures

Project Name: Former State AFB 

Address: City, State

Facility Contact & Phone Number: Bob, Smith, (111) 222-3333

Sampling Team Leader: John Brown

Affiliation: ABC MMRP Contractor, Inc.

Address & Phone Number: Street, City, State, Zip, (444) 555-6666

Sampling Personnel: John Brown 

Field Oversight Personnel: Jill Lively

Affiliation: CEHNC

Date(s) of Oversight: 26-27 June 2003

Checklist section(s) completed for this overview:

1 X 2___3 X 4___5___6___7___8___ 

KEY:

1 General Procedures 2 Groundwater Sampling 

3 Soil & Sediment Sampling 4 Surface Water Sampling

5 Waste Sampling 6 Storm Water Sampling 

7 Air Sampling 8 Potable Water Sampling

1) Type of samples collected? Soil

Comments: None

SAMPLE FIELD AUDIT – FORM BASED ON EM 200-1-6 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-4 

2) Were sampling locations properly selected? Yes X No___ 

Comments: Contractor used GPS to relocate samples from previous sampling event that were high; the 

remainder of the samples were randomly placed.

3) Were sampling locations adequately documented in a bound field logbook using indelible ink? 

Yes_____ No X

Comments: UFP-QAPP had no field log requirements specified. However, log is minimal – typically 

limited to time collected and sample identification. One sample was back-entered and another was 

missing from logbook when reviewed. Some intervals were 6” (one auger bucket); others were 18” (3 

auger buckets). Depth of sample (and size of interval) should be noted clearly for all samples. No 

information was recorded about soil conditions, which varied from stiff clay to topsoil to sand and from 

very dark brown (almost black) to very light brown (sand). 

4) Were photos taken and photolog maintained? Yes____ No X 

Comments: I did take some site photographs.

5) What field instruments were used during this study? GPS

6) Were field instruments properly calibrated and calibrations recorded in a bound field logbook? Yes 

_____ No_____ N/A X

Comments: GPS was factory calibrated.

7) Was sampling equipment properly wrapped and protected from possible contamination prior to sample 

collection? Yes X No______ 

Comments: None

8) Was sampling equipment constructed of Teflon, polyethylene, glass, or stainless steel? Yes X 

No_____ 

Comments: Encore samplers were also used.

9) Were samples collected in proper order? (least suspected contamination to most contaminated?) 

Yes_____ No X 

Comments: Samples from berm (hottest, most accessible) were collected first. They were 

collected in numeric order, for the most part.

10) Were clean disposable latex or vinyl gloves worn during sampling? Yes X No_____ 

Comments: None

11) Were gloves changed before each sample? Yes X No____ 

Comments: None
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-5 

12) Was any equipment field cleaned? Yes X No____ 

Comments: None

13) Type of equipment cleaned? Bowls, spoons, auger bucket

14) Were proper cleaning procedures used? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Liquinox + water, water, ASTM Type II DI water

15) Were equipment rinse blanks collected after field cleaning? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Only 1 VOC vial collected. Typically, 3 are collected for aqueous VOC samples.

16) Were proper sample containers used for samples? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Bottle certifications were appropriate.

17) Were split samples offered to the regulatory agency representative? Yes _____ No____ N/A X 

Comments: None

18) Was a receipt for samples form given to regulatory agency representative? Yes____ No___ N/A X 

Comments: None

19) Were any duplicate samples collected? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Two duplicates collected; 93R-5 and 93R-16

20) Were samples properly field preserved? Yes X No ____ 

Comments: Majority required samples to be cooled to 4oC; all samples were placed in a cooler 

with ice; rinsate metals sample was collected in a bottle pre-preserved with HNO3; rinsate VOCs sample 

was collected in a bottle pre-preserved with HCl.

21) Were preservative blanks utilized? Yes ____ No X 

Comments: None

22) Were field and/or trip blanks utilized? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Trip blanks only.

23) Were samples adequately identified with labels or tags? Yes X No____ 

Comments: None
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-6 

24) Were coolers sealed with custody seals after collection? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Custody seals were taped at my request.

25) Were security measures taken to insure custody of the samples after collection? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Samples were either physically with the sampler, locked in the vehicle, or locked in 

the sampler’s hotel room.

26) Were chain-of-custody and receipt for sample forms properly completed? Yes X No____ 

Comments: CoC in 2nd cooler was a photocopy of the first COC. This is not good practice – each 

cooler should have a CoC that indicates what is really in it. If the photocopy method is used in the future, 

the CoC and copy should be annotated to show which containers are associated with which cooler. 

Contractor is not currently using any sort of request for analysis form. The CoC referred the laboratory to 

the quote. Recommended that they consider some sort of analysis request in the cooler that states method 

specifics rather than referring to a quote that may not be readily available to login personnel.

27) Were any samples shipped to laboratory? Yes X No____ 

Comments Samples were held overnight; WP requires that samples be shipped each day, but 

CEHNC rep agreed to hold samples in order to complete all sampling in one day.

28) If yes to No. 27, were samples properly packed? Yes____ No X 

Comments: 

SVOC bottles were placed horizontally not vertically

VOC cooler was compressed significantly (probably had too much ice in too small a cooler)

Soil jars were not individually wrapped; they were put back in shipping box inside the cooler

Sampler only had one temperature blank; so only one cooler got a temperature blank

Sampler purchased plain packing tape, not fiber tape as specified in WP

Coolers did not have “This side up” or “Fragile” labels, although one was marked already

Ice was placed in cooler in its original packaging (8-10# bag) inside a garbage bag, rather than in 

Ziploc bags that could be placed around the samples
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-7 

29) What safety monitoring equipment, protection, and procedures were used prior to and during 

sampling? Safety briefing conducted; no monitoring performed (or required); PPE (gloves) were used. 

30) Was safety monitoring equipment properly calibrated and were calibrations recorded in a bound field 

logbook? Yes ____ No ____ N/A X 

Comments: None
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-8 

1) Type of samples collected? Soil (surface and subsurface)

2) General description of samples? Discrete samples, variety of soil types and colors, ranged from stiff 

clay to sand to topsoil

3) How many samples were collected? 20 (+ QC samples, which included 2 MS/MSDs, 2 duplicates, 

and 1 rinsate)

4) Were background and/or control samples collected? Yes ____ No X 

Comments: None

5) Were representative samples collected? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Many samples were stiff clay – sampler made a good effort to break them up and mix 

them up.

6) Were grab or composite samples collected? Grab

7) Were composite samples areal or vertical? N/A

8) How many aliquots were taken for the composite sample? N/A

9) What procedures and equipment were used to collect samples? Spoon; Encore sampler (VOCs); hand 

auger (at depth)

10) Were samples thoroughly mixed prior to putting them into the sample containers? Yes X No ____

Comments: Not mixed for Encore samplers; else, see #5 on page 5.

11) Were samples properly placed into sample containers? Yes X No____ 

Comments ___________________________ 

12) Were samples chilled with water and iced immediately after collection? Yes X No ___ 

13) For what analyses were the samples collected? VOCs, SVOCs, metals, explosives

14) If samples were split, what were the sample/station numbers for these? N/A

15) Was a drilling rig, backhoe, etc., used to collect soil samples? Yes ____ No X

Comments: None

16) What was done with the soil cuttings from the drill rig or backhoe? N/A

17) Were the cuttings collected for proper disposal, or containerized until characterized? Yes___ No X 

Example Field Oversight Checklist – Soil and Sediment Sampling
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

C-9 

Comments: Cuttings from hand auger were replaced in hole.

18) Were the drilling rig, back hoe, etc., properly cleaned prior to arriving on site? Yes X No____ 

Comments: None

19) What was the condition of the drilling and sampling equipment when it arrived on site? (cleanliness, 

leaking jacks, peeling paint) Satisfactory

20) Was a decontamination area located where the cleaning activities would not cross-contaminate clean 

and/or drying equipment? Yes X No____ 

Comments: Decon was performed in plastic tubs that were taken from location to location in 

vehicle.

21) Was clean equipment properly wrapped and stored in a clean area? Yes X No____ 

Comments: None

22) Was the drilling rig(s) properly cleaned between well borings? Yes ____ No____ N/A X 

Comments: None

22) Were the cleaning and decontamination procedures conducted in accordance with the project plans? 

Yes X No____ 

Comments: None

23) Other comments or observations. 

Sampler only had one hand auger bucket, so he couldn’t use a clean bucket for the sampling interval at 

depth. He collected as he went due to refusal concerns (prior direction had been to sample at 5’ or refusal 

for samples at depth). It would probably have been difficult to have had a new bowl/auger at the correct 

interval if he reached refusal, which he did several times. Recommended that he bring more than one 

bucket next time. 

GPS accuracy is a real problem. Current requirement is to measure to sample locations to 1’ accuracy, 

but that requirement post-dates this WP, which doesn’t specify GPS accuracy for sampling. The GPS 

used for this event (and the initial event) was accurate to 20’. Reacquisition of exact sample locations is 

unlikely – sampler was unable to relocate one point he had staked the day before.

Sampler was not well prepared. He was unable to meet several minor WP requirements due to lack of 

appropriate supplies (i.e., temperature blanks, cooler labels, fiber tape, individual sample wrapping, and 

VOC vials) and did not attempt to correct these problems in the field when they were noted. He did 

acquire rinsate bottles from a local laboratory because their laboratory did not ship any. Coolers used 

were those provided by the laboratories, and they were probably too small to contain the samples and an 

appropriate amount of ice.

Jim Smith, Contractor Chemist, called on 3 July 2003 to inform HNC that samples were received at 9 oC 

based on IR gun measurement.
EM 200-1-15 

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C-10 

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
EM 200-1-15 

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D-1 

APPENDIX D

Chemical/Physical Properties of Munitions Constituents

Table D-1: Chemical/Physical Properties of Primary Explosives

Compound Chemical 

Formula Abbreviation CAS Number Molecular Weight

Melting 

Point (°C)

Boiling Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure (mm 

Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log Kow Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atmm3

/mole)

Lead azide N6-Pb LA 13424-46-9 291.24 190 

(decomp)a 350 (explodes)a U d 230 @ 18°Ca 1.47 (est.)g U d U d

Mercury fulminate C2-Hg-N2-O2 - 628-86-4 284.62 210 

(explodes)f NA d 0.000612 @ 25°C (est.)b 100 @ 15.5°Ca -4.83 (est.)b

11.1 

(est.)b U d

Diazodinitrophenol C6-H3-N4-O5 DDNP 4682-03-5 211.11 230.43 (est.)b 538.16 (est.)b 1.95 x 10-12 @ 

25°C (est.)b

630.5 @ 25°C 

(est.)b

2.09 

(est.)b NA d, e 2.86 x 10-9(est.)b

Lead styphnate C6-H-N3-O8-Pb - 15245-44-0 468.3 235 

(decomp)a

260-310 

(explodes)c

2.65 x 10-9 @ 

25°C (est.)b

Practically 

insoluble in 

water a

1.06 

(est.)b

3010 

(est.)b

3.58 x 10-11

(est.)b

Tetracene C18-H12 - 92-24-0 228.30 357b 399 (est.)b 2.49 x 10-9 b 0.00151 @ 

25°C b 5.76 b 6.46 x 105 b

5.01 x 10-6

(est.)b

Potassium 

dinitrobenzofuroxane K-C6-H4-N4-O6 KDNBF 42994-94-5 265.20 210 (explodes)c NA d U d 2,450 @ 30°Cc 0.99 (est.)g U d U d

Lead 

mononitroresorcinate C6-H5-N-O4-Pb LMNR 51317-24-9 364.32 U d U d U d U d 1.31 (est.)g U d U d

Note:

o

C = degrees Celsius

atm-m3

/mol = atmostpher meters cubed per mol

CAS = Chemical Abstract Summary

Hg = mercury

Kow = Octanol-Water Partition Coefficient

Koc = Organic Carbon Partition Coefficient

mg/L = milligrams per liter

mm = millimeters a Hazardous Substances Data Bank (HSDB), available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/, retrieved in March-September 2012 b USEPA, 2011. Estimation Programs Interface (EPI) SuiteTM for Microsoft® Windows, v 4.10. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA. c US Army Materiel Command, 1971, Engineering Design Handbook: Explosives Series – Properties of Explosives of Military Interest, AMC Pamphlet (AMCP) 706-177, January 1971; Online version 

available at: http://www.knovel.com/web/portal/browse/display?_EXT_KNOVEL_DISPLAY_bookid=3846&VerticalID=0 d U – Unavailable; NA – Not applicable e This chemical is a Quaternary Ammonium Compound (QAC). Adsorption of QACs seem to occur mainly by an ion-exchange mechanism and depends on cation-exchange capacity of the sorbent and 

variety of other parameters. b 

f USARDEC, 1960. Encyclopedia of Explosives and Related Items, PATR 2700, U.S. Army Research and Development Command; TACOM, ARDEC; Warheads, Energetics and Combat Support

Center; Picatinny Arsenal; New Jersey, USA. g Chemspider (http://www.chemspider.com/), predicted properties generated using ChemAxon (http://www.chemicalize.org/) 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-2 

Table D-2: Chemical/Physical Properties of Secondary Explosives, Co-Contaminants, and Breakdown Products 

Compound Chemical 

Formula Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point (°C)

Boiling Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure (mm 

Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atmm3

/mole)

Aliphatic Nitrate Esters

1,2,4-Butanetriol 

trinitrate C4-H7-N3-O9 BTN 6659-60-5 241.12 60.3 (est.)b 297 (est.)b 0.00106 @ 25°C (est.)b

515 @ 25°C 

(est.)b

2.00 

(est.)b

54.4 

(est.)b

3.37 x 10-9

(est.)b

Diethyleneglycol 

dinitrate C4-H8-N2-O7 DEGN 693-21-0 196.116 -11.3a 161a 5.9 x 10-3 @ 25°C a

3.9 x 103 @ 

25°C a 0.98a 32 (est.)a

3.9 x 10-7

(est.)a

Nitrocellulose C12-H21-N-O13 NC 9004-70-0 387.30 262 (est.)b 606 (est.)b 1.41 x 10-17 @ 

25°C (est.)b Immiscible a -4.56 (est.)b

0.0020

3 (est.)b

3.29x10-23 

(est.)b

Nitroglycerin C3-H5-N3-O9 NG 55-63-0 227.09 2.8 and 13.5a 218 

(explodes)a

2.0x10-4 @ 

20°Ca 1,800 @ 25°Ca 1.62a 180 (est.)a

4.3x10-8

(est.)a

Nitrostarch C12-H12-(NO2)8-

O10

NS 9056-38-6 684.26 U g U g U g U g U g U g U g

Pentaerythritol

tetranitrate C5-H8-N4-O12 PETN 78-11-5 316.14 140.5a 205-215 (explodes)a

1.36x10-7 @ 

25°C a 43 @ 25°C a 2.38 (est.)a

650 

(est.)a

1.32x10-9

(est.)a

Triethylene 

glycoldinitrate C6-H12-N2-O8 TEGN 111-22-8 240.17 65.8 (est.)b 298 (est.)b 0.000907 @ 25°C (est.)b 6,600 @ 25°C b 0.6224 (est.)b

26.2 

(est.)b

1.71 x 10-10 

(est.)b

1,1,1-

Trimethylolethane 

trinitrate

C5-H9-N3-O9 TMETN 3032-55-1 255.14 77.2 (est.)b 306 (est.)b 0.000453 @ 

25°C (est.)b 516 @ 19°C b 2.46 (est.)b

331 

(est.)b

4.47 x 10-9

(est.)b

Nitramines

Octahydro-1, 3, 5, 7-

tetranitro-1,3,5,7-

tetrazocine

C4-H8-N8-O8 HMX 2691-41-0 296.15 281a 280 

(decomp)a

2.41x10-8 @ 

25°Ca 5 @ 25°Cb 0.16b 18.9 

(est.)b

8.67x10-10 

(est.) a

Hexahydro-1,3,5-

trinitro-1,3,5-triazine C3-H6-N6-O6 RDX 121-82-4 222.12 205.5b 353 (est.)b 4.10x10-9 @ 20°C b 60 @ 25°Cc 0.87b 51.7 (est.)b 2.0x10-11 c

Ethylenediamine 

dinitrate C2-H10-N4-O6 EDDN 20829-66-7 186.124 U g 372 (est.)h 4.59 x 10-7 @ 25°C (est.)h U g -1.42 (est.)i U g U g

Ethylenedinitramine C2-H6-N4-O4 Haleite 505-71-5 150.09 67 (est.)b 266 (est.)b 0.00464 @ 

25°C (est.)b 2,300 @ 20°Cb -1.80 (est.)b

40.6 

(est.)b

3.82 x 10-11 

(est.)b

Nitroguanidine C-H4-N4-O2 NQ 556-88-7 104.07 239 

(decomp)a NA g 1.43x10-11 @ 25°Ca

4.4x103 @ 

25°Ca -0.89 a 12 (est.)a

4.45x10-16 

(est.)a

2,4,6-Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine C7-H5-N5-O8 Tetryl 479-45-8 287.14 130-132 187 

(explodes)a

1.2x10-7 @ 

25°C (est.)a 74 @ 25°Ca 1.64 (est.)a

2,100 

(est.)a

2.7x10-9 

(est.)a
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-3 

Compound Chemical 

Formula Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point (°C)

Boiling Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure (mm 

Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atmm3

/mole)

Nitroaromatics

2,4,6-Trinitrophenol 

(Picric Acid) C6-H3-N3-O7 PA 88-89-1 229.10 122-123a 300 (explodes)a

7.5x10-7 @ 

25°Ca

1.27x104 @ 

25°Ca 1.44a 180 (est.)a 1.7x10-8a

Ammonium Picrate C6-H6-N4-O7 AP 131-74-8 246.13 decomp a NA g 3.37 x 10-11 @ 

25°C (est.)b 10 @ 20°Ca -1.40 (est.)b

5363 

(est.)b

2.94 x 10-22 

(est.)b

1,3-Diamino-2,4,6-

trinitrobenzene C6-H5-N5-O6 DATB 1630-08-6 243.14 182 (est.)b 439 (est.)b 2.15 x 10-8 @ 25°C (est.)b

5.24 x 104 @ 

25°C (est.)b

-0.36 

(est.)b

424 

(est.)b

2.43 x 10-13

(est.)b

2,2’,4,4',6,6'-

hexanitroazobenzene C12-H4-N8-O12 HNAB 19159-68-3 452.21 274 (est.)b 635 (est.)b 1.62 x 10-14 @ 25°C (est.)b

0.146 @ 25°C 

(est.)b

4.17 

(est.)b

5.16x 

106 

(est.)b

5.55 x 10-20 

(est.)b

1,3,5-Triamino-2,4,6-

trinitrobenzene C6-H6-N6-O6 TATB 3058-38-6 258.15 350b 481 (est.)b

 1.58 x 10-11 @ 

25°C (est.)b

2.63 x 105 @ 

25°C (est.)b

-1.28 

(est.)b

707 

(est.)b

8.60 x 10-17

(est.)b

2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene C7-H5-N3-O6 TNT 118-96-7 227.13 80.1a 240 

(explodes)a

8.02x10-6 @ 

25°Ca 115 @ 23°Ca 1.60 a 1,600 a 2.1x10-8(est.)a

Other Secondary Explosives

Ammonium Nitrate H4-N2-O3 - 6484-52-2 80.06 169.7a 200-260 

(decomp)a

49.8 @ 25°C 

(est.)h 2,130 @ 25°Ca 0.03 (est.)i U g U g

Nitroaromatic Breakdown Products/Co-Contaminants

1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene C6-H3-N3-O6 1,3,5-TNB 99-35-4 213.11 121.5a 315a 6.44x10-6 @ 

25°Ca 278 @ 15°Ca 1.18a 104 (est.)a 6.49x10-9a

1,3-Dinitrobenzene C6-H4-N2-O4 1,3-DNB 99-65-0 168.11 89-90a 291b 2x10-4 @ 25°Ca 533 @ 25°Ca 1.49a 150a 4.9X10-8a

2,4-Diamino-6-

nitrotoluene C7-H9-N3-O2 2,4-DANT 6629-29-4 167.17 121 (est.)b 339 (est.)b 2.7x10-5 @ 25°C (est.)b

2.1x104 @ 

25°C (est.)b

0.55 

(est.)b

25.4 

(est.)b

2.93x10-12

(est.)b

2,6-Diamino-4-

nitrotoluene C7-H9-N3-O2 2,6-DANT 59229-75-3 167.17 121 (est.)b 339 (est.)b 2.7x10-5 @ 25°C (est.)b

2.1x104 @ 

25°C (est.)b

0.55 

(est.)b

25.4 

(est.)b

2.93x10-12

(est.)b

2,4-Dinitrotoluene C7-H6-N2-O4 2,4-DNT 121-14-2 182.14 71a 300a 1.47x10-4 @ 

22°Ca 200 @ 25°Cb 1.98a 360a 5.4x10-8b

2,6-Dinitrotoluene C7-H6-N2-O4 2,6-DNT 606-20-2 182.14 66a 285a 5.67x10-4 @ 

25°Ca 208 @ 25°Cd 2.10a 19-72a 7.5x10-7c

2-Amino-4,6-

dinitrotoluene C7-H-7-N3-O4 2-Am-DNT 35572-78-2 197.15 174.5b 342e 3.33x10-6 @ 25°C (est.)b

1223@ 25°C 

(est.)b

1.84 

(est.)b

229 

(est.)b

3.27x10-11

(est.)b

4-Amino-2,6-

dinitrotoluene C7-H-7-N3-O4 4-Am-DNT 19406-51-0 197.15 171b 352 (est.)b 3.65x10-6 @ 25°C (est.)b

1223@ 25°C 

(est.)b

1.84 

(est.)b

229 

(est.)b

3.27x10-11

(est.)b

2-Nitrotoluene 

(o-Nitrotoluene) C7-H7-N-O2 2-NT 88-72-2 137.14 -10.6/ -4.1d 225d 0.1 @ 20°C d 652 @ 30°Cd 2.30b 261 (est.)b 1.25x10-5b
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-4 

Compound Chemical 

Formula Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point (°C)

Boiling Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure (mm 

Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atmm3

/mole)

3-Nitrotoluene 

(m-Nitrotoluene) C7-H7-N-O2 3-NT 99-08-1 137.14 15.5d 231d 0.1 @ 20°Cd 498 @ 30°Cd 2.45b 510 (est.)a 9.3X10-6a

4-Nitrotoluene 

(p-Nitrotoluene) C7-H7-N-O2 4-NT 99-99-0 137.14 51.6b 238.3b 1.57x10-2 @ 25°Cb 2100c 2.37b 285 (est.)b 5.63x10-6b

3,5-Dinitroaniline C6-H5-N3-O4 3,5-DNA 618-87-1 183.12 163f 340 (est.)b 8.54x10-6 @ 

25°C (est.)b

1290 @ 25°C 

(est.)f 1.89b 355b 2.96x10-11 (est.)b

Nitrobenzene C6-H5-N-O2 NB 98-95-3 123.11 5.7b 210.8b 2.45x10-1 @ 

25°Cb 2090@ 25°Cb 1.85b 87b 2.4x10-5c

Nitramine Breakdown Products

Hexahydro-1-nitroso3,5-dinitro-1,3,5-

triazine

C3-H6-N6-O5 MNX 5755-27-1 206.12 145 (est.)b 372 (est.)b 5.37x10-6 @ 

25°C (est.)b

2.1 x105

@ 

25°C (est.)b

-0.84 

(est.)b

5.86 

(est.)b

4.07x10-8

(est.)b

Hexahydro-1,3-

dinitroso-5-nitro-1,3,5-

triazine

C3-H6-N6-O4 DNX 80251-29-2 190.12 150 (est.)b 390(est.)b 1.81x10-6 @ 

25°C (est.)b 1x106 (est.)b -1.66 

(est.)b

1.25 

(est.)b

2.62x10-8 

(est.)b

Hexahydro-1,3,5-

trinitroso-1,3,5-triazine C3-H6-N6-O3 TNX 13980-04-6 174.12 146 (est.)b 408 (est.)b 7.75x10-7 @ 25°C (est.)b

1x106@ 25°C 

(est.)b

-1.78 

(est.)b

0.645 

(est.)b

1.69x10-8

(est.)b

a HSDB, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/, retrieved in March-September 2012 b USEPA, 2011. Estimation Programs Interface (EPI) SuiteTM for Microsoft® Windows, v 4.10. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA. c USAPHC, 2010. Reference Document 230, Methodology for Determining Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel, June 2010. d Verschueren, Karel (2009). Handbook of Environmental Data on Organic Chemicals, Volumes 1-4 (5th Edition). John Wiley & Sons. Online version available at: 

http://www.knovel.com/web/portal/browse/display?_EXT_KNOVEL_DISPLAY_bookid=2437&VerticalID=0

e Yaws, Carl L. (2008). Yaws' Handbook of Physical Properties for Hydrocarbons and Chemicals. Knovel. Online version available at: 

http://www.knovel.com/web/portal/browse/display?_EXT_KNOVEL_DISPLAY_bookid=2147&VerticalID=0 f SRC Physical Properties database (PHYSPROP), available at http://www.srcinc.com/what-we-do/databaseforms.aspx?id=386, retrieved in July 2012 g U – Unavailable; NA – Not applicable h Chemspider (http://www.chemspider.com/), predicted properties generated using the ACD/Labs’ ACD/PhysChem Suite (http://www.acdlabs.com/products/pc_admet/physchem/physchemsuite/), 

retrieved in September 2012. 

i Chemspider (http://www.chemspider.com/), predicted properties generated using ChemAxon (http://www.chemicalize.org/)
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-5 

Table D-3: Chemical/Physical Properties of Chemical Agents and Agent Breakdown Products 

Common Name Chemical 

Formula Chemical Name Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point 

(°C)

Boiling 

Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure 

(mm Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atm-m3/mole)

Blister Agents

Distilled Mustard C4-H8-Cl2-S 

Bis(2-

Chloroethyl)-

Sulfide

HD 505-60-2 159.08a 13-14a 215-217a 0.11 @ 25°Ca 9.20E+02

c

2.41 

(est)a 120a 2.10E-05c

Ethyldichloro-arsine C2-H5-As-Cl2 --- ED 598-14-1 174.89a -65a

156 

(decompo

ses)a

2.29 @ 

21.5°Ca

Rxts with 

watera

2.34 

(est)b

60.7 

(est)b

7.60X10-3 

(est)b

Lewisite C2-H2-As-Cl3

Dichloro(2-

Chlorovinyl)-

Arsine

L 541-25-3 207.32a 0.1a

190 

(decompo

ses)a

0.58 @ 25 °Ca 500a 2.56 

(est)b 143a 3.2X10-4a

Methyldichloroarsine C-H3-As-Cl2 --- MD 593-89-5 160.86 -55j 133j 7.76 @ 20°Cj Rxts with 

water

1.85 

(est)b

32 

(est)b

6.41x10-3 

(est)b

Nitrogen Mustard 

(HN-1) C6-H13-Cl2-N 

Ethylbis(2-

Chloroethyl)-

Amine

HN-1 538-07-8 170.08a -34a

194 

(decompo

ses)a

0.25 @ 25°Ca 160 @ 25 

Ca

2.02 

(est)a 360a 3.36X10-4a

Nitrogen Mustard 

(HN-2) C5-H11-Cl2-N 

Mechlorethamine;

N,N-Bis(2-

Chloroethyl) 

Methylamine

HN-2 51-75-2 156.06a -60a

87 deg C 

@ 18 mm 

Hga

0.17 @ 25°Ca 12000 @ 

25 Cb 0.91a 23 (est)b 8.5X10-8 (est)a

Nitrogen Mustard 

(HN-3) C6-H12-Cl3-N 

Tris(2-

Chloroethyl) 

Amine

HN-3 555-77-1 204.53a -4a

230-235 

(decompo

ses)a

0.011 @ 

25°Ca

160 @ 25 

Ca

2.27 

(est)a 672a 1.85X10-5 

(est)a

Phenyldichloroarsine C6-H5-As-Cl2 --- PD 696-28-6 222.93a -20a 255a 0.113 @ 

25°Ca

Rxts with 

watera NA 820a 3.0X10-5 (est)a

Phosgene Oxime C-H-Cl2-N-O --- CX 1794-86-1 113.9a 39-40a 128a 13 @ 40°C 

(liquid)a 25000a 0.73 (est)a 68a 5.5X10-7a

Blister Agent Breakdown Products

1,4-Dithiane C4-H8-S2 --- --- 505-29-3 120.23c 112.3a

115.6 deg 

C at 60 

mm Hga

0.80 @ 25°Ca 3000a 0.77a 63a 4.2X10-5a

1,4-Oxathiane C4-H8-O-S 1,4-Thioxane 15980-15-1 104.17d -28 (est)b 147a 4.61d 3.99E+04

d 0.53d 19.59b 5.38E-06d

2-Chlorovinyl 

Arsenous Acid

C2-H4-As-CIO2

--- CVAA 85090-33-1 170.427 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

2-Chlorovinyl 

Arsenous Oxide C2-H2-As-Cl-O Lewisite Oxide CVAO 3088-37-7 152.41b 18 (est)b 120.5 (est)b

15.3 @ 25°C 

(est)b

13000 

(est)b

1.94 

(est)b

72 

(est)b 0.001874 (est)b
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-6 

Common Name Chemical 

Formula Chemical Name Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point 

(°C)

Boiling 

Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure 

(mm Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atm-m3/mole)

Ethyldiethanol-amine C6-H15-N-O2 --- --- 139-87-7 133.189a -50a 247a 2.45X10-3 @ 

25°C (est)a

1000000 

(miscible)

a

-1.01 

(est)a 1a 1.14X10-10 

(est)a

Thiodiglycol C4-H10-O2-S --- TDG 111-48-8 122.18c -10.2a 282a 0.00323 @ 

25°Ca Misciblea -0.63a 11a 1.9X10-9a

Triethanolamine C6-H15-N-O --- TEA 102-71-6 149.19a 20.5a 335.4a 3.59X10-6 @ 

25°Ca Misciblea -1.00a 7a 7.05X10-13a

Diethanolamine C4-H11-N-O2 --- DEA 111-42-2 105.14a 28a 268.8a 1.4X10-4 @ 

25°Ca Misciblea -1.43 (est)a 4a 3.9X10-11a

Blood Agents

Arsine As-H3 --- SA 7784-42-1 77.95c -116a -62.5a 11,000 @ 

20°Ca 28a NA NA NA

Cyanogen Chloride Cl-C-N --- CK 506-77-4 61.48c -6.55a 13a 1.23X10+3 @ 

25°Ca 27.5a -0.38 (est)b

4.67 

(est)b 5.00E-03c

Hydrogen Cyanide H-C-N --- AC 74-90-8 27.03c -13.4a 25.6a 742 @ 25°Ca 1.00E+06

c -0.25a NA 1.30E-04c

Choking Agents

Chlorine Cl2 --- --- 7782-50-5 70.91c -101a -34.04a 5.83X10+3 @ 

25°Ca 6300a NA NA 0.0117a

Chloropicrin C-Cl3-N-O2

Trichloronitromethane PS 76-06-2 164.38a -64a

112 deg C 

at 757 mm 

Hga

24 @ 25°Ca 1.62E10+

3a 2.09a 81a 2.05X10-3a

Diphosgene C2-Cl4-O Trichloro-methyl 

Chloroformate DP 503-38-8 197.83a -57a 128a 10 @ 20°Ca 2389 (est)b

1.49 

(est)b

5.972 

(est)b 0.000103 (est)b

Phosgene C-Cl2-O Carbonyl Chloride CG 75-44-5 98.92c -118a 8.2a 1420 @ 25°Ca 475100b -0.71 

(est)b 2.2a 1.7X10-2 @ 24.85 deg Ca

Chemical Agent Decontaminant

Acetylene 

Tetrachloride C2-H2-Cl4 

1,1,2,2-

Tetrachloroethane --- 79-34-5 167.85a -43.8a 146.5a 4.62 @ 25°Ca 2900a 2.39a 79a 3.67X10-4a

Nerve Agents

Cyclosarin C7-H14-F-O2-P 

Cyclohexyl 

Methylphosphonofluoridate

GF 329-99-7 180.16c -30a 239a 0.044 @ 

20°Ca 3700a 1.60 (est)a

42 

(est)a 2.8X10-6a
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-7 

Common Name Chemical 

Formula Chemical Name Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point 

(°C)

Boiling 

Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure 

(mm Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atm-m3/mole)

VX C11-H26-N-O2-

P-S 

o-Ethyl S-(2-

diisopropylaminoethyl) 

Methylphosphonothiolate

--- 50782-69-9 267.37c <-51a 298a 0.0007 @ 

25°Ca 30000c 2.09a 330a 3.5X10-9c

Sarin C4-H10-F-O2-P 

Isopropyl Methylphosphonofluoridate

GB 107-44-8 140.09c -57a 147a 2.86 @ 25°Ca

1000000 

(miscible)

a

0.3a 35a 5.3X10-7c

Soman C7-H16-F-O2-P 

Pinacolyl Methylphosphonofluoridate

GD 96-64-0 182.18c -42a 167a 0.4 @ 25°Ca 21000c 1.778a 221a 4.6X10-6c

Tabun C5-H11-N2-O2-P 

Dimethyl-amidoethoxy-phosphoryl 

cyanide

GA 77-81-6 162.13c -50a 240a 0.07 @ 25°Ca 98000c 0.38a 38a 1.5X10-7c

Nerve Agent Breakdown Products

Diisopropyl methyl 

phosphonate C7-H17-O3-P --- DIMP 1445-75-6 180.18c <25b

121.05 @ 

10 mm 

Hga

0.28 @ 25 °Ca 1500a 1.03a 87a 4.4X10-5c

Dimethyl methyl 

phosphonate C3-H9-O3-P --- DMMP 756-79-6 124.08c <50a 181a 0.962 @ 25°Ca 1000000b -0.61a 11a 1.25X10-6a

EA 2192 C9-H22-N-O2-PS 

Diisopropylamino-ethyl 

Methyl Thiolophosphonate, S-(2-

Dilsopropylaminoethyl) 

Methylphosphono-thioic 

Acid

--- 73207-98-4 239.32b 58 (est)b 339 (est)b 0.00000514 @ 

25°C (est)b

13990 

(est)b 0.96af 79.4 4.38X10-12

(est)b

Ethyl 

methylphosphonic 

acid

C3-H9-O3-P --- EMPA 1832-53-7 124.08b -8 (est)b 222 (est)b 0.019 @ 25°C 

(est)b 180000c -0.15 (est)b

5 

(est)b

5.18X10-9

(est)b

Isopropyl methyl 

phosphonic acid C4-H11-P-03 --- IMPA 1832-54-8 138.10c -8 (est)b 230 (est)b 0.0119 @ 25°C (est)b 48000c 0.27 (est)b

8 

(est)b

6.88X10-9

(est)b

Methylphosphonic 

Acid C-H5-O3-P --- MPA 993-13-5 96.02c 108.5a Decomposesa

0.000327 @ 

25°C (est)b >20000a -0.70 (est)a 1 (est)a 1.22X10-11(est)b

Pinacolyl 

methylphosphonic 

acid

C7-H17-03-P --- PMPA 616-52-4 180.19b 20 (est)b 265 (est)b 0.00124 @ 

25°C (est)b

2231 

(est)b

1.63 

(est)b

33 

(est)b 1.61x10-8 (est)b
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-8 

Common Name Chemical 

Formula Chemical Name Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point 

(°C)

Boiling 

Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure 

(mm Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atm-m3/mole)

Incapacitating Agent

3‐Quinuclidinyl 

benzilate C21-H23-N-O3 

3-(2,2-Diphenyl-2-

Hydroxyethanoyloxy)-

Quinuclidine, aka 

QNB, EA2277

BZ 6581-06-2 337.42a 164a

170 deg C 

(decompo

ses)a

2.38X10-10 

@ 25°Ca 200a 3.01 

(est)a

4942 

(est)b 5.34X10-

11a

Note: NA – Not Available a HSDB, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/, retrieved in March 2012 b USEPA, 2011. Estimation Programs Interface (EPI) SuiteTM for Microsoft® Windows, v 4.10. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA. c USAPHC, 2010. Reference Document 230, Methodology for Determining Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel, June 2010. d SRC PHYSPROP, available at http://www.srcinc.com/what-we-do/databaseforms.aspx?id=386, retrieved in March 2012 e NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards (NPG), 2010, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pgintrod.html f Munro et al. The Sources, Fate, and Toxicity of Chemical Warfare Agent Degradation Products. Environmental Health Perspectives, Volume 107, No. 12, December 1999 g ToxProfiles, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/index.asp, retrieved in March 2012 h Toxicity of Military Smokes and Obscurants, National Academies Press. Volume 1 (1997), Volume 2 (1999) and Volume 3 (1999). I California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, available at http://oehha.ca.gov/, retrieved in March 2012

j Berkeley Database
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-9 

Table D-4: Chemical/Physical Properties of Riot Agents and Smokes

Common Name Chemical 

Formula Chemical Name Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point (°C)

Boiling 

Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure 

(mm Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atmm3

/mole)

Riot Control – Tear Agents

Bromoacetone C3-H5-Br-O 1-Bromo-2-

Propanone BA 598-31-2 136.99a -36.5a 137a 90 @ 20°Cd 6.96E+04d 0.11d 4 (est)a 5.7X10-6 (est)a

Bromobenzylcyanide C8-H6-Br-N 

AlphaBromobenzene-acetonitrile, Camite

BBC, CA 5798-79-8 196.05a 29a 242a 0.012 @ 

20°Ca 678.2 (est)b 1.83 (est)b 286.1b 2.84E-07b

Chloroacetophenone C8-H7-Cl-O 

2-Chloroacetophenone, Mace, 2-

Chloro-1-

Phenylethanone

CN 532-27-4 154.59c 58-59a 244-245a 0.0054 @ 

20°Ca 470c 1.93 (est)b 90a 3.5X10-6a

Dibenzox-azepine C13-H9-N-O Dibenz(b,f)[1,4]Oxaz

epine CR 257-07-8 195.22a 73a 321 (est)b

2.2X10-4 

@ 25°C 

(est)a

124 (est)a 3.01 

(est)a

1020 

(est)a 4.1X10-3a

oChlorobenzalmalonit

rile

C10-H5-Cl-N2

O-Chlorobenzylidene 

Malononitrile CS 2698-41-1 188.62a 95-96a 310-315a 3.4X10-5 @ 20°Ca 51.9d 2.76 (est)a

1700 

(est)a 1.0X10-8a

Oleoresin Capsicum 

"Pepper Spray" C18-H27-N-O3

Capsaicin (Primary 

Active Ingredient) OC 404-86-4 305.462a 65a

210-220 

@ 0.01 

mm Hga

1.3X10-8 

@ 25°C 

(est)a

10.3 (est)a 3.04a 1100 

(est)a 1.0X10-13a

Riot Control – Vomiting Agents

Adamsite C12-H9-As-ClN 

Phenarsazine 

Chloride DM 578-94-9 227.58a 195a

410 

(decomp

oses)a

2x10-13 @ 

20°Ca 0.65a 4.05 

(est)a

5750 

(est)a 3.3X10-8a

Diphenylchloroarsine (Clark 

I)

C12-H10-As-Cl --- DA 712-48-1 264.59b 44a 337a 0.0002 @ 

25°Ca 2.72a 4.52a 1.53E+04b 0.0000368a

Diphenylcyanoarsine (Clark 

2)

C13-H10-As-N --- DC 23525-22-

6 255.15b 93 (est)b 376 (est)b

0.00000716 

@ 25°Cb 18.82b 3.29 

(est)b

6274 

(est)b

0.000000127

7 (est)b

Smokes

Chlorosulfonic Acid Cl-H-O3-S With Sulfur Trioxide, 

makes up FS --- 7790-94-5 116.53a -80a

151-152 

@ 755 

mm Hga

0.75 @ 

20°Ca

Rxts with 

watera NA NA NA

Hexachloro-ethane C2-Cl6 --- HC 67-72-1 236.74c Sublimesa Sublimes

a

0.4 @ 

20°Ca 41c 4.14a 1,380 to 2,360a 3.90E-03c
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

D-10 

Common Name Chemical 

Formula Chemical Name Abbreviation CAS Number

Molecular 

Weight

Melting 

Point (°C)

Boiling 

Point 

(°C)

Vapor 

Pressure 

(mm Hg)

Water 

Solubility 

(mg/L)

Log 

Kow

Koc

Henry's Law 

constant 

(atmm3

/mole)

Red Phosphorus (P4)n

Amorphous 

Phosphorus RP 7723-14-0 123.9h Sublimes at 416°Ch 280.5k 0.03 @ 21°Ci

negligible 

in waterh NA NA NA

Silicon Tetrachloride Si-Cl4 --- --- 10026-04-

7 169.90a -70a 59a 236 @ 25°Ca

Rxts with 

watera NA NA NA

Sulfur Trioxide S-O3

With Chlorosulfonic 

Acid, makes up FS --- 7446-11-9 80.063a 62.2a Sublimes

a

263 @ 

25°C (est)a

Rxts with 

watera NA NA NA

Tin Tetrachloride Sn-Cl4 Stannic Chloride KJ 7646-78-8 260.52a -33a 114.15a 18 @ 20°Ca Rxts with 

watera NA NA NA

Titanium 

Tetrachloride Ti-Cl4 --- FM 7550-45-0 189.68c -24.1a 136.4a 10 @ 20°Cg NA NA NA NA

White Phosphorus P4 

WP aka Molecular 

Phosphorus; 

Elemental P (Valence 

State 0) - CAS# 

7723-14-0

WP 12185-10-

3 123.90a 44.1a 280a 0.026 @ 20°Ca 3k NA NA NA

Note: NA – Not Available a HSDB, available at http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/, retrieved in March 2012 b USEPA, 2011. Estimation Programs Interface (EPI) SuiteTM for Microsoft® Windows, v 4.10. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, USA. c USAPHC, 2010. Reference Document 230, Methodology for Determining Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel, June 2010. d SRC PHYSPROP, available at http://www.srcinc.com/what-we-do/databaseforms.aspx?id=386, retrieved in March 2012 e NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards (NPG), 2010, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/pgintrod.html f Munro et al. The Sources, Fate, and Toxicity of Chemical Warfare Agent Degradation Products. Environmental Health Perspectives, Volume 107, No. 12, December 1999 g ToxProfiles, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/index.asp, retrieved in March 2012 h Toxicity of Military Smokes and Obscurants, National Academies Press. Volume 1 (1997), Volume 2 (1999) and Volume 3 (1999). I California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, available at http://oehha.ca.gov/, retrieved in March 2012
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-1 

GLOSSARY

Section I -- Abbreviations

2-Am-DNT .............................2-Amino-4,6-Dinitrotoluene 

2-NT .......................................2-Nitrotoluene 

2,4-DNT .................................2,4-Dinitrotoluene 

2,6-DNT .................................2,6-Dinitrotoluene 

4-Am-DNT .............................4-Amino-2,6-Dinitrotoluene 

4-NT .......................................4-Nitrotoluene 

AAPP .....................................Abbreviated Accident Prevention Plan 

AAR .......................................After Action Report 

ABP ........................................Agent Breakdown Product 

AC ..........................................Hydrogen Cyanide 

ADR .......................................Automated Date Review

AEDB-R .................................Army Environmental Database-Restoration

AEL ........................................Airborne Exposure Limit 

AES ........................................Atomic Emission Spectrometry

AHA .......................................Activity Hazard Analysis

AKO .......................................Army Knowledge Online

Al............................................Aluminum 

ALARACT .............................All Army Activities Message

ALLTEM ...............................All-Time EMI System

AP ..........................................Ammonium Picrate

APP ........................................Accident Prevention Plan

ARAR ....................................Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement 

AS ..........................................Asbestine Suspension 

ASCII .....................................American Standard Code for Information Interchange 

ASR ........................................Archives Search Report

ATF ........................................Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms 

ATSDR ..................................Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry

AUV .......................................Autonomous Vehicle 

AVS........................................Acid Volatile Sulfides

BA ..........................................Bromoacetone 

BBC........................................Bromobenzylcyanide 

BERA .....................................Baseline Environmental Risk Assessment 

bgs ..........................................Below Ground Surface 

BIP .........................................Blow in Place

BMP .......................................Bit Map

BOSS......................................Buried Object Scanning Sonar 

BRA .......................................Baseline Risk Assessment

BRAC .....................................Base Realignment and Closure 

BUD .......................................Berkeley UXO Discriminator

BZ ..........................................3-Quinuclidinyl Benzilate

CA ..........................................Chemical Agent
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-2 

CAA .......................................Clean Air Act

CAC .......................................Common Access Card

CADD ....................................Computer-aided Design and Drafting 

CAIS ......................................Chemical Agent Identification Set

CAR .......................................Corrective Action Request 

CAS ........................................Chemical Abstracts Service

CD ..........................................Compact Disk

CDC .......................................Contained Detonation Chamber

CDFR .....................................Chemical Data Final Report

CDQC ....................................Chemical Data Quality Control

CEES ......................................2-Chloroethyl Ethyl Sulfide

CERCLA ................................Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 

Liability Act 

CFR ........................................Code of Federal Regulations

CG ..........................................Phosgene 

CK ..........................................Cyanogen Chloride 

Cl ............................................Chlorine 

cm ...........................................Centimeter

CMUA....................................Concentrated Munitions Use Area 

CN ..........................................Tear Gas

CO2 .........................................Carbon Dioxide 

COPC .....................................Chemical of Potential Concern

COTS .....................................Commercial Off the Shelf

CPR ........................................Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 

CQC .......................................Chemical Quality Control

CR ..........................................Diphenylcyanoarsine 

CRP ........................................Community Relations Plan

CRREL ...................................Cold Regions Research Engineering Laboratory 

CS ...........................................o-Chlorobenzalmalonitrile 

CSM .......................................Conceptual Site Model 

CVAA ....................................Cold Vapor Atomic Absorption 

CVAO ....................................Lewisite Oxide

CW .........................................Chemical Weapon

CWA ......................................Chemical Warfare Agent

CWC ......................................Chemical Weapons Convention 

CWM......................................Chemical Warfare Materiel

CWM DC ...............................Chemical Warfare Materiel Design Center

CX ..........................................Center of Expertise

cy ............................................Cubic Yards 

CZMA ....................................Coastal Zone Management Act

DA ..........................................Department of the Army or Diphenylchloroarsine 

DAC .......................................United States Army Defense Ammunition Center

DANC ....................................Decontaminating Agent, Non-Corrosive 

DANT ....................................Diaminonitrotoluene 

DA PAM ................................Department of the Army Pamphlet
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-3 

DASA-ESOH .........................Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, 

and Occupational Health

DC ..........................................Design Center or Diphenylcyanoarsine

DDESB ..................................Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board

DERP .....................................Defense Environmental Restoration Program 

DGM ......................................Digital Geophysical Mapping

DGPS .....................................Differential Global Positioning System

DM .........................................Adamsite

DMM......................................Discarded Military Munitions

DNT .......................................Dinitrotoluene 

DNX .......................................Hexahydro-1.3-dinitroso-5-nitro-1,3,5-triazine

DoD ........................................Department of Defense

DoDIC ....................................Department of Defense Identification Code 

DoDM ....................................Department of Defense Manual

DOE .......................................Department of Energy

DOP........................................Dilution of Precision

DOT .......................................Department of Transportation 

DP ..........................................Diphosgene 

DPE ............................................................Deflection Probable Error

DQCR ....................................Data Quality Control Report 

DQO .......................................Data Quality Objective

DSSS ......................................Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum

DU ..........................................Depleted Uranium

DVD .......................................Digital Video Disc

EC ..........................................Engineer Circular or Ethyl Centralite

ECBC .....................................Edgewood Chemical Biological Center 

ECD........................................Electron Capture Detector

EDD .......................................Electronic Data Deliverable

EE/CA ....................................Engineering Evaluation / Cost Analysis 

EKO .......................................Engineering Knowledge Online 

ELAP......................................Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program

EM..........................................Engineer Manual or Electromagnetic

EM CX ...................................Environmental and Munitions Center of Expertise 

EMI ........................................Electromagnetic Induction

EO ..........................................Executive Order

EOD .......................................Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

EP ...........................................Engineer Pamphlet 

EPC ........................................Exposure Point Concentration 

EPP .........................................Environmental Protection Plan 

ER ..........................................Engineer Regulation 

ERA........................................Ecological Risk Assessment

ERAGS ..................................Ecological Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund 

ERDC .....................................Engineering Research and Development Center

ERIS .......................................Environmental Restoration Information System 

ESTCP....................................Environmental Security Technology Certification Program 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-4 

FAR ........................................Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FBR ........................................Fluidized Bed Reactor 

FDEMI ...................................Frequency Domain Electromagnetic Induction 

FM ..........................................Titanium Tetrachloride

FOA........................................Field Operating Activities

FRMD ....................................Formerly Used Defense Site Records Management Database

FS ...........................................Feasibility Study or Chlorosulfonic Acid 

FUDS .....................................Formerly Used Defense Site

FUDSMIS ..............................Formerly Used Defense Site Management Information System

G .............................................Gram

GA ..........................................Tabun (Ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate) 

GAC .......................................Granular Activated Carbon

GB ..........................................Sarin

GC ..........................................Gas Chromatography

GD ..........................................Soman (Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate) 

GDS........................................Geospatial Data and System

GF ..........................................Cyclosarin 

GFAA .....................................Graphite Furnace Atomic Absorption Spectrophotometry 

GIS .........................................Geographic Information System 

GPO........................................Geophysical Prove-out 

GPR ........................................Ground Penetrating Radar 

GPS ........................................Global Positioning System 

GSV........................................Geophysical Systems Verification

H .............................................Mustard

HA ..........................................Hazard Assessment

HC ..........................................Hexachloroethane

HD ..........................................Distilled Mustard

HDOP .....................................Horizontal Dilution of Precision

HE ..........................................High Explosive 

HHE .......................................Health Hazard Evaluation

HHRA ....................................Human Health Risk Assessment 

HMX ......................................Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine

HN-1, 2, 3 ..............................Nitrogen Mustards 

HPLC .....................................High Performance Liquid Chromatography 

HQAES ..................................Headquarters, Army Environmental System 

HQUSACE .............................Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers

HRR .......................................Historical Records Review

HTRW ....................................Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste 

HUMMA ................................Hawai’i Undersea Military Munitions Assessment

Hz ...........................................Hertz 

IAW........................................In Accordance with

ICP .........................................Inductively Coupled Plasma 

IDW........................................Investigation-Derived Waste

IGD ........................................Interim Guidance Document 

IHF .........................................Interim Holding Facility
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-5 

INS .........................................Inertial Navigation Systems

IS ............................................Incremental Sample

ISE..........................................Ion Selective Electrode

ISO .........................................Industry Standard Object 

ITRC ......................................Interstate Technology Regulatory Council 

IVS .........................................Instrument Verification Strip

JPEG ......................................Joint Photographic Experts Group 

KJ ...........................................Tin Tetrachloride 

KO ..........................................Contracting Officer

KPA........................................Kinetic Phosphorescence Analysis

L .............................................Liters

LC ..........................................Liquid Chromatography 

LCS ........................................Laboratory Control Spike 

LIDAR ...................................Light Detection and Ranging 

LOD .......................................Limit of Detection

LOQ .......................................Limit of Quantitation

LTM .......................................Long-Term Management

LUC........................................Land Use Control 

m ............................................Meters 

M2S2 ......................................Military Munitions Support Services 

Mb ..........................................Megabyte

MBES .....................................Multibeam Echo Sounder 

MC .........................................Munitions Constituents

MD .........................................Munitions Debris 

MEC .......................................Munitions and Explosives of Concern 

MFD .......................................Maximum Fragmentation Distance

mg/L .......................................Milligrams per Liter

MIDAS ...................................Munitions Items Disposition Action System

MK2 .......................................Mark 2

mm .........................................Millimeters

MMDC ...................................Military Munitions Design Center

MMRP....................................Military Munitions Response Program 

MNX ......................................Hexahydro-1-nitroso-3,5-dinitro-1,3,5-triazine

MP ..........................................Man-Portable 

MPPEH ..................................Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard

MPV .......................................Man-Portable Vector Sensor

MQO ......................................Measurement Quality Objective

MR .........................................Munitions Response or Molasses Residuum

MRA ......................................Munitions Response Area 

MRCSP ..................................Munitions Response Chemical Site Plan

MRCSS ..................................Munitions Response Chemical Safety Submission 

MRESP ..................................Munitions Response Explosives Site Plan 

MRESS ..................................Munitions Response Explosives Safety Submission 

MRS .......................................Munitions Response Site 

MRSPP ...................................Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol 
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-6 

MS ..........................................Mass Spectrometry or Matrix Spike

ms ...........................................Millisecond

mV..........................................MilliVolt

NAGPRA ...............................Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act

NC ..........................................Nitrocellulose

NCMUA .................................Non-Concentrated Munitions Use 

NCP ........................................National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency 

Plan

NDAI......................................No DoD Action Indicated 

NDGPS ..................................Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System

NEW ......................................Net Explosive Weight 

NFA........................................No Further Action 

NG ..........................................Nitroglycerine

NIOSH ...................................National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health

NPD........................................Nitrogen Phosphorous Detector 

NQ ..........................................Nitroquanidine 

NRHP .....................................National Register of Historic Places

NRL........................................Naval Research Lab

NSCMP ..................................Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program

NSN........................................National Stock Number 

NTCRA ..................................Non-Time Critical Removal Action

O&M ......................................Operations and Maintenance 

OB ..........................................Open Burn 

OC ..........................................Oleoresin Capsicum

OD ..........................................Open Detonation 

OESS ......................................Ordnance and Explosives Safety Specialist

ORISE ....................................Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 

OSHA .....................................Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PA ..........................................Preliminary Assessment

PAH........................................Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbon

PARCCS ................................Precision, Accuracy, Representativeness, Completeness, 

Comparability, and Sensitivity

Pb ...........................................Lead

PDOP .....................................Position Dilution of Precision

PDS ........................................Post-Digestion Spike 

PDT ........................................Project Delivery Team

PE ...........................................Performance Evaluation

PETN......................................Pentaerylthritol tetranitrate

PLS .........................................Professional Land Surveyor 

PM ..........................................Project Manager

PMP........................................Project Management Plan

PNNL .....................................Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

PP ...........................................Post Processing 

PPE .........................................Personal Protective Equipment 

PPRTV ...................................Provisional Peer Reviewed Toxicity Value
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-7 

PQO........................................Project Quality Objective

PRV ........................................Post-Remediation Validation

PS ...........................................Chloropicrin 

PSP .........................................Physical Security Plan

PWP .......................................Plasticized White Phosphorus 

PWS .......................................Performance Work Statement

QA ..........................................Quality Assurance 

QAPP .....................................Quality Assurance Project Plan

QASP .....................................Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan

QC ..........................................Quality Control 

QMS .......................................Quality Management System

QSM .......................................Quality Systems Manual

RA ..........................................Removal Action

RAB .......................................Restoration Advisory Board 

RAGS .....................................Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund 

RAIS ......................................Risk Assessment Information System

RAO .......................................Remedial Action Objective

RCRA .....................................Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

RD ..........................................Remedial Design

RDX .......................................Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine

RF ...........................................Radio Frequency 

RI............................................Remedial Investigation

RLS ........................................Registered Land Surveyor 

RmD ......................................Remedial Action

RMS .......................................Root Mean Square 

ROE........................................Right of Entry 

ROV .......................................Remotely Operated Vehicle

RP ...........................................Red Phosphorus 

RPE .........................................Range Probable Error

RTK........................................Real-Time Kinematic

RTS ........................................Robotic Total Station

SA ..........................................Selective Availability or Arsine

SAR ........................................Synthetic Aperture Radar or Small Arms Range

SAS ........................................Synthetic Aperture Sonar 

Sb ..........................................Antimony

SBP ........................................Sub-Bottom Profiler

SDSFIE ..................................Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure, and the 

Environment 

SEDD .....................................Staged Electronic Data Deliverable

SEM .......................................Simultaneously Extracted Metals

SERDP ...................................Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program

SHPO .....................................State Historical Preservation Office

SI ............................................Site Inspection

SIM ........................................Selected Ion Monitoring 

SLERA ...................................Screening-Level Ecological Risk Assessment
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-8 

SNR ........................................Signal to Noise Ratio

SOP ........................................Standard Operating Procedure 

SOW .......................................Statement of Work

SPE .........................................Solid-Phase Extraction

SPME .....................................Solid-Phase Micro-Extraction

SR ...........................................Stationary Receivers

SSHP ......................................Site Safety and Health Plan

SSS .........................................Side-Scan Sonar

TBC ........................................To Be Considered 

TCLP ......................................Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedures

TCRA .....................................Time Critical Removal Action

TDEMI ...................................Time Domain Electromagnetic Induction 

TDG .......................................Thiodiglycol 

TDOP .....................................Time Dilution of Precision

TEMTADS .............................Time Domain Electromagnetic Multi-Sensor Towed Array 

Detection System

TH ..........................................Thermite

TH3 ........................................Thermate

TH4 ........................................Thermate

THPO .....................................Tribal Historic Preservation Office

TIFF .......................................Tagged Image File Format

TM..........................................Technical Manual

TNB........................................Trinitrobenzene 

TNT ........................................Trinitrotoluene 

TNX .......................................Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitroso-1,3,5-triazine

TOI .........................................Target of Interest

TPP .........................................Technical Project Planning

TR ..........................................Technical Report

TRW .......................................Technical Review Workgroup 

UFP-QAPP .............................Uniform Federal Policy – Quality Assurance Project Plan

U.S. ........................................United States

USACE ..................................United States Army Corps of Engineers

USAEC ..................................United States Army Environmental Command 

USAEHA ...............................United States Army Environmental Hygiene Agency 

USAIPH .................................United States Army Institute of Public Health

USAPHC ................................United States Army Public Health Command

USATCES ..............................United States Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety

USATHAMA .........................United States Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency

USC ........................................United States Code 

USEPA ...................................United States Environmental Protection Agency 

USGS .....................................United States Geological Survey

UTM .......................................Universal Transverse Mercator

UV ..........................................Ultraviolet

UXO .......................................Unexploded Ordnance 

UXOSO ..................................Unexploded Ordnance Safety Officer
EM 200-1-15 

30 Oct 15 

Glossary-9 

VDOP .....................................Vertical Dilution of Precision

VSP ........................................Visual Sampling Plan

VX ..........................................o-Ethyl S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl 

WAA ......................................Wide Area Assessment

WAAS ....................................Wide Area Augmentation System

WMP ......................................Waste Management Plan

WP..........................................White Phosphorous 

WWI .......................................World War I

WWII .....................................World War II

XRF ........................................X-Ray Fluorescence

μg/L ........................................Micrograms per Liter

μm .........................................Micrometers

Section II - Terms

Active Installations

Installations under the custody and control of Department of Defense. Includes operating 

installations, installations in a standby or layaway status, and installations awaiting closure under 

the Base Realignment and Closure legislation.

Active Range

A military range that is currently in service and is being regularly used for range activities (40 

CFR 266.201). 

Administrative Record

The body of documents that “forms the basis” for the selection of a particular response at a site. 

Documents that are included are relevant documents that were relied upon in selecting the 

response action as well as relevant documents that were considered but were ultimately rejected. 

Until the Administrative Record is certified, it shall be referred to as the “Administrative Record 

file.”

Agent Breakdown Products (ABPs)

Degradation products of chemical agents; compounds that have been identified that are formed 

by decomposition, hydrolysis, microbial degradation, oxidation, photolysis, and 

decontamination. Discussions of ABPs may also include co-contaminants that were impurities 

formed during manufacture. 

Anomaly

Any item that is seen as a subsurface irregularity after geophysical investigation. This 

irregularity will deviate from the expected subsurface ferrous and non-ferrous material at a site 

(e.g., pipes, power lines). 

Anomaly Avoidance

Techniques employed by explosive ordnance disposal or unexploded ordnance (UXO) personnel 

on property known or suspected to contain UXO, other munitions that may have experienced 
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Glossary-10 

abnormal environments (e.g., discarded military munitions), munitions constituents in high 

enough concentrations to pose an explosive hazard, or chemical agent (CA), regardless of 

configuration to avoid contact with potential surface or subsurface explosive or CA hazards, to 

allow entry to the area for the performance of required operations. 

Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs)

Applicable requirements are cleanup standards, standards of control, and other substantive 

environmental protection requirements promulgated under Federal or state environmental law 

that specifically address a hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action, location 

or other circumstance found at a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) site. Relevant and appropriate requirements are cleanup 

standards that, while not “applicable”, address situations sufficiently similar to those encountered 

at a CERCLA site that their use is well suited to the particular site.

Archives Search Report (ASR)

A detailed investigation to report on past MEC activities conducted on an installation. The 

principal purpose of the Archives Search is to assemble historical records and available field 

data, assess potential ordnance presence, and recommend follow-up actions at a Defense 

Environmental Restoration Program – Formerly Used Defense Sites. There are four general 

steps in an Archives Search: records search phase, site safety and health plan, site survey, and 

archives search report including risk assessment.

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)

Program governing the scheduled closing of Department of Defense sites. (Base Closure and 

Realignment Act of 1988, Public Law 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, and the Defense Base Closure 

and Realignment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808) 

Center of Expertise (CX)

A CX is a United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) organization that has been 

approved by Headquarters, USACE as having a unique or exceptional technical capability in a 

specialized subject area that is critical to other USACE commands. These services may be 

reimbursable or centrally funded. 

Chemical Agent (CA)

A chemical compound intended for use (to include experimental compounds) that, through its 

chemical properties, produces lethal or other damaging effects on human beings, and is intended 

for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate persons through its 

physiological effects. Excluded are research, development, test, and evaluation solutions, riot 

control agents, chemical defoliants and herbicides, smoke and other obscuration materials, flame 

and incendiary materials, and industrial chemicals. (DASA-ESOH Interim Guidance for 

Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) Responses, April 1, 2009) 

Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM)

Items generally configured as a munition containing a chemical compound that is intended to 

kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through its physiological effects. CWM includes 

V- and G-series nerve agents or H-series (mustard) and L-series (lewisite) blister agents in other 
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Glossary-11 

than-munition configurations; and certain industrial chemicals (e.g., hydrogen cyanide [AC], 

cyanogen chloride [CK], or carbonyl dichloride [called phosgene or CG]) configured as a 

military munition. Due to their hazards, prevalence, and military-unique application, only 

chemical agent identification sets (CAIS) that contain neat agent or dilute nerve agent are 

considered CWM. K951/952 are managed as CWM but for storage treatment and disposal are 

handled as hazardous waste in accordance with SAIE-ESOH 23 Apr 2007 memo: Treatment of 

chemical agent identification set (CAIS) as Hazardous Waste. CWM does not include: riot 

control devices; chemical defoliants and herbicides; industrial chemicals (e.g., AC, CK, CG) not 

configured as a munition; smoke and other obscuration producing items; flame and incendiary 

producing items; or soil, water, debris or other media contaminated with low concentrations of 

chemical agents where no chemical agent hazards exist. Soil, water, debris, or other media 

contaminated with dispersed V- and G- series nerve agent, H- and HN-series blister agent, or L 

will be considered and managed in accordance with 40 CFR 266 Subpart M. (DASA(ESOH) 

Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) Responses, April 1, 2009) 

Chemical Weapon (CW)

Any munition or device containing or suspected of containing any chemical listed on the 

schedules in DASA-ESOH Interim Guidance for Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) Responses, 

April 1, 2009. 

Community Relations Plan (CRP)

Formerly called the Public Involvement Plan, the CRP serves as the framework to establish a 

successful information exchange with the public during the Environmental Restoration Process. 

The CRP follows guidelines set forth under Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization 

Act. Each CRP must be tailored to fit the individual site and situation and should also 

accommodate any site-specific agreements between the U.S. Army and the U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency or state environmental agencies. The CRP is not a static document and 

should be revised to reflect the development and progress of actions at the site.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)

Congress enacted CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, on 11 December 1980. This law 

created a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries and provided broad Federal authority to 

respond directly to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger 

public health or the environment. 

Concentrated Munitions Use Area (CMUA)

CMUAs are munitions response sites (MRSs) or areas within MRSs where there is a high 

likelihood of finding unexploded ordnance or discarded military munitions and that have a high 

amount of munition debris within them as a result of historical munitions use and fragmentation. 

CMUAs are most commonly target areas on ranges; however, they also include explosion sites, 

open burn / open detonation areas, and potentially even disposal sites where munitions have been 

disposed of over a relatively large area (i.e., not small, isolated burial pits). 
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Glossary-12 

Conceptual Site Model (CSM)

A CSM is a description of a site and its environment that is based on existing knowledge. It 

describes sources and receptors, and the interactions that link these. It assists the team in 

planning, data interpretation, and communication. 

Control Markers

Project control markers may consist of markers and/or benchmarks established by any federal, 

state, local, or private agency with positional data within the minimum acceptable accuracy 

standards prescribed by the project team.

Conventional Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC)

The term “conventional MEC” refers to MEC (see definition) other than chemical warfare 

materiel, biological warfare materiel, and nuclear ordnance. 

Corrective Action

The action taken to eliminate the causes of an existing nonconformity, defect, or other 

undesirable situation in order to prevent recurrence. (ER 5-1-11) Note: Following through with 

a corrective action is critical. In performing a corrective action, the Project Delivery Team 

should be careful not to simply correct the resultant symptoms of a systematic problem, but 

should seek to rectify the real cause behind the problem, as well as investigate if there are other 

aspects of the project that may have been affected by the systemic problem.

Corrective Action Request (CAR)

The CAR is a report documenting action to correct conditions adverse to quality.

Customer

The customer is a party, organization, or sponsor that depends upon the professional services, 

expertise, and advice of a project manager and technical personnel. Typically, the customer is 

the decision maker who is funding the project and responsible for the project property, such as 

the Department of Defense agencies, and sometimes the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

The customer is a key member of the Project Delivery Team and should be encouraged to 

participate through the Technical Project Planning process. 

Data Quality Objective (DQO)

A DQO is a qualitative and quantitative statement developed to clarify study objectives, define 

the type of data needed, and specify the tolerable levels of potential decision errors. A DQO is 

used as the basis for establishing the type, quality and quantity of data needed to support the 

decisions that will be made.

Decision Document

The Department of Defense has adopted the term Decision Document for the documentation of 

remedial action decisions at non-National Priorities List FUDS Properties. The decision 

document shall address the following: Purpose, Site Risk, Remedial Alternatives, 

Public/Community Involvement, Declaration, and Approval and Signature. A Decision 

Document for sites not covered by an interagency agreement or Federal facility agreement is still 

required to follow a CERCLA response. All Decision Documents will be maintained in the 
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Glossary-13 

Formerly Used Defense Sites Property/Project Administrative Record file. An Action 

Memorandum is the decision document for a removal response action. 

Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP)

Congressionally authorized in 1986, DERP promotes and coordinates efforts for the evaluation 

and cleanup of contamination at Department of Defense installations and Formerly Used Defense 

Sites. (10 U.S.C. 2701 et. seq.) 

Design Center (DC)

A specified U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) field office assigned a singular technical 

mission that is permanent and USACE-wide in scope. The designated office is to be considered 

the “lead activity” in a specialized area where capability needs to be concentrated for maximum 

effectiveness, economy, and efficiency. The Military Munitions Design Center (in coordination 

with the District Project Manager) will execute all phases of the Military Munitions Response 

Program response project after the approval of the Inventory Project Report unless the removal 

action is transferred to an approved District. (ER 1110-1-8153) 

Discarded Military Munitions (DMM)

Military munitions that have been abandoned without proper disposal or removed from storage 

in a military magazine or other storage area for the purpose of disposal. The term does not 

include unexploded ordnance, military munitions that are being held for future use or planned 

disposal, or military munitions that have been properly disposed of consistent with applicable 

environmental laws and regulations. (10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(3)) 

Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA)

An EE/CA is prepared for all non-time-critical removal actions as required by Section

300.415(b)(4)(i) of the National Contingency Plan. The goals of the EE/CA are to identify the 

extent of a hazard, to identify the objectives of the removal action, and to analyze the various 

alternatives that may be used to satisfy these objectives for cost, effectiveness, and 

implementability. 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

The detection, identification, onsite evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of 

unexploded ordnance and of other munitions that have become an imposing danger, for example 

by damage or deterioration. 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Personnel

Military personnel who have graduated from the Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal; 

are assigned to a military unit with a Service-defined EOD mission; and meet Service and 

assigned unit requirements to perform EOD duties. EOD personnel have received specialized 

training to address explosive and certain chemical agent hazards during both peacetime and 

wartime. EOD personnel are trained and equipped to perform render safe procedures on nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and conventional munitions, and on improvised explosive devices. 
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Glossary-14 

Explosive Soil

Because of some past munitions-related activities (e.g., settling ponds or explosives sumps at 

munitions production or demilitarization facilities), concentrations of explosives in soil (e.g., 

sand, sludge, clay) can exist such that the mixture itself presents an explosive hazard. DoD 

6055.09-M, V7.E4.4 provides definitions and guidance for explosive soil.

Feasibility Study (FS)

A study undertaken to develop and evaluate alternatives for remedial action. 

Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS)

A FUDS is defined as a facility or site (property) that was under the jurisdiction of the Secretary 

of Defense and owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by the United States at the time of 

actions leading to contamination by hazardous substances. By the Defense Environmental 

Restoration Program policy, the FUDS program is limited to those real properties that were 

transferred from Department of Defense control prior to 17 October 1986. FUDS properties can 

be located within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Territories, Commonwealths, and 

possessions of the United States. 

Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Project

A FUDS Project is a unique name given to an area of an eligible FUDS property containing one 

or more releases or threatened releases of a similar response nature, treated as a discrete entity or 

consolidated grouping for response purposes. This may include buildings, structures, 

impoundments, landfills, storage containers, or other areas where hazardous substance are or 

have come to be located, including FUDS eligible unsafe buildings or debris. Projects are 

categorized by actions described under installation restoration (hazardous, toxic, and radioactive 

waste [HTRW] and CON/HTRW), military munitions response program, or building 

demolition/debris removal. An eligible FUDS Property may have more than one project. 

Geophysical Techniques

Techniques utilized for the detection and measurement of buried anomalies (e.g., ferromagnetic 

indicators and ground penetrating radar) to investigate the presence of munitions. 

Hazardous Fragmentation Distance (HFD)

Distance at which the areal number density of hazardous fragments or debris becomes one per 

600 square feet (55.7 square meters).

Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste (HTRW) Activities

HTRW activities include those activities undertaken for the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s Superfund program, the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, including the 

FUDS, and Installation Restoration Program sites at active Department of Defense facilities; 

HTRW actions associated with civil works projects; and any other mission or non-mission work 

performed for others at HTRW sites. 
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Glossary-15 

Intrusive Activity

An activity that involves or results in the penetration of the ground surface at an area known or 

suspected to contain munitions and explosives of concern. Intrusive activities can be of an 

investigative or removal action nature. 

Land Use Controls (LUCs)

Physical, legal, or administrative mechanisms that restrict the use of, or limit access to, 

contaminated property to reduce risk to human health and the environment. Physical 

mechanisms encompass a variety of engineered remedies to contain or reduce contamination and 

physical barriers to limit access to property, such as fences or signs. The legal mechanisms are 

generally the same as those used for institutional controls (ICs) as discussed in the National 

Contingency Plan. ICs are a subset of LUCs and are primarily legal mechanisms imposed to 

ensure the continued effectiveness of land use restrictions imposed as part of a remedial decision. 

Legal mechanisms include restrictive covenants, negative easements, equitable servitudes, and 

deed notices. Administrative mechanisms include notices, adopted local land use plans and 

ordinances, construction permitting, or other existing land use management systems that may be 

used to ensure compliance with use restrictions. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP) 

Lead Regulatory Agency

States or tribes are generally the lead regulator for environmental investigations and response at 

non-National Priorities List (NPL) Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS). In certain 

circumstances, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) may serve as lead regulator 

when the state or tribe requests USEPA assume the lead or when USEPA chooses to exert its 

lead regulator role. In cases where a non-NPL FUDS is on or affecting tribal land, the lead 

regulator role generally falls to the affected tribe. Project-specific circumstances may warrant 

assumption of the lead regulator role by USEPA. When a FUDS is either proposed for inclusion 

or listed on the NPL, USEPA is the lead regulator. 

Mag & Flag

The use of geophysical equipment to survey an area in a real-time mode and mark the location of 

geophysical anomalies. This method is performed without using post data processing. 

Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard (MPPEH)

Material owned or controlled by the Department of Defense that, prior to determination of its 

explosives safety status, potentially contains explosives or munitions (e.g., munitions containers 

and packaging material; munitions debris remaining after munitions use, demilitarization, or 

disposal; and range-related debris) or potentially contains a high enough concentration of 

explosives that the material presents an explosive hazard (e.g., equipment, drainage systems, 

holding tanks, piping, or ventilation ducts that were associated with munitions. 

Maximum Fragmentation Distance (MFD)

The calculated maximum distance to which any fragment from the cylindrical portion of an 

ammunition and explosives (AE) case is expected to be thrown by the design mode detonation of 

a single AE item. This distance does not address fragments produced by sections of nose plugs, 

base plates, boat tails, or lugs. These special fragments, from the non-cylindrical portions of the 

AE case, can travel to significantly greater distances (i.e., more than 10,000 feet [3,048 meters]) 
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Glossary-16 

than the calculated maximum distances. The maximum fragment distance also may be the 

measured distance, based on testing, to which any fragment from an AE item is thrown. 

Military Munitions

Military munitions means all ammunition products and components produced or used by or for 

the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S. Armed Services for national defense and 

security, including military munitions under the control of the Department of Defense, the U.S. 

Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and National Guard personnel. The term 

military munitions includes: confined gaseous, liquid, and solid propellants, explosives, 

pyrotechnics, chemical and riot control agents, smokes, and incendiaries used by DoD 

components, including bulk explosives and chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions, 

rockets, guided and ballistic missiles, bombs, warheads, mortar rounds, artillery ammunition, 

small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, torpedoes, depth charges, cluster munitions and 

dispensers, demolition charges, and devices and components thereof. Military munitions do not 

include wholly inert items, improvised explosive devices, and nuclear weapons, nuclear devices, 

and nuclear components thereof. However, the term does include non-nuclear components of 

nuclear devices, managed under DOE's nuclear weapons program after all required sanitization 

operations under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, have been completed. (40 CFR 

260.10) 

Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP)

The MMRP category is defined as response actions (i.e., the identification, investigation, and 

remedial actions, or a combination of removal and remedial actions) to address munitions and 

explosives of concern or munitions constituents. This includes the removal of foreign military 

munitions if it is incidental to the response addressing Department of Defense military munitions 

at a Formerly Used Defense Sites property. (ER 200-3-1) 

Military Range

Designated land or water area set aside, managed, and used to conduct research on, develop, test, 

and evaluate military munitions and explosives, other ordnance, or weapon systems, or to train 

military personnel in their use and handling. Ranges include firing lines and positions, maneuver 

areas, firing lanes, test pads, detonation pads, impact areas, and buffer zones with restricted 

access and exclusionary areas. (Military Munitions Rule, 40 CFR. 266.201) 

Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC)

This term, which distinguishes specific categories of military munitions that may pose unique 

explosives safety risks, means:

(a) unexploded ordnance, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2710 (e) (9); 

(b) discarded military munitions, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2710 (e) (2), or 

(c) munitions constituents (e.g., TNT, RDX) present in high enough concentrations to pose an 

explosive hazard. 
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Glossary-17 

Munitions Constituents (MC)

Any materials originating from unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, or other 

military munitions, including explosive and non-explosive materials, and emission, degradation, 

or breakdown elements of such ordnance or munitions. (10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(3)) 

Munitions Response (MR)

Response actions, including investigation, removal and remedial actions to address the 

explosives safety, human health, or environmental risks presented by unexploded ordnance, 

discarded military munitions, or munitions constituents. 

Munitions Response Area (MRA)

Any area on a defense site that is known or suspected to contain unexploded ordnance, discarded 

military munitions, or munitions constituents. Examples include former ranges and munitions 

burial areas. An MRA is comprised of one or more munitions response sites. 

Munitions Response Explosives Siting Plan (MRESP)

The munitions response explosives safety submission required for munitions response 

investigation or characterization that involves intentional physical contact with munitions and 

explosives of concern (MEC). The MRESP address areas (e.g., magazines) used for the storage 

of commercial or military demolition explosives, recovered MEC, planned or established 

demolition or disposal areas; and the munitions response area, munitions response site, or 

response area boundaries. 

Munitions Response Explosives Safety Submission (MRESS)

The document which serves as the specifications for conducting work activities at the project. 

The MRESS details the scope of the project, the planned work activities, and potential hazards 

(including the maximum credible event) and the methods for their control. 

Munitions Response Site (MRS)

A discrete location within a munitions response area that is known to require a munitions 

response. 

National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)

Revised in 1990, the NCP provides the regulatory framework for responses under CERCLA. 

The NCP designates the Department of Defense as the removal response authority for ordnance 

and explosives hazards. 

Non-Concentrated Munitions Use Area (NCMUA)

NCMUAs are munitions response sites (MRSs) or areas within an MRS where there is a low 

amount of munitions debris or unexploded ordnance due to limited historical munitions use and 

fragmentation. NCMUAs may be either entire MRSs (e.g., training and maneuver areas) or they 

may be a portion of an MRS outside of a concentrated munitions use area (e.g., buffer areas). 
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Glossary-18 

Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel (NSCWM)

Chemical warfare materiel (CWM; see definition) that is not included in the chemical stockpile. 

NSCWM is divided into five categories: buried CWM, recovered chemical weapons (items 

recovered during range clearing operations, from chemical burial sites, and from research and 

development testing), former chemical weapon production facilities, binary chemical weapons, 

and miscellaneous CWM (unfilled munitions and devices and equipment specially designed for 

use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons). 

Ordnance and Explosives Safety Specialist (OESS)

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel, classified as a GS-0018 Safety Specialist, and who is 

unexploded ordnance-qualified. OESS perform safety, quality assurance and Military Munitions 

Design Center (MMDC) functions for the government. The OESS may reside in and report to 

the construction field office or may reside in the engineering/construction office within the 

MMDC. 

Preliminary Assessment (PA)

The PA is a limited-scope investigation that collects readily available information about a project 

and its surrounding area after the property has been determined to be Military Munitions 

Response Program eligible. The PA is conducted on a property-wide basis and evaluates all 

potential projects and hazards. Regardless of the number of categories of hazards present hazardous, 

toxic, and radioactive waste (HTRW), unexploded ordnance / discarded military munitions / 

munitions constituents, building demolition/debris removal, etc.), only one PA will be prepared for 

the property. For Formerly Used Defense Sites, the PA will comply with the requirements in ER 

200-3-1. The PA is designed to distinguish, based on limited data, between sites that pose little 

or no threat to human health and the environment and sites that may pose a threat and require 

further investigation. The PA also identifies sites requiring assessment for possible removal 

actions and helps set priorities for Site Inspections by collecting enough information to fill out at 

least one of the Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol modules. If the PA results in a 

recommendation for further investigation, a Site Inspection is performed. 

Project Delivery Team (PDT)

The PDT is a multi-disciplined project team lead by the Project Manager with responsibility for 

assuring that the project stays focused, first and foremost on the public interest, and on the 

customer’s needs and expectations, and that all work is integrated and done in accordance with a 

Project Management Plan and approved business and quality management processes. The PDT 

focuses on quality project delivery, with heavy reliance on partnering and relationship 

development to achieve better performance. The PDT shall consist of everyone necessary for 

successful development and execution of all phases of the project. The PDT will include the 

customers, the Project Manager, technical experts within or outside the local U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers activity, specialists, consultants/contractors, stakeholders, representatives from other 

Federal and state agencies, and higher level members from Division and Headquarters who are 

necessary to effectively develop and deliver the project actions. The customer is an integral part 

of the PDT. (ER 5-1-11) 
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Glossary-19 

Project Management Plan (PMP)

A living document used to define expected outcomes and guide execution and control of project 

(or program) actions. Primary uses of the PMP are to facilitate communication among 

participants, assign responsibilities, define assumptions, and document decisions. Establishes 

baseline plans for scope, cost, schedule, safety, and quality objectives against which performance 

can be measured, and to adjust these plans as actual performance dictates. The project delivery 

team develops the PMP.

Project Manager (PM)

The PM is responsible for management and leadership of a project during its entire life cycle, 

even when more than one U.S. Army Corps of Engineers District or activity is involved. The 

PM will generally reside at the geographic District but can be elsewhere as needed. The PM and 

Project Delivery Team (PDT) are responsible and accountable for ensuring the team takes 

effective, coordinated actions to deliver the completed project according to the Project 

Management Plan. The PM manages all project resources, information and commitments, and 

leads and facilitates the PDT towards effective development and execution of project actions. 

(ER 5-1-11) 

Quality 

The totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to meet 

the stated or implied needs and expectations of the project. Quality expectations need to be 

negotiated among the Project Delivery Team members (which includes the customer) and are set 

in the Project Management Plan. (ER 5-1-11). More specifically, the quality of a response 

action is measured by how closely that response action meets the standards and expectations of 

the customer.

Quality Assurance (QA)

An integrated system of management activities involving planning, implementation, assessment, 

reporting, and quality improvement to ensure that a process, item, or service is of the type and 

quality needed to meet project requirements defined in the Project Management Plan. 

Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP)

A formal document describing in comprehensive detail the necessary quality assurance, quality 

control, and other technical activities that must be implemented to ensure that the results of the 

work performed will satisfy the stated performance criteria of the project.

Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)

All service contracts require the development and implementation of a QASP. A QASP 

describes how government personnel will evaluate and assess contractor performance. The 

purpose of the QASP is to describe how project performance will be measured and assessed 

against performance standards. It is based on the premise that the contractor, not the 

government, is responsible for managing quality control. 
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Glossary-20 

Quality Control (QC)

The overall system of technical activities that measures the attributes and performance of a 

process, item, or service against defined standards to verify that they meet the stated 

requirements established in the Project Management Plan; operational techniques and activities 

that are used to fulfill requirements for quality.

Quality Management

Processes required to ensure that the actions at the project would satisfy the needs and objectives 

for which it was undertaken, consisting of quality planning, quality assurance, quality control, 

and quality improvement. 

Quality System

A structured and documented management system describing the policies, objectives, principles, 

organizational authority, responsibilities, accountability, and implementation plan of an 

organization for ensuring quality in its work processes, products (items), and services. The 

quality system provides the framework for planning, implementation, and assessing work 

performed by the organization and for carrying out required quality assurance and quality 

control. (ER 5-1-11). 

Quantity-Distance (Q-D)

The quantity of explosives material and distance separation relationships that provide defined 

types of protection. These relationships are based on levels of risk considered acceptable for the 

stipulated exposures and are tabulated in the appropriate Q-D tables provided in Department of 

Defense Manual 6055.09. Separation distances are not absolute safe distances but are relative 

protective safe distances. Greater distances than those shown in the Q-D tables will be used 

whenever possible. (DoDM 6055.09) 

Remedial or Remedial Action (RA)

Those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal 

actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the 

environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not 

migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health, welfare or the environment. 

The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage; 

confinement; perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches; clay cover; neutralization; 

cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials; recycling or 

reuse; diversion; destruction; segregation of reactive wastes; dredging or excavations; repair or 

replacement of leaking containers; collection of leachate and runoff; onsite treatment or 

incineration; provision of alternative water supplies; and any monitoring reasonably required to 

assure that such actions protect the public health, welfare and the environment. The term 

includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and community facilities 

where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures, such 

relocation is more cost-effective and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage, 

treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be 

necessary to protect the public health or welfare. The term includes offsite transport and offsite 

storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated 

contaminated materials. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP)
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Glossary-21 

Remedial Design (RD)

A phase of remedial action that follows the remedial investigation/feasibility study and includes 

development of engineering drawings and specifications for a site cleanup. 

Remedial Investigation (RI)

Process undertaken to determine the nature and extent of the problem presented by a release 

which emphasizes data collection and site characterization. The RI is generally performed 

concurrently and in an interdependent fashion with the feasibility study. 

Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study (RI/FS)

See separate definitions for RI and FS. 

Removal or Removal Action

The cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment. Such actions 

may be taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, 

such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release 

of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as 

may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to 

the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The term 

includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to limit access, 

provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened 

individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any 

emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.] The requirements for removal actions are addressed in 

40 CFR §§300.410 and 330.415. The three types of removals are emergency, time-critical, and 

non time-critical removals. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP)

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)

Enacted in 1976, RCRA promotes the protection of health and the environment. It regulates 

waste generation, treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal for facilities currently in 

operation. 

Response Action

A CERCLA-authorized action involving either a short-term removal action or a long-term 

removal response. This may include, but is not limited to, removing hazardous materials, 

containing or treating the waste on-site, and identifying and removing the sources of ground 

water contamination and halting further migration of contaminants. 

Restoration Advisory Board (RAB)

A Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) is a forum for the discussion and exchange of information 

between representatives of the Department of Defense, regulators, state and local governments, 

tribal governments, and the affected community. RABs provide an opportunity for stakeholders 

to have a voice and actively participate in the review of technical documents, to review 

restoration progress, and to provide individual advice to decision makers regarding restoration 

activities at Formerly Used Defense Sites Properties and Projects.
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Site Inspection (SI)

Activities undertaken to determine whether there is a release or potential release and the nature 

associated threats. The purpose is to augment the data collected in the Preliminary Assessment 

and to generate, if necessary, sampling and other field data to determine the presence, type, 

distribution, density and location of ordnance and explosives. 

Stakeholder

Stakeholders include federal, state, and local officials, tribal officials, community organizations, 

property owners, and others having a personal interest or involvement or having a monetary or 

commercial involvement in the Formerly Used Defense Sites Property that is to undergo a 

remedial/response action.

Technical Project Planning (TPP)

The process for designing data collection programs at Formerly Used Defense Sites properties. 

The TPP process helps ensure that the requisite type, quality, and quantity of data are obtained to 

satisfy project objectives that lead to informed decisions and project/property closeout. 

Time-Critical Removal Action (TCRA)

A TCRA is a response to a release or threat of release that poses such a risk to public health 

(serious injury or death), or the environment, that clean up or stabilization actions must be 

initiated within six months.

Tribes

Federally recognized American Indian and Alaskan Native governments. 

Uniform Federal Policy – Quality Assurance Project Plan (UFP-QAPP)

Consensus document prepared by the Intergovernmental Data Quality Task Force that provides 

instructions for preparing Quality Assurance Project Plans for any environmental data collection 

operation. 

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)

Military munitions that (a) have been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for action; (b) 

have been fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to constitute a 

hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material; and (c) remain unexploded either by 

malfunction, design, or any other cause. (U.S.C. 2710 (e) (9)) 

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)-Qualified Personnel

Personnel who have performed successfully in military explosive ordnance disposal positions, or 

are qualified to perform in the following Department of Labor, Service Contract Act, Directory 

of Occupations, contractor positions: UXO Technician II, UXO Technician III, UXO Safety 

Officer, UXO Quality Control Specialist, or Senior UXO Supervisor. 

Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Technicians

Personnel who are qualified for and filling Department of Labor, Service Contract Act, Directory 

of Occupations, contractor positions of UXO Technician I, UXO Technician II, and UXO 

Technician III.
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