ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 21st CENTURY

THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

AND POST-MODERN WARFARE

Steven Metz

April 2000
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ISBN 1-58487-018-4

ii
Foreword ........................

Summary .......................

Introduction ......................

Part I:

Strategic Context....................

Part II:

Images of Future War ................

Part III:

The Mark of Success for Future Militaries .....

Part IV:

Conclusion and Recommendations ..........

Endnotes .......................

About the Author ................... 

iii
Within the past decade, the U.S. military has impleme

number of programs to assess the changes underway in the 

security environment and in the nature of warfare. D

leaders and thinkers have concluded that revolutionary ch

taking place and, if the United States develops appro

technology, warfighting concepts, and military organizat

can master or control this change, thus augmenting Am

security.

In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz, who was one 

earliest analysts of the strategic dimension of the revolu

military affairs, suggests that official thinking within th

military may be too narrow. The information revoluti

contends, will have far-reaching strategic effects

transformation it brings will not only be technologica

political, social, ethical and strategic as well.

As he explores the impact that the information revo

may have on the conduct of armed conflict, Dr. Metz introd

number of ideas which need further analysis, includi

potential for the emergence of nontraditional, netw

enemies; multidimensional asymmetry; the privatizat

security; and the potential impact of technologies like ro

nonlethality, and nanotechnology. He concludes w

asessment of the features likely to characterize succ

militaries in the 21st century.

Because it deals with the future, this study is conceptu

speculative. But the issues and linkages it raises are d

relevant to today’s strategic thinkers and leaders. The St

Studies Institute is pleased to offer it as a contribution to 

over the nature of the challenges that the U.S. military will 

coming decades.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Interim Director

Strategic Studies Institute

v
INTRODUCTION

The information revolution is increasing inte

nectedness and escalating the pace of change in n

every dimension of life. By examining the ongoing ch

in the nature of armed conflict and thinking expans

looking for wider implications and relationships

exploring cross-cutting connections between techn

ethics, social trends, politics, and strategy, the archite

the future U.S. military can increase the chanc

ultimate success.

PART I: STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Interconnectedness and Globalization.

One of the most important changes associated wi

information revolution is a dramatic increase i

interconnectedness of people around the world. Alm

dimension of modern life has been untouched b

information revolution. In the realm of security

information revolution brings both good news an

news, speeding the accumulation of information 

slowing the pace of decisionmaking.

The information revolution has also sped up the p

change in all aspects of life. Rapid change alway

winners and losers. Much of the violence that will ex

the early 21st century will originate from the losers 

change underway today.

Organizational Change.

The information revolution is altering the sha

economic and political organizations. Today, the succ

commercial firm is one with a global perspective, a w

vii
project teams or work groups rather than hierarch

bureaucracies. This phenomenon is migrating t

political world as well. Clinging to old practice

organizations entails escalating costs and risk

governments as much as for corporations. At the sam

that interconnectedness undercuts the viabil

authoritarianism by allowing repressed citize

communicate, organize, and mobilize, it also p

handcuffs on elected governments. This reflects an hi

deconcentration of political, economic, and ethical po

The information revolution is both a force for sta

and for instability. On the positive side, it complicat

task of old-style repression and facilitates the develop

of grass roots civil society. But the information revo

also allows organizations intent on instability or viole

form alliances, thus making the world more dang

Some of the most complex struggles of the 21st centu

pit polyglot networks against states. Hierarchie

bureaucracies face serious disadvantages when 

against unscrupulous, flexible, adaptable enemies.

The Changing Nature of Armed Conflict.

The U.S. Department of Defense and the mi

services hold that speed, knowledge, and precisio

minimize casualties and lead to the rapid resolution of 

thus minimizing the problems associated wit

challenges to the political utility of force. States with 

intellectual and financial resources than the United S

will not have the luxury of using technology to 

strategic problems. Whether the United States c

deterred from intervention by weapons of mass destru

or terrorism is one of the central questions for the f

global security environment.

viii
Interconnectedness, the dispersion of powe

knowledge that flows from the information revolution

the eroding legitimacy of armed force are leading tow

multidimensional trend toward privatization withi

realms of security and armed conflict. As nations seek 

to attain a surge capacity without the expense of susta

a large, peacetime military, and as they face diffic

recruiting from their own populations, contracting w

an attractive option for filling the ranks. Corporate ar

navies, air forces, and intelligence services may be 

actors in 21st century armed conflict. This will open 

realms of strategy and policy.

Asymmetry.

States which decide to commit aggression in co

decades will know that if the United States and the 

community decide to counter the aggression, they can

qualitative gap between the U.S. military and all oth

wide and growing. This leaves aggressors two options

can pursue indirect or camouflaged aggression, or the

attempt to deter or counter American interve

asymmetrically. Asymmetry is a characteristic of peri

rapid change, particularly revolutionary ones. In geol

history, there have been times when many new s

emerged. Most proved unable to survive, leading t

periods with less diversity. Military history follow

same pattern: periods of great diversity follow peri

relative homogeneity. The current era is one of dive

For the period of diversity, asymmetry will be a dom

characteristic of armed conflict.

Combatants.

In the opening half of the 21st century, the types of 

and nonstate combatants which have characterized r

armed conflict will continue to exist, but they are likely 

ix
first post-modern state combatant, attaining g

amplified speed and precision by the integrati

information technology and development of a syst

systems which links together methods for t

acquisition, strikes, maneuver, planning, communic

and supply. Its organization will be less rigidly hierar

than that of modern state combatants. The final ty

combatants in 21st century armed conflict are likely 

post-modern nonstate ones. These will consist of 

networks of a range of nonstate organizations, 

political or ideological in orientation, others seeking pr

PART II: IMAGES OF FUTURE WAR

The Official View.

Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 

century are likely to see some combination of three mo

warfare: formal war, informal war, and gray area 

Formal war pits state militaries against other 

militaries. It has been the focus of most futures-ori

thinking within the U.S. military and Departme

Defense. The official vision of future war reflects the 

that “information superiority” will be the lifeblood 

post-modern military and thus the key to battl

success. 

Futures-oriented thinking deals with force develop

which is a responsibility of the services. In fact, most 

futures thinking within the U.S. military is still done 

services. So far, the Army’s program is the most elabor

has formulated a vision that is highly innovative 

approach to technology, organization, and leadershi

conservative in its assumptions about the nature of wa

and the purposes of American military power. The U.

Force’s vision of future war is also characterized 

combination of creativity and conservatism. The Ma

are looking at fairly radical changes in tactica

x
doctrine. The Navy’s view of future war is based 

“revolution in strike warfare” using existing 

platforms with better systems of target acquis

intelligence, and guidance.

The official American view of the future consis

treats technology, particularly information technology

force multiplier rather than as a locomotiv

revolutionary transformation. With the exception of a

three new tasks for the U.S. military—space opera

information warfare, and homeland protection—the o

vision anticipates few if any strategic shifts.

Asymmetry Again.

Asymmetry has become a central concept in o

American thinking about future warfare. The question 

becomes: what forms of asymmetry will be most com

and, more importantly, most problematic for the U

States? Enemies using precision munitions or weap

mass destruction to complicate deployment into a thea

operations could pose a serious challenge to some 

most basic tenets of American strategy. A cou

deployment strategy is only one of several asymm

approaches that future enemies may attempt. They 

also resort to terrorism, either in conjunction w

counterdeployment strategy or in lieu of it. Of all for

asymmetry, urban warfare may be the most proble

and the most likely. Two types of technology, though, 

help alleviate some of the challenges posed by 

operations: nonlethal weapons and robotics.

Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 

century will see both symmetric formal war pittin

modern states, and asymmetric formal war pitt

post-modern military against a modern one. It remain

seen whether another post-modern military will eme

challenge the United States or whether, as Ame

strategic thinking posits, the post-modern U.S. militar

xi
modern militaries.

Informal War.

Informal war is armed conflict where at least one 

antagonists is a nonstate entity such as an insurgent 

or ethnic militia. Twenty-first century informal war w

based on some combination of ethnicity, race, region

economics, personality, and ideology. Informal war wil

be more common and more strategically significant. Co

in future informal war is likely to remain “hands on,” p

the combatants in close combat. Warriors will be 

spersed among noncombatants, using them as shield

bargaining chips. At times, refugee disasters w

deliberately stoked and sustained to attract ou

attention and intervention. Unlike formal war, inf

war will remain dirty and bloody.

Some types of informal war will be compara

simple. Counterinsurgency, which uses military for

attain not only the short-term restoration of order bu

ultimate resolution of the conflict that led to disorder 

first place, is a different and more difficult matter. Th

no doctrine or strategy for dealing with netw

opponents, be they existing criminal cartels or f

insurgents. To be successful against future insurgent

U.S. military will need better intelligence, better 

protection, and greater precision at the tactica

strategic levels. In part, these things require 

organizational methods. Emerging technology also 

promise. Again, nonlethal weapons and robotics may 

the most vital.

Gray Area War.

Gray area phenomena combine elements of tradi

warfighting with those of organized crime. Today, gra

threats are increasing in strategic significance. Since 

area war overlaps and falls in between traditional na

xii
often scramble to find the appropriate security struct

counter it. As the debate within the United States ov

use of the military to counter gray area enemies inten

in coming years, creation of an American nat

gendarmerie should be considered. It could form it

alliances with similar security forces around the worl

operate more effectively against gray area enemies 

interconnected security environment and globa

economy. 

Strategic Information Warfare.

Future war may see attacks via computer vi

worms, logic bombs, and trojan horses rather than bu

bombs, and missiles. Information technology might pr

a politically usable way to damage an enemy’s natio

commercial infrastructure badly enough to attain v

without having to first defeat fielded military forces.

Today strategic information warfare remains sim

concept or theory. The technology to wage it does not 

But until it is proven ineffective, states and nonstate 

which have the capacity to attempt it probably will, do

because it appears potentially effective and less risky 

other forms of armed conflict.

Cyberattacks might erode the traditional adva

large and rich states hold in armed conflict. Private en

might be able to match state armed forces. As one 

world’s most “wired” nations, strategic information wa

could be particularly problematic for the United S

forcing policymakers and military strategists to exa

some of their most basic beliefs about warfightin

national security.

Technological Transformation.

New technologies or new combinations of techn

have the potential to alter not only tactics and opera

xiii
allow military planners to select which individu

physical object in a building is to be destroyed.

Coming decades are likely to see the proliferat

robots around the world and in many walks of life. As 

the most avid customers of new technology, thi

certainly affect the American military. Initially, the 

function of military robots will be to replace huma

particularly dangerous or tedious functions. The 

breakthrough and decision point will come when 

advance to the point that they have the potential for co

use. 

While initial thinking about robotics concentrat

miniaturization and the integration of networks of 

robots with relatively limited functions, partially or

robots may prove nearly as useful. Beyond technol

obstacles, the potential for effective battlefield robots 

a whole series of strategic, operations, and ethical i

particularly when or if robots change from being lift

killers. 

Other emerging technologies could prove eq

revolutionary. One example is what can be c

“psychotechnology.” Future military commanders 

have the technology to alter the beliefs, perceptions

feelings of enemies. Any developments in this 

warrant very close scrutiny. Barring some sort of 

fundamental change in the global security environ

they should be eschewed.

PART III: THE MARK OF SUCCESS FOR FUTU

MILITARIES

Foundation.

Even in revolutionary times, continuity outw

change. This holds true for the current revoluti

military affairs. War will always involve a dangerou

dynamic relationship among passion, hatred, re

xiv
and warriors will survive any real or apparent chan

the nature of armed conflict. War is and will be distinc

other types of human activity. Largely because of 

future warriors, at least in democracies like the U

States, will continue to be bound by an ethos stressing 

honor, sacrifice, and the highest ethical standards.

Speed.

One of the most important determinants of succe

21st century militaries will be the extent to which th

faster than their opponents. Tactical and operational 

comes from information technology—the “digit

force—and appropriate doctrine and training. Str

speed will be equally important as a determinant of su

in future armed conflict. For nations that unde

long-range power projection, strategic speed inc

mobility into and within a theater of military opera

Strategic speed also entails faster decisionmaking. O

the core dilemmas the United States is likely to f

having a military that can deploy and operate at light

speed, while strategic and political decisionmaking rem

a time-consuming process of consensus building.

Speed also has an even broader, “meta-stra

meaning. The militaries which meet with the gr

success in future armed conflict will be those whic

undertake rapid organizational and conceptual adapt

Successful state militaries must institutionalize proce

for what might be called “strategic entrepreneurship”

ability to rapidly identify and understand signi

changes in the strategic environment and form appro

organizations and concepts.

Precision.

So far thinking on the revolution in military affai

focused on what might be called physical precision

ability to hit targets with great accuracy from 

xv
strategists and commanders must come to think in te

psychological precision as well: shaping a mi

operation so as to attain the desired attitudes, belief

perceptions on the part of both the enemy and 

observers, whether noncombatants in the area of opera

or global audiences.

Precision has a strategic component which is some

overlooked. Strategic precision entails shaping a milit

that it best reflects its nation’s strategic situation, incl

strategic culture, level of technological developmen

most significant threats. For the U.S. military, this e

finding the appropriate balance among capabilities t

with formal war, informal war, and gray area war. I

entails reaching a degree of privatization which maxi

efficiency without creating unacceptable risks. In atta

strategic precision, past success can be a hindrance. V

limits the urge to adapt and innovate. For the U

States, avoiding a victory-induced slumber will be a ke

toward a post-modern military.

Finding and Hiding.

One of the most crucial dynamics of future armed co

will be the struggle between finding and hiding. Succ

militaries will be those better at finding their enemies 

their enemies are at finding them. Within the U

States, the emphasis has been on the offensive part o

equation—the finding. Hiding, though, warrants 

attention. Future military strategists must rebuild 

understanding of deception and hiding, working wit

information technology that allows things like mor

and sophisticated spoofing (including things 

holographic soldiers, tanks, planes, and so forth

particular, the notions of operational and stra

deception must be revisited.

xvi
The most successful future militaries will be thos

undertake a “blank slate” reevaluation of their most 

concepts and organizational precepts. Developing h

blends of hierarchical structures with networks, 

components with private, and humans with machine

be particularly important. Reevaluating career paths 

military also might be necessary. The trend i

commercial world has been toward a blurring be

management and staff. If this is extrapolated t

military, it might be necessary to consider whethe

division of a service into enlisted personne

commissioned officers makes sense in the 21st centu

addition, the organization of militaries into land, sea

air services needs assessed. Perhaps it would make 

sense to organize them into components focused 

specific type of armed conflict—one for formal war, o

informal, and one for gray area war. Alternat

post-modern militaries must consider whether a 

service is needed for new operating environments. 

militaries able to let go of old organizational pattern

embrace, even master new ones will be the most lik

succeed in future armed conflict.

Adjusting Civil-Military Relations.

The current health of American civil-military rel

is based on the perception that: (1) the military has a 

job to do in defending the nation against external enem

does so very competently, and should receive ade

resources to do so; (2) the effectiveness of the U.S. mi

does not threaten domestic civil rights or pol

institutions; and, (3) the U.S. military represents the b

traditional American values. Changes in any of these 

components could degrade civil-military relations.

The U.S. military must do its part to help for

problems with civil-military relations. Foremost, it 

assure that any capabilities or methods it develops r

xvii
should eschew operational concepts that call fo

preemptive use of force on the part of the United Sta

for actions that would indiscriminately 

noncombatants. And, unless circumstances change in 

fundamental way, the military should eschew develop

of dangerous new technologies like psychotechnology 

run counter to American values like personal privac

civil rights.

Controlling for Asymmetry.

Since asymmetric conflict will be common in the op

decades of the 21st century, finding ways to res

transcend it will be one of the determinants of succe

militaries and other organizations that participa

armed conflict. For the United States, what might be 

an asymmetry of time is likely to be particu

problematic. Today, long wars are simply consi

inconceivable in American planning While every

suggests that the future United States (just like the cu

one) would prefer short wars, failing to plan for protr

conflict increases the chances it will occur. Given 

greater attention should be given to protracted war 

various wargames, seminars, and simulations that th

military uses to think about future armed conflict.

Adapting to Technological Shifts.

The ability to accept and capitalize on eme

technology will be a determinant of success in future a

conflict. No military is better at this than the Americ

large part because no culture is better at it tha

American. That said, there will be new, radical techno

with great promise which will challenge the ability 

military to master and integrate. In particular, rob

miniaturization, and nonlethality are likely to provid

keys to future success.

xviii
Because strategy and armed conflict are so comple

action has a multitude of second order effects (and 

fourth, and so on). Strategic decisions made t

particularly by the United States, will have secon

third order effects on 21st century armed conflict. So

these second order effects will be strategic and politic

take one example, by vigorously pursuing a revolut

military affairs designed to augment power projection 

perhaps, to lessen the need for allies, the United State

very well encourage the strengthening of regional se

structures designed to minimize the need for Ame

involvement or intervention. Many future innovation

bring equally unexpected second and third order e

The development of military robotics, biotechnology

psychotechnology, in particular, may unleash a hurric

political, legal, and ethical problems.

Conclusion.

No nation has ever undertaken a full revoluti

military affairs unless it is responding to perceived r

recent disaster. The paralysis of victory is great and v

interests always powerful. If historical patterns hol

U.S. military may not be able to make the leap in

future on its own. It often seems that the Pentagon’s 

for the future, including systems acquisitions, are bas

“bygone battles.” Ultimately, firm prodding m

necessary. This could come from Congress, the Pres

and Secretary of Defense, or from battlefield defeat. 

nation is lucky, visionary leadership rather than Ame

blood will inspire the necessary changes.

Recommendations.

The key strategic challenges for the Army in the sh

mid-term (5 to 20 years) will be attaining greater str

mobility, completing digitization, and becoming as eff

xix
to threats. The key strategic challenges for the m

long-term (15-30 years) will be:

• developing and integrating robotics and miniatu

systems;

• stressing the full modularity of equipment, sy

and organization;

• developing methods for the rapid transformat

doctrine, concepts, and organizations; and,

• developing greater psychological precision, incl

the full integration of nonlethal capabilities.

To prepare for this second wave of transformatio

Army should use its futures-oriented programs 

intellectual resources, particularly the Army After 

Project and the War College, to explore the str

implications.

xx
The German philosopher Hegel held that revolutio

the locomotive of history. According to his theory, 

social, political, and economic system builds up tension

contradictions over time. Eventually these explo

revolution. Taking the argument one step further, 

held that a revolutionary did not have to wait fo

explosion, but could speed it up, manipulate it, and c

it. But Lenin was wrong. One cannot create a revolut

the way that an architect designs a building. Nor 

possible to control revolutions like a conductor lea

orchestra. Revolutions are much too big and compl

that. Those who live in revolutionary times can only m

thousand small decisions and hope that they move h

forward in the desired direction. This holds as mu

military revolutions as for any other kind.

A “revolution-centric” perspective on the developm

war emerged among American strategic thinkers i

1990s. Now security analysts, military leaders, and de

policymakers, not only in the United States, but aroun

world, accept the idea that some sort of revoluti

military affairs is underway.

1

 Its nature and eve

outcome, though, are less clear. One thing is certai

United States has a greater stake in the revoluti

military affairs than any other nation. By defin

revolutions upset existing relationships and hierar

Since the current configuration of global political, econ

and military power is favorable to the United State

chances are that fundamental strategic change will 

deleterious to the American position. Washington is 

faced with the difficult task of modulating, directi

controlling the revolution in military affairs.

History has seen two types of military revolu

Operational and tactical revolutions occurred when 

technology, operational concepts, or military organiza

1
effectiveness of military organizations. The revolut

the 1920s and 1930s that led to mechanized land wa

strategic air war, and carrier war at sea is one exa

Strategic revolutions have been much rarer. Alvin 

Heidi Toffler suggest that strategic revolutions occur 

a much broader shift in the method of production ch

the entire panoply of human relationships, thus alteri

only how militaries fight, but who fights and why 

fight.

2

 Today American strategic thinkers assume th

world is in the midst of an operational or technol

military revolution and plan accordingly. In fact, a str

revolution may be under way, spawned by and reflecti

information revolution.

Underestimating the extent of the ongoing revolut

military affairs and failing to understand its intricacie

second order effects can endanger American security

need to think broadly and holistically is pressing. In s

terms, the information revolution is increasing inte

nectedness and escalating the pace of change in n

every dimension of life. This, in turn, shapes the evolut

armed conflict. Whether in economics, politic

warfighting, those who are able to grasp the magnit

this will be the best prepared to deal with it.

The architects of the 21st century American m

must understand the broad political, economic, socia

ethical changes brought by the information revolutio

by its manifestations—interconnectedness an

escalated pace of change. They must understand the 

these changes are having or might have on the evolut

armed conflict. Then, most importantly, they must de

some notion of what characteristics the future Ame

military must have to prosper in the new stra

environment. The better an individual, an organizatio

state understands the nature of a revolution, the bet

chances of emerging a winner. By examining the on

changes in the nature of armed conflict and thi

expansively, looking for wider implications and rel

2
technology, ethics, social trends, politics, and strateg

architects of the future U.S. military can increas

chances of ultimate success. This study provides 

suggestions on how this might be done.

3
STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Interconnectedness and Globalization.

What is driving the current revolution in mi

affairs? Throughout history, many factors have altere

human condition: new ideas, religions, ecological s

disease, migrations, conquest, and so forth. T

technology, particularly information technology, i

locomotive, defining what is possible and pushing old 

values, methods, and organizations into obsolescen

part of this, the information revolution is shapin

strategic environment in which armed conflict takes 

The revolution in military affairs is the dependent var

driven and buffeted by wider changes. To understand f

armed conflict, then, one must at least attem

understand the political, economic, social, and e

dimensions of the information revolution.

One of the most important changes associated wi

information revolution is a dramatic increase i

interconnectedness of people around the world. T

evident at many levels and in many ways. For indivi

the number of people with whom they can cultivate 

sort of relationship has increased exponentially. For m

human history, people only connected with the rela

few people who lived in their locale or whom they m

travels. Printing and literacy increased this somewh

allowing people to develop at least a rudime

understanding of others far away. Radio, the telegrap

telephone, and television increased interconnecte

further by escalating the speed with which ideas cou

transmitted and augmenting their psychological imp

making them more “human.” Today, inform

technology allows the transmission of massive amou

data to large audiences over great distances very qu

5
and powerful than the static one between autho

reader.

On a personal level, individuals can cultiv

relationship with hundreds or thousands of people, wh

through email, online chat, or other means. The explos

wireless communications means that anyone who wa

can stay “connected” twenty-four hours a day. On

stand in the middle of an African game reserve 

kilometers from the nearest paved road and read 

email from a hand phone. By 2025, according to the U

States Commission on National Security/21st Century

entire world will be linked, so that from any station

mobile station it will be physically possible to sen

receive near-instantaneous voice, video and other 

electronic signals to any other station.”

3

 As Bill 

phrases it:

Universal connectivity will bring together all the informat

and services you need and make them available to y

regardless of where you are, what you are doing, or the kind 

device you are using. Call it “virtual” convergence

everything you want is in one place, but that place is wherev

you want it to be, not just at home or in the office.

4

Even more importantly, information technology a

everyone with access to it to become attuned to issue

problems in far-flung parts of the globe. There are t

thousands of newspapers, newsletters, magazines, 

stations, and government documents available online

rooms, email distribution lists, and online newsgroups 

for every conceivable topic. One can cultivate a 

sophisticated understanding of any part of the 

without leaving home. Information previously ava

only to those with the ability and the time to visit a l

can now be delivered to anyone with a simple PC 

phone. 

The information revolution opens new vistas for 

who do leave home. For most of history, to m

6
information technology allows potential migrants to 

reconnoiter the area they would like to move to, a

retain reasonable ties with the family and friend

behind. International travel and migration—wh

permanent or temporary—is thus easier and more com

than it has ever been. The world is crisscrossed by netw

some based on ties like ethnicity or nationality, othe

shared ideas, concerns, or ideology. These provide not 

source of information, but also a means to mobilize eco

and political support for an organization or an idea.

Some dimensions of the information revolution 

technological advancements are destabilizing or 

dangerous. They have, for instance, blurred the distin

between fantasy and reality. Users of Internet Relay 

(IRC) jokingly compare “RL” (real life) to the virtual 

that entertains, informs, and, sometimes, confuses t

The psychologically mature users understan

distinction between RL and IRC. For others, partic

adolescents and less mentally stable adults, the bound

unclear, causing misunderstanding, confusion and an

The fact that one can create an online per

unencumbered by reality can be liberating, but 

dangerous for the immature or irresponsible. Freed

always potentially dangerous. In this IRC is sim

microcosm of the wider problems brought b

information revolution. Advances in communic

technology, especially the ability to meld reality and fa

through things like morphing, when combined wit

marketability of violent entertainment, confuse the 

and the unstable who then feed each others’ delusio

virtual communications. In the worst cases, fantas

reality become hopelessly entangled and the result c

events like the murders at Columbine High School.

The information revolution has brought inform

overload. Everyone with a PC and an Internet conn

runs the risk of being bombarded with ideas and im

While this can broaden an individual’s perspecti

7
information, it can also reinforce delusions by showin

others believe the same thing. Bizarre ideas and ou

lies can be propagated much more easily than in the 

One has only to look at the plethora of conspiracy or 

web sites to see this at work.

6

 And, information techno

also broadening the gap between the “haves” and 

nots,” both within advanced societies like the United S

and in the world as a whole.

Almost no dimension of modern life has been unto

by the information revolution. One of its most impo

effects has been the cascading globalization of econo

The “tactical” outcome is that businesses must have a 

approach to markets, financing, trends, risk amelior

partners, and suppliers. The “strategic” outcome 

linkage of economies around the world. “Econ

downturns,” notes the U.S. Commission on Na

Security, “that have usually been episodic and loca

become, thanks to the integration of global fina

markets, more systemic in their origins and hence 

global in their effects.”

7

 In a sense, this is not an en

new phenomenon. Thomas Friedman points out tha

period from the late 19th century to the middle of the 

also saw substantial globalization driven by a decl

transportation costs arising from the invention o

railroad, steamship, and automobile.

8

 But the proc

globalization underway today is immensely more pow

in terms of its impact on politics, economics, culture

values.

Every state must choose between participation 

globalized economy or persistent poverty. Particip

means that the state—not just businesses within a 

but the government itself—must follow certain ru

behavior, including things like limiting corruption 

making budgeting and finances transpa

“Transparency,” write Robert Keohane and Joseph N

becoming a key asset for countries seeking investm

The ability to hoard information, which once seem

8
and transparency necessary to attract investme

globally competitive terms.”

9

 This has imm

implications. Decisions made by multinational fin

institutions, overseas banks, or investors on the othe

of the world now determine the economic health of a n

nearly as much as decisions made by its own leade

Jessica T. Mathews writes, “National governments a

simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. Th

sharing powers—including political, social, and se

roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, 

international organizations, and with a multitude of c

groups, known as nongovernmental organizations.”

sense, all states have taken on some of the weak

vulnerability, and lack of control that traditio

characterizes small states. As the ability of the st

control its economy fades, it is likely to become w

across the board, thus leading to a major, pe

revolutionary transformation of the global sec

system.

11

Economic globalization has a direct effect on secur

all likelihood, there will be states which refu

participate. As they fall further and further behind

may lash out with military aggression or terrorism. 

Washington did not create globalization, Americans 

been the most successful at adapting to it and thus 

gained substantial advantages. “Those people who d

benefit from a more integrated global economy,” acco

to the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Cen

“are unlikely to blame their own lack of social capital

are more likely to sense conspiracy and feel resentm

In the eyes of many other nations, then, globalizatio

deliberate strategy on the part of the United Sta

spread its influence and culture. While this is not tru

idea is pervasive and is likely to spark anti-Ame

sentiment in states which come out losers d

globalization. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s P

Minister, who accused the “Great Powers” of delibe

9
crisis, is simply one of the first of what will be many le

looking for a scapegoat to explain their shortcomin

frustrations.

13

 As globalization erodes the ability of po

leaders to fully control their own country’s desti

simultaneously erodes their propensity to a

responsibility for events. This leads to a searc

scapegoats. Often the symbols of globalization—the U

States, the International Monetary Fund, and si

icons—will serve this function.

The information revolution, by eroding the contro

authoritarian regimes can exercise over their citize

both liberating and destabilizing. The inform

revolution helped destroy Marxism-Leninism by st

discontent and allowing opposition movements to 

coalitions both within their states and outside. It ma

necessarily represent the global ascendance of truth, 

certainly shortens the lifespan of lies. With the except

dinosaurs like North Korea, Libya, Afghanistan, and 

which will tolerate opprobrium rather than surr

control of their citizens, world public opinion ma

Increasingly, states which practice repression do so th

quick, spasmodic campaigns as in Rwanda. 

international intervention will continue to require a 

process of consensus building, the world will see a 

series of humanitarian disasters in the face of 

genocide or ethnic cleansing. In so many ways

information revolution brings both good news an

news, speeding the accumulation of information an

increasing the data that must be considered and the 

of available options, slowing the pace of decisionmak

While amplifying and magnifying connections

information revolution has drastically increased the p

change in human life. “By almost any measure," w

Hans Moravec, “the developed world is growing 

capable and complex faster than ever before.”

14

 S

personal, economic, political, ethical, and technol

factors all shift with breathtaking speed. Transform

10
organizations adapt to the pace of change and, at 

even control it. Those that cannot will face anxiety, s

conflict, and failure.

Rapid change always has winners and lo

revolutionary change even more so. Much of the vio

that will exist in the early 21st century will originate 

the losers of the change underway today. The losers wi

polyglot group. They will include some societies or 

unable or unwilling to adapt to globalization, partic

ones that cannot continence the lack of contro

transparency that successful integration into the glob

economy demands.

15

 The more benign ones may at

isolation from the world (even given the human cost

will entail.) Others, like Iran or Afghanistan, will wrap 

cause in cultural identity and use the tools of state pow

resist or punish the United States, the Interna

Monetary Fund, and other nations or organiza

associated with globalization and interconnectednes

there will also be losers within globalizing states

protests against the World Trade Organization’s 

Seattle meeting may give birth (or, at least, coherenc

new ideology defined by opposition to globalization 

interconnectedness. It is likely to bring tog

environmental activists, industrial workers, religiou

cultural leaders opposed to the globalization, and po

conservatives concerned about the erosion of na

sovereignty and the intrusiveness of globalization.

1

movement, with its dizzying, almost bizarre complexit

reliance on modern technology for mobilization 

communication at the same time that it rejects the eco

and social consequences of modernization, will typify 

of the political movements of the coming era. Most 

components will not use violence and armed force, but 

will. The information revolution will empower 

opposed to it as well as those who accept it.

11
The onward rush of information revolution is al

the shape of economic and political organizations. D

the industrial age big, hierarchical organizations 

advantage over smaller, less formally organized ones. 

like Standard Petroleum and General Motors could cr

absorb smaller competitors through brute power. 

states, unless protected by some quirk of polit

geography, could seldom compete militarily with large 

Today, the trend in the business world is toward macro

integration and “strategic partnerships” but int

decentralization and the loosening of hierarc

Technology is forcing a major shift in paradigms of 

with adaptability and speed as important as aggr

resources.

17

 By allowing multiple, cross-cutting conne

between individuals and organizations, technolo

dispersing power, creativity, and productive capa

Today, the successful commercial firm is one with a 

perspective, a web of strategic partnerships, and in

flexibility based on project teams or work groups r

than hierarchies or bureaucracies. This phenomen

migrating to the political world as well.

In the business world, the pressure to adopt m

organizational structure is a matter of institutional 

death. Corporations that resist risk failure. Governm

with their political and military resources, can hang 

outmoded structures longer than businesses. A govern

using outmoded organizational methods is in less dan

failure than a corporation that refuses to adapt

clinging to old practices and organizations en

escalating costs and risks for governments as much 

corporations. As the same time that interconnecte

undercuts the viability of authoritarianism by all

repressed citizens to communicate, organize, and mo

it also places handcuffs on elected governments. Mor

more, governments are blamed for economic and 

conditions that they cannot ameliorate or control.

12
economic, and ethical power. Carl Builder and 

Nichiporuk wrote, “Since so many of the institutions 

nation-state are hierarchical and so many o

transnational organizations are networked, the net f

power today tends to be out of the nation-state an

nonstate actors.”

18

 Global public policy networks, whi

loose alliances of government agencies, interna

organizations, corporations, nongovernm

organizations, professional societies, and other 

groups, are becoming major political actors.

19

 Inform

technology allows issue, goal, or project oriented net

to grow as dispersed actors communicate and coord

across great distances, thus mobilizing pressu

governments.

20

 Interest networks, if they have s

leadership and an attractive “product,” can wield infl

disproportionate to their size. More and more, flexi

creativity, astute marketing and responsivene

supporters or constituents trump pure size o

aggregation of resources. States are like dinosaurs to

the end of the Cretaceous Period: powerful but cumber

not yet superseded but no longer the unchallenged m

of their environment.

The information revolution is both a force for sta

and for instability. On the positive side, it complicat

task of old-style repression and facilitates the develop

of grass roots civil society. It is not coincidence that th

more democracy today than at any time in history. B

information revolution also allows organizations inte

instability or violence to form alliances, thus makin

world more dangerous. Some of the most complex stru

of the 21st century will pit polyglot networks against s

Colombia today offers a glimpse of this. There the allia

political insurgents, drug cartels, international m

hired legal and economic advisers, and other affilia

flush with resources and unbound by ethical or 

considerations. Characterized by “nimble 

organizations” and “high tech gear,” the Colombian 

13
exposure of their core organization, and use the 

technology for encryption and cellular phone cloning.

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a leftist gue

movement which protects the heroin and cocaine indus

has amassed a small air force.

22

 Such dangerou

polyglot enemies will probably propagate, posing 

dangers for state security services. Hierarchies 

bureaucracies face serious disadvantages when 

against unscrupulous, flexible, adaptable enemies. If 

are like dinosaurs, networks are like early mammals

weak but waiting for the time that they will inher

earth. 

The strategic context in which future armed confli

unfold will be a tempestuous blend of the old and the 

The information revolution is challenging the tradi

frameworks which provided personal identity 

moderated behavior, whether the family, village, ch

place of employment, region, state, or nation

replacements for these things are nascent, but not 

place. As a result, the old bedrocks still matter—as Th

Friedman points out, even the most forward-looking h

still needs an “olive tree,” which is his metaph

“everything that roots us, anchors us, identifies u

locates us in this world.”

23

 Individuals, organization

states are redefining themselves, altering who the

what they do, and how they relate to others. The worl

never be the same.

The Changing Nature of Armed Conflict.

The essence of warfare will always remain the sa

antagonists attempt to impose their wills on each 

while struggling with fog and friction. The informatio

though, is generating important changes in the cond

armed conflict. As these mature in the second decade 

21st century and beyond, some will be “case spe

affecting a limited number of states or particular re

14
participant in armed conflict and every mode of 

organizations which participate in armed conflict, fro

smallest terrorist cell to the most complex state mi

are being changed by new technology, particu

information technology. For relatively simple war-m

organizations, technology is helping to over

shortcomings in communications, intelligence

planning. For the complex militaries of advanced state

change is even deeper, leading—at least accordi

American military thinkers—toward a fully “digi

force where information technology eradicates fog 

friction.

Other forces are also shaping armed conflict

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is partic

important. In fact, Martin van Creveld contends 

proliferation will obviate traditional state-on-state 

Even if one does not go that far, there is no question 

proliferation will dramatically alter the strategic ca

for most nations. Nearly every moderately advanced 

will have weapons of mass destruction, ballistic or 

missiles, or the capacity to make them by the second or 

decade of the 21st century.

25

 This may not make a

conflict itself obsolete but, as van Creveld argues

certainly make old-style major war unbearably danger

Proliferation, in combination with interconnecte

and globalization, has created challenges to the po

utility of armed force. This is likely to escalate in co

decades. This is not entirely new. History is replete 

attempts to constrain, regulate, ban, or delegitimize a

force. The United Nations Charter, which const

binding international law for its signatory states, 

strict limits on the conditions under which armed fo

acceptable. Article 38 states:

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likel

endanger the maintenance of international peace and secur

shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enqu

15
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful mea

of their own choice.

26

Since the end of the Cold War, challenges t

acceptability of armed force have continued and 

accelerated, particularly in open political systems lik

United States. To a large extent, this is a result 

information revolution. The casualties of war and 

families are no longer faceless, but real, grieving huma

is harder for policymakers to use force when 

constituents understand the likely results. Ame

leaders have responded by searching for modes of wa

that minimize friendly military and civilian casu

particularly the use of precision aerial bombing

problem is that such modes of warfare are inherentl

decisive. It is possible that the concept of decisive v

will fade from the lexicon of strategy in coming decad

Edward Luttwak contends, early 21st century war ma

like early 18th century war where campaigns were w

for relatively limited objectives and the antagonists 

not willing to pay a high blood cost for success.

27

Other elements of interconnectedness appear 

constraining at least state on state aggres

Globalization of the economy has created such 

linkages that armed violence in one part of the world 

ripple effect, often causing price increases or inf

elsewhere. This increases the pressure on h

parties—particularly those integrated into the g

economy—to refrain from war or seek a speedy end 

already underway. Undoubtedly there will be times 

states consider the interests at stake in a confl

important that they are willing to accept the costs of go

war. But the frequency of conflicts where a state se

vital interests at stake and where war is seen 

acceptable means of promoting or protecting these int

is declining. This is particularly true for the United S

Preserving democracy and freedom against commu

was a cause for which most Americans were willing to 

16
in ethnic and religious enmity, are difficult to under

and do not seem worth dying for, so minimizing casu

has become a central consideration for military plan

sometimes the preeminent one.

28

 When the intere

stake are less than vital, the economic and political co

armed conflict may serve as a brake. Ironically, th

these same constraints may prevent states from mobi

and deploying overwhelming force in all but the 

extreme cases, and thus cause those armed conflicts t

occur to be protracted. Again like wars in the early 

century, early 21st century wars may drag on for ext

periods of time.

In some ways, interconnectedness and globalizatio

creating new vulnerabilities for the United States. F

enemies are likely to have a better understanding 

American mentality than past ones and thus be able to 

more effective political and psychological campaigns. 

leaders may be attending college in the United States t

Those who are not can use the Internet as a window in

American psyche. And, as Martin Libicki suggests, 

states may be able to use the “globalization of percepti

cast themselves as victims and mobilize world p

opinion if they engage in conflict with the United State

Interconnectedness also means that future enemie

have a potential constituency within the United S

This is not to imply that émigré communities are auto

breeding grounds for “third columnists.” But immigra

even native-born children or grandchildren of immig

can, in some cases, retain a tie to their ethnic hom

which can lead them to lobby for or against Ame

military involvement, as did Serbian Americans durin

first stages of the 1999 air campaign. This increase

pressure on American policymakers and military lead

minimize casualties if the use of force becomes nece

Émigré communities can also provide logistics 

intelligence support for terrorists. Interconnectednes

make protection against terrorism more difficult.

17
services hold that speed, knowledge, and precisio

minimize casualties and lead to the rapid resolution of 

thus minimizing the problems associated wit

challenges to the political utility of force. States with 

intellectual and financial resources than the United S

will not have the luxury of using technology as a pall

for the strategic problems associated with inte

nectedness and thus must seek other solutions. One 

response has been renewed interest in multina

peacekeeping. The idea is that containing or dete

armed conflict limits the chances of full blown war. 

states may turn instead to strategies of passive de

One of the dilemmas of interconnectedness is that 

happens in one place affects many others, but expla

this to mass publics remains difficult. Aggressive sta

non-state actors will also have to find ways to transcen

constraints brought on by interconnectedness. Som

rely on proxy conflict, providing surreptitious or, at 

quiet support to insurgents, militias, or terrorists w

activities further the aims of the sponsoring state. 

may attempt hidden or camouflaged aggres

particularly cyberwarfare aimed at the inform

systems of their enemies. Some—particularly those 

find their ambitions blunted by the United States

turn to political methods, ceding battlefield superior

the American military while seeking to con

Washington through legal and political means. Ame

military advantages, after all, are not always matched 

equal political and diplomatic superiority.

Because globalization and interconnectedness ero

control which regimes can exercise within their s

those with a shaky hold on power will often seek scape

but will sometimes turn to the time-tested meth

solidifying internal unity by external aggression as 

Since globalization and interconnectedness rais

political and economic cost of protracted war, regimes 

seek to deflect internal discontent through ext

18
something before the international community can 

consensus on intervention. Future actions like the 

seizure of Kuwait are not out of the question, at lea

states which believe that the United States cannot o

not stop them. Whether the United States can be det

from intervention by weapons of mass destructi

terrorism is one of the central questions for the future 

security environment.

Privatization.

Interconnectedness, the dispersion of powe

knowledge that flows from the information revolution

the eroding legitimacy of armed force are leading to

privatization in the realms of security and armed co

This has a long history, particularly functions inv

technical skills beyond those of the average warrior. D

the early modern period, for instance, artillery and 

engineering were often handled by contractors rather 

regular soldiers. Today, as warfighting becomes ever 

complex and the costs of training and retaining tech

specialists escalate, the same process is occurring. W

the United States, many jobs done by uniformed perso

few years ago are now handled by contractors. This inc

not only administrative tasks but, increasingly, plan

analysis, wargaming, training, and education. To tak

example, the United States recently established the A

Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) to help African 

improve their civil military relations and their abi

understand national security planning and de

budgeting.

30

 This is similar to Department of De

schools established for Europe, the Asia-Pacific region

the Americas. But unlike these others, which are ope

by the U.S. military, the corporation Military Profes

Resources International, which is composed mos

retired U.S. military officers, is responsible fo

development and implementation of the curriculu

ACSS (with oversight from the Office of the Secret

19
Department of Defense and service wargames. As 

business world, “outsourcing” allows the U.S. milita

acquire expertise while retaining organizational flexib

Today the contracting out of military functions is 

pervasive in the United States. In coming decades, 

states will probably turn to it both as a means of acq

cutting edge expertise and providing surge capacity d

major operations. They might, for instance, hire m

support when they go to war rather than buildin

extraordinarily expensive military infrastruc

Privatization will give many state militaries and non

actors the ability to acquire advanced skills much 

effectively and quickly than if they had to develop 

internally. Drug cartels and rogue states, for ins

might simply hire the best available information w

experts. This could decrease the qualitative advantag

by the United States and other advanced militaries, a

in key areas where the expense of contracting is warra

The same could happen in the realm of combat itsel

world is witnessing the re-emergence of powerfu

effective mercenary firms, particularly in places 

Sub-Saharan Africa where state militaries are rife 

problems and weaknesses. The best known was a com

called Executive Outcomes which was composed of co

veterans from the ex-South African Defence Force

company not only offered military advice and consu

but also combat forces which saw action in Angol

Sierra Leone.

32

 While Executive Outcomes officially 

shop at the end of 1998 (largely in response to South A

passage of the Military and Foreign Assistance A

successor or successors may emerge.

33

 In fact, there 

reports in early 1999 that South African mercen

simply relocated to Eastern Europe and continued to s

the Angolan rebels (who could pay with the proce

diamond sales).

34

 This is simply the starkest examp

wider trend toward the privatization of security.

35

20
the expense of sustaining a large, peacetime military

as they face difficulties recruiting from their 

populations, contracting will be an attractive optio

filling the ranks. Eventually, advanced nations lik

United States may replicate the development of the R

army. During the early days of the Roman Republi

army was composed largely of citizen soldiers who s

during times of threat. Eventually this gave way to an 

of long-service professionals attracted by the fina

benefits service could provide. By the late imperial per

was increasingly difficult to recruit Romans becau

other economic opportunities and because the prest

military service declined. At that point, the army 

composed mostly of foreigners attracted by the cha

gain citizenship and other material inducements. Th

the possibility that the future U.S. military may ha

turn to foreign recruits in order to fill its ranks. T

simply one additional form of the privatization of sec

History suggests another twist that privatization 

take as well. Whenever rich, powerful companies be

that no state was willing to shed blood to defend their p

and assets, the temptation was to form private armie

navies. The British East India Company, for instance

had one of the largest military establishments on ea

coming decades see the development of truly transna

or non-national corporations, this process may be rep

Corporate armies, navies, air forces, and intelli

services may be major actors in 21st century armed co

This will open new realms of strategy and policy. Wo

for instance, it be legal and acceptable for the United S

to declare war on a corporation that was guilty of a

aggression against a friend? To sign an alliance with 

Asymmetry.

States which decide to commit aggression in co

decades will know that if the United States and the 

21
qualitative gap between the U.S. military and all oth

wide and growing. This leaves aggressors two options

can pursue indirect or camouflaged aggression, or the

attempt to deter or counter American interve

asymmetrically. While the word “asymmetry” only re

entered the American strategic lexicon, the idea is no

From Sun Tzu’s contention that “all warfare is bas

deception” through B.H. Liddell Hart’s advocacy o

“indirect approach” to Edward Luttwak’s “paradoxica

of strategy,” strategic thinkers have long trumpete

wisdom of avoiding the enemy’s strength and probing f

weakness.

36

 Asymmetry simply means making max

use of one’s advantages. It is the core logic of all compe

endeavors, whether sports, business, or war. Cons

winners master this logic.

Through what might be called “low” asymm

militaries facing a superior opponent avoid 

force-on-force battles and rely on hit-and-run ta

deception, camouflage, dispersion, the use of com

terrain like cities, mountains, and jungles, guerilla wa

or terrorism. They often drag out the conflict, playing 

asymmetry of will or patience, and make use of thei

tolerance for pain and cost. Throughout history

asymmetry has allowed the weak to overcome the m

from the defeat of Darius by Scythian guerrillas throug

American Revolution and Spain’s expulsion of Napol

the 20th century wars of liberation in Algeria, Zimb

Namibia, Vietnam, and other colonies. By contrast, 

asymmetry is favored by militaries facing an enemy 

outnumbers them or in situations where casualties m

minimized. High asymmetry uses superior techn

information, training, leadership, and the ability to 

and coordinate complex operations to over

quantitative disadvantages or limit the blood c

warfare. Many colonial wars, from those of Caesar th

the campaigns of the Spanish conquistadors t

European conquest of Africa in the 20th century ev

22
Blood River, and Omdurman were won by asymmet

the modern context, blitzkrieg, whether used by its Ge

architects or by the coalition forces expelling Iraq 

Kuwait, is an example of high asymmetry.

Asymmetry is a characteristic of periods of rapid ch

particularly revolutionary ones. In geological history, 

have been times when many new species emerged. 

proved unable to survive, leading to new periods wit

diversity. Military history follows the same pattern: p

of great diversity follow periods of relative homoge

The current era is one of diversity. In coming decades

methods of warfare or of military organizations will 

dysfunctional, thus leading to greater homogeneity. B

the period of diversity, asymmetry will be a dom

characteristic of armed conflict.

Combatants.

Throughout the 20th century both states and non

actors have undertaken armed conflict. While 

nonstate actors, particularly insurgent movements, 

shaped history, state combatants have been the 

significant. Great wars tend to work against divers

methods and organizations for armed conflict, serv

weed out the dysfunctional from the successful. The 

wars of the 20th century did precisely that for 

combatants. While there certainly was great var

among states in terms of the size, effectiveness

technological advancement of their militaries, there 

significant similarities in terms of military organiza

and methods. These included: (1) hierarchical organiz

into services defined by the primary oper

environment, and into discrete groups of officer

enlisted personnel; (2) formal, hierarchical procedur

planning and decision making; (3) a professional c

some type reinforced, in many cases, by a reserv

emphasis on linear operations (supported, in some cas

23
campaigns, and wars; and, (5) reliance on the equip

produced by advanced industry and science, and on f

supply systems. Nonstate combatants varied from 

Their organization tended to be less formal, with 

combination of guerrilla combatants, political ca

terrorist cells, and militias. Their operational techn

stressed hit and run tactics, harassment, psychol

actions, and guerrilla activities, often using com

terrain. Their supply systems tended to be a blend 

formal and informal, often relying on captured 

ammunition, and equipment, in large part because th

not have the geographic, financial, or organiza

resources to do otherwise. Often the ultimate object

nonstate combatants was to take on the characteris

state ones.

In the opening half of the 21st century, the types of 

and nonstate combatants which have characterized r

armed conflict will continue to exist, but they are likely 

joined by new forms. The U.S. military probably will 

first postmodern state combatant, attaining gr

amplified speed and precision by the integrati

information technology and development of a syst

systems which links together methods for t

acquisition, strikes, maneuver, planning, communic

and supply. Its organization will be less rigidly hierar

than that of modern state combatants. This will both r

the fact that a digitized force needs less rigidly centr

control, and that the sort of high tempo, pulsed, ho

nonlinear operations it will undertake simply will not 

with rigid, centralized control.

37

 The final ty

combatants in 21st century armed conflict are likely 

postmodern nonstate ones. This will consist of 

networks of a range of nonstate organizations, 

political or ideological in orientation, others seeking 

They will work toward an overarching common purpos

will not be centrally controlled or have a single cen

gravity.

24
result will be a more or less symmetric. Even thoug

side may prove more capable or compotent than the 

their basic tactics, strategies, and weapon systems w

similar. But much of 21st century armed conflict w

distinctly asymmetric, pitting one of the four types aga

different one. In all asymmetric conflicts, the combata

material disadvantage will succeed only when it can 

use of greater will and creativity. When there 

asymmetry of will and creativity, postmodern 

combatants will generally have an advantage. When 

is an asymmetry of will and creativity, anything is poss

25
IMAGES OF FUTURE WAR

The Service and DOD View.

The specific shape of future armed conflict w

determined by policy decisions, technolo

developments, economic, political, and social trends, a

the geostrategic configuration that emerges. This diz

complexity makes it impossible to predict the path of f

warfare with certainty. At best, images can be ske

Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 21st ce

are likely to see some combination of three mod

warfare: formal war, informal war, and gray area wa

Formal war pits state militaries against other 

militaries. Since the 17th century, it has been the 

strategically significant form of armed conflict an

probably remain so for at least a few more decades, pe

longer. For this reason, it has been the focus of 

futures-oriented thinking within the U.S. military 

Department of Defense. American policymakers 

military leaders are attempting to define and create th

postmodern state military, primarily for use against “

states” or a “near peer competitor” that might appear 

in the 21st century.

38

The official vision of future war reflects the belie

“information superiority” will be the lifeblood 

postmodern military and thus the key to battlefield su

According to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, 

ongoing transformation of our military capabilities

so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)—cent

developing the improved information and comman

control capabilities needed to significantly enhance 

operations.”

39

 Deriving from a “system of systems

connects space-based, ground-based, and air-based se

and decision-assistance technology, inform

27
commanders to use precision weapons—many fired 

safe locations far from the battlefield—to strike the en

decisive points at exactly the right time.

40

 The idea i

American forces will be nearly omniscient while e

forces are confused and blind.

41

The most important expression of the official Ame

vision of future war is a document known as Joint 

2010.

42

 Known within the Department of Defense a

2010,” this is the “conceptual template” for the futur

military able to attain “full spectrum dominan

qualitative superiority over any anticipated enemy i

anticipated operating environment. JV 2010 holds th

key to success in an increasingly lethal battlespace w

“dominant battlespace awareness” growing from the s

of systems. This will allow the postmodern U.S. milit

survive on a battlefield replete with weapons of 

destruction and precision guided munitions. JV 2010 s

To cope with more lethal systems and improved targeting, 

forces will require stealth and other means of pass

protection, along with mobility superior to the enemy’s abilit

retarget or react or our forces. Increased stealth will reduce 

enemy’s ability to target our forces. Increased dispersion 

mobility are possible offensively because each platform 

individual warfighter carries higher lethality and has grea

reach. Defensively, dispersion and higher tempo complic

enemy targeting and reduce the effectiveness of area attack 

area denial weaponry such as weapons of mass destruc

(WMD). The capability to control the tempo of operations an

necessary, sustain a tempo faster than the enemy’s will a

help enable our forces to seize and maintain the initia

during military operations.

43

As the U.S. military evolves along the lines descri

JV 2010, it will gradually abandon old operational con

like massed force and sequential operations in fav

massed effects and simultaneous operations. These w

possible because information technology will 

commanders to identify targets and coordinate co

28
technological advances, according to JV 2010, “will con

the trend toward improved precision. Global positi

systems, high-energy research, electromagnetic techn

and enhanced stand-off capabilities will provide incr

accuracy and a wider range of delivery options.”

44

To make maximum use of emerging technology, JV 

outlines four new operational concepts to guid

development of U.S. armed forces and military str

dominant maneuver which is defined as 

multidimensional application of information, engage

and mobility capabilities to position and employ w

dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accom

the assigned operational tasks”; precision engag

which will allow accurate aerial delivery of wea

discriminate weapon strikes, and precise, all-we

stand-off capability from extended range; full-dimen

protection of American forces based on active measure

as battlespace control operations to guarantee air

space, and information superiority, and integr

in-depth theater air and missile defense, and pa

measures such as operational dispersion, stealth

improved sensors to allow greater warning against a

including chemical or biological attack; and focused lo

which is “the fusion of information, logistics

transportation technologies to provide rapid crisis resp

to track and shift assets even while enroute, and to d

tailored logistics packages and sustainment directly 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation

Joint Vision 2010 was intended to synchroniz

futures-oriented programs which the services had beg

develop. Where JV 2010’s time frame was mid-term

Joint Experimentation Program created in 1998 a

United States Atlantic Command (USACOM, 

renamed U.S. Joint Forces Command or JFCOM) sou

expand the U.S. military’s thinking about future warf

weaving together the services’ futures programs.

46

 Th

very ambitious undertaking. Futures-oriented thi

29
services. In fact, most of the futures thinking with

U.S. military is still done by the services. The Army, t

Force, and the sea services have each developed a ra

futures programs based on their expectation abou

future security environment and the future of war.

So far, the Army’s program is the most elaborate. 

there is no White House, National Security Coun

congressional concept of the future security environm

long-term American national security strategy, the A

like the other services, has had to craft its notion 

future role of landpower on its own.

47

 It has formul

vision that is highly innovative in its approa

technology, organization, and leadership, but conserv

in its assumptions about the nature of warfare an

purposes of American military power. This ble

innovation and conservatism runs throughou

documents and programs that explain the Army’s v

the future.

Army Vision 2010, which explains how the Arm

support the ideas introduced in Joint Vision 2010, a

that landpower will remain the most salient form of mi

power in the future security environment because 

American military operations will fall on the lowe

middle portions of the continuum of military opera

because most foreign militaries will remain land

oriented, and landpower makes permanent “the othe

transitory advantages achieved by air and naval for

Army Vision 2010 also argues that the Army is best 

among the services to deal with asymmetric challenge

as urban combat, terrorism, information warfare

insurgency. While it notes that operations other 

full-scale war will be the most common task of the 

century Army, it identifies the possibility of conven

war against “once dominant states [which] percei

unfavorable shift in power relative to their neighbors

and “radical fundamentalism,” according to Army 

2010, might motivate war in the “Euro-Middle East re

30
“the Asian arc.” Should either of these happen, the 

Army might be called on the defend or liberate terr

contain the conflict, or perform other missions.

49

To transform the concepts outlined in document

Army Vision 2010 into reality, the Army developed a 

of battlelab simulations and exercises called Lou

Maneuvers.

50

 Begun in 1992, this quickly grew in

elaborate “Force XXI” process that uses battle laborat

warfighting experiments, and advanced techn

demonstrations to generate and test ideas.

51

 I

mid-1990s, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis R

decided that his service needed to look even deeper in

future. The pace of change in the modern world had be

so intense, General Reimer concluded, that com

organizations like the Army must extend their str

planning horizons. And the main weapon platforms 

Army, including the Abrams main battle tank, the Br

fighting vehicle, and the Apache attack helicopter 

expected to approach obsolescence around 2015. Ge

Reimer thought it necessary to craft a rigorous meth

decide whether the Army should seek a new generat

tanks, fighting vehicles, and helicopters or instead p

“leap ahead” technology.

The framework for this analysis is the Army After 

Project—an ongoing series of wargames, works

studies, and conferences which explore the fea

strategic environments of the 2020-2025 period 

speculate on the sort of technology, force structure

operational concepts that the U.S. Army might need.

of the most crucial parts of the Army After Next proce

been identifying the most likely or dangerous type of e

Speed and Knowledge, which was the first annual rep

the Army After Next Project, singled out a “major mi

competitor.”

53

 This would be a nation-state that thre

the United States or U.S. interests but cannot or do

emulate the digitized American military. Such an e

would attempt to offset technological inferiority 

31
distributed air defense, coastal seacraft, subma

inexpensive cruise and ballistic missiles, 

unsophisticated weapons of mass destruction which 

become, as Richard Betts points out, weapons of the 

rather than the most advanced.

54

 Quantity would subs

for quality. The Army After Next Project seeks to de

force with superior operational and decisional s

strategic mobility, and battlefield awareness to defea

a “major military competitor.”

The Army After Next Project assumes that pre

weapons will make the battlefield of 2025 so deadly th

defensive will be strengthened, making extended man

possible only when the enemy’s advanced systems 

been degraded and when one’s own forces have very 

degrees of mobility and speed. Mobility and speed will 

distributed, decentralized, high tempo operations 

what are described as “cascading” effects. “Ta

success,” according to the second annual report of the 

After Next Project, “piled up nearly simultaneously a

the entire battlespace, could then lead under the 

circumstances to rapid operational-level disintegrat

the enemy’s plans are first foiled and then shattered—

as his ability to control his own forces evaporates bef

can respond.”

55

The Army After Next will be built on knowledge acc

from advanced information technology, specifical

integrated, multilayered system of systems that 

information from a variety of sources and provid

coherent, near real time, common picture o

battlespace.” The Annual Report states that “knowle

paramount. . . . the unprecedented level of battle

awareness that is expected to be available will signific

reduce both fog and friction.” It continues:

Knowledge will shape the battlespace and create conditions 

success. It will permit...distributed, decentraliz

noncontiguous operations...It will provide security and red

32
weaknesses, and centers of gravity, coupled with ne

complete visibility of friendly force status and capabiliti

knowledge will underwrite the most efficient application of 

elements of military power—enabling higher tempos 

operations. Knowledge will also focus and streamline t

logistics support required to maintain high tempos.

56

Organizationally, the Army After Next Pr

anticipates a hybrid U.S. Army combining very adv

components with “legacy” forces. This will inc

contingency forces including Battle Forces, Strike F

Campaign Forces, Homeland Defense Forces, and S

Forces.

57

 Through this combination, the future U.S. 

would retain flexibility and be able to operate in coa

with allies who had not built “digitized” forces. Throu

the Army After Next Project’s studies, programs, warg

and seminars, though, emphasis remains on coun

cross-border aggression against a state where the U

States had economic interests (usually petroleum

another state using combined arms warfare with 

additional technological twists and capabilities. Invar

the “blue” forces emerge victorious leaving the 

unprepared to think about the consequences of or resp

to defeat.

The U.S. Air Force’s vision of future war is 

characterized by a combination of creativity 

conservatism. The Air Force 2025 study, commission

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was an cauldron o

creative thinking. It solidified the position of th

University as the U.S. military’s cutting edge sou

ideas. Often using teams with a senior researcher of c

or lieutenant colonel rank and a number of majors, Air 

2025 explored topics such as information wa

unmanned aerial combat platforms, organizations t

with the gray area between peace and war, and ways to 

efficiently erode an enemy’s unity and will.

58

To some extent, the Air Force is more open to innov

strategic concepts than the other services, particular

33
exotic technologies such as micro-techno

biotechnology, and nanotechnology could alter the sh

future battlefields. But generally, Air Force’s senior le

see future warfare as an extrapolation of the 1990s. T

Force Strategic Plan indicates that non-state enemie

asymmetric strategies will pose challenges and the 

military must become more proficient in environmen

the infosphere, space, and urban areas, but ass

continuity in American strategy and in the overall nat

armed conflict. Ironically, the Air Force planning docu

notes the ongoing diffusion of information technolog

the commercialization of space, but does not sugges

these might challenge the notion of “inform

superiority” on which Joint Vision 2010 is built.

The sea services also subscribe to the notion that f

warfare will be a high-tech version of late 20th ce

combat. But the Marines, at least, are looking seriou

fairly radical changes in tactical and operat

procedures, including new organizations and doctri

fact, the Marines are in many ways the service 

amenable to true transformation. For instance, the M

Corps After Next (MCAN) Branch of the Marine 

Warfighting Laboratory is exploring what it ca

“biological systems inspiration” for future warfig

According to its web site:

. . . for the last three centuries, we have approached war a

Newtonian system. That is, mechanical and ordered [sic]. 

fact, it is probably not. The more likely model is a comp

system that is open-ended, parallel, and very sensitive to ini

conditions and continued “inputs.” Those inputs are 

“fortunes of war.” If we assume that war will remain a comp

and minimally predictable event, the structures and tactics 

employ will enjoy greatest success if they have the follow

operational characteristics:

• dispersed

• autonomous

• adaptable

• small

34
parallels biology. For that reason, much of the efforts of MCA

focus on exploiting biological inspiration in future milita

systems.

59

To move in this direction would require technolog

biomimetic engineered materials; small, “bug like” rob

neural or neuronal nets capable of complex, ada

responses; parallel computers; and, nanotechnology

there is more to it than that. What the Marine Corps 

Next group is grappling with—to use a phrase that is 

to becoming a cliche—is a “paradigm shift.” 

futures-oriented programs of the others services focus 

on “paradigm refinement”—doing what they 

traditionally done better through new technology a

associated concepts and organizations. The real 

becomes whether the Marines can truly undert

paradigm shift while the other services, the Departm

Defense, and some of the key leaders of the Marine 

concentrate on paradigm refinement.

The end of the Cold War largely eradicated the pr

mission of the Navy: retaining control of the seas in th

of enemy seapower. In response, the Navy has shift

focus from fleet encounters and protection of sea li

communication from hostile forces to influencing eve

land via Marine Corps operations and strikes lau

from the sea.

60

 To do this, the Navy plans to continue 

existing weapons platforms, particularly ca

battlegroups, surface platforms, and multi-pu

submarines.

61

 It talks of decisive victory in future war 

cruise missiles, naval aviation, and better t

acquisition.

62

 The Navy holds that “sea strike”—atta

targets on land from the sea, is a “revolutionary” conce

Because of the massive cost of a ship, the 

concentrates more on applying new technology to exist

proposed ones rather than the development of whol

weapons platforms as the Air Force and Army prefer. 

this means is that great efforts are going to have to be 

35
electronic signature, particularly as more states de

precision weapons, weapons of mass destruction

improved means of target acquisition through thing

the purchase of commercial overhead imagery. While 

theorists contend that “if it can be found, it ca

destroyed” is one of the “rules” of the current revolut

military affairs, the Navy assumes that this is eith

true, or will not hold for America’s enemies. To a 

extent, this is one more illustration of the hubris 

pervades the official American perspective on f

warfare. Unassailable American technological super

and “full spectrum dominance” are articles of faith.

Like the Army and Air Force, the Navy is explo

different approach to warfare (albeit using ex

platforms). In the case of the Navy, this is c

“network-centric warfare” in which a postmodern mi

using networked sensors, decision makers and sh

collapses an enemy’s will to resist quickly and efficie

According to Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, Pres

of the Naval War College, network-central wa

“enables a shift from attrition-style warfare to a much 

and more effective warfighting style characterized b

new concepts of speed of command and the ability 

well-informed force to organize and coordinate co

warfare activities from the bottom up.”

65

 A military 

masters network-centric warfare, according t

adherents, will achieve information superiority, reac

long distances with precision weapons, and collap

enemy’s will through the shock of rapid and closely l

attacks. 

Elsewhere within the Department of Defense, the s

continues for ways of applying new technology to tradi

modes of armed conflict. The joint experimentation pro

at JFCOM is an important part of this. It remains to be 

though, whether this will incorporate analysis of 

paradigm shifts in addition to paradigm refinemen

whether the results of the experiments will h

36
Defense, Congress, and other national political lead

least as long as the threat to American security re

manageable. 

Other pockets of innovation and creativity exist th

the Department of Defense. For instance, the Penta

Office of Net Assessment, which was the birthpla

American thinking on the revolution in military affair

developed an Operational Concepts Wargaming Progr

explore the ideas outlined in JV 2010.

66

 The Defense S

Board has done some useful thinking about a 

land-based military unit which reflects the opera

preferences and technological capabilities of a postm

military. This new unit would be light, agile, and pot

would operate in a distributed and desegregated fa

utilizing high situational awareness generate

information technology, depending on remote 

connected by a robust information infrastructure

supported by precision logistics.

67

 Such an organi

could provide a rapid intervention capability and pr

the way for heavier units which would arrive later. It 

fight for two weeks or less and then either be reinfor

withdrawn. The basic element would be “combat 

which would make extensive use of unmanned vehicle

robotics, using humans “only when necessary.” They 

avoid direct firefights, remaining dispersed most of th

for survivability, massing only to repulse a major a

Information technology would be central: “A key capa

for combat cell mission success is maintaining a 

awareness bubble larger than the enemy’s.”

68

Along similar lines, a study group at the Departm

Defense’s Center for Advanced Concepts and Techn

has explored the concept of “rapid dominance” attain

“shock and awe.” This is a very important attem

integrate a psychological dimension into mainst

thinking on the revolution in military affairs. The goa

use a variety of approaches and techniques to control 

an adversary perceives, understands, and knows.

69

 

37
or absolute knowledge and understanding of itsel

adversary, and operational environment; rapidity 

timeliness in application; operational brillian

execution; and near total control and sign

management of the operational environment.

It is not clear, though, what effect an inability to 

one or more of these things might have on a postm

military. While attaining a perfect picture of the batt

would give the U.S. military great advantages, relian

this would also be a vulnerability. Might the future 

military become so accustomed to the absence of the 

war that it could not overcome imperfect knowledge w

does occur? As one dimension of the paradoxical lo

strategy, weakness sometimes begets strength 

strength sometimes begets weakness. Eventually

intricate conundrum might erode the battlefield adva

of the American armed forces.

All of the services agree that the future U.S. m

needs some sort of highly capable, rapidly deplo

expeditionary unit. The core concept behind t

“strategic preclusion” which, in a crisis, would allo

U.S. military to achieve battlefield dominance befo

enemy has completed “operational set.”

70

 This would 

the opponent to either concede or face inevitable d

Again, the expectation is that future warfare will 

reprise of Desert Shield/Desert Storm—unambig

cross-border aggression by one state against anothe

services, however, offer few explanations of why Ame

political leaders would use military force early in a 

when they traditionally consider it a last resort. Sim

there is little indication of how the various future strik

expeditionary forces might be used against nontradi

enemies or ambiguous aggression. “Strategic preclu

may be an example of the tendency to prepare to fig

previous enemy rather than future ones.

38
similar logic. Joint doctrine defines information opera

as “actions taken to affect adversary information 

information systems while defending one’s own inform

and information system.”

71

 Despite immense debate w

the services and the Department of Defense, the ge

notion is that information is an “enabler” of tradi

forms of military activity, “an amalgam of warfig

capabilities integrated into a CINC’s theater cam

plan. . . .”

72

 While official thinking accepts the fac

information technology has had a revolutionary effec

revolution is thought to have cemented the str

realities of the past, particularly the technolo

advantage held by the U.S. military rather than cre

new vulnerabilities or the potential for enemies to ma

surpass the United States. The American technol

advantage is an article of faith in official thinking, la

because of the extent of investment and effort devoted 

Little consideration is given to the creativity which mi

born from the desperation of America’s enemies.

The official American view of the future consis

treats technology, particularly information technology

force multiplier rather than as a locomotiv

revolutionary transformation. Concepts such as “str

preclusion,” “full spectrum dominance,” and “inform

superiority” reflect the situation of the 199

qualitatively dominant U.S. military focusing on dete

or defeating traditional cross-border aggression. 

official documents accede that future enemies will at

asymmetric methods, but it is what might be ca

“moderate” asymmetry rather than a radical type. O

discussions of technologies that appear to have the pot

to be truly transformative—nonlethal weapons, str

information warfare, robotics, and so forth

conservative, seeing these things as support syste

conventional warfighting rather than new mod

warfare.

73

 With the exception of adding three new tas

the U.S. military—space operations, information wa

39
few if any strategic shifts. 21st century war, accord

official thinking, will be mirror late-20th century war

new technology allowing future generals and privates 

what past warriors could only dream of.

Asymmetry Again.

The notion that 21st century warfare will p

omniscient postmodern U.S. military in lop-s

lightening operations against evil aggressors is ent

But is it accurate? Perhaps, particularly in those inst

where an aggressor does not expect American involve

There may be times when the United States surpris

aggressor using Soviet-style equipment, tactics

operations. Such wars would be a reprise of Desert S

Opponents who do anticipate and plan for Ame

involvement, though, are likely to attempt to count

prowess of the U.S. military through asymmetric me

To some extent, current official thinking recognize

In fact, asymmetry has become a central concept in o

American thinking about future warfare. While 

Vision 2010, which was released in 1996, does not exp

mention asymmetry or asymmetric counters, al

planning documents now do. The Air Forces’ G

Engagement notes that “hostile countries and non

actors [will] seek asymmetric means to challeng

military superiority”; the 1998 Annual Report of the 

After Next Project contends that “major competitor

probably develop creative asymmetric strategies”; an

1999 Joint Strategic Review provides an in-depth an

of the implications of asymmetric methods. The rea

fairly simple: the Gulf War seemed to show that the U

States cannot be defeated by conventional Soviet

methods. If anything, the gap between the Ame

military and opponents who might attempt force-on

combat in open terrain is growing. No potential enem

soon undergo a information-based revolution in mi

40
feel the need to challenge the United States or, at lea

make themselves impervious to American interventi

The question then becomes: what forms of asym

will be most common and, more importantly, 

problematic for the United States? Enemies using pre

munitions or weapons of mass destruction to comp

deployment into a theater of operations could pose a se

challenge to some of the most basic tenets of Ame

strategy.

74

 Since the campaigns of Ulysses Gran

William Sherman, the “American way of war” has call

the build-up of massive amounts of materiel and supp

a theater of operations, and then the use of this ma

advantage to attain decisive victory through a strat

annihilation.

75

 This is contingent on the enemy’s abse

effective power projection to strike at the rear bases. 

American Civil War, the Confederacy simply did not 

the force necessary to capture Union depots at place

City Point, Virginia. In the European theater of Worl

II, the English Channel, the Royal Air Force, and the 

Navy kept the rear bases safe until adequate Ame

forces were deployed. And, in the Gulf War, Ame

airpower and landpower protected the rear bases.

In a future where enemies have some precision g

munitions and weapons of mass destruction (along 

delivery systems), in-theater sanctuaries may not 

Even air superiority and theater missile defense wou

inadequate against a nuclear-armed enemy, since 

cannot assure the sort of 100 percent effectiveness t

necessary. Given this, the future American military 

confront an enemy using a counter-deployment strat

which precision guided munitions and ballistic mi

whether with nuclear, biological, and chemical warhe

conventional ones, are used to attack U.S. bases and st

areas both in the United States and in a thea

operations, and to threaten states that provide su

bases, staging areas, or overflight rights to the U

States. 

41
have to be met with a combination of strategic airp

naval strike forces, theater air superiority, theater m

defense, focused logistics to minimize the supplies nee

theater, and a range of methods to limit the need 

lengthy build-up of forces, equipment, and supplies. A

1997 National Defense Panel wrote, “The days o

six-month build-up and secure, large, rear-area bas

almost certainly gone forever. WMD will require 

increase dramatically the means to project lethal 

from extended ranges.”

76

 The capacity to deploy force

resupply them directly from the continental United S

into a theater of operations could prove invalu

minimizing the chances that states in the thea

operations could be coerced into denying U.S. forward 

or staging areas.

The need to protect U.S. forces from strikes launch

an enemy using a counter-deployment strategy sugges

need for what might be called “theater reconfigu

areas” rather than traditional fixed bases. Such th

reconfiguration areas could be located in remote ar

nations which agree to host them, with a landing strip 

only fixed part of the base. All of the other things nee

prepare equipment and troops for combat could be m

concentrating just before an inbound aerial convoy a

and dispersing as soon as it left. The inventory of supp

a theater reconfiguration area would be kept to a mini

and replenished only as necessary. Repair and ho

facilities would also be mobile and dispersed. Th

reconfiguration areas could be protected by conven

concealment methods, electronic masking, a

laser-based missile and air-defense web comb

ground-based fire platforms, long-loiter and quick-la

UAV fire platforms, and space-based sensor an

platforms. Autonomous sentry systems which 

somewhere between a full-fledged robot and a 21st ce

mobile, smart mine could provide local secu

Host-nation support would be kept to a minimum to p

42
several decoy theater reconfiguration areas could be 

in each country that allowed them. Such a “shell g

could provide effective deception and thus complicat

attempts to strike at the theater reconfiguration area

missiles.

A counter-deployment strategy is only one of se

asymmetric approaches that future enemies may att

They might also resort to terrorism, either in conjun

with a counter-deployment strategy or in lieu of it, to 

American involvement in a regional conflict. In an era 

weapons of mass destruction are becoming more com

the terrorism problem is so pressing that some se

analysts have begun advocating a retrenchment from 

activism is order to lower the chances of prov

terrorism.

77

 It may eventually come to that. In l

retrenchment, countering an enemy relying on terr

would require a three part strategy. The first would 

make terrorist attacks more difficult by effe

intelligence and by the further hardening of targets. C

emerging information technology, including new for

sensors and new methods for transforming sensor dat

usable intelligence, provide part of the solution. The s

part would be to institute a policy stating terrorist s

against the American homeland will provoke a decla

of war against those who use terrorism or sponsor it. 

an approach is a traditional part of war. World War I

all, began by Serbian sponsorship of terrorism again

Austro-Hungarian Empire. Future sponsors of terror

whether the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Iran, Lib

some new one—should know that they are performi

act of war and pay accordingly. The third part would 

assure that if the American homeland is stru

terrorism, the result is public support for effective 

against the perpetrators rather than disengagement 

the conflict that first led to the problem.

Of all forms of asymmetry, urban warfare may b

most problematic and the most likely. In 1996 Ralph P

43
high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the spra

houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken ci

our world... in the next century, in an uncontro

urbanizing world, we will not be able to avoid 

deployments short of war and even full-scale city com

But as Thomas Ricks notes, urban warfare is one 

where the innovation associated with the revoluti

military affairs so far “hasn’t helped.”

79

 Even the G

Accounting Office has noted the inability of the 

military to conduct urban operations.

80

Admittedly, few military activities are more di

than combat in a modern city. Major General Robe

Scales writes:

A large urban center is multi-dimensional. Soldiers m

contend with subterranean and high-rise threats. Ev

building could be a nest of fortified enemy positions that wo

have to be dug out, one by one. Moreover, an experienced ene

could easily create connecting positions between buildin

With limited maneuver space, the urban environm

precludes mobility operation and largely negates the effect

weapons, while minimizing engagement ranges. The proxim

of buildings plays havoc with communications, further add

to command and control difficulties. Finally, the psycholog

effects of combat on soldiers are magnified. While the arra

threats from multiple dimensions has a debilitating effect 

soldiers, it further hastens the disintegration process t

haunts all military units locked in close-combat operations

Such fighting involves six key dilemmas

coordination among military units is complicat

separation into small units and by the fact tha

buildings can limit the range of radio signals; (2) it i

and tedious, nullifying the advantage in maneuve

decisional speed that an advanced military has 

less-advanced opponents; (3) it is difficult to distin

combatants and noncombatants; (4) the battlefield is 

thick with noncombatants; (5) holding control of an a

often more difficult than the initial clearing, since e

44
concentrations of communications and information 

operations there will be transparent, broadcast aroun

world by a variety of means from cell phones to web 

linked to satellite modems. In combination these dile

pose an extraordinarily thorny problem.

There are actually three different types of oper

that the U.S. military might have to perform in urban 

policing, raids, and sustained combat.

82

 Of these, sus

combat is the hardest. As the 1997 report of the Na

Defense Panel phrased it, “Urban control—the require

to control activities in the urban environment—w

difficult enough. Eviction operations—the requirem

root out enemy forces from their urban strongholds—w

even more challenging.”

83

 Part of the solution is 

doctrine, training, and rules of engagement.

84

 The 

Marine Corps is far ahead of the other services in this a

In their Urban Warrior experiment, which took pl

Oakland, California in 1999, the Marines explore

utility of existing technology like palm-held comp

unmanned aerial vehicles and parachutes steered b

Global Positioning System in an urban battle.

85

 At the 

time, the Marines are exploring different ways of organ

units involved in urban combat, particularly 

hierarchical, more networked structures.

86

 During m

revolutions, organizational and conceptual change is n

always more difficult than the adoption of new techn

This certainly holds for urban combat. Joel Garreau 

“An electronic network may give the Marines un

dented flexibility, adaptability and competitiveness, 

may also fundamentally unravel the way the Marines 

worked for more than 200 years.”

87

Even existing technology is inadequate for u

operations.

88

 Two types of technology, though, migh

alleviate some of the challenges: nonlethal weapon

robotics. The utility of stand-off, lethal strikes, even i

are substantially more precise than those available 

will remain limited in urban warfare. City fighting inv

45
Nonlethal capabilities might enable the U.S. milita

overcome enemy forces from urban environments 

minimal civilian casualties and limited risk to Ame

forces. If nonlethal weapons were developed which 

temporarily incapacitate people, separating comba

and noncombatants would entail much less risk to 

forces. To hold areas already cleared, nonlethal we

could limit the risk to U.S. soldiers on sentry dut

lessen the chances that noncombatants wandering th

cleared areas would be harmed. For refugee control—

is a vital but often overlooked dimension of u

combat—nonlethals could help stop riots and assis

forces in dealing with any combatants who attemp

hide among refugees.

89

An Army-sponsored workshop at the Jet Prop

Laboratory, which brought together military profess

and robotics experts, was prescient when it noted 

robots hold particular promise for information gath

the highest priority mission in urban combat operat

Satellites and overhead sensors can never provide th

of dynamic, three-dimensional picture necessary for 

operations. Robotics have the potential to offe

horizontal perspective to augment overhead senso

addition, robotics can form part of a “dynamic perime

guard prisoners and prevent the reinfiltration of cl

areas.

91

 The most useful way of penetrating en

controlled areas might be through networks of very 

but relatively low resolution robotic sensors, with 

intelligence picture developed through data fusion

utility of robotic systems is almost endless. In armed co

they could not only perform reconaissance function

also serve as mine detectors and sweepers, smoke or 

obscurant dispensers, obstacle deployers or brea

communication relays, target designators, de

ambulances, logistics “mules,” mobile shields, or offe

strike systems.

92

46
biomechanical revolution as engineering device

blended with organic ones, thus leading to various ty

cyborgs. In early 2000, scientists combined a huma

with an electronic circuitry chip. By controlling the 

with a computer, scientists say they can control the ac

of the cell. The computer sends electrical impulses 

cell-chip, triggering the cell’s membrane pores to ope

activating the cell. Scientists hope they can manufa

cell-chips in large numbers and insert them into the b

replace or correct diseased tissues.

93

 From a m

perspective, such cyborg platforms may be easier to 

than purely mechanical robots. For instance, scientist

that it will be several decades before robots the s

cockroaches will have the mobility of cockroaches

substantial progress has been made in implanting d

in living cockroaches which allows them to be “steere

future urban warfare, sensory-carrying cockroaches m

maneuvered by soldiers thus providing inform

dominance. 

Broadly speaking, the opening decades of the 

century will see both symmetric formal war pittin

modern states, and asymmetric formal war pitt

postmodern military against a modern one. There w

reprises of both the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. 

former, the United States may become indirectly inv

providing support of one kind or the other to an ally. As 

and more nations acquire nuclear weapons, forma

between them may come to look more like 

India-Pakistan war of 1999 than the Iran-Iraq 

Combatants may launch a few limited conventional s

and perhaps some cyberattacks, but rely primarily on 

aggression to remain below the threshold of either ma

retaliation by their opponent or economic and po

pressure from the rest of the world.

94

 It remains to b

whether another postmodern military will emer

challenge the United States or whether, as Ame

strategic thinking posits, the postmodern U.S. militar

47
modern militaries.

Informal War.

Informal war is armed conflict where at least one 

antagonists is a nonstate entity such as an insurgent 

or ethnic militia. It is the descendent of what became k

as low intensity conflict in the 1980s. Like today, f

informal war will be based on some combinati

ethnicity, race, regionalism, economics, personality

ideology. Often ambitious and unscrupulous leader

use ethnicity, race, and religion to mobilize support for 

is essentially a quest for personal power. The objecti

informal war may be autonomy, separation, outright c

of the state, a change of policy, control of resource

“justice” as defined by those who use force.

Informal war will grow from the culture of vio

which has spread around the world in past decades, fl

from endemic conflict, crime, the drug trade

proliferation of weapons, and the trivialization of vio

through popular culture. In many parts of the w

violence has become routine. Whole generations now 

as normal. To take one example, Debbie Stothard, an e

on refugees who campaigns for democracy in Mya

said of the guerrilla groups there:

These are people who have not had access to a good educa

and for whom violence is a way of life..It never occurs to th

that mounting a siege on a hospital is actually wrong. They h

not lived in a world where detaining someone with forc

actually unacceptable. It’s as though they came from a differ

planet . . .

95

This is not an isolated case. In Latin America, the M

East, South Asia, Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa a

some extent, the inner cities of the United States, a cu

of violence has become so pervasive that it is impossi

quell.

48
part because of the declining effectiveness of s

Traditionally, governments could preserve internal 

by rewarding regions or groups of society which supp

the government, punishing those which did not, and

wise leadership, preempting conflict and violence th

economic development. In a globalized economy, the a

of governments to control and manipulate the econo

diminished, thus taking away one of their prime too

quelling dissent and rewarding support. In regions w

the state was inherently weak, many nations have 

areas of territory beyond the control of the govern

And, as political, economic, and military factors con

traditional cross border invasion, proxy aggressio

become a more attractive strategic option. Reg

unwilling to suffer the sanctions and opprobrium 

results from invading one’s neighbors find that supp

the enemies of one’s neighbors is often overlooked. T

not likely to change in coming decades. Finally

combination of globalization and the Cold War have f

the growth of an international arms market at the 

time that the international drug traffic and the coales

of international criminal networks have provided sour

income for insurgents, terrorists, and militias. With en

money, anyone can equip a powerful military force. W

willingness to use crime, nearly anyone can gen

enough money.

Informal war is not only more common than in the 

but also more strategically significant. This is true, in 

because of the rarity of formal war but also becau

interconnectedness. What Martin Libicki calls 

globalization of perception”—the ability of people to 

what is happening everywhere—means that ob

conflicts can become headline news. There a

backwaters any more. As suffering is broadcast aroun

world, calls mount for intervention of one sort or the 

Groups engaged in informal war use persona

technological interconnectedness to publicize their c

49
institutions. The Zapatista movement in southern Me

a model for this process. The Zapatistas, in conjunction 

a plethora of left-leaning Latin Americanists and h

rights organizations, used of the Internet to 

international support with web pages housed on serv

places like the University of California, Swarthmore

the University of Texas.

96

 This electronic coalition-bu

was so sophisticated that a group of researchers fro

RAND Corporation labeled it “social netw

Undoubtedly, more organizations will follow this 

blending the expertise of traditional political move

with the cutting-edge advertising and mark

techniques that the information revolution has spaw

During the Cold War the strategic significance 

intensity conflicts was determined by their potent

spark superpower confrontation or to escalate into 

fighting. Today and in coming decades, stra

significance of informal wars will be determined bo

their potential for contagion through refugee flo

terrorism, and by the global image of them which coa

or is created, whether by participants or other inter

parties. A defining feature of the information revolut

that perception matters as much as tangible things

will certainly hold for informal warfare. Future strat

will find that crafting an “image assessment” or “perce

map” of a conflict will be a central part of their plan

While 20th century military strategists like Eisen

and Marshall took their cues from industrial manage

21st century military strategists must learn from 

advertising and marketing industries.

Combat in future informal war is likely to remain “

on,” pitting the combatants in close combat. In many 

fighting will take place in heavily populated areas. Wa

will be interspersed among noncombatants, using th

shields and bargaining chips. At times, refugee dis

will be deliberately stoked and sustained to attract ou

attention and intervention. Informal wars will also b

50
Clausewitz’s trinity—plays the greatest role. Unlike f

war, where the trends are toward precision 

depersonalization through stand-off capabilities, inf

war will remain dirty and bloody, driven by hatred 

than science.

In failed states, informal war may be symmet

militias, brigand bands, and warlord armies fight 

other. At other times, it may be asymmetric as 

militaries, perhaps with outside assistance, fight ag

insurgents, militias, brigands, or warlord armies. F

United States, the asymmetric form will be espe

important since the American military may be ask

support friendly regimes, contribute to multina

intervention forces, provide humanitarian relief, or 

participate in direct combat. This might involve sta

operations where U.S. forces, in conjunction with allie

seek to restore order or facilitate humanitarian relie

then turn over responsibility for long-term ameliorat

the conflict to some other agency or organization. 

probability, multinational mechanisms for 

reestablishment of stability and for conflict resolutio

grow and improve in coming years. Quite possibly, th

be the major task of the United Nations.

Quick operations to restore stability will be taxin

feasible. Counterinsurgency, which uses military for

attain not only the short-term restoration of order bu

ultimate resolution of the conflict that led to disorder 

first place, is a different and more difficult matt

involves long-term engagement and alteration of a cou

political, economic, security, and even social order. Cu

American thinking on the security environmen

military strategy discounts insurgency and cou

insurgency. Ten years ago they received a moderate am

of thinking in doctrine and strategy: now they are la

ignored. If insurgency is defined solely as rural 

warfare—its most common and successful variant fro

1940s to the 1990s—then it might make sense to releg

51
problems in the 21st century. But if insurgency is seen 

broadly as protracted, asymmetric warfare waged 

organization with a strategic perspective, then the ch

are that it will mutate, reemerge and pose challen

American allies in coming decades. Just as in the 1960

1980s, the future U.S. military will have to redis

counterinsurgency and relearn the lessons of the pas

As external sponsors have faded away and 

militaries began to understand Maoist people’s wa

chances of it working declined. Future insurgents wil

to develop new strategies. Every insurgent strategy 

have three components: a method for defendin

movement against government security forces; a met

raising support; and, a method of attaining ult

success. In Maoist people’s war, insurgent movem

defended themselves by tactical dispersion, interspe

among noncombatants, the use of complex terrain su

jungles, mountains, or cities, high internal morale

effective intelligence and counterintelligence. 

supported themselves by using political and psychol

means to mobilize internal backers, by taxing citizen

businesses in “liberated” or semi-liberated zone

capturing arms and supplies from security forces, a

external patronage, whether from a state like the S

Union, Cuba, China, and Libya, or a network of ideol

allies like a diaspora community (e.g., the Mala

communists raised money from Chinese commu

throughout the Asia-Pacific region, Irish insurgents 

used their ethnic brothers in the United States, a

forth). Finally, old-style insurgents sought succe

exhausting the government, weakening it through gue

war, terrorism, and political warfare, and simply outla

it.

Future insurgents would need to perform the 

functions of defense, support, and the pursuit of victor

will find new ways to do so. In terms of defense, dispers

likely to be strategic as well as tactical. There will b

52
linkages, pervasive sensor webs, and standoff weapo

astute insurgents will spread their command and c

apparatus around the world. Information technolog

make this feasible. Right wing anti-government theor

the United States have already developed a concep

call “leaderless resistance” in which disassociated terr

work toward a common goal and become aware of 

other’s actions through media publicity.

99

 The inform

revolution will provide the opportunity for “v

leadership” of insurgencies which do not choos

anarchical path of “leaderless resistance.”

Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, Daniel Ortega, 

Savimbi, Fidel Castro and other 20th century insu

leaders needed physical proximity to their top lieuten

Twenty-first century insurgent commanders will be a

exert at least a reasonable degree of control from a la

computer with a satellite modem and web cam sit

anywhere in the world, with their transmissions encr

and bounced throughout the web in order to comp

tracing. The top leadership might never be in the 

physical location. The organization itself is likely 

highly decentralized with specialized nodes fo

functions like combat operations, terrorism, fund ra

intelligence, and political warfare. In many cases, insu

networks will themselves be part of a broader g

network unified by opposition to the existing politica

economic order. For instance, an insurgent ne

attempting to overthrow the government of a state fr

to the United States might cultivate loose ties with a 

of titular allies including global criminal ca

anti-government groups within the United States, or 

political groups seeking to constrain American power

Unless some sort of new ideological division em

among the world’s great powers—which is 

inconceivable—future insurgents will be unlikely t

state sponsors. The trend will be toward “stand a

insurgent movements that rely on the open ma

53
insurgent movement will be one of the most important

commercialization of insurgency has been underway 

since the end of the Cold War cut off ideological patro

In Colombia, Peru, Kosovo, and other areas, insur

have found drug trafficking a lucrative source of incom

Sierra Leone and Angola, it is diamond smuggling

reliance on a single source of income is a vulnera

Future insurgents may be diversified in their fund-r

methods, using cybercrime as well as traditional me

like extortion, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, and 

trafficking. They might even move into legit

commercial ventures, undertake fund-raising among 

thinking” organizations around the world (making 

use of the Internet), and “tax” co-ethnic diasporas. M

will allow future insurgents to contract out key fun

such as fundraising, intelligence and, perhaps, even 

military action. Well-financed insurgents will be able 

the state-of-the-art talent in key areas like inform

security or offensive information warfare, thus m

them equal or superior to the security forces confro

them. And by contracting out their armed actions, the

lessen the risk to themselves.

Countering new style insurgency will not be easy. 

is no formal doctrine for dealing with networked oppon

be they existing criminal cartels or future insurgents. 

successful against future insurgents, the U.S. militar

need better intelligence, better force protection, and g

precision at the tactical and strategic levels. In part, 

things require new organizational methods. For ins

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt contend that to m

networked opponents, governments must de

network/hierarchy hybrids like those taking shape 

corporate world.

100

 The American military also must 

its conceptual tool kit. Ideas like phased operation

centers of gravity, which originated in respon

industrial age warfare against hierarchical enemies

provide little insight into dealing with networked one

54
nonlethal weapons and robotics may prove the most 

Robotic sensor webs could help with intelligence coll

which is always one of the most difficult and most 

aspects of counterinsurgency. With better intellig

greater precision becomes possible. It might be possib

instance, to identify and neutralize insurgent leaders 

little or no collateral damage or civilian casua

Removing insurgent leaders does not automatically l

victory: that requires amelioration of the tensions 

opened the way for the insurgency in the first place

solving root causes is certainly easier with insu

leaders and cadre out of the way. Nonlethal weapon

robotics also hold great promise for helping to protec

American forces that become involved in cou

insurgency. The lower American casualties, the great

chances that the United States would stick w

counterinsurgency effort over the long period of tim

success demands.

Informal war in the coming decades will not repre

total break with its current variants. It will still 

hands on combat, with noncombatants as pawn

victims. Insurgents, militias, and other organizations 

use it will seek ways to raise the costs of conflict for 

forces. State forces, whether modern or postmodern

simultaneously seek ways to impose stability or, in 

cases, defeat their opponents at an acceptable cost. It i

to remember, though, that informal and formal war w

inextricably linked. Interconnectedness and 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are raisin

costs and risks of formal war. States which use tradi

force against enemies will often run the risk of retaliat

weapons of mass destruction or, at least, of severe eco

pressures from the global financial community which 

not look favorably on the market dislocations caused b

As a result, states will turn more and more to proxy vio

through which they might gain their objectives 

staying below the threshold which would lead to the 

55
consequences. The core strategic dilemma for future le

will be identifying that threshold.

Gray Area War.

As the Cold War ended defense analysts like M

Manwaring noted the rising danger from “gray 

phenomena” that combined elements of tradit

warfighting with those of organized crime.

101

 Gray are

is likely to increase in strategic significance in the 

decades of the 21st century. To an extent, this is a ret

historical normalcy after the abnormality of the Cold 

Militaries have long confronted both “big” and “s

enemies, protecting state territory from foreign inv

while fighting bandits, pirates, and brigands. When fo

invasion was a major concern, armed forces tend

concentrate on it. When it was not, they often spent m

their time and effort on internal order or “small” ene

This is certainly within the American tradition. Throu

most of U.S. history the Army and, to a lesser exten

Navy focused on bandits, pirates, and brigands rathe

preparing to fight other states in major wars.

Today, gray area threats are increasing in str

significance. Information technology, with its tende

disperse information, shift advantages to fle

networked organizations, and facilitate the creat

alliances or coalitions, has made gray area enemies 

dangerous than in the past. For small or weak countrie

challenge is particularly dire. Not only are their se

forces and intelligence communities less proficient, b

potential impact of gray area threats is amplified b

need to attract outside capital. In this era of globaliz

and interconnectedness, prosperity and stability wit

state are contingent on capital inflows. Except in na

that possess one of the very rare high-payoff na

resources like petroleum, capital inflows require sta

and security. In places like Colombia, South Africa, Ce

56
by criminal activity and the insecurity it spawns

makes gray area threats a serious security challenge. 

means that the United States, as the engineer of 

order, must take them more seriously.

Gray area war involves an enemy or a netwo

enemies that seeks primarily profit, but which has po

overtones and a substantially greater capabilit

strategic planning and the conduct of armed conflict 

traditional criminal groups. Like future insurgents, f

networked gray area enemies may have nodes tha

purely political, some political elements that use inf

war, and other components that are purely criminal

greatly complicates the task of security forces that 

deal with them. Because gray area enemies fall in be

the realm of national security and law enforcemen

security forces that confront them must also be a 

blend of the military and the police. Like the mi

security forces must have substantial fire power 

traditional or informational), and the ability to app

problems strategically (i.e., to integrate agencie

elements of power, undertake long-term force develop

and to think in terms of ultimate objectives and p

programs to attain them). But these security force

must have characteristics of law enforcement, wo

within legal procedures and respecting legal rights.

In the opening decades of the 21st century, it will 

sense to talk about both strategic and astrategic gra

war. The strategic form will be that used by some coh

organization or, more likely, network of organiza

driving toward a specific purpose. Even though the obj

will be monetary rather than purely political, violenc

be goal-oriented. Astrategic gray area war will c

primarily of turf battles between armed gangs or milit

may be related to refugee movements, ethnic co

ecological degradation, or struggles for political power 

Jamaica in the 1990s, where political parties used 

gangs to augment their influence). When astrategic 

57
forces (such as they are) will be serving as mercenarie

partially controlled by their paymasters, rather than a

units under the actual command of political autho

Even astrategic gray area war, though, will have se

implications since it can deter investment and growth

in outside intervention, and, potentially, spark wider a

conflicts. As with many types of future war, the cha

will be the connections and linkages. A single gray are

alone may not be a serious challenge to a major stat

major alliance, but when a number of gray 

organizations are linked, or when gray area organiza

are connected to other types of threats, the dange

increase.

Since gray area war overlaps and falls in be

traditional national security threats and law enforce

issues, states must often scramble to find the appro

security structure to counter it. Nations with a F

administrative tradition have an advantage in that th

comfortable with the idea of a national gendarmerie 

overlaps military and police functions. As the debate w

the United States over the use of the military to co

gray area enemies intensifies in coming years, creation 

American national gendarmerie should be considered

an organization could combine elements of the militar

intelligence community and law enforcement agencie

the Drug Enforcement Agency and Federal Bure

Investigation. It could form its own alliances with s

security forces around the world and operate 

effectively against gray area enemies in an interconn

security environment and globalized economy.

Gray area war will also pose serious legal and civil 

questions. Should enemies which use it be treat

criminals, with full legal protection, or as mi

combatants, protected by the law of armed warfare? 

what sorts of legal and ethical frameworks will ap

gray area war spills across borders and bec

increasingly transnational? Even today the United S

58
drug trafficking and terrorism to the citizens of 

countries, sometimes ignoring normal extrad

procedures.

102

 This problem is likely to escalate as gra

enemies proliferate and coalesce into networks. The l

response may be an updating of the tradit

international law dealing with piracy which gav

nation the right to apprehend and punish a pirate o

high seas. Perhaps this should also apply to future gra

pirates operating in arenas like cyberspace.

The danger from gray area problems should n

underestimated. If left unchecked, gray area conflic

mutate onto informal or even formal war, as one stat

pressure or even force against another which is prov

sanctuary to criminals (or, at least, is looking the 

way). As a general rule, the lower the level that an a

conflict can be resolved, the less the danger. Conc

effort to thwart gray area war in coming decade

prevent it from becoming even more dangerous.

Strategic Information Warfare.

 Formal, informal, and gray area war are all l

extensions of existing types. Technology, though, could 

or allow more radical change in the conduct of a

conflict. For instance, information may become an a

weapon rather than simply a tool that supports tradi

kinetic weapons. Future war may see attacks via com

viruses, worms, logic bombs, and trojan horses rather 

bullets, bombs, and missiles. This is simply the 

version of an idea with recent antecedents in mi

history. Beginning with the writings of people like 

Douhet in 1930s, some strategic thinkers held that it 

be possible to defeat an enemy state by attackin

homeland directly, bypassing its military forces i

field.

103

 Strategic bombing alone did not bring Germa

its knees in World War II (although the theory was 

nearly implemented against Japan, which still had a 

59
But for its advocates, this did not disprove their positio

simply showed that the technology of the time 

immature. 

Eventually nuclear weapons did make it possi

destroy a state without fighting a single engagemen

its armed forces. But the political utility of nuclear we

was always subject to question. Their destructivenes

so immense that even a state that waged a “succe

nuclear war would have found it a Pyrrhic victory.

104

 

1960s, the arsenals of the nuclear powers were exte

enough that it seemed that the only real purposes of 

weapons was to deter their use by others and, possi

deter full-scale invasion of the homeland. Very muc

ultimate hammer, nuclear weapons could not be us

instances that called for the modulated use of force.

Proponents of strategic warfare contend that techn

now allows their theory to be applied. Inform

technology might provide a politically usable way to da

an enemy’s national or commercial infrastructure 

enough to attain victory without having to first d

fielded military forces. During World War II, the Ger

and Japanese mitigated the effects of strategic bomb

dispersing their productive capacity. The only co

response of the Allies was massive, sustained bomb

every conceivable target. This was inefficient and c

extensive collateral damage (which would now be polit

unacceptable). Modern economies are so tightly linke

interdependent that destroying a few key compon

particularly communications and power grids, could l

a cascading collapse of the whole system.

Today strategic information warfare remains sim

concept or theory. The technology to wage it does not 

Even if it did, strategists cannot be certain str

information warfare would have the intended psychol

effect. Would the destruction of a state’s infrastru

truly cause psychological collapse? Would the failu

60
will of a people or steel it? After all, everyone wh

attempted to use concerted strategic bombing, wheth

Germans and the Allies in the World War II o

Americans in Vietnam, underestimated the willpow

their enemies. But until infrastructure warfare is p

ineffective, states and nonstate actors which hav

capacity to attempt it probably will, doing so beca

appears potentially effective and less risky than other 

of armed conflict.

Future infrastructure war could take two forms. I

version, strategic information attacks would be us

prepare for or support conventional military operati

weaken an enemy’s ability to mobilize or deploy force

second possible form would be “stand alone” str

information warfare. This might take the form 

sustained campaign designed for decisive victory or, 

likely, as a series of raids designed to punish or coer

enemy. Facing a future Iraq or Serbia, for instanc

United States could conceivably use strategic inform

attacks rather than aerial bombardment, in part beca

the belief that such actions would provoke less po

opposition. All of this is, however, speculation. Toda

technological feasibility, psychological effect, and 

ramifications of strategic information warfare re

unclear.

But should cyberattacks, whether as part of str

information warfare or as terrorism, become commo

traditional advantage large and rich states hold in a

conflict might erode. Cyberattacks require much 

expensive equipment than traditional ones. The nece

skills exist in the civilian information technology world

of the things that made nation-states the most eff

organizations for waging industrial age war wa

expense of troops, equipment and supplies. Conven

industrial-age war was expensive and wasteful. 

organizations that could mobilize large amounts of m

flesh, and material could succeed at it. But if it be

61
internet connections, a vast array of organizations 

choose to join the fray. Nonstate organizations could 

effective as states. Private entites might be able to m

state armed forces. Private or commercial organiza

might even wage information war on each other—

“gang wars” played out on servers and network back

around the world rather than in ghetto alleys.

As one of the world’s most “wired” nations, str

information warfare could be particularly problema

the United States, forcing policymakers and mi

strategists to examine some of their most basic beliefs 

warfighting and national security. For instance, the 

existence of an infrastructure attack as well as its s

could be hidden, at least for a while. An extensive se

problems and system failures induced by an infrastru

attack could occur before the United States understoo

it was under attack. It is easy to imagine how tempers 

flair if some American defense official in the future h

tell the president that the United States was at war 

was impossible to identify the enemy.

Strategic information warfare would raise a pleth

ethical, political, and legal issues. If the United State

facing a high-tech insurgent, criminal, or ter

movement, for instance, could the American milita

some other branch of government) strike at its inform

and financial assets even though they were spread 

computer networks in dozens of sovereign nations? S

cyberattacks be answered only in kind or might tradi

weapons be used to respond to them? And, how doe

concept of collateral damage apply to cyberattacks? 

even broader level, who is responsible for the defens

nation’s information infrastructure? The government

military? Private industry?

At the same time that basic policy issues are 

discussed, the Clinton administration has b

addressing organizational questions. The first majo

62
Infrastructure Protection.

105

 Efforts to protect 

information systems have centered on the Nat

Infrastructure Protection Center of the FBI.

106

 This in

representatives of the FBI, the Central Intelligence Ag

the Defense Department, the Secret Service, NASA, an

U.S. Post Office. In addition to assisting with cri

investigations of cyberattacks, it makes informati

weaknesses in software available to the public. 

following a number of major denial-of-service h

attacks on large commercial Internet sites in Feb

2000, President Clinton announced an initiative to cr

voluntary, private-sector network to monitor and res

Participants will include Charles Wang, chairm

Computer Associates International Inc.; Howard Sch

chief information security officer at Microsoft Corp.; H

Miller, head of the Information Technology Associat

America; and “Mudge,” a member of a hacker think 

that does security consulting under the name AtStak

President plans to ask Congress for $9 million to help c

the center.

107

 According to the White House, the cente

of the federal government’s efforts in this area will b

Institute for Information Infrastructure Protectio

which the President has requested $50 million in his 

Year 2001 budget.

108

While substantial movement is underway on the de

of national information infrastructure, offe

information warfare is more controversial.

109

 Followi

1999 air campaign against Serbia, there were report

the United States had used offensive information wa

and thus “triggered a superweapon that catapulte

country into a military era that could forever alter the 

of war and the march of history.”

110

 According to this 

the U.S. military targeted Serbia’s command and c

network and telephone system. Other press re

though, suggested that whatever offensive inform

warfare capabilities the United States had were not 

against Serbia due to ethical and practical proble

63
predicted or controlled given current technology, there 

fears that their use would make American mi

commanders liable to war crimes charges. In January 

though, U.S. Air Force General Richard Meyers, 

commander of U.S. Space Command, announced th

organization will be given the mission of “com

attack.”

112

 The irony is that pressure exists to make th

of force both less lethal and more precise. At the end 

20th century, information warfare is less lethal but als

precise than conventional force. If this changes, str

information warfare could be catapulted to a central r

U.S. military strategy.

Technological Transformation.

There are glimmerings of changes in war even 

profound than strategic information warfare. While 

will not alter the essence of war, new technologies o

combinations of technology have the potential to alt

only tactics and operational methods, but military str

itself by the second or third decade of the 21st century

of the most important trends in military strategy be

the 18th and 20th centuries was the broadening of its 

In the 18th century, one needed only to destroy the en

field army or, in some cases, seize control of key fo

territory. With the emergence of “total war” in the 

century, an enemy’s entire society and infrastru

became the targets of military operations. M

technology allowed war to move toward a “total” 

described by Clausewitz, reaching ever greater lev

destruction. The conundrum faced by political leaders 

is that there is still a need to use armed force

interconnectedness and other factors have made it di

to mobilize and sustain the level of passion and 

necessary for total war. Strategists thus need some w

coerce or punish an enemy elite or, at least, to disrupt 

plans, without the wholesale destruction of infrastru

or killing of noncombatants. This is the reason 

64
revolution in military affairs.

Within a few decades, technology may provide solu

to this strategic conundrum. After the Gulf War, Ame

military leaders bragged that technology allowed th

not only select which building a bomb will hit, but to 

which window of the building the bomb entered. 

technology, particularly mini- or micro-robots, may 

military planners to select which individual or ph

object in a building is to be destroyed. For the first ti

might be possible to target only the aggressor’s le

leaving noncombatants untouched. Within a few de

the technology might exist to construct killer robots th

of a grain of sand that could search for and kill f

Saddam Husseins.

Like all new military technology, such fine-

precision will bring new risks, costs, dilemmas

unintended side effects. Americans have long stru

with the ethics of deliberate assassination of enemy lea

Such acts were rare even in the midst of declared 

During World War II, the only known instances we

American downing of the plane carrying Ad

Yamamoto, a British attempt to kill Erwin Rommel, 

German plot to kill Dwight Eisenhower. T

assassination of enemy leaders outside of declared w

proscribed by presidential directive. But as the techn

to target enemy elites becomes available, Americans 

any others who develop a postmodern military) may re

the ethics of using it. Future armed conflict may no l

pit one society against another, but one leadership 

against another.

113

 While much speculation on futur

focuses on the proliferation of weapons of mass destru

and the spread of terrorism and thus contends 

noncombatants will be prime victims of future war

opposite is at least feasible. With brilliants robots, f

armed conflict, like much of medieval war and 18th ce

European war, may be a sport for elites that leave

masses relatively untouched.

65
decades are likely to see the proliferation of robots a

the world and in many walks of life. Hans Morave

instance, contends that mass produced robots will app

the next decade and slowly evolve into general pu

machines.

114

 Ray Kurzweil takes the argument even fu

and holds that by the end of the 21st century, human b

will no longer be the most intelligent entities o

planet.

115

 However fast the evolution of robotics proce

will invariably affect armed conflict. As one of the mos

customers of new technology, this will certainly affe

American military in the years after 2020.

Initially, the prime function of military robots wil

replace humans in particularly dangerous or te

functions. Examples might include evacuation of casu

under fire; operating in environments where nu

biological, or chemical weapons have been used; 

clearing; fire fighting; and reconnaissance, surveil

and target acquisition.

116

 The real breakthrough 

decision point will come when robots advance to the 

that they have the potential for combat use. This wil

some time, particularly for land warfare which takes 

in a much more challenging operating environme

autonomous systems than does air, space, or sea wa

Robots intended for battlefield use will have to be ord

magnitude “smarter” than those used for less str

functions such as loading and moving material.

117

Current thinking about the technological characte

of future military robots moves along two parallel t

each synthesizing robotics and other eme

technologies. The first envisions autonomous system

employ sensors, computing, and propulsion very dif

from that used by people. One of the goals in this ar

miniaturization. Mini or micro-robots could be 

carried, yet perform a range of difficult or dang

military missions.

118

 The Pentagon already has 

million program under way to develop a bird

flapping-wing micro-air vehicle for battle

66
beginning, The true revolution could come from 

maturation of microelectromechanical systems or M

which many leading scientists contend will be deve

within 30 years with a dramatic impact in many endea

MEMS technologies construct very tiny mecha

devices coupled to electrical sensors and actuat

According to the Defense Advanced Research Pr

Agency (DARPA):

The field of Microelectromechanical Systems (MEMS) is 

revolutionary, enabling technology. It will merge the functio

of compute, communicate and power together with sen

actuate and control to change completely the way people a

machines interact with the physical world. Using 

ever-expanding set of fabrication processes and materia

MEMS will provide the advantages of small size, low pow

low mass, low-cost and high-functionality to integrat

electromechanical systems both on the micro as well on t

macro scale.

MEMS is based on a manufacturing technology that has h

roots in microelectronics, but MEMS will go beyond this init

set of processes as MEMS becomes more intimately integrat

into macro devices and systems. MEMS will be successful 

all applications where size, weight and power must decrea

simultaneously with functionality increases, and all wh

done under extreme cost pressure.

121

Eventually MEMS could open the way for an even 

profound revolution in nanotechnology which is bas

“bio-mimicry” manufacturing. A report from the 

Commission on National Security/21st Century state

The implications of nanotechnology are particula

revolutionary given that such technologies will operate at t

intersection of information technologies and biotechnologi

This merging and melding of technologies will produ

smaller, more stable, and cheaper circuitry that can 

embedded, and functionally interconnected, into practica

anything—including organic life forms.

122

67
allow things like a “robotic tick” the size of a large 

which could attach itself to an enemy system such as a 

then gather and transmit information or perform sab

at a designated time.

123

 In a fanciful but technolog

feasible description of the future battlefield, James A

writes:

MEMS opens a window on a new generation of technology t

will literally transform the battlefield. Tomorrow’s soldier 

go to war with tiny aircraft in his backpack that he will be abl

fly ahead of him to smell, see and hear what lies over the hi

inside the next building. Additional intelligence will be supp

by sensors disguised as blades of grass, pockets of sand or e

clouds of dust.

124

However radical such a notion might seem, it is, li

official vision of the future, essentially new technology 

in old ways. By contrast, futurists like Martin Libick

speculated on modes of warfare to make maximum 

MEMS-based technology. In fact, Libicki’s altern

vision of future war is one of the most profound and cr

seen to date. Its essence is that information techn

among other things, is shifting the advantage in warf

“the small and the many” over “the large, the complex

the few.” This is in stark contrast to orthodox Ame

strategic thinking that seeks ever more capable sy

that are, by definition, more expensive, and thus acqui

smaller numbers, but is a logical development of the co

of distributed robotics under exploration by DARPA.

 Libicki describes three stage in the ascendance o

small and the many.” He calls the first “popup war

This is based on extant technology in a sec

environment characterized by the proliferation of pre

guided munitions (PGMs). While Joint Vision 201

other official documents expect many states to 

precision guided munitions, they assume that the Ame

military can overcome enemy PGMs by stealth, opera

dispersion, and speed. Libicki is more skeptical. 

68
drawn-out,” he writes, “but...the betting has to be ag

stealth for any platform large enough to encomp

human...even with stealth, everything ultimately c

found.”

125

 The result will be “popup warfare” where 

sides stay hidden most of the time, pop up just brie

move or shoot, and then “scurry into the background

Libicki’s second stage of future warfare, which he 

“the mesh,” uses technologies available over the ne

years against an enemy with developed industr

underdeveloped informational capabilities. To a 

extent, this is coterminous with the official vision tha

for an interlinked mesh of sensors and inform

technology to give American commanders a clea

perfect view of the battlefield while their opponents re

in the dark. Reinforcing the assumptions found in 

Vision 2010 and other official documents, Libicki w

“Tomorrow’s meshes will allow their possessor to 

anything worth hitting.”

127

Libicki’s third stage represents the ultimate ascen

of “the small and the many.” He contends that even

enemies will develop their capabilities to the point th

platforms that compose the American military’s “mesh

be vulnerable to attack. The solution is to weave a 

composed of small, moderately priced objects rather t

handful of very large and very expensive ones. “Batt

meshes, as such, can be built from millions of se

emitters, and sub-nodes dedicated to the task of coll

every interesting signature and assessing its valu

location for targeting purposes.”

128

 This is w

MEMS-based robotics becomes significant. L

speculates on the value of ant-like robots with eac

having a fairly limited capability, but the weaving tog

of their collective capabilities generates exte

capabilities. The inherent redundancy of the mesh in 

Libicki calls “fire ant warfare,” in which small, rela

simple weapons and sensors swarm onto a large co

69
than the one envisioned in official documents.

While initial thinking about robotics concentrat

miniaturization and the integration of networks of 

robots with relatively limited functions, partially or

robots may prove nearly as useful. According to a r

report from the U.S. Commission on National Securit

Century, “Notions of ‘androids,’ cyborgs,’ and ‘bionic

and women have dwelled exclusively in the realm of s

fiction. But at least the beginnings of such capabilities 

literally exist within the lifetime of today’s eleme

school children.”

129

 Soon it might be possible to m

cameras or other sensors on dogs, rats, insects or bird

to steer them using some sort of implant. 130

Simple cyborgs like this may be only the beginnin

even more fundamental revolution or, more precisel

marriage of several ongoing technological revolu

Lonnie D. Henley, for instance, argues that a meld

developments in molecular biology, nanotechnology

information technology will stoke a second gener

revolution in military affairs.

131

 Nanotechnology 

manufacturing process that builds at the atomic leve

is in very early stages, but holds the real possibil

machines that are extremely small, perhaps 

microscopic. Eric Drexler, the most fervent advoc

nanotechnology, predicts that it will unlea

transformation of society as self-replicating nanor

manufacture any materials permitted by the laws of n

and thus help cure illness, eliminate poverty, an

pollution.

1 3 3

 As Henley points out, comb

nanotechnology with molecular biology and advanc

information technology could, conceivably, lead to t

like biological warfare weapons that are selective in ta

and are triggered only by specific signals or circumsta

It could also lead to radically decentralized sensor 

perhaps composed of millions of microscopic air

sensors or, at least, a mesh of very small robo

envisioned by Libicki. And, Henley contends, it 

70
networks into silicone-based computers, thus gr

augmenting their “intelligence.”

Beyond technological obstacles, the potentia

effective battlefield robots raises a whole series of stra

operational, and ethical issues, particularly when 

robots change from being lifters to killers. The ide

killing system without direct human control is frighte

Because of this, developing the “rules of engagemen

robotic warfare is likely to be extraordinarily conten

How much autonomy should robots have to engage ta

As a robot discovers a target and makes the “decisi

engage it, what should the role of humans be? Wo

human have to give the killer robot final approval to s

How would the deployment of battlefield robots affe

ability of the U.S. military to operate in coalition with 

who do not have them (given that a roboticized force is 

to take much lower casualties than a non-roboticized 

Should the United States attempt to contro

proliferation of military robotic technology? Is this fe

since most of the evolution of robotic technology

information technology in general, will take place 

private sector? Should a fully roboticized force b

ultimate objective?

Other emerging technologies could prove eq

revolutionary. One example is what can be c

“psychotechnology.” Future military commanders 

have the technology to alter the beliefs, perceptions

feelings of enemies. This could range from thing

“morphing” an enemy leader and creating a tele

broadcast in which he surrenders to much more fright

ideas like perception-altering implants, chemica

beams of some sort. Such technologies would be partic

ominous from an ethical perspective. Today, effectiv

controllable psychotechnology is science fiction, but 

was space flight not so long ago. Any developments i

realm warrant very close scrutiny. Barring some s

71
environment, they should be eschewed.

72
THE MARK OF SUCCESS

 FOR FUTURE MILITARIES

Foundation.

The more things change, the more they stay the 

Like all cliches, this one has a core of truth, particular

of armed conflict. Colin Gray reminds us, more 

strategy is persistent, even eternal, than is changea

Even in revolutionary times, continuity outweighs ch

This holds true for the current revolution in military a

No matter how much technology, operational metho

military organizations shift (or appear to shift), wa

always involve, as Clausewitz noted, a dangerou

dynamic relationship among passion, hatred, re

chance and probability.

1 3 5

 The best that mi

commanders and strategists can hope for is to hold pa

in check with rationality, and to minimize the delet

effects of chance and probability through plan

training, and, to an extent, technological aids. One ca

prepare for chance through redundancy, fallback posi

and “Plan B.” Passion injects even more conu

particularly in informal war where its depths c

difficult for those not intimate with the conflict. For 

reason, humans find it easier to accept simple bad luck 

blind hatred.

The “specialness” of warfighting and warrior

survive any real or apparent changes in the nature of a

conflict. War is and will be distinct from other ty

human activity. Largely because of this, future warrio

least in democracies like the United States, will conti

be bound by an ethos stressing duty, honor, sacrifice

the highest ethical standards. Sometimes their enemie

not share this. This ethical asymmetry is likely 

significant. In future armed conflict as in past warfig

73
What will change, though, is the definition of quality. 

expand and take on new, important meanings. But t

not surprising: the expansion of concepts and definiti

perhaps the most pervasive change of all in the cu

revolution in military affairs.

Speed.

One of the most important determinants of succe

21st century militaries will be the extent to which th

faster than their opponents. Increased speed is a de

element of the current revolution in military affairs (a

the information revolution and the revolution in bu

affairs, for that matter). Armed forces that can mov

make decisions rapidly will have inherent advan

Tactical and operational speed comes from inform

technology—the “digitized” force—and approp

doctrine and training. It allows a military to surpr

enemy, to maximize its own advantages and minimize 

of the opponent, and to remain dispersed as long as po

(which will be vital in the lethal battlefields of the 

century thick with precision guided munitions and we

of mass destruction). A military with tactica

operational speed will be able to “pulse” its activ

concentrating and dispersing in rapid sequence. Ju

there are specific frequencies at which a pulsed strobe 

is most unsettling to those exposed to it, it is likely 

there are psychologically optimal frequencies for p

military operations.

Strategic speed will be equally important 

determinant of success in future armed conflict. For na

that undertake long-range power projection, strategic 

includes mobility into and within a theater of m

operations. In the broadest sense, this entails mak

lighter, more transportable military force. A num

technologies show promise in this arena, from rela

simple steps like replacing heavy materials in m

74
woven metal, for instance—to more complex one

eventually moving away from petroleum based fuel

kinetic ammunition, both of which are heavy and b

Another step that could help with strategic speed 

emphasis on modularity in all military systems. R

than having a tank that could only be a tank, a truc

could only be a truck, etc., it would be very valuable to h

standard mobility platform which could have task-sp

modules attached to it.

Strategic speed also entails faster decisionmaking

of the core dilemmas the United States is likely to f

having a military that can deploy and operate at light

speed, while strategic and political decisionmaking rem

a time-consuming process of consensus building. Th

Army is currently using the concept of “strategic preclu

as a tool to assess long-term force development.

136

 Thi

for an Army that can be deployed to a theater to for

imminent aggression rather than having to dislod

aggressor that has already seized the territory of Ame

friend or ally. But this concept assumes that a f

American president will use military force very earl

crisis before other options have been exhausted

American political decisionmaking process simply do

work that quickly. Consensus building, particularly w

involves the use of force, takes time. This problem is 

worse for decisionmaking in alliances like NATO w

each participant must undertake national decisionm

prior to collective action. This is not always bad th

consensus decision is often better than an imposed 

particularly in any a system where the rank and file 

both some degree of power and access to inform

Protraction, though, brings risk.

In coming decades, interconnectedness plu

dispersion of power and information will make the ne

consensus decisionmaking even more important. State

have to justify the use of armed force. The probl

balancing the time consuming nature of cons

75
ability to launch quick, perhaps even preemptive mi

operations will be one of the advantages which postm

militaries will have over less advanced adversaries. B

states which have the potential to build postm

militaries will be precisely those with the greatest ne

consensus decisionmaking. This will be an endu

perhaps even defining dilemma for advanced states. 

decisionmaking speed may not be decisive in future a

conflict, it will be a factor, with some advantages go

those entities that can reach a decision quickly. 

suggests an advantage of sorts for postmodern non

actors, which often will have more streamlined mea

decisionmaking. Often armed conflict betwe

postmodern state military and a postmodern nonstate 

will be one where the aggregate resources of the sta

used to counterbalance the flexibility and adaptabi

the nonstate actors. In such cases, the ultimate outcom

often be contingent on the willingness of the state to 

the costs of the conflict.

Speed also has an even broader, “meta-stra

meaning. The militaries which meet with the gr

success in future armed conflict will be those whic

undertake rapid organizational and conceptual adapt

In existing militaries, with their bureaucratic 

hierarchical organizations, change is slow, often glac

can take decades to develop and field new systems, con

or methods. Some of the enemies of the future, partic

networked opponents using informal and gray area 

will adapt rapidly. In some cases, this may compensa

quantitative shortcomings. To respond, successful 

militaries must institutionalize procedures for what 

be called “strategic entrepreneurship”—the abil

rapidly identify and understand significant changes 

strategic environment and form appropriate organiza

and concepts. Information technology will help. By all

intricate, cross-cutting, and broad band communi

across components of the military, information techn

76
The institutional cultures of successful militaries wil

toward greater creativity and flexibility and away f

debilitating degree of risk aversion. This will 

far-ranging effects on recruitment, leader develop

promotion, and education. Military schools like sta

war colleges will be particularly vital. As in the past, v

or defeat in future armed conflict will be rooted in e

that took place years earlier in military classrooms.

Precision.

It is often said that the American military of the f

must be “more lethal.”

137

 But lethality is only part of 

success. In fact, the future American military must b

to operate with greater precision. In one sense, this is 

new idea. Most analysis of the current revolution in mi

affairs stresses precision. George and Meredith Fried

for instance, rank the development of precision g

munitions along with the introduction of firearm

phalanx, and the chariot as “a defining moment in h

history.”

138

 But despite the attention given to precisio

architects and analysts of the revolution in military a

have taken too narrow an approach to it. Like s

precision has multiple facets and dimensions.

So far thinking on the revolution in military affai

focused on what might be called physical precision

ability to hit targets with great accuracy from 

distances with precisely the desired physical e

Physical precision is derived from improved intellig

guidance systems and, increasingly, from the abil

adjust or “tune” the effects that a particular weapon h

proposed electro-magnetic gun, for instance, cou

adjusted from a non-lethal setting to an extremely 

one.

139

 But there is more to precision than simply hitti

right target. Military strategists and commanders 

come to think in terms of psychological precision as w

77
operation so as to attain the desired attitudes, belief

perceptions on the part of both the enemy and 

observers, whether noncombatants in the area of opera

or global audiences. Like so much of the revoluti

military affairs, this is a new variant of an old idea. Mi

thinkers have long understood that war is integ

perhaps even essentially psychological. Sun Tzu, of c

crafted the quintessentially psychological approa

strategy, contending that “all warfare is base

deception.”

140

 While some disciples of Clause

particularly German military strategists, acted 

disregard for the psychological dimension of strateg

Prussian theorist himself clearly understood that war 

psychological struggle and the objective is to brea

enemy’s will.

141

Today the American military is not as stro

psychological precision as it should be, in part be

technological advantages appear to make psychol

effectiveness unnecessary. The explanation, though

even deeper than that. For a nation composed of 

cultures, the United States has never had a 

understanding of other cultures, perhaps because i

never a major colonial power. This has shown up whe

the U.S. military is engaged in cross-cultural conflict. 

American strategists “mirror image” the enemy and 

their campaigns based on what they feel would 

Americans to surrender without taking into accoun

psychological differences between antagonists. Whe

enemy does not react to conditions the way that Ame

would, he is labeled “irrational.” The American expe

with counterinsurgency offers many illustrations: a

thinkers like Edward Lansdale and John Paul Vann 

understood it were often ignored. But just as m

corporations are finding that they can no longer affo

inefficiencies of their industrial predecessors, postm

militaries must extract every possible degree of prec

psychological and well as physical. In fact, so much o

78
in the full glare of global scrutiny that psychol

precision might be the more important variant.

How might future militaries attain gr

psychological precision? To some extent, technolog

help. It is vital to have a very wide range of m

capabilities—a “rheostatic” capability—to assure th

operation has the desired psychological affect. 

suggests a growing need for effective nonlethal wea

particularly in instances where the psychological obj

is to demonstrate the futility of opposition without kill

many of the enemy or noncombatants that the enemy

is steeled rather than broken or that public opposit

mobilized. Some advocates of nonlethal weapons go so 

to see them as the central element in future a

conflict.

142

 This is probably an overstatement; they w

an integral tool for attaining psychological precisio

sustaining the political utility of force.

Different forms of psychotechnology might allow g

psychological precision. Conceivably, technology mig

developed that would give militaries the ability to alt

perceptions of targets, perhaps causing intense fear, 

or whatever reaction was required. But any state wi

capability and inclination to develop such technology s

be extraordinarily careful because of the potenti

violations of basic human rights. In the vast major

cases, technology for psychological manipulation sho

eschewed. Some state or organization unbound by e

and legal constraints, though, eventually may 

psychotechnology. Then the United States will ha

decide whether to respond in kind or seek other me

defense. The potential for a psychotechology arms r

real.

Technology, though, is only part of psychol

precision. There is a vast body of psychological ana

particularly that dealing with anxiety and fear, which 

adequately integrated into military planning. Whe

79
enemy, the operation should be phased and shape

maximum psychological impact. Successful militaries 

take steps to assure that operational and strategic pla

staffs are psychologically astute, whether by educatin

planners themselves or using information technolo

provide access to psychologists, cultural psychologist

members of other cultures. They should undertake 

cultural psychological studies aimed at building data 

and models which can help guide operational plannin

Precision has a strategic component which is some

overlooked. Strategic precision entails shaping a milit

that it best reflects its nation’s strategic situation, incl

strategic culture, level of technological developmen

most significant threats. For the U.S. military, this e

finding the appropriate balance among capabilities t

with formal war, informal war, and gray area war. I

entails reaching a degree of privatization which maxi

efficiency without creating unacceptable risks. In atta

strategic precision, past success can be a hindranc

Edward Luttwak points out, the paradoxical lo

strategy often makes victory the midwife of d

Militaries which have won great victories resist ch

even when the methods and structures that brought 

success grow obsolete.

143

 Victory limits the urge to 

and innovate. For the United States, avoid

victory-induced slumber will be a key step tow

postmodern military.

Strategic precision will also entail the ability to id

the key strategic thresholds. Nonlethal weapons 

strategic information warfare will cause the thresho

the acceptable use of force to be redrawn. In the old se

system, states and even nonstate actors knew when 

was considered appropriate. At times they deemed the 

and risks of ignoring this worthwhile, but usually fo

their strategies with the threshold in sight. But non

weapons and strategic information warfare 

increasingly blur this threshold. It will be some time 

80
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

globalization are elevating the threshold at which 

will be willing to undertake the costs and risks of large

conventional war, leading them toward less provo

(and less effective) methods such as limited strikes, 

violence, or information warfare. Eventually

maturation of miniaturized robots may force an addi

redefinition of thresholds as states that have 

technology decide when and how it should be used. S

that develop an accurate understanding of these 

thresholds—those that understand the ethical conto

their time—will be less likely to make dang

miscalculations, and thus more successful than the

astute counterparts.

Finding and Hiding.

In an age of precision guided munitions, what c

found usually can be destroyed. As Martin Libicki 

conventional warfare is changing from force on fo

hide-and-seek.

144

 Given this, one of the most c

dynamics of future armed conflict will be the str

between finding and hiding. Successful militaries w

those better at finding their enemies than their enemi

at finding them. Within the United States, the emp

has been on the offensive part of this equation—the fin

American strategists and technologists are expending 

effort and treasure to build ever more effective syste

systems linking a multiplicity of sensors, developing m

for rapid data fusion, and communicating the de

knowledge to battlefield commanders. This is cer

worthwhile: the ability to “find” will be a determin

success in future armed conflict. Hiding, though, war

more attention.

Hiding has not been ignored, particularly at the ta

level. Witness all of the effort given stealthy technol

the United States. Campaign plans usually inclu

81
security. But the information revolution and interco

tedness have altered some of the basic precepts of dece

Standard works on military deception written as recen

10 years ago are virtually obsolete.

145

 Future m

strategists must rebuild their understanding of dece

and hiding, working with new information technolog

allows morphing and sophisticated spoofing (incl

things like holographic soldiers, tanks, planes, a

forth). In particular, the notions of operational and str

deception must be revisited. At the same time, the lega

ethical dimensions of deception need refinement. Mili

which do this before they enter armed conflict will inc

their chances of success. Those which do it “on the fly

face problems.

Reorganizing.

A revolution in military affairs requires not only 

technology, but new operational concepts and organizati

The most successful future militaries will be those 

undertake a “blank slate” reevaluation of their 

concepts and organizational precepts. Organization

represent a hybrid blend of hierarchical structures 

networks, public components with private, and hu

with machines await further analysis. We can borrow 

the business world, but not import directly. We know 

hybrid will be important, but do not yet know 

shortcomings and hidden problems.

Other blank slate organizational questions also 

asked. For instance, does it make sense to think of mi

service as a career that begins at age 18 or 21, continu

20 or 30 years, and then stops? The dynamics o

information revolution may, in fact, force postm

militaries to consider things like mid-career accessio

addition to contracting. Since many of the skills need

future militaries will also be in great demand in the ci

sector, militaries might find it necessary to recruit mid

82
the service, and to reward them at a level equivalent to 

they would attain in the civilian sector. This is, of cou

risky procedure. It could cause tension and rifts wit

military between those who were career mil

professionals and those who came in mid-career. 

would have to be taken to assure that that those who j

the military mid-career reflected the ethos of honor, 

and sacrifice that is essential to the functioning 

military. Some analysts are already voicing concern 

the ethical repercussions of privatizing many mi

functions.

147

 Even so, reevaluating career paths i

military might be necessary.

The trend in the commercial world has been tow

blurring between management and staff. If th

extrapolated to the military, it might be necessa

consider whether the division of a service into en

personnel and commissioned officers makes sense 

21st century. After all, this distinction arose to refle

schism between commoners and aristocrats durin

birth of modern militaries. Since societies are no l

organized that way, perhaps militaries should abando

split between aristocrats and commoners.

In addition, the organization of militaries into land

and air services needs assessed. Perhaps it would 

more sense to organize them into components focuse

specific type of armed conflict—one for formal war, o

informal, and one for gray area war. Alternat

postmodern militaries must consider whether a new s

is needed for new operating environments. Martin L

for instance, supports the creation of an “information 

within the U.S. military.

148

 There are reports that Ch

considering formation of a fourth military serv

concentrate on information warfare.

149

 Other analy

even further than calling for a new service. For R

Bunker, who is one of the more creative writers on f

warfare today, this implies a fundamental change 

nature of warfare—not simply the appliqué of m

83
future, but the addition of a fifth dimension of warf

three-dimensional space and time.

150

 In stark contr

the official vision of the future, Bunker holds tha

United States is unlikely to attain dominant battle

knowledge in cyberspace, whether in what he cal

“upper tier” which is the Internet and the electroma

spectrum, or the “lower tier” which is the stealth mask

physical forces. But, he predicts, other state militarie

do no better, so the prime enemy will be non-state a

often criminals, with the flexibility and creativity to 

use of cyberspace’s potential. For the U.S. military 

truly successful, Bunker argues, it must master 

concepts like cyber-shielding, cyber-maneuver, and wh

calls “bond-relationship” targeting that creates “ta

disruption within a thing, between it and other thin

between it and its environment by degrading, severi

altering the bonds and relationships which defin

existence.” Whether Libicki’s more modest propos

Bunker’s radical one proves accurate for postm

militaries, it is clear that those which are able to let go 

organizational patterns and embrace, even master 

ones will be the most likely to succeed in future a

conflict.

Adjusting Civil-Military Relations.

The ability of a state military to succeed at a

conflict is determined, in part, by its relationship 

society it defends. Stable, healthy civil-military rela

make it easier to sustain support for a military and f

military to recruit talented members. At the beginn

the 21st century, the changing nature of armed confli

force every state military to evaluate and adju

relationship with society. For instance, the abil

postmodern militaries to strike targets around the 

very quickly and with apparent impunity will aggrava

tension between military commanders and civ

leaders.

151

 Military commanders will recognize that 

84
and decrease risk, while civilian leaders—at least th

democracies—will continue to see armed force as 

resort, only to be used when other methods have failed 

the risks to the military have thus escalated). Even

the emergence of strategic information warfare an

increased significance of gray area war and infrastru

attacks will blur the line between military and nonmi

functions. 

Since so many factors shape civil-military relati

historical, economic, political, cultural, demographic, a

forth—every military will face a slightly different 

problems as it adjusts. Despite some recent worries a

“crisis” in American civil-military relations, the 

military continues to be held in high esteem by the pub

This is due, in part, to the great efforts by the leaders 

the services to inculcate the highest ethical stan

possible, and to stress sacrifice, honor, and duty. It i

due to the afterglow arising from of the collapse of the S

Union and the American-engineered victory in the 

War. Eventually this will fade. If the future U.S. milit

involved in murky and morally confusing conflicts ag

nonstate actors and criminal cartels rather than aggr

dictators, public support might be shakier.

In 1992 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. held that the use 

military in nontraditional roles, especially law enforce

functions, could shake the foundation of civil-mi

relations.

153

 While Dunlap’s literary device—a failed f

military coup d’etat in the United States—was delibe

far-fetched, his point merits serious consideration

current health of American civil-military relations is 

on the perception that: (1) the military has a vital job to 

defending the nation against external enemies, it d

very competently, and should receive adequate resour

do so; (2) the effectiveness of the U.S. military doe

threaten domestic civil rights or political institutions

(3) the U.S. military represents the best of tradi

85
could degrade civil-military relations.

This is not to suggest that American policym

should eschew the use of the military for anything 

than traditional warfighting. If informal or gray are

poses serious threats to American national securit

American people and their elected leaders are lik

demand the involvement of the U.S. military

policymakers must be aware of the potential dang

civil-military relations. Among other things, any decl

the prestige of the military could complicate recruit

The integration of more and more technology 

increasingly rapid and complex operations makes it vi

the military to be able to attract the highest quality rec

The prestige of service is a vital component of this. 

prestige erodes, it will be very difficult to attract t

particularly in those realms like information techn

and strategic leadership where the military com

directly with the commercial world for talent. Along 

same lines, the U.S. military must continue its effo

assure that its ethnic and gender composition re

American society (even while insisting that its values r

the best of American society rather than the norm).

The U.S. military must do its part to help for

problems with civil-military relations. Foremost, it 

assure that any capabilities or methods it develops r

national values and strategic culture. For instan

should eschew operational concepts that call fo

preemptive use of force on the part of the United Sta

for actions that would indiscriminately 

noncombatants like attacks against satellit

information systems which are linked to global netwo

might be tempting to use hacker attacks to seiz

economic or informational resources of, say, a gray 

enemy, but if this entails intrusion into the inform

infrastructure of other states, its adverse political r

could outweigh its military utility. Given this, the 

military should not even suggest such actions to po

86
fundamental way, the military should eschew develop

of dangerous new technologies like psychotechnology 

run counter to American values like personal privac

civil rights.

After Vietnam, the U.S. military stopped t

civil-military relations for granted and recognized t

was like a marriage or any other relationship: mainte

required hard work. As a result, the American m

established a number of outreach and communica

programs to solidify its links with the public and 

elected leaders. In the 21st century security environ

successful militaries will emulate this. Those which 

civil-military relations to chance will suffer; those 

nurture the relationship through the transition i

nature of armed conflict will have an easier time.

Controlling for Asymmetry.

Since asymmetric conflict will be common in the op

decades of the 21st century, finding ways to res

transcend it will be one of the determinants of succe

militaries and other organizations that participa

armed conflict. When a postmodern state military is 

against a modern state military or a modern nonstate 

time will be the key element. Postmodern militarie

attempt to use speed and knowledge to bring the conf

quick resolution. Their enemies will seek protracted 

whether through dispersion, deception, terro

counterdeployment operations, or persistence. This m

that postmodern militaries must seek speedy resolut

conflicts. But what will happen if they fail?

Current American thinking about future war is bas

the idea that if war becomes necessary, the pre

method is a quick resolution using cutting-edge, ra

deployable forces and precision strikes against key ta

If sustained combat becomes necessary, then re

component units (and, hopefully, allied forces) w

87
component units, plans for the creation, training

equipping of new units are underdeveloped. Similarly, 

are no plans for reconstituting the defense industrial 

Long wars are simply considered inconceivable. Thi

potential problem. While everything suggests tha

future United States (just like the current one) would 

short wars, failing to plan for protracted conflict incr

the chances it will occur. Given this, greater atte

should be given to protracted war in the various warg

seminars, and simulations that the U.S. military u

think about future armed conflict.

Armed conflict involving a postmodern nonstate a

more difficult to asses, in large part because there a

full-blown examples to consider. It is not clear, for ins

whether a postmodern nonstate actor could undert

protracted conflict or not. In all likelihood, it could s

would not be constrained by the interconnectednes

legal/ethical frameworks that make protracted war di

for nations. Asymmetric conflict with a postm

nonstate actor is thus likely to devolve into a contest of 

with the side willing to pay the greatest price in bloo

treasure coming out ahead. Successful 21st ce

militaries will be those who understand asymm

transcend it when possible, and moderate its effects 

they cannot transcend it.

Adapting to Technological Shifts.

The ability to accept and capitalize on eme

technology will be a determinant of success in future a

conflict. This is good news for the United States. No mi

is better at this than the American, in large part becau

culture is better at it than the American. American

infatuated with technology. This has deep roots in hi

As the United States grew and matured throughou

19th century, the rapid expansion of the frontier 

persistent labor shortages. Technology, by substit

88
What began, then, as a practical reaction to an eco

problem eventually had a profound impact on na

perceptions and attitudes, settling deep withi

American collective self-conscious. It is more 

coincidence that much of modern, technology-inte

industry was born in the United States, or that wiza

technology from Eli Whitney through Thomas Edison 

Gates have become American cultural icons. Technol

part of how Americans see themselves, to reach fo

instinctive. This works to the advantage of the Ame

military.

That said, there will be new, radical technologies 

great promise which will challenge the ability o

military to master and integrate. In particular, rob

miniaturization, and nonlethality are likely to provid

keys to future success. But resistance to automated sy

will probably be intense. It was the manned combat air

carrier battlegroup, armored division, and Marine 

squad that made the U.S. military the dominant o

earth. The natural tendency will be to reject revoluti

technology in favor of applique technology that aug

the capability of existing combat systems in some ma

way. Eventually, the benefits of such an approach will 

out. The real issue will then be whether it is the 

military that first proves willing to jettison the ol

adopt the new, or some other. History holds om

warnings on this account. Seldom did the state tha

began a revolution in military affairs end up master

At one time, Britain and France were far ahead of Ger

in aircraft and tank development. But Germany was 

willing to innovate, in large part because of its m

inferiority. The result was blitzkrieg. It is at least po

that the United States is blazing the way in the cu

revolution in military affairs, but will eventually be p

by another state or another nonstate actor driv

innovation by desperation and perceived weakness. I

case, the future certainly belongs to those armed 

89
the maximum effectiveness from it.

Anticipating Second and Third Order Effects.

Because strategy and armed conflict are so comple

action has a multitude of second order effects (and 

fourth, and so on). Often, these become vital determi

of the future. When President Franklin Roos

authorized the Manhattan Project, for instance, who 

have anticipated that this decision would eventually h

increase the strategic significance of rural guerrilla w

raising the risks associated with traditional great 

war), solidify the political and economic ties betwee

United States and its former enemies, Germany and J

(by providing cheap security through extended deterr

generate the “space race” as the United States an

Soviet Union competed for the strategic “high ground

inspire a global peace movement? In all likelihood, str

decisions made today, particularly by the United S

will have equally profound second and third order effe

21st century armed conflict.

Some of these second order effects will be strateg

political. To take one example, by vigorously pursu

revolution in military affairs designed to augment 

projection and, perhaps, to lessen the need for allie

United States may very well encourage the strengthen

regional security structures designed to minimize the 

for American involvement or intervention. In part, t

because Americans consistently fail to understand 

intimidating the combination of U.S. military power

economic power, and American popular culture can 

many people around the world, the fact that the U

States currently faces no pressing threat to vital na

interests yet is willing to spend billions, perhaps trilli

dollars to undertake a revolutionary improvement 

armed forces is frightening. Washington, they con

must have plans to use the postmodern American mi

90
are actually pursuing the revolution in military affair

way to retain the political utility of armed forc

maintain the global political and economic gains made 

the Cold War, the second order effects of this actio

likely to prove adverse to American interests and objec

Many future innovations will bring equally pro

and equally unexpected second and third order effect

development of military robotics, biotechnology

psychotechnology, in particular, may unleash a hurric

unpredictable political, legal, and ethical problems. 

may make armed force more precise and thus less ho

or they may have the exact opposite effect and escala

human costs to even higher levels. The growing inte

nectedness among aggressor organizations may mak

world a more dangerous place, or they may inspire g

interconnectedness among organizations dedicated to 

and security, thus making the world safer. The benevo

or malevolence of change is not preordained.

Ultimately, no one can fully predict the second 

effects of innovations, much less third and fourth 

effects. But this does not justify ignoring them

innovation, whether the development of new technol

the creation of new organizations and operational con

should be assessed for its broader political, social, cul

ethical, and legal ramifications. It is probably unreaso

to expect militaries, even the most astute and farsi

ones like the U.S. military, to do this on its ow

interconnectedness links diverse things, shaping the f

of armed conflict increasingly will become a shared 

among militaries and other agencies and organizatio

the creator of first postmodern military, the United S

must pave the way in this. Even this will not allow all s

and third order effects to be controlled, but the mor

can be anticipated, the better the decisions will 

questions of accepting or rejecting change and innov

Successful militaries in the 21st century will thus be 

which create an seamless web with nonmil

91
second and third order effects.

92
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIO

Conclusion.

Historians will see the last decade of the 20th ce

and the first decade or two of the 21st century as a tu

point in the evolution of armed conflict. At this poi

know fundamental change is underway but can only 

its ultimate outcome. Having assumed responsibili

encouraging and sustaining security around the worl

United States has a huge stake in this shift. To a 

extent, the ability of the U.S. military to adapt to chan

the nature of armed conflict will determine whethe

result is a more stable world or a more dangerous o

far, the U.S. military has undertaken substantial effo

understand and master the changes underway i

nature of armed conflict. But all these remain encum

by the historic successes of the 1980s and 1990s. 

future wars which the U.S. military thinks about and 

for continue to look like reprises of the Gulf War 

updated version of a Warsaw Pact strike to the wes

American military may face 21st century war unprepa

No nation has ever undertaken a full revoluti

military affairs unless it is responding to perceived r

recent disaster. The paralysis of victory is great and v

interests always powerful. If historical patterns hol

U.S. military may not be able to make the leap in

future on its own. It often seems that the Pentagon’s 

for the future, including systems acquisitions, are bas

“bygone battles.”

154

 Even the prestigious Defense S

Board has questioned whether Pentagon leaders are w

take the risks necessary to transform the milita

Ultimately, firm prodding may be necessary. This 

come from one of two directions. One is direct and pers

intervention by its political masters. This might come 

93
Reorganization Act established a preceden

congressional intervention in the armed forces. Con

felt that after years of cajoling, the U.S. military wa

taking jointness as seriously as it should. Legislatio

used to change this. Outside intervention could also 

from the President and Secretary of Defense if they 

reform minded and willing to fight the inertia i

military and in the wider defense community. The s

possible motive for revolutionary transformation, th

might be battlefield defeat. Just as the Battle of Jen

Prussia to serious military reform and defeat in World 

led Germany toward blitzkrieg, a bloody fiasco—if it d

cause an American withdrawal from global engagem

might fuel a revolutionary transformation withi

military. If the nation is lucky, visionary leadership r

than American blood will inspire the necessary chan

Recommendations.

The key strategic challenges for the Army in the sh

mid-term (5 to 20 years) will be attaining greater str

mobility, completing digitization, and becoming as eff

at shaping the strategic environment as it is at respo

to threats. The key strategic challenges for the m

long-term (15-30 years) will be:

• developing and integrating robotics and miniatu

systems;

• stressing the full modularity of equipment, sy

and organization;

• developing methods for the rapid transformat

doctrine, concepts, and organizations; and,

• developing greater psychological precision, incl

the full integration of nonlethal capabilities.

To prepare for this second wave of transformation, the 

should use its futures-oriented programs and intell

94
War College, to explore the strategic implications of 

challenges.

95
This study grew from a series of talks on the revolution in m

affairs and future war given at locations ranging 

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso to the White House Conf

Center. I owe a deep debt to those who invited me to spea

those who prodded me with questions or observations fol

the talks. I’d also like to thank Robert Bunker, James 

Edward Greisch, Douglas Johnson, Earl Tilford, D

Schnelle, and John Garofano for insightful comments on 

drafts of this study. All flaws and shortcomings that rema

purely my own and do so despite the best efforts of this gr

cutting-edge strategic thinkers.

1. See, for instance, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, 

Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, D

Pentagon, 1999, (henceforth Annual Report 1999), Chap

Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, R

the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p. iii; Keith Thom

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Warfare in the Informat

Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1997; La

Freedman, “Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” 

Analysis, Vol. 14, No.1, April 1998, pp. 55-66; Yves Boye

Révolution dans les Affaires Militaires?, Paris: Fondation p

Etudes de Défense, 1998; Robbin F. Laird and Holger H. M

Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives, Washingt

National Defense University Institute for National Strategic S

1999; and The Future Security Environment, Kingston, O

Canadian Army Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 199

author has given presentations on the revolution in military af

Australia, Canada, Belgium, France, Singapore, Germany, Jap

South Africa. This suggests the extent of interest in the topic.

2. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at th

of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993.

3. New World Coming: American Security in the 21st C

Report on the Emerging Global Security Environment for th

Quarter of the 21st Century, Arlington, VA: United States Com

on National Security/21st Century, September 15, 1999, p. 7.

97
Forbes ASAP, October 1, 1999, reprinted at http://www.for

/asap/99/1004/045.htm.

5. Internet Relay Chat was created by Jarkko Oikarinen i

Since starting in Finland, it has been used in over 60 countries 

the world. IRC is a multi-user chat system, where people m

“channels” (also known as “rooms,” these are virtual places, 

with a certain topic of conversation) to talk in groups, or privately

is no restriction to the number of people that can participate in 

discussion, or the number of channels that can be formed on I

more on the genesis of IRC see http://www.mirc.co.uk/help/ja

and jarkko2.txt.

6. For a tiny sample, see http://www.cruzio.com/~bl

http://www.angelfire.com/ne/identityonline/; http://www.Stormfr

http://www.christian-aryannations.com/; http://www.natva

http://www.ufo.pair.com/dossier/abfuct-kidnap.html; http://www.kin

com/doctrine.htm; http://www.wckkkk.com/people.html; http://www.ne

web/wwf2.shtml; http://www.forteantimes.com/artic/95/mind.html http:; 

alienjigsaw.com/index.html; http://www.thewinds.org/index.html; http:

.mo-net.com/~mlindste/7momilit.html; http://www.melvig.org/; http

usaor.net /users/ipm/;and http://ad2k.com/Army.html.

7. New World Coming., p. 1.

8. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New 

Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, pp. xv-xvi.

9. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Pow

Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

5, September/October 1998, p. 93.

10. Jessica T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

1, January-February 1997, p. 50.

11. Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the 

Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. vii.

12. New World Coming, p. 27.

13. See Mohamed Mahathir, A New Deal For Asia, Suban

Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1999.

14. Hans Moravec, Robot: Mere Machine to Transcenden

New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 1.

98
Peters, “Spotting the Losers: Seven Signs of Non-Competitive 

Parameters, Vol. 28, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 36-47. Like most of 

articles, this one is brilliant but hindered by hyperbo

sensationalism.

16. See Timothy Egan, “Free Speech vs. Free Trade,” Ne

Times, December 5, 1999.

17. New World Coming, p. 6.

18. Carl H. Builder and Brian Nichiporuk, Infor

Technologies and the Future of Land Warfare, Santa Monica, CA

Corporation, 1995, p. 35.

19. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, “The Other World Wide Web: 

Public Policy Networks,” Foreign Policy, No. 117, Winter 1999-2

44-56.

20. Norman C. Davis, “An Information-Based Revolu

Military Affairs,” in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In A

Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, Santa Mon

RAND Corporation, 1997, p. 83.

21. Douglas Farah, “New Drug Smugglers Hold Tech Adva

Washington Post, November 15, 1999, p. 1.

22. Tim Johnson, “Colombian Guerrillas Amass Air Force,” 

Herald, November 15, 1999.

23. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, p. 27. Friedm

the Lexus—the Japanese luxury automobile—as a metaphor for 

modern and ingrained with cutting edge technology.

24. Discussions with the author, Bonn, Germany, Septembe

Van Creveld also makes this point inThe Rise and Decline of the 

25. For an astute assessment of the process of proliferation 

implications for the United States, see Robert W. Chandler, T

Face of War: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Revitaliz

America’s Transoceanic Military Strategy, McLean, VA: AM

Press, 1998. Also useful are the various publications of the N

Defense University’s Center for Counterproliferation Resear

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/ccp/cenresh.html.

26. Article 51 of the Charter does note that member states h

right of individual or collective self-defense “until the Security 

99
security.”

27. Edward N. Luttwak, “Toward Post-Heroic Warfare,” 

Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May-June 1995, pp. 109-122.

28. Some research suggests that this perception is inaccurat

D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi contend that American leader

bought into a powerful myth, born during the Vietnam W

cemented during the ill-fated Somalia action of October 199

Americans are casualty-shy.” (“How Many Deaths Are Accept

Surprising Answer,” Washington Post, November 7, 1999, p. B

also Andrew P.N. Erdmann, “The U.S. Presumption of Quick, C

Wars,” Orbis, Vol. 43, No. 3, Summer 1999, pp. 363-382; Don M. 

John A. Nagl, and Tony Pfaff, Army Professionalism, the Militar

and Officership in the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S

War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1999, pp. 22-26; and 

Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and S

Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarte

114, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 53-78. Whether the perception of c

aversion is or is not accurate, though, it does shape current Am

military planning and long-term force and strategy developmen

29. Martin Libicki, “Rethinking War: The Mouse’s New 

Foreign Policy, No. 117, Winter 1999-2000, p. 41.

30. See “African Center for Strategic Studies Begins 1 Nove

Dakar,” USIS Washington File, October 22, 1999, reprin

http://www.eucom.mil/programs/acri/usis/99oct22.htm.

31. On ACSS, see “DOD Launches African Center for S

Studies,” press release from the Office of the Assistant Secre

Defense (Public Affairs), July 22, 1999, reprint

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1999/b07221999_bt34

ml. For information on Military Professional Resources Intern

(MPRI), see their web site at http://www.mpri.com/about/

analysts are concerned that the growth of organizations like 

represents an attempt to bypass congressional oversight of Am

defense policy. See Bruce D. Grant, “U.S. Military Expertise f

Private Military Consultants as a Tool of Foreign Policy,” Essay

Washington, DC: National War College Institute for National S

Studies, 1998.

32. See David Isenberg, “Soldiers of Fortune, Ltd.: A Pr

Today’s Private Sector Corporate Mercenary Firms,” Center for D

Information Monograph, November 1997; idem., “Th

100
Shearer, “Outsourcing War,” Foreign Policy, No. 112, Fall 19

68-81; Khareen Pech, “Executive Outcomes—A Corporate Conqu

Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, eds., Peace, Profit or Plund

Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, Halfway 

South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999; and Her

Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: The 

Executive Outcomes,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 3

1998, pp. 307-331.

33. Robert Block, “African Supplier of Mercenaries Shuts, 

Wants to Give Peace a Chance,” Wall Street Journal, Decem

1998, p. A13. For background on the legislation that led to Ex

Outcome’s demise, see Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers, “Merc

and Mischief: The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistanc

Institute for Security Studies Papers, No. 25, September 1997.

34. Jimmy Seepe, “SA’s Dogs of War Move to E E

Johannesburg Sowetan, February 3, 1999, p. 7, reprinted on th

Internet site, February 3, 1999.

35. Jakkie Cilliers and Richard Cornwell, “Mercenaries a

Privatisation of Security in Africa,” African Security Review, Vo

2, 1999, and, pp. 31-42.

36. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., L

Oxford University Press, 1963; B. H. Liddell Hart, Strate

Indirect Approach, New York: Frederick Praeger, 1954; and Edw

Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridg

Belknap, 1987.

37. In addition to these tactical and operational character

postmodern militaries, Charles C. Moskos and James Burk c

that such forces will (1) focus on subnational and nonmilitary iss

be composed of small professional armies with reserves s

missions; (3) face a skeptical or apathetic public; (4) have a muc

role for civilian employees; and, (5) have women and homo

integrated or accepted. See “The Postmodern Military,” in Jame

ed., The Adaptive Military: Armed Forces in a Turbulent W

edition, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1998.

38. For instance, Cohen, Annual Report 1999, Chapter 

William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1997, Section 2.

39. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Section 7.

101
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William A. Owe

for instance, his article “The American Revolution in Military A

Joint Force Quarterly, No. 10, Winter, 1995/1996, pp. 37-38. 

excellent assessment of the role of sensor grids in modern warf

Martin C. Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow’s War, Washingto

National Defense University Institute for National Strategic S

1999.

41. See the description in Ryan Henry and C. Edward P

“Military Theory and Information Warfare,” in Ryan Henry 

Edward Peartree, eds., The Information Revolution and Intern

Security, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Intern

Studies, 1998.

42. The Joint Staff is at work on a document entitled Join

2015 which is to expand and refine the ideas of Joint Vision 201

drafts suggest that this will be a powerful, even profound sta

which will correct many of the shortcomings of the earlier docu

43. Joint Vision 2010, Washington, DC: Chairman of th

Chiefs of Staff, n.d., pp. 14-15.

44. Ibid., p. 11.

45. Ibid., p. 24.

46. Briefing by Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr., Comma

Chief (CINC) of U.S. Atlantic Command, to the Joint Experime

Futures Workshop, Breezy Point Naval Air Station, November 

For background, see Mark A. Johnstone, Stephen A. Ferran

Robert W. Critchlow, “Joint Experimentation: A Necessity for 

War,” Joint Force Quarterly, No. 20, Autumn/Winter 1998-19

15-24. Information on the JFCOM J-9/Joint Experimentatio

sections is available at http://www.acom.mil/jexp.nsf.

47. Each of the services as well as the Defense Intelligence A

Central Intelligence Agency and other components of the gove

have crafted a vision or a series of visions of the future geos

environment. The Joint Experimentation Program at the U.S

Forces Command may help fuse the service visions. It remain

seen whether the National Security Council can provide an even 

linkage.

48. Army Vision 2010, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Depa

of the Army, 1996, p. 2.

102
50. Battle Labs: Maintaining the Edge, Fort Monroe, VA: 

States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1994, pp. 6 and 

The name “Louisiana Maneuvers” was an allusion to a series of m

training exercises held in the fall of 1941 as the U.S. Army 

preparation for World War II. See James W. Dunn, “The 1941 Lo

Maneuvers” at http://www.wood.army.mil/engrmag/pb59512 / rev

The U.S. Army’s Louisiana Manuever Task Force was disba

1996 as it gave way to the Force XXI process.

51. See Force XXI...America’s Army of the 21st C

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1995.

52. For an excellent explanation of the role that wargaming 

the Army After Next process, see Robert B. Killebrew, “Learnin

Wargames: A Status Report,” Parameters, Vol. 28, No. 1, Sprin

pp. 122-135.

53. Speed and Knowledge, the annual report on the Army Aft

Project to the Chief of Staff of the Army, July 1997, p. 9-10.

54. Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destr

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1, January/February 1998, p. 27.

55. Speed and Knowledge, p. 9.

56. Ibid.

57. Second Annual Report of the Army After Next Proje

Monroe, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and D

Command, December 7, 1998, pp. 11-13.

58. See, for instance, Joseph A. Engelbrecht, Jr., et al., “Alte

Futures for 2025: Security Planning to Avoid Surprise,” a r

paper presented to Air Force 2025, April 1996; William B. Osb

al., “Information Operations: A New War-Fighting Capabi

research paper presented to Air Force 2025, August 1996; Je

Theiret, et al., “Hit ‘em Where It Hurts: Strategic Attack in 2

research paper presented to Air Force 2025, August 1996; Br

Carmichael, et al., “Strikestar 2025,” a research paper presente

Force 2025, August 1996; and Edward F. Murphy, “Infor

Operations: Wisdom Warfare For 2025,” a research paper prese

Air Force 2025, August 1996. These papers are availa

http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/.

59. http://208.198.29.7/mcwl-hot/home/index.html

103
61. See Forward . . . From the Sea: The Navy Operational C

Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1997; and Departmen

Navy 1999 Posture Statement: America’s 21st Century Force.

62. John B. Nathman, “A Revolution in Strike Warfare,” Sea 

October 1999, pp. 28-33.

63. See, for instance, the web page of the Chief of Naval Ope

Strategic Studies Group at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ssg/.

64. See David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P

Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Info

Superiority, Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Concep

Technology, 1999.

65. Arthur K. Cebrowski, “Sea, Space, Cyberspace: Bor

Domains,” speech presented February 26, 1999, reprin

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/pres/speeches/borderless.htm. S

Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric W

Warfare: Its Origin and Future,”Proceedings of the U.S. Naval In

Vol. 124, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 28-35.

66. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Section 7.

67. Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study Task F

Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority, Vo

Final Report, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense

68. Ibid., p. II-10.

69. Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock an

Achieving Rapid Dominance, Washington, DC: National D

University Press, 1996.

70. Second Annual Report of the Army After Next Project, 

and, Cohen, Annual Report 1999, Chapter 11.

71. Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Ope

October 9, 1998, p. II-10.

72. Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace...The Decis

in War, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, n.d., p.2.

73. See the web pages of the Joint Robotics Pr

(http://www.jointrobotics.com/); the Joint Non-Lethal W

104
Force Information Warfare Center (http://www.afiwc.aia.af.m

also General Richard Myers, Commander in Chief of U.S

Command, special briefing on the current activities of U.S

Command, January 5, 2000, reprinted at http://www.defense

/news/Jan2000/t01052000_t104myer.html.

74. For elaboration, see Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Dir

the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Em

Threats, Revolutionary Capabilities, and Military Transform

testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcom

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 5, 1999, repri

http://www.csbahome.com/Publications/ETACtestimony.htm

75. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A Hi

United States Military Strategy and Policy, Bloomington: 

University Press, 1973.

76. Transforming Defense, p. 42.

77. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” pp. 26-41

78. Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters, 

No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 43.

79. Thomas E. Ricks, “Urban Warfare: Where Innovation 

Helped,” Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1999, p. 10. See also W

G. Rosenau, “Every Room Is a New Battle: The Lessons of 

Urban Warfare,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 20, No. 

p. 385.

80. Peter J. Skibitski, “Draft GAO Study Criticizes Pentagon 

Warfare Capability,” Inside the Navy, February 7, 2000, p. 2.

81. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Future Warfare, C

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1999, pp. 177-178. This p

is from an article entitled “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. M

Forces Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare,” Armed 

Journal International, Volume 136, No. 3, October 1998. In thi

Major General Scales proposes an “indirect approach” to 

operations. This would entail establishing a loose cordon aroun

occupied by enemy forces and isolating it from the outside 

Technology would then be used to suppress information flows wi

besieged city. Strikes would be mounted against decisive points, 

for psychological effects as American forces demonstrate m

105
“collapse on itself.”

82. Daryl G. Press, “Urban Warfare: Options, Problems, a

Future,” Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 83, No. 4, April 1999, pp. 1

83. Transforming Defense, p. 15.

84. John R. Groves Jr., “Operations in Urban Environ

Military Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, July-August 1998, pp. 31-40. 

analysis of specific doctrinal needs, see Russell W. Glenn, “. . . W

of Brothers”: The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine

Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1999, pp. 19-52.

85. See Gary Anderson, “Urban Warfare: Russia Shows W

To Do,” Wall Street Journal, January 25, 2000.

86. Daniel Verton, “Urban Warfare Tech May Alter Corps,” 

Computer Week, March 15, 1999.

87. Joel Garreau, “Point Men for a Revolution: Can the M

Survive a Shift From Hierarchies to Networks?” Washingto

March 6, 1999, p. 1.

88. Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Ski

American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threa

Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1998, p. viii. See also Rus

Glenn, et al., Denying the Widow-Maker: Summary of Proceedin

RAND-DBBL Conference on Military Operations on Urbanized 

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1998.

89. For discussion of the strategic implications and oper

concepts associated with nonlethal weapons, see Douglas C. Lo

Jr. and Steven Metz, Nonlethality and American Landpower: S

Context and Operational Concepts, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S

War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998. See also Malcolm 

A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of Non-Lethal Weapons, L

Brassey’s, 1996; and Nick Lewer and Steven Schofield, Non

Weapons: A Fatal Attraction?, London: Zed, 1997. Information 

military efforts on nonlethal weapons is available on the web sit

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program at http://iis.marcorsyscom

mil/jnlwd/.

90. Robotics Workshop 2020, sponsored by he U.S. Army R

Laboratory, February 25-27, 1997, Jet Propulsion Labo

Pasadena, CA. Workshop report developed by the Strategic Asse

106
p. B-31.

91. Ibid., p. B-32.

92. Ibid., p. B-34.

93. “University of California Researchers Mate Human Cel

Circuitry,” story posted on the CNN web site, February 25

http://cnn.com/2000/HEALTH/02/25/bio.chip.ap/index.htm

94. See Celia W. Dugger and Barry Bearak, “You’ve Got The 

So Do I. Now I Dare You To Fight,” New York Times, January 1

(electronic download).

95. Quoted in Seth Mydans, “For Inept Burmese Rebel Ban

Death Was Clear,” New York Times, January 26, 2000 (ele

download).

96. See, for instance, http://www.sccs.swarthmor

~justin/fzln/about.html and http://www.utexas.edu/students

The latter lists 44 Zapatista web sites.

97. David Ronfeldt, John Arquilla, Graham E. Fuller, and 

Fuller, The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico, Santa Moni

RAND Corporation, 1998.

98. This idea that the American military periodically pu

institutional memory of counterinsurgency and then has to re-le

developed in Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the 

of American Capability, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

99. L.R. Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” reprin

http://www2.mo-net.com/~mlindste/ledrless.html.

100. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Looking Ahead: Pr

For Information-Age Conflict,” in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, e

Athena’s Camp, pp. 461-462. Nichiporuk and Builder explore th

idea in Information Technologies and the Future of Land Warf

101. Max G. Manwaring, ed., Gray Area Phenomena: Con

the New World Disorder, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993.

102. For instance, Aimal Kansi was captured in Pakistan for 

shooting outside CIA headquarters, and in 1990 Humberto 

Machain was seized in Guadalajara, Mexico for his role in the to

107
United States’ Extraterritorial Abduction of Alien Fugitives: 

Process Standard,” New England International and Comparat

Annual, Vol. 3, 1997, reprinted at http://www.ne

/annual/vol3/alien.htm; Zahid F. Ebrahim, “Dodging the 

Extradition,” Chowk Interactive Magazine, reprin

http://www.chowk.com/CivicCenter/zebrahim_mar1398.htm

United States v. Alvarez-Machain (91-712), 504 U.S. 655 

reprinted athttp://supct.law.cornell.edu/test/hermes/ 91-712.Z

103. Guilio Douhet, The Command of the Air, Washingt

Office of Air Force History, 1983. See also David MacIsaac, “Voic

the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Peter Paret, ed., 

of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Prince

Princeton University Press, 1986; and Bernard Brodie, Strateg

Missile Age, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

particularly pages 82-88.

104. For instance, Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the 

Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Itha

Cornell University Press, 1989, pp. 4-8.

105. See the Commission’s web site at http://www.pccip.g

106. John J. Stanton, “Rules of Cyber War Baffle U.S. Gove

Agencies,” National Defense, February 2000, p. 29. On the govern

program for dealing with cybercrime, see David Johnston

Officials Lay Out Plan to Fight Computer Attacks,” New York 

February 17, 2000 (electronic download).

107. Reported on the CNN Internet site, http://www.cnn.co

/TECH/computing/02/14/hacker.security/index.html.

108. “Strengthening Cyber Security through Public-

Partnership,” fact sheet released by the White House Office of th

Secretary, February 15, 2000, reprinted at http://www.whiteho

/library/PressReleases.cgi?date=1&briefing=1. For deta

Defending America’s Cyberspace: National Plan for Info

Systems Protection Version 1.0, Washington, DC: The White 

2000.

109. See Winn Schwartau, “Ethical Conundra of Infor

Warfare,” in Alan D. Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R. T

Goodden, eds., Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict 

Information Age, Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1996

legal arguments surrounding information warfare, see Walte

108
Research Corporation, 1999.

110. Lisa Hoffman, “U.S. Opened Cyber-War During Kosovo 

Washington Times, October 24, 1999, p. C1.

111. Bradley Graham, “Military Grappling With Guideli

Cyber Warfare,” Washington Post, November 8, 1999, p. A1.

112. General Richard Myers, Commander in Chief of U.S

Command, special briefing on current activities of the U.S

Command, the Pentagon, January 5, 2000, transcr

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2000/t01052000_t104

ml. See also Bill Gertz, “U.S. Set To Take Warfare On

Washington Times, January 6, 2000, p. 3. General Myers ha

become Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

113. Although thinking in terms of low intensity conflict rath

high technology, Martin van Creveld made this same argumen

Transformation of War, New York, Free Press, 1991, pp. 198-2

114. Moravec, Robot, p. 25.

115. Ray Kurzweil,The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Co

Exceed Human Intelligence, New York: Viking, 1999.

116. Robotics Workshop 2020, pp. B-2 to B-3.

117. STAR 21: Strategic Technologies for the Army 

Twenty-First Century, Technology Forecast Assessments, Wash

DC: National Academy Press, 1993, p. 148.

118. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Dist

Robotics Program, overview reprinted at http://www.darpa.m

/DRobotics/index.html.

119. Lee Gomes, “It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy Plane!—Pentagon 

Research Into Robin-Sized Robots,” Wall Street Journal, April 

p. B1.

120. H. Lee Buchanan, Deputy Director, Defense Ad

Research Projects Agency, testimony before the Subcommi

Military Research and Development, Committee on National S

United States House of Representatives, February 27, 1997.

121. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “MEMS 

Vision Statement,” reprinted at http://www.darpa.mi

109
“MEMS 2003 and Beyond A DARPA Vision of the Future of ME

presentation reprinted at http://www.darpa.mil/MTO/ MEM

/index.html.

122. New World Coming, p. 8.

123. Robotics Workshop 2020, p. B-26.

124. James Adams, The Next World War: Computers 

Weapons and the Front Line Is Everywhere, New York: Sim

Schuster, 1998, p. 125.

125. Martin C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculat

Armed Conflict in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC: N

Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, 199

126. Ibid., p. 21.

127. Ibid., p. 24.

128. Ibid., p. 29.

129. New World Coming, p. 20.

130. Robotics Workshop 2020, p. A-8.

131. Lonnie D. Henley, “The RMA After Next,” Parameters, 

No. 4, Winter 1999/2000, pp. 46-57.

132. See Eric Drexler and Chris Peterson, Unbounding the 

The Nanotechnology Revolution, New York: William Morrow

reprinted full text at http://www.foresight.org/UTF/U

_LBW/index.html. See also the nanotechnology web page 

Foresight Institute at http://www.foresight.org/NanoRev/ind

133. David Voss, “Moses of the Nanoworld,” Technology 

March/April 1999, pp. 60-62.

134. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford, UK: Oxford Un

Press, 1999.

135. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ: Pr

University Press, 1976, p. 89. For analysis of the meaning and m

Clausewitz’s “trinity,” see Edward J. Villacres and Chris

Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters, 

No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 9-19.

110
Phase Plus Strategic Preclusion: Joint Solution to a Joint Pr

Parameters, Vol. 29, No. 3, Autumn 1999, pp. 70-85.

137. For instance, General Eric K. Shinseki, address 

Eisenhower Luncheon, 45th Annual Meeting of the Associatio

United States Army, October 12, 1999, reprint

http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/991012.htm; Transforming D

National Security in the 21st Century, Report of the National D

Panel, December 1997, p. 33; Joint Vision 2010, p. 13; etc.

138. George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: 

Technology and American World Dominance in the 21st Centu

York: Crown, 1996, p. x.

139. U.S. Army Chief Scientist A. Michael Andrews, intervie

Ron Laurenzo, Defense Week, November 29, 1999, p. 6.

140. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 66.

141. Clausewitz, On War, p. 90 and ff.

142. For example, John B. Alexander, Future War: Non

Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare, New York: St. M

1999.

143. Luttwak, Strategy, pp. 62-65. For an astute analysis of h

tendency affects the post-Gulf War U.S. military, see Daniel P. 

“The Ghosts of Omdurman,” Parameters, Vol. 21, No. 3, Autum

pp. 28-39.

144. Libicki, Illuminating Tomorrow’s War, p. 1.

145. For instance, Michael Dewar, The Art of Deception in W

Devon, Great Britain: David and Charles, 1989.

146. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pa

Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, No. 37, Fall 1994

147. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Technology and the 21st C

Battlefield: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Statesman 

Soldier, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College St

Studies Institute, 1999, pp. 13-19.

148. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net, pp. 50-69. See also Ma

Libicki and James A. Hazlett, “Do We Need an Information 

Joint Force Quarterly, No. 2, Autumn 1993, pp. 88-97. While the 

111
the U.S. Department of Defense, the Pentagon’s Defense Infor

Systems Agency has set up a special joint task force known 

Computer Defense Network to deal with defensive information w

(Bill Gertz, “Internet Warfare Concerns Admiral,” Washington 

November 18, 1999, p. 1).

149. Bill Gertz, “China Plots Winning Role in Cyber

Washington Times, November 17, 1999, p. 1. See also “China

Publishes Book On Information Warfare”, excerpts from re

Chinese army newspaper Jiefangjun Bao, December 7, 1999, r

by the BBC Monitoring Summary of World Broadcasts, repri

http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/00/mil_c4i_012400b_j.shtm

150. Robert J. Bunker, “Higher Dimensional Warfi

Bond-Relationship Targeting and Cybershielding,” a paper pr

at “The Future of War,” the Ivan Bloch Commemorative Confere

Petersburg, Russia, February 24-27, 1999.

151. Edward N. Luttwak, “From Vietnam to Dese

Civil-Military Relations in Modern Democracies,” Survival, Vol. 

1, Spring 1999, pp. 99-112.

152. The idea of a “crisis” in American civil-military rela

explored in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, ed

Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? See also Dou

Johnson and Steven Metz, American Civil-Military Relation

Issues, Enduring Problems, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War C

Strategic Studies Institute, 1995; Michael C. Desch, Civilian Co

the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Baltimore

Hopkins University Press, 1999; and Sam C. Sarkesian, “T

Military Must Find Its Voice,” Orbis, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 19

423-437.

153. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., “The Origins of the Military 

2010,” Parameters, Vol. 22, No, 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 2-20.

154. Bradley Graham, “Pentagon’s Wish List: Based on 

Battles?” Washington Post, August 25, 1999, p. A3.

155. Colin Clark, “DSB: Pentagon Lacks Urgency To 

Change,” Defense News, October 11, 1999, p. 3.

112
STEVEN METZ has been Research Professor of Na

Security Affairs in the Strategic Studies Institute 

1993. Prior to that, he served on the faculty of the Ai

College, the U.S. Army Command and General 

College, and several universities. He has also served 

advisor to U.S. political organizations and camp

testified in the U.S. Senate and House of Representa

and spoken on military and security issues aroun

world. He is author of more than seventy articles, e

and chapters on such topics as nuclear war, insurg

U.S. policy in the Third World, military strategy, 

African security policy, and U.N. peace operation

Metz’s current research deals with the role of the Ame

Army in the 21st century, the African security environ

and the effect of the information revolution on m

strategy. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and a M

International Studies from the University of S

Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the 

Hopkins University.

113
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Interim Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Steven Metz

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler