TWEAKING NATO:

THE CASE FOR INTEGRATED

MULTINATIONAL DIVISIONS

Raymond A. Millen

June 2002
*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not

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*****

The author would like to thank Dr. Thomas-Durell Young and

Lieutenant Colonel Brian Lovatt (Ret) for insightful comments on

earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors or misinterpretations

which remain do so despite their best efforts.

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ISBN 1-58487-092-3

ii
FOREWORD

In 1931, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

penned the following thoughts on innovation: “We must

hold our minds alert and receptive to the application of

unglimpsed methods and weapons. The next war will be

won in the future, not in the past. We must go on, or we will

go under.” As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) adapts to the emerging strategic environment, it

must consider innovative organizational structures that

will allow it to harness the potential of its European

partners.

In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen

examines NATO’s enduring deficiencies and their

detrimental effect on military capabilities. The decade

following the end of the Cold War has revealed a far

different world than envisioned. As the United States

ruefully discovered, the reduced threat did not diminish

security obligations. NATO’s European members hoped

otherwise and paid insufficient attention to military

capabilities. NATO enlargement exacerbates the existing

problems. NATO’s integrated military structure does not

easily accommodate the new members, which still suffer

from the effects of the Soviet system. Simply put, their

nascent market economies and unsophisticated militaries

represent great obstacles to NATO interoperability.

Lieutenant Colonel Millen explores the establishment of

integrated multinational divisions as a solution to NATO’s

salient problems. The co-stationing of Allied units in

existing casernes and under a host division headquarters

certainly provides opportunities worth discussing.

Streamlining the Alliance to a single active corps of ten

divisions and the establishment of a robust logistical supply

group permits greater utility of limited manpower and

equipment. Under this structure, all Alliance members can

iii
focus modernization on select units and become active

participants in all NATO operations.

As Lieutenant Colonel Millen points out, this bold

approach creates challenges for the Alliance, but the

tremendous benefits outweigh the short-term risks. To

remain relevant, the Alliance must seek innovations.

Otherwise, it will become a Cold War relic.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

monograph as a topic of debate that will continue well into

the millennium.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iv
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

RAYMOND A. MILLEN is currently assigned as the

Director of European Security Studies at the Strategic

Studies Institute. A lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, he

graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was

commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety

of command and staff assignments in Germany and

Continental United States. He commanded a light infantry

company during Operation JUST CAUSE, the invasion of

Panama in 1990. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has also served

as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the

German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany;

Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort

Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and

Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He

is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General

Staff College, and holds an M.A. degree in National Security

Studies from Georgetown University. He is a Foreign Area

Officer for Western Europe. Lieutenant Colonel Millen has

published articles in a number of scholarly and professional

journals, including Infantry Magazine and The Swiss

Military Journal. His book, Command Legacy, was

published by Brasseys in April 2002.

v
SUMMARY

The greatest peril to NATO is not a matter of relevancy

but rather the inability to adapt to European realities and

enduring deficiencies. Insufficient military spending and

investment as well as significant downsizing have resulted

in an ever-widening capabilities and interoperability gulf

between the United States and the Alliance partners. The

Defense Capabilities Initiative will likely not bear fruit

because the Allies are incapable of correcting the identified

deficiencies under existing budget constraints. NATO may

have broadened its mandate to include crisis response

operations, but European military forces are incapable of

swift power projection and will suffer inveterate manpower

shortages for deployed forces. Multinational corps and

divisions suffer from the enduring problems with command

authority, transfer of authority, and corps combat service

support. NATO’s approach to multinational formations

suffers from a lack of true integration. Subordinate units

are isolated from each other until assembled for a crisis.

This approach is akin to baking a cake without mixing the

ingredients beforehand.

The problems associated with veteran members pale in

comparison to NATO’s new members and candidates. The

lingering effects of the communist economies and the Soviet

integrated military structure represent enduring barriers

to swift integration with the Alliance. Several more years of

reforms are necessary before the new members can

contribute to the existing NATO integrated military

structure. Financing a modern, interoperable force is

simply beyond their economic capabilities. NATO

enlargement is a superb initiative, enhancing European

stability and security, but without the ability to harness the

potential of new members, NATO will lamentably view

them as not-ready-for-primetime and continue to

marginalize them.

vi
The vast majority of NATO’s ailments can be cured by

the adoption of integrated multinational divisions (IMD),

meaning the subordinate brigades and battalions are

stationed together under the host division headquarters.

The IMD allows every NATO member to contribute forces

according to its size and relative wealth. Integration of new

members will proceed more quickly and assuredly because

they have the opportunity to train intimately with Allied

units. Language immersion as well as daily contact with

democratic values and Western culture creates stronger

bonds among members. For the Alliance as a whole, IMDs

allow for a greater pooling of resources and manpower and

permit focused modernization of the force contributions.

IMDs permit NATO to rely on the Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) as the centerpiece of

the Alliance with a dedicated, robust combat service

support group and rotating commanding general.

Maintenance and modernization of two other corps

headquarters are crucial to ensure seamless command and

control for enduring peace support operations. Such an

approach permits Allies to lower the readiness of their

remaining divisions and brigades until mobilized for major

threats. The result is a more cohesive, modern, mobile

NATO at a pittance of the current cost. Perhaps, these

reforms can lower the defense spending obligation to 1.5

percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) without

lowering military capabilities.

Recommendations.

The United States can improve its strategic position and

cohesion by pursuing the following:

• Convert the two U.S. divisions in Europe into IMDs in

order to assist in the assimilation of new members

into the Alliance.

vii
• Encourage other NATO members to adopt this model

in order to make more effective use of their military

spending and resources.

• Establish the ARRC as NATO’s higher readiness force

for all missions and maintain the EUROCORPS and

EUROFOR corps headquarters, sufficiently staffed

and equipped with the most modern and robust

command and control systems. Rotate the command

of the ARRC among the contributing members.

• Expand the existing ARRC combat support (CS) and

combat service support (CSS) base into an Area

Support Group (ASG) equivalent to provide assured

logistics during training and deployments. The ASG

must be sufficiently large to support multiple

rotations during extended peace support operations

(PSO).

The IMD architecture means that all Allies share

responsibilities, risks, and benefits. With all members

actively engaged in operations, the United States will not

feel compelled to take unilateral military action or

constantly bear the lion’s share of military operations.

Making the necessary reforms will be a challenge and will

require substantial marketing of the idea, but the

alternative solutions are no cure. NATO must break the

mold and grasp the opportunities.

viii
TWEAKING NATO:

THE CASE FOR INTEGRATED

MULTINATIONAL DIVISIONS

Introduction.

NATO continues as the most successful and enduring

alliance in history. Notwithstanding a handful of

dissenting viewpoints, NATO has no security peers. Even

so, its preeminent role in European security is not a

foregone conclusion. Given Europe’s stable situation,

NATO’s continued relevance is predicated less on collective

defense than on collective security.

Post-Cold War initiatives, such as the Defense

Capabilities Initiative, Combined Joint Task Force, and the

European Security and Defense Policy, are laudable but

address the manifestations and not the ailments plaguing

the Alliance: burden sharing, command authority,

interoperability, and diminishing military capabilities. The

current political atmosphere and integrated military

structure cannot reconcile these opposing forces. Another

approach is needed—integrated multinational divisions

(IMDs). At first glance, the reader may dismiss this

approach as hackneyed, but the details reveal its

practicability.

The first part of this monograph examines the enduring

European NATO member deficiencies and the chronic

assimilation difficulties of new members with the Alliance.

The second part examines the opportunities presented

through the restructuring of NATO nation land forces into

IMDs and some recommendations for streamlining the

integrated military structure. Through such reforms,

NATO will gain enhanced interoperability, equalize burden

sharing, mitigate ongoing command authority issues and

accommodate existing lower defense spending. The U.S.

Army will benefit by cultivating the military potential of

1
every member and allowing it to realign forces in accordance

with U.S. National Security Strategy and National Military

Strategy without commitment penalties. Consequently,

NATO not only will continue to be relevant but also a more

cohesive and adaptive security organization for the future

strategic environment.

European Deficiencies.

Technological Shortcomings. The technological gap

between the United States and its NATO Allies is

increasing, adversely affecting interoperability and

Europe’s ability to contribute to NATO combat operations.

The origins of this predicament stem from Europe’s pursuit

of a peace dividend in the post-Cold War period. European

force level reductions resulting from the Conventional

Forces in Europe treaty and the global recession in the early

1990s prompted governments to divert more funds from

defense budgets to domestic spending. In the process,

European governments particularly assigned a lower

budgetary priority to military research and development,

which has shrunk to approximately one-third of the U.S.

defense research budget.1

Insufficient apportionment of the gross domestic

product (GDP) to military spending has led to a significant

degradation of European military capabilities (Table 1).

NATO has established a goal of 2.0 percent of GDP as the

minimum apportionment for defense spending for the

purpose of maintaining burden sharing.2 Unfortunately,

half of the NATO members fail to meet the established goal

and appear incapable of meeting their obligations.3

European counterclaims that much money is spent on

economic assistance to Eastern European countries and

similar activities are red herrings. This diversion of funds

may indeed enhance regional stability but does nothing for

the health of the Alliance. Financial obligations to the

Alliance should remain the dominant focus, but the political

will is lacking, particularly when domestic social issues are

2
more pressing. NATO has yet to address the arrears

adequately, and the decline in European armed forces

continues.

3

Table 1. Defense Expenditures of NATO States.
Defense expenditures per troop indicate the general

sophistication of the respective armed forces. Ideally, small,

modernized active forces are the most use to the Alliance.

The larger the defense expenditure per troop, the more

interoperability is enhanced.4 Most of the bottom half falls

well below the average expenditure (excluding Iceland) of

$89,714, reflecting the wide disparity of sophistication

within the Alliance.

European NATO nations’ negligence of the armed forces

became apparent during the NATO-led operations in

Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). The United States bore

the brunt of the fighting in both air campaigns, flying

approximately 70 percent of the all sorties, expending 80

percent of the precision-guided munitions, and providing

practically all of the aviation electronic warfare support;

both operations revealed the growing technological gap

between the United States and the European allies.5

Specifically, the Kosovo conflict revealed deficiencies in

“cruise missiles, radar satellite observation systems,

offensive jammers, [and] aircraft identification systems.”6

European military capabilities have plummeted in other

areas as well. Strategic airlift capabilities are far from

adequate, and procurement of an intra-theater aircraft is

progressing very slowly. Reconnaissance and surveillance

platforms are few. Stand-off, precision guided munitions

take years to procure in proper amounts and require

extensive training of soldiers. Budget constraints have

lowered pilot flying hours below the minimum of 120 hours

per pilot per year.7

Admittedly, the Alliance has taken steps to correct the

European deficiencies. The 1999 Washington Summit

instituted the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), whose

goal was to close the capabilities gap and improve

interoperability.8 With an eye on the future, DCI sought to

“improve defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of

future multinational operations across the full spectrum of

Alliance missions . . .”9 The identified deficiencies were

4
broken down into 59 measures and grouped into 5 discrete

areas:

• Deployability and mobility;

• Sustainability and logistics;

• Survivability of forces and infrastructure;

• Effective engagement; and,

• Consultation, Command and Control and Information Systems.10

Unfortunately, 50 percent of the measures have proven

to be resource intensive and beyond the capabilities of the

individual members. Ultimately, any DCI improvement

requires cooperative initiatives, such as consortia, research

and development sharing, and the leasing or selling of

equipment.11 Given the numerous shortfalls of European

armed forces, it is little wonder that some in the United

States are reluctant to engage in coalition warfare with the

European allies. This is not to say that European NATO

nations cannot or will not increase their military

technology. Improvements will come, albeit slowly and

definitely lagging behind the United States. The technology

gap is symptomatic of a European attitude that the United

States will provide security assurance no matter how

insouciant European concerns. Casting aside all the

rhetoric of pan-Europeanists, the future European Union

will not likely progress beyond a confederacy of states, and

all the security problems associated with confederacies will

persist.

Organizational Shortcomings. European land forces are

still largely oriented towards territorial defense rather than

expeditionary missions. In view of NATO’s acceptance of

conflict prevention and crisis management tasks to include

peace support operations, European participation is

hampered by poor power projection capabilities and

manpower limitations as a result of conscription.12

5
In the past decade, European NATO countries have

downsized their armed forces with insufficient attention to

modernization and reform. They have reduced the number

of divisions, but the remaining forces are still as heavy as

their Cold War predecessors. Transforming land forces into

lighter, more agile, and more effective instruments is

expensive and time-consuming. Given the current levels of

military spending, the transformation of European armies

will progress slowly at best. Without strategic airlift or

sealift, European power projection capabilities are limited

mainly to rail and road transportation. Hence, for the most

part, European militaries are not tailored for crisis reaction

operations.

The issue of conscription is much more problematic.

While some European countries have professional armies,

many have retained conscription either wholly or partially

because it is the most cost effective way to fill the ranks.13

Conscript forces are not as capable as professional forces

because lower pay and shortened military service

obligations (ranging from 8 to 12 months) produce an

ill-trained and relatively unmotivated soldier.14

Conscription limits the force size a country can deploy to

a crisis area. Many countries with conscription cannot

legally deploy their conscripts out-of-area. Since conscripts

are largely lower-ranking soldiers—the work horses—the

officers and noncommissioned officers must take up the

slack. Moreover, soldiers in specialty positions (staff,

communications, intelligence, and so forth) are in high

demand and are deployed much more frequently than

planned. To fulfill the manpower requirements of a

deploying unit, nondeploying units must contribute

personnel and usually key equipment. Experience suggests

that peace support operations require the dedication of

three units (usually battalions) for each mission

requirement—the unit deployed, the unit preparing for the

deployment, and the unit recovering from the deployment.

Manpower problems multiply whenever a deployment or

multiple deployments lasts months, forcing the armed

6
forces to use the same personnel or units more often than

foreseen. Trained soldiers leave the service in frustration or

exhaustion. To counter this trend, some countries may offer

significant pay incentives, but this approach makes

extended deployments exorbitantly expensive and devours

the military budget.

The average term of European conscript service is 12

months or less. Even if a country permitted the use of

conscripts for out-of-area deployments, the deployment

window of opportunity is small. The average conscript

spends 4-6 months for initial training. Soldiers need at least

a month in a unit before they become familiar with

procedures. Since most crises rarely fall in sync with the

conscription service cycle, the deployment time of each

conscript will only be a few months. Without any special

crisis provisions in national laws, managing the personnel

requirements alone during a crisis can be overwhelming.

Conversion to a professional army has ramifications

though. Countries that have converted to a volunteer force

without concomitant increases in incentives suffer acute

manpower shortages. Without adequate pay, medical and

retirement benefits, accommodations, and family

incentives among others, few citizens will volunteer to serve

their country for a 3-year tour. Investment in the soldier is

not the only expense either. Recruitment requires

sophisticated marketing initiatives, meaning the

government must engage a professional marketing firm to

be successful. Demographics for each country are unique. A

recruitment campaign for one country may not work in

another. For example, the United States promises financial

support for college in its recruitment advertisements. Such

an approach means little to Europeans since college is

almost regarded as a right. It may be that a European will

respond to the societal prestige of military service.

Regardless, a successful recruitment program requires

significant financing.

7
Because of the need for incentives and the concomitant

expenses, the size of European professional armies will be

small, perhaps no more than one to two divisions per

country. Whether a country relies on conscription or a

professional force, the result is fewer forces available for

crisis reaction operations.

NATO Structural Shortcomings.

Integrated Military Structure Shortcomings. NATO’s

integrated military structure still retains much of its Cold

War arrangements, making it ill-suited for expeditionary

operations and limiting the benefits of enlargement.

Despite the shift towards multinational formations,

NATO’s basic military building block still rests on national

divisions, meaning that each member country contributes

divisions to the Alliance for use in traditional Article 5

(collective defense) or non-Article 5 (conflict prevention and

crisis management to include peace support operations).

This arrangement was practicable during the Cold War

since the Alliance’s sole focus was on territorial collective

defense, and the need for simplicity overrode any initiatives

towards greater military efficiency among its members.

NATO organized the General Defense Plan of Germany into

eight national corps, whose commanders retained crucial

command authorities, e.g. authority over training, logistics,

task organization, and mission assignments, among

others.15 Theoretically, greater military coordination could

be effected among the members upon a war alert since the

Alliance could expect a few weeks of preparation time before

the Warsaw Pact could generate the needed offensive power

for an attack.

With NATO’s extension of its mandate to include

non-Article 5 missions, these Cold War arrangements

required revision. The shift from a territorial orientation to

an expeditionary posture has profound implications on the

ground forces. Unlike air and naval forces, ground forces

require closer tactical cooperation in expeditionary

8
operations. As Dr. Thomas-Durell Young has correctly

observed, “‘(L)and forces’ are not discrete independent units

which can be easily employed tactically in combined

operations (like ships and aircraft), but rather are

comprised of combined arms teams made up of various

subset formations, each of which may have different

mission-essential tasks assigned to them.”16 As crisis

response operations permit little time for mission

preparation among coalition partners, mission success is

jeopardized.

NATO’s relatively recent adoption of multinational

corps and multinational divisions is an attempt at greater

integration but has fallen short primarily due to political

sensibilities and the physical stationing of subordinate

units in their parent countries rather than under the

assigned headquarters. In his extensive studies on NATO’s

military structures, Young has identified three enduring

major shortcomings with the multinational corps—

command authority, transfer of authority, and corps CSS.17

These deficiencies alone hamper effective deployment.

The issue of sovereignty has deprived multinational

corps commanders of proper command authority. NATO

allies balk at yielding crucial command authority to

commanders of multinational corps in peacetime and

insufficient command authority during non-Article 5

operations. Without the authority to train their

subordinate units to standards in peacetime or the freedom

to control them tactically during a conflict, corps

commanders are hamstrung. By extension, the ambiguity

concerning the “transfer of authority” (TOA), the moment

when the contributing nation allows the commanding

general to take charge of its forces, adds to the confusion.18

The opportunity for subordinate units composing

multinational corps or multinational divisions to conduct

collective training is limited because they are

geographically separated by dozens of miles. Their first

opportunity to operate together as a cohesive force is during

9
a deployment. Under such circumstances, operations in a

crisis region will be sub par until units become accustomed

to operating together. For crises that require decisive

intervention, mission accomplishment will be endangered.

The absence of corps CSS units for all corps, except the

Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),

hamstrings rapid deployment of NATO land forces. Allied

members do not even allocate CSS units to the

multinational corps, and even earmarking such units in

peacetime to specific corps remains unfulfilled. For any

type of crisis response operation, CSS support becomes ad

hoc, wasteful, and chaotic because the corps commanders

will need to solicit contributions from respective nations

during the deployment phase.19 This state of affairs is

hardly conducive to rapid decisive operations.

The Impact of Enduring Deficiencies on NATO

Enlargement.

Whatever the problems associated with the old members

contributing to the Alliance, they pale in comparison to the

new members and the candidates’ challenges. Simply put,

assimilation into the Alliance is beyond the means of the

newcomers in the short term unless NATO makes

appropriate accommodations.

The New Members. Under NATO’s current organizational structure, enlargement does little to strengthen the

Alliance in real terms. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic have added about 200,000 troops to the Alliance,

but increased membership without the ability to harness

the military potential provides more fat than muscle.20

In preparation for their inclusion in NATO’s integrated

military structure, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic continue restructuring and modernizing their

armed forces. Military reforms are progressing reasonably

well but suffer from a lack of funding, and the pace of

modernization is directly tied to economic progress and

10
force reductions. If either falters, then so does the pace of

modernization and reform.

Poland has undertaken a progressive restructuring and

modernization program called the “Komorowski Plan,”

which is to culminate in 2006. The objective is to reduce its

armed forces to 150,000 service members, of which 75,000

will be professional soldiers, by 2006. Conscription has been

reduced to a 12-month service obligation. Poland is

reducing the percentage of senior officers to 30 percent of

the total force, and reorganizing its general staff along the

lines of the U.S. Joint Staff. The army is buying 128

German Leopard 2A4 tanks, converting its T-72 tanks to

NATO standards, producing a new infantry fighting vehicle

(KTO), and making similar upgrades with other weapon

systems. Of course, the pace of modernization greatly

depends on the economy. Poland has declared four brigades

for NATO’s immediate and rapid reaction forces and two

divisions for the main defense forces (30,000 troops total).21

Hungary’s 10-year modernization plan comprises three

phases ending in 2010. Hungary is reducing its armed

forces to 37,500 by 2003 and plans to end conscription by

2010. It is reorganizing the general staff along the lines of

the U.S. Joint Staff. It has declared a combat battalion, a

military intelligence company, two antiaircraft platoons,

and military police unit for the Immediate Reaction Force, a

brigade to the ARRC, and one tank brigade, five infantry

brigades, as well as antiaircraft, artillery, engineer and

support units for the main defense forces. Hungary has

provided the Tászár Air Base in support of the Bosnia peace

mission, and Hungary’s geographic location provides NATO

with access to the Balkans.22

The Czech Republic has no formal plans to reduce the

armed forces, but a general staff study recommends a

reduction to 45,000 by 2010. It is retaining conscription

with a 12-month service obligation. The army is upgrading

around 120 of its T-72 tanks and plans to modernize 70

percent of its equipment. Additionally, the air force is

11
investing in a modern L-159 subsonic fighter jet. The Czech

Republic has allotted 8,400 troops for the immediate and

rapid reaction forces and has declared its rapid reaction

brigade to the ARRC by 2002 (47,000 troops total).23

The fact remains that the new NATO members are

having trouble integrating into the Alliance. The Soviet

military doctrinal legacy persists. All have hundreds of

T-55 tanks, which are obsolete. Poland’s armed forces still

have a low level of training. Most training is conducted at

battalion level and only in garrison instead of the field.

Brigade level exercises are infrequent. Pilots only fly 60

hours per year, whereas the NATO minimum standard is

120 hours. The Hungarian army conducts inadequate

training, is not “modern” (e.g., lacking unit tasks,

conditions, and standards), and has too much obsolete

Soviet equipment. Defense spending has recently declined

to 1.51 percent due to the diversion of funds for natural

disaster relief. Initial force reductions disproportionately

affected the manpower levels of operational units, resulting

in a manpower deficit. The Czech army conducts no

training above company level and needs to improve its

English language training. Most of its equipment is also of

obsolete Soviet make. The L-159 fighter jet is consuming 70

percent of the military budget and does not seem worth the

investment since its pilot training averages 60 hours per

year.24

Attempting to reach technical interoperability is an

expensive process and in view of the old members’

difficulties in attaining the DCI objectives, the prognosis for

new members with their nascent market economies is that

technical interoperability problems will persist. Procedural

interoperability is a matter of training with NATO

procedures. Given the Soviet military doctrinal legacy and

the infrequent opportunities to train with other NATO

partners, internalizing NATO procedures will likely

proceed slowly.

12
The Candidate States. The members of NATO’s

Membership Action Plan (MAP): Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic,

Albania, and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of

Macedonia, are candidates for membership during the

Prague Summit in November 2002. While some have a

better chance than others this round, all suffer from

persistent military capability problems.

As with NATO members, the NATO candidates must

contribute 2 percent of their GDP to defense spending. At

first glance, NATO’s requirement may seem arbitrary since

so many NATO members do not meet the requirement, but

the 2 percent apportionment goal ensures candidates

devote sufficient funding to the military for the transition

into NATO’s integrated military structure. Currently, only

Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania can meet the standard

(Table 2).

13

Table 2. Defense Expenditures.
Defense expenditures per troop, depicting the general

sophistication of the armed forces, are much more

problematic. The NATO European median is $82,602

(Italy), with Poland having the lowest expenditure of

$14,727. A low figure of defense expenditures per troop

indicates a lower level of technological sophistication,

making interoperability very difficult to attain. Taken

together, these figures determine whether a candidate

nation is a potential contributor or a parasite to NATO.25

Only Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia meet or

surpass Poland. No candidate shows much promise of

attaining interoperability without significant assistance.

An overview of candidate armed forces reveals that

persistent, deep-rooted problems will mar any

contributions to NATO’s integrated military structure.

Enlargement does enhance stability and increase European

security, but in the realm of military capabilities, NATO’s

military structure will not benefit much.

Albania’s active army consists of 40,000 soldiers, of

which 22,500 are conscripts (12-month service obligation).

The active force structure is in the process of reform and

should comprise seven divisions and a commando brigade.

The navy has 2,500 sailors operating numerous coast guard

vessels. The air force has 4,500 airmen operating 98 combat

aircraft; of course, how many are actually operational is

questionable. The equipment is a mixture of old Soviet and

Chinese origin.26 Interoperability with NATO would be

poor.

The Bulgarian army has an active force of 42,400, of

which 33,300 are conscripts (12-month service obligation).

The active force structure consists of four mechanized

infantry divisions, four armor brigades, three mechanized

infantry brigades, one airborne brigade, and several air

defense and artillery regiments. The navy has 5,260 sailors

(2,000 conscripts) with one submarine, a frigate, and

several coast guard vessels. The air force has 18,300 airmen

with 181 combat aircraft and 43 attack helicopters. Pilots

14
average 30 to 40 flying hours per year. All equipment is

Soviet vintage, much of it quite old.27 Interoperability with

NATO would be poor.

Estonia’s active army consists of 4,800 soldiers, of which

2,870 are conscripts (12-month service obligation). The

active force structure comprises five infantry battalions,

one artillery battalion, one guard battalion, and one

reconnaissance battalion. The navy has 250 sailors (140

conscripts) with several coast guard vessels. The air force

has 140 airmen operating 3 aircraft and 7 helicopters. Pilot

training averages 70 flying hours per year. Equipment is

scant and of Soviet origin.28 Interoperability with NATO

would be poor.

The Latvian active army has 2,400 soldiers, including

1,690 conscripts (12-month service obligation). The active

force structure consists of one infantry battalion, one

reconnaissance battalion, one Special Forces team, one

peacekeeping company, and one artillery unit. The navy

has 840 sailors (360 conscripts) with several coast guard

vessels. The air force has 210 airmen operating 19 aircraft

and 4 helicopters.29 Equipment is of Soviet origin and old,

and interoperability with NATO would be poor.

Lithuania’s active army has 9,340 soldiers, including

3,720 conscripts (12-month service obligation). The active

force structure comprises two motorized rifle brigades, one

light infantry battalion, one engineer battalion, and one

peacekeeping company. The navy has 560 sailors (280

conscripts) manning several coast guard vessels. The air

force has 800 airmen operating 27 aircraft and 12

helicopters.30 Equipment is of Soviet origin and old.

Interoperability with NATO would be poor.

Macedonia has an active force of 16,000 soldiers, of

which 8,000 are conscripts (9-month service obligation).

The active force structure consists of 2 brigades and a border

guard brigade. The air force has 700 airmen operating 10

aircraft and 4 helicopters. The equipment is a mixture of

15
quite old Soviet origin and U.S. equipment.31 Interoperability with NATO would be poor.

The Romanian active army has 106,000 active soldiers,

including 71,000 conscripts (12-month service obligation).

The active force structure has about 18 mechanized infantry

brigades, 7 armor brigades, 7 mountain brigades, 1 guards

brigade, 1 engineer regiment, and several air defense and

artillery brigades. The navy comprises 20,800 (12,600

conscripts) with 1 submarine, 1 destroyer, 6 frigates, and

several coast guard vessels. Moreover, it has 10,200 marine

infantry. The air force has 43,500 airmen (25,000

conscripts). It possesses 323 combat aircraft and 16 attack

helicopters with pilots having an average of 40 flying hours

per year. Two airborne brigades also belong to the air force.

Much of the equipment is Soviet made and very old. 32

Interoperability with NATO would be poor.

Slovakia has an active army of 23,800 soldiers, of which

13,600 are conscripts (12-month service obligation). The

active force structure has an armor brigade, a mechanized

infantry brigade, an artillery brigade, and a rapid reaction

battalion. The air force comprises 11,500 airmen with 84

combat aircraft and 19 attack helicopters. Pilot training

averages 45 flying hours per year. All the equipment is

Soviet vintage and would have poor interoperability with

NATO.33

Slovenia’s active army contains 9,000 soldiers, of which

4,000 to 5,000 are conscripts (7-month service obligation).

The active force structure comprises seven infantry

battalions, two independent mechanized battalions, one

Special Forces brigade, a surface-to-air missile brigade, an

aviation brigade (eight armed helicopters), and an artillery

battalion. All equipment is a mixture of Soviet and

Yugoslavian production and would have poor interoperability with NATO.34

Conscription makes up 50 percent or more of the

candidate nation armed forces. The retention of

conscription is likely to remain in the near term because of

16
the expense associated with professional armies.

Depending on the laws regarding the deployment of

conscripts, the actual size of a deploying force for crisis

response may be a mere pittance.

The size of the armed forces, especially for Article 5

missions, is a serious issue regarding integration into a

battle. For high tempo combat operations, force size

contributions below a brigade are of dubious value since

they are difficult to integrate into larger maneuver units

capable of conducting combat tasks. A national contribution of a combat battalion or company would need to be

integrated into a brigade or division in order to generate the

needed combat power for successful combat operations. If

such small units have no opportunity to conduct extensive,

collective training with their host brigades prior to a

military operation, they will lack the necessary skills to

accomplish assigned missions. Since a contribution of a

brigade-sized force is beyond the capabilities of smaller

members, NATO must address how to integrate smaller

combat units into its structure.

Countries with Soviet equipment, especially aircraft,

would have severe difficulties operating with NATO.

Differences in communications, avionics, and computerization would hamper interoperability. Soviet-made aircraft

would not participate in a NATO air campaign because of

incompatibilities and the dangers of fratricide. Soviet

armored vehicles, particularly the older models, would

create more confusion that contribution. The inventories of

all the MAP countries consist of Soviet T55 and T72 tanks as

well as BTR and BMP armored personnel carriers, which

either need to be scrapped or upgraded to NATO standards.

Upgrading Soviet vehicles to NATO standards may create

fresh problems, given the plethora of Soviet exports during

the Cold War to potential adversaries. Given the fog of war

in conflicts, NATO members would have problems

distinguishing friend from foe and risk fratricide. In the

final analysis, it is cheaper and easier simply to invest in

western equipment and weapons.

17
The Necessary Restructuring.

Clearly, the European contribution to NATO is

deteriorating. Without an imminent threat, NATO’s

European partners are unlikely to devote a greater part of

their GDP to defense. Because power projection is a stated

task of crisis management missions and because the

European allies are unwilling or unable to improve these

capabilities, NATO must make some innovative reforms.

Otherwise, the United States will continue to bear the lion’s

share of every conflict and operation.

The Integrated Multinational Division and the Impact

on New Members. The Alliance must adopt a force structure

that allows the assimilation of new members into the

integrated military structure. The Cold War approach of

separate national divisions within the Alliance was

sufficient under pure collective defense, but, with the

addition of collective security tasks, interoperability and

defense budget austerity assume greater prominence.

The Alliance needs to take the bold step and transform

its divisions into IMDs. Such an initiative allows the

member states to downsize their aggregate force

contribution without reducing their commitment to the

Alliance. Additionally, such divisions permit assured and

swift integration and interoperability of new members.

The IMD reconciles the deficiencies associated with

multinational units. As Thomas-Durell Young correctly

points out, “multinational land formations are, by their very

nature, less efficient and less effective than a similar pure

national formation. Differences in language, weapon

systems, organization, logistics, and procedures, all hinder

the operation of multinational formations.”35 Such friction

occurs because multinational units rarely operate as an

integrated force until thrown together for a crisis. The IMD

model mitigates this friction by integrating allies at a much

lower level and co-locating all the division subordinate

units.

18
As a matter of illustration, transforming a U.S. division

into an IMD is a relatively easy process. Retaining its

divisional headquarters, a maneuver brigade, and an

aviation brigade, the U.S. IMD allocates unit assignments

according to new members’ contributive capabilities and

size (Figure 1). In this manner, new members can

specialize, that is, modernize selected units instead of

attempting to modernize their entire armed forces

immediately. Because smaller countries can only

contribute small forces (ranging in size from a company to

brigade), these units would make a greater contribution as

an integral part of a division. Integrating smaller units into

an IMD is much more manageable than clustering a

multinational corps with dozens of discrete, small units.

Each unit retains its existing organizational structure since

its soldiers are accustomed to it, and it is unlikely to have a

negative impact on military operations. Contributing

members retain their national integrity through their units

19

Figure 1. Idealized Integrated Multination Division.

and are responsible for personnel and equipment

requirements. Participating nations would also contribute

personnel to the division headquarters, combat support,

and combat service support units.
The question of sovereignty is a crucial issue. No nation

likes the idea of another country commanding its forces.

“Nations have been loath to give up command authorities

over land forces to foreign commanders out of fear that, inter

alia, they will be ‘fragmented’ or improperly commanded.”36

Given the size of each unit contribution, fragmentation is

not an issue. The issue of command authority is a matter of

trust, which resolves itself after a period of training and

familiarization with the division. In matters of training, the

unit commander retains full responsibility. Naturally, he

submits his training plan to division for final review and

approval, but this administrative function does not impinge

on his own command authority. For contributing members

the advantages are self-evident—yielding a modicum of

sovereignty in exchange for assured contributions to the

Alliance.

The IMD provides the opportunity for all members to

demonstrate their value to the Alliance. It may seem a

small matter, but competitive activities, such as tank and

artillery gunnery, marksmanship matches, and Best

Ranger competition, as well as the participation in the

Expert Infantryman Badge and Expert Medical Badge

tests, greatly enhance individual and unit pride and esprit

de corps. Working towards tangible goals and being

rewarded for them probably do more to engender NATO

cohesion than any other factor. The IMD is the best vehicle

for building this sense of belongingness.

To improve equipment interoperability, NATO allies

may lease or sell equipment to new members. Such an

approach to integration is much cheaper than expecting

new members to develop and produce needed equipment on

their own. For its own IMD, the United States can offer to

lease or sell existing division organic equipment that is

already in Europe. Regardless, each contributing member

state can focus its modernization to key units initially and

modernize the rest of its armed forces over time. If the

contributor accepts the U.S. sell/lease program, the supply

channels are strictly American. If not, the supply channels

20
emanate from the contributing country. Each member state

assigns maintenance and supply troops to the combat

service support brigade. In this manner, member countries

become accustomed to U.S. maintenance, supply, and

reporting procedures. The same approach holds true for the

rest of the Alliance.

To improve procedural interoperability, participation in

training activities, such as weapons qualification,

individual and collective training, field exercises, and

planning processes, expose new members to NATO’s

military methods and procedures, enhancing the

integration process immensely. The new NATO members

are not thoroughly familiar with the concepts of Task,

Conditions, and Standards, the Mission Essential Task

Listing, Troop Leading Procedures, the five-paragraph

Operations Order, the Deliberate Decision-Making Process,

and so forth. Most of these concepts require some mentoring

because they are Western in design and a little arcane,

particularly for the military cultures steeped in Soviet

doctrine. Relying solely on classroom instruction to teach

NATO-compatible procedures and practices is not sufficient

because the concepts require frequent application in

training. Without practice and personal assistance, new

members may give up in frustration and simply go through

the motions. Under the tutelage of their NATO hosts, they

can focus on these concepts and procedures, resolve issues

as they arise, and assimilate them.

One of the greatest obstacles for the armed forces of new

members is learning English. Language immersion is the

most effective and quickest way for non-English speakers to

gain proficiency. Use of existing host nation facilities,

barracks, and housing, as well as access to television and

radio programs (British Broad Cast, Armed Forces

Network, etc.), would expose foreign national soldiers and

their families to English and Western culture. Daily

contacts with host nation soldiers and families also expose

new members to Western democratic values. Since the

NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) pays for the

21
infrastructure, opening existing casernes to new members

would actually lower expenses. Immediate use of existing

barracks, training areas, ranges, housing, and facilities

provide powerful incentives for new member states. It is

highly unlikely that any country would pass up such an

opportunity. Furthermore, the influence of the Western

armed forces will slowly permeate the contributing nations

as soldiers rotate through the IMD.

Admittedly, some cultural differences merit mention.

For instance, some contributing nations may permit female

soldiers in combat units or gays in the military. Such issues

remain within the purview of the relevant commander, and

the host nation headquarters should accommodate the

cultural differences without derailing the integrated

concept.

The IMDs permit greater participation in collective

defense and the new crisis response missions. Integrated

membership negates the ad hoc character of contingency

missions and allows all members, regardless of their size, to

participate more effectively and efficiently. In this manner,

instead of the few shouldering the burden of security,

responsibility is evenly distributed throughout the Alliance.

Although the initial readiness of the IMD will be low,

readiness will increase rapidly with the series of phased,

train-up activities, culminating in certification. As with any

initiative, the devil is in the details, but the U.S. Army can

meet these challenges and truly integrate new members

into the Alliance. Once this initiative is proven, other

NATO countries can elect to adopt the IMD structure with

new and old members, producing thoroughly modern and

cohesive units at less cost and manpower.

The Impact on the Rest of the Alliance. The IMD could

provide crucial opportunities for all Alliance members.

Given the inadequate military spending expenditures,

manpower and technology deficiencies, and lowered

readiness, the IMD could permit allies to consolidate their

scarce military resources. Countries could equip their

22
designated IMD units with the most modern and lighter

equipment and weapon systems and fill the ranks with

professional soldiers vice conscripts. NATO’s Defense

Requirements Review, which determines the number of

divisions based on mission needs, will need to adjust the

numbers if the IMD concept is adopted.

The ARRC already has a number of standard,

multinational divisions, so the framework for a transition to

the IMD exists. The 10 divisions of the ARRC are sufficient

to conduct crisis management and immediate collective

defense. The ARRC would comprise high readiness land

forces, meaning they receive priority in manpower, funding,

and modernization. To be truly effective though, the

subordinate units of each IMD must be physically

consolidated under a designated headquarters. The host

country, with funding from the NSIP, would be responsible

for implementing the infrastructure upgrades for air and

sea ports of debarkation. The existing national

headquarters should remain in order to minimize turmoil.

Multinational Division (South) remains unspecified, but

France is well-positioned to stand it up if it is so disposed,

and the facilities in southern France are sufficient to

support it. The U.S. 173d Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy

is logically positioned fill out the 3d Italian Infantry

Division (Mechanized) (Table 3).37

A U.S. Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) can

comprise the immediate reaction force of the ARRC,

permitting rapid deployment of the most modern force and

underscoring America’s continued commitment to the

Alliance. Its stationing near Ramstein Air Base in

Germany (perhaps nearby Baumholder) ensures rapid

deployment.

23
The ARRC needs a Special Forces Group (SFG)

comprising teams from all Alliance members in order to

ensure early engagement into potential crisis regions. The

amount of expertise and knowledge that the various

member states’ special forces possess makes the ARRC SFG

indispensable. The former U.S. Special Forces caserne at

Bad Tolz, Germany, would be a perfect location for training.

The ARRC has an established CSS capability (actually

the only NATO corps CSS), which all members can augment

without effort or added expense.38 Given his unique

position, the ARRC commander would need an “Integrated

Directing and Control Authority” similar to the authority

granted to the commanding general of the I

German/Netherlands Corps. This authority is needed to

assure that the forces are trained according to task,

conditions, and standards. Upon alert, the TOA

automatically falls to the ARRC commander in order to

permit proper command and control.39 The command of the

ARRC rotates among the allies, demonstrating not only

shared contributions but also shared authority. In this

24

Table 3. ARRC Integrated Multinational Divisions.
matter, all the Allies have a chance to be chiefs instead of

indians.

Streamlining NATO’s Subordinate Corps. The divisions

of the lower readiness forces operate with reduced readiness

without a significant impact on the effectiveness of the

Alliance. Other than mobilization for a major war,

activation of the lower readiness forces is predicated on the

augmentation or rotation of deployed ARRC divisions in a

crisis region. Pragmatically, establishing higher and lower

readiness forces permits the European allies to focus assets

on their designated IMD units. The economic savings in

essential areas—lower manpower requirements, fewer

units to maintain, and fewer weapons and equipment to

field—permit a greater focus on technological innovations.

Although fewer divisions represent a calculated risk, the

smaller, integrated ARRC permits the Europeans to resolve

the DCI deficiencies at less cost, manpower, and resources.

Despite the reliance on the ARRC for most missions, the

Alliance will still need to maintain at least two additional

corps headquarters (EUROCORPS and EUROFOR) for

extended peace support operations. These additional

command and control headquarters are crucial to ensure

key corps staff, communications, and intelligence

personnel, among others, are not overdeployed. Sustaining

a peace support operation requires that personnel and

equipment have a chance to recover; otherwise the system

begins to break down. These headquarters require the most

modern and robust command and control systems in order

to communicate to the parent headquarters and host

nations, as well as the forward deployed subordinate units.

Command and control cannot be an ad hoc affair with

obsolete systems.

Conclusion.

Establishing IMDs allows faster assimilation of new

members as well as increasing interoperability within

NATO. The opportunity to buy or lease western equipment

25
allows new members to invest more money into their

economies, which is an important goal for emerging market

economies. Designating a few units for the IMD allows new

countries to specialize and modernize without exorbitant

defense budgets. Integration precludes the need of

individual nations establishing separate logistical units in

support of contingency missions. New members will acquire

greater proficiency of English through immersion. By

frequent participation in collective training, new members

gain a greater appreciation for NATO training, planning,

maintenance, and supply procedures. Moreover, soldiers

and their families gain a greater understanding of Western

democratic values and culture, which in turn will find its

way to the home country, forging greater bonds.

If the Alliance does not adopt the IMD concept, NATO

will not realize its full potential as a cohesive force.

Enlargement will add to the collection of members, but the

contributions of individual members will be limited.

Heretofore, the burden of military operations rested on a

few members. The current structure does not allow all

members to contribute to every operation because the

Alliance cannot integrate them fully. The IMD paradigm

allows integration of even the smallest members and

permits greater economy in military spending. Under this

structure, members may be able to lower their military

spending to 1.5 percent of their GDP without a drop in

capabilities.

Recommendations.

The United States can improve its strategic position and

cohesion by pursuing the following:

• Convert the two U.S. divisions in Europe into IMDs in

order to assist in the assimilation of new members

into the Alliance.

26
• Encourage other NATO members to adopt this model

in order to make more effective use of their military

spending and resources.

• Establish the ARRC as NATO’s higher readiness

force for all missions and maintain the EUROCORPS

and EUROFOR corps headquarters, sufficiently

staffed and equipped with the most modern and

robust command and control systems. Rotate the

command of the ARRC among the contributing

members.

• Expand the existing ARRC CS and CSS base into an

Area Support Group (ASG) equivalent to provide

assured logistics during training and deployments.

The ASG must be sufficiently large to support

multiple rotations during extended PSO.

NATO cannot afford to rest on its laurels and transform

the Alliance into a European country club. NATO embodies

U.S. European policy at 30 percent of the cost to the United

States. The Alliance provides hope to nonmembers and

security for members. The restructuring to IMDs ensures

that NATO remains relevant, resolves many of the current

command authority and training issues and eliminates the

need for superfluous and potentially competing European

military security initiatives. The emerging strategic

environment demands greater efficiency and cooperation

among the Alliance members, and the integrated

multinational division structure meets these challenges.

ENDNOTES

1. Dr. Andrew Dorman, European Adaptation to Expeditionary

Warfare: Implications for the United States Army, Washington: Joint

Services Command and Staff College, Defense Studies Department,

publication pending, p. 8.

2. Thomas S. Szayna, “NATO Enlargement: Forecasting the ‘Who’

and ‘When’,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 2001, Vol.

VII, Issue 3, p. 44. Hereafter referred to as Szayna, “Forecasting.”

27
3. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, Integrating New Allies Into

NATO, Washington: Congressional Budget Office, Internet

http://www.cbo.gov, Chapter 2, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as Lis,

Integrating. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, NATO Burdensharing

After Enlargement, Washington: Congressional Budget Office, August

2001, Internet, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index-2976&

sequence=0&from=0, Chapter 1, p. 14. Hereafter referred to as Lis,

Burdensharing. Hungary is projected to increase its expenditure to 1.8

percent by 2001.

4. Szayna, Forecasting, pp. 44-45. Lis, Integrating, chapter 2, p. 1.

5. Loren Thompson, “New Century, Old Question: Can Europe Keep

Up?” Sea Power Magazine, January 2000, Internet, http://www.

lexingtoninstitiute.org/defense/newcent.htm, pp. 4-5. John G. McGinn

and Timothy Liston, “Beyond the Rhetoric and Acronyms: The Reality of

European Military Capabilities,” National Security Studies Quarterly,

Vol. VII, Issue 1, Winter 2001, pp. 78, 82-83.

6. Dorman, p. 8.

7. McGinn, p. 87; Dorman, pp. 10-11.

8. Ibid, p. 92.

9. Defense Capabilities Initiative, NATO Press Release, April 25,

1999, Internet, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm, p.

1.

10. Driving Capability Transformations, SACLANT/NATO Themes

2000, Internet, http://www.saclant.nato.int/pio/FACTS/

themes00.htm, p. 11. Hereafter referred to as Transformations.

11. Ibid, p. 11. The salient shortfalls are as follows:

• Deployable support units and capabilities for land, maritime, and

air forces;

• Maritime communications systems;

• Guaranteed availability of strategic sea and airlift for rapid

deployment of forces, particularly for non-Article 5 operations;

and,

• Specialized capabilities such as air-to-air refueling, tankers,

surveillance and reconnaissance assets, Theater Ballistic Missile

Defense, NBC protection and protection capabilities.

28
12. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, April 24, 1999, Internet,

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm, paras. 10 and 12.

Hereafter referred to as Concept.

13. John J. Lis and Zachary Selden, NATO Burdensharing After

Enlargement, Washington: Congressional Budget Office, August 2001,

Internet, http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index-2976&

sequence=0&from=0, Chapter 1, p. 7. McGinn, pp. 84-85. Dorman, p. 9.

The United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, and Belgium have

professional armies; Germany, Italy, and Spain have partial

conscription; Sweden and Norway have retained conscription.

14. USNI military database, Internet, http://www.periscope.

ucg.com/nations/nato/index.html. Portugal’s conscription ranges

from 4 to 8 months in the army and 4 to 18 months in the other services.

Germany has opted for partial conscription, meaning that citizens serve

for 9 months as conscripts and then receive the increased benefits of a

volunteer army if they decide to remain. Germany permits a limited

number of conscripts to volunteer to extend their service to 23 months in

order to participate in peace support operations.

15. Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Formations and

NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures, Carlisle Barracks: U.S.

Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, December 1997, p. 7.

Hereafter referred to as Young, MLF and NATO.

16. Thomas-Durell Young, Reforming NATO’s Military Structures:

The Long-Term Study and Its Implications for Land Forces, Carlisle

Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 15,

1998, p. 18. Hereafter referred to as Young, Reforming NATO.

17. Young, MLF and NATO; Young, Reforming NATO;

Thomas-Durell Young, Multinational Land Forces and the NATO Force

Structure Review, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College: Strategic

Studies Institute, June 2000. Hereafter referred to as Young, MLF and

NATO Force Structure.

18. Young, MLF and NATO Force Structure, pp. 6-9, 11-12; Young,

MLF and NATO, pp. 13-14.

19. Young, MLF and NATO Force Structure, p. 10.

20. Department of State, The Enlargement of NATO: Why Adding

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO Strengthens

American National Security, Washington: U.S. Department of State,

1998, p. 14.

29
21. Lis, Integrating, Summary, p. 3, Chapter 3, pp. 1-2; Wojciech

Luczak, “Polish Land Forces Trimming into 21st Century,” Military

Technology, Vol. 25, Issue 8, August 2001, pp. 98-103; Anonymous, “The

Polish Armed Force Restructuring and Modernization Plan

(2001-2006),” NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, Monch Media,

Inc, 2001, pp. 152-153.

22. Lis, Integrating, Summary, p. 4, Chapter 2, p. 4, Chapter 3, pp.

2-3 and 8; Laszlo Szabo and Gyula Bene, “On the Way to a Modern

Force: The Restructuring Program of the Hungarian Defense Forces,”

NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, Monch Media, Inc, 2001, pp.

148-150; Hungary; Internet http://www.periscope.ucg.com/nations/

nato/hungary/index.html.

23. Lis, Integrating, Summary, p. 4, Chapter 3, pp. 3-4; Jeffrey

Ulbrich, “Czech Military a Long March From Being a Full Contributor

to NATO,” The Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2001, p. A8.

24. Lis, Integrating, Chapter 1, pp. 2-3, Chapter 3, pp. 1-4; Ulbrich,

p. A8; Szabo and Bene, p. 149.

25. Szayna, Forecasting, pp. 44-45. The figures differ from Szayna’s

original calculations because he used older data files, but the

conclusions remain valid.

26. The Military Balance 2000-2001, London: Oxford University

Press, October 2000, p. 102. Hereafter referred to as World Balance;

Internet http://www.periscope.ucg.com/nations/nato/ albania/

index.html.

27. Ibid, pp. 89-90.

28. Ibid, p. 93.

29. Ibid, p. 97.

30. Ibid, p. 98.

31. Ibid, pp. 98-99.

32. Ibid, pp. 100-101.

33. Ibid, p. 102.

34. Ibid, p. 102.

35. Young, MLF and NATO Force Structure, p. 9.

30
36. Ibid. (Emphasis in original.)

37. Young, MLF and NATO, pp 25-38 and 71-80. Dr. Young

provides excellent details on NATO’s multinational land formations,

especially the ARRC.

38. Ibid, p. 72.

39. Thomas-Durell Young, “Multinational Land Forces and the

NATO Force Structure Review,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, Issue 4,

August 2000, pp. 45-52. Dr. Young identifies lack of command authority

and transfer of authority as crucial deficiencies within NATO.

Additionally, the ARRC and MND(C) are the only multinational units

with declared CSS formations. Hence, the ARRC is likely the best

structure to integrate the IMD concept.

31
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell